


**PREDICTORS OF POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN NEW DEMOCRACIES:  
A COMPARATIVE STUDY**

**Elnari Potgieter**

Thesis presented in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts at the  
Stellenbosch University



Supervisor : Prof P.V.D.P. du Toit

Co-Supervisor: Dr C.L. Steenekamp

Department of Political Science

Stellenbosch University

December 2013

## **DECLARATION**

By submitting this thesis electronically, I declare that the entirety of the work contained therein is my own, original work, that I am the authorship owner thereof (unless to the extent explicitly otherwise stated) and that I have not previously in its entirety or in part submitted it for obtaining any qualification.

Signed: E. Potgieter

Date: 20 November 2013

## ABSTRACT

Comparative studies investigating predictors of political participation in new democracies are rare. This study addresses an identified gap in the literature on predictors of political participation in new democracies in order to build on the rich body of literature concerned with political participation and democratic consolidation which already exists, but also to contribute towards understanding the role of citizens and their decisions pertaining to political participation in new democracies.

In order to address the identified gap, this cross-national comparative study uses World Values Survey (2006) data for Chile, Poland, South Africa, and South Korea as part of a cross-sectional secondary analysis aimed at ascertaining what predictors of political participation can be identified for these new democracies.

Drawing primarily from studies by Shin (1999) and Dalton (2008) which used the Civic Voluntarism Model by Verba, Schlozman and Brady (1995) as theoretical framework, predictors of political participation considered in this study include: personal resources (level of education and self-reported social class), political engagement and motivation (political interest and left-right political ideology), group membership and networks, as well as demographic attributes (age, gender and size of town). Forms of political participation investigated include: voting as conventional form of participation; and boycotts, petitions and demonstrations as forms of political protest behaviour. The relationships between the possible predictors of participation and forms of political participation were determined by multiple regression analysis.

The main findings by this study are that political interest is an important predictor of voting and political protest behaviour; age is a strong predictor of voting; and group membership has a greater impact on political protest behaviour than on voting.

## OPSOMMING

Vergelykende studies wat ondersoek instel na voorspellende faktore van deelname aan politieke aktiwiteite in jong demokrasieë, is skaars. Deur indikatore van politieke deelname in nuwe demokrasieë na te vors, spreek hierdie studie dus die geïdentifiseerde gaping in die literatuur aan en brei dit uit op die korpus tekste aangaande politieke deelname en demokratiese konsolidasie. Verder bevorder dit ook 'n beter begrip van landsburgers en hul besluite rakende politieke deelname in jong demokrasieë.

Ten einde die aangeduide literatuurgaping te oorbrug, steun hierdie verglykende studie op data van die “World Values Survey” (2006) vir Chili, Pole, Suid-Afrika en Suid-Korea. Dit vorm deel van 'n sekondêre analise om individuele eienskappe as voorspellers van deelname aan politieke aktiwiteite in nuwe demokrasieë, te identifiseer.

Studies deur Shin (1999) en Dalton (2008), wat gebruik maak van Verba, Schlozman en Brady (1995) se “Civic Voluntarism Model”, dien as primêre teoretiese begroning. Daaruit word afgelei dat moontlike voorspellers van deelname aan politieke aktiwiteite gelys kan word as: persoonlike hulpbronne (vlak van opvoeding en self-geïdentifiseerde sosiale klas); politieke betrokkenheid en motivering (belangstelling in politiek en politieke ideologie); groeplidmaatskap en –netwerke asook demografiese eienskappe (ouderdom, geslag en grootte van dorp). Die vorme van politieke aktiwiteite waaraan daar aandag gegee word, is eerstens stemgedrag tydens nasionale verkiesings as konvensionele vorm van politieke deelname en tweedens biokotte, petisies en demonstrasies as vorme van politieke protesgedrag.

Die hoof bevindinge van hierdie studie is dat politieke belangstelling 'n belangrike voorspeller is vir stemgedrag en politieke protesgedrag; ouderdom is 'n sterk voorspeller vir deelname aan verkiesings en groeplidmaatskap het 'n groter invloed op politieke protesgedrag as op die keuse om te stem.

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to express my heartfelt gratitude towards everyone that has supported me during the writing of this thesis.

Firstly, to my family – in particular my mother, Ilza Potgieter, and my grandparents, Carl and Elna Hugo. Their consistent support (despite adversities) inspires me to reach and work for every dream and goal.

Secondly, to the numerous mentors who helped me with their wisdom and experience – in particular Prof Hans Müller whose wise words have guided me through various tough career and study decisions.

Thirdly, to Professor Du Toit, my patient supervisor, who has motivated and guided my work despite illness, I extend my profound gratitude. Also, to Dr. Steenekamp, who assisted me in particularly with the statistical aspects of my research.

Fourthly, to Professor Anthony Leysens, Tannie Magda and the rest of the Political Science Department for taking such an interest in my work and allowing me to represent the Department at the South African Association of Political Science Conference in 2012.

Fifthly, to my friends who supported me throughout the completion of my thesis, in particular Genevieve Stander, Anton Botha and Naadirah Grimsel.

Next, I would also like to express the deepest appreciation to the Mandela Rhodes Foundation and the staff working for this foundation – not only for providing me with the funding to complete this degree, but the vested interest they take in my development as a young African leader.

Last but not least, I would like to assert my most humble gratitude to the Lord for giving me the strength, courage and ability to complete this thesis.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

Declaration	i
Abstract	ii
Opsomming	iii
Acknowledgements	iv
Table of Contents	v
List of Tables	vii
List of Diagrams	vii
List of Abbreviations	viii
<b>Chapter 1: Introduction and Outline</b>	<b>1</b>
1.1. Introduction	1
1.2. Background to the study: Linking democratic consolidation and political participation	1
1.3. Research problem and research question	5
1.4. Research methodology	8
1.5. Limitations and delimitations of the study	10
1.6. Rationale and significance	12
1.7. Chapter outline	14
<b>Chapter 2: A Literature Review</b>	<b>16</b>
2.1. Introduction	16
2.2. Political participation	17
2.2.1. The development of the study of political participation as part of the study of democratic political culture	18
2.2.2. Forms of political participation	23
2.3. Perspectives on factors that motivate political participation	25
2.4. Combining two recent studies on predictors of political participation	36
2.5. Summary	38
<b>Chapter 3: Research Design and Methodology</b>	<b>40</b>
3.1. Introduction	40
3.2. Research design and methodology	40
3.2.1. A comparative analysis of four new democracies	40
3.2.2. Secondary data analysis	47
3.3. Description of datasets	49
3.3.1. World Value Survey (WVS)	49
3.3.2. Sample size and method	49
3.4. Political participation as dependent variable	51
3.4.1. Voting	52
3.4.2. Forms of political protest	53
3.5. Summary	54
<b>Chapter 4: Analyses and Findings</b>	<b>55</b>
4.1. Introduction	55
4.2. Political participation	55
4.2.1. Voting	55
4.2.2. Political protest behaviour	57
4.3. Predictors of political participation	58
4.3.1. Personal resources	59
4.3.1.1. Level of education	60
4.3.1.2. Self-reported social class	62

4.3.2. Political engagement and motivation	64
4.3.2.1. Left-right political ideology	65
4.3.2.2. Political interest	66
4.3.3. Group membership and networks	67
4.3.4. Demographics	71
4.3.4.1. Age	71
4.3.4.2. Gender	72
4.3.4.3. Size of Town/community/area	73
4.4. Multiple regression	74
4.4.1. Predictors of voting	76
4.4.2. Predictors of political protest behaviour	78
4.4.3. Interpretation of Findings	80
4.4.3.1. Model 1: Personal resources	80
4.4.3.2. Model 2: Political Motivation and engagement	85
4.4.3.3. Model 3: Group membership and networks	86
4.4.3.4. Model 4: Demographic characteristics	90
4.4.3.5. Predictive power of the independent variables	91
4.5. Summary	94
<b>Chapter 5: Conclusion</b>	<b>96</b>
5.1. Introduction	96
5.2. Democratisation and political participation	96
5.3. Predictors of political participation	97
5.4. Methodological aspects	98
5.5. Findings, interpretations and suggestions for further studies	99
5.5.1. Personal resources	99
5.5.2. Political engagement and motivation	101
5.5.3. Group membership and networks	102
5.5.4. Demographic characteristics	104
5.5.5. General	105
5.6. Conclusion	106
<b>Bibliography</b>	<b>107</b>
<b>Appendix</b>	<b>120</b>

## LIST OF TABLES

Table 3.1: An overview of political society in the four selected countries	42
Table 3.2: Material and post-material as most important values, by country	44
Table 3.3: General and transformation characteristics	45
Table 3.4: Basic indicators of democracy and development	46
Table 3.5: Overview of the fifth wave of the WVS in the four selected countries	51
Table 4.1: Self-reported turnout in previous national elections, by country	56
Table 4.2: Voter turnout for previous national elections (IDEA)	56
Table 4.3: Political protest behaviour	57
Table 4.4: Levels of education, by country	61
Table 4.5: Self-reported social class, by country	64
Table 4.6: Left-right political ideology	66
Table 4.7: Political interest category, by country	67
Table 4.8: Group membership and networks, by country	69
Table 4.9: Age, by country	72
Table 4.10: Gender, by country	73
Table 4.11: Size of Town/ area	74
Table 4.12: Predictors of voting	76
Table 4.13: Predictors of political protest behaviour	78

## LIST OF DIAGRAMS

Diagram 4.1: Possible predictors of political participation	59
---	----



## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AIDS	Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
ANC	African National Congress
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
COSATU	(The) Congress of South African Trade Unions
CVM	Civic Voluntarism Model
FH	Freedom House
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HDI	Human Development Index
HIV	Human Immunodeficiency Virus
IDEA	International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance
KSDC	Korean Social Science Data Centre
MORI	Market Opinion Research International
NEC	National Election Commission
NGO	non-governmental organisation
NP	National Party
NPO	non-profit organisation
PI	Principle Investigator
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SES	socio-economic status
SPSS	Statistical Package for Social Sciences
UNDP	United Nations Development Project
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
USA	United States of America
WVS	World Values Survey
WVSEC	World Values Survey Executive Committee

# PREDICTORS OF POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN NEW DEMOCRACIES: A COMPARATIVE STUDY

## Chapter 1: Introduction and Outline

### 1.1 Introduction

*“Citizen participation is at the heart of democracy. Indeed, democracy is unthinkable without the ability of citizens to participate freely in the governing process”* (Verba, Schlozman & Brady, 1995:1).

After three waves of democracy<sup>1</sup>, democratic systems are challenged to deepen and strengthen democratic processes through higher degrees of participation in combination with political efficiency. A great body of literature in the social sciences is concerned with the value of citizens taking part in the democratic process, but the inner dynamics of doing so still need in-depth analysis and research (Nohlen, 2002: 19), especially for its relevance in creating a deeper understanding of the mechanisms at work in new democracies.

### 1.2. Background to the study: linking democratic consolidation and political participation

After the Cold War and the fall of the Berlin Wall and several military and authoritarian regimes, democracy has positioned itself as a central concept in policymaking and scholarly work (Coppedge & Gerring, 2011:247). As the third wave of democracy swept the world, new democracies were created at such a rate that the acclaimed scholar Francis Fukuyama (1992) claimed that the spread of liberal democracy to almost every corner of the world represents the “end of history” and that all nations will eventually become liberal democracies (Dalton, 2008:1).

However, the surge in the number of democracies seems to have reached a plateau, especially as many countries struggle to consolidate and deepen democracy as the dominant regime type (UNDP, 2002:13). Many of the third-wave cases have yet to deliver in terms of desirable democratic outcomes (particularly since many of them entailed rapid democratic transitions) as even some of the celebrated third-wave democracies show symptoms of stagnation and a lack of democratic depth. In other words, instead of moving towards becoming stable liberal

---

<sup>1</sup> The term “waves of democracies” refers to “a group of transitions from non-democratic to democratic regimes that occur within a specific period of time and that significantly outnumber transitions in the opposite direction during the period” (Samuel Huntington cited in Diamond, 1996:20). Third-wave democracies are countries which transformed to become democracies after 1974 (Diamond, 1996: 20).

democracies, many new democracies move to become mere electoral<sup>2</sup> or pseudo-democracies<sup>3</sup> (Du Toit & Kotzé, 2011:30).

These trends in democratisation lead to scholars who study democracy particularly emphasising two topics, namely: 1) the diffusion of democracy into the remaining non-democratic corners of the world; and 2) the deepening of democracy and democratic consolidation (Nohlen, 2002: 14). The latter topic is becoming increasingly important since the ideology of democracy has spread worldwide, but the quality of democracies in practice is questionable. Many political actors and researchers now focus on democratic consolidation<sup>4</sup> and not mere democratic transition, since sustaining democracy proves to be just as difficult a task as establishing it (Schedler, 1998:91).

Democratic consolidation can be defined as “taking steps in order to increase the significance of political participation by minimising the importance of factors that undermine its significance” (Nohlen, 2002:14). Thus, political participation is an essential part of the democratic consolidation process (Nohlen, 2002:14), especially since what differentiates democracy from authoritarian regimes is particularly that it is a political system which involves ordinary people (through political participation) in the making of public policies. The democratic process should serve the needs of the citizens rather than those of the political leaders. Therefore, democratic consolidation requires more than mere support for democracy, but a commitment to the norms and procedures of democracy such as political participation (Barber, Pateman & Thompson cited in Shin, 1999:96).

Inherent to the basic definition of democracy, is the idea that citizens take part in politics, especially the normative commitment to foster opportunities for private citizens to participate in elections, organize pressure groups and parties, and have the freedom to publically express views on political issues (even though they might be unpopular with the government) without fear of reprisal (Birch, 2007: 81).

---

<sup>2</sup> Electoral democracies can be defined as countries which have regular elections, but without authentic contests for power and where those in power are often not held accountable. Furthermore, effective political equality is often undermined in these countries (Du Toit & Kotzé, 2011:30).

<sup>3</sup> Pseudo-democracies are democracies where elections are held, but as an empty ritual taking place in an environment where the playing field is merely tilted to favour the hegemonic or dominant party (Du Toit & Kotzé, 2011:30).

<sup>4</sup> The meaning of democratic consolidation is a highly debated, but the classic definition of a consolidated democracy is a democracy where the regime type is “the only game in town” (Schedler, 1998:99).

Birch (2007: 80) defines political participation as “participation in the process of government”. The actors involved are private citizens (as distinct from public officials or elected politicians). These actors then actively take part in the processes through which government policies are created and implemented, as well as the processes through which political leaders and authorities are chosen (Birch, 2007:80). Ekman & Amnå (2012:11) offer an even more apt definition of political participation as “all actions directed towards influencing governmental decision-making and political outcomes”.

Political participation requires resources and time. Rational choice theorists, such as Downs (cited in Dalton, 2008:57), regards participation in political activities as irrational in most cases, as the cost of participating in politics is likely to outweigh the effect that individuals’ efforts will have on political decisions and policies. Rational actors will refrain from taking part in political activities and choose to “free-ride” whilst reaping the benefits of the efforts of other actors. However, citizens still do participate in political activities. The choice to participate in politics thus extends beyond self-interested calculations and hence an element of social and psychological reasoning in the choice to participate in politics cannot be disregarded (Dalton, 2008:57).

Verba *et al.* (1995) created the Civic Voluntarism Model (CVM) in 1995, which summarised many different social-psychological theories accounting for why people participate in political activities. Verba *et al.* (1995) contend that citizens take part in political activities for three reasons: 1) they can; 2) they want to; or 3) someone asked them to take part. These three reasons can be expressed as the three main factors which influence participation, namely: 1) the personal resources to participate; 2) the political attitudes that motivate participation; and 3) the community groups who motivate participation (Dalton, 2008:58). These factors correlate with the micro-level individual traits that influence political participation mentioned by scholars such as Kitschelt and Rehm (2008) and influenced the work of Dalton (2008).

Dalton (2008:6) asserts that politics and the characteristics of the citizens taking part in political action have changed over the years, which lead to the transformation of the democratic process in which these citizens participate. In his book - *Citizens Politics* (2008) - Dalton investigates how the role of citizens within the democratic process has evolved and how these changes alter the democratic process in advanced industrial societies. His study focused on four countries,

namely: Germany, France, Great Britain and the United States of America (USA) (Dalton 2008:3-4).

Dalton's study utilised opinion surveys and made use of the CVM (as per Verba *et al.*) as the theoretical framework for his study (Dalton, 2008:3). His study focused on three predominant influencing factors on political participation, namely: 1) resources, 2) political orientation, and 3) group connections. Dalton's study combines seven variables to represent the three factors, namely: 1) education, 2) age, 3) gender, 4) political efficacy, 5) left/right political attitudes, 6) political party attachment, and 7) membership in a union or business group. The gathered data were then statistically analysed in order to identify which of these variables are predictors of political participation (Dalton, 2008:62).

Dalton (2008:63-69) utilised multiple regression analysis in his study to calculate the standardised coefficients of the named predictors of political participation in relation to various forms of political participation. He focused on voting turnout, campaign activity, direct contacting, communal activity, protest activity and internet activism as political participation forms for his study. Dalton (2008:70-74) then compared the correlates in an attempt to identify the predictors of political participation in these advanced industrial societies.

Research concerned with predictors of political participation (such as Dalton's), especially in advanced democracies, has been plentiful. However, a lack of comparative studies on this topic in new democracies is evident.

New democracies are often researched as single case studies with the aim of investigating whether the general findings and theories in comparative studies hold up in detailed cases, or as critical case studies. Such single case studies allow for a greater variety of variables to be included than in studies with many cases. They may generate new hypotheses and theories through asking new questions or informing analyses (Keman, 2008:70). This in turn offers future researchers possible themes to elaborate on by using more countries in similar studies, based on the single case studies' findings, by means of comparison.

As example is D.C. Shin's studies published in the book - *Mass Politics and Culture in Democratizing Korea* (Shin, 1999). His study examines democratic consolidation in the Republic of Korea (South Korea). It incorporates research on mass public opinion and the behaviour of

citizens in an attempt to distinguish between democracy as an ideal and as a practice in this country. The study did not only consider support for democracy, but citizen competence and participation as well (Shin, 1999: xxvii, 67, 95) by investigating the levels and patterns of the citizens' psychological engagement in, and cognitive awareness of, political life, as well as their involvement in political life and associational groupings.

For his study, Shin (1999:113) considered different citizen traits to represent possible predictors of political participation. These are: age, gender, level of schooling, income level, region and community (Shin, 1999:113). Shin (1999:113) categorised the different forms of political activism into attentiveness (watching TV and taking part in political discussions), political participation (electoral, non-electoral and protest) and associational participation (primordial and non-primordial). Empirical data from the 1994 Korean Democratic Survey were used and multiple regression analysis (similar to Dalton's) was done to show the relationship between certain individual characteristics and political participation (Shin, 1999:117).

Shin's study (1999) on South Korea focused on political participation as part of the process of democratic consolidation, specific to this new democracy, in order to foster a deeper understanding of democratisation in that particular country. However, much research still needs to be done on this topic for new democracies in general, especially since so many of the democracies transformed during the third wave are perceived as being mere electoral democracies.

### **1.3. Research problem and research questions**

Ever since the onset of the third wave of democracy and the "globalisation of democracy", scholars have taken interest in the comparison of new and established democracies (Nohlen, 2002:13). Political participation has featured as theme of such comparisons, particularly because citizens from old and new democracies often differ in the way they understand and take part in elections and political activities.

Which citizens take part in political activities and what the attributes are of these citizens are clearly matters of interest in research on political participation. Who takes part in politics is a vital question to ask, as those who participate in politics have an impact on policy making and the policy agenda. The citizens who communicate with policymakers and politicians are the citizens whose interests are represented when political and policy decisions are made. It is the

participants in political activities who give meaning to these activities (Dalton, 2008:57). Also, investigating how the characteristics of citizens and their participation in political activities relate across nations might enable a deeper understanding of how the political process and circumstances in nations shape the choices (pertaining to political participation) of its citizens in democracies (Dalton, 2008:57).

It is important to bear in mind, however, that the homogeneity of the countries and regions that are part of the overall category of democratic countries has decreased. Whereas the group of older democracies remained almost entirely associated with the Western industrialised world (with a few exceptions), the group of new democracies includes countries from places as geographically dispersed as Southern Europe, Latin America, East Europe, Africa and Asia. The composition of the group of new democracies is markedly heterogeneous (Nohlen, 2002:14).

Additionally, the context in which political participation takes place may differ between new and more established democracies. Variables such as levels of equality, governmental and societal emphasis on politics and political participation, the centrality of a representative system of government, and the confidence in political institutions are all factors which may shape the context of political participation. These variables can be strengthened by intervening factors such as the political culture specific to a certain country or the institutional design of a country (Nohlen, 2002:18).

Also, often as a result of fraudulent and corrupt elections in the past (Nohlen, 2002:18), citizens in less established democracies tend to emphasise participation in more unconventional forms of political activism (such as protests), since voters developed a different understanding of the impact that voting might have on political decisions and policymaking. In such cases where citizens distrust electoral procedures, institutional requirements should be in place to foster electoral participation (Nohlen, 2002: 18). Should arrangements to foster electoral participation fail, other forms of political participation are often pursued by citizens or they may develop an apathetic attitude towards political participation.

The need for research on new democracies derives from the fact that the institutional arrangements, macro-historical differences and development issues of new democracies differ from those in established democracies. Bearing in mind that exceptions do exist, new democracies in general struggle with high degrees of social inequality, tend to focus political

culture on the lack of proper government systems (despite inconsistencies as result of uneven modernisation processes) and social disparities, deficiencies in the rule of law and democratic governability, as well as low levels of trust in political institutions and accountability (Nohlen, 2002:16-17). Understanding these specifics begins with investigating the problems and issues of the particular cultural, political and social conditions and characteristics of the various new democracies which together form the group of new democracies (Nohlen, 2002: 18).

Research in established democracies indicates that understanding who takes part in political activities, whose interests are considered in policy and political decision-making, and what characteristics of citizens are predictors of political participation, can enable a deeper understanding of the democracy and its politically active citizens. A deeper understanding of the consolidation process (or the lack thereof) may be gained by investigating these processes in new democracies.

It is clear from the above that comparative research on democratic consolidation, especially political participation as an elemental part of it, is of value. Lack of knowledge on the intricacies of political participation in new democracies limits the understanding of what citizen traits and/or characteristics predict political participation in new democracies and thus limits the understanding of the role citizens play in new democracies.

Understanding political participation and the decision to take part in political activities in democracies raises political questions in that the fundamental fibre of democracy as “government of, by and for the people” materialises as the political engagement of citizens. The choices, decisions and policies made by politicians and political decision-makers are influenced by the political actions of citizens. Understanding who takes part in political activities makes for a deeper understanding of the democratic process and its results. The lack in literature and in-depth analysis on the topic, especially in new democracies, materialises as a research problem. One this study would like to address in order to understand the political problem observed.

This study aims to identify predictors of political participation in new democracies. It aims to achieve the same goal Dalton (2008) and Shin (1999) had in mind with their studies, namely to foster a deeper understanding of the citizens’ role in democracies and democratisation.



The main question this study addresses is: What characteristics of citizens are possible predictors of political participation in new democracies? A set of research questions, pertinent to the aspects elaborated on above, can be posed. These lead to propositions to be explored within the context of this study.

In terms of political participation in new democracies, this study aims to investigate the following questions:

- Who takes part in political activities?
- What are the demographic attributes, personal resources, political motivational factors and group associations of citizens who take part in political activities?
- What relationships can be found between demographic characteristics, personal resources, political motivational factors and group associations of citizens with various forms of political participation?
- What similarities are there in the findings from the data of the four countries?

By investigating possible answers to these questions, this study aims to fill the knowledge gap that exists on predictors of political participation in new democracies.

#### **1.4. Research methodology**

Following the framework of Dalton (2008), this comparative study will seek to establish relationships between possible predictors of political participation and forms of political participation by comparing suitable data originating from Chile, Poland, South Africa and South Korea as new democracies. The study will examine the political activities of individuals in these democracies through a secondary analysis of the fifth wave of the World Value Surveys (WVS) (as source of data from mass surveys). The study thus operates at the micro-level and qualifies as a predominantly quantitative study (Landman, 2003:18). As the data analysed emanate from one specific point in time, the study is cross-sectional (Neuman, 2006:36).

The purpose of this study is predominantly exploratory, since it aims to examine a little understood phenomenon, namely political participation in new democracies as part of democratic consolidation, and only then moves to more refined research questions by focusing on asking “what” questions. Additionally, elements of a descriptive study are present, since this study will present the details of the relationship between certain traits of citizens and political participation through answers to “who” questions in order to paint a picture of political

participation in new democracies. Furthermore, elements of explanatory research are evident, as this study might expand on theories on political participation formulated in other parts of the world (particularly the more established democracies) (Neuman, 2006:33-35).

Sufficient data pertaining to political participation types and the possible predictors of participation can be found in the WVS questionnaires and will enable the pinpointing of the predictors of political participation in the four new democracies selected. In order to analyse the WVS data pertaining to the investigation of the predictors of political participation, the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) will be used. SPSS is a computer application specifically designed for the statistical analysis of survey data. It offers in-depth analysis, preparation and access, analytical reporting, graphics and modelling (Steenekamp, 2011:17).

SPSS is particularly useful for the purposes of this study, as it will assist in doing multiple-regression analyses,<sup>5</sup> which will be performed in order to identify the predictors of political participation in the four new democracies mentioned. This commonly used statistical technique in behavioural and social sciences identifies the relationship between two or more variables (independent variables and a dependent variable) of which the value is to be predicted. Regression analysis is utilised in order to determine the equation which represents the relationship between these variables (Du Toit & Kotzé, 2011:220).

Political participation serves as the dependent variable in the study. The political participation forms chosen to be investigated relates to the studies by Hail (2011), Barnes and Kaase (1979) and Inglehart and Catterberg (2002). Hail constructed an index of extra-institutional political participation, as this type of participation measures a deeper level of engagement in politics than mere electoral participation. His index demonstrates a more physical and psychological engagement in politics. The three types of political activity accounted for by Hail's index are: 1) "signing petitions", 2) "joining in boycotts", and 3) "attending peaceful demonstrations" (Hail, 2011).

In addition to Hail's indicators, this study adds "voting" as a high-pressure type of political activity (Dalton, 2008:40). Many scholars are critical of the value of voting as the only indicator of political participation, particularly because of its misuse by political elites in order to limit citizen influence on policy. However, elections still serve as a vital instrument of democracy,

---

<sup>5</sup> Chapter 4 will offer a more in-depth discussion of this (see pages 74-75).

particularly for their symbolic value and instrumental impact on policies. They enable citizens to form part of the democratic political system and support the validation of the rest of the democratic process (Dalton, 2008:40). Taking part in elections will thus be included in this study's investigation of political participation.

As independent variables, certain demographics and traits of citizens will be used as predictors of political participation. Predominantly building on the studies done by Dalton and Shin, this study combines only the relevant attributes for the four countries examined. Dalton (2008:67) utilised education, age and gender as part of resources as predictor of political participation. As motivational predictors, Dalton specified political efficacy and left-right political orientations. Political party membership and membership of a group serve as Dalton's group factors. Shin (1999) includes gender and age as biological indicators, education and income as socio-economic resources, and region and community as regional indicators. Dalton (2008:161) mentions race, ethnicity, religious affiliations and internet activism as additional factors not used in their study, but worth elaborating on as predictors of political participation.

The independent variables for this study are possible predictors of political participation as decided upon by using the CVM, as well as Dalton's and Shin's studies as theoretical framework. Gender, age and size of town/community serve as demographic parameters; education and self-reported social class serve as possible personal resource parameters; the political engagement and motivational parameters taken into consideration will be political interest and left-right political ideology; and membership of groups or networks serves as parameters for associational involvement.

### **1.5. Limitations and delimitations of the study**

The predominantly quantitative nature of this study means that some of the traits of citizens and the understanding of some of the attributes and characteristics of the four countries might not be taken into account in the analysis (Landman, 2003; 19).

Furthermore, secondary analysis has its own limitations, despite its cost and time effectiveness. As the researcher does not gather the data him/herself, he/she might not be able to detect any mistakes made during the survey process. This in turn might affect the validity of the study (Babbie & Mouton, 2002: 256).

However, the advantages of the chosen methodology could be mentioned. Manheim and Rich (1981:124-125) state that secondary data analysis often enables the use of data the researcher would not have had the opportunity to gather, given time and other resource constraints. Secondary analysis thus enables a fuller understanding of the already gathered data, whilst saving valuable time and cost resources. Furthermore, the possibility of affecting respondents' answers by repeated contact for surveying purposes can be limited by using secondary data. Also, secondary analysis allows for different techniques to be utilised in order to analyse the same set of collected data. Another point worth mentioning is that comparisons with other studies across countries and time spaces are made easier in, for example, comparative trend studies (such as the WVS), where standardised data are made available (Bailey, 1982:302).

Another limitation of this study is the fact that the WVS surveys fail to cover many of the other commonly used measures of political participation, such as making contact with a public official or donating money to a certain campaign. Thus, the index of political participation utilised can be regarded as not comprehensive enough in comparison with other studies on political participation (Hail, 2011). However, as Hail stated, the political activities which have been incorporated are strong indicators of extra-institutional participation and the addition in this study of 'voter turn-out' to Hail's index may offer a deeper understanding of political participation.

The question can be raised whether individual-level attitudes do play a significant role in sustaining democratic institutions at the societal level. Despite many debates on the matter, Inglehart and Welzel (2003:65-66) follow in the footsteps of scholars such as Lipset, and Almond and Verba by stating that an essential precondition of effective democratisation is an political culture which enables it. The authors make it clear that more deeply rooted orientations have their impact in the promotion of democratisation at the societal level, especially when they are tapped by self-expression values. Given the fact that democracy is an attribute of nations and not of individuals, the attitudes at the individual level must be aggregated to the level of nations. And since the link between political culture and democratic institutions is particularly strong at the aggregate level, the investigation of democratic mass culture can be executed on the individual level (Inglehart & Welzel, 2003:78-80). Additionally, when the correlates of political action across nations and modes are compared, the way that the political process in nations shapes the choices of its citizens on participation can become evident (Dalton, 2008:57).

Another possible limitation is the cross-sectional nature of the study, since a study of this nature cannot capture social processes, trends and change over time effectively (Neuman, 2006:37). For this study WVS data for the respective countries from the 2005-2007 wave of WVS surveys will be used. Much has happened (globally) since these surveys were executed. In the years after 2006 global and national events might have had such an impact on citizens that the citizens of dissident countries' political behaviour and political participation might have been affected profoundly. Regardless, it is worth studying and elaborating on the particular data (even for a specific time frame) in order to compare findings and contribute towards the understanding of democratic consolidation.

For the aims of this study it will be deemed adequate to establish the relationships (if there are any) between the variables and to provide possible explanations for them in terms of historical and political contexts. This study attempts merely to enable a rudimentary understanding of these trends.

### **1.6. Rationale and significance**

Often the response to the proposal of a study is simply “Why?” What is the significance of the study and what does it matter? Why the chosen topic and chosen case studies?

The most obvious reason for research on aspects of democracy in new democracies is plainly that it has not yet been done. As mentioned earlier, research on the predictors of political participation in Western democracies and their trends is plentiful, but there is a scarcity of research on the topic in new democracies. Numerous explanations for this can be given. It might be that the geographical dispersion of democracies that developed during the third wave of democracy and the fact that they only recently democratised, makes research on new democracies a bit more challenging. It could also be argued that the focus (of resources and attention) on more established democracies in social science can be blamed. Whatever the reason, it is evident that there is a gap in research on new democracies and especially comparative research on political participation in these countries.

As stated before, one of the characteristics of the group labelled “new democracies” is their heterogeneity. The four chosen countries are similar in some aspects, but differ profoundly in others.<sup>6</sup> The similarities allows for more emphasis to be laid on exploring the trends in political

---

<sup>6</sup> These aspects will be elaborated on in Chapter 3. Please see pages 40-47.

participation in new democracies as the potential influences of other variables are limited. However, for this study, the different social, geographical and historical dynamics of the four case studies might make for interesting findings.

Following Dalton's framework in his study, *Citizen Politics* (2008), four countries serve as case studies in this study in order to balance the need for comparison as well as for attention to national characteristics (Dalton, 2008:4). The four chosen countries are: Chile, Poland, South Africa and South Korea. Several criteria are applied to determine these four.

Contrary to Dalton's study, which focused on advanced industrialised Western democracies, the focus of this comparative study falls on new democracies from different parts of the world. The countries may differ with regards to institutional backgrounds, internal cleavages, attitudes towards democracy, and the regimes from which they emerge and transformed to become democracies. However, all four of these countries are perceived as "flagship democracies" in their respective regions (Banks *et al.*, 2009: 271, 1331; Klein, 2011; Shin, 1999: xxiii). Furthermore, all four have been rated "Free" by Freedom House (Freedom House, 2006a; 2006b; 2006c; 2006d) and all four have middle to high Human Development Index HDI ratings from the UNDP (UNDP, 2011). Also, all four democracies formed a pact between the old and new regimes in order to facilitate a smoother transition to democracy, which enables a greater chance of democratic consolidation. Furthermore, reservations have been raised pertaining to the quality of democracy and the degree of democratic consolidation of all four of these democracies (Mattes, 2008:116; Valenzuela & Dammert, 2006: 65; Shin, 1999: xxiii; Banks *et al.*, 2009:1143). The case selection is thus based on the "most different cases, most similar outcomes" format.<sup>7</sup>

Since all four of these countries are scrutinized for the quality of their "flagship democracies" and are arguably failing to consolidate fully, elaborating on the demographics of the citizens taking part in politics might be valuable for many reasons. These include: identifying the pattern of who participates and thus influences policy- and -decision-making; elaborating on the characteristics of citizens taking part in politics and thus partially defining the meaning of political activism in these new democracies; and, by comparing the findings across the four nations, helping to identify how the specific political processes in the different countries may shape citizens choices on whether and how to participate (Dalton, 2008:57).

---

<sup>7</sup> See Chapter 3 pages, 46-47.

The focus on political participation in democracy may be illuminating in that democratic consolidation is not possible without political participation (Nohlen, 2002:13). Investigating the characteristics of citizens engaging in political participation might help to identify citizens who should be motivated to take part in politics and highlight areas that need to be addressed in order to enable the citizens of new democracies to participate equally in the democratic processes of their respective countries.

As stated, the WVS serves as this study's primary source of data in order to reach its aims. The WVS is a rich investigation of socio-cultural attitudes and political change in countries across the world (Kotzé, 2001:134) and it aptly serves as a source of individual data on political participation (Campante & Chor, 2010:6-7). Furthermore, the WVS is the single most analysed set of data used by especially social scientists. It functions as a valuable tool to analyse patterns at the mass public level. This global project, of which the sixth wave of survey is currently being conducted (Inglehart, 2011: 15), has been in operation since 1981 (Babbie & Mouton, 2001:265). It utilises a standardised questionnaire in gathering data in 97 countries across the world in which 90% of the world's population resides (Inglehart, 2011: 2). The use of this data set will be valuable in reaching the aims of this study.

Hopefully, this study will help to fill the knowledge gap that exists on political participation in new democracies, as well as to inspire the launching of future studies to elaborate on aspects related to the topic of this study.

### **1.7. Chapter outline**

This study will consist of five chapters of which the first chapter (as set out above) serves as a brief introduction to the contextualisation and principal variables of this study. The second chapter will draw on research on political participation done prior to this study, expand on the theoretical frameworks underpinning this study, and position this study within the broader literature on political participation in order to indicate the knowledge gap it will fill.

The third chapter will elaborate on the methodology and research design in order to describe the relationship between the chosen dependent and independent variables. It will conceptualise and operationalise the key variables of the study and explain the measurement and data analysis particulars of the study. Additionally, the chapter will explore the various techniques available

for a secondary study, consider further limitations and delimitations of the study, and explain the variables from the WVS chosen for this particular study. Furthermore, this chapter will provide a description of the WVS and the methodology used in the WVS. This chapter also elaborates on the reasoning behind the particular case selection.

Chapter Four will present and discuss the results, as well as their bearing on the hypothesis, and analyse the implications of the relationships derived from the result of the analysis. Since the WVS is quantitative in nature, this chapter will represent the results in tables and/or graphs, and provide descriptions of the processes used to identify the relationship between the demographics and political participation of citizens in new democracies. This chapter will also elaborate on the differences and similarities in the findings, as well as place these findings in the political, socio-economic and historical contexts of the four case studies. It will also consider the implications of the findings for the four countries and potentially for new democracies in general.

Finally, chapter Five will offer a conclusion on what has been said on predictors for political participation in new democracies, the findings of study and the most important points of the analysis. Recommendations for future studies on the topic or related themes will be made.



## Chapter 2: A Literature Review

### 2.1. Introduction

Citizen participation is essential for democracy (Verba, Schlozman & Brady 1995:1; Dalton & Klingemann, 2007:3; Kitschelt & Rehm, 2008:446; Chang & Chyi, 2009:127). It is in essence the channel through which citizens can communicate information regarding their needs, preferences and concerns to political decision-makers. Understanding who participates in political activities is valuable, particularly since citizens who participate in political activities can have their voices and concerns heard by political decision-makers, and thus might have an impact on political decision-making (Verba *et al.*, 1995:1).

Political participation is the mechanism through which individuals communicate their needs and preferences to public officials and attempt to have an impact on what these officials do. In a democracy<sup>8</sup>, the value of the political voice of each individual should be equal to that of every other individual. However, individuals who are not participating in political activities cannot safeguard their interests and run the risk that government treatment towards them will be less favourable than to those whose preferences and needs have been expressed. Citizens who raise their concerns are more likely to have their interests reach the policy agenda. As part of the process to try and understand which voices influence political decision-making, it is of value to investigate what motivates individuals to take part in political activities (Verba *et al.*, 1995:14).

This chapter introduces the concept of “political participation” and provides an overview of the development of the study of political participation as one dimension of the study of democratic political culture. This chapter will also outline the various forms of political participation; compare theoretical perspectives that attempt to identify motivational factors for political participation; as well as provide an overview of recent studies in the field of predictors of political participation.

---

<sup>8</sup>“Democracy” as concept is complex and ambiguous with evaluative overtones and even the basic definition offered as “rule by the people” raise questions pertaining to the meaning of “rule” and who “the people” are. However, in the most conceptualisations of democracy, recurring themes are widespread participation in political activities and the influence of political decisions made by citizens (Kavanagh, 1983:173). This study will not examine the intricacies of the debates regarding the definition of democracy, but will rather accept democratic systems as political systems which allow for direct and/or indirect participation by the (mostly adult) population in influencing political decision-making and the selection of the rulers of the population. This study will focus on aspects of political involvement of citizens, particularly political participation, as part of the process of democratisation and democratic consolidation.

## 2.2. Political participation

Democratic theorists, following Rousseau, have either advanced or accepted that a proper system of government without opportunities for political participation by ordinary citizens is unlikely to consolidate as democracy (Birch, 2007:80). Even the most basic definition of democracy<sup>9</sup> supports the notion of political participation as a fundamental part of it (Kaase & Marsh, 1979:27), especially as part of the normative commitment to foster opportunities for private citizens to participate in elections, and to organise pressure groups and political parties, as well as having the freedom to publically express views on political issues (even though these views might be unpopular with the government) without fear of reprisal (Birch, 2007: 81).

Kitschelt and Rehm (2008:446) affirm the above sentiments by asserting that political participation serves as the link between the mass public and political elites. The authors state that a democracy cannot function effectively without the political participation of its citizens (Kitschelt & Rehm, 2008:446). Dalton (2008:32) also supports this idea when he states that “[d]emocracy should be a celebration of an involved public”. He claims that democracy loses its validity without including the public (Birch, 2007:81). Political participation thus features as a fundamental part of democratisation.

The conceptualisation of political participation has evolved since its historically narrow definition and scholars’ preoccupation with electoral participation at the beginning of political participation studies. However, the definition of political participation expanded to include activities to such an extent that some scholars (such as Berger, 2009; Ekman & Amnå, 2012) call for a clearer distinction between political participation and civic engagement.<sup>10</sup> Political participation is defined in various ways (Kavanagh, 1983:181). Popular definitions of political participation<sup>11</sup> includes: “activity by private citizens designed to influence governmental decision-making” (Huntington, 1976:4); “legal acts by private citizens ... directly aimed at influencing the selection of governmental personnel and/or actions that they take” (Verba, Nie & Kim, 1978:1) and “participation in the process of government” (Birch, 2007:80). This study will use the definition of political participation, by Ekman and Amnå (2012:11), as “actions directed towards influencing governmental decisions and political outcomes”.

---

<sup>9</sup> “Rule by the people” (Kavanagh, 1983:173).

<sup>10</sup> Ekman and Amnå (2012) mentions that no real consensus exist on what “civic engagement” stands for, but Berger (2009) mentions that it includes various different social activities in accordance with associational involvement and political participation. For Ekman and Amnå (2012:11) what differentiates the two terms is the fact that political participation activities (as more goal orientated actions) are actions specifically directed to impact on governmental decisions and political outcomes.

<sup>11</sup> This study will focus on political participation and not civic engagement.

### 2.2.1 The development of the study of political participation as part of the study of democratic political culture

The concepts of political culture<sup>12</sup> and political engagement have long been a part of politics and feature as strong themes in the classic literature (Almond, 1980: 2). Philosophers such as Plato, Aristotle, Machiavelli, Montesquieu and Rousseau elaborated on ideas about political culture and political socialisation as well as political participation. These ideas came together in the works of De Tocqueville (1945:299) who claimed that “the manners of people may be considered as one of the great general causes to which the maintenance of a democratic republic ... is attributable” and he added that (American) democracy’s inner workings were in part attributable to the “habits of the heart” of the citizens of the country. Tocqueville’s work in many ways embodies the start of what has become political sociology<sup>13</sup> (Almond, 1980:6; LaPierre & Westbrook, 2008: 26; Ersson & Lane, 2008:420).

Research themes in other fields spilled over to political science. These include the works on social action by sociologists such as Parsons and Weber, which later influenced research on political culture (Almond, 1980:13). Moreover, empirical social-psychological research in the 1940s and 1950s spurred political researchers to consider attitudes and demographic correlates as part of their studies (Almond, 1980:13). The openness of political science to ideas from other social sciences gave rise to a deeper understanding of citizens’ political behaviour by studying the individual in a wider context (Kavanagh, 1983:11).

A pioneering study is *The People’s Choice*<sup>14</sup> by Paul Lazarsfeld, and his associates (Lazarsfeld, Berelson & Gaudet, 1944) who were among the first to utilise systematic survey research in

---

<sup>12</sup> Ersson and Lane (2008:420) assert that political culture is a “key tool in the analysis of how communities engage in politics” and that it holds the “basic attitudes of people towards politics, policy and the polity” (Ersson & Lane, 2008:422).

<sup>13</sup> Political sociology, according to Rush (1992:92, 95), examines the processes through which individuals familiarise themselves with the political system and the processes which establishes their reactions to and understanding of politics and political phenomena in a particular society.

<sup>14</sup> *The People’s Choice* (1944) reported on American political behaviour, particularly the formation of voting behaviour during a presidential campaign. The study surveyed approximately 3000 voters in Erie County, Ohio at the time of the 1940 USA national presidential campaign. Interviews were repeated in order to enable a longitudinal study on data pertaining to the impact of political propaganda in an empirical manner. The study aimed to analyse why people voted as they did, not to predict the outcome of the election. *The People’s Choice* is a pioneering study in that it was the first to follow how voting behaviour changed (or did not change) throughout a national political campaign (Britt, 1945). Lazarsfeld, more rooted in the field of psychology, was the first to apply survey research to the study of voting behaviour and his work led to a proliferation in research on voting behaviour. Interestingly enough, the study found that interpersonal factors had a greater impact than parties and mass media on electoral behaviour (Bartels, 2008). The studies done by Lazarsfeld and his colleagues are referred to as the Columbia school of thought (Bartels, 2008).

order to explain voters' choices in terms of demographic characteristics, attitude patterns and exposure to communication. The work of Lazarsfeld and his team, which established the use of survey research in order to study electoral behaviour, was called the Columbia school of thought (Heath, 2007: 610; Bartels, 2008).

Traditionally, before the then controversial manifestation of the behavioural approach in the 1950s, (Kavanagh, 1983:2) political theory was predominantly normative or prescriptive. Rather than analysing and describing the current situation, it was more concerned with the desirable forms of government, relations between individuals and society, or the clarification of concepts (Kavanagh, 1983:3). Political science, as a social science, had a low status precisely because of its neglect to study crucial topics, a lack of consensus on the central core of the discipline, and the careless use of concepts over which disagreements raged. Political science did not grow as a discipline, whilst other social sciences developed methods and systematic theories (Kavanagh, 1983:3; Easton, 1951, 36; Easton: 1957:383).

It was David Easton<sup>15</sup> (1951, 1957) who advanced general systems theory in political science in order to delimit significant areas of research, enable political scientist to integrate data and identify relationship between variables. The aim of this is to offer general theory as a tool for scholars to establish generalisations and empirical conclusions, as well as theories according to which their findings can be tested and compared (Kavanagh, 1983:3).

Also, after the two world wars, a shift towards research on political behaviour in political science was evident, especially after what is called a scientific revolution in the study of politics during the 1950s (Kavanagh, 1983:1). Political behaviour can refer to the study field of human behaviour in politics, as well as the specific approach and methods to study this aspect of politics. "Behavioralism"<sup>16</sup> emerged as a reaction to the traditional emphasis of political science

---

<sup>15</sup> Easton (1951:40, 51) attributed the impoverishment of political theory to two tendencies in political science at the time of his writing. Firstly, the predominance of the use of the historical approach by scholars in the field distracted their attention from constructive value theory. Secondly, there was a lack of interest among scholars to work on causal theory (or systematic empirically-orientated theory) concerned with political behaviour in the field. Easton (1951:58) argued that political scientists should frame the fundamental areas of research in political science by "synthesising and codifying" the limited generalisations of political science at the time, as well as attempt to build a working conceptual frame of reference for science. Later, Easton (1957:400) claimed that studies concerned with political life needs a general theory. He proposed systems theory, focused on input-output dynamics between a system and its environment, as an "economical way of organising presently disconnected data" and that using systems theory "promises interesting dividends" for political science.

<sup>16</sup> Behavioralist studies examine different observable phenomena by controlling for environmental factors and discounting subjective elements as part of the situational approach (Kavanagh, 1983:4). The main emphasis of the approach is behaviour particularly because it is observable. Eulau (1963, cited in Kavanagh, 1983:10) explains this

during the interwar years. In disregard of actual political behaviour and informal politics, for many years the discipline focused on constitutions and formal political institutions. These concerns, in combination with the increase in the application of quantitative methods in social science research, made way for the advancement of research on political behaviour in Political Science (Kavanagh, 1983:1).

During the 1960s research dealing with political socialisation and political behaviour proliferated. Almond (1980:6) asserts this development was provided for by social science methodology (particularly survey methods) which developed after the Second World War, as well as the intellectual challenges, theoretical developments and the methodological inventions at the time (Kaase & Marsh, 1979:35-37; Dalton & Klingemann, 2007:19; Bartels, 2008:13-14).

Following the Columbia school's claim that election survey data may serve as a resource to understand elections and campaigns, scholars at the University of Michigan<sup>17</sup> developed electoral research even further. Their work culminated in another influential study in election studies (Heath, 2007:610; Bartels, 2008), namely *The American Voter*<sup>18</sup> by Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes (1960). Different to the Columbia studies, the Michigan scholars used national survey samples. They did not only develop and test electoral behaviour theories, but were able to provide an historical account of the factors which had an impact on the outcomes of certain national elections (Bartels, 2008:7). Thus, their studies served descriptive and theoretical purposes (Campbell *et al.*, 1960).

Another pioneering venture during the 1960s was the *Civic Culture* by Almond and Verba (1963). Balancing theories of political sociology, democratic stability and the new developments in research technology, the authors of the *Civic Culture* were able to refine and develop the subjective means and attributes of stable democratic politics (Almond, 1980:23). They took a significant step forward by compiling the *Civic Culture* as a study of the citizenry of five

---

approach in political science as being “concerned with what man does politically and the meanings he attaches to his behaviour”.

<sup>17</sup> Based in the Survey Research Centre at the University of Michigan, a then growing interdisciplinary team of scholars conducted national surveys (Bartels, 2008) to assess, among other things, “the influence of various psychological, sociological and political factors on the determination of the vote” and “analyse the crystallisation of the vote” (Campbell & Kahn, 1952:3). Examples of these studies include Campbell and Kahn (1952), Campbell, Gurin and Miller (1954), Campbell and Cooper (1956). Campbell, Miller, Converse and Stokes later formed the centre of the Michigan team (Bartels, 2008) which produced *The American Voter* (1960).

<sup>18</sup> *The American voter* is a seminal work in the field of election studies. The authors used primary data, which were gathered through surveys by scholars at the University of Michigan, pertaining to the USA presidential elections in 1952 and 1956 (Bartels, 2008:5).

different nations. Following this study, the collection of public opinion data for comparative political behaviour studies increased considerably. Not only were country specific comparative surveys conducted, but also institutionalised cross-national surveys were repeated in order to enable longitudinal research, hence contributing to an ever increasingly data-rich field of study (Dalton & Klingemann, 2007:4). The *Civic Culture* (1963) brought new research themes to the fore (Lijphart, 1980:54) and managed to link individual political behaviour and choices with macro-political circumstances. Furthermore, the book propounded the idea that political participation is embedded within a wider society (Verba, 1980:203) and brought new dimensions to the approach of studying political participation.

In 1965, Milbrath published *Political Participation* as a compilation of the ideas and propositions concerning political participation prevailing at the time (Milbrath & Goel, 1977: vii). The literature on political participation at that point was primarily based on findings in the USA or on single case studies (Dalton & Klingemann, 2007:13), with studies such as the *Civic Culture* starting to break the mould (Dalton & Klingemann, 2007:4). At first, researchers mostly treated political participation as a uni-dimensional notion with voting as the primary focus of the study field (Milbrath & Goel, 1977: 14). A less explored aspect of political participation by the time of Milbrath's (1965) compilation was political protest. It was labelled as "unconventional participation". For an extended period of time, protest forms of political activity were not deemed as worthy of much attention by many political participation scholars. However, political protest activities aim to have an impact on policies and political decision-making and can thus be regarded as forms of political participation.

Studies concerned with political protest started to feature in political participation literature after the 1960s, when a wave of political protests in especially the advanced industrial Western democracies<sup>19</sup> startled scholars and politicians. The rapid increase in demonstrations and strikes in the 1960s made apparent the need to analyse political protest forms of participation as an important part of political participation dynamics (Kavanagh, 1983:186). "Unconventional"<sup>20</sup> forms of political actions and political sophistication increased at the same time as trust in

---

<sup>19</sup> Kaase and Marsh (1979:33-35) mention deaths from domestic violence, armed attacks, riots and anti-government protest demonstrations in the Netherlands, Britain, the USA, Germany and Austria, as well as protest activities in Northern Ireland, particularly during the 1960s-1970s, as examples.

<sup>20</sup> Kaase and Marsh (1979:59) framed conventional forms of political participation as institutionalised modes which are "acts of political involvement directly or indirectly related to the electoral process"(Marsh & Kaase, 1979:84), such as reading up on politics, discussing politics, campaigning, contacting political or public officials work on community problems and attending political meetings, as opposed to unconventional political participation such as political protest forms which utilise tactics such as petitions, demonstrations, boycotts and strikes.

governments declined. These occurrences challenged findings of empirical studies done before the 1960s which were conducted during periods of political stability and economic growth, but which managed to sketch a very partial picture of the political processes which emerge from the 1960s onwards at best (Barnes & Kaase, 1979). The theme of the day was no longer stability, but change and with that came a return to the ideals of classic democratic theories<sup>21</sup> (Barnes & Kaase, 1979:14).

Furthermore, during the 1960s discontent with the limited range of political science research as result of the behaviorist movement prompted an increase in academic interest in normative questions during the 1970s, as seen in the works of Rawls (1971) and Nozick (1974). Seeking to drive the field of political science into new directions, scholars dissatisfied with the over-emphasis of behaviorism on studying only observable phenomena became evident (Heywood, 2007:15). Behaviorists worked to shape political research into a rigorous scientific discipline, quite in line with the natural sciences (Easton, 1969:1051), which severely narrowed the scope of political studies by preventing it from straying beyond what is directly observable (Heywood, 2007:15). From this developed what Easton (1969:1051) calls the post-behavioural revolution, which fully evolved during the 1970s.

Socio-political changes, as mentioned earlier, also impacted on transformations of the focus of the social sciences. Such an example is the post-behavioural critique of empirical work prior to these changes, targeting especially elitist and pluralist theories. Prior to these shifts, research focused on conventional forms of political participation, totally disregarding more direct forms of political participation such as protest behaviour. Whether the concepts of these actions were not thoroughly developed and established, or the rightful place of these forms of political action was wrongly overlooked is not clear, but these unconventional forms of political participation - for the most part unexplored prior to the work of Barnes and Kaase (1979) (Ekman & Amnå, 2012 :6) - are linked to other developments in society. The deficiency in knowledge pertaining to more unconventional forms of political participation demanded the attention of scholars (Barnes & Kaase, 1979:14).

Barnes and Kaase (1979), with their book *Political Action*, were among the first scholars to do empirical work on unconventional political participation in advanced industrial societies. The

---

<sup>21</sup> These include equality and the rights of minorities (Barnes & Kaase, 1979:14).

authors (1979:27) specifically used the term “political action”<sup>22</sup> rather than “political participation”. At the time their book appeared, empirical research had yet to catch up to the new emphasis on non-institutionalised non-electoral political actions which developed after changes in mass politics in Western democracies in the 1960s (Barnes & Kaase, 1979:27). The authors aver that political protest and violent political behaviour manifested worldwide throughout history and have always been worthy of analysis. But at the time of their research, political science was poor in theories on political action except for theoretical fragments derived from other theories on related topics (Barnes & Kaase, 1979:15).

### **2.2.2. Forms of political participation**

Currently, “political participation” is a more comprehensive concept than the uni-dimensional meaning it had at first. It allows for the understanding that many different forms of political engagement exist (Dalton, 2008:33). Political activities may take place in different arenas and contexts, and involve numerous modes as well as various actors (Kitschelt & Rehm, 2008:446, 449, 465). However, the ambiguous nature of the discussions on political participation in recent years means that gaining clarity on which activities constitute forms of democratic political participation is essential (Birch, 2007: 87; Ekman & Amnå, 2012:3-4).

Verba and Nie (1972:2-3) identified four general types of political participation: 1) voting, 2) campaign activity, 3) contacting officials, and 4) cooperative or communal activities. They excluded protest behaviour. The authors found these activities not to be interchangeable, but rather that citizens tend to focus on the political activities which correspond with their motivations and goals. Furthermore, they found that certain political activities tend to cluster together as modes of participation.<sup>23</sup>

Dalton (2008:33) in his book *Citizen Politics* (2008), adopts the four types of political participation as identified by Verba and Nie (1972), but added two types to the list: 1) protest

---

<sup>22</sup> Barnes and Kaase (1979) specifically focused on political action rather than political participation, given their theoretical concerns regarding a lack of empirical research on direct non-institutionalised non-electoral political action at the time of their studies. The authors highlight the co-operative qualities of political action and the possible pressures and threats exerted by such actions which might shape the interactions between partisans and political authorities (Kaase & Marsh, 1979:27, 39). The particular interest of the study was to measure and explain political action, specifically unconventional political behaviour, the focal point being “concrete acts of unconventional political behaviour”. The actions analysed as such behaviour were petitions, demonstrations, boycotts, occupations, blockades, rent strikes, and unofficial strikes.

<sup>23</sup> Later, Verba, Nie and Kim (1978), and Milbrath and Goel (1977) conceptualise political participation in an even broader sense. They depicted political participation as a multi-dimensional concept by distinguishing different styles and levels of difficulty in participation. Furthermore, they differentiated between conventional and unconventional participation, making for even more probing research possibilities and themes.



and other forms of contentious politics, and 2) internet activism. The levels of pressure exerted on officials differ, the possibility of conflict varies, the effort required to take part in different political activities varies and the amount of cooperation with others also differs between these modes of political activity (Dalton, 2008: 35). Furthermore, forms of political participation vary with regards to the extent to which they can be multiplied. On the one end is voting with mandated equality, since each individual can make use of only one opportunity to vote for every election. On the other end are campaign contributions which can be inflated according to the means of the contributor. Additionally, political activities have different capacities to convey messages to political decision-makers. Voting offers little information to the receiving end, whilst information rich acts such as making contact with officials allows for specific and detailed messages to be conveyed (Verba *et al.*, 1995:9-10).

Different typologies to distinguish amongst political activities have developed over the years. Coffé & Bolzendahl (2010:319) (in exploring the gender differences in political participation) measured voting and political party membership as “institutional” participation and other politically important but less institutionalized behaviours as political “activism”. These include taking part in a demonstration, the signing of petitions, boycotting products for political/ethical/environmental reasons or directly contacting a politician. Political activism can again be differentiated into types of participation. Some are collective in nature, others private acts of activism. Some involve direct contact, others deliver their message in a more indirect manner.

Many other increasingly complicated classifications and typologies of political participation activities may be found within the discipline.<sup>24</sup> These various classifications of political activities may offer challenges to political participation scholars. Kitschelt and Rhem (2008:449) argue that the numerous typologies of political participation are disjointed and only identified isolated types of actions. Individuals might take part in political activities as a once-off event, but more often than not their contributions form part of a complex web of activities constructed around a certain site to express political views (Kitschelt & Rhem, 2008:450). In addition, Van Deth (2001) asserts that “the study of political participation in the last fifty years is the study of a continuously expanding number of specific forms of political participation”. The failure to

---

<sup>24</sup> Some of these typologies and classifications are mentioned here. Ekman and Amnå (2012) distinguish between “latent” and “manifest” forms of political participation. Teorell, Torcal and Montero (2006) classify political activities as electoral participation, consumer participation, party activity, protest activity or contact activity. Berger (2009) distinguishes between civil and moral engagement. Dalton (1988:64) created a scheme with thresholds to distinguish between different forms of unconventional political behaviour.

clarify what activities should be regarded as political and what activities as non-political activities means that the study of political participation has become “a theory of everything” according to Van Deth (2001).

The different forms, typologies and the arguments pertaining to the conceptualisation of political participation, make it difficult for scholars to decide which forms to include when embarking on research on political participation. Without getting enmeshed in the intricate debates concerning different typologies and classifications of political participation activities, four forms of political participation will be investigated in this study. Inglehart and Catterberg (2002:6-7), in their study on trends in political action, simply distinguishes between conventional political action and unconventional political action. For them, partially drawing from Barnes and Kaase (1979), conventional political action involves writing to a parliamentary representative and voting, while unconventional political action involves demonstrations, boycotts and the occupation of buildings (Inglehart & Catterberg (2003:6-7). Hail (2011) uses attending peaceful demonstrations, signing petitions and joining boycotts in his study on Eastern religions and their impact on political passivity or action. He asserts that these forms of extra-institutional political participation measure a deeper level of engagement in politics than other forms of lawful political participation, particularly more than voting. This study will draw from these assertions in conceptualising political participation.<sup>25</sup>

### **2.3. Perspectives on factors that motivate political participation**

Political participation researchers are often concerned with who takes part in political activities and how citizens choose to take part (or not take part). These are vital questions to consider, as political participation has an impact on policy results. The citizens who communicate with policymakers are more likely to have their interests represented when political and policy decisions are made. Many models and explanations have been developed to serve as tools to investigate what motivates citizens to participate. Leighley (1995:181), in his review on research concerning mass political participation and the motivational factors involved, identifies three broad main theoretical underpinnings in studies on the discipline, namely: 1) rational choice theories, 2) socio-economic status (SES) theories, and 3) social capital theories. Likewise, Pattie, Seyd and Whiteley (2003) also identify these three alternative theories to explain citizenship and civic engagement, although instead of SES theories, they used a version of this theory called civic voluntarism.

---

<sup>25</sup> See Chapter 3, pages 55-58.

Firstly, scholars following the rational choice approach emphasise that decisions to participate in political activities are based on cost-benefit analysis by rational actors within a political system (Dalton & Klingemann, 2007:13). These theories work with the fact that political participation requires resources and time (Dalton, 2008: 57). The limitation of this approach is the fact that it assumes full rationality under all circumstances, which is very rarely the case.<sup>26</sup> The logic of this approach may bring about contradictory conclusions<sup>27</sup> (Pattie *et al.*, 2003: 444).

Democratic citizens are almost “rationally ignorant”, according to Downs (cited in Milner, 2000:83). There is a contradiction between “rational citizens” wanting democracy to work well for the benefits they can derive from a democratic society along with the realisation that informed citizens are needed to make democracy work but, on the other hand, the same “rational citizens” know that the costs of informing themselves are not outweighed by the individual benefits of doing so (Milner, 2000:83). Even theorists<sup>28</sup> such as Downs (1957: 245) regard political participation activities to be irrational in most cases, as the effort to participate requires more from the citizens than the expected returns from their participation - particularly since every individual effort is unlikely to have a significant impact on political decision-making. Rational actors would either defer from participating in political activities, or “free-ride” and reap the benefits of the efforts of other actors. Given that citizens still do participate, it can be deduced that the choice of participation extends beyond mere self-interested calculations (Dalton, 2008:57).

In order to explain why citizens still do participate, Olsen (1965) distinguished between collective benefits (available to both participants and non-participants) and selective benefits (available only for participants). He avers that citizens will participate if the benefits they receive (whether collective or selective) surpass the costs involved to participate. Whiteley and Seyd (1996, 1998) combined rational choice and socio-psychological models of participation to

---

<sup>26</sup> In order to address this limitation, researchers utilise the behavioural economic model as approach in attempt to tie rational and psychological perspectives. According to this approach citizens try to maximize their own welfare. It assumes that citizens have limited computational capacities and attention, as well as that citizens keep their expectations of others, as well as their desires, fixed (Sniderman & Levendusky, 2007:437-438).

<sup>27</sup> An example of such a conclusion is Down’s voting paradox which explains that the chances of one voter’s participation being pivotal to the outcome of an election is very slight. If rational actors then disregard potential benefits in comparison with their personal efficacy in achieving the benefits which means it is thus less likely for an individual to participate since their vote is not crucial to the outcome, then all individuals in a truly rational electorate should abstain from voting (Pattie *et al.*, 2003:444)

<sup>28</sup> Other scholars who were inspired by the work of Downs (1957) include Black (1958), Plott (1967), Davis, Hinich and Ordeshook (1970), Enelow and Hinich (1984) and Clavert (1985).

outline a “general incentives” rational action model. This model takes into account the costs and benefits of participation to individuals, as well as citizens’ attachments and groups. Fishkin (1995:148) argues that the choice to acquire the needed information for political participation is dependent on the social capital motivating rational citizens to do so or not. Citizens in a civic community with dense community networks and activities are more likely to internalize norms to motivate them to participate and join with others. As Tocqueville noted, political participation is dependent on “habits of association ... making it easier for each individual to participate ... for mutual interest” (cited in Milner, 2000:83).

Secondly, the social capital theoretical framework offers different insights into the nature of political participation. During the 1980s social capital studies gained academic repute, particular the work of three scholars, namely: Pierre Bourdieu, James Coleman and Robert Putnam (Steenekamp, 2011:20). All three of these key social capital scholars emphasise the value of networks and relationships as resource, although in different ways (Steenekamp, 2011:33). Putnam’s work (1993, 1995, 2000) especially contributed to the existing popularity of social capital as academic concept, since his work managed to appeal to a greater audience (Steenekamp, 2011:21).

For Putnam (2000:18-19) the essence of social capital theory is that “social networks have value and that social contacts affect the productivity of individual and groups” (Putnam, 2000:18-19). Social capital, according to Putnam (2000:19), can be defined as the “connections among individuals-social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them”. Essential to social capital theories is Putnam’s (1993) claim that membership and taking part in local organisations cultivates a sense of trust amongst citizens. Societies where many citizens take part in social and voluntary activities are likely to be more trusting, affluent, successful and well-governed than societies where this is not the case. A positive correlation between higher levels of trust and voluntary activities with higher levels of political activism should thus be evident (Pattie *et al.*, 2003:445).

According to its exponents, social capital enables actors who have managed to attain this asset (through membership in social networks and/or other social structures) benefit from it and achieve goals they would not have been able to without being holders of such an asset (Portes, 1998:6; Steenekamp: 2011:71; Rubenson, 2000). This argument which asserts that social capital brings about “tangible benefits” to those who have it, can be substantiated through studies testing

for evidence supporting it (Steenekamp, 2011:45). The claim that relationships and networks can serve as resources has been tested in a various empirical contexts and researchers have discovered numerous ways in which these networks and relationships of people can assist in improving various aspects of their lives<sup>29</sup> (Steenekamp, 2011:46). In political science, a great body of literature pertaining to the relationship between social capital and political behaviour developed from this theoretical framework.<sup>30</sup>

However, critics note a few reservations they have with the concept and use of social capital theory. The first point, as mentioned by Rubenson (2000), relates to issues concerned with the confusion over the definition of social capital which may limit the usefulness of the term in the social sciences and consequently poses problems for the measurement of social capital.

A related point of critique is the opposition of some scholars to the use of “capital” as part of the concept. Cohen (2000:220-221), for example, states that trust and interpersonal relationships are “specific and contextual”, whereas the use of social capital implies an unsound parallel between “direct interpersonal relationships and economic exchanges on the market”. Furthermore, like all types of capital, social capital is value neutral. It is a resource which can help in attaining goals - good and bad - which would not have been possible in its absence. Social capital itself cannot be either good or bad (Rubenson, 2000).

The above criticism relates to the mostly unexplored darker side of the notion of social capital (Steenekamp, 2011:55). Portes (1998:18) mentions that “sociability cuts both ways”. Thus, just as social capital may hold positive benefits for its holders (as Putnam emphasises in his work), social capital may deliver negative (intended or unintended) outcomes (Steenekamp, 2011:55). Such a negative outcome is that social capital may promote inequality, since “access to different types of networks is unequally distributed” (Steenekamp, 2011:56). The value of the attained social capital depends on its social location (Edwards & Foley, 1997:677) and it can even be used by more powerful networks to suppress the social capital of actors in less powerful networks (Schulman & Anderson, 1999: 367-369) and limit non-group members’ access to groups which benefit from social capital (Portes, 1998:15). Furthermore, actors can misuse social capital for intended perverse gains (such as organised crime networks and militias groups) (Steenekamp,

---

<sup>29</sup> Social capital theories have been applied to a variety of themes and in various disciplines (such as health, education, history, politics and sociology). See Steenekamp (2011:46-55) for further details.

See Rubenson (2000) and Portes (1998:3-6) for more detail.

<sup>30</sup> See Lake and Huckfeldt (1998); Teorell (2003); Abbarracin and Valevov (2011) and Teney and Hanquinet (2012) as examples.

2011:59; Rubenson, 2000), as well as unintended negative consequences, such as in the political arena where a small group of elites and/or community leaders often dominates political processes and thus only their particular perspective are included when policy decisions are made (Steenekamp: 2011: 60).

On a more theoretical level, scholars such as Foley and Edwards (1998) and Tarrow (1996), question Putnam's historical inferences and causal reasoning. Tarrow (cited in Booth & Richard, 1998) in particular proposes that Putnam's reasoning in his earlier work, claiming that civil society shaped government performance, is flawed and asserts that the opposite – the political context shaping civil society - is more probable. In addition, Foley & Edwards (1996:44), through underlining Tocqueville's emphasis on the importance of political freedom of association to enable a strong civil society, believe that Putnam misconstrued Tocqueville's ideas on civil society and they support Tarrow's and Steenekamp's argument that political context forms civil society (Booth & Richard, 1998; Steenekamp, 2011).

Thirdly, there is the SES model. Leighley (1995:181) affirms that this is the most broadly accepted model for explaining political participation and that the most empirical studies concerned with political participation rely on the SES model as developed by Verba and Nie (1972). This model asserts that political participation choices are primarily driven by the resources available to the citizen, as well as the individual's civic orientations. The evidence for this assertion is overwhelming in political participation literature with numerous scholars pinpointing a relationship between level of education, as well as income and occupation (Leighley, 1995:183). Over the years, studies adopting SES as theoretical foundation have expanded to multivariate analyses in order to enable more detailed analyses of more than specifically SES dispositions and characteristics of individuals and their relationship with political participation choices. Some of these characteristics which enjoy academic attention are age and generational differences,<sup>31</sup> gender,<sup>32</sup> race and ethnicity<sup>33</sup> (Leighley, 1995:183-184), as well as religion<sup>34</sup> and regional<sup>35</sup> differences (rural/metro divide or geographical divides) (Dalton, 2008:161).

---

<sup>31</sup> See Quintelier & Hooghe (2011); Dalton (2007); Jennings (1987, 1979); Quintelier (2008); Sapiro (2004), Soule (2001), Bennett (2000); Jennings, Kent and Stoker (2001); Wass (2007) and Melo and Stockemer (2012).

<sup>32</sup> See Norris (2007); Lafferty (1978); Coffé and Bolzendahl (2010); Fridkin and Kenney (2007); Bernstein (2005).

<sup>33</sup> See Kotzé (2001); Leighley & Vedlitz (1999); Pantoja & Segura (2003).

<sup>34</sup> See Esmer & Petterson (2007); Hail (2011); Patterson (2005); Inglehart and Norris (2004); Leege (1988).

<sup>35</sup> See Moon (2005); Cho (2000); Choi and Lee (1980); Kim and Choe (1988); Nie, Powell and Prewitt (1969a & b); McDonough, Shin and Moisés (1998); Bendix and Lipset (1966:63).

Addressing the need for a more comprehensive model, Brady, Verba and Schlozman (1995) moved beyond the SES model by incorporating not only the socioeconomic component, but also civic skills (i.e. communicational and organisational capacities) as well. This led to the assembling of a resource-based model with methodological and theoretical advantages by not focusing only on psychological engagement with politics, but also by yielding the impact of the components emphasized by the SES model (Brady *et al.*, 1995:271). This model, called the “Civic Voluntarism Model” (CVM), combines the social-psychological theories of why people participate in political activities with the SES model (Dalton, 2008:58).

The CVM model develops the SES model in four ways. Firstly, the conceptualisation of resources by Verba *et al.* (1995) is more comprehensive than in other SES models in that economic resources, as well as education and time as resources are taken into account. Secondly, drawing from the rational choice approach, the authors consider the citizens’ sense of political efficacy as having an impact on participation choices. Thirdly, the CVM takes into account the importance of the general involvement of citizens in the political system and the effect of this on political participation. Lastly, Verba *et al.* (1995) regard mobilisation (as part of a network group) as having an impact on citizens’ political participation choices (Pattie *et al.*, 2003:445).

The dominant theme of the SES model is that individuals of higher socio-economic status are more active in politics (Bendix & Lipset, 1966; Leighley & Nagler, 1992; Verba & Nie, 1972; Wolfinger & Rosenstone, 1980; Leighley & Vedlitz, 1999). Thus, those with higher levels of education, higher levels of income and higher status employments are more likely to be politically active (Conway, 1991; Leighley, 1990; Leighley & Nagler, 1992). However, the SES model never explains this relationship. The CVM aims to address these short-comings. It illuminates what resources are needed to carry the costs of different types of political activities and the manner in which the endowment of certain resources supports or limits the capability of individuals to participate (Verba *et al.*, 1995:285). Through its focus on resources, the CVM applies a variant of the rational actor approach not often applied in the political sciences. It utilises the principles of what is called in “consumer behaviour<sup>36</sup>” in economics. This approach does not only emphasize the preferences of individuals, but the options available for the

---

<sup>36</sup> Consumer behaviour is the study of how groups and/or individuals choose, secure or get rid of services, products, ideas and/or experiences with the aim of satisfying their needs, and the impacts of these processes and choices on society and the individual/group. The approach strives to discern the process of decision-making of the individuals/groups and it attempts to understand the wants and/or needs of the individuals/groups by studying demographic indicators and the behaviour of these actors. Furthermore, it investigates the influence of society on these actors and their decisions (Kuester, 2012:110).

individuals as well. These limits of choice, unlike preferences, are easier to observe directly and a more straightforward explanation can be derived (Verba *et al.*, 1995:286). Verba *et al.* (1995:286) utilise this idea and apply it to political behaviour by focusing on the costs and benefits of taking part in political activities and they thus retain the rigid assumptions made in analyses based on variants of the rational actor approach, but still provide a theoretically sound and in-depth explanation of political participation. Its resource-centred approach explains how the status and class of individuals constrain the choices individuals can make with regards to political participation.

The CVM also manages to address one of the core points of critique of the SES model: its weak theoretical basis. The addition of the insights of Verba *et al.* (1995) on how socioeconomic position and political activity of citizens are linked fills this gap. The CVM in essence enhances and illuminates the inner workings of the SES model by providing a deeper understanding of how and why high levels of SES correlates with higher levels of political participation. The model does not incorporate all aspects of political systems that might significantly impact on political participation, but it aims to incorporate the most significant aspects for the purposes of their study (Verba *et al.*, 1995:19).

Particularly compelling in their approach is the way the authors relate the SES model and citizen activity to explain political participation. The SES model emphasises the effects of education level, income and occupation on political choices, and it asserts that citizens with more resources to participate are more likely to be the politically active segment of the citizenry. It is therefore often the more affluent and educated citizens whose opinions, priorities and needs are heard by political decision-makers (Milbrath, 1965; Milbrath & Goel, 1977; Rosenstone & Hanson, 1993; Brady *et al.*, 1995; Pattie *et al.*, 2003:445; Beaumont, 2011:217; Scervini & Segatti: 2012,10) However, the unique insights that Verba *et al.* (1995:19) gain from their analyses of the origins of participatory factors and the consequences of this on the different forms of political participation enables the authors to extend the SES model and offer a richer explanation of political participation. Verba *et al.* (1995:3) explain participation in political activities as motivated by two fundamental factors, namely the individual's motivation and the capacity to do so. The CVM considers being part of a network of recruitment as the third factor determining political participation choices, since networks motivate citizens to participate in political activities (Verba *et al.*, 1995:4).



In other words, this explanatory model of political activity derives from three factors. In search of an answer of the question of who participates and why, the authors changed the question to ask who do not participate and why. They offer three answers as explanation. The first reason is that the individuals cannot participate; in other words, they do not have the means and resources (such as the time, money and skills) to participate. Secondly, they do not want to participate. Some individuals do not engage with political matters, have very little interest in politics and political issues, or have little knowledge of political matters. Lastly, some individuals are not part of recruitment networks and/or nobody asked or mobilised them to participate in political activities (Verba *et al.*, 1995:15-16). The authors did not only aim to address these questions, but also traced the origins of these participatory factors in non-political and informal experiences. They looked at institutions with which individuals associate as they move through life (such as non-political organisations and religious institutions) which may foster participation. These institutions often serve as the sites of political cues and as the locus of recruitment to activity, as well as sites for developing skills as resources of political participation (Verba *et al.*, 1995:17-18).

The study by Verba *et al.*'s (1995) focused on investigating political participation in America in their search for answers. The authors (1995:272) emphasised time, money and skills as resources to enable participation (determining whether citizens can participate). For them, political engagement (impacting on whether citizens want to participate) includes elements such as a sense of political efficacy, individual interest in politics, civic values underpinning political engagement, identification with a political party and the support of specific issues. As factors of recruitment (which determine whether citizens are asked to participate), the authors looked at the impact that requests to participate amongst members of groups at work, church or other organizations have. Since its publication, however, researchers have built on and elaborated on the CVM and its variables.

Kitschelt and Rhem (2008:449) embrace a more comprehensive idea of personal resources. The authors assert that a “consistently confirmed influence on political participation” comes from “socio-economic skills and endowments”. According to Kitschelt and Rhem (2008: 456), a very important resource factor is the availability of time. From here, their emphasis on variables such as occupation, age and education is drawn. Education enables citizens to process and understand more information, as well as fosters a stronger self-confidence and the sense of capacity to control the circumstances they live in, empowers actors to pursue certain goals strategically

through political participations and makes it possible for civilians to take part in deliberative processes to achieve certain set objectives. Indirectly, education has an impact through its influence on income levels. More educated citizens are more likely to have more financial resources available and more flexibility with regards to time management in order to participate in political activities. Education,<sup>37</sup> income level and professional/occupational life may also constrain the variety of civic activities individuals take part in, which may in turn affect interpersonal communication and orientations (such as beliefs and political preferences) and could foster the likelihood of coordinated political participation, as well as the readiness to be involved in political action (Kitschelt & Rehm, 2008:465). Here, personal resources interconnect with what Kitschelt and Rehm (2008:465) labels “recruitment” and Dalton (2008:58) calls “group connections”.

With regards to personal resources (the characteristics determining who can participate), social status is perceived by many political scientists as the most important predictor of political participation.<sup>38</sup> Usually, education and income level are included as personal resource factors, since citizens of higher status are more likely to have the time, money, ability and the access to information to get involved (Verba & Nie, 1972). Dalton (2008:57) adds a few characteristics to this list. He mentions that related research has also been done on how participation might vary according to age and gender as well.

Group membership and networks can especially be regarded as a relevant enhancer of participation, precisely for citizens with fewer resources to participate, but have moved beyond the level of mere naive socio-economic political activism. According to Kitschelt and Rhem (2008:465), residential and occupational life are both influential parameters of recruitment. Organisations related to the work process, but also cultural, regional or social civic associations, can bring about social communication which in turn fosters opportunities for collective action. Likewise, class and group milieu sustain and may foster the same capacity for collective actions. The presence of associational groups attracts citizens who are more likely to linger at the margins of political life into political participation. Dalton (2008:59) supports Kitschelt and Rhem in this notion by mentioning the different authors (Verba *et al.*, 1995; Putnam, 2003; Armingeon, 2007; Gray & Caul, 2000) who claim that political action can be increased by citizens’ participation in social groups. Dalton elaborates on this by asserting that experiences in

---

<sup>37</sup> See also Hillygus (2005); Berinsky and Gabriel (2010).

<sup>38</sup> See Knutsen (2007); Leighley (1995); Brady *et al.* (1995).

associational groups might develop the skills and the orientations of the members that might be utilised to enable them to take part in political actions and motivate participation. Also, political party affiliation may motivate individuals to take part in political activities (Karp & Banducci, 2007:217). A sense of party identification may stimulate citizens to take part in political activities in support of their preferred party. On the other hand, individuals with few or no party bonds are often less concerned with election outcomes and political matters (Dalton, 2008:59).

Dalton (2008:161) furthermore mentions the role of associational networks such as class and regional differences, race and ethnicity, as well as religion as networks which might further political participation. Additionally, Kitschelt and Rehm (2008:466) mention the role of family life as almost being at the intersection between the resources available and group connections. Within families, experience, connections, generations, work and residential life connect. Family life may foster a taste and interest in political life and provide the skills to participate. Related to family life being a factor in political activism trends are the demographic traits mentioned earlier by Dalton, namely gender and age. Studies have shown that women and younger citizens tend to participate less than men and the older generations as a result of upbringing, culture (related to family life) and political experience (Kitschelt & Rhem, 2008:466). Furthermore, Dalton mentions Uhlaner's (1989) claim (cited in Dalton 2008:59) that these various groups may even provide a reference point for individuals so as to ascertain whether they perceive political participation as a worthwhile activity or not.

Concerning the impact of political attitudes and political engagement as motivational factor for political participation, Dalton (2008:58) and Pattie *et al.* (2003) assert that participation patterns are influenced by the nature of political action and the beliefs of citizens. Participation might even be stimulated by a sense of political efficacy<sup>39</sup>, or be limited by cynicism, which again might foster apathy and withdrawal from political activities. Furthermore, political dissatisfaction might causally influence political participation (although the relationship is a topic of debate). Dissatisfaction might stimulate political action in order to address issues at hand, whilst conversely political satisfaction might encourage political participation, since satisfaction fosters support for the political process.

---

<sup>39</sup> Beaumont (2011:217), citing scholars such as Almond and Verba (1963), Bandura (1997), and Morrell (2003), asserts that "a sense of internal political efficacy, or political confidence or competence, is a crucial component of political agency and democratic participation". In other words, the individuals own perception of whether he/she can have an impact to effectively influence politics play a role in determining political participation choices. Also see Chang and Chyi (2009); Quintelier and Hooghe (2011); Finkel (2007).

Other attitudinal factors to consider, according to Dalton (2008:59), include partisanship and ideology. According to Dalton (2008:59), political process may be altered by considerable concentrations of political participation among ideological extremists. Kitschelt and Rehm (2008:466) concur with these notions by stating that orientations are the final and proximate determinants of political participation. For them, such orientations include ideology and political interest. Complex ideologies offer the combination of analytical and descriptive propositions with normative inclinations, as well as strategic prescriptions of action, to move from the given state to the desired state. The political knowledge of individuals can then be organized into these different ideologies or thought patterns. Perceived immediate causal mechanisms to shape ideologies are engagement in politics and civic involvement, although associations with socio-economic and occupational factors have also been identified (Kitschelt & Rehm, 2008: 466-467).

The CVM, however, does have some limitations, of which the two most mentioned are discussed here. Some scholars find it questionable that the authors find the motivation and capacity to participate in political activities in a non-political setting, almost in disregard of the structure of political institutions that facilitate and determine the opportunities for participation (Rubenson, 2000:11). Mindful of this point of critique, this study will consider the political background and situation of the countries which will be analysed.

Furthermore, Verba *et al.* (1995) find convincing connections between citizen involvement in non-political institutions, particularly between the improvement of civic skills and civic capacities as part of these institutions and political participation, but the authors fail to answer the question why people participate in politics (Rubenson, 2000:14). Since the purpose of this study is not to identify why people participate in political activities, but rather what the predictors are of political participation, this point of criticism will not be regarded as a limitation of this study.

On the basis of this overview of different approaches to analyse political participation, it is important to note that no explanation of political participation will ever be fully comprehensive and able to capture all individual and social factors impacting on political behaviour choices. Therefore, in order to select a limited set of variables, a particular theoretical underpinning should be utilised to explain phenomena. When embarking on empirical studies, the measurability of factors and whether the explanatory factors are theoretically interpretable and substantially interesting, as well as whether the factors aim to explain relevant issues should be

taken into account (Verba *et al*, 1995:274). This study will use the CVM as theoretical underpinning, particularly building on studies of political participation that have the same theoretical foundation.

#### **2.4. Combining two recent studies on predictors of political participation**

There is a growing body of contemporary research on political participation in both sociology and political science (Lamprianou, 2013:21), but a full overview cannot be offered here. Rather, the emphasis will be on two recent studies on specifically predictors of political participation, namely: *Citizen Politics* by Dalton (2008) and *Mass Politics and Culture in Democratizing Korea* by Shin (1999). The reasons for this are: 1) like me, both authors took a particular interest in the possible predictors of political participation – asking “why”, “how” and “who” questions in order to understand the role of citizens and their political choices as part of democratic processes more clearly; 2) both of these authors looked at voting and “unconventional” forms of political participation as part of their analysis; and 3) the CVM forms the theoretical underpinning of their studies, as it does of mine. Furthermore, it was Shin’s recommendation that a comparative analysis of new democracies be undertaken, in combination with the interesting findings of Dalton’s comparative study on advanced democracies, which sparked my initial interest in the gap in the literature that this study aims to fill.

Particularly relevant for this study is that when the correlates of political action across nations and modes are compared, the way that the political process in nations shapes the choices of its citizens on participation becomes evident (Dalton, 2008:57). Furthermore, societies value political participation differently. Political participation may be a desirable goal, but obtaining it involves costs and trade-offs in terms of other goals. These costs and trade-offs vary between different societies and at different levels of development and modernization. Scholars have tried to ascertain the relationships between aspects of development and political participation (Huntington, 1976:17). The works of Dalton (2008) and Shin (1999) in this regards as been influential for my study.

Dalton (2008:6) asserts that politics and the citizens taking part in political actions have changed over the years. Correspondingly, the transformation of the democratic process in which these citizens participate is inevitable. By using data gathered in Germany, France, Great Britain and the USA in his study *Citizen Politics*, Dalton devotes particular attention to the role of citizens

within the democratic process, how this role has evolved and how changes in this role alter the nature of democracy (Dalton 2008:3-4).

Dalton (2008:3) relies mainly on opinion surveys to provide specific standards to evaluate the various aspects and illustrations of public political behaviour and opinions. In investigating who takes part in political activities in these four countries, Dalton utilises the CVM (as per Verba *et al.*). The study takes into account six variables (from this model) to represent the three influencing factors as stipulated by the CVM (personal resources, political orientations and group connections) as part of a statistical analysis with the aim of pin-pointing predictors of political participation.

Dalton's study illustrates that young people are merely changing the way they participate; they are not ceasing to participate as many scholars aver. Younger citizens in advanced societies tend to take part in more direct action methods, although it is true that youth participation in electoral politics is declining in general. Furthermore, the study again emphasizes the importance of personal resources and their relationship with political participation. The growing complexity of politics in these countries requires sophisticated and knowledgeable citizens to take part in political activities. Education and status perceivably influences the inclination to participate in the political process (Dalton, 2008:71). The impact of political attitudes on political participation in these countries, however, varies. "Political efficacy", for example, is an important motivator for electoral participation, but less so for other forms of participation. Interestingly enough, "Left/Right ideological affiliations" have little impact on political participation choices in general, but do influence citizens' inclination to take part in protests (especially amongst those with resources to do so) (Dalton, 2008:72). This has been the finding for more developed countries. Furthermore, Dalton's study found a relationship between group ties and political participation. "Party attachments" influences especially electoral participation, but has less of an impact on communal or campaign activity. "Group membership", however, encourages all forms of political participation, according to Dalton, particularly political activities which take place in groups (such as protests) (Dalton, 2008:72). However, Dalton focused on four advanced industrial countries (namely the USA, Great Britain, the Federal Republic of Germany and France).

As stated, little comparative research has been done on how relevant democratic theories are in new democracies in general. What have been done, are single case studies, such as the one by

D.C. Shin on democracy in South Korea (1999). Furthermore, scholars such as Bratton, Mattes and Gymiah-Boadi (2005), Mattes and Thiel (1998) and Schulz-Herzenberg (2007) have done quite extensive research on political participation in South Africa and Africa, whilst scholars such as Patterson (2005) and Pantoja and Segurd (2003) investigated political participation in Latin American countries, and Barnes (2006) conducted research on political participation in post-communist countries.

What makes Shin's study particularly of interest for this study is the fact that Shin's study, as Dalton's study, uses the CVM as theoretical underpinning for his study. His study, published as *Mass Politics and Culture in Democratizing Korea* (Shin, 1999), investigates the consolidation of democracy in the Republic of Korea. He incorporates research on mass public opinion and behaviour in order to distinguish between democracy as an ideal and as a practice in this country. The study does not only consider support for democracy, but citizen competence and participation as well (Shin, 1999: xxvii, 67, 95). The study examines the levels and patterns of the citizens' psychological engagement in, and cognitive awareness of, political life, as well as their involvement in political life and associational groupings (Shin, 1999:116).

Shin uses empirical data from the 1994 Korean Democratic Survey to discern how many citizens, separated according to different demographic categories relevant to the political life of the country, took part in certain political activities. Multiple regression analyses (similar to those in Dalton) are then done to show the relationship between the demographic characteristics and the subtypes involved in political participation (Shin, 1999:117). This study found that South Korean Males, of 40 plus years and with a college degree are the most likely to participate in political activities. This is quite similar to the findings of Dalton (2008, 72), which found that age and education levels are some of the strongest predictors of political participation in advanced democracies. Shin (1999:127) hints at the possibilities of a cross-national comparative analysis on political participation in new democracies since this gap has not yet been filled. Such a comparison will prove to be challenging. With my study, I plan to address this identified gap in literature and also to contribute towards a richer understanding of new democracies.

## **2.5. Summary**

This thesis builds on the CVM of Verba *et al.* (1995) and draws from the studies of Dalton (2008) and Shin (1999) in order to analyse the predictors of political participation in new democracies. For this study, the ultimate question is: What attributes of citizens predict political

participation and the associated choices in new democracies? Possible factors contributing to political participation choices will be divided into four categories, namely: demographic characteristics, personal resources, political engagement and motivational factors, and group membership and network factors. Thus, besides the three categories as provided for by the CVM, an additional category will be used for factors which might relate to more than one of the categories.

It is important to remember that this study cannot take into account all factors which may possibly influence individuals' decisions with regards to political participation. Thus, only factors which are relevant to the countries chosen for this study and as derived from the CVM as theoretical underpinning will be used. I have divided these factors into four groups. Firstly, demographic characteristics will include: age, size of town/community, and gender. Secondly, personal resource indicators will include: level of education and self-reported social class. Thirdly, political engagement and motivational factors will include: political ideological orientation and political interest. The last category will include group membership and networks.

The findings of the studies by Dalton and Shin may offer hints as to the possible conclusion this study may reach. It will be interesting to ascertain whether levels of education, gender, age, socio-economic status and political affiliations turn out to be strong predictors of political participation for the chosen new democracies (as in the mentioned studies). The next Chapter will explain how this study aims to fill the identified gap, as well as describe the methodology and research design of this study.



## Chapter 3: Research Design and Methodology

### 3.1. Introduction

The proliferation of survey research in political science in the 1960s in the USA resulted in a mass of public opinion and electoral behaviour data (Kavanagh, 1983: 13). New research technology served as a further catalytic agent for the conceptualisation of political culture and political behaviour based on empirical observation. Statistical analysis allowed for the identification of certain interaction patterns, specifically the relations of social-structural and demographic variables with political and social behaviour, as well as the relationships of attitude variables to social and political behaviour, such as seen in the work done by Almond and Verba (1963) and Milbrath (1965) (Almond, 1980:15).

This study aims to identify the predictors of political participation in new democracies by following in the tradition of previous empirical studies. The research objective of this study is to find possible similarities and/or differences pertaining to predictors of political participation between Third Wave democracies, and aims to gain in insight into more than just the dynamics at work in a single area, but rather to encompass the different cultural regions of the heterogeneous group labelled “new democracies” (Wnuk-Lipinski & Fuchs, 2006:39). This chapter will outline the research design and methodology of this thesis as a comparative, cross-national micro-analytical<sup>40</sup>, cross-sectional study utilising secondary resources (mainly the WVS).

### 3.2. Research design and methodology

#### 3.2.1. A comparative analysis of four new democracies

Partially following Dalton’s study, *Citizen Politics* (2008), four countries are chosen as cases for this study in order to balance the needs for broader comparison and attention to specific national characteristics. However, in contrast to Dalton’s study on advanced industrialised Western countries, this study is concerned with new democracies, namely Chile, Poland, South Africa and

---

<sup>40</sup> Cross-national micro-analysis in political science is the “study of political attitudes and behaviour of individuals in more than one country” (Pierce & Pride, 1972: 13) with two related purposes. The first purpose is to discover and describe differences pertaining to political behaviour of individuals in different nations, emphasising its causes and consequences. This approach focuses on social-psychological and behavioural parameters of different countries and compares the important descriptive characteristics of the micro-level political behaviour of the citizens of these different nations. The second purpose is to discover the common relationships among variables in different countries, which are chosen on the basis of theory. The emphasis of this approach is cross-national comparison of relationships among sets of variables, which is supported by empirical findings (Pierce & Pride, 1972:14).

South Korea. These countries differ with regards to regional cultures, political backgrounds and societal contexts (Nohlen, 2002:14). Their selection was based on a specific set of criteria.

Firstly, as Wilensky (1975:21) asserts, the extent of democracy in a specific society is related to the institutional background allowing for political participation and the inclusivity of citizen participation. Wilensky (1975) relates to the two dimensions used by Dahl (1971) to measure “polyarchy”,<sup>41</sup> namely liberalisation (legitimate political contestation) and inclusiveness (to what extent citizens take part in political activities) (Verba, Nie & Kim, 1978:3). Lijphart (1991) asserts that it is essential to take into account the political institutions which emerge during the transition to democracy when looking at democratic consolidation. Lijphart (1991) argues that it is not only the transition to democracy which is important, but that coming to an agreement over the proper institutional framework for the new administration plays a substantial role in determining the success of democratisation. The political institutions that may impact on the dynamics of democracy and democratic consolidation are constitutions and electoral systems. The design of political institutions and how they relate to society offer valuable insights into how different political actors within a political system form part of the system, as well as how polities continue to benefit from democratic development and stability or not (Heine, 2006:92). Framing the different institutional backgrounds of democracies facilitates a deeper understanding of democratic progress/regress, as well as political outcomes, possibly stimulated by these institutions (Heine, 2006:66). Table 3.1 provides an overview of the institutional background and governmental machinery of the four countries selected for this study.

Secondly, internal cleavages, such as ethnic, religious, regional, economic and social differentiations in the four countries, can be used as a way of showing how these countries differ with regards to social dynamics. Such cleavages can reinforce each other and may often lead to social tensions and/or conflicts (Berg-Schlosser, 2006: 410), which in part set the tone for political culture and behaviour. Berg-Schlosser’s attestations tie in with Dahl’s (1971:206) assertion that sub-cultural cleavages are a “variable condition” which affects the progress and/or regress made while countries develop towards “polyarchal opposition and political participation”

---

<sup>41</sup>The term “polyarchy” was formulated by Dahl in his seminal work, *Polyarchy* (1971). The term defines regimes with the proper institutions, political processes and necessary conditions of modern representative democracy and for following the democratic principles as identified by Dahl. He claims that such regimes possess two general features: 1) they have a “high tolerance of opposition” (Heywood, 2007:33) and with these elements of opposition, the ability to keep the government accountable (for example competitive party systems, protected civil liberties afforded by institutions and a thriving civil society); and 2) the opportunities to take part in political activities are broad enough in scope to enable a credible level of response from citizens (such as with regular and competitive elections) (Heywood, 2007:33).

(Leiserson, 1971:214). Table 3.1 summarises the social cleavages found in the respective countries.

**Table 3.1: An overview of political society in the four selected countries**

	<b>Chile</b>	<b>South Africa</b>	<b>South Korea</b>	<b>Poland</b>
Constitution	Reformed	New	Reformed	New
Executive	Presidential System	Semi-presidential System	Presidential System	Semi-presidential System
Legislation	Weak	Medium	Weak	Medium
Centralization	Centralised	Federal	Centralised	Centralised
Electoral System	Binomial <sup>42</sup>	Proportional Representation	Proportional representation	Proportional Representation
Party System	2 Alliances	Hegemonic/One-party	3 Major Parties	Multi-party
Suffrage (years of age)	18; universal and compulsory <sup>43</sup>	18; universal	19; universal	18; universal
Support for Democracy	Medium	Medium	Relatively Low	Relatively Low
Satisfaction with Performance of Democracy	Medium	Medium	Low	Low
Social Cleavages:				
Ethnic	Some	Yes	No	No
Religious	No	Yes	Some	No
Economic	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Regional	Some	Yes	Yes	Some

Table based on information from “Table 6: Political Factors” and “Table 1: General Characteristics” in Berg-Schlusser (2006: 412, 422), CIA: *World Fact Book* (2012) and the *Political Handbook of the World: 2010* (Banks et al.: 2009).

Thirdly, at the time the WVS data were gathered, all four countries had already transitioned to democracy, but were still in the process of democratic consolidation. The relationship between democratic attitudes towards and satisfaction with democracy, and political participation has been researched by many scholars. The literature on the direction and strength of these relationships are quite fragmented and inconclusive; however, that there are relationships between these variants are hardly disputed (Bratton, 2009: 1). As Dahl (1989) asserts, political culture should be supportive of democratic institutions and ideals in order for the democratisation process to successfully follow through. Political participation, in turn, is an important fundamental part of democratic consolidation (Nohlen, 2002:12-14). Levels of support for democracy, and levels of satisfaction with the performance of democracy, thus offer insight

<sup>42</sup> The binomial voting system is unique to Chile (*The Economist*, 2012). It followed from the Pinochet regime and was institutionalised to establish political stability (Huneus, 2013). During elections parties, coalitions and/or independent organisations present lists with usually two candidates per district in elections for both the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. For more information, see Huneus (2013).

<sup>43</sup> For Chileans, registration to vote is voluntary. However, voting is mandatory for citizens who are registered (*The Economist*, 2012).

into possible concerns pertaining to political participation and democratic consolidation. Table 3.1 provides the levels of support for democracy and the levels of satisfaction in the four countries under investigation.

Fourthly, Inglehart (2000:228) claims that economic development promotes the spread of post-materialist values and cultural changes, which in turn are conducive to deepening democracy. In order to investigate citizens' changing values, Inglehart formulated a value change theory based on two hypotheses: 1) the scarcity hypothesis which is based on the idea that what is in short supply will be what citizens value the most; and 2) the socialisation hypothesis which claims that individuals' values reflect the conditions in which they grew up. Values may vary among societies given differences in (among other things): affluence, levels of education, access to information and welfare systems (Dalton, 2008:81).

Inglehart's work (cited in Dalton, 2008:84) primarily provided for an investigation into changes from materialist values to post-materialist values. Although both materialist and post-materialist values are often supported in societies, one will take priority. More developed countries with higher living standards tend to emphasise post-materialistic values, whilst subsistence economies tend to value materialistic values (Dalton, 2008:89-90). When considering possible predictors of political participation in new democracies, background insight into the values of the citizens of these democracies might add a deeper level of understanding to the dynamics at play as these democracies consolidate. Table 3.2 provides details on the values supported by country<sup>44</sup>.

---

<sup>44</sup>The WVS poses the following three questions related to material versus post-material values to all respondents. The first question asks: "People sometimes talk about what the aims of this country should be for the next ten years. On this card are listed some of the goals which different people would give top priority. Would you please say which one of these you, yourself, consider the most important? And which would be the next most important?" The response categories include: "A high level of economic growth", "Making sure this country has strong defence forces", "Seeing that people have more say about how things are done at their jobs and in their communities" and "Trying to make our cities and countryside more beautiful". The second question asks: "If you had to choose, which one of the things on this card would you say is most important? And which would be the next most important?" The possible answers include: "Maintaining order in the nation", "Giving people more say in important government decisions", "Fighting rising prices" and "Protecting Freedom of Speech". This question is then followed with the following question: "Here is another list. In your opinion, which one of these is most important? And what would be the next most important?" The possible answers include: "A stable economy", "Progress toward a less impersonal and more humane society", "Progress toward a society in which Ideas count more than money" and "The fight against crime".

For the purposes of this study, all the aims which were perceived as most important in each country were used to discern where the value emphasis in the country lies. Table 3.2 summarises the percentage respondents who chose either a materialistic or post-materialistic value per question, by country.

**Table 3.2: Materialist and post-materialist as most important values, by country**

		<b>Chile</b>	<b>Poland</b>	<b>South Africa</b>	<b>South Korea</b>
Q1.	Materialist	65.2	65.7	71.3	64.9
	Post-materialist	34.8	34.3	28.7	35.1
	<b>Total</b>	100	100	100	100
Q2.	Materialist	62.0	64.3	71.6	85.6
	Post-materialist	38.0	35.7	28.4	14.4
	<b>Total</b>	100	100	100	100
Q3.	Materialist	66.4	81.3	86.9	78.6
	Post-materialist	33.6	18.7	13.1	21.4
	<b>Total</b>	100	100	100	100

From the WVS data, it can be discerned that more Chileans underscore post-materialistic values than is the case for the other countries, while South Africans seem to be the least inclined to rate post-materialistic values as the most important for society. In general, all four countries have more respondents emphasizing materialistic values.

Fifthly, all four countries have undergone democratic transformation after 1974<sup>45</sup> and are thus new democracies. However, in order for the democratic regimes to have had some impact on the respective political societies and cultures,<sup>46</sup> countries for which the transformation period was actualised at least a decade before the data used for this study were compiled, are used. Only new democracies for which data were gathered during the fifth wave<sup>47</sup> of the WVS are utilised as cases. Table 3.3 outlines the transition time periods of the respective new democracies used as part of this study.

Sixthly, the countries differ in terms of the regimes they had to overcome in order to become democratic. Such differences make for different experiences in the transformation process, again maximizing the differentiation of the cases with the aim of obtaining perspectives on the impact of the different contextual backgrounds of new democracies on political participation. However, possible similar “patterns” in findings on indicators of political participation can be found, despite these differences.

---

<sup>45</sup> These countries transformed from an authoritarian regime towards democracy as part of the third wave of democracy which commenced in 1974 (Diamond, 1996:20).

<sup>46</sup> It is a generally accepted idea that “the longer democratic norms exist, the longer they will persist” (Schmitter, 1998:33). In this study on political participation in new democracies, the researcher prefers that the countries used for this study had at least a decade for the new regime to have an impact on the political system.

<sup>47</sup> The WVS project managed to administer five sets/waves of surveying between 1981 and 2007. The fifth wave was executed from 2005 until 2007 and it was finalised by 2008 (WVS, 2008:1).

Based on Valenzuela (1992) who asserts that regime change through reform<sup>48</sup> is by far the most promising transformation type to foster democratic consolidation, only new democracies which transformed through reform will be used for this study, but the regime from which they transformed may differ. Table 3.3 specifies the regimes and transition types of the four chosen democracies.

**Table 3.3: General and transformation characteristics**

	<b>Chile</b>	<b>South Africa</b>	<b>South Korea</b>	<b>Poland</b>
Region	South America	Sub-Saharan Africa	East Asia	Eastern Europe
Previous Regime	Personalistic military dictatorship	Racial oligarchy (“apartheid”)	Military dictatorship (bureaucratic-authoritarian)	Post-totalitarian communist
Transition Period	1989-1990	1990-1994	1987	1989-1990
Transition Type	Pact*	Pact	Pact	Pact

Table compiled based on information from “Table 1: General Characteristics” in Berg-Schlosser (2006:412), information gathered from Heine (2006:65) and from the *CIA: World Fact Book* (2012). \*Change took place through reform. All players are brought into the “deal-making” process from the beginning of the transition and a transaction takes place between the leaders of the previous and the democratic regimes (Heine, 2006:71).

Finally, all four of the countries had to be perceived as representative of successful cases of democratic development in their respective regions at the time the WVS was carried out. Two basic indicators of democracy and development, the Human Development Index (HDI)<sup>49</sup> and Freedom House (FH)<sup>50</sup> score, are used as measures for the four countries’ performances as representative successful cases of democratic development in their respective regions. None of the countries scored an HDI score below 0.5 for the year the WVS data were gathered. The countries are also amongst the highest HDI-ranked countries in their respective regions and none of them is ranked lower than the category of “medium developed” countries. In addition, all four countries obtained a score of less than 2 on the FH scale at the time the WVS data used for this study were gathered in the particular country. The breakdown of the HDI and FH scores, as well

<sup>48</sup> Valenzuela (1992) offers a useful typology for the classification of regime transitions. Authoritarian regimes can simply give way, withdraw from the scene or be subdued during war. An alternative typology is “extrication”, during which the authoritarian regime delays its defeat and manages to set up some conditions for the next regime or phase. Lastly, change can also occur through reform during which leaders of the old and new regime negotiate and compromise in order to realise a smoother transition. “Deal making” among role-players takes place right from the start of the transition period. Political actors then feel more committed to, and included in, the process of transformation.

<sup>49</sup> The United Nation Development Project (UNDP) compiles a Human Developmental Index (HDI) for 194 countries worldwide every year. It uses three dimensions in order to calculate the HDI value attributed to every country. The first dimension, “A Long and Healthy Life”, uses “Life Expectancy at Birth” as indicator. The “Knowledge” dimension is rated by “Adult Literacy Rate” and “Gross Enrolment Ratio” and the last dimension, “A Decent Standard of Living” uses “GDP per Capita (PPP US\$)” as indicator (UNDP, 2008).

<sup>50</sup> Freedom House reports annually on the levels of freedom in the world. It aims to assess the state of civil and political rights in different nations by focusing on the degree of democratic freedoms in the different nations. A scale ranging between 1 and 7 is used (1 meaning “Free” and 7 indicating “Not Free”) (Freedom House, 2011).

as the years in which the fifth wave of the WVS was conducted in the respective countries, is summarised in Table 3.4.

**Table 3.4: Basic indicators of democracy and development**

	Chile	South Africa	South Korea	Poland
Year fifth wave of WVS was conducted	2006	2006	2005	2005
<b>Human Development Index:</b>				
HDI*	0.874	0.670	0.922	0.870
Life Expectancy Index***	0.891 (78.4)	0.418 (50.1)	0.887 (78.2)	0.839 (75.3)
Education Index	0.918	0.840	0.988	0.952
GDP Index	0.812	0.753	0.908	0.833
HDI global ranking (trend 1980-2011)	44	123	15	39
HDI regional ranking (trend 1980-2011)	1	6	13**	8
Level of Development*	High	Medium	High	High
<b>Freedom House*:</b>				
Freedom Rating	1	1.5	1.5	1
Political Rights	1	2	2	1
Civil Liberties	1	1	1	1

The above table is partially based on "Table 2: Basic Indicators" (Berg-Schlosser, 2006:414), data gathered from the UNDP Human Development Index (2011a-2011b) and UNDP Human Development Report 2006 (UNDP, 2008), Freedom House (2011) and WVS (2011a-2011d). \*Indicated for year when WVS was conducted in the particular country. \*\*South Korea ranked with OECD countries. \*\*\* Life expectancy at birth (in years) in brackets.

Noteworthy is the lower Life Expectancy Index for South Africa. Unemployment rates, HIV/AIDS, infant mortality, violent crime and rising income inequality contributed to the decline in life expectancy in this country (Du Toit, 2006), which in turn lowers South Africa's Life Expectancy Index and HDI index scores. However, the criteria outlined indicate that the four countries should be successful cases of democratic development in their respective regions. Despite its low global HDI ranking, South Africa ranked sixth in its region. Furthermore, the emphasis here is on democratic development and not only human and/or economic development indicators.

Not only do the four cases chosen for this study meet the criteria as outlined above, but the case selection for this study follows the "most different cases, most similar outcomes"<sup>51</sup> format - the most promising design for this study, given its specific aims. The four countries differ with regards to region, culture, political society, development and regime of departure before

<sup>51</sup> The "most different cases, most similar outcomes" approach is typically used for comparative studies which identify a particular outcome that it aims to explain. Often, few other common features will be found amongst the cases (Landman, 2003:31-33) and the cases could vary to a large extent on other characteristics (Keman, 2008:75). The chosen cases are thus dissimilar with regards to features which are not part of the hypothesis and the hypothesis will remain the same across the cases (Keman, 2008:74). The intentional choice of particular countries for such study with a common outcome as criteria can be seen as being "selection biased", which will unfortunately limit the inferences the researcher can draw from such a comparison (Landman, 2003:33).

democratisation. However, they are similar in outcomes, since they are all new democracies which transformed from previous regimes through a “pact”. Their concern is not democratization, but democratic consolidation. Furthermore, they are similar in the way they are perceived as the “avant-garde” of new democracies in their respective regions (Wnuk-Lipinski & Fuchs, 2006:41).

### **3.2.2. Secondary data analysis**

Cross-national studies of political attitudes and behaviours can be conducted in numerous ways, of which survey analysis is an effective option. In order to describe and explain attributes of people, surveys are specifically designed and a questionnaire administered to a sample which is representative of the population of which these individuals form part. Individuals are approached to answer the questionnaire in order to gather data (Pierce & Pride, 1972:24). Survey data can either be gathered by researchers themselves to use for their own studies, or researchers can use data which were already gathered through surveying.

This study will not be using data gathered by the researcher, but will use data as gathered by the WVS. This is thus a secondary analysis of WVS data. Secondary survey data analysis is the reanalysis of previously gathered data which were not necessarily originally gathered by the researcher who is using the data (Neuman, 2000:291). Studies framed for secondary analysis, analyse rather than collect data (Neuman, 2006:333). Furthermore, secondary analyses rarely make use of data collected for one specific question. The advantages of this type of research design are as follows:

- Data for secondary analyses can be used for studies that test hypotheses which often involve reports of social, economic and political conditions as variables. It is particularly useful for studies across nations or time periods (Neuman, 2000:301).
- Secondary analyses are cost effective, allows for comparisons amongst groups, countries and time and it allows for the use of already gathered data in order to answer questions the original researcher did not think of (Neuman, 2006:333).

For this study, the cost effectiveness and feasibility for comparisons amongst groups and countries make a secondary analysis research design applicable. However, secondary analysis is not without limitations. Some of the disadvantages are:



- Researchers run the risk of using secondary data that are inappropriate for the questions their particular studies aim to answer. Researchers embarking on secondary analyses should thus consider units of analysis and sampling methods used by the data gatherers even before embarking on their research project (Neuman, 2006:333).
- Units of analysis and variable attributes can also pose problems to researchers using existing data. It is important to thoroughly assess the relevant units of analysis for the study at hand in order to limit the chances of committing either the ecological or the individualistic fallacy<sup>52</sup> (Neuman, 2006:336).
- Furthermore, validity can become a problem when the theoretical underpinning of the study does not match that of the organisation which gathered the data, whilst problems pertaining to equivalence and representation in samples can limit the reliability of secondary analyses studies (Neuman, 2000:306-307).

The final concern pertains to missing data and how the data were compiled. Sometimes, data have been gathered, but were lost. Other times the data were never gathered and falsified to produce results. These problems pose limitations, especially on longitudinal studies (Neuman, 2000:308-309). A related concern is that the researcher using the secondary data has no control over how the data were gathered. Systematic errors, errors in reports and organizing data and mistakes made when publishing information can thus not be addressed by the researchers themselves (Neuman, 2000:306).

Despite these concerns, the cross-national micro-level nature of this study, using relevant survey data collected amongst individuals in the four countries in order to compare political participation choices and behaviour across these nations, seems to be appropriate for the framework of this study, despite the risks and limitations as mentioned. Using a trusted source of data is the best way a researcher embarking on secondary analysis may limit the possibility of enacting these concerns (Neuman, 2000:306-307).

---

<sup>52</sup> The individual fallacy is made when a whole group is given the characteristics of an individual in that group. The problem often evolves when a causal relationship between the individual and aggregate level is assumed. To prevent such a fallacy, the link between the levels should be based on observable causal relationships. An ecological fallacy, on the other hand, makes the mistake of attributing group characteristics to the individuals in the group (Pierce & Pride, 1972:18). The same solutions serve to prevent both fallacies.

It is clear from the above that the ability to infer causality or test a theory by using secondary data can be limited by numerous factors. The above mentioned limitations are addressed as far as possible by using a reliable data source, namely the WVS organisation.

### **3.3. Description of datasets**

#### **3.3.1. World Values Survey (WVS)**

The WVS is a co-operative academic project focused on world-wide changes in values and the impact of this on social and political life (WVS, 2008:2). The WVS has been labelled as the “largest cross-national investigation of social change that [has] ever existed” (WVS quoted in Du Toit & Kotzé, 2011:8). The project covers 97 countries (ranging from poor to wealthy countries, and democratic and liberalised countries to those ruled by authoritarian regimes) and 88% of the world’s population. Five waves of the WVS were completed between 1981 and 2007 and the sixth wave is currently being administered (WVS, 2008:3).

The aim of the project is to assist social scientists and policy-makers in understanding worldviews and global and regional changes. It serves as a global empirical data source of the values, motivations and beliefs of ordinary citizens at the individual level. The aggregates of these individual findings aim to assist in the understanding of how cultural and societal changes - as well as changes with regards to human values and beliefs - influence economic development, creativity, quality of life and democracy (WVS, 2008:2-4). Specifically relevant for this study is the interest of the WVS organization has in the dynamics of democracy. The World Value Survey Executive Committee (WVSEC) accepts that an essential part of democratisation is the empowerment of “the people” beyond elections. The WVS project studies mass-level developments concerning various dimensions of democracy (WVS, 2008:8, 13).

#### **3.3.2. Sample size and method**

The WVS project facilitates a global network of social scientists and assigns a Principle Investigator (PI) to the various participant countries. Fieldwork consists of face-to-face interviews executed by local field organisations and is supervised by academic researchers. The PI in every country makes sure all the rules and procedures as set out by the WVSEC are implemented and are responsible for the analysis and interpretation of the gathered data. All sampling and documentation is subject to WVSEC approval before fieldwork commences and internal consistency checks are done throughout the surveying phase (WVS, 2008: 3-4).

The WVSEC provides a root questionnaire to all PIs. This questionnaire is translated to the local languages of the respective countries before fieldwork commences (WVS, 2008:4). The WVSEC sets out very clear rules for the PIs in order to ensure that the data used and disseminated meets academically accepted methodological standards. These requirements enable comparisons across time and space and ensure reliability (Du Toit & Kotzé, 2011:9 and WVS, 2005).

Nationally representative samples are drawn (WVS, 2008:2, 4) and data are weighted to correct bias as a result of non-responses or over-sampling of a specific group of citizens (Häder & Gabler, 2003:124). The WVSEC prefers the use of full probability sampling,<sup>53</sup> but in certain cases quota sampling<sup>54</sup> is allowed in accordance with the WVSEC. The minimum sample size is 1000 respondents (WVS, 2005).

The assumption that generalised questions are equally suitable for gathering data from different areas and contexts does pose the risk of conceptual overstretching (Rose, 2007:296). However, the WVS allows for area-specific additional questions and area-specific translations in order to limit the possibility of conceptual overstretching. Table 3.5 provides an overview of the fifth wave of the WVS in each of the countries under investigation.

---

<sup>53</sup> A probability sample is a sample in which a sampling frame is developed and elements from the sampling frame are then selected according to a mathematically random procedure. All the elements in the population have an equal probability of being selected (Neuman, 2006:227).

<sup>54</sup> Quota samples are non-random samples. The researcher will identify general categories into which cases or persons will be selected, after which a predetermined number of cases in each category are selected (Neuman, 2006:221).

**Table 3.5: Overview of the fifth wave of the WVS in the four selected countries**

	<b>Chile</b>	<b>South Africa</b>	<b>South Korea</b>	<b>Poland</b>
<b>Period of fifth WVS Survey</b>	14-24 June 2006	22 November-20 December 2006	1 December-15 December 2005	December 2005
<b>PI</b>	Marta Lagos	Mari Harris and Hennie Kotzé	Soo Young Auh and Sang-Jin Han	Renata Siemienska
<b>Data Collection Institute</b>	MORI (Market Opinion Research International)	Markinor	KSDC (Korean Social Science Data Center)	CBOS Public Opinion Research Centre
<b>Fieldwork Method/Survey Procedure</b>	Interviews **	Interviews **	Interviews **	Interviews **
<b>Sample Type</b>	Random Sampling	Probability sampling: random sampling.	Purposive quota sampling	Full probability sampling
<b>Sample Size</b>	1000	2988	1200	1000
<b>Weighted</b>	According to education, gender and city (Census 2002 data).	According to community size, province, race, gender and age.	According to age, gender and schooling distributions of target population.	According to gender, age and education.
<b>Respondents' Age</b>	18 years and older	16 years and older	20 years and older	18 years and older
<b>Languages in which core questionnaire was available (other than English)</b>	Spanish	Afrikaans, Zulu, Xhosa, South Sotho, Tswana and North Sotho (Pedi)	Korean	Polish

\*Table compiled by using technical information from the WVS website (WVS, 2011a; WVS, 2011b; WVS, 2011c; WVS 2011d). \*\* All interviews were face-to-face.

### 3.4. Political Participation as dependent variable

This study is concerned with political participation in new democracies. As stated in Chapter 2, numerous definitions of political participation have been developed over the years. During the 1950s and 1960s<sup>55</sup>, political participation was tantamount to voter turnout, despite the fact that voting is just one way of participating in politics (Verba *et al.*, 1995). Different forms of participation, as reported by Verba and Nie (1972), appeal to citizens according to their different orientations, psychological involvement in politics, partisanship and a sense of contribution to the welfare of society (Kavanagh, 1983:182). The emphasis of this study will thus include alternative forms of participation as well as voting.

This study draws from the definition of Ekman and Amnå (2012) who defines political participation as “all actions directed towards influencing governmental decision-making and political outcomes”. The authors assert that these actions are “goal-orientated”, observable and

<sup>55</sup> See as examples Lipset (1960); Deutsch (1961); Burnham (1965); Milbrath (1965); McCrone and Cnudde (1967); Needler (1968) and Sharkansky and Hofferbert (1969).

can easily be measured. Ekman and Amnå (2012:11) go on to emphasise that through these actions, ordinary citizens aim to have an impact on political outcomes in society, decisions that impacts on public affairs, as well as political processes. The definition by Ekman and Amnå (2012:11) ties in with the definitions of political participation used by Conway (1991:3-4), Verba *et al.* (1995:9), Brady (1999:737) Birch (2007:80) and Teorell, Torcal and Montero (2007). The actors involved are private citizens (separate from public officials or elected politicians) who actively take part in the processes through which government policies are created and implemented, as well as the processes through which political leaders and authorities are chosen (Birch, 2007:80).

The different forms of political participation make it difficult for scholars to decide what forms to study when embarking on research about political participation. This study will draw from the work of various authors<sup>56</sup> and their focus on political action, but will not exclude voting, since it is the most fundamental form of political participation in democratic nations (Milner, 2000:81) and the most basic form of participation in democratic politics (Catt, 1995:2). The forms of political participation used for this study are “voting behaviour”, “petitions”, “boycotts” and “demonstrations”.

### **3.4.1. Voting**

Representation is a constituent part of representative democracies and the representation process in democracies is associated with elections and voting. Elections and voting are not sufficient to sustain democracy, but they are necessary ingredients to ensure democratic political representation (Heywood, 2007: 73, 253). In democracies the opportunity to vote is presented in the form of regular elections (Verba *et al.*, 1978:53), whereby voters select representatives to various executive offices and legislatures on the local and national level (Milner, 2000:82).

The act of voting is quantifiable, visible and identifiable (Milner, 2000:81). Voting is different from other political acts in that it demands little initiative from the individual, since the occasion to vote presents itself in the form of regular elections organised by officials (Verba *et al.*, 1978:53). Also, the voters merely asserts who and/or which party they would prefer as policymakers and political leaders, not particular issues or concerns they wish to be addressed. The democratic character of voting is established through the competitive nature of elections, which enables the public to keep politicians and officials accountable (Heywood, 2007:74).

---

<sup>56</sup> Such as Barnes and Kaase (1979), Inglehart and Catterberg (2002) as well as Hail (2011).

Voting serves as a powerful but blunt form of political participation in that it offers little information about voters' particular preferences, but still exerts pressure on leaders. Furthermore, voting is an individual act, but its outcome is broad and it affects both political leaders and the citizens (Verba *et al.*, 1978:53).

Voting is measured by the WVS through asking each respondent whether he/she voted in the national elections prior to the study. The possible responses are limited to either "Yes" or "No" as an answer.

### **3.4.2. Forms of political protest**

Barnes and Kaase (1979) developed measurements for both "conventional" political action, such as voting and writing one's representative in parliament, and "unconventional" forms of political action, such as demonstrations, boycotts and occupation of buildings (Inglehart & Catterberg, 2002:306-307). In their study on political action, Inglehart and Catterberg (2002:304) distinguished between bureaucratized and elite-directed forms of participation (such as voting and party membership), and individually-motivated and elite-challenging forms of participation, such as petitions, demonstrations, strikes, boycotts and the occupation of buildings. In Hail's (2011) study on the impact of religion on political participation in Asian countries specifically, he used only extra-institutional measures of political participation featured in the WVS root questionnaire as forms of political participation. He asserts that these forms of political participation measure a deeper level of engagement in politics than other forms of political participation, specifically more than voting, and argues that these activities require more physical and psychological engagement in politics (Hail, 2011).

Combining the forms of political actions used by Barnes and Kaase (1979), Inglehart and Catterberg (2002) and Hail (2001), as well as identifying which forms are measured in the fifth wave of the WVS, this study will focus on "boycotts", "petitions" and "lawful demonstrations" in addition to "voting". Worth mentioning is that the three unconventional forms of participation mentioned here are all legal and direct forms of political action.<sup>57</sup>

---

<sup>57</sup> Kotzé (2001) labels active resistance amongst citizens as a form of political protest. He utilises a political protest continuum - ranging from weaker forms of political protest, such as signing petitions, to the more extreme forms of protest, such as resorting to violence - based on a scheme of unconventional political behaviour by Marsh (1977:42) and Dalton (1988:119). This conceptual model clarifies which forms of unconventional political behaviour can be seen as direct political action and indirect political action, which are categorised as illegal/legal political actions and which forms of political action are violent.

The measurement of the various forms political protest for this study follows from the way in which Kotzé (2001) and Hail (2011) utilised the WVS in their studies on unconventional political participation. In the WVS root questionnaire the following statement is put to all respondents: “I am going to read out some different forms of political action people can take, and I’d like you to tell me, for each one, whether you have actually done any of these things, whether you might do it or never will do it: (1) have done (2) might do (3) would never do.” The items relevant for this study included in the list are: (a) “joining in boycotts”, (b) “attending lawful demonstrations” and (e) “signing a petition” (Kotzé, 2001:139).

### **3.5. Summary**

This chapter provides an overview of the research design and methodology utilised to study the predictors of political participation in new democracies. The knowledge derived from such a study, given the limitations mentioned, will not be able to determine exact relationships amongst its variables, but rather offer an insight into how the propensity for political participation concentrates amongst certain kinds of individuals, who are found in certain parts of a given society and who are the product of certain critical configurations of social experience and psychological dispositions (Kaase & Marsh, 1979:65) in a comparative manner.

It is important to accept that all research, as with this study, involves inclusion and exclusion. Some phenomena are the focus of the study and will be incorporated into the final analyses, whilst other phenomena will be left out in order to accommodate the limitations in resources. The best the researcher can do is to reflect on both the behaviour of the individual and the impact of time and space in which the behaviour occurs (Rose, 2007:298).

This empirical study is concerned with the predictors of political participation in new democracies. Four new democracies, namely Poland, South Africa, South Korea and Chile, were chosen based on a specific set of criteria. Data as gathered during the fifth wave of the WVS project will be utilised as part of this cross-national, micro- and secondary analysis of political participation. Political participation includes “voting”, “boycotts”, “petitions” and “demonstrations” for the purposes of this study. The following chapter will include the findings from the data analysis as well as an interpretation of the results.

## **Chapter 4: Analyses and Findings**

### **4.1. Introduction**

The primary aim of this study is to determine the attributes of individuals which can be identified as predictors of political participation, particularly in new democracies. This is done by using data for Chile, Poland, South Africa, South Korea as gathered by the WVS. The relationships between the individuals' attributes (independent variables decided on by using the CVM as theoretical framework) and political participation (as dependent variable) are identified by making use of multiple regression analysis. The results of these analyses are used to draw comparisons between the findings for the respective countries.

This chapter investigates the dependent variable - namely political participation - and independent variables - namely possible predictors of political participation - used in this study, as well as the relationships between the identified variables. The findings of the data analysis (as based on the methodology explained in Chapter 3) are presented and discussed. Challenges encountered during the analysis, as well as how these are addressed, will also be mentioned. After the discussion on the findings of the analysis, a conclusion is drawn.

### **4.2. Political participation**

Political participation, as defined by Ekman and Amnå (2012:11), involves “all actions directed towards influencing governmental decision-making and political outcomes”. Various forms of political participation can be investigated, but this study draws from Barnes and Kaase (1979), Inglehart and Catterberg (2002) and Hail (2011) by focusing on forms of political protest behaviour, specifically petitions, boycotts and demonstrations. In addition to political protest behaviour, voting adds another dimension of political participation as dependent variable for this study. It is an essential form of political participation in democratic nations (Milner, 2000:81).

#### **4.2.1. Voting**

All four of the new democracies hold regular national elections and they have universal suffrage (CIA: World Factbook, 2012). Elections, offering citizens the opportunity to vote, are a fundamental part of the democratic process (Heywood, 2007: 253). Voting requires little effort and few resources (such as time and money) from the individual. Also, little cooperation with others is needed when casting a vote. Voting may exert strong pressure on officials, but the vote itself offers little information to officials other than the choice made (Dalton, 2008:35).



Table 4.1 summarises the self-reported voting turn-out for the respective countries in national elections prior to the gathering of the data.<sup>58</sup>

**Table 4.1: Self-reported turnout in previous national elections, by country**

	Chile	Poland	South Africa	South Korea
<b>Did not vote</b>	28.1	32.4	30.6	23.6
<b>Voted</b>	71.9	67.6	69.4	76.4
<b>Total</b>	100	100	100	100

South Korea had the highest percentage (76.4%) of self-reported voters, while Poland had the lowest percentage (67.6%) of self-reported voters for the previous national elections. For all four countries more than two thirds of the respondents stated that they did vote in the national elections prior to the gathering of the WVS data. However, self-reported turnout and national statistics on voter turnout for these elections differ.

Table 4.2 contains the official statistics on voter turnout for the specific national elections as indicated by IDEA, an international intergovernmental organisation that supports the development of sustainable democracy worldwide (IDEA, 2012).

**Table 4.2: Voter turnout for previous national elections (IDEA)<sup>59</sup>**

Country (Year)	Chile (2005)	Poland (2005)	South Africa (2004)	South Korea (2002)
<b>Voter Turnout*</b>	87.67	50.99	76.73	70.8

\* As indicated by IDEA (2012).

Similarly to the turnout figures indicated in Table 4.2, the official turnout statistics of IDEA indicate that South Africa and South Korea had a voter turnout of more than two thirds of the population for the specific national elections in question. Furthermore, the self-reported voting statistic and the official voting turn-out statistics for these two countries are quite similar. Both turnout statistics also show that more than two thirds of Chileans voted during the elections in question. However, the self-reported statistic for Chile is 15.77% lower than the official turnout statistic as provided by IDEA. Chile's high turnout might be a result of regulations which make it compulsory for registered voters to vote.<sup>60</sup> Poland had a voter turnout of only 51% according

<sup>58</sup> The WVS asks every respondent whether he/she voted in the national elections prior to the study. Respondents may then answer either "Yes" or "No". Bear in mind that some of the responses are from citizens who were not yet old enough to vote by the time of the national elections referred to.

<sup>59</sup> Note that percentages of Table 4.1 and 4.2 differ. This might be attributable to the over- or under-reporting of self-reported voting behaviour.

<sup>60</sup> See Chapter 3, page 42.

to IDEA. The self-reported voting statistic for the same election is 17.39% higher than the official statistic. Polish respondents might thus have over self-reported their participation in the national election in question. Poland has the lowest voter turnout in both Table 4.1 and Table 4.2. In Chapter 3<sup>61</sup> it was stated that the four countries can be perceived as the “avant-garde” of new democracies in their respective regions. Poland’s low self-reported voter turn-out and low turn-out according to national statistics is quite disconcerting since elections form such fundamental part of democracy. This finding might be explained as a result of the country’s “abandoned society syndrome”.<sup>62</sup>

#### 4.2.2 Political protest behaviour

Numerous forms of unconventional political participation can be investigated. However, for the purposes of this study the focus is on petitions, boycotts and peaceful and lawful demonstrations. Forms of political protest exert strong pressure on officials and offer plenty of information about the issues raised to officials, policymakers and politicians. Such actions are often marked by disagreement between the different actors involved, require a lot of effort and require at least some cooperation with other citizens (Dalton, 2008:35). Table 4.3 looks at the protest behaviour<sup>63</sup> of respondents in the four countries.

**Table 4.3: Political protest behaviour<sup>64</sup>**

	<b>Chile</b>	<b>Poland</b>	<b>South Africa</b>	<b>South Korea</b>
<b>Taken part in 0 activities</b>	73.8	72.2	74.6	62.1
<b>Taken part in 1 activity</b>	14.8	18.0	13.6	27.4
<b>Taken part in 2 activities</b>	9.6	6.7	7.1	7.7
<b>Taken part in 3 activities</b>	1.8	3.2	4.7	2.8
<b>Total</b>	100	100	100	100

Quite contrary to the findings for voting, two thirds of the respondents for nearly all four countries have not done any of the political activities mentioned (except South Korea with 62.1% of respondents who have done none of the activities, falling just short of two thirds of

<sup>61</sup> See Chapter 3, page 45.

<sup>62</sup> See pages 91-93 for more on this.

<sup>63</sup> The WVS questionnaire asks respondents whether they have done, might do or will never do certain political activities. The relevant activities mentioned include: join in boycotts, attend peaceful and lawful demonstrations, and sign a petition. An index was constructed which combines how many of these three activities respondents took part in.

<sup>64</sup> The “Political Protest Behaviour” variable is a composite variable of the three types of political protest behaviour under examination, namely joining in boycotts, attending peaceful and lawful demonstrations, and signing a petition. First, I recoded each of the variables as follows: 0 = “might do” + “would never do” and 1 = “have done”. Second, I computed a “political protest behaviour” variable by adding all three recoded variables. The new variable (“political protest behaviour”) formed a scale from 0 – 3, indicating the number of political protest activities that respondents have taken part in.

respondents as well). Explanations can be offered for this finding. As stated, voting requires less effort and fewer resources than taking part in political protest activities. Individuals might find it easier and less resource intensive to participate in elections rather than to take part in more demanding forms of political protest, and still influence political choices and policies.

South Africa has the highest percentage of respondents in the category for having done none of the mentioned activities (74.6%) as well as for having done all three activities (4.7%). South Korea has the lowest percentage of respondents in the category for none of the mentioned activities (62.1%), but the highest percentage of respondents who have done only one of the mentioned activities (27.7%). Chile has the highest percentage of respondents who have done two of the mentioned activities (9.6%), but the lowest percentage of respondents who have done all three of the activities (1.8%).

#### **4.3. Predictors of political participation**

Various studies<sup>65</sup> concerned with political participation investigate who takes part in political activities and how citizens choose to take part in political activities. It is useful to examine these questions, since the citizens who take part in political activities and individuals who communicate with policymakers have their interests represented (or at least communicated) when political and policy decisions are made. Thus, who takes part in political activities may influence policy-making.

Scholars seeking to understand what attributes may serve as predictors of political participation have based their research on various models and theories.<sup>66</sup> The most broadly utilised model to explain political participation is the SES model, which asserts that resource availability explains citizens' political participation choices. The CVM created by Verba, Brady and Schlozman (1995), used as explanatory model for this study, elaborates on the SES model by considering both resources available and the civic skills of citizens. Based on the CVM by Verba, Brady and Schlozman (1995)<sup>67</sup>, as well as studies which utilised this model to shed light on political participation in specific countries (mainly Dalton, 2008<sup>68</sup> and Shin, 1999<sup>69</sup>) and the further

---

<sup>65</sup> See Chapter 2, pages 18-23.


<sup>66</sup> See Chapter 2, pages 25-35.

<sup>67</sup> Verba *et al.* (1995: 15-16) assert that an individual's political participation choices are influenced by whether the individual can, wants to and has been asked to participate. The authors used personal resources as an indication of whether the individual can participate; political motivation as indication of whether he/she wants to participate; and being part of a network of recruitment as indication of possible group motivation to participate in political activities.

<sup>68</sup> Dalton (2008) based the predictors analysed in his study on this framework offered by Verba *et al.* Dalton (2008:62) used age, gender and education as indicators of personal resources; political efficacy and left/right

insights of Kitschelt and Rhem (2008)<sup>70</sup> on the model, I focus on the possible predictors of political participation as stipulated in Diagram 4.1.

**Diagram 4.1: Possible predictors of political participation**



#### 4.3.1. Personal resources

Personal resources play a role in enabling or limiting the various political activities that individuals take part in (Kitschelt & Rhem, 2008: 456). Not only socio-economic skills and endowments, but also the amount of time available (as resource factor) to participate in political activities have an impact on the decisions made by individuals in terms of participation in

---

alignment as indicators of political motivation; and party attachment and group membership as indicators of group effects.

<sup>69</sup> Shin (1999) also used the CVM as theoretical framework for his study on political participation in South Korea. However, Shin used mostly demographic categories which are relevant for the political life of the country. These are gender, age, education, income group, region and community (Shin, 1999:113).

<sup>70</sup> Kitschelt and Rhem (2008:449) offer further insights into how these different indicators can be categorised. The authors emphasise the importance of time as resource factor and the impact of social status as part of personal resources. They mention occupation, education, income level as indicators, as well as age and gender. Groups and networks, according to Kitschelt and Rhem (2008:466), develop skills and help orientate individuals for political participation. Group membership and network indicators mentioned by the authors include cultural, societal and regional groups, as well as occupational and residential life. They place special emphasis on religious groupings and party attachments. They again mention age and gender as indicator here. Indicators for political engagement mentioned by Kitschelt and Rhem (2008:466) include ideology, perceptions of political efficacy and political interest of the individual. The authors assert that these orientations are the “final” determinants of political participation choices.

political activities (Kitschelt & Rhem, 2008:456). Personal resources in this study are indicated by level of education and self-reported social class.

If personal resources play a role in impacting on political participation choices, individuals with higher levels of education and/or individuals who perceive themselves as middle- or upper -class citizens should be more likely to take part in political activities. Thus, countries with higher percentages of citizens with higher levels of education and/or more citizens in the middle and upper social classes should have more citizens who take part in political activities.

#### **4.3.1.1. Level of education**

Numerous studies have investigated the relationship between levels of education and political participation. Some academics<sup>71</sup> support the assertion that the more educated an individual is, the more he/she will take part in political activities. Scholars explain this association by stating that education enables citizens to acquire the resources to participate, as well as granting citizens opportunities to attain the civic skills needed<sup>72</sup> to effectively communicate their concerns to politicians. Furthermore, some scholars<sup>73</sup> assert that it is through education that citizens acquire the skills to understand and engage in politics (Berinsky & Lenz, 2011: 357).

However, some studies find that in developed countries (such as the USA and Canada), political participation (particularly voter turnout) has not increased in recent years, despite rising levels of education in the respective developed countries investigated (Berinsky & Lenz, 2010:358). In order to explain this, the literature that focused on education as only one of the characteristics which develops a disposition to participate in politics was highlighted (Berinsky & Lenz, 2010:358). Other scholars (such as Blais, Gidengil, Nevitte & Nadeau, 2004: 232) assert that education remains a powerful foundation for political participation and they attribute the decline in voter turnout to generational effects, rather than rising levels of education. Because of these contradictory findings, it was interesting to investigate whether higher education levels serve as predictor for political participation for the four case studies.

---

<sup>71</sup> See Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes (1960); Bennett and Klecka (1970); Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980); Nie, Junn and Stehlik-Barry (1996) and Hillygus (2005).

<sup>72</sup> See Verba *et al.* (1995).

<sup>73</sup> See Rosenstone & Hansen (1993).

To measure level of education, the WVS indicates the highest level of education a respondent has attained. The response categories differed slightly for the four different countries.<sup>74</sup> For analytical purposes the data were separated into four categories: no schooling, primary education, secondary education and tertiary education/professional training. Table 4.4 indicates the percentages of respondents per country who have attained a particular level of education.

**Table 4.4: Levels of education, by country**

	<b>Chile</b>	<b>Poland</b>	<b>South Africa*</b>	<b>South Korea</b>
<b>No Schooling</b>	1.5	0.2	5.6	0
<b>Primary Education</b> <sup>75</sup>	21.5	22.1	17.2	7.8
<b>Secondary Education</b> <sup>76</sup>	46.5	64.5	62.2	38.9
<b>Tertiary Education/Professional Training</b> <sup>77</sup>	30.4	13.2	15	53.3
<b>Total</b>	100	100	100	100

\* “Artisan’s certificate obtained”, “Technical” and “Secretarial” omitted (amounts to 2.9% in total).

<sup>74</sup> The education systems of the four countries differ. Chileans have free access to pre-school from 5 years of age, but attendance of pre-school is not mandatory. Primary schooling (eight grades) is compulsory and so is secondary schooling (four grades). Pupils may then decide on following the university preparatory or technical-professional curriculum. Tertiary education opportunities include universities, professional institutes and technical schooling centres (UNESCO, 2011b).

For Polish children, pre-school education has been compulsory since 2003/2004 for six-year olds. All children aged 7-12 attend compulsory primary school. Pupils may then choose between vocational secondary education or general secondary education. Pupils completing a general secondary school write a final examination called “matura” which, if passed, enables them to apply for university studies. Pupils who do not write the “matura” may study at a post-secondary vocational school. There are numerous institutions, such as universities and academies (UNESCO, 2011d).

South Koreans may choose to place their children in kindergartens, but from 6 years old they must attend six years of elementary education. After completing elementary school, children move to three years of middle school, after which they move to three years of secondary education at high schools. Some South Koreans choose to attend vocational schools after middle school. High school graduates may then apply for university placements, where students have to comply with very strict standards in order to succeed (UNESCO, 2011c).

For South Africans, primary school follows from Reception until Grade 6. This is followed by junior secondary (Grades 7-9) and then further education and training as Grades 10-12. Schooling is compulsory up until Grade 9 after which pupils may continue to Grade 10 or may pursue technical training. Those who continue to Grade 12 write an examination at the end of Grade 12. Students who wish to pursue university-level education have to comply with certain standards and subject choices in order to apply for university admission. Tertiary education consists of either university degrees or certificates and diplomas obtained after the successful completion of Grade 12 (UNESCO, 2011a).

In order to make the findings useful, the categories used to indicate the different levels of education had to be comparable. Four categories were decided on, namely: no schooling, primary education, secondary education and tertiary education/professional training with the aim of creating manageable categories which would still allow for the variation in educational systems among the countries.

<sup>75</sup> “Primary Education” includes “Some Primary Education/incomplete” and “Primary School Completed” for all four countries.

<sup>76</sup> “Secondary Education” includes: “Some High School/incomplete” and “Matric/completed high school” for South Africa; “Incomplete Secondary Schooling: technical/vocational type”, “Complete Secondary Schooling: technical/vocational type”. “Incomplete secondary schooling: university-preparatory type” and “complete secondary schooling: university-preparatory type” for South Korea and Poland; “Media incompleta” and “Media Completa” for Chile.

<sup>77</sup> “Tertiary Education” includes: “Technikon diploma/degree completed”, “Some University/without degree”, “University degree completed” and “Professional” for South Africa, “Some University/Incomplete University” and “Complete University” for Poland and South Korea; “Instituto Superior/técnico profesional incomplete”, “Instituto Superior/técnico profesional complete”, “Universitario incomplete” and “Universitario Completa” for Chile.

The majority of Chilean, Polish and South African respondents fall into the category for secondary education. A large percentage of Chilean respondents also fall into the category for tertiary education. The majority of South Koreans fall in the category for tertiary education or professional training.

South Africa has the highest percentage of respondents who have no schooling at all (5.6 %). Ramdass (2009:111) explains that the South African government was grappling with numerous challenges (such as political instability; poverty and hunger; income and material deprivation of children, the increasing impact of HIV/AIDS on progress made to develop the country; high levels of crime and violence at schools), which limited progress made to foster educational attainment by 2006 (Ramdass, 2009:111).

South Korea has the highest percentage of respondents at the tertiary level (53.3%) and 0% respondents with no schooling. This comes as no surprise given the dedication to furthering education in Korea and the country's consistent rankings as part of the top of the global learning curve (Parr, 2012; Sorensen, 1994:10) attributable to traditional attitudes supporting educational attainment, the desire for upward mobility in a rapidly changing society (Sorensen, 1994:22) as well the country's effective education system and the promotion of a culture of education (Parr, 2012).

#### **4.3.1.2. Self-reported social class**

Since the democratisation and modernisation of Western nations, social class<sup>78</sup> - as a structural cleavage in industrial societies - became a dominant predictor of political behaviour and attitudes (Knutson, 2007:457). Of particular interest to political researchers is the link between class and voting behaviour.

Lafferty (1978:233) asserts that the social structure of a nation is altered when the economy develops. A few prominent changes occur: 1) as the middle and upper classes grow, more citizens move towards cities; and 2) the organisations of society become more complex. As these social changes take place, political changes often follow. Citizens have more access to political information, they are more aware of political concerns, and they develop a sense of political

---

<sup>78</sup> Socio-economic status extends to include components of education, income level and occupation (Brady, Verba & Schlozman, 1995:271).

efficacy with other relevant attitudes. In turn, these developments lead to increases in political participation (Lafferty, 1978:234). Countries with larger middle and upper classes will then also show higher levels of participation, if this assertion holds true.

The focus of this study on medium and highly developed<sup>79</sup> new democracies offers the chance to investigate the dynamics as outlined by Lafferty. Self-reported social class does not only indicate the monetary resources of the individual to participate, but also the self-perceived socio-economic situation of respondents.

Kitschelt and Rhem (2008: 465) offer further insights on class participation. The authors assert that social class can sustain the capacity to take collective action. For individuals who identify themselves with a certain socio-economic group, associating with that group might serve as a relevant enhancer of political participation, particularly for lower-income groups. Being part of a lower social class might, because of group dynamics and not purely because of monetary resources.

However, comparative studies show that the impact of class on voting has declined in advanced Western countries over the past few decades. Deindustrialisation in post-industrial societies, transformation of the traditional class structures and the rise of other social cleavages in combination with conflicts based on values (rather than on class differences) are some of the reasons scholars offer as explanations for a declining relationship between social class and political participation (Knutsen, 2007: 472).

Investigating social class as a possible predictor of political participation in new democracies may offer interesting insights. The following question was asked to all WVS respondents: “People sometimes describe themselves as belonging to the working class, the middle class, or the upper or the lower class. Would you describe yourself as belonging to the upper class, upper middle class, lower middle class, working class or lower class.” Table 4.5 summarises the percentage of respondents per category in the four respective countries.

---

<sup>79</sup> See Chapter 3, page 46.



**Table 4.5: Self-reported social class, by country**

	<b>Chile</b>	<b>Poland</b>	<b>South Africa</b>	<b>South Korea</b>
<b>Lower Class</b>	13.4	14	33.8	5.7
<b>Working Class</b>	25.7	43.1	21.1	15.8
<b>Middle Class*</b>	59.4	42.1	42.0	77.9
<b>Upper Class</b>	1.5	0.8	3.1	0.7
<b>Total</b>	100	100	100	100**

\* "Middle Class" includes "Upper Middle Class" and "Lower Middle Class".

\*\*Rounded percentage.

The majority of Chilean and South Korean respondents identified themselves as middle-class citizens (59.4% and 77.9% respectively). Polish respondents primarily identified themselves as either working or middle class (43.1% and 42.1% respectively). The majority of South African respondents identified themselves as middle class (42.0%), but the percentage of lower-class South African citizens (33.8%) is almost as large as the percentage of middle-class citizens. South Korea has the most respondents who self-reported as middle class.

South Africa has the highest percentage of lower-class respondents (33.8 %), but also the highest percentage of upper-class respondents (3.1%). This observation makes sense in the light of South Africa's Gini Coefficient score<sup>80</sup> of 67.4 in 2006, indicating wide levels of inequality in this country. Also, being the only one of the four countries categorised as "medium developed"<sup>81</sup> and the country with the lowest HDI score,<sup>82</sup> the high percentage of lower-class respondents may be related to the country's state of development.

If being part of the middle and/or upper class relates to more participation in political activities, South Korea should have the highest percentage of politically active citizens and South Africa the lowest percentage of respondents who are politically active, which (in the light of the findings expressed in Table 4.1 and 4.2<sup>83</sup>) has not been the case. The relationship between these variables might shed more light on the matter.

#### **4.3.2. Political engagement and motivation**

The second set of potential predictors of political participation involves policy preferences and attitudes towards political affairs. Dalton (2008:58) labels this as political motivation while

<sup>80</sup> The GINI index measures deviation of the distribution of income (or consumption) from a distribution that is perfectly equal. This is measured among individuals or households in separate countries. A value of 0 indicates absolute equality while a value of 100 indicates absolute inequality (UNDP, 2012).

<sup>81</sup> Lafferty (1978) asserts that as countries develop, their middle and upper classes will become bigger. South Africa is still perceived as a developing country, which explains why the country's middle class is the smallest of the countries used in this study.

<sup>82</sup> See Chapter 3, page 46.

<sup>83</sup> See Chapter 4, page 56.

others refer to it as political attitudes or political engagement.<sup>84</sup> Participation can be influenced by perceptions of political efficacy<sup>85</sup> of citizens, political dissatisfaction or satisfaction, ideology and political interest (Kitschelt & Rhem, 2008:466). This study will focus on Left-Right political ideology and political interest.

#### **4.3.2.1. Left-right political ideology scale**

Freeden (1996:3) defines ideologies as “those systems of political thinking, loose or rigid, deliberate or unintended, through which individuals and groups construct an understanding of the political world they, or those who occupy their thought, inhabit and then act on that understanding”. The political preferences of individuals can thus vary greatly as their understanding of the political world varies (Rockey, 2010:2).

The left-right political ideological spectrum, often used for studies concerned with political ideology, originates from the time of the French revolution. This spectrum summarises citizens’ attitudes towards the role of the state and the economy. Citizens who affiliate to the left favour egalitarianism, multiculturalism (Kazin, 2011), government intervention and collectivism (Heywood, 2007:276). Ideological values associated with the left include equality, liberty, reform, internationalism, fraternity and human rights (Heywood, 2007:276). Current supporters of the left notably underscore intervention by government on the behalf of minority groups (Kazin, 2011). Individuals who affiliate to the right support free-market economies and individualism. Ideological values of the right typically include: order, duty, tradition, reaction, nationalism, authority and hierarchy (Heywood, 2007:276). Right-wing supporters also promote the deregulation of industries and commerce and commits to conservative values (Kazin, 2011).

Ideology may influence political participation patterns. Should political participation be concentrated strongly among either of the ideological extremes, the policy process might be distorted by their activities. Whether or not participants in political activities are more or less equally drawn from the Left or from the Right of the spectrum carries implications for: 1) the democratic process through the variety of concerns raised to officials (Dalton, 2008:59); and 2) the way citizens proceed to move from the current to the desired state (Kitschelt & Rhem, 2008:466-467). In countries where citizens are not highly concentrated on either the left or the right, this dimension of ideology is not expected to influence political participation patterns.

---

<sup>84</sup> See Chapter 2, pages 34-35.

<sup>85</sup> See Chapter 2, page 34, particularly footnote 39.

The following question was put to all WVS respondents: “In political matters, people talk of ‘the left’ and ‘the right’. How would you place your views on this scale, generally speaking?” The respondent then was shown a scale of 1-10 with 1 meaning Left and 10 meaning Right. Table 4.6 summarises the distribution of citizens in the four countries along according to Left-Right political ideology.

**Table 4.6: Left-right political ideology\***

	<b>Chile</b>	<b>Poland</b>	<b>South Africa</b>	<b>South Korea</b>
<b>Mean</b>	5.38	5.89	6.52	5.69
<b>Median</b>	5	5	6	6
<b>Standard Deviation</b>	2.151	2.215	2.223	2.057

\*Minimum=1 (Left) and Maximum=10 (Right). Recoded to Minimum=0 (Left) and Maximum=9 (Right) for Multiple Regression.

From Table 4.6 it can be discerned that respondents in the four countries are not highly concentrated on either the left or the right. However, South Korea, South Africa and Poland all lean slightly towards the centre right. South Africa also leans more to the right than is the case for the other countries. The impact, if any, of left-right political ideological affiliation as possible predictor of political participation for this study is not expected to be significant.

#### **4.3.2.2. Political interest**

Political interest has been defined in various ways.<sup>86</sup> I draw on Van Deth (2000:119) who argues that there are two aspects to political interest: 1) the “degree to which politics arouses a citizen’s curiosity” or “a citizen’s attentiveness to politics”; and/or 2) “the relative importance of political matters compared with other activities”.

Citizens who are more politically active are usually more interested in politics and more knowledgeable about political matters (Almond & Verba, 1963; Quintelier & Hooghe, 2011:63). The direction of the relationship between the two variables, however, remains a topic of debate in the social sciences. For the purposes of this study, the effects of political interest (as with Almond & Verba, 1963 and Quintelier & Hooghe, 2011) on political participation (and not the other way around) will be considered. Under investigation is the claim that citizens who are interested in politics will be more politically active.

---

<sup>86</sup> See Shani (2007:2); Zaller (1992:21) and Dostie-Gaulet (2009:406).

Political interest has been measured by asking respondents the following question: “How interested would you say you are in politics? Are you...”. The following options were then given: very interested, somewhat interested, not very interested or not at all interested. Table 4.7 summarizes the percentage of respondents per category for the respective countries.

**Table 4.7: Political interest, by country**

	<b>Chile</b>	<b>Poland</b>	<b>South Africa</b>	<b>South Korea</b>
<b>Not interested at all</b>	48.2	23.5	22.5	15.1
<b>Not very interested</b>	27.8	34.7	32.3	46.1
<b>Somewhat interested</b>	18.1	36.4	28.2	34.8
<b>Very interested</b>	5.8	5.4	17.0	4.1
<b>Total</b>	100	100	100	100

South Africa has the highest percentage of respondents who are very interested in politics (17%) and Chile has the highest percentage of respondents who are not at all interested in politics (48.2%). South Korean respondents are concentrated at the categories for those who are not very interested or who are somewhat interested (46.1% and 34.8% respectively). Polish and South African respondents are more spread among categories and are thus more divided on the topic.

### **4.3.3. Group membership and networks**

Political mobilisation, as channelled through social networks<sup>87</sup>, enjoys attention among scholars interested in social movements and political participation. Social networks have been identified by some academics as recruitment channels for conventional and unconventional forms of political participation as well as for non-political forms of civic engagement (Lim, 2008:961). The core premise of this set of possible predictors of political participation is that citizens participate when they are asked to, or encouraged by someone who forms part of their social networks – fellow citizens with whom they are connected to do so (Lim, 2008:961 and Verba *et al.*, 1995).

This topic is widely debated in the scholarly literature. Some scholars<sup>88</sup> assert that the impact of networks is more powerful when activists foster stronger ties with others in the group. Others<sup>89</sup> focus particularly on members of social movements and civic associations, and not just on any group. Scholars who question this relationship criticise the conceptualisation and measurement

---

<sup>87</sup> “Social networks” is here used as a noun, defined by the *Oxford English Dictionary* as “a network of friends, colleagues, and other personal contacts”. When specifically referring to online social networks, this will be stipulated as such.

<sup>88</sup> See McAdam and Paulsen (2003) and Gould (2004).

<sup>89</sup> See Passy and Giugni (2001) and Viterna (2006).

of indicators used in the above mentioned studies. The strength of ties of members to networks has been measured in terms of: 1) the number of ties to organisations; 2) the source of the relationships; and/or 3) whether the connection between the members and the organisation is direct or indirect. These measures can correlate with “tie strength”, but other aspects of social networks may have an impact on how this relationship plays out (Lim, 2008:962). Furthermore, most studies concerned with organisational ties use membership of social movements and/or civic associations as proxy. However, it is difficult to keep the impact of associational ties within networks on political participation apart from the influence of membership of the organisation on its own when using these associations as representative measures (McAdam & Paulsen, 1993).

Kitschelt and Rhem (2008:465) assert that group connections and/or associational involvement can be regarded as an enhancer of political participation, particularly for citizens with fewer resources. Dalton (2008: 59) also mentions group membership and networks as possible predictors of political participation and the fact that participation in social groups may increase participation in political action. These groups might even serve as a reference point for individuals to discern whether taking political action is worthwhile or not. The authors mention cultural, regional and social civic associations, as well as age groups, gender, class groups, occupational groups, political party affiliation, religious groups and family life (Kitschelt & Rhem, 2008:465; Dalton, 2008:59). Drawing from these authors, membership of a group can thus be seen as a possible predictor of political participation.

Active membership in the following groups and networks will be used as possible indicators of political participation: a church/religious organisation, a sport/recreational organisation, an art/music/educational organisation, a labour union, a political party, an environmental organisation, a professional association, a humanitarian/charitable organisation or a consumer organisation. Membership of these groups was ascertained by the WVS by posing the following question to respondents: “Now I am going to read off a list of voluntary organisations. For each one, could you tell me whether you are and active member, and inactive member, or not a member of that type of organisation?” The groups as mentioned were then read out aloud. Table 4.8 summarises the percentage of respondents per category.

**Table 4.8: Group membership and networks, by country**

	Chile	Poland	South Africa	South Korea
<b>Church/Religious Organisation</b>				
Not a member	56.9	77.3	17	53.4
Inactive member	20.6	10.2	30.8	27.5
Active member	22.5	12.5	52.2	19.1
Total	100	100	100	100
<b>Sport/Recreational Organisation</b>				
Not a member	69.7	86.1	61.8	63.5
Inactive member	15.8	9.5	22.8	21.8
Active member	14.5	4.4	15.4	14.7
Total	100	100	100	100
<b>Art/Music/Educational Organisation</b>				
Not a member	74.5	87.6	69.8	73.4
Inactive member	13	7.9	19.6	17.7
Active member	12.5	4.5	10.6	8.9
Total	100	100	100	100
<b>Labour Union</b>				
Not a member	83	86.6	76.5	90.8
Inactive member	12.7	8.7	17.5	7.7
Active member	4.3	4.7	6	1.5
Total	100	100	100	100
<b>Political Party</b>				
Not a member	86.1	92.5	63.1	92.6
Inactive member	11.9	6.3	28.8	6.4
Active member	2	1.2	8.1	1.1
Total	100	100	100	100
<b>Environmental Organisation</b>				
Not a member	87.1	92.4	78.1	91.8
Inactive member	11.3	5.9	16.8	6.4
Active member	1.6	1.7	5.2	1.8
Total	100	100	100	100
<b>Professional Organisation</b>				
Not a member	84.9	90.0	79.4	90.2
Inactive member	11.2	6.4	15.1	7.4
Active member	3.9	2.7	5.5	2.4
Total	100	100	100	100
<b>Humanitarian/Charitable Organisation</b>				
Not a member	78	89.5	78.3	90
Inactive member	13.4	7.3	15.8	8.1
Active member	8.6	3.2	5.9	1.8
Total	100	100	100	100
<b>Consumer Organisation</b>				
Not a member	88.4	93.8	81.1	93.1
Inactive member	10.6	5.7	15.3	5.4
Active member	1	0.5	3.7	1.5
Total	100	100	100	100

In general, active membership of group and networks is low. South Africa, the least developed of the four countries<sup>90</sup>, has the highest percentage of active members in almost every group or network variable. South Africa also has the most respondents who have taken part in all three protest activities used for this study<sup>91</sup>. This observation can possibly be explained by the findings of Kitschelt and Rhem (2008:456) which states that group networks can enhance political

<sup>90</sup> See Chapter 3, page 46.

<sup>91</sup> See Chapter 4, page 57.

participation, especially in the case of citizens with fewer personal resources to participate. On the other hand, South Korea and Poland - which are more developed<sup>92</sup> - have fewer respondents who are active members in groups. Poland's low percentages of active members of organisations can relate to what academics have labelled as "a syndrome of an abandoned society". Channels of representation in the Polish democracy have been weakened by the withdrawal of the trade unions from the democratic political processes of the country, the alienation of political parties from society and the hindrance of debates allowing for different political views (Puchalska, 2005:817). Studies find that although Poland is in many ways an economic success story, the social and political consolidation of democracy and democratic processes is still weak (Puchalska, 2005:817).

An interesting observation is that the percentages of active members reported for church/religious organisations by respondents from all four respective countries are high in comparison with the percentages reported for the other groups. Furthermore, the 52.2% active members of religious organisations in South Africa is noteworthy. Churches and other religious organisations provide resources and social spaces where members with similar interests can possibly recognise their "common cause" (Hail, 2011; Tilly, 2008). Also, Verba *et al.* (1995) claim that religious organisations may offer opportunities for their members to learn certain civic skills which may encourage them to participate in political activities (Hail, 2011). These networks may be of value for less privileged communities, which lack the opportunities to develop these skills as part of other groups (Hail, 2011). It will be interesting to see what the relationship between membership of religious organisations and political participation is for the four countries and in particular whether this relationship differs in the South African case.

Fewer respondents reported that they are not members of sport/recreational organisations than is the case for other groups. This finding is of interest since studies by social capital scholars such as Levermore (2008) and Keim (2006) have shown that sport may help address social problems through creating "networks of tolerance and trust" (Hagen, 2012:6). These networks in turn might lead to an increase in political and civic engagement (Hagen, 2012:6).

A final observation worth mentioning is that South Africa has far fewer respondents who are not members of a political party than is the case for other countries (in other words, more inactive and active members of political parties than the other countries). This is not surprising. Political

---

<sup>92</sup> See Chapter 3, page 46.

parties (particularly the NP) played a significant role in the perpetuation of racial segregation during the apartheid years, while others (especially the ANC) played an important role in the liberation of South Africa (Marais, 2011: 17, 21). Today, “the main [political] parties are historically well established with consistent bases of electoral support” (Afrimap, 2006:19). Again, it will be interesting to see what the relationship between membership of a political party and political participation is for the respective countries, as well as whether this relationship differs from the others in the South African case.

#### **4.3.4. Demographics**

Shin’s (1999:113) study incorporated gender, community and age as possible predictors of political participation. Drawing from his study, these indicators are incorporated as demographic characteristics in my study.

##### **4.3.4.1. Age**

A large body of literature claims that age has an impact on political participation choices of the individual. Dalton (2008: 58, 62, 69) states that as citizens become grow older, they have more family, occupational, economic and social responsibilities, and hence the relevance and impact of politics on their life increases. The author also mentions that the type of political activities different age groups take part in may also differ. Younger citizens, more enthusiastic and inclined towards rebellion (and often with more time on their hands while concentrated at educational institutions), may be more inclined to protest activity. As citizens grow older and take on more responsibilities, the desire to participate in political protest activities will then decline, but older age groups will take part in more conventional forms of political participation, such as voting and campaigning.

These statements tie in with Crittenden (1963:331) who asserts that the increase in participation as citizens grow older is a result of “roles and statuses”. Other authors - such as Kernell and Jacobson (2003) and Nie, Verba and Kim (1974) - focused more on the claim by Milbrath (1965) that “participation rises gradually with age, reaches a peak and levels off in the forties and the fifties, and gradually declines above sixty”. Furthermore, generational experiences might also have an impact on whether and how citizens take part in political activities (Soule, 2001; Dalton, 2008:69).



Age may thus be a possible predictor of political participation, but the relationship with various types of political activities might differ. The WVS establishes the age of respondents by simply asking “How old are you?” Table 4.9 summarizes the responses gathered per country and per age group.

**Table 4.9: Age\* by Country**

	<b>Chile</b>	<b>Poland</b>	<b>South Africa</b>	<b>South Korea</b>
<b>Youth</b>	17.1	15.5	23.7	13.7
<b>Younger Adult</b>	29.4	21.9	34.0	34.1
<b>Middle Aged</b>	34.3	39.8	28.6	36.1
<b>Elderly</b>	19.2	22.8	13.6	16.2
<b>Total</b>	100	100	100	100

Age Groups as follows: “Youth”=16-24; “Younger Adult”=25-39; “Middle Aged”=40-59 and “Elderly”=60 years and older.

Respondents from Chile, South Korea and Poland are more concentrated in the categories for middle aged and elderly citizens. South Africa’s respondents are more concentrated in the younger categories. This finding makes sense in light of the fact that South Africa has a very young population, with 77.6% of citizens below the age of 35 (UNFPA, 2013).

If Dalton’s claims are applicable, the level of participation in conventional forms of participation will increase with age and the levels of participation in forms of political protest will decrease with age. It can also be expected that countries with a younger population would show a higher percentage of protest activists, whilst countries with an older population should show a higher percentage of voting participation.

South Africa is the country with the highest percentage of “Youth” respondents, as well as the most respondents who have participated in all three protest activities.<sup>93</sup> Poland, with the highest percentage of respondents in the “Middle Aged” and “Elderly” category, also has a low percentage of respondents who have taken part in two or more protest activities.<sup>94</sup> Dalton’s claims offer a possible explanation to this observation.

#### **4.3.4.2. Gender**

Some studies find that women are less likely to take part in political activities than men are.<sup>95</sup> Dalton (2008:58) asserts that education patterns, income differences and employment patterns as

<sup>93</sup> See Chapter 4, page 57.

<sup>94</sup> See Chapter 4, 57.

<sup>95</sup> Coffé and Bolzendahl (2010); Norris (2002); Burns (2007) and Gallego (2007).

well as socialisation explain the finding<sup>96</sup> that men are more politically active than women. Other studies, such as by Koch (1997), indicate that women might vote more if issues of relevance to women featured more strongly in politics<sup>97</sup>. Some scholars<sup>98</sup> also assert that women participate differently and take part in different forms of political activities than men do. What is relevant for this study is that a large body of the literature asserts that men are more inclined to participate in political activities than women.

During the gathering of the WVS data interviewers had to indicate the gender of respondents based on their observation. The WVS aims to have 50% men and 50 % women as respondents to the questionnaire. However, since the gathered data should be representative of the populations interviewed, in some countries the percentage of female and male respondents interviewed are not always precisely 50%. Table 4.10 indicates the percentages of female and male respondents by country.

**Table 4.10 Gender, by country**

	<b>Chile</b>	<b>Poland</b>	<b>South Africa</b>	<b>South Korea</b>
<b>Female</b>	55.1	48.8	50.0	50.2
<b>Male</b>	44.9	51.2	50.0	49.8
<b>Total</b>	100	100	100	100

Chile and South Korea interviewed more females, Poland interviewed more males and South Africa interviewed an equal percentage of males and females.

#### **4.3.4.3. Size of town/area/community**

The last demographic factor follows from Shin's (1999) study which incorporated community as a possible predictor of political participation. Kitschelt and Rhem (2008:465) also mention the relevance of residential life as a possible influential parameter of recruitment for political participation activities. People living in rural areas are often more involved with community activities, while city dwellers are more isolated as result of a highly pressured lives with less time to be involved in political activities. However, other scholars<sup>99</sup> assert that the lack of material resources to participate, lower levels of education and limited access to opportunities to participate in rural areas can bring about a lower participation rate in rural areas. If size of town/area does have an impact on political participation, the impact is very country and context

<sup>96</sup> See Lafferty (1978) ; Schlozman, Burns and Verba (1994); Norris (2002); Burns (2007) and Shin (1999).

<sup>97</sup> Koch (1997).

<sup>98</sup> Coffé and Bozendahl, 2010

<sup>99</sup> See Chapter 2, page 33-34.

specific. However, it is still of interest to add this variable as a possible predictor of political participation to this study in order to discern whether any similarities can be identified among the four new democracies.

The WVS supervisor for each respective country indicates the area/size of town of each respondent, based on where the interviews were held. The possible categories are usually based on size of town, but in order to accommodate for country-specific contexts, some countries' categories indicate the area or community rather than the population size. Table 4.11 summarises the percentage of respondents per category for the four countries respectively.

**Table 4.11 Size of Town/ Area\*\*\***

	<b>Chile</b>	<b>Poland</b>	<b>South Africa*</b>	<b>South Korea**</b>
<b>Under 2 000(rural)</b>	0	32.8	18.3	5.9
<b>2 000-5 000</b>	0	6.8	2.2	8.7
<b>5 000-10 000</b>	0	3.6	4.3	40.3
<b>10 000-20 000</b>	0	5.2	8.7	4.4
<b>20 000-100 000</b>	16.1	20.4	6.2	5.3
<b>100 000 and more (metro)</b>	83.9	31.2	60.2	35.3
<b>Total</b>	100	100	100	100

\* South African categories: "Rural", "Village", "Small Town", "Large Town", "City" and "Metro".

\*\* South Korea categories: "Farm/Mountain/Fishing Village", "Urban Farm/Fishing Village", "Medium/Small City", "Industrial area near City", "Business area in Metropolitan City", "Residential area in Metropolitan City".

\*\*\* As a cautionary note, when interpreting the above table it is important to keep in mind that the response categories varies among the countries. To ease analysis, the category for "Under 2000" will be referred to as "rural" and the category "100 000 and more" will be referred to as "metro".

In general, respondents are concentrated in metropolitan and city areas. More than 80% of Chilean respondents live in metro areas. South Korea has the highest concentration of its respondents in the category for "Medium/Small City" (40.3%), but also has 35.3% of its respondents living in metro areas. The majority of South African respondents live in metropolitan areas (60.2%). Noteworthy is the finding that Poland has the highest percentage of respondents in rural areas (32.8%) and 31.2% of Polish respondents living in metropolitan areas. The percentage of South Africa respondents from rural areas (18.3%) is also worth mentioning.

#### **4.4. Multiple regression**

Multiple regression is used to determine whether the independent variables are possible predictors of political participation in the four new democracies. Multiple regression is a statistical method which is used to investigate the relationships of multiple independent variables with a dependent variable. This process identifies the relationship of each independent variable

with the dependent variable, while “statistically controlling for” the other independent variable(s) (Dalton, 2008:262).

In Tables 4.12 and 4.13, the standardised regression coefficients (or beta weights) for each relationship are reported. This coefficient indicates strength and the direction of the relationship between the two variables and thus describes the relationship (Dalton, 2008:262-263). The beta weights, through their expression of the influence of each independent variable, enable the researcher to assess the “relative importance” of each predictor used in the study (Thiessen, 1993:264). Beta weights may range from -1.0 (indicating a perfect negative relationship between the variables) to 1.0 (indicating a perfect positive relationship).<sup>100</sup> Values under +/-0.1 are weak, values between +/-0.1 and +/-0.2 are moderate in strength, and values above +/-0.2 indicate strong relationships (Dalton, 2008:265-266).

Also reported in Tables 4.12 and 4.13 is the R, R-squared and the adjusted R-squared for each country<sup>101</sup>. The R-squared value is an indication of the proportion of variation (or variability) in the dependent variable as explained by the variations in the set of indicators or independent variables used as part of the regression (Gupta, 2000). The adjusted R-squared measures the proportion of variance in the dependent variable as explained or accounted for by variations in all of the independent variables together (Gupta, 2000; Thiessen, 1993: 311). The latter takes into account the loss in the degrees of freedom brought about by the independent variables (Thiessen, 1993:311).

The standardised regression coefficients and adjusted R-squared values, as found through the multiple regression analysis, will be used when interpreting the findings. These findings are indicated in Tables 4.12 and 4.13. The results for models 1-4<sup>102</sup> are indicated to show the change in the R, R-squared and adjusted R-squared as the different sub-divisions (personal resources, political engagement/motivation, membership of networks and demographics) of predictors are added.

---

<sup>100</sup> Thiessen (1993:190) explains that when “increasing values of one variable are associated with increasing values of the other variable”, these variables stand in a positive relationship with each other. Thiessen also explains that in a negative relationship, “increasing values of one variable are associated with the decreasing value of the other” variable.

<sup>101</sup> See Appendix for the full outcomes of the multiple regression analysis per groups of parameters by country.

<sup>102</sup> Model 1 = personal resources; Model 2 = political engagement/motivation; Model 3 = membership of networks and Model 4 = demographics.

#### 4.4.1: Predictors of voting

The following findings are based on the results of my multiple regression analysis (as summarised in Table 4.12). Taken together, the set of independent variables chosen for this study accounts for 25.9% variance in voting for Chile, 18.8% of variance for South Africa, 3.1% of variance for Poland and 10.5% of variance for South Korea.

**Table 4.12: Predictors of voting**

	<b>Chile</b>	<b>Poland</b>	<b>South Africa</b>	<b>South Korea</b>
<b>Model 1: Personal resources</b>				
Level of education	0.118*	0.009	0.047*	0.100*
Self-reported social class	-0.011	0.098*	-0.060*	0.081*
R	0.072	0.103*	0.079*	0.096
R-squared	0.005	0.011*	0.006*	0.009
Adjusted R-squared	0.002	0.007*	0.005*	0.008
<b>Model 2: Political engagement/motivation</b>				
Left-right political ideology	0.054	0.05	0.033	0.068
Political interest	0.076*	0.103*	0.079*	0.128*
R	0.131*	0.170*	0.142*	0.218*
R-squared	0.017*	0.029*	0.020*	0.048*
Adjusted R-squared	0.011*	0.023*	0.018*	0.044*
<b>Model 3: Group membership/networks</b>				
Church/religious Organisation	0.072	0.043	-0.024	-0.012
Labour Union	0.006	0.035	0.026	0.006
Political Party	-0.035	0.031	0.143*	0.000
Sport/Recreational Organisation	0.026	0.042	-0.053*	0.014
Art/Music/Educational Organisation	-0.012	0.018	-0.040	0.052
Environmental Organisation	-0.005	0.037	-0.004	-0.094*
Professional Association	-0.042	-0.007	0.024	-0.067*
Humanitarian/Charitable Organisation	0.032	0.007	-0.042	0.067
Consumer Organisation	-0.050	-0.025	-0.011	0.001
R	0.218*	0.203*	0.263*	0.238*
R-squared	0.047*	0.041*	0.069*	0.057*
Adjusted R-Squared	0.029*	0.021*	0.064*	0.046*
<b>Model 4: Demographics</b>				
Age	0.518*	0.102*	0.384*	0.298*
Gender (male=1)	0.030	-0.068	-0.045*	0.042
Size of Town/Community	-0.060	-0.028*	-0.021	0.009
<b>R</b>	0.525*	0.236*	0.440*	0.342*
<b>R-squared</b>	0.276*	0.056*	0.194*	0.117*
<b>Adjusted R-squared</b>	0.259*	0.031*	0.188*	0.105*

Note: Table entries are standardised coefficients from multiple regression analyses. All statistically significant effects ( $p < 0.05$ ) are indicated by an asterisk (\*).

Furthermore, a few prominent observations regarding the beta weights are made. Level of education is a significant predictor of voting in Chile, South Africa and South Korea. For all three of these countries the direction of the relationship is positive. For Chile and South Korea the relationship is moderate (0.118 and 0.100), for South Africa it is weak (0.047).

Social class has a significant, but weak, relationship with voting in South Africa (-0.060), Poland and South Korea (0.098 and 0.081). In the South African case, this relationship is negative, indicating that as social class rises, voting turnout decreases. In the Polish and South Korean case the relationship is positive, indicating that higher social class are associated with higher voting turnouts.

Political interest has a significant relationship with voting in all four countries. For Chile and South Africa, this relationship is weak (0.076 and 0.079), while for Poland and South Korea this relationship is moderate in strength (0.103 and 0.128).

Very few of the groups and networks have a significant relationship with voting in any of the four countries. In South Africa, political party membership has a moderate relationship with voting (0.143) and sport/recreational membership has a weak negative relationship with voting (-0.053). For South Korea, membership of an environmental organisations or a professional organisation has a weak negative relationships with voting (-0.094 and -0.067).

Age is a significant predictor of voting in all four countries. For Chile, South Africa and South Korea this relationship is positive and strong (0.518, 0.384 and 0.298 respectively). For Poland the relationship is also positive, but moderate in strength (0.102).

Gender materialises as a predictor of voting only for South Africa, the beta weight (-0.045) indicating a weak and negative relationship between gender and voting. Given the coding of the data (please see Tables 4.12 and 4.13), this means that women in South Africa are more likely to vote. Size of town/area has a relationship to voting only in Poland, for which the relationship is negative and weak (-0.028). This indicates that individuals from more rural areas in Poland are more likely to vote.

**4.4.2: Predictors of political protest behaviour****Table 4.13: Predictors of political protest behaviour**

	<b>Chile</b>	<b>Poland</b>	<b>South Africa</b>	<b>South Korea</b>
<b>Model 1: Personal resources</b>				
Level of education	0.148*	0.065	0.114*	0.024
Self-reported social class	0.010	0.014	-0.042	-0.014
R	0.222*	0.111*	0.134*	0.048
R-squared	0.049*	0.012*	0.018*	0.002
Adjusted R-squared	0.046*	0.009*	0.017*	0.001
<b>Model 2: Political engagement/motivation</b>				
Left-Right political ideology	-0.096*	-0.036	-0.058*	-0.087*
Political interest	0.229*	0.160*	0.124*	0.205*
R	0.355*	0.220*	0.223*	0.240*
R-squared	0.126*	0.048*	0.050*	0.057*
Adjusted R-squared	0.121*	0.042*	0.048*	0.054*
<b>Model 3: Group membership/networks</b>				
Church/Religious Organisation	-0.064	0.040	-0.047*	-0.046
Labour Union	0.031	0.188*	0.083*	0.010
Political Party	0.139*	0.075	0.131*	0.114*
Sport/Recreational Organisation	0.001	-0.117*	-0.030	0.059
Art/Music/Educational Organisation	0.138*	0.026	0.023	0.024
Environmental Organisation	0.035	0.164*	-0.037	-0.099*
Professional Association	-0.117*	0.044	0.053	-0.043
Humanitarian/Charitable Organisation	0.015	0.072	0.012	0.194*
Consumer Organisation	-0.085	-0.288*	-0.048	-0.082*
R	0.400*	0.371*	0.302*	0.317*
R-squared	0.160*	0.138*	0.091*	0.101*
Adjusted R-squared	0.144*	0.118*	0.086*	0.091*
<b>Model 4: Demographics</b>				
Age	0.042	-0.053	0.111*	0.005
Gender (male=1)	0.036	0.072*	0.034	-0.018
Size of Town/Community	-0.027	0.056	0.108*	0.022
<b>R</b>	<b>0.404*</b>	<b>0.385*</b>	<b>0.337*</b>	<b>0.319*</b>
<b>R-squared</b>	<b>0.164*</b>	<b>0.148*</b>	<b>0.113*</b>	<b>0.102*</b>
<b>Adjusted R-squared</b>	<b>0.143*</b>	<b>0.124*</b>	<b>0.107*</b>	<b>0.089*</b>

Note: Table entries are standardised coefficients from multiple regression analyses. All statistically significant effects ( $p < 0.05$ ) are indicated by an asterisk (\*).

The following findings are based on the results of the multiple regression analysis (as summarised in Table 4.13). The adjusted R-squared values indicated in Table 4.13 shows that the set of independent variables account for 14.3% of variance in political protest behaviour for

Chile, 12.4% of variance in Poland, 10.7% of variance in political action for South Africa and 8.9% of variance in South Korea.

Table 4.13 offers a few further insights for this study. Level of education has a significant relationship with political protest behaviour only in Chile and South Africa. Both of these relationships are moderate positive (0.148 and 0.114).

Left-right political ideology is a significant predictor of political protest behaviour in Chile, South Africa and South Korea (with beta weights of -0.096, -0.058 and -0.087 respectively). For all three countries, the relationship is negative and weak.

Political interest has a strong and positive relationship with political protest behaviour in Chile, South Africa, Poland and South Korea (with beta weights of 0.229, 0.124, 0.160 and 0.205 respectively).

Group membership and networks feature more as a predictor of political protest behaviour than for voting. For Chile, membership of a political party has a moderate relationship with political protest behaviour (0.139); membership of an art/music or educational organization has a moderate positive relationship with political protest behaviour (0.138) and membership of a professional association has a moderate negative relationship with political protest behaviour (-0.117).

For South Africa, membership of a church/religious organisation has a negative and weak relationship with political protest behaviour (-0.047), while membership of a labour union or political party has a moderate positive relationship with political protest behaviour (0.083 and 0.131 respectively).

For Poland, membership of a labour union has a strong positive relationship to political protest behaviour (0.188); membership of a sport/recreational organisation has a moderate negative relationship with political protest behaviour (-0.117); membership of an environmental organisation has a positive moderate relationship with political protest behaviour and membership of a consumer organisation has a strong negative relationship with political protest behaviour (-0.288).



For South Korea, membership of an environmental organisation has a weak negative relationship with political protest behaviour (-0.099); membership of a humanitarian/charitable organisation has a positive moderate relationship with political protest behaviour (0.194) and membership of a consumer organisation has a negative weak relationship with political protest behaviour (-0.082).

Age has a significant relationship with political protest behaviour in South Africa. The relationship is positive and moderate in strength (0.111). Gender has a weak positive relationship to political protest behaviour in Poland (0.072) and size of town/area has a significant moderate relationship with political protest behaviour in South Africa (0.108).

#### **4.4.3. Interpretation of findings**

In this section the interpretation of the beta weight values per model will be discussed, after which the interpretation of the adjusted R-squared values (indicative of the predictive power of the set of independent variables) will follow.

##### **4.4.3.1. Model 1: Personal resources**

Personal resources do seem to have an impact on voting, although not as strongly as the literature review led me to expect. The fact that all four of these countries are categorised as medium or highly developed might explain why resources themselves are not a very salient predictor of voting in these four countries. As explained earlier,<sup>103</sup> the act of voting is not very resource intensive for citizens. The choice to vote or not to vote might thus depend on more than personal resources available to vote. However, personal resources also do not materialise as a very strong predictor of participation in political protest behaviour, even though these are more resource-intensive political activities. A deeper analysis of this finding is thus called for.

Firstly, some scholars<sup>104</sup> assert that education is not directly linked to political participation, but rather to political knowledge, political interest and sophistication, which then have an impact on political participation by developing the abilities of citizens to process and understand politics as well as build their confidence to take part in political activities. Seeing that primary and secondary schooling are mandatory for citizens in all four countries and education levels quite high (except for South Africa), the important factor to investigate may then be the level of

---

<sup>103</sup> See Chapter 4, pages 55-57.

<sup>104</sup> Brady *et al.* (1995)

political interest and sophistication as outcomes of education. The findings for political interest and level of education as provided in Tables 4.12 and 4.13 are here investigated together. For this analysis the emphasis will fall on South Africa and South Korea given the clear differences in educational levels and approaches to education.<sup>105</sup>

South Africa has the highest percentage of respondents with no schooling, as well as the highest percentage of respondents who have not taken part in political protest activities. The positive relationship between level of education and voting is weak, and the positive relationship between level of education and political protest behaviour is moderate in strength. However, South Africa has the highest percentage of respondents who are interested in politics. Political interest has a weak positive relationship with voting and a moderate positive relationship with political protest behaviour.

The South African education system has come a long way since the apartheid years when the move to divide and segregate according to racial lines was also clear in educational policies. Educational resource allocation favoured white citizens (a minority group), which impacted negatively on the levels of educations of non-white citizens (Nkoane, 2006:243). In 1994 the country held its first democratic elections as the apartheid regime came to an end. Under the leadership of the ANC the provision of education became imperative and radical policy reforms were implemented to advance education. However, by 2006 institutions of education were struggling to maintain their numerous roles and responsibilities in society. Educational institutions had to respond to societal needs, support and increase diverse staff and student populations, ensure access and equity, respond to fiscal constraints, as well as deal with expectations of accountability, effectiveness and quality education (Nkoane, 2006: 244). Furthermore, Crouch and Vinjevold (2006:1) mention that the government struggled with maintaining quality education amidst policy implementation to improve access to education. These observations tie in with those of Ramdass (2009) who noted that the advancement of education in South Africa was limited by the lack of quality education; rising crime levels; a lack in resources, facilities and teachers; and HIV/AIDS reducing the number of qualified teachers and skewing public funds as well as foreign investments. The low levels of education of the respondents can thus be attributed both to government policies of the past and the current lack of resources to provide quality education. However, South Africans are still interested in politics –

---

<sup>105</sup> See Chapter 4, pages 60-62 and footnote 73.

possibly as a by-product of the country's apartheid history and the profound impact political decisions had on the lives of citizens in the country.

In the South Korean case we find that education has a moderate positive relationship with voting, but no relationship with political action. South Korea has the highest percentage of respondents in the tertiary education category, as well as the highest percentage of voters and the lowest percentage of respondents who have not taken part in political protest activities. Political interest in the South Korean case has a moderate positive relationship to voting and a strong positive relationship with political action. In addition, South Korea has the lowest percentage of respondents who are not interested in politics.

South Korea introduced compulsory elementary education in the 1950s. Following years of educational development, the educational policies of the country emphasized human education (aimed at preparing pupils for future societies) in the 1990s. At present, four characteristics foster educational advancement in South Korea: 1) the citizens' zeal for education; 2) efficient policy implementation; 3) rapid expansion in numbers in all levels of education; and 4) an emphasis on equity in education. The country's national curricula set specific standards to which all educational institutions need to comply. This national curriculum is revised every five to ten years in order to make sure that these set standards, teaching methods and materials remain relevant to the developments of the day (Lee, 2013).

South Korea's long history of fostering education has borne fruit. The country's education system is regarded as one of the most effective in the world, when using indicators such as literacy rates, school attendance and university graduation rates. A large part of this success is attributed to a culture that values education (Parr, 2012) linked with policies which enables resources for educational advancement and for citizens to obtain a quality education (Lee, 2013).

South Korea has encountered some challenges in its education systems, such as: 1) an over-centralised education administration which limits diversity; 2) difficulties in balancing equity and excellence at educational institutions; and 3) intense competition for college entrance, which results in personal resources being used for private tutoring classes, and high stress levels (Lee, 2013). These challenges differ profoundly from the challenges mentioned in the South African case.

In addition to the South Korean education system's emphasis on "human education", which focuses on developing children for future societies, the National Election Commission (NEC) of South Korea's Korean Civic Education Institute for Democracy has been offering civic education programmes to all South Koreans since 2005. These programmes do not only develop civic awareness among young Koreans at school, but are also offered at various other institutions such as national agencies, NGOs and NPOs, press agencies and professional groups. These programmes aim to build an advanced political culture of mature civic political awareness and a thorough understanding of democratic procedures and systems (Kang, 2013).

It seems like education is a proxy for political participation and not a cause of political participation. I deduce from this that the determining factor is the quality and the content of the education received, not merely the level of education. For example, South Korea's education system (which emphasizes the value of educating people in order to be engaged citizens) seems to be bearing fruit, as seen in both the country's voting turnout and level of political interest. For South Africa, grappling with restraints which limits the education system from performing effectively, but with a high level of respondents who are interested in politics, a different dynamic might be in play to foster this interest in political matters – as stated, possibly deriving from the the country's recent apartheid history.

Secondly, the findings of this study relates to Knutsen's<sup>106</sup> assertion that the impact of class on political participation has been on the decline in recent years. The transformation of societies and traditional class structures has been offered as an explanation, as well as detachment from class-related structures as living standards improve. However, in countries with high levels of inequality and bigger working classes, this factor might still be relevant (Knutsen, 2007:272-273). The latter situation seems to hold in the South African case (with both a high level of inequality and a small middle class in comparison with the other three countries), where a negative relationship between class and participation is indicated. Thus, citizens who form part of the lower social classes in South Africa, with probably more grievances to express and who are more inclined not to be satisfied with the current state of affairs, are more likely to vote in this country.

---

<sup>106</sup> See Chapter 4, pages 62-63.

In commenting on Lafferty's<sup>107</sup> premise that more developed countries have more middle- and upper-class citizens and thus a more politically active population, South Korea can be used as a point in case. South Korea has the highest HDI score, as well as the highest percentage of middle-class respondents and the lowest percentage of lower-class respondents of the four cases. The country also has the highest percentage of respondents who have voted and the lowest percentage of respondents who indicated that they have not taken part in political action activities. The relationship between social class and voting is weak but positive, and there is no significant relationship between social class and political protest behaviour. The relationship between class and political protest behaviour might be explained in terms of Lafferty's premise. However, there is still a significant relationship between voting and class. This might be a result of the fact that South Korea has a large middle-class, but also citizens educated in how democracy works. The middle-class citizens, with more resources to further their education, thus do have an understanding of the importance of voting as part of a democracy.

Chile has the second highest HDI ranking of the four countries, the second highest percentage of respondents who perceive themselves as being middle class, the second highest percentage of respondents who have voted, but the highest percentage who have not taken part in political protest activities. Social class has no significant relationship to voting or political action in this country. This country also showed more citizens emphasising post-materialist values than is the case for the other three countries. It thus seems that the assertion that as countries develop, so voting based on class declines, hold true for the Chilean case.

Poland also has a high HDI score, but the percentage of working-class and middle-class citizens is almost the same. The country has the lowest voting turn-out and the percentage of respondents who have taken part in political protest activities is not high either. Social class is a weak positive predictor of voting in this country, but not for political protest behaviour. The relationship between voting and class might be attributed to the same dynamic at play as is the case for South Korea where educated middle-class citizens with more resources to participate understand the importance of voting as part of democracy.

It seems that class may have an impact on voting, but it has no significant relationship with political action. In the light of the claims that voting is primarily an action taken by an individual, the individual's perceptions of whether he/she can participate as well as whether

---

<sup>107</sup> See Chapter 4, page 62-63.

he/she has the resources (time and money) to participate can indeed influence the choice to participate, as well as the type of participation. The South African case is unique in this instance, given the negative relationship between voting and class – a finding attributable to the country's level of inequality, smaller middle class and level of development.

#### **4.4.3.2. Model 2: Political motivation and engagement**

This study did not find a significant relationship between left-right political ideology and voting. As stated earlier, given the spread in left-right respondents, this variable was not expected to have a noticeable impact on voting behaviour. However, left-right political ideology features as a weak predictor with a negative value for political protest behaviour in Chile, South Africa and South Korea. This indicates that in those three countries, affiliation to the left is significant for political protest behaviour. This finding makes sense in light of the fact that more unconventional political protest activities have been associated to leftist movements through the years.

Chulhee (2007:33) states that as countries develop, social changes ensue. The confrontations between left and right decline and an emphasis on “New Politics”<sup>108</sup> develops as political issues diversify. Furthermore, direct political participation activities (such as boycotts and demonstrations) are increasingly popular among citizens. These shifts take place in line with societies moving to post-modern and post-material values. In the light of this assertion, I find it interesting that there is no significant relationship between left-right political ideology and voting, but for three of the countries a relationship between left-right alignment and political protest behaviour has been found. According to Chulhee (2007), the relationship between left-right political ideology and political participation can be relevant as countries develop. Also, political protest activities should be popular as forms of political participation to express “New Politics” issues, but the findings here show that being part of the left has a significant relationship with political protest behaviour in these countries – in line with the “Old Politics” idea that unconventional participation types are often used by citizens affiliated to the left. Taking into consideration that citizens emphasised materialist values<sup>109</sup>, it seems like the political culture of these new democracies are still a combination of the “Old” – and “New

---

<sup>108</sup>Knutsen (1995) explains that “Old Politics” are associated with industrial societies where societal divisions (such as left-right alignments) are economically based; political parties and labour unions are fundamental to power dynamics; economies are regulated by governments and materialist values are emphasised. “New Politics” are associated with advanced industrial societies where environmental quality, alternative life styles and social and political participation are emphasised; minority rights and social equality are revered; and post-material values are increasingly of importance.

<sup>109</sup> See Chapter 3, page 43- 44.

Politics”. Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi (2005) found that a move from “Old” to “New” politics has not taken place in South Africa, but rather that protest actions are taken to address materialist issues (more related to the themes of “Old” politics). Whether this is also the case for Chile and South Korea requires an in-depth investigation which is beyond the scope of this study.

Political interest is a weak to moderate predictor of voting in all four countries, but a strong predictor of political protest behaviour. These findings support scholars who assert that there is a relationship between political interest and taking part in political activities. This is said while bearing in mind the above comments on the relationship between education and political interest.

#### **4.4.3.3. Model 3: Group membership and networks**

Group membership and networks does not feature as a very prominent predictors of voting. Given that voting is such an individually motivated action, this finding is not surprising. However, groups and networks do have more of an impact on political protest behaviour than on voting, which relates to the fact that protest action requires co-operation and is more resource intensive than voting. Being motivated or demotivated to take part in forms of political protest activity by a fellow community member seems to play a role in influencing political protest behaviour. The types of groups which do have an impact on political protest behaviour seem to relate to the contextual backgrounds of the four countries.

In the South African case liberation movements, labour unions (eg. COSATU) and political parties mobilised citizens to take action during apartheid in order to liberate the country (Marais, 2011: 434). Membership of these groups also features as predictors of political protest behaviour in the South African case. The dynamic mentioned by Chulhee (2007:33) explains the findings of the relationship between labour unions and political party membership with political protest behaviour, as well as the relationship between political party membership and voting. Chulhee (2007:33) notes that as countries develop, class-based voting and the confrontation between left-right decline, while post-materialist values, direct participation and “New Politics” rise. With this dynamic, citizens lose trust in institutions associated with the “Old Politics” such as political parties and labour unions. In this regard South Africa is the least developed of the four countries under investigation and fosters materialist values most strongly of the four cases. At the same time, it is also the country where labour union and political party membership do have a relationship with political protest behaviour – a finding which does not apply to the other three

more developed countries. It seems that the institutions of “Old Politics” are still of some importance in the South African case. However, the move towards “New Politics” can already be seen in the loss of the South African public’s confidence in labour unions from 1981-2006, as reported by Du Toit and Kotzé (2011:50). As South Africa develops, the move towards “New Politics”, according to Chulhee, should lead to a further decline in confidence in the institutions of the “Old Politics”. It will thus be interesting to see whether labour unions remain as noteworthy institutions in South African politics in future, as well as how the relationship between membership of labour unions and political participation in this country changes as the country develops.

In addition, a weak negative relationship between membership of a church/religious organisation with political action is indicated in South Africa. South Africa also has a large percentage of respondents who are active members of church/religious organizations (52.2%). The negative relationship between church membership and political protest behaviour seems to contradict the premise that group membership develops skills and recruitment opportunities to take part in political activities and may boost political participation. South African religious/church groups are well known to play an active role in promoting democracy and democratic institutions (Kuperus, 1999). A possible explanation of this negative relationship between membership and political protest behaviour is that active members of church/religious groups spend more of their time and financial resources on church-related activities, with few resources left to participate in the more resource-intensive unconventional forms of political protest behaviour.

However, another possible explanation can be related to a finding by Du Toit and Kotzé (2011). Using WVS data (as gathered for the fifth wave) on tolerance of homosexuality, abortion, prostitution, divorce, euthanasia and suicide, Du Toit and Kotzé (2011: 108-110) found that South African society is socially conservative, despite a liberal constitution and a dominant liberal rhetoric in the political sphere. Du Toit and Kotzé (2011:110) also found that religious and non-religious South African respondents were far less tolerant than atheists in the country. In addition, Du Toit and Kotzé (2011: 50) found that for the period 1989-2006 the South African public consistently ranked church and religious groups as the institutions in which they have the most confidence. Interestingly enough, confidence in South African churches and religious groups increased during the 1990s the period of transition from apartheid, marked by political and social turmoil – even though churches, as was the case for numerous other South African civic organisations at the time, were “divided along the lines of conflict” (Du Toit & Kotzé,



2011:50). Du Toit and Kotzé (2011:50-51) explains the confidence of the South African public in churches as a consequence of churches' function to serve as both source of "inspiration and reassurance". Given that churches and religious organizations are often spaces where individuals can foster "common causes" (Hail, 2011), it is possible that conservative South African citizens affiliate more with values upheld in their church communities and find "common causes" in these spaces rather than in spaces (such as the political sphere) where a liberal rhetoric dominates. It can also be that the members of religious groups would rather invest their personal resources in the common causes of religious groups and churches - in which they have more confidence - than in political parties which predominantly advocate liberal rather than conservative values, and in which they have less confidence. Furthermore, it can also possibly be that within the church community, congregation members are demotivated by fellow members to participate in political activities.

Another interesting finding is the negative relationship between membership of a sport/recreational group and voting in the South African case. Hagen (2009) specifically investigated this relationship and found no relationship between sport membership and formal political participation – despite expectations that the contrary would be proven through his study. Hagen (2009:80) attributed this finding to "the nature of South Africa's current political culture and context [which] has resulted in social capital's impact being limited to other areas besides formal political participation." Further investigation into this relationship is needed since Hagen (and I) expected a positive relationship between the two variables, but findings proved otherwise. It would be of value to investigate this relationship further and to discern what it is about the current political culture and context in South Africa bring that has produced these results.

In the South Korean case membership of environmental groups and professional associations has a negative relationship with voting. This findings relates to Dalton's (2008:94) claim that in more developed countries a shift from material to post-material values (such as environmental affairs, individual freedom, quality of life, participation and social equality) is taking place. Citizens who espouse post-material values are more likely to support new forms of direct democratic participation, rather than structured electoral participation (Dalton, 2008: 94; Chulhee, 2007:33). Although South Koreans emphasize primarily materialist values,<sup>110</sup> some respondents do emphasise post-materialist values – possibly leading to an emphasis on diverse political issues and direct action, as explained by Chulhee (2007).

---

<sup>110</sup> See Chapter 3, page 44.

In Chile, group membership does not feature as a predictor of voting; however, data show a relationship between political protest behaviour and group membership of groups holding post-material values (art/music and educational groups). Chilean respondents showed stronger post-materialist tendencies than those in the other countries. As countries develop and transform, citizens lose interest in political institutions associated with the industrial period, diversify their political issues and concerns, and place an emphasis on post-material values (Chulhee, 2007). In the light of this statement, absence of a significant relationship between group membership and voting in Chile makes sense. The identified relationship between membership of a group related to post-material values and political protest behaviour can also be explained by Chulhee's (2007) assertions as Chilean respondents foster some post-material values.

Another explanation can be the "Penguin Revolution" which took place in Chile in 2006. The movement started in 2005 as citizens petitioned the government of President Ricardo Lagos. Michelle Bachelet was then appointed as president in January the following year after campaigning for social justice and an emphasis on the poor and vulnerable. Students were optimistic about the prospects of educational reform, but they soon discovered their optimism was left unaddressed when the president failed to mention educational reform in her state of the nation speech (Reel, 2006). This inspired a new protest movement for educational reform. Students demanded free public transport, central government involvement to reform the failed public school system and free college entrance exams. The students reached a compromise with Bachelet and returned to their classes – a very significant milestone for Chilean democracy (Hatfield, 2006). If this revolution fully explains the relationship between membership of an educational/art organisation and political action, one also would expect a significant generational impact on political participation and that the relationship between political protest behaviour and "youth" in the Chilean case would be significant in this study. However, this is not the case since no significant relationship has been found between age and political protest behaviour for Chile.

In Poland group membership is not an important predictor of political participation. The impact of labour union membership on protest behaviour may relate to the country's communist history during which socialist movements and labour unions played a great role in motivating and mobilising the Polish masses to take political action (Banks, Muller, William & Isacoff, 2009: 1141). The relationship between membership in an environmental group (a concern related to post-material values) indicates post-materialist values may play a role in determining protest

behaviour in Poland – indicating a possible shift in political culture to emphasise a more diverse spectrum of political issues than in the past.

#### **4.4.3.4. Model 4: Demographic characteristics**

With regards to demographic characteristics, gender and size of town/area/community do not seem to play an important role in predicting voting or protest behaviour. Only for South Africa, gender materialised as a predictor of voting. The regression indicated a weak negative relationship between gender and voting<sup>111</sup>, thus indicating that more women than men indicated that they have voted in the 2004 national election (the election prior to the WVS study). A possible explanation is that South Africa is a signatory to the 1997 SADC Declaration on Gender and Development. Member states to this declaration commits to equal gender representation in “key organs of state”, with at least 30% representation of women in these state institutions by 2005 – a figure South Africa passed already in 2004 (Kalley, Matlosa and Kadima, 2004). Furthermore, more women than men registered to vote in the 2004 election, which makes it probable that more women than men voted in the election (Gouws, 2004). Hassim (1999) also mentions that a noticeable shift took place in the way women’s electoral interest were portrayed and articulated by organisations after 1994, asserting a need to increase women’s representation (despite differences between organisations on how this should be brought about). In light of these assertions, Koch’s (1997) statement that women might be more inclined to participate if issues of relevance to women are represented can explain the finding for women’s voting in South Africa. However, an in depth study (possibly longitudinal) to explore and explain this finding in more depth is required.

Age serves as a significant predictor of moderate to strong strength of voting in all four countries. This finding is similar to those in studies by Crittenden (1963) and Dalton (2008) which shows that as citizens grow older and take on more responsibilities, they tend to participate in conventional forms of political participation. Age does not have a significant relationship with political protest behaviour. As stated before, Dalton asserted that protest behaviour is more likely to be the forms of participation adopted by the youth. However, in the same study Dalton (2008:71) claims that the youth are changing their modes of political participation, particularly in the direction of political consumerism, internet activism and voluntarism, and protest activities. For example, online social networking sites (such as Twitter

---

<sup>111</sup> Prior to the multiple regression, “Male” was coded=1 and “Female”=0. The regression delivered a small negative score for the relationship between gender and voting in the South African case (-0.045), which means that more women than men indicated that they voted in the previous national election.

and Facebook) function as part of the public sphere<sup>112</sup> (Lutz, 2013:1). Social media and online networking sites are growing (Lutz, 2013:1), making this part of the public sphere increasingly relevant when it comes to civic engagement and the way people express their social and political sentiments. However, these types of political participation have not been included as part of my study.

The findings of this study that age does not relate to political protest behaviour might thus be explained by the fact that the forms of political participation citizens take part in (particularly by the youth) are changing. It also might be that generational backgrounds not only influence the forms of political participation engaged in, but also whether opportunities to take part in such actions were present during individuals' younger years.

#### **4.4.3.5. Predictive power of the independent variables**

Looking at how the adjusted R-squared values change as independent variables are added to the regression, two observations stand out. Firstly, when demographic characteristics are added to the model, the proportion of variance in voting as explained by the set of predictors used increases quite noticeably. This might be attributed to the fact that demographic characteristics may have an impact on whether an individual is asked to participate, as well as whether the individual has the resources to participate.

Poland stands out. The explanatory power of the set of variables for voting in Poland decreased as groups were added, but it increased as demographic parameters were added. This might also be attributable to the “abandoned society syndrome”,<sup>113</sup> since Polish citizens have become apathetic towards group activities, especially those related to politics. However, demographics - particularly age – does have a relationship to voting.

Secondly, it is clear that groups and networks added to the set of independent variables made the biggest impact on the proportion of variance in political protest behaviour explained by the set of independent variables, except in the Chilean case where political engagement parameters increased the predictive power of the set of variables the most. The fact that groups and networks account for a large proportion of variance in political protest behaviour makes sense since these

---

<sup>112</sup> Public spheres are spaces where the members of the public can meet with the aim to elaborate, discuss and debate current and public affairs. The public sphere is nestled between state and society, thus functioning as a component of socio-political organisation (Lutz, 2013:1). The public sphere provides a space for citizens to participate in public affairs, as well as offering a platform to keep governments accountable (Castells, 2008: 78-79).

<sup>113</sup> See Chapter 4, page 91-93.

activities are mostly co-operative. Being part of a group and/or network provides for the opportunity to be motivated or demotivated to take part in activities from people whom individuals are connected to and engage with regularly.

Regarding the power of the whole set of independent variables used to explain political participation, a few observations are relevant. For Chile, South Africa and South Korea the explanatory power of all the independent variables is greater for voting than for political protest activities, but for Poland this study finds the opposite. Poland has been an exception in many of the findings of this study and I thought this might be attributed to the country's communist past. This possibility is derived from a study by Barnes (2006) who compared how political participation is changing in post-communist new democracies. These countries exhibit many of the political participation trends identified in Western European countries, such as a decline in associational membership and a rise in endorsement of nonviolent forms of political protest (Barnes, 2006:76-77). What is particular to post-communist countries is that their social structures are "flat" with little differences in income and standards of living among citizens, and a lack in experience in participating in democratic processes, coupled with a lack of fully understanding the personal impact of policies and democratic politics by citizens. Furthermore, Barnes (2006:77) states that both citizens and political leaders in post-communist countries seem unsure about their roles within democratic societies. Unfortunately, the gap between citizens and leaders grows as policymakers and politicians do little to involve citizens as part of political processes or to include them into policy decisions. Civil society reacts by choosing between two alternatives which emerged after the communist era and transitions to democracy: 1) citizens avoid anything related to politics; or 2) they separate the public sphere from civil society, which results in individuals forming parts of issue-based groups rather than being tied to political parties and/or labour unions. Post-communist countries thus have well-educated citizens without experience in democratic politics as well as political leaders who fail to include citizens in democratic processes, which in turn leads to citizens being either negative or apathetic about conventional democratic political participation (Barnes, 2006: 77-79).

Interestingly, Barnes's (2006:96) findings did not reveal the level of political participation he expected from a country with the level of socio-economic development and closeness to Western Europe (with regards to space and culture) that characterizes Poland. For my study, given the country's level of development, class structure and levels of education, I expected higher levels of political participation as well – despite its communist past. An explanation for this can be

what Garawski (2001) and Hausner (2003) referred to as the “abandoned society” syndrome. In reaction to the Poland’s communist past, the systemic transformation to democracy was based on an extreme version of a free market doctrine (Gray, 1993:26) and the assertion of universal values such as “democracy” and “prosperity” (Ost, 2002:115-118) without consulting the Polish citizens. It seemed as if the ruling bodies excluded citizens from democratic debate, but still used democratic values and terms to support the transformation. The result, as Hausner (1992) states, is that the reforms that stem from results of the transformation to democracy itself are often supported, but not the methods and institutions “directing the process of change” (Puchalska, 2005:816). Trade unions were excluded from political processes (Schoflin, 1994:136), the political scene became fragmented, pluralist debate was limited, and political parties became alienated from citizens and the community (Puchalska, 2005:817). The outcome is evident in the low support for democracy and the low level of satisfaction with the performance of democracy<sup>114</sup> among Polish people.

Furthermore, the Catholic Church and its importance in Polish politics may offer further explanations for the findings of this study. Poland was one of two communist countries which managed to transform even before the fall of the Berlin wall. What is unique to the Polish transition is that it was driven by an opposition movement against the socialist system as led by citizens. This movement was associated to Solidarity, which came into government after the transition. The Catholic Church had an important role to play in the success of this movement to bring about a post-communist society (González-Enríque, 2002:21). The political role of the Catholic Church remains evident – particularly given the “significant reinforcement of its legal position” (Daniel, 1995:401) during the transition from communism. However, the gain in legal reinforcements led to a loss in prestige in the eyes of some of the Polish citizens (Daniel, 1995:401). Polish citizens living in rural parts of the country and Polish citizens living in more urban areas are divided on the topic of the political relevance of the Catholic Church. Citizens living in rural areas (almost a third of the country) tend to hold more conservative values and feel vulnerable as the economy modernises. Citizens from rural Poland serve as the main support base of the Catholic Church. Their urban counterparts tend to support a move towards a market economy and often support a state-church separation. Thus, Polish citizens hold different social and ideological views on what post-communist Poland should be. Division on the topic of the political relevance of the church and an absence of political parties which manage to reconcile

---

<sup>114</sup> See Chapter 3, page 42.

the contradictory views of Polish citizens (Paramio, 2002:7-11) may contribute to the apathy towards both political participation activities and being part of groups and networks.

Given that so many structural and institutional factors shape the specific context of democratic and formal participation in Poland, it might be that my predictors based on the CVM explains less of the dynamic behind being politically active in this country than is the case for the other three countries. In support of this view, I offer a comment by Barnes (2006:77), who states that “[p]olitical involvement is heavily dependent on contextual factors as well as on attitudes; differences in resources ... and ease of acting on preference”. It seems probable that the complex contextual factors at play in Poland may offer more of an explanation to political participation choices by its citizens than differences in resources and associational networks.

Commenting on the findings for the four countries in general, I find that the indicators used for my study explain more about voting than protest behaviour. This might be because elections are institutionalised forms of participation and entail individual acts of voting. However, protest activities are usually conducted in co-operation with others and pose more risks of conflict. The choice to participate in these forms of political participation might be influenced by more than merely the attributes of the individual. It might be that structural, contextual and historical backgrounds contribute more to the political protest behaviour of individuals. My findings thus correspond with scholars who assert that findings on the predictors of political participation depend on the type and nature of political activities within a societal and political context.

#### **4.5 Summary**

This chapter elaborated on the dependent variable for this study, namely political participation in the forms of voting and political protest behaviour. Following this, the possible predictors of political participation in their respective categories as used for this study are introduced and the frequencies of these in the respective countries discussed. After that, the findings of a multivariate regression with the whole set of independent variables are summarised and explained by using the beta weight findings, as well as the adjusted R-squared values.

The main findings of this study based on the beta weight values are that:

- political interest is an important predictor of political participation (voting and political protest behaviour) in all four countries;
- age group is a strong predictor of voting in all four countries;

- and group membership has a greater impact on influencing political protest behaviour than on voting.

The main findings of this study based on adjusted R-square values are that demographics increased the explanatory power of the model when it comes to voting in all four countries, and membership of a network or group played a noticeable role in impacting political protest behaviour. These findings correspond with literature which asserts that who takes part in activities and the individuals' political participation choices also depends on the nature of the political activities.

A large body of literature maintains that personal resources plays the most influential role in predicting political participation, but I found that the impact of personal resources on political participation is not as profound as I expected. This might be attributed to the fact that these countries are the "avant-garde" with regards to democratic development. The institutions, education systems and opportunities to participate are available. Political participation thus becomes a decision influenced by more than just the question of whether the individual "can" participate.

The next chapter will briefly summarise the study's most important points, as well as offer ideas for future research which may stem from this study.



## Chapter 5: Conclusion

### 5.1. Introduction

This study was conducted to address the lack of comparative research on political participation in new democracies, particularly the lack of literature on predictors of participation in new democracies. The findings of this study might advance a deeper understanding about who takes part in political activities, and what attributes of individuals influence political participation, and hence may offer insights into what concerns of citizens are raised to politicians and officials. The main goal envisioned was to deepen the understanding of the role of the citizen in democratic processes by discerning what motivates or demotivates individuals to take part in political activities, particularly in new democracies.

The following questions were asked with regards to political participation in new democracies:

- Who takes part in political activities?
- What are the demographic attributes, personal resources, political motivational factors and group associations of citizens who take part in political activities?
- What relationships can be found between demographic characteristics, personal resources, political motivational factors and group associations of citizens with various forms of political participation?
- What similarities are there in the findings based on the data from the four countries?

Four new democracies were examined: Chile, Poland, South Africa and South Korea. They were chosen on the basis of a set of criteria. Relevant data as gathered during the fifth wave of the WVS were used to investigate the relationships between possible predictor of political participation for all four cases. These possible predictors were determined by using mainly the CVM by Verba *et al.* (1995) as a theoretical framework to the study.

This chapter offers an overview of the theories and concepts used as part of this study as well the methodology and findings of the study. Recommendations for future studies are also put forward.

### 5.2. Democratisation and political participation

The emphasis of this study was on political participation, given the importance of political participation as a fundamental part of democratic systems and the essential part it plays in the

consolidation of democracies. For this study the definition of political participation by Ekman and Amnå (2012:11) was used. The authors define political participation as “all actions directed towards influencing governmental decision-making and political outcomes”; the actors involved are citizens who take part in the activities and processes through which political officials are chosen, as well as processes which influence government policies and agendas. Two types of political participation were considered, namely: 1) voting as a form of conventional political participation and, 2) political protest behaviour. The latter includes the signing of petitions, joining in boycotts and attending peaceful and lawful demonstrations – these forms of behaviour were selected by drawing from Inglehart and Catterberg (2002), Hail (2011) and Barnes and Kaase (1979).

### **5.3. Predictors of political participation**

There is a rich body of literature on political behaviour and political participation in which three main streams of thought on political behaviour can be identified, namely: 1) rational choice theories; 2) social capital theories; and 3) SES theories. The latter, which claim that citizens with a higher socio-economics status are more active in political activities, is the most broadly accepted and utilised approach to explain political participation. This study utilised specifically the CVM, an extension of SES models, as its theoretical framework.

The CVM model, as created by Verba, Brady and Scholzman (1995), moved beyond the SES models considering not only socioeconomic factors of individuals, but civic skills as well. Furthermore, the CVM combines the SES model with social and psychological theories in explaining political participation behaviour. The authors assert that citizens will take part in political activities if: 1) they can; 2) they want to; and 3) they are asked to take part. Personal resource factors are then used to indicate whether citizens can take part, political motivation and engagement factors to indicate whether they want to take part, and group membership and networks to indicate whether citizens are asked to take part.

Two studies which used this model as theoretical framework inspired the use of the CVM for this study. Dalton (2008), in his book *Citizen Politics*, used the CVM in order to investigate predictors of political participation in four advanced industrial societies (namely Great Britain, Germany, France and the USA). Shin (1999), in his book *Mass Politics and Culture in Democratizing Korea*, also used the CVM as basis for his study on democratic consolidation and the gap between the ideal of democracy and actual practice in South Korea. Taking from these

two studies, as well as from Kitschelt and Rhem (2008) and their elaborations on the CVM model, this study used the CVM model to identify possible predictors of political participation in new democracies, as well as to frame the methodology for this study.

This study used “level of education” and “self-reported social class” as parameters of personal resources; “political interest” and “left-right political ideology” as parameters of political engagement and motivation; membership of a “church and religious organisation”, “sport/recreational organisation”, “art/music/educational organisation”, “political party”, labour union”, “consumer organisation”, “humanitarian/charitable organisation”, “professional organisation” or an “environmental organisation” as parameters of group or network membership. In addition, demographic characteristics as possible predictors of political participation were added. Here “gender”, “age” and “size of town/community” were incorporated as possible predictors of political participation.

Given the predominance in the literature to date of personal resources as predictor of political participation, as well as numerous studies (including those by Dalton and Shin) finding that age and gender have a noticeable impact on participation, some of the variables expected to materialise as predictors of political participation for the four case studies were level of education, self-reported social class, gender and age groups. Also, a topic of interest was the impact of active membership of groups and networks on political participation choices.

#### **5.4. Methodological aspects**

WVS data concerned with characteristics and political participation activities of individuals in four countries (Chile, Poland, South Africa and South Korea) were used. This study can thus be described as a comparative, cross-national, micro-analysis of political participation. This cross-sectional secondary data analysis used data gathered during the fifth wave of the WVS.

The “most different case, most similar outcomes” approach was used to choose the countries for this study. Four countries were chosen (as with Dalton’s study in 2008) in order to balance attention to detail of national characteristics of the four countries, but still enable a meaningful comparative study between the cases. A specific set of criteria was used to select Chile, Poland, South Africa and South Korea as the cases for this study. The countries all had to be new democracies which have successfully developed democratically and are revered in their respective regions as success stories of democratic transformation. These countries are in the

process of democratic consolidation and democratic deepening, and no longer struggle for liberation and transformation to democracy. Their transformations to democracy (from various kinds of regimes) had to have occurred through pacts, as well as had to have happened at least ten years prior to the gathering of the data used for this study, in order to allow for the democratic regime to have had an impact on the political systems and culture of the countries. Thus, the four cases share similar outcomes. However, the countries differ with regards to regions, as well as political and societal contexts. The countries have political institutional as well as social cleavage differences, and they transformed from different kinds of previous regimes. Thus, these countries differ as cases, but are similar in their outcomes as “avant-garde” new democracies.

Some limitations to the methodology have been mentioned, but using a trusted source of data such as the WVS is the best way to limit the impact of these possible limitations of the study. Also, being mindful of these limitations and differences with regards to background has been helpful in interpreting the data and findings.

## **5.5 Findings, interpretation and suggestions for future studies and research**

Data gathered by the fifth wave of the WVS were used to conduct this secondary analysis. The frequencies of each respective variable have been discussed, as well as the findings as gathered through multiple regression analyses to identify the relationships between the set of independent variables (predictors of political participation) as well as the dependent variables (voting and political protest activities). The main findings, interpretations and suggestions for future studies per predictor group follow below.

### **5.5.1. Personal resources**

Firstly, the relationship between personal resources and political participation is not as strong as I expected after conducting my literature review. In order to further investigate the intricacies of the interaction between personal resources and political participation, I would suggest a longitudinal comparative study to investigate whether the relationship between personal resources and political participation declines, rises or first rises and then declines as countries attain higher levels of development. I state this specifically keeping in mind the assertion by Lafferty (1987) that as countries develop and their middle class grows, citizens become more politically active. Furthermore, a greater variety of indicators of personal resources (e.g. income level and how individuals spend their time) might offer further insights into the relationship

between personal resources and political participation. However, my study delivered a few interesting findings on the relationship between education levels and class with political participation.

When it comes to the identified relationship between education and political participation, I mainly focused on the findings for South Korea and South Africa, given their differences with regards to the performance of their education system. I originally followed the argument that education fosters political interest which finds expression in political participation. This seems to hold for South Korea, where the education system incorporates democratic citizenship education as part of the country's education curriculum. For South Korea, it seems as if the content of education plays a role in fostering political participation – this seems clear from the percentage of respondents who vote as a conventional form of democratic participation. However, a thorough investigation of the relationship between level of education, political interest and political participation needs to be done to confirm this idea. It would also be interesting to see the findings of a longitudinal study on the relationship between education and political participation to determine whether initiatives focused on democratic education bring about higher levels of participation, whether resources available to citizens with higher levels of education foster political participation, or whether there are other aspects of the Korean culture or history which fosters political participation.

In the South African case, it seems as if though the relationship between level of education and political participation relates to the resources available to participate (time, finances) for citizens with a higher education. I suspect that the education system and educational institutions of this country, grappling with numerous obstacles after apartheid, do not foster democratic citizenship to the extent that South Korea's education system manages to. However, South Africans are still interested in politics – a finding I attribute to the country's recent apartheid history and the interest citizens had and still have in bringing a new order about. An interesting study here will be to investigate the relationship between level of education and political participation by racial groups and income levels or class groups, thus investigating whether having the resources to participate coupled with higher education levels results in political participation, as well as whether years of segregation have had an impact on this dynamic. Another interesting study will be to investigate the relationship between level of education, political interest and political participation by race group – again focusing on whether years of segregation and differences in access to education have had an impact on fostering political participation.

My findings on the relationship between class and political participation correlate with assertions by Knutsen (2007) that the impact class has on political participation declines as countries develop. The findings for South Africa, as least developed and most unequal of the four countries, coupled with a relationship between class and political participation, confirm Knutsen's statement that class has a bigger impact in unequal societies with larger working-class populations. However, to fully investigate Knutsen's statements and determine whether they are relevant to the four cases, I propose a longitudinal study to investigate whether class has a declining impact on political participation as countries develop. Such a study will then also offer valuable data to further investigate the Lafferty's (1978) assertions that as countries develop, their middle class grows, and the population becomes more politically active. Lafferty's idea seems to substantiate my findings for South Korea, but to confirm the dynamic a longitudinal analysis is called for.

### **5.5.2. Political engagement and motivation**

The relationship identified between affiliating to the "left" and political protest behaviour is not surprising since protest activities are traditionally perceived as forms of political participation by citizens who identify with the left. Furthermore, I drew from Chulhee (2007) who states that as countries develop, a move from "Old" to "New Politics" takes place – making for issue-based political participation, a move from materialist to post-materialist values and transformation to unconventional participation. Incorporating data on these different aspects shows that elements of his assertion might be true for the countries investigated, bearing in mind that the findings for the South African case do differ from the other three cases. A longitudinal analysis of this specific dynamic needs to be conducted in order to investigate whether such "moves" in the political rhetoric of the remaining three countries are indeed taking place.

The findings on the relationship between political interest and political participation are not surprising. Confirming studies which assert that political interest relates to taking part in political activities, my study found weak to moderate relationships between political interest and political participation in all four countries. What interests me is what brings generates political interest, since the explanation for this can be used to promote responsible democratic participation and thus serve to foster democratic consolidation. In the section on personal resources I mention the possible link between level of education and political interest. However, as stated, this link might depend on the content of education and active policies to incorporate democratic education into

the education system, as in South Korea. For South Africa, I suspect that political interest has been fostered by its apartheid past and the vested interest citizens have in political decision-making. In the Polish case a lack in political interest among Polish citizens can be attributed to the identified “abandoned society syndrome” as an aftermath of a communist past – citizens are educated, but have little say in democratic processes and a limited understanding of democratic politics, again furthering my suspicion that it is not merely education level that is important to encourage participation, but education focused on stimulating political interest and political knowledge and, through this, responsible political participation.

### **5.5.3. Group membership and networks**

My findings indicate a stronger relationship between active group membership and political protest behaviour rather than with voting specifically. This is not surprising as voting is an individual activity, whilst protest activities are often done in groups. The finding confirms the view of scholars who assert that findings on political participation depend on the type of participation decided on, not only on political participation in general. It makes sense that group political actions have a greater relation to active group membership than individual political actions, since the recruitment and skills of fellow participants for group actions can more easily be facilitated in groups where individuals already have a cause in common. As Verba *et al.* (1995) stated, individuals are more likely to participate if asked to participate.

Findings on group membership as predictor of political participation are very country specific. My study found that being part of a political party or a labour union has predicts political participation in the South African case. The importance of these political institutions is also reflected in the levels of active membership of these groups. Furthermore, South Africa is the least developed of the four countries investigated and upheld materialist values most strongly of all the countries. These findings confirm the view of scholars who assert that less developed countries tend to uphold materialist values and tend to still embrace “Old Politics” and its institutions. Not only can this be explained by the South Africa’s level of development, but also by its apartheid past during which freedom movements, parties and labour unions played a profound role in bringing about liberty and democracy. An interesting study could be done to discern whether there is a generational dimension to support for the “Old Politics” and its institutions. South Africans who lived through apartheid might be loyal to certain institutions which represented them and still represents their voice. However, whether the same can be said for younger generations is open to question. Younger generations can be socialised to be loyal

towards certain groups by families and friends; however, a longitudinal study might shed light on how these sentiments develop over generations.

My study also found that more South Africans are active members of religious groups than is the case for the other countries. Being an active member of such a group has a negative relationship with political action in the South African case – an interesting find given the assertion by scholars that being part of a group may foster political participation through developing the skills to participate, as well by providing for opportunities to recruit participants. There are two possible explanations for this. The first explanation I can offer is that, since membership of religious groups means citizens are already offering their time and resources to activities as part of religious organisations, they have few resources left to participate in political actions. Also, corresponding with findings by Du Toit and Kotzé (2011), it may be that the socially conservative South African population struggles to find a political platform where their conservative values are upheld, because the political rhetoric of the country is predominantly liberal. However, within religious groups more conservative values may often still be upheld, thus providing the large percentage of active members of religious groups and socially conservative South Africans a non-political platform where they find common ground on issues. That there is a relationship between South African respondents who are religious and support of conservative values has been confirmed by Du Toit and Kotzé's (2011) study. However, a further investigation into the relationship between conservative values, group membership of a religious organisation and political participation is necessary to elaborate on this finding.

Furthermore, my study identified an interesting negative relationship between membership of a sport organisation and political participation in the South African case. Based on social capital theories asserting that being part of a group may foster participation, a positive relationship between these variables was expected. However, Hagen (2009) in his study investigated this relationship and was also surprised when he found no relationship between active membership of a sport/recreational group and political participation. Hagen (2009) attributed the finding to the specific political and societal context of the country – establishing the specifics of this assertion could make an interesting study on the different factors at play to produce a finding that surprised both me and Hagen.

In the Chilean case, it seems like group membership of organisations associated with “Old Politics” does not feature as an important predictor of political participation. This country's



respondents also showed the strongest emphasis on post-material values of the four cases. It is possible that the dynamic as explained by Chulhee (2007) may already be at play and that Chile is moving from “Old Politics” to “New Politics”. However, a longitudinal study will have to confirm this. It is worth mentioning the relationship between membership of an educational/art group with political protest behaviour in Chile. This can be explained by what has been labelled the “Penguin Revolution” – a series of protests by Chilean students for access to quality education in 2006.

As with Chile, it seems as if the South Korean society might be moving to “New Politics”, with “Old Politics” institutions and political activities possibly losing popularity. However, as with Chile, a longitudinal study is needed to confirm this.

Finally, the findings for Poland confirm the view of scholars who claim that the civil society of this country suffer from an “abandoned society syndrome” as a result of its communist past and a drastic transition to democracy. Polish citizens tend not to get involved with politics and if they do get involved with groups or networks, they focus mostly on issue-based concerns.

#### **5.5.4. Demographic characteristics**

Surprisingly, gender and community did not feature as significant predictors of political participation for this study. Only in the South African case was a weak relationship found between being female and voting, a finding which can possibly be explained by the changes in South African women’s participation after 1994.

Furthermore, my study shows a relationship between age and voting in all four countries. This finding confirms the view of scholars who assert that as citizens grow older and take on more responsibilities, political decision-making and politics become more important for them, given their greater vested interest in the impact of policies and political decisions on their lives. A further interesting study would be to investigate the relationship between age and political interest in order to discern whether political interest develops with age as well as further political participation.

The relationship between age and political protest behaviour is less clear. A possible reason for this is that younger citizens with more time and access to groups (e.g. at educational institutions) tend to have a greater aptitude for, and are more inclined to, participate in unconventional forms

of political participation. However, with the recent popularity of social networking sites as part of the public sphere, younger citizens might be finding alternative platforms to assert their political views and grievances. Since these alternative forms of participation have not been included to my study, this possibility cannot be elaborated on. However, future studies might compare the level and nature of online activism by younger citizens in the four countries investigated. It will be interesting to see whether contextual differences such as access to the internet, technological education and levels of freedom of speech impact on how younger citizens use online platforms to assert political views and take part in political activities in these differing cases.

#### **5.5.5. General**

The possible predictors used for this study explain voting participation more than they did political protest behaviour. This is possibly because voting is an individual action. The decision to participate in this conventional form of participation is likely to be explained more by the indicators included in this study, while political actions – often in groups and requiring more time and effort from participants – may involve more political and contextual factors (in addition to the attributes identified by the CVM) influencing their choices around participation in these unconventional activities.

Special mention was made of my findings for Poland. The findings for this country were often profoundly different to those for the other cases (e.g. levels of participation, the extent to which the model explains participation in this country). My findings substantiate findings by Barnes (2006) who investigated political participation in post-communist new democracies. The country's communist past, as well as the way the country transformed into democracy, impacts greatly on how citizens participate in political activities and how they perceive political activities, as well as on how political leaders go about democratic rule. Scholars attribute the lack of political participation in this country to the “abandoned society syndrome” – a situation where citizens and leaders within a democracy do not understand the importance of citizen participation as part of democratic consolidation, with a lack in political participation and low levels of satisfaction with democracy as a result. Furthermore, the political relevance of the Catholic Church divides Polish citizens and political parties, which may further sustain the general apathy towards politics. An in-depth study into the sentiments towards democracy during and after the country's communist regime might offer interesting material to explain how citizens in the

country perceive democracy and what needs to be done to enable a more democratic political culture.

The fact that the possible predictors used for this study only explained a limited percentage of variance in political participation can be explained by two possibilities. Firstly, other possible indicators which could have been included as part of the study - such as race, language differences, income levels and occupation – might contribute to the variance explained if they should be added as possible predictors. Secondly, as some studies assert, institutional, historical and economic backgrounds to political participation choices may also influence the political choices made by citizens. The attributes of individuals thus only partially explain political participation of citizens.

The latter statement might bring insight to the broader question on the prospects of democratic consolidation, with political participation as an element of the consolidation process. Democratic consolidation in this study was defined as “taking steps in order to increase the significance of political participation by minimising the importance of factors that undermine its significance” (Nohlen, 2002:14). Specifically Mattes and Thiel (1998) assert that both citizens and elite commitments towards democracy are needed to consolidate democracy. Structural, attitudinal and institutional factors need to align to to foster democratic consolidation. The findings of this study offer explanations and insights on political participation as an important feature of the process of democratic consolidation. More specifically, this study identifies some of the attributes which predict citizens' participation in various political processes, which deepens our understanding of the role of citizens and their choices in the process of democratic consolidation.

## **5.6 Conclusion**

As stated before, the aim of this study was to execute a comparative analysis on predictors of political participation in new democracies in order not only to fill an identified literature gap, but also to contribute towards a deeper understanding of the role of citizens in consolidating new democracies. I believe that my findings for the four countries as new democracies and individual findings specific to the cases do offer valuable insights into the consolidation of new democracies.

## Bibliography

- Abbarracin, J. & Valevov, A. 2011. Political Participation and Social Capital Among Mexicans and Mexican Americans in Central Illinois. *Hispanic Journal of Behavioural Sciences*, 33(4):507-523.
- Abrahamson, P. R. & Inglehart, R. 1994. Education, Security, and Post-materialism: a Comment on Duch and Taylor's "Post-materialism and the Economic Condition". *American Journal of Political Science*, 38(3):797-814.
- Almond, G.A. & Verba, S. 1963. *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Almond, G.A. 1980. The Intellectual History of the Civic Culture Concept, in Almond, G.A., Verba, S. & Pye, L.W. (eds.), *The Civic Culture Revisited*. Boston: Little, Brown and Company.
- Armington, K. 2007. Political Participation and Associational Involvement, in Van Deth, J., Montero, J. & Westholm, A. (eds.), *Citizenship and Involvement in European Democracies*. London: Routledge.
- Babbie, E. R. & Mouton, J. 2001. *The Practice of Social Research*. Cape Town: Oxford University Press.
- Bailey, K.D. 1982. Post-functional Systems Analysis. *Sociological Quarterly*, 23(4):509-536.
- Bandura, A. 1997. *Self-efficacy: The Exercise of Control*. New York: Freeman.
- Banks, A. S., Muller, T.C., William, W.R., Isacoff, J.F (eds.). 2009. *Political Handbook of the World: 2010*. Washington D.C.: CQ Press.
- Barnes, S.H. 2006. The Changing Political Participation of Postcommunist Citizens. *International Journal of Sociology*, 36 (2):76-98.
- Barnes, S.H., & Kaase, M. 1979. Introduction, in Barnes, S.H., & Kaase, M., *Political Action: Mass Participation in Five Western Democracies*. Beverley Hills, CA: Sage. 14-27.
- Barnes, S.H., & Kaase, M. 1979. *Political Action: Mass Participation in Five Western Democracies*. Sage: Beverley Hills, CA.
- Bartels, L.M. 2008. The Study of Electoral Behavior. Forthcoming in Leighley, J.E. (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of American Elections and Political Behavior*. [Online.] Available at: <http://www.princeton.edu/~bartels/electoralbehavior.pdf> [19 March 2013].
- Beaumont, E. 2011. Promoting Political Agency, Addressing Political Inequality: A Multilevel Model of Internal Political Efficacy. *The Journal of Politics*, 73(1):216-231.
- Becker, P.E. & Dhingra, P. 2001. Religious Involvement and Volunteering: Implications for Civil Society. *Sociology of Religion*, 62:315-35.
- Bendix, R. & Lipset, S.M. 1966. Class, Status and Power: Social Stratification, in Bendix, R. & Lipset, S.M., *Comparative Perspective* (2nd. ed.). New York: Free Press.
- Bennett, S. 2000. Political Apathy and Avoidance of News Media Among Generations X and Y: America's Continuing Problem, in Mann, S. & Patrick J., *Education for Civic Engagement in Democracy*. Bloomington: ERIC Clearinghouse for Social Studies.
- Bennett, S.E. & Klecka, W.R. 1970. Social status and political participation: A multivariate analysis of predictive power. *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, 14(3), 355-382.
- Berger, B. 2009. Political Theory, Political Science, and the End of Civic Engagement. *Perspectives on Politics*, 7 (2): 335-350.
- Berg-Schlosser, D. 2006. Conclusion: Successful Democratisation Across Cultures?, in Van Beek, U.J. (ed.), *Democracy under Construction: Patterns from Four Continents*. Pretoria: Van Schaik Publishers. p.411-429.
- Berinsky, A. J. & Lenz, S.G. 2010. Education and Political Participation: Exploring the Causal Link. *Political Behaviour*, 33:357-373.
- Bernstein A. G. 2005. Gendered Characteristics of Political Engagement in College Students. *Sex Roles*, 52:299-310.

- Birch, A. H. 2007. Political Participation, in Birch, A.H. (ed.), *The Concepts and Theories of Modern Democracy* (3rd ed.). New York: Routledge. 144-158.
- Black, D. 1958. *Theory of Committees and Elections*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Blais, A., Gidengil, E., Neviite, N. & Nadeau, R. 2004. Where does turnout decline come from? *European Journal of Political Research*, 43: 221-236.
- Booth, J.A & Richard, P.B. 1998. Civil Society and Political Context in Central America. *American Behavioral Scientist*, 42:33-47.
- Brady, H. 1999. Political Participation, in Robinson J.P., Shaver, P.R., & Wrightsman, L.S. *Measures of Political Attitudes*. San Diego: Academic Press.
- Brady, H.E., Verba S. & Schlozman, K.L. 1995. Beyond SES: A Resource Model of Political Participation. *American Political Science Review*, 89(2):271-294.
- Bratton, M. 2009. Democratic Attitudes and Political Participation: An Exploratory Comparison Across World Regions. Paper prepared for the Congress of the International Political Science Association, Santiago, Chile, July.
- Bratton, M., Mattes, R., and Gyimah-Boadi, E. 2005. *Public Opinion, Democracy, and Market Reform in Africa*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Britt, S.H. 1945. The People's Choice: How the Voter makes up his mind in a Presidential Campaign. *Journal of Consulting Psychology*, 9(5):268.
- Burnham, W.D. 1965. The Changing Shape of the American Political Universe. *The American Political Science Review*, 59(1):7-28.
- Burns N. 2007. Gender in the Aggregate, Gender in the Individual, Gender and Political Action. *Politics & Gender*, 3:104–124.
- Calvert, R. L. 1985. Robustness of the Multidimensional Voting Model: Candidate Motivations, Uncertainty, and Convergence. *American Journal of Political Science*, 29: 69-95.
- Campante, F. R. & Chor, D. 2010. *Schooling, Political Participation and the Economy* (Draft document), 1-39. [Online]. Available at: [http://www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/fcampan/Papers/Campante-Chor%20\(Feb%2010\).pdf](http://www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/fcampan/Papers/Campante-Chor%20(Feb%2010).pdf) [4 May 2012].
- Campbell, A. & Cooper, H.C. 1956. *Group Differences in Attitudes and Votes: A Study of the 1954 Congressional Election*. Ann Arbor, MI: Survey Research Center, Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan.
- Campbell, A. & Kahn, R.L. 1952. *The People Elect a President*. Ann Arbor, MI: Survey Research Center, Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan.
- Campbell, A., Gurin, G., & Miller, W.E. 1954. *The Voter Decides*. Evanston, IL: Row, Peterson & Co.
- Castells, M. 2008. The New Public Sphere: Global Civil Society, Communication Networks, and Global Governance. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 616: 78-94.
- Catt, H. 1996. *Voting Behaviour: A Radical Critique*. London & New York: Leicester University Press.
- Chang, H. & Chyi, H. I. 2009. Voting with Their Feet: The Relationship Between Political Efficacy and Protest Propensity among Hong Kong Residents. *Taiwan Journal of Democracy*, 5(2):127-144.
- Chulhee, C. 2007. The New Political Culture and Political Participation: A Cross-National and Cross-Civilization Assessment. *The Review of Korean Studies*, 10(2):31-51.
- Cho, K. 2000. *Jiyeokjooeui Seongeowa Haprijeok Yoogwonja* [Regional Voting and Rational Voters]. Seoul: Nanam Publishing House.
- Choi, S. & Lee, C. 1980. Environment, Policy and Electoral Participation: A Comparison of Urban and Rural Areas, in C.L. Kim (ed.), *Political Participation in Korea: Democracy, Mobilization and Stability*. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-Clio Press.

- CIA. *World Fact Book*. [Online.] Available at: <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/rq.html> [9 December 2012].
- Coffé, H. & Bolzendahl, C. 2010. Same Game, Different Roles? Gender Differences in Political Participation. *Sex Roles*, 62: 318-333. 2 February.
- Cohen, J. 1999. Trust, Voluntary Association and Workable Democracy: the Contemporary American Discourse of Civil Society, in Warren, M.E. (ed.), *Democracy & Trust*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Conway, M.M. 1991. *Political Participation in the United States* (2nd ed.). Washington: Congressional Quarterly Press.
- Coppedge, M. & Gerring, J. 2011. Conceptualizing and Measuring Democracy: A New Approach. *Perspectives on Politics*, 9(2):247-267.
- Crittenden, J. 1963. Aging and Political Participation. *The Western Political Quarterly*, 16(2), 323-331.
- Crouch, L. & Vinjevold, P. 2006. South Africa: Access before Quality, and what do we do know? *Profesorado. Revista de currículum y formación del profesorado*, 10, 1. [Online.] Available at: <http://www.ugr.es/local/recfpro/Rev101ART6ing.pdf> [12 July 2013].
- Dahl, R. 2005. What Political Institutions Does Large-Scale Democracy Require? *Political Science Quarterly*, 120(2):187-197.
- Dahl, R. A. 1971. *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.
- Dahl, R. A. 1989. *Democracy and its Critics*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Dalton R.J. 2007 *The Good Citizen: How a Younger Generation is Reshaping American Politics*. Washington, DC: CQ Press.
- Dalton, R. J. 2008. *Citizen Politics: Public Opinion and Political Parties in Advanced Industrial Democracies*. 5<sup>th</sup> ed. Washington, D.C: CQ Press.
- Dalton, R.J. & Klingemann, H. 2007. Citizens and Political Behaviour, in Dalton, R.J. & Klingemann, H.(eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Political Behaviour*. New York: Oxford University Press. 3-26.
- Dalton, R.J. 1988. *Citizen Politics in Western Democracies*. Chatham house: Chatham, NJ.
- Daniel, K. 1995. The Church-State Situation in Poland After the Collapse of Communism. *Brigham Young University Law Review*, 2: 401-419.
- Davis, O. A., Hinich, M.J, & Ordeshook, P.C. 1970. An Expository Development of a Mathematical Model of the Electoral Process. *American Political Science Review*, 64: 426-428.
- De Tocqueville, A. 1945. *Democracy in America*. Alfred A. Knopf: New York.
- Deutsch, K. W. 1961. Social Mobilization and Political Development. *The American Political Science Review*, 55 (3):493-514.
- Diamond, L. 1996. Is the Third Wave Over? *Journal of Democracy*, 7(3):20-37.
- Dostie-Goulet, E. 2009. Social Networks and the Development of Political Interest. *Journal of Youth Studies*, 12 (4):405-421. August.
- Downs, A. 1957. An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy. *Journal of Political Economy*, 65(2): 135-150.
- Du Toit, P. & Kotzé, H. 2011. *Liberal Democracy and Peace in South Africa*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Easton, D. 1951. The Decline of Modern Political Theory. *The Journal of Politics*, 13(1):36-58.
- Easton, D. 1957. An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems. *World Politics*, 9(3):383-400.
- Easton, D. 1969. The New Revolution in Social Science. *The American Political Science Review*, 4(63):1051-1061.

- Edwards, B. & Foley, M.W. 1997. Social Capital and the Political Economy of our Discontent: Social Capital, Civil Society and Contemporary Democracy. *American Behavioral Scientist*, 40(5): 669-678.
- Ekman, J. & Amnå, E. 2012. Political Participation and Civic Engagement: Towards a New Typology. *Human Affairs*, 22(2):238-300.
- Enelow, J.M. & Hinich, M.J. 1984. *The Spatial Theory of Voting: An Introduction*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Ersson, S. & Lane, J. 2008. Political Culture, in Caramani, D. (ed.), *Comparative Politics*. New York: Oxford University Press. 419-441.
- Esmer, Y & Pettersson, T. 2007. Religion and Voting Behaviour, in Dalton, R.J. & Klingemann, H. (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Political Behaviour*. New York: Oxford University Press. 481-501.
- Eulau, H. 1963. *The Behavioural Persuasion in Politics*. New York: Random House.
- Field, A. 2009. *Discovering Statistics Using SPSS* (3rd ed.). London: Sage.
- Finkel, S.E. 1985. Reciprocal Effects of Participation and Political Efficacy: A Panel Analysis. *American Journal of Political Science*, 29(4):891-913.
- Fishkin, J. 1995. *The Voice of the Public People: Public Opinion and Democracy*. Yale University Press, New Haven.
- Foley, M.W. & Edwards, B. 1996. The Paradox of Civil Society. *Journal of Democracy*, 7:38-52.
- Foley, M.W. & Edwards, B. 1998. Civil Society and Social Capital Beyond Putnam. *American Behavioral Scientist*, 42(1):124-139.
- Freedon, M. 1996. *Ideologies and Political Theory: A Conceptual Approach* (1st ed.) Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Freedom House. 2006a. South Africa: Freedom in the World 2006. [Online.] Available at: <http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/south-africa> [7 May 2012].
- Freedom House. 2006b. Chile: Freedom in the World 2006. [Online.] Available at: <http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/chile> [7 May 2012].
- Freedom House. 2006c. South Korea: Freedom in the World 2006. [Online.] Available at: <http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/South Korea> [7 May 2012].
- Freedom House. 2006d. Poland: Freedom in the World 2006. [Online.] Available at: <http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/poland> [7 May 2012].
- Fridkin K. & Kenney, P. 2007. Examining the Gender Gap in Children's Attitudes Toward Politics. *Sex Roles*, 56:133-140.
- Gallego A. 2007. *Inequality in Political Participation: Contemporary patterns in European countries*. Irvine: Center for the Study of Democracy: University of California.
- Gardawski, J. 2001. *Zwi zki Zawodowe na Rozdro u* (Trade Unions at the Cross-roads). Warszawa: FriedrichEbert Stiftung.
- González – Enriquez, C. 2002. The Peculiar Traits of the Polish Transition, presented as part of FRIDE's seminar on democratic transition and consolidation 2001 - 2002: the transition to democracy in Poland [Online] Available at: <http://www.fride.org/publication/373/seminar-on-democratic-transition-and-consolidation-2001--2002:-the-transition-to-democracy-in-poland> [21 August 2013].
- Gould, R.V. 2004. Why do Networks Matter? Rationalist and Structuralist Interpretations., in Mario, D. & McAdam, D. (eds.), *Social Movements and Networks: Relational Approaches to Collective Action*. Oxford University Press. 233-257.
- Gouws, A. 2004. Women and the 2004 Election. In J.Kalley, K. Matlosa, D. Kadima (eds.), *Election Update 2004: South Africa*. Electoral Institute of Southern Africa (EISA). [Online] Available at: <http://www.eisa.org.za/WEP/souwomen.htm> [19 November 2013].
- Gray, M. & Caul, M. 2000. Declining Voter Turnout in Advanced Industrial Democracies 1950-1970. *Comparative Political Studies*, 33:1091-1122.

- Gupta, A. V. 2000. Regression explained in simple terms, in Gupta, A., *SPSS for Beginners*. United States: Vijay Gupta Publishers.
- Hagen, D.E. 2012. *Social Capital and Political Participation in South Africa: The Relationship between Membership in Voluntary Associations and Formal Political Participation*. Thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts (International Studies) at the University of Stellenbosch, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, Political Science Department, March. [Online.] Available at: <http://scholar.sun.ac.za> [29 May 2013].
- Hail, H. 2011. *Do Eastern Religions Promote Political Passivity? Religion and Political Participation in South Korea and Taiwan*. Presented at the 7th Annual Centre for the Study of Democracy Graduate Student Conference, 7 May [Online.] Available at: <http://www.democracy.uci.edu/files/democracy/docs/conferences/grad/2011/Henry%20Hail%20-%20For%20CSD%202011%20conference%20-%20Religion%20and%20Political%20Participation%20in%20South%20Korea%20and%20Taiwan.pdf> [4 May 2012].
- Hair, J. F., Black, W.C., Babin, B.J., Tatham, R.L. & Anderson, R.E. 2006. *Multivariate Data Analysis*. (6<sup>th</sup> ed.). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.
- Hassim, S. 1999. The dual politics of representation: women and electoral politics in South Africa. *Politikon South African Journal of Political Studies*, 11(26):201-212.
- Hauser, S. (2000). Education, Ability, and Civic Engagement in the Contemporary United States. *Social Science Research*, 29(4), 556-582.
- Hausner, J. 1992. *Populist Threat in Transformation of Socialist Society*. Warsaw: Friedrich-Ebert Foundation.
- Hausner, J. 2003. Akt Oskar enia' (Indictment). *Polityka*, 25.
- Haynes, P. 2009. *Before Going any Further with Social Capitalism: Eight Key Criticisms to Address*. INGENIO(CSIC-UPV) Working Paper Series, February [Online.]. Available at: [http://digital.csic.es/bitstream/10261/14203/1/Before\\_Going\\_Any\\_Further\\_With\\_Social\\_Capital\\_Eight\\_Key\\_Criticisms\\_to\\_Address\[1\].pdf](http://digital.csic.es/bitstream/10261/14203/1/Before_Going_Any_Further_With_Social_Capital_Eight_Key_Criticisms_to_Address[1].pdf) [6 February 2013].
- Heath, A. 2007. Perspectives on Political Behaviour, in Dalton, R.J. & Klingemann, H. (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Political Behaviour*. New York: Oxford University Press. 610-617.
- Heine, J. 2006. Institutional Engineering in New Democracies, in Van Beek, U.J. (ed.), *Democracy under Construction: Patterns from Four Continents*. Pretoria: Van Schaik Publishers. p.65-94.
- Heywood, A. 2007. *Politics* (3<sup>rd</sup> ed.). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Hillygus, D. S. 2005. The Missing Link: Exploring the Relationship Between Higher Education and Political Behavior. *Political Behavior*, 27(1), 25-47.
- Huneus, C. 2013. Chile: A System Frozen by Elite Interests. *IDEA, Case Study: Chile*. [Online.] Available at: [http://www.idea.int/elections/upload/chile\\_esd.pdf](http://www.idea.int/elections/upload/chile_esd.pdf) [5 July 2013]
- Huntington, S.P. 1976. *No Easy Choice*. Harvard University Press: Cambridge & London.
- IDEA. 2012. *Voter Turnout*. [Online.]. Available at: <http://www.idea.int/vt/> [27 May 2013].
- Inglehart, R. & Catterberg, G. 2002. Trends in Political Action: The Developmental Trends and the Post-Honeymoon Decline. *International Journal of Comparative Sociology*, 43: 300-316.
- Inglehart, R. & Catterberg, G. 2002. Cultural Change and the Rise of Participatory Publics. *International Journal of Comparative Sociology*, 44(1): 300-316. March.
- Inglehart, R. & Norris, P. 2004. *Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide*. Cambridge University Press.
- Inglehart, R. & Welzel, C. 2003. Political Culture and Democracy: Analyzing Cross-Level Linkages. *Comparative Politics*, 36(1): 61-79. October.
- Inglehart, R. 2000. Globalization and Post-materialist Values. *Washington Quarterly*, 23(1):215-228. Winter.



- Inglehart, R. 2011. *Values Change the World*. World Value Survey (WVS) [Online]. Available at:  
[http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/wvs/articles/folder\\_published/article\\_base\\_110/files/WV\\_Sbrochure6-2008\\_11.pdf](http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/wvs/articles/folder_published/article_base_110/files/WV_Sbrochure6-2008_11.pdf) [5 May 2012].
- Jennings, M. K. 1987 Residues of a Movement: the Aging of the American Protest Generation. *American Political Science Review*, 81(2): 367–382.
- Jennings, M. K. 1979. Another look at the Life Cycle and Political Participation, *Journal of Political Science*, 23(4):755-771.
- Jennings, M. K. & Stoker, L. 2001. *Generations and Civic Engagement: A Longitudinal Multiple-Generation Analysis*. Paper presented at the 2001 American Political Science Association Convention.
- Kaase, M. & Marsh, A. 1979. In *Political Action: Mass Participation in Five Western Democracies*. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. 27-56.
- Kalley, J., Matlosa, K., Kadima, D. 2004. *Election Update 2004: South Africa*. Electoral Institute of Southern Africa (EISA). [Online] Available at:  
<http://www.eisa.org.za/WEP/souwomen.htm> [19 November 2013].
- Kang, K. 2013. *Educating the Youth for Political Participation and Sustainable Democracy*. National Election Commission, Republic of Korea. [Online.] Available at: [http://www.isei-ivei.net/eng/evaleng/ponencias-ingles/educaiton\\_in\\_Korea\\_MKLEE.pdf](http://www.isei-ivei.net/eng/evaleng/ponencias-ingles/educaiton_in_Korea_MKLEE.pdf) [14 July 2013].
- Karp, J.A., & Banducci, S.A. 2007. Party Mobilization and Political Participation in New and Old Democracies, *Party Politics*, 13(2):217-234.
- Kavanagh, D. 1983. *Political Science and Political Behaviour*. London: George Allen and Unwin Publishers:
- Kazin, M. 2011. *American Dreamers: How the Left Changed the Nation*. Knopf: New York.
- Keim, M. 2006. *Sport as Opportunity for Community Development and Peace-Building in South Africa*. Occasional Paper: International Conference on Sport and Development.
- Keman, H. 2008. Comparative Research Methods, in Caramani D. (ed.), *Comparative Politics*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Kernell, S., & Jacobson, G.C. 2003. *The Logic of American Politics* (2nd ed.). Washington: CQ Press.
- Kim, H. N. & Choe, S. 1988 Urbanization and Changing Voting Patterns in South Korean Parliamentary Elections, in Kim, I.J. & Kihl, Y.W.(eds), *Political Change in South Korea*. New York: Paragon House.
- Kitschelt, H. & Rehm, P. 2008. Political Participation, in Caramani, D. (ed.), *Comparative Politics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 446-472.
- Klein, K. 2011. Obama: Poland a Model for New Democracies. *Voice of America*, [Online.] Available at: <http://www.voanews.com/english/news/US-President-Praises-Poland-as-Model-of-Democracy-122767664.html> [5 May 2012].
- Knutsen, O. 1995. The Impact of Old Politics and New Politics Value Orientations on Party Choice – A Comparative Study. *Journal of Public Policy*, 15(1) :1-63.
- Knutsen, O. 2007. The Decline of Social Class? , in Dalton, R.J. & Klingemann, H. (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Political Behaviour*. New York: Oxford University Press. 457 - 476.
- Knutsen, O. 2007. The Decline of Social Class?, in Dalton, R.J. & Klingemann, H. (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Political Behaviour*. New York: Oxford University Press. 457 - 476.
- Koch, J. 1997. Candidate Gender and Women’s Psychological Engagement in Politics. *American Politics Research*, 25(1), 118-133.
- Kotzé, H. & Lombard, K. 2002. Revising the Value Shift Hypothesis : A Descriptive Analysis of South Africa’s Value Priorities between 1990 and 2001. *Centre for international and Comparative Politics*, 29(2):163-182.

- Kotzé, H. 2001. Unconventional Political Participation and Political Confidence in South Africa: A Longitudinal Analysis Using Data from the World Value Survey. *Social Dynamics*, 27(2):134-155. December.
- Kuester, S. 2012. *Strategic Marketing & Marketing in Specific Industry Contexts*. Lecture notes distributed for Marketing 301 at the University of Mannheim. 110.
- Kuperus, T. 1999. Building Democracy: an Examination of Religious Associations in South Africa and Zimbabwe. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 37(4):643-668. December.
- Lafferty, W.M. 1978. Social Development and Political Participation: Class, Organization and Sex. *Scandinavian Political Studies*, 4:233-254.
- Lake, R.L.D. & Huckerfeldt, R. 1998. Social Capital, Social Networks and Political Participation. *Political Psychology*, 19(3):567-584.
- Lamprianou, I. 2013. Contemporary Political Participation Research: A Critical Assessment. In K.N. Demetriou (ed.), *Democracy in Transition: Political Participation in the European Union*. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer. 21-42.
- Landman, T. 2003. *Issues and Methods in Comparative Politics: An Introduction*. (2nd ed.). New York: Routledge.
- LaPierre, P. & Westbrook, R.B. 2008. Alexis de Tocqueville and the Moeurs of the Mass, in *The Disenchantment of American Liberalism: European Theory and the Travails of the Mass Democracy, 1945-1962*. Dissertation presented for the Degree of Doctorate in History at the University of Rochester, [Online.] Available at: <https://urresearch.rochester.edu/institutionalPublicationPublicView.action?institutionainstitu=5436> [8 March 2013].
- Lazarsfeld, P. F., Berelson, B. and Gaudet, H. 1944. *The People's Choice*. New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce.
- Lee, M. 2013. *The PISA Results and the Education System in Korea*. Korean Institute of Curriculum and Education (KICE). [Online.] Available at: [http://www.isei-ivei.net/eng/evaleng/ponencias-ingles/educaiton\\_in\\_Korea\\_MKLEE.pdf](http://www.isei-ivei.net/eng/evaleng/ponencias-ingles/educaiton_in_Korea_MKLEE.pdf) [14 July 2013].
- Leege, D. C. 1966. Catholics and the Civil Order: Parish, Participation and Civic Participation. *Review of Politics*, 50:704-736.
- Leighley, E. & Nagler, J. 1992. Individual and Systemic Influences on Turnout: Who Votes? 1984. *Journal of Politics*, 54:718:740.
- Leighley, J. E. 1990. Social Interaction and Contextual Influences on Political Participation *American Politics Quarterly*, 18: 459-75.
- Leighley, J.E. & Vedlitz, A. 1999. Race, Ethnicity and Political Participation: Competing Models and Contrasting Explanations. *The Journal of Politics*, 61(4):1092-1114.
- Leighley, J.E. 1995. Opportunity and Incentives: A Field Essay on Political Participation. *Political Research Quarterly*, 48(1):181-209.
- Leiserson, A. 1971. Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition by Robert. A. Dahl. Seven Polarizing Issues in America Today. *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 397: 213-214.
- Levermore, R. 2008. Sport: A New Engine of Development? *Progress in Development Studies*, 8(1): 183-90.
- Lijphart, A. 1980. The Structure of Inference, in Almond, G.A., Verba, S. and Pye, L.W., *The Civic Culture Revisited*. Boston: Little, Brown and Company.
- Lijphart, A. 1991. Constitutional Choices for New Democracies. *Journal of Democracy*, 2(1): 72-84.
- Lim, C. 2008. Social Networks and Political Participation: How do Networks Matter? *Social Forces*, 87(2):961-982.
- Lipset, S.M. 1960. *Political Man*. New York: Doubleday & Company.
- Lutz, B.F. 2013. *Public Digital Media and Democracy: Constructing Instruments for Measuring Expressions of Support for Democracy on Twitter*. Thesis presented in partial fulfilment of

- the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts (International Studies) in the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences at Stellenbosch University. [Online.] Available at: <http://scholar.sun.ac.za/handle/10019.1/79986> [15 July 2013].
- Manheim, J.B. & Rich, R.C. 1981. *Empirical Political Analysis: Research Methods in Political Science*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
- Marais, H. 2011. *South Africa Pushed to the Limit: the Political Economy of Change*. Claremont: UCT Press.
- Marsh, A. & Kaase, M. 1979. Measuring Political Participation. In S.H. Kaase & A. Marsh, *Political Action: Mass Participation in Five Democracies*. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
- Marsh, A. 1977. *Protest and Political Consciousness*. London: Sage Publications.
- Mattes, R. 2008. South Africans' Participation in Local Politics and Government. *Transformation*, 66/67: 116-141.
- Mattes, R., and Thiel, H. 1998. Consolidation and Public Opinion in South Africa. *Journal of Democracy*, 9(1): 95-110.
- McAdam, D. & Paulsen, R. 1993. Specifying the Relationship between Social Ties and Activism. *American Journal of Sociology*, 99(3):640-667.
- McCrone, D. J. & Cnudde, C.F. 1967 Toward a Communications Theory of Democratic Political Development. *American Political Science Review*, 61:72-9.
- McDonough, P., Shin, D.C. & Moisés, J.A. 1998. Democratization and Participation: Comparing Spain, Brazil and Korea. *The Journal of Politics*, 60 (4):919-953.
- Melo, D.F. & Stockemer, D. 2012. Age and Political Participation in Germany, France and the UK: A Comparative Analysis. *Comparative European Politics*, Online publication, doi: 10.1057/cep.2012.31.
- Milbrath, L.W. & Goel, M.L. 1977. *Political Participation: How and Why do People get Involved in Politics?* Chicago: Rand McNally College Publication Co.
- Milbrath, L.W. 1965. *Political Participation; How and Why do People get Involved in Politics?* Chicago: Rand McNally.
- Milner, H. 2000. Social Capital, Civic Literacy and Political Participation, in Dowding, K., Hughes, J. and Margetts, H. (eds.), *Challenges to Democracy: Ideas, Involvement and Institutions*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 91-99.
- Moon, W. 2005. Decomposition of Regional Voting in South Korea: Ideological Conflicts and Regional Interests. *Party Politics*, 11(5): 579-599.
- Morrell, M. E. 2003. Survey and Experimental Evidence for a Reliable and Valid Measure of Internal Political Efficacy. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 67 (4): 589-602.
- Needler, M.C. 1968. *Political Development in Latin America: Instability, Violence, Evolutionary Change*. New York: Random House.
- Neuman, W.L. 2000. *Social Research Methods* (4<sup>th</sup> ed.). Needham Heights: Allyn & Bacon.
- Neuman, W.L. 2006. *Social Research Methods* ( 6<sup>th</sup> ed.). New York: Pearson.
- Nie, N. H., Bingham Powell, G. Jr. & Prewitt, K. 1969a. Social structure and Political Participation: Developmental Relationships, I. *American Political Science Review*, 63: 361-378.
- Nie, N. H., Bingham Powell, G. Jr. & Prewitt, K. 1969b Social Structure and Political Participation: Developmental Relationships, II. *American Political Science Review*, 63: 808-832.
- Nie, N. H., Verba, S., & Kim, J. 1974. Political Participation and the Life-Cycle. *Comparative Politics*, 6(3):319-340.
- Nie, N., Junn, J., & Stehlik-Barry, K. 1996. *Education and Democratic Citizenship in America*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Nkoane, M.M. 2006. Challenges Facing South Africa's Educational Advancement. *International Journal of Educational Advancement*, 6(3):243-252.

- Nohlen, D. 2002. Introduction: Political Participation in New and Old Democracies, in Pintor, R.L., & Gratschew, M. (eds.), *Voter Turnout Since 1945: A Global Report*. Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) Publications.
- Norris P. 2002. *Democratic Phoenix: Reinventing Political Activism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Norris, P. 1999. Introduction: The Growth of Critical Citizens, in P. Norris (ed.), *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Government*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1 – 27.
- Norris, P. 2007. Political Activism: New Challenges, New Opportunities, in Dalton, R.J. & Klingemann, H. (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Political Behaviour*. New York: Oxford University Press. 628-249.
- Nozick, R. 1974. *Anarchy, State and Utopia*. New York: Basic Books.
- O'Donnell, G. Schmitter, P. & Whitehead, L. 1986. *Transition from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions About Uncertain Democracies*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Olson, M. 1965. *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Open Society Foundations for South Africa. 2006. *South Africa: Democracy and Political Participation*. Discussion Paper published by Open Society Foundation for South Africa. [Online] Available at: [http://www.afriMAP.org/english/images/report/AfriMAP\\_SApolpart\\_discdoc.pdf](http://www.afriMAP.org/english/images/report/AfriMAP_SApolpart_discdoc.pdf) [28 May 2013].
- Ost, D. 2002. Imagining and Creating the Enemy: Trade Unions in the New Polish Democracy', in Mokrzycki, E., Rychard, A. and Zybertowicz, A. (eds), *Utracona Dynamika? O Niedojrza o ci Polskiej Demokracji*. Warszawa: IFiS PAN.
- Pantoja, A.D. & Segura, G.M. 2003. Does Ethnicity Matter? Descriptive Representation in Legislatures and Political Alienation Among Latinos. *Social Science Quarterly*, 84 (2): 441–460.
- Paramio, L . 2002. The Double Transition in Poland. Paper, presented as part of FRIDE's seminar on democratic transition and consolidation 2001 - 2002: the transition to democracy in Poland [Online] Available at: <http://www.fride.org/publication/373/seminar-on-democratic-transition-and-consolidation-2001--2002:-the-transition-to-democracy-in-poland> [21 August 2013].
- Parr, C. 2012. Finland and South Korea top the Learning Curve. *The Times Higher Education* [Online]. Available at: <http://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/421944.article> [6 May 2013].
- Passy, F., & Giugni, M. 2001. Social Networks and Individual Perceptions: Explaining Differential Participation in Social Movements. *Sociological Forum*, 16(1):123-153.
- Patterson, Eric. 2005. Religious Activity and Political Participation: The Brazilian and Chilean Cases. *Latin American Politics and Society*, 47(1): 1-29.
- Pattie, C., Seyd, P. & Whiteley, P. 2003. Citizenship and Civic Engagement: Attitudes and Behaviour in Britain. *Political Studies*, 51:443-468.
- Pierce, J.C. & Pride, R.A. 1972. *Cross-National Micro-Analysis: Procedures and Problems*. London: SAGE Publications.
- Plott, Charles. 1967. A Notion of Equilibrium and Its Possibility under Majority Rule. *American Economic Review* 57: 787-806.
- Portes, A. 1998. Social Capital: Its Origins and Applications in Modern Sociology. *Annual Review Sociology*, 24 :1-24.
- Przerwowski, A. 1996. What Makes Democracies Endure? *Journal of Democracy*, 7(1): 39-55.
- Puchalska, B. 2005. Polish Democracy in Transition? *Political Studies Association*, 53(4):816-832.

- Putnam, R.D. 1993. The Prosperous Community: Social Capital and Public Life. *American Prospect*, 13:35-42.
- Putnam, R.D. 1995. Turning in, Turning out: The Strange Disappearance of Social Capital in America. *Political Science and Politics*, 28: 1-20.
- Putnam, R.D. 2000. *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- Quintelier E. 2008 Who is Politically Active: the Athlete, the Scouts Member or the Environmental Activist? Young People, Voluntary Engagement and Political Participation. *Acta Sociologica*, 51(4): 355–370.
- Quintelier, E. & Hooghe, M. 2011. Political Attitudes and Political Participation: A Panel Study on Socialization and Self-Selection Effects among Late Adolescents. *International Political Science Review*, 1–19. Available: <https://lirias.kuleuven.be/bitstream/123456789/308507/3/IPSR%20Quintelier%20Hooghe%202012.pdf> [18 March 2013].
- Ramdass, K. 2009. The Challenges Facing Education in South Africa. [Online.] Available at: <https://ujdigispace.uj.ac.za/handle/10210/5397> [23 April 2013].
- Rawls, J. 1971. *A Theory of Justice*. Harvard: Harvard University Press.
- Rockey, J. 2010. Who is Left-wing, and who just thinks they are? Working Paper no.09/23, Department of Economics of the University of Leicester, UK.
- Rose, R. 2007. Perspectives on Political Behaviour in Time and Space, in Dalton, R.J. & Klingemann, H. (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Political Behaviour*. New York: Oxford University Press. 283-298.
- Rosenstone, S. J. & Hansen, J.M. 1993. *Mobilization, Participation and Democracy in America*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Rubenson, D. 2000. *Participation and Politics: Social Capital, Civic Voluntarism, and Institutional Context*. Paper presented at the Political Studies Association-UK 50<sup>th</sup> Annual Conference in London, 10-13 April [Online.]. Available at: <http://www.psa.ac.uk/cps/2000/Rubenson%20Daniel.pdf> [6 February 2013].
- Rush, M. 1992. *Politics and Society: An Introduction to Political Sociology*. New York: Prentice Hall.
- Sapiro V. 2004 ‘Not your Parents’ Political Socialization: Introduction for a New Generation. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 7: 1–23.
- Scervini, F., & Segatti, P. 2012. Education, Inequality and Electoral Participation. *Research in Social Stratification and Mobility*, 30:403-413.
- Schedler, A. 1998. What is Democratic Consolidation? *Journal of Democracy*, 9(2):91-107.
- Schlozman K.L., Burns N., & Verba S. 1994. Gender and the Pathways to Participation: the Role of Resources. *The Journal of Politics*, 56:963–990.
- Schlozman, K. L. 2002. Citizen Participation in America: What do we know? Why do we care?, in Katznelson, I. & Milner, H.V.(eds.), *Political Science: State of the Discipline*. New York: W.W. Norton and Co. 433–461.
- Schmitter, P. 1998. Some Basic Assumptions About the Consolidation of Democracy, in Inoguchi T., Newman, E. & Keane, J.(eds.), *The Changing Nature of Democracy*. Tokyo: United Nations University Press. 23-36.
- Schopf in, G. 1994. Postcommunism: The Problems of Democratic Construction. *Daedalus*, 123 (3),136.
- Schulman, M. D, & Anderson, C. 1999. The Dark Side of the Force: A case study of Restructuring and Social Capital. *Rural Sociology*, 64(3), 351-372.
- Schulz-Herzenberg, C. 2007. A Silent Revolution: South African Voters, 1994-2006. In S. Buhlungu, J. Daniel and R. Southall (eds.), *State of the Nation: South Africa*. Cape Town: HSRC Press.

- Shani, D. 2007. Developing Interest in Politics: The Effect of Early Life Socialization. Paper prepared for the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, IL, April 12-15.
- Sharkansky, I. & Hofferbert, R.I. 1969. Dimensions of State Politics, Economics, and Public Policy. *American Political Science Review*, 63, (3), 867-879.
- Shin, D.C. 1999. *Mass Politics and Culture in Democratizing Korea*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Shin, D.C. 2007. Democratization: Perspectives from Global Citizenries, in Dalton, R.J., & Klingemann, H. (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Political Behaviour*. New York: Oxford University Press. 259-279.
- Sniderman, P.M. & Levendusky, M.S. 2007. An Institutional Theory of Political Choice, in Dalton, R.J. & Klingemann, H. (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Political Behaviour*. New York: Oxford University Press. 437-453.
- Sorenson, C.W. 1994. Success and Education in South Korea. *Comparative Education Review*, 38(1):10-35.
- Soule, S. 2011. Will they Engage? Political Knowledge, Participation and Attitudes of Generations X and Y. Paper prepared for the 2001 German and American Conference on Active Participation or a Treat to Privacy [Online]. Available at: <http://www.bpb.de/veranstaltungen/dokumentation/130036/will-they-engage-political-knowledge-participation-and-attitudes-of-generation-x-and-y> [6 May 2013].
- Steenekamp, C. 2011. *Bridging the Divide: The Development, Dimensions and Determinants of Social Capital in Post-Apartheid South Africa*. Dissertation presented for the Degree of Doctorate of Philosophy at Stellenbosch University, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, Political Science Department, December. [Online.] Available at: <https://scholar.sun.ac.za/login> [4 May 2012].
- Stolle, D. 2007. Social Capital, in Dalton, R.J. & Klingemann, H. (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Political Behaviour*. New York: Oxford University Press. 655-670.
- Tarrow, S. 1996. Making Social Science Work Across Time and Space: A Critical Reflection on Robert Putnam's Making Democracy Work. *American Political Science Review*, 90:389-397.
- Teney, C. & Hanquinet, L. 2012. High Political Participation, High Social Capital? A Relational Analysis of Youth Social Capital and Participation. *Social Science Review*, 41(5):1213-1226.
- Teorell, J. 2003. Linking Social Capital to Political Participation: Voluntary Associations and Networks of Recruitment in Sweden. *Scandinavian Political Studies*, 26(10):49-66.
- Teorell, J., Torcal, M. & Monetero, J.R. 2007. Political Participation: Mapping the Terrain, in Van Deth, J.W., Montero, J.R. & Westholm, A. (eds.), *Citizenship and Involvement in European Democracies: A Comparative Analyses*. New York & London: Routledge.
- The Economist*. 2012. *Chile's Electoral System: Bye-bye Binomial? Americas View: The Americas*. [Online.] Available at: <http://www.economist.com/blogs/americasview/2012/02/chiles-electoral-system> [5 July 2013].
- Thiessen, V. 1993. *Arguing with Numbers: Statistics for the Social Sciences*. Canada: Fernwood Publishing.
- Uhlener, C. 1989. *Rational Turnout*. *American Journal of Political Science*, 33:390-422.
- UNDP. 2002. *Human Development Report 2002: Deepening Democracy in a Fragmented World*. [Online.] Available at: <http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2002/> [4 May 2012].
- UNDP. 2008. *Human Development Indices*. [Online.] Available at: <http://undp.org/en/reports> [4 May 2012].
- UNDP. 2011. Human Development Index (HDI). [Online.] Available at: <http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/indicators/103106.html> [7 May 2012].

- UNDP. 2011a. Human Development Index (HDI). [Online.] Available at: <http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/indicators/103106.html> [7 May 2012].
- UNDP. 2011b. Regional and National Trends in Human Development Index 1980-2011. [Online.] Available at: <http://hdr.undp.org/en/data/trends/> [9 December 2012]
- UNESCO. 2011a. World Data on Education: South Africa (7th ed.) [Online.] Available at: [http://www.ibe.unesco.org/fileadmin/user\\_upload/Publications/WDE/2010/pdf-versions/South\\_Africa.pdf](http://www.ibe.unesco.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Publications/WDE/2010/pdf-versions/South_Africa.pdf) [6 May 2013].
- UNESCO. 2011b. World Data on Education: Chile (7th ed.) [Online.] Available at: [http://www.ibe.unesco.org/fileadmin/user\\_upload/Publications/WDE/2010/pdf-versions/Chile.pdf](http://www.ibe.unesco.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Publications/WDE/2010/pdf-versions/Chile.pdf) [6 May 2013].
- UNESCO. 2011c. World Data on Education: South Korea (7th ed.) [Online.] Available at: [http://www.ibe.unesco.org/fileadmin/user\\_upload/Publications/WDE/2010/pdf-versions/South\\_Korea.pdf](http://www.ibe.unesco.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Publications/WDE/2010/pdf-versions/South_Korea.pdf) [6 May 2013].
- UNESCO. 2011d. World Data on Education: Poland (7th ed.) [Online.] Available at: [http://www.ibe.unesco.org/fileadmin/user\\_upload/Publications/WDE/2010/pdf-versions/Poland.pdf](http://www.ibe.unesco.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Publications/WDE/2010/pdf-versions/Poland.pdf) [6 May 2013].
- UNFPA. 2013. South Africa: Youth. [Online.] Available at: <http://countryoffice.unfpa.org/southafrica/2013/04/22/6609/youth/> [28 May 2013]
- UNDP. 2012. International Human Development Indicators. [Online.]. Available at: <http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/indicators/67106.html> [24 April 2013]
- Valenzuela, A. & Dammert, L. 2006. Problems of Success in Chile. *Journal of Democracy*, 17(4):65-79).
- Valenzuela, J.S. 1992. Democratic Consolidation in Post-transitional Settings: Notion, Process and Facilitating Conditions, in Mainwaring, S., O'Donnell G.A. and Valenzuela, S.J. (eds.), *Issues in Democratic Consolidation: the New South American Democracies in Comparative Perspective*. South Bend: University of Notre Dame.
- Van Beek, U.J. 2006. Editor's Introduction, in Van Beek, U.J. (ed.), *Democracy under Construction: Patterns from Four Continents*. Pretoria: Van Schaik Publishers. 21-38.
- Van Deth, J. W. 2000. Interesting but Irrelevant: Social Capital and the Saliency of Politics in Western Europe. *European Journal of Political Research*, 37: 115-147.
- Van Deth, J.W. 2001. *Studying Political Participation: Towards a Theory of Everything?* Paper presented at the Joint Sessions of Workshops of the European Consortium for Political Research, Grenoble, 6–11 April.
- Verba, S., & Nie, N.H. 1972. *Participation in America: Political Democracy and Social Equality*. New York: Harper and Row.
- Verba, S., Nie, N.H. & Kim, J. 1978. *A Seven Nation Comparison: Participation and Political Equality*. Cambridge University Press: New York.
- Verba, S., Schlozman, K. & Brady, H. 1995. *Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Viterna, J.S. 2006. Pulled, Pushed and Persuaded: Explaining Women's Mobilization into the Salvadoran Guerrilla Army. *American Journal of Sociology*, 112 (1):1-45.
- Wilensky, Harold. 1975. *The Welfare State and Equality*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Wnuk-Lipinski, E. & Fuchs, S. 2006. Theoretical Framework and Methodology. In U.J. Van Beek (ed.), *Democracy under Construction: Patterns from Four Continents*. Pretoria: Van Schaik Publishers, p. 39-62.
- Wolfinger, R. E., & Rosenstone, S. J. 1980. *Who Votes?* New Haven: Yale University Press.
- WVS. 2005. *Rules for Primary Investigators*. [Online.] Available at: [http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/wvs/articles/folder\\_published/survey\\_2005/files/WVS-rules\\_for\\_PIs\\_wave5.pdf](http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/wvs/articles/folder_published/survey_2005/files/WVS-rules_for_PIs_wave5.pdf) [12 December 2012].

- WVS. 2007. *Values Change the World: World Value Survey*. [Online.] Available at: [http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/wvs/articles/folder\\_published/article\\_base\\_110](http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/wvs/articles/folder_published/article_base_110) [7 November 2011].
- WVS. 2008. *Values Change the World: Brochure about the WVS*. [Online.] Available at: [http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/wvs/articles/folder\\_published/article\\_base\\_110](http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/wvs/articles/folder_published/article_base_110) [12 December 2012].
- WVS. 2011. *Documentation of the Value Surveys*. [Online] Available at: <http://www.wvsevadb.com/wvs/WVSDocumentation.jsp?Idioma=I> [21 October 2011].
- WVS. 2011a. *Technical Specifications of the Value Surveys, Poland (2005)*. [Online] Available at: <http://www.wvsevadb.com/wvs/WVSTechnical.jsp?Idioma=I> [21 October 2011]
- WVS. 2011b. *Technical Specifications of the Value Surveys, South Africa (2007)*. [Online] Available at: <http://www.wvsevadb.com/wvs/WVSTechnical.jsp?Idioma=I> [21 October 2011].
- WVS. 2011c. *Technical Specifications of the Value Surveys, South Korea (2005)*. [Online] Available at: <http://www.wvsevadb.com/wvs/WVSTechnical.jsp?Idioma=I> [21 October 2011].
- WVS. 2011d. *Technical Specifications of the Value Surveys, Chile (2006)*. [Online] Available at: <http://www.wvsevadb.com/wvs/WVSTechnical.jsp?Idioma=I> [21 October 2011].
- Zaller, J. R. 1992. *The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion*. New York: Cambridge University Press.



**Appendix****Table A: Multivariate regression: Predictors for voting, Chile.**

	<b>Model 1</b>			<b>Model 2</b>			<b>Model 3</b>			<b>Model 4</b>		
	<b>B</b>	<b>S.E</b>	<b>Beta</b>	<b>B</b>	<b>S.E</b>	<b>Beta</b>	<b>B</b>	<b>S.E</b>	<b>Beta</b>	<b>B</b>	<b>S.E</b>	<b>Beta</b>
Constant	0.837	0.051		0.763	0.061		0.734	0.064		0.484	0.206	
Level of Education	<i>-0.044</i>	<i>0.024</i>	<i>-0.078</i>	-0.051	0.024	-0.090	<i>-0.044</i>	<i>0.025</i>	<i>-0.078</i>	0.067	0.023	0.118
Social Class (self-reported)	<i>0.010</i>	<i>0.025</i>	<i>0.016</i>	<i>0.000</i>	<i>0.025</i>	<i>0.000</i>	<i>0.001</i>	<i>0.025</i>	<i>0.001</i>	<i>-0.006</i>	<i>0.022</i>	<i>-0.011</i>
Left/Right Political Ideology				<i>0.014</i>	<i>0.008</i>	<i>0.069</i>	<i>0.012</i>	<i>0.008</i>	<i>0.061</i>	<i>0.011</i>	<i>0.007</i>	<i>0.054</i>
Political Interest				0.043	0.017	0.096	0.037	0.018	0.084	0.034	0.016	0.076
Church/Religious Organisation							0.064	0.021	0.122	<i>0.038</i>	<i>0.019</i>	<i>0.072</i>
Labour Union							<i>0.050</i>	<i>0.035</i>	<i>0.064</i>	<i>0.005</i>	<i>0.031</i>	<i>0.006</i>
Political Party							<i>-0.011</i>	<i>0.049</i>	<i>-0.011</i>	<i>-0.033</i>	<i>0.043</i>	<i>-0.035</i>
Sport/Recreational Organisation							<i>-0.001</i>	<i>0.023</i>	<i>-0.003</i>	<i>0.015</i>	<i>0.021</i>	<i>0.026</i>
Art/Music/Educational Organisation							<i>-0.039</i>	<i>0.026</i>	<i>-0.067</i>	<i>-0.007</i>	<i>0.023</i>	<i>-0.012</i>
Environmental Organisation							<i>-0.007</i>	<i>0.060</i>	<i>-0.006</i>	<i>-0.005</i>	<i>0.052</i>	<i>-0.005</i>
Professional Association							<i>-0.040</i>	<i>0.041</i>	<i>-0.049</i>	<i>-0.034</i>	<i>0.035</i>	<i>-0.042</i>
Humanitarian/Charitable Organisation							<i>0.048</i>	<i>0.029</i>	<i>0.073</i>	<i>0.021</i>	<i>0.026</i>	<i>0.032</i>
Consumer Organisation							<i>-0.117</i>	<i>0.069</i>	<i>-0.103</i>	<i>-0.056</i>	<i>0.061</i>	<i>-0.050</i>
Age										0.237	0.017	0.518
Gender										<i>0.026</i>	<i>0.030</i>	<i>0.030</i>
Size of Town/Area										<i>-0.068</i>	<i>0.038</i>	<i>-0.060</i>
<b>R</b>	<i>0.072</i>			0.131			0.218			0.525		
<b>R squared</b>	<i>0.005</i>			0.017			0.047			0.276		
<b>R squared adjusted</b>	<i>0.002</i>			0.011			0.029			0.259		

Notes: B is the unstandardized coefficient and Beta is the standardized coefficient. Values in Italics are not significant ( $p > .05$ ).

**Table B: Multivariate regression: Predictors for political protest behaviour, Chile.**

	<u>Model 1</u>			<u>Model 2</u>			<u>Model 3</u>			<u>Model 4</u>		
	<b>B</b>	<b>S.E</b>	<b>Beta</b>	<b>B</b>	<b>S.E</b>	<b>Beta</b>	<b>B</b>	<b>S.E</b>	<b>Beta</b>	<b>B</b>	<b>S.E</b>	<b>Beta</b>
Constant	<i>-0.034</i>	<i>0.091</i>		<i>0.063</i>	<i>0.105</i>		<i>0.077</i>	<i>0.110</i>		0.243	0.404	
Education Level	0.220	0.043	0.215	0.168	0.042	0.164	0.136	0.043	0.133	0.152	0.046	0.148
Social Class (self-reported)	0.015	0.045	0.014	<i>-0.002</i>	<i>0.044</i>	<i>-0.002</i>	0.013	0.044	0.012	<i>0.011</i>	<i>0.044</i>	<i>0.010</i>
Left/Right Political Ideology				<i>-0.037</i>	0.013	<i>-0.103</i>	<i>-0.034</i>	0.013	<i>-0.095</i>	<i>-0.034</i>	0.013	<i>-0.096</i>
Political Interest				0.205	0.030	0.254	0.188	0.031	0.232	0.185	0.031	0.229
Church/Religious Organisation							<i>-0.061</i>	<i>0.037</i>	<i>-0.064</i>	<i>-0.060</i>	<i>0.038</i>	<i>-0.064</i>
Labour Union							<i>0.053</i>	<i>0.059</i>	<i>0.038</i>	<i>0.044</i>	<i>0.060</i>	<i>0.031</i>
Political Party							0.243	0.084	0.143	0.236	0.085	0.139
Sport/Recreational Organisation							0.005	0.040	0.005	<i>0.001</i>	<i>0.041</i>	<i>0.001</i>
Art/Music/Educational Organisation							<i>0.140</i>	<i>0.045</i>	<i>0.133</i>	0.145	0.045	0.138
Environmental Organisation							<i>0.066</i>	<i>0.102</i>	<i>0.035</i>	<i>0.066</i>	<i>0.102</i>	<i>0.035</i>
Professional Association							<i>-0.173</i>	0.069	<i>-0.117</i>	<i>-0.174</i>	0.069	<i>-0.117</i>
Humanitarian/Charitable Organisation							0.016	0.051	0.013	<i>0.018</i>	<i>0.051</i>	<i>0.015</i>
Consumer Organisation							<i>-0.174</i>	<i>0.119</i>	<i>-0.086</i>	<i>-0.171</i>	<i>0.120</i>	<i>-0.085</i>
Age										<i>0.034</i>	<i>0.033</i>	<i>0.042</i>
Gender										<i>0.056</i>	<i>0.059</i>	<i>0.036</i>
Size of Town/Area										<i>-0.055</i>	<i>0.075</i>	<i>-0.027</i>
<b>R</b>	0.222			0.355			0.400			0.404		
<b>R squared</b>	0.049			0.126			0.160			0.164		
<b>R squared adjusted</b>	0.046			0.121			0.144			0.143		

Notes: B is the unstandardized coefficient and Beta is the standardized coefficient. Values in *Italics* are not significant (  $p > 0.05$ ).

**Table C: Multivariate regression: Predictors for voting, South Africa.**

	<u>Model 1</u>			<u>Model 2</u>			<u>Model 3</u>			<u>Model 4</u>		
	<b>B</b>	<b>S.E</b>	<b>Beta</b>	<b>B</b>	<b>S.E</b>	<b>Beta</b>	<b>B</b>	<b>S.E</b>	<b>Beta</b>	<b>B</b>	<b>S.E</b>	<b>Beta</b>
Constant	.797	.028		0.711	0.038		0.687	0.040		0.392	0.044	
Level of Education	-0.042	0.015	-0.064	-0.46	0.015	-0.071	-0.036	0.015	-0.055	0.030	0.015	0.047
Social Class (self-reported)	<i>-0.014</i>	<i>0.011</i>	<i>-0.027</i>	<i>-0.011</i>	<i>0.011</i>	<i>-0.022</i>	<i>-0.007</i>	<i>0.011</i>	<i>-0.015</i>	-0.030	0.011	-0.060
Left/Right Political Ideology				<i>0.003</i>	<i>0.004</i>	<i>0.013</i>	<i>0.004</i>	<i>0.004</i>	<i>0.020</i>	<i>0.007</i>	<i>0.004</i>	<i>0.033</i>
Political Interest				0.052	0.010	0.114	0.039	0.010	0.087	0.036	0.009	0.079
Church/Religious Organisation							<i>0.016</i>	<i>0.013</i>	<i>0.026</i>	<i>-0.014</i>	<i>0.012</i>	<i>-0.024</i>
Labour Union							<i>0.031</i>	<i>0.020</i>	<i>0.039</i>	<i>0.021</i>	<i>0.019</i>	<i>0.026</i>
Political Party							0.110	0.018	0.155	0.101	0.017	0.143
Sport/Recreational Organisation							-0.094	0.014	-0.155	-0.032	0.014	-0.053
Art/Music/Educational Organisation							-0.061	0.018	-0.090	<i>-0.027</i>	<i>0.017</i>	<i>-0.040</i>
Environmental Organisation							<i>-0.008</i>	<i>0.025</i>	<i>-0.010</i>	<i>-0.003</i>	<i>0.023</i>	<i>-0.004</i>
Professional Association							0.053	0.025	0.065	<i>0.019</i>	<i>0.024</i>	<i>0.024</i>
Humanitarian/Charitable Organisation							<i>0.002</i>	<i>0.023</i>	<i>0.003</i>	<i>-0.033</i>	<i>0.022</i>	<i>-0.042</i>
Consumer Organisation							<i>-0.018</i>	<i>0.024</i>	<i>-0.020</i>	<i>-0.010</i>	<i>0.023</i>	<i>-0.011</i>
Age										0.182	0.010	0.384
Gender										-0.041	0.019	-0.045
Size of Town/Area										<i>-0.005</i>	<i>0.005</i>	<i>-0.021</i>
<b>R</b>	0.079			0.142			0.263			0.440		
<b>R squared</b>	0.006			0.020			0.069			0.194		
<b>R squared adjusted</b>	0.005			0.018			0.064			0.188		

Notes: B is the unstandardized coefficient and Beta is the standardized coefficient. Values in Italics are not significant (  $p > .05$ ).

**Table D: Multivariate regression: Predictors for political protest behaviour, South Africa.**

	<u>Model 1</u>			<u>Model 2</u>			<u>Model 3</u>			<u>Model 4</u>		
	<b>B</b>	<b>S.E</b>	<b>Beta</b>	<b>B</b>	<b>S.E</b>	<b>Beta</b>	<b>B</b>	<b>S.E</b>	<b>Beta</b>	<b>B</b>	<b>S.E</b>	<b>Beta</b>
Constant	0.139	0.053		<i>0.115</i>	<i>0.071</i>		0.175	0.076		<i>-0.175</i>	<i>0.090</i>	
Level of Education	0.168	0.028	0.140	0.154	0.028	0.128	0.132	0.028	0.110	0.137	0.029	0.114
Social Class (self-reported)	<i>-0.014</i>	<i>0.021</i>	<i>-0.016</i>	<i>-0.005</i>	<i>0.021</i>	<i>-0.006</i>	<i>-0.009</i>	<i>0.021</i>	<i>-0.009</i>	<i>-0.038</i>	<i>0.021</i>	<i>-0.042</i>
Left/Right Political Ideology				-0.032	0.008	-0.084	-0.029	0.008	-0.076	-0.022	0.008	-0.058
Political Interest				0.145	0.018	0.174	0.110	0.018	0.132	0.104	0.018	0.124
Church/Religious Organisation							-0.060	0.024	-0.053	-0.052	0.024	-0.047
Labour Union							0.139	0.038	0.097	0.119	0.037	0.083
Political Party							0.186	0.034	0.143	0.171	0.033	0.131
Sport/Recreational Organisation							<i>-0.049</i>	<i>0.027</i>	<i>-0.044</i>	<i>-0.033</i>	<i>0.028</i>	<i>-0.030</i>
Art/Music/Educational Organisation							<i>0.003</i>	<i>0.033</i>	<i>0.002</i>	<i>0.028</i>	<i>0.033</i>	<i>0.023</i>
Environmental Organisation							<i>-0.062</i>	<i>0.046</i>	<i>-0.041</i>	<i>-0.056</i>	<i>0.045</i>	<i>-0.037</i>
Professional Association							<i>0.088</i>	<i>0.047</i>	<i>0.059</i>	<i>0.080</i>	<i>0.047</i>	<i>0.053</i>
Humanitarian/Charitable Organisation							<i>0.042</i>	<i>0.043</i>	<i>0.029</i>	<i>0.017</i>	<i>0.043</i>	<i>0.012</i>
Consumer Organisation							<i>-0.085</i>	<i>0.045</i>	<i>-0.052</i>	<i>-0.079</i>	<i>0.045</i>	<i>-0.048</i>
Age										0.097	0.019	0.111
Gender										<i>0.058</i>	<i>0.037</i>	<i>0.034</i>
Size of Town/Area										0.048	0.010	0.108
<b>R</b>	0.134			0.223			0.302			0.337		
<b>R squared</b>	0.018			0.050			0.091			0.113		
<b>R squared adjusted</b>	0.017			0.048			0.086			0.107		

Notes: B is the unstandardized coefficient and Beta is the standardized coefficient. Values in *Italics* are not significant (  $p > 0.05$ ).

**Table E: Multivariate regression: Predictors for voting, South Korea.**

	<u>Model 1</u>			<u>Model 2</u>			<u>Model 3</u>			<u>Model 4</u>		
	<b>B</b>	<b>S.E</b>	<b>Beta</b>	<b>B</b>	<b>S.E</b>	<b>Beta</b>	<b>B</b>	<b>S.E</b>	<b>Beta</b>	<b>B</b>	<b>S.E</b>	<b>Beta</b>
Constant	0.751	0.057		0.496	0.070		0.480	0.071		<i>0.098</i>	<i>0.083</i>	
Level of Education	-0.041	0.020	-0.061	<i>-0.023</i>	<i>0.020</i>	<i>-0.035</i>	<i>-0.024</i>	<i>0.020</i>	<i>-0.035</i>	0.067	0.023	0.100
Social Class (self-reported)	0.065	0.022	0.087	0.056	0.022	0.075	0.056	0.022	0.075	0.060	0.021	0.081
Left/Right Political Ideology				0.026	0.006	0.124	0.027	0.006	0.131	<i>0.014</i>	<i>0.006</i>	<i>0.068</i>
Political Interest				0.084	0.016	0.151	0.087	0.016	0.156	0.071	0.016	0.128
Church/Religious Organisation							<i>0.002</i>	<i>0.016</i>	<i>0.003</i>	<i>-0.006</i>	<i>0.016</i>	<i>-0.012</i>
Labour Union							<i>-0.008</i>	<i>0.043</i>	<i>-0.006</i>	<i>0.008</i>	<i>0.042</i>	<i>0.006</i>
Political Party							<i>0.001</i>	<i>0.050</i>	<i>0.000</i>	<i>-0.001</i>	<i>0.049</i>	<i>0.000</i>
Sport/Recreational Organisation							<i>0.010</i>	<i>0.018</i>	<i>0.017</i>	<i>0.008</i>	<i>0.017</i>	<i>0.014</i>
Art/Music/Educational Organisation							<i>0.019</i>	<i>0.022</i>	<i>0.028</i>	<i>0.035</i>	<i>0.021</i>	<i>0.052</i>
Environmental Organisation							<i>-0.103</i>	<i>0.046</i>	<i>-0.086</i>	<i>-0.113</i>	<i>0.045</i>	<i>-0.094</i>
Professional Association							<i>-0.039</i>	<i>0.037</i>	<i>-0.037</i>	<i>-0.072</i>	<i>0.036</i>	<i>-0.067</i>
Humanitarian/Charitable Organisation							0.096	0.044	0.085	<i>0.075</i>	<i>0.042</i>	<i>0.067</i>
Consumer Organisation							<i>-0.009</i>	<i>0.050</i>	<i>-0.007</i>	<i>0.002</i>	<i>0.049</i>	<i>0.001</i>
Age										0.138	0.016	0.298
Gender										<i>0.036</i>	<i>0.025</i>	<i>0.042</i>
Size of Town/Area										<i>0.002</i>	<i>0.007</i>	<i>0.009</i>
<b>R</b>	<i>0.096</i>			0.218			0.238			0.342		
<b>R squared</b>	<i>0.009</i>			0.048			0.057			0.117		
<b>R squared adjusted</b>	<i>0.008</i>			0.044			0.046			0.105		

Notes: B is the unstandardized coefficient and Beta is the standardized coefficient. Values in Italics are not significant (  $p > .05$ ).

**Table F: Multivariate regression: Predictors for political protest behaviour, South Korea.**

	<u>Model 1</u>			<u>Model 2</u>			<u>Model 3</u>			<u>Model 4</u>		
	<b>B</b>	<b>S.E</b>	<b>Beta</b>	<b>B</b>	<b>S.E</b>	<b>Beta</b>	<b>B</b>	<b>S.E</b>	<b>Beta</b>	<b>B</b>	<b>S.E</b>	<b>Beta</b>
Constant	0.364	0.102		0.364	0.123		0.330	0.123		0.301	0.148	
Level of Education	<i>0.057</i>	<i>0.035</i>	<i>0.048</i>	<i>0.030</i>	<i>0.035</i>	<i>0.025</i>	<i>0.026</i>	<i>0.035</i>	<i>0.022</i>	<i>0.029</i>	<i>0.040</i>	<i>0.024</i>
Social Class (self-reported)	<i>0.002</i>	<i>0.039</i>	<i>0.002</i>	<i>-0.018</i>	<i>0.038</i>	<i>-0.014</i>	<i>-0.019</i>	<i>0.038</i>	<i>-0.015</i>	<i>-0.019</i>	<i>0.038</i>	<i>-0.014</i>
Left/Right Political Ideology				-0.037	0.011	-0.100	-0.032	0.011	-0.086	-0.032	0.011	-0.087
Political Interest				0.215	0.028	0.218	0.201	0.028	0.203	0.203	0.029	0.205
Church/Religious Organisation							<i>-0.039</i>	<i>0.028</i>	<i>-0.041</i>	<i>-0.045</i>	<i>0.029</i>	<i>-0.046</i>
Labour Union							<i>0.018</i>	<i>0.075</i>	<i>0.008</i>	<i>0.023</i>	<i>0.076</i>	<i>0.010</i>
Political Party							0.275	0.087	0.114	0.273	0.087	0.114
Sport/Recreational Organisation							<i>0.056</i>	<i>0.031</i>	<i>0.055</i>	<i>0.061</i>	<i>0.031</i>	<i>0.059</i>
Art/Music/Educational Organisation							<i>0.030</i>	<i>0.038</i>	<i>0.026</i>	<i>0.028</i>	<i>0.039</i>	<i>0.024</i>
Environmental Organisation							<i>-0.211</i>	<i>0.080</i>	<i>-0.098</i>	<i>-0.213</i>	<i>0.080</i>	<i>-0.099</i>
Professional Association							<i>-0.083</i>	<i>0.065</i>	<i>-0.044</i>	<i>-0.083</i>	<i>0.065</i>	<i>-0.043</i>
Humanitarian/Charitable Organisation							0.389	0.076	0.194	0.390	0.076	0.194
Consumer Organisation							<i>-0.194</i>	<i>0.087</i>	<i>-0.082</i>	<i>-0.193</i>	<i>0.088</i>	<i>-0.082</i>
Age										<i>0.004</i>	<i>0.028</i>	<i>0.005</i>
Gender										<i>-0.028</i>	<i>0.045</i>	<i>-0.018</i>
Size of Town/Area										<i>0.010</i>	<i>0.013</i>	<i>0.022</i>
<b>R</b>	<i>0.048</i>			0.240			0.317			0.319		
<b>R squared</b>	<i>0.002</i>			0.057			0.101			0.102		
<b>R squared adjusted</b>	<i>0.001</i>			0.054			0.091			0.089		

Notes: B is the unstandardized coefficient and Beta is the standardized coefficient. Values in *Italics* are not significant (  $p > 0.05$ ).

**Table G: Multivariate regression: Predictors for voting, Poland**

	<u>Model 1</u>			<u>Model 2</u>			<u>Model 3</u>			<u>Model 4</u>		
	<b>B</b>	<b>S.E</b>	<b>Beta</b>	<b>B</b>	<b>S.E</b>	<b>Beta</b>	<b>B</b>	<b>S.E</b>	<b>Beta</b>	<b>B</b>	<b>S.E</b>	<b>Beta</b>
Constant	0.671	0.067		0.540	0.081		0.511	0.083		0.462	0.098	
Level of Education	<i>-0.007</i>	<i>0.032</i>	<i>-0.008</i>	<i>-0.009</i>	<i>0.032</i>	<i>-0.011</i>	<i>-0.005</i>	<i>0.032</i>	<i>-0.007</i>	<i>0.007</i>	<i>0.033</i>	<i>0.009</i>
Social Class (self-reported)	0.066	0.026	0.104	0.059	0.026	0.093	0.057	0.026	0.090	0.062	0.026	0.098
Left/Right Political Ideology				<i>0.010</i>	<i>0.008</i>	<i>0.051</i>	<i>0.010</i>	<i>0.008</i>	<i>0.052</i>	<i>0.010</i>	<i>0.008</i>	<i>0.050</i>
Political Interest				0.065	0.021	0.122	0.062	0.021	0.117	0.055	0.022	0.103
Church/Religious Organisation							<i>0.037</i>	<i>0.027</i>	<i>0.058</i>	<i>0.027</i>	<i>0.027</i>	<i>0.043</i>
Labour Union							<i>0.030</i>	<i>0.036</i>	<i>0.037</i>	<i>0.028</i>	<i>0.036</i>	<i>0.035</i>
Political Party							<i>0.039</i>	<i>0.061</i>	<i>0.030</i>	<i>0.040</i>	<i>0.061</i>	<i>0.031</i>
Sport/Recreational Organisation							<i>0.017</i>	<i>0.038</i>	<i>0.020</i>	<i>0.035</i>	<i>0.039</i>	<i>0.042</i>
Art/Music/Educational Organisation							<i>0.004</i>	<i>0.041</i>	<i>0.004</i>	<i>0.016</i>	<i>0.042</i>	<i>0.018</i>
Environmental Organisation							<i>0.058</i>	<i>0.066</i>	<i>0.050</i>	<i>0.043</i>	<i>0.065</i>	<i>0.037</i>
Professional Association							<i>-0.001</i>	<i>0.048</i>	<i>-0.001</i>	<i>-0.007</i>	<i>0.048</i>	<i>-0.007</i>
Humanitarian/Charitable Organisation							<i>-0.002</i>	<i>0.050</i>	<i>-0.002</i>	<i>0.007</i>	<i>0.050</i>	<i>0.007</i>
Consumer Organisation							<i>-0.045</i>	<i>0.086</i>	<i>-0.028</i>	<i>-0.040</i>	<i>0.086</i>	<i>-0.025</i>
Age										0.047	0.020	0.102
Gender										<i>-0.059</i>	<i>0.035</i>	<i>-0.068</i>
Size of Town/Area										<i>-0.006</i>	<i>0.008</i>	<i>-0.028</i>
<b>R</b>	0.103			0.170			0.203			0.236		
<b>R squared</b>	0.011			0.029			0.041			0.056		
<b>R squared adjusted</b>	0.007			0.023			0.021			0.031		

Notes: B is the unstandardized coefficient and Beta is the standardized coefficient. Values in *Italics* are not significant (  $p > 0.05$ ).

**Table H: Multivariate regression: Predictors for political protest behaviour, Poland**

	<u>Model 1</u>			<u>Model 2</u>			<u>Model 3</u>			<u>Model 4</u>		
	<b>B</b>	<b>S.E</b>	<b>Beta</b>	<b>B</b>	<b>S.E</b>	<b>Beta</b>	<b>B</b>	<b>S.E</b>	<b>Beta</b>	<b>B</b>	<b>S.E</b>	<b>Beta</b>
Constant	<i>0.163</i>	<i>0.132</i>		<i>0.071</i>	<i>0.160</i>		<i>-0.009</i>	<i>0.156</i>		<i>-0.023</i>	<i>0.185</i>	
Level of Education	0.136	0.065	0.089	<i>0.109</i>	<i>0.064</i>	<i>0.072</i>	<i>0.116</i>	<i>0.062</i>	<i>0.076</i>	<i>0.100</i>	<i>0.064</i>	<i>0.065</i>
Social Class (self-reported)	<i>0.056</i>	<i>0.051</i>	<i>0.047</i>	<i>0.035</i>	<i>0.050</i>	<i>0.029</i>	<i>0.024</i>	<i>0.049</i>	<i>0.020</i>	<i>0.017</i>	<i>0.049</i>	<i>0.014</i>
Left/Right Political Ideology				<i>-0.022</i>	<i>0.015</i>	<i>-0.057</i>	<i>-0.013</i>	<i>0.015</i>	<i>-0.036</i>	<i>-0.014</i>	<i>0.015</i>	<i>-0.036</i>
Political Interest				0.189	0.041	0.188	0.158	0.039	0.157	0.160	0.041	0.160
Church/Religious Organisation							<i>0.031</i>	<i>0.052</i>	<i>0.025</i>	<i>0.049</i>	<i>0.052</i>	<i>0.040</i>
Labour Union							0.293	0.067	0.191	0.288	0.067	0.188
Political Party							<i>0.176</i>	<i>0.110</i>	<i>0.073</i>	<i>0.179</i>	<i>0.110</i>	<i>0.075</i>
Sport/Recreational Organisation							<i>-0.155</i>	<i>0.071</i>	<i>-0.098</i>	<i>-0.185</i>	<i>0.072</i>	<i>-0.117</i>
Art/Music/Educational Organisation							<i>0.056</i>	<i>0.078</i>	<i>0.033</i>	<i>0.044</i>	<i>0.080</i>	<i>0.026</i>
Environmental Organisation							0.341	0.121	0.156	0.357	0.121	0.164
Professional Association							<i>0.079</i>	<i>0.090</i>	<i>0.042</i>	<i>0.084</i>	<i>0.090</i>	<i>0.044</i>
Humanitarian/Charitable Organisation							<i>0.148</i>	<i>0.090</i>	<i>0.080</i>	<i>0.133</i>	<i>0.090</i>	<i>0.072</i>
Consumer Organisation							<i>-0.735</i>	<i>0.171</i>	<i>-0.229</i>	<i>-0.733</i>	<i>0.171</i>	<i>-0.228</i>
Age										<i>-0.047</i>	<i>0.037</i>	<i>-0.053</i>
Gender										0.119	0.066	0.072
Size of Town/Area										<i>0.022</i>	<i>0.015</i>	<i>0.056</i>
<b>R</b>	0.111			0.220			0.371			0.385		
<b>R squared</b>	0.012			0.048			0.138			0.148		
<b>R squared adjusted</b>	0.009			0.042			0.118			0.124		

Notes: B is the unstandardized coefficient and Beta is the standardized coefficient. Values in *Italics* are not significant ( $p > 0.05$ ).