

**Interrogating China's approach to relations with sub-Saharan Africa  
in official documents (2000-2010) through critical discourse analysis.**

by

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## Declaration

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Cm'tki j w'tgugt xgf "

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## ABSTRACT

China's rise as an economic superpower has had important consequences for its relations with African countries over the past 10-15 years. Not only were these relations thoroughly reviewed and significantly increased, but China also adopted a new cooperation policy that its administration describes as being based on mutual benefits and win-win economic collaboration. However, there is a sceptical public opinion in Africa and also in some developed countries about China's current engagement with African countries, and in particular with countries from the sub-Saharan region. In fact, China is frequently accused of acting as a new colonizing power and of increasing its relations with African countries simply as a strategy to achieve higher power-politics status and to structure a new global economic order.

The present study addresses the question of whether China's official discourse about its relations with sub-Saharan African countries from 2000 to 2010 contains any grounds for the sceptical public opinion mentioned above. In more concrete terms, the main objective of the study is to determine from a linguistic perspective, and more specifically from a critical discourse analysis point of view, whether there are any overt or covert messages of power and ideology in China's discourse to sub-Saharan African countries which could justify the sceptical public opinion about China's current engagement in this part of the continent .

The texts representing China's discourse about its relations with sub-Saharan African countries that are examined for this study comprise official speeches, statements, and other related official documents delivered by Chinese officials in the period 2000-2010, and published in English on the websites of various institutions, including China's official websites. These texts are examined from within the framework of the Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA) as set out by, specifically, Wodak (2001a). The texts are analysed using the DHA three-dimensional procedure consisting of (i) identifying the Content(s) and Topic(s) of the specific discourse, (ii) investigating the discursive strategies used in the specific texts, and (iii) analysing the linguistic means and the specific context-dependent linguistic realizations.

On the one hand, the analysis of the Discourse Topics indicates that the relations between China and sub-Saharan African countries are grounded in China's pluralist approach to international affairs. From this perspective, then, it could be argued that China's current engagement in sub-Saharan Africa does not warrant the sceptical public opinion mentioned earlier. On the other hand, however, the analysis of the discursive strategies used to represent China and sub-Saharan African countries, indicates that such scepticism is likely warranted.

The relations between China and African countries have predominantly been investigated from economic and political perspectives. However, the manner in which these relations are expressed, implied, negotiated, interpreted, distributed, etc. in discourse has not yet received any systematic attention. The present study was therefore undertaken to contribute, from a linguistic perspective, to the knowledge of and the debate about China's current engagement in Africa.

## OPSOMMING

China se opgang as 'n ekonomiese supermoondheid het belangrike gevolge gehad vir sy betrekkinge met Afrikalande oor die afgelope 10-15 jaar. China het hierdie betrekkinge deeglik hersien en beduidend uitgebrei, en het daarby ook 'n nuwe samewerkingsbeleid aanvaar wat volgens sy administrasie gegrond is op wedersydse voordele en wen-wen ekonomiese samewerking. Daar is nietemin 'n skeptiese openbare mening in Afrika en ook in sommige ontwikkelde lande oor China se huidige verbintenis met Afrikalande, en in die besonder met lande van die sub-Sahara streek. Trouens, China word gereeld daarvan beskuldig dat hy optree soos 'n nuwe koloniale moondheid, en dat sy verhoogde betrekkinge met Afrikalande bloot 'n strategie is om groter magspolitiese status te bekom en om 'n nuwe globale ekonomiese struktuur daar te stel.

Die huidige studie fokus op die vraag of China se amptelike diskoers oor sy betrekkinge met sub-Sahara Afrikalande vanaf 2000 tot 2010 enige gronde bied vir die genoemde skeptiese openbare mening. In meer konkrete terme, is die hoofogmerk van die studie om vanuit 'n taalwetenskaplike perspektief, en meer spesifiek vanuit die oogpunt van kritiese diskoersanalise, vas te stel of China se diskoers met sub-Sahara Afrika enige overte of koverte boodskappe van mag en ideologie bevat wat kan dien as regverdiging vir die skeptiese openbare mening oor China se huidige betrokkenheid in hierdie deel van die kontinent.

In die studie word 'n verskeidenheid tekste ontleed wat verteenwoordigend is van China se diskoers oor sy betrekkinge met sub-Sahara Afrikalande. Dié tekste sluit amptelike toesprake, verklarings en verwante dokumente van Chinese amptenare in wat gelewer is in die tydperk 2000-2010, en wat in Engels gepubliseer is op die webwerwe van verskeie instellings, insluitend China se amptelike webwerwe. Die tekste word ondersoek binne die raamwerk van die Diskoers-Historiese Benadering (DHB) soos uiteengesit in, spesifiek, Wodak (2001a). Die analise van die tekste volg die DHB se drie-dimensionele prosedure, wat die volgende inhoud: (i) identifisering van die Inhoud(e) en Onderwerp(e) van die spesifieke diskoers, (ii) analise van die diskursiewe strategieë wat gebruik word in die spesifieke tekste, en (iii) analise van die talige middele en die spesifieke konteks-afhanklike talige realiserings.

Aan die een kant dui die analise van die Diskoers Onderwerpe daarop dat die betrekkinge tussen China en sub-Sahara Afrikalande gebaseer is op China se pluralistiese benadering tot internasionale sake. Vanuit hierdie perspektief kan daar dus geargumenteer word dat China se huidige betrokkenheid in sub-Sahara Afrika nie gronde bied vir die skeptiese openbare mening wat hierbo genoem is nie. Aan die ander kant, egter, dui die analise van die diskursiewe strategieë wat aangewend word in die voorstelling van China en sub-Sahara Afrikalande daarop dat daar waarskynlik wel gronde is vir sulke skeptisisme.

Die betrekkinge tussen China en Afrikalande is tot dusver merendeels vanuit ekonomiese en politieke perspektiewe ondersoek. Die wyse waarop sulke betrekkinge uitgedruk, geïmpliseer, onderhandel, geïnterpreteer, versprei, ens. word in diskoers, is egter nog nie sistematies ondersoek nie. Die huidige studie is gevolglik onderneem om, vanuit 'n taalwetenskaplike perspektief, 'n bydrae te lewer tot die kennis van en die debat oor China se huidige betrokkenheid in Afrika.

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# Chapter 1

## Introduction

### 1.1 General Remarks

More than 60 years after its founding in 1949, and more than 30 years after economic reforms were initiated in 1978, the People's Republic of China (hereafter referred to as China) has risen to become not only a global economic superpower, but also an emergent centre of global power in various other domains as well (Todaro & Smith 2009; Gill 2010). One impact of this rise is the increase in China's economic, political and cultural relations with many countries in the world, especially with other developing countries in Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, and Asia (Eisenman, Heginbotham & Mitchell 2007:xiii). As far as the African continent is concerned, economic relations between China and African countries have increased to such an extent that China has become one of the continent's most important trading partner after the European Union (as a whole). This partnership mainly entails exports of Chinese goods and Chinese imports of agricultural and natural resources from the African continent (Alden 2009; Taylor 2009). In fact, up until 2007, the production of agricultural and mineral goods for export constituted the main source of economic growth in the continent.<sup>1</sup>

Nevertheless, more than two decades after the end of colonialism, most African countries – especially in the sub-Saharan region – still experience strikingly high levels of poverty in the sense that they continue to struggle with socio-economic and political underdevelopment (Konadu-Agyemang & Panford 2006:1)<sup>2</sup>. Indeed, according to the 2009 World Bank report, the level of poverty in sub-Saharan Africa was the highest in the world. It is within this socio-economic and political context that China has increased its relations and cooperation with Africa – more specifically, with sub-Saharan Africa – on various levels (e.g. in the areas of trade, investment, military matters, education, diplomacy, diverse types of aid, etc.). This

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<sup>1</sup> World Bank (2009).

<sup>2</sup> Cf. also the United Nations Development Programme (2011).

increasing cooperation with the continent is illustrated by, amongst others, the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) Ministerial Conference which was initiated in 2000 and held every third year. In addition, in 2006 China's administration released a new foreign policy document entitled *China's African Policy*. Through the FOCAC and the *China's African Policy* document, China, as a new global superpower, has reviewed and expanded its economic, political and cultural relations with African countries, and started a new cooperation policy that China's administration describes as based on mutual benefits and win-win economic cooperation (Hu Jintao 2006).<sup>3</sup>

However, as reported in the media, there is a sceptical public opinion in Africa and also in some developed countries about China's current engagement with African countries, an engagement which, as noted above, is described in China's official discourses as involving relations of mutual benefits and win-win economic cooperation. For instance, Polgreen and French (2007) report a comment by the Zambian politician Michael Sata who states that Chinese interest "is exploiting us, just like everyone who came before. They have simply come to take the place of the West as the new colonizers of Africa." Similarly, former South African president Thabo Mbeki warned African countries in 2006 not to fall into a "colonial relationship" with China.<sup>4</sup> In response to criticism about China's involvement in Africa, China's Foreign Minister Mr Yang Jiechi stated in 2010 that

I have noted that some people in the world do not want to see development of China-Africa relations, and they keep making an issue out of the China-Africa energy and resource cooperation. ... But I don't see any reason for some countries to oppose China in carrying out the equal and mutually beneficial cooperation with Africa."  
(Yang Jiechi 2010)<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Chinese president Hu Jintao's speech at the FOCAC in Beijing, 4 November 2006.

<sup>4</sup> BBC News. 2006 (14 December). Mbeki warns on China-Africa ties. Online: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/6178897.stm> (24 May 2010).

<sup>5</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. 2010 (7 March). Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi Answers Questions from Domestic and Overseas Journalists on China's Foreign Policy (NPC and CPPCC Annual Sessions 2010). Online: <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t662388.htm> (8 May 2012).

In 2012 the Chinese Communist Party (CPC) also responded to criticism about China's involvement in Africa, commenting as follows on a trip to Addis Ababa by Jia Qinglin's (Chairman of CPPCC<sup>6</sup> National Committee) during the 18th African Union (AU) Summit:

[s]imilar to previous visits to Africa by the Chinese leaders, Chairman Jia's trip to Africa this time is again presumed as an "energy tour" or "oil-trip" by some adherents of "zero sum"-thinking and Cold-War-mentality in the Western media. China's assistance rendered in building the AU Conference Center is also assumed as "purposely displaying China's influence in Africa", jealously. Therefore, China is accused of being "excessively involved in Africa" with "intention to colonize Africa" and so far so forth. (Communist Party of China (CPC) News Network 2012)<sup>7</sup>

Thus, as claimed by Taylor (2009:1), and reflected by the above comments, the core criticism of China's current engagement with Africa is the accusation that China is a new colonizing power, with the purpose of exploiting Africa's natural resources and flooding the continent with low-priced manufactured goods while turning a blind eye to the autocracies that are still found in some African states. Moreover, China is accused of increasing the China-Africa cooperation with the strategic idea of using economic and political relations with African countries as a means of achieving "power-politics power" and structuring a new global economic order (Taylor 2009:8).

## 1.2 Focus and Problem Statement

Considering China's official discourse (statements, interviews, speeches and the *China's African Policy* document) about economic, political and cultural relations with sub-Saharan Africa from 2000 to 2010, it is not clear whether they contain any overt or covert messages of power and ideology which could justify the sceptical public opinion – noted in the previous section – about China's engagement in this African region. Furthermore, China-Africa relations have mostly been investigated from economic and political perspectives (cf. e.g.

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<sup>6</sup> The Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC)

<sup>7</sup> Communist Party of China News Network (CPC). 2012 (6 April). China Africa Relations: Frog-Leap Development and Future Challenges. Online: <http://www.focac.org/eng/zxxx/t920757.htm> (8 May 2012).

Taylor 2006; Hutchison, Eisenman, Heginbotham & Mitchell 2007; Guerrero & Manji 2008; Ampiah & Naidu 2008a). However, the way these relations are expressed, implied, negotiated, interpreted, distributed, etc. in the discourse (or the texts) has not yet been investigated in the available literature. The present study is therefore undertaken to contribute, *from a linguistic perspective*, to the knowledge and the debate about China's engagement in Africa from 2000 to 2010.

### 1.3 Research Question and Objectives

The study takes as its point of departure a basic assumption of Fairclough's (1992:64) framework of Critical Discourse Analysis (cf. Chapter 2). On this assumption, there are three functions of language and dimensions of meaning which coexist and interact in all discourse: (i) the *identity function* which relates to the ways in which social identities are set up in discourse, (ii) the *relational function* which has to do with how social relationships between discourse participants are enacted and negotiated, and (iii) the *ideational function* which concerns the way in which texts signify the world and its processes, entities and relations. In accordance with this perspective, the present study is guided by two main hypotheses. The first is that there are various messages of power and ideology in China's<sup>8</sup> discourse about relations with sub-Saharan Africa, where such messages have presumably evolved, particularly in the past decade, in line with China's emergence as a major player on the world economic market. The second hypothesis is that there is ground for the evident sceptical public opinion about China's current engagement in this African region. In order to determine the validity of these hypotheses, one would have to (i) define what constitutes "messages of power and ideology", (ii) demonstrate that such messages can be identified in China's discourse, and then (iii) proceed to analyse such messages from a critical linguistic perspective to determine whether there is sufficient justification for the evident public scepticism. Against this background, and focusing specifically on official speeches, statements, and other related official documents delivered by Chinese officials in the period

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<sup>8</sup> The term "China" is used in this study in reference to the country and its government. In using the term generically, the researcher does not deny that a country as big and diverse as China cannot be conceptualized as a single, undivided entity with a unitary vision and policy. The complexity of a government and its representatives in deciding on international relations and exhibiting national ideas is one that should be kept in mind throughout this study where reference is made to "China".

2000-2010 and published in English on the websites of various official institutions, the general research questions can be formulated as follows:

- A. Are there any objectionable messages of power in China's official discourse about its socio-economic relations with sub-Saharan African countries?
- B. If yes, what are these messages and how are they communicated?

Proceeding from these research questions, the study takes the following as its three main objectives:

- to provide a linguistic description of the relevant discourses (i.e. specific speeches, statements in the media, and related documents by Chinese officials published in English and directed at particular sub-Saharan African countries);
- to describe the relations between the relevant discourses and the social-political and historical context in which they were produced; and
- to explicate the possible overt or covert messages of power and ideology in the relevant speeches and documents, and to identify and describe the linguistic means that are used to convey such messages.

The expression "published in English" used above requires clarification at this point. The documents that were collected for the study are all in English, for example those presented on the websites listed under Anon. (2000), Anon. (2006), and Jintao (2004) in the Bibliography. It is likely that these and other documents were originally produced in Mandarin Chinese and subsequently translated into English (or perhaps first into, say, French or Portuguese, depending on the official language of the African country concerned). Although the process of translation could well have had an effect on the content of the original intended messages, the present study will focus on the available English texts only.

In this regard, it is important to clarify that the documents analysed in the present study were not translated by or for me for the purpose of the study. Moreover, these English documents were collected from the websites of the following governmental institutions: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China; the Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the Republic of South Africa; the Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the United Republic of Tanzania; the Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the Republic

of Zimbabwe; the Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the Federal Republic of Nigeria; the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation; and the Embassy of the People's Republic of China in Jamaica.

As part of the government, a country's foreign ministry is in charge of that country's diplomatic relations with other countries. Accordingly, in the case of China, one of the main responsibilities of its ministry of foreign affairs is to release information about important diplomatic activities and elaborate on foreign policies.<sup>9</sup> The visits of Chinese Presidents to African countries, including their participation in the FOCAC summits, are part of China's diplomatic relations with these countries. Therefore, it can be assumed that publishing the speeches of the Chinese Presidents during their diplomatic missions in African countries, and the *China's African Policy* document, falls within the duty of the Chinese ministry of foreign affairs. On these grounds, it can plausibly be assumed that the English versions of the official Chinese documents – as found on the website of the Foreign Ministry of the People's Republic of China – are authorised translations, i.e. approved by, at least, the Chinese foreign ministry. One should keep in mind, however, that the messages intended by the authors do not necessarily coincide with how the messages are construed by the readers/hearers of the English versions. As it is, in reception of texts, authors' intentions and readers' interpretations are difficult to determine, and often do not correspond. The hazards of working with translated texts are therefore fully recognized.

The websites of the FOCAC and the Chinese embassies contain various documents dealing with activities related to these governmental institutions. The specific documents collected from these two websites were produced by officials of these institutions. It can therefore be assumed that the translated documents published on the websites are authorised translations, i.e. approved by the authors and/or the institutions.

In short, the documents analysed in the present study were collected from governmental institutions as they were originally published in English, without any subsequent editorial changes or spelling/punctuation/translation corrections. Given that the official institutions from which the data were collected provided the English translation of documents which were most likely first produced in Mandarin Chinese, the English versions of the documents analysed in this study are regarded as officially authorised translations. These are the translations that the institutions have made available to potential readers worldwide who do

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<sup>9</sup> <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/en/wjb/zyzz/>

not speak Mandarin Chinese, and at whom the documents are actually directed (cf. section 1.7.2.5).

Following insights from Translation Studies, this study recognizes that there are different ways/strategies of translating which correspond to various theoretical approaches to translation.<sup>10</sup> Due to the variety of approaches, there may be different ways of translating texts from one language into another (Jakobsen 1994b, Pym 2010). Pym (2010:1-2) illustrates this point with reference to alternative renditions of the term “Tory” which is used to designate the British Conservative Party. Pym (2010:2) notes that one translator might adopt the view that “translation should explain the source culture”<sup>11</sup>, according to which he/she would use the English term and insert explanatory information. Another translator might emphasize that “translation should make things understandable to the target culture”, according to which he/she would just use an equivalent expression such as “the main right-wing party”. A third translator might argue that “the translation should re-situate everything in the target culture”, hence he/she would give the name of a conservative political party in the target-culture. A fourth translator might argue that since the source text was not primarily about politics, there is no need to spend time on details; he/she would then simply not address possible ignorance of the reader.

Thus, according to the particular approach to translation adopted, different translators might select alternative ways of translating the same text, and consequently they might come up with different translations of the same source text. In this regard Asensio (2003:50) states that:

Practice and common sense show us every day that there is not just one adequate translation for a text, that those who look for the true translation in equivalence between languages are wrong. Translation is not an operation of comparing languages; it is a communicative and creative act.

The fact that the translator is faced with several choices to render a certain expression from one language to another indicates that he/she has a certain freedom of selection in translating. However, research in Translation Studies reveals that apart from the theoretical approach

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<sup>10</sup> Cf. e.g. Pym (2010) for a detailed discussion of the various theoretical approaches to translation.

<sup>11</sup> In Translation Studies (cf. e.g. Jakobsen 1994a, Pym 2010), the text which is translated from is referred to as the “source text”, and the text produced by the process of translation as the “target text”. From this perspective, terms such as “source language” and “target language”, or “source culture” and “target culture” are often used by extension of “source text” and “target text”.



adopted, there are other linguistic and non-linguistic factors which can reduce the number of choices that a translator has in order to put an expression into a different language (cf. e.g. Sørensen 1994, Asensio 2003, Pym 2010). According to Asensio (2003:51) these factors include

- meaning constraints: both in source and target texts;
- textual constraints: type, function, content (both in source and target language);
- translation constraints: for instance depending on the social situation of the act of translation, law and collegial regulation;
- ethical constraints at various levels;
- communicative constraints: communicants, goal, vehicle, means and signal;
- assignment constraints: deadlines, price and other mercantile consideration;
- conceptual constraints: depending on the approach to translation adopted by the translator;
- ability constraints: the translator's skills (including his/her knowledge of the subject field (example, economics, trade, history));
- risk constraints: the risks assumed by the translator.

With regard to the present study, one example of a linguistic constraint in translation would be found in the use of jargon – i.e. a kind of specialized or technical language used in a specific domain such as in Economics and International Relations. Such jargons are used to discuss or describe matters related to a field of specialization where specific terms have dedicated meanings, as in Economics, Social Development Studies, and Diplomacy. This study assumes that the jargon of Economics and International Relations was a deterministic factor in the way technical terms such as “cooperation” or “diplomatic relations” are translated in documents analysed in this study.

Mandarin and English belong to two unrelated language families. Consequently, a translator may have to deal with cross-cultural variations in terms of, for example, pragmatics. A cross-cultural study by Hsieh and Chen (2005) shows that some differences exist between Mandarin Chinese and English in the use of modality when performing the speech act of refusal. Because of these differences, adopting a literal translation – i.e. word for word – would not be an adequate strategy to render the relevant meaning and pragmatic effect of modals into English.

A possible non-linguistic factor determining choices in the translation of the documents analysed in the present study concerns the constraints imposed by the client (i.e. the person or institution who requests and pays for the services of the translator). It is assumed here that translating for the government compels a translator to follow certain legal, professional, ethical or other requirements (Asensio 2003). This means that during the process of translation, the translator is aware that non-compliance with stated instructions and agreements may result in liabilities for him/her. From this perspective, the fact that the translated documents were published on the websites of governmental institutions suggests that the translation satisfied the requirements of these institutions.

Although there are some factors which constrain and impose a specific way of translating, not all of them are strictly observable (Asensio 2003:50). The freedom of the translator remains even when the number of translation choices have been reduced by applying all the constraints listed above. Asensio (2003:51) mentions the following as factors that keep the translator's choices open:

- the variation in the target language (synonymy);
- the need for solution to new problems arising during the process of translation;
- the approach to translation adopted by the translator;
- the translator's skills;
- personal creativity.

Moreover, although deterministic factors seem more imposing when it comes to official translation, concurrent elements such as common sense, language resources and the translator's creativity often enable him/her to move away from a prescribed way of translating, a way which is generally literal and conservative (Asensio 2003:51). Attending to these concurrent elements may lead the translator to generate more alternatives and to select the one most suitable to

- improve the style and understanding of the translated text (for instance, by increasing concision, precision, coherence, consistency, or by homogenizing terminology and correcting errors);
- make the text plausible by introducing specific elements recognizable as belonging to the target language and text;
- provide cultural/institutional information and explanation when necessary;
- avoid lexical and semantic gaps;

- clarify meanings through the translator's own interpretation within non-established limits;
- facilitate the identification of references. (Asienso 2003:51-52)

The above mentioned concurrent elements not only contribute to the translator's freedom in translation, they also provide a high number of different versions for the same meanings and the same texts; these versions may be equivalent in terms of the validity or adequacy of the translation. Concurrently, and as a result, these elements may also lead the translator to opt for a way of translating which modifies the source text. To illustrate, consider again Pym's (2010) example regarding the possible ways of translating the term "Tory". As noted above, Pym (2010:2) suggests the following possibilities:

- (1) using the English term and inserting information to explain it;
- (2) giving a target language equivalent such as "the main right-wing party";
- (3) giving the name of a conservative political party in the target culture;
- (4) avoiding reference to the term "Tory" if the text does not primarily concern politics.

Opting for the strategy in (1) involves inserting elements, e.g. a footnote or brackets, at the surface level of the target text which do not appear in or correspond to any explicit elements in the source text (although the inserted information might be implicitly present in the source text). As a result, the source text and the target text will not be identical at the surface level. In other words, employing the strategy in (1) would not produce a "faithful translation" (Sørensen 1994) of the source text. A faithful translation, as defined by Sørensen (1994:14), is a reproduction of the source language text in the target language text in such a way that, at surface level, the target language text exactly mirrors the source language text. From this perspective, the translation strategy in (2) would yield a faithful translation because, assuming that the Tories is the strongest right-wing party in the United Kingdom in terms of the number of representatives it has in parliament and in local government, then the two expressions "Tory" and "the main right-wing party" refer to the same political party.

Deterministic factors which constrain the translator's choice concerning the way in which the translation is done, may also lead to ways of translating which modify the source text. As regards pragmatics, for instance, awareness of cross-cultural variation between the source language and the target language may lead the translator to select a way of translating which

would fit the target language but which may involve modifications in the use of terminology, tense, modality, stylistic features, speech acts, etc. (Sørensen 1994).

To summarize, a translator may be led to modify a source text by adding or changing elements in order to fit the target language. Such elements represent the translator's discursive presence – i.e. another voice – in the translated text. I fully acknowledge that the process of translation of the documents analysed in the present study could well have had an effect on the content of the original intended messages. However, the way(s) in which these documents were translated and the extent to which the source texts were modified in this process are issues that fall well outside the scope of this study.

## **1.4 Impact**

As far as could be ascertained from the available literature, the current relations between China and sub-Saharan African countries have not been systematically investigated from a linguistic perspective, and more specifically, from a critical discourse perspective.<sup>12</sup> Therefore, as already mentioned in section 1.2, the present study will provide further insight into and contribute to the knowledge and growing scholarship about China-Africa relations and the discourses that constitute such relations.

## **1.5 Research Paradigm and Design**

The present study is conducted within a qualitative paradigm for two main reasons. First, as stated by Taylor (2001:324), amongst others, most studies in discourse analysis are qualitative in nature. This point is also clear from the discourse analytic approaches outlined in Chapter 2 below. The second reason has to do with the nature of the data investigated in

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<sup>12</sup> I am not aware of any (critical) discourse analysis of China's political discourse about its relations with African countries that have been published since the completion of this study. However, it must be noted that some recent studies, such as the ones listed below, do pay attention to the discourse about China-Africa relations:

Axelsson, M. 2009. China in the eyes of Africa –a textual analysis of the Nigerian and South African blogosphere regarding China's activity on the African continent. Online: [www.essays.se/essay/ee3652258b/](http://www.essays.se/essay/ee3652258b/) (03 August 2013).

Sautman, B. and Y. Hairong. 2008. The Forest for the Trees: Trade, Investment and China-in-Africa Discourse. Online: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40377480> (03 August 2013).

this study (documents and speeches); unlike data obtained by means of surveys, questionnaires, interviews, etc., the texts in question do not lend themselves to being analysed within a quantitative paradigm.

Generally speaking, and as also indicated in the research questions in section 1.3, the present study is concerned with the expression or enactment of power and ideology in discourse. In this respect, Van Dijk (1999:233) argues that ideologies may in principle map onto various properties of discourse (i.e., graphics, intonation, syntax, local meanings and coherence, topics, style, rhetoric, speech acts, and interactional features), which means that features of ideology can be described at several levels of discourse (Van Dijk 2006:115; cf. also Van Dijk 2011). Just like ideologies, power can be enacted through various properties of discourse (Chilton & Schäffner 2002; Van Dijk 2001b, 2008, 2011; Fairclough 2011). According to Van Dijk (1989:22), power can be made manifest through various genres, contents, and styles of discourse. Against this background, the present study will be conducted within a discourse analysis research design.

The meaning of the term “discourse analysis” (hereafter DA) often shows variation among scholars working in different academic disciplines and following different approaches to discourse (Schiffrin, Tannen, & Hamilton 2001; Van Dijk 2011). As far as Linguistics is concerned, DA refers to a domain of inquiry which focuses on the study of language in use in social contexts (see e.g. Brown & Yule 1983; Gee 1999; Van Dijk 2011). This definition is in line with a general “contemporary” paradigm in discourse studies that is based on the functional view of language (Van Dijk 1985, 1997d, 2011). This approach takes as its point of departure the claim that the primary functions of human language are to communicate and to interact in social context (Brown & Yule 1983; Gee 1999). More precisely, in DA language is considered as a social interactive activity (Schiffrin 1994:415). As a consequence, discourse is studied by taking into consideration its functional relations with the social context in which it (discourse) occurs (Van Dijk 1985:4).

The functional approach to language is opposed to a strictly formal descriptive or structuralist approach (Van Dijk 1985, 2011) in which language is considered “by itself” (De Beaugrande 1997a).<sup>13</sup> From this perspective, the linguistic forms or structures of discourse or text are

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<sup>13</sup> The formal approach to language was very popular in linguistics during the first half of the twentieth century (Van Dijk 1985; De Beaugrande 1997a, b).

analysed without considering their communicative and interactive purposes within a specific social context (De Beaugrande 1997a; Van Dijk 1997 b, d, amongst others).

Thus, according to He (2001:429), from a functional view of language, the objective of DA is (i) to provide methods and theories to describe and explain linguistic phenomena in terms of the affective, cognitive, situational, and cultural contexts of their use, and (ii) to identify the linguistic resources through which language users (re)construct their life (i.e. their identity, role, activity, community, emotion, stance, knowledge, belief, ideology, and so forth) .

However, given the diverse properties of discourse – e.g. its spoken and written nature, and its various linguistic units and structures found at distinct levels or dimensions, (lexical, syntactic, semantic, etc.) – discourse analysts tend to focus on one or more of these aspects of discourse, or on one class or type of discourse (Van Dijk 1997b:5). Therefore, any investigation involving discourse analysis corresponds to a type, style or genre of study determined by the focus of the investigator (Van Dijk 1997 b,d). Polanyi's (2001) investigation of the linguistic structure of discourse, for example, is a type of discourse analysis which, adopting a Linguistic Discourse Model (LMD), focuses on the linguistic structure of the basic units of discourse.

Moreover, because of different focuses in the linguistic analysis of discourse, DA is currently considered as a multidisciplinary or a cross-disciplinary field in Linguistics (Van Dijk 2011). Furthermore, given the theoretical diversity in the linguistic conception of discourse (cf. section 1.6.1.2 below), it goes without saying that the study of discourse within the field of DA varies according to different methodological and theoretical approaches (Schiffrin et al. 2001).

## **1.6 Central Concepts in the Study**

### **1.6.1 Critical Discourse Analysis**

As mentioned in the previous section, linguistic studies of discourse are determined by the different methods of analysis and theoretical approaches . The particular linguistic approach

that is adopted in the present study is that of Critical Discourse Analysis (henceforth CDA).<sup>14</sup> Besides representing an approach to the linguistic analysis of discourse, CDA is also often regarded as a field or domain of study, as well as a paradigm (Fairclough 1992; Van Dijk 2001b; Wodak 2001b; Wodak & Meyer 2009b). In the subsections below, several of the key concepts of CDA are explicated, namely ‘critical’ (section 1.6.1.1), ‘discourse’ (1.6.1.2), ‘text’ (1.6.1.3), and ‘ideology’ and ‘power’ (1.6.1.4).

### **1.6.1.1 The Notion ‘Critical’ in CDA**

The “critical” aspect of CDA has its roots in Critical Theory as developed by the Frankfurt School of Philosophy, and more particularly in the influential work of the Western Marxist Jürgen Habermas (Van Dijk 1993; Fairclough & Wodak 1997; Wodak 2001b; Wodak & Meyer 2009b).

According to McCarty (as quoted in Roderick 1986:73), Habermas’s

entire project, from the critique of contemporary scientism to the reconstruction of historical materialism, rests on the possibility of providing an account of communication that is both theoretical and normative, that goes beyond a pure hermeneutics without being reducible to a strictly empirical-analytic science.

The social use of language, and more precisely human communication, is therefore the focus of Habermas’s work (cf. Roderick 1986; Bernstein 1995; McCarty 2002). In Habermas’s approach to critical theory the social dimension of linguistic practices – that is, the view of language use as a social practice – implies that linguistic practices (or language use) are embedded in, and constrained and shaped by the larger context constituted by institutions, economic structures, political relations and cultural traditions (Roderick 1986:6). Hence, for Habermas, any theory of the social use of language – or linguistic practices regarded as forms of social practice or social action (as in the case of speech acts) – has to take into account the constraints of the larger social context. In other words, Habermas emphasizes the social constraints on linguistic practices (Roderick 1986), and therefore argues for a social theory

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<sup>14</sup> According to Wodak (2001b:5), the terms “Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA)” and “Critical Linguistics (CL)” are often used as synonyms, although CDA is more often used nowadays. Some scholars (e.g. Van Dijk 1997b) prefer using the term “Critical Discourse Studies (CDS)”.

which can account for such constraints. From a Marxist perspective, however, Habermas adopts the critical view of the capitalist society as characterized by forms of social domination in terms of unequal relations of power between social groups (see the discussion in section 1.6.1.4 below). Along with other critical theorists, Habermas thus shares a concern for social justice and the belief that contemporary industrialized societies all suffer from pervasive injustice (Bernstein 1995:11). That is why, like other critical theorists, but with a particular focus on communication, Habermas advocates a “critical theory” of society which aims not only at describing social reality, but also at criticizing it and attempting to change it (Roderick 1986:7).

These three aims of describing, criticizing and attempting to change social reality represent core features of Critical Theory as perceived by Habermas. In accordance with these aims, Geuss (1981:1-2) presents the distinguishing features of the Frankfurt School’s version of Critical Theory in form of the following theses:

1. Critical theories have special standing as guides for human action in that:
  - (a) they are aimed at producing enlightenment in the agents who hold them, i.e. at enabling those agents to determine what their true interests are;
  - (b) they are inherently emancipatory, i.e. they free agents from a kind of coercion which is at least partly self-imposed, from self-frustration of conscious human action.
2. Critical theories have cognitive content, i.e. they are forms of knowledge.
3. Critical theories differ epistemologically in essential ways from theories in the natural sciences. Theories in natural sciences are “objectifying”, whereas critical theories are “reflective”.

In short, the theory advocated by the Frankfurt School and Habermas in particular is one which is critical, emancipatory and practical (Bernstein 1995:11). In accordance with this theory, the term “critical” is used in CDA with the principal aim of investigating critically several aspects of social inequality as expressed, constituted, legitimized, etc. in the use of language (Wodak 2001b:11). In this respect, Fairclough (1989:5) argues that “critical” is used in the special sense of aiming at “showing up” (i.e. uncovering or making visible) various connections – such as those between language, power and ideology – which may be hidden from people. From this perspective, most studies in CDA have investigated social inequality



as particularly found in media discourses, political discourses, organizational or institutional discourses, and in discourse practices which are potential “sites” of gender issues, racism issues, social identity issues, and others forms of social discrimination (Wodak 1989; Wodak & Chilton 2005, amongst others).

Owing to its critical perspective, CDA is regarded as a reaction against the “uncritical” formal paradigm which was dominant in the 1960s and the 1970s in linguistically-oriented discourse analysis studies (Van Dijk 2001c:352). Unlike CDA which addresses the functional properties of discourse from a critical perspective, discourse analysis approaches in the formal paradigm were primarily concerned with (i) identifying and describing the linguistic structure of discourse in terms of its components and the relationships between those components; (ii) identifying and describing how the linguistic components of discourse and the relations between them serve communicative purposes; and (iii) developing theories and methods of analysis to account for the linguistic structure of discourse and/or the communicative functions of the linguistic structure of discourse (Schiffrin 1994).

In view of the principal aim of CDA mentioned above, an important consequence of adopting a critical approach is that the researcher implicitly takes on an essential additional role as someone who is directly involved in the social issues that are investigated. In this regard, Wodak (1989:xiv) argues that researchers in CDA are socially committed in the sense that they are motivated by the critical objective of uncovering injustice and inequality, and therefore “siding with” the powerless and suppressed (cf. also Fairclough 1995). The question whether investigators should be neutral or not as regards their social or political values or interests when conducting research, falls outside the scope of this study. Issues of subjectivity and objectivity in the social sciences have been addressed by numerous scholars (cf. e.g. Fairclough 1989 for discussion and references). For the purposes of the present study, I adopt the following argument put forward by critical discourse analysts:

Theory formation, description, and explanation, also in discourse analysis, are sociopolitically “situated”, whether we like it or not. Reflection on the role of scholars in society and the polity thus becomes an inherent part of the discourse analytical enterprise. This may mean, among other things, that discourse analysts conduct research in solidarity and cooperation with dominated groups. (Van Dijk 2001c:353)

### *Main Principles of CDA*

Research in CDA share a common set of assumptions that Fairclough and Wodak (1997) have summarized and presented in the form of eight main principles. A first one is that *CDA is a problem-oriented approach* in the sense that it addresses primarily social problems such as power abuse, injustice, and inequality between individuals or social groups (Van Dijk 1993; Wodak 2001b). In contrast to other approaches in discourse analysis studies, CDA does not provide one specific theoretical and methodological approach for analysing discourse (Van Dijk 1993; Wodak 2001b). Rather, CDA is primarily interested in and motivated by socially relevant and pressing issues. On the one hand, CDA hopes to understand such issues better through discourse analysis; on the other hand, it intends to contribute towards social change through critical understanding from which proposals can be derived for practical implementation in social, cultural, political, and economic contexts (cf. Van Dijk 1993:252; Fairclough & Wodak 1997; Wodak 2001b). In line with this approach, the potentially problematic phenomenon of China's increasing involvement in sub-Saharan African countries (as expressed in sceptical public opinion; cf. section 1.1) is critically investigated in the present study in order (i) to provide a better insight into the potential underlying issues in China's discourse with the countries in question, and (ii) to contribute to the knowledge and growing scholarship about China-Africa relations.

A second main principle of CDA is that *power relations are discursive*. Wodak (2001b:10) argues that language is not powerful on its own; it gains power by the use people with power make of it. From this perspective, CDA focuses on explaining how social relations of power are enacted, legitimized, challenged, etc. through language use (Van Dijk 1993). Adopting this viewpoint, the CDA approach to discourse analysis is followed in the present study in addressing the research question formulated in section 1.3.

A third CDA principle is that *discourse both reflects and shapes society and culture*. This principle has to do with the dialectical relationship between discourse and social structure, as will be clarified in the next section. In short, this principle emphasizes the fact that language use on the one hand not only contributes to reproducing society and culture as it is (e.g. social identities and social relationships including social power relationships, system of belief and knowledge, and so on), but on the other hand also serves to transform various aspects of society and culture (Fairclough 1992:65).

A fourth principal of CDA is that *discourse serves as an expression of ideology* in the sense that language use, as a form of social behaviour, represents a medium of ideology (Fairclough 1989; Fairclough & Wodak 1997). In this respect, Fairclough and Wodak (1997) argue that in order to understand how language use can express ideology, it is important to consider – apart from the textual dimension – the discursive practice dimension of discourse regarding the ways a given text is interpreted, received, and also its social effects.

A fifth main principle of CDA is that *discourse is historical* in the sense that discursive practices (i.e. the whole process of production and interpretation of discourse) are dynamic because they are situated in space and time which both constitute their historical context. This again emphasizes the importance of the context of language use in CDA. Considering the historical and the socio-political context of language use is therefore fundamental to a better understanding of discourse (Fairclough & Wodak 1997; Wodak 1989, 2001b).

A sixth principle of CDA concerns the claim that *the relation between text or discourse and society is mediated* instead of being simply deterministic (Fairclough 1989, 1992; Fairclough & Wodak 1997; Wodak & Meyer 2008). Many theorists have studied this mediated relation from different perspectives corresponding to distinct approaches in CDA. For instance, Van Dijk (1993, 1997b, 2001c, and 2009a), following a social cognitive approach, studies the mediation between discourse and society by focusing on social cognitions, that is, socially shared representations of societal arrangements, social groups and social relations, as well as mental operations such as interpretation, thinking and arguing, inferencing and learning. A different approach is taken by Fairclough (1992:65) who analyses the mediated relation between text and social structures by focusing on the dialectical relationship between discourse and social structures. I return to these two approaches of CDA in Chapter 2.

Another main principal of CDA is that, besides being descriptive, *discourse analysis is also interpretive and explanatory* (Fairclough & Wodak 1997:279). This is to say that it is through interpretation and explanation that discourse or text is linked to manifestations of ideologies and social power relationships. However, Fairclough and Wodak (1997) emphasize that interpretation and explanation are dynamic and open processes in the sense that they can be revised in the light of new information or new elements in the context.

In view of the interpretative and explanatory levels of analysis identified in CDA, the methods of analysis adopted in this approach are regarded as “hermeneutic”<sup>15</sup> in nature, as opposed to the analytical-deductive or causal explanation found in other fields (Fairclough & Wodak 1997; Wodak & Meyer 2008). According to Wodak and Meyer (2008), CDA uses a hermeneutic interpretation process. This is in line with the “hermeneutic circle” which refers to the idea that, on the one hand, the meaning of one part (e.g. of a text) can only be understood in the context of the whole whereas, on the other hand, the whole (is in turn only accessible from its component parts (Wodak & Meyer 2008:22). As pointed out by Wodak and Meyer (1997), hermeneutic interpretation thus requires detailed documentation regarding both the linguistic analysis of a text and the analysis of the context in which the discourse is produced.

A last main principle of CDA that is relevant for the present study is that *discourse is a form of social action (or practice)* in the sense that, as mentioned earlier, it not only reflects or represents social entities and relations, but also has an effect on such social realities (Fairclough 1992:3; cf. also Van Dijk 1993; Fairclough & Wodak 1997; Wodak & Meyer 2009b). The present study deals with the discursive construction of the relations between China and sub-Saharan African countries, both representing political and economic entities. It is assumed that such a construction not only reflects power relations between China and sub-Saharan Africa but also has certain effects on these relations.

However, social realities such as social dominance and inequality are complex by their nature and by the way they manifest, especially through language use. Van Dijk (1993), for instance, argues that it is more complicated than it seems to ascertain the relationships between language use and the reproduction of social dominance and inequality. As a result, CDA adopts – as a methodological principle – an interdisciplinary or multidisciplinary approach in order to grasp and adequately analyse relationships between complex social phenomena and language use (Van Dijk 1993; Fairclough 1995; Fairclough & Wodak 1997; Wodak & Meyer 2001).

As regards the interdisciplinary approach, Van Dijk (1993:279) points out that various theories, methods or disciplines can be employed depending on their relevance to contribute

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<sup>15</sup> Wodak and Meyer (2009b:22) characterize hermeneutics as “the method of grasping and producing meaning”.

to the main aim of the critical approach, namely the understanding of social inequality and injustice. There are accordingly many approaches to CDA which correspond to different and specific theories, methods for analysis, or disciplines used by various scholars (Van Dijk 1993, 2001c; Wodak & Meyer 2001). In Wodak and Meyer's (2009b:5) words,

CDA has never been and has never attempted to be or to provide one single or specific theory. Neither is one specific methodology characteristic of research in CDA. Quite the contrary, studies in CDA are multifarious, derived from quite different theoretical backgrounds, oriented towards different data and methodologies.

An overview of the major approaches to CDA will be provided in Chapter 2.

### **1.6.1.2 Discourse**

The term “discourse” is used with various meanings in different academic disciplines. In linguistics the term is evidently used with reference to language, although it is also used in different senses according to various theoretical perspectives (cf. e.g. De Beaugrande 1985, 1997a; Fairclough 1992; Mills 1997; Van Dijk 1997b). Schiffrin, Tannen, and Hamilton (2001b:1) argue that the various definitions of “discourse” in linguistics fall into three main categories, namely (i) anything beyond the sentence, (ii) language use, and (iii) a broader range of social practice that includes non-linguistic (e.g. visual) and non-specific instances of language.<sup>16</sup>

The first category can be observed in many domains of linguistic inquiry and theoretical perspectives where discourse is defined in relation to the term “sentence” and often also to “text”. For instance, Stubbs (1983:1) defines discourse as “language above the sentence or above the clause”, whereas Dooley and Levinsohn (2001) regard “discourse” and “text” as synonymous terms. For De Beaugrande (1985:7), however, discourse is a set of mutually relevant texts.

In theoretical frameworks where a clear distinction is made between discourse and text (cf. e.g. De Beaugrande 1985; Fairclough 1995; Fries & Gregory 1995; Van Dijk 1997b), the relation between these entities is explained in terms of text being a component or a property

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<sup>16</sup> Schiffrin et al. (2001b) do not specify exactly what they mean by “non-specific instances of language”.

of discourse. This is also the view underlying Van Dijk's (1997b) and Kress' (1985) definitions of text, according to which discourse is manifested in the form of text (Kress 1985:27).

In linguistic-oriented discourse analysis studies, the term "discourse" is generally used with reference to its functional dimensions, which have to do with the two other categories identified by Schiffrin et al. (2001b), presented as (ii) and (iii) above (cf. also Fairclough 1995; Van Dijk 1997b). According to Van Dijk (1997b), "discourse" refers to a form of spoken or written language use occurring in a communicative event involving individuals who are interacting in a particular social context. This definition of discourse is in line with its general use in the linguistic domain of Discourse Analysis. The definition also reflects, according to Van Dijk (1997b), the three main dimensions associated with discourse, namely (i) a form of language use (i.e. the language use dimension), (ii) a form of communicative event in which people use language to communicate ideas or beliefs and to express emotions (i.e. the cognitive dimension), and (iii) a form of verbal interaction in specific social contexts (i.e. the interaction dimension).

Van Dijk's definition of discourse also reflects the "general" (or "abstract") use of the term in discourse studies, as opposed to its "particular" (or "concrete") use when referring to a particular or definite instance of text or talk as in, for example, expressions like "this discourse" or "a discourse about ..." (Van Dijk 1997b:3-4). Moreover, Van Dijk (1997b:4) argues that the term "discourse", in its general or abstract sense, may also be used to refer to specific types or social domains of language use as in, for instance, expressions such as "medical discourse" and "political discourse".

"Political discourse" is a key notion in the present study. However, as noted by Wilson (2001:398), defining it is not an easy matter, for two reasons. Firstly, the political nature of discourse has been defined by many scholars in relation with general issues such as power, conflict, control or domination – to such an extent that almost any discourse may be considered as political (cf. also Gee 1999). For example, referring to a study by Diamond, Wilson (2001:398) notes that the discourse of a staff meeting may well be considered as "political" because issues of power and control are being addressed. Secondly, if the political nature of a discourse is only confined to political contexts and to political actors (i.e.

politicians, political institutions, political media, etc.), then ordinary people's everyday talks about political matters are excluded.

Although acknowledging the difficulties in defining the term "political discourse", I will be using it in the present study in the broad sense of "discourse" described above, namely its "general" or "abstract" use to refer to specific types or social domains of language use, including "political discourse". More precisely, the term "political discourse" is used in this study to refer to an instance of spoken or written language used by political actors who are engaged in communication in a particular social context.

As mentioned above, CDA places great emphasis on the social dimension of language, with discourse – language use – being viewed as a form of social practice or social action. On this approach, the social context of language use is accordingly taken to be an essential aspect of discourse (Wodak 2001b): the social practice aspect implies a dialectical relationship between discourse and social structure in the sense that (i) discourse occurs in and is shaped by society, and at the same time (ii) discourse also has certain effects on society (Fairclough 1989:23). That is, on the one hand, language exists among groups of individuals who live in a multilevel and complex society. In this respect, individuals use language in ways which are determined by the social institutions, positions, situations, conditions and circumstances in which they find themselves. On the other hand, discourse has social effects in the sense that, according to Fairclough (1992:64), it is a practice not merely of representing the world or society, but of signifying, constituting and constructing the world in meaning.

Against this background, CDA can be characterized as an approach to discourse analysis which focuses on the way that social and political issues such as power abuse, dominance, and inequality are enacted, confirmed, legitimated, reproduced, or challenged through text and talk in the social and political context (Van Dijk 2001c:352). In a nutshell, the primary concern in CDA is the relationship between language, power and ideology (Wodak 2001b). Concepts such as 'ideology' and 'power' (and more specifically 'social power') are therefore key concepts in CDA (cf. section 1.6.1.4 below).

### 1.6.1.3 Text

As in the case of “discourse”, the term “text” is used with different meanings in the various domains of and theoretical approaches to linguistics (cf. e.g. De Beaugrande 1980, 1985, 1997a,b; De Beaugrande & Dressler 1981; Fries & Gregory 1995; Van Dijk 1997b; Halliday 2002). One general way of defining “text” is according to its social function and its structural characteristics. In Text Linguistics, for example, a text is considered to be the naturally occurring manifestation of language which is used for communicative purposes (De Beaugrande 1980:1). From this perspective, “text” is defined as a communicative occurrence (or a communicative unit) which is required to satisfy seven principles of textuality (De Beaugrande & Dressler 1981:3). The first principle is *Cohesion*, which concerns the ways the actual uttered or written words (or surface elements) are mutually connected according to grammatical forms and conventions within a sequence. *Coherence*, the second principle, has to do with the ways in which concepts (i.e. elements of knowledge representing the cognitive content of surface elements) and relations (i.e. the links between concepts in the text) are mutually accessible and relevant. The third principle of textuality is *Intentionality*, which deals with what the text producer intends to communicate or to achieve. *Acceptability* is the fourth principle and concerns the receiver’s attitude regarding the text: it is presumed to be cohesive and coherent with an intended communicative purpose. The fifth principle, *Informativity*, has to do with the degree to which the occurrence of the actual text is (from the text receiver’s perspective) predictable. *Situationality*, the sixth principle, deals with the factors which make a text relevant to the situation in which it occurs. The final principle is *Intertextuality*. This concerns the connection between the current text and other texts of the same type (e.g. other poems, road signs, news articles, etc.) (De Beaugrande & Dressler 1981:3-10).

In the theoretical framework of Systemic-Functional Grammar (cf. e.g. Fries & Gregory 1995; Halliday 2002), the term “text” (spoken or written) refers to an instance of language use as a social behaviour (Ventola 1995:5). However, in order to qualify as a text, an instance of language use has to fulfil certain specific features. For example, according to Halliday (2002), what distinguishes a text from a “non-text” is that, unlike a non-text, a text is a semantic unit with the distinguishing features of generic structure, textual structure, and cohesion. Generic structure concerns the form of a text as a property of its genre, for example



that of a poem or newspaper article. The textual structure has to do with the way a clause is organized as a message, and the way the message in a given discourse is organized into information units. Cohesion concerns the semantic relations between certain elements of a given text, for example between proper names and pronouns (Halliday 2002: 30-46).

Another general way of defining the term “text” is in relation to or in contrast with the term “discourse”. For example, in (Critical) Discourse Analysis (cf. Fairclough 1992; Van Dijk 1997d, amongst many others) a text is taken to be a dimension of discourse. Adopting this view, Kress (1985:27) articulated the difference between text and discourse by pointing out that discourse is realized or manifested in the form of a text. Van Dijk (1997b) similarly considers text as a dimension, or property, of discourse. According to him, there are two “modes” of language use, i.e. of discourse: spoken language use and written language use (or spoken discourse and written discourse). The former refers to “talk”, whereas the later refers to “text” (Van Dijk 1997b:3). Unlike other scholars (e.g. De Beaugrande 1985; Kress 1985; Fairclough 1992) Van Dijk uses the term “text” to refer only to written language.

Adopting the approach associated with (Critical) Discourse Analysis, as described above, the term “text” is used in the present study in a general way to refer to any spoken or written manifestation/realization of discourse. The spoken or written words in a political speech, for instance, are taken to constitute a text.

#### **1.6.1.4 Ideology and Power**

##### *Ideology*

As pointed out by several theorists, defining the concept of ‘ideology’ is a difficult task. McLellan (in Heywood 2007:5) argues that it is the most elusive concept in the whole of the social sciences. As a result, ‘ideology’ has been defined in various and often contradictory ways in the literature (cf. Eagleton 1994b; Decker 2004; Heywood 2007). According to Decker (2004:12), in order to understand the various definitions of this concept, it is important to ground the different conceptions of ideology in the rigorous historical paradigms of the theorists and philosophers who have investigated it. Such a task goes well beyond the scope of the present study and will not be attempted here. However, I shall give an exposition that indicates the aspects of ‘ideology’ which are relevant to this study.

Besides the difficulty in grasping the concept of ‘ideology’, Decker (2004:6) argues that most modern theorists of ideology would agree that definitions of the concept typically (perhaps inevitably) run the risk of giving – at least unconsciously – a subjective (and perhaps ideologically-driven) representation of the very phenomenon that they seek to define objectively.

Against this background, it is important to note that the term “ideology” was first used in the eighteenth-century in France during the period of the Enlightenment. The term was coined by the French philosopher and revolutionary aristocrat Antoine Destutt de Tracy (1754-1836) in 1796 during the French revolution (Eagleton 1994b; Decker 2004; Heywood 2007). In its original use, “ideology” meant the “science of ideas” (Heywood 2007:5), where science was placed in opposition to metaphysics and psychology. The ideas referred to in De Tracy’s definition involved social ideas or thoughts which were considered as social phenomena (Eagleton 1994b).

Although Ideology, as a scientific field of study, was first developed during the eighteenth-century, the object of this study (i.e. social ideas) had already been addressed by philosophers in connection with the relationships between consciousness (i.e. ideas and beliefs) and material reality (i.e. real or actual social conditions) (Eagleton 1994b; Decker 2004; Heywood 2007). Different and contrasting perspectives emerged from these philosophical reflections. A brief review of the various perspectives shows that some philosophers such as Plato (428 BC-348 BC), known as “idealists”, believed that ideas are innate, autonomous, and that they are prior to and more authentic than material reality. In contrast, “materialists” such as Condillac (1715-1780) believed in the primacy of the material world over ideas. Other philosophers such as Hobbes (1588-1679), known as “empiricists”, argued that the external social world determines our thoughts and ideas, whereas “rationalists” such as Descartes (1596-1650) believed that people’s innate ideas form the basis of their experience of the external world (Hawkes 1996).

It appears therefore that the historical conceptualization of ideology was grounded in the way that philosophers approached the intrinsic relationships between ideas and real material social conditions. Like others French scholars working in the field of Ideology, De Tracy was a materialist who believed in the close interrelationships between ideas and material circumstances (Eagleton 1994b:5). From this perspective, he developed a so-called “science

of ideas” in order to examine how the human mind is conditioned – via the senses – by the social and material environment (Eagleton 1994b:4). In this scientific endeavour, as mentioned by Decker (2004:23), the early French exponents of Ideology believed that discovering the source of human ideas would bring about social changes; in doing so they merged a humanist, republican agenda with “scientific” progress. In order to understand this approach, Eagleton (1994b:2) provides the following overview of the situations in which the new science was born:

Ideology, then, belongs to modernity – to the brave new epoch of secular, scientific rationality which aims to liberate men and women from their mystifications and irrationalism, their false reverence for God, aristocrat and absolute monarch, and restore to them instead their dignity as fully rational, self-determining beings. It is the bourgeoisie revolution at the level of the mind itself; and its ambition is nothing less than to reconstruct that mind from the ground up, dissecting the ways we receive and combine our sense-data so as to intervene in this process and deflect it to desirable political ends.

However, as pointed out by Eagleton (1994b:5), the endeavour to study people’s ideas was also driven by the fact that the early French exponents of Ideology were an odd mixture of materialists and idealists in the sense that, apart from considering the close interrelation between ideas and material circumstances, they also believed in ideas as being at the very foundation of social life. Advocating the primacy of ideas over material reality formed a core argument against the exponents of Ideology. Amongst the most influential opponents of De Tracy’s new science was the then French Emperor Napoleon Bonaparte. In order to defend and protect his authoritarian political regime, Napoleon claimed that De Tracy and his followers – whom he pejoratively referred to as “ideologues” – were “dreamers” and “windbags” who had substituted a “diffuse metaphysics” for a “knowledge of the human heart and of the lessons of history” (Eagleton 1994b:5). In other words, Napoleon accused ideologues of being irrational and unrealistic as opposed to his pragmatism<sup>17</sup> as a political leader. Because of his negative view of Ideology at the early stage of the new science, Napoleon is considered as the first person to have given the term “ideology” a negative connotation (Eagleton 1994b; Decker 2004).

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<sup>17</sup> Following Heywood (2007:3), Pragmatism can be defined as “behaviour shaped in accordance with practical circumstances and goals rather than ideological objectives.”

The meaning of the term “ideology” has changed considerably since it was first used in the eighteenth century. From its original use by De Tracy to denote a “neutral science”, the term has since the time of Napoleon been used to refer to specific socio-political modes of thought (Decker 2004:12). As a consequence of its various uses, Thompson (2001:7170) argues that ‘ideology’ is a highly contested concept and that there is no general consensus today about what it refers to: different references, senses, connotations. Eagleton (1991:1-2), for example, identifies 16 main different meanings of “ideology”:

- the process of production of meanings, signs and value in social life;
- a body of ideas characteristic of a particular social group or class;
- ideas which help to legitimate a dominant political power;
- false ideas which help to legitimate a dominant political power;
- systematically distorted communication;
- that which offers a position for a subject;
- forms of thought motivated by social interests;
- identity thinking;
- socially necessary illusion;
- the conjuncture of discourse and power;
- the medium in which conscious social actors make sense of their world;
- action-oriented sets of beliefs;
- the confusion of linguistic and phenomenal reality;
- semiotic closure;
- the indispensable medium in which individuals live out their relation to a social structure;
- the process whereby said life is converted to a natural reality.

Heywood (2007:5), who is primarily concerned with political ideologies – e.g. liberalism, socialism, nationalism, ecogism – likewise identifies ten meanings of “ideology”:

- a political belief system;
- an action-oriented set of political ideas;
- the ideas of the ruling class;
- the world view of a particular social class or social group;
- the political ideas that embody or articulate class or social interests;

- the ideas that propagate false consciousness amongst the exploited or oppressed;
- the ideas that situate the individual within a social context and generate a sense of collective belonging;
- an officially sanctioned set of ideas used to legitimize a political system or regime;
- an all-embracing political doctrine that claims a monopoly of truth;
- an abstract and highly systematic set of political ideas.

It is not my purpose here to embark on a detailed discussion of the various meanings associated with the term “ideology”. It is however important to note that, as pointed out by Eagleton (1994b:15), the meanings of this term depend on whether it is used in a pejorative, a positive or a neutral manner. Moreover, according to Eagleton (1994b:15) theories of ideology represent, amongst others, attempts to explain why it is that people come to hold certain views; and to this extent, these theories examine the relation between thought and social reality. Irrespective of how this relation is conceived – as a reflection or contradiction, a correspondence or dislocation, an inversion or imaginary construction – theories of ideology assume that there are specific historical reasons why people come to feel, reason, desire and imagine as they do.

According to Thompson (2001), the way in which ideology is studied in the literature is determined by whether a critical or more general (“neutral”) connotation is attached to the concept. As mentioned earlier, the pejorative view of the concept of ‘ideology’ started with Napoleon. Another negative view of this concept was later put forward in the influential work of Karl Marx and his collaborator Friedrich Engels who linked it to specific socio-political modes of thought (Decker 2004:12).

As is clear from the above discussion, Marx did not coin the term “ideology”. Decker (2004:10) points out that Marx never provided a complete theory of ideology (cf. also Eagleton 1994 for more discussion of Marx’s diverse views on ideology). Still, Marx’s conceptions of ideology form the basis for numerous academic discussions of this concept (Eagleton 1994b; Van Dijk 1998; Decker 2004; Thompson 2001; Heywood 2007). In order to understand Marx’s conceptions, it is of relevance to note that he adopted a materialist approach (Eagleton 1994b), even though some theorists claim that his approach is rather a synthesis of materialism and idealism (cf. e.g. Hawkes 1996). Moreover, Marx and Engels were primarily concerned with social development and social change in history, and their

focus was on conflicts between exploiting and exploited classes in capitalist societies throughout history (Eagleton 1994b; Heywood 2007). In this respect, Marx and Engels (1994:24) presents the following conception of ideology in the *German Ideology*:<sup>18</sup>

The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e. the class which is the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force. The class which has the means of material production at its disposal has control at the same time over the means of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it.

The above remarks form a critique of capitalist society. For Marx, this society represents a social organization in which the capitalist economic production base plays a determinant role; the capitalist society is furthermore characterized by the exploitation of the workers – who constitute the proletarian class – by the people who own capital. The exploitation of one social group by another in capitalist society, and the unequal distribution of wealth among individuals correspond to an unequal relation of power between social groups. As a consequence, capitalist society is characterized by conflicts between individuals or groups who struggle to define or organize society according to their own interests. According to Marx, ideology therefore represents the ideas and reflects the social interests of the ruling class (Heywood 2007), hence the expression “bourgeois ideology” (Eagleton 1994b). In short then, Marx views ideology in a critical way as an instrument of the dominant class to define society according to its own interests and in order to maintain its domination over the other classes. In order to achieve this goal, ideas are presented as independent from real material conditions (Eagleton 1994b; Heywood 2007).

Marx’s negative and critical conception of ideology is based on the premise that concrete historical necessity precedes thought (Decker 2004:8). Thus, from a materialistic perspective, the belief in the autonomy and primacy of ideas over material reality is Marx’s core critique of idealists. In this respect, in their criticism in *The German Ideology* of the idealists known as the Young Hegelian philosophers – whom Marx considered as intellectual advocates of the ruling class – Marx and Engels argue that in contrast to the idealists’ view, all human

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<sup>18</sup> *The German Ideology* was co-written by Marx and Engels in 1845. The expression “the ruling class” in the quoted section refers to the capitalist bourgeois class.

consciousness is rooted in material conditions; consciousness can therefore be changed only by transforming these conditions (Eagleton 1994b:6). In essence, then, Marx regards ideology as an inversion of the relations between consciousness (i.e. ideas) and the material world (Eagleton 1994b; Decker 2004; Thompson 2001). From Marx and Engels' perspective, the autonomy and primacy of consciousness over reality is a mistaken view, one which Engels calls "false consciousness". For Engels, false consciousness represents a situation where people erroneously believe that they act autonomously and independently of material constraints when, in fact, the very basis of their mental activity lies in their relation to socially established modes of production (Decker 2004:7).

Marx therefore conceived ideology in a critical way to the extent that he regarded the idealists' conception of consciousness as having the practical function of distracting people from their oppression and exploitation by generating illusions and mystifications, that is, false consciousness (Eagleton 1994b:6; cf. also Heywood 2007). The illusions and mystifications stem from the idealist view that people's consciousness is not determined by and has no relation with the concrete material circumstances in which they live. In other words, on this view, there is a non-relation between ideas and reality in a class system society, as pointed out by Eagleton (1994b:6): "... there is an apparent non-correspondence between ideas and reality in class society, but this non-correspondence is structural to that form of life, and fulfils an important function within it."

It is important to keep in mind that, for Marx, people's ideological misconceptions are not just the distortion of reality or 'false consciousness', but somehow inherent in the material structure of capitalist society itself (Eagleton 1994b:11). Marx's critique of the nature of economic production in capitalist society is also set out in his influential book *Capital* (1867) in which he puts forward a theory of ideology which differs from the social class struggle-based one discussed above (Eagleton 1994b; Decker 2004). In a capitalist mode of production, employees work in exchange for a certain amount of money which represents their wage. More precisely, a value is attached to an individual's physical or intellectual effort (i.e. labour-power) during a period of time (i.e. labour-time), and this value is represented by the wage. Marx argues that there is only an "apparent" correspondence between effort and wage; for him, capitalism is "in essence" characterized by the fact that employees are not paid exactly according to the value of their labour. This is because capitalists (i.e. employers) make profit out of the surplus value generated by employees'

work and for which the latter are not paid. Ideology thus resides in the apparent relations between workers and the product of their labour, which is regarded as a commodity. According to Mepham (1994:217), Marx regarded the selling of the labour-power commodity as the real relation of exchange which is transformed into the mystifying phenomena of wages or wage-contracts. Moreover, as pointed out by Marx (1994:26), individuals also work (to some extent) for one another, and therefore their labour assumes a social form. In this respect, wages disguise the real nature of the social relations involved in transactions between capitalist and labourer in bourgeois society (Mepham 1994:217). Marx (1994:23) uses the expression “fetichsism of commodities” to refer to the ideological relations between workers and the products of their labour (i.e. commodities) in capitalist society. This expression conveys the idea that, under capitalism, commodities detach themselves from social control and take on a “fetishistic life” of their own. Hence it is the transaction between commodities which governs human relations, instead of the other way round.

As mentioned earlier, Marx developed many theories of ideology but never provided a single comprehensive theory of this notion. However, his different conceptions of ‘ideology’ in *The German Ideology* and *Capital* have been hugely influential in academic debates on this notion (Decker 2004:9). Marx’s theories of ideology, which were presented within the broad domain of economic production, were further developed and revised by his followers in various other domains of intellectual inquiry. These followers, generally referred to as “(neo-)Marxists”, include scholars such as Georg Lukács, Louis Althusser, Antonio Gramsci and Jürgen Habermas, amongst many others. For instance, Western Marxists such as Georg Lukács and Louis Althusser extended Marx’s ideas by emphasizing the important role of culture, practice and consciousness (Eagleton 1994b). According to Williams (1994:175), (neo-)Marxists’ conceptions of ideology share the following three general features:

- a system of beliefs characteristic of a particular social class or group;
- a system of illusionary beliefs – false ideas or false consciousness – which can be contrasted with true or scientific knowledge;
- the general process of the production of meaning and ideas<sup>19</sup>.

The critical way of using ‘ideology’ is characteristic of most (neo-)Marxists’ views of this concept. According to Thompson (2001:7170), the study of ideology from such a critical

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<sup>19</sup> For a detailed discussion of Marxist views of the concept of ideology, see e.g. Eagleton (1994a).



perspective would involve not merely describing values or beliefs, but also “unmasking” them, that is, showing how they misrepresent the world or how they serve dominant interests.

A general use of the term “ideology” (as opposed to the critical approach) is illustrated by the influential work of the non-Marxist Karl Mannheim as set out in his 1936 book *Ideology and Utopia* (cf. Eagleton 1994a; Thompson 2001; Heywood 2007). Mannheim (1994:50) is considered as a leading figure in the “sociology of knowledge” tradition. Within that tradition, people’s ideas or knowledge about the world represent the object of inquiry, and research aims at gaining an understanding of the social foundation of systems of ideas.

Like Marx, Mannheim has a negative conception of ideology (Eagleton 1994b). For Mannheim, ideologies represent systems of thought which serve to defend a particular social order, and which broadly express the interests of its dominant or ruling group (Heywood 2007:8). Mannheim (1994) moreover distinguishes two different views of ideology, namely “particular ideology” and “total ideology”. According to Mannheim (1994:51), the particular conception of ideology is found when the term is used to refer to a person’s sceptical opinion about an opponent’s ideas and representations. Such opposing ideas and representations are regarded as more or less conscious disguises of the real nature of a situation, the recognition of which would not be in accord with one’s interests. Mannheim (1994:51) notes however that although this conception of ideology is different from the common-sense notion of what constitutes a lie, the distortions of reality within the conception range from conscious lies to half-conscious and unwitting disguises; from calculated attempts to mislead others to self-deception. From this perspective, it appears that ideology as conceived by Marx, for instance, corresponds to the particular conception.

In contrast to the particular interpretation, the total conception of ideology, according to Mannheim (1994:51), is found when the term is used to refer to the ideology of a particular time or of a particular historic-social group (e.g. a social class), where the focus is on the characteristics and composition of the “structure of the mind” of the particular time or group. Note, however, that the particular and the total conceptions of ideology have the following principle in common: ideas and representations which are put forward are considered or interpreted according to the social conditions or position of the person/group who are expressing or holding them (cf. Mannheim 1994:50-68 for detailed discussion).

Mannheim's (1994:50) theory is intended to identify and account for the meanings which can be ascribed to "collective minds". Accordingly, he is primarily interested in the way that social and historical conditions determine systems of thought, which implies that the focus is on the total conception of ideology. In line with this total (or general) conception, the aim of studying ideology is to gain understanding of systems of thought rather than – as would be the case with the critical approach associated with (neo-)Marxists – to unmask and discredit such systems (Mannheim 1994:50).

### *Power*

The development of CDA was significantly influenced by, amongst others, (neo-)Marxist theories of ideology (Van Dijk 1993; Fairclough & Wodak 1997; Wodak & Meyer 2009b). This influence is evident from the way in which CDA employs the concept 'hegemony', specifically as it was conceived by the Western-Marxist Antonio Gramsci. Gramsci, whose approach to ideology represents an extension of Marx's theoretical ideas, shares Marx's view of ideology as a political instrument that is used by bourgeois groups to maintain their domination (i.e. power) over the labour or proletarian classes. However, given the changes that have taken place in capitalist societies, Gramsci does not share Marx's theory of power which asserts that ruling classes maintain their domination over their subordinates by the use of force and coercion (Bates 1975; Decker 2004). According to Bates (1975:351), Gramsci's view is grounded in the premise that "man is not ruled by force alone, but also by ideas". From this perspective, Gramsci claims that apart from the use of coercion – e.g. through the intervention of the police or the army – ruling classes also make use of ideology, and more specifically of hegemonic control (Bates 1975; Decker 2004). Hegemony, for Gramsci, has to do with the various techniques used by ruling classes in order to secure the tacit consent of their subordinates to be ruled. Ideology amongst other measures is part of this process (Eagleton 1994:13). Thus Gramsci introduces the concept 'hegemony' in Marx's theory of ideology (Bates 1975; Eagleton 1994; Decker 2004; Heywood 2007), and for him the concept has to do with a particular type of relation of power between different social groups.

The broad Gramscian conception of power – i.e. hegemony – is the one to which CDA ascribes (Van Dijk 1993, 2001c), although the specific definition of this concept differs according to the particular approach taken by various theorists. For instance, from a cognitive

perspective, Van Dijk (2008:65) defines social power – as realized by the power relations between social groups, institutions, or organizations – in terms of “the control exercised by one group or organization (or its members) over the actions and/or the minds of (the members of) another group, thus limiting the freedom of action of the others, or influencing their knowledge, attitudes or ideologies.”

For Reisigl and Wodak (2009:88), social power has to do with an asymmetric relationship among social actors who assume different social positions or belong to different social groups. From their perspective, power is viewed as the possibility of exercising one’s own will within a social relationship, often against the will or interests of others (Reisigl & Wodak 2009:88). This is also the view adopted in the present study. Thus regarding the reference in research question A as to messages of power, the operative definition adopted here is that such a message conveys an assumption of inequality in the relationships between different social actors in different social positions who often also belong to different social groups. It is assumed here that the message defined as one of power or ideology, is one that expresses differences in terms of power status in a social relationship, with the stronger actor exercising his/her will over the will or interests of the weaker. In this respect, it is important to point out that international relations are characterised by unequal relations of economic and political power between countries or groups of countries. In the case of the present study, China is, in contrast to sub-Saharan African countries, a significant global economic and political power (cf. Chapter 3). Thus the overall context includes the position of China as economically and politically stronger than African countries. It is against the background of this asymmetric relation of economic and political power between China and sub-Saharan African countries that the possibility of China exploiting African countries is imagined and expressed in the sceptical public opinion noted in Chapter 1.

Conceptions of power, just as conceptions of ‘ideology’ vary according to the approach taken by particular CDA theorists (Wodak 2001a; Wodak & Meyer 2009b). For instance, Wodak and Meyer claim that Fairclough adopts a more Marxist-orientated conception of ideology that he (in Wodak & Meyer 2009b:9) defines as “representations of aspects of the world which contribute to establish and maintain relations of power, domination and exploitation”. Van Dijk (1998:8), in contrast, views ideology as “the basis of the social representations shared by members of a group.” Within the Discourse Historical Approach to CDA, ideology is taken to be an (often) one-sided perspective or world view composed of

related mental representations, convictions, opinions, attitudes, and evaluations, which are shared by members of a specific social group (Reisigl & Wodak 2009:88). The latter conception of ideology will be adopted in the present study.

Regardless of the various conceptions of ideology introduced by various theorists in CDA, it is important to keep in mind that this concept is regarded within this framework as a core element in the exercise of power relations among people (Wodak 2001a:10). Moreover, as pointed out by Wodak and Meyer (2009b:8), the focus in CDA is primarily on the hidden and latent types of everyday beliefs, which often appear disguised as conceptual metaphors and analogies, thus attracting the attention of linguists.

Following Marx (1994:24), it is assumed in the present study that “the ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e. the class which is the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force.” Relations between large institutions such as countries or states and governments also include aspects of social class relations which remain an issue between the various states. For instance, in negotiating trade the institution with more money is dominant, whereas the one that will receive funding is socially in a weaker position. Since the present study deals with relations between countries or states, and more specifically between global economic superpower countries (in the present case, China) and less powerful ones (sub-Saharan African countries), it is claimed here that the ideas of the strongest economic countries are the dominant ideas. Hence, in view of the fact that all African countries are independent and sovereign, I adopt Gramsci’s conception of hegemony as a kind of power relation between China and sub-Saharan African countries.

## **1.7 Data Analysed in the Study**

### **1.7.1 Sources of Data**

The speeches and interviews by Chinese officials and related official Chinese documents (see Table 1.1) focusing on cooperation with Africa in general, and sub-Saharan countries in particular, will be analysed in this study. The relevant documents were collected from China’s official websites (those of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, and particular Chinese embassies in Sub-Saharan African countries), and also from the official website of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation).

## 1.7.2 Inclusion Criteria

The inclusion criteria for selection of the data are based on (i) the time, (ii) the type of speech events, (iii) the countries in which the documents were produced, (iv) the speaker/writer, and (v) the audience (i.e. the readers/listeners).

### 1.7.2.1 The Time

The increase in China-Africa cooperation is illustrated, amongst others, by the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) established and their meeting held for the first time in Beijing in October 2000. Taking this date as point of departure, the texts to be analysed in this study are documents which were produced between October 2000 and December 2010.

### 1.7.2.2 The Speech Events

The documents analysed in this study include speeches and interviews that were produced during the following speech events:

- The speeches delivered by the Chinese president during his official visits to Gabon, Nigeria, South Africa, and Tanzania.
- The speeches delivered by two Chinese presidents at, respectively, the first (2000) and the third (2006) ministerial conferences of the FOCAC summits.
- Interviews given by the then Chinese ambassadors to Tanzania and Nigeria, and by a Chinese State councilor to, respectively, *Daily News* (a Tanzanian national newspaper), *Leadership News* (a Nigerian national paper), and *Xinhua News Agency* (an official Chinese press agency).

It was not possible to identify the specific type of speech event during which the *China's African Policy* document was released in January 2006.

### 1.7.2.3 The Countries

There are 45 sub-Saharan African countries<sup>20</sup> located in four regions (viz. Western Africa, Eastern Africa, Central Africa, and Southern Africa), and most of them have diplomatic relations with China<sup>21</sup>. It is to be expected, therefore, that there will be numerous speeches and other related documents about cooperation by Chinese officials directed at each of these countries. For the purposes of the present study, however, I have restricted the number of speeches to one speech per region. This decision was based on two considerations, one being the qualitative nature of the study. The second consideration concerns the fact that the Chinese officials' speeches during the FOCAC summits, as well as the *China's African Policy* document are inclusive in the sense that they are not directed to specific African countries but to all 47 countries having diplomatic relations with China. It is therefore assumed that – apart from the four speeches directed at specific sub-Saharan African countries – selecting the *China's African Policy* document and the speeches from the FOCAC summits provides us, from a qualitative perspective, with adequate substantial data.

The four speeches referred to above were delivered in Gabon, Nigeria, South Africa and Tanzania, respectively. These countries were selected because (i) they are each located in a specific region of sub-Saharan Africa, and (ii) they represent (to a lesser or greater degree) economic and political forces in their respective regions as well as in the continent as a whole. In this respect, South Africa is the most prominent economic force in Africa<sup>22</sup>, with vast natural resources such as gold, diamonds and platinum<sup>23</sup>. As regards its relations with China, it is significant that South Africa became China's largest African trade partner in 2009.

South Africa has a total population of approximately 49.4 million; Nigeria, by contrast, is Africa's most populous country with approximately 158.5 million people, representing about

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<sup>20</sup> United Nations Development Programme (UNDP, 2011).

<sup>21</sup> According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. Online: <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/gjhdq/2913/>

<sup>22</sup> World Bank. 2011 (July). South Africa Economic Update: Focus on Savings, Investment, and Inclusive Growth. Online: [http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTSOUTHAFRICA/Resources/SAEU-July\\_2011\\_Full\\_Report.pdf](http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTSOUTHAFRICA/Resources/SAEU-July_2011_Full_Report.pdf) (26 April 2012).

<sup>23</sup> The South Africa Guide. 2010 (February). Online: <http://www.thesouthafricaguide.com/natural-resources/south-africa-economy-south-african-natural-resources/> (26 April 2012).

47% of West Africa population.<sup>24</sup> In fact, Nigeria is amongst the five most populous countries in the world<sup>25</sup>. Along with South Africa, Nigeria is moreover one of the strongest economic powers in Africa. According to the World Bank (2011), Nigeria is the biggest producer of oil in Africa, and also has the largest natural gas reserves in the continent. It therefore seems plausible that a partnership with Nigeria would be of strategic importance for China in view of the large Nigerian population and that country's economic potential as far as natural resources are concerned.

Gabon, like Nigeria and South Africa, is rich in natural resources. The country is an important producer of oil, manganese and wood, and also has reserves of minerals such as diamonds, niobium and phosphates, gold, lead/zinc, potassium salts and magnesium<sup>26</sup>. However, unlike Nigeria, South Africa and also Tanzania, Gabon has a small population of only 1.4 million, which makes it – from an economic perspective – a small potential market for Chinese goods. Still, despite its small population, Gabon has China as its second largest customer after the United States of America,<sup>27</sup> a fact which can be ascribed to its richness in natural resources.

As far as Tanzania is concerned, this country is the biggest (in terms of land area) in Eastern Africa, with the largest concentration of wild animals.<sup>28</sup> Economically, it is regarded as a strategic country because of its geographical position in the East African region. The capital, Dar es Salaam, serves as a major port providing access to the Indian Ocean for neighbouring inland countries such as Malawi, Zambia, Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda<sup>29</sup>. Tanzania is

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<sup>24</sup> World Bank (2011).

<sup>25</sup> Population Reference Bureau. 2011 (July). World Population Data Sheet. Online: [http://www.prb.org/pdf11/2011population-data-sheet\\_eng.pdf](http://www.prb.org/pdf11/2011population-data-sheet_eng.pdf) (26 April 2012).

<sup>26</sup> Le Gabon.org, Official Portal of the Gabonese Republic. 2012 (April). Online: <http://www.en.legabon.org/index.php?m=0&s=0> (26 April 2012).

<sup>27</sup> Jansson, J. C. Burke and W. Jian. 2009 (August). Chinese Companies in the Extractive Industries of Gabon & the DRC: Perceptions of Transparency. Online: [http://www.ccs.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2009/11/Chinese\\_Companies\\_in\\_the\\_Extractive\\_Industries\\_of\\_Gabon\\_and\\_the\\_DRC.\\_CCS\\_report\\_August\\_2009.pdf](http://www.ccs.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2009/11/Chinese_Companies_in_the_Extractive_Industries_of_Gabon_and_the_DRC._CCS_report_August_2009.pdf) (8 May 2012).

<sup>28</sup> The United Republic of Tanzania. 2012. Online: <http://www.tanzania.go.tz/economicsurveyf.html> (8 May 2012).

<sup>29</sup> World Bank (2011).

China's largest aid recipient country in Africa; the Tanzania-Zambia Railway built in 1976, for instance, represents one of China's largest foreign aid projects.<sup>30</sup>

#### 1.7.2.4 The Speaker/Writer

Relations between China and Africa have been addressed by many Chinese officials from various ranks in the Chinese administration. In line with the qualitative paradigm adopted for this study, however, the number of speakers has been limited to specific officials: (i) the Chinese Presidents, because they are the highest ranked officials, representing the state at both national and international level; (ii) the Chinese ambassadors, who represent the Chinese government in sub-Saharan African countries; and (iii) the State Councillor, who apart from being a member of the Chinese government, specifically focused on China-Africa relations in his interview given to the official Chinese press agency, the *Xinhua News Agency*.

It is important to note that some of the above mentioned speakers are not necessarily the (only) authors of the texts they presented. Indeed, there is a possibility that the Chinese President did not think alone about the content of the speeches he delivered in African countries or during the FOCAC summits. These speeches might have been conceived by some members of his cabinet or/and some other member(s) of the Chinese administration. Similarly, it is assumed that the *China's African Policy* document was conceived by a group of members of the Chinese government. However, regardless of the identity of the real author(s) of the texts, what is important to consider is the hierarchical position and role of the speaker in the organization they represent. The Chinese President, like the Chinese ambassador, represents the Chinese administration at a top level. This status implies that they speak on behalf of a group of members. Considering that multiple authors may have been involved in producing a text read by, for example, the President, one has to accept that each of the texts analysed in this study represents a number of different voices all intent on promoting the position of the Chinese government. It is also likely that the texts, to some extent, carry contradicting messages because different authors at different stages would foreground different ideas. However, without more information on the exact contributors to the text, it is not possible to distinguish individual voices. It would be possible to interpret conflict or contradictions between various speeches as evidence of the multivoicedness

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<sup>30</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. 2000 (17 November). Online: <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/ziliao/3602/3604/t18009.htm> (8 May 2012).



brought about by multiple authors. This characteristic of the texts is acknowledged, but will not be further examined in the analyses.<sup>31</sup>

### **1.7.2.5 The Audience**

The question as to who the selected speeches, interviews, and related official Chinese documents actually address is important because the audience – that is the readers/listeners – is a key element of the context (see Chapter 2). It is therefore important to indicate that in Gabon in 2004 and in Nigeria in 2006, the Chinese president made his speeches at the National Assemblies of these countries, standing before the members of parliaments who – as members of the institutions – constituted an important part of the audience. Amongst other people in the audience, the head of states and representatives of diplomatic missions in the two countries were also considered as important members of the audience to the extent that, like the members of parliaments, they were explicitly referred to in the president's speech.

In 2007 at the University of Pretoria in South Africa, the members of this institution (i.e. the members of the university administration, the members of faculties, and the students) constituted an important part of the audience to the extent that they were directly referred to in the Chinese president's speech. Similarly, in 2009 in Tanzania, the Chinese president's speech was also directed at the youth who were part of the audience and explicitly referred to in the speech along with the Tanzanian head of state.

As main members of the audience during the FOCAC summits, the Chinese president's speeches were primarily directed at African heads of state and representatives of African governments. Representatives of other African institutions were also addressed to in the speeches. For instance, during the first FOCAC summit held in 2000 in Beijing, the Chinese president's explicitly referred to the then Secretary-General of the African Union.

The selected interviews were given to national and official news agencies. National and official newspapers circulate throughout the whole country, and articles published in these types of newspapers are generally directed at nationals even though they might interest a wider range of readers. From this perspective, it can be assumed that the intended readers of the Chinese officials' interviews are any national (including officials) of the specific country.

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<sup>31</sup> On the concept of 'multivoicedness', cf. e.g. Bakhtin (1981).

As far as the *China's African Policy* is concerned, it is directed at African countries which have diplomatic relations with China. It is however stated in the *China's African Policy* document (see Annex) that: “[b]y this African Policy Paper, the Chinese Government wishes to present to the world the objectives of China’s policy towards Africa and the measures to achieve them...” The expression “world” in this quoted section of the *China's African Policy* implies that the intended reader of this policy document is any institution in the world (e.g. states, governments, political or business organizations), politicians, and trade leaders, amongst others, which might be interested in China’s involvement in Africa.

The ten texts analysed in this study are listed in Table 1.1 below. The texts are presented according to their date of delivery. The codes in the Text reference column on the left provide the following information: (i) the text number – e.g. T1, T2, etc., (ii) the particular speech event – e.g. the first FOCAC summit (FOCAC1), a speech by the President (S), an interview (I), and (iii) the speaker/writer – e.g. the President (Pres).

Table 1.1: Selected texts constituting the data

<b>Text reference</b>	<b>Date</b>	<b>Speaker/writer</b>	<b>Title on the text</b>
T1/FOCAC1-Pres	10/10/2000	China’s President: Mr. Jiang Zemin	“China and Africa-Usher in the New Century Together”
T2/S-Pres	02/02/2004	China’s President: Mr Hu Jintao	“Consolidating China-Africa traditional friendship and deepening China-Africa all-round cooperation”
T3/CAP	1/2006	China’s government	“China’s Africa Policy”
T4/S-Pres	27/04/2006	China’s President: Mr Hu Jintao	“Work Together to Forge A New Type of China-Africa Strategic Partnership”
T5/I-S.C	23/10/2006	State Councillor Tang Jiaxuan	(none)
T6/FOCAC3-Pres	04/11/2006	China’s President: Mr Hu Jintao	(none)
T7/S-Pres	07/02/2007	China’s President: Mr Hu Jintao	“Enhance China-Africa Unity and Cooperation To Build a Harmonious World”
T8/S-Pres	16/02/2009	China’s President: Mr Hu Jintao	“Work Together to Write a New Chapter of China-Africa Friendship”
T9/ I-Amb	09/10/2009	China’s Ambassador to Tanzania Mr Liu Xincheng	(none)
T10/I-Amb	04/12/2010	China’s Ambassador to Nigeria Mr Deng Boqing	(none)

## 1.8 Organization of the study

The rest of the study is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides a description of three approaches to CDA that are relevant for the analysis of the various texts. These approaches

are the Dialectical-Relational Approach, the Socio-cognitive Approach, and the Discourse-Historical Approach. Particular attention will be given to the Discourse-Historical Approach, specifically as set out by Wodak (2001a); this approach forms the main framework of critical discourse analysis used in this study.

Wodak (2001a) argues that a critical study of language as a social practice has to take into account the socio-political and historical contexts in which the discourse is produced. Adopting this view, Chapter 3 provides the broader socio-political and historical contexts in which the documents constituting our data are embedded.

In accordance with the Discourse-Historical Approach to CDA, Chapter 4 provides an analysis of the relevant texts making use of the so-called three-dimensional approach. In terms of this approach, the analysis is conducted in three steps: (i) the different Contents and Discourse Topics of the various texts are identified, (ii) the discursive strategies used in the texts are identified and investigated, and (iii) a description is given of the linguistic means of realization as well as the context-dependent linguistic realizations found in the texts. The main findings are summarised in Chapter 5, the concluding chapter.

## Chapter 2

### Literature Review and Theoretical Framework

Exploring relations between language, ideology and power has been dealt with by many scholars in linguistics, and in CDA in particular. The first main section of the present chapter provides a description and a discussion of the leading approaches to CDA that are relevant for the topic of this study. These approaches are the Dialectical-Relational Approach, the Socio-Cognitive Approach, and the Discourse-Historical Approach. In the second main section of the chapter, I will pay particular attention to the Discourse-Historical Approach as set out by, specifically, Wodak (2001a); this approach will form the framework for the critical discourse analysis that is conducted in Chapter 4.

#### 2.1 Literature Review

As mentioned earlier, there are various approaches to CDA which correspond to different theoretical and methodological perspectives. In this respect, Wodak and Meyer (2009b) mention six dominant approaches, namely: the Dialectical-Relational Approach, the Socio-Cognitive Approach, the Discourse-Historical Approach, the Corpus-Linguistics Approach, the Social Actors Approach, and the Dispositive Analysis Approach. However, amongst all these approaches, only three are relevant for the present study, namely the Dialectical-Relational Approach, the Socio-Cognitive Approach, and the Discourse-Historical Approach. These approaches are described in the next three sections.

##### 2.1.1 The Dialectical-Relational Approach

The Dialectical-Relational Approach (hereafter DRA) to CDA was developed by Fairclough (1992, 2001, 2003, 2005a, 2005c, 2006, 2009) and Chouliaraki & Fairclough (1999). In his approach to CDA, Fairclough (2001:123) is particularly concerned with the radical changes which are taking place in contemporary social life, with how discourse figures within processes of change, and with shifts in the relationship between discourse and other social elements within networks of practices. In this regard, Fairclough (in Chouliaraki & Fairclough 1999; Fairclough, Jessop & Sayer 2004; Fairclough 2005b) adopts a critical

realism perspective<sup>32</sup> in considering social life as made up of, amongst others, social structures (or the “real”) and social events (or the “actual”). In Fairclough’s (Fairclough et al. 2004:4) view, social structures are the high and abstract levels of things or objects, their structures or natures and their causal powers and liability. They define and delimit what possibly can happen in real life and they include languages and other semiotic systems such as economic systems (e.g. capitalism), and social class systems. Social events, in contrast, are the low and concrete level of things actually happening and which often (partly) involve discursive activity (e.g. a board meeting or a soccer game). Social events are mainly caused by social structures, social practices, and social agents (or social subjects, i.e. people).

For Fairclough (2005a, 2005b, 2005c, 2009), there is no direct relationships between the abstract level of social structures and the concrete level of social events. In fact, Fairclough argues that the relationships between the two levels are mediated by social practices. Fairclough (2005c:77) uses the term “social practice” to refer to a relatively stabilised form of social activity such as, for instance, classroom teaching, family meals, medical consultations. The relationships between social structures and social events are mediated in the sense that, for instance in the case of family – which represents a type of social structure –social practices include family meals and family discussions.

Therefore, and also from an ontologically realist perspective, Fairclough (2005b:915) views the social world as a socially and, in part, linguistically constructed world. In this respect, he (2001, 2005c) regards every social practice as an articulation of different types of social elements – i.e. ordered in relation to each other – including discourse, which are in a relatively stable configuration (2001:1). According to Fairclough (2001, 2005a, 2005c), these social elements are:

- Activities
- Social relations
- Objects and instruments
- Time and place
- Social subjects, with their beliefs, knowledge, values, etc.
- Discourse (or semiosis).

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<sup>32</sup> Fairclough’s work is influenced by the philosophical approach of Critical Realism. The leading scholar of this approach is Roy Bhaskar (cf. e.g. Sayer, A. 2000. *Realism and Social Science*. London: Sage Publications).

Fairclough (2001, 2003, 2005a, 2005b, 2005c, 2009; cf. also Chouliaraki & Fairclough 1999) prefers using the term “semiosis” instead of “discourse”: on his approach discourse is perceived as ‘language in use’ and also as an element (or aspect) of social practices in particular relations with other elements of such practices.

Fairclough (1995:17) argues that semiosis, like the other elements of social practices, carries ideological representations and constructions of the world which are used as a means to reproduce relations of power or struggles between individuals in a given social organisation or institution. In addition, it is contended within the DRA that semiosis is internally and dialectically related to non-semiotic (i.e. non-discursive) elements of social practices (Fairclough, 2001, 2003, 2005b, 2005c, 2009). According to Fairclough (2001, 2005c, 2009) this dialectical relationship, i.e. this dialectics of semiosis, means that although each element of a given social practice is different from the others, they each partly “internalize” (or contain) the others. For instance, social relations, on the one hand, partly involve discourse<sup>33</sup> (the way people talk to each other) and discourse, on the other hand, partly involves social relations (the way people behave towards each other) (Fairclough 2009:163). Accordingly, research in DRA focuses on analysing the dialectical relationships between semiosis and other elements of social practices (Fairclough 2009:163).

Social practices, according to Fairclough (1992), have various orientations relating to economic, political, cultural, and ideological domains of social life in which semiosis may be involved, in some cases partially. The present study is therefore concerned with semiosis as an element of political and ideological practices. The concept ‘Ideology’ as employed in Fairclough’s approach is viewed from a Marxist perspective; Chiappello and Fairclough (2002:187) define this concept as follows:

a system of ideas, values and beliefs oriented to explaining a given political order, legitimizing existing hierarchies and power relations and preserving group identities. Ideology explains both the horizontal structure (the division of labour) of a society and its vertical structure (the separation of rulers and ruled), producing ideas which legitimize the latter, explaining in particular why one group is dominant and another dominated, why one person gives orders in a particular enterprise while another takes orders.

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<sup>33</sup> In Fairclough’s use of “discourse”, the term incorporates language and as well as other forms of semiosis such as body language and visual images (2005b:917).

From this perspective, Fairclough (1992:67) asserts that semiosis – regarded as an element of ideological practices – constitutes, naturalizes (i.e. makes things being seen as non-ideological and as “common-sense”), sustains and changes significations of the world from diverse positions in social power relations. The implication is that ideological and political practices are linked in the sense that ideology represents significations (generated within social power relations) as a dimension of the exercise of power and struggle over power. Besides, semiosis as an element of political practices is not only a site of power struggle, but it also plays a particular role in power struggle.

As described earlier, Fairclough (2005c, 2009) distinguishes three levels of social organisation, namely social structures, social practices, and social events. Language in general – considered as a social semiotic – is present as an element of each level and in a specific semiotic form. From the top to the bottom, languages (e.g. English or French) are the semiotic element of social structures. Languages as a type of social structure define and delimit the potential possibilities of texts<sup>34</sup> which are the semiotic element of concrete social events. The abstract level of languages and the concrete level of texts are mediated by “orders of discourse” which are the semiotic element of social practices.

According to Fairclough (2005c:77), social practices are articulated together – i.e. ordered in relation to each other as a network – to constitute social fields, organizations, and institutions. Moreover, a particular way in which social practices are networked is called a social order and the semiotic aspect (i.e. the language aspect) of a social order is called an “order of discourse”<sup>35</sup> (Fairclough 2005c:77; 1992). An order of discourse is made up of diverse discourses<sup>36</sup>, genres and styles, all of them configured in a particular way (Fairclough 2001, 2005a, 2005b, 2005c, 2009).

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<sup>34</sup> Fairclough (1992, 1995, 2005c) uses the term “text” in a broad manner which includes written and spoken language, and other multi-semiotic texts which include words and different semiotic forms (e.g. visual images and body language) as found in , for instance, interviews, meetings, television programs, etc.

<sup>35</sup> Fairclough (1989, 1995, 2005c, and 2009) borrowed and adapted the concept of “order of discourse” from Michel Foucault’s work, which has had a significant influence on Fairclough’s theoretical approach.

<sup>36</sup> Fairclough (2005c, 2009) uses “discourse(s)” (sometimes with an article) as a count noun and in a concrete sense (as opposed to the abstract one) to refer to a particular way of representing some aspect of social life – for instance, “the neo-liberal discourse of globalization”.

To understand the elements of orders of discourse, it is important to note that for Fairclough (1992:64) there are three functions of language and dimensions of meaning which coexist and interact in all semiosis: (i) the identity function which relates to the ways in which social identities are set up in discourse, (ii) the relational function which has to do with how social relationships between discourse participants are enacted and negotiated, and (iii) the ideational function which concerns the way in which texts signify the world and its processes, entities and relations<sup>37</sup>. Accordingly, Fairclough (2005a:58) argues that discourses, genres, and styles correspond to these three main ways in which discourse figures in social practices and social events. Discourses are particular ways of representing aspects of social life associated with particular social actors' perspectives and positions (Fairclough 2009:162), genres are social actors' particular ways of (inter)acting in their semiotic aspect (for instance, a political debate in parliament, an interview), and styles (for instance, being a leader, being "liberal") are the semiotic aspect of particular ways of being or of social actors' identities (Fairclough 2005c:78). At the concrete level of social events, discourses, genres, and styles correspond to three types of meaning of texts, namely representation, action and identification, respectively. Moreover, the relationship between discourses, genres, and styles is a dialectical one; hence, part of text analysis in DRA involves establishing the "interdiscursivity" of a text – i.e. the dialectical interrelations between discourse, genre, and style (Fairclough 2005c).

According to Fairclough (1995:188), orders of discourse (where discourse appears as discourses, genres, and styles) are socially conventionalized discursive practices which are available to social actors in particular circumstances and according to their social positions and perspectives. This means that an order of discourse represents a particular and privileged way (amongst and above alternative ones) of generating meaning through discourses, genres, and styles (Fairclough 2005c:78). For instance, according to Fairclough (2005c:79), discourses include representations of how things are and have been, as well as imaginaries – i.e. representations of how things might or should be. For Fairclough (1989:17, 1995, 2005c), therefore, orders of discourse are ideologically shaped by social relations of power in social

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<sup>37</sup> These three aspects or functions of semiosis are Fairclough's (1992) adaptation of Halliday's systemic functional view of a text as a unit having three main functions: (i) ideational (representing the world), (ii) interpersonal (constructing social relations and systems of belief and knowledge, and showing attitudes, desires, etc.), and (iii) textual (connecting the different parts of texts together and connecting texts to their contexts of production). Halliday's work in Systemic Functional Linguistics has significantly influenced Fairclough's theoretical approach to text analysis.



fields, institutions, organizations, and in society as a whole. Ideology may be enacted in ways of interaction through genres, and inculcated in ways of expressing an identity through styles. From this perspective, Fairclough (in Wodak & Meyer 2009b:9) argues that “analysis of texts... is an important aspect of ideological analysis and critique”.

As mentioned earlier, the DRA is particularly concerned with the radical changes which are taking place in contemporary social life. In this regard, modern China is an interesting case study since the country has been through important social and economic changes triggered by the economic reforms initiated in 1978 and which have led the country to its current economic power status. But more precisely, the DRA is concerned with the way discourse figures within processes of social change. In this respect, too, it would be interesting to investigate how China’s political discourse regarding its relations with sub-Saharan African countries constitutes, represents and contributes to the processes of social and economic changes happening in the country. Such an investigation falls outside the scope of the present study, however; the DRA is accordingly not a suitable framework for the purpose of the analysis presented in Chapter 4.

Another reason why the DRA is not suitable for the purpose of the present study is its view of discourse as dialectically determined by social structure, where such determination is mediated by social practices which can be ideologically invested as regards the conventions to which they are subject. From this view, the approach has been applied mostly to social practices which can be relatively easily identified as, for instance, classroom teaching, family meals, medical consultations, board meetings, and so on. In the context of the present study, international relations between countries can to a certain extent be considered as a form of political practice. Corresponding to such practice are certain conventions according to which individuals interact linguistically within that practice. This perspective implies that the relations between China and sub-Saharan African countries – which clearly belong to the international relations practice – are subject to the same conventions. Thus, unless I demonstrate that there are different or particular conventions according to which people interact when dealing with relations between China and sub-Saharan African countries, the fact that these belong to international relations – seen as a political practice – is not a solid basis for claiming that the relations between the relevant countries are ideologically shaped by relations of power.

Regarding social practices, moreover, the DRA focuses on analysing the dialectical relationships between discourse and other elements of social practice. However, given my object of inquiry, the problem with such an approach is that it would be difficult, and maybe biased, to only infer possible ideological structures from the dialectical relations between, on the one hand, elements of the relations between China and sub-Saharan African countries and, on the other hand, the political discourse dealing with such relations.

### **2.1.2 The Socio-Cognitive Approach**

The Socio-Cognitive approach (hereafter SCA) was developed by Van Dijk (2001b, 2009a). Within this approach, the focus is on the cognitive (i.e. mental) dimension of language use in general, and of discourse in particular (Van Dijk 1997b, 1997d, 2001b, 2009a, 2009b). Indeed, for Van Dijk language use is not only a social activity but also involves mental activities. From this perspective, the SCA focuses on what Van Dijk (1998, 2001b, 2005, 2009a, 2009b) refers to as the “discourse-cognition-society triangle”, that is, the relations between discourse structures, social cognition, and society. More specifically, and from a critical discourse analysis point of view, Van Dijk (1998, 2001a, 2001c, 2005, 2009a, 2009b) uses a socio-cognitive approach to examine the relations between discourse structures<sup>38</sup> and society, in terms of social relations of dominance as well as power between members of social or cultural groups, organisations or institutions.

#### **2.1.2.1 Discourse as Mental Process**

Van Dijk (1997b:17) points out that discourse production and comprehension are also cognitive processes in the sense that, for instance, an account of the grammar (in terms of syntax, semantics, etc.) and other properties for instance, speech acts, conversational interaction, etc.) of text or talk points to the fact that language users have knowledge of the rules that govern such structures and properties and the contexts in which they apply. Moreover, to understand a sentence, to establish coherence between sentences or to interpret the topic of a given text or a talk presupposes that language users share a repertoire of socio-cultural beliefs. Furthermore, the choice of lexical items, the variation of style or the use of

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<sup>38</sup> That is, generally speaking, grammatical structures and as well as strategies and other properties of text and talk (Van Dijk 1997a).

rhetorical devices similarly presuppose that language users express opinions or ideologies and therefore contribute to the construction of new ones or the modification of existing ones with their interlocutors.

### 2.1.2.2 Social Cognition

Van Dijk (1997b, 1997d, 1998, 2009b) uses the term “belief” in both a general and a more technical manner to refer to any product or properties of thinking or of the mind. Used in this manner, the term includes all the presupposed knowledge, beliefs, ideologies, attitudes, judgment and opinions, emotions, propositions, norms, and values which influence or determine the cognitive processes of discourse production and comprehension. On the one hand, such beliefs can be personal, that is, related to an individual’s beliefs; or, on the other hand, they can be related to social structures (such as social or cultural groups, organisations, institutions, and so on) in a sense that these beliefs can be shared with all or most other members of such structures. In other words, a distinction is drawn between personal beliefs and social beliefs. As far as ideologies are concerned, Van Dijk (1998:49) claims that they are the foundation of the social beliefs shared by all or most members of a social group<sup>39</sup>.

Thus as described so far, beliefs have both a cognitive dimension (they are from the domain of the mind) and a social dimension in the sense that they are socially or culturally shared by group members and have social functions (Van Dijk 1998, 2003, 2005, 2009a). Van Dijk (2003, 2005, 2009a, 2009b) argues that Critical Discourse Analysis in general, and the Socio-Cognitive approach, in particular, is primarily concerned with socially shared sets (or systems) of beliefs which are viewed as constituent elements of social representations<sup>40</sup> – that is, of organized sets or systems of socially shared beliefs such as knowledge, ideologies, attitudes, and so on (Van Dijk 1998:46). In this respect, Van Dijk uses the term “social cognition” to refer to a socially shared system of mental representations and the processes of their effective use by group members in social situations (Van Dijk 1998, 2001b, 2005, 2009a, 2009b).

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<sup>39</sup> Van Dijk (1998) distinguishes beliefs of a given society or a culture as a whole, from beliefs of various social groups within such a society/culture. Ideologies belong to the second type of beliefs (Van Dijk 1998:37).

<sup>40</sup> Van Dijk uses the term “social representation” or “socially shared mental representation” only to refer to organized clusters of socially shared beliefs (1998:46).

The social dimension of mental representations such as ideologies draws attention to the fact that they are expressed, (re)produced and changed through social practices and interactions in general, and through discourse<sup>41</sup> in particular (Van Dijk 1998:191). In other words, ideologies, like other socially shared mental representations, also have a discursive dimension and, as mentioned earlier and as argued by Van Dijk (1998, 2009a, 2009b), they play an important role in the cognitive processes of discourse production and comprehension. Moreover, Van Dijk (1998:192) argues that discourse has a special status in the reproduction of ideologies because unlike most other social practices, and in a more explicit way than most other semiotic codes (such as photos, pictures, images, signs, paintings, etc.) various properties of text and talk (such as syntax, semantic forms, rhetorical structures, speech acts, etc.) allow members of social groups to actually express or formulate abstract ideological beliefs or any other opinion related to such ideologies.

As mentioned earlier, the SCA examines the relations between discourse and society. More specifically, this approach addresses the link between the structures and properties of text and talk, on the one hand, and dominance or power relationships between group members, on the other hand<sup>42</sup>. In this regard, Van Dijk (2001a, 2001b, 2005, 2009a) claims that these relations are not direct, but are rather necessarily mediated by social cognitions. Indeed, for Van Dijk (1997d, 1998) ideologies – seen as a system of socially shared mental representations – are the corresponding cognitive facet of social power. Therefore, and in line with the discourse-cognition-society triangle, ideologies are the cognitive “interface” between discourse structures and power relations among members of social or cultural groups, organisations or institutions (Van Dijk 1998, 2001a, 2009a).

### **2.1.2.3 Context Model**

The SCA emphasizes that processes of discourse production and comprehension are highly context-dependent (Van Dijk 1997d, 1998, 2005, 2009a, 2009b). However, from a multidisciplinary approach and from a cognitive view of the concept, Van Dijk (2009b:4)

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<sup>41</sup> Van Dijk (1998) emphasizes that apart from discourse (text or talk), there are other semiotic practices (such as non-verbal language or practices) which can be used to express or (re)produce ideologies.

<sup>42</sup> Van Dijk (1997b, 1997d, 1998, 2001c, 2005, 2009a, 2009b) considers discourse as belonging to the “micro” level of social interactions between individuals, whereas relations between groups belong to the “macro” level of social structures. The micro-macro distinction would also apply to relations such as personal beliefs vs. social beliefs, the individual vs. the group, and so on.

defines ‘context’ as those elements (properties or “categories”) of the social and the cultural situation of language use which are perceived as currently relevant by participants for their production and comprehension of discourse. The elements of such a situation would include, according to Van Dijk (2009b), the setting (time, place, etc.), the happening, the participants including their personal, social and mental features (i.e. their personality, interests, gender, social roles and relations, knowledge, opinions and ideologies, etc.), and the activity or conduct.

Thus the cognitive dimension of the context stems from the fact that the selection of the elements of the social situation, on the one hand, and their definition as relevant for the production and the understanding of discourse, on the other hand, are active and on-going processes which take place in the mind of discourse participants during a discursive interaction (Van Dijk 1997d, 1998, 2009b). In other words, contexts are mental representations of the relevant elements of social situations in which discourse occurs (Van Dijk 2009a, b). Moreover, the notion of relevance in the definition of elements of the social situation implies that contexts are subjective, and hence also personal, mental representations of (elements of a) social situation (Van Dijk 2009b). From this perspective, Van Dijk (2009b:6) considers contexts as subjective mental models of episodes;<sup>43</sup> since they are subjective, they represent personal experiences, namely the experience of the current event or situation, and they also feature instantiations of social and cultural<sup>44</sup> knowledge individuals share about social and communicative situations and their participants<sup>45</sup>. In this respect, Van Dijk (2009b) uses the term “context model” (or simply “context”) to refer to the subjective mental model of a communicative episode.

Thus, it should be borne in mind that contexts, according to the SCA, are not some (part or properties of a) social situation, but a subjective mental model of such a situation (Van Dijk

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<sup>43</sup> Van Dijk (2009b:6) defines ‘model’ as a subjective representation of an episode (i.e. an event). In this respect, a verbal interaction, a car accident, or a personal experience, for instance, would each be considered as an episode.

<sup>44</sup> Van Dijk (1998, 2001b) also stresses the importance of culture in the relevance of elements of the social situation. He points out that an element of a given social situation can be perceived as relevant in a culture whereas the same element would not be considered as relevant in another culture.

<sup>45</sup> A consequence of such subjectivity, according to Van Dijk (2009a, 2009b), is that the subjective representation or construction of the social situation can explain, amongst other things, specificities or personal variation in the structuring and processing of discourse about the same social situation.

2009b:7). From this perspective, it is claimed within the SCA that given a discursive interaction, it is not the (relevant) elements of that social situation themselves that influence or constrain the way discourse participants produce and understand discourse, but rather the discourse participants' context models (Van Dijk 2009b). Van Dijk (2009b:4) argues that the elements of a social situation do not directly influence discourse simply because of the fact that social aspects of the situation are not directly involved in the cognitive processes of discourse production and understanding.

Thus context models, according to the SCA, are the necessary link, or "interface", between discourse and social context or society (Van Dijk 1998, 2005, 2009a, 2009b). Moreover, as Van Dijk (2009a:66) claims, mental models control the appropriate adaptation of discourse production and comprehension to their social and cultural environment. However, if context models influence discourse structures, such structures also influence mental models (Van Dijk 2001a, 2001b, 2005, 2009b). For example, Van Dijk (2001b) argues that a headline of a newspaper article about crime may powerfully influence the way a reader would select and define as relevant certain elements of the social situation in which the article occurs. At the same time, the headline may also influence the reader's social representations. For instance, the headline may challenge or reinforce their knowledge, values, or ideology about the current communicative situation and/or the writer.

According to Van Dijk (1998, 2009b), the way discourse participants interpret and mentally represent the elements of a social situation as relevant to them is influenced by their personal representations (as opposed to the mental representations they share with other group members). In other words, discourse participants' context models about a social situation "feature" (that is, provide information about) their personal representations of that situation (Van Dijk 1998, 2009b). Moreover, according to Van Dijk (1998), an individual's representations – such as their knowledge, ideologies, or beliefs – are "personal versions" that are grounded in personal knowledge, opinion, or experience of life, and not necessarily identical copies of the representations shared with all or most other group members. However, Van Dijk (1998, 2009b) contends that socially shared mental representations also influence personal representations. Indeed, as far as ideologies are concerned, Van Dijk (1998:79) argues that personal versions of ideologies should still be considered as socially shared mental representations because such ideologies are part of social (semantic)

memory<sup>46</sup>. On this view, context models also feature instantiations of ideologies – and other mental representations – that individual language users share with all or most other group members (Van Dijk 1998, 2009b). Therefore, it can be claimed that context models are based on socially shared mental representations such as ideologies (Van Dijk 2009b:251). Moreover, according to Van Dijk (1998:213), context models – regarded as mental models – are also part of the interface between socially shared mental representations, such as ideologies, and personal text and talk. In other words, there is no direct relation between ideology and discourse in the sense that it is not possible to read ideological structures directly from text or talk because ideologies need to be very general and fairly abstract (Van Dijk 2009a:79; cf. also 1998). In short, if context models determine the way language users produce and understand discourse, then ideology, through context models, can account for the way discourse is structured and the way the structures or properties of discourse are understood by participants.

#### **2.1.2.4 Events Models**

The SCA stresses the importance of examining the ways language users produce and interpret meaningful discourses (Van Dijk 2009a). In this approach, the meaning (or semantics) of a discourse is examined in terms of aspects related to, amongst others, its coherence, that is, the relations between its propositions, and between those propositions and the facts of the world they refer to. From this cognitive perspective, Van Dijk (2009a:76) claims that the coherence of a discourse is always defined subjectively in the sense that discourses are not so much coherent because their propositions refer to related objective facts in some possible world, but rather because they refer to the episodes (events and situations discourses refer to) as interpreted, personally experienced, defined and (seen to be) related by language users. In short, the coherence of a discourse is a language user's subjective interpretation of an event or situation the propositions of the discourse refer to. Those subjective interpretations of episodes can thus be considered as a kind of mental model represented in episodic (personal) memory. Hence it can be stated that the coherence of a given discourse is a language user's

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<sup>46</sup> Van Dijk (2009a:64) distinguishes episodic (personal, autobiographic) memory (EM) from semantic (socio-cultural, shared) memory (SM); he also distinguishes short term (working) memory (STM) from long term memory (LTM). Semantic memory is part of long term memory. Furthermore, context models – considered as mental models – are part of personal (episodic) memory (Van Dijk 1998, 2009b).

mental model of the event the discourse refers to (Van Dijk 2009a). Van Dijk (1995, 1998, 2009a) calls “event models” the mental models which events discourses refer to.

Both event models and context models are therefore types of mental model. However, if event models are models of events which discourses refer to, context models –defined as models of communicative events – represent a kind of event model (Van Dijk 2009a). Van Dijk (2009a:76) claims that event models include almost all the elements of context models such as setting, participants and actions/events. Moreover, unlike context models which are “pragmatic” – since they relate to the appropriateness of discourse to the social and cultural context of language use – event models are “semantic” because they relate to the meaning of discourses (Van Dijk 2009a).

In short, then, event models are the mental representations of what language users talk about or interpret according to their personal representations (knowledge, opinions, attitudes, ideologies, and so on). However, as mentioned earlier, personal representations are influenced by socially shared mental representations, such as the socially shared opinions of a group (i.e. social attitudes) about a specific event or situation. Such domain-specific social attitudes are controlled by ideological beliefs (Van Dijk 1995, 1998, 2009a). According to Van Dijk (2009a:79), these domain-specific social attitudes may influence event models under the final control of context models. In other words, according to the SCA, discourse meaning – in terms of event model – is the domain where ideology can be link to discourse (Van Dijk 1995, 1998, 2009a).

One important feature of the SCA is that it stresses both the cognitive and social nature of ideology. Adopting this view, social representations are assumed here to be the link between discourse and social power relations among members of social or cultural groups, organisations or institutions. In other words, the cognitive aspects – in terms of social representations –which influence the production of China’s discourse concerning relations with sub-Saharan Africa are taken to be crucial elements when trying to infer possible message(s) of ideology and power.

Another important feature of the SCA is that it emphasizes the fact that processes of discourse production and comprehension are highly influenced by context, and more precisely by context model. In this regard, as one can expect, China’s political discourse



dealing with its relationships with sub-Saharan African countries takes place in a specific context involving social, economic and political events and factors which occur or have occurred at a national (from China's perspective) as well as an international level. However, given the complexity of such a context, it is contended that Chinese officials' context models contain information about the relevant events and factors which determine the discourse. A context model can therefore help to infer the possible message(s) of ideology and power in China's political discourse.

For Van Dijk (2001b:97), as mentioned earlier, the SCA is primarily interested in the socio-cognitive interface of discourse analysis. However, as he argues (2001b:97), the complex, 'real-world' problems which the CDA deals with also need to be investigated from, for instance, historical, cultural and philosophical approaches. This view is also adopted in the present study. Indeed, the relations between China and sub-Saharan African countries are particularly complex due not only to the various levels of cooperation involved, but also because of the history of those relations, as well as the cultural differences between the countries (cf. the discussion in the next chapter). In short, it is claimed here that a socio-cognitive approach is not a sufficient framework for investigating China's political discourse.

### **2.1.3 The Discourse-Historical Approach**

The Discourse-Historical Approach (hereafter DHA) was developed by Ruth Wodak and her colleagues at the University of Vienna (cf. e.g. Wodak 2001b; Reisigl & Wodak 2001, 2009; Weiss & Wodak 2003b). This approach focuses on historical and political discourses and it was initially developed to study post-World War II anti-Semitic attitudes in Austrian political discourse (cf. Reisigl & Wodak 2001, 2009). It was subsequently used to study other social discrimination phenomena – all seen as forms of ideology – such as racist discrimination against migrants from Romania in Austria (cf. Reisigl & Wodak 2001, 2009). Furthermore, the DHA has also been used to study political discourses about nationhood and national identity in Austria, and the construction of identity in European Union discourse (cf. Wodak 2001a; Reisigl & Wodak 2009).

The DHA aims at “demystifying” (i.e. uncovering or making clear) the hegemony of specific discourses by deciphering the ideologies which establish, perpetuate or fight dominance (Reisigl & Wodak 2009:88). The concept of “ideology” in this approach is defined as an

(often) one-sided perspective or world view composed of related mental representations, convictions, opinions, attitudes, and evaluations, which are shared by members of a specific social group (Reisigl & Wodak 2009:88).

Ideologies, for the DHA, serve not only as an important means of establishing and maintaining unequal social power relationships among people through discourse, but they also function as a means of transforming these relationships more or less radically (Reisigl & Wodak 2009:88). From this perspective, and in more specific terms, unequal social power relationships imply an asymmetric relationship among social actors who assume different social positions or belong to different social groups (Reisigl & Wodak 2009:88). Hence for the DHA, the concept of “(social) power” is defined as the possibility of imposing one’s own will within a social relationship against the will or interests of others (Reisigl & Wodak 2009:88). In this respect, Reisigl and Wodak (2009:88-89) argue that there are various ways in which power can be implemented, including “actional power” (i.e. physical force or violence), the control of people through threats or promises, an attachment to authority (i.e. the exertion of authority and submission to authority) and technical control through objects, such as means of production, means of transportation, weapons, and so on.

Thus, as mentioned earlier, within the DHA ideologies are regarded as important means of establishing and maintaining unequal social power relationships among people through discourse. An important claim of the DHA which is adopted in the present study, is that ideologies are produced and reproduced by means of and through discourse (Reisigl & Wodak 2001, 2009). In this context, “discourse” is interpreted in line with Van Dijk’s (1998) socio-cognitive use of the term, that is, as a structured form of knowledge and memory (Weiss & Wodak 2003b:13; Reisigl & Wodak 2009).

It is important to note, however, that the DHA shares with the other CDA approaches the view of language (be it spoken, written, or visual) as a form of social practice (Fairclough & Wodak 1997; Wodak 2001b; Reisigl & Wodak 2001; Weiss & Wodak 2003b). This view of language suggests that any instance of language use – that is, a discourse or a discursive practice – constitutes and is constituted by the specific social structure in which it occurs. That means that there is a dialectical relationship between particular discursive practices and the specific social fields of actions (including situations, institutional frames and social structures) in which they are embedded. According to Reisigl and Wodak (2009:98), a

(social) field or domain of action is a segment of social reality which constitutes a (partial) “frame” of a discourse (e.g. the sphere of political action would be considered as a social field of action). Thus the dialectical view implies that, on the one hand, the situational, institutional and social settings shape and affect discourses, and, on the other hand, discourses influence discursive as well as non-discursive social and political processes and actions (Weiss & Wodak 2003b:22). From this perspective, the DHA defines discourse as:

a complex bundle of simultaneous and sequential interrelated linguistic acts that manifest themselves within and across the social fields of action as thematically interrelated semiotic, oral or written tokens, very often as ‘texts’, that belong to specific semiotic types, i.e. genres (Reisigl & Wodak 2001:36).

According to this definition, discourse is realised through text, where “text” is defined as the “specific and unique realization of a discourse” (Wodak 2010:17). Thus the DHA makes a clear distinction between “discourse” and “text”; this distinction is an important characteristic of the approach (Wodak 2001b; Reisigl & Wodak 2009).

Apart from texts, however, it is claimed within the DHA that discourses is also realised through genres, in the sense that texts can be assigned to genres (Reisigl & Wodak 2009:90). In this regard, the DHA shares Fairclough’s definition of “genre” as a socially approved way of using language in relation with a particular type of social activity (Reisigl & Wodak 2009:90).

Thus the DHA examines manifestations of ideologies and social power relations through discourse by linking fields of action, genres, discourses and text. This endeavour focuses on the analysis of texts since, according to Wodak (2001b:11):

in texts discursive differences are negotiated; they are governed by differences in power which are themselves in part encoded in and determined by discourse and by genre. Therefore texts are often sites of struggle in that they show traces of differing discourses and ideologies contending and struggling for dominance.

Unlike other approaches in CDA, the DHA analyses manifestations of ideologies and social power relationships in discourse by adhering to the socio-philosophical orientation of critical theory. This theory addresses three interconnected forms of critique (Wodak 2001b:65; cf. also Reisigl & Wodak 2001, 2009):

The *Text* or *discourse-immanent critique* which aims at discovering inconsistencies, (self-)contradictions, paradoxes and dilemmas in the internal structures of text or discourse (e.g. in terms of its syntactical or semantical structures, its cohesion, the structures related to forms of implication or argumentation, and so on).

In contrast to the first aspect, the *Socio-diagnostic critique* is concerned with the demystifying exposure (i.e. making clear or explicit) of the – manifest or latent – persuasive or ‘manipulative’ character of discursive practices. Here, the analyst makes use of their contextual knowledge and embeds the communicative or interactional structures of a discursive event in a wider frame of social and political relations, processes and circumstances. It is at this point that the analyst is obliged to apply social theories as well as other theoretical models from various disciplines to interpret the discursive events.

From a practical perspective, the future-related *prospective critique* is related to the analyst’s contribution – based on the results of the study – to the transformation and improvement of communication (e.g. within public institutions by elaborating proposals and guidelines for reducing language barriers in public offices, media reporting, and so on).

Thus, in accordance with the socio-philosophical orientation of critical theory, the concept of “critique” or a “critical” analysis of discourse has to be understood, for the DHA, as gaining distance from the data, embedding the data in the social context, clarifying the political positioning of discourse participants, and having a focus on continuous self-reflection while undertaking research. Moreover, the purpose is the application of results (Reisigl & Wodak 2009:87-88)

In view of this understanding of the concept of “critique”, and keeping in mind that one of the aims of the DHA (in accordance with the core principles of CDA) is to de-mystify ideologies and social power relations through the systematic and “retroductable” investigation of (written, spoken or visual) semiotic data (Wodak & Meyer 2009b:3), it is argued that in order to minimize the risk of being critically biased and to avoid simply politicizing rather than accurately analysing, an analyst should apply the principle of ‘triangulation’ (Weiss & Wodak 2003b:21). This principle, which represents a distinctive feature of the DHA, involves two methodological procedures: (i) combining various relevant and complementing disciplines and methods, and (ii) analysing a variety of empirical data and also taking into account sufficient background information regarding the context in which a particular discourse event is embedded (Wodak 2001a; Reisigl & Wodak 2009).

Clearly, “context” is a core concept of the principle of triangulation. Within the DHA, this concept is conceived primarily from an historical perspective, even though a socio-cognitive view is also integrated within that perspective<sup>47</sup> (Weiss & Wodak 2005; Wodak 2006; Wodak & Meyer 2009b; Wodak 2010). In this respect, according to the DHA, an analysis of the context of a particular discourse should focus on the following four dimensions (Reisigl & Wodak 2001:41):

- (1) the immediate language or text-internal co-text, i.e. the ‘synsemantic environment’ or ‘semantic prosodic’ of a single utterance (lexical solidarities, collocational particularities and connotations, implications, presuppositions as well as thematic and syntactic coherence), and the local interactive processes of negotiation and conflict management (including turn-taking, the exchange of speech acts or speech functions, mitigation, hesitation and perspectivation)
- (2) the intertextual and interdiscursive relationship between utterances, texts, genres and discourses (discourse representation and allusions or evocations)
- (3) the extra linguistic social/sociological variables and institutional frames of a specific ‘context of situation’ (the formality of situation, the place, the time, the occasion of the communicative event, the group(s) of recipients, the interactive/political roles of the participants, their political and ideological orientation, their gender, age, profession, level of education as well as their ethnic, regional, national, religious affiliations or membership)
- (4) the broader socio-political and historical context in which the discursive practices are embedded in and related to; that is to say, the fields of action and history of the discursive event as well as the history to which the discourse topics are related.

The principle of triangulation is a feature, amongst others, that makes the DHA more suitable for the present study. On the one hand, because of the nature and the complexity of the object of inquiry, the “context of situation” as well as the broader socio-political and historical context, will make it possible to analyse China’s political discourse both as an element of a communicative event and as an element of political practice in dialectical relation with society in general. In addition, the socio-cognitive view of the non-linguistic context can – through the Chinese officials’ context model(s) – provide a deeper understanding of the

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<sup>47</sup> According to Wodak (2006), the mediation between discourse and social phenomena (i.e. society) should also be considered in cognitive terms. On this view, cognitive elements of ‘knowledge’ and ‘context model’ (in Van Dijk’s (1997b, 1998, 2009a, 2009b) terms), influence the processes of text production and comprehension.

mental processes or aspects – in terms of social representations – which influence the production of China’s political discourse.

Thus, for the purpose of the present study, China’s political discourse regarding its relations with sub-Saharan African countries will be examined within the framework of the Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA) as set out by, specifically, Wodak (2001a).

## **2.2 Theoretical Framework**

China’s relevant discourses – i.e. speeches, statements in the media, and related documents by Chinese officials – directed to sub-Saharan African countries will be analysed using the DHA principles and tools. In this regard, it is important to keep in mind that as a methodological principle, and as already mentioned in the previous section, the DHA applies the principle of triangulation (Weiss & Wodak 2003b). As also pointed out above, discourse is defined within the DHA as:

a complex bundle of simultaneous and sequential interrelated linguistic acts that manifest themselves within and across the social fields of action as thematically interrelated semiotic, oral or written tokens, very often as ‘texts’, that belong to specific semiotic types, i.e. genres (Reisigl & Wodak 2001:36).

Discourses accordingly have themes or topics in the sense that they are always “about something”. Within the DHA, the main theme or topic of a particular discourse is called the “macro-topic” of that discourse. In addition, a discourse on a macro-topic is always situated within and across a particular social field of action such as, for instance, the sphere of political action (Reisigl & Wodak 2001). The relation between a discourse on a macro-topic and a particular social field of action is in line with the DHA view of language as a form of social practice. On this view, discourse constitutes and is constituted by the specific social structure in which it occurs, which means that there is a dialectical relationship between particular discourses and the specific social fields of actions in which they are embedded.

The DHA focuses on the relationships between fields of action, genres, and macro-topics. From this perspective, and as far as the sphere of political action is concerned, these relations can be represented as follows in the figure below (Reisigl & Wodak 2009:91).

Figure 2.1: Fields of political action, political genres and discourse topics (Reisigl & Wodak 2009:91)

Field of action: Lawmaking procedure	Field of action: Formation of public attitudes, opinions and will	Field of action: Party-internal formation of attitudes, opinions, and will	Field of action: Inter-party formation of attitudes, opinions, and will	Field of action: Organisation of international/inter-state relations	Field of action: Political advertising	Field of action: Political executive and administration	Field of action: political control
<b>Political (sub)-genres:</b> law, bill, amendment, parliamentary speech and contribution of MPs (including heckling and questioning of political opponent), minister speech, state of the union address, regulation, recommendation, prescription, guideline, etc.	<b>Political (sub)-genres:</b> press release, conference, interview, talk show, presidential speech, speech of an MP (especially if broadcasted), opening speech, commemorative speech, jubilee speech, radio or TV speech, chancellor speech (e.g. inaugural speech), minister speech, election speech, state of the union address, lecture and contribution to a conference, (press) article, book, etc.	<b>Political (sub)-genres:</b> party programme, declaration, speech on a party convention or in a party meeting, speech or statement of principle, party jubilee speech, etc.	<b>Political (sub)-genres:</b> coalition negotiation, coalition programme, coalition paper/contract/agreement, speech in inter-party or government meeting/sitting, inaugural speech (in the case of a coalition government), commemorative speech, etc.	<b>Political (sub)-genres:</b> speech on the occasion of a state visit, inaugural address, speech in meetings/sittings/summits of supra-national organisations (European Union, United Nations, etc.), war speech, declaration of war, hate speech, peace speech, commemorative speech, note, ultimatum, (international) treaty, etc.	<b>Political (sub)-genres:</b> election programme, election slogan, election speech, election brochure, announcement, poster, flier, direct mailing, commemorative speech, speech of an MP, state of the union address, etc.	<b>Political (sub)-genres:</b> Decision (approval, rejection), chancellor speech (e.g. inaugural speech), minister speech, major speech, speech of inauguration, farewell speech, speech of appointment, state of the union address, governmental answer to a parliamentary question, etc.	<b>Political (sub)-genres:</b> Declaration of an oppositional party, parliamentary question, speech of an MP, heckling, speech of protest, commemorative speech (especially admonitory or blaming speech), election speech, press release petition for a referendum, etc.


It is claimed within the DHA that a particular discourse about a specific topic can find its starting point within one field of action and proceed through another one. In other words, discourses and discourse topics “spread” to different fields and discourses; they cross between fields, overlap, refer to each other or are in some other way socio-functionally linked (Reisigl & Wodak 2001:36-37). The principle that discourses spread to different fields and relate to or overlap with other discourses is called “interdiscursivity” (Reisigl & Wodak 2009:90). This principle can be observed in the fact that, for example, a discourse on climate change often refers to topics or sub-topics of other discourses, such as finances or health (ibid). Because of the principle of interdiscursivity, then, macro-topic relatedness is considered within the DHA as the primary characteristic of a discourse (Wodak 2001b; Reisigl & Wodak 2009).

Similar to discourses, it is argued within the DHA that texts are also linked to other texts; such connections or intersections are called “intertextuality” (Reisigl & Wodak 2001, 2009). According to Reisigl and Wodak (2009:90), intertextuality has to do with the fact that texts are linked to other past or present texts, where such links can be establish in many different ways, for example where two texts refer to the same topic or theme, or to the same events, or where an argument is transferred from one text to another one. In the latter case, the term “recontextualisation” is used when one element (e.g. an argument or a theme) is transferred from the context of one text or discourse to a new context from another text or discourse. Inversely, “de-contextualisation” refers to the action of taking a given element out of its original context (Reisigl & Wodak 2009).

Thus, as pointed out by Reisigl and Wodak (2009:92), the DHA also takes into account the relationships – in terms of interdiscursivity and intertextuality – between discourses, discourse topics, genres, and texts. These relationships are illustrated in the figure below (Reisigl & Wodak 2009:92).



Figure 2.2: Interdiscursive and intertextual relationships between discourses, discourse topics, genres and texts (Reisigl & Wodak 2009:91)



Against the background of the above features and the principle of triangulation, Reisigl and Wodak (2009:92-94) present the DHA as a three-dimensional framework consisting of the following procedures:

- i. identifying the content or topic(s) of a specific discourse;
- ii. investigating the discursive strategies, i.e. the more or less intentional plan of practices (including discursive practices) adopted in order to achieve a particular social, political, psychological or linguistic goal;
- iii. analysing the linguistic means (as types) and the specific context-dependent linguistic realisations (as tokens).

In accordance with this three-dimensional approach, the analyses of the relevant data presented in this study will proceed in the following three stages:

1. Identification of the explicit content and the discourse topic(s) of the relevant texts.
2. Identification of the discursive strategies used in the texts. At this stage, and in accordance with the principle of triangulation, I will examine the discursive

strategies as they are defined and characterized by Van Leeuwen (2008). Based on Halliday's Systemic Functional Grammar, Van Leeuwen (2008:23) proposes a "sociosemantic" inventory of the ways in which the actors in social practices can be represented in English. In other words, the discursive strategies proposed by Van Leeuwen (2008) are linked to their grammatical features. For instance, nomination is a discursive strategy that is realized by the use of proper nouns, whereas exclusion is a strategy which is realized by not referring (in the sense that there is no linguistic trace) to a social actor (Van Leeuwen 2008).

3. Description of the linguistics means and the context-dependent linguistic realizations of the strategies identified in stage 2. Following Van Leeuwen (2008), the linguistic means of realization of the discursive strategies will be described within the framework of Halliday's Systemic Functional Grammar (1985; 1994).

Although not central to the analyses presented in Chapter 4, a brief overview of the main assumptions and concepts of Systemic Functional Grammar (SFG) is in order here. It must be emphasised, however, that the purpose of this overview is merely to provide some background for the discussion in that chapter. It is explicitly not the aim of this study to give a comprehensive account of SFG.

SFG, as the name indicates, takes a functional approach to grammar. Originally developed by Halliday (1985, revised in 1994), SFG regards language as a semiotic system, that is, a system of meanings that is accompanied by forms (words and other linguistic units) through which the meanings are manifested (Halliday (1994:xiv). From this perspective, a language (as a system) provides its users with a choice of ways (i.e. linguistic choices) for expressing meanings (Bloor & Bloor 1995:2). For instance, one may address somebody as "Sir", "Paul", "Honey" or "dude"; one may use either an active or a passive form of a verb in order to describe a given state of affairs; and one can use either a direct or indirect speech act to make a request. As suggested by these examples, meanings are, for Halliday (1994:xvii), encoded in "wordings", that is, in grammatical sequences or "syntagms" which consist of lexical items such as verbs and nouns, grammatical items such as *the* and *if*, as well as items which belong to an "in-between" type such as prepositions. SFG is therefore a theory of grammatical units ("wordings") in relation to their meanings and function (Halliday 1994:xii).

Halliday (1994:xiii-36) claims that all languages are organised around three main kinds of meaning, or “metafunctions”. These metafunctions are the “experiential”, the “interpersonal”, and the “textual” (Bloor & Bloor 1997; Martin et al. 1997). According to Halliday (1994:36), the experiential metafunction concerns the use of language to construe experience; the interpersonal metafunction is concerned with the use of language to enact social relationships; and the textual metafunction deals with the use of language to create relevance in particular communication contexts. In addition, each metafunction is associated with a particular grammatical system (Halliday 1994; Martin et al. 1997). The experiential metafunction, for instance, is associated with the system of Transitivity. For Halliday (1994:106), a language enables its users to build a mental picture of reality, to make sense of what goes on around them and inside them. Hence a clause is interpreted as a way of representing patterns of experience (Halliday 1994:106). The system of Transitivity is the overall grammatical resource that enables language users to construe “goings on” (Martin et al. 1997:100).

The interpersonal metafunction is associated with the system of Mood (e.g. the imperative or the subjunctive). Considering the functions of grammatical mood (e.g. to convey a command, as in “Sit down”), the system of Mood is related to the meaning of the clause as an exchange or an interactive event involving a speaker (or writer) and an addressee (Halliday 1994:68).

The textual metafunction is associated with the system of Theme. The Theme is the entity or state of affairs in the real or an imagined world that a given clause is concerned with, it is the point of departure of the message contained in the clause (Halliday 1994:37). For instance, in the clause “The President stepped down” the Theme would be “the President”, whereas “to step down” would be the Theme in “To step down is not an option for the President”. The clause therefore, for Halliday, is also interpreted as a message. From this perspective, the system of Theme has to do with the organization of information within individual clauses in a given text and, through this, the organisation of the larger text (Martin et al. 1997:21).

In short, taking language as a semiotic system, SFG investigates the way grammar is used in context to express meaning (Halliday 1994; Bloor & Bloor 1995; Martin et al. 1997).

As mentioned earlier in connection with the three stages according to which the analyses of the relevant data will be presented in this study, Van Leeuwen (2008) proposes a description

within the framework of SFG of the linguistic means by which discursive strategies are realized. With regard to the ways in which participants in social practices can be represented in a particular language – for example English in the case of Van Leeuwen’s (2008) analysis – such a description is based on the meaning of the clause as representation.

Regarding my choice of analytical framework, it is important to note that if one wants to study the ways some speakers or writers exercise power in or by their discourse, one needs to study those properties of text or talk that can vary as a function of social power. Such properties include stress, intonation, word order, lexical style, speech acts, and rhetorical figures, amongst others (Van Dijk 2001b:99). With regard the texts to be analysed in the present study, however, the choice of the units of analysis has to take into account the translated nature of the texts. As already discussed in section 1.3, Mandarin Chinese and English are two unrelated languages. Consequently, possible cross-cultural variations in terms of grammar, vocabulary and/or pragmatics exist between the two languages. Due to possible discrepancies between the languages my analytical choice will be the study of some linguistic forms – in terms of vocabulary and grammar – which are, to a certain extent, not affected by the process of translation. For instance, although there might be cross-cultural variation between English and Mandarin Chinese in the use of modal auxiliaries (cf. Chapter 5), the expression of modality does exist in the two languages. Thus, even though the two languages differ in the way modality is expressed, the process of translation would not affect the use of modality in these languages.

Against the background of the above considerations, the analytical focus of the study will be on the analysis of discursive or representational strategies. As already mentioned, Reisigl and Wodak (2009:94) regard “strategy” as the more or less intentional plan of practices (including discursive practices) which is adopted in order to achieve a particular social, political, psychological or linguistic goal. From this perspective, it is important to understand that users of a particular language have a range of linguistic choices available to them for deciding how to refer to other people. These choices allow language users to place people in the social world and to highlight or hide certain aspects of identity. Thus, representational choices will always bring association of values, ideas and activities.

## Chapter 3

### Contextualization of Documents

As pointed out in Chapter 2, the concept of “context” is conceived from both a historical and a socio-cognitive perspective within the Discourse Historical Approach to critical discourse analysis. From the DHA perspective, an analysis of the context of a particular discourse focuses on four dimensions, namely (i) the immediate language or text-internal co-text, (ii) the intertextual and interdiscursive relationship between utterances, texts, genres and discourses, (iii) the extra linguistic social/sociological variables and institutional frames of a specific context of situation, and (iv) the broader socio-political and historical context which the discursive practices are embedded in and related to. The present chapter specifically deals with the fourth dimension – that is, the broader socio-political and historical context in which the documents which constitute the data for this study are embedded.

The reason for proceeding in this way is based on the following important point that triggered the research topic: China’s growing interest in Africa since the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century has raised concerns about “the real motivation” of that country’s involvement in the continent. In order to understand such concerns it is necessary to provide information about the relevant socio-political and historical background concerning China and, in particular, the sub-Saharan African region.

#### 3.1 Background on the Chinese Context

The People’s Republic of China (PRC, hereafter referred to as China) is located in East Asia. It is the third largest and most populous country in the world. The vast majority of Chinese people belong to the Han ethnic group (Hunter & Sexton 1999; Toops 1999). Han Chinese have what may be called a “Confucian culture”. Since they are the dominant group in China, the country as a whole is, culturally speaking, heavily influenced by the value system associated with Confucianism, although there is also a distinctive popular Chinese culture (Hunter & Sexton 1999; Toops 1999; Gamer 1999a; Adler 2011).

From a political perspective, China is often described as a one-party state ruled by the Communist Party of China (CPC) (cf. e.g. Dumbaugh & Martin 2009). Because of the dominance of the CPC, the political system of the country is considered to be “non-democratic”; Lary (2007:212), for example, notes that this system is a form of “socialism with Chinese characteristics”, where the characteristics in question include aspects of capitalism. Following from this, China’s economic system has been defined as a “socialist market economy”. However, as argued by Wong (1999:105), this system looks like a conventional mixed economy in the sense that the government controls big industries while leaving a lot of light and consumer-oriented economic activities to a competitive market (cf. also Hunter & Sexton 1999).

China is classified by the United Nations as a developing and medium human development country, that is, with a Human Development Index (HDI)<sup>48</sup> value of less than 0.677 but more than 0.488 in 2010. The World Bank classifies the country as having a middle-income economy, that is, with a Gross National Income (GNI) per capita of more than US\$975 but less than US\$11,906 in 2008<sup>49</sup>.

However, more than 30 years after economic reforms were initiated in 1978, the country has risen to become a global economic superpower (Todaro & Smith 2009). According to the World Bank (2011),<sup>50</sup> the country’s annual average growth of about 9.4% per year since 1978, has led it to become the world’s second largest economy since 2010. Due to this rapid growth, China is expected, according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), to overtake the United States of America (USA) as the world’s largest economy in 2016<sup>51</sup>.

China does not only have the world’s largest population and fastest-growing economy. As pointed out by Gill (2010:137), China is also a major force in various other domains: in 2010

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<sup>48</sup> United Nations Development Programme (2011). The Human Development Index (HDI) attempts to rank countries on a scale of 0 (lowest human development) to 1 (highest human development) based on achievements in three basic dimensions: a long and healthy life, access to education and a decent standard of living (Todaro & Smith 2009; United Nations Development Programme (UNDP, 2010).

<sup>49</sup> World Bank (2010).

<sup>50</sup> Cf. also Kuijs, L. and T. Wang. 2005. China’s Pattern of Growth: Moving to Sustainability and Reducing Inequality. *World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3767*: 1-13.

<sup>51</sup> According to an IMF official forecast and as reported in MarketWatch. 2011 (April 2011). Online: [http://articles.marketwatch.com/2011-04-25/commentary/30714377\\_1\\_imf-chinese-economy-international-monetary-fund](http://articles.marketwatch.com/2011-04-25/commentary/30714377_1_imf-chinese-economy-international-monetary-fund) (6 Jun 2011).

it had the world's largest foreign currency reserves; the world's largest army with the second largest military expenditures; the third largest nuclear weapons arsenal; and it was one of the five veto-wielding permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. In that year, China was moreover the largest importer of iron ore, aluminium and paper; the second largest consumer of oil; and the largest emitter of greenhouse gases. The country currently has the world's largest number of mobile telephone and internet users; Mandarin is the dominant language for content on the worldwide web; and China is the third-largest patent-holder after the USA and Japan. The World Bank (2010) indicates that between 1981 and 2004, the country lifted more than 600 million people out of poverty, one of the most rapid and remarkable socioeconomic transformations in history.

In view of the above statistics and its current economic status, China has clearly become an emergent centre of global power – along with the USA, the European Union (EU), Russia and India – due to its growing influence in global affairs (Bergsten, Fred, Freeman, Lardy & Mitchell 2008; Gill 2010; Herd & Dunay 2010). Therefore, as pointed out by Messner (2011:217), there is no doubt that China has developed the potential to become a key actor in world politics in the course of the next one or two decades and to challenge the existing leadership of the West which has emerged over the past two centuries. It is against the background of this potential power and influence that the country has reviewed and expanded its economic, political and cultural relations with Africa in general, and with sub-Saharan African countries in particular.

## **3.2 Background on the Sub-Saharan Africa Context**

### **3.2.1 Regions and Countries of Sub-Saharan Africa**

Sub-Saharan Africa refers to the area of the African continent situated south of the Sahara desert. With its 24.3 million kilometres, the area accounts for about 80% of the continent land surface (Aryeetey-Attoh 2003b; Collins & Burns 2007). Geographically, the sub-Saharan region can be divided into four (sub-)regions, namely West Africa, East Africa, Central Africa, and Southern Africa; the northern region, that is, Northern Africa, is not part of sub-Saharan Africa. From a political perspective, sub-Saharan Africa comprises all the countries and some island countries of the continent, excluding the Northern African countries Algeria,

Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, South Sudan, Tunisia, and Western Sahara. In total, there are 45 sub-Saharan African countries located in the four regions.<sup>52</sup>

From the mid-1880s up until the early 1990s most sub-Saharan African countries were under the dominance of European colonial powers that were on the rise as global superpowers (Fage & Tordoff 2002; Yeboa 2003; Collins & Burns 2007). In fact, the partition of sub-Saharan Africa into 47 countries is one of the political and social impacts of Colonialism (Fage & Tordoff 2002; Yeboah 2003). As pointed out by Panford and Konadu-Agyemang (2006:12), since the colonial era sub-Saharan Africa has been under the influence of international economic and political orders established by developed nations, in particular the United States and various European countries; for much of the 20<sup>th</sup> century the region has also felt the effects of the so-called Cold War between the West and the Communist bloc. As stated by Yeboah (2003a:97), Colonialism involved not just political subordination, but also economic, cultural, and political domination (cf. also Fage & Tordoff 2002).

### **3.2.2 Populations and Cultures of Sub-Saharan Africa**

Africa is not only the world's second largest continent, but also the second largest continent in population after Asia. This is due to the fact that the population of the African continent has been increasing significantly since the last century. Indeed, reports show that during the 20<sup>th</sup> century 90% of the world's population growth took place in countries classified by the United Nations (UN) as "less developed countries" (LDCs), that is, all the African, Latin American and Caribbean countries, the Asia countries (except for Japan), and the Oceania countries (excluding Australia and New Zealand)<sup>53</sup>. In 1999, according to the UN, the fastest population growth in the world took place in sub-Saharan Africa and in some parts of South

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<sup>52</sup> These 45 countries are: Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Congo (Democratic Republic of the), Côte d'Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, São Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Swaziland; Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe (UNDP 2011)

<sup>53</sup> Population Reference Bureau (2009).



and West Asia<sup>54</sup>. In addition, the UN<sup>55</sup> also reported in 2001 that the 21<sup>st</sup> century has been “an unprecedented century” of population growth in the sense that the world population grew from 1.6 billion in 1900 to 6.1 billion people in 2001. According to the report, in 2001 95% of the growth occurred in LDCs, with the highest growth having occurred in Africa.

The highest population growth in Africa takes place in the sub-Saharan region. In fact, data show that since the dawn of the 21<sup>st</sup> century the population of the region has accounted for about 80% and more of the population of the continent.<sup>56</sup> The size and high growth of the sub-Saharan African population can be explained by the fact that, amongst others, the region has the highest fertility rate in the world. Moreover, the region houses not only one of the most populous countries in the world – that is, Nigeria – but also some of the countries having the largest population growth in the world, such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Somalia, and Uganda.<sup>57</sup>

At the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, the population of sub-Saharan Africa was socio-culturally diverse. Sall (2003:43) states that sub-Saharan Africa is a melting pot of cultures in the sense that “native” African culture – that is, born on the African continent – is mixed with successive layers of cultures of Eurasian origin. Eurasian influences stem from the expansion of Islam, colonization, the spread of Christianity, and the establishment and strengthening of ties with the West (cf. Fage & Tordoff 2002; Yeboa 2003; Collins & Burns 2007).

### 3.2.3 Economy

The peoples of sub-Saharan Africa live in countries which are, like China, generally referred to as “developing countries” – as compared to the “developed” ones (cf. Todaro & Smith 2009; United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 2010). Moreover, the countries are sometimes classified according to their levels of gross national income (GNI) per capita.

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<sup>54</sup> United Nations Population Fund. 1999. The State of World Population 1999. Online: [http://www.unfpa.org/webdav/site/global/shared/documents/publications/1999/swp\\_1999\\_eng.pdf](http://www.unfpa.org/webdav/site/global/shared/documents/publications/1999/swp_1999_eng.pdf) (2 May 2011).

<sup>55</sup> United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. 2001. *World Population Monitoring 2001: Population, environment and development*. New York: United Nations. [ST/ESA/SER.A/203]

<sup>56</sup> Population Reference Bureau (2002, 2005, and 2010).

<sup>57</sup> Population Reference Bureau (2005, 2008, and 2010).

Some sub-Saharan African countries are classified either as low-income or middle-income countries by the World Bank<sup>58</sup>. Unlike high-income countries – such as Germany, Japan, the United Arab Emirates, and the USA – which are countries with a GNI per capita of US\$11,906 or more in 2008, middle-income countries – such as Cape Verde, Gabon, Mauritius, and South Africa – are those with a GNI per capita of more than US\$975 but less than US\$11,906. Low-income countries – such as Benin, Burundi, São Tomé and Príncipe, and Zimbabwe – are those which have a GNI per capita of US\$975<sup>59</sup> or less.

According to the World Bank's income-based method of classifying countries, most sub-Saharan African countries have low-income economies. In fact, according to the World Bank (2010), about 30 out of 43 low-income economies were in sub-Saharan Africa in 2009. Moreover, the World Bank data show that, in general, a large number of people in sub-Saharan countries live in extreme poverty, that is, on less than US\$1.25 a day at purchasing power parity. Although the World Bank (2009:30) points out that the proportion of people in sub-Saharan African countries living on less than US\$1.25 fell from 58% in 1996 to 50% in the first quarter of 2009, it is still striking that about half of the population of these countries live in extreme poverty.

It is generally accepted amongst scholars that when assessing the level of development and poverty in a country, one has to go beyond the income factor (UNDP 2010; Todaro & Smith 2009). In this respect, and similar to China, sub-Saharan African countries can also be classified according to their level of human development. This classification scheme is used by the UNDP which considers human development as “multidimensional”, defining it as

the expansion of people's freedoms to live long, healthy and creative lives; to advance other goals they have reason to value; and to engage actively in shaping development equitably and sustainably on a shared planet. People are both the beneficiaries and drivers of human development, as individuals and in groups (UNDP 2010:2).

Based on four human development indicators – life expectancy at birth, mean years of schooling, expected years of schooling, and GNI per capita – some sub-Saharan African countries are often classified as medium human development or low human development

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<sup>58</sup> World Bank (2005).

<sup>59</sup> World Bank (2010).

countries. Unlike very high human development countries – such as France, Israel, Singapore and the USA – which have a HDI<sup>60</sup> value between 0.788 and above in 2010, high human development countries – such as Argentina, Kuwait and Serbia – are those with a HDI value of less than 0.788 but more than 0.677. Medium human development countries – such as Cape Verde, Gabon, Botswana and South Africa – are those with a HDI value of less than 0.677 but more than 0.488, while low human development countries – such as Benin, Kenya, Angola and Zimbabwe – have a HDI value of less than 0.488. Since 2000, most sub-Saharan African countries have been classified as low human development countries.

The UNDP's human development-based method of classifying countries shows the level of poverty in countries from a broader perspective. For the UNDP, the concept of 'human poverty' is understood as multidimensional in the sense that it means deprivations in basic and essential needs related to three dimensions, namely health, education, and living standards (Todaro & Smith 2009; UNDP 2010). This conception of development and poverty is also adopted in the present study.

As pointed out by the UNDP (2010:30), "sub-Saharan Africa is typically considered as the region facing the greatest challenges in human development". Although some substantial progress in improving human development has been registered in some countries (UNDP 2010), the low level of human development is a big challenge for the overall region because of the large numbers of people who are living there in extreme poverty. Indeed, the UNDP (2002:10) points out that 20 sub-Saharan African countries, with more than half of the region's population, were poorer in 2002 than they were in 1990, while 23 countries were poorer than they were in 1975. Moreover, the UNDP (2010: 97) indicates that in 2010 sub-Saharan Africa had the highest incidence of multidimensional poverty. According to *The World Bank Annual Report 2010*, 20 million more people in sub-Saharan Africa will experience extreme poverty in 2015. Furthermore, according to the UNDP (2000, 2005, and 2010), most of the world's poorest countries – classified as "least developed countries" (LDCs) – are in sub-Saharan Africa. In fact, most Sub-Saharan African countries are

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<sup>60</sup> Human Development Index (cf. note 1)

classified as LDCs; between 2000 and 2010, 30 or more LDCs out of 50 were in sub-Saharan Africa.<sup>61</sup>

In short, most sub-Saharan African countries are poor. Yet the physical geography of sub-Saharan Africa – that is, its natural features – shows that the region exhibits a great diversity in terms of landscapes, climate, vegetation, and soils (cf. Aryeetey-Attoh 2003a, b; Collins & Burns 2007). This is so because, as pointed out by Collins and Burns (2007:21), the continent is punctuated by every geographical and geologic feature, such as high mountains, plateaus, rivers, lakes, rainforests, savanna grasslands, arid deserts. Collins and Burns also draw attention to the fact that the characteristics and the configuration of the geographical and geological attributes of the African continent in general have created the natural resources, plants and animals which enabled humans to survive in the distant past and to proliferate in the last two millennia. It is because of these riches that the main purpose of European presence in sub-Saharan Africa during the colonial period was – with the exception of some Southern and East African countries – the extraction and exportation of mineral resources, along with agricultural products, to Europe, on the one hand, and the importation of manufactured goods from Europe to the African region on the other hand. As a consequence of the colonisers' activities, sub-Saharan Africa became economically dependent on Europe and also culturally dependant on European manufactured goods (Sall 2003; Yeboah 2003). Decades after the end of colonialism, and since the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, sub-Saharan African economies continue to be, dominated by the production of agricultural and mineral goods for export (Sall 2003:25; cf. also Collier 2002).<sup>62</sup>

*The World Bank Annual Report* (2009:30) indicates that the sub-Saharan region's economic growth accelerated from 3.1% in 2000 to 6.1% in 2007. In addition, the World Bank (2011:14) reported in 2011 that the region was one of the fastest-growing developing regions in the world, due to a vigorous rebound of its economic growth – after the global financial crisis in 2008-2009 – from 1.7% in 2009 to 4.7% in 2010. Furthermore, significant progress

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<sup>61</sup> The countries which are generally classified as LDCs are Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda, São Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, and Zambia. (UNDP 2002, 2005, and 2010).

<sup>62</sup>cf. also World Bank (2009).

towards achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) was noticeable in countries such as Ethiopia, Ghana, and Malawi<sup>63</sup>.

In sum, sub-Saharan African countries are classified as developing countries either because of their ranking as middle- and low-income economies, or because they are low in terms of human development indicators. Irrespective of the classification method used, it is important to acknowledge the very high level of poverty in the overall region. Moreover, although significant economic growth and some progress in terms of human development have been noticeable in many countries since the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, the World Bank (*African Development Indicators* 2011:130) notes that sub-Saharan African countries continue to face, long-term challenges, including dependence on a few primary commodities, low human capital, weak governance, low youth employment, low empowerment of women, and climate change (cf. also Konadu-Agyemang & Panford 2006). It is in the context of these development problems and challenges that these countries have increased their cooperation with China.

### 3.3 China and Sub-Saharan African Countries Relations

Relations of cooperation between the People's Republic of China and African countries started in the mid-1950s.<sup>64</sup> The first diplomatic contacts started in 1955 with the Asian-African conference – also known as the Bandung conference – at which six independent African countries – namely Egypt, Ethiopia, the Gold Coast (Ghana), Liberia, Libya, and Sudan – were represented alongside 23 Asian countries including China. The first Chinese embassy in Africa was established in Egypt in 1956, and China's first embassy in a sub-Saharan African country was established in Guinea in 1958 (Larkin 1973).

China's earliest cooperation with African countries took the form of economic relations, mainly in trade and aid (Larkin 1973). From a diplomatic perspective, however, it has been argued in the literature (Larkin 1973; Ogunsanwo 1974; Le Pere 2008; Alden 2009) that from the mid-1950s to 1971, China's foreign policy in Africa was heavily influenced by the

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<sup>63</sup> World Bank. 2011. African Development Indicators 2011. Online: [http://data.worldbank.org/sites/default/files/adi\\_2011-web.pdf](http://data.worldbank.org/sites/default/files/adi_2011-web.pdf) (6 June 2011).

<sup>64</sup> cf. e.g. Larkin (1973); Ogunsanwo (1974); Hutchinson (1975); Taylor (2006, 2009); Le Pere (2008); Alden, Large & Soares De Olivera (2009b); Alden (2009).

country's interpretation not only of the African context, but also and more generally of the international one. In this respect, it is important to mention that at the time of the Bandung conference in 1955, most African countries were still under direct colonial rule. During the period under consideration, colonisation of African countries by European powers was part of the polarization of the world into, on the one hand, what China's leadership referred to as "imperialism" and whose leading power were the USA and, on the other hand, socialism whose leading power was the Soviet Union. With the proclamation of the People's Republic of China in October 1949 and the accession to power of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) at the same time, China was a socialist country and was therefore opposed to imperialism (Larkin 1973; Ogunsanwo 1974; Hutchinson 1975; Taylor 2006; Ampiah & Naidu 2008b; Alden et al. 2009b; Alden 2009).

It has been argued in the literature that China's diplomatic activities in Africa had the political aim of bringing an anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism revolution to the continent (Hutchinson 1975; Larkin 1973; Ogunsanwo 1974; Le Pere 2008; Alden 2009). However, as stated by Hutchison (1975:283), it was believed in China that the country's revolution was *the* model for dependent countries and that Marxism as conceived by Mao Zedong was the only true communist doctrine. In this respect, China's leaders wanted to have the Chinese revolutionary and developmental models copied by African people (Hutchinson 1975; Alden 2009). From this perspective, scholars such as Larkin (1973:2) have argued that with her foreign policy in Africa between 1956 to 1971, China in fact sought not only the redistribution of power and the birth of a new world system – with China acting as the third global power next to the Soviet Union and the USA – but that she also sought universal deference to a common interest defined by the CCP (cf. also Taylor 2004; Le Pere 2008; Alden 2009).

Decades after the end of the Cold War, which lasted from the early 1950s until the late 1980's, the international context is being characterized by an acceleration of economic globalization processes, and the importance of China in the global economy has been increasing (Alden et al. 2009b:6). Since the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, the country has risen to become a global economic power and an emergent centre of global political power along with Western powers (Taylor 2004; Ampiah & Naidu 2008b; Alden 2009; Gill 2010). The importance of Africa in China's foreign policy has also changed since the end of the Cold War (Taylor 2004, 2006, 2009; Le Pere 2008; Alden 2009; Alden et al. 2009b). In fact,

the increase in China's involvement in Africa has been described by scholars as "arguably the most momentous development on the continent since the end of the Cold War" (Taylor 2009:1). According to Swartbooi and Seibeb (2010), Chinese policy in Africa focused on support for independence and Pan-African movements from the Bandung Conference in 1955 until the end of the 1980s; today, however, these relations focus on economic diplomacy (cf. also Alden 2009; Taylor 2009). From 2000 to 2010, China has increased its relations with Africa – more specifically, with sub-Saharan Africa – on various levels, e.g. in the areas of trade, investment, military matters, education, diplomacy, and diverse types of aid (cf. Ampiah & Naidu 2008b; Alden 2009; Alden et al. 2009b; Taylor 2009). With regard to trade, for instance, China became the second most important of Africa's trading partners, behind the United States, and ahead of France and the United Kingdom (Taylor 2009). Trade between China and African countries in general consist mainly of exports of Chinese goods and Chinese imports of natural resources (minerals and oil) from the African continent (Alden 2009; Goldstein, Pinaud, & Reisen 2009; Taylor 2009). As Taylor (2009:2) emphasizes, the sub-Saharan region accounts for the vast majority of trade between the continent and China. The increase in the level of China's involvement in Africa is also illustrated by, amongst others, the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) Ministerial Conference created in 2000, and held in 2000, 2003, 2006, and 2009 (Taylor 2004; Le Pere 2008). It is during the conference of 2006, and through the release of a new foreign policy document entitled *China's African Policy*, that China's administration reviewed and expanded its relations with African countries, in order to start a new cooperation policy that China's administration describes as based on mutual benefits and win-win economic cooperation (Hu Jintao 2006)<sup>65</sup>.

The documents that constitute the data for this study comprise the above-mentioned policy document as well as speeches and interviews by the Chinese administration and officials which were delivered during the period just outlined in which there was an increase in relations between China and sub-Saharan Africa. The specific documents are analysed in the next chapter.

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<sup>65</sup> Chinese president Hu Jintao's speech at the FOCAC in Beijing, 4 November 2006.

## Chapter 4

### Analysis

In this chapter, the relevant texts concerning China's relations with sub-Saharan African countries will be analysed using the principles and tools provided by the DHA framework. The texts will be analysed using a three-dimensional approach, namely (i) identifying the different Contents and Discourse Topics of the texts, (ii) identifying and investigating the discursive strategies used in the texts, and (iii) describing the linguistics means of realization as well as the context-dependent linguistic realizations found in the texts.

#### 4.1 Contents and Discourse Topics

In this section I identify the different Contents and Discourse Topics of the texts that constitute my data. The general question to be answered is: what is/are the explicit idea(s) or theme(s) of the different texts? For each text, the Contents and Topic(s) that have been identified will be presented and illustrated by means of extracts from that text.

The main Contents and Topics presented below were identified on the basis of their recurrence through the different texts. In order to show this recurrence, each Topic was identified with the aid of three examples (i.e. extracts) from three different texts and genres. The recurrence of the Topics in different texts is important because it enables one to point out instances of intertextuality. The presentation of the contents and the discourse Topics is subsequently followed by an analysis of the relations of intertextuality and discursivity between the discourse Topics, the genres, the texts that constitute the data and other discourses.

As regards Content, the following four aspects can be identified:

- A. the narration of the state of the relationship between China and sub-Saharan African countries;
- B. the narration of achievements in social, political and economic development in sub-Saharan African countries;



- C. the narration of achievements and challenges in social and economic development in China;
- D. the argumentation for a global appeal for peace and development.

These Contents were identified with the help of the following nine Discourse Topics:

- I. The long, strong, diverse, fruitful and increasing relations between China and sub-Saharan African countries.
- II. China and African countries have “similar experiences, shared objectives and a common future”.
- III. A long history of friendship between China and sub-Saharan African countries.
- IV. The desire and commitment to strengthen, increase and diversify the relations with sub-Saharan African countries.
- V. China’s foreign policy of peace and development in sub-Saharan Africa.
- VI. Recognition of political, social and economic achievements in sub-Saharan Africa.
- VII. Recognition of achievements and challenges in China’s social and economic development.
- VIII. The global appeal for cooperation towards peace and development.
- IX. Increase in China-sub-Saharan Africa cooperation to contribute to global peace and development and the establishment of a new international political and economic order (NIPEO)

In the following section, the above Contents and their associated Topics are illustrated by means of extracts from the texts<sup>66</sup>.

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<sup>66</sup>All the extracts are given in their original (translated) form, i.e. without any editorial changes or spelling/punctuation corrections.

#### **4.1.1 The Narration of the State of the Relationship between China and Sub-Saharan African Countries**

The nature of the relationship between China and sub-Saharan African countries is described in different ways by the Chinese officials. As illustrated by the following extracts, this Content involves five inter-related Discourse Topics.

##### **Discourse Topic I: The long, strong, diverse, fruitful and increasing relations between China and sub-Saharan African countries**

###### Extract 1

In recent years, the political trust between China and Africa has deepened, trade and economic cooperation become more fruitful, and the friendly exchanges at all levels and in all fields such as culture, education, public health, science, technology and sports developed vigorously. The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation launched at the beginning of the century has become the new platform for closer China-Africa relations and stronger cooperation. China and Africa have set out to establish a new type of partnership featuring long-term stability, equality and mutual benefit and China-Africa friendship and cooperation have entered a new stage of all-round development. [T2/S-Pres]

###### Extract 2

This year marks the 35th anniversary of diplomatic ties between China and Nigeria. Over the years, our two countries have adhered to the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, our two peoples have forged strong ties of friendship, and our cooperation in all fields has yielded fruitful results. And this naturally leads to the forging of China-Nigeria strategic partnership, which will both benefit our two peoples and help promote China-Africa cooperation and South-South cooperation. [T4/S-Pres]

###### Extract 3

The founding of the People's Republic of China and the independence of African countries ushered in a new era in China-Africa relations. For over half a century, the two sides have enjoyed close political ties and frequent exchange of high-level visits and people-to-people contacts. Our bilateral trade and economic cooperation have grown rapidly; cooperation in other fields has yielded good results; and consultation and coordination in international affairs have been intensified. China has provided assistance to the best of its ability to African countries, while African countries have also rendered strong support to China on many occasions.

Sincerity, equality and mutual benefit, solidarity and common development-these are the principles guiding China-Africa exchange and cooperation and the driving force to lasting China-Africa relations. [T3/CAP]

**Discourse Topic II: China and African countries have “similar experiences, shared objectives and a common future”.**

Extract 4

China is the biggest developing country and Africa is the continent with the largest number of developing countries. Our combined population accounts for over one-third of the world's total. Both China and Africa are important forces for global peace and development. To deepen China-Africa traditional friendship, boost practical cooperation and forge in an all-round way a new China-Africa strategic partnership is the shared desire of our two peoples. [T7/S-Pres]

Extract 5

Africa is one of the birthplaces of mankind, and China is one of the cradles of human civilization. Being the two most ancient civilizations, China and Africa can and should make greater contribution to the development of the human society in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. We are bound by similar experiences, shared objectives and a common future. [T4/S-Pres]

Extract 6

In the long course of history, the Chinese and African peoples, with an unyielding and tenacious spirit, created splendid and distinctive ancient civilisations. In the modern era, our peoples launched unremitting and heroic struggle against subjugation, and have written a glorious chapter in the course of pursuing freedom and liberation, upholding human dignity, and striving for economic development and national rejuvenation. The progress and development of China and Africa are a major contribution to the advancement of human civilisation. [T6/FOCAC3-Pres]

**Discourse Topic III: A long history of friendship between China and sub-Saharan African countries.**

Extract 7

As an old Chinese saying goes, ‘Nothing can separate people with common goals and ideals not even mountains and seas.’ In spite of the long distance between us, leaders and people of our two countries have engaged in friendly exchanges since the 1960s and forged a profound friendship during Africa’s struggle for national liberation. Over

the past 45 years since the establishment of diplomatic ties, both sides have attached great importance to the growth of our relations. [T8/S-Pres]

Extract 8

Despite the vast distance between them, China and Africa enjoy a long history of friendly exchanges. Over the years, the Chinese and African peoples shared weal and woe and forged a close bond of empathy and friendship. In particular, over the past half a century, we have supported each other in national liberation and maintained sincere cooperation in development and close coordination in international affairs. China-Africa friendship has stood the test of times, and China-Africa cooperation has benefited both sides. We in China take great pride in our friendship with the African people. The Chinese people and the African people have always been and will remain true friends who treat each other as equals and with mutual trust and all sincerity, good partners of mutually beneficial cooperation and close brothers who stand together in times of difficulty. I call on the Chinese people and the African people to carry forward their friendship from generation to generation. And I am sure that the Chinese and African peoples will live in friendship from generation to generation. [T7/S-Pres]

Extract 9

It was Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Ding Xiaoping and other Chinese leaders of the older generation and the forerunners of the African movement for national liberation who forged and nurtured this great China-Africa friendship. And the friendship between the Chinese and African peoples is based on a solid foundation. The past five decades have witnessed frequent exchange of high-level visits between China and African countries and a growing friendship between their peoples. We have always understood, respected, sympathized with and supported each other in international affairs, and carried out fruitful cooperation in the political, economic, trade, scientific, technological, cultural, educational, public health, sports, social and other fields on the basis of equality and mutual benefit. In the process of developing friendship and cooperation over the years, China and African countries have developed many important and viable principles governing international relations. [T1/FOCAC1-Pres]

**Discourse Topic IV: The desire and commitment to strengthen, increase and diversify the relations with sub-Saharan African countries.**

Extract 10

Economically, China and Africa should be partners of cooperation and should draw on each other's strength to work for mutual benefit. They should work together to enhance South-South cooperation and North-South dialogue and work for economic globalisation to develop in a way that brings balanced, general and win-win benefits to all. They should promote economic cooperation in diversified forms to increase

trade volume and improve trade structure. The Chinese Government will implement in good faith the five measures to help other developing countries accelerate their development announced by President Hu Jintao at the High-level Meeting on Financing for Development during last year's UN World Summit. China will continue to encourage and assist Chinese companies to invest in Africa. And we also warmly welcome African companies doing business in China. [T5/I-S.C]

#### Extract 11

At the Beijing Summit, the Chinese and African leaders unanimously agreed to establish and develop a new type of China-Africa strategic partnership featuring political equality and mutual trust, economic win-win cooperation and cultural exchange. They adopted a plan for promoting China-Africa cooperation in the next three years. The Chinese Government announced eight policy steps to enhance practical cooperation with Africa and support Africa's development. They include expanding China's assistance to Africa, cancelling the debts of Highly Indebted Poor Countries and Least Developed Countries in Africa, opening China's market to Africa and broadening China-Africa cooperation in the economic and social fields. [T7/S-Pres]

#### Extract 12

China intends to further promote its agricultural cooperation and exchanges with African nations at various levels, through multiple channels and in various forms. Focus will be laid on the cooperation in land development, agricultural plantation, breeding technologies, food security, agricultural machinery and the processing of agricultural and side-line products. China will intensify cooperation in agricultural technology, organize training courses of practical agricultural technologies, carry out experimental and demonstrative agricultural technology projects in Africa and speed up the formulation of China-Africa Agricultural Cooperation Program. [T3/CAP]

In this present Content dealing with China-sub-Saharan African countries relationship, the international sceptical opinion about China's involvement in the continent is also directly or indirectly addressed by China's officials. This can be ascertained through the following Topic and examples:

### **Discourse Topic V: China's foreign policy of peace and development in sub-Saharan Africa.**

#### Extract 13

At the Beijing Summit, I announced on behalf of the Chinese Government eight policy measures to strengthen practical cooperation with Africa and support African countries development. It is heartening to see that the implementation of these

measures is well underway. China has substantially increased its assistance to Africa, exempted tariffs on some African exports to China and basically completed the debt cancellation plan. The China-Africa Development Fund is up and running. China has begun the construction of the conference center for the African Union (AU), and has made good progress in building hospitals, malaria prevention and treatment centers, agricultural technology demonstration centers and rural schools in Africa. Youth volunteers and senior agricultural experts from China have arrived and started their work in Africa. Progress in all these areas has brought tangible benefits to the people of Africa and offered an even brighter prospect for China-Africa cooperation. [T8/S-Pres]

#### Extract 14

For more than one hundred years in China's modern history, the Chinese people were subjected to colonial aggression and oppression by foreign powers and went through similar suffering and agony that the majority of African countries endured. From the mid-19th century to the mid-20th century, the Chinese people launched a heroic struggle to fight colonial aggression and foreign oppression, achieve independence and liberation and build a new China of the Chinese people. Having realized this century-long historic mission, the Chinese people today are working as one to make life better for themselves. Because of the sufferings they experienced and the struggle they launched, something they will never forget, the Chinese people are most strongly opposed to colonialism, oppression, and slavery of all manifestations. Because of this, the Chinese people have the most profound sympathy for all other nations in their pursuit of independence, happiness and their aspirations. Since the founding of New China in 1949, the Chinese Government and people have provided the African people with firm political, material and moral support in their heroic struggles for liberation and against colonial rule. China has never imposed its will or unequal practices on other countries and will never do so in the future. It will certainly not do anything harmful to the interests of Africa and its people. [T7/S-Pres]<sup>67</sup>

#### Extract 15

China, the largest developing country in the world, follows the path of peaceful development and pursues an independent foreign policy of peace. China stands ready to develop friendly relations and cooperation with all countries on the basis of the

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<sup>67</sup> This is an extract from President Hu Jintao's speech at the University of Pretoria in 2007. It shows that the speaker is responding to criticism (prior to the speech event at the university) about China's involvement in Africa. But at the same time, the speaker is anticipating criticism about China's involvement in Africa from the audience at hand. What is important to note here is that this extract is an example of intertextuality in the sense that apart from the speaker's voice (i.e. his viewpoint, perspective and personality in relation to what is being talked about) his utterances carry traces of other utterances or other voices of real and imagined addressee(s) who could have been expressing scepticism about China's involvement in Africa (cf. section 1.1 of Chapter 1). In short, the Chinese President's discourse contains elements of his addressees' viewpoints and perspectives. Such intertextuality could profitably be analysed, but is left here as a topic for further investigation.

Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence<sup>68</sup> so as to contribute to peace, stability and common prosperity around the world. [T3/CAP]

#### **4.1.2 The Narration of Achievement in Social, Political and Economic Development in Sub-Saharan African Countries**

The general idea expressed in connection with the social, political and economic developments in Africa, is addressed through the Discourse Topic 6.

##### **Discourse Topic VI: Recognition of political, social and economic achievements in sub-Saharan Africa.**

###### Extract 16

South Africa, renowned as the ‘rainbow nation’, has an important place in both Africa and the world. I visited South Africa back in 1999, and I was deeply impressed by its beautiful landscape, the great vitality it enjoyed after breaking the shackles of apartheid and the South African people's dedication to national development. Eight years later, I am now back in South Africa, and I am equally impressed by the great achievements the South African Government and people have made in promoting national reconciliation, economic development and social reform and in enhancing peace and development in Africa. Just as President Mbeki has said, South Africa has entered an ‘Age of Hope’. What you have achieved in South Africa heralds not only the future of this great country, but also the future of Africa and human progress. [T7/S-Pres]

###### Extract 17

With the largest population in Africa, Nigeria has a huge domestic market and is rich in natural resources, which give Nigeria enormous potentials. It is good to see that Nigerian people have made great efforts to achieve social stability and economic development. I am fully confident of the future of Nigeria. [T10/I-Amb]

###### Extract 18

Following their independence, countries in Africa have been conscientiously exploring a road to development suited to their national conditions and seeking peace, stability and development by joint efforts. Thanks to the concerted efforts of African countries and the Organization of African Unity (OAU)/the African Union (AU), the

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<sup>68</sup> The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence are: “(1) mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, (2) mutual nonaggression, (3) mutual non-interference in internal affairs, (4) equality and mutual benefit, and (5) peaceful coexistence.” (Kim 1994:131).

political situation in Africa has been stable on the whole, regional conflicts are being gradually resolved and economy has been growing for years. The NEPAD has drawn up an encouraging picture of African rejuvenation and development. African countries have actively participated in the South-South cooperation and worked for the North-South dialogue. They are playing an increasingly important role in international affairs.

Africa still faces many challenges on its road of development. However, with the persistent efforts of African countries and the continuous support of the international community, Africa will surely surmount difficulties and achieve rejuvenation in the new century. [T3/CAP]

#### **4.1.3 The Narration of Achievements and Challenges in Social and Economic Development in China**

The social and economic developments in China as expressed in this content are dealt with through the Discourse Topic VII.

##### **Discourse Topic VII: Recognition of achievements and challenges in China's social and economic development.**

Extract 19

The Chinese people are, too, faced with a historic task of national rejuvenation. In the past five decades and more since the founding of the People's Republic, and especially since the implementation of reform and opening-up over 20 years ago, China's modernization drive has made remarkable achievements. The social productive forces and the comprehensive national strength of China have made a historic leap forward and the Chinese people are, on the whole, living a comfortable life. However, we are keenly aware that, given our huge population, weak economic base and uneven development, our per capita GDP ranks fairly low on the country list of the world and we need to work long and hard, even by generations, to turn China into a modern country. The Communist Party of China set forth at its 16<sup>th</sup> National Congress more than a year ago the goal of building a well-off society in an all-round way. Today, our 1.3 billion countrymen are working vigorously, and with full confidence, towards this grand goal. [T2/S-Pres]

Extract 20

Since the policy of reform and opening-up was introduced in 1978, the Chinese people have succeeded in embarking on a path of development suited to China's national conditions. They have dedicated themselves to building socialism with Chinese features, greatly boosting productivity and China's national strength and



raising their own living standards. Between 1978 and 2006, China's GDP grew to US\$2.6269 trillion from US\$216.5 billion, and its trade jumped to US\$1.7607 trillion from US\$20.6 billion, while the number of the rural poor shrank from 250 million to 21.5 million. China has on the whole brought a moderately prosperous life to its people. On the other hand, we are keenly aware that China is still the world's largest developing country with a huge population, weak foundation and uneven regional development. China ranks behind the 100th place in terms of per capita GDP and faces numerous difficulties and challenges in its development endeavor. [T7/S-Pres]

#### Extract 21

China has achieved sustained and rapid economic growth, marked progress in social development programs and moderate prosperity for its people as a whole. China is a big developing country with a population of 1.3 billion. What it has achieved in the reform and opening up endeavor is in itself a significant contribution to world peace and development. We are keenly aware, however, that China remains the biggest developing country in the world. A huge population, weak economic foundation and uneven development are the basic features of the country. [T8/S-Pres]

#### **4.1.4 The Argumentation for a Global Appeal for Peace and Development**

The issue of world peace and development in the context of international politics and economic systems is the concern expressed through the Discourse Topics VIII and IX.

#### **Discourse Topic VIII: The global appeal for cooperation towards peace and development.**

#### Extract 22

The world is undergoing profound and complex changes. Peace, development and cooperation are the calling of the times. Thanks to accelerated economic globalization, countries are becoming increasingly interdependent and their interests more closely interconnected. Working together to share opportunities, meet challenges and achieve common development is the desire of all peoples. [T4/S-Pres]

#### Extract 23

The world today is in profound changes. Peace, development and cooperation are the defining features of our times. The growing trend towards multipolarity and economic globalization presents mankind with both rare opportunity of development and severe challenges. People across the world hope to share opportunities, jointly meet challenges and ensure common development. [T7/S-Pres]

Extract 24

The first few years of the new century witness a continuation of complex and profound changes in the international situation and further advance of globalization. Peace and development remain the main themes of our times. Safeguarding peace, promoting development and enhancing cooperation, which is the common desire of all peoples, represents the irresistible historical trend. On the other hand, destabilizing factors and uncertainties in the international situation are on the rise. Security issues of various kinds are interwoven. Peace remains evasive and development more pressing. [T3/CAP]

**Discourse Topic IX: Increase in China-sub-Saharan Africa cooperation to contribute to world peace and development and the establishment of a new international political and economic order.**

Extract 25

... China and Africa have come to share more concerns and accordingly, more interests and objectives in facilitating the establishment of a new international economic and political order that is fair and equitable. [T2/S-Pres]

Extract 26

China will continue to work with Africa to uphold the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, and strengthen consultation and cooperation in the United Nations and other multilateral organizations. It will continue to take an active part in the building of a New Asia-Africa Strategic Partnership and other mechanisms for South-South Cooperation and North-South Dialogue. China is committed to promoting multilateralism and democracy and rule of law in international relations, establishing a just and equitable new international political and economic order and safeguarding the legitimate rights and interests of developing countries. [T4/S-Pres]

Extract 27

However, development in different countries is extremely uneven. Hegemonism and power politics still exist. Developing countries are still faced with an arduous task of safeguarding their sovereignty, security and interests. The gap between the North and the South is being widened not only economically, but also in science and technology. Hence, there has emerged a disturbing 'digital divide'. The Prolonged poverty and backwardness, Coupled with external factors, have exacerbated the otherwise latent ethnic rifts, religious feuds and social conflicts in some developing countries, led to conflicts and wars in these countries and impaired their state stability and national development.

At the root of these problems are many irrational and inequitable factors in the current international political and economic order. They are detrimental not only to world

peace and development, but also to the stability and development of the vast number of developing countries.

Mankind is about to usher in a new century. It has been the demand of the times and call of the people all over the world to establish an equitable and just new international political and economic order. Let us work together with wisdom and courage to build such a new order and advance the lofty cause of peace and development for mankind. [T1/FOCAC1-Pres]

As mentioned earlier, the recurrence of the Topics in the different texts is an indication of intertextual relationships between these texts. Accordingly, in the next section, we describe the intertextual relationships between the identified discourse Topics, the genres and the texts.

#### 4.1.5 Intertextuality

The relationship of intertextuality between texts can be established through, for instance, reference to the same aspect of content or the same discourse Topic. To illustrate, consider the Extract 28 concerning the Discourse Topic V presented above:

Extract 28

I am visiting Africa to learn more about this great continent. I am here to learn from Africa and carry forward traditional China-Africa friendship. Most importantly, I have come to Africa to work with African countries to increase mutual trust, enhance mutually beneficial cooperation, advance common development, and forge a new type of China-Africa strategic partnership. [T4/S-Pres]

This extract exemplifies China's conception of its relations of peace and common development with sub-Saharan African countries. Moreover, as shown in Discourse Topic V (section 4.1.1), this reference to China's foreign policy of peace and common development in sub-Saharan Africa is made not only in the *China's African Policy* document (T3/CAP), China's president Hu Jintao's speeches at the National Assembly of Nigeria (T4/S-Pres), at the University of Pretoria (T7/S-Pres) and at the Welcoming Rally Held By People from Various Sectors in Dar es Salaam (T8/S-Pres), but also in all the other texts that constitute the data for this study – that is, from the first FOCAC summit (T1/FOCAC1-Pres) held in 2000 to the interview by the then Ambassador Deng Boqing (T10/I-Amb) in 2010. In short, the occurrence of this Topic in these texts enables me to establish a relation of intertextuality between them.

The extract in 29 is another example of a Discourse Topic that is shared between the texts, the Topic in question being the one presented as VIII above.

#### Extract 29

The world is undergoing profound and complex changes. Peace, development and cooperation are the calling of the times. Thanks to accelerated economic globalization, countries are becoming increasingly interdependent and their interests more closely interconnected. Working together to share opportunities, meet challenges and achieve common development is the desire of all peoples. [T4/S-Pres]

This extract from President Hu Jintao's speech at the National Assembly of Nigeria (T4/S-Pres) expresses a global appeal for peace and development (Content D). This appeal (formulated as Discourse Topic VIII in the section 4.1.4) is actually found in nine out of the ten texts analysed in this study, the only exception being the interview by the then State Councillor Tang Jiaxuan (T5/I-S.C). It is important to notice that, apart from sharing the Topic of a global appeal for peace and development, both Extracts 28 and 29 focus on the justification or reasoning behind such an appeal. The use of the same argument in different texts – even though presented differently from the way in which it was illustrated in the section dealing with the Discourse Topic VIII – represents an instance of intertextuality. Furthermore, the fact that the same argument is used in different times and on different occasions represents an instance of recontextualisation. This recontextualisation stretches over the entire timeframe (2000-2010) covered in this study. The argument underlying the global appeal for peace and development was initially put forward by President Jiang Zemin in his speech during the first FOCAC summit in 2000 as following:

#### Extract 30

The world today is moving towards multi-polarity and the international situation is on the whole easing of modern science and technology driven by information technology and life science are advancing rapidly. Economic globalisation is gaining momentum. Countries in the world have engaged themselves in ever extensive and in-depth co-operation and exchanges. The lofty cause of peace and development of mankind has promised a bright prospect.

However, development in different countries is extremely uneven. Hegemonism and power politics still exist. Developing countries are still faced with an arduous task of safeguarding their sovereignty, security and interests. The gap between the North and the South is being widened not only economically, but also in science and technology. Hence, there has emerged a disturbing 'digital divide' The Prolonged poverty and backwardness, Coupled with external factors, have exacerbated the otherwise latent ethnic rifts, religious feuds and social conflicts in some developing countries, led to

conflicts and wars in these countries and impaired their state stability and national development. [T1/FOCAC1.Pres]

In January 2006 the same argument appeared in the *China's African Policy* document as shown in the following extract:

Extract 31

The first few years of the new century witness a continuation of complex and profound changes in the international situation and further advance of globalization. Peace and development remain the main themes of our times. Safeguarding peace, promoting development and enhancing cooperation, which is the common desire of all peoples, represents the irresistible historical trend. On the other hand, destabilizing factors and uncertainties in the international situation are on the rise. Security issues of various kinds are interwoven. Peace remains evasive and development more pressing. [T3/CAP]

These two extracts show the use of the same argument in two texts which belong to two different political fields of action and two different political (sub-)genres. The speech at the FOCAC summit belongs primarily to the political field of organization of international/interstate relations and to the political (sub-)genre of speech in summits, whereas the foreign policy document has to do primarily with the field of law-making procedure and the (sub-)genre of orientation (Reisigl and Wodak 2009). Thus, I am dealing here with the transfer of an argument from one text (the speech) to another text (the policy). In other words, the argument underlying the global appeal for peace and development was (i) de-contextualised, that is, it was taken out of the speech during the summit, and then (ii) recontextualised, that is, it was placed in the context of the policy document (Reisigl and Wodak 2009). The same process of decontextualisation-recontextualisation shows up in the interview with the then Ambassador to Tanzania, Liu Xinsheng, in October 2009:

Extract 32

Currently, the international situation is undergoing major changes and adjustments. The ever deepening globalization has brought both rare opportunities to mankind and extensive challenges to the international community. New uncertainties have emerged in regional hotspot issues, impacting the evolution of international security situation. Global issues such as climate change, energy security, environmental degradation, worsening poverty, spread of communicable disease and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are becoming increasingly acute.

All this shows that our world is becoming smaller and smaller and countries and peoples are getting closer to one another. As countries are more than ever interdependent with their interests closely interconnected, no one can expect to

achieve true development and prosperity in isolation, or secure durable peace and stability on one's own. [T9/I-Amb]

In addition to sharing particular Topics (and underlying arguments, as illustrated above), the data show that the texts can also be linked in other ways. Consider the following extract:

Extract 33

Ladies and Gentlemen, Dear friends,

Early this year, the Chinese Government issued the African Policy Paper. The paper expounds on China's goals of carrying forward China-Africa traditional friendship and building a new type of strategic partnership with Africa in a new era and its firm commitment to this goal. [T4/S-Pres]

This extract from President Hu Jintao's speech at the National Assembly of Nigeria contains an explicit reference to the *China's African Policy* document (T3/CAP). This reference enables me to link the speech to the policy document. Reference to the document in question was also made, for instance, in the 2006 interview with the then State Councillor Tang Jiaxua:

Extract 34

China's African Policy is the first policy paper on a continent issued by the Chinese Government. It shows our resolve to enhance China-Africa solidarity and cooperation in the new international environment. The thrust of the paper is the fostering of a new type of China-Africa strategic partnership featuring political equality and mutual trust, economic win-win cooperation and cultural exchanges and enrichment. Specifically, it has three essential elements:

Politically, China and Africa should be strategic partners that trust and support each other. The two sides should maintain high-level exchanges and dialogue and enhance people-to-people exchanges in diversified forms to boost popular support for China-Africa friendship. They should be guided by the principle of treating each other as equals and of mutual non-interference in internal affairs, and respect each other's independent choice of road of development. In international affairs, the two sides should strengthen coordination and cooperation to jointly promote democracy in international relations and uphold the lawful rights and interests of developing countries. [T5/I-SC]

As in the case of the Extract 33, the explicit reference to the *China's African Policy* document and its content in the above extract establishes a link between the interview and the policy document. Similarly, in the Extract 35 below a relation of intertextuality can be

identified between President Hu Jintao's speech at the 2006 FOCAC summit in Beijing and the 2009 interview with the then Ambassador to Tanzania, Liu Xinheng:

Extract 35

In the Beijing Summit FOCAC, eight measures on aid to Africa were proposed by Chinese side, including increasing the aid provided to Africa by doubling China's 2006 assistance by 2009 and strengthening cooperation in areas such as human resource development, agriculture, medical care, social development and education. As to Tanzania, we are assisting in the construction of three rural primary schools, a cardiac surgery and treatment centre, a Malaria-prevention and Treatment Centre and an agricultural technology demonstration centre. [T9/I-Amb]

In this extract, the explicit reference to the Chinese President's speech during the FOCAC serves to remind the addressee of the decisions and the outcomes of the summit.

Intertextuality between the texts that are analysed in this study is also found in the relations between the different political fields of actions and, therefore, between the political (sub-) genres. For instance, in the Extract 32 I showed that the argument for an appeal for global peace and development was de-contextualised from President Jiang Zemin's speech during the first FOCAC summit in 2000, and then recontextualised in the then Ambassador Liu Xinheng's interview in 2009. Let us assume, however, that the argument in question is actually either an interpretative or a realistic argument about the state of world security in an increasingly interdependent world. In other words, it is a perception of or an opinion on the state of international security and global interdependence at that time. Opinions are what is expected from politicians during interviews. Hence Ambassador Liu Xinheng's interview can be taken to belong to a particular (sub-)genre, namely that of the political field of formation of public attitudes, opinion and will (Reisigl and Wodak 2009). However, as already mentioned, President Jiang Zemin's speech belongs primarily to the political field of organization of international/interstate relations and to the political (sub-) genre of speech in summits. From this perspective, taking his statement about the state of international security and global interdependence to represent an opinion means that I have to consider his speech as also belonging to the political field of formation of public attitudes, opinion and will, hence to the (sub-)genre of what Reisigl and Wodak (2009:91) call "president speech". In this respect, I can regard the recontextualization of the argument underlying the global appeal for peace and development not only as an intertextual link between the two texts – in fact, between the interviews and all six of the Presidents speeches analysed in this study – but also

as an indication of the fact that it is the same argument or opinion about the state of international security and global interdependence which is used by all the speakers in the specific timeframe.

A further instance of intertextuality involving different political fields of actions and political (sub-)genres is found in the following three extracts:

Extract 36

(5) Cooperation in international affairs

China will continue to strengthen solidarity and cooperation with African countries on the international arena, conduct regular exchange of views, coordinate positions on major international and regional issues and stand for mutual support on major issues concerning state sovereignty, territorial integrity, national dignity and human rights. China supports African nations' desire to be an equal partner in international affairs. China is devoted, as are African nations, to making the UN play a greater role, defending the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, establishing a new international political and economic order featuring justice, rationality, equality and mutual benefit, promoting more democratic international relationship and rule of law in international affairs and safeguarding the legitimate rights and interests of developing countries. [T3/CAP]

Extract 37

Fifth, maintain close coordination in international affairs. China has always appreciated the important role played by Africa in international affairs. China and Africa share extensive common position and have a good tradition of cooperation on major international issues. To strengthen coordination and cooperation in international affairs meets our mutual interests. China will continue to work with Africa to uphold the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, and strengthen consultation and cooperation in the United Nations and other multilateral organizations. It will continue to take an active part in the building of a New Asia-Africa Strategic Partnership and other mechanisms for South-South Cooperation and North-South Dialogue. China is committed to promoting multilateralism and democracy and rule of law in international relations, establishing a just and equitable new international political and economic order and safeguarding the legitimate rights and interests of developing countries. Africa's aspiration for peace and development deserves respect and sympathy, and the international community should be more focused on Africa's development and increase assistance to Africa. China will continue to work for more progress in UN reform to make the world body place greater emphasis on the issue of development and address as a top priority the under-representation of developing countries, including African countries. [T4/S-Pres]



## Extract 38

To establish a new international political and economic order and enable our future generations to live in a beautiful world. I recommend that we should make concerted efforts in the following areas:

[...] 3. Take part in international affairs on the basis of equality and in an enterprising spirit. China and African countries should increase consultation, coordination and cooperation on the bilateral and multilateral fronts, participate actively in the management of international affairs and formulation of international rules and promote the reform of the international political, economic, financial and trading systems. In this way, the voice of developing countries will be heard more clearly in the world, a fair international environment will be created and the legitimate rights and interests of developing countries will be effectively safeguarded. [T1/FOCAC1-Pres]

As mentioned earlier, the *China's African Policy* belongs primarily to the political field of action of lawmaking procedure and to the (sub-)genre of orientation (Reisigl and Wodak 2009). As such, it contains a set of orientations in different areas of cooperation, such as in International Affairs as illustrated in Extract 36 above. However, as illustrated by Extract 37 and Extract 38, there are also sets of orientations in the other documents analysed in this study. This indicates that the political (sub-)genre of orientation occurs in these other documents as well. Accordingly, the recommendations referred to in Extracts 37 and 38, which are part of China's foreign policy of peace and development in sub-Saharan Africa (Discourse Topic V), are expressed in three fields of political action, namely (i) the field of lawmaking procedure, (ii) the field of formation of public attitude, opinion and will and (iii) the field of organization of international/interstate relations. By linking these three fields, the use of the (sub-)genre of orientation therefore establishes a relation of intertextuality between the policy, the President's speeches and the interviews.

In sum, it was shown that the reference to the same discourse Topics or content in the different texts creates relations of intertextuality. Moreover, it was found that intertextuality through shared Contents can also lead to intertextuality through shared political (sub-)genres and fields of political action. Figure 4.1 below illustrates these relations between the Discourse Topics, the political (sub-)genres and the fields of political action. As is also clear from this figure, the different Discourse Topics that have been identified above are all interconnected to a certain extent. Indeed, if all the Discourse Topics under the same content are connected – such as the Discourse Topics I to V of Content A – it becomes clear that intercontent relations also exist through their different Discourse Topics. For instance, China

with its foreign policy of peace and development (Content A, Discourse Topic V) has developed long, strong, diverse, fruitful and increasing relations with sub-Saharan African countries (Content A, Discourse Topic I). Such relations (Content A, Discourse Topic I) have contributed to some political, social and economic achievements in some sub-Saharan African countries (Content B, Discourse Topic VI). Moreover, based on the same policy (Content A, Discourse Topic V), China wants to strengthen, increase and diversify its relations with sub-Saharan African countries (Content A, Discourse Topic IV) because cooperation between nations is fundamental in order to achieve global peace and development in this increasingly interdependent world (Content D, Discourse Topic VIII).




Figure 4.1: Relations between the discourse topics, the political (sub-) genres and the fields of political action in China's official discourse on its relations with sub-Saharan African countries

The Topics I-IV are all concern with the notion of relationship. Moreover, these four Topics are all connected to the Topic V which concerns China's pluralist approach to state-to-state relations and, more generally, to its pluralist approach to international affairs (Klein, Reiners, Zhimin, Junbo and Šlosarčík 2010<sup>69</sup>) as referred to in the Discourse Topic VIII. This means that China and sub-Saharan Africa relations, as referred to in Topic I, are grounded in China's approach to international affairs as mentioned in Discourse Topic VIII. The significance of these interconnections between Topics is shown in Figure 4.1. The ellipses of the Topics I, V and VIII not only link these Topics to each other, but also to most of the other Topics. This explains the dominance of the ellipses of these three Topics. This dominance indicates the importance of China's pluralist view on and approach to its relations with sub-Saharan African countries. Interestingly, a pluralist approach to international relations emphasises, amongst others, the sovereignty and independence of states and consequently the notion of political equality in state-to-state relations (cf. e.g. Klein, Reiners, Zhimin, Junbo & Šlosarčík 2010) as referred to in China's Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence (cf. note 2). Moreover, pluralism is characterised by an acceptance of diversity, that is, the freedom of choice with regard to values, culture, ways of life, etc. (Schlosberg 2006:142). From this perspective, the recognition of political, social and economic achievements in sub-Saharan Africa (Discourse Topic VII) can be regarded as an acknowledgment of the different ways or strategies of sub-Saharan African countries – as compared to those of China referred to in Topic VII – to achieve development. Support for this interpretation is found in the following extract:

#### Extract 39

Following their independence, countries in Africa have been conscientiously exploring a road to development suited to their national conditions and seeking peace, stability and development by joint efforts. Thanks to the concerted efforts of African countries and the Organization of African Unity (OAU)/the African Union (AU), the political situation in Africa has been stable on the whole, regional conflicts are being gradually resolved and economy has been growing for years. [T3/CAP]

#### 4.1.6 Interdiscursivity

The following nine Discourse Topics were identified in section 4.1:

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<sup>69</sup>Cf. also Junbo, J. Pluralism: as Philosophical Base of Chinese Diplomacy. Online: <http://www.cewp.fudan.edu.cn/attachments/article/68/Jian%20Junbo,%20Pluralism%20As%20Philosophical%20Base%20of%20Chinese%20Diplomacy.pdf> (7 August 2012).

- I. The long, strong, diverse, fruitful and increasing relations between China and sub-Saharan African countries.
- II. China and African countries have “similar experiences, shared objectives and a common future”.
- III. A long history of friendship between China and sub-Saharan African countries.
- IV. The desire and commitment to strengthen, increase and diversify the relations with sub-Saharan African countries.
- V. China’s foreign policy of peace and development in sub-Saharan Africa.
- VI. Recognition of political, social and economic achievements in sub-Saharan Africa.
- VII. Recognition of achievements and challenges in China’s social and economic development.
- VIII. The global appeal for cooperation towards peace and development.
- IX. Increase in China-sub-Saharan Africa cooperation to contribute to global peace and development and the establishment of a new international political and economic order (NIPEO)

In the context of the present study, It is already known that I am dealing here with the discourse on relations between China and sub-Saharan African countries. In this respect, the first five Topics, as well as the Topic IX, reflect the subject of the discourse. Consider, however, the discourse Topic V. As pointed out in the previous section, the reference to China’s foreign policy of peace and development in sub-Saharan Africa is made in all the texts that constitute the data for this study. The recurrence of this Topic in all the texts clearly indicates a relation of intertextuality between the texts. Furthermore, the fact that the Topic creates an intertextual link between the texts led me to the conclusion that China’s foreign policy of peace and development in sub-Saharan Africa is an important theme in China’s official discourse on its relations with sub-Saharan African countries. Also interesting is the fact that this theme is found in the discourse on ‘China’s peaceful development’ in the international domain as well.<sup>70</sup> In other words, China’s official discourse on its relations with sub-Saharan African countries is also a part of China’s discourse on peaceful development

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<sup>70</sup> Cf. e.g. the White paper on ‘*China’s Peaceful Development*’ released in 2011 by The Information Office of the State Council, China’s Cabinet. Available online at <http://ao.chineseembassy.or/por/sghd/t856543.htm>

from a global perspective. This implies that there is an interdiscursive connection between these two discourses: it is to be expected that China's general approach to international relations will be reflected in its relations with Africa. Since China's philosophy of "peaceful development" encompasses its pluralist view and approach to international relations (see Klein et al. 2010), I can therefore assume that China's official discourse on its relations with sub-Saharan Africa is based on the same view and approach.

Similar to the Topic of China's foreign policy of peace and development, the reference in almost all the texts to the argument underlying the global appeal for peace and development (Topic VIII) led me to the conclusion that this Topic constitutes a main theme in China's official discourse on its relations with sub-Saharan African countries. In other words, this discourse appears to be part of the discourse on international security/relations and global interdependence. Therefore, since China adopts a pluralist view on international affairs, it is likely that this same view is transferred in the discourse on its relations with sub-Saharan African countries.

The fact that China's official discourse on its relations with sub-Saharan African countries can be linked to other discourses as well is also illustrated in the following extract:

#### Extract 40

Times are progressing, and Africa is advancing. We are pleased to see that, through generations of arduous struggles, decolonisation was completed and racial segregation as an institution abolished throughout the African continent. This is a tremendous contribution to human progress. Decades of relentless efforts have brought about progress in the cause of peace and development in Africa. In recent years, Africa has worked hard to resolve regional conflicts, resulting in greater stability in its overall situation. Seeking self-strengthening through unity, African countries have formed the African Union and laid down the New Partnership for African Development. African countries have actively explored a development path suited to their national conditions, taking economic growth, poverty eradication and improvement of people's livelihood as their top priority. The economy of Africa as a whole has grown for nine years in a row. With assistance from the international community, Africa has vigorously invested in education and personnel training and spared no efforts to address such social problems as HIV/AIDS. African countries have worked hand in hand with the other developing countries, promoting South-South cooperation and playing their increasing role in international affairs. The Chinese Government and people rejoice at seeing each and every achievement scored by Africa. We are convinced that through the persistent efforts of all the African governments and

people and with the support of the international community, Africa's revitalization will surely be realized. [T2/S-Pres]

This extract from President Hu Jintao's 2004 speech at the Gabonese parliament is a narrative about development – political, social and economic – in sub-Saharan African countries as perceived by the speaker (Content B). But the most important point here is the fact that this extract is about national development in sub-Saharan Africa; as a consequence, it links the speech with the discourse which deals (exclusively) with matters of development in the countries in question. This narrative occurs in seven out of the ten texts analysed in this study<sup>71</sup>, which means that it is not only an intertextual link between these texts but also an interdiscursive link between China's official discourse on its relations with sub-Saharan African countries and the discourse on development in these countries.

Another example of the relation of interdiscursivity is found in the following extract from President Hu Jintao's 2007 speech at the University of Pretoria:

#### Extract 41

Since the policy of reform and opening-up was introduced in 1978, the Chinese people have succeeded in embarking on a path of development suited to China's national conditions. They have dedicated themselves to building socialism with Chinese features, greatly boosting productivity and China's national strength and raising their own living standards. Between 1978 and 2006, China's GDP grew to US\$2.6269 trillion from US\$216.5 billion, and its trade jumped to US\$1.7607 trillion from US\$20.6 billion, while the number of the rural poor shrank from 250 million to 21.5 million. China has on the whole brought a moderately prosperous life to its people. On the other hand, we are keenly aware that China is still the world's largest developing country with a huge population, weak foundation and uneven regional development. China ranks behind the 100th place in terms of per capita GDP and faces numerous difficulties and challenges in its development endeavor. [T7/S-Pres]

This extract is a narrative of achievement in China's internal social and economic development (Content C). Similar to the narrative of development in sub-Saharan African countries, this narrative intertextually links seven of the ten texts in the data<sup>72</sup>. Therefore, the

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<sup>71</sup> The three exceptions are State Councillor Tang Jiaxuan's interview (T5/I-SC), President Hu Jintao's speech at the 3rd FOCAC summit (T6/FOCAC3-Pres), and the interview with the then Ambassador to Tanzania, Liu Xinsheng (T9/I-Amb).

<sup>72</sup> The three exceptions are *China's African Policy* (T3/CAP), State Councillor Tang Jiaxuan's interview (T5/I-SC), and President Hu Jintao's speech at the 3rd FOCAC summit (T6/FOCAC3-Pres).

narrative concerning China's development does not only represent an intertextual link in China's official discourse on its relations with sub-Saharan African countries, but also an interdiscursive link between that discourse and the discourse on China's own development.

In terms of interdiscursivity, then, the data shows that China's official discourse on its relations with sub-Saharan African countries can be linked to four other discourses, namely:

1. China's discourse on its peaceful development in the international domain;
2. the discourse on development in (sub-Saharan) African countries;
3. the discourse on China's internal development;
4. the discourse on international security/relations and global interdependence.

Figure 4.2 below illustrates the relations of intertextuality and interdiscursivity between the Discourse Topics, the texts, the genres and other discourses. Due to space constraints, only four texts from different genres involving five Discourse Topics are used to illustrate the relations mentioned above. These texts and Discourse Topics are listed below.

#### *Texts*

1. President Jiang Zemin's speech at the first FOCAC (T1/FOCAC1.Pres)
2. *The China's African Policy* (T3/CAP)
3. China's president Hu Jintao's speeches at the University of Pretoria (T7/S-Pres)
4. Ambassador to Tanzania Liu Xinsheng's interview (T9/I-Amb)

#### *Discourse Topics*

- The long, strong, diverse, fruitful and increasing relations between China and sub-Saharan African countries (Discourse Topic I)
- China's foreign policy of peace and development in sub-Saharan Africa (Discourse Topic V)
- Recognition of political, social and economic achievements in sub-Saharan Africa (Discourse Topic VI)
- Recognition of achievements and challenges in China's social and economic development (Discourse Topic VII)

- The global appeal for cooperation towards peace and development (Discourse Topic VIII)




Figure 4.2: Relations of intertextuality and interdiscursivity between the discourse topics, the texts, the genres and other discourses



In Figure 4.2, the top smaller ellipses given in dashed lines represent the genres of the texts; the configuration of these ellipses show the way in which they are related to one another. For instance, it was pointed out with reference to the extracts 36-38, that the political (sub-)genre of orientation occurs together with two (sub-)genres, namely a speech delivered on the occasion of a state visit and a speech delivered at a summit. The texts are presented in the double-lined rectangles and bold arrows are used to indicate the genre(s) to which a text is assigned. The smaller ellipses at the bottom represent the Discourses Topics. The way in which these Topics are grouped indicates their interconnections; for instance, as mentioned in section 4.1.5, with its foreign policy of peace and development in sub-Saharan Africa (Discourse Topic V) China has developed long, strong, diverse, fruitful and increasing relations with the countries of this region (Discourse Topic I). Moreover, these relations have contributed to political, social and economic achievements in sub-Saharan Africa (Discourse Topic VI). As in sub-Saharan African countries, there have also been achievements (although some challenges still remain) in China's social and economic development (Discourse Topic VII). From this perspective, development progress in China and sub-Saharan Africa can be achieved through increasing the relations between China and the countries in question, which is in accordance with the appeal for cooperation towards achieving global peace and development (Discourse Topic VIII; see also Figure 4.1). The diamond-headed arrows link the Topics to the texts and the brace indicates that the four texts have the five Topics in common. The brace therefore shows the relations of intertextually among the four texts, whereas interdiscursivity is pointed to by the two overlapping ellipses. In the figure, the dashed arrow between the Discourse Topic IV and the Discourse Topic V indicates the topical intersection between the two texts.

## 4.2 Discursive Strategies

In accordance with CDA principles, as noted in the introduction to Chapter 1, discourse is regarded in this study as a form of social practice. From this perspective, discourse reflects ideological representations of social actors which serve to reproduce relations of power (Fairclough 1995). In terms of this view, I consider China's official discourse on its relations with sub-Saharan African countries as representing the practice of inter-state relations. Such a view of China's discourse is supported by the findings in section 4.1, which showed that the

Discourse Topics that were identified are related to inter-state relations and to China's view of and approach to these relations.

Pursuing the idea of discourse as a form of social practice, the present part of the analysis is concerned with the discursive construction (or representation) of the relations between China and sub-Saharan African countries. More precisely, I will investigate the discursive strategies – which have to do with linguistic means – that are used in the texts by Chinese officials to represent these relationships. Based on Reisigl and Wodak's (2009:94) definition, "strategy" is interpreted here as the more or less intentional plan of practices (including discursive practices) that is adopted in order to achieve a particular social, political, psychological or linguistic goal. In accordance with the research question of the present study, the investigation of the discursive strategies is grounded on the assumption that the strategies used in the texts serve to convey ideology and power relations between China and sub-Saharan African countries.

It is important to keep in mind that the view of discourse as a form of social practice requires me to identify, as part of the essential elements which constitute any performed social practice, the key participants or actors of the particular practice. Such a requirement is in line with the practice I am dealing with. Thus, with regard to inter-state relations, states (or countries, including their respective governments) are the key participants in the sense that the establishment of such relations implies states as the principal actors<sup>73</sup>. For the purposes of this study, I will focus on four key participants that are identified in the texts, namely (i) the relevant countries (including their governments and officials such as heads of state, ambassadors and other officials), (ii) their people (interpreted both broadly and in a more restricted manner, e.g. officials, doctors, students, etc.), (iii) the speakers and (iv) the addressees. From an International Relations perspective, various other actors in China-Africa relations are mentioned in the texts, such as private and state-owned companies, political

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<sup>73</sup> In the domain of International Relations, other actors such as intergovernmental organizations, non-governmental organizations, and various other non-state groups or organizations also play a role in inter-state relations (cf. Baylis, Smith & Owens 2008). Put differently, the state can be regarded as a "big umbrella" under which various actors assume different roles and positions according to their varying appointments and interests. I thus do not ascribe to a "black box" position on the Chinese state or its government which would construct it as a single actor with a unitary vision of its policy, its intentions and its best practices in African relations. Given this diversity of actors, I will focus in the present study on governments as represented by their heads of state or their senior diplomatic officials.

parties, parliaments, and intergovernmental organizations like the United Nations (UN), the African Union (AU) and the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation. These actors are all to varying degrees subsumed under the four groups mentioned above. On the one hand, China and the African countries – as sovereign states – are all part of the UN and the FOCAC, and the African countries are also part of the AU. Also, state-to-state relations represent the higher level of inter-state relations while unofficial relations between, for example, political parties or tertiary education institutions occur at a lower level. On the other hand, as far as private and state-owned companies are concerned, several such Chinese companies are active in Africa (Taylor 2004; Cheru & Obi 2010). Unlike the private companies, however, the state-owned ones are used by the Chinese government to implement the country's foreign policy in Africa.

The various discursive strategies that are used to represent the four groups of participants in the different texts are investigated in the subsections of 4.2 below. It was pointed out in Chapter 1 that CDA does not represent one single or specific theoretical framework or research methodology (Wodak & Meyer 2009b:5). Moreover, it was also noted in that section that the principle of triangulation makes it possible to combine various relevant disciplines and methods. Given this possibility, the discursive strategies will be identified in the subsections below in accordance with their definitions and properties as proposed by Van Leeuwen (2008). It must be noted, however, that Van Leeuwen's proposals about the discursive strategies which are used to represent social actors in texts deal only with "human beings". In the present study, these proposals are extended to include "non-human" entities as well, specifically countries and governments.

With regard to the way the participants are referred to linguistically in the texts, 15 discursive strategies can be identified in terms of Van Leeuwen's (2008) proposals. These strategies are briefly characterised below.

### 4.2.1 Nomination

Nomination occurs when participants are referred to in terms of their unique identity (Van Leeuwen 2008:40). Typical examples from my data are “Nigeria”, “President Mbeki”, and “South Africa”, as in the following extracts:<sup>74</sup>

Extract 42

With the largest population in Africa, *Nigeria* has a huge domestic market and is rich in natural resources, which give *Nigeria* enormous potentials. It is good to see that Nigerian people have made great efforts to achieve social stability and economic development. I am fully confident of the great future of *Nigeria*. [(T10/I-Amb)]

Extract 43

Just as *President Mbeki* has said, *South Africa* has entered an ‘Age of Hope’. [T7/S-Pres]

### 4.2.2 Genericization

Genericization occurs when the participants are represented as non-specific or as classes (Van Leeuwen 2008:35). This is shown by the use of the term “Africa” in the following extracts:

Extract 44

Both China and *Africa* are important forces for global peace and development. To deepen China-Africa traditional friendship, boost practical cooperation and forge in an all-round way a new China-Africa strategic partnership is the shared desire of our two peoples. [T7/S-Pres]

Extract 45

China will strengthen cooperation with *Africa* in the UN and other multilateral systems by supporting each other's just demand and reasonable propositions and continue to appeal to the international community to give more attention to questions concerning peace and development in *Africa*. [T3/CAP]

### 4.2.3 Specification

Unlike genericization, specification occurs when participants are represented as specific entities or individuals (Van Leeuwen 2008:35). In Extracts 46 and Extract47 below, the

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<sup>74</sup> Here and in subsequent extracts the expression(s) associated with a particular discursive strategy will be given in italics.

strategy is realised by reference to specific African countries (“the Arab Republic of Egypt”, “Tanzania”):<sup>75</sup>

#### Extract 46

In May 1956, diplomatic relations at the ambassadorial level were established between China and *the Arab Republic of Egypt*, inaugurating China's diplomatic relations with African countries and marking a new stage of China-Africa relations. [T5/I-SC]

#### Extract 47

Q9.<sup>76</sup> Your views on Chinese assistance in the exploitation of Africa’s resources.  
A: Resources cooperation between China and *Tanzania* will help *Tanzania* to realize sustainable development, China will facilitate information sharing and cooperation with *Tanzania* in resources development. [T9/I-Amb]

Note that the journalist asked a question concerning “Africa” as a whole in the extract 47. Yet, the interviewee’s response focused on Tanzania as a specific country. A similar specification is seen in Extract 48 where specific reference is made to “Tanzanian people” as part of the group “African people”:

#### Extract 48

Tanzania is one of the cradles of mankind. The *Tanzanian people* have a glorious tradition and have made important contributions to the victory of the African people in gaining national independence and fighting against apartheid. [T8/S-Pres]

### 4.2.4 Classification

Classification is a type of identification strategy. Identification occurs when participants are defined in terms of what they, more or less permanently, or unavoidably, are (Van Leeuwen 2008:42). This strategy occurs when participants are referred to in terms of the major categories used by a given society or institution to differentiate between classes of people<sup>77</sup>

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<sup>75</sup> It should be noted that a particular expression could arguably instantiate more than one discursive strategy. For example, it could well be that an expression that is classified as, say, an instance of Nomination also serves as an instance of Specification and/or Individualization (cf. below).

<sup>76</sup> This is an extract from the 2009 interview with the then Chinese Ambassador to Tanzania Liu Xinsheng. In the text, the “Q” stands for question whereas the “A” stands for answer.

<sup>77</sup> As pointed out above, Van Leeuwen (2008) focuses on “human beings” when he examines the various discursive strategies involved in the representation of social actors.

(Van Leeuwen 2008:42). However, it is clear from the data that this strategy is also used to refer to countries. In the texts the countries are sometimes referred to in terms of their economic status or level of development, and classification is realised through the use of descriptive expressions such as “developing countries”, “least developed countries”, and “heavily-indebted poor countries”, as in:

Extract 49

China and African countries should increase consultation, coordination and cooperation on the bilateral and multilateral fronts, participate actively in the management of international affairs and formulation of international rules and promote the reform of the international political, economic, financial and trading systems. In this way, the voice of *developing countries* will be heard more clearly in the world, a fair international environment will be created and the legitimate rights and interests of *developing countries* will be effectively safeguarded. [T1/FOCAC1-Pres]

Extract 50

Last year, at the High-level Meeting on Financing for Development at the UN summit marking its 60th anniversary, I announced a five-point proposal to assist other *developing countries* in speeding up development. This includes: Granting zero-tariff treatment for some exports from the *least developed countries*, increasing aid to the *heavily-indebted poor countries* and *least developed countries* and canceling debts contracted by them, providing concessional loans and effective medicine for treating malaria, and training professionals. [T4/S-Pres]

The expressions “the biggest developing country” and “the continent with the largest number of developing countries” in Extract 51 also illustrate the use of classification strategy:

Extract 51

China is *the biggest developing country* and Africa is *the continent with the largest number of developing countries*. [T7/S-Pres]

#### 4.2.5 Relational Identification

Relational identification occurs when participants are represented in terms of their personal, kinship, or work relation to each other (Van Leeuwen 2008:42). In the data, this strategy is realised by the use of expressions such as “brother” or “brotherly”, “friends” as in the following extracts:

Extract 52

A rapidly developing Africa has drawn the attention of the international community. The Chinese people rejoice at the achievements our African *brothers* have made and sincerely wish the *brotherly* African people greater success in your endeavor for national development and revitalization. [T4/S-Pres]

Extract 53

Let me begin by conveying to our *friends* present here and to the *brotherly* Tanzanian people the warm greetings and best wishes of the 1.3 billion Chinese people. [T8/S-Pres]

Extract 54

African countries have also offered valuable support to China. Our African *friends* played an important role in restoring the lawful seat of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations. [T5/I-SC]

#### 4.2.6 Functionalization

Functionalization, as opposed to identification, occurs when participants are represented in terms of an activity, something that they do such as, for instance, an occupation or role (Van Leeuwen 2008:42). The use of the expression “leaders” in Extract 55 is an instance of functionalization:

Extract 55

We, *leaders* of China and African countries, in a common pursuit of friendship, peace, cooperation and development, are gathered in Beijing today to renew friendship, discuss ways of growing China-Africa relations and promote unity and cooperation among developing countries. [T6/FOCAC3-Pres]

#### 4.2.7 Collectivization

Collectivization is a form of assimilation, and assimilation occurs when participants are represented as groups instead of as specific individuals (Van Leeuwen 2008:37). I saw earlier that the term “Africa” is often used in a generic sense to refer to all the African countries having diplomatic relations with China. The data reveal that the representation of African countries as “a group of similar countries”, where the similarity concerns the fact that they belong to the same continent, is also realised by the use of expressions such as “African countries”, “African nations”, as well as “developing countries”, as in:

Extract 56

The Chinese government is willing to share China's successful experience with *African countries*. [T9/I-Amb]

Extract 57

It [= The Chinese government – H N-M] encourages and supports competent Chinese enterprises to cooperate with *African nations* in various ways on the basis of the principle of mutual benefit and common development, to develop and exploit rationally their resources, with a view to helping *African countries* to translate their advantages in resources to competitive strength, and realize sustainable development in their own countries and the continent as a whole. [T3/CAP]

Extract 58

The Chinese Government will implement in good faith the five measures to help other *developing countries* accelerate their development announced by President Hu Jintao at the High-level Meeting on Financing for Development during last year's UN World Summit. [T5/I-SC]

Collectivization is also realised in the texts by the expression “people”, which is often used to refer to Chinese and Africans in general, as in:

Extract 59

The Chinese *people* did away with imperialism. Feudalism and bureaucrat-capitalism, known as the ‘three big mountains’ weighing down on the backs of the Chinese *people*. And founded the People's Republic of China where the *people* become the masters of the country. [T1/FOCAC1-Pres]

Extract 60

The purpose of growing China-Africa relations is to serve the Chinese and African *people* and fruits of our cooperation should be shared by all our *people*. [T8/S-Pres]

Extract 61

Africa has made important progress in regional integration under the guidance of the African Union. The African *people* are more united and confident than ever before. [T4/S-Pres]

#### 4.2.8 Aggregation

Aggregation is a type of assimilation. Unlike collectivization, aggregation occurs when participants are represented as a quantified group of people. The number “1.3 billion” in extracts 62 and 63 illustrates the use of this strategy:



Extract 62 (53 above)

Let me begin by conveying to our friends present here and to the brotherly Tanzanian people the warm greetings and best wishes of the *1.3 billion* Chinese people. [T8/S-Pres]

Extract 63

Today, our *1.3 billion* countrymen are working vigorously, and with full confidence, towards this grand goal. [T2/S-Pres]

#### **4.2.9 Individualization**

In contrast to collectivization, individualization occurs when the participants are represented as individuals instead of as groups (Van Leeuwen 2008:37). I already saw in the case of the specification strategy (section 4.2.3) that African countries are sometimes individually referred to instead of as part of the group “African countries” (cf. also note 9).

#### **4.2.10 Association**

As conceptualised by Van Leeuwen (2008:38), association is another way of representing participants as groups. This strategy occurs when reference is made to (i) groups formed by participants and/or (ii) groups of participants – either generically or specifically referred to – which are never labelled in the text (although the participants or group of participants who make up the association may of course themselves be named and/or categorised). Many instances of association can be found in the texts. For example, in the extract 64 below “China” and “African countries” are associated in relation to situations and activities which aim at strengthening, increasing and diversifying China-Africa relations (i.e. Discourse Topic IV in section 4.1.1). Similarly, in the extract 65 mention is made of an alliance between “[t]he Chinese Government and people” and “the South African Government and people”:

Extract 64 (49 above)

*China* and *African countries* should increase consultation, coordination and cooperation on the bilateral and multilateral fronts, participate actively in the management of international affairs and formulation of international rules and promote the reform of the international political, economic, financial and trading systems. In this way, the voice of developing countries will be heard more clearly in the world, a fair international environment will be created and the legitimate rights

and interests of developing countries will be effectively safeguarded. [T1/FOCAC1-Pres]

Extract 65

*The Chinese Government and people* will work closely with *the South African Government and people* to enhance mutual political trust and practical cooperation and steadily strengthen China-South Africa strategic partnership to the benefit of our two peoples. [T7/S-Pres]

#### 4.2.11 Dissociation

Alliances between participants and/or group of participant may be formed (“association”) and dissolved (“dissociation”) as the text proceeds (Van Leeuwen 2008:39). Dissociation occurs after association, and the strategy is realised when participants are represented separately. Consider in this regard the following extracts from the same text:

Extract 66

Over the past 50 years, *China and Africa* have increased mutual understanding, supported and helped each other. In their respective national endeavors to promote development and pursue a better life, *the Chinese and African peoples* have fostered profound friendship, and fruitful progress has been made in China-Africa cooperation. [T4/S-Pres]

Extract 67

*China* helped Africa to train freedom fighters for national liberation. And *African countries* supported the restoration of the lawful seat of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations. [T4/S-Pres]

In the first extract, “China and Africa” expresses an association, as does “the Chinese and African peoples”. As the text proceeds, however, it is noticeable in the second extract that “China” and “African countries” are represented separately and in different actions.

Another example of dissociation is found in the following extracts:

Extract 68

Economically, *China and Africa* should be partners of cooperation and should draw on each other's strength to work for mutual benefit. They should work together to enhance South-South cooperation and North-South dialogue and work for economic globalisation to develop in a way that brings balanced, general and win-win benefits

to all. They should promote economic cooperation in diversified forms to increase trade volume and improve trade structure. [T5/I-SC]

Extract 69 (58 above)

The *Chinese Government* will implement in good faith the five measures to help *other developing countries* accelerate their development announced by President Hu Jintao at the High-level Meeting on Financing for Development during last year's UN World Summit. *China* will continue to encourage and assist Chinese companies to invest in *Africa*. And *we* also warmly welcome African companies doing business in China. [T5/I-SC (39-42)]

In Extract 68, “China and Africa” are represented as a group, an association. As the text progresses, however, dissociation is realised by the individualization of the “Chinese government”, whereas, with the use differentiation strategy (see below), African countries are collectivised by “other developing countries”. Similarly, dissociation is realised by individualizing China through the use of the expressions “China” and “we”, that is, referring to China as an individual participant, separate from the African countries (“Africa”).

#### **4.2.12 Differentiation**

Differentiation, as defined by Van Leeuwen (2008:40), explicitly differentiates an individual participant or group of participants from a similar participant or group, creating the difference between the “self” and the “other”, or between “us” and “them”. This strategy is realised through the use of the expression “other” in the extract 69 as well as in 70:

Extract 70 (50 above)

Last year, at the High-level Meeting on Financing for Development at the UN summit marking its 60th anniversary, I announced a five-point proposal to assist *other* developing countries in speeding up development. [T4/S-Pres]

#### **4.2.13 Personalization**

Personalization is a discursive strategy which personalizes participants by representing them as human beings through the use of personal or possessive pronouns, proper names, or nouns whose meaning includes the feature “human” (Leeuwen 2008:46). Consider for example the use of the personal pronoun “we” in the following extracts:

Extract 71

China is firm in upholding the diversity of the world and diversified models of development. *We* hold that countries should respect and learn from each other, and different civilizations should coexist in harmony, benefit from each other through exchanges and competition, and seek common development by expanding common ground and shelving differences. [T4/S-Pres]

Extract 72

China's development is peaceful, open, cooperative and harmonious in nature. *We* aim to build a harmonious society at home and work with other countries to build a harmonious world of enduring peace and common prosperity. [T7/S-Pres]

#### 4.2.14 Activation and Passivation

With activation and passivation strategies, the focus is on the roles given to the participants in the representation of the relations between China and sub-Saharan Africa. More precisely, the grammatical roles that are given to the participants in the texts are investigated.

From a functional grammar perspective (Halliday 1994), a participant in a clause can be represented either as an actor (i.e. agent) or as a goal (i.e. patient) (Van Leeuwen 2008). Depending on the process represented in a given clause (for instance, the process of doing, of sensing, or of being), the actor is the participant that “does” something (the deed), the “senser” (i.e., the one that “senses something”), or the one that is “identified” (i.e. the “token”) (Halliday 1994:143); the goal, by contrast, is the one the deed is extended to, or directed at (Halliday 1994:109). For the purpose of the analysis, I shall just refer to the two types of participant roles as Actor and Goal, without using the specific term for a particular type of process (see Halliday 1994:143 for detailed description). Consider, for instance, the material processes in the clauses in Extract 73:

Extract 73

*We* [= the Chinese government – H N-M] will expand trade and investment and strengthen practical cooperation with *Africa*. [T8/S-Pres]

In the above extract, “we” (i.e. the Chinese government) is the Actor in relation to the processes of “expanding” and “strengthening”. But these processes are directed at “Africa”, which is accordingly given the grammatical role of Goal. From the Chinese government’s

point of view, the above processes are therefore processes of “doing” something “for” African countries, whereas from the perspective of the African countries’, these processes are processes of “happening” in the sense that something will be done for or happen to them (Halliday 1994). In view of these two perspectives, participants can thus be given either an active role (i.e. the role of “doing” something) or a passive role (i.e. the role of something “happening” to them) (Halliday 1994; Van Leeuwen 2008). In this regard, Van Leeuwen (2008) distinguishes two kinds of role allocations, namely activation and passivation. Activation occurs when participants are represented as the active, dynamic forces in an activity, whereas passivation occurs when they are represented as “undergoing” the activity or as being “at the receiving end of it” (Van Leeuwen 2008:33). In these terms, then, China (i.e. “we”, the Chinese government), in Extract 73 is represented as active, whereas African countries (i.e. “Africa”) are represented as passive.

A participant in a passive role (i.e. one who is “passivated”) can be represented either as a subject (one who is “subjected”) or as a beneficiary (one who is “beneficialised”) (Van Leeuwen 2008). A subjected participant is treated as an object in the representation, whereas a beneficialised participant is considered as the one who benefits from the action (Van Leeuwen 2008:33, also Halliday 1994). To illustrate, consider the material process represented by the clause in Extract 74:

#### Extract 74

In all these years, China has firmly supported *Africa* in winning liberation and pursuing development. [T6/FOCAC3-Pres]

In this extract, “Africa” is represented in a passive role in relation to the process of “supporting”. More precisely, “Africa” is represented here as subjected in the representation in the sense that it is treated as an object of support during colonization and in activities related to development (I return to this point in the next section).

As regards the notion of being a beneficiary, consider the following extract:

#### Extract 75

China has trained technical personnel and other professionals in various fields for *Africa*. It has built the Tanzara Railway and other infrastructural projects and sent medical teams and peacekeepers to *Africa*. [T6/FOCAC3-Pres]

In this extract, “Africa” is represented in a passive role in relation to the processes of “training” and “sending”. More specifically, “Africa” is beneficialised in the representation in the sense that it is represented in the material processes as the participant who benefits of profits from the actions of “training” and “sending”.

### 4.3 Linguistic Means and Context-Dependent Linguistic Realizations

In this section I analyse the discourse strategies that have been identified in the texts under discussion in terms of their linguistic features. The analysis is along the proposals put forward by Van Leeuwen (2008) within the framework of Halliday’s (1994) Systemic Functional Grammar (cf. also Bloor & Bloor 1995).

#### 4.3.1 Nomination

In the data, Nomination is realised through the use of proper nouns (such as “Nigeria”, “South Africa”) and structures comprising an official title plus surname (such as “President Mbeki”). This is illustrated in the extracts 42 and 43 above, repeated here as 76 and 77<sup>78</sup>, respectively:<sup>79</sup>

Extract 76 (42 above)

With the largest population in Africa, *Nigeria* has a huge domestic market and is rich in natural resources, which give *Nigeria* enormous potentials. It is good to see that Nigerian people have made great efforts to achieve social stability and economic development. I am fully confident of the great future of *Nigeria*. [(T10/I-Amb)]

Extract 77 (43 above)

Just as *President Mbeki* has said, *South Africa* has entered an ‘Age of Hope’. [T7/S-Pres]

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<sup>78</sup> In many instances the same extract will be used in the course of the discussion below to illustrate different strategies (cf. note 9). In such cases, the extract in question is presented with a new number and with its previous number in brackets.

<sup>79</sup> Here and in subsequent extracts the linguistic means and context-dependent linguistic realizations associated with a particular discursive strategy will be given in italics.

### 4.3.2 Genericization

In the data, genericization is realised by the use of the proper noun “Africa”, as illustrated below:

Extract 78 (44 above)

Both China and *Africa* are important forces for global peace and development. To deepen China-Africa traditional friendship, boost practical cooperation and forge in an all-round way a new China-Africa strategic partnership is the shared desire of our two peoples. [T7/S-Pres]

Extract 79 (45 above)

China will strengthen cooperation with *Africa* in the UN and other multilateral systems by supporting each other's just demand and reasonable propositions and continue to appeal to the international community to give more attention to questions concerning peace and development in *Africa*. [T3/CAP]

The term “Africa” denotes the second-largest and the second-most-populous continent. However, it is clear from the context in which “Africa” is used in the above extracts that this is not used to nominate the continent, but rather to refer to all the countries in the continent which have diplomatic relations with China. Indeed, the term “Africa”, used in this manner, does not refer to one specific country amongst the 45 sub-Saharan African countries which are situated in different areas of a very large continent and therefore geographically very different from one another. Rather, the term expresses a perception of the continent as being made up of a homogeneous group of countries. Moreover, the use of “Africa” to refer to African countries in general indicates that these countries are represented on the basis of where they are located, namely, on the continent. In other words, belonging to the continent is regarded here as the most important common ontological property shared by African countries. In short, rather than referring to specific sub-Saharan African countries, “Africa” is used in the text as a generic term to refer to these countries. There are 331 occurrences of the term “Africa” in the data as compared to 132 occurrences of the expression “African countries” and 59 references to specific countries. I return to this issue in section 4.3.15 below.

### 4.3.3 Specification

In the data, specification is realised by reference to specific African countries through the use of proper nouns such as “the Arab Republic of Egypt” and “Tanzania” in the following extracts:

Extract 80 (46 above)

In May 1956, diplomatic relations at the ambassadorial level were established between China and *the Arab Republic of Egypt*, inaugurating China's diplomatic relations with African countries and marking a new stage of China-Africa relations. [T5/I-SC]

Extract 81 (47 above)

Q9. Your views on Chinese assistance in the exploitation of Africa’s resources.  
A: Resources cooperation between China and *Tanzania* will help *Tanzania* to realize sustainable development, China will facilitate information sharing and cooperation with *Tanzania* in resources development. [T9/I-Amb]

Note that, instead of employing proper names, the strategy of specification is realised by the article “the” (and also the possessive pronoun “their”) in:

Extract 82

China is ready to play a constructive role and help *the* African countries settle *their* differences and disputes. [T4/S-Pres]

In the above example, “the” is used as a deictic element to refer to specific countries which can be identified from the broad political context in the continent. In the nominal group “their differences and disputes”, “differences and disputes” is the core element which contains the necessary information on the basis of which the African countries in question can be identified.

### 4.3.4 Classification

In the data, classification is realised through the use of classifiers such as “African”, “developing”, “least developed” and “heavily-indebted” in the nominal group “African countries”, “African people”, “developing countries”, “least developed countries”, and “heavily-indebted poor countries”, as in:



Extract 83

To truly help the *African* people and support Africa's development, the international community must help Africa realize economic and social development. [T7/S-Pres]

Extract 84 (49, 64 above)

China and *African* countries should increase consultation, coordination and cooperation on the bilateral and multilateral fronts, participate actively in the management of international affairs and formulation of international rules and promote the reform of the international political, economic, financial and trading systems. In this way, the voice of *developing* countries will be heard more clearly in the world, a fair international environment will be created and the legitimate rights and interests of *developing* countries will be effectively safeguarded. [T1/FOCAC1-Pres]

Extract 85 (50, 70 above)

Last year, at the High-level Meeting on Financing for Development at the UN summit marking its 60th anniversary, I announced a five-point proposal to assist other *developing* countries in speeding up development. This includes: Granting zero-tariff treatment for some exports from the *least developed* countries, increasing aid to the *heavily-indebted* poor countries and *least developed* countries and canceling debts contracted by them, providing concessional loans and effective medicine for treating malaria, and training professionals. [T4/S-Pres]

In the above extracts, the adjectival expressions “developing”, “least developed” and “heavily-indebted” represent classifiers because they indicate the subclasses that the “countries” under discussion belong to. These countries are therefore distinguished from, for instance, “developed countries” or “poor countries”. Similarly, the adjective “African” functions as a classifier because it places the people or countries that are referred to into a subclass of people or countries. In this specific case the classifier specifies the origin or provenance of the people or the countries.

The strategy of classification is also realised by relational clauses in identifying processes, as illustrated in the following extracts:

Extract 86

Both *China and Africa* are the cradles of the ancient human civilizations. [T1/FOCAC-Pres]

Extract 87 (51 above)

*China* is the biggest developing country and *Africa* is the continent with the largest number of developing countries. [T7/S-Pres]

Taking 87 as example, this extract contains two relational clauses: (i) “China is the biggest developing country” and (ii) “Africa is the continent with the largest number of developing countries”. In each clause, there is a relational process realised by the copular verb “is”. The relational processes realised by means of the two clauses are identifying processes in which “China” and “Africa” are the identifiers, whereas “the biggest developing country” and “the continent with the largest number of developing countries” play the role of the identified.

#### 4.3.5 Relational Identification

Relational identification is realised in my data by the use of expressions denoting personal, kinship, or work relations such as “brother”, “brotherly”, “friends” and “colleagues”. Consider the following extracts in this regard:

Extract 88 (52 above)

A rapidly developing Africa has drawn the attention of the international community. The Chinese people rejoice at the achievements our African *brothers* have made and sincerely wish the *brotherly* African people greater success in your endeavor for national development and revitalization. [T4/S-Pres]

Extract 89 (53, 62 above)

Let me begin by conveying to our *friends* present here and to the brotherly Tanzanian people the warm greetings and best wishes of the 1.3 billion Chinese people. [T8/S-Pres]

Extract 90

Dear *colleagues* and *friends*,  
This year marks the 50th anniversary of the inauguration of diplomatic ties between New China and African countries. [T6/FOCAC3-Pres]

#### 4.3.6 Functionalization

Functionalization is realised in the data by the use of the noun “leader” as, for instance, in:

Extract 91(55 above)

We, *leaders* of China and African countries, in a common pursuit of friendship, peace, cooperation and development, are gathered in Beijing today to renew

friendship, discuss ways of growing China-Africa relations and promote unity and cooperation among developing countries. [T6/FOCAC3-Pres]

#### 4.3.7 Collectivization

Collectivization is realised by the use of collective expressions such as (African, developing) “countries”, “nations”, “people”, as illustrated in the following extracts:

##### Extract 92

It [= the Chinese government – HN-M] encourages and supports competent Chinese enterprises to cooperate with African *nations* in various ways on the basis of the principle of mutual benefit and common development, to develop and exploit rationally their resources, with a view to helping African *countries* to translate their advantages in resources to competitive strength, and realize sustainable development in their own *countries* and the continent as a whole. [T3/CAP]

##### Extract 93

We should encourage strengthened cooperation and exchanges between *countries*, urge the international community to implement the Millennium Development Goals and support other developing *countries* in fully tapping their strengths to speed up their development. [T7/S-Pres]

Collectivization is emphasised to an even larger extent by the use of the term “people” in Extract 94, Extract 95 and Extract 96 below. In these cases the term encompasses not only those who can be referred to as “ordinary citizens”, but also influential people – due to their status, role, or functions – such as heads of states and governments, government officials, diplomats, and political leaders and activists.

##### Extract 94

President Bongo is an old friend of the Chinese *people* who has made important contributions to the development of China-Gabon relations. [T2/S-Pres]

##### Extract 95

In the 1950s and 1960s, *people* of China and Africa fought shoulder-to-shoulder against the colonial rule in order to achieve national liberation on the African continent. [T8/S-Pres]

##### Extract 96

During the South African *people's* struggle against apartheid, the Chinese *people* stood firmly with you, and our two *peoples* forged profound friendship. [T7/S-Pres]

Considering the history of China's cooperation with African countries (Larkin 1973; Ogunsanwo 1974), it is important to recall that during Africa's struggle against colonialism and apartheid, the Chinese government provided African political leaders and activists with financial, technical, and moral support. From this perspective, the use of the term "people" in the above three extracts suggests that emphasis is placed on the idea that officials and political leaders or representatives are regarded as representative of their people. It should be noted in this regard that "people" is a key term in China's political ideology, as is clearly shown in the following extract from China's constitution:

Article 2. All power in the People's Republic of China belongs to the people. The organs through which the people exercise state power are the National People's Congress and the local people's congresses at different levels. The people administer state affairs and manage economic, cultural and social affairs through various channels and in various ways in accordance with the law.<sup>80</sup>

The remarks in extract Extract 94 should be understood against this background: through his friendship with the Chinese officials (including the speaker) whom he met, President Bongo indirectly became the friend of the Chinese people.

Collectivization is also realised in the data by the use of deictic and anaphoric pronouns such as the personal pronouns "they" and "you". For instance:

Extract 97 (96 above)

During the South African people's struggle against apartheid, the Chinese people stood firmly with *you*, and our two peoples forged profound friendship. [T7/S-Pres]

Extract 98

Having smashed the shackles of the colonial rule that lasted for several centuries, the African people won their national liberation and independence. *They* have since registered gratifying progress in social and economic development. [T1/FOCAC1-Pres]

There are 22 instances of the use of the personal pronoun *you* and six of the pronoun *yours* in the texts constituting the data for this study. The personal pronoun *you* is used more often in the speeches (19 times) than in the interviews and the *China's African Policy* document;

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<sup>80</sup> Constitution of the People's Republic of China. Online: <http://english.people.com.cn/constitution/constitution.html>

also, the pronoun occurs more often in the welcoming or greeting part of the speeches (10 times), as illustrated in the following extracts:

Extract 99

It is a great pleasure for me to have this opportunity to visit Gabon and meet, here at this Palace of the National Assembly, a symbol of China-Gabon friendship, with parliamentarians and diplomatic envoys accredited to Gabon. First of all, on behalf of the Government and people of China, I would like to extend my sincere greetings and best wishes to *you* and, through *you*, to the Gabonese people and the people of whole Africa. [T2/S-Pres]

Extract 100

On behalf of the Chinese Government and people and in my own name, I wish to extend a very warm welcome to *you* and deep appreciation to *you* for attending the Summit. [T6/FOCAC3-Pres]

The data reveal that the personal pronoun “you” was used the most (11 times) in the Chinese President’s speech at Pretoria University. In his speech, the President used the pronoun twice in the greeting part, and seven times to refer to the addressees, as in:

Extract101

I see so many young faces in the audience today. In my younger days, I was involved in youth affairs in China. I like to talk to young people and benefit from them. Being with *you* today, I can feel your youthful vigor and this brings me back to the unforgettable years when I was a young man of your age. Being young is enviable and I wish *you* a great future. The future of South Africa lies with *you*, and the hope of African renaissance lies with young people in Africa. [T7/S-Pres]

In Extract 101, the use of the first-person singular pronoun *I* indicates the speaker’s (here, the Chinese President) personal attitude at this specific moment of the speech event. The speaker expresses his personal bond with and his opinion about the young people, that is, the students in the audience. But by using the first-person singular pronoun *I*, on the one hand, the president positions himself as somebody who has, generally speaking, a certain experience in something, namely in “youth affairs”. In other words, the President is empathizing or expressing solidarity with the young people. On the other hand, by using the second-person plural pronoun *you*, the President involves the young people in the audience (the “you”) in an interactive speech role in which they have to, at least, acknowledge or accept the President’s attitude.

As illustrated in Extract 99 and Extract 101, the data reveal that the use of the second-person pronoun *you* occurs in the texts only in relation to certain activities, events, or facts which personally involve the addressee(s). The fact that the pronoun was used the most in the Chinese President's speech at Pretoria University can plausibly be explained by the political and historical context of South Africa. The first fully democratic elections in 1994 brought an end to the apartheid system in the country. Thus, when President Hu Jintao gave his speech at Pretoria University in 2007, South Africa was free from apartheid for only 13 years. From this perspective, when the President used the pronoun *you* in Extract 97, some of the people in the audience who were born before 1994 had, at some point, personally experienced the racial segregation system.

In short, I can argue that the pronoun *you* is used more often in the welcoming or greeting part of the speeches because the members in the audience which constitute the addressees are personally part of the context of situation in which the speech event takes place.

The data show that collectivization is also realised by the first-person plural pronoun *we*, as in:

#### Extract 102

The Chinese are a peace-loving nation. *We* believe in cooperation and harmony among nations, and *we* hold that the strong and the rich should not bully the weak and the poor. [T7/S-Pres]

With regard to the use of the first-person plural pronoun, it is important to explain why it is considered here as a collective. Consider the following extracts:

#### Extract 103

China will announce important measures to enhance cooperation with Africa at the Summit. *We* are working hard and maintaining close communication and consultation with African countries to ensure that the Summit will be a meeting of unity and success and yield concrete outcomes. [T4/S-Pres]

#### Extract 104

Providing assistance to African countries to the best of our capacity and with no political strings attached is an important part of China's Africa policy. As China grows stronger economically, *we* will increase assistance to our friends. [T2/S-Pres]

In view of the co-texts of “we” in these extracts, it cannot be asserted that the pronoun refers to some group of people which has been mentioned earlier and in which the speaker, here the Chinese President, includes himself. As regards the extra-linguistic context, it is important to note that, as indicated in the Chinese government official website<sup>81</sup>, “[t]he President of the People's Republic of China is the Head of State, as well as the supreme representative of China both internally and externally.” Recall also the emphasis on “the people” in China’s constitution:

Article 2. All power in the People's Republic of China belongs to the people. The organs through which the people exercise state power are the National People's Congress and the local people's congresses at different levels. The people administer state affairs and manage economic, cultural and social affairs through various channels and in various ways in accordance with the law.<sup>82</sup>

In accordance with China’s state regulations, the Chinese president thus acted, in his speeches, not only as the representative of the Chinese state but also and most importantly as a representative of “the people” of China. Such representativeness indicates that the speaker visualizes the state as a collective in which he includes himself. It can therefore be asserted that “we” must necessarily refer to “China” seen as governed by the people and therefore regarded as a group.

In this respect, consider also the use of the pronoun *we* in Extract 105 by the then State Councillor Tang Jiaxuan during his 2006 interview. In this extract, the State Councillor was answering a question regarding the *China’s African Policy* document issued by the Chinese government:

Extract 105

China will continue to encourage and assist Chinese companies to invest in Africa. And *we* also warmly welcome African companies doing business in China. [T5/I-SC]

According to China’s constitution, the State Councillor is a member of China’s government. He was therefore speaking as a member of the government which released the policy. Hence,

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<sup>81</sup> Online: [http://www.gov.cn/english/2008-03/15/content\\_921051.htm](http://www.gov.cn/english/2008-03/15/content_921051.htm)

<sup>82</sup> Constitution of the People's Republic of China. Online: <http://english.people.com.cn/constitution/constitution.html>

if one regards the government as a group of people, it could be argued that “we” is used as a deictic element that refers to the then group of officials of the government in which the councillor includes himself. Considering the co-text, however, the conjunction “and” indicates the anaphoric function of the pronoun “we”, with “China” being the antecedent. This function is reinforced by the adverb “also”. Thus, it can be claimed that the State Councillor used the pronoun *we* to refer to “China”. In accordance with the extract from China’s constitution given above, and similar to the Chinese President, it can be asserted that the councillor used the first-person plural as a collective to refer to China.

It could of course be objected that the use of the personal pronoun *we* is to be expected because “government” can be used to refer to a country or a state: after all, it is the government that rules a country/state. Moreover, a government can be visualised as a group of people, which implies that *we*, as used in the above extract, can refer to this specific group of people in which the speaker includes himself.

In view of the above argument, it is important to consider the way the speakers visualize the country or the government they refer to in the texts. Note that “government” is, grammatically speaking, a collective noun. However, depending on the context, it can be interpreted either as a specific group of officials or as the state and its administration as a whole. In this respect, consider the use of the pronoun *it* in the following two extracts from the *China’s African Policy* document:

#### Extract106

The Chinese Government will adopt more effective measures to facilitate African commodities' access to Chinese market and fulfill its promise to grant duty-free treatment to some goods from the least developed African countries, with a view to expanding and balancing bilateral trade and optimizing trade structure. *It* intends to settle trade disputes and frictions properly through bilateral or multilateral friendly consultation, mutual understanding and mutual accommodation. [T3/CAP]

#### Extract107

The Chinese Government will step up China-Africa cooperation in transportation, communication, water conservancy, electricity and other infrastructures. *It* will vigorously encourage Chinese enterprises to participate in the building of infrastructure in African countries, scale up their contracts, and gradually establish multilateral and bilateral mechanisms on contractual projects. [T3/CAP]



In these two extracts the co-texts of “it” indicate that the pronoun is used to refer to “the Chinese government”. Thus, given the fact that *it* is not conventionally used to refer to humans, the members of the government who conceived the policy are not encoded in the use and the meaning of “it”. It could thus be claimed that the use of this pronoun as a substitute for “the Chinese government” reveals that in this specific context, the government is perceived as a whole, that is, as the state and its administration, rather than a group of people. Besides, it could be argued that the choice of the third-person pronoun instead of the first-person plural *we* is influenced by the political (sub-)genre of the texts. In this regard, however, the data reveal the use of the first-person plural pronoun even in the *China’s African Policy* document, as in:

Extract 108

(2) Conflict settlement and peacekeeping operations

China supports the positive efforts by the AU and other African regional organizations and African countries concerned to settle regional conflicts and will provide assistance within *our* own capacity. [T3/CAP]

But, as was already shown, the data reveal that the first-person pronoun *we* is sometimes selected as a substitute for the “Chinese government”, as in:

Extract 109

4. In education, the Chinese government shall not only offer 100 scholarships to Tanzania each year during the following three years, but also provide a lot of chances for short-term training in China in various areas. This year 68 Tanzania students have got the scholarship to study in China. Meanwhile, *we* will help to build some schools in the rural areas.[T9/I-Amb]

Extract 110

Since the founding of New China, the Chinese Government has always attached great importance to developing relations with Africa and adopted a series of related policies and guidelines. Consistently adhering to the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, *we* respect the independent choices made by African countries for their political systems and development paths. *We* have provided them with assistance to the best of our ability and developed economic and technical cooperation with them. *We* support their efforts for a strong and united Africa through collective self-reliance. *We* call for greater attention by the international community to peace and development on this continent and support African countries in their participation in international affairs on an equal footing. *We* have worked to strengthen consultations and cooperation with

Africa and made joint efforts to safeguard the rights and interests of the developing countries. [T2/S-Pres]

The co-texts of the pronoun “we” indicate that it refers to “the Chinese government”, which suggests that the speaker presents himself as one of the referents of the pronoun. However, the extra-linguistic context might indicate otherwise. The speaker in Extract109 is the then ambassador to Tanzania, Liu Xinsheng, whereas the speaker in Extract110 is President Hu Jintao. According to China’s constitution, neither of them is a member of the government. Therefore, it cannot be asserted that, by using “we” in the above extracts, the speakers regard the “Chinese government” as a group of people of which they are members. Still, the intertextual relationship between the texts indicates that “China” and “the Chinese government” are often used as synonyms, as in:

Extract 111

*China* adheres to the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, respects African countries' independent choice of the road of development and supports African countries' efforts to grow stronger through unity. [T3/CAP]

Extract 112 (110 above)

Since the founding of New China, *the Chinese Government* has always attached great importance to developing relations with Africa and adopted a series of related policies and guidelines. Consistently adhering to the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, we respect the independent choices made by African countries for their political systems and development paths. [T2/S-Pres]

From a semantic perspective, the first-person plural pronoun *we* is conventionally used to refer to a group of people made up of:

- *I* (the speaker/writer) + *you* (the addressee (s))
- *I* (the speaker/writer) + *he/she/they* (which exclude the addressee(s)) (Greenbaum & Quirk 1990; Halliday 1994 )

The above examples illustrate the fact that in some occurrences of *we* in the texts, the addressee(s) is not encoded in the use and the meaning of the first-person plural pronoun. Such a use of this pronoun is referred to in the literature as the “exclusive-*we*”, as opposed to the “inclusive-*we*” that includes in its meaning the speaker and the addressee (cf. e.g.

Pennycook 1994). Thus, in the data, the pronoun *we* is sometimes exclusive because its meaning does not include the addressee.

#### 4.3.8 Aggregation

As pointed out in section 4.2.8, the strategy of aggregation occurs when participants are represented as a quantified group of people. In the data, aggregation is realised by the use of numeral as illustrated in the following:

Extract 113 (63 above)

Today, our *1.3 billion* countrymen are working vigorously, and with full confidence, towards this grand goal. [T2/S-Pres]

Extract 114

This year *68* Tanzania students have got the scholarship to study in China. Meanwhile, we will help to build some schools in the rural areas. [T9/I-Amb]

#### 4.3.9 Individualization

In the data, individualization is realised through the first-person singular pronoun “I” or “me/my” and the second-person singular pronoun “you”, as in the following extracts:

Extract 115

This is the sixth time for *me* to set foot on the land of Africa. Every time *I* come, it’s like coming back home. And every time *I* talk to our African friends and listen to your views on China, China-Africa relations and world affairs, *I* get new inspirations and food for thought. [T8/S-Pres]

Extract 116

China's development has created more development opportunities to Africa. The allegations *you* referred to are unfounded as far as history is concerned, and they distort the current relations between China and Africa. [T5/I-SC]

The realization of the individualization strategy by the singular pronoun “you” occurs only twice in the data (in two texts of interviews):

Extract 117

China's development has created more development opportunities to Africa. The allegations *you* referred to are unfounded as far as history is concerned, and they distort the current relations between China and Africa. [T5/I-SC]

Extract 118

A: Just as *you* said, the two countries need to learn from each other. [T9/I-Amb]

#### 4.3.10 Association

In the data, association is realised by the use of the conjunction “and”, as in:

Extract 119 (49, 64, and 84 above)

China *and* African countries should increase consultation, coordination and cooperation on the bilateral and multilateral fronts, participate actively in the management of international affairs and formulation of international rules and promote the reform of the international political, economic, financial and trading systems. [T1/FOCAC1-Pres]

Extract 120

China *and* Africa have set out to establish a new type of partnership featuring long-term stability, equality and mutual benefit and China-Africa friendship and cooperation have entered a new stage of all-round development. [T2/S-Pres]

The strategy is also realised by “circumstances of accompaniment” (Halliday, in Leeuwen 2008:39), which is overtly marked with the preposition “with” as illustrated in the following extracts:

Extract 121 (65 above)

The Chinese Government and people will work closely *with* the South African Government and people to enhance mutual political trust and practical cooperation and steadily strengthen China-South Africa strategic partnership to the benefit of our two peoples. [T7/S-Pres]

Extract 122

... China will work together *with* Africa in the exploration of the road of sustainable development. [T3/CAP]

A further way of realising the strategy of association is through the use of the modifier “our”, as in:

Extract 123

Over the years, *our* two countries have adhered to the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, *our* two peoples have forged strong ties of friendship, and *our* cooperation in all fields has yielded fruitful results. And this naturally leads to the forging of China-Nigeria strategic partnership, which will both benefit *our* two peoples and help promote China-Africa cooperation and South-South cooperation. [T4/S-Pres]

Extract 124

In the long course of history, the Chinese and African peoples, with an unyielding and tenacious spirit, created splendid and distinctive ancient civilisations. In the modern era, *our* peoples launched unremitting and heroic struggle against subjugation, and have written a glorious chapter in the course of pursuing freedom and liberation, upholding human dignity, and striving for economic development and national rejuvenation. [T6/FOCAC3-Pres]

The first-person pronoun *we* is similarly used for realising the strategy of association, as shown in the extracts below:

Extract 125 (55, 91 above)

*We*, leaders of China and African countries, in a common pursuit of friendship, peace, cooperation and development, are gathered in Beijing today to renew friendship, discuss ways of growing China-Africa relations and promote unity and cooperation among developing countries. [T6/FOCAC3-Pres]

Extract 126

Our economic cooperation in the future could focus more on infrastructure, agriculture and resources development, and *we* shall step up our mutually beneficial cooperation to promote common development, thus making both sides winners. [T2/S-Pres]

The use of the deictic “the” and the numerative “two” in the nominal group “the two sides” is likewise considered here as instances of association:

Extract 127

It is important for China and Africa to increase governmental and nongovernmental interactions at various levels in addition to keeping the current frequency of high-level exchanges. Equally important is for *the two* sides to enhance trade and economic

cooperation, and expand cooperation in science, technology, culture, education, health, tourism, management and other areas. [T2/S-Pres]

Extract 128

In recent years, thanks to the joint efforts of *the two* sides, China-Africa relations have, building on traditional friendship, made new progress, which finds expression in enhanced political relations and closer cooperation in economy, trade, culture, education, and other fields. As this year is of special commemorative significance for the two sides, the Chinese and African leaders have agreed to work together to lift China-Africa relations to a new level. [T5/I-SC]

#### 4.3.11 Differentiation

Differentiation is realised in two ways in the data, one being by the use of the determiner “other” (e.g. “other developing countries”), as in Extracts 129 and 130:

Extract 129 (50, 70, and 85 above)

Last year, at the High-level Meeting on Financing for Development at the UN summit marking its 60th anniversary, I announced a five-point proposal to assist *other* developing countries in speeding up development. [T4/S-Pres]

Extract 130 (58, 69 above)

The Chinese Government will implement in good faith the five measures to help *other* developing countries accelerate their development announced by President Hu Jintao at the High-level Meeting on Financing for Development during last year's UN World Summit. [T5/I-SC (39-41)]

The differentiation strategy is also realised by the use of the first-person plural exclusive *we* as discussed earlier, as illustrated in the following extracts:

Extract 131

*We* in China will not forget Africa's full support for restoring the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations. Nor will *we* forget the sincere and ardent wish of African countries and people for China to realise complete and peaceful reunification and achieve the goal of building a modern nation. [T6/FOCAC3-Pres]

Extract 132

In the course of national development, the Chinese people will hold high the banner of peace, development and cooperation, pursue an independent foreign policy of

peace and peaceful development and continue the opening-up strategy for mutual benefit and win-win cooperation. *We* will work with the people of other countries to build a harmonious world of enduring peace and common prosperity. [T4/S-Pres]

#### 4.3.12 Personalization

Personalization is realised in the texts by the use of the first-person personal pronoun *our* and *we*, as in:

Extract 133

China supports the positive efforts by the AU and other African regional organizations and African countries concerned to settle regional conflicts and will provide assistance within *our* own capacity. [T3/CAP]

Extract 134 (71 above)

China is firm in upholding the diversity of the world and diversified models of development. *We* hold that countries should respect and learn from each other, and different civilizations should coexist in harmony, benefit from each other through exchanges and competition, and seek common development by expanding common ground and shelving differences. [T4/S-Pres]

#### 4.3.13 Activation

Activation is realised by grammatical structures in which participants are represented in an active role (cf. section 4.2.14 above). This is illustrated by the functions expressed by means of the proper names in the following extracts: the expressions “South Africa” in (135) and “China and Tanzania” in (136) both represent the actor in relation to the processes realised by the verb, i.e “has” in (135) and “had”, “enhanced” and “expanded” in (136).

Extract 135

*South Africa*, renowned as the ‘rainbow nation’, has an important place in both Africa and the world. [T7/S-Pres]

Extract 136

*China and Tanzania* have had close high-level contacts, enhanced political mutual trust and expanded practical cooperation in a wide range of areas. [T8/S-Pres]

In the possessive attributive clause in Extract 135, “South Africa” is represented in an active position in the sense that it is portrayed as the Actor in the process realised by the verb. In other words, “South Africa” is activated in the extract because it is represented as the “possessor” of “an important place in both Africa and the world”. In Extract 136 “China and Tanzania” are similarly portrayed as the Actors of the processes realised by the verbs. In Van Leeuwen’s (2008:33) terms, the active role of “South Africa” and “China and Tanzania” is “foregrounded”. This means that the countries are explicitly coded in the clauses as the Actors in relation to the processes in question. Hence the clauses in Extract 135 and Extract 136 illustrate the fact that, in the data, activation is realised by “participation”, that is, by grammatical participant roles.

In the clauses in Extract 137 and Extract 138, however, the active role of the participants is indirect, as opposed to being direct in Extract 135 and Extract 136 (see below).

#### Extract 137

We [= China – HN-M] are working hard and maintaining close communication and consultation *with African countries* to ensure that the Summit will be a meeting of unity and success and yield concrete outcomes. [T4/S-Pres]

#### Extract 138

China will work together *with Africa* in the exploration of the road of sustainable development. [T3/CAP]

In the processes realised by the verb “work” in Extract 137 and Extract 138, “with African countries” and “with Africa” are circumstantial elements of accompaniment in the clauses. From this perspective, “African countries” and “Africa” are “indirect participants” (Halliday 1994:150) in the sense that they are portrayed as being joint partners of China in the processes realised by the verb; this portrayal is expressed through the use of the preposition *with* which indicates a circumstance of accompaniment or, more specifically, comitancy (Halliday 1994:156).

A participant is accordingly taken to be directly involved in a process when the grammatical element that functions as Actor (or Goal) typically stands in a direct relationship – i.e. without the need of a preposition as intermediary – to the verb that realises the process (Halliday 1994:131). In contrast, a participant is indirectly involved in a process when the



element that functions as Actor (or Goal) stands in an indirect relationship – i.e. through a preposition serving as intermediary – to the verb that realises the process. Hence, in extracts (137) and (138), “we” and “China” function as direct active participants, whereas “African countries” and “Africa” represent indirect active participants. In short, these extracts illustrate the fact that activation is also realised indirectly through “circumstantialization” (Van Leeuwen 2008:33).

It is important to note that indirect participation is brought about by circumstantialization. But prepositions do not necessarily indicate indirect participation. Some grammatical constructions such as nominalisation (e.g. “The issuance of a joint declaration by Chinese and African leaders at the Summit” in Extract 139) and passivisation (e.g. “were proposed by” in Extract 140) involve the use of prepositions without implying indirect participation, as shown in the following extracts:

Extract 139

*The issuance of a joint declaration by Chinese and African leaders at the Summit is now under discussion between them. [T4/S-Pres]*

Extract 140

In the Beijing Summit FOCAC, eight measures on aid to Africa *were proposed by* Chinese side, including increasing the aid provided to Africa by doubling China’s 2006 assistance by 2009 and strengthening cooperation in areas such as human resource development, agriculture, medical care, social development and education. [T9/I-Amb]

In a passive construction such as in Extract 140, the preposition “by” does not indicate indirect participation but only the use of the passive voice. The active counterpart of the same clause (as in Extract 141) has to be considered in order to determine the direct role of the participant in the process expressed by the verb.

Extract 141

In the Beijing Summit FOCAC, *Chinese side proposed* eight measures on aid to Africa, including increasing the aid provided to Africa by doubling China’s 2006 assistance by 2009 and strengthening cooperation in areas such as human resource development, agriculture, medical care, social development and education.

In the data, activation is also realised by “possessivation” (Van Leeuwen 2008:33) in the sense that possessive pronouns and markers are used in order to represent a participant as the “possessor” of a process. This is illustrated by the possessive expressions “Your (support)” and “Africa’s (aspiration)” in the following extracts:

Extract 142

*Your* [= African countries’ – HN-M] support strengthened the courage and confidence of the Chinese people to prevail over the natural disaster. [T8/S-Pres]

Extract 143

*Africa’s* aspiration for peace and development deserves respect and sympathy, and the international community should be more focused on Africa’s development and increase assistance to Africa. [T4/S-Pres]

#### 4.3.14 Passivation

As mentioned section 4.2.14, a participant in a passive role can be represented either as subject or as beneficiary. The strategy of “subjection” (Van Leeuwen 2008:34), that is, the representation of a passive participant as subject, is realised in the texts by participation (i.e., by grammatical participant roles) and, more precisely, when the “passivated participant” (i.e., the participant represented in a passive role) is the Goal of the process expressed by the verb (Van Leeuwen 2008:34). Consider again the extract in (74), repeated here as (144):

Extract 144 (74 above)

In all these years, China has firmly supported *Africa* in winning liberation and pursuing development. [T6/FOCAC3-Pres]

It was noted in section 4.2.14 that “Africa” in (144) is passivated in relation to the process realised by the passive participle form of the verb *support*. More precisely, “Africa” is portrayed as the object in the representation, in the sense that it is represented in the material process as the Goal, the entity at which the “support” is directed. Note that in the process expressed in Extract 144, “Africa” is considered to be subjected (i.e., represented as a subject) and not beneficialised (i.e., represented as a beneficiary) because, grammatically speaking, a beneficiary forms a third party alongside an Actor and a Goal (Van Leeuwen 2008:33; see also Halliday 1994). Moreover, depending on its position in the clause, a beneficiary may appear with or without a preposition, usually to or *for* (Halliday 1994:145).

Therefore, in the clause in Extract 144, “Africa” is regarded as the object because it cannot co-occur with the preposition *to* or *for*.

The strategy of beneficialization (i.e. the representation of a passive participant as beneficiary), is also realised in the data by participation. In this case, the passivated participant is represented either as Recipient in a material process (alternatively referred to as Receiver in a verbal process) or Client (Van Leeuwen 2008:34). The Recipient, on the one hand, is the participant that something (concrete) is given to, and it may appear with or without a preposition in a clause (Halliday (1994:144-145). In the Extract 145 and Extract 146, “African countries” and “Africa” are represented as beneficiaries, and more specifically, as the Recipients.

Extract 145

It [= China – HN-M] will continue to send medical teams and provide medicines and medical materials to *African countries*. [T3/CAP]

Extract 146

It [= China – HN-M] has built the Tanzara Railway and other infrastructural projects and sent medical teams and peacekeepers to *Africa*. [T6/FOCAC3-Pres]

The Client, on the other hand, is the participant for whom services are provided (e.g. supplying information, training, advice, etc.) and it may also appear with or without a preposition (Halliday 1994:145). In the extracts in (147) and (148), “African countries” and “China” are represented as Clients.

Extract 147

China has provided assistance to the best of its ability to *African countries*, while African countries have also rendered strong support to *China* on many occasions. [T3/CAP]

Extract 148

They [= African countries – HN-M] gave *China* strong support in foiling anti-China motions introduced by some Western countries at the UN Human Rights Commission. [T5/I-SC]

### 4.3.15 Findings and Discussion

In this section, the main findings regarding the use of the discourse strategies are presented and discussed according to the frequency and significance of their occurrence in the texts. Moreover, I will focus on the states or the countries (“China” and “(sub-Saharan) African countries”) which are the key actors in the practice of inter-state relations.

#### 4.3.15.1 Nomination

The preceding analysis of the data reveals that countries (“China”, “Gabon”, “Nigeria”, “South Africa”, and “Tanzania”) are more often referred to by their proper names than officials. However, it appears from the data that China is more nominated than African countries: 446 instances of nomination of China as compared to only 59 nominations of (sub-Saharan) African countries. The relatively few occurrences of nomination of African countries may not be relevant if I take into account the fact that the speeches during the FOCAC summits, the interview with the then State Councillor Tang Jiaxuan, and the *China’s African Policy* document were all directed at African countries in general. It is accordingly assumed that the speakers/writers did not have to refer to the various individual African countries in their addresses or talks. However, if I consider the speeches or talks on China’s cooperation with the sub-Saharan African countries in question, the fact that the speakers nominate China more often than the African countries is of relevance. Indeed, it is interesting to note that in President Hu Jintao’s speech at the National Assembly of Nigeria, for instance, the speaker used the nomination strategy to refer to China much more frequently (72 times) than to refer to Nigeria (3 times). Similarly, in his speech at Pretoria University, the Chinese president nominated China 59 times as compared to the 10 times that he referred to South Africa. Moreover, in these speeches Nigeria and South Africa were more often referred to as included in either the generic expression “Africa” or the collective expressions “African countries” and “African nations”.

#### 4.3.15.2 Genericization and Collectivization

As regards representing sub-Saharan African countries, 184 occurrences were found of the use of collective expressions (“African/developing countries/nations”) compared to 331 occurrences of the generic term “Africa”. Apparently, then, nomination, and therefore individualization and specification, are less often selected as strategies precisely because the countries are more often represented in generic and collective terms. From this perspective, the striking preference of genericization and collectivization strategies to represent sub-Saharan African countries could be taken to indicate that China is more interested in dealing with the group of countries as a whole, rather than with individual countries.

With regard to the use of the first-person plural pronoun *we* in the texts, the data reveal that it is more often used in the context of China’s attitude to or range of activities in or with sub-Saharan African countries (cf. the Content A in section 4.1.1). Consider for instance the following extract:

##### Extract 149

Thirdly, strengthen dialogue and exchanges between the Chinese and African civilizations and make common progress through mutual learning and enrichment. The Chinese and African peoples both create splendid cultures in the long course of history and made important contribution to the progress of human civilization. *We* should bolster exchanges and interactions between the Chinese and African civilizations at different levels and in diversified forms to enhance mutual understanding and friendship between our peoples. *We* should strengthen cooperation in education, science, technology, public health, culture, sports and tourism, support closer cooperation between cultural institutions, news media, academic groups and institutions of higher learning, and encourage the holding of cultural festivals, art performances and exhibitions and sports events. In particular, *we* should enhance cooperation in human resources development and increase popular support for growing China-Africa relations. [T7/S-Pres]

##### Extract 150

*We* are glad to see that in recent years, African countries have made innovative efforts and worked in unity to promote national development and revitalization and made remarkable achievements in promoting peace and development in the region. [T4/S-Pres]

In view of the relations of intertextuality that have been demonstrated in the course of the analysis, and taking into account the specific situations in which the exclusive-*we* occurs, it is evident from Extract 151 and Extract 152 that “we”, as found in Extract 152 is used in place of “China” in the extract 151 from the *China’s African Policy* document:

Extract 151

(4) Medical and health cooperation

*China* is ready to enhance medical personnel and information exchange with Africa. It will continue to send medical teams and provide medicines and medical materials to African countries, and help them establish and improve medical facilities and train medical personnel. *China* will increase its exchanges and cooperation with African countries in the prevention and treatment of infectious diseases including HIV/AIDS and malaria and other diseases, research and application of traditional medicine and experience concerning mechanism for public health emergencies. [T3/CAP]

Extract 152

2. In health, *we* will<sup>83</sup> continue to send medical teams to Tanzania to help improve the medical conditions here, to build some hospitals and to provide aid to prevent and treat malaria.” [T9/I-Amb]

The analysis of the data also revealed that the exclusive-*we* is often used in relation to China’s attitude to, or range of activities concerning its social and economic development (cf. Content C). This use of exclusive-*we* is illustrated in 153.

Extract 153

China is a big developing country with a population of 1.3 billion. What it has achieved in the reform and opening up endeavor is in itself a significant contribution to world peace and development. *We* are keenly aware, however, that China remains the biggest developing country in the world. A huge population, weak economic foundation and uneven development are the basic features of the country. The problems and difficulties that *we* encounter in the course of development are rarely seen elsewhere in terms of their scale and complexity. To build a well-off society in an all-round way and at a higher level that benefits the over one billion population, to basically achieve modernization of the country and to ensure common prosperity for all the Chinese people, *we* still have a very long way to go and *we* still need to make persistent and unyielding efforts. [T8/S-Pres]

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<sup>83</sup>As illustrated by the extracts 149 and 152, the data reveal that different modal auxiliary verbs such as *will* and *should* are used with the pronoun *we*. Given the multiple modal meanings that can be expressed by means of modal auxiliaries (cf. Chapter 5), the analysis of the specific meanings and uses of *should* and *will* as it occurs in these two extracts may be relevant.

154 instances of the use of the first-person plural *we* (and its equivalent *us*) were found in the texts. The contexts in which it is used and the number of times it occurs in these contexts are summarised in the following table:

Table 4.1: The use and number of occurrences of the pronoun *we*

<b>Referent</b>	<b>Pronoun</b>	<b>Number of occurrences</b>
<i>Inclusive</i>		
China + (sub-Saharan) African countries/ China people + African people	we	48
Interviewer + Interviewee	we	1
<i>Exclusive</i>		
Speaker + Chinese people	we	3
China/Chinese government	we	102
Total		154

As shown in this table, the exclusive-*we* occurs with a significantly higher frequency than the inclusive-*we*. Recall that the exclusive-*we* is used in place of “China” or “the Chinese government” in the texts. It was pointed out in section 4.3.7 that the pronoun *it* is also used in the texts to refer to that country or its government. This use of *it* and the exclusive-*we* in the texts indicates that these two pronouns, along with their associated expressions – i.e. “China” and “the Chinese government” – represent paradigmatic choices to refer to the country. In view of the higher frequency of the exclusive-*we*, on the one hand, and the specific situations in which it occurs, on the other hand, the paradigmatic preference of the first-person plural pronoun could be taken as a matter of pragmatic importance. Given all the possible paradigmatic choices, this preference requires further attention.

It was demonstrated in section 4.3.7 that speakers tend to use the exclusive-*we* in order to refer to China<sup>84</sup>, where this entity is viewed as “belonging to” or “being controlled by” the people (cf. the passage from China’s constitution in section 4.3.7 above); in essence, then,

<sup>84</sup> Or the Chinese government as being representative of “China”.

“China” is visualised as “a group of people”. In this regard, it is important to realise that the Chinese culture is collectivistic in nature (Gao & Ting-Toomey 1998). In collectivistic cultures, according to Hofstede (in Gao & Ting-Toomey 1998:3), “people stress fitting in with and belonging to the in-group, and they focus on a ‘we’ identity”. From this perspective, it is argued that

[g]iven that Chinese emphasize a “we” identity and an in-group affiliation, and that Chinese selves are embedded in relation with others, Chinese often have a tendency to use the pronoun *we* to express not only group views but also personal ones. Moreover, they are more at ease when speaking as members of a group than as individuals. (Gao & Ting-Toomey 1998:73)

In accordance with this view, it is claimed here that the exclusive pronoun *we* is used in the texts to personalize, and therefore to represent China as “a group of people”. The use of the exclusive-*we* therefore serves to emphasize the representativeness of the speakers, in the sense that the pronoun identifies the speakers as belonging to a distinct group of people. Considering the genres of the texts (speeches and interviews), the exclusive-*we* gives a clear indication to the addressees that the speakers are talking on behalf of a (very large) group in which they include themselves. However, the use of the exclusive pronoun also serves to distance the speaker from the addressees: the latter are not part of the group referred to. The pronoun therefore serves to create an image of “we/us” (“China”) dealing with “you/them” (“Africa/African countries”). In view of the fact that the first-person plural pronoun is more often used in relation to China’s attitude to and range of activities in/ with African countries, it is thus claimed that it serves to differentiate and to emphasize the status of China in relation to the attitude and activities expressed or described by the speakers. Such emphasis of the status of China is reinforced by (i) the speakers’ use and the relatively low number of occurrences of the “self-referential meaning” conveyed by the expression “developing countries” (cf. section 4.3.13.4 below) to represent China, and (ii) the use of the aggregation strategy (cf. section 4.3.8) to refer to Chinese people, as illustrated in the following extract:

Extract 154

China is a big developing country with a population of *1.3 billion*. [T8/S-Pres]

It would appear, therefore, that the personalization strategy as expressed by the use of the exclusive-*we* in turn serves to realise the differentiation strategy, in the sense that China (exclusive-*we*) is represented through the latter strategy as “us”, “the biggest developing



country with 1.3 billion people”, that is, a group that is distinct from “them”, the group of “developing countries”.

I saw in section 4.3.7 that, based on the intertextual relations between the texts, the exclusive-*we* serves as a substitute for “China” or the “Chinese government” in the speeches and the interviews. In fact, the data reveal that this pronoun is used in speech situations where both the speakers and the addressees are physically present, unlike the physical absence of the addressees in the case of the *China’s African Policy* document. In this regard, it is interesting to note that, compared to the number of occurrences of the personal pronoun *we* (154 times), only 28 occurrences of the pronoun *you/yours* were found in the texts (see section 4.3.7), and that it is more often used in the speeches. When using personal pronouns to refer to countries, the inclusive pronoun *we* is used for China; by contrast, sub-Saharan African countries are only referred to by the inclusive-*we* or the third person pronoun (*it, its, they, them*), as in:

Extract 155

In recent years, under the leadership of President Kikwete, Tanzania has worked hard with ‘New Zeal, New Vigor, and New Speed’ to grow *its* economy, improve the well-being of the people, maintain political stability, make continued progress in development, and play an important role in African and international affairs. *It* is renowned as the “oasis of peace” in Africa. [T8/S-Pres]

Extract 156 (110 above)

Since the founding of New China, the Chinese Government has always attached great importance to developing relations with Africa and adopted a series of related policies and guidelines. Consistently adhering to the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, we respect the independent choices made by African countries for *their* political systems and development paths. We have provided *them* with assistance to the best of our ability and developed economic and technical cooperation with *them*. We support *their* efforts for a strong and united Africa through collective self-reliance. [T2/S-Pres]

The following table summarises the use of personal pronouns in the texts for referring to the various countries:

Table 4.2: Use of personal pronouns to refer to countries

<b>Country</b>	<b>Personal pronoun</b>
Sub-Saharan African countries	It/Its, they/their/them, inclusive- <i>we</i>
China	It/its, inclusive- <i>we</i> , exclusive- <i>we</i>

It was argued above that the exclusive-*we* is used to personalize China. As shown in Table 4.2, sub-Saharan African countries are only personalised through the inclusive-*we* when they are represented as being associated with China. In fact, the inclusive-*we* is the only linguistic means with the semantic feature “human” (in the sense that *we* involves at least the speaker and/or some other people<sup>85</sup>) that is used to represent sub-Saharan African countries. However, as shown in Table 4.1, the inclusive-*we* occurs only 48 times as compared to the 102 occurrences of the exclusive-*we*. Moreover, there is no human feature associated with the meaning of the generic term “Africa” which, as already noted, is most often used (331 times) to refer to sub-Saharan African countries. It should also be noted that, based on their conventional/dictionary meanings, the collective expressions “country” and “nation” (as in “African nations”, “African countries”, “developing countries”<sup>86</sup>) can imply a reference to people. However, as mentioned earlier, the data contain only 184 occurrences of these collective expressions, in contrast to the 331 occurrences of the generic term “Africa”.

The above observations about the ways in which China and sub-Saharan African countries are linguistically referred to in the texts suggest an important point in connection with China’s interest in these countries. As noted, the texts show a preference for the use of expressions whose meanings do not include the feature “human” to refer to sub-Saharan African countries. In this respect, it is claimed here that the significantly higher frequency in the use of the generic term “Africa” conveys the underlying idea that China’s interests in sub-Saharan African countries are less directed at the African people and much more orientated to the countries as part of the continent. This interpretation of China’s primary interest is supported by the relational clause in Extract 157, where the speaker realises the identification strategy by representing China and the African continent in the following terms:

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<sup>85</sup> Cf. Wilson (1990) for the use of an exclusive-*we* whose meaning excludes the speaker.

<sup>86</sup> As this term is used by the United Nations (cf. Chapter 3)

Extract 157

*China* is the largest developing country in the world and *Africa* is the continent with the largest number of developing countries. [T1/FOCAC1.Pres]

#### 4.3.15.3 Association

The analysis of the data reveals that China and African countries are often represented in association, and that the strategy is sometimes realised by the use of the inclusive-*we* as shown in Table 4.1. However, considering the number of occurrences of the inclusive pronoun, it appears that China and sub-Saharan African countries are more often represented as separate entities than in association. Moreover, taking the *China's African Policy* document as an example, I have found that China, the Chinese government, and African countries are referred to 195 times. Out of this number, however, there are only 36 instances in which China and African countries are represented in association, which means that there are 160 occurrences in which they are referred to separately. Statistically, these references can be represented as in the following table:

Table 4.3: Representation of China and African countries in association and separately in the *China's African Policy* document

Country	Number of occurrences	Percentage
	<i>Separately</i>	
China (incl. Chinese government/it/its/our/the country)	86	44%
African countries or nations (incl. Africa/countries in Africa/its /they/their/them/developing countries/the least developed countries)	74	38%
	<i>In association</i>	
China and African countries (incl. our/both or the two sides/developing countries)	35	18%
Total	195	100%

As shown in this table, China and (sub-Saharan) African countries are more often represented separately than in association. This fact, it is claimed here, reflects China's attitude toward sub-Saharan African countries.

It was established in the first part of the analysis (cf. section 4.1.5), that the texts constituting my data – and more importantly the *China's African Policy* document, because of the political sub-genre of that text – deals with inter-state relations. In this respect, the findings of the use of the exclusive-*we* in Table 4.1 and also those in Table 4.3 concerning the use of the association strategy, provide grounds for claiming that the relations between China and (sub-Saharan) African countries, as defined in the *China's African Policy* document, are not primarily relations of cooperation. According to the Oxford Dictionary of English (2003:381), the term “cooperation” is defined as, amongst others, “the action or process of working together to the same end”. Obviously, the opposite of working together is working separately. However, the problem with working separately towards the same goal is that it can lead to rivalry; in contrast, it is less likely that rivalry will occur when individuals/countries work (separately or together) towards different goals or interests. From this perspective, and keeping in mind the sceptical public opinion about China's current engagement in Africa as described in Chapter 1, it is claimed here that China and (sub-Saharan) African countries are less represented in association and much more often as separate actors because China, for its own interests, is primarily interested in working *in* rather than *with* African countries<sup>87</sup>.

It could of course be objected that China is interested in working in African countries for common interests. For instance, there is no doubt that Africa's natural resources can contribute to support China's growing economy. At the same time, China's planned actions in African countries (e.g. African countries' debt reduction and relief, investment, and economic assistance) as described, for instance, in the *China's African Policy* document, can contribute to the development of those countries. Regarding China's planned actions in (sub-

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<sup>87</sup>In the texts constituting the data (e.g. President Hu Jintao's speeches at the University of Pretoria (2007) and at the Welcoming Rally Held By People from Various Sectors in Dar es Salaam (2009)), it was noted that young Chinese are encouraged to volunteer and work in African countries together with African people, whereas young Africans are “invited” to China only to study or to visit. This striking difference in the exchange activities between young Chinese and Africans seems to support the claim that China is primarily interested in working *in* rather than *with* African countries.

Saharan) African countries, however, the fact that these actions are initiated and planned by China, and that China is much more frequently represented as a separate Actor (cf. section 4.2.14 above and section 4.3.15.6 below) in the execution of these actions convey the idea, at least implicitly, that China takes on the role of deciding what is good for (sub-Saharan) African countries, rather than this being a collaborative decision. By deciding what is good for (sub-Saharan) African countries China – as an economic and political power, in fact, as the biggest developing country – is imposing its ideas (in Marxist terms, an act of power; cf. section 6.1.4 of Chapter 1) about what to do to achieve development.

#### 4.3.15.4 Classification

The analysis of the data reveals that the expression “developing countries” is used only in connection with the involvement of China and African countries in international political and economic affairs. In the *China’s African Policy* document, for instance, the expression “developing countries” occurs only four times: twice in the *Foreword*, once in the policy section dealing with *Cooperation in international affairs*, and once in the *Multilateral cooperation* section. The Extract 158 from the *Foreword* illustrates the use of “developing country” in connection with China’s description of its attitude in international relations:

##### Extract 158

China, the largest *developing country* in the world, follows the path of peaceful development and pursues an independent foreign policy of peace. China stands ready to develop friendly relations and cooperation with all countries on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence so as to contribute to peace, stability and common prosperity around the world. [T3/CAP]

The use of “developing countries” in the context of international politics is also illustrated, in the following two extracts:

##### Extract 159

People across the world hope to share opportunities, jointly meet challenges and ensure common development. China is the biggest *developing country* and Africa is the continent with the largest number of *developing countries*. Our combined population accounts for over one-third of the world's total. Both China and Africa are important forces for global peace and development. [T7/S-Pres]

Extract 160 (49, 64, 84, 119 above)

China and African countries should increase consultation, coordination and cooperation on the bilateral and multilateral fronts, participate actively in the management of international affairs and formulation of international rules and promote the reform of the international political, economic, financial and trading systems. In this way, the voice of *developing countries* will be heard more clearly in the world, a fair international environment will be created and the legitimate rights and interests of *developing countries* will be effectively safeguarded. [T1/FOCAC-Pres]

The expression “developing countries” occurs 52 times in the data and is used 19 times in President Jiang Zemin’s speech at the first FOCAC summit. This is much higher than the number of occurrences of this expression in other texts, for example in *China’s African Policy* document (four times), President Hu Jintao’s speech at the Gabonese parliament (nine times), and the then State Councilor Tang Jiaxuan’s interview (seven times). It seems likely that the high frequency of use of “developing countries” in Jiang Zemin’s speech can be ascribed to (i) the global appeal for cooperation towards peace and development (Discourse Topic VIII) and (ii) the need to increase China-sub-Saharan Africa cooperation in order to contribute to global peace and development and the establishment a new international political and economic order (Discourse Topic IX). These are the main Discourse Topics of the President’s speech, as reflected in the following extracts:

Extract 161

However, development in different countries is extremely uneven. Hegemonism and power politics still exist. *Developing countries* are still faced with an arduous task of safeguarding their sovereignty, security and interests. The gap between the North and the South is being widened not only economically, but also in science and technology. Hence, there has emerged a disturbing ‘digital divide’ The Prolonged poverty and backwardness, Coupled with external factors, have exacerbated the otherwise latent ethnic rifts, religious feuds and social conflicts in some *developing countries*, led to conflicts and wars in these countries and impaired their state stability and national development. [T1/FOCAC1-Pres]

Extract 162

In the new international order, the right of all countries to development based on equality, especially that of the *developing countries*, should be ensured. To help *developing countries* to boost their economy is vital to a lasting peace and common development of the world. Developed countries should effectively reduce or exempt the debts owed by *developing countries*, help them to enhance their capabilities for

self-development and vigorously develop their human resources with a view to gradually narrowing the gap between the North and the South in economy, science and technology and other fields. They should not do nothing but seek natural resources, market and profit from the *developing countries*. The international community should take more aggressive and effective measures to reform the international economic, trade and financial systems so as to effectively safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of *developing countries*. [T1/FOCAC1-Pres]

In order to understand the use of the expression “developing countries” in the texts, we need to distinguish three different types of meaning that can be conveyed by this expression. Firstly, the expression can be used to convey a meaning which may be described as “inclusive-developing countries”. This seems to be the intended meaning when reference is made to the group of countries comprising China and African countries (and also other countries). The second meaning involves what may be described as “exclusive-developing countries”. Used in this way, the expression “developing countries” refers to African (as well as other) countries, but excludes China. The third meaning involves “self-referential-developing country”, and is used when the speaker specifically refers to China as a developing country. The three meanings are illustrated in extracts Extract 163, Extract 164 and Extract 165, respectively.

#### Extract 163

It has been proved that strong China-South Africa relations of all-round cooperation serve the fundamental interests of both countries and peoples, promote unity and cooperation among *developing countries* and contribute to global peace and development. [T7/S-Pres]

#### Extract 164

The Chinese people will never forget that it was due to the strong support of the vast number of *developing countries*, those in Africa included, that China successfully regained its lawful seat in the United Nations at the 26th session of the United Nations General Assembly in 1971. [T2/S-Pres]

#### Extract 165

China, the largest *developing country* in the world, follows the path of peaceful development and pursues an independent foreign policy of peace. [T3/CAP]

56 occurrences of the expression “developing countries” (or “developing country/developing world”) were found in the data. The use and number of occurrences of this expression is summarised in Table 4.4 in terms of the three meanings described above.

Table 4.4: The meanings and number of occurrences of the term “developing countries”

Countries	Types of meaning of “developing countries”	Number of occurrences
China + African countries	“Inclusive-developing countries”	17
Sub-Saharan African countries	“Exclusive-developing countries”	35
China	“Self-referential-developing countries”	7
Total		59

As shown in this table, the self-referential use of the expression “developing countries” occurs the least number of times in the texts. The expression is more often used in an exclusive way to refer to sub-Saharan African countries. The difference in number of occurrences indicates that the group of “developing countries” is not a stable one. In fact, the analysis reveals that through the use of the expression “developing countries”, China and sub-Saharan African countries are sometimes associated and represented as forming an alliance that exists only in relation to situations and activities involving international affairs. In the same contexts, however, the association is also “dissolved”, as in the following extracts:

## Extract 166

At the G20 Summit on Financial Markets and the World Economy held in Washington last November, I appealed on behalf of the Chinese Government to the international community to pay greater attention to the damage of the crisis on *developing countries*, especially the least developed ones, and do all it can to minimize the damage. The international community, developed countries in particular, should assume due responsibilities and obligations, continue to deliver on their aid and debt relief commitments, maintain and increase assistance to *developing countries* and effectively help them maintain financial stability and economic growth. They should take concrete steps to help *developing countries*, especially those in Africa, overcome difficulties and improve the external environment necessary for the development of these countries.

Both *China and African countries* belong to the developing world. We see each other as important strategic partners. China fully appreciates the wishes and aspirations of African countries and supports Africa’s efforts to secure peace and stability and meet the MDGs at an early date. [T8/S-Pres]

## Extract 167 (68 above)

Economically, *China and Africa* should be partners of cooperation and should draw on each other's strength to work for mutual benefit. *They* should work together to



enhance South-South cooperation and North-South dialogue and work for economic globalisation to develop in a way that brings balanced, general and win-win benefits to all. *They* should promote economic cooperation in diversified forms to increase trade volume and improve trade structure. *The Chinese Government* will implement in good faith the five measures to help *other developing countries* accelerate their development announced by President Hu Jintao at the High-level Meeting on Financing for Development during last year's UN World Summit. [T5/I-SC]

In Extract 166, the speaker uses “developing countries” in an exclusive way to refer to African countries (amongst others). Yet “China and African countries” are associated in order to use the term “developing world” in an inclusive and hence also in a self-referential way. The association strategy is also realised in Extract 167 by “China and Africa” and the pronoun “they”. However, the fact that the “Chinese government” is referred to separately indicates a dissociation from the previously mentioned “China and Africa” group. Moreover, the use of the determiner “other” not only emphasizes the dissociation, but also indicates the realization of the differentiation strategy. Thus the speaker in this text moves from the previously identified “China and Africa” group to (i) the separately mentioned “Chinese government” and (ii) the exclusive “developing countries”.

Of importance here is the fact that the expression “developing countries” is much more often used to refer to (sub-Saharan) African countries. Accordingly, considering the specific situations and activities in which the expression occurs, it is claimed that classifying and referring to sub-Saharan African countries as “developing countries” emphasizes their relatively poor social and economic development, and therefore their weakness in global affairs. At the same time, the emphasis on sub-Saharan African countries’ “weaknesses” emphasizes China’s relative strength/power in the areas in question.

To summarise, the dissociation and differentiation strategies serve to represent China and sub-Saharan African countries as separate and different actors in international affairs. As pointed out in the previous section, the use of the exclusive-*we* serves to realize the differentiation strategy in the sense that the pronoun represents China as a group, and sub-Saharan African countries as a different group. I can therefore distinguish the two groups of countries on the basis of the way they are referred to separately or collectively in the texts.

Table 4.5 below provides a summary of the characteristics of the two groups in terms of the ways they are referred to in the texts.

Table 4.5: Differences in representation of China and sub-Saharan African countries

<b>Discursive strategies</b>	<b>Number of occurrences</b>
<i>Group 1: China/Chinese government</i>	
Nomination	<b>446</b>
Collectivization	
• Inclusive- <i>we</i>	49
• Exclusive- <i>we</i>	<b>102</b>
Classification	
• Self-referential-developing countries	5
• Inclusive-developing countries	17
Aggregation	<b>8</b>
<i>Group 2: Sub-Saharan African countries/government</i>	
Nomination	59
Genericization	<b>331</b>
Specification	
Collectivization	
• Inclusive- <i>we</i>	49
• Collective nouns	<b>184</b>
Classification	
• Inclusive-developing countries	17
• Excluding-developing countries	<b>35</b>

As shown in this table, the strategies of nomination and personalization (as realised by the personal pronoun *we*) are more often used to represent China, whereas those of genericization, collectivization and classification are more often used to represent sub-

Saharan African countries. The numbers given in bold highlight the main characteristics of the two groups according to the way there are represented in the texts.

#### 4.3.15.5 Relational Identification

It was shown in section 4.3.5 that relational identification is realised in the texts by the use of expressions denoting personal, kinship or work relations, such as “friends”, “brother”/ “brotherly” and “colleagues”, as illustrated in 168 and 169.

Extract 168 (52, 88 above)

A rapidly developing Africa has drawn the attention of the international community. The Chinese people rejoice at the achievements our African *brothers* have made and sincerely wish the *brotherly* African people greater success in your endeavor for national development and revitalization. [T4/S-Pres]

Extract 169 (53, 62, and 89 above)

Let me begin by conveying to our *friends* present here and to the *brotherly* Tanzanian people the warm greetings and best wishes of the 1.3 billion Chinese people. [T8/S-Pres]

It is of interest to note that the italicised expressions in the above extracts occur 38 times in the texts, and much more in the speeches than in the interviews.

I mentioned earlier that China has a collectivistic culture and that this tends to influence the communication style of Chinese (Gao & Ting-Toomey 1998). In accordance with their collectivistic culture, one aspect that determines and characterizes the Chinese self is the importance of maintaining in-group relationships (Gao & Ting-Toomey 1998). It has been claimed in the literature that in-group members (or insiders) in Chinese culture fall into two categories: automatic and selected. Automatic members include one’s parents, siblings, relatives, colleagues, and classmates, whereas selected members are those with whom special relations are established through helping and sharing information. In addition, the five common criteria of an insider are niceness, trustworthiness, caring, helpfulness, and empathy (Gu, in Gao & Ting-Toomey 1998:15). Against this background, and given the way in which the nature of the relations between China and African countries is defined in the texts, as

illustrated in Extract 170, it is plausible that African countries and people fit in the second category mentioned above, that is, the category of selected members.

#### Extract 170

This year marks the 50th anniversary of the inauguration of diplomatic relations between New China and African countries. Over the past 50 years, China and Africa have increased mutual understanding, supported and helped each other. In their respective national endeavors to promote development and pursue a better life, the Chinese and African peoples have fostered profound friendship, and fruitful progress has been made in China-Africa cooperation. [T4/S-Pres]

Gao and Ting-Toomey (1998:14) moreover argue that

... when friends become very close, Chinese consider them as members of the family...consequently, kinship forms of address such as uncles, aunts, sisters, and brothers are adopted in social relationships. The term of address dictates a communication style that is appropriate in a given relational context.

The above observations about Chinese culture provide a basis for understanding the way sub-Saharan African countries and people are referred to in the texts: such references are determined by whether they are viewed as in-group members (or insiders) or out-group members (or outsiders). In this respect, the use of relational and kinship terms of address in the texts strongly suggests that the addressees are considered as insiders. However, the analysis of the data reveals that the use of the relational identification strategy as realised by relational and kinship terms of address, is not in line with the use of the collectivization strategy as realised by the first-person plural personal pronoun. As mentioned earlier, Chinese people emphasize a *we* identity and an in-group affiliation (Gao & Ting-Toomey 1998:73). It was accordingly argued above that the use of the exclusive-*we* pronoun serves to indicate the in-group positioning of the speakers whereas it positions the addressee in an out-group role. From this perspective, and as shown in Table 4.1, the fact that the exclusive-*we* is used more often (105 times) than the inclusive-*we* (48 times), provides grounds for claiming that sub-Saharan African countries and people are primarily considered as outsiders. Moreover, as regards the use of the expression “developing countries”, it was shown that (i) it is more often used to refer to sub-Saharan African countries and (ii) it is often used in relation to dissociation and differentiation strategies. The expression “developing countries” therefore refers to an unstable group; it is moreover used more often to identify sub-Saharan African countries as a group separate from China.

In short, it is claimed here that the relational identification strategy, as realised by relational and kinship terms of address, is used in the texts as part of the “giving *mian zi*” communication skill in Chinese social interactions where *mian zi*, according to Gao (2009:176), can be defined as ‘face’ or ‘image’. Gao (2009:183) describes the skill of “giving *mian zi*” as involving the following practices:

attending to others’ reputation and self-esteem, respecting others’ right, supporting others, giving others confidence, building others’ image, making allowances for others, tolerating others, and accommodating others. In other words, [giving] *mian zi* amount to the ultimate confirmation of the important role of ‘other’ in Chinese social interactions.

The data reveal that the relational identification strategy, as realised by relational and kinship terms of address, occurs more often in speeches. Given the speech situation, I contend that giving *mian zi* is used as a strategic means to get acceptance from the addressees.

#### 4.3.15.6 Activation and Passivation

The data reveal that China (i.e. the country including its government and people) is most often represented as an active participant. Moreover, the country is activated frequently in association with African countries. With regard to passivation, China is not often represented as a passive participant. (Sub-Saharan) African countries, in contrast, are most often represented as passive participants. When activated, the countries are more often represented as passive participants in association with China than without being associated with China. Table 4.6 below summarizes the frequency of use of Activation and Passivation strategies for representing China and (sub-Saharan) African countries in the texts that constitute the data.

Table 4.6: Frequency of use of Activation and Passivation strategies in the texts

Countries	Activation		
China	583		
(sub-Saharan) African countries	118		
China and (sub-Saharan) African countries	252		
	Passivation		
		<i>Subjected</i>	<i>Beneficialised</i>
China	25	23	2
(sub-Saharan) African countries	307	217	90
<b>China and (sub-Saharan) African countries</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>7</b>

The higher frequency of the use of Activation for representing China may not be relevant, if I take into account two important features of China's official discourse on its relations with African countries as expressed in the texts under analysis. The first feature concerns the interdiscursive link between China's official discourse on its relations with African countries and the discourse on China's own development (cf. section 4.1.6). As mentioned in Chapter 3, economic reforms initiated by China's governments since 1978 have led the country to become a global economic superpower. It is therefore not relevant for the present discussion that in the narrative concerning its development (cf. Content C), China is represented as the Actor in relation to the process of its own development.

The second important feature is the intertextual link between the *China's African Policy* document and the other texts from the data (cf. section 4.1.6). A foreign policy represents a country's behaviour and planned actions in its dealing with other countries (Plano & Olton 1969). It is accordingly plausible to assume that in its policy documents, a country would more often represent itself as an Actor, that is, as one that behaves and that takes action. Table 4.7 illustrates the frequency of the use of Activation and Passivation strategies for representing China and (sub-Saharan) African countries in the *China's African Policy* document.

Table 4.7: Frequency of use of Activation and Passivation strategies in the *China's African Policy* document

<b>Countries</b>	<b>Activation</b>		
China	106		
(sub-Saharan) African countries	20		
China and (sub-Saharan) African countries	22		
	<b>Passivation</b>		
		<i>Subjected</i>	<i>Beneficialised</i>
China	1	0	1
(sub-Saharan) African countries	41	30	11
<b>China and (sub-Saharan) African countries</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>

As illustrated in the above table, the data reveal that there is a lower frequency of "activation by association" (i.e activation of China in association with African countries) in the parts of the texts dealing with China's planned actions in African countries. However, there is a higher frequency of activation by association in activities involving the following two contents: (i) the narration of the state of the relationship between China and sub-Saharan African countries (Content A), excluding the Discourse Topic V dealing with China's foreign

policy of peace and development in sub-Saharan Africa, and (ii) the narration of an appeal for global peace and development (Content D).

As mentioned above, a foreign policy represents a country's behaviour and intended actions in its dealing with other countries. From this perspective, the fact that China, as an individual participant, is much more frequently represented as Actor as opposed to being portrayed as Actor in association with (sub-Saharan) African countries is therefore of relevance. This striking difference in China's activation, as illustrated in the tables 4.6 and 4.7, provides a measure of insight into the country's behaviour in its dealing with sub-Saharan African countries. The lower frequency of activation by association suggests that, much more than collaboration, China shows great individuality or autonomy in its behaviour when dealing with (sub-Saharan) African countries. In other words, the desire to act alone rather than in partnership appears to be more important in China's discourse. That also means that China intends to rely more often on its own strength and resources when dealing with African countries. Such an attitude serves to emphasize China's (economic, political, ect.) capability, and therefore power, to implement its policy in African countries. It can also be argued that the lower frequency of activation by association is a means for China to represent itself as the most active participant, and thus the most important actor in the relation between China and sub-Saharan African countries.

Tables 4.6 and 4.7 illustrate that although often activated by association, (sub-Saharan) African countries are also frequently represented as passive participants. More precisely, the data reveal that these countries are more often represented as subjects than as beneficiaries.

In short, the analysis of the texts reveals that in its discourse on its relations with (sub-Saharan) African countries, China is most often represented as an active participant whereas the African countries are generally represented as passive participants. Clearly, then, in the discourse in question China is most often given the leading or stronger role of Actor (because it is represented as the most active country) whereas sub-Saharan African countries are often given the weaker role of being the most passive participant in the relationship. This representation of (sub-Saharan) African countries' role as a more passive one is in line with

the prevailing attitude in global economy and politics towards African countries, which are generally regarded as “receiving/following/reacting” countries (Harrison 2009)<sup>88</sup>.

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<sup>88</sup> Harrison, G. 2009. Donors and States: Aid and Political Practice. Online: <http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/Africa/091009afinternat.pdf> (28 December 2012).



## Chapter 5

### Summary and Concluding Remarks

The present study focused on China's discourse – i.e. the various speeches, interviews, and related documents by Chinese officials – on its relations with sub-Saharan African countries in the period of 2000-2010. The texts in question were analysed using the principles and tools associated with the Discourse Historical Approach (DHA, cf. Wodak 2001a), as described in Chapter 2. In line with this approach, Chapter 3 provided the broad socio-political and historical context in which the discourse is embedded.

In Chapter 4, the texts through which China's discourse is realised were analysed using the DHA three-dimensional procedure consisting of (i) identifying the Content(s) and Topic(s) of the specific discourse, (ii) investigating the discursive strategies used in the specific texts, and (iii) analysing the linguistic means and the specific context-dependent linguistic realizations.

The following four main Contents were identified from the texts:

- E. The narration of the state of the relationship between China and sub-Saharan African countries;
- F. The narration of achievements in social, political and economic development in sub-Saharan African countries;
- G. The narration of achievements and challenges in social and economic development in China;
- H. The argumentation for a global appeal for peace and development.

These Contents were identified with the help of the following nine Discourse Topics:

- I. The long, strong, diverse, fruitful and increasing relations between China and sub-Saharan African countries.
- II. China and African countries have “similar experiences, shared objectives and a common future”.
- III. A long history of friendship between China and sub-Saharan African countries.

- IV. The desire and commitment to strengthen, increase and diversify the relations with sub-Saharan African countries.
- V. China's foreign policy of peace and development in sub-Saharan Africa.
- VI. Recognition of political, social and economic achievements in sub-Saharan Africa.
- VII. Recognition of achievements and challenges in China's social and economic development.
- VIII. The global appeal for cooperation towards peace and development.
- IX. Increase in China-sub-Saharan Africa cooperation to contribute to global peace and development and the establishment of a new international political and economic order (NIPEO)

The identification of the main Contents and Discourse Topics enabled me to establish intertextual relations between the various texts. It was observed from the data that the texts very often refer to the same Contents and Discourse topics. These shared Contents and Discourse Topics constitute intertextual links. Moreover, it was also observed that intertextuality by means of the shared Contents creates, as a result, intertextuality through the same political (sub-) genres and fields of political action.

Furthermore, the identification of the main Contents and Discourse Topics enabled me to establish the interdiscursive relations between China's official discourse on its relations with sub-Saharan African countries and four other discourses, namely (i) China's discourse on its own peaceful development, (ii) the discourse on development in (sub-Saharan) African countries, (iii) the broad discourse on China's development, and (iv) the discourse on international security/relations and global interdependence.

It was argued that relations between China and sub-Saharan African countries, as referred to in Topic I, are grounded in China's pluralist approach to international affairs as contained in Discourse Topic VIII. Such a pluralist approach emphasizes, amongst others, the sovereignty and independence of states and, consequently, the notion of political equality in state-to-state relations as referred to in China's Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. From these

Discourse Topics, therefore, China's current engagement in sub-Saharan Africa does not warrant the sceptical public opinion referred to in Chapter 1.

In line with the DHA principles, discourse was regarded in the present study as a form of social practice. From this perspective, China's official discourse on its relations with sub-Saharan African countries was taken to represent a key element in the practice of inter-state relations (cf. section 4.2 in Chapter 4). In this regard, the countries (including their governments and officials), their people, the speakers, and the addressees were identified as the four key participants in the practice of inter-state relations as represented in the texts under analysis.

Discourse – regarded as a form of social practice – carries ideological representations of social actors (Fairclough 1995). Therefore, the analyses presented in this study focused on the linguistic representation of participants in the texts that constitute the data. In accordance with the principle of triangulation – which allows one to combine various relevant disciplines and methods when analysing discourses from a DHA perspective; cf. e.g. Reisigl & Wodak 2009 – 15 discursive strategies were identified and investigated according to the way they are defined and characterized by Van Leeuwen (2008). The description of these strategies and their linguistic means of realization are summarised in Table 5.1 below.

Table 5.1 Summary of the discursive strategies and their linguistic means of realization.

Linguistic strategies	Descriptions	Linguistic means	<i>Examples</i>
Activation	Linguistic representation of participants as being active	Grammatical representation of participant as Actor	<i>“China<sup>89</sup> will work together with Africa...”</i>
Aggregation	Linguistic representation of participants as a quantified group of people	Numeral	<i>“1.3 billion”</i>
Association	Linguistic representation of participants as not permanent groups	Conjunction, circumstances of accompaniment, first-person plural pronoun, nominal groups	<i>“China and Africa have...”</i>
Classification	Linguistic reference to participants in terms of major categories used to differentiate between classes of people or countries	Classifiers, relational clauses	<i>“...the legitimate rights and interests of developing countries...”</i>
Collectivization	Linguistic representation of participants as a group of similar people or countries	Collective expressions, personal and possessive pronouns	<i>“President Bongo is an old friend of the Chinese people...”</i>
Differentiation	Explicit differentiation of an individual participant or group of participants from a similar participant or group	Determiner, first-person plural pronoun	<i>“...the five measures to help other developing countries...”</i>
Dissociation	Linguistic representation of participants separately. The strategy occurs after association	(after Association) Grammatical representation of participants separately	<i>“China helped Africa ...”</i>

<sup>89</sup> In this table, the linguistic means associated with a particular discursive strategy is given in italics.

Table 5.1 (continued)

Linguistic strategies	Descriptions	Linguistic means	Examples
Functionalization	<i>Linguistic representation of participants in terms of an activity, role, etc.</i>	Expressions	“We, <i>leaders</i> of China and African countries...”
Genericization	Linguistic representation of participants as non-specific or as classes	Expression	“China will strengthen cooperation with <i>Africa</i> ...”
Individualization	Linguistic representation of participants as individuals instead of as groups	Personal and possessive pronouns	“And every time <i>I</i> talk to our African friends...”
Nomination	Linguistic reference to participants in terms of their unique identity	Proper nouns, title + surname	“ <i>Nigeria</i> has a huge domestic market...”
Passivation	Linguistic representation of participants as being passive	Grammatical representation of participant as Goal	“China has firmly supported <i>Africa</i> ...”
Personalization	Linguistic representation of participants as human beings	Personal and possessive pronouns	China... will provide assistance within <i>our</i> own capacity”
Relational identification	Linguistic reference to participants in terms of their personal, kinship, or work relation to each other	Expressions	“...the achievements our African <i>brothers</i> have made...”
Specification	Linguistic representation of participants as specific entities or individuals	Proper names, deictic, possessive pronouns	“...cooperation between China and <i>Tanzania</i> will help <i>Tanzania</i> ...”

In accordance with the research question of the present study, the investigation of the discursive strategies was grounded on the assumption that the strategies used in the texts serve to convey ideological aspects underlying power relations between China and sub-Saharan African countries.

The analysis revealed that the speakers tend to use the first-person personal pronoun *we* to refer to China (and its government). This tendency shows that through the use of the personal pronoun, and more specifically the use of the exclusive-*we*, the speakers often emphasize their in-group identity. Therefore, the use of the exclusive-*we* serves to indicate the Chinese in-group positioning of the speakers whereas it puts the African addressees in an out-group position. Moreover, given that the exclusive-*we* is used more often in the texts than the inclusive-*we*, it is argued that sub-Saharan African countries and people are more often

represented as outsiders. Furthermore, since the pronoun *we* is frequently used in relation to China's attitude towards and set of activities in/with sub-Saharan African countries, it was argued that the exclusive-*we* serves to differentiate and to emphasise the status of China in relation to the attitude and activities expressed or described by the speakers.

The use of the exclusive-*we* to represent China and to emphasize the Chinese in-group identity also serves to personalize China. In this respect, it was found that the speakers tend to use the personalization strategy to refer to China more often than they use this strategy to refer to sub-Saharan African countries. By contrast, these countries are most often referred to in generic terms as "Africa".

The ways in which China and sub-Saharan African countries are linguistically represented in the texts indicate China's interest in these countries. In this regard, the striking preference of the strategy of genericization as realised by the use of the expression "Africa" to refer to sub-Saharan African countries suggests that China is more interested in its activities in the continent as a land mass, than with the countries as specific territories. Moreover, given the high preference of the use of expressions whose meanings do not include the feature "human" to refer to sub-Saharan African countries, it was claimed that the significantly high frequency in the use of the generic term "Africa" conveys the underlying idea that China's interests in sub-Saharan African countries are less directed at the African people and much more orientated to the countries as part of the continent. This interpretation of China's primary interest can therefore justify the sceptical public opinion about China's current engagement in sub-Saharan Africa as noted in Chapter 1.

The analysis also showed that China and sub-Saharan African countries are more often represented separately than in alliance or as a group. It was argued that this way of representing the countries reflects China's attitude towards sub-Saharan African countries. Indeed, given that the exclusive-*we* is more often used in the texts than the inclusive-*we*, and that the strategy of association is less often used in the China's African Policy document, in particular, it was claimed that the relations between China and sub-Saharan African countries, as expressed in the texts, are not primarily relations of cooperation. From this perspective, and considering the sceptical public opinion about China's current engagement in Africa, it was contended that China and sub-Saharan African countries are less

represented in association and more as individual participants because China is primarily interested in its activities in (rather than with) African countries for its own (rather than shared) interests (cf section 4.3.15.3).

The analysis showed that the expression “developing countries” is used more often in an exclusive way to refer to sub-Saharan African countries only. The data revealed that through the use of the expression “developing countries”, China and sub-Saharan African countries are sometimes associated and represented as forming an alliance which exists only in relation to situations and activities involving international affairs. However, the data also revealed that the expression “developing countries” is much more often used to refer to (sub-Saharan) African countries. Accordingly, and considering the specific situations and activities in which the expression occurs, it was claimed that classifying and referring to sub-Saharan African countries as “developing countries” serve to emphasize their relatively poor social and economic development, and therefore their weakness in global affairs. At the same time, the emphasis on sub-Saharan African countries’ “weaknesses” emphasizes China’s relative strength/power in the areas in question. In other words, dissociation and differentiation strategies through the use of the expression “developing countries” serve to represent China and sub-Saharan African countries as separate groups and different actors with different measures of strength/power in international affairs.

In short, the use of the strategies of genericization, dissociation and differentiation as means to represent sub-Saharan African countries carries ideological representations of China and sub-Saharan African countries as two separate entities. In this regard, it was argued that the use of the strategies of (i) personalization to represent China, (ii) aggregation to represent Chinese people, (iii) genericization to represent sub-Saharan African countries, as well as (iv) the emphasis on China’s strength/power in the context of global affairs all serve to convey ideological representations of power relations between China and sub-Saharan African countries. Although relational and kinship terms of address are often used in the texts, the analysis showed that given the collectivistic nature of Chinese culture, the use of the strategy of relational identification is not in line with the use of the strategy of collectivization as instantiated in the texts by the use of the pronoun *we*.

The analysis revealed that in the discourse on its relations with (sub-Saharan) African countries, China is most often represented as an active participant whereas the African countries are frequently represented in a passive role. The high frequency of the representation of China as an active participant shows that in the discourse in question, China is most often given the strong role of Actor whereas sub-Saharan African countries are generally given the weaker role of being the passive participant in the relationship.

It is important to point out here that the discursive strategies that were focused on in the present study are not the only such strategies which can be identified in the texts under analysis. One further strategy that could be investigated is that of argumentation as employed within the DHA framework (Wodak 2001a; Reisigl & Wodak 2009).

In accordance with the principle of triangulation, the DHA uses argumentation theory in order to investigate the use of arguments or argumentation schemes in discourse. More precisely, investigating the strategy of argumentation focuses on the analysis of the principal claims as well as the topoi and fallacies employed to justify these claims (Reisigl & Wodak 2009:110). Following Kienpointner, Reisigl and Wodak (2009:110) describe topoi as:

... parts of argumentation which belong to the required premises. They are the formal or content-related warrants or “conclusion rules” which connect the argument(s) with the conclusion, the claim. As such, they justify the transition from the argument(s) to the conclusion.

As regards fallacies, Reisigl and Wodak (2009:110) point out that an argumentation scheme can be either reasonable or fallacious. If the latter is the case, the argumentation gives rise to a fallacy, that is, a conclusion that does not necessarily follow from the evidence. In the context of the present study, therefore, investigating the strategy of argumentation would require analysing the topoi and potential fallacies which occur in the specific texts to justify China’s claims about its current engagement in sub-Saharan African countries. As a case in point, consider the following extract from President Hu Jintao’s speech at the University of Pretoria in 2007:



Extract 171 (155)

The world today is in profound changes. Peace, development and cooperation are the defining features of our times. The growing trend towards multipolarity and economic globalization presents mankind with both rare opportunity of development and severe challenges. People across the world hope to share opportunities, jointly meet challenges and ensure common development. China is the biggest developing country and Africa is the continent with the largest number of developing countries. Our combined population accounts for over one-third of the world's total. Both China and Africa are important forces for global peace and development. To deepen China-Africa traditional friendship, boost practical cooperation and forge in an all-round way a new China-Africa strategic partnership is the shared desire of our two peoples. It is also the calling of the times. [T7/S-Pres]

This extract illustrates, as noted in section 4.1.4, the argumentation underlying a global appeal for cooperation towards peace and development (Content D). The extract contains an argument for the claim that China and African countries should increase their cooperation. In accordance with the Content D, the argument is grounded on the following hypothesis: Cooperation between countries contributes to peace and development in these countries. So, if cooperation between countries contributes to peace and development in these countries, then cooperation between China and African countries will contribute to peace and development in these countries.

The claim is justified by the topos of “rightness” (of cooperation as the way to achieve development and peace in China and sub-Saharan African countries). On the one hand, the claim is supported by attested evidence showing that cooperation between countries contributes to development. For instance, there is no doubt that China’s import of natural resources from African countries contributes to that country’s growing economy. At the same time, China’s investments and aid (e.g. in the construction of roads, railways, hospitals and other important infrastructures) in some African countries contribute to the development of those countries.

On the other hand, even though the above claim seems reasonable and appealing, it could well be fallacious in view of evidence showing that cooperation between countries does not necessarily contribute to peace and development in these countries. This is especially true if one considers the results of “cooperation” between African and European countries over the

past two centuries: very often such cooperation has given rise to exploitation, corrupted and dictatorial regimes, social instability, and civil wars in some sub-Saharan African countries. In fact, some of the African countries who have established links with China over the past decade – e.g. Nigeria, Gabon, Zimbabwe – are still very much underdeveloped and in the grip of socio-political problems such as corruption, nepotism, unemployment, etc. In short, although cooperation could very well lead to “global peace and development”, as envisaged in Extract 171, this is not a guaranteed outcome.

Another phenomenon that could profitably be analysed is that of modality, which has to do with “the grammaticalized expression of the subjective attitudes and opinions of the speaker including possibility, probability, necessity, obligation, permissibility, ability, desire, and contingency” (Kosur 2010:1). These notions (‘possibility’, ‘probability’, ‘necessity’, etc.) are referred to as “modal meanings” (Aarts 2011:275). One way of expressing modality in English is by means of modal auxiliary verbs such as *can*, *might*, *must*, *will* and *should*. In the texts constituting the data, modality is generally expressed by the use of the modal auxiliaries *must* and *should*, as illustrated in the following extracts:

Extract 172

China and Africa have made important contribution to the progress of human civilization. We *should* strengthen cultural exchanges, draw on each other’s culture to increase mutual understanding and friendship. [T4/S-Pres]

Extract 173

We *must* sustain the momentum of this trend by maintaining close friendship, treating each other as equals and working closely to promote mutually beneficial cooperation and common development, and thus elevate China-Africa friendship and cooperation to a higher level. [T7/S-Pres]

According to Aarts (2011:276-277), there are three different types of modality in English, namely deontic modality, epistemic modality, and dynamic modality. Deontic modality is concerned with such notions as ‘obligation’ and ‘permission’, as in the following examples:<sup>90</sup>

- (1) a. Well, you *must* be slightly more succinct then.  
 b. You *may* voluntarily give up your right to reduced liability.

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<sup>90</sup> These and subsequent examples are taken from Aarts (2011:276-277).

Epistemic modality deals with ‘knowledge’ and/or ‘inference’; for instance:

- (2) a. “He *must* be here somewhere,” Anne said.
- b. You *may* be left out of it because you are a freelancer.

As regards dynamic modality, it is typically concerned with such notions as ‘ability’ and ‘volition’, as in the following examples:

- (3) a. In two or three years of learning that language we’re never going to be able to speak it to the same standard we *can* speak our native tongue.
- b. So if you *will* go downstairs, and then you could look through these two postgraduate guides.

Within the framework of these three general types of modality, modal auxiliaries can express multiple modal meanings depending on the way and the context in which they are used. For example, according to Aarts (2011:288-291) the auxiliary *should* can be used to express six different modal meanings within this framework, depending on the context:<sup>91</sup>

- (i) *Should* can be used to express necessity (deontic meaning), as in:

And of course as a learner you *should* be extra careful.

- (ii) *Should* can be used to express evidence-based supposition (epistemic modality), as in the following examples:

- a. On Saturday I’m off to a fireworks & classical music evening at Leeds Castle which *should* be good.

- b. I *should* have thought he’d’ve had one before now.

- (iii) Certain verbs, adjectives and nouns trigger the use of *should*. In such situations, the auxiliary can be used in a “mandative” and a “putative” way. For Aarts (2011:290), “mandative *should*” (e.g. *should* in the *that*-clause as in (a) below) expresses a

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<sup>91</sup> Two of these meanings, namely the mandative and putative meanings, are presented together in (iii) below. Cf. also Smith (1989) on the different interpretations of the auxiliary *must*.

directive meaning, whereas “putative *should*” (e.g. *should* in the *that*-clause in the (b) example) expresses an evaluative, reflective, attitudinal or emotive meaning:

- a. It is important<sup>92</sup> [that all randomised clinical trials *should* be published irrespective of their results].
- b. It is disappointing, therefore, [that the submitted design *should* fall far short of its clearly stated goal].

(iv) *Should* can be used in conditional clauses where the speaker expresses a certain amount of doubt as to the actualization of the situation referred to; for instance:

*Should* you have any further queries please do not hesitate to contact me.

(v) *Should* can be used in a clause that expresses ‘purpose’, as in the following example:

There was a deliberate effort to make it appear surgical, and almost consequence-free in order that public opinion at home *should* not be eroded.

In view of the multiple modal meanings that can be expressed by means of modal auxiliaries, the analysis of modality in the texts examined in the present study would consist in providing the specific semantic and pragmatic meanings of such auxiliaries in these texts. However, since the texts constituting the data are either documents that have been translated into English or that have been produced by non-native (and perhaps not fully fluent) speakers of English, an accurate analysis of modality would have to take into account possible linguistic and cross-cultural differences involving the meanings and use of modal auxiliaries in English and Mandarin Chinese<sup>93</sup>.

The use of the strategy of argumentation, as well as the expression of modality, remain as topics (amongst others, for example the use of speech acts) for further study of China’s discourse on its relations with sub-Saharan African countries.

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<sup>92</sup> The underlined word is the one that triggers the use of *should*.

<sup>93</sup> For the meanings of modal verbs in Mandarin Chinese, see for instance the study by Yu (1997). [http://ling.nthu.edu.tw/abstracts/Yu\\_2007.pdf](http://ling.nthu.edu.tw/abstracts/Yu_2007.pdf)

It was pointed out in Chapter 1 that, as reported in the media, there is a sceptical public opinion in Africa and also in some developed countries about China's current engagement with African countries. For instance, at the time of the Fifth FOCAC summit in July 2012 in Beijing, the Financial Times reported that South African President Jacob Zuma "warns on Africa ties to China".<sup>94</sup> Expressing concern about the unbalanced nature of the trade relations between China and some African countries, the South African President made the following remarks:

China's commitment to Africa has already been demonstrated through tangible and concrete results, particularly in terms of human resource development, debt relief, and investment. On the other hand, Africa's commitment to China's development has been demonstrated by the supply of raw materials, other products, and technology transfer. As we all agree, Your Excellency, this trade pattern is unsustainable in the long term. Africa's past economic experience with Europe dictates a need to be cautious when entering into partnerships with other economies.<sup>95</sup>

On the one hand, the discussion of the Discourse Topics in Chapter 4 indicated that the relations between China and sub-Saharan African countries are grounded in China's pluralist approach to international affairs. From this perspective, then, it could be argued that China's current engagement in sub-Saharan Africa does not warrant the sceptical public opinion illustrated by the South African President's remark and the similar remarks quoted in Chapter 1. On the other hand, however, the analysis in Chapter 4 of the discursive strategies used to represent China and sub-Saharan African countries, indicates that such scepticism is likely warranted.

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<sup>94</sup> <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/33686fc4-d171-11e1-bbbc-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2HwNepjIp>

<sup>95</sup> Remarks by President Jacob Zuma at the opening session of the 5th Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, Beijing, China. <http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/pebble.asp?relid=6486>

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## Appendix

In the present section I provide the ten documents which constitute the data analysed in this study. These documents are texts which are presented according to their date of delivery. To each text is assigned a code number given between square brackets. All the texts are given in their original (translated) form, i.e. without any editorial changes or spelling/punctuation corrections.

- **Document 1: [T1/FOCAC1-Pres]**

The first document is the full text of the speech given by Chinese President Jiang Zemin at the opening ceremony of the first Ministerial Conference of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) which was held in Beijing in 2000.

Document 1: [T1/FOCAC1-Pres]

**China and Africa-Usher in the New Century Together**  
**Speech by President Jiang Zemin of The People's Republic of China At the Opening**  
**Ceremony of The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation**  
**2000/10/10**

Your Excellencies President Eyadema, President Bouteflika President Chiluba President Mkapa and Secretary-General Salim.

Excellencies,

Ladies and Gentlemen:

In this golden autumn of October, we are gathering here in Beijing for the Forum on China-Africa Co-operation Ministerial Conference Beijing 2000. This is the first of its kind in the history of Sino-African relationship On behalf of the Chinese Government and people and in my own name, I wish to extend our warm welcome to all our distinguished guests coming from afar and express my sincere congratulations on the successful convocation of the Forum.

China is the largest developing country in the world and Africa is the continent with the largest number of developing countries. At the turn of the millennium and the century. China and Africa are faced with both historical opportunities for greater development and unprecedented challenges. At this important historical juncture, an in-depth discussion between us on how to strengthen co-operation and promote common development will undoubtedly exert a far-reaching important impact on the cross-century development of Sino-African relations, closer South-South co-operation and the establishment of an equitable and just new international political and economic order.

The 20th century has witnessed earth-shaking changes in both China and Africa. The Chinese and African peoples once fought courageously for their national independence and freedom. They have since made strenuous efforts for peace and development. They have scored remarkable achievements and made historical progress in building up their countries.

During the Second World War, the Chinese people and the African people fought an anti-Fascist war bravely on their respective fronts and contributed tremendously to the final victory of the war.

Having smashed the shackles of the colonial rule that lasted for several centuries, the African people won their national liberation and independence. They have since registered gratifying progress in social and economic development.

The Chinese people did away with imperialism. Feudalism and bureaucrat-capitalism, known as the "three big mountains" weighing down on the backs of the Chinese people. And founded the People's Republic of China where the people become the masters of the country. They have finally found a development path of building socialism with Chinese characteristics and have been marching along this path confidently.

We have come to the conclusion after a review of the history of the past one hundred years that the Chinese people and the African people both treasure independence, love peace and long for development and that they are both important forces for world peace and common development. It is the unremitting efforts made by the people throughout the world, including the Chinese and African peoples, that forces for world peace have kept growing and the world development cause has made considerable progress.

The world today is moving towards multi-polarity and the international situation is on the whole easing of Modern science and technology driven by information technology and life science are advancing rapidly. Economic globalisation is gaining momentum. Countries in the world have engaged themselves in ever extensive and in-depth co-operation and



exchanges. The lofty cause of peace and development of mankind has promised a bright prospect.

However, development in different countries is extremely uneven. Hegemonism and power politics still exist. Developing countries are still faced with an arduous task of safeguarding their sovereignty, security and interests. The gap between the North and the South is being widened not only economically, but also in science and technology. Hence, there has emerged a disturbing "digital divide" The Prolonged poverty and backwardness, Coupled with external factors, have exacerbated the otherwise latent ethnic rifts, religious feuds and social conflicts in some developing countries, led to conflicts and wars in these countries and impaired their state stability and national development.

At the root of these problems are many irrational and inequitable factors in the current international political and economic order. They are detrimental not only to world peace and development, but also to the stability and development of the vast number of developing countries.

Mankind is about to usher in a new century. It has been the demand of the times and call of the people all over the world to establish an equitable and just new international political and economic order. Let us work together with wisdom and courage to build such a new order and advance the lofty cause of peace and development for mankind.

The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, the principles and spirit enshrined in the OAU Charter and other universally recognised norms governing international relations should form the political basis for the new international order. Furthermore, it is imperative to establish some new principles responsive to the spirit of the times and to the changes and developments in the world provided that people of all nations can reach consensus.

In the new international order, the right of all countries to sovereign equality and to freedom from outside interference in their internal affairs must be ensured to them. All countries, big or small, strong or weak, rich or poor, should respect each other's sovereignty and independence. This is of paramount importance to world peace. They should have the right to choose their own development path and model in light of their national conditions No country should be allowed to impose its own social system or ideology on others, nor should it be allowed to made irresponsible remarks on other countries' internal affairs. Peacekeeping operations must be based on the basic principles of getting prior consent from the parties concerned, neutrality, no use of force except for self-defense and obtaining authorization

from the UN Security Council such operations must aim at maintaining peace and should not be used as a means to pursue selfish ends.

In the new international order, all countries should be ensured their right to participate in international affairs on an equal footing. It is the people of all countries who are the main players behind the world development. As such, they should participate in the management of the world. It is imperative to promote democracy in international relations, address international issues through consultation and meet the challenges facing mankind together. The movement towards political multi-polarity of the world will be conducive to the democratization of international relations. The positive role of the United Nations should be strengthened, so should the status and role of the developing countries and international and regional organizations composed of such countries.

In the new international order, the right of all countries to development based on equality, especially that of the developing countries, should be ensured. To help developing countries to boost their economy is vital to a lasting peace and common development of the world. Developed countries should effectively reduce or exempt the debts owed by developing countries, help them to enhance their capabilities for self-development and vigorously develop their human resources with a view to gradually narrowing the gap between the North and the South in economy, science and technology and other fields. They should not do nothing but seek natural resources, market and profit from the developing countries. The international community should take more aggressive and effective measures to reform the international economic, trade and financial systems so as to effectively safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of developing countries.

In the new international order, all ethnic groups and civilizations should be ensured their right to common development. The world is a colorful and diverse one. Various ethnic groups and civilizations inevitably differ from one another and each has its own advantages, given their distinctive histories, cultures and development models. This is the fundamental reason why the world is full of vitality. Only when the diversity of the world is respected can various ethnic groups and civilizations live in harmony, learn from each other and complement each other. All ethnic groups and civilizations should respect each other, treat each other as equals and pursue common progress and improvement in the spirit of seeking common ground while putting aside differences. Their differences should serve to encourage them to seek common development. Only by so doing will various civilizations in the world blossom with radiant splendor.

An equitable and just new international political and economic order cannot possibly be put in place overnight. It will take an incremental process for such a system to take shape. So long as the international community, China and Africa included, work together, a new international political and economic order responsive fully to the demands and wishes of all peoples in the world will surely be established.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Both China and Africa are the cradles of the ancient human civilizations. Their time-honored histories and cultures are an important part of world civilization.

It was Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping and other Chinese leaders of the older generation and the forerunners of the African movement for national liberation who forged and nurtured this great China-Africa friendship. And the friendship between the Chinese and African peoples is based on a solid foundation. The past five decades have witnessed frequent exchange of high-level visits between China and African countries and a growing friendship between their peoples. We have always understood, respected, sympathized with and supported each other in international affairs, and carried out fruitful cooperation in the political, economic, trade, scientific, technological, cultural, educational, public health, sports, social and other fields on the basis of equality and mutual benefit. In the process of developing friendship and cooperation over the years, China and African countries have developed many important and viable principles governing international relations.

To establish a new international political and economic order and enable our future generations to live in a beautiful world. I recommend that we should make concerted efforts in the following areas:

1. Strengthen solidarity and promote South-South cooperation. South-South cooperation is an important means through which developing countries may effectively respond to the changes in the international situation and meet the challenges that may be brought about by economic globalization. It helps developing countries to give full play to their advantages in natural and human resources, tap to the full their respective productive and technological potential, take advantage of the others' strengths to make up for their own weaknesses, and achieve common improvement. Developing countries must enhance their capacity for self development and increase their national aggregates. This is a fundamental guarantee for accelerating their development.

2. Enhance dialogue and improve North-South relations. The development of developing countries is indispensable for world prosperity and the concerted efforts of all countries are

essential to human progress. Developed countries and developing countries should conduct dialogue, eliminate prejudice, seek common ground while reserving differences and respect each other. Developed countries should take full account and care of the interests of the less privileged developing countries and increase financial investment and technology transfer to them to help build up their capacity for development. A smaller development gap and better political and economic relations between the North and the South is an important foundation for a just and equitable new international political and economic order.

3. Take part in international affairs on the basis of equality and in an enterprising spirit. China and African countries should increase consultation, coordination and cooperation on the bilateral and multilateral fronts, participate actively in the management of international affairs and formulation of international rules and promote the reform of the international political, economic, financial and trading systems. In this way, the voice of developing countries will be heard more clearly in the world, a fair international environment will be created and the legitimate rights and interests of developing countries will be effectively safeguarded.

4. Look forward into the future and establish a new long-term stable partnership of equality and mutual benefit. The establishment of stronger friendly ties and closer cooperation between China and Africa serves the interests of their peoples and conforms to the trend towards world peace and development. We will deepen our mutual understanding and trust through various forms of exchanges, especially direct contacts between top leaders of both China and African countries. We will take various measures to tap the potential and explore new ways and areas of our economic cooperation and trade so that a new pattern of China-Africa economic relations and cooperation based on mutual benefit and aimed at common development will gradually take shape. We will also give play to the initiative of all quarters, and promote an all-round friendship between us. We will make special efforts to educate our younger generations so that the traditional friendship between China and Africa will be passed on from generation to generation.

Ladies and Gentlemen:

To establish a fair and reasonable new international political and economic order is a lofty cause benefiting all mankind. Despite twists and turns on the road ahead, there are bright prospects for this cause. So long as we work together tirelessly, we will surely achieve the great goals that we have been pursuing together and accomplish the lofty cause that we have been promoting.

Thank you.

- **Document 2: [T2/S-Pres]**

The second document is the full text of the speech given by Chinese President Hu Jintao at the National Assembly of Gabon in 2004.

Document 2: [T2/S-Pres]

**Consolidating China-Africa Traditional Friendship and Deepening China-Africa All-round Cooperation**

**Speech by President Hu Jintao of the People's Republic of China At Joint Session of the Gabonese Parliament**

**2 February 2004**

Your Excellency President El Hadj Omar Bongo,  
Your Excellencies Senate President Georges Rawiri and  
Speaker of the National Assembly Guy Nzouba-Ndama,  
Members of Parliament,  
Ambassadors,  
Ladies and Gentlemen,

It is a great pleasure for me to have this opportunity to visit Gabon and meet, here at this Palace of the National Assembly, a symbol of China-Gabon friendship, with parliamentarians and diplomatic envoys accredited to Gabon. First of all, on behalf of the Government and people of China, I would like to extend my sincere greetings and best wishes to you and, through you, to the Gabonese people and the people of whole Africa.

This year marks the 30th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and Gabon. In the past three decades, our two countries have conducted fruitful cooperation in wide-ranging areas and become each other's genuine and dependable partner. President Bongo is an old friend of the Chinese people who has made important contributions to the development of China-Gabon relations. I am confident that my current visit will further deepen and advance the friendship and cooperation between our two peoples.

Forty years ago today, Zhou Enlai, the beloved late premier of the Chinese people, was in the middle of his very first visit to Africa. He described his ten-country African journey as one of "seeking friendship, peace and knowledge". It was in the same spirit that successive Chinese

leaders made their African trips later on. Through their visits, the Chinese people have come to know more about Africa and increased their friendship with the African people. To see the African people work assiduously in nation-building and the African continent hold out bright prospects for development has the Chinese people greatly inspired.

Since the founding of New China, the Chinese Government has always attached great importance to developing relations with Africa and adopted a series of related policies and guidelines. Consistently adhering to the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, we respect the independent choices made by African countries for their political systems and development paths. We have provided them with assistance to the best of our ability and developed economic and technical cooperation with them. We support their efforts for a strong and united Africa through collective self-reliance. We call for greater attention by the international community to peace and development on this continent and support African countries in their participation in international affairs on an equal footing. We have worked to strengthen consultations and cooperation with Africa and made joint efforts to safeguard the rights and interests of the developing countries.

China-Africa friendship dates back long in history and is deeply rooted in the hearts of our peoples. Since the founding of New China, we have always unswervingly supported the cause of national liberation in Africa and lent a sincere helping hand to African countries' endeavour at national economic development. Chinese experts, doctors, teachers and workers sent to Africa have worked shoulder to shoulder with the local people and forged a deep friendship of affinity. In international affairs, China and African countries have understood and supported each other and become trustworthy partners. The Chinese people will never forget that it was due to the strong support of the vast number of developing countries, those in Africa included, that China successfully regained its lawful seat in the United Nations at the 26th session of the United Nations General Assembly in 1971. In recent years, the political trust between China and Africa has deepened, trade and economic cooperation become more fruitful, and the friendly exchanges at all levels and in all fields such as culture, education, public health, science, technology and sports developed vigorously. The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation launched at the beginning of the century has become the new platform for closer China-Africa relations and stronger cooperation. China and Africa have set out to establish a new type of partnership featuring long-term stability, equality and mutual benefit and China-Africa friendship and cooperation have entered a new stage of all-round development.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

This is my third visit to Africa. Africa has abundant natural resources and a huge potential for development. Even though suffering hundreds of years of colonial domination and plunder and still facing considerable difficulties and challenges, the African people are industrious, brave, fearless and enterprising. These characters have left a deep impression on me.

Times are progressing, and Africa is advancing. We are pleased to see that, through generations of arduous struggles, decolonisation was completed and racial segregation as an institution abolished throughout the African continent. This is a tremendous contribution to human progress. Decades of relentless efforts have brought about progress in the cause of peace and development in Africa. In recent years, Africa has worked hard to resolve regional conflicts, resulting in greater stability in its overall situation. Seeking self-strengthening through unity, African countries have formed the African Union and laid down the New Partnership for African Development. African countries have actively explored a development path suited to their national conditions, taking economic growth, poverty eradication and improvement of people's livelihood as their top priority. The economy of Africa as a whole has grown for nine years in a row. With assistance from the international community, Africa has vigorously invested in education and personnel training and spared no efforts to address such social problems as HIV/AIDS. African countries have worked hand in hand with the other developing countries, promoting South-South cooperation and playing their increasing role in international affairs. The Chinese Government and people rejoice at seeing each and every achievement scored by Africa. We are convinced that through the persistent efforts of all the African governments and people and with the support of the international community, Africa's revitalization will surely be realized.

The Chinese people are, too, faced with a historic task of national rejuvenation. In the past five decades and more since the founding of the People's Republic, and especially since the implementation of reform and opening-up over 20 years ago, China's modernization drive has made remarkable achievements. The social productive forces and the comprehensive national strength of China have made a historic leap forward and the Chinese people are, on the whole, living a comfortable life. However, we are keenly aware that, given our huge population, weak economic base and uneven development, our per capita GDP ranks fairly low on the country list of the world and we need to work long and hard, even by generations, to turn China into a modern country. The Communist Party of China set forth at its 16th National Congress more than a year ago the goal of building a well-off society in an all-

round way. Today, our 1.3 billion countrymen are working vigorously, and with full confidence, towards this grand goal.

Currently, the international situation is undergoing the most complex and most profound changes since the end of Cold War. Peace and development remain the two main themes for the people across the world. Peace is the prerequisite to development whereas development the guarantee for peace. It has become the shared aspiration of the international community to pursue development in a peaceful environment. However, the world is still not tranquil, with uncertainties affecting peace and development on the increase. There are new manifestations of hegemonism and power politics. Conflicts caused by ethnic and religious clashes or by boundary and territorial disputes are cropping up from time to time. The uneven development is even more evident as the gap between North and South has widened further. Such non-traditional security threats as raging terrorism, rampant transnational crimes, spread of deadly diseases and worsened pollution of the environment, are posing greater danger to human development. Our mankind is facing new challenges and opportunities in our quest to maintain world peace and promote common development.

With this as a backdrop, China and Africa have come to share more concerns and accordingly, more interests and objectives in facilitating the establishment of a new international economic and political order that is fair and equitable. China is the world's largest developing country and Africa the continent with the highest concentration of developing countries. We in China are ready to work with African countries in an effort to seize the historical opportunities, deepen cooperation at all fronts and promote common development. Here, I would like to propose the following three-point initiative:

First, build on the traditional friendship and push for new progress in China-Africa relations. The traditional China-Africa friendship was fostered by the older generation of leaders on both sides, the essence of which is sincere friendship, equality, mutual support and close cooperation. Indeed, strengthening solidarity and cooperation with all developing countries, African countries included, has been a basic starting point of China's foreign policy. The Chinese Government will unswervingly carry forward the traditional China-Africa friendship and, proceeding from the fundamental interests of our peoples, step up an all-directional cooperation with African countries, breaking new ground and adding new contents to the cooperation. It is important for China and Africa to increase governmental and nongovernmental interactions at various levels in addition to keeping the current frequency of high-level exchanges. Equally important is for the two sides to enhance trade and economic



cooperation, and expand cooperation in science, technology, culture, education, health, tourism, management and other areas. Together with our African brothers, we are ready to do whatever is helpful to peace and development in Africa, to the friendship and cooperation between China and Africa, and to the maintenance of interests of the developing countries as a whole.

Second, persist in mutual assistance and mutual benefit and promote the common prosperity of China and Africa. Providing assistance to African countries to the best of our capacity and with no political strings attached is an important part of China's Africa policy. As China grows stronger economically, we will increase assistance to our friends. As a matter of fact, China and Africa are fairly complementary economically. Africa is rich in natural and human resources and China has applicable know-how and experience. Both have a broad consumer market and the potential for our cooperation is enormous. We would like to see China and Africa become closer partners in trade and economic cooperation. We will earnestly implement the follow-up actions of the China-Africa Cooperation Forum, support the development of the African Union and the implementation of NEPAD, seriously fulfil our promise on zero tariffs to some African commodities and increase our import from Africa, and explore new ways to expand trade with African countries. We will take an active part in cooperation programs that benefit the ordinary people in the spirit of diversity in forms, equality, mutual benefit and giving the need of the people top priority. We will create a more favourable environment for investment and cooperation by enterprises from both sides and provide better policy and financial support to Chinese enterprises operating in Africa. Our economic cooperation in the future could focus more on infrastructure, agriculture and resources development, and we shall step up our mutually beneficial cooperation to promote common development, thus making both sides winners.

Third, cooperate even more closely in an effort to safeguard the rights and interests of the developing countries. We believe that the international decision-making mechanism should be democratic, transparent, fair and equitable; all countries, big or small, strong or weak, rich or poor, are equal and are entitled to participate and play a role in international affairs. We also believe that economic globalisation should benefit all the people in the world and move in a direction conducive to common prosperity. As a permanent member of the UN Security Council, China will continue to support the reasonable propositions and requests of the vast number of developing countries, African countries included, work to promote the solidarity and cooperation of the developing countries and enhance their capacity to meet the

challenges collectively. China supports African countries in their efforts to resolve regional conflicts and develop the economy by self-strengthening through unity, and participates in UN peacekeeping operations in Africa and programs aimed at promoting African economic and social development. China is ready to step up consultation and coordination with Africa in such areas as safeguarding the authority of the United Nations, pushing the Security Council reform and increasing the developing countries' representation in the Council. While facilitating the South-South cooperation, China will vigorously promote the North-South dialogue in the interest of better North-South relations. In particular, we call for greater commitment and actions on the part of the developed countries in technology transfer, wider market access, lower trade barriers, more financial aid and investment, and greater debt reduction in favour of the developing countries so as to help the South with economic development and poverty eradication.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Looking back, the tree of China-Africa friendship has borne rich fruits thanks to the concerted efforts of the leaders and peoples of both sides. Looking ahead, we see even brighter prospects for China-Africa cooperation. Let us join hands and renew our abiding commitment to stronger cooperation in an all-round way on the basis of our traditional friendship.

Thank you.

- **Document 3: [T3/CAP]**

The third document is the *China's African Policy* which was released by the Chinese administration in 2006.

Document 3: [T3/CAP]

**China's African Policy**  
**(January 2006)**

Foreword

The first few years of the new century witness a continuation of complex and profound changes in the international situation and further advance of globalization. Peace and development remain the main themes of our times. Safeguarding peace, promoting development and enhancing cooperation, which are the common desire of all peoples, represent the irresistible historical trend. On the other hand, destabilizing factors and uncertainties in the international situation are on the rise. Security issues of various kinds are interwoven. Peace remains evasive and development more pressing.

China, the largest developing country in the world, follows the path of peaceful development and pursues an independent foreign policy of peace. China stands ready to develop friendly relations and cooperation with all countries on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence so as to contribute to peace, stability and common prosperity around the world.

The African continent, which encompasses the largest number of developing countries, is an important force for world peace and development. China-Africa traditional friendly relations face fresh opportunities under the new circumstances. With this African Policy Paper, the Chinese Government wishes to present to the world the objectives of China's policy toward Africa and the measures to achieve them, and its proposals for cooperation in various fields in the coming years, with a view of promoting the steady growth of China-Africa relations in the long term and bringing the mutually-beneficial cooperation to a new stage.

Part I: Africa's Position and Role

Africa has a long history, vast expanse of land, rich natural resources and huge potential for development. After long years of struggle, the African people freed themselves from colonial

rule, wiped out apartheid, won independence and emancipation, thus making significant contribution to the progress of civilization.

Following their independence, countries in Africa have been conscientiously exploring a road to development suited to their national conditions and seeking peace, stability and development by joint efforts. Thanks to the concerted efforts of African countries and the Organization of African Unity (OAU)/the African Union (AU), the political situation in Africa has been stable on the whole, regional conflicts are being gradually resolved and economy has been growing for years. The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) has drawn up an encouraging picture of African rejuvenation and development. African countries have actively participated in the South-South cooperation and worked for the North-South dialogue. They are playing an increasingly important role in international affairs.

Africa still faces many challenges on its road of development. However, with the persistent efforts of African countries and the continuous support of the international community, Africa will surely surmount difficulties and achieve rejuvenation in the new century.

#### Part II: China's Relations with Africa

China-Africa friendship is embedded in the long history of interchange. Sharing similar historical experience, China and Africa have all along sympathized with and supported each other in the struggle for national liberation and forged a profound friendship.

The founding of the People's Republic of China and the independence of African countries ushered in a new era in China-Africa relations. For over half a century, the two sides have enjoyed close political ties and frequent exchanges of high-level visits and people-to-people contacts. Bilateral trade and economic cooperation have grown rapidly; cooperation in other fields has yielded good results; and consultation and coordination in international affairs have been intensified. China has provided assistance to the best of its ability to African countries, while African countries have also rendered strong support to China on many occasions.

Sincerity, equality and mutual benefit, solidarity and common development - these are the principles guiding China-Africa exchanges and cooperation and the driving force to lasting China-Africa relations.

#### Part III: China's African Policy

Enhancing solidarity and cooperation with African countries has always been an important component of China's independent foreign policy of peace. China will unswervingly carry forward the tradition of China-Africa friendship. Proceeding from the fundamental interests

of both the Chinese and African peoples, China will establish and develop a new type of strategic partnership with Africa which features political equality and mutual trust, economic win-win cooperation and cultural exchange. The general principles and objectives of China's African policy are as follows:

-- Sincerity, friendship and equality. China adheres to the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, respects African countries' independent choice of the road of development and supports African countries' efforts to grow stronger through unity.

-- Mutual benefit, reciprocity and common prosperity. China supports African countries' endeavor for economic development and nation building, carries out cooperation in various forms in the economic and social development, and promotes common prosperity of China and Africa.

-- Mutual support and close coordination. China will strengthen cooperation with Africa in the United Nations and other multilateral systems by supporting each other's just demand and reasonable propositions and continue to appeal to the international community to give more attention to questions concerning peace and development in Africa.

-- Learning from each other and seeking common development. China and Africa will learn from and draw upon each other's experience in governance and development, strengthen exchanges and cooperation in education, science, culture and health. Supporting African countries' efforts to enhance capacity building, China will work together with Africa in the exploration of the road of sustainable development.

The one-China principle is the political foundation for the establishment and development of China's relations with African countries and regional organizations. The Chinese Government appreciates the fact that the overwhelming majority of African countries abide by the one-China principle, refuse to have official relations and contacts with Taiwan and support China's great cause of reunification. China stands ready to establish and develop state-to-state relations with countries that have not yet established diplomatic ties with China on the basis of the one-China principle.

#### Part IV: Enhancing All-round Cooperation Between China and Africa

##### 1. The political field

###### (1) High-level visits

China will maintain the momentum of mutual visits and dialogues between Chinese and African leaders, with a view of facilitating communication, deepening friendship and promoting mutual understanding and trust.

(2) Exchanges between legislative bodies

China favors increased multi-level and multi-channel friendly exchanges on the basis of mutual respect between China's National People's Congress (NPC) and parliaments of African countries and the Pan-African Parliament of the AU, for the purpose of deepening understanding and cooperation.

(3) Exchanges between political parties

The Communist Party of China (CPC) develops exchanges of various forms with friendly political parties and organizations of African countries on the basis of the principles of independence, equality, mutual respect and non-interference in each other's internal affairs. The purpose of such exchanges is to increase understanding and friendship and seek trust and cooperation.

(4) Consultation mechanisms

Mechanisms such as national bilateral committees between China and African countries, political consultation between foreign ministries, joint(mixed) committees on trade and economic cooperation and mixed committees on science and technology should be established and improved, so as to institutionalize dialogue and consultation in a flexible and pragmatic manner.

(5) Cooperation in international affairs

China will continue to strengthen solidarity and cooperation with African countries in the international arena, conduct regular exchange of views, coordinate positions on major international and regional issues and stand for mutual support on major issues concerning state sovereignty, territorial integrity, national dignity and human rights. China supports African nations' desire to be an equal partner in international affairs. China is devoted, as are African nations, to making the United Nations play a greater role, defending the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, establishing a new international political and economic order featuring justice, rationality, equality and mutual benefit, promoting more democratic international relationship and rule of law in international affairs and safeguarding the legitimate rights and interests of developing countries.

(6) Exchanges between local governments

China's Central Government attaches importance to the exchanges between local governments of China and African countries, vigorously supports twin province/state and twin city relationship aimed at facilitating bilateral exchanges and cooperation in local development and administration.

## 2. The economic field

### (1) Trade

The Chinese Government will adopt more effective measures to facilitate African commodities' access to Chinese market and fulfill its promise to grant duty-free treatment to some goods from the least developed African countries, with a view of expanding and balancing bilateral trade and optimizing trade structure. It intends to settle trade disputes and frictions properly through bilateral or multilateral friendly consultation, mutual understanding and mutual accommodation. Efforts will be made to encourage business communities on both sides to set up China-Africa Joint Chamber of Commerce and Industry. When conditions are ripe, China is willing to negotiate Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with African countries and African regional organizations.

### (2) Investment

The Chinese Government encourages and supports Chinese enterprises' investment and business in Africa, and will continue to provide preferential loans and buyer credits to this end. The Chinese Government is ready to explore new channels and new ways for promoting investment cooperation with African countries, and will continue to formulate and improve relevant policies, provide guidance and service and offer convenience. African countries are welcome to make investment in China. The Chinese Government will continue to negotiate, conclude and implement the Agreement on Bilateral Facilitation and Protection of Investment and the Agreement on Avoidance of Double Taxation with African Countries. The two sides should work together to create a favorable environment for investment and cooperation and protect the legitimate rights and interests of investors from both sides.

### (3) Financial cooperation

To further develop China-Africa cooperation in the area of finance, the Chinese Government will support the effort of Chinese financial institutions to increase exchanges and cooperation with their counterparts in African countries as well as regional financial institutions in Africa.

### (4) Agricultural cooperation

China intends to further promote its agricultural cooperation and exchanges with African nations at various levels, through multiple channels and in various forms. Focus will be laid on the cooperation in land development, agricultural plantation, breeding technologies, food security, agricultural machinery and the processing of agricultural and side-line products. China will intensify cooperation in agricultural technology, organize training courses of

practical agricultural technologies, carry out experimental and demonstrative agricultural technology projects in Africa and speed up the formulation of China-Africa Agricultural Cooperation Program.

(5) Infrastructure

The Chinese Government will step up China-Africa cooperation in transportation, telecommunications, water conservancy, electricity and other types of infrastructure. It will vigorously encourage Chinese enterprises to participate in the building of infrastructure in African countries, scale up their contracts, and gradually establish multilateral and bilateral mechanisms on contractual projects. Efforts will be made to strengthen technology and management cooperation, focusing on the capacity-building of African nations.

(6) Resources cooperation

The Chinese Government facilitates information sharing and cooperation with Africa in resources areas. It encourages and supports competent Chinese enterprises to cooperate with African nations in various ways on the basis of the principle of mutual benefit and common development, to develop and exploit rationally their resources, with a view of helping African countries to translate their advantages in resources to competitive strength, and realize sustainable development in their own countries and the continent as a whole.

(7) Tourism cooperation

China will implement the program of Chinese citizens' group tour to some African nations and, grant more African countries, as they wish and as far as feasible, Approved Destination Status for out-bound Chinese tourist groups. China welcomes citizens from African nations for a tour of the country.

(8) Debt reduction and relief

China is ready to continue friendly consultation with some African countries to seek solution to, or reduction of, the debts they owe to China. It will urge the international community, developed countries in particular, to take more substantial action on the issue of debt reduction and relief for African nations.

(9) Economic assistance

In light of its own financial capacity and economic situation, China will do its best to provide and gradually increase assistance to African nations with no political strings attached.

(10) Multilateral cooperation

China is ready to enhance consultation and coordination with Africa within multilateral trade systems and financial institutions and work together to urge the United Nations and other



international organizations to pay more attention to the question of economic development, promote South-South cooperation, push forward the establishment of a just and rational multilateral trade system and make the voices of developing countries heard in the decision-making of international financial affairs. It will step up cooperation with other countries and international organizations to support the development of Africa and help realize Millennium Development Goals in Africa.

### 3. Education, science, culture, health and social aspects

#### (1) Cooperation in human resources development and education

The Chinese Government will give full play to the role of its "African Human Resources Development Foundation" in training African personnel. It will identify priority areas, expand areas of cooperation and provide more input according to the needs of African countries so as to achieve greater results.

Exchange of students between China and Africa will continue. China will increase the number of government scholarships as it sees fit, continue to send teachers to help African countries in Chinese language teaching and carry out educational assistance project to help develop Africa's weak disciplines. It intends to strengthen cooperation in such fields as vocational education and distance learning while encouraging exchanges and cooperation between educational and academic institutions of both sides.

#### (2) Science and technology cooperation

Following the principles of mutual respect, complementarity and sharing benefits, China will promote its cooperation with Africa in the fields of applied research, technological development and transfer, speed up scientific and technological cooperation in the fields of common interest, such as bio-agriculture, solar energy utilization, geological survey, mining and the R&D of new medicines. It will continue its training programs in applied technologies for African countries, carry out demonstration programs of technical assistance, and actively help disseminate and utilize Chinese scientific and technological achievements and advanced technologies applicable in Africa.

#### (3) Cultural exchanges

China will implement agreements of cultural cooperation and relevant implementation plans reached with African countries, maintain regular contacts with their cultural departments and increase exchanges of artists and athletes. It will guide and promote cultural exchanges in diverse forms between people's organizations and institutions in line with bilateral cultural exchange programs and market demand.

(4) Medical and health cooperation

China is ready to enhance medical personnel and information exchanges with Africa. It will continue to send medical teams and provide medicines and medical materials to African countries, and help them establish and improve medical facilities and train medical personnel. China will increase its exchanges and cooperation with African countries in the prevention and treatment of infectious diseases including HIV/AIDS and malaria and other diseases, research and application of traditional medicine and experience concerning mechanism for public health emergencies.

(5) Media cooperation

China wishes to encourage multi-tiered and multi-formed exchanges and cooperation between the media on both sides, so as to enhance mutual understanding and enable objective and balanced media coverage of each other. It will facilitate the communication and contacts between relevant government departments for the purpose of sharing experiences on ways to handle the relations with media both domestic and foreign, and guiding and facilitating media exchanges.

(6) Administrative cooperation

China will carry out exchanges and cooperation with African countries in civil service system building, public administration reform and training of government personnel. The two sides may study the feasibility of setting up a mechanism for personnel and administrative cooperation.

(7) Consular cooperation

China will hold regular/irregular consular consultations with African countries during which the two sides may have amicable discussions on urgent problems or questions of common interest in bilateral or multilateral consular relations in order to improve understanding and expand cooperation. The Chinese side will work with Africa to facilitate personnel flow and ensure the safety of their nationals.

(8) People-to-people exchanges

China will encourage and facilitate the exchanges between people's organizations of China and Africa, especially the youth and women, with a view of increasing the understanding, trust and cooperation of people on both sides. It will encourage and guide Chinese volunteers to serve in African countries.

(9) Environmental cooperation

China will actively promote China-Africa cooperation in climate change, water resources conservation, anti-desertification, bio-diversity and other areas of environmental protection by facilitating technological exchanges.

(10) Disaster reduction, relief and humanitarian assistance

China will actively carry out personnel exchange, training and technological cooperation in the fields of disaster reduction and relief. It will respond quickly to African countries' request for urgent humanitarian aid, encourage and support exchanges and cooperation between the Red Cross Society of China and other NGOs on the one side and their African counterparts on the other side.

4. Peace and security

(1) Military cooperation

China will promote high-level military exchanges between the two sides and actively carry out military-related technological exchanges and cooperation. It will continue to help train African military personnel and support defense and army building of African countries for their own security.

(2) Conflict settlement and peacekeeping operations

China supports the positive efforts by the AU and other African regional organizations and African countries concerned to settle regional conflicts and will provide assistance within our own capacity. It will urge the UN Security Council to pay attention to and help resolve regional conflicts in Africa. It will continue its support to and participation in UN peacekeeping operations in Africa.

(3) Judicial and police cooperation

China is prepared to promote the exchanges and cooperation between Chinese and African judicial and law enforcement departments. The two sides may learn from each other in legal system building and judicial reform so as to be better able to prevent, investigate and crack down on crimes. China will work together with African countries to combat transnational organized crimes and corruption, and intensify cooperation on matters concerning judicial assistance, extradition and repatriation of criminal suspects.

China will cooperate closely with immigration departments of African countries in tackling the problem of illegal migration, improve exchange of immigration control information and set up an unimpeded and efficient channel for intelligence and information exchange.

(4) Non-traditional security areas

In order to enhance the ability of both sides to address non-traditional security threats, it is

necessary to increase intelligence exchange, explore more effective ways and means for closer cooperation in combating terrorism, small arms smuggling, drug trafficking, transnational economic crimes, etc.

#### Part V: Forum on China-Africa Cooperation And Its Follow-up Actions

Launched in 2000, the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation has become an effective mechanism for the collective dialogue and multilateral cooperation between China and Africa and put in place an important framework and platform for a new type of China-Africa partnership featuring long-term stability, equality and mutual benefit.

China attaches importance to the positive role of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation in strengthening political consultation and pragmatic cooperation between China and Africa, and stands ready to work with African countries to conscientiously implement the Beijing Declaration of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, the Program for China-Africa Cooperation in Economic and Social Development and the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation-Addis Ababa Action Plan (2004-2006) and its follow-up action plans. China will work with African countries within the framework of the Forum to explore new ways to enhance mutual political trust, promote the comprehensive development of pragmatic cooperation, further improve the mechanism of the forum, and try to find the best way for furthering cooperation between the Forum and the NEPAD.

#### Part VI: China's Relations with African Regional Organizations

China appreciates the significant role of the AU in safeguarding peace and stability in the region and promoting African solidarity and development. China values its friendly cooperation with the AU in all fields, supports its positive role in regional and international affairs and stands ready to provide the AU assistance to the best of its capacity.

China appreciates and supports the positive role of Africa's sub-regional organizations in promoting political stability, economic development and integration in their own regions and stands ready to enhance its amicable cooperation with those organizations.

- **Document 4: [T4/S-Pres]**

The fourth document is the full text of the speech given by Chinese President Hu Jintao at the National Assembly of Nigeria in 2006.

Document 4: [T4/S-Pres]

**Work Together to Forge A New Type of China-Africa Strategic Partnership**

**President Hu Jintao of the People's Republic of China**

**The National Assembly of Nigeria**

**(27 April 2006)**

The Honorable Ken Nnamani, President of the Senate,

The Honorable Aminu Bello Masari, Speaker of the House of Representatives,

Deputies, Heads of Diplomatic Missions,

Ladies and Gentlemen, Dear friends,

I am delighted to meet you at the National Assembly of Nigeria today. First of all, I would like to convey to you and the great Nigerian people the warm greetings and best wishes of the 1.3 billion Chinese people.

I am visiting Africa to learn more about this great continent. I am here to learn from Africa and carry forward traditional China-Africa friendship. Most importantly, I have come to Africa to work with African countries to increase mutual trust, enhance mutually beneficial cooperation, advance common development, and forge a new type of China-Africa strategic partnership.

This is my first visit to Nigeria. The beautiful land and hospitable people of Nigeria have left me an unforgettable impression. This year marks the 35th anniversary of diplomatic ties between China and Nigeria. Over the years, our two countries have adhered to the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, our two peoples have forged strong ties of friendship, and

our cooperation in all fields has yielded fruitful results. And this naturally leads to the forging of China-Nigeria strategic partnership, which will both benefit our two peoples and help promote China-Africa cooperation and South-South cooperation.

Ladies and Gentlemen, Dear friends,

This year marks the 50th anniversary of the inauguration of diplomatic relations between New China and African countries. Over the past 50 years, China and Africa have increased mutual understanding, supported and helped each other. In their respective national endeavors to promote development and pursue a better life, the Chinese and African peoples have fostered profound friendship, and fruitful progress has been made in China-Africa cooperation.

At the Bandung Conference in 1955, a leader of New China and African leaders for the first time met and shook hands. Fifty years later, at the Meeting in Commemoration of the 50th Anniversary of the Bandung Conference in 2005, China and other Asian and African countries committed themselves to building a new type of Asian-African strategic partnership. China helped Africa to train freedom fighters for national liberation. And African countries supported the restoration of the lawful seat of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations. Braving hardship in the tropical jungles, Chinese and African workers built the great Tazara Railway. China-Africa cooperation in practical terms has expanded in all fields. The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation has been inaugurated, and a new type of China-Africa strategic partnership is being forged. All these milestones of China-Africa friendship will go down in history. The great progress in China-Africa relations over the past 50 years will remain fresh in our minds.

We will always remember the successive Chinese and African leaders and particularly the older generation leaders who contributed so much to promoting China-Africa friendship with their dedicated efforts. We will always remember the indelible contribution made by the Chinese and African peoples to the friendship between China and Africa.

Today, China and Africa are good friends, good partners and good brothers. Our cooperation, covering a wide range of areas including political relations, economy, science, technology, culture, education and health, is deepening. We are gratified and heartened by all this progress.

Ladies and Gentlemen, Dear friends,

The world is undergoing profound and complex changes. Peace, development and cooperation are the calling of the times. Thanks to accelerated economic globalization,

countries are becoming increasingly interdependent and their interests more closely interconnected. Working together to share opportunities, meet challenges and achieve common development is the desire of all peoples.

We are glad to see that in recent years, African countries have made innovative efforts and worked in unity to promote national development and revitalization and made remarkable achievements in promoting peace and development in the region. Africa has made important progress in regional integration under the guidance of the African Union. The African people are more united and confident than ever before. A rapidly developing Africa has drawn the attention of the international community. The Chinese people rejoice at the achievements our African brothers have made and sincerely wish the brotherly African people greater success in your endeavor for national development and revitalization.

Ladies and Gentlemen, Dear friends,

Early this year, the Chinese Government issued the African Policy Paper. The paper expounds on China's goals of carrying forward China-Africa traditional friendship and building a new type of strategic partnership with Africa in a new era and its firm commitment to this goal.

To this end, China will continue to work with Africa and make innovative efforts in keeping with the trend of the times to widen China-Africa cooperation, enrich and inject new vitality into it. Here, I would like to propose the following:

First, strengthen political mutual trust. China firmly shares the desire of the African countries to maintain independence and sovereignty and pursue modes of development that suit their particular national conditions. It supports their efforts to enhance self-development through unity and resolve their problems by themselves. China supports the African Union in playing a leading role in enhancing African unity and cooperation. China will maintain close contact with African countries at the leadership level and promote communication and exchanges between governments, parliaments, political parties and non-governmental organizations of our two sides to enhance mutual understanding and friendship. China is committed to the effective function of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation and will continue to enhance its cooperation with the African Union and other sub-regional organizations and regional multilateral institutions in Africa to strengthen collective dialogue, broaden consensus and expand common interests. We should put China-Africa friendship above everything else, take each other's concern seriously and properly handle new issues arising in China-Africa relations in the new circumstances.

Second, expand win-win economic cooperation. Africa has rich resources and market potentials, whereas China has available effective practices and practical know-how it has gained in the course of modernization. China-Africa cooperation thus has broad prospects. To enlarge the scope of China-Africa cooperation and diversify ways of conducting such cooperation and enable both sides to draw on their comparative strengths is in our mutual interests. China will make continued efforts to extend our cooperation in trade to investment, technology and project contracting, and to encourage companies and other economic entities to join our governments in conducting economic cooperation. Greater attention should be paid to knowledge-based cooperation such as capacity building, human resources training and science and technology exchanges, to promoting value-added processing industry of primary products and upgrading of traditional industries, and to enhancing social development and making life better for local communities. China remains committed to providing assistance to African countries to the best of its ability. Last year, at the High-level Meeting on Financing for Development at the UN summit marking its 60th anniversary, I announced a five-point proposal to assist other developing countries in speeding up development. This includes: Granting zero-tariff treatment for some exports from the least developed countries, increasing aid to the heavily-indebted poor countries and least developed countries and canceling debts contracted by them, providing concessional loans and effective medicine for treating malaria, and training professionals. These steps are mainly designed to help Africa, and China will speed up the implementation of these steps to the benefit of African people.

Third, increase cultural interaction. Both endowed with splendid cultures, China and Africa have made important contribution to the progress of human civilization. We should strengthen cultural exchanges, draw on each other's culture to increase mutual understanding and friendship. China supports enhanced cooperation between cultural institutions, media, academic groups and institutions of higher learning of the two sides and would be happy to host cultural festivals, arts exhibitions and sports events with Africa. China will provide more scholarships for African students to study in China and encourages Chinese youth volunteers to work in Africa. China asks all Chinese citizens and nationals in Africa to live in harmony with the local people, contribute their share to local economic and social development and serve as a bridge for enhancing China-Africa friendship.

Fourth, strengthen security cooperation. Global security concerns the interests of all countries, including China and African countries. In order to create an international environment for common development, China and Africa should strengthen exchanges and



consultation and promote collective security in the international community and a new security concept featuring mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and cooperation. To jointly meet global challenges, China will strengthen consultation and cooperation with Africa in non-traditional security areas such as the prevention and control of major infectious diseases, bird flu and the fight against transnational crimes. China supports the African Union and other regional organizations and countries in Africa in their efforts to promote regional peace and will increase its input and take an active part in the UN-led peacekeeping operations in Africa. China is ready to play a constructive role and help the African countries settle their differences and disputes.

Fifth, maintain close coordination in international affairs. China has always appreciated the important role played by Africa in international affairs. China and Africa share extensive common position and have a good tradition of cooperation on major international issues. To strengthen coordination and cooperation in international affairs meets our mutual interests. China will continue to work with Africa to uphold the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, and strengthen consultation and cooperation in the United Nations and other multilateral organizations. It will continue to take an active part in the building of a New Asia-Africa Strategic Partnership and other mechanisms for South-South Cooperation and North-South Dialogue. China is committed to promoting multilateralism and democracy and rule of law in international relations, establishing a just and equitable new international political and economic order and safeguarding the legitimate rights and interests of developing countries. Africa's aspiration for peace and development deserves respect and sympathy, and the international community should be more focused on Africa's development and increase assistance to Africa. China will continue to work for more progress in UN reform to make the world body place greater emphasis on the issue of development and address as a top priority the under-representation of developing countries, including African countries.

Ladies and Gentlemen, Dear friends,

Tremendous achievements have been made in China's economic and social development since the founding of the People's Republic of China, and especially since the launching of reform and opening-up drive 28 years ago. Historic progress has been made in raising China's social productivity and increasing its overall national strength. The Chinese people, as a whole, are leading a relatively comfortable life. The Chinese people are making concerted efforts to build a society of moderate prosperity in all aspects. A general plan has been

adopted for promoting China's economic and social development in the years to come. The following are our goals. By the year 2010, China's per capita GDP should double that of 2000 and the energy consumption per unit GDP should be 20% lower than that at the end of 2005. By the year 2020, its GDP should quadruple that of 2000 to reach US\$ 4 trillion, averaging US\$ 3,000 per head. By that time, China will have a more developed economy, greater democracy, more advanced science and education, a more developed culture, greater social harmony and higher living standards.

On the other hand, we are keenly aware that China is still a developing country with a large population, weak foundation and uneven development. China will remain in the primary stage of socialism for a long time to come. Though China's total economic output is among the largest in the world, with a 1.3 billion population, it is still behind the 100th place in terms of per capita GDP. China still faces many difficulties and challenges in its development endeavor, and its path to modernization will be a long and arduous one.

In the course of national development, the Chinese people will hold high the banner of peace, development and cooperation, pursue an independent foreign policy of peace and peaceful development and continue the opening-up strategy for mutual benefit and win-win cooperation. We will work with the people of other countries to build a harmonious world of enduring peace and common prosperity.

-- China is committed to safeguarding world peace. China will remain a staunch force for world peace. To China, its own development is an integral part of the progress of mankind. China will develop itself by maintaining a peaceful international environment, and its own development, in turn, enables China to promote world peace. China will work with other countries to enhance global security and stability.

-- China is committed to pursuing common development. China is firm in pursuing the opening-up policy and mutually beneficial cooperation with other countries. China draws on progress in world economic and scientific development to develop itself. With its own development, it in turn makes due contribution to the world. China will continue to work for economic globalization to develop in a more balanced way and bring benefit to all. It will work for more favorable conditions in the international economic, trade and financial mechanisms that will benefit all countries, developing countries in particular, making the 21st century truly a century of development for all.

-- China is committed to promoting exchanges among civilizations. China is firm in upholding the diversity of the world and diversified models of development. We hold that

countries should respect and learn from each other, and different civilizations should coexist in harmony, benefit from each other through exchanges and competition, and seek common development by expanding common ground and shelving differences. In short, history has proved and will continue to prove that China's development is peaceful, open and cooperative in nature. China's development will not pose a threat to anyone. On the contrary, it will bring more development opportunities to the world.

Ladies and Gentlemen, Dear friends,

The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Beijing Summit and the Third Ministerial Conference will be held in Beijing this November. Jointly initiated by China and Africa, the Summit has received warm response and great support from African leaders. The issuance of a joint declaration by Chinese and African leaders at the Summit is now under discussion between them. The declaration will summarize the views and common position of the two sides on major international and African issues and China-Africa relations. A 2007-2009 action plan for the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation will also be adopted at the Summit, which will provide a framework for cooperation between the two sides in the next three years. China will announce important measures to enhance cooperation with Africa at the Summit. We are working hard and maintaining close communication and consultation with African countries to ensure that the Summit will be a meeting of unity and success and yield concrete outcomes.

I sincerely look forward to welcoming President Obasanjo and other African leaders in Beijing at the Summit to celebrate the China-Africa friendship and discuss ways to further our cooperation.

Ladies and Gentlemen, Dear friends,

Africa is one of the birthplaces of mankind, and China is one of the cradles of human civilization. Being the two most ancient civilizations, China and Africa can and should make greater contribution to the development of the human society in the 21st century. We are bound by similar experiences, shared objectives and a common future. Let us seize the opportunity and meet challenges. Let us carry on the traditional friendship, strengthen comprehensive cooperation and endeavor to forge a new type of strategic partnership between China and Africa!

May China and Nigeria enjoy lasting friendship!

May China and Africa enjoy lasting friendship!

Thank you.

- **Document 5: [T5/I-SC]**

The fifth document is the full text of an interview given in 2006 by the then State Councillor Tang Jiaxuan to the Chinese official press agency *Xinhua News Agency*.

Document 5: [T5/I-SC]

**Exclusive Interview Given by State Councillor Tang Jiaxuan to the Xinhua News Agency**

**October 23, 2006**

**I. This year marks the 50th anniversary of the inauguration of diplomatic relations between New China and African countries. How do you view the growth of China's relations with Africa?**

Despite the long distance between China and Africa, their friendly exchanges have a long history. The founding of New China in 1949 ushered in a new era in China-Africa relations. In May 1956, diplomatic relations at the ambassadorial level were established between China and the Arab Republic of Egypt, inaugurating China's diplomatic relations with African countries and marking a new stage of China-Africa relations. Since then, many African countries have established diplomatic relations with China as they gained independence. China now has diplomatic ties with 48 African countries.

Over the past fifty years, the Chinese and African peoples have shared weal and woe, sympathized with and supported each other. China stood firmly with the African people and provided them with moral support and material assistance in their strenuous struggle to overthrow colonial rule and gain national liberation. Since African countries won independence, China has continued to support them in upholding sovereignty, safeguarding independence and promoting economic development. By doing so, China has contributed to Africa's political stability and socio-economic development.

African countries have also offered valuable support to China. Our African friends played an important role in restoring the lawful seat of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations. They gave China strong support in foiling anti-China motions introduced by some

Western countries at the UN Human Rights Commission. The vast majority of African countries adhere to the one China principle and support China's reunification. They have helped China defeat many attempts by Taiwan to "participate in the United Nations" and squeeze its way into the World Health Organisation and other international bodies. They also supported China in its bid to host the 2008 Olympics and the 2010 World Expo.

In recent years, thanks to the joint efforts of the two sides, China-Africa relations have, building on traditional friendship, made new progress, which finds expression in enhanced political relations and closer cooperation in economy, trade, culture, education, and other fields. As this year is of special commemorative significance for the two sides, the Chinese and African leaders have agreed to work together to lift China-Africa relations to a new level. To this end, the Chinese Government issued early this year China's African Policy, calling for a new type of strategic partnership between China and Africa. This has received warm response from the African countries. In April and June this year, President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao visited Africa respectively. On 3-5 November, the two sides will hold the Beijing Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation and its third Ministerial Conference. Several dozen African leaders will meet in Beijing for the Summit and exchange views with Chinese leaders on enhancing future cooperation.

I wish to point out in particular that, despite the profound changes both in the international environment and in China and Africa in the past half century, China-Africa friendship has stood the test of time, gained in strength and is thriving with vigour and vitality. The fundamental reason behind this is that the two sides have always treated each other with sincerity and as equals, and pursued mutual benefit, solidarity, cooperation and common development. This is the valuable asset fifty years of China-Africa friendly relations have left us and it will continue to drive the strong and long-term growth of China-Africa relations.

**II. You mentioned China's African Policy issued by the Chinese Government. What is the basic thrust of China's policy towards Africa?**

China's African Policy is the first policy paper on a continent issued by the Chinese Government. It shows our resolve to enhance China-Africa solidarity and cooperation in the new international environment. The thrust of the paper is the fostering of a new type of China-Africa strategic partnership featuring political equality and mutual trust, economic win-win cooperation and cultural exchanges and enrichment. Specifically, it has three essential elements:

Politically, China and Africa should be strategic partners that trust and support each other.

The two sides should maintain high-level exchanges and dialogue and enhance people-to-people exchanges in diversified forms to boost popular support for China-Africa friendship. They should be guided by the principle of treating each other as equals and of mutual non-interference in internal affairs, and respect each other's independent choice of road of development. In international affairs, the two sides should strengthen coordination and cooperation to jointly promote democracy in international relations and uphold the lawful rights and interests of developing countries.

Economically, China and Africa should be partners of cooperation and should draw on each other's strength to work for mutual benefit. They should work together to enhance South-South cooperation and North-South dialogue and work for economic globalisation to develop in a way that brings balanced, general and win-win benefits to all. They should promote economic cooperation in diversified forms to increase trade volume and improve trade structure. The Chinese Government will implement in good faith the five measures to help other developing countries accelerate their development announced by President Hu Jintao at the High-level Meeting on Financing for Development during last year's UN World Summit. China will continue to encourage and assist Chinese companies to invest in Africa. And we also warmly welcome African companies doing business in China.

Culturally, China and Africa should be partners in advancing human civilisation and building a harmonious world. We should exchange experience on governance and respect cultural diversity. And we should promote tolerance, dialogue and equality among different civilisations so that they will draw on each other's strength and enjoy common prosperity. China and Africa should learn from each other through enhanced cultural exchanges.

**III. What is on the agenda of the Beijing Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation? What new measures will China announce at the Summit to grow its relations with Africa? And what is the significance of this Summit to the growth of China-Africa relations?**

The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) was founded by China and Africa in 2000. It has become an effective mechanism and important platform for enhancing China-Africa collective dialogue and cooperation in practical terms in the new era. The theme of this Summit is "Friendship, Peace, Cooperation and Development". During the Summit, the Chinese and African leaders will review the friendship and cooperation in the past 50 years between the two sides and the progress achieved since FOCAC's establishment six years ago. They will also reaffirm the forging of a new -type of strategic partnership between China and

Africa, map out the future for sustaining bilateral cooperation and exchange views on major regional and international issues.

A key focus of the Summit is to upgrade the mutually beneficial cooperation between China and Africa and inject new vigor into their friendship. During the Summit, China will announce important proposals and initiatives on strengthening its relations with Africa, as well as specific measures to help African countries speed up their development. They are also designed to implement the five measures announced by China to assist other developing countries.

I am convinced that the successful convocation of the Summit will enhance the friendship between the Chinese and African leaders, and promote the comprehensive growth of China-Africa friendship and cooperation in greater depth and width and lift them to a higher level. It will enhance solidarity of developing countries and South-South cooperation and contribute to the glorious cause of global peace and development. The Summit will highlight the in-depth growth of and progress towards maturity in China-Africa relations and become a new landmark in the annals of China-Africa friendship.

**IV. Some people are fanning up the "China threat" in Africa. There are also people in Africa who fear that Chinese commodities would float the African market and cause unemployment. What is your view on this issue? What benefits will China's development bring to Africa?**

China and African countries are all-weather friends, partners of sincere cooperation and good brothers. China wishes Africa well. It is committed to helping Africa and hopes to see Africa grow and become stronger. The economic cooperation and trade between China and Africa are mutually beneficial. China's development has created more development opportunities to Africa. The allegations you referred to are unfounded as far as history is concerned, and they distort the current relations between China and Africa.

First, China's development has created a growing export market for Africa. In recent years, China's foreign trade has increased rapidly, so has its imports from Africa. In 2005, China-Africa trade volume reached US\$ 39.8 billion. It included US\$ 21.1 billion of import from Africa, which exceeded China's export to Africa.

Second, China's development has created more job opportunities for Africa. The Chinese Government encourages established and reputable Chinese companies to make investment in diversified forms in Africa. According to preliminary statistics, China's total investment in Africa has reached US\$ 6.27 billion. China has launched over 800 non-financial investment

projects in 49 African countries, covering trade, manufacturing and processing, resource development, communications, agriculture, etc. China will develop new forms of cooperation, expand the scale of investment, upgrade cooperation and provide quality service to promote common development of both China and Africa.

Third, China has endeavored to provide sincere assistance to Africa. Up to now, over 720 major projects have been completed in 49 African countries with Chinese assistance, and 58 projects have been launched in 26 African countries with preferential loans from China. China has exempted RMB 10.9 billion yuan of debts of 31 heavily indebted poor countries and least developed countries in Africa, and extends zero-tariff treatment to some imports from 28 least developed countries in Africa. China has also trained over 14,600 African personnel in various fields.

It is hardly avoidable that some problems may occur in the process of continuous expansion of China-Africa cooperation. These problems are limited in nature and can be resolved through cooperation and consultation in accordance with the principles of equality and mutual accommodation. China appreciates the concern of some African countries on trade deficit and textiles and is taking measures and working with the African countries concerned to resolve them.

I also wish to point out that China-Africa cooperation is transparent, open and inclusive by nature. It will not affect the cooperation of China or African countries with a third party, nor will it hurt the interests of any third party. Quite on the contrary, strengthened China-Africa cooperation and common development will only bring good opportunities for the rest of the world.

#### **V. What does future hold for China-Africa relations?**

The traditional China-Africa friendship is of great value to both sides. China is the biggest developing country and Africa has the largest number of developing countries. In the new era, the common interests between the two sides are increasing rather than decreasing, and the potential for cooperation is expanding rather than diminishing. Boosting China-Africa friendship and all-round cooperation is a long-term and strategic decision China has made, and it is a natural choice for the two sides in pursuit of common development and prosperity. Strengthened consultation and closer cooperation between the two sides will uphold the legitimate rights and interests of developing countries and advance democracy in international relations. I am convinced that, with concerted efforts of China and Africa, we will surely make greater contribution to the building of a harmonious world of enduring



peace and common prosperity.

- **Document 6: [T6/FOCAC3-Pres]**

The sixth document is the full text of the speech given by Chinese President Hu Jintao at the opening ceremony of the third Ministerial Conference of the FOCAC which was held in Beijing in 2006.

Document 6: [FOCAC3-Pres]

**Address By Hu Jintao President of the People's Republic of China At the Opening  
Ceremony  
of the Beijing Summit of The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation  
Beijing, 4 November 2006**

Your Excellency Prime Minister Meles Zenawi,

Distinguished colleagues and guests,

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Dear Friends,

Our meeting today will go down in history. We, leaders of China and African countries, in a common pursuit of friendship, peace, cooperation and development, are gathered in Beijing today to renew friendship, discuss ways of growing China-Africa relations and promote unity and cooperation among developing countries. On behalf of the Chinese Government and people and in my own name, I wish to extend a very warm welcome to you and deep appreciation to you for attending the Summit. I also want to extend, through the African leaders present today, the cordial greetings and best wishes of the Chinese people to the brotherly African people.

The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation was jointly set up by China and Africa in October 2000, a major initiative taken to promote traditional China-Africa friendship and cooperation. In the six years since then, two ministerial conferences have been held, first in Beijing and

then in Addis Ababa. Today, the Forum serves as an important platform and effective mechanism for conducting collective dialogue, exchanging experience in governance and enhancing mutual trust and cooperation in practical terms between China and African countries.

Dear colleagues and friends,

This year marks the 50th anniversary of the inauguration of diplomatic ties between New China and African countries. Though vast oceans keep China and Africa far apart, the friendship between our peoples has a long history and, having been tested by times, is strong and vigorous. In the long course of history, the Chinese and African peoples, with an unyielding and tenacious spirit, created splendid and distinctive ancient civilisations. In the modern era, our peoples launched unremitting and heroic struggle against subjugation, and have written a glorious chapter in the course of pursuing freedom and liberation, upholding human dignity, and striving for economic development and national rejuvenation. The progress and development of China and Africa are a major contribution to the advancement of human civilisation.

During the past five decades, the Chinese and African peoples have forged close unity, and our friendship has flourished. China-Africa exchanges and cooperation have grown in all fields and yielded fruitful results. In international affairs, China and Africa enjoy trust and cooperate closely to uphold the legitimate rights and interests of the developing world.

In all these years, China has firmly supported Africa in winning liberation and pursuing development. China has trained technical personnel and other professionals in various fields for Africa. It has built the Tanzara Railway and other infrastructural projects and sent medical teams and peacekeepers to Africa. All this testifies to the friendship cherished by the Chinese people towards the African people. We in China will not forget Africa's full support for restoring the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations. Nor will we forget the sincere and ardent wish of African countries and people for China to realise complete and peaceful reunification and achieve the goal of building a modern nation.

Today, China-Africa friendship is deeply rooted in the hearts of our two peoples, and our friendship has endured the test of time and changes in the world. This is because we have never strayed from the principle of enhancing friendship, treating each other as equals, extending mutual support and promoting common development in building our ties.

— Friendship provides a solid foundation for reinforcing China- Africa friendly ties. We both value our traditional friendship and are committed to enhancing it.

— Treating each other as equals is crucial for ensuring mutual trust. We both respect the development path independently embarked upon by the other side. We both are serious in addressing each other's concerns and are eager to benefit from each other's practice in development.

— Mutual support is the driving force behind the ever growing China-Africa cooperation. We both wish to see progress in the development endeavour of the other side and sincerely support such endeavour. And we are engaged in comprehensive cooperation.

— Common development is the shared aspiration of the Chinese and African peoples. We are committed to pursuing mutually beneficial cooperation to bring the benefits of development to our peoples.

Dear colleagues and friends,

The world today is undergoing profound and complex changes. But peace, development and cooperation remain the calling of the times. There is a growing trend towards multipolarity and economic globalization. Science and technology are making daily advance, regional cooperation is deepening and there is increasing interdependence among nations. All this has created rare development opportunities for the international community. On the other hand, imbalance in global development, widening gap between North and South, the combination of traditional and non-traditional security threats as well as increasing factors of instability and uncertainty standing in the way of peace and development all pose a daunting challenge to developing countries in their pursuit of sustainable development.

China is the largest developing country, and Africa is home to the largest number of developing countries. Our combined population accounts for over a third of the world total. Without peace and development in China and Africa, there will be no global peace and development.

In this new era, China and Africa share increasing common interests and have a growing mutual need. The forging of a new type of China-Africa strategic partnership is determined by the dynamics of China-Africa cooperation, and it represents our wish to promote global peace and development. Building strong ties between China and Africa will not only promote development of each side, but also help cement unity and cooperation among developing countries and contribute to establishing a just and equitable new international political and economic order. To enhance this new type of strategic partnership, China will strengthen cooperation with Africa in the following fields:

First, deepen political relation of equality and mutual trust. We will maintain high-level

contacts and mutual visits, establish a regular high-level political dialogue mechanism and conduct strategic dialogue to enhance mutual political trust and traditional friendship and achieve common progress through unity.

Second, broaden win-win economic cooperation. We will give full play to our respective strength, enhance economic and trade ties, broaden areas of cooperation, support cooperation between our business communities, upgrade cooperation in human resources development and explore new ways of cooperation so that both sides will share the benefits of development.

Third, expand exchange for cultural enrichment. We will strengthen cultural and people-to-people exchanges to increase mutual understanding and friendship between our two peoples and particularly between the younger generation. We will enhance exchanges and cooperation in education, science and technology, culture, public health, sports and tourism to provide intellectual motivation and cultural support for China-Africa cooperation.

Fourth, promote balanced and harmonious global development. We will enhance South-South cooperation and promote North-South dialogue. We urge developed countries to honour their promises on market access, aid and debt relief. We should strive to meet the Millennium Development Goals and steer economic globalisation in the direction of creating prosperity for all.

Fifth, strengthen cooperation and mutual support in international affairs. We are committed to upholding the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, respecting diversity of the world and promoting democracy in international relations. We call for enhancing international security cooperation based on mutual trust and benefit and addressing each other's concerns through consultation and coordination so that we can jointly respond to threats and challenges to global security.

Dear colleagues and friends,

China values its friendship with Africa. To strengthen unity and cooperation with Africa is a key principle guiding China's foreign policy. China will continue to support Africa in implementing the New Partnership for Africa's Development and in its effort to strengthen itself through unity, achieve peace and stability and economic revitalisation in the region and raise its international standing.

To forge a new type of China-Africa strategic partnership and strengthen our cooperation in more areas and at a higher level, the Chinese Government will take the following eight steps:

1. Double its 2006 assistance to Africa by 2009.

2. Provide 3 billion U.S. dollars of preferential loans and 2 billion U.S. dollars of preferential buyer's credits to Africa in the next three years.
3. Set up a China-Africa development fund which will reach 5 billion U.S. dollars to encourage Chinese companies to invest in Africa and provide support to them.
4. Build a conference centre for the African Union to support African countries in their efforts to strengthen themselves through unity and support the process of African integration.
5. Cancel debt in the form of all the interest-free government loans that matured at the end of 2005 owed by the heavily indebted poor countries and the least developed countries in Africa that have diplomatic relations with China.
6. Further open up China's market to Africa by increasing from 190 to over 440 the number of export items to China receiving zero-tariff treatment from the least developed countries in Africa having diplomatic ties with China.
7. Establish three to five trade and economic cooperation zones in Africa in the next three years.
8. Over the next three years, train 15,000 African professionals; send 100 senior agricultural experts to Africa; set up 10 special agricultural technology demonstration centres in Africa; build 30 hospitals in Africa and provide RMB 300 million of grant for providing artemisinin and building 30 malaria prevention and treatment centres to fight malaria in Africa; dispatch 300 youth volunteers to Africa; build 100 rural schools in Africa; and increase the number of Chinese government scholarships to African students from the current 2000 per year to 4000 per year by 2009.

Dear colleagues and friends,

Both China and Africa are cradles of human civilisation and lands of great promise. Common destiny and common goals have brought us together. China will remain a close friend, reliable partner and good brother of Africa.

Let's join hands and endeavour to promote development in both China and Africa, improve the well-being of our peoples and build a harmonious world of enduring peace and common prosperity!

Thank you.

- **Document 7: [T7/S-Pres]**

The seventh document is the full text of the speech given by Chinese President Hu Jintao at the University of Pretoria in 2007.

Document 7: [T7/S-Pres]

**Enhance China-Africa Unity and Cooperation To Build a Harmonious World**  
**Speech at University of Pretoria, South Africa**  
**Hu Jintao**  
**President of the People's Republic of China**  
**Pretoria, 7 February 2007**

Dear Professor Pistorius, Vice Chancellor and Principal of the University of Pretoria,

Members of the faculty and students,

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Dear friends,

I am very glad to have this opportunity to come to the prestigious University of Pretoria and talk to you today. First of all, I wish to extend, on behalf of the 1.3 billion Chinese people, cordial greetings to you and best wishes to the brotherly people of both South Africa and Africa. The University of Pretoria will celebrate its 99th birthday in a few days, and I would like to express my warm congratulations to you, Mr. Vice Chancellor, the faculty and students of the University.

South Africa, renowned as the "rainbow nation", has an important place in both Africa and the world. I visited South Africa back in 1999, and I was deeply impressed by its beautiful landscape, the great vitality it enjoyed after breaking the shackles of apartheid and the South African people's dedication to national development. Eight years later, I am now back in South Africa, and I am equally impressed by the great achievements the South African Government and people have made in promoting national reconciliation, economic development and social reform and in enhancing peace and development in Africa. Just as President Mbeki has said, South Africa has entered an "Age of Hope". What you have achieved in South Africa heralds not only the future of this great country, but also the future

of Africa and human progress.

During the South African people's struggle against apartheid, the Chinese people stood firmly with you, and our two peoples forged profound friendship. Since China and South Africa established diplomatic relations about 10 years ago, especially since the forging of the strategic partnership in 2004, China-South Africa relations have registered fast and healthy growth on all fronts, and the friendship and trust between our two peoples have been further enhanced. It has been proved that strong China-South Africa relations of all-round cooperation serve the fundamental interests of both countries and peoples, promote unity and cooperation among developing countries and contribute to global peace and development. The Chinese Government and people will work closely with the South African Government and people to enhance mutual political trust and practical cooperation and steadily strengthen China-South Africa strategic partnership to the benefit of our two peoples.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Dear friends,

Despite the vast distance between them, China and Africa enjoy a long history of friendly exchanges. Over the years, the Chinese and African peoples shared weal and woe and forged a close bond of empathy and friendship. In particular, over the past half a century, we have supported each other in national liberation and maintained sincere cooperation in development and close coordination in international affairs. China-Africa friendship has stood the test of times, and China-Africa cooperation has benefited both sides. We in China take great pride in our friendship with the African people. The Chinese people and the African people have always been and will remain true friends who treat each other as equals and with mutual trust and all sincerity, good partners of mutually beneficial cooperation and close brothers who stand together in times of difficulty. I call on the Chinese people and the African people to carry forward their friendship from generation to generation. And I am sure that the Chinese and African peoples will live in friendship from generation to generation.

With perseverance and dedication, Africa and its people have in recent years endeavored to promote peace and development on the continent and achieved remarkable progress. We applaud the progress made by you, our African brothers and sisters, and we wish you new success in advancing the great cause of national development and revitalization.

The world today is in profound changes. Peace, development and cooperation are the defining features of our times. The growing trend towards multipolarity and economic globalization presents mankind with both rare opportunity of development and severe

challenges. People across the world hope to share opportunities, jointly meet challenges and ensure common development. China is the biggest developing country and Africa is the continent with the largest number of developing countries. Our combined population accounts for over one-third of the world's total. Both China and Africa are important forces for global peace and development. To deepen China-Africa traditional friendship, boost practical cooperation and forge in an all-round way a new China-Africa strategic partnership is the shared desire of our two peoples. It is also the calling of the times. We must sustain the momentum of this trend by maintaining close friendship, treating each other as equals and working closely to promote mutually beneficial cooperation and common development, and thus elevate China-Africa friendship and cooperation to a higher level.

The year 2006, which has just passed, will go down as a milestone in the history of China-Africa relations. It bore witness to the success of the Beijing Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation. At the Beijing Summit, the Chinese and African leaders unanimously agreed to establish and develop a new type of China-Africa strategic partnership featuring political equality and mutual trust, economic win-win cooperation and cultural exchange. They adopted a plan for promoting China-Africa cooperation in the next three years. The Chinese Government announced eight policy steps to enhance practical cooperation with Africa and support Africa's development. They include expanding China's assistance to Africa, canceling the debts of Highly Indebted Poor Countries and Least Developed Countries in Africa, opening China's market to Africa and broadening China-Africa cooperation in the economic and social fields. Closer China-Africa cooperation has focused international attention on peace and development in Africa and raised the standing of Africa in the international community. This further shows that the common development of China and Africa has important and far-reaching significance on promoting the lofty cause of peace and development of mankind.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Dear friends,

To truly help the African people and support Africa's development, the international community must help Africa realize economic and social development. The policy steps taken by the Chinese Government to enhance practical cooperation with Africa and support Africa's development are designed to strengthen Africa's capacity for self-development and improve the welfare of the African people. I am making this eight-nation visit to Africa to consolidate China's traditional friendship with Africa, implement the decisions made at the



Beijing Summit, expand practical cooperation, promote common development and work with Africa to strengthen the new type of China-Africa strategic partnership. To accomplish this goal, China is ready to make joint efforts with Africa in the following key areas.

**Firstly, forge friendship, maintain close political dialogue and coordination and increase mutual understanding and trust.** Both China and Africa cherish their traditional friendship and are dedicated to boosting their relations. This is the inexhaustible source of strength for propelling the growth of China-Africa relations. We should maintain high-level exchanges and visits and step up strategic dialogue on major issues of mutual interest to increase our common understanding. We should strengthen interactions between governments, parliaments, political parties and public groups to consolidate the political foundation of China-Africa friendship. China firmly supports the African countries in upholding independence and sovereignty and pursuing models of development suited to their national conditions. It firmly supports the African Union, other regional organizations and the African countries in their efforts to promote peace and stability. China is ready to play a constructive role in helping Africa resolve its differences and disputes by itself. China will remain actively involved in UN peacekeeping operations in Africa.

**Secondly, deepen cooperation and expand economic and technological exchanges to achieve mutual benefit and win-win progress.** Economic and technological cooperation is an important foundation for growing China-Africa relations. We should expand mutually beneficial cooperation and draw on our comparative strengths. We should also diversify ways of conducting China-Africa cooperation. In addition to trade, we should expand our cooperation to other areas, including investment, technology and project contracting. Priority should be given to agriculture, infrastructure, manufacturing and public welfare projects that are vital to people's livelihood. The Chinese Government will continue to take steps to increase import from Africa to balance the trade between the two sides. We encourage Chinese companies to increase investment in Africa, provide technical and management training and help Africa develop processing and manufacturing industries so as to ease employment pressure and enhance the competitiveness of its exports. China will continue to support the New Partnership for Africa's Development. The Chinese Government will fully implement the policy steps announced at the Beijing Summit for strengthening pragmatic cooperation with Africa and supporting its development to help Africa expedite socioeconomic development, enhance capacity-building and improve people's livelihood, thus bringing real benefit to the African people.

**Thirdly, strengthen dialogue and exchanges between the Chinese and African civilizations and make common progress through mutual learning and enrichment.**

The Chinese and African peoples both created splendid cultures in the long course of history and made important contribution to the progress of human civilization. We should bolster exchanges and interactions between the Chinese and African civilizations at different levels and in diversified forms to enhance mutual understanding and friendship between our peoples. We should strengthen cooperation in education, science, technology, public health, culture, sports and tourism, support closer cooperation between cultural institutions, news media, academic groups and institutions of higher learning, and encourage the holding of cultural festivals, art performances and exhibitions and sports events. In particular, we should enhance cooperation in human resources development and increase popular support for growing China-Africa relations.

**Fourthly, treat each other as equals and strengthen cooperation in international affairs to uphold the legitimate rights and interests of developing countries.**

China and Africa have extensive common ground and a fine tradition of cooperation on major international issues. It serves our shared interests to strengthen coordination in international affairs. We should work together to uphold the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and enhance consultation and coordination at the United Nations and other multilateral institutions. We should urge the international community to enhance the awareness of collective security and develop a new thinking on security featuring mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and coordination so as to foster an enabling international environment for common development. We should jointly meet global challenges and step up consultation and cooperation on non-traditional security issues including major communicable diseases, avian influenza and transnational crimes. We should promote South-South cooperation and North-South dialogue, call on the international community to focus attention on Africa, urge developed countries to deliver their commitments of improving market access, increasing aid and debt relief, and take effective steps to help African peoples resolve their difficulties. China will work to see to it that in carrying out UN reform, more attention is paid to development and that priority is given to addressing the under-representation of developing countries, African countries in particular, in the United Nations.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Dear friends,

China has always taken a keen interest in Africa's development, and the Chinese people have

always been deeply concerned about the welfare of the African people. We fully support Africa's cause of peace and development and sincerely hope to contribute our share to helping the African people build their homeland and improve their lives.

The Chinese are a peace-loving nation. We believe in cooperation and harmony among nations, and we hold that the strong and the rich should not bully the weak and the poor. Six hundred years ago, Zheng He, a famed Chinese navigator of the Ming Dynasty, headed a large convoy which sailed across the ocean and reached the east coast of Africa four times. They brought to the African people a message of peace and goodwill, not swords, guns, plunder or slavery. For more than one hundred years in China's modern history, the Chinese people were subjected to colonial aggression and oppression by foreign powers and went through similar suffering and agony that the majority of African countries endured. From the mid-19th century to the mid-20th century, the Chinese people launched a heroic struggle to fight colonial aggression and foreign oppression, achieve independence and liberation and build a new China of the Chinese people. Having realized this century-long historic mission, the Chinese people today are working as one to make life better for themselves. Because of the sufferings they experienced and the struggle they launched, something they will never forget, the Chinese people are most strongly opposed to colonialism, oppression, and slavery of all manifestations. Because of this, the Chinese people have the most profound sympathy for all other nations in their pursuit of independence, happiness and their aspirations. Since the founding of New China in 1949, the Chinese Government and people have provided the African people with firm political, material and moral support in their heroic struggles for liberation and against colonial rule. China has never imposed its will or unequal practices on other countries and will never do so in the future. It will certainly not do anything harmful to the interests of Africa and its people. China respects the political systems and paths to development independently adopted and pursued by the African people that suit their national conditions. China supports the African countries in strengthening democracy, the rule of law and good governance. And China supports them in fully tapping their potential and actively participating in international cooperation and competition.

In the course of fast growth of China-Africa cooperation, it is natural that new issues and new challenges may arise. Yet, compared with the larger interests of China-Africa cooperation, these issues, which occur in the course of advance, can surely be resolved through friendly consultation and deepened cooperation. China takes seriously the concerns about the imbalance in the structure of China-Africa trade and the scope of Chinese investment. We

have taken and will continue to take effective steps with African countries to address those concerns. I am confident that with our concerted efforts, China-Africa cooperation will continue to enjoy steady progress.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Dear friends,

Since the policy of reform and opening-up was introduced in 1978, the Chinese people have succeeded in embarking on a path of development suited to China's national conditions. They have dedicated themselves to building socialism with Chinese features, greatly boosting productivity and China's national strength and raising their own living standards. Between 1978 and 2006, China's GDP grew to US\$2.6269 trillion from US\$216.5 billion, and its trade jumped to US\$1.7607 trillion from US\$20.6 billion, while the number of the rural poor shrank from 250 million to 21.5 million. China has on the whole brought a moderately prosperous life to its people. On the other hand, we are keenly aware that China is still the world's largest developing country with a huge population, weak foundation and uneven regional development. China ranks behind the 100th place in terms of per capita GDP and faces numerous difficulties and challenges in its development endeavor. It will take many years of dedicated efforts before we can catch up with the medium-level developed countries. Under the guidance of the scientific thinking on development that puts people first and calls for comprehensive, coordinated and sustainable development, we will give top priority to economic development, deepen reform and opening-up, increase people's welfare, work to build a harmonious society, and move steadily towards our development goals.

China's development is peaceful, open, cooperative and harmonious in nature. We aim to build a harmonious society at home and work with other countries to build a harmonious world of enduring peace and common prosperity. China is dedicated to peace, development and cooperation. We will continue to pursue the independent foreign policy of peace, the path of peaceful development and the opening-up strategy for mutual benefit. The Chinese people are ready to work with the African people to build a harmonious world of enduring peace and common prosperity. We should advocate mutual respect among and participation by all countries, promote multilateralism and democracy in international relations and work for equality, democracy and justice in the international community. We should encourage strengthened cooperation and exchanges between countries, urge the international community to implement the Millennium Development Goals and support other developing countries in fully tapping their strengths to speed up their development. We should work for a fair and

just multilateral trading and financial system and we should work to move economic globalization in a direction that benefits all countries. We should encourage dialogue and mutual learning between countries, respect for and preservation of cultural diversity and diversity in development models and harmonious co-existence of different civilizations so that global development will be full of vitality. Furthermore, we should jointly address global security issues through enhanced dialogue and coordination, and resolve disputes through dialogue and negotiation to uphold regional and global security and stability.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Dear friends,

Young people are the future of a country and the hope of a nation. I see so many young faces in the audience today. In my younger days, I was involved in youth affairs in China. I like to talk to young people and benefit from them. Being with you today, I can feel your youthful vigor and this brings me back to the unforgettable years when I was a young man of your age. Being young is enviable and I wish you a great future. The future of South Africa lies with you, and the hope of African renaissance lies with young people in Africa.

The young Chinese and Africans are a dynamic force in advancing China-Africa friendship and in building a harmonious world. Greater interactions and deeper understanding and friendship between them are crucial for forging enduring China-Africa friendship. The Chinese Government sees great value in the exchanges between Chinese and African youths and is committed to strengthening these exchanges. Over 20,000 African students have studied in China on Chinese Government scholarships and their experiences have contributed to greater understanding and friendship between the African and Chinese youths. At the same time, more young Chinese have come to Africa to study or on voluntary service programs. The University of Pretoria alone has over 260 Chinese students. Currently, China provides 2,000 government scholarships for African students each year. The Chinese Government will double the number in the next three years. We also encourage young Chinese volunteers to come to Africa to participate in Africa's development.

Here, I wish to take this opportunity to make an announcement. The Chinese Government will invite 500 African youths, including university students, to visit China in the next three years. I hope some of you here will visit China on this program.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Dear friends,

To renew China-Africa traditional friendship, develop the new type of China-Africa strategic

partnership and build a harmonious world is our shared strategic decision and historical mission. Let's join hands and work tirelessly to realize this common vision.

Thank you.

- **Document 8: [T8/S-Pres]**

The eighth document is the full text of the speech given by Chinese President Hu Jintao at a welcoming rally held in 2009 in Dar es Salaam.

Document 8: [T8/S-Pres]

**Work Together to Write a New Chapter of China-Africa Friendship**  
**Address by H.E. Hu Jintao**  
**President of the People's Republic of China**  
**At the Welcoming Rally Held by People from Various Sectors In Dar es Salaam**

**16 February 2009**

Your Excellency President Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete,

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Dear Friends,

Today, I am delighted to have this opportunity to meet with you, friends from various sectors in Dar es Salaam during my visit to this beautiful country of Tanzania. Let me begin by conveying to our friends present here and to the brotherly Tanzanian people the warm greetings and best wishes of the 1.3 billion Chinese people. I also wish to thank President Kikwete and the Tanzanian Government for the thoughtful arrangements and warm hospitality.

Tanzania is one of the cradles of mankind. The Tanzanian people have a glorious tradition and have made important contributions to the victory of the African people in gaining national independence and fighting against apartheid. In recent years, under the leadership of President Kikwete, Tanzania has worked hard with “New Zeal, New Vigor, and New Speed” to grow its economy, improve the well-being of the people, maintain political stability, make

continued progress in development, and play an important role in African and international affairs. It is renowned as the “oasis of peace” in Africa. We rejoice at the achievements of Tanzania and we sincerely wish the brotherly Tanzanian people new and even greater success in the future.

As an old Chinese saying goes, “Nothing can separate people with common goals and ideals not even mountains and seas.” In spite of the long distance between us, leaders and people of our two countries have engaged in friendly exchanges since the 1960s and forged a profound friendship during Africa’s struggle for national liberation. Over the past 45 years since the establishment of diplomatic ties, both sides have attached great importance to the growth of our relations. China and Tanzania have had close high-level contacts, enhanced political mutual trust and expanded practical cooperation in a wide range of areas. Our relationship has become a model for China-Africa cooperation and South-South cooperation. Yesterday President Kikwete and I had an in-depth exchange of views and reached broad agreement on how to further our bilateral relations. We signed agreements on economic and technological cooperation. I had the pleasure to attend the completion ceremony of the Tanzania National Main Stadium. This large multi-functional sports facility, which was built with assistance of the Chinese Government, will become a new landmark of friendship between our two countries.

Yesterday, I went to the Chinese Experts Cemetery in Majohe Village to pay my respects to the 69 Chinese experts and technicians who were laid to rest there. They gave their lives to the development of Tanzania and, in particular, to the construction of the Tanzania-Zambia Railway. The youngest among them was only 22 years old. The Chinese Government and people will always cherish their memory and will never forget their contribution to our friendship with Tanzania.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Dear Friends,

This is the sixth time for me to set foot on the land of Africa. Every time I come, it’s like coming back home. And every time I talk to our African friends and listen to your views on China, China-Africa relations and world affairs, I get new inspirations and food for thought.

In the 1950s and 1960s, people of China and Africa fought shoulder-to-shoulder against the colonial rule in order to achieve national liberation on the African continent. This was followed by our cooperation in various forms on the basis of equality and mutual benefit. Now in this new century, we are working together to attain the Millennium Development

Goals (MDGs) and bring about development and rejuvenation of China and Africa. China-Africa friendship has travelled a glorious path in the past half century and more. Similar historical experiences and shared goals have tied our destinies together and enabled our relationship to withstand the test of time and changes in the international situation. I wish to reiterate here that the Chinese people have always cherished our traditional friendship with Africa and we will continue to do so in the future. We will always view African people as our all-weather friends whom we can fully trust and count on. We will forever remain good brothers and good partners of the African people.

At the Beijing Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation in 2006, leaders of China and African countries agreed to develop a new type of strategic partnership featuring political equality and mutual trust, economic win-win cooperation and cultural exchanges. It marked a new page in the annals of China-Africa relations. In the past two years and more, thanks to our joint efforts, China and Africa have further increased political exchanges and enhanced strategic mutual trust. We have given each other understanding and support on major issues of our respective concern. Our cooperation in the economic, trade and other fields continues to deepen. A large number of important cooperation projects have been launched or completed. For the very first time, our two-way trade exceeded 100 billion US dollars last year. Our cultural and people-to-people exchanges are flourishing, as we have increasingly frequent cultural, educational, youth, tourist and non-governmental interactions.

At the Beijing Summit, I announced on behalf of the Chinese Government eight policy measures to strengthen practical cooperation with Africa and support African countries development. It is heartening to see that the implementation of these measures is well under way. China has substantially increased its assistance to Africa, exempted tariffs on some African exports to China and basically completed the debt cancellation plan. The China-Africa Development Fund is up and running. China has begun the construction of the conference center for the African Union (AU), and has made good progress in building hospitals, malaria prevention and treatment centers, agricultural technology demonstration centers and rural schools in Africa. Youth volunteers and senior agricultural experts from China have arrived and started their work in Africa. Progress in all these areas has brought tangible benefits to the people of Africa and offered an even brighter prospect for China-Africa cooperation.

The year 2008 was an eventful and momentous year for China. We will not forget that immediately after the massive earthquake in Wenchuan, Sichuan Province, our African



friends expressed sympathy to the Chinese Government and people, and many African countries gave generous assistance to our relief efforts in spite of their own difficulties. Your support strengthened the courage and confidence of the Chinese people to prevail over the natural disaster. We will not forget that the successful torch relay in the run-up to the Beijing Olympic Games in this very city, the famed “House of Peace”, promoted the noble and pure Olympic spirit. We will not forget that African friends have consistently given us firm support on Taiwan and Tibet-related issues as well as other major issues concerning China’s sovereignty and core interests. All these are vivid examples which show that the Chinese and African people are true friends who have weathered storms together and shared weal and woe. Here, on behalf of the Chinese Government and people, I wish to express once again our heartfelt thanks to the brotherly African people.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Dear Friends,

The world is undergoing major changes and adjustments. There is a growing trend toward a multi-polar world, and economic globalization continues to gather momentum. The pursuit of peace, development and cooperation has become the call of our times. The international situation is generally stable. On the other hand, however, destabilizing factors and uncertainties are clearly on the rise in international political and economic landscape. The international financial crisis triggered by the sub-prime mortgage crisis is worsening. It has rapidly spread from some parts of the world to the entire globe, from developed countries to emerging markets and developing countries, and from the financial sector to the real economy. It has grown into a severe and widespread international financial crisis rarely seen in history. The impact of the crisis on economies around the world is still deepening and its grave consequences will be felt more acutely in the days to come. It has put developing countries in a particularly disadvantaged position. Many African friends are concerned that in the face of the daunting challenge of the financial crisis, their international development partners may scale back aid, debt relief and investment in Africa. At the G20 Summit on Financial Markets and the World Economy held in Washington last November, I appealed on behalf of the Chinese Government to the international community to pay greater attention to the damage of the crisis on developing countries, especially the least developed ones, and do all it can to minimize the damage. The international community, developed countries in particular, should assume due responsibilities and obligations, continue to deliver on their aid and debt relief commitments, maintain and increase assistance to developing countries and

effectively help them maintain financial stability and economic growth. They should take concrete steps to help developing countries, especially those in Africa, overcome difficulties and improve the external environment necessary for the development of these countries.

Both China and African countries belong to the developing world. We see each other as important strategic partners. China fully appreciates the wishes and aspirations of African countries and supports Africa's efforts to secure peace and stability and meet the MDGs at an early date. During times of adversity, it is all the more important for China and Africa to support each other, work in concert and tide over the difficulties together. Let us work together and focus our efforts on the following key areas:

First, strengthen solidarity and mutual assistance to jointly meet the challenge of the international financial crisis. We know full well the difficulties we face at home; we are also keenly aware of the difficulties faced by our African friends. On behalf of the Chinese Government, I would like to solemnly undertake that we will earnestly follow through on the various measures announced at the Beijing Summit. We will continue to increase assistance to Africa and cut debts owed by African countries as our ability permits. We will expand trade and investment and strengthen practical cooperation with Africa. We are also willing to increase exchanges and cooperation with African countries to jointly fend off financial risks.

Second, enhance mutual trust and cement the political foundation for traditional friendship. China is ready to have closer high-level exchanges with African countries and strengthen strategic dialogue and consultations with you by taking full advantage of the various consultation mechanisms at different levels so as to enhance mutual understanding and trust between us. China firmly supports the efforts of African countries, the AU and other regional organizations to safeguard state sovereignty and independently resolve African issues. We will continue to be actively involved in UN peacekeeping operations in Africa and play a constructive role in addressing conflicts and hot-spot issues and maintaining peace and security on this continent.

Third, raise the level of practical economic cooperation and trade on the basis of reciprocity and mutual benefit. China will continue to promote trade with Africa, accommodate Africa's concerns as best as it can, and adopt preferential measures to increase imports from Africa. The Chinese Government encourages and supports the efforts of more and more established Chinese companies to invest in Africa, create more jobs for the local people and transfer more technologies to their African partners. We also encourage Chinese companies in Africa to shoulder more social responsibilities and forge amicable relations with the local

communities. As for problems that may arise from our cooperation, we want to properly resolve them through consultations with our African friends on an equal footing so as to maintain the larger interests of our friendly cooperation.

Fourth, expand people-to-people exchanges and deepen cultural cooperation. The purpose of growing China-Africa relations is to serve the Chinese and African people and fruits of our cooperation should be shared by all our people. We are ready to increase exchanges with African countries in culture, education, health, sports, tourism and other fields. We want to forge closer links among young people, women, non-governmental groups, media organizations and academic institutions of the two sides, and enhance human resources cooperation. In this way, the China-Africa friendship will take a deep root in the hearts of the people.

Fifth, work closely together and strengthen coordination in international affairs. We will intensify cooperation with African countries in the United Nations, the World Trade Organization and other multilateral institutions and jointly meet such global challenges as climate change, food security, poverty alleviation and development. We also wish to take part in the formulation of international economic, financial and trade rules and build a more equitable and reasonable international economic order together with African countries. China appreciates Africa's desire to increase its representation and say in reforming the international financial system and supports AU's participation in the G20 financial summit.

Sixth, enhance coordination and jointly promote the further development of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation. We are ready to strengthen institutional building of the Forum and bring into full play its role of giving political guidance to the overall China-Africa relations. We will continue to have full coordination with African countries to comprehensively implement all follow-up actions of the Beijing Summit. We will work with African countries to make good preparations for the Fourth Ministerial Conference to be held in Egypt in the fourth quarter this year and ensure its success.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Dear Friends,

The year 2008 marked the 30th anniversary of China's reform and opening up program. Over the past thirty years, China has successfully realized the historic transformation from a highly centralized planned economy to a vibrant socialist market economy, and from a closed or semi closed society to one that fully embraces the world. China has achieved sustained and rapid economic growth, marked progress in social development programs and moderate

prosperity for its people as a whole. China is a big developing country with a population of 1.3 billion. What it has achieved in the reform and opening up endeavor is in itself a significant contribution to world peace and development. We are keenly aware, however, that China remains the biggest developing country in the world. A huge population, weak economic foundation and uneven development are the basic features of the country. The problems and difficulties that we encounter in the course of development are rarely seen elsewhere in terms of their scale and complexity. To build a well-off society in an all-round way and at a higher level that benefits the over one billion population, to basically achieve modernization of the country and to ensure common prosperity for all the Chinese people, we still have a very long way to go and we still need to make persistent and unyielding efforts.

Since last year, due to the impact of the international financial crisis and the notable slow-down of the world economy, China has encountered more difficulties in economic development. In the face of the situation, we strengthened macroeconomic regulation and swiftly adjusted our policies. Our primary task now is to maintain steady and relatively fast economic growth and to this end, we have rolled out an array of policy measures to boost domestic demand and promote economic growth. This will not only lend a strong impetus to China's economic development but also stimulate world economic growth. We will continue to take effective measures to ensure steady and relatively fast growth of our own economy and play a constructive role in promoting stability and development of the world economy.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Dear Friends,

Today, I see many young faces here. Earlier in my career, I was engaged in youth affairs for many years and I always feel a special bond with the young people. Both President Kikwete and I highly value the youth exchanges and cooperation between China and Tanzania and between China and Africa as a whole. The China-Africa friendship that we enjoy today is the result of concerted efforts of people of several generations from both sides. The future of this friendship will be in the hands of our young people. People of the younger generation embody not only the hope of greater development of China and Africa, but also the promise of even stronger friendship between the two sides in the future.

The past few years have seen closer youth exchanges between China and Africa. More and more African young people are eager to learn about China and go to China. Over 20,000 young people from Africa have so far studied in China on Chinese government scholarships. Many of them have become pillars in the development of African countries. Many young

Chinese have also come to Africa. Working in local communities day in and day out, they have gone through thick and thin together with the people there and contributed their share to economic and social progress in Africa. They have become young ambassadors for China Africa friendship. During my visit to Africa in 2007, I invited 500 young people from Africa to visit China. Their visits helped enhance mutual understanding and friendship between the young people in China and Africa, including those in Tanzania. Today, I am pleased to announce that the Chinese Government has decided to invite 50 students from Tanzania to visit China within this year and have exchanges with their Chinese counterparts. We will continue to work with African countries to vigorously promote and support exchanges and cooperation between our young people. The younger generation will surely excel the older one. I am convinced that the China-Africa friendship and cooperation will be passed on to the younger generation and through their hands to future generations and will grow from strength to strength.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Dear Friends,

To strengthen friendship and cooperation between China and Africa is a noble mission that history has entrusted to us. Let us join hands to build on our past achievements, work tirelessly to advance the new type of China-Africa strategic partnership and write a new chapter in the annals of China-Africa friendship!

Thank you.

- **Document 9: [T9/I-Amb]**

The ninth document is the full text of an interview given in 2009 by the then Ambassador to Tanzania Mr Liu Xinsheng to the Tanzanian national newspaper *Daily News*.

Document 9: [T9/I-Amb]

**Interview with Chinese Ambassador to Tanzania Liu Xinsheng by Gabby Mgaya of  
Daily News  
(2009-9-29)**

**Q1.** The reasons and ideals behind the revolution of 1949.

**A:** Thanks for the congratulations and the interview. The so-called Chinese revolution of 1949 is a sequence of revolutions breaking out in China since the first decade of last century. From 1840 onwards, China, a prosperous nation with glorious ancient civilization, had gradually declined to an impoverished semi-colonial, semi-feudal country, being bullied by the western powers. The ordinary Chinese people had ever since led a bitter life because of the combination of exploitation by the foreign powers and the ruling class who cared nothing but the selfish interest of their own. Domestic trouble and foreign invasion is the reason leading to the revolutions in the recent history of China.

The bourgeois initiated the revolution against feudalism and foreign invasion, their original ideal was to build an independent capitalist country to the benefit of the people. They, however, betrayed their original ideals and the people. That led to the birth of Chinese Communist Party, who sought to make the Chinese people master of their own country and their own fate and national rejuvenation.

**Q2.** The Secret behind the great success.

**A:** The secret behind China's economic success is, first, China has embarked on a path of development that suits its national conditions; second, China has adopted policy of reform and opening up since late 1970s. Since you mentioned China is also a technology powerhouse, I would like to add one more point, that, China has also emphasized self-reliance in its effort to modernize its economy, especially in the field of technology. God helps those who help themselves.

**Q3.** The significant achievements of opening-up policy.

**A:** China has adopted the opening-up policy since the late 1970s. That is a path towards historical changes and unprecedented achievements, especially in term of social and economic development. With an average annual growth rate of 9.7%, China's GDP has increased by 16 times in the past 30 years, jumping from 15<sup>th</sup> to the 3<sup>rd</sup> place in the world. China's imports and exports have seen a 100-time increase during the same period, raising China from the 32<sup>nd</sup> to the 3<sup>rd</sup> largest trading nation. The Chinese people, once lacking basic living necessities, are now enjoying initial prosperity. China's per capital GDP has grown by nearly 10 times, from US\$226 to US\$2,100. The poor rural population has dropped from over 250 million to about 10 million. China has successfully met the basic needs of its population, which accounts for 23% of the world total.

**Q4.** Finer details of China's foreign policy.

**A:** Over thirty years of reform and opening-up, China's relations with the world have undergone historic changes, its independent foreign policy of peace enables it to play a constructive role in world affairs. China always advocates for peace, development and cooperation. The fundamental goals of this policy are to preserve China's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, create a favorable international environment for China's reform and opening up and modernization construction, maintain world peace and propel common development. The main content of this policy includes:

1. We are committed to following the path of peaceful development. We seek peaceful settlement of international disputes and hotspot issues and greater international and regional security cooperation.
2. We are committed to pursuing a win-win strategy of opening-up. We will work to broaden converging interests with other countries and, while pursuing our own development, we will accommodate the legitimate concerns of others, especially those of developing countries.
3. We are committed to building a harmonious world. We hold that all countries should uphold the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, abide by international law and universally recognized norms governing international relations, and embrace a spirit of democracy, harmony, collaboration and win-win progress in international relations.
4. We are committed to developing friendly relations and cooperation with all countries on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. We will, as always, enhance solidarity and cooperation with other developing countries and deepen our traditional

friendship with them.

**Q5.** Your assessment of the policy of strategic partnership with foreign partner states.

**A:** Currently, the international situation is undergoing major changes and adjustments. The ever deepening globalization has brought both rare opportunities to mankind and extensive challenges to the international community. New uncertainties have emerged in regional hotspot issues, impacting the evolution of international security situation. Global issues such as climate change, energy security, environmental degradation, worsening poverty, spread of communicable disease and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are becoming increasingly acute.

All this shows that our world is becoming smaller and smaller and countries and peoples are getting closer to one another. As countries are more than ever interdependent with their interests closely interconnected, no one can expect to achieve true development and prosperity in isolation, or secure durable peace and stability on one's own. These are the main reason leading to China's strategic partnership with foreign states or state groups, including the strategic partnership between China and Africa featuring "political equality and mutual trust, economic win-win cooperation and cultural exchanges". These partnerships may be insufficient, but are necessary for us to confront challenges together and pursue mutual benefit and win-win progress.

**Q6.** How can China help its African partners step up their export levels?

In recent years, the trade relation between China and Africa has developed rapidly. In 2008, China-Africa trade volume stood at \$106.8 billion with a year-on-year increase of over 30 % from 2000.

In 2008, China exported \$50.84 billion to Africa with a year-on-year increase of 36.3% while Africa exported \$56 billion to China, an increase of 54%. Actually, due to the accelerated pace of China's imports from Africa, pattern of bilateral trade between China and Africa has changed from surplus of \$0.94 billion in 2007 to deficit of \$5.16 billion in 2008.

The significant change of more African exports than Chinese exports is obviously resulted from the Chinese government's different steps and policies to address the previous imbalance issue through according zero-tariff treatment, promoting Chinese investment in Africa countries, providing economic and technical co-operation and supplying technical training courses.

All of these policies are designed to enhance the competitiveness of African products and assist Africa develop processing and manufacturing industries so as to promote Africa's



exports to China. I think with the joint efforts, more and more competitive ‘made in Africa’ products will be introduced and enjoyed by Chinese people.

**Q7:** Tanzania and China have been great friends since 1964 when the two countries established diplomatic relations. Tanzania is very thankful of Chinese assistance over the years. Major projects include the Tanzania- Zambia Railway Line, the Friendship Textile Mill and assistance in the agricultural, health and education sectors. What are your future plans and strategies to maintain the Sino-Tanzania ties?

**A:** China and Tanzania have been good friends for over 40 years. I’m quite satisfied and pleasant to see the healthy and steady development of the relation between two countries. China, according to its own strength and capability, made a lot of contributions to Tanzania’s social and economic development over years, especially in the sectors of infrastructure, agriculture, health and education. The medical team of China arrived in this country shortly after the diplomatic relation was established. They healed thousands of people here and provided them a large amount of medicine which was desperately wanted. Tanzania-Zambia Railway and the Friendship Textile Mill are also landmarks of Sino-Tanzania friendship. China’s policy and strategy to Tanzania haven’t changed today and China is going to create more and more such landmarks.

In the Beijing Summit FOCAC, eight measures on aid to Africa were proposed by Chinese side, including increasing the aid provided to Africa by doubling China’s 2006 assistance by 2009 and strengthening cooperation in areas such as human resource development, agriculture, medical care, social development and education. As to Tanzania, we are assisting in the construction of tree rural primary school, a cardiac surgery and treatment centre, a Malaria-prevention and Treatment Centre and an agricultural technology demonstration centre. Three technical cooperation projects including Tanzania-Zambia Railway, Chalinze Water Supply and National Stadium are going well. China has dispatched tree senior agricultural experts to the Ministry of Agriculture of Tanzania to provide support in the area of policy consultation, irrigation and agronomy. China will also dispatch some youth volunteers to Tanzanian by the end of this year to work in some colleges and schools where they will be able to provide their professional knowledge and increase the mutual understanding between two peoples. And China is also planning to help Tanzania build a national conference centre in the next one or two years.

I believe the friendly ties between two countries will get more and more steady in future.

**Q8.** You have the largest population in the world; and yet you manage to feed your people.

You have got ambitious agricultural production plans. In the wake of the global food crisis, China can export its food production technologies to the outside world, especially Africa. What are your comments on this?

**A:** As we know, there are more than 1.3 billion people in China, feeding Chinese people is one of the most persistent challenge faced by Chinese Government. After years of effort the issue has already been solved. Nowadays China not only provides enough foods to Chinese, but also exports agricultural products to the rest of world as the world's fourth largest trading nation. The Chinese government is willing to share China's successful experience with African countries.

To forge a new type of China-Africa strategic partnership and strengthen our cooperation in the field of agriculture within the framework of the FAO Special Program for Food Security, the Chinese government decided to dispatch senior agricultural experts to Africa and set up 10 special agricultural technology demonstration centers in Africa from 2007 to 2009 during the Beijing Summit of The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation.

At present, more than 100 experts have already been dispatched to 35 African countries to help their governments formulate agricultural development plans, improve seed strains, pass on applicable agricultural technologies and managerial expertise, and train local technicians. Besides, smooth progress has been made in feasibility studies and designing for demonstration centers of agricultural technology in 10 African countries.

In addition, to meet Africa's needs, China is, since the Beijing Summit, conducting workshops for 49 African countries to train 10,000 African professionals in agriculture, business, education, health, science, technology and etc. by the end of 2009.

**Q9.** Your views on Chinese assistance in the exploitation of Africa's resources.

**A:** Resources cooperation between China and Tanzania will help Tanzania to realize sustainable development, China will facilitate information sharing and cooperation with Tanzania in resources development.

Despite their remarkable economic growth in recent years, Tanzania is still vulnerable in its economy as the majority of their exports are unprocessed raw materials, China will translate Tanzania's advantages in resources to competitive strength, and to realize sustainable development in Tanzania.

The Chinese government encourages and supports competent Chinese enterprises to cooperate with Tanzania in developing and exploiting rationally their resources. While the Chinese enterprises are involved in resources exploitation in Tanzania, they contribute to the

continent's development at the same time. The investment has brought real benefits to people in Tanzania and the continent as a whole. China's cooperation with Tanzania is based on boosting sustainable development in Tanzania.

**Q10:** Plans to enhance exchange programmes in sports, health, culture and education.

**A:** Just as you said, the two countries need to learn from each other. As for the exchange programmes, I can say, what we have done in the past years is very successful and we are going to take further steps to enhance such programmes:

1. In sports, we shall send youth volunteers to teach P.E. and invite some groups to learn Martial Arts in China.
2. In health, we will continue to send medical teams to Tanzania to help improve the medical conditions here, to build some hospitals and to provide aid to prevent and treat malaria.
3. In culture, with a view to further promoting the friendly relations, we will send more cultural delegations and arts troupes to Tanzania and invite more Tanzania cultural delegations and arts group to China; we will have a lot of exchange programmes, including the exchanges of art exhibition, exchanges and cooperation between artists, scholars, writers, and experts of the two countries.
4. In education, the Chinese government shall not only offer 100 scholarships to Tanzania each year during the following three years, but also provide a lot of chances for short-term training in China in various areas. This year 68 Tanzania students have got the scholarship to study in China. Meanwhile, we will help to build some schools in the rural areas.

- **Document 10: [T10/I-Amb]**

The last document is the full text of an interview given in 2010 by the then Ambassador to Nigerian Mr Deng Boqing to the Nigerian national newspaper *Leadership Newspaper*.

Document 10: [T10/I-Amb]

**Ambassador Deng Boqing gave an interview to Leadership Newspaper  
(2010-12-04)**

Recently, the Chinese Ambassador to Nigeria, H.E. Mr. Deng Boqing, gave an interview to Leadership Newspaper. Below is the full content of the interview:

**1. On arriving to Nigeria to take up the post, what is your impression and understanding of your job's challenge?**

Nigeria is an important and big developing country. The Nigerian people are wise and intelligent. Although arrived in Nigeria not long ago, I have truly felt the friendship and sincerity of Nigerian people towards Chinese people, and enjoyed the support of the Nigerian government, the understanding and help from many Nigerian friends, all of which are so impressive.

With the largest population in Africa, Nigeria has a huge domestic market and is rich in natural resources, which give Nigeria enormous potentials. It is good to see that Nigerian people have made great efforts to achieve social stability and economic development. I am fully confident of the great future of Nigeria.

I feel honored to have the opportunity to work in this beautiful country, at the same time I am aware of great responsibility on me for promoting the cordial bilateral relations between China and Nigeria.

**2. Nigeria and China currently enjoy robust bilateral relations, courtesy of your predecessors. What areas of the relationship do you envisage the greatest challenge?**

Well, I quite agree with your comments on Sino-Nigeria relations. Thanks to the great efforts made by both of Chinese and Nigerian governments and the peoples as well as my hard-working predecessors, the cordial bilateral relations have been undergoing rapid, comprehensive and stable growth in recent years. The strategic partnership has been further

strengthened, with mutual political trust particularly deepened, cooperation in international affairs continuously enhanced, and exchanges in culture, education and sports fields more and more frequent. Cooperation in the fields of infrastructure, agriculture, communications and energy has been continuously pushed forward. The bilateral trade volume, investment and number of cooperation programs have been drastically on the rise. For instance, the annual bilateral trade volume has increased from US \$0.86 billion in 2000 to US \$6.37 billion in 2009, up 744%, and will hopefully hit the record of US \$7.5 billion at the end of year 2010. The accumulated Chinese actual investment in Nigeria reached US \$4.14 billion in December 2006 and jumped to US \$7.55 billion in June 2010, up 82%.

During my tenure, I would try all my efforts to maintain the sound momentum of such dynamic cooperative relations and eventually enhance the strategic partnership between China and Nigeria. I wish that with the support of Nigerian friends in all circles, the exchanges and mutual understanding would be continually promoted, win-win economic cooperation would be broadened and the cooperation achievements would be ensured to benefit our two peoples.

**3. China's intention and involvement in Africa is still a matter of curiosity, because some section of the media, especially those influenced by the west still believe that China is in Africa to satisfy its natural resource appetite.**

There has long been the argument that China is plundering Africa's resources. Obviously, it is a bias against the mutual beneficial cooperation between China and Africa. Anyone who is familiar with the history would know that the friendly relations and cooperation between China and Africa did not start just yesterday, but as early as half a century ago. In those years, China firmly supported many African countries in achieving national independence, assisted the African people in building a large number of infrastructure projects including the TAZARA railway and sent over 10,000 doctors to Africa. But China did not take away a single drop of oil or a single ton of mineral ores from Africa within the same period.

In recent years, China has increased its aids to African countries without any political strings. It is particularly noteworthy that in spite of the global financial crisis, which has led to a downturn in the world economy and reduction in development aid to Africa, the Chinese government has continued to honour its commitments to increasing aids and investment to Africa under the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation.

On the other hand, China firmly sticks to the principle of mutual benefit, win-win progress, equality and self-willingness in promoting the economic and trade cooperation with Africa.

Essentially speaking, the economies of China and Africa are highly complementary to each other, as China enjoys sound processing capacity while Africa is rich in natural resources.

As to the exploitation of African resources, the Chinese enterprises' taking part in the activities on the African continent has been welcomed by the African people, as it enabled them to have had more favorable options from the international competition, and improved the local productive capacity. In terms of energy cooperation, China is not the largest importer of energy from Africa but a smaller one, comparing with USA and Europe. Taking Nigeria's crude oil export as an example. In the year 2009, 40% of Nigeria's oil was exported to the US and 25% to Europe, however China's percentage is not more than 1% of the total.

At last, I would like to emphasize that the economic and trade relations that Africa has with China are based on mutual benefit, which are essentially different from what it had with the western countries during the colonial period.

**4. China's actual investment in Nigeria has reached 7 billion US dollars, what do you hope to add up during your tenure?**

The economic interaction between China and Nigeria is rich in content and mutual investment is one of the key important cooperation. It is true that in recent years China's investment in Nigeria is increasing, and it covers a vast variety of fields, such as the exploitation of oil and gas resources, infrastructure construction, agriculture, trade, power and communications, etc., which has created many local job opportunities and improved the local productive capacity. The number of local employees of Chinese enterprises in Nigeria, such as CCECC, WEMPCO, the Lee Group etc., have all surpassed 10,000. It is particularly noteworthy that the Chinese enterprises have set up two Economic and Trade Cooperation Zones jointly with local governments. It is estimated that the Lekki Free Trade Zone, one of the two zones, is supposed to attract investment of 5 billion US dollars in the future.

The Chinese government will, as always, take more favorable measures to encourage the Chinese companies to invest in Nigeria. Meanwhile, I have two suggestions to attract more Chinese companies' investment in Nigeria. Firstly, both governments shall cooperate and set up a platform for enterprises to meet regularly and seek cooperation opportunities. Secondly, both sides shall provide more incentives as well as preferential policies for enterprises. I am convinced that the Chinese investment volume will keep on rise in the coming years with the joint efforts by both sides.

**5. Nigeria is now at very important point in her political life as election is scheduled in April of next year to inaugurate a new administration. What is your impression of**

**activities leading up to this great event?**

I noticed that recently the Nigerian people are enthusiastic about making preparation for the general election, which is scheduled to be held in April next year. I am convinced that through a free and fair election, the Nigerian people will definitely elect their right leadership and new administration, which will lead them forward to achieve the social and economic development and promote their well-being.

**6. Forum on China-Africa Cooperation has just clocked ten years, since it was inaugurated in Beijing in 2000. What in your view are challenges and prospects of FOCAC in the years ahead?**

The founding of FOCAC was an important event in the history of Sino-African cordial relationship. As a creative move of developing countries to reinforce their solidarity and cooperation and join hands to cope with challenges under new circumstances, the establishment of FOCAC draws wide attention from the international community. Since the establishment of FOCAC, China-Africa relations have entered into a new phase of rapid, comprehensive and stable growth.

The world today is undergoing profound and complex changes. Imbalance in global development, widening gap between the North and the South, the combination of traditional and non-traditional security threats as well as increasing factors of instability and uncertainty stand in the way of global peace and development. All these pose a daunting challenge to China and African nations in their pursuit of sustainable development. In order to deal with the challenges, both China and Africa have agreed to strengthen the cooperation under FOCAC to realize common development.

Reviewing the past, we are glad to see that FOCAC, with the high attention and joint efforts of both sides, has become an important platform of collective dialogue and effective mechanism of pragmatic cooperation between China and Africa, and achieved major progress of lifting up China-Africa relations, increasing political mutual trust, boosting pragmatic cooperation and promoting the democratization of international relations. Taking the trade area as example, in the year of 2009, China-Africa trade volume exceeded US\$91 billion compared with US\$10.6 billion in 2000.

On the Fourth Ministerial Conference of FOCAC held in Egypt in 2009, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao announced that China would take eight new measures to strengthen China-Africa cooperation under FOCAC in the coming three years:

1) To provide US\$10 billion of concessional loans to African countries, and support to set up

a US\$1 billion special loan for small and medium-sized African businesses;

2) To build 100 clean energy projects for Africa covering solar power, bio-gas and small hydro-power;

3) To carry out 100 joint demonstration projects on scientific and technological research;

4) To further open up China's market to African products;

5) To increase the number of agricultural technology demonstration centers built by China in Africa to 20, and send 50 agricultural technology teams to Africa and train 2,000 agricultural technology personnel for Africa;

6) To provide medical equipments and anti-malaria materials worth RMB500 million to the 30 hospitals and 30 malaria prevention and treatment centers built by China and train 3,000 doctors and nurses for Africa;

7) To build 50 China-Africa friendship schools and train 1,500 school principals and teachers for African countries; will increase the number of Chinese government scholarships to Africa to 5,500, and will train a total of 20,000 professionals of various fields for Africa;

8) To launch a China-Africa joint research and exchange program to enable China and Africa's scholars and think tanks to conduct more exchanges and cooperation and share development experience.

This year marks the 10th anniversary of FOCAC. Standing at the new historical starting point, I believe that China and African countries will keep making joint efforts to lift FOCAC development to a new level, benefiting more people of both sides.

**7. China results in economic reforms were quite different from the outcome of many African countries who introduced economic reforms at the behest of the World Bank and the IMF is not quite impressive. What are peculiar elements of China's reforms, she would share with Africa?**

It was not until 1978 that China entered a new era of reform and opening-up to the outside world, a road charted by Mr. Deng Xiaoping. Since then China has come a long way. Over the past three decades, China has been transformed and tremendous changes have taken place.

Firstly, China's economy has changed from a highly centralized planned economy to a socialist market economy;

Secondly, China has changed from a relatively closed economy to a completely open economy;

Thirdly, China has changed from an economy of shortage to one in most areas of which



supply can meet or even surpass a little over the demand. Shortage of consumer goods is a thing of the past;

Fourthly, China's infrastructure has made tremendous progress;

Fifthly, the structure of the economy has also undergone dramatic changes;

Last but not least, the well-being of the Chinese people has improved dramatically with over two hundred million people getting rid of poverty.

Maybe it is most noteworthy that China's economy has been enjoying fast growth with average growth rates of 10%. In the second quarter of 2010, China's GDP overtook Japan and became the world's second largest economy behind the United States.

As Mr. Deng Xiaoping said many years ago, China is both big and small, strong and weak. It's easy for people outside China to see the growth, its big and strong side, while people inside China to see the difficulties, the small and weak side.

Although China's achievement in the past 30 years is amazing, China remains the largest developing country in the world, and the overall national strength of China should not be overestimated. Because of its huge population of 1.3 billion, its backward economic foundation to start with, despite the considerable size of its GDP, China's per capita GDP today still trails behind over one hundred countries in the world. China is still faced with many challenges, such as the remaining poverty, uneven development and the expanding gap between rural and urban areas, between the West and East, and the enormous resources and environmental costs of economic growth, etc. For example, at present, there are still more than 130 million Chinese people living under poverty line, the number is almost equal to Nigeria's population.

Therefore, the development of China is a long and arduous process. If there are any experiences from China's reforms in the past 30 years, the greatest experience I can tell is that China has exploited its development road step by step with efforts of generations, which has eventually found a development mode suitable to its own situation.

There exist several similarities between China and Nigeria: a large population, intelligent and hardworking people, a huge domestic market, strong entrepreneur spirit and a rapidly growing economy. Besides this, Nigeria is rich in resources and great prospect of oil, gas and solid minerals. As a true friend to Nigeria, China is ready to share experience and to learn from each other on addressing the social and economic challenges in the pursuit of sustainable development. I am glad to see that Nigeria has made great achievements in the process of seeking a suitable reform mode meeting its own needs.

