

Long's homiletic bridge will, therefore, engage a certain hermeneutic framework: what the Bible actually says (the form of text) as well as what it does (the intention of text). This interpretive reflection on the text is not a matter of following rules or procedures, but of acquiring skills and learning how the preacher becomes a living witness to the biblical passages. That is, the witness may afford insight into how the preacher understands the biblical language as one of the meaningful events. Further, preachers are to find their position in this divine event. The preacher can then testify, "I was there at the event and saw and experienced for myself what happened." In the sermon the preacher performs is to become the actual witness: the preacher must be apprentices of intention of text in the modern world. This hermeneutic obedience must be able to allow traffic of both word and event. The preacher gains not merely knowledge about the text, but testimony of what the text is about, of what God is already doing for us in Jesus Christ.¹⁶ In this case, preaching as testimony not only reconstructs the biblical propositional theme but also reconstructs the Christian life. This action of being the witness of the text can reconstruct the time and place of preaching as well as a time and place for the practice of imagination (Brueggemann 1997a: 32). This "reimagination of reality" is constructed by the performative dimension of the biblical language. The preacher then sees that the language of the scripture can be imagined in terms of God's ongoing action in the world and the church.¹⁷ Therefore, the re-imagination of the

¹⁶ Long is not alone in arguing the role of the testimony as Christian interpretation. The classic starting place for this issue is Paul Ricoeur's essay "the Hermeneutics of testimony". According to Ricoeur (1980: 128-130) Christian hermeneutics, or Christian interpretation is not based in facts, rather is based in testimony, which is an entirely different interpretive framework.

¹⁷This idea is also proposed by Brueggemann(1997a: 32-35), he suggest in a powerful way the creative function of imagination in the generation of meaning in preaching: "the image gives rise to a new world of possibility"; preaching as understood here aims at images arising out of the text that may give rise to a church of new obedience"

performative dimension of biblical language will establish a Christian life with God's action.

5. Summary and conclusion.

This chapter has investigated three well-known homileticians, Buttrick, Campbell and Long. In particular we have noted that their views and methods are similar insofar as they emphasize that what the biblical text intends to say and do must govern what the preacher hopes to say and do in the sermon. In this, Buttrick (1987: 308) claimed hermeneutically the homiletic bridge is a way of continual movement. It consists of immediacy, reflection and praxis; the intention of the text, intention toward the text, and intention to do given by the text. Thereby, the movement from text to sermon is to be designed through the intention of biblical language as well as its own intentional action. Campbell (1997: 239) attempted to emphasize the performative aspect of language as a sovereign subject. That is, the autonomous function of the Bible has a certain performative momentum towards building up the church. Finally, Long (2005: 106) asserted persuasively that the preacher, who acts as witness, should explicate in the sermon both what the text says and what the text does. With regard to their homiletical assessment of biblical language, therefore, it suggests an important possibility in order to formulate the movement of the text to sermon. This homiletical assumption refers to the text itself is a meaningful act; what the text is doing (performative action), and not merely what it means (objective of the topic).

This performative dimension will lead to rethinking the movement from text to sermon in two areas: first, with regard to the preaching material; second with regard to the

execution of preaching. The preacher will think the notion of the preaching material as an informative proposition. In this case, the meaning of a biblical passage through words and texts have a meaning as the “propositional content” in which the preacher produces a sermon as the “the big idea or the moralistic theme.” However, the preacher concerns the biblical word to be “action (performative)”, which refers not only to what it meant but also to the process of doing it. This performative aspect of the Scripture is a meaningful and a intentional divine action, which is understood by the logic of the God on the move in the word of text (Müller 1991: 132). This theological movement creates the Christianity which impacts on how people live in a real life situation by changing attitudes in a specific way. Similarly, Achtemeier claims (1980: 23) that “language brings reality into being for a person and orders and shapes the person’s universe”. For her, “if we want to change someone’s life ...,we must change the images-the imaginations of the heart-in short, the words by which that person lives” (ibid: 24). To put this point more precisely, God’s word is also a divine performative action. This divine action has a force to change the inner construct of reality. This perspective on God’s word enables us to distinguish between the meaning of what the Bible says and the force of what the Bible says.

In addition, the performative dimension of biblical language will cause us to rethink the execution of preaching. The preaching performance should try to discover the text’s momentum and its function in order to find the total impact when moving from text to sermon. This dimension demands from the interpreter both participation and existential decision. First of all, if interpreters have themselves been interpreted by the performative dimension of the text, the preacher then can execute its performative force.

This multiple homiletic motif may be useful to live homiletically in hermeneutical tension between the action performed by the Scripture: (“what was said and done by story elements such as the story of God, the story of Jesus and the story of Israel”) and the preaching performed by the preacher: (“what is said and done and suffered, now, by those who seek to share His will and hope”) (Lash 1986: 42). This interpretive performance of Scripture in preaching will not be only engaged on the superficial level of the grammatical or historical meaning of the text. Rather, it assesses a different level of the text in which the preacher takes up a particular stance toward the openness of the world of the text. This multidimensional concept of the biblical text should require that the preacher respects the role of the biblical text as agent. The Scripture is a doer; what is done in writing something. This conviction regarding the Scripture seems to arise in a certain sense from the illocutionary act and perlocutionary act of language.¹⁸ That is, the movement from text to sermon may be identified according to illocutionary acts in the biblical passage (what the text is doing in it is saying). From this perspective, the biblical passage will imply that the insight in illocutionary force has entered homiletic theory (Rose 1997: 68).¹⁹ To put this homiletical point more precisely, the preacher will be rethinking the notion of divine intention in terms of illocutionary act. An

¹⁸ According to speech act theory, the performative aspect of language sharply distinguishes between three categories of action when one uses the word/text, viz. (1) The locutionary act: uttering words (e.g., saying the word “Hello”); (2) The illocutionary act: what we do in saying something (e.g., greeting, warning, promising, commanding, etc.); (3) the perlocutionary act: what we bring about by saying something (e.g., deterring, persuading, surprising) (Austin 1975: 98-108).

¹⁹ This proposition is not unprecedented. In fact, Craddock already entered (1979) the speech act theory as a primary homiletical theory. Craddock stresses; “J.L. Austin has reminded us of the creative or performative power of word. Words not only report something; they do something (34). He criticizes that too often today words simply describe: they “serve only as signs pointing to the discovered or discoverable data” (33). But, Craddock emphasizes that “before they were smothered by a scientific and technological culture, words danced, sang, teased, lured, probed, wept, judged, and transformed” (34). Craddock’s conviction is that a word is “an action, something happening” (44): “words are deeds” (34). And his hope is to recover the “dynamistic and creative functions of language” (34).

illocutionary act on description in the Scripture therefore becomes the most fundamental concept in the preaching material as well as the sermonic unit. This homiletical perspective will appreciate the descriptive power of the speech act theory with regard to the link between the text and biblical preaching. For example, Tostengard (1989: 78) proposes that a sermon should seek “to *do* the text for the hearer”. Consequently, the illocutionary action in the biblical passage must generate in the interpreter a new self-understanding or new insight into reality in the movement of the text to sermon. This undeveloped homiletic prospect will help to provide an alternative criterion for evaluating the homiletic bridge. Furthermore, it will focus on how preaching is understood as the execution of the illocutionary force in the text. Therefore, the next chapter will suggest a way forward by means of an analysis and application of speech act theory. This will explore what contributions speech act theory might make to our examination of the homiletic bridge.

CHAPTER 3

THE ALTERNATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR A HOMILETICS BRIDGE IN THE LIGHT OF SPEECH ACT THEORY: PREACHING IS RE-ILLOCUTION OF THE TEXT

1. Introduction

In the previous chapter we highlighted the possibility of the performative dimension of biblical language to formulate the movement of text to sermon in terms of illocutionary speech acts. This assessment seems to apply a certain new criterion in the relation between the text and the sermon. That is, the movement from text to sermon may be identified in terms of the illocutionary acts in the biblical passage. From this perspective, the performative dimension of the biblical passage implies that the insight of speech act theory (SAT) has entered homiletic theory. This leads us in this chapter to explore what contributions SAT might make to our examination of a homiletic bridge. Therefore, the purpose of this chapter is to briefly survey the methods and terminology in SAT, particularly Austin and his student, Searle's, work regarding this issue.²⁰ In addition, this chapter will show how their insights in SAT apply to the particular process of movement from the biblical text to the sermon. It will become crucial to ask how the preacher utilizes the illocutionary action, the constitutive rules and the direction of in order to make a homiletical bridge. Therefore, homiletical application of this SAT terminology will suggest an alternative central idea through which to build a Scripture-based bridge between text and sermon.

2. Speech act theory (SAT)

²⁰ These two linguists have been chosen for a specific reason: "If Austin is the Luther of SAT, John Searle may be considered its Melancthon, its systematic theologian" (Vanhoozer 1998: 209).

or historic structure in order to understand its locution level. However, this well-known knowledge of God doesn't make any difference to understanding "God is one" in their life, except to the demons. In order to avoid this misunderstanding, the preacher will have to involve not only the locution level, but also the illocution level. This consideration will become the fundamental hermeneutic device to find the intention of the biblical text as well as the normative task of preaching.²⁴ Therefore, one of the most important benefits of illocution action is to rethink the meaning of Scripture and the faithful response to it.

2.2. John Searle: Speech Act.

Searle develops in a persuasive way Austin's initial study of the perspective dimension which becomes the study of "speech acts theory"(SAT) in his book "*Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language*,"(1969). Searle stresses that "[t]he unit of linguistic communication is not, as has generally been supposed, the symbol, word or sentence, or even the token of the symbol, word or sentence, but rather the ... performance of the speech act" (ibid: 16).

From this perspective, he subsequently proposes the following hypothesis:

"the production of the sentence token under *certain conditions is the illocutionary act*, and the *illocutionary act is the minimal unit of linguistic communication*" (Searle 1971: 39) [my emphasis].

²⁴ William Alston acclaims the importance of Austin's analysis of illocutionary action: "If this is the line along which meaning should be analyzed, then the concept of an illocutionary act is the most fundamental concept in semantics and, hence, in the philosophy of language", see William P Alston 1964, 39.

His hypothesis of SAT agrees with Austin's perspective of using language as the basic unit of communication not in its "constative" dimension, but rather as performing a speech act. However, he suggests a more detailed framework within the performative aspect of language usage. There are three different type of actions when people use the word/text, viz. (1) utterance acts: to utter words (e.g., morphemes and sentences); (2) propositional acts: to refer and predicate; (3) illocutionary acts: to state, question, command, promise, and so on(Searle 1969: 29).

Particularly, Searle points out that Austin's distinction between locutionary and illocutionary acts is not possible. In Searle's analysis(1968: 413), there is no utterance of a sentence with its meaning that is completely "force-neutral". A well, every literal text contains some indicators of force as part of meaning, which is to say that "every rhetic act is an illocutionary act". Searle's assessment:

"One cannot just express a proposition while doing nothing else and have thereby performed a complete speech act When a proposition is expressed it is always expressed in the performance of an illocutionary act."(Searle 1969: 29)

Searle claims clearly that the propositional act cannot stand on its own. That is, any language cannot just indicate and describe without making an assertion or asking a question or performing some other illocutionary act. The propositional acts cannot occur alone; further, it is always an illocutionary act that is simultaneously performed. This incorporation within a propositional expression and its illocutionary act means that most illocutionary acts will have propositional content. More clearly, Searle stresses (1969: 30) that what people do with a proposition is the illocutionary act: "The

illocutionary force indicator shows how the proposition is to be taken". Therefore, Searle introduces (1969: 31) that the formulation of speech act can be represented as $F(p)$ where " F " is the illocutionary force and " P " is the proposition. To put it simply, " F " creates a proposition and counts as illocutionary acts (a warning; " $W(p)$ ", blessing; " $B(p)$ ", promise; " $Pr.(p)$ ", etc), and in here, (P) stands for the propositional content and F for the stance adopted by the speaker toward it (Vanhoozer 1998: 210). That is, a proposition becomes a meaningful action by illocutionary force.

In addition, Searle (1971: 40) teaches that the use of language is also explained by these constitutive rules, further, it governs human behavior. From this, the propositional content can be understood as having certain "constitutive rules". These constitutive rules constitute and regulate activities, and often have the form: "X counts as Y in context C." (1969: 35). For example, under the constitutive rules of soccer, the soccer player kicking a soccer ball into the goal *counts as* one score. There are conventions involved in these constitutive rules, which are related to all kinds of non-linguistic criteria. Therefore, to perform illocutionary acts will be to engage in "a rule-governed form of behavior" (Searle 1979: 17).

In fact, the biblical text is itself "a rule-governed form of behavior", for it contains certain "constitutive rules" such as honour and shame, kinship, the value system of purity, or the ancient economy. The reading of Scripture clearly encounters a totally different world and it manifests itself in the discussions of the social, political and cultural dynamics of the world of Scripture. Cultural conventions involved in these constitutive rules, are related to all kinds of institutional facts. These non-linguistic

elements would help us to recognize where illocutionary action is working, whereby we may notice that the illocutionary action creates new realities. For example, “You are guilty” is an institutional fact that created a social reality within a successful performance of the relevant speech act in the court (Searle 1995: 54-55). In this way, the benefit of Searle’s formulation: “X counts as Y in context C” in SAT will call attention to the central problem of being self-evident.²⁵ Historically, Christianity has for a long time been aware of how easy it is to use Scripture to prove a particular dogma, or to justify a particular practice, only to be accused of distorting the text. Of course, one does not have to be a scholar to misread the Bible; it can happen during daily devotions as well as during preaching. Therefore, the preacher should be more concerned with textual meaning as an institutional fact, and less concerned with his or her own subjective responses to the clear fact of the text.

3. The definition of meaning in the SAT

Searle also goes further (1969: 43) to define the notion of meaning. In considering meaning in SAT, it may be useful to mention another SAT theorist, Paul Grice. His definition of meaning in the utterance: “To say that a speaker *S* meant something by *X* is to say that *S* intended the utterance of *X* to produce some effect in a hearer *H* by means of the recognition of this intention.”²⁶ This account of meaning stresses clearly that the

²⁵ In Searle’s key formula, the utterance X counts as Y in context C, have developed “institutional fact” in his book in *“The Construction of Social Reality”* (1995) whereby we may understand that this kind of “counting -as” operation creates states of affairs. For example, ‘You are guilty as charged’ is an institutional fact that creates social reality. This conceptuality is a fruitful idea for biblical scholars to explore in analyzing how the biblical world is constructed.

²⁶ This notion of meaning is proposed by Paul Grice, Some SAT theorists, like Grice, argue that meaning is to be primarily a matter of intention; others emphasize the role of conventions. The strength of Searle’s theory deals with including both factors; see more information on “Meaning” in *Philosophical*

intention produces effects on an audience. This definition seems plausible, yet it requires further examination, because it confuses illocutionary with perlocutionary acts. That is, illocutionary acts through the sender succeeds in doing what he/she is trying to do by getting the receiver to recognize what text or utterance he is trying to get across. However, the 'effect' on the hearer is not a belief or response; it consists simply in the hearer/readers' understanding the illocutionary act of the speaker/author. This effect is an illocutionary effect (*IE*)(Searle 1969: 47). Therefore, Searle proposes (ibid: 47) an alternative definition of the meaning in terms of SAT: "the speaker *S* intends to produce an illocutionary effect *IE* in the hearer *H* by means of getting *H* to recognize *S*'s intention to produce *IE*". According to his definition, the meaning is a matter specifically of illocution, not perlocution (Searle 1971: 45).

More precisely, Searle refuses to give any function of perlocutions in the foundation of meaning: "I will reject the idea that the intentions that matter for meaning are the intentions to produce effects on audiences (Searle 1983: 161) ." For example, The Bible testifies to God's force in the world, regardless of how people respond to it, but it only persuades if the people respond to its testimony with belief. Therefore, the meaning is the intention-as-expressed in the illocution action. These illocutionary points will be created by the author's intention that determines how propositional context makes relationship with the world. This display reality is a matter specifically of illocutionary action that is created by the author's intentional purpose, not by the reader's individual experience. From this aspect, biblical preaching is not identical with preaching about individual experience. When the preacher prepares a sermon using an illocutionary

Review(July 1957), pp.377-88, also see Searle1971, 44-46.

action of the text, the preacher is not merely gathering propositional information about that text. Rather, the preacher tries to demonstrate how the propositional information works together as an illocutionary act that is simultaneously performed through biblical preaching. For example, the utterance of the centurion in front of Jesus: “Surely this man was the Son of God!”, (Mk 15:39) his statement is neither simply p nor simply F but $F(p)$. More specifically it is an assertive which entails making the messianic reality in the context of the Passion of the Christ. This reality is created by the illocutionary action he or she [the author] performed. It is not created by such self-evident reading. This illocutionary force is “a living language voice in search of a hearer, a voice which seeks to break in upon us from beyond”(Tostengard 1989: 81). There is nothing for the preacher to say, until the preacher recognizes the illocutionary act. With regard to this assessment of meaning in terms of SAT, therefore, it becomes crucial to ask how people recognize the divine’s intention to produce illocutionary force. It expects God’s warning, promising, commanding, healing, etc.

4. The direction of fit between words and the world.

Searle points (1976: 3) out that the speaker’s intention creates illocutionary force in which some illocutions have a part in their purpose. This illocution point determines the kind of directedness between the propositional content and the world in order to represent how the object is in the world. It is a matter of how the propositional contents match the world through the purpose of illocutionary points. Because, as Searle clearly stresses(1969: 47), the author intends $F(p)$ both a propositional content and the energy of an illocutionary force. From this, whenever an elementary illocutionary act is satisfied in an actual context of utterance, a success of fit between language and the

world is required. (Vanderveken 2001a: 32). This necessity is called direction of fit, which plays a key role in SAT's understanding the logic of illocutionary action. (Searle 1979: 3-4).

Searle said (1979: 10-16) that there are basically five types of speech act $F(p)$ which people do with language (e.g., assertives, directives, commissives, expressives and declarations), often, the speaker does more than one of these at once in the same utterance: (1) the assertive: utterances say how things are; (2) the directives: utterances to try to get them to do things; (3) the commissives: utterances which commit ourselves to doing things;(4) the expressive: utterances expressing our feelings and attitudes; (5) the declaration: utterances bringing about changes through our utterances.

Therefore, the classification of illocutionary acts is precisely the distinction between different illocutionary points. This distinction shows how the speaker's intentionality makes the same proposition count as an illocutionary act, such as a warning; " $W(p)$ ", blessing; " $B(p)$ ", promise; " $Pr.(p)$ ", etc(Searle 1976: 2).

In order to explain this directedness in terms of SAT, Searle uses an illustration of both a shopping list of a shopper and a detective²⁷:

"In the case of the shopper's list...*to get the world to match the words*; the man is supposed to make his actions fit the list. In the case of the detective...*to make the words match the world*; the man is supposed to make the list fit the actions of the shopper. This can be further

²⁷ Searle borrows this illustration from Anscombe 1957, see.

demonstrated by observing the role of ‘mistake’ in the two cases. If the detective gets home and suddenly realizes that the man bought pork chops instead of bacon, he can simply *erase the word ‘bacon’ and write ‘pork chops’*. But if the shopper gets home and his wife points out he has bought pork chops when he should have bought bacon he *cannot correct the mistake by erasing ‘bacon’ from the list and writing ‘pork chops’*” (Searle 1976: 3) [my emphasis].

Searle’s illustration of the shopping list shows that even though the propositional content (*p*) of the two lists will be the same, their force (*F*) will be quite different. This difference is equated with the author’s intention that determines the direction (and manner) of fit between words and world (Vanhoozer 1998: 247). For example, when James writes that “You believe that God is one. You do well; the demons also believe, and shudder”, (Jas 2:19): the proposition content “God is one” purposes an assertion point, which has a word to match the world direction of the fit. However, when Paul writes that “For there is one God and one mediator between God and men, the man Christ Jesus”, (1Ti 2:5): its purpose intended a promises point, which has a world to match the words direction of the fit. Both biblical passages have partly the same propositional content “God is one”, however, the distinction between different directions of fit is precisely the distinction between different kinds of illocutionary points.

Based on Searle’s observation (Searle 1976: 10-16; 1979: 12-20) that each illocutionary point makes fundamentally only four possible directions of fit (word-to-world direction, world-to-word direction, double direction or empty direction): (1) Illocutionary acts with an assertive point (e.g. assertions, conjectures, predictions) have the words-to-world direction of fit. This illocutionary point is to represent how things are (It is

raining); (2) Illocutionary acts with the commissive or directive point (e.g., promises, vows, acceptance, and requests) have the world-to-words direction of fit. This illocutionary point is to have the world transformed by the future course of action of the speaker (Open the window); (3) Illocutionary acts with the declaratory illocutionary point (e.g., definitions, appellations, appointments, benedictions and condemnations) have the double direction of fit to bring about correspondence between propositional content and reality (You are fire); (4) Illocutionary acts with the expressive point (e.g., apologies, thanks, complains, boasts) have the empty direction of fit. This illocutionary point is just to express the speaker's mental state about a represented fact. In this case, in expressive utterance, speakers do not attempt to represent how things are and they do not want to change things (I am so sorry).²⁸

These differences of intentionality in the direction of fit between words and the world are important for the homiletic bridge: when the preacher has correctly identified a homiletical idea (propositional content), having thoughts and ideas of a given passage, the interpretive task is not yet complete. Important is to determine what the biblical author was intending by his or her words (more strictly, their propositional content). For many preachers, the weakness of the homiletic bridge they use, may be to urge the congregation to respond to the "how-tos" of spiritual life seen in text. In this case, they concern only (*p*), which easily transforms a dogmatic or a moralistic lesson. The preacher can too easily find the moral vision or dogmatic essence in the Scripture, but not precisely pay attention to its directions of fit. In other words, they must seriously ask the question "Is the illocutionary force *F* of this propositional content (*p*) really intended

²⁸ For more on direction of fit, see Daniel Vanderveken, 1990, 103-110

to count as a dogmatic or a moralistic message?” As Searle points (1969: 29) out, the proposition is expressed it is always expressed in the performance of an illocutionary act. That is, any moralistic theme or dogmatic idea is neither simply p nor simply F but $F(P)$ in which this propositional subject cannot stand on its own. Therefore, the sermon should pay attention to the dual nature of the text, both its illocutionary act (what the text wishes to do) and its propositional content (what the text wishes to say).

In order to achieve this, the homiletic bridge should imitate the biblical author’s attention as $F(p)$. This homiletic bridge will be built when both the Scripture and the sermon concentrate on the same matter in the same manner. In fact, the purpose of Scripture is most often not merely to inform, but to do something else like to promise, to comfort, to warn, etc. True preaching thus will endeavor not only to retell the same propositional content as the text (it just makes the sermon so boring), but will rather aim at obtaining the same response as the original biblical author intended. Therefore, the homiletics bridge is largely a matter of following directions: the direction of the author’s attention (e.g., to a proposition), and the direction of fit between words and world (e.g., the kind of illocution).

5. Summary and conclusion.

This chapter has investigated, on the basis of Austin’s and Searle’s work the term ‘SAT’. This philosophy of linguistic theory makes four important contributions: firstly, speaking is to perform an act; secondly, SAT is able to distinguish between the meaning of what we say (locution), the force of what we say (illocution) and the appropriate response by saying something (perlocution). Thirdly, SAT requires constitutive rules for

it to count as an action; fourthly, SAT explains that when the proposition is expressed, it is always expressed in the performance of an illocutionary act. It is symbolized as $F(p)$. In this case, each illocutionary point has a different direct of fit, which helps us to know the author's intention that determines the direction (and manner) of fit between words and world.

In order to rethink the homiletical bridge in light of SAT, the following three questions provide a framework to our approach: (1) Which constitutive rules do govern in the biblical passage?; (2) Which kind of illocution action does it perform in the biblical passage?; (3) How does $F(p)$ in the text determine the kind of direction of fit to open up an alternative reality in the Christian life? Even though each question has its distinctiveness, the distinctions are connected in an interdependence of interpretation methodology. From this, the preaching can be understood by metaphorey of as surfing. Even though a surfer is performing on the surface of the water, this activity is completely reacting to potential impetuses from the depths of the sea water. However, before enjoying surfing, the surfer should learn to swim in the water. Similarly, the preaching in application of SAT will not be only engaged with the superficial level of the grammatical or historical meaning of the text (propositional content), but also to assess different text levels in illocutionary force. At this stage the preacher is able to distinguish between the *meaning* of what text say and the *force* of what text do. This distinction can create a particular hermeneutical sensitivity to finding the illocution in the text. This illocutionary action refreshes the preaching material, the propositional content in the biblical text having usually recognized the fixed topics. However, the illocutionary points will be demonstrating toward a basic homiletical ideas (theme,

subject purpose) as $F(p)$: a warning; “ $W(p)$ ”, blessing; “ $B(p)$ ”, promise; “ $Pr.(p)$ ”, etc), in here, (P) stands for the propositional content and F for the stance adopted by the text toward it. To put it simply, “ F ” creates a proposition biblical issue which counts as meaningful action, therefore, this meaningful action is a special determining factor in the normative preaching task. From this aspect, the preaching is re-illocution of the text.

In addition, the illocutionary act of the biblical text should be to engage the congregation in “a rule-governed form of behavior”. This constitutive rule makes concrete the particular identity that has a focus in the communal confession. This attention is used in and by particular community living at a particular time and place with particular shared beliefs, institutions and practices (MacIntyre 1988: 373). These institutions would help us to recognize the identity of the illocutionary action in the text. Furthermore, the identity of illocutionary acts is precisely connected to the distinction of direction of fit. This distinction shows how the text intentionally creates the same proposition as an illocutionary act, such as a warning; “ $W(p)$ ”, blessing; “ $B(p)$ ”, promise; “ $Pr.(p)$ ”, etc (Searle 1976: 2). In this way, the congregation realizes how the biblical text still challenges the modern world. This direction of fit is fruitful in the sense that the preacher and congregation gain new practice in Christianity. The preaching is the re-illocutionary act toward the same direction of fit within the text.

For example, if the preacher prepares the sermon using John 2:1-12; “The Wedding at Cana” perhaps, he/she can accept the miracle at Cana as ordinary preaching material for propositional information; and then to construct a sermon plainly within this proposition. This sermon may have the goal to explain that “the obedience creates the miracle” or

“how we can expect the miracle in ordinary life”. In this case, the preacher uses the illustration to clarify a certain relevant message on “Christian obedience”. Finally, before he finishes this sermon, the congregation already knows what this sermon tells us, but they still struggle to apply it in their different lives. However, if the preacher applies SAT to build a homiletical bridge in the light of three questions: (1) *Which constitutive rules do govern in the biblical passage?*; (2) *Which kind of illocution action does it perform in the biblical passage?*; (3) *How does $F(p)$ in the text determine the kind of the direction of fit to open up alternative reality in the Christian life?* The followre outline summarizes the basic answers to questions on three different levels:

(1) *Which constitutive rules do govern in the biblical passage?*

The reading of “The Wedding at Cana”, John 2:1-12 encounters a totally different world and therefore manifests a cultural difference between an ancient and a modern wedding. Simply put, what is the meaning that someone supplies wine? Whose duty is it – the bridegroom’s side or the bride’s in the context of Jesus’ time? These constitutive rules would help the preacher recognize the identity of the illocutionary action in the text.

(2) *Which kind of illocution action does it perform in the biblical passage?*

According to this passage, when the wine supply ran out during the wedding festivities, Jesus’ mother spoke to him about the problem. At that time, Jesus said: “My time has not yet come”, (Jn 2:4). In order to clarify this utterance of Jesus in SAT, the preacher should pay attention to the intentionality of the text, which creates a proposition,

counting F (in Jesus' time) as an illocutionary act such as a warning; " $W(p)$ ", blessing; " $B(p)$ ", and promise; " $Pr.(p)$ ". Particularly, in the context of a wedding, the proposition of Jesus' time counts as a promise; " $Pr.(Jesus' time)$ ". This " $Pr.(p)$ " will give one of the important biblical messages of -Jesus as bridegroom. Therefore, preachers can do more than one thing with the same proposition; they can preach God' promise in Jesus Christ. These illocutionary points will create different effects; it can be frighten, alarm and bring hope within the congregation.

(3) How does $F(p)$ in the text determine the kind of direction of fit to open up alternative reality in the Christian life?

The preacher has identified a homiletical idea (propositional content) such as "obedience creates the miracle" in particular biblical passages. However, the preacher should pay attention to its directions of fit when he /she preaches on the subject of Christian obedience in this passage. The preacher asks seriously that this illocutionary point really gives as (*p: a plot, content, and character*) "obedience" as the central idea of the sermon. It is often pointed out that homiletics suggests "saying the same thing as the text". However, in SAT, homiletics suggest that "doing the same thing as the directedness of the text". Therefore, the preaching as re-illocutionary act in the text seeks the intentionality of the text in which the homiletical purpose pertains to the directedness of the illocutionary effect in the text. This association leads to the preaching succeeds to accomplish what the preacher is seeking to do to create the same the response of belief as the author anticipated in this passage.

As a result of these questions and answers, SAT manifests “the movement between text and sermon”, by refreshing the preaching material and the preaching praxis; that is, creating the homiletic bridge. In light of SAT this will provide not only a reflection on the same ideas as the text, but also aims at being faithful to the same purpose, eliciting the same response as the illocutionary force in the intention of the Scripture. To summarise: the preacher cannot build a satisfactory homiletic bridge, until the preacher is aware of the illocutionary act helping the preaching to be a re-illocution of the text. In this case, the homiletic bridge requires a response that will result in a suitable and responsible manner in which Scripture is appreciated. The homiletical application of SAT suggests that the Scripture uses a preacher rather than a preacher using the Scripture. The central idea is to build a Scripture-based bridge between text and sermon. This means that, the essence of interpretation in preaching is to recognize the illocutionary action in the Bible, because this illocutionary action creates the central idea of the sermon as well as developing a unit of the sermon content. In the next chapter we will explore how the interface of SAT and biblical studies assists the preacher to interpret the Scripture as God’s speech act.

CHAPTER 4

THE INTERFACE OF BIBLICAL STUDIES AND HOMILETICS IN THE LIGHT OF SPEECH ACT THEORY: THE PREACHER TO INTERPRET THE SCRIPTURE AS GOD'S SPEECH ACT

1. Introduction

The previous chapter highlighted the alternative framework for a homiletical bridge between text and sermon in light of speech act theory. The preacher who applies SAT to build this homiletical bridge in light of the three afore-mentioned questions should arrive at a different sermon goal, namely

- (1) Which kind of illocutionary action does this biblical passage perform?
- (2) Which constitutive rules govern this biblical passage?
- (3) For the $F(p)$ in this text, what is the direction of fit between words and world and how may this open up an alternative reality in the Christian life?

In this case, the preacher cannot build a satisfactory homiletical bridge, until the preacher is aware of the illocutionary act such as promising, hinting, arguing, blessing, condemning, announcing, evoking, praising, praying, telling, and joking. This SAT insight has a far-reaching effect on the nature of performing acts in the biblical text. The recent SAT studies painstakingly classified over 270 “performative verbs” and analyse how the text and reader are related to them, according to whether the author is declaring something, committing himself to some course of action, directing the text in some way, asserting something, or expressing some psychological state.²⁹ Once the preacher

²⁹For more information of the classifying of “performative verbs”, see Vanderveken 1990:166-219.

accepts that the illocutionary nature of biblical language is dynamic in this way, it is a first step to rethinking “what is the connotation of the preaching” in relationship between Scripture, the power of Holy Spirit, and the preacher. The re-illocution of the Scripture in biblical preaching will be the corollaries of the Bible as God’s authoritative speech act to be *F(p)*, the *Holy Spirit (Jesus)*.

Therefore, this chapter will show how SAT can help us to interpret the Bible as well as how this SAT application can serve persuasively in important homiletical issues such as “the preaching Jesus”, “the witness as preaching” and “the power of preaching.” From these, the interdisciplinary approaches within hermeneutics and homiletics in the light of SAT are neither simply utilizing the biblical text as the footnote in a sermon nor simply suggesting a magical single way in homiletic methodology as the praxis of preaching. In certain cases, for a particular illocutionary force of the text there will be the reconceiving that the preaching are the Words of God. Therefore, SAT might re-introduce the sovereignty of God and the necessary role of the Holy Spirit in Jesus Christ as a basic homiletic confession.

2. The use of illocutionary acts in biblical interpretation in the refreshing of “the preaching Jesus.”

Thiselton’s works have frequently proposed that Biblical language can be understood as speech act in a variety of hermeutical and theological areas.³⁰ He wrote two New

³⁰ Thiselton, Anthony C, “The Parables as Language-Event: Some Comments on Fuchs’s Hermeneutics in the Light of Linguistic Philosophy.” in the *Scottish Journal of Theology* 23 (1970): 437-68; “The Supposed Power of Words in the Biblical Writings.” in *The Journal of Theological Studies* 25 (1974):283-99;1992 *New Horizons in Hermeneutics: The Theory and Practice of Transforming Biblical Reading*. Grand Rapids: Zondervan; “Speech-Act Theory and the Claim that God Speaks: Nicholas Wolterstorffs *Divine Discourse*.” in *Scottish Journal of Theology* 50 (1997): 97-110; “Communicative Action and Promise in Interdisciplinary, Biblical and Theological Hermeneutics.” in *The Promise of Hermeneutics*.1999 Edited by Roger Lundin, Clarence Walhout, and Anthony C. Thiselton. Grand Rapids:

Testament commentaries on 1st Corinthians and Hebrews in the light of SAT.³¹ One of his primary works is “The Supposed Power of Words in the Biblical Writings”(Thiselton 1974: 38). This article utilizes the notion that biblical words can be refreshed as speech acts, especially blessings and curses in the Old Testament. According to him, these biblical words are not dependent on primitive notions of word-magic. Rather the power of blessings and curses renders the nature of the speaking agent, and the illocutionary force of what is uttered, in line with the accepted convention of the situation.³²

In addition, Thiselton applies(1992: 286) SAT more concretely to Jesus’ performative utterances in the Synoptic Gospels. This work showed that the words of Jesus in his narrative texts can be demonstrated as having speech act character in the light of illocutionary point such as exercitive, directive and verdictive (Thiselton 2006: 76-81). For example, when Jesus says: “My son, your sins are [hereby] forgiven” (Mk 2:5; Mt. 9:2; Lk 5:20); “Peace! Be still” (Mk 4:35-41; Mt 8: 23-27; Lk 8:22-25), he applied especially SAT as biblical interpretation toward one of the most famous of Jesus’ utterances, the so-called “The Great Commission”:

Eerdmans, 133-239.

³¹ Thiselton, Anthony C, 2000 *The First Epistle to the Corinthians*. New International Greek Testament Commentary. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans; Thiselton, Anthony C, “The Epistle to the Hebrews,” in *Commentary 2000*, ed.J.D.G.Dunn and J.W.Rogerson, forthcoming.

³² See Thiselton’s assessment of this issue(2006: 62-63):“Blessing and cursing are prime examples of what J.L Austin called performative language, namely, a language-use in which ‘the issuing of the utterance is the performing of an action’. It is an “illocutionary” act, i.e. performance of an act in saying something, as opposed to performance of an act of saying something... Acts of blessing in the Old Testament rest on accepted conventions; on procedures or institutions accepted within Israelite society, and usually involving conventionally accepted formulae. They are effective, in most cases, only when performed by the appropriate person in the appropriate situation.”[my emphasis]

“Go therefore and make disciples” (Matt. 28:19) constitutes an *exercitive* which appoints, commands and *assigns* an “institutional” *role*. “Teaching them to observe all that I have commanded you” (Matt. 28:20) combines the *exercitive* and *habitative* dimensions of *authorization*. “Lo, I am with you always, to the close of the age.” (Matt. 28:20) represents a classic illocution example of the sub-category identified by Austin, Evans, Searle, and Recanati as “*commissives*” (Thiselton 1992: 287).

From this hermeneutical application within SAT, the preacher may identify a number of other examples of illocutionary categories of Jesus’ utterances in other narrative sequence. This SAT application in biblical interpretation highlights the illocutionary point constituted in the narrative plot. This biblical approach will suggest an alternative criterion for the understanding of Jesus’ words and his works. As SAT points out, the speaker’s intention creates the illocutionary act in which the sequence of the illocutionary action in Jesus’ utterances can be ascribed to his identity. Therefore, the identity of Jesus should “govern interpretations of conventional “messianic” language, rather than that ready-made assumptions about the meaning of such language should govern an understanding of Jesus”(Thiselton 2006: 80).

If the narrative plot in the stories of Jesus can be understood as speech acts, Jesus’ utterances in biblical passages should be performing actions such as warnings, commands, invitations, judgments, promises, or pledges of love (Thiselton 2006: 78). These biblical plots can be represented as $F(p)$ where “ F ” is the illocutionary force (what Jesus intend) and “ P ” is the propositional expression(what Jesus said) (cf. Searle 1969: 31). This narrative content cannot occur alone, further, it is always an illocutionary act that is simultaneously performed. More clearly, what narrative text

expresses with a propositional context is the illocutionary action (cf. Searle 1969: 30).³³ Jesus' effective words is basic to illocutionary activity in which several of Jesus' stories also can be represented unambiguously as $F(p)$. It should be characterized in the form of a promise " $Pr(p)$ ", warning " $W(p)$ ", blessing " $B(p)$ " etc. These biblical basic narrative illocutionary activities are clearly suggesting the reality of Jesus' intention, its basic plea; hear my word, believe me and follow me. Therefore, in SAT, the biblical narrative is important not because it provides a "homiletical plot" for sermons, or because preaching should consist of telling stories. Rather its illocutionary force *reveals the identity of Jesus of Nazareth*, who has been raised from the dead and seeks today *to form a people who follow his way*. Accordingly, *preaching from the gospels begins with the re-illocutionary point of Jesus' meaningful action* (cf. Campbell 1997: 190).

Homiletically, the preaching as re-illocution of the text can serve Campbell's main argument in "*Preaching Jesus: New directions for homiletics in Hans Frei's postliberal theology*", (1997). His work tried to overcome a limited narrative appropriation in the context of contemporary narrative preaching method. In this limited appropriation, the preacher interprets merely a displayed narrative structure of its biblical passage and then moves to apply those findings in the general transmission of preaching. This simplification is precisely what a lot of narrative homileticians have done (Campbell 1997: 190). However, if the preacher uses the illocutionary point as the central theological idea of the sermon, this homiletical proposition can be seen to focus on Jesus' intentional action as a significant guide to Christian preaching (cf. Campbell

³³ The biblical narrative can have genuine illocutionary force (Lanser 1981: 293). The biblical author projects a world towards the reader. In narrative, (p) is best viewed not as propositional content but as the plot (Vanhoozer 1998: 227).

1997: 192). Here, the narrative preaching does not intend the congregation to find similar stories in the biblical narrative. Rather, the preacher stresses that Jesus' narrative must have "messianic illocutionary force". This force is not created by our contemporary stories, because, what Jesus did, in the biblical narrative, is not to be regarded as a past event, rather it will have rapport with his people - what Jesus' hopes to say and to do in the contemporary world. This illocutionary force is exactly the essential nutrition to foster contemporary communities in Jesus Christ.

For example, Jesus said on the cross; "It is finished!" (John19:30). This is neither simply p nor simply F but $F(P)$ or more specifically, an assertive action which entails the declaration of a new reality. This reality is created by the specific illocutionary action the author performed. It is not such a reader-made event because, as Searle points out(1969: 47), the speaker intends to produce an illocutionary effect. Furthermore any proposition expressed is always expressed in the performance of an illocutionary act (ibid: 29). From this, the illocutionary point of Jn19:30 should make public the identity of Jesus in which the modern Christian confession is evaluated by this illocutionary force in the context of the Passion of the Christ. This $F(p)$ as "*declaration (the Passion narrative)*" generates an alternative reality, which can correct fake confessions as well as fake biblical preaching. This correction has focused on what Jesus promised or guaranteed in the Christian life, more than how the church understand his promise in modern life.

Regarding this homiletical reality, SAT can be used to establish the new relationship between Christology and Homiletics, to be conceived as an extension with an emphasis

on the uniqueness of his illocutionary force. Because, as SAT points out(1969: 47) Jesus (the speaker) intends to produce an illocutionary effect. Therefore, this illocutionary force of Jesus' utterance will refresh a certain interpretive practice in the identity of Jesus-centered preaching. In this way, the biblical illocutionary force exhibits the purpose of preaching. More precisely, this illocutionary force governs the message of preaching. The homiletical proposition can be seen to focus on illocutionary force as a significant guide to biblical preaching. The preacher does not preach that the congregation finds their familiar experience in the biblical passage, rather, the preacher stresses that illocutionary force will impact to challenge the congregation's life. To put it simply, the Jesus' speech act: *warnings (cross), commands (cross), invitations (cross), promises (cross), and pledges (cross)*; these illocutionary acts continue to play across time through the preaching Jesus.

Preaching is more than to claim a mere past event or abstract doctrinal information. Preaching is performing acts such as His promising, His arguing, His blessing, and His condemning of the Christian community in which the modern church invites trust, obedience, surrender and devotion. This self-involving level of interpretation in preaching suggests new insights in "what the text meant" and "what the text means" in homiletical context. In fact, this distinction is inappropriate to recognize any real zealous goal of illocutionary action in the Scripture. Because, in SAT, there is no rhetic act of a propositional-historical format (what the text meant) with its meaning that is completely "force-neutral", but every proposition content is expressed as it is always expressed in the performance of an illocutionary action(Searle 1968: 413; 1969: 29). Therefore, the re-illocutionary preaching is effectively performed, when the preacher

transforms a new relationship between the Scripture and congregation, and invites the community to participate in this transformation. This preaching vision is biblically adequate to communicate the element of the illocutionary force of Scripture as the normative nourishment for the church (cf. Campbell 1997: 257). Therefore, the preaching of Jesus in SAT is no more entertainment, but rather enters into an alternative reality of the modern church.

3. The use of illocutionary acts for biblical interpretation in terms of “the witness of preaching.”

Nicholas Wolterstorff has applied SAT in biblical interpretation.³⁴ According to him, the illocutionary action offers new ways “of thinking about God speaking”(1995: 13). His argument also relies on the nature of illocutionary acts, which can distinguish between God saying and God doing acts in Scripture. In using one locutionary act to perform another illocutionary act, Wolterstorff explains(1997: 30): “I have performed one action by performing another distinct action”. Accordingly, it is possible that God’s speaking can be understood as a speech act. Here is his analysis(Wolterstorff 1995: 13):

“Once illocutionary acts are thus distinguished from locutionary acts, then it immediately occurs to one that though of course such actions as asking, asserting, commanding, and promising, can be performed by way of uttering or inscribing sentences, they can be performed in many other ways as well. One can say something by producing a blaze, or smoke, or a sequence of light-flashes. Even more interesting: one can tell somebody something by deputizing someone else to speak on one's behalf. In short, contemporary

³⁴ Wolterstorff, Nicholas. “Why Animals Don’t Speak.” *Faith and Philosophy* 4 (1987): 463-85; 1995, *Divine Discourse: Philosophical Reflections on the Claim That God Speaks*. New York: Cambridge University Press; “True Words” in: Alan G. Padgett and Patrick R. Keifert(ed), *But Is It All True?* Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2006.

speech-action theory opens up the possibility of a whole new way of thinking about God speaking: perhaps the attribution of speech to God by Jews, Christians..., should be understood as the attribution to God of illocutionary actions, leaving it open how God performs those actions.”

From this perspective, God can create an illocutionary force with or without a linguistic system. In fact, the Bible describes dynamic media such as fire, water, wind, silence and human being to perform a divine illocutionary force. As Wolterstorff further remark(*ibid*: 1995: 38):

“Actually all of us use conventional gestures of various sorts to say things: winks, nudges, shrugs, nods, and so forth. The media of divine discourse are even more diverse, or so at least the biblical writers claim. Words, yes; but beyond that, happenings of all sorts: dreams, visions, apparitions, burning bushes, illnesses, national calamities, and national deliverances, droughts - on and on. When reflecting on discourse, be it human or divine, it’s important to keep in mind this diversity of media - especially important to keep in mind that one doesn’t need words to say things.”

This diversity of “media of divine discourse” opens up the possibility that Scripture itself is SAT. That is, God can perform a speech act without having to utter sounds. From this, the preacher refreshes God being present within illocutionary acts in the Bible, because faithful preaching requires a certain attitude of hearing the living voice of God. The preacher cannot preach anything until the preacher is aware of God’s living Words. According to SAT, the basic unit of linguistic communication is not the locution level (symbol, word, and sentence) but the performance of a speech act.³⁵ There are

³⁵ Searle clearly said(1969: 16) that “[t]he unit of linguistic communication is not, as has generally been supposed, the symbol, word or sentence, or even the token of the symbol, word or sentence, but rather the production or issuance of the symbol or word or sentence in the performance of the speech act. ... More precisely, the production or issuance of a sentence token under certain conditions is a speech act, and

many Christian communities which read the Bible (locution level) in order to encounter God's presence (illocution level) in contemporary life. SAT is not the only bridge between speaker and audience in the synchrony dialogue situation, but in certain cases, for particular types of illocutionary force in the text, it continues to play across time here and there (Pratt 1977: 136).³⁶ This illocutionary force is in essence that of the presence of God through the text. Forth-reaching, the illocutionary force of the Scripture may suggest an alternative logic of the presence of God as His speech act (Wolterstorff 1995: 19-36).

Homiletically, God's presence as God's speech act is more than to retell a biblical statement or biblical story. Rather, His words are His speech acts in Scripture. If that is so, it becomes the central issue in the mystery of preaching, expressed in the Reformed statement that "preaching of the word of God is the Words of God." (see the second Helvetic Confession). This "is" must be understood in a pneumatological way (Immink 2002: 161). The preacher can rethink this Reformed confession in the light of SAT in which God's basic illocutionary activity in the text will serve the theological support of the mystery of preaching. Note Vanhoozer's remark in this regard:

"If the *Father is the locutor*, the *Son is his preeminent illocution*, Christ is God's definitive Word, the substantive content of his message. And the *Holy Spirit—the condition and power of receiving the sender's message—is God the perlocutor*, the

speech acts ... are the basic or minimal units of linguistic communication"

³⁶ Pratt has made a good start in applying speech act theory to texts. She points out, in "*Toward a speech act theory of literary discourse*", on this issue, the displayed text, is really doing something: "verbally *displaying* a state of affairs, inviting his addressee(s) to join him in contemplating it, evaluating it, and responding to it." (Pratt 1977: 136). The text, then, can have genuine illocutionary force.

reason that his words do not return to him empty (Isa. 55:11)” (1998: 457) [my emphasis].

If the preacher reflects on the above quotation concerning the mystery of preaching, this mystery of preaching is represented by $F(p)$ where *the Holy Spirit (a biblical content)* assists the Word of God in the preaching. This homiletical theology depends on the inner authority and witness of the Scripture and the convincing power of the Holy Spirit. To put it differently, the nature of the preaching itself could be understood as the perlocutionary action of *the Holy Spirit (a biblical content)*.

This situation leads to the following important theme in the task of preaching that the Holy Spirit illumines the preacher to bring out the illocutionary force of the biblical passage. In this view, the preacher has a vast responsibility with regard to his or her sermon. The preacher could receive the *Holy Spirit* as the perlocutor’s energy in a responsible way. Therefore, if the preacher wants to share in the mystery of preaching in SAT then he/she must learn to respond faithfully to the various illocutionary actions in Scripture. The Holy Spirit illumines the preacher in order to create a Bible-oriented sermon through illocutionary force of the biblical passage. Thus, the preacher will not to be satisfied until he/she engages with both the dynamic illocution actions as well as its suitable perlocution. Effective preaching depends basically on the inner testimony of the Spirit (illocutionary force) and on the faithful reception of the preacher (perlocutionary action). This dialectic co-operative action enables the language of preaching to be re-illocutionary in which the preacher performs the execution of a divine illocutionary act. Therefore, the recognition of illocutionary force in the text restates the basic perspective of the witness of the preaching: becoming the performance of re-illocutionary action in

Scripture.

Homiletically, the image of the preacher as the performer of this re-illocutionary action can serve Long's proposition on "*The witness of preaching*", (2005). His main work tried to overcome the limited traditional image of the preacher, as a herald, a pastor or a storyteller (Long 2005: 45-51). According to him, witness is the crucial action in which the preacher has to report that a text is about something, which may be performed under certain conditions and with certain intentions (ibid:47). Note his remark in this regard:

"When the preacher makes the turn from the exegesis of the biblical text toward the sermon itself, ... The move from text to sermon is a move from beholding to attesting, from seeing to saying, from listening to telling, from perceiving to testifying, from *being* a witness to *bearing* witness." (Long 2005: 100).

This activity is obviously performed in an illocutionary act in Scripture (cf. Coady 1992: 25; Wolterstorff 2006: 38). The image of witness in preaching will not only be a valuable source of what happens in a past episode, being itself a basic means of knowledge in the present, as well as doing what it asserts in the present (Brueggemann 1997b: 165; Ricoeur 1980: 123). Indeed, witness in preaching becomes the performance of re-illocutionary action. In some way, the witness as a performer of illocutionary action has to wait on the illocutionary action in the biblical text to govern the present testimony. This re-illocutionary act will create a connection between what the text said in the past and the preaching context in the present. It is important to remember that both "what the text meant" and "what the text means" is not isolated in the context of

SAT (cf. Searle 1969: 29). The image of the witness in re-illocutionary preaching concerns the illocutionary force of the biblical text. Not only being the testimony of its original witness, but is also equally legitimate to all subsequent contemporary preachers in their present testimony.

This model of preaching is a form of testimony in the modern world referring both to what has happened to the world as it was to the new vision of what could be; to the world as it might or ought to be. Therefore, re-illocutionary preaching should pay attention to the dual nature of witness that God did something in Jesus Christ (His commands) and God will do something for the modern world in Jesus Christ (His promises). This dual aspect of witness is required of the preacher to in all the Christian Confessions. This response will result in the Christian witness in which the preacher engages with the practical, participatory, first-person nature of these confessions of faith in order to become a responsible “witness to Jesus Christ” in light of SAT (Neufeld 1994: 76).³⁷

4. The value of the illocutionary acts in biblical interpretation regarding the power of preaching.

When preachers encounter illocutionary acts in the Biblical text, they basically become dependent upon the locutionary levels to make some kind of interpretative judgment concerning the nature of the speech act. When Jesus says at the end of Matthew’s gospel, “I am with you always”, the preacher simply interprets this illocutionary act as a

³⁷ Neufeld examines SAT to bear witness to Jesus Christ in a confessional formula and especially its function in 1 John. He concludes that the biblical text exercises “power to transform the readers’ expectations, speech and conduct”(Neufeld 1994: 133). This illocutionary force in the text bears witness to Jesus Christ (ibid :76).

promise. However, there are other examples which remain complicated, for instance, when Paul said “Women should remain silent in the churches” (1Co 14:34). Even though the words of the text are clear, the question must be asked: which illocutionary point is Paul performing? The preacher should note that a variety of locutionary levels in the biblical texts do not necessarily correspond only to single illocutions. That is, speakers characteristically perform a locutionary act with a single utterance in which they utter words with a certain sense and reference. However, they also mean to perform illocutionary acts with a certain force such as assertions, promises, orders, declarations and apologies:

The notice : “Wet paint” as a		
Locutionary act	Illocutionary act	Perlocutionary act
It is a sentence according to the rules of the English imperative mood.	It is a warning, commanding, hinting or uttering something which have a certain conventional force.	It is a convincing, persuading, deterring, surprising sentence.

Therefore, when utterances have effects on audiences in which audiences have to perform perlocutionary acts, they aim at convincing, pleasing, influencing, or embarrassing. Thus, when a speaker utters a single sentence in English (or any other language), there are at least two, possibly three things going on (Austin 1975: 58-78; Searle 1979: 8-29). Hence, this nature of SAT unquestionably establishes that the biblical writings perform multiple speech acts (Wolterstorff 1995: 55). Therefore, the preacher may take the case where the Bible itself invites or requires several multi-layered, multi-directional actions. According to Thiselton, this nature of biblical language is generally agreed upon in several biblical case-studies. He notes:

“The very same word, however, combines a number of functions - they perform several multi-layered, multi-directional actions: They are sermon, creed, confession, hymn, praise, acclamation, exposition, argument, celebration. Much of the poverty of some preaching today derives from exclusive attention either to ‘teaching,’ or ‘exhortation,’ or personal anecdote, in contrast to the richly multi-layered, multi-level model of preaching...”(Thiselton 1999: 146).

Interestingly, this criticism on “the poverty of preaching” is not unprecedented. In fact, Craddock had criticized this, saying that too often today words simply describe: preachers “serve only as signs pointing to the discovered or discoverable data”(Craddock 1979: 33). In order to overcome “the poverty of preaching”, Craddock already regarded the illocutionary force as primary biblical interpretation elements in preaching (1979: 34-44). He stresses; “J.L Austin has reminded us of the creative or performative power of words. Words not only report something; they do something” (ibid: 34). Craddock’s conviction advocates the notion that preaching reconceives the biblical language to be “an action, something happening” (44): “words are deeds” (34), and his hope is to recover the “dynamistic and creative functions of language” in the context of homiletics (34).

Nevertheless, recent preaching styles have simply missed the point of Craddock’s critique of the carelessness of biblical language used in the sermon. Often preachers have tried to present several preaching styles such as “story preaching, dialogue sermons, and homiletical plot” in terms of a “new homiletic” (Campbell 1997: XI; Thompson 2001b: 9-11). Craddock emphasizes that “before they were smothered by a scientific and technological culture, words danced, sang, teased, lured, probed, wept,

judged, and transformed”(1979: 34). That is, the illocutionary action in the text itself is a divine symphony, putting breath into our dry sermons. The multiple speech actions lead to change the monotonous preaching God’s breath to the dry bones of the sermon. This is how Calvin and the Reformers understood the Spirit’s illumination: the Spirit convicts us that the Bible contains God’s dynamic illocutions and enables us to respond to them as we ought (Vanhoozer 1997: 156). Therefore, if the preacher reconsiders the Spirit’s illumination in light of illocutionary action, the multi-directional $F(p)$ through the Spirit’s illumination opens rethinking about the power of preaching.

Through this approach, the preacher is in a position to make a proposal concerning a homiletic principle. In the light of SAT, preaching depends on dynamic illocutions in the Bible, in which there is a dual divine-human agency in operation. This is what Wolterstorff terms a “double agency discourse”(Wolterstorff 1995: 38). This expresses an ordinary every-day situation found everywhere. For example, a chief executive officer might order what his or her secretary should say by dictating or indicating a message that should be said. It may even be said by the secretary knowing the intention of the CEO. In this case, the CEO empowers the secretary to write by signing the text, thereby showing that what the secretary says *counts as* the CEO’s illocutionary act. Similarly, the CEO might dispatch the secretary as a negotiator to represent the CEO. A deputized person does not necessarily receive the exact words to use, but still speaks in the name of the deputizer: “the deputy has, as it were, power of attorney”(Wolterstorff 1995: 44). Thus, the buyer is encountered not merely with locutionary acts of the negotiator, but more precisely with the negotiator’s locutionary acts which *count as* the CEO’s illocutionary acts performed by the negotiator. However, this leads to an

interesting question: permitted that the deputizer's locutionary action - the negotiator, the diplomat and the ambassador's locutionary acts - do these deputizers themselves perform illocutionary acts by way of their locutionary acts? But, is do they speak discourse in their own voice? Wolterstorffs answers thus:

“... [I]t might sometimes be the case that the very same utterings[of the deputizer] count both as the performance of speech actions by the ambassador and as the performance of speech actions by his head of state; these might be the very same speech actions, or somewhat different. Probably the most common occurrence, though, is that in the course of issuing the warning, the ambassador moves back and forth between speaking in the name of his head of state and speaking in his own voice; and sometimes part of what he does when speaking in his own voice consists of communicating a message from his head of state(Wolterstorff 1995: 45).”

This, “double agency discourse” homiletically can serve to enable us to rethink the power of preaching. It is often pointed out that the power of the sermon depends on “saying the same thing as the text”. However, in SAT, the preaching power consists of “doing the same thing as the performance of illocutionary force in the text”. It is a very important issue, because there are many boring sermons saying precisely the same thing as the Bible. Also, the preacher can easily misunderstand the issues of power in preaching, if he/she takes on the biblical passages word for word. Paul states that he demonstrated the power of preaching in Corinth: “My message and my preaching were not with wise and persuasive words, but with a demonstration of the Spirit's power, so that your faith might not rest on men's wisdom, but on God's power.” (1Co 2:4-5). According to Paul, the basic essence of preaching is the Spirit's power through which everything is done. This power of God's word is exactly the illocutionary force in terms of SAT. It is clear in this connection that Paul's preaching in Corinth pays attention to

God's illocutionary actions. When the Spirit empowers what Paul proclaimed by preaching Jesus Christ and him crucified, his preaching authorized God's illocutionary acts in Jesus Christ. Thus the Corinthians were encountered, not merely with locutionary acts of Paul, but more precisely, with Paul's locutionary acts which *count as* illocutionary acts performed in God's power. In light of SAT, when Paul said "the power of God" it is a clear illocutionary act to authorize the power of the preaching. The power of preaching will be the medium of encounter with God's illocutionary power through Scripture. This "double agency discourse" in the preaching should aim to encompass a sense, both of the impact of what the text says and of the response to it. Therefore, truthful biblical preaching in light of SAT needs to be evaluated with reference to the affair of a non-linguistic agent (Brummer 1981: 11).

5. Summary and conclusion.

This chapter has explored the interface of SAT and biblical studies, as well as showing how this SAT application to biblical interpretation may serve persuasively to evaluate important homiletical issues such as "the preaching Jesus", "the witness of preaching" and "the power of preaching." The application of SAT in biblical interpretation makes three important contributions to each of these homiletical issues.

Firstly, "the preaching of Jesus", as represented in SAT as $F(p)$, should be clearly characterized in the form of a promise " $Pr(p)$ ", warning " $W(p)$ ", blessing " $B(p)$ " etc. This preaching is basic a re-illocutionary activity to stress the reality of Jesus' intention. Its basic: hear my word, believe me and follow me.

Secondly, in SAT “the witness of preaching” starts to perform a re-illocutionary action in some way. It requires that both “what the text meant” and “what the text means” should not simply be isolated in the context of SAT. This model of the preaching engages with the practical, participatory, first-person nature of the confession of faith in order to become a responsible “witness to Jesus Christ”.

Thirdly, in SAT “the power of preaching” makes it clear that preaching has to pay attention to God’s illocutionary action. Thereby, “the power of God” is clear that illocutionary acts authorize the power of preaching in Jesus Christ. Thereby in preaching, the congregation will be encountered, not merely with locutionary acts of the sermon, but more precisely, with locutionary acts which *count as* illocutionary acts performed by God’s power. Therefore, the preaching, as medium of the encounter with God’s power through Scripture can definitely aim to include a sense both of the impact of the linguistic levels (what the text says) and the non-linguistic level (of response to what it is).

What would be the corollaries of such a view of SAT in our conception of the interface of biblical studies and homiletics? The answer to this will have to the three normative tasks of preaching approach in the light of SAT.

Firstly, the re-illocutionary act of preaching is seen not only as interpretation of Scripture but as the agent of performance in the illocutionary action of Scripture. The preacher not only preaches concerning what the Scripture “meant (past)” or “means (present)”. Rather, the preaching is essentially the response(s) which the biblical

passages anticipates in the preacher's life; furthermore, the full meaning of the sermon when it is only performed by preachers even when they are faithful to the text is not yet complete. Therefore, the re-illocutionary preaching contains the life of the preacher as an essential part.

Secondly, the nature of the re-illocutionary act of preaching itself must be understood as a process and a progress of "Sanctification". This ongoing progress is not for a limited period, rather it is required through the whole of the preacher's life, in which the calling of the preacher is essential in his ministry of the word. During training, the illocutionary force of Scripture will have to teach the hermeneutical imperative to the preacher as the Holy Spirit empowers the preaching material in order to accomplish the divine intention in modern words, not only in the application of the sermon. Therefore, the preacher does not modify, but ministers Scripture.

Thirdly, re-illocutionary preaching pays attention to both the impact of the linguistic levels and the non-linguistic level of the utterance. The Holy Spirit instructs the preacher through the Bible in such a way that it is indeed a divine illocution as well as human locution. This is the so-called "internal witness" of the Spirit, by which the preacher confesses the Bible as the Word of God. The Spirit empowers the locution of the biblical text by impressing its illocutionary force on the preacher. Thereby the preacher sees and hears God's speech act; warnings, commands, invitations, promises, and pledges, and after that the preacher can stand on the pulpit as well as serving (under- standing) illocutionary force by the Holy Spirit.

These promising interdisciplinary approaches are neither simply utilizing the biblical text as a footnote in a sermon, nor simply suggesting a magic single way of homiletic methodology as the praxis of preaching. Rather, the particular illocutionary force of the text will be the re-conceiving that the preaching is the performance of the Words of God. Obviously, the Reformed tradition stressed that the biblical text is the foundation of the Christian life and message for the Church. In this tradition, the text is not only the “written Scripture”, but also it is the living God at work in Jesus Christ and through the Holy Spirit. For Calvin, biblical texts were an indispensable part of the work of the Holy Spirit. After this, preaching is nothing more than a strict elaboration of the “acted text” in which Holy Spirit does not come to us as a timeless truth, but to give wisdom. This wisdom is not only to stress such the skill which a preacher gleans meaning from the text, or seeks to translate the text in the contemporary world. It is the goal so that we continuously perform God’s will in the modern world under guidance of the Holy Spirit.

Being Christian is nothing else than the performance of biblical passages in Jesus Christ. All Christian action has to be based on and activated by such performance of texts in the preaching event. In this case, the aim of preaching is not only to carry or mention some religious experience or its concept in the preaching event, rather preaching in itself becomes thereby an interpretive performance of Scripture with the Holy Spirit. Therefore, SAT must re-introduce the sovereignty of God and the necessary role of the Holy Spirit in Jesus Christ whereby the homiletic confession gives recognition to the fact that the Bible is God’s authoritative speech act as $F(p)$; the *Holy Spirit(Jesus)*.

CHAPTER 5

General summary of previous chapters and conclusion

1 Introduction

This research began with the question of how the preacher to make a more satisfactory connection between the text and sermon by appreciation the essence of SAT. This offers practical homiletical guidelines for the application of performance of illocutionary force of the text. That is an event performed as the living Word of God for modern man. This research thus endeavored to investigate the issue of the practical application in two senses. Firstly, it examined how SAT helps us to create biblically the bridge between text and sermon in clear ways. Secondly, it paid attention to the role of illocutionary force in Scripture to help us understand the mystery that the preaching of the Word of God.

2. Summary of previous chapters

Chapter 2 investigated three well-known homileticians, Buttrick, Campbell and Long. In particular we noted that their views and methods are similar insofar as that they emphasize what the biblical text intends to say and do must govern what the preacher hopes to say and do in the sermon. In this, Buttrick (1987: 308) stressed hermeneutically that the homiletic bridge is a way of continual movement. This movement consists of immediacy, reflection and praxis; the intention of the text, intention toward the text, and intention to do given by the text. Thereby, the movement from text to sermon is designed through the intention of biblical language as well as its own intentional action. Campbell (1997: 239) attempted to emphasize the performative aspect of language as a sovereign subject. That is, the autonomous function of the Bible

has a certain performative momentum towards building up the church. Finally, Long (2005: 106) asserted persuasively that the preacher, who acts as witness, must explicate in the sermon both what the text says and what the text does. With regard to their homiletical assessment of the performative dimension of biblical language, therefore, it suggested the important possibility of formulating the movement of the text to sermon. This homiletical assumption referring to the text itself is a meaningful act; what the text is doing (performative action), and not merely what it means (objective of the topic). This homiletic motif is useful to rethink the movement from the text and sermon. The interpretive performance of Scripture in preaching is not only engaged on the superficial level of the grammatical or historical meaning of the text. Rather, it requires a different level of the text in which the preacher can take up a particular stance toward the openness of the energy of the text. This multidimensional concept of the biblical text requires that the preacher must respect the role of a certain sense from the illocutionary act of the biblical language. That is, the movement from text to sermon is identified according to speech acts in the biblical passage (what the text is doing in it is saying). From this perspective, preaching a biblical passage will imply an insight in SAT entered homiletic theory. The appreciation of SAT in the Scripture therefore is a most fundamental concept in the preaching material as well as the sermonic unit. This homiletical perspective appreciated the descriptive value of SAT with regard to the link between the text and biblical preaching.

Chapter 3 investigated on the basis of Austin's and Searle's work the term 'SAT'. The philosophy of linguistic theory makes important contributions. Particularly, there are basically five types of speech act (Searle 1979: 10-16), namely assertives, directives,

commissives, expressive and declaration. Often words do more than one of these at once in the same utterance.

- (1) The assertive: utterances which say how things are
- (2) The directives: utterances which try to get others to do things
- (3) The commissives: utterances which commit ourselves to doing things
- (4) The expressives: utterances which express our feelings and attitudes
- (5) The declaration: utterances which bring about changes through our utterances

Therefore, the classification of illocutionary acts is precisely the distinction between different illocutionary points. This distinction shows how the speaker's intentionality enables the same proposition to count as illocutionary acts such as a warning; " $W(p)$ ", blessing; " $B(p)$ ", promise; " $Pr(p)$ ", etc (Searle 1976: 2). In addition, this propositional content must be understood within certain "constitutive rules". They constitute and regulate activities and often have the form: "X counts as Y in context C." (Searle 1969: 35). The SAT argues that the use of language is explained by the constitutive rules which, furthermore, govern human behavior. For example, under the constitutive rules of soccer, when the soccer player kicks a soccer ball into the goal, it *counts as* one score. There are conventions involved in these constitutive rules, which relate all kinds of nonlinguistic criteria. Therefore, to perform illocutionary acts will be to engage in "a rule-governed form of behavior" (Searle 1979: 17).

Further SAT stressed that each illocutionary point has only four possible directions of fit,

namely word-to-world direction, world-to-word direction, double direction or empty direction (Searle 1976: 10-16; 1979: 12-20).

- (1) Illocutionary acts with an assertive point (e.g. assertions, conjectures, predictions) has the words-to-world direction of fit. This illocutionary point is to represent how things are (e.g. “It is raining”)
- (2) Illocutionary acts with the commissive or directive point (e.g., promises, vows, acceptance, and requests) have the world-to-words direction of fit. This illocutionary point is to have the world transformed by the future course of action of the speaker (e.g. “Open the window”)
- (3) Illocutionary acts with the declaratory illocutionary point (e.g., definitions, appellations, appointments, benedictions and condemnations) have the double direction of fit to bring about correspondence between propositional content and reality (e.g. “You are fired”)
- (4) Illocutionary acts with the expressive point (e.g., apologies, thanks, complaints, boasts) have the empty direction of fit. This illocutionary point is just to express the speaker’s mental state about a represented fact. In this case, in expressive utterance, speakers do not attempt to represent how things are and they do not want to change things (e.g. “I am so sorry”)

In order to rethink the homiletical bridge in the light of SAT, the following three questions provided a framework for our approach:

1. Which constitutive rules govern this biblical passage?

2. Which kind of illocutionary action does this biblical passage perform?
3. For the $F(p)$ in this text, what is the direction of fit between words and world and how may this open up an alternative reality in the Christian life?

Take for example a possible exposition of John 2:1-12, “The Wedding at Cana”. Perhaps the preacher takes as the primary propositional information the fact that this is the first public miraculous sign Jesus performs and continues to construct a sermon plan with this proposition. The goal of this sermon may be to explain how “obedience creates the miracle” or “how we should expect the miraculous in ordinary life”. The preacher may then use illustrations to elucidate certain recent understandings of “Christian obedience”. By the end the congregation already knows what this sermon tells them, but they still struggle to apply it to their different lives.

However, the preacher who applies SAT in order to build a homiletical bridge in light of the three aforementioned questions will arrive at a different sermon goal.

(1) *Which constitutive rules govern the biblical passage?*

The preacher of “The Wedding at Cana” encounter a totally different world that becomes manifest firstly in the cultural differences between ancient and modern weddings. The preacher should be asking questions like whose responsibility was it to provide wine in this context, the bridegroom or bride’s family. These institutional rules would help the preacher recognize the identity of the illocutionary action in the text as well as avoid subjective exegesis.

(2) Which kind of illocution action does it perform in the biblical passage?

According to this passage, the wine supply ran out during the wedding festivities and Jesus' mother spoke to him about the problem. At that time, Jesus said: "My time has not yet come"(John 2:4). In order to clarify Jesus' utterance in terms of SAT, the preacher must pay attention to how the intentionality of the text makes it such that the proposition ("Jesus' time") counts as an illocutionary act such as a warning; "*W(p)*", blessing; "*B(p)*", and promise; "*Pr.(p)*". More specifically the proposition of the Jesus' time counts as a promise; "*Pr.(Jesus' time)*" This "*Pr.(p)*" will highlight an important biblical theme, namely that of God/Jesus being the bridegroom of his people. The preacher should therefore preach God's promise in Jesus Christ. This illocutionary point will serve to create different effects of fright, alarm, or hope within the congregation.

(3) How does $F(p)$ in the text determines the kind of the direction of fit to open up for alternative reality in the Christian life?

The preacher has originally identified a homiletical idea (propositional content) as "obedience creates the miracle" in this particular biblical passage. However, the preacher should pay attention to the direction of fit when he/she preaches on the subject of Christian obedience from this passage. The preacher must seriously ask whether this illocutionary point really counts as (*p*: a plot, content, and character) the obedience message? It is often pointed out that homiletics suggests "saying the same thing as the text". However, in SAT, homiletics suggests "doing the same thing as directedness of

the text”. Therefore, preaching as re-illocutionary act in the text seeks intentionality of text in which the homiletical purpose pertains to the directedness of the illocutionary effect in the text. This association leads to the preaching *counts as* seeking to accomplish and what response the illocutionary force anticipates in this passage.

From this brief example it is clear how SAT serves to refresh both preaching material and preaching praxis in context of the movement from text to sermon. That is, the homiletical bridge in the light of SAT will not only reflect the same ideas as the text, but also aims to elicit the same response as the illocutionary force in the intention of the Scripture. To put it simply, the preacher does not modify Scripture, but rather want to ministers to it. It becomes clear therefore that the homiletical bridge requires a suitable and responsible manner in an application of the illocutionary point in biblical passages. The essence of interpretation in preaching is therefore to recognize the illocutionary act in the Bible. This is the case because the illocutionary act creates the meaning as well as the perlocutionary action.

Chapter 4 investigated the interface of SAT and biblical studies, as well as showing how this SAT application to biblical interpretation can persuasively serve to evaluate important homiletical issues such as “the preaching Jesus” of Campbell, “the witness of preaching” of Long and “the power of preaching of Buttrick.” The application of SAT in biblical interpretation makes three important contributions to each of these homiletical issues.

Firstly, “the preaching of Jesus”, as represented in SAT as $F(p)$, should be clearly

characterized in the form of a promise “*Pr(p)*”, or a warning “*W(p)*”, or a blessing “*B(p)*” etc. This re-illocutionary preaching of Jesus is to stress the reality of Jesus’ intention in modern world. Basically: hear my word, believe me and follow me. This *F(p)* generates an alternative reality in which the modern church can correct its confessions as well as its preaching.

Secondly, in SAT “the witness of preaching” established the perform of a re-illocutionary action in some way. This required that both “what the text meant” and “what the text means” should not simply be isolated in the context of SAT. This model of the preaching requires the practical, participatory, first-person nature of the confession of faith in order to become a responsible “witness to Jesus Christ”.

Thirdly, in SAT “the power of preaching” is formulating that preaching has to pay attention to God’s illocutionary action. Thereby, the preacher depends on the fact that illocutionary acts authorize the power of preaching in Jesus Christ. Thereby in preaching, the congregation will be encountered, not merely with locutionary acts of the sermon, but more precisely, with locutionary acts which *count as* illocutionary acts performed by God’s power. Therefore, the re- illocutionary preaching, as double agency discourse with God’s power through Scripture can definitely aim to include a sense both of the impact of illocution level and perlocution level in Scripture.

These contributions in the interface of hermeneutics and homiletics designated the three normative tasks of preaching approach in the light of SAT.

Firstly, the re-illocutionary act of preaching is seen not only as an interpretation of Scripture but especially as the agent of performance in the illocutionary action of Scripture. This is the case because the illocutionary force of text creates the preachable content (meaning) as well as the perlocutionary action (response). Therefore, the life of the preacher must be an essential part of preaching.

Secondly, the nature of the re-illocutionary act of preaching itself must be understood as a process in the progress of “Sanctification”. During this ongoing movement, the Holy Spirit teaches the preacher that how to minister Scripture. To put it simply, Scripture evaluates the preacher rather than the preacher assessed Scripture.

Thirdly, re-illocutionary preaching pays attention to both the impact of the linguistic levels and the non-linguistic level of the utterance. The Holy Spirit instructs the preacher through the Bible in such a way that it is indeed a divine illocution as well as human locution. Thereby the Spirit will instruct independently the how preacher can perform God’s speech act; warnings, commands, invitations, promises, and pledges, and after that the preacher can serve the church with His words.

3. Conclusion

In the light of SAT, the movement from text to sermon is neither simply to be viewed as finding the timeless principles, meanings, big ideas from Scripture nor to emphasize a human experience in modern world to serve a re-narration of the text. Rather, the homiletical bridge in SAT has to be considered as the performative action of the text itself. The essence of interpretation in preaching is therefore to recognize the

illocutionary act in Scripture. In SAT, the illocutionary act creates the meaning as well as the perlocutionary action. This is the center of matter in order to build a more satisfactory bridge between text and sermon. Obviously, the SAT can directly serve the reformed confessions in which the living Triune God is still speaking through the Scripture in the present. The Spirit is the enabler of a disclosure of the autonomous and meaningful action of the Bible. The Spirit has continually enabled the Christian community to understand and enact the Scripture in the context of the common life of the Christian community (Kelsey 1975: 29-30). This means that the Bible is not given to be exegeted in academic isolation, but to be performed by the people of God (Fowl 1991: 29). Perhaps, when the preacher proclaims the re-illocutionary preaching, he/she will encounter an unexpected manner of sermon. However, this creative preaching generates the unexpected reality through the Bible in which the Spirit gives the energy to accomplish this alternative reality. That is the destiny of the pilgrim as well as the preacher life in Christ.

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