

**Global, Transnational and National Social Movements: The Case Study of “Occupy
Wall Street”**

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Declaration

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Abstract

Despite their lack of merits and demands, Occupy Wall Street (OWS) did become a defining feature in the short aftermath of the Financial Crisis and a part of the global occupy-movements during the protest year of 2011. As the founders and organisers behind the first encampments in Zuccotti Park called out for a "Tahrir moment" in the United States of America (US), few scholars or pundits had seen the leaderless movement coming. OWS spread across the US in the matter of months, hitting the media headlines gradually and more rapidly than any previous protest movement. Scholarly responses to OWS have been plentiful, and their categorisations of the OWS' structure, demands and impact have been going in many different directions.

This study attempts to debate and analyse the main research question; is OWS a new kind of a social movement? Even though there are several ways in which one may approach this question, the following will focus on the organisational structures, the political opportunity structures and the global linkages of OWS. The organisational structures has been debated by most, as the movement has a leaderless structure, it is ruled by consensus and supported by protesters from all social spheres, who came, protested and left as they pleased. The political and economic deficits, which gives way to the political opportunity structures of the movement, has not been this dramatic since the Great Depression. The Financial Crisis of 2008 has not only been defined as an economic crisis, but also a crisis of representative democracy. Furthermore, the global protest movements of 2011 have been similar in several ways. Even as all of them, be it Tahrir, 15M, in Greece or OWS, has been unique in matters of context, time and space, they share similarities in tactics, methods and fundamental demands - democracy and prosperity.

The concluding statement to the research question is not clear-cut. Rather, it revokes former debates, which distinguished between old and new social movements, and implements a globalising civil society. A new kind of a social movement has come and gone, with elements of the earlier movements. It has added new modes of tactics, structures and demands, all formed by the present context. OWS is not an exception.

Opsomming

Ten spyte van hul gebrek aan eise en tasbare sukses, het “Occupy Wall Street (OWS) wel ’n definiërende kenmerk geword tydens kort naloop van die Finansiële Krisies, asook ’n deel van die globale beset-bewegings tydens die 2011 protesjaar. Daar was min akademiëci en kenners wat, ten tye van die eerste kamperings in Zuccotti Park en die eis deur die stigters en organiseerders van OWS vir ’n “Tahrir oomblik”, die opkoms van hierdie leierlose beweging voorsien het. Binne ’n kwessie van maande het OWS dwarsoor die VSA versprei, eers stadig en daarna vinniger die hoofopskrifte van die media gehaal as enige ander protes-beweging wat dit voorafgegaan het. Daar is heelwat akademiese bydraes (uit verskillende dissiplines) wat daarop gemik is om OWS te verstaan in terme van hoe om dit te kategoriseer, die struktuur daarvan, die eise wat gestel is en die impak daarvan.

Die doel van hierdie studie is om die hoofnavorsingsvraag te bespreek en analiseer, naamlik; is OWS ’n nuwe soort sosiale beweging? Die benadering wat gevolg word is om te fokus om organisatoriese strukture, politieke geleentheidstrukture and die globale verbintnisse van OWS. Die organisatoriese strukture het die meeste aandag gekry in die literatuur tot dusver, aangesien die organisasie ’n leierlose struktuur het. Besluite word deur middel van konsensus geneem en ondersteuning word gewerf van protesteerders uit ’n verskeidenheid van sosiale sfere. Hierdie protesteerders het opgedaag, protes aangeteken, en weer vertrek na willekeur. Die politieke en ekonomiese terkortkominge van die kapitalistiese stelsel in die VSA, waarin die politieke geleentheidstrukture van die beweging geanker is, was, sedert die Groot Depressie, nie so skynbaar dramaties nie. Die Finansiële Krisies wat in 2008 sy hoogtepunt bereik het, word gedefinieer nie alleen as ’n ekonomiese krisies nie, maar ook as ’n krisies van verteenwoordigende demokrasie. Daarby is daar bevind dat die globale protesbewegings wat in 2011 gedy het, soortgelyke kenmerke gehad het. Nieteenstaande die feit dat Tahrir in Egipte, 15M, die Griekse protes-aksies en OWS wel as uniek gesien kan word in terme van konteks, tyd en ruimte, is daar ooreenkomste in taktiek, metodes en fundamentele eise: deelnemende demokrasie en welvaart vir almal.

Die slotsom waartoe die tesis kom is nie definitief nie. Eerder, is die gevolgtrekking dat daar teruggegaan moet word na vorige debatte wat onderskeid getref het tussen ou en nuwe sosiale bewegings, en ook na die literatuur oor die moontlikheid van ’n globale burgerlike samelewing. Wat wel vasstaan is dat ’n nuwe soort sosiale beweging verskyn het en weer gekwyn het, wat aspekte van vorige bewegings omvat maar ook in duidelike terme van hulle verskil. In die opsig is OWS nie ’n uitsondering nie, met nuwe taktiek, strukture en eise wat almal gevorm is binne die huidige konteks.

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1. Introduction

Noam Chomsky (2012) discusses the relationship between politics and money, in his book '*Occupy*', which may be a suitable point of departure, in understanding the essential claim for the global phenomenon of the '*Occupy Movement*' movement;

“Concentration of wealth yields concentration of political power. And concentration of political power gives rise to legislation that increases and accelerates the cycle. The legislation, essentially bipartisan, drives new fiscal policies, tax changes, also rules of corporate governance, and deregulation. Alongside of this began a very sharp rise in the costs of elections, which drives the political parties even deeper than before into the pockets of the corporate sector”(Chomsky, 2012:28).

Social movements and revolutions, both peaceful and violent, have been defining occurrences, through collective action, in the history of social- and political change. Social movements, organized and united on shared identities, have opposed and pressured ruling regimes, be it democratically elected or authoritarian, to do something they would not otherwise have done. In modern capitalist democracies, and in the neo-liberal era, they have been, and still are, a challenge to secure representative democracy, and most vividly to balance socioeconomic stability. This has caused crises and several upheavals in an interconnected global polity. Alter-capitalist and alter-globalisation movements, such as anti-World Trade Organisation (WTO), World Social Forum (WSF) and ATTAC, have been very much present in the social movement analysis and theoretical frameworks over the last decade. Commonly have most of the new social movements challenged the present state of social movements – in academic studies and practice. Within the last years we have witnessed a growth in public tension and uprisings, in the Western world, Middle East and Asia, such as OWS, at the Tahrir Square, in Greece, Tunisia, Spain, Turkey and Thailand. All of whom has been related to socio-economic relations and the role of representative democracy. Hence, the theoretical- and explanatory frameworks have been ranging extensively in their adaptation and analysis in order to grasp the movements aims, structure and motives. At the core of the debates and upheavals, today as in former social and public tensions, we find the conflictual relationship between money and politics.

Pickerill and Krinsky (2012:1) argued that '*analysing the occupy movement is important for understanding the political importance of social movements and the theoretical*

limits of social movement approaches'. These argument stances a highly interesting dispute, as it challenges the way we grasp and analyse social movements today – domestically and globally. The most adopted theoretical frameworks, in order to define and categorize social movements, have been the New Social Movements (NSM), Transnational Social Movements (TSM) and Global Social Movements (GSM). As the occupy movement and OWS has been highly debated, both within the theoretical frameworks and accordingly within their political outcomes, it is still a major debate ranging within Social Movement Studies (SMS) whether the theoretical frameworks will account for and comprehend the newer social movements. The forthcoming case study of OWS will embark on the main research question; *is OWS a new kind of a social movement?* The aims of the case study is to understand what type of social movement OWS is, in relations to other '*occupy movements*', how they are organized, their adopted tactics and claims, and then how this challenges the present state of SMS and how we understand newer social movements.

1.2 Background

In 2008, the global economy collapsed like a set of dominoes, starting off in the financial centers of the United State of America (US), and quickly spreading throughout the Western world, causing a massive negative impact on national economies, their financial institutions, bi- and multilateral agreements, and the domestic economy of working- and middle class inhabitants (Fukuyama, 2012). The global financial crisis of 2008 has in the short aftermath been characterized as being as bad as, or even worse than the Great Depression of the 1930s (Eichengreen and O'Rourke, 2012; Brucato, 2012:77). Multiple and inter-related crisis that have occurred over the last decade may be signals that we are entering the physical and social limits of the existing world capitalist order, where some may claim that the world-system is in the late stages of a systemic crisis (Smith and Wiest, 2012:7). These statements and the call for systematic change have been constant in social movements over the last decades (Smith and Glidden, 2012). Prior to the "*Battle of Seattle*" in 1999, the prime focus has been on domestic social movements, whereas over the last decade it has shifted towards a range of transnational and global social movements. Social movements for systematic change have been visible in OWS, as it has been in the anti-WTO demonstrations, WSF and ATTAC, to name a few. The later debates and analysis have been plentiful in finding the perpetrator(s), the source of systematic failure and predicting the future outcome(s) of the world order (Fukuyama, 2012; Gill, 2010). Still, it is unclear and disputed

if and how '*another world is possible*'. The enormous amount of scholarly contributions to the field portrays this image. The present debates mainly centers on the issues of systematic reform or sector adjustments.

In the aftermath of the financial crisis there has been much speculation on what may have triggered the crisis, ranging from the accusations that '*the global market economy is to blame*', '*societies run by capitalist interests are not sustainable*', or '*the core of the present ideology will fall on its own utopian beliefs*' (Varoufakis, 2011). These statements can be engaged to mean that, at one time or another, the neo-liberal system will devour itself. In Stiglitz's critique of market fundamentalism, the free and self-regulating market is a '*myth*' (Stiglitz, 2001:xiii). The *myth* of the redistributing '*invisible hand*', projected as a '*mildly ironic joke*' (Rothschild, 2001:116), '*systemic crisis of neo-liberal capitalism*' (Kotz, 2009), the '*neo-liberal fallacy*' (Przeworski, 1992), the claim of a '*systemic crisis*' (Smith and Weist, 2012), has been a constant in the counter presented by newer present social movements.

In times of financial crisis, most notably in the post 2008 financial crisis, several of the former '*great debates*' and classical works have their renaissance, such as Karl Polanyi's '*The Great Transformation*', where he makes some quite interesting observations in the aftermath of the Great Depression (Tarrow, 2005:17-18). Amongst them, the term '*double movement*' has a clear link to the case study in mind, where Polanyi claimed that '*the free-market*' is checked by a social counter movement (Polanyi, 1957:130). According to Munck (2006:175), the '*Polanyian problematic*' and '*double-movement*' presents an interpretive lens with which to examine the various facets of the alter-globalization counter-movements. It departs from the basic idea that '*globalization is a human construct, and it can thus be deconstructed by society*' (Munck, 2006:175). And if not deconstructed in a radical sense, it ought to be restructured back to a notion of 'common sense'. The battle towards a 'common sense', between politics and money, is today played out by the 'occupy movements' in various camps around the world.

It is argued that the economy is embedded and institutionalized in rules and principles (Chaves, 2012:117). However, the economy, nationally and globally, is comprised of social relations and the conflicting interests which configure these relationships (Chaves, 2012:117). Therefore, the conflict may be projected as a reconciliation project between social democracy and democratic capitalism. The reconciliation between social- and economic stability in a '*capitalistic system*', was condemned as utopia by Polanyi in the aftermath of the Great Depression, and has been revitalized by Eichengreen (2008:3) after the financial crisis in

2008. According to Streeck (2011), the utopian project of reconciliation¹, between '*free play of market forces*' and '*social need or entitlement*', are doomed to fail (Streeck, 2011: 7; 24). This is what Streeck claims to be the '*normal condition*' of democratic capitalism, and that crises are the byproducts of the reconciliation project (Chaves, 2012:117). One of the major intervening mechanisms, to find a stable and sustainable path, as debated through '*double movement*', and as the objective of OWS, are the '*social counter movements*' for domestic- and global democracy and prosperity, which will be elaborated upon in Chapter 3.

Neo-liberalism, representative democracy, and the hegemonic production of ideas and its overarching legitimacy, are challenged from several stances. Cobbett and Germain (2012:112) argue that the neo-liberal system has lost its automatic legitimacy, and that OWS may be the actor to contest the legitimacy and act as a facilitator for future outcomes (Chaves, 2012:119). It is a widespread acknowledgment that GSMs have intensified over the last years (Amenta et.al. 2012:409-419), and that they are contesting the very foundations of global socio-economic relations (Ghimire, 2005:9). Since 2001, and the establishment of the WSF, they have fostered more deliberate work to build cross-sectorial and transnational movement alliances, which encourages efforts to link local struggles with a critique of the global neo-liberal economic order (Smith and Wiest, 2012:3; Tarrow, 2005:4). OWS and the occupy movements is an extension of the former transnational alliances – but further challenges the way in which we comprehend and analyse them.

In the beginning and heyday of the neo-liberal era, Margaret Thatcher claimed that "*there is no alternative*". This leads to the problematic quest for many scholars today; *are there alternatives to the neo-liberal world order and how may it come about?* The projections are two-fold. One is the internal mechanisms, which will balance the system back to its '*normal*' function. Almond (1991: 474) claimed that '*democratic capitalism*' would reform by adopting and adapting to its critique. The other, following the rationale of system-critique, which will be debated in this case study on OWS, is the external pressure from '*global civil society*' and their united movement against the neo-liberal system. This follows the rationale that globalization is a movement from above and below, whereas the following will contemplate the '*globalization from below*'. The present crisis is unique, as all contemporary crises are unique. The research aim and outcome from this case study will highlight how OWS may differ from the former social movements, and how that challenges the theoretical frameworks of SMS.

¹ Streeck (2011) writes in the New Left Review that: '*a lasting reconciliation between social and economic stability in capitalist democracies is a utopian project*'.

1.3 Occupy Wall Street

OWS, as a movement, started off in Zuccotti Park, in New York's financial district, on September the 17th 2011, starting as a protest against *social- and economic inequality*. The movement has claimed unity as '*the 99%*'² (Brucato, 2012:78), whereas most occupiers have affinity towards the slogan '*we are the 99%*', by which they mean that 1 per cent of the population possesses 40 per cent of the world's wealth, while the remaining 99 per cent shares the remaining 60 per cent (van Stekelenburg, 2012:225). OWS is said to have tactical and motivational links to the roots in the London student uprisings of 2010, deficit protests in Greece, the Spanish *Indignados*, and the Arab Spring (Hardt and Negri, 2011; Juris, 2012:261). It is further claimed to be the '*middle class in crisis*' and is a '*critical response to a fundamental crisis of representative politics*' (Razsa and Kurnik, 2012:239). The founders of the OWS movement argue that "*America needed their own Tahrir*" - an idea that was "*spontaneously taken up by all the people of the world*". The movement was disorganized in the beginning. Later, a group led by David Graeber and some of his colleagues, formed the *New York General Assembly (NYGA)*, which was to hold weekly meetings on the issues of the road forward with their demands, working groups and decentralization, and whether or not to have a leadership. *Adbusters*, a Canadian organization, has been at the forefront front of the movements, and the co-founder of *Adbusters*, Kalle Lasn, claimed that the goals of the movement have been *economic justice*, calling for a "*transaction tax*" on financial speculation, the reinstatement of the *Glass-Steagall Act*³ and the revocation of corporative personhood. By late 2011, the movement had inspired over two thousand other solidarity protests and occupations throughout the world (Brucato, 2012:78). By February 2012, there were squares occupied by occupiers in 1590 cities worldwide (van Stekelenburg, 2012:224).

Hardt and Negri (2012), and Butler (2011:193) have claimed OWS to be a response to the '*crisis of representative politics*'. Klein (2012) articulated that OWS was out to '*change the underlying values that govern our society*' (Klein, 2012:3). Moreover, a keen observation

² The slogan and '*identity notion*' of the '*99%*' has been claimed to be against the corporate influence in American politics, as they were given the blame for the financial crisis of 2008, and that corporative America were the belongings and source of the crisis (Brucato, 2012:78).

³ The '*Glass-Steagall Act*' was passed in 1933 in response to the failure of the banks following the Great Depression. Almost immediately upon enactment, the financial community lobbied to have the Act repealed. Over the years, this persistent lobbying led to a continual reinterpretation and liberalization of the Glass-Steagall Act, until the Act was repealed by Bill Clinton in 1999. Legislators and regulators are again questioning the role that the investment banking activities of commercial banks have played in a financial crisis. Some believe the repeal of Glass-Steagall contributed significantly to the current financial crisis. Others believe that if Glass-Steagall had still been in place, the financial crisis would be much worse (Crawford, 2011:127)

of the movement has been that it is a *'non-affiliated, non-programmatic and disorganized set of protests, interconnected through a variety of social media, drawing attention to gross inequalities of wealth and power'* (Tormey, 2012:132). Tarrow (2011) claimed that OWS was a GSM of a completely new kind. Halvorsen (2012:7) categorized it as a *'global movement'* functioning as the *'politics of asking'* for systematic change. Hayduk (2012:43) has defined it as an *'alter-globalization movement'*. Yangfung (2012:247) defined it as a *'protest movement'*. And Brucato (2012:79) claimed OWS to share similarities with NSM's. As this paragraph has shown, there have been several disputing approaches in understanding and categorizing OWS in the contemporary frameworks, which is directly related to the purpose of this case study.

At this point, it may be stated that OWS is not a political party or single issue movement, it does not have a confined hierarchy or formal structures, nor has it claimed its aims and objectives in a manifesto of some sort (Tormey, 2012:132). Tormey (2012:134), as Tarrow (2011), projects the claims and the role of OWS as being that the *'representative politics, the politics of political parties, elections and voting is on the wane'*. OWS predominantly challenges the structures of social and economic inequality, and subsequently representative democracy and international financial structures. It is less clear how they challenge the theoretical framework of social movements.

1.4 Literature review

The study of social movements is a wide field within social studies. In a normative and idealistic sense, social movements are *'sources of alternatives, hope and theories of how the world can be made differently'* (Escobar, 2001:2). Hence, in a more realistic sense there is a need for strong and influential social movements to effect changes in the global economy and its dominant institutions (Bourdieu, 2001:16). Nonetheless, the study of GSMs has been rapidly gaining attention over the last decade and a half, most notably as seen in Negri and Hardt's *'Declaration'* (2012), Smith and West's *'Social Movements in the World System: the Politics of Crisis and Transformation'* (2012), della Porta *'Social Movements: An Introduction'* (2006) and *'Transnational Protest and Global Activism'* (2004), Smith *'Social Movements for Global Democracy'* (2008), Tarrow *'Power in Movements: Social Movements and Contentious Politics'* (2011) and *'The New Transnational Activism'* (2005), Cohen and Rai *'Global Social Movements'* (2000) and Hamel et. al. *'Globalization and Social Movements'* (2001). The point, which is presented here, and as seen in the former and contemporary movements, social movements are moderately more than voices for change or

unity – they have and will continue to be defining features for the future. And the tools of explaining and understanding them shall continue to be challenged.

Social movements could, in their simplest form, be defined as “*networks of informal interactions between a plurality of individuals, groups, or associations, engaged in political or cultural conflict*” (Diani and Bison, 2004:282). Furthermore, social movements are understood as agents, like the media and governmental agencies, providing a goal for their members' grievances (Snow and Benford, 1992:136). Hence, they differ from conventional political actors, such as interest groups, because they lack the access to political institutions and the elites who operate within them (Smith, 2008:109).

The '*conflict*' between politics and *civil society*, is a common struggle against or for an outcome, with specifically defined ends and means, whereas the uniting denominator within the social movement is the notion of '*identity*'. In a historic perspective, the uniting and common notion of identity has been seen in '*labor movements*', and their united struggle for more equal economic rights. Moreover, in recent social movement studies '*identity*' has been a defining and complex variable in order to understand and analyze the organization of movements (Tarrow, 2005:15). The shifting ground has been the uniting denominator, economic equality in the former labor movements to social rights in NSM - understood as '*single issue movements*', whereas the shift was portrayed as a cultural- and social phenomenon (Tilly, 1993:5). This change of identity in social movements and their uniting multiplier was particularly observable in the disorganized revolts and insurrections of 1968 (Tormey, 2012:132).

Since the 1970s, there has been an increasing focus on the explanatory framework of NSM, which has been characterized by special interest groups, cutting across a variety of social groups and classes, such as human rights movements (Amnesty International), feminist movements, LGBT (lesbian, gay, bisexual and transsexual), and environmental movements (Greenpeace) (Crossley, 2002:149). Still, these movements are united around common interests and identities, but in this respect more cohesive on social and cultural rights, than the economic rights in former '*labor movements*'. The theoretical and explanatory framework of NSM has been criticized from several stances, such as Buechler (1995), who challenge the continuity between old and new social movements (Buechler, 1995:449), which is most vivid in the former debate on GSM's and NSM's, after the '*Battle of Seattle*' in 1999, and presently with regard to OWS. Still, the debate on NSM remains salient, because of the very different slant which it puts upon movement analysis and the types of questions it involves (Crossley, 2002:149). The most explicit variable, today, is the use of *social media* and *identity networks*

(Buttel and Gould, 2004:39), in defining and constructing the essential characteristics of collective identity and collective action. These variables are most explicit to OWS, and will be debated in Chapter Four, under the independent variable '*organizational structures*' and the paradigm of '*social movement organization*' (SMO).

It is through action that feelings of belonging will be reinforced or weakened, and it produces an evolution of collective action which redefines the notion of identity (della Porta and Diani, 2006:93). In this regard, it is the interaction between structural tensions and the emergence of a collective actor that defines itself, and its adversaries, on the basis of certain values and/or interests (della Porta and Diani, 2006: 94). '*Identity*' refers to the ability of the individual to recognize itself in the past and the future (Baron and Bryne, 2003:164-165), and it is the interaction and construction of a shared definition by several individuals which creates the '*political opportunity structures*', and constraints, for collective action (Melucci, 2003:342). According to Melucci (1988:341-342), the analysis of a social movement is established on the capacity of the actor to “(a) maintain a unity and a consistency that enables him to compare expectations and rewards at different times; (b) relate his deprivation to an identifiable agent of the environment toward which the protest or mobilization can be directed; (c) can recognize the expected benefit as not only desirable but due”.

GSM, as the name implies, has a supra-national network of actors, with global causes in more than one state (della Porta, 2006:18). The features which distinguish the GSM from social movements of the late twentieth century are their international orientation, broad range of issues and diversity (Kohler and Wissen, 2003:942). Nonetheless, the term GSM is unwieldy because of its complexity and must be further analyzed (Kohler and Wissen, 2003:942). In this case study on OWS, GSM will be more suitable than '*anti-globalization movement*', since OWS is not against globalization, nor capitalism, but its negative impacts. Furthermore, the imperative fact when analyzing alter-globalisation movements is that they adopt a global network and uses several tools of globalisation in their struggle. Another feasible theoretical framework, which is reviewed in this study, is TSM. Tarrow has defined '*trans-national social movements*' as '*socially mobilized groups with constituencies in at least two states, engaged in sustained contentious interactions with power-holders in at least one state other than their own, or against an international institution or a multinational economic actor*' (Tarrow, 2001:11).

Nevertheless, GSMs contribute to the expansion of what has been termed as '*global civil society*' and the '*transnational public sphere*' (Mohagdam, 2012:410). GSMs against '*neo-liberal globalization*' have their common identity in '*meaning work*', in which actors use

it to convince people to engage in collective action (Snow and Benford, 1992:136). The '*meaning work*' approach has a rewarding view when analyzing the construction of the collective identity (della Porta, 2006:62). This means that the movement has constructed the collective subject, integrated the structural mobilisation potential, convinced sympathizers to become involved in collective action and further convinced the public that the cause is just and the '*status quo*' is unfair (della Porta, 2006:62). The construction of '*meaning work*' in OWS has been built around the identity of "the 99%". This strategy convinces people to sympathize with the movement, and become a part of the mobilisation, in physical participation and in social media, towards changes in the somewhat unfair 'status quo'.

Furthermore, GSM may be analyzed as an ideological construction, working against the negative effects of globalization, neo-liberalism and the free-market. Hence, there are variations between GSMs, as they are contemplated as '*alternatives*', '*reformers*' or '*statists*'. The different forms of GSMs may also, in alternative terms, be related to '*direct action*', '*radical liberals*' and '*revolutionaries*' (Green and Griffin, 2002). To recap; the hypothesis of '*social movements from below*' derives from the notion and anti-thesis to '*globalization from above*'. Buttel and Gould (2004) argue that social movements against global mechanisms have to be global in themselves, in vision and scope, if they are to be successful (Buttel and Gould, 2004:38). These global social movements from below have become as debated and analyzed as the phenomenon of globalisation itself (Buttel and Gould, 2004:40).

OWS does provide clues that we are entering an era of significant transformation in the organization and structure of world order (Cobbett and Germain, 2012:110). It is further argued that OWS is a unique social movement because of its political action by heterogeneous partisans who both demand and exemplify increased transparency and participation in decision making. It also relies upon both human-scaled and participatory technologies. OWS is a micro-community which embodies a vision for pluralistic, direct democratic society, and they demonstrate it through practice (Brucato, 2012:76). OWS are more of a 'reformist' GSM than an alternative or statist, as they call for a reformation. But the call for reformation is still vague, as they have no clear roadmap towards any reform. It could be more of a call for participants to be a part of the reform by engaging in true 'direct democracy'. Brucato (2012:77-78) defines OWS to be the first worldwide postmodern uprising, and as a potential democratic solution for a way beyond the financial crisis of 2008.

1.5 Problem statement

In regards to OWS, there are several political and organizational spheres which may not fit within the previous definitions elaborated upon by the literature on GSM, TSM and NSM. It has been claimed, from several different stances, that there are continuities and discontinuities between the forms of direct democracy that we explore at OWS, and those that are characterized as '*alter-globalization movements*' (Graebner, 2011; Klein, 2012; Juris, 2012). Brucato (2012), on the other hand, claims that certain aspects of OWS have similarities with the NSM paradigm (Brucato, 2012:79). Moreover, there are different factors and variables by which one may define and identify a GSM, TSM or NSM.

The essential task will be to characterise how and why OWS differs from the former social movements, and how it challenges the theoretical framework of social movements - SMS. One approach shall be to define how OWS is organisationally and politically structured. A prime focus has to be on the contextual realities of the movement. OWS is organised and forwarded by and through social media and identity networks, by the notion of '*meaning work*', both domestically and globally. Furthermore, as they have challenged the way of participation and democracy, the focus has been to demonstrate direct democracy through practice and engagement in collective action. But, it has then been by adopting core tools of globalisation and inter-national networks. This way of conducting mobilisation and repertoire has not been unique in OWS, but also seen in the other occupy movements of 2011. Therefore, OWS cannot be observed as isolated from the other occupy movements. Another approach shall be to analyse what it claims, and by what means they claim it, toward the rest of a given population, by constructing a '*meaning work*'. The identity has been on the notion of the "99%", and to forward the messages of inequality in social and economic relations by direct democracy.

The political and organisational structures of OWS are in some ways similar to former movements. But, the contemporary theoretical frameworks differs from any social movement that we have seen since the '*Battle of Seattle*' in 1999, and still have similarities to the NSMs of post-1968, and the context of social forces post the '*Great Depression*'.

1.6 Aims and objectives

The primary aim of this case study is to conceptualise and analyse OWS within the contemporary theoretical frameworks of GSM, TSM and NSM. Tarrow (2011) suggested that OWS is a social movement of a completely new kind, and it could therefore be claimed that it

offers new insights in the study of social movements, and that they are radically stronger and more influential than the previous types of GSMs, TSMs and NSMs. The outcome of the case study will then be to elaborate on how and why OWS challenges the contemporary theoretical frameworks of social movements. By doing so, we may be able to debate the research question; *is OWS a new kind of a social movement?*

The objectives of the study are to understand and provide some of the challenges that OWS may have caused for the current theoretical frameworks within which the study of social movements occur. It will proceed to analyse where the current state of GSM theory is located, and analyse OWS within the contemporary frameworks. It is predicted that there will be several challenges in fitting the empirical case study of OWS into the contemporary theoretical framework of GSM, TSM and NSM, which will be the defining findings of this thesis.

1.7 Methodology

This study will adopt a case study approach to analyse three defining features of OWS and test its empirical findings with the contemporary theoretical frameworks of social movement studies. The theoretical framework, which I have chosen for this case study, is GSM, TSM and NSM. The hypothesis of this study will be to test if OWS is a new social movement, by comparing the empirical finding with the theoretical frameworks of social movements. The main reason for choosing a case study on OWS is that it focuses on the cases themselves and what they have to say about theory (Campbell, 2010:174). The primary goal of conducting a case study is to discover contrasts, similarities and/or patterns and through this the study will contribute to the development or the confirmation of theory (Campbell, 2010:174). It will therefore be a deductive study, where the outcome will be to test how a contemporary social movement like OWS challenges the present tools of SMS. This case study will be a desk-top study, where all information and data will be retrieved from existing resources. It will be essential to be critical when collecting and selecting data, as there are vast amounts of data with less reliability and mostly biased in its approach.

OWS will be analysed and categorised according to the three independent variables; '*political opportunity structures*', '*organisational structures*' and '*global linkages*', within a GSM, TSM and NSM framework. The first, '*political opportunity structures*' (POS) are defined as containing of several elements within the political environment; polity structure, governmental structures and social stability, in a way that facilitates for a context in which

political behavior occurs (Eisinger, 1973:12). These structures enable or constrain the social movements in one or several particular ways. POS would function as filters between the mobilisation of the movement and its choice of strategies and its capacity to change the social environment (Kitschelt, 1986:59). Hence, Tarrow (1998:76-77) argued that POS has been defined as the consistent, but not necessarily formal or permanent dimension, that the political environment provides incentives for collective action by affecting people's expectations for success or failure. With reference to GSM, Tarrow (2005:25) has introduced the parameter of '*complex internationalism*', in which he claims it to be '*a dense, triangular structure of relations among states, non-state actors, and international institutions, and the opportunities this produces for the actors to engage in collective action at different levels of this system*'. Consequently, it will be essential to specify in which sectors the POS of OWS operates in. as mentioned earlier, the context of OWS is unique and has to be treated as such, compared to the former social movements and their POS. It will be of interest to analyse how the POS of OWS impacts how they decide on their tactics and conduction of mobilisation, in regards to the present context. Are the POS of OWS different to the former and similar social movements? And if so; does this challenge the theoretical framework of social movements?

The organisational characteristics of a social movement may be defined within the paradigm of '*social movement organisation*' (SMO), where it is a formally organised component of the social movement. Kriesi (1996) distinguishes SMOs from other types of formal organisations by two criteria; they mobilise their support from collective action, and they do so with a political goal, namely to obtain a collective good or avoid a collective ill from the authorities (Kriesi, 1996:152). Within this definition, Snow and Benford (1992) have proposed a framing theory which focuses on how social movements construct, articulate and disseminate their messages to recruit members and mobilise support. This framing is the conscious strategic efforts by groups of people to fashion shared understanding of the world and of their own roles and identities that legitimate and motivate for collective action (McAdam, 1996:6). It has been mentioned earlier, through the notion of '*meaning work*', which OWS has successfully recruited and motivated to involvement through the slogan '*we are the 99%*'. Within this variable the study will categorise boundaries, members, and structures of OWS, and compare it to what the theoretical framework has to provide in order to explain these mechanisms. Are the organisational structures of OWS different from the former and similar social movements? And if so; does this challenge the theoretical framework of social movements?

The third variable is the '*global linkages*', which OWS projects to the rest of the world and networks in contestation, as written or orally expressed, in a manifesto or other media. OWS had its origin and stronghold in the US, but had encampments around the globe. Furthermore, there has been strong linkages between OWS and the other 'occupy movements', in terms of tactics, structure and communication between them. It will be vital to further elaborate on the claimed linkages and whether there is a stronger link and network between them. The level of linkages in transnational activity, as the mentioned occupy movements are domestically based but also in a global network, with '*spill-over effects*' between them, will be a vital point of interest. If so, it is not a new phenomenon, but it has been rapidly increasing over the last decades as the usage of social media and information flow has had a steady growth. The role of social media has a given impact, but it is rather unknown at what level they impact the linkages between the occupy movements. Are the global linkages of OWS different from former and similar social movements? And if so; does this challenge the theoretical framework of social movements?

1.8 Structure of thesis

Chapter One covered the introduction to the problem statement of the thesis, research question and claims, a preliminary literature review, the methodological framework of a case study, the aims and objectives. Chapter Two will present the theoretical frameworks related to social movement studies, by means of a literature review, and present the conceptualization and operationalization of key concepts such as social movements, global civil society, global social movements, new social movements, alter-globalization movements and protest movements in general. Chapter Three will present the case study of OWS and contextualize it by outlining the historical backgrounds of the Great Depression, the present financial crisis, globalization and alter-globalization movements, debate neo-liberalism and anti-capitalist movements in a historical perspective, and present the issues of reconciliation between capitalism and social needs in a global and neo-liberal system. Chapter Four will analyse the independent variables for the analysis; '*social movement organisations*', '*political opportunity structures*' and '*global linkages*', and analyze the characteristics of OWS in relation to the 'occupy movements', and then summarise the concluding findings.

2. Conceptual and Theoretical Framework

This chapter will examine the analytical, theoretical and conceptual frameworks, which are relevant to the study. As noted in the introduction, the study of social movements is a broad and diverse field in academics. The diverse field of *social movement studies* (SMS) enhances the study of social sciences, sociology and psychology, and contribute a range of variables, particularly when analysing social movements at a transnational level. This study will focus on a more narrow set of variables, within the paradigm of political economy, and in the intersection of domestic and international activism. In the subsequent sections of this theoretical and conceptual chapter, the historical movements and their theoretical frameworks, *new social movements* (NSM), *alter-globalization movements*, and *transnational social movements* (TSM) and *global social movements* (GSM), will be highlighted in a dense literature review. This will also include the explanatory mechanisms of social movement actors; *global civil society* and *transnational activists*.

It has been argued that the theoretical dilemmas that we face, when analysing the current transnational movements, has its theoretical controversies in the division between the ‘*so-called new social movement and old social movements*’ (Hosseini, 2006:1). The main claim here is that the ‘*theoretical and intellectual controversies over the cognitive nature of the post-1960s movements have persisted unresolved and extended into arguments about the characteristics of global social movements*’ (Hosseini, 2006:2). Therefore, the theoretical section of this study will debate the intersection of old and new social movements, taking into account the contemporary occurrences of transnational activism, and the intersection between domestic and international activism. At this point, as elaborated upon in Chapter One, it is disputed whether OWS is defined to domestic activism, or a global movement, and how it may be placed within the frameworks of GSM, TSM and NSM. In any case, the analysis of OWS is reviving a debate over the NSM framework, and towards a new- or newer-NSM framework. As the three theoretical frameworks are the backdrop of the analysis, the forthcoming will highlight some of the main variables and adopted premises in the analysis of social movements in a historical perspective. These highlighted variables and premises will be incorporated into the analysis in Chapter Four.

2.1 The analytical framework

Following the social movement studies of Snow and Benford (1988; 1992), the adoption of *framing*, provides a useful approach, by focusing on the social psychology of

collective action. This *framing* allows us to better understand the extraordinary diffusion of the global movements, in both academic communities, global civil society and the remarkable growth of transnational social movements over the last decade (Tarrow, 2003:20). The modern social movement developed within the nation state, and their main target of protest was the nation state (della Porta and Tarrow, 2005:1). On an international level, global social movements developed within the global sphere and the globalization era, where the contemporary world system, international institutions and corporations were the main target of protest. Today, social movements and domestic activism may not be analysed separated from other social movements and domestic activists. The contemporary *framing* and understanding of *global civil society* is highly intersected, as it connects and strengthens the national and the international into the same frame. A rapidly increasing interconnected *global civil society* share a common understanding of how this ought to be and how to do it. During 2011, we witnessed several movement grow at national levels, but by the same methods and desires – occupation and representative democracy. The domestic movements became part of a global movement, but they were not structured as any of the former.

According to Tarrow, there are two mechanisms that must be present for a transnational social movement to be successful, *diffusion*; the transfer of information along established lines of interaction, and *brokerage*; the linking of two or more previously unconnected social sites, or social movements, which mediates their relation with each other (Tarrow, 2002). Furthermore, there are two ways of analysing a movement, by adopting the '*meaning work*' concept from Benford and Snow (2000) and by conducting a master frame analysis (della Porta, 2006:63), following the rationale to find the linkage between individual and collective identity, and the construction of linking them (Melucci, 1996:67). The master frame is detected by '*identifying culpable agents, be they individuals or collective structures or processes*' (Snow and Benford, 1992:137). The essential task, in the master frame, is detecting the solution to the grievances of the movement (della Porta, 2006:74), be it '*social justice*' within the framework of '*another world is possible*' or '*environmental justice*' following the framework of '*another world is urgent*'. The '*meaning work*' of OWS and the occupy movements were of the '*social justice movements*', and where '*another path of democracy is urgent*'. Still, the context of the occupy movements were different and their relations were not mediated in a formal structuration or organisation.

In the same manner that the establishment of national states produced social movements, did the mechanisms of globalization produce transnational or global social movements (della Porta and Kriesi, 1999: 17-18). The development of global social

movements requires that we establish a discourse that identifies both the common identity (*us*) and the target of the protests (*the other*) at the supra-national level (della Porta, 2006:19). The '*collective action frame*' is created by the movements' organizers in order to attract support, signal intentions, and gain media attention (Tarrow, 2005:61). By doing so, the activists must relate their contention to the '*common sense*' of their targeted public in relations (Tarrow, 2005:61). Globalisation has provided social movements with new possible opportunities and resources in influencing both states and non-state actors (Kennedy and Zald, 2000:1). The Seattle protests in 1999 have similarities to the previous movements, but, also, have shown some new characteristics, which makes them unique. Some of the similarities are the noted institutionalization of the organisational structures, the creation of formalized associations, further specialization on single issues, a decreased emphasis on protests, promotion of lobbying strategies and voluntary actions (della Porta, 2006:22). With the Battle of Seattle, came some additional changes in characteristics, marked by more structured associations and affinity groups, shifting identities from single issues to global concerns, criticism of neo-liberal globalization, exploitation of women and the environment, and defence of peace and justice (della Porta, 2006:22). The extraordinary shift in 1999 transformed the collective identity and actions of labour unions of both conventional protectionists and contenders, environmental groups, both conventional and contentious, and activists who targeted the '*world system*' (Tarrow, 2003:21).

Former studies on the '*single issue*' movements of the 1960s analysed them as domestic movements and with a clearer "*us and them*" frame, whereas the anti-WTO demonstrations were approached as global movements against undemocratic international institutions. The adopted frame of this study, a '*global frame*', has the frame-bridging of bringing together domestic and international opponents of neo-liberalism, free-trade, and supporters of environmental sustainability and global democracy (Lichbach, 2003: 25-34). The contemporary transnational social movements may not be understood or approached in an isolated manner, but rather by adopting a '*master-frame*' in the sphere of globalization, by bringing several variables of collective action together, such as organizational structures, political opportunities and global claims. '*Frame-bridging*', will be understood as '*the linkage of two or more ideologically congruent but structurally unconnected frames regarding a particular issue or problem*' (Snow et al. 1986:467), and may be adopted by the facilitators of the movement, but can still be confronted by the media or the '*common sense*' of the (global) civil society.

2.2 Conceptual Frameworks

In the same understanding that the study of *social movements* is a wide and diverse field of study, the definitions of social movements differs between scholars, cross-disciplines and through historical changes and contexts. A movement, as simply defined by the Oxford English Dictionary, has been defined as ‘*a series of organized activities working toward an objective*’ and ‘*an organized effort to promote or attain an end*’. Furthermore, the addition of ‘*social*’ enhances the informal and (dis)organized activities of people, as separated from the formal activities of the state and international institutions. Hence, one ‘social movement’, may be defined as professional and highly organized, and others on the contrary. There are, as this chapter will analyse, several conflicting paradigms in the study of contemporary social movements, especially in transnational activism, and the chosen approach in this case study is more of a deliberately adopted framework, which can be understood in several ways, but will be articulated in the subsequent sections. As it was articulated in Chapter One, the theoretical and contextual approaches to the ‘occupy movement’ and OWS has been diverse and conflicting, and needs further examination by bringing together the conceptual frameworks in SMS.

2.2.1 A short historical background

The first scholarly introduction to '*social movements*' was conducted by Lorenz von Stein, in his book '*History of the French social movement from 1789 to the present (1850)*' (Tilly, 2004:5). During the same period, Marx and Engels (1850) wrote in the '*Communist Manifesto*' that the proletarian movement was the self-conscious and independent movement of the immense majority, as opposed to the historical movements which were the representative of a minority and in the interests of the minority (Marx and Engels, 1958:44). At this point, social movements were conveyed as '*the idea of a continuous, unitary process by which the whole working class gained self-consciousness and power*' (Marx and Engels, 1958:44).

One of the more critical definitions arising from the former debates was that social movements were '*efforts by a large number of people to solve collectively a problem that they feel like they have in common*' (Toch, 1965:5). This very broad definition seems to cover '*labour movements*', and the '*single issue movements*' which emerged in the 1960s. Later, the notion of a uniting body was added, understood as '*collectivities*' or '*organizations*', which carried the banner of the movement and its hierarchy, coordinated and mobilized its members (McCarthy and Zald, 1973). Common in the notion so far, is that they were '*voluntary*

collectives that people support in order to effect changes in the society' (McCarthy and Zald, 1973). The emerging understanding is three-fold, by uniting the variables of *identity*, *organization* and *grievance*. In a historic perspective, it was *grievance* and desire for *social change* which united people within a movement. Furthermore, it is the organization, later approached as a *social movement organization* (SMO), which unites the masses under a collective banner and is, in this context, understood as *'a complex, or formal organization which identifies its goals with the preference of a social movement or a counter-movement and attempts to implement these goals'* (McCarthy and Zald, 1973). Hence, the uniting force of identities is the common belief among the people who *'represent preferences for changing some elements of the social structure and/or reward distribution of a society'* (McCarthy and Zald 1977:1218). Identity, which unites the members of the movement, is the common belief of how things are supposed to be.

A broad, but more specific definition, which will more accurately fit the previous and present social movements, and has proven to be feasible for a wider set of scholars, but still does not seem to describe OWS, is collected from Tilly (1984), where he defines the characteristics of social movements as to be *'sustained series of interactions between power holders and persons successfully claiming to speak on behalf of a constituency lacking formal representation, in the course of which those persons make publicly visible demands for changes in the distribution or exercise of power, and back those demands with public demonstrations of support'* (Tilly, 1984:306). A missing perspective in this projection on *'interaction'* is the primary focus on social movements before emphasising the role of *'demonstrations'*. Demonstrations or protests are the actions of interaction or behaviour of the movements, projected as the *'joint action'* of the movement (Opp, 2009:34).

During the first half of the 19th century, social movements began more effective mobilization for workers' rights, and religious emancipation, which were reflected in parliamentary reforms (Tilly, 2004:35). The strategies of social movements became more available to the reformers, radicals and the conservative activists (Tilly, 2004:35). In the 20th century, social movements became a more common phenomenon, relentlessly seen in the labour movements and the socialist movements (Tilly, 2004:35). They mobilized and recruited members to become strong and influential actors. In both theoretical and empirical studies, the post-World War II era marked changes in the way that social movements were organised and how their political projects were conducted. Social movements, focused on *'single issues'*, were seen in women's movements, gay rights movements, peace movements, civil rights movements, anti-nuclear movements and environmental movements, in the post-

modern era. The theoretical approaches have projected them as '*new social movements*' (NSM). In the era of globalization and interconnected civil society, further steps were made towards the understanding of '*Global Social Movements*' and the '*alter-globalization movements*', as the movements adapted to the international sphere and the mechanisms of globalization.

Today, there are two contemporary debates on how world affairs should be organized, according to the introduction chapter in Jackie Smith's book, '*Social Movements for Global Democracy*' (2008). On the one side we find policies and practices which are supported by the most powerful governments in the world in their desire for a continuation and increase of globalised capitalism. On the other hand there are the citizens who object to the expanding global markets and constant exploitation of the workforce and scarce resources (Smith, 2008: 3). The rationale of the latter is the call for a world order which is less focused on markets and increasingly focused on the population (Smith, 2008: 3). This paradigm of the contemporary contested world views follows in the '*era of globalization and alter-globalization*'.

The time frame chosen for the thesis, as argued in Chapter One, starts in the late 1990's with the Battle of Seattle in 1999. The main point has been, as Smith argues; '*as the tensions between the United States (US) and Soviet Union declined... other social and economic issues came to the fore of global policy agenda*' (Smith, 2008:4). The notion of an ideological and policy triumph for capitalism and the '*end of history*' follows this rationale and were made famous by Fukuyama in his article '*The End of History*' (1989) and book '*End of History and the Last Man*' (1992). In the post-Cold War era, open market capitalism, *laissez faire* trade and reduced public spending were advocated on a global scale, pushed forward by the hegemonic power of the US, and the international institutions of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank (WB) and later the World Trade Organization (WTO). Less focus was on the (global) civil society and the strength of solidarity (Smith, 2008:7). The '*Battle of Seattle*' and the creation of WSF came in the aftermath of the '*End of History*', and were by definition a TSM mostly working against the influential power of MNC in international institutions, whereas OWS is a domestic based movement, with nodes of interaction worldwide, against corporative influential power in domestic policy making and within '*capitalist democracy*'.

2.2.2 The Transatlantic Divide in SMS

Social Movement Studies (SMS) has been a field within sociology for almost a century, where the prime focus has been on *how* and *why* social movements emerged, continued and declined (Lyman, 1995). However, the field of study separated into two distinct groups, located, respectively, in Europe and North America, marked by the social movements of the 1960s (Jenkins, 1983). Between the two camps, scholars got increasingly divided on how to explain the main mechanisms in the 1960s movements. In the US, the field began in the 1920s, where the study was based on the European mass psychology and the study of collective behaviour, such as sects, trends and patterns (Neidhardt and Rucht, 1991). Prior to the 1970s, US scholars projected social movements as temporary responses by distinct groups to strain placed on the social structures, and presumed that they were primarily motivated by emotions – '*a-rational, if not outright irrational*' (Jenkins, 1983:528). Among others, Dahl adopted this view, in his classic book '*Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City*' (1961), where he claimed that social movements, which used unconventional means of politics, such as demonstrations, occupations etc. were acting outside what was seen as real, conventional politics, and were therefore projected as irrational and unneeded (McAdam, 1982:2). This view has been mostly present in the analysis of OWS, from several stances, but mostly in the media.

In the European tradition of SMS, prior to the 1970s, social movements were defined as organised collectives pursuing strategic action, following the writings of Karl Marx (Neidhardt and Rucht, 1991:425). In this approach, the study focused on class analysis and labour movements as a conflict between workers and employers (Neidhardt and Rucht, 1991:425). As mentioned earlier in this study, the empirical evidence of SMS marks a shift in the late 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s, as social movements were no longer synonymous with class- and labour struggles, but increasingly social and cultural rights. These occurrences produced a shift in the theoretical approaches, and laid the foundation for a new paradigm. In Europe there was a shift towards explaining the macro-structural and cultural changes during the late 1960s (Tarrow, 1988:424). Whereas, in the US, the NSM approach was adopted, but the studies were more focused on long-term improvements in organizations, resources and political opportunities, then in the European studies (McCarthy and Zald, 1977:1214).

In the US, the theoretical paradigms of '*Resource Mobilization Theory*' (RMT) and '*Political Process Theory*' (PPT) were adopted, to approach the social movements in terms of organizational and political factors, such as cycles of protests, recruitment, the relationship to

institution channels, and selection of tactics (McCarthy and Zald, 1977; Tarrow, 1988). The two theoretical approaches focused more on the rational and instrumental dimension of social movement participation and action, and less on the previous focus on the emotional and psychological emphasis (Tarrow, 1988:425). During the 1990s, there was a shift among schools, embodied in a critique of the NSM-paradigm, RMT and PPT (Stryker. et al. 2000; Hetherington, 1998). Stryker (et. al. 2000:4) claimed that RTM and PPT missed the variables of culture and identity, and on the other side Hetherington (1998:3) claimed that NSM theory did not implement the role of organization and politics. Some of the methodological tools and variables, in SMS, will be further adopted and debated in Chapter Four, and towards a analysis of OWS.

2.2.3 Social Movements

Social movements, as discussed in the previous sections, have been defined in several ways in the literature (Snow et al. 2004:6). Even though numerous definitions have been offered, all of them are problematic, either because they are too broad or too narrow (Crossley, 2002:2). Most of the definitions provided in this subsection, will agree on one central aspect, that a social movement is a '*collectivity of individuals*', where they refer to different kinds of collectives (Opp, 2009:36), and in some cases manifested towards '*family resemblance*' (Crossley, 2002:2). On the other hand, McCarthy and Zald differ on this point, whereas they claim that a social movement is a '*set of options and beliefs*' (McCarthy and Zald, 1977). The main notion of a definition has a prime focus on the collectives of individuals, while McCarthy and Zald focus on the mind-set of a group of individuals. The difference, as illustrated above, is that most scholars adopt an inter-subjective understanding of what is to be emphasised and not.

A broad and all-inclusive definition on social movements, which will be adopted in the study of OWS is; “...*collectives acting with some degree of organization and continuity outside of institutional or organizational channels for the purpose of challenging or defending extant authority, whether it is institutionally or culturally based, in the group, organization, society, culture, or world order of which they are part*” (Snow et al. 2004:11). Even within this definition the notion of the *individual* becomes problematic, as it could be challenged that it focuses too broadly on the organization and the collective manifests. The role of single individuals, connected in loose organizations, is one of the main observations, when analysing the ‘occupy movement’ and OWS. The notion of who belongs to a

movement becomes salient, as it could be claimed that anyone who wears the t-shirt or button of the movement, is a member (Crossley, 2002:2). Tarrow (2005) adds the notion of the individual identity, that members have '*shared beliefs and solidarity*'. Crossley (2002:6) further adopts the additional idea that; '*members of any organization, in order to qualify as such, must assumedly subscribe to a set of beliefs which are distinct from those of the wider population and sufficiently homogeneous for us to describe them as those of a single movement*'. The challenging point is whether the movement constitutes individuals from the majority of the population. This idea follows the projection of anti-nuclear or feminist movements, that the majority of the population, to some degree, share the same basic assumptions, which aspires to the values of justice and equality, in a notion of 'common sense'. A further problem is the *degree* of involvement by the members of the movement. If, in case, a person wear the button of the "*anti-nuclear movement*" is the person a part of the movement? Therefore, a more suitable definition of the case study of OWS, is given by Koopmans (1993); '*social movements are characterized by a low degree of institutionalization, high heterogeneity, a lack of clearly defined boundaries and decision making structures, a volatility matched by few other social phenomena*' (Koopmans, 1993:637).

In Snow, Soule and Kriesi's book '*The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*' (2004), they claimed that the definition of social movements may differ in terms of what is emphasized or accented. Hence, they approached a conceptualization of social movements as containing at least three of the following items: '*collective or joint action; change oriented goals or claims; some extra- or non-institutional collective action; some degree of organization; some degree of temporal continuity*' (Snow et al. 2004:6). Diani and Bison have defined social movements to be a '*distinct social process, consisting of the mechanisms through which actors engage in collective action*' (Diani and Bison, 2004).

In della Porta's major contribution to social movement studies, '*Social Movements: an Introduction*' (2006), social movements are conceptualized by three main characteristics. These three elements will define the differentiation which contrasts social movements from other collective action processes (della Porta, 2006:22). Firstly, the members of social movements are involved in conflicting relations with clearly identified opponents (della Porta, 2006:22). The conflict is of a cultural and/or political origin, where the members are engaged by opposing or promoting the ideas for social change. In this understanding, the conflict is characterized by an oppositional relationship to those who seek control over political, economic or cultural power. The conflicting relationship, between the two parts, is a

process marked by making negative claims on each other, where the possible realized demands would be damaging to the interests of the other actor (Tilly, 1978). Regarding the conflicting relationship between social movements, which conduct collective action on globalization issues, such as against WTO, and not on the issues of officials' misconduct or specific policy mistakes, the conflict is with the representatives of distinct coalitions of interests (della Porta, 2006:21). It is then, when collective actions are opposing individuals or groups of individuals, difficult to label it as a social movement process (della Porta, 2006:21).

The second characteristic, to define a social movement is the dense informal network, where it is claimed to differentiate the social movement process from '*the innumerable instances in which collective action takes place and is coordinated, mostly within the boundaries of specific organizations*' (della Porta, 2006:21). Both the individual, and organized actors, engage in the social movement process of sustaining the exchange of resources in the pursuit of a common goal (della Porta, 2006:21). It is a permanent negotiation and coordination of specific initiatives, regulation of the individuals conduct and defining the strategies for collective action (della Porta, 2006:21). Hence, no single organized actor can claim to represent the movement as a whole (della Porta, 2006:21). Thirdly, a social movement shares a distinct collective identity, and the movement is not more than the sum of protest events on certain issues (della Porta, 2006:21). But, a social movement process is only in place when the collective identities develop, which goes beyond the specific events and initiatives (della Porta, 2006:21). The recognition and creation of a collective identity provides the members with a shared commitment to a common purpose and cause, where the linked activists and /or organizations will regard themselves as inextricably linked to other actors (della Porta, 2006:21).

Collective identity building entails actors to establishing connections between the different occurrences, which will be relevant to their experience in time and space, and build them into the broader narrative of the movement (Melucci, 1996). An established connection in time and space will therefore involve both the activist and the organization to not only see themselves as part of the specific goals, but as an element in the larger process for change (della Porta, 2006:22). Nonetheless, the collective building of an identity must be maintained after the specific initiative or a particular campaign has come to an end, where this persistence has two important consequences (della Porta, 2006:24). First, it will be easier to create a revival of mobilization, when favourable conditions recur. And second, when the representation of the collective identity and the rest of the population develop in a gradual

transformation, there will be a facilitation of new movements and solidarities (della Porta, 2006:24).

2.2.4 Global Civil Society (GCS)

'*Civil society*' may be defined as the voluntary form of collective action, which is different and autonomous, from corporations and state power (Kaldor, 2003:377). The contemporary adoption of civil society could be separated into three different ideological categories: *liberals*, who regards civil society as a countervailing force against the unresponsive and corrupt state, and the exploitative corporations that ignore environmental issues and human rights abuses; *conservatives*, who discern in civil society the beneficial effects of globalization for a development of democracy and economic development, and an idea of freedom in its march against its enemies; *radicals*, who advance civil society as a repository of the forces of resistance and opposition, where forces could be mobilized into a counter-hegemonic bloc or a '*global anti-mobilization movement*' (Petras and Veltmeyer, 2005:10).

The Marxian view, that civil society and the proletariat would emerge, contained the idea of a counter-hegemonic force. Gramsci, on the other hand, regards civil society as a place where the hegemony of the state obtains and requires consent. It is within civil society that hegemony is sustained, reproduced, channelled, and in the same place where counter-hegemonic forces would be able to emerge (Cox, 1999:5). Civil society, as a transformation of opposition into an emancipatory direction, would be the construction of social organizations as a movement from below (Cox, 1999:6-8). Therefore, civil society will be approached as an arena, where power and contestation would be the key players dynamics, in analysing the conflict of identities and ideologies. Hence, as Scholte (2002:283-284) explains, the pure form of civil society does not pursue public office or wealth, but rather the deliberate approach to change certain governing rules of society.

In global movements, such as OWS, the adoption of the concept '*global citizenship*' and Marshalls (1949) three dimensional definitions of citizenship; civic, political and social, may prove to be useful in the present era of information and social media. The prospected notion is a world with an inclusive global civilization based on diversity (Hoikkala, 2009:5). Civil society, in the era of globalization, has taken up several analytical approaches in the scholarly debates on the issues of its nature, extent, periodization and direction (Scholte, 1999:8). The perception of globalization is that it designates towards the increasing

connections across the population of the world, and it provides an insight towards distinctions of the contemporary global affairs (Scholte, 2000). '*Global civil society*' (GCS), on the other hand, approaches the activities that address transnational issues and communication, which has a global orientation, and works on the premises of supra-national solidarity (Scholte, 1999:10). Furthermore, civic associations which approach global issues may be approached as GCS, as they adopt supra-national modes of communication, adopt a transnational organization, and are motivated by sentiments of global solidarity (Scholte, 1999:10-12).

As both '*civil society*' and *globalization* are well established phenomena and still contested, the subsequent approach to the intersection of the two will list three versions of how they apply to the global context, by adopting the notion of '*the activist version*', '*the neo-liberal version*' and '*the post-modern version*'. First, the *activist perspective* relates to civil society which emerged from opposition movements in Central Europe in the 1970s and 1980s (Kaldor, 2003:377). Its radicalization of democracy, by both restrictive state-power and redistribution of state-power, and pushing forward active citizenship towards self-organizing outside formal political circles, has been important in transnational advocacy networks in global social movements, like the one in Seattle in 1999 (Kaldor, 2003:377-378). Second, the *neo-liberal version*, in the post-Cold War and *laissez-faire*- era, approaches civil society as the substitute for many of the functions previously performed by the state, and functions within the field of welfare where the state could no longer afford to perform (Kaldor, 2003:377-378). On a global scale, where there is no defined hierarchy, GCS performs the functions necessary to clear the path for economic globalization, pave the way for privatization of democracy building and humanitarianism, and evade the responsibilities of states for welfare and security (Kaldor, 2003: 378-379). Third, the *post-modernist version* focuses on the arena of pluralism and contestation in global networks, a source of incivility as well as civility, and furthermore approaches the importance of multiple identities as a precondition for civil society (Kaldor, 2003: 378-379). Within this approach, the contestation occurs on a global scale, but is not clear cut as such, but interconnected by nodes of individuals, communication and the context in both domestic and global democracy.

2.3 Theoretical Frameworks

People of the '*networked society*' and the '*information age*' resist negative economics and social opportunity, and project the way of living as '*people all over the world resent the loss of control over their lives, over the environment, over their jobs, over their economies,*

over their governments, over their countries, and, ultimately, over the faith of the Earth' (Castells, 2009:72). Since the social movements were divided into 'old' and 'new', and most of the 'new' social movements were to be defined as NSM, social movements and GCS has changed quite a bit. One aspect is networked societies around the globe and the other is peoples desire for prospect and security.

The theoretical diversity, as this thesis will debate, includes the highly debated intersection between *old* and *new* social movements, and how transnational activism revives the former debates on how we define contemporary social movements. With the emergence of the '*Battle of Seattle*' the debate reopened (Crossley, 2002:149), particularly because of the adoption of '*social media*' and '*identity networks*' in SMS (Buttel and Gould, 2004:39), which is salient in the contemporary SMS (Holsti, 2011:119). Still, contemporary forms of activism, such as the '*occupy movement*' and OWS, may not be similar with the NSM '*identity networks*', nor any other previous forms of contention (Tarrow 2011; Hardt and Negri 2011; Holsti 2011; Harvey 2011; Sassen 2011; Klein 2011).

Nonetheless, two broader questions do arise when analyzing OWS. First, is the question if OWS, or only the '*occupy*' movement, may be defined as a global movement. The '*occupy movement*' is more of a global movement, as it has a wide network of domestic movements, but it is challenging to fit it into the frameworks of GSM and TSM. Furthermore, OWS is mostly a US based- and domestic movement, but is claimed to be a global movement, which does not easily fit the frameworks of GSM, TSM or NSM. These questions will be analysed in chapter Four. In order to do so, this subsection will mainly approach and highlight three theoretical frameworks; new social movements (NSM), global movements and transnational/global social movements, to lay a theoretical foundation for the analysis.

2.3.1 New Social Movements (NSM)

The term New Social Movements (NSM) refers to a cluster of social movements which began to emerge out of the student movements in the late 1960s – peace movements, environmental movements, second-wave feminist movements, animal rights and so on (Crossley, 2002:149). The argument is that there has been a paradigm shift, from modernity to post-modernity, and therefore implies new ways of theorizing social movements. In other terms, it may be debated as a shift from material goals to social goals. In order to gain an extensive understanding, concerning the theoretical framework of NSM, Buechler (1995; 2000; 2001) has highlighted several of the prevalent themes, which sought to capture the

contemporary and structural context of post-modernity, and to understand the notion of '*collective action*' in the new paradigm.

NSM, approached as a shift from the labour movements struggle against industrial capitalism, gained theoretical labels such as '*post-industrial*' and '*post-modern*'. The central claims are that NSMs are products of the shift to the post-industrial economy, and that NSMs are different from the social movements of the industrial age (Pichardo, 1997:412). Crossley (2002:149) pointed out that most, if not all, of the former NSMs, are in a period of latency, if they have not disappeared all together, while others have achieved a foothold in the political system, or in the more local sites of struggle, in which they emerged.

Previous approaches to social movements, which had European traditions, were claimed to have inadequacies, as Marxism was the base for analysing collective action, and laid the foundation of a new paradigm in NSM (Buechler, 1995:441). The Marxist approaches were critiqued for two main reasons. First, Marxist economic reductionism presumed that all politically significant social action will derive from the fundamental economic logic of capitalist production, and that all other social logics were secondary, at best, in shaping such action (Buechler, 1995: 441-442). Second, Marxism's class reductionism presumes that the most significant social actors would be defined by class relationships rooted in the process of production and that all other social identities were secondary, at best, in constituting collective actors (Buechler, 1995: 441-442). Social movement theorists moved away from this approach, by adopting the NSM-paradigm, and rather focused on other notions, such as politics, ideology, culture, ethnicity, gender and sexuality, in order to explain and understand collective action and identity (Buechler, 1995: 441-442). These new approaches must be seen in the light of the contemporary context and the goal of the movements.

One of the central points in approaching the NSM paradigm, by US scholars, was the notion of Resource Mobilisation Theory, in order to understand *collective action* (Buechler, 1995: 441-442). Collective action, as seen in the labour movements against capital, were understood in Marxian terms, and approached as '*a response to large scale social dynamics and the study of social movements is thereby elevated as an examination of the significance of significant social change*' (Touraine, 1988). The paradigm focused on a '*rational actor engaged in instrumental action through formal organization to secure resources and foster mobilization*' (Touraine, 1988). McCarthy and Zald (1977) claimed that this approach had considerable merit in theoretical and empirical approaches to understanding social movements. Later critiques and alternative approaches led to a new understanding, which

focused less on the RMT and rather studied collective action by focusing on the role of *framing activities* and the *cultural process* in social activism (Snow and Benford, 1992).

Buechler, in his critique, approaches the NSM in seven ways, by referring to several prominent scholars within NSM studies, in what he claims to be a more accurate path of NSM as '*new social movement theories*' (Buechler, 1995:442). First, most strands of NSM theory underscore symbolic action of civil society, or the cultural sphere as a major arena for collective action, alongside instrumental action in the state or political sphere. Second, NSM theory stresses the importance of processes that promote autonomy and self-determination, instead of strategies for maximizing influence and power. Third, some NSM theorists emphasize the role of post-materialist values on contemporary collective action, as opposed to conflicts over material resources. Fourth, NSM theorists tend to problematize the, often fragile, process of constructing collective identities and identifying group interests, instead of assuming that conflict groups and their interests are structurally determined. Fifth, NSM theory also stresses the socially constructed nature of grievances and ideology, rather than assuming that they can be deducted from a group's structural location in society. And finally, NSM theory recognizes a variety of submerged, latent, and temporary networks, which often provides the foundation for collective action, rather than assuming that centralised organisational forms are prerequisites for successful mobilisation.

The NSM approach, as debated above, is a shift from the Marxist view of class, and a rejection of this very specific historical thesis, by the claim that '*societies have changed*' (Crossley, 2002:149). The working class is no longer the key player which will facilitate change. NSM theorists have rejected the claim that the labour movement will be the agent of change and that class struggle is the fault line in the present social order. Crossley argues that, in some cases, NSM theorists seek to find the movement which emerges from the class struggle (Crossley, 2002: 151). The claim for a new social base, encapsulates the middle class, and created collective identities around ethnicity, religion and lifestyle. One of the most severe changes in the theoretical approaches was the notion of culture, which were at this point distinguished from those of political and economic based identities. Nonetheless, the organisational structures and methods changed by the break of the old/new social movements, as the new movements were less susceptible to traditional forms of cooperation and social control, as the material goals of the movements were not an aim for their members and their united struggle (Buechler, 2000:45-48).

A further debate is required, to address the claim that there is nothing new about the NSM approach in SMS. The main point of critique, to this approach, is the historical critique,

which points out that most of the repertoires, issues and organizational forms, which NSM adopted, can be identified in the history of what is called '*old social movements*' (Crossley, 2002:150). Furthermore, this critique overlooks the representation of European scholars, and their paradigm shift in the Marxist strand, which focuses more on the class and identity (Crossley, 2002:150). The Marxist framework, in a '*conflict approach*', the major conflict line in capitalistic societies, where there are two social groups, the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, is an on-going revolutionary overthrow of the present order (Crossley, 2002:150).

The later debates, over the break from old to new social movement frameworks, have been disputed from several stances, where Pichardo (1997) claimed that the '*new*' label could only be temporary. In his critical approach, Pichardo separates the NSM-paradigm into two levels. The macro-level concentrates on the relationship between the rise of contemporary social movements, and the larger economic structure, and the role of culture in such movements (Pichardo, 1997:411). And on the micro-level there is a concentration with how issues of identity and personal behaviour are bound up in social movements (Pichardo, 1997:411).

In Pichardo's approach, the NSM paradigm is focused on a historically specific vision of social movements as associated with new forms of '*middle class radicalism*' (Pichardo, 1997:411). In this sphere, Pichardo asks if the contemporary movements are unique, and answers by claiming that they are fundamentally different in character than the movements of the past, where the main differences are found in the ideology and goals, tactics, structure, and the participants of the contemporary movements (Pichardo, 1997: 414). Still, he claims, as the so-called contemporary social movements are unique in all those notions, the notion of identity is repeated as the base for membership (Pichardo, 1997: 425). At best, it could be argued that they represent additions to the repertoire of social movements (Pichardo, 1997: 425). The logic of this argument is that social movements are reflections of the contemporary social relations and changes. These points become salient in the later analysis of contemporary social movements, such as the uniqueness of OWS. Whether we need new theories of social movements in a contemporary sphere, is uncertain. Hence, Pichardo elaborates; '*not that social movement theory presented a complete account of movement dynamics... a modification of theory that attended to the 'why' of movements in addition to the 'how' would seem to be a better direction to proceed*' (Pichardo, 1997: 426). He concludes by articulating that the role of culture and identity in modern contention is the most provocative and informative aspect of the NSM thesis (Pichardo, 1997: 426). It is the element around which a reformulation of the NSM thesis should be constructed.

Melucci claimed that there are no need for the distinction between old and new (1995), because a *conflict* is always carried forward by the temporary actors who bring to light the crucial dilemmas of a contemporary society (Melucci, 1994:102). The conflicts concern the production and appropriation of resources that are crucial for a global society, where the constant processes generate both new forms of power and new forms of opposition (Melucci, 1994:102). Therefore, the conflict is not chiefly expressed through action, in order to achieve outcomes in the political system, but the fact that action affects institutions, because it selects new elites, modernises organisational forms, creates new goals and new languages (Melucci, 1994:102). Changes in language are based on the notion that language and culture recasts and recodes the organisation of information to the public, where contemporary societies are grounded in the ability to inform and 'give form' (Melucci, 1994:102). *Collective action* is the action which challenges the apparatuses that govern the production of information. Nonetheless, Melucci has abandoned the concept of class relationships in his studies, as it is linked with the capitalist industrial society and classes as real social groups are withering away, only to adopt it as a traditional category to focus on the relational and conflicting dimension of the production of the basic orientation of a society (Melucci, 1994: 106). Social class and the categorisation between old and new social movements, should not be the interpretive lens which we adopt to the study of contemporary social movements. Rather, the contemporary stand between the governing and governed, in the unique context which is the present, shall be the interpretive lens.

2.3.2 Alter-Globalisation Movements

Globalization, not only of the economy, but numerous areas of social and cultural life, has, over the past decades, been the most visible and disquieting aspect in the evolution of capitalism, which was and still is primarily led by the United States (Touraine, in Pleyers, 2010:xi). This notion follows the rationale of a hegemonic power centred in the United States, as seen in the '*historical structures*', when studying global political economy, and its global construction of ideas, material capabilities and institutions (Cox, 1981: 135-138).

Cox (2004) has defined the alter-globalisation movements through the term '*nebuleuse*', which defines a counter-hegemonic movement towards '*new multilateralism*'. The present world order, which centres from the notion of *pax-Americana*, is a relationship between social forces, material capabilities and ideologies, which are embedded in institutions, and further identifies how social forces, states and the present world order

coexist (Cox, 2004). In a state centric approach, towards *multilateralism*, the world order is made of anarchy, among states (Wendt, 1999), and in a '*complex multilateralism*' approach, the role of civil society and NGOs are incorporated (O'Brian et al, 2000). Former social movements, which approached international institutions, like anti-WTO demonstrations and WSF, claimed a democratic deficiency – '*governance without government*'. The present '*occupy*' movement and OWS are approaching the domestic democratic deficiency in liberal parliamentarism. The democratic system, and the world system, is under attack, and with reference to the term '*counter hegemonic movement*', both OWS and WSF may be defined as such.

Globalisation has been understood as '*the people of the world have been incorporated into a single global society*' (Cohen and Kennedy, 2000:24). Following this approach, we can identify six strands of globalisation and its effect on global society: *changing concepts of time and space; an increasing volume of cultural interactions, the commonality of problems facing all of the world's inhabitants; growing interconnections and interdependencies; a network of increasingly powerful transnational actors and organizations; synchronization of all the dimensions involved in globalization* (Cohen and Kennedy, 2000:24). Arguing from these strands, Cohen and Kennedy claim that this approach has two points of departure. One, is the notion of *globalism* and the other of *glocalization* – meaning that the globalisation process has a two-fold dynamic, from local to global, and global to local (Cohen and Kennedy, 2000:27). Or put differently, globalization from *above* and from *below*.

The changes which occurred from the end of the industrial revolution until today have caused a several changes in the way society is structured and conducted, in ways of economics, politics, social relations and culture. Within this period, the time-space distances were rapidly reduced, most notably in later decades, because of the developments in electronic communication and social media. The world is interconnected, bringing the population of the world towards a similar way of thinking, acting and pursuit of solidarity. Global resistance against the neo-liberal doctrine has been following different sets of ideas and tactics, such as *revolutionaries* and *reformist, universalists* and *localists, ideological* motivated and *identity-based* initiatives, *universalists* and *particularists, pluralists* and *communitarians, modernists* and *post-modernists* (Starr, 2000). The common denominator is the quest for alternatives to the current neo-liberal order, by interaction of citizens and groups, in networks and coalitions, and exchanging ideas and prospects.

Movements against neo-liberal globalization have networked together into families of movements, each very different from the other (della Porta, 2006:58), seemingly functioning

as a '*movement of movements*'. Even though the aggression is fluid, they come together on the basis of political affinities (della Porta, 2006:58). The unification between them has reconciled the organisations against capitalism, as critiques of globalisation (della Porta, 2006:58). Furthermore, several of the movements, in the past and present, like OWS, have tried out different forms of direct democracy and alternative forms of decision making, and the movements against neo-liberal globalisation increasingly make reference to the concept of consensus democracy (della Porta, 2006:58). The alter-globalisation movement may be defined as an ideological construction, or trend of global resistance, in order to redefine global interaction by other means. On the other hand, it should also be approached as the '*plural participation of grassroots from below in transnational solidarity networks*', whereas the defining aim is to enhance globalisation on a democratic track (Hosseini, 2006:5).

The variety of global activism may be defined as both *particularism* and *universalism*, which has interrelated dichotomies with the post-1960s social movements, and the theoretical frameworks adapted to explain them in an intersection between old and new social movements (Hosseini, 2006:6). The global activism, and the dualism by means and aims, within *global vs. local*, *particular vs. universal*, with *local autonomy* and *universal norms*, were not approached as contradictory, but rather sees as the same mechanism (Hosseini, 2006:6). The supposedly contested forces of resistance between particularism and cosmopolitanism, has been related to the local issues and thereafter related to issues of a broader context and global resistance (Kohler and Wissen, 2003:943). It is more of a logical conclusion that local and domestic issues and activism become interrelated to the global norms, as the domestic and global norms are increasingly interrelated. And with the episodes of the global '*occupy*' movement and OWS, there may be a subsequent debate of '*scale shift*' in contestation, from the global level to the networked domestic levels.

At the end of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st century, there was an escalation in the number of transnational movements, which challenged the intersection between a new type of *internationalism* and the emerging '*plural global solidarity*' (Sen et al. 2004:1). The theoretical frameworks of transnational and global movements intersect with the paradigm shift between old and new social movements, where there is a transformation of the power networked between the global civil society (Wainwright, 2004: xviii). The tactics adopted in the quest to change the current shortcomings of international political- and economic institutions, are, in the present days, focused on the intersection between reform and revolutions, and subsequently transforming into a '*non-reformist reform*' or '*revolutionary reform*' (MacEwan, 1999: 15). The latter leads to the upcoming debate -

whether there are any unique explanatory shifts in the GSM and TSM approach, compared with the previous debated intersection between old and new social movements.

2.3.3 Global Social Movement (GSM)

'Global society is a community of citizens and states organized around a shared human identity and common norms that promotes cooperation and social cohesion' (Smith, 2008:4). Global unity is here focussed on the understanding that *'citizens and social movements can have an impact on the way our common global future is shaped'* (Pleyers, 2010:11). A focus on a *global* social movement should not only be on the organization which attempts to unite the *global civil society*, but rather on the unity in *'social meanings'*, shared by the actors who embody them (Pleyers, 2010:11). But, the global civil society has various means and aims of approaching the notion of *'another world is possible'*, and the unity and networks of activists are organized in diverse ways.

The adoption of the term and theoretical framework, GSM, focuses on the varieties of action by different groups and organizations globally, in order to oppose the impact of neo-liberal globalisation, by a call for equality and prosperity. The main task of the activists in the GSM has been understood to counter the apparent negative aspects of global neo-liberalism. The movement facilitates a creation of unified identities among a heterogeneous mass and various approaches to alternative visions, processes, strategies and tactics. The altered movements in the pool of GSM are both distinctive and similar, in several aspects. The GSMs focuses on aspects such as redistribution of wealth and power, equity in material wealth, representation and influence, autonomy, representative and participatory democracy, rejection of traditional hierarchy, economic independence from concepts of *'growth'* and *'development'*, and rejection of the *'top-down'* model (Kingsworth, 2003: 317).

Buttel and Gould (2004) draw parallels between the GSM framework, and what they define as the *'anti-corporate globalization movement'* (Buttel and Gould, 2004:39). The latter movement is defined to be a broad coalition of the smaller movements (debt relief, fair trade and AIDS etc.) and the larger movements (human rights and organized labour movements), draw participants and participating organisations from a diversity of ideologies (Buttel and Gould, 2004:39). The commonality between them is the critique of their neo-liberal economic policies and the anti-democratic nature of international economic institutions (Buttel and Gould, 2004:39). The uniqueness of this movement structure is the adoption of interaction by

internet media, which enables them to coordinate participants and activities on an intercontinental arena, and thereby stimulating simultaneous global discussion and mobilisation (Buttel and Gould, 2004:39). The adopted organizational structure enables the leaders to maintain a diverse coalition across ideological and geographical commitments and to a non-hierarchical and consensus based decision making body. All members, delegates, movements and organisations are able to form '*spoke councils*', in order to lay strategic and tactical decisions, which enable them to include all members and operate without a formal leadership or a clear organization hierarchy (Buttel and Gould, 2004:39).

GSMs have been adept at creating coalition movement structures across and within national borders and new discourses (Buttel and Gould, 2004:41). Moreover, the GSMs have been able, in a logical and necessary way, to respond to the global processes, such as regional and international free trade agreements, market expansions, international governmental organisations and regimes, and particularly the growing international role played by MNCs (Buttel and Gould, 2004:41). Still, the critique of the GSM framework has been prominent from several areas. Their argument is that, as it has been approached to other frameworks in SMS, they are too wide to be precise and too narrow to capture the necessary complexity. The global liberation movements have been over-unified, homogenising the struggle of class, and failing to recognize differentiation within this, along lines of ethnicity, gender and class, and refused to accept the idea of a diversity of needs and aims (Eschle, 2001:37). GSM does not emphasise the intervening process that leads people into contentious politics, and exaggerate the role of globalisation in transnational activism (Tarrow, 2005: 5). It seems that the term '*GSM*' has so far been adopted as an '*umbrella term*', without being able to clearly define the mechanisms of global contestation. A more fertile approach will be found in the term '*transnational social movements*', defined and elaborated by Tarrow in his book '*the new transnational activism*' (2005).

2.3.4 Transnational Social Movement (TSM)

The term '*transnational*' has been defined as '*any non-governmental actor from one country that has relations with any actor from another country or organisation*' (Willets, 2005:430). Still, the framework *Transnational Social Movements* (TSM), as comparatively similar to the previously discussed movements, are clusters of relatively marginalized actors, which promote some form of social or political change (Smith et al. 1997:59). The overarching organisation has increasingly emerged to advance social movement goals,

whereas the movement promotes different goals, by facilitating for a variety of political opportunities in national, intergovernmental, and trans-governmental decision making arenas, where these factors influence the strategic choices they make (Smith et al. 1997:59). By these means, the movements and organisations are able to impact the outcome of global policy.

There are three processes of trans-nationalisation, by social movements, that have to be identified: *diffusion*; related to the spread of movement ideas, practices, and frames from one country to the next, *domestication*; the playing out on domestic territory of conflicts that have their origin externally, and *externalization*; relates to the challenges to super national institutions to intervene in domestic problems or conflicts (della Porta and Tarrow, 2005:2). When it comes to transnational collective action, there emerges a need to focus beyond the previously mentioned notions, which is the '*coordinated international campaigns on the part of networks of activists against international actors, other states, or international institutions*' (della Porta and Tarrow, 2005: 3).

Tarrow projects the understanding of transnational activism and the interlinked notion of local and global contention further. By linking the domestic to the international activism, the basic premises of his approach are that transnational activism has a historical background, that it is more than a reflex against globalisation, and that it is shaped in the opportunity structures of international politics (Tarrow, 2005:3). The historical background is based on diffusion and mobilization from below, whereas the diffusion across borders was most visible during the Reformation and anti-slavery movements in Europe, nationalism, printing and railroads. The international mobilisation was visible in socialist movements and political Islam (Tarrow, 2005:4). The new and different understanding of transnational activism is to be found in its frequency, spectrum and wider range of domestic and international concerns, whereas the most striking feature in contemporary movements is the connection to globalisation and changing structures of international politics (Tarrow, 2005:4-5). Still, domestic and transnational movements in collective action cannot be traced directly to grievances or social cleavages only (Tarrow, 2005:6). The links of alter-globalization and contentious collective action may not be traced to global economic injustice alone, in order to explain the rise of global social movements (Tarrow, 2005:6). In opposition to globalisation, Tarrow projects '*internationalism*' as a sphere where opportunity structures for transnational activism may emerge (Tarrow, 2005:8).

Internationalism reaffirms that nation states are the basic actors in the international system, but must also include the increased horizontal density of relations across states, governmental officials and non-state actors, vertical links among the subnational, national

and international levels, and incorporate an informal and formal structure of transnational activism and networks of non-state, state and international actors (Tarrow, 2005:8). By focusing on an increasingly complex synergy of internationalism, it is possible to approach the transnational activism and the political processes which activists trigger to connect their local claims across their borders and onto international processes.

As former social movements have been constituted with the creation of the nation state, the transnational growth of activism has been a *spill-over* from domestic contention across borders, and furthermore facilitated by an interlinked international activism against various players, between the local and global spheres. Further challenges are to understand the fusion between local and global contention. This fusion is created in a '*complex internationalism*', and defined as '*a dense, triangular structure of relations among states, non-state actors, and international institutions, and the opportunities this produces for actors to engage in collective action at different levels of this system*' (Tarrow, 2005:25). In order to approach the role and identity of the activists in 'complex internationalism', Tarrow has adopted the term '*rooted cosmopolitans*', which he finds to be '*individuals and groups who mobilize domestic and international resources and opportunities to advance claims on behalf of external actors, against external opponents, or in favour of goals they hold in common with transnational allies*' (Tarrow, 2005:29).

There are six processes of transnational contention. In order to approach an analysis of the domestic collective action in transnational contention, two frames may be adopted: '*global framing*'; where there is a mobilisation of international symbols to frame the domestic conflict, and '*internationalization*'; consisting of a response to foreign or international pressure within domestic politics (Tarrow, 2005:32). On the other hand, connected to domestic activism and international conflict there is the frame of '*diffusion*'; where there is a transfer of claims, or forms of contention from one site to the other, and '*scale shift*'; a coordination of collective action at a different level than where it began (Tarrow, 2005:32). Lastly, there are two processes which occur on the international level, which has the potential to create transnational social movements: '*externalization*'; a vertical projection of domestic claims onto international institutions or foreign actors, and '*transnational coalition formation*'; a horizontal formation of common networks among actors from different countries with similar claims (Tarrow, 2005:32).

Still, three claims may be articulated to understand the implications of fusing domestic and international activism. First, even as the domestic contention against international institutions could lead to internationalisation there will be no permanent links across the

border (Tarrow, 2005:33). Second, the diffusion of a particular form of collective action and a shift in the scale of contention may unify the action across the borders, but this is only temporary and may reduce domestic activism upon which true social movements must be built (Tarrow, 2005:34). Third, externalization of domestic contention and the formation of durable transnational coalitions are the strongest signs that a fusion of domestic and international contention is taking place (Tarrow, 2005:34).

2.4 Conclusion

World politics could be characterized as governance without government (Rosenau and Czempiel, 1992). This statement challenges the approaches of activists and scholars of global activism as a missing link between international relation studies (IR) and SMS, since the state is the main actor in an anarchical world system. All grievances must be addressed to the state, and not the international institutions, since it is the states which give authority to the global governance. Therefore, it is of vital importance to understand the context in which the movements operate, in order to understand their characteristics and opportunity. The transnational social movement which operates in a complex internationalism and the emerging multilateralism is an attempt to '*reconstitute civil society and political authorities on a global scale, building a system of global governance from the bottom up*' (Cox, 1997: xxvii). The challenge is to understand by what means the movements may approach the non-visible global government by the unification of a global civil society, or through the formal mechanisms approaching the state, and then the international.

Touraine claimed that the former labour movements were embodied in unions, parties, cooperatives and mutual aid organizations (Touraine, 1978:124). Pleyers claimed that the alter-globalization movement is embodied in diverse and relatively autonomous actors and events, activists, and networks across the globe (Pleyers, 2010:11). As the financial crisis set the pace in both the US and Europe, and challenges were disproportionately placed on the middle class, it could be claimed that OWS is the present class struggle of the former '*labour movement*'. But, as the next chapter will elaborate upon, OWS were a highly diverse movement in terms of its members, and in terms of their tactics and goals.

3. The Great Recession and Occupy Wall Street

The credit crisis of 2007, financial crisis of 2008, together, along with the difficult period that followed, known as '*The Great Recession*', are claimed to be as difficult as, and in some considerations worse than, the '*Great Depression*' of the early 1930s (McNally, 2011). During the early 1930s the global economy went into long-term decline, following the crash in the New York Stock Exchange in 1929. However, the economy managed to regain its strength, mostly, following the defeat of fascism in Europe, and '*the New Deal*' in the US. Nevertheless, Gills (2010:176) argues that the US economy gained stability and decline in unemployment by the mid 1930s, but claims that it remained in a systemic crisis until the mid 1940s. The roots of the Great Depression were to be found in unadjusted financial policy, blamed on the financial centres - which were later to be regulated by several legislations, preventing speculation, separating banks engaging in securities and insurance business, and from poor management. Examples of the following legislations were the '*Glass-Steagall Act*' and the '*Securities Act*', both established in 1933. The Roosevelt administration enacted significant financial reforms, with the intention of putting into place a system of money, banking, and investment based on community banks, mutual savings and loans, and credit unions (Korton, 2012:56).

During the 1930s, the threat of a popular uprising, mainly from the working class, pushed forward governmental intervention in the finance markets (Chomsky, 2012:25). Amongst others, Kramer (2012:39) has drawn an analogy between OWS and the protest during 1933-34. In one of the greatest strike years, 1934, nearly one and a half million workers engaged in over 1,800 broad-based strikes over the country (Kramer, 2012:41). Today, the '*Great Recession*' ended in the second quarter of 2009, but for most Americans there's no recovery of employment rates or median income (Gelder, 2012: 63). Even as the unemployment rate is declining, the median income of the average American household is still stagnant. The level of popular protest movements has since the start of the '*Great Recession*', been strong in both the US and across Europe. On both continents, the economy is and will be an important and challenging issue of debate.

In the previous chapter, the two terms '*globalisation*' and '*alter-globalisation*', in various forms, were discussed and conceptualised with the intersecting mechanism of transnational social movements advocating and mobilising for systemic change. This chapter will discuss and project the intersection of a '*financial crisis*' and '*systemic crisis*', in '*democratic capitalism*', as a source of contention. Hence, as Gills (2010:169) reminds us,

'the term 'crisis', like 'globalisation'... has been as used and abused in a bewildering variety of meanings and contexts'. Deriving from the understanding that OWS emerged from the context of the *'Great Recession'*, there are four statements which will be contextualised in order to proceed with the analysis of the main claim in this study; *'is OWS a new type of social movement?'* First, the connection between the *'Great Depression'* and the *'Great Recession'* will be discussed, following the claim that the latter is as difficult as, or even worse than, the former. It is important to see the linkages, because during the *'Great Depression'* the strikes came and went, just like OWS came and went during the *'Great Recession'*. Secondly, it will focus on the question as to whether the present crisis is centred in the US, or if it is truly a *'global crisis'*, following the claim that OWS is a reaction to a global *'systemic crisis'* (see Streeck, 2011). Thirdly, it will contextualise the struggle of OWS in the light of Critical Theory and Open Marxism. Fourth, it will elaborate on the main issues in the global *'financial- and systemic crisis'*, as seen in the balance between social and economic needs, in capitalist democracies. And lastly, what is OWS, what do they claim and how do we contextualise their contestation in terms of motives, organisational structure, tactics and political platform.

3.1 The Great Depression and the Great Recession

There have been several financial- and credit crises over the last decades, as seen in Asia in 1997-1998, Norway in 1987, and Argentina in 2001 (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2008:339), but generally they have been regional or national. Hence, arguably, they were caused by a global financial network, which only occurred in some countries and by wrongful national policies. On the other hand, *'systemic crises'* have occurred, according to Gills (2010), twice over the last century, namely during the *Great Depression* and in the aftermath of the *Financial Crisis*. A *'systemic crisis'* occurs when the interconnected financial system breaks down, and most states are affected by it. Several scholars have linked the two crises together in terms of causes, but not in terms of policy outcomes (Almunia, et al. 2010:220). In the US, the Great Depression was intervened by a strong state which passed a series of bills in order to prevent future crisis. In the aftermath of the Great Recession there has been less intervention, other than debates and frustration. The present struggle of OWS has not just been an movement against the current financial policy, but also the general political system, low degree of legitimacy and political representation, and the impact and power of Multi

National Corporations (MNC). Hence, most notably, both policies and social movement changes by time, space and context. Then, I would argue, it is the present context which makes OWS into a new type of social movement. Before we embark on this question and a categorisation of OWS, the upcoming discussion will provide the contextual frames and case study for the analysis in Chapter Four.

In an article from 1932, Gay (1932:522) articulates some of the challenges of the current time; *'the people... are now confronted by an emergency more serious than war... the gravity of the present situation lies not merely in the widespread suffering, vast as that is, but in the questions it excites concerning the fundamental strength and character of our economic structure'*. A financial depression, as transpired in the 1930s, was in the aftermath defined as when gross domestic product (GDP) declined 10 per cent, or greater, for a specified period of time (Posner, 2010:218). This has not been the case in the US, in the aftermath of the *financial crisis*. The present situation may rather be what Keynes (1936:218) argued to be *'unemployment equilibrium'*, which is a situation where capitalist systems have a tendency to fluctuate around a level well below full employment. In the aftermath of 1929 till 1933, the unemployment rate inclined from 5% till 25 %, and the GDP fell 25% by 1933 (Wade, 2009:543). Hence, the present crisis has had a stable unemployment rate at 10%. Krugman (2012), when analysing the financial crisis, follows Keynes's definition of a depression, where it is defined as *'a chronic condition of subnormal activity without any marked tendency either towards recovery or towards complete collapse'*. A *'financial crisis'*, on the other hand, may be defined as the collapse of activity in the financial sectors, along with reductions in real output, consumption, employment and other components of real activity (Cooper, 2002:159).

The start of modern economics goes back to the 18th century, the industrial revolution, and the theoretical foundations in Smith's *'Wealth of the Nations'*, and to the theoretical contribution of political economy by Ricardo, Malthus, Marshall and Mill. Later, in the aftermath of the *Great Depression*, modern economics was formed by the incorporation of Keynes paradigm shift in his approaches of political economy, most notably known by macroeconomics and *'The General Theory of Employment, Interests and Money'* (1936). Keynes (1931; 1963), among others, claimed that the financial markets were important sources and propagators of decline during the *Great Depression* (Calomiris, 1993:61). In the aftermath of the *Great Depression*, it was widely believed that unregulated markets were inherently unstable, subject to fraud and manipulation by insiders, and capable of triggering deep economic crisis, accompanied by political and social unrest (Crotty, 2009:563). In order

to protect the state and the national economy from these dangers, the US government created a strict financial regulatory system, which worked effectively through the 1960s (Crotty, 2009:563).

Still, the *Great Depression* of the 1930s did not end hastily, but was overcome by the ‘*great mobilization*’ of the 1940s – meaning that the government gained control over production decisions in major industries, advanced full capacity and employment (Galbright, 2009). This approach did address the root causes of the previous decades of over-concentration of wealth; ‘*over-exploitation of labour and the nature, over-accumulation of capital combined with under-consumption for the majority*’ (Gills, 2010:176). There were, according to Gills (2010:176), a need for restoration and rebuilding of the countervailing social forces, as a response to capital logic. Social forces, understood as non-state and private actors which are capable of causing change, were to gather on the grounds of social solidarity, ethos and identity, in order to facilitate for a more humane political economy. The social forces, as a countervailing force to capital logic, did prevail in the aftermath of the Great Depression. Furthermore, the *Great Depression* was transmitted internationally through capital flows, trade and commodity prices, even though countries were affected differently depending on their circumstances and policies (Almunia, 2010:221). Nonetheless, as the *Great Depression* began in the US, it could be characterized as a global phenomenon, as it were to impact most economies around the globe, but hardest in the US and Europe (Eichengreen and O’Rourke, 2012). The short term global effects of the *Financial Crisis* were as bad as those in the *Great Depression*, even though the global stock market and world trade declined faster during the *Financial Crisis* (Eichengreen and O’Rourke, 2012). In a historical perspective, the recovery of the economy may last longer than it did over the 1930s and 1940s, especially in Europe.

3.2 The US, the Global and neo-liberalism

In the period from 2001 until the bubble burst in 2007, the world economy had its best period of growth, than any other six year period, over the last three decades (Wade, 2008:23). But the downside was also present, as in 2006 when the US deficit was equal to India’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (Wade, 2008: 10). Subsequently, in 2007, the ‘*credit crunch*’ led the markets into the financial crisis, and a global financial crisis in 2008 – a crash that would turn into a *global recession* (Gamble, 2009:92). Five aspects converged during 2007; the real

estate crisis, the banking crisis, the credit crunch, the recession and the crisis of state indebtedness (Sarkar, 2011:190).

In the US, a *recovery* took place within financial institutions, such as banks, insurance companies, large corporations and stock markets, but the recovery has yet to *recover* the production and personal economy for the vast majority of Americans (Wolff, 2012:24). The financial crisis of 2008 were not only to hit the economy of the US, but as the global economy is highly integrated, no country or economy could escape it, even though some countries are at the centre and others in the periphery (Gamble, 2009: 114). In Europe, the financial crisis is as severe as in the aftermath of the Great Depression (Wolff, 2012: 57). In an analysis of the financial crisis, Gamble (2009: 102) asks the vital question; ‘*who is to blame for creating this mess?*’ In order to contextualise the financial crisis, Wade (2009: 7) describe the ‘*optimistic story*’, where he quotes Gillian Tett of the Financial Times; ‘*the pillars of faith on which this new financial capitalism was built have all but collapsed*’. The highly optimistic view for the future, was built on three premises: *policy*; a combination of loose monetary policy in the US and a failed financial regulation and supervision strategy, *recovery of GDP*; as unemployment will lag behind the GDP, and *pre-emption*; the recovery will occur rapidly enough to pre-empt political support for serious financial regulation and reform (Wade, 2009: 7-8). A natural starting point for the analysis is the US, where the crisis first occurred, and furthermore, because the US still has a dominant position, and significant structural capacities, in the global monetary system (Gamble, 2009:120).

If, as activists in OWS claim, the financial system is not just and fair, and has to be restructured and changed, the problems are plentiful. The rhetoric of OWS has most certainly ascended in the same path as that of Wade (2009); *financial capitalism has collapsed*. The challenging question which few may or will dare to embark upon: what are the options for the future policies of the monetary system, both nationally and globally? Gamble (2009) discusses five frameworks in order to portray the picture of different ideas that have been dominant over the last years. As Gamble (2009: 141) argues; capitalist crisis are not events of nature, but the battle of ideas – on how to secure jobs, growth and prosperity. In this approach the *market fundamentalists*; emphasise the maintenance of financial stability and safeguard the market order, through the financial growth model, meaning that the market will fulfil the stabilization of international order, *national protectionists*; where the first priority is the security and welfare state of the national community, through governmental responsibility, *regulatory liberals*; furthering preservation of a relatively open global economy, through new regulatory structures and curbing the excesses of neo-liberalism, *anti-capitalists*; as it

implies, are going against the present world order, previously consisted of socialist movements, but now containing the green movements, arguing for a stronger state control, like the nationalisation of the banks (Gamble, 2009:143-163). The fourth framework, *cosmopolitan liberals*, focuses on tightening regulatory control over the economy, but through the establishment of new forms of global governance (Gamble, 2009:143-163). In order to change the existing international regime, the cosmopolitan liberals call for social movements from below, by changing the order of institutional frames and their policy and containments (Gamble, 2009:143-163). Lastly, the more powerful changes are to be found in the call for change within global institutions and regimes, such as G-7 and G-20, IMF, WB and WTO, and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), to balance structural power away the few powerful states, towards a broader band of inclusion and unity within global governance and global civil society. The goal, according to Gamble (2009:157), is to change the overarching structure of the global economy and its growth, through long-term and balanced growth, by redistribution of wealth and power within the global governance. Nonetheless, it does not mean an abolishment of the global market economy, as anti-capitalists ask for, but preventing protectionism, installing global regulations and building institutions of cosmopolitan democracy. As social movements call for, Gamble (2009: 167) emphasises the dilemma, ‘*how can the world be brought to face these challenges and begin to manage them?*’ These are among the questions and tasks global civil society-activists have undertaken. Among these activists are OWS. Both nationally and globally. But, still, these are only theoretical approaches. The next discussion will elaborate on the challenges which OWS and global civil society attack; the heart of the system.

3.3 Legitimacy and socio-economic issues

As Gramsci elaborated upon eight decades ago, the role of *legitimacy*, and not *force* or *markets*, is the main element in social relations and the cause of contestation. Even though the issue of legitimacy would not arise without force or markets, it is a highly relevant issue for most activist, and especially OWS⁴, today. Gramsci acknowledges that the situation and process is different in every country, although the content is the same. The content is the crisis of the ruling class’s hegemony, where it is defined as a ‘*crisis of authority*’, and approached as a general ‘*crisis of the state*’ (Gramsci, 1971:210). The global crisis of today is

⁴ OWS has been, by many, defined as a movement mainly attacking the lack of ‘representative democracy’, where private actors have too much power and influence (Rehman, 2013).

a crisis of state authority and credibility, understood as a rift between the ‘*ruling ideology*’ and the ‘*popular masses*’ (Gramsci, 1971:275). The issues of *legitimacy*, and explicitly the lack of it, has been a cause and reason for upheavals and contestation over the history, be it during the French Revolution, the anti-Vietnam movement, the anti-WTO movement, WB or IMF, or over the issues of globalisation. The shared similarities, in the grievances of these movements, are the lack of legitimacy in state institutions or international institutions. The issue at hand, in this study, is the lack of legitimacy and discontent in *global capitalism* and *democratic capitalism*, as a cause of justified contention by following a united ‘*common sense*’. The social tension, which has been visible in democratic capitalism since the late 1980s, will build to an explosive level (Shutt, 2005: 129). Shutt (2005:83) elaborates on the point; ‘*the public image of global capitalist economic order has been transformed from that of an almost universally triumphant success to one of chaotic failure bordering on collapse... blurring the public’s perception of the full extent of the systemic crisis*’, which are not only signs of breakdown but evidently the rising discontent with it.

The present crisis, as seen in the aftermath of the collapse in the American financial system in 2008, became both an economic and political crisis of global dimensions (Streeck, 2011:5). Still, as the neo-liberal doctrine has been implemented in various degrees around the world, its impact and contention will differ depending on the location. As the origin, and point of study, the US should be the natural focus of analysis. In order to contextualize the crisis, it should be approached as a conflicting transformation of the social formation within ‘*democratic capitalism*’ (Streeck, 2011:5). Democratic capitalism was established in the Western world, after World War II, and laid the foundation of ideas and expectations of economic growth, in an extraordinary way over the following decades (Streeck, 2011:5). The system of democratic capitalism and economic growth functioned in a condition ruled by an endemic conflict between capitalist markets and democratic politics (Streeck, 2011:6), which resulted in a lack of economic growth, rising unemployment and indebted states by the end of the 1970s. Over the last three decades, neo-liberal policies have caused a ‘*really bitter class war that has led to social, economic and political arrangements in which the system of democracy has been shredded*’ (Chomsky, 2012: 54).

The legitimacy crisis within democratic capitalism is not a new issue, as discussed above, and has been debated by scholars such as Habermas (1974: 5), where he claim that the conflict in a capitalist society has its form in two ways; as the priority of economic imperatives cannot depend on the discursive formation of the publics will and therefore appears as a technocracy, and the depoliticised public is excluded from discussion as a result

of long-term erosion of the cultural tradition, regulated conduct and bounded condition of the political system, which all together causes a chronic need for legitimation. Or, said by other words, capitalism and democracy does not function easily together. The critique forwarded by Habermas may, today, be seen as not only a critique towards the financial crisis, but also towards a '*systemic crisis*'. Hence, the suspicion and subsequent lack of legitimacy in democratic capitalism, and that capitalism and democracy may not function together easily, should not be projected as something new (Streeck, 2011:6). But, it became a political crisis of rationality, because '*the administrative system can no longer make the imperatives it receives from the economic system compatible with the extension of the masses*', which causes a crisis of legitimisation as '*the system of legitimisation can no longer maintain the loyalty of the masses to the necessary level while complying with the imperatives it has received from the economic system*' (Habermas, 1973: 68), which means that the insufficiency of rationality causes insufficiency of legitimisation. *System theory* will characterise it as a crisis when the structure of a social system facing problems offers less possibilities towards solution than the system demands to endure (Habermas, 1973:11). A crisis, be it legitimacy or systematic, has occurred when the social forces are mobilised into a social movement, which confront or alter the legitimacy of those in power or the system they operate within. OWS was one of those who confronted the legitimacy within democracy.

According to Touraine (1996:106-107), the natural legitimisation of liberalism, has already been worn out and destroyed by economic globalisation. If so, the answer will not be found in the present structures nor will there be a platform for debate. The current financial crisis could be approached as a moment of an epochal change, as the G-20 meeting in London reported; '*we face the greatest challenges to the world economy in modern times... major failures in the financial sector and in financial regulation and supervision were fundamental causes of the crisis. Confidence will not be restored until we rebuild trust in our financial system*' (Morgan, 2010:17). The construction of the financial structures that we see today have been made by governments and various social actors, who produced the institutional arrangements by laws and rules, on property rights, governance structures and rules of exchange for all markets in capitalist societies (Fligstein, 2001: 27). Even as the financial structures have been constructed by various actors and given legitimacy by laws and regulations, it is still a puzzle for scholars, as it is for OWS, on how to deconstruct it. And if it is to be deconstructed by legitimacy, it will be reconstructed by an open and legitimate democracy.

The constructed legitimacy, as in national and international structures, rests on three pillars of institutions, *the cognitive*; which are the technical knowledge and understanding which make them work, *the normative*; which is the underlying beliefs of market actors about the best way in which the market should work, and *the regulative framework*; which is how the rules of the market are developed and shaped (Morgan, 2010:18). In times of crisis in the market, like the present, there are two types of legitimacy which need to be distinguished and addressed; the political and the pragmatic (Morgan, 2010: 20). *Political legitimacy* occurs when there is a broad social consensus that something has gone wrong, and that governmental and intergovernmental institutions should interfere (Morgan, 2010: 20). This has to do with market failures, when private actors generate the failure and the public is left to deal with the mess, and the restoration is through control and regulation (Morgan, 2010: 20). In a transnational market crisis governments and regulators must engage in complex negotiations and improve cooperation to deal with the polycentric range of audiences (Morgan, 2010: 20). On the other hand, *pragmatic legitimacy* is a more fragile form of legitimacy, which rests on the self-interested calculations of corporate actors about the expectations of their peers (Morgan, 2010:21). This type of crisis and pragmatic legitimacy occurs when social practices, which had previously worked, seem to collapse and the positive outcomes are no longer being produced (Morgan, 2010:21). The present is a mixture of both political legitimacy and pragmatic legitimacy, calls for governmental interference and international negotiations. Even though social practices have almost collapsed and outcomes are less to few, the steps towards any solution, both in the US and Europe seems far away.

At present, we observe stagnant, and even declining incomes for the majority of the population, insecurity, and rising unemployment, in a system which used to be very strong, and now is seemingly weakened (Chomsky, 2012: 54). The, almost natural, consequences have been a conflict in the political economy of democratic capitalism, which is ruled by two conflicting principles: *productivity*; which is the merits of the free market forces, and *social needs*; which is the entitlement of collective choices under democratic politics (Streeck, 2012:7). Governments, under democratic capitalism, are theoretically required to honour both principles simultaneously, even though the two will never align (Streeck, 2012:7). In Marxian terms, the classical economic theory projects market justice as '*true justice*', which means that rewards are according to contribution rather than needs defined as rights (Streeck, 2012:8). In this understanding and adoption of justice, economic theory becomes the social theory (Streeck, 2012:8). A lack of alignment, which decreases the will of the majority, leads to bitterness, anger, frustration, and a particular atomized society (Chomsky, 2012:55). In this

approach, Chomsky (2012:55) elaborates that ‘*occupy is really the first sustained response to this*’. The idea of a ‘*moral economy*’, under which the citizens have rights that take precedence over the outcomes of market exchanges, are ideas that people will not give up (Streeck, 2012:8). An understanding that a ‘*moral economy*’, which relates to the ‘*common sense*’ of the vast majority and gains support by the ‘99%’, has its relations to the evolution of political economy and the discrepancy between growth/output and needs. According to Streeck; ‘*this is arguably what Polanyi described as a counter-movement against the commodification of labour in The Great Transformation*’ (Streeck, 2012:8). OWS may be referred to as a worldwide protest against the economic and social injustice caused by capitalism’s power over governments and the individual, which has led to a skewed distribution of wealth in the developed world. The goal, even though utopian, is a pathway closer towards a political economy for the 99%. The logic and legitimacy in this path is what Gramsci defines as a ‘*good sense*’, which is the healthy nucleus of a ‘*common sense*’ (Rehman, 2013:9).

3.4 The ‘Polanyian Problematic’ lens

Two ways of approaching the challenges of a new economy, as opted by OWS, could be to adopt ‘*Open Marxism*’ – as a critique towards the separation of state and civil society, and of politics and economics (Bieler and Morton, 2003:469), or a ‘*Polanyian Problematic*’ – as it presents a complex, unified and dialectical means to interpret globalisation and its social contestation by diverse social and political forces (Munch, 2006:175). Inherent, within both, is the adoption of Critical Theory, when analysing globalisation, social forces and resistance. Still, these theoretical approaches do not define ‘*social movements*’ as a social force *per se*, but rather address the comprehensive features of social forces through the studies of Global Political Economy (GPE) and contestation. Hence, a ‘*double movement*’ approach, as debated in ‘*The Great Transformation*’, will, on the one hand, characterise the unfettered market economy, and on the other hand the countermovement of (global) civil society (Block, 2001:4). A failed approach will be to contextualise OWS as a counterhegemonic movement of the hegemonic order of neo-liberalism. The starting point shall and should be the idea of a progressive movement, with strong means and less goals.

The immanent critique, which originated from the Frankfurt School of Critical Theory, and through critical economy by the conception of the state, where it promotes an

understanding of the state as a ‘*social relation of production*⁵’ and offers insights into the class-related social forces linked to contemporary processes of capitalist development, issues of resistance and collective agency (Bieler and Morton, 2003:467). Social forces, as such, are the main collective actors, which operate within and across ‘*the forms of state*’ and ‘*shapes of world order*’, by bringing together a coherent conjuncture of *ideas* (inter-subjective meanings and collective images of the world order), *material capabilities* (accumulated resources) and *institutions* (the amalgams of the previous two) (Cox, 1981: 139). Open Marxism will, ultimately, be a critical approach which interrogates theoretical and practical categories, as it is intentional about the constitution of the social world, in a spirit of opposition and resistance to capitalist relations and exploitation (Bieler and Morton, 2003: 468).

As opposed to the theoretical approaches of neo-realist and neo-liberal institutionalists, where the notions ‘*state*’ and ‘*market*’ are taken for granted and adopt the two separate entities as their starting point of investigation, ‘*Open Marxism*’ will suggest to adopt the ‘*social relations of production*’ as a starting point (Bieler and Morton, 2003: 470). Within this approach, the *state* (politics) and *civil society* (economics) will be connected, and the collective identity will be connected with the individual elements. The separation of state and civil society obscures the social class antagonism between capital and labour, and was further projected as the social phenomenon within which conflict occurs (Bieler and Morton, 2003: 472). Furthermore, it is the separation of state and civil society which distorts the relationship between the state and globalisation in the mainstream GPE approaches, where the state and the market are approached as two opposed forms of social organisation (Bieler and Morton, 2003: 472). Subsequently, a critical approach will be more suitable to the study of global civil society, as the civil society is the central point of investigation for contestation and class-struggle. Furthermore, as the study will elaborate upon, there is a discussion whether class, in the struggle between state and markets, is the main actor of analysis in a case study of OWS.

On the other hand, the ‘*Polanyian problematic*’ of the ‘*double movement*’ might function as a heuristic device for approaching globalisation and contestation, at the beginning of the 21st century (Munck, 2006:175). Even though Polanyi’s work, ‘*The Great Transformation*’ was first published in 1944, and later revised in 2001, it attracted attention as it argued that ‘*another world is possible*’, in the contestation against neo-liberalism, globalisation and capitalism (Munck, 2006:176). The ‘*Polanyian problematic*’ may be

⁵ Cox defines ‘*production*’ to be understood in the broadest sense. ‘*It is not confined to the production of physical goods used or consumed. It covers the production and reproduction of knowledge and of the social relations, morals and institutions that are prerequisites to the production of physical goods*’ (Cox, 1989:39).

adopted for three main reasons. First, it holds contemporary relevance for those who seek to understand the world in a sense of post-Washington Consensus and the impact of neo-liberalism (Munck, 2006:176). Second, it argues in favour of the alter-globalisation movement, as the movement by itself does not have utopian aims, but rather that the self-regulating market is a utopian goal as it simply cannot be achieved (Munck, 2006:176). Thirdly, it provides an interesting sphere for innovation and creativity in an era when socialism, as we have known it, seems neither viable as a policy system, nor attractive as an ideology for social transformation (Munck, 2006:176). Therefore, according to Munck (2006:180), the '*Polanyian problematic*' will pose the possibility that history advances through a series of '*double movements*'. Still, Polanyi stresses that '*social class*' is not always a determinant in the form of economic determinism, as seen in the '*new social movements*' mobilised around non-class issues (Munck, 2006:182). But, Polanyi emphasises that the fate of social classes is more frequently determined by the needs of the society than the fate of the society is determined by the needs of classes (Munck, 2006:182). The '*double movement*' will consist of members of one or more social classes, in a struggle to counter the wrongdoings of globalisation and neo-liberalism, towards equality and sustainability. By approaching this understanding of social classes and global civil society, it enables us to approach the fundamentals of social movements, and OWS.

As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the recovery after the financial crisis took place within the financial institutions, and accordingly recovery within the private economy of the citizens will take time - there has even been widespread anger at the Wall Street bailouts. Fukuyama (2012:53) emphasized the point that there has been no great upsurge by left-wing Americans, but rather a dynamic populist movement by the right-wing (*Tea Party*). According to Fukuyama (2012), the failure of a left-wing mobilisation is to be found in the lack of ideas, as opposed to the right-wing realm of ideas. The essence of these observations is the fact that the current form of globalised capitalism is eroding the middle-class⁶ social base, on which liberal democracy rests (Fukuyama, 2012). In a historical perspective, during the first half of the 20th century, there was a strong belief on the progressive left that some form of socialism, government control of the commanding heights of the economy in order to ensure, relatively, egalitarian distribution of wealth, was unavoidable for all advanced

⁶ The middle-class is here understood to be the people who are neither at the top nor at the bottom of their societies in terms of income, who have received at least secondary education, and who own either real property, durable goods, or their own business (Fukuyama, 2012: 54).

countries – ‘*socialism was believed to represent the will and interests of the vast majority of people in modern democracies*’ (Fukuyama, 2012:54-55).

Still, as the middle class grew and gained strength around the world, the appeal of a Marxist approach towards political economy and social relations diminished, mostly because the middle class is believed to act in their self-interests to protect their property and position, and only support democracy on principled grounds (Fukuyama, 2012:56). Within this sphere, it is believed that modern capitalism created the middle class and abolished working-class (Fukuyama, 2012:58), and therefore presents the vital question; does global capitalism undermine the middle-class and the base on which liberal-democracy rests upon? Fukuyama’s answer is yes, and adds the challenging notion; that a left-wing mobilisation will not happen as long as the middle class of the developed world remain enthralled by the narratives of the past generation; that their interests will be best served by ever-freer markets and smaller states (Fukuyama, 2012:61). Still he concludes, ‘*the alternative narrative is out there, waiting to be born*’ (Fukuyama, 2012:61).

At this point there are no alternative systems next to capitalism and socialism, and OWS has not presented any, if only setting the path towards something else. Furthermore, as a class-less and horizontal movement, without any motives, except objecting inequality and failed representation, OWS is a difficult puzzle to fit into a more challenging picture. It is clear that the neo-liberal doctrine and globalisation will trigger counter-movements, but it is less clear if they will achieve any of their goals, even though they still will ‘*rattle to pieces the brittle structures that support global laissez-faire*’ (Gray, 1999:20). An alternative ideology, as opposed to socialism and capitalism, has to be populist; ‘*the message would begin with a critique of the elites that allowed the benefit of the many to be sacrificed to that of the few and a critique of the money politics, especially in Washington, that overwhelmingly benefits the wealthy*’ (Gray, 1999:20). So, what are the challenging issues presented, and how may they be born? The consequences of the present system, and subsequent lack of alternatives, are that the neo-liberal politics undermine social-democratic structures, welfare-state structures, and the power of labour and create an increasingly in-egalitarian society, with increased power in the hands of the corporate sector and the wealthy (Chomsky, 2012:64).

Chomsky (2012:64) defines the present financial crisis and its opposition as two ways of analysing it; a ‘*class war*’ and a ‘*failure of design*’. A main issue in the analysis of OWS has been whether it is a movement of the ‘*middle class*’ or a social movement of the left. None of them seem to be describing the movement, but the notion of ‘*failure of design*’ may

be more accurate. As there has been two global '*financial crisis*', and the first were overcome by government intervention, regulations and a massive mobilisation, how did we get into another recession and what has changed? According to Korton (2012:56-57) the '*Main Street*' economy of the US, understood as the will of the many, as opposed to the '*Wall Street*' economy, in the aftermath of the *Great Depression*, financed the victory in WWII, created the strong American middle class, laid the foundation for an unprecedented period of economic stability and prosperity, and placed America as the global leader in industry and technology. This system secured the American dream of a stable and comfortable life in return for hard and honest work, for the majority of Americans (Korton, 2012: 56-57). But, in the 1970s, Wall Street mobilised their interests to use their financial and media power to re-establish control over the economy (Korton, 2012: 56-57). Since then, according to Korton (2012: 56-57), it has been defined as a '*class-war*', which Wall Street won. When analysing the rhetoric of OWS, it is clear that it creates a class-divide, between the 1% and the 99% (Schmitt, 2012:20), and then furthers the point by Chomsky (2012:54), that OWS actually creates class consciousness. The uprising of OWS, has inhabited members of all social classes, and has gained support in most states where the financial crises stroke the hardest. A '*class-war*' approach does, partly, seem to fit. But, rather, a '*failure of design*' – as a just cause for contention and a breach of '*common sense*', seems to be more fitting. If so, a class-war against the failed system, the further notion and essence is whether it was a brief moment of contest, or a brief moment of a moment in contest.

3.5 Occupy Wall Street (OWS)

OWS started, officially, in September 2011. The movement claimed to be inspired by the tactical manoeuvres of Arab Spring, and the uprisings in Europe earlier the same year, and were taking place by a challenge from the Canadian magazine *Adbusters*; to meet up on Wall Street, on September 17 and bring a tent (Schwartz, 2011: 2). An labour organisation, the New Yorkers Against Budget Cuts, responded by organising a meeting on 1 August, and by coordinating the logistics for the coming occupation (Bennet, 2011: 2). A few thousand people showed up on 17 September, and at the end of the day some of them set up a camp in Zuccotti Park (Gelder, 2012:1). The movement, which no politician or pundit predicted, was to become a national, and later an international movement (Gelder, 2012:1). During the fall of 2011, OWS gained headlines, in both national and international media. In the aftermath of September 17, 2011, there have been several attempts to describe, theorize and analyse the

movement, mostly on the issues of their political programme and influential power on national and international policy makers (Rehman, 2013:1).

As this study will attempt to characterise and label OWS within social movement studies (SMS), the subsequent descriptive case study will contain of three elements. First, it will approach the founding of the movement, and its spread across borders. Second, it will provide a summary of its organisational structure, political motives and tactics. Third, it will discuss the manifest of the movement, as seen in the '*manifest of the 99%*'.

3.5.1 Birth and consolidation

The birth of the movement, Kroll (2012:16) argues, started months before 17 September, which were the initial encampment in Zuccotti Park. On the fourth floor of 16 Beaver Street, a group of artists, activists, writers, students, and organizers, of different nationalities met, to talk about changing the world. The group was to lay the foundation of an organizing body in what was to be known as the '*New York City General Assembly*' (NYCGA) (Kroll, 2012:16). Then, in July 2011, the Canadian anti-capitalist magazine, *Adbusters*, issued a call to flood lower Manhattan with ninety thousand protesters, under the slogan; '*Are you ready for a Tahrir moment?*' (Kroll, 2012:16). The idea, as in Cairo's Tahrir, was to occupy, be seen and be heard. Two of the participants in the 16 Beaver Street meeting, were a couple from Spain, who had participated in the '*Indignados*' movement on 15 May, also known as 15-M, articulated a desire to replicate a core part of the movement to the US – the general assembly (Kroll, 2012:17). The US version of a general assembly became a '*leaderless group of people who get together to discuss pressing issues and make decisions by pure consensus*' (Kroll, 2012:17).

By August 2011, the movement started its consolidation, by continued leaderless structure and non-hierarchical organisation, but by popular consent and inclusion. On 2 August, a group from 16 Beaver Street decided to hold an assembly, in the context of a congressional hearing of the possible cuts in the debt ceiling, which turned out to become a general assembly, a discussion on no single issues or persons (Kroll, 2012:18). The NYCGA were to meet regularly on Saturdays, discussing issues of economics and politics (Kroll, 2012:19). *Adbusters*' call for the rally and their iconic picture of the ballerina on top of Wall Street's charging bull, connected with the NYCGA, and settled on the date; 17 September, as the day of action in Wall Street (Kroll, 2012:19). The protests and occupation were soon to spread across the country, from Boston to Los Angeles (Kroll, 2012:20). After 17 September,

the movement spread rapidly online, to thousands of locations globally, through social networking sites, and more than 1500 unique Facebook pages (Gaby and Caren, 2012:368). On October 15 2011, the OWS movement went global, in 951 cities, 82 countries, under the banner of ‘*October 15*’ and ‘*Global Change*’, protesting against income equality, corrupt politicians, and economies rigged to benefit a wealthy few at the expense of everyone else (Kroll, 2012:21). By that time, OWS were to play a large role in criticising the crisis management of global capitalism (Gagy, 2012:146).

3.5.2 Tactics

As different from ‘formal’ social movements and conventional political interaction, where concrete demands and negotiations are conducted with political authorities for compromises and settlements, OWS captured spaces of representation, both physical and discursive, as their main offensive (Suliman, 2013:120). According to Dutta (2012:44-45), the aim of OWSs tactics has been to disrupt the hegemony of global neo-liberalism, by the presence of protestors and occupiers at the financial centre, Wall Street, where they interrogate and challenge the taken-for-granted assumption of the privatised process involved in economic decision making. As this description of OWS and their tactics is somehow unconventional in formal politics, the ideas of the ‘*encampments*’ and occupiers are simple, the notion of ‘*symbolic protests*’ and ‘*collective identity building*’, as seen in former social movements. As a more nuanced approach, Suliman (2013:119) characterised the acts of OWS to be ‘*resistance politics*’, concerned with claiming physical space and creating representational spaces. The most prominent tactic of OWS, and mostly focused on by the media, has been the urban tent camps within major cities. Still, the tactics of OWS have been a physical occupation of symbolic places, like Wall Street, as a site of US and global economic decision making, where OWS seeks to recapture the site, and through the process, challenge the privatised nature of US and global economic decision making (Dutta, 2012: 44-45). Furthermore, the confrontation and building of camps in public spaces has its aim to visualise who they are and what they stand for, for example develop movement frames, ideologies and a shared identity (van Stekelenburg, 2012: 226-227). The tactics of building connections at the grassroots and networks of cooperation lies at the heart of OWS, which is based upon solidarity, resources, concepts and communication (Dutta, 2012:46-47). Collective identity building became sacred to OWS, whereas the movement were to be built from scratch and aimed to grasp the 99%, as a counterbalance to the 1%.

As the adoption of ‘*non-violence*’ has become a buzzword of the present-day movements, OWS has officially embraced ‘*diversity of tactics*’ (Schneider, 2012: 39). One may understand this as condoning acts of violence, but the issue has ever since been of the table and the issues of property damage and self defence continued to be debated within OWS (Schneider, 2012: 39). The guidelines for the movement were later promulgated by OWS’s Direction Action Committee; ‘*don’t instigate physical violence against cops or pedestrians*’ and ‘*we respect the diversity of tactics, but consider how our actions may affect the entire group*’ (Schneider, 2012: 39). The values of the movement as a whole and the autonomy of the single protester have been seen throughout OWS, as they focus on individual autonomy, consensus decision-making, decentralisation and equality (Schneider, 2012:40). The adopted form of ‘*diversity in tactics*’ has been defined as a form of political disobedience *par excellence*, mostly because its emphasis on autonomy, rather than authority, represents a direct contradiction to the kind of order that ordinary politics presupposes (Schneider, 2012:42). Still, several hundred of the movements’ protesters have been arrested, and in some cases have even been attacked by police using pepper-spray (Schneider, 2012:41).

3.5.3 Organisation

The description of OWS, is on their webpage: ‘*Occupy Wall Street is a leaderless resistance movement with people of many colours, generations and political persuasions. The one thing we all have in common is that We Are The 99% that will no longer tolerate the greed and corruption of the 1%. We are using the revolutionary Arab Spring tactic to achieve our ends and encourage the use of nonviolence to maximize the safety of all participants*’ (Dutta, 2012: 44-45). OWS provide an essential consensus based organisation and democratic structures, not only in the NYCGA, but in all camps (Rathke, 2011: 84). The somewhat new feature for OWS, compared to former and similar social movements, has been the clear-cut leaderless philosophy, non-hierarchical structure and consensus based organisation. The organisational structure, which OWS has adopted, is that the camps function as the organisation, by consensus, as a democratic ideal. The grassroots occupation is constituted in resistance to the top-down forms of decision making in neo-liberal structures, which lies in the hand of the small and powerful elite (Dutta, 2012:46). OWS further define themselves as:

'a people-powered movement that began on September 17, 2011 in Liberty Square in Manhattans Financial District, and has spread to over 100 cities in the United States and actions in over 1500 cities globally. #ows is fighting back against the corrosive power of major banks and multinational corporations over the democratic process, and the role of Wall Street in creating an economic collapse that has caused the greatest recession in generations. The movement is inspired by popular uprisings in Egypt and Tunisia, and aims to fight back against the richest 1% people that are writing the rules of an unfair global economy that foreclosing on our future' (Dutta, 2012:46).

Procedures and processes which are conducted at the local General Assemblies are organically developed, incorporating learning curves and flexibility at the collective decision making at each General Assembly (Dutta, 2012:47). The web-page of OWS therefore provides a *'quick guide'*, which has the purpose to facilitate and encourage development of group dynamics in people assemblies (Dutta, 2012:47). The essence of collective thinking, as articulated on their web-page, is that it *'is born when we understand that all options, be these options our own or others, need to be considered when generating consensus and that an idea, once it has been constructed indirectly, can transform us. Do not be discouraged: we are learning; we'll get there: all that's needed is time'* (Dutta, 2012:48-49). The structure of *'collective thinking'* and consensus is in opposition to the notions of top-down decision making in the political economy of neo-liberalism. The networked movement has an emphasis on the spread of information, as seen in web-pages such as *'how to occupy: grassroots practice for global change'*, where the subsection *'how to camp/how to occupy'* explains: this *'is conceived to promote and spread the methods, techniques and knowledge about peaceful occupation of public spaces while developing sustainable ways of living based on participatory democracy'* (Dutta, 2012:51).

The motive of the post 1968-movements, as it is for *'occupy'*, has been to think globally and act locally (van Stekelenburg, 2012: 229). Dutta (2012:66-67) claims the movement's linkages between the local and the global to be articulated in the resistance against neo-liberal economic policies. On the one hand, as it has been claimed, the movements action in New York and across the US, were juxtaposed in relationship with the popular assemblies in Egypt, Spain, Oaxaca, and worldwide (Dutta, 2012:67). Furthermore, there are the worldwide occupy- and social justice movements on 15 October as organised solidarity protests (Dutta, 2012:67). OWS were at large organised on the basis of social media, in a horizontal network. And, pled for an international day of action, 15 October,

whereas there were 500.000 protesters in Madrid (Schneider, 2011:17). By February 2012, there were 1,590 global encampments which associated themselves with Occupy (van Stekelenburg, 2012:224).

Indications of a worldwide solidarity protest is to be found on their web-pages, under headings such as '*mass days of action*', '*occupy together*', '*actions and directory*', '*interoccupy*' and '*how to occupy*', where 1465 protest-cities around the world had adopted the twitter-hyperlink of OWS (Dutta, 2012:68). Gagy (2012:146) links OWS to the protests in Eastern Europe, in Warsaw, Prague, Budapest, Belgrade and Sofia, where a few hundred people participated in the call for world revolution. For instance, the Milla movement in Hungary, participated on 23 October 2011, and shared similarities on the desire to not enter into party politics, but rather aims to enhance civil engagement (Gagy, 2012:146).

3.5.4 Politics

The first documented political statement from OWS, produced by NYCGA, claims that they were imagining a new socio-political and economic alternative that offers greater possibility of equality (The Occupy Wall Street General Assembly, 2011:25). Also, the '*Declaration of the Occupation of New York*', accepted by the NYCGA on 29 September 2011, was a public statement, but did not make any real political demand (Suliman, 2013: 119). Rather, the statement consisted of a list of grievances (Suliman, 2013:119). The organisational structures and way of conducting consensus politics towards a coherent policy platform has not worked out, in a typical fashion. Butler (2011: 193), explains this by the differences of authorities and OWS, where the concrete demands could simply not be written into a policy platform. Furthermore, the organisational structures of OWS, and the 'cell structured' encampments had different grievances and common causes, which could not be isolated into a shared document (Schmitt et al. 2012: 6). This has been, in most regards, the weakest link of OWS.

Even though the protesters rallied against inequality, the power of the financial sector, the large multinational corporations, and failed politics, the grievances seems to be quite vague in where to address the grievances. Still, the major slogan and main claim, '*we are the 99%*', aspired to most of the occupiers (van Stekelenburg, 2012: 224-225). The slogan, '*we are the 99%*', refers to the '*99%*' of the population which possess 60 per cent of the worlds wealth, whereas the '*1%*' possesses the remaining 40 per cent of the worlds wealth (van Stekelenburg, 2012:225). Through out the General Assemblies, issues of debate included;

debt cancellation, taxes on financial transactions, the reinstatement of the Glass-Steagall Act, paid sick leave for all, full employment, the creation of a mechanism for ensuring political transparency, and imposition of a social wage (Roth, 2011: 4). The narrative of greed in the voices of resistance against economic injustice, as approached in an alter-capitalist movement, is to resist corporate greed, which is the core of the OWS movement. Still, in the post ‘*no hate*’, the change that defines the characteristics of OWS, and their stance towards corruption, greed and wealth, it is articulated as;

‘many people from different places have been affected by the greed of the 1% and by the false solutions of corporate greed, union busting, and the slashing and privatization of social services. The 99% is varied and broad – but we have principles of solidarity, and we are working together to make a better world – a world of inclusion, dignity, love and respect. #OWS has no space for racism, sexism, trans-phobia, anti-immigrant hatred, xenophobia, and hatred in general’ (Dutta, 2012:55).

The main frame of understanding, when analysing the political motives of OWS, is close towards a holistic paradigm, which Rasza and Kurnik (2012: 238) defines as ‘*crisis of representative democracy*’. The ideas put forward by OWS, which were regarded as pointless by mainstream media and formal political institutions, were rather a form of movement politics *par excellence* – calling into attention the ‘*permanent state of crisis in democratic politics and global markets*’ (Suliman, 2013: 120). The OWS movement is structured on solidarity, and is made up by collective experiences of marginalised people from different places (Dutta, 2012:56). Therefore, the greed of the 1% is to be understood as the framework against which the resistance of the movement is organised (Dutta, 2012:57).

3.5.6 A manifesto?

On 1 October 2011 came the first official collective statement of the protesters in Zuccotti Park (Gelder, 2012: 36-38). The document was accepted by the NYCGA on September 29, 2011, with minor updates made on October 1, 2011 (Gelder, 2012: 36-38). The statement, termed ‘*Declaration of the occupation of New York City*’, contains a list of 23 grievances towards the ‘*system*’. This is a list, in their own words, of why protesters are occupying Wall Street. The basis of the grievances is the notion that ‘*no true democracy is attainable when the process is determined by economic power. We come to you at a time*

when corporations, which places profit over people, self-interests over justice and oppression over equality, run our government' (Gelder, 2012: 36-38).

On 17 October, a work termed '*The Occupy Manifesto*⁷' was published, '*by the people and for the people*', sub-sectioned into two parts; '*the problem*' and '*what we demand*', consisting of six pages. The problem, as noted in the manifesto, is; '*corporate greed gone unchecked*' - as lobbyism threatens democracy and the fact that Supreme Court in January 2010 ruled giving corporations the same constitutional right as human beings. Inequality is a problem, because the 1% of the population makes more money than the combined other 99% in America. Furthermore, the problem is not solved through politics, as both sides of the political spectrum have concerns about the way of conduct. And lastly, it is not just an American problem, because there were protests around the world. The demands of the manifesto, which may be looked upon as a political programme, is to end the extreme wealth disparity, by seven steps; forced corporate restraint, fair taxes, institute fair usury laws in all 50 states making outrageously high interest rate illegal, a constitutional amendment to overturn the Supreme Court's decision to give corporations the same First Amendment rights as people, discourage companies from sending jobs overseas by implementing a tax on that practice and a living wage for all (Gelder, 2012: 36-38).

According to the web-pages of OWS, May 2012 was to be the '*International Global Spring Assembly*', as a part of a global call for change. A statement, the '*Global May Manifesto*', '*calls for systematic changes in the global economy; the radical democratization of international institutions like the IMF, BIS, and UN; the replacement of the G8/20 with democratic UN assembly; a system of global taxation in financial transactions; and for the abolishment of tax havens*'. It further states that it does not represent the position of any local or city assembly but rather it is offered for their consideration. The statement was endorsed by consensus on 4 May 2012 by the International Assembly.

3.6 Conclusion

The answer to '*what do they want?*' is as complicated to answer, as the members of the movement are varied. In OWS every single protestor, every single encampment, is a delegate at the General Assembly. The members of the movement have asked for the achievement of '*collective liberation*', some to declare their desperation, others to a new model of life, and

⁷ The work may be retrieved at: By The People and for The People. (2011). *The Occupy Manifesto*. Worldwide. Retrieved from <http://www.amazon.com/The-Occupy-Manifesto-ebook/dp/B005WM0ETI>

others of the imposition of new taxes on financial transactions (Scherer, 2011:6). The voices of the protesters were not to be declared in speakers, but by echoing one another's words to amplify them, and through the adaption of hand signals to show their opposition or support (Scherer, 2011:7). As opposed to the '*Tea Party*', the movements' protesters called for opportunity and equality instead of liberty, called for personal debt instead of federal debt, and blamed the wealthy instead of the government (Scherer, 2011:7-10). By October 2011, a Time/Abt SRBI poll showed that more than half of those polled had heard of OWS, and furthermore liked what they heard (Scherer, 2011:7-10). In the same poll, only 27% favoured the '*Tea Party*' (Scherer, 2011:7-10). The basic images among the population, and their '*common sense*', showed that 81% thought that things were on the wrong track (Scherer, 2011:7-10).

At this point, Korton (2012: 55) claimed, OWS has achieved a remarkable breakthrough, as they have penetrated the filter of the corporate media and captured the imagination of America and the world, and focused attention on Wall Street banks and corporations. The future holds what OWS may have laid the foundation for, namely, a much needed debate on the economy's values, purpose and structure (Korton, 2012: 55). The US, as we see it today, is of two tales. One is the Wall Street economy, which is accountable only to faceless financial markets and devoted to financial deception, and speculation to maximize financial returns to its most powerful players (Korton, 2012:56). And, the other is the Main Street, which is directly accountable to real people who have a natural interest in building healthy communities with thriving local economies and natural environments (Korton, 2012:56). OWS did become the voice of Main Street. Not so surely is it if they will go down in history as a Main Street movement, or maybe just a Main Street moment.

4. Conclusion

Several books and articles, such as *'This changes everything: Occupy Wall Street and the 99% movement'* (Gelder, 2011), *'Occupy'* (Chomsky, 2012), *'Occupy nation: the roots, the spirit and the promise of Occupy Wall Street'* (Gitlin, 2012), *'Occupy the economy: challenging capitalism'* (Wolff, 2012) and *'Rebel Cities: from the right to the city to the urban revolution'* (Harvey, 2012), have been written on the emergence, dynamics and stagnation of OWS (Reman, 2013:1). Still, the multi-disciplinary discussion and study of OWS often suffers from a historical amnesia (Smith and Glidden, 2012:288), as most of their tactics and structures have similarities to earlier movements. This claim holds credibility, as opposed to the claim projected by Tarrow (2011) where he states that it is a new type of a social movement.

National and transnational collective action has, historically, derived from two main master frames of study in SMS; *'global social justice'* and *'opposition to neoliberal globalisation'*, whereas the transnational diffusion of repertoires, ideas and beliefs, and the growth of domestic protests have approached international organisations to change domestic policies (della Porta and Tarrow, 2005:7). OWS, on the other hand, challenges domestic politics, but by occupation and alternative nodes of direct democracy, in a global network of occupy movements. Hence, there are several spheres and categories in which we may analyse the movement, its residence and context. Important aspects have been the organisational structures, like leadership, hierarchy and membership. Suurpaa and Valentin (2009:2) also claim that *'any contemporary analysis of the themes around active citizenship should be placed within the social and political context of increasing globalisation and transnationalism'*, also understood in light of relatively new social media instruments and global solidarity networks. Still, the role of social media has been overestimated, as we shall differentiate between *'real'* activism and *'virtually'* communicated activism (Harvey, 2012:161-162). *'Real activism'* is the traditional way of conducting activism, by physical presence and participation, whereas *'virtual activism'* contemplates within social media and through other modes of communication. Therefore, the analysis will primarily focus on the analytical instruments which SMS has had to offer in social movement theory over the last decades. Nevertheless, the more interesting features are *why*, and not *how*, there are increased solidarity networks within and between the occupy movements.

The broader frame of understanding and analysis of OWS is as follows; former GSM's, such as WSF and ATTAC, worked to alter global corporative power in international

institutions and at a global level, whereas OWS attempts to alter corporative power in domestic politics, but as a part of a global network – the occupy movements. The main differences should be analysed as a ‘*scale shift*’, from global contestation in international arenas to globally networked contestation in domestic arenas. The contestation encampments by ‘*occupy movements*’ are highly networked through human interaction and motivation, understood in the sphere of ‘*spill over effects*’ between the various domestic encampments. Even though the context of the various domestic movements are wide-ranging, the same tactics and grievances follow, and with a degree of recognition of the others. As this thesis has followed, generally, a historical materialist methodology, in analysing the uniqueness of OWS within the theoretical frameworks of SMS, the subsequent analysis will explicitly focus on the notions of ‘*scale shift*’ from international to domestic, between historical movements, the ‘*spill-over effects*’ between present and past social movements, and incorporate the three independent variables, POS, SMO and global linkages, in debating the claimed uniqueness of OWS.

Firstly, there is the understanding that OWS has a strong degree of affiliation towards the encampment-movements⁸ during 2011, such as the Arab Spring and the *Tahrir Square* movement, and the Spanish movements of *Indignados* and *15M*. Secondly, it has been debated that OWS adopted their social movement organisation, intentionally or not, from the late 1990s movements, such as the *anti-WTO demonstrations* and *WSF*. Furthermore, the issues to which OWS is ideologically opposed are not dissimilar to former movements, such as *ATTAC* and other global justice movements, in objecting a globalised and undemocratic corporative power-balance. Lastly, there is a debate as to whether OWS is truly a global movement in the sphere of the theoretical frameworks of GSM and TSM. OWS became a global movement, but may rather be understood as a network of encampment movements, which alters ‘*business as usual*’ at a domestic level, share the same tactics, and falls under a network of ‘*spill-over effects*’ between domestic occupy movements. The key element is and should be focused on the role of ‘direct democracy’ by practice.

The forthcoming will debate these claims as they are highly relevant to the research question. Furthermore will it approach the three main variables of this thesis and result in a concluding summary of the findings.

⁸ Encampment-movements, or so called ‘*occupiers*’ who brought tents, took place on squares in major cities like New York, London, Tel Aviv and Amsterdam (van Stekelenburg, 2012:224).

4.1 The occupy movements of 2011, and OWS

OWS may be defined as a global network of domestic encampment movements. OWS grew rapidly and influential as the vast majority of global civil society (GCS) advance into a decreased say in social, economic, financial, political and ecological processes (Juris et al. 2012: 434). An increasing number of people participated in movements, like OWS, in order to gain a say in public matters. It has been claimed, in several instances, that OWS was inspired by the waves of global protests during 2011, such as the Arab Spring, the Greek resistance, the encampments in Spain, the Wisconsin uprising and the Israeli summer (Juris et al, 2012: 434). The similarities have, most arguably, been defined as a '*rise of occupy movements*' and the '*pitfalls of majoritarianism*' at a global level (Juris et al, 2012: 435), demonstrating a failing representative democracy for an increased number of people, in the US, Europe, Turkey and the Middle East. These projections are context-based, and are not to be analysed as independent occurrences in SMS. They should, as argued, be understood as global networked movements, connected through '*spill-over effects*' and as being highly interconnected. The subsequent debate shall be centred on contemporary networked global social movements, as an influence towards, and from, OWS.

The Arab Spring, and particularly the movement in *Tahrir Square*, is different than OWS, mostly because their main purpose was to remove the political elite, and their mobilising slogan was merely a call for '*real democracy*' (Hardt and Negri, 2011). Still, weeks after the uprisings at *Tahrir Square*, Western protesters had been inspired by the events in Egypt and began to conceptualise the possibilities for a similar mass uprising in the US (Kerton, 2012:302). Adbusters, who could be seen to originate OWS, asked: "*are you ready for a Tahrir moment?*" (Kroll, 2012:16). But, more importantly, as Valk (2011:15) observed, the movement in New York was not attempting to depose a dictator, but had the same group of alienated group of youth, frustrated over a bankrupt, corrupt, and unaccountable political and economic system. OWS was to borrow from both the strategic and tactical methodologies of the Egyptian revolution, which had gained widespread media coverage world wide (Kerton, 2012:303). OWS was inspired by the Tahrir movement, but also motivated and inspired by a spill-over effect from Spain's *15M* movement, both of which occurred over 2011 (Gledhill, 2012: 342). As such, the 2011 occupy movements may not be analysed as separate occurrences, even though different in time, space and context.

The 15M, alternatively known as *Indignados*, were a social movement response to the global economic crisis, the approaches taken by the European Union (EU) and the Spanish

government, during 2011 (Castaneda, 2012:309). On the issue of tactics the movement must be observed as directly preceding OWS (Castaneda, 2012:309), and have similarities to OWS as they mobilise around the occupation of public squares. Hence, the situation in Spain was more complex (Hardt and Negri, 2011), and remains so, as well as differing from that of the US (Morell, 2012:386). 15M claimed '*real democracy now*' as their main banner. Still, Morell (2012:386) claims, the 15M movement, through its actions in public spheres, constructed new layers of mobilisation, by incorporating networks and skills from previous social movements such as the anti-globalisation movement, and connected with previous generation of protesters who had mobilised over civil liberties in transition towards democracy. The main features, which separates 15M from the '*Global Justice Movements*' (GJM) of the early 2000, were the more complex system of interactions and synergies of a plurality of components (Morell, 2012:387-388). Most notably, as a difference between the organisational structures of OWS and 15M, have been the emergence of the '*Free Culture and Digital Commons Movement*' (FCM) in Spain (Morell, 2012:386), which interacted and contributed to the genealogy of the 15M in ways of composition, agenda, frame and organisational logic (Morell, 2012:389). As highly comparative to OWS, the 15M movement held General Assemblies on important issues, taken by consensus (Castaneda, 2012:312).

The Israeli encampments preceded OWS and mobilised closely after the Arab Spring and the Spanish Indignados (Gordon, 2012:350). Activists which were central to the building and mobilisation of the Israeli movement, also known as the '*Rothschild-Tahrir*', had been present in the Indignados movement, and returned to Israel with inspiration of tactics and models of process (Gordon, 2012:350). The issues at hand, for the Israeli movement, were a call for welfare policies replacing any explicit form of anti-capitalism, and furthermore an overall call towards the government to abandon the neoliberal ideology (Gordon, 2012:350). Still, the context in Israel is quite different from the rest of the globe, as the country has enjoyed a steady growth in their economy and low rates of unemployment, which rather shifted the movement further towards a call for solutions on social problems (Gordon, 2012:349).

The encampment movements and occupy movements can be compared, but mostly on the issues of tactics and strategies. The political motives were too different on the domestic context and the political opportunity structures, even though most members were the marginalised youth in the domestic context, which were mobilised by the same strategies – '*meaning work*'. The main difference, which will be debated later, is the role of a central organisational structure in the movement and the role of leadership.

4.2 Movements of the 1990s and early 2000

Prior to the 2011 encampments, the Zapatistas rebellions in Mexico in 1994 and the anti-WTO demonstrations in Seattle in 1999 should be understood as a reaction to neo-liberal globalisation structures, and as anti-globalisation movements. As a shift from reactive to proactive mobilisation, the establishment of WSF in 2001, was a formal creation in the aftermath of the anti-WTO demonstrations, and pressure from *ATTAC*, in order to present a proactive alternative to the neo-liberal world order presented by the WTO (Feixa et al. 2009:425). In the Coxian term *nebuleuse*, the WTO was perceived as the enforcer, promoter and defender of transnational corporate hegemony (Cox, 2002:33-34). The anti-WTO demonstrations, and later WSF, had a clear and strategic opponent in their struggle. This has not been the case for OWS, as the opposed has not been an organisation or one easily identifiable opponent, but rather a complex and clustered system of policies and politics, and a vague group labelled as the “1%”.

The primary target of the ‘*Battle of Seattle*’ and later WSF, was the WTO, and the projected mission to balance the ‘*structural power*’ of international institutions. WSF, on the other hand, should be defined as an *alter-globalisation movement*, or as Cox defines it, a *counter-hegemonic movement*, as an approach towards a ‘*new multilateralism*’ (Cox, 2002:33-34). When WSF was established, it marked a transition from anti- to alter globalisation, as WSF did not reject the system, but rather wished to reform it. The challenges, in the global political economy, had been present for decades, since the rise of neo-liberalism in late 1970s, the ‘*lost decade*’ of 1980s, and through IMF and WB failed implementation of ‘*Structural Adjustment Programmes*’ (SAP), bankruptcy in Mexico in 1982, and the fall of the Asian Tigers (Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and South Korea) in 1997, all fell within what McNally (2002) defined as ‘*the global loss of democracy*’. Social inequality rose enormously after the 1970s, as neo-liberalism and finance capital had been ascendant (Calhoun, 2013:33). Resistance towards the global hegemonic system, resembling Gramsci’s notion of ‘*war of movements*’, raised around the world, against international institutions, such as the IMF, WB and WTO (Drainville, 2002: 179). Subsequently, the counter movements of the 1990s and early 2000s, made the framework for an establishment of WSF in 2001, and created a formal setting for ideas and discussions (Smith et al. 2008:19). The challenges of transforming the movements from claiming - what they are against - to projecting an alternative for the way of conduct was a challenge approached by WSF. WSF

gave an opportunity for emerging alter-globalisation movements to stop elaborating what they were against and start articulating what they were for (Klein, 2002:158). The annual meetings of WSF were to gather social movements, NGOs, and other civil society organisations, all of which had the opposition to neo-liberal globalisation in common (Curran, 2007:7). For OWS there has been no clear agenda or alternative, but the occupiers and civil society has been invited to participate in the forum (general assembly), by creating a 'meaning work' for mobilisation and action through 'direct democracy'.

It may be claimed that several of the issues on OWS's agenda, or manifesto, are the same as those of the earlier movements, such as WSF and ATTAC, but on different scales. Still, one of the main elements, when analysing OWS, have been the issue of building consensus within the SMO on a political programme. In '*Freedom is an Endless Meeting*' (2002), Francesca Polletta traces the on-going development of participatory democracy through 20th century social movements, and conclude that the consensus model, which OWS has adopted, were known in the *Direct Action Network* (DAN), which draws from movements mobilising to alter and oppose WTO and corporate globalisation in the late 1990s (Smith and Glidden, 2012: 288). Hardt and Negri (2011) also further this point, and claim that OWS has deep roots in the globalisation protest-movements that occurred in Seattle in 1999 and Genoa in 2001. This approach has been largely ignored in the mainstream discussions of how OWS is connected to the historical movements of the past.

The adoption and use of social networks, in the new wave of global protests, such as Twitter and Facebook, may be important ingredients in the movements, but not those which make or define the movements (Hardt and Negri, 2012). Still, in the present era of networked global movements, the increased adoption and use of social media strengthens the movements around the globe, in a sphere of mobilisation, recruitment and demarcation of a common grief. And, more importantly, they lay the foundation for a global *spill-over effect* between the domestic movements. In van Stekelenburgs (2012:225) analysis of OWS, McAdams' (et al. 2001) term '*scale shift*' has been adopted to explain the communication and '*spill-over effects*' between the movements. The way of adopting tactics and strategies from each other enables the movements to structure and mobilise their own domestic movement within their own context. Scholars and activists have debated the relationship between social media and social movement activity during the current global cycle of protest (Constanza-Chock, 2012:375). Over the first months of occupation, marches and encampment in Zuccotti Park, OWS gained huge amounts of media attention across social network sites, print and broadcast platforms (Constanza-Chock, 2012: 378). It was a very

interesting time, as the movement spread across the US and internationally, gaining massive mobilisation and support. Thousands of occupiers were arrested even while they continued to conduct General Assemblies around the world (Constanza-Chock, 2012:378). However, few academics or politicians, maybe not even the protesters, knew where OWS was moving, or even who their opponents were, other than “*Wall Street*” as a phenomenon or a strategic site.

4.3 OWS as a new-NSM?

Tarrow (2011) claimed that OWS is neither a civil rights movement nor the *Tea Party* of the Left. Rather, he argues, OWS is a social movement of a completely new kind (Tarrow, 2011). The main characteristic which separate OWS from the earlier movements is that they advance few policy proposals and have a shifting configuration of supporters as it spreads across the country (Tarrow, 2011). Furthermore, the claim OWS projects in their declaration from the NYCGA of 30 September 2011 is most arguably not a policy platform, per se, for a social movement, even though the lack of policy proposals is not the main characteristic which makes OWS unique. Instead of drafting a policy proposal, they bringing together members and support, OWS asks their members and supporters what they want (Tarrow, 2011). This is, according to Tarrow, unique in social movements, diffuses the theoretical framework in social movement studies, and is furthermore challenging towards the study of transnational social movement. But, consensus making in social movements is not something new. WSF also had a consensus based approach, but then by bringing organisations and academics into the debate. OWS invite the whole public into the debate; unemployed, youth, academics and all concerned members of the society. In order to contextualise OWS, Tarrow (2011) does not approach it as an anti-capitalist movement, but rather a movement whose main target is the economic relations and failed systems purported to serve the public interests. It was the same mechanisms which were under scrutiny in the aftermath of the Great Depression, and the similarities between them are strong (Tarrow, 2011). The main difference, when analysing the policy outcomes, is that Roosevelt ‘*welcomed the hatred of the mob*’ and adopted the *New Deal*, whereas currently the Democrats have not yet adopted any wide ranging policy to answer the critiques of OWS (Kramer, 2012:1). The chances, Tarrow (2011) claimed, quite rightly, OWS may be a ‘*we are here*’ movement, flaring up quickly and disappearing in the same pace.

Hardt and Negri (2011), also writing in late 2011, approached OWS as a ‘*global democracy movement*’. According to them, OWS hits a nerve in the system, of failure in

representation, equality and corporate greed, which may lead into a democratic constituent process (Hardt and Negri, 2011). The interesting aspect of OWS is the emerging cycle of the movement, which adopts a horizontal participatory structure, without representatives, experimenting in democratic organisation, before articulating policies for social change, and therefore aspire towards real democracy (Hardt and Negri, 2011). As debated earlier, Hardt and Negri (2011) emphasise the point that OWS has familiarities to the 2011 encampments in Spain, Israel, Egypt and Greece, and further the point of context and the translated mechanisms into their own unique situation.

Brucato (2012:77), on the other hand, contextualises OWS in the sphere of the financial crisis, and analyses OWS as a global grassroots uprising, while defining it as '*the first worldwide postmodern uprising*'. But by using the tools of social movement studies, Brucato claims that certain aspects of OWS have similarities to the NSM frameworks, which occurred in the SMS of the late 1960s and 1970s (Brucato, 2012:79). OWS is more of a '*newer social movement*', engaged in continuous contestation, for social and economic rights, broadly defined under the umbrella of social justice, and therefore expressed as '*a politics and a life that are yet to be thought*' (Brucato, 2012:80). But, in order to adopt the NSM framework, one must not only define the framework of the explanatory paradigm, but analyse how the NSMs transpired and developed within the sphere of *means* and *end* of the contextualised environment. The more interesting aspect arising here is that an analysis of OWS provides a unique analysis of the context of the present financial crisis. As similar to the '*single issue movements*' of the 1960s and 1970s, OWS mobilises and embodies in a pluralistic, direct democratic society, and furthermore demonstrate it through practice. OWS, and the former movements, have been concerned with identity and interests of their members' identity, in the struggle and actions towards an end and a goal, which is the main or sole purpose of the movement.

As argued in Chapter Two, the social movement must be analysed outside of the context in which they occur. In van Stekelenburg (2012), OWS has been approached as a product of our time, as opposed to former and similar social movements, which are products of their own context and time. This makes the categorisation challenging. The present is different in terms of grievances, strategies and tactics, and more importantly; '*people no longer take part in protest as a member of a social movement organisation or interest group, but as individuals*' (van Stekelenburg, 2012:229). The occupiers participate as individuals, who do not have a formal membership or belong to a SMO, can freely come and go as they want, and still feel as part of the movement. The role of social media, such as Twitter and

Facebook, connects the global civil society into the same contextual understanding, and therefore breaks down the former need for formal organisations and conventional leadership (van Stekelenburg, 2012:229).

The constant change in social movements and their context, which is influenced by the former social movements, will always define the new social movement as a “*new social movement*”. The approach, as debated in ‘*newer social movements*’, has been present prior to the 2011 encampments, as Feixa, Pereira and Juris (2009: 421) emphasised the point of ‘*new NSM*’ of the last two decades, in an analysis of global movements in an ‘*anti-corporate globalization movement*’. By conducting a historical comparative study, they define the ‘*old*’ to be the ones ranging from the 19th century in the context of an emerging industrial society and class-struggles, the ‘*new*’ as new modes of collective action in a postmodern society on multi- and cross-class struggles, mostly on social issues from the 1960s, and the ‘*new-new*’ is defined as the new modes of collective action in an era of global networks and interaction, from the late 1990s (Feixa et al. 2009:423). The present movements, as seen around the world from 2011 until present days in Turkey, are unique in their own context as occupy/protest-movements, and still comparative to the former.

The wave of global protest-movements, from the late 1990s, may be separated into three phases; *latency*, *emergence* and *consolidation*. The first phase comprises in the 1990s and the *Zapatista* movement’s struggle against the Mexican government’s implementation of the *North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement* (NAFTA), which they fought with information more than arms, and gained a loose decentralised global web of solidarity groups (Feixa et al. 2009:424). Within the same phase, international financial organisations, such as the WTO, WB, IMF and the Group of Eight (G8) created a new economic order, which were to eliminate the barriers to free trade at the world level, leading to the rise of ‘*grassroots globalisation*’ (Feixa et al. 2009:424). The changes in the world order and the furthered adoption of digital information channels laid the foundation for a new disorganised and decentralised network of interconnected movements, which is visible in present movements.

The second phase, *emergence*, came with the ‘*Battle of Seattle*’ in 1999, and were defined as the first globally recognised battle between representatives of the new world order and the ‘*anti-globalisation soldiers*’ (Feixa et al. 2009:423). Information on contestation flourished on the web, social movement actors came together and organised a statement

against the rise corporate globalisation, and some 50,000 demonstrators took to the streets (Feixa et al. 2009:424-425).

The third phase, *consolidation*, which began in 2001 in Porto Alegre (Brazil), where a platform was set forward for a proactive approach for an alternative, as divergent to the earlier reactive opposition of Seattle in 1999 (Feixa et al. 2009:425). The establishment of the Porto Alegre opposition, and the newly formed *ATTAC* in France, came together and formed the organisational alternative to the *World Economic Forum* (WEF), the WSF. Participants from around the world, with a variety of different backgrounds, came together to debate alternatives to the neoliberal globalisation (Feixa et al. 2009:425). The main characteristics, as derived during these three phases, could be summarised in the following:

i) an emphasis on globalism and trans-nationality and their articulation with local context; ii) the use of new information and communication technologies, particular the Internet; iii) the articulation of economic and identity-based demands; iv) development of innovative forms of action; v) the creation of new forms of organisation; and vi) the gathering of diverse traditions and organisations under a common umbrella (Feixa et al. 2009:426).

The earlier defined elements of global opposition to the neoliberal world order, have familiarities towards a framework of ‘*new*’, or ‘*newer NSM*’, and a networked GCS, increasingly focused on the individual rather than the former focus on SMO. The research subsequently will analyse the three independent variables, POS, SMO and global linkages, with reference to the former debate, in an attempt to categorise OWS within the theoretical framework of SMS.

4.5 Organisation, politics and linkages

The projected independent variables in this study have been separated in three sub-claims, under the main claim ‘*is OWS a new kind of a social movement*’. The first sub-claim is ‘*are the organisational structures of OWS different from former and similar social movements?*’ The second sub-claim, as will be analysed, ‘*are the political opportunity structures of OWS different from former and similar social movement?*’ And lastly, ‘*are the global linkages of OWS different from the former and similar social movements?*’ The

analysis will debate the three sub-claims categorically and thereafter bring them together towards a holistic conclusion of the main claim; is OWS a new kind of a social movement?

4.5.1 The informal organisation

SMO are, by definition, formal groups which are primarily designed to promote specific social changes (Smith et al. 1997:60). Their primary tasks are to mobilise new human- and material resources, activating and coordinating action through ebbs and flows of movement energy, and link various elements of social movements' together (Smith et al. 1997:60). Nonetheless, their effectiveness in coordinating movement activities varies greatly according to patterns of organisation and participation (Smith et al. 1997:60). Activists and connected individuals may not be formally associated with the SMO, but still participate in the movements' activities (Smith et al. 1997:60).

In the analysis, the Canadian *Adbusters* has functioned as the organising element of the movement, even though their degree of influential power in the movement has been debated and their official statement has been that they are promoting a leaderless and horizontal organisational structure (see Juris et al. 2012). This is a strong point in the analysis, as former movements have had a formal or semi-formal leadership to stir and direct the claims and goals of the movement. And for the movement itself, it may have proven to be the weakest element of OWS. Still, as van Stekelenburg (2012:229) observes, there is a weak organisation, which means that the network of individuals constitutes the disorganised and horizontal movement of OWS. A people's movement *par excellence*, but not a SMO by its standards. Rather, OWS operated with an "inner" and "outer" organisation (Gitlin, 2013:3), where the movement was not lead from the active OWS organisers, but by the underground centres of informal power (Smucker, 2013:219). Hence, a small core group did a large amount of the work inside the organisation, but they did not hold the power of the movement (Jaffe, 2013:201).

In recent studies and most SMS, SMO has been a popular acronym in the analysis of social movements (della Porta and Diani, 2006:140). SMO is the organising component of a social movement, but it is only one part of the particular movement, and the social movement may contain of several SMOs, which all share the same goal (Zald and McCarthy, 1997:21). This point becomes salient when analysing the decentralisation of OWS, where each local network has their own 'occupy' movement (see Uitermark and Nicholls, 2012). A common definition, describing the organisational level of a social movement is; 'a complex, or formal,

organisation which identifies its goals with the preferences of a social movement and attempts to implement these goals' (McCarthy and Zald, 1977:1218). della Porta and Diani (2006:140) contest that the definition has proven to be ambiguous, as it only fits highly structured and formal organisations. It should project a more suitable definition for less formal movements, such as the occupy movements and OWS; seeing them rather as *'associations of persons making idealistic and moralistic claims about how humans, personal or group life, ought be organised that, at the time of their claims making, are marginal to or excluded from mainstream society* (Lofland, 1996:2-3). When approaching an analysis of the SMO of OWS, the adoption of another classification seems more ideal, where SMOs often do have a coordinating role in social movements, but they do not employ or direct the participants (Zald and McCarthy, 1997:21).

In another perspective, SMO may be divided into two subdivisions. Grass-root SMOs are focused on local issues, where their members are interlinked with and through the cause, and on an idealistic basis (Zald and McCarthy, 1997:20). On the other hand, professional SMOs gain their contributions from foundations and donors, with a bureaucratic and paid staff, and focus on issues which may affect a wider constituency (Zald and McCarthy, 1997:21). OWS is, by most regards, centred in the grass-root SMOs, and should be regarded as such. It may be debated that *Adbusters* and other central figures in the movement have set the direction for OWS and their path forward. Hence, social movements, political parties and interests groups are often compared to each other, on the assumption that they all embody different styles of political organisation (della Porta and Diani, 2006:25). The difference between them is that social movements are not understood as organisations of a particular kind, as seen in the organisational characteristics or patterns of behaviour. Social movements are not single organisations, working as networks of a more formalised SMO, where the members are united around the notion of a collective identity (della Porta and Diani, 2006:25). In regards to social movements, and here with reference to OWS, they may be both formal and informal networks. OWS still fits the social movement tag, as an informal movement, and a grass-root movement.

Within the field of social sciences, social movements have meant networks of interaction and specific organisations (della Porta and Diani, 2006:25). Social movements should, therefore, not be exclusively understood within the concepts of organisational theory and formal organisations (della Porta and Diani, 2006:25). Furthermore, della Porta and Diani (2006:26) contest that if social movements are analytically different from SMO, any organisation which is involved in a social movement dynamic may be regarded as a *'social*

movement organisation'. The organisers for the first meeting, Adbusters, had an organisational role in the movement, where they became an internet-based organiser. As Castells (2012:168) puts it; "*Occupy was born on the internet, and it was diffused by the internet*". The distinction to be found between the movement and other forms of social and political actors is the contrast between conventional styles of political participation (such as voting) and the use of public protest (della Porta and Diani, 2006:28). Nonetheless, an awareness of the heterogeneity of organisational forms adopted by social movement activists is important (della Porta and Diani, 2006:140). Kriesi (1996) has described the internal structure of NSMs in Western Europe during the 1980s, as deriving from formalisation; with the introduction of formal membership criteria, written rules, fixed procedures, formal leadership, and a fixed structure of offices, professionalization; understood as the presence of paid staff who pursue a career inside the organisation, internal differentiation; involving a functional division of labour and the creation of territorial units, and integration; through mechanisms of horizontal and/or vertical coordination. It is clear that OWS has chosen, deliberately, a less formal structure than that projected by Kriesi (1996). Still, this is the projection of formalised '*single issue movement*' in a different context, functioning more like '*interest organisations*' and lobbyist mechanisms. OWS attempted to be maximally open and inclusive, without a formal organisation and avoiding any conventional sorts of politics (Calhoun, 2013:36). The purpose of the SMO was more an attempt to reach the '*common sense*' of the population, than to change the system by approaching the ones in power.

Nonetheless, social movements mostly use non-institutionalised tactics in advancing the interests of their constituencies. These tactics are understood by two characteristics; the involvement of activists that are not part of the formal political process and that they are intended to be legally or illegally disruptive (Burstein, et al. 1995: 278). In this study, the notion of tactics is highly relevant. Hence, it is important to distinguish between social movements and other formations of collective interests' representation and avoiding building protest into the definition of social movements (e.g. Rucht 1998: 54). OWS is, for all intents and purposes, an informal SMO, decentralised, leaderless, and sporadic as those prior to the establishment of WSF. If this should be traced to the projections of Feixa (et al 2009), OWS is a reactive global force, embedded in domestic contestation, which may later structure into a proactive movement, and further develop alternative modes of the outcome of social and economic needs. The desired needs, which are embedded in the '*common sense*' of the people, were not forwarded through charters or conventional political battles.

As compared to former movements, the adopted structures of consensus making within

the movement, and therefore OWSs SMO, differentiate them from some, but not all of the former and similar movements. But, this notion does most interestingly depend on the adopted definition on how to incorporate the empirical evidence of the social movement. The former debate incorporated different definitions on where the SMO of OWS may fit, which means that it does fit some and may be unique according to some. Still, the empirical evidence on OWS is unique, even though the explanatory framework differs in regards to their embedded uniqueness. It is therefore possible to make a claim both ways – the SMO of OWS is unique in definitions of formal social movements, in both a historical and contextual setting. On the other hand, the degree of informality, and nearly non-existence of a leadership, no administration or administrative expenses, the flat structure and fulfilment in a consensus based political platform, categorises OWS as different from those earlier and similar movements, but it does not make it unique. Still, the core of OWS was the identity: “we are the 99%” (Gitlin, 2013:8), which is unique. It was a populist message, but created a unifying frame for mobilisation, even though it did not signal any ideological consensus (Calhoun, 2013:34). OWS had a degree of SMO, only a very informal one. The SMO was not an organisation or an administration, it was the public sphere, and the content was the member who came, occupied, spoke, protested, interacted with others, participated in social media, and then went home or into the encampments. Still, the ideological path and its political agenda were to be an impossible task, mostly because of the SMO of OWS. OWS became known for, and will be remembered by, its informal organisation and structures, and freedom of assembly. When we regard the different camps and occupants, it is more suitable to talk of networks rather than organisations, which differ from earlier and similar movements on the notion of communication and linkages through social media (Calhoun, 2013:36).

The first sub-claim to this case study did ask whether the SMO of OWS were different from the former social movements. The one thing which clearly separates OWS from most of the former is the informal SMO. But this does not make them unique or of a new kind – it is more of a question regarding the level of informality. The grass-root SMO had been present in former social movements, according to the studies of Zald and McCarthy (1997:21). And as the informal movement had challenges in fitting the SMO definition, there had been alternative ways of approaching the less formal ones as “*an association of persons making idealistic and moral claims...*” (Lofland, 1996:2-3). OWS were a decentralized movement, informal and weak, but further organised by the networks of individuals, diffused by the internet and united by a common identity. OWS was not different from the former, but less

formal.

4.5.2 Contextual structures and limitations

In late 2010, and during 2011, there were waves of activism across the globe, where streets and squares were filled with self-organised citizens demanding attention for both political and social rights (Biekart and Fowler, 2013: 527). It will be known as the time of global activism for change, in various contexts. The '*Political Opportunity Structures*' (POS), also known as '*political opportunity theory*' and '*political process theory*', shall be characterised by the social and political environment in which the movements operate, and are factors that facilitate or constrain the social change efforts (Smith et al. 1997:66). Or, in other words, POS are the dimensions of the political context that make collective action more or less likely. It is within these structures that OWS has played out, though in different ways and at varied paces. The concept of POS provides a deeper understanding of the variations in outcomes which the movement may hope for, whereas the basic approach is that contextual factors will help us to understand variations on SMO, strategies and outcomes (Shawki, 2010:383). According to Mayer (2004:125), political opportunity theory argues that the actions of the activists depend on the existence, or lack, of a specific political opportunity. The perspectives in defining OWS, especially in terms of a united motive and political charter, have been plentiful. By identifying the POS of OWS, we may retrieve an understanding of both the context and the counterpart. As such, the forthcoming focuses on the motives of OWS, and less on the context, because it seems that OWS has not paid particular attention to the political and contextual factors, but rather the lack of representative democracy. OWS has, in most instances, focused its attention on the publics' need, instead of requests in changing politics.

In a broader perspective of OWS, the context of struggle has been the '*Great Recession*', and the POS has been caught in a complicated and deadlocked conflict between the Democrats and the Republicans, in adjusting its policies for stabilisation. There has been a coherent call from the members of OWS towards the government to strengthen control over corporate power, most notoriously Wall Street, and impose regulations which will punish the financial speculators and the privileged few, as opposed to the majority, when things fall apart. Still, as OWS has been struggling to uphold a comprehensible front and present a political platform towards the government and centres of power, the activity of OWS has decreased, to the point of ceasing to exist. The most cited critique of OWS has been "*lack of*

demands”, whereas the reply is that there is no lack of demands – it is a strategic decision of the movement (Smucker, 2013:221). The lack of demands was the means of the movement, and not the goal in and of itself. As in former NSM, the aim of the movement is the public and their awareness, and not primarily changing policies (Langman, 2013:165).

It may be debated that the slogan of OWS, “*we are the 99%*”⁹, related to the majority of people and managed a mass mobilisation during the recession, but still could not find a common policy in order to stay united and strong over a longer period. A movement which came, claimed and went, or in Tarrows’ (2011) words: a “we are here” movement. In between, when the movement had its peak in number of participants and media coverage, there were a thousand voices and slogans, whereas all sub-categorised under the banner “*we are the 99%*”, as a ‘*recognise us*’ policy. It is rather unclear whether the movement and its participants had a rational and visible goal of the protest, as an imperative for change. It has certainly been a movement of means, but less of goals.

In a study from 1973, it has been noted that the changes in levels of riots across the US in the 1960s were dependent on the political opportunity for organisation and mobilisation, and the visible openings for individual or collective participation (Eisinger, 1973). Eisinger (1973:125) views the opportunities as context based. They served in various ways to obstruct or facilitate the activity towards political goals. As emphasised by Mayer (2004:126), the context effects the mobilisation, advancement and choosing of claims, employment of strategies and tactics, and of mainstream institutional politics and policy. Hence, the struggle of OWS has not solely been on economic issues, but simultaneously on democratic representation and social issues. It has challenged the constellations of liberal democracy and therefore adopted the essential mode of consensus making (see Brucato, 2012).

The strategy of using non-conventional tactics, as opposed to approaching to change or influence governments through the electoral process, OWS is not different to former NSM (Langman, 2013:161). These tactics do not seek to influence politicians or policies in the political sphere, but rather in the public sphere where the culture shall be turned in order to impact politics (Langman, 2013:161). When reviewing van Stekelenburg (2012:227), a social movement may be judged by three factors; public opinion, media coverage and political outcome. The chosen tactics and strategy has proven to be fruitful in regards to gaining the support of the public opinion and gaining media coverage, whereas the political outcomes

⁹ Gitlin (2013:6) claim that most Americans saw them selves as part of the «99%» and within a «middle class» group, and had not seen the benefits of the economic growth that had been present over the last four decades. But when the crisis came around, it was the «99%» who were to pay for it.

have been absent in terms of changes in politics and policies.

According to Tarrow (2007:80), the contextual features are characterised by the degree of centralisation in the political system, the nature of the electoral system, the position of political parties, international alliances, and the degree of state repression within a country. The contextual factors in the US have not been an advantage for OWS. The US, as a modern and functioning democracy, albeit with flaws and challenges, has a strong and consolidated state, whereas change may not occur easily. The opportunity is available for social movements and movement members, when the existing political system is vulnerable to social change (Cragun and Cragun, 2008:233-234). But, POS must be approached according to the stable structural elements of the strength or weakness of the state, and the forms of repression it usually or regularly employs (Kriesi et al. 1995). The birth and growth of OWS, and its decrease, is to be understood out of its POS and the present context in the US. OWS came in a time of need and desire for change, and, as Gitlin (2013:3) describes; had a sizable impact on the 2012 Presidential election in the US and drove the political centre of gravity towards the left. Considering this, it is demanding to perceive the effect it may have had.

The concept of POS is consistent, but are not necessarily formal or permanent dimensions of the political environment that provide incentives for collective action by affecting people's expectations for success or failure (Tarrow, 2007:77). Within this range, collective action will emerge because the conditions for mobilisation have expanded in the polity in general (Tarrow, 2007:77). By adopting this variable, it is feasible to understand *how* mobilisation spreads from people with strong resources and deep grievances to those with fewer resources and less grievances (Tarrow, 2007:77). Also, it will demonstrate *why* social movements emerge and/or increase their activity at a given time (Cragun and Cragun, 2008:234). The interesting aspect, as different from the earlier NSM, which will be a rapidly defining feature of the newer NSMs is the fact that they become increasingly composed of free individuals. Singular protesters are attached to the cause and ideas behind it, and not necessarily to the movement. Another benefit is that it encompasses a range of structural features of political systems, which makes them more or less insulated from civil society and open to the demands of social movements (Shawki, 2010:383). Still, as in the case of OWS, these groups collapse when their opportunities decline, because they lack the internal resources to ensure cohesion (Tarrow, 2007:77). During the financial crisis, the system has showed its robustness, and less on any room for political or policy changes. The opportunities and constraints will decline or grow according to the situation and its context, in time and space, and cannot compensate for prolonged weaknesses in organisational, cultural and

ideological resources (Tarrow, 2007:77). In order for the movement to succeed, all three components; political opportunity, resources and grievances, must be present (Cragun and Cragun, 2008:234). The resilient point here is that OWS contained all three, at some degree, but missed a fourth component - a coherent collection of means and ends. Nonetheless, a decline in the mobilisation of OWS has not only been due to the lack of definite goals, but as importantly on the dimensions of the political opportunities for larger systematic changes or re-implementation of key bills like Glass-Steagal-act. Furthermore, as a grass-root organisation, it has problems in maintaining a rapid pace without stronger and constant resources.

There was a window of opportunities for mobilisation and contestation as the system revealed its flaws and weakness, but it also showed a system which was deeply robust and less open for change. A way of understanding the movement can be by understanding the context in which the opponent is situated. The opportunity and formation of the movement is communicated with crucial information, by informative allies and exposure of their enemies' weaknesses (Tarrow, 2007:72). When a political space is created for collective action and possible coalitions, the movement has created opportunities - POS, for their members and supporters (Tarrow, 2007:72). Tarrow (2007:72) claims that the challengers who take hold of those opportunities are the catalysts for social movements and cycles of contention, and occasionally provide for revolutions and democratic breakthroughs. OWS did take the chance, started a cycle of contention, and at its peak made the headlines as a revolutionary force. If not a democratic breakthrough, it was still a democratic vitalisation by its members and supporters. Even though the possibilities and POS were identified by OWS, challenged by their means in consensus and inclusion, they were not to be visible for long.

As noted, OWS did not contain a strong movement in action, but individuals and camps, for a somewhat unified purpose. The POS, which derived from individuals, and only presented by the organisation itself, is identified by four elements in the protest literature; *an opportunity to change a state of affairs at affordable costs, identification with the group at stake, desire to address an opponent that has violated their values, and experience emotions such as anger, resentment and frustration that act as amplifiers* (van Stekelenburg, 2012:226). The occupiers approached an opponent, which was not to be seen as a politician or political wing, but rather that politics, as a whole, was seen as a problem, and that the system of parliamentary democracy was outdated (van Stekelenburg, 2012:226). Most Americans agreed that the power of money in politics had to be curbed, that taxes should be more progressive, that too-big-to-fall-banks should be dealt with, and more importantly that

the government had been their handmaidens (Gitlin, 2013:8-9).

A Democratic President, working with a Republican majority in Congress, during a recession, will be in a locked position towards consensus, or merely a joint majority in Congress, making the implementation of regulations difficult, which alters the US state to the sphere of dead-lock without political power. This notion signifies the element of '*scale shift*' from international contestation to domestic contestation, as different from former GSM. As a comparative point in the debate, the '*Great Depression*' and the Roosevelt Administrations implementation of the second New Deal and the *Glass-Steagall Act*, came under a period of strong contestation, where the Democrats held the majority in Congress and the Senate (see Kramer, 2012). In summary, the POS of the earlier movements - the labour movements of the 1930s, had a wide field of possibilities, compared to the present situation of political deadlock in the US. The domestic opportunities of social movements revolve around three concepts: *state strength*, *states' prevailing strategies towards challengers*, and *the problem of repression and social control* (Tarrow, 2007:81). Within these factors, it is perceived that '*centralised states with effective policy instruments at their command attract collective actors to the summit of the political system, whereas decentralised states provide a multitude of targets at the base*' (Tarrow, 2007:81), understood here as a democratic project. Stronger states will have the capacity to implement the policies they choose to support when they are favourable to the challengers claims, whereas weaker states will gravitate to conventional forms of expression when they are negative, and violence or confrontation ensues (Tarrow, 2007:81). Still, even if states are projected as strong or weak, there are differences in their approaches, as they may be '*inclusive*' by responding to, and absorbing the demands, and facilitate their entry into the polity, or '*exclusive*' by both weak and strong states (Tarrow, 2007:81). The financial crisis, and the political challenges in the US, showed a strong state, who did not invite that voices of the many in to the traditional political circuits, but rather stood firm during the complicated times.

As a way of grasping the interlinked movements of 2011, and in analysing *internationalisation* and contestation, Polanyi's vision of the state was two-fold: '*both as a handmaiden and the regulator of capitalism*' (Tarrow, 2005:18). The projected countermovement was driven by the victims of capitalism to redress the balance of power, and involved the institutions which were created to regulate capitalism and the abuses it fostered (Tarrow, 2005:18). In the case of OWS, Wall Street was self-regulated, as former regulations such as the *Glass-Steagall Act* were repealed by the Clinton Administration in 1999. In the present era, the contemporary countermovement against neo-liberalism and

unfettered systems of capitalism is categorised as a part of the '*global justice movement*'. Hence, OWS is not, as argued by Tarrow (2011), against neo-liberalism, nor is it an anti-capitalist movement. Furthermore, there are imperfections in adopting Polanyi's analogy, because it ignores significant new elements, such as the capacity of non-state actors to organise across borders and intersect with both states and international institutions (Tarrow, 2005:19). In this sphere, *globalisation* and *internationalisation* must be distinguished. *Globalisation* is the source of interests, ideology and grievances, and furthermore the producer of the contemporary international capitalist economy (Keohane, 2002, in Tarrow, 2005:19). On the other hand, *internationalism* is the institutional and informal framework where transnational activism takes shape (Tarrow, 2005:19). It is within the latter that transnational political opportunities are seized and created to empower activism. Hence, all of the 2011 social movements did, by different ends, adopt the same tactics and structures towards a unified and 'common sense', as the domestic system began to reveal its flaws.

OWS was a movement which was created in the context of the Great Recession, but profoundly influenced by the earlier and similar movements of 2011. The influence came from countries with relatively weak states, a revitalising social society and room for mobilisation, like in the Egypt and Western Europe. The interlinked domestic movements and their spill-over effects were to influence OWS in terms of vision and tactics, maybe more towards an increased utopian goal. As POS has been a framework adapted to the study of local and national politics, it has largely ignored the rapidly growing sphere of 'activism across borders'. Therefore, it will be argued that '*internationalism will make the threats of globalization more visible and offers resources, opportunities, and alternative targets for transnational activists and their allies to make claims against other domestic and external actors*' (Tarrow, 2005:8). Furthermore, as there is a brief outbreak of contention, there is a rapid growth of progression from domestic contention to a fusion between local and global activism (Tarrow, 2005:16). The main reasons for adopting this approach are to challenge the broad approaches of the GSM paradigm, conceptualise the new political and social arena that fuses domestic and international contention, and analyse the aspects of '*social movement spill-over*'. The domestic political opportunities, within the domestic movements, were inspired and motivated by the earlier movements like the NSMs, and even more by each other. As Langman (2013:165) claimed, the former NSM did not present possible changes, but invited the public to be part of the changes. The context of OWS is quite different from the former, but the POS and way of mobilising is mostly similar to the former NSMs. Therefore, it may not be claimed that the POS of OWS is different from the former.

4.5.3 Global linkages

On 15 October 2011, OWS called for a global revolution, it identified itself with the Arab Spring, Spanish Indignados and the London Riots, but the contexts of a cohesive revolution among the movements were altered (Gagy, 2012:143). Most of all were they altered because of the individual contexts of the domestic movements. Hence, the 'occupy' movement were domestic movements connected in a global protest network, and may not be regarded as an isolated and exclusively US based movement. The fact that the roots of the mobilisation, significance and tactics were international, and not only domestic, makes us shift the lens towards the international networks of contentions (Calhoun, 2013:27). Transnational contention will, in the case of OWS, be defined as '*conflicts that link transnational activists to one another, to states, and to international institutions*' (Tarrow, 2005:25). The questions which usually would be approached are; *who* the mediators between domestic and international venues are, and *how* the local is engaged and linked to the global. In one sense there has been a strong 'spill-over' of tactics and strategies between the movements, in both electronic communication and human interaction. The level of interaction and linkage between the domestic movements has been elaborated upon in the first part of this chapter. The '*how*' factor, which is meant to elaborate on the local issues in an international framework, remains a difficult case. OWS called for an international revolution, but were not using international structures or international institutions. It was rather a global appeal on domestic structures, whereas the international ties were of solidarity with each other's domestic struggle. Furthermore, it may be as debated by Scholte (1999:10), the global civil society coming together in an informal network of supra-national solidarity.

Internationalism, which is the frame of understanding in international contestation, is the core and provider of structures in which opportunities and threats arise from non-state actors, even though it goes beyond the concrete international institutions, regimes and processes (Tarrow, 2005:25). With reference to OWS, it is still within the framework and opportunity structures of internationalism that domestic actors engage and encounter others similar to them and transcend their borders by forming coalitions (Tarrow, 2005:25). International institutions, like IMF, WTO and WB, are seen as threats to ordinary citizens around the world, which are the source of resentment and resistance (Tarrow, 2005:25). But, in this case study, the former altered institutions have not been an issue. In the earlier global

movements, the international institutions have been portrayed as agents of global capitalism (Tarrow, 2005:26). As in domestic politics, the international institutions are targets of resistance and fulcrums for social change, and approached as '*coral reefs*' in a broader sea of '*complex internationalism*' (Tarrow, 2005:27). For OWS this has not been the case, but rather that the state itself and politics itself has been '*handmaidens*' of unfettered corporative power. Several scholars have approached internationalism as a process towards the sphere of '*global social society*', '*world polity*' and '*transnational citizenship*' (Tarrow, 2005:27). Even though we are not talking about an international movement altering international structures and institutions, we may rather observe a global community interlinked in a process towards equality in political- and social rights. The activists, in the context of OWS, are the '*who*' in this process, which approach the development for social- and political change. The defining elements of OWS and POS, is the individual protesters, and the uniqueness, as compared to the former movements. OWS is not only a movement of individuals but individuals in movement. This is, as discussed by Kaldor (2003:378-379), the post-modernist version of pluralism and contestation in global networks.

The second question, in analysing '*how*' the local is connected to the global, may be formed by the domestic activists which connect their claims and grievances to the international, by seizing and creating the political opportunities which arise in both domestic-, and international arenas. Activists, and movements, which operate in both the domestic, and international, and within the influence of international institutions, regimes and practices, have been coined '*rooted cosmopolitans*', and defined as '*individuals and groups who mobilize domestic and international resources and opportunities to advance claims on behalf of external actors, against external opponents, or in favour of goals they hold in common with transnational allies*' (Tarrow, 2005:29). Tarrow claims that the transnational activists are subgroups of rooted cosmopolitans, and will therefore be defined as '*people and groups who are rooted in specific national context, but who engage in contentious political activities that involves them in transnational networks of contacts and conflicts*' (Tarrow, 2005:29). Their uniqueness, as relative to the domestic activists, is their ability to shift activities among levels and taking advantage of opportunities which arise within the complex international society (Tarrow, 2005:29). The fusion between domestic and international activism occurs within this internationalisation, by producing mechanisms and processes that escape the narrow confines of international institutions (Tarrow, 2005:29). The links and *spill-over effect*, between the encampment movements of 2011, and the historical relations to former movements, furthers this approach. In Tarrow's theoretical framework, the single activists functions as the *who*,

and the adoption of networks and social media between movements function as the *how*.

The integration, between global civil society, states and the formal international structures, may be conceptualised in several ways. As mentioned earlier, there are two spheres on the international level which may be highlighted when approaching global integration and global claims. Firstly, *globalisation* is the global economic integration of formerly national economies into the global economy and the effective erasure of national boundaries for economic purposes (Snow et al. 2009:318). Second, *internationalisation* is the increasing importance of relations between nations, international trade, treaties, alliances, protocols etc. (Snow et al. 2009:318). Underlying both of these, we find the socio-cultural globalisation, or the transnational interaction among individuals and groups that generate the ideologies, identities, and cultures that transcend national boundaries. It is the activity of the social movements and the articulation of collective identities and global claims which are the keys to global integration (Snow et al. 2009:318). As discussed in chapter 2.3.2, the global dynamics extends from both the local to the global, and from the global to the local, whereas the ‘occupy movements’ goes from local to local, in a global network.

Compared to former NSM, the claims of WSF and ATTAC have been the altering of global corporative power in international institutions, whereas for OWS it has been corporative power in domestic politics and policies. This is a simplistic categorisation of the differences between the earlier movements and the present encampment movements. But, if comparing OWS to the social movements post-Great Depression, it is highly illuminating, even though it did not have a globalised network of domestic movements. In competitive politics, actors progress and act within the name of their identity, which defines their relations to others. It is therefore the interactions that define the claims they project towards the rest of the population (McAdam et al. 2003:137). These claims will define them and their relations towards what they oppose. The ‘*claim making*’ by social movements may be observed from multiple stances, as observed by their members, the rest of the public and those against whom the claims are directed. In most cases, a scholar may define the movement by their claims, the members may have affinity towards the claims, and the rest of civil society and the projections by the media have their ideas and adaption of the claims. On the basis of the *claim making*, the contentious repertoires arise and fulfil the notion of collective identity. The collective identity, which is the glue of the movement, is the cognitive, morel, and emotional connection with a broader community, category, practice, or institution (Polletta and Jasper, 2001:285). The projected claims are separations between ‘*us*’ and ‘*them*’, and are set on different levels of interaction, meaning the local, national and international, and towards

public institutions, international institutions and international actors. OWS approached the 1% as they approached the politics itself; the Arab Spring approached a dictator and politics itself; the Spanish Indignados approached the crisis management and politics itself. In sum the claims were the same, as they all approached domestic politics itself, even though in different contexts, but by the same tactics and strategies.

Global linkages and networks within and between domestic movements are not something new in SMS. As debated, the question of '*who*' and '*how*' becomes salient. The activists in the different camps are the '*who*', and the interaction between them is '*how*'. Kaldor (2013: 378-379) debated the relation in former global networks, and it may in the linkages between OWS and the 'occupy movement' be understood as a post-modernist version of pluralism and contestation in global networks. The global linkages of OWS are not different from the former social movements. Rather, it has increased, through the internet and other tools of globalisation.

4.5 Conclusion

The approaches to define OWS have been plentiful, and have been going many different directions. Both during and in the after-math of OWS' primetime, the movement has been misunderstood by mass media, as it has been analysed by academic social movement scholars (Langman, 2013: 165). Most of the approaches, in a mission to define OWS, have been to describe what they are not and what they should have done, instead of what they are and did. The reason is that most attempts to define what they are is purely descriptive, and have not succeeded in pinpointing it as a whole, in relations to any former social movement. The primary reason that most analysts have failed in defining OWS, is that the measuring instruments of SMS have been used to understand the structural and organisational levels in the former movements. This is not to say that the instruments are faulty, but increasingly out of date. The members of progressive social movements today are gradually autonomous beings and not formal members of the movement. In SMS and by its instruments, OWS has been a mosaic of tactics, mobilisation and grievances, put together and defined by single individuals. A stated point is that OWS is not like any other social movement, but rather it is comprised of phases and pieces of earlier movements. But, that does not mean that OWS is of a new kind. It is just a new version of the earlier movements, with some strategies, tactics and ideologies of the present, working in a global network.

As this thesis has proposed to answer the research question; *is OWS a new type of a social movement*, it analysed the organisational, political and global linkages of the movement. This multitude of layers approached the US as a starting point, but approached the ‘global civil society’ as an arena for contention and activism. Even though OWS has declined and maybe even ended, the echoes of ‘occupy’ roams the streets around the globe today. A passive revolution towards equality and prosperity, and not a rapid and coherent change, is more likely to occur, as the present situation in the US is still in the political deadlock, and their structural power at a global level is in decline. In Europe, with autonomous and nationalistic states, the power of the EU is not able to restrain or restructure the members of the union towards prosperous unity. Still, the political outcome of the counter-movements is not as important as the means of the movements – it is a constant process. The occupy movement and OWS has so far only been a reaction to the financial crisis and the political system, but may, as the creation of WSF become a proactive movement, if it becomes increasingly structured and coherent.

The former global movements of the two previous decades, such as WSF and ATTAC, are to be defined as *alter-corporative movements*. WSF, and to a degree ATTAC, were movements, NGOs and civil society organisations (CSO) united against global corporative power. OWS is a network of individuals, united into a movement by the links of “*we are the 99%*”, protesting against corporative power in domestic politics. Occupy, on the other hand, is a network of tactics and ideas between semi-organised movements across the globe. Between OWS and the other occupy movements there is a strong degree of spill-over, in matters of tactics and ideas. The latter, as seen around the world in 2011, were linked, but in quite different contexts. OWS did, in a struggle towards something else, fit the trends of former social movements, such as the Global Justice Movement, by a struggle to create alternative forms of organisation and internal direct democracy (Piven, 2013:191). But, for OWS, the means of the movement and the “*99%*”, were never to become strong and implementable goals. Rather, the means became a part of the tactics – true and open democracy. The political effect of the movement was only an indirect output, mostly towards the Presidential Election 2011, which is difficult to measure. But, the exercise of the participants in direct democracy was highly visible, as felt and done by the thousands of occupiers’ world-wide. The one thing they really managed to put forward was the question: *how can we change the system and what should it look like, in order to gain political, economic and social equality, in a seemingly democratic state?*

The claimed uniqueness of OWS is to be found in some spheres of the analysis. Contestation is not solely from a formal SMO who stir and direct the individuals belonging to the movement, but rather individuals who act as protesters, who may be amateur-protesters and professional protesters, coming, speaking and protesting as they please, and then leave. The lack of a formal leadership is present in OWS, but this is not unique, or necessary to obtain the status of having an informal SMO. The lack of a policy platform is neither unique, even though OWS is more of a movement in the policy of asking, than the policy of claiming.

The problems, which the empirical evidence of OWS creates, is not to be found in the movement itself, but rather in the theoretical frameworks created in SMS. None seems to fit, which pulls the debate further towards the insufficiencies in former debates on the NSM paradigm. If we go back, and redefine it to be a shift between old and new social movements, and thereafter analyse new social movements as what they are, and not as NSM, it is more of a deliberate attempt to provide a flexible framework in the analysis. We must be careful not to interpret OWS only in terms of a kind of movement it was not (Calhoun, 2013:37). But, in reflection to the tools in SMS, OWS should be understood as a social movement, and furthermore of a new kind. Hence, with a less rigid framework it does not bring any major change into the SMS. So to speak, the tactics, structures and global linkages have been used before, but in this case with other measures. As times have changed, and the tools of the movements have changed, it is time to change the tools in which we analysing them with. A study of OWS, the occupy-movements, and similar movements, should further focus on the individuals in movement and how they are bound together, by which means, towards a goal. People are, more than ever, informed, autonomous and critical, but free to come and go as they please, within the given movement.

OWS came in the era of the Great Recession, and as a reaction to the governments' bailout of the 1%, and leaving the 99% to fend for themselves. Next to this, there have been numerous issues on the agenda, such as inequality, corruption, social benefits, representation and the Tobin Tax to name a few, but few of them ever made it to any charter of a kind. As a result, the notion of *unity* was only defined after the main slogan "*we are the 99%*". The movement has been leaderless and more camp-structured, leaving the protesters and members of OWS shattered and semi-organised. As a result, the numbers have varied from day to day, whereas the commitment has had a short peak and in a steep decline. OWS was for a shorter time a movement, and occupy became a way of doing a role as an active citizen, consisting of individuals who had a mind-set in the same path – equality and prosperity. Its ways of direct

democracy and tactical means will define social movements for a long time to come and being implemented in most contexts around the globe.

The SMS-literature has defined three main outcomes from protests, in which OWS may hope for; *political outcomes*, in which politicians or political decision move in the claimed direction; *media coverage*, in gaining coverage of the protest and/or the issues at stake; *public opinion*, gain the consciousness of the issues raised (van Stekelenburg, 2012:227). In this sense, OWS has already had great success (Gamson, 2012; Sobieraj, 2011; Wallerstein, 2011). Compared to the first two months of New York occupations, the ‘*Battle of Seattle*’ in 1999 only received 10 per cent of the media coverage (Sobieraj, 2011). Furthermore, the *public opinion* of OWS was largely positive and supportive, as the cries for change were to fluctuate with the ‘*common sense*’ of the average inhabitant, particularly the working- and middle class (TIME, 2011: 23). The disputed point, still debated today, is the *political outcomes* of OWS, which has to be debated out of the political opportunity structures, in a domestic context. OWS was a new kind of a new NSM, as a part in a new type of a global solidarity network. Occupy, on the other hand, is here to stay, as a way of tactics, ideas and opposition.

OWS was not a social movement of a new kind, but rather a mosaic of the former movements. The SMO, POS and global linkages of OWS was not different from any other forms we have seen in former movements, but rather a blend of them. Hence, there were challenges as most of the theoretical frameworks in SMS have been adjusted accordingly to the more formal, centralized and structured movements. OWS and the ‘*occupy movements*’ of 2011 challenged the former ways of organising, claiming and approaching the ‘*common sense*’ of the population - by inviting the population into being the change. It should be claimed that this way of structuring social movements may be an increasing trend, both globally and domestically. Therefore, it should be interesting to elaborate upon and further analyse how the present ‘*occupy movements*’ gain the headlines, new supporters and sets the pace towards change.

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