Declaration

By submitting this dissertation electronically, I declare that the entirety of the work contained therein is my own, original work, that I am the sole author thereof (save to the extent explicitly otherwise stated), that reproduction and publication thereof by Stellenbosch University will not infringe any third party rights and that I have not previously in its entirety or in part submitted it for obtaining any qualification.

April 2014
ABSTRACT

After the First World War (1914-1918) – the first “total war” in modern history, where whole populations, not just military forces, became participants in the war effort, the potential power of propaganda was realised, through the exploitation of mass communication media to manipulate public opinion. Alongside politico-diplomatic, economic and military manoeuvres, governments needed to mobilise the minds of their population to secure support, to mobilise them behind the war policy and to avoid discontent and dissension. This was particularly crucial to South Africa during the Second World War (1939-1945), especially as the country was threatened by deeply ingrained political tensions and internal divisions. The wartime Union, under General Jan Smuts, experienced an escalation of political extremism and militancy from radical sections of white Afrikaner nationalists who opposed the government’s war policy. Furthermore, some elements within even the Union Defence Force (UDF) displayed disloyal tendencies which threatened the morale of the armed forces. Thus, in response, the government waged a massive propaganda campaign during the war aimed at stimulating recruitment, at preserving national morale, at combating anti-war resistance and at minimising disruptions to the implementation of its war policy.

To this end, the authorities exploited information avenues such as radio broadcasts, the press, films, mobile recruiting tours and military demonstrations for publicity and propaganda purposes. As propaganda delivery channels, radio, the press and films were potentially powerful. However, the strategy pursued by the authorities failed to maximise their full impact. The government also did not enjoy a media monopoly for the conduct of its war propaganda. The SABC continued operating independently and its airtime was not handed over to the authorities. Similarly, while the government relied on the support of sympathetic newspaper editors for its propaganda campaign, newspapers themselves sometimes ignored censorship regulations and published material which was unhelpful to the national war effort. Meanwhile, the opposition press also contested the propaganda terrain by waging anti-war campaigns. Films were the weakest link due to limited government control, production obstacles and an English language dominance which alienated the majority of white Afrikaans speakers. Another problem was persistent rivalry among various official and semi-official propaganda agencies and a lack of clarity over a common propaganda policy.
When it came to recruitment, government propaganda achieved particularly limited success. Despite patriotic appeals for volunteer enlistment, the shortage of manpower remained a persistent problem throughout the war. Alongside this, social and economic problems such as food and housing shortages also had a negative impact on public morale. The positive reach of propaganda efforts within the military, especially education, information and social welfare services, was also limited in that they were unable to dispel dissatisfaction resulting from poor service conditions, military policies, and the growing influence of war weariness. Towards the end of hostilities, there was a perceptible decline in troop discipline and morale.

In general, therefore, the Union government’s overall war publicity and propaganda effort failed to produce a solid sense of national war cohesion or war unity. Although the country remained stable and was able to sustain war participation, it could not be said that South Africa’s leadership was able to persuade inhabitants – whether white or black - to participate in the Second World War as a war to be embraced as a people’s war.
**OPSOMMING**

Die Eerste Wêreldoorlog (1914-1918), die eerste “totale oorlog” in kontemporêre geskiedenis waartydens nie net militêre magte nie, maar hele gemeenskappe by die oorlogsopposing betrek is, het die potensiaal van propaganda om die openbare mening met behulp van die massamedia te manipuleer, tuisgebring. Naas polities-diplomatiese, ekonomiese en militêre manevrering, moes regerings ook die gesindheid van die bevolking beïnvloed om hulle agter die oorlogsopposing te skaar en twis en tweedrag te vermy. Gesindheidsbeïnvloeding was vir die Unieregering van kardinale belang gedurende die Tweede Wêreldoorlog (1939-1945), aangesien Suid-Afrika onder diepgaande politieke verdeeldheid en interne spanning oor die oorlogskwessie gebuk gegaan het. Die Smuts-bewind het heweige politieke druk en militante weerstand ervaar van Afrikanernasionaliste wat teen die regering se oorlogsbeleid gekant was. Ontevrede elemente in die Unieverdedigingsmag (UVM) het insgelyks dislojale neigings openbaar, wat die moraal van die gewapende magte ondermyn het. Die regering het gevolglik gedurende die oorlog ’n omvattende propagandaveldtog van stapel gestuur om weerstand teen sy oorlogsopposing te beveg, ontwrigting in die implementering van die oorlogsbeleid tot ’n minimum te beperk, die werwing van soldate te bevorder en die nasionale moraal hoog te hou.

Die Smuts-regering het ’n verskeidenheid van instrumente, waaronder radio-uitsendings, gedrukte media, rolprente, mobiele werwingsveldtogte en miltêre demonstrasies, vir hul reclame- en propagandaveldtogte ingespan. Die regering se propagandastrategieë het egter nie dié kragtige instrumente optimaal uitgebuit om maksimum trefkrag te verseker nie. Daarby het die regering ook nie ’n monopolie oor alle mediaplatvorms vir geniet om hul propagandaveldtogte te bedryf nie. Die SAUK het onafhanklik gefunksioneer en min lugtyd aan die regering afgestaan om radio-uitsendings vir publisiteit en propagande te benut. Die regering het voorts sterk op koerantredakteurs gesteun om hul propagandaveldtogte te bevorder, maar redakteurs het soms sensuurre gulasies geïgnoreer en artikels geplaas wat regeringsbeleid ondermyn het. Die opposisiepers het uiteraard ook die regeringspropaganda met anti-oorlogpropaganda beveg. Rolprente was die swakste skakel in die regering se reklame- en propagandastelsels vanweë hul swak beheer daaroor, ’n gebrek aan tegniese vaardigheid, die hoë koste van rolprentproduksies, asook die oorheersing van die bedryf deur die Engelse taal, wat die meerderheid Afrikaanssprekendes die harnas ingejaag het. ’n
Verdere probleem was die voortdurende wedywering tussen die verschillende amptelike en halfamptelike propaganda-agentskappe. Dit was veral die gebrek aan ’n duidelike propaganda-beleid wat tot oorvleueling en mededinging geleid het.

Wat werwingspropaganda betref, het die regering beperkte sukses behaal. Naas ’n beroep op pligsbesef, eer en glorie, het die regering oor geen hefkrag beskik om werwing te bevorder nie. ’n Gebrek aan mannekrag het derhalwe die UVM dwarsdeur die oorlog gekortwiek in weewil van die regering se omvattende reklame- en propagandaprogramme. Teen 1945 het slegs sowat 330 000 uit die Unie se bevolking van nagenoeg tien miljoen vir vrywillige krygsdiens aangemeld. Sosio-ekonomiese uitdagings soos ’n gebrek aan voedselvoorraden en behuising het ook negatief op die openbare en burgerlike moraal ingewerk. Interne propaganda in die UVM, veral deur middel van die opvoedings-, informasie- en welsynsdienste, het ook beperkte sukses behaal as gevolg van ontevredenheid met militêre beleid, swak diensvoorwaardes en oorlogsmoegheid. Dié ontevredenheid het moraal en dissipline ondermyn en teen die einde van die oorlog tot uitdagende gedrag en oproer onder die troepe geleid.

Oor die algemeen genome, was die Unie-regering se totale reklame- en propagandapoging dus oneffektief. Alhoewel die hele stelsel nie in duie gestort het nie en Unie se oorlogspoging sonder groot ontwrigting voortgegaan het, het die oorlogsmoegheid, oneffektiewe beleide en die invloed van sosio-ekonomiese probleme uiteindelik tot openbare en militêre ontnugtering geleid.
# CONTENTS

Acknowledgements ix  
List of Figures and Illustrations xi  
Selected List of Abbreviations xiv  

INTRODUCTION xvii  

CHAPTER 1 NATIONAL SECURITY RISKS AND THREAT PERCEPTION 1  

CHAPTER 2 POLICIES, STRATEGIES AND STRUCTURES: SA’S INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSE 57  

CHAPTER 3 HOME-FRONT PROPAGANDA: RADIO AND THE PRESS 109  

CHAPTER 4 HOME-FRONT PROPAGANDA: FILMS, NEWSREELS AND MILITARY DISPLAYS 177  

CHAPTER 5 UNION DEFENCE FORCE’S INTERNAL PROPAGANDA: EDUCATION AND TRAINING SERVICES 200  

CHAPTER 6 UNION DEFENCE FORCE’S INFORMATION AND SOCIAL WELFARE SERVICES 244  

CHAPTER 7 CONCLUDING PERSPECTIVES 283
SOURCES
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This dissertation would not have been possible was it not for the facilitation and support of my promotor, Prof Bill Nasson, who painstakingly dedicated his time and effort in the production of this document. I am indebted to his intellectual input, particularly in navigating the complex and multifaceted subject of war propaganda.

I am also grateful for the encouragement from everyone else in the School for Security and Africa Studies in the Faculty of Military Science. Great appreciation particularly goes to my colleagues in the Department of Military History, Lt Col (Prof) Ian van der Waag, Lt Col (Prof) (ret) Deon Visser, and a former colleague, Cdr (Prof) Thean Potgieter, who selflessly shared their unique insights into the field of Military History. As senior military officers and academics, they have really enriched my experience and expanded my horizon in the study of military affairs.

My deepest gratitude to the Social Science Research Council’s Next Generation Social Sciences in Africa Fellowship Programme, which provided funding to conduct research. Without their financial support, I would not have been able to travel to various archival centres for research. It made a huge difference in facilitating the research process. The Military Academy is also appreciated for supporting my initial research efforts.

Conducting research was made relatively painless due to the assistance of the staff at the various archival centres across South Africa. Their knowledge of the various archival collections and assistance was crucial in making the research process more effective. Credit must also go to the Military Archives in Pretoria, the South African Museum of Military History in Johannesburg, the South African Film, Video and Sound Archives in Pretoria, and the South African Broadcasting Corporation Archives for giving me access to wartime audio-visual material which enhanced the content of this study.

My heartfelt thanks to my beloved family: my wife Gerniva-Baboledi, my two sons, Kgetho and Kgotsofalo, and my two daughters, Rethabile and Masego, who had to endure my constant travels and sleepless nights due to the demands of this study. I am really grateful for their love and commitment, for constantly checking up on me and for their moral support and
perseverance during this journey. My parents and siblings are also acknowledged and appreciated for their encouragement.

I say thanks to everyone who contributed in any way to my development, especially friends, colleagues and academics who facilitated my progress from undergraduate to advanced studies. My study leaders at master’s level are greatly appreciated for preparing me for higher levels of academic study and to be able to join them in expanding the frontiers knowledge.
LIST OF FIGURES AND ILLUSTRATIONS

FIGURES

Figure 1: JC Smuts in 1914  
Figure 2: JC Smuts in 1939  
Figure 3: Smuts’s War Cabinet  
Figure 4: Col E.T. Stubbs, DNEAS, War Art  
Figure 5: NMC Soldier, War Art  
Figure 6: NMC Stretcher Bearer, War Art  
Figure 7: NMC, Making Beer, War Art  
Figure 8: Dead Germans, War Art  
Figure 9: Cape Corps at EL Haseiat, War Art  
Figure 10: Casualties W. Desert, War Art  
Figure 11: Reading Night, War Art  
Figure 12: NMC Reading iNdlovu-Tlou  
Figures 13-16, UDF Entertainment, The Nongqai, Apr 1945  
Figure 17: NMC Choir  
Figure 18: NMC Brass Band  
Figure 19: NMC Drill Display  
Figure: 20: NMC Tug of War  
Figure 21: IMC Boxing  
Figure 22: IMC Boxing

ILLUSTRATIONS

Illustration 1: The Afrikaner Broederbond Structure  
Illustration 2: South African National Party Membership Card  
Illustration 3: The Ossewa Brandwag Badge
Illustration 4: Union Defence Force Command Structure, 1939

Illustration 5: Directorate Military Intelligence Structure, 1943

Illustration 6: Non-European Army Services Organisation, 1940

Illustration 7: Bureau of Information: Propaganda Channels

Illustration 8: Bureau of Information Personalities

Illustration 9: Cartoon, Flying to Nowhere, 1939

Illustration 10: Cartoon, Die Pad van Suid Africa, 1939

Illustration 11: Cartoon, Nazi Allegiance, 1939

Illustration 12: Cartoon, History in the Making, 1942

Illustration 13: Cartoon, History in the Making, 1942

Illustration 14: Cartoon, Miss Tea and Mr Skokiaan, 1942

Illustration 15: News of the War, Sepedi, English and Xitsonga

Illustration 16: The Union at War: How to Join Force, 1940

Illustration 17: Poster, Recruitment, The Nongqai, Nov 1941

Illustration 18: Poster, War Industry, The Nongqai, Sep 1940

Illustration 19: Poster, Women at Work, The Nongqai, Sep 1940

Illustration 20: Poster, The Call to Women, The Nongqai, Jan 1941

Illustration 21: Poster, UDF in the Field, The Nongqai, Nov 1940


Illustration 23: Invaders Beware! The Nongqai, Oct 1939

Illustration 24: “V” Sign: Victory Symbol to Scare Adolf Hitler

Illustration 25: V for Victory Sign, The Nongqai, Nov 1941

Illustration 26: V for Victory Sign, Flash, Jun 1944

Illustration 27: V for Victory and for Freedom, Smuts

Illustration 28, Vukani, NMC Recruitment
Illustration 29, Careless Talk Warning Posters 174
Illustration 30: Anti-Fascist and Anti-Hitler Propaganda Posters 174
Illustration 31: War for Freedom and Peace Propaganda Poster 175
Illustration 32: Economic Propaganda Poster 175
Illustration 33: Leaflet, Message from the North, Lt Col Hartshorn’s Tour 199
Illustration 34: AES Handbook for IOs 243
Illustration 35: What Soldiers Think: Attitude Survey 243
Illustration 36, UDF Rates of Pay, Ic Digest, Mar-Apr 1943 276
Illustration 37: UDF Journal, Ic Digest, Mar-Apr 1943 276
Illustration 38: UDF Journal, The Sable, Aug 1943 276
Illustration 39: UDF Magazine, El Bullsheat, Oct 1942 276
Illustration 40: UDF Magazine, Clamp, Sep-Oct 1943 276
Illustration 41: UDF Newspaper, EAForce News, 4 Feb 1942 276
Illustration 42: UDF Newspaper, Springbok, 23 Oct 1941 277
Illustration 43: UDF Newspapers, NMC, iNdlovu-Tlou, 2 Sep 1944 277
Illustration 44: Honour and Good Name Poster 277
Illustration 45: Avoid Disease Posters 278
Illustration 46: Anti-Venereal Disease Posters 279
Illustration 47: UDF Entertainment Advertisements 280
Illustration 48: UDF Forces Radio Advertisement 280
SELECT LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AB: Afrikaner Broederbond (Afrikaner Union of Brothers)
ACF: Active Citizen Force
ADK: Afrikaans-Duitse Kultuur-Unie (German-Afrikaans Cultural Union)
ADPR: Assistant Director of Public Relations
AES: Army Education Services
AF (FA): African Mirror
AG: Adjutant General
AO: Auslandsorganisation (Foreign Organisation)
BBC: British Broadcasting Corporation
BNSC: Bantu News Service Committee
BOI: Bureau of Information
CC: Cape Corps
CCK: Chief Native Commissioner, Eastern Cape
CGS: Chief of the General Staff
CMF: Central Mediterranean Forces
CPS: Civilian Protection Services
DC: Secretary for Defence
DDMI: Deputy Director of Military Intelligence
DGO: Director General of Operations
DGO and I: Director General of Operations and Intelligence
DHQ: Defence Headquarters
DMI: Director of Military Intelligence
DNEAS: Directorate for Non-European Army Services
DRA: Defence Rifle Association
ESPC: Essential Services Protection Corps
GG: Governor General
GOA: General Officer Administration
GOC: General Officer Commanding
HNP: Herenigde Nasionale of Volks Party (Re-united National Party)
IMC: Indian-Malay Corps
IO: Information Officer
JUS: Department of Justice
KCL: Killie Campbell Library, Archives and Manuscripts
KJB: Native Commissioner of Johannesburg
MEF: Middle East Force
MFF: Mobile Field Force
MOI: Ministry of Information (British)
NAD: Native Affairs Department
NASAC: National Archives of South Africa, Cape Town
NASAP: National Archives of South Africa, Pretoria
NEAS: Non-European Army Services
NCO: Non-Commissioned Officer
NMC: Native Military Corps
NO: Nuwe Orde (New Order)
NSDAP: Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartie (National Socialist German Workers’ Party) (Nazi Party)
NTS: Secretary for Native Affairs
OB: Ossewa-Brandwag (Ox-Wagon Sentinel)
OC: Officer Commanding
OFS: Orange Free State
OKW: Ober Kommando Wehrmacht (German High Command)
OWI: Office of War Information (USA)
PF: Permanent Force
PNP: Purified National Party
POW: Prisoner of War
PP: Press and Propaganda
RARO: Reddingsdaabond Amateur Rolprent Organisasie (Salvation Bond Amateur Film Organisation)
RUSI: Royal United Service Institution
SABC: South African Broadcasting Corporation
SAFVSA: South African Film, Video and Sound Archives
SAIC: South African Intelligence Corps
SAIRR: South African Institute of Race Relations
SANDFA: South Africa National Defence Force Archives
SANP: South African National Party
SAPA: South African Press Association
SAPR: South African Public Relations
SAWAS: South African Women’s Auxiliary Service
SSW: Somerset West Magistrate
SWA: South West Africa
Toc H: Talbot House
UCT: University of Cape Town
UDF: Union Defence Force
UDFI: Union Defence Force Institute
UKZN: University of Kwazulu-Natal
UNISA: University of South Africa
UP: United Party
UUTS: Union Unity Truth Service
UWH: Union War History
VIP: Visual Instruction and Propaganda
VOBI: Volksbioskope (Afrikaner People’s Cinema)
WAAF: Women’s Auxiliary Air Force
WAAS: Women’s Auxiliary Army Services
WD: War Diary
WIO: Welfare – Information Officers
WITS: University of the Witwatersrand
YMCA: Young Men’s Christian Association
INTRODUCTION

The Second World War (1939-1945) was one of the most colossal events in the history of the twentieth century. It was the deadliest and the most absorbing in terms of the human and material resources. After the First World War (1914-1918) – the first “total war” in modern history, whereby whole communities, not just military forces, became participants in the war effort, the potential power of propaganda was realised, through the exploitation of mass communication media to manipulate public opinion. Propaganda was a social force which aided national governments in mobilising public opinion to secure national solidarity, cooperation and consent behind the war policy. Hence scholars, particularly in the twentieth century, immersed themselves in the research and production of works dedicated to examining the phenomenon of propaganda as an instrument for mobilising public opinion and shaping attitudes, primarily in the context of the Second World War. However, the conceptualisation of propaganda has been vague and, at times, it is used interchangeably with publicity or advertisement and also with the so-called psychological operations.

In 1927, Harold Lasswell, an American sociologist, defined propaganda as ‘the management of collective attitude by the manipulation of significant symbols’.\(^4\) His emphasis was on the impact of the appropriate symbols - written or spoken words, pictures or musical sounds, on the alteration of an attitude, which he defined as ‘valuational disposition or tendency to act according to certain patterns of valuation’\(^5\). Accordingly, propaganda’s purpose is to foster a favourable or negative attitude towards or against a particular object or cause, and to eliminate those suggestions that would produce unfavourable responses. This definition was expanded in 1938, in his book, *Propaganda Technique in the World War*, wherein propaganda is defined as ‘the management of opinions and attitudes by direct manipulation of social suggestion rather than by altering other conditions in the environment or its organisation’.\(^6\) In the context of war, Lasswell emphasises that propaganda is one of the three chief instruments in operations: military power as coercive power on land, sea or air; economic pressure in terms of controlling access to resources; and propaganda as the direct use of suggestion to ‘mobilise the animosity of the community against the enemy, to maintain friendly relations with neutrals or arouse them against the enemy and to promote national unity’.\(^7\) In his view, Lasswell indicated that his work intended to generate an understanding of the propaganda phenomenon which had ‘created utopianism that fed the masses’, by analysing its techniques and role in that regard.\(^8\)

Writing in 1962, Terence Qualter argued that propaganda must also explain what the propagandists do. Thus, he defined it as ‘the deliberate attempt by some individual or group to form, control, or to alter the attitudes of other groups by the use of the instruments of communication, with the intention that in any given situation the reaction of those so influenced will be that desired by the propagandist’.\(^9\) For effectiveness, Qualter emphasised the need for propaganda to adapt to the needs of the situation and the audience in order for it to ‘be seen, remembered and acted upon’.\(^10\) Other scholars defined propaganda in the context of their own fields such as psychology, political science, history and also as a type of

\(^5\) Ibid., pp. 627-631.
\(^7\) Ibid.
\(^8\) Ibid., p. 2.
\(^10\) Ibid., p. xii.
communication. Still today, there is no consolidated thought on the conceptual definition of propaganda.

Leonard William Doop indicated in 1989 that it was not possible to have a clear-cut definition of propaganda because of its complex nature involving societal behaviour in different times and cultural contexts. However, Jowett and O’Donnell disagree. They believe that, although the definition is itself complex, it is necessary to identify its characteristics in order to be able to analyse it. To that end, they offered their own definition: ‘propaganda is the deliberate, systematic attempt to shape perceptions, manipulate cognitions, and direct behaviour to achieve a response that furthers the desired intent of the propagandist’. In analysing the basic features of propaganda, Jowett and O’Donnell state that it is a form of communication, with emphasis on the deliberate intent (wilful and premeditated), systematic (meaning methodical and in organised regularity, not random) and the goal is to ‘attempt’ or try to ‘create a certain state or states in a certain audience’, for example, ‘perceptual, cognitive, behavioural’ or all of them. The desired end-state should be determined as an objective beforehand. This definition does not significantly deviate from the previous definitions. Other scholars appropriated Jowett and O’Donnell’s definition in their analysis of propaganda, because it is more encompassing and incorporates most of the basic elements, such as intentionality, systematic “attempt” and the manipulation of thought, attitude and action to benefit the propagandist.

The definition by Jowett and O’Donnell is more relevant to this study because it provides a broad framework for an account of the role of propaganda in warfare throughout the history of the twentieth century, particularly the way it was applied during the First and Second World Wars. It also incorporates some of the key thoughts about propaganda that featured in the pre-war works of the influential authorities on the subject, Harold Lasswell (pioneer of

---

12 As Quoted in Jowett and O’Donnell, Propaganda and Persuasion, p. 4.
14 Ibid., p. 7.
15 Ibid., pp. 7-9.
propaganda studies), Leonard Doop (foremost author on the psychology of propaganda and served as director of foreign intelligence in the office of war information (USA) during the Second World War), as well as Sidney Rogerson, (publicity and public relations specialist and former British military officer).\textsuperscript{18} These works, focusing on war propaganda, were published in the 1930s.

In South Africa, the conception of propaganda was broad and flexible. It was conceptualised by specialists in various fields such as H. Sonnabend, S. Biesheuvel, R.F.A. Hoernlé and L. Fouché, as well as the leading educationist and wartime director of military intelligence, E.G. Malherbe.\textsuperscript{19} These specialists conceptualised the basic principles of propaganda in terms of the philosophical foundations, historical development and psychology, for special instructions in the various institutional agencies which carried out propaganda activities. Basically, the conception of propaganda included elements such as information or “education”, a form of publicity or advertisement as well as a form of psychological and political persuasion, all aimed at manipulating perceptions and influencing behaviour towards the interests of the government.\textsuperscript{20} Broadly speaking, the aims were to create awareness and to arouse public interest in the war, to influence the public to reject Nazism and Fascism as well as the narrow ethnic-based nationalism, and to embrace the liberal democratic values and a common “white South Africanism” pursued by the ruling United Party under General J.C. Smuts.\textsuperscript{21} Towards blacks, propaganda was aimed at combating agitations and to influence them to remain acquiescent and non-challenging to the established socio-political order.

Thus, the basic thrust of Jowett and O’Donnell’s definition and its inherent characteristics, mainly drawn from the historical examples including the two world wars, is more of a refinement of the previous broad notions about propaganda; hence its relevance and usefulness in the South African context during the Second World War.

\textsuperscript{18} Lasswell, The Theory of Political Propaganda (1927); Lasswell, Propaganda Technique in the World War (1938); Rogerson, Propaganda in the Next War (1938); L.W. Doop, Propaganda: Its Psychology and Technique (Henry Holt, New York, 1935).
\textsuperscript{19} E.G. Malherbe’s wife, Janie Malherbe also served as an intelligence officer in the Union Defence Force during the Second World War. To eliminate confusion in references to the Malherbes in this study, the director of intelligence (E.G) will be identified as Dr Malherbe and the wife through her relevant military rank.
\textsuperscript{20} Propaganda instruction was carried out by a semi-official pro-government propaganda agency called the Union Unity Truth Service (UUTS), which established a School for Propaganda and Political Instruction in Johannesberg during the war.
As indicated above, the potential power of propaganda was acknowledged at the end of the First World War. It was realised that warfare had transformed and, as Jowett and O’Donnell put it, ‘no longer did single battles decide wars … whole nations were pitted against other nations, requiring the cooperation of entire populations, both militarily and psychologically’. Michael Howard, a British military historian, held a similar view that, ‘war had become a matter, not simply for military specialists, but for society as a whole’. The British had led the way during the First World War by organising propaganda agencies, such as the War Aims Committee, the War Propaganda Bureau and the Neutral Countries Sub-committee, to wage a massive mobilisation effort to preserve national morale and to conduct psychological warfare against the enemy. At that time, the British propaganda efforts were undertaken by Alfred Charles Harmsworth or Lord Northcliffe, the press man of Britain who owned a chain of newspapers, including The Times and The Daily Mail. He was approached by the prime minister, Lloyd George, to become the director of propaganda in 1916, because of his huge influence in the print media. But, John Buchan, another influential military correspondent who served under John Charteries in the British intelligence section on the Western Front, was appointed to that position in early 1917. On 30 May 1917, Lord Northcliffe was appointed as head of War Mission to the United States of America (USA) to ‘control British operations’ there, including publicity.

Due to the exaggeration of the ‘atrocity stories’ featuring massacres, mutilations or tortures of civilians or prisoners of war, mainly in the anti-German campaigns, to draw sympathies from the neutral countries or to persuade the Americans to enter the war, propaganda was discredited after the war, particularly in Britain and in USA. The USA’s Committee of

27 Thompson, Northcliffe, p. 275.
Public Information (CPI), headed by the journalist, George Creel, suffered the same fate as in Britain because the post-war realities proved to be inconsistent with the wartime propaganda messages. 29 But, there were concerns from some propaganda enthusiasts who believed that the British government should have “an organised information service as necessary as any line of defence in the future war”. 30 Conversely, unlike in the First World War, it should be driven by the truth, not ‘false news’ which would be contradicted by evidence later on. 31 The Germans, under Adolf Hitler, had realised the impact of propaganda on the defeat of Germany in 1918, and thus took over where the British and the Americans had left off, to orchestrate a wave of propaganda in Germany and across the world during the inter-war years. 32 A special government ministry for propaganda headed by Joseph Goebbels (ministry of public enlightenment and propaganda) was established in Germany, and the world was subjected to an intensive propaganda campaign to promote Hitler’s ideology of National Socialism (Nazism).

Many avenues were exploited by Nazi Germany for propaganda purposes, especially the new innovation of radio, which broadcast messages in a variety of languages to thousands of audiences in foreign countries. Nazi agents penetrated the social, political and economic structures of societies in foreign states through “expert missions”, including South Africa, in order to facilitate the advancement of the ideals of Nazism. 33 By the outbreak of the war in September 1939, Nazi propaganda had created confusion in the targeted countries, and some in Europe, notably Holland, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Scandinavians, quickly succumbed to the German military power. Also, France and Britain reacted too late, both militarily and through propaganda, in some cases, due to the influence of the pre-war pro-German lobbies such as the Cliveden Set in Britain. 34 It was only when the war had already begun, that national governments began to build-up the psychological resistance to Nazi propaganda, through the establishment of special information and propaganda agencies as part of the overall wartime strategy. It is therefore no surprise that during and after the war,

---

29 Jowett and O'Donnell, Propaganda and Persuasion, pp. 208-217; Rhodes, Propaganda, p. 131.
30 Rhodes, Propaganda, p. 108; Rogerson, Propaganda in the Next War, p. 156.
31 Rhodes, Propaganda, p. 119; Rogerson, Propaganda in the Next War, p. 156.
volumes of works dedicated to the examination of propaganda during the Second World War were produced. However, the focus was more on Europe, Asia and USA. Africa, which was also subjected to propaganda from all sides – the colonial masters seeking black cooperation and support during the war or the opposing powers attempting to disrupt the war effort by creating internal dissensions - featured less in that historiography about wartime propaganda. Only recently, some works have attempted to fill this void.

In South Africa, the history of Second World War propaganda is a theme that attracted little attention. The most informative publications on South Africa’s role in the Second World War have appeared as official histories, but are more concerned with the campaign, battle or regimental histories of the traditional “drum and trumpet” type, with a strong focus on strategy, organisation and the operational aspects of the war. Very few have crossed into the so-called “New Military History”, for example, those that reflect on the experiences of

35 Studies of propaganda in the Second World War have been undertaken in various countries especially in Germany, former U.S.S.R, USA, France, Italy, Japan and Britain, as it gained recognition as an essential tool in furthering the aims of nation states in peace and war. See Lasswell, Propaganda Technique in the World War; Rogerson, Propaganda in the Next War; Qualter, Propaganda and Psychological Warfare; Rhodes, Propaganda: The Art of Persuasion: World War II; Mackenzie, Propaganda and Empire; Lasswell, Lerner and Speier (eds.), Propaganda and Communication in World History; Balfour, Propaganda in War: 1939-1945; Wilke (ed.), Propaganda in the 20th Century; Y.R. Kamalipour and N. Snow (eds.), War, Media and Propaganda: A Global Perspective (Rowman and Littlefield, Lanham, New York and Oxford, 2004); Jowett and O’Donnell, Propaganda and Persuasion.


troops in the frontlines, endurance, deprivations on the home front, prisoners of war, plight of foreign nationals, military-society links, circumstances of non-whites, information management and propaganda. \(^{39}\) The rationale leans more towards the traditional world-wide predominance of the sensational aspects of war, i.e. campaign analysis, battlefield accounts, strategy and tactics or the professional activities of armed forces such as doctrine, organisational structure, weapons development, as well as the procurement and training of manpower. \(^{40}\) In his doctoral dissertation awarded by the Randse Afrikaanse Universiteit (now University of Johannesburg) in 1986, Louis Grundlingh noted this neglect and stated that, ‘considerable studies on the Second World War have lately been done on aspects other than military or strategic. The same cannot be said about South Africa. In the available literature, military themes dominate. No social questions were asked’. \(^{41}\) In addition, given the diversity of the South African society in terms of race, class, gender and culture, social themes in the context of the Second World War experience by different groups still remain under-researched. This is the main weakness that Grundlingh attempted to correct, by at least addressing the experiences of the one neglected section of the South African population, blacks, and analysing their participation in the Second World War. His contribution has enriched the South African historiography in that regard, especially as this section of the society was hitherto scantily mentioned in mainstream histories. Grundlingh’s work is one example of attempts to broaden the frames of enquiry regarding South Africa’s experiences of the Second World War by the diverse sections of the population, from a social and political perspective, that is, other than the military aspects.

Furthermore, the efforts of Grundlingh have since been supplemented by related studies such as Ian Gleeson’s book, *The Unknown Force: Black, Indian, Coloured Soldiers through the*...

---


\(^{40}\) See van der Waag, *Contested Histories*, pp. 27-29.

Two World Wars, which appeared in 1994.\(^{42}\) As the title suggests, Gleeson provides an overview of the role played by blacks, Indians-Malays and so-called coloureds, collectively referred to as “Non-Europeans”, as the neglected sections of the society in South Africa during the two world wars. It is however too short to cover the entire spectrum of two world wars and how each of the sections played their part and their experiences thereof. Non-Europeans were also not homogenous socially, culturally or politically. Although all (Non-Europeans) were subjected to South Africa’s discriminatory policies, each group was further sub-categorised and subjected to the differentiated military service conditions. Thus, the experiences of Non-Europeans were different.

Since then, a few more useful studies focussing on the broader issues relating to South Africa during the Second World War have appeared. Specifically, they cover the various war-related aspects such as the Union’s politico-strategic environment\(^ {43}\), international relations\(^ {44}\), the impact of the Ossewa-Brandwag’s anti-war activism\(^ {45}\), the Nazi penetration and influence in South Africa\(^ {46}\), social history of white servicemen\(^ {47}\), the anti-Semitism in South Africa\(^ {48}\) as


\(^{44}\) Hyam and Henshaw, The Lion and the Springbok: Britain and South Africa since the Boer War (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003); Stewart, Empire Lost: Britain, the Dominions and the Second World War (Continuum, London, 2008).


well as the wartime elections. In the context of the social dimensions within the military forces, three works are notable: Ian van der Waag’s *History of the South African Defence Force Institute*, (SADFI, then known as the Union Defence Force Institute (UDFI)) (1991), covers the social welfare services (canteen system) for the UDF troops; Henrius Bantjés’s *Die Vermaaklikheidsgroep* (The Entertainment Unit) (1990), which covers the entertainment services organised for the military forces; and Michael Cardo’s *Army Education Services (AES)* (2002), which deals with the information and political education system within the UDF.

However, as far as wartime propaganda in South Africa is concerned, there is no single and detailed study longer than a journal article. Some of those that emerged most recently, for instance, the articles of K. Fedorowich and E.D.R. Harrison, focus on the espionage, subversive operations, intelligence and counter-intelligence activities involving Germany and Britain in southern Africa. A very recent publication by S. Chetty, has attempted to provide a glimpse of the propaganda effort in South Africa. However, it has a narrow source base and focus as it describes mainly the visual propaganda dimension based on the analysis of a pro-war publication, *Libertas* and the two post-Tobruk documentaries, *Fall In* and *With our Men in the North*, produced for military recruitment. The article is also slanted towards women and, to a limited extent, the representations of blacks in those visual propaganda materials. Therefore, there is no detailed and in-depth study of wartime propaganda in South Africa. This historiographical limitation needs to be addressed because of the various socio-political

---

challenges and the competing ideological paradigms (fascism, black and white nationalisms, liberal politics as well as communism) which were accelerated in the country during that war.

As E.G. Malherbe put it, during the Second World War, South Africa was the only country to engage in what was regarded as a ‘two front war’: the first front being outside, i.e. in the theatre where battles were fought, and the second front being inside, i.e. the homefront, against the subversive activities and sabotage operations waged by some anti-war factions.\(^{55}\) Interestingly, in 1920, John Buchan said exactly the same thing of South Africa in the First World War. He indicated that, ‘South Africa, of all the British Commonwealth nations, had the most intricate task … [she] had foes within and without her gates … she had to contend with internal revolution and the enemy across her own border’.\(^{56}\) This had huge implications for internal security, stability and public order as well as presented a threat to the country’s war effort. Thus propaganda, almost everywhere, assumed strategic significance as an instrument of state policy during war and crisis. In South Africa, particularly, since the government adopted a volunteer military system and having to construct a military force basically from scratch, because the previous administration under General J.B.M. Hertzog pursued a thrifty and passive defence policy, propaganda was more vital. At the time, the UDF was severely ill-prepared for the war, with no equipment, trained manpower and training facilities in September 1939. To compound matters, there were elements within the UDF who were opposed to the war policy and also refused to serve beyond the borders of the Union. Some of them even displayed disloyal tendencies and thus threatened the cohesion and morale within the armed forces.

Another challenge for South Africa was the reaction of the population to the war. Some white Afrikaans-speaking sections of the society were violently opposed to the country’s support of Britain and subsequently waged various anti-war campaigns to maintain putative neutrality. Hence the views stated above, that the Union faced a two-front war because, after the mobilisation of the UDF for deployment in the war theatres, about half of the troops remained in the country to counter the anti-war resistance and safeguard internal security. Sections of the white Afrikaans speakers were also heavily influenced by Nazi propaganda, particularly through the Zeesen Radio broadcast service, which encouraged Afrikaner dissension and the

---


overthrow of General J.C. Smuts’s government. With regard to blacks, the racial policies prevented them from whole-heartedly supporting the war policy, particularly since they were requested to serve without arms (guns). There was also contradiction between what the war was fought for: the values of democracy and freedom, against the undemocratic doctrines of fascism and Nazism, and on the other hand, the segregation policies which denied those democratic values to blacks. Hence their limited support for the Union’s war policy. In a nutshell, the Union was not united when war broke out. The government of Smuts, which led the country into the war, was severely constrained and had to navigate a number of problems in order to give effect to its war policy. It is on this basis that propaganda became critical to create an imperative for intervention in the war and to mobilise public support.

Hence the need arose to undertake this study in order to examine the role and significance of propaganda in South Africa’s effort to effect its war policy, while on the other hand having to contend with a multifaceted internal anti-war activism. To fill this neglected gap of South Africa’s wartime experience, this study seeks to explore the propaganda efforts in the country, by attempting to address a few questions: What kind of challenges did the authorities encounter? What were the internal security conditions and threat perception that necessitated the mobilisation of propaganda? What were the goals of that propaganda? What kind of policy measures and response strategies were employed? How did the authorities cater for the different population and gender groups? Which kinds of programmes were implemented? Which kinds of platforms were exploited and for what purpose? In which areas were those programmes and platforms applied? What was the content or the main themes of the propaganda messages? Given the diversity of the population and their interests, how did the targeted audience react to propaganda? And lastly, how effective were those propaganda platforms and programmes, i.e. success and failures of those efforts?

As Marwick states, ‘war is a great auditor of institutions … a supreme test of a country’s military, social, political and economic institutions … if they are inadequate they will collapse.’57 South Africa was severely tested during the Second World War. This study examines the above questions, from a socio-political perspective, and attempts to give account of how the Union government exploited propaganda in an effort to give effect to the war policy and to sustain the country’s institutions. Therefore, the Union government and its

actions are at the centre of the study. The population, on whom propaganda from the government, the opposition movements and from the enemy was applied, is also central to the analysis, especially in terms of the reactions. This study is confined to the South African context, but references to other areas will be made where this is relevant or could assist in the illumination of the analysis.

As highlighted, the study also takes into account the structural and socio-political diversity of the South African society (even in the military), which therefore implies an examination of the propaganda strategies and objectives as applied to the different population groups and their responses. The study is undertaken within the context of “war and society”, because it investigates a social phenomenon – propaganda – and its usage in the manipulation of the society’s thoughts, attitudes and behaviour during the war situation. There is a clear link between the war and its impact on the South African society.

The study itself is based on extensive research in South Africa’s archival repositories. The records in the South African National Defence Forces Archives (Military Archives) in Pretoria, form the main basis of the study. The most significant archival groups are the Archives of the Chief of the General Staff, Archives of the Adjutant General, Archives of the Secretary for Defence, Archives of the Directorate for Non-European Services and the Native Military Corps, and the Press and Propaganda Archives. Other critical records on the subject of this study were obtained from the National Archives of South Africa, Pretoria. Most importantly, the Smuts papers were particularly useful. They were supplemented with the Archives of the Secretary for Native Affairs. Other critical papers used are the Harry (H.G.) Lawrence collections (University of Cape Town), E.G. Malherbe collections (University of Kwazulu-Natal, Durban) and T.C. collections (Wits University, Johannesburg). The National Museum of Military History, Johannesburg, was also useful in their collections of the posters, war art and photographic pictures of the DNEAS members.

Furthermore, the South African Broadcasting Corporation’s Archives in Johannesburg have been very valuable in providing the annual reports from 1937-1949, and also the audio clips that were recorded during the war. In addition to these, the South African Film, Video and Sound Archives in Pretoria have enriched the study by making available the actual wartime films and newsreels (African Mirror) produced for propaganda purposes. Therefore, this study attempts to cover a wide-spectrum of the propaganda efforts. However, there is a
limitation. There are few records on propaganda conducted by the opposition, except a few newspaper clippings. But, that shortcoming is offset by the collections on the opposition movements which are located in the Military Archives and in the collections of H.G. Lawrence and E.G. Malherbe. There are a few secondary sources that have also been used to supplement the archival records and to fill the gaps on the opposition movements. There are still many other records that have not been listed above, but have been significant in the development of the study. Details of these may be found in the source references throughout this study. It was a challenging exercise to sift through many volumes of archival documents to extract the most appropriate data relevant to the study and the most rewarding in the amount of knowledge that has been acquired in the process.
CHAPTER 1

NATIONAL SECURITY RISKS AND THREAT PERCEPTION

*German propaganda is more dangerous, subtle and insidious than any attack by armies. Night by night, the soul of the people of South Africa is being sapped and their convictions undermined by the broadcast from Zeesen.*

The Union of South Africa’s participation in what became the Second World War (1939-1945), was riddled with controversies. Like most countries during the inter-war years, it was affected by the *Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartie* (NSDAP) (National Socialist German Workers’ Party) (in short, Nazi Party), whose agents actively penetrated foreign states to propagate Nazi ideas, to generate support for Nazi Germany and to establish linkages with potential Nazi sympathisers. Those Nazi agents also established espionage networks, collected intelligence and sought to exploit tensions within societies to create instability and fragmentation for purposes of reducing national resistance to the advancement of the Nazism.

As such, the Union, as well as Germany’s former colony in southern Africa, South West Africa (SWA) (currently Namibia), became targets for Nazi activities. Both countries had

---


61 Lawrence Papers, BC640, E5.44.2, Official (South African) White Book on Nazi and Nazi Propaganda in South Africa from 1933 to the Outbreak of the War in September 1939, vol. 3, pp. 247-253; Furlong,
German nationals and those of German extraction. After her First World War defeat, Germany was stripped of her colonies and one of them, SWA, was given to the Union to administer as a mandated territory on behalf of the League of Nations. SWA became a source of political tension between the Union government and Nazi Germany. Many Germans in that country became enthusiastic about Hitler’s National Socialism and had begun to agitate for the German takeover. The Union was also targeted due to the genealogical connection of some Afrikaners with Germany, for example, the pre-war Minister of Defence, Oswald Pirow, and due to her (historical) relationship with the British Empire, Germany’s perceived arch-rival for European hegemony. The chief aim was to deprive Britain of the potential support in the event of war, by cultivating the Union’s neutrality and disrupting the imperial war capacity. This was highlighted in September 1939 through the country’s virulently contested parliamentary decision to participate in the war against Germany and the resultant political turbulence that followed during the war.

This chapter, therefore, intends to illustrate the nature and extent of Nazi Germany’s manoeuvrings in the Union during the 1930s to facilitate Nazi influence and its impact on domestic politics. It explicitly examines three broad issues: the establishment of a branch of the Nazi Party in the Union during the 1930s and the various mechanisms exploited to orchestrate penetration and expansion; the development of Nazi-inspired, ultra-nationalistic movements in the country; and the growth of internal anti-war and anti-government activism. Broadly speaking, the analysis of the above themes serves to highlight the sources of controversies regarding the Union’s entry into the war, particularly the neutrality question, and the determinant factors which shaped government actions to facilitate the realisation of the objectives of the war policy.

Between Crown and Swastika, pp. 16-17; Fedorowich, ‘German Espionage and British Counter-Intelligence in South Africa and Mozambique’, pp. 209-230; Furlong, ‘Allies at War?’, pp. 16-29.
THE NEUTRALITY PREDICAMENT

When war erupted in September 1939, the debate about the Union’s neutrality became the primary focus. Leading personalities with conflicting views about this decisive political question were General J.B.M. Hertzog, the Union Prime Minister, and General J.C. Smuts, his deputy since the inception of the Fusion government in 1934. According to Hertzog, the Union could adopt a neutrality policy and not support Britain if the latter was involved in war.64 Such neutrality would strengthen the principle of sovereignty that he (Hertzog) had politically been fighting for. From its inception, the Hertzog-led National Party existed for the purpose of ensuring that the Union was completely emancipated from British dominance and that Afrikaner interests were secured.65

On the other hand, Smuts believed that the neutrality policy was not an option for the Union, constitutionally, morally and practically.66 He believed that European events also had implications for South Africa and the country could ill-afford to remain isolated from international affairs.67 Smuts questioned the wisdom of extreme elements within the society about crying for neutrality ‘in all circumstances and in all cases’, without due consideration to the unfolding international events at the time.68 German territorial expansionism and intolerance presented evidence of a ‘fever of war in a nation’ and Smuts anticipated that Hitler would continue because he was striving for world domination.69 His views were expressed in a letter to his British friends, M.C and A.B. Gillett, that he did not believe Hitler would retreat. He was also concerned about the unchecked growth of Nazism in the Union, particularly the spread of ‘propaganda, falsehood, delusion and fomenting of strife carried on by foreign agents.’ 70 These developments regarding the Union’s domestic politics also affected British authorities. Reports indicated that some Afrikaner people were infuriated by

the British connection and longed for a Boer Republic. Matters came to head after Germany invaded Poland on 1 September 1939 and Britain declared war on Germany two days later. Britain was at war and the Union had to determine her policy position. As Hertzog and Smuts had on various occasions indicated that the Union parliament would decide the matter, their opposing motions were thus debated on 4 September 1939. The outcome favoured Smuts, with a narrow majority of only thirteen votes. Hertzog, thereafter, failed to persuade the Union’s governor general, Sir Patrick Duncan, to dissolve the parliament and call a general election. He resigned and Duncan asked Smuts to form a government. Smuts agreed and formed a new cabinet that took South Africa into the war. He became the Prime Minister, and also assumed the portfolios of external affairs and defence. Proclamation no. 197 of 6 September 1939 formally announced the severing of the Union’s ties with Germany and entering a state of war against her.

Surprised by the developments, Smuts wrote to Gillett and remarked that he was planning a life of leisure away from public life as he expected to be out of office soon. In contrast, he was in his old job as a Prime Minister and had to ‘face a very anxious and difficult situation’. (See Gen Smuts in 1914 and in 1939, figs. 1 and 2) Following the parliamentary decision, extreme Afrikaner nationalists held demonstrations for some weeks, with accusations that Hertzog had been ‘double-crossed’ by his coalition “friends” (by Smuts). Intelligence officials provided numerous reports about the volatile political situation and the

---

74 Debates of the House of Assembly, vol. 36, 2-5 September 1939, vote results, col. 95-100; UCT, Sir Patrick Duncan Papers, BC 294, A27.2, Memorandum on House of Assembly Debates on the War or Neutrality, 6 September 1939, p. 3.
75 UCT, Sir Patrick Duncan Papers, BC 294, A27.3-6, Duncan to Hertzog, 5 September 1939.
79 South African National Defence Force Archives (SANDFA), Union War Histories (UWH), Box 265, B.1 .20, Internal Security, Intelligence Summaries, 17 November 1939; Reitz, No Outspan, pp. 243-244; See also Roberts and Trollip, The South African Opposition, pp. 20-21.
prevalent anti-government activism which also included death threats to Smuts.\textsuperscript{80} Massive political warfare was waged against him, as he remarked:

\begin{quote}
My political opponents are extremely active and extremely mischievous, holding meetings and holding me up as an agent of England, and doing their best to mislead our poor ignorant backveld who largely believe that neutrality would have saved them and kept things sweet and pleasant for them. I cannot at present join in this wretched political campaigning as I have my hands more than full with the affairs of country.\textsuperscript{81}
\end{quote}

Once more in South Africa, as in 1914, war had reinvigorated latent tensions which saw the country confronted with internal unrest and subversive activities in many areas. The country was divided politically into two broad categories: pro-war party that supported government’s war policy, and the anti-war party that rejected the war policy.\textsuperscript{82} To a large degree, the growing anti-war activism in the Union had been cultivated through Nazi propaganda throughout the 1930s and intensified in the early stages of the war.\textsuperscript{83} The next section, therefore, will illustrate the pre-war developments and Nazi machinations in South Africa, and how these impacted on the country’s wartime politics.

**NAZI INTRIGUES IN THE UNION DURING THE 1930s**

Seven years before the outbreak of the war, Nazi Germany had established its presence in South Africa through the founding of the NSDAP branch in 1932.\textsuperscript{84} The German intelligence service of the Ober Kommando Wehrmacht (OKW) (German High Command) called the Abwehr, had been engaged in coordinating the collection of operational intelligence, i.e. espionage and counter-espionage, the organisation of sabotage and subversion in enemy or potential enemy territories, including South Africa.\textsuperscript{85} Before the war, agents were sent across

\textsuperscript{81} Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 246, Smuts to A.B. Gillett, 13 September 1939.
\textsuperscript{82} UWH, Box 265, B.I. 20, Internal Security, Intelligence Summaries, 21 September 1940.
\textsuperscript{83} UWH, Box 265, B.I. 20, Internal Security, Intelligence Summaries, 1939-1941; Lawrence Papers, BC640, E5.44.4, Official White Book on Nazi Activities and Nazi Propaganda in the Union of South Africa from the Year 1933 to the Outbreak of War in September 1939, vols. 2-5; SANDFA, ZB, Box 1, WR 65/9/41, Extracts of Zeesen Broadcast, 11 November 1941; SANDFA, PP, Box 1, Zeesen Broadcast, October 1940; UWH, Box 239, B.I. 1, Extracts of Zeesen Broadcast, 9 - 10 October 1939.
\textsuperscript{84} Lawrence Papers, BC640, E5. 45, Nazi Activities in the Union of South Africa Before and During the War, December 1945; Strahl, *Seven Years*, p. 69; Furlong, *Between Crown and Swastika*, p. 16.
\textsuperscript{85} Lawrence Papers, BC640, E5. 47, G.C. Visser, Strictly Confidential Report on the Affidavit of Dr Luitpold Werz, 25 November 1946. The Luitpold Werz affidavit was collected as part of the Lawrence
the world with the essential function of obtaining knowledge about the prevailing conditions in targeted countries as well as key personalities, so that in the event of hostilities, they could discharge their duties efficiently.\textsuperscript{86} As far as South Africa was concerned, it would later transpire, through the Union’s intelligence reports of 1939, that there was a plot to disseminate Nazi ideas to pave the way for the eventual incorporation of the country into Germany’s sphere of interest.\textsuperscript{87} The “annexation plot” exposé was conducted through the Union’s newspapers in 1940.\textsuperscript{88}

To facilitate the realisation of such ambitions, information about South Africa was collected and channelled through to the German Foreign Office, Berlin, via the German Consulate in Lourenço Marques (now Maputo) in Portuguese East Africa (Mozambique). The Political Section 10 (Pol. X) in the German Foreign Office, under Dr Harold Bielfeld, was responsible for dealing with colonial questions south of Sahara, including South African internal affairs.\textsuperscript{89} Information on shipping and matters of military significance from Lourenço Marques, for example, troop movements and naval intelligence, would be received by the German Foreign Office in Berlin and then passed on to the relevant section of the OKW. Information dealing with South Africa’s internal politics would be handled by the Foreign Office.\textsuperscript{90} German


Lawrence Papers, BC640, E5. 45, Nazi Activities in the Union of South Africa Before and During the War, December 1945.


interest in South Africa developed rapidly after 1933, both in the economic and political spheres. The political developments were particularly observed, mostly with keen interest on the internecine conflict within white politics dealing with the South African relationship with Britain. Citino observes that Nazi Germany was on alert to see if there were any elements of weaknesses in South Africa that could be exploited to disconnect her from Britain and to orchestrate the return of SWA to Germany. There was a manifest significance of South Africa to the Nazi government as detailed information about the internal developments in the country was requested from employees of the German press organisations and in the Union.

Nazi activities spread across the world, mostly in those countries with the potential for being neutral in the event of international hostilities. The aim was to disseminate as far and as deep as possible, Nazi doctrines, theories, ideas and world philosophy to the German nationals (Reichs Germans) and naturalised Germans (Volk Germans) living abroad, as well to the non-Germans who exhibited inclinations towards the Germans. As indicated above, South Africa and SWA fell within the Nazi regime’s sphere of interest. In addition, Portuguese East Africa, a colony of Portugal, a country which remained neutral during the Second World War, also became the centre of Nazi espionage networks and the main conduit of intelligence on southern Africa to Berlin. It also had a significant number of Germans. Many of the German officials and individuals stayed in Portuguese East Africa for the duration of the war, and some moved through that country to go back to Germany. Thus, throughout the war, Nazi manoeuvres and intelligence regarding South Africa were coordinated through the office of the German Consul in Portuguese East Africa, particularly in the early 1930s when the Nazi Party assumed power in Germany.


91 Citino, *Germany and the Union of South Africa in the Nazi Period*, pp. 61-62.
94 Furlong, ‘Allies at War?’, p. 18.
95 Lawrence Papers, BC640, E3. 38, J. Goodwin, Commissioner of Immigration and Asiatic Affairs, Lorenzo Marques, reply to E.K. Scallan, Union Consulate General, Lorenzo Mraques, 11 October 1939.
96 Although there are some references to German activities in the Union and SWA in the 1920s, developments regarding the intensified coordination of Nazi operations manifested in the early 1930s with the coming to power of Hitler’s Nazi Party. See Lawrence Papers, BC 640, E3. 50, Political and Subversive Correspondence Located in old German Consulate, South West Africa, Acting Deputy Commissioner, South African Police Commanding SWA Division to Commissioner of South African Police, Pretoria, 30 November 1939; UCT, Jagger Library, Archives and Manuscripts, Morris Alexander Papers, BC160, List IV, File 24, A Memorandum on the anti-Jewish Movements in South
In 1932, a German electro-technics academic at the University of Cape Town, Professor Herman Bohle, founded a branch of NSDAP in the Union.97 From its inception, this NSDAP was directed exclusively at the communities of German extraction residing in South Africa and not necessarily aimed at the white Afrikaner population. Through NSDAP, Herman Bohle gave lectures in Cape Town on Nazism, amidst strong objections from members of the Jewish community because of Hitler’s anti-Jewish agitations in Germany.98 The South African government took no action. The NSDAP expanded its operations to Johannesburg, Pretoria, Durban, East London, Port Elizabeth, Bloemfontein, Tzaneen and Philippi (Cape Province).99

In October 1939, a memorandum titled ‘Nazi Plot in SA, Attack from Within’, circulated within the Union’s intelligence structures. It described the methods and channels utilised by the Nazi agents to gain a foothold and spread Nazism in South Africa and in many countries throughout the world. Operations were coordinated through the NSDAP’s chain of local structures, particularly the cells which operated in secret. Around the cells there were subsidiary organisations such as the Labour Front, the Schools Associations, the Church Associations, the League of German Women Abroad, the Hitler Youth Movement and the Winter Help, which were directed through the German diplomatic structures and representatives.100 The political activities were coordinated through the NSDAP’s Landesgruppe Südafrika (local “National Committee” or Country Group of South Africa) as the main organisation which controlled a network of related sub-organisations: Ortgruppen (Local Groups) and Stützpunkte (Supporting Points), operating in various centres across the Union.101


Lawrence Papers, BC640, E5. 45, Nazi Activities in the Union of South Africa, December 1945; Strahl, Seven Years, p. 69; Furlong, Between Crown and Swastika, p. 16.


Lawrence Papers, BC640, E5. 45, Nazi Activities in the Union of South Africa, December 1945; Furlong, Between Crown and Swastika, p. 17.

UWH, Box 279, B.I. 30, Nazi Plot in SA, Attack from Within, 28 October 1939, pp. 1-12; A similar copy is found among the official documents regarding policy and related materials of Harry Lawrence; See Lawrence Papers, BC640, E5. 9, Very Confidential Memorandum Relating to Nazi Activities in the Union of South Africa, pp. 1-8.

UWH, Box 279, B.I. 30, Nazi Plot in SA; Lawrence Papers, BC640, E5. 45, Nazi Activities in the Union of South Africa; Lawrence Papers, BC640, E5. 9, Very Confidential Memorandum Relating to Nazi Activities in the Union of South Africa, pp. 1-8; Furlong, Between Crown and Swastika, pp. 17-18.
Herman Bohle was the *Landesgruppeleiter* (Country Group Leader) in South Africa from 1932 to 1934 and was succeeded by Bruno Stiller, who was also a German Consul in Cape Town and later Counsellor of German Legation in Pretoria. Various other organisations, such as societies, clubs, press, libraries and business, were targeted for Nazi influence. The Nazi government in Germany maintained control and supervision of these local organisations through the agency of the *Auslandsorganisation (AO)* (Foreign Organisation), the central body based in Berlin, under the leadership of Ernst Wilhelm Bohle, the son of Professor Herman Bohle. These organisations promoted Nazi doctrines by ‘extolling the virtues of National-Socialism’ within the German-speaking communities living outside Germany and to sympathetic groups and individuals in foreign countries.

In October 1933, the German Nazi Minister of State for Enlightenment of the People and Propaganda, Dr Joseph Goebbels, issued a circular to the German diplomatic representatives and passport officials abroad, reflecting on the Nazi government’s foreign policy direction:

> The ‘Refutation’ section of this Department does not limit itself to refuting the lies and inciting propaganda of other countries, and to the supply of informative material, but considers its main task to be to explain to other countries the ideas championed by National Socialism, while it undertakes to carry out the Führer [Adolf Hitler]’s high principled ideas, expressed in his speeches and in the utterances of leading personalities of the movement, in a form adapted to the mentality and psychological make-up of the foreigners.

The main forms of Nazi penetration were through the press, clubs, German educational classes, correspondences and propaganda – the chief weapon. Various groups and

---


104 UWH, Box 281, B.I 31, Nazi Propaganda in the Union, no date; UWH, Box 279, B.I. 30, Nazi Plot in SA. E.W. Bohle came from England as boy and attended school in South Africa, see P.J. Furlong, ‘Fascism, the Third Reich and Afrikaner Nationalism: An Assessment of the Historiography’, *South African Historical Journal*, no. 27, November 1992, pp 113-126. The Foreign Organisation was incorporated into the German Foreign Office and its activities received diplomatic protection. The Organisation coordinated activities across the world where there were an appreciable number of German-speaking people.

105 UWH, Box 281, B.I. 31, Nazi Propaganda in the Union, n.d.; Lawrence Papers, BC640, E5.45, Nazi Activities in the Union of South Africa.

organisational structures such as societies, schools, teachers, missionaries, churches, farmers, sympathetic foreign officials, editors of the press, restaurants and libraries, were targeted with a stream of propaganda material in furtherance of Nazi ideals.\textsuperscript{107} Whilst the main aim was to foster internal unity within Nazi Germany, propaganda was also intended to influence foreign countries by disseminating Nazi doctrine, methods and ideas in order to gain a foothold and to gather information about the country.\textsuperscript{108} It was also introduced in foreign states as an instrument to create disunity and confusion. Nazi policy in foreign countries was intended to exploit internal grievances and latent frictions in a society, for example, stimulating racial antagonisms, exaggerating labour and management differences, sowing suspicion and distrust between the government and its subjects, encouraging and supporting disruptive and obstructive organisations in a given country.\textsuperscript{109} Propaganda was considered a reliable weapon for weakening the internal social cohesion and political unity of a targeted foreign country.

In order to provide the basis of understanding and to create awareness within the country’s political corridors, intelligence authorities in the Union produced documents that outlined the main purpose of Nazi foreign propaganda:

\begin{quote}
To act as a solvent – to extend the lines of cleavage within foreign states and so to widen them that the composite body splits up and disintegrates...the points of difference may be found to exist between allies, between a government and its subjects, between minorities and majorities, between social classes. Nazi propaganda is simply to emphasize these differences and widen them until complete disintegration is achieved.\textsuperscript{110}
\end{quote}

\begin{footnotes}
\item[107] Lawrence Papers, BC640, E5.44.2, Official White Book on Nazi Propaganda in the Union of South Africa, vol.3, p. 253
\item[108] Lawrence Papers, BC640, E5.44.262, Otto von Strahl, ‘Protect your Home Country’, 18 July 1941, pp. 1-19; Strahl, \textit{Seven Years}, p. 69.
\item[109] Lawrence Papers, BC640, E5.44.262, Otto von Strahl, ‘Protect your Home Country’, 18 July 1941, pp. 1-19; Disruptive efforts were undertaken in many countries in Europe: Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Ukraine, Belgium and Holland. See also Qualter, \textit{Propaganda and Psychological Warfare}, pp. 112-113.
\item[110] UWH, Box 279, B.I. 30, Nazi Plot in SA. The document also mentioned the influence of Professor Ewald Bause, an expert on Military Science. In his book, “\textit{Germany Prepares for War: the Nazi Theory of National Defence}”, he urges that disruptive propaganda should be exploited to “dissolve a united mass of enemy people”. Prof Bause’s influence on Nazi thought was controversial because his book “\textit{The Science of Offence}” was banned in Germany on 22 October 1933 after it was considered to be glorifying the war, thus creating suspicion around the world against Nazi aspirations and intentions. See \textit{The Courier-Mail}, 23 October 1933. The South African-based newspapers and the Board of the German African Party (anti-Nazi), in their warnings against Hitler’s quest for world domination, also refer to Bause’s book, “\textit{Raum und Volk}” (Space and Folk) as the basis of Nazi Germany’s foreign policy which had implications for South Africa.
\end{footnotes}
Nazi agents in the Union were widespread and operated secretly in various structures before and during the course of the war. Many of the Nazi activities in the Union were recorded and reported by Baron Otto von Strahl, the former German Consul based in Durban, South Africa from 1936 to 1938. According to his reports, a number of Germans, posing as experts in varied fields, came to the Union during the 1930s. Most of them belonged to the Geheime Staatspolizei (Gestapo) (Secret State Police), the Foreign Organisation (German, AO), the Hitler Youth Movement, or the Labour Front, and were sent by the Nazi government to acquire knowledge about the Union. These agents came in various professional capacities, such as geologists, zoologists, medical men, journalists, architects, technicians, road engineers, artists, ex-generals and naval officers. Several of them served in the diplomatic sphere as well as in the South African commerce and industries such as shops, mining, hotels, restaurants, hair salons, mission stations and local harbours (as German boats employees).

Their tasks were to collect information about the various aspects which related to the Germans in the country, as well as espionage work for the Nazis, and to report to Berlin headquarters. Such information was consolidated in four broad categories:

a. Information about the existence of a German colony, a number of Germans there and their membership to the Nazi Party.

b. Information on the German medical facilities and medical practitioners, schools, churches and newspapers in their vicinity.

c. Information the number of German offices, their sizes, club and meeting rooms, sports facilities, libraries and flags.

d. Information on the available codes, addresses for secret communication and routes for propaganda material.

This information was critical for the establishment of a Nazi power base among the German nationals and those of German extraction in a given country (e.g. Oswald Pirow in South

---

111 Baron Otto von Strahl worked as a German diplomatic representative for about twenty years since 1918 and became the German Consul in Durban, South Africa, in 1936 (representing the German government led by the Nazi Party). He was dismissed from his diplomatic post in Durban on 4 November 1937 as he refused to join the Nazi Party and left South Africa on 11 March 1938. He was the main informant of the Allies on Nazi activities around the world and in the Union of South Africa. See Strahl’s diplomatic service details in the German Foreign Service in his book, Seven Years as Nazi Consul, published during the war in 1942. See also Furlong, Between Crown and Swastika, pp. 17-18.


Africa. In addition, espionage and propaganda efforts would be coordinated through such structures to advance the Nazi cause and to render countries susceptible to subversion in the event of international hostilities.\textsuperscript{114} Agents in the Union collected intelligence on economic, military and political conditions. Four of such agents operated in the South African ports: Durban - Hans Mladeck, agent-general of the German African Lines and Sven Behrmann, cargo inspector of the German African Lines, Cape Town - Rheinhold Ihlenfeldt, passenger office manager of the German African Lines, and Heinz Gaertner, a wool buyer for German firms who operated in East London. These agents were interned in the Union and, in June 1944, were repatriated to Germany by the \textit{SS Drottingholm}.\textsuperscript{115}

The South African cultural sphere was the most targeted area of Nazi penetration. Among other avenues, agents facilitated the infusion of Nazi ideals in the arts and sciences, youth education (in schools), university students, music and theatre, religious science, films and broadcasting, as well as through the celebration of Nazi customs and traditions.\textsuperscript{116} These activities were mainly directed at German nationals in order for them to maintain connections with their home country. The Von Strahl report on Nazi activities in the Union, specifically identified and stressed the domain in which the Nazis, for seven years, were overtly active and the aims thereof:

\begin{quote}
\textit{In fact, in the cultural sphere the Nazis in this country [Union] made even more gestures than in the political sphere and introduced into the Union everything from Nazi Germany of which it was susceptible, with the clearly the visible intention of making this country slowly but surely another victim of their objectives and lust for annexation, or of consciously preparing the soil for such.}\textsuperscript{117}
\end{quote}

The editor of the German weekly publication in South Africa, \textit{Der Deutsche Afrikaner}, Dr Wilhelm Stark, was tasked to facilitate the advancement of the Nazi cause after replacing a certain Dr Hanisch in 1935.\textsuperscript{118} On 21 December 1937, the AO directive from its press office

\begin{footnotes}
\begin{enumerate}
\item[115] Lawrence Papers, BC640, E5.45, Nazi Activities in South Africa, December 1945.
\item[116] Lawrence Papers, BC640, E5.44.2, Official White Book on Nazi Propaganda in the Union of South Africa, vol. 3, p. 247.
\item[117] Lawrence Papers, BC640, E5.44.2, Official White Book on Nazi Propaganda in the Union of South Africa, vol. 3, p. 248.
\item[118] Lawrence Papers, BC640, E5.44.4, Official White Book on Nazi Propaganda in the Union of South Africa, vol. 5, pp. 480-481 and 503; See also Furlong, \textit{Between Crown and Swastika}, p. 19; The
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotes}
in Berlin, requested Stark, as part of undertaking Nazi missions, to furnish full volumes of various South African newspapers along with periodicals to Germany. The rationale given was that these publications would add value to the Ausland (Foreign) Press Literature in the Prussian State Library in Berlin. Similarly, in January 1939, the German Labour Front’s Ausland (Foreign) Section Press Bureau in Berlin, instructed W. Krause, leader of the Labour Front in South Africa (Johannesburg), to provide a report containing publication titles, editorial information, circulation and related publication details concerning all English, Afrikaans and German papers and periodicals published in South Africa. The required reports were to reflect the situation in South Africa on perspectives and activities relating to the Nazis. This actually underscored an enormous level of attentiveness Nazi Germany paid to South Africa, essentially in the political sphere.

The Deutsche Afrikaner paper, which had focused its content on Germany from a nationalistic perspective, swung to Nazism when Hitler came to power in 1933. In the Union, it was published in Pretoria, Johannesburg, Cape Town, Durban, East London and likewise in Windhoek and Swakopmund (SWA). The paper intensified its Nazi propaganda objectives in its policy objectives. On 19 July 1937, it issued an appeal to Germans living in South Africa, revealing its policy:

*To the Germans in South Africa, with today’s issue ... the “Deutch Afrikaner” has arrived at a decisive turning point in its history. We won’t rest until our paper has become an influential paper, which as an undaunted champion forcible represents our German interests to the world...*

The paper also reflected on the anti-Nazi agitations in the country and across the world, to strengthen its appeal and message to the Germans. It purported to be an “all-uniting paper” aimed at championing the German cause, by conquering opposition and promoting German

---

119 Lawrence Papers, BC640, E5.44.4, Official White Book on Nazi Propaganda in the Union of South Africa, vol. 5, pp. 480-481.
120 Lawrence Papers, BC640, E5.44.4, Official White Book on Nazi Propaganda in the Union of South Africa, vol. 5, pp. 503-504.
121 Lawrence Papers, BC640, E5.44.4, Official White Book on Nazi Propaganda in the Union of South Africa, vol. 5, p. 506.
solidarity. In addition, the political attitudes of the Deutsche Afrikaner were discernible from the numerous articles that were published. Since Stark took over its editorship, he cultivated anti-British animosity through pictures and articles by ascribing the liability of dissatisfaction and war in the world to the British. At the same time, whilst criticizing British actions in the Union, for example, through historical examples of the circumstances leading to the Anglo-Boer War, the paper also presented Germany as a friendly nation that supported the Afrikaners and protected the President of the South African Republic (Transvaal), Paul Kruger. But, due to the influence and dominance of British imperialism, they (Afrikaner) invaded SWA (during the First World War). An excerpt of the article reads in the following manner:

*In this critical hour German men in Pretoria formed a body guard which day and night kept their eye on the old Boer President. German Transvalers formed a living shield for the protection of Paul Kruger, for didn’t the whole of Pretoria have to be on their guard against a sudden attack by Jameson’s friends in Johannesburg? Spontaneous friendship for this Boer nation which was of the same stock, prompted these German men to act, and those German volunteers who fought and fell during the Anglo-Boer War for the liberty of the Africander [sic] nation were inspired by the same spirit. And what thanks did they get? Africanders [sic] conquered South West Africa for the Empire and the Hitler Youth Movement and the N.S.D.A.P were prohibited and their leaders banished from the country. … When one looks for the only one who benefits by this discord, namely British Imperialism. If the Africander [sic] nation wants to preserve its originality against British culture, it cannot forego friendly relations with other nations, and who else would primarily deserve consideration in this respect as an unselfish friend, if not Germany.*

Similar articles appeared regularly in the Deutsche Afrikaner, stimulating prejudice against the British and promoting German perspectives. Together with similar papers published in other parts of the Union, the Deutsche Afrikaner facilitated the favourable perspectives about Nazism in the country. With Stark at the helm, the paper introduced competitions where many questions were about the Nazi and the prizes for the correct answers were only Nazi

---


123 Lawrence Papers, BC640, E5.44.4, Official White Book on Nazi Propaganda in the Union of South Africa, vol. 5, p. 570.
books. The targets were the youth, who also received a covering letter with the prize.\textsuperscript{124} Another feature of the paper was to promote Nazi customs and practices, with the view of educating the Germans living abroad about Nazi traditions.

Explanatory information about certain Nazi customs and practices were published regularly. They included the so-called Solstice festivals, “German Christmas festival”, blood weddings, baptisms in Hitler’s name, along with other known activities like the Winter Relief function of the Labour service and Labour Front, which were observed annually.\textsuperscript{125} Throughout the Union, festivals were introduced to the boys and girls in their various structures and celebrations, accompanied by speeches honouring Hitler.\textsuperscript{126} German teachers and teachers’ organisations were implored to advance the struggle for the establishment of a German community abroad in service of Germany. During meetings of teachers in their associations, they were often informed that they should carry out their duties of conquering the hearts and minds of the youth to secure the future of Nazi Germany abroad.\textsuperscript{127} The National Socialistic Teacher’s Association, an organisation for German teachers abroad founded by the Nazi Party in Germany, exercised control and influence on youth education. It ensured that education was carried along the Nazi lines.

The perpetuation of Nazi ideals among the youth became mostly evident in Natal, at a German school in Hermannsburg. According to the reports found amongst the documents seized from a certain Heinze Hecker, a Reich German teacher who was sent to the Hermannsburg school years before, Nazi guidance was carried out to boys and girls. That school, situated near Greytown, belonged to the mission centre, Hermannsburg Synod, led by Rev W. Bodenstein, stationed at Moorleigh near Estcourt in Natal. In that school, educational themes and instructions were based on the glorification of Hitler and the Nazi cause. Subjects such as “race problems”, “blood and soil” and “Germanic Paganism” were introduced into the syllabus, along with performing other practices like singing Nazi songs and giving the

\textsuperscript{124} Lawrence Papers, BC640, E5.44.4, Official White Book on Nazi Propaganda in the Union of South Africa, vol. 5, p. 510.
\textsuperscript{125} Lawrence Papers, BC640, E5.44.2, Official White Book on Nazi Propaganda in the Union of South Africa, vol. 3, p. 367.
\textsuperscript{126} Lawrence Papers, BC640, E5.44.2, Official White Book on Nazi Propaganda in the Union of South Africa, vol. 3, p. 368.
Nazi salute to German visitors at the school. The German culture, character and the Nazi mission to the world were also required to be extended to the children of foreign nations. These were meant to increase the number of admirers of the Nazi state. It was therefore with little surprise that some schools and teachers in the Union, whether German or non-German (mainly white and Afrikaans), engaged in the propagation of Nazi notions and anti-government feelings after war broke out. This caused major concerns for the Union authorities at the outbreak of the war and during the early stages of the conflict.

Churches, clergymen and missionaries, some of whom having established themselves in the Union since the nineteenth century, were also infiltrated and became important channels through which the Nazi cause was advanced. German missionaries, especially those who had been in South Africa for longer periods, were pressed to be part of the Nazi Party and advance the Nazi cause or threatened with a loss of their stipends, whilst new ones were sent to the country to preach along Nazi lines, combining Hitler’s policy with religious teachings whenever it was possible. This effort of applying pressure was orchestrated by Bruno Stiller. Stark of the Deutsche Afrikaner, using a list of names in his possession, also pestered many of clergymen and missionaries to subscribe to his paper at reduced costs. Working through the German Legation in Pretoria, which provided him with the list, Stark was instrumental in contacting missionaries with various kinds of requests, including writings about Christian character of the Nazi paper, ensuring the congregations understand their

128 Lawrence Papers, BC640, E3.221, Nazi Activities and Propaganda in Schools in Natal, 22 February 1940.

129 This was quoted as a speech by E.W. Bohle, the AO leader in Germany, to the gathering of German teachers abroad in Brunswick on 17 August 1935. See Lawrence Papers, BC640, E5.44.2, Official White Book on Nazi Propaganda in the Union of South Africa, vol 3, p. 253.

130 Lawrence Papers, B640, E.280-282, Subversive Activities in the Schools of the Union, Office of the Controller of Censorship to the Minister of Interior and Chairman of the Cabinet Committee on Security, 30 January 1941. Schools that were specifically mentioned in the reports with regard to their anti-government propagation were in Malmesbury, Morressburg, Piquetsberg, Clanwilliam, Van Rynsdorp, Gariep, Springbok and Districts, Port Nolloth, Calvinia, Williston (probably Wellington), Fraserburg, Sutherland, Ceres, Butterworth, Greystown Natal, Dordrecht, Berdford, Barkly East, Berlin Cape, Molteno, Klerksdorp and Laingsburg.


mission of spreading Nazism. In some instances, the missionaries preaching among black South Africans were required to indicate that Hitler was coming to bring salvation and good luck to them.

The increased number of missionaries in South Africa, many of whom were coming through the Rhenish Mission Society and the Berlin Mission Society, prompted the Secretary for Native Affairs, D.L. Smit, to request legislative amendments. In a confidential memorandum to the Union Prime Minister, Hertzog, Smit noted that in 1937, immigration officials granted permits to 162 foreign missionaries, of whom 130 were German, and in 1938, it was 240 missionaries, with 186 being German. This was particularly alarming. In discussions with the Union’s chief of general staff (CGS), General Sir Pierre van Ryneveld and also with the UDF general staff, Smit raised similar concerns and was perturbed by the state of affairs. Concerns derived from the belief that those foreign missionaries were still loyal to their home countries and in the event of war, they might organise amongst black South Africans and embarrass the defence authorities. Smit went on to argue that, because of the enormous religious influence the missionaries had on blacks, they formed ‘a perfect intelligence system and may later prove a serious danger to safety of the State’. The legislative changes proposed by Smit dealt with section twenty-four and paragraph forty-five of the Native Trust and Land Act of 31 August 1936. Since the missionaries moved freely within black areas in South Africa, it was deemed necessary to restrict their movements and to prevent new ones from entering the country, except in exceptional circumstances. The proposed amendment was developed in the following manner:

Missionaries and their non-European employees, irrespective of creed or race, other than those who were resident in the Native areas prior to the coming into operation of the Native Trust and Land Act, 1936 (31st August 1936), will have to obtain the written permission of the Minister of Native Affairs to be in the Native Areas ... that the Department of the Interior be instructed for the present not to admit any more missionaries of alien nationality into the

---

137 Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 130, Memorandum on Foreigners in Native Areas, 24 April 1939.
Despite assurances from the German missionary who served the Roman Catholic mission in Kimberley, Bishop Meising, that due to the bad treatment of Catholics by the Nazi government, they were not favourably disposed to that regime, Germany still made arrangements for funding of missionaries through the German companies operating in South Africa. One implicated company was identified as the South African Motors, Imports and Industries, which was established in 1938 to “push German goods.” In a summary on the subject of the foreign Roman Catholic missionaries operating in black areas, out of a total of fifty-two naturalised foreigners (missionaries), seventeen were German, and the non-naturalised Germans accounted for 618 out of the total of 866. Missionaries from Protestant Societies included twenty-seven naturalised Germans out of forty, and seventy-eight non-naturalised ones out of 297. It was indeed an alarming development in the country since the German missionaries in the Union exceeded all other foreign missionaries, and mostly in black areas. In the light of the deteriorating international security situation that was orchestrated by German expansionism, the increasing German presence produced trepidations among the Union authorities, of course, depending on their particular dispositions towards that country.

Church bodies and structures in the Union, such as the Berlin Mission Society, Cape Synod and Hermannsburg Synod, gatherings and conferences as well as leading personalities loyal to the Nazi regime, were canvassed and utilised for communicating Hitler’s mission of “reconstructing Germany”. Missionaries like Bodenstein of the Natal-based Hermannsburg Synod, advocated for bringing Germans together in one fold, and, for this purpose, through

138 Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 130, Memorandum on Foreigners in Native Areas, 24 April 1939. See further details about the specific amendments to the Act given as Appendix C and Appendix D of the memorandum.
139 Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 130, Memorandum on Foreigners in Native Areas, 24 April 1939.
140 Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 130, Memorandum on Foreigners in Native Areas, 24 April 1939.
141 Hermannsburg Mission Society was one of the leading German missionary establishment in Natal founded by the German missionary Ludwig Harms in 1854. The Hermannsburg mission society was permeated with Nazi influence in the 1930s and through the work of its Luthern priest, Rev. W. Bodenstein, facilitated the establishment of organisations for the promotion of German interests in Natal and elsewhere in the Union of South Africa. Von Strahl mentioned the influence of the Hermanns mission society in his numerous reports that he submitted to the wartime Union Minister of Interior, H.G. Lawrence. For a brief history, development and growth of the German population and culture in Natal through the facilitation of the Hermannsburg mission societies, see H.J. Oschadleus, Natalia 22, 1992, pp. 27-38; See also Furlong, Between Crown and Swastika, p. 71.
the synod committee system, founded a German Association for the Promotion of German interests in Natal on 24 January 1935. A similar organisation was established in the Cape in 1936, under Bruno Stiller. He organised lectures, musical evenings, and with the help of some Stellenbosch University professors and students, arranged for Nazi film exhibitions.

These efforts, facilitated through the German diplomatic services in Pretoria, were designed to unite and organise Germans in their respective localities and to firmly inculcate Nazi ideals in their minds. German missionaries, mission stations and the synod system in the Union and SWA played an integral part in disseminating and entrenching Nazi Germany’s political perspectives. It was however, in the political context where the greatest risks for internal security and stability in the Union became acute. Some Union individuals and groups, who displayed sympathetic inclinations to Germans, created an opportunity for Nazi growth and influence in the country. The far right nationalistic persons and movements became particularly susceptible, and directly or indirectly, contributed to the Nazi cause, by creating a context of confusion, antagonism and security vulnerabilities in the Union.

NAZI STIMULUS AND AFRIKANER NATIONALISTIC MOVEMENTS

Interaction between South Africa and Nazi Germany was conducted extensively through trade and, for the Afrikaans-speaking South Africans, through cultural exchanges. Bilateral trade between the two countries grew rapidly from 1933. Germany was regarded as the “second best customer” of South Africa after Britain, with a total of fourteen percent of the country’s exports taken up by Germany and forty-two percent by Britain. Economically, both countries benefited as they obtained the much needed material from each other. Germany acquired raw materials such as vanadium, manganese, ore and diamonds, whilst the Union benefited from German technical support in fisheries, breweries and in the rail system. Thus, at that time, economic benefits influenced the South African government officials to tread carefully when dealing with the Germans and not to “strain the relations” by

---

144 Hagemann, ‘Very Special Relations’, pp. 128-129; Citino, Germany and the Union of South Africa, p. 3; Furlong, Between Crown and Swastika, pp. 70-82.
146 Citino, Germany and the Union of South Africa, pp. 2-3.
entertaining the growing concerns regarding the existence of the Nazis in the Union.\textsuperscript{147} Within German circles, it was even believed that the British influence in the South African commerce and industry would diminish and Germany would outstrip other states as the main economic partner.\textsuperscript{148} It was, however, in the cultural sphere where German influence was crucial and also pervaded the political corridors of the Union.

“Ties of blood” between the Germans and the Afrikaners were opportunistically invoked to facilitate an understanding of the historical connections.\textsuperscript{149} Closer affinity between the two groups derived from the Afrikaners who had German ancestry and historical sympathies and the support offered by the Germans during the Afrikaner struggles against the British. Throughout their history of settlement in South Africa, many Afrikaners perceived the British to be their arch-rivals in the dominance of the country since the nineteenth century. The British occupation of the Cape (first in 1795 and second in 1806), the migration of the Voortrekkers, known as the Great Trek, from the Cape into the South African hinterland (between 1836 and 1838) to escape British authority, and the failed attempts in achieving Afrikaner independence in the First-Anglo Boer (1880-81) and the Second Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902), were some of the historical events that cultivated anti-British feelings among a number of Afrikaners.\textsuperscript{150}

Germans, perceived to be the main power with the capacity and willingness to challenge British supremacy in the struggle for European hegemony, were considered worthy Afrikaner partners in the South African context. Some ardent nationalistic elements within the

\textsuperscript{147} Malherbe, \textit{Never a Dull Moment}, p. 186; Citino, \textit{Germany and the Union of South Africa}, 22-32.
\textsuperscript{148} Lawrence Papers, BC640, E5.44.1, Official White Book on Nazi Propaganda in the Union of South Africa, vol 2, p. 185; Citino, \textit{Germany and the Union of South Africa}, p. 2.
\textsuperscript{150} There are too many publications – general or specific histories – on the history of South Africa that capture the theme of the Afrikaners struggle against British influence. See for example H. Gilomee, \textit{The Afrikaners: Biography of a People} (Tafelberg and University of Virginia Press, Cape Town and Charlottesville, 2003); B.J. Liebenberg and S.B. Spies, eds., \textit{South Africa in the 20th Century} (J.L. van Schaik, Pretoria, 1993); J. Barber, \textit{South Africa in the Twentieth Century: A political History-In Search of a Nation State} (Blackwell, Oxford and Massachusetts, 1999); T.R.H. Davenport and C. Saunders, \textit{South Africa: A Modern History} (Macmillan and St Martin’s Press, London and New York, 2000); D. Harrison, \textit{The White Tribe of South Africa: South Africa in Perspective} (University of Carliifonia, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1981); Furlong, \textit{Between Crown and Swastika}, Chapter 3; See also M. Roberts and A.E.G. Trollip, \textit{The South African Opposition}, 1939-1945 (Longman, London et al, 1947), for processes and developments within the South African Opposition politics which were directed towards advancing Afrikanerdom culturally, politically, socially and economically, with common hostility against the British influence in South Africa.
Afrikaner ranks even engaged in extreme measures of launching an abortive rebellion against the Union government in 1914. These elements were hoping to exploit the British focus on European hostilities and military commitments at the outbreak of the First World War, to overthrow the Union government which supported Britain, and establish an independent republic. The then Union Prime Minister, General Louis Botha, led the South African forces against his brethren and suppressed the rebellion. It was therefore imperative to ensure and intensify relations with an alternative power that had the potential to aid the nationalistic Afrikaner cause – the elimination of the British dominance in South Africa and the establishment of a republic. That power was perceived to be Germany, as it appeared to be successful during the early stages of the war.

Formal and informal interactions between the two groups were encouraged, particularly in the 1930s as pro-German and some anti-British Empire politicians were in power in the Union: Hertzog and Oswald Pirow. Hertzog’s National Party came to power in 1924, after forming a coalition with the Labour Party to become a majority over Smuts’s South African Party (SAP) in the Union parliament. It was during his (Hertzog) administration that German-South Africa relations were heightened. Closer German-Afrikaner interfaces were forged through the agency of the Afrikaans-Duitse Kultuur-Unie (ADK) (Afrikaans-German

---


153 See details in Furlong, Between Crown and Swastika, Chapter 6.

154 According to Deneyes Reitz, General Hertzog, while arguing for why South Africa should remain neutral during the cabinet meeting at Groote Schuur (in Cape Town) during the weekend before the parliamentary session on Monday, 4 September 1939, also “appreciated” the ‘mighty work of reconstruction that Hitler was carrying out’. See D. Reitz, No Outspan (Faber and Faber, London, 1942), p. 239; See also Hagemann, ‘Very Special Relations’, p. 128. Furlong, ‘Apartheid, Afrikaner Nationalism and the Radical Right: Historical Revisionism in Herman Gilomee’s The Afrikaners’, South African Historical Journal, vol. 49, November 2003, pp. 207-222.
Cultural Union), an organisation that was instrumental in facilitating the exchange programmes, especially for students and scientists.\footnote{Lawrence Papers, BC640, E5.44.2, Official White Book on Nazi Propaganda in the Union of South Africa, vol. 3, p. 293; Hagemann, ‘Very Special Relations’, p. 128; Furlong, Between Crown and Swastika, pp. 77-82.}

Through the ADK, nationalistic Afrikaner intellectuals engaged regularly with German representatives, including members of the Nazi Party, thus creating a platform for exchanging ideas.\footnote{Furlong, Between Crown and Swastika, pp. 77-82; also Furlong, ‘Apartheid, Afrikaner Nationalism and the Radical Right’, pp. 207-222.} These exchanges, as much as they influenced the intellectual development of radical nationalists, seemed to benefit the Germans more.\footnote{See Strahl, Seven Years, pp. 96-98, for the increase in the number of German professionals and other officials that came into South Africa. See also Citino, Germany and the Union of South Africa, p. 30.} German “experts” such as Werner Schmidt-Pretoria, learned more about South Africa and provided reports on how to expand German influence in the country.\footnote{Hagemann, ‘Very Special Relations’, pp. 129-130.} This was highlighted further in a secret report by another German “expert”, Count Graf Karlfried von Dürckheim-Montmartin, an emissary of the German Foreign Office, who “toured” South Africa and SWA during 1934-1935, and worked together with other Nazi agents such as Stark.\footnote{Lawrence Papers, BC640, E5.44.4, Official White Book on Nazi Propaganda in the Union of South Africa, vol. 5, pp. 477-480; Hagemann, ‘Very Special Relations’, p. 129-130; An account of the visit of Count Graf Karlfried von Dürckheim-Montmartin to South Africa is available in the Malherbe Papers at the University of KwaZulu-Natal. The circumstances of von Dürckheim-Montmartin’s visit are also elucidated in E.G. Malherbe’s book, Never a Dull Moment (Howard Timmins, Cape Town, 1981).}

Reflecting back on his time as a Director of the National Bureau for Educational and Social Research in South Africa and an organiser of the New Education Fellowship Conference which was held in Cape Town and Johannesburg in July 1934, Dr Ernst Gideon Malherbe recalled the name of Count von Dürckheim-Montmartin, a German speaker who was actually not invited.\footnote{Malherbe, Never a Dull Moment, pp. 183-87. See also the correspondence between the South African High Commissioner in Britain, Charles T. te Water and Dr E.G. Malherbe, the Officer in Charge, National Bureau of Education, and the subsequent correspondence between te Water and the German Minister of Foreign Affairs at that time, Konstantin Freiherr von Neurath (1933-1938), See E.G Malherbe Collections, University of KwaZulu-Natal (UKZN), Killie Campbell Archives and Manuscripts, Durban, File 505/11, KCM 56982 (184-187), between November and December 1933.} The conference’s theme was “The Adaptation of Education to the Changing Social and Economic Needs with Special Reference to South Africa.”\footnote{Malherbe Papers, File 505/11, KCM 56982 (185), Te Water to Von Neurath, 27 November 1933.} Dr Malherbe did not approve of Von Dürckheim-Montmartin because he had actually invited renowned German scholars on education, Dr Gertrude Bäumer, the Minister of Social Welfare in the German Weimar Republic (before Hitler came to power in 1933), and had publications to her name, as
well as Professor Friedrich Schneider, professor of education at the University of Cologne and editor of the International Education Review.¹⁶² These scholars were refused permission to attend the conference in South Africa and were also dismissed from their positions by the Nazi government in about October/November 1933.¹⁶³ No reasons were provided for their dismissal. However, the German Minister of Foreign Affairs, Baron Konstantin Freiherr von Neurath, stated in a letter to the high commissioner of the Union of South Africa in London, Charles te Water, that the two scholars were not appropriate persons to speak on the “new” education system of Germany. Freiherr von Neurath, in reply to Te Water, who had intervened on behalf of the conference organiser, Dr Malherbe, presented the following the reasons for the replacement of the two delegates:

*Professor Schneider and Frau Dr Bäumer have not taken any active part in the reorganisation of the German educational system which has been initiated in the last few months, and, consequently, will hardly be in a position to give an absolutely accurate and complete description of the motives and tendencies of this latest educational development.*¹⁶⁴

What was required, from a Nazi German perspective, was to bring someone who ‘would be in a position to give an expert description of the fundamental principles and aims of the National-Socialist educational policy’, argued Von Neurath, and concluded by suggesting a certain “expert”, senator Dr von Hoff, the director of education in Bremen.¹⁶⁵ This was a clear indication that the Nazi government wanted to use the conference as an occasion to propagate the Nazi ideals; in consequence, they could not support anyone who did not play along. Dr Malherbe did not entirely disapprove of the new name added, but expressed the view that the conference was designed to have the speakers advising South Africans on the educational problems and the organisation of social work, not to hear about ‘the recent developments under the National Socialist regime’. He also pointed out that if Prof Schneider and Dr Bäumer were to come, Dr von Hoff might be feared as a Nazi spy, thus impacting on

¹⁶² Malherbe Papers, File 505/11, KCM 56982 (185), Te Water to Von Neurath, 27 November 1933; Malherbe, *Never a Dull Moment*, p. 184.
¹⁶³ Malherbe Papers, File 505/11, KCM 56982 (184), see an earlier letter from Schneider to Malherbe, informing him that his request for leave to attend the Education Fellowship Conference in South Africa has been turned down, 19 October 1933. In November of the same year, Baron von Neurath confirmed the pensioning off of Prof Schneider and the release of Dr Bäumer from her post.
¹⁶⁴ Malherbe Papers, File 505/11, KCM 56982 (187), Von Neurath to Te Water, 16 December 1933.
¹⁶⁵ Malherbe Papers, File 505/11, KCM 56982 (187), Von Neurath to Te Water, 16 December 1933. No first name was given. In many of the records in South Africa and in books that used German records, the full names of persons are not given, only one or more initials, then the last name. See also Robert Citino’s book, *Germany and the Union of South Africa*; Otto von Strahl, *Seven Years as a Nazi Consul*; Roberts and Trollip, *The South African Opposition*. 
the presentations of the two academics. Though ultimately none of the suggested names came to the conference, the “spy” concerns could not have been closer to the truth, as it was later revealed, in the person of Von Dürckheim-Montmartin, who used a conference as a cover. His real task was revealed later in a secret report which was confiscated in SWA, about his reflections on the prospects of advancing Nazism in South Africa.

At the behest of Hitler, Von Dürckheim-Montmartin, a Teachers Training College lecturer at Kiel, and Frau Nitsche, who taught at a social work training college, were sent to South Africa as replacements. These two were “unknowns” and Dr Malherbe, at the time still naïve about Nazi Germany’s ulterior motives, complained to Hertzog, who replied that Hitler must not be offended in anyway. This type of rebuff came to characterise the South African government’s response to concerns about the rising Nazi activities in the country until the outbreak of the war. Von Dürckheim-Montmartin and Frau Nitsche came as German speakers, presented unimpressive papers at the conference and disappeared shortly thereafter.

Von Dürckheim-Montmartin’s activities and purpose in South Africa and SWA would later be revealed. Dr Malherbe, in his capacity as director of intelligence in South Africa, learned more about Von Dürckheim-Montmartin from a captured copy of a secret report written to Hitler via the German Minister of Foreign Affairs, Joachim von Ribbentrop, who had replaced Baron von Neurath in 1938. That copy of a secret report was seized by the South African intelligence authorities in the German consulate’s offices in SWA in 1939. The contents of the report, published in 1940 as part of the Union government’s pro-war

---

166 Malherbe Papers, File 505/11, KCM 56982 (205), Malherbe to Te Water, 10 January 1934.
167 Malherbe, Never a Dull Moment, p. 185.
168 Malherbe, Never a Dull Moment, p. 185.
170 Malherbe Papers, File 505/10, KCM 56982 (179), Paper by Von Dürckheim-Montmartin titled “Education in the New Germany”, which attempted to explain the “new” direction of the German government and advocating the idea of the “Volksgemeinschaft” (folk community) within the framework of National-Socialism aimed at “race preservation, destruction of sickly elements and rejection of alien influences”, New Education Fellowship Conference, Cape Town, 2-13 July 1934.
171 Malherbe, Never a Dull Moment, pp. 186-187.
propaganda effort to reduce pro-Nazi bias in the country, reflected the real purpose of Von Dürckheim-Montmartin’s visit to the Union during 1934-1935.173

Von Dürckheim-Montmartin was a Nazi spy with a mission to learn about South Africa and to determine the way in which the Nazi philosophy could be disseminated in schools, churches, and via German newspapers, for the purpose of preparing for the eventual annexation of the country.174 Contents of the report were published in the bulletin by the pro-Smuts and pro-war organisation called the Union Unity Truth Service (UUTS). It dealt with Nazi espionage and propaganda operations in the Union, as well the desire to secure Afrikaner support due to their pro-German sentiments.175 About 60 000 copies of the bulletin were distributed and also provided to various newspapers for reproduction, to expose the German ambitions.176 The report mentioned various factors, particularly the imperative of propaganda, to ensure that Nazi Germany would prevail in South Africa:

All Nazis’ efforts and operations should be fused with German ‘kultur’ ... and intensify the work and activity of the German church officials, schools, school masters, missionaires, newspapers [and] societies. English and Afrikaans newspapers which show any noticeable inclination towards the Nazi way of living, should be supported and subsidised; similarly non-German newspapermen should be “cultivated”, and if necessary, bribed. Propaganda work among the natives in reserves and separate territories should be increased, whilst the

173 Malherbe Papers, File 443/1, KCM 56975 (7), Manuscript on Von Dürckheim about his visit to the New Education Fellowship Conference, n.d.
175 The Union Unity Truth Service was established in 1939 as a pro-war propaganda organisation supporting General J.C. Smuts and the ruling United South African National Party (United Party) and used for the dissemination of pre-war, anti-fascist and anti-South African nationalist propaganda. Its Director was T.C. Robertson. See the U.U.T. collections at William Cullen Library, University of the Witwatersrand (Wits), Johannesburg, Collection no. A1883, Union Unity Truth Service and Truth Legion Records, 1932-1948.
176 Malherbe Papers, File 443/1, KCM 56975 (5), Nazi Influence on South African Politics and the ‘Von Dürckheim Report’, September 1940; ‘The Dürckheim Documents’, Torch Sparks, no. 5, n.d. In was also indicated in Torch Sparks, the official communication paper within the UUTS, that the copy of the report was given to ‘every newspaper south of the Sahara – whether Afrikaans, English, Portuguese, French, German or Jewish – for exposure of the Nazi plot to execute the old German “Mittel-Afrika” dream’; ‘Nazi Designs on South Africa. A Plot to Annex the Union’, n.d. unmounted paper; ‘German Intrigue in the Union Disclosed’, The Star, 3 September 1940; ‘Amazing Nazi Plot to Annex S.A. Revealed’, Sunday Times, 1 September 1940.
discontented, dissatisfied Indian elements in all parts of the Union, particularly in Natal, should be stirred up, incited, exploited, continually.177

Nazi efforts, noted the report, needed to be directed at increasing a wedge between the English and the Afrikaners, and to facilitate cooperation between Germans and Afrikaners.178 The great opportunity, argued Von Dürckheim-Montmartin, ‘lies in the disunity of the opponents, that is, in the opposition between British and Boers’.179 This aspect of the internal dynamics in white politics was observed keenly by the Germans in the 1930s. Any sign of weaknesses or tensions regarding the British-South Africa relations were reported with enthusiasm to Berlin, for example, the controversial appointment of Duncan as governor general of South Africa in 1937.180

Duncan, a former member of Sir Alfred Milner’s kindergarten and Union member of parliament for Fordsburg in the Transvaal since 1916, had a German wife, Alice Dold181 from Kokstad in East Griqualand, and had lived in South Africa for more than thirty years since 1901.182 His appointment as governor general to replace George Villiers, Earl of Claredon, broke with a historical tradition of appointing non-South African citizens to that post, though it was a new development in other Dominions.183 In the German circles, the appointment of Duncan, a South African citizen, was considered significant in a process towards dissolution of ties between the Union and Britain.184 It was in such areas of internal contestations that German officials in South Africa earnestly reported to Berlin. The Von Dürckheim-Montmartin report also mentioned the names of high profile South African nationalist

177 Malherbe Papers, File 443/1, KCM 56975 (6b), Summary of the Dürckheim Report, September 1940.
178 Malherbe Papers, File 443/1, KCM 56975 (6b), Summary of the Dürckheim Report, September 1940; ‘German Intrigue in the Union Disclosed’, Star, 3 September 1940; ‘Amazing Nazi Plot to Annex S.A. Revealed’, Sunday Times, 1 September 1940.
179 Malherbe Papers, File 443/1, KCM 56975 (6b), Summary of the Dürckheim Report, September 1940; ‘Amazing Nazi Plot to Annex S.A. Revealed’, Sunday Times, 1 September 1940.
181 Alice Dold was a third daughter and seventh child (out of nine) of Victor Dold, a German immigrant to South Africa, trader and farmer. Victor Dold’s other daughter, Retha Dold lived in Germany and married to Herman Speiser, a German diplomat and supporter of the Nazi. See C.J. Driver, Patrick Duncan: South African and Pan African (David Phillip, Cape Town, 2000), pp. 4 and 28. This book is the biography of Patrick Duncan’s son who carried his father, Patrick Duncan senior’s name. It provides the background regarding Duncan Jr’s family.
184 Lawrence Papers, BC640, E5.44.4, Official White Book on Nazi Propaganda in the Union of South Africa, vol. 5, p. 551; Citino, Germany and the Union of South Africa, p. 66.
leaders, Hertzog and Pirow, as being well disposed to the Germans and the new German outlook.\textsuperscript{185} Also, far right movements, some of which openly embraced Nazi ideals, made their way into the reports as they became locally originated representations of the fascist designs in the Union. The Greyshirts movement was singled out for its “hard fight” against the Jewish community – a major pre-occupation which characterised Nazi propaganda.\textsuperscript{186} At the time of Von Dürckheim-Montmartin’s visit, the Greyshirts were one of the rightist ‘shirt’ movements inspired by European fascist concepts which had sprung up in various countries around the world, including South Africa.\textsuperscript{187}

The Von Dürckheim-Montmartin report merely revealed the extent of Nazi manoeuvrings in South Africa which, in the 1930s, appeared insufficient to bring many Afrikaners to the side of the Germans. Hagemann, drawing from the German sources, argues that German diplomats in the Union were not naïve. Emil Wiehl, the German Minister Plenipotentiary in South Africa, after being requested to comment, to criticise and to endorse the plans contained in the Von Dürckheim-Montmartin report, noted that Afrikaners wanted to profit from the German power in their historical struggle against the British. They did not necessarily view themselves as “subjects” of a foreign power – Nazi Germany.\textsuperscript{188} Citino, reflecting on the German official records of communication, also makes the same argument. He notes that though the nationalistic Afrikaners’ race consciousness, anti-British sentiment and anti-Jewish perspectives were consonant with Nazi ideals, however, they were ‘not German’ and the Afrikaners ‘had no desire to trade “God Save the King” for ‘Deutschland über Alles’ or the ‘Horst Wessel Lied’.\textsuperscript{189} Pertaining to the fight against the Jews, nonetheless, the Nazis found a reciprocated point of agreement with some of the most extreme nationalistic Afrikaners.

Nazi Germany’s anti-Jewish persecution and propaganda were transplanted to South Africa. At that time, various agencies intensively engaged in the production and distribution of

\textsuperscript{185} Malherbe Papers, File 443/1, KCM 56975 (6b), Summary of the Dürckheim report, September 1940, ‘German Intrigue in the Union Disclosed’, \textit{The Star}, 3 September 1940; ‘Amazing Nazi Plot to Annex S.A. Revealed’, \textit{Sunday Times}, 1 September 1940.

\textsuperscript{186} Malherbe Papers, File 443/1, KCM 56975 (6b), Summary of the Dürckheim report, September 1940; Citino, \textit{Germany and the Union of South Africa}, pp. 70-73.


\textsuperscript{188} Hagemann, ‘Very Special Relations’, pp. 130-31.

propaganda to various foreign states. It was estimated that in 1934, about thirteen million pounds were spent on foreign propaganda, and by 1937, the reported funding expenditure, according to the Dutch newspaper, *Het Volk*, of 16 December, was estimated to have reached twenty-one million pounds, for the promotion of Nazism in other countries.\(^{190}\) Similar reports also appeared in a series of articles in *Common Sense*, a joint publication by the Society of Jews and Christians, Johannesburg, which aimed at countering Nazism in South Africa. A quote from an unnamed writer of *Quarterly Review* of October 1938, in a “Nazi International” section, was reproduced as follows:

*The organisation of foreign propaganda by the German Government is so vast, so intricate and widely ramified, that it almost baffles description. There is not just one agency for the purpose, but a variety of bodies, each sub-divided into departments and sections, linked up with the other main organs of Government, such as the Foreign Office, the War Office, and the Gestapo (Secret State Police), and sending out their multitudinous tentacles to the remotest corners of the universe, yet all controlled by central authority.*\(^{191}\)

Such was the German devotion to influencing thoughts and attitudes of foreign nations, mainly with regard to creating favourable disposition towards the country. One of the influential means of propaganda was the utilisation of radio broadcast. After the construction of the short-wave transmitter in Zeesen, Germany, in 1931, the Nazi regime exploited this technology in 1933 to conduct propaganda.\(^{192}\) Broadcasts were conducted in eighteen different languages, including Afrikaans to South Africa, by the time war broke out. It was already established that some Afrikaner nationalistic movements in the country were opposed to a war. The Afrikaans announcer at Zeesen Radio was Dr Sidney Erich Holm, a South African of German origin, who was recruited by German diplomatic representatives and together with his wife and children, went to Germany aboard the *S.S. Pretoria*, on 20 March 1939.\(^{193}\) Initially, German information about the country was conducted via Lourenço Marques. Later a secret wireless transmitter was installed in South Africa and operated on the

\(^{190}\) UWH, Box 281, B.I. 31, Nazi Propaganda in the Union, n.d.
\(^{191}\) UWH, Box 281, B.I. 31, Nazi Propaganda in the Union, n.d; See also G. Saron, ‘It did Happen Here: How the Nazi Conducted Propaganda in South Africa’, *Common Sense*, vol. 1, no. 7, January 1940, p. 9.
farm of Ossewabrandwag (OB) leader, Dr J.F.J. van Rensburg, near Vryburg. The wireless service was run by Nazi spy, Lothar Sittig (codename Felix), a South African with German roots, and assisted by Dutch journalist, Henri Jacques (Hans) Rooseboom, who was inserted into the Union by the Nazis in October 1939. Zeesen Radio utilised Afrikaans press reports and the secret transmitter to broadcast “credible” news about the country to the South African audience. Through Zeesen, Nazi propaganda was transmitted, using emotive language to arouse anti-British feelings, chiefly through reference to atrocities of the Anglo-Boer War:

… courage and deep sense for righteousness and freedom. These characteristics will inspire South Africa although Afrikaner renegades, jingoes and Jews are suppressing the freedom of expression of the Afrikaner with force and cunning, and forced him into war for the interest of England, who is the arch enemy of the Afrikaner … the Boer nation had repeatedly to fight bitterly [against Britain] for its independence and rights … English and Jews systematically prepared the war for England against the Boers in 1899. 75,000 Boers fought against 450,000 British soldiers … the Boers fought stubbornly until the British directed their efforts in the most brutal manner against women and children in order to bring the fighting men to their knees. During these years, 26,000 women and children died. A terrible guilt over which many British are shamed of. But they soon forgot.

Zeesen Radio criticised South Africa’s participation in the war and referred to Smuts in a variety of ways: ‘Smuts, the friend of England’, ‘Smuts, handyman of the Empire’ and ‘the little South African Dictator’. As war progressed, there were also insinuations that Smuts had invited British soldiers to settle in South Africa after the war, invoking further emotions from the ultra-nationalist Afrikaners to regard such action as the ‘occupation of land by the enemies of the Afrikaner nation’. Zeesen Radio became such a menace to the Smuts

194 Lawrence Papers, BC640, E5.78, Statement about Activities of Henri Jacques (Hans) Rooseboom during the period 9th October 1939 to 28th June 1942; Lawrence Papers, BC640, E5.47, Affidavit of Dr Luitpold Werz, 25 November 1946.
195 Lawrence Papers, BC640, E5.78, Statement about Activities of Henri Jacques (Hans) Rooseboom during the period 9th October 1939 to 28th June 1942; See also Fedorowich, ‘German Espionage and British Counter-Intelligence in South Africa and Mozambique’, pp. 209-230.
196 See Zeesen Broadcast (ZB), WR 65/9/41-WR 65/9/43, Broadcast from Enemy Radio Station, 1941-1945. The extracts from these transcripts are in Afrikaans. Those dealing with South Africa have been highlighted in red ink, suggesting the areas considered harmful and requiring counter-statements against the claims contained in the broadcast.
197 Press and Propaganda (PP), Box 1, Zeesen Broadcast, October 1940.
198 UWH, Box 239, B.I. 1, Extracts of Zeesen Broadcast, 9 - 10 October 1939.
199 ZB, Box 1, WR 65/9/41, Extracts of Zeesen Broadcast, 11 November 1941.
government that arrangements were made via the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) for the specific purpose of countering the claims made in the broadcast.200

In addition to Zeesen Radio, two other agencies were also significant in advancing Nazi influence in South Africa. They were the German Fitche Association (Duitse Fitchebund), with its central offices in Hamburg201 and the World Service (Welt Dienst), based in Erfurt, Germany.202 The Fitche Association’s object was to refute Germany’s war culpability regarding its role in the First World War. Leaflets, books and pamphlets were produced and sent out. In 1935, about five million leaflets were reported to have been sent abroad. The published leaflets were written in several languages, including brilliant Afrikaans.203 This highlights that the Afrikaans-speaking community was essential to the Nazi cause. In one of the requests to the Deutsche Afrikaner, Dr Kurt Johannsen, who was running a secret press propaganda office in Hamburg, newspapers in the Union, both Afrikaans and English, were to be identified for the purposes of publishing Nazi propaganda paper, “Germany Speaks”.204 Stark listed about eight Afrikaans and five English newspapers ultimately, and gave their titles to Johannsen.205

A stream of other literature flooded the Union, and many of them served to discredit the existing liberal democratic institutions, to amplify the peril of communism, to exalt the pre-eminence of the Aryan race and to vilify the Jewish community.206 On each sheet of the pamphlets distributed by the Fitche Association, it was stated that, “further copies may be obtained free of charge from the Secretary … please distribute them among your friends”,

200  Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 132, Memorandum for Cabinet Sub-Committee on Publicity, 8 November 1939. See chapter 3 for further discussion about the South African publicity and propaganda arrangements.
201  UWH, Box 281, B.I. 31, Nazi Propaganda in the Union, n.d; See also Saron, ‘It did Happen Here’, Common Sense, from January to March 1940.
202  UWH, Box 281, B.I. 31, Nazi Propaganda in the Union, n.d. World Service (German – Welt Dienst) was an organisation founded by Ulrich Fleischhauer during 1933, in Erfurt, Germany, and regularly sent out bulletins that glorified Nazism and ran publications to “shirt” movements around the world. It also organised international conferences for the “Pan-Aryan (pure-blood whites” and “Anti-Jewish Union” between 1933-1938.
204  Lawrence Papers, BC640, E5.44.4, Official White Book on Nazi Propaganda in the Union of South Africa, vol. 5, p. 545.
205  The Afrikaans papers listed for Nazi propaganda were Die Transvaler (Johannesburg), Die Volksblad (Bloemfontein), Die Burger (Cape Town), Die Oosterlig (Port Elizabeth), Die Vaderland (Johannesburg), Die Suiderstem (Cape Town), Die Volkstem (Pretoria), Die Huisgenoot (Cape Town); and the English papers were Pretoria News (Pretoria), Rand Daily Mail (Johannesburg), The Friend (Bloemfontein), The Cape Argus (Cape Town) and the Cape Times (Cape Town).
206  UWH, Box 281, B.I. 31, Nazi Propaganda in the Union, n.d.
and a Hamburg address was provided. Numerous ways were devised to disseminate the pamphlets in the country. Bundles of these pamphlets would at times be sent by “friends” for distribution, wrapped up in merchandise and smuggled into the Union. Sometimes the pamphlets would be brought in by German sailors and given to their associates at the harbours. In another situation, pamphlets were mailed to the addresses in the country. Many church ministers of the Dutch Reformed Church received such mails which were progressively sent on a larger scale.

Another agency, World Service (*Welt Dienst*), published weekly Nazi propaganda bulletins in eight languages. Despite the publications by the Fitche Association, the World Service unleashed the most negative portrayal of the Jews. They were referred to as capitalists, Christian babies ritual killers, and people who were out to dominate the world. The German Minister, Wiehl, exploited anti-Jewish agitation as a weapon against the anti-German protests and boycott of German goods that took place in the Union and other parts of the world as a result of the persecution of the Jews in Nazi Germany. Due to the stimulus, to some extent, of Nazi agents, imitation movements in South Africa were founded on the anti-Jewish platform. A memorandum issued by the Jewish leadership in the country provided a brief appraisal of the various anti-Jewish “shirt” movements that developed in the country soon after Hitler came to power in 1933. The South African Greyshirt Movement (the South African Christian National Socialist Party), was founded on 26 October 1933 in Cape Town.

---

207 UWH, Box 281, B.I. 31, Nazi Propaganda in the Union, n.d; See also Saron, ‘It did Happen Here’, Common Sense, p. 9.
by Louis T. Weichardt. At its gathering, a Nazi salute was given and the movement became active in the Eastern and Western Cape. In the Transvaal, Manie Wessels established the South African Democratic Movement (the Blackshirts) in December 1933 and also operated in the Orange Free State.\(^{213}\) Jewish businesses and services were confronted with organised boycotts and in Bloemfontein, some of the Jewish shops had swastikas affixed on the buildings.\(^{214}\) From 1934 onwards, there were additional anti-Jewish movements founded in South Africa and some of the original ones were reconfigured in the process.

In May 1934, the reconfigured and renamed South African National Party (SANP) (not Hertzog’s or Malan’s National Party), led by Weichardt came into being. It was a consolidation of the South African Gentile National Socialist Movement (variation of “Christian” and “Party” in the name of previous organisation) and the “South African Greyshirts” which then referred to itself as the “Storm Troopers”. The “South African Greyshirts” or “Storm Troopers” was designed to provide bodyguards to speakers and maintained order at meetings. A branch of the SANP, under the leadership of R.K. Rudman was active in Natal. Due to internal dissensions, the SANP splintered and its former organising secretary, J.H.H. de Waal, Jnr., apparently unhappy with Weichardt’s advocacy of dictatorship, formed the Gentile Protection League in Cape Town in January 1935. Another splinter group, the South African Fascists, was founded by J.S. von Moltke, and operated in the Eastern Provinces and Free State. In Cape Town, a movement under the name of The People’s Movement, describing itself as “non-political” and “disavowed connections” with either Weichardt or Von Moltke, was founded by H.S. Terreblanche.\(^{215}\) In another splinter, this time from the “Blackshirts”, *Die Volksbeweging* (an Afrikaans renaming of the People’s Movement) was founded by Chris Havemann.\(^{216}\)

All these movements, despite slight variations in their stated perspectives, predominantly shared common anti-Jewish policy in their respective programmes.\(^{217}\) Anti-Jewish


\(^{216}\) Saron, ‘It did Happen Here: The “Shirt” movements as Links in the World Nazi Chain’, *Common Sense*, vol. 1, no. 8, February 1940, p. 8.

\(^{217}\) UWH, Box 279, B.I. 30, Memorandum Relating to the Nazi Activities in the Union of South Africa, October 1939; Saron, ‘It did Happen Here: The “Shirt” movements as Links in the World Nazi Chain’,
publications were produced and distributed in various parts of the country where these movements were active. Among others, *Die Waarheid* (The Truth) was published by the Greyshirts, *Ons Reg* (Our Right) by the “Blackshirts” and the *Terre Blanche* by The People’s Movement. Bruno Stiller, counsellor in the German Legation in Pretoria and a Nazi Party leader in the Union, was particularly mentioned in the South African intelligence reports as the key figure in fostering these “shirt” movements.

The Greyshirts under Weichardt became the main vociferous movement which modelled itself along the Nazi lines, and led the campaigns against the Jewish community. This movement was highly regarded in the Nazi circles. After a raid on the Nazi headquarters in SWA in 1935, the Greyshirts were mentioned in the German documents as a ‘sister movement’, with its leader, Weichardt described as ‘leader of the South African Nazis’ and as ‘an honest fanatical Nazi’. Morris Alexander, a leader of the Jewish board of deputies in Cape Town, provided a summary of the contents of the seized Nazi documents, which specifically refer to South Africa. It was indicated that, though no evidence was found, funding was considered for promoting anti-Semitic campaigns in South Africa. The South African intelligence authorities also referred to the same report and mentioned ‘several hundred pounds out of some political fund to place at the disposal of the Greyshirt movement’.

In 1937, the Greyshirts were represented at the annual World Service congress held in Erfurt, by one Miss A. Marshall, who published the accounts of the congress in the publication of the movement, *Die Waarheid*. The implications of these “shirt” movements in the Union lay more in their anti-Jewish messages based on Nazi ideals, in the context of the existing socio-
economic problems. The Greyshirts apportioned blame to the Jews for the economic hardships, communistic influences and other ‘machinations’ orchestrated to ensure (Jewish) control in all spheres of the South African society, thus requiring strong resistance.

In September 1938, Weichardt, unable to attend the World Service Congress in Germany, sent a message and urged the Congress for the formation of a “united front throughout the world against the Jews”. In his efforts to draw support from the extreme nationalistic elements in the white Afrikaans-speaking society, Weichardt exploited the ‘poor white problem’ largely produced by the Economic Depression of the early 1930s, and poor agriculture, difficulties for white unskilled workers in urban centres, as well as the influx of blacks to urban centres who competed for unskilled job opportunities with whites, to apportion culpability to the Jews. The German officials in South Africa emphasised the fact that it was the English-Jews, with capitalistic tendencies, that promoted their self-interest to the detriment of the Afrikaners. Through the “rhetoric of protest and opposition” to the Jewish community in South Africa, the Greyshirts facilitated the growth and visibility of the Nazi influence in South Africa. To a limited extent, the Blackshirts also fostered anti-Jewish antagonism in the Union, making pronouncements that the Jews were dominating the world. The fomenting of anti-Jewish hostility, by fostering ideas of Jewish domination in

---

226 UWH, Box 281, B.I. 31, Nazi Propaganda in the Union, n.d; This document explained that “the purpose of Nazism is to transplant anti-Semitism wherever possible and to foster everywhere the ideas of Jewish domination, Jewish world plot, which have been popularised in Germany itself ... the Nazi hope to thereby to create discord and division among people ... break national unity and weaken its resistance to foreign influence”; Shain, ‘Anti-Semitism and South African Society’, p. 190; Scher, ‘Louis T. Weichardt’, pp. 56-70; Furlong, Between Crown and Swastika, pp. 20-21 and 27-34.
227 UWH, Box 281, B.I. 31, Nazi Propaganda in the Union, n.d.
230 Citino, Germany and the Union of South Africa, pp. 72-79; Furlong, Between Crown and Swastika, pp. 20-21 and 27-35.
231 In 1936, a group of Stellenbosch University’s professors, with Dr H.F. Verwoerd in attendance, led a protest in opposition to the government’s allowance of the immigration of the Jews from Germany to South Africa who were fleeing from Nazi persecution. See Bunting, The Rise of the South Africa Reich, pp. 60-63; Shain, ‘Anti-Semitism and South African Society’, p. 190; Furlong, Between Crown and Swastika, p. 62.
232 Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 129, Meeting: S.A, National Peoples’ Movement (Blackshirts), Westene, Johannesburg, Deputy Police Commissioner Witwatersend Division to the Minister of Justice, 7 January 1939.
the world, was an essential element in the promotion of the broader Nazi aims. By the second half of the 1930s, anti-Jewish protests and campaigns became increasingly manifested in South Africa.233

Closer magnetism between the German National Socialists and the South African narrow conception of nationalism - exclusive Afrikaner nationalism, derived from the construction of ‘common enemies: communism and Jewry’.234 The memorandum on anti-Jewish movements suggests that the concentration of the activities of these movements were ‘on the economically depressed classes and poorer parts of the country – more especially in the Western Transvaal and the hinterland of the Cape’.235 The memorandum further asserts that the anti-Jewish messages exploited the ‘ignorance of their listeners’ by making ‘capital of their economic hardships by attributing the cause of these to the Jews’.236 Through public speeches, pamphlets and mail, anti-Jewish propaganda was disseminated, even to the school children, and in certain cases, to coloureds and blacks, urging them to view Jews as “dominant” in commerce and professional aspects of the country.237 Racial animosity in the Union was thus incited at grassroots level. Hence, even the previously mainstream Afrikaner nationalistic leaders such as Dr D.F. Malan of the Gesuiwerde Nasionale Party (‘Purified’ National Party), evolved their views and became openly anti-Jewish, with the view to reaching peripheral classes of the society. Malan commented in 1937, that the Jews were to blame for the disunity and marginalisation of Afrikaners.238

The ‘Purified’ National Party (PNP) was a product of party political realignments in South Africa after the economic crisis of the early 1930s.239 This party was initially not overtly anti-

---

234 Hagemann, Very Special Relations, p. 131; Furlong, Between Crown and Swastika, chapter 2.
238 Dr D.F. Malan’s speech was delivered at Stellenbosch in 1937. See Shain, ‘Anti-Semitism and South African Society’, p.191; Furlong, Between Crown and Swastika, pp. 52-54.
239 Die Gesuiwerde Nasionale Party (‘Purified’ National Party) was a breakaway party formed by Dr Malan after a section of the Afrikaners rejected the Fusion of their original National Party (NP) of Hertzog with the South African Party (SAP) of Smuts in 1934, to form the United South African National Party (United Party). The PNP was established out of a need for maintaining Afrikaner ethnic identity, with the view to advancing the idea of establishing an independent Afrikaner-dominated South African Republic See Roberts and Trollip, The South African Opposition, pp. 6-8; Brits, ‘Political
Jewish, despite the radical elements inside. In the mid-1930s, anti-Jewish attitudes became apparent within the PNP. This became predominantly evident in 1936 when Dr Malan and radical leaders such as Dr H.F. Verwoerd, protested against the arrival of Jewish refugees on a chartered ship, the *SS Stuttgart*, from Germany.\(^{240}\) The PNP was advocating for the imposition of stricter immigration regulations which effectively affected the Jewish community. Anti-Jewish protests were carried out when the *SS Stuttgart* arrived in Cape Town to beat the deadline of restrictive immigration law which was to be effective on 1 November 1936.\(^{241}\)

By 1937, anti-Jewish activism had developed into an integral part of the PNP’s political programme in opposition to the United Party-led government. It was no longer about dreading economic competition, but a racially-charged political antagonism against the Jews.\(^{242}\) This became a matter of extreme significance to Nazi Germany, as Malan was in the political mainstream and also enjoyed the growing support of many Afrikaners.\(^{243}\) Besides, the “shirt” movements became smaller and weaker due to constant sub-divisions, and also operated in the political periphery.\(^{244}\) Malan’s PNP, thus, had the opportunity and latitude to incorporate anti-Jewish messages into its political programme to obtain grassroots support which was often neglected.

Malan also courted overt admirers of Hitler’s Nazism, the Greyshirts and the Blackshirts, in his attempt to obtain electoral support.\(^{245}\) These overtures failed primarily due to the Greyshirts rejecting pluralistic party politics and constitutionalism. Malan and the PNP were committed to, and did not want to deviate from constitutional democratic imperatives as a platform for facilitating the realisation of Afrikaner dreams – the achievement of an Afrikaner-dominated republic. Dr Malherbe made the association between the National Party


\(^{241}\) The Immigration Quota Act of 1930, which was proposed by Malan, to restrict the immigrants from southern and eastern Europe, aimed at the Jews even though they were not specifically mentioned in the Act, was further buttressed with the introduction of a requirement for one hundred pounds paid upfront for each refugee when entering South Africa. Hence the chartering of the *SS Stuttgart* to beat the deadline of 1 November 1936. See Bunting, *The Rise of the South Africa Reich*, pp. 60-61; Furlong, *Between Crown and Swastika*, pp. 46-69; Hellig, ‘German Jewish Immigration to South Africa’, p. 127; Citino, *Germany and the Union of South Africa*, pp. 77-78.


\(^{243}\) Citino, *Germany and the Union of South Africa*, pp. 160-163;

\(^{244}\) Furlong, *Between Crown and Swastika*, pp. 21-22.

and its Nazi affiliation through a membership card dated 31 August 1937. This card was issued to M.J.F Bergman, membership no. 7719 of Dundee, Natal. It reflected a clear connection with the Nazi movement and had a swastika emblem on the top left page and on the stamp at the bottom left. On both emblems, the South African National Party and its abbreviated letters, S.A.N.P., were printed. On the right page, the following words appear:

[English] *The South African National Party emanates from the S.A. Gentile National-Socialist Movement and incorporates the said Movement as also the S.A. Grey Shirts.*


Dr Malherbe reproduced it in his book, *Never a Dull Moment*, and indicated that, ‘then [before the war] already the National Party had adopted the Nazi swastika as its symbol’, and went on to note that the word “Gentile”, written in the Afrikaans translation as “Christelike”, was an indication of ‘the strong anti-semitic leanings in the National Party at the time’. Anti-Semitism, continued Malherbe, ‘was fundamental to Hitler’s theory which he put into practice in the most barbarous way during the war.’

In 1934, after the fusion of Hertzog and Smuts’s parties to form the United Party, Malan broke away and formed the PNP, known in Afrikaans as “*Die Gesuiwerde*” Nasionale Party, sometimes just referred to, in short, as the “Purified” or “*Die Gesuiwerde*”. Weichardt’s Greyshirts, notorious for its frequent changing of names in the 1930s and 1940s, also called itself the South African National Party in 1934 (as discussed above). It had changed from its previous name, the South African Christian National Socialist Movement. From the words on the membership card, it can be inferred that the National Party referred to here, was actually the Greyshirts, not Malan’s PNP. This is because the “Purified” did not have the words, “South African”, in the Party’s name, which the renamed Greyshirts had. The previous name of the Greyshirts, the South African Christian National Socialist Movement, is actually

---

246 Malherbe Papers, File 443/3, KCM 56975 (39a), Membership card (and other material) of the Nazi Party, “The South African National Party”.
247 Malherbe Papers, File 443/3, KCM 56975 (39a), Membership card (and other material) of the Nazi Party, “The South African National Party”.
248 Malherbe, *Never a Dull Moment*, pp. 244-245.
249 Malherbe, *Never a Dull Moment*, p. 245.
captured in the Afrikaans translation in the card. The connotation of this membership card is in the fact that the pre-war Nazi linkages with the nationalistic movements in South Africa really existed, and, judging from the membership number on the card (7719), that by 1937, there were already adherents of over 7700.250 (See Illustration 2)

The proliferation of the “shirt” movements and their association with Nazi ideals, especially on the anti-Jewish policy, stirred up the political currents in South Africa. It was however, the founding of the Ossewa-Brandwag (OB) (Ox Wagon Sentinels) in February 1939, with Nazi links, which presented a menacing political force and a threat to the Union government before and during the course of war. In its seemingly innocuous self-promotion, on a cultural platform, the OB stimulated popular appeal among the Afrikaans-speaking sections of the population. (See Illustration 3) It developed rapidly as a mass movement, advocating for Afrikaner national unity, with, according to the author, Marx, a vague and ‘least fixed programme’ of all.251 Consequently, the OB benefitted from a “mass influx” of adherents to the organisation, and later, gravitated into the political terrain, where it threatened the established nationalistic movements, such as the “Purified”, that have been fighting for the advancement of Afrikaner interests. The movement, also, threatened the South African state when it embraced violence as means to achieving its goals and, according to intelligence reports, collaborated with the Nazi agents in the destabilisation of the country.252

In June 1944, the OB leader, J.F.J. (Hans) van Rensburg, with the title, Commandant General, reflected on the origin and development of the movement. He spent five hours on his farm, giving an interview to an American, Dr Jack S. Harris, a ‘special assistant’ in the United States Office of War Information in South Africa, in which he described the OB as follows:

---

250 Malherbe Papers, File 443/3, KCM 56975 (39a), Membership card (and other material) of the Nazi Party, “The South African National Party”.
252 Lawrence Papers, BC640, E5,45; Nazi Activities in the Union of South Africa; Lawrence Papers, BC640, E5, 47; Affidavit of Dr Luitpold Werz, 25 November 1946; UWH, Box 265, vol. 1, 4/11-39, B.I. 20, Secret Internal Security, Weekly Intelligence Reports, 1939-1945; Malherbe Papers, File 444/7, KCM 56975 (87-100), Secret Military Intelligence Reports on the Ossewabrandwag, c1940-5; See also Visser, OB: Traitors or Patriots?, chapters 3 (Stormjaers), 4 (Violence), 12 (Sabotage) and 13 (The Wire Cutting Circuit); C. Marx, The Oxwagon Sentinel, pp. 515-519; H. Strydom, For Folk and Führer (Jonathan Ball, Johannesburg, 1982), pp. 8-12 and 74-75.
A national revolutionary movement which is the herald and the fore-runner of an Authoritarian Republic, national in its approach to social problems and social in its approach to national questions. If our opponents call that National-Socialism the accusation leaves us unmoved. Indeed, we take it as a compliment.253

In that interview, Van Rensburg expressed his admiration for Germany’s efficiency and material progress, and most importantly, praised Hitler as a “saint” who was like a “supernatural force that was outside the mundane world”.254 It was on this basis that Dr Harris, in his account and analysis of the OB, raised concerns about the “inaction” of the South African authorities. His criticism in the report, which he sent to the American Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, is expressed in the following fashion:

The most striking of the many anomalies in the Union of South Africa is the fact that while it is allied with the other United Nations in the fight to the finish against Hitlerism, it permits its local brand of Hitlerism to thrive virtually unchecked. Still on the loose are its local “fuehrer” and all but a few of his followers, although their declared objective is the overthrow by revolutionary means of the government now in power. The incredulous observer from abroad finds that while loyal “Springboks” are fighting and dying to destroy the Nazis of Europe, the Nazis of South Africa are carrying on with only slight interference [in] their campaign to establish a National-Socialist State.255

Dr Harris went on to describe van Rensburg and his various positions, evidently emphasising the point that he was a former military officer and government official in the Union:

This “fuehrer” is Dr. J.F.J. (Hansie) Van Rensburg, ex-Colonel of the Union army, ex-Secretary of the Union Department of Justice, ex-administrator of the Orange Free State province, but currently the “Kommandant-General” of the Ossewabrandwag (Ox-Wagon

253 Lawrence Papers, BC640, E5. 84, “Exhibit A”, Foreword Written by J.F.J. van Rensburg, The Ossewabrandwag. Some Information on its Origins, its Development and its National Political Aims, no date on the report, but could possibly be during June 1944.
254 Lawrence Papers, BC640, E5. 83, Interview with Dr. J.F.J. van Rensburg, Kommandant-General of the Ossewabrandwag, 5 June 1944.
255 Lawrence Papers, BC640, E5. 83, Interview with Dr. J.F.J. van Rensburg, Kommandant-General of the Ossewabrandwag, 5 June 1944.
Sentinels), an organisation whose methods and objectives are indistinguishable from those of Hitler’s Nazi party during its palmist days.256

This characterisation of the OB reflects the extent of the change which the movement had undergone, from its inception in 1939. The OB, from its beginning in Bloemfontein, was founded as a cultural movement, with the intention of keeping the spirit of the symbolic Great Trek, after the centenary celebrations of that event in 1938.257 The ox-wagon, explained Van Rensburg, represented the ‘unifying symbol … a token of nationhood’ which had been lacking in the Afrikaners in the Free State, Transvaal, Natal and the Cape Province.258 It was considered a reflection of the whole Afrikaner history and heritage which needed to be kept alive. These views had been consolidated earlier, in June 1942, with the publication of the brochure titled, ‘Die Ossewa-Brandwag: Vanwaar en Waarheen’,259 under the signature of its Kommandant-General, Dr Van Rensburg. This brochure recalled the history of the Afrikaners and their past sufferings under the yoke of British Imperialism, criticised the Union’s participation in the war and then envisioned the country as a Christian National Republic under a strong leadership and without the complexities of parliamentary politics.260 Until then, the founders of the movement had exploited that ox-wagon symbol associated with the Afrikaner history and heritage to invoke the emotional fervour and established an organisation with broadly defined objectives.261

Its foundation was initially one of the many nationalistic movements that had mushroomed during the 1930s, with the object of advancing Afrikaner aspirations. It however emerged strongly above other movements. Its main attraction lay in its strategy of styling itself as a cultural movement and its indifference to party politics. Its primary focus was in the maintenance of Afrikaner unity and the preservation of its traditions and cultural heritage.

256 Lawrence Papers, BC640, E5. 83, Interview with Dr. J.F.J. van Rensburg, Kommandant-General of the Ossewabrandwag, 5 June 1944; An account on the interview is recorded in the analysis of the OB by Jack Harris, which has also been reproduced by Visser in OB: Traitors or Patriots, pp. 148-175.
258 Lawrence Papers, BC640, E5. 84, The Ossewabrandwag. Some Information on its Origins, its Development and its National Political Aims, no date on the report, but could possibly be during June 1944.
259 English Translation, ‘The Ox Wagon Sentinel: Wherefrom and Whereeto’.
This aspect of the movement, Roberts and Trollip, noted in 1947, that it provides the reasons why the OB’s message was powerful and effective:

*The O.B. succeeded because it seemed to offer everyman – and at first also to every woman – the chance of an individual and ponderable contribution to the great task of unifying the Afrikaner nation. At ‘braaivleisaande’, at ‘junkskie’ meetings, at the local ‘kultuurvereniging’, and even on occasion at church, Afrikaners could meet in that Trekker dress which was to be the uniform of the movement, and feel a sense of community of culture, of common heritage, of organised progress towards a great goal – a feeling which they did not always (or even, perhaps, often) experience within the framework of their political parties. The O.B., indeed, aspired to embrace the whole Volk. Where parties divided, quarrelling over sordid personal issues, the O.B. united. It was to be Highest Common Factor of Afrikanerdorn ...*

Upon its founding, the OB announced its aims which were presented in general terms that they appealed to every nationalistic Afrikaner. During an interview with the Afrikaans newspaper, *Die Volksblad*, in February 1939, its first Kommandant-General, Colonel J.C.C. Laas, outlined the objectives of the movement, deriving from its constitution, in the following manner:

a. The perpetuation of the spirit of the ox-wagon in the Union.
b. Sustaining, intensifying and giving expression to the traditions and principles of the Dutch Afrikaner.
c. The protection and advancement of the religious-cultural and material interests of the Afrikaners.
d. The nurturing of loyalty and national pride of the Afrikaners.
e. The binding and uniting of all Afrikaners, male and female, who supported these principles and have the will to expend energy in striving to realise them.

It was, argues Marx, this ‘vagueness and lack of clarity’ that attracted many Afrikaner nationalists, including members of established political parties, to contribute to the

---

262 Roberts and Trollip, *The South African Opposition*, p. 74. Definition of the Afrikaans words, phrases or expressions is found on pp. 217-240 of the book. In English, the ‘braaivleisaande’ refers to social evenings where meat is roasted on open fires (barbeque evenings); ‘junkskie’ refers to a game played with yoke pins; and, ‘kultuurvereniging’ refers to Cultural society.

movement. By the outbreak of the war, the OB was stirring up the entire political environment, through anti-war activism and sabotage. It became the main preoccupation of the South African intelligence and security authorities during the war, because it undermined state authority and threatened internal stability. Undercurrents of unrest had been festering in the country for sometime during 1939. The Orange Free State (OFS) command intelligence officer reported that republican spirit was vigorous in the many areas and the “anti-government section is ready for action if, and, ‘orders come from Pretoria.’” Then, the OB’s influence was seemingly clandestine and it was still, to some extent, not fully developed organisationally to present a major threat. At the beginning of 1940, intelligence reports on the OB multiplied. There was a new drive to recruit members for the movement, and, it was anticipated that some OB members serving in the Union Defence Force (UDF) would refuse to go north of the Zambesi River for military operations, should the situation arise.

According to the intelligence reports, the OB was organising with the view that, as soon as military forces were called northwards, the ‘society would expect Mr [Oswald] Pirow to give his long awaited “lead”, and should the political crisis arise in the Union, the whole Ossewa Brandwag organisation will be placed at the disposal of the republican section’. This view was expressed mainly in the OFS. During December 1939, reports indicated that the some officers in the UDF were intending to undermine the government’s position. UDF officers were envisaged to retain their commissions in the various commandos so as to keep government supporters out of key positions. The implication was that ‘in a time of crisis, the Government will be faced with opposition in the ranks of its own forces’. The situation pertaining to the OB changed rapidly in the second quarter of 1940. In April, the concerns of the intelligence authorities were confirmed. At a meeting in Bloemfontein, the OB’s Kommandant General, Laas, revealed that the movement was a military organisation. The intelligence officer in OFS established that the movement would be constituted by undetermined number of generals, with 3 400 men under each. The arrival from Germany, of

266 UWH, Box 265, B.I. 20, Intelligence Summary, 11 November 1939.
267 UWH, Box 265, B.I. 20, Intelligence Summary, 5 January 1940.
268 UWH, Box 265, B.I. 20, Intelligence Summary, 5 January 1940.
269 UWH, Box 265, B.I. 20, Intelligence Summary, 16 December 1939.
15 000 badges for the OB, was also announced. When one member asked why the OB did not take over the government on 4 September 1939, when the war policy was adopted, Laas explained that ‘it was inadvisable then as there were British warships round our shores’.270 What the informant revealed about Laas’s report in the meeting was disconcerting:

_The OB has completed or is completing a fourteen days intensive organisation. In this period of 14 days every General had to have 3, 400 men in readiness. The object of this activity [is] to have a large number of men in readiness when Government declares Martial Law. These men would then be armed by Government [reasons thereof not provided] and the majority of the Government supporters are sent north the OB would overthrow the Government in the Union._

In the final analysis of the OFS command intelligence officer, the statement above was one of many that reverberated in the area. However, when the issue of OB uniforms was introduced, it represented a possible challenge to other lawful military establishments in the Union. It therefore warranted stronger action.272 Laas, due to his secretive nature and weak organisational skills, was forced to resign from the OB in October 1940, and Dr J.F.J. van Rensburg, then the administrator of the Free State, was voted in as the Kommandant General of the movement in December 1940.273 He was inaugurated on 15 January 1941. In the process, the OB also began to articulate its stance on politics – anti-parliamentary politics - through its official newsheet, _Die OB (Amptelike Ossewabrandwag –Mededelings)_ , which was published weekly from October 1941.274

Van Rensburg led the OB into direct confrontation with the government due to the role of the movement’s sub-organisation, the _Stormjaers_ (Storm Troopers).275 It started off as an elite unit for providing security at OB meetings and other gatherings, but developed along military

---

270 UWH, Box 265, B.I. 20, Intelligence Summary, 18 May 1940.
271 UWH, Box 265, B.I. 20, Intelligence Summary, 18 May 1940.
272 UWH, Box 265, B.I. 20, Intelligence Summary, 18 May 1940.
273 UWH, Box 276, B.I. 28, Opposition Leader, Dr J.F.J. van Rensburg, 31 December 1940; ‘Dr. J. Van Rensburg Resigns’, _Rand Daily Mail_ , 13 December 1940; Roberts and Trollip, _The South African Opposition_ , pp. 77-78; Furlong, _Between Crown and Swastika_ , p. 138; Visser, _OB, Traitors or Patriots?_ , p. 13.
275 UWH, Box 276, B.I. 28, Opposition Leader, Dr J.F.J. van Rensburg, 31 December 1940; ‘Saboteurs are Soldiers of the Future Republic’, _Rand Daily Mail_ , 10 August 1942; Marx, _Oxwagon Sentinels_ , pp. 353-354; Furlong, _Between Crown and Swastika_ , p. 144; Visser, _OB, Traitors or Patriots?_ , pp. 26-28, 92-95; Strydom, _For Folk and Führer_ , pp. 8-12.
lines, with the old Boer commando ranks, for the purpose of undertaking violent operations in
the Union.\textsuperscript{276} According to the affidavit of Dr Luitpold Werz, Van Rensburg had already
made contact with Nazi agents and proposals for the organisation of a rebellion inside the
Union, with German assistance, were suggested in August 1940.\textsuperscript{277} The central objective was
to orchestrate South Africa’s internal revolution was to assassinate Smuts and thus
demoralise the forces of the British Empire.\textsuperscript{278} From late 1940, the country descended into an
internal security emergency, with the state confronted with the anti-war para-military
movements which engaged in various subversive activities (see below for further details).\textsuperscript{279}

Then, there was of course, the \textit{Afrikaner-Broederbond} (AB).\textsuperscript{280} During the war, Union
intelligence and censorship officials produced reports on the AB and its growing influence on
other organisations and the threat to the state. For example, during 1943, Hastings Beck
furnished an intelligence report to Dr Malherbe indicating that the AB had entrenched itself
in the education system through the increase of its membership from teachers, and the placing
of its members on the school committees.\textsuperscript{281} The AB, through its subsidiary organisation, the
FAK, intended to organise an open protest against dual language medium education and to
engage in a general strike in schools and colleges.\textsuperscript{282} School children were incited to reject
English and to go on strike in places such as De Aar and at Vryheid. In one of the comments
by a school teacher, it was stated that English does not belong to South Africa, and another
teacher commented about the longing to teach German only.\textsuperscript{283} In schools and in higher
education institutions, strong aversion to English as a language of instruction, the
appointment of teachers and lecturers as well as the utilisation of textbooks, was reflected in

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{276} ‘Saboteurs are Soldiers of the Future Republic’, \textit{Rand Daily Mail}, 10 August 1942; Visser, \textit{OB:}
\item \textsuperscript{277} Lawrence Papers, BC640, E5. 47, Affidavit of Dr Luitpold Werz, 25 November 1946; See also
Strydom, \textit{For Folk and Führer}, pp. 8-12.
\item \textsuperscript{278} Strydom, \textit{For Folk and Führer}, pp. 3, and 8-12.
\item \textsuperscript{279} See S. Dubow, ‘Introduction’, in Dubow and Jeeves, \textit{South Africa’s 1940s}, pp. 2-3.
\item \textsuperscript{280} Malherbe Papers, File 445/3, KCM 56975 (194), The Afrikaner Broederbond by Capt. Janie A.
Malherbe, 29 March 1944; Malherbe Papers, File 444/7, KCM 56975 (194), The Afrikaner
Broederbond by Capt. Janie A. Malherbe, March 1944; For the history of the Afrikaner Broederbond,
see A.N. Pelzer, \textit{Die Afrikaner-Broederbond: Eerste 50 Jaar} (Tafelberg, Kaapstad, 1979); See also
Century}, p. 134; A.M. Grundlingh, ‘Afrikaner Nationalism and White Politics’, in Liebenberg and
\item \textsuperscript{281} Malherbe Papers, File 445/1, KCM 56975 (168), Censorship Report on Subversive Influences in
Training Colleges and Schools, 1943.
\item \textsuperscript{282} Malherbe Papers, File 445/1, KCM 56975 (168), Censorship Report on Subversive Influences in
Training Colleges and Schools, 1943.
\item \textsuperscript{283} Malherbe Papers, File 445/1, KCM 56975 (168), Censorship Report on Subversive Influences in
Training Colleges and Schools, 1943.
\end{itemize}
numerous censorship letters intercepted by the Union authorities. What was significant in this context was the racial antipathy that was cultivated through speeches at various gatherings and in pamphleteering. It was also a reflection of a growing strength and influence of the AB, thus creating anxieties for the authorities. Hence the strong devotion to unpacking the complex network of the AB structures and associations in order to understand and deal with it.

According to Dr Malherbe, the AB had permeated various structures of the Union society and government departments. Its structural organisation was charted as a diagrammatic representation of the various elements and the extent of its linkages with related organisations. Dr Malherbe asserted that the organisational arrangements were based on Nazi patterns and it was entrenched in government departments including the railways, justice and police, welfare, labour, provincial education departments, agriculture, and even churches and political movements such as the OB and the Nationalist Party of Malan.284 (See Illustration 1) Through local divisions and cells, the movement reproduced itself up to the lower levels of the society. Intelligence reports contained a list reflecting the membership and organisations that were controlled by the AB.285

On 13 December 1943, Dr Malherbe recounted, the AB celebrated its twenty-five year anniversary in Bloemfontein. On this day, distinguished Nationalist Party leaders such as the Hendrik F. Verwoerd (future Prime Minister of South Africa) and Nico Diederichs (a future State President of South Africa), as well as other leaders of the Dutch Reformed Church, gave speeches and praised the achievements of the AB. Dr Malherbe managed to get hold of the meeting’s proceedings and a list of about 300 members in attendance. He then urged Smuts to allow him to give the names to the newspapers for publication; but he refused.286 The list in the intelligence reports of 1943-1944, had about 150 names on it. Dr Malherbe lamented Smuts’s refusal to publish the list, as it would have publicly exposed the AB’s operations and facilitated an understanding of the reasons behind various appointments to prominent positions in the government service, churches and educational institutions.287

285 Malherbe Papers, File 444/4, KCM 56975 (71d), Afrikaner Organisations (List 1) and the Afrikaner Bond Membership (List 2), 1943-44.
286 Malherbe, Never a Dull Moment, p. 241.
287 Malherbe, Never a Dull Moment, p. 241.
could be inferred that Smuts’s caution was intended to reduce the cleavages within the white society as a result of the war.

The political motivations of the AB emerged after 1934, with the fusion of former political adversaries, the NP and the SAP. On 16 January 1934, an executive council of the AB, chaired by Professor J.C. van Rooy of Potchefstroom University, produced a secret circular which was signed together with the AB general secretary, I.M. Lombard. The circular stated that ‘the main point is for Afrikanerdom to reach its ultimate goal of dominance in South Africa … the Afrikaner-Bond must rule South Africa.’\textsuperscript{288} In May 1939, this perspective was confirmed by Diederichs during an interview with Herr Kirscher of Germany’s Foreign Office, that the Broederbond’s central aim was to conquer the entire state machinery from inside, with the main focus being on the leadership.\textsuperscript{289} That is why, the schisms that existed within the nationalist Afrikaner political circles, since the establishment of the Fusion government in 1934, threatened such ambitions of the AB.

After the centenary celebrations of the “Great Trek” in 1938, leading to the founding of the OB in 1939, the hopes of achieving Afrikaner unity were dashed when a promising movement eschewed its cultural pretensions and entered the political terrain when war broke out. Initially, common hostility to the government’s war policy seemed to provide an opportunity for mutual harmony among nationalistic Afrikaner movements to advance their cause at multi-levels. Malan’s “Purified” and the OB even attempted a Cradock Agreement in October 1940, each undertaking to operate in its sphere of competence: OB work on cultural grounds and the “Purified” in the political realm.\textsuperscript{290} The agreement failed to achieve its intended objectives as the OB rejected parliamentary politics and campaigned for the realisation of the republic through revolutionary action. Malan’s “Purified” remained the mainstream political opponent of the government’s war policy. Until the outbreak of the war and during the course of the war, Nazi Germany continued to maintain contact with extreme

\textsuperscript{288} Lawrence Papers, B640, E3. 263, The Afrikaner Bond, 11 November 1941. This report is a reproduction of a speech delivered by the then Prime Minister, General Hertzog, at Smithfield, titled: ‘Aims of the Afrikaner Bond. Secret Society backed by Nationalists. Dangerous Policies. Folly of Domination by one Race in the Union’. It was subsequently published in \textit{The Star} newspaper, 7 March 1935; Malherbe Papers, File 445/3, KCM 56975 (194), The Afrikaner Broederbond by Capt. Janie A. Malherbe, 29 March 1944. See also Pelzer, \textit{Die Afrikaner-Broederbond}, pp. 63-64.

\textsuperscript{289} Furlong, \textit{Between Crown and Swastika}, pp. 81-82.

\textsuperscript{290} The so-called Cradock Agreement between the OB and the reformulated \textit{Herenigde Nasionale of Volks Party} (HNP) was completed on 30 October 1940. See Roberts and Trollip, \textit{The South African Opposition}, pp. 77-78.
Afrikaner nationalist movements and individuals to foment instability, thereby creating cracks in the unity of the British Empire.

Hageman asserts that Germany failed to cultivate the neutrality of the Union, and that Berlin did not regard South Africa as a key factor in international diplomacy.\(^{291}\) The Nazi interaction with the OB, the abortive attempts at using Sidney Robey Leibbrandt to instigate armed rebellion and assassinate Smuts through “Operation Weissdorn” in 1941\(^ {292}\), the maintenance of spy networks in the Union, carrying out and supporting subversive and anti-war activities in the country, however, provide a different picture. In fact, strategically, Citino shows that South Africa’s entry into the war achieved many objectives. It weakened the strategic position of Germany as the Union harbours provided a safety zone for Allied shipping, for repairs and refuge, as well as keeping the British communications to India open, as the Mediterranean and the Suez Canal in the north were threatened by Italy. German-Japanese linkage in the Indian Ocean was, in a broader strategic context, also prevented by the Union’s participation in the war.\(^ {293}\)

Citino also blames the German diplomatic efforts which were directed at the German minority whose role in influencing South Africa to remain neutral was limited. German diplomats such as Wiehl and later Rudolf Leitner, bet on the wrong Union politician, Oswald Pirow, due to their obsession with his “German roots”, whose political ability was weak. Malan, argues Citino, would have presented the best option as he was ‘anti-Semitic, anti-British, and likely to remain neutral in a war’\(^ {294}\). However, the Germans were blinded by the fact that Malan was not a German, his loyalty was with the Afrikaners and would never replace English oppression with German oppression. Had they supported him quietly, the prospects of having a “congenial government” in power, thereby strengthening their hands in ensuring that South Africa was kept out of the war, would have been enhanced. Nonetheless, Nazi agents continued to inspire anti-war movements and subversive activities in South Africa, thus creating a climate of instability and insecurity in the country during the war.

\(^{291}\) Hagemann, ‘Very Special Relations’, pp. 140-141.
\(^{293}\) Citino, *Germany and the Union of South Africa in the Nazi Era*, p. 229.
\(^{294}\) Citino, *Germany and the Union of South Africa in the Nazi Era*, p. 230-231.
GROWING SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES

Anti-government attitudes were increasingly cultivated in many parts of the Union, mainly amongst the Afrikaner nationalists. In the OFS, the police reported that lantern slides, showing pictures depicting the concentrations camps during the Anglo-Boer War, farms burned down and men on commando, with folk songs in between, were exhibited to about six to seven hundred people at Visser Hall, Normal College, Bloemfontein. The slides were exhibited by a certain Christo Kriel, who provided commentary on the slides and mainly emphasised negative British actions during the Anglo-Boer War. Pictures of this nature were intended to stir up feelings and escalate anti-government hostility. The audience even shouted “Good Old Hitler”, when a picture of a German woman handing General Louis Botha a 10 000 pounds cheque to rehabilitate ruined Afrikaners, was shown on the slide. The Attorney General, however, replied that action against such exhibitions could be undesirable, and advised the police to warn Kriel instead, until the Minister of Justice had given instructions.

Reports of a similar nature, which reflected efforts by extreme nationalistic elements to undermine the morale of the society and threaten state authority, were produced frequently by the Union intelligence officials. In Natal, residents of Ashley, a suburb in Pinetown, were opposed to the government’s war policy and were advocating for a republic. It was feared that, because many of the residents of Pinetown were railway workers who travelled in and out of Durban, they would spread ill-feeling against the government regarding the war policy. It was further reported that wild rumours were spread among blacks in that district. However, those rumours had little effect as blacks ‘trusted the officials to tell them the truth [about Germany and the war]’. Activities of school teachers in various parts of the country also cultivated hostile attitudes against the government. In OFS districts, the intelligence officers reported that some teachers expressed their political views to children instead of confining their efforts to the school curriculum. Expressions of anti-Jewish feelings were also taking

---

295 NASAP, Archives of the Department of Justice (hereafter JUS), Box 1506, 1/62/39, Lantern Slides. Complaint against Christo Kriel, South African Police, Criminal Investigation Department, Deputy Commissioner of Police to Attorney General, Bloemfontein, 13 September 1939.
296 JUS, Box 1506, 1/62/39, Complaint against Christo Kriel, 13 September 1939.
297 JUS, Box 1506, 1/62/39, Attorney General to Deputy Commissioner of Police, Bloemfontein, 14 September 1939.
298 JUS, Box 1506, 1/62/39, Magistrate of Pinetown to Secretary for Justice, 4 October 1939.
299 UWH, Box 265, B.I.20, Internal Security, Intelligence Summaries, 17 November 1939.
place in OFS rural districts. Afrikaner communities were told that the Jews controlled the
country, the mines, the banks and big businesses while they (Afrikaners) were left
destitute.300 Government censorship reports were replete with information that Nazi ideas had
been embraced in some schools. In some Transvaal schools, for example, the Nazi salute was
used to open the lessons. Pupils cited Hitler as a person who stood for freedom.301 In the
Cape, support for the OB and pro-Nazi sentiments grew. Many white schools in the
surrounding areas of Touws River, including Clanwilliam, Van Rhynsdorp, Calvinia and
Klipwerf, as well as at Lambert’s Bay, had gone over to the OB and had embraced Nazi
sympathies.302 People loyal to the government did not trust the police, hence they did not
report such cases.

Nazi and anti-government propaganda was also spreading among school children in the
Transvaal districts. Some parents and children complained about the attitude of teachers in
Central and Western Transvaal, that ‘children were deliberately taught to be politicians and
not citizens’.303 The influence of the teachers was enormous since some of them also owned
stores, farms and agencies, thus able to spread their anti-government propaganda beyond their
schools. People who did not have radio sets were invited to converge at central points where
they could listen to Nazi broadcast through Zeesen.304 In Rustenburg, a lorry carried poor
whites to a central point to listen to Zeesen and thereafter they were provided with foodstuffs.
In the Bethal and Klerksdorp districts, Zeesen news service was relayed to friends and
sympathisers through the telephone by those who own wireless sets. Farmers in the area were
thus encouraged to express pro-German sentiments as a result.305 Broadcast from Zeesen
were directed at denouncing the war effort, invoking Afrikaner plight and suffering,
disparaging Smuts and instigating internal revolution.306 Besides Zeesen, various other
subversive activities were reported.

300  UWH, Box 265, B.I. 20, Internal Security, Intelligence Summaries, 17 November 1939.
301  UWH, Box 265, B.I. 20, Internal Security, Intelligence Summaries, 25 November 1939; See also
Furlong, Between Crown and Swastika, pp. 150-151.
302  Lawrence Papers, B640, E3, 280-282, Subversive Activities in the Schools of the Union, Office of the
Controller of Censorship, Cape Town, 30 January 1941.
305  UWH, Box 265, B.I. 20, Internal Security, Intelligence Summaries, 16 December 1939.
306  UWH, Box 265, B.I. 20, Internal Security, Intelligence Summaries, 1939-1941; SANDFA, Zeesen
Broadcast, WR 65/9/41-WR 65/9/43, Broadcast from Enemy Radio Station, 1941-1945; UWH, Box
265, B.I. 20, Internal Security, Intelligence Summaries, 16 December 1939; Chief of the General Staff,
War, (CGS, War), Box 197, 42/2, Extracts and Intercepts. Foreign Papers and Broadcast, 27 September
1940.
Those activities included rumour mongering, anti-government press\textsuperscript{307}, political speeches, pro-German propaganda by missionaries\textsuperscript{308}, and the dissemination of subversive pamphlets. In one pamphlet, Afrikaners were urged to fight for a republic by “decisive action”. It referred to sabotage ‘as a weapon to deal a deathblow to the present government and to attain South Africa’s freedom’.\textsuperscript{309} One farmer was reported to have said that ‘they ought to shoot the Smuts Government out of office’.\textsuperscript{310} The aim was to generate anti-government political resentment and deprive it of popular will and support. Before the war, particularly in rural districts, people were told that ‘if Great Britain went to war and South Africa joined her, martial law would be proclaimed and a republic declared’.\textsuperscript{311} The mine workers in the Witwatersrand were reportedly going to instigate instability by using the South African Mine Workers’ Union to make impossible demands – for a larger share of the gold premium – which would not be granted and trouble would start.\textsuperscript{312} Among blacks, Nazi propaganda focused on socio-economic conditions. The Witwatersrand command intelligence officer reported that blacks were informed that they would receive their land back and the passes would be abolished when Hitler wins the war. Missionaries were considered to be the main culprits in disseminating subversive Nazi propaganda among blacks.\textsuperscript{313}

Hence, Smuts often lamented the unchecked growth of Nazism in the country.\textsuperscript{314} He was called the “great Afrikaner Judas” who was betraying South Africa.\textsuperscript{315} His CGS, Van Ryneveld, also noted that ‘the Union is being subjected to a subtle but concentrated offensive by the Nazis with their propaganda machine, all according to Hitler’s “conquest from within”. Unfortunately a large number of our own people are dupes and are consciously or unconsciously playing to the Nazi game’.\textsuperscript{316} Subversive activities were likewise extended to the military.

\textsuperscript{307} The main Afrikaans papers critical of the government were \textit{Die Vaderland}, \textit{Die Volksblad}, \textit{Die Transvaler} and \textit{Die Burger}. These papers carried reports that covered speeches of opposition leaders such as Dr. D.F. Malan, Oswald Pirow, Dr. J.F.J. van Rensburg (OB), which were mainly critical of the government’s war policy and internal security measures.

\textsuperscript{308} UWH, Box 265, B.I. 20, Internal Security, Intelligence Summaries, 12 October 1940.

\textsuperscript{309} UWH, Box 265, B.I. 20, Internal Security, Intelligence Summaries, 5 January 1940.

\textsuperscript{310} UWH, Box 265, B.I. 20, Internal Security, Intelligence Summaries, 16 December 1939.

\textsuperscript{311} UWH, Box 265, B.I. 20, Internal Security, Intelligence Summaries, 25 November 1939.

\textsuperscript{312} UWH, Box 265, B.I. 20, Internal Security, Intelligence Summaries, 25 November 1939.

\textsuperscript{313} UWH, Box 265, B.I. 20, Internal Security, Intelligence Summaries, 16 December 1939.


\textsuperscript{315} UWH, Box 265, B.I.20, Internal Security, Intelligence Summaries, 16 December 1939; CGS, War, Box 197, 42/2., Extracts and Intercepts. Foreign Papers and Broadcast, 27 September 1940.

\textsuperscript{316} CGS, War, Box 223, 49/1, Van Ryneveld to D.P. Mercier, Winburg, Bloemfontein, 17 January 1940.
The OB, by the outbreak of the war, had infiltrated the security establishment and threatened the reliability of the forces. Recruitment was also hampered due to subversive activities and the influences of the OB. Regiments constituting the 4th Infantry Brigade were understrength due to the prevailing political hostility to the government and as a result of propaganda. Young men were informed that, after undergoing military training, they would be the first to be sent out and were afraid of losing their jobs. Colonel D. Pienaar, officer commanding Voortrekkerhoogte and Transvaal (TVL) Command, received reports that a farmer, Theunis Lourens, rebuffed recruitment efforts for the Botha Regiment, in the Standerton district, ironically Smuts’s own constituency. Lourens reasoned that he was a Blackshirt and the Germans were relying on his support.

In Queenstown, members of the Defence Rifle Association (DRA), Dordrecht Commando, were considered untrustworthy as well as susceptible to a rebellion ‘at the slightest pretext’ due to poor leadership of the officers and pro-Nationalist and pro-German political tendencies. Major P.W. Baker, officer commanding Dordrech-Indwe Commando, was described as ‘hypocritical, deceitful and treacherous’. The officers of the Thabanchu-Ladybrand-Ficksburg Commando and related areas were reportedly disloyal and even indicated that they would refuse to take up arms to fight “England’s war”. Intelligence reports further indicated that a rebellion was contemplated soon after war broke out. P.J. Oosthuizen, principal of the Reitz High School and a member of the OB in the OFS, disclosed that an armed rebellion in South Africa was very possible shortly after the outbreak of the war, ‘if a lead had been given’ and if support from sections of the UDF was provided to Oswald Pirow.

The police were also penetrated. In the Witwatersrand, a police constable “commanded a police battalion” of eight hundred and ten members comprising of units from the railway police, South African Police, Johannesburg Traffic Police and the Prison Service. Thus, there were significant challenges to the state in terms preserving internal security and also of

---

317 UWH, Box 265, B.I. 20, Internal Security, Intelligence Summaries, 10 November 1939.
318 UWH, Box 265, B.I. 20, Internal Security, Intelligence Summaries, 8 December 1939;
320 JUS, Box 1506, file 1/62/39, C.H. Poppe to the Chief Control Officer, Queenstown, 1 November 1939.
322 UWH, Box 265, B.I.20, Internal Security, Intelligence Summaries, 17 November 1939.
323 Visser, OB: Traitors or Patriots?, pp. 94-95.
combating the threat of subversion. These challenges also impacted on the efforts of the Smuts government to mobilise the South African society to support the war effort.

CONCLUSION

The Union’s intelligence officials had already established, in their reports and recommendations of November 1939, that, as part of the war effort, government propaganda was to be considered as a ‘weapon worth many battalions’ in influencing public opinion for their loyalty and support for the war policy. The reality and impact of Nazi influence was realised to have penetrated deep and over many years leading to the outbreak of the war. When taking stock of the extent of subversive forces in the Union, intelligence officers concluded that it was imperative to ‘review our publicity weapons and see if they are being used to the best advantage in a more intensely attack on the insidious propaganda which has saturated the platteland [countryside].

At the outbreak of the war, the country was divided. The nationalistic movement spearheaded by the mainstream political parties such as Malan’s “Purifieds” as well as the extra-parliamentary and militant organisations like the OB, remained hostile towards the government’s war policy. Revolutionary euphoria and anti-government activism gripped the Union and began to escalate with the apparent German military successes in the early stages of the war. On the other side, black South Africans, due to the prevailing racial policies of the country and their failure to secure any social and political concessions they hoped for after their participation in the First World War, were ambivalent towards getting involved in the war again. The Union authorities, therefore, had to re-examine the domestic situation in terms of military requirements and to intensify efforts to progressively gain public confidence, stabilise the volatile home front, mobilise the society and effectively place the country on a war footing. Existing policies had to be reviewed and refined, strategies devised and institutional structures reorganised to provide the framework for the effective prosecution of the war effort. However, given the complex dynamics of the South African society and the multiple audiences with varying perspectives and aspirations regarding the war, it would prove to be a mammoth task for the Union authorities in attempting to mobilise public support for the war policy. Throughout the war, various measures were adopted to engender

public interest and to sustain the mobilisation efforts for the war. Propaganda was the main instrument in that regard.
Fig. 1: Gen JC Smuts in 1914: The Nonqai, Oct 1939

Fig. 2: Gen JC Smuts in 1939: The Nonqai, Oct 1939
Illustration 1: The Afrikaner Broederbond Structure: EG Malherbe Collections, vol. 444/3, UKZN, Durban

Illustration 3: The Ossewa Brandwag Badge: EG Malherbe Collections, vol. 444/7, UKZN, Durban
CHAPTER 2

POLICIES, STRATEGIES AND STRUCTURES: SA’S INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSE

The Union’s governor general, Duncan, signed a proclamation on 6 September 1939 for officially marking South Africa’s entry into the Second World War.325 This also signified Smuts’s political triumph over his adversaries, chiefly Hertzog and Malan.326 Yet, this political triumph was tenuous. Fresh in his thoughts were the bitter internal debates327 that saw him narrowly defeating Hertzog’s motion on non-belligerence.328 Thus, Smuts, with heightened consciousness, contrasted the level of support he might command in the country, with the nature of organised opposition against him, and also appreciated the enormity of the challenges that confronted him:

My stand has of course the unanimous approval of the English and of a large section of Africanders (sic). But mere approval is nothing as against strong organisation; so my opponents are organising while I am governing the country and tackling its problems ... Here in S. Africa I have had my hands more than full – in coping with all the new problems of organisation for war, in reorganising our DOD, and not least in fighting with our political opponents who are moving heaven and earth to strengthen their position and weaken mine.329

In response to the challenges reflected in his comments, Smuts had to determine how the Union’s war policy would be executed. From the above comments, three broad objectives emerged: a strong government to coordinate the war effort, the restructuring of the department of defence (DOD) to improve the Union’s military position, and the need to counter the anti-war activism and enemy propaganda. In addition, the South African society, the source of manpower for military service and war production, needed to be mobilised to

326 Duncan Papers, BC 294, A27.2, Continuation of Memorandum of 4th September 1939, 6 September 1939, pp. 3-5; See also Duncan Papers, BC 294, A27.3, Annexure A, Duncan’s reply to Hertzog regarding the request to dissolve the parliament, 5 September 1939; Duncan Papers, BC 294, A27.7, Duncan’s letter to Hertzog expressing regret at the severance of their official association.
328 Debates of the House of Assembly, vol. 36, 2-5 September 1939, vote results, col. 95-100. It was a narrow majority of merely 13 votes, despite Duncan’s claims of a “substantial majority”, Duncan Papers, BC 294, A27.3, Annexure A, Duncan’s reply to Hertzog, 5 September 1939.
support the government’s war policy. To achieve the stated goals, several measures were introduced to ensure an efficient prosecution of the war. This chapter, therefore, intends to analyse South Africa’s institutional response to give effect to her war policy. Firstly, it will briefly review the strategic challenges and the policy constraints that confronted Smuts at the beginning of his administration. Then, it will reflect on the development of defence and security policies in order to facilitate the prosecution of the war. In the third place, the chapter will discuss the various government strategies which were contrived and structures that were established to facilitate the execution of the war policy. The chapter is designed to unpack the organisational configurations and programmes of the Union government to facilitate the various publicity and propaganda schemes with regard to supporting the war policy. It also lays the basis for the subsequent chapters which will analyse the means and contents of war propaganda to facilitate the realisation of the objectives of the Union’s war policy.

**STRATEGIC CHALLENGES AND POLICY CONSTRAINTS**

After taking office on 6 September 1939, Smuts was confronted with a number of problems: military position, defence policy, political opposition and internal security. The key factor in considering participation in a war was the state of the armed forces. In a memorandum of the Union’s military position on 7 September 1939, submitted by Major General J.J. Collyer, military secretary to Smuts, the UDF was found wanting. In terms of the command and staff, the memorandum stated that, an ‘elementary but necessary feature’ of military preparations was neglected.\(^{330}\) It was noted that ‘in the case of the Union military forces, where both commanders and staff officers with any real knowledge of their duties in war are rare, especially in the second instance, a careful and deliberate selection of the best men is of vital importance’.\(^{331}\)

Due to the difficult economic circumstances after the First World War, and the reshuffling of posts during Hertzog’s administration (1924 and 1933), few competent and experienced military officers were available. Van der Waag explains that due to disillusionment, many


capable officers resigned, took early retirement or ‘lost their enthusiasm’. This was also a product of long term political infighting and dissension, resulting from the historical contest and tensions between Afrikaner nationalists and English speakers in South Africa. The blame for the poor state of military leadership and neglect of proper military preparations was ascribed to Oswald Pirow, Hertzog’s Defence Minister from March 1933 to September 1939. His political disposition and passive defence policy resulted more in making pronouncements and limited action. Thus, Smuts inherited a military force which was ‘without appointed leaders or trained staff, unfit to take the field, untrained, unequipped and unorganised’. Authorities were confronted with the question of the limited strength of UDF units, the availability and quality of training facilities and military equipment in all arms of services: army, air force, navy and medical personnel. Hence, the Union’s Secretary for Defence, C.H. Blaine, in his report to the defence advisory committee on 5 September 1940, asserted that South Africa was not dealing with military expansion, but a question of ‘creating an army’.

The military position was also complicated by discontent and disloyalty reported within the general staff of the UDF and the Union, including the burgher commandos or DRA. In an undated ‘most secret’ memorandum titled ‘Security of Own Forces’, there were descriptions such as the “admirer of Hitler”, “pro-Nazi”, “hostile to government”, “associated with

---

338 C WS (War), Box 42, 10/4, The Birth of South Africa’s Army, 1939/40, 6 September 1940, p. 1.
339 Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 132, Col Thwaites to Lt Gen (Andries) Brink, 17 November 1939; Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 132, DMI to Military Secretary to Prime Minister, 14 November 1939; See also Van der Waag, The Union Defence Force between the Two World Wars, p. 207-219.
Ossewabrandwag”, “anti-British”, “disloyal”, “ready to take action against the government” and “likely to rebel at first opportunity”, which were attributed to many officers in the UDF. Thus, Smuts was severely handicapped with regard to appointing loyal and politically reliable officers to command his forces.

Another difficulty pertained to the Union’s defence policy. The *South African Defence Act* of 1912, which underwent some amendments in the 1920s and 1930s, was a constraint in terms of South Africa’s policy towards the war. Its original stipulation that, ‘every citizen shall be liable between his seventeenth and his sixtieth year to render in time of war personal service in defence of the Union in any part of South Africa whether within or outside the Union’, was the source of controversy. When Hertzog assumed power in 1924, the focus of the UDF was ‘for the defence of South Africa in any part of southern Africa … in the event of South African involvement in a war outside the Union, the Active Citizen Force would not be sent’.

In the 1930s, in view of the deteriorating international security situation and with the rise of the totalitarian states spearheaded by Germany, the Union’s defence policy changed. Pirow, then the Defence Minister, stated that the Union would consider rendering assistance ‘in the defence of British interests in East Africa but then only if the white populations were threatened’. But, the UDF would not serve outside Africa and, if the interests of South Africa made it inevitable to participate in a war, the parliament would have to decide the matter. The general line of argument perpetuated by the Nationalists was that of confining South Africa to her own defence or around her immediate borders, not for European wars. This view became a central feature of the opposition movements’ campaign against the Union’s war policy. There were agitations and insinuations of revolutionary repercussions if the UDF was to be employed beyond the limits of the *Defence Act*. Hence, to support the war policy, Smuts opted to establish a military force based on a volunteer system and the

---

340 Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 132, Memorandum, Security of Own Forces, no date, no. 60.
342 *South Africa Defence Act*, No. 13 of 1912, Chapter V, Section 77 (1-2) and Section 78.
343 This was expressed by Colonel F.P.H. Cresswell, then Hertzog’s defence minister, at the Imperial Conference in 1926. See Van der Waag, ‘The Union Defence Force Between the Two World Wars’, pp. 207, 214.
346 CGS (War), Box 42, 10/4, The Birth of South Africa’s Army, 1939/40, 6 September 1940, pp. 3-6.
main theatre would be outside South Africa – the main defence line was further afield in East Africa. His political opponents continued to use the defence policy to mount the anti-war campaigns. Some members of the Union parliament and ex-members of the government vehemently opposed the government’s war policy and, even undermined morale and threatened recruitment for military service.347

After the vote of 4 September 1939, the defeated members of parliament were determined to unite their efforts in opposition to Smuts’s war policy. On the evening of 6 December 1939, Hertzog was bid farewell by an enthusiastic crowd when he boarded a train for the Pretoria. At the station, the crowd carried him and Malan shoulder-high, singing songs and hymns, listening to encouraging speeches from the other nationalistic leaders, including the PNP parliamentarians.348 Some Stellenbosch University students expressed gratitude to Hertzog for his stance and personal sacrifice.349 He told the crowd to remain calm if ‘they were to build up proper Afrikanerdom’.350 Pirow had previously left for Pretoria and took formal leave at the Defence Headquarters.351 Malan and Hertzog were to attempt an abortive “nationalist Afrikaner reunion” as an opposition front against Smuts.352 The attempted “Afrikaner re-union” gave birth to a new nationalist party called Die Herenigde Nasionale Party of Volksparty (Re-united Nationalist Party or People’s Party) (HNP).353 However, the two Afrikaner leaders had divergent principles. Hertzog was opposed to republicanism and emphasised equal political rights and status between the English-speaking South Africans and the Afrikaners, whilst Malan stood for complete Afrikaner dominance.354 The re-union collapsed.

Pirow, who remained with Malan, also created tensions within the HNP due to his close association with the Nazi doctrines when he published Die Nuwe Orde (New Order)

---

347 UWH, Box 276, B.I. 28, Opposition Attacks on Government, 1940-1945; CGS (War), Box 42, 10/4, The Birth of South Africa’s Army, 1939/40, 6 September 1940, p. 2.
348 ‘Hertzog Goes North’, Cape Times, 7 September 1939.
349 ‘Hertzog Goes North’, Cape Times, 7 September 1939.
351 ‘Mr Pirow Takes Farewell’, Cape Times, 7 September 1939.
pamphlets during the period 1940-1941.\textsuperscript{355} The *Nuwe Orde* (NO) was constituted as a study group within the HNP, supported mostly by the ex-Hertzog followers. Malan did not approve of the development of internal cliques that could threaten HNP cohesion. Pirow espoused Nazi ideals and advocated an authoritarian state.\textsuperscript{356} Malan objected to the importation of foreign ideologies. He wanted to consolidate the Afrikaner nationalism and to establish a republic, not a dictatorship.\textsuperscript{357} Nonetheless, the Union’s political landscape remained a contested area throughout the war, with the opposition movements, despite their divergent approaches, campaigning against Smuts’s government, mostly on the war policy.\textsuperscript{358}

For that reason, Blaine contended in his analysis of the progress of the military forces in 1940, that the DOD was confronted with a ‘subtle, undermining influence – the campaign against recruiting’, leading to a conclusion that, ‘somewhere in the mechanism of the nation’s war machine, there must be 5\textsuperscript{th} columnists whose complex or aim is to hinder or destroy’.\textsuperscript{359} In one example of recruiting challenges at the Western Province Regiment, some men were reluctant to enlist for service as officers openly declared their opposition to serve outside the Union.\textsuperscript{360} Numerous intelligence reports refer to young men being dissuaded from joining the UDF with threats such as that, ‘if they volunteer for service … they will have no job to return to after the war’.\textsuperscript{361} It was, therefore, largely due to the Union’s political ambivalence and internal discord that resulted in the failure to conceive and implement effective defence policies. This failure manifested in the state of military unpreparedness, with a substantial lack of air force equipment, a small-sized army and lack of a navy when war broke out in 1939.\textsuperscript{362} Similarly, the political dissensions also impacted on the internal security situation.

As discussed in the previous chapter, the Union’s security officials remained concerned about the increasing threat of subversion in the country. At the end of May 1940, the interdepartmental committee on security noted the alarming security situation in the country:

\textsuperscript{356} See UWH, Box 265, B.I. 20, Intelligence Summaries, 1939-1945.
\textsuperscript{357} Roberts and Trollip, *The South African Opposition*, pp. 92-97; Barber, *South Africa in the Twentieth Century*, p. 120.
\textsuperscript{358} Marx, *Oxwagon Sentinel*, pp. 495-496; Roberts and Trollip, *The South African Opposition*, pp. 92-97; Barber, *South Africa in the Twentieth Century*, p. 120.
\textsuperscript{359} CGS (War), Box 42, 10/4, The Birth of South Africa’s Army, 1939/40, 6 September 1940, p. 4.
\textsuperscript{360} UWH, Box 265, B.I. 20, Internal Security, Intelligence Summaries, 17 November 1939.
\textsuperscript{361} SANDFA, Army Intelligence, Box 46, I. 40, Weekly Censorship Summaries, 25 February 1941.
It is an undoubted fact that the so-called “Fifth Column” is strong in the Union. All political opponents of the Government are not necessarily members of the column. But no section of the opposition has exposed their cards and it is not known to what extent defections from Hertzog-Havenga group have joined the Malan extremists. If support for the Ossewabrandwag is to be taken as an indication of the strength of the pro-German element, then it can be accepted as a fact that the Government has to contend with something that is widespread and not weak. Evidence keeps pouring in that in every corner of the Union the cankerous growth has taken a foothold and is showing its existence now that Germans are enjoying success overseas.363

Pro-German feelings were reflected in the Afrikaans comments such as ‘Hitler gaan wen’ (Hitler is going to win), ‘Niks kan hom stop nie’ (nothing can stop him), ‘Hitler sal dinge reg maak’ (Hitler will make things right), and ‘Hitler sal ons 10/- per dag en meer grond en al die bier wat ons wil hê, gee’ (Hitler will give us 10/- per day, more land and all the beer that we want).364 These comments made the government anxious about the prevalence of the anti-war spirit which could also have huge security implications for the Union. According to the inter-departmental committee on security, the so-called “fifth column” - a subversive movement to undermine state authority – comprised of those sections of the population who supported Hitler, those who believed that the Union was British, thus would do anything, including assistance to the enemy, just to damage Britain, those who just hated Britain, those who were pro-Nazi and the Germans in the country.365 While contending with the political problems, defence policy obstacles and the anti-war agitations, Smuts’s own welfare was also precarious. He privately expressed his anxiety:

The police guard are of course annoying, but say that they act on strict instructions based on information from confidential sources. I heard on the radio tonight that the Prime Minister of Roumania [Rumania] has just been assassinated; so I ought not to be too confident about my own safety.366

363 Lawrence Papers, BC 640, E3. 183, Memorandum on Internal Security, 30 May 1940. The Inter-Departmental Security Committee was established in May 1940, and it comprised of the Minister of Interior, Lawrence, the Minister of Justice, Dr C. Steyn, the Controller of Censorship, Colonel (later Brigadier) H.J. Lenton, the Commissioner of Police, Colonel G.R.C. Baston (who replaced I.P. de Villiers), the Chief Control Officer, Colonel Truter, departmental heads of Railway Police, Immigration, Railway Board and the Civilian Protection Services (CPS).
364 Lawrence Papers, BC 640, E3. 183, Memorandum on Internal Security, 30 May 1940.
365 Lawrence Papers, BC 640, E3. 183, Memorandum on Internal Security, 30 May 1940.
Furthermore, on 3 November 1939, during a public address in Bloemfontein Town Hall, Smuts vocalised his concerns about the influence of the Zeesen broadcast on the South African public and the opposition factions. He lamented the impact of the Zeesen propaganda on the convictions and sentiments of the population. An excerpt from the Bloemfontein speech reflects the expression of Smuts’s concerns:

“Night by night this country is being attacked and bombarded with propaganda from Germany, in a way far more dangerous, subtle and insidious than any attack by armies. Night by night, the soul of the people of South Africa is being sapped and their convictions undermined by that broadcast from Zeesen. There are other broadcasters going about this country from platform to platform and they are even more dangerous than the announcer from Zeesen.”

The Zeesen announcer carried on with his criticism of Smuts as an agent of the British Empire and a pawn of Jewish capitalism, and often quoted newspaper articles from neutral countries such as Belgium, to exalt the anti-war factions as heroes and to place the culpability for the war on the British. At the same time, Zeesen made calls for the public to take action against Smuts and for South Africa to leave the war. Such negative utterances convinced the government authorities that the main object of waging publicity campaigns was to refute and discredit Zeesen broadcasts. It was considered that the targeted audience to German propaganda was a section of the white Afrikaans-speaking people who supported Malan and also harboured strong pro-Nazi and anti-British bias.

The Zeesen announcers were Holm (Neef Holm), Jan A. Strauss (Neef Buurman), Michael J. Pienaar (Neef Hermanus), Eckart W. Becker (Neef Sagie) and Johannes J. Snoek (Neef Bokkies), who constituted the team of the Africa-zone editorial office of that radio station in Germany. They targeted the Afrikaner audience in framing propaganda messages to intensify anti-war activism. Emotive language was employed to appeal to sentiments with references to the Afrikaners’ history and to direct anger at the British. Based on the peculiarity of

---

367 Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 303/1, General Smuts’ Speech, 3 November 1939. This speech was translated and published by T.C Robertson, Director of the Union Unity Truth Service.
368 UWH, Box 239, B.I. 1, Extracts of Zeesen Broadcast, 4-6 November 1939.
369 UWH, Box 239, B.I. 1, Extracts of Zeesen Broadcast, 9-10 October and 6-10 November 1939.
370 Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 132, Memorandum for Cabinet Sub-Committee on Publicity, 8 November 1939.
context, derogatory expressions such as ‘Smuts, a Jew’\textsuperscript{372}, ‘the English jingo’\textsuperscript{373}, ‘Mr Smuts’ (not General Smuts)\textsuperscript{374}, ‘the British leader’ (not South African), ‘Jannie Smuts or Slim Jannie’, ‘accidental majority Parliament’, ‘Smuts and his Jewish pals’\textsuperscript{375}, ‘treason and misuse of military principles’\textsuperscript{376}, ‘Smuts, Imperial friend’\textsuperscript{377}, and ‘the traitor and liar’\textsuperscript{378}, were the characteristic features of the Zeesen broadcast. Even some South Africans began to appreciate German propaganda, especially when it appealed to historical adversities suffered by the Afrikaners, for example, the concentration camps during the Anglo-Boer War. One government opponent employed Zeesen language such as ‘Jan Smuts, the traitor of our nation, the liar, the hypocrite, the British-Jewish Imperialist’\textsuperscript{379}, to express his indignation at the government’s support of Britain in the war. It was hardly surprising that, from the beginning of the war, the Union authorities became more concerned with devising strategies to counter the Zeesen broadcast, as it was considered too influential and detrimental to the morale of the public.\textsuperscript{380}

The Union government sought, from the start, to extend state power and government responsibility. Given the problems outlined above, Smuts’s administration orchestrated various schemes to expedite preparations for the implementation of the war policy. These included measures to circumvent the defence policy constraints, to confront the anti-war activism and to safeguard internal security and stability in order to prevent a repeat of ‘another 1914 Rebellion’.\textsuperscript{381} Censorship and propaganda were interrelated areas of immediate activity. Smuts firstly appointed a war cabinet, developed enabling policy provisions and devised strategies to effect the Union’s war policy. At the same time, he also initiated institutional structures to improve the military position, to safeguard internal security and stability as well as to facilitate recruitment and to sustain national morale. With regard to the latter point, Smuts and his government needed to assuage the loyalists that the government was imposing its authority and also to create an opportunity for converting the neutral and

\textsuperscript{372} UWH, Box 281, B.I. 31, Axis Broadcast by Traitors, 30 October 1939. 
\textsuperscript{373} UWH, Box 239, B.I. 1, Extracts of Zeesen Broadcast, 9 October 1939. 
\textsuperscript{374} UWH, Box 239, B.I. 1, Extracts of Zeesen Broadcast, 10 October 1939. This was a Zeesen quote from the South African anti-government newspaper, \textit{Die Volksblad}; UWH, Box 239, B.I. 1, Extracts of Zeesen Broadcast, 4 November 1939. 
\textsuperscript{375} UWH, Box 239, B.I. 1, Extracts of Zeesen Broadcast, 10 October 1939. 
\textsuperscript{376} UWH, Box 239, B.I. 1, Extracts of Zeesen Broadcast, 3 November 1939. 
\textsuperscript{377} UWH, Box 239, B.I. 1, Extracts of Zeesen Broadcast, 4 November 1939. 
\textsuperscript{378} Marx, ‘Dear Listeners of South Africa’, p. 154. 
\textsuperscript{380} See previous quote from General Smuts’ Speech at Bloemfontein, 3 November 1939. 
\textsuperscript{381} Lawrence Papers, BC 640, E3. 183, Memorandum on Internal Security, 30 May 1940.
ambivalent public towards the government. The supporters of the opposition also had to be influenced and swayed towards the government, for example, to create awareness for economic opportunities presented by wartime conditions.

**WAR CABINET, POLICY DEVELOPMENTS AND RESPONSE STRATEGIES**

Smuts’s first task was not too difficult. Pragmatism and political expediency determined his actions and rationale. He was never shy to turn to ‘old friends’, and even ‘old opponents’ to fill various portfolios in his wartime administration.382 ‘With patience and experience of the difficulties of teamwork in the government’, noted Smuts, these old opponents could ‘mellow into real workers … But I expect some fun and even trouble as we move along’.383 He was referring to W.B. Madeley of the Labour Party and C.F. Stallard of the Dominion Party, who formed part of Smuts’s war cabinet.384 Over and above his position as Prime Minister, Smuts assumed two other portfolios: defence and external affairs - critical portfolios for effective coordination of the war strategy.

Among other appointments, Deneys Reitz became the Deputy Prime Minister,385 Minister of Native Affairs, and later a member of Smuts’s war committee.386 A liberal Afrikaner, Jan Hofmeyr, who became known for his sympathies with the plight of blacks in South Africa387, was the Minister of Finance and Education. It was an important position for coordinating funding for the war effort and maintaining balance with the economic imperatives for the civilian sector. For communications, C.F. Clarkson became the Minister of Posts and Telegraphs, and C. Steyn was the Minister of Justice.388 H.G. Lawrence became Minister of Interior and Public Health, and later also chaired the inter-departmental committee on internal

---

386 Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 136, Minutes of the War Committee Meeting, 6 December 1940.
security. Hofmeyr, Lawrence and Steyn were the key role-players in Smuts’s internal security coordination and the facilitation of government propaganda. Smuts, confident of his wartime cabinet, described them as ‘a happy family, consisting almost entirely of old comrades who trusted my leadership’.389 (See Smuts’s Cabinet in 1939, Fig. 3) He further noted that:

*I have the advantage of having inspired confidence through long years of patience and at last serving the country’s interest in a supreme crisis. And this reputation may stand me in good stead in the very difficult days ahead. And the Nats [Nationalists] of course make out that all this was dark plotting on my side which in the end caught them napping.*390

In July 1940, after a review of the state of the DOD, Smuts created the defence advisory committee. He explained that in order to facilitate proper efficiency, there was a need to ‘cut out overlapping’ and to ‘revise functions and responsibilities’ as well as ‘to provide proper liaison and consultation’.391 The purpose of the defence advisory committee was to examine the DOD and its sub-divisions in terms of control systems, and to provide advice where necessary with regard to the required improvements in its workings and organisation.392 Van Ryneveld was also instructed to allow members under his control to give evidence to the committee in terms of the requirements for improvement and in the performance of their functions.393

Smuts also introduced various policy measures to accelerate military organisation and to safeguard internal security. Because of the political controversies regarding the defence policy, the government introduced the Africa Oath policy on 7 February 1940 for military volunteers.394 Those volunteers who accepted the Oath, wore ‘an orange flash’ on their uniforms, and were required ‘to serve anywhere in Africa’.395 That Oath, however, was not generally accepted and it elicited controversies. Some of the UDF members refused to sign it

---

391 CGS (War), Box 42, 10/4, Smuts to Reitz, 31 July 1940.
392 CGS (War), Box 42, 10/4, Smuts to Reitz, 31 July 1940; UWH, Box 91, MS 58, Defence Advisory Committee, Secretary for Defence to All Heads of Sections, 10 August 1940; ‘Smuts Appoints Defence Advisory Committee’, *Rand Daily Mail*, 2 August 1940.
393 CGS (War), Box 42, 10/4, Smuts to van Ryneveld, 1 August 1940.
394 SANDFA, Press and Propaganda Archives (PP), Box 56, PR 41/2, Orange Flash, 29 November 1940; Martin and Orpen, *South Africa at War*, vol. 7, p. 58; Orpen, *East African and Abyssinian Campaigns*, p. 6; Visser, *OB: Traitors or Patriots?*, p. 31.
395 SANDFA, Press and Propaganda Archives (PP), Box 56, PR 41/2, Orange Flash, 29 November 1940; Martin and Orpen, *South Africa at War*, vol. 7, p. 58; Orpen, *East African and Abyssinian Campaigns*, p. 6; Visser, *OB: Traitors or Patriots?*, p. 31.
and some resigned. Nonetheless, the adoption of the volunteer-based military service enabled Smuts to overcome the defence policy constraints. It provided a sense that, those who volunteered would be loyal and committed to the government’s war policy. The next step, with regard to policy matters, related to the introduction of a series of guidelines and protocols to enhance internal security and stability. A number of censorship and national security regulations were thus introduced.

‘The popular impression that the censor’, stated the British Military Regulations on Censorship in Time of War or Emergency, ‘is merely an iron hand with blue pencil scoring out anything of interest’. Yet in practice, lessons from the First World War had proven that examining and censoring correspondence provided invaluable information, particularly regarding the injustices and criticisms that impact on the morale of the public and the serving members in the military. Smuts and the war cabinet moved swiftly to take pre-emptive actions. Several emergency regulations were passed for facilitating the execution of the war policy and to deprive the anti-war elements of the means to organise and undermine government efforts. The key regulations were Proclamation no. 201 of 1939 and the War Measures Act, No. 13 of April 1940, which formed the basis for managing wartime economy and to maintain internal security.

The department of justice issued a general minute in September 1939, warning its officials about the imperative of loyalty, obedience, resource conservation and also invoked the regulatory frameworks limiting the issuing of firearm licences. Based on these, suspected persons and enemy aliens were monitored and interned, private firearms and ammunition were confiscated, and in order to eliminate opportunities for uprisings, the government also suspended the activities of trade unions, mainly for white workers. In view of the prevailing political conditions, the Union authorities gradually imposed censorship which

396 Martin and Orpen, *South Africa at War*, vol. 7, pp. 223-225; See also a consolidated report on army morale, Malherbe Papers, File 441/10, KCM 56974 (864), Memorandum on Army Morale and Propaganda, by DMI (Ic), March 1943; SANDFA, Archives of the Quartermaster General (QMG), Group 1, Box 104, Q 91/339, Morale in the Army, 25 August 1943; Visser, *OB: Traitors or Patriots?*, p. 31.

397 Army Intelligence, Box 21, I.19, CE2/2, Censorship Regulations, August 1938.


399 JUS, Box 1506, 1/56/39, General Minute No. 27, Outbreak of War, 11 September 1939.

began in November 1939. During the cabinet committee meeting in October 1939, it was suggested that no rigid censorship should be imposed and also, counting on the cooperation of the loyal press, a voluntary press censorship was to be obtained from the Press Union.\footnote{Lawrence Papers, BC 640, E3. 4, Second Meeting of Cabinet Committee, 5 October 1939.}

Based on the British Regulations for Censorship, South Africa imposed censorship on all postal and telegraphic communications passing between the Union and SWA, and all countries other than the members of the British Commonwealth.\footnote{Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 144, Union of South Africa, Report on the Postal and Telegraphic Censorship, 4 September 1940.} As war progressed, there was a deterioration of security due to the growing activism of the anti-war elements, which also hampered recruitment. Thus, it was becoming apparent that the tasks of the Union security services would be enhanced if the scope of censorship was expanded. In June 1940, through the publication of the notice called the Censorship and Despatch of Correspondence Regulations, the government granted authority to subject ‘all communications whatsoever’ to censorship.\footnote{Army Intelligence, Box 21, I. 19, CE2/2, Censorship Regulations, 5 June 1940.}

To give effect to the censorship policy, authorities decided to establish four primary censorship stations in Cape Town, Johannesburg, Durban and Windhoek, with a subsidiary station in Pretoria. For effective control of all external telegraphic traffic, three major telegraphic censorship points were established in Johannesburg, Cape Town and Durban.\footnote{Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 144, Union of South Africa, Report on the Postal and Telegraphic Censorship, 4 September 1940.} Colonel (later Brigadier) H.J. Lenton, director of signals and postmaster general of the Union of South Africa, was appointed as controller of censorship.\footnote{Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 144, Union of South Africa, Report on the Postal and Telegraphic Censorship, 4 September 1940; SANDFA, Army Intelligence, Box 50, I. 44, History of Censorship, 31 March 1943.} He was based in Cape Town, the country’s legislative capital and the headquarters of the naval intelligence section. Shortly thereafter, the Union’s censorship policy was extended to the British High Commission Territories of Basutoland (Basotholand) (now Lesotho), Bechuanaland (now Botswana) and Swaziland. In addition, new smaller censorship stations were established in De Aar, a strategic railway junction in the northern Cape, to deal with correspondence from SWA, and also in Port Elizabeth, East London and Bloemfontein. These places were regarded as strategic locations – the major railway routes into the interior, and became important censorship points for the treatment of inland correspondence.\footnote{Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 144, Union of South Africa, Report on the Postal and Telegraphic Censorship, 4 September 1940.}
The types of correspondence requiring censorship included telegrams, letters, postcards, photographs, sketches, printed matter, packets, parcels as well as the telegraph and telephone communications.\[^407\] Private correspondence was required to be conducted in plain English or Afrikaans only, and codes, cyphers and shorthand were forbidden.\[^408\] Reference to, or any publication of military information such as troop strengths, location, movements, armament, equipment, plans and forecast of future operations, position, billets, camps, shipping movements, criticisms of forces as well as casualties was prohibited under the censorship regulations.\[^409\]

In an undated memorandum on unit censorship, Lieutenant B.J. Olivier, one of the officers in the intelligence section (who often undertook research among troops), argued that, ‘the Army must be strong in health and morale’, and that the morale is strengthened by the conviction of the freedom of writing which grants the soldier an outlet to feelings, otherwise, due to restrictions, they may repress those feelings, then leading to discontent and poor morale.\[^410\]

For censorship to be effective and to enable the authorities to counter subversive propaganda, it was decided to implement secret selective censorship, to trap suspects and to give ‘enemy propagandists’ a false sense of security and put them off their guard.\[^411\] Through censorship, the government was able to intercept harmful material and to gain insight into the feelings within the armed forces and the dissatisfaction within the population in order to determine areas where instability could emanate and to institute preventive measures expeditiously.

Anxiety about the growth, influence and militancy of the anti-war elements, prompted the Union authorities to consider further “comprehensive measures” to combat internal security

\[^407\] Army Intelligence, Box 21, I. 19, CE2/2, Censorship Regulations, 5 June 1940; Army Intelligence, Box 50, I. 44, History of Censorship, 31 March 1943.
\[^408\] Army Intelligence, Box 21, I. 19, CE2/2, Censorship Regulations, 5 June 1940; Army Intelligence, Box 50, I. 44, History of Censorship, 31 March 1943.
\[^409\] Army Intelligence, Box 21, I. 19, CE2/2, Censorship Regulations, 5 June 1940; Army Intelligence, Box 21, I. 19, CE2/2, Postal Censor, Obliteration of Writing, Chief Censor to the Deputy Chief Censors, August 1940; Army Intelligence, Box 21, I. 19, CE2/2, Memorandum on Unit Censorship, n.d.; Army Intelligence, Box 21, I. 19, CE2/2, Censorship, Director General of Operations to General Staff Intelligence, Nairobi, 15 August 1940; Army Intelligence, Box 21, I. 19, CE2/2, Telegram, General Staff Intelligence to Deputy Director of Intelligence, 27 August 1940.
\[^410\] Army Intelligence, Box 21, I. 19, CE2/2, Memorandum on Unit Censorship, n.d.
\[^411\] Army Intelligence, Box 21, I. 19, CE2/2, Telegram, General Staff Intelligence to Deputy Director of Intelligence, 27 August 1940; Army Intelligence, Box 21, I. 19, CE2/2, Memorandum on Unit Censorship, n.d.
threats.\textsuperscript{412} Seventeen months after the emergency regulations were promulgated, the government published the \textit{War Measures Act} No. 4 of February 1941, containing a comprehensive set of fifty-four regulations, constituting the framework for a “National Security Code”.\textsuperscript{413} The preliminary provisions were muted at the end of 1940, when the security conditions in the country deteriorated and the judicial system was hamstrung by the existing legal framework to effectively deal with the prosecution of the anti-war elements. It was regarded as crucial to introduce effective measures ‘to maintain internal order and security, and to safeguard public safety’.\textsuperscript{414} These regulations dealt with various subjects including prohibitions of unauthorised drilling, attacks on serving uniformed members, making, printing, writing or displaying subversive statements, authorising the minister of interior to seize books or documents deemed to hamper security and defence, illegal use of explosives, restriction on listening to enemy wireless, spreading of rumours, public violence, ban on organisations considered detrimental to defence and internal security as well as restricting the participation of state employees in suppressed associations.\textsuperscript{415}

One of the organisations considered to be a security threat, falling under the provisions of the Security Code, was the \textit{Ossewa-Brandwag} (OB). Subsequently, the Secretary for Defence issued instructions that members of the public service were forbidden from being members of the OB, as well as from participating in, or representing any subversive organisation.\textsuperscript{416} In the following months, the government continued to promulgate emergency regulations to provide for war-related offences such as “special crimes” (contravening post-office administration

\begin{footnotes}
\item\textsuperscript{412} Unisa, UP Archives, Central Head Office, Intelligence Reports, Resolutions of “Die Unie Bond”, 14-15 March 1939; Lawrence Papers, BC 640, E3, 186, Committee on Internal Security Report, Lawrence to Smuts, 1 June 1940.
\item\textsuperscript{413} CGS, Group 2, Box 93, 169/7, Fortnightly Intelligence Reports, 10 February 1941; Union of South Africa, Government Gazette Extraordinary, n. 2851, February 1941.
\item\textsuperscript{416} SANDFA, Secretary of Defence Archives (DC), Box 3841, DF 1887, Circular No. 1 of March 1941, inviting attention to observe Proclamation No. 44 of March 1944 regarding the prohibitions of public servants from being members of an association known as “Die Ossewabrandwag” under the National Security Regulations, Secretary of Defence to all Heads of Sections and Os.C. Commands, 19 March 1941; CGS (War), Box 223, 0200, Internal Security Measures, Declaration Regarding the Association known as “Die Ossewabrandwag”, 19 March 1941; For a recent analysis and details of the OB see Marx, \textit{Oxwagon Sentinels}.
\end{footnotes}
and shipping combinations or housebreaking with intent to steal or theft), prosecution of persons suspected of hampering the government’s war effort and the provisions for the special high courts to deal with serious cases on sabotage.

Other than the development of policies, the government also devised strategies to facilitate the execution of those policies. On 18 September 1939, after the appointment of the war cabinet, Lawrence discussed a number of response strategies with Smuts, regarding internal security and counter-propaganda measures. Smuts’s major anxiety came from the persistent, nightly Zeesen broadcast to South Africa, which incited the public against him and his government. In mid-September 1939, during a meeting with regard to the introduction of security measures, Smuts informed Lawrence that he could not allow the continued Zeesen propaganda offensives and the agitation of the people against him. He urged for the implementation of effective counter-measures. In the same month, displaying some measure of anxiety, he wrote to a friend about the personal attacks he endured from the Zeesen broadcast:

One of the funniest minor features of the German propaganda is a nightly Afrikaans tirade against me from Zeesen. It is the most awful filth imaginable. Night by night South Africa listens to my infamies – some distortions of the facts but mostly pure inventions. I have not a shred of character left, and the question at the end often is why such a criminal is still allowed to live.

As a result, Smuts urgently needed to have measures in place to counter Zeesen’s broadcast of negative news about the Union leadership and also to inform the public about the government’s policies. At first, he suggested the “jamming” of Berlin broadcast, but Lawrence felt that it might eliminate wireless if Germany retaliates with the same (jamming)

---

417 SANAP, Archives of the Union Executive Council (URU), Box 203, 1534, Proclamation relating to War Measure No. 37, April 1942; URU, Box 202, 367, Measures for Perpetrators of Acts of Violence and Sabotage, December 1941.
418 URU 2034, 2062, Trial of Serious Cases of Sabotage, June 1942.
420 Lawrence Papers, BC640, E3.2, Notes on Matters Discussed with Smuts, 10:20 to 11:00 am, 18 September 1939. The extracts from Zeesen Broadcast Archives start from 1941 and those in the Press and Propaganda Archives focusing on the Zeesen Radio Broadcast, vols. 1-31, commence in 1940. Most of the extracts covering 1939 come from the Union’s Intelligence Summaries from 1939. See UWH, Box 239, B.I. 1, Extracts of Zeesen Broadcast, September to November 1939; See also Marx, ‘Deal Listeners in South Africa’, pp. 148-172.
approach. Instead, it was suggested to have a thirty-minute government broadcast on the war policy. On the advice of Dr H. van der Bijl, the director-general of war supplies, it was considered a better strategy to ‘adopt Hitler’s method, and, by constant repetition, get our view across’. The government policy and war position, and not party politics, were to be the subject of the broadcast. Lawrence further suggested the establishment of the cabinet sub-committee to meet on weekly basis to deal with propaganda. ‘It was a good idea’, believed Smuts, and suggested that Reitz and Hofmeyr should assist Lawrence.

Shortly after the war broke out, the Government Information Bureau was established and in October 1939, A.N. Wilson of the Argus Printing and Publishing Company was appointed as the government information officer (also director of the Bureau of Information) (BOI), with the initial mandate to counter Zeesen propaganda. Wilson was required to provide the news and to provide confidential information for background to leading articles and to put out broadcast every evening at 7:15. He was also to ensure the distribution of information from the ministers or government departments to the press, but firstly had to obtain the ministers’ authority to make major announcements. Hofmeyr, who sat on the cabinet committee on publicity, indicated that Wilson should liaise with ministers for statements on government policy and not only limit information relating to the war, but to provide coverage to other aspects of government activities. He concluded that the Union’s propaganda should be more indirect and not direct. In addition, Wilson was to liaise with the British Ministry of Information (MOI) to determine what kind of information was required about South Africa in relation to the war.

---

422 Lawrence Papers, BC640, E3.2, Notes on Matters Discussed with Smuts, 10:20 to 11:00 am, 18 September 1939.
423 Lawrence Papers, BC640, E3.2, Notes on Matters Discussed with Smuts, 10:20 to 11:00 am, 18 September 1939.
424 See the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC), Annual Reports, 1937-1949, Board’s War Policy, 1939, SABC Library, Johannesburg, pp. 3-4. The policy of the SABC did not support party politics.
425 Lawrence Papers, BC640, E3.2, Notes on Matters Discussed with Smuts, 10:20 to 11:00 am, 18 September 1939.
427 Lawrence Papers, BC640, E3.4, Notes of the Second Meeting of Cabinet Committee on Publicity, 5 October 1939.
428 Lawrence Papers, BC640, E3.4, Notes of the Second Meeting of Cabinet Committee on Publicity, 5 October 1939.
From the onset, the government strategy was to refute the misrepresentation of facts by Zeesen, and to supply the “right” information on the war or government activities.\(^{429}\) In November 1939, Wilson submitted a memorandum for the cabinet sub-committee on publicity, outlining the envisaged scheme that would be adopted by the BOI to facilitate government publicity and to counter Zesen. The BOI’s envisaged activities as outlined in the memorandum were as follows:

a. The collection and organisation of information related to government policy and activities for purposes of publication.

b. The examination of Zeesen broadcast and the preparation of statements relating thereto for transmission over the radio and to the Press.

c. The preparation of statements of a more direct propaganda value for radio transmission and publication to the press.

d. The liaison with London, arrangement and supply of publicity photographs, weekly press cuttings and news summaries to the British Press Relations Officer. Also, to maintain contact and exchange information with the British High Commissioner in South Africa.

e. The maintenance of friendly contacts with the Press and distribution of news to newspaper correspondents, and also to maintain a close watch at the South African Press for all comments and news of interest to the Union government.\(^{430}\)

Furthermore, it was also emphasised that the material for broadcast in English and Afrikaans should be identical and the writers or translators should endeavour to use simple language and explanatory words where technical concepts are unavoidable. Propaganda was to appeal to an ordinary person and not for complex intellectual reasoning.\(^{431}\) This was similar to the German approach which also used simple language to mobilise sentiments and to discredit opponents.\(^{432}\) It was suggested that, in terms of the culture and psychology of the Afrikaans speakers, the treatment and presentation of material ought to be more subjective and directly

\(^{429}\) Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 132, Memorandum for Cabinet Sub-Committee on Publicity, 8 November 1939; Malherbe Papers, File 438/1, KCM 56974 (531b), Memorandum on State Publicity, no date.

\(^{430}\) Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 132, Memorandum for Cabinet Sub-Committee on Publicity, 8 November 1939.

\(^{431}\) Marx, ‘Dear Listeners of South Africa’, p. 155; Smuts Papers, vol. 132, Memorandum for Cabinet Sub-Committee on Publicity, 8 November 1939.

appeal to their sentiments, in particular, the use of sarcasm, irony and humour was desirable and effective.\textsuperscript{433}

‘Propaganda’, noted the BOI’s memorandum, ‘must be directed to a specific purpose’ or it could lead to confusion in the public mind, thus rendering it ineffective. For the South African audience (white Afrikaans speakers), the “specific purpose” towards which the focus of propaganda was essentially required was as follows:

To try and convert the [white] Afrikaans-speaking section of the population from their present pro-Nazi attitude of the mind, to a belief in the justice of the Allied cause, and to a subsequent or consequent belief in the correctness of South Africa’s policy of entering the war. A subsidiary purpose must be to satisfy the English-speaking section that the Government’s activities in the conduct of the war are efficient.\textsuperscript{434}

Since South African mainstream politics was dominated by white English-Afrikaans divide, the efforts of the BOI mostly targeted the Afrikaans-speaking section of the population as an important political and electoral constituency. White Afrikaans speakers also constituted the majority (among whites) and were to be the main source of supply for military recruits. In an assessment of the white Afrikaans speakers’ potential for support or opposition to the government and its war policy, the BOI’s memorandum estimated that there were four categories:

a. Those who were convinced supporters of Smuts.
b. Those who were waverers and open to persuasion. Among this group were the supporters of Hertzog.
c. There were those who supported Dr Malan. This group was susceptible to sentimental appeal and argument. It is at this category where propaganda must be rigorously directed.
d. Those who were so rabid that they would always be impervious to propaganda.\textsuperscript{435}

The strategy was, therefore, to wage a propaganda campaign of breaking down and destroying the pro-Nazi bias in order to create a platform for building goodwill towards the

\textsuperscript{433} Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 132, Memorandum for Cabinet Sub-Committee on Publicity, 8 November 1939.
\textsuperscript{434} Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 132, Memorandum for Cabinet Sub-Committee on Publicity, 8 November 1939.
\textsuperscript{435} Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 132, Memorandum for Cabinet Sub-Committee on Publicity, 8 November 1939.
government and the cause of the Allies. Efforts were to be directed at exposing the Zeesen inaccuracies, misstatements, factual distortions and deliberate lies, and to provide authentic information instead. It was considered that this strategy would discredit the Nazis and the Zeesen radio for its untrustworthiness. Through an element of ridicule, sarcasm, irony and humour in government broadcast, ‘people must laugh at Zeesen.’

The German propaganda approach, in contrast, was designed to provoke anger, even used vulgarity, to inflame opinion and to magnify social tensions. As far as the Zeesen broadcast to South Africa was concerned, its objective was to destabilise the Union’s war effort by appealing to Afrikaner nationalism and to the opposition movements to believe in the German victory. In addition, the government’s participation in the war was presented as ludicrous and devoid of any political rationale, “national” legitimacy and the consent of the majority of the population. Since these accusations against the government were manifesting in the public psyche and enhancing the pro-Nazi sentiment in South Africa, it was recommended to counter these by incorporating Nazi comments which derided South Africa and expressed contempt for the South African conditions. Furthermore, it was recommended to undermine the faith some Afrikaners had in the Nazi ideas, by exposing the inherent perspectives on religion, race, education and culture. In this way, the pro-German sentiment would gradually be reduced as the Afrikaners were particularly sensitive towards their religious values and would never withstand German attacks on their pride as a race and culture. It was therefore vital to persuade the people of South Africa that their interests were at stake and it was imperative to participate in the war to ensure that those interests were preserved.

Following these suggestions, Wilson commenced with his plans to discredit Zeesen. He arranged with the SABC to allocate fifteen minutes every evening for national

436 Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 132, Memorandum for Cabinet Sub-Committee on Publicity, 8 November 1939.  
437 Wright, The Ordeal of Total War, p. 65; Qualter, Propaganda, p. 113; Marx, ‘Dear Listeners of South Africa’, p. 155.  
438 UWH, Box 281, B.I. 31, Axis Broadcast by Traitors, 30 October 1939; UWH, Box 239, B.I. 1, Extracts of Zeesen Broadcast, 4 November 1939.  
439 UWH, Box 239, B.I. 1, Extracts of Zeesen Broadcast, 4, 6-10 November 1939.  
440 The pro-Nazi and anti-government sentiments were frequently reported in the Intelligence Summaries of the Union DOD and in the reports from the Government Magistrates in the various districts of the country, especially from the countryside.  
441 Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 132, Memorandum for Cabinet Sub-Committee on Publicity, 8 November 1939.  
442 The South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) was established under Act No. 22 of 1936. In terms of its broadcasting licence issued by the Postmaster-General under Radio Act of 1926, the SABC
Adequate organisational arrangements were also necessary to give effect to the policy provisions and to operationalise the response strategies. Thus, Smuts started off by reorganising the DOD as well as by establishing the security structures to provide physical security to vital and vulnerable economic points in the country. Most importantly, in addition to reorganising the military and related support structures, Smuts had to institute multiple publicity and propaganda mechanisms to stimulate public interest, to mobilise public support, to facilitate military recruitment and, at the same time, to combat the anti-war and anti-government propaganda.

**MILITARY ORGANISATION AND INTERNAL SECURITY STRUCTURES**

As indicated above, Smuts inherited a weak military set-up. It was critical for him to place the Union’s military in a proper war footing. This was done through the restructuring of the DOD, mainly by making strategic appointments to head the various sections. At the head, Van Ryneveld, who was appointed as CGS in 1933, remained defence chief (abbreviated Dechief in military correspondences), ‘for the overall supervision and administration’ at DHQ. According to Martin and Orpen, Van Ryneveld also became too close to Smuts, virtually ‘the operational chief of staff to the Minister (of defence –Smuts)’. His position gave him so much authority that, as C.G. Kerr, chairman of the war histories advisory committee would write later on (in 1979), wartime South Africa was ‘completely dominated by Sir Pierre Van Ryneveld whose personalised style of command enabled him to control every aspect of Defence … he proclaimed himself as the sole Executive Officer of the UDF’. His authoritarian approach created tensions between himself and Blaine, who in September 1939, had been brought in from the department of justice, to replace A.H.

---

443 SABC, Annual Reports, 1937-1949, Board’s War Policy, 1939, SABC Library, Johannesburg, p. 3-4.
444 SABC, Annual Reports, 1937-1949, Board’s War Policy, 1939, SABC Library, Johannesburg, p. 4; Malherbe Papers, File 438/1, KCM 56974 (531b), Memorandum on State Publicity, no date; Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 144, Memorandum on the Bureau of Information: Present Activities, 23 August 1940.
445 JUS, Box 1506, 1/62/39, Guarding of Explosive Magazines, Minute Issued by the Secretary for Commerce and Industries, A.J. Bosman, 12 September 1939.
446 UWH, Box 86, MS 2, Approved Organisation of UDF Command Structure, 29 September 1939; Martin and Orpen, *South Africa at War*, vol. 7, pp. 24-25.
447 Martin and Orpen, *South Africa at War*, vol. 7, p. 25.
Broeksma as Secretary for Defence. Brigadier Piet de Waal was appointed as director-general of operations (DGO). He was responsible for all military intelligence and security, as well as censorship and propaganda when the UDF was deployed outside the country. Brigadier de Waal was the grandson of General Louis Botha, the first Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa (1910-1919). Collyer occupied the military secretary position and also served on the war committee chaired by Smuts. (See Illustration 4)

For the proper coordination of war supplies, the directorate of war supplies was constituted on 24 November 1939. Its director-general was Dr Hendrik J. van der Bijl, assisted by H.C. McColm as commercial deputy and O.H. Hansen as technical deputy. In anticipation of the nature of the technical demands and in the handling of the commercial side of technical contracts, Van der Bijl recommended both deputies to Smuts, despite the fact that they were all (including Dr van der Bijl) recruited from Iscor. Blaine, as Secretary for Defence, was appointed as one of the three directors in war supplies directorate (two others were Lieutenant Colonel A.G.E. Pienaar, chair of the Union Tender Board and F.J. Fahey, chair of the National Supplies Control Board). Van der Bijl and McColm also served as member of the war supplies committee chaired by Collyer.

And the intelligence section, then headed by Colonel B.W. Thwaites (since April 1937), was duly upgraded during the war. In February 1940, the post of the director of intelligence

---

448 Martin and Orpen, *South Africa at War*, vol. 7, pp. v, 34; Van der Waag, Smuts's Generals, p. 58.
449 UWH, Box 86, MS 2, Approved Organisation of UDF Command Structure, 29 September 1939; UWH, Box 86, MS 2, Organisation - Defence Headquarters, Ryneveld to Heads of Sections, 8 February 1940; Martin and Orpen, *South Africa at War*, vol. 7, pp. 33-34.
450 Van der Waag, Smuts's Generals, p. 58.
451 Papers of the Director-General of War Supplies Department (hereafter DGS), Box 53, DWS 752, War Committee, 5 April 1940 to 25 October 1941.
452 The directorate of war supplies was reorganised in 1942, with the formation of the national council of supplies for advising the government regarding the production, supply, import or export of goods. See Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 134, Suggested Establishment of a Directorate of National Supplies and Resources, Secretary for Defence to the Minister of Defence, 27 August 1942; Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 134, Draft Powers of the Director-General of War Supplies, December 1942; Proclamation no. 319 of 1942, Union Government Gazette Extraordinary, vol. 130, no. 3130, 23 December 1942; UWH, Box 393, P.M.H. 18, Medical Services, n.d.
455 See SANDFA, Personnel File, P1/3653/6, Thwaites, B.W, Van Ryneveld to the Minister of Defence (then Oswald Pirow), April 1937; UWH, Box 86, MS 2, Allowances – War Appointments, Quartermaster General to Heads of Sections, 7 October 1939; Personnel File, P1/3653/6, Thwaites, B.W, Circular, Promotions and Appointments: Officers, Adjutant General to All Heads of Sections, 22
(DMI) was created. It was responsible for civil security, intelligence, local censorship and propaganda. In addition, the post of the deputy director of military intelligence (DDMI) was established, mainly for military-related intelligence, censorship as well as for military security and propaganda when the UDF was on active service. Lieutenant Colonel H.T. Newman was appointed as the DDMI and reported to the director general of operations (DGO), Colonel de Waal. Fokkens explains that military intelligence (MI), in collaboration with Allied intelligence agencies ‘waged a silent war against pro-German and anti-government’ elements as well as engaged in counter-espionage against German spies. Collaboration with the Union SAP’s Criminal Investigation Department (CID) and the exchange on information on subversive activities in the country also constituted part of the operational scope of Military Intelligence.

Owing to the developments in the war situation and the general expansion of the army, more reorganisation in the UDF’s DHQ took place. In 1942, an expanded intelligence structure called directorate of military intelligence (retaining DMI abbreviation) came into existence. Dr E.G. Malherbe, after introducing and being in charge of the educational services of the UDF members from February 1941, was asked by Smuts to become the director of military intelligence. Major C.S.B. Powell from the South African War College became the DDMI in June 1942. Dr Malherbe, previously the director of census and statistics, had volunteered for service in the UDF in November 1939, and served on fulltime...
basis as an educational officer from February 1941, teaching soldiers in the various training camps in the Union regarding the reasons for war service.\footnote{Malherbe Papers, File 432/1, KCM 56974 (11-14), Recruitment, Identification and Discharge Record relating to Dr E.G. Malherbe, Volunteer’s Identity Book for Use on Discharge.}

In September 1940, Dr Malherbe, together with Prof R.F.A. Hoernlé, Prof H.J. Rousseau and Lieutenant (later Major) Leo Marquard, cognizant of the “misunderstanding” deriving from the liberal use of the words such as Nazism, Fascism, Communism, and Democracy, wrote a memorandum to the military authorities, defining the need, purpose and method of an army education scheme for soldiers. It was considered imperative to develop the consciousness of the soldiers not only on what they were fighting against, also what they were fighting for – to preserve the country’s political, cultural and economic assets.\footnote{UCT, Jagger Library, Archives and Manuscripts, Leo Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.38, History of Army Education Services, 30 September 1945; Malherbe, \textit{Never a Dull Moment}, p. 215; N. Roos, \textit{Ordinary Springboks. White Servicemen and Social Justice in South Africa, 1939-1961} (Ashgate, Aldershot, Burlington, 2005), pp. 48-54.} Smuts believed it was ‘an excellent idea’, and after further discussions and refinements, that “educational” scheme was approved in February 1941.\footnote{Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.38, History of Army Education Services, 30 September 1945.} The CGS, who approved the scheme, requested that it be a branch of intelligence, designated I(M), with “m” standing for morale (of the UDF members).\footnote{Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.38, History of Army Education Services, 30 September 1945.} Dr Malherbe was in charge of the army education scheme (AES), and in June 1942, with the rank of lieutenant colonel, he assumed the position of DMI in the South African Intelligence Corps (SAIC).\footnote{Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.38, History of Army Education Services, 30 September 1945; Malherbe, \textit{Never a Dull Moment}, pp. 215-217.} Until the end of the war, Dr Malherbe was the DMI and head of AES, assisted by Marquard as his deputy and chief education officer.\footnote{Roos, \textit{Ordinary Springboks}, p. 48.} All the education officers were referred to as the information officers (IOs). According to Roos, the AES was designed by Afrikaner liberals who feared the influence of Nazism on the development of extreme political tendencies among white soldiers, thus desired to “educate” them on responsible citizenship within the liberal democratic institutions.\footnote{According to Dr Malherbe, the name of the Army Education Scheme was changed to Army Information Service, as soldiers were averse to the word “education”.} The AES was thus one of the main propaganda instruments to foster positive attitudes in support of the government’s war policy (details in the next chapter).
The DMI was responsible for the organisation, collection and distribution of military intelligence, control of the Film Production Unit, control of the War Museum, control of the Historical Records Branch as well as carrying out government policy regarding the AES.\footnote{AG (War), Box 4, 168/2/2/2/2, Establishment – Director of Military Intelligence, 13 July 1943.} The configuration of the DMI consisted primarily of three main parts: intelligence organisation, miscellaneous and army education services.\footnote{AG (War), Box 4, 168/2/2/2/2, Establishment – Director of Military Intelligence, Organisational Chart.} The intelligence organisation component, besides its Intelligence Corps, was further divided into three sub-sections, Ia (information), responsible for collecting, collating and distribution of information relating to the enemy, Allies and neutrals (mainly in Africa); Ib (security), responsible for collecting information, civil security and intelligence, military security intelligence and dock security; and Ic (censorship, publicity and propaganda), responsible for censorship of military correspondences, managing war correspondents, for publicity of military activities and public relations, and propaganda towards the troops, control of war artists as well as the coordination economic propaganda. The production and circulation of army training and propaganda films, the production and management of army history and the war museum fell under the miscellaneous, in conjunction with the Ic sub-section.\footnote{AG (W), Box 4, 168/2/2/2/2, DMI Establishment, 14 January 1943.} The army information and morale (Im) resorted under the AES, which later also dealt with the books for troops, in addition to facilitating the scholastic education and correspondence courses.\footnote{AG (W), Box 4, 168/2/2/2/2, Establishment – Director of Military Intelligence, Organisational Chart; Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.38, History of Army Education Services, 30 September 1945.} These arrangements were purely for the military. A separate arrangement for the mobilisation of the civilian population was facilitated through BOI (discussed below).

Within two years after the establishment of the intelligence organisation and structure, the defence advisory committee wrote a report, under the signature of its chair, Reitz, complaining about the lack of a ‘coordinating centre’ to process and transmit sensitive information to the relevant authorities for action. As a result, there was excessive ‘confusion, overlapping and delay’ pertaining to the ‘collection and dissemination of intelligence information’, thus leading to forfeiture in value and failure to act.\footnote{CGS (War), Box 224, 49/15, Reitz to Smuts, 27 September 1942.} To remedy the situation, the report recommended the establishment of an Intelligence Clearance Bureau (ICB), ‘as the central point for receiving intelligence information, recording it and distributing it promptly
to the proper quarter for action’. The ICB was envisaged to be under the minister of interior and responsible to the Prime Minister.

On 22 October 1942, resulting from the recommendations of the defence advisory committee, an Intelligence Records and Clearance Bureau (IRB) was established under Brigadier H.J. Lenton in his capacity as the controller of censorship, and under the direction of Lawrence as interior minister. Senior officials representing censorship, SAP, Railway Police, Military Intelligence Section, Treasury, Commissioner for Immigration and Commissioner for Customs, constituted the IRB and would meet weekly or whenever necessary. The IRB’s activities were as follows:

a. To act as a clearing house for all reports pertaining to internal security questions, facilitating their swift transmission to the pertinent authorities for executive decision and action, and recording that action by the concerned section.

b. To ensure the preservation of a full set intelligence records.

c. To keep the minutes of each meeting and send a copy to the Minister of Interior.

To avoid confusion, the CGS clarified to his subordinates that the IRB would not interfere with the normal functioning and obligations of the DDMI, but would supplement it with regard to pertinent military material that might be exploited from hitherto untapped sources. It was also confirmed that the IRB would not ‘undertake outside investigations of criminal, subversive or disloyal activities of individuals’, its main focus was for processing, recording and dissemination of intelligence information. The UDF’s intelligence section, particularly the Ic, co-ordinated its efforts with other government and non-government

---

477 CGS (War), Box 224, 49/15, Reitz to Smuts, 27 September 1942.
478 CGS (War), Box 224, 49/15, Memorandum, Intelligence Records and Clearance Bureau (IRB), 22 October 1942. The file refers to the Intelligence Records and Clearance Bureau and in the memorandum regarding its establishment; the acronym is indicated as I.R.B. Historians have however retained the original acronym of ICB, which refers to the same organisation. For consistency with the founding records, this study would use the IRB acronym.
479 CGS (War), Box 224, 49/15, Van Ryneveld to Adjutant General and the Director of Military Operations and Intelligence, 25 October 1942; CGS (War), Box 224, 49/15, Memorandum, Intelligence Records and Clearance Bureau (IRB) 22 October 1942.
480 CGS (War), Box 224, 49/15, Memorandum, I.R.B (Intelligence Records Bureau), 22 Ocober 1942; Fedorowich, German Espionage and British Counter-Intelligence, p. 215.
481 CGS (War), Box 224, 49/15, Memorandum, I.R.B (Intelligence Records Bureau), 22 Ocober 1942.
482 CGS (War), Box 224, 49/15, Van Ryneveld to Adjutant General and the Director of Military Operations and Intelligence, 25 October 1942.
483 CGS (War), Box 224, 49/15, Memorandum, I.R.B (Intelligence Records Bureau), 22 October 1942; Fedorowich, ‘German Espionage and British Counter-Intelligence’, p. 215; Fokkens, ‘The Role and Application of the Union Defence Force’, p. 121.
agencies such as the BOI and the Union Unity Truth Service, as well as with the department of native affairs (NAD) to deal with matters affecting black South Africans during the war.

In July 1940, the Directorate Non-European Army Services (DNEAS) was established. Its object was to facilitate the mobilisation of blacks, so-called coloureds and Indian-Malay for military service, however, in non-combatant capacity. Three military units, basically comprising of the Cape Corps (commanded by Lt Col C.N. Hoy), the Indian and Malay Corps (commanded by Lt Col G. Morris) and the Native Military Corps (commanded by Lt Col B.W. Martin) were ultimately mobilised for service within, and also outside South Africa. The direction, organisation, administration as well as recruitment was under the authority of Colonel E.T. Stubbs and also Lieutenant Colonel B.W. Martin who represented the director (Stubbs) in the North. The government authorities instituted various measures to draw recruits to fill up the ranks of these units. However, DNEAS was a separate structure in the overall military establishment. The government was more concerned about the white political constituency in addressing the manpower requirements of the UDF and in resuscitating the security apparatus of the state. (See Illustration 6)

484 UWH, Box 89, MS 34, Organisation and Establishment – Indian Services Corps, Adjutant General to all Heads of Sections, 15 July 1940; SANDFA, AG (3), Box 224, 154/51/658/0, Organisation – Non-European Army Services, Memorandum on NEAS, 28 March 1941.
485 AG (3), Box 224, 154/51/658/3, Organisation and Establishment, Adjutant General to all Heads of Sections, 20 May 1940.
486 UWH, Box 89, MS 34, Organisation and Establishment – Indian Services Corps, Adjutant General to all Heads of Sections, 15 July 1940.
487 SANDFA, Directorate Non-European Army Services (DNEAS), Group 2, Box 3, NAS 3/1/1, Ryneveld to Wakefield, 16 August 1940. The functions of DNEAS in UDF were outlined by the Director as follows: transport drivers, artisans and sappers, hygiene personnel, loaders, batmen, cooks, tailors, bootmakers, labourers, artillery aids, guards, watchmen, medical aids, stretcher bearers, stablemen, dressers, postilions, pioneers and mechanics.
488 CGS (War), Box 129, 32/1, Circular, Non-European Army Services, by Quartermaster General, 12 July 1940.
During Lawrence’s meeting with Smuts in September 1939, he noted some of the suggestions pertaining to enhancing the internal security measures. Contained in the suggestions was the appointment of the former SAP commissioner, Sir Theodore Truter, as chief control officer under the department of justice, to deal with internment processes. There was also consideration for Colonel I.P. de Villiers, then commissioner of the police, to undertake the responsibility for protecting the key industries.\(^{490}\) In October 1939, the Essential Services Protection Corps (ESPC), under the Minister of Defence and administered via the Secretary for Defence, Blaine, was established, to maintain surveillance and protect the vital points of the Union against sabotage.\(^{491}\) The ESPC was organised as a semi-military structure, but not as a UDF unit, and its “companies” were established in critical coastal areas of Cape Town, Durban, Port Elizabeth, and East London.\(^{492}\) There was also an inland company and roads regiment for the protection of the lines of communication throughout the Union.\(^{493}\) Lieutenant Colonel A.A. Stanford, chief of police and investigation, South African railway headquarters, was commanding the ESPC’s railway regiment, which was responsible for the protection of the railways in the coastal cities.\(^{494}\) Lieutenant Colonel P.I. Hoogenhout, chairman of the national road board, was an officer commanding of the ESPC’s roads regiment.\(^{495}\) The powers of suspension, reduction, dismissal and discharge, were delegated to the police commissioner (Colonel de Villiers).\(^{496}\) With the exception of Blaine and Hoogenhout, the various commanders of the ESPC units were former police officers who were selected on the basis of their experience and character.\(^{497}\)

Another internal security structure called the Civilian Protection Services (CPS), under Major (later Colonel) T.B. Clapham, was established in 1940.\(^{498}\) Its purpose was to perform

---

\(^{490}\) Lawrence Papers, BC640, E3.2, Notes on Matters Discussed with Smuts, 10:20 to 11:00 am, 18 September 1939.

\(^{491}\) CGS (War), Box 224, 49/13, The Story of the Essential Services Protection Corps (ESPC), 2 December 1941; Martin and Orpen, *South Africa at War*, vol. 7, p. 34; Fedorowich, ‘German Espionage and British Counter-Intelligence’, pp. 213-214. The vulnerable and vital points to be protected included railways, roads and bridges, petrol and oil tanks, power stations, electricity supply stations, wireless stations, cable stations, telephone exchanges, dock wharfs and airport bases.

\(^{492}\) CGS (War), Box 224, 49/13, The Story of ESPC, 2 December 1941, pp. 2-4; Martin and Orpen, *South Africa at War*, vol. 7, p. 34.

\(^{493}\) CGS (War), Box 224, 49/13, The Story of ESPC, 2 December 1941, pp. 6-8.


\(^{496}\) Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 143, C.H Blaine’s Instruction, Internal Security, 30 May 1930; CGS (War), Box 223, 49/1, Internal Security Measures, 1940.

\(^{497}\) CGS (War), Box 224, 49/13, The Story ESPC, December 1941, p. 5.

\(^{498}\) CGS (War), Box 224, 49/13, Civilian Protection Services (CPS), Blaine to Lawrence, 13 July 1940; CGS (War), Box 224, 49/13 Memorandum, Adjutant General to OCs and Head of Sections, 17 October 1940.
preventive and protective operations in the defence of the civilian population against possible attacks from the air, and the sea, and against the dangers arising from sabotage and sudden emergency.\footnote{Lawrence Papers, BC 640, E3. 188, Memorandum on Internal Security, Suggested Scheme, Lawrence to Smuts, 12 June 1940; CGS (War), Box 223, 49/1, Internal Security, General Minute, 25 June 1940; CGS (War), Box 224, 49/13, CPS, Blaine to Lawrence, 13 July 1940; CGS (War), Box 224, 49/13 Memorandum, Adjutant General to OCs and Head of Sections, 17 October 1940.} The CPS was a civilian organisation under the control of the local authorities (municipalities) – mayors – who were designated as chief area commandants, with the defence authorities maintaining an over-riding responsibility.\footnote{CGS (War), Box 224, 49/13, CPS, Blaine to Lawrence, 13 July 1940; CGS (War), Box 224, 49/13 Memorandum, Adjutant General to OCs and Head of Sections, 17 October 1940.} It comprised of 10,000 strong Civilian Guard, for public protection and to assist the police in maintaining law and order.\footnote{UWH, Box 265, B.I. 20, Intelligence Summaries, 12 October 1940; Lawrence Papers, BC640, E3. 138, Circular, Civilian Protective Services Instruction no. 1, 17 July 1940, amended on 23 June 1942; Fedorowich, ‘German Espionage and British Counter-Intelligence’, p. 215.} It was considered a significant step by the government in reinforcing the morale of the population which had been complaining about the need for civilian defence measures. Also, it was deemed necessary to organise home-front counter-measures to protect homes, villages, towns and cities against anti-war factions and organised attacks, as well as to provide intelligence.\footnote{UWH, Box 265, B.I. 20, Intelligence Summaries, 12 October 1940; Lawrence Papers, BC640, E3. 138, Circular, Civilian Protective Services Instruction no. 1, 17 July 1940, amended on 23 June 1942; Fedorowich, ‘German Espionage and British Counter-Intelligence’, p. 215. The CPS was divided into five categories: warning signals, medical services and fire-fighting, police and traffic, mechanical services, supplies and maintenance (transport, sirens, black-outs, rescue parties and shelters), non-Europeans (patrols in black areas) as well as information, instruction and propaganda (reports, notices and literature).} This effort was undertaken by loyal citizens of the Union.

To counter the subversive activities and propaganda, civilian resources were mobilised in the form of vigilance committee, based on the suggestions by Lieutenant General Andries Brink, commander-in-chief of the burgher commandos, Major General J.J. Collyer, the military secretary, and Louis Esselen, Smuts’s trusted confidant and chairman of the railway board.\footnote{Lawrence Papers, BC 640, E3. 188, Memorandum on Internal Security, Suggested Scheme, Lawrence to Smuts, 12 June 1940.} The tasks of the vigilance committee included:

a. To observe espionage, sabotage, and hostile action by groups.

b. To promptly report on all cases of intimidation, tampering with natives, subversive speech or action, and parachutists, should the latter arise.

\footnote{Lawrence Papers, BC 640, E3. 188, Memorandum on Internal Security, Suggested Scheme, Lawrence to Smuts, 12 June 1940.}
c. To immediately report all cases of hardship from whatever cause arising as affecting the wives and families of those away on active service, with a view to prompt examination and, where necessary, early redress.

d. Generally to watch for any movement or action which may tend to impair internal security.\(^{504}\)

A network of vigilance committees would operate in the Transvaal, OFS, Natal and in the Eastern Province, where there was a larger proportion of German speakers. The interior minister, Lawrence, was ultimately responsible. Given the government’s established intelligence system, Lawrence did not want to entrust intelligence work to civilian “amateurs”, fearing a ‘disconcerting embarrassment’ should things go wrong. In his comments on the local vigilance committees, he cautioned that, ‘the views are bound to be coloured by local prejudices, and local gossip, and their recommendations, apart from being valueless, may often involve the government in difficulties’, if there was official recognition and authority given to them.\(^{505}\) He recommended that the vigilance committees must not enjoy official government recognition and should rather be run through local security liaisons. Lawrence also saw an expanded role of the vigilance committees, with respect to obtaining information about the so-called “fifth column” as well as to mobilise public opinion to support government policy. He argued in this manner:

*Public opinion plays a very important part in controlling the minds of men already part of the military machine, or those just on the point of deciding to become part of that machine. By obtaining first-hand information on the feelings of the public, many dangers and difficulties can be averted and overcome. Conversely, if it is necessary to launch a certain line of propaganda in view of the existing military and other exigencies, numerous committees spread throughout the country can be invaluable in helping to shape and direct local opinion.*\(^{506}\)

Therefore, the influence on public opinion was urgently required to counter the escalating subversive speeches and the instigation of violence during the war. Hence, as indicated above, the internal security scheme was designed for the provision of intelligence (unofficial)

\(^{504}\) Lawrence Papers, BC 640, E3. 188, Memorandum on Internal Security, Suggested Scheme, Lawrence to Smuts, 12 June 1940; Fedorowich, ‘German Espionage and British Counter-Intelligence’, p. 215.

\(^{505}\) Lawrence Papers, BC 640, E3. 188, Memorandum on Internal Security, Suggested Scheme, Lawrence to Smuts, 12 June 1940.

\(^{506}\) Lawrence Papers, BC 640, E3. 188, Memorandum on Internal Security, Suggested Scheme, Lawrence to Smuts, 12 June 1940.
information, to facilitate the dissemination of government propaganda, to combat militant action, to mobilise public opinion and to win over opponents towards the government policy. Thus, hand-in-hand with security measures, the government also progressively devised various publicity and propaganda systems to mobilise the South African public to support its war policies. As Lasswell put it, securing public support was ‘an inescapable corollary of large scale modern war’.

PUBLICITY AND PROPAGANDA ARRANGEMENTS

The BOI was regarded as the primary medium for the dissemination of news and also for publicity on the activities of the DOD. Its functions were outlined in its reports of 1940 and 1942, and were further confirmed by the interior minister in the Union parliament in March 1942. Its press section dealt with a survey of the daily newspapers (about 20 of them) for incipient agitations, grievances or complaints and political tendencies, then compiled a press report for circulation to all cabinet ministers for responses or to issue authority for explanatory statements. It also handled official press statements issued by the secretary for defence, CGS and other senior officials. Other functions related to liaison with the publicity section of military intelligence, serving as publicity agency for recruitment and mediated between the press and military censorship on relevant matters, coordinated publicity with other state departments and disseminated newsletters, news and broadcast material to the Allied and neutral countries. The BOI coordinated and performed the general publicity functions, from radio broadcast, production, distribution and management of film exhibitions in South Africa and abroad, to the facilitation of the press coverage of defence publicity campaigns. Radio, as mentioned earlier, was envisaged to be used by the BOI for the provision of counter-claims against the Zeesen broadcast. This, however, had its own problems. (See Illustrations 7-8)

507 UWH, Box 264, B.I. 20, Intelligence Summaries, 29 June 1940.
There were controversies relating to allegations of pro-Nazi and anti-government tendencies within the SABC which threatened to derail the BOI’s broadcasting efforts.\textsuperscript{513} Those allegations began early in September 1939 due to the perceptions of inaction from the SABC to define its war policy and even not informing its officers of its intentions.\textsuperscript{514} Some of the criticisms emanated from the newspapers, of which the anti-government ones like \textit{Die Transvaler} accused the SABC of being under government control, while others such as the \textit{Sunday Times} complained about the ‘silence’ on the war issue.\textsuperscript{515} The chief critic was George Heard, a political correspondent for the \textit{Rand Daily Mail} and columnist of the \textit{Sunday Times}, who mysteriously disappeared in Cape Town while ‘returning to a naval ship of which he was an officer’ in 1945.\textsuperscript{516}

Through a board resolution, the SABC had declared its war policy on 18 September 1939:

\textit{As the Union was at war, the Board considered that it was its duty to support authority in the prosecution of the war and to co-operate with the Government in every possible way in bringing it to a successful issue ... while full effect will be given to the war policy of the Corporation, every effort will be exercised by the Board to frame and carry out its broadcasting programmes with due regard to both English and Afrikaans culture.}\textsuperscript{517}

Prior to officially defining its war policy, the SABC had for fourteen days, every hour from 6:00 am to 12:00 midnight, aided the government’s war policy by relaying speeches by prominent British and Allied statesmen as well as commentators with regard to political and military matters.\textsuperscript{518} The SABC relayed the special news services that came through the South African Press Association (SAPA). However, due to the need to have a sitting of full board

\textsuperscript{513} UWH, Box 265, B.I. 20, Intelligence Summaries, 1 December 1939; Unisa, United Party (UP) Archives, Central Head Office, Intelligence Report, \textit{Report on African Broadcasting Corporation}, 8 November 1939. The name ‘African Broadcasting Corporation’ was the previous name of the broadcasting company established in 1927 and experienced financial difficulties of the early 1930s. The government under Hertzog provided financial support and the company was reorganised as the SABC in 1936.


\textsuperscript{515} \textit{Report of Commission of Enquiry, SABC}, pp. 11-12.

\textsuperscript{516} George Heard was regarded as a liberal-democrat and stubborn in his views. He strongly supported the government’s war policy and was an avid propagandist of Jan Hofmeyr. See Macdonald, \textit{Jan Hofmeyr}, pp. 69-71.

\textsuperscript{517} SABC, Annual Report, 1937-1939, Board’s War Policy, 1939, p. 4, SABC Library, Johannesburg.

members from various parts of the country to decide on such a critical matter, the delay of fourteen days became a source of criticism. On 3 December 1939, Heard wrote in the *Sunday Times* accusing the section of the SABC staff of ‘attempting to frustrate the policy of the Smuts Government’ and ‘actively parading its sympathy with Hitlerism.’ He was regarded as the voice of the ‘anti-Nazi’ and, due to his strong and unwavering political views, J. Langley Levy, the *Sunday Times* editor, fired him early in the war.

The criticisms surrounding the SABC, from the Union’s declaration of war on 6 September 1939, led to calls from the government circles to place the corporation directly under military control. As a result, the government instituted a commission on enquiry on 25 October 1939 to probe the operations of the SABC in relation to the war. In its annual report of 1940, the SABC indicates that ‘the board invited the Government to appoint a judicial commission to enquire into its affairs’. The commission initially led by Advocate R. Evelyn Wright, later (after adjournment in December 1940) by Advocate P.S. Claasen, was required to investigate the claims against the SABC and to determine whether the interests of the Union, as a belligerent in the war, were safeguarded. It was also required to make recommendations on whether to place broadcasting directly under military or other government control for the duration of the war.

After completing its investigation, the commission found that many of the allegations were either unfounded or grossly exaggerated, except in one case where, out of the two hundred employees, only five were dismissed on the grounds of improper conduct and exhibiting anti-government tendencies. The commission also concluded that the resolution of the SABC board to support the government’s war policy, was diligently carried out and there was no cause for complaint. The SABC director, Major Rene S. Caprara, of Italian descent, was however, blamed for entertaining the objections of some of the Afrikaans announcing staff.

---

520 Report of Commission of Enquiry, SABC, p. 12; SABC, Annual Report, Board’s War Policy, pp. 4-5.
522 UWH, Box 265, B.I. 20, Intelligence Summaries, 1 December 1939; Lawrence Papers, BC 640, E3. 200, Inter-departmental Committee on Security, Report on the SA Broadcasting Corporation, no date.
523 Report of Commission of Enquiry, SABC, pp. 3-4; SABC, Annual Report, Board’s War Policy, pp. 4-5.
525 Report of Commission of Enquiry, SABC, pp. 3-4; SABC, Annual Report, Board’s War Policy, pp. 4-5.
528 Report of Commission of Enquiry, SABC, p. 34.
towards broadcasting the statements from the BOI. According to the commission, despite the objectors’ ‘artistic and conscientious scruples’, it was ‘their duty to broadcast the statements’ in compliance with their contractual obligations and the corporation’s licence which provided for the ‘dissemination of statements on official requirements’. The commission did not recommend placing the SABC under military or government control. Meanwhile, cooperation between the BOI and the SABC continued, albeit with changes in broadcast policy. Wilson’s broadcast were discontinued and, instead, prominent people in the society were arranged to provide talks on the theme, ‘Why We are in the War’ and on other current topics that were considered relevant.

Tothill argues that the government erred by attempting to counter the Zeesen propaganda as its listenership increased instead, and that Afrikaans speakers had to reluctantly listen to Wilson and his staff, who were also not fluent in Afrikaans. This was later rectified (in 1940) with the appointment of the fully bilingual speakers in the BOI, namely, M. Uys Krige and S.J. Marais Steyn. Another criticism came from the opposition papers: Die Vaderland, Die Burger, Die Transvaler and Die Volksblad, which attacked Wilson for his language deficiency, for political warfare against the Zeesen announcer (Holm) and in attempting to sway the Afrikaner opinion towards the government. The pro-government English paper, Natal Daily News, also criticised Wilson’s war of words against the Zeesen announcer which was described as an unnecessary ‘childish backchat’. Other criticisms, with respect to the BOI’s general conduct and coordination of publicity and propaganda, came from the DOD. The BOI was accused by military intelligence officials of monopolising all the news and information hoarding, neglect of the Afrikaans language and the preponderance of English.

530 Report of Commission of Enquiry, SABC, pp. 5 and 34-35.
531 Lawrence Papers, BC 640, E3.58, Report of the Executive Committee of the National Advisory Committee on Publicity, 6 January 1941.
532 F.D. Tothill, ‘The 1943 General Election’ (Unpublished Master of Arts thesis, University of South Africa, 1987), pp. 109-110; Wilson wrote a memorandum to the Prime Minister and responded to criticisms of his staff, excluding himself, that those who were not bilingual were taking lessons in Afrikaans. See Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 142; Memorandum of the Duties of Information Officers, 14 February 1940.
534 UWH, Box 265, B.I. 20, Intelligence Summaries, 10 November 1939; UWH, Box 265, B.I. 20, Intelligence Summaries, 17 November 1939.
536 CGS (War), Box 197, 42/4, Minutes of a Meeting on the Working of the Existing Organisation for Press Information, Publicity and Propaganda, 17 October 1940.
publicity material\textsuperscript{537}, interference in military intelligence\textsuperscript{538}, lack of quality reporting\textsuperscript{539} as well as the administrative inefficiency in terms of the dissemination of material to rural-based newspapers for publication.\textsuperscript{540} The DOD preferred to deal with its own publicity operations.

In early November 1939, the DOD appointed the press liaison officer, W.A. Bellwood (later Captain and chief press liaison officer), on the staff of Blaine.\textsuperscript{541} His chief objective was to facilitate the effective coordination of the recruiting and publicity efforts in a centralised manner. Bellwood recommended a publicity scheme which involved broadcasting and the production of material for films on the soldier’s life in the camp, the issuing of booklets and brochures, the development of posters for recruitment and for warning people against “careless talk” or gossiping, the organisation of the historical war records for posterity (under Captain E. Axelson and Captain J. Agar-Hamilton)\textsuperscript{542}, and to ensure the general publication of defence activities to the press.\textsuperscript{543} The press liaison section of the DOD was attached to the BOI, for the dissemination of propaganda about the UDF to the public.\textsuperscript{544}

In April 1940, Bellwood was given authority to have the local press liaison officers on the staff of the various military units, who would be selected and instructed by him in policy and press discipline.\textsuperscript{545} Three months later, in July 1940, an instruction was issued to all the OCs

\begin{footnotes}
\item[537] Malherbe Papers, File 438/1, KCM 56974 (531a), Publicity for the Army at Home and in the Field, 1941; Malherbe Papers, File 438/1, KCM 56974 (544), Recognition of the Afrikaans Element in Propaganda, 1942.
\item[538] CGS (War), Box 197, 42/4, Reply of the UDF Quartermaster General and the Director General Operations to the Director of Information, 28 August 1940; CGS (War), Box 197, 42/4, Minutes of a Meeting on the Working of the Existing Organisation for Press Information, Publicity and Propaganda, 17 October 1940.
\item[539] CGS (War), Box 197, 42/4, Newman to Lawrence, 28 August 1940.
\item[540] Malherbe Papers, File 143/2, KCM 56992 (15b), Memorandum Concerning the Bureau of Information, Captain (Mrs) Janie Malherbe, 16 March 1942.
\item[541] CGS (War), Box 197, 42/4, Instructions Governing Publicity, 11 November 1939.
\item[542] AG (War), Box 4, 168/2/2/2/2, Establishment – Director of Military Intelligence, 13 July 1943; See also PP, Box 39, PR 1/5, Organisation of Propaganda Projects, Kreft to S. Cooper (of The Star newspaper and head of government consultative committee on publicity and propaganda, 13 June 1941; PP, Box 36, War Diaries and Historical Surveys, June 1945.
\item[543] CGS (War), Box 197, 42/4, Memorandum on the Plan for Press and Information Division, 3 April 1940.
\item[544] Debates of the House of Assembly, vol. 40, August – September 1940, col. 1247; PP, Box 63, PU/6/3, Report on Relationship between the Bureau of Information and Military Intelligence, DMI (Ic) to DDMI, 8 January 1941. The subordination of the military propaganda to the BOI was never an acceptable arrangement to the military officials, who constantly complained about how the BOI failed them. See CGS (War), Box 197, 42/4, Press Liaison Officer, Thwaites to Blaine, 13 November 1939; CGS (War), Box 197, 42/4, Report on the Control of Military Information issues to the Public through the Press, Newsreels, Broadcast, etc, DDMI’s Reply to Controller of Censorship, 16 April 1942.
\item[545] CGS (War), Box 197, 42/4, Instruction to all Military Commands by the Chief of the General Staff, 6 April 1940.
\end{footnotes}
of the various military commands to facilitate the publication of news of local military interest to the press.\(^{546}\) The OCs were to utilise and direct the command intelligence officer to perform press liaison tasks, to act as censors on purely local matters, cautiously provide liberal views of military publicity to the press, support projects to write stories about historical and achievements of military units, support reporters and photographers authorised by the DOD to cover the activities of UDF units, and to generally provide support and facilities to promote propaganda efforts aimed at depicting the Union’s war effort in the most positive light.\(^{547}\) To ensure that no valuable information was inadvertently given to the enemy, the OCs were also instructed to ensure that the photographers reported to them on arrival and when leaving, that they were to be accompanied by an officer during the course of their work, and that all the photographs taken were to be subjected to censorship before publication.\(^{548}\) The defence authorities persistently impressed upon the OCs that military information such as troop and shipping movements, numbers and position of men and the publication of particulars or quality of military exercises and equipment were to be kept out of the newspapers.\(^{549}\) To the newspapers though, military information was considered worthy “news value” items that, to the annoyance of military authorities, they were not hesitant to publish.\(^{550}\) On the other hand, the press also complained about the requests from some military commands in the Union, to publish at no costs, the notices and recruiting advertisements which were not considered “news items”.\(^{551}\) Blaine subsequently issued a circular instructing all OCs to organise the publication of notices and advertisements for the press through the government printer in Pretoria, who bore the cost implications.

In June 1940, through the efforts of the BOI, government and the press concluded a voluntary censorship agreement whereby the newspapers undertook to ensure that military secrets or unauthorised statements that could impact negatively on the conduct of military operations

\(^{546}\) The military was divided into six military commands: the Cape, Eastern Province, Natal, Transvaal (with a sub-unit for the Witwatersrand area), Roberts Heights (Voortrekkerhoogte) and Orange Free State. See Martin and Orpen, *South Africa at War*, vol. 7, p. 3.

\(^{547}\) CGS (War), Box 197, 42/4, Instruction to all Military Commands by the Director General of Operations, 29 July 1940.

\(^{548}\) CGS (War), Box 197, 42/4, Instruction to all Military Commands by the Director General of Operations, 29 July 1940.

\(^{549}\) CGS (War), Box 197, 42/4, Instructions on Communications to the Press, 8 February 1940; CGS (War), Box 197, 42/4, Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, London, to the Minister of External Affairs, Pretoria, 20 July 1940.

\(^{550}\) ‘Brass Hats have a lot to Learn’, *The Sunday Express*, 18 February 1940, CGS (War), Box 199, 42/5, press cuttings; CGS (War), Box 199, 42/5, Officer Commanding, Voortrekkerhoogte and Transvaal Command to the Deputy Chief of the General Staff, 21 February 1940.

\(^{551}\) CGS (War), Box 197, 42/4, Circular to all Military Commands by the Secretary for Defence, 13 March 1940.
and on recruitments efforts were not published. The government, through the BOI, would provide news items to the press via the SAPA and would ensure that military information was not provided. Additionally, the South African authorities adopted the British instructions on restricting the publication of meteorological information in the newspapers. It was feared that, although weather affected shipping, aircraft and transport, the weather forecasts, reference and information on current weather and photographs should not be published by the press as it could be used by the enemy. The restrictions were designed to eliminate the risk of the enemy to derive deductions from published weather information in terms of the implications for the movement of ships, planes and traffic. Although provisions were generated to ensure the maximum publicity of the Union’s war effort, with no risk for military security, there existed constant frictions, internal rivalries and the overlapping of functions among government publicity organs.

On many occasions throughout the war, the government was prompted to facilitate the organisational efficiency by the restructuring and consolidation of the state publicity apparatus on the one hand, and to deal with complaints against the BOI, as well as the subsequent breaches of military security by the press on the other. The BOI was also accusing the defence authorities of missing opportunities for wider publicity when military operations, aircraft departures and other special manoeuvres could not be photographed due to a lack of advance notification from the DOD. Wilson suggested an appointment of a military officer with ‘journalistic flair’, to be placed in the office of the CGS, with the object of accessing confidential documents relating to military operations and manoeuvres, maintaining contact and interviewing section heads about developments in their areas for the purposes of publication or for useful propaganda. Despite the objections from other senior military officers, Wilson’s proposal was accepted, with the proviso that the required officer should

552 CGS (War), Box 197, 42/4, Report on the Control of Military Information issues to the Public through the Press, Newsreels, Broadcast, etc, DDMI’s Reply to Controller of Censorship, 16 April 1942; Tothill, ‘The 1943 General Election’, p. 97.
553 Tothill, ‘The 1943 General Election’, p. 97; CGS (War), Box 197, 42/4, Minutes of a Meeting on the Working of the Existing Organisation for Press Information, Publicity and Propaganda, 17 October 1940.
554 CGS (War), Box 197, 42/4, British Circular on the Publication Meteorological Information, 9 March 1940; CGS (War), Box 197, 42/4, Meteorological Information: Restrictions on Publications, 29 October 1940.
555 CGS (War), Box 197, 42/4, Wilson to Ryneveld, 16 August 1940.
556 CGS (War), Box 197, 42/4, Wilson to Ryneveld, 16 August 1940.
557 CGS (War), Box 197, 42/4, Brigadier J. Mitchel-Baker and Col Newman raised objections. In handwritten notes, Mitchel-Baker complained about the workload, whilst Newman stated that the staff of the Bureau did not know what they wanted from the UDF, 28 August 1940.
exercise tact and that ‘most officers would resent and resist any suggestion that he has the right to cross-examine them’.\(^{558}\)

Yet, on 19 October 1940, the director of military operations and intelligence (before the reorganisation of the DMI) proposed an appointment of an officer who would be a member of the military intelligence section to keep touch with the various departments in the DHQ and to collect information for release to the press.\(^{559}\) This proposal was in direct competition with the BOI’s request. What appeared to be a final instruction was issued in December 1940, when Newman drew attention to the fact that ‘all information intended for publication must be given to the Press through director of Military Operations and Intelligence’, including information for the director of information (Wilson).\(^{560}\) Consequently, turf wars between the BOI and the DOD ensued.

In 1941, Wilson recommended the appointment of a press liaison officer with a rank of lieutenant colonel, for the UDF in North Africa, covering the Middle-East, as his war correspondents were not provided with adequate facilities and support for publicity activities. Approval was given for the appointment of Lieutenant Colonel E.P. Hartshorn as chief press liaison officer with South African Forces in Egypt covering the Middle-East, assisted by Captain J.W.A. Bell from the *The Star* newspaper, who also served in Abyssinia as military intelligence officer.\(^{561}\) This request was approved on 17 October 1941. The BOI was represented in the South African Mobile Field Force (MFF) by Lieutenant C. Norton, formerly a chief descriptive reporter of the *Rand Daily Mail*.\(^{562}\)

Constant friction and turf wars between the main state publicity organs persisted throughout the war. On a number of occasions, the government had to engage in the restructuring processes in order to reduce persistent rivalries and the overlapping of publicity functions between departments. Early in December 1940, Lawrence, established a National Advisory Committee on Government Publicity to advise the government on publicity and mobilisation

---

558 CGS (War), Box 197, 42/4, Secretary for Defence to Heads of Sections, 30 August 1940.
559 CGS (War), Box 197, 42/4, Military Information for the Press, Director of Military Operations and Intelligence to Chief of the General Staff, 19 October 1940.
560 CGS (War), Box 197, 42/4, Military Information for the Press, Director of Military Operations and Intelligence, Instruction to all Military Units, 23 December 1940.
561 CGS (War), Box 197, 42/4, Louis Esselen to CGS, 16 October 1941.
562 PP, Box 63, PU 6/9/1, Bureau of Information, Memorandum to the Press, Director of Bureau of Information to DDMI, 1 August 1940.
efforts for the war.\textsuperscript{563} The advisory committee was required to co-opt representatives from the defence recruiting, defence intelligence, controller of manpower and director-general of war supplies for the purposes of directing the national publicity effort and for considering a comprehensive Union-wide propaganda drive for the mobilisation of manpower for military service and war production.\textsuperscript{564} This committee, consisting of six members, was chaired by Sisson Cooper of the Argus Company and E.B. Dawson of the \textit{Sunday Express}, as the vice-chairman. Members of the DOD, Lenton and Newman, also sat on the committee and it was allocated about £47,000 for propaganda campaign for a period of six months.\textsuperscript{565} The committee served to co-ordinate information about the war and advised on publicity campaigns through the means of newspapers, posters, films and radio broadcast. The government also used its discretion to entrust many official publicity schemes to private advertising agencies, and subsequently to an Association of Advertising Contractors\textsuperscript{566}, to maximise the dissemination of information to the country’s population.

The publicity structures were not functioning effectively. In early 1942, the defence recruiting and publicity committee replaced the national advisory committee. It was largely comprised of military personnel and representatives of government departments. The chairman was Colonel Werdmuller (director of recruiting) and Dr Malherbe (director of military intelligence), as the vice-chairman, with representations from the BOI. This committee, operating under Blaine, was granted advisory and executive powers, and had a limited scope of mainly recruiting.\textsuperscript{567} The BOI remained the chief government publicity agency and the DOD utilised its DMI (Ic) section under Captain R.N. Lindsay and Captain J. Malherbe (wife of Dr Malherbe) to handle the censorship, publicity of military activities, public relations (for UDF) in the Union and in the field, as well as propaganda to the

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{563} Lawrence Papers, BC 640, E3. 58, National Advisory Committee on Publicity, 6 January 1941; CGS (War), Box 43, 10/7, Deputy Director of Recruiting to the Defence Authorities Committee, 3 January 1941.

\textsuperscript{564} CGS (War), Box 197, 42/4, Lawrence to Blaine, 22 December 1941.

\textsuperscript{565} CGS (War), Box 197, 42/4, Lawrence to Blaine, 22 December 1941; Adjutant General Group 3 (AG 3), Box 6, Notes on Meeting of Defence Authorities Committee, 23 December 1940 – 24 January 1941; NASAP, Department of Trade and Industry Archives (HEN), Box 2191, 432/1/13, vol. 2, Memorandum on Government Publicity and Propaganda by Major P.T. van der Walt and Sergeant V.J. Clapham, 27 November 1943.

\textsuperscript{566} HEN, Box 2191, 432/1/13, vol. 2, Memorandum on Government Publicity and Propaganda by Major P.T. van der Walt and Sergeant V.J. Clapham, 27 November 1943.

\textsuperscript{567} HEN 2191, 432/1/13, vol. 2, Memorandum on Government Publicity and Propaganda by Major P.T. van der Walt and Sergeant V.J. Clapham, 27 November 1943.
\end{flushleft}
troops.568 The DMI (Ic) organised and facilitated propaganda lectures as well as wrote motivations for the advancement of propaganda instruction at the South African War College.569 As stated in the previous section, the defence intelligence’s Film Production Unit was established in December 1940, for the object of producing films of training value for distribution among UDF units throughout the Union.570

The defence authorities adopted the practice in Britain and America, to produce and circulate military training and interest films. The idea originated from the South African Air Force which requested Dr Malherbe, who was then liaising with the department of education with regard to the provision of educational films, to obtain training films from the British air ministry. The UDF film production unit was thus formed under Major H.C. Weaver. He was responsible for directing, producing, writing and editing scenarios, scripts and delivering commentary on recruiting and propaganda films.571 The Film Unit initially started with the importation and distribution of films from Britain and America, to the training centres and camps, then, in 1942, it was able to produce and circulate its own films.572 The unit produced and distributed training films, recruiting films, instructional and educational films, (British) ministry of information (MOI) films, general interest films as well as information and propaganda films for the 16 mm and 35 mm projectors.573

By 1942, the Film Unit had produced twenty-seven films at the cost of five thousand-five hundred pounds.574 The demand for the films increased rapidly and, for better co-ordination, the BOI’s film section was requested to be incorporated into the expanded UDF Film Unit in July 1942.575 It was considered desirable since most of the film production in South Africa

568 CGS (War), Box 197, 42/4, Report on the Control of Military Information issues to the Public through the Press, Newsreels, Broadcast, etc, DDMI’s Reply to Controller of Censorship, 16 April 1942; AG (War), Box 4, 168/2/2/2, Reorganisation of Director of Military Operations and Intelligence, 13 July 1943; Malherbe Papers, File 144, KCM, 56949 (110), Propaganda Duties Carried out by Capt (Mrs) Malherbe of Ic Sub-section, DDMI, 30 September 1942.

569 PP, Box 57, PR 31, Theory of Propaganda, Lectures, 19 August 1941; PP, Box 57, PR 31, Memorandum by Lt J. E. Sacks of Ic, 6 August 1940.

570 AG (War), Box 5, 168/2/2/2/4, Deputy Chief of Staff to Director of Military Intelligence, 5 October 1942.

571 AG (War), Box 4, 168/2/2/2/2, Establishment – Director of Military Intelligence, 14 January 1943; PP, Box 63, PU 6/4/2, Activities, Establishment and Progress of UDF Film Unit, 29 August 1942.

572 AG (War), Box 4, 168/2/2/2/2, Establishment – Director of Military Intelligence, 14 January 1943; PP, Box 63, PU 6/4/2, Activities, Establishment and Progress of UDF Film Unit, 29 August 1942.

573 PP, Box 63, PU 6/4/2, Activities, Establishment and Progress of UDF Film Unit, 29 August 1942.

574 AG (War), Box 4, 168/2/2/2/2, Establishment – Director of Military Intelligence, 14 January 1943.

575 PP, Box 63, PU 6/4/2, Expansion of Defence Film Unit to Incorporate Film Section of Bureau of Information, DDMI to DCS, 16 July 1942.
was directly or indirectly concerned with the national war effort. The defence authorities argued that the UDF Film Unit was primarily pre-occupied with training films. Thus, an intensive recruitment drive in 1942 (post-Tobruk military disaster for UDF) required military propaganda films to stimulate national interest in ‘South Africa at War’, and the military needed to play an active role in the production and distribution of those films relating to the war effort.\(^{576}\) Van Ryneveld and Blaine agreed to the request in August 1942. The BOI, however, still carried on with other contractual obligations relating to importation, distribution and exhibition of other films to the public.

In 1943, at the request of Lindsay (Ic), the adjutant general (AG) approved the establishment of the public relations unit which included a self-contained film and photographic section to operate in the North.\(^{577}\) This unit did not operate effectively due to shortage of manpower and technically-skilled personnel. It was criticised for the nature of the photographs taken, of which the majority showed troops in camps and social context, not of the troops on the frontline in military action.\(^{578}\) Lack of trained personnel was cited as a reason. Nonetheless, the Unit was able to produce about a thousand prints per month for the BOI, DMI, British MOI, military newspapers, illustrations for articles by observers and war correspondents.\(^{579}\)

Rivalries and accusations caused friction between the BOI, the military and the press. The DMI (Ic) accused the BOI of not effectively giving publicity to the UDF activities even when the military had provided the necessary material.\(^{580}\) Even the existence of the UDF Film Unit created anxiety for Wilson as he regarded film production and circulation as an encroachment on a trade which was regarded as his preserve and under the monopoly of the African Consolidated Films, a private film company working closely with the BOI.\(^{581}\) The question of the publication of military news to the press also remained a problem.\(^{582}\) Newspapers continued to disregard censorship procedures and often published military information such

\(^{576}\) PP, Box 63, PU 6/4/2, Expansion of Defence Film Unit to Incorporate Film Section of Bureau of Information, DDMI to DCS, 16 July 1942.
\(^{577}\) PP, Box 40, UDF/FP/8/1, A Brief History of SAPR Film and Photo Unit, May 1945.
\(^{578}\) PP, Box 40, UDF/FP/8/1, Official Photographs, Wakefield to Theron, 7 December 1944.
\(^{579}\) PP, Box 40, UDF/FP/8/1, Report by OC, SAPR Film and Photographic Unit, 28 December 1944; PP, Box 40, UDF/FP/8/1, South African Public Relations Film and Photographic Unit, Italy, April 1945.
\(^{580}\) PP, Box 63, PU 6/9/5, Report on the Relationship between the Bureau of Information and the UDF, 13 January 1941.
\(^{581}\) PP, Box 63, PU 6/9/5, Report on the Relationship between the Bureau of Information and the UDF, Discussion with Mr A.N.Wilson, Report by Capt I. Baries of Ic Film Unit, 6 January 1941.
\(^{582}\) PP, Box 63, PU 6/9/4, Report of Meeting of Newspaper Editors Consultative Committee, 23 October 1940.
as locations, identity of units and casualties.\textsuperscript{583} The BOI was often blamed for some of the mishaps.\textsuperscript{584} As confusion, overlapping functions and accusations between the different state organs with regard to “news”, “censorship” and “publicity” questions ensued, the ruling was obtained from Smuts in 1942:

*Military Intelligence should be responsible for propaganda about the army to the army, the Bureau should be responsible for propaganda and publicity about the army to the public … and the Bureau services involved radio broadcast, photographs, film services and general propaganda [to the public in South Africa, neutral and Allied countries]*\textsuperscript{585}

This arrangement helped to reduce frictions and remained in force for the most part of the war. The BOI was able to assist the military with news services from South Africa to the troops in North and East Africa, through radio and newspapers. Also, it exploited and coordinated existing media: newspaper advertisements, posters, cinema slides, radio broadcast, leaflets, recruitment tours, exhibitions, parades and public demonstrations, for publicising the efforts of the DOD in recruitment campaigns.\textsuperscript{586} Publicity activities of the BOI were designed to convert the anti-war elements towards the government and to prepare the ground for the recruitment operations of the DOD. Other semi-official agencies were also utilised to counter anti-government opposition.

The Union Unity Truth Service\textsuperscript{587} served the interest of the ruling United Party, and the Jewish Board of Deputies helped to counter pro-Nazi bias by publishing and commenting on

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{583} CGS (War), Box 197, 42/4, Secretary for Defence to the Editor of the *Cape Times*, 14 August 1940; CGS (War), Box 197, 42/4, Cipher Telegram, Dechief to Force Nairobi, 5 March 1941; CGS (War), Box 197, 42/4, Colonel R.D. Pilkington Jordan to Adjutant General, 28 November 1941; CGS (War), Box 197, 42/4, Adjutant General to CGS, 1 December 1941; CGS (War), Box 197, 42/4, Lawrence to Blaine, 22 December 1941; CGS (War), Box 197, 42/4, Major General F.H Theron, General Officer Administration (GOA), UDF, Middle East Force to CGS, Military Press Censorship, 1 May 1942.

\textsuperscript{584} CGS (War), Box 197, 42/4, Wilson to Blaine, 25 September 1940; CGS (War), Box 197, 42/4, Wilson to CGS, 2 October 1940; CGS (War), Box 197, 42/4, Blaine to Lawrence, 25 October 1941; CGS (War), Box 197, 42/4, Adjutant General to CGS, 1 December 1941; CGS (War), Box 197, 42/4, Lawrence to Blaine, 22 December 1941.

\textsuperscript{585} CGS (War), Box 197, 42/4, Wilson to Theron, 11 May 1943.

\textsuperscript{586} Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 150, Bureau of Information: Statement on Activities, 21 May August 1942.

\textsuperscript{587} The Union Unity Truth Service produced posters, stamp stickers, cartoons, magazines, brochures, bulletins, newspaper advertisements, cinema and loudspeakers in service of the United Party. It also published a pictorial magazine called *Libertas*, similar to *Life* of the United States and the *Picture Post* of the British. Unisa, Central Head Office, General Elections and Provincial Elections, 1943; CGS (War), Box 199, 42/5, Robertson to CGS, 11 December 1940.

captured German documents as well as on reported atrocities. The UUTS, through its active members and propagandists called the Truth Legion, endeavoured to combat Nazism in South Africa and to provide intellectual, moral and political support for Smuts and the national government in the prosecution of the war. Operating from Johannesburg, the UUTS presented itself as ‘the new Crusade’, with Smuts as its commander-in-chief, and called for people to serve the nation in war. Its director was T.C. Robertson, the parliamentary correspondent for the Rand Daily Mail, who was appointed in August 1940. The UUTS had its own propaganda advisory committee under Senator G. Hartog (Member of Parliament) as the chair. The language policy of the UUTS was both Afrikaans and English.

The UUTS advocated for the adoption of militant propaganda which would be carried out by an independent organisation as itself. In a memorandum on the ‘Co-ordination of Propaganda in the Union, Results of the Deputation to the Minister of Interior’, it was resolved that the BOI will operate independently of the UUTS, as the former disseminated information for the government and the latter conducted ‘aggressive and partisan propaganda’ which would not commit the government. However, the two agencies (BOI and UUTS), had strained relations owing to the lack of clarification of roles. Hence Lawrence, as the Minister of Interior, just as he was intervening in the turf wars between the BOI and the defence authorities, also had to facilitate a smooth co-operation between the BOI and the UUTS. The UUTS organised and facilitated various pro-war propaganda schemes such as the production of the Afrikaans-language film, Noordwaarts (Northwards), the publication of an illustrated magazine called Libertas, which received good reviews in its first issue in December 1940, and also organised publicity campaign called ‘peace through

588 See Morris Alexander Papers, BC160, List IV, File 24, Memorandum on the anti-Jewish Movements in South Africa, 1935, pp. 1-13; See also a series of articles in Commons Sense, with regard to Nazi Propaganda in South Africa.
589 University of the Witwatersrand (Wits), William Cullen Library, Archives and Manuscripts, Union Unity Truth Service and Truth Legion (UUTS); A 1883, 1, Constitution of the Truth Legion, n.d; See also the Suggested Scheme of Organisation for Propaganda to be Known as “Union Unity Truth Service”, October 1939.
590 University of the Witwatersrand (Wits), William Cullen Library, Archives and Manuscripts, T.C. Robertson Papers, A 2012, B20.2, Minutes of the Propaganda Advisory Committee of the Union Unity Truth Service, 9 August 1940.
591 UUTS, A 1883, 1, Language Policy of the Union Unity Truth Service, 14 August 1940.
592 Robertson Papers, A 2012, B20.2, Minutes of the Propaganda Advisory Committee of the Union Unity Truth Service, 14 October 1940.
593 Robertson Papers, A 2012, B20.2, Co-ordination of Propaganda in the Union, Results of the Deputation to the Minister of Interior’, Minutes of the Propaganda Advisory Committee of the Union Unity Truth Service, 12 February 1942.
victory’, which was against the government opponents who advocated peace with Germany.\footnote{UUTS, A1883, 3, \textit{Torch Sparks}, A pamphlet for communicating UUTS information to officials and members, Issue nos. 5-7, 1940-1941.} In addition, the UUTS operated a radio broadcast called ‘Mystery Radio Freedom’ which criticised the anti-war factions and attacked the Zeesen announcements in the evenings.\footnote{Robertson Papers, A 2012, Ae 5.1, Broadcasting, October to November 1941. The establishment of the radio broadcast was recommended in the Suggested Scheme of Organisation for Propaganda to be Known as “Union Unity Truth Service”, October 1939.}

In December 1940, the UUTS established the School of Propaganda and Political Education, which operated from Kero Hotel, Johannesburg.\footnote{UUTS, A1883, 14, Course in Propaganda Modern Propaganda Scheme for Training of Frontline Workers, School of Propaganda and Political Education, 10 December 1940.} This School admitted a special selection of five young South Africans from each of the mainly white universities, for expert instruction on the principles and application of modern propaganda. The ten-day course was presented through a series of lectures by about nineteen prominent individuals and academics. Among the lecturers was one Pastor W. Luckoff, former bodyguard of Hitler and member of the Black Guards in Nazi Germany, who fled to South Africa following the persecution of many priests in that country.\footnote{UUTS, A1883, 10, The Story of Pastor Luckoff, 1941.} His lectures were on the menace of Nazism and the oppressive practices that would threaten the civil liberties of the people under German rule.

Other UUTS lecturers and speakers included Advocate G. Saron, who focused on the Fifth Column and the fostering of the anti-Jewish sentiments in a society, Professor Leo Fouché on the history of propaganda, Dr Malherbe on the significance of film as a propaganda and educational instrument, Robertson on Nationalist Propaganda and Steyn on the question of the equality between English and Afrikaans and the need to preserve the political and constitutional freedom of South Africa.\footnote{UUTS, A1883, 14, Programme and Lectures for the School of Propaganda and Political Education, 9 December 1940.} The curriculum of the propaganda school broadly dealt with the philosophical foundations of propaganda, historical development, psychology of propaganda, practical methods and techniques as well as counter-propaganda.\footnote{UUTS, A1883, 14, Course in Propaganda Modern Propaganda Scheme for Training of Frontline Workers, School of Propaganda and Political Education, 10 December 1940.} The
school’s first class was on 9 December 1940, and the graduates were expected to return to their districts and become good propagandists.600

The UUTS also brought in B.F.G. Paver, head of the Bantu Press601, to facilitate propaganda through black newspapers. The UUTS arranged for the publication of booklets in different black languages to explain the causes of the war and object for which the war was fought.602 The government, on the other side, had enlisted the services of the BOI, which co-ordinated efforts with the NAD, to combat war apathy and subversive propaganda among blacks as well as to stimulate recruitment.603 Originally under the auspices of the quartermaster general, in December 1940, DNEAS was transferred to the adjutant general, who was in charge of all recruiting operations.604

Even prior to the outbreak of the war, the government authorities were concerned about the development and spread of subversive propaganda among blacks.605 The Secretary for Native Affairs, D.L. Smit, issued a circular in September 1939, informing the native affairs officials and the magistrates to maintain surveillance and report deviations from normal activities among blacks, missionaries and traders.606 Black political movements were also placed under observation in the context of subversive propaganda activities.607

600  UUTS, A1883, 14, Introductory Address by J.W. Higgerty, Member of Parliament, School of Propaganda and Political Education, 10 December 1940.
602  Robertson Papers, B20.2, Minutes of the Propaganda Advisory Committee of the Union Unity Truth Service, 9 August 1940.
603  NASAP, Archives of the Native Commissioner Johannesburg (KJB), Box 496, N9/13/3, Note for Conference, Enemy Propaganda, At the Office of the Director of Native Labour, 5 June 1940; KJB, Box 497, N9/13/5, Departmental Circular no. 20 of 1940, Enemy Propaganda, Dissemination of Authentic News, 11 June 1940; AG (3), Box 286, 154/189/17/1, Reorganisation of Non-European Army Services, Adjutant General to all Heads of Sections, 3 December 1940.
604  AG (3), Box 286, 154/189/17/1, Reorganisation of Non-European Army Services, Adjutant General to all Heads of Sections, 3 December 1940.
606  NTS, Box 9629, vol. 2, 511/400, Departmental Circular No. 19 of 1939, Outbreak of War, 16 September 1939.
607  NTS, Box 1681, vol. 1, 26/328, Political Movements Amongst Blacks, The Universal Negro Improvement Association and African Community League, du Plessis to Coetzee, 28 June 1940; NTS, Box 1681, vol. 1, 26/328, Circular No. 33 of 1940, Acting Chief Magistrate of Transkeian Territories
As war progressed, rumours about the German victories and the opportunities for black South Africans were spreading. For example, the *Rand Daily Mail* reported that blacks were “informed” that if the Germans win the war, blacks will get ‘hundred pounds for a cow, ten shillings a day for work, free access to European drinking, best seats in the theatre and racial equality’ In the Sekhukhune district of the north-eastern Transvaal, rumours were spread that ‘Hitler is coming to liberate blacks and members of the Zion Church will be given flags so that they will not be killed by the German soldiers’. In a sworn statement to the magistrate of Lydenburg, a female resident, Johanna Letuku, reported that Simon Pule, a minister in the African Methodist Episcopal church, after a prayer meeting, addressed a congregation that, ‘Germans will beat the British and they are right inside England killing people’. German and foreign missionary institutions were suspected of spreading subversive propaganda among blacks across many parts of the country.

The DDMI received many reports about the spread of subversive propaganda among blacks. It was suspected that some German missionaries, churches, meetings at the mining compounds and migrant black workers were responsible for the dissemination of “war statements”. In most cases, subversive propaganda was mainly about the imminent German victories and the liberation of blacks on one side, or that blacks were placed in the frontlines by the British to be fired at first and that the British were also shooting at black servicemen when retreating from the Germans. Hence the government, through the NAD, instituted

608 NASAP, Archives of the Native Commissioner Johannesburg (KJB), Box 496, N9/13/3, Report of Conference on Enemy Propaganda, 5 June 1940.
610 NTS, Box 9629, vol. 2, 511/400, Native Subversive Propaganda, DDMI to Secretary for Native Affairs, 24 July 1940.
612 GG, Box 1572, 50/1629, Effect of German Propaganda on the Minds of the Natives, A. Cele to the Governor General, 7 November 1939; NTS, Box 9629, vol. 2, 511/400, Alleged Enemy Propaganda – Transkei and Ciskei, Houghton Gray to Smuts, 4 March 1942.
various publicity and propaganda schemes to counter-act subversive activities among blacks as well as to facilitate recruitment.

In mid-1940, a conference on ‘Enemy Propaganda’ was held in Pretoria to discuss ways and means of combating subversive propaganda and to determine the best methods of conveying the war news to blacks. The committee, which referred to itself as the Bantu News Service Committee of the Witwatersrand (BNSC), was mainly concerned with providing news services to blacks through radio. In other meetings, it was recommended to publish pamphlets and news bulletins as well as to utilise wireless transmissions, loudspeakers and films shows to stimulate interest in the war and to combat insidious propaganda among blacks. The NAD, thus, played a critical role in assisting the defence authorities in waging propaganda campaigns towards the black population of South Africa.

After recognising its own limitations in the initial propaganda efforts, DNEAS established the propaganda and publicity department in April 1942, to work closely with the NAD. DNEAS co-ordinated efforts to provide publicity for its units, particularly the Native Military Corps (NMC), by publishing bulletins in black newspapers, and through the DMI (Ic), the native commissioners, magistrates, local chiefs and headmen, engaged in counter-propaganda activities to ‘produce the correct frame of mind’.

In August 1942, DNEAS established a propaganda school for black soldiers at Palmietkuil North Training Depot, Welgedacht in 1942, and later at Rietfontein XI, NMC School,
Springs in 1943. The purpose of arranging propaganda courses for blacks was to avert boredom among the troops and to enable troops on leave to be able to influence other blacks in justifying their enlistment and how the war had implications for South Africa and blacks in particular. The syllabus, presented by NMC officers, ranged from geographical origins of blacks in the NMC, including other black soldiers in Africa, to German treatment of conquered peoples and the reasons for black participation in the war against Hitler. The content of the three-week course was designed to increase awareness about the danger of German victory and the need for blacks to see themselves as part of the bigger effort to defeat the worst oppressive states. In addition to the propaganda school, other publicity and propaganda measures included the production and circulation of films, recruitment tours, the publication of the newspaper called Ndlovu-Tlou, for black troops and the translation of the English and Afrikaans News of the War paper into nine black languages, which circulated it in the Union, the Protectorates, Rhodesia, East and West Africa as well as in Europe.

These measures were not so much dissimilar to those employed for the other sections of the Union society. They were merely implemented through a separate agency of DNEAS and the NAD, due to the perceived racial and socio-cultural differences and needs for blacks and whites. The friction between the various publicity and propaganda agencies in the country remained the same in all circumstances. Even Stubbs submitted that DNEAS needed to have a ‘free hand’ in conducting publicity and propaganda, without having to go through the BOI,

621 Directorate Non-European Army Services (DNEAS), Group 2, Box 10, 3/21/E, Propaganda Course, Native Details, Stubbs to OCs of NMC Units, 21 August 1942; DNEAS, Group 2, Box 10, 3/21/E, Propaganda Course, Native Details, DNEAS to all OCs of NMC Units, 3 November 1943.
622 DNEAS, Group 2, Box 10, 3/21/E, Propaganda Course, Native Details, Stubbs to OCs of NMC Units, 21 August 1942; DNEAS, Group 2, Box 10, 3/21/E, Report on the First Propaganda Course, Lt R.E. Antel, 26 September 1942.
623 DNEAS, Group 2, Box 10, 3/21/E, Syllabus of Propaganda Course, 24 July 1942.
624 DNEAS, Group 2, Box 10, 3/21/E, Propaganda Course, Native Details, Stubbs to OCs of NMC Units, 21 August 1942; DNEAS, Group 2, Box 10, 3/21/E, Report on the First Propaganda Course, Lt R.E. Antel, 26 September 1942.
625 See NMC, Box 12, NAS 3/21, Propaganda and Press Matters (Film Matters and Pamphlets), DNEAS to UDF Deputy Chief of Staff, 29 May 1942.
626 DNEAS, Group 2, Box 10, 3/21/K, Newspapers for Native Military Corps, DNEAS to OCs of NMC Units, 4 November 1942; DNEAS, Group 2, Box 10, 3/21/K, Bantu Soldiers’ Newspaper: “Ndlovu-Tlou”, DNEAS to DCS, 4 January 1943; HEN, Box 2190, 432/1/12, Weekly Newsletter, Bureau of Information, 19 March 1944. The nine black languages were Xhosa, Sotho, Setswana, Sepedi, Xitsonga, Tshivenda and Zulu for the Union, Herero and Ovambo for SWA.
627 See NMC, Box 12, NAS 3/21, Memorandum on Native Recruiting and Posters, by 2nd Lieutenant J.B. Bruce to DNEAS, Lt Col E.T. Stubbs, n.d.
which was accused of failing to do anything about the publicity data that was previously furnished.628

CONCLUSION

Although South Africa was geographically removed from the main theatre of military operations, the multiple security, publicity and propaganda measures reflected the impact of the war conditions, especially given the country’s political fractures and societal divisions on the basis of race, class and also gender. The activities of the extra-parliamentary movements, subversive operations, sabotage, and declining morale among the Union troops as well as the prevalence of the social and economic tensions, required the authorities to adopt various measures to maintain control and authority. Censorship, publicity and propaganda systems therefore, served to facilitate the containment of the anti-war resistance as well as to inspire public confidence in the government, to sustain morale and to effectively execute the war policy.

Despite the persistent inter-agency rivalries, turf wars and the overlapping functions, the authorities did not impose a single regulatory framework for state publicity. It was a more convenient strategy. It could be argued that, in the context of the prevailing political conditions, the co-existence of the multiple publicity agencies was necessitated by political expediency and the need to maintain flexibility in order to have more scope for publicity manoeuvres. In addition, the multiple audiences who had competing perspectives and aspirations about the war, required the government and military officials to constantly adapt their various publicity and propaganda programmes to sustain public support for the war policy. This point will be illustrated in the next chapters whereby the content and context of the government’s propaganda mechanisms for shaping public opinion in relation to the war policy will be examined.

---

Fig. 3: Smuts’s War Cabinet, *Cape Times*, 7 Sep 1939

Illustration 5: Directorate Military Intelligence Structure, 1943, Military Archives, AG (W), vol. 4

Illustration 6: Non-European Army Services Organisation, 1940, Military Archives, UWH, vol. 90
Illustration 7: Bureau of Information: Propaganda Channels, Military Archives, PP, vol. 63

Illustration 8: Bureau of Information Personalities, *The Nongai*, Jun 1942
CHAPTER 3

HOME-FRONT PROPAGANDA: RADIO AND THE PRESS

As indicated in the previous sections, the Union had no defence plan to swiftly put a well-trained and well-equipped military force on the ground. Thus, the question of attracting and mobilising sufficient volunteers for military service arose in the DOD. In the estimation of the military authorities, manpower requirements to fill the ranks of the UDF, particularly white males of effective military age of 18 and 44, would be drawn from 452,369, and those between 45 and 60 years from 160,604. From the key age category of 18-44, where the majority of recruits would be needed, about half (meaning approximately 225,000) would not be available due to factors such as medical unfitness or employment in key industries. Furthermore, the adjutant general explained to the CGS that from the remaining half (of 18-44 age category), approximately 112,000 would actually volunteer, falling below the estimated establishment of 143,000 (139,000 for the field force and 3,900 for home defence). There was an immediate shortfall of over 30,500. These figures were derived from the census of May 1936 and allowance was made for deaths from 1936 - 1939, and the possible unavailability of other personnel such as the police, prison services personnel, university students, civil servants, mining and personnel in crucial positions.

The potential military labour from blacks was estimated at 2 million out of the available 7 million, and 200,000 out of the 600,000 so-called coloureds. This figure was an exaggeration by DNEAS at the time, when there were fears that Italians would deploy their 160,000 black troops against whites during their campaign in Abyssinia (now Ethiopia) when

---

629 UWH, Box 88, MS 22, Organisation of UDF for War, CGS to Chairman of Defence Advisory Committee and Chairman of Defence Authorities Committee, 2 October 1940; Further manpower estimation, see CGS, Group 2, Box 93, 169/7, Fortnightly Intelligence Report, 25 January 1941; UWH, Box 239, Economic Consequences for South Africa of a Nazi Victory, by DMI (Ic), 14 October 1941, pp. 1-8; PP, Box 57, EC 38/I, Economic Warfare Intelligence Summary, n.d.
630 UWH, Box 88, MS 22, CGS to Chairman of Defence Advisory Committee and Chairman of Defence Authorities Committee, 2 October 1940.
631 UWH, Box 88, MS 22, CGS to Chairman of Defence Advisory Committee and Chairman of Defence Authorities Committee, 2 October 1940; CGS, Group 2, Box 93, 169/7, Fortnightly Intelligence Report, 25 January 1941; UWH, Box 239, Economic Consequences for South Africa of a Nazi Victory, by DMI (Ic), 14 October 1941, pp. 1-8; PP, Box 57, EC 38/I, Economic Warfare Intelligence Summary, n.d.
632 UWH, Box 90, MS 50, Military Employment of Natives, Stubbs to Collyer, 11 June 1940.
hostilities started. 633 However, a modest assessment of about 1 600 000 blacks between 18-45 years was more in line with the census of May 1936. 634 It was ultimately determined that out of the available manpower, over 1 million blacks were already employed in agriculture and mining and these were not to be considered. About 600 000 blacks, therefore, could be recruited for military labour. 635 Nonetheless, the mobilisation of both whites and non-whites would become a real challenge. Factors such as the anti-war resistance, opposition propaganda, racial policies as well as military service conditions would impact on enlistment. The authorities were aware that manpower recruitment would be very slow and required intensified efforts to stimulate public interest in the war and to secure support on the home-front. Therefore, from the outset, a massive publicity and propaganda campaign was imperative. In the context of the prevailing circumstances, the following broad objectives needed attention: fostering a militant and patriotic spirit in the society, facilitating recruitment for military service and war production, countering subversive propaganda as well as preserving public and troop morale. Agencies such as the BOI, DMI (Ic), SABC, UUTS, newspaper editors and the private advertising companies played a significant role to ensure the realisation of those objectives.

This chapter examines the platforms and methods exploited by Union authorities to implement propaganda programmes to the public (civilians on the home-front). At the same time, it will also analyse the content of propaganda messages in relation to the objectives of the government, especially given the diversity of the South African public and their wide-ranging aspirations and expectations. For the purpose of effective analysis, this chapter on home-front propaganda will focus on two major platforms, radio and the press, which were the first to be considered by the Union authorities for delivering propaganda messages. 636 It should also be noted that the same platforms were employed for military propaganda (that is propaganda towards the UDF troops). Personal appeals conducted via the radio or at public

---

633 UWH, Box 90, MS 50, Military Employment of Natives, Stubbs to Collyer, 11 June 1940; Martin and Orpen, *South Africa at War*, vol. 7, p. 74.
634 CGS, Group 2, Box 93, 169/7, Fortnightly Intelligence Report, 25 January 1941; UWH, Box 239, Economic Consequences for South Africa of a Nazi Victory, by DMI (Ic), 14 October 1941, pp. 1-8; PP, Box 57, EC 38/I, Economic Warfare Intelligence Summary, n.d.
635 UWH, Box 88, MS 22, CGS to Chairman of Defence Advisory Committee and Chairman of Defence Authorities Committee, 2 October 1940; CGS, Group 2, Box 93, 169/7, Fortnightly Intelligence Report, 25 January 1941; UWH, Box 239, Economic Consequences for South Africa of a Nazi Victory, by DMI (Ic), 14 October 1941, pp. 1-8; PP, Box 57, EC 38/I, Economic Warfare Intelligence Summary, n.d.; AG (3), Box 342, 154/203/3, Stubbs to Adjutant General, 22 February 1941.
636 Lawrence Papers, BC640, E3.2, Matters Discussed with Smuts, 18 September 1939; Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 144, Memorandum on the Bureau of Information: Present Activities, 23 August 1940.
gatherings, and the value thereof, will also be analysed in this chapter. The next chapter will then examine the role and significance of films, newsreels and military displays, in the broader government propaganda scheme to mobilise public support. The rationale for this division is to focus attention and for deeper analysis in terms of structure, method and content of propaganda programmes in relation to the goals set out by the Union authorities and the reception of the targeted audience. For the same reasons, subsequent chapters dealing with the internal propaganda in the UDF will also be analysed in the same context. Of immediate concern though, is to briefly review the main institutional structures and their basic roles in the coordination and implementation of the Union government’s propaganda initiatives, both for civilians on the home-front and for the UDF troops in the field.

PROPAGANDA INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES

As indicated in the previous chapter, the main agencies for facilitating the delivery of the Union’s propaganda programmes were the BOI, DMI (Ic), SABC, and UUTS, as well as the newspaper editors and the private advertising companies, which played a significant role to ensure the realisation the government’s policy objectives. The BOI was the main agency for government publicity and propaganda, with the object of popularising government policy and the Union’s war effort at home and in some neutral countries. Through its broadcast section, it coordinated efforts in conjunction with the DMI (Ic) and the SABC, for broadcasting war news and film production. Its press section dealt with newspapers regarding war news, advertisement and publicity of military activities.637

The UUTS was a semi-official agency and explained its role more explicitly: to conduct aggressive and militant nation-wide propaganda in support of Smuts and the national government’s war policy, and to combat the ‘lying propaganda’ of the anti-war factions.638 The SABC had already committed itself toward supporting the government’s war policy and, it allocated time slots for government officials and departments.639 The DMI (Ic)


638  Robertson Papers, A 2012, B20.2, Minutes of the Propaganda Advisory Committee of the Union Unity Truth Service, 14 October 1940; UUTS, A 1883, 1, Constitution of the Truth Legion; See also the Suggested Scheme of Organisation for Propaganda to be Known as “Union Unity Truth Service”, October 1939.

639  SABC, Annual Report, War Policy, 1939.
devoted attention to recruitment drives and for sustaining the morale of the UDF troops. The
defence authorities also preferred to exploit newspapers to publicise special military activities
of local interest without going through the channel of the BOI. As indicated previously,
this caused constant friction between the DMI (Ic) and the BOI. As the main liaison between
the DOD and the press, the BOI arranged permits for newspapers, enabling them to gain
access to military units. Occasional inter-agency frictions and criticisms often took place;
however, there was no permanent damage to relations as co-operation continued on many
levels throughout the war. Mobilising propaganda effort was imperative and these agencies
tolerated each other in an endeavour to promote the government’s war policy.

RADIO BROADCAST AND PERSONAL APPEALS

As a matter of urgency, the Union’s government officials considered it crucial to exploit
radio to counter the damage caused by Zeesen broadcast to South Africa. Radio was a novelty
which the Germans have been using throughout the interwar years as the main instrument of
penetration to foreign countries to promote Nazism. Britain exploited their main radio
station, the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), to broadcast in forty-seven different
languages to wage what they called ‘political warfare’ in various countries. In South
Africa, the authorities had realised the significance of radio to advance the government
publicity and propaganda campaigns. The BOI had liaised with the SABC to allocate time for
the government and military officials to make direct appeals to the public, indicating to them
the threats that were posed by Germany against the values of freedom and democracy.

640 PP, Box 63, PU 6/9/4, Report of Meeting of Newspaper Editors Consultative Committee, 23 October
1940; PP, Box 63, PU 6/9/5, Report on the Relationship between the Bureau of Information and the
UDF, 13 January 1941; CGS (War), Box 197, 42/4, Report on the Control of Military Information
issues to the Public through the Press, Newsreels, Broadcast, etc, DDMI’s Reply to Controller of
Censorship, 16 April 1942; Adjutant General (War), Box 4, 168/2/2/2, Reorganisation of Director of
Military Operations and Intelligence, 13 July 1943; Malherbe Papers, File 144, KCM, 56949 (110),
Propaganda Duties Carried out by Capt (Mrs) Malherbe of DMI (Ic), 30 September 1942.
641 PP, Box 63, PU 6/9/4, Report of Meeting of Newspaper Editors Consultative Committee, 23 October
1940.
642 UWH, Box 281, B.I. 31, Nazi Propaganda in the Union, n.d; UWH, Box 279, B.I. 30, Memorandum
Relating to the Nazi Activities in the Union of South Africa, October 1939; Marx, ‘Deal Listeners in
South Africa’, pp. 148-172; Furlong, Between Crown and Swastika, pp. 134-135; Jowett and
O'Donnell, Propaganda and Persuasion, p. 241; G. Wright, The Ordeal of Total War, 1939-1945
643 CGS (W), Box 197, 42/1, Radio in Relation to Military Propaganda, Werdmuller to Wakefield, 21
April 1944; See also Wright, The Ordeal of Total War, p. 65; Jowett and O'Donnell, Propaganda and
644 Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 299, Generals Smuts’s Appeals to the Public for Funds for Propaganda, 28
September 1939; CGS, Group 2, Box 93, 169/7, Fortnightly Intelligence Report, 25 January 1941;
The SABC had organised its radio transmissions into “A”, for English programmes and “B” for Afrikaans programmes. The broadcast messages were designed to arouse emotions and to break down the attraction to Nazi ideals disseminated through Zeesen broadcast and Nazi agents. For blacks, through the advice of the voluntary and short-lived Bantu News Service Committee (BNSC), the NAD arranged for the daily broadcast of “authentic” war news by means of telephone lines connected to loudspeakers. The NAD co-operated with the department of post and telegraph, and the SABC for the broadcast of this news service. The areas covered by the broadcast were mainly urban centres of Johannesburg, Cape Town, Durban and Pietermaritzburg. (See details below)

Radio was exploited as a powerful means for the public to hear senior government officials and military officers in the country making earnest appeals for military service. Government officials also made speeches at public gatherings and those speeches were recorded for radio broadcasting. In addition, the newspapers, too, covered such meetings and reproduced the speeches in their publications, either for comments or, in the case of the opposition, mostly for criticism. Smuts was often requested to make personalised messages

---

646 NTS, Box 9653, 520/400/9, Broadcast to Natives (War News), Meeting of Provisional Committee in Regard to News Service and Enemy Propaganda held in the Office of the Chief Native Commissioner, Witwatersrand, 11 June 1940. The Bantu News Service Committee (BNSC) voluntarily constituted itself as a committee to deal with the news services and counter-propaganda among blacks, mainly in the Witwatersrand area. It was chaired by the Witwatersrand Chief Native Commissioner, Major H.S. Cooke, assisted by Graham Ballenden, director of the municipal native affairs department, H.N. Wellbeloved from the chamber of mines, Audrey Richards from the University of the Witwatersrand’s department of Bantu Studies, as well as the newspaper men, George Heard and B.G. Paver. See also NASAP, Archives of Native Commissioner Johannesburg (KJB), Box 496, N9/13/3, Minutes of the Meeting of the Bantu News Service Committee held at the Office of the Director of Native Labour, 11 July 1940.
647 NTS, Box 9653, 520/400/9, Broadcast to Natives (War News), Meeting of Provisional Committee in Regard to News Service and Enemy Propaganda, 11 June 1940; See also NTS, Box 9629, vol. 2, 511/400, Report of the Conference on Enemy Propaganda in Office of the Director of Native Labour, 5 June 1940; SABC, Annual Report, 1940, p. 8.
648 NTS, Box 9653, 520/400/9, Broadcasting of News to Natives, Senator E.H. Brookes to Senator C.F. Clarkson, 20 June 1940; NTS, Box 9653, 520/400/9, Broadcasting of News to Natives, D.L. Smit to E.H. Brookes, 24 June 1940; NTS, Box 9653, 520/400/9, Telephone Broadcasting to Natives, D.L. Smit to postmaster-general, 29 June 1940; National Archives of South Africa, Cape Town (NASAC), Archives of the Chief Commissioner Easter Cape (CCK), vol. 16, Propaganda and Publicity, D.L. Smit to R. Malcolmson, n.d; SABC, Annual Report, 1940, pp. 8-11.
649 See SABC, Annual Reports, 1939-1945.
650 Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 303/1, General Smuts’ Speech at Bloemfontein, 3 November 1939.
651 UWH, Box 265, B.I. 20, Intelligence Summaries, 10 November 1939; UWH, Box 265, B.I. 20, Intelligence Summaries, 17 November 1939; UWH, Box 276, B.I. 28, Opposition Statements Regarding the War Issue, 1940-1943.
to loyal movements and organisations in support of their various endeavours related to religion or the war effort. Some of the movements encouraged Smuts to continue and increase the “selling points” for the war in order to advance publicity for recruiting. Encouragement and goodwill messages in addition to addressing meetings played an important role in the sphere of personal approach. Thus, broadcasting and personal appeals were utilised in complementary manner for publicity and propaganda.

From 1940 to early 1941, through the BOI, government officials addressed specific subjects related to their respective departments. Also, prominent individuals loyal to the government were invited to give talks regarding South Africa’s reason for participating in the war from the perspectives of their fields of expertise. Another approach was for government officials, after being briefed through the press summaries supplied by the BOI, to prepare statements to refute or clarify press statements relating to their departments as background to the news for radio broadcast. Wilson, the BOI’s director, was also responsible for refuting the claims made by Zeesen’s nightly broadcast. The purpose was to combat and discredit Zeesen propaganda. This approach was abandoned in late 1940, when prominent citizens were used to explain government policy, and the time slot in the SABC was changed to from 7:15 pm to 7:45 pm. The BOI, in co-operation with the SABC, facilitated the broadcast for counter-propaganda and for the mobilisation of the society for the war.

From the beginning of the war and through most of 1940, the government was mostly on the defensive. Wilson was expected to put out broadcast every evening, refuting the Zeesen statements and providing “accurate” information about the government policy. The SABC

655 Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 144, Memorandum on the Bureau of Information: Present Activities, 23 August 1940; UWH, Box 91, MS 71, Radio Broadcasting, Wilson to Collyer, 11 January 1941; UWH, Box 91, MS 71, Radio Broadcasting, Beukes to Collyer, 30 April 1941; PP, Box 63, PU 6/16, Reorganisation of Bureau of Information, 14 July 1941.
656 Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 132, Memorandum for Cabinet Sub-Committee on Publicity, 8 November 1939; Lawrence Papers, BC640, E3.4, Notes of the Second Meeting of Cabinet Committee on
also recorded Zeesen transmissions and supplied the BOI with transcripts. These transcripts were then examined to expose misleading aspects of the Zeesen transmissions. The BOI, then, obtained statements from the government or military authorities, also quoted sources from Allied and neutral territories, and produced counter-propaganda information for radio broadcast to ridicule and discredit Zeesen information. In some cases, Zeesen made claims that the Germans were receiving secret information from South Africa. The BOI, after examining the transcripts from the SABC, would liaise with the military and naval authorities to disprove those claims. Statements from the official broadcast, including those inaccuracies from Zeesen transmissions were reproduced in the newspapers to benefit those who might have missed or misunderstood the broadcast messages.

Through the SABC radio broadcast, Wilson regularly emphasised to the public how South Africa avoided the Nazi danger through the government’s adoption of the war policy and by associating with the Commonwealth of Nations. Fear appeals were employed for justifying the Union government’s decision. For instance, there were broadcast about the widespread Nazi plot to sabotage South Africa’s vital industrial organisation and the influence these had on the “shirt” movements which advocated revolution against the state. To the loyalists, it was stated that government had in its possession a list of members of the Nazi organisations in the Union’s principal towns and cities. It implied that the government was aware of the Nazi threat and was taking steps to contain the damaging effects to public morale. The broadcast of this nature continued every night until the reorganisation of the BOI in

---

657 UWH, Box 239, B.I. 1, Extracts of Zeesen Broadcast, 9-10 October and 6-10 November 1939; ZB, WR 65/9/41-WR 65/9/43, Broadcast from Enemy Radio Station, 1941-1945; PP, vols. 1-31, Zeesen Broadcast, 1940-1945.

658 The Zeesen Extracts were highlighted in red markings at sections that were relevant to South Africa, see ZB, WR 65/9/41-WR 65/9/43, Broadcast from Enemy Radio Station, 1941-1945; PP, vols. 1-31, Zeesen Broadcast, 1940-1945. See chapters 1 and 2 of this study for details.


660 UWH, Box 265, B.I. 20, Intelligence Summaries, 10 November 1939.

661 UWH, Box 265, B.I. 20, Intelligence Summaries, 10 November 1939.

662 UWH, Box 265, B.I. 20, Intelligence Summaries, 10 November 1939; UWH, Box 265, B.I. 20, Intelligence Summaries, 17 November 1939. Von Strahl produced numerous reports of the Nazi activities in South Africa, however, the information was known to the interior minister, Lawrence, who was responsible for internal security, and a list of dangerous people in the country was not revealed to the public. Lawrence Papers, BC640, E3, 266, Memorandum on Dangerous Nazis, 4 March 1942; See also Lawrence Papers, BC640, E5.44.1, Official White Book on Nazi and Nazi Propaganda in South Africa, vols. 2-5, September 1939.
December 1940, where the focus shifted to positive propaganda\textsuperscript{663}, thus taking the initiative from Zeesen and proactively promoting the cause of the government. Zeesen announcers continued with disparaging remarks, attacking every issue to support government opponents throughout the war.\textsuperscript{664}

As a result of the recommendations of the National Advisory Committee on Government Publicity in 1940, the BOI’s broadcasting activities were reorganised. The BOI’s staff was expanded and new roles were allocated. P. Beukes and M. Uys Krige dedicated their efforts to the Afrikaans programmes and worked with D. Dornell, as director of broadcasting and Captain N. Sutherland, a radio liaison attached to the director-general war supplies (for publicity on industrial capacity for war production).\textsuperscript{665} As discussed above, prominent individuals and experts were brought on board to address specific topics to the public.\textsuperscript{666} The subjects addressed in those broadcast included military achievements, economic power of Allied countries including South Africa, the conditions in Germany and the Axis powers as well as the resistance in the territories occupied by Germany.\textsuperscript{667} These arrangements were carried out throughout the war and were designed to inspire the public, and to preserve their morale.

Smuts also made urgent appeals to the South African public through radio broadcast and personally addressed meetings. In a message to ‘fellow South Africans’ in September 1939, he explained the nature of the threat South Africa was confronted with:

\begin{quote}
\emph{In this war Britain fights a life and death struggle against the domination of the world by force, against the Nazi policy of demands on other nations accompanied by threats of force. This policy threatens the liberty and independence of all small nations, South Africa included}
\end{quote}

\begin{flushright}
663 PP, Box 63, PU 6/3, Bureau of Information, Hand Written note, DMO and I to DMI (Ic), 23 December 1943.
664 UWH, Box 239, B.I. 1, Extracts of Zeesen Broadcast, 9-10 October and 6-10 November 1939; ZB, WR 65/9/41-WR 65/9/43, Broadcast from Enemy Radio Station, 1941-1945; SANDFA, PP, vols. 1-31, Zeesen Broadcast, 1940-1945.
665 Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 144, Memorandum on the Bureau of Information: Present Activities, 23 August 1940; UWH, Box 91, MS 71, Radio Broadcasting, Wilson to Collyer, 11 January 1941; UWH, Box 91, MS 71, Radio Broadcasting, Beukes to Collyer, 30 April 1941; PP, Box 63, PU 6/16, Reorganisation of Bureau of Information, 14 July 1941.
666 UWH, Box 91, MS 71, Radio Broadcasting, Wilson to Collyer, 11 January 1941; PP, Box 63, PU 6/16, Reorganisation of Bureau of Information, 14 July 1941.
667 UWH, Box 91, MS 71, Radio Broadcasting, Wilson to Collyer, 11 January 1941.
\end{flushright}
... our people have taken their place besides Britain and France in the ranks of those who resist the rule of force.668

While on the other side, Smuts remarked about the impact of Zeesen propaganda and the need to marshal military and non-military resources to counter its negative influences:

*But our countrymen think otherwise ... opportunity is being taken to revive and accentuate the racial antagonisms of the past. And we are being subjected to an incessant deadly propaganda from abroad. These opinions and influences must be dealt with by forces of another kind ... and will fight mischievous misrepresentation 'propaganda', and the sowing of discontent and hatred inside our country.*669

Smuts, thus, appealed for united effort in a struggle against the Nazi threat and for counter-propaganda:

*Our young men will be rolling up in their thousands to form the forces which will compose our army of defence ... they will make their contribution for the rule of right and freedom and justice here and in the world ... In this struggle on the home front active measures will need to be taken to collect and disseminate truthful information and to keep the public continually and accurately informed and wisely guided ... a large fighting publicity fund will be necessary to finance a nation-wide campaign for the above objects, to support the Government in giving full effect to the policy approved by the Parliament, to deal with propaganda from abroad and misrepresentation at home, by clear statement of truth, to prevent the real issue before the country from being clouded by racial animosities and to promote mutual understanding between all sections of our people.*670

The central theme in this message was “unity” of effort against the threat to the ideals of freedom, independence and justice posed by German activities. It was a message directed at the anti-war resisters and objectors, elucidating that Nazi Germany was not going to promote the interests of South Africa, but was aggressively pursuing domination by force or the threat of force. The decision of the Union parliament to enter the war was a defensive effort ‘against

668 Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 299, General Smuts’s Appeals to the Public for Funds for Propaganda, 28 September 1939.
669 Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 299, General Smuts’s Appeals to the Public for Funds for Propaganda, 28 September 1939.
670 Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 299, Generals Smuts’s Appeals to the Public for Funds for Propaganda, 28 September 1939.
the rule of force’ represented by Nazi Germany and the fight for the preservation of the rights, freedoms and justice as represented by Britain. South Africa was thus participating in a ‘defensive war’ to protect her own interest. In October 1939, prominent government loyalists such as Sir James Rose-Innes, Brigadier General H.N.W. Botha, Colonel Sir W. Dalrymple and Sir Charles Smith, reproduced Smuts’s message in the Rand Daily Mail, and made an appeal for contributions to ‘buy security and happiness’ for the country and the children. The notion of victimhood and the safety of the country became common features of the national appeals. There was a promise of security against the feared threat of Nazism and thus, the population needed to make sacrifices.

In his first public meeting in Bloemfontein, Smuts again emphasised that South Africa was at the cross-roads where she had to choose “friends” for future relations in a “dangerous world”, particularly between the Commonwealth of Nations or Nazi Germany, and she chose the former as it guaranteed future democracy and freedom. He boldly stated:

*If Germany wins, then not only England but South Africa as well is lost. We will first become a Nazi country, and then our independence is lost.*

Smuts tied the success of Britain to the protection of South Africa’s freedom and independence. The central theme was that Britain represented the desired political and moral justice, as opposed to Nazi Germany which promoted tyranny and oppression. Thus, German victory should be feared because of the negative ramifications it would have for the South African nation. The speech was published in a booklet form by the UUTS. In the last page of that booklet, publishers added a picture of Smuts with the following message in bold words: ‘He is Saving South Africa. What are YOU Doing’. This was actually the main idea behind Smuts’s broadcast and speeches at the beginning of the war. He pointed out aspects of Nazi Germany’s “injustices”, from the invasion of Austria, Czechoslovakia, Sudetenland, and Poland, and besought the society to contribute towards a “national effort” to save the country from being the next victim. Nazi Germany was regarded as a force of destruction against

---

672 Smuts Papers, vol. A1, 303/1, General Smuts’s Speech at Bloemfontein, 3 November 1939. This speech was translated and published by T.C Robertson, Director of the Union Unity Truth Service.
673 Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 303/1, General Smuts’s Speech at Bloemfontein, 3 November 1939. This speech was translated and published by T.C Robertson, Director of the Union Unity Truth Service.
674 Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 303/1, General Smuts’s Speech at Bloemfontein, 3 November 1939.
675 Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 303/1, General Smuts’s Speech at Bloemfontein, 3 November 1939.
smaller and weaker nations. In contrast, Britain stood for justice and for protection of the weaker and powerless nations such as South Africa.

In a subsequent message in February 1940, Smuts lamented the existing internal divisions in South Africa as largely a result of Nazi propaganda and the effect it would have on the country’s capacity to resist:

*We are up against another very serious drawback and danger, and that is the systematic propaganda that is now being used as a weapon against the people of this country ... there has been an intense and systematic effort at undermining the people by propaganda in South Africa. That propaganda took different forms – sometimes opposition, to or even persecution of, this or that section of the community ... there has been this effort to demoralise public opinion, to debauch South Africa, to undermine it in way that has been most successful in other countries ... the day may come, with our powers of resistance so undermined and we are weakened internally, that all attempts at active defence on our part would be in vain.*

He followed-up this concern by calling for an end to anti-Semitism and advocated unity and co-operation between Afrikaans and English speakers. Through the unity campaign, he was striving for uniting the people and not to have ‘two nations in this country’, but a ‘South African nation’. The ‘nation’ referred to in this message was in terms of Afrikaans and English speakers and not the “non-whites”. In these messages, an appeal was made for “national unity” and the recognition that South Africa was fighting a righteous war – a “just war”. It was a patriotic call to defend the liberties, to reverse the influence of the anti-government propagandists and sympathisers so as to create space for the people to ‘enjoy security and continued political peace’. After the German invasion of Holland, Belgium and Luxembourg in mid-1940 (the smaller and weaker nations), fear appeals against Nazi Germany became dominant. Smuts pointed out that those events ‘have shattered all doubts’ and those nations were ‘like us [South Africa], fighting for their lives … for the right to be

---

677 Lawrence Papers, B 640, E3.7. Address by The General Rt. Hon. J.C. Smuts on the Union Unity Fund, 9 February 1940; See also M. Cardo, ‘Fighting a Worst Imperialism’: White South African Loyalism and the Army Education Services (AES) during the Second World War, *South African Historical Journal*, vol. 46, No.1, May 2002, pp. 141-174. Cardo explains that the notion of a “South African Nationhood” had more to do with the political and cultural cooperation between the English and Afrikaners in the context of a broad white national identity as opposed to the cultural and racial exclusivist Afrikaner nationalism which was growing rapidly during wartime under the influence of Nazism and fascist ideals.
free … for the common cause of civilisation against the forces of darkness and barbarity.’

The war was presented as a contest between good and evil, and that South Africa was fighting on the side of good against the evil enemies, Nazi Germany and her allies. Smuts also emphasised how the invaded countries, together with Poland, Norway and France, were caught unprepared due to the disorganisation that was caused by Nazi propaganda. A similar observation was made by a government supporter who warned that Germans used broadcasting to speed-up confusion and panic in Holland, Belgium and Norway, in order to invade successfully. Smuts, as a result, made a strong appeal for military service:

“To all able-bodied sons of South Africa, the call has come to make their stand in the line of resistance to the forces of tyranny and oppression, to fight in defence of all those liberties which we hold dearer than life itself, to fight and conquer. And to that call, the youth and manhood of South Africa is responding nobly … thousands are leaving security, ease and comfort, to face discomfort, hardship, wound and even death itself for the cause…”

The idea of war as a “defensive struggle” was reiterated to bring out a sense of victimhood against the “evil forces” of darkness which threatened the freedom enjoyed by the South African people. It was meant to stir public emotions and to project people’s anger against Nazi Germany. The call was about sacrifice, honour and duty to safeguard the liberties and heritage which were under attack by dangerous enemies. Either for work in the supply of war material and in essential services on the home-front, or for service in the frontlines, the fear appeals were employed consistently for people “to combat the danger”.

In one broadcast in June 1941, a staff officer of the directorate of the coast and anti-aircraft artillery in South Africa, made a strong appeal for men between 35 and 55 years to enlist in the coast artillery. As an old soldier who fought in the Great War and left the service in

679 Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 303/1, Speeches and Broadcast by J.C. Smuts, No. 120, November 1939-December 1941.
680 CGS (War), Box 197, 42/1, E.M. Brown to Smuts, 9 June 1940.
683 UWH, Box 274, B.I. 25, ‘Active Service with the Artillery in South Africa’, Broadcast by a General Staff Officer on the Staff of the Directorate of Coast and Anti-Aircraft Artillery, 5 June 1941.
peacetime, he explained that unlike before, it was not a war fought ‘at comfortable distances’ in the trenches, it was a ‘total war’. The staff officer gave a warning about Nazi Germans:

*Hitler had bred a generation of ruthless fanatical fighters – even the youngest of them trained to mow down with their Tommy guns every living thing – even women and children – even animals. Against such an enemy we’ve got to do our bit in some form or another or be snuffed out.*

It was a warning against complacency and an appeal for the relevant age groups to enlist for service ‘to ensure security’ or ‘die a slave’ to Hitler. Brigadier General H.D. Pienaar, officer commanding the 1st South African Brigade in North Africa, also made an appeal in a recorded broadcast from the Derna area in Libya, warning against Japan’s entry into the war and thus presenting a real threat to the Union’s security from the Indian Ocean. He stressed the need to bury petty political differences and to mount a collective effort to defend ‘the integrity and priceless liberty’ of the country. Employers were also urged to assist the government by granting allowances to dependents of men in military service.

In a morale-boosting effort, Pienaar remarked that he was not calling for help as the desert was ‘littered with the debris’ of what was once the mighty German army under General Erwin Rommel with his Afrika Korps. The claim was that, although Allied forces were winning, dangers were still lurking. The society was called upon to add more numbers of the able-bodied men to complete the success and to combat the new threat – Japan. Van Ryneveld and Smuts also consistently broadcast Christmas, New Year as well as congratulatory messages to the Union troops in the field and in the country, as well as to

---

684 UWH, Box 274, B.I. 25, ‘Active Service with the Artillery in South Africa’, Broadcast by a General Staff Officer on the Staff of the Directorate of Coast and Anti-Aircraft Artillery, 5 June 1941.
685 UWH, Box 274, B.I. 25, ‘Active Service with the Artillery in South Africa’, Broadcast by a General Staff Officer on the Staff of the Directorate of Coast and Anti-Aircraft Artillery, 5 June 1941.
686 UWH, Box 274, B.I. 25, ‘Active Service with the Artillery in South Africa’, Broadcast by a General Staff Officer on the Staff of the Directorate of Coast and Anti-Aircraft Artillery, 5 June 1941.
687 ‘Brig. Pienaar’s Call for Service’, Cape Times, 8 January 1942.
688 ‘Brig. Pienaar’s Call for Service’, Cape Times, 8 January 1942.
those in military hospitals. These messages were broadcast in both English and Afrikaans.

In May 1940, the South African Women’s Auxiliary Army Services (WAAS) was established. Due to the increasing need for manpower, Smuts made a strong appeal for women to support men in the war effort. The general theme of messages to women was about releasing men for the frontline, whilst taking over men’s tasks in the industries at home. Members of the WAAS were drawn from the pre-existing voluntary women’s organisation called the South African Women’s Auxiliary Service (SAWAS), which assisted the troops with a range of services such as providing refreshments, entertainment and hospitality. The SAWAS, operating under the DOD for better co-ordination of women’s war-related tasks, was headed by Mrs J.J. Pienaar as the principal commandant (until September 1940) and Mrs Edith O’Connor as her assistant.

With the increasing manpower requirements to assist the UDF, some members of the SAWAS became the first recruits of the WAAS and also assisted in further recruitment efforts for other services. Colonel Werdmuller, director of recruiting and Major (Mrs) A.H. Lugtenburg, officer commanding the WAAS, also personally addressed meetings to stimulate interest in the work of the WAAS to secure recruits for military service and war production. At the recruiting meeting in Pretoria, Lugtenburg expressed disappointment at some women for failing to heed the call and urged them to realise that their services would be

---

689 CGS (War), Box 199, VI, 42/5, Broadcast of Christmas and New Year to UDF by Van Ryneveld, 21 November 1941; CGS (War), Box 199, VI, 42/5, Broadcast Message by Field Marshall Smuts to all Officers and Men in Military Hospitals, 24 December 1941.
690 CGS (War), Box 199, VI, 42/5, Broadcast of Christmas and New Year to UDF by Van Ryneveld, 21 November 1941; CGS (War), Box 199, VI, 42/5, Broadcast Message by Field Marshall Smuts to all Officers and Men in Military Hospitals, 24 December 1941.
691 UWH, Box 261, B.I. 17, Women and the War, 6 July 1943.
692 See Martin and Orpen, South Africa at War, vol. 7, Chapter 5, Chronic Shortage of White Men, pp. 72-83.
694 UWH, Box 261, B.I. 17, Women and the War, 6 July 1943; SANDFA, UWH, Box 274, B.I. 25, ‘Active Service with the Artillery in South Africa’, Broadcast by a General Staff Officer on the Staff of the Directorate of Coast and Anti-Aircraft Artillery, 5 June 1941.
695 Martin and Orpen, South Africa at War, vol. 7, pp. 18, 54, 63. Other services included staffing canteens, arranging accommodation for troops on transit or leave or visiting, recruitment of women, and as drivers for convoys.
696 Martin and Orpen, South Africa at War, vol. 7, p. 63.
697 ‘Women Recruits’, The Star, 21 August 1940.
for duty to themselves and to their children. Recruiting rallies were held throughout the country and addressed by government officials such as Reitz and Smuts’s wife, S.M (Isie) Smuts, often referred to as Ouma Smuts. Isie Smuts was the head of the South African Gifts and Comforts Organisation, which was established in 1940 under the authority of Mrs J.J. Pienaar, until 29 July 1940. The Gifts and Comforts Organisation catered for the physical and mental well-being of servicemen by organising and supplying them with what was called “glory bags.” These bags contained an assortment of items such as toothpaste, toothbrush, pair of socks, handkerchief, pencil, writing paper and others. Isie Smuts attended women’s meetings and recruiting rallies to make personal appeals to women who could not enlist in the military, to join and support the Gifts and Comforts Organisation. During those rallies, women were encouraged to proudly engage in support roles in order to release men for military service in the North and to do their bit in other areas related to the war effort. Skills training and opportunities in the male-dominated industries were also emphasised for women to join up.

In one radio broadcast by Mrs P.M. Anderson in September 1941, commandant of Command 14 (one of the women’s units), it was indicated that the military demands for machinery and technical equipment created new opportunities for women to work in munitions and engineering areas, unlike previously where they worked in sweets, biscuits and soap works or as packers and checkers in warehouses. Through propaganda, government was creating an impression that the country was initiating social change to the existing norms pertaining to women. That change was through women’s participation in hitherto socially unacceptable roles. In the recruiting broadcast for the coast and anti-aircraft artillery, the directorate made this change explicit:

Artillery needs a number of women between the ages of 22 and 32, of good education (especially mathematics) for training ... we don’t want these women as clerks or drivers – we

---

699 ‘Women War Workers Rally’, Cape Argus, 26 March 1941.
700 Martin and Orpen, South Africa at War, vol. 7, p. 65.
701 See Martin and Orpen, South Africa at War, vol. 7, pp. 287-292; ‘Comforts for our Boys up North’, Cape Times, 25 March 1941.
704 UWH, Box 261, B.I. 17, Women and Industry, Broadcast Talk by P.M. Anderson, Commandant of Command 14, 17 September 1941.
want them as fighting men ... not actually serving the guns, but manipulating the intricate range-finders and other delicate instruments.\textsuperscript{705}

Chetty contends that as much as women were implored to participate in new activities in the military and industrial production, their roles were still perceived to be an extension of their domestic roles as caregivers and “supporters” of men who were on the frontlines.\textsuperscript{706} War had brought about an important social development for women, albeit largely for white and middle-class. However, as much as propaganda assisted in playing up these new activities, the changes were not revolutionary as they still perpetuated the pre-existing gender stereotypes in the perceptions of women in South Africa.\textsuperscript{707} Words such as “mothers”, “partners”, “wives”, “your husbands” or “your relatives”, which featured in many propaganda messages, served as examples of the gender perceptions about women.

Nonetheless, it could be stated that an important aspect of radio broadcast and recruitment meetings, was that female voices were added to encourage support. It was equally a useful propaganda tactic to have a male military officer stressing that women were not required to perform “lowly tasks”, for example, as drivers, but to be in the war front manipulating heavy weapons.\textsuperscript{708} Most importantly, women were urged to take up new opportunities offered by the military demands that may facilitate personal development for future employment in the male-dominated economic sectors.\textsuperscript{709} Inherent in war propaganda towards women was the message for them to prepare for the changed post-war social and economic environment in which they would be effective participants.\textsuperscript{710}

Radio increased in value, particularly to the white audience, due to war propaganda. This much was illustrated by the increase in the number of radio licences since the outbreak of the war. According to the SABC’s annual reports, the number of effective listeners’ licences had

\textsuperscript{705} UWH, Box 274, B.I. 25, ‘Active Service with the Artillery in South Africa’, Broadcast by a General Staff Officer on the Staff of the Directorate of Coast and Anti-Aircraft Artillery, 5 June 1941.
\textsuperscript{706} Chetty, ‘Gender Under Fire’, pp. 61-63.
\textsuperscript{707} Ibid., p. 63.
\textsuperscript{708} UWH, Box 274, B.I. 25, ‘Active Service with the Artillery in South Africa’, Broadcast by a General Staff Officer on the Staff of the Directorate of Coast and Anti-Aircraft Artillery, 5 June 1941.
\textsuperscript{709} SUWH, Box 261, B.I. 17, Women and Industry, Broadcast Talk by P.M. Anderson, Commandant of Command 14, 17 September 1941; UKZN, Malherbe Papers, File 143/1, KCM 56992 (18), Opportunity Calls: Women of South Africa, Lt J. Malherbe, 7 November 1941.
\textsuperscript{710} UWH, Box 274, B.I. 25, ‘Active Service with the Artillery in South Africa’, Broadcast by a General Staff Officer on the Staff of the Directorate of Coast and Anti-Aircraft Artillery, 5 June 1941; Malherbe Papers, File 143/1, KCM 56992 (18), Opportunity Calls: Women of South Africa, Lt J. Malherbe, 7 November 1941.
increased from 212,914 in 1938 to 249,199 by 31 December 1939. The comparative statistics since 1936 showed a continuous increase, from 161,767 to 180,227 in 1937, and about 60,219 licences were issued in the eight months on 1939 alone.\footnote{711} By 1945, the number of effective radio licences stood at 365,244.\footnote{712} The SABC declared that the importance of broadcast service increased as a result of the war.\footnote{713} It also meant more revenue for the corporation.

From 1940 onwards, the SABC expanded its operations by establishing a mobile recording unit under a multi-lingual journalist, Bruce Anderson (also English commentator), assisted by Johan Lamprecht (engineer and Afrikaans commentator), Jimmy Chapman and Roland Sinclair, both engineers.\footnote{714} The aim was to enlarge reporting with direct actuality material. The mobile recording unit accompanied the UDF to East Africa, North Africa and to Europe. As the pace of the war increased, the SABC also increased its war-related programmes for the public, which also included messages between troops and relatives as well as entertainment items.\footnote{715} Thus, radio became a significant instrument which brought war to the homes of the South African public and also helped in the government’s recruitment efforts.

Due to technical deficiencies, the SABC’s recordings from East Africa, however, delayed for days before transmission to the Union. In 1941, after the mobile recording unit moved to Egypt, the South Africans could listen to recordings of events within hours as a result of the support of the BBC and the Egyptian State Broadcasting.\footnote{716} Technically, the situation remained largely the same until September 1944, when the South African corps of signals built a powerful transmitter to enable direct transmissions of the SABC to the Union.\footnote{717} It was a significant development since the SABC could then compete with the BBC effectively for the South African listenership. Through such efforts, the SABC expressed pride in being
able to bring the war closer to the South African public. However, that public was mainly the white audience. When the idea of providing radio broadcast services to blacks was considered in June 1940, it was for entirely different objectives.

From 8 July 1940, black South Africans were subjected to a torrent of propaganda through the introduction of radio broadcast to them in vernacular. But, the initial focus of government campaign was on combating subversive propaganda among black communities. Since war began, the NAD received numerous reports about the Nazi and the communist propaganda from the magistrates, police, military intelligence and from members of the public. The NAD instructed the magistrates and native commissioners to hold regular monthly meetings with chiefs, local headmen and communities to provide authentic and reliable news. A system of propaganda through radio broadcasting was regarded as a new improvement for informing a largely non-literate people. The rationale for providing news broadcast services to blacks was as follows:

> Enemy propaganda was causing Government great concern … recent events in other countries have shown that even supposedly loyal subjects may have pro-Nazi leanings. Malicious rumours spread rapidly through the Union … Statements such as “the Germans

---

721 NTS, Box 9629, vol. 2, 505/400 – 511/400, Subversive Propaganda among Natives, 1939 -1942; GG, Box 1572, 50/1629, Effects of German Propaganda on the Minds of Natives, A. Cele to the Governor General, 7 November 1939; NTS, Box 9629, vol. 2, 511/400, Native Subversive Propaganda, DDMI to Secretary for Native Affairs, 24 July 1940; UWH, Box 265, B.I. 20, Propaganda among Natives, Intelligence Summaries, 1939-1942.
722 UWH, Box 265, B.I. 20, Intelligence Summaries, 10 November 1939; NTS, Box 9629, vol. 2, 511/400, Report of the Conference on Enemy Propaganda, 5 June 1940; NASAC, Archives of the Magistrate Somerset West (1/SSW), Box 88, N1/9/2, Native Unrest and Propaganda, Agitations and Troublesome Persons, Native Affairs Commissioner to all Magistrates in the Cape Province, 4 June 1940.
723 NTS, 9653, 520/400/9, Memorandum on Preliminary Inquiry into Reception of Government War News Service, 16-27 July 1940, by A.I. Richards, 17 August 1940; NTS, 9653, 520/400/9, Broadcasting to Natives, by M. Janisch, Research and Welfare Officer, Native Affairs Department, 4 September 1940; NTS, 9653, 520/400/9, War News for Natives, Smit to Richards, 27 September 1940.
will win the war”, “You will have an easier time after the war under German rule” were being freely preached among Natives.\footnote{KJB, Box 496, N9/13/3, Report of the Conference on Enemy Propaganda, 5 June 1940; See also NTS, Box 9653, 520/400/9, Communist Literature, ‘Freedom is Being Murdered’, pamphlet attached to letters regarding communist influence among blacks, to D.L. Smit, by an official in the NAD, 13 June 1940.}

Part of the concern was that the influence was also instigated by the communists to facilitate black agitation against the government.\footnote{KJB, Box 496, N9/13/3, Report of the Conference on Enemy Propaganda, 5 June 1940. At the time, the Communist Party of South Africa was still opposed to the war, until 1941 when Germany invaded Russia.} The acting Chief Native Commissioner of Witwatersrand, E.A. Kernick, made the following recommendation:

\begin{quote}
In order to combat enemy and other subversive propaganda among Natives and generally to prevent unrest among them during the war, the Government is considering a plan to link up every location, compound, mine compound, hostel and other centre where large numbers of Natives congregate at the Reef, by means of landlines, and to broadcast authentic news and propaganda daily by telephone and loudspeakers at an appropriate hour from the central broadcast station in Johannesburg.\footnote{KJB, Box 496, N9/13/3, Subversive Propaganda among Natives, E.A. Kernick to Smit, 15 June 1940; See also announcements about the proposed scheme by newspapers, ‘Broadcast for Natives’, The Star, 24 June 1940; ‘Broadcast for Native Compounds’, Rand Daily Mail, 24 June 1940.}
\end{quote}

Thus, the SABC co-ordinated efforts with the post office officials to connect loudspeakers to central receivers in order to transmit radio programmes into public spaces.\footnote{NTS, 9653, 520/400/9, Broadcasting of News to Natives, Lowe to Smit, 5 July 1940; NTS, Box 9629, vol. 2, 511/400, Report of the Conference on Enemy Propaganda, 5 June 1940; CCK, vol. 16, N1/5/5, Telephone Broadcasting to Natives, D.L. Smit to R.M. Craig, Cape Province, 20 August 1940.} The reason for the broadcast via the landlines was given by NAD’s D.L. Smit as follows:

\begin{quote}
The Government was unfavourable to the system of wireless broadcasting generally. There was always the danger that the enemy could radiate on the same wave-length and defeat our object. The Government felt that the Natives at their homes were not unduly disturbed over the war and were carrying on very quietly.\footnote{NTS, 9653, 520/400/9, Notes of (Emergency) Meeting on Enemy Propaganda etc. Held at the Office of the Director of Native Labour, Johannesburg, 27 June 1940.}
\end{quote}

Major Caprara, director of the SABC, also indicated that ‘it would not be possible to have a special wave-length for broadcasting to natives’.\footnote{NTS, 9653, 520/400/9, Notes of (Emergency) Meeting on Enemy Propaganda, 27 June 1940.} Hence consideration was given to provide
broadcasting service by means of telephones, as an experiment in the Witwatersrand. However, the NAD considered it imperative that the news service should be extended to other major cities in the Union. The NAD, in Pretoria, prepared about two-pages of news bulletins supplied free of charge by SAPA, then telephoned to Johannesburg, and telegraphed to the various centres for broadcasting. The date of the transmission was fixed for Sunday evening, 7 July 1940, between seven and eight o’clock.

The telephone broadcast service was inaugurated by Reitz, in order for the black audience to ‘hear his living voice’ and for the interpreters to ‘convey what he says’. The actual relaying of the news commenced on Monday, 8 July 1940, and it was reported to have been successful, except that ‘a great many points of diffusion had not been adequately equipped’. J.M. Brink, Chief Native Commissioner of Johannesburg, reported that only sixty-eight points of the original envisaged 150 points have been ‘connected up and were running’, that ‘interpretation and speaking were very satisfactory, reception in most cases had been good’. However, there were some problems. There was a delay in receiving approved news from Pretoria, shortage of equipment and about half of the available equipment were not serviceable. As a result, it was suggested to ‘commandeer all Public Address Systems in the Union and to interdict the selling of any such equipment without authority’. It was resolved to secure the services of the directorate of war supplies for assistance in obtaining the required equipment.

730 NTS, Box 9653, 520/400/9, Broadcasting of News to Natives, D.L. Smit to Senator E.H. Brookes, 24 June 1940; NTS, 9653, 520/400/9, Notes of (Emergency) Meeting on Enemy Propaganda, 27 June 1940; NTS, Box 9653, 520/400/9, Telephone Broadcasting to Natives, D.L. Smit to postmaster-general, 29 June 1940.
731 NTS, 9653, 520/400/9, Notes of (Emergency) Meeting on Enemy Propaganda, 27 June 1940.
732 NTS, Box 9653, 520/400/9, Broadcasting of News to Natives, D.L. Smit to Senator E.H. Brookes, 24 June 1940; NTS, 9653, 520/400/9, Notes of (Emergency) Meeting on Enemy Propaganda, 27 June 1940; NTS, 9653, 520/400/9, Telephone Broadcasting to Natives, Smit to H.C. Lugg, Chief Native Commissioner, Pietermaritzburg, 29 July 1940.
733 NTS, Box 9653, 520/400/9, Dissemination of War News, Magistrate of Frankfort, OFS to Secretary for Native Affairs, 4 July 1940; NTS, Box 9653, 520/400/9, Address of Colonel the Honourable Deneys Reitz, M.P., Minister of Native Affairs for Union of South Africa, Delivered in Pretoria/Johannesburg in 1940, 7 July 1940.
734 KJB, Box 496, N9/13/3, Minutes of the Meeting of the Bantu News Service Committee held at the Office of the Director of Native Labour, 11 July 1940.
735 KJB, Box 496, N9/13/3, Minutes of the Meeting of the Bantu News Service Committee, 11 July 1940.
736 KJB, Box 496, N9/13/3, Minutes of the Meeting of the Bantu News Service Committee, 11 July 1940; See also NTS, Box 9653, 520/400/9, Broadcasting of News to Natives, Smit to H.J. van der Bijl, 23 July 1940; NTS, Box 9653, 520/400/9, Notice, Government Native Broadcasting Scheme, Public Address System and Components Thereof, 23 July 1940.
From the government’s side, the official in charge of the programmes and the news was Carl Faye, the linguist and broadcast officer in the NAD.\textsuperscript{737} Initially, Bennet Ngwabeni (replaced by Charles Matlapora (Matloporo) in other records - from January 1941), regarded as a ‘well-educated and competent linguist’, was appointed on 8 July 1940 as a part-time interpreter to translate the broadcast material to isiXhosa and Sesotho languages.\textsuperscript{738} The actual ‘speaker of the broadcast’ was Walter Mangcipu, a court interpreter in the office of the native commissioner in Johannesburg, whose ‘voice, diction and elocution’ had been tested and found to be suitable for radio announcements.\textsuperscript{739} Other black announcers such as Charles Mpanza\textsuperscript{740} and Edward Masinga\textsuperscript{741} (both for Natal-Zululand), Thomas Nkosinkulu\textsuperscript{742} (Xhosa in Cape Province) and later Andrew Moyake (Xhosa)\textsuperscript{743}, were all employed to deliver the daily broadcast in the predominant black languages spoken in the country – isiZulu, isiXhosa Sesotho and Setswana (Charles Matlapora and Sam Moloyane).\textsuperscript{744}

Though the purpose of using black interpreters was to make the information understandable to the audience\textsuperscript{745}, it was yet another propaganda ploy to influence blacks to identify with the war, and to eliminate any resistance that might develop as a result of using an English or Afrikaans announcer. To ensure that the listeners were there to hear the broadcast, the authorities issued instructions to the employers, compound managers and superintendents to facilitate the congregation of blacks at the diffusion points from 7:00 pm to 7:30 pm each

\textsuperscript{737} NTS, Box 9653, 520/400/9, Dissemination of News to Natives, Lugg to Smit, 12 July 1940.
\textsuperscript{738} NTS, Box 9653, 520/400/9, News Broadcast to Natives, J.M. Brink to E.W. Lowe, 9 July 1940; For broadcasters see also NTS, Box 9655, 520/400/ 13, National Broadcast for Natives (From Studios of the SABC), 29 September 1942.
\textsuperscript{739} NTS, Box 9653, 520/400/9, News Broadcast to Natives, Brink to Lowe, 9 July 1940; NTS, Box 9653, 520/400/9, Native Interpreters: Broadcasting of News, Lowe to Smit, 10 July 1940.
\textsuperscript{740} NTS, Box 9653, 520/400/9, Dissemination of News Natives, Lugg to Smit, 12 July 1940; NTS, 9653, 520/400/9, Translation of a Broadcast Delivered by the Chief Native Commissioner, Natal, in Zulu by means of the Telephone and Loudspeakers to the Natives of Pietermaritzburg and Durban, 27 July 1940.
\textsuperscript{741} NTS, Box 9653, 520/400/9, Dissemination of News to Natives, Lugg to Smit, 12 July 1940; NTS, 9653, 520/400/9, Translation of a Broadcast Delivered by the Chief Native Commissioner, Natal, in Zulu by means of the Telephone and Loudspeakers to the Natives of Pietermaritzburg and Durban, 27 July 1940; See SABC, T73/200-201, Interview with K.E. Masinga, First Zulu Announcer of SABC, Durban Studios, 5 March 1975.
\textsuperscript{742} CCK, vol. 16, N1/5/5, Telephone Broadcasting to Natives, D.L. Smit to R.M. Craig, Cape Province, 20 August 1940.
\textsuperscript{743} CCK, vol. 16, N1/5/5, Broadcast to Natives, A.G. Walker, Native Commissioner, King Williamstown to E.F. Owen, Chief Native Commissioner, Eastern Cape, 29 April 1943.
\textsuperscript{744} See NTS, Box 9653, 520/400/9, Dissemination of News to Natives, Lugg to Smit, 12 July 1940; CCK, vol. 16, N1/5/5, Telephone Broadcasting to Natives, D.L. Smit to R.M. Craig, Cape Province, 20 August 1940; NTS, Box 9654, 520/400/9, War News Broadcast, Announcer, Sam Moloyane to Native Commissioner, Bloemfontein, 1 June 1944.
\textsuperscript{745} NTS, Box 9653, 520/400/9, News Broadcast to Natives, J.M. Brink to E.W. Lowe, 9 July 1940; NTS, Box 9653, 520/400/9, Native Interpreters: Broadcasting of News, Lowe to Smit, 10 July 1940.
evening (at that time including Saturdays and Sundays). The compound managers and
superintendents were also required to operate the telephone switches as per instructions of the
television department, as well as to amplify or clarify any point, and to reply to questions
emanating from the listeners. They also had to monitor and observe reactions of blacks to
the broadcast and to report accordingly.

At mine compounds around Johannesburg and at black locations in various urban centres,
daily war news, current events and recorded speeches were broadcast via telephone lines and
then loudspeakers. The initial content was mainly news bulletins which were translated
from English. The inaugural news were delivered by Reitz, who conveyed the message of
appreciation and the gave an overview of the purpose of the broadcast:

These announcements are issued to enable you to hear the news about the war. This news
service is a token of our goodwill towards you. It is meant to let you know what is happening
in the war which involves so many people in order that you may have news upon which you
can rely, and not led astray by other stories, namely, rumours ... a device of the Germans.
Beware of rumours and adhere to the news you hear through these broadcast.

The main focus of the government officials was to combat subversive propaganda among
blacks, especially to contain the spread of rumours. On 27 July 1940, the Chief Native
Commissioner of Pietermaritzburg, H.C. Lugg, used the telephone system to address the Zulu
audience in their language, and submitted the transcript to the Secretary for Native Affairs
(Smit), with pride in the manner in which his message was used ‘to strike at a cord which
would appeal to the emotions and instil the Natives with a little confidence’. He was
referring to his utilisation of the Zulu figure of speech and praise poetry (calling himself a

746 NTS, Box 9653, 520/400/9, Broadcasting of News to Natives, Lowe to Smit, 5 July 1940.
747 NTS, Box 9653, 520/400/9, Broadcasting of News to Natives, Lowe to Smit, 5 July 1940; NTS, Box
9653, 520/400/9, Government Native News Service: Instruction to Local Telephone Operators, n.d;
NTS, Box 9653, 520/400/9, List of Points Connected to the UP, n.d.
748 NTS, 9653, 520/400/9, Broadcasting of News to Natives, Smit to Van der Bijl, 23 July 1940; NTS,
9653, 520/400/9, Telephone Broadcasting to Natives, Smit to Native Commissioners, 3 August 1940;
Director of Native Labour, 5 June 1940; CCK, vol. 16, N1/5/5, Telephone Broadcasting to Natives,
D.L. Smit to R.M. Craig, Cape Province, 20 August 1940; ‘Natives Hear Radio News at 200 Posts’,
Rand Daily Mail, 9 July 1940; ‘News Service for Natives’, Picture, The Star, 9 July 1940; ‘Natives
Promised Golden Age, Insidious Campaign by Pro-Nazis’, Rand Daily Mail, 24 July 1940.
749 NTS, Box 9653, 520/400/9, Extracts, Address of Colonel the Honourable Denyes Reitz, M.P., Minister
of Native Affairs for Union of South Africa, Delivered in Pretoria/Johannesburg in 1940, 7 July 1940.
750 NTS, 9653, 520/400/9, Broadcasting to Natives, 27 July 1940, H.C. Lugg to Smit, 1 August 1940.
King’s praiser or *iMbongi* in Zulu language). In that address, Lugg praised the broadcast service, which was critical as many blacks were ‘handicapped’ because many were uneducated, were reliant on reading *Ilanga Lase Natal* paper or listening to explanations offered by the native commissioners, and unlike whites, could not read the available English newspapers.

He continued to state that due to the blacks’ inability to read newspapers, they were ‘troubled by wild rumours and lies’. Lugg invoked Shaka’s greatness and praised the traditions of the Zulu kingship to criticise the Germans as ‘kingless people’, whilst likening the Zulu royal heritage with that of Britain’s King George VI. Thus, the Zulus were to remain loyal to the British king with ‘royal blood’ and ‘long royal lineage’ against the ‘upstarts’ of Germany.

In his address, due to the need to “touch” Zulu emotions, Lugg conveniently neglected to mention the destruction of the Zulu society by the British during the nineteenth century. The general tone of the address still reflected the racial categorisation of the South African society and the paternalistic inclination which presented Britain as the main centre which should be supported or else the whole world would collapse.

As the broadcast service continued, there was a loss of interests in “pure news” and changes were implemented later with the provision of musical items, songs, background information to the news such as ‘geographic situation of the belligerents … and their relationship to and distance from the Union’. A selection of popular songs in isiZulu and Sesotho were used,

---

751 NTS, 9653, 520/400/9, Translation of a Broadcast Delivered by the Chief Native Commissioner, Natal, in Zulu by means of the Telephone and Loudspeakers to the Natives of Pietermaritzburg and Durban, 27 July 1940; NTS, 9653, 520/400/9, Broadcasting to Natives, 27 July 1940, H.C. Lugg to Smit, 1 August 1940.

752 NTS, 9653, 520/400/9, Translation of a Broadcast Delivered by the Chief Native Commissioner, Natal, 27 July 1940. See the original Zulu version of Lugg’s speech, “*Ukukuluma kukaNtabazabantu waseNatali nakwaZulu Ekuluma noZulu ose Mgungundlovu naseTekwini ngoCingo loMoya*”, NTS, 9653, 520/400/9, Translation of a Broadcast Delivered by the Chief Native Commissioner, Natal, 27 July 1940.

753 NTS, 9653, 520/400/9, Translation of a Broadcast Delivered by the Chief Native Commissioner, Natal, 27 July 1940.

754 NTS, 9653, 520/400/9, Translation of a Broadcast Delivered by the Chief Native Commissioner, Natal, 27 July 1940.

755 In Lugg’s parable, he used the expression ‘when that house falls, the sun will fall with it’, see NTS, 9653, 520/400/9, Translation of a Broadcast Delivered by the Chief Native Commissioner, 27 July 1940.

756 NTS, 9653, 520/400/9, Memorandum on Preliminary Inquiry into Reception of Government War News Service, 16-27 July 1940, by A.I. Richards, 17 August 1940, pp. 1-7; KJB, Box 496, N9/13/3, Subversive Propaganda among Natives, G. Ballenden to J.M. Brink, 8 August 1940. See also the proposed popular Zulu and Sotho songs, KJB, Box 496, N9/13/3, Popular Native Records, Acting Native Commissioner to SABC, 9 July 1940.
however, these were insufficient to cater for the demand in the respective languages.\textsuperscript{757} The song, “Nkosi Sinkelela iAfrika” was the concluding item at the end of broadcast.\textsuperscript{758} The broadcast, however, did not produce the desired results. Disappointing reports about loss of interest in broadcast services and low attendance figures at broadcast centres were submitted.\textsuperscript{759}

The first main report came from Dr Audrey Richards, the original member of the BNSC. She undertook an inquiry into the news venture to determine the quality of the transmission and to assess the reactions of the black listeners. The report was based on the respondents from only three municipal compounds around the Witwatersrand: Wemmer Barracks compound, Van Beek Street compound and City Deep compound.\textsuperscript{760} About forty-seven questions were presented to the respondents and the results, though insufficient to draw valid conclusions and to make generalisations, were able to provide insight into the perceptions of blacks regarding the war.

According to Richards’s report, attendance of the broadcast were disappointing, with about 150-300 persons in attendance at Wemmer Barracks, contrary to the possible 3000.\textsuperscript{761} It was a similar situation at other locations. The difficulties for those who attended the broadcast were not related to lack of comprehension, but to lack factual details such as the causes of the war, the geographical position of the European or other African countries, the cultural characteristics of the different people living in those countries, e.g. Kenya or Rumania, as well as the relations between Great Britain and South Africa or what the word “empire” actually implied.\textsuperscript{762} What was required, therefore, was not merely the presentation of news, but also the delivery of commentary and explanations. From the questions, the investigators also ascertained that blacks were more interested in the implications of the stated events, for

\textsuperscript{757} KJB, Box 496, N9/13/3, Popular Native Records, Acting Native Commissioner to SABC, 9 July 1940; NTS, 9653, 520/400/9, Report on Line Broadcasting for Natives, by Hugh Tracy, Lugg to Smit, 20 September 1940.

\textsuperscript{758} KJB, Box 496, N9/13/3, Broadcast of War News Bulletins to Natives, Lowe to Caprara, 13 November 1940.

\textsuperscript{759} NTS, 9653, 520/400/9, Memorandum on Preliminary Inquiry into Reception of Government War News Service, 16-27 July 1940, by A.I. Richards, 17 August 1940, pp. 1-7; KJB, Box 496, N9/13/3, Subversive Propaganda among Natives, G. Ballenden to J.M. Brink, 8 August 1940; NTS, 9653, 520/400/9, Report on Line Broadcasting for Natives, by H. Tracy, Lugg to Smit, 20 September 1940.

\textsuperscript{760} NTS, 9653, 520/400/9, Memorandum on Preliminary Inquiry into Reception of Government War News Service, 16-27 July 1940, by A.I. Richards, 17 August 1940, pp. 1-7.

\textsuperscript{761} NTS, 9653, 520/400/9, Memorandum on Preliminary Inquiry into Reception of Government War News Service, p. 3.

\textsuperscript{762} NTS, 9653, 520/400/9, Memorandum on Preliminary Inquiry into Reception of Government War News Service, p. 4.
example, if the bombing or torpedo of a ship took place nearer to South Africa or how those events impacted on them. The report also revealed that some blacks were suspicious of government intentions. Conscious of the prevailing socio-political conditions, some stated in private that, ‘they knew the Government would not be giving them news without some ulterior motive … they believed the institution of the service was designed to prevent blacks from getting the full truth’.764

According to the report, it was difficult for the broadcast to cater for different classes of blacks, literate and illiterate, as both require differentiated presentations, alternating between details on daily basis and consolidated weekly summaries.765 The report was given to the Secretary for Native Affairs (Smit), whose response was as follows:

One difficulty about the whole business is that the Natives are generally apathetic in so far as the war was concerned, and this particularly applied to the uncivilised Native. We have made every effort to meet the position by the distribution throughout the country of thousands of weekly bulletins and their publication in all the Bantu newspapers, and the Native Commissioners were asked to hold regular meetings to explain the news to the multitude. I am told that generally throughout the Reserves the tribal Natives do not bother much about the war. We started the dissemination of news through loudspeakers and these are not having the results anticipated. The department cannot do more ... I do not think the big campaign throughout the urban areas will have much effect.766

Two months later, in September 1940, another report by Hugh Tracy from Natal (an SABC branch manager at Durban studio), reflected the same views contained in the Richards report. It also argued that ‘the Natives cannot be expected to take active interest in the war as they believe it primarily concerns white races’.767 The report also questioned the hypocrisy of the Union government, which gave lip-service to the ideals of democracy while refusing democracy to the black society. The German propaganda, on the other hand, touched the

763 NTS, 9653, 520/400/9, Memorandum on Preliminary Inquiry into Reception of Government War News Service, p. 5.
764 NTS, 9653, 520/400/9, Memorandum on Preliminary Inquiry into Reception of Government War News Service, p. 5.
765 NTS, 9653, 520/400/9, Memorandum on Preliminary Inquiry into Reception of Government War News Service, pp. 6-7; See also commentary to the Richards report, NTS, 9653, 520/400/9, Broadcasting to Natives, by M. Janisch, 4 September 1940; NTS, 9653, 520/400/9, War News for Natives, Smit to Richards, 27 September 1940.
766 NTS, 9653, 520/400/9, War News for Natives, Smit to A.I. Richards, 21 August 1940.
767 NTS, 9653, 520/400/9, Report on Line Broadcasting for Natives, by Hugh Tracy, Lugg to Smit, 20 September 1940.
‘Achilles heel of South African racialism’ by promising improved living conditions for blacks.\textsuperscript{768} Thus, ‘apathy to the war, and to the war news’ should not have been surprising because blacks were hardly allowed to consider themselves “South Africans”.\textsuperscript{769} The report suggested that the government must reinforce positive loyalty through, for example, promises of higher wages, not negative loyalty of obedience to authority. In addition, improvements in the programmes such as the provision of entertainment and educational topics or musical items, were suggested as the tonic to stimulate interest and thus increase black listenership.\textsuperscript{770}

Several reports echoing similar sentiments, particularly the lack of variety in the broadcast programmes which led to poor attendances and low listenership, were submitted from various centres across the country from 1940 - 1941.\textsuperscript{771} In one report, the need for “human voice” delivered in person at meetings, was more preferable to blacks. They needed personal interface to have opportunities for asking questions, rather than to have one-way speeches coming from “intsinbi” (a piece of metal).\textsuperscript{772} In another report, few adults went to the broadcast centres, of whom many were children who made noise during broadcast, thus defeating the objective.\textsuperscript{773}

In September 1942, the first wireless broadcast was introduced by the SABC.\textsuperscript{774} The wireless broadcast was conducted in English and Afrikaans, then translators followed in Sesotho for the Transvaal and OFS, isiXhosa for the Cape Provinces and isiZulu for Natal, on Tuesday, Thursday and Saturday (excluding Sunday and public holidays).\textsuperscript{775} The wireless broadcast

\textsuperscript{768} NTS, 9653, 520/400/9, Report on Line Broadcasting for Natives, by H. Tracy, Lugg to Smit, 20 September 1940.
\textsuperscript{769} NTS, 9653, 520/400/9, Report on Line Broadcasting for Natives, by H. Tracy, Lugg to Smit, 20 September 1940.
\textsuperscript{770} NTS, 9653, 520/400/9, Report on Line Broadcasting for Natives, by H. Tracy, Lugg to Smit, 20 September 1940.
\textsuperscript{771} NTS, 9653, 520/400/9, Extracts from Reports received on the Native Broadcast, n.d; NASAP, NTS, 9653, 520/400/9, Broadcasting, Lowe to Smit, 11 September 1940; CCK, vol. 16, N1/5/5, Wireless Broadcasting of News, Chief Native Commissioner, King Williamstown to Secretary for Native Affairs, 25 April 1941.
\textsuperscript{772} ‘War News for the Bantu’, \textit{The Star}, 7 August 1940.
\textsuperscript{773} CCK, vol. 16, N1/5/5, Wireless Broadcasting of News, Town Clerk of King Williamstown to Chief Native Commissioner, 8 April 1941.
\textsuperscript{774} NTS, Box 9655, 520/400/13, National Broadcast for Natives (From Studios of the SABC), 29 September 1942; SABC, 1/63 (42) Dap, Audio Clip, by Announcer: Harcourt Collet, First Broadcast to Natives, 29 September 1942; SABC, Annual Report, 1942, p. 7.
\textsuperscript{775} NTS, Box 9655, 520/400/13, National Broadcast for Natives (From Studios of the SABC), 29 September 1942; SABC, 1/63 (42) Dap, Audio Clip, by Announcer: Harcourt Collet, First Broadcast to Natives, 29 September 1942; NTS, Box 9655, 520/400/13, Broadcast for Natives, Smit to Caprara, 16 November 1942; NTS, Box 9655, 520/400/13, Broadcast for Natives, Smit to L. Fouché (as SABC chairman of the board of governors), n.d.
was in the mornings between 9:45 and 10:15, and thus complemented the evening transmissions via landlines. Throughout the war, wireless broadcast were used to popularise the war in the minds of blacks, praising the use of the “Orange Flash”, the rapid military mobilisation of the UDF, dramatizing military operations in the war theatre, especially the activities of the 6th South African Armoured Division. The announcer during the first broadcast, Harcourt Collet, made a request to wireless owners to allow blacks to listen to the news and entertainment as well as general talks.

Despite increased broadcast services via both landline and wireless, there were still low levels of responses from blacks. In many parts of the country, most people did not have access to wireless sets and had limited broadcast centres, inconvenience of time schedules, shortage of technical equipment, shortage of batteries where there was no electricity, or simply, refusal by wireless owners to allow blacks to listen. Along similar lines of Richards’ report on black interest in broadcasting services during 1940, a Johannesburg-based independent body called the Broadcast Sub-Committee of the South African Institute of Race Relations (SAIRR), under the signature of H. Kuper, B.W. Vilakazi and E.O.J. Westphal, academics of the University of the Witwatersrand, produced another report on the

---

779 KJB, Box 496, N9/13/3, Daily Broadcast of News, Manager, Wemmer Compound to Acting Native Commissioner, Johannesburg, 1 September 1942; NTS, Box 9655, 520/400/ 13, Broadcast for Natives: Short Report, Native Commissioner of Utrecht to Chief Native Commissioner, Pietermaritzburg, 30 December 1942; NTS, Box 9655, 520/400/ 13, Broadcast for Natives: Short Report, Native Commissioner, Nqutu to Chief Native Commissioner, Pietermaritzburg, 5 January 1942; NTS, Box 9655, 520/400/ 13, Summary of Replies Received from Native Commissioners-Natal, as on 28 December 1942, Acting Chief Native Commissioner, Natal to Secretary for Native Affairs, 14 January 1943.
780 NTS, Box 9654, 520/400/9, Broadcast to Natives, Magistrate, Bloemfontein to Secretary for Native Affairs, 3 May 1944; NTS, Box 9654, 520/400/9, War News Broadcast, Announcer, Sam Moloyane to Native Commissioner, Bloemfontein, 1 June 1944.
781 NTS, Box 9654, 520/400/9, War News: Broadcasting to Natives, Acting Native Commissioner, Potgietersrus to Secretary for Native Affairs, 21 January 1943.
782 NTS, Box 9655, 520/400/ 13, Summary of Replies Received from Native Commissioners-Natal, as on 28 December 1942, Acting Chief Native Commissioner, Natal to Secretary for Native Affairs, 14 January 1943; NTS, Box 9655, 520/400/ 13, Broadcast for Natives: Short Report, Acting Assistant Native Commissioner, Estcourt to Chief Native Commissioner, Pietermaritzburg, 12 January 1943; NTS, Box 9655, 520/400/ 13, Broadcast for Natives: Short Report, Native Commissioner, Newcastle to Chief Native Commissioner, Pietermaritzburg, 6 January 1943; CCK, vol. 16, N1/5/5, Wireless Broadcasting of News, Acting Magistrate, Sterkspruit to Chief Native Commissioner, 20 January 1943.
same issue in March 1943. Their investigation was based on the information “gleaned” from three black target groups around Johannesburg: the literate (educated), the semi-literate (chauffer, waiters) and the completely illiterate (gardener, domestic servant who could neither read nor write in any language). The report stated that, with regard to the broadcast services to blacks, the main technical problem was that, about ninety-eight percent of them in the Transvaal and in OFS ‘did not own or have access to radio sets’. The rural-based blacks were worse-off as their areas were undeveloped and had no electricity. The urban-based group also had similar problems of the lack electrical wiring in their townships. Of the seventy-three thousand blacks living in the four large townships around Johannesburg, only about ten people in each township, mainly the traders, owned radio sets. Therefore, lack of access to radio sets, mainly due to unaffordability, was a huge short-coming in terms of broadcasting efforts. The report went on to note with interest that when one (unidentified) private company offered ‘to establish a means of reception at each [black] home for which the occupants, if they wished to tune in, would pay 6d per month in the slot’, it was rejected by many whites who believed that it would ‘teach the natives wrong ideas’.

Another problem was that black people, moreover, were opposed to the use of loudspeakers to listen to the broadcast. They reasoned that the transmission was often poor, and it was also not worth their effort to ‘walk long distances, stand in the open, in dust or rain’, for about thirty minutes and listen to ‘someone else talking [about] things’ that they did not even understand properly. The targeted potential listeners were often tired after work and wanted to rest at home. The report also criticised the content of the broadcast programmes. It indicated that many blacks, though they were perceived by the authorities as semi-literate and illiterate, they were still intelligent and could ‘see through fairy tales and lies’. Blacks were aware of the prevailing world crisis and they knew that they were implicated in the war in which they were ‘invited to participate’. Despite the appeals of ‘music and folklore’, at that
time, they were not interested in the repetition of their traditions and culture. They were interested in the ‘political events, war news, labour movements and the Atlantic Charter for Africa’. After realising that such topics were not part of the content, and that the main motive was to encourage recruiting, blacks simply stayed away because the programmes ‘were uninteresting and the announcer often used crude propaganda.’ One respondent who was semi-literate, even discouraged the potential recruits by saying that if they joined the military, they would still be in the ‘army long after the war [was] over’ and also that the promises ‘were wind and the stories fables’.

In response, the authorities, just as they did with the Richards’s report, were indifferent. R. Erasmus of the BOI made notes to Smit, and stated that the report was out of date as the changes in programming had taken place as of 19 June 1942. Furthermore, it was considered that ‘it would have dangerous repercussions to start talking to Africans on radio about the Atlantic Charter and politics’. Such task, according to Erasmus, was a ‘delicate privilege of the Departments and the Government’. Radio broadcast to blacks were actually the government’s wartime measure intended to combat subversive activities among them. Hence any criticisms and suggestions were hardly considered.

By 1943, radio broadcast to blacks remained largely unaltered in terms of the technical quality and programme contents. Many blacks lost interest and stopped listening. Several native commissioners even recommended that the services be discontinued as they no longer served any purpose. By 1944 and 1945, with the winding down of hostilities, the broadcast...
services were no longer viable. In general, the use of radio broadcast for propaganda among blacks had proven ineffective. However, until the last official broadcast on 13 October 1945, the authorities were happy about the “valuable development for blacks” with regard to the novelty of radio broadcasting, especially due to what they considered to be a high rate of illiteracy among blacks.

After the war, broadcast services to blacks were carried out by the SABC, though they were limited. As far as military recruitment was concerned, radio was useful in supplementing the efforts of the recruiting agents. But, it was not the chief government instrument to realise that objective. The authorities focused more on the exploitation of personal appeals made by various leaders and chiefs at various gatherings.

The native commissioners, magistrates, local chiefs and headmen as well as the returning NMC members were requested to assist in the government’s recruitment efforts. NMC members on leave were required to use their influence and persuasion to secure black recruits. As war progressed, the urgent need for recruits increased, especially after the Allied military defeat at Tobruk, Libya in June 1942. The authorities ordered some NMC


NTS, Box 9654, 520/400/9, Broadcast to Natives, Magistrate, Bloemfontein to Secretary for Native Affairs, 2 August 1944; NTS, Box 9654, 520/400/9, Broadcast of News Bulletins to Natives, A.J. Liemebeer, Secretary of Gold Producers Committee to Secretary for Native Affairs, 5 September 1945; NTS, Box 9654, 520/400/9, Broadcast to Natives: Loudspeaker, Native Commissioner, Bloemfontein to Secretary for Native Affairs, 29 September 1945.

SABC, T73/200-201, Interview with K.E. Masinga, First Zulu Announcer of SABC, Durban Studios, 5 March 1975.

See NMC, Box 15, NAS 3/21/B, Discussion by Sub-Committee on Non-European Propaganda, 6 July 1942; NMC, Box 15, NAS 3/21/C, NMC, Speeches and Appeals, Chiefs S.W. Makaula (Baca), R. Sibasa (Venda), A. Moiloa (Lehurutse, Tswana), S. Mampuru (Nebo, Pedi), H. Mangope (Lehurutse, Tswana), M. Buthelezi (Zulu), J.K. Mankurwane (Batlhaping, Tswana), C. Mopeli (Wietzishoek, Sotho), W.K. Manthe (Taung, Tswana), B. Sigcau (Pondo), J. Moshesh (Sotho), S.H. Lehana (Botlokoa – Mt Fletcher, Sotho), J. Moeipi (Pedi), M. Zulu (Melthoth, Natal), G. Mbulaheni (Zoutpansberg, Venda), L. Ngcobo, (Natal, Zulu).

DNEAS, Group 2, Box 6, NAS 3/4/1, Recruiting NEAS, OC, 3rd Battalion NMC Woltemade, Cape Town to DNEAS, 15 April 1942; DNEAS, Group 2, Box 6, NAS 3/4/1, Recruiting NEAS, OC, 6th Battalion NMC, Cullinan to DNEAS, 18 April 1942; NMC, Box 15, NAS 3/21/C, Publication in a Booklet Form, “Appeals by Native Chiefs”, Mockford to Blaine, 15 January 1944.
members from the Middle-East to assist in recruiting and propaganda among blacks.803 One of them was Sergeant Reuben Baloyi (Moloi or Maloyi in other records), an NMC member taken as a prisoner of war after the fall of Tobruk, who then escaped from that (POW) camp at Mersa-Mantru on 3 August 1942. For his courage and determination, Sergeant Baloyi was awarded Military Medal.804 Reputable black soldiers such as Baloyi were useful in government propaganda efforts. For example, some of those black soldiers who could speak English, Afrikaans, Zulu and Sotho, also accompanied mobile film vans to various black areas in the Union for recruitment and propaganda purposes.805 However, ‘this method’, explains Grundlingh, ‘was not wholly successful’ because some NMC members who regretted enlisting for military service discouraged other blacks from joining up.806 This undermined government propaganda efforts for recruitment and resulted in fewer members of the black community joining the military.

Recruitment appeals were also undertaken by organising large meetings. In Bloemfontein, the military and government officials addressed an open air gathering of about 8000 blacks in March 1942.807 There were isiXhosa and Sesotho interpreters who conveyed the messages to the crowd. Though the meeting was well attended, common concerns among blacks related to the bearing of arms, financial incentives and the support of dependents after the war. They were not impressed with the message that if they joined the military, they will be “well-fed and well-clothed”.808 Similar concerns over pay and bearing arms were expressed during subsequent recruitment meetings at Kimberley and at Green Point locations. These meetings were poorly attended and some blacks were even afraid of entering the hall in Kimberley.809 Other meetings of a similar nature were held in Natal, Zululand, Transkei and Transvaal. Payment and the bearing arms remained the foremost deterrent for the recruitment of

803 AG (3), Box, 342, 154/203/3, Recruiting, NEAS, Stubbs to AG, 19 December 1941; DNEAS, Group 2, Box 6, NAS 3/4/1, DNEAS to Secretary for Native Affairs, 23 April 1942; DNEAS, Group 2, Box 6, NAS 3/4/1, Recruiting, OC, 3rd Battalion NMC to DNEAS, 20 April 1942.
804 NMC, Box 14, NAS 3/21/A, Further Dramatic Escape from Tobruk, Reuben Molo, by DNEAS for press publication, October 1942; AG (3), Box 42, 154 x/390, Return of Natives from ME for Recruiting or Propaganda Purposes, Theron to DNEAS, 2 October 1942.
805 AG (3), Box 42, 154 x/390, Return of Natives from ME for Recruiting or Propaganda Purposes, DNEAS to General Officer Commanding, UDF, MEF, 13 November 1942.
807 DNEAS, Group 2, Box 6, NAS 3/4/1, Report on Recruiting Meeting at Bloemfontein Location, Kimberley and Green Point Location, 30 March to 1 April 1942.
808 DNEAS, Group 2, Box 6, NAS 3/4/1, Report on Recruiting Meeting at Bloemfontein Location, Kimberley and Green Point Location, 30 March to 1 April 1942.
809 DNEAS, Group 2, Box 6, NAS 3/4/1, Report on Recruiting Meeting at Bloemfontein Location, Kimberley and Green Point Location, 30 March to 1 April 1942.
blacks. The authorities, however, persisted with recruitment propaganda campaign among blacks by engaging in personal contact as it provided better opportunities for interaction than radio, which was employed more towards the white communities.

A new dimension in radio broadcast was added with the clandestine operations of the UUTS’s Mystery Radio Freedom and another anti-government radio called Mystery Radio. Their names obviously suggested secrecy and the anonymity of the announcers. The Mystery Radio Freedom broadcast pro-war and pro-government messages which invoked the Christian values of the Afrikaners. In a similar fashion as Zeesen, the announcers employed name-calling and labelling techniques towards the anti-government and pro-Nazi elements. For instance, people such as Oswald Pirow were called ‘traitors, Quislings, Hitler’s Henchmen and enemy of free South Africa’. Broadcasters also praised the Union’s decision to enter the war and exalted the UDF troops about their military efforts in defence of freedom. The Mystery Radio Freedom, therefore, added to the government’s counter-propaganda measures against the Zeesen broadcast.

The Mystery Radio, on the other hand, broadcast anti-government messages in Afrikaans every Sunday afternoon. Through mechanical devices, the SABC recorded the messages and forwarded them to the intelligence authorities to analyse and prepare counter-propaganda. The broadcast waged anti-Smuts and anti-British campaigns, using history to drive home a sense of marginalisation, dispossession and repression of the Afrikaners by the British. For example, constant references to the Anglo-Boer War concentration camps sought to mobilise anti-British sentiment among the Afrikaner populace and to urge action against the government. As with Zeesen, the broadcast of the Mystery Radio also emphasised the futility of the Union’s military effort against the powerful German army which possessed advanced weapons. In addition, Afrikaners were urged to resist and rid the country of Smuts.

810 DNEAS, Group 2, Box 6, NAS 3/4/1, Recruiting NEAS, OC, 3rd Battalion NMC Woltemade, Cape Town to DNEAS, 15 April 1942; SANDFA, DNEAS, Group 2, Box 6, NAS 3/4/1, Recruiting Native Military Corps, Magistrate Qumbu to Chief Magistrate, Umtata, 26 September 1942.
811 UUTS, T.C. Robertson Papers, A 2102, Ae 5.1, Broadcasting, 8 October 1941.
812 UP Archives, Central Head Office, Intelligence Reports, vol. 2, Mystery Radio Transmissions, Translations and Transcripts, July to August 1942.
813 UUTS, T.C. Robertson Papers, A 2102, Ae 5.1, Broadcasting, 8 October 1941.
814 UUTS, T.C. Robertson Papers, A 2102, Ae 5.1, Broadcasting, 8 October 1941.
815 UP Archives, Central Head Office, Intelligence Reports, vol. 2, Mystery Radio Transmissions, Translations and Transcripts, July to August 1942.
816 UP Archives, Central Head Office, Intelligence Reports, vol. 2, Mystery Radio Transmissions, 26 July 1942.
the Jews and also the Communists who were mainly accused of instigating the call for equal rights for blacks. The messages were feeding on the existing social tensions, discontent and dissensions relating to white poverty and racial prejudices to inflame public opinion against the Smuts government.

The loss of about 10 722 UDF members during Rommel’s defeat of the Allies at Tobruk in June 1942 compounded matters for the Union authorities. It was a national disaster. According to the survey conducted by the Union’s chief censor, many South Africans expressed ‘disappointment and heartache’ at the losses and criticised the government for the ineffective running of the war. For the opposition, the Tobruk disaster was a justification of their objections to the war policy. Government supporters urged for immediate counter-action. For example, R. Oliver of Roodepoort, wrote to one relative soldier serving in the 21st Field Battery, Durban, that ‘this is not the time to hold inquest or enquiry, but to get stuck in at them boots and all, and knock hell through all the Rommels and the Nazis ever made’.

Consequently, the authorities reacted. They undertook a variety of recruitment drives, with radio as one of the chief instruments (except for blacks). Smuts launched a recruitment campaign through radio broadcast, appealing for 7 000 men to replace the losses. The slogan became known as ‘Avenge Tobruk’ and was launched through the military recruitment officers. The military authorities also launched publicity campaigns for the field artillery, corps of signals, tank corps and infantry from October 1942. The recordings of the achievements of these units were broadcast to South Africa. Other recruiting drives included personal contacts with employers, attending local meetings, interacting with women as wives, mothers or relatives of men on active service, and the use of stories of enthusiasm,

817 UP Archives, Central Head Office, Intelligence Reports, vol. 2, Mystery Radio Transmissions, 26 July 1942.
818 UP Archives, Central Head Office, Intelligence Reports, vol. 2, Mystery Radio Transmissions, July to August 1942.
820 Army Intelligence, Box 50, I.44 (E), Memorandum Regarding Public Reaction to the Fall of Tobruk and Mersa Manthuhr, 7 July 1942.
821 Army Intelligence, Box 50, I.44 (E), “Critical” Censorship letter dated 28 June 1942, Memorandum Regarding Public Reaction to the Fall of Tobruk and Mersa Manthuhr, 7 July 1942.
822 CGS (War), Box 207, VI 45/5, Tobruk, 27 June 1942.
823 CGS (War), Box 207, VI 45/5, ‘Avenge Tobruk’ Recruiting Drive, Director of Recruiting to all Recruiting Officers, 29 June 1942.
824 Army Intelligence, Box 20, I.20. (A), Recruiting Publicity Campaign, Deputy Chief of Staff to General Officer Administration, UDF, Middle East, 17 October 1942; Army Intelligence, Box 20, I.20. (A), Broadcast by Major-General Dan Pienaar, 20 November 1942; Army Intelligence, Box 20, I.20. (A), Training for the Guns, Broadcast by 2nd Lt H.T Hoernle of South African Artillery, 10 December 1942.
sacrifices and personal stories of recruits to inspire the public.\textsuperscript{825} The post-Tobruk recruitment campaign yielded positive results within a few months. In January 1943, it was reported that 12,000 recruits were obtained, exceeding the requirement of 10,000.\textsuperscript{826}

Still, the use of radio for publicity and propaganda was not without problems. The main shortcomings were the shortage of military radio observers, inadequate and obsolete technical equipment, delayed transmissions to the Union and the military’s competition with the SABC personnel for recording devices.\textsuperscript{827} The latter aspect prompted the DMI officers to write strong letters of complaints to the CGS and the Prime Minister.\textsuperscript{828} In comparison to America, England and Australia, radio in South Africa was inadequately utilised for publicity and propaganda efforts to sustain interest in the war.\textsuperscript{829} In addition, another cause of concern was the under-exploitation of Afrikaans language for propaganda. Afrikaans-speaking public regularly tuned into Zeesen for overseas news about the war and their opinion was moulded in that context.\textsuperscript{830} Dr Malherbe also complained about the limited utilisation of Afrikaans in radio service. He remarked that it was in fact the Afrikaans public that needed to be influenced the most or risk losing that audience to the anti-war elements.\textsuperscript{831} Despite these problems, radio remained an integral part of government publicity and propaganda efforts throughout the war. It was supplemented by the press and also the films, which added a visual dimension to propaganda drives. Zeesen radio, on the other hand, went off air in April 1945, when the Allied troops captured Germany’s Koenigswusterhausen, the site of its broadcast station.\textsuperscript{832}

\textsuperscript{825} CGS (War), Box 207, VI 45/5, ‘Avenge Tobruk’ Recruiting Drive, Director of Recruiting to all Recruiting Officers, 29 June 1942.
\textsuperscript{826} AG (War), Box 4, 168/2/2/2, Proposed Establishment, Sub-Section Director of Military Intelligence, 14 January 1943.
\textsuperscript{827} Malherbe Papers, File 432/7, KCM 56974 (104), Lindsay to Malherbe, 24 June 1944; Malherbe Papers, File 432/7, KCM 56974 (553), Malherbe to Esselen, 16 October 1944.; Malherbe Papers, File 432/7, KCM 56974 (134), A.R. Delius to Malherbe, 28 November 1944.
\textsuperscript{828} Malherbe Papers, File 432/7, KCM 56974 (104), Lindsay to Malherbe, 24 June 1944; Malherbe Papers, File 432/7, KCM 56974 (553), Malherbe to Esselen, 16 October 1944.
\textsuperscript{829} CGS (War), Box 197, 42/1, Radio in Relation to Military Propaganda, Werdmuller to Wakefield, 21 April 1944.
\textsuperscript{830} Malherbe Papers, File 432/7, KCM 56974 (534), R.F.A. Hoernlé to J.A. Davenport (BBC), 6 May 1941. This could also explain the increase in radio licences from the SABC Annual Reports, 1939-1945.
\textsuperscript{831} Malherbe Papers, File 432/7, KCM 56974 (544), Recognition of the Afrikaans Element in Propaganda, Malherbe to Wilson, 14 February 1941.
THE PRESS

Unlike radio, the press constituted the largest component of the publicity and propaganda media because of its diversity, range, visual impact and reach. For instance, it comprised of multiple forms that included newspaper articles, magazines and periodicals, pamphlets, posters, pictures, photographs, booklets and newsletters. Although radio had the advantage of ignoring national boundaries, transcending illiteracy barriers and having wider broadcast coverage to many people at the same time, the press had enduring capacity. Newspapers, for example, could be read more than once, be passed on to others or saved for future reference. Printed news and advertisements complemented the instantaneous or recorded voice messages and appeals over the radio, but remained “permanent” for continued reference and for posterity, if well preserved. However, neither radio nor the press, was exclusively preferred over the other. There were overlaps in these media platforms for the Union’s publicity and propaganda campaigns. During the war, newspapers entered the fray by organising news and framing the war in a campaign of words to win the war of ideas so as to either incite popular support for intervention or, for the anti-war movements, to promote the neutrality policy.

The Union government did not enjoy monopoly of the press. The freedom and independence of the press afforded opportunities for the anti-government factions to contest the publicity and propaganda space to advance their cause. The anti-government press was predominantly Afrikaans, and the pro-government press was predominantly English, though there were a few Afrikaans papers which supported the government. The English press, though, enjoyed the highest wartime circulation in the Union than the Afrikaans press. This could partly be a result of the educated black readers, mainly in urban areas, who mostly preferred English

---

833 Die Volkstem (Transvaal), Die Suiderstem (Western Cape), Ons Land (Eastern Cape), Die Volk (Transvaal) and Die Vrystater (OFS) were some of the pro-government Afrikaans newspapers. The Afrikaans papers for the government opposition were Die Vaderland (Transvaal), Die Transvaler (Transvaal), Die Burger (Western Cape), Die Oosterlig (Eastern Cape) and Die Volksblad (OFS).

834 Tothill, ‘The 1943 Elections’, pp. 107-108. According to the report by Henry McNulty, the United Press Association correspondent in the Union, by March 1943, the major English newspapers were led by The Sunday Times with 80,000 circulation, followed by The Star with 65,000 and Cape Times with 40,000. The top Afrikaans paper was Die Vaderland with 25,000 circulation (its weekly country edition had 26,000), followed by Die Transvaler with 17,000 (with 2,500 for its country edition), and lastly Die Burger which had 10,000 circulation.
papers. It could thus be argued that the government enjoyed more coverage in the press. Though, as Dr Malherbe argued, English speakers were the least preferred audience because the group of anti-government factions with Nazi sympathies came from the Afrikaners, who had to be swayed towards the government.

At the start of hostilities, there was no rigid system of censorship imposed on the press. The government and the majority of the newspaper editors concluded a Voluntary Censorship Agreement to prevent the inadvertent publication of information that could aid the enemy. But, not all newspapers were signatories to that agreement. They were *Die Transvaler*, *Forward* and the *Guardian*. Discretionary submission of military-related material for censorship and the non-committal attitude of the non-signatories to the Voluntary Censorship Agreement presented problems for the Union authorities. During the war, both the English and Afrikaans papers embarked on internal propaganda warfare. In the process, information that would otherwise have been censored ended up in the publications. The anti-government papers were particularly culpable in some of the cases. It was to be expected, since propaganda warfare in the non-loyal Afrikaans papers took the form of an anti-government posture. Criticisms were levelled at the war policy, condemning and ridiculing government information initiatives, amplifying military difficulties and promoting the racialised and ethnic-based political mobilisations and militant protests of the opposition movements. These papers adopted what could be branded a “disparaging approach” against the government during the war and consistently featured articles that promoted the anti-war and the exclusivist Afrikaner nationalistic causes.

---


836 Malherbe Papers, File 432/7, KCM 56974 (544), Recognition of the Afrikaans Element in Propaganda, Malherbe to Wilson, 14 February 1941; Malherbe Papers, File 438/1, KCM 56974 (531a), Memorandum on Films for Publicity and Propaganda, 1941. (only year).

837 Lawrence Papers, BC 640, E3. 4, Second Meeting of Cabinet Committee, 5 October 1939; CGS (War), Box 197, 42/4, Minutes of a Meeting on the Working of the Existing Organisation for Press Information, Publicity and Propaganda, 17 October 1940.

838 CGS (War), Box 197, 42/4, Report on the Control of Military Information issues to the Public through the Press, Newsreels, Broadcast, etc, DDMI’s Reply to Controller of Censorship, 16 April 1942; CGS (War), Box 197, 42/4, Minutes of a Meeting on the Working of the Existing Organisation for Press Information, Publicity and Propaganda, 17 October 1940; PP, Box 63, PU 6/9/4/, Report of Meeting of Newspaper Editors Consultative Committee in Pretoria, 23 October 1940.

839 CGS (War), Box 197, 42/4, Press Censorship, Kreft to Wilson, 25 March 1942; Malherbe Papers, File 432/7, KCM 56974 (94), Relationship between Military Authorities and the Press, DMI to Deputy Chief of Staff (DCS), 29 March 1943.
The Union security officials and pro-government publicity agencies (e.g. UUTS) reported many negative statements emanating from the major anti-government papers: Die Transvaler, Die Vaderland and Die Burger, reflecting their anti-government attitude. On 17 November 1939, Die Transvaler and Die Vaderland reported that the children’s toys for that year were in the form of soldiers, tanks, submarines and warships.\textsuperscript{840} This was an attempt to inflame public opinion against the government for an unwarranted exposure of children to violence as a result of the war policy. Die Burger, in September 1939, published Advocate J.G. Strydom’s speech in Pretoria, accusing Smuts of being a British Imperialist whose salvation would be to leave England and to address the Jewish question, the distinction between Europeans and non-Europeans, the poor-white question and to pursue a Republican ideal.\textsuperscript{841} Likewise, Die Vaderland attacked the government’s use of radio broadcast and described the information officer as ‘little Adolph Wilson’ who would appear in a musical as ‘His Master’s Voice’.\textsuperscript{842} In an instigation to destabilise the mine workers, one government report described Smuts as ‘the man who shot you down like dogs in 1922 is again at the head of affairs’, and the mine workers were urged to withdraw their buying power (estimated at 14 million pounds per annum) and support alternative Afrikaner economic movements such as the Reddingsdaadbond (Rescue Action League/Salvation Bond).\textsuperscript{843}

As war progressed, attacks on the government’s war policy intensified. Initial German military successes in Europe gave heart to government opponents who grew bolder in their anti-war statements. A.J. Werth, of the opposition, reportedly indicated that Smuts was mistaken to believe that Britain would win and he would be a hero, instead, the possibility was that Germany would emerge victorious.\textsuperscript{844} In a leader page of Die Burger, the government’s war policy was regarded as futile and the only ray of light came from the reunion of the Afrikaners. The paper also criticised the actions of the government for confiscating rifles as an illegal act and ‘the greatest scandal in the General [Smuts]’s career’.\textsuperscript{845} On the front page of Die Transvaler, it was reported that the Dutch Reformed Church Synod requested Smuts to make peace with Germany and quoted a statement that ‘the

\textsuperscript{840} UWH, Box 265, B.I. 20, Intelligence Summaries, 25 November 1939.
\textsuperscript{841} Wits, Ossewabrandwag Records, A 726, A15, Opposition Press Reports, Die Burger, 27 September 1939.
\textsuperscript{842} UWH, Box 265, B.I. 20, Intelligence Summaries, 10 November 1939.
\textsuperscript{843} UWH, Box 265, B.I. 20, Intelligence Summaries, 10 November 1939.
\textsuperscript{844} Wits, Ossewabrandwag Records, A 726, A15, Opposition Press Reports, Die Burger, 5 July 1940.
\textsuperscript{845} UWH, Box 276, B.I. 28, Opposition Attacks on Government, Die Burger, 4 September 1940.
people feel that the country’s participation in the war has affected their conscience. The paper also criticised the dismissal of some soldiers for their refusal to sign the Africa Oath, and also highlighted the poor conditions and bad food at the some military camps. In a political meeting covered by a pro-government paper, *Die Volksstem*, it was reported that Dr W. du P. Erlank stated in Pretoria that if a rebellion took place and failed, it would not be a tragedy, but, it would be a tragedy if no protest against the prevailing conditions was undertaken. Erlank then reflected on the plight of the Afrikaners, from historical incidents of Slagtersnek to the concentration camps of the Anglo-Boer War, and concluded that retribution would follow the bitter struggle of the Afrikaners (Compare also with related incidents like the suppression of the 1914 rebellion and the 1922 mine workers’ strike in other sources).

The papers were advancing the exclusive Afrikaner nationalistic cause and supported the dissenting opinion against the war policy. They also heightened the racialised ethnic-based opposition politics through the anti-British, anti-Jewish and anti-Black features. For instance, the participation of blacks in a “white man’s war” was opposed vehemently, particularly at the question of them carrying firearms, something the military authorities and some political leaders, such as Reitz, considered necessary. Arming blacks was portrayed as a ‘national security threat’ by the opposition papers and the Nationalists. The government was at pains to refute the opposition claims and to rationalise the suggestions for arming blacks. Defeatism (based on the assumption of German victory over Britain), racialised ethnic-based cultural and social politics of identity were the hallmarks of the opposition papers. The English papers, in contrast, assumed the pro-government angle and presented articles in the

---

847 UWH, Box 276, B.I. 28, Opposition Attacks on Government, *Die Transvaler*, 21 September 1940.
853 Afrikaner Nationalist leaders such as Dr Malan, Paul Sauer, Eric Louw and Strydom persistently stated in various speeches that Britain would lose the war and the Union must sever ties and negotiate with the seemingly victorious Germany. Wits, Ossewabrandwag Records, A 726, A15, Opposition Press Reports.
most positive light or in criticism of the anti-war activists. However, there were occasions where the government was under criticism, albeit for different reasons than the opposition papers.

The *Natal Mercury* in December 1941 criticised the military authorities for lack of equipment such as anti-air guns, rifles, grenades, aircraft as well as the lack of trained personnel to secure vital installations.\(^{854}\) During the previous year, the *Sunday Express* was also accused of a similar case of reporting on the lack of ammunition.\(^{855}\) More criticisms of the military continued in the following war years. In April 1942, the *Sunday Times* published an open letter to the Chief Paymaster, which complained about the troops who, as result of payment delays to their dependents, had court orders issued against them for defaulting on payments.\(^{856}\) In the same year, *Forward*, which supported the Labour Party, a partner in Smuts’s United Party, published a critical article complaining about the ‘uneasiness’ regarding the lack of social and economic improvements promised by Smuts.\(^{857}\) It was responding to the other pro-government papers that criticised Walter Madeley, the Labour Party leader about expressing dissatisfactions within the United Party. *The Natal Witness* also accused Madeley of socialist opinions and criticised the United Party leaders for arrogating to themselves the prerogative of portraying the war as the United Party’s war and not South Africa’s war.\(^{858}\)

Examples of the weaknesses in the existing system of self-censorship included the publication of casualties, publishing interviews by returning soldiers on leave or in hospitals and general rumours about the welfare of the soldiers after the war.\(^{859}\) Despite the unhappiness of the authorities, action was limited to mere appeals to newspapers to cooperate with the BOI with regard to publication of articles that would impact on public morale.\(^{860}\) It was however, not the general practice to cover negative aspects of wartime government policies and activities. Primarily, the English and loyalist Afrikaans papers

\(^{854}\) CGS (War), Box 199, 42/5, Leading Article in “Natal Mercury”, DDMI to CGS, 17 December 1941.
\(^{855}\) ‘Brass Hats have a Lot to Learn’, *Sunday Express*, 18 February 1940.
\(^{856}\) ‘Open Letter to the Chief Paymaster’, *Sunday Times*, 22 April 1942.
\(^{857}\) ‘The Press Creates Political a Crisis’, *Forward*, 20 November 1942.
\(^{859}\) CGS (War), Box 197, 42/4, Blaine to Editor of “Cape Times”, 14 August 1940; CGS (War), Box 197, 42/4, Colonel R.D. Pilkington Jordan to Adjutant General, 28 November 1941; CGS (War), Box 197, 42/4, Lawrence to Blaine, 22 December 1941; CGS (W), Box 197, 42/4, Theron to CGS, 1 May 1942; Malherbe Papers, File 432/7, KCM 56974 (94), Relationship between Military Authorities and the Press, DMI to Deputy Chief of Staff (DCS), 29 March 1943.
\(^{860}\) CGS (War), Box 197, 42/4, Wilson to Prime Minister, 15 June 1944.
provided ample coverage in support of the war effort. Criticism emanating from this section of the press could be branded as a “constructive approach” as the papers essentially implored the government for improvement and efficiency in the war effort. To a larger extent, the English papers played a major role in framing the war in a positive light and in exposing the subversive activities of the anti-war elements. Also, they assisted in moulding public opinion towards supporting the war by featuring recruitment advertisements, press statements for appeals and the reasons for intervention in the war, military publicity and in the morale-building efforts of positive war-related news items, e.g. Allied military successes. The official agency for such publicity and propaganda efforts was the BOI in co-operation with the DMI (Ic).

The primary aim of the BOI was to improve the morale of the South African public as well as to discourage and counter-act the subversive propaganda among civilians. The BOI was also the only channel through which all information relating to the policy and activities of the DOD would be supplied. For practical reasons, though, local military commands were authorised to maintain direct contact with the press to deal with matters of local interest. To preserve the morale within the UDF, propaganda and publicity was conducted through the DMI (Ic). There were no independent newspapers which had war correspondents with the UDF in the field. It was only the BOI and SAPA representatives who supplied war news and photographic pictures regarding UDF activities in the field to the press in South Africa and

---


862 Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 144, Memorandum on the Bureau of Information: Present Activities, 23 August 1940; Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 150, Bureau of Information: Statement on Activities, 21 May 1942; CGS (War), Box 197, VI 42/4, Minutes of a Meeting on the Working of the Existing Organisation for Press Information, Publicity and Propaganda, 17 October 1940.

863 PP, Box 63, 6/9/5, Report on the Relations between the Bureau of Information and Military Intelligence, 13 January 1941; SANDFA, CGS (War), Box 197, 42/3, Director of Information’s Reply to General Theron, Wilson to Theron, 11 May 1943.

864 PP, Box 63, PU 6/9/1, Memorandum to the South African Press, 1 August 1940; CGS (War), Box 197, 42/4, Minutes of a Meeting on the Working of the Existing Organisation for Press Information, Publicity and Propaganda, 17 October 1940.

865 PP, Box 63, PU 6/9/1, Memorandum to the South African Press, 1 August 1940; CGS (War), Box 197, 42/4, Instruction to all Military Commands by the Director General of Operations, 29 July 1940.

866 PP, Box 63, 6/9/5, Report on the Relations between the Bureau of Information and Military Intelligence, 13 January 1941; CGS (War), Box 197, 42/3, Director of Information’s Reply to General Theron, Wilson to Theron, 11 May 1943.
The BOI also supported the defence recruitment campaigns such as the military exhibitions, parades and public demonstrations through the newspaper coverage of those activities.\(^{868}\)

The most significant approach in relation to the engineering of pro-government propaganda was to ascertain the prevailing trends in the country. To this end, the BOI’s press section surveyed about twenty daily newspapers for emerging distresses, objections or grievances and partisan trends, then produced a report for government officials to refute allegations and to provide explanatory statements.\(^{869}\) In the same manner, the DMI (Ic) produced what was called ‘Highlights from the Opposition Press’, which was a summary of the anti-government papers, mostly translated from Afrikaans, for use by the UDF officials and the Allied military officials who did not speak or understand Afrikaans.\(^{870}\) To prepare answers from the opposition questions in parliament as well as to determine the level of support for the government, the UUTS also followed a similar approach of producing summaries of both the pro- and anti-government papers.\(^{871}\) These press summaries were crucial in reflecting the ebb and flow of national sentiments in the Union. Also, the government and military authorities had an opportunity to prepare and issue statements for information and to make appeals to the public for support. The pro-government papers were particularly vital in publishing the official press statements and interviews from government officials. Those statements were mostly released through the BOI in co-operation with SAPA, which in turn supplied them to the newspapers. Other press features were obtained through covering the speeches or activities of the government and military officials.

Smuts, in particular, issued many press statements in which he rationalised the entry of South Africa into the war against Germany. He declared that the Union parliament had exercised its constitutional mandate to decide on intervention in the war, as advised by him, and that it was to preserve the country’s freedom and independence against the systematic expansion of Nazi

\(^{867}\) CGS (War), Box 197, 42/3, Director of Information’s Reply to General Theron, Wilson to Theron, 11 May 1943; PP, Box 63, PU 6/9/4, Report on Military Publicity and Propaganda by Assistant Director of Public Relations, General Officer Administration, UDF Middle East Force, 22 February 1944.


\(^{870}\) Malherbe Papers, File 444/5, KCM 56975 (76-78), Highlights from the Opposition Press, 1941-1944, by Capt (Mrs) Malherbe, 25 April 1944.

\(^{871}\) UUTS, Robertson Papers, A 2102, B 20.3, Press Reports 260-382, 1941-1944.
Germany by force. Like other small European countries, South Africa needed to be protected against Nazi domination and oppression. Appeals were made to evoke public sympathies and solidarity in support of the Union leaders’ resolve to fight. Smuts also attempted to moderate negative perceptions about the British Empire. He argued that the old British Empire ended with the Anglo-Boer War because South Africa’s self-governing institutions and its sovereignty in the world were retained afterwards. Instead, there was the British Commonwealth of Nations which he described as ‘Britain plus the free Dominions’. And so, South Africa was involved in equal “partnership” with Britain and not coercively “conscripted” by the “Empire” to participate in the war. Still, the central theme in propaganda rhetoric was that Britain epitomised liberal traditions, democratic values and freedom which small nations like South Africa enjoyed. In contrast, Nazism embodied tyranny, domination and oppression which were opposed by the Allied forces.

‘The truth is’, remarked Smuts in one of his press interviews in 1942, ‘the Germans have already lost the war … they have not only organised Europe for themselves, they have organised the whole world against themselves … the Allies have today more fighting men than the Axis, and they can produce more’. It was one of his bandwagon arguments, as in many speeches and broadcast by other leaders, that Smuts portrayed Germany as a dangerous threat, but, she was confronted by the “whole world”. Since “every nation” was on board, it would be unthinkable for the public to believe that Germany could emerge triumphant. Notions of national “defence” and “safety” were prominently employed in propaganda rhetoric to promote the war policy. Smuts made the most of these virtue words to mobilise public sympathies and support. In 1943, during the Union elections dubbed the ‘Soldier’s Vote’, because they took place in the middle of the war, he incorporated those virtue words in one of his speeches:

A vote against the war policy is a vote against South Africa, against the security of our country which we are pledged loyally to death … the country is in mortal danger … we should
follow only one call ... to unite behind the country’s defence policy ... to defend her and keep her safe for the future.877

Smuts’s speeches also found their way into the international press. The *Daily Telegraph* reproduced his address to the United Kingdom Parliament in London during 1942, where he expressed the view that the Allies were embarking on the ‘offensive phase’ in the struggle between two contrasting systems and ideologies – democracy against totalitarianism.878 This speech, which was also broadcast over the radio, was covered in many papers and even listeners’ comments were published.879 It was one of the major propaganda scoops for Smuts as the speech also reflected thoughts on the kind of an international order desired.

Union military officials also exploited the press to issue statements and to promote the country’s significance in the war. Van Ryneveld, expressing his views on home defence, indicated that South Africa played a key role in the overall strategic plan of the Allied war effort due to its ports. ‘The Union was no longer a port of call’, reckoned Van Ryneveld, ‘it was a very vital link both in the matter of production and distribution and in the allocation of its manpower for fighting forces’.880 It was a form of economic propaganda as he praised War Supplies for improved productive capacity which meant more job opportunities for potential recruits. The country mainly needed men and women for training. ‘Equipment would soon overtake us… but the best equipment in the hands of untrained men and women was useless’, argued Van Ryneveld.881 After his return from a six week trip to London 1943, Van Ryneveld issued a press statement expressing delight on discussing war financing with ‘big men’ of the British Treasury. He explained the centrality of manpower in the British war production and how that impacted on the heavy bombing blitz against Germany. It was vital for the Union to make its own army, air and naval manpower contribution to the war effort to secure an opportunity for claiming a share in the future of the world.882

---

880 CGS (War), Box 201, VI 42/8, General Van Ryneveld - Press Interview, 21 February 1942.
881 CGS (War), Box 201, VI 42/8, General Van Ryneveld - Press Interview, 21 February 1942.
882 CGS (War), Box 201, VI 42/8, Press Statement, 3 December 1943.
The DMI (Ic) also orchestrated press statements prepared by Lieutenant (later Captain) (Mrs) J.A. Malherbe, to promote the government’s war policy, to counter opposition propaganda and to explain the various aspects of the military and service conditions, especially in relation to women. In one press release, Malherbe criticised those who called for equal pay between men and women of similar ranks, without due consideration of the differences in actual wartime responsibilities and activities. She regarded it as selfish and ‘calculated opportunism’ if the equal pay argument did not take into account that most women’s voluntary activities included running canteens, transport and organising entertainment, even sewing and knitting as opposed to men fighting in the war zone.883 She also took a swipe at the anti-war elements for criticising the government’s consideration of arming blacks whilst they (government opponents) refused to fight.884

In another press article, Malherbe indicted the ‘defeatist attitude’ of some women who wrote whining and depressing letters to the serving menfolk which impacted on troop morale.885 She was addressing the National Council of Women of South Africa in Johannesburg and requested them to assist the government ‘to frustrate the defeatist and whining talk’.886 In a counter-argument published in the Bloemfontein-based weekly magazine, The Outspan, the writer, Phyllis Juby, described the “whining letters” as a ‘healthy exchange of thoughts and feelings’ between partners.887 Malherbe, this time a captain, wrote to the editor of The Outspan, Gordon Makepeace, to challenge Phyllis Juby’s article as she (Malherbe) believed it was “undoing” the work of the military due to the ‘unconscious thoughtlessness’ of those “whining” letters which had damaging effect on the morale of the of troops.888 By October 1942, Malherbe noted that her challenging article, ‘It’s not What we Write but How we Write that Matters’, was never published. However, she continued to use the press to publish articles or to translate English into Afrikaans some features that highlighted women’s actions

883  Malherbe Papers, File 44/110, KCM 56996 (16a), ‘Should Women Officers in the Army get the Same Pay as Men?’, 1940 (only year).
887  ‘Should Women Write Freely to their Menfolk’, The Outspan, 31 July 1942.
888  Malherbe Papers, File 44/110, KCM 56974, (857), Capt. J.A. Malherbe to Gordon Makepeace, 12 August 1942.
that could strengthen morale on the home-front such as avoiding rumours, gossiping, wastage and despondency.\textsuperscript{889}

Apart from featuring official press statements, pro-government papers were also vital in promoting the government’s war policy and in vilifying the opposition’s activities through negative propaganda. As the European security situation worsened, Bob Connolly, the \textit{Rand Daily Mail} and \textit{Sunday Express} cartoonist, published satirical depictions of the Nazi danger accompanied by political manipulations as well as South Africa’s position at that time. In one cartoon in the \textit{Rand Daily Mail}, the Nationalists who were advocating for the Union’s neutrality, are presented as flying a dark unstable Nazi aircraft, whilst the United Party leaders were flying in a white aircraft pointing towards the South African unity.\textsuperscript{890} In the \textit{Sunday Express}, a Czech man is depicted with his one hand tied to a pole, while Hitler looks on, with the caption, ‘Nazi Allegiance’.\textsuperscript{891} The Union parliament’s decision to enter the war was reflected in the \textit{Rand Daily Mail} as a single road, \textquote{Die Pad van Suid Afrika} (The Path of South Africa), splitting into a fork.\textsuperscript{892} The message represented the internal divisions and the leaders taking opposite directions: Hertzog as following the dark path (non-belligerence, German sympathy) and Smuts following the path of light in support of the Allies. Cartoons of such nature, name-calling and labelling increased rapidly in the pro-government press as soon as war broke out. (See illustrations 9-11)

Immediately after the British declaration of war against Germany, pro-war papers urged the government to follow suit. Animal-like archetypal terms such as ‘the mad dog’, were soon projected on Hitler\textsuperscript{893}, and Nazism was branded an evil system that needed to be eliminated.\textsuperscript{894} \textit{The Forum} publication was instrumental in producing dedicated features explaining Hitler’s aims and the impact of Nazism on the less suspicious groups. In its features, an anti-Nazi group called the Board of the German African Party (Non-Nazi), presented the case against Nazism and indicated that many South Africans did not sufficiently appreciate the precise objectives of Herr Hitler. References were made to sections of Hitler’s book, \textit{Mein Kampf}, illustrating the nature of the Nazi doctrine as that of ‘fire and

\textsuperscript{889} Malherbe Papers, File 44/110, KCM 56974, (858), Women and the Home-Front, Capt Malherbe to Piet Beukes (The BOI), 19 June 1942.
\textsuperscript{891} ‘Cartoon News’, \textit{Sunday Express}, 23 July 1939.
\textsuperscript{893} ‘The Mad Dog of Europe’, \textit{Sunday Times}, 3 September 1939.
\textsuperscript{894} ‘Nazism will be Destroyed’, \textit{Sunday Express}, 3 September 1939.
sword’, with the ultimate aim of world domination. Through *The Forum*, the South African public was “educated” about the danger and duplicitous nature of Hitler’s promises of peace whilst preparing for the destruction of the targeted country. For example, Hitler did not honour any of the treaties of peace he promised or signed with some European countries such as France. ‘We wish to address the following to the Afrikaners’, stated the paper, ‘many of you, especially the followers of Dr. Malan and his policy, believe that Hitler will be the saviour of the Afrikaners … only misled or indifferent people can expect liberty from Hitler.’ The annexation of Austria, the Czechoslovakia and Sudetenland were used as examples to confirm that Hitler should not be trusted. Interestingly, it was in February 1940 when *The Forum* published a feature that illustrated how Hitler promised France peace for twenty-five years while, on the other side, he was preparing for her destruction, and by June 1940, France had fallen to the German blitzkrieg which had swept her along with the Lower Countries of Europe.

Negative propaganda designed to reduce the appeals of Nazi doctrine became increasingly evident in the pro-government papers. Warnings against “slavery”, loss of the political and personal “liberties” under Nazism and Hitler’s “false promises” were frequently featured. Early in 1939, the *Cape Argus* published a speech by former Nazi clergyman, Pastor W. Luckhoff, at the University of Cape Town, warning about German plans to offer the Afrikaners a Republic, but only consisting of Basotholand, small portions of OFS and Natal, and yet the country remaining under Nazi protection. Nazi sympathisers, the ‘indifferent Afrikaners’, were warned that aligning with Germany held the danger of exchanging the Union Jack for ‘bondage and denigration of the Afrikaans people to helots and slaves of the Hitler-System’. Another approach to mobilise the anti-Nazi sentiment, was to use extracts from Nazi publications to illustrate the negative portrayal and prejudices of the Germans against the Union Afrikaners. For example, in G.A. Gedat’s book, *Was Wird Aus Diesem Afrika? (What will Become of This Africa?)*, it was indicated that:

*The Boers have missed their hour of destiny ... settling as pioneers on huge farms, they began to degenerate, few of them appreciated the value of education for their children. The blacks*
were compelled by them to do hard work and this encouraged pre-existing tendency to
laziness and they degenerated into poor Whites.900

Such kinds of the Germans’ negative depiction of the Afrikaners became frequent features of
anti-Nazi campaigns. It was particularly the Jewish Board of Deputies and the UUTS who
used extracts from captured German documents to publish news features or bulletins that
reflected the prejudiced Nazi portrayals of the Afrikaners and the plots to annex South
Africa.901 This tactic of depicting Nazism negatively served dual purposes. Firstly, the
government’s war policy was rationalised as a struggle against a “ruthless” and tyrannical
adversary – Hitler’s Nazism; secondly, through name-calling and labelling, it served to
negatively stigmatise the opposition movements which sympathised with Nazi Germany. The
effect would thus be the swinging of positive public opinion towards the government and the
rejection of the opposition’s policies.

The opposition had also been employing similar name-calling and labelling technique which
was predicated on associations with the British Empire since the beginning of the war.902 The
main government opposition, Malan’s HNP, persistently apportioned blame on Smuts for
creating internal divisions and distress by supporting Britain. Hence they waged the “peace”
and “stop the war” campaigns, some of which through satirical cartoons.903 In turn, to wrestle
the propaganda initiative from the opposition, government authorities collated the carefully
selected anti-war extracts from the anti-government press, parliamentary debates and
speeches, and produced circulars and bulletins which presented the opposition movements
and leaders in unfavourable light.904 For example, the HNP’s rejection of the English-
Afrikaans equality, negative statements about the soldiers and the republican plans were

900 UWH, Box 281, B.I. 31, German Ambitions in Africa, Extracts from G.A. Gedat, Was Wird Aus
Diesem Afrika?, n.d.
901 Alexander Papers, BC160, List IV, File 24, ‘What the Nazis Think of the Afrikaners’ in a
memorandum titled ‘South Africa for South Africans – Nor For Germany’, n.d; ‘Amazing Nazi Plot to
Annex S.A. Revealed’, Sunday Times, 1 September 1940; ‘German Intrigue in the Union Disclosed’,
The Star, 3 September 1940; See also features of Common Sense which published numerous articles
against Nazism during the war.
902 ‘Malan Announces Pact with Ossewabrandwag, “Republic” to be on Eire Model’, Rand Daily Mail, 1
November 1940.
903 UWH, Box 276, B.I. 28, Opposition Statements on the War Issue and the Election, 1940-1943; ‘Die
904 Army Intelligence, Box 50, I.44 (C), SA Leaders and Personalities, 1940-1941; UP Archives,
Intelligence Reports, Nationalist Party Policy: A Series of Extracts from the Speeches of its Leaders,
1940-1944; UWH, Box 276, B.I. 28, Opposition Statements on the War Issue and the Election, 1940-
1943.
published to expose the racialised and exclusivist policies of the opposition.905 The relations between the HNP and the OB as well as the statements about the wish for German victory were also published to illustrate the negative attitudes towards the Union servicemen and the opposition’s association with the Nazis. Malan’s supporters were referred to as the ‘Malanazis’, and the HNP was referred to as a ‘Nazinale Party’, to project a negative connotation that would elicit rejection by the South African public.906 In this regard, the public would realise that the future of the country lay with supporting Smuts and the war policy.907

Through negative propaganda, the government was able to attribute the country’s distresses towards the Nazi interferences in the domestic affairs to create internal dissensions and instability.908 The effect was that the opposition was then left with the task to find alternative areas other than the war policy to fight the government. It was found to be on the racial front.909 The government, though, needed to secure a healthy public opinion towards its own war policy. This was attempted through a combination of the newspaper advertisements, newsletters, posters and magazines. These were exploited for waging recruitment drives, military demonstrations and economic propaganda campaigns. Whilst the pro-government newspapers played a useful role in exposing the potential dangers such as the Fifth Column and rumour mongering910, their crucial significance lay in the publicity given to recruitment initiatives. The BOI arranged with friendly newspapers to publish information about the recruitment calls, up-coming military demonstrations and the war pictures. Explanations about the nature and purpose of the military events were also provided. The newspapers were

905 UP Archives, Intelligence Reports, Nationalist Party Policy: A Series of Extracts from the Speeches of its Leaders, 1940-1944; UWH, Box 276, B.I. 28; Opposition Statements on the War Issue and the Election, 1940-1943.
906 UWH, Box 265, B.I. 20, Intelligence Summaries, 20 January 1940; UP Archives, Intelligence Reports, ‘Nasionale becomes a Nazinale Party’, Nationalist Party Policy: A Series of Extracts from the Speeches of its Leaders, 1940-1944.
907 UWH, Box 273, B.I. 25, Memorandum of the Propaganda Co-ordinating Committee, 17 September 1942.
908 Army Intelligence, Box 50, I.44 (C), SA Leaders and Personalities, 1940-1941; UP Archives, Intelligence Reports, Nationalist Party Policy: A Series of Extracts from the Speeches of its Leaders, 1940-1944; UWH, Box 273, B.I. 25, Memorandum of the Propaganda Co-ordinating Committee, 17 September 1942; UWH, Box 276, B.I. 28, Opposition Statements on the War Issue and the Election, 1940-1943.
909 After 1943, when German forces were on the retreat, the HNP embarked on intensified campaigns to secure the exclusive socio-economic and political rights of Afrikaners against other racial groups, especially blacks. The ideology of Apartheid was developed during the war.
supplemented by the production of newsletters, bulletins and magazines that promoted the UDF units.

Early in the war, the authorities organised various press-related activities to obtain military volunteers. In February 1940, the DOD published a recruitment booklet titled ‘The Union at War: How to Join Forces’, and elaborated on the need for military training of the able-bodied men of military age. The booklet contained information about all the available units in which interested persons could enlist for full-time or part-time military service. The information in the booklet mainly served to create awareness about the available military units such as the infantry, artillery, technical services, engineering, signals and medical corps, in which eligible members of the public could serve.911 An important piece of information to induce interest was about the rate of pay for men employed on full-time basis. An unmarried private’s pay was approximately ten pounds a month in the first year, which increased annually.912 If married, the pay would include family, ration and lodging allowances, in accordance with the number of children he had. The pay was higher for other ranks. It was a vital incentive for those who were unskilled and without decent job prospects at the time. Joining the military held out the prospects of personal development which would be useful after war. Until May 1940, the focus of recruitment for military service was still mainly on white men and not on women.

After the formation of WAAS in May 1940, volunteers between the ages of 18-40 were required for active service for the duration of the war, either in the Union or anywhere in Africa.913 Recruiting meetings and rallies were organised and personally addressed by eminent personalities such as Werdmuller, Reitz and Isie Smuts, to stimulate interest and to obtain recruits for service.914 Advertisements were published in the newspapers to alert the public about the rallies and strong appeals were made towards women to enlist, often with poor responses.915

911 The Union at War: How to Join Forces, DOD, Cape Town, 1 February 1940.
912 The Union at War: How to Join Forces, DOD, Cape Town, 1 February 1940, pp. 13-14.
913 UWH, Box 261, B.I. 17, Women and the War, 6 July 1943.
The military authorities also organised recruiting marches and tours conducted by WAAS and publicised in the newspapers. In March 1941, WAAS members marched through Cape Town in a major recruiting rally. The *Cape Times* heaped praise on those women for ‘standing by the men’ and their willingness to ‘make sacrifices for freedom and [for] defence of South Africa, their country and their home’.\(^{916}\) Rallies were supplemented with WAAS tours organised throughout the Union’s towns and rural districts to bring the military closer to the public and to facilitate recruitment. During the tours, newspapers were provided with draft articles by the military authorities via the BOI to alert and to publicise the events.\(^{917}\) Urgent calls for more women recruits to join the ranks of army and the air force were posted in newspapers, with information about the available avenues for enlistment, and propaganda leaflets were distributed to the crowds.\(^{918}\) The role of press was to maximise exposure and to create anticipation and excitement before the military tours reached the towns. Usually, the profiles of the leading figures who accompanied the tours were published to enhance the status and significance of the events.\(^{919}\)

Despite the rallies and tours, recruitment drives did not seem to have the desired effect. Malherbe of DMI (Ic), after her recruiting tour of the Transvaal, reported that women lacked knowledge about opportunities offered and the service conditions. Rumours about the moral misbehaviour of Army women, bad facilities and conditions in the barracks, lack of spiritual opportunities and being “sent North”, were spread in the country districts, thus militating against recruitment.\(^{920}\) The report focused more on the rural districts because the large pool for potential recruits were predominantly Afrikaans-speakers – the targeted audience who needed to be converted towards the government’s war policy. The lack of sufficient information was blamed on the BOI for supplying seventy-eight rural newspapers with broadcast talks or stale news that led editors to ignore the BOI’s material.\(^{921}\) This explains the urgency with which the military authorities organised personal contacts at meetings and attempted house to house visits in some districts of the Transvaal to make strong appeals for

\(^{916}\) ‘Salute to Women War Workers’, *Cape Times*, 25 March 1941.

\(^{917}\) Malherbe Papers, File 143/2, KCM 56992 (17), Report: Advance Preparations and Publicity by Lt J. Malherbe, 7 November 1941.

\(^{918}\) ‘Wanted: 100 000 Women to Work for Victory’, *Cape Times*, 25 March 1941; ‘Recruiting for S.A.W.A.S.’, *Cape Argus*, 4 April 1941.


\(^{920}\) Malherbe Papers, File 143/2, KCM 56992 (16), General Report: Recruiting Tour undertaken through Northern and Eastern Transvaal by Lt J. Malherbe, 18 December 1941.

\(^{921}\) Malherbe Papers, File 143/2, KCM 56992 (15), Report: Concerning the Bureau of Information by Lt J. Malherbe, 16 March 1942.
more recruits.922 In one appeal, Werdmuller invoked historical memories of the Voortrekker women who fought alongside their menfolk and subsequently called for women to assist the Springboks who needed to be nearer the frontlines.923 By 1942, the calls became more desperate due to the worsening military situation for the Allied forces and the threat of Japan in the Indian Ocean. Newspapers abounded with articles appealing for recruits and the authorities offering explanations about the available opportunities, pay rates, promotions and skills development.924 However, recruitment of women progressed slowly.925

The press also played an important role in giving publicity to the military demonstrations and the exhibitions of the country’s industrial production. From October 1940, the military authorities organised various recruiting tours of mobile columns (Steel Commando), war supplies demonstration tour (War Trains) and Air Commando displays.926 Together with the BOI, the military authorities organised the press and the SABC for publicity of those demonstrations. The Star published articles explaining the nature and purpose of the Steel Commando – to showcase all units of the UDF, and also delineated the route map of the mobile tour.927 The Cape Argus did the same with the War Trains. It reported that the main purpose of the exhibitions was for the South African public to take pride in the country’s own productive capacity and praised the factory workers as home-front fighters playing a critical role in the war.928 The BOI drafted articles for the newspapers to cover the activities and movements of the mobile columns. Newspaper editors were requested to publish the prepared articles only when the military tours entered the local area. Pictures of the various military equipment were published in the recruiting pamphlets that accompanied the tours.929 The newspapers also covered the actual tours and provided glowing reports about the significance

922 Malherbe Papers, File 143/2, KCM 56992 (16), General Report: Recruiting Tour undertaken through Northern and Eastern Transvaal by Lt J. Malherbe, 18 December 1941.
923 ‘Women Recruits Needed’, Rand Daily Mail, 8 October 1941.
926 CGS (War), Box 207, 45/4, Military Recruiting Tours, Werdmuller to the AG, October 1940; CGS (War), Box 207, 45/4, Defence – Railways - War Supplies Demonstration Tour” “War Trains”, Werdmuller to All Sections Heads and Unit Officers Commanding, 17 March 1941; SANDFA, CGS (War), Box 207, 45/4, Air Commando Tour of the Union, Werdmuller to Blaine, 13 June 1941.
927 ‘Army Unit Tour: Procession of All Units’, The Star, 26 October 1940; ‘Mobile “Commando” Route’, The Star, 30 October 1940.
928 ‘War Train Tour of the Union’, Cape Argus, 14 March 1941.
929 UWH, Box 277, B.I. 29, ‘See the War Train’, Recruiting Pamphlet, 1941 (only year); UWH, Box 277, B.I. 29, ‘See for Yourself the Home-Front’s Mighty War Effort’, Recruiting Pamphlet, 1941 (only year).
of the military displays and the need for recruits. Colonel Werdmuller was in charge of the tours and utilised the opportunity to address the public for recruiting purposes, including blacks, who actually did fall within his scope of recruitment. To supplement the recruitment tours and military displays, the DMI (Ic) facilitated the publication of articles about the various UDF units in the field. Information about the tank corps, artillery, signallers and infantry as well as their training centres in the Union was prepared for the BOI to distribute to the press. The articles served to educate the public about the significance and role of each unit in the army, and how eligible members could develop and enhance their skills at the available training depots. Examples of how those units performed in military campaigns in Abyssinia, Libya and Egypt were also offered for the purpose of highlighting their significance and enhancing the reputation of the relevant regiments. Smuts wrote a dedicated publication called the *Sidi Rezegh and its Call*, reflecting on the encounters of the 5th South African Brigade which suffered heavy losses against the Germans and Italians. As in previous speeches, he described the war as a contest between ‘the total forces of evil and aggression in mass attack on the united forces of freedom – Germany, Italy and Japan against the British Commonwealth of Nations, Russia and America’. On this basis, he made renewed calls for recruits to fill the depleted ranks. The publication contained pictures of the troops engaged in their routine work and others cheerfully playing in social scenes. The UDF’s film and photographic unit, operating in the North from 1943, played an important role of producing thousands of photos per month for military publicity and propaganda. The unit, despite lacking sufficient skilled personnel comparable to, for example Britain, America and Australia, was instrumental in supplying the newspapers with the visual depiction of the UDF troops in various war settings.

---

930 ‘Men Needed for the Home-Front: Objects of the War Trains Tour of the Union’, *Cape Argus*, 29 March 1941.
932 Army Intelligence, Box 20, I. 20 (A), Recruiting Publicity Campaign, November-December 1942.
933 Army Intelligence, Box 20, I. 20 (A), The Home of Guns, 17 November 1942; Army Intelligence, Box 20, I. 20 (A), To The Last Round, 17 November 1942; Army Intelligence, Box 20, I. 20 (A), The Private Soldier at Work: The New Springbok Infantry, 17 November 1942; Army Intelligence, Box 20, I. 20 (A), Preparing for the Offensive: The South African Tank Corps, 9 November 1942.
934 UWH, Box 240, B.I. 2, Sidi Rezegh and its Call, December 1942.
935 UWH, Box 240, B.I. 2, Sidi Rezegh and its Call, December 1942, p. 10.
936 PP, Box 40, UDF/FP/8/1, A Brief History of SAPR Film and Photo Unit, May 1945.
937 PP, Box 40, UDF/FP/8/1, Report by OC, SAPR Film and Photographic Unit, 28 December 1944; PP, Box 40, UDF/FP/8/1, South African Public Relations Film and Photographic Unit, Italy, April 1945.
photos mainly depicted soldiers in social scenarios and also reflected the ruined cities after military operations.\textsuperscript{938}

Black press was also instrumental in stimulating war enthusiasm within the black communities. The government identified a list of black newspapers circulating in the Union to publish various articles about NEAS. The NAD contracted the head of Bantu Press, B.F.G. Paver, to promote the war among black communities through articles in the eight black newspapers and the Secretary for Native Affairs’ \textit{Weekly News Bulletin}.\textsuperscript{939} The articles dealt with life in military camps, recruitment, the various phases of training, special parades and demonstrations, award ceremonies, arrivals and receptions of casualties, as well as general interest news.\textsuperscript{940} The military authorities conducted a “Soldiers Friend Column”\textsuperscript{941} in all black newspapers, where questions were invited from the black civilians and soldiers on matters pertaining to experiences of difficulties, pensions, employment, medical categories, allotments, financial relief, re-employment and other military-related issues.\textsuperscript{942} In addition, the eminent NMC members, their achievements and activities were published in the “Gossip Column” sections of the black newspapers.\textsuperscript{943} Major Frank Brownlee, former Judge President of Native Appeal Court for the Transvaal and Natal, was instrumental in drafting the articles

\textsuperscript{938} ‘Suid Afrikaners Aan and Agter Front’, \textit{Die Vaderland}, 19 August 1944.
\textsuperscript{939} DNEAS Group 2, Box 10, NAS, 3/21 K, DNEAS to DCS (DMI), 13 February 1943; NMC, Box 11, NAS, 3/21, Report on Publicity and Propaganda, 20 August 1942; See various versions of Black Press in J.C. Amsrong (ed.), \textit{The Black Press in South Africa and Lesotho: A Descriptive Bibliographical Guide to African, Coloured and Indian newspapers, newsletters and magazines, 1836-1976}, (G.K. Hall and Co, Boston Massachusetts, 1979). The newspapers referred to here are \textit{Bantu World} (Johannesburg), \textit{Umteteli wa Bantu} (Johannesburg), \textit{Imvo Zabantsundu} (Johannesburg), \textit{Ilanga lase Natal} (Durban), \textit{Um-Afrika} (Marianhill), \textit{Umthunywa} (Umtata), \textit{Mochochono} (Maseru), \textit{Morongoa oa Morena} (Palmerton), \textit{Indaba Zovuyo} (Palmerton), and also the Secretary for Native Affairs’ \textit{Weekly News Bulletin}.
\textsuperscript{942} Box 11, NAS, 3/21, Report on Publicity and Propaganda, 20 August 1942; NMC, Box 16, NAS, 3/21/D, Questions by NMC members and Replies by DNEAS, DNEAS to Secretary, Bantu Press, 3 December 1942; NMC, Box 16, NAS, 3/21/D, Questions by NMC member, Sgt D.R. Moko, Secretary, Bantu Press to DNEAS, 13 April 1943; NMC, Box 16, NAS, 3/21/D, Soldiers’ Friend Column, DNEAS to the Editor, Bantu Press, 24 May 1943.
\textsuperscript{943} NMC, Box 14, NAS 3/21/A, Further Dramatic Escape from Tobruk, Reuben Moloi, by DNEAS for press publication, October 1942; NMC, Box 14, NAS 3/21/A, More Honours for Cape Corps and Native Military Corps, by DNEAS for publication in the press, at the request of the Secretary to the Minister of Native Affairs, 8 February 1944.
for the publicity of the NMC and also prepared leaflets in black languages to combat Nazi propaganda among blacks.\(^{944}\)

The BOI, together with the NAD, also translated an English and Afrikaans newsletter called *News of the War* into black languages.\(^{945}\) The *News of the War* contained information about the military operations, military successes and pictures of the NEAS engaged in the various activities as well as the awarding of medals.\(^{946}\) The purpose of the *News of the War* was ‘to keep Africans well informed about the war’ and to promote black identification with the war.\(^{947}\) It was a “hard sell” approach with the immediate objectives of cultivating black enthusiasm in the war by showcasing the military achievements and contributions of the black servicemen. Another approach was concerned with combating the growth of subversive German propaganda among blacks.\(^{948}\) The government employed negative propaganda to nurture the anti-German sentiment. Newspapers published articles reflecting the atrocious German colonial record in SWA and Tanganyika, and also how the Nazis were treating the inhabitants of the occupied European countries since the war started.\(^{949}\) Propaganda was crafted to induce fear and to dissuade the public, both black and white, from advocating Nazi victory as that would result in adverse consequences for the nation. (See illustrations 12-15)

The South African Services’ official news magazine, *The Nongqai*, added to the growing list of publications which promoted military publicity and propaganda. First published in the Pretoria offices of the Union’s commissioner of police in 1913 as a monthly regimental journal, it contained articles, stories, anecdotes, pictures and sketches on the security services, i.e. the military, the police and the prison officials.\(^{950}\) Though it declared that ‘politics and argument’ had no place in the magazine, it could not escape the promotion of war propaganda as it was committed to the publication of articles, stories and pictures of the South African forces. *The Nongqai* had an exclusive section called ‘Defence Headquarters’, which was

---

944 UWH, Box 240, B.I. 2, South Africa at War – Military Matters, 18 June 1942; ‘Natives told about Nazi “White Ants”’, *Rand Daily Mail*, 4 June 1940.

945 HEN, Box 2190, 432/1/12, Weekly Newsletter, Bureau of Information, 19 March 1944.

946 *News of the War*, Bureau of Information, 1941-1945.

947 HEN, Box 2190, 432/1/12, Weekly Newsletter, Bureau of Information, 19 March 1944.


949 ‘Life under Germans’, *The Star*, 21 September 1940; ‘Hitler, the Satan of Today’, *The Star*, 29 April 1941; SANDFA, UWH, Box 281, B.I. 31, Native Africans’ Opinion of Nazi Germany, 14 December 1940.

dedicated to matters of a military nature. As war progressed, the magazine assisted the government in the recruitment campaigns. Through its advertisement supplement, it carried information in English and Afrikaans, regarding the procedures to be used by the public to join the various units of the UDF on full-time or part-time basis.

From August 1940, after the departure of the UDF troops for deployment in the North, *The Nongqai* created a dedicated section called ‘Going Up North: Union Troops on the Move’, which dealt with the news from the troops serving in East and North Africa. Each monthly issue was dedicated to a particular branch of military service or war activity, both on the home-front and outside South Africa. The stories and articles of servicemen and UDF units were also accompanied by photographic pictures for illustrative purposes. Also, through *The Nongqai*, the stories of the many “obscure” units of the UDF such as the salt convoys and the despatch riders or even the story of an equipment officer of the entertainment unit, were told, explaining their unglamorous but arduous tasks, in order to illustrate their significance in support of the war effort. What *The Nongqai* did was to provide an extensive coverage of the various aspects of the war and to construct heroic images of the South Africa armed forces for the purpose of enhancing their popularity and for generating interest in the war effort.

Throughout the war, *The Nongqai* maintained its loyalty by promoting the war policy, spreading editorial messages of sacrifice and unity in both English and Afrikaans, publishing Christmas greetings from General Smuts, devoting articles relating to individual members in the war effort, the various roles of UDF units, personal stories and profiles of servicemen, war-related cartoons and sketches, defence weapons and manoeuvres, anecdotes and interviews. The “V for Victory” propaganda symbol and the South African version of it was also popularised in the magazine. This symbol was promoted by the BBC during 1941 to rally support for an unwavering determination of the Allied forces and resistance against the Axis powers.

---

954 See volumes of *The Nongqai*, 1939-1945.
movements of occupied Europe to fight for victory against the Axis powers.\textsuperscript{956} Even though \textit{The Nongqai} played its part in wartime propaganda, as a mouthpiece to promote the South African armed forces, it suffered a major shortcoming like the rest of the mainstream press – the lack of troop photographs in military action.\textsuperscript{957} (See illustrations 16-23)

Another magazine with a dedicated effort of promoting the government’s war policy was \textit{Libertas}, published in Johannesburg by the UUTS. The first issue of this illustrated propaganda magazine appeared in December 1940.\textsuperscript{958} \textit{Libertas} was a 96-page pictorial magazine designed along similar lines as \textit{Life} and the \textit{Picture Post} magazines of the United States and Britain respectively.\textsuperscript{959} The UUTS, which had undertaken to wage a militant propaganda campaign, designed the magazine for the sole purpose of publicising the Union’s war effort. Its major emphasis, just like \textit{The Nongqai}, was on popularising military service and the work of the participants in the war. To this end, \textit{Libertas} ran a series of picture biographies of the ‘South African Heroes’ in the armed forces and their various activities in service of the nation during the war.\textsuperscript{960} By 1943, in order to increase circulation and to arouse further interest in the magazine, the policy of \textit{Libertas} had changed from only popularising military service and the Union’s war effort, to deal constructively with the social and economic issues through its pictures.\textsuperscript{961} As the main pro-government propaganda vehicle, the UUTS also decided to enhance the magazine’s appeal by converting it into a National Trust, whereby it would serve to promote the preservation of the Union’s natural and animal resources and the promotion of national unity after the war.\textsuperscript{962}

The London-based \textit{Royal United Service Institution (RUSI)} published a journal dedicated to the promotion of naval and military science and literature. The \textit{RUSI} journal was published quarterly and made available to the members of \textit{RUSI} in any part of the world.\textsuperscript{963} During the war, the South African political and military events were published regularly under the “notes” sections of the Navy, Army and Air Force. The significant role of \textit{RUSI} journal was

\begin{footnotes}
\item[957] See copies of \textit{The Nongqai}, 1940-1945.
\item[958] ‘Libertas - A Great Success’, \textit{Torch Sparks}, No. 7, A pamphlet communicating UUTS information to officials and members, 13 January 1941.
\item[959] CGS (War), Box 199, 42/5, Robertson to CGS, 11 December 1940.
\item[960] ‘A Day in the life of a Woman Transport Driver’ (J.A. Malherbe), \textit{Libertas}, vol. 1, no.2, January 1941; See copies of \textit{The Nongqai}, 1940-1945.
\item[961] UUTS, A1883, 20, Union Unity Truth Service Annual Report, 1 July 1942 - 30 June 1943.
\item[962] UUTS, A1883, 20, Union Unity Truth Service Annual Report, 1 July 1942 - 30 June 1943.
\item[963] Journal: \textit{Royal United Service Institution (RUSI)}, May 1939. This journal was published in January, April, July and October of every year.
\end{footnotes}
to publish professional articles of educational value—useful lessons about war, and also provided the space for brief notes on military news about the various members of the Commonwealth of Nations such as South Africa, Canada, Australia and India. Because it catered for many countries, the RUSI journal played a limited role in South Africa’s war propaganda effort.

There were also numerous other publications of multiple variety that proliferated in the Union. The “V for Victory” propaganda sign was presented in large posters and also in small pocket-sized publications, depicting Hitler being overwhelmed with the “V” sign everywhere. Smuts also popularised the “V for Victory” in booklet, and explained that the ‘in South Africa the V stands not only for victory, but also for Freedom – Vryheid.’ The public was urged to adopt the sign as a national watchword in a determined struggle for victory and freedom. Another publication called Flash, published in Pietermaritzburg during the war, had a “V” sign on its logo, and dedicated its content to ridiculing the anti-government elements. In 1944, Flash had a full page of a large “V” sign advertisement which had pictures of SAWAS members inside it with a caption, ‘We Salute the Queens’, in an effort to honour the role women were playing in the Union’s struggle for victory. Publications of a similar nature flooded the country and greatly contributed to the government’s propaganda effort on the home-front in terms of boosting morale and popularising the services of the South African forces in the war. (See illustrations 24-27)

Posters also served as another media for publicity and propaganda in the promotion of the Union’s the war effort on the home-front. The BOI commissioned commercial artists and advertising contractors for the design and production of war-related propaganda posters. Posters were mainly used for recruitment purposes, issuing careless talk warnings, and vilifying the Nazis and the anti-war elements. The posters were displayed at prominent places

968 See Four Enemies by the Goodwill Council, Vanguard to Victory by Conrad Norton and Uys Krige, (General Smuts) Investing in Friendship by London-based Hodder and Stoughton publishers, They Answered the Call by the Jewish Board of Deputies, and the various other propaganda publications in Afrikaans and English from the USA.
969 AG (War), Box 6, 168/2/7/8, Establishment SAINC (V) – War Artist, 1 September 1943; ‘SA War Artists’, The Nongqai, October 1942; NASAP, Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 150, The Bureau of Information: Present Activities, 21 May 1942.
such as post offices, railway stations, police stations, shops, establishments, defence recruiting facilities as well as on trains and buses.\textsuperscript{970}

For propaganda among blacks, the posters were printed in Sesotho for the Transvaal population, isiZulu for Natal and isiXhosa for the Cape, Ciskei and Transkei.\textsuperscript{971} The posters were displayed at native commissioners’ offices, black drinking places (native beer halls), on buses for black commuters and in cinemas for black patrons.\textsuperscript{972} These were supplemented with thousands of recruitment appeals in English and a relevant black language according to the area, and containing pictures of the black chiefs.\textsuperscript{973} Posters were simplified to convey the relevant message through the pictures and with limited words, such as, ‘Manpower for Airpower’, (Afrikaans) ‘\textit{Steeds Getrou Op Die Pad van Suid Afrika: 1838, 1899, 1941}’ and ‘Recruits Wanted-South African Medical Services’.\textsuperscript{974}

The war artists were also instrumental in crafting recruitment posters for the NMC. For example, in one poster, an NMC soldier in military outfit (without an assegai) was depicted calling on others in Sesotho, isiXhosa and isiZulu languages to “Wake up (\textit{Vukani}) and Join” because the enemy was planning a ‘Nazi Africa’.\textsuperscript{975} These kinds of messages were regularly used to heighten the fear of a Nazi victory in order to persuade people to join up. The works of the war artists who recorded concrete impressions of the war involving South Africa were significant in complementing the posters. (See illustrations 28-32)

Official South African war artists, chiefly Captain Neville Lewis, Lieutenant Geoffrey Long and Lieutenant Francois Krige, were required to produce paintings in colour or etchings for

\textsuperscript{970} Army Intelligence, Box 20, 1, 20, PR 23/4/2, Recruiting Drives, 10 September 1940; Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 150, The Bureau of Information: Present Activities, 21 May 1942.
\textsuperscript{971} DNEAS, Group 2, Box 6, NAS 3/4/1, Recruiting Activities, DNEAS Lieutenant to Lt Col Mockford, 5 November 1942.
\textsuperscript{972} DNEAS, Group 2, Box 6, NAS 3/4/1, Recruiting Activities, DNEAS Lieutenant to Lt Col Mockford, 5 November 1942; DNEAS, Group 2, Box 6, NAS 3/4/1, List of Bus Owners, Secretary in the Office of Local Transportation Board to DNEAS, 20 November 1942.
\textsuperscript{973} DNEAS, Group 2, Box 6, NAS 3/4/1, Printing of Appeals by Native Chiefs, DNEAS to Government Printer, Pretoria, 23 December 1942; NMC, Box 15, NAS 3/21/C, NMC, Speeches and Appeals, Chiefs S.W. Makaula (Baca), R. Sibasa (Venda), A. Moloi (Lehurutse, Tswana), S. Mampuru (Nebo, Pedi), H. Mangope (Lehurutse, Tswana), M. Buthelezi (Zulu), J.K. Mankurwane (Batlapang, Tswana), C. Mopeli (Wietzishoek, Sotho), W.K. Manthe (Taung, Tswana), B. Sigcau (Pondo), J. Moshesh (Sotho), S.H. Lehana (Botlokoa – Mt Fletcher, Sotho), J. Moepi (Pedi), M. Zulu (Melthoth, Natal), G. Mbulaheni (Zoutpansberg, Venda), L. Ngcobo, (Natal, Zulu).
\textsuperscript{974} ‘Posters in South Africa’, \textit{The Nongqai}, November 1941.
\textsuperscript{975} NMC, Box 14, 3/21/A, Propaganda and Press Matters, NMC Recruiting Poster, “\textit{Vukani}”, n.d.
pictorial portrayal of the country’s war effort for propaganda and for historical records.  

Official war artists were part of the DMI under Dr Malherbe which facilitated the control of the war art, publication of reproductions and also organised exhibitions. The war artists produced various paintings and water colour drawings depicting war scenes (e.g. Tobruk in 1942), military hardware, portraits of military personnel, in the shelters, in convoys, in the navy and war production. War artists portrayed a version of the reality of war, which the South African still photographers were not able to produce. The paintings were mostly exhibited in several places and then preserved for historical records once their value had diminished. After the war, there were about 313 artworks produced by the UDF official war artists and other private persons and the South African War Museum had 583 war art copies in its possession. (See figs. 4-11)

CONCLUSION

Radio and the press were critical to the Union government’s propaganda effort during the war. However, both had different strengths and weakness. Radio was valuable for reaching a wider public at the same time, even the non-literate public, but the government did not exercise complete control over the scope of, and content of what was transmitted. Until late in the war, technical deficiencies hampered direct and instant transmissions to the Union, thus impacting on radio’s effectiveness in the government’s propaganda effort. The content was also not accepted by whole communities, especially black South Africans. The press, on the other hand, had by far, greater reach, scope and visual impact. However, it was mainly accessible to literate people, and was more open to contestations by various groups, including government opponents. The government also had no control over the newspaper editors, who had the sole monopoly over the contents. The editors volunteered to observe censorship regulations, but breached them on many occasions, especially the opposition movements.

---

976 AG (War), Box 6, 168/2/7/8, Establishment SAINC (V) – War Artist, 1 September 1943; SANDFA, AG (3), Box 2A, 51/1, Catalogue of SA War Art, 1939-1945, by DCGS (DMI), 21 August 1947; ‘SA War Artists’, The Nongqai, October 1942.

977 AG (War), Box 4, 168/2/2/2, Establishment DMI-DCS Section, Organisational Chart, 13 July 1943.

978 AG (3), Box 2A, 51/1, Catalogue of SA War Art, 1939-1945, by DCGS (DMI), 21 August 1947; AG (War), Box 6, 168/2/7/8, Establishment SAINC (V) – War Artist, 1 September 1943; ‘SA War Artists’, The Nongqai, October 1942; Malherbe Papers, File 440/2, KCM 56974 (648), The First Exhibition South African War Art: Illustrated Souvenir Edition, October 1941.


980 AG (3), Box 2A, 51/1, Catalogue of SA War Art, 1939-1945, by DCGS (DMI), 21 August 1947. The latest number of artistic works from the SA Military Museum is about a thousand.
which, unlike the government, had their own newspaper publications. The government, to some extent, had control over the news content of the UDF activities in the war zone as these were channelled through the BOI and SAPA. Another advantage was drawn from the posters and artworks produced by authorised war artists and government-contracted advertising companies.

Despite these shortcomings, radio and the press proved to be valuable instruments in the conduct of propaganda operations, especially because of their reach and accessibility. They were also much cheaper, as compared to the other platforms which were also exploited to advance the Union government’s propaganda campaign: films, newsreels and military demonstrations. These platforms offered more visual impact due to motion presentations and, in the case of military displays, live action. However, as will be shown in the next chapter, their high technical and financial requirements presented difficulties to the Union authorities. Hence their role remained supplementary to radio and the press. The next chapter will examine these other platforms and their value in detail, in the context of South Africa’s war propaganda on the home-front.
Illustration 9: Rand Daily Mail, 26 Jun 1939

Illustration 10: Rand Daily Mail, 6 Sep 1939

Illustration 11: Sunday Express, 23 July 1939

Illustration 12: Bantu World, 12 Sep 1942

Illustration 13: Bantu World, 12 Sep 1942

Illustration 14: Bantu World, 12 Sep 1942
Illustration 24: Victory Symbol to Scare Adolf Hitler, Ditsong Museum of Military History, Johannesburg
Illustration 29, Careless Talk Warning Posters, Ditsong Museum of Military History, Johannesburg

Illustration 30: Anti-Fascist and Anti-Hitler Propaganda: Military Archives, War Diaries, vol. 533. These posters were produced for the UDF troops too.


Fig. 4: Col E.T. Stubbs, DNEAS, War Art No. 1279

Fig. 5: NMC Soldier, War Art No. 1815
Fig. 6: NMC, Stretcher Bearer, War Art No. 1816
Fig. 7: NMC, Making Beer, War Art No. 1780
Fig. 8: Dead Germans, War Art No. 1618
Fig. 9: CC, EL Haseiat, War Art No. 1569
Fig. 10: Casualties W. Desert, War Art No. 1619
Fig. 11: Reading Night, War Art No. 1721

Figures 4-11: War Art, Ditsong Museum of Military History, Johannesburg
CHAPTER 4

HOME-FRONT PROPAGANDA: FILMS, NEWSREELS AND MILITARY DISPLAYS

In order to arouse and sustain public enthusiasm in the war as well as to facilitate recruiting, the Union authorities exploited the novelty of films and newsreels to conduct war propaganda. From the military side, arrangements were also made for undertaking mobile recruiting tours and for staging military displays to the public throughout the country. These activities were designed to inspire the public through live action and to showcase the Union’s military capacity for the purpose of boosting public morale and to support recruitment efforts. This chapter analyses these various programmes as additional avenues exploited by the Union government to secure home-front support during the war. It will firstly examine the production and exhibition films and newsreels as well as the value they added to the Union’s war propaganda effort. Thereafter, the chapter will deal with the organisation of military tours and demonstrations as well as the impact these had on recruitment.

FILMS AND NEWSREELS

To start with, it is useful to provide some background about the origin and development of the film industry in South Africa, so as to create context for the role they (films – newsreels) played in war propaganda. By the outbreak of the war, the film industry has been developed for forty-five years in South Africa. Following the mineral revolution in the Union, from the discoveries of diamond in Kimberley (1869) and gold in the Reef (1886), the film industry emerged ten years later.981 As early as 1895, mobile bioscopes had reached the Johannesburg mining fields and continued until the establishment of the African Film Productions in 1910 by the New York (USA) immigrant, Isadore William Schlesinger.982 Schlesinger consolidated the national production, distribution and exhibition under the African Consolidated Films and the African Consolidated Theatres.983

983 Ibid., p. 89.
In 1913, Schlesinger’s African Films company founded the *The African Mirror*, which became an important vehicle for producing war news in motion pictures to the public during the war.\(^{984}\) Apart from African Films, other film companies such as the United Artists, Union Films, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer and 20\(^{th}\) Century Fox, entered the South African market, especially in the 1930s.\(^{985}\) Because of their entertainment value and mental distraction, films came to play a significant role with regard to propaganda campaigns to generate support for the Union’s war policy. Out of the immediate wartime propaganda necessity and convenience of the available film resources and capacity, the Union’s DMI (Ic) and the BOI exploited the cinema for popular mobilisation of the society. Thus, the BOI brokered arrangements for collaborative efforts with the existing film bodies to wage the country’s propaganda campaign.\(^{986}\) The military, on the hand, went on to develop in-house film production capability to cater for the instruction and training needs of the UDF.

Military authorities acknowledged the role of modern film as one of the most important aspect of wartime propaganda.\(^{987}\) However, it was also South Africa’s weakest link in the whole propaganda system. Part of the reason was the initial focus on training and instructional films. These were supplied by the British war office in mid-1940.\(^{988}\) In December of the same year the UDF Film Unit under Major Weaver was established for producing and circulating military instructional and general interest films.\(^{989}\) Until mid-1942, this Film Unit mainly concentrated on the production and circulation of films to various training centres and camps in the Union. By June, it had veered into publicity by producing a


\(^{987}\) AG (War), Box 5, 168/2/2/2/4, Deputy Chief of Staff to Director of Military Intelligence, 5 October 1942; PP, Box 63, PU 6/4/2, Activities, Establishment and Progress of UDF Film Unit, 29 August 1942; AG (War), Box 4, 168/2/2/2/2, Establishment – Director of Military Intelligence, 14 January 1943.

\(^{988}\) AG (War), Box 4, 168/2/2/2/2, Establishment-Director of Intelligence, Subsection, Film Production Unit, 24 December 1942.

\(^{989}\) PP, Box 63, PU 6/4/2, Establishment – Film Production Unit, Weaver to Malherbe, 16 September 1942; AG (War), Box 4, 168/2/2/2/2, Establishment – Director of Military Intelligence, 14 January 1943; PP, Box 63, PU 6/4/2, Activities, Establishment and Progress of UDF Film Unit, 29 August 1942.
recruiting film for women.\textsuperscript{990} British and American films were still imported and distributed through the BOI.

When the UDF troops were deployed in the North, there was mainly one cinematographer, Lieutenant Frank Dixon (who resigned in January 1941 and was replaced by Merl la Voy) and one still photographer, Lieutenant S.A.D. Keartland, both working for the BOI, to cover the activities of the South African forces in the field.\textsuperscript{991} Although the military had its own film unit, the BOI’s film section, with the assistance of a film critic and part-time film advisor to the BOI’s director, Thelma Gutsche\textsuperscript{992}, had maintained monopoly over the production, circulation and exhibition of films in the Union throughout the war, which was a source of constant friction and weakness in terms of conducting effective war propaganda through films.\textsuperscript{993} Attempts to remedy the situation were undertaken during the post-Tobruk recruitment drive. As a result of the need for better co-ordination of film propaganda activities, proposals were approved by Lawrence and Van Ryneveld to incorporate the BOI’s film section into the UDF Film Unit.\textsuperscript{994} However, the proposals were partially implemented as the BOI still maintained control over the film aspect of war propaganda. A measure of relief was achieved with the establishment of the film and photographic unit under Captain F.N. Clayton in 1943, as a sub-section of the South African public relations (SAPR) based in North Africa/Middle East (and later moved to Italy).\textsuperscript{995}

Clayton was a cinematographer, and was assisted by Lieutenant D. Abraham and Lieutenant J.W. Nicholls for still photography.\textsuperscript{996} These were the only two staff members who performed the two tasks of taking shots of the UDF troops in the field. A third member, a cine operator

\textsuperscript{990} PP, Box 63, PU 6/4/2, Military Film Unit, Malherbe to Director of Military Training (DMT), 29 June 1942.

\textsuperscript{991} PP, Box 63, PU 6/9/1, Memorandum on the Bureau of Information – Representatives in the Field, DMI (Ic) to DDMI, 29 October 1940; PP, Box 63, PU 6/9/1, Memorandum, Bureau of Information: Proposed Reorganisation, 14 July 1941.

\textsuperscript{992} PP, Box 63, PU 6/9/1, Memorandum, Bureau of Information: Proposed Reorganisation, 14 July 1941; Malherbe Papers, File 438/1, KCM 56974 (532b), Correspondence, Thelma Gutshe to Dr Malherbe, 29 January 1941 and 14 March 1942.

\textsuperscript{993} PP, Box 63, PU 6/9/5, Report on the Relationship between the Bureau of Information and the UDF, Discussion with Mr A.N.Wilson, Report by Capt I. Baries of Ic Film Unit, 6 January 1941; PP, Box 63, PU 6/9/4, Notes, Final Military Publicity Campaign, DMI (Ic) Press Liaison Staff, 14 January 1944; PP, Box 63, PU 6/9/4, Memorandum on Military Publicity and Propaganda, R.N. Lindsay (ADPR) to DMI, 22 February 1944.

\textsuperscript{994} PP, Box 63, PU 6/4/2, Expansion of Defence Film Unit to Incorporate Film Section of Bureau of Information, DDMI to DCS, 16 July 1942.

\textsuperscript{995} PP, Box 40, UDF/FP/8/1, Report by OC, SAPR Film and Photographic Unit, 28 December 1944; PP, Box 40, UDF/FP/8/1, Official Photographs, Wakefield to Theron, 7 December 1944.

\textsuperscript{996} PP, Box 40, UDF/FP/8/1, Report by OC, SAPR Film and Photographic Unit, 28 December 1944.
named Sergeant J.H. Middleton, was ill and could not offer any assistance. These arrangements, however, remained inadequate to cover the entire activities of the UDF during the war.

In January 1944, the press liaison staff of the DMI (Ic)’s assessment report on war propaganda filming for UDF was very blunt: ‘present film coverage is inadequate and poor … [it] is due to the lack of cameramen with the South African forces’. In the following month, the assistant director of public relations (ADPR) in the North, Major (later lieutenant colonel) R.N. Lindsay wrote in his memorandum to the DMI (Dr Malherbe) that ‘the film aspect of publicity is without doubt the weakest part of the organisation’. The staff shortage limited the work of film production and circulation, however, some successes were recorded. Thousands of reels and photographs were produced and distributed to the Union and to the UK. In 1944, the entire UDF Film Unit had handled and circulated about 56,000 16 mm (short standard for travelling) and 35 mm films (international cinema standard) for military training, recruitment and for general publicity.

A large proportion of film production and circulation during the war was handled by the BOI. By 1942, the BOI had organised with major film companies like the African Films, Union Films and Metro-Goldwyn-Meyer, for the production and exhibition of war propaganda films to the public. The BOI also deployed its photographer and cinematographer as war correspondents who accompanied the UDF in the North to film their activities. The films were then handled in the Union by the BOI through contracted film companies and were shown in cinemas throughout the Union. The BOI’s films were also distributed to the

997 PP, Box 40, UDF/FP/8/1, Report by OC, SAPR Film and Photographic Unit, 28 December 1944.
998 PP, Box 63, PU 6/9/4, Notes, Final Military Publicity Campaign, DMI (Ic) Press Liaison Staff, 14 January 1944.
999 PP, Box 63, PU 6/9/4, Memorandum on Military Publicity and Propaganda, R.N. Lindsay (ADPR) to DMI, 22 February 1944.
1000 PP, Box 40, UDF/FP/8/1, Report by OC, SAPR Film and Photographic Unit, May 1945.
1001 PP, Box 40, PR 1/2/2, South African Public Relations Film and Photo Unit (SAPR), Liaison, Publicity and Results, Memorandum for Colonel Campbell-Ross, 27 July 1944; ‘Military Movies’, The Nongqai, December 1944.
1002 Malherbe Papers, File 438/1, KCM 56974 (542), Memorandum on The Utilisation of Film Resources in Furthering the War Effort on a National Scale, 30 June 1942.
Despite their tumultuous relationship, the BOI and the DMI (Ic), in collaboration with the SABC and the UUTS, played a key role in integrating films within the broader propaganda system to facilitate the stimulation of a nation-wide interest in the Union’s war effort. Films, newsreels and even slides were produced and circulated in the cinemas and at many exhibition centres in the country.

In collaboration with the DMI (Ic), the BOI arranged for the production of various war propaganda films. One of the first films produced by the African Films in 1940 was called *Fighters in the Veld*, with commentary in both English and Afrikaans, for exhibition throughout the country. Because of the apparent laxity and slow recruitment progress when war began, the film was designed to mobilise public awareness and support for the war. *Fighters in the Veld* reflected the “backveld” origin of the troops, mainly the Afrikaners, who were historically pastoralists and were responding to a call by the Union leaders to defend their freedom. The film depicted the development of men from civilian life, disorganised and relaxed, to a disciplined posture of military men. A conventional cliché of portraying a civilian man as ignorant and weak, and after joining the army, developed into a disciplined, focused and “real” man, was employed in the film. The film, reflecting the prevailing stereotypes of the social status of women, also portrayed women knitting and sewing garments for the troops, fulfilling their support role as care-givers.

*Fighters in the Veld* also showed military vehicles moving into communities, including black areas, to portray the army as part of the nation, not a separate caste. It was a gesture of friendship as well as to showcase the country’s military might to combat subversive propaganda among blacks, which had magnified the power of the German army. From civilian occupations to military service, the *Fighters in the Veld* showed the UDF soldier with high levels of efficiency and co-ordination, effective in manoeuvres, a well-developed sense of speed in gun-handling and very fit. In the messages, phrases like “defend freedom” and “national honour” were frequently used. Smuts was exalted as a “man of action” who was...
leading South Africa against the “Nazi threat and tyranny”. Religious values were invoked in the film where the UDF troops were depicted as “crusaders of the cross”, representing enlightened forces. fighters in the veld basically reflected what was “good” and “desirable” about military service that people should not fear to join, and the worth of the cause for which they were fighting.

For the recruitment of blacks, DNEAS arranged with the BOI to produce the main silent film called Ayihlome, which was also done by African Films in 1942. Films had in recent decades played a significant role in the recruitment of blacks for South Africa’s gold mines. In the 1920s, organisations such as the Native Recruiting Corporation (NRC) and the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association (WNLA) (later The Employment Bureau of Africa (TEBA)) utilised mobile cinemas as part of the black labour-recruitment system for the mines. In addition to the recruitment of black labour, films were also used for what was called ‘health and safety propaganda’ campaign, to promote workers’ health and to reduce the risk of sexually transmitted diseases (STDs) among blacks as a result of the miners’ fraternisation with prostitutes. Reynolds argues that it was typical of the propaganda films, which were also used in colonial Africa, to promote western products (e.g. medicine) and for “improving the lives” (e.g. civilisation) of blacks.

For military recruitment, similarly with Fighters in the Veld, the central theme in the film, Ayihlome, was the promotion of the value of serving in the military in order to develop personal skills which would be relevant after the war. There was also emphasis on the critical need of defending the values of democracy and liberty threatened by the forces of evil.

1009 Fighters in the Veld, FA 2525, part 1.
1010 Fighters in the Veld, FA 2524, part 2.
1011 Fighters in the Veld, FA 2524, part 2.
1012 SANDFA, DNEAS, Group 2, NMC, Box 11, NAS 3/21, Recruiting Film, Lt Col H.S. Mockford (DNEAS) to Maj T.E Leifeldt (Native Commissioner), 7 July 1942.
1014 Reynolds, From Red Blanket to Civilisation, pp. 133-135.
represented by Nazi Germany. As with the rest of colonial Africa, references to the protection of freedom and democracy had limited appeal to blacks due to the prevalent racial policies of discrimination across the continent. Blacks have often wandered about the hypocrisy of fighting for freedom in Europe, yet subjected to racial oppression at home:

Most Africans feel and declare that they have not only nothing to fight for, but nothing to fight with. Even many of those who had volunteered and answered the call became disillusioned when they discovered the unsatisfactory, humiliating, discriminating conditions they have to serve under.

In *Ayihlome*, blacks were portrayed as living in a timeless void without advancement and development regardless of the prevailing changes brought about by modernity. The stereotypes of projecting blacks in primordial context were apparent. The film started with a traditional Zulu war dance, as this nation was historically assumed for its martial prowess. Black soldiers in the film were portrayed wearing modern uniforms, but still carrying the traditional *assegais*. It implied that blacks were still living in the nineteenth century, even though they had been exposed to modernity during the mining revolution. In fact, blacks knew and used firearms in their military resistance during the colonial wars of conquest as far back as the mid-1800s. Perhaps, as Grundlingh puts it, the film producers believed that black loyalty could be aroused with their portrayal in a nineteenth century traditional military context. The radio speech by the Chief Native Commissioner in Pietermaritzburg, Lugg, in July 1940, alluding to the Zulu military tradition, was typical of that view. That perspective implied that, despite the advances in technology and urbanisation, blacks were impervious to military modernity.

1021 *Ayihlome*, A 302, 1942; Grundlingh, ‘The Participation of South African Black’, pp. 72-78; Regarding the contextualisation of films into African cultures, see also Reynolds, ‘From Red Blanket to Civilisation’, pp. 139-140.
1022 *Ayihlome*, A 302, 1942.
Because of the financial constraints for DNEAS, the film was silent and commentators were used for interpretation.\textsuperscript{1025} A special commentary was delivered in English and translated in black languages according to the preferences of the region.\textsuperscript{1026} There were also copies of \textit{Ayihlome} which had an Afrikaans commentary.\textsuperscript{1027} It therefore required the training of black translators to accompany recruiting officers during exhibitions and tours.\textsuperscript{1028} In a similar fashion as \textit{Fighters in the Veld}, the film depicted blacks transforming from their relaxed rural background to becoming disciplined and “genuine” soldiers.\textsuperscript{1029} It showed blacks in training for their tasks in the army, for example, driving lessons, cobbling and sewing, which were learned in the military.\textsuperscript{1030}

Thus, enlisting for military service ensured that black men acquired skills which were necessary for them to look after themselves after the war. As an economic incentive, \textit{Ayihlome} also showed troops drawing their salaries and their dependents getting allowances.\textsuperscript{1031} This was designed to incentivise potential recruits about the benefits of military service and how they would improve their socio-economic conditions. The film generally reflected the “nice” part of military service, but not the hardships which were actually experienced by many blacks in the army and produced resentments.\textsuperscript{1032} The film scenarios were shot at the various NMC training centres in the Union: Driefontein, Welgedacht, Rietfontein XI, Palmietkuil and Spaarwater, and the actors were drawn from

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1025} NMC, Box 15, NAS 3/21, Native Recruiting Film, Mockford to E.D. Dawson, 6 March 1942; DNEAS, Group 2, Box 6, NAS 3/4/1, Recruiting Film, \textit{Ayihlome}, December 1942.
\item \textsuperscript{1026} DNEAS, Group 2, NMC, Box 6, NAS 3/4/1, Recruiting Film- \textit{Ayihlome}, DNEAS to Manager of African Theatres Limited, 21 December 1942.
\item \textsuperscript{1027} \textit{Ayihlome}, A 302, 1942.
\item \textsuperscript{1028} NMC, Box 5, NAS 3/4/20/1, Native Military Corps Recruiting: Progress Report for period 10/1/43 to 23/1/43.
\item \textsuperscript{1029} \textit{Ayihlome}, A 302, 1942; NMC, Box 15, NAS 3/21, Native Recruiting Film, Scenario Script, English, 23 February 1942; NMC, Box 13, NAS 3/21, Film Script: ‘Mayihlome Impi Madoda’, (Zulu language), Officer in Charge, Native Recruiting, Natal and Zululand, 5 March 1943; Grundlingh, ‘The Participation of South African Blacks’, p. 56.
\item \textsuperscript{1030} \textit{Ayihlome}, A 302.
\item \textsuperscript{1031} \textit{Ayihlome}, A 302; See also Reynolds, From Red Blanket to Civilisation, p. 141.
\end{itemize}
some blacks who supplied their names as having some experience in the amateur theatres and/or films.\footnote{1033}

The production of films and their scenarios were influenced by K.A. Maxwell, public relations officer of the Tea Market Expansion Bureau, a corporate body for commercial publicity representing the tea growers throughout the world. The films were then modified after consultations with the film producers and the military authorities.\footnote{1034} According to Maxwell, the main themes of the films were ‘loyalty to the king, security of the home and peace time use of the training received in the army’, and not to create the ‘heroes or heroines’.\footnote{1035} Maxwell’s views were related to another film, *Uyafuneka*, which focused on the leaders, Smuts, the coronation of the British king and queen in London and the still pictures of heroic African kings such as Shaka, Dingaan, Dinizulu, Dalindyebo and Hintsa and other great chieftains.\footnote{1036} The other two themes on home security and peacetime application of the acquired skills from the army were closely adhered to in *Ayihlome*.\footnote{1037} For sheer novelty and entertainment, many blacks attended the film exhibitions in local theatres, eating halls, beer halls and reserves throughout the war.\footnote{1038} The black recruitment films were all shown across the country by means of the ten mobile cinema vans which the Tea Market Expansion Bureau had donated to the DNEAS after war broke out.\footnote{1039} However, in these recruitment films, for example, *Ayihlome*, producers were out of step with the reality of black life and their aspirations about the war. They wanted to be armed like their white counter-parts in the UDF and the end of colour discrimination.\footnote{1040} Furthermore,
what blacks ultimately desired was equality of military service, democratic freedoms and social justice.\textsuperscript{1041} It was demeaning to blacks for the authorities and the film producers to insinuate that carrying an assegai would evoke their traditional warrior valour and they would then flock to the military.\textsuperscript{1042} Against modern weapons, an assegai was obviously useless.\textsuperscript{1043} Blacks saw a role for themselves in the war as armed soldiers serving the country, not what was portrayed in the films. Though the films were attended regularly, they did not improve the recruitment of blacks.\textsuperscript{1044}

The DMI (Ic) and the BOI facilitated the production and circulation of many other war-related films. Among others were \textit{Springboks Trek North}, \textit{Call to Arms}, \textit{Road to Victory}, \textit{Sinews of War}, \textit{Technical Training}, \textit{Air Commando} and \textit{With Smuts in Africa}.\textsuperscript{1045} Along with training films, the DMI (Ic) also produced a number of information and recruitment films reflecting the various aspects of the military activities and the war effort, e.g. assault practice, engineers destroying bridges, map reading, NEAS camp life, Indian and Malay corps, Morse tests, NEAS medical corps, advanced flying instruction, theory of coastal gunnery, \textit{She is South Africa} (WADC recruiting) and others.\textsuperscript{1046} Some of the films were produced for recruitment into specific branches of UDF units, e.g. \textit{Ubique} by Union Films and \textit{Over to You} by African Films, for artillery and signallers.\textsuperscript{1047} Others were specifically directed at women. For women, the emphasis, as indicated above, was for them to take their place beside men. In one film, women’s responsibilities were shown to have evolved from the nineteenth century Victorian portrait, of rearing a family, to a modern twentieth century Miss South Africa


\textsuperscript{1042} NMC, Box 12, NAS 3/21, Native Recruiting Film, Maxwell to Gutsche, 7 May 1942.

\textsuperscript{1043} NTS, 9653, 520/400/9, Memorandum on Preliminary Inquiry into Reception of Government War News Service, 16-27 July 1940, by A.I. Richards, 17 August 1940, pp. 1-7; NTS, Box 9655, 520/400/13, Preliminary Report on Broadcasting for Africans in the Transvaal, 2 March 1942, pp. 1-6. For details on African resistance to colonial conquest, See B. Vandervorts, \textit{Wars of Imperial Conquest: 1830-1914} (Routledge, London and New York, 1998). It should also be noted that blacks have also participated in the First World War where they witnessed modern military weapons in action.

\textsuperscript{1044} Grundlingh, ‘The Participation of South African Blacks’, p. 56.


\textsuperscript{1046} PP, Box 63, PU 6/4/2, Production Report – UDF Film Unit, April 1941 to September 1942.

\textsuperscript{1047} Army Intelligence, Box 20, I. 20 (D), PR 23/18/1, Recruiting – Films, 24 February 1943.
figure who decided to wear khaki (military uniform) in order to fight for the family.\textsuperscript{1048} The film then showed all aspects of military service for women such as weapon manufacturing, packing parachutes, medical areas, signalling operating range finders and searchlights as well as making food and clothing for the troops.\textsuperscript{1049}

Newsreels were useful and effective means of facilitating war propaganda. As a result of the difficulties associated with the production of films depicting troops in action, newsreels were useful substitutes for propaganda in South Africa.\textsuperscript{1050} The \textit{African Mirror} played a major role in this regard. Throughout wartime, the \textit{African Mirror} took up a pro-government angle and produced short newsreels on the various aspects of South Africa’s involvement in the war. From 1939-1945, newsreels of the \textit{African Mirror} depicted UDF troops engaged in their military activities, both in the Union and in the North. The activities included searching and removing landmines, driving military vehicles, gun operations and war production work.\textsuperscript{1051} The \textit{African Mirror} collaborated with the BOI and the SABC to produce many of the scenes that focused on recruiting drives such as military parades and the appeals calling for enlistment in various towns across the Union, as well as the military success in the field.\textsuperscript{1052} In one of the newsreels, Hitler and the Italian Fascist leader, Benito Mussolini, were described as a pair of “blood-stained gangsters” who lied to world and perpetrated hatred and prejudice.\textsuperscript{1053} Their speeches were translated and some of their gestures reproduced in satirical manner to illustrate their “foolishness”.\textsuperscript{1054} In addition to the \textit{African Mirror}, the Union authorities also imported \textit{The March of Time} series from America. \textit{The March of Time} was a popular newsreel series which produced the re-enactments and dramatic portrayal of

\textsuperscript{1048} Army Intelligence, Box 20, I. 20 (D), PR 23/18/5, Recruiting – Films, “More Women” Filmlet, 1943 (only year).
\textsuperscript{1049} Army Intelligence, Box 20, I. 20 (D), PR 23/18/5, Recruiting – Films, “More Women” Filmlet, 1943 (only year).
\textsuperscript{1050} Army Intelligence, Box 21, I. 20 (N), PR 23/13, Publicity and Propaganda as Applied to Recruiting, Lindsay to Werdmuller, 5 November 1945.
\textsuperscript{1051} SAFVSA, \textit{African Mirror}, vol. 9, no. 25, FA 2333, Transvaal Scottish, Benoni, December 1939; \textit{African Mirror}, vol. 9, no. 20, FA 2323, Recruiting Parade in Grahamstown, November 1939; \textit{African Mirror}, vol. 10, no. 155, A 3210, Defenders of Africa, June 1942; \textit{African Mirror}, vol. 10, no. 209, FA 5505, Call to Arms, June 1943; \textit{African Mirror}, vol.11, no. 238, FA 1174, SA Troops in El Alamein, July 1942; \textit{African Mirror}, vol. 11, no. 307, FA 5430, Surrender of the City, May 1945.
\textsuperscript{1053} \textit{African Mirror}, vol. 11, no. 306, FA 5969, Crime Doesn’t Pay, May 1945.
\textsuperscript{1054} \textit{African Mirror}, vol. 11, no. 306, FA 5969, Crime Doesn’t Pay, May 1945.
fact, education and entertainment. Its value was more in its concealed approach in depicting war propaganda.

Exhibitions of the films and newsreels were organised by the BOI on behalf of the government. The BOI negotiated and administered agreements with film companies for the production and exhibition of the films and newsreel material taken by its cinematographers and those imported from the British ministry of information. The main film companies utilised by the BOI and the DMI (Ic) were African Films, Metro-Goldwyn-Meyer and United Artists. These companies agreed to circulate and exhibit the UDF films in their respective theatres. These exhibitions were for white South Africa audiences. DNEAS organised with managers of non-European theatres for the exhibition of Ayihlome and other black films in 1942. But, not all non-European theatres could assist DNEAS though. One theatre in particular, the Central Palace Cinema in Kimberley, indicated that they only catered for ‘Chinese, Indians and Coloureds’. A Gaiety Cinema in Stellenbosch also turned down the request for screening Ayihlome as Africans in that area never attended the non-European performances. Yet, many other cinemas in the Union accepted the request to assist the military authorities. Apart from using theatres, the BOI also organised with two touring companies, Parker’s Travelling Talkie Tours and the Tea Market Expansion Bureau, to use their mobile cinema vans for exhibitions of propaganda films in rural districts of the country.

For the Afrikaans audience, the BOI arranged to provide the monthly film programme of thirty-minutes to Parker’s Travelling Talkie Tours for the exhibition of Afrikaans-commentated films and newsreels in four targeted rural areas covered by their mobile cinema

1055 Malherbe Papers, File 438/1, KCM 56974 (531a), Memorandum on Films for Publicity and Propaganda, 1941. (only year).
1056 Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 150, The Bureau of Information: Present Activities, 21 May 1942; Malherbe Papers, File 438/1, KCM 56974 (542), Memorandum on The Utilisation of Film Resources in Furthering the War Effort on a National Scale, 30 June 1942.
1057 Malherbe Papers, File 438/1, KCM 56974 (555), Weaver to Malherbe, 15 November 1944.
1058 DNEAS, Group 2, Box 6, NAS 3/4/1, Recruiting Film- Ayihlome, DNEAS to Manager of African Theatres Limited, 21 December 1942.
1059 DNEAS, Group 2, Box 6, NAS 3/4/1, Recruiting Film- Ayihlome, Manager of Central Palace Cinema to DNEAS, 2 December 1942.
1060 DNEAS, Group 2, Box 6, NAS 3/4/1, Recruiting Native Military Corps, Manager Gaiety Cinema to DNEAS, 14 December 1942.
vans. The programme material was selected from the British Ministry of Information, *African Mirror*, *War Pictorial News* and the shots taken by the BOI’s own cinematographer. Mobile cinema exhibitions in black communities were conducted through the services of the Tea Market Expansion Bureau. The BOI arranged for talkie vans of the Tea Market Expansion Bureau for the exhibition of the 16 mm black recruiting films. The use of the mobile cinema vans ensured that war propaganda could reach a wider audience, particularly in the remote countryside, who would otherwise not have been able to access the regular cinemas.

The UUTS, which was dedicated to the promotion of the government’s war policy, also exploited the mobile cinema vans to get into rural districts of the Union for the exhibition of its own Afrikaans propaganda films: *Noordwaarts*, *Trekgees*, *Springbokke Storm* and *Onthou Japan*. Three mobile cinema vans equipped with 16 mm film projectors and generators travelled throughout the country to screen war-related propaganda films. The cinema vans were accompanied by the UUTS organiser who gave a speech to the audience at each show, sometimes resulting in verbal altercations with members of the audience. The UUTS shows were taken to the remote Afrikaans-dominated areas of the country in order to mobilise public sentiment and support of the war. According to the reports of the UUTS, its film shows were often well attended, especially *Noordwaarts*, with Uys Krige’s wife, Lydia Lindeque starring, which was estimated to have been viewed by over 200,000 people a year.

There was a great need to penetrate the white Afrikaans audience since the majority of government opponents were white Afrikaans-speakers – an important political constituency and source of potential recruits. This aspect was highlighted by Dr Malherbe in his criticism of the BOI. He lamented the fact that, though the majority of the white Union population

---

1065 UUTS, A1883, 20, Union Unity Truth Service Annual Report, 1 July 1942-30 June 1943; Gutsche, *The History and Social Significance of Motion Pictures*, p. 371; Roos, *Ordinary Springboks*, 32.
1066 UUTS, A1883, 20, Union Unity Truth Service Annual Report, 1 July 1942-30 June 1943.
1067 UUTS, A1883, 20, Union Unity Truth Service Annual Report, 1 July 1942-30 June 1943.
1068 See UUTS, A1883, 20, Union Unity Truth Service Annual Report, 1 July 1942-30 June 1943; Gutsche, *The History and Social Significance of Motion Pictures*, p. 371; Roos, *Ordinary Springboks*, 32.
including the UDF was Afrikaners, the Afrikaans language was not well represented in propaganda. In his criticism, Dr Malherbe argued that ‘not a single pro-Government propaganda newsreel with Afrikaans commentary has been screened’ and the opposition exploited that fact as an anti-war weapon by reasoning that ‘all the films dealing with the war are English. Let them fight the war themselves’. He also noted that the atmosphere in cinemas was “un-Afrikaans” due to the many scenes in the films with the Union Jack displayed and also with the singing of ‘God Save the King’ at the end of the show. Afrikaners who supported the war were required to be given prominence in propaganda media, though the use of the phrase “loyal Afrikaners” was to be avoided because, in the South African context, it easily connoted loyalty to Britain, thus playing into the hands of the anti-war activists.

Dr Malherbe’s concerns were a response to the growing Afrikaner opposition cinema which was perpetuated by the Reddingsdaabond (Salvation Bond). This movement had already started with the establishment of the Volksbioskope (VOBI) (Afrikaner People’s Cinema) in 1939 and the Reddingsdaabond Amateur Rolprent Organisasie (RARO) (Salvation Bond Amateur Film Organisation) in 1940. VOBI and RARO film companies were both aimed at promoting Afrikaner culture through cinema, and produced exclusive Afrikaans newsreels that were shown in a circuit of 500 towns and smaller areas in the country districts by mobile projecting units. Thus competition to entice the Afrikaans audience was high during the war. Hence the BOI’s increasing use of the mobile cinema vans to deliver war propaganda in Afrikaans to rural communities. From 1942, the BOI also began to re-edit English material into Afrikaans commentaries and to persuade the newsreel-producing companies to introduce Afrikaans into their newsreels. To promote a South African atmosphere in the cinema, the British Coat of Arms was replaced by the Union Coat of Arms during the singing on the national anthem.

1069 Malherbe Papers, File 438/1, KCM 56974 (531a), Memorandum on Films for Publicity and Propaganda, 1941. (only year).
1070 Malherbe Papers, File 432/7, KCM 56974 (544), Recognition of the Afrikaans Element in Propaganda, Malherbe to Wilson, 14 February 1941.
1071 Gutsche, The History and Social Significance of Motion Pictures in South Africa, pp. 264, 345; Tomaselli, Encountering Modernity, pp.8-9.
1072 Malherbe Papers, File 438/1, KCM 56974 (531a), Memorandum on Films for Publicity and Propaganda, 1941. (only year).
Although generally criticised for inexpert production and the over-dependence on the commercial film companies that monopolised the industry\textsuperscript{1075}, films and newsreels nonetheless played a significant role in generating popular appeal for the war, particularly as some of the films had South Africa actors in them.\textsuperscript{1076} They also had an impact on the non-literate people who benefited from the mobile cinema vans that travelled throughout the Union. The films also played an additional role of complementing the military recruitment tours and demonstrations. The military demonstrations added the “live” dimension to the propaganda spectacle and as such, enhanced the value of the films which were also shown in the evenings during the displays.

MILITARY TOURS AND DISPLAYS

Concurrent with the cinema, radio broadcast and press advertisements, the Union authorities organised tours of the military mobile recruiting columns across the country. For proper control and co-ordination, the director of recruiting, Werdmuller, was charged with the responsibility of arranging with mayors, magistrates, police commandants and provincial commandants of SAWAS in the relevant towns and districts to ensure the smooth running of the mobile recruiting tours.\textsuperscript{1077} The programme of the tours featured military parades, displays of various units, broadcast speeches from mobile vans, recruiting meetings, distribution of propaganda material and where feasible, attendance of social events like sports, meat-grill in the evenings (Braaivleis-aande), camp-fire concerts and church parades.\textsuperscript{1078} Tours also varied according to the perceived requirements in terms of gender and race: for white male recruits, for women recruits and for non-whites.\textsuperscript{1079} Maximum publicity was ensured by arranging with the press, the SABC and the cine cameramen to cover the events on daily basis. The BOI was instrumental in facilitating these publicity

\textsuperscript{1075} Malherbe Papers, File 438/1, KCM 56974 (531a), Memorandum on Films for Publicity and Propaganda, 1941. (only year); PP, Box 63, PU 6/9/4, Notes, Final Military Publicity Campaign, DMI (1c) Press Liaison Staff, 14 January 1944; PP, Box 63, PU 6/9/4, Memorandum on Military Publicity and Propaganda, R.N. Lindsay (ADPR) to DMI, 22 February 1944.


\textsuperscript{1077} CGS (War), Box 207, V1, 45/4, Military Recruiting Tours, Werdmuller to the AG, October 1940.

\textsuperscript{1078} CGS (War), Box 207, V1, 45/4, Military Recruiting Tours, Werdmuller to the AG, October 1940.

\textsuperscript{1079} The Office of the Director of Recruiting and Deputy Adjutant General, Colonel Werdmuller, concentrated on recruitment tours for white males and females whilst DNEAS arranged with the Department of Native Affairs for military tours and demonstrations by the NMC for black recruits.
The foremost objectives of the military mobile tours were to popularise the Union’s armed forces, to instigate public interest in the war and to maximise recruiting.

The defence mobile recruiting column called the Steel Commando, took place from 1 November to 10 December 1940. It started from Pretoria and travelled through the various towns and villages of the Transvaal, OFS, Eastern (Cape) Province, Cape Midlands, Western (Cape) Province and returned to Johannesburg via the Northern Cape. The military force of the Steel Commando consisted of 600 men with 120 vehicles, including the detachments of infantry, engineers, machine-guns, signallers, medical ambulances, artillery, armoured cars and technical services along with the 180 men of the Special Services Brigade and the 80-member orchestra band for entertainment and ceremonial performances. The intended purpose of the Steel Commando tour was to enable the South African public to view the typical examples of the Union’s modern mobile forces and to demonstrate the progress made since the outbreak of the war. The Steel Commando drew huge enthusiastic crowds from towns and surrounding districts and lavish hospitality was extended by small villages to the column. Large numbers of blacks in some districts also came to view the proceedings. Werdmuller took the opportunity to make appeals for recruits. He also addressed thousands of blacks who came to view the Steel Commando and told them that ‘there would soon be openings for their services’. Both the English and Afrikaans languages were used in the recruiting speeches made to the public. At the end of the tour in December, the proceedings of the Steel Commando were concluded with an address by Smuts who also took the general salute in Johannesburg.

Another tour called the Defence-Railways-War Supplies Demonstration Tour or War Trains, was organised from Johannesburg on 22 March 1941, travelling through all the provinces of

1081 UWH, Box 249, B.I. 9, Army Units Tour of Union, November 1940.
1082 ‘Mobile Commando Route’, The Star, 30 October 1940; SANDFA, CGS (War), Box 207, VI, 45/4, Military Recruiting Tours, Werdmuller to the AG, October 1940.
1083 CGS (War), Box 207, VI, 45/4, Military Recruiting Tours, Werdmuller to the AG, October 1940; ‘Army Tour of the Union: Procession of All Units’, The Star, 26 October 1940.
1084 AG (3), Box 344, 154/203/9, Mobile Recruiting Force, Werdmuller to AG, 5 November 1940; CGS (War), Box 207, VI, 45/4, Telegram, Werdmuller to Van Ryneveld, 7 November 1940.
1086 CGS (War), Box 207, VI, 45/4, Mobile Recruiting Force, Werdmuller to AG, 5 November 1940; CGS (War), Box 207, VI, 45/4, Esselen to Campbell Ross, 11 November 1940.
1087 CGS (War), Box 207, VI, 45/4, Special Order - Mobile Recruiting Column: Route March and Ceremony of Retreat, 7 December 1940.
the Union and returned to Pretoria on 7 May 1941. The two War Trains traversed the Union and their tour was extended to the three northern territories, namely, Southern Rhodesia (modern Zimbabwe), Northern Rhodesia (modern Zambia) and Belgian Congo (modern Democratic Republic of the Congo, formerly known as Zaire), from 12 May to 5 June 1941.

The primary object of the tour was to demonstrate to the public what the war supplies directorate has been doing to secure the home-front with the purely South African material and labour to meet the requirements. It was mainly a public morale-boosting exercise but the trained recruiting officers also accompanied the trains to advise potential volunteers on how their services could best be utilised in the war effort. The BOI also produced articles to publicise the tour in the newspapers and heaped praises on the capacity of the country to maintain high-levels of production with her own resources and personnel. Newspaper editors were requested to publish prepared articles only when the military tours entered the local area. Pictures of the War Trains exhibiting artillery, armoured fighting vehicles, ammunition, equipment, uniforms, food supplies and life-size models of uniformed men and women of the services were published in recruiting pamphlets that accompanied the trains. Moreover, men were urged to volunteer for training and to ensure adequate production of quality supplies. The War Trains tour took eleven weeks and successfully visited hundreds of towns where huge crowds came to view the trains and the war materials.

The situation was similar with the Air Commando tour in July 1941, which presented to the public air displays, firing demonstrations, drill displays by Women Auxiliary Air Force

1088 AG (3), Box 344, 154/203/10, Defence-Railways-War Supplies Demonstration Tour: “War Trains”, Werdmuller to All Section Heads, 17 March 1941; UWH, Box 277, B.I. 29, ‘See the War Train’, Recruiting Pamphlet, 1941 (only year).
1089 CGS (War), Box 207, VI, 45/4, Defence – Railways - War Supplies Demonstration Tour: “War Trains”, Werdmuller to Assistant Secretary (Administration) of Defence Authorities Committee (Defence Finance Body), 9 June 1941.
1090 AG (3), Box 344, 154/203/10, Defence-Railways-War Supplies Demonstration Tour: “War Trains”, Werdmuller to All Section Heads, 17 March 1941.
1091 UWH, Box 277, B.I. 29, War Trains National Tour, March 1941.
1092 UWH, Box 277, B.I. 29, ‘See the War Train’, Recruiting Pamphlet, 1941 (only year); UWH, Box 277, B.I. 29, ‘See for Yourself the Home-Front’s Mighty War Effort’, Recruiting Pamphlet, 1941 (only year).
1093 ‘Men Needed for the Home-Front: Objects of the War Trains Tour of the Union’, Cape Argus, 29 March 1941.
1094 ‘War Train Ends 10 000-mile Tour’, Rand Daily Mail, 6 June 1941.
(WAAF) and demonstrations of the armoured fighting vehicles.\textsuperscript{1095} Arrangements were also made with the Union Films to produce a 35 mm film depicting the varied activities of the Air Force to be shown at throughout the circuits of the 20\textsuperscript{th} Century United Artist across the Union.\textsuperscript{1096} The displays of the Air Commando were spectacular; however, the end-product of the film production was of poor quality. The Air Commando film was merely a series of newsreel shots strung together into a whole without any coherence.\textsuperscript{1097} Nonetheless, military demonstrations of the Steel Commando, the War Trains and the Air Commando proved to be the most practical and effective propaganda mechanisms which popularised the military to the public. Apart from the recruitment objectives, the military tours and exhibitions also served the economic propaganda agenda. The country’s industrial capacity, economic assets and productive power were crucial propaganda weapons as they demonstrated the potential for self-sustainability and the prospects for the post-war national development.

SAWAS also organised a recruiting train tour from Cape Town to Johannesburg consisting of 150 women under Mrs C. Newton-Thompson, deputy commandant of Command 13, in April 1941.\textsuperscript{1098} The train was decorated with recruiting messages, equipped with loudspeakers, carried a full band and the SAWAS exchanged greetings and handed out propaganda leaflets at towns and villages where the train passed through.\textsuperscript{1099} Another recruitment tour, with higher publicity in the newspapers, was undertaken in October 1941. It was a major SAWAS nation-wide recruitment tour under the leadership of the senior SAWAS officers. The tours were divided into the Cape tour, OFS and Natal tour and the Transvaal tour. The Cape tour was undertaken by Major Hansie Pollak, SAWAS second in command and economics lecturer at Wits University. Major M.E. Coetzee, the wife of the editor of Die Volkstem, C.S. Coetzee and former president of the South African National Council of Women was in charge of the OFS and Natal tours. For the Transvaal, the two tours were organised under Major J.F. Jordaan, first Provincial Commandant of SAWAS and then Lieutenant Malherbe, the DMI (Ic) officer and wife of Dr E.G. Malherbe.\textsuperscript{1100} The profiles of these senior officers were

\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{1095} CGS (War), Box 207, 45/4, Air Commando Tour of the Union, Director of Recruiting to Quartermaster General, July 1941.
\item\textsuperscript{1096} CGS (War), Box 207, 45/4, Air Commando Tour: Production of Air Force Film, Werdmuller to Blaine, 19 June 1941.
\item\textsuperscript{1097} Army Intelligence, Box 21, PR 23/13, Publicity and Propaganda as Applied to Recruiting, Lindsay to Werdmuller, 5 November 1941.
\item\textsuperscript{1098} ‘Recruiting for S.A.W.A.S.’, \textit{Cape Argus}, 4 April 1941.
\item\textsuperscript{1099} ‘Recruiting for S.A.W.A.S.’, \textit{Cape Argus}, 4 April 1941.
\item\textsuperscript{1100} ‘Women Officers to Tour S.A.’, \textit{Rand Daily Mail}, 7 October 1941; ‘Women and Girls of South Africa: Your Country Calls’, \textit{The Zoutpansberg Review}, 24 October 1941.
\end{itemize}
published in the newspapers to reflect their status in the social and business life. It was designed to demonstrate the critical nature of the prevailing conditions that saw high profile women with eminent social standing trading their comfortable civilian lives to serve in defence of the country.

In January 1941, the military authorities established the Youth Training Brigade for young boys who left school but were still too immature to enlist for military service. By May, the unit had 1691 personnel including officers.\textsuperscript{1101} To stimulate interest and recruiting for the Youth Training Brigade, a train tour was organised to travel from Potchefstroom, through twenty-seven towns in the Western Transvaal, Griqualand West, North-Western Cape, Eastern and Northern Transvaal from 20 September to 21 October 1941.\textsuperscript{1102} At various towns, the Youth Brigade contingent was welcomed by the mayor and assistance was offered by the municipal authorities, the police and members of SAWAS for hospitality. The programme of the tour consisted of the Guard of Honour and the band marching through streets. In the late afternoon, the contingent engaged in physical training displays and retreat ceremony. The officer commanding of the brigade then addressed the public through loudspeakers, explaining the objects of the Youth Training Brigade – physical and mental training as well as developing relevant skills for civilian life.\textsuperscript{1103} The Youth Brigade was aimed at preparing the youth for enlistment in the fighting forces when they had matured. It was the tour’s aim to advertise the Youth Training Brigade and to prepare the public for further recruiting appeals to support the war effort. The tour also attracted large crowds and many enjoyed the band. However, in terms of recruiting into the Youth Brigade, only thirty-nine boys enlisted. It was a low return, though that was not indicated as the primary aim.\textsuperscript{1104}

In May 1942, Lieutenant Colonel E.P. Hartshorn, the chief press liaison officer with the South African forces in Egypt, embarked on a recruiting tour of the Union aboard a Boston

\textsuperscript{1101} UWH, Box 274, B.I. 25, The Progress of the Youth Training Brigade, Broadcast by Colonel A.F. Murray, 7 May 1941.
\textsuperscript{1102} UWH, Box 274, B.I. 25, Some Observations on the Tour of the Youth Training Brigade, H.H.H. Bierman (DMI War Correspondent) to Lindsay, 1941 (only year).
\textsuperscript{1103} UWH, Box 274, B.I. 25, Youth Training Brigade Demonstration Tour, OC, Youth Training Brigade Touring Contingent to General Officer Commanding Inland Defence and the Director of Recruiting, 22 October 1941.
\textsuperscript{1104} UWH, Box 274, B.I. 25, Youth Training Brigade Demonstration Tour, OC, Youth Training Brigade Touring Contingent to General Officer Commanding Inland Defence and the Director of Recruiting, 22 October 1941.
Bomber aircraft from the North.\textsuperscript{1105} Hartshorn was a veteran of the First World War where he lost his left arm whilst holding a defective hand grenade in a raiding expedition in the Dardanelles campaign against the Turks.\textsuperscript{1106} The general officer administration, Theron, recommended to the CGS that Hartshorn to fly from Libya to undertake a recruitment tour of South Africa to deliver the message ‘direct from troops in the frontline’ in English and by Captain J.H. Visser in Afrikaans.\textsuperscript{1107} The messages were printed on a leaflet shaped like an aircraft bomb and showered into towns which did not have suitable airbases for propaganda purposes.\textsuperscript{1108} (See Illustration 33)

The tour took place from 4 to 29 May 1942 and the BOI organised publicity for it. However, Hartshorn was criticised for the manner in which he delivered his speeches. He urged the ‘women to get stuck into those muddy tripe-hounds, the self-made keymen, the one-man businessmen and those who are dodging and hiding in the part-time units’.\textsuperscript{1109} The use of crude language and labelling people as “dodgers” whilst many were in fact supporting the war effort as war workers, civil servants, serving in food production and in the general maintenance of essential services was unappreciated.\textsuperscript{1110} The press, the public and the DMI (Ic) (as the tour was not organised by them) were critical of Hartshorn’s vigorous speech. His rhetoric was considered bad for recruiting propaganda and the stinging appellations in the language were uninspiring in terms of public relations exercise for the government.\textsuperscript{1111}

Recruitment meetings organised for blacks also involved military parades and bands. The approach was to organise recruiting meetings at various centres in the Union and arrange for the local NMC units to perform military displays. During the recruiting meeting in Bloemfontein in March-April 1942, members of the 7\textsuperscript{th} battalion NMC performed a guard of honour and marched behind the Cape Corps band through the streets from Bloemfontein station to the black residential area.\textsuperscript{1112} It was the same procedure with the Kimberley detachment of the 7\textsuperscript{th} battalion NMC involved in the guard of honour to entertain the public.

\begin{footnotes}
1105 UWH, Box 274, B.I. 26, Recruiting: Lt.-Col. E.P. Hartshorn, GOA, UDF (MEF) to CGS, 9 April 1942.
1106 UWH, Box 274, B.I. 26, Col Hartshorn’s Tour, May 1942.
1107 UWH, Box 274, B.I. 26, Col Hartshorn’s Tour, May 1942.
1108 UWH, Box 274, B.I. 26, Col Hartshorn’s Tour, May 1942.
1109 Army Intelligence, Box 21, PR 23/17, Lt.-Col. E.P. Hartshorn’s Tour, Ic to DDMI, 18 May 1942.
1110 Army Intelligence, Box 21, PR 23/17, Cutting from “Daily Dispatch”, East London, 7 May 1942.
1111 Army Intelligence, Box 21, PR 23/17, Cutting from “Daily Dispatch”, East London, 7 May 1942; Army Intelligence, Box 21, PR 23/17, Lt.-Col. E.P. Hartshorn’s Tour, Ic to DDMI, 18 May 1942.
1112 DNEAS, Group 2, Box 6, NAS 3/4/1, Report on Recruiting Meeting at Bloemfontein Location, Kimberley and Green Point Location, 30 March to 1 April 1942.
\end{footnotes}
In Natal and Zululand, recruiting meetings were more elaborate with the slaughter of two cows and drinks provided to the audience whilst the members of the local 2nd battalion NMC gave a display.1113 Regular trading and social events such as cattle sales and shows were attended by the military recruiting officers who also presented propaganda among blacks.1114 A physical training display, an official march and a concert party in the evening conducted by the NMC were organised in Alexander Township for recruitment purposes.1115 An NMC Choir was also organised at this meeting to sing the “iNkosi Sinkelela iAfrica”.1116 At all these meetings, black NMC members were utilised as interpreters as the speeches were often delivered by white magistrates in English.

Military tours and displays had a substantial propaganda impact on the viewing public as many of them were often well attended. Unlike the press, radio, films and posters, they offered personalised interaction which appealed to the public. In most cases, more recruits were obtained during and immediately after the tours.1117 But, it was a strenuous and expensive propaganda activity that required enormous amounts of resources for a successful execution.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has shown how the Union authorities exploited films, newsreels and military displays to mobilise the different sectors of the South African public to support the war policy. However, it proved to be a difficult task. The high production and maintenance costs of films and military displays especially, militated against their advantage in the visual and motion impact. The films also produced criticisms due to limited local productions and the predominance of English over the Afrikaans language, thus perpetuating the ‘Afrikaner-British’ nationalistic contest. The situation was, to some extent, alleviated by the UUTS which produced Afrikaans films and exhibited them in the Union’s remote countryside. Still, the government had limited control over the quality, content and exhibitions as the film

1113 DNEAS, Group 2, Box 6, NAS 3/4/1, Recruiting Tour, Natal and Zululand, OC 2nd Battalion NMC to DNEAS, 23 May 1942.
1114 DNEAS, Group 2, Box 6, NAS 3/4/1, Recruiting-Zululand, Area Commandant, Welgedacht to DNEAS, 23 May 1942.
1115 DNEAS, Group 2, Box 6, NAS 3/4/1, H.S. Mockford to the Director, SABC, 21 November 1942.
1116 DNEAS, Group 2, Box 6, NAS 3/4/1, H.S. Mockford to the Director, SABC, 21 November 1942. The song was part of the music in the Ayihlome film.
1117 CGS (War), Box 210, VIII, 45/8, Analysis of Recruiting Figures, Diagrams and Graphs, 1941-1945. See the soaring figures of 1941-1942, which declined from 1943-1945.
companies were independent and needed to satisfy their business interests first. The government, therefore, could not fully optimise their utilisation for war propaganda. The military, at least, had modest internal capability, though shortage of well-qualified technical personnel was a problem. Propaganda films, also, had little appeal to blacks as the content was irrelevant to their socio-economic and political aspirations. Film shows were attended for purely entertainment. Hence, by 1944, the authorities concluded that films were the weakest link in the Union’s propaganda system.

The military mobile recruiting columns and demonstrations achieved some success in the publicity and propaganda machinery of the government. The BOI ensured that they were well publicised, and, as a result, the attendance was satisfactory. The military authorities maximised the opportunities for direct interaction with the public by attending social events. These enhanced public awareness and popularity of the military. More recruits were thus obtained through those the military tours, as the recruiting figures revealed.1118

However, despite the exploitation of the various media channels to stimulate interest in the war, the UDF experienced chronic shortage of manpower throughout the war. Also, the different platforms perpetuated the racial or gender stereotypes, hence they were at times rejected. Given the spectre of violence and the subversive activities when war broke out, the government’s publicity and propaganda efforts on the home-front were marginally effective. It was very difficult to forge a “united nation” during the war, especially given the depth and intensity of the racial divisions, and the diverse interests of the South African population. Similar challenges were also experienced within the UDF, and the officials were at pains to eliminate divisions, to foster “unity” within the military force and to preserve morale so as to ensure the effective prosecution of the war effort. The next two chapters, dealing with the UDF’s internal propaganda operations, will illustrate these aspects.

1118  CGS (War), Box 210, VIII, 45/8, Analysis of Recruiting Figures, Diagrams and Graphs, 1941-1945.
DEAR CITIZEN.

This is a message from the North—from the front line in Libya.


Our inspired leader, our "Quibaa," calls to you. We call to you from far off. The people of the united countries—loved and unconfined, call to you.

This is the critical year, when the war will be won or lost, so answer the call now! NOW OR NEVER.

Front line troops.

Front line troops.

God bless you and keep you safe.

C.A.
CHAPTE

UNION DEFENCE FORCE’S INTERNAL PROPAGANDA: EDUCATION AND TRAINING SERVICES

Despite the Union government’s adoption of the volunteer system for military service, the loyalty, motivation and commitment of the UDF members could not be automatically expected. Following the decision to enter the war in support of Britain, disconcerting reports about the anti-government activities and the exhibitions of disloyalty within the military forces were submitted to the authorities. Those reports reflected the deeply embedded political discords, the impact of the Nazi propaganda plus the growing manifestations of the Nazi-inspired political extremism in the country. The major concerns were the political and military implications on the subject of the troops’ loyalty, morale and the war effort. The challenge for the military authorities, therefore, as pointed out in the secret memorandum of the DMI (Ic), was ‘to help ensure the security of our own forces by consolidating and increasing their morale, so as to stimulate them to pitch where the fullest use is made of all their resources … to safeguard the security by launching effective counter-propaganda’.

To this end, numerous memoranda about the organisation of propaganda projects and the suggested schemes for implementation among the UDF troops were considered. However,
as the authorities were to find out in the course of the war, it was not merely the subversive activities that impacted on troop morale and disinclinations, there were other factors of organisational and administrative nature, military policies as well as training and service conditions which produced the discontent and apathy within the Union’s forces.1124

This chapter analyses the conception and institutional responses by the Union government and military authorities to wrestle with the question of disaffections and morale within the UDF. The discussion will commence with a brief reflection on some of the pertinent problems such as the undercurrents of disloyalty and disaffections resulting from subversive activities, military administration and service conditions which impacted on troop morale. Then, it outlines the processes and initiatives, particularly the education and training aspects, which were contrived for mental stimulation, to raise and shape the political consciousness of the troops and to combat monotony during leisure times. This chapter will also illustrate the prevailing ideological paradigms and the ways the military authorities delineated the content and objectives of propaganda for the troops. Lastly, it will also reflect on the notions about the future socio-political order in the South Africa society.

SUBVERSION, ANTIPATHY AND DISQUIETS WITHIN THE UDF

The prevailing political dissensions in South Africa, mostly as a result of the different right-oriented Afrikaner nationalistic movements’ opposition to the government’s war policy, correspondingly produced antagonisms within the military forces. Military intelligence and censorship reports reflected a sense of apathy and disgruntlement, especially among some white Afrikaans-speaking UDF members, which was attributed to the anti-war activism and hyper-nationalistic tendencies associated with Malan’s HNP and the radical OB.1125 For example, in November 1939, Thwaites (then DMI) wrote to Lieutenant General Andries Brink (C-in-C, Burger Commandos), and warned him that some loyal officers of the

1124 Malherbe Papers, File 441/11, KCM 56974 (893), Report on the Factors Affecting Morale in the Army at Premier Mine, by Capt Janie Malherbe, 28 August 1942; SANDFA, Archives of the Quartermaster General (QMG), Group 1, Box 104, Q 91/339, Morale in the Army, 25 August 1943.; DNEAS Group 2, Box 20, NAS 3/42, Treatment and General Welfare of Members of Non-Europeans of NMC Battalions and Units, 3 July 1940 – 28 August 1944.
1125 Army Intelligence, Box 21, CE 2/2, Propaganda Calculated to Disturb the Relations of M.F.F., General Staff, Intelligence to DDMI, 27 August 1940.
Thabanchu Commando (DRA unit in the OFS) reported to the intelligence officials ‘that 50% of their men were not loyal to the Government’.\textsuperscript{1126} With regard to another DRA unit, the Dordrecht Commando (Queenstown-Eastern Cape), Thwaites suggested that it should be disbanded because of the ‘unsatisfactory reports on account of the unreliability of the majority of its officers’.\textsuperscript{1127} In a letter to Smuts’s military secretary (Collyer), the DMI also identified a number of the DRA officers in the Transvaal, OFS and Eastern Cape, whose ‘varying degrees of conduct was prejudicial to good order and military discipline’\textsuperscript{1128}

Many officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) in various units of the permanent force (PF), the ACF and the DRA were reportedly pro-Nationalist, pro-Nazi and pro-OB and expressed hostilities towards the government, some even declared their intentions ‘to rebel or assist the enemy in the event of military activity’.\textsuperscript{1129} Consequently, in one response, Brink, cautioned all commandants regarding the DRA’s appointment of officers. He warned the potential officers that, although individuals were free to hold any political views, it was imperative that members abide by and be prepared to carry out the Union’s war policy.\textsuperscript{1130} Some of the more unreliable UDF officers such as A. Spies, F.G.T Radloff and H. Anderson (even J.C.C. Laas and J.F.J. van Rensburg) were dismissed from military service or placed on reserve.\textsuperscript{1131} These men became active members of the radical OB which was then growing in intensity as a ‘focal point of anti-Government activity’.\textsuperscript{1132}

The intelligence reports continued to present an unfavourable depiction of the growing threat of subversion within the military forces as well as obstructions to the recruitment process.\textsuperscript{1133}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1126} Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 132, Col Thwaites to Lt Gen (Andries) Brink, 17 November 1939.
\item \textsuperscript{1127} Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 132, Col Thwaites to Lt Gen (Andries) Brink, 17 November 1939.
\item \textsuperscript{1128} Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 132, DMI to Military Secretary to Prime Minister, 14 November 1939.
\item \textsuperscript{1130} Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 143, D.R.A.’s: Appointment of Officers, Commander-in-Chief, Burger Commandos to all Commandants, 30 November 1939.
\item \textsuperscript{1132} UWH, Box 264, B.I. 20, Military Intelligence Summaries, 29 June 1940.
\item \textsuperscript{1133} CGS (War), Box 42, 10/4, The Birth of South Africa’s Army, 1939/40, 6 September 1940; NASAP, JUS, Box 1506, file 1/62/39, C.H. Poppe to the Chief Control Officer, Queenstown, 1 November 1939; UWH, Box 265, BI 20, Internal Security, Intelligence Summaries, 17 November 1939; UWH, Box 265, B.I. 20, Internal Security, Intelligence Summaries, 10 November 1939; UWH, Box 265, B.I. 20, Internal Security, Intelligence Summaries, 8 December 1939; Army Intelligence, Box 46, I. 40, Weekly Censorship Summaries, 25 February 1941.
\end{itemize}
According to Blaine, some of the problems in the UDF were cultivated by some ex-members of the Hertzog government who ‘were deliberately and without restraint attempting to undermine the morale of South Africa’s future army’. Blaine indicated that ‘the small Permanent Force included a large number of susceptible soldiers encouraged from outside [to challenge the legal limits of where they should serve]… and was riddled with Ossewa-Brandwag organisation’. On this point, military intelligence reported that the OB has been successful in permeating the government institutions including most units of the UDF. In addition, the recruitment process was also being inhibited by ‘a subtle and undermining influence - campaign against recruiting’.

The political situation in South Africa had become volatile and the security conditions were deteriorating. During mobilisation and soon after the first UDF contingent left for East Africa in mid-1940, the country increasingly experienced the anti-war militancy and violence that included bomb outrages, sabotage, riots and assaults on the Union soldiers. With

---

1134 CGS (War), Box 42, 10/4, The Birth of South Africa’s Army, 1939/40, 6 September 1940, p. 2.
1135 CGS (War), Box 42, 10/4, The Birth of South Africa’s Army, 1939/40, 6 September 1940, p. 2.
1136 UWH, Box 264, B.I. 20, Military Intelligence Summaries, 29 June 1940; CGS, Group 2, Box 93, 169/7, Fortnightly Intelligence Report, 25 January 1941.
1137 CGS (War), Box 42, 10/4, The Birth of South Africa’s Army, 1939/40, 6 September 1940, p. 4.
1140 CGS (War), Box 47, 12/4, Report of the Commission of Inquiry: Disturbances at Potchefstroom University College, 10 October 1940; CGS (War), Box 47, 12/4, Report of the Commission of Inquiry: Johannesburg Disturbances, Jan-Feb 1941, 19 March 1941; ‘Stone Them to Death’, Cape Argus, 28 January 1941; CGS, Group 2, Box 93, 169/7, Fortnightly Intelligence Report, 10 February 1941.
1141 Army Intelligence, Box 33, CE 6/16, Censorship Summary, 3 December 1940; UWH, Box 265, B.I. 20, Intelligence Summaries, 20 January 1940; ‘Brutal Attack on Soldier’, Cape Argus, 16 September 1940; CGS (War), Box 47, 12/5, Friction Between Civilians and Soldiers, W.M. Hare, Magistrate,
regard to the last aspect, Visser indicates that during 1940 in the Transvaal province alone, there were about seventy-nine ‘cases of assault on soldiers reported to the police for investigation … many were certainly unreported.’ These assaults on soldiers were carried out by ‘bearded men’ who were associated with the OB because, since its formation, most members wore beards ‘as proclamation of either they belonged to the Ossewa Brandwag or were otherwise against the Government and its war policy’. In other cases, soldiers were sometimes ill-disciplined. For instance, in the south-western districts of the Cape and also in the Transvaal, the soldiers were accused of ‘disorderly conduct’ and ‘attacks on civilians’. Consequently, on the question of civil-military relations, it was not an ideal situation whereby the military was involved in physical confrontations in the Union whilst it was also subjected to “ridicule” from some of the government opponents in time of war. Government supporters were, in addition, perturbed by the spate of the anti-war activism and the assault on soldiers. In apparent disbelief, an intelligence officer quoted the Rand Daily Mail’s report during September 1940, and was critical of the government’s tolerance of the anti-war elements and their actions:

*There can be no doubt that the public is becoming gravely disturbed by the increasing number of assaults on soldiers. Cases of the kind are reported almost every day from many parts of the country, and it can fairly be assumed that many others take place, but not reported. In Potchefstroom, these crimes came to a sudden end when the soldiers wrecked the University College. But the method of retaliation, though undoubtedly effective, is undesirable for many reasons ... other means must be found. One is that severe punishment*
should be inflicted when attackers are caught. A week or two ago, a man charged with
assaulting a soldier in Pretoria was allowed to sign an admission of guilt, and pay six
pounds, in expiation of his offence. That is a ridiculous penalty. Imprisonment without the
option of a fine should be imposed in every case, and, if corporal punishment were inflicted, it
might help put a stop to this type of violence.1146

Another government supporter, Jack N. Berman of Johannesburg, wrote to Van Ryneveld in
May 1941, condemning the HNP for instigating half a million ‘Europeans’ to oppose the war
effort ‘in every way … these people, in this democratic country, are called “Nationalists?”…
in other countries, they would be styled, more simply, traitors and, under War conditions,
dealt with as such’.1147 Among the soldiers, on the same token, there was a feeling that they
were fighting for the country where some sections of the population “did not appreciate
them” and that their loved ones were threatened by the anti-war elements.1148

Because the country was unprepared for the war, adequate response measures to deal with
security problems in the Union and in the UDF were still lacking.1149 With regard to military
formations and within the military units, practical steps to counter subversive activities were
limited to issuing broad statements which were not fully clarified and without detailed
procedures.1150 Martin and Orpen proclaim that when the war broke out, the Union defence
headquarters did not have ‘properly conceived plan for the defence of South Africa or for its
participation in any kind of war’.1151 This also implied the limited capacity to fight against the
subversive activities in the Union and within the armed forces. It took months for the
authorities to develop and put in place a series of war measures and proclamations in
place.1152 In the meantime, the UDF, as a military institution and instrument of national

1146 UWH, Box 265, B.I. 20, Intelligence Summaries, 21 September 1940. Quotation from the Rand Daily
Mail, no exact date.
1147 CGS (War), Box 197, VI, 42/3, J.W. Berman to Van Ryneveld, 23 May 1941.
1148 Army Intelligence, Box 33, CE 6/16, Censorship Summary, 3 December 1940; War Diaries (WD) vol.
1, Box 296, Military Censorship Summary, East Africa Force Headquarters, 20 February 1941.
143, Draft Memorandum on Internal Security, Lawrence to Smuts, 12 June 1940; Martin and Orpen,
South Africa at War, vol. 7, p. 26; Furlong, Allies at War?, p. 16.
1150 AG (War), Box 4, 168/2/A1, Memorandum on Duties of Command Intelligence Officers, Military
Intelligence and Security of the Forces, 26 March 1940; AG (War), Box 4, 168/2/A1, Command
Intelligence Officers Carrying Out Functions of SA Police, Brig Gen Wakefield to DGO, 12 August
1940.
Memorandum on Internal Security, Lawrence to Smuts, 12 June 1940.
1152 These measures, including the National Security Code, are discussed in Chapter 3 of this study.
defence and security, was under strain due to the undermining activities of the anti-war elements.

Campaigning against recruitment and the undermining of the war effort was a daunting challenge for the military authorities. Within months of mobilisation in 1940, the press and the censorship officers were reporting that rumours were circulating in the Union about the heavy troop casualties and the daily burials of the men suffering from diseases. From April to August 1940, the military security branch (Ib) reported that 127 troops were discharged from the UDF in connection with the subversive activities and endangering the forces. In March 1941, it was reported that there were increasing attempts to undermine the morale of the troops in the North through anonymous letters containing ‘false rumours about sickness, death and infidelity among soldiers and their families’. One demoralising extract in a letter from the 2nd South African Air Force Base Training and Reinforcement Depot in East Africa read:

> But I will tell you what I read in a letter from someone who calls himself “Interested Friend”. You are unfaithful and have met someone on the sly. You wish that I was dead or would die from fever. Dearest, how can you write of your love burning for me, how can I understand this? Is this my reward for my clean conduct and is there no such thing as God’s mercy? Must I pay to the utmost and is the only way to torture my heart?

Another extract from an anonymous letter received by a soldier in the 15th Field Ambulance in East Africa read:

> I write [because] we are said for you, you so far away and things go so bad here by your house. Your wife make[s] merry with so many soldiers [back in the Union], she say[s] she [is] happy to send you away far and out of way so that she can flirt easy. When you [were] at Premier [Mine], you go away on Sunday evening so when [the] train pull[s] away ... 1 2 3

---

1153 Army Intelligence, Box 21, I. 19, CE2/2, General Staff, Intelligence to DDMI, DHQ, 27 August 1940; War Diaries (WD) vol 1, Box 296, Morale of Troops, General Staff Intelligence, Chief Field Censor, East Africa Force Headquarters to Officers Commanding, All South African Units, 24 March 1941; ‘The Rumour-Monger Menace’, *EP Herald*, 22 May 1940; ‘False Reports Spread’, *The Star*, 26 November 1940; ‘False Reports on Casualties’, *The Star*, 21 November 1941.

1154 CGS, Group 2, Box 93, 169/6, Internal Security, 1 September 1940.

1155 Malherbe Papers, File 441/10, KCM 56974 (861), Anonymous Letters to Soldiers and their Relatives, Director of Military Operations and Intelligence to Director of Information (Bureau), 15 March 1941.

1156 War Diaries (WD) vol 1, Box 296, Military Censorship Summary, East Africa Force Headquarters, 20 February 1941.
she catch[es] a soldier and they go and stay at Belgrave Hotel till late at night. Everyone knows how bad your wife is you fool ... you give food to children not your own.¹¹⁵⁷

Military authorities, concerned about the effect of the letters on the state of mind and morale of troops, attempted to counter these rumours with a press article submitted through the BOI, with the intention of exposing the matter as subversion by creating wider publicity in the newspapers and on the radio.¹¹⁵⁸ For reassurance, it asserted that ‘the senders of these foul letters will find their efforts foiled by the fact that authorities are immediately taking steps to expose the matter by openly drawing the attention of all ranks of the troops to the staleness of the methods used and the motive underlying them’.¹¹⁵⁹ The public was informed that families and relatives of soldiers would be notified officially of their circumstances.¹¹⁶⁰ Furthermore, the chief field censor, East Africa Force, requested the censorship officers in the UDF units in South Africa ‘to keep a close watch on all correspondence’ to determine the victims of those rumours and to report to DMI (Ib), the security sub-section of military intelligence, to deal with the matter.¹¹⁶¹

In South Africa, there was a small committee consisting of the controller of censorship, SAWAS and DMI (Ic), which came together to determine measures for combating the ‘alarmist and defeatist rumours’ in the country.¹¹⁶² SAWAS undertook to establish social clubs throughout the Union for the soldiers’ families and friends at which the question of rumours could be exposed through frank discussions.¹¹⁶³ Through those discussions, the military authorities believed that the ‘rumours cannot flourish where there is enlightenment’.¹¹⁶⁴ Thus, information was critical to counter the spread of rumours about the troops.

¹¹⁵⁷ War Diaries (WD) vol 1, Box 296, Military Censorship Summary, East Africa Force Headquarters, 20 February 1941.  
¹¹⁵⁸ Malherbe Papers, File 441/10, KCM 56974 (861), Article, Anonymous Letters to Soldiers and their Relatives, 15 March 1941.  
¹¹⁵⁹ Malherbe Papers, File 441/10, KCM 56974 (861), Article, Anonymous Letters to Soldiers and their Relatives, 15 March 1941.  
¹¹⁶⁰ Malherbe Papers, File 441/10, KCM 56974 (861), Article, Anonymous Letters to Soldiers and their Relatives, 15 March 1941.  
¹¹⁶¹ Malherbe Papers, File 441/10, KCM 56974 (860), False Reports Spread Among Soldiers and their Relatives, Director of Military Operations and Intelligence to CGS, 31 March 1941.  
¹¹⁶² Malherbe Papers, File 441/10, KCM 56974 (860), False Reports Spread Among Soldiers and their Relatives, Director of Military Operations and Intelligence to CGS, 31 March 1941.  
¹¹⁶³ Malherbe Papers, File 441/10, KCM 56974 (865), Social Clubs for Soldiers Families, Circular to all SAWAS Branch Commandants, 6 March 1941.  
¹¹⁶⁴ Malherbe Papers, File 441/10, KCM 56974 (860), False Reports Spread Among Soldiers and their Relatives, Director of Military Operations and Intelligence to CGS, 31 March 1941.
It was however, not only the external forces that undermined the morale of Union forces. There were other internal factors that the troops persistently complained about throughout the war. Some of the problems related to the military policy or government policy and the applications thereof.\footnote{Army Intelligence, Box 33, CE 6/C11, Censorship Summaries, 13 March 1941; Army Intelligence, Box 46, CE 2/15, Low Level of Morale on the Home Front, 24 February 1942; Malherbe Papers, File 441/10, KCM 56974 (864), Memorandum on Army Morale and Propaganda, by DMI (Ic), March 1943. Army Intelligence, Box 33, CE 6/C11, Censorship Summaries, 13 March 1941; Army Intelligence, Box 46, CE 2/15, Low Level of Morale on the Home Front, 24 February 1942; Malherbe Papers, File 441/11, KCM 56974 (893), Report on the Factors Affecting Morale in the Army at Premier Mine, by Capt Janie Malherbe, 28 August 1942; QMG, Group 1, Box 104, Q 91/339, Morale in the Army, 25 August 1943.} Other problems were associated with military life, service conditions and concerns about the post-war situation.\footnote{Army Intelligence, Box 33, CE 6/C11, Censorship Summaries, 13 March 1941; Army Intelligence, Box 46, CE 2/15, Low Level of Morale on the Home Front, 24 February 1942; Malherbe Papers, File 441/11, KCM 56974 (893), Report on the Factors Affecting Morale in the Army at Premier Mine, by Capt Janie Malherbe, 28 August 1942; QMG, Group 1, Box 104, Q 91/339, Morale in the Army, 25 August 1943.} It was particularly the government and military policies that had profound impact of the negativity towards the conditions of service for UDF volunteers of lower ranks, especially when they applied to the black volunteers. Colour bar and discriminatory practices pertaining to the service conditions of black troops in the UDF created discontent and resentment among blacks. The concerns related to their treatment and welfare including pay, promotional opportunities and, chiefly, the discrepancies of military ranks in relation to white troops.\footnote{DNEAS Group 2, Box 7, NAS 3/6, Native Military Corps, Conditions of Service, 6 July 1940 – 11 September 1945; DNEAS Group 2, Box 20, NAS 3/42, Treatment and General Welfare of Members of None-Europeans of NMC Battalions and Units, 3 July 1940 – 28 August 1944; CGS (War), Box 130, 32/13, 1644, Relations Between Europeans and Non-Europeans in the UDF, May 1941 – January 1942. DNEAS Group 2, Box 7, NAS 4/6 8/6, War Measures Act no. 5, 23 January 1942; DNEAS Group 2, Box 25, NMC, NAS 3/36/7, NMC Morale and Behaviour, 24 January 1944. Grundlingh, ‘The Participation of South African Blacks’, pp. 111-114. See CGS (War), Box 131, 32/23, Memorandum on NEAS, by Parliamentary Representatives of Natives: Senator H.C. Malcomess, Margaret Ballinger, Donald B. Molteno and G.K. Hemming, 17 September 1940; NMC, Box 12, NAS 3/21, Reader’s Questions to the Editor of Native Newspaper: ‘Umteteli wa Bantu’, Question No. 25, What is the Highest Rank of Native? Answer, Sergeant, A.B. O’Brien, Secretary, Native Printing and Publishing Company to DNEAS, 20 October 1941.} Black volunteers generally joined the military due to economic considerations rather than political concerns. Still, they were politically conscious and often resisted disadvantageous practices based on racial grounds.\footnote{DNEAS Group 2, Box 7, NAS 4/6 8/6, War Measures Act no. 5, 23 January 1942; DNEAS Group 2, Box 25, NMC, NAS 3/36/7, NMC Morale and Behaviour, 24 January 1944. Grundlingh, ‘The Participation of South African Blacks’, pp. 111-114. See CGS (War), Box 131, 32/23, Memorandum on NEAS, by Parliamentary Representatives of Natives: Senator H.C. Malcomess, Margaret Ballinger, Donald B. Molteno and G.K. Hemming, 17 September 1940; NMC, Box 12, NAS 3/21, Reader’s Questions to the Editor of Native Newspaper: ‘Umteteli wa Bantu’, Question No. 25, What is the Highest Rank of Native? Answer, Sergeant, A.B. O’Brien, Secretary, Native Printing and Publishing Company to DNEAS, 20 October 1941.} As Grundlingh explains, unlike in the British and French armies, black troops in the UDF could never become officers, irrespective of their educational background, experience, knowledge and skills.\footnote{Grundlingh, ‘The Participation of South African Blacks’, pp. 111-114. See CGS (War), Box 131, 32/23, Memorandum on NEAS, by Parliamentary Representatives of Natives: Senator H.C. Malcomess, Margaret Ballinger, Donald B. Molteno and G.K. Hemming, 17 September 1940; NMC, Box 12, NAS 3/21, Reader’s Questions to the Editor of Native Newspaper: ‘Umteteli wa Bantu’, Question No. 25, What is the Highest Rank of Native? Answer, Sergeant, A.B. O’Brien, Secretary, Native Printing and Publishing Company to DNEAS, 20 October 1941.} By virtue of being black, the highest military rank that could be attained was that of a sergeant (and staff sergeant in 1942 after the interventions of the native representative councillors in parliament).\footnote{Grundlingh, ‘The Participation of South African Blacks’, pp. 111-114. See CGS (War), Box 131, 32/23, Memorandum on NEAS, by Parliamentary Representatives of Natives: Senator H.C. Malcomess, Margaret Ballinger, Donald B. Molteno and G.K. Hemming, 17 September 1940; NMC, Box 12, NAS 3/21, Reader’s Questions to the Editor of Native Newspaper: ‘Umteteli wa Bantu’, Question No. 25, What is the Highest Rank of Native? Answer, Sergeant, A.B. O’Brien, Secretary, Native Printing and Publishing Company to DNEAS, 20 October 1941.} Even such a
rank was still subordinated to a white soldier of any rank.\textsuperscript{1171} Military authorities were conscious of the impact of discriminatory practices on black troops and attempted to introduce measures that would facilitate the development and preservation of their morale.\textsuperscript{1172} However, their efforts were constrained by the prevailing political circumstances that focussed on minimising the white antagonism, particularly from the anti-war factions in the country. The lack of equal opportunities and the discriminatory practices accounted for the persistent disgruntlements and resentments among the black troops.

Among all UDF troops, frustrations set in as a result of inactivity due to an ‘astronomical shortage of kit and equipment’\textsuperscript{1173}, also due to monotony of camp life\textsuperscript{1174} as well as the performance of repetitive dull routines by men who had completed their training but kept “indefinitely” in base camps.\textsuperscript{1175} On the UDF’s shortage of equipment, Martin and Orpen clearly capture the distressing situation:

\begin{quote}
To say South Africa was unprepared for the war is no exaggeration ... it was not only the fault of a political Cabinet or Minister of Defence, or even of a parsimonious Minister of Finance who refused to allocate funds for armaments ... no ‘shopping list’ was at hand to guide any authority appointed to obtain for the Defence Department what it required to fulfil its responsibilities ... so, the politically divided country was faced not with simply going ahead with the realization of well-laid plans, but with the creation of a virtually new army, air force and navy from scratch.\textsuperscript{1176}
\end{quote}

It was inevitable that inactive troops would be bored and frustrated, resulting in the decline of morale. Further dissatisfactions among troops emanated from the general military administration and policies. Because of the internal political divisions, the government introduced the Africa Oath policy on 7 February 1940 and required volunteers ‘to serve

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{1171} DNEAS Group 2, Box 7, NAS 4/6 8/6, War Measures Act no. 5, 23 January 1942; Grundlingh, The Participation of South African Blacks in the Second World War, pp. 111-114.
\textsuperscript{1172} DNEAS Group 2, Box 20, NAS 3/42/1, Lt Col Mockford to OC Boschpoort NMC Camp, 3 July 1942.
\textsuperscript{1173} Shortage of equipment was a result of many years of neglect. See N. Orpen, \textit{East African and Abyssinian Campaigns: South African Forces World War II}, vol. 1 (Purnell, Cape Town and Johannesburg, 1968), p. 3.
\textsuperscript{1174} Army Intelligence, Box 33, CE 6/C11, Censorship Summaries, 13 March 1941.
\textsuperscript{1175} Malherbe Papers, File 441/11, KCM 56974 (893), Report on the Factors Affecting Morale in the Army at Premier Mine, by Capt Jane Malherbe, 28 August 1942.
\textsuperscript{1176} Martin and Orpen, \textit{South Africa at War}, vol. 7, p. 26.
\end{footnotes}
anywhere in Africa’. Many soldiers refused to sign the Oath on the grounds that they were only prepared to defend the Union within its borders. The introduction and implementation of the Africa Oath (1940) and later the General Service Oath (Service Anywhere in the World, January 1943), caused dissatisfactions among soldiers regarding the differences in the treatment of those who signed and those who did not. Those who signed the oaths (and even served outside South Africa) generally received better treatment, although, there were some grievances. Those who declined to sign the oaths, declared Visser, were viewed with derision and described as ‘parade ground soldiers with no guts’. Although the issue of signing oaths elicited controversies and bitterness within the white society and the military, there were other organisational problems that produced dissatisfactions among the soldiers.

During the early months of the war, when UDF mobilisation was taking shape, volunteers became frustrated due to the delays in processing the troops, lack of accommodation at training camps, diseases at overcrowded camps (Natal Mounted Rifles at Ladysmith), lack of training material and lack of action. G.E. Visser writes that due to the lack of accommodation, the warning order on 8 July 1940 for the fulltime service of the volunteers of the Middellaandse Regiment at Graff Reinet, Eastern (Cape) Province Command, for 22 July, was cancelled twice. It created a social dilemma because some of those volunteers, on the basis of the first warning order, had left their civilian employment for fulltime military service and thus, had no income when the order was cancelled. The situation was desperate

1179 Martin and Orpen, *South Africa at War*, vol. 7, pp. 223-225; Visser, *OB: Traitors or Patriots?*, p. 31.
1180 Martin and Orpen, *South Africa at War*, vol. 7, pp. 223-225; See also a consolidated report on army morale, Malherbe Papers, File 441/10, KCM 56974 (864), Memorandum on Army Morale and Propaganda, by DMI (Ic), March 1943; QMG, Group 1, Box 104, Q 91/339, Morale in the Army, 25 August 1943.
1181 Visser, *OB: Traitors or Patriots?*, p. 31.
1183 The first cancelled date was for 22 July 1940, the next one was for 29 July. It was also changed to August 1940, when mainly those who were in a desperate situation of being jobless, were accommodated in Bloemfontein, then to Premier Mine in Pretoria. G.E. Visser, ‘Die Geskiedenis van die Middellaandse Regiment, 1934-1943’ (Unpublished MA Thesis, University of South Africa, Pretoria, 1983), pp. 71-72.
and the military authorities, on a limited scale, called up those whose circumstances were
dire, if they could prove it, for fulltime service.\textsuperscript{1184}

Another point of frustration related to camp life. Soldiers in base camps, mainly in the Union,
were dissatisfied with remaining in camps for longer periods when they had actually enlisted
for active service. They declared that they were ‘either forgotten’ or that their immediate
superiors refused to dispense with their services because of being “too” competent.\textsuperscript{1185} Some
troops in the Natal Mounted Rifles (NMR) at Andalusia were so dissatisfied that they signed
petitions about their grievances pertaining to ‘inaction at camps’ and questioning the ‘delays
to go North’.\textsuperscript{1186} One soldier of the Pretoria Highlanders wrote to his wife complaining about
stagnation in military camps:

\begin{quote}
We class ourselves as night watchmen, as we rarely do anything else and are unable to
visualise any better prospect. I have considered every possible way of working a transfer ... I
am of the opinion that I would be more use back at work as I’d be saving S.A.R money and
would be learning my job instead of stagnating here ... I never imagined I would one day be
on the same level as the old men who guard the picks and shovels of road gangs at night.\textsuperscript{1187}
\end{quote}

Military discipline and petty offences such as drunkenness, selling military equipment and
leaving camps without passes also became a problem.\textsuperscript{1188} Military courts handled
approximately 1500 cases at Premier Mine alone every month, creating congestions in the
military judicial system and immobilising officers and men for protracted periods of time.\textsuperscript{1189}
Likewise, there was anxiety regarding the increasing number of desertions and the discharges
which, according Malherbe, were ‘exceedingly high’ at about ‘500 monthly’ on the records
of the dispersal depots.\textsuperscript{1190} Those discharges were attributed to the dissatisfactions, as
Malherbe raised a question with regard to ‘persons who have had clean records for a year or

---

\textsuperscript{1185} Army Intelligence, Box 33, CE 6/C11, Censorship Summaries, 13 March 1941; Malherbe Papers, File
441/11, KCM 56974 (893), Report on the Factors Affecting Morale in the Army at Premier Mine, by
Capt Janie Malherbe, 28 August 1942.
\textsuperscript{1186} Army Intelligence, Box 33, CE 6/C11, Censorship Summaries, 23 July 1941.
\textsuperscript{1187} Army Intelligence, Box 33, CE 6/C11, Censorship Summaries, 19 July 1941.
\textsuperscript{1188} Army Intelligence, Box 33, CE 6/C11, Censorship Summaries, 19 July 1941.
\textsuperscript{1189} Malherbe Papers, File 441/11, KCM 56974 (893), Report on the Factors Affecting Morale in the Army
at Premier Mine, by Capt Janie Malherbe, 28 August 1942.
\textsuperscript{1190} Malherbe Papers, File 441/11, KCM 56974 (893), Report on the Factors Affecting Morale in the Army
at Premier Mine, by Capt Janie Malherbe, 28 August 1942.
18 months and suddenly go berserk’. Malherbe cautioned that the ‘dissatisfied soldiers had nothing good to say about the army, and consciously or unconsciously assist in slandering it’. It was thus critical that their distresses and legitimate concerns be resolved expeditiously or risk losing them to the anti-war factions which exploited military service conditions to wage anti-government propaganda. Moreover, there were troops who, in the censorship reports, were described as the ‘never-do-wells’ or ‘constant-grumblers’ and ‘base-wallowers’ who caused tensions which affected morale within camps.

Tensions at the higher military hierarchy also complicated matters. There was what Kerr, with reference to Van Ryneveld’s leadership style, describes as ‘dictatorship’ by ‘the fountain of all decisions’ in the UDF- the CGS, who was in constant collision with the main accounting officer of the DOD - Defence Secretary Blaine. The clash of the two main figures in the higher military establishment created complications in the decision-making process as there were sometimes ‘conflicting orders and instructions from formations, commands and DHQ sections’. It is on this basis that the administrative and policy-related matters presented difficulties and impacted on troop morale. Hence, by 1943, an unsigned hand-written note commenting on the DMI (Ic)’s ‘Memorandum on Army Morale’, highlighted the point that ‘it is very difficult for propaganda to overcome the effects of policies which take no account of morale … what is essential is that those who can speak with authority on morale should be consulted when policies are drawn up’. The DMI (Ic), therefore, had to contend with this tricky aspect of policy and military administration when the schemes for sustaining troop morale were developed and implemented from late 1940 and early 1941 until the end of the war.

1194 Army Intelligence, Box 33, CE 6/C11, Censorship Summaries, 23 July 1941; Malherbe Papers, File 441/11, KCM 56974 (893), Report on the Factors Affecting Morale in the Army at Premier Mine, by Capt Janie Malherbe, 28 August 1942.
1195 Martin and Orpen, ‘Foreword’, South Africa at War, vol. 7, p. V.
1197 Malherbe Papers, File 441/10, KCM 56974 (864), Notes on Memorandum on Army Morale and Propaganda, unsigned comments, n.d.
In addition to the policy-related problems, lack of variety in the activities at base camps produced boredom and the troops began to contemplate their prospects after the war. After enlistment and being in camps without much to do, some of the troops took the initiatives of establishing discussion groups to articulate their concerns regarding the post-war socio-economic visions. The government and military authorities were not oblivious to the distresses and restlessness of the troops. But, the question of the troops debating about the social and economic conditions of the post-war society, in a volatile political environment of the Nazi-perpetuated extremism, produced anxieties among the Union officials. The concerns of the Union officials pertained to the potential subversion of the UDF, the development of untenable demands by the soldiers and the Nazi-inspired political extremism which could possibly result in the creation of an alternative ‘post-war fascist or Soldiers’ Party. The loyalty of the largely white Afrikaans-speaking members of the UDF to the government and the war policy needed to be secured. As a result, within the Union military forces, the authorities instituted various measures throughout the war to combat the subversive influences, to eliminate camp monotony and to sustain the morale of the troops.

In broad terms, the measures which were instituted included education and training, entertainment and recreational facilities for the troops. Educational services involved lectures and talks as well as reading material for mental stimulation. This will be examined in the next section. As far as entertainment and recreation, these will be dealt with in the next chapter on social welfare services. However, it should be noted that due to the unprepared state of the military, the preoccupation with mobilisation and the financial considerations, there was initial reluctance to introduce propaganda for the troops. After several letters and memoranda from the DMI (Ic) and from white liberal supporters of Smuts with regard to the introduction of counter-measures against subversive activities, as well as the need to

1200 PP, Box 56, PR 2/2, Memorandum on Propaganda in Military Units, DDMI to SO3 (Ic (ii), Advance Headquarters, 9 June 1941, PP, Box 57, PR 3/4/1, Memorandum on the Scope and Work of I.C.(iii), the Propaganda Branch of Military Intelligence, Lt JE Sacks, 6 August 1940; Roos, Ordinary Springboks, p. 49; Malherbe, Never a Dull Moment, pp. 215-217.
1201 AG, Group 3, Box 6, Notes on Meetings of Authority Committee, 1940-1941; CGS (War), Box 197, 42/1, War Propaganda, DDMI to CGS, 26 September 1940; Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.38, History of Army Education Services, 30 September 1945; Dr Malherbe also expressed the challenges he encountered with the Finance Minister, Hofmeyr, who was strict with finances to facilitate the delivery of political propaganda. See Malherbe, Never a Dull Moment, pp. 219-220.
inculcate the appreciation of liberal democracy among troops, the institution of propaganda schemes within the UDF was authorised in 1941.1202

EDUCATION AND TRAINING

At the start of the war, as with the unprepared state of the military force, South Africa had no policy or an organised propaganda system.1203 However, there was “theorising” about propaganda, its technical aspects, its significance in the preservation of morale and its capacity to undermine the morale of the enemy, which the DMI (Ic) and civilian experts produced.1204 In November 1940, during a meeting of the National Advisory Council on Publicity and Propaganda (where the military was not represented), the question of having an organisation ‘working on specialist propaganda inside the Army’ was raised by the director of the UUTS, Robertson.1205 The Interior Minister, Lawrence, mistakenly replied that publicity and propaganda was the function of the BOI (which assisted the military in the recruitment publicity and propaganda). Furthermore, Lawrence continued that, as far as he knew, the military was not supposed to have such a propaganda structure. To this point, Robertson contended that ‘the army should … every modern army on the Continent has such a welfare establishment which deals with propaganda and such matters within the army’.1206

The point here was that inter-agency rivalry was rife in the government’s propaganda machine. For example, during the above-mentioned meeting, the fact that there was a special

---

1202 CGS (War), Box 197, 42/1, War Propaganda, Thwaites to CGS, 13 April 1940; PP, Box 39, PR 1/5, Organisation: Propaganda Projects. Draft of Proposed Circular to O’s C, n.d.; PP, Box 39, PR 1/5/2, Propaganda Among Our Troops, G.S.O.2 (Ic) to D.G.O (for DDMI), 8 November 1940; Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.2, Memorandum on Education the Troops in the Political, Social and Economic Reasons for Our being at War (A Suggested Scheme), 31 October 1940; Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.38, History of Army Education Services, 30 September 1945.
1203 PP, Box 57, PR 3/4/1, Memorandum on the Scope and Work of I.C.(iii), the Propaganda Branch of Military Intelligence, Lt JE Sacks, 6 August 1940; PP, Box 40, PR 1/2/2, Memorandum for Colonel Campbell-Ross, 24 July 1944.
1205 PP, Box 63, PU 6/3, Army Publicity and Propaganda, DMI (Ic) to DDMI, 27 November 1940.
1206 PP, Box 63, PU 6/3, Army Publicity and Propaganda, DMI (Ic) to DDMI, 27 November 1940.
branch of military intelligence (the DMI (Ic)) dealing military publicity and propaganda within the UDF was not even mentioned. It was surprising, according to the DMI (Ic), that Wilson (the BOI’s director), who knew and interacted with the military propaganda branch (DMI (Ic)), sat in that meeting and failed to correct Lawrence’s mistaken statement.\textsuperscript{1207} This might be attributed to the prevailing contestations between the DMI (Ic) and the BOI. Many of the earlier activities of the DMI (Ic), on which reports were generated, related more to the publicity and propaganda towards the South African public (for a positive public opinion and for recruitment), hence the clashes they encountered with the BOI.\textsuperscript{1208} In a hand-written comment on the report, the DDMI replied to the Ic’s concern that ‘we should just go ahead with our propaganda work and keep careful files of our effort.’\textsuperscript{1209}

Because of the “alarming” censorship reports concerning the restlessness of the troops during the second half of 1940, the necessity for the formal institution of propaganda within the UDF increased. The DMI (Ic) submitted memoranda\textsuperscript{1210} to the higher military authorities regarding the need to improve the morale of the troops. In November 1940, Major D.A.W. Ruck of DMI (Ic) wrote to the director general of operations (for DDMI), indicating the imperative of instituting constructive propaganda among the UDF troops because of censorship reports that revealed disaffections among some of the Afrikaans – speaking troops which was attributed to boredom.\textsuperscript{1211} To alleviate the problem, he suggested propaganda interventions which included the provision of lecturer services and talks, the issuing of army newspapers to the troops and the utilisation of mobile cinema for both entertainment and instructional value.\textsuperscript{1212}

\textsuperscript{1207} PP, Box 63, PU 6/3, Army Publicity and Propaganda, DMI (Ic) to DDMI, 27 November 1940.
\textsuperscript{1208} CGS (War), Box 197, 42/4, Memorandum on the Plan for Press and Information Division, 3 April 1940; CGS (War), Box 197, 42/4, Instruction to all Military Commands by the Chief of the General Staff, 6 April 1940; Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 144, Memorandum on the Bureau of Information: Present Activities, 23 August 1940; CGS (War), Box 197, 42/4, Reply of the UDF Quartermaster General and the Director General Operations to the Director of Information, 28 August 1940; CGS (War), Box 197, 42/4, Minutes of a Meeting on the Working of the Existing Organisation for Press Information, Publicity and Propaganda, 17 October 1940.
\textsuperscript{1209} PP, Box 63, PU 6/3, Army Publicity and Propaganda, DMI (Ic) to DDMI, 27 November 1940.
\textsuperscript{1210} PP, Box 57, PR 3/4, Memorandum on the Scope and Work of (DMI) I.C.(iii), the Propaganda Branch of Military Intelligence, by Lt J.E. Sacks, Kreft to Wakefield, 6 August 1940; PP, Box 59, PR 7/2/1, Suggested Measures for Countering Subversive Propaganda in South Africa, by Lt J.E. Sacks (Ic), 17 September 1940; PP, Box 57, PR 3/1, Propaganda: Its Power as a Weapon of War, by Capt R.L. Robb, Intelligence and Security Officer, 2 September 1941.
\textsuperscript{1211} PP, Box 39, PR 1/5/2, Propaganda Among Our Troops, G.S.O.2 (Ic) to D.G.O (for DDMI), 8 November 1940.
\textsuperscript{1212} PP, Box 39, PR 1/5/2, Propaganda Among Our Troops, G.S.O.2 (Ic) to D.G.O (for DDMI), 8 November 1940.
In January 1941, the DMI (Ic) submitted a draft letter to the DDMI requesting to give effect to the propaganda requirement in the UDF by appointing welfare (propaganda) officers at military units to ‘build troop morale, the keenness of men and to instil a strong sense of comradeship and devotion to duty in the early stages of the war’. It was proposed that officers commanding the military units were to appoint ‘Welfare (Propaganda) Officers’ with the rank of a captain, for the purpose of dealing with matters of education, entertainment and recreation for the troops. The proposed functions of the welfare (propaganda) officer were varied:

a. Providing instructional handbooks and facilitate lessons in propaganda technique.
b. Facilitating lecture services by officers and men who have participated in previous campaigns to share their experiences for inspirational purposes.
c. Encouraging loyalist English and Afrikaans literature in the military camps.
d. Ensuring the installation of radio receiving sets in officers and men’s messes with special microphone equipment for facilitating announcements and lectures.
e. Making arrangements for distributing the news, pamphlets and literature in camps.
f. Organising entertainment such as camp concerts, camp songs, sports and also for arranging special services to advice troops with personal problems.

Closer co-operation between the welfare (propaganda) officer and the unit intelligence officer, who also served as censor officer, was fundamental in expediting the passing of useful information on the views and feelings of the troops, thus maintaining alertness and to facilitate the implementation of the relevant antidotes in cases of disaffections. The welfare (propaganda) officer would liaise with the DDMI (specifically the Ic section) for the submission of weekly reports to the DHQ (DDMI) and to receive special instructional and propaganda material for distribution in the units. Though the proposals were clearly designed for the UDF troops, the DMI (Ic)’s activities at the beginning of the war (also throughout the war for that matter due to the concerns for military security), persistently

---

1213 PP, Box 39, PR 1/5, Appointment of Welfare (Propaganda) Officer in Every Unit, Draft Letter to Os. C Units, Ic to DDMI, 2 January 1941.
1214 PP, Box 39, PR 1/5, Appointment of Welfare (Propaganda) Officer in Every Unit, Draft Letter to Os. C Units, Ic to DDMI, 2 January 1941. The draft letter was an attempt to give detail to the previous suggestions from the Ic regarding the implementation of propaganda to the troops. However, the type of personnel to perform those functions was not clarified.
clashed with those of the BOI as the former also dealt with the publicity of the UDF activities towards the public – the domain of Wilson.\textsuperscript{1217}

As indicated above, it took more than a year for the military authorities to give official sanction for the introduction of propaganda among the troops. Despite the various letters and memoranda from the DMI (Ic),\textsuperscript{1218} the military authorities relented to the submission from an unofficial committee led by a University of the Witwatersrand (Wits) academic – Professor R.F.A (Alfred) Hoernlé, an influential professor of philosophy and liberal supporter of Smuts.\textsuperscript{1219} On 10 September 1940, the unofficial committee held a meeting at Wits in Johannesburg to deliberate on the ways and means of assisting the DOD by delivering the educational services to the South African soldiers.\textsuperscript{1220} From this meeting, Hoernlé submitted the proposed scheme to Smuts on 19 September 1940. The Hoernlé scheme proposed an institution of an educational service for the UDF troops (mainly white) on the basis of the following rationale:

\begin{itemize}
  \item[a.] UDF members should know what they were \textit{fighting for}, not only what they were \textit{fighting against}. To explain the reasons why South Africa was engaged in a war and thus developing their political consciousness with regard to the cause they were fighting for.
\end{itemize}

\textsuperscript{1217} CGS (War), Box 197, 42/4, Minutes of a Meeting on the Working of the Existing Organisation for Press Information, Publicity and Propaganda, 17 October 1940; PP, Box 63, PU 6/9/5, Report on the Relationship between the Bureau of Information and the UDF, 13 January 1941; CGS (War), Box 197, 42/4, Report on the Control of Military Information issues to the Public, DDMI’s Reply to Controller of Censorship, 16 April 1942.

\textsuperscript{1218} This might have been due to the misunderstandings regarding the different roles of the Bureau of Information and the military intelligence section dealing with publicity and propaganda. See CGS (War), Box 197, 42/4, Minutes of a Meeting on the Working of the Existing Organisation for Press Information, Publicity and Propaganda, 17 October 1940; PP, Box 63, PU 6/9/5, Report on the Relationship between the Bureau of Information and the UDF, 13 January 1941; PP, Box 57, PR 3/1, Points to be Considered in the Organisation of Any Propaganda and Publicity, Ic to DDMI, 4 August 1941.


\textsuperscript{1220} Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.38, History of Army Education Services, 30 September 1945; ‘Prof Hoernlé Dead: Brilliant Academic Career’, \textit{The Star}, 21 July 1943.
b. The need to stimulate thinking and to sustain the intellectual interest of soldiers in social life.

c. The provision of assistance to those soldiers whose educational careers had been interrupted by the war.

d. To afford opportunities to engage in discussions and to debate problematic issues of relevance and interest to soldiers as well as to combat boredom.

e. At the later stage, to facilitate the provision of services for soldiers in preparation for their re-entry into the civilian life.\textsuperscript{1221}

The proposed educational service was intended to be conducted by a panel of civilian lecturers without any financial benefits for them.\textsuperscript{1222} Topics to be addressed by the educational service included the illumination of the background, causes and ideological underpinnings of the war, economic and social implications, nationalism, principles of democracy, press and propaganda, race relations, population problems, non-Europeans, post-war reconstruction and international order.\textsuperscript{1223} Smuts was interested in the scheme and passed it on to his CGS, Van Ryneveld, which was then deliberated further between the director general training and operations, Major General George Brink and Hofmeyr in October 1940.\textsuperscript{1224}

In the meantime, Leo Marquard, an instructor at the South African Military College, and his wife, Mrs Nell (N.J.) Marquard, who was involved in welfare activities, proposed an alternative scheme for political education in the UDF troops.\textsuperscript{1225} Unlike the Hoernlé’s scheme, the Marquards’ proposal advocated training a corps of about fifty \textit{military} officers,
not civilians, as political instructors to deliver the lectures to the UDF troops.\textsuperscript{1226} The Marquards’ proposal was submitted to Dr Malherbe, who was also involved in the proposals generated by Professor Hoernlé.\textsuperscript{1227} Subsequently, on 1 November 1940, Dr Malherbe rephrased the letter from the Marquards and submitted it as a memorandum titled ‘Education the Troops in the Political, Social and Economic Reasons for Our being at War’, to Colonel H.T. Newman (DDMI) and Colonel H.B. Klopper (then director of infantry and armoured fighting vehicle training).\textsuperscript{1228}

The Marquard memorandum explained the necessity for propaganda and set out the intended objectives and methods of instituting what became the \textit{Army Education Services} (AES).\textsuperscript{1229} The AES would serve to create awareness among the UDF troops about the Union’s cultural, political and economic assets to be preserved – through their sacrifices.\textsuperscript{1230} Dr Malherbe believed that the suggested scheme of the Marquards would appeal to the military authorities from an organisational perspective.\textsuperscript{1231} The main objective of the rephrased Malherbe-Marquard scheme was to strengthen troop morale and to ‘improve the fighting force against Nazism’.\textsuperscript{1232} The memorandum emphasised that the AES should not be treated as an “auxiliary” activity, but as an integral part of military training and educational development:

\textit{The scheme of instruction must not receive stepfatherly treatment. It must not be looked upon by the military authorities as some new-fangled idea (born of civilian cranks) which, if}

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{1226} Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.2, Memorandum on Educating the Troops in the Political, Social and Economic Reasons for Our being at War (A Suggested Scheme), 31 October 1940; Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.1, E.G.M. Malherbe to L. Marquard, 1 November 1940.
\bibitem{1228} Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.2, Memorandum on Educating the Troops, 31 October 1940; Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.1, E.G.M. Malherbe to L. Marquard, 1 November 1940.
\bibitem{1229} UWH, Box 287, B.I. 36, The Army Education Scheme for the UDF, Bulletin, 1941, pp. 1-4; AG (3) Box 207, 154/51/50/5, Organisation and Establishment: Army Education Services (V), Circular to All Heads of Sections, 17 July 1942; Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.1, E.G.M. Malherbe to L. Marquard, 1 November 1940; Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.2, Memorandum on Educating the Troops, 31 October 1940; Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.38, History of Army Education Services, 30 September 1945; \textit{Army Education Handbook}, 1943, pp. 5-159.
\bibitem{1230} UWH, Box 287, B.I. 36, The Army Education Scheme for the UDF, Bulletin, 1941, pp. 1-4; AG (3) Box 207, 154/51/50/5, Educational Course (784 G), Malherbe to the Adjutant General, 11 March 1941; Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.2, Memorandum on Educating the Troops, 31 October 1940; \textit{Army Education Handbook}, 1943, pp. 5-159; ‘Education for the Army’, \textit{Cape Times}, 24 February 1941; Malherbe, \textit{Never a Dull Moment}, p. 215; Roos, \textit{Ordinary Springboks}, pp. 51-54.
\bibitem{1231} Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.1, E.G.M. Malherbe to L. Marquard, 1 November 1940.
\bibitem{1232} UWH, Box 287, B.I. 36, The Army Education Scheme for the UDF, Bulletin, 1941, pp. 1-4; AG (3) Box 207, 154/51/50/5, Educational Course (784 G), Malherbe to the Adjutant General, 11 March 1941; Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.2, Memorandum on Educating the Troops, 31 October 1940, p. 1; Malherbe, \textit{Never a Dull Moment}, p. 215; Cardo, ‘Fighting a Worse Imperialism’, p. 149.
\end{thebibliography}
Instruction must somehow be made part and parcel of the whole scheme of training a democratic army to fight Fascism. It is as much a weapon as a Bren Gun – as the Germans and Italians realise very clearly. We want an army not of mercenaries but of soldiers – soldiers who are imbued with a powerful ideal. The scheme of instruction will, therefore, have to be carefully integrated with the present scheme of training.1233

Combining education with propaganda would expand the knowledge and also enhance the mental stimulation of the soldier. The DMI (Ic)’s draft proposal for the appointment of welfare (propaganda) officers in military camps and training establishments also emphasised this point of combining educational service and propaganda:

*The institution of a special service via the Welfare (Propaganda) Officer to men ... on one side would be instructional articles (map reading, directing finding by stars, hints for distance finding, etc) and on the other side [would be] a matter of a propagandist character (war aims, encouragement of comradeship, etc).*1234

It was a difficult task to convince high military officers regarding the imperative of such an educational scheme.1235 Nevertheless, they needed to be persuaded since it was deemed essential to integrate political education with military training to enhance the prospects of winning the war ‘in anything but purely military sense’.1236 To pursue the goal of political education, careful consideration was required for the selection of appropriate personnel.1237

The objective of the Malherbe-Marquard scheme was to have personnel who should, ‘as far as humanly possible be people in the army and not civilians’, to conduct political education. Young men who had undergone military training and possessed the required military attributes such as discipline, had to be ‘hand-picked’ for the special type of training for the purpose of co-ordinating ‘democratic training [political education] with military training

---

1234 PP, Box 39, PR 1/5, Appointment of Welfare (Propaganda) Officer in Every Unit, Draft Letter to Os. C Units, Ic to DDMI, 2 January 1941.
1235 See comments of the establishment of AES, AG (3) Box 207, 154/51/50/5, Provision of Educational Services to the Troops, Director General of Training and Operations to the Adjutant General, 27 February 1941.
1237 UWH, Box 287, B.I. 36, The Army Education Scheme for the UDF, Bulletin, 1941, pp. 1-4; AG (3) Box 207, 154/51/50/5, M.F.F. Educational Corps, Director General of Training and Operations to CGS, n.d; AG (3) Box 207, 154/51/50/5, SA Educational Corps, Director General of Training and Operations to Adjutant General, 22 February 1941.
[squad drills, company drills, weapons training and military law]. Such training of the political instructors was envisaged to take two to three months at a time and their selection to the course was on the basis of their educational background, ability and they had to be ‘in sympathy with the Government’s war policy’. After undergoing political education, these specially selected officers, still working as combatants, were to speak with authority to military men, were to provide the ‘main diet’ of the educational programme to at least twenty troops in camps and on active service and were to live among the troops, not to come in occasionally to deliver an ‘odd lecture’.

Still, as Cardo shows, there was to be closer cooperation between the military and civilian aspects of the education scheme. The civilian experts in their respective fields would be selected to provide lectures to the selected nucleus of political instructors and to inspire interest in those specialised educational areas. The suggested education scheme further envisaged a curriculum that included the following topics:

a. Explanations of Fascism and Nazism.
b. The weaknesses and strengths of the Democratic institutions.
c. The Democratic tradition and the underlying principles.
d. The economics of Fascism.

e. How progress can be achieved under the democratic system without the brutality of revolutionary and of Gestapo – methods
f. Propaganda methods and how to combat them.

The main objectives of the syllabus of the envisaged political education were twofold: ‘to equip soldiers to defend democracy and to equip citizen-soldiers to build a better democracy

1239 UWH, Box 287, B.I. 36, The Army Education Scheme for the UDF, Bulletin, 1941, pp. 1-4; Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.2, Memorandum on Educating the Troops, 31 October 1940, p. 3.
1241 AG (3) Box 207, 154/51/50/5, Provision of Educational Services to the Troops, Director General of Training and Operations to the Adjutant General, 27 February 1941; Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.2, Memorandum on Educating the Troops, 31 October 1940, p. 2; Cardo, ‘Fighting a Worse Imperialism’, p. 149.
1242 AG (3) Box 207, 154/51/50/5, S.A.I.C: Educational Course (784 G), 18 March 1941-18 April 1941, South African Military College, 18 March 1941; UWH, Box 287, B.I. 36, The Army Education Scheme for the UDF, Bulletin, 1941, pp. 1-4; Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.2, Memorandum on Educating the Troops, 31 October 1940, p. 3.
once the threat of Fascism has been removed’.\textsuperscript{1243} The advantage of the AES was that even after the war, the “politically-trained” officers and men would ‘act as a powerful and salutary leaven amongst their own folks when they get home in the different parts of South Africa’.\textsuperscript{1244} Dr Malherbe, conscious of the prevailing political sensitivities in the country, emphasised that ‘special attention should be paid to the needs of the Afrikaans-speaking troops’ as well as to ensure that most of those political education officers were themselves proficient in Afrikaans.\textsuperscript{1245} It was imperative for Dr Malherbe to assuage the political sensitivities of the Afrikaans-speakers to eliminate the risk of what Cardo refers to as ‘volkish Afrikaner nationalism’ that could jeopardise the English-Afrikaans relations and adversely impact on morale.\textsuperscript{1246}

The Minister of Education and Finance, Hofmeyr, was at first reluctant about the Malherbe-Marquard scheme.\textsuperscript{1247} As deliberations on that scheme were taking place within the government and the high-ranking military officials, experimentation with the Hoernlé scheme was allowed (by defence and Hofmeyr) to proceed in the Pretoria (at Waterkloof, Lyttleton and at the Military College-\textit{Voortrekker Hoogte}/Roberts’ Heights) and at the Sonderwater-Premier Mine areas.\textsuperscript{1248} This experimentation scheme involved a series of four lectures dealing with the general subjects such as the genesis of the war\textsuperscript{1249}, the rise of dictators and how they acquire and employ their power\textsuperscript{1250} and democracy as a government method versus

\begin{itemize}
\item Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.2, Memorandum on Educating the Troops, 31 October 1940, p. 3.
\item Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.2, Memorandum on Educating the Troops, 31 October 1940, p. 3; See also details in the AES Bulletin, UWH, Box 287, B.I. 36, The Army Education Scheme for the UDF, Bulletin, 1941, pp. 1-4.
\item Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.2, Memorandum on Educating the Troops, 31 October 1940, p. 4. See also Cardo, ‘Fighting a Worse Imperialism’, p. 149.
\item Hoernlé Papers, AD 1623, C 2/4, Lecture 1: How the War Began, Draft, n.d.
\item Hoernlé Papers, AD 1623, C 2/4, Lecture 2, Dictatorships, Draft, n.d.
\end{itemize}
dictatorship. On 11 February 1941, the Malherbe-Marquard scheme was eventually approved by Van Ryneveld, for adoption within the UDF intelligence section (as IM - for morale), with Dr Malherbe in charge as an education officer.

The Hoernlé scheme was then instituted in the ACF in the Transvaal and also extended to the OFS, Natal, Eastern and Western Cape. A panel of local civilian lecturers were organised at the nearby base camps under Major E. Eybers (Bloemfontein), Major S.H. Skaife (Cape Town), Major J. Smeath-Thomas (Grahamstown), Major O.J.P. Oxley (Pietermaritzburg) and Major J.Y.T Greig (Hoernlé’s successor after his death in 1943, who also organised lecturers at the Witwatersrand, Premier Mine and Potchefstroom). Hoernlé, with the military rank of lieutenant colonel, drew most of the lecturing staff and material from the Universities of the Witwatersrand and Pretoria. Within the UDF, the training course for the political education instructors under the Malherbe-Marquard scheme commenced on 18 March 1941. The AES thus came into existence and had a dual purpose: firstly to sustain the morale and fighting efficiency of the troops to defeat Nazism; linked to the first aim, it served

---


1252 AG (3) Box 207, 154/51/50/5, Establishment S.A. Educational Corps, DGTO to AG, 10 February 1941; AG (3) Box 207, 154/51/50/5, AES Approval Letter, CGS to DGTO, 17 February 1941; Malherbe Papers, File 432/1, KCM 56974 (11-14), Recruitment, Identification and Discharge Record relating to Dr E.G. Malherbe, Volunteer’s Identity Book for Use on Discharge; Marquard Papers, BC 587, D.3.38, History of Army Education Services, 30 September 1945 - Significant Dates in the History of Army Education Scheme; Martin and Orpen, South Africa at War, vol. 7, p. 105; Malherbe, Never a Dull Moment, p. 215. See previous chapters.

1253 AG (3) Box 207, 154/51/50/5, AES Approval Letter, CGS to DGTO, 17 February 1941; AG (3) Box 207, 154/51/50/5, M.F.F. Educational Corps, Director General of Training and Operations to CGS, n.d; Marquard Papers, BC 587, D.3.38, History of Army Education Services, 30 September 1945; PP, Box 39, PR 1/5/2, Propaganda Among our Troops, Reply by Director Military Operations and Intelligence, to General Staff Officer, East Africa Force HQ, 29 November 1940; Martin and Orpen, South Africa at War, vol. 7, p. 105.

1254 AG (3) Box 207, 154/51/50/5, M.F.F. Educational Corps, Director General of Training and Operations to CGS, n.d; AG (3) Box 207, 154/51/50/5, Provision of Educational Services to the Troops, Director General of Training and Operations to the Adjutant General, 27 February 1941; Marquard Papers, BC 587, D.3.38, History of Army Education Services, 30 September 1945, p. 12; Cardo, ‘Fighting a Worse Imperialism’, p. 150.

1255 AG (3) Box 207, 154/51/50/5, M.F.F. Educational Corps, Director General of Training and Operations to CGS, n.d; AG (3) Box 207, 154/51/50/5, Provision of Educational Services to the Troops, Director General of Training and Operations to the Adjutant General, 27 February 1941.

1256 AG (3) Box 207, 154/51/50/5, Educational Course (784 G), Malherbe to the Adjutant General, 11 March 1941; AG (3) Box 207, 154/51/50/5, S.A.I.C: Educational Course (784 G), 18 March 1941-18 April 1941, South African Military College, 18 March 1941; UWH, Box 287, B.I. 36, The Army Education Scheme for the UDF, Bulletin, 1941, pp. 1-4; WD, vol. 1, Box 292, 194/3, The Training and Work of Education Officers, Broadcast Talk by Major E.G. Malherbe, 14 June 1941; Marquard Papers, BC 587, D.3.38, History of Army Education Services, 30 September 1945, p. 3.
to give shape and expression to the sometimes inarticulate and vague ideals and beliefs with regard to what the war was fought for, e.g. democratic way of life as opposed to Nazism.\textsuperscript{1257}

As a critical requirement, the political education instructors had to be specially selected and trained prior to being entrusted with that type of work.\textsuperscript{1258} To this end, Dr Malherbe and Marquard went to Cairo, Egypt to conduct the selection process among the troops in the war zone.\textsuperscript{1259} The first training course commenced with thirty-eight candidates on the nominal roll.\textsuperscript{1260} All the trainees were hand-picked men brought to Pretoria from the war zone, Egypt, for the AES course at the South African Military College, \textit{Voortrekker Hoogte} (formerly Roberts’ Heights), one of the UDF’s military commands, training and mobilisation centre.\textsuperscript{1261} After four weeks of training, a written test and practical examination, thirty out of the original thirty-eight qualified with commissioned ranks as ‘Education Officers’, and others remained non-commissioned officers (NCOs).\textsuperscript{1262} However, the military bureaucracy\textsuperscript{1263} only gave approval on 13 May 1940, for the establishment of ten captains and twenty lieutenants of the AES, resorting under the umbrella of the SAIC.\textsuperscript{1264} Most of the newly qualified education officers had various university qualifications.


\textsuperscript{1258} AG (3) Box 207, 154/51/50/5, Educational Lectures’ Course, Circular to All Heads of Sections, 29 January 1941, DGTO to AG; AG (3) Box 207, 154/51/50/5, S.A. Educational Corps, DGTO to AG, 22 February 1941.


\textsuperscript{1261} AG (3) Box 207, 154/51/50/5, Educational Course (784 G), Malherbe to the Adjutant General, 11 March 1941; AG (3) Box 207, 154/51/50/5, S.A.I.C: Educational Course (784 G), 18 March 1941-18 April 1941, South African Military College, 18 March 1941; UWH, Box 287, B.I. 36, The Army Education Scheme for the UDF, Bulletin, 1941, pp. 1-4; Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.38, History of Army Education Services, 30 September 1945, p. 3; Malherbe, \textit{Never a Dull Moment}, p. 217; Cardo, ‘Fighting a Worse Imperialism’, p. 151; Roos, \textit{Ordinary Springboks}, p. 52.


\textsuperscript{1263} Cardo erroneously states that it was the Attorney General who authorised plans for military establishment for the AES. It was actually the Adjutant General, abbreviated as A.G., and it does not mean the Attorney General.

\textsuperscript{1264} Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.38, History of Army Education Services, 30 September 1945, p. 3; Cardo, ‘Fighting a Worse Imperialism’, p. 151.
In June 1941, Dr Malherbe gave a broadcast talk in East Africa, explaining the role and purpose of the education officers as well as inviting applications for another course envisaged to take place in August 1940. During that talk, he indicated that six of those successful candidates from the 18 March to 18 April 1941 course held doctoral degrees, fifteen held master’s degrees, others were chartered accountants, advocates, agricultural experts and university lecturers.\footnote{WD, Box 292, vol. 1, 194/3, The Training and Work of Education Officer, broadcast talk by Major (Dr) Malherbe, 14 June 1941; Malherbe, \textit{Never a Dull Moment}, p. 217.} The general purpose of the education officers, as explained by Dr Malherbe, was the following:

\begin{itemize}
  \item[a.] To provide systematic instruction to the troops and officers on topics dealing with the issues of the war and post-war reconstruction and adjustment. The lectures were designed for forty to forty-five troops at a time to facilitate effective deliberations. Attendance was compulsory for everyone in the unit.
  \item[b.] To organise facilities for activities of a general educational nature in the men’s spare time. This was designed to keep the men in touch with their interest and hobbies, to enhance mental stimulation and to combat boredom whilst the troops were waiting. Classes were voluntary and included instruction a variety of subjects such as languages, geography, law, accountancy and commercial subjects.
  \item[c.] To maintain links with other recreational services provided by other agencies such as the UDF Film Unit or to cooperate with the Young Men’s Christian Association (YMCA) and chaplains for morale stimulation. Each brigade officers was supposed to have a van with reference library and a 16 mm film projector for showing the sound films.\footnote{WD, Box 292, vol. 1, 194/3, The Training and Work of Education Officer, broadcast talk by Major (Dr) Malherbe, 14 June 1941. See also Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.38, History of Army Education Services, 30 September 1945, Appendix F, UDF Army Education Scheme: Duties of Information (Education) Officers, pp. 1-2.}
\end{itemize}

The focus and emphasis in the AES was apparent in the topics that were covered in the curriculum of the training course. Expert instruction was conducted by ‘practical men of affairs as well as outstanding academics’.\footnote{Malherbe, \textit{Never a Dull Moment}, p. 218.} The topics covered in the first and subsequent training courses were of economic, social, cultural-political and internal military-relations nature, with national and international focus. To facilitate healthier interactions within the
military organisation, lectures by members of the Military College covered relations of the educational officer to other officers, his adjustment to military conditions and the relations to intelligence and security work.\textsuperscript{1268} The UDF film unit OC, Weaver, lectured on the functions, use and maintenance of film projectors.\textsuperscript{1269} To improve an understanding of economic matters, Dr H.J. van der Byl and Dr H.J. van Eck lectured on the industrial development of South Africa; Professor H. Leppan dealt with the agricultural resources; Dr T.W. Osborn handled food and nutrition; Dr F. Meyer focused on the iron and steel production; Dr W.J. Busschau and Dr S. Haughton taught on the mining industry; Dr J.E. Holloway was responsible for finance and taxation lectures; and Prof H. Frankel drew comparisons of the economic systems under various political regimes, i.e. Fascism, Nazism and Communism.\textsuperscript{1270} Lectures on social matters included Dr F. Biljon who focused on economic production and income distribution; Dr S. Biesheuvel attended to the psychological aspects of propaganda; Professor I.D. MacCrone handled social interaction and relations; and Dr Z.K. Mathews, J.D. Rheinalt-Jones and Reverand S. Thema gave analysis on the race relations and ‘native matters’.\textsuperscript{1271}

Concerning the ideological aspects of the war and the cultural-political issues, lectures were given by Hoernlé on the concepts and implications of Nazism, Fascism, Communism and Democracy; Professor T. Haarhoff, Professor M.C. Botha and Professor C.M. van den

\textsuperscript{1268} WD, Box 292, vol. 1, 194/3, The Training and Work of Education Officer, broadcast talk by Major (Dr) Malherbe, 14 June 1941; See also UCT, Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.38, History of Army Education Services, 30 September 1945, Appendix D, Information Officer Course; Cardo, ‘Fighting a Worse Imperialism’, p. 151.

\textsuperscript{1269} UWH, Box 287, B.I. 36, The Army Education Scheme for the UDF, Bulletin, 1941, pp. 1-4; AG (3) Box 207, 154/51/50/5, S.A.I.C: Educational Course (784 G), 18 March 1941-18 April 1941, South African Military College, 18 March 1941; WD, Box 292, vol. 1, 194/3, The Training and Work of Education Officer, broadcast talk by Major (Dr) Malherbe, 14 June 1941; Malherbe, \textit{Never a Dull Moment}, p. 218.


\textsuperscript{1271} See Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.38, History of Army Education Services, 30 September 1945, Appendix D, Information Officer Course. Leo Marquard also presented lectures on the subject of ‘Native Problems’ and how to educate the white South Africa opinion on the development of Africans for economic productivity, not on moral issues, human rights, injustices and unfairness. Marquard believed that the moral questions to evoke pity were feeble and evaporated quickly. He instead emphasised to the trainees that they needed to concentrate more on economics. Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.7, Methods of Lecturing on Native Problem, n.d. (note on the document suggests the date of 1943?). See also Cardo, ‘Fighting a Worse Imperialism’, p. 154.
Heever dealt with the promotion of the ‘South Africanism’ notion by explaining the English-Afrikaans cultural heritage, relations and cooperation for the common purpose. Professor Leo Fouché, a historian, addressed the notion and ideals of democracy with its associated freedoms of thought and speech, with specific reference to historical process of “democracy” during the old South African republics. Fouché, together with Hoernlé and Dr Malherbe were the chief examiners at the AES training course. Another historian, Professor J. Agar-Hamilton, also gave lectures on the origins of the war. Dr Malherbe and Leo Marquard presented lectures on how the education officers could deliver the facts and provoke discussions among the audience. Dr Malherbe also dealt with the exposition and clarification of the so-called ‘-ism’ in political systems, referring to Socialism, Fascism, Nazism, Communism, New Idealism and the South African Democracy.

Some members of the UUTS’s lecturing staff at the School of Propaganda and Political Education in Johannesburg, also provided expertise as AES course instructors. They included Advocate Saron, Dr Sonnabend and Pastor Luckhoff. Most of the AES lecturers such as Fouché, Hoernlé, Haarhoff, MacCrone and Biesheuvel, were also part of the UUTS lecturing staff.

---

1272 The notion of ‘South Africanism’ was mainly centred on a national effort to construct a South African national identity based on English-Afrikaans cooperation. Dr Malherbe and Leo Marquard often referred to that subject in their writings and teaching throughout the war period. See WD, Box 292, vol. 1, 194/3, The Training and Work of Education Officer, broadcast talk by Major (Dr) Malherbe, 14 June 1941; Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.5, Education for Better South African Citizenship, Draft Memorandum, 4 August 1942; E.G. Malherbe, ‘Education for South Africanism: Teaching Cooperation in Our Schools’, Common Sense, May 1941; E.G. Malherbe, ‘Nasionale Samewerking’, Suid Afrika, ‘n Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Volk, March 1942; The ‘South Africanism’ notion is also at the centre of the argument by Cardo, ‘Fighting a Worse Imperialism’, pp. 141-174; Roos, Ordinary Springboks, pp. 48-56.

1273 WD, Box 292, vol. 1, 194/3, The Training and Work of Education Officer, broadcast talk by Major (Dr) Malherbe, 14 June 1941; Malherbe, Never a Dull Moment, p. 152; Malherbe, Never a Dull Moment, p. 218.

1274 WD, Box 292, vol. 1, 194/3, The Training and Work of Education Officer, broadcast talk by Major (Dr) Malherbe, 14 June 1941; See Prof Fouché’s draft lecture to the UUTS which was also presented to the AES candidates. UUTS, A1883, 14, Programme and Lectures for the School of Propaganda and Political Education, 9 December 1940; UUTS, A1883, 14, The Voortrekker’s Struggle for Freedom, by Leo Fouche, 16 December 1940.

1275 Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.38, History of Army Education Services, 30 September 1945, pp. 5-6.


1278 Malherbe Papers, File 432/9, KCM 56974 (145), Solution by -ISMs, Some Political Definitions, handwritten lecture notes by E.G. Malherbe, n.d.; A document containing similar definitions of the –isms, was sent to the UUTS by Wilson of the BOI. See UUTS, A1883, 2, The Various Forms of Government Explained, Wilson to Robertson, 13 March 1940; See also Cardo, ‘Fighting a Worse Imperialism’, p. 152.

1279 WD, Box 292, vol. 1, 194/3, The Training and Work of Education Officer, broadcast talk by Major (Dr) Malherbe, 14 June 1941; UUTS, A1883, 14, Programme and Lectures for the School of Propaganda and Political Education, 9 December 1940.
There was thus effective cooperation between the two main propaganda structures in the Union. As the training courses progressed and expanded, some of the previously qualified and experienced education officers provided assistance in the AES as tutors and examiners. The first group of the qualified education officers sailed to the North with the troops on a ship from Durban in June 1941. The education officers were divided into two groups: fourteen of them under Marquard were attached to the 1st South African Division in Egypt and the other fifteen under Captain J.J. Malherbe were attached to the 2nd South African Division which went to Egypt after a few weeks. While on the ship to the North, the fourteen education officers delivered a full lecture programme and were bombarded with questions. According to Marquard, the lectures were ‘on the whole, well received’. Lectures continued in the field at Mersa Mantru where the 1st Division was holding the area and at El Alamein, where the 2nd Division was based. The education officers, who were nervous about being perceived as “softies” by the troops in field, were welcomed as part of the routine, and shared the discomfort of the war zone such as nightly bombing raids, sand-riddled food and drinks.

The lectures themselves were regarded as a distraction from the military rigours such as digging. Desert conditions were difficult. Generally, there was a lack of lecturing facilities such as blackboards, paper and visual aids. It took ‘scrounging’ by the education officers to acquire material that could be utilised for lecturing, to find vehicles and accommodation. In some cases, lectures were conducted on sand. Education officers did not wait at rear areas for lectures. They followed the troops ‘in trenches, manning Ack Ack sites, or digging’.

---

1280 See UUTS, A1883, 14, Programme and Lectures for the School of Propaganda and Political Education, 9 December 1940.
1281 Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.38, History of Army Education Services, 30 September 1945, pp. 5-6; Malherbe Papers, File 441/7/3, KCM 57008 (113), Should We Bury Democracy, lecture by W. Dashwood, c1940-1943; Malherbe Papers, File 441/7/3, KCM 57008 (112), What does Nazism Mean?, lecture by A. Lennox-Short, c1940-1943; Malherbe Papers, File 441/7/3, KCM 57008 (114), Germany and Italy under Wartime Conditions, talk by V.M. Pinkley, n.d.
1283 Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.38, History of Army Education Services, 30 September 1945, p. 3; WD, Box 292, vol. 1, 194/3, The Training and Work of Education Officer, broadcast talk by Major (Dr) Malherbe, 14 June 1941.
While in Egypt, the original term of the ‘education officers’ was replaced by ‘information officers’ (IOs) in July 1940, at the suggestion of Brink, general officer commanding (GOC) 1st South African Division.\(^{1287}\) He requested an alternative to the term ‘education’ as he feared the troops might not like that word because it would ‘remind them of school’.\(^{1288}\) Official instructions regarding the usage of the term, ‘information officers’ (IOs), were communicated in June 1942.\(^{1289}\)

Whilst in the field, IOs performed many tasks. However, the main goal of IOs in the AES was political education – emphasis on ‘political training in democracy’.\(^{1290}\) The organisational principle was that an IO would be attached to a unit of about one thousand men.\(^{1291}\) A brigade would have a brigade IO with a rank of a captain and there would also be a divisional IO who was in charge of coordinating the information effort for the division. For lecturing purposes, it was determined that a platoon size group of about forty members was adequate for greater engagement and each man would have at least one lecture per week.\(^{1292}\)

However, owing to the demands of active service, attendance of lectures was sporadic. There was also ambivalence from OCs who doubted the value of education within the military and were concerned about the potential decline in discipline. Thus, due to the fact that the AES enjoyed official backing from the highest levels in the Union’s military hierarchy, those OCs cooperated with the IOs out of loyalty. Between June 1941 and November 1941, the AES operated successfully as it was a quieter period in the North, thus allowed for effective lecturing. As Marquard asserts, the whole concept of the AES ‘was “sold” to all the ranks’.\(^{1293}\) When the Sidi Resegh campaign began in November 1941, Brink and Major General I.P. de Villiers (GOC, 2nd SA Division), requested all IOs to move forward with the

\(^{1287}\) Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.38, History of Army Education Services, 30 September 1945, p. 6; Cardo, ‘Fighting a Worse Imperialism’, p. 151.

\(^{1288}\) Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.38, History of Army Education Services, 30 September 1945, p.6; Malherbe, Never a Dull Moment, p. 217.

\(^{1289}\) AG, (3), Box 286, 154/189/21/3, Reorganisation in the DCS Section, 9 June 1942.

\(^{1290}\) Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.38, History of Army Education Services, 30 September 1945, p. 7. See also Army Education Handbook, p. 5; Roos, Ordinary Springboks, pp. 52-53.

\(^{1291}\) AG (War), Box 5, 168/2/2/2/10, Army Education Services (V), Memorandum on Establishment of Information Officers, 10 July 1942. There were sometimes larger numbers of 1500-2000 at Air School for example or there would be 500-600 at an armoured unit.

\(^{1292}\) Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.38, History of Army Education Services, 30 September 1945, p. 7.

troops to ‘make themselves useful in any capacity’. There, and in subsequent campaigns, the IOs performed various functions, for example, as intelligence officers, as liaison officers, as navigators for convoys, as platoon commanders and, when the opportunity arose, dealt with educational work.

In broad terms, the content of the IOs lectures with the troops included discussions on the political, social and economic questions, with emphasis on the post-war adjustments, debates about troops as citizens and not as soldiers, issues of family and later informational sessions about leisure time utilisation. The IOs were provided with facts and statistics from the AES headquarters in Pretoria, and from 1942, were supplied with a ‘Bulletin’ as a communication channel and also as a platform for news, information and material for instruction. A consolidated *Army Education Handbook* which also incorporated the various bulletins was provided and updated from 1942. (See illustration 34)

Marquard indicates that initially, lectures were oriented towards being ‘extensive than intensive’ and focused more on being ‘anti-fascist’ instead of ‘pro-democracy’. In subsequent years, the AES expanded and developed better, focusing on intensive work and emphasising more on the notions of democracy and its dynamics. The IOs were required to remain impartial and objective, to encourage objective thinking and critical evaluation of facts among the troops, to combat groundless suspicions, rumours and subversive propaganda, to cultivate tolerance towards opposing views, to avoid advocacy of institutions and public criticism of official government policy, rather, provide facts about those aspects and leave the evaluations to the audience. The main aim was ‘to train troops politically …

---

1296 Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.38, Appendix F, U.D.F. Army Education Scheme: Duties of Information (Education) Officers, p. 1; See also WD, vol. 2, Box 532, UDF Stationary and Publications Depot, Middle East Reports, 1941-1945; Roos, *Ordinary Springboks*, pp. 52-53.
1297 AG (War), Box 5, 168/2/2/10, Army Education Services (V), Duties of Information (Education) Officers, Army Education HQ, 14 July 1942; Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.38, Appendix F, U.D.F. Army Education Scheme: Duties of Information (Education) Officers, p. 1.
for an attitude of the mind that bases action on thought’. The emphasis of the lecturers was on pursuing “truth” as the ‘best propaganda’, and enhancing the capacity of the troops to recognise and discredit propaganda of lies.

Since the IOs also worked as intelligence officers, their trained background and knowledge of world affairs placed them in an enviable position in comparison to other regular intelligence officers. Through access to censorship letters, the IOs could estimate the morale of the troops, warn the OCs accordingly or, if possible, lessen their frustrations by explaining the reasons why something was happening, for example, reasons for shortages or delays of material. It was often difficult for IOs to provide remedies if the problems were associated with policy grievances and sometimes their suggestions were misconstrued as criticisms of departments or sections.

Nonetheless, there were other advantages. The AES, through Dr Malherbe as DMI, had direct access to the higher echelons of government and military power. While on one hand he had to contend with military security in the Union, he was also obligated to ensure the maintenance of troop morale in field and in the Union. Hence at times, Smuts intervened in support of Dr Malherbe and the AES activities that were considered “progressive and innovative”. Another advantage was that the IOs interacted with all ranks and that enabled them to estimate troop morale, thus keeping the authorities ‘informed of the feelings and opinions in

---

1302 Army Education Handbook, p. 9.

1303 Army Education Handbook, pp. 6, 9; UCT, Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.38, History of Army Education Services, 30 September 1945, pp. 9-11.

1304 Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.38, History of Army Education Services, 30 September 1945, pp. 10-11; Malherbe, Never a Dull Moment, pp. 222.

1305 AG (War), Box 5, 168/2/2/10, Army Education Services (V), Duties of Information (Education) Officers, Army Education HQ, 14 July 1942; UCT, Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.38, History of Army Education Services, 30 September 1945, p. 11.


1307 Malherbe Papers, File 441/11, KCM 56974 (893), Report on the Factors Affecting Morale in the Army at Premier Mine, by Capt Janie Malherbe, 28 August 1942; Malherbe Papers, File 441/10, KCM 56974 (864), Memorandum on Army Morale and Propaganda, March 1943; QMG, Group 1, Box 104, Q 91/339, Morale in the Army, 25 August 1943.

1308 For examples where Dr Malherbe secured the intervention of Smuts, see Malherbe, Never a Dull Moment, pp. 220, 225, 252.
the Army’.1309 According to Dr Malherbe, the IOs ‘became the intimate right-hand men of the commanding officers’.1310

A further development of the AES included the rise of voluntary discussion clubs and “parliaments” where soldiers debated issues and expressed their opinions on pertinent issues pertaining to the war, political or social conditions.1311 These “soldiers’ parliaments”, were fictitious “democratic institutions” with “opposing political parties” that provided an outlet for projecting the soldiers’ perspectives.1312 It was a welcome distraction and the soldiers Up North felt that they at least had access to some form of ‘direct democratic participation afforded by the parliament’.1313 In the Union, however, sometimes the “soldiers’ parliaments” were misinterpreted by the military authorities on the grounds of contravening the military disciplinary code and Smuts had to intervene as he understood that it was ‘good for the morale of his boys’.1314 The IOs ran the discussion clubs as facilitators and chairs, and also organised information and reading rooms for the troops.1315 They also organised and maintained library facilities in the Union and in the field, controlled the information rooms (or tents), and provided educational material such as books, periodicals, pamphlets, current events pictures, maps and charts.1316 In addition, the IOs organised exercises that included the establishment of ‘commissions of enquiry’ to investigate social or economic problems, or special interest groups such as farmers who concentrated on farming-related challenges and developments.1317 These ensured that every opportunity was utilised to enhance the educational development of the soldiers, to create awareness about the civic obligations, and, to sustain their political, social and economic consciousness along with adding value to their experience during their military service.

1309 AG (War), Box 5, 168/2/2/10, Army Education Services (V), Memorandum on Establishment of Information Officers, 10 July 1942.
1310 Malherbe, Never a Dull Moment, pp. 222.
1311 Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.38, History of Army Education Services, 30 September 1945, pp. 8-9; Malherbe, Never a Dull Moment, pp. 223-225.
1312 Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.38, History of Army Education Services, 30 September 1945, pp. 8-9; Malherbe, Never a Dull Moment, pp. 223-225.
1313 Roos, Ordinary Springboks, p. 56.
1314 Malherbe, Never a Dull Moment, p. 225.
1317 The reading material were organised in libraries ran by the IOs and were stocked with various reading material secured through the various structures such as the DMI (1c), the UUTS, Jewish Board of Deputies, Toc H (Talbot House), YMCA, Union Defence Force Institute (UDFI), and some came through the education and propaganda departments in USA, Britain, Australia and New Zealand.
At the beginning, the AES comprised of white male soldiers as political education instructors, except the inclusion of Z.K. Mathews and S. Thema in 1942 to lecture to the trainees on race issues and ‘native problems’. The situation changed as a result of the need to extend the educational services to women who served in the military. This was attempted in March 1942 when seven women attended the third AES training course at the Military College, five from the Women’s Auxiliary Air Force (WAAF) and two from the Women’s Auxiliary Army Services (WAAS). Although all of them qualified as IOs, they could not be placed on the AES establishment as there was no provision for that purpose. These women returned to their units. In June 1942, negotiations within the higher military HQ of the WAAF and WAAS took place. It was thus decided that the special needs of women could be catered for if women combined both social welfare services with education for citizenship since women were considered to be ‘less politically mature than men … and inclined to approach problems from a personal aspect’.

During August-September 1942, a combined welfare and information course took place at No. 100 Air School at Voortrekker Hoogte (Pretoria), for the WAAF, the WAAS and for some educationally qualified civilians. It was a joint training effort between the department of social welfare which handled the welfare section of the course and the AES for political instruction. The curriculum of the course included topics such as ‘legal status of women’, ‘women in industry’, ‘the history of the women’s movement’. The professional background of the forty course members varied, and included ‘an advocate, a journalist, a librarian, a child welfare worker, a farmer’s wife, and several of the teaching profession’. Out of the group, twenty six qualified and were appointed to work at various units throughout the Union. They were referred to as welfare – information officers (WIOs) and performed

---


similar information work as their male counterparts: lecturing, arranging discussion clubs, managing libraries, publishing news bulletins, inspiring formal education, encouraging handicraft work as well as the social-welfare services such as family or work-related problems. The WIOs were not on the AES establishment, but on the WAAF and WAAS establishments with a liaison officer operating as a link with the AES, and the latter also provided support by providing literature on political aspects.

The value of training WIOs was recognised during the 1943 Elections when women ‘voted with great care, having been thoroughly prepared by information lectures’. However, Marquard also claims that, though party programmes were discussed during the elections, the IOs ‘never lent themselves to doing propaganda for any one of the three political parties that constituted the Government’. Cardo argues that while the soldiers used their ‘newly acquired political knowledge and democratic process into action by voting’, Malan and his HNP believed that the IOs were not neutral and were accused of being the agents of the UP. Suffice to indicate that it would be difficult to sustain the argument for the “impartiality” of the IOs as, through their “educational and informational sessions” about the elections, the thinking of the troops would have been manipulated to lean towards supporting UP as the governing party, which pursued the war policy, especially as it was during the middle of the war in 1943.

Subsequent courses for WIOs could not be conducted exclusively and the demand for more officers was addressed by putting the new candidates through the AES training course at the Military College. By 1944, interest in social and political questions had been entrenched, and the reading habits in camps were inculcated through the maximum use of the detachment libraries. At this time, the Refresher Courses were being presented at Valhalla near Pretoria and some of the WIOs in 1945 attended the Demobilisation Course at the Pretoria

dispersal depot. From then, a number of WIOs were attached to the Demobilisation Corps as there they served as re-adjustment officers and dispersal officers.\textsuperscript{1329} To the AES, the value of information course was derived from the ‘political education’ and general consciousness about the national issues at stake which, to some extent, was a vital preparation for their civilian responsibilities as citizens.\textsuperscript{1330}

Officially, the AES was never extended to blacks. It was only in 1942 that attempts at formal training for attachment to the NMC were undertaken, however, the proposed scheme was rejected by DNEAS.\textsuperscript{1331} The main reason was that since war began, the NEAS director, Stubbs, regarded that area as his domain and preferred to organise NMC activities – recruitment, training and propaganda – from his office or work through the NAD.\textsuperscript{1332} Lieutenant Colonel H.S. Mockford, assistant director of NEAS, expressed the views of his directorate regarding the organisation of propaganda for NMC:

\textit{On 12 June 1942, during a meeting of various directorates interested in propaganda and subversive activities, it was decided that this Directorate should be responsible for the training of propaganda details and to arrange for a series of propaganda courses to be held and run by D.N.E.A.S., consisting of native soldiers nominated by various OsC. These courses were intended to train native details in discussing propaganda matter with native soldiers in camps in order to counter subversive activities ... to impart the right information to the native soldiers so that, when they go on leave, they will be able to counter subversive talk in their district.}\textsuperscript{1333}

The initial three week propaganda course for black soldiers started at Palmietkuil North Training Depot, Welgedacht in 1942, and other courses took place at Rietfontein XI, NMC


\textsuperscript{1330} NMC, Box 52, NAS 3/42, Report on Activities and Returns by Welfare Officers, Propaganda Section, October 1944, pp. 1-5; Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.38, History of Army Education Services, 30 September 1945, p. 19.

\textsuperscript{1331} DNEAS, Group 2, Box 4, NAS 3/1/14, Mockford (for DNEAS) to OC, 1st Battalion, NMC, 31 May 1941; DNEAS, Group 2, Box 6, NAS 3/4/1, Recruiting in Natal-Zululand, Mockford to P.H. Lazarus, 22 April 1942; DNEAS, Group 2, Box 10, 3/21/E, Propaganda Course, Native Details, 1942-1943.

\textsuperscript{1333} DNEAS, Group 2, Box 10, 3/21/E, Propaganda Courses, DNEAS to GOS, Inland Area, 27 February 1943.
School, Springs in 1943. The aim of the NEAS propaganda course differed with the AES. It was not for political education for “citizenship”, but was designed to justify the inclusion of blacks in the military and to counter subversive activities (mainly what was regarded as communistic talks) among blacks. The specific objectives of the propaganda programme were outlined as follows:

a. To give the Bantu soldier an idea of his purpose in the army, and how this war affects him as a native of South Africa.
b. To combat the subversive activities propaganda in the NMC.
c. To give native recruiters and idea of what sort of argument to put forward.
d. To use intelligent native NCOs, who are chosen for character, for doing this kind of work and influence their own tribe.
e. To enable them to appeal to his own people, unlike if a European was used for that purpose.

Lieutenant R.E. Antel was in charge as a propaganda course commander. The course was conducted in English and repeated in Sesotho and isiZulu afterwards. The course content included the discussions about the various provinces from which NMC members came, who were the enemies and where they lived, how the enemies (Germany, Japan) treated their own subjects, how the enemies treated the conquered people, fifth column propaganda, why natives had to join the military and the conditions of service. Discussions of a political nature, particularly those pertaining to the status of blacks in the Union were avoided. Such topics were deflected by pointing out that those subjects ‘were for the politicians and not for the army’, and that political discussions had a delaying effect, thus giving an advantage to the
enemy.\textsuperscript{1338} One of the emphasis in the discussions was that the Axis victory over the Allies was not going to improve the conditions of blacks. The case of the Herero-Nama atrocities experienced at the hands of the Germans during the colonial wars of conquest in 1904-1907, was used to illustrate the futility of advocating for the German victory.\textsuperscript{1339} By the end of 1943, about fifteen courses were held and the number of suitable candidates, i.e. intelligent, literate and of good character, at each course varied between fifteen and thirty.\textsuperscript{1340} The courses were conducted orally and there were no written examinations.\textsuperscript{1341} Each morning, candidates were encouraged to present the lectures to the fellow classmates in English, Sesotho or isiZulu on a subject derived from the previous lecture, and answered questions from the audience. This was meant to reinforce what was learnt and to practise responding to questions at their various camps after the completion of the course.\textsuperscript{1342}

The importance of the propaganda course was heavily emphasised and there was general satisfaction expressed in the reporting about the progress of the courses.\textsuperscript{1343} Since the DNEAS was running its own propaganda programme for different objectives, the AES was not satisfied as they felt the needs of the NMC were not catered for.\textsuperscript{1344} As a result, the IOs were instructed to provide informal instruction, for example, literacy classes, especially Up North, to blacks.\textsuperscript{1345} But, the arrangement was sporadic and eventually collapsed due to lack

\textsuperscript{1338} DNEAS, Group 2, Box 10, 3/21/E, Report on the First Propaganda Course, Lt R.E. Antel, 26 September 1942; DNEAS, Group 2, Box 10, 3/21/E, Programme of Propaganda Courses Given to Native Military Corps, n.d.


\textsuperscript{1340} DNEAS, Group 2, Box 10, 3/21/E, Report on Course No. 2, Lt Antel, November 1942; DNEAS, Group 2, Box 10, 3/21/E, Report on Course No. 3, Antel, December 1942.

\textsuperscript{1341} DNEAS, Group 2, Box 10, 3/21/E, Programme of Propaganda Courses Given to Native Military Corps, n.d.; DNEAS, Group 2, Box 10, 3/21/E, Student Propaganda Course, DNEAS to OC, PE Fortress Command, 6 November 1943.

\textsuperscript{1342} DNEAS, Group 2, Box 10, 3/21/E, Programme of Propaganda Courses Given to Native Military Corps, n.d.; DNEAS, Group 2, Box 10, 3/21/E, Report on the Work Done, Propaganda Information, by Corporal Horny Ngezana, C Company NMC, Wynberg; 30 November 1942; DNEAS, Group 2, Box 10, 3/21/E, Student Propaganda Course, DNEAS to OC, PE Fortress Command, 6 November 1943.

\textsuperscript{1343} DNEAS, Group 2, Box 10, 3/21/E, Report on the First Propaganda Course, Lt R.E. Antel, 26 September 1942; DNEAS, Group 2, Box 10, 3/21/E, Report on the Work Done, Propaganda Information, by Corporal Horny Ngezana, C Company NMC, Wynberg; 30 November 1942; DNEAS, Group 2, Box 10, 3/21/E, Lt Antel to OC, NMC School, Rietfontein, 27 July 1943; DNEAS, Group 2, Box 10, 3/21/E, OC, Port Elizabeth Fortress Command to all Unit OsC in the Area, 13 September 1943; DNEAS, Group 2, Box 10, 3/21/E, Propaganda Courses, DNEAS to OsC, Area Commands, 29 October 1943.

\textsuperscript{1344} Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.38, History of Army Education Services, 30 September 1945, p. 19.

\textsuperscript{1345} NMC, Box 52, NAS 3/42, Report on Activities and Returns by Welfare Officers, Propaganda Section, October 1944 (only month and year on report), pp. 1-5.
of co-operation from the army authorities. However, mainly in the Union, several libraries, books, stationery material and even teachers trained for adult education were provided in various NMC camps. In the Air Force units, both in the Union and outside, however, the information officers were able to provide educational services to blacks due to largely the co-operative spirit of the authorities in that service. Marquard often asserted that the Air Force was more receptive to innovative ideas and were cooperative in educational efforts of the AES than in the Army. In contrast with the NMC, the authorities allowed the AES to utilise the services of the IOs to the Cape Corps (CC) from December 1942 until August 1945. Even the CC NCOs were trained in the Information NCO courses and if qualified, were placed on the AES establishment. Unlike the sporadic efforts towards the NMC, the work of the AES among the CC entailed formal education and citizenship training. The total number of CC Information NCOs both in the Union and in the North varied, and at one time it was estimated at thirty-eight. They performed various tasks such as running libraries, encouraging reading and promoting discussion classes as well as dealing with formal education.

Generally, the AES attempted to cooperate with various other agencies and organisations dealing with the welfare of the soldiers such as the Union Defence Force Institute (UDFI), the Red Cross, Ic Digest, Gifts and Comforts, Springbok Newspaper and the UDF Film Unit. However, cooperation with the BOI did not take place due to the prevailing contestations about publicity and propaganda jurisdiction with the DMI (Ic) and also that soldiers distrusted the BOI as a propaganda machine (an irony in this case). Due to the involvement of civilians in lecturing to the troops, the AES had more liaison with the civil societies, but, occasionally also came under public criticism for various reasons, for instance, the Nationalist press called Dr Marlherbe ‘Die Propaganda Kolonel’ (Propaganda Colonel),

1347 NMC, Box 52, NAS 3/42, Report on Activities and Returns by Welfare Officers, Propaganda Section, October 1944, pp. 1-5.
1348 NMC, Box 52, NAS 3/42, Report on Activities and Returns by Welfare Officers, Propaganda Section, October 1944, pp. 1-5.
on the elections of 1943, or accused him of arranging ‘compulsory political lectures’.

The AES grew steadily, both in terms of the number of IOs trained and in terms of the content which was elaborated through publications.

The IOs increased from the initial thirty in May 1941 to 152 officers, twenty other ranks and sixty-three NEAS NCOs by September 1945. Nine IOs were taken as prisoner of war, three at Sidi Resegh and six at Tobruk. Four of these IOs carried out educational work at the various POW camps in Europe. But, these numbers were insufficient for the 250 000 UDF members. On average, the soldiers actually attended one lecture per month rather than the original estimate of one lecture per week for every soldier in a group of forty. In terms of content, along with the pursuit of the Anglo-Afrikaans national identity and mutual cooperation, the AES took up other national issues such as the socio-economic and political problems of non-Europeans. The plight of non-Europeans gained prominence through using black lecturers at training courses, through AES bulletins and booklets as well as by contributing articles in the various journals. It was hoped that through raising consciousness among white soldiers with regard to the plight of non-Europeans, they would in turn further propagate the ideal of transforming the conditions of non-Europeans through education in order to contribute towards the economic development of the country.

To ascertain the attitude of white troops towards various national issues, a survey called, ‘What the Soldier Thinks’, was conducted among almost seven thousand white UDF members of all ranks inside and outside the Union in May 1944. With regard to those topics specifically relating to blacks, the results of the survey revealed that 47% believed blacks ought to be given more opportunities slowly, but not the same opportunities as whites.

---

1353 Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.38, History of Army Education Services, 30 September 1945, p. 4. Malherbe puts the total number of IOs at 350 including NCOs, Malherbe, Never a Dull Moment, p. 219.
1354 Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.38, History of Army Education Services, 30 September 1945, p. 4; Malherbe, Never a Dull Moment, p. 236-239.
1355 Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.38, History of Army Education Services, 30 September 1945, p. 11; Malherbe, Never a Dull Moment, p. 236-239.
1356 Cardo, ‘Fighting a Worse Imperialism’, p. 173.
1359 Malherbe Papers, File 441/8, KCM 56974 (835), The AES Attitude Test: “What do You Think” (Wat Dink Jy?), no date indicated on the report; What the Soldier Thinks?, Booklet, Government Printer, Pretoria, 1944; Malherbe, Never a Dull Moment, pp. 249-253.
of getting any kind of job; 45% believed blacks ought to be given education of the same kind of Europeans, but those educational opportunities were to be slowly extended to them; and 42% believed blacks should be given more political rights than they had, but slowly.\footnote{Malherbe Papers, File 441/8, KCM 56974 (835), The AES Attitude Test: “What do You Think” (Wat Dink Jy?), Results of Attitude Survey, n.d.; What the Soldier Thinks?, Booklet, pp. 23-30; Malherbe, Never a Dull Moment, pp. 249-253. Italics, own emphasis to indicate that the liberal views about the status of blacks were still coloured with notions of their inferiority.} It is on this basis that Roos argues that, although the AES was conceptualised on the liberal-democratic vision, it was still hamstrung by the ‘racialized practices and social assumptions of segregated colonial society’.\footnote{Roos, Ordinary Springboks, pp. 53-55.} (See illustration 35)

On the other hand, the AES instigated the production of white Anglo-Afrikaans national identity based on what Cardo refers to as the ‘principles of bilingualism and convergence of two streams’ (referring to the Anglo-Afrikaner combination and Afrikaner ethnic nationalism) - ‘with liberal-democratic ideals of active, rational, citizenship’.\footnote{Cardo, ‘Fighting a Worse Imperialism’, p. 174.} It also entailed the development of a more liberal perspective with regard to the ‘role and status of blacks in South Africa’.\footnote{Cardo, ‘Fighting a Worse Imperialism’, p. 174.} Despite the presence of the communist IOs, for instance, Brian Bunting, Roley Arenstein and Wolf Kodesh, the AES did not engender a ‘revolutionary’ fervour that challenged the ‘white hegemony’ in the Union, but highlighted a need for a gradual extension of ‘rights’ to non-Europeans.\footnote{UCT, Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.7, Methods on Lecturing on Native Problems, 1943, p. 3, paragraphs 9 and 10; Roos, Ordinary Springboks, pp. 53-55. Cardo, ‘Fighting a Worse Imperialism’, p. 174.}

Nonetheless, the AES represented a concerted propaganda effort by the UDF to maintain troop morale, to rationalise the purpose of the Allied war effort, to develop consciousness about ‘national unity’ and to create awareness about the political, economic and social challenges in South Africa. However, because of its confinement to the military, its limited reach among the troops and the public suspicions later on, the liberal-oriented AES remained an ‘illusion’ that failed to extend into the post-war South Africa.\footnote{Cardo, ‘Fighting a Worse Imperialism’, p. 174.} It worked for a short duration (within the military) as it was dictated by the war circumstances that created a ‘ready audience’ hoping for a new social order after the war. The AES was a short term measure which, as Malherbe noted to his friend, Professor Jac Rousseau of the University of Rhodesia, in January 1974, that it was a ““flea-bite” on the Army as a whole’, the main
impact being on the IOs *themselves* who had ‘a sense of involvement, a realisation of a responsibility’.\textsuperscript{1366}

**CONCLUSION**

Ultimately, it was not only sufficient for the government and military authorities to swell the ranks of the UDF for military service. An important consideration was to keep the volunteers motivated, loyal and committed to the Union’s war policy. It was also critical to combat subversive activities and to improve the morale of the troops. As soon as the mobilisation process was underway, reports of disgruntlements, disaffections and subversive activities began to multiply. Such negative reports threatened the internal stability of the UDF and authorities were anxious about the risks of the development of alternative perspectives to the Union, or at least the UP’s reforming outlook. Hence, Union authorities had to institute various strategies and measures to contend with the challenges and to counter those negative developments within the UDF. The AES became the most valuable mechanism in this regard. As the main propaganda project for troops, it was designed to systematically shape their political perspectives in order for them to reject the notions of fascism, Nazism and even communism, and to embrace a more liberal outlook in the context of what was referred to as ‘South Africanism’. The AES mainly assisted in the rationalisation of the war effort and in the development of the socio-political and economic consciousness of the UDF troops. However, it was constrained by its limited ratio of IOs to troops, its failure to extend beyond the military and the war, as well as its failure to pose sustained challenge to white hegemony given South Africa’s segregated politics and society.\textsuperscript{1367} The main beneficiaries of AES were the IOs for the knowledge they had acquired through the political education school and intelligence services they rendered, which added value to their career development after the war.\textsuperscript{1368}

\textsuperscript{1366} Malherbe Papers, File 441/4/3, KCM 57008 (11), Malherbe to J. Rousseau, 3 January 1974. Italics indicate that Malherbe emphasised that point in the letter to Prof Rousseau. On the achievements and careers of the IOs, see Malherbe, *Never a Dull Moment*, pp. 217-219.

\textsuperscript{1367} See the conclusions in Roos, *Ordinary Springboks*, pp. 54-56; Cardo, ‘Fighting a Worse Imperialism’, p. 174; Malherbe Papers, File 441/4/3, KCM 57008 (11), Malherbe to J. Rousseau, 3 January 1974; *Never a Dull Moment*, pp. 217-219.

Apart from the “educational” efforts for mental stimulation and to eliminate boredom among troops, it was equally imperative to improve their physical, social and psychological well-being. This was done through the provision of information services, social welfare, entertainment and recreational services for the troops in the Union and in the field. The next chapter will examine these programmes and the impact they had on the morale of the UDF members during the war.
Illustration 34: AES Handbook for IOs, EG Malherbe Collections, vol. 441/6, UKZN, Durban

Illustration 35: What Soldiers Think: Attitude Survey, EG Malherbe Collections, vol. 441/8, UKZN, Durban
CHAPTER 6

UNION DEFENCE FORCES’S INFORMATION AND SOCIAL WELFARE SERVICES

As indicated in the previous chapter, the next concern for military authorities was to attend to the social welfare of troops, to keep them informed about their service conditions, as well as about the conditions at home and abroad. This chapter reflects on the various social welfare, entertainment and recreational services provided to the UDF troops during the war. Firstly, it considers the implementation of information services to the troops, which were mainly coordinated by women’s organisations in collaboration with the AES officers. Secondly, it examines the operations of organisations such as the Young Men’s Christian Association (YMCA) and the Talbot House (Toc H), which were integrated into the Union Defence Force Institute (UDFI) during the war to provide for the social welfare of the troops in camps and in adjoining towns. Furthermore, it will also examine the cooperation of the above-mentioned organisations with the DMI (Ic), for the orchestration of these entertainment and recreational activities for the UDF members on active service.

1369 Young Men’s Christian Association (YMCA) was originated by a draper worker in London in June 1844, George Williams, who was concerned about the poor social and moral conditions of the urbanised young workers. YMCA became an instrument for promoting the moral values and Christianity, and thereafter expanded its work to include the provision of educational, recreational and social welfare facilities, programmes and services during the 19th and 20th century. During the two world wars, YMCA supported the troops by providing volunteers for medical support services, catering for prisoners of war, refugees or displaced persons, establishing huts and mobile canteens for food, refreshments, and for resting and recreation for soldiers. See UWH, Box 268, B.I. 22, YMCA and Toc H, Broadcast Talk by Reverend P.H.S. Sitters, 20 November 1941; ‘A Call from the Men of the Hour’, Y.M.C.A and Toc H War Fund Appeal, YMCH South African War Work Fund, Johannesburg, March 1940.

1370 Toc H or Talbot House, named after Lt Gilbert Talbot, a British soldier who died in July 1915 and brother of Neville Talbot, a senior British Army chaplain who provided ministerial services to the troops. Toc H was established in December 1915 by Neville Talbot’s subordinate chaplain, Reverend Phillip Thomas Byard (Tubby) Clayton, as a soldiers’ club for resting and recreational purposes at Poperinge town, Belgium. Toc H was short for TH and “Toc” meant “T” in the language of the military signallers. Toc H “homes” were built during the Second World War in urban centres adjacent to the military camps to cater for the social and recreational needs of the soldiers. See UWH, Box 268, B.I. 22, YMCA and Toc H, Broadcast Talk by Reverend P.H.S. Sitters, 20 November 1941; ‘A Call from the Men of the Hour’, Y.M.C.A and Toc H War Fund Appeal, Toc H, Southern Africa, Johannesburg, March 1940.


1372 CGS (War), Box 62, V1 20/2, UDFI (YMCA and Toc H), Memorandum of Interview with Sir Pierre van Ryneveld, Chief of the General Staff and Brigadier General J. Mitchel-Baker at Defence Headquarters, Pretoria, 23 July 1940.
INFORMATION SERVICES FOR TROOPS

In July 1940, arrangements were made to establish a soldiers’ information bureau at Noord Street railway station, Johannesburg (no connection with the BOI). Its purpose was to support the troops on leave by providing information and advice regarding transport, accommodation and hospitality facilities, particularly for those who came from other parts of the Union. This bureau’s OC was Mrs T.B. Glanville, president of the Victoria League – the South African version of the British Empire’s ‘philanthropy’ and ‘propaganda’ organisation, whose members in South Africa were also part of the SAWAS. She was assisted by Mrs W.M. Frames, who supervised the daily relays of women, even on weekends, and provided the necessary advice to soldiers. The information bureau expanded its operations in 1941. Apart from normal enquiries, arrangements were made for lifts, facilitating meetings between the soldiers and the hostesses of private recreational facilities, and arranging holiday facilities or visits to towns.

Women’s organisations such the Victoria League and the Toc H League of Women Helpers (female version of Toc H), also played a significant role in the provision of advisory and distress relieve services as well as assisting in the educational activities of the soldiers. The Victoria League supported the establishment and maintenance of educational facilities (reading rooms and libraries for soldiers’ clubs) and participated in the supply of books and magazines in a “Books for Troops Scheme” for the South African soldiers in the Union and in the field. Services of this nature provided additional comfort to the soldiers and served

1378 UWH, Box 268, B.I. 22, YMCA and Toc H, Broadcast Talk by Reverend P.H.S. Sitters, 20 November 1941; CGS (War), Box 62, VI 20/2, Toc H League of Women Helpers, QMG Circular No. 38 of 1944, 13 July 1944; Martin and Orpen, South Africa at War, vol. 7, pp. 293-295.
to strengthen their morale. Those efforts were also complementary to the AES’ political
programme within the UDF.\footnote{Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.38, History of Army Education Services, 30 September 1945, pp. 22-23; Malherbe, \textit{Never a Dull Moment}, pp. 223.} Actually, the AES’ programme included a “comprehensive”
information effort by generating publications, collaborating with other organisations in
procuring and distributing reading material, also organising and maintaining library facilities
in the Union and in the field.\footnote{Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.38, History of Army Education Services, 30 September 1945, pp. 8, 15-17.} This information effort was necessary and fundamental for
the sustainability of the AES project because the publications provided the basis for the IOs’
lecturing material. It was also imperative to infuse deliberate political education with further
reading after the lectures. Some of the IOs even indulged in the production of booklets, contributed articles or served as editors of publications which were distributed among the
UDF troops.\footnote{Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.38, History of Army Education Services, 30 September 1945, p. 8; Malherbe, \textit{Never a Dull Moment}, pp. 223.}

To maintain the interest of the soldiers, twenty to thirty page booklets such as \textit{South Africa’s}
\textit{Economic Resources, Population Problems, When We All Get Home} and others, were

Apart from the booklets, there were various news sheets produced by IOs in the various military units. Some of the news sheets were humorous and made fun of the Axis leaders, and also provided troops with journalistic flair an opportunity to express their writing talents or served as cartoonists.\footnote{Malherbe Papers, File 442/1, KCM 56974 (986a), ‘Himmler: Hangman of Europe’, draft copy for publication in \textit{El Bullsheet} newsheet, n.d.; Malherbe, \textit{Never a Dull Moment}, pp. 223-224; Cardo, ‘Fighting a Worse Imperialism’, p. 163.}

Among the popular news sheets were \textit{El Bullsheet} and \textit{P*E*P} (Peace, Education and Progress), which contained reports on unit sporting actions, cartoons and fun
write-ups like ridiculing the Axis powers, exalting the Allied leadership or remarking
sarcastically about Smuts’ opponents in the Union as well as reflecting on South Africa’s
social issues.\footnote{Malherbe Papers, File 442/1, KCM 56974 (987), \textit{El Bullsheet}, (Army newsletter), August 1943 – February 1944; Malherbe Papers, File 442/1, KCM 56974 (986b), \textit{P*E*P} (Peace, Education and Progress), 2 July 1945. Some of the write-ups were also in Afrikaans; Cardo, ‘Fighting a Worse Imperialism’, p. 163; Malherbe, \textit{Never a Dull Moment}, pp. 223-224.} A service magazine called \textit{Clamp}, was published by 22 Air School in 1942.
During its one year anniversary in October 1943, the magazine affirmed its two-fold programme: to amuse and to arouse.\textsuperscript{1387} Thus, it articulated its policy ‘to serve the democratic cause’ by fighting ‘against the canker of fascism ... to crush prejudice, racial intolerance and national narrowness’.\textsuperscript{1388} *Clamp* took an ideological stand against the Axis or the South African version of fascism and carried articles that were in support of the government’s war policy.

Another initiative came in 1943, when *The Sable* – a magazine for the 6\textsuperscript{th} South African Armoured Division\textsuperscript{1389}, was published. *The Sable* was as a medium of ‘artistic and literary’ expression for the troops in the division and the first to reproduce war art in colour.\textsuperscript{1390} In its first edition, opinion polls within the division, conducted by Professor H.J. Rosseau (lecturer at the AES political training course) to ascertain the attitude of the troops with regard to South Africa’s social, political and economic issues, were published. The preliminary results reflected the notions of a desire for closer Afrikaans-English cooperation and also the need to improve the educational levels of non-Europeans.\textsuperscript{1391} The magazine also carried articles on sports and various kinds of cartoons to make it more humorous. (See illustrations 38-40)

In addition, there were other news sheets and journals that were published for the benefit of the soldiers. In 1941, the Springbok Legion, a sort of the ‘soldiers’ trade union’ for the ex-servicemen of the war, was established.\textsuperscript{1392} It advocated the civil and economic rights of the volunteers.\textsuperscript{1393} It became industrious in its publications which informed the debates and

\textsuperscript{1387} ‘One Year Old’, *Clamp*, no. 9, October 1943, p. 9.

\textsuperscript{1388} ‘One Year Old’, *Clamp*, no. 9, October 1943, p. 9.

\textsuperscript{1389} The 6\textsuperscript{th} SA Armoured Division became famous for achieving a military victory at the Battle of Celleno in June 1944, spearheading the British 8\textsuperscript{th} Army and the American 5\textsuperscript{th} Army’s offensive operation against the Germans. See J. Bourhill, *Come Back to Portofino: Through Italy with the 6th South African Armoured Division* (30 Degrees South, Johannesburg, 2011); E. Kleynhans, ‘The First South African Amoured Battle in Italy during the Second World War: The Battle of Celleno – 10 June 1944’, *Scientia Militaria*, vol. 40, no. 3, 2012, pp. 250-279; Martin and Orpen, *South Africa at War*, vol. 7, chapters 15 and 23.

\textsuperscript{1390} ‘Editorial’, *The Sable*, August 1943.

\textsuperscript{1391} ‘Let the People Speak’, *The Sable*, August 1943, pp. 6, 33.


discussions among the troops regarding the post-war ‘square deal’ and economic security, thus sparking consternation within the military circles.\textsuperscript{1394} Claiming membership of 50 000, the Legion committed itself to supporting the troops with respect to twenty-one identified issues, for example, legal aid, housing projects, land re-settlement, pensions, pay and allowances, accommodation for soldier’s families, as well as jobs for unemployed ex-soldiers.\textsuperscript{1395} What followed after its establishment was the production of a series of literature dedicated to those subjects.\textsuperscript{1396}

Apart from fighting for the rights of soldiers, the Legion also stated as its policy to ‘expose and fight any organisation, political party or group of individuals who support or tolerate Fascism in any of its manifold forms’.\textsuperscript{1397} It published literature that was designed to be anti-racism and to promote racial tolerance among the various groups in South Africa.\textsuperscript{1398} Though, with its anti-fascist stance, the Legion seemed to be advancing the propaganda effort of the government, however, its objectives were perceived to be at odds with the liberal democratic principles advocated by the military authorities through the AES project.\textsuperscript{1399} Dr Malherbe and Lt Olivier’s memorandum on the attitude of the soldiers towards the ‘current affairs’ identified four ideological factions in the country regarding the nature of South Africa’s constitutional framework: liberal democrats; social democrats; socialists and communists; and a fascist group.\textsuperscript{1400} Most of the soldiers were classified under the social democrats because of their demands for state intervention to prevent the ‘capitalist self-interest’ and to ensure ‘economic security and right and justice’ for the ‘common man’.\textsuperscript{1401} The Legion

\textsuperscript{1394} Malherbe Papers, File 441/11, KCM 56974 (907), General Attitude of S.A. Soldiers to Current Affairs: Colonel Malherbe’s Notes on Lt B.J. Olivier’s Memorandum (Our Soldiers and the Future) - Written at the Request of General Smuts, 5 August 1942. For elaboration on the vision of the post-war ‘social justice’ for the World War Two veterans, see Roos, \textit{Ordinary Springboks}, pp. 48-49.

\textsuperscript{1395} ‘After the War, WHAT?’, \textit{The Springbok Legion}, Newsletter, n.d; Malherbe Papers, File 441/11, KCM 56974 (867); Roos, \textit{Ordinary Springboks}, pp. 48-49.

\textsuperscript{1396} Malherbe Papers, File 441/11, KCM 56974 (908), Our Soldiers and the Future, Memorandum by Lt B.J. Olivier, 5 August 1942; ‘Social Security for Ex-Volunteers’, \textit{The Springbok Legion}, Newsletter, c1944; Malherbe Papers, File 441/11, KCM 56974 (870); ‘Land Settlement for Ex-Soldiers’, \textit{The Springbok Legion}, Newsletter, c1944, Malherbe Papers, File 441/11, KCM 56974 (868).

\textsuperscript{1397} ‘After the War, WHAT?’, \textit{The Springbok Legion}, Newsletter, n.d; Malherbe Papers, File 441/11, KCM 56974 (867).


\textsuperscript{1399} Malherbe Papers, File 441/11, KCM 56974 (907), General Attitude of S.A. Soldiers to Current Affairs: Colonel Malherbe’s Notes on Lt B.J. Olivier’s Memorandum (Our Soldiers and the Future) - Written at the Request of General Smuts, 5 August 1942.

\textsuperscript{1400} Malherbe Papers, File 441/11, KCM 56974 (907), General Attitude of S.A. Soldiers to Current Affairs, 5 August 1942.

\textsuperscript{1401} Malherbe Papers, File 441/11, KCM 56974 (907), General Attitude of S.A. Soldiers to Current Affairs, 5 August 1942.
earned opprobrium for seemingly promoting ‘radicalism’ and ‘communistic leftist tendencies’ within the military, and it was feared such a tendency would ‘sweep the country like a flowing tide after the war is over’.\footnote{Malherbe Papers, File 441/11, KCM 56974 (907), General Attitude of S.A. Soldiers to Current Affairs, 5 August 1942; Roos, Ordinary Springboks, pp. 48-56.} The AES’ democratic citizenship education was therefore, considered an alternative to the Legion’s leftist tendency by ensuring that soldiers ‘maintain a political perspective in meeting the post-war adjustments’, and to ‘realise the significance of the fundamental principles of democracy’.\footnote{Malherbe Papers, File 441/11, KCM 56974 (907), General Attitude of S.A. Soldiers to Current Affairs, 5 August 1942; Roos, Ordinary Springboks, pp. 48-56.} To this end, authorities augmented the AES lectures by mobilising an information effort through the literature publications and by maintaining an ‘Information Room’ (or tent)\footnote{Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.38, History of Army Education Services, 30 September 1945, pp. 8, 15-16; Cardo, ‘Fighting a Worse Imperialism’, pp. 155, 163.}, by enabling the soldiers to ‘ventilate their views’ to the public through dedicated special pages in local papers, and by using the IOs and the Ic section for ‘responding through writing corrective information’ in the same pages.\footnote{Malherbe Papers, File 441/11, KCM 56974 (907), General Attitude of S.A. Soldiers to Current Affairs, 5 August 1942.} The said papers identified for that purpose included The Forum, The Springbok, and Arthur Barlow’s Weekly.\footnote{Malherbe Papers, File 441/11, KCM 56974 (907), General Attitude of S.A. Soldiers to Current Affairs, 5 August 1942.}

In addition, soldiers were provided with various reading material such as the British’s Oxford University Press (O.U.P) pamphlets, and periodicals such Libertas, Trek, Common Sense, World Press Review, War, Army Bureau of Current Affairs (ABCA), a handful of government reports and Hansard copies as well as the DMI (Ic)’s Ic Digest.\footnote{Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.38, History of Army Education Services, 30 September 1945, pp. 8, 15-16; Cardo, ‘Fighting a Worse Imperialism’, pp. 155, 163; Malherbe, Never a Dull Moment, p. 223.} By publishing the government reports such as the one by Dr H.J. van Eck\footnote{Dr van Eck was a leading industrialist and economist who also gave lectures for the AES training course. He was also Chair of the South African Industrial and Agricultural Requirements Commission; Chair of the Social and Economic Planning Council in South Africa during the war. See Cardo, ‘Fighting a Worse Imperialism’, p. 165.}, on the socio-economic conditions in the country, and the budget speech by Major Piet van der Byl, Minister without Portfolio and chairman of the civil re-employment board\footnote{Civil Re-Employment Board Budget Speech, by Major Piet van der Byl, Minister without Portfolio and Chairman of Civil Re-employment Board, The Government Printer, Pretoria, 1942.}, it was aimed at publicising among the soldiers, the policy processes of the government in connection with the wages and the
rehabilitation of the volunteers after the war.\textsuperscript{1410} It is also important to note that some of the AES publications drew heavily from the DMI’s ‘Economic Intelligence’ propaganda and counter-propaganda reports\textsuperscript{1411}, and some of the international news and affairs material were acquired from the USA, the BBC, the British \textit{ABCA}, as well as literature from Australia and New Zealand.\textsuperscript{1412}

The DMI produced a monthly publication, \textit{Ic. Digest} from 1941-1945, which supplemented the AES by carrying varied articles of interest to the soldiers, ranging from morale, war production, pension policies, culture and identity, UDF salaries, food and famine, ‘native’ economic problems, demobilisation benefits and even warnings against Axis propaganda.\textsuperscript{1413} (See illustrations 36-37) Furthermore, the whole UDF information effort was complemented by the local propaganda agencies such as the UUTS and the Jewish Board of Deputies, which agreed to supply copies of their publications to the military authorities for distribution among the troops from late 1940.\textsuperscript{1414} Arrangements were made with Robertson (of the UUTS) and Saron (of the Jewish Board of Deputies) to obtain 1000 copies of \textit{Die Volkstem}, a loyalist Afrikaans newspaper, 1000 copies \textit{Common Sense}, and a further 1000-2000 copies of another loyalist Afrikaans paper, \textit{Die Volk}, for free distribution among UDF troops, especially to the Afrikaans speakers.\textsuperscript{1415} These papers, including a package of the \textit{Sunday Times} newspaper, the \textit{Parade} and the Middle East weekly publication, were distributed to the troops in the forward areas, to the lines of communication (L. of C.) troops, to the SAAF and the Royal


\textsuperscript{1411} See PP, Box 58, EC 17, Economic Propaganda: Subversive Activities, 1941-1945; PP, Box 57, EC 38, Economic Propaganda: Intelligence Summaries, 1941-1945; PP, Box 57, EC 6; Economic Comparison: Germany, Italy, Britain, USA, April 1941; PP, Box 57, EC 28, South Africa’s War Effort: Economic Material by DMI (Ic), 9 January 1942; ‘The Economic War’, \textit{Current Affairs}, vol. 6, February 1942, issued by the Middle East Branch of Army Bureau Current Affairs (ABCA), GHQ, Middle East Force, pp. 4-12.


\textsuperscript{1413} See copies of \textit{Ic Digest}, 1941-1945, in Malherbe Papers, File 442/2, KCM 56974 (989-1021); Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.38, History of Army Education Services, 30 September 1945, p. 22; See also Cardo, ‘Fighting a Worse Imperialism’, 158.

\textsuperscript{1414} PP, Box 39, PR 1/5, Military Propaganda and Publicity, Ic to DMI, 6 December 1940.

\textsuperscript{1415} PP, Box 39, PR 1/5, Military Propaganda and Publicity, Ic to DMI, 6 December 1940.
Air Force (RAF), to hospitals and casualty clearing houses and to the local messes.\textsuperscript{1416} The distribution of the reading material was conducted by the Movement Control to Division HQ for the divisions, by Air Intelligence for the air force, by Welfare Officers for regular troops, by Kenyan Information Officers for hospitals and casualty clearing stations and by Force HQ Central Registry for the Nairobi messes.\textsuperscript{1417} The reading matter was not merely useful for information, but for morale and propaganda value.\textsuperscript{1418}

To ensure that the troops in the field were not exposed to what was considered to be harmful reading material, the South African military authorities applied the Kenyan censorship regulations which prohibited the importation of certain publications and, if papers were addressed directly to the recipient, they would be opened in the presence of the Unit OC’s appointed officer.\textsuperscript{1419} The prohibited publications from South Africa were \textit{Die Burger}, \textit{Die Oosterlig}, \textit{Die Traansvaler}, \textit{Die Vaderland} and \textit{Die Volksblad} – all Afrikaans papers associated with the anti-war elements and, if found, they were immediately destroyed in the presence of the addressee.\textsuperscript{1420} To maintain alertness and military security, the DMI (Ic) and the AES also ensured a regular supply of security bulletins and pamphlets from the British Army and from the Union DHQ, and were accompanied by latest lecture material to the IOs who also doubled up as intelligence officers.\textsuperscript{1421} In addition to the pamphlets, bulletins, periodicals and magazines, another important information service for the troops was in the form of the UDF’s “home-grown” newspapers, firstly for Europeans in early 1941 and then for the NMC in late 1942.\textsuperscript{1422}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1416} WD 1, Box 291, 2328, East Africa Force Intelligence Propaganda Summary, March 1941.
\item \textsuperscript{1417} WD 1, Box 291, 2328, East Africa Force Intelligence Propaganda Summary, March 1941.
\item \textsuperscript{1418} WD 1, Box 296, 1 SAD/G/102/B, Reading for Troops, General Staff (Ic), East Africa Force HQ to All Intelligence Officers and Unit Commanders, East Africa, 26 April 1941; Malherbe Papers, File 438/1, KCM 56974 (539), Concerted Propaganda Campaign, Ic (iii) to Ic, n.d.
\item \textsuperscript{1419} WD 1, Box 296, 1 SAD/G/102/B, Censorship: Newspapers and Periodicals, General Staff Intelligence to All Officers Commanding Units, 6 November 1940.
\item \textsuperscript{1420} WD 1, Box 296, 1 SAD/G/102/B, Censorship: Newspapers and Periodicals, General Staff Intelligence to All Officers Commanding Units, 6 November 1940.
\item Malherbe Papers, File 432/5, KCM 56974 (50-57), Military Intelligence Handbooks, Manuals of Intelligence in the Field, 1939-1940; WD 1, Box 296, 1 SAD/G/102/B, \textit{Military Propaganda Handbook}, General Staff, DHQ, 1941; CGS, Group 2, Box 93, 169/6, Outline of Security Lectures, Intelligence and Security, British Air Ministry, 1 December 1942.
\end{itemize}
The question of newspapers for the troops was raised when the troops had left for the war theatre in November 1940. The ‘Army Newspaper’, as it was then contemplated, was envisaged to supplement papers from other propaganda agencies and the east African press.\textsuperscript{1423} The DHQ had also requested the BOI to supply daily 1500 word news service for troops in Kenya. On 1 February 1941, the South African directorate of army printing and stationary services (DAP and SS), using a mobile printing section, produced and published the \textit{EAForce News} in Nairobi, Kenya, as a daily newspaper for the troops in east Africa.\textsuperscript{1424} The news service for the paper was provided by the BOI in Pretoria through wireless and by the Kenya Information Officer.\textsuperscript{1425} Production of the paper was carried through to Abyssinia and then to Egypt. Because the mobile printing section remained in Kenya when troops were moved to Egypt, the BOI arranged to continue the publication under a different name, \textit{Springbok}, which replaced the \textit{EAForce News}, and became a weekly news sheet.\textsuperscript{1426} The BOI supplied 1600 words per week for the news service via wireless and the editor was P. Brennan, with J. Lessing seconded by the UDF as Afrikaans editor.\textsuperscript{1427} The first copy of the \textit{Springbok} appeared on 23 October 1941 in Cairo.\textsuperscript{1428} (See Illustrations 41-42)

Though the publication of the \textit{EAForce News} was ‘enjoyed’ by the troops\textsuperscript{1429}, it was however criticised because it was exclusively in English before its change to \textit{Springbok}.\textsuperscript{1430} Also, the UDF propaganda branch, the DMI (Ic) was not involved in the production of the paper.\textsuperscript{1431} The paper was also slated for affording more coverage on the international news than on the

\textsuperscript{1423} PP, Box 39, PR 1/5/2, Propaganda Among Our Troops, G.S.O.2 (Ic) to D.G.O (for DDMI), 8 November 1940; PP, Box 39, PR 1/5, Military Propaganda and Publicity, Ic to DMI, 6 December 1940.

\textsuperscript{1424} Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 150, Bureau of Information: Statement on Activities, 21 May 1942; ‘Introduction’, \textit{EAForce News}, 1 February 1941; Malherbe Papers, File 438/1, KCM 56974 (531a), Publicity for the Army at Home and in the Field, 1941; WD 1, Box 291, 2328, East Africa Force Intelligence Propaganda Summary, March 1941.


\textsuperscript{1426} PP, Box 63, PU 6/9/1, Bureau of Information, Proposed Reorganisation, Wilson to Kreft, 14 July 1941.

\textsuperscript{1427} PP, Box 63, PU 6/9/1, Bureau of Information, Proposed Reorganisation, Wilson to Kreft, 14 July 1941; Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 150, Bureau of Information: Statement on Activities, 21 May 1942; Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.38, History of Army Education Services, 30 September 1945, p. 23.

\textsuperscript{1428} UWH, Box 162, Narep Unfo 16, Cursory Survey of the South African Public Relations, 30 November 1944, by Maj J. Strydom, pp. 30-31.

\textsuperscript{1429} WD, vol. 1, Box 291, 2328, East Africa Force Intelligence Summary, 2 April 1941.

\textsuperscript{1430} Malherbe Papers, File 438/1, KCM 56974 (531a), Publicity for the Army at Home and in the Field, 1941; Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.38, History of Army Education Services, 30 September 1945, p. 23; See also CGS (War), Box 197, 42/4, Summary of Director of Information’s Reply to General Theron’s Proposals, Wilson to Theron, 11 May 1943.

\textsuperscript{1431} Malherbe Papers, File 438/1, KCM 56974 (531a), Publicity for the Army at Home and in the Field, 1941; Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.38, History of Army Education Services, 30 September 1945, p. 23; See also CGS (War), Box 197, 42/4, Summary of Director of Information’s Reply to General Theron’s Proposals, Wilson to Theron, 11 May 1943.
South African home-town items. The situation was improved with the publication of the *Springbok*, with A.B. Hughes and J.C. Vlok responsible for writing English and Afrikaans articles respectively. The AES also made use of the *Springbok*’s columns for educational matters and conducted opinion polls for the benefit of the editors. The paper remained under the control of the BOI, which also claimed that it was not a propaganda sheet but a ‘newspaper to give troops news about their country’. Nonetheless, these papers, in addition to the pamphlets and periodicals from the DMI (Ic), provided an added value to the news and propaganda media for the South African troops up North. The news sheets were also available for the NMC members at the YMCA recreational places; however, a need for a dedicated newspaper for blacks in their own language was recognised.

In mid-1942, proposals were sent via the Secretary for Native Affairs to the DMI and the Secretary for Defence regarding the need to produce and distribute a newspaper to the NMC members. In October 1942, the defence authorities committee granted authority for the establishment of the newspaper for the NMC members in the Union, in the Middle East and in Madagascar. The number of copies was to be 4000-6000 copies for the Union and Madagascar, and 3000 for the Middle East. Arrangements were made with B.G. Paver, head of the Bantu Press, for the production of the paper, called *Ndlovu-Tlou*, in two black languages, Sesotho and isiXhosa, at the cost of forty pounds per week. Soon after it came out in November 1942, *Ndlovu-Tlou* was heavily criticised by DNEAS for its poor

---

1432 Malherbe Papers, File 438/1, KCM 56974 (531a), Publicity for the Army at Home and in the Field, 1941; CGS (War), Box 197, 42/4, Summary of Director of Information’s Reply to General Theron’s Proposals, Wilson to Theron, 11 May 1943.


1435 CGS (War), Box 197, 42/4, Summary of Director of Information’s Reply to General Theron’s Proposals, Wilson to Theron, 11 May 1943.

1436 DNEAS, Group 2, Box 10, 3/21/K, Newspapers for NMC Details, DNEAS to OCs of NMC Formations, 3 November 1942.

1437 DNEAS, Group 2, Box 10, NAS 3/21/K, Proposed Newspaper for Native Troops, DMI to Blaine, 6 October 1942.

1438 DNEAS, Group 2, Box 10, 3/21/K, Newspapers for Non-European Soldiers in the North and Madagascar, Blaine to Smit, 20 October 1942.


1440 ‘Ndlovu’, isiXhosa language, Weekly no. 32, 2 September 1944.

quality.\textsuperscript{1442} It was criticised for the lack of pictures and for containing fifty percent extracts from the *Weekly News Bulletin* (WNB) of the NAD as well as the other fifty percent reproduced from the other black newspapers.\textsuperscript{1443} The paper also lacked the ‘Editorial’ bearing on the war. Its news content was stale because the NMC members had already read other papers at the YMCA recreational huts where the *Springbok* and the *WBN*, containing the same news, were accessed or the news had been broadcast on the radio.\textsuperscript{1444}

The *Ndlovu-Tlou* also had an official government stamp of the NAD on the front page, thus appearing to be a Government Gazette, resulting in the lack of interest from the soldiers. It was further described as unattractive because it had only a few cross-heads and lacking the main heads, which then presented it as a blank wall. The NMC members were not impressed with their depictions carrying assegais or the news content about one chief with many cows and a large volume of milk.\textsuperscript{1445} What they wanted to see were political news, speeches of the ANC President, Dr A.B. Xuma, government decision pertaining to discriminatory policies and arrangements for post-war settlement and education, and the report of the Social and Economic Planning Council (the Van Eck Report). Furthermore, the NMC members preferred to read about the events such as disturbances, animal diseases or the costs of purchasing a cow.\textsuperscript{1446} The troops recommended to the authorities that they wished to see matters affecting them as soldiers such as pension rights, pay and allowances. The following year in 1943, improvements were reported in the comments from DNEAS, after discussions between DNEAS, NAD and the Bantu Press.\textsuperscript{1447} However, notwithstanding the criticisms, reports from the north indicated that the paper was read with great interest as if fulfilled the need for having a paper dedicated to black soldiers.\textsuperscript{1448} From its inception in 1942 to 1945,

\textsuperscript{1442} DNEAS, Group 2, Box 10, 3/21/K, Bantu Soldiers’ Newspaper: “Ndlovu-Tlou”, DNEAS to DCS, 4 January 1943; NMC, Box 19, 3/21/K, Newspapers: NMC Details, “Ndlovu-Tlou”, DNEAS to AG, 30 January 1943.

\textsuperscript{1443} DNEAS, Group 2, Box 10, 3/21/K, Bantu Soldiers’ Newspaper: “Ndlovu-Tlou”, DNEAS to DCS, 4 January 1943.

\textsuperscript{1444} DNEAS, Group 2, Box 10, 3/21/K, Newspapers for NMC Details, DNEAS to OCs of NMC Formations, 3 November 1942; DNEAS, Group 2, Box 10, 3/21/K, N.M.C. Publication: “iNdlovu”, UDF Amin HQ, MEF to DNEAS, 30 January 1943.

\textsuperscript{1445} DNEAS, Group 2, Box 10, 3/21/K, Newspapers for NMC Details, DNEAS to OCs of NMC Formations, 3 November 1942; Grundlingh, Black Participation in the Second World War, pp. 144-146.

\textsuperscript{1446} DNEAS, Group 2, Box 10, 3/21/K, Notes on Discussions Re Ndlovu held at Garawi, by Maj Rodseth (ADDNEAS) and B Olivier (*Springbok*, war correspondent), 30 January 1943.

\textsuperscript{1447} DNEAS, Group 2, Box 10, 3/21/K, N.M.C. Publication: “iNdlovu”, DNEAS to UDF Amin HQ, MEF to DNEAS, 13 February 1943; Grundlingh, ‘The Participation of South African Blacks’, p. 146.

\textsuperscript{1448} DNEAS, Group 2, Box 10, 3/21/K, N.M.C. Publication: “iNdlovu”, UDF Amin HQ, MEF to DNEAS, 30 January 1943. See also NMC, Box 19, 3/21/K, N.M.C. Publication: “iNdlovu”, F. Rodseth (SA OI, UDF ME), to AG, 30 January 1943.
Ndlovu-Tlou was published and distributed to the troops through the unit commanders and helped in the morale among the black troops.\textsuperscript{1449} However, as far as the other NEAS units, the Cape Corps and the Indian Malay Corps were concerned, there was no newspaper for them.\textsuperscript{1450} The Ndlovu-Tlou was produced through the NAD and it was purely for the NMC members who read Sesotho or isiXhosa. For the CC newspapers, arrangements were made in January 1944 with the editors of The Sun and The Cape Standard newspapers in Cape Town to publish, at reduced rate, copies for the CC members.\textsuperscript{1451} The News of the War publication was also issued by the NAD and was meant for the NMC.\textsuperscript{1452} The IMC were to be serviced through the English newspapers as there was no special arrangement for them. (See illustrations 43-44)

Another dimension of the UDF information services included the material for health education. For this purpose, the GOA Middle East HQ, Theron, instituted the UDF propaganda and publicity committee in December 1944.\textsuperscript{1453} The aim of the committee was to ‘initiate, plan and direct publicity and propaganda schemes’.\textsuperscript{1454} The UDF’s visual instruction and propaganda (VIP) section, which originated in the Union under Sergeant Vic Clapham, a professional copywriter and visual education trainer with the AES at Premier Mine, was included in this committee and fell under the overall authority of the assistant director public relations (ADPR), Lieutenant Colonel Lindsay.\textsuperscript{1455} The institution of the UDF propaganda

\textsuperscript{1449} DNEAS, Group 2, Box 10, 3/21/K, Newspapers for NMC Details, DNEAS to OCs of NMC Formations, 3 November 1942; “Ndlovu-Tlou”, NMC Newspaper, 2 September 1944; DNEAS, Group 2, Box 11, 3/21/K, NMC Newspaper: “Ndlovu-Tlou”, Victory Souvenir Publication, DNEAS to Secretary, Bantu Press, 8 May 1945; Ndlovu-Tlou, 12 May 1945.

\textsuperscript{1450} NMC, Box 12, NAS 8/21/A, CC, Circular, Bantu Newspapers, Port Elizabeth Fortress HQ to All Units with NE Attachments, 19 November 1943; NMC, Box 12, NAS 8/21/A, CC, News of the War, Mockford to OC, 16 Field Co. SAEC, Port Elizabeth, 30 November 1943.

\textsuperscript{1451} NMC, Box 12, NAS 8/21/A, CC, News of the War, Mockford to OC, 16 Field Co. SAEC, Port Elizabeth, 30 November 1943; NMC, Box 12, NAS 8/21/K, Newspaper for Cape Corps Details, DNEAS to Government Printer, 6 January 1944; NMC, Box 12, NAS 8/21/K, Reading Matter, DNEAS to OCs, 1st, 3rd, 5th and 6th CC Battalions, 18 January 1944.

\textsuperscript{1452} NMC, Box 12, NAS 8/21/A, CC, Circular, Bantu Newspapers, Port Elizabeth Fortress HQ to All Units with NE Attachments, 19 November 1943; NMC, Box 12, NAS 8/21/A, CC, News of the War, Mockford to OC, 16 Field Co. SAEC, Port Elizabeth, 30 November 1943.

\textsuperscript{1453} PP, Box 36, 6/19/6, Establishment of Committee to Control and Coordinate Visual Instruction and Propaganda, Theron to All Heads of Sections, 31 December 1944; World War 2 War Diary, Vol. 2 (WD 2), Box 533, War Diary for January 1945 in Respect of UDF Printing and Services in CMF and MEF, Report by Major P.T. van der Walt, Staff Officer, Printing and Stationary Services, CMF, 1 February 1945.

\textsuperscript{1454} PP, Box 36, 6/19/6, Establishment of Committee to Control and Coordinate Visual Instruction and Propaganda, Theron to All Heads of Sections, 31 December 1944.

\textsuperscript{1455} WD 2, Box 533, War Diary for January 1945 in Respect of UDF Printing and Services in Central Mediterranean Forces (CMF) and MEF, Report by Major P.T. van der Walt, Staff Officer, Printing and Stationary Services, CMF, 1 February 1945; PP, Box 36, 6/19/6, Minutes of a Meeting of the UDF Publicity and Propaganda Committee held on 6 February 1945 at 14: 30 in the Office of the ADPR in...
and publicity committee and the inclusion of the VIP section were regarded as ‘an important event’ since a ‘coordinated and properly planned propaganda schemes directed to the forces in the field’ would be conducted ‘by a section of the UDF’ in the Central Mediterranean Forces (CMF) in Italy.\footnote{WD 2, Box 533, War Diary for January 1945 in Respect of UDF Printing and Services in CMF and MEF, Report by Major P.T. van der Walt, Staff Officer, Printing and Stationary Services, CMF, 1 February 1945.} It was to be a combined effort of the VIP section, the field newspaper *Springbok* and the use of radio which were considered essential in the ‘interest of morale, health, education and economy’.\footnote{WD 2, Box 533, Committee for Coordination and Conduct of Publicity and Propaganda Schemes to the UDF Forces, by P.T. van der Walt, SO (PSS), 17 January 1945; Malherbe Papers, File 441/4/3, KCM 57008 (35), Story of the Visual Instruction and Propaganda Unit, World War II, by Vic Clapham, 12 January 1974, p. 7.}

For effective publicity and propaganda scheme, the committee exploited the radio, posters, leaflets and the *Springbok*, to conduct publicity efforts on behalf on other UDF sections like medical services or the Air Force with regard to morale and security.\footnote{WD 2, Box 533, War Diary, March 1945, Printing and Stationary Services: UDF, CMF, MEF, Progress Report, van der Walt, 12 April 1945; Malherbe Papers, File 441/4/3, KCM 57008 (35), Story of the Visual Instruction and Propaganda Unit, World War II, by Vic Clapham, 12 January 1974, p. 7.} The VIP section in particular, was instrumental in the poster campaigns to combat malaria, venereal disease (VD), typhus and typhoid fever, which were rising within the South African forces in Italy due to the cessation of hostilities at that time.\footnote{WD 2, Box 533, War Diary, March 1945, Printing and Stationary Services: UDF, CMF, MEF, Progress Report, van der Walt, 12 April 1945; Malherbe Papers, File 441/4/3, KCM 57008 (35), Visual Instruction and Propaganda Unit, Vic Clapham, 12 January 1974, p. 7. See also Roos, *Ordinary Springboks*, pp. 56-60.} Priority was given to campaigns to combat VD, typhus and typhoid which were reported to be endemic.\footnote{Malherbe Papers, File 441/4/3, KCM 57008 (35), Visual Instruction and Propaganda Unit, Vic Clapham, 12 January 1974, p. 7; Roos, *Ordinary Springboks*, pp. 56-60.} Despite severe restrictions – by military policing and through strict military regulations, VDs were a problem among troops due to occasions of social and sexual encounters at various establishments in north Africa and in Italy.\footnote{PP, Box 36, 6/19/6, Minutes of a Meeting of the UDF Publicity and Propaganda Committee held on 6 February 1945 at 14: 30 in the Office of the ADPR in Rome, Lt Col R.N. Lindsay, Chairperson; WD 2, Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za} The VIP produced various health promotion posters such as ‘Eat

---

\footnote{PP, Box 36, 6/19/6, Minutes of a Meeting of the UDF Publicity and Propaganda Committee held on 6 February 1945 at 14: 30 in the Office of the ADPR in Rome, Lt Col R.N. Lindsay, Chairperson; WD 2, Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za}
Only the Food, Fruit and Vegetables as supplied by the Army, Avoid Typhoid’, ‘Typhus, the Penalty of Sleeping in Unauthorised Places’, ‘Careless Drinking Causes Typhoid’, (Afrikaans) ‘Pas op Vir Die (VD) Bints, Vermy Siekte’/ Beware of VD, Avoid Sickness’, and ‘VD, What’s Mine, is Yours’. The posters also warned soldiers against visiting brothels and to stay clear of ‘pick-up’ girls for the sake of their partners back home. Other posters were used for transport maintenance and conservation. Drivers were warned about the dangers of reckless driving and the need to ensure economy of sources.

According to Clapham, the VIP spearheaded the Union campaigns for inducing the idea of health discipline, thrift and financial discipline for troops, aiding the AES’ educational programme and combating the ‘insidious political propaganda that Goebbels and his minions on the enemy side were constantly beaming to troops by radio, by rumour, by air-dropped leaflets’. Anti-Hitler and anti-Fascist posters were thus published to combat the impact of German propaganda. (See also illustration 30) The VIP used various visual materials to get their message across. Warnings against the health risks were presented in the form of a sixteen page booklet titled, ‘Disease, and Enemy Ally’ or posters, with colourful images to facilitate the promotion health discipline and to ensure that the troops would not miss anything, and thus would ‘not be incapacitated’ due to preventable illnesses. Another important factor was the invocation of pride and the preservation of the image of the UDF as an organisation, especially with the words, ‘Never Forget you are a Citizen of South Africa.
and South Africa has a Good Name’. Through the establishment of the UDF publicity and propaganda committee in 1944, the authorities ensured that they maintained control of the propaganda agenda and process in the field and, more importantly, that they ensured the maintenance of morale, discipline and vigilance especially when hostilities were slackening and the risk of misusing leisure time as a result of inactivity would increase. (See illustrations 44-48)

Through the posters and other publicity material, the UDF authorities exercised a measure of social control over the troops with respect to directing their moral behaviour, ‘by getting the soldier’s attention, stimulating interest and by directing his mind and action in a positive manner.’ While the UDF propaganda programme was conducted to ensure ‘victory in the struggle for the minds of men’, it was also organised to promote the “enlightenment” of the troops ‘through education and information’ for ‘civilian life ahead’. This was done through the utilisations of visual propaganda. Furthermore, the UDF authorities also organised additional recreational resources and entertainment programmes such as the radio, to create more variety and to try to ensure that in the end, the troops were kept informed, occupied, disciplined, free of negative influences and remained within the bounds of the military establishment.

ENTERTAINMENT AND RECREATION SERVICES

In late 1940, the UDF Entertainment Unit was established. According to its OC, Major Myles E. Bourke, the UDF Entertainment Unit was ‘something new in the history of the

1469 WD 2, Box 533, Visual Instruction, Monthly Report, 1 February 1945; ‘Three Honours to Uphold: Your are a Springbok, Your are a Volunteer, You are a Man’, Poster by Visual Instruction and Propaganda Section, CMF and MEF, WD 2, Box 533, March 1945.
1470 Roos, Ordinary Springboks, p. 57.
1471 Malherbe Papers, File 441/4/3, KCM 57008 (35), Visual Instruction and Propaganda Unit, Vic Clapham, 12 January 1974, p. 7; Roos, Ordinary Springboks, p. 60.
1473 AG (9), Box 163, 213/14/62, War Establishment: Entertainment Unit, 15 November 1940; UWH, Box 162, Narep Unfo 16, Units and Formations, The Story of the 1st S.A. Entertainment Unit, by Cpl G. Haughton, 15 November 1941; For origins and historical details see H. Bantjé, ‘Die Vermaaklikheidsgroep van die Unie-Verdedigingsmag Gedurende die Tweede Wereldoorlog: n Historiese Ontleding’ (Unpublished master’s (MA) thesis, University of Pretoria, Pretoria, 1990), pp. 20-22.
1474 AG (9), Box 163, 213/14/62, Appointment: Entertainment Unit, Wakefield to Mitchel-Baker, 7 January 1941.
Union’ Army … there was nothing like it before’. Officially, the unit was known as the 19th Reserve Motor Transport Company, a name given in order to avoid public criticism and attacks from the opponents of the government. The primary aim of the entertainment unit was to combat boredom and to improve the morale of the South African forces in the Union and also on active service in the field. In an interview with The Nongqai, Major Bourke, the OC, expressed the significance of his Entertainment Unit:

Our work is as essential as that of the Medical Services. We are not only setting out to give the troops a pleasant evening, but to restore to normality nerves that are over-strained. A man who is mentally sick, who is bored and depressed soon breaks down physically, and the war of nerves ‘would claim another victim, another casualty’, if some relieve and relaxation were not provided. We provide that relaxation and diversion!

The establishment of the entertainment unit was a response to the dissatisfactions among the troops arising out of the frustrations due to prolonged periods of inactivity, dull and repetitive training routines, digging endless trenches and doing guard duties. In the early stages of the mobilisation process, organised entertainment for the troops was non-existent. For example, in an attempt to break the monotony of camp-life, ‘natural comedians’ and ‘enthusiastic amateurs’ amongst the troops took the initiative by voluntarily presenting impromptu concert displays during their spare time. However, these voluntary entertainers

1475 ‘The Union Defence Force Entertainment Units’, The Nongqai, September 1941, p. 1181. See also a similar comment by Cpl Haughton, UWH, Box 162, Narep Unfo 16, Units and Formations, The Story of the 1st S.A. Entertainment Unit, by Cpl G. Haughton, 15 November 1941, Introduction, p. 1.
1476 AG (9), Box 163, 213/14/62, Organisation and Establishment: 19th M.T. Company, AG to QMG, 17 January 1941.
1477 AG (9), Box 163, 213/14/62, Entertainment of Troops, QMG to AG, 2 January 1941; AG (9), Box 163, 213/14/62, CGS letter to Chairman of Financial Authorities, F.C. Sturrock Committee, 9 January 1941; AG (9), Box 163, 213/14/62, Organisation and Establishment: 19th M.T. Company, AG to QMG, 17 January 1941; ‘The Union Defence Force Entertainment Units’, The Nongqai, September 1941, p. 1181; Bantjës, ‘Die Vermaaklikheidsgroep’, p. 152.
1478 UWH, Box 162, Narep Unfo 16, The Story of the 1st S.A. Entertainment Unit, 15 November 1941; AG (9), Box 163, 213/14/62, Memorandum on the Necessity for a Definite Establishment for Troop Entertainment in the Union of South Africa, by Maj Myles Bourke, 2 January 1941; AG (9), Box 163, 213/14/62, Entertainment of Troops, QMG to AG, 2 January 1941; ‘The Stuff to Give the Troops’, The Nongqai, September 1941, 1185; Bantjës, ‘Die Vermaaklikheidsgroep’, pp. 21-22, 152.
1479 ‘The Stuff to Give the Troops’, The Nongqai, September 1941, 1185.
1480 UWH, Box 162, Narep Unfo 16, The Story of the 1st S.A. Entertainment Unit, 15 November 1941; AG (9), Box 163, 213/14/62, Necessity for a Definite Establishment for Troop Entertainment, 2 January 1941; AG (9), Box 163, 213/14/62, Entertainment of Troops, QMG to AG, 2 January 1941; Malherbe Papers, File 441/4/3, KCM 57008 (37), The Springbok Legion, by Vic Clapham, 12 January 1974, p. 1; Bantjës, ‘Die Vermaaklikheidsgroep’, pp. 14, 21; Roos, Ordinary Springboks, pp. 48, 57.
1481 UWH, Box 162, Narep Unfo 16, The Story of the 1st S.A. Entertainment Unit, 15 November 1941; AG (9), Box 163, 213/14/62, Memorandum on the Necessity for a Definite Establishment for Troop
could not satisfy the needs of the troops in isolated military camps. Hence, after the
discussions of the adjutant general, Major General Len Beyers, the GOA Middle East HQ,
Theron and the quartermaster general, Brigadier General Mitchel-Baker, approval was
granted for an official organisation of the UDF Entertainment Unit on 1 November 1940, to
provide ‘a tonic for the nerves’ and to serve as ‘an antidote to the 5th column activities’.

The entertainment unit organised regular shows and concert tours performed by amateur
artists throughout the Union from March 1941. The shows consisted of the ‘Amuseliers and
Gipsies’ who performed musical displays, singing and dance steps, and the ‘Crazy Gangs’
which performed “mad” shows of tricks on stage. There were also comedies,
impersonations and others such as ‘Ballyhoos concert group’ and the ‘Bandoliers’ which
presented various productions to the troops. The entertainment unit also had the East
African Force entertainment unit to cater for troops in east Africa, a South African
entertainment quarter for north Africa and the middle east as well as for the Italian theatre.

By 1945, the entertainment unit had about eighteen units which performed in various towns
in the Union, also in Italy, Iran, Egypt, Syria, Giblartar, Tunisia, Greece (only the
Amuseliers), Kenya, Abyssinia, Uganda, Eritrea, and Somalia. By March 1946, when the
entertainment unit’s existence came to an end, it had presented about eight thousand shows to
millions of soldiers.

However, there were some criticisms. Some of the performances were criticised for leaning
too much towards radio and films, thus losing the South African character. The entertainment

---

1482 UWH, Box 162, Narep Unfo 16, The Story of the 1st S.A. Entertainment Unit, 15 November 1941; AG (9), Box 163, 213/14/62, Memorandum on the Necessity for a Definite Establishment for Troop Entertainment, 2 January 1941; AG (9), Box 163, 213/14/62, Entertainment of Troops, QMG to AG, 2 January 1941; ‘The Union Defence Force Entertainment Units’, The Nongqai, September 1941, p. 1181; Bantjés, ‘Die Vermaaklikheidsgroep’, p. 21.


1486 ‘Equipping the UDF Entertainment Units’, The Nongqai, April 1945, p. 393; Bantjés, ‘Die Vermaaklikheidsgroep’, p. 153; Roos, Ordinary Springboks, p. 58.

unit performers were also English-speakers. Other complaints related to the dubious jokes or, with regard to the conservative chaplains in Potchefstroom, the ‘sexual element’ due to the somewhat “nakedness” of female dancers. However, on the contrary, Dr Malherbe, who was in the audience at Mersa Mantru in 1942, reacted by writing a congratulatory letter to Bourke. He enjoyed the performances and ‘got a kick out of seeing how much the boys enjoyed it’. He appreciated the rendition of the Afrikaans items, for example, the ‘Boereplaas’ (Boer Farm), which invoked nostalgia among troops, and the popularity of the girls’ items because many of the young men ‘had not clapped eyes on a woman for six months or more’.

In response to Dr Malherbe’s letter of appreciation, Bourke indicated that UDF HQ was not offering him any encouragement at all. He also explained that it was difficult to perform shows in Afrikaans because he could not find Afrikaans-speaking artists because of ‘extreme political views’. In fact, those artists who performed the Afrikaans items were all English and had never spoken an Afrikaans word before. Some of them were even imported from England. It was through the efforts of one Afrikaans singer, Jan van Zyl, who was used as an Afrikaans producer, that some of the popular renditions were in Afrikaans. The entertainment unit was valued by Dr Malherbe, nevertheless, and similarly to the AES but ‘from different angles’, as a significant morale-building effort. Dr Malherbe appreciated the entertainment unit for doing ‘a fine work in the Army’. (See figs. 13-16, 82) The VIP section of Clapham, also contributed significantly to the massive attendance of the entertainment unit’s shows by putting up various advertisements on the radio and through posters. (See also illustrations 44-48)

---

1488 Malherbe Papers, File 432/7, KCM 56974 (64), Information Officer, UDF Admin HQ, MEF to Malherbe, 2 April 1942.
1490 Malherbe Papers, File 438/1, KCM, 56974 (538), Malherbe to Bourke, 22 April 1942. The letter was reproduced in The Nongqai, June 1942, p. 676.
1491 Malherbe Papers, File 438/1, KCM, 56974 (538), Malherbe to Bourke, 22 April 1942.
1492 Malherbe Papers, File 438/1, KCM, 56974 (538), Malherbe to Bourke, 22 April 1942.
1493 Malherbe Papers, File 438/1, KCM, 56974 (538), Malherbe to Bourke, 25 April 1942.
1494 Malherbe Papers, File 438/1, KCM, 56974 (538), Malherbe to Bourke, 25 April 1942.
1495 Malherbe Papers, File 438/1, KCM, 56974 (538), Malherbe to Bourke, 22 April 1942;
Although the UDF entertainment unit was mainly designed for the entertainment of white volunteers, it did however, present some male-only shows to NEAS members. As Roos has argued extensively in his book, the UDF authorities were always “vigilant” in ensuring that the ‘segregated character of the UDF’ was maintained through the prohibitions of ‘inter-racial social’ associations between blacks and whites. Thus, in terms of the ‘segregated racial and cultural logic’ of the South African society, white females would not perform for black soldiers. The UDF authorities had extended the implications of the ‘racial and cultural categories that organised the segregated society’ in South Africa, by ensuring that activities among troops were conducted in the manner that did not challenge or subvert those categories. Consequently, NEAS members were given a “taste” of the shows and their response was often subdued. Dr Malherbe attributed their lukewarm response to the fact that ‘it would seem bad taste and impolite to make any noise by clapping or cheering.’

NEAS members also had their own concert groups that operated under the authority of Stubbs. There was the No. 1 NMC Concert Party, as one of the four NEAS entertainment units (2 NMC and 2 CC units) to provide the recreation for the NEAS members in the Union and in the middle-east. The NMC entertainment unit was established in 1944 under one Lieutenant Ballenger as the OC, and consisted of actors, singers, tap dancers, clowns, magicians and musicians. The producer for the concert party was the well-known pianist, composer and musician in Johannesburg, Staff Sergeant Mark Radebe, assisted by the

1497 Malherbe Papers, File 438/1, KCM, 56974 (538), Malherbe to Bourke, 22 April 1942; Bantjés, ‘Die Vermaaklikheidsgroep’, p. 154.
1498 Roos, Ordinary Springboks, p. 60.
1499 Roos, Ordinary Springboks, p. 57.
1500 Roos, Ordinary Springboks, p. 57.
1501 Malherbe Papers, File 438/1, KCM, 56974 (538), Malherbe to Bourke, 22 April 1942.
1502 NMC, Box 52, NAS 3/42, Report on Activities and Returns by Welfare Officers, October 1944, pp. 1-5; CGS (War), Box 131, 32/21, Notes on Discussion Held in QMG’s Offices Regarding Entertainment among Non-Europeans, 6 October 1943; AG (3), Box 1, 154/X/4, Non-European Entertainment Mid-east, QMG to AG, 30 July 1943; AG (3), Box 1, 154/X/4, SA Entertainment Units: Tour No. 4 NMC Concert Party No. 2 Central Command, OC Central Command Bloemfontein to OC No.1 Remount Grazing Farm, Andalusia, 1 August 1944; AG (3), Box 1, 154/X/4, SA Entertainment Units: The No.2 NMC Concert Party, DNEAS to OCs NMC Durban and Pietermaritzburg, 28 September 1944; NMC, Box 14, NAS 3/21, Propaganda and Press Matters: The No.1 NMC Concert Party, DNEAS to European and Non-European Newspapers, 31 January 1945; ‘Die Vermaaklikheidsgroep’, p. 154.
saxophonist and trumpeter, Sergeant Samuel Kgasi.\textsuperscript{1505} In addition, there were other entertainment groups such as the ‘NMC Brass Band’, ‘Africa Stars’ and ‘South Easterners’ which performed regularly, even to whites who attended the shows, and were appreciated widely for talent and efficiency.\textsuperscript{1506} There was also the No. 1 CC Band in Kimberley and No. 2 CC Band in Piet Retief. Because the members of the No. 1 CC Band consisted of the coloured veterans of the First World War, they were not fit for service outside South Africa, thus a new No. 4 CC Band, consisting of elements of the No. 1, No. 2 and ten available General Services troops, was organised.\textsuperscript{1507} Concert parties provided a variety of entertainment for the NEAS and other UDF members to combat boredom among troops. (See figs. 12 and 17-22)

Besides the entertainment units, film shows also played a significant role in the escapism and mental distraction of the troops. The film entertainment services, conceived in 1940, were provided by the Mobile Cinema Unit\textsuperscript{1508}, through the support of the UDF Film Unit\textsuperscript{1509}, which also produced films to assist in propaganda efforts and to showcase aspects of the military activities and the war effort.\textsuperscript{1510} The mobile cinemas were particularly important both in the Union and afield because, while it was easier for troops in the rear areas and near


\textsuperscript{1507} AG (3), Box 1, 154/X/4, Signal, Concert Units, Dechief to Unidef, 22 September 1943; AG (3), Box 1, 154/X/4, Authority to Organise 4th CC Band, Deputy Adjutant General (DAG) to DNEAS, 27 September 1943; AG (3), Box 1, 154/X/4, CC Band No. 4, DNEAS to DAG, 19 November 1943.

\textsuperscript{1508} UWH, Box 136. Narep ME 10, UDFI (YMCA and Toc H), Middle East and Italy, Monthly Progress Reports, 1941-1944; CGS (War), Box 62, VII 20/2, UDFI (YMCA and Toc H), Progress Reports, 1941-1945; World War 2 Diary (WD), vol. 2, Box 511, MEF and CMF, Monthly Progress Reports, 1944-1945; ‘Running a Mobile Cinema’, \textit{The Nongqai}, January 1943; Van der Waag, \textit{History of SADFI}, pp. 39, 49; PP, Box 39, PR 1/5/2, Propaganda Among Our Troops, G.S.O.2 (Ic) to D.G.O (for DDMI), 8 November 1940; PP, Box 39, PR 1/5, Military Propaganda and Publicity, Ic to DMI, 6 December 1940.

\textsuperscript{1509} Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 150, The Bureau of Information: Present Activities, 21 May 1942; ‘The South African Bureau of Information: The First Exclusive Interview with the Director, A.N. Wilson’, \textit{The Nongqai}, June 1942; PP, Box 40, UDF/FP/8/1, Report by OC, SAPR Film and Photographic Unit, 28 December 1944; PP, Box 63, PU 6/9/4, Memorandum on Military Publicity and Propaganda, R.N. Lindsay (ADPR) to DMI, 22 February 1944; PP, Box 40, PR 1/2/2, South African Public Relations Film and Photo Unit (SAPR), Liaison, Publicity and Results, Memorandum for Colonel Campbell-Ross, 27 July 1944; ‘Military Movies’, \textit{The Nongqai}, December 1944; PP, Box 40, UDF/FP/8/1, Report by OC, SAPR Film and Photographic Unit, May 1945.

\textsuperscript{1510} AG (War), Box 5, 168/2/2/2/4, Deputy Chief of Staff to Director of Military Intelligence, 5 October 1942; PP, Box 63, PU 6/4/2, Activities, Establishment and Progress of UDF Film Unit, 29 August 1942; PP, Box 63, PU 6/4/2, Production Report – UDF Film Unit, April 1941 to September 1942; AG (W), Box 4, 168/2/2/2/2, Establishment – Director of Military Intelligence, 13 July 1943.
the towns to patronise cinema theatres, it was difficult for troops in the forwards areas of military operations or just in remote and isolated places.\footnote{1511}{NMC, Box 53, NMP 20/2, Entertainment of Troops: Cinema Shows, OC, Witwatersrand Command HQ to OCs, NMC and IMC, Witwatersrand Units, 3 October 1940; NMC, Box 18, NAS 3/21/F/1, Tours: Film Vans, Mobile Film Van Tour No. 53, 21 November 1944; NMC, Box 17, NAS 3/21/F/1, NMC: Tour Film Vans, DNEAS Film Vans Itinerary, Tour 64, 25 June 1945 and Tour 66, 30 July 1945; ‘Running a Mobile Cinema’, The Nongqai, January 1943; Van der Waag, History of SADFI, pp. 39, 49; Malherbe Papers, File 438/1. KCM, 56974 (538), Malherbe to Bourke, 22 April 1942; Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 150, Bureau of Information: Statement on Activities, 21 May 1942.}

The UDFI (YMCA and Toc House) was the main provider of film services to the troops in east and north Africa, with eighty-three percent of cinema entertainment in the Western Desert.\footnote{1512}{UWH, Box 136, Narep ME 10, UDFI (YMCA and Toc H), Middle East and Italy, Monthly Progress Reports, 1941-1944; CGS (War), Box 62, VII 20/2, UDFI (YMCA and Toc H), Progress Reports, 1941-1945; World War 2 Diary (WD), vol. 2, Box 511, MEF and CMF, Monthly Progress Reports, 1944-1945; Van der Waag, History of SADFI, pp. 39-40, 49.} The exhibitions were all “talkie” pictures, preceded by the \textit{African Mirror} newsreels, then the main feature and some advertisements. Some of the popular film shows included ‘Deanna Durbin in \textit{That Certain Age}, George Formby in \textit{Keep Your Seats Please} and Bing Crosby in \textit{The Star Maker}’.\footnote{1513}{‘Running a Mobile Cinema’, The Nongqai, January 1943; Grundlingh, The Participation of South African Blacks, p. 145.} The South African troops, including NEAS members as well as the New Zealanders, British, Polish, Free French and Indian troops, sat on sand and enjoyed two hours of film entertainment free of charge.\footnote{1514}{UWH, Box 136. Narep ME 10, UDFI (YMCA and Toc H), Middle East and Italy, Monthly Progress Reports, 1941-1944; CGS (War), Box 62, VII 20/2, UDFI (YMCA and Toc H), Progress Reports, 1941-1945; World War 2 Diary (WD), vol. 2, Box 511, MEF and CMF, Monthly Progress Reports, 1944-1945; ‘Running a Mobile Cinema’, The Nongqai, January 1943; ‘The UDF Film Unit: How Movies are Used in the Defence Force to Speed Training and Build Morale’, The Nongqai, November 1943, p. 1131; Van der Waag, History of SADFI, pp. 47-49.} The mobile cinemas also extended their film shows once a week to hospitals and casualty clearing stations in order to lift the morale of the sick and wounded.\footnote{1515}{UWH, Box 136. Narep ME 10, UDFI (YMCA and Toc H), Middle East and Italy, Monthly Progress Reports, 1941-1944; CGS (War), Box 62, VII 20/2, UDFI (YMCA and Toc H), Progress Reports, 1941-1945; World War 2 Diary (WD), vol. 2, Box 511, MEF and CMF, Monthly Progress Reports, 1944-1945; ‘Running a Mobile Cinema’, The Nongqai, January 1943; ‘The UDF Film Unit: How Movies are Used in the Defence Force to Speed Training and Build Morale’, The Nongqai, November 1943, p. 1131; Van der Waag, History of SADFI, pp. 47-49.} Cinema shows were provided to smaller audiences of thirty or to larger groups of up to 2000. By January 1942, about eight UDFI mobile cinemas had exhibited three hundred and seventy-seven shows to over 156 000 men in three months.\footnote{1516}{DC, Group 2, Box 3888, vol. 3, Q 393/3, South African YMCA Work: Monthly Notes, October-December 1941; DC, Group 2, Box 3888, vol. 3, Q 393/9, UDFI (YMCA and Toc H), Middle East, Progress Reports, March 1942; DC, Group 2, Box 3888, vol. 3, Q 393/9, UDFI (YMCA and Toc H), YMCA-Toc H National War Work Council Second Annual Conference, 8-9 May 1942; UWH, Box 136. Narep ME 10, UDFI (YMCA and Toc H), Middle East and Italy, Monthly Progress Reports, 1941-1944; CGS (War), Box 62, VII 20/2, UDFI (YMCA and Toc H), Progress Reports, 1941-1945 ‘Under the Red Triangle’, The Nongqai, January 1942, p. 3; Van der Waag, History of SADFI, p. 40.} The mobile cinemas were nicknamed ‘Bioscope Boys’, and provided a...
vital mental diversion for the troops and enjoyed immense popularity particularly in the military bases at the isolated areas.\textsuperscript{1517} However, the maintenance of segregation between the racial groups, though desired by the authorities, was difficult due to the shortage of facilities. In some cases, for example at Carolina, near Barberton, whites and CC members shared a tent for a film show.\textsuperscript{1518} It remained a perpetual challenge to ensure the maintenance of segregated film shows or concert displays throughout the war.

In addition to receiving news from South Africa and about other international events through the services newspapers, the BOI, in collaboration with the SABC, provided radio broadcast service to the troops in the north.\textsuperscript{1519} As indicated in the previous chapter, the BOI had arranged with the Egyptian State Broadcasting Company to broadcast special South African programmes at regular intervals from Cairo.\textsuperscript{1520} The broadcast included a weekly thirteen and half minutes of recorded greeting messages from the family members or relatives of the soldiers from South Africa.\textsuperscript{1521} The programme producer and announcer for the South African broadcast items was one Louis Knobel, on the staff of the SABC (Bruce Anderson was in overall command).\textsuperscript{1522} From 1940, arrangements were also made through the DDMI to supply wireless sets to the troops.\textsuperscript{1523} Radio services were expanded later during 1944 and 1945. On 19 April 1944, the South African corps of signals established a radio unit under the SAPR, for direct transmission of war-related information to the Union.\textsuperscript{1524} It was a military (UDF) radio unit which operated through the beam service from the Allied Algiers Station to


\textsuperscript{1518} NMC, Box 53, NMP 20/2, Director: YMCA Services in Non-European Military Camps to DNEAS, 21 December 1941.

\textsuperscript{1519} Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 136, Home News supplied by the Bureau of Information, 1940; Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 150, Bureau of Information: Statement on Activities, 21 May 1942; Malherbe Papers, File 438/1, KCM 56974 (531a), Publicity for the Army at Home and in the Field, 1941; SABC, Annual Reports, 1939-1945.

\textsuperscript{1520} Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 150, Bureau of Information: Statement on Activities, 21 May 1942; SABC, Annual Reports, 1940-1945.

\textsuperscript{1521} Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 150, Bureau of Information: Statement on Activities, 21 May 1942; CGS (War), Box 199, 42/5, Van Ryneveld’s Broadcast Message to Troops, 29 November 1941; SABC, Annual Reports, 1940-1945.


\textsuperscript{1523} CGS (War), Box 199, 42/5, Bureau of Information to DDMI, 3 October 1940; ‘1,119 Radio Sets Sent to SA Troops’, \textit{Rand Daily Mail}, 17 November 1942.

\textsuperscript{1524} PP, Box 41, Broadcasting: History of the Radio Unit, South African Public Relations, 19 April 1944 – 1 February 1945.
the Union and it was for the first time since the war began that there was a ‘beam-direct relay’ to the country.  

The radio unit’s first experimental beam to South Africa was on 1 July 1944 via the Allied military station (Algiers), and subsequently via Rome, to Algiers, then to the Union on 7 July 1944. The first transmission was conducted by Captain Roger Bayldon, a journalist who was on the staff of the ADPR, mainly about war news and other military activities. In his first broadcast, Bayldon stated that the purpose of that radio unit was ‘to take you [South Africans] to war’. Other radio observers were Captain Cecil Williams, Captain Henry Joubert, Lieutenant C. Chosack, and Captain D. Erwin as the OC, radio sub-unit, SAPR. These radio unit observers were all part of the AES, and captains Bayldon and Joubert were operating with the public relations, handing material to SABC. The well-known and experienced journalists, Uys Krige and Lieutenant Jacques Malan were stationed with public relations in London and operating with the BBC. The UDF radio unit, operating from Rome, was assisted by the Americans and the British with their technical equipment. Following the British and the American examples of having their own radio stations in their camps to carry military traffic back to their countries, and also the radio stations to their troops, the South African Forces Radio station was established in December 1944 in Rome. It was an upgrade of the initial radio unit and was operated by Lieutenant C. Chosack and Lieutenant L. Rootenberg.

---

1526 PP, Box 41, Addendum to History of Radio Unit, 5 May 1945.
1527 PP, Box 41, Addendum to History of Radio Unit, 5 May 1945; PP, Box 41, Broadcast: Military Observers, Broadcast No.1, Lt Bayldon, UDF RU, n.d. (presumably 1 July 1944).
1528 PP, Box 41, Broadcast: Military Observers, Broadcast No.1, Lt Bayldon, UDF RU, n.d. (presumably 1 July 1944).
1529 PP, Box 41, Addendum to History of Radio Unit, 5 May 1945.
1530 PP, Box 41, Addendum to History of Radio Unit, 5 May 1945.
1531 PP, Box 41, Memorandum on Possible Radio Transmission to Union, Capt D. Erwin to DMI (Ic), 6 June 1944.
1532 PP, Box 41, Memorandum on Possible Radio Transmission to Union, Capt D. Erwin to DMI (Ic), 6 June 1944; PP, Box 36, 6/19/6, Establishment of Committee to Control and Coordinate Visual Instruction and Propaganda, Theron to All Heads of Sections, 31 December 1944. Vic Clapham referred to that Radio Service as Springbok Radio, see Malherbe Papers, File 441/4/3, KCM 57008 (35), Visual Instruction and Propaganda Unit, Vic Clapham, 12 January 1974, p. 8.
1533 PP, Box 36, 6/19/6, Establishment of Committee to Control and Coordinate Visual Instruction and Propaganda, Theron to All Heads of Sections, 31 December 1944; CGS (War), Box 198, 42/5, Prime Minister’s Inaugural Broadcast Speech, Campbell-Ross to Lomberg, Chief of Radio Section, 27 January 1945.
Changes regarding the radio station were already contemplated in August 1944 to serve the 'forces, from the forces to the forces – a South African forces programme to the South African forces everywhere and to the “home-front”'. 1534 This military radio station started its experimental transmissions on 1 January 1945 and officially opened with an address to the troops by General Smuts on 1 February 1945, the birthday of the 6th SA Armoured Division. 1535 It also became a useful publicity and propaganda medium for the UDF propaganda and publicity committee and the VIP Unit. 1536 Members were encouraged to send in requests, to submit scripts or ideas and to compile and submit thirty minutes programmes. 1537 With regard to the news, the radio focused on the news from home, sport, stock exchange prices and war news from other theatres. 1538 Arrangements were also made to have records in English, Afrikaans and some in black languages from South Africa. About 1, 250 were received by 30 January 1945, of which 800 were in English, 250 in Afrikaans, 100 were in unspecified black languages and 50 were American. 1539 Whatever its shortcomings, due to the direct and immediate broadcast service, the South African Forces Radio was a welcome alternative to the BBC broadcast or the previously delayed recordings of the SABC.

1534 PP, Box 41, Radio Presentation of Programmes of Radio Observers Unit, Erwin to Lindsay (ADPR), 17 August 1944.
1535 PP, Box 41, Minutes of a Meeting of the South African Forces Radio Broadcasting Committee, 17 January 1945; PP, Box 41, News Service for SA Troops’ Broadcasting Station, DDMI to Deputy Director, Signals, 5 January 1945; PP, Box 36, 6/19/6, Establishment of Committee to Control and Coordinate Visual Instruction and Propaganda, Theron to All Heads of Sections, 31 December 1944; CGS (War), Box 198, 42/5, Prime Minister’s Inaugural Broadcast Speech, Campbell-Ross to Lomberg, Chief of Radio Section, 27 January 1945; CGS (War), Box 198, 42/5, Prime Minister’s Inaugural Broadcast Speech, Dechief to Unidef, Main (UDF HQ Italy), 29 July 1945.
1536 PP, Box 36, 6/19/6, Establishment of Committee to Control and Coordinate Visual Instruction and Propaganda, Theron to All Heads of Sections, 31 December 1944; ’The South African Forces Radio: Take Forwards the Springboks’, Poster by Visual Instruction and Propaganda Section, CMF and MEF, WD 2, Box 533, April 1945; Malherbe Papers, File 441/4/3, KCM 57008 (35), Visual Instruction and Propaganda Unit, Vic Clapham, 12 January 1974, pp. 7-8; WD 2, Box 533, War Diary for January 1945 in Respect of UDF Printing and Services in CMF and MEF, Report by Major P.T. van der Walt, Staff Officer, Printing and Stationary Services, CMF, 1 February 1945.
1537 PP, Box 41, Minutes of a Meeting of the South African Forces Radio Broadcasting Committee, 6 February 1944, Attachment of South Africa Radio- Rome, Broadcasting Times; ’Tune in to South African Forces Radio’, Poster by Visual Instruction and Propaganda Section, CMF and MEF, WD 2, Box 533, April 1945.
1538 PP, Box 41, Minutes of a Meeting of the South African Forces Radio Broadcasting Committee, 17 January 1945; SANDFA, PP, Box 41, Minutes of a Meeting of the South African Forces Radio Broadcasting Committee, 30 January 1945.
1539 PP, Box 41, Minutes of a Meeting of the South African Forces Radio Broadcasting Committee, 6 February 1944; PP, Box 41, Minutes of a Meeting of the South African Forces Radio Broadcasting Committee, 30 January 1945.
The SABC also started to exploit the military radio facilities since September 1944 for direct relays to the Union.\textsuperscript{1540} The BBC, through the arrangements of the Middle East propaganda directorate, had also been broadcasting propaganda and news items to the South African forces since their deployment in the field. Its programmes included the “News from South Africa – African Transmission”, broadcast every week on Fridays, and the “Song Time in the Laager” – the BBC Forces Programme for the UDF troops in Middle East. It was, however, criticised for ‘giving undue prominence to the OB and the disloyal elements in the Union’\textsuperscript{1541}. The comments from the troops of the 1\textsuperscript{st} and 2\textsuperscript{nd} divisions were negative towards the BBC in terms of the quality of its programmes to South African soldiers. The Afrikaans-speaking troops were unimpressed with the poor Afrikaans language pronunciations and the selection and quality of the songs such as \textit{Sarie Marais} or \textit{Suikerbossie} which were assumed to have ‘mystic symbolic appeal’. The troops also felt ‘embarrassed’ by flattering language about their ‘glorious exploits’. They were also bored by ‘interminable talks’ and some “bed-time stories” which even influenced some troops ‘to tune into Zeesen’, though they discounted its apparent propaganda.\textsuperscript{1542} It was important to have quality Afrikaans broadcasting service as the Afrikaans-speakers were in the majority of the UDF. As result, the BBC welcomed the supply of Afrikaans material for broadcasting purposes from the experienced Krige and Malan.\textsuperscript{1543} Nonetheless, a variety of radio programmes such as popular music, news broadcast, “melodious moments”, “break for music”, “when the day is done” and also hospital requests, offered additional forms of entertainment for the troops on active service.\textsuperscript{1544}

As far as the SA Forces radio was concerned, the reaction of the troops was satisfactory. Between January and February 1945, letters from the audience expressing satisfaction at the transmissions, request programmes and news services were received.\textsuperscript{1545} To verify such reports, the Public Opinion Committee for SA Forces Radio was established on 30 March

\begin{footnotesize}
\footnote{UWH, Box 162, Narep Unfo 16, Cursory Survey of the South African Public Relations, 30 November 1944, by Maj J. Strydom, pp. 35, 41; SABC, Annual Reports, 1944, p.5.}
\footnote{CGS (War), Box 198, 42/5, Theron to Van Ryneveld, 9 April 1942.}
\footnote{CGS (War), Box 198, 42/5, Theron to Van Ryneveld, 9 April 1942.}
\footnote{Malherbe Papers, File 438/1, KCM 56974 (553), Malherbe to Esselen, 16 October 1944; Malherbe Papers, File 438/1, KCM 56974 (557), Malherbe to Wakefield, 17 October 1944; Malherbe Papers, File 438/1, KCM 56974 (552), Malherbe to J. Grenfell Williams (Acting Assistant Controller, Overseas Service, BBC), 28 December 1944.}
\footnote{Bantjés, ‘Die Vermaaklikheidsgroep’, p. 107.}
\footnote{PP, Box 41, General Comments on the UDF Forces Radio Station based on Letters Received from Personnel in Central Mediterranean Forces, 12 March 1945.}
\end{footnotesize}
1945 to ‘measure the opinion of our [UDF] Forces concerning the Station’. Major A.E. Ferning, senior IO within the AES was in charge and a survey questionnaire with two parts was developed: part A for collecting data on listening habits (e.g., how many people/radio sets); and part B for expression of opinion and preferences. The survey consisting of 220 questionnaires was conducted from 6-13 April within the UDF-SAAF units and the outcome was appalling. Only twenty-one questionnaires were returned, and it was attributed to bad timing as troops were busy with military preparations. The feedback contained in the returned questionnaires was that only a few men listened due to the weak signal and that programmes were poor. The estimated numbers of radio sets possessed by thirteen units were 120 and the estimated listeners were twenty-six. Given the limited number of respondents, the results could hardly be generalised to represent the cross section of opinions of the UDF troops. There was also a large listening public in hospitals and convalescent depots in Rome and their opinions were not surveyed, only informal reports. It was then concluded that the SA Forces radio station needed to improve technically for better quality transmission, to secure more sets for the troops and to improve programmes so as to compare favourably with other stations such as the 8th Army Mobile, BBC Direct, British Forces Radio, American Expeditionary Station and even the German station (unspecified, probably Zeesen), which ranked higher in terms of quality.

In South Africa, transmissions were facilitated through the SABC. Black soldiers, in particular, also benefitted from the expanded wireless transmissions from September 1942. The DNEAS offered its support to NAD regarding the NMC and military matters, and even provided talks by some AES members such as Selope Thema for broadcasting.

1546 PP, Box 41, Public Opinion Committee for SA Forces Radio, Staff Officer, Signals to ADPR, 31 March 1945.
1547 PP, Box 41, Forces Radio Survey: AES Questionnaire, 31 March 1945.
1548 PP, Box 41, Summary of Results: SA Forces Radio, by Public Opinion Committee, 14 May 1945; PP, Box 41, Summary of Results: SA Forces Radio, Lindsay to Wilson, 22 May 1945.
1549 PP, Box 41, Summary of Results: SA Forces Radio, by Public Opinion Committee, 14 May 1945; PP, Box 41, Summary of Results: SA Forces Radio, Lindsay to Wilson, 22 May 1945.
1550 PP, Box 41, Summary of Results: SA Forces Radio, Lindsay to Wilson, 22 May 1945.
1551 PP, Box 41, Summary of Results: SA Forces Radio, by Public Opinion Committee, 14 May 1945; PP, Box 41, Minutes of a Meeting of the South African Forces Radio Broadcasting Committee, 15 May 1945.
1552 NMC, Box 18, NAS 3/21/J, Propaganda and Publicity: Broadcast to Natives, DNEAS to DDMI, 2 September 1942; NMC, Box 18, NAS 3/21/J, Broadcast to Natives in Vernacular, Malherbe to Smit, 23 September 1942; NMC, Box 18, NAS 3/21/J, News Bulletin by Department of Native Affairs, Sesotho Translation, 2 October 1942.
1553 NMC, Box 18, NAS 3/21/J, Broadcast to Natives, DNEAS to Secretary for Native Affairs, 19 October 1942; NMC, Box 18, NAS 3/21/J, Broadcast: Taking Cover, n.d.; NMC, Box 18, NAS 3/21/J,
But, as with the problems with the rest of the black South African audience, many NMC members could not listen to the daily programmes because of the unsuitable broadcast timings during training schedules.\textsuperscript{1554} The OC of 1\textsuperscript{st} Battalion NMC, Dynamite Factory in the Cape Town, even argued that ‘no civilian employer could allow his labour force to stand idle for 30 minutes thrice weekly’.\textsuperscript{1555} Serving soldiers needed training time “badly” that listenership by the NMC would not have been high throughout the war. Nevertheless, those who could listen, enjoyed the programmes presented in vernacular.

Sport was another form of entertainment. The UDF authorities in the western desert, the Middle-East and in Italy, organised various sporting activities for recreational purposes. As sports was regarded as one of the priority activities, sporting equipment such as rugby balls, soccer balls as well as cricket bats and hockey sticks were acquired and distributed to the troops.\textsuperscript{1556} For the troops, including NEAS members, every Wednesday afternoon was set aside for boxing\textsuperscript{1557}, soccer\textsuperscript{1558}, athletics\textsuperscript{1559} as well as rugby games\textsuperscript{1560}, and weekends were especially used for sporting competitions between units or between services.\textsuperscript{1561}

For NEAS members, interest was more into soccer. There were leagues formed in military Commands and various floating trophies such as ‘NEAS Directors’ Trophy’ and ‘Directors’...
Floating Trophy’ were played for. Rugby and cricket were most popular among white troops, and tournaments were organised between the services and even between countries, for example, South Africa against New Zealand. The South African Gifts and Comforts Committee as well as the YMCA South African War Work Council were particularly instrumental in securing donations for sporting equipment for the UDF troops.

As indicated in the previous section, an important enterprise for sustaining the morale and spiritual well-being of the troops was the development of the field force canteen services by the UDFI under Lieutenant Colonel T.R. Pornsford as the OC. Pornsford was the national secretary for the YMCA who was requested, together with Captain L.C. Campling of the Toc H, to assist the DOD in organising canteen services for the troops. The operations of the UDFI originated in July 1940 in East Africa, at the request of the CGS. The UDFI, which operated as a volunteer unit of the ACF from November 1941, worked closely with the YMCA and the Toc H in East Africa for the provision of the canteen and recreational facilities, moral and spiritual support services for the soldiers.

---

1562 NMC, Box 51, NAS 3/22/7, Cape Fortress Sports League: NEAS Soccer Fixtures, 11 April- 6 June 1945; CGS (War), Box 131, 32/21, Disposal of Non-European Army Services Trophies, Director of Land Forces to CGS, 7 December 1949; Grundlingh, ‘The Participation of South African Blacks’, p. 144.

1563 Malherbe Papers, File 442/1, KCM 56974 (988), Sport Report for El Bullsheet, October 1943; ‘Div. At Play’, The Sable, August 1943; Roos, Ordinary Spingboks, pp. 61-62.


1565 CGS (War), Box 62, VI 20/2, UDFI (YMCA and Toc H), Memorandum of Interview with Sir Pierre van Ryneveld, Chief of the General Staff and Brigadier General J. Mitchel-Baker at Defence Headquarters, Pretoria, 23 July 1940; AG (3), Box 207, 154/51/50/9, Report on Meeting held Between YMCA and Toc H Representatives and Members of the DOD at Defence Headquarters, 12 October 1940; Van der Waag, History of the South African Defence Force Institute, Introduction, p. vi.

1566 CGS (War), Box 62, VI 20/2, Correspondence, wrt Canteen Services, Dechief to Unidef, 23 July 1940; CGS (War), Box 62, VI 20/2, Maintenance of Wet Canteens, J. Mallet, National War Services Secretary to Van Ryneveld, 26 July 1940; CGS (War), Box 62, VI 20/2, Memorandum for “Authorities Committee”, by Van Ryneveld, 27 September 1940; CGS (War), Box 62, VI 20/2, UDFI (YMCA and Toc H), Memorandum of Interview with Van Ryneveld and Mitchel-Baker, 23 July 1940; AG (3), Box 207, 154/51/50/9, Report on Meeting held Between YMCA and Toc H Representatives and Members of the DOD at Defence Headquarters, 12 October 1940; CGS (War), Box 62, VI 20/2, Canteen and Social Amenities, E.A., CGS to Minister of Defence, 3 October 1940.

1567 AG (3), Box 207, 154/51/50/9, Report on Meeting held Between YMCA and Toc H Representatives and Members of the DOD at Defence Headquarters, 12 October 1940; CGS (War), Box 62, VI 20/2, Circular, Union Defence Force Institutes, AG to QMG and All Heads of Sections, 11 November 1940.

1568 AG (3), Box 207, 154/51/50/9, Report on Meeting held Between YMCA and Toc H Representatives and Members of the DOD at Defence Headquarters, 12 October 1940; CGS (War), Box 62, VI 20/2,
Within the Union, the UDFI’s civilian version was called South African War Work Council and provided similar services to the soldiers. From 1941, the UDFI became the chief orchestrator of the comprehensive entertainment and recreation efforts for the troops in the different theatres of military operations. It arranged for the reading and writing amenities, expedited the procurement, production and distribution of news sheets, magazines, periodicals, reference books, bulletins and pamphlets. Operated by the members of the YMCA and Toc H, the UDFI provided the triangle huts, marquees, dug-outs and cinemas from home bases to the forward areas. In addition, it operated the mobile canteen facilities which offered refreshments such as tea, coffee, cigarettes, beans, bacon, biscuits, toiletries and a water trailer as well as services such as lectures, religious services, art classes, concerts, libraries, note-paper games and mobile cinema shows for troops on active service.

The YMCA operated the huts in the base camps and mobile canteens in the field, and the Toc H, which dealt mainly with the wet canteens (offering beer), operated in towns and villages

---

1569 Circular, Union Defence Force Institutes, AG to QMG and All Heads of Sections, 11 November 1940; Van der Waag, History of SADFI, p. 39.
1571 See various monthly reports in UWH, Box 136. Narep ME 10, UDFI (YMCA and Toc H), Middle East and Italy, Monthly Progress Reports, 1941-1944; CGS (War), Box 62, VII 20/2, UDFI (YMCA and Toc H), Progress Reports, 1941-1945; World War 2 Diary (WD), vol. 2, Box 511, MEF and CMF, Monthly Progress Reports, 1944-1945; For publicity efforts see ‘Running a Mobile Cinema’, The Nongqai, January 1943; ‘The UDF Film Unit: How Movies are Used in the Defence Force to Speed Training and Build Morale’, The Nongqai, November 1943, p. 1131.
1572 UWH, Box 136. Narep ME 10, UDFI (YMCA and Toc H), Middle East and Italy, Monthly Progress Reports, 1941-1944; CGS (War), Box 62, VII 20/2, UDFI (YMCA and Toc H), Progress Reports, 1941-1945; World War 2 Diary (WD), vol. 2, Box 511, MEF and CMF, Monthly Progress Reports, 1944-1945; YMCA and Toc H War Fund Appeal, YMCA South African War Work Fund, Johannesburg, March 1940; YMCA and Toc H War Fund Appeal, Toc H, Southern Africa, Johannesburg, March 1940.
1573 UWH, Box 136, Narep ME 10, UDFI (YMCA and Toc H), Middle East and Italy, Monthly Progress Reports, 1941-1944; CGS (War), Box 62, VII 20/2, UDFI (YMCA and Toc H), Progress Reports, 1941-1945; World War 2 Diary (WD), vol. 2, Box 511, MEF and CMF, Monthly Progress Reports, 1944-1945; Van der Waag, History of SADFI, chapters 5, 6 and 7; ‘Under the Red Triangle’, The Nongqai, January 1942, p. 3.
where they believed there was ‘greater control’ and a minimum risk of drunkenness.\textsuperscript{1574} The YMCA did not operate the wet canteens as an established tradition throughout its existence.\textsuperscript{1575} The UDFI also established the soldiers’ recreational clubs such as the Springbok Club, Voortrekker Club, Sable Club, Red Tabs Centre, Eagle’s Nest, the Non-European Leave Centre and many others in North Africa and Europe.\textsuperscript{1576} These clubs, both in South Africa and in the North, including Europe, were important social centres for troops on leave, and provided various services such as accommodation, tourism, meals, tea, showering facilities or getting hair-cuts.\textsuperscript{1577}

The Gifts and Comforts organisation also supported the efforts of the UDF authorities to strengthen the physical and mental well-being of the soldiers in the Union, North Africa, the Middle-East and Italy.\textsuperscript{1578} Thousands of products such as shaving equipment, cigarettes, matches, combs, towels, razors, warm socks, sporting and musical equipment were contained in ‘glory bags’ and sent to the troops.\textsuperscript{1579} Until the end of the war, the Gifts and Comforts


\textsuperscript{1575} CGS (War), Box 62, VI 20/2, UDFI (YMCA and Toc H), Memorandum of Interview with Van Ryneveld and Mitchel-Baker, 23 July 1940.

\textsuperscript{1576} UWH, Box 136, Narep ME 10, UDFI (YMCA and Toc H), Middle East and Italy, Monthly Progress Reports, 1941-1944; CGS (War), Box 62, VII 20/2, UDFI (YMCA and Toc H), Progress Reports, 1941-1945; World War 2 Diary (WD), vol. 2, Box 511, MEF and CMF, Monthly Progress Reports, 1944-1945; Van der Waag, \textit{History of SADFI}, pp. 47-55; Roos, \textit{Ordinary Springboks}, p. 58.


\textsuperscript{1579} UWH, Box 268, B.I. 22, YMCA and Toc H, Broadcast Talk by Reverend P.H.S. Sitters, 20 November 1941; UWH, Box 267, B.I. 21, South African Gifts and Comforts Committee, Summary of Articles, 15 April 1942; UWH, Box 267, B.I. 21, South African Gifts and Comforts Committee, Progressive
organisation had raised thousands of pounds to finance their supply of gifts to the troops and also organised thousands of women to assist with war work for the troops, though funding appeals were still being made due to the high demand for goods.1580

The provision of recreational and entertainment facilities were attempts by the UDF authorities to ensure that the troops enjoyed the social care services, their morale was sustained and they were kept gratified. For the NEAS members, much as the services were for building morale, they were also aimed at preventing them from “drinking, loitering aimlessly and consorting with loose women”.1581 Similarly, this was the case with the white troops as the authorities also controlled their leisure activities, for example, by ‘taking over the restaurants and hotels’ as well as the local staff soon after the 6th SA Armoured Division moved into Italy in 1944, for their exclusive utilisation by the South Africans.1582 The important factor for the UDF authorities was that the troops utilised those social welfare facilities and services in a regulated manner and in a controlled environment so as to keep them safe, healthy, content and focussed on their military obligations.1583


1582 ‘Big Hotel in Florence for Troops’, The Star, 20 October 1944; Roos, Ordinary Spingboks, p. 60.

1583 UWH, Box 268, B.I. 22, YMCA and Toc H, Broadcast Talk by Reverend P.H.S. Sitters, 20 November 1941; UWH, Box 136. Narep ME 10, UDFI (YMCA and Toc H), Middle East and Italy, Monthly Progress Reports, 1941-1944; CGS (War), Box 62, VII 20/2, UDFI (YMCA and Toc H), Progress Reports, 1941-1945; UWH, Box 267, B.I. 21, South African Gifts and Comforts Committee, Appreciation Extracts, 15 April 1942.
CONCLUSION

In terms of social welfare and entertainment services, the UDF authorities attempted to ensure the improvement of the physical and psychological well-being of the soldiers. The entertainment units and the UDFI provided the necessary mental diversions and the morale-strengthening facilities and services which the soldiers enjoyed. For the authorities, these measures also served the strategic imperative of maintaining social control over the UDF troops in terms of their behaviour and discipline. Keeping the troops in the military base camps or at the UDF-controlled establishments outside South Africa, also reduced the risks to the soldiers’ health and also served to prevent them from the external influences that could be inconsistent with the existing socio-political conditions in South Africa or could also create unsustainable expectations among troops regarding the post-war social, political and economic order. The social welfare efforts of the authorities, however, were severely impacted by the military policies - pay, leave, allowances, pensions, promotions, transfers and movements – which, at times led to the decline of morale among the troops. 1584 Consequently, it became increasingly difficult for those involved in propaganda efforts to sustain the motivation and commitment of the troops, while at the same time having to contend with the policies that continued to impact on their morale. It remained a distressing situation for Dr Malherbe and even Brink, to whom the soldiers expressed their dissatisfactions as a result of the paradoxes and inconsistencies that plagued the UDF throughout the war. 1585

---

1584 See reports on morale, UKZN, Malherbe Papers, File 441/11, KCM 56974 (893), Report on the Factors Affecting Morale in the Army at Premier Mine, by Capt Janie Malherbe, 28 August 1942; SANDFA, QMG, Group 1, Box 104, Q 91/339, Morale in the Army, 25 August 1943; SANDFA, DNEAS Group 2, Box 20, NAS 3/42, Treatment and General Welfare of Members of None-Europeans of NMC Battalions and Units, 3 July 1940 – 28 August 1944.

1585 See QMG, Group 1, Box 104, Q 91/339, Morale in the Army, 25 August 1943; Bantjés, ‘Die Vermaaklikheidsgroep’, pp. 11-14; Martin and Orpen, South Africa at War, vol. 7, pp. 223-229.
Illustration 36, *Ic Digest*, Mar-Apr 1943

Illustration 37: *Ic Digest*, Mar-Apr 1943

Illustration 38: *The Sable*, Aug 1943

Illustration 39: *El Bullsheet*, Oct 1942

Illustration 40: *Clamp*, Sep-Oct 1943

Illustration 41: *EAForce News*, 4 Feb 1942
Illustration 42: *Springbok*, 23 Oct 1941

Illustration 43: *iNdlovu-Tlou*, 2 Sep 1944

Fig. 12: NMC Reading *iNdlovu-Tlou*, NEAS Photographic Records, Ditsong Museum of Military History

Illustration 44: UDF Honour and Good Name, Military Archives, War Diaries vol. 533
Illustration 45: Avoid Disease Posters, Military Archives, War Diaries, vol. 533
Illustration 46: Anti-Venereal Disease Posters, Military Archives, War Diaries, vol. 533
Illustration 47: UDF Entertainment Advertisements, Military Archives, War Diaries, vol. 534

Illustration 48: UDF Forces Radio Advertisement, Military Archives, War Diaries, vol. 533
Fig. 13: *The Nongqai*, Apr 1945

Fig. 14: *The Nongqai*, Apr 1945

Fig. 15: *The Nongqai*, Apr 1945

Fig. 16: *The Nongqai*, Dec 1945
Fig. 17: NMC Choir

Fig. 18: NMC Brass Band

Fig. 19: NMC Drill Display

Fig. 20: NMC Tug of War

Fig. 21: IMC Boxing

Fig. 22: IMC Boxing

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUDING PERSPECTIVES

Before assessing the strengths, weaknesses and impact of South African propaganda during the Second World War, it would be useful to identify the important elements to be considered, especially those highlighted in the previous propaganda studies. Writing in 1927, Lasswell stressed that ‘no propaganda fits tightly into its category of major emphasis’.\(^{1586}\) Thus, it is more useful to analyse propaganda according to the nature and extent of its purpose, the range of its objectives and the degree of its appraisal as an institutional imperative. In wartime, propaganda generally attempts to mobilise public opinion favourable to the state’s policy towards the war, either for intervention or for neutrality, also to counter resistance against the policy and to ‘attract the indifferent or to prevent them from assuming a hostile bent’.\(^{1587}\) When the policy of intervention in the war is adopted, the priority of propaganda mobilisation would thus be to secure population support and loyalty, to entice the neutrals and to denigrate the adversary.\(^{1588}\)

With regard to ascertaining whether propaganda has attained the desired effect, Jowett and O’Donnell emphasise that ‘propaganda must be evaluated according to its ends’.\(^{1589}\) It is imperative to consider whether the purpose and, in essence, whether ‘some specific goals have been achieved’.\(^{1590}\) The goals would vary according to the peculiar circumstances facing the nation state at that time. Therefore, in assessing the question of propaganda accomplishments in South Africa, the noteworthy issues should be in connection with the achievement of the intended purposes and goals. It is also imperative to appraise the apparatuses which were exploited for the propaganda effort in order to give an indication of whether they were adequate in expediting the achievement of those goals. This chapter, therefore, explores the above elements to determine the success of South Africa’s propaganda

\(^{1586}\) Lasswell, The Theory of Political Propaganda, p. 629.

\(^{1587}\) Ibid.


\(^{1589}\) Jowett and O’Donnell, Propaganda and Persuasion, p. 279.

\(^{1590}\) Ibid., p. 286.
efforts during the war. The discussion will commence with a brief review of the South African situation early in the war period in order to highlight some of the challenges which confronted the country at the time. During the review, the purpose and goals of propaganda efforts would also be exposed. Then the discussion will address those goals in order to ascertain whether they were accomplished. Since the war was fought over six years, it is also necessary to examine those goals in the context of the permutations of the war. The intention is to ascertain the concomitant adaptations of propaganda efforts in relation to the changing war circumstances. As a point of departure, this evaluation of propaganda is mainly concerned with the South African context. Specifically, it is concerned with South Africa’s attempts, at least for the ruling UP at the time, to sustain her socio-political values and institutional structures, while also attempting to re-envision her political future in the context of the prevailing political conditions and ideological currents.

UNION POLITICS AT THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR

When war broke out, the South African political situation was unstable. Through most of the 1930s, the country was subjected to Nazi propaganda which encouraged exclusive ethnic-nationalism among white Afrikaans speakers and promoted anti-British and anti-Jewish sentiment. Nazi Germany, in an attempt to limit the war potential of Britain, her main European rival, mounted an extensive propaganda effort to create schisms within the Empire and possibly to cultivate the neutrality of many countries, including South Africa. As a result, the Union experienced bitter political divisions on the question of neutrality or intervention. By the outbreak of the war in September 1939, the country was confronted with a range of challenges.

In the main, there was hostility and organised opposition towards the Union’s war policy by pro-republican Afrikaner nationalists, particularly the violence that was perpetuated by the OB. The prevailing political tensions were exacerbated by Nazi propaganda, especially through the Zeesen broadcast, which condemned the Smuts administration for the war policy

---

1591 Discussed in chapter 1 of this study.
1593 Details in chapter 1.
and encouraged the anti-war elements to resist all efforts relating to the Union’s participation in the war. Furthermore, the previous Hertzog administration had pursued a passive defence policy and neglected the Union’s military preparations. As discussed in previous chapters, the military problems were also compounded by some members of the UDF commandos who did not support the war and were opposed to the deployment of the forces outside South Africa. This created anxieties with regard to the troop loyalty and their commitment to the government’s war policy.

Therefore, at the beginning of the war, South Africa was severely constrained. There was an absence of national consensus on the war policy, a limited military capacity, a limited support from some members of the UDF and then, a low population morale due to the wave of the anti-war activism unleashed soon after the country entered the war.\(^{1594}\) Another point is that South Africa was divided on racial basis, with many blacks relegated to the political periphery, especially after the way they were cast aside despite their participation the First World War.\(^{1595}\) Their reaction to the government’s war policy ranged from half-hearted support, indifference and to an outright rejection. Thus, it is on the basis of such constraints that South Africa’s propaganda goals would derive, and against which to determine whether propaganda efforts during the Second World War were successful.

Smuts obtained a narrow parliamentary majority for the country to participate in the war against Germany. The parliamentary triumph was a victory for the pro-war argument. However, opponents of Smuts’s war policy later accused him of betraying Hertzog\(^{1596}\) and the latent tensions were thus re-invoked. Anti-government sentiments were cultivated in many parts of the country, mainly due to the Nazi propaganda which exploited the country’s political conditions and encouraged discontent among Afrikaners and also rumours-mongering among blacks. There was a concerted propaganda offensive against the government’s war policy which was conducted through political speeches, peace meetings, attacks on Smuts and through various other subversive operations. The aim was to ignite anti-government agitation and to deprive it of popular support for the war. Therefore, due to the

\(^{1594}\) See Army Intelligence, Box 33, CE 6/16, Censorship Summary, 3 December 1940; Army Intelligence, Box 46, I. 40.H, CE 2/15, Low Level of Moral on the Home Front, 1c to DDMI, 24 February 1942.

\(^{1595}\) For detailed discussion see A. Grundlingh, Fighting their Own War: South African Blacks and the First World War (Ravan Press, Johannesburg, 1987).

\(^{1596}\) UWH, Box 265, B.I. 20, Internal Security, Intelligence Summaries, 16 December 1939; CGS (War), Box 197, 42/2., Extracts and Intercepts. Foreign Papers and Broadcast, 27 September 1940. See the details in chapter 1.
prevailing internal political disagreements, Union authorities were compelled to devise strategies to counter-act the anti-war sentiments and to facilitate the prosecution of the war effort. To this end, a massive publicity and propaganda effort was mounted to give effect to the realisation of the war policy’s objectives.

Mindful of the prevailing internal politics, Smuts discarded any thought of a conscription policy and adopted a volunteer system for military service. Therefore, the first goal was to stimulate public interest and to foster patriotism in order to secure volunteers. Secondly, due to the escalation of the anti-war activism, it was imperative to preserve internal security and public order. This goal was also pursued among blacks, whose agitation for improvement of their political, social and economic circumstances, was interpreted by the authorities as subversive because they challenged what Roos calls the ‘colonial order’.1597 In the third place, there was a necessity to sustain public morale on the home-front and also within the UDF in order to effectively focus the efforts on prosecuting the war. These goals emerged out of the public appeals made by the government and military officials in the context of the prevailing political circumstances relating to the country’s war policy.1598

However, those goals did not imply that they were mutually exclusive or were in sequential order for the employment of propaganda initiatives. There were overlaps, with varying degrees of emphasis, depending on the specific needs or purpose of propaganda at the time. For example, to obtain recruits, it was necessary to create a stable environment, to inspire the public and stimulate interest as well as to foster patriotism. It therefore, implied that propaganda efforts would be multifaceted. In broad terms, all propaganda initiatives were aimed at ensuring a positive outcome in all spheres of South Africa’s war effort. The above goals served as indicators to aid in the evaluation of the effectiveness of the propaganda efforts during the war. However, it is equally appropriate to review the various platforms and methods which were exploited for the implementation of propaganda programmes. The rationale is to ascertain their strengths and weaknesses as delivery mechanisms, in order to determine how they impacted on the realisation of propaganda goals. Such evaluation would

1597 For details on the argument see Roos, Ordinary Springboks, chapter 4.
1598 Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 299, Generals Smuts’s Appeals to the Public for Funds for Propaganda, 28 September 1939; UWH, Box 265, B.I. 20, Intelligence Summaries, 10 November 1939; Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 132, Memorandum for Cabinet Sub-Committee on Publicity, 8 November 1939; Lawrence Papers, BC640, E3.4, Notes of the Second Meeting of Cabinet Committee on Publicity, 5 October 1939.
provide indications for drawing conclusions on the success or failure of the Union’s propaganda efforts.

**PROPAGANDA PLATFORMS AND METHODS**

The delivery of propaganda to the South African public was facilitated via the exploitation of key media platforms: radio, the press and the films. Radio, which had been heavily exploited by the Germans and the British, was considered the main instrument of propaganda.\(^{1599}\) South African authorities requested Wilson to conduct counter-propaganda through the SABC radio broadcast. The strategy was for the government officials to make direct appeals to the public and, in the case of public criticism, to provide explanatory statements to alleviate the public’s anxiety regarding the actions of the government.\(^{1600}\)

The government’s initial propaganda approach was, however, passive and defensive. Zeesen had been broadcasting for long periods during the inter-war years. There was also no policy nor system on how to implement propaganda. Hence the initial approach of merely issuing counter-statements. That strategy, however, was modified in 1940 when the Union’s experts in their various fields were utilised in the SABC’s radio broadcast to rationalize to the listeners why the country was at war against Germany and, generally, to promote the government’s war policy. Broadcast services were also extended to the black population, mainly to counter subversive activities, to inform them about the war and to appeal for their support when recruiting officials came to their areas.

The value of radio was that, it had the potential to reach a larger audience at one time and also over long distances (e.g. Zeesen in Germany to South Africa). Another advantage was that broadcast could be transmitted in different languages, therefore facilitating an understanding by multiple populations, especially in a plural society like South Africa. The predominant languages used for broadcasting were English and Afrikaans for the white audience, and then Sesotho, Setswana, isiXhosa and isiZulu for the relevant black audience in their specific areas. Radio was also a useful tool for communicating information to non-literate people who would otherwise not be reached by the press.

---

\(^{1599}\) See Lawrence Papers, BC640, E3.2, Notes on Matters Discussed with Smuts, 10:20 to 11:00 am, 18 September 1939; Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 144, Memorandum on the Bureau of Information: Present Activities, 23 August 1940.

\(^{1600}\) See chapter 3.
One major advantage of radio was that, because of the intensive technical requirements, the government could enjoy a far greater monopoly as the main audio communication asset, which was not readily available to the opposition movements.\textsuperscript{1601} In South Africa, the SABC fell under the political authority of the minister of post and telegraphs (Clarkson) – then in Smuts’s war cabinet. However, there were several limitations. Transmissions by other clandestine radio stations, particularly anti-government ones, generated confusion because they naturally presented a different picture to the official version of news. The white Afrikaans-speaking section of the population was targeted by the Zeesen radio as well as the Mystery Radio in order to arouse their hostility against Britain by emphasising the historical oppression and military humiliations of the Afrikaners at the hands of the British. Those negative messages exacerbated social tensions and intensified anti-war activism against the Union government.\textsuperscript{1602} Therefore, government monopoly and dominance of the radio as a platform of propaganda was challenged by broadcast from other radio stations. However, the counter-statements and talks presented by government loyalists countered their perspectives with patriotic constructions, especially with regard to refuting adverse depictions of war events.

Secondly, there was a social problem related to radio. South Africa’s population was diverse in terms of language and culture. It was difficult to satisfy the needs of every language group. The white population was predominantly Afrikaans-speaking, but English was widely spoken and understood by Anglo-Afrikaners. Still, the dominance of the English language in the SABC’s propaganda broadcast drew sharp criticisms from the public and even from some of the authorities.\textsuperscript{1603} The under-exploitation of the Afrikaans language for propaganda was a major shortcoming as Afrikaans speakers, including soldiers, often tuned into Zeesen for news about the war and for entertainment.\textsuperscript{1604} Even members of the black population, who

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{1601} See the position of the SABC with regard to the war, \textit{Report of Commission of Enquiry, SABC}, pp. 1-35. \\
1602 See UWH, Box 265, B.I. 20, Intelligence Summaries, 1939-1943; UP Archives, Intelligence Reports, vol. 2, Mystery Radio Transmissions, July to August 1942. \\
1604 Malherbe Papers, File 432/7, KCM 56974 (544), Recognition of the Afrikaans Element in Propaganda, Malherbe to Wilson, 14 February 1941; Malherbe Papers, File 432/7, KCM 56974 (534), Hoernle to J.A. Davenport (British Broadcasting Corporation), 6 May 1941; SANDFA, CGS (War), Box 198, 42/5, Theron to Van Rynneveld, 9 April 1942.}
had access to radio, were negatively influenced by Zeesen broadcast. For blacks, the language question was even worse in terms of addressing cultural dispositions.

The third problem was the radio time utilised for war propaganda. The fact that only fifteen (and later thirty) minutes were allocated by the SABC for the government, also limited the impact radio could have had on the public. Despite the increase in radio licences, the programmes of the SABC were not dominated by the war. According to Werdmuller, the Americans had 800 radio transmitters, the BBC radiated 400 hours per day in various languages and the Australians had up to 27 national and 99 commercial stations, all ‘pumping [propaganda] material which does not allow their respective nations to forget that, priority No.1, is to “Finish The Fight”’. In contrast, South Africa had the SABC, the BBC radio service, and SAPA news and thus, ‘the propaganda value of the South African Broadcasting in the interest of the war [was] very close to zero’. The consequence was a diminished listenership interest in the war because of an ineffectual broadcasting policy.

Other shortcomings related to equipment deficiencies, shortage of military radio observers in the war areas, delayed recordings from the war zone, lack of instantaneous transmissions, and the turf wars between the BOI, the defence authorities and the SABC personnel, which impacted on publicity and propaganda effectiveness. In terms of the speed of transmissions ‘to bring the South African public nearer the front line in imagination’, the South African authorities were failing in that regard. Improvements in radio transmission came in late 1944, with the establishment of the UDF’s Radio Observer sub-unit attached to the SAPR. This service aimed at ‘bridging the gap’ in radio broadcasting, between the war in the north and back in the Union, where ‘war was receding in the consciousness of South

---

1605 NMC, Box 15, NAS 3/21 B, Discussion by the Sub-Committee on Non-European Propaganda, 6 July 1942.
1606 See SABC Annual Reports, Programmes, 1939 – 1945.
1607 CGS (W), Box 197, 42/1, Radio in Relation to Military Propaganda, Werdmuller to Wakefield, 21 April 1944.
1608 CGS (W), Box 197, 42/1, Radio in Relation to Military Propaganda, Werdmuller to Wakefield, 21 April 1944.
1609 Malherbe Papers, File 432/7, KCM 56974 (104), Lindsay to Malherbe, 24 June 1944; Malherbe Papers, File 432/7, KCM 56974 (553), Malherbe to Esselen, 16 October 1944; Malherbe Papers, File 432/7, KCM 56974 (134), A.R. Delius to Malherbe, 28 November 1944.
1610 CGS (War), Box 197, 42/1, DDMI Memorandum, Radio and Military Cooperation, Deputy Chief of Staff (DCS) (Brig Gen Wakefield in 1944) to Adjutant General (AG) (Maj Gen Len Beyers), 21 April 1944.
Africans at home'. However, the main difference was that the Radio Observer Unit was recording the “UDF in action at the frontlines”, and then passed the material on to the SABC, which did not use that material as the military authorities would have liked. The military authorities, therefore, circumvented the SABC by supplying their recorded material to the BBC, which then broadcast to South Africa. Given the above difficulties, therefore, the effectiveness of radio for delivering propaganda to the masses of South Africa was severely constrained. The situation was no better with regard to radio services to the UDF members abroad.

For about five years, UDF members could mainly obtain news about war events elsewhere and about South Africa by listening to foreign radio stations as the military authorities did not have such a facility. The BBC was criticised for irrelevant and poor quality programmes, not its technical efficiency. The establishment of the South African Forces Radio station in December 1944, in Rome, brought some relief in the entertainment sphere. However, the survey of the Public Opinion Committee for SA Forces Radio in April 1945 revealed some shortcomings. There was general lack of radio sets, poor signals and the musical items were predominantly American. Soldiers even rated other radio stations above South African ones.

Radio broadcast to blacks in South Africa also had various shortcomings. According to the SAIRR report of 1943, there were concerns regarding the minimum number of vernaculars to cater for the various cultural groups, for which language group were the broadcast designed to influence, and what the relevant content should be. The government opted for the dominant languages of isiZulu, Sesotho, Setswana and isiXhosa, not, for example, Xitsonga and Tshivenda. The cultural interests of all these groups differed. The timings of the broadcast were also problematic. With reference to the mid-week wireless broadcast, some of the respondents to the SAIRR investigators indicated that they had never even heard of the broadcast as they were always working. They complained that they went to work early and

1611 PP, Box 39, 1/19/5, Radio Observers Sub-Unit, DCS to DMI, 10 May 1944; UWH, Box 162, Narep Unifo 16, Cursory Survey of the South African Public Relations, 30 November 1944, by Maj J. Strydom, p. 41; PP, Box 41, Memorandum on Possible Radio Transmission to Union, Capt D. Erwin to DMI (Ic), 6 June 1944; SABC, Annual Report, 1944, p. 5.
1612 See chapter 6.
1613 See chapter 6.
1614 PP, Box 41, Summary of Results: SA Forces Radio, by Public Opinion Committee, 14 May 1945; PP, Box 41, Minutes of a Meeting of the South African Forces Radio Broadcasting Committee, 15 May 1945.
returned too late. After work, they all wanted ‘to relax in the evening over a family meal’.  
Many expressed the same sentiment about the unsuitable times during the day. The broadcast were also limited as the transmissions could not reach the rural population, especially blacks, as many of them did not have access to the wireless sets or were too far from the broadcast centres.  

Furthermore, blacks generally lost interest. The native commissioners, who monitored attendance of broadcast services reported disappointing results. Very few blacks, in proportion to the expected numbers, attended the broadcast services, especially those conducted through the telephone connected to loudspeakers (e.g. 100-150 out of the expected 3000 hostel dwellers). Blacks were also critical of the technical quality of the broadcast through loudspeakers and were suspicious of government intentions. The news broadcast without providing background information failed to facilitate understanding among blacks about the war issues. They were also unhappy about the content of the programmes which did not feature any political or labour issues, and those programmes were regarded as “ridiculous”, “condescending” and “childish” at times because they were out of touch with the black interests.  

Instead of the radio broadcast, blacks preferred personal contacts for direct interaction. Radio was ineffective in that regard. But, it must be acknowledged that the objective of the government with regard to radio service to blacks was to combat subversive rumours, not mainly for recruitment. Hence, DNEAS, in addition to the appeals by the officials, the local chiefs and native commissioners, also opted to utilize returning NMC members to enhance recruitment efforts. This endeavor also backfired as some of those members who experienced the harsh treatment in the UDF, discouraged other potential recruits from enlisting. Regular meetings to secure black recruits were also ineffective. The main reason was the suspicion blacks had towards government overtures as a result of the country’s political policies. The NAD concluded that the poor responses of blacks to propaganda efforts were

---

1615 NTS, Box 9655, 520/400/13, Preliminary Report on Broadcasting for Africans in the Transvaal, 2 March 1943, pp. 1-5.  
1616 See chapter 3.  
1617 See chapter 3.  
1618 See the listeners reactions reports, chapter 3. Specifically NTS, 9653, 520/400/9, Memorandum on Preliminary Inquiry into Reception of Government War News Service, 16-27 July 1940, by A.I. Richards, 17 August 1940, pp. 1-7; NTS, Box 9655, 520/400/13, Preliminary Report on Broadcasting for Africans in the Transvaal, 2 March 1943, pp. 1-5.  
largely a result of the general apathy among blacks in the ongoing war.\textsuperscript{1620} Therefore, there was little they could do to change the situation. The Secretary for Native Affairs, Smit, failed to acknowledge that it was mainly due to the marginalisation of blacks from the political processes, their neglect after serving in the First World War, the racialised military service conditions and the accelerated black nationalism and agitations for equality, which rendered government propaganda efforts towards blacks ineffective. Therefore, irrespective of the kinds of platforms and methods utilised, government propaganda towards blacks had limited effect.

Another war propaganda platform exploited was the printed media. The advantages of the printed media lay in diversity, range and visual impact. Authorities used a variety of printed media to generate public interest and to promote the country’s war effort, both in South Africa and abroad. In terms of preference, the printed media came second to radio because there was a degree of government control over the SABC due to its political oversight, but not over the press. The government and military authorities actually negotiated with newspaper editors to assist in publicity and propaganda campaigns regarding the Union’s war effort. Through the BOI and SAPA, the authorities would supply the news and photographs for publication in the press and would also place advertisements for recruitment. Yet, the agreement with the newspapers was voluntary and some of the papers, especially from the opposition, published articles which placed the country’s military forces or the war effort in a negative light. The government derived a limited advantage from the press and the control measures were inadequate to prevent the negative publicity. For example, although the material could be censored before the BOI submitted them to the newspapers, some papers could obtain information from interviewing soldiers on leave or from those who have been discharged. The anti-war press used such information to criticize the war policy and to inflame public opinion against the government. Still, the authorities derived some advantages because none of the papers had independent war correspondents with the UDF in the field, only the BOI and SAPA representatives were authorised to provide war news and photographic pictures.\textsuperscript{1621}

\textsuperscript{1620} See chapter 3, NAD officials’s comments to reports about black reactions to war news service, NTS, 9653, 520/400/9, War News for Natives, Smit to Richards, 21 August 1940; NTS, Box 9655, 520/400/13, Concerning Native Broadcast, R. Erasmus to Smit, 23 September 1943.

\textsuperscript{1621} See CGS (War), Box 197, 42/3, Director of Information’s Reply to General Theron, Wilson to Theron, 11 May 1943; PP, Box 63, PU 6/9/4, Report on Military Publicity and Propaganda by Assistant Director of Public Relations, General Officer Administration, UDF Middle East Force, 22 February 1944.
To counter the effect of the anti-war press, the BOI, the DMI (Ic) and even the UUTS, produced press summaries on daily basis to enable the authorities to manufacture counter-statements against the public criticisms and allegations. The military authorities also applied censorship measures to prevent the anti-government papers from reaching the troops in the field and organised with the pro-war papers to supply their publications to the troops. This was in addition to the newspapers specifically produced and dedicated to the troops, for both whites and blacks. Newspapers were supplemented with dedicated military magazines, service journals and, for visual imagery, posters and war art. These press efforts, though, were constrained by the general lack of ‘action pictures’ which the authorities complained about frequently. The main shortcomings with regard to the utilisation of the press for war propaganda had more to do with the BOI’s monopoly of news supply and pictures which drew criticisms from the defence authorities. The BOI was mostly criticised for having few war correspondents, for poor quality and selection of photographs, and for administrative inefficiency which resulted in delays regarding news supply to newspapers, especially to those in the countryside.

Nonetheless, the press remained the most significant medium of war propaganda because of its variety, range and scope, and that one paper could be exchanged between several readers, thus making it a cheaper option. The newspapers, in particular, offered the government and military authorities the opportunity to conduct counter-propaganda against the negative publicity through elaborate press statements or by availing themselves for press interviews. On the other hand, the opposition movements produced their own publications which contested the terrain of wartime propaganda. But, those opposition papers were mainly in Afrikaans, and about half of them were pro-Union government and the war policy. In terms of reach, authorities could therefore count on pro-government Afrikaans papers as well as English papers, which had the largest circulation, to facilitate the Union’s propaganda effort.

---

1622 See PP, Box 40, UDF/FP/7/5, DCS to ADPR, UDF Admin HQ, 16 December 1944; PP, Box 40, UDF/FP/8/1, Report by OC, SAPR Film and Photographic Unit, 28 December 1944; Malherbe Papers, File 438/1, KCM 56974 (553), Malherbe to Esselen, 16 October 1944.

1623 See comments of the defence authorities in various reports and correspondences in chapter 3 and 6.

1624 See the categories and the circulation of the pro-war newspapers in the Union discussed in chapter 3.
In addition to the independent newspapers, there were several pro-government publications such as Libertas and The Nongqai, which were dedicated to providing publicity for armed forces. These journals carried stories about the activities of the UDF, as units or profiled individuals, thus giving maximum exposure of the troops. Therefore these journals, heavily-laden with the pro-war content, supplemented pro-war newspapers. The government also produced news sheets such as the EAForce/Springbok, and for blacks, the Ndlovu-Tlou as well as the Weekly News Bulletin and News of the War. These news sheets were dedicated to the war effort and played an important role in the mental stimulation of the troops. However, black soldiers did not really like Ndlovu-Tlou because the content was a reproduction of the Weekly News Bulletin, rendering the news stale to readers. The advantage of dedicated UDF papers was that the content was determined by government agencies: the BOI and the NAD for blacks. In the final analysis, the press, therefore, provided a larger coverage of South Africa’s propaganda effort and was also the strongest of the platforms that the government exploited. It could therefore be regarded as the most effective in terms flooding the public with war-related news. However, the lack of government-owned mainstream newspapers became a source of weakness, especially during the 1943 elections where it had to negotiate for space and pay for advertisements.\footnote{1625} The opposition movements, especially the HNP, had their own newspapers dedicated to publicity and propaganda.\footnote{1626}

Union authorities also utilised films for war propaganda. By the outbreak of the war in 1939, the film industry in South Africa had been developing for over four decades. At the time of crisis, as Thelma Gutsche noted, it was surprising that the government ‘did not see the necessity for films for politics’, but the opposition movements did.\footnote{1627} For, as war ignited domestic tensions, extreme nationalists such as Dr Rompel, orchestrated the production of amateur films to promote Afrikaner culture. Opposition movements such as the Reddingsdaabond (Salvation Bond) facilitated the establishment of the VOBI and RARO film companies to promote Afrikaner culture amongst the white Afrikaans-speaking public in the Union.\footnote{1628} Despite this, the Union government made no provision for exploiting films for propaganda purposes. It was left to the African Mirror, the weekly newsreel which presented
commercial advertisements, to produce ‘patriotic items and inspiring commentary’ in order to stimulate interest in the war.

It took about nine months after the outbreak of the war, before the BOI could commission the African Films company to produce a short military film, *Fighters in the Veld*, to depict the country’s contribution in the war effort. According to Gutsche, the film was an edited series of documentaries by the *African Mirror* and made little impression in the country.\(^{1629}\) Many other war propaganda films were produced and exhibited thereafter, including the special instructional films produced by the UDF’s Film Unit which operated from December 1940.\(^{1630}\) One weakness of the film propaganda, though, was the preponderance of the English language films produced, imported and circulated in the Union. After two years of the war, Dr Malherbe highlighted the disadvantages stemming from there, especially the point that white Afrikaans speakers were “marginalized” through those films.\(^{1631}\) According to Gutsche, there was “irritation” and “resentment” by the nationalist Afrikaners who derided the films. The situation was improved when the UUTS facilitated the production of Afrikaans propaganda films such as *Noordwaarts*, and exhibited them through their mobile cinemas across the Union.\(^{1632}\) The BOI thus followed suit from 1942, by re-editing the English material to the Afrikaans language and by using mobile cinemas for Afrikaans film exhibitions to rural communities.\(^{1633}\)

However, as it would be acknowledged by the authorities later, the film section of the Union’s war propaganda effort was the weakest. Part of the reason was that the authorities relied on the private film companies to produce films and they, in turn, were more concerned with the commercial productions for revenue purposes. The government did not have the film producing capacity – skilled manpower and technical equipment - to maximize the exploitation of films for war propaganda. Until April 1944, the film material intended for propaganda was handled by the BOI, with a limited number of cinematographers (two at the

\(^{1629}\) Gutsche, *The History and Social Significance of Motion Pictures in South Africa*, p. 270.

\(^{1630}\) AG (War), Box 5, 168/2/2/2/4, DCS to DMI, 5 October 1942; PP, Box 63, PU 6/4/2, Activities, Establishment and Progress of UDF Film Unit, 29 August 1942; AG (War), Box 4, 168/2/2/2, Establishment – Director of Military Intelligence, 14 January 1943.

\(^{1631}\) Malherbe Papers, File 432/7, KCM 56974 (344), Recognition of the Afrikaans Element in Propaganda, Malherbe to Wilson, 14 February 1941; Malherbe Papers, File 438/1, KCM 56974 (531a), Memorandum on Films for Publicity and Propaganda, 1941.

\(^{1632}\) See UUTS, A1883, 20, Union Unity Truth Service Annual Report, 1 July 1942-30 June 1943; Gutsche, *The History and Social Significance of Motion Pictures*, p. 371; Roos, *Ordinary Springboks*, 32.

most). The UDF’s Film and Photographic Unit under Clayton was also constrained as it had
two cine operators, who also doubled-up to take still photographs with obsolete equipment,
thus creating an inadequate coverage of the UDF outside South Africa. Hence the DMI (Ic)’s
press liaison staff as well as Lindsay, the ADPR in the North, described the film dimension of
the Union’s publicity and propaganda effort as “inadequate”, “weak” and “poor”.

For blacks, films played an important amusement value, but failed to mobilise support for the
war. The content was outdated and, as with radio broadcast, the messages were out of tune
with black interests. It was, however, black troops who benefited and enjoyed film
exhibitions for entertainment purposes. The UDFI (YMCA and Toc House) played a major
role in this regard, with the provision of film services to the troops in the Union and in east
and north Africa. The Union troops, including NEAS members as well as members of the
other Allied forces enjoyed free film shows provided by the mobile cinema vans. Films
provided valuable psychological relief for troops in various military camps and in isolated
areas and complemented the weaknesses of radio broadcast.

With regard to UDF’s internal propaganda, authorities introduced the AES in February
1941. The need for implementing propaganda initiatives inside the military forces was
contemplated in mid-1940, to improve the morale of the troops and for political education. In
particular, the educational intervention was considered imperative to combat the reported
restlessness among the troops and to create awareness among them regarding the Union’s
cultural, political and economic assets that needed to be preserved. In addition to sustaining
troop morale, the AES was also intended to prepare the troops for post-war tasks of educating
other members of the public about the value of democratic citizenship. The AES training
programme, conducted at the Military College in Pretoria became a deliberate government
effort to shape the mental outlook of the soldiers.

However, the AES project encountered a number of problems once the scheme was
established. Military operational requirements led to the sporadic attendance of lectures
conducted by the IOs. The OCs also doubted the value of education within the military and

---

1634 See chapter 4, films and newsreels section.
1635 See details in terms of film productions and scenarios in chapter 4.
1636 See chapter 5.
1637 See Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.2, Memorandum on Educating the Troops, 31 October 1940, p. 3;
See also details in the AES Bulletin, UHW, Box 287, B.I. 36, The Army Education Scheme for the
were anxious about the potential disruptive effects on military discipline. But, as a result of
the official support of the AES from Smuts and Van Ryneveld, the OCs cooperated. Though
the IOs, who were also trained intelligence officers, could also assess the morale among the
troops and intervene where possible, they could do nothing when it came to the policy-
induced troop frustrations. Their advice landed them in trouble with the senior authorities.1638

In 1942, the AES was expanded to include the training of WAAF and WAAS. The graduate,
called welfare-information officers (WIOs) combined both the social welfare services with
education for citizenship to dedicated to the women due to their unique problems.1639 To
NEAS members, the AES was never officially extended to them. Instead, the propaganda
courses for black soldiers were organised by DNEAS in 1942, with the aim of countering
subversive activities among them. The programme mainly emphasised the reasons for war
and, more specifically, the negative implications of a Nazi victory. Political topics, just like
with the radio broadcast service, were avoided.1640

The AES represented a concerted propaganda effort by military officials to rationalise the
Allied war effort, to develop consciousness about the political, economic and social
challenges in South Africa. However, it had its weaknesses. Due to the large number of the
troops, its reach was limited. Its liberal orientation failed to materialise beyond the war in
South Africa.1641 The AES was a war measure of a short duration and its long term vision
ended in 1948 when the National Party came to power. The avenue for liberal politics was
closed with the NP’s implementation of the policy of apartheid. Dr Malherbe would concede
later that the AES had minor influence on the consciousness of the army during the war.1642

1638 See Malherbe Papers, File 441/11, KCM 56974 (893), Report on the Factors Affecting Morale in the
Army at Premier Mine, by Capt Janie Malherbe, 28 August 1942; QMG, Group 1, Box 104, Q 91/339,
Morale in the Army, 25 August 1943; Marquard Papers, BC 587, D3.38, History of Army Education
Services, 30 September 1945, p. 10-11.
1639 See UWH, Box 162, Narep, Unfo 16, Units and Formations: History of WAAS Welfare (Information
WAAS, p. 1.
1640 See DNEAS, Group 2, Box 10, 3/21/E, Report on the First Propaganda Course, Lt R.E. Antel, 26
September 1942; DNEAS, Group 2, Box 10, 3/21/E, Programme of Propaganda Courses Given to
Native Military Corps, n.d.
1642 See Malherbe Papers, File 441/4/3, KCM 57008 (11), Malherbe to J. Rousseau, 3 January 1974. Italics
indicate that Malherbe emphasised that point in the letter to Prof Rousseau. On the achievements and
careers of the IOs, see Malherbe, Never a Dull Moment, pp. 217-219.
As indicated, therefore, there were several weaknesses with regard to the main platforms, radio, press and films, which were utilised by the Union government for war propaganda. The government did not enjoy the monopoly over these platforms, especially the radio and the films. However, the agencies concerned with publicity and propaganda efforts continued with their general support for the government’s war policy and also provided assistance with regard to facilities and technical support. Hence, there were few disruptions and no collapse of the system for the duration of the war. There were, however, problems with regard to the actual responses from the public with regard to volunteering for military service. Indeed, irrespective of employing multiple propaganda platforms – radio, the press, films, rallies and military demonstrations – to persuade the public to enlist for military service or for war production, this goal of war propaganda could not be fully realised.

RECRUITMENT PROPAGANDA

As shown in the previous sections, the Union’s mobilisation efforts basically started from the lowest base and the need for manpower was urgent. As Martin and Orpen emphasise, ‘unlike machines, men could not be rapidly produced, ready for action, nor could they be imported’.

Many UDF units were understrength. Out of the estimated total population of ten million, the defence authorities were concerned about the potential number of military age recruits they could obtain. From the total population, about 500,000 eligible white males, at least 143,000 was required. Shortfalls were expected as a result of the impact of the anti-war propaganda and due to penultimate line at the bottom, “medial unfitness” or involvement in key civil occupations or industries.

In September 1939, according to the figures provided by the defence authorities, the UDF found itself with some 20,000 odd regular force and some 100,000 odd reserve force members. It was way below the required establishment. With Hitler’s commencement of the German blitzkrieg, events in Europe turning worse for the Allies, South Africa had no

1643 Martin and Orpen, South Africa at War, vol. 7, p. 63.
1644 See chapter 3, specifically the manpower estimates, SANDFA, UWH, Box 88, MS 22, CGS to Chairman of Defence Advisory Committee and Chairman of Defence Authorities Committee, 2 October 1940; CGS (War), Box 42, 10/4, The Birth of South Africa’s Army, 1940/40, 6 September 1940.
1645 See UWH, Box 88, MS 22, Organisation of UDF for War, 2 October 1940; Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 132, Statement of Local Military Position of 7th September 1939, pp. 1-13; CGS (War), Box 42, 10/4, The Birth of South Africa’s Army, 1939/40, 6 September 1940, pp. 1-2.
single division ready to be deployed for active service. There were teething problems. These included military forces having to be built from the ground, the impact of anti-war hostility from Afrikaner nationalists, refusal by some UDF members to serve ‘anywhere in Africa’ and the impact of German propaganda on the progress of recruitment.\textsuperscript{1646}

Until then, South Africa had neither organised publicity and propaganda system nor policy. Government supporters, individually or through their organisations, encouraged the authorities to take propaganda seriously in order to expedite recruitment. The DMI also implored the senior officials to add propaganda as an imperative in the list of factors required in the appreciation of the war.\textsuperscript{1647} Until December 1940, with Lawrence’s establishment of the National Advisory Committee on Government Publicity\textsuperscript{1648}, three organisations, the BOI, DMI (Ic), UUTS, had been engaged in propaganda efforts, but mostly in an independent manner. Hence, there was no concerted and general propaganda framework to guide their activities and coordination of their efforts.\textsuperscript{1649} This resulted in overlaps and clashes over jurisdiction and authority in delivering propaganda. By 1941, the DMI (Ic) was still complaining about the ‘confused propaganda arising out of the absence of policy’ and the seemingly “official policy” of ‘soft pedal recruiting to protect labour’.\textsuperscript{1650} It was confirmation that the South African publicity and propaganda efforts, as far as recruiting was concerned, had not been going well.

Smuts and other senior government and military officials made patriotic appeals to the public to support the government to fight for the preservation of the rights, freedoms and justice in a righteous war against ‘the rule of force’.\textsuperscript{1651} Various forms of mass media were exploited to evoke emotions, calling for sacrifice, honour and duty, to safeguard the liberties and heritage threatened by Nazism. However, the enthusiasm and rush of recruits did not materialise as it

\textsuperscript{1646} See UWH, Box 265, B.I. 20, Intelligence Summaries, 1939-1940.
\textsuperscript{1647} See SANDFA, UWH, Box 265, B.I. 20, Intelligence Summaries, 1939-1940.
\textsuperscript{1648} Lawrence Papers, BC 640, E3. 58, National Advisory Committee on Publicity, 6 January 1941; CGS (War), Box 43, 10/7, Deputy Director of Recruiting to the Defence Authorities Committee, 3 January 1941.
\textsuperscript{1649} See the criticisms from military intelligence, specifically PP, Box 57, PR 3/4, Memorandum on the Scope and Work of (DMI) I.C.(iii), by Lt J.E. Sacks, 6 August 1940; PP, Box 59, PR 7/2/1, Military Counter-Propaganda on the Home-Front, Ic to DDMI, n.d; PP, Box 59, PR 7/2/1, Suggested Measures for Countering Subversive Propaganda in South Africa, by Lt J.E. Sacks (Ic), 17 September 1940.
\textsuperscript{1650} See PP, Box 57, PR 3/1, Points to be Considered in any Reorganisation of Propaganda, Ic to DDMI, 4 August 1941.
\textsuperscript{1651} See Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 303/1, Speeches and Broadcast by J.C. Smuts, Nos. 127 - 134, November 1939 - December 1941; UWH, Box 274, B.I. 25, ‘Active Service with the Artillery in South Africa’, Broadcast by a General Staff Officer on the Staff of the Directorate of Coast and Anti-Aircraft Artillery, 5 June 1941.
was hoped. In contrast, the UDF had been losing men due to the introduction of the Africa Oath and later the General Service Oath.\footnote{1652} Because recruitment was not improving and there was constant shortage of manpower, in September 1940, the director of recruiting Werdmuller, arranged for the optimisation of the publicity and propaganda avenues – the press, radio, visiting churches, attending community gatherings and social events, and undertaking recruiting marches and loudspeaker vans to enhance recruitment efforts.\footnote{1653} Between November 1940 and October 1941, the well-publicised military mobile recruiting columns traversed the Union and the neighbouring countries to exhibit military hardware, to inspire the public and to appeal for recruits. The tours were often well attended by crowds and also facilitated interaction between the military and the public. These secured more recruits at the time.\footnote{1654} However, the general manpower shortage continued to plague the authorities. Martin and Orpen indicate that ‘manpower shortage’ was a ‘perennial problem’, and the CGS had to inform the war committee that ‘it should seldom be necessary to discharge anybody as medically unfit … men were therefore to be retained in the service up to the limit of their capacity to serve’.\footnote{1655}

The problem of persistent manpower shortage was attributed to the population “with a peculiar split of loyalties” – mainly between the pro-war and the anti-war factions.\footnote{1656} In particular, it was the impact of the anti-war resistance which kept many white men out of military service. It was a similar situation with the recruitment results of women – mostly disappointing.\footnote{1657} As far as the recruitment propaganda employed towards blacks, success was also limited. Authorities exploited various mechanisms for recruitment propaganda such as appeals by chiefs, native commissioners, returning NMC members, poster displays, newspaper advertisements, mobile film vans and military demonstrations. However, in terms of the goal of obtaining as many recruits as possible, there was limited responsiveness from blacks. A recurring concern was the prohibition to carry firearms and differentiated service

\footnote{1652} See the controversies around the Africa Oath and the Orange Flash in chapters 2, 3 and 6.
\footnote{1653} See CGS (War), Box 207, VI, 45/4, Military Recruiting Tours, Werdmuller to the AG, October 1940.
\footnote{1654} See recruiting figures, specifically, CGS (War), Box 210, VIII, 45/8, Analysis of Recruiting Figures, Diagrams and Graphs, 1941-1945.
\footnote{1655} See Martin and Orpen, South Africa at War, vol. 7, pp. 104-106.
\footnote{1656} See Martin and Orpen, South Africa at War, vol. 7, pp. 104-106.
conditions. In view of the prevailing government policies, propaganda efforts towards blacks could not be useful.\textsuperscript{1658}

1942 was a disaster in the country’s history. Allied forces under Major General Klopper surrendered Tobruk to Major General Rommel in June, with South Africa losing the whole Division (over 10,000 troops). All sorts of criticism against the government emerged.\textsuperscript{1659} In reaction to that disaster, the Union authorities launched an intensive recruitment campaign to replace the losses incurred at Tobruk. Funds were made available for recruitment efforts (£22,000) and the ‘Avenge Tobruk’ campaign was waged five days later after the surrender of the garrison.\textsuperscript{1660} Smuts took the lead and appealed for 7,000 men to replace the losses. A massive publicity campaign followed, inducing the public to enlist in various military units required in war service: field artillery, corps of signals, tank corps and infantry.\textsuperscript{1661} In addition, meetings were organised, interactions with wives, mothers and the relatives of serving men were arranged, and stories of sacrifices and achievements of soldiers were told in order to try to generate a combative spirit within the public. In a very recent article, S. Chetty provides an interesting examination of the recruitment films which were produced after the Tobruk disaster to enhance the propaganda efforts.

One film in particular, \textit{Fall In}, produced by Union Films, appealed to the South African public to increase their support for the country’s participation in the war. The main emphasis was to denigrate the Italo-German forces as the ‘gangsters and criminals’ who did not respect war conventions and devastated “innocent” nations with bombs.\textsuperscript{1662} According to Chetty, the war was localised by presenting the UDF as the “police” and their Axis enemies as “criminals” who needed to be stopped far away from the Union borders.\textsuperscript{1663} As in all other

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{1658} See the criticisms from Dr Audrey Richards, Hugh Tracy and the SAIRR trio of Dr Kuper, B. Vilakazi and E. Westphal discussed in the chapter 3 – Radio Broadcast to Natives.
\bibitem{1659} See censorship reports, CGS (War), Box 207, VI 45/5, Tobruk, 27 June 1942; Army Intelligence, Box 50, I. 44(E), Memorandum Regarding Public Reaction to the Fall of Tobruk and Mersa Mantruh, 7 July 1942.
\bibitem{1660} HEN 2191, 432/1/13, vol. 2, Memorandum on Government Publicity and Propaganda, 27 November 1943; CGS (War), Box 207, VI 45/5, ‘Avenge Tobruk’ Recruiting Drive, Director of Recruiting to all Recruiting Officers, 29 June 1942; Martin and Orpen, \textit{South Africa at War}, vol. 7, pp. 158-160.
\bibitem{1661} See SANDFA, Army Intelligence, Box 20, I.20. (A), Recruiting Publicity Campaign, Deputy Chief of Staff to General Officer Administration, UDF, Middle East, 17 October 1942; Army Intelligence, Box 20, I.20. (A), Broadcast by Major-General Dan Pienaar, 20 November 1942; Army Intelligence, Box 20, I.20. (A), Training for the Guns, Broadcast by 2nd Lt H.T Hoernle of South African Artillery, 10 December 1942.
\bibitem{1663} Chetty, ‘Imagining National Unity’, p. 118.
\end{thebibliography}
appeals, the emphasis in the message of *Fall In* was on the threat posed by the Axis to South Africa’s safety and the risk to her freedom. If the Union did not provide the required recruits, the disaster of Tobruk could befall the country, and the sacrifices of those captured would have been in vain. Thus, more men were requested to enlist for military service in order to ensure the speedy conclusion of the war and the safe return of the Tobruk prisoners of war. Until the end of 1942, the constant message of avenging Tobruk campaign was the appeal to the sympathy and national patriotism or using “guilt” to instigate public support.

In this respect, the post-Tobruk campaign proved successful. From June to September 1942, the monthly intake was about 2,030 recruits. The number of recruits was considerably higher than expected. Early in 1943, instead of the 7000 troops required, about 12,000 recruits had reportedly enlisted. The rush of recruits was not expected to be sustained during 1943. In the comments about recruiting, it was projected that, following the trends of 1941 to 1942, excluding the effects of the Tobruk Drive, the intake in 1943 was likely to be considerably lower. Indeed, the estimations were proven to be correct. During the period from February to November 1943, the average weekly intake declined from 325 in 1942 to 113. In assessing the reasons for the general lack of recruits, Werdmuller visited about thirteen centres in the Union and found that there was too much complacency: sporting games, racing competitions and general entertainment was taking place normally while the country was at war. Upon further investigation, there was also what was called a ‘misapplication of ability’, artisans being used as barmen, ship repair specialists used as switchboard attendants and machine-tool operators doing paint work. These problems resulted in limited public enthusiasm and indifferent morale among serving troops.

In spite of the changed propaganda strategy which appealed more to personal motivations such as better pay or economic opportunities, by 1943, there was a definite decline in

---

1664 Chetty, Imagining National Unity, p. 121.
1665 See CGS (War), Box 210, 45/8, Recruiting and Wastage Figures, Tobruk Recruiting Drive, 17 November 1942.
1666 See AG (War), Box 4, 168/2/2/2, Proposed Establishment, Sub-Section Director of Military Intelligence, 14 January 1943.
1667 See CGS (War), Box 210, 45/8, Comments on Tobruk Recruiting Drive, 17 November 1942.
1668 See CGS (War), Box 210, 45/8, Recruiting Figures, 6 November 1943.
1669 Martin and Orpen, *South Africa at War*, vol. 7, p. 159.
recruitment numbers and morale was also low.\textsuperscript{1671} The recruitment of blacks, which had been ‘going very badly’ for the government, was stopped in March 1943, probably due to the prevailing view in certain government quarters that ‘the war would soon be over’.\textsuperscript{1672} The situation of low recruitment numbers continued during 1944 and 1945, despite the introduction of direct radio transmissions to the Union to keep the public closer to the war. The goal of securing volunteers for military service was partly successful, mainly in terms of sustaining the country’s continued participation in the war - then later through the exploits of the 6\textsuperscript{th} SA Armored Division (which also experienced chronic manpower shortage).

Thus, in terms of numbers at the outbreak of the war, the original military strength was about 20,000 men, but by August 1941, the strength had increased to 130,000 trained men. In June 1943, the figure stood at 169,000 white men and women and 102,000 NEAS members. By 1945, the total number of the UDF members was about 330,000 volunteers, with 190,000 being white males.\textsuperscript{1673} The NEAS volunteers were about 123,000 in total, with 76,000 being members of the NMC.\textsuperscript{1674} The deduction can be made that, from where South Africa had started in 1939, there was marked improvement in the strength of the UDF by the middle of the war. It was estimated that one in every three males had enlisted.\textsuperscript{1675} The authorities were satisfied on one hand, and complained about manpower shortage in the various military units on the other.

Although the numbers appeared to be almost half of eligible white males, many of them remained in the Union to contain the anti-war elements. But, the shortage of manpower remained a persistent problem throughout the war. Therefore, if one takes into account that there was an estimated total 1.2 million males of military age, and only about 300,000 volunteers were obtained, it was a low return. However, the fact that there was “no military

\textsuperscript{1671} UKZN, Malherbe Papers, File 441/11, KCM 56974 (893), Report on the Factors Affecting Morale in the Army at Premier Mine, by Capt Janie Malherbe, 28 August 1942; SANDFA, Archives of the Quartermaster General (QMG), Group 1, Box 104, Q 91/339, Morale in the Army, 25 August 1943; ‘Opportunities for Women: What the Army has to Offer’, \textit{The Star}, 8 July 1942; Chetty, Imagining National Unity, p. 125.


force” at the beginning of the war, success was therefore modest. And also, the increase in
the strength of the UDF was attributed mostly to the “robust” propaganda drive, especially
the mobile tours, and others.\textsuperscript{1676} Thus, one of the propaganda goals achieved some limited
success, especially given that the recruitment records corresponded with the number of
recruits obtained after a recruitment drive.\textsuperscript{1677} But for blacks, out of the estimated 600,000,
and only 76,000 enlisting, it was worse as a proportion, and propaganda in this regard can be
viewed as having failed to provide much of a service inducement.\textsuperscript{1678} In all categories, in any
event, volunteering for military service was equally motivated by factors such as economic
necessity, peer pressure, adventure and patriotic fervor, and not necessarily due to war
propaganda.\textsuperscript{1679}

PUBLIC AND MILITARY MORALE

On the basis of the available records, it would not be possible to construct a complete picture
regarding the impact of propaganda on the state of national morale during wartime South
Africa. It should noted that, there was no concerted effort during the war to ascertain the level
of morale, but merely a survey conducted by intelligence officials who were trying to
determine the level and extent of the threat to national security. Of more value, though, were
the censorship summaries gleaned from correspondences which gave some insights into the
feelings and opinions of the public. However, those summaries focused more on reporting
about the outgoing letters to the troops, either in the Union or in the field, and the likely
impact of the contents on troop morale. In 1943, an attempt at producing a consolidated
report on morale was done, but it was only concerned with feelings and opinions of troops.
That notwithstanding, it would still be useful to examine these surveys and reports which
were generated during the war in order to gain some perspective on the mood of the nation at
that time.

30-31.

\textsuperscript{1677} See CGS (War), Box 210, 45/8, Recruiting and Wastage Figures, Tobruk Recruiting Drive, 17
November 1942; Jackson, \textit{The British Empire and the Second World War}, pp. 241-242; Roos, 

\textsuperscript{1678} Gleeson, \textit{The Unknown Force}, p. 148; Grundlingh, The Participation of South African Blacks, pp. 85-
87.

\textsuperscript{1679} Roos, \textit{Ordinary Springboks}, pp. 30-31; Gleeson, \textit{The Unknown Force}, p. 148; Grundlingh, The
Participation of South African Blacks, pp. 85-87; Spies and Liebenberg, \textit{South Africa in the 20\textsuperscript{th} Century}, p. 277.
The question of morale had been the most problematic for South Africa. As discussed in chapter 1, the internal security and stability of the country was threatened by intensified subversive activities perpetuated by the ethno-nationalistic Afrikaner section of the population, which was hostile to Smuts’s war policy. At the time, Nazi propaganda had penetrated the country and was persistently undermining national confidence and morale through the Zeesen broadcast. In response, the government devised a propaganda strategy which was intended to facilitate the conversion of the white Afrikaans-speakers from their pro-Nazi bias to a positive attitude towards the government’s war policy and to instil a belief in them about the morality of the cause pursued by South Africa and the Allied powers. Consequently, as the effects of Nazi propaganda were felt in the various sectors of the country’s population, the authorities employed a counter-propaganda strategy, of refutation against Zeesen statements, and the justification of the government policies. This strategy also entailed the pursuit of the philosophy of “truthful propaganda”, which required accurate factual information (political, social and economic), to counter the inaccuracies and distortions of the facts by the opponents. It was considered necessary at the time to create a platform from which to build national goodwill and to facilitate the mobilisation of public opinion favourable to the Union government’s policies.

However, this strategy was not effective as the reports continued to reflect the decline of national morale due to the escalation of the anti-war activism. Thwaites, then the DMI, indicated that ‘much has been accomplished since the Union made up its mind to reply to Zeesen, but there is a tremendous leeway to be made up … the enemies of the Government’s war policy had a flying start and it [was] difficult to make up the leeway’. The military also considered the refutation strategy as ineffective. It was indicated that radio, the most powerful propaganda instrument then, was weakened by ‘the defence and justification’ approach for short duration, instead of a continuous commentary and emphasis on favourable news regarding the ‘inevitably victorious end of the war’. Government loyalists were also not satisfied with the initial radio broadcast and wrote to the authorities requesting an

---

1680 See Lawrence Papers, BC640, E3.2, Notes on Matters Discussed with Smuts, 10:20 to 11:00 am, 18 September 1939; Lawrence Papers, BC640, E3.4, Notes of the Second Meeting of Cabinet Committee on Publicity, 5 October 1939; Smuts Papers, vol. 132, Memorandum for Cabinet Sub-Committee on Publicity, 8 November 1939.

1681 For details of Nazi propaganda and its effects, see chapter 1.

1682 See Union’s intelligence reports and security assessments in chapter 1.

1683 See UWH, Box 265, B.I. 20, Intelligence Summaries, 25 November 1939.

1684 See Army Intelligence, Box 20, I. 20 (J), Memorandum on the Stimulation of Recruiting in South Africa, R. Jordaan to DMI, 11 May 1941.
intensification and diversification of the propaganda efforts in view of the growing anti-war resistance.\footnote{1685} Changes were implemented in December 1940, when the broadcast programme of the BOI was expanded to include talks by the Union’s panel of experts in the various fields to educate the public about the country’s social, cultural, religious, political (civil liberties and democratic freedoms) and economic assets which needed to be protected and preserved.\footnote{1686} This was regarded as positive propaganda and it was deemed necessary to improve on that service. Also, the Union government’s principle of voluntary military service also contributed towards breaking the opposition’s influence as no one was forced to serve in the war, but merely appealed to the population’s sense of patriotism to defend the country’s interests. This approach reduced the risk of negative publicity and the potential repercussions on the public and military morale. There are other factors to consider, which also had a bearing on national morale. These were captured by the American sociologist, Lasswell, when he wrote in 1938 that, ‘during war, much reliance must be placed on propaganda to promote the economy of food, textiles, fuel and other commodities’.\footnote{1687} Thus, as much as it was necessary to obtain recruits, it was equally important to assure the public about the economic power of the country to sustain the population and still be able to contribute to the war effort. To this end, authorities employed economic propaganda.\footnote{1688} But the actual economic realities in the country contradicted such efforts.

Like all the other belligerents in the war, South Africa also employed the rationing of resources such as paper, fuel and foodstuffs, and the public complained about the shortages.\footnote{1689} Through the use of economic intelligence summaries, the government made pronouncements in the print media, radio and via films, exalting the productive capacity, the economic strength and the abundance of resources of the country and her allies (British

\begin{footnotes}
\begin{enumerate}
\item[1686] See UWH, Box 273, B.I. 25, Broadcast by ‘Panel Speakers’, 21 June 1941.
\item[1687] Lasswell, \textit{Propaganda Technique in the World War}, p. 9.
\item[1688] See specifically PP, Box 58, EC 17, Economic Propaganda: Subversive Activities, 1941-1945; PP, Box 57, EC 38, Economic Propaganda: Intelligence Summaries, 1941-1945; PP, Box 57, EC 6; Economic Comparison: Germany, Italy, Britain, USA, April 1941; PP, Box 57, EC 28, South Africa’s War Effort: Economic Material by DMI (Ic), 9 January 1942; ‘The Economic War’, \textit{Current Affairs}, vol. 6, February 1942, issued by the Middle East Branch of Army Bureau Current Affairs (ABCA), GHQ, Middle East Force, pp. 4-12; PP, Box 57, EC 6, \textit{Reuters: Economic Service}, Commercial Bulletin, 7 January to 4 March 1942.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotes}
Commonwealth and the USA), whilst down-playing those of the Axis.\textsuperscript{1690} The military mobile recruiting tours also served the economic propaganda value through the display of war materials produced in the Union’s industries. Thus, for the purposes of the war, the government’s propaganda presented an optimistic perspective, particularly since the country was geographically removed from the war zone. But, in terms of satisfying the daily needs of the population, propaganda could not help. The effects of rationing and shortages of regular supplies such as milk, butter, eggs, meat, maize, bread, vegetables as well as cloth and the housing shortages, soon elicited criticisms against the government as being unable to adequately provide for its population.\textsuperscript{1691} This aspect was however not too high on the authorities’ agenda, which proved to be their undoing after the war. The concern of the authorities was more about political warfare. (This point is highlighted below, in the section on the 1943 elections, where the war policy was a decisive factor).

From 1940, with the seemingly successful German military operations against the Allies in Europe, anti-government agitations escalated in anticipation of obtaining favourable peace terms after the defeat of Britain (Union’s ally), of which the prize was the Afrikaner republic. The public expressed outrage at the government’s “tolerance” of the anti-war elements and their activities.\textsuperscript{1692} In 1941, an intelligence officer motivated for the intensification of propaganda effort in this manner:

\textit{An attempt should be made to switch hostile districts into friendly areas, and to turn the scales against Nationalist and pro-Nazi agents who [were] poisoning the public mind without anyone checking their progress. Government supporters [were] not kept sufficiently informed with daily happenings and developments to counteract or contradict the campaign of calumny which [was] freely indulged in by the outspoken supporters of Nazi-ism. What [was] needed was propaganda, more propaganda and still more propaganda...}\textsuperscript{1693}

\textsuperscript{1690} See PP, Box 57, EC 1, Report on the Interview with Professor S.H. Frankel in Connection with Cooperation in Collecting Economic Information for Propaganda Purposes, by Lt Sacks, 16 August 1940; PP, Box 57, EC 1, Economic Warfare and Propaganda, 27 January 1941; UWH, Box 91, MS 71, Radio Broadcasting, Wilson to Collyer, 11 January 1941; UWH, Box 239, B.I. 2, South Africa at War, 14 October 1941; UWH, Box 240, B.I. 2, The South African Armed Forces at War, 20 January 1944.


\textsuperscript{1692} See chapter 1.

\textsuperscript{1693} CGS, Group 2, Box 93, 169/7, Fortnightly Intelligence Report, 26 February 1941.
It was one of the many reports which expressed frustration with the apparent manner in which anti-war elements were carrying on with their subversive activities without any meaningful response on the side of the government. It also implied that the existing government propaganda actions were not reaching the public as much as they should have been. On 24 February 1942, another intelligence official produced a disconcerting censorship report about the low level of civilian morale. It indicated that there was growing ‘despondency, disappointment, nervousness and discouragement’ which was expressed in the letters of the relatives of the serving men, thus, in turn affecting the morale of the troops. These ‘demoralising and disheartening’ statements, noted the report, were attributed to the impact of the OB activism, and there were also doubts about the ‘veracity of the Press and radio’ as well as about the country’s ability to win the war. The report summed up the deterioration of civilian morale, despondency and a sense of defeatism in three words: ‘bewilderment, distrust and fear’.

The confusion was created by the optimistic use of propaganda in exaggerating the military exploits of the Allies, for example, the press and radio reports about the ‘inevitable destruction of General Rommel’s army … enclosed in a ring of steel’, then suddenly, ‘Rommel’s remarkable recovery’, or the ‘invincibility of Singapore … fighting to the last men’, then, her surrender to Japan. It produced doubt, confusion and also the fear within the public of the threat from Japan to the Union via the Indian Ocean. The implication of this report was that propaganda was “untrue” because it was contradicted by the events. It also meant that it would be increasingly difficult to counter the opposition propaganda if government information was exaggerated. It was therefore suggested that, ‘all publicity reports should refrain from over-optimism, that news should be swift, truthful and unambiguous so that shocks can be anticipated’, not the “rosy pictures” about the imminent obliteration of the enemy. This report shows that public morale was affected negatively by the internal security threats and the military setbacks encountered by the Allied forces. It was therefore difficult for propaganda to refute the facts about the military setbacks. Hence, after the disaster of Tobruk in June 1942, the morale was very low, and the propaganda campaign focused on gaining public sympathy in order to obtain recruits. Even though public

1694 Army Intelligence, Box 46, CE 2/15, Low Level of Morale on the Home Front, 24 February 1942.
1695 Army Intelligence, Box 46, CE 2/15, Low Level of Morale on the Home Front, 24 February 1942.
1696 Army Intelligence, Box 46, CE 2/15, Low Level of Morale on the Home Front, 24 February 1942.
1697 See CGS (War), Box 207, VI 45/5, Tobruk, 27 June 1942; SANDF, Army Intelligence, Box 50, I. 44.(E), Memorandum Regarding Public Reaction to the Fall of Tobruk and Mersa Mantruh, 7 and 11 July 1942.
morale was low, the response to the recruitment campaign exceeded expectations. This could be attributed to the public anger and fear of the implications of the ultimate German victory. The government had been doing its utmost to play up the Nazi threat to the country’s independence and liberties, through films and newsreels which showed the devastations caused by bombings.  

By 1943, public moral had slackened. This was attributed to complacency and war weariness, and not by military setbacks. 1699 Ironically, the Allied forces were enjoying military successes and the Axis forces were driven out of Africa by May 1943. 1700 As discussed above, by 1944-1945, government propaganda efforts, by means of direct radio transmissions from Rome, were still attempting to invigorate enthusiasm about the war, particularly in praising the role of the 6th SA Armoured Division in contributing towards the military victories of the Allied forces in Italy. 1701 As Dr Malherbe pointed out, the main reason for propaganda by then was to build up the image of a ‘common soldier as a hero in the minds of the South African public’. 1702 The focus, therefore, was on the post-war situation and the need to ‘minimise disruptions’ brought about by the six years of war. 1703 At the time, especially from 1943 onwards, the public was more concerned about the social and economic reconstruction and wondering how the government was going to respond to the situation after the war. 1704

Apart from the impact of the despondent letters from the relatives at home or the subversive rumours spread through the anonymous letters 1705, there was a decline in the morale among

1698 See chapter 4.
1699 See Malherbe Papers, File 441/11, KCM 56974 (893), Report on the Factors Affecting Morale in the Army at Premier Mine, by Capt Janie Malherbe, 28 August 1942; QMG, Group 1, Box 104, Q 91/339, Morale in the Army, 25 August 1943; See also Martin and Orpen, South Africa at War, vol. 7, pp. 159-160; Chetty, ‘Imagining National Unity’, pp. 121-125.
1700 See Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 261, Smuts to Gillett, 21 June 1943; Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 261, Smuts to Gillett, 4 July 1943; Martin and Orpen, South Africa at War, vol. 7, chapters 15 and 16; Roos, Ordinary Springboks, chapter 6.
1702 UKZN, Malherbe Papers, File 438/1, KCM 56974 (553), Malherbe to Esselen, 16 October 1944.
1705 War Diaries (WD) vol. 1, Box 296, Military Censorship Summary, East Africa Force Headquarters, 20 February 1941; Malherbe Papers, File 441/10, KCM 56974 (861), Anonymous Letters to Soldiers and their Relatives, Director of Military Operations and Intelligence to Director of Information (Bureau),
the troops due to the military and administrative policies. In a memorandum compiled by
Captain Janie Malherbe in August 1942, a number of military policy-related factors
impacting on morale were exposed. Dissatisfactions within the UDF arose as a result of the
stagnation in camps, lack of troops movements, inappropriate utilisation of troops, denial or
delays of leave applications, delays in pay allowances or approval of requests, monotonous
military life, discriminatory service conditions (mainly for blacks) and concerns about the
post-war situation.\textsuperscript{1706} A more elaborate report on military morale, titled ‘Memorandum on
Apathy in the U.D.F. Towards the War’, was produced twelve months later, on 25 August
1943, by the DMI.\textsuperscript{1707}

That report revealed that, widespread apathy towards the war, both in the UDF and in the
civilian population, was a result of war ‘weariness, irritation and boredom’ about the war
which, by then, was in the fourth year. People were interested in personal difficulties such as
housing problems, cost of living, lack of supplies, inflation, plight of the poor, food shortage
and general economic insecurity. Furthermore, the memorandum also stated that ‘the
remoteness of the war from South Africa, and the removal of any direct threat to the country’
were reasons for the apparent state of national apathy. These factors were of a general nature
and applied mainly to the civilian population. The UDF members were unhappy about the
dull and unrealistic training routines, the defence policy whereby promotions were frozen and
the uncertainty about the future of the UDF.\textsuperscript{1708}

Another policy matter that created dissatisfaction within the UDF, was the introduction of the
General Service Oath (Blue Oath – service anywhere in the war) in 1943. Just as the Africa
Oath of 1940, it generated hostilities between those who took in and those who did not.\textsuperscript{1709}
The distinction between men who served in the North and those who did not, also generated
ill-feeling among the troops.\textsuperscript{1710} Other factors which militated against troop morale were
issues related to service conditions, salaries and allowances, leave, promotions, transfers and

\textsuperscript{1706} Malherbe Papers, File 441/11, KCM 56974 (893), Report on the Factors Affecting Morale in the Army
at Premier Mine, by Capt Janie Malherbe, 28 August 1942.
\textsuperscript{1707} SANDFA, QMG, Group 1, Box 104, Q 91/339, Morale in the Army, 25 August 1943.
\textsuperscript{1708} SANDFA, QMG, Group 1, Box 104, Q 91/339, Morale in the Army, 25 August 1943.
\textsuperscript{1709} See QMG, Group 1, Box 104, Q 91/339, Morale in the Army, 25 August 1943; Martin and Orpen,
\textit{South Africa at War}, vol. 7, pp. 223-229.
movements. These problems were acutely felt by the NMC members, some of whom reacted by committing various offenses such as absent without leave, drunkenness, “losing” military articles and clothing (trousers, vests, boots, helmets, shirts, belts, Haversack, towels, spoons, coats and water bottles), in a deliberate contravention of the military disciplinary code.

As a result of the above factors, it was difficult for the IOs to lift the morale of the troops when the problems lay with the government policies and the administrative inefficiencies. The sensitivity and seriousness of the matter forced Dr Malherbe to issue instructions that the report on the low troop morale was highly classified and should be ‘kept under lock and key, in suitable custody or destroyed by fire if not required for records’. In fact, the manifestation of dissatisfactions within the UDF became explosive in August 1945, when disillusioned troops rioted at Helwan camp in Egypt, hurling an assortment of objects and breaking windows, due to their frustrations at the ‘maladministration of the repatriation issue’, overcrowding and the failure to expedite the demobilisation process. Authorities acknowledged their inadequacies and more facilities as well as sports equipment were provided to the camp. There was also an improvement in the repatriation efforts by the authorities, though on a limited scale due to shortage of transport, to ‘bring the boys home’. The riots at Helwan were a demonstration of the level of disillusionment that had been setting in among the troops, and also within the civilian population, with regard to the Smuts administration. Before then, the government had been convinced that the policies they pursued were supported by the population. This view was produced by the results of the general elections of 1943, where the UP, in an apparent endorsement of its war policy,

---

1711 See reports on morale, UKZN, Malherbe Papers, File 441/11, KCM 56974 (893), Report on the Factors Affecting Morale in the Army at Premier Mine, by Capt Janie Malherbe, 28 August 1942; QMG, Group 1, Box 104, Q 91/339, Morale in the Army, 25 August 1943; DNEAS Group 2, Box 20, NAS 3/42, Treatment and General Welfare of Members of None-Europeans of NMC Battalions and Units, 3 July 1940 – 28 August 1944.

1712 See World War 2 Diaries, vol. 1, Box 101, D1-4 (88), Offenses and Punishment Report, Lt Col G.K. Mackensie, 2nd Battalion NMC, Oribi Camp, November to December 1942; DNEAS Group 2, Box 20, NAS 3/42, Treatment and General Welfare of Members of None-Europeans of NMC Battalions and Units, 3 July 1940 – 28 August 1944.

1713 QMG, Group 1, Box 104, Q 91/339, Morale in the Army, Summary, Malherbe to Mitchel-Baker, 16 September 1943.


defeated the opposition movements. This perspective requires further examination, especially in the context of the mistaken belief that the population was “happy” with the government.

Towards the end of 1942, the UP-led government contemplated the holding of general elections. Within the government’s publicity and propaganda structures, it was felt that if the elections were to be held, ‘there should be no suggestion of hesitancy on the part of the government of the outcome of the General Elections’. The general thought was that, the government must display confidence and not be afraid to ‘go to the people [for support] so that it proceeds with its great task of winning the war’. According to legislation, the period of the Union parliament’s House of Assembly was coming to end after five years. Since it was elected in May 1938, the first meeting of the House was on 22 July, and thus its term of office was about to expire on 21 July 1943. But, there was doubt about the advisability of holding the general elections in wartime, especially given South Africa’s controversies surrounding her participation in the war.

This view was expressed by Reitz in September 1942, during the opening of the war market in aid of the Governor General’ Fund and the Red Cross. He stated that ‘the government was not going to hand over the country to the people who would make peace with Germany and the people did not want “racialists bawling at one another”’. The conditions in the country were not considered favourable for elections. If the elections were to be held, argued Reitz, ‘there might be a “miniature civil war” and a lot of “bad blood” would be aroused’. Reitz was cautious about the prospect of winning the elections. It was less than three months after the Tobruk disaster and the intelligence surveys on the mood of the nation had not been encouraging. The first shocks of the Tobruk events were wearing down, but there was an increase in the number of censored letters which expressed pessimism and doubted the country’s prospects in prosecuting the war. Thus, Reitz, while he claimed not ‘to fear the results of the election’, he realised that since the opposition organisations depended on a

1716 UWH, Box 273, Meeting of Propaganda Co-ordinating Committee, General Election, Pretoria, 17 September 1942.
1717 UWH, Box 273, Meeting of Propaganda Co-ordinating Committee, General Election, Pretoria, 17 September 1942.
1718 Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 258, Memorandum on General Elections, unsigned, but had written note by Louis Esselen attached to it, dated 12 March 1943.
1721 Army Intelligence, Box 27, CE 4/1, Memorandum Regarding Public Reactions to the Fall of Tobruk and Rommel’s Advance into Egypt, 11 July 1942.
German victory, ‘if they attained power by a “snap” majority, what would happen to the men “up North”’.\textsuperscript{1722} His views were also supported by one UP official and member of parliament, Colonel K. Rood, who explained that ‘he was opposed to the general election because thousands of young men, who had joined the Army to destroy Hitlerism, would not be able to exercise the very democratic rights which they were fighting to retain’.\textsuperscript{1723} He was concerned that due to the ‘absence of thousands of United Party supporters’ who were in military service, the opposition could exploit the war conditions to bring about the ‘downfall of the government’.\textsuperscript{1724}

Therefore, because of the war conditions and the prevailing public mood, government officials were not convinced that it was the right time to hold the elections. However, the UP intelligence reports presented a different picture about the feelings within the white electorate. According to the survey by Captain G.H. Ribbink, the UP intelligence officer, most members of the public have been mellowing towards Smuts and his war policy since 1941. The reasons, according to the reports, were the entry of Japan into the war (against the Allies), the internecine strife within the opposition movements, especially the clashes between Malan (HNP) and Van Rensburg (OB) on the question of how to achieve the Afrikaner republic. The report also indicated that, although there were “pockets” of people in the Cape and the OFS, “who refused to change” or who still “lived in the past and could never get away from the Boer War”, there were general signs of the “softening of attitude” towards Smuts’s war policy.\textsuperscript{1725} Some, who were ‘virulent anti-warites’, had turned around and condemned the bomb outrages and Malan’s ‘dictum’ that, ‘even if the country was invaded by the enemy, the Nationalists would not take up arms’.\textsuperscript{1726} They, in turn, expressed an ‘anti-Hitler and anti-Nazi’ sentiment, and also went on to declare to Ribbink that, ‘Generaal Smuts het die regte ding gedoen toe hy oorlog verklaar het teen Duitsland’ (General Smuts did the right thing when he declared war against Germany).\textsuperscript{1727} Ribbink, still, lamented the lack of propaganda activity, especially in the country-side, to capitalise on the changing sentiment towards the government’s war policy. This ‘lack of propaganda activity’ was a regular feature in the intelligence reports, particularly with regard to the critical need to

\textsuperscript{1725} UP Archives, Intelligence Service Reports, Capt G.H. Ribbink to O.A. Oosthuizen, 28 December 1941.
\textsuperscript{1726} UP Archives, Intelligence Service Reports, by Capt G.H. Ribbink, 17 June 1942.
\textsuperscript{1727} UP Archives, Central Head Office, Intelligence Service Reports, by Capt G.H. Ribbink, 17 June 1942.
convert the Afrikaans-speaking section of the population living in the rural areas.\textsuperscript{1728} Hence, in order to make sure of election victory, propaganda efforts were intensified.

The focus of the government was on discrediting Malan and his HNP, by producing publications with a selection of quotations about the racialistic tendencies during his past declarations against the English speakers, the negative attitude of the opposition leaders towards the soldiers, as well as by exposing “an unwritten alliance of Malan with Hitler” regarding the German assurances not to dominate South Africa or to interfere in her internal politics.\textsuperscript{1729} These propaganda efforts were undertaken before even a decision was made about whether there would be elections.\textsuperscript{1730} A stable atmosphere in the country was paramount to ensure the election victory for the UP.

In January 1943, Smuts had not yet decided on what to do. He noted privately that he was waiting to ‘see how the war goes’ before making a decision – either to prolong the life of the parliament or to dissolve it and hold a general election. Although the atmosphere seemed favourable then, he did not want to take a risk on the elections which he regarded as ‘the most important ever held’ in the Union.\textsuperscript{1731} Because of some undercurrents of agitation, Smuts wanted to keep the decision about the elections in abeyance, leaving the opposition ‘guessing and cursing’ until there was visible success of the Allied forces on all fronts, and he was sure of ‘winning the elections’.\textsuperscript{1732} By April 1943, the situation in the Union appeared to be calmer, and Smuts had concluded an electoral pact with the Dominion and the Labour parties to support one another and not to put up candidates against each other in the parliamentary seats held by any of them.\textsuperscript{1733} Thereafter, on 15 May 1943, it was announced that the general elections would be held on 7 July of that year, providing a seven weeks window for election

\textsuperscript{1728} See UWH, Box 265, B.I. 20, Intelligence Summaries, 1939-1945; UP Archives, Intelligence Service Reports, by Capt G.H. Ribbink, 17 June 1942; Army Intelligence, Box 50, I. 44, 22-23 June 1942; Army Intelligence, Box 24, I 22, Intelligence Records Bureau Summary, 7 February 1942.

\textsuperscript{1729} UWH, Box 273, Meeting of Propaganda Co-ordinating Committee, General Election, Pretoria, 17 September 1942; UWH, Box 273, Lawrence’s Speech, 28 August 1942; UP Archives, ‘National Party Policy: A Series of Extracts from Speeches by its Leader’, by OA Oosthuizen, 1942.


\textsuperscript{1731} Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 261, Private Letters, Smuts to Gillett, 13 January 1943.

\textsuperscript{1732} Smuts Paper, A1, vol. 261, Private Letters, Smuts to Gillett, 13 January 1943.

campaigns. By that time of the election date announcement, the opposition movements had already begun with their anti-war campaign.

In April 1943, Malan declared that ‘if we come to power, we will terminate our active participation in the war. We will withdraw from the war. We shall bring back within our borders our troops who have been sent far beyond our borders’. This view, together with the Black Manifesto view - the influence of communists on the black society as a result of the Union’s association with Russia due to war, became a central election themes for the Nationalists. The elections were regarded as the ‘khakhi elections’ or the ‘Soldiers’ Vote’, because the Union’s war policy was at the centre of the debates. To optimise the chances of electoral success, the government also amended the electoral laws in 1943 to allow the soldiers on active service, even those outside the country, to participate in the elections. To allow more opportunities for the soldiers to cast their votes and to allow time for the ballot papers to be returned to the Union in time, the voting process for them took place over the period 28-30 June 1943. The opposition movements urged their supporters to vote against Smuts, while the UP played up the national security threats and encouraged their supporters to unite behind the war policy in order to ensure the future safety of the country. As the SABC policy did not approve of utilising radio for political parties, the

1736 As quoted from Die Transvaler, 30 April 1943, UWH, Box 276, B.I. 28, Opposition Statements Regarding the War Issue and the Election, April to July 1943.
1737 UWH, Box 276, B.I. 28, Newspaper Extracts: Memorandum on Opposition Statements Regarding the War Issue and the Election, April to July 1943; Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 261, Private Letters, Smuts to Gillett, 22 April 1943; Army Intelligence, Box 50, I. 44 (B), Counter-Election Propaganda, 21 June 1943; See also Tothill, ‘The 1943 Elections’, pp. 222-248.
1739 UWH, Box 276, B.I. 28, Newspaper Extracts: Memorandum on Opposition Statements Regarding the War Issue and the Election, April to July 1943; Army Intelligence, Box 50, I. 44 (B), Counter-Election Propaganda, 21 June 1943; UP Archives, General Elections and Provincial Elections, Military Election Matters, 22 June 1943.
1741 UP Archives, Pamphlet to Troops: What You Should Know about the Election, issue by the UP, 1943.
1742 UP Archives, Smuts on Nationalism, Speech Delivered at the Salvation Army Diamond Jubilee, 12 April 1943; UWH, Box 276, B.I. 28, Newspaper Extracts: Memorandum on Opposition Statements Regarding the War Issue and the Election, April to July 1943; Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 299, An Appeal by the Prime Minister, n.d.; UP Archives, General Elections and Provincial Elections, Military Election Matters, June 1943; Army Intelligence, Box 50, I. 44 (B), Counter-Election Propaganda, 28 June 1943; ‘South Africa’s Most Momentous General Elections: Duty to Army and Nation’, The Star, 3 July 1943.
election campaigns were waged through the alternative media platforms. The government, though, was at a disadvantage because the Zeesen radio campaigned against the war policy in support of the opposition movements.\textsuperscript{1744} The HNP had \textit{Die Transvaler}, \textit{Die Burger} and \textit{Die Vaderland}, as its newspaper organs which played a vital role in the campaigns, while the UP had none, and had to pay for its advertisements.\textsuperscript{1745}

However, the UP’s campaigning proved successful, especially with the involvement of the UUTS which produced posters, stamps, stickers, cartoons, photographs of leaders, pamphlets and leaflets, booklets and brochures, mobile cinema vans, loudspeaker announcements, military demonstrations, and newspapers advertisements.\textsuperscript{1746} Smuts was used as a brand in the campaigns and, at the same time, the opposition movements were disparaged by publishing their negative statements about the Jews, the English, the soldiers and also their views about the black society in the Union.\textsuperscript{1747} The elections went well and the UP won by 110 to 43, giving them a 67 majority over the HNP.\textsuperscript{1748} Although it was difficult to determine the impact of propaganda on the outcome of the elections, it could be deduced that, what worked for the UP were the internal struggles within the opposition movements which failed to form a united front to fight against the government as well as the votes from servicemen and their relatives back in the Union.\textsuperscript{1749} The UP had an electoral pact with the

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{1743} SABC, Annual Report, Board’s War Policy, 1940, pp. 4-6.
\textsuperscript{1744} ZB, Box 8, WR 65/9/43, Broadcast from Enemy Radio Station, July 1943; PP, Box 18, Zeesen Broadcast, July 1943; Army Intelligence, Box 50, I. 44 (B), Counter-Election Propaganda, United Party Election Circular No. 4, 28 June 1943.
\textsuperscript{1746} UP Archives, Elections 1943, Correspondence and Propaganda, May-July 1943; Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 261, Smuts to Gillett, 21 June 1943; Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 261, Smuts to Gillett, 4 July 1943; UP Archives, Intelligence Reports, Ribbink to Oosthuizen, 12 June 1943; Tothill, ‘The 1943 Elections’, pp. 239-245.
\textsuperscript{1747} UP Archives, UP Pamphlets: ‘National Party Policy: A Series of Extracts from Speeches by its Leader’, by OA Oosthuizen, 1942; UP Archives, UP Election Talk No. 5, 25 May 1943; Army Intelligence, Box 50, I. 44 (B), Counter-Election Propaganda, United Party Election Circular No. 4, 28 June 1943; Tothill, The 1943 Elections, pp. 239-245.
\end{flushleft}
Dominion and Labour parties, whereas the main opposition, the HNP, failed to secure the same support from the other anti-war movements, mainly because of Pirow (New Order) and Van Rensburg (OB)’s rejection of the constitutional politics – thus refraining from voting.  

Tothill also contends that the victory of the UP in the 1943 elections was a product of ‘the most carefully prepared for country’s history’ and also due to the fact that the war was going well for the Allies. Nonetheless, given the country’s unstable political climate going into the war and the fact that the elections were held in the middle of the war without disruptions, culminating in the UP victory, was indicative of the extent to which the public had “mellowed” towards Smuts’s war policy. Hence, in 1944, Smuts could speak with a measure of satisfaction at how the country had progressed since September 1939:

> In spite of difficulties, a divided public, a political situation that had always to be carefully watched, subversive movements, sabotage and the absence of transport and supplies, we could preserve our social and industrial peace ... we were more free from strikes and other disturbances than ever before.  

However, as Tothill maintains, the UP’s victory was an illusion because the socio-economic aspects were not really addressed. These were conceded by Smuts on 6 December 1944, at the fourth UP congress in Bloemfontein (the first after the general elections), while addressing the gathering on the Social, Economic and Political Review of the Union. He acknowledged that, while the election victory had ratified his war policy and ‘repudiated the Opposition’, the job at home in terms of looking after the country was ‘less successful’. Because of war requirements, there was shortage of food and other civilian supplies as well as the introduction of controls to facilitate rationing and to regulate consumption, which drew public criticism. The other point was the demobilisation process which was wrecked by administrative problems and the returning troops who then faced an acute housing shortage.
problem. These socio-economic issues were to play an important role in the future course of South African politics after the war, when the UP lost the elections to the HNP under Malan in 1948. While the UDF members were disillusioned with the UP's inability to improve their socio-economic conditions after the war, there were other factors such as increased black urbanisation, which produced growing self-awareness and accelerated black nationalism. This, in turn, led to political agitation and labour strikes, which also ‘aroused fears in many white people’, who then flocked to the NP, to ensure the preservation of a harder segregationist order and a return to an uncompromising conservatism.

Therefore, the UP’s liberal ideology perpetuated through the AES could not counter the “threat” of black nationalism in the eyes of many Afrikaans-speaking whites. Afrikaner nationalism, which was accelerated throughout the war by the NP, was consolidated after the war, mainly due to fear of the socio-economic competition from blacks, as a result of the increase of urban employment and their increased politicisation. This aspect helped to clinch the electoral contest for Malan, who, unlike the UP, did not vacillate about the “native policy”, but clearly emphasised racial segregation to eliminate any “threat” to white socio-economic privileges.

On any broad measurement of scale, the Union’s publicity and propaganda efforts had a limited effect because they could not satisfy the requirements and aspirations of the diverse population. For blacks in South Africa and across the African continent, the content of the propaganda messages for the Allies stood at variance with the reality of their social, economic and political conditions. The democratic values which the war was fought for, were contradicted by the discriminatory policies and practices in the Union. Hence, as in many colonies around the African continent, there was an increase of black nationalism and political activism for decolonisation, equal rights and freedom. Black political action increased immediately after the war with a number of labour strikes taking place in the industrial sector.

---

1756 Smuts Papers, A1, vol. 304/2, General Smuts’s Speech at the Union Congress of the United Party, Bloemfontein, 6 December 1944, pp. 6-7.
1757 See Tothill, ‘The 1943 Elections’, p. 3; Marx, Oxwagon Sentinel, pp. 484-487; Deegan, The Politics of the New South Africa, p. 18; See also Roos, Ordinary Springboks, chapters 6 and 7.
1759 Marx, Oxwagon Sentinel, pp. 482-483; See also Roos, Ordinary Springboks, chapters 6 and 7.
1760 Marx, Oxwagon Sentinel, pp. 482-483.
In turn, rising African nationalism, with Smuts’s political weakness and the alienation of a large portion of the white electorate, combined with difficult socio economic conditions, provided Malan’s NP with ammunition which was exploited through the apartheid platform to attain victory in the 1948 general elections. This defined the post-war South African politics, with the NP’s persistent effort to maintain power, and also to gain global acceptance of its policies throughout the second half of the twentieth century. As minority white rule would go on to find itself fighting a new and different kind of “apartheid war” in the decades after 1945, the propaganda of government and of its opposition found new forms and new fields of operation.
A. ARCHIVAL SOURCES

1. National Archives of South Africa: Pretoria

Accessions
A 1: J.C. Smuts Papers
Vols: 129; 130; 132; 134; 136; 143; 144; 150; 152; 246; 247; 258; 261; 262; 298/2; 299; 303/1; 304/2; 307.

Archives

Archives of the Department of Justice (JUS)
Vol: 1506.

Archives of the Department of Trade and Industry (HEN)
Vols: 2190; 2191.

Archives of the Director General of War Supplies (DGS)
Vol: 53.

Archives of the Governor General (GG)
Vol: 1572

Archives of the Native Commissioner Johannesburg (KJB)
Vols: 496, N9/13; 497, N9/13/3

Archives of the Secretary for Native Affairs (NTS)
Vols: 1681; 9610; 9629; 9653; 9654; 9655.
Archives of the Union Executive Council (URU)
Vols: 2002; 2023; 2034

2. National Archives of South Africa: Cape Town

Archives of the Chief Commissioner Eastern Cape (CCK),
vol. 16

Archives of the Magistrate Somerset West (1/SSW),
Vol. 88, N1/2/2


Adjutant General (AG), Group 3
Vols: 1; 2A; 6; 42; 207; 224; 286; 342; 344.

Adjutant General (AG), Group 9
Vol. 163

Adjutant General, (War)
Vol: 4; 5; 6.

Archives of Army Intelligence
Vols: 20; 21; 24; 27; 33; 46; 50.

Chief of the General Staff, Group 2
Vols: 50; 93.

Chief of the General Staff (War)
Vols: 42; 43; 47; 62; 129; 130; 131; 197; 198; 199; 201; 207; 210; 223; 224.

Directorate Non-European Army Services (DNEAS), Group 2
Vols: 3; 4; 6; 7; 10; 11; 12; 20; 25.

DNEAS: Native Military Corps (NMC)
Vols: 5; 6; 11; 12; 13; 14; 15; 16; 17; 18; 19; 22; 51; 52; 53

Personnel Records
P1/3653/6, Thwaites, B.W.

Press and Propaganda (PP)
Vols: 1; 7; 18; 28; 31; 35; 36; 39; 40; 41; 56; 57; 58; 59; 60; 63

Quartermaster General (QMG), Group 1
Vol. 104, Q 91/339

Secretary for Defence (DC)
Vols: 3841; 3888

Union War Histories (UWH)
Vols: 86; 88, 89; 90; 91; Box 136; 162; 239; 240; 249; 261; 264; 265; 267; 268; 273; 274; 276; 277; 279; 281; 287; 393

World War 2: War Diaries (WD 1)
Vol: 101; 291; 292; 296

World War 2: War Diaries (WD 2)
Vols: 511; 532; Box 533; 534.

Zeesen Broadcast (ZB)
Vols: 1; 3; 8; 15 (WR 65/9/41 - WR 65/9/43)
4. **University of Cape Town: Jagger Library, Archives and Manuscripts**

BC 160: M. Alexander Papers  
List IV, 24

BC 294: P. Duncan Papers  
Vols: A27. 1 – 9;

BC 587: L. Marquard Papers  
Vols: D3. 1-5; D3. 7-8; D3. 11; D3. 15; D3. 16; D3. 25; D3. 38.

BC 640: H.G. Lawrence Papers  
Vols: E3.1-34; E3. 35-53; E3. 128-157; E3. 221; E3. 330-352; E3. 158-244; E3. 245-261; E3. 262; E3. 263-264; E3. 266; E3. 276; E.280-282; E5. 44. 262; E5. 44.4; E5. 48-75; E5. 76-84; E3. 280-282; E5. 44.1; E5. 44.2; E5. 45; E5. 46; E5. 47; E5.9.

5. **University of Kwazulu-Natal: Killie Campbell Archives and Manuscripts: Durban**

E.G Malherbe Papers  
Vols: 143/2; 144; 432/1; 432/5; 432/7; 432/8; 432/9; 438/1; 440/2; 441/4/3; 441/7/3; 441/8; 441/10; 441/11; 442/1; 442/7; 442/8/4; 442/9; 443/3; 444/4; 444/5; 444/7 445/1; 445/3; 505/10; 505/11.

6. **University of South Africa: United Party Archives Archives, Central Head Office, Pretoria**

United South African Party Archives: Intelligence Records  
World War 2: Whole Archive
7. **University of Witwatersrand: William Cullen Library, Archives and Manuscripts**

Union Unity Truth Service and Truth Legion (UUTS) Collections
Vols: A 1883, 1; A1883, 3; A1883, 10; A1883, 14, A1883, 20.

T.C. Robertson Papers
A 2012
Vols: A 2012, Ae 5; A2012, B20.2; A2012, B 20.3.

R.A.F. Hoernlé Papers
Vol. AD 1623, Ab 2,

Ossewabrandwag Records
Vol: A 726, A15.

E.T. Stubbs Papers

A. B. Xuma Papers
Vols: Box C, AD 843; Box 0, Military Matters, 14.1 – 14.8.

**B. UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA OFFICIAL GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS**


*Proclamation No. 197, 1939.*

*Proclamation No. 201, 1939.*

*Proclamation No. 319, 1942.*

*Proclamation No. 44, 1944.*

*South Africa Defence Act, No. 13, 1912.*

*War Measures Act No. 13, 1940.*

*War Measure Act No. 14, 1941*
C. THE SOUTH AFRICAN FILM, VIDEO AND SOUND ARCHIVES (SAFVSA), PRETORIA

_Ayihlome_, A 302

_Fighters in the Veld_, FA 2524; 2525

_African Mirror_
Vols: FA 2333; FA 2323; A 3210; FA 5505; FA 1174; FA 5430; FA 5969; FA 14150.

SABC, Documentary: _With Our Men in the North_, n.d

D. THE SOUTH AFRICAN BROADCASTING CORPORATION ARCHIVES, JOHANNESBURG

South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC)
Annual Reports, 1937-1949, SABC Library, Johannesburg
SABC Audio Clips: T 86/989-1999; SABC, T73/200-201; 1/63 (42) Dap, Audio Clip; 30/54-58 (45) Audio Clip

E. DITSONG: SOUTH AFRICAN MUSEUM OF MILITARY HISTORY, JOHANNESBURG

Non-European Army Services Photographic Records: Unnumbered
War Art: 1963; 1279; 1569; 1618; 1619; 1721; 1780; 1815; 1816.
Posters: 024; 026; 026; 027.
F. LITERATURE

Union Defence Force and Other Military Publications

Army Education Handbook
Clamp
EAForce News
El Bullsheet
Ic Digest
Military Propaganda Handbook
New Africa Pamphlet
iNdlovu-Tlou
P*E*P (Peace, Education and Progress)
Springbok
The Nongqai
The Sable
Royal United Service Institution (RUSI)
The Union at War: How to Join Forces
What the Soldier Thinks?
Y.M.C.A South Africa and Toc H War Fund Appeal

General Publications: Newspapers and Magazines

Cape Argus
Cape Times
Common Sense
Current Affairs
Democrat and Chronicle
Die Burger
Die Ossewa-Brandwag
Die Ossewa-Brandwag: Vanwaar-Waarheen
Die Suiderstem
Die Transvaler
Die Vaderland
Die Volkstem
E.P. Herald
Flash – Dawn of Victory Cavalcade Edition
Forward
Inkululeko
Libertas
Natal Daily News
Rand Daily Mail
Reality: A Journal of Liberal and Radical Opinion
Reuters: Economic Service
St. Louis Star Times
Star News
Sunday Times
The Bantu World
The Courier-Mail
The Daily Telegraph
The Forum
The Natal Witness
The New York Times
The Outspan
The Springbok Legion
The Star
The Sunday Express
The Times
The Zoutpansberg Review
Torch Sparks
Books


Bourhill, J. 2011. *Come Back to Portofino: Through Italy with the 6th South African Armoured Division* (30 Degrees South, Johannesburg)


Dubow, S. and Jeeves, A. (eds.) 2005. South Africa’s 1940s: World of Possibilities (Double Storey, Cape Town)


Grosskopf, J.F.W. 1932. Platelandseverarming and Plassverlating: Verslag van die Carnegie-kommissie, Deel 1, Ekonomiese Verslag (Pro Ecclesia Drukkery, Stellenbosch)


Gutsche, T. 1972. The History and Social Significance of Motion Pictures in South Africa, 1895-1940, (Howard Timmins, Cape Town)


Jackson, A. 2006. The British Empire and the Second World War (Hambledon Continuum, London and New York)


Reitz, D. 1942. *No Outspan* (Faber and Faber, London)


Strahl, O.v, 1942. *Seven Years as a Nazi Consul* (Ridout and Co, Cape Town)

Strydom, H. 1982. *For Folk and Führer* (Jonathan Ball, Johannesburg)


Visser, G.C. 1976. *OB: Traitors or Patriots?* (Macmillian, Johannesburg)


**Journal Articles: Hard Copies and Electronic**


Hellig, J. 2009. ‘German Jewish Immigration to South Africa during the 1930s: Revisiting the Charter of SS Stuttgart’, *Jewish Culture and History*, vol. 11, issue 1-2, pp. 124-138.


Roth, M. 1983. ‘If you give us rights we will fight: Black involvement in the Second World War’, *South Africa Historical Journal*, no. 15, November, pp. 85-104.


Theses and Dissertations


