**The Influence of the Global Financial Crisis and other Challenges for South Africa's Non-Governmental Organisations and the Prospects for Deepening Democracy**

By

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
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March 2013

DECLARATION

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ABSTRACT

The point of departure for this study was the wide-ranging furore in media publications regarding the pervasive decline in donor funding for civil society organisations in South Africa, as influenced by the recent global financial crisis, and the subsequent shutting down of a number of civil society organisations. The decision to embark on this study has its roots in the fact that civil society is an important feature in a democracy with regards to government responsiveness, accountability as well as citizen participation in democratic governance. In South Africa, particularly, this is important in light of the country's fledgling democracy, and even more so, when considering the ruling party's overwhelming political power resulting in a dominant party system.

The aim of this study was to find out what accounts for the plummet in donor funding, and the overriding question guiding this study was: Has the global financial crisis influenced civil society in South Africa? The broader question asked was: What are the challenges facing civil society organisations in South Africa? This study aims to assist in the evaluation of the potential role that civil society has played and continues to play in South Africa's young democracy and what the implications would be for democracy if civil society organisations were hampered in these roles and continued to close offices.

This study is explorative in nature and relied on qualitative data obtained from in-depth interviews conducted with two prominent South African non-governmental organisations; namely the Institute for Democracy and the Treatment Action Campaign. A key informant was selected and interviewed from each organisation. The findings of the interviews were operationalised through the lenses of Andrew Heywood's (2007) conceptual theoretical framework, which puts forward five resources that civil society organisations need in order to exert their influence. While acknowledging the importance of all five resources, this study pays particular attention to financial resources received through international donor funding, for without financial resources it is difficult for an organisation to survive.

The findings of the interviews and the conclusions drawn underscored four realities: firstly that the decrease in funding is not limited to the organisations examined in this study, but civil society as a whole. The second reality rests on the fact that the global financial crisis has indeed influenced the Institute for Democracy and the Treatment Action Campaign in ways that are a cause for a concern, not only for the survival of the organisation, but also for the durability of

South Africa's young and at times fragile democracy. The third reality points to other challenges that have influenced donor funding, such as South Africa's middle income status, a shift in donor orientation and focus and donor-specific problems. The fourth reality that was pointed out thrust this study into the conclusion that financial resources are the essential life-blood of civil society organisations. In light of the role that civil society plays in a democracy, the findings in this study point to a concerning trend in South Africa.

OPSOMMING

Die aanvangspunt van hierdie studie is die omvangrykende mediadekking aangaande die wydverspreide afname in donateursbefondsing vir burgerlike samelewingorganisasies in Suid-Afrika. Hierdie afname is beïnvloed deur die onlangse globale finansiële krisis en het tot gevolg die ontbinding van 'n aantal burgerlike samelewingorganisasies. Die besluit om met hierdie studie te begin het sy oorsprong in die feit dat die burgerlike samelewing 'n belangrike kenmerk van demokrasie is veral met betrekking tot regeringsresponsiwiteit, aanspreeklikheid sowel as die deelname van burgers aan 'n demokratiese regering. In Suid-Afrika is dit belangrik, veral met die oog op die land se jong demokrasie en nog meer wanneer die heersende party se oorweldigende politiese mag in ag geneem word en dat dit tot 'n dominante partystelsel lei.

Die doel van hierdie studie is om vas te stel wat die oorsaak van die daling in skenkersfondse is. Die rigtinggewende vraag vir die studie was: het die wêreldwye finansiële krisis die burgerlike samelewing in Suid-Afrika beïnvloed? Die studie beoog om by te dra tot die evaluasie van die potensiële rol wat burgerlike samelewing in Suid-Afrika se jong demokrasie gespeel het, en steeds speel, en wat die implikasies vir demokrasie sou wees indien burgerlike samelewingorganisasies se rol bemoeilik word en verplig word om nog meer van hulle kantore te sluit.

Die studie is ondersoekend van aard en het staatgemaak op kwalitatiewe data wat verkry is deur in-diepte onderhoude met twee vooraanstaande Suid-Afrikaanse nie-regeringsorganisasies te voer naamlik die Instituut vir Demokrasie en die 'Treatment Action Campaign'. 'n Gesaghebbende segsman uit elke organisasie is gekies vir die onderhoude. Die bevindings is geoperasionaliseer deur die lense van Andrew Heywood (2007) se konseptuele teoretiese raamwerk wat aanvoer dat daar vyf hulpbronne is wat burgerlike organisasies nodig het om hulle invloed te laat geld. Terwyl die waarde van al vyf hulpbronne erken word, skenk hierdie studie in die besonder aandag aan die finansiële hulpbronne wat van internasionale skenkersfondse ontvang word omdat burgerlike organisasies beswaarlik daarsonder kan oorleef.

Die bevindinge van die onderhoude en die gevolgtrekkings wat gemaak is beaam vier realiteite: eerstens dat die daling in befondsing nie beperk is tot die organisasies wat aan die studie deelgeneem het nie, maar burgerlike samelewing as 'n geheel. Die tweede realiteit berus by die feit dat die globale finansiële krisis inderdaad die Instituut van Demokrasie en die 'Treatment

Action Campaign' op kommerwekkende maniere beïnvloed het, nie net in terme van die organisasies se oorlewing nie, maar ook in terme van die behoud van Suid-Afrika se jong en soms brose demokrasie. Die derde realiteit dui op ander uitdagings wat skenkersfondse beïnvloed het soos Suid-Afrika se middel inkomstestatus, 'n fokusverskuiwing van skenkingsgeoriënteerdheid tot skenker-spesifieke probleme. Die vierde realiteit wat uitgewys is dwing die studie om tot die gevolgtrekking te kom dat finansiële hulpbronne 'n noodsaaklikheid vir die behoud van burgerlike gemeenskapsorganisasies is. In die lig van die rol wat burgerlike gemeenskap in demokrasie speel, is die bevindings van die studie kommerwekkend.

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Your encouragement, support and continued prayers are most appreciated. To my dear parents and sister, words in the English language cannot begin to express my gratitude to you for always believing in me, and for your boundless and unconditional love.

Ndiyabulela ngakho konke. Yanga uThixo anganisikelela, aphinde anisikelele.

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Dr Nicola de Jager

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Thank you all for the moral support and for burning the mid-night oil with me. Thank you for making what can be a lonely, mentally and emotionally draining process, pleasurable, and humorous. And thank you for never refusing to read through my work when my eyes just couldn't anymore. I believe this is not the end, but the beginning of life-long friendships.

Interviewees

I would like to extend a word of thanks to Mr Len Verwey (Researcher at the Institute for Democracy) and Ms Catherine Tomlinson (Researcher at the Treatment Action Campaign) for taking time out of their busy schedules to meet for an interview and reply to my interview questions respectively. Your contributions have aided this study and have given me new insight on the topic. Thank you also for always replying to my 'endless' emails.

Heavenly Father

Above all, thank you Lord for bringing the aforementioned people into my life and for the strength and abilities to complete this study. Thank you for the spirit of perseverance to see this through when at times doubt and weariness crept in. Above all, thank you for never, ever leaving my side. Unto God alone be all the glory!

DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated in loving memory of my love, my inspiration, my best-friend, my mother,

Nomvula Cynthia 'Mpitsi' Moleko.

13.02.1955 – 23.07.2011

You have never stopped believing in me and like God, you have been my 'footprints in the sand'.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

Aids	Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
ANC	African National Congress
ARV	Anti-Retroviral
AZT	Azathioprine
BCM	Black Consciousness Movement
BEE	Black Economic Empowerment
BIS	Budget Information Service
CBO	Community Based Organization
CDCE	Curriculum Development and Citizenship Education
COSATU	Congress of South African Trade Unions
CPU	Child Protection Unit
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
CSU	Community Safety Unit
DoH	Department of Health
EUPRD	European Union Program for Reconstruction Development
FIFA	Federation International Football Association
FNS	Friedrich Naumann Stiftung
FOSATU	Federation of South African Trade Unions
GFATM	Global Fund for Aids, Tuberculosis and Malaria
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GEAR	Growth Employment and Redistribution
HIV	Human Immunodeficiency Virus
IANSA	International Action Network on Small Arms
IDASA	Institute for Democracy
LOGIC	Local Government Information Centre
MTCT	Mother-to-Child Transmission
MEC	Member of the Executive Council
NAPWA	National Association of People with Aids
NEDLAC	National Economic Development and Labor Council
NGK	Dutch Reformed Church

NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NPS	National Strategic Plan
NUSAS	National Union of South African Students
ODA	Official Development Assistance
PGP	Political Governance Programme
PIMS	Political Information Monitoring Service
PMA	Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association
PMTCT	Prevention of Mother-to-Child Transmission
RAPCAN	Resources and Prevention of Child Abuse and Neglect
RDP	Reconstruction and Development Program
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SAMP	Southern African Migration Project
SANAC	South African National Aids Council
SAPS	South African Police Services
SITO	States in Transition Observatory
TAC	Treatment Action Campaign
TEP	Transformation and Equity Programme
UDF	United Democratic Front
U.S.	United States
TK	TaraKlamp

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1. Introduction:

Zara Nicholson published an article in the *Cape Times* on 2 February 2012 regarding the Democracy Institute (Idasa), the Black Sash, and the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) losing millions in funding and consequently having to close down crucial projects and retrench staff. Idasa's executive director Paul Graham commented on the fact that they were forced to retrench 70 staff members in 2012. The annual budget has been halved from R100 million to R50 million in the year 2012, Graham continued. In addition, the Idasa Cape Town office had to be closed down where the media department and political information and monitoring service were housed. The projects in the Cape Town office were completely locally based, thus it was impossible to get funding (Nicholson, 2012).

With regard to the Black Sash, the article reports that the organisation has lost six major donors over the past five years, most of them large international church-based donors. The withdrawal of funds has meant the loss of approximately R24 million. According to National Director of Black Sash, Marcella Naidoo, the lack of funding for the organisation will lead to them not being able to do the substantive work that they are used to. In addition, the article highlights the fact that the TAC is also facing difficult financial times as seen with its R6.5 million grant from the *Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria* which is facing a crisis with donor funding shortfalls. This article makes a link between the lack of funding for these organisations as well as the global financial crisis. To quote the executive director at Idasa, 'International funders have been withdrawing their funds to South Africa for a few years now. The global financial crisis was precarious but we were able to keep going because we had secured funding and we had reserves but that ran up last year and we had to cut staff sharply' (quoted in Nicholson, 2012).

This article, as well as several others that followed in the media[1] have reiterated the issues expressed in this article, thus highlighting the need to investigate the issue of international

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[1] See also, Cape Argus: Barnes, 2011. 'NGOs feel the pinch as funds dry up'; West Cape News: Luhanga, 2011. 'Bleak new year for NGOs'; IOL News: Ajam, 2009. 'NGOs feel the pinch of recession'; IOL News: 'Charities, NGOs funds ''drying up''.

funding in light of the role that civil society has played and needs to play in deepening democracy in South Africa.

1.2. The Global Financial Crisis

The financial crisis in the late 2000s, known as the Global Financial Crisis, is regarded by many economists to be the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930s. It brought about the collapse of big financial institutions, the rescuing of banks by national governments and declines in stock markets around the globe. In many areas, the housing market also suffered, resulting in a number of evictions, foreclosures and long-lasting unemployment. It contributed to the failure of key businesses, downturn in consumer wealth estimated in trillions of United States (U.S.) dollars, and a considerable decline in economic activity, producing a severe global economic recession since the year 2008 (Naude, 2009:1).

The global financial crisis was set off by a multifaceted interplay of valuation and liquidity problems in the United States banking system in 2008. The bursting of the U.S. housing bubble, which peaked in 2007, caused the values of securities tied to U.S. real estate pricing to plunge, wounding financial institutions around the world (Naude, 2009:2-3). Questions regarding bank solvency, declines in credit availability and damaged investor confidence had an impact on global stock markets, where securities suffered large losses during 2008 and early 2009. Economies worldwide lost pace during this time, as credit constricted and international trade decreased. Governments and central banks reacted with unparalleled fiscal stimulus, monetary policy development and institutional bailouts (Naude, 2009:2-3).

As a developing country, South Africa has not been left untouched by this global financial crisis. Pertaining to developing countries, the Overseas Development Institute explained in 2008 that the effect of the global financial crisis on developing countries would centre around two aspects. Firstly, the financial problem could lead to spill-overs for stock markets (te Velde, 2008:3). Secondly, the wide-ranging economic recession could harmfully impact developing countries in six areas (te Velde, 2008:3-4): trade and trade prices would come under strain, remittances to developing countries would decrease and remittances per migrant would decline, foreign direct investment and equity investment would come under pressure, the commercial lending of banks may face difficulties, aid budgets would become strained as funding of these organisations is affected by the downturn, and the capital adequacy ratios of development finance institutions would come under pressure. At that time, the Overseas Development Institute further predicted

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that as South Africa was highly dependent on foreign direct investment, it would be hard pressed to reduce interest rates, a position further exacerbated by a high current account deficit and pressure on its exchange and inflation rate (te Velde, 2008:4).

It is noteworthy to mention that the South African Government's reaction to the global financial crisis was detailed in the 2009 *Framework for South Africa's response to the international economic crisis* (South African Government Information, 2009). Within this Framework, the broad tenets of Government's response were to:

- 'Put measures in place to protect low income earners, the unemployed and vulnerable groups
- Strengthen the capacity of the economy to grow and create decent jobs
- Maintain high levels of public sector infrastructure investment and encourage private sector investment and corporate social investment programmes
- Put an economic and social stimulus package in place' (South African Government Information, 2009:4-5).

Economic data showed that South Africa had for the most part broken away from the recession in the third and fourth quarters of 2009 (South African Reserve Bank, 2010:1), had shown growth in real Gross Domestic Product (South African Reserve Bank, 2010:13) and confidence in the financial sector also increased (South African Reserve Bank, 2010:14). In addition, a major boost to the economy came during the International Federation of Football Association (FIFA) Soccer World Cup in South Africa in 2010. The construction of stadiums, improvements of airports and other infrastructure, as well as 300, 000 soccer tourists visiting South Africa came at an opportune moment.

Nevertheless South Africa had not been left unaffected by the economic downturn. For instance, there was an abrupt decline in demand for export products and a drop in commodity prices, with global fund managers and portfolio investors cautious of investments in emerging markets such as South Africa (South African Government Information, 2009:2). Concerning job losses, in his 2010 *State of the Nation* address, President Jacob Zuma stated that the consequences of the global financial crisis was that in the region of 900 000 jobs were lost in South Africa in the year 2009 alone (Zuma, 2010:3).

It is important to bear in mind that although South Africa did not escape the negatives of the downturn in the Euromarket, the fast growing trade and investment relations with India and especially China softened recessionary impacts in this area. This is as far as the commodity booms are concerned. Resource and market-seeking opportunities have attracted these Asian nations to Africa.

With that said, the global financial crisis has had a bearing on a number of other sectors in a number of ways. With regard to the civil society sector, the past three or four years have seen a number of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) fall under strain, financially and being on the verge of collapse due to a lack of financial support (Inyathelo, 2011). There has been a loss in activists and leaders, to government and business, while many NGOs struggle to pay their employees. There is an alarming crisis in the civil society sector in South Africa. The timing of the crisis in the civil society sector and the global financial crisis seem to overlap and the key question to ask therefore is, what is the influence of the latter on the former?

Unquestionably civil society organisations in South Africa performed a key role in the ending of apartheid and ushering in a democratic system in 1994. In addition, these organisations have offered the needed support for democratic governance, either by means of direct rendering of social services to the disadvantaged or developing public discourses through grounded primary research and shrewd analysis of social policy problems facing leaders in government and business. They have become a fundamental and central part of the country's policy making and service delivery landscape (Aitchison, 2000:1). This can be seen in civil society's attempt to hold government accountable to the services that it is not providing to the poor. This is also evident in the various local, national and international NGOs that have responded to the HIV and Aids crisis facing South Africa for instance. These NGOs are engaged in service delivery, including prevention, care and treatment programmes, human rights, together with paralegal advice and litigation on behalf of people living and affected by HIV/Aids, and in research and education, advocacy and lobbying.

Moreover, on many occasions NGOs have come to the rescue either in terms of critiquing poorly conceived national policy initiatives, exposing incompetence in the public service and lack of understanding of the nature of the challenges facing our democracy. The most recent and noteworthy exemplar of this is the 'Right to Know Campaign' which is a coalition of more than 400 civil society organisations fighting for the right to know and rejecting the Protection of

Information Bill, also known as the Secrecy Bill that is currently before the South African Parliament.

According to Rapoo (2010), despite civil society organisations' achievements, and having shown their worth in supporting and underpinning South Africa's democracy, many are facing financial constraints. This has rendered a large number of NGOs extremely vulnerable to collapse, with many not only losing their experienced staff and senior leadership – invariably to government and business where conditions of employment and remuneration are better. Many have been forced to introduce drastic cuts to their budgets, operational activities as well as staff, which in turn are threatening the capacity of many NGOs to render their services or carry out their projects. Some donors have decreased or are no longer able to provide operational financial support, which is crucial for sustaining NGOs (Rapoo, 2010).

It is important to note, however that not all CSOs are the same with regards to their source of revenue. The key source of funding for some NGOs is not donor funding, for instance churches and trade unions. Churches receive financial support from tithes and offering from the congregation and trade unions depend almost solely on membership fees. However, for the purposes of this study, NGOs that rely on donor funding will be the focus.

It is also important to note that in as much as the global financial crisis has been significant in the experiences of NGOs in South Africa; the reality is that NGOs have always battled with funding. The global financial crisis has exacerbated the problem.

1.3. Literature Review: Civil society and democracy

1.3.1. Civic Culture

Almond and Verba (1963) wrote the pioneering book, *Civic Culture*. The book was considered pioneering as it was the first attempt to methodically gather and codify variables quantifying political participation across five different states. Based on cross-sectional surveys, the variables measured the characteristics utilised to assess the level of political participation of citizens in Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Mexico and the United States. According to John et al (2010), *Civic Culture* is a landmark which has made a profound contribution on scholars examining political behaviour. John et al (2010) continue to assert that the book set a high standard for future studies in this research area, possibly initiating the systematic comparative survey of political attitudes and prompting long-running research projects on a number of topics,

such as trust and political efficiency. *Civic Culture* was not merely a record of democracy and political participation; it embodied a specific theory of civic participation, determining the social and psychological fundamentals for an effective and stable democracy. While subject to critical analysis and varying degrees of modification over subsequent decades, Almond and Verba's (1963) general idea of 'political culture' continues to be a strong force within political analyses (John et al, 2010).

Through their work, Almond and Verba (1963) sought to produce a theory of 'civic culture' that would account for political involvement of citizens or lack thereof in democratic states. They investigated the link between citizen participation and attitudes regarding their political system, and maintained that a country's political institutions ought to correspond with political culture for it to have a stable political system. The authors defined political culture as 'attitudes toward the political system and its various parts, and attitudes toward the self in the system' (Almond and Verba, 1963:13). The political culture of a country, they argued, is the particular distribution of forms of orientation towards political objects among the citizens of the country. In this, the political culture may or may not be compatible with the structures of the political system.

Almond and Verba (1963) maintained that political culture consists of cognitive, affective orientations towards the political system. Based on incompatible orientations towards political objects, the authors differentiate between three types of political culture, namely, parochial, subjective and participant culture. Parochial culture refers to individuals having no cognitive orientation with regard to the political system. The subjective culture is characterised by individual's cognitive orientations toward the output aspects of the political system. Participant culture on the other end of the spectrum, is a culture where individuals have cognitive orientations toward both the input and output aspects of the political system. In essence, participant culture is a culture in which citizens develop orientations towards the political system in its entirety. This includes output and input, as well as citizens in the political system, thus embodying, a developed notion of their own political efficiency and competence as actors in the political system (Walter, 1965).

Almond and Verba (1963) provide an explanation of how congruence and incongruity between the political system and its culture leads to the weakening or stabilisation of the system. By this the authors assert that the cultures aforementioned are congruent with traditional, authoritarian as well as democratic systems respectively. The congruence is denoted by positive affective

and evaluative orientations in the applicable areas: there is a scale from alienation, through apathy, to allegiance. Thus, 'civic culture' they argue, is an allegiant participant political culture. As such, Almond and Verba (1963:6) defined civic culture as a 'pluralistic culture based on communication and persuasions, a culture of consensus and diversity, a culture that permitted change but moderated it'.

The purpose of *Civic Culture* was to measure the standards which constitute the civic culture of 'operating democratic systems' (Almond and Verba, 1963:11). By so doing, the authors believe that the cultural standards required for a stable democracy will be readily disseminated to newly emerging democracies of that time. In order to limit the study to the attitudes of the individuals, in the survey questionnaire, Almond and Verba avoided questions about the government, and instead presented questions enquiring 'about the individual's perception about government in relation to himself' (Almond and Verba, 1963:70).

With the intention of creating an environment of comparability, Almond and Verba (1963) placed respondents into the three categories of political culture (parochial, subject and participant). They maintained in addition, that, these three types of political culture can intermix and are not mutually exclusive. Moreover, the authors asserted that political cultures are not homogenous, therefore they were of the opinion that the combination between all these orientations 'lead to a balanced political culture' (Almond and Verba, 1963:32).

By gathering the data collected in the five nations regarding political culture, the authors were able to 'validate inferences…and develop independent measures that can be used to explain other phenomena'[2] (Almond and Verba, 1963:50). The authors hypothesised that a democratic system must have a political culture in place in which the citizens believe they possess the ability to influence government.

At the time of writing *Civic Culture* (1963), Almond and Verba had witnessed what Huntington (1991) calls the 'second wave of democracy'. As such, the authors witnessed the emergence of many new democracies. The authors recognised, however that there was more to democratic systems than mere structures and formal institutions. It was necessary that a political culture

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[2] It is to be noted that the survey findings and analyses of Almond and Verba's study are beyond the scope of this thesis. It is the theoretical claims, rather than the survey analysis that this study finds beneficial in the literature on civil society.

that supports democratic ideals emerge and this is the thread that binds this thesis to the authors' theory to a certain degree.

What is significant, therefore, is the fact that 'civic culture' requires a general belief in participation in civic duties, as well as acceptance of the authority of the state. A democratic system must have a political culture in which citizens believe they possess the ability to influence government. This is where CSOs come in, for they act as additional links between society and government, thus contributing towards a democracy.

1.3.2. The role of civil society

The literature is centred around the academic debate on the role of civil society in a democracy as well as the different schools of thought on the relationship between civil society and democracy.

The concept of civil society can be traced back to Adam Smith, George Wilhelm, Friedrich Hegel and Karl Marx, among others. These scholars conceptualised the state and civil society as two distinct and sometimes disagreeing bodies, with the latter autonomous from the state and based on economical interactions through instruments of the market (Baker, 2002; Wanyande, 1996). The Italian scholar Antonio Gramsci characterised civil society as 'the realm of culture and ideology, or more concretely, as the associational realm (made up of the church, trade unions, and so forth), through which the state under normal circumstances, perpetuates its hegemony or achieves consent' (quoted in Baker, 2002:6). Contemporary discussions on civil society now focus on non-class-based forms of collective action tied to the judicial, associational and public institutions of society (Cohen and Arato, 1992).

It is important to note that civil society is a highly contested concept. Social scientists have debated the merits and limitations of civil society since its early modern usage in the late seventeenth century in Western Europe (Cohen and Arato, 1992:84). Scottish moralists, for example, regard civil society as the foundation of ethics; a place where norms came from the people rather than from outside institutions such as the monarch or the church (Seligman, 2002:14). Subsequent theorists from Hume, to Hegel to Marx have critiqued this idealistic conception of civil society each for different reasons. Hume, for an example, disputed the notion of universalistic social norms, while Hegel maintained that civil society should be entrenched in institutions of the state, together with corporations (Seligman, 2002:14).

Taking a wide-ranging understanding of the concept, civil society welcomes a variety of actors, including, amongst others, NGOs, trade unions, churches, media, research institutions and think tanks, social movements, women's groups, environmental groups and human rights organisations (de Jager, 2006:106). The disagreement with regard to which roles civil society is required to meet is manifest in its many and diverging definitions.

The concept of civil society has surfaced in a breadth of literature spanning communitarianism, new social movements, social capital, associative democracy, and deliberative democracy. Its copious usage, according to Henriks (2002:3) has given civil society an unclear character as it is often used interchangeably with other concepts such as 'public sphere' and 'community'. Naturally, this terminological swamp makes travelling through the territories of civil society a difficult endeavour. It should therefore come as no surprise that sourcing an agreed upon definition is near impossible.

Civil society broadly refers to the formal and informal associations and networks in society, which exist outside the state. Some definitions limit civil society to the domain of voluntary association, encompassing everything from loose apolitical social networks to sporting clubs through to organised and politically motivated interest groups. Others go further and distinguish civil society from not just the state, but from the economy (Young, 2000:158). Civil society, as distinct from the state and the economy, '…include[s] all institutions and associational forms that require communicative interaction for their reproduction and that rely primarily on processes of social integration for coordinating action within their boundaries' (Cohen and Arato, 1992:429).

In contemporary discussions and according to de Jager (2006:107), there are three broad understandings of the roles of civil society. The first, which stemmed from the rise of anti-communist movements in Eastern Europe, views civil society as a source of state opposition (Seligman, 2002: 13-33). This position grew out of the experiences in both Eastern Europe and Latin America over the past two decades or so where grassroots groups acquired wide public impetus to oust repressive regimes (Havel, Klaus and Pithart, 1996:12). The second broad understanding of civil society came out of North America as a reaction to liberal individualism. In this context, the concept refers to the communal and associational spaces of social life, which, it is argued, are necessary for a well-functioning democracy (Putman, 1993). Scholars such as Muchie (2004:7), have further argued for the strength of civil society and have stood firm on the premise that the state is established in partnership as well as cooperative arrangements.

Continuing this line of thought, Habib (2003:228) takes the halfway point on the matter by acknowledging the plurality of civil society's social and political agendas, which in turn will be reflected in state-society relations. By inference, it is expected that some interactions between the state and civil society will be epitomised by cooperation, while others will be epitomised by tension and conflict.

1.3.3. Civil society and democracy

With regard to democracy, civil society is by and large regarded as a positive force for the deepening of democracy. However, the reasons for why this is the case, vary significantly across theories of politics. Classical liberals such as Locke and Hume broadly take the position that civil society is 'good' for democracy because it makes it possible for independent individuals to move freely between voluntary associations, consequently providing a counterbalance to the powers of the state (Scalet and Schmidtz, 2002:26). Modern liberals, however, are more sceptical of civil society's potential for democracy. They caution against the anti-liberal, anti-market and potentially anti-democratic tendencies of the more communitarian advocates of civil society (Henriks, 2002:5).

However, communitarians such as Amitai Etzoni and Michael Sandel argue that civil society is positive for democracy because it provides a site where communities, not self-interested individuals or the state, co-determine their own destinies (Etzioni, 1995). Along similar lines, neo-Tocquevilleans argue that civil society is the site where citizens are 'schooled' in democracy. For example, Robert Putnam (1993:65) claims that civic virtues such as trust and reciprocity are fostered by the activities of largely apolitical associations, which cut across social cleavages.

Prominent scholars that are acclaimed in the study of civil society and its relation to democracy are Samuel Huntington, Larry Diamond, Robert Putman, Linz and Lipset to mention but a few. Diamond and Putman for instance have placed emphasis on a collegial culture to make democracy work. They have argued for the strong relation between the independent, local-based, citizen groups and democracy. The higher the number of associations in a country, the higher the likelihood that, democratic institutions will improve, as Diamond and Putman maintain (Diamond, 1996 and Putman, 1993). They assert, therefore that efforts should be made to fortify such groups to bring democratic transition where there is none and consolidate democracy

where there is already an existing one. Efforts to bring forth democracy through civil society and civic engagement is said to bring changes in three ways, (a) changes at the micro social level will produce macro-political results, (b) in a society, disposition and practices shaped in one association will have spill-over effects in other circumstances and (c) the same associational structures will operate in similar ways in different socio-historical contexts (Armony, 2004:7). The idea that a strong civil society fosters democracy, holds the state in check, and in turn contributes to development (Howell and Pearce 2001: 40), has influenced information of donor policies on good governance and greater cooperation with NGOs.

Diamond (1996) has underscored civil society as key for the development and preservation of secure democracy in developing countries. Diamond (1992:6-12) has mentioned several functions of civil society in consolidating democracy and particularly for developing countries: check and balance the power of the state, ensure pluralism, increasing political participation, teach democratic norms, recruit and train new political leaders and resist authoritarian rules. For all these functions civil society requires a democratic environment where the market needs to be stable as well as the other state institutions to be well institutionalised. Diamond has pointed out conditions for civil society groups. They must have democratic goals as well as internal democracy, organisational institutionalisation, pluralism without fragmentation and so forth (Diamond, 1996:212, 1999).

Moreover, Diamond maintains that civil society performs a fundamental role in checking, monitoring, and bringing under control the exercise of state power, and in holding the state accountable and responsive to the people (Diamond 1999: 239). Linz and Stepan (1996:17) on the other hand write about the necessary conditions under which democracy can survive and function, and among others, these two scholars call to attention the importance of a vibrant civil society and argue that conditions must exist for the development of a free and lively civil society.

1.3.4. Civil Society in South Africa

Civil society in South Africa historically is widely recognised for its contribution in ending apartheid. It is to be noted however that there are multiple factors besides domestic pressures that played a role in ending apartheid, and international factors such as political isolation, sanctions, and so forth cannot be overlooked. However the scope and focus of this research does not look beyond the domestic factors. In South Africa extensive mobilisation was a source

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of pressure for democratic change. Therefore, its importance needs to be understood when looking at the various ways in which it can work for democracy today. As Habib (2005) explains, there is a need to reflect upon the characteristics of civil society that are most likely to assist the development and consolidation of democracy.

Under apartheid, civil society was vibrant and strong and it was one sector that the apartheid government could not fully repress. As the 1970s drew near, anti-apartheid NGOs like the unions and the array of organisations associated with the anti-Black Consciousness Movement (BCM) began to make their presence felt (Marx, 1992). In the 1980s and the early 1990s, the apartheid movement, internally led by the United Democratic Front (UDF), sought to bring down the apartheid regime and replace it with a democratic government. At the same time, many other concerns were raised by membership organisations, including working conditions, environmental degradation, urban services, agricultural productivity, HIV/Aids awareness, liberation ideology, people's education, school curriculum and so on. These revealed the variety of matters of interest to civil society organisations, communities and activists, who were deeply politicised but whose concerns extended beyond the issue of state power (Greenstein, 2003:3). The ability to speak out about a number of disparate local concerns into a global anti-apartheid movement was the strongest asset for civil society groups, because it allowed civil society to present a united front against the apartheid regime (Greenstein, 2003:3).

According to Heinrich (2001) under the apartheid regime, four different types of NGOs existed. Organisations closely linked with and supporting the anti-apartheid movement; liberal NGOs advocating changes in apartheid policy from within the political system; NGOs focusing on social service delivery while trying to stay non-aligned with regard to the political arrangement; and lastly there were large welfare bodies co-operating with the apartheid regime on the racially segregated social services. The anti-apartheid NGOs were positively influenced by the struggle for non-racial democracy, placing a premium of importance on the inclusion of all relevant stakeholders.

Presently, civil society fulfils the three possible state-society relations[3]: partnerships, adversarial, and a combination of both. Alliance partners sometimes make concessions to the

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[3] It is to be noted that some civil society organisations, such as community-based organisations (CBOs) have no interaction with the government.

reality of limited capacity of the state to transform society and control the economy under conditions of globalisation (Habib, 2005:674). They frequently mention the need to involve popular forces in the process of governance and invoke the notion of partnerships with civil society and the private sector (Greenstein, 2003:4). However, organisations in civil society also act as the opposition in government because of the weak opposition in Parliament, and at times compensates for the lack of a strong political opposition. The significance of civil society is therefore two-fold in a democratic process, as seen in South Africa.

It needs to be noted that in facilitating the deepening of democracy, it is indeed the very existence and plurality of civil society, and its diversity of state-civil society engagements, that is beneficial for democracy.

1.4. Rationale of the study

Civil society is a distinguishing feature of democratic regimes. Democratic governments are expected to be responsive to the wishes of the people, and civil society is one way in which people can make their wishes known. Like political parties, civil society facilitates participation and is therefore a second link between citizens and government in democratic states (Sadie, 2007:217). As previously argued, civil society not only strengthens representation and broadens the scope of political participation; it also checks government power and promotes debate and discussion. In addition, along the lines of keeping government in check and accountable, Schlemmer (2005:8), highlights two varieties of accountability: vertical and horizontal accountability. Vertical accountability, government accountability to voters, is obviously weakened by the political comfort zone of easy electoral victories of the African National Congress (ANC). Horizontal accountability is the accountability of government to the independent monitoring and watchdog institutions that are part of a constitutional democracy. According to Fox (2000:1) civil society therefore influences horizontal accountability in two main ways: directly, by encouraging the creation and empowerment of institutional checks and balances, and indirectly, by strengthening the institutions of vertical accountability that underpin them, such as electoral democracy and an independent media.

The decision to embark on this study therefore has its roots in the fact that civil society is an important feature in democracy in South Africa, even more so, seeing as though the ruling party, the ANC has overwhelming political power resulting in a dominant party system. This

undeniably poses a potential threat to the competitiveness of the multiparty system, accountability and the authority of the Constitution (Sadie, 2007:9). Scholars such as Welsh (1994:205) have gone as far as to say that dominant-party systems damage democracy because it may limit the accountability and responsiveness that is created through the key threat of the ballot box. An extended period of power can therefore engender complacency, arrogance and even corruption in a dominant party system. It is clear therefore that in the absence of a strong opposition party, a robust civil society is not only necessary, but mandatory.

Lastly, the relevance of the study is to assist in the evaluation of the role that civil society has played in shaping South Africa's young democracy and what it will mean for democracy if civil society organisations are to breakdown and shutdown. This is of importance in any democracy; however it is particularly important in a democracy such as South Africa that is young, fragile, and where issues of consolidating its democracy are so critical, coupled with a dominant party system. In addition this study is significant in that it examines two prominent NGOs that have been significant historically as well as in the new dispensation. It is significant to consider what it means for the smaller and less prominent NGOs, if the 'big guys' are suffering.

1.5. Problem statement

In light of the role of civil society in deepening democracy, NGOs, as a type of civil society organisations may be beginning to experience the negative effects of the global financial crisis in South Africa. This research therefore seeks to explore the influence of the global financial crisis and other challenges on South Africa's NGO's, with a particular focus on the following NGOs: Idasa and the TAC.

1.6. Research question and main proposition:

The overarching question guiding this study is: what are the challenges facing civil society groups in South Africa, with a focus on the global financial crisis? Therefore, this study will be asking a secondary question: has the global financial crisis influenced democracy in South Africa? Civil society groups are an integral part of our democracy, thus what does the demise of civil society organisations, due to a lack of funding, mean for participatory, representative and accountable democracy?

1.7. Research design:

The study is explorative in nature and relies on qualitative data with the design type being the use of case studies. Case studies according to Mouton (2004:149) are usually qualitative in nature and aim to provide an in-depth description of a small number of cases (less than fifty). The utilisation of case studies offers some strength in research. These strengths according to Mouton include high construct validity, in-depth insights as well as establishing connections and relationships with research subjects.

The two case studies are Idasa and the TAC. These NGOs are selected because each illustrates a distinct mode of engagement with the South African state. These organisations have emerged as very strong and vociferous organisations attempting to change the social landscape and influence the state. The Black Sash, which was included in the article that highlighted the need to embark on this research, has been excluded as research has revealed that the Black Sash is not very active any longer; it was most active pre-1994.

1.8. Research methodology:

1.8.1. Data Collection

The data was collected by means of in-depth individual interviewing of key informants in the two selected NGOs. The in-depth individual interview is one of the most frequently used methods of data gathering within the qualitative approach. It differs from most other interviews in that it is an open interview which allows the object of study to speak for it/him/herself rather than to provide a respondent with a battery of the interviewer's own predetermined, hypothesis-based questions (Babbie and Mouton, 2008:289). According to Herbert and Irene Rubin (1995), qualitative interviewing design is characterised by being 'flexible, iterative, and continuous, rather than prepared in advance and locked in stone' (Rubin and Rubin, 1995:46). The study is therefore empirical.

In essence, the qualitative data was acquired through individual in-depth interviews with the two NGOs, as well as reviewing secondary data, namely, academic journals, books, government publications, working papers, speeches, newspapers, NGO papers and relevant sources for the theoretical underpinnings of the study. The study thus, employs secondary data analysis as well as primary data analysis through interviews.

The literature examined in chapter one and two, as the desktop part of the study prepared the ground for the empirical part when knowledge was generated through interviews with key informants.

1.8.2. Unit of analysis and variable selection

The unit of analysis in this study is NGOs as a part of civil society organisations in South Africa; particularly looking at Idasa as well as the TAC. The dependent variable in this study is South Africa's NGOs and the independent variable that is used is resources, the focus being on financial resources.

Idasa is an independent public interest organisation that is committed to building sustainable democratic societies in partnership with African and international partners. It is a registered Section 21 company in South Africa. Idasa runs democracy and governance programs in more than 20 countries in Africa, its programs focusing on building democratic societies across the African continent. Idasa's work focuses not only on elections, but also pays particular attention to what happens between elections. Whilst free and fair elections are important to any democratic state, Idasa targets its programs to build up the capacity of civil society, encourage the transparency and accountability of governments, and create active citizens (Idasa, 2012).

The TAC is a leading advocacy group for people living with HIV/Aids. It was founded by the HIV-positive activist Zackie Achmat in 1998. The TAC is rooted in the experiences, direct action tactics and anti-apartheid background of its founder. The TAC has been credited for compelling the reluctant government of former South African President Thabo Mbeki to begin making antiretroviral drugs available to South Africans. The TAC advocates for increased access to treatment, care and support services for people living with HIV, and for the carrying out of the country's National Strategic Plan on HIV and Aids (TAC, 2012).

Although there are similarities between Idasa and the TAC, the key difference between the two case studies is that Idasa does not receive any membership fees because it is a non-membership NGO. The TAC does receive minute membership fees, but this does not form the basis of its income because the majority of the members are young, unemployed women, the great majority of whom do not pay their membership fees.

1.8.3. Conceptualisation and operationalisation of civil society and democracy

It is important to get an understanding and clarification about the different concepts that will be used in this study, moreover, defining key concepts will help draw meaningful conclusions about them.

Civil society: Civil society is a highly contested term and there is no scholarly consensus on its definition. Nonetheless, in this study, civil society will be defined as the formal and informal associations and networks in society, which exist outside the state, for example, NGOs, trade unions, churches, media, research institutions and think tanks, women's groups, environmental groups and human rights organisations. This definition does not include markets and it is of importance to note that civil society is different to society, that is the general populace, and also differs from political society, which includes political parties.

In addition, the distinction between civic society and civil society will be made. Civic society refers the 'local state' where citizens participate in for instance local health boards, schools, community councils, planning partnerships and all the other mechanisms ultimately under the direction of the state. Civil society on the other hand refers to 'voluntary action' undertaken by citizens not under the direction of any authority exercising the power of the state (Keane, 2008:2).

Civil society can be measured in terms of Heywood's framework; how interest groups exert influence. According to Heywood (2007:304), the success of interest group influence is a complex issue. Not only is their efficiency often determined by a number of factors beyond their control, but their successes or effectiveness is also tied to their strategies, tactics and roles. Similarly, Heywood adds, the nature of the group and the resources at its disposal are crucial determining factors of its political strategy. The resources include the following:

1. public sympathy for the group and its goals
2. the size of its membership or activist base
3. its financial strength and organisational capabilities
4. its ability to use sanctions that some way inconvenience or disrupt governance
5. personal or institutional links it may have to political parties or governance bodies.

Public sympathy can therefore be understood as those outside of the organisation understanding the organisation's circumstances as their own. In other words, it is the case

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whereby the public views the cause or interest of the organisation as worthy and reasonable. This is a resource that Heywood (2007) deems necessary for CSO's to exert their influence. With regards to the second resource, size of membership, Heywood understands the size of a group's membership to be instrumental in exerting influence. 'There is size in numbers' would be an appropriate reference in underscoring the importance of this resource. The third resource, financial resources are deemed important by Heywood. Adequate financial resources refer to the state where an organisation is in a position of financial adequacy; meaning that the organisation has enough money to meet all its requirements. For the day-to-day running of an organisation, the costs of programmes and so forth, financial resources prove to be a resource that is important. Pertaining to the fourth resource, litigation and lobbying are regarded as some of the avenues to explore in an attempt to use sanctions that in some way inconvenience or disrupt governance. Lastly, personal or institutional links groups may have to political parties or governance bodies: Heywood deems engagement in political society, through links to political parties or representation in parliament, can offer distinct advantages and potential influence for CSOs.

Other factors unique to South Africa such as the loss of anti-apartheid activists to government and business are explored.

The operationalisation of civil society is centred on these resources with a particular focus on the financial resources, through international as well as domestic donor funding.

Democracy: Although democracy is a highly contested concept with no scholarly consensus, for the purposes of this study, at the most rudimentary level, the term can simply be understood as a system of 'government of the people, by the people, and for the people' (Lincoln, 1863)[4]. Its tenets include, but are not limited to:

   i.   A political system for choosing and replacing the government through free and fair elections.

   ii.   The active participation of the individuals, as citizens, in politics and civil life.

   iii. Protection of the human rights of all citizens.

   iv.   A rule of law, in which the laws and procedures apply equally to all citizens.

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[4] The Gettysburg Address is a speech by former U.S. President Abraham Lincoln (1863).

Whilst some scholars understand democracy in procedural terms[5], as electoral competition and decision-making, others view it in terms of substantive elements such as the distribution of power and resources within society[6]. Nevertheless, the central question to ask is; how do citizens exercise control and scrutiny over political institutions? Therefore, this study chooses to understand democracy through Dahl's (1971) concept of 'polyarchy'. While there is no scholarly consensus on the concept of democracy, (Gallie, 1956) asserts that Dahl's (1971) conception of polyarchy is gaining recognition. The concept was initially coined in Dahl and Lindblom's book (1953), but was developed most fully in Dahl (1971). Polyarchy is defined as the set of institutional arrangements that permit public opposition and establishes the right to participate in politics (Dahl, 1971). In these two respects: public contestation and inclusiveness, polyarchy fortifies democracy (Coppedge and Reinicke, 1990).

In essence, the democratic ideal for Dahl is polyarchy and the scale or criteria of polyarchy measures the degree to which national political systems meet the minimum requirements for political democracy, where real-world 'democracies' rather than abstract ideals are the standard (Dahl, 1971).

As formulated in *Polyarchy* (Dahl 1971: 3), the following minimum requirements for political democracy are presented: [7]

1. Freedom to form and join organisations
2. Freedom of expression
3. The right to vote
4. Eligibility for public office
5. The right of political leaders to compete for support
6. Alternative sources of information
7. Free and fair elections
8. Institutions for making government policies depend on votes and other expressions of preference.

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[5] See Fukuyama, 1992; Schumpeter, 1942; Przeworski, 1991; Huntington, 1989; O'Donnell and Schmitter, 1986, Linz and Stepan, 1996.

[6] See Diamond, 1992; Schmitter, 1991; Merkel, 2004.

[7] Dahl (1971) offers these guarantees as necessary, (though not sufficient) conditions for democracy.

The term polyarchy is useful for steering around the avenues and significant tenets of participatory and representative democracy in terms of civil society's active involvement in democracy, which forms the central point of this study.

1.8.4. Limitations and delimitations of the study

This study is explorative and the main shortcoming of explorative studies is that they seldom provide satisfactory answers to research questions, though they can hint at the answers and can give insight into the research methods that could provide definitive answers. The reason exploratory studies are seldom definitive in themselves has to do with representativeness (Babbie and Mouton, 2008:80). Representativeness means 'that quality of a sample of having the same distribution of characteristics as the population from which it was selected. By implication descriptions and explanations derived from an analysis of the sample may be assumed to represent similar ones in the population' (Babbie and Mouton, 2008:647). In addition the use of case studies offers its limitations, such as a lack of generalisability of results as well as non-standardisation of measurement. Also the data collection and analysis can be very time-consuming (Mouton, 2004:150). Nevertheless, this research is still worthwhile. As outlined by Du Plooy (2001) and Yin (1994), the main advantage of a case study research lies in the specific details and holistic understanding researchers gain from a particular case. It can thus be regarded as a robust research method particularly when a holistic, in-depth study is required. Case studies can be a practical and applied method when a large sample population is difficult to obtain. Case studies present data of real-life situations and they provide better insights into the detailed occurrences of the subjects of interest (Yin, 2004). In addition, Du Plooy (2001) and Yin (1994) assert that case studies can achieve maximum understanding when used in combination with theory. In this study theory plays a critical role in defining the research question and research aims. Theory forms the groundwork for the study.

This study analyses the same cases over the same period, 2008 to 2012. In particular the beginning of the global financial crisis and when its consequences were experienced and have possibly influenced the civil society groups in South Africa, with a particular focus on Idasa and the TAC.

1.9. Chapter outline

Figure 1: Outline of the Study

Chapter 2: This chapter presents the theories of group politics and provides an overview of civil society in South Africa and its contributions to deepening democracy.

Chapter 3: This chapter reports on the findings from the interviews with the key informant from Idasa. In addition, Heywood's (2007) criteria are applied to this case.

Chapter 4: This chapter reports on the findings from the interviews with the key informant from the TAC. In addition, Heywood's (2007) criteria are applied to this case.

Chapter 5: This chapter provides an evaluation and summary of the key findings that address the research question posed in chapter one and draws conclusions.

CHAPTER 2:

OVERVIEW OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN SOUTH AFRICA AND ITS CONTRIBUTION TO DEEPENING DEMOCRACY

2.1. Introduction

This chapter starts by examining civil society and theories of group politics. This is done by launching a discussion of two key theories of group politics so as to establish the foundation of the overview of civil society. This chapter then provides the history of the South African civil society, dating back to apartheid times and the influence of the civil society sector towards ending the discriminatory system. Thirdly, an analysis will be made of civil society organisations that have emerged post-apartheid, with a particular focus on those organisations that have contributed in bolstering democracy in South Africa by making use of the wide array of modes of engagement available at their disposal. Fourthly, this chapter looks into the current state of affairs of civil society in South Africa. Lastly, an investigation is done of the political tool, generally known as 'democracy assistance' used by the global North in the South. Particular attention is placed on the boom and decline in donor funding of democracy assistance in South Africa.

2.2. Civil society: Conceptualisation and theory

2.2.1. Civil Society Defined

Civil society is a highly contested term and there is no scholarly consensus on its definition. Nonetheless, as stated in the preceding chapter, in this study (as borrowed from de Jager, 2006) civil society is defined as the formal and informal associations and networks in society, which exist outside the state, for example, Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), trade unions, churches, media, research institutions and think tanks, women's groups, environmental groups and human rights organisations. This definition does not include markets, because markets refer to the economic society. It is of importance to note that civil society is different to society that is the general populace and political society, which includes political parties and where most of the political agenda is set.

Pertaining to NGOs, which are the focus of this study, it is important to clarify its meaning. The Oxford Dictionary of Politics defines an NGO as an 'organisation which is not established by a governmental entity or international agreement' (Oxford, 1999:370). It is also important to note

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two crucial matters in this regard: the first is that civil society is a broad term and that NGO's form part of civil society. The second matter to note is that NGOs are recognised by some scholars such as Heywood (2007) and Sadie (2007) as interest groups. These terms are used interchangeably in this study. What is of significance is the fact that the term NGO and interest group point to the same thing. For example, the Oxford Dictionary of Politics (2009:264) defines interest groups as 'organisations seeking to advance a particular sectional interest or cause, while not seeking to form a government or part of a government'. Sadie (2007:218) defines interest groups as 'any group of people with shared attitudes and goals that try either spontaneously or consciously to protect or promote their interests by influencing the governmental decision-making process in order to realise those goals'.

2.2.2. Theories of group politics: Pluralism and Corporatism

The study of organised groups has been integrated into wider analyses of the distribution of power and the nature of the state. Two of the leading approaches with regard to the distribution of power in modern political systems are pluralism and corporatism (Sadie, 2007:219). A discussion on group politics is necessary for it brings to light civil society's wide variations in form and character. In addition, it is important in that it underscores the various roles of CSOs in their relationship to the state.

According to Dryzek and Dunleavy (2009:35), pluralism is a belief in many (plural) ways of life, many approaches to knowledge and numerous centres of power in society, committed to modest, healthy competition. The conditions are believed to be best achieved under liberal democracy. From an intellectual stance, pluralism is opposed to any form of 'monism'[12] in political and social thinking.

As a normative theory, pluralism places emphasis on the beneficial outcomes of social and cultural diversity, of having many different institutions, values, groups and ways of life. It also promotes constitutional methods of embracing different perspectives on public policy matters. As an explanatory theory of politics, pluralism shows how policy is made in interactions across diverse actors and institutions. Thus liberal democracies are described as polyarchies with multiple centres of power, meaning government by the many, and not the few. This effect is

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[12] Those belief systems that conform to a single philosophical idea or over-arching value, a single theory of history or evolutionary trajectory, a single culture or way of life, a single religion or sacred book, or single centre of government.

realised primarily by the interest group process, competitive elections that can only be won by organising alliances of minority views, as well as representative government (Dryzek and Dunleavy, 2009:35).

Heywood (2007:219) echoes Dryzek and Dunleavy in his explanation of pluralism, for he maintains that pluralist theories put forward the most positive representation of group politics, in that fundamentally they argue that power is widely and evenly dispersed in society. Decisions are made by means of an intricate process of bargaining and interaction that makes sure that the viewpoints and interests of a large number of groups are taken into consideration.

Pluralists accentuate the ability of groups to both defend the individual from government and uphold democratic responsiveness (Sadie, 2007:219 and Heywood, 2007:297). In addition, pluralists place particular importance on the role of groups in liberal democracies, stating the outcome of many political conflicts provides wider avenues for political participation and ensures a wider distribution of power as stated above. Pluralism can therefore be defined as wide-ranging participation in the political process by means of competition between independent groups and competing viewpoints. Although groups are not always successful in influencing decisions, each group, whatever it demands, has equal access to the political resources required for success (Sadie, 2007:219). In terms of civil society, this translates into a variety of relationships between the state and civil society; conflictual, collaborative, a variety of both collaborative and conflictual or a non-engaging relationship.

The second theory of group politics, corporatism, differs from pluralism in that it attempts to locate the implications of the closer links that have developed in industrialised societies between groups and states (Heywood, 2007:299; Sadie, 2007:219).

Corporatism is a social theory that points out the incorporation of certain of society's groups into the decision-making process. The state benefits from the cooperation and expertise of groups such as business and labour in the implementation of policy decisions (Sadie, 2007:219). Concomitantly, the groups gain from having to share in political power (Schmitter, 1974 and Lehmbruch, 1979 in Sadie, 2007:219). The emphasis is on the functional representation of certain groups in the policy-making process. In turn for giving certain groups easier access to this process, the state gains greater social control (Panitch, 1980:173 in Sadie, 2007:219).

Critics of corporatism have argued that corporatism perpetually privileges economic or functional groups, because it produces a form of tripartism that binds government to business and organised labour. However, it may leave consumer or promotional groups out in the cold, and institutionalised access is likely to be restricted to so-called 'peak' associations that speak on behalf of a range of organisations and groups. Secondly, in contrast to pluralism, corporatism depicts groups as hierarchically ordered and dictated by leaders who are not directly answerable to members. Indeed, it is argued that the price that group leaders pay for privileged access to government is a willingness to deliver the compliance of their members. From this point of view, 'government by consultation' may merely be a pretence covering up the fact that corporatism acts as a mechanism of social control. Thirdly, a concern that has been articulated is about the threat that corporatism poses for representative democracy. While pluralism suggests that group politics adds to the representative process, it is argued that corporatism generates the image of decisions being made outside the reach of democratic control and through a process of bargaining in no way subject to public scrutiny. Finally, corporatism has been linked to the problem of government 'overload', in which government may effectively be 'captured' by consulted groups and thus be unable to resist their demand (Heywood, 2007:299-300).

Therefore, the variety of relationships between the state and civil society differ quite significantly, and can be distinguished into three sets. There are a set of informal community based organisations (CBOs), mainly in marginalised communities, who have no relationship with the state on the one hand. On the other end of the spectrum, there are a variety of more formal CSOs, which oppose the government. Though these organisations also engage with the state, their relations with the government tend to take on an adversarial tone. Finally, the third group is a set of more formal NGOs, which have joined in partnerships with the state. These organisations have more collegiate interactions with the state. Nevertheless, CSOs are not restricted in the three categories mentioned for there are no permanent friends or enemies for CSOs, but permanent interest. It is that interest therefore that dictates the relationship with the state in a given time.

As argued by Sadie (2007:219), in liberal democracies, South Africa being no exception, one cannot argue that either pluralism or corporatism prevails. Often elements of both can be traced,

depending on the policy area and the issue. One issue may reflect corporatist tendencies, while pluralism is evident in another.

2.3. Civil society in South Africa

2.3.1. Civil society in Apartheid South Africa

According to Habib (2003:3), there are two distinct phases in the evolution of contemporary civil society in South Africa. Before Habib identifies these, however, he maintains that it may be useful to note that contemporary civil society is distinguished by the fact that it not only mirrors the demographic realities of South African society, but also goes beyond the racialised form of the adversarial-collaborative dichotomy that characterised civil society relations with the state in earlier times. In any case, the first phase, the diverse racial profile of contemporary civil society has its roots in the 1980s when there was a growth in associational life in this country. Indeed, the distinctive characteristic of this period is not only the longitudinal growth of the sector, but the formal emergence, or at least the coming out in the political realm of a significant part of it, namely black civil society actors who had up until then been either banned or prohibited from working in the public sphere (Habib, 2003:3).

The second phase as argued by Habib dates back to the early 1990s when the nature and operations of a considerable part of the civil society, once again anti-apartheid civil society actors, changed as a result of new opportunities and challenges. Both phases of course coincide with important moments in the evolution of the political system: the first with the liberalisation phase, and the second with the democratisation phase of the transition[13] (Schmitter and O'Donell, 1986). Civil society has therefore influenced and been shaped by the political transition in South Africa.

According to Habib, before liberalisation in the early 1980s, the overriding element in civil society was organisations and institutions that were either pro-apartheid and/or pro-business. Agencies critical of the state and the socio-economic system were either actively suppressed or marginalised from the formal political process. The major political contest within civil society

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[13] This follows O'Donnell and Schmitter's four-volume study on the subject. It has become customary in the literature to separate democratic transitions into these two distinct phases. Liberalisation refers to the moment when authoritarian leaders open up the political system, whereas democratisation is the time in which representative political systems become institutionalised.

seemed to be between pro-apartheid institutions like the Broederbond and N.G. Kerk, and liberal oriented organisations such as the Institute of Race Relations and the National Union of South African Students (NUSAS) (Habib, 2003:4). It is to be noted however that some of the leaders of NUSAS were relatively radical and anti-business from very early on. Nevertheless, the majority of the organisation tended to stay largely liberal in orientation until at least the late 1970s and early 1980s. To be sure, as the 1970s drew nearer, anti-apartheid civil society organisations like the unions and the wide range of organisations linked with the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM) began to make their presence felt (Marx, 1992).

In the 1980s the anti-apartheid elements within civil society re-emerged after much repression from the state, and within a few years became the major element within the sector. Two events buttressed this growth in anti-apartheid civil society organisations. The first was the liberalisation of the political system given by the P.W. Botha regime in the early 1980s. This included reform of the more crude aspects of Grand Apartheid[14], the attempted political co-optation of some sections of the disenfranchised communities, and allowing the emergence of some civic activity within, and representation of, the black population (Louw, 2004:131; Habib, 2003:86).

In any case, the reform of the political system in the early 1980s did in fact allow the re-emergence of anti-apartheid civil society. The Soweto uprising on 16 June 1976[15] and the more wide-ranging union action during the 1970s gave rise to a struggle between reformers and Conservatists within the core of the state (Habib, 2003:4). The formers wanted to alter apartheid, and make it better suited to the modernising requirements of the economy, and appoint some constituents of the black population by giving them a 'share' in the system. The latter wanted a recommitment to the traditional plan of 'Grand Apartheid' (Louw, 2004:87). The triumph of P.W. Botha and his reformist alliance in the leadership succession debate of the National Party (NP) and thereby the South African State in the late 1970s created the

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[14] Grand Apartheid refers to a form of apartheid, which involved comprehensive racial segregation and measures such as the removal of black people from white areas and the establishment of black homelands.

[15] High school student-led protests in Soweto township, outside Johannesburg. South African students from numerous schools began to protest in the streets of Soweto, in response to the introduction of Afrikaans as the medium of instruction in local schools as well as a general lack of funding and resources in 'Black schools'. Police responded with teargas and live bullets. The official death toll was 23, but it could have been higher than 200 because the incident triggered widespread violence throughout South Africa, which claimed more lives.

opportunity for the spread of the reformist project (Sparks, 1990). A chain of institutional reforms followed; a major component of which included the recognition and legalisation of independent black unions and the founding of a political space that allowed the re-emergence of anti-apartheid civil society. In addition, the state presented the rationale for mobilising this sector by offering a reform that tried to include some, and marginalise other elements of the Black community. Anti-apartheid civil society was therefore allowed by and given the rationale for mobilisation by the state's liberalisation initiative (Fine, 1992:78; Louw, 2004:87).

Certainly, not this entire scenario was positive. In fact, very soon into the reform program the state began to actively repress elements within the anti-apartheid camp. But despite this repression, which became relatively severe under the state of emergency, the anti-apartheid civil society retained its popular legitimacy. This enabled it to re-emerge very quickly when De Klerk took over the leadership and replaced P.W. Botha as President, and reintroduced and even extended, the state's liberalisation initiative. The ultimate result was that by the 1990s the anti-apartheid camp had become the dominant element in the civil society sphere (Habib, 2003:5).

The second development facilitating the re-emergence of anti-apartheid civil society according to Hearn (1998), was the increasing availability of resources to non-profit actors in South Africa. Two types of resources are crucial in this regard. The first, human resources, increasingly became available in the early 1980s as university students and graduates politicised by the activities of the 1970s, and political prisoners, many of whom were released in the early 1980s, came together in a myriad of ways to not only organise community and political activities but to also establish non-profit institutions to support these mass struggles. The second, fiscal resources initially emerged from private foundations and foreign governments who were moved to act largely due to the fact that the 16 June 1976 revolt and its consequences made its way to the television screens in the advanced industrialised world. The increasing tempo of struggle within the country, however, also gradually compelled local actors, particularly corporates and churches to begin to back anti-apartheid non-profit activity in South Africa (Stacey and Aksartova, 2001). This rising availability of resources, both from foreign and domestic sources, then, set-up the second building block that facilitated the re-emergence and expansion of anti-apartheid civil society in South Africa.

A point that needs to be underscored in the history of the emergence of contemporary civil society is that, despite the fact that the anti-apartheid civil society was born within the womb of the state's reform program, state-civil society relations tended to take an adversarial form throughout the 1980s. This is because the liberalisation initiative was not democratic. Indeed, like all liberalisation initiatives in transitional societies, it must be conceptualised in relative terms. Thus, anti-apartheid civil society maintained its distance from, and was treated with wariness by, what was still an apartheid state. The legal environment, including the tax regime, while allowing anti-apartheid NGOs and Community Based Organisations (CBOs) to emerge, was nonetheless still antagonistic to their operations. Similarly, the political and security environment remained repressive and became even more so after the State of Emergencies were announced in 1985 and 1986. This antagonistic environment, then, made sure that state-civil society relations took an adversarial form in the first decade of the anti-apartheid civil society organisations. This was to change only in the middle of the second decade when South Africa entered the democratisation phase of its political transition (Fine, 1992:78-79; Kabemba, 2005:2).

2.3.2. Civil society in the transition to democracy in South Africa

The rise of civil society in South Africa is connected with the anti-apartheid struggle whose primary goal was to remove power from a racially prejudiced, oppressive, and illegitimate minority regime; and a number of studies[16] have investigated this phenomenon. This is not to say that there were no CSOs prior to this, or that CSOs were only limited to those in opposition to apartheid. Afrikaans churches and trade unions were very active as well. The Rand Revolt/Rebellion of 1922 bears testimony to this reality.[17]

The rise of civil society, or what O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986:27-28, 48-56) term the 'resurrection of civil society' and which they define as generalised politicisation and popular activation, became increasingly important during this phase in challenging the authoritarian regime of South Africa. Therefore, it is of particular importance to pay some attention to the position and role of civil society in South Africa during the liberalisation phase of transition, specifically, with regard to the political dispensation and the resistance to the regime by mass mobilisation.

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[16] See Friedman, 1991; Noyoo, 2000; O'Donnell and Schmitter, 1986.
[17] See Alexander, 1999

The significance of civil society in a transition to democracy in terms of O'Donnell and Schmitter's analysis (1986:48, 50), is that civil society necessitates the breaking down of the normative and intellectual base of a regime (Adam and Moodley, 1993:31). Challenges from below, which give effect to perpetual conflicts in the socio-political realm of authoritarian regimes, have often contributed to or determined the pace of transition. This makes a reversion to authoritarian rule at the peak of popular mobilisation arduous. Those resisting change (hardliners) begin to realise that a return to repression will be exceptionally costly (O'Donnell and Schmitter, 1986:27; Stepan, 1990:46). Huntington (1991:108-109) also maintains that some form of mass mobilisation intensifies the pressure on the authoritarian incumbents, and raises the costs of repression (Gillespie, 1990:57).

Of particular importance in the liberalisation phase is the criticism that began to emerge from the government's traditional religious support base, namely the Dutch Reformed Churches. In 1986 the Dutch Reformed Church (NGK) to which two-thirds of Afrikaners and ninety per cent of cabinet members belonged, adopted a document called, 'Church and Society,' in which apartheid was declared a mistake, racism condemned as a sin, the withholding of political rights regarded as an affront to human dignity, and the authorities asked to pay 'on-going and sympathetic attention' to regulations which people found offensive. By an overwhelming majority, the NGK voted in favour of opening the church to all races (Guise, 1993:57). This constituted an important step in the 'corrosion of the normative and intellectual basis of the regime' (O'Donnell and Schmitter, 1986:48, 50; Adam and Moodley, 1993:31).

Trade unions, in turn, affirmed their role and place within civil society after changes were made to the laws governing labour and thus positioned themselves as important players in the process of democratisation. In a comparative study of Southern Europe and Latin America, Valenzuela (1989) asserts that labour movements occupied a special place during the transition from authoritarianism, particularly because the organised network of the labour movement gives it greater capacity for effective and extensive mass mobilisation at critical moments than other social groups. The labour movement in South Africa occupied a similar place as that of its counterparts in the two countries mentioned above. Valenzuela (1989:446-467) posits that South African trade unions possessed 'a widespread base and the ability to interfere with the economy', and therefore he regards it as the antagonism that posed the greatest threat to the apartheid regime.

In South Africa, economic growth and industrialisation led to a rise in the number of semi-skilled workers to the point where they provided an organisational basis for trade unions. The growth of trade unions during this phase was facilitated by the labour relations reforms, which resulted from the Wiehahn recommendations of 1977-1979[18] (Webster, 1991:50). These labour law reforms for the first time, allowed the formal recognition of trade unions for blacks within the official industrial relations system in South Africa. This provided an important boost to civil society. Trade unions had a strong base at the lowest structures with strong shop-floor structures that could be used, as argued by Valenzuela, to mobilise the labour force against the state. Furthermore, trade unions developed close links with civil organisations in the black townships (Webster, 1991:54-55).

The unions focussed on important industries with large workforces. They met with particular success at multinational corporations that were susceptible to international pressure and especially the metal, textile, and chemical industries. These were soon connected into a trade union centre, which grew through mergers and further organisation in 1979 into a national trade union body, namely the Federation of South African Trade Unions (FOSATU). With 45 000 members (Karis and Gerhart, 1997:217; Marx, 1992:195,198; Friedman, 1987:180-187), it emerged as the main union federation encouraging transformation of the state, but upheld a vigorous non-racial position (Marx, 1992:195). This constituted an important first strategic step in opposition to the government's new labour policy that emerged after the Wiehann Commission's report (Cooper, 1996:63-64).

Union membership doubled between 1979 and 1982, but the period between 1982 and 1985 experienced a slower, yet still substantial, growth in membership (Macun, 1983:48- 53; Marx, 1992:196). This was consequently also accompanied by an increase in strike action, demonstrations, stay-aways and mass actions to win union demands during this period (Cooper, 1996:65-66). In November 1984 FOSATU also formed an alliance with community organisations in certain areas so as to organise a successful two day stay-away in support of a wide set of student and community demands (Friedman, 1987:447); yet it tried not to form alliances with political movements (Marx, 1992:196-197).

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[18] Growing labour militancy and increasing township protests culminating in the Soweto Uprising of 1976, drove the state into reforming labour law. The finding of the Wiehahn Commission of enquiry, led to labour law reforms consenting to, the formal recognition of black trade unions within the official industrial relations system for the first time in South African history.

FOSATU made the strategic decision that its affiliated unions would apply for registration in terms of the new labour legislation, albeit on a non-racial basis. They could also sign in members in spite of the law, which denied union membership to migrants and foreign workers. FOSATU's decision to apply for registration thus opened up new possibilities. Furthermore, official legality, that is the right to exist and bargain as a union, would bring a number of benefits, such as the right to organise and recruit in factories, to sign recognition agreements and to oppose victimisation of union members (Cooper, 1996:64- 65). The negotiation of recognition agreements, which set out the rights and duties of shop stewards and trade unions in the workplace, was an important step in establishing the 'rule of law' on the shop floor; thereby contributing towards a culture of democracy (Cooper, 1996:65).

In addition, unions also provided practical 'education' in democratic principles in the structures and processes of the relevant organisations. FOSATU, for example, provided educational programmes to teach 'democratic organisational procedures' (Marx, 1992:195). A further consequence of the legalisation of trade unions was the creation of super-federations, such as the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), which became a powerful union on the South African political landscape.

After the suppression of the UDF, COSATU, was drawn into the forefront of resistance to authoritarian rule and the late 1980s saw successful mass action campaigns against the Separate Amenities Act, and the Labour Relations Amendment Act, and many protest actions (Innes, 1992:339-343).

From the above follows that trade unions became increasingly important in South Africa's transition to democracy. Apart from its usual function of looking after the interests of the workers, their role had even wider ramifications. Economic and political factors were closely intertwined in the trade union movement of South Africa even at shop-floor level (Marx, 1992:194). Thus, the trade union movement became an important factor in mobilising the masses, putting pressure on the government, educating the people and recruiting political leaders. At the same time, it provided much needed opportunities for coordinating and consolidating similar interests, thereby reducing the number of possible players in any future political settlement.

With regard to students, parents, teachers and civic associations, seething discontent persisted through the 1980s. Consequently, school and consumer boycotts, strikes and stay- aways,

challenged the attempt at co-option, encouraging the rise of civil associations as well as student and youth movements, which sought to mobilise dissent (Lawrence, 1994:4). Most of the civil associations were aligned to the UDF, although their establishment seemed to have been the outcome of a fairly spontaneous reaction to repression.

In addition, numerous local and foreign interest groups and NGOs such as the South African Institute for Race Relations, the Institute for Democracy (Idasa), the Urban Foundation and the Black Sash were also operating in South Africa. They were often directly involved in political issues, did research and provided assistance to those affected by apartheid policies and the struggle. Their work as well as their presence in civil society is still felt today. This will be discussed at length in the third chapter of this study.

Lastly, a number of features of civil society are important in a discussion on the role of civil society in South Africa's transition to democracy. Firstly, on the one hand, a section of civil society triumphed in opposing and pressurising the authorities and made demands on them, but on the other hand, a section of civil society gave important support to the government. Secondly, in addition to the demands made on the authorities, civil society channelled and even expressed some of the demands coming from the marginalised section of political society, thereby exerting influence over both the state and the masses. Thirdly, it played an important role in the mobilisation of the masses and offered much needed moral and material support to the masses during times of political unrest. Fourthly, many organisations within civil society belonged to international organisations that provided both moral and material support to them, as well as being influential in the mobilisation of the international community against South Africa's political dispensation. Fifthly, many of the organisations of civil society had constitutions that laid down the rules in terms of which they could function, as well as the powers and roles of their officials and members, in that way providing indispensable experience that could be of use in negotiations and a future democratic South Africa. Sixthly, important research was conducted by civil society organisations and political alternatives were devised for South Africa.

2.3.3. Civil society in the democratic era

The existence of a strong independent civil society is one of the hallmarks of a consolidated democratic regime as argued in chapter one, and arguably the most important factor in democratic consolidation according to Linz and Stepan (1996). South Africa has made leaps and strides regarding the development of independent organisations and associations that comprise civil society since the transition to democracy in 1994.

The first few years of the post-apartheid period were directed by the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), which aimed to deal with the injustices of apartheid. It sought after the creating a 'developmental state'; a viable, globally-competitive economy coupled with welfare state elements. The RDP was supported strongly by a wide coalition of social forces; this commitment arose from the inclusive participatory process which helped to shape it (Ranchod, 2007:3) However, according to Ranchod, the programme was not well thought through; the state capacity to meet the objectives of welfare and popular demand and at the same time create a competitive economy was overestimated.

In addition, RDP, a national agenda for social development that was originally outlined by the country's trade unions, but later adopted by the alliance that was about to run the country. However, the plan was deeply flawed. It conceptualised the state as the only leader or arbitrator of the transition to democracy, of the RDP, and in so doing it all but suffocated the voice of civil society (Forde, 2011:237). This consecutively made people spectators in their own lives, as Jay Naidoo, would later admit. Jay Naidoo was the Minister tasked with the RDP. 'What followed was a decade of state-led development', he says, during which the political space also narrowed to such an extent that factionalism set in across the ANC and fear started to saturate society (Quoted in Forde, 2011:237).

As a result, in 1996 the ANC-led government's macro-economic strategy changed into Growth Employment and Redistribution (GEAR). While GEAR was a very well thought out policy strategy, its evolution was completely opposite to that of the RDP; there was little, if any, initial civil society participation. Government made it clear that GEAR was non-negotiable. GEAR was a typical example of a technocratic approach to policy-making which severely limits democratic citizen participation. Swilling and Russell (2002:8) posit that 'GEAR defined central roles for the for-profit sector in economic growth and service delivery and for the non-profit sector in poverty alleviation, without the CSOs playing a role in the decision'.

In 1997 the government introduced the Non-profit Organisations Act which defined Non-Profit Organisations (NPOs) as 'A trust, company or other association of persons established for a public purpose and the income and property of which are not distributable to its members or office-bearers, except as reasonable compensation for services rendered' (RSA, 1997). Current

functions envisaged by the government are watchdog and service delivery roles (Swilling and Russell, 2002:5). However, Friedman argues for the service delivery role (Friedman, 2002:14).

In line with its 'developmental state philosophy'[19], the ANC-led government wanted the state to be the driving force behind the economy and the transformation of society. In this scenario, it envisaged civil society as a partner in making this a reality. Civil society is now largely perceived by the ANC-led government as an extension of its delivery capacity, and its role as an independent mechanism to challenge, contradict and influence policy has been largely overlooked. Some analysts have put it more starkly and asserted that CSOs are becoming 'delivery intermediaries between the framers of social policy and those for whom it is intended' (Friedman, 2002:14).

The new dispensation has led to the formation of many new CSOs opposed to what they see as further entrenchment of poverty and inequality amongst South Africans. This is because of government policy, especially its macro-economic policies which are largely based on the tenets of the Washington Consensus which calls for, *inter alia*, economic and trade liberalisation, limited state intervention in the economy and rationalisation of the public service. They have been actively engaging the state through various modes; whether they have had any impact will be discussed shortly (Ranchod, 2007:5).

Fakir (2004:7) lays a contextual basis for the emergence of these CSOs. He argues that 'the liberalisation of markets and strict fiscal discipline assisted in addressing development priorities in the early years of transition, but soon reached their limitations, particularly in the area of poverty eradication and the availability, distribution and accessibility of public goods and services, as the social and economic legacies of apartheid continued to affect the ability of both state and society to meet the goals set out in the RDP.'

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[19] It is to be noted, however that South Africa is not a pure developmental state, but rather a welfare or Third way state. As de Jager asserts, although the ANC sees South Africa as a developmental state, the state lacks the efficiency of such states in South East Asia (de Jager, 2012:162). de Jager continues to argue that it might be more accurate to observe a trend towards South Africa becoming a welfare state, as in Scandinavia. But she notes that in welfare states, all citizens benefit from social grants, whereas in South Africa only approximately 15 million people out of a population of 50 million benefit from old age, child and disability grants. In South Africa, taxpayers are excluded from such grants; in welfare states, all taxpayers are also recipients of state benefits for example health insurance.

According to Greenberg and Ndlovu (2004), there are two types of CSOs; those that try to fit into programmes initiated by government and those that mobilise to confront government in order to affect change. They argue that many of the biggest and strongest civil society organisations orient upwards, justifying and elaborating the actions and ideologies of the dominant power. Others orient to the grassroots (Kihato and Rapoo, 1999). However, this is a rather crude classification and many organisations, such as the TAC, straddle both roles. How CSOs engage the state and attempt to affect change, as well as how successful they have been, will now be discussed in the subsequent paragraphs.

2.4. Methods of influence of civil society in South Africa

2.4.1. Political strategies / resources utilised

According to Heywood (2007:304), the success of interest group influence is a complex issue. Not only is their efficiency often determined by a number of factors beyond their control, but their successes or effectiveness is also tied to their strategies, tactics and roles. Similarly, Heywood adds, the nature of the group and the resources at its disposal are crucial determining factors of its political strategy. The resources include the following:

1. public sympathy for the group and its goals
2. the size of its membership or activist base
3. its financial strength and organisational capabilities
4. its ability to use sanctions that some way inconvenience or disrupt governance
5. personal or institutional links it may have to political parties or governance bodies.

Kihato and Rapoo (1999:34) posit that formal engagement with the state incorporates the methods included in the legislative processes as well as other constitutional mechanisms (such as the Commission on Gender Equality, and the Human Rights Commission) and statutory mechanisms (such as NEDLAC) through which policy development can occur.

Formal methods include the following: First, by contributing to green and white papers, in which CSOs make written submissions and comments to the relevant ministries. Some government departments hold workshops where stakeholders are invited to make verbal submissions or express their opinions on the proposed new legislation.

Second, by submissions to portfolio committees: the committees provide a forum where ordinary citizens or organisations can make formal representations to government on new laws or policy during the parliamentary process. The committees are, therefore, key structures to utilise for advocacy (Kihato and Rapoo, 1999). COSATU is one CSO which often takes up the challenge to make submissions via the formal route. One such example is when the call for submissions on the Green Paper on Further Education and Training came, COSATU took pains to stress redress of the economy so as to ensure that the previously marginalized were afforded better access to education and training opportunities. Third, by means of forums and government commissions, especially at local government level. These include ward committees, where citizens and councillors are supposed to interact at ward level in planning for local development (Kihato and Rapoo, 1999).

Kihato and Rapoo (1999:35) also identified several informal methods of interaction, including: negotiations (can be formal). These include activities such as behind the scenes interactions with policy-makers and unofficial discussions between government officials and CSOs; petitions. These can be used to demonstrate how much popular support an issue has. An example of this is the 'Million Faces' petition, which is part of the Control Arms Campaign, a joint initiative by Amnesty International, Oxfam International and the International Action Network on Small Arms. Over 800 000 people in 160 countries have already given their photographs to the Million Faces Petition, which is the world's largest photo petition, calling on leaders to back stricter controls on the arms trade. It represents the million people who have been killed by arms since the last UN conference on small arms in 2001 (ISS, 2006).

Lobbying is another method of interaction used by CSOs. This is used to persuade individuals or groups with decision-making power to support an organisation's position; and general public policy debates (for instance in the media) and mobilising pressure groups. These can include debates in community halls, civic associations, newspaper articles, and radio stations. A good example of the employment of informal methods was the 2001 Resources and Prevention of Child Abuse and Neglect (RAPCAN) campaign aimed at preventing the closure of the Child Protection Unit (CPU). For six weeks, RAPCAN campaigned to convince policy-makers in the policing sector to withdraw the decision. It and others used: television to publicise the issues; other electronic media to keep stakeholders informed; networking with other organisations to raise appropriate questions to the South African Police Service (SAPS); lobbying of the

chairperson of the CPU; and submissions to the National Council of Provinces and the SAPS (Ranchod, 2007:7).

2.4.2. Resource: Democracy Aid

Seeing as though financial resources are the focal point of this study, the discussion that will follow pertains to this resource. This section will be looking at aid for the purposes of democracy promotion in South Africa. This discussion will examine the boom and decline in this funding over the years.

In the last two decades or so, and particularly in the last decade, an extensive global public policy network has developed quickly to promote democracy worldwide, especially in those countries that became more democratic during what Huntington (1991) calls the 'Third Wave' of democratisation.

More than forty countries experienced transitions from some form of authoritarian rule to more democratic systems between the years 1974 and 1999 (Sisk, 1999/2000). The democracy promotion policy network responded to, and helped in influencing this wave of regime change. Therefore, the 'Third Wave' of transitions to democracy has been characterised by a mutual embrace between internal forces within countries demanding more access to political power and the external international forces that have worked to facilitate and improve open elections and multiparty politics. This combination of demand for more democracy and international promotion of participatory governance explains the growth in new democracies around the world notwithstanding some setbacks and failures in particular instances. The network of actors organised in support of democracy endorsement includes the governments of major states and their aid agencies, international organisations, international financial institutions, multilateral donors, NGOs with global programs, region and country-specific NGOs, and philanthropic organisations (Sisk, 1999/2000).

During the 1990s the global North has gradually used a new tool, political aid, to influence its relations with the global South. This is generally known as 'democracy assistance'. This has been aimed at governmental structures such as parliament, the judiciary and local government,

as well as CSOs, with the purpose of bolstering the institutions and culture of liberal democracy (Hearn, 2000:815). A number of scholars have explored this phenomenon.[20]

Foreign intervention has long been a factor in South African politics, however, the type of international involvement in the 1990s changed considerably from that of the previous years. Direct engagement took the place of pressure through isolation, giving foreign powers potential influence over domestic South African politics (Landsberg, 1994:276).

Although 'democracy' frequently entered the foreign policy making discourse of the North in the post-war period, it was not the dominant form in which the North related to the South. The main form was the development of strategic partnerships with authoritarian regimes. The new industry grew out of a re-evaluation of Western foreign policy towards the South, specifically within the US (Hearn, 2000:815).

With the US defeat in Vietnam, the Nicaraguan revolution and other nationalist triumphs in the South, US foreign policy in relation to the Third World had reached 'crisis-point' by the late 1970s according to Hearn (2000:815). It had been ineffective at preventing popular anti-US regimes taking power in South East Asia, Central America and Southern Africa and its ability to influence occurrences abroad seemed very limited. By the early 1980s, a new agreement started to take form among policy-makers concerning the strategy of 'democracy promotion'. This involved two important elements that will be briefly explained in the subsequent paragraphs (Hearn, 2000:815).

First was the acknowledgement that coercive political arrangements had failed to handle the social movements that had opposed and defied authoritarian rule and that formal liberal democracies were better able to take in social rebellion and conflict. It is noteworthy to understand that the grounds for resorting to liberal democracy were that it was believed to be a better guarantor of stability. The objective stayed the same: social stability, it was basically that the means to achieve the end had altered. It is about building political structures that most successfully maintain the international system. It has no more to do with radical change than its predecessor, authoritarianism does. As Samuel Huntington (1996:51), one of the leading advocates for formal democracy, explicitly asserts: 'The maintenance of democratic politics and the reconstruction of the social order are fundamentally incompatible'.

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[20] See Barkan 1994; Diamond 1995a; Mark Robinson 1995, 1996a, 1996b; Carothers 1997.

The second element is that, where previous foreign policy had placed attention almost completely on the strength of the client state and its governmental system, the new democracy strategy started to become aware and acknowledge the vital role of civil society. It was from within civil society that opposition to authoritarian rule had appeared and therefore it was important 'to penetrate civil society and from therein assure control over popular mobilisation' (Robinson, 1996:69).

This is an important part of democracy assistance. Aid is aimed at a nation's most influential, modern, advocacy-orientated CSOs, for an example: women's organisations, human rights groups, national or sectoral NGO for a, business associations, private policy institutions, youth and student organisations, and professional media associations (Hearn, 2000:816).

According to Carothers (1999), since its inception in the early 1980s, democracy assistance has sustained its ascension. In the 1990s as stated by Hearn (2000:817), this was propelled by three key developments: the academic and donor concern with 'governance' as the source of underdevelopment, the application of political conditionality, in other words, making aid conditional on political reforms, and the shifting balance of power in North-South relations. An accepted view developed during the 1980s that Africa's underdevelopment was brought on by a failure of the state and that 'governance' had to be remodelled, from the bottom up. Forming civil society developed into the road to restructuring the state (Landell-Mills, 1992; Beckman, 1993; Williams and Young, 1994:84). Making aid dependent on such reform has been a position of strong disagreements between the governments of a number of sub-Saharan African states and donors (Gibson, 1999). No such coercion was necessary in South Africa. As international opposition to apartheid from Western states, mixed with native opponents, a wide-ranging agreement was established over the form that a new liberal democracy would take. With the decease of nationalist and socialist ideologies, such foreign, explicitly political, interference was not seen with the same degree of scepticism any longer. The latter has allowed the North to intervene in civil societies of the South with a remarkable level of recognised legitimacy (Hearn, 2000:817).

South Africa has had a long history of Western support to civil society. The politics of apartheid, specifically of the late 1970s and 1980s, produced, in the words of Aitkinson et al (1996:4), 'a vast array of more or less popular, more or less institutionalised organisations and initiatives in broad opposition to the apartheid state.' These comprised of trade unions, CBOs, sector-based mobilised movements of youth, students and women, as well as business, professional and

religious associations. It is these types of CSOs (although they were almost never described as such) that donors financed. This support started with Denmark in the mid-1960s and in the 1970s it was followed by Norway and Sweden (Jakobsen, 1996). It ended in the mid-1980s with the imposition of sanctions by Western governments and the international isolation of the apartheid state. The Nordic countries at this point were joined by the European Union and the US, who individually offered $340 million over a nine year period to CSOs, before the end of apartheid and the 1994 elections[21] (USAID, 1995; Olen, 1998:350). Even with such great involvement, a complete account of foreign assistance to civil society in this period is still to be written, owing to the secret and clandestine nature of that support (Hearn, 2000:817).

2.4.2.1. Foreign donors to South Africa

The biggest overall foreign donor to South Africa is the US. It provided in the region of $530 million from 1994 to 1999. The EU is the second biggest foreign donor, providing an EU Programme for Reconstruction and Development (EUPRD) of nearly $420 million between 1994 and 1999. Between the two of them and no-one else, almost $1 billion of global aid was sponsored to South Africa's transition to democracy. Other key foreign donors to South Africa are the Netherlands, the Nordic countries, Germany and the United Kingdom, providing between $15 million and $45 million yearly since 1994. Canada is comparatively, a smaller bilateral donor, providing under $10 million per annum (Hearn, 2000:819).

The largest actor in the international donor community world-wide, the World Bank, plays a marginal role as a lending institution. Even so, it has a considerable presence in South Africa by offering itself as a 'knowledge bank' which has offered the government with 'lessons of international experience' on all facets of policy[22] (Michie and Padayachee, 1997).

2.4.2.2. The decline in donor funding

Funding from the developed world into South Africa has been gradually shrinking over the last few years. This rising funding decline is brought about by both internal and external circumstances that have resulted in the shutting down of several NGOs across the country, many of which have been the pillars of South Africa's civil society and deepening democracy.

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[21] With its support for the liberation movement, the Soviet Union was also an important 'donor', and must be included in discussions about foreign aid in this time.
[22] For more on the Bank's influence in South Africa see Michie, J. and Padayachee V. (1997) (eds). The Political Economy of South Africa's Transition, London: Harcourt Brace.

These include the closure of Idasa (Cape Town office); the Wolpe Memorial Trust down-scaling its operations, and only focusing on the Annual Memorial Lecture; Noah (Centre helping HIV/Aids orphans) has been forced to cut back its support for orphans and in fact has closed down 67 out of the 90 centres across the country. The Black Sash has also faced serious financial troubles having to retrench staff and shut down projects. Also, Cape Town Rape Crisis has been adversely affected by the lack of funding for NGOs. As of July 2012, a lack of funding has meant that retrenchment notices were served from the board of trustees to the organisation's entire staff, with the exception of director Kathleen Dey as said in the Daily Maverick, Mail and Guardian and well as West Cape News to mention but a few newspapers that have printed on the matter.

NGO's, which cover 30 percent of the civil services in South Africa, are crucial to meeting the development needs of civil society in the country. NGOs are a vital presence in areas such as public health, education and in safeguarding governmental transparency. The effect made by NGOs is extensively felt, particularly in the area of advocacy and in the work done in poor communities relating to access to education and human rights[23].

Externally, the fact that South Africa is more and more considered a middle income country has made an impact upon the decision of donors to invest. This, together with the insufficient funding by the South African government, has put pressure on the capacity of NGOs to meet the needs of the communities which they serve.

Another key factor what many have called a 'funding crisis' is the effects that the economic recession has had on donors. In 2009, The Southern African NGO Networks' executive director, David Barnard, has been cited several times in print media, stating: 'Funders are not able to assist the organisations anymore because they themselves aren't coping. It is going to have a major impact on welfare organisations, either they will close down or their staff will be forced to leave the NGO sector.' In addition, one of the largest funding channels in South Africa, the Lottery, has brought about more uncertainty for NGOs reliant on its payments.

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[23] This decline has been the buzz-word in CSO discussions and has been stated and affirmed time and gain in print-media. See the following links: http://westcapenews.com/?p=4645 ; http://blacksash.org.za.www59.cpt1.host-h.net/index.php/media-and-publications/black-sash-in-the-media/1155-idasa-black-sash-face-funding-crisis-2-feb-2012-sundaytribunecoza-sunday-tribune ; http://mg.co.za/article/2011-11-01-cape-town-rape-crisis-trust-faces-closure ; http://dailymaverick.co.za/article/2012-07-23-the-great-ngo-funding-crisis ; http://www.bigissue.org.za/uncategorized/the-big-issue-feels-pinch-of-sa-ngo-funding-crisis ; http://www.ngopulse.org/article/emerging-funding-crisis-south-african-civil-society ; http://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/charities-ngos-funds-drying-up-1.423572

Internally, increasing operational expenses, the rising burdensome specifications that need to be followed on behalf of the donors and in terms of the business plan have to a great degree lessened the level of flexibility that NGOs have.[24]

These developments are a concern in light of the need for a vigorous civil society in South Africa. The ability for NGOs to lobby for efficient governance is a key function within the political setting of South Africa in present-day. Also, the scarcity of capacity in the area of health care and education is significantly assuaged by the work of many NGOs within these disciples. The view that South Africa is a 'middle income' country needs to be looked at in light of the considerable disparities in the quality of life between the rich and the poor in the country.

2.5. Conclusion

In South Africa, the political pressure civil society was able to exert through mass mobilisation put pressure on the Apartheid state to adopt measures of political liberalisation and to consider negotiations as a possibility to bringing an end to the pervasive political strife. In addition, civil society, contributed to the development of the rudimentary, yet crucial prerequisites for democratic pluralism. Swilling's (1990:156) view stands firm on the premise that civil society is the key source of democratic values and a uniting point for democratic forces. Thus, the presence of a vibrant civil society and the appropriate structural conditions such as political culture, economic development and international involvement, provided a favourable environment for political liberalisation and the corrosion of the apartheid system.

In the democratic system that South Africa has since 1994 adopted, elected officials are meant to represent the interests of their constituents in government, so elections are a needed, though not sufficient for the functioning of a well-functioning democracy. A vibrant civil society provides another avenue for popular will and demands to be articulated, particularly between elections and outside of political parties. Civil society organisations provide avenues for those voices and matters that may not have been given precedence by political parties, to be put on the public agenda. Numerous modes of engagement are used by civil society organisations in their interaction with government and spaces of civil society engagement have widened post-apartheid. These modes of engagement will be discussed more elaborately in the third and fourth chapter.

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[24] Some would argue that foreign donors along with their financial support bring their own agenda and self interests (See Carothers, 2009). However, CSOs losing donor funding is still a cause for concern. It is for this reason therefore that fundraising and ways to ensure self-sufficiency are avenues that CSOs need to explore.

South Africa has a vibrant and strong civil society, which arguably is one of the most important factors in democratic consolidation according to Linz and Stepan (1996). South Africa's civil society is plural in nature, embodying a wide array of interests, and working well in keeping the government accountable, which is a necessary condition for the democratic regime to survive and become consolidated. This is one area in which South Africa has always been strong, even before the democratic transition was affected. Given the fact that the parliamentary opposition is significantly weak, the existence of a strong civil society is important in assuming that role of keeping a check on the ruling party, in particular, within a dominant party system. As Breytenbach (2006:183) puts it, the media and other social groupings, together with the judiciary (in particular the Constitutional Court), provide essential checks and balances in South Africa's society and 'may indeed have become substitutes for small opposition parties'. It is for this reason therefore, that the closing down of NGOs in such large numbers makes this study worthwhile. The buzz in the media on the issue bears testament to this fact. The role of CSOs is huge and it would be a great misfortune for South Africa's young and at times fragile democracy if these CSOs ceased to exist.

CHAPTER 3:

CASE STUDY I

INSTITUTE FOR DEMOCRACY (IDASA)

3.1. Introduction

This chapter is designated to do three tasks, namely: to examine the Institute for Democracy (Idasa); discuss the findings of the interview that was conducted with the organisation and lastly operationalise these findings through the lenses of Heywood's conceptual theoretical framework. These three tasks will be tackled as follows: this chapter starts by providing an overview of the organisation, the historical context under which it was established, the programmes that they administer as well as their contribution to civil society and the deepening of democracy in South Africa. The second part briefly describes the principles that Heywood lays down in his framework. The third part of the chapter presents the findings of the interview conducted and analyses the qualitative information by using Heywood's framework. In other words, this part will apply Idasa's *modus operandi,* as revealed in the interviews, to Heywood's framework and reveal the challenges faced by Idasa. It is against this point that this chapter will make inferences and draw its conclusions.

3.2. Idasa: The organisation

3.2.1. Historical context

Idasa was founded in 1986 by Alex Boriane and Frederik van Zyl Slabbert, former members of Parliament who came to the conclusion that extra-parliamentary action was needed in order to bring an end to the apartheid system (Idasa, 2012).

When the organisation was established, it was committed to 'promote a non-racial democratic South Africa' (Idasa memorandum quoted in Kabemba and Friedman, 2001:6). Its stated goal was 'to mobilise white opinion to understand and accept the current dynamics in South African politics and the realities of the society, and thereafter work towards a non-racial nation in which all will be free to exercise their democratic rights and enjoy the benefits and protection of full citizenship' (Idasa memorandum quoted in Kabemba and Friedman, 2001:6). This implied a belief that white people could be persuaded, rather than coerced, to give up power, a viewpoint

which Idasa quickly noted, incited 'bitter attacks from the apartheid government and right-wing whites and strong suspicion from the black left' (Idasa, 1989:2). As Boraine later stated, its main objective was to stimulate and promote negotiation between the white authorities and black resistance consortiums, 'the major emphasis in all that we set out to do, was on negotiation politics… in contrast to the politics of exclusion, of repression and resistance' (Boraine, 1994:205-212).

According to Widmann (1997:10), Idasa was an important expression of white extra-parliamentary resistance, representing the splitting of white solidarity; it was sensitive to the imputation that it was a channel or intermediary for compromise rather than in conflict with the white minority. Therefore, Idasa's 1989 annual report brought to light its strength and its ability to place itself in the centre of political forces and factions (Idasa, 1989). For the most part Idasa was successful in upholding credibility among anti-apartheid forces. It was a more critical voice than the parliamentary opposition, trying to compel the apartheid government to conform to 'the basics of democracy, human values and dignity' (Graham, quoted in Kabembe and Friedman, 2001:7). Idasa's work at that point in time, included arranging and coordinating meetings, conferences (national as well as international) and secret negotiations, which was increasingly, consistent with resistance tactics (Kabemba and Friedman, 2001:7).

Idasa's most acclaimed action in earlier times, many would agree, was the July 1987 conference it arranged in Dakar, Senegal. A group of 61 people, mostly white Afrikaners, went to meet the African National Congress (ANC) which was banned at the time and branded by the apartheid regime as a 'terrorist' movement (Levy, 2007:7). This initiative was consistent with the organisation's claim to: 'stem from a need for contact and communication between those people of goodwill who have been kept apart for so long that they have lost touch with each other's humanity. It seeks to counter the distrust that exists throughout South Africa and to persuade whites not to cling to apartheid because of fear of an alternative' (Idasa, 1987). This was the first open and public meeting between members of the banned ANC and members of the South Africa's white political establishment (Len, 2007:8).

The Dakar conference was backed financially by Danielle Mitterand of France-Liberté Foundation and the Friedrich Naumann Stiftung (FNS), and was made possible by Senegalese president Abdou Diouf's agreement to consent to the meeting to happen openly in his country (Widmann, 1997). Aside from easing hostility to the ANC and consequently laying the

groundwork for negotiation, the conference assisted in promoting Idasa's reputation intercontinentally and therefore increased its sources of funding. In 1989, it followed by organising with the FNS another meeting between ANC representatives and their counterparts (Kabembe and Friedman, 2001:9).

As Boraine (1989:3) states, Idasa's plan of pursuing 'the creation of a negotiation climate which will lead to a new democratic, non-racial, South Africa' was an outcome of its own strategic choices. In 1988 all Idasa staff members gathered to talk about the projects and events it believed it ought to support during 1989. Idasa is certain that its endeavours in the late 1980s had a distinct influence in South Africa. Meanwhile by 1989, the anticipation for Nelson Mandela's release from prison and of a negotiated agreement was elevated, and Graham believes that Idasa was able to yield 'bonding or bridging social capital'. By this, Graham means that it brought people of diverse backgrounds and standpoints together to brood over South Africa's future and therefore to bridge some of the divisions between them (Graham, quoted in Kabembe and Friedman, 2001:8). Additionally and more specifically, Idasa offered a means for middle-class whites who did not agree with the system of apartheid but did not want to be involved in the liberation movement. For the first time, these whites started to visit black townships: the rifts were starting to fall way. Idasa continued keeping negotiation in the public attention by organising conferences within South Africa[25] as well as overseas, the latter to cater for the still banished resistance leadership (Kabembe and Friedman, 2001:8).

Once negotiations started in early 1990, Idasa continued with its commitment to facilitating and engaging with the white right wing in an attempt to bring them to the negotiating table (Kabembe and Friedman, 2001:12). With the negotiations in progress, and in light of its belief that the path on the road to democracy was irrevocable, Idasa started to modify its programme, staff, and structure to adapt to South Africa's future demands. But also there was considerable continuity in terms of the original work and programmes that they administered. Idasa's workshops and conferences continued in 1999, and the focal point continued to be on the obstacles to a negotiated future. In 1990 the organisation concentrated on the media, the military, and particularly on reducing growing white fear regarding the future. It sought to perform 'an interpretative and facilitative role against the background of contending aspirations and fears' (Idasa, 1990). Idasa's commitment to negotiation and reconciliation at the grass roots level

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[25] These national conferences included 'Options for the future', a culmination of several regional conferences focusing on the 1988 ANC constitutional guidelines, and 'Peace and security', which attracted considerable attention.

intensified significantly. However by 1991, the focus shifted to economic justice, education, human rights, media, and grass-roots participation. In addition, Idasa also set up the Training Centre for Democracy in Johannesburg to teach other civil society organisations (CSOs) to put democracy into practise. Its aim was to make sure that democracy was instituted not by those in power alone, but by the participation of active citizens (Kabembe and Friedman, 2001:9; Idasa, 2012).

In 1993, those campaigning for change and the abolishment of the apartheid system at the negotiation table agreed that minority rule would be traded in for a government elected by a universal suffrage on 27 April 1994. Idasa's focus during this time period was determined and influenced by the election which was the conclusion of the negotiations for which it had worked. This meant more funding and staff, training domestic observers, party election agents and voter educators. Voter education however, along with other organisations promoting democracy, such as the Institute for Multiparty Democracy, was a priority for Idasa which saw this as part of buttressing the institutional capability needed to maintain a well rooted democracy (Graham, cited in Idasa, 1994).

3.2.2. Idasa in the present day: contributions to the deepening of democracy

After 1994, the focus of Idasa's work shifted to the creation of a democratic culture in South Africa, based on active citizenship. Idasa sees itself as an independent public interest organisation, whose core value is promoting sustainable democracy in South Africa by building partnerships with African and international partners (Idasa, 2012).

In 1995 Idasa's programmes fell in three areas: governance, security, and public education (Idasa, 1995). A considerable amount of governance effort was devoted to preparing for the local elections. The Local Government Information Centre (Logic) was established to provide citizens access to information on elections (Idasa, 1995). Idasa's current activities occur in two democracy centres, each with its own council. The Cape Town centre housed five programmes[26]: the Budget Information Service (BIS); the Political Information and Monitoring Service (Pims); Democracy Radio; the Transformation and Equity Programme (TEP), the Southern African Migration Project (Samp); and the public opinion service (POS). The Pretoria office houses three centres: Curriculum Development and Citizenship Education (CDCE); the

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[26] As media headlines have stated, as of 2012 this office has been closed down. The interview report in the next section of the chapter attests to this fact.

Community Safety Unit (CSU); and Logic. According to Idasa (2012), there is also a KwaZulu Natal democracy project.

What is noteworthy about this organisation is that, rather than defining democracy as a specific set of norms and procedures, Idasa maintains that democracy is better understood as a principle that informs the development of political institutions, norms and procedures (Idasa, 2012). Idasa considers capacity building to be critical in the achievement of its mission and primary objectives. The objectives being: representation of voters; community and public participation; delivery of state services and constitutional obligations; and appropriately articulated and organised citizen demands; enforcement of laws, regulations, by-laws and the constitution, and informed compliance and consent by citizens (Idasa, 2012). The Political Governance Programme (PGP), the Community and Citizen Empowerment Programme and the School for Democracy are specialised components of Idasa. States in Transition Observatory (SITO) is a research and advocacy unit within Idasa's Political Governance Programme that provides information on and analysis of political developments in countries in transition or crisis (Idasa, 2012).

Today, Idasa is an acclaimed public interest organisation that is also recognised in Africa. It maintains international links with many similar organisations through the world movement for democracy. Idasa runs democracy and governance programs in more than twenty countries in Africa, its programs focus on building democratic societies across the African continent. Idasa's work focuses not only on elections, but also pays particular attention to what happens between elections. Whilst free and fair elections are important to any democratic state, Idasa targets its programs to build up the capacity of civil society, encourage the transparency and accountability of governments, and create active citizens (Verwey, 2012).

3. 3. Interview Report and analysis:

Civil society can be measured in terms of Heywood's framework; how interest groups exert influence. According to Heywood (2007:304), the success of interest group influence is a complex issue. Not only is their efficiency often determined by a number of factors beyond their control, but their success or effectiveness is also tied to their strategies, tactics and roles. Similarly, Heywood adds, the nature of the group and the resources at their disposal are crucial determining factors of its political strategy.

The resources include the following:
1. Public sympathy for the group and its goals
2. The size of its membership or activist base
3. Its financial strength and organisational capabilities
4. Its ability to use sanctions that in some way inconvenience or disrupt governance
5. Personal or institutional links it may have to political parties or governance bodies

Idasa will be operationalised through the lenses of Heywood's framework, that is, resources that interest groups possess and make use of. The focus is placed on the financial resources, which they may receive from international and or domestic donor funders. Before an analysis can be made of Heywood's framework in relation to Idasa's political strategy, it is at this point that this study will report on the findings of the interview.

An interview was conducted on 27 August 2012 with Mr Len Verwey.[27] The informant that was interviewed was selected because of his knowledge and expertise in the area of donor funding and would therefore provide information on the topic that is most reliable. The questions asked and information collected during the interview were divided into five themes (Heywood's resources as mentioned above). Refer to appendix A for the full transcript of the interview.

The success of a civil society organisation in achieving its aims will depend on a number of factors, the most of which are the resources that Heywood argues for. It is of importance to note, however that the success of a CSO is not limited to these resources alone and that there are a number of other factors that can contribute to the effectiveness and success of such an organisation. In addition, according to Sadie (2007:220), the methods utilised are determined by a number of dynamics including the internal structure and nature of the group, the political culture, and the subject-matter with which the group is concerned. The analysis of the interview with Idasa will be analysed with reference to Heywood's resources that interest groups have at their disposal to exert their influence.

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[27] Len Verwey manages the Budget Unit of Idasa's Political Information and Monitoring Service in their Cape Town office. His research has included work on budgeting and socio-economic rights, the role of Parliament in the budget, political economic debates in South Africa and their budgetary implications, and the challenges of budgeting at sub-national level in South Africa. He has coordinated Idasa's responses to the South African Budget and Medium-Term Budget Policy Statement in recent years.

Table 1 summarises the extent to which Idasa has fulfilled the utilisation of the resources interest groups have at their disposal.

HEYWOOD'S FIVE RESOURCES OF INFLUENCE	IDASA'S AVAILABILITY & ACCESS TO RESOURCES (Utilised/Not utilised/Partially Utilised/On the decline/Not Applicable)
1. Public sympathy for the group and its goals	On the decline
2. The size of its membership or activist base	Not applicable
3. Its financial strength and organisational capabilities	On the decline
4. Its ability to use sanctions that in some way inconvenience or disrupt governance	Available and Utilised
5. Personal or institutional links it may have to political parties or governance bodies	Available and Partially utilised

Table 1: Idasa's access to Heywood's resources

3.3.1. Resource 1: Public sympathy for the group and its goals

Public sympathy for the group and its goals being the first resource, it appears that Idasa lacks this resource quite significantly in recent times. Public sympathy for Idasa has decreased over the years, and this is manifest in the fact that one of its major challenges in the present-day as stated by the interviewee is that of convincing both local and international donors that the organisation's work is still relevant, worthwhile and crucial for the country today.

The toil of winning hundreds if not thousands of people into your cause is one strategy that Heywood advocates for. There is strength in numbers, the saying goes, which means that people tend to take you seriously when they realise who else supports your work. 'Sympathy', as defined by Adam Smith (1759) is the effect that is produced when we imagine another person's circumstances as our own, and find their reaction to the circumstances to be reasonable. In so doing, we respond by experiencing a smaller-scale version of their feelings, even though we do not share the circumstances that incited their response. Smith refers to this

also as 'fellow-feeling'. Pertaining to 'public sympathy', the principle outlined by Smith can be transferrable. Public sympathy can therefore be understood as those outside of the organisation understanding the organisation's circumstances as their own. In other words, I would say that it is the case whereby the public views the cause or interest of the organisation as worthy and reasonable.

As the interviewee testified, in the last five or six years Idasa has had the challenge of convincing donors and the government of their continued relevance. South Africa's democracy is functioning; the country has held four free and fair elections, the rule of law is protected and South Africa has a Constitution that is internationally acclaimed to mention, but a few of the successes in its young democracy. To be succinct, democracy is enduring and stable. Therefore, it comes as no surprise that some donors might see South Africa as heading in the right direction and focusing on other countries that are lagging behind in terms of the quality of democracy (if a democracy exists at all) as well as looking at socio-economic development. The fact that the interviewee mentions, out of all the challenges the organisation faces, the challenge of having to convince both funders and the South African government of their continued relevance reveals that it is a great challenge and a threat to its survival. The fact that the organisation is also faced with the task of convincing people of their viewpoint, which holds that a strong civil society presence is needed to enable citizens to make their voices heard, shows the gravity of the situation and reveals also that while the organisation has been successfully funded in previous years, today sympathy from the public has decreased quite drastically and has to be fought for severely.

In addition, perhaps the decline in public sympathy for Idasa is a case of 'mission accomplished'. The organisation's original and main mission was that of facilitating a negotiated transition in 1994, and seeing as though this has been achieved, the question to ask is whethere this could be the reason for the decline in public sympathy? The reason may be unclear, however, the issue of declining donor funding continues to be a difficulty for many NGOs. CSO's such as the Institute for Security Studies, the Black Sash, and many others are going though similar financial struggles.

3.3.2. Resource 2: The size of a group's membership and activist base

The second question asked related to Heywood's second resource, the size of membership or activist base. Heywood sees the membership base of a civil society organisation as being

instrumental in its exertion of influence and determines how strong and successful it is. According to Hague and Harrop (2004:175), this is a matter of density[28] and pure numbers. These authors continue to add that the highest penetrations are generally accomplished when, as with professional bodies, membership is a state of practice.

However, not all CSOs have a membership base. In the case of Idasa, Heywood's second resource is not at all applicable. As Len Verwey, the interviewee states: 'I think we work at a slightly higher level in the sense that we're not a grass-roots NGO, we tend to work more with policy-makers and other stake-holders at that level, and with a mass based movement'. Nevertheless, the fact that Idasa is a non-membership NGO does not reduce their influence and the advancement of their interests and goals. Idasa exerts its influence through its policy expertise and specialist knowledge as its staff consists of mainly researchers and experts in the field.

3.3.3. Resource 3: The financial strength and organisational capabilities

Financial strength seems to be a resource that Idasa lacks quite significantly in recent times. While the organisational capabilities of Idasa are strong (as its history and current stature testifies), they are nevertheless weakened by financial insufficiency.

The work of NGOs is by nature unprofitable. Traditionally, NGOs rely on the goodwill and generosity of others to cover the costs of their activities through grants and donations. Today, unfortunately, NGOs find that such traditional funding sources are often insufficient to meet growing needs and rising costs; Idasa is no exception.

What explains this phenomenon must be considered in light of two dynamics: the global financial crisis as well as donor focus shifting to countries that are in greater need. In terms of the global financial recession, donors have less money at their disposal, therefore they have to scale-back funding and be more careful about where and how they spend their money. The second reason is due to South Africa's own economic development. Donors now see South Africa as a middle income country and are shifting their focus to North Africa and more impoverished nations within the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC).

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[28] According to Hague and Harrop (2004:175), density of membership refers to 'the proportion of those eligible to join a group who actually do so'. An encompassing membership in this sense means that it provides CSOs with more influence and authority with the government.

Financial resources are important for an NGO. It is the premise of this study that interest groups that are well funded are more likely to be effective in the attainment of their goals and advancement of their interests. Groups with greater financial resources at their disposal can employ professional lobbyists to try and exert influence on public policy. It is important to note that financial resources are an imperative, not just for the running of programmes that the organisation is involved with, but also for the operation costs of an organisation. Certainly, this is not meant to trivialise other factors, as they too matter in the day-to-day running of an organisation, for instance human resources in the form of good quality staff, a strong management structure, volunteers, and so on. However the argument made in this study is that, without adequate financial backing, these other factors seem less significant and suffer significantly, because they are also reliant on finances to put their plans into action.

Adequate financial resources refer to the state where an organisation is in a position of financial adequacy; meaning that the organisation has enough money to meet all its requirements. Let us assume an NGO has to pay electricity bills of R10 000 and rent of R5 000 and employee salaries of R25 000 then its net cash requirement per month is R40 000. If the net revenue of the organisation reaches R40 000 per month then they can be considered to be in a position of financial adequacy. That is they have enough funds to meet all their financial requirements. However, what we are seeing in today's NGO's and in South Africa, particularly those NGOSs discussed in this study, is that an NGO's expenses are beyond their net revenue. What this means is that major projects and or services are delayed or terminated, staff members are downsized, NGO branches are closed down, or NGOs close down altogether. This yields grounds for serious concern.

Idasa has had a significant cut in funding, so much that the Cape Town Democracy Centre has been closed. In addition, more than half of their staff members have been retrenched as Verwey attested. The overriding question that this study sought to answer is whether the global financial crisis has had a bearing on donor assistance to CSOs in South Africa. Based on Verwey's testimony, 'it has had a huge influence'. Verwey continues to maintain that in the past two or three years, there has been a substantial decrease in funding for Idasa, so much that the organisation was forced to retrench half its staff and close down the Cape Town office as stated above. Verwey provides two reasons[29] for the decrease in donor funding for CSOs in the country: 'it's the global financial crisis, which has made less money available and it's also a

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[29] Verwey's response is consistent with the literature on the subject of donor funding for South Africa's NGOs.

change in focus of that funding. South Africa becoming a middle-income country, this kind of factor in a time of resource scarcity has meant that it's more difficult for ODA funders to convince their own citizens that they should send money to South Africa'. What this means therefore is that donors are faced with the difficult task of either offering assistance to South Africa, which has made strides over the last 18 years of its democracy, or to Sudan or Somalia for example where conditions are far worse in terms of poverty, social and political order. However, the pulling out of funding that is instrumental for the deepening of South Africa's young and fragile democracy is a cause for concern. As seen in the work that Idasa has since its inception carried out, and the unfinished process of maturation of South Africa's democracy means that it would be a pity if the country lost the voice of CSOs like Idasa which has been instrumental in the advocating of active citizenship, social justice and the bolstering of democratic values and institutions.

Moreover, what makes Idasa's situation trickier and more difficult is the fact that they do not have other channels of receiving funding. In other words, they do not have the option of, for instance, getting assistance from big corporations, or the option of raising funds in the form of providing services commercially. As Verwey maintains, 'sometimes people ask us 'but why don't you then put more effort on trying to get corporate social responsibility funding'? ''Why don't you get funding from the big companies''? And the answer is actually, we probably would consider that, but South African large companies are not willing to fund governance type work in South Africa, because they are too scared of being perceived as being anti-ANC, anti-government. So they are happy to fund building houses, but they will not fund governance type work at this point. So that kind of avenue is also closed to organisations such as ours'. In addition, Idasa is essentially an institute that comments and tries to influence policy, therefore the work that they do cannot be provided commercially. This means that they are fully reliant on donor funding.

Therefore, financial resources in the form of donor funding make up a critical element of the efficiency of an organisation such as Idasa and that the shrinking in funding is threatening the future of not just Idasa, but many NGOs in civil society. The global recession, which has made money scarcer, coupled with a change in focus on the side of international funders, has made the survival of Idasa disheartening especially given the role that Idasa has placed in South Africa, both historically and at present.

3.3.4. Resource 4: the ability to use sanctions that in some way inconvenience or disrupt governance

This question relates to Heywood's fourth resource, the ability of interest groups to use sanctions that in some way inconvenience or disrupt governance. Lobbying[30] and litigation[31] are a way in which NGO's can exert their influence. The fourth resource that interest groups have at their disposal will be analysed by looking at the lobbying and litigation strategies of Idasa for these two strategies do indeed inconvenience governance.

It has been found, according to Sadie (2007:220) that the most effective lobbying techniques involve direct personal communication with decision-makers. This includes deputations to politicians and the personal presentation of research results and testimonies at legislative hearings. Activities involving non-personal communication between decision-makers and interest groups such as letters and public relations campaigns are rated less effective.

At Idasa we see that lobbying and litigation is at the core of its modes of influence. For instance, as stated by the interviewee, a few years ago the organisation engaged in direct lobbying. In 2004, Idasa campaigned for the leading political parties, including the ANC, to reveal their private funding sources (in terms of the Promotion of Access to Information Act of 2000). Idasa asserted that private donations 'ought to be regulated by way of specific legislation in the interest of greater openness and transparency' (Venter and Landsberg, 2011 quoted in the Cape Times, 2005). This motion was challenged by most parties in question. The democratic Alliance, the official opposition party, particularly contended that corporations could be refused government contracts if they were known to have donated money to opposition parties (Cape Time, 2005 cited in Venter and Landsberg, 2011). Additionally, prospective donors disinclined to have their political connections publicised could be reluctant to donate to any further (Cape Time, 2005 cited in Venter and Landsberg, 2011).

The court case was dismissed by the high court following the political parties in question agreeing to legislate on the issue. Then Secretary-general, Kgalema Motlanthe, in a sworn written statement stated that 'a parliamentary process is currently under way to pass appropriate legislation' (Cape Time, 2005 cited in Venter and Landsberg, 2011). However,

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[30] Lobbing according to the *Oxford Concise Dictionary of Politics* (2009) refers to attempts to exert influence on the formation or implementation of public policy.
[31] Litigation on the other hand refers to the process of bringing or contesting legal actions in court.

several years after the ANC made a public commitment to do so, it has made no developments in improving legislation to regulate private funding to political parties, albeit the party's commitment to transparency in party funding was expressed in its 2007 Polokwane resolutions (Venter and Landsberg, 2011).

According to Venter and Landsberg (2011), the disinclination to legislate on political party funding goes to the centre of the private funding discussion in South Africa, while political parties endeavour to safeguard the identity of their sponsors, they are consequently fostering the jeopardy posed to South Africa's democracy by debauching the validity of disclosed funding. Venter and Landsbergis continue to assert that in order to foster and deepen the institutional underpinning of democracy and, for instance, avert donor generosity from being inappropriately reciprocated by government. Several institutions in South Africa, such as the Independent Electoral Commission and the Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa agree that some form of disclosure or registration of funding is warranted.

Litigation is a very useful strategy for CSOs seeking to change policy or legislation or to force the state to comply. And the Constitution provides for the public to act as friends of the court or 'amicus curiae', meaning that any party or individual may provide information and arguments to the court, even though the party may not be directly involved in the case. A typical example is in the TAC case for anti-retroviral drugs (ARVs) where Idasa was able to act as 'amicus curiae' by providing expert evidence (Ranchod, 2007:16). However, litigation is costly endeavour, thus without financial backing, this resource cannot be utilised.

3.3.5. Resource 5: personal or institutional links groups may have to political parties or governance bodies

Robinson and Friedman (2005:24) argue that engagement in political society, through links to political parties or representation in parliament, can offer distinct advantages and potential influence for interest groups. Robinson and Friedman continue to assert that key CSOs in South Africa have maintained close relationships with the ruling ANC and this has in some cases worked to their advantage, for it widened opportunities for policy dialogue. A good example of this is the corporatist relationship that COSATU has with the ANC.

Critics would argue that working closely with government forecloses other options predicated on a more active watchdog role in which CSOs assume a more independent stance working on behalf of citizens. A further issue is whether co-operation with government diminishes or

enhances citizen voice (Robinson and Friedman, 2005:24). What surfaced in the interview shows that this is Idasa's view on the matter to a certain degree.

It appears that Idasa does not have or wish to have any formal institutional links with political parties as this would bring into question its credibility. Verwey stated that the organisation certainly has links with government, and, he affirmed that the slogan at the organisation is that of 'no permanent friends; no permanent enemies'. There have been periods and instances where the organisation has been in successful partnerships with government in specific projects. Then again, there have been instances where a certain level of antagonism has existed between Idasa and the government. Pluralist scholars who comment on the different relationships between the state and civil society would be spot on, for indeed, depending on the issue, state-civil-society relations can take many different forms at different times: conflictual, collaborative, or a variety of both.

3.4. Conclusion:

In sum, pressure groups are confronted by a wide range of 'points of access'. Their choice of targets and methods, however, depend on two factors. First, how effective is a particular strategy likely to be? Second, what resources are available to achieve these aims? Idasa has had at its disposal high levels of public sympathy as seen in their ability to secure donor funding during the latter years of apartheid, during the transition to democracy, and post-apartheid. In addition, it has made use of strategies that inconvenience governance bodies as demonstrated in the 2004 court case with South Africa's major political parties, and their role in the TAC's case regarding the provision of ARV drugs. However, two resources that are interlinked are failing and weakening the organisation's potential. These are the funding that has decreased fundamentally, which is essentially linked to their lack of public sympathy which has consequently taken a slump. Given the structure of Idasa, the fact that the organisation does not have a base of support or membership, fortunately does not take away from their efficiency and potential role in civil society because they work at a slightly higher level, in that they are not a grass-roots NGO.

What we are seeing however is that in spite of the organisation's utilisation of Heywood's resources or modes of engagement, their survival, which translates into their influence, is jeopardized. This, as maintained by Verwey as well as the media, is owing to the fact that South Africa is now considered a middle income country and funding is being directed to countries that

are in greater need. The second reason is because the world is experiencing or has experienced a global recession which has made funds scarcer.

It is for these reasons therefore that this study stands firm on the premise that financial resources are incredibly crucial for an NGO. Other resources matter, however they take a back seat because without money nobody and certainly, no organisation can survive. Money does in deed make the world go round.

Civil society is a distinguishing feature of democratic regimes. Democratic governments are expected to be responsive to the wishes of the people, and civil society is one way in which people can make their wishes known. CSOs facilitate participation and are therefore a second link between citizens and government in democratic states. Civil society not only strengthens representation and broadens the scope of political participation; it also checks government power and promotes debate and discussion. With the demise of such important advocates and protectors of South Africa's democracy, it could mean that democracy becomes a system in theory and not in practice. It could mean that democracy is merely what happens at elections every five years and more ominously, this scenario could translate into a 'democracy without the people'.

CHAPTER 4:

CASE STUDY II

THE TREATMENT ACTON CAMPAIGN (TAC)

4.1. Introduction

This chapter is designated to do three tasks, namely: to examine the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC); discuss the findings of the interview that was conducted with the organisation and lastly operationalise these findings through the lenses of Heywood's conceptual theoretical framework. These three tasks will be tackled as follows: This chapter starts by providing an overview of the organisation, the historical context under which it was established, the programmes that they administer as well as their contribution to civil society and the deepening of democracy in South Africa. The second part very briefly describes the principles that Heywood lays down in his framework. The third part of the chapter presents the findings of the interview conducted, followed by an analysis of the qualitative information by using Heywood's conceptual theoretical framework. In other words, this part will apply the TAC's *modus operandi*, as revealed in the interviews, to Heywood's framework and reveal the challenges faced by the TAC. It is at this point that this chapter will make inferences and draw its conclusions.

4.2. The TAC: the organisation

4.2.1. Historical context

On 10 December 1998, International Human Rights day, the TAC was born as a group of approximately 15 people protested at the staircase in front of the St. George's Cathedral in Cape Town. This group included people infected with the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV), a medical student, a 66-year-old grandmother, a former human rights commissioner and a selection of others, determined to draw attention to the suffering and death caused by the epidemic. This group of protesters were demanding medical treatment for people living with HIV. By-passers were surprised, as few were aware of the fact that HIV could be treated, and the treatment was in fact freely available in Western countries. By the end of the day, the group had collected over 1000 signatures; calling on the government to devise a treatment plan for people living with HIV in South Africa (TAC, 2012).

The launch of the TAC opened a new chapter on the politics of HIV and Aids (Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome). South Africans were disgruntled by the discourse of doom. They were unsettled by popular discourse of how Aids was going to kill millions of people, ruin the economy and devastate the health services, and how there was apparently nothing that could be done to stop it. Although anti-Aids medication had altered the manifestation of the epidemic in developed countries, most South Africans did not know they existed. In addition, it appears that even health workers and HIV/Aids activists seemed to accept that these drugs were unattainable to the developing world, sentencing the developing world's HIV infected population to a premature death (TAC, 2012).

However, on 30 November 1998, when well-known gay rights and Aids activist Simon Nkoli[32] joined the list of South Africans to die of Aids-related illnesses, his colleague and comrade, leader of the TAC, Zackie Achmat decided to take action (TAC, 2012).

Achmat spoke at Simon Nkoli's memorial service and announced that a protest would be held on 10 December 1998 to launch a new campaign, under the backing of the National Association of People With Aids (Napwa), to fight for access to HIV treatment. Initially conceived as a Napwa project, the TAC has grown into an influential independent force in South African politics. In just two years, the organisation was able to spread the message that people with HIV/Aids could be treated and that poor people have a right to health care. The message has been loud and persistent, and neither the pharmaceutical industry nor the government has been able to ignore it, as future events would demonstrate (TAC, 2012).

4.2.2. TAC's work: HIV/Aids activism intensified

In the words of Friedman (2007:3), 'the fight for a comprehensive government response to HIV and Aids is one of the more significant sagas of post-apartheid South Africa'. The TAC is justifiably regarded as the clearest evidence that civil society action can change policy in the new democratic South Africa.

For further detail on the TAC's efforts, see Friedman and Mottiar, 2005; Jones, 2005; Mbali, 2005. The TAC, supported by key international non-governmental organisation (NGO) associates and influential South African civil society public figures, was able to compel the government into agreeing, in late 2003, to the dispensing by the public health system of anti-

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[32] One of South Africa's most prominent gay and HIV/Aids activists. Nkoli was one of the first South African activists to publicly acknowledge his HIV-positive status.

retroviral (ARV) medication to people living with virus. Since this policy change, the TAC has been engaged in a crusade to hold the government to its promise to combat HIV/Aids. At that time it had received the antagonism of then Minister of Health and some provincial health departments, but in the same token, it has constructed co-operative relationships with some provinces and key figures in public health decision-making (Friedman, 2006:15).

The TAC met with two main obstacles in its struggle for universal access to prevention, treatment and care for those with HIV/Aids. The first was the international pharmaceutical companies, which kept the price of patented medication high. The second obstacle was the African National Congress (ANC) government's denialism under President Mbeki. The TAC took both of these parties to court in 2001 (Friedman, 2006:16).

In April 2001, the government and the TAC initially joined forces against the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association (PMA), which was trying to prohibit the parallel importation of generic drugs. Although the South African market represented 0.6 percent of the international market, the 39 major pharmaceutical companies that included the PMA feared that the case would damage the international companies in the long run, and dropped the case (Friedman, 2006:16).

But in September of the same year, the partnership between the state and the TAC had ended, as the TAC and the Department of Health (DoH) confronted each other in court over the affordability of providing the drug Nevirapine to prevent mother-to-child transmission (MTCT) of HIV. Despite the Western Province finding the money to provide the potentially life-saving drug, it was deemed unaffordable to extend treatment for the whole country (Smout, 2011). The strategic and critical engagement with the government that followed was significant, for it allowed the TAC to pragmatically counteract the government's changing position. Rather than being regarded as an anti-ANC activist group, the TAC ensured it based its criticisms of the government's actions, or lack thereof in the language of the South African Constitution (Smout, 2011).

Under Section 27 of the Constitution 'everyone has the right to have access to healthcare services' (RSA Constitution, 1996). The TAC asserted that it was the legal obligation for the government to overcome the expensive costs of treatment and be transparent about the means that it employs. By articulating its criticisms in the language of the Constitution, the TAC utilised

the most important and valued legal document in South Africa to criticise its chief author (Smout, 2011). In so doing, the TAC maintained the character and tone of the dispute within the framework of human rights and presented a link to the earlier anti-apartheid struggles that many TAC members had also been a part of. It also adapted political songs from anti-apartheid struggles as well as engaging in acts of civil disobedience, prompted by its leader, Achmat (Friedman, 2006).

It is this important relationship between the government, the TAC and international human rights organisations that marks the TAC's significant position in contemporary South Africa. In campaigning for healthcare as a socio-economic right, the TAC was concurrently defending and extending political rights, such as freedom of speech and the right to peaceful demonstration which were won in the fight against the apartheid system (Smout, 2011). It is for this reason that the TAC is not branded as an anti-ANC activist group, in spite of relentlessly going against former President Mbeki's Aids denialism[33] (Smout, 2011).

4.2.3. The TAC's contribution to democracy

The TAC can therefore be said to participate in democratic governance in two ways: it has played a crucial role in forcing the government to heed the concerns of an important social constituency, people living with HIV, a number which fell well over five million. These gains have been won not for the affluent or people likely to gain access to government, most TAC members are unemployed black women aged 14-24. It has, therefore, given a voice to people who would not otherwise be heard (Friedman, 2006:16).

The TAC has also participated in the effort to ensure that government policy, adopted in response to citizen demands and the ethos of the Constitution, is put into practice. While the

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[33] Aids denialism refers to the promotion of one or more of the following pseudo-scientific views: (1) HIV does not cause Aids, (2) the risks of antiretroviral drugs outweigh their benefits and (3) there is not a large Aids epidemic in sub-Saharan Africa. Former President Mbeki began openly questioning the viral aetiology of Aids as well as the benefit and effectiveness of proven treatment, particularly Azathioprine, calling it 'toxic'. Mbeki had been in communication with several notorious AIDS denialists and later established a Presidential Aids Advisory Panel, requesting the expertise of unorthodox scientists and denialists. Then Minister of Health, Manto Tshabalala-Msimang became his ally in his consequent disputes with HIV/Aids activists and the scientific establishment. Against the counsel of South African and international physicians and public health specialists, the Mbeki government refused to provide a mother-to-child transmission prevention plan until it was compelled to do so in a court case brought by the TAC in the Constitutional Court. For a comprehensive explanation of AIDS denialism in South Africa, see Nattrass, 2007.

attempt to hold government to its promises is often conflictual, there are also examples of co-operation (Friedman, 2006:16). Once again, as in Idasa's case, elements of pluralism can be traced in the relationship between the TAC and the government depending on the issue at hand.

The TAC is therefore a vehicle for citizen engagement in policy-making and implementation, important features of participatory democracy (Heywood, 2005) and its campaign has functioned within the rules and norms of constitutional democracy. The TAC's role has been to mobilise its constituency to make use of the rights conferred by the democratic system, so as to participate in public decisions. In this way, the TAC is a vehicle for participatory democratic governance, regarded not as participation in formal forums, but as a process in which citizens use democratic rights to make their views voiced about how they are to be governed (Friedman, 2006).

Moreover, the TAC has demonstrated that the most effective means of participatory governance is in the rights enshrined in the Constitution and the democratic framework and institutions which uphold them.

4.3. Interview Report and Analysis:

The same principles applied in the interview with Idasa remain the same in terms of the manner in which the questions were structured thematically. However, the TAC was unavailable to meet for a one-on-one interview. Therefore, interview questions were forwarded via email to a key informant in the organisation, Catherine Tomlinson[34].

The key informant that was interviewed was selected because she holds a senior position at the TAC and is one of the most knowledgeable researchers on the subject of donor funding and would thus provide information on the topic that is most reliable. Tomlinson's expertise and experience within the organisation means that her contribution to this study is critical and invaluable. The questions asked and information collected during the interview was divided into five themes (Heywood's resources as mentioned in the preceding chapters). Table 1

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[34] Catherine Tomlinson is a senior researcher at the TAC, where she has worked for four years in the organisation's Policy, Communication and Research Department. Tomlinson is particularly interested in intellectual property and medicine access and is at present working on TAC's campaign to amend the Patents Act 57 of 1978.

summarises the extent to which the TAC has fulfilled the utilisation of the resources interest groups have at their disposal.

HEYWOOD'S FIVE RESOURCES OF INFLUENCE	TAC'S AVAILABILITY & ACCESS TO RESOURCES (Available/Utilised/Not utilised/Partially utilised/Not Applicable)
1. Public sympathy for the group and its goals	Available and Utilised.
2. The size of its membership or activist base	On the decline
3. Its financial strength and organisational capabilities	On the decline
4. Its ability to use sanctions that in some way inconvenience or disrupt governance	Available and Utilised
5. Personal or institutional links it may have to political parties or governance bodies	Available and Partially Utilised

Table 2: The TAC'S access to Heywood's resources

4.3.1. Resource 1: Public sympathy for the group and its goals

South Africa has been one of the countries most severely hit by the HIV/Aids epidemic. The estimated overall HIV prevalence rate is around 10,6 percent according to Statistics South Africa (2011). The total number of people living with HIV is estimated at approximately 5,38 million mid-year 2011. An estimated 16,6 percent of the adult population aged 15-49 years in South Africa is HIV positive (Stats SA, 2011).

The HIV/Aids rights movement in South Africa is centred around the TAC and this organisation gained recognition domestically and internationally. The TAC is seen by many as an exemplar for CSOs around the world, a 'champion' of demands for social equity and the rights promised by democratic citizenship. The TAC has successfully developed a human rights framework that has not only attracted a solid constituency domestically, but also resonates with global HIV/Aids rights struggles, which are focused on the issue of treatment access and more recently with

broader, global socio-economic rights struggles. In essence, TAC has gained mainstream respectability (Friedman, 2006).

The organisation's leader Zackie Achmat has been nominated for a Nobel Peace Prize; was included in *Time* magazine's list of 'Heroes' (2003) and was described by *The New Yorker* magazine as South Africa's 'most important dissident since Nelson Mandela' (Power, 2003). In addition, *Vanity Fair* profiled Achmat in its 'Special Africa Issue' (June 2007) as one of a few activists, business and entertainment figures, and a number of government officials embodying the 'Spirit of Africa' (Richards, 2007).

As Jacobs and Johnson (2007) point out, framing the fight against HIV/Aids as a human rights issue has enabled links between the TAC and international advocacy networks that are sympathetic to its cause and also facilitated in the provision of a receptive international political location for its message. These authors continue to add that the human rights framework offers a shared pool of meaning that served to bridge homosexual and HIV/Aids advocacy struggles in the industrialised countries with HIV/Aids struggles in Africa. The TAC's focus on the right to treatment, a powerful influence of the HIV/Aids movement since the early days of the epidemic in the United States, deeply resonated with groups such as Act Up and the Health Gap Coalition, but also with CSOs generally, who are not normally connected with HIV/Aids or health matters. For example, the prominent, and mainly mainstream, international NGO Civicus: World Alliance for Citizen Participation, included the TAC as the perfect 'case study' in an activist manual on 'how to run a local campaign linked to an international movement' (Civicus, cited in Jacobs and Johnson, 2007).

In contrast to Idasa, it is clear that the TAC enjoys a great degree of public sympathy, not just in the initial years of its work, but even today. Those outside the organisation deem the work that they do as worthy, relevant, and much needed. The elevated public sympathy for the TAC is reinforced by the fact that its campaign was embedded within the framework of human rights, a Constitutional right not only recognised in South Africa's constitution, but elsewhere in the world. Nowhere in the world are HIV statistics so high, nowhere in the post-democratic South Africa has an NGO been so resilient and influential in changing public opinion and discourse, it is no wonder public sympathy for the TAC is high. However, in these difficult financial times, this issue becomes more complex, as funds are scarcer.

Nevertheless, to echo the interviewee's statement: 'The number of challenges facing the public sector makes it difficult to have one campaign strategy goal. TAC has many on-going campaigns and goals at the same time. This makes it difficult for the public, government etc. to understand what TAC does'. Moreover, the interviewee's acknowledgment of the fact that with over 1.5 million people receiving ARV treatment from the public sector and comprehensive services being made available, could account for the decline in membership. Could it be that public sympathy for the TAC is on the decline, since ARV treatment is freely available in South Africa, thus demonstrating that the main goal of the TAC has been achieved? These are pertinent questions to be considered, and this study argues that these could be developments worthy to be noted and monitored in the future with regards to public sympathy for the TAC.

4.3.2. Resource 2: The size of a group's membership and activist base

Heywood sees the membership base of a civil society organisation as being instrumental in its exertion of influence and determines how strong and successful it is. In the interview, Tomlinson (2012) stated that the TAC has around 10 000 members. She continued to add that with the availability of ARV medication in the public health sector, there has been a decline in membership.

It is important to bear in mind the clarification that Mvinjelwa (2004) makes concerning the membership or activist base: the TAC is in many ways a conventional membership NGO, although significant characteristics of its internal structure are unconventional. There appears to be no definite distinction between TAC members who usually do not pay fees, but fill in membership forms, and its 'supporters', 'volunteers' or 'activists' (Mvinjelwa, 2004 cited in Friedman and Mottiar, 2004). Indeed, Berold (2004) maintains that 'volunteers' and members in essence point to the same thing (Berold, 2004 cited in Friedman and Mottiar, 2004). The primary way of becoming a TAC member is to join a TAC branch and officials and activists usually seem far more comfortable calculating the number of branches than members (for example, one activist put the membership at almost four times its actual size) (Friedman and Mottiar, 2004:6). And, while certain branches do charge a small membership fee, this does not seem to be the norm. Therefore, it may be more accurate to describe people active in the TAC as 'participants' rather than drawing a clear distinction between members and supporters (Friedman and Mottiar, 2004:6). In essence, the TAC membership is a source of mobilisation, for example in marches and petitions, as opposed to a source of revenue.

Membership in early 2004 was said to be approximately 8 000, this had increased to 9 500 by the middle of the same year, although the TAC admits that some people listed as members had died (Geffen, 2004 cited in Friedman and Mottiar, 2004), this however, is a small proportion of the five million people estimated to have been be living with HIV/Aids in 2005. The fact that the TAC draws some of its membership from people living with the virus and that some members lose their lives is, in the view of its leadership, one reason for its limited size (Achmat, 2004 cited in Friedman and Mottiar, 2004). In addition, Mongose, a TAC activist, states also that the stigma of being known as HIV positive is a deterrent to membership: 'some people who are not HIV positive will avoid hanging around with me or joining TAC because they are afraid that they will automatically be assumed by their community to be HIV positive' (Mongose, 2003 cited in Friedman and Mottiar, 2004).

In addition, the TAC activists highlight that the numbers of individuals taking part in its marches, which in 2004 they estimate to have been between 8 000 and 15 000, indicate an ability to mobilise people well beyond its membership (Geffen, 2004). The TAC officials insist that its strength is not based on numbers, a view firmly supported by activists in other CSOs as well, who assert that influence is derived from resources other than the size of membership (Desai, 2004). But TAC leaders acknowledge that the size of its base does constrain it to a certain degree, by ensuring that it cannot undertake some campaigns and cannot win issues by organised strength alone (Mthathi, 2004 cited in Friedman and Mottiar, 2004). This compels the TAC to make use of other resources at its disposal, rather than relying solely on one resource.

Therefore, the fact that the TAC's size of membership is on the decline, does not mean that its activist base is stifled. As stated by Geffen (2004) in the preceding paragraphs, the TAC has been able to mobilise people well beyond its membership base. This means, that the size of membership or activist base declining, in the case of the TAC does not take away from its efficiency. Strength in this context does not rest in numbers, but in the ability to mobilise and gather together individuals into ones cause, irrespective of their affiliation with the organisation. Additionally, it must be noted that not all CSOs have a membership base, because CSOs differ in function, form and objectives.

In addition, as Tomlinson, the interviewee attests, there has been a decline in membership with the wide availability of ARVs in the public sector. Therefore, the decline in membership for the TAC could be a result of a case of 'mission accomplished'.

4.3.3. Resource 3: The financial strength and organisational capabilities

The time of expanding financial resources to combat HIV/Aids is over, according to the World Bank (2009). The World Bank continues to maintain that the global economic crisis has shrunk resources available for foreign aid at exactly the time when more resources are needed.

There is a rising backlash against HIV/Aids-related funding on the grounds that too many resources have been assigned to the Aids response, particularly to ARV drugs (Nattrass and Gonsalves, 2009). However, as Nattass and Gonsalves (2009:2) state, 'even before the global economic crisis, and at the height of the long boom which underpinned the increase in global funding for Aids, a backlash was evident'. The general premise was that HIV/Aids activism had earned an 'unfair' amount of resources; this activism was squandering these resources on socially questionable expenditure and that the money should rather be assigned to other purposes (Garrett, 2007). The heart of the backlash, nevertheless, came from those arguing that HIV/Aids-related funding had undermined health systems in developing countries (England, 2007a; 2007b, 2008). This is a problematic, especially for the HIV/Aids crusade which made the availability of ART treatment possible in developing countries. In the South Africa context particularly, the lessons learned from the fight against HIV/Aids, notably, the significance of community mobilisation and including health-care 'consumers' in decision-making, are beginning to drown the new discourse of 'country ownership'[35] (Nattrass and Gonsalves, 2009).

Financial strength seems to be a resource that the TAC lacks in recent times, just as it is for other HIV/Aids NGOs and most of the NGO sector in South Africa. While the organisational capabilities of the TAC are strong (as its local and international stature testifies), they are nevertheless weakened by financial inadequacy.

On January 2012, the TAC issued a statement in a newsletter where they appealed to donors and reiterated the fact that they were facing a grave financial crisis (TAC, 2012). This statement continued to state that the TAC depends on a five year grant from the Global Fund For Aids, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM)[36] for a large proportion of its work. The TAC is one of the

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[35] Country ownership encompasses joint responsibility and mutual accountability with donors and other partners, specifically when external economic and technical resources are required to fully meet the health-sector needs of host countries.

[36] The GFATM was created in 2002 to increase resources to fight HIV/Aids, tuberculosis and malaria, and to direct those resources to areas of greatest need. GFATM is a public-private partnership and international financing institution with the function of attracting and distributing supplementary financial resources to prevent and treat HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria. This partnership is between governments, civil society, the private sector as

sub-recipients of what is called the Round Six grant. In July 2011, the organisation was meant to receive a R6,5 million grant. More than seven months late, the GFATM grant was finally released to the TAC (Plus News, 2012).

Tomlinson (interviewee) stated four on-going challenges that the TAC is experiencing, one of them, in her own words is 'dwindling funding for HIV'. When Tomlinson was asked about the importance of financial resources in the day-to-day running of the TAC, she maintained: 'financial resources are necessary to run any organisation. The scale of TAC's campaign also requires financial resources. TAC almost had to shut down last year (2011) because of the delays in receiving money from the GFATM. We have now received this funding and able to pay for staff and programmes'.

The key question in these circumstances is what accounts for the delays, or the possibility of a discontinuation in funding? The answer to this question in the case of the TAC is slightly more intricate and multifaceted than what one sees in Idasa's case in the previous chapter. It should be noted, moreover that an explanation on the reasons behind the decline or delay in funding for the TAC will be examined by looking at specifically the grants that the organisation receives from GFATM, their largest donor, and the donor that the TAC in its aforementioned newsletter, labelled as the main contributor to its financial crisis.

There are several, interrelated dynamics that can be attributed to delays in the organisation's primary source of funding, the GFATM. The first dynamic has its roots in the global financial crisis. With many large international donor countries struggling with the difficulties of the economic recession and debt crisis, this has made money less available to them and consequently less available to those in need. A second reason which accounts for the delays in donor funding is, according to the TAC, because the GFATM systems are extremely complex and that the Fund is not pleased that the DoH has met its criteria. The TAC also understands that the plan to amalgamate Round Six, Round Nine and Round Ten grants into a single flow has added to the delays.

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well as communities affected with the aforementioned diseases. The GFATM depends on charitable financial donations from all sectors of society: governments, the private sector, social enterprises, philanthropic foundations and individuals. GFATM for example, signs a legal grant agreement with a 'Principal Recipient'. The principal recipient receives GFATM financing directly, and utilises it to implement prevention, care and treatment programmes or transfers it to other organisations ('Sub-Recipients') who provide those services. In South Africa, the primary recipient of funding is the National Department of Health and the sub-recipients are CSOs in the country, such as the TAC, Soul City, and South Africa Business Coalition on HIV/Aids (SABCOHA) to mention a few.

Another factor that plays itself out in the TAC's funding problems is owing to South Africa's economic position, which is sound and regarded as middle-income. South Africa has the heaviest burden of HIV, but the country is financially sound, has good fiscal policies and healthcare is receiving more in the national budget. According to treasury data, total spending on HIV was R16.9-billion for 2010/11, of which R5-billion was from donors. But as donor funding is scaled back, South Africa will still be able to pay for its antiretroviral programme, unlike many poorer nations (Deghaye and Whiteside, 2012). Although South Africa's economic position as a possible explanation for donor decline is not confirmed in the interview with the TAC, literature does confirm this, and so does South Africa's Minister of health.

According to the Minister of Health, Dr Aaron Motsoaledi, in South Africa 'we can't say we are rich, but we have started that programme of being self-sufficient for a long time. And I'm quite confident that you are not going to be hearing about any province or any area not getting ARVs because of this Global Fund money. There will be problems in other programmes, but not in ARVs. We have tried to be self-sufficient for a long time, especially with the buying of ARVs. We use very little donor money with the purchase of ARVs. The donors are helping us to run programmes of prevention, to fund NGOs… but the ARVs… most of the monies is ours' (Motsoaledi quoted in Thom, 2012).

South Africa utilises less than 10 percent of donor money to purchase ARV drugs. However, some countries are less fortunate. In Zimbabwe, for instance, funding scarcities threaten to disturb treatment for more than 112 000 patients who will already be taking ARVs by the year 2014 (Bodibe, 2012). In addition, Mozambique anticipates facing shortages of first-line ARV drugs by the end of 2013. Many developing nations rely on donor funding for up to 90 percent of their HIV/Aids programmes. However, South Africa is the only African country that is able to fund the majority of its ARV treatment in the public healthcare sector, and further, it is the only African country that donates to the GFATM (Bodibe, 2012). Therefore, this is one reason which could account for the decline in funding geared towards South Africa's HIV/Aids programmes and the TAC's donor decline, because the GFATM is the source, from which both the South African government (primary recipient) and the TAC (secondary recipient) receive their funding.

It is against this backdrop that the TAC has embarked on 'Given-Gain'[37] fundraising drive to raise funds from individuals across South Africa. As Tomlinson (2012) affirms: 'TAC's funding is largely and historically received from international funders. Given the insecurity of continuing to rely on these funders, TAC has begun to seek more funding nationally. A national fundraising office is now active, and they have set up a number of initiatives including using Given-Gain'.

Therefore, financial resources in the form of donor funding, particularly those that are received from the GFATM make up a critical element of the efficiency of an organisation such as the TAC and that the shrinking in funding is threatening the future of not just the organisation, but HIV/Aids programmes that save the lives of many.

The international response to HIV/Aids is decreasing and commitments uncertain because of the global economic crisis, internal issues with the largest donor institution, possible donor fatigue and these kinds of issues have played a part in the decrease of the TAC funding. What this means for an organisation that has, and continues to be a mouth-piece for a marginalised sector of society, brings their existence and future at the hands of others and moreover disempowers an organisation that is relevant, needed, and that is crucial for the democratic counterbalance of this vital section in society. Financial resources are the lifeline of the TAC, as they are for any organisation. The decline, delay, or removing of financial resources is removing the spark of life in a sector needed in South Africa.

4.3.4. Resource 4: the ability to use sanctions that in some way inconvenience or disrupt governance

In the words of Tomlinson, 'the TAC has used a number of strategies to achieve its goals, including: lobbying, picketing marching, legal action and civil disobedience'. Indeed, the TAC adopted a numbers of strategies and modes of influence in its HIV/Aids campaign and activism. It has combined civil disobedience and others kinds of mass mobilisation, as well engagement with formal institutions (including the courts and public health officials). The TAC has succeeded

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[37] Given-Gain was founded in July 2001. It is a web-based platform serving the non-profit sector with online publishing, fundraising, database management and communication tools. In the past decade, the organisation has grown to serve over 400 organisations, processing over R300 million in donations to over 2 300 projects from over 45 000 donors. In Southern Africa, Given-Gain is supported by the Given-Gain Foundation South Africa (GGFSA), whose primary role is to provide training, support and advisory services to Given-Gain clients. Since its launch in 2010, GGFSA has served a number of key organisations and supported some of the most successful web based, social networked, fundraising campaigns in South Africa.

in altering public policy, overcoming official unwillingness to introduce large-scale public provision of ARV medication to HIV-positive patients (Ranchod, 2007:12).

According to Heywood (2003:4), it has been argued that there is hardly a Chapter Nine institution (those institutions mandated in Chapter Nine of the South African Constitution to protect the rights of citizens, such as the South African Human Rights Commission) or statutory body that has not been used by the TAC (Heywood, 2003:4). Its campaigns have included appeals to the Human Rights Commission, the Public Protector, the Competition Commission, the Gender Commission and the Auditor General. The TAC has also made use of the courtroom when it partnered with the government in dealing with copyright laws preventing the use of generic HIV drugs. The TAC achieved a second court victory when it forced the then minister of health, Dr. Mantho Tshabalala-Msimang, to provide ARV treatment for the prevention of MTCT of HIV (Ballard et al, 2005).

The use of lobbying and litigation by the TAC can be traced to its 1998 to 2003 treatment access campaign as well as subsequent policy creation. In a sense, the fourth resource for exerting influence has been considered implicitly in the historical context of the TAC's inception and inextricably with other resources.

Nevertheless, with regard to lobbying, the TAC came into conflict with the South African government and international pharmaceutical companies to provide broader access to HIV drugs for people living with HIV as stated earlier. By the end of 1998, the TAC had already commenced a campaign for the Prevention of Mother-to-Child Transmission of HIV (PMTCT). In this campaign, the TAC compelled the government to provide access to Azathioprine (AZT). Some government officials argued that the drug was too expensive, while others openly rejected the efficiency of the treatment (Heywood, 2003).

For the following five years, the TAC demonstrated and marched all over South Africa in protest of the government and pharmaceutical companies. The case was later presented to the Court in 2002.

Reiterating the anti-dompas (pass law) defiance campaigns of the apartheid epoch, the TAC started the 'Christopher Moraka Defiance Campaign against Patent Abuse' in 2000 (Robins 2004). This civil disobedience campaign aimed to bring to light the profiteering on patented medication by unlawfully bringing in generic medication from Thailand (Robins 2004).

In public, the TAC stated its objectives of defying pharmaceutical patents at a conference in July 2000, while also pleading to other organisations and individuals to take part in their campaign. This brought great international attention, strengthening the uproar against pharmaceutical company, Pfizer. After Achmat purchased 5 000 capsules of fluconazole in Thailand, the TAC revealed the profiteering and patent exploitation by Pfizer. For example, a 200 mg capsule of fluconazole[38] cost R28.57 in the South African public healthcare sector and R80.24 in the private sector, while in Thailand, one capsule cost R1.78. It became evident that Pfizer had raised prices of brand medications. This discrepancy in pricing, along with Pfizer's reluctance to disclose their investment and pricing policies, left Pfizer with a tainted reputation (Bloom 2000).

Not long after, and in March 2001, Pfizer finally lowered medication prices. The public pressure built up through TAC's protests in the form of demonstrations throughout Cape Town and Durban, forced the company to reduce the prices of their products (Thomas and Dorono 2004). In government clinics, Pfizer made its drugs freely available (Robins 2004).

Though the TAC won a victory against Pfizer, the fight against pharmaceutical giants was not over. While TAC was also confronting the South African government in its PMTCT campaign, it was working alongside the government in a court case instigated by pharmaceutical companies. In March 2001, thirty-nine pharmaceutical companies, represented through the PMA, brought the South African government to court (OXFAM Policy Report, 2001). The PMA claimed that certain amendments to the 1997 Medicines and Related Substances Act were unconstitutional. The proposed amendments would enable the government to make drugs more affordable in South Africa by decreasing the prices of the PMA's drugs (TAC Diary 2008). The law allowed less expensive generic drugs to be imported or made in South Africa. Though the TAC was not initially involved in the case, the organisation incorporated itself into the court case as a 'friend of the court', or *amicus curiae*, to present testimony relevant to the government's case.

In addition, as stated by Tomlinson in the interview: 'The work of TAC and partners has also resulted in the adoption of a comprehensive policy to respond to HIV in South Africa. This was done through working with government and SANAC (South African National Aids Council)'. Indeed, the TAC has made use of a number of strategies to inconvenience governance, and even beyond 2003. Presently, there are a number matters of which the organisation is lobbying for. The most recent, as stated in the interview, is the complaint lodged by the organisation with

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[38] Treatment for Cryptococcal meningitis, a medical condition common among HIV patients.

the Public Protector against KwaZulu-Natal Member of the Executive Council (MEC) for health and KwaZulu-Natal DoH for its use of the Tara Klamp (TK), an unsafe male circumcision device[39].

4.3.5. Resource 5: personal or institutional links groups may have to political parties or governance bodies

According Tomlinson, in earlier times, while South Africa had a denialist government, the TAC's relationship with government was extremely conflictual. However today, the organisation has improved its relationships with government and often works to support its initiatives. This is owing to the fact that nowadays, the leadership of the DoH has displayed the political will to manage HIV, and basing interventions on scientific support. However, Tomlinson adds that: 'the TAC has retained its independence and continues to challenge government'. Once again, this points to the plural and corporatist relationship that exists between the state and CSOs in the South African democratic context. Thus, the TAC is able to balance its role of conflict and co-operation in its relationship with the government.

4.4. Conclusion

In conclusion, to echo Tomlinson's words, in South Africa today there is a more extensive arena for NGOs to exist and campaign, in contrast to earlier times. The right to strike and demonstrate for instance is now defended in the laws that govern the country. Examples are plenty of the TAC's use of sanctions that in some inconvenience and disrupt governance, and this can be traced to the TAC's overall treatment access campaign that prompted its launch and shaped its subsequent work. Lobbying, litigation, defiance campaigns, demonstrations and so forth, are among the organisation's many strategies in this regard. This is one resource that the TAC has made great use of, more so than many other CSOs in the country.

In addition, the TAC enjoys a great degree of public sympathy, not just in the initial years of its work, but even today. The TAC's links with international advocacy groups has enabled this.

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[39] The complaint asks the Public Protector to investigate the procurement and continuing use of the Tara Klamp (TK) to perform medical circumcisions on adolescent and adult men in KwaZulu-Natal. According to the TAC, the TK is a dangerous instrument. For this reason, it has not been approved by the World Health Organisation, because it failed in the only clinical trial conducted to test its safety. The TAC has continued to ask the KwaZulu-Natal government to stop the use of the TK since the organisation has first learned of its use in 2010. The TAC has also asked the National Department of Health to intervene. The TAC's complaint is supported by the South African Medical Association and the Southern African HIV Clinicians Society.

Moreover, the framing of the fight against HIV/Aids as a human rights issue has enabled links between the TAC and international advocacy networks that are sympathetic to its cause and also assisted in the provision of a receptive international political cite for its message. Indeed, those outside the organisation deem the work that the TAC does do as relevant. Nowhere in the world are HIV statistics so high, and nowhere in the post-democratic South Africa has an NGO been so resilient and influential in changing public opinion and discourse, it comes as no surprise that public sympathy for the TAC is high. However, in these uncertain financial times, this issue becomes more intricate, as funds are scarcer.

Pertaining to size of membership, the fact that the TAC's size of membership is on the decline, does not mean that its activist base is stifled, as the TAC has been able to mobilise people well beyond its membership base. This means, therefore that the size of membership or activist base declining, in the case of the TAC, does not take away from its efficiency.

What we are seeing however, is that in spite of the TAC's well utilisation of Heywood's modes of engagement, their survival, which translates into their influence, is endangered. This is owing to financial strength, which appears to be a resource that the TAC lacks in recent times quite significantly, just as it is the case for other HIV/Aids NGOs and the rest of the NGO sector in South Africa. This occurrence is owing to the fact that the global financial crisis has made funds scarcer and thus caution and parsimony on spending results on the side of the donors. Also, South Africa's position as a middle income country has conceivably forced donors to fund developing countries that have weaker economies, that is to say, economies that are unable to provide treatment to HIV infected individuals in their country. As the minister of the DoH, Dr Motsoaledi has affirmed, South Africa is capable of providing ARV treatment for HIV positive South Africans and the country is well on its way to 'self-sufficiency', a position that he advocates for strongly.

However, the TAC's situation, with regard to financial resources is more intricate than what meets the eye. There is interplay of the above mentioned factors along with specific donor-specific problems, as shown in the GFATM circumstances. It is in light of this, that the survival of the TAC has been placed at stake and the organisation has resorted to alternative fundraising initiatives.

Civil society has a vital role to ensure that democratic rights are upheld. Civil society and communities have the power to shape and inform these laws and policies in South Africa.

Government is required to carry out public consultations on new laws and policies before they are adopted. Additionally, while adopting good laws and policies is important, this in itself is not enough. An active civil society is necessary in ensuring that these policies are implemented. The TAC has demonstrated with its lobbying tactics, and its constitutional court case that the role that civil society must and can play an instrumental role in ensuring that the government upholds the legal rights of its citizens. With the demise of such important advocates and protectors of South Africa's democracy and Constitution, it would mean that democracy is a system whereby citizens are passive spectators in their own lives. This is a cause for great concern, particularly for an NGO such as the TAC, which advocates on behalf of a marginalised social constituency. Active citizenship and participation, as displayed by the TAC's actions, fortifies and deepens the quality of democratic governance by constantly bringing overlooked and diverse needs, concerns, and perspectives into the decision-making process. It is because of the role that CSOs have in deepening democracy, that this study highlights the problem of donor funding, because the work of the TAC is indispensable and moreover stifled without sufficient financial backing, even in the presence of a myriad of other resources mentioned in this study.

CHAPTER 5

EVALUATION AND CONCLUSION OF STUDY

5.1. Introduction

Having read numerous media publications reporting the closure of key CSOs in South Africa, and the rising ramifications of the global financial crisis, this stimulated an interest in exploring this phenomenon. This study sought to understand and explore the nature of the influence of the global financial crisis on South Africa's CSOs with a focus on non-governmental organisations in particular, and the prospects for deepening democracy. The research question guiding this study was: what are the challenges facing civil society groups in South Africa, with a focus on the global financial crisis? In addition, this study asked a narrower question: has the global financial crisis influenced democracy in South Africa? This chapter is designated to summarise and assemble the different aspects and findings of the study. This will be done as follows: The first part outlines the progression of this research study, by concisely reviewing the rationale, aims, purpose, research question and design of the study, as well as the conceptual theoretical framework utilised. The second part of this chapter evaluates this study and the findings of the two case studies. The third part discusses possible implications of the study as well as that of democracy in South Africa and indicates possible areas for future research on the subject.

5.2. Overview of the study

Chapter one served as an introduction to the research study. It presented an overview of the global financial crisis which began in 2008. The global financial crisis was brought about by an interplay of valuation and liquidity problems in the U.S. banking system in 2008. The bursting of the U.S. housing bubble, which peaked in 2007, caused the values of securities tied to U.S. real estate pricing to plummet, bringing devastation to financial institutions globally. Difficulties in bank solvency, declines in credit availability and wounded investor confidence had an impact on global stock markets, where securities suffered large losses during 2008 and early 2009. Economies worldwide lost pace during this period, as credit constricted and international trade tapered. Governments and national banks acted in response to this occurrence with unparalleled fiscal stimulus, monetary policy development and institutional bailouts (Naude, 2009:2-3). As a developing country, South Africa was affected by the economic recession. Several sectors were influenced by the economic crisis, and the civil society sector is one.

Pertaining to the civil society sector, the past three or four years have seen a number of NGOs fall under strain, financially and being on the verge of collapse due to a lack of financial support.

In this chapter two sets of literature were reviewed: first the pioneering literature of Almond and Verba (1963) on civic culture as well as extensive literature on the role of civil society; civil society and democracy; and more specifically civil society in South Africa. The literature reviewed, as the desktop part of the study, prepared the ground for the empirical part.

In addition, this chapter identified the problem statement: in light of the role of civil society in deepening democracy. NGOs, as a type of civil society organisations may be beginning to experience the negative effects of the global financial crisis in South Africa. This research therefore sought to explore the influence of the global financial crisis and other challenges on South Africa's NGO's, with a particular focus on Idasa as well as the TAC.

The rationale of this study has its roots in the fact that civil society is an important feature in democracy. This study holds that in South Africa, civil society is even more important, seeing as though the ruling party, the ANC has overwhelming political power resulting in a dominant party system. In the absence of a strong opposition party, a robust civil society is not only necessary, but mandatory. Thus, the relevance of the study has been to assist in the evaluation of the role that civil society has played in shaping South Africa's young democracy and what it will mean for democracy if key CSOs are to shut down.

Further, the first chapter established the research method and research design of the study. The study was explorative in nature and relied on qualitative data with the design type being the use of case studies. The study was explorative in nature, allowing for the systematic investigation of relationships among the variables of the study. In addition, the research design was chosen to consist of a data-gathering method using primary data obtained by means of in-depth interviews with key informants from the two case studies (NGOs): Idasa and the TAC.

This chapter also contained the conceptualisation and operationalisation of the key concepts and variables of the study. The dependent variable (civil society) was conceptualised. This study conceptualised civil society as formal and informal associations and networks in society, which exist outside the state, for example, NGOs, trade unions, churches, media, research institutions and think tanks, women's groups, environmental groups and human rights

organisations. This definition does not include markets and it is of importance to note that civil society is different to society, that is the general populace, and it differs from political society, which includes political parties. Further, the dependent variable was operationalised in terms of Heywood's (2007) framework which argues for five resources CSOs need in order to exert their influence, namely:

1. public sympathy for the group and its goals
2. the size of its membership or activist base
3. its financial strength and organisational capabilities
4. its ability to use sanctions that some way inconvenience or disrupt governance
5. personal or institutional links it may have to political parties or governance bodies.

Another important matter to consider is the importance of civil society for democracy. Scholars such as Huntington, Diamond, Putman, Linz and Lipset for example consider civil society as key for the development and preservation of secure democracy in developing countries. Civil society has a vital role in ensuring that democratic prerequisites and rights are upheld by the government by holding those in government accountable and responsive to their constituents.

Chapter two served to build a foundation for the study, and provide a historical account of civil society in South Africa. In essence, this chapter provided a detailed overview of civil society in South Africa and its contributions to deepening democracy. This chapter started by presenting theories of group politics, namely pluralism and corporatism, with the aim of underscoring the various roles of CSOs in their relationship to the state. The evolution of civil society in South Africa was explained, by looking at civil society during apartheid, during the transition to democracy and in the democratic era. Further, chapter two put forward methods of influence, strategies and resources that civil society in South Africa have at their disposal and that they employ. This chapter outlined the five resources that CSOs can use to exert their influence, with a focus on financial resources. This was looked at through democracy aid to South Africa; the boom years as well as the current years where there has been a decline.

This chapter found that pluralism places emphasis on the beneficial effects of social and cultural diversity of having many different institutions, values, groups and ways of life. Pluralism also encourages constitutional methods of incorporating different perspectives on public policy matters. Corporatism on the other hand, accentuates the incorporation of certain groups in society into the decision-making process for a mutually beneficial outcome. The CSOs gain from

having to share in political power, and the state benefits from the cooperation and expertise of groups such as business and labour in the execution of policy decisions.

In this chapter it was discovered that the presence of a vibrant civil society and the appropriate structural conditions such as political culture, economic development and international involvement, provided a conducive environment for political liberalisation and the corrosion of the apartheid system. In addition, chapter two found that in the democratic South Africa, a vibrant civil society provides an avenue for popular will and demands to be expressed. CSOs provide avenues for those matters that may not have been given precedence by political parties, to be put on the public agenda. Numerous modes of engagement are used by CSOs in their interaction with government and spaces of civil society engagement have broadened post-apartheid. This chapter also found that a pluralist relationship between civil society and government exists, and the form that this pluralist relationship takes, is contingent on the issue at hand.

Chapters three and four contained the main analysis of the study and built on Heywood's framework on CSO resources. These two chapters served to report the findings of the interview conducted with key informants at Idasa and the TAC. The first case-study, Idasa was examined in chapter three and in chapter four, the TAC. These two chapters examined Idasa and the TAC by looking at each organisation's historical context, its present-day programmes and operations as well as its contributions to democracy. In addition, this chapter reported the findings of the interview and provided an analysis of the findings through the lenses of Heywood's framework, essentially a summary of the extent to which Idasa and the TAC has fulfilled the utilisation of the resources that it has available was presented.

For Idasa, the study found the following: Public sympathy for Idasa and its goals is on the decline, though it was high in the initial years of democracy in South Africa, it has decreased in recent times. With regards to the size of membership and activist base, this study found that Idasa is a non-membership NGO. However, the fact that this organisation is a non-membership NGO does not reduce its influence and the advancement of its interests and goals. Pertaining to financial strength, this appears to be a resource that Idasa lacks significantly, particularly in recent times; so much that the organisation has been forced to close-down its Cape Town office and retrench its staff members. Idasa has made use of lobbying and litigation. However, in the absence of financial strength, litigation avenues are weakened, because litigation is costly

endeavour. Finally, with regards to personal or institutional links with political parties, this study discovered that Idasa does not have or wish to have any formal institutional links with political parties, as this, the organisation believes would bring into question its credibility.

For the TAC the study found the following: The study also uncovered that the TAC, as with Idasa, exhibited pluralistic tendencies in its interactions with the government. This is evident in the lobbying and litigation strategies employed by the TAC, but also in the partnerships that have also been cultivated between the government and the organisation. With regards to financial resources: as Idasa struggles with financial resources, so does the TAC. This is attributed to the global recession which has made funding for NGOs less. This study found that one of the organisation's largest donors (GFATM) delayed a grant by several months which placed the organisation in what they call a 'funding crisis'. Reasons for this delay in funding are complex, however, internal donor problems were revealed as one of the causes for the delay among other issues. Pertaining to membership, the TAC has seen its membership size decrease, however this has not stifled the activist base, for the TAC has been able to mobilise individuals beyond their activist base. Additionally, with the rollout of ARV treatment in South Africa, membership has decreased. Finally, regarding public sympathy for the organisation and its goals, the TAC has seen high levels of public sympathy. The elevated public sympathy for the TAC is bolstered by the fact that its major campaign (access to treatment for individuals living with HIV/Aids) was embedded within the framework of human rights.

5.3. Evaluation of the study

This section finalises the thesis with an evaluation of the research study. It consists of three main parts: one that focuses on answering the research questions, the second discusses implications and recommendations for future research, and the third reports the key findings of the interviews conducted. Before proceeding, it is important to note a few matters first. The majority of the articles and studies presented in the literature analysis in chapters one and two were found to be very useful in serving as a foundation for this research. The use of primary data in the research study was ideal, for insider and expert insight on the two NGOs examined, added an invaluable contribution on the analysis of the study. However, in light of only one organisation, Idasa, being able to meet for a face-to-face interview, this may have had a bearing on the depth of the interview via correspondence due to the TAC not being available for an in-depth interview. Nevertheless, the TAC key informant allowed for follow up questions, also via

correspondence after the initial questionnaire was mailed. This alleviated the concerns regarding the profundity of the interview to a great extent.

During the data analysis, this study focused on identifying themes from the interview data, namely the five resources identified in Heywood's framework. Through identifying themes, this study was able to ascertain the information required, and also by using two sources of information, this study was able to look for repetition in the data, or supporting evidence or differences from the two sources. These two case studies are similar in that one could argue they were victims of their success long before the onset of the global financial crisis. Perhaps the realisation of its goals meant that these two organisations could no longer hold on to donor funding. The global financial crisis may have merely been an intensifying element in an already adverse situation. The differences, on the other hand rest on the fact that Idasa is a non-membership group, while the TAC has membership. Nevertheless, the TAC's membership is a source of mobilisation, not revenue. This inadvertedly, places both organisations in the same position in terms of donor income, for they both reply on it for the functioning of the organisations.

5.3.1. Answering the research question

The central question asked in this study was: what are the challenges facing civil society organisations in South Africa, with a focus on the global financial crisis? The secondary question was: has the global financial crisis influenced democracy in South Africa? Civil society groups are an integral part of our democracy, thus, what does the demise of civil society organisations, due to a lack of funding, mean for participatory, representative and accountable democracy? These questions were answered by examining two CSOs, Idasa and the TAC by secondary data analysis.

In answering the research questions posed, this study learned that civil society groups are faced with a number of challenges. A challenge that seemed to be salient, at least in the two CSOs examined, was finances in the form of donor funding. In light of the second and narrower question this study sought to answer, it became apparent that the global financial crisis has indeed influenced CSOs and correspondingly influenced democracy, for the role of CSOs is democratic in nature. The fact that some NGOs have been adversely affected by the financial crisis, it inadvertently undermines the democratic role that CSOs fulfil. When looking at the third

and fourth broader question of this study, the invaluable role that civil society has played historically and in present-day in South Africa is highlighted. The political pressure that civil society was able to exert through mass mobilisation put pressure on the apartheid state to adopt measures of political liberalisation and to consider negotiations as a possibility to bringing an end to the pervasive political strife. In addition, civil society contributed to the development of the rudimentary, yet crucial prerequisites for democratic pluralism. In the democratic system that South Africa has since 1994 adopted, elected officials are meant to represent the interests of their constituents in government, so elections are needed, though not sufficient for a well-functioning democracy. A vibrant civil society provides another avenue for popular will and demands to be articulated, particularly between elections and outside of political parties.

Essentially, this study maintains that civil society is a distinguishing feature of democratic regimes. Democratic governments are expected to be responsive to the wishes of the people, and civil society is one way in which people can make their wishes known. CSOs facilitate participation and are therefore a second link between citizens and government in democratic states. Civil society not only strengthens representation and broadens the scope of political participation; it also checks government power and promotes debate and discussion. With the possible demise of such important advocates and protectors of South Africa's democracy, it could mean that democracy becomes a system in theory and not in practice. It could also mean that democracy is merely what happens at elections every five years and more ominously, this scenario could translate into a 'democracy without the people'. Therefore, in the absence of a strong opposition party (as is the case in South Africa), a robust civil society is not only necessary, but mandatory.

Challenges for CSOs in South Africa

From the two case studies and from supporting secondary data, it was found that that the key challenges faced by civil society in South Africa are as follows:

- Funding shortages due to an increasing scarcity of donor funding, resulting from the global financial crisis, as well as allocation of funding away from middle income developing countries, like South Africa, towards low income developing countries.
- Human resource challenges as people move from CSOs into more secure incomes in business and government.

- In addition, owing to the limited understanding of the continued role of CSOs in a democracy, this has resulted in a decrease in public sympathy for the work that these two organisations perform.

It is to be noted that although this study is making general conclusions, it recognises the limitations of case-studies. Generalisations cannot always be made. However, these case studies were used to complement secondary data that was already available.

5.3.2. Implications and recommendations for future research

The significance and implications of this study are extensive. This study has contributed to the discussions on the role of civil society and wider analyses of the distribution of power and the nature of the state. A discussion on group politics with reference to pluralist and corporatist theories was important for it brought to light civil society's wide variations in form and character. In addition, it is important in that it underscored the various roles of CSOs in their relationship to the state.

The CSO's available and utilised resources for the exertion of their influence by CSOs in democratic regimes has far reaching consequences for not only South Africa's civil society, but African states as a whole, and other states that have dominant party systems and fledgling democracies.

While this research focused on resources, predominantly financial resources, other resources that CSOs have at their disposal could be examined for future studies, for instance, access to an independent media, links with international CSOs, and the utilisation of social media and technology. Therefore, the possibility of incorporating these factors into a more comprehensive framework could be explored. In addition, fundraising efforts for CSOs is another possible future research area. Many CSOs are fully dependent on donations and grants, thus, it would be appropriate to explore means to ensure self-sufficiency of CSOs, especially in light of the economic climate that society is under. In addition, this study interviewed the receivers of the donor funding, possible future studies could include the donor funders' expressed grounds for decreasing, delaying or halting donations to certain CSOs. This could potentially open a new dimension on the topic of donor funding, democracy aid, development aid and so forth.

5.4. Conclusion

To return to the opening considerations about the influence of the global financial crisis: the present-day world is one of difficult compromises as a result of shrinking budgets. The economic environment is becoming progressively stark and the question or rather the concerns that this study has pointed to are warranted.

Civil society has the power to shape and inform the norms, discourse, debates and most importantly laws and policies in South Africa. Government is required to carry out public consultations on new laws and policies before they are adopted. Additionally, while adopting good laws and policies is important, this in itself is not sufficient. An active civil society is necessary in ensuring that these policies are implemented. The TAC and Idasa have demonstrated that civil society can and ought to and play an active role in ensuring that the government responds to the needs of the citizens. With the reduction, delay and or halt in financial backing for such important advocates and protectors of South Africa's democracy and Constitution, it would mean that democracy is a system whereby citizens are passive bystanders in their own lives.

Active citizenship and participation, as displayed by the two case studies' actions, fortifies and deepens the quality of democratic governance. It is because of the role that CSOs have in deepening democracy, that this study highlights the problem of donor funding, because the work of civil society is indispensable and moreover stifled without sufficient financial backing, even in the presence of a myriad of other resources mentioned in this study.

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APPENDIX A

INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPTION:

INSTITUTE FOR DEMOCRACY

<u>Interviewer:</u> Nomathamsanqa Masiko

<u>Interviewee:</u> Len Verwey

<u>Dates:</u> 20 August 2012

Question 1:

The first question asked was a general question, to better understand Idasa and the work that they do.

Question: Briefly tell me about Idasa. (classification of organisation, what you do, programmes you're involved in, when NGO started, why it started, etc.)

<u>Respondent:</u> *Idasa started in the mid-1980s as a means of finding a democratic alternative to South Africa. So initially it was a lot of facilitation of democratic dialogue between organisations that were quite polarised and the band ANC, and then you know white South Africa. Post 1994 we are an organisation that in various ways tries to consolidate democracy in South Africa as well as in the rest of the continent. We understand democracy as consisting of democratic institutions, active citizenship and social justice. So the organisation head office is in Pretoria but we actually work across Africa these days in partnerships with African NGO's as well. You know in a sense our roots are still here. So it's really any kind of work that we feel contributes to the democracy. It's a mix of research and advocacy work really.*

Question 2:

The second question asked related to Heywood's second resource, the size of membership or activist base.

Question: *Tell me about the size of your membership/activist base. What is the composition of your base of support and has there been a steady growth over the years?*

Respondent: *I don't know that the term 'base of support' is so accurate for us. I mean we are an NGO. At the moment we are about 50 staff and in a range of partnership agreements with NGOs but we're not a mass movement we never have been, we have always defined ourselves as an institute. We used to be an institute for democracy in South Africa, so I think we work at a slightly higher level in the sense that we're not a grass-roots NGO, we tend to work more with policy-makers and other stake-holders at that level, and with a mass based movement.*

Question 3

The third question asked was also a general question, seeking to better understand the organisation's goals and priorities, with the 'hidden intention' of finding out if 'the deepening of democracy' is at all a priority for the organisation.

Question: *What are the key aims and goals of Idasa and would you say that these goals have been met? If yes or no, please motivate your answer.*

Respondent: *The consolidation of democracy which is citizen empowerment, making the institutions more democratic, and also a society which is defined by social justice which for us means, if you look at South Africa: it means much less inequality, reducing poverty significantly, obviously creating jobs as well. Democracy is always a journey rather than a destination (somewhere, where you arrive). South Africa became a formal democracy in 1994, but I mean there are a lot of challenges obviously still, and even in countries that have established democracies we see in the global North, we see a lot of established democracies under threat in various ways these days, so this kind of work will always exist. And we would always like to contribute to it as well.*

Question 4

The fourth question was seeking to understand the challenges facing the organisation, so as to see if those challenges have a great bearing in the organisation. Another concealed objective of this question was to find out if any of the resources Heywood speaks of creep up, particularly, the financial resources.

Question: *What have been and/or are the key challenges facing Idasa in the attainment of the aforementioned goals?*

Respondent: *Well, we've been around for, and are probably the oldest existing NGO in South Africa, I mean, it's been 20 years now (since 1986). The challenges have probably changed over the years. The initial challenges were just trying to contribute to democracy in South Africa. Because we had a formal democracy, but there was so much work to do with institutional reform in South Africa as well, that initially it was a question for us of finding ways to, there was so much work to be done, the entire statute book of apartheid South Africa had to be re-written. So in that time we worked quite closely with Parliament. I would say that in last 5 or 6 years, the challenge has more been to convince both funders and the South African government of our continued relevance. 'Cause the argument is sometimes made that, well, we don't really need democracy organisations in South Africa, we are a democracy, we have money. So it's more to convince people of our viewpoint, which is that you need a strong civil society presence in any society, if citizens are going to be able to make their voices heard.*

At times in our history we've been successfully funded, in other words, we've been able to make the argument that our work is important to be funded. But in the last 3 or 4 years, that has been more difficult.

Like many NGO's in South Africa, at the moment, I think the primary challenge is one of survival. We're seeing, I think, a changing environment where funding from abroad is scarcer and government funding, Lottery funding, all of these mechanisms are not really taking up the slack very effectively. We did a study, for example, it was actually for SARS, on civil society in South Africa, and it was amazing how many NGO's were complaining about delays in funding coming through to them. From government's perspective, it's not a huge sums of money necessarily, but a 2 month delay on R500 000 can make a difference between an NGO surviving or having to close down.

Question 5

The fifth question asked, I would argue encompasses the crux of the interview, for it inquires about the focal point of the study, and that is financial resources of the organisation. Question five is therefore three-fold. Because the question is so heavy-loaded, there was also a follow up and probing question that was unplanned, but crept up during the interview. The follow up question asked whether the funding that Idasa received came with any conditionality.

Question: *a). How important are financial resources in the day-to-day running of the organisation/programmes that the organisation has and where do these financial resources come from? b). Who are your chief sources of funding, local or international? c). What about the Global Financial Crisis? How has it influenced Idasa, if at all?*

Respondent: *a). It's pretty essential really. Even though all of our staff I'd say tend to work in this field for ethical reasons, because they regard themselves as activists and they want to change the world. You know they still have bills to pay, as well. I don't think you could ever have a successful NGO-culture based on volunteerism. So salaries need to be paid, work needs to be done. So, what happens is that a lot of heads of NGOs spend most of the time worrying about funding, trying to fund-raise, etc. But I think that's fine. But what we're seeing at the moment is that too many organisations are struggling too much, and I don't think it's good for the depth of democracy in South Africa. And we see what happened with, for example what happened at Lonmin mine, and these kind of issues. We see that there are so many issues actually that are unresolved in our society, so it would be a pity if at this point too many of these CSOs do go under.*

b). Idasa has always had a mix of funding. But primarily, we are funded by altruistic foundations, so the Ford foundation, the open society foundation these kind of things on the one hand, and on the other hand we are funded by ODA (Official Development Assistance) from Northern governments for development. Those have been our two main ones. We have often taken project funding from, for example the South African government. But we've never wanted or had it as a main source of funding because we feel our independence is an important part of our brand and our credibility as well.

Follow-up question: *Does the funding that you receive come with any conditionality?*

Resondent: *All of it is for specific work (project-based). We write proposals, or we rather respond to calls for proposals that are out there in the world. Some of them are successful, 1 in 5 or 1 in 10 of the proposals we send out are successful in fact. But obviously, we look for the proposals that fit our own mission. We do also try to talk to donors about what we think is important, and that's influenced the kind of work that gets funded.*

c). It's had a huge influence. We've seen in the last 2 or 3 years a significant cut in funding available to an organisation such as ours to the extent that we retrenched half of our staff last year and closed our Cape Town office. I think it's a combination of things, really. It's the global

financial crisis, which has made less money available and it's also a change in focus of that funding. South Africa becoming a middle-income country, this kind of factor in a time of resource scarcity has meant that it's more difficult for ODA funders to convince their own citizens that they should send money to South Africa. So in other words, if you're sitting with a problem of I can either send money to the Sudan or South Africa. It's hard for them on that side, even if they perhaps think there are pressing challenges here. South Africa is a democracy, it's a middle income country, it's harder to make that argument.

Question 6

This question relates to Heywood's fourth resource, the ability of interest groups to use sanctions that in some way inconvenience or disrupt governance.

Question: *What strategies does Idasa use (for example lobbying, protesting, boycotts) to achieve its goals? A follow-up question came up during the interview regarding the success of one strategy that Idasa used a few years ago, specifically litigation.*

Respondent: *We use a mix of research and advocacy. So on the one hand, quite a lot of our staff are researchers, so they try and understand the situation, so that we can actually lobby effectively. I would say it's a mix as well. We work with Parliament, we make submissions to Parliament, for example, we meet with policy-makers, we provide inputs on draft legislation, we do a lot of talking to the media, trying to look at the way they regard things as well. And in some cases we are actively involved in some campaigns, like the 'right-to-know campaign'. Once or twice in our history, we used litigation. A couple of years ago we took South Africa's major political party to court to try to compel them to reveal the sources of party funding. So basically, we use a mix of strategies to be effective.*

Follow-up question (*How successful was the court case?):*

Respondent: *Well, we lost the case and there still isn't legislation for party funding, so probably not that successful.*

Question 7

This question was quite loaded as well. It sought to explore Heywood's fifth resource in his framework; that of personal or institutional links interest groups may have to political parties or governance bodies. This question was three-fold:

Questions:

a). *Can you provide specific examples of where Idasa influenced the government or government policy? How did you achieve this? b). Do you have institutional links with political parties/government or other civil society organisation? How do these links, if they exist, benefit the organisation and that which the organisation does? c). How is your relationship with the government?*

Respondent:

a and b). We don't have any institutional links (formal links) with political parties, I think we've in a sense avoided that. We certainly have links with government. So I think the successes are usually where you make a contribution to legislation. For example that's one kind of success, and I think there's a lot of those. But on the other hand, probably where we are most effective is quite intangible because it's about getting people to talk across their differences. I mean that's what our history is, that's where the organisation's history lies as well. We continue to do that kind of facilitation. I think given what's happened in the last week, etc, there's probably a more urgent role for Idasa again, because we seem to have quite a breakdown in a way, of the ability of stakeholders in for example what happened at Lonmin mine. That kind of thing is the kind of work we actually do well; trying to bring parties together, trying to find solutions as well. But you know it's not always democracy workers, perhaps not as… It's impact is not as easy to point to as for example building houses in an informal settlement.

c). It varies, I mean, one of our slogans is: 'no permanent friends, no permanent enemies'. So I think we've worked in some cases very successfully in partnership with government in specific projects. There've also been times when I think some people in government have been annoyed with us. Government's also a very very 'broad' concept, so I think we have friends, we have 'not' enemies, but people who don't like us in government as well.

Question 8

Question eight is a more general question, seeking to uncover the role and place of civil society in society, past and present.

Question: *What does being an NGO in present-day SA mean/entail, and has it changed from historical times?*

Respondent: *I think if you look at the apartheid era, if you looked at the NGO sector at that point, there were really only two things. There were welfare oriented white NGOs that worked with needy people in the society 'arm blankes', and then you had obviously those NGOs that were more all directly or indirectly involved in the struggle against apartheid. So I think what's happened in democratic South Africa, a lot of NGOs have had to redefine themselves and also redefine their relationship with government: are they antagonistic, are they going to work closely in partnership? If they do that, how do they keep their independence? These are the kind of question that a lot of NGOs have had to ask themselves. And of course the other trend is that what happened post '94 is that a lot of the senior and perhaps most skilled and experienced members of the struggle went into government. So a lot of those NGOs lost a lot of their top people. And I think that's also been an interesting challenge. In South Africa now in the 5 or 6 years as you know we have this kind of, a so called 'new left'. There's a strong social movement, organised around service delivery protests, etc. So I think for established NGOs, there's also been an interesting challenge; how do we relate to those movements? What can we add in these discussions as well? So I think it's an on-going process of redefining yourself; of trying to understand where the most important work is as well.*

Question 9

Question nine focused its attention to the rationale of this study and that is the role or rather the potential role those civil society organisations have in deepening South Africa's democracy.

Question: *Do you think that civil society organisations have a role to play in deepening South Africa's democracy? If so, how?*

Respondent: I *think in a way I've answered that; undoubtedly. For us the important thing here is that democracy is not something that happens every 5 years, when we vote. It is how citizens relate; it is a matter of citizens being empowered. Basically our understanding of democracy is*

where people are able to influence decisions that affect them on a daily basis and I think that kind of work is not something that government can or should do by itself. There's always a role for civil society. Accountability, participation, and transparency are the pillars of good governance, so civil society can make democracy more accountable, it can hold decision-makers to account. And then also with participation, civil society organisations are able to provide quite valuable inputs on policy making, in many cases they tend to be closer to the people, which is useful obviously if you are making policy that's supposed to benefit the people as well. So I think it is vital that we have a strong civil society. A lot of the problems, funding problems as well that civil society organisations face, particularly those that concerned with issues of governance and accountability, like Idasa, there's a few others as well, and I think it would be a pity if we lost that voice, especially in the next few years.

<u>Follow-up question</u> (*Do you foresee the current situation looking up at all?*):

<u>Respondent:</u> *It will probably only look up substantially if things get substantially worse in South Africa. That is not something I would wish for the country, but in a sense, of course when things go bad, it's good for funding in a country. So perhaps it would be best to hope that we could be redundant soon.*

To conclude the interview, I asked the interviewee if he had anything further that he wanted to add; any closing remarks that is:

<u>Respondent:</u> *An interesting thing, given the topic of your thesis, the financing of NGOs: Sometimes people ask us 'but why don't you then put more effort on trying to get corporate social responsibility funding'? 'Why don't you get funding from the big companies'? And the answer is actually, we probably would consider that, but South African large companies are not willing to fund governance type work in South Africa, because they're too scared of being perceived as being anti-ANC, anti-government. So they are happy to fund building houses, but they won't fund governance type work at this point. So that kind of avenue is also closed to organisations such as ours.*

<u>Concluding question relating to closing remarks:</u> (*what about raising your own funds, how easy is that? [Doing work commercially?]*)

<u>Respondent:</u> *Again, there's probably a small component of what we do, could be charged for. There are other NGOS… In the past I worked for an adult education NGO, and there you could*

charge for it, because it was a skill that you were transferring. I don't think it's the same for Idasa, 'cause Idasa is essentially an institute, it comments, it tries to influence policy, it is not something you can try to provide commercially, even if you wanted to. So we are fully reliant on enough people thinking that this kind of work is important.

The fourth question of the interview sought to understand the challenges facing the organisation, so as to see if those challenges have a great bearing in the organisation. Another concealed objective of this question was to find out if any of the resources Heywood speaks of creep up, particularly, the financial resources.

APPENDIX B

Interview Transcription:

Treatment Action Campaign

<u>Interviewer:</u> Nomathamsanqa Masiko

<u>Interviewee:</u> Catherine Tomlinson

<u>Dates:</u> 16 September 2012 and 17 October 2012

Question 1:

The first question asked was a general question, so as better understand the TAC and the work that they do.

<u>Question:</u> *Briefly tell me about the TAC. (classification of organisation, what you do, programmes you're involved in, when NGO started, why it started, etc.)*

<u>Respondent:</u>

TAC is an activist movement, a non-profit and a civil society organisation. TAC's historical campaigns have focused on securing access to HIV medicines. However, TAC's work has expanded to lobby for access to equitable health care services. TAC does this by carrying out campaigns, using a number of strategies including marches, media and legal avenues. TAC also provides education and support on HIV and TB in the 6 districts that we work across the country. This is carried in communities and health care facilities.

Question 2:

The second question asked related to Heywood's second resource, the size of membership or activist base.

<u>Question:</u> *Tell me about the size of your membership/activist base. What is the composition of your base of support and has there been a steady growth over the years?*

Respondent: *TAC has around 10,000. There has been a decline in membership with the wide availability of antiretrovirals in the public sector.*

Question 3:

The third question asked was another general question, seeking to better understand the organisation's goals and priorities, with the 'hidden intention' of finding out if 'the deepening of democracy' is at all a priority for the organisation.

Question: *What are the key aims and goals of the TAC and would you say that these goals have been met? If yes or no, please motivate your answer*

Respondent: *TAC's key historical goal was securing access to HIV treatment and prevention. This has largely been met. South Africa has the largest public sector antiretroviral programme in the world (over 1.5 million people receive ARVs from the public sector) and comprehensive prevention services are available through the public sector.*

Yet challenges remain, new evidence is constantly emerging on the best treatment and prevention. Therefore TAC continues to lobby for new interventions (such as circumcision or better ARVs) as evidence emerges.

In recent years, TAC expanded its vision and mission beyond HIV: Vision: A unified quality health care system which provides equal access to HIV prevention and treatment services for all people. Mission: To ensure that every person living with HIV has access to quality comprehensive prevention and treatment services to live a healthy life.

These goals have not been met as numerous challenges (i.e. shortages of staff, medicines and problems with expenditure) continue to plague the public health sector in South Africa.

Question 4:

The fourth question was seeking to understand the challenges facing the organisation, so as to see if those challenges have a great bearing in the organisation. Another concealed objective of this question was to find out if any of the resources Heywood speaks of creep up, particularly, the financial resources.

Question: *What have been and/or are the key challenges facing the TAC in the attainment of the aforementioned goals?*

Respondent:

Key challenges that TAC has overcome, include:

- *Lack of knowledge about HIV and treatment*

- *Denialism by government*

- *High costs of ARV medicines*

On-going challenges that we face, include:

- *Dwindling funding for HIV.*

- *Difficulties in bringing about social change to reduce the spread on HIV.*

- *Lack of capacity to budget for and manage the delivery of health services at a provincial level within the department of health.*

- *The number of challenges facing the public sector makes it difficult to have one campaign strategy goal. TAC has many on-going campaigns and goals at the same time. This makes it difficult for the public, government etc. to understand what TAC does.*

Question 5

The fifth question asked, encompasses the crux of the interview, for it inquires about the focal point of the study, and that is financial resources of the organisation. Question five is therefore three-fold.

Question: *a). How important are financial resources in the day-to-day running of the organisation/programmes that the organisation has and where do these financial resources come from? b). Who are your chief sources of funding, local or international? c). What about the Global Financial Crisis? How has it influenced the TAC, if at all?*

Respondent:

a). Financial resources are necessary to run any organisation. The scale of TAC's campaign also requires financial resources. TAC almost had to shut down last year because of the delays in receiving money from the global fund. We have now received this funding and able to pay for staff and programmes.

b). TAC's funding is largely and historically received from international funders. Given the insecurity of continuing to rely on these funders, TAC has begun to seek more funding nationally. A national fundraising office is now active, and they have set up a number of initiatives including using Given-Gain.

c). ?

Question 6

This question relates to Heywood's fourth resource, the ability of interest groups to use sanctions that in some way inconvenience or disrupt governance.

Question: *What strategies does the TAC use (for example lobbying, protesting, boycotts) to achieve its goals?*

Respondent: *TAC has used a number of strategies to achieve its goals, including: lobbying, picketing marching, legal action and civil disobedience.*

Read more at: http://www.tac.org.za/community/files/10yearbook/index.html and http://www.tac.org.za/community/files/file/TreatmentLit/2009/OrganisingInOurLivesEng.pdf

Question 7

This question was quite loaded as well. It sought to explore Heywood's fifth resource in his framework; that of personal or institutional links interest groups may have to political parties or governance bodies. This question was three-fold: *a). Can you provide specific examples of where Idasa influenced the government or government policy? How did you achieve this? b). Do you have institutional links with political parties/government or other civil society organisation? How do these links, if they exist, benefit the organisation and that which the organisation does? c). How is your relationship with the government?*

a). TAC's campaigns have forced government to provide antiretrovirals to pregnant mothers to reduce their risk of transmitting HIV to their infants. This was done through campaigning and a constitutional court case. Through civil disobedience, TAC forced government to provide ARVs to HIV positive people and adopt targets for scaling up access to treatment. The work of TAC and partners has also resulted in the adoption of a comprehensive policy to respond to HIV in

South Africa. This was done through working with government and SANAC (South African National Aids Council).

b and c). In the past, while South Africa had a denialist government, TAC's relationship with government was extremely conflictual. However today we have improved relationships with government and often work to support their initiatives. This has occurred because today leadership of the DoH (Department of Health) has demonstrated the political will to tackling HIV, and basing interventions on scientific evidence. However TAC has retained its independence and continues to challenge government. This year for instance, TAC lodged a complaint with the public protector for its use of the Tara Klamp (an unsafe circumcision device).

Question 8

Question eight is a more general question, seeking to uncover the role and place of civil society in society, past and present.

<u>Question</u>: *What does being an NGO in present-day SA mean/entail, and has it changed from historical times?*

<u>Respondent</u>: *Today there is far more room for NGOs to exist and demonstrate than in previous years. The right to strike and demonstrate is now upheld in our laws.*

It would be far more difficult to carry out TAC's campaigns in previous years. Partner organisations in other African countries continue to face violence, harassment and arrest for lobby for the same goals as TAC does.

Question 9

Question nine focused its attention to the rationale of this study and that is the role or rather the potential role those civil society organisations have in deepening South Africa's democracy.

<u>Question</u>: *Do you think that civil society organisations have a role to play in deepening South Africa's democracy? If so, how?*

Respondent: *Civil society has a vital role to ensure that our democratic rights are upheld. Civil society and communities have the power to shape and inform these laws and policies in South Africa. Government is required to carry out public consultations on new laws and policies before they are adopted. Additionally, while adopting good laws and policies is important, this in itself is not enough. An active civil society is necessary to ensuring that they are properly implemented. TAC demonstrated with our constitutional court case the role that civil society must and can play in ensuring government upholds the legal rights of its citizens.*

Follow-up questions:

Question 10:

Question: *What has come out of the TAC's complaint with the public protector for its use of the Tara Klamp?*

Respondent: *We have received a receipt of acknowledgement and have been asked to submit additional evidence which we have done. No decision has been made by the Public Protector to date.*

Question 11

Question: *How reliant is the TAC on donor funding? Can you do without it? What are the Implications of decrease/stop in funding?*

Respondent: *TAC provides all of its services for free, the organisation is entirely reliant on donor funding. The implication of a stop in funding is that TAC would have to shut down.*

Question 12

Question: *Is there anything that you feel you need to add, given the topic of my thesis "The influence of the global financial crisis and other challenges to SA's NGO's and the prospects for deepening democracy"?*

Respondent: *Civil society organisations are necessary for upholding and strengthening democracy given that they play a watchdog role in holding government to account. The financial crisis puts this work at risk. Therefore it is essential that new and sustainable mechanisms for*

funding civil society are found. One mechanism that has been proposed is implementing a financial transaction tax (Robin Hood Tax). TAC and partners have lobbied for the adoption of a small tax to fund development work and civil society.

Question 13

Question: *What strategies does the TAC use to achieve its goals? (eg. lobbying, protesting, boycotts) Please expand on the matter.*

Respondent: *This is detailed in the TAC 10 year history and organising in our lives. You can quote from these books as TAC.*

http://www.tac.org.za/community/files/10yearbook/index.html

http://www.tac.org.za/community/files/file/TreatmentLit/2009/OrganisingInOurLivesEng.pdf

Question 14

Question: *Has the global financial crisis influenced the TAC at all? Please expand.*

Respondent: *Yes. TAC has gone through numerous rounds of retrenchments when funding has not come through, or we have not received adequate funding for programmes (this is discussed in the annual reports from the last few years). Many programmes have restarted once funding has become available but this has been very difficult for staff and moral. Additionally the production of TAC's magazine Equal Treatment has been interrupted because of funding challenges. In coming years, it is expected that funding will decline and this will impact on what services and programmes TAC is able to provide.*