The Hammer and the Anvil: The Convergence of United States and South African Foreign Policies during the Reagan and Botha Administrations

by

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Declaration

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Abstract

This study is an historical analysis of the American policy of Constructive Engagement and serves as a comprehensive review of that policy, its ideological foundation, formulation, aims, and strategies. This study also serves as a detailed assessment of the policy’s ties to the South African Total National Strategy.

Constructive Engagement, according to the Reagan Administration, was designed to lend American support to a controlled process of change within the Republic of South Africa. This change would be accomplished by encouraging a “process of reform” that would be accompanied by American “confidence building” with the apartheid regime. Before this process could begin, however, the region had to be stabilized, and the conflicts within southern Africa resolved. With the assistance of American diplomacy, peace could be brought to the region, and South Africa could proceed to political reform within the Republic.

In reality, the most important aims of Constructive Engagement were to minimize Soviet influence within the Frontline States of southern Africa and remove the Cuban combat forces from Angola. These goals would be largely achieved by supporting and encouraging the South African policy of destabilizing its neighbours, called the Total National Strategy. This alignment inexorably led to a situation in which global policy issues eclipsed regional concerns, thereby making the United States a collaborator with the apartheid regime. Consequently, South Africa was allowed to continue its program of apartheid while enjoying American encouragement of its policy of regional destabilization, particularly its cross-border attacks into Angola and Mozambique. The U.S. support for the apartheid government offered through Constructive Engagement made the policy vulnerable to criticism that the apartheid regime’s “experiment with reform” was not a move toward liberalizing the Republic’s political system but that it was tailored to deny citizenship through the establishment of Bantustans, a point that provided ammunition to domestic opponents of Constructive Engagement.

For a time, U.S.-South African cooperation was effective; the Frontline States were grudgingly forced to accept Pretoria’s regional hegemony. However, dominance of the Frontline States did not improve the security of the South African state. The African National Congress had not been defeated and was determined to make the Republic ungovernable. Furthermore, by the late-1980s, Pretoria could not dominate southern Africa and Angola, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe, which, although crippled from years of war, appeared poised to reassert themselves in the region. For South Africa, the Total National Strategy had failed, and coexistence with its neighbours would be a necessity. Without a powerful apartheid regime with which to reduce communist influence in southern Africa, the Reagan Administration abandoned Constructive Engagement.
Opsomming

Hierdie studie is ’n historiese analise van die Amerikaanse beleid van Konstruktiewe Betrokkenheid en dien as ’n omvattende oorsig van dié beleid, sy ideologiese grondslag, formulering, oogmerke en strategieë. Dit dien ook as ’n gedetailleerde beoordeling van die beleid se bande met Suid-Afrika se Totale Nasionale Strategie.

Volgens die Reagan-administrasie was Konstruktiewe Betrokkenheid bedoel om Amerikaanse steun te verleen aan ’n beheerde proses van verandering binne die Republiek van Suid-Afrika. Hierdie verandering sou bereik word deur die aanmoeding van ’n ‘hervormingsproses’ wat met Amerikaanse ‘bou van vertroue’ met die apartheidregime gepaardgaan. Voordat dié proses kon begin moes die streek egter eers gestabiliseer en die konflikte binne Suider-Afrika opgelos word. Met behulp van Amerikaanse diplomasi kon vrede in die streek bewerkstellig word, en kon Suid-Afrika oorgaan tot binnelandse politieke hervorming.

In werklikheid was die vernaamste oogmerke van Konstruktiewe Betrokkenheid om Sowjet-invloed binne die Frontliniestate van Suider-Afrika te minimaliseer en die Kubaanse gevegsmagte uit Angola te verwyder. Dié doelwitte sou grootliks bereik word deur die ondersteuning en aanmoeding van Suid-Afrika se beleid om sy buurstate te destabiliseer, wat as die Totale Nasionale Strategie bekend gestaan het. Hierdie ooreenstemming van belange het noodwendig gelei tot ’n situasie waar globale beleidskwessies streeksaangeleenthede oorskud, en sodoende die Verenigde State van Amerika ’n kollaborateur van die apartheidregime gemaak. Gevolglik is Suid-Afrika toegelaat om sy apartheidprogram voort te sit terwyl hy Amerikaanse aanmoeding van sy beleid van streeksdestabilisering geniet, veral sy oorgrensaanvalle in Angola en Mosambiek. Die Amerikaanse steun vir die apartheidregering wat deur Konstruktiewe Betrokkenheid gebied is, het die beleid vatbaar gemaak vir kritiek dat die apartheidregering se ‘eksperiment met hervorming’ nie ’n stap in die rigting van die liberalisering van die Republiek se politieke stelsel is nie, maar eerder toegespits is op die ontsegging van burgerskap deur die vestiging van Bantoestans, ’n punt wat ammunisie verskaf het aan teenstanders van Konstruktiewe Betrokkenheid binne die VSA.

Die VSA-RSA-samewerking was vir ’n tyd lank doeltreffend; die Frontliniestate moes skoorvoetend Pretoria se streekshegemonie aanvaar. Oorheersing van die Frontliniestate het egter nie die veiligheid van die Suid-Afrikaanse staat verbeter nie. Die African National Congress was nie verslaan nie en was vasbeslote om die Republiek onregeerbaar te maak. Boonop kon Pretoria teen die laat-1980s nie Suider-Afrika domineer nie en Angola, Mosambiek en Zimbabwe, hoewel verswak weens jare se oorlogvoering, het gereed gelyk om hulle weer in die streek te laat geld. Vir Suid-Afrika het die Totale Nasionale Strategie misluk, en naasbestaan met sy buurstate sou ’n noodsaaklikheid wees. Sonder ’n magtige apartheidregime waarmee kommunistiese invloed in Suider-Afrika verminder kon word, het die Reagan-administrasie Konstruktiewe Betrokkenheid laat vaar.
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Chapter I

1.1 Introduction

Why did the Reagan Administration pursue a policy of constructive engagement with the Republic of South Africa? This dissertation attempts to explain American foreign policy in southern Africa in the decade before the end of the Cold War. In the broadest sense, this dissertation is about power and the complex channels through which it worked in United States Cold War foreign policy and about the political players and the web of relations within which they were enmeshed. However, this doctoral study is also something more modest, for it focuses on a particular country and policy: South Africa and the Reagan Administration’s policy of Constructive Engagement. Through this policy, it is possible to see how the United States-South African relationship was conceived, implemented, and justified. It is also possible to scrutinize the internal disputes within both countries about the nature of their relationship and to see the changes the political actors made in strategy and tactics in response to shifting domestic circumstances.

According to its chief architect, Chester Crocker, Constructive Engagement was designed to lend American support to an open-ended and long-term process of change within the Republic of South Africa. This change would be accomplished by encouraging a “process of reform” that would be accompanied by American “confidence building” with the apartheid regime. Before this process could begin, however, the region had to be stabilized, and the conflicts within southern Africa resolved. With the assistance of American diplomacy, peace could be brought to the region and South Africa could proceed to political reform within the Republic.

After decades of research and writing on the American-South African relationship, the definition of Constructive Engagement provided by Chester Crocker has remained largely unchallenged. However, the end of the Cold War and the declassifying of documents related to the period and policy has provided an opportunity to re-examine the policy and foreign policy, in general, of the United States.

1.2 Problem Statement and Focus

This dissertation will explore the ultimate objectives of Constructive Engagement. As it was presented in the 1980s, the policy was designed to provide American support for managed political liberalization within the Republic of South
Africa and “to create a regional climate conducive to negotiated settlement and political change.”¹ Chester Crocker warned, “these things would not happen if Soviet-Cuban adventurism went unanswered and a cycle of reciprocal, cross-border violence was allowed to take root.” In Crocker’s estimation, it was only after the Front Line States (FLS) accepted South African leadership in the region and abandoned their outdated Marxist ideologies and allies, that Pretoria could begin the “steps and sequences” that would lead to “piecemeal power-sharing steps” with its own black majority.² Because P.W. Botha’s “commitment to reform was as genuine as the commitment to become an autonomous regional superpower capable of assuring the defense of South Africa’s interests in Africa,” Secretary Crocker believed the United States should support his strategy for change.

In reality, U.S. policy objectives in southern and South Africa were geopolitical. Since this goal was predicated on the existence of a powerful apartheid-dominated South Africa, Washington would continue to move closer to and to protect the Pretoria regime from strong UN-sponsored sanctions. This was objective was expressed to the South Africans who were told that the Reagan Administration wished to:

- establish a new relationship with South Africa based on a realistic appraisal of our mutual interests in the Southern African region. . . . We have effectively ended the unproductive ostracism of recent years . . . The South Africans now have a sure sense of where we are coming from in strategic terms. They know that we are determined to roll back Soviet influence throughout the world and in their region.³

To be sure, to the extent that both capitals saw the Soviets as the real threat to their security interests, Washington and Pretoria were in agreement. However, South Africa opposed a regional settlement that would have ended its control over Namibia and compelled it to accept Marxist governments in neighboring countries, even if those governments that were not allied with Moscow. Washington continued to ignore that fact and supported South Africa’s regional aggression. This stance served as further evidence that the administration’s major concern in southern Africa was geopolitical. This attitude inexorably led to a situation in which global policy issues overwhelmed regional concerns.

To achieve the primary goal of rolling back communist influence in southern Africa, Constructive Engagement would rely on P.W. Botha’s Total National Strategy. The South African Total National Strategy—the use of political, military, diplomatic,
and economic tools in a long-term effort to develop effective responses to internal and external national security threats—reflected Pretoria’s quest to achieve hegemony over its neighbors as the best way to preserve the power of white South Africa. Through acts of destabilization, Prime Minister P. W. Botha attempted to foster an environment in which the Republic could dominate its neighbors whose values, political philosophies, and color conflicted outwardly with those of white South Africa. As such, South African foreign policy adapted itself to the reality that somehow white South Africa must achieve a workable *modus vivendi* with its black neighbors in order to survive.

At the same time, Pretoria’s determination to preserve white minority-rule in South Africa clashed fundamentally with the interests of its black neighbors. Thus, the southern African nations committed themselves to the dismantling of apartheid, whether by peaceful or violent means. This stance constituted a prime security threat for white South Africa, especially with the region’s determination to give moral and sometimes territorial support to the ANC. Pretoria manipulated its links, economic and military, with southern Africa to ensure South Africa’s neighbors evicted the ANC from their borders.

Likewise, Pretoria feared the onslaught of communism. With the independence of Angola, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe and their ostensible commitment to socialism, South Africa felt encircled by a communist menace. Under the leadership of President Botha and Defence Minister Malan, Pretoria prepared its people and military to ward off this regional communist menace. South Africa even hoped that formal economic integration under a constellation of states would bind together the anticommunist forces of southern Africa to face communism’s onslaught.

Instead, South Africa found itself isolated from both the region and the world community, besieged from all sides. Both the ANC and the communists threatened to foment disorder and revolution within the Republic. With no other option, Pretoria turned to destabilization to acquire the cooperation and security that had, until then, eluded South Africa. For a time, destabilization seemed to work: southern Africa was silenced and grudgingly accepted Pretoria’s regional order. However, Angola, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe, although jolted from years of unrest, had become permanent fixtures in southern Africa and were determined to break free from South African dominance. For South Africa, the Total National Strategy had failed and it was time to coexist in peace with its neighbors.
The fortunes of the Total National Strategy also had important implications for Constructive Engagement. First and foremost, the fact that Constructive Engagement supported the Botha Administration’s approach within South Africa—an approach violently rejected by black South Africans—made the policy vulnerable to criticism that the apartheid regime’s “experiment with reform” was not a genuine step toward democracy. Consequently, as the townships descended into chaos and the Botha Administration responded with harsh security measures, the Reagan Administration found it increasingly hard to defend Constructive Engagement as a policy directed at addressing black South African concerns such as self-determination, economic prosperity, and human rights.

Part of the reason the policy of Constructive Engagement and its principal strategic objectives remain an enigma is that, although numerous newspaper and magazine articles had been written on the South African-United States relationship during the Cold War, most were long on hyperbolic headlines and short on earnest examination. Most journalists focused on the debate over sanctions, with few bothering to look past that issue to understand the broader strategic objectives of the policy. Similarly, within academia, many works detailed the move toward sanctions that ended Constructive Engagement, but the broader geopolitical objectives of the policy remain largely unaddressed. Analysts have also tended to treat the policy of Constructive Engagement in isolation. None have synthesized the facts into a historical framework, and knowledge of the policy’s ultimate aim to rollback Soviet influence in the region via South Africa’s Total National Strategy still has not been advanced in any systematic manner. Indeed, the shaping of the societies of southern Africa to conform to the interests of the United States and South Africa is perhaps the most important but least studied aim of the policy of Constructive Engagement. Equally discouraging is that much of what has been written about the policy of Constructive Engagement is not critical, with very little examination of the policy from an independent perspective. When most of the analyses were conducted, the policy was exceptionally controversial, and people’s careers and reputations—and even perhaps the policy’s ultimate success—depended on how journalists, academics, policymakers, and the public understood it. Unfortunately, the large numbers of analyses written during the 1980s were often polarized from the start, aimed at either extolling the policy to the extent of declaring it an “American-style solution to racial segregation” or condemning the policy as “Destructive Engagement.” In turn, these biased findings were often misused by the
Reagan and Botha governments or by their opponents pushing their own agendas. Thus, years after the writing of these works, the body of literature concerning the policy of Constructive Engagement is incomplete, not only in the arena of known facts about the policy and its strategic objectives but also in the lack of historical analysis. This dissertation is intended to resolve these issues, both the lack of an historical analysis that accounts for the policy’s geopolitical objectives and the limitations of prior approaches.

In addition, this dissertation will explore the role that ideology played in both the United States and the Republic of South Africa in the formulation and implementation of their foreign policies. In South Africa, the defence of domestic institutions and domestic relations was a matter of primary political significance, and foreign policy became an extension of that domestic sphere. President Reagan’s anticommmunist ideology also played a critical role in shaping Constructive Engagement.

Moreover, this work is instructive because it questions the rationale of “constructive engagement” as a tool of foreign policy. Constructive engagement—the policy of conferring respectability on a policy of appeasing a belligerent or abusive foreign state and concealing the fact that the United States was doing so—has lived on in American foreign relations, most notably in relation to China. United States policy makers have consistently advocated engagement with China and emphasized a lack of influence on that state as opposed to those who call for censure and isolation because of human rights abuses. In many ways, the debate over China mirrors the debate over engagement with South Africa during the Reagan Administration. Clearly, outlining the success and failures of Constructive Engagement as implemented by Chester Crocker should help policy makers determine the effectiveness of engagement as a foreign policy instrument.

For the above stated reasons, this study will be a useful examination of the actions and policies of the United States and South Africa during the Cold War, viewed in light of what seems, in retrospect, to have been their alternatives and consequences. In addition to the specific policy analysis, this work will help illustrate the broader themes important to the wider study of diplomatic history. Apartheid South Africa clearly demonstrated the perils to a foreign power that claimed it could affect major change in another country’s society. When Constructive Engagement was unable to deliver reform acceptable to black South Africans, the policy became vulnerable to
attacks within the Republic and the United States. This study will examine if the vulnerability to domestic criticism, and the subsequent passage of sanctions by the U.S. Congress, was a result of the Reagan Administrations fixation on geopolitical objectives in the region rather than political liberalization within the Republic. Additionally, a great deal can be added to the history of this period by examining the domestic actors in both the United States and South Africa in the mainstream political narrative of Constructive Engagement because they took a leading role in its demise. Finally, documentation of Constructive Engagement provides a unique opportunity to examine a policy in terms of its ideological and theoretical basis and is, therefore, a valid and important contribution to the study of diplomatic history in the modern era.

1.3 Literature Review

While the Reagan Administration’s policy of Constructive Engagement is not unexplored territory, the writings of diplomats and political scientists have long provided the central, if not exclusive, body of interpretation. The earliest literature on Constructive Engagement was written by American and South African policy analysts during the 1980s. These studies focused on the issue of sanctions or the debate within the United States Congress. One of the most important of these works was Sanctioning Apartheid, published in 1991 by Africa World Press. This book, edited by Robert E. Edgar, has a number of articles covering the sanctions and disinvestment campaign against the Republic of South Africa. The book details South Africa’s continued need for foreign capital and the corresponding vulnerability to international sanctions and the flight of foreign companies. This work is a valuable resource for raw economic data concerning South Africa’s in the 1980s.

Alex Thomson’s book Incomplete Engagement: US Foreign Policy towards the Republic of South Africa, 1981–1988 provides one the most comprehensive analyses of the Reagan Administration’s South Africa policy yet to be published. Thomson’s work deals primarily with the debate within the American political system and overstates the importance of American diplomat Chester Crocker. Additionally, Thomson never questions Crocker’s assertion that Constructive Engagement was ultimately designed to end apartheid and bring peace to southern Africa. This dissertation will examine if Crocker’s geopolitical aims in southern Africa differed from his public statements concerning ending apartheid in South Africa.
Princeton N. Lyman’s work, Partner to History: The U.S. Role in South Africa’s Transition to Democracy, provides a valuable perspective from an important diplomatic player on how the end of apartheid was kept on course and did not devolve into violence. Lyman carries the narrative to the election and inauguration of Nelson Mandela. This work joins new scholarship detailing the transition period of South Africa, and while these all represent substantial contributions to the literature of the period, the timeframe of these works postdate Constructive Engagement.

Les de Villiers, former Senior Deputy Secretary of Information in Pretoria, has joined other scholars in detailing how United States economic and trade policy over almost 40 years helped transform the social and political system of South Africa and contributed to the demise of apartheid, helping create the conditions necessary for the elections of 1994. This study seeks to build on many of these first works written by political scientists and diplomats by creating a more detailed and expansive historical analysis of the policy. More specifically, this work will study the strategic objective of the United States and Republic of South Africa and how they attempted to reshape the countries of southern Africa.

In 1992, Chester A. Crocker, chief architect of Constructive Engagement, joined the debate by offering an emphatically positive interpretation of Constructive Engagement in his work, High Noon in Southern Africa: Making Peace in a Rough Neighborhood. Though Crocker’s work provides a unique point of view from inside the Reagan Administration, his account does not come from the perspective of a disinterested observer, but from the viewpoint of someone who wants to vigorously defend his place in history. Indeed, when Secretary Crocker wrote his history of Constructive Engagement, he clearly had Winston Churchill’s maxim in mind: “History will be kind to me for I intend to write it.” While he acknowledges that he did not realize how unfair, ignorant and unprofessional the media, the international community and the anti-apartheid movement would be—virtually the only mistakes he concedes are public relations gaffes—Secretary Crocker believed his policies in the region were a “brilliant success” that were responsible for ending the wars in southern Africa and paving the way for the end of apartheid. While this viewpoint makes Crocker’s narrative informative and useful, High Noon in Southern Africa it is not a critical analysis of the policy of Constructive Engagement, nor does it deal at length with the South African Total National Strategy.
In his dissertation, “Constructive Engagement: The Rise and Fall of an American Foreign Policy”, James V. D’Amato argues that:

Constructive engagement was a subtle policy designed by Chester Crocker to lend American support to an open-ended and longterm process of change within the Republic of South Africa. Within this policy, its first goal was to facilitate the stabilization of the southern African region in order to enable Pretoria to proceed with needed internal reform without the irritant or worry of hostile activity on its borders. As part of this goal, the most important American aim was to promote the independence of Namibia in tandem with a Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola. Other aims included effecting normalized relations between the Republic and black-ruled states in the region—especially Mozambique. Once the region had attained a sufficient level of stabilization, the Reagan administration felt South Africa would proceed more rapidly with internal change.10

D’Amato accepts Crocker’s narrative, never questioning whether there were hidden objectives to Constructive Engagement. D’Amato also fails to see the correlation between the Total National Strategy and Constructive Engagement. Finally, the author states that Constructive Engagement ended with the imposition of sanctions in 1986. In fact, the policy continued throughout the Reagan Administration until the Total National Strategy was abandoned in favour of regional cooperation.

J. E. Davies’ book *Constructive Engagement? Chester Crocker and American Policy in South Africa, Namibia and Angola 1981-811* is the best scholarship on the policy of Constructive Engagement yet produced. The author divides the book into two parts—“Constructive Engagement and South Africa” and “Linkage: South Africa, Angola and Namibia.” The first half of the book focuses on the objectives of the policy, the debate within the American Congress, and Pretoria’s response to Constructive Engagement. The second portion of the book details the regional objectives of Constructive Engagement. It is in this section that Davies presents the policy as a failure, with South Africa taking advantage of the Reagan Administration’s largess to crack down on internal opposition and destabilize the region. In the author’s estimation, negotiations with the Frontline States were only to appease Crocker, who was deceived by the South Africans.

It is on this point that this dissertation will diverge sharply from Davies’ work. This dissertation will investigate if the policy of Constructive Engagement’s tolerance of South Africa’s policy of destabilization and the use of harsh internal security measures and limited constitutional reforms were integral to American ambitions in
southern Africa. Additionally, this dissertation will examine if the administration’s view of the black opposition helped to ideologically tether Constructive Engagement to the Total National Strategy. Illustrating the common objectives of the two policies is an important feature that sets this dissertation apart from any previous study of the Reagan policy of Constructive Engagement.

1.4 Methodology and Approach

The objective of this work is not simply to create a compilation of facts about the policy of Constructive Engagement. As significant as it would be simply to collect and synthesize all of the often incongruent information about the policy in one place, the creation and implementation of an overall analytic and historical architecture is more important. This dissertation will organize and integrate what is known about the policy of Constructive Engagement in a systematic historical analysis. This project employs systemic theories of international politics to illuminate how the Reagan Administration formulated Constructive Engagement. Of central importance are how and why the strategy was chosen and why the policy continued even after circumstances had changed in southern Africa. Neoclassical realism “posits that systemic pressures are filtered through intervening domestic variables to produce foreign policy behaviors.”\(^\text{12}\) This emerging approach recognizes that states “react differently to similar systemic pressures,” in part, because domestic-level pressures have a profound influence on foreign policies, especially on how leaders view external threats. I place the Constructive Engagement approach within the neoclassical realist framework. During the first stage of formulation, domestic-level variables such as domestic politics, ideology, and analogies of appeasement were critical in narrowing options and ultimately determining how the Reagan Administration conceived and implemented the policy of Constructive Engagement. I argue that these variables, rather than systemic pressures and changes in the external security environment, better explain American foreign policy in southern Africa during the last decade of the Cold War.

1.5 Limitations

A brief word about data limitation is necessary. The topic of Constructive Engagement and its strategic objectives in southern Africa remains largely unexplored by historians for a variety of reasons: the relative newness of this period in history, the
policy’s rapid demise after the United States Congress voted for sanctions, the impetus to move on to new scholarship related to post-apartheid South Africa, and most importantly, the character of the United States-South African relationship itself. Because Constructive Engagement was always controversial and secrecy was the norm, research into the policy’s geopolitical objectives has remained difficult. Although many diplomats and policy makers were seemingly quite open about the policy’s publicly stated goal to liberalize the South African political system, many other aspects of the policy were classified and concealed. The Reagan and Botha governments walked a fine line, considering potentially explosive revelations about their collaboration in reordering the strategic balance of the region. The United States and South Africa were often at the centre of dangerous covert and semi-covert operations that they did not want the world to know about. In consideration with the near universal condemnation of the apartheid government and the Reagan policy of Constructive Engagement, most documents related to Constructive Engagement were classified, and the undisclosed objectives of Constructive Engagement were completely deniable. For decades, this secrecy has curtailed outside study of the policy and its broader strategic goals. However, the end of the Cold War presented a new opportunity for scholarship on Constructive Engagement and the broader study of US-RSA relations.

The National Security Archive’s South Africa Collection at George Washington University is the largest collection of contemporary declassified national security information outside the United States government. The collection includes 12,000 pages of previously classified materials from intelligence agencies, the executive branch, the State Department and all National Archives documents dealing with most aspects of United States policy toward South Africa from 1962 to 1989. Previously hidden behind the “national security” wall, these documents were unavailable to scholars before the late-1990s and provided fresh sources for examination of United States-South Africa relations during the Cold War. Many of the most important documents were included in two major publications of the National Security Archives and supplemented by a microfiche collection with over 2,500 hundred previously classified documents on American policy in southern Africa. Through these documents it is possible to see the internal debates and motivations of the Reagan Administration in the formulation and implementation of Constructive Engagement. In fact, former members of the both the Carter and Reagan administrations—the very people that helped to formulate and implement policy in southern and South Africa—have used the
National Security Archive to “gain access to papers—including documents they authored—that they otherwise have been unable to obtain from the U.S. government.”¹³  Also included in the National Security Archive are thousands of newspaper and magazine articles, primary and secondary materials and oral history interviews. Every archival resource related to United States-South Africa relations dated from 1977 to 1989 was reviewed and without the National Security Archive it would have been impossible to adequately explore the subject covered in this dissertation.

Although the National Security Archive collection is the most comprehensive document set related to American policy on southern and South Africa that exists, it has limitations. The biggest limitation is the continued classification of most documents related to Reagan’s National Security Council (NSC). These documents are not available to historians because the NSC has resisted the release of documents postdating the Carter Administration. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has also refused to declassify documents related to southern and South African documents during the 1980s.¹⁴

This work utilizes the declassified records related to southern and South Africa in the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library; these included declassified cables; policy briefs, and memorandum from the State Department; the CIA; the National Security Council; the National Atomic Energy Agency; and phone transcripts of President Reagan with American lawmakers. The documents found in the Reagan Library proved invaluable in substantiating the arguments of this dissertation. Unfortunately, like the National Security Archive, the library had limited access to the records of the CIA and NSC.

Likewise, the official papers of two key players in the formulation of American policy in southern Africa, Central Intelligence Director William Casey and Secretary of State George Schultz, are not available to the public, representing a major limitation in my research. The Reagan Diaries, edited and abridged by Douglas Brinkley, was published in 2007.¹⁵ The work provides only a handful of references to southern and South Africa, few of which were of use in understanding the relationship of Constructive Engagement to the Total National Strategy. Similarly, President Reagan’s personal letters were of limited use for this dissertation.¹⁶

Another limitation is the lack of firsthand accounts about this topic by officials in the Botha Administration. Though multiple interview requests were sent to former members of the Botha Administration, no acknowledgment was ever received. This left
only the public statements of Botha officials and testimony given to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). Though these resources proved valuable, they have their limitations. In particular, the legalistic nature of the TRC narrowed the focus of the investigation in ways that did little to reveal the relationship of the Total National Strategy to Constructive Engagement. Though Niel Barnard made himself available to journalists in recent years, his interviews centred on the negotiations to release Nelson Mandela and the process to end apartheid in the final years of the 1980s. This makes his interviews limited for the purposes of this study.

Neither Minister of Foreign Affairs Roelof “Pik” Botha nor State President P.W. Botha published memoirs after their years of public service. However, in 2010, author Theresa Papenfus published an extensive biography of Pik Botha. Papenfus draws on firsthand accounts and also interviews with Botha conducted by Sue Onslow, Head of the Southern Africa Programme at the London School of Economics, that provided important insights into the American-South African relationship during the Reagan Administration. The work also has given a unique perspective from a member of the Botha government on the resolution of Namibian independence and the end to the war with Angola.17

Before he died, P.W. Botha was interviewed at length by Jan Lamprecht, the proprietor of the anti-ANC website, AfricanCrisis.org. Lamprecht also compiled extracts from speeches of Botha that were organized and published by amateur historian J.J.J. Scholtz. According to Lamprecht, Botha reviewed the book and said it “represents accurately his views and that he stands by them.” Though the book did prove useful in understanding Botha’s views on southern and South Africa, it lacked the type of detail one might expect from a memoir.18

As for the Reagan Administration, requests for interviews were denied or not acknowledged by several officials, though Reagan Communications Director, Patrick Buchanan, and Secretary of State for African Affairs, Chester Crocker, made themselves available and provided valuable insights into the South Africa-United States relationship during the 1980s.

1.6 Outline of Chapters

The second chapter, “Prelude to Constructive Engagement: U.S. Foreign Relations with South Africa (1948-1980),” examines the critical foreign policy determination that successive South African regimes used to gain acceptance and
legitimacy from the Western powers. The more farsighted of the South African leaders understood that identifying with the interests of the Western powers was the best defence for the apartheid state. “Legitimacy,” which for the most part was elusive or grudgingly granted, was achieved through a number of strategies, among which were the forging of economic, strategic, and military alliances with Western powers and the adoption of an anti-Communist strategy during the Cold War. These strategies proved effective. For three decades, United States administrations consistently resisted calls for economic sanctions against South Africa and argued the importance of trade and investments as means of encouraging change in South Africa’s policy of apartheid. Finally, this chapter will outline the necessary preconditions for Constructive Engagement to evolve into a foreign policy of the United States.

The third chapter, “From Theory to Practice: The Formulation and Implementation of Constructive Engagement,” reviews and analyzes Reagan’s anti-communist ideology. As outlined by its chief architect, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Chester Crocker, this policy comprised two ideas: change in South Africa had to be controlled and the region had to be stabilized before initiating controlled change. There is considerable evidence that the Reagan Administration proceeded further than any other in identifying its own interests with those of the Nationalist Party and would take a hardline approach to the region.

The fourth chapter examines the Total National Strategy, the all-embracing, counter-revolutionary plan to address the vital components of national security: political, military, economic, psychological, scientific, religious, cultural, financial, intelligence, and so on. The purpose of the Total National Strategy policy would be to stave off the forces of the black liberation movement and roll back any communist influence that may have aided in its ascendancy. Drawing on the considerable resources of the Republic and with help from the Reagan Administration, the National Party would attempt a series of “reforms” that would push the black majority into a series of semi-independent “Bantustans”, effectively making black South Africans aliens in their own country. Regionally, the Total National Strategy would attempt to establish South Africa as the economic and political leader of the region.

The fifth chapter addresses the tortuous negotiations and parallel military attacks that accompanied the Reagan Administration’s attempt to act as a “mediator” for South Africa as it brought its neighbours to the negotiating table in terms favourable to the Republic and the United States. As part of this process, the administration sought
to increase the sway of South Africa over all states in the region and openly sought to change the direction of states it regarded as inimical to United States interests, such as Angola and Mozambique. Thus encouraged, Pretoria set out to implement its own Total National Strategy. For the Botha Government, the Reagan Administration’s regional objectives and willingness to work within the framework of apartheid complemented the aims of the Total National Strategy and affirmed South Africa’s status as a protector of Western values, a bulwark against communism, and a steadying influence in the region. As part of this policy, South Africa continued its occupation of Namibia and launched a campaign of military, political, and economic destabilization against neighbouring states. By the beginning of 1984, the American attempt to “stabilize” southern Africa as a first step in its broader policy of Constructive Engagement had shown few, if any, results. Namibia still was not independent, the Cubans remained in Angola, and the United States received almost universal condemnation for its role in the whole affair.

The sixth chapter, “The Demise of Constructive Engagement,” reviews and analyzes the steady erosion of Constructive Engagement after the unprecedented explosion of political resistance following Pretoria’s introduction of a new constitution in 1983. With the policy so closely linked to the Total National Strategy, Constructive Engagement was bound to fail once the township uprisings began.

2 Ibid., 76-77.
8 Les de Villiers, In Sight of Surrender: The U.S. Sanctions Campaign against South Africa, 1946-1993 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, 1995); Other scholars that have contributed to the scholarship of the period include Deon Geldenhuys, Foreign Political Engagement: Remaking States in


10James V. D’Amato, “Constructive Engagement: The Rise and Fall of an American Foreign Policy” (doctoral dissertation, University of South Carolina, 1988).


14Ibid.


Chapter II

Besides the sin of omission, America has often been positively guilty of working in the interest of the minority regime to the detriment of the interests of black people. America’s foreign policy seems to have been guided by a selfish desire to maintain an imperialistic stranglehold on this country irrespective of how the blacks were made to suffer.

Steve Biko, *I Write What I Like*¹

We had better look after our own interests where national security and international monetary matters are concerned.

Richard Nixon, note to Kissinger²

2.1 Prelude to Constructive Engagement: The United States and South Africa (1948-1980)

The United States foreign policy relations with the Republic of South Africa from 1948 to 1980 were formulated by the cold, zero-sum calculations of the Cold War. For the most part, United States administrations looked at South Africa as a dependable ally in the Super Power confrontation and consistently resisted calls for economic sanctions against the Republic.

The purpose of this chapter is not to furnish a full history or analysis of United States policy in southern Africa during the pre-Reagan years of the Cold War, but to show the patterns of change in the region that provide a historic context to Reagan’s policy of Constructive Engagement. With the collapse of the buffer states and the subsequent encroachment of black nationalism, it appeared inevitable that the white fortress of southern Africa would be toppled, providing a clear victory for the Soviet Union. It was this seeming inevitability that Constructive Engagement would be designed to reverse.

2.2 The Truman and Eisenhower Administrations and the Foreign Policy Approach of a New Sovereign State

2.2.1 The Cold War

In the early morning hours of August 6, 1945, the first atomic bomb, named Little Boy, was detonated over the city of Hiroshima, Japan, killing seventy thousand people in a flash hotter than the surface of the sun. Three days later, the city of Nagasaki met the same fate, with 20,000 Japanese killed. On August 10, 1945, Japan’s
military leadership accepted the terms of surrender set down by the Allies in the Potsdam Declaration.

The destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki symbolized not only the end of one war, but also the beginning of a new world order. With fascism relegated to history and the United States virtually unrivaled in the world, Americans should have experienced a sense of security and confidence perhaps not seen since the Roman Empire. The facts of American power were indisputable. The United States accounted for more than half the world’s manufacturing, possessed nearly two-thirds of the planet’s gold reserves, and controlled half of its shipping. The United State’s economic dominance was also reflected in the military strength of the country. The country had nearly 12.5 million service members, had the world’s finest navy, and possessed airpower that was second to none. Foremost, the United States was the country that possessed the atomic bomb, a weapon that had dramatically shifted the balance of power in the country’s favour. But from the moment the Second World War ended, the United States felt surrounded by a thousand dangers. It could have hardly been otherwise. The Soviet Union had no intention of relegating itself to second-tier status in the post-war period and immediately began to challenge the nascent “Pax Americana.”

On March 5, 1946, Winston Churchill spoke of the emerging rivalry when he told an American audience that:

From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic an iron curtain has descended across the Continent. Behind that line lie all the capitals of the ancient states of Central and Eastern Europe. Warsaw, Berlin, Prague, Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade, Bucharest and Sofia; all these famous cities and the populations around them lie in what I must call the Soviet sphere, and all are subject, in one form or another, not only to Soviet influence but to a very high and in some cases increasing measure of control from Moscow. . . .

In a great number of countries, far from the Russian frontiers and throughout the world, Communist fifth columns are established and work in complete unity and absolute obedience to the directions they receive from the Communist center. Except in the British Commonwealth and in the United States where Communism is in its infancy, the Communist parties or fifth columns constitute a growing challenge and peril to Christian civilization.

During the struggle with the Axis powers, the competing political philosophies of the Allied powers were subordinated to the practical need to destroy fascism, but by 1946, the ideological rivalries of the Cold War would be all too obvious. Not only would the
Soviet leadership endeavoured to consolidate power at home, but also saw it as their responsibility and an historical inevitability for the communist revolution to defeat the forces of Western capitalism.

In the United States, George Kennan outlined a strategy for Western victory in this ideological struggle that involved a “long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies.” The Kennan policy of limited containment was to have a shelf-life of less than one year. In March 1947, the President officially superseded the Kennan strategy with the Truman Doctrine, which neatly delineated the world into two distinct ideological camps:

One life is based upon the will of the majority, and is distinguished by free institutions representative government, free elections, guarantees of individual liberty, freedom of speech and religion and freedom from political oppression. The second way of life is based upon the will of a minority forcibly imposed on the majority. It relies upon terror and oppression, a controlled press, framed elections and the suppression of personal freedom. 

Truman continued that it would be the policy of the United States to help “all free peoples to maintain their institutions and their integrity against aggressive movements that seek to impose upon them totalitarian regimes.” With the Truman Doctrine, the principals in dispute would be of universal application; hence, there would be no regional limitations to American involvement.

2.2.2 South Africa: Political Transformations

As the metastasizing impulse to divide the world spread, a distant outpost of the West was undergoing its own transformation. On June 1, 1948, the Nationalist Party of South Africa took the reins of government from the United Party and its leader, Jan Smuts. The Afrikaners, comprising roughly 12 percent of the population, had finally wrested political control of the land where their cultural and historical identity had been forged for over three hundred years. When Daniel François Malan was made the Prime Minister of South Africa, he appealed to that sense of Afrikaner nationalism and its attendant sense of persecution, declaring:

In the past we felt like strangers in our own country, but today South Africa belongs to us once more. For the first time since Union, South Africa is our own. God grant that it always remains our own.
To ensure that South Africa remained in its hands alone, the Nationalist Party denied a voice to the majority of the population through a whole series of institutionalized inequalities, which the laws and practices of the South African régime now enforced. Differing perhaps only in scale from other systems found in the world, apartheid in its completed form was the most formidable racial edifice ever created. South Africa’s system was also meant to permanently ensure the survival of white rule at a time when Black Nationalism was sweeping across the continent. While a detailed analysis of apartheid is outside the scope of this dissertation, it is important to note that, from 1948 to 1994, South African foreign and security policies were explicitly concerned with the survival of Pretoria’s racial system, making South Africa a country whose foreign relations were determined almost exclusively by domestic policy. 

South Africa’s racial policies, however, presented intractable problems for the South Africans in the foreign policy arena. Standing against a veritable firestorm in the United Nations, the more farsighted of the South African leaders understood that identifying with the interests of the Western powers was the best defence for the apartheid state. “Legitimacy,” which for the most part was elusive or grudgingly granted, was achieved through a number of strategies, among which were the forging of economic, strategic, and military alliances with Western powers and the adoption of anti-Communist strategy during the Cold War. These strategies proved remarkably effective.

2.2.3 The Western Alliance and South Africa

Before the Second World War, Africa was of minimal interest to United States foreign policy-makers, and Washington’s policies appeared to have identified American interests primarily with those of the European colonial powers. In the post-war period, there were periodic complaints about Pretoria’s racial policies, but the geopolitical calculations of American policy makers seemed to have held sway. The Truman Administration regarded South Africa as a reliable ally in the Cold War and a frontline auxiliary against Soviet encroachment in southern Africa.

Central to the Truman Administration were South Africa’s abundant raw materials for the production of nuclear weapons. Securing South Africa’s allegiance and its resources—gold, chromium, vanadium, manganese, the vital platinum group, and the non-ferrochrome metals, among others—for the purposes of national defence was considered to be of vital strategic importance in maintaining American nuclear
superiority over the Soviet Union. In order to increase its nuclear arsenal and hinder similar efforts in the Soviet Union, the United States required a monopoly on crucial raw materials and, thus, needed to maintain stable relations with white minority governments in southern Africa.12

American dependence on South African minerals, in particular, was one of the decisive factors in United States-South Africa relations during the Truman Administration. By 1948, American policy makers were aware that the single largest limiting factor in the nuclear program was the lack of fissionable material, uranium ore, in particular. With the National Party firmly in control of uranium mines, it was imperative for the United States to see that relations with apartheid’s architects be on good terms. The eventual Combined Development Trust between the United States, Britain, and South Africa ensured that those deposits remained permanently within the Western alliance.

The South Africans, for their part, saw a close alliance with the West as critical to the country’s security in the post-war period. D. F. Malan outlined this strategy in his “African Charter,” a document that called for the preservation of the African continent for “Western European Christian Civilization.”13 Specifically, it proposed to keep both “Asiatics and Communists” out of southern Africa. While there appeared to be little chance of an invasion, swart gevaar “black peril,” was presented as the major threat to South Africa.

2.2.4 Collaboration and International Condemnation

In the international arena, the Cold War’s early days corresponded with those of apartheid, but apartheid received little attention in the United Nations; communism dominated the diplomatic arena. The United States needed as many allies in the war against communism and the Soviet Union as it could gather, and in the bipolar world of the Cold War, the Afrikaner government was a strong, steadfast defender of capitalism.

As the United States and South Africa drew closer in military-strategic matters, the Truman and Eisenhower administrations would use America’s preeminent position in the Western alliance to shield South Africa and its racial policies from international criticism. When the issue made its way to the United Nations, Washington fell back on a claim that the country was unwilling to meddle in the domestic affairs of a sovereign nation, a curious claim considering that Eisenhower had used the CIA to overthrow the governments of Mohammad Mossadegh in Iran and Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala.
simultaneously. In fact, during the 1950s, military cooperation between the United States and South Africa became more integrated, with American warships docking and refueling at South African ports and close collaboration between United States and South African intelligence agencies. It was also during this period of intense competition between the Super Powers that a close working relationship was developed between Washington and Pretoria concerning atomic energy and space research.\textsuperscript{14} South Africa never became a close strategic partner on par with America’s European allies, but there were sufficient geopolitical and economic ties during the Truman and Eisenhower administrations to keep diplomatic relations strong and relatively consistent.

South Africa’s racial policies remained a minor irritation for the United States until 1960, when 67 black South Africans were killed, an additional 186 were wounded, and 11,000 detained during a protest over the pass laws, causing a minor crisis in the American-South African relationship. The Sharpeville Massacre, as it came to be known, created an unprecedented international outcry and focused the world’s attention on this outpost in the Western alliance. The United Nations condemned the killings, and foreign companies and governments withdrew their investments from the country with increasing frequency. The U.S. Department of State joined the chorus of criticism and issued a statement urging the South African government to address black grievances. The Eisenhower Administration, however, had never given its support to this statement, and an official retraction was promptly issued. The incident was important enough that President Eisenhower personally apologized to the South African ambassador, assuring him that the United States supported the white regime and was committed to its place in the Western alliance.\textsuperscript{15}

2.3 Kennedy and Johnson Administrations

2.3.1 Kennedy and Africa

The containment of communism and profitability of South African markets could not remain forever the sole factors dictating American policy. Some of the more farsighted American policy makers understood that the European empires were disintegrating and that the newly freed peoples of the Third World would be looking to align themselves with either the United States or the Soviet Union. Africa was literally a continent to win.
While there can be little doubt that President Kennedy was a committed Cold Warrior, and stridently opposed to communism, he understood that the momentum of Black Nationalism in Africa was a nearly unstoppable force. He thought it best to hedge his bets in Africa. Whereas the Truman and Eisenhower administrations had offered unqualified support of South Africa, during the Kennedy Administration, that support would not come without significant caveats. As one official in the Kennedy Administration noted:

If the Republic of South Africa does not have a policy which is going to meet with the satisfaction of its people, there will be upheaval in that area, and the moment they start having that kind of upheaval there will be foreign intervention and quite likely the Russians would go in and there would be a strong Communist penetration . . . detrimental to the security of the U.S.\textsuperscript{16}

The South African racial policies were also out of step with events in the United States. John F. Kennedy’s presidency coincided with the beginnings of the Civil Rights movement and the Democratic Party’s first steps to abolishing the American South’s “Jim Crow” laws. The Ford Foundation’s \textit{Report of the Study Commission on U.S. Policy Toward Southern Africa} contains a revealing passage:

The links between the domestic politics of the United States and relations with South Africa are unmistakable. It was not by chance that friction developed only as the United States began, in the years after World War II, to rectify its most glaring domestic inequity. Nor was it by chance that the pressure exerted on the South African regime by Washington has correlated with the commitment of Particular administrations to advancing the civil Rights of America’s own black population.\textsuperscript{17}

As Richard Bissell reports, the “Democratic administrations of John F. Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson established the baseline of U.S. opposition to South African racial policies.”\textsuperscript{18}

From the moment he took office, it was clear that the Kennedy Administration was committed to demonstrating United States support for the process of decolonization in Africa, particularly at a time when more and more African states were gaining independence and forming a substantial voting bloc in the United Nations. Washington was eager to see that these newly independent nations would favour political and ideological alignment with the West rather than with the Soviet bloc and adjusted American policy accordingly. Moreover, Kennedy was determined to employ moral pressure to force South Africa to reform its racist policies. In the United Nations,
the Kennedy Administration, reflecting its anti-Colonial and anti-apartheid attitude, supported the resolutions condemning apartheid and Pretoria’s administration of South-West Africa, but opposed economic sanctions against South Africa.19

2.3.2 Dissident Groups

By 1961, Prime Minister Hendrick Verwoerd had succeeded J. G. Strijdom as prime minister of South Africa and moved decisively to strengthen apartheid during his premiership. By 1963, the South African government had penetrated and destroyed much of the underground resistance. In its efforts in this direction, the South African Police (SAP) were aided by a series of harsh security laws passed beginning in 1961.20 During this period, spanning from 1961 to the passage of the Terrorism Act of 1967, South Africa moved away from the protection of individual rights guaranteed under British law to regulations under which the powers of the State were greatly increased. By 1964, incidents of sabotage dropped from 100 a year to 10, and by 1965, internal resistance had all but disappeared. All the while, the South African government denied the country’s internal troubles were related to the racial policies of apartheid, instead claiming incidents like Sharpeville were initiated by “subversive, communist and liberal elements outside South Africa.”21

In the end, the Kennedy Administration appears to have seen no credible alternative to the white regime in Pretoria.22 With the ANC and most resistance leaders forced underground, the Afrikaner government and its apartheid system had clearly forestalled any notion of majority rule.23 While at this time it was not clear what shape the threat from opposition groups would take, it soon became apparent that they could not match the strength of the South African Defence Force (SADF). In a document detailing South Africa’s opposition groups, the CIA reported:

Subversive groups in the Republic of South Africa have recently displayed a growing capability to use sabotage and terrorism to harass the whites with a series of challenges for several years. The recent history of these groups, although it does attest to improved conspiratorial techniques tends to confirm their basic weakness when pitted against the power of the South African state.24

Far from supporting these left-leaning elements, there appears to have been at least some collaboration between the United States and South Africa in derailing the resistance movements within the Republic. The CIA penetrated the ANC and, having done so, passed on actionable intelligence to the South African government, including
the group’s activities and the whereabouts of ANC leaders. Among the information passed to the South African security services was the precise travel itinerary of Nelson Mandela, ultimately leading to his apprehension and subsequent twenty-seven year incarceration.\textsuperscript{25} Despite all the talk of human rights, the Kennedy Administration had decided to help a Cold War ally over the Soviet supported ANC.

2.3.3 Fissures in the Cold War Relationship

By 1963, the United States’ willingness to shield South Africa from international pressure began to waver, and a consensus that the Republic was a liability began to form in the minds of top administration officials. Undersecretary G. Mennen Williams clearly articulated this growing dissatisfaction when, in June 1963, he told Secretary Dean Rusk that:

In my view, the time has come to review our arms supply policy toward South Africa. I believe we should be thinking now in terms of a total arms embargo. Our present partial arms policy is equivocal, is not an effective pressure on the South Africans, and is considered inadequate by the African countries and by many influential sources in the U.S. who are concerned about racial discrimination. While a total arms embargo would fall short . . . it is the only way we can convince both world and domestic opinion that we mean business in our disapproval of apartheid.\textsuperscript{26}

Tension continued to mount as communication between Washington and Pretoria was intentionally limited and the South African ambassador was denied access to Kennedy and to his successor.\textsuperscript{27} Perhaps more importantly, the Kennedy Administration declined to sell weapons to Pretoria after January 1, 1963 and hinted that the United States was not opposed to a nonbinding U.N. resolution for other member-states to refuse arms to South Africa. However, in a move that would become standardized over the Cold War, South Africa would attempt, usually with success, to leverage the spectre of communist encroachment in its relationship with the United States.

Despite a few punitive measures against the Republic, the Kennedy Administration’s actions on South Africa proved largely symbolic. Even key advisers like Rusk, who saw apartheid as “repugnant,” saw little evidence that the United States could exact change in the Republic.\textsuperscript{28} Furthermore, they had to weigh the costs of permanently cutting off arms sales to South Africa, given that the United States had promised “prompt and sympathetic attention to reasonable requests for the purchase of military equipment required for defence against external aggression”\textsuperscript{29} and, more
importantly, that the United States had “military assets we derive from Portugal and South Africa.” The administration quickly pivoted from the threat of sanctions and decided to quietly license the sale of spare parts for C-130 aircraft to the South Africans.

While the Kennedy presidency began with a public commitment to end the racial systems of southern Africa, by and large, the administration had resorted to a traditional Cold War strategy and did very little to influence the South African government. Whatever hopes Kennedy had for change in southern Africa ended when he was assassinated in Dallas, Texas, in November 1963.

2.3.4 Johnson Administration

President Johnson increased his criticisms of Pretoria’s racial policies initiated by Kennedy, but limited American actions to rhetorical pressure. Increasingly bogged down in Vietnam, the Johnson Administration decided to avoid entanglements in southern Africa, and South Africa virtually disappeared as a foreign policy consideration. By the late-1960s, both countries had grown increasingly distrustful of one another as diplomatic contacts diminished.

The relationship, however, came close to fracture in January 1964 over the issue of the Odendaal Commission. The commission’s plan advocated the South African Government to relocate South West African populations to “homelands” in outlying areas formerly leased or owned by commercial farmers. In most cases, this action would require forced relocations, involving the resettlement of people on the basis of ethnic origin. A National Security Council briefing paper described the plan as “the most extreme apartheid legislation yet proposed,” which, if passed, would “remove the last vestiges of job security” for South Africa’s non-white population by reducing them to the status of migratory workers. In a move seemingly out of step with American Cold War policy, the Johnson Administration determined to collaborate with the British to derail the Odendaal Plan. Failing that, it appears President Johnson was prepared to sever most military and economic ties with Pretoria. A secret memorandum authorized NASA to begin looking for new facilities outside South Africa, recommended suspending investment loans to the Republic, and instructed the State Department to begin looking at potential sanctions to pressure Pretoria into changing its policy on South West Africa.
After a series of high-level meetings between Great Britain, the United States, and South Africa, in which it was made clear that the United States and Britain were vociferously opposed to the commission’s recommendations, Pretoria proved “conciliatory” and the Odendaal Plan was permanently shelved. This capitulation on the part of the South African leadership would go a long way towards repairing relations with the Johnson Administration. Thus, the familiar pattern of resisting calls for sanctions was re-established and cooperation on nuclear technology reaffirmed.

The Kennedy-Johnson administrations were considered wholly inadequate by many liberal observers who believed that neither president had lived up to his human rights rhetoric and “failure to translate public denouncements of apartheid and colonialism in Africa into actions that might have forced colonial and minority regimes to alter their policies.” American conservatives were also dissatisfied with the Kennedy-Johnson approach. Many claimed that it amounted to little more than an ineffective and counterproductive policy of “harassment,” based on domestic considerations rather than geopolitical realities. They also noted that the policy was not supported by many Senate Democrats and was frequently considered as hopelessly naïve and counterproductive by American foreign policy experts, including Dean Acheson, George Ball, and George Kennan.

2.4 Nixon Administration

When Richard Nixon came to office in 1969, he determined to change the Kennedy-Johnson policy of sharp public rebukes against Pretoria and immediately moved to strengthen Cold War alliances with South Africa. He was disposed to see the situation in southern Africa’s white minority regimes of Portuguese Angola and Mozambique, Rhodesia, and particularly South Africa as quite different than his Democratic counterparts. But there was always the zero-sum calculation of the Cold War. Nixon wrote, “No one can travel in Africa, even as briefly as I did, without realizing the tremendous potentialities of this great continent. Africa is the most rapidly changing area in the world today. The course of its development, as its people continue to emerge from a colonial status and assume the responsibilities of independence and self-government, could well prove to be the decisive factor in the conflict between the forces of freedom and international communism.”

The South Africans took a keen interest in the Nixon Administration; however, there was a concern that American policy toward the Republic would be tailored “to
appease liberal and Negro sentiment.” Consequently, South African Ambassador H. L. T. Taswell informed the United States Secretary of State William Rogers that the apartheid government was anxious to move closer to both the United States and the new black African nations. The South Africans wanted American support and understood that it would be necessary to modify its rhetoric to provide less of a target for international and domestic critics of the Nixon Administration if it decided to engage communism in southern Africa. Fears that the administration would “crack down” on South Africa were unfounded. As one administration official would bluntly concede, the United States was concerned with strategic considerations, not “moralistic reformism.” With major political backing from parties with considerable interests in southern Africa’s banking, commercial, and industrial sectors, Nixon quickly shifted to a more conservative approach in his dealings with the region. He was responsible for a “partial relaxation” of economic sanctions toward South Africa and increased communications with the white minority government. As the Report of the Study Commission stated, “Just as interest in civil rights and support from black leaders had contributed to Kennedy’s and Johnson’s rhetorical opposition to South Africa, so Nixon’s ‘Southern strategy’ of courting racial conservatives made rapprochement with South Africa attractive.” The shift in regional approaches was most clearly illustrated in “National Security Study Memorandum 39.” This dissertation will now examine the preparation, text, and impact of this significant document and the manner in which it influenced U.S. foreign policy toward the Republic of South Africa.

2.4.1 Tar Baby Dilemma

In 1969, Henry Kissinger, Nixon’s National Security Advisor, directed the National Security Council Interdepartmental Group —composed of officials of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Departments of State and Defence—to conduct a comprehensive review of U.S. policy toward southern Africa; the research of the Interdepartmental Group was to be assisted by representatives from other agencies and departments, including Treasury, Commerce, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Agency for International Development, and the National Aeronautical and Space Administration. According to Dr. Kissinger’s orders, defined in the secret memorandum of April 10, the report:
should consider (1) the background and future prospects of major problems in the area; (2) alternative views of the U. S. interest in Southern Africa; and (3) the full range of basic strategies and policy options open to the United States.49

National Security Study Memorandum 39 did not signal that southern Africa had achieved a higher priority on the United States foreign policy agenda; actually, NSSM 39 was only one of more than eighty such studies of American foreign policy that Kissinger had requested in 1969.50 However, as Tierney recalls, “This was the first time there had been a close analysis of policy assumptions and interests in Southern Africa.”51

Kissinger, of course, was primarily concerned with managing the superpower relationship that he considered central to international politics; although he regarded southern Africa as a peripheral concern, it was one that, nevertheless, had become too much under the control of a “client-oriented” bureaucracy in the State Department. The regions peripheral status was succinctly, if not nauseatingly, summed up when President Nixon commented to Secretary Kissinger, “Henry, let’s leave the niggers to Bill Rogers [Secretary of State, 1969-1973] and we’ll take care of the rest of the world.”52 Given a free hand by the president, Kissinger lost no time in implementing a new, more “realist” approach toward the region so that he could concentrate his attention on more critical foreign policy problems.53

National Security Study Memorandum 39 would be the United States’ operating template during the Nixon Administration. The document begins with a discussion of the actions of previous administrations in response to the nationalist revolutionary movements opposing the colonial and white minority governments of Portuguese Angola and Mozambique, Rhodesia, and South Africa. While the study noted that the United States disapproved of the region’s racial policies and implemented a number of largely symbolic steps against the white regimes, economic and scientific cooperation, particularly with South Africa, had continued with relatively little interference; however, Washington had introduced more stringent measures against the white minority governments than had London or Paris.54 However, NSSM 39 revealed that, in formulating its southern African policy, the United States should remain conscious of a number of global realities that must necessarily shape the foundation of American policy toward the region. These considerations included the following:
the strategic importance of southern Africa, particularly with the closing of the Suez Canal following the 1967 Middle East war and the increased Soviet naval activities in the Indian Ocean; the U.S. need to use overflight and landing facilities for military aircraft heading to and from Indochina;

Significant investment and balance of trade advantages to both Britain and the U.S. in South Africa...as the major gold supplier in the capitalist world and its importance in guaranteeing the useful cooperation of the two-tier gold price system.55

According to the document, “The aim of [the] present policy is to try to balance our economic, scientific and strategic interests in the white states with the political interests of dissociating the U.S. from the white minority regimes and their repressive racial policies.”56 The policy-makers were obviously concerned that American relations with black Africa and the remainder of the developing world might be seriously retarded if the United States57 was unwilling to distance itself from the white regimes. The text of NSSM 39 most certainly betrayed “the contradictions inherent in prevailing American policy and the limitations on America’s ability to resolve the contradictions and achieve its primary goals by employing politically acceptable means.”58

The objectives of U.S. policy toward southern Africa, some of which indeed appeared contradictory and incompatible, were subsequently defined by NSSM 39:

• to improve U.S. standing in black Africa and internationally on the racial issue;
• to minimize the opportunities for the USSR and Communist China to exploit the racial issue in the region for propaganda advantage and to gain political influence with black governments and liberation movements;
• to encourage moderation of the current rigid racial and colonial policies of the white regimes;
• to protect economic, scientific, and strategic interests and opportunities in the region, including the orderly marketing of South Africa’s gold production.

After a description of United States interests, objectives, and present policy, NSSM 39 provided a list of five policy options that the Nixon administration could adopt as a foundation for its southern African policy. Ultimately, Option 2—its premise and general posture reproduced below—was Kissinger’s choice:

**Premise:**
The whites are here to stay and the only way that constructive change can come about is through them. There is no hope for the blacks to gain the political rights they seek through violence, which will only lead to chaos and increased opportunities for the communists. We can, by
selective relaxation of our stance toward the white regimes, encourage some modification of their current racial and colonial policies and through more substantial economic assistance to the black states (a total of about $5 million annually in technical assistance to the black states) help to draw the two groups together and exert some influence on both for peaceful change. Our tangible interests form a basis for our contacts in the region, and these can be maintained at an acceptable cost.

**General Posture:**

We would maintain public opposition to racial repression but relax political isolation and economic restrictions on the white states. We would begin by modest indications of this relaxation, broadening the scope of our relations and contacts gradually and to some degree in response to tangible—albeit small and gradual—moderation of white policies. . . . At the same time we would take diplomatic steps to convince the black states of the area that their current liberation and majority rule aspirations in the south are not attainable by violence and that their only hope for a peaceful and prosperous future lies in closer relations with the white-dominated states. We would emphasize our belief that closer relations will help to bring change in the white states. We would give increased and more flexible economic aid to black states of the area to focus their attention on their internal development and to give them a motive to cooperate in reducing tensions. We would encourage economic assistance from South Africa to developing black nations. This option accepts, at least over a 3 to 5 year period, the prospect of unrequited U.S. initiatives towards the whites and some opposition from the blacks in order to develop an atmosphere conducive to change in white attitudes through persuasion and erosion. To encourage this change in white attitudes, we would indicate our willingness to accept political arrangements short of guaranteed progress toward majority rule, provided they assure broadened political participation in some form by the whole population.59

History suggests that it would have been out of character for the Nixon Administration to have selected an option other than the one ultimately chosen. Option 3 represented the policy of the Kennedy-Johnson approach, which Kissinger was determined to change, and Options 1, 4, and 5—which favoured complete United States support for one side or the other or complete disengagement from the region altogether—were not viable alternatives considering U.S. interests.60 In December 1969, the National Security Council discussed NSSM 39, and Kissinger subsequently determined that Option 2 should be adopted as the foundation of American policy towards southern Africa. In addition to supplying the rationale for adopting Option 2 as a basis for U.S. policy, the secret study also clearly reinforced the importance of South Africa in the estimates of the Nixon policy-makers.61 A number of officials in the State
Department, particularly in the Africa Bureau, were apprehensive of this new approach to the region, especially towards South Africa. The more aggressive attacks on the Nixon Administration’s selection of Option 2 asserted that it amounted to an alliance with the forces of racism in southern Africa. Other commentators stated that, at the very minimum, Nixon’s decision to support the apartheid government represented a cynical promotion of American strategic and economic interests at the expense of African aspirations for a liberalized political system. Nixon’s defenders on the American right, however, believed that the Republic was an important “client” state and a bulwark against communist encroachment.

Although the administration would maintain public opposition to repressive colonial and racial policies, political and economic pressures against the white regimes would be relaxed; it was argued that increased communication, selective involvement, and friendly persuasion would be more effective instruments in influencing these regimes, particularly South Africa, to reform their racial policies.” In any event, it should be understood that even though the Nixon Administration had clearly decided to change the policy of the previous administrations, in the words of a scholar of South Africa, “The change involved a ‘tilt’ rather than a fundamental alteration in the ‘low-profile’ approach of the U. S. toward southern Africa.”

2.4.2 The Nixon Administration Policy in Action

President Nixon did not initially confer with Congressional leaders concerning the implementation of his new policy, nor did he publicly announce the direction that U.S-South African relations were likely to follow in the coming months. The Nixon Administration did, however, use the newspaper column of Ken Owen, a Washington-based correspondent with the Johannesburg Star, to communicate the new policy to Pretoria and to relay the message that improved relations with South Africa would be welcome. Despite Nixon’s reluctance to discuss his approach with the American electorate, the administration’s actions soon made clear that a change in strategy had occurred. The first indication of a shift in policy was Nixon’s appointment of John Hurd, a conservative Texan, as ambassador to South Africa. The Nixon administration’s policy of “communication” had begun.

In accordance with the new policy, American officials were instructed to limit criticisms of South Africa’s racial policies. Nixon’s directive became obvious in U.S. voting behavior in the United Nations. The Report of the Study Commission explains...
“condemnation of apartheid and South African intransigence over Namibia was replaced by abstention, and abstention on resolutions requiring action was replaced by opposition.” In 1972, the United States cast negative votes on seven major resolutions involving southern Africa. In the Security Council, the U.S. vetoed an Afro-Asian resolution advising an extension of the Rhodesian sanctions against the most blatant sanction-busters—South Africa and Portugal. In fact, on nearly every resolution concerning the region, the American delegate voted in concert with his colleagues from Pretoria and Lisbon.

South African embassy personnel and visiting representatives from Pretoria were permitted and encouraged to make the diplomatic rounds in Washington. To the consternation of the State Department, the Republic’s ambassador was granted direct access to Kissinger, and South African diplomats enjoyed warm receptions at the White House and Department of Defence. When Kissinger became the Secretary of State, he overruled the Department’s Africa Bureau decision to deny entry visas to important South African government officials. A series of high-level exchanges ensued. Cornelius Mulder, the Minister of Information, was received by Vice President Gerald Ford and subsequently by top Pentagon officials: Admiral Hugo Biermann, Chief of the South African Defence Force, met with Admiral Thomas Moorer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The South African government must have been encouraged that such consultations had become routine. Not only did the meetings provide Pretoria with an open channel for cooperation, but also afforded the Republic a renewed sense of prestige and legitimacy within the Western community as allies in the war against communism.

2.4.3 Military and Strategic Collaboration

While the Nixon Administration admitted that the United States did not have critical security interests in southern Africa, “it also viewed this African region as being logistically important for its global defence system.” Consequently, a militarily secure South Africa was seen by Washington as an attractive strategic objective. President Nixon agreed to the recommendation of Option 2, which advised continued enforcement of the arms embargo against South Africa but with certain latitude in regard to equipment that could be used for either military or civilian purposes. Moreover, Nixon announced in January 1970 that the embargo remain in place. However, he encouraged Kissinger to revise the definitions of the restrictions
constituting the embargo. An authority reports that these revised “guidelines provided substantial relaxation of controls in three areas: (1) certain items were taken off the validated license list; (2) items still under validated licensing controls, such as aircraft, were made available for export; and (3) items from the munitions control category were transferred to the validated license list.” Over vehement criticism from liberal and black African-oriented interest groups, these revised guidelines allowed the Nixon White House to sell $219 million in aircraft to South Africa during its first term and to provide parts and repairs for C-130 transport planes sold to the Republic prior to 1963.

2.4.4 Ford Administration

The Ford Administration remained sympathetic to South Africa in the United Nations, vetoing a number of resolutions concerning the urgency of the racial situation and the Republic’s expulsion from the General Assembly. High-ranking South African officials continued their visits to Washington, and Minister Mulder was again received by officials at the Departments of State and Defence. Ford Administration officials and conservative congressmen were allowed to participate in South African government-sponsored trips to confer with cabinet ministers in Pretoria. A number of legislators did so and returned to Washington and encouraged closer relations with the Republic, particularly in the geopolitical sphere. Similarly, Secretary of Defence James Schlesinger publicly advised that the Western Alliance use the intelligence-gathering facility at Silvermine. With South Africa confronting increased criticism from the international community, these gestures from the Ford Administration and Congressional conservatives were enormously encouraging to the white regime.

2.4.5 The Collapse of the Portuguese Empire and Threats to White Rule in Southern Africa

In April, 1974, just months before President Nixon’s resignation, there was a coup d’état in Portugal that replaced the Caetano regime and fifty years of neo-fascism with a military junta that harboured communist sympathies. The revolutionary government in Lisbon made it quite clear that the Portuguese empire in southern Africa would no longer be maintained and the colonial possessions of Angola and Mozambique would receive their independence. The basic assumption of Option 2 of NSSM 39—the whites, at least the Portuguese—were not there to stay. This
development would have enormous consequences for the South Africans beyond the theoretical foundations of U.S. policy. In the words of one observer, “the demise of the Portuguese empire seemed to presage the collapse of the ‘old order’ in southern Africa.” After years of neglect, the collapse of the Portuguese colonies finally brought southern Africa to the attention of the highest U.S. policy-makers.

In regard to Mozambique, the Ford Administration had little choice but to acknowledge the primacy of the Marxist-leaning Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) because, after the collapse of the rival National Coalition Party (COREMO) movement, there was simply no other political organization to assume power from the retiring Portuguese. Moreover, the United States government “had maintained informal contacts with FRELIMO for a number of years.” Furthermore, Kissinger’s Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Donald Easum—an individual publicly sympathetic to African aspirations for majority rule and a critic of Option 2—was the first foreign diplomat to meet formally with the Mozambican transitional government and considerably improved the dialogue between Washington and Maputo.

Kissinger did not necessarily resent Easum’s diplomatic breakthrough with the Mozambicans. He did, however, feel that Easum and his colleagues in the Bureau of African Affairs were sympathetic toward the emerging African socialist governments and the growing Soviet-Cuban involvement in southern Africa. Nor did he particularly appreciate Easum’s attempt to redirect the course of U.S. policy toward the region. Trying to restore some level of credibility to American policy on the continent, Easum commented to the press in Dar es Salaam, “We are using our influence to foster change in South Africa—not to preserve the status quo.” Later the same day, he took on the Republic directly, saying that South Africa’s expulsion from the United Nations depended on “the degree to which South Africa made meaningful changes.” Easum returned to find that he had been sacked by Kissinger for his comments. He was replaced by Nathaniel Davis, former ambassador to Chile and allegedly involved in Pinochet’s coup, who became the new Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs. Kissinger assured Hilgard Muller, South Africa’s Foreign Minister, that the appointment indicated a sharp movement away from the “missionary zeal” of the Department of State in its dealings with the Republic.

In Angola, there were three liberation movements—the pro-Western National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), the Soviet-backed Popular Movement for
the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), and the South African-supported National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). Although MPLA may have been farther left-leaning ideologically, there was little to distinguish it from FNLA or UNITA. All three groups used anti-colonial rhetoric, all expressed some vague “Marxist” notion of governance, and all had been willing to accept support from any country willing to give it with few preconditions. For instance, the MPLA, led by Agostinho Neto, had lobbied the United States in 1962 for support while not labelling the MPLA as a communist organization. The FNLA, led by Holden Roberto, went to Algeria, Cuba, Egypt, China, and the Soviet Union in hopes of securing support. Jonas Savimbi, the leader of UNITA, approached the same countries—with the exception perhaps of the Soviet Union—as well as North Vietnam, and acquired military training for his troops from North Korea.89

Despite a long history of strife between these groups, Secretary Kissinger and the international media discovered a new narrative to explain why the Mbundu, the Ovimbundu, and the Kongo had been fighting off and on for half a millennia: it was a consequence of the Mbundu’s “communist” sympathies and the Ovimbundu and Kongo’s “capitalist” inclinations.90 Though the United States had little knowledge of the country and few interests to protect there, Angola would become America’s newest Cold War battleground, though the U.S Congress would be the last to know.91

2.4.6 Collaboration on Southern Africa

How precisely the United States arrived at supporting one or the other group is still a mystery. When Ford’s CIA chief was asked by the U.S. Congress what the difference between each was, he flatly stated, “They are all independents. They are all for black Africa. They are all for some fuzzy kind of social system, you know, without really much articulation, but some sort of let’s not be exploited by the capitalist nations.” When asked why the Chinese were backing the FNLA or UNITA, he stated: “Because the Soviets are backing the MPLA is the simplest answer.” Surprised by Colby’s frankness, Congressman Aspin asked the chief if that sort of reasoning was dictating American opposition to these groups; he replied, “It is.”92

In January 1975, each of these groups appeared to have put aside their differences and was attempting to cooperate in a transitional government. Their differences, however, proved intractable, and the transitional government began to dissolve. Civil war appeared inevitable as each group began to arm and to lobby for
outside support. Washington was, however, not overly concerned because the consensus at the State Department was that the militarily superior FNLA would prevail.93 As the fighting between the MPLA and the FNLA-UNITA factions escalated between January and July, the Soviet Union and Cuba expanded their support for the MPLA, “providing nearly $35 million in arms and several thousand Cuban military advisors.”94 Kissinger was concerned that the Marxist MPLA, with substantial Soviet assistance, might seize power in Angola, and thought it essential to stop the “establishment of a radical and potentially hostile regime in Angola.”95 Additionally, the secretary believed the credibility of U.S. policy “throughout the world not permit such a power play by the USSR to go totally unchallenged.”96 Although Kissinger, in January, 1975, had previously favoured a modest amount of economic assistance only for the FNLA, by the summer of that same year, the Secretary had decided that diplomatic initiatives were useless unless “they [were] supported by continued military pressure on the ground” and against the advice of the State Department, decided to provide increased military assistance to both the FNLA and UNITA.97

With the assistance of Zaire’s President Mobutu, a strong anti-communist ally in the region, in June 1975, the CIA began to funnel $31 million in “light arms, mortars, ammunition, vehicles, boats and communication equipment.”98 On August 3, 1975, a small South African contingent crossed into Angola to help tip the balance in favour of UNITA.

The United States Congress became increasingly concerned by the fact that Washington and Pretoria were cooperating in regards to Angola. The spectre of Vietnam hung over everything, including American involvement in southern Africa. Many legislators also believed that the United States had abandoned the moral high-ground by involving itself in the conflict and were “critical of both the covert U.S. aid and South African military intervention, which in their opinions were not coincidental.”99 Congressional investigations also uncovered CIA collaboration with the South African Defence Force and immediately moved to limit American involvement in Angola.

Despite obfuscations by the administration, the United States had been involved in Angola from the start. A declassified State Department memorandum was explicit, saying “we believed it was essential to the credibility of our policies throughout the world not to permit such a power play by the USSR to go totally unchallenged in African and elsewhere, this means showing that the United States, despite recent
reverses in southeast Asia and our preoccupation at home is still able to react when a power—the Soviet Union in this instance—moves to upset the international political environment.” The document continued, indicating that it was “only after exhaustive review and assessment of all these factors that the Executive Branch approved, in June of this year [1975], undertaking a program of covert activities.” Furthermore, the Nixon Administration had sought South African support and hoped to use that country as a proxy to pursue American interests in the region. There was also a close collaboration between the American and South African intelligence agencies, but with increased scrutiny from the U.S. Congress, it was becoming more difficult for Kissinger to publicly work with the South Africans on the Angolan conflict. It would be better if the United States-South Africa collaboration would fall off the front pages of the newspapers for awhile. Unfortunately for the secretary, it was not to happen that way.

On the morning of October 23, 5,000 SADF soldiers and an armoured division—with a small contingent of American, Portuguese, and European mercenaries—struck deep into Angola territory and began a rapid advance on the capital. The world was stunned, and there were rumours that the military operation had been done at the behest of the United States. Kissinger would claim that “we had no foreknowledge of South Africa’s intentions, and in no way cooperated militarily.” Characteristically, Kissinger was being less than truthful. Wayne Smith, director of the State Department’s Office of Cuban Affairs from 1977 to 1979, wrote that “in August and October [1975] South African troops invaded Angola with full U.S. knowledge.” He could have added encouragement as well because a declassified State Department memorandum made it obvious that “military pressure” was essential to achieving American goals in the region and that CIA-funded mercenaries had accompanied the SADF during the invasion.

Still weary of involvement in conflicts and regions about which the country had almost no knowledge, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee was determined to keep the United States from becoming further involved in Angola. Especially problematic was the dubious military competence of the FNLA and UNITA and the possibility that the U.S. would have to intervene to rescue them. Shortly thereafter, the Congress passed the Clark Amendment, which cancelled all covert aid to Angola. The amendment, attached to the Foreign Assistance Act, was vetoed by President Ford; however, the identical Tunney Amendment passed the Senate on December 19, 1975, and the
measure was similarly supported by the House the following month.\textsuperscript{106} When covert American participation in the Angolan civil war was forced underground, Kissinger moved to dissociate himself from the South African actions. The congressional action and the subsequent abandonment by the Ford Administration happened just as a South African armoured division appeared poised to take the capital of Luanda.\textsuperscript{107}

2.4.7 Cuban Intervention and the Collapse of the South African Military Offensive

On November 4, 1975, in response to the South African invasion of Angola, Cuba began to deploy the first of 30,000 troops to Angola to save the MPLA from an imminent collapse. Although the Soviets were not initially consulted, they eventually threw their considerable financial support to the Cubans and the MPLA to turn back the South Africans. That support proved decisive, and what seemed to be a certain victory for the SADF became a disaster. As General Sir Walter Walker, a former NATO commander, remarked, “Without U.S. support, the South African Government decided that discretion was the better part of valour. Therefore the only alternative to shooting down Soviet transport planes was to retire.”\textsuperscript{108} The MPLA took control of the country, and Agostinho Neto was sworn in as Angola’s first president shortly after South African forces withdrew from the country.\textsuperscript{109}

Although the U.S. government concealed its suspected role, members of the South African defence establishment, including Prime Minister Vorster himself, maintained that they had launched the invasion at U.S. instigation. This was confirmed by former CIA station chief in Luanda, Robert Hultslander, who told historian Piero Gleijeses “that Kissinger’s policy on Africa itself was short sighted and flawed” and that he was “deeply concerned . . . about UNITA’s purported ties with South Africa, and the resulting political liability such carried. I was unaware at the time, of course, that the U.S. would eventually beg South Africa to directly intervene to pull its chestnuts out of the fire.”\textsuperscript{110}

The effects of the American reversal were immediate. The South Africans were angered by Kissinger’s abrupt about-face and anxious about the United States’ unwillingness to counter Soviet involvement in the region. Those strategists previously keen to work with the United States became disillusioned by the administration’s reversal, and relations between the two countries cooled.\textsuperscript{111}
Although American involvement in the Angolan war was largely shelved, the region did not fade from the attention of Washington. With the emergence of black Marxist governments in Mozambique and Angola, there were renewed anxieties concerning Soviet-Cuban involvement in the nationalist struggles in Rhodesia and Namibia and the OAU states dedicating themselves to the armed struggle in southern Africa.\textsuperscript{112} In Rhodesia, Joshua Nkomo’s Zambia-based guerrilla movement was gaining strength and appeared to pose a serious threat to the white regime in Salisbury. Additionally, the South West African People’s Organization (SWAPO), with backing from the Soviets, was becoming a formidable military force in Namibia.\textsuperscript{113}

\subsection*{2.4.8 United States-South African Cooperation concerning Rhodesia}

The Ford Administration was chastened but still determined to contain Soviet-Cuban encroachment in the region by non-military means. The administration viewed the escalating violence in Rhodesia as a product of Soviet meddling in the country.\textsuperscript{114} Kissinger concluded that, to forestall Soviet-Cuban involvement, the United States should support majority rule in Rhodesia by means of “a negotiated settlement.”\textsuperscript{115} The United States would also encourage a diplomatic solution in Namibia, but management of the Rhodesian crisis would remain the primary objective.

On April 27, 1976, in Lusaka, Zambia, Kissinger delivered a speech directed toward a black African audience and sketched out his recalibrated policy toward the region. The Secretary guaranteed a U.S. commitment to “majority rule . . . for all the peoples of Southern Africa.”\textsuperscript{116} He outlined America’s role in moving Rhodesia towards democracy and affirmed that the United States was committed to the independence of Namibia.

Concerning South Africa, Kissinger was evasive, articulating a vague expectation of human rights in the Republic in the near future. He did, however, acknowledge that the United States was relying on South Africa to encourage Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith to reach a negotiated settlement. Declassified documents suggest that South Africa nudged Smith toward political compromise and the front-line states discouraged guerrilla movements in the region as a quid pro quo.\textsuperscript{117}

Still smarting from the Angolan debacle, the South African government initially reacted negatively to the Lusaka speech. Pretoria, however, soon recognized that the Secretary’s speech was not directed at South Africa, but Rhodesia. South African policy makers also realized that the Ford Administration required the Republic’s
influence to encourage Salisbury to resolve the deepening crisis. As in earlier instances, the policy makers believed that it could be useful to the United States as an ally in a Cold War crisis.118

Despite Pretoria’s understandable identification with Ian Smith’s government in Rhodesia, it was also true that the escalating insurgency in that country was complicating South Africa’s own situation. As one contemporary noted, South Africa “would have preferred a moderate African government to a white one that was a perpetual invitation to outside intervention in the region.”119 Indeed, Pretoria had unsuccessfully tried to negotiate a Rhodesian settlement with the Zambians shortly after the Lisbon coup. Naturally, they were not disinclined to Kissinger’s proposal.

Negotiations between Washington and Pretoria over the Rhodesian situation began in May with a meeting between Secretary Kissinger and South African ambassador, R. F. “Pik” Botha. Kissinger told Botha that it would be necessary for South Africa to convince Ian Smith to compromise or that both countries would lose credibility in the future. If a settlement in Rhodesia were achieved, Botha was assured that the Ford Administration was willing to accept the South Africa-supported Turnhalle constitutional talks in Namibia. In another fortuitous event, President Ford suggested a possible summit with Prime Minister Vorster. Thus, a meeting between Kissinger and Vorster was scheduled for late June in Bavaria. Vorster had a keen interest in seeing the Rhodesian issue settled. Moreover, the meeting conferred an enormous legitimacy on the Vorster government. When the Soweto riots erupted in mid-June, that legitimacy would be helpful to Pretoria as it was confronted with a cascade of international scorn.120

Secretary Kissinger and the South African Prime Minister met in West Germany on June 24. After the meeting, Kissinger flew to multiple capitals in Africa and Europe to try to salvage the Rhodesian negotiations. After shoring up the peace process, Kissinger and Vorster met again in Zurich and then in Pretoria in mid-September. At that meeting, it was rumoured that Kissinger assured the Prime Minister that the United States would manipulate the gold prices to aid South Africa in exchange for cooperation on Rhodesia.121 True or not, shortly thereafter Pretoria began applying pressure on the Rhodesians to negotiate.122

Chastened by his Angolan experience, Kissinger realized that it would be necessary to be more cognizant of domestic considerations in regards to Rhodesia. This time, he kept the Democratic leadership in the loop, including Senator George
McGovern, so the Secretary was careful to acknowledge that he was working with South Africa. He also wanted the American public to know that this cooperation was not a tacit endorsement of the Republic’s racial policies, even going so far as to assure a black audience in Philadelphia that apartheid was “repugnant to the world’s conscience.”

Always the equivocator, he was careful not to mention that apartheid was repugnant to the United States in particular. His equivocations worked; this time Kissinger’s diplomacy in the region did not raise the ire of liberal Democrats. Quite unexpectedly, the main criticism came from the right, with conservative Republicans accusing Kissinger of abandoning a pro-Western ally in Rhodesia. The most strident of these critics was California governor Ronald Reagan, who was running in the Republican presidential primary.

By late September, Kissinger’s efforts in the region began to show results. The leadership in Salisbury announced an “agreement to negotiate a transition to majority rule.” For Ian Smith, the same man who unilaterally declared independence in order to maintain white rule, such an action was unthinkable a few years earlier. However, just as the talks appeared to be moving in the right direction, the two black states withdrew from the negotiations, and the peace process collapsed.

This occurrence was not especially surprising. The process was always bound to be a difficult one, and U.S. influence in the region was always limited. Kissinger, however, was angered at the political capital expended with no results and placed the blame squarely on the black African states. The front-line states, for their part, were prepared to wait for Watergate to claim its final causality, bringing with it a Carter Administration that would presumably be more inclined to support their interests. It was also at this time that South Africa was confronting a crisis after Soweto and was focused on the internal situation. Helping save a diplomatic initiative for the Ford Administration during a tight presidential election was not a priority for Pretoria.

The Ford Administration left the Rhodesian problem as well as the conduct of future relations with Pretoria to the incoming Democratic administration. The influence of Henry Kissinger, which had been so instrumental in establishing the policy of communication with the Republic, along with the ideological inclinations that underpinned it, would most certainly be absent from the Carter White House. Consequently the controversial Nixon-Kissinger-Ford policy appeared to be drawing to a close and with it a real possibility that the United States “tilt” towards Pretoria would promptly reverse.
2.5 Carter Administration

2.5.1 The Foundations of the Carter Policy

When Jimmy Carter entered the White House in 1977, it was clear that relations between the U.S. and South Africa would be promptly restructured. Carter brought to the presidency a conviction that the United States must promote the cause of racial justice in southern Africa. The President’s beliefs were influenced by a number of factors, including his Christian beliefs, his advocacy for human rights, and the political support that his election had received from the Black community in the United States. On a personal level, Carter was ashamed that he had not more fully embrace the Civil Rights Movement in his native Georgia.\(^{127}\)

More importantly, the Carter Administration viewed geopolitics from a more “liberal” viewpoint than did its predecessors. Thus, the Cold War confrontation was deemphasized, and the United States committed itself to resolving long-neglected regional problems throughout the world. As President Carter stated, “We are now free of that inordinate fear of communism which once led us to embrace any dictator who joined us in that fear.”\(^{128}\) Carter made it clear from the beginning that human rights would play a prominent role in his administration, stating in his inaugural address, “Because we are free we can never be indifferent to the fate of freedom elsewhere.”\(^{129}\) Southern Africa would figure prominently in this new approach. The administration believed that the Black Nationalism sweeping the continent was an unstoppable force that would eventually topple the white fortress in southern Africa. In that circumstance, it made no sense to continue to support South Africa and Rhodesia when their days were numbered. Consequently, recognition, encouragement, and eventual support for this Black Nationalist movement were the only sensible alternative for U.S. policy.\(^{130}\)

The persistent vestiges of colonialism and racism in southern Africa, not the adventurism of Moscow and Havana, were perceived as the adversaries that U.S. influence and diplomacy should confront.

Carter’s election was received with consternation bordering on hysteria in Pretoria. Policy makers in the Republic had been consistently disappointed by the Nixon-Ford administrations, but they could always count on a certain level of understanding and cooperation. With Carter they fully expected to be abandoned altogether. Shortly before Carter’s inauguration, Prime Minister Vorster told expressed this sentiment when he told the South African people:
It is my firm conclusion that if a communist onslaught should be made on South Africa . . . then South Africa will have to face it alone, and certain countries who profess to be anti-communist will even refuse to sell arms to South Africa to beat off the attack.\textsuperscript{131}

South African officials expecting to be rebuked by the Carter Administration would not be disappointed in the coming months.

Andrew Young, Ambassador to the United Nations, assumed responsibility as Carter’s principal policy-maker for southern Africa and quickly became South Africa’s most strident critic. Young indicated that the United States had a “great deal of responsibility to pursue majority rule in southern Africa” and “we can’t really assume the moral leadership that we need . . . unless we are aggressively pursuing majority rule.”\textsuperscript{132} Young refused to equivocate in his criticism of the Republic, calling the South Africans “racists” and advocated an aggressive move “toward majority rule” in South Africa because there’s “going to be change . . . and the only question is whether it will be rational or violent.”\textsuperscript{133} Though Young did not want to see the white minority driven from the country, he believed the “the fears of the white community . . . really are leading them to destroy themselves.”\textsuperscript{134}

Perhaps most irritating to the South Africans was the seeming reversal on regional matters. Rather than staying aligned with white South Africa, the United States was siding with black Africa, and if an imminent “bloodbath” was to be averted in the region, it would be better if the country “be on the side of the forces of liberation and independence.”\textsuperscript{135} The influence of communism in the region, in Young’s view, was a canard: “In no sense should the ferment in southern Africa be attributed to Soviet influence; but, rather, to the spirit of freedom and the dignity of humankind.” For the Soviets to succeed, all they had to do was wait because the region would fall into “inevitable chaos . . . because of forces that we helped to create.”\textsuperscript{136} Young went so far as to remark that the Cuban presence was a “stabilizing force” in Angola and that the United States would resolve the Rhodesian crisis.\textsuperscript{137} However, on a personal level, Young never passed up an opportunity to criticize the South African government, even declaring the Nationalist Party as “illegitimate.”\textsuperscript{138}

With the United States actively engaged in a rhetorical assault on South Africa, many policy makers in that country thought it wise to find allies outside of the Western orbit. In April, Minister Mulder, who was expected to succeed Vorster, made a long parliamentary address that espoused the wisdom of cultivating new alliances. In the
months following the speech, South Africa expanded contacts with Israel, the Shah’s Iran, and the Nationalist Chinese in Taiwan, as well as approaching anti-communist military regimes of South America.

2.5.2 Mondale-Vorster Meetings

In May 1977, Vice President Walter Mondale met with Vorster in Vienna for a candid discussion of the gravity of the racial situation in southern Africa. Mondale made it quite clear that the Carter Administration had completely rejected the Kissinger approach and wanted to see reform in South Africa itself. Mondale told Vorster that the Republic’s racial policies would no longer be ignored in return for its cooperation on Rhodesia and Namibia; there would also have to be immediate progress towards “full political participation”\(^{139}\) for all South Africans.

White South Africans were unmoved by Mondale’s remarks, and Vorster was “very, very direct” in rejecting Mondale’s explicit call for “one man/one vote” in the Republic.\(^{140}\) National Party leaders told white South Africans that a “split” had occurred between the two countries, and R. F. Botha declared that the Carter Administration “should not expect that . . . we will negotiate our own destruction . . . There is a point beyond which we cannot go.” The United States, according to Botha, was pursuing this policy because “your blacks want us to pay the price for what your whites did to them and that your whites likewise want to rid themselves of their guilt complex by pushing it off on us.” He went on to say that, by introducing “one man-one vote,” the United States had “radicalized American demands to the point of threatening our destruction. It is our country yet you tell us your morality requires full and equal participation, which Mr. Mondale said means the same as one man, one vote.” If the South Africans would follow this policy prescription, it “would inevitably lead to their destruction.”\(^{141}\)

Aside from Mondale’s statement on voting rights, a number of other incidents continued to complicate U. S.-South African relations, and communication between Washington and Pretoria was impeded by distrust. Only a day after the Vienna conference, Young, on an official mission to South Africa, toured Soweto and encouraged the black residents of the township to adopt a program of economic boycotts against white-owned businesses.\(^{142}\) Pretoria was extremely irritated by Young’s behaviour. Further complicating matters was the Republic’s nuclear program. In August, the Soviet Union informed the United States that its intelligence had
discovered South African installations for testing a nuclear device in the Kalahari. American satellites confirmed the Soviet allegation, and the United States, its European allies, and the Soviet Union warned Pretoria to desist from any experimentation with nuclear weapons. Pretoria was stunned and outraged that Washington had collaborated with Moscow against South Africa. President Carter also issued an order, of which Pretoria became aware, that every federal agency was to provide a detailed disclosure of all of its departmental links and activities with South Africa. Furthermore, the South African finance minister was officially discouraged from making a prearranged visit to Washington.

As tension over the Republic’s nuclear program consumed the attention of American policy makers, South African police officers beat to death Steven Biko, leader of the Black Consciousness Movement, while Biko was in their custody. This was an inopportune time for an internationally known activist to be killed, and South African authorities attempted to cover up the circumstances of Biko’s death, saying he died while on a hunger strike. When the findings of a post-mortem were released to the public, the police said he might have “hurt his head when he fell out of bed.” The United States State Department denounced the South African explanation, saying Biko was a “victim of flagrant neglect and official irresponsibility.”

Vorster undoubtedly anticipated escalated pressure from the United States and wanted his political position to be sufficiently secure so as to react decisively to any unfriendly initiative that Washington might launch. Therefore, he announced a general election for November to reconfirm his mandate. After the snap election was planned, anti-American rhetoric in South Africa manifestly increased. When Carter and Mondale each offered conciliatory public gestures toward South Africa in October to mitigate South African hostility, they were both sharply rebuked for attempting to manipulate the election. The South African government also ordered an extensive crackdown on internal dissent, and numerous black and white anti-apartheid activists were incarcerated. The Prime Minister made it quite clear that he was determined to deflect pressure from abroad and pre-empt opposition from within.

### 2.5.3 The United Nations and the Carter Initiative

The October crackdown generated an intense wave of international protest that prompted the United Nations to enact punitive measures against South Africa. The United States lent its support to a mandatory arms embargo adopted by the U.N. The
administration had previously been considering such a step if Vorster proved to be uncooperative, and there had been a minor U. S. tightening of the voluntary embargo in July. American participation itself in this resolution did not have a particularly significant effect on South Africa, other than bolstering Vorster’s pre-election popularity, because the Republic had been obtaining its important armaments from Israel and France and through clandestine procurement. Moreover, at that point, South Africa had developed an effective domestic arms-producing industry.

However, President Carter was not content merely to enforce U. S. compliance with the restrictions of the U.N. embargo, his administration actually extended them. Much to the consternation of American businessmen and Congressional conservatives, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance announced that Carter, by executive order, would prohibit the transfer of all items to the South African military and police and cancel the continued provision of spare parts for systems already acquired. The Commerce Department added that the embargo applied to the entire span of civilian products, including sophisticated technology purchased by the South African government. The Carter Administration, however, encountered stern criticism from the anti-apartheid lobby when it authorized the sale of Cessna and Piper light airplanes to private South African interests because Pretoria had always reserved the right to commandeer civilian aircraft in times of national emergency.

In contrast to the prompt suspension of security-related equipment to South Africa, Carter realized that it was not nearly as convenient to withdraw U. S. cooperation from the Republic’s nuclear energy program even though he was under increasing public pressure to do so. Pretoria’s clever policy of “calculated ambiguity”—that is retaining the option for the development of nuclear weapons—made Washington reluctant to sever its atomic technological ties with South Africa, for by doing so, the United States would forfeit its supervisory and moderating influence. As Young said, “if you break the relationship altogether, there is no way to monitor and it is almost because you can’t trust them that you have to stay close to them.”

2.5.4 Southern Africa during the Carter Administration

Secretary Vance continued the herculean task begun by his predecessor of negotiating a Rhodesian settlement and worked closely with his British counterpart, Foreign Minister David Owen, toward this end. South Africa’s influence on Smith would have been helpful in the process. However, Pretoria was less willing to
pressure Salisbury toward a settlement than it had been during the previous American administration when South Africa was accommodated in exchange for its effort. Vorster had previously indicated to the Carter Administration that, if the United States had nothing to offer in return, he would no longer attempt to coerce the Rhodesian prime minister. Warning that the Republic and the United States were close to a complete break over Rhodesia, Vorster declared that, if American pressures persisted, “the end result for southern Africa would be exactly the same as if it was subverted by Marxism. In one case, it will come about as a result of brute force, and in the other it will be strangulation with finesse.”154 In any event, Smith ultimately tended to move towards an internal settlement with Bishop Abel Muzorewa and other moderate African leaders, excluding the more radical elements of the Patriotic Front from the new government.155

With regard to Namibia, a new approach was implemented to accelerate the independence of this troubled and disputed territory. Mondale had made it clear at Vienna that Pretoria must abandon the Turnhalle constitutional negotiations that Kissinger had previously hinted Washington might be induced to recognize. The Carter Administration rejected the Turnhalle plan, which would have practically excluded SWAPO, because it would have created a provisional government composed of politicians, white and black, who were unquestioningly loyal to Pretoria; this development would, of course, have inhibited the possibility of free elections. Moreover, Turnhalle proposed the establishment of Bantustans as a prelude to independence.156

Instead, the United States in concert with the four other Western members of the Security Council—Britain, France, West Germany, and Canada—attempted to promote a solution in accordance with the U.N. Security Council Resolution 385, which called for free Namibian elections supervised by the U.N.157 Young’s deputy, Ambassador Donald McHenry, spearheaded this multilateral initiative. The five Western ambassadors in South Africa urged Pretoria to open new Namibian negotiations in which the U.N. would participate, and this Western Contact Group approach became standard operating procedure in finding a solution in Namibia.158

McHenry persistently pressured South Africa to permit just one more concession toward Namibian independence; in the process, increasingly suspicious officials in Pretoria found McHenry to be exceedingly calculating and “over time they had decided that he had made up his mind exactly what the final solution in Namibia
should be: a handover to SWAPO under U.N. auspices.”

McHenry’s determined and relentless push towards a Namibian settlement greatly agitated South Africa and ultimately put the Afrikaner government on the defensive.

South Africa had its own ideas as to what would constitute an acceptable settlement in Namibia. Even though Pretoria participated in the tedious U.N. negotiations, it was reluctant to allow a settlement to mature. The South African government understandably had little inclination to compromise its political and military position in Namibia—especially not at the insistence of the unfriendly Carter Administration, which Pretoria perceived as the champion of radical Black Nationalism in southern Africa. South Africa was determined to deprive SWAPO of its military option and attacked its guerrilla bases in Angola. Despite condemnations from the United States, Minister of Defence P.W. Botha ignored the protest and warned, “South Africa would not be intimidated and would strike again if its security was threatened.” South Africa also did not dismiss its very real option of pressing on with its internal settlement and eventually established political structures within Namibia to facilitate such a contingency.

2.5.5 Drift to the Right

As the Namibian problem demonstrates, Pretoria had no interest in cooperating with the Carter White House. The South African government, instead, sought to cultivate associations with prominent Americans who were also uncomfortable with the current U.S. policy and who may have been helpful in promoting its position. Pretoria had every reason to expect that it would encounter a large and sympathetic audience in the United States. Shortly after the Vienna meeting with Mondale, Vorster had received standing ovations from two civic organizations, composed largely of American businessmen stationed in South Africa, after delivering speeches sharply critical of the United States. Also, following the October 1977 crackdown, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce opened an office in Johannesburg and indicated that American business did not “necessarily support the Carter initiative.”

A number of influential Americans visited the Republic and amplified their support of the South African government. New Hampshire’s conservative governor, Meldrim Thompson, received a red-carpet welcome and was followed by Dr. Ernest Lefever of Georgetown University, who was greeted with equal attention. Congressman James Wright of Texas inspected the SASOL oil-from-coal refining
facility and praised South Africa’s technological prowess. Senator Barry Goldwater addressed a white audience and confessed that he was very much embarrassed by Carter’s policy toward the region.\textsuperscript{167}

On a highly publicized trip to South Africa in August 1978, presidential contender John Connally denounced U.S. policy and furthermore assured Pretoria,

\hspace{1cm} We can’t dictate to you. This view accords with most of the people back home. You are going to see the U.S. Congress reflecting this view and it will become more and more manifest as time goes by.\textsuperscript{168}

Governor Connally’s remarks were off the mark, except perhaps in his native Texas, but nonetheless prophetic. By 1979, the Carter Administration had realized that American influence in the region was limited, certainly insufficient to produce the negotiated settlements desired. A conservative attitude was also increasingly evident in the Congress, which reflected the mood of the general population. Meanwhile, within the administration itself, “Africanists” such as Young were being pushed aside by “globalists” such as National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, who argued that southern Africa could not be divorced from the superpower struggle; even President Carter himself became quite preoccupied with arresting Soviet expansionism with the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{169}

A number of observers have noted that, beginning in late 1978 and early 1979 Carter’s policy seemed to be reverting back to the Kissinger approach, which sought to pre-empt Soviet involvement through negotiated settlements while rewarding South Africa for its cooperation in the process. Vance visited Pretoria in October 1978 and demonstrated that the Carter Administration was indeed willing to employ the Kissinger practice of linkage. Much to the dismay of the State Department “Africanists,” the Secretary delivered a handwritten letter from President Carter to the newly elected South African Prime Minister, P. W. Botha, stating that Botha would be invited to make an official visit to Washington if progress toward a Namibian settlement could be made. The South African government leaked the letter to the press.\textsuperscript{170} Obviously, Prime Minister Botha was most unenthusiastic in responding to Carter’s invitation, and there was other evidence of the erosion of Carter’s activist initiative.

Ambassador Young, the most vocal Africanist, resigned in August 1979. Even though his retirement resulted from an indiscreet contact with an envoy of the Palestine
Liberation Organization, “his resignation . . . symbolized the decline of U.S. activism in Southern Africa.” And prior to Young’s departure, McHenry had been replaced as the chief negotiator of the Western Contact Group by a British diplomat, Sir James Murray, who was more sympathetic to South African sensitivities. However, Pretoria remained unconvinced of the advantage of cooperating with even this modified Carter Administration. The Botha government realized that, considering the current attitude of the American public and Congress as well as the divisions within the administration, Carter was in an unlikely position to increase economic pressure against the Republic. Pretoria now had little reason, positive or negative, to bend towards Washington.

2.5.6 Muldergate and the Election of P. W. Botha

South Africa was also preoccupied with a domestic crisis. Pretoria was dramatically shaken by the unfolding Information Scandal, which eventually reached the highest levels of the Afrikaner establishment. The Secretary of Information, Eschel Rhoodie, was involved in the distribution of government funds to private South African organizations, as well as to an American publisher, to purchase U.S. newspapers in an effort to influence American public opinion. Rhoodie was also embezzling some of the funds for his personal use. After Rhoodie was accused, he incriminated his superior, Minister of Information Connie Mulder, who accepted responsibility. The scandal then became known as “Muldergate.” However, a subsequent parliamentary investigation also implicated Hendrick van den Burg, the head of the secret service, and State President J. B. Vorster, who had previously, in an unusual move, retired from the powerful Prime Ministry to assume this largely ceremonial office. Vorster resigned in June 1979 and the South African government was paralyzed politically and diplomatically by these shocking revelations.

In April, as the scandal was beginning to culminate, Botha provoked a bitter fight with the United States over a relatively minor incident. The South African government revealed that a spy camera had been detected in the American ambassador’s plane, and three U.S. military attaches were ordered to leave Pretoria. Washington retaliated by ordering the expulsion of two senior South African military officers from the United States. Speculation has been that Botha created the crisis to divert the attention of the South Africa public away from Muldergate and towards an external adversary; other analysts have argued that the “spy plane flap” was precipitated as part of a strategy to distance South Africa from the United States so the
Botha government could concentrate on promoting a more autonomous direction in international relations. In either case, this incident set the pattern of diplomatic hostilities between the two nations, a pattern that would persist throughout the final days of the Carter Administration.

When the South African government did recover from the Information Scandal, it was with a vigorous momentum that implemented a number of unexpected innovations, both internal and external. Botha announced a series of reforms designed to abolish “petty apartheid” or social segregation in an effort to defuse domestic unrest and to repair South Africa’s international image. The Prime Minister also explained his vision for a “constellation” of southern African states as the foundation of a new order. Pretoria also began to expand its commercial links with black Africa, including Zambia and Mozambique, in an effort to enlarge its economic orbit. These developments would prove critical in the South Africa-United States relationship during the Reagan Administration and are discussed in detail in Chapter 3.

Botha also accelerated the Vorster government’s policy of securing alliances with other anti-communist middle powers. Although Pretoria regretted the fall of its good friend, the Shah of Iran, in 1979, during the following year, Botha enjoyed two summits with the premier of the Republic of China and continued to maintain close ties with the State of Israel. In regard to the United States, Botha was pursuing a longer term strategy. Pretoria continued to build bridges to conservative congressmen with the hope that it eventually could re-establish closer relations with a post-Carter administration.

Despite South Africa’s movement toward racial reform, communication with the United States government did not improve, and during the concluding months of the Carter Administration, bilateral relations disintegrated into a tit-for-tat exercise in diplomatic agitation. Washington accused Pretoria of spending $20 million (USD) annually for propaganda purposes in the United States. The South African police disrupted the operations of the U.S. International Communications Agency (USICA) and monitored those who attended the broadcasts of “Roots” at the USICA centre in Pretoria. In turn, Washington delayed South Africa’s applications for honorary consulates in the United States and sent American embassy personnel as observers to trials of political prisoners in the Republic. In addition, the South African Air Force harried a U.S. naval detachment as it sailed around the Cape. Finally, N. J. Niewoud,
the South African surgeon general, was refused a visa to enter the United States to attend an international medical conference.177

In this climate of bilateral animosity, the activist Carter initiative, which so earnestly sought to promote the causes of racial justice and majority rule in Rhodesia and Namibia and which was intended to apply pressure on South Africa to dismantle apartheid and move toward a pluralistic democratic society, came to a close. Peace and majority rule had finally been achieved in Rhodesia, but only after British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher managed to bring the Muzorewa government, the product of Smith’s internal settlement, the white minority, and the Patriotic Front guerrillas to the bargaining table to reach a workable compromise. However, the Carter administration “played no direct role in the breakthrough.”178

Even though Carter’s negotiators had established the framework for a Namibian settlement they were unable to bring it to a successful conclusion. South Africa ultimately suspended the negotiations to assess the outcome of the evolving Rhodesian situation and to await a more accommodating administration in Washington.179 Further, although Pretoria finally committed itself to limited racial reforms, the historic decision hardly seemed the result of U.S. influence, which had, in fact, reached an all-time low. These realities tended to indicate the general ineffectiveness of Carter’s policy, in which sincere commitments proved to be insufficient agents to accomplish those goals.

An Afrikaner intellectual, Hermann Giliomee, provides a concise balance sheet that evaluates the Carter administration’s stance toward South Africa:

Under Carter the United States supported the U.N. arms embargo, refused to cooperate with South Africa in the production of synthetic fuels . . . and expressed concern to the South African government about human rights violations. The administration, however, stopped short of any action that would seriously harm U.S. interests in South Africa. It refused to support the demand for economic sanctions . . . and resisted the implementation of the so-called mild economic options, such as a ban on new investment or statutory enforcement of the Sullivan principles on employment practices.180

It was Carter’s reluctance to resort to punitive measures that subjected him to criticism from even his own ideological constituency. Those same individuals, who so highly praised the Carter White House for its firm commitment to change, ultimately criticized it for failing “to take dramatic steps that would both give substance to rhetorical pressure and withdraw U.S. support.”181 Observers who expected Carter to force a
reordering of the status quo in southern Africa were most disappointed in late 1978 and early 1979 when U.S. policy again seemed to follow Kissinger’s track.

Despite the insistence of impatient liberal proponents, Carter realized that his activist approach would not succeed. His administration had overestimated Washington’s ability to influence events in southern Africa, lost the enthusiasm of an American public that was becoming increasingly conservative, and “received little support from its European allies who did not want their economic interests in South Africa damaged by a reckless U.S. policy.” Of course, however, the Carter policy received its most vehement criticism from the American right. General Sir Walter Walker cynically berated Carter’s political advocacy of human rights as a fraud in general and a contemptible hypocrisy as it was applied to Africa. He pointed out that the Carter Administration attacked the South African government for detaining political dissidents, but remained comparatively silent as Uganda’s Idi Amin inflicted unspeakable acts of barbarism and genocide on his population. Carter even provided training for Amin’s security forces at Ft. Hood, Texas. Furthermore, former Secretary of State Kissinger warned that the administration had gravitated too far towards Africa’s “ideological radicals,” placing U.S. policy in a perplexing situation.

Considering the outcome of the 1980 presidential election in the United States, perhaps the most compelling critique of the Carter initiative came from Ronald Reagan. Candidate Reagan criticized the Africanists in the Carter administration:

For being insensitive to the need to protect U.S. national interests and America’s position of power within the global system. Their policy for Southern Africa was pictured as placing African interests above American interests and consequently as having failed to check the real and potential spread of Soviet power into Southern Africa.

According to Reagan, the United States had alienated a reliable Cold War ally without any substantive reforms and at the expense of American interests. Furthermore, these strategic interests had been sacrificed for nothing. South Africa had not facilitated change in southern Africa, and the Republic was no closer to full political enfranchisement for black South Africans.

2.6 Conclusion

From the Second World War to the Ford Administration, there had been a remarkable consistency in American foreign policy towards the Republic of South
Africa. Each administration had attempted to balance strategic and economic interests against human rights issues. Though the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations chose to place slightly higher emphasis on human rights, like the Truman, Nixon, and Ford Administrations, American strategic interests would always remain the priority. The Carter Administration, however, chose to de-emphasize the Cold War confrontation. Consequently, security ties with the Republic diminished, and there was an increased emphasis on human rights in South Africa. By the time Ronald Reagan came to the presidency, bilateral relations were at an all-time low, and many South African policy makers believed the United States had abandoned it to the “Marxist Onslaught.”

Whereas President Carter had placed an emphasis on full political participation for the peoples of southern Africa, including South Africa, the incoming Reagan Administration’s policy toward southern Africa would rest on the priorities of protecting U.S. interests and containing communist influences in the region. The South African leadership was euphoric over Reagan’s victory. Two weeks before the inauguration, American journalists reported that Pretoria was “anticipating a sympathetic White House and . . . looking for shifts in U.S. policy to mark the start of a new era of warmer ties.” The South African government was particularly encouraged by the fact that “the Reagan administration viewed the problems of southern Africa in the context of East-West relations” and that “Washington had adopted a tough posture toward Moscow.” Moreover, South African policy makers were calculating that Reagan would be far more concerned with the global containment of communism than with promoting a “marginally rewarding” campaign for political rights in South Africa; they were also aware that conservative Republicans had historically proven to be more sympathetic to the continuation of white minority rule in Africa.

Regarding the issue of arresting the spread of communism in southern Africa, members of the security establishment clearly expected a United States-South Africa strategic alliance. In fact, Robert Rotberg revealed that some South Africans thought that influential U.S. policymakers might even publicly “condone the perpetuation of apartheid because the menace of Soviet communism (in the bitter battle between good and evil in the world) is the greater of the two dangers.” Furthermore, the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) proclaimed Reagan’s victory a defeat for “pseudo-liberalism, permissiveness, state intervention, appeasement, and anti-patriotism”: “Western Christian culture,” it exclaimed, “still had a fighting chance against the continuing expansion of Marxist ideology.” It was a reversal of these
Soviet gains at the hands of liberal weakness and idealism to which Chester Crocker—Assistant Secretary of African Affairs during the Reagan Administration—reacted in his writings and in his formulation of the future Reagan policy of “Constructive Engagement.” Though Crocker would publicly present the policy as a balanced solution to regional conflict and liberalization of the Republic’s political system, implicitly, constructive engagement was designed to support South African initiatives to reduce Soviet and Cuban influence throughout southern Africa and to ensure the survival of the powerful apartheid state as a bulwark against anti-communism in Africa.

7 Ibid., 71.
11 Ibid., 4-5.
17 *South Africa: Time Running Out*, 340.
18 Bissell, 25.
19 Nyangoni, 13.
20 Jaster, 10.
21 Barber, 128.
22 Bissell, 36.
23 Ibid., 26.
27 *South Africa: Time Running Out*, 348.
28 Secretary Dean Rusk, Memorandum to Averell Harriman et al., 1963. *Declassified History*, doc. 2.

29 Ibid.

30 Secretary Robert McNamara, Letter to Secretary Dean Rusk, 11 July 1963, *Declassified History*, doc. 4.


32 *South Africa: Time Running Out*, 348-349.

33 Ibid. 349.

34 Bissell, 26


37 McGeorge Bundy, National Security Assistant, Memorandum to Secretary Dean Rusk et al., National Security Action (NASM) 295, in “The U.S. Policy Toward South Africa.” *Declassified History*, doc. 7.


40 El-Khawas and Cohen, 29.

41 Richard Nixon, *The Emergence of Africa: Report to the President by Vice-President Nixon on His Trip to Africa* (Washington, DC: Department of State, 1957).


43 H.L.T. Taswell, Memorandum to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, 20 March 1969, “USA Relations with South Africa,” Countries, 1/33/3, vol. 11, ASAMFA.

44 “S.A. is Low on Nixon’s List,” *Rand Daily Mail*, 11 April 1969, USA Relations with South Africa, Countries, 1/33/3, vol. 11, ASAMFA.


47 *South Africa: Time Running Out*, 352.


50 El-Khawas and Cohen, 24-25.

51 Ibid., 26.


53 Ibid., 105-107.

54 Ibid., 26.


56 Ibid., 26.

57 Ibid., 24.

58 *South Africa: Time Running Out*, 350-351.


61 Acheson, 20 April 1969, National Archives.
64Karis, 335-336.
65Karis, 335-336.
66E1-Khawas and Cohen, 28.
67 The South Africans welcomed Hurd’s appointment. As Ambassador Taswell subsequently wrote: “While his hands will be tied to some extent by the limitations imposed by American foreign policy towards our country, . . . I think Mr. Hurd’s heart is in the right place as far as we are concerned.” Taswell, Memorandum to the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, 11 June 1970, USA Relations with South Africa, Countries, 1/33/3, vol. 16, ASAMFA.
69E1-Khawas and Cohen, 31.
71E1-Khawas and Cohen, 31.
72 Ibid.
73 Ibid.
74Taswell, Memorandum to the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, 25 March 1971, USA Relations with South Africa, Countries, 1/33/3, vol. 18, ASAMFA.
75Nyagoni, 48-49.
76E1-Khawas and Cohen, 36.
77 Ibid.
78 Ibid., 36-37.
79 Ibid., 53-54.
80 Ibid., 51.
81 Price, 48.
83E1-Khawas and Cohen, 57.
84 Ibid., 27.
88 Ibid., 17-18.
92 Hearings before the House Select Committee on Intelligence (The Pike Committee), in CIA - The Pike Report (Nottingham, England: Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation, 1977), 218.
93 Bender, 72.
94 Ibid., 80.
96 Ibid.
97 Ibid.
98 House Select Committee on Intelligence, Selection from Pike Report Relating to Angola, February 1976, Declassified History, doc. 38.
99 E1-Khawas and Cohen, 59-60.
100 State Department Memorandum for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 16 December 1975, Declassified History, doc. 37.
101 Bender, 88-99.
102 White House Memorandum of Conversation with Chinese Officials, “The Soviet Union; Europe; the Middle East; South Asia; Angola,” 3 December 1975, Record Group 59, Records of the Department of State, Policy Planning Staff, Director’s Files (Winston Lord), 1969-1977, box 373, National Security Archive.
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110 Gleijeses, 176.
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119 South Africa: Time Running Out, 355.
120 South Africa: Time Running Out, 355.
123 Karis, 339.
124 South Africa: Time Running Out, 355.
130 South Africa: Time Running Out, 356-357.
131 Ibid., 357.
135 Ibid.
136 Ibid.
140 Ibid.
143 South Africa: Time Running Out, 358.
144 Karis, 347.
151 U.S. Congress, House. United States-South Africa Relations: Nuclear Cooperation, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on International Relations, June 30 and July 12, 1977, 43.
156 Nyagoni, 101.
158 Geldenhuys, Diplomacy of Isolation, 229.
161 Geldenhuys, Diplomacy of Isolation, 227-228.
162 Bissell, 37-38.
163 Ottaway, 645; South Africa: Time Running Out, 364.
164 Bissell, 37.
165 South Africa: Time Running Out, 360.
166 Bissell, 38.
167 South Africa: Time Running Out, 360.
168 Bissell, 39.
169 Ottaway, 637-638.
171 Ottaway, 639.
172 Ibid.
174 Bissell, 38-41.
176Ottaway, 645-647.
177Bissell, 42, 65.
178Ottaway, 642.
179Bissell, 42.
181Karlis, 354.
182Giliomee, 179-180.
183Walker, 110, 119-120.
184Ottaway, 637.
185Price, 53.
187*Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents* (hereafter WCPD), (February 6, 1985), 146; (February 4, 1986), 139.
188WCPD (October 24, 1985), 1293-95; (March 14, 1986), 356-64.
190 The Iran/Contra aid affair involved the illegal sale of TOW missiles to an enemy of America in order to secure funding for the Contras operating in Nicaragua. The affair graphically demonstrated the administration’s pursuit of ends regardless of means.
191WCPD (March 14, 1986), 14.
192Gaddis, 357.
Chapter III

“The African problem is a Russian weapon aimed at us…”

Ronald Reagan, Radio address, November 2, 1976

3.1 From Theory to Practice: The Formulation and Implementation of Constructive Engagement

This chapter will outline the ideological foundations of the Reagan Doctrine and its southern African manifestation called “Constructive Engagement.” As outlined by its chief architect, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Chester Crocker, “Constructive Engagement” comprised two ideas: that change in South Africa had to be controlled and that the region had to be “stabilized” before initiating controlled change. Considerable evidence suggests that the Reagan Administration proceeded further than any other Western nation in identifying its own interests with those of the South African state. This stance was taken largely because Constructive Engagement’s ultimate objective was not the managed political liberalization of the Republic of South Africa, as was claimed in the 1980s, but rather the rollback of Soviet influence in southern Africa. Because this latter goal was predicated on the existence of a South Africa dominated by apartheid, the policy’s stated objective of political change within the Republic was merely a façade.

3.2 The Reagan Doctrine

Although President Reagan never used the rubric himself—indeed, the label was first used in 1985 by neoconservative writer, Charles Krauthammer—the Reagan Doctrine was the administration’s hard-line prescription for national doubt and cautiousness that developed in the 1970s in response to a confluence of events that included eroding confidence in the American economy, Soviet military and nuclear parity, Soviet and Cuban gains in the developing world, and finally the Iranian hostage crisis, which seemed to epitomize American helplessness and confusion. According to the Reagan Administration, American influence dwindled during this period not because the international order was changing in ways that undercut U.S. dominance, but because liberal policy makers ignored the country’s vital interests and allowed American power to wane in the face of an active and hostile Soviet Union. The Reagan Doctrine asserted that the country needed to promote the principal values of “American
Exceptionalism”—democracy, freedom, equality, individualism, free enterprise, self-determination—to reaffirm the United States was the “Shining City on the Hill” and an example for other countries to follow. The Reagan Doctrine was thus directed not only at Soviet adventurism in the developing world but also at the “introspection, self-doubt, and hesitancy” that Reagan identified as the source of American decline in the 1970s.²

The main advocates of a forceful American posture were members of a small, hawkish elite that tended to see liberals in Congress and the policy establishment as the greatest threat to democracy after communism.³⁴ The Reagan Doctrine was a rallying point for conservatives against the enemy at home as well as abroad. Foremost, the Reagan Doctrine made a case for continued high defence spending by emphasizing the argument that the decline of American defence capabilities after the Vietnam War invited aggressive Soviet behaviour in the 1970s and that, to check the spread of Marxism, the U.S. needed to restore its military power and demonstrate America’s willingness to defend its interests globally.³

Among the policy’s most important advocates were neoconservatives such as Jeanne Kirkpatrick, Elliott Abrams, Norman Podhoretz, and Irving Kristol, many of whom broke with the Democratic Party in the early 1970s and became aggressive conservative spokespersons during the Carter Administration. Neoconservatives were a valuable element of the constituency that put Reagan in office in 1980, but were by no means natural allies of more traditional conservatives, especially on economic issues. However, neoconservative and traditional conservative views were more compatible on foreign policy issues, particularly on the point that, under Carter, lack of resolve and illusions about Soviet actions in foreign policy circles caused American influence to erode and invited Soviet adventurism abroad. The Reagan Doctrine drew on this ideological viewpoint which provided a means by which conservatives from across the political spectrum could counter liberal weakness when confronted by Soviet belligerence.⁴

Reagan Doctrine advocates in the administration reflected the change in U.S. foreign policy in their public statements on the Soviet Union and the Cold War. Secretary of State George Shultz emphatically stressed the inseparability of power and diplomacy and asserted that as the defender of democracy and guarantor of Western security, the United States had to defend anticomunist allies and to be more aggressive in reversing Soviet gains in the developing world. Labelling the Carter
Administration as the archetype of American vacillation and weakness, Jeanne Kirkpatrick, at that time a professor at Georgetown University, wrote:

The failure of the Carter administration’s foreign policy is now clear to everyone except its architects, and even they must entertain private doubts, from time to time, about a policy whose crowning achievement has been to lay the groundwork for a transfer of the Panama Canal from the United States to a swaggering Latin dictator of Castroite bent. In the thirty-odd months since the inauguration of Jimmy Carter as President there has occurred a dramatic Soviet military buildup, matched by the stagnation of American armed forces, and a dramatic extension of Soviet influence in the Horn of Africa, Afghanistan, Southern Africa, and the Caribbean, matched by a declining American position in all these areas. The U.S. has never tried so hard and failed so utterly to make and keep friends in the Third World.5

According to Kirkpatrick, the vision of America not just as the defender of democracy but as a force for its expansion was infused into U.S. policy from the top down by Reagan, against considerable resistance within the bureaucracy.6 Kirkpatrick cited three factors that forced the administration to push U.S. foreign policy to the right: the Soviet military buildup during the 1970s; the simultaneous expansion of Marxist influence throughout the developing world, with the accession of leftist governments in Vietnam, Ethiopia, Angola, South Yemen, Mozambique, Afghanistan, and Nicaragua; and a corresponding acceleration of the war of ideas, with growing Soviet influence over “language and concepts key to the discussion of morality and law and in such political arenas as the United Nations.”7

The goal of the Reagan Doctrine was to reverse this evolution of the military, geopolitical, and ideological correlation of forces in a way that would make the cost of Soviet Union adventurism prohibitively high. The question was whether officially sponsoring insurgencies in Asia, Africa, and Latin America was the most effective way to do so. Theoretically, the U.S. could have responded to Soviet expansionism by strengthening its own ties with other key countries, such as China or Egypt, rather than trying to reverse particular Soviet gains. However, one premise of the Reagan Doctrine was that the countries and regions in which Marxist governments acceded in the 1970s were of great strategic value, especially Afghanistan, which the administration viewed as a stepping stone for Moscow toward the Persian Gulf, and Nicaragua because of its proximity to the United States. In the case of southern Africa, eventual Reagan appointee to the head of the State Department, Larry W. Bowman, testified that the
region was threatened by a “resource war” waged by “Soviet proxy activity” that could bring the “severest consequences” for American interests.⁸

Speaking to South Africa more specifically, in 1978, conservatives Peter Duignan and L. H. Gann wrote in *Business Week*, “South Africa at present controls the Cape route, a major consideration at a time when Soviet Naval power has become predominate in the western part of Indian Ocean. . . . . It plays a major role in the global economy as the world’s greatest producer of gold and as a major exporter of uranium, diamonds, chrome, magnesium, and other materials.”⁹ Citing South Africa’s long-standing and devout opposition to communism, this point of view contended roughly that any destabilization of South Africa’s ruling regime was wrong because the alternative to white rule was communist rule. For example, on August 21, 1979, Richard Viguerie, political consultant and chief architect of Reagan’s 1980 electoral victory, said, “The alternative to the current Government is a Communist regime. If South Africa falls, freedom is not likely to prevail in the rest of the world for much longer.”¹⁰ In this view, more support for South Africa was necessary, and punitive economic sanctions merely played into Soviet hands.

Therefore, the Reagan Doctrine called for symmetric response at such key points as southern Africa, where Soviet advances were perceived as threats to American interests. Primary among those concerns were the United States’ considerable economic interests in southern Africa. These interests had their own advocates at home and in southern Africa.

### 3.2.1 The Anticommunist Lobby

Southern Africa had been a traditional concern of ideological anticommunists; its minerals, Cape sea route, and political juxtaposition of Marxist guerrillas and anti-Marxist white regimes had guaranteed attention to the region’s phalanx of problems. These activists would play a critical role in ideologically conjoining the foreign policy of the United States and South Africa in the context of the Super Power struggle.

In the controversy surrounding the Byrd Amendment, the anticommunist Liberty Lobby¹¹ played an important role. Along with its offshoots—the American-South African Council and the National Coordinating Committee of the Friends of Rhodesian Independence—it placed advertisements, arranged tours, published issue briefs, and drummed up support for Rhodesia among its 14,000 members nationwide. Their arguments made an appeal to the strategic importance, indeed necessity, of
supporting minority anticommmunist rule. For example, a pro-Rhodesian viewpoint argued:

Rhodesia is the key to the West’s precarious position in the Afro-Asian world. If Rhodesia falls, both South Africa and Portuguese Africa will inevitably fall like dominoes, leaving the entire continent in anti-Western hands. . . . We must not allow this to happen.12

A similar line of argument characterized the anticommmunist outlook in the South Africa debate.

In the 1970’s, particularly during the debate over the Clark Amendment, this rigid anticommunism was largely in remission. In the context in which the Clark Amendment was considered—immediately after the fall of Saigon, following a divisive and exhausting war—this point of view carried little weight in the domestic debate.13

From 1976 to the mid-1980s, the anticommmunist lobby was resuscitated and began to exert increasing influence on foreign policy debates. Leaving aside the larger questions of general public mood swings and shifting policy preferences, the ideological anticommmunist lobby under Ronald Reagan was growing more assertive and effective for a number of reasons. The first was the election of Reagan itself; Ronald Reagan was more predisposed to the right-wing foreign policy viewpoint than any President before him. A second source of power was the development during the late 1970’s of a sophisticated, computerized lobbying and fundraising apparatus. These groups mastered the techniques of direct mail, achieving a fund-raising capability that simply outstripped opposing organizations. For example, it is estimated that in the 1980 presidential campaign, conservative lobby groups played an important role in providing Ronald Reagan with nearly five times as much private campaign monies as President Carter.

A number of groups were established during the late 1970’s and early 1980’s that were to play key roles in future debates over southern Africa policy. Examples include the Free the Eagle National Citizen’s Lobby, which by 1985 claimed a membership of 265,000 and was one of only four lobbying groups that reported spending in excess of $1 million on lobbying activities in Congress in 1984. Another case is the Heritage Foundation, established in 1973, “to make the voice of responsible conservatism heard in Washington, D.C. and throughout the world.” Focusing on policy politics, Heritage sought to put out magazines, books, and timely issue briefs and summaries to be used in Congressional debate. Other groups involved in the
anticommunist debate included Lew Lehrman’s Citizens for America and World Anticommunist League, the Conservative Caucus, the American Security Council, which would set up Ambassador Kirkpatrick’s meeting with South African intelligence officers in 1981, and the National Jewish Coalition, publishers of *Commentary* magazine.14 One Congressional aide estimated that between 10 and 30 such groups were involved with the 1985-1986 decision to give aid to Jonas Savimbi’s UNITA guerrillas.15

Additionally, an ethnic lobby, represented by the Cuban American National Foundation, was to play a vital role in the debate over Angola. This group’s emphasis was on Cuban policies and expansion in the world. Although this ethnic group was exclusively concentrated in the state of Florida, it was nonetheless influential in key Congressional districts. Congressman Claude Pepper (D-Fla.), chairman of the House Rules Committee, had a district of approximately 40% Cuban-Americans, while Sep. Dante Fascell (D-Fla.), chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, had a 25-30% Cuban-American constituency.

All these anticommmunist pressure groups had a common purpose: to see that U.S. policy would tilt heavily to the right in supporting the apartheid regime in South Africa and the Republic’s ally in Angola, UNITA. By mobilizing money and public opinion, these anticommmunist groups could, they hoped, reverse the Marxist gains in southern Africa. The Carter Administration had represented a low point in southern Africa, with Rhodesia and Mozambique moving into the Marxist camp and an unprecedented decline of American influence in the region. With Reagan’s accession to the presidency, South Africa and its American allies would vigorously work to reverse those gains and to cement a working relationship between the two countries in rolling back Marxist influence in the region.

### 3.2.2 Support for Right-Wing States

According to Jeanne Kirkpatrick, one of the primary threats facing the West was the failure of its own leaders to stand by autocratic, pro-Western allies. Writing in the neoconservative publication *Commentary* in 1977, Professor Kirkpatrick outlined the situation that threatened American interests in places like southern Africa:

The pattern is familiar enough: an established autocracy with a record of friendship with the U.S. is attacked by insurgents, some of whose leaders have long ties to the Communist movement, and most of whose
arms are of Soviet, Chinese, or Czechoslovak origin. The “Marxist” presence is ignored and/or minimized by American officials and by the elite media on the ground that U.S. support for the dictator gives the rebels little choice but to seek aid “elsewhere.” Violence spreads and American officials wonder aloud about the viability of a regime that “lacks the support of its own people.” The absence of an opposition party is deplored and civil-rights violations are reviewed. Liberal columnists question the morality of continuing aid to a “rightist dictatorship” and provide assurances concerning the essential moderation of some insurgent leaders who “hope” for some sign that the U.S. will remember its own revolutionary origins. Requests for help from the beleaguered autocrat go unheeded, and the argument is increasingly voiced that ties should be established with rebel leaders “before it is too late.” The President, delaying U.S. aid, appoints a special emissary who confirms the deterioration of the government position and its diminished capacity to control the situation and recommends various measures for “strengthening” and “liberalizing” the regime, all of which involve diluting its power.

The emissary’s recommendations are presented in the context of a growing clamor for American disengagement on grounds that continued involvement confirms our status as an agent of imperialism, racism, and reaction; is inconsistent with support for human rights; alienates us from the “forces of democracy”; and threatens to put the U.S. once more on the side of history’s “losers.” This chorus is supplemented daily by interviews with returning missionaries and “reasonable” rebels.

As the situation worsens, the President assures the world that the U.S. desires only that the “people choose their own form of government”; he blocks delivery of all arms to the government and undertakes negotiations to establish a “broadly based” coalition headed by a “moderate” critic of the regime who, once elevated, will move quickly to seek a “political” settlement to the conflict. Should the incumbent autocrat prove resistant to American demands that he step aside, he will be readily overwhelmed by the military strength of his opponents, whose patrons will have continued to provide sophisticated arms and advisers at the same time the U.S. cuts off military sales. Should the incumbent be so demoralized as to agree to yield power, he will be replaced by a “moderate” of American selection. Only after the insurgents have refused the proffered political solution and anarchy has spread throughout the nation will it be noticed that the new head of government has no significant following, no experience at governing, and no talent for leadership. By then, military commanders, no longer bound by loyalty to the chief of state, will depose the faltering “moderate” in favor of a fanatic of their own choosing.

In either case, the U.S. will have been led by its own misunderstanding of the situation to assist actively in deposing an erstwhile friend and ally and installing a government hostile to American interests and policies in the world. At best we will have lost access to friendly territory. At worst
the Soviets will have gained a new base. And everywhere our friends will have noted that the U.S. can not be counted on in times of difficulty and our enemies will have observed that American support provides no security against the forward march of history.  

Kirkpatrick and her allies in South Africa would not have to concern themselves with such an outcome during the Reagan years. During a television interview on March 3, 1981, for instance, Reagan had expressed sympathy for the South Africans in a manner that called into question just how close the new U.S. policy toward the Republic was to be. Paralleling frequent South African arguments, Reagan had asked “Can we abandon a country that has stood beside us in every war we have fought? A country that, strategically, is essential to the free world in its production of minerals that we all must have?” As long as the South African government continued to make “a sincere and honest effort” to solve its racial problems, Reagan felt, the United States should help in every way possible. The South Africans were ecstatic. Under a headline entitled “US Will Not Leave South Africa in the Lurch,” Die Vaderland praised the new US “policy”: “Not only is it virtually the opposite of that adopted by the Carter Government, but it is even more friendly than the policy of Richard Nixon.”

In a manner that must have greatly pleased the apartheid regime, the Reagan Administration denied the African National Congress was a legitimate alternative to the Nationalist Party because “any group that is supported by the Soviet Union does not have freedom as one of its objectives.” Reagan himself made his feelings known when he referred to the ANC as “Soviet guerillas” and stated that the government of South Africa “was under no obligation to negotiate the future of the country with any organization that proclaims a goal of creating a communist state and uses terrorist tactics and violence to achieve it.” Republican Representative Dan Burton was just as explicit, declaring that:

For roughly a year at black political gatherings it has been a custom to pay some kind of homage to Marxism for which any support is perceived as a challenge by the white authorities. Sometimes it is then furling of a Soviet flag that makes the tribute. Other times demonstrators chant slogans lauding the formal alliance between the outlawed African National Congress and the banned South African Communist Party. This is done on a regular basis. And they point out in very vivid terms that the ANC and the South African Communist Party are very closely affiliated with one another... Some 19 of the 30 members of the executive committee of the African National Congress are known communists, and
we believe as many as 25 . . . committee would not support an organization allied with Nazis or fascists, and I do not think we should lend legitimacy to a group allied with people who are equally anti-democratic and anti-American.22

The denial of the ANC as an alternative to the apartheid regime was a given in the containment militarist policies such as the Reagan Doctrine, which were predicated on a particular set of beliefs about Soviet actions: that the USSR was an inherently expansionist power with global ambitions; that it was likely to be an instigator or at least a supporter of instability in the developing world; and that the language it understood best was power, not accommodation. Soviet-American relations were seen as a zero-sum contest, in which peripheral conflicts had major implications because of their impact on perceptions of the relative strengths of the superpowers. Such beliefs gave policy makers ideological guidelines for evaluating events and making decisions and were crucial in dealing with ambiguous events such as political instability in southern Africa.23

The problem arose when the Reagan Administration refused to acknowledge any evidence that there may have been alternative explanations for events. When policy makers remained rigidly committed to one conception of how the world worked, policy based on these beliefs became inconsistent with reality. Southern Africa was a case in point. Even “Marxist” states like Angola and Mozambique remained economically unaligned with the Soviet Union and refused a request for a “much sought after naval base.”24 Despite this fact, southern Africa would remain central to the architects of the Reagan Doctrine, even as the CIA challenged that assumption when it admitted that the region was “largely peripheral” to the Soviet Union’s strategic ambitions.25

Reagan Doctrine advocates showed a similar ideological inflexibility in their response to the overthrow of right-wing governments in the Philippines and Haiti in 1986. These events challenged a basic premise of the Reagan Doctrine: that right-wing, anticommunist regimes were less oppressive and less of a threat to the international order than Marxist governments.26 Reagan, however, believed that Marxist dictatorships were a greater threat to peace because internal oppression often leads to external belligerence. This was no abstraction, but an operating principal in the administration’s foreign policy. Chester Crocker was rebuked for his tacit support for majority rule in South Africa, and Shultz stated shortly afterward that there were many models for transition from authoritarian rule to democracy, but no peaceful way to
democratize a Marxist regime. The authoritarian-totalitarian rule remained as an essential criterion for how to deal with Cold War relationships. Called by some critics “ballots for the right, bullets for the left,” the information that fit the Reagan Doctrine’s ideological view—democracy spreading in the developing world—was included; that which did not—the fact that right-wing regimes were often illegitimate and diplomatic liabilities—apparently was not taken into consideration.

3.2.3 War by Proxy

The Reagan Administration had a spectrum of possible methods by which to counter the expansion of Soviet influence, ranging from diplomatic overtures and foreign aid at one end of the spectrum to military action at the other. Options between these extremes included many possible combinations of incentives to change behaviour, beginning with diplomatic pressure and escalating to political and/or economic sanctions; covert actions, from propaganda to full-scale guerrilla warfare; and overt military threats, posed through either words or demonstrations of force.

Several factors placed important constraints on where and how the administration could realistically hope to implement the Reagan Doctrine. American public opinion was foremost. From the Nixon Doctrine’s assignment of containment responsibility to regional surrogates, through Carter’s reassertion of American interests abroad in his pledge to repel aggression in the Persian Gulf, to the Reagan Doctrine’s support for rebellions against leftist governments, containment policy reflected the indelible impact of Vietnam on the American public’s attitude toward foreign commitments. Each program delegated the primary burden of containment to allied governments. Although the Reagan Administration had sought to exorcise Vietnam syndrome from the national outlook, public support for military actions abroad remained limited to quick, decisive, low-cost initiatives, and voters were wary of situations that seemed to require long-term commitments for uncertain ends. This point was clearly demonstrated by the generally positive public response to the 1983 American “liberation” of Grenada and simultaneous criticism of the deployment of U.S. Marines in Lebanon. In one analyst’s words, Americans “want to stop the spread of communism, but only from a safe distance offshore, without getting involved in other countries’ problems.”

In southern Africa, this responsibility would fall to South Africa and UNITA as the region was represented a question of America’s national will to stand up to Soviet
oppression and a geopolitical and moral necessity. For example, Representative Jack Keep (R-NY) contended, “We Americans have not the right to sit on our hands while soldiers from Cuba and commanders from the USSR crush the aspirations of 5 million African blacks.”29 Aid to MNR guerrillas in Mozambique was described, less successfully, in similar terms.30 Hence, the Reagan Doctrine adjusted but maintained the division of labour that marked post-Vietnam containment policy. This factor would prove critical in linking the geopolitical aims of the Total National Strategy with the Reagan Doctrine.

3.3 Constructive Engagement

In the first term of the Reagan Administration, policy toward southern Africa was crafted and implemented by the African Affairs Bureau of the State Department (AF), under the lead of Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, Chester Crocker. Constructive Engagement, as the policy was labelled, made a complex and delicate public argument that American concerns could all be pursued and satisfied simultaneously. The fragile domestic agreement or, at least, the wait-and-see attitude that the policy initially enjoyed among the few interested policy makers rested on a series of risky and uncertain propositions—that South Africa would undertake internal reforms that could provide political cover for the administration but did not go so far as to threaten the rule of the National Party, that a solution to Namibian independence (including Cuban troop withdrawal) could be worked out on terms favourable to the United States, and that Soviet influence could be eliminated from the region using the combined power of South African military force and American diplomacy.

Chester Crocker came back to head AF after serving on the Reagan transition team that reviewed Africa policy. During the Nixon Administration, he had served on the National Security Council staff when NSSM 39 was implemented, and some critics attributed him with having an important role in its execution.31 Thereafter, he had been Director of African Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies at Georgetown University and had chaired the Africa Subcommittee of the Republican National Committee’s foreign policy study group.

Like other policies before it, Constructive Engagement needed to convey to American and international audiences that the United States considered apartheid repugnant. In diplomatic fashion, Crocker expressed this sentiment in articulating U.S. goals related to the Republic: “the emergence in South Africa of a society with which
the United States can pursue its varied interests in a full and friendly relationship without constraint, embarrassment, or political damage.” Pursuing American interests without embarrassment required that South Africa change in certain directions. Most importantly, South Africa needed to begin a “process” that would end racial segregation and encourage a new political dispensation that included black South Africans. In addition, American attitudes on “democracy, pluralism . . . a strong market economy required that the process of this change be evolutionary rather than cataclysmic.” The administration, however, did not advocate any specific outcomes, preferring to leave the reform process in the hands of the Botha Administration. As Crocker would tell the United States Senate, “We do not aim to impose ourselves, our solutions, or our favorites in South Africa; such an intrusion would be unwarranted and unwise for an outside party.”

There were, of course, many voices of dissent in the State Department and a public uproar from the anti-apartheid lobby concerning this policy, which would reduce official criticism of South Africa’s racist policies and seek to improve relations between Washington and Pretoria. However, the Reagan Administration argued that, even though it found apartheid repugnant, it could still pursue positive relations with a government committed to racial reform. When and how that racial reform would proceed would remain a matter for the white South African leadership to decide.

Some of the domestic controversy that eventually unravelled Constructive Engagement was apparent before Crocker was even in place as Assistant Secretary. Sen. Jesse Helms(R-NC), dean of Congress’ ideological anticommunists, delayed Crocker’s confirmation until April of 1981. Helms expressed concern about Crocker’s more realist approach to superpower competition, questioning whether Crocker would see issues “through Nigerian eyes rather than American.” The ideological right’s influence was further evident in the composition of the transition team that included, in addition to Crocker, a Helms staffer; Helms’s choice for the Assistant Secretary slot, John Carbaugh; and. Marion Smoak, a lobbyist for the South Africa-imposed and -supported Democratic Turnhalle Alliance regime in Namibia.

After his confirmation process finally concluded, Assistant Secretary Crocker found himself in an unusual position in several respects. First, he already had publicly articulated his views on what U.S. policy should be in a number of articles and publications. In addition, he had a remarkable amount of autonomy in formulating and implementing these ideas.
Foremost, Crocker stressed that American opposition to Soviet or Cuban expansion needed to receive more emphasis than it had under the Carter Administration. Crocker wrote, “While a reflexive response by the West is not called for, there are no grounds for complacency about the impact of Soviet-Cuban military intervention in Africa.” American strategic concerns needed sufficient consideration in a region “where important Western economic, resource, and strategic interests are exposed.” However, Crocker’s approach to East-West issues was squarely in the realist school of anticommunism. He stressed the need in U.S. policy for sophistication and intimate local understanding: “A serious policy will restrain our tendency to stereotype local factions and will thereby broaden our options to conduct a flexible policy.”

Crocker identified American strategic interests with a resolution of the military conflicts that had consumed the region. Heightened conflict increased opportunities for the Soviets to expand their involvement; peaceful economic development gave the United States the edge in superpower competition in the region. “Far from resolving conflict or meeting regional development needs,” Crocker wrote, “Moscow and its allies profit from keeping the pot boiling.” In his estimation, American policy could best ease the tense border conflicts in the region—in Namibia, in Angola, in Mozambique—by reducing communist influence in the region.

This regional demilitarization had the additional benefit of contributing to another set of fundamental American concerns, the ending of the Republic’s draconian racial system. Peace along South Africa’s borders would presumably make it easier for the apartheid regime to consider meaningful internal reforms. Crocker told a Senate subcommittee, “We strongly doubt that serious internal reform is likely in a climate of constant fighting with adversaries along South Africa’s borders,” and “The quest for security and the imperative of change are dependent upon one another.”

Constructive Engagement also argued for the free extension and expansion of commerce. The policy argument for economic activity dovetailed nicely with other guiding concerns and assumptions. Western investment would help to foster change in South Africa. “Capitalism and apartheid cannot coexist. We believe that capitalism will help to bring about the end of apartheid through a process of peaceful, evolutionary change based on adequate economic growth,” Deputy Assistant Secretary Wisner told a Congressional committee. Constructive Engagement was “totally opposed” to economic sanctions: they would damage American economic interests, “sabotage”
needed job opportunities for blacks in South Africa, remove the “positive force for change” of the Sullivan codes, and “produce disastrous consequences” for the states surrounding South Africa. The policy also encouraged American economic aid and investment in such “Marxist” countries surrounding South Africa as Mozambique and Zimbabwe.

Constructive Engagement’s ideological foundation was based in the assumption that, while black politics was growing increasingly important, control over the pace and substance of political change lay squarely with the white minority in South Africa, particularly the Afrikaners. In his 1980 *Foreign Affairs* article, Crocker contended, “It is fatuous to argue that whites have already lost the initiative within South Africa.” Thus, U.S. policy needed most importantly to work with the internal dynamics of white politics while building black political and economic capabilities for the future. Thus, Constructive Engagement stressed “white-led change in the direction of real power-sharing.”

If white politics were the relevant arena, policy tactics would need to be tailored to the peculiar characteristics of South African white, most importantly Afrikaner, politics. Constructive Engagement urged a “tone of empathy” not only for black suffering “but also for the awesome political dilemma in which Afrikaners and other whites find themselves.” American tactics had to be sensitive to the “cult of Afrikaner unity” and siege mentality. This sensitivity meant praising white attempts at reform as well as criticizing elements of apartheid. While pressure could be useful in strengthening reformist tendencies in South Africa, “publicly expressed encouragement and support of positive steps [was] another important tool of policy.” The process, in the words of one analyst, took “the form of reliance upon stability and constructive change generated by the white political leadership in South Africa to create a more harmonious policy, one that will protect important U. S. interests in the region.” For the Reagan Administration, political liberalization in South Africa would remain a distant objective, the details and mechanics of which would be left to the white leadership of that country.

Crocker believed that the key to this change was not to be found within the Republic, but in the dynamics of southern Africa. Much like Botha’s vision of a constellation of states, Crocker’s writings suggested that the U.S. focus should be on the creation of a southern Africa economic alliance with South Africa assuming the leadership role. In his estimation, the United States had to be “as pragmatic as the
politically diverse states of the region” in accepting South African economic linkages with the region as a whole. Moreover, the United States should “where possible . . . try to build on and strengthen linkages between them on conditions they are prepared to accept.” These links represented “more than a past history of colonial convenience and domination by white-ruled South Africa; they also signify a basis for the survival and future development of highly vulnerable economies.”52 While this did not mean that the United States should encourage the “satellitization” of southern African black states to Pretoria, it was a recognition that “the region’s substantial potential rested on such integration and on rational economic policies.”53 These notions of a southern economic alliance were essentially the same as those envisioned by P. W. Botha.54

More importantly perhaps, there would be virtually no daylight between Botha and Crocker on the Namibia-Southwest Africa and the Angola issues. These matters were in Crocker’s estimation “closely intertwined” and could not be easily disentangled. Although Crocker never precisely outlined how these issues should be resolved, he stated that, “the ultimate goal should be to reduce or eliminate the communist combat presence in southern Africa and to bring about a political compromise acceptable to all major political forces in Angola.”55 This change could be accomplished, in large measure, by recognizing the importance of UNITA in the process and by “maintaining the pressure for a departure of communist combat forces.”56 In the case of Namibia, it would be in American interests to move that country towards independence. Though Crocker saw the South African notion of an “internal settlement” as unworkable, he believed it critical to “allay Pretoria’s concern” about the role of the U.N. in the process and to accept as inevitable that any solution would collapse “unless or until Pretoria gains confidence that it can live with the outcome of a transition that it does not control unilaterally.”57 He also believed it critical for the US to “retain its flexibility about the modalities of an international settlement for Namibia.”58 Essentially, he was arguing that the U.N. framework for independence would only serve as a loose blueprint, with the United States providing alternative solutions when necessary to move the process forward.

These ideas would have enormous consequences for the region after Crocker’s appointment as Assistant Secretary. Regional policies would be oriented around South Africa, with alliance and economic linkages cultivated by the Reagan Administration vigorously pursuing “treaties” of nonaggression between the Republic and its neighbours. At various points, the United States would play a pivotal role in seeking
separate accords between South Africa and Mozambique, Angola, and Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland. For Crocker, it would be necessary to eliminate ANC cross-border incursions into the Republic from these countries before any meaningful progress could be made on internal reform in South Africa. Perhaps more importantly, the establishment of non-aggression agreements between South Africa and its black neighbours would deprive the Soviets and Cubans of a southern African base of operations.59

Indeed, Chester Crocker believed that it was critical for the United States to remove Cuba from southern Africa, a notion shared by Ronald Reagan and his conservative allies. Like the communist presence in Nicaragua and Soviet presence in Afghanistan, it would become a priority of the Reagan Administration to see the Marxist forces rolled back from southern Africa. UNITA would prove critical in advancing that goal. Crocker believed that Jonas Savimbi’s guerrilla organization enjoyed a high level of “popular and indigenous support.” He also thought that UNITA strength could be leveraged to push the Cubans from Angola. That notion would become the crux of the Reagan Administration’s efforts to link U.S. recognition, “explicitly, to Cuban withdrawal, and implicitly, to a reconciliation between the MPLA and UNITA.”60

Crocker, however, had few illusions about how difficult this linkage would be. Force or, at least, the threat of force would be necessary to push the MPLA to evict the Cubans from Angola. Therefore, it would be essential for the Reagan Administration to see that the Clark Amendment was overturned and covert assistance begin to the UNITA guerrillas. Using proxies like the South Africans and UNITA, the United States could secure its own interests and set back Soviet regional ambitions. Once communist influences were removed from southern Africa, the issue of racial reconciliation in South Africa could begin in earnest, or so Crocker said. In Crocker’s estimation, “The American stance must be firmly supportive of a regional climate conducive to compromise and accommodation in the face of concerted attempts to discredit evolutionary change and to exploit the inevitable ambiguity and periodic ‘incidents’ that will accompany political liberalization.”61 For Crocker, the major shortcoming with the Carter approach—and that advocated by critics in the U.S. Congress—was the fixation with the final disposition of the Republic, rather than the process itself.62 A viable and lasting solution that was attained with regional agreements with South Africa and its black neighbours—agreements that ensured the permanent removal of
Soviet influence from southern Africa—were the outcomes the United States should focus on.  

Crocker had expressed a belief that the coalition that had come to dominate P. W. Botha’s government believed in movement—though perhaps limited in scope—toward political reform in the Republic; in his words, “The long-delayed prospects for political change have opened up.” Moreover, Crocker was optimistic that Washington could help promote such change by adopting a strategy that coupled quiet but concerted diplomatic pressure with a program of incentives and rewards for movement in the right direction. However, Crocker clarified, “Since the power to coerce Pretoria is not in American hands, the limited influence available should be carefully husbanded for specific application to concrete issues of change.” Crocker cautioned that instead of impatiently demanding full political rights, it would be more realistic and productive for United States to encourage “the process of getting there.” He contended, “The argument that the West can only support power sharing preceded by a full-blown national convention keeps us immobilized by a distant objective.”

Nevertheless, Crocker insisted that the long-awaited process of reform would never develop if Pretoria failed to receive the active engagement of an understanding American administration to “strengthen the hand of official modernizers and other agents of change” and to provide positive incentives needed to push the process forward. Consequently, U.S. policy makers must be willing to “normalize” the relationship with South Africa and publicly applaud Pretoria’s reform process as it opened up opportunities for black participation. Crocker made it clear that punitive measures were not part of the strategy when he stated: “Constructive Engagement does not mean waging economic warfare against the Republic; nor does it mean erecting foolish pinpricks that only erode the American position in South African and world markets.”

Constructive Engagement’s fate, however, was made insecure by the danger or even the probability of offending powerful forces in the United States. Crocker recognized this risk before embarking on the policy. In an article entitled “The U.S. Policy Process and South Africa,” he wrote:

Once African issues are taken from the Africanists because of pressures from outside the policy maker community, the political extremes seize the initiative. The twin poles of East-West theology and black-white theology take over the African debate at this point.
This debate, Crocker further contended, had dire consequences:

The net result, given our system of government, will be nasty debate followed by compromise, inconsistencies, public-relations posturing, and, at times, a paralysis of policy. The United States, in sum, may be destined by its own complexity to be an ineffective actor in southern Africa. Or to put it more accurately, the U.S. government may be so destined by the nature of American society and politics.  

Crocker took a very condescending view of the intentions and tactics of domestic forces that might oppose his policy. He warned against the “deliberate obfuscation” of anti-apartheid activists who “trade on the currency of crisis and polarization.” Although he did not dwell on it in this article, the potential opposition to Constructive Engagement from ideological anticommunists also posed a challenge to the policy, as Crocker’s own confirmation saga made evident. The only domestic allies outside the State Department that Constructive Engagement could expect were in the business community.

The same article also argued that domestic politics made it likely that Congress would become involved in making the policy, with dire consequences. Crocker, critical of opponents of his policy to the point of scorn, thought such involvement was disastrous for coherent, sophisticated debate and policy. Citing “structural and leadership weakness in the legislative branch,” Crocker claimed that Congress could only paralyze government action because it was “not equipped to lead in any direction or even to help shape the national debate on key public policy issues except by distorting and oversimplifying them.” With congressional involvement, “further domestication of foreign policy toward Africa” was likely, with the end result being that policy would be “a sloppy compromise.” In the article, Crocker added, “A sophisticated policy can be expected only when the Congress is not heavily involved in it.” Crocker, however, knew better than anyone that, in the absence of positive results, Constructive Engagement could be undone by domestic criticisms.

While Crocker would pitch Constructive Engagement as a policy largely directed at the internal dynamics of South Africa, in reality, it should be seen as a regional policy through which American and South African interests converged. Al Haig made this aim clear when he sent a secret memorandum to President Reagan stating that his meetings with the South African Foreign Minister were a success:
In our meetings with Pik Botha, I believe we accomplished our major objective – to establish a new relationship with South Africa based on a realistic appraisal of our mutual interests in the Southern African region. The capstone was your meeting with the Foreign Minister, which had major symbolic and substantive overtones and reflected the frank and friendly tone in our discussions throughout the visit. We have effectively ended the unproductive ostracism of recent years... The South Africans now have a sure sense of where we are coming from in strategic terms. They know that we are determined to roll back Soviet influence throughout the world and in their region. They understand our determination to get the Cubans out of Angola and that we will not allow UNITA to be sacrificed (original emphasis).

Though Haig would acknowledge that American credibility in southern Africa “hinges on continued South African Government progress on the home front,” the detailed list of goals in the region did not include the aspirations of the black majority in South or southern Africa. Indeed, the South Africans asked for “firm assurances that the agreement will not simply lead to a ‘one-man, one-vote, one-time’ outcome” in Namibia. Haig’s response was simply: “We agree.” He added:

To complete the picture, we have publicly endorsed a stance of “constructive engagement” toward the Republic. We have tabled forthcoming proposals on consular matters, restoring our military attached link, and Coast Guard training for South African sea and air rescue personnel. On the nuclear matter, we will seek relief for the South African Government...73

According to Crocker, “Haig wanted the Soviets and their surrogates to know that this was a new era. We did not intend that pro-Western states like South Africa to be written off as fair game for Moscow, Havana, Luanda, and their SWAPO guerrilla allies.”74 This was not Haig side-stepping Crocker in his dealings with the South Africans. Indeed, Crocker advised Haig that the administration saw:

a new era of cooperation, stability and security in the region. We also share their view that the chief threat to the realization of this hope is the presence and influence in the region of the Soviet Union and its allies.75

Though Crocker would attempt to present his policy as reforming the political system of South Africa, these documents leave little doubt that strategic interests and the zero-sum calculus of the Cold War were the primary drivers of Constructive Engagement. In fact, when asked if he believed that the Total National Strategy and Constructive Engagement served as mutually reinforcing policies, Chester Crocker said, “sometime it was, other times not so much... they could be compatible if the South Africans were
cooperative.” Ultimately, he believed American-South African cooperation in the region would help push back communist influence and expose “the bankruptcy of Soviet militarism in the region.” Crocker believed the time was right for just such cooperation because the Soviets were a “stale and uncreative geritocracy” that was becoming increasingly “marginalized in Africa.” Though he conceded the Soviets were “dinosaurs with big muscles” and were willing to “fight hard” to protect their “sunk costs in Ethiopia and Mozambique,” he thought it was time to pursue a more aggressive anticommunist strategy in the region. The tightrope Crocker would have to walk was between achieving the primary goal of reducing communism in the region while engaging South “in a full and friendly relationship without constraint, embarrassment, or political damage.” Time was not, however, on Crocker’s side. The Secretary knew that the Total National Strategy needed to show positive results promptly, both in the region and within the Republic, before domestic forces in the United States mobilized against South Africa.

3.4 United States-South African Rapprochement, 1981-1986

With the transition to the Reagan Administration, the United States relaxed both its rhetoric and concrete restrictions toward Pretoria. In the summer of 1981, for instance, the Reagan Administration moved to re-establish military attaché ties between the United States and Pretoria, to allow South African Coast Guard personnel to participate in American training programs, and to permit the South African consulates to have honorary personnel assigned to the United States in Phoenix and Pittsburgh. These moves were integral to Crocker’s plan to support and encourage cooperation and trust between the two countries in the early days of the Reagan Administration. Crocker stressed that American opposition to Soviet-Communist expansion needed to receive more emphasis than it had under the Carter Administration. Crocker wrote, “While a reflexive response by the West is not called for, there are no grounds for complacency about the impact of Soviet-Cuban military intervention in Africa.” American strategic concerns needed sufficient consideration in a region “where important Western economic, resource, and strategic interests are exposed.”

Crocker linked American strategic interests with a resolution of the military conflicts plaguing southern Africa. Heightened conflict increased opportunities for the Soviets to expand their involvement, but peaceful economic development gave the United States the advantage in southern Africa. “Far from resolving conflict or meeting
regional development needs,” Crocker wrote, “Moscow and its allies profit from keeping the pot boiling.” American policies could best combat communism by easing the tense border conflicts in the region—in Namibia, in Angola, in Mozambique. If American demands were rejected, Crocker warned: “it was important for Luanda, SWAPO, and their Soviet and Cuban backers to know that it was a new situation after 1981. If they obstructed our settlement terms, the price and the pain would grow. South African power was one of the anvils of our diplomacy.”

Given Crocker’s admission, it is difficult not to conclude that the Reagan Administration’s policy of Constructive Engagement was relying on the South Africans Total National Strategy to roll back communist influence in the region. Indeed, when asked specifically if the South African Defence Force would serve as the military “anvil” to American diplomacy in the region, Chester Crocker answered, “we never had any intention of putting troops in the ground, so it speaks for itself.”

Though Crocker conceded that “the anvil was difficult . . . and often undercut us because of suspicion,” it seems clear that the South Africans understood that the Reagan Administration wanted a “new era of cooperation, stability and security in the region” based on their agreement with the administration that the “chief threat to the realization of this hope is the presence and influence in the region of the Soviet Union and its allies.” The fact there was only one act of destabilization directed at South Africa’s neighbours during the Carter Administration and dozens against the FLS during the Reagan Administration, should have suggested to Crocker that the chief threat to “new era of cooperation, stability and security in the region” might actually be the South African destabilization campaign and the administration’s support might be compounding the problem. In fact, Secretary Crocker was perfectly aware there was a correlation between South Africa’s regional military campaign and American diplomatic initiatives in the region. As Crocker would bluntly admit, if Constructive Engagement’s “settlement terms” were rejected by the FLS, “the price and the pain would grow” Since the United States had few effective measures to punish the states of southern Africa the “SADF and UNITA would have a key role to play in wearing down resistance on the other side.”

3.4.1 Military Cooperation

During the Reagan Administration, military cooperation between the United States and South Africa took a new turn on several fronts. Five high-ranking South
African military officials visited the United States in March 1981, breaking an 18-year-old U.S. ban on officer-level meetings between the two countries. The State Department, in order to avoid criticism, distanced itself from the visit and announced that these officers had obtained U.S. visas by falsely identifying themselves as civilians to American visa officers in South Africa. The Department also denied having held any talks with the South African military officials. However, the press soon learned that the visitors had actually met with key officials from the National Security Council and the Pentagon’s Defence Intelligence Agency, as well as with the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Jeane Kirkpatrick.90

The administration later admitted this fact, but it maintained that Kirkpatrick had been “unaware of the identity of the gentlemen.”91 However, despite the administration’s argument that it had been tricked into granting the visas, a State Department memorandum indicated that there was, indeed, great interest within the administration in receiving such visits. This interest was reflected in a memorandum from the State Department responding to a request by a private right-wing lobbying group, the American Security Council, which sought to invite top South African military officials to brief the Council on the situation in South Africa.92

The memorandum correctly points out that a long-standing policy of the United States (revived and reaffirmed by President Carter) forbade meetings between military officers of the two countries. However, without necessarily confirming that the Reagan Administration would change the policy, the memo concluded on a very promising note, assuring General Robert C. Richardson of the American Security Council that “his views would receive a prompt response from the State Department.”93

It is not possible on the strength of the administration’s response to the American Security Council to say that the Reagan Administration did change this policy. However, judging from official visits made by South African military officials and the exchange of military attachés between Washington and Pretoria shortly after Reagan’s ascendance to the Presidency, one can make the claim that, indeed, the policy was changed to allow the development of a military relationship between the two countries. In defence of the reinstitution of military attaché ties, Crocker stated: “We do not believe that by sending attachés there or by having them here, that we are doing South Africa a favor.”94 Rather, by fulfilling a basic intelligence function as liaisons with members of the South African military, American military attachés were providing “proper coverage . . . of our interests in South Africa.”95
On June 10-11, 1981, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State, William Clark, held talks with South African Defence Minister, Magnus Malan, and in August, several South African military personnel were sent for training at the U.S. Coast Guard station at Governor’s Island, New York. Again, on October 13, South African police and military officials were granted visas by the State Department and allowed into the United States on “a working visit.” Naval attachés were exchanged between the two countries in early December.96

The Coast Guard issue was pitched as an essential function of American interests. Because the “crucial waters around the southern tip of Africa,” were important to the United States, it made sense to see that they were properly defended.97 The addition of consulates in Pittsburgh and Phoenix were said to serve American interests because they helped facilitate trade, travel, and commerce between the United States and the Republic. Every effort was made to tie these steps to American interests and make it clear to the South Africans that the administration saw its own interests in the region as closely linked with those of the Republic.98

Nowhere was the U.S. partnership with South Africa more clearly demonstrated than in U.S. arms supplies to Pretoria. As outlined in Chapter 2, U.S. administrations had a tendency to use their support and endorsement of an arms embargo against South Africa as a manifestation of their opposition to apartheid. On the surface, the embargo constituted a significant step toward reducing apartheid’s military threat in southern Africa. However, despite the embargo, South Africa never failed to acquire substantial military supplies from the United States and other Western countries.99

U.S. businesses also began to export non-military goods—including food, industrial chemicals, computers, and surveillance aircraft—to the South African police and military.100 One particularly controversial sale, attributed to an error, involved 2,500 high voltage cattle prods exported after clearance by the Commerce Department.

Although the sale of some computer equipment and hardware to the South Africans had continued throughout the Carter Administration, the selling of more advanced technology had generally been restricted on the grounds it could used for non-civilian purposes by the Republic.101 That practice would change in 1982, when the Reagan Administration approved the sale of the Cyber 170/750 computer to the South African’s Center for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR). As the most advanced computer manufactured in the world, it was believed that the technology could be used by South Africa’s intelligence services. More importantly, the
computer’s capacity to break encryption codes and model nuclear explosions had the potential to add to the Republic’s nuclear capabilities.\textsuperscript{102}

The decision to sell military equipment to the Republic was dictated in large part by the Reagan Administration’s strong emphasis on South Africa’s strategic importance, which favoured proponents of continued military cooperation with South Africa within the national security bureaucracies. Peter Schraeder, for example, maintained that the administration’s efforts to bolster United States-South African military cooperation were supported by bureaucracies such as the CIA and the Pentagon:

whose organizational missions looked upon the staunchly anti-communist Afrikaner government as a natural ally. . . . Sharing the CIA’s concern over the growing levels of Soviet involvement in southern Africa, the Defence Department favored any policy that rationalized growing levels of U.S.-South African military cooperation.\textsuperscript{103}

It was clear that arming South Africa would neither promote nor encourage regional stability, which the United States had proclaimed to be its goal in southern Africa in the postwar period. Rather, these weapons were intended to be and were used to preclude any further Soviet gains in southern Africa.\textsuperscript{104}

President Reagan was not solely responsible for arming South Africa. As discussed in Chapter 2, the military partnership with Pretoria existed under every U.S. administration since World War II, including the Kennedy and Carter Administrations, with the latter’s policy rhetoric raising high expectations among black South Africans and the growing anti-apartheid movement throughout the region that Pretoria’s friendship with Washington was over. Reagan, however, contributed more than any other U.S. President before and after him to South Africa’s determination to suppress the liberation struggles of the black majority and to destabilize neighbouring governments that supported that struggle.

A clear testament to Reagan’s approval of these incursions came in September 1982, when CIA director William Casey informed P. W. Botha that the administration wanted destabilization to continue until the ANC was effectively removed from the FLS.\textsuperscript{105} Because of Casey’s history of sidestepping proper channels, it could be argued that that the director’s comments to Botha were not official policy.\textsuperscript{106} When Chester Crocker was asked if Casey had told the South Africans that the United States approved
of the removal of the ANC from the FLS, he responded, “I have no idea what he told them. . . . He might have told them one thing at breakfast but after a few drinks at dinner, who knows what he told them?” He added that Casey had “a history of going off the reservation” because he “always wanted to be wanted to be Secretary of State” and often attempted to “conduct foreign policy from the CIA.”

There is, however, considerable evidence that the elimination of the ANC from the FLS was indeed part of Constructive Engagement’s principal objectives. To achieve this goal, among others, the administration would engage the Republic in a “new era of cooperation” based on the shared view that “the chief threat . . . is the presence and influence in the region of the Soviet Union and its allies.” Like P.W. Botha, President Reagan considered the ANC among those allies and would rely on the Total National Strategy to reduce the threat the organization posed to American geopolitical objectives.

3.4.2 Nuclear Cooperation

The Reagan Administration also revived nuclear collaboration with South Africa, despite growing international fears that Pretoria might have been using its supply of nuclear material from the United States and other Western countries (France and West Germany) to make its own nuclear bomb. As soon as Reagan took office, American nuclear assistance to South Africa was reactivated. In his meetings with Foreign Minister Pik Botha, Alexander Haig assured the South Africans that “we will seek relief for the South African Government on their Department of Energy Contract and will make a best effort on fuel supply for their reactors within our legal and legislative constraints.” At the meeting Pik Botha explicitly brought up the question of the supply of fuel elements to Koeberg. When Haig “nearly lost his temper” and interjected that the subject had not been cleared with him, Botha reported:

Reagan overruled him, and asked me directly, ‘Are you producing a bomb?’ I replied, ‘Mr President, we have the capacity to do so. But I commit my Government in assuring you that we will never test such a device without first consulting the US government’. Reagan’s response was, ‘That sounds fair.’ Haig again objected, ‘We cannot be associated with this at all.’ I appealed to Reagan, ‘Mr President, I believe the Soviet Union also believes we are in the process and have the capacity. And this suspicion may act as a deterrent not to go too far in fomenting unrest in Southern Africa. And we believe that is a deterrent.’
After Botha’s visit, Reagan authorized exports of nuclear material, computers, and other high technology items and also invited South African nuclear experts to visit a gaseous diffusion plant in Piketon, Ohio. As a State Department draft paper clearly pointed out, “the United States placed a high priority on the resumption of nuclear cooperation with South Africa.”

The administration’s decision, it seems, was made largely in pursuit of America’s geopolitical and economic objectives to face the challenge of the Soviet threat and to cash in on the sales of being a major supplier for South Africa’s nuclear fuel needs. The Reagan Administration encouraged the South Africans to sign contracts with American companies for its fuel requirements, including Helium-3, which could be used to manufacture tritium, a component of thermonuclear weapons.

Administration officials defended the policy by claiming that such cooperation would be restricted to civilian uses of nuclear energy. However, there were no guarantees that South Africa would abide by the rules of the agreement. The Chairman of the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Energy, Nuclear Proliferation and Government Processes, Senator Charles Percy, asked Commerce Secretary Malcom Baldridge “what assurances will the United States receive that this material will be put to use in the manner South Africa has stated?” The Secretary did not wish to paint himself or the administration into a corner. He politely brushed off the Senator, saying, “the United States will require assurances that this material will be put to use in the manner that South Africa has stated.” How these assurances were to be obtained and enforced is not known.

As the Cold War receded into history, South Africa signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty on July 10, 1991. Two years later, Pretoria broke its silence to confess that it had, in fact, embarked on a nuclear arms building program. It is now known from President F. W.de Klerk’s March 1993 address to Parliament that “at one stage, South Africa did . . . develop a limited nuclear deterrent capability,” a decision that was made as early as 1974 “against the background of a Soviet expansionist threat in Southern Africa” and reinforced by “the build-up of Cuban forces in Angola from 1975 onwards.” The original plan, according to de Klerk, was to build seven nuclear devices. When the project was terminated in 1990, six of those devices had been completed. One can only conclude, therefore, that by continuing nuclear collaboration with South Africa, the United States and other Western countries contributed to the buildup of South Africa’s nuclear capability.
3.4.2 Economic Engagement

Economic cooperation between the United States and South Africa was a prominent feature of Constructive Engagement and an important means by which the Reagan Administration could aid the Republic as it embarked on its campaign to dominate southern Africa. Shortly after Reagan’s arrival in Washington, the United States surpassed Britain to become South Africa’s leading trade partner in both exports and imports. The Reagan Administration made a concerted effort to ease government regulations on U.S. exports to South Africa, thus facilitating greater American participation in the apartheid economy.120 The relaxing of trade restrictions by the Reagan Administration was a major boost to U.S. private capital willing to do business with South Africa, an important constituency of the Republican Party, but most importantly, it was a great benefit to the Pretoria government. William Pomeroy, among others, maintained that “the activity of U.S. loan capital has literally been the savior of the racist government . . . and played a vanguard role in creating financial respectability and stability for the apartheid regime.”121

The Reagan Administration saw things differently. Government officials argued that economic cooperation would help to foster meaningful change away from apartheid, and such being the case, the administration was opposed to trade restrictions and divestment by U.S. firms in South Africa. Instead of divesting, U.S. officials argued that American corporations operating in South Africa could help promote social change by adopting the Sullivan principles, which advocated, among other things, fair employment practices, higher wages for black South Africans, and the establishment of training programs that would prepare blacks for supervisory, administrative, and technical jobs. The Sullivan principles were endorsed by many within the government, including the State Department—no doubt at the urging of the administration—which pitched the policy as a significant and definite force for change in South Africa. In short, it carried the promise of providing a solution to the problem of job discrimination and segregation that precluded black South Africans from decent employment and occupational advancement opportunities.

While the Sullivan Code could have conceivably helped to improve the economic and social status of some South African blacks, its effect was limited by the fact that it was not obligatory on the part of U.S. corporations. As a result, those companies that valued financial considerations over the plight of black workers continued to ignore the Sullivan principles and reaped handsome profits from the
exploitative system guaranteed by the apartheid government. In 1983, 29 of the 145 companies that had committed themselves to the Sullivan principles dropped out of the program. By 1987, only 92 American companies operating in South Africa continued to be signatories to the Sullivan Code.

Furthermore, the Sullivan Code could not produce any significant changes in the apartheid system because it did not address two of the most critical issues in South Africa. It made no recommendations for black political participation, nor did it challenge South Africa’s separate development policy, which confined blacks to the poverty-stricken homelands and severely restricted the movement of those in the urban areas through the pass laws.

Substantial increases in loans from U.S. banks to South African also occurred during the first four years of the Reagan Administration. By the end of 1984, American banks had given loans of up to $4.7 billion to South African businesses, twice the amount that had been given in 1978. American investments in the South African mining industry alone stood at $6.5 billion. The United States also strongly supported a $1 billion IMF loan to South Africa in November of 1982. The application for the loan coincided with a period of economic decline in the Republic. The depreciation of South African gold, the corresponding decline of the Rand, and the enormous increase in military expenditures had helped push the country into its worst decade since the 1930s. The application, however, was bound to be controversial from the beginning. Democratic members of the U.S. Congress saw the loan as conveying legitimacy on the apartheid government and directly financing its racial policies. To international critics, the loan was a naked attempt to subsidize South Africa’s military expenditures and, consequently, its destabilization program in southern Africa.

This, of course, was not lost on the ANC. Speaking in Lisbon, Oliver Tambo viciously attacked the administration’s policies in South Africa, stating:

Under the United States policy of "constructive engagement" there has been an increase in United States investments, loans, and the financing of apartheid; new avenues of military and nuclear cooperation with the racist regime have been opened up - as for example, the sale of Helium-3, which is used in the production of thermonuclear weapons and the sale of sophisticated computers and technology directly related to the nuclear research and development programme of the regime.

"Constructive engagement" has destroyed rather than saved life. For the black majority, infant mortality remains the highest in the world while
life expectancy is the lowest in the world; unemployment of black workers has now reached the astronomical figure of two and a half million - more than 20 percent of the economically active population; educational spending for blacks continues to be 20 times less than for white South Africans; more than 80 percent of the black people live below the poverty datum line; millions of African people have been denied their birthright and dumped into the bantustans where unemployment, starvation, disease and other deaths await them. All this is happening whilst the Pretoria regime is proclaiming a policy of reform. But it is not a policy of reform: it is a policy of ever more violence and repression. As Newsweek Magazine (March 21, 1983) has stated, apartheid has a "harsh new grip". A "harsh new grip" is part of the reality we have come to associate with "constructive engagement." ¹²⁵

The Reagan Administration ignored these criticisms and advocated aggressively for the loan, arguing that it was purely apolitical. The administration understood that the loan was essential for the South Africans in a period of financial insecurity. To be sure, IMF lending was to become one of the Reagan Administration’s most frequently used tactics in rewarding allies in the President’s anticommunist crusade; for instance, the United States exerted considerable effort to have the IMF approve an $85 million loan to the threatened Duarte regime in El Salvador.¹²⁶ In contrast, America’s decision to successfully oppose similar requests to the IMF from the governments of Grenada, Vietnam, and Nicaragua carried undeniable ideological and political overtones.

Despite protestations from a number of African and Arab nations, the United States, with considerable help from its Western friends, was able to secure the loan for South Africa, and when Democrats in the House of Representatives moved to limit future IMF loans to South Africa, the administration was able to mobilize Republicans and conservative Democrats in the Senate to block the measure.¹²⁷ As in other policy areas, the Reagan Administration viewed its efforts toward facilitating the South African request for an IMF loan as an essential aspect of its overall strategy of aiding South Africans in reducing communist influence in southern Africa.

Even though the administration maintained that it did not encourage or discourage investments in South Africa, some officials clearly favoured greater American involvement in the South African economy. Assistant Secretary of State Crocker left little doubt as to the administration’s position in this regard when he spoke to the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations in November 1981. The administration, Crocker stated, hoped to eliminate “legal and regulatory disincentives to U.S. businessmen . . . to propose legislation to permit export trading companies,” and to
pursue economic profits, through trade and investments, in those African countries with healthy economies, such as “Nigeria, Gabon, Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Botswana, Zimbabwe and of course, South Africa.”

3.4.3 Non-criticism of South Africa’s Domestic Institutions

As Chester Crocker implemented the policy, it became increasingly clear that opponents of the Reagan policy of Constructive Engagement shared a worldview incompatible with that of the policy’s advocates. The proponents of Constructive Engagement, as exemplified by Chester Crocker, viewed the situation in South Africa in terms of power and influence: The situation in the Republic and southern Africa was simply too complex to reduce to “one man-one vote.”

The opponents of Constructive Engagement, on the other hand, viewed the situation in South Africa in terms of a wrong that had to be righted or of an abominable evil that had to be eradicated. Crocker’s perceived attempt to gently prod Pretoria into slowly moving toward what was so evidently “right” was wrong-headed, for not only did it fail to lead to substantive change, but it also accepted the presence of and worked with the “evil” at the same time that it attempted to diminish it. Punitive sanctions would prove to be popular with this group, therefore, for such sanctions represented both a punishment for the “evil” as well as a literal “turning of the back” upon it. There could be no middle ground on the issue of apartheid.

A perfect example of this philosophical clash—and one that exemplified the polarized views of both quarters—concerned the controversy over a Crocker statement made during an important August 1981 speech before the American Legion in Honolulu. Attempting to portray the neutral “honest-broker” role that the United States planned to play in its South Africa policy, Crocker stressed that the United States should, by no means, “choose between black and white [elements of South African society].” Instead, the United States must necessarily “avoid action that aggravates the awesome challenges facing South Africans of all races.”

Crocker’s explanation of United States policy was immediately dismissed by the ANC, which stated in 1981:

Since Botha and Reagan have proclaimed themselves as allies we must consider what are their common objectives in southern Africa. What interests, and most importantly whose interests, will this alliance promote?
For the imperialists and racist South Africa alike, the ultimate objectives are: to regain economic, political and military control over the entire southern African region and to perpetuate the plunder of the region’s mineral resources. The strategy applied in order to secure these objectives includes:

Firstly, the denial of the legitimacy of the liberation struggle and the attempted isolation of the liberation movement.

Secondly, the isolation of independent African countries from the world progressive forces in order to weaken them, the destabilisation and the overthrow of their legal governments.

Thirdly, the attempt to transform the Indian and South Atlantic Oceans into military zones as an extension of the NATO alliance.

Within this strategy the maintenance of the apartheid system is an a priori condition and its success requires, as an indispensable element, the strengthening of the apartheid regime.

The arrogant assumption of the paramountcy of outside interests above those of Africans is but one aspect of the ideology that unites Pretoria and Washington. The inevitable victory of the liberation struggle will teach them that it is the interests of sovereign governments and of the majority of the people that need to be taken into account when considering our countries, our future, and, need I emphasise it, our minerals and wealth.  

To Gerry Studds (D-Mass) an American refusal to take sides indicated that Crocker did not have “an awareness of the Western moral issues at stake.” Such a policy, moreover, sent the wrong type of signals to the world at large. As Studds insisted, “Surely you have squandered much of the moral stature and credibility of this country in that region and in that continent by persisting in giving statements like this.” Crocker’s speech and its message was “a document of shame in terms of a signal to the world that this country either no longer stands for or is from this point forward no longer going to articulate what many of us thought made us unique in the world.”

Refusing to accept Studds’ view, Crocker, for his part, reiterated what he felt remained the pragmatic course of action for the United States if it truly desired to perform an important role in southern Africa: “We do not think it is going to be helpful to us and our ability to be in any way relevant, excepting as a source of moral posturing, irrelevant moral posturing when the chips are down, for us to indicate that we have already chosen as between the different contending forces in South Africa.”
In reality, the Reagan Administration had chosen sides in South Africa. As Crocker would point out to American audiences: “We do not want to destabilize South Africa or jeopardize our own strategic interests...”135 The liberation movement, on the other hand, was dismissed alternately as dangerously “Marxist” or lacking the “means for a direct assault on white power” that could bring the Botha Administration to the bargaining table.136

If Crocker could keep the debate centred on the possibility of gradual change, the policy would have a chance of survival; however, if the debate ever began to focus on the realities of apartheid, as it eventually would, Constructive Engagement would be doomed. Crocker argued that, if official U. S. rhetoric on domestic reform was minimized, then the political climate would be more favourable for the Botha government to proceed with its program of racial reconciliation. However, Pretoria’s critics were not convinced of the Republic’s commitment to change and were unimpressed by the progress that Reagan’s quiet diplomacy had produced. Soon-to-be Nobel laureate Bishop Desmond Tutu, for instance, charged that the government, rather than offering “real” change, was only “applying an inhuman system more humanely.”137

The ANC, for its part, viewed the “reforms” as predictable examples of changes “that could occur—and in fact did occur—in slave societies” as the regime attempted to maintain its power in a historically untenable situation.138 In addition, in the American Congress, such opponents of the Reagan policy as Solarz, Wolpe, and Gray were on record as stating that anything less than “one man-one vote,” majority rule within South Africa would be both insufficient and insignificant.139

Chester Crocker saw these reductionist views as hopelessly naïve. First, it was not in the United States’ power to convince the South Africans to liberalize. More importantly, it was not in U.S. interests to do so. The administration needed a powerful ally in the region to serve as one of the “ anvils” of American diplomacy. For Crocker, it would be necessary to keep all constituencies focused on the “process” of reform, not results, while the Republic helped roll back communist influence in southern Africa.

3.5 Conclusion

In sum, it is clear that the Reagan Administration’s Constructive Engagement policy was formulated largely within the context of American geopolitical and economic interests. Washington was interested more in blocking Soviet expansionism...
than in encouraging the growth of representative governance and the fostering of human rights in South Africa. The administration’s argument that constructive change could only come through the maintenance of friendly ties with the South African government was largely a cover for its intention to bolster white domination. Washington could, thus, be guaranteed of South Africa’s support for its overall Cold War objective of containing the Soviet Union in Africa.

The election of Ronald Reagan—who in a 1976 campaign speech would state “the African problem is a Russian weapon aimed at us”—would indeed prove extremely fortuitous for the apartheid regime. On taking the office of Prime Minster in September 1978, P. W. Botha, in his inaugural address, echoed a similar sentiment when he declared he would not let South Africa fall to “the forces of chaos.” Only a few months before Reagan’s election, Botha would add: “There is only way of withstanding this onslaught . . . and that is to establish a Total National Strategy.” The aim of this policy would be to stave off the forces of the black liberation movement and roll back any communist influence that may have aided that movement. Marshalling all the resources of the South African state, the Total National Strategy would attempt a series of modest reforms that would confine the black majority to a series of semi-independent “Bantustans”—thereby not challenging the existing power structure within the Republic—and regionally establish South Africa as the economic and political hegemon of the region.

5This theme was first advanced by Jeanne Kirkpatrick, “Dictatorships and Double Standards,” Commentary 68, no. 5 (November 1979): 34-45.
6In Kirkpatrick’s words, “The President began to get this position into his speeches, and he wrote it in himself. There was never a formal meeting of the National Security Planning Group or a National Security Decision Directive.” Sara Fritz, “Reagan Doctrine: Watershed Legacy,” Los Angeles Times, August 31, 1986, 12.
8The importance of mineral resources had been advanced by the both American conservatives and South African Nationalist Party leaders since the conclusion of the Second World War. See Larry W. Bowman, “The Strategic Significance of South Africa to the United States: An Appraisal and Policy Analysis,” African Affairs 81 (1982): 159-191.
10For a detailed version of this argument, see Arnaud de Eorchgrave, “KGB Fronts Push Campaign to Destabilize South Africa,” Washington Times, July 31, 1985, 1A, 8A.
11The connection between these far right groups and domestic racist organizations (e.g., John Birch Society) inside the United States is important but beyond the scope of this dissertation.


18 Ibid., 235.


25 Ibid.


33 Ibid.


35 *United States Policy on South Africa*. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Africa Affairs of the Committee on on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 98th Congress, Second Session, 26 September, 1984, 12.

36 Kornegay, 7.

37 Ibid., 8.


43 Ibid., 14.

48 Ibid., 347.
49 Ibid., 350.
50 Ibid., 350.
52 Crocker, Greznes, and Henderson, 12-13.
53 Ibid., 8.
54 Botha’s plan to create an economic alliance in southern Africa will be covered in detail in Chapter 3.
55 Ibid., 10.
56 Ibid.
57 Ibid.
59 Ibid.
62 Ibid.
63 Fisher, 22.
65 Ibid., 327.
66 Ibid., 348.
67 Ibid., 346.
69 Ibid., 144.
70 Ibid., 149.
71 Ibid., 151.
72 Ibid., 153.
76 Crocker, Chester A. Interview by Author. 19 September 2011.
77 Ibid.
83 Crocker, Greznes, and Henderson, 14.
84 Crocker, *High Noon*, 170.
85 Crocker, Chester A. Interview by Author. September 19, 2011.
86 Ibid.
87 Crocker, ‘Scope Paper.’


93 Ibid.


95 Ibid., 27.


97 Ibid.


107 Crocker, Chester A. Interview by Author. September 19, 2011.

108 Chester Crocker’s “Scope Paper” for Secretary of State Alexander Haig’s in Preparation for Haig’s meeting with Pik Botha on 14 May 1981. Reproduced in Pauline Baker’s, The United States and South Africa, Appendix A.

109 This will be covered in detail in Chapter 4.


112 Danaher, 193.


114 Pomeroy, 171.


116 Ibid.


118 Ibid.
When Crocker articulated the administration’s objectives in southern Africa, he placed priority on achieving regional stability and coexistence. But it is difficult to understand how regional tensions could be reduced by a nuclear armed South Africa.


Pomeroy, 73.


Chapter IV

4.1 Introduction: Fears of a “Total Onslaught”

In the late 1970s, Pretoria developed a new approach for its foreign policy. The defensive, reactionary style that characterized the Vorster years gave way to a new commitment to self-assertiveness and self-reliance. Policy makers believed that the Republic faced a “total onslaught” of forces, working from every possible direction to undermine the stability of South Africa. Orchestrated by the Soviet Union, the notion of a “total onslaught” represented the fear and paranoia that both the white populace and the government felt in the face of a dangerous future. To counter this “total onslaught,” a “Total National Strategy” became a security necessity. When P.W. Botha became Prime Minister in 1978, Pretoria rationalized and implemented just such a strategy. Implicit in the Total National Strategy was a commitment to self-reliance—to develop South Africa’s capacity to stand alone. Two broad characteristics defined this approach: an overall militarization of South Africa and a new initiative aimed at achieving regional domination.

This chapter describes the historical and ideological development of the South African notion of a “total onslaught” and the subsequent implementation of Botha’s “Total National Strategy,” which was largely formulated and refined by the country’s defence establishment. The second half of the chapter will detail the crisis in the Republic that followed the constitutional reforms enacted by the National Party in 1983.

“Ons volk en ons land en sy mense ervaar vandag die totale aanslag van die marxistiese ekspansionisme.”¹ Such were the words with which Prime Minister P. W. Botha characterized the nature of the “onslaught.” Convinced that South Africa was the “focal point in the struggle between the major powers of the world,” Pretoria saw itself as the prime African prize for the Soviet Union.² For Pretoria, Moscow had designed and implemented a communist-inspired, communist-planned, and communist-supported “onslaught” to capture for the Kremlin South Africa’s geographic position, mineral wealth, transport facilities, industrial capacity, and communications systems.³ As Botha would warn the House of Assembly:

The rationale lies in the strategic position and the mineral wealth of RSA. Soviet Russia believes that it can control the supply of oil from the Middle East and minerals from South Africa to the West, it can
dominate the West and force it to surrender... The totality of the onslaught is brought about by the combination of and interaction between the Soviet desire for world domination on the one hand and the struggle for political power by Black Power organisations on the other. The Soviet Union exploits Black nationalism for its own purposes.4

Several distinct components were seen as parts of the “onslaught.”5 First, the extensive Soviet armaments buildup in southern Africa, especially in Angola and Mozambique, indicated to Pretoria that Moscow was preparing its satellites for a conventional war with South Africa.6 Second, South Africa believed that Soviet aid to the ANC and SWAPO served to promote the direct and indirect guerrilla infiltration necessary to weaken both the capacity of South Africa to respond and the morale of the white populace to resist. As he would tell a National Party meeting in Bethlehem, “The war we wage today is about 20 to 30 per cent military and more than 70 per cent non-military. We must adapt ourselves accordingly, or we shall in the end lose the military war as well.”7 Third, Soviet diplomatic efforts seemed to be aimed at isolating South Africa. Such international punitive measures as the arms and oil embargoes were labelled by Pretoria as the successful outcome of Soviet machinations.

Pretoria even implicated the West in the “total onslaught.” By not taking an aggressive stance in blocking Soviet encroachment in southern Africa, the West had “gleefully” cooperated in the mission to strangle South Africa.8 Speaking at a National Party meeting, P.W. Botha would warn his counterparts in the West: “South Africa will never fight for the West on its battlefields again. South Africa will in future be neutral. . . . I will not allow the sons of South Africa to die for West who has rejected South Africa and has completely abandoned her.”9 Western support for sanctions and other diplomatic measures only served to bolster the perception of the West’s betrayal of South Africa. For example, actions such as the Clark Amendment and Britain’s violation of the Simonstown agreement confirmed for South Africa the malevolent intent of the Western powers.10 Moreover, Pretoria frequently cited the Western media’s portrayal of South Africa as an instrument of Moscow’s subversion campaign.

Thus, for Pretoria, Moscow had employed the nations of both southern Africa and the international community to establish its dominion over South Africa. Similarly, in the government’s view, the Soviet Union also organized domestic subversion in its campaign to undermine South Africa. In response, Pretoria branded internal opponents of the South African government, including opposition parties, anti-apartheid groups, and seditious individuals, as direct participants in the “onslaught.”11 For instance,
government officials vehemently criticized liberal academics in Parliament and ostracized white anti-apartheid church leaders. Likewise, leading South African scholars countered ecclesiastical condemnations of apartheid by finding in them a definite inclination toward communism. Furthermore, the apartheid government accused black trade unions and associated black trade unionists with efforts to promote large-scale unemployment in order to foment a social revolution.

In short, for Pretoria, the Soviet Union represented the chief planner and initiator of the “onslaught” against South Africa, involving its African satellites, liberation movements, the West, and local South Africans. As capsulated by the Department of Defence in the 1982 White Paper:

The ultimate aim of the Soviet Union . . . is to overthrow the present body politic in the RSA and to replace it with a Marxist-oriented form of government to further the objectives of the U.S.S.R. . . . All possible methods and means are used to attain this objective . . . instigating social and labour unrest, civilian resistance, terrorist attacks against the infrastructure of the RSA.

There are two important points to be taken from this refinement of the Republic’s comprehensive threat assessment of the “total onslaught.” First, the threat appraisal discounted the likelihood that apartheid might be the driving force in South Africa’s domestic problems, instead placing the blame for internal instability on a Soviet-orchestrated conspiracy. For nearly two decades, this view of the world was meticulously constructed and maintained within South Africa’s security establishment. Second, and perhaps more importantly, the comprehensive “Total National Strategy,” which seemed to be the only appropriate response to the envisioned “total onslaught,” provided the state with the tools it needed to destroy its opposition, both internal and external.

4.2 A Total National Strategy

The Total Strategy was an all-embracing, counter-revolutionary plan to address the vital components of national security: political, military, economic, psychological, scientific, religious, cultural, financial, intelligence, and so on. As such, the Total Strategy involved all of South Africa, from government departments to population groups to social organizations. The 1977 White Paper defined a Total Strategy as

the comprehensive plan to utilize all the means available to a state according to an integrated pattern in order to achieve the national aims
within the framework of the specific policies. A Total National Strategy is, therefore, not confined to a particular sphere, but is applicable at all levels and to all functions of the state structure.\textsuperscript{17}

The Total National Strategy consisted of two basic components—a quest for domestic preparedness against the external threats and a reorientation of South Africa’s relations with both the West and the rest of Africa.

The Total National Strategy was based conceptually on the writings of the French General André Beaufre. Often referred to as the “brain behind the French Army,” Beaufre had been director of the French Institute of Strategic Studies, past editor of its journal, \textit{Stratégie}, and an internationally recognized strategist and expert on European political-military affairs. His military career had included command assignments in Europe and Africa in World War II, in Indochina in 1947, and in Egypt in 1956.\textsuperscript{18}

In \textit{Strategy for Tomorrow}, Beaufre contended that the West must plan long-range “political, economic, and social objectives before devising a common security strategy that would support societal goals.”\textsuperscript{19} Beaufre believed that the “total onslaught” required “total indirect or counter-strategies that coordinated and aligned military and political policy, as well as with foreign, financial, economic policy and production.” This is where “contestants manoeuvre for advantage on a broad social plane and where the brute actualities of military combat are only one more direct dimension of the competitive process.”\textsuperscript{20} Believing that communism had brought together ideology and terror in what appeared to be a “permanent fusion,” Beaufre believed that the West needed to formulate a Total Strategy and pleaded for policy makers to accept that eventuality.\textsuperscript{21}

It was perhaps natural for South Africans to see a parallel with Beaufre’s general theme, which embraced the broad context of European and Atlantic security. He asserted that, in the future even more than in the past, the military power of a nation would depend on its economic strength and the self-discipline of its people. The credibility of such a nation in the future, among both its allies and adversaries, would depend on their assessment of its moral, productive, and staying powers.

Beaufre’s ideas were subsequently adopted and brought to the Republic by academics like Deon Fourie and military officers such as Lieutenant General C. A. Fraser and Brigadier General Magnus Malan. Beaufre’s conceptual framework began to appear in the official documents of the Ministry of Defence as early as 1971, but it was
the 1977 *Defence White Paper* that definitively committed the country to a Beaufrean framework. In an *RSA White Paper on Defence 1977*, P.W. Botha outlined his strategic vision for ensuring the survival of the apartheid state, largely in terms drawn directly from the writings of André Beaufre. According to Botha:

1. The process of ensuring and maintaining the sovereignty of a state’s authority in a conflict situation has, through the evolution of warfare, shifted from a purely military to an integrated national action. Up to and including the beginning of the 20th century, the successful resolution of a conflict situation was based purely upon victory of one army over another. Since World War I, however, this type of warfare has made such excessive demands upon all states that, due to a lack of coordinated national action, the result in many countries has been the total disruption of the national economy and the psychological disruption of the population. The resolution of a conflict in the times in which we now live demands interdependent and coordinated action in all fields—military, psychological, economic, political, sociological, technological, diplomatic, ideological, cultural, etc. Germany had already realized this before World War II, and Russia has maintained a multi-dimensional campaign against the West since this war. Consequently, we are today involved in a war, whether we wish to accept it or not.

2. It is therefore essential that a Total National Strategy be formulated at the highest level. The defence of the RSA is not solely the responsibility of the Department of Defence. On the contrary, the maintenance of the sovereignty of the RSA is the combined responsibility of all government departments. This can be taken further—it is the responsibility of the entire population, the nation and every population group. The Department of Defence is merely an executive body responsible for the achievement of certain national security goals, as directed by the Government.

3. On account of the inherent strength of Defence, it is essential, and it has indeed already been acknowledged, that the employment of the Defence Force be directed by Parliament. The powers of the Defence Force are determined, limited and defined in the Defence Act which also prescribes the aims and functions of the Defence Force. The striving for specific aims cannot, however, take place in isolation. It must be coordinated with all the means available to the state. . . .

4. The RSA has already recognized this need by the establishment of the State Security Council. . . .

5. As already indicated, one of the functions of the State Security Council is to formulate the Total National Strategy for the RSA. Total Strategy is, however, a complex subject. It can perhaps be described as the comprehensive plan to utilize all the means available to a state according to an integrated pattern in order to achieve the national aims within the framework of the specific policies. A national strategy is,
therefore, not confined to a particular sphere, but is applicable at all levels and to all functions of the state structure [author’s emphasis].

6. The main elements that influence this, namely the political, psychological, technological, and military means, are, in the strategic sense, dynamic and interacting. Strategy, therefore, is not something constraining, since a change in one of the factors must have an effect on all the others. It must be constantly adapted to changing situations in respect of, for example, the threat, manpower potential, the financial climate, domestic or foreign policies, etc. Constant interaction and revision of planning and implementation at all levels of the various government departments are essential.

7. Since strategy is normally directed towards the enemy’s actions, it cannot be determined purely on the basis of one’s own actions, but the reaction of the enemy must also be determined; this, in turn, demands a counter-reaction. This characteristic of strategy calls for an outstanding intelligence service in order to forecast the action of the enemy.

8. It is clear that in order to formulate and implement military strategy meaningfully, there is a need for a Total National Strategy. This has already been acknowledged by the Government. It is because of the complexity of this need and with a view to national security that coordination between government departments is of the utmost importance. There are few, if any, government departments which are not concerned with one or other aspect of national security, or which do not contribute to the realization of [national security], . . .

10. Our country’s defence is not a matter for the SA Defence Force alone. The defence of one’s country demands dedication, vigilance and a willingness to sacrifice on the part of everyone whose privilege it is to live in this country.

Just as Botha had said in the 1977 Defence Whitepaper, the Total National Strategy would not be limited to a single sphere, but was “applicable to all levels and to all functions of the state structure.”

4.2.1 Militarization of South Africa

Working from the Twelve-Point Plan, Botha oversaw a complete militarization of South Africa. At the top, Botha reorganized the government to centralize decision-making in the most effective way to meet the “onslaught.” The ad hoc style of the Verwoerd and Vorster years that featured prominently in the Muldergate scandal and the failed Angola intervention focused Botha’s attention on the urgent necessity for governmental reorganization.

At the heart of Botha’s centralization was a new Cabinet structure. Botha developed an interlocking system of Cabinet committees to coordinate policy
formulation and implementation. In place of the twenty ad hoc committees that met under Vorster, Botha centralized power into five core committees: the SSC, Economic Affairs, Finance, Internal Affairs, and Social Affairs. Moreover, Botha consolidated the thirty-nine government departments into twenty-two. At the same time, the Office of the Prime Minister was expanded to give the Prime Minister more power, culminating in the creation of the Executive State President. Botha’s government became one of executive order and executive power, a Herrenvolk democracy. In this manner, Botha hoped to do a better job administering policy to counter domestic and international pressures.

At the top of this reorganized system rested the State Security Council (SSC), tasked with formulating and executing all issues related to national security. Thus, the powers of the SSC were broad enough to include nearly every decision or action needed, including foreign and domestic policy. Although officially, the SSC was equal among the other Cabinet committees, “in fact, it was primus inter pares.” Not only did the SSC have more responsibility than any of the other committees, but it also had more than ten times as many full-time employees. Furthermore, the SSC was shrouded in secrecy, giving it an air of importance that the other committees lacked. For instance, SSC meetings were open only to primary and co-opted members while most would be expected to attend other cabinet meetings. Likewise, much speculation existed as to the actual membership roster of the SSC.

With the threat of war shaping Pretoria’s national security policy, the military influence in SSC decision-making became prominent, especially with Generals Magnus Malan and Constand Viljoen acting as the primary members. It was undeniable that the military had assumed a greater role in policy formulation, especially with regard to foreign policy, overshadowing at times the Department of Foreign Affairs. At the same time, however, the team-style approach of the SSC prevented any part of policy from becoming the exclusive domain of any one bureaucratic faction. If it was true that the Department of Defence had gained significant influence in foreign policy, it was also true that the Department of Foreign Affairs had acquired limited leverage in defence policy.

Broadly, however, the Botha centralization measures contributed to an overall militarization of South African foreign policy. With a more tightly controlled leadership, bodies with heavy military influence such as the SSC directly affected the direction of foreign policy, especially those measures relating to South Africa’s
national security. With the “total onslaught” contributing to a siege mentality in South Africa, foreign policy became a matter of military survival. Consequently, increased military involvement was inevitable.

The South African military was most affected by the implementation of the Total National Strategy. Indeed, the opening words of the 1982 White Paper reiterated the charge of the military: “A MOTIVATED AND PREPARED SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENCE FORCE MUST AT ALL TIMES BE READY TO DEFEND THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA WITH DETERMINATION AND PERSEVERANCE AGAINST ANY MILITARY ‘ONSLAUGHT.’”33 The introduction of Cuban troops and sophisticated Soviet arms into the region provided the impetus for South Africa to aggressively improve its conventional capabilities.

First, the military modernized its technology to guard against surprise attacks.34 Such moves included the expansion of coastal surveillance through radar, patrol vessels, and so on. Second, Pretoria took steps to strengthen the South African Defence Force (SADF). As part of this effort, the government extended conscription from twelve to twenty-four months and passed an amendment legalizing the deployment of the SADF outside of South African territory. Moreover, military exercises expanded to demonstrate to both the region and the world the growing strength of the SADF. Third, South Africa acquired a series of anti-tank projectiles and long-range strike aircraft to improve its capacity to fight and win a conventional war.

The soaring defence budget reflected the heightened importance of military preparedness in South African national security. For example, the expenditure on armed forces increased from R847 million in 1973 to R1972 million in 1980.35 Even accounting for inflation, this growth evidenced the increased importance of the military to a threat-conscious South Africa.36 Similarly, the growth of SADF personnel as a percentage of the white population from 3.1% in 1970 to 8.6% in 1983 illustrated the growing militarization of South Africa. Moreover, the total manpower potential of the SADF jumped from 78,000 troops in 1970 to 239,100 in 1983.37

By far, the most successful attempt to achieve military self-sufficiency occurred in the arms industry. Beginning with the first U.N. voluntary arms embargo in 1963, South Africa had sought to overcome its dependency on Western sources for weapons by developing its own arms industry. By the time the U.N. passed its 1977 mandatory arms embargo, the Armaments Development and Manufacturing Corporation of South Africa (ARMSCOR) was producing approximately 75% of its non-naval weapon
needs. In fact, ARMSCOR production had enabled South Africa to become militarily self-sufficient in many categories of arms production. As a result, South Africa allocated only 15% of its defence budget to arms imports, as opposed to the 70% it had typically spent in the early 1970s. Even so, South Africa was not entirely militarily self-sufficient. It still largely depended on imports to meet its aviation requirements, especially as its planes became outdated.

By the mid-1980s, ARMSCOR was the world’s tenth largest arms manufacturer. South Africa had developed the capacity to export, as its presence at arms expositions suggested. As one of the three largest financial undertakings in South Africa, ARMSCOR possessed assets greater than R1617 million ($627 million at current prices). Furthermore, ARMSCOR was one of the largest year-round employers of labour. It directly employed over 23,000 workers and indirectly provided employment for over 100,000 workers at 9 subsidiaries and 3000 private subcontractors. Such statistics illustrated the importance of ARMSCOR to the South African economy. An indigenous arms industry represented both a major savings of foreign exchange and a major stimulus to the economy, especially during times of recession.

Along the lines of the Total National Strategy, ARMSCOR contributed to the militarization of South Africa. At the locus of the government, military, and private sector, ARMSCOR symbolized the union of disparate South African forces inherent to the Total National Strategy. Indeed, 70% of ARMSCOR production was contracted to the private sector. Through ARMSCOR, private enterprises supplied items ranging from SADF uniforms to sophisticated weapons. With such extensive links to the arms industry, the private sector clearly had a material stake in armaments production. Likewise, the main ARMSCOR board reflected the links between the government and private sector. Appointed by the State President (formerly the Prime Minister) and responsible to the Defence Minister, the board included the chief of the SADF, the director general of finance, and a variety of individuals from the major financial, manufacturing, and commercial areas of the private sector. As a result, observers labelled ARMSCOR a “paradox.” It was “a state corporation run almost exclusively by private enterprise.”
4.2.2 SADF Defence Posture and Threat Perceptions

By 1975, it had become apparent that South Africa’s strategic policy makers perceived a two-fold threat. The 1982 Defence White Paper discussed the threat in broad terms of the Marxist “onslaught” against Africa, but specifically assigned both conventional and counterinsurgency roles to the combat branches of the SADF.

In June 1979, Magnus Malan, stated, “The possibility of a conventional military threat to South Africa in the not too distant future cannot be ruled out.” However, a review of all the forces that that it might bring to bear in a confrontation against any one or any combination of the front-line states showed that, with regard to equipment alone, South Africa was at least equal to and, in many areas, superior to all potential regional adversaries. In addition to material considerations, a brief review of many other areas related to the armed forces of these nations, including sources of recruitment, military traditions and backgrounds, defence infrastructure, and reserve organizations, also indicated the superiority of the SADF.

Another consideration was the perceived conventional threat of the Soviet Union and its proxies. With the election of Botha, South Africa had expanded its concept of the conventional threat to include the possibility of an attack by Soviet, Cuban, or Eastern European troops staging through neighbouring countries and using prepositioned military equipment. In February 1981, General Malan stated, “There is an unprecedented buildup of conventional heavy armaments in Southern Africa and should these be manned and used by Communist proxy forces, it could very rapidly lead to a conventional onslaught against South Africa.” Later, in 1982, General Malan said, “The presence of sophisticated weaponry of Russian origin in South Africa’s neighbouring states indicates that South Africa and Southwest Africa/Namibia could become targets of a conventional onslaught.”

Finally, the possibility of a conventional attack was seen in conjunction with other pressures. This type of threat could take the form of conventional force raids conducted in coordination with terrorist tactics. The possibility of such attacks had been discussed since 1979 and had received increased attention since 1981. However, while the composition and training of the SADF made it clear that the government was planning to meet the threat of a conventional attack, it was also apparent that the possibility of a conventional attack had been used to justify increases in defence expenditures, new security legislation, and in support of a new conscription law. As
General Malan stated in 1982, “the possibility of a conventional attack against South Africa is the main reason for the country’s new national service system.”

This use of the threat of conventional attack made sense when viewed within the framework of justifying the implementation of various facets of the Total National Strategy and, in part, explained the difference between South African statements and the real military potential of the Republic’s neighbours. What was probably a more accurate description of South African defence planners’ estimates of the conventional threat faced by South Africa was put forward by General Constand L. Viljoen, Chief of the SADF, in 1983. In examining the conventional threat, he concluded that “in light of factors such as poor economic conditions, internal instability, relatively deficient physical infrastructures, the inability to properly maintain or to replace advanced military equipment and discord arising from old regional conflicts, the African countries (individually and collectively) are not a real offensive military threat to the RSA.”

According to General Vilojen, the real threat of conventional weapons in South Africa’s neighbours was in the possibility of these weapons being provided to “terrorist” organizations and in the use of these weapons by host countries in defending “terrorist” bases and headquarters against South African pre-emption and reprisals.

4.2.3 The Terrorist Threat

To understand South Africa’s regional policy, one must first recognize that South Africa’s domestic conditions limited its foreign policy. Specifically, South Africa had externalized many of its domestic problems into its relations with its neighbors. In the South African view, the major threat to its domestic order stemmed neither from internally based discontent nor from African nationalism. Prime Minister Botha expounded upon this theme in his 28 January 1981 address to the House of Assembly:

We do not see the struggle in Southern Africa as a struggle between Whites and non-Whites. It is an entirely different struggle. It is a struggle between the powers of chaos, Marxism and destruction on the one hand and the powers of order, Christian civilization and the upliftment of people on the other.

This attitude prevailed among both policy makers and the white public. For example, 77.4 percent of those surveyed in a 1984 opinion poll strongly disagreed with the
statement, “South Africa’s blacks have good reason to take up arms against the
government.”

Consequently, events in the region had far greater significance to both the South
African policy elite and the general public. Believing that the “terrorist threat” to South
Africa had emanated primarily from the black-ruled states of the region, Pretoria
combated internal threats to the existing power structure through its regional policy.

Many observers of South African affairs saw, besides the danger of
conventional attack, two other types of dangers to the Republic. The first of these was
the danger posed by internally and externally supported guerrilla movements, such as
Umkonto We Sizwe. The second was the danger of domestic unrest in response to the
internal repression, such as the 1976 Soweto disturbances. However, it was clear that
South African defence planners did not distinguish between these two types of threats.
This tendency to group all non-conventional threats under the general heading of
“terrorist” can be seen in the statements of South African government officials. For
example, in 1981, the Chief of the Army, Lieutenant General J. J. Geldenjuys, defined
two types of modern warfare, “insurgency or terrorist warfare and conventional
warfare.” Furthermore, the missions assigned to the Army, Navy, and Air Force in the
1982 White Paper on Defence were divided between conventional and
counterinsurgency.

Two points should be made about the terms in which the South African
government discussed its perception of the threat. First, the terms terrorism, insurgency,
insurrection, and guerrilla warfare were all used interchangeably by government
officials. Second, the armed forces also made no distinction between confronting
externally supported and mounted threats and assisting the SAP in the enforcement of
internal security regulations. Both were classified as counterinsurgency duties. The
tendency in South Africa not to distinguish between an external non-conventional
threat and internal unrest, to lump all forms of unconventional threat under the heading
“terrorism,” was significant for two reasons. First, this view allowed, within the
framework of the Total Onslaught/Total National Strategy, a logical connection
between the communist threat, “terrorist” organizations, and internal unrest in South
Africa. For the Republic, the ANC was an agent of “revolutionary and terrorist warfare.
. . playing in the orchestra of Moscow. . . to further the process of destabilisation in the
region of the Republic of South Africa.” Once this connection was made, it was
possible to see internal unrest, such as boycotts and the actions of labor unions, as
resulting, not from South Africa’s internal apartheid policies, but as a result of external interference from black Africa and the Soviet Union. In 1981, Prime Minister Botha accurately asserted that the Soviet Union was providing financial support to such revolutionary organizations inside South Africa as the banned ANC and that some of South Africa’s neighboring states were providing bases for terrorists.

The second point to be made is that this view of terrorism as inspired by external interference rather than internal policies had implications for South Africa’s neighbours. Since it first became involved in Angola, South Africa had justified cross-border operations as a legitimate reaction to disturbances inside South Africa: “It is the clear and repeatedly stated policy of the South African government that it will take whatever measures are necessary to counter political violence. That policy includes striking at terrorists in their bases wherever they may be.” As long as internal unrest was linked to intervention by its neighbours in the Republic’s internal affairs, the government could justify a wide variety of defensive responses. These ranged from “hot pursuit” operations to pre-emptive strikes to the actual occupation of territory and destabilization of neighbouring governments.

With the upsurge in ANC attacks after 1980, mostly from Mozambique, these raids assumed greater importance. In February, 1980, South African security forces discovered the biggest cache of ANC ammunition ever found in South Africa near the Mozambique border in Natal. A few months later, the ANC performed its highly successful sabotage of the Sasol plant. In 1981, the ANC claimed responsibility for the sabotage of two major power stations in the Transvaal. Worse, in May, 1982, the ANC car bombed the SAAF Headquarters on a busy Pretoria street, killing eighteen South Africans and wounding 200. Finally, the damage done to the Koeberg nuclear power complex by a 1982 ANC attack demonstrated to all South Africans the power and sophistication of ANC sabotage.

As such, driving the ANC as far from South Africa’s borders as possible dominated much of the Republic’s national security policy. Standing in Pretoria’s way of totally expelling the ANC from southern Africa were regional governments sympathetic to the political aims of the ANC and willing to afford the ANC shelter, aid, and encouragement. To combat this situation, Pretoria oriented much of its national security policy to:

The fact that certain states in the region adapted an unfriendly stance towards South Africa, in the sense of
making their territories available to the ANC for terrorist attacks on South Africa, compelled the government to safeguard its wider national interests. There was no other choice.62

Thus, a fundamental component of South African national security was an attempt to prevent its neighbours from supporting the ANC and affording it direct access to South Africa.

South Africa claimed that its raids in the neighbouring states responded to such ANC terrorist acts. For instance, the discovery of the arms cache in Natal led directly to the South African attack of the ANC in Matola in January, 1981.63 Similarly, South Africa answered the Pretoria car bombing with an air attack against suspected ANC quarters in Maputo and a blockade on all trade to and from Lesotho, forcing the expulsion of over 3000 South African refugees from Lesotho.64 As General C.L. Viljoen, chief of the SADF, explained, terror raids formed an integral component of South African defence:

The South African Defence Force has no other choice but to launch cross-border operations with the purpose of destroying enemy bases, supply stores, and logistical channels, and in the process to check enemy action from areas on the borders of the Republic of South Africa. Enemy host countries have already been warned repeatedly and at the highest level that support for and harbouring of terrorist organisations which are directed at overthrowing the authorities are not to be tolerated and that there will be no hesitation in taking the appropriate steps against such enemies.65

Finally, SADF raids appealed to President Reagan’s anti-terrorist measures, especially American anti-terrorist strikes in Libya. For example, Botha and Malan linked ANC, PAC, and SWAPO actions to Libyan terrorism. Malan even claimed that these anti-South African organizations were part of the same international terror network to which Libya belonged.66 As such, Pretoria attempted to link South Africa with American attempts to extinguish terrorism.

The efficacy of this approach was confirmed when, on June 18, 1985, President Reagan was asked about the South African retaliation against ANC targets in Botswana that killed twelve. In his response, the president linked ANC violence to the Trans World Airlines hijacking incident that resulted in the murder of U.S. Navy diver, Robert Dean Stethem:
The raid across the border was perhaps the kind of incident that I’ve just been talking about here in our own situation. There is no question about the violence of the ANC [African National Congress] and their striking and their attacks on people and their murdering and so forth.67

In the same question and answer session with the media that he linked the ANC with terrorism, President Reagan would declare to “international assassins” and “terrorists” that:

America will never make concessions to terrorists—to do so would only invite more terrorism—nor will we ask nor pressure any other government to do so. Once we head down that path there would be no end to it, no end to the suffering of innocent people, no end to the bloody ransom all civilized nations must pay.

In subsequent remarks to the media and in speeches, Regan would continue to refer to “the Soviet-armed guerrillas of the African National Congress, operating both within South Africa and from some neighboring countries” that had “embarked upon new acts of terrorism.” In his June 22, 1986 speech, just days after the shooting of unarmed protestors by South African security forces, the president detailed the tactics of the ANC as:

the mining of roads, the bombings of public places, designed to bring about further repression, the imposition of martial law, eventually creating the conditions for racial war. The most common method of terror is the so-called necklace. In this barbaric way of reprisal, a tire is filled with kerosene or gasoline, placed around the neck of an alleged collaborator, and ignited. The victim may be a black policeman, a teacher, a soldier, a civil servant. It makes no difference. The atrocity is designed to terrorize blacks into ending all racial cooperation and to polarize South Africa as prelude to a final, climactic struggle for power.68

In dealing with the ANC, Reagan believed the South Africans had “a right and responsibility to maintain order in the face of terrorists.” He would unequivocally state that the South African government was under no obligation to “negotiate the future of the country with any organization that . . . uses terrorist tactics and violence.” This rhetoric perfectly mirrored that used by the South African government, which described the ANC as “revolutionaries, perpetrators of violence and adventurers” that would not
be included in the reform process because it wanted to “dominate through dictatorship.”

In October, 1986 the apartheid government took to the airwaves to state that “where the ANC’s commitment to violence and revolution is concerned, there is abundant and incontrovertible evidence” including:

- the most depraved acts of violence the necklacing murders have been endorsed by the African National Congress, with its Secretary General, Mr Alfred Nzo, saying that this is something that black people should use against other black people who are suspected of being what he calls collaborators. Mrs Winnie Mandela, wife of Nelson Mandela, has said: Together, hand-in-hand with our boxes of matches and our necklaces, we shall liberate this country.

This radio address was directed at the United States Congress, which was then advocating for sanctions and that the ANC be unbanned and Nelson Mandela released. Pretoria urged the U.S. Congress to “take note” of the organization’s use of terrorism and “of much other evidence of the ANC’s stance on violence and . . . not merely set out to whitewash the organisation.” Botha’s government would continue to foster this theme by disseminating a video to American legislators and friendly media outlets titled The ANC Method: Violence. The video included pictures and video of members of the ANC juxtaposed with images of the Palestine Liberation Organization, the Irish Republican Army, the Red Brigades, and the German Baader-Meinhoff gang. A screen shot of ANC President Oliver Tambo was inserted between Lybia’s Moammar Gadhafi and PLO chairman Yasser Arafat, while scenes of political assassinations, the murder of civilians in the Roman airport, and the murdered of American sailor Robert Dean Stethemon the AchilleLauro were linked to necklacings in South Africa.

The approach was effective, with President Reagan’s Republican allies in the United States Congress labelling the ANC and other “so-called ‘National Liberation Movements’” as “Soviet-sponsored terrorist organizations.” In testimony to the subcommittee on Security and Terrorism, witnesses detail acts of violence by the ANC including the “horrifying consequences” of “bombing an urban shopping center and automobile showrooms, and attacks on small police stations manned by South African blacks.” The Republican congressmen were building on a June 1981 hearing titled “Historical Antecedents of Soviet Terrorism” that found “subcontractors” like the ANC were part of the “Soviet Union’s commitment to the use of terrorism and armed revolution to achieve its goal of Communist world domination.” The committee
warned that “Western interests is enhanced by southern Africa’s geopolitical importance along the strategic sea routes around Africa and by its growing importance as a source of critical minerals” and added “We will not lend our voice to support those dedicated to seizing and holding power through violence.” The fact that the current South African government was holding onto power using violence apparently never occurred to the committee that concluded “that humane values are not necessarily served by the overthrow of conservative regimes. If we encourage upheavals without putting in their place a moderate democratic alternative, a foreign policy conducted in the name of justice and human rights, could wind up by making the world safe for anti-American radicalism.” To highlight the violent nature of the ANC, the committee issued a statement that “the witnesses who appeared before the subcommittee [were] protected while in Washington by the . . . U.S. Marshal Services” because the organization had issued a “death notice” on all defectors. 74

Another committee headed by Republican Congressman Dan Burton would claim the ANC was a terrorist organization comparable to the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and would “kill anyone who participates in any sort of reform.”75 Burton told the committee that he had no objection to the South Africans negotiating with “legitimate organizations representing the black majority” but:

My objection is to naming a particular organization as representing the black majority, and especially to naming an organization that is clearly allied to the South African Communist Party. This committee would not support an organization allied with nazis or facists[sic], and I do not think we should lend legitimacy to a group allied with people who are equally antidemocratic and anti-American. On the House floor, I was charged with saying that because of communism we cannot do anything about apartheid. I resent that charge. I resent the idea that because I look at history and see nation after nation fall to Communist-backed revolutions claiming to bring freedom and each time, after a great bloodbath, bringing greater misery and oppression that I am against freedom or for apartheid. All I am pointing out is that alliances between Communists and non-Communists have always resulted in a complete tyranny and great bloodshed. It happened in Nicaragua. It happened in Angola. It happened in Vietnam. It happened in Mozambique. It happened in Grenada. And it happened in Ethiopia. Why are we helping to bring the same fate to South Africa?

Burton urged his fellow congressmen to support “the many non-Communist black groups in South Africa” and “not support blindly any group that opposes
apartheid regardless of Communist influence that would bring a new tyranny—this time, compliments of the Soviet Union.” The anti-ANC rhetoric emanating from the U.S. Congress would continue with Senator Jesse Helms questioning Chester Crocker about “that violent group in South Africa, the African National Congress, the crowd that is fighting for freedom by hanging tires around the necks of people who disagree with them, filling them with gasoline, setting them afire, including children.” Senator Helm’s, however, failed to see the irony when he asked Crocker why the United States State Department was not opening a dialogue with RENAMO, a group that committed acts of terror against Mozambican citizens.76

4.2.4 South African Society and the Total Strategy

Not only had the commitment to Total Strategy militarized the government and industry of South Africa, it had also affected South African society. Pretoria had tried to foster an atmosphere that made military service attractive and made military responses to policy issues look sensible. It had tried to justify increased expenditures on the armed forces as vital to national security.77 This process had permeated every sector of South African society. First, military propaganda pervaded the South African media. South African television abounded with heavily edited documentaries designed to emphasize the “total onslaught” and the SADF’s role in combating the Soviet advance. Often, radio and television news, especially the state-owned and operated radio-television network, featured military events and frequently covered military parades that promoted and glorified South African military service. With the advertising industry on the military bandwagon, South African media both directly and indirectly created an emotional climate conducive to the Total National Strategy.78

Second, white education had also acquired a military dimension. The SADF had set up cadet programs of paramilitary drills and training, which were compulsory for all white boys in government schools. Elementary and even nursery school students journeyed to local military installations for field trips.79 Third, citizens were encouraged to participate in counter-infiltration manoeuvres in their local districts. In areas sensitive to ANC terrorist raids, especially in northern Natal and the eastern Transvaal, citizens belonged to “area-protection” units of the South African Army and were tasked with defending their districts from communist subversion.80

The Total National Strategy found a receptive audience among white South Africans, particularly among Afrikaans-speakers. National militarization was deeply
rooted in the Afrikaner way of defining his social and political world. A nation armed in unity was characteristic of the way the Afrikaner has confronted threats to his security throughout South African history. As former Prime Minister D.F. Malan explained, the national survival of the Afrikaner in the face of threats from the “barbarians” should be the goal of national security policy:

> It is through the will of God that the Afrikaner People exists at all. In His wisdom He determined that on the southern point of Africa... People should be born who would be the bearer of Christian culture and civilization...God also willed that the Afrikaans People should be continually threatened by other Peoples... there were times when as a result of this Afrikaner was deeply despairing, but God at the same time prevented the swamping of the young Afrikaner People in the sea of barbarianism.

Furthermore, communism’s advocacy of racial equality rendered the anticommunist component of Total Strategy crucial to the national defence of white South Africa. The ideology that formed the basis for Afrikaner perceptions of the world was that of the volk as an ethnic group with its own distinct religion, culture, and political sovereignty. The survival of the volk had preoccupied Afrikaners for 150 years. The assumption of power by the National Party in 1948 did not allay the feelings of concern over the preservation of this identity. Instead, having a majority in Parliament meant that, for the first time, Afrikaners would be able to control the government and ensure the survival of the volk. As internal and external pressures on South Africa had grown since 1960, the focus of the South African response had remained the preservation of their identity. The debate between verligte (enlightened) and verkrampte (closed off) Afrikaners was not a struggle between liberal and conservative, but a narrower dispute over the most effective means to accomplish the same end.

Religious and legal principles formed an important part of the ideological foundation of the Total National Strategy. Maintenance of Christian values in the face of Western materialism and communist atheism was a real concern of the Dutch Reformed churches of South Africa, a concern that was shared with many South African English-speaking churches. Regard for law and morality in international relations was included in Afrikaner university instruction. Ironically, non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries was an often-quoted legal principle, reflecting...
South Africa’s disinterest in the affairs of other nations and the desire of South Africa to detach its own domestic affairs from its dealings with other countries.

Another facet of the concern with law and religion was a preoccupation with the view that South Africa stood alone as an isolated outpost of Western Christian civilization against a growing “onslaught” on these values. The communists of the Soviet Union were responsible for this attack, but they were unintentionally supported by other forces weakening the Western world, including liberalism, materialism, secularism, and socialism. South African leaders took seriously the idea that the ultimate goal of the Soviet Union was world domination and apparently viewed other communist states, such as the Peoples’ Republic of China, as Soviet agents. The 1982 Defence White Paper defined the threat in these terms:

> The ultimate aim of the Soviet Union and its allies is to overthrow the present body politic in the RSA and replace it with a Marxist-oriented form of government to further the objectives of the U.S.S.R., therefore all possible methods and means are used to attain this objective. This includes instigating social and labor unrest, civilian resistance, terrorist attacks against the infrastructure of the RSA and the intimidation of Black leaders and members of the Security Forces. This “onslaught” is supported by a worldwide propaganda campaign and the involvement of various front organizations, such as trade unions and even certain church organizations and leaders.⁸⁵

This is not to say that all the whites in South Africa were united behind the government on every issue. There was a traditional split between Afrikaner and English-speaking South Africans to be considered. Equally important within the context of South African defence policy was how white South Africans supported the government on defence matters and how willing they were to endure military service in support of, as they saw it, their way of life. With regard to white support for government defence policies, it is useful to examine a public opinion survey conducted by Geldenhuys in 1982.⁸⁶ This survey found that the government’s explanation of the communist threat was shared by the majority of the white population. Furthermore, there were indications that the majority of the white population supported such government defence policies as cross-border operations in order to meet the threat. In addition, white South Africans had endured an ever-increasing burden of military service with little outward display of opposition. These stances did not mean that opposition to government defence policies and conscription could not increase in response to increased pressure on South Africa, as happened in Rhodesia in the waning
days of the Smith regime. It did mean that, as long as the government could redirect, diffuse, or effectively respond to these pressures, white approval would remain high, allowing the government to rely on a continued high level of support from the nation’s white population.

Thus, with political, economic, social, technological, and media support, one observer concluded:

Total Strategy selectively interprets the world in the narrow, didactic and melodramatic terms with which white South Africa is so familiar, confusing communism, nationalism, dissidence, subversion, racism and imperialism into an interpenetrable [sic] mélange from which only the security of the white state emerges as constant and paramount.87

In short, through the militarization of South Africa, Pretoria hoped to enhance South African capabilities to preserve apartheid and dominate its neighbours. Operating under the guidelines of the Total National Strategy, Pretoria oversaw a major governmental reorganization, military expansion, increase in arms production, and social militarization in order to render South Africa self-reliant in face of the “total onslaught.”

4.2.5 The Twelve-Point Plan

Throughout the first half of 1979, Botha, who had begun formulating the Total National Strategy while Minster of Defence, and his main spokesperson, General Malan, continued to expand upon the total conflict and the need for a strategy to combat the threats it posed. In June, Malan called for cohesion of population groups to face the communist conventional, unconventional, and psychological threats. In July 1979, P. W. Botha raised the “total conflict” issue with regard to South Africa’s position in Namibia.88 By August 1979, Botha was ready to unveil his new strategy. Speaking at the Natal National Party Congress, he outlined what came to be known as the Twelve-Point Plan. This plan, as it was stated and fine-tuned over the following months, attempted to define policy objectives for the government over a wide range of interests. Botha presented the plan as one to which the government was totally committed and as the only hope for salvation in the face of the “total onslaught.”89

The first six points of the plan dealt largely with domestic political matters. In short, these points stated the ideological foundation of the plan, making it clear that the plan was a restatement of National Party policy, committing South Africa to separate
development. The seventh point recognized the economic integration between the races that had already occurred and could be seen as an effort on the part of the government to remove ideology from economic activity. The eighth point announced what had already become a major foreign policy initiative of the Botha regime: the creation of a “peaceful constellation of states in southern Africa.” The formation of this constellation was seen as inevitable because economic, political, and security considerations drew the states of the region into closer relationships. In short, the constellation was a South African attempt to detach its internal policies from its external relations and to draw its neighbours closer together, mainly by establishing economic ties.⁹⁰

The ninth, tenth, and eleventh points dealt with South Africa’s defence policies. The ninth proclaimed South Africa’s determination to defend itself from any form of outside interference. The tenth called for a policy of neutrality in the East-West conflict. The eleventh concerned the “maintenance of effective decision making by the state, which rests on a strong Defence Force and Police Force to guarantee orderly government as well as efficient, clear administration.” This point reflected Botha’s style of governing and his upcoming reorganization, as well as the increased role that the military would play in South Africa’s government. The twelfth point committed the South African government to the maintenance of free enterprise as the economic basis of the country. This point reflected Botha’s attempt to draw the economic sector into his plans for both the constellation and internal change and, thus, was related to points seven and eight.⁹¹

4.2.6 Racial Dimension of the Twelve-Point Plan

In the area of relations between the races, the Twelve-Point Plan adhered to the tenets of separate development, but with a difference. Points one through three reconfirmed the commitment of South Africa to apartheid. Point four assigned some political power in the newly reorganized government to coloured and Asian peoples.⁹² In addition, administrative exemptions in the Group Areas Act would allow Asians and coloureds the right to house black servants and to receive general preference over blacks in the expenditure of government money. In these and other matters, it was apparently the intention of the government to blur the racial boundary between coloureds, Asians, and whites while widening the inequalities between these groups and blacks. This was clearly an attempt to pull two ambiguously situated groups into the white camp, thereby denying their support to the black majority.⁹³
Under the Total National Strategy concept, blacks were dealt with in a twofold strategy. First, rural blacks were handled by the homeland policy, the goal of which was to create a system of semi-independent, semi-autonomous states dominated by South Africa. Political development in these states was carefully monitored to ensure that these states remained dependent on and under the control of South Africa.  

Second, urban blacks received new “rights” that allowed them some local political power, limited rights of citizenship and property holding, and the promise of increased participation in the country’s economic institutions. Moves to accommodate urban blacks were supposed to result in new reform measures and greater responsiveness to the needs of this group. In reality, when considered in the light of the Total National Strategy, it seems that these moves were intended to split opposition to white dominance by separating rural and urban blacks. Just as the “political dispensation” accorded to Asians and coloureds was intended to split these groups from blacks, giving urban blacks a stake in the system was intended to separate them from rural blacks. As Frankel states, the “Total Strategy is also devoted to realizing the ‘old’ liberal belief that the existence of a black middle class committed to the ideals of free enterprise capitalism is an important ingredient in the maintenance of the system.”  

In 1983, South African government announced the creation of the new constitutional structure with a Tricameral legislature into which coloureds and Indians would be independently incorporated but black South Africans (73% of the populations) were to be denied any political participation. The first elections for this constitution were held in the fall of 1984 and were overwhelmingly boycotted by coloured and Indian voters. Only 30.9% of coloured and 20.3% of Indian voters who had even registered actually voted. For their part, blacks in South Africa regarded the elections as a “farce” and began to mobilize in opposition to the Total National Strategy’s new political dispensation.  

The Reagan Administration, for its part, presented the new constitutional plan as evidence of an ongoing reform process that could eventually lead to a nonracial society. Under-Secretary of State of Political Affairs Laurence Eagleburger declared
in a major speech on southern Africa in the summer of 1983, “the indisputable fact which we must recognize is that the South African Government has taken the first step toward extending national political rights beyond the white minority.” While critics of the regime had a tendency “to reject all incremental improvements that are not explicitly linked to a full-blown democratic blueprint,” the Reagan Administration, while recognizing “the limits of current change,” still expected such reforms to lead, in a careful, controlled, and evolutionary manner, to yet further change. Thus the administration believed it was “incumbent on us to avoid the arrogance of rejecting such steps. Nor, if we would be credible, can we expect South Africa’s would-be reformers to announce their game plan and their bottom line to the world at large.”

The South African constitutional plan, therefore, was viewed as deserving of the administration’s support and as evidence of the propriety of its policy of Constructive Engagement.

In the United States, interpretations of the new constitution’s significance differed sharply. Crocker hailed it as a limited but meaningful step toward “wider political participation,” while Sen. Edward Kennedy (D-MA) condemned it as “merely an attempt at ‘divide and rule.’” Although the Reagan Administration was not uncritical of the exclusion of blacks in the proposed system, it applauded Pretoria’s decision to extend political participation for nonwhite segments of the South African population. Some analysts argued that it “was the impression that the United States was identifying itself with the South African government’s latest scheme for preserving and prolonging apartheid that was critical to the view of Constructive Engagement held by most black South Africans.”

The view of Constructive Engagement held by a number of American congressmen was also further damaged when they realized that, not only would blacks be excluded from the new political dispensation, but many would be deprived of their South African citizenship because it appeared Pretoria would press on with its policy of removing Africans to the tribal homelands. A growing number of the members of Congress insisted that a tougher approach was needed if blacks in South Africa were ever to experience genuine change. The administration, however, was determined to shield the Republic from criticism concerning apartheid to help further its own strategic ambitions that could only be achieved with a powerful and active anticommmunist government operating within the region.
4.3 “People’s War”

By the beginning of the second Reagan Administration, a new movement against the apartheid regime was beginning in the Republic of South Africa. Undaunted by the uprisings, P.W. Botha warned:

The South African Government has not yet applied the full authority and powers of the State to create order in this country. If we are forced to use the full powers of the State, many people will be hurt. I want to issue this warning: There are people who are provoking us. There are people who they can play with us. There are people who think they can call in foreign powers to harm South Africa. Do make the mistakes of your lives. You will be hurt, and will be hurt badly.104

Despite Botha’s threats, the constitutional reform sparked black opposition and protest all over South Africa on a scale not seen since the 1976 Soweto student uprising.105 Discontented black South Africans expressed their outrage in many ways: work stay-aways; rent, school, and bus boycotts; peaceful demonstrations; political speeches; and so forth. The disturbances in the urban areas of the Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging area were the most severe, with an official death toll between August 1 and September 20, 1983, of eighty, sixty-five of whom were shot by the police. By the beginning of November, 155 South Africans had died in the protests.106

Clearly a new chapter was unfolding in the history of black opposition to apartheid in South Africa. Pretoria had assumed that the existential threat to South Africa was chiefly the Soviet Union operating through proxy states. However, with the increase in domestic protests against apartheid, Pretoria was forced to realize that the real challenge to its existence and the cornerstone of the black struggle for freedom was actually within South Africa itself.107

The new black anti-apartheid campaign was coordinated by the United Democratic Front (UDF), which brought together over four hundred community-based groups, trade unions, churches, student associations, and other anti-apartheid organizations. Even though it had its own local leadership, the UDF had strong contacts with the exiled African National Congress. In fact, it was understood from its inception that the UDF was the proxy for the outlawed ANC within South Africa. The movement’s strong links with the ANC were further indicated by the naming of Nelson Mandela as the organization’s patron.108
Even though the UDF’s immediate goal was to oppose the new constitutional reforms, its long-term vision was nearly identical to that of the ANC and was, in fact, very similar to the aims of the ANC’s Freedom Charter: the creation of a democratic, nonracial and apartheid-free South Africa. As David McKeen noted, this vision was embodied in the movement’s 1983 declaration:

We, the freedom loving people of South Africa, say with one voice to the whole world that we cherish the vision of a united, democratic South Africa based on the will of our people, and will strive for the unity of our people through united action against the evils of apartheid.109

The UDF staged demonstrations across South Africa, calling upon the Indians and coloureds to boycott the proposed 1984 elections held under the new constitution. Strikes were also organized by emerging nonracial organizations and black trade unions as additional forms of protest against the government’s constitutional reforms. Two umbrella organizations, the Transvaal Regional Stay-Away Committee (TRSC) and the Federation of South African Trade Unions (FOSATU), were at the forefront of this growing black labour challenge to the political order in South Africa.110

The mid-1980s in South Africa were characterized by intensified violence, including violence against municipal facilities, counter revolutionary violence directed at the liberation movement and protestors, and the “necklace” for black South Africans deemed as “impipis.” The necklace method involved hanging a gasoline soaked tire around the neck of black collaborators and setting it alight. The heat generated was so high it resulted in the skull of the victim bursting, providing a gruesome warning to any who might inform to the government.111 As the chaos raged in the townships, Oliver Tambo, speaking for the ANC, called on the protestors to make the Republic “ungovernable.”112 Concurrently, the number of MK guerrilla attacks jumped from 44 in 1984, to 136 in 1985, to 228 in 1986, adding to the bloodshed and pushing the country closer to anarchy.113 Considering the ANC’s historical hesitance to use popular uprisings in the battle against Pretoria, this was an important change in strategy.

Many authors believe that Oliver Tambo’s call, in 1985, for a “people’s war” was a cynical attempt to catch up to the reality on the streets. In fact, the ANC had been advocating for an escalation from the beginning of the township uprisings, contradicting the assertion that the ANC’s endorsement of a “people’s war” was retroactive, intended to consolidate its prominence in the liberation movement.
In his examination of the history of the UDF, Jeremy Seekings notes that pro-confrontationists within the UDF “not only were inspired by the events on the East Rand and Vaal Triangle, but also felt that they were doing the ANC’s bidding.”114 As early as the second day of the Vaal Uprising in September 1984, the ANC “called on its supporters to ‘intensify the struggle and . . . open new fronts. We must render inoperative the ability of apartheid to exploit and oppress us further. The sharp confrontations now raging in Sharpeville, Evaton, Sebokeng, Lenasia and other areas must be widened and extended to other areas.’”115

The ANC repeated such calls over the following months of 1984: “What is happening today . . . in the African areas around the Vaal Triangle must be extended to cover the entire country.” The protestors saw themselves as implementing the ANC’s calls for mass-based direct action, or what was later called “ungovernability.”116 The ANC had already made calls to render South Africa “ungovernable” when it met for its Second National Consultative Conference in Kabwe, Zambia, in June 1985, but the conference incorporated this new tactic into the organization’s official strategy.117

Kabwe introduced three significant shifts in policy that deviated from the strategic conceptions the ANC had held since the turn to violence in the early 1960s: the endorsement of mass uprisings, the decentralization and expansion of armed activity to a “people’s war,” and the removal of the prohibition on “soft” targets. ANC statements before, during, and after Kabwe explicitly endorsed the mass uprising in which township residents across the country were encouraging blacks to make the nation “ungovernable.” The ANC thereby abandoned its former belief that mass uprising was an ineffective or even counter-productive method of struggle. Kabwe officially encouraged “a decentralized form of armed struggle reminiscent of the PAC’s earlier call for mass insurrection.”118

At Kabwe, the ANC also decided that the armed struggle against the apartheid government and its institutions should be stepped up and “endorsed the conversion of Umkhonto strategy from sporadic attack to ‘people’s war.’”119 Essentially, people’s war meant the intensification of violence inside South Africa.120 In conjunction with the spontaneous violence black South Africans were undertaking, the MK trained people locally and, more significantly, distributed weapons extensively throughout the townships.121 The fact that the number of MK guerrilla attacks jumped from 44 in 1984, to 136 in 1985—with fully 80 of those attacks occurring in the second half of 1985 after the June Kabwe conference—to 228 in 1986 indicates that the wider distribution of
weapons resulting from the ANC’s new strategy was having an immediate impact. Additionally, the ANC “encouraged all militants to identify themselves as part of MK, regardless of formal affiliation or training.” Therefore, the ANC did not merely endorse the uprising—it actively supported it and tried to escalate the unrest to create chaos in the Republic.

After Kabwe in 1985, the ANC continued to call for a decentralized armed struggle. In January 1986, the National Executive Committee of the ANC issued a statement entitled “Attack, Advance, Give the Enemy No Quarter!” The title of the document is an accurate indication of its incendiary rhetoric. Reflecting on the successes of 1985, it praised the “mass combat units” that had helped make South Africa ungovernable while continuing to emphasize that the “urgent task we face this year is the rapid expansion and extensive activisation of Umkhonto we Sizwe within the country, drawing in the millions of our people into combat” with the goal of “intensifying and transforming the armed struggle into a real people’s war.” In another call to the people in May 1986—”From Ungovernability to People’s Power”—the ANC was even more explicit in its advocacy of arming the masses, calling for the formation of “mobile defence units.”

Let us intensify our armed activities at all levels. More and more contingents of our people must be armed. . . . We must multiply the formation of people’s defence militia everywhere so as to meet more effectively the assault by the enemy’s armed forces and the treacherous vigilantes and “impis” which they employ. Our People’s Army, strengthened by the emerging popular militia, must intensify and spread its armed actions across the country.

The Kabwe proceedings also made a decisive break with the ANC’s tradition of non-violence and sustained commitment to avoiding bloodshed, resolving that the war should become more violent in its tactics by dissolving the prohibition on attacking “soft targets,” that is, civilians.

In a press conference on June 25, 1985, immediately following the close of the Kabwe conference, Oliver Tambo was questioned about the conference’s conclusions about what were legitimate military targets. Tambo admitted that the ANC had indeed relaxed the distinction between hard and soft targets, explaining simply that “the struggle must be intensified at all costs.” Justifying the move because of the government’s own soft-target attacks, Tambo claimed that “the distinction between ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ is going to disappear in an intensified confrontation, in an escalating
Furthermore, when asked specifically whether the ANC would start attacking white civilians rather than adhere to its old tactic of sabotage, Tambo reiterated the ANC’s new stance that “in the course of intensification of the struggle the distinction between soft and hard targets—buildings and people—will naturally disappear. . . . In the course of escalation, that is not going to be avoidable.”

However, the ANC did not reject the possibility of negotiations with the apartheid government. Although the Political Report of the Kabwe Conference states that the ANC believed the government was trying to use negotiations to divide the liberation movement, it also asserts that “the NEC is of the view that we cannot be seen to be rejecting a negotiated settlement in principle. . . . No revolutionary movement can be against negotiations in principle.” Such vagueness and ambiguity about the endgame of the uprisings not only allowed such a double vision to exist within the ANC, but more importantly, gave the ANC the strategic flexibility to react to whatever course the struggle ended up taking.

In the short term, the ANC’s encouragement of all-out intensification of the struggle in order to put pressure on the state created some complications for the leaders who aimed at negotiated settlement. Thabo Mbeki, head of the ANC’s department of information and one of the proponents for the negotiations strategy, stated in an interview in 1985 that “our aim is to win whites away from apartheid . . . So, terrorist attacks hurt us.” In the end, however, the radical rhetoric served a essential purpose in spite of its short term consequences because it kept the ANC’s radical supporters faithful to the organization as it secretly began negotiations, giving the ANC the base of mass political support that substantiated the ANC’s claim to be the chief political player in future negotiations with the state.

This development would have important implications for the Reagan Administration’s policy of Constructive Engagement. From the beginning, the administration had shown no interest in dealing with the ANC and had minimized contact as early as 1981 when the administration had declined to take a meeting with the group. In the administration’s view, the ANC was a Soviet sponsored terrorist proxy that “does not want a peaceful settlement . . . who want trouble in the streets and that’s what’s going on.” A year later, the U.S. Senate’s Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism added to that sentiment, reporting:
The evidence received by the subcommittee is deeply disturbing. It suggests strongly that the original purposes of the ANC and SWAPO have been subverted, and that the Soviets and their allies have achieved alarmingly effective control over them. The demonstrated activities of these organisations, moreover, cannot easily be reconciled with the goal of liberation or the promotion of freedom. The evidence has thus served to illustrate once again the Soviet Union’s support for terrorism under the guise of aiding struggles for national liberation. It is past time to bring these facts to the attention of our policymakers, the American people, and the world at large.\textsuperscript{135}

The ANC and SWAPO had become “Soviet sponsored terrorist organizations” in the subcommittee’s view. While American foreign policy should be “grounded in the humane values of our people and of our democratic traditions,” the committee warned that:

Iran should teach us that humane values are not necessarily served by the overthrow of conservative regimes. If we encourage upheavals without putting in their place a moderate democratic alternative, a foreign policy conducted in the name of justice and human rights, could wind up by making the world safe for anti-American radicalism. . . . The findings of the subcommittee appear particularly relevant at a time when SWAPO and the ANC are being touted as the sole legitimate political forces and representatives of the people in Namibia and South Africa, respectively. Cuba, Vietnam, Nicaragua, and Iran are glaring and tragic reminders of our failure to fully comprehend and appreciate the motives, ideologies and interrelationships of those who sought political power under the guise of national liberation. These situations also serve as graphic examples of the terrible price which others have paid for our previous mistakes.

Therefore, all diplomatic contacts with the organization were severed by the Reagan Administration and contacts with more moderate elements within the black community, including Zulu Chief Gatsha Buthelezi. The President meet with Buthelezi in February 1985 and described the chief as a “very impressive man—well educated & while dedicated to ending apartheid in S. Africa still is well balanced & knows it will take time.”\textsuperscript{136} Reagan believed that leaders like Buthelezi represented not just the interests of black South Africans, but also enjoyed popular support in the Republic. In a letter to his friend George Murphy, the president wrote that he had “recent figures” that showed the majority of black South Africans opposed punitive sanctions and “are well aware they would be the first to suffer and many of their leaders flatly declare that the radicals who do not want them, want them because of the chaos they would bring. And, of course, they would be ready to seize power with the help of the Red Brethren.”\textsuperscript{137} This rhetoric
would dovetail perfectly with the policies of the Botha Administration that refused to negotiate with the ANC on the grounds it was a “tool of the South African Communist Party” working “at the behest of a foreign power.”

Events in the Republic should certainly have changed how the Reagan Administration addressed events in South Africa. With black South Africans—many loyal to the ANC—prepared to risk imprisonment and death to achieve full political rights, it stands to reason that Constructive Engagement, which stressed process over specifics, would have to adapt to survive. However, American officials talked to the National Party only, relying on the Total National Strategy to produce change in South Africa that would reduce internal violence and provide political cover for Constructive Engagement.

In short, the Reagan Administration could not achieve its goal of rolling back communist influence in the region by negotiating with what it considered a Soviet proxy. When asked if the administration believed the ANC was “antithetical to American interests” and needed to be rolled back in the region, Reagan official Pat Buchanan replied, “By then, the ANC was the predominant opposition force, and just as we had to deal with the VC [Vietcong] and NVA [North Vietnamese Army] in Vietnam [sic], no one would have believed that we could ignore the main opposition force, the ANC.” When asked about Buchanan’s viewpoint on the ANC and if this represented President Reagan’s view, Secretary Crocker replied, “that was Pat Buchanan’s policy” and that American policy in southern Africa was a success “no thanks to him.” When asked if he thought majority rule, which would have inevitably resulted in the ANC taking power in the Republic, was antithetical to American interests, Chester Crocker replied, “We never believed the ANC was a terrorist movement . . . We were concerned about their policies, but were convinced they were worthwhile.”

While the secretary may have viewed the ANC as a legitimate political force, there is considerable evidence that Crocker indeed viewed the organization as antithetical to American interests. This is most obvious when Secretary Crocker reasoned that one of the best moments for a “fresh opportunity” for change during this period would come only when “Pretoria had physically broken the back of the resistance movement” through the Total National Strategy.

According to press reports, the Reagan Administration moved beyond rhetorical attacks on the ANC by providing Pretoria with intelligence on “communications between the African National Congress headquarters in Lusaka, Zambia, its guerrilla
training camps in Angola and its offices in Africa and Western Europe” that was intended to provide “specific advance information on planned bombings and disruptions by the congress.” One former administration official said that the intelligence gathering was “routine” and added “they also wanted any and all tasking related to the A.N.C., including the movements of Oliver Tambo. We got a list of 10 people of Tambo’s staff—the A.N.C. high command.” An intelligence officer serving in the Reagan Administration was quoted as saying “I’ve known about it for a long time, that we target the A.N.C. We’ve always considered them to be the bad guys, to be Soviet pawns, stalking horses for the Soviets.”143

On July 23, 1986, Secretary of State Schultz acknowledged that the administration had “serious concerns about the ultimate objectives” of the ANC but denied the CIA was conducting intelligence operations aimed at the organization—a curious denial considering it was the National Security Agency (NSA) that was alleged to have undertaken those activities. CBS News reported the same day as the Schultz denial that it had confirmed that the National Security Agency had “spied on the African National Congress” during the Reagan Administration and “passed the information on to British intelligence.” The British, in turn, then passed the information to the “South African secret police.”144 Though the administration would continue to deny any intelligence gathering on behalf of Pretoria, when the U.S. Congress drafted sanctions legislation aimed at South Africa, the Reagan Administration successfully lobbied to have intelligence cooperation between the United States and the Republic exempted—a strange request if no such cooperation existed.

4.4 State of Emergency and the Total Strategy

As violence began to overwhelm the townships, Botha faced the certainty that his reform package was insufficient to overcome the “sabotage” of the black opposition.145 Though he had always presented the Tricameral parliament as a first step in his reform process, the black population’s near universal rejection of the constitution would now force Botha to push forward with new reforms.146 Determined to maintain control, the administration had to bring black leaders into the process or risk the unrest in the townships overwhelming the Republic’s ability to effectively govern the country. Botha’s new approach would consist of driving a wedge between black constituencies and the introduction of new security measures to improve his bargaining position when the black leadership was brought to the negotiating table. The Botha approach was
applauded by the Reagan Administration as it attempted to rollback Soviet influence in the region vis-à-vis the South African Total National Strategy.

At the opening of the Tricameral parliament in January 1985, Botha announced that full property rights for Africans in urban areas would be legislated into existence, that the detested influx control would be altered to make them less cumbersome, and that the policy of forced removals would be reviewed. Other legislative matters addressed during this period included the replacement of the hated passbooks—central to the enforcement of the influx control system—in April 1985 by a universal identity book for all South Africans. In December that same year, Minister of Constitutional Development and Planning, Chris Heunis, announced that qualified black South Africans would be eligible for freeholder rights rather than the ninety-nine year property leasing system. The basic constitutional dispensation, however, would continue to exclude blacks from direct participation at the national level and white dominance of the political system would continue.

Essential to Botha’s reforms was a rethinking of the relationship between South African and the homelands from that of a series of bi-lateral contacts to that of a multi-lateral system. At the National party congress in Durban, Botha’s speech focused on the need for the abandonment of the “outdated” system of influx control, one of the cornerstones of apartheid. This was followed by a speech at Bloemfontein where Botha declared that South African citizenship would be restored to black Africans, both within the homelands and the Republic. Botha indicated that black leaders in the homelands would be involved in the negotiating process as long as they agreed to renounce “violence as a tool for change.” Botha would also agree that his administration would be committed to a single South Africa citizenship. Legislatively speaking, these speeches outlined Botha’s way forward when face with violent uprisings in the townships. These reforms, however, would not fundamentally change the racial basis of political representation in South Africa nor threaten the integrity of group identity. Indeed, Botha would continue to claim that the white population was not a minority. In an October 1985 National Party meeting Botha stated: “We are a land of minorities, not a land of white minorities as against a vast Black majority.” This would echo an earlier statement that: “There is nothing to prevent the Black peoples of South Africa from becoming one state. They have not formed it because they are different peoples with different backgrounds, different cultures, different languages, different ambitions, different lifestyles, different customs.” President Reagan would express
similar sentiments, referring to the issue of “tribalism” in South Africa and claiming that dissolving apartheid was complicated because “we have a great division even among the people who are being oppressed. It is a tribal policy more than it is a racial policy, and that is one of the most difficult parts here.”\textsuperscript{154}

While the Prime Minister continued to address the issue of reconciliation throughout the early 1980s, it was his August 1985 speech to the National Party Congress, dubbed the “Rubicon Speech,” that was to layout the reform agenda for the second half of the decade. After ridiculing those elements of South African society that had offered unsolicited opinions on what he should propose in his speech, Botha outlined the accomplishments of his reform process, including “modernizing our labor laws, the creation of a Development Bank for Southern Africa, as well as a Corporation for the Development of Small Business Activities” and a “provision for R100 million to provide people with work.” On the political front, the Prime Minister reminded his audience that “since South Africa freed itself from colonialism, democracy has already been broadened and millions of people who never had a say in Governmental affairs under the British Colonial system, have it today.” Though Botha foresaw a place for black participation in the Homelands and offered the vague promise of “broadening of democracy,” he assured his audience that “reasonable South Africans will not accept the principle of one-man-one-vote in a unitary system. That would lead to domination of one over the other and it would lead to chaos. Consequently, I reject it as a solution.” He labeled the black opposition as “barbaric communist agitators and murderers” that were on the “payroll of their communist masters.” Even Nelson Mandela, at that point imprisoned for decades, was singled out as a violent, communist revolutionary and his past crimes against the apartheid government were recounted in detail. How this laundry list of grievances and reiteration of previously established government policy was a departure from the status quo, a “crossing of the Rubicon,” Prime Minister Botha never explained.\textsuperscript{155}

The Botha speech, widely anticipated as a blueprint for a move away from apartheid, was widely panned as a failure, both within the Republic and internationally.\textsuperscript{156} The Prime Minister, however, never conceded that his reform package had failed and in January 1985 the government moved ahead with a plan to establish a negotiating forum comprising the government and African leaders to debate the future direction of political reform.\textsuperscript{157} Seeking to draw prominent figures from the homelands
and black local authorities into the process, Botha declared that the National Council would be empowered to discuss:

a wide range of constitutional and related matters to improve communication between the Government and Black communities and to create a more favorable basis for negotiations aimed at arriving at mutually acceptable development steps in the constitutional field.\textsuperscript{158}

Participants would include government officials from all three houses of parliament, “homeland” leaders, leaders from the urbanized African communities, and other African leaders outside of established structures.\textsuperscript{159} Its initial focus would be community concerns, but the National Council would also address the issue of creating a new political dispensation that would be “a starting point for power-sharing.”\textsuperscript{160}

There, however, was one persistent problem with Botha’s vision of black South African cooperation in his reform process—no black South African leader would actually participate. Even the usually reliable Chief Buthelezi, whose participation was essential to the success of the process, dismissed the President’s National Council stating:

I would start negotiation with the State President tomorrow if he was serious about addressing the fundamental issues of black constitutional rights in our country. But if he wants to go it alone in the national council then he is welcome to try with whomever is prepared to sit with him on it.\textsuperscript{161}

His plan now totally rejected, Botha pushed ahead without input from the black majority. He would reaffirm his basic approach to gradual reform in September 1986, declaring:

Our reform is a process of modernization. In announcing the Twelve Point Plan for orderly change and reform seven years ago, I then stated this truth. Through the adoption of the Twelve Point Plan, we undertook to continue with meaningful reform on a wide and balanced basis. On the one hand the plan was the affirmation of a framework and a point of departure through which the realities of our multi-cultural society would serve as the guidelines for reform and modernisation. On the other hand it was also the basis on which concrete reform steps in the fields of constitutional, economic and social affairs could be implemented. It was enunciated with due cognisance of our national security, prosperity, foreign relations and our national interests. Any objective observer who has kept a close watch on developments during the past seven years since the Twelve Point Plan was announced, would have to agree that
we are indeed succeeding in the realisation of those goals we have set for ourselves.162

On the issue of one-man-one-vote, however, Botha would not compromise. To enter into a unitary system would amount to suicide:

We do not want to forfeit our civilised values. We want to improve them and share them with others. We believe that it is ours, that it belongs to our children, that it belongs to South Africa. These include respect for property and for religious freedom. They include respect for our language rights and those of others; they include our culture and cultures of others; they include our family and the traditional way of life of others as families.163

Two years later, Prime Minister Botha would reiterate this theme stating “Our policy is one of orderly evolutionary liberation. If we fail, a light will die that our forefathers helped to light in Africa.”164

At every stage of the process, the Reagan Administration would support Botha’s approach to political reform—a process that would ensure that the black majority remained without any say in the foreign policy of the Republic. Secretary George Shultz would declare that the constitutional reforms were of “major importance” and that “blacks are acquiring a steadily expanding base of de facto leverage as consumers, workers, professionals and fellow South Africans” though the “time for broadened and overt political bargaining (except in the South African-Homeland context) has not yet arrived.” Shultz warned detractors of Botha’s reform process that they were “cheering on a . . . race war in southern Africa.”165 For his part, Chester Crocker dismissed critics as too focused on outcomes and described the Botha Administration as a “reformist government”166 that had created “many opportunities in terms of the peaceful organization by black South Africans for acquiring a greater stake, acquiring a better bargaining stance in the future.”167 When pressed on how exactly this could be accomplished given the lack of black representation in the government, Crocker commented that the black majority needed to drop their myopic demand to end apartheid and enter the political process without preconditions.168

It was in the days following Botha’s disastrous “Rubicon Speech” that American audiences, including the U.S. Congress, waited to see if the Reagan Administration would finally break with the Botha Administration and support sanctions against Pretoria. Prime Minister Botha had nothing to fear. The Reagan Administration described the speech as an “important development” that “could be an important step
away from ‘Grand Apartheid’ under which all blacks are to be based—and have their political voice—in tribal homelands.” The State Department memo described Botha’s approach as “dismantling apartheid” and that “his newly stated vision of the reform process” signalled “a new determination to reduce racial polarization at home and to defuse foreign criticism.” Because the administration’s reaction would be “carefully watched both here and there . . . We cannot be overly warm” but:

we also must see the speech in its historical context; it may be the most important step to date by the Afrikaners to come to terms publicly with South African political reality and the imperative of change. We should cautiously welcome the spirit in which it appears to have been issued, indicate that we hope the important subjects it raises are clarified and that a genuine reform process based on dialogue between all peoples in South Africa will flow from it.

The administration view was no doubt favourable because the Botha version of reform, based on representation through the Homelands, was a framework that would not compromise American interests in southern Africa by allowing an ANC takeover of the Republic. Constructive Engagement would be based, on American and South African “mutual interest in the Southern African region” and the goal to “roll back Soviet influence” in the region.

In an effort to win international support for South Africa’s constitutional reforms the Reagan Administration created a public diplomacy initiative aimed at highlighting the “subtler story of reform.” Following the line of Botha, who declared that moving to “one man, one vote” would create a “situation of blood and strife,” Ambassador Nichols said that the United States should avoid a path that “could fan the flames of a tragic holocaust” and that the administration needed to “put across” that it held the “moral high ground.” He added that despite “a Nobel laureate of charismatic talents who plays the media like a violin” the reform process “has in fact contributed more change than South Africa had witnessed in decades.” The real problem, according to a secret State Department memorandum, was that the Reagan Administration needed to “change the terms of the debate” not the policy of Constructive Engagement or the reform measures undertaken by the South African government. The administration’s initiative was directed at multiple constituencies, including the “right-of-center” groups in the United States, the U.S. Congress and the international community. The president would “Sound a healing note” and convey that the administration saw apartheid as a “profound evil” that ran counter to “the President’s personal as well as American
values” but also “accept that a race war would be a tragedy in human terms and in terms of our interests of our in stability in this important region.” Americans needed to understand that “racial problems are not solved overnight and cannot be solved by outsiders . . . 6,000+ miles away.” Congress would be warned not to “play with Matches” or risk the “Moral Nightmare of an Apocalyptic Scenario” where “the Soviets thrive.” Though the initiative would “communicate effectively with South African audiences,” black South Africans were to be largely ignored—except to increase “black awareness of U.S. initiatives and policies”—while other “hostile audiences” were to be avoided altogether.177

On September 5, 1985, the White House created a “Special Working Group” to put the plan into action. In an “urgent” memorandum, National Security Advisor Robert McFarlane stressed the need to convey to international and domestic audiences:

We seek to use the influence we have to end apartheid peacefully but rapidly, achieve peace in Namibia and in that context achieve a withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola, end cross border violence in the region, and limit Soviet influence there.178

On September 7, the White House circulated National Security Directive 187, which stated in part:

The United States and its allies have important political, commercial, and strategic interests in South Africa. These are being threatened by widespread violence and increased tensions in South Africa, and continued Soviet challenges to our important interests in the area.179

Despite the administration’s public diplomatic efforts that stressed the “moral” aspects of American policy in southern Africa, the real aim of U.S. policy continued to be to “reduce the prospect of revolutionary violence and the opportunities for expansion of Soviet influence.”180

Within a month of being formed, the White House provided three specific measures to implement the diplomatic initiative:

An initial PR effort, closely coordinated with our efforts to prevent Congressional adoption of unhelpful legislation, to get an explanation for our policy to key leadership groups and audiences.

A medium-term program strengthen Embassy Pretoria’s ability to communicate effectively with audiences in South Africa through expanded political reporting, press and public outreach, and educational, human rights and economic aid to black South Africa.
A long-term effort to build a broader base of domestic support by involving key American citizens and institutions in contacts with South African counterparts and programs for constructive, peaceful change in South Africa.\textsuperscript{181}

President Reagan, members of his cabinet and the federal bureaucracy were involved from the start, though the State Department took the lead in implementing the plan. By September, 1985, Assistant Secretary Richard Armitage informed Chester Crocker that the effort had done “a fine job” in “crafting an immediate public diplomacy counter offensive.” Armitage, however, advised Crocker to engage the State Department’s Soviet Active Measures Working Group to counter “Soviet Disinformation in Africa.”\textsuperscript{182}

The administration followed up with their initial efforts by creating the U.S. Corporate Council of South Africa designed to “coordinate business efforts to resist divestment and promote reform” and was to work in tandem with the administration’s public diplomacy effort in South Africa. Vice President George H.W. Bush would be tasked with selling American involvement as a “process” that required U.S. involvement in South Africa “rather than calling for symbolic, one-time gestures, or a negative approach.”\textsuperscript{183}

President Reagan would take the lead in selling the American public and the international community on the legitimacy of Botha’s reform efforts. An examination of Reagan’s public comments on South Africa after the public relations initiative began indicate that he almost always prefaced his remarks concerning apartheid with the word “repugnant.” Nevertheless, the overall policy would not be altered and American support for Botha would remain steadfast. In a speech, the president said he did not anticipate any change in policy towards South Africa “because I have to look at what has been accomplished so far.” The president would go on to explain:

Our relationship with South Africa, which has always over the years been a friendly one . . . we have made it plain, in spite of that, that apartheid is very repugnant to us and that they should go down the path of reform and bringing about a more perfect democracy in their country. And our present relationship has, we believe, resulted in some very substantial changes: the very fact that now the blacks have ability—being in labor unions or even having their own labor unions; the fact they can buy property in the heretofore white areas; that they can own businesses in some 40 white-dominated business districts. They have eliminated the segregation that we once had in our own country—the type of thing where hotels and restaurants and places of entertainment
and so forth were segregated—that has all been eliminated. They recognize now interracial marriages and all. But we believe that for us to take an action now such as some are suggesting, turning our backs and walking away, would leave us with no persuasive power whatsoever. We think that if we continue we can help the present administration there, which is a reformist administration as evidenced by the things that I have just mentioned.

Just as Botha had warned that the “war being waged against us by the South African Communist Party and the ANC” was meant to install a “dictatorship of communist origins,” President Reagan warned that “the Soviet Union” was “in its usual style, stirring up the pot and waiting in the wings for whatever advantage they can take—we’d be very innocent, naive, if we didn’t believe that they’re there ready to do that.”

In a secret memorandum to Communications Director Pat Buchanan, the Associate Director of the Public Liaison, Mona Charen, would urge the administration to change tactics in regards to South Africa. She warned that the administration was “bound to lose the argument on South Africa unless we make some changes . . . We’ve already lost the high ground. The left adores this issue.” She urged the administration to switch the terms of the debate and tell the American public that full political participation for the black majority would result in a communist state:

We know that the choice is not between apartheid and Jeffersonian Democracy but between the current system and (as you eloquently put is [sic] last Friday) “The People’s Republic of South Africa.” We don’t like apartheid but we’re just afraid to be too hard on S. Africa if the likely outcome will be communism. Everyone will be permanently worse off then, with no incremental steps toward democracy such as Botha is currently taking. . . . Let’s say it plainly. We have nothing to be ashamed of. By rights, the high ground belongs to us.

Therefore, the United States should accept apartheid as the lesser of two evils because the “American people understand opposition to communism. They have no idea that that’s what we’re worried about because we haven’t told them yet.” The president would adopt this strategy in his public remarks, explaining why an apartheid government was preferable to a state run by a black majority:

In South Africa you’re talking about a country—yes, we disagree and find repugnant some of the practices of their government, but they’re not seeking to impose their government on other surrounding countries. Nicaragua is a totalitarian, Communist State. It is a sort of a vassal of the Soviet Union. And it has made plain in utterance after utterance, even since the Somoza revolution, that their revolution is not going to be
confined to their borders, that they intend to spread that revolution throughout Latin America.\textsuperscript{187}

Though the administration would continue to stress that the Republic needed to “reform energetically and without delay” and “take steps to address black grievances,”\textsuperscript{188} the official line was that the United States would not specifically ask for full enfranchisement for black South Africans. In fact, when pressed about the issue by congressional critics, Chester Crocker responded that the “administration would not impose ourselves, our favorites, our solutions” on the Republic.\textsuperscript{189} This must have come as a great relief to the Botha Administration that had announced to the world that “A system of one man, one vote in a unitary state in the Republic of South Africa simply will not work.”\textsuperscript{190}

For the Botha and Reagan administrations, it would be necessary and proper to foster and empower “responsible black leaders” like Zulu Chief Chief M. Buthelezi.\textsuperscript{191} The administration, however, must have been greatly disappointed when Chief Buthelezi referred to Botha’s national council as “a castration chamber” where only “political eunuchs will want to go.”\textsuperscript{192} Despite these setbacks, the administration ignored its detractors and challenged groups that would not participate to “review what contribution . . . each could make to create a climate conducive to the beginning of negotiations.”\textsuperscript{193} Though Secretary Schultz believed that ANC involvement in the process was possible and represented the choice between “Armageddon and serious relevance to change in South Africa,” President Reagan would soon make it abundantly clear that he agreed entirely with the Botha Administration and saw no reason to include the banned organization.

By 1986, Botha’s national council had failed to bring in any “responsible” black leaders and critics of Constructive Engagement were pressing the administration to justify continued American support for the apartheid regime. According to Secretary Crocker, the administration’s support was “not a question of whether to ‘help Botha,’ but of how best to help ourselves.”\textsuperscript{194} It would be necessary to make “policy adjustments” or risk “serving up our strategy as an entree to the carnivores of Washington.”\textsuperscript{195}

The situation was further complicated by a South African request for an invitation of P.W. Botha to the United States. As President Reagan would nonchalantly acknowledge in his diaries, “having him here will present some touchy problems.”\textsuperscript{196} To explore the possibility, Crocker meet with South African Foreign Minister Pik Botha—
who had just recently been “publicly slapped down by P.W. Botha” for suggesting there might come a time when a black South African could be president—to address American concerns over the reform process and the request for a presidential invitation. Citing the “power of the white right and the SAG’s own legalistic knots as brakes on more rapid change,” the foreign minister told Chester Crocker that the Botha Administration was not willing to lift of the state of emergency or accelerate the reform process. Pik Botha “bluntly” told Crocker that “I cannot give you the clarity you think you need for such a meeting to take place . . . We simply cannot meet your price.”

Though Crocker told Botha that the Reagan Administration was not interested in “trying to sell our public the same rusty Studebaker,” he understood the “continuing stress within the governing party over the tactics and timing of reform.”

It was also during this period that South Africa stepped up attacks on the FLS. While President Reagan had “sympathy & understanding for the complexity of South Africa’s problem,” he believed there was no “justification for acts of this kind” and withdrew Ambassador Herman Nickel. With “South Africa’s recent aggressive regional policies” creating an “impasse in the Namibian peace process,” a debate over the effectiveness of Constructive Engagement began within the Reagan Administration. In a secret NSC memorandum, Phillip Ringdhal wrote Robert McFarlane:

There is also a perception by Chet Crocker, fed mainly by media reports and outside conservatives “close to the White House” that Constructive Engagement is no longer a viable policy and needs to be changed, and that the White House is therefore distancing itself from the policy . . . There has been much debate within at State since Nickel’s return regarding suggested policy changes in light of recent developments, but Crocker has not accepted any suggestions—at least not yet. He would maintain that Nickel was recalled to review the situation, not the policy, to review the implications of recent South African actions, and to decide whether South Africa is still prepared to work toward peaceful settlement in the region . . . The key policy question for us is whether the parties themselves want to pursue a settlement at this time. Recent South Africa paramilitary actions, its establishment of the MPC government in Namibia, its recent attitudes toward the U.S., and Angola’s near paranoia suggest otherwise. [Redacted Section] Another question is whether we should continue to commit our diplomatic prestige where the key player—South Africa—appears to be immune to any U.S. influence or suggestions which rub against its policy aims.

With the “problem of U.S. diplomatic fallout to South Africa’s actions, and the appropriate U.S. visibility” in mind, Secretary Crocker’s office was tasked with creating
a limited sanctions package aimed at pre-empting U.S. Congressional action and increasing funding for “assistance programs for black South Africans and for the regional Front Line State economies.” They would also develop “ideas for raising the profile of our dialogue with ANC leaders” though Crocker wanted the South Africans to understand that “talking with someone does not mean that you approve of them or agree with them.” President Reagan also informed Secretary of State Schultz that the administration “should offer a plan to Pres. Botha that could offer something other than just turning the 5 mil. Whites over to a govt. by 26 mil. Blacks.”

The task of writing the President’s speech on American policy in South Africa was handed to Pat Buchanan, who stressed that Reagan should avoid “weakness” and should unapologetically support the Botha regime. Chester Crocker was distressed to discover that Buchanan, a frequent critic of the “Boer bashers” at the State Department, had been brought into the process and described the first draft of his speech as a:

[S]tridently polarizing message. It would give no U.S. Senator part from Jesse Helms and a few associates any ground to stand on. A presidential veto of economic sanctions was threatened up front. There were two or three lines about Pretoria’s official violence and nearly a page about ANC terrorism and the “necklacing” of blacks by township comrades. South Africa was compared favorably to the rest of Africa, and our interests in the region reduced essentially to an anti-Communist manifesto. The real bottom line was to keep South Africa’s minerals and ports out of Soviet hands! There was no diplomatic game plan, no effort to reposition ourselves in the debate, no call for contact and negotiation with the ANC, no regional assistance program in the Front Line States, and no real call to action or threat of action. This draft was unequivocal; it was pro-Pretoria.

While the final draft of the speech was being hammered out, the CIA circulated a “special estimate” on the ANC “to discredit the concept of higher-level American contacts with the ANC and to undermine the argument for pressing Pretoria to unban and negotiate with it.” As President Reagan went to the media to talk about the importance of South African minerals, he cynically reminded American women that sanctions would mean they had to “give up all their jewelry.” Simultaneously, the South African ambassador, Herbert Beukes, was being reassured by the administration that “Pretoria need not worry.”

On July 22, 1986, President Reagan stepped to the podium in the East Room of the White House and gave his speech to the World Affairs Council and Foreign Policy
Association. The president acknowledged that apartheid was “morally wrong and politically unacceptable,” but he opposed additional sanctions against Pretoria on the premise that it would primarily harm black Africans—an argument that Reagan officials acknowledged before the speech was “garbage.” Rather than abolish all apartheid laws, the president would ask the South Africans to eliminate “apartheid laws.” He also referred to the “calculated terror by elements of the African National Congress,” which he tagged as “Soviet-armed guerrillas.” The ANC’s campaign involved:

the mining of roads, the bombings of public places, designed to bring about further repression—the imposition of martial law and eventually creating the conditions for racial war.

The most common method of terror is the so-called necklace. In this barbaric way of reprisal, a tire is filled with kerosene or gasoline, placed around the neck of an alleged “collaborator,” and ignited. The victim may be a black policeman, a teacher, a soldier, a civil servant. It makes no difference. The atrocity is designed to terrorize blacks into ending all racial cooperation and to polarize South Africa as prelude to a final, climactic struggle for power.

In defending their society and people, the South African Government has a right and responsibility to maintain order in the face of terrorists.

Given the ANC’s use of violence and ties to the Soviet Union, he declared that “the South African Government is under no obligation to negotiate the future of the country with an organization that proclaims a goal of creating a communist state and uses terrorist tactics and violence to achieve it.” If the apartheid regime were replaced by the ANC, “the Soviet Union will be the main beneficiary. And the critical ocean corridor of South Africa and the strategic minerals of the region would be at risk. Thus, it would be a historic act of folly for the United States and the West—out of anguish and frustration and anger—to write off South Africa.”

President Reagan said that Americans needed to see beyond the images of the “terrorism, violence, and repression” and see the larger picture of “dramatic change” in the Republic:

Black workers have been permitted to unionize, bargain collectively, and build the strongest free trade union movement in all of Africa. The infamous pass laws have been ended, as have many of the laws denying blacks the right to live, work, and own property in South Africa’s cities. Citizenship, wrongly stripped away, has been restored to nearly 6 million blacks. Segregation in universities and public facilities is being set aside. Social apartheid laws prohibiting interracial sex and marriage
have been struck down. It is because State President Botha has presided over these reforms that extremists have denounced him as a traitor.210

While Chester Crocker claimed that the Reagan speech was “daylight robbery” committed by ultra-conservative elements within the administration hoping to hijack his policy in southern Africa, the speech did not represent a watershed for Constructive Engagement. President Reagan was publicly articulating what had been established policy for six years and reflected in official, though often classified, documents of the U.S. government. When asked by the author if the speech accurately reflected the president’s views, Pat Buchanan, though conceding he no longer remembered the specifics, replied, “I did write the Reagan speech after a clash with Schultz and State and . . . those speech views reflected the president’s real views.”211 When asked if the speech correctly represented President Reagan’s views concerning the ANC, as Pat Buchanan indicated, Chester Crocker was effusive in his praise of the president but said Reagan often had “strong views—views not carefully vetted or researched” and that those opinions were “were put in front of him by other advisors.”212 He said this type of incongruity in “political and diplomatic” message was typical when “tensions in the White House” arise when trying to communicate to “four or five constituencies.” Crocker said he was not interested in engaging in a “pissing contest with Pat Buchanan” and simply added that “Casey and Buchanan had done what they thought they should.”213

It was, however, not just the ideological right-wing Reagan officials that emphasized the danger of the ANC. Chester Crocker warned that the U.S. did not “want to destabilize South Africa or jeopardize our own strategic and economic interests” by allowing communist proxies to take over the country.214 By the mid 1980s, Crocker was still identifying the ANC as close allies of the Soviets215 and continued to negotiate only with the Botha Administration. Even after Reagan’s speech in 1986, Crocker’s own State Department stated in a secret memorandum written in May 1987 that it should be the goal of the U.S. to avoid and prevent “a scenario in South Africa of revolutionary violence and expanded influence” of the Soviet Union and broaden “participation in and acceptance” of “a strong market-based economic system in South Africa.”216 A State Department briefing paper revealed how this objective would be accomplished:

While encouraging peaceful evolution from the apartheid system, we must assure that the communist-led violent opposition groups are unable to bring a hostile, anti-western repressive dictatorship to power in the
name of equal rights for all. The U.S. should identify and enhance the standing of moderate and peaceful anti-apartheid groups like Inkatha, and end the legitimization of terrorist, pro-Soviet groups such as the ANC and the Azanian People’s organization.217

While the Reagan Administration was providing support for Botha’s reform process—a process that would ensure the ANC was excluded from power sharing—the Republic faced uprisings in the townships that threatened to make the country ungovernable. The South African government initially responded to the conflagration by declaring a partial state of emergency in July 1985, giving the police sweeping powers to suppress the protests and to place stringent restrictions on political gatherings. Speaking to the South African people, Prime Minister Botha declared on July 21, 1985:

Every responsible South African has, with growing concern, taken note of conditions of violence and lawlessness which, in recent times, have increased and have become more cruel and more severe in certain parts of the country, especially in the black townships. These acts of violence and thuggery are mainly directed at the property and persons of law-abiding black people, and take the form of incitement, intimidation, arson, inhuman forms of assault, and even murder. This state of affairs can no longer be tolerated. Thus far, the government has shown the utmost patience. However, I cannot ignore the insistence of all responsible South Africans, especially of the majority of the black communities, who ask that conditions are normalised and that they are granted the full protection of the law to continue their normal way of life. It is the duty of the government to ensure that a normal community life is re-established and that community services are efficiently rendered. Children must be able to receive tuition. Breadwinners must be able to fulfill their daily task. The life and property of all people must be protected, and law and order must be maintained. In view of the prevailing conditions, it is essential that the situation be normalised in such a way that the climate for continued dialogue in the interest of all people in the constitutional, economic, and social fields in ensured. Against this background, the government has . . . decided to proclaim a state of emergency.218

Security forces were deployed in thirty-six magisterial districts to suppress the protests, and in the ensuing violence, thousands of protesters were killed or arrested.219 With public gatherings banned, the funerals of those killed in the protests became the primary venue for disseminating political information to tens of thousands of mourners who turned out to hear the eulogies.

For the first eleven months of the uprisings the South African government allowed the press to show television images of the deteriorating situation. As a result,
the international community witnessed an uncensored view of the government crackdown that gave a significant boost to the sanctions campaign. By November 1985, Botha had seen his reform agenda sufficiently damaged by the international press coverage. Later that year, Botha decided to rectify that mistake and banned the media from recording or printing about incidents of unrest in South Africa.220

Given the methods employed by the government, Botha was wise to banish the media from the townships. During the state of emergency, the use of brutality was to become a common practice for members of the South African police. In one incident, 19 mourners attending a funeral procession in the Uitenhage area were killed by security forces. The violence extended beyond simple misconduct by police. The abduction and murder of activists was also used by the apartheid government, with assassination squads working with the consent of the State Security Council. In particular, Botha favoured, though subsequently denied for the remainder of his life, the development of advanced weapons and covert operations that would give South Africa additional advantages against its adversaries. South Africa initiated a series of internal and external military and paramilitary operations. These included assassinations, torture, and smuggling as well as forgery, propaganda, and subversion. All were defined as “legitimate” weapons against the “total onslaught” of “red” and “black” forces. These practices were established at the top and legitimized brutal tactics throughout the military, police, and intelligence services.221

Among the more ambitious programs created within the framework of the Total National Strategy was Project Coast. The program was tasked with creating chemical and biological weapons (CBW) that could not only counter those of the Soviets but also be used against domestic enemies of the apartheid government. The program was nominally under the supervision of Surgeon General, Major General Nieuwoudt, though it was largely to be directed by Wouter Basson, a young SADF cardiologist and one-time personal physician of P. W. Botha. Project Coast was eventually brought under the umbrella of activities directed by the Civil Cooperation Bureau (CCB). The CCB was created in 1986 and drew on the tactics and experiences of the Selous Scouts, a Special Forces regiment of the Rhodesian Army tasked with liquidating opponents of the government both within and outside the country. The CCB would serve as the foundation of an alleged “third force” that would combine the military capacity of the SADF and the police functions of the SAP in keeping black South Africans from taking control of the country.
Though its explicit aim was neutralizing any Soviet launched CBW attack, it appears that, from the start, Project Coast was aimed primarily at domestic foes of the government. The CCB used a variety of techniques, including assassination and biological warfare. Domestic opponents in Dukuduku in KwaZulu-Natal were the first to fall victim to the regime’s CBW program. It is reported that, in November 1983, Basson instructed South African agents “to tie their intended victims to trees and smear a jell-like ointment on their bodies. When that failed to kill them, they were allegedly injected with an anaesthetic drug and then a muscle relaxant. After they had died, their bodies were thrown into the sea.” Dr. Basson was also accused of supplying poisoned tea and fruit that was used to murder Special Forces member Lance Corporal Victor de Fonseca, who was believed to be leaking details of South Africa’s clandestine operations in southern Africa.

The use of lethal toxins was not nearly as ambitious as the fertility research undertaken by scientists with Project Coast. In an interview with the BBC, Daan Goosen, the managing director of Roodeplaat Research Laboratories between 1983 and 1986, verified that Project Coast’s researchers were tasked with developing agents to cause sterility in black South Africans. Initial attempts to introduce these agents secretly via topical lotions was deemed unworkable, and according to testimony given at the TRC, the scientists turned their attention to creating a delivery system that could be introduced via the water supply. The scientists were told that this project, aimed at altering the racial demographics of the Republic, was the most important research they would undertake in their careers with Project Coast.

The urgency felt by the apartheid government would only accelerate with the onset of violence in the Vaal Triangle, which would spread throughout the country within months. Project Coast figured prominently in the Total National Strategy’s attempt to bring the unrest under control. According to SADF General Meiring:

SADF Chief of Staff, General ConstandViljoen, as well as Generals Liebenberg and Meiring, were seeking an offensive CBW substance that would weaken and incapacitate rioters and was less irritating than tear gas. They consulted Basson and Project Coast. Also, the SADF sought a chemical that would color the skin for about two weeks and allow the identification of frontrunners in the violence.

In response to General Viljoen, Delta G Scientific developed a “New Generation Tear (NGT) Gas,” also known as CR gas. The NGT gas was designed to be more powerful than conventional CS tear gas and to
incapacitate without lethality or excessive irritation. NGT (CR) gas was intended to counteract rolling mass actions led by the ANC or its surrogates. According to Gen. (ret.) Meiring, NGT (CR) gas was used rarely and only on the Chief of the Army’s say-so. When NGT (CR) gas was used, it was usually mixed with CS gas and solved in water to be used by water cannon. . . . General Liebenberg revealed that chemical agents were being developed to make people passive and to render equipment unusable. Gen. Lothar Neethling, South African Police forensics commander, ordered the development of tear gas, gas grenades, and tranquilizing drugs for use in pacifying rioters. Neethling was also an expert in use of CBW for assassination and worked closely with Basson, who supplied poisons to get rid of individual opponents of the regime.227

In addition to research into nonlethal gases and irritants, researchers attempted to create a biological agent that could kill or incapacitate blacks Africans. This “black bomb” would be deployed in the event of an uprising over the area where the insurrection was taking place.228

Despite the South African strategies to undercut the protests, incidents of unrest actually increased more than twofold over the first four months of 1985, from approximately 1,000 on the eve of the imposition of emergency to almost 3,000 during September-October. As the government contained the insurrection in the emergency districts, activists fled those areas, spreading the rebellion outside to districts previously unaffected. Realizing that the uprisings were widening, in October, Botha lifted the state of emergency on six of the magisterial districts previously covered, only to extend it to an additional eight districts the next day. Finally, after 229 days, Botha lifted the state of emergency entirely.229

Notwithstanding Botha’s assertion to the contrary, the state of emergency had not achieved its objectives; the townships were still in turmoil, the ANC was resuming its revolutionary activities, and the Republic faced a crisis of epic proportions. Using a counter-revolutionary strategy formulated at the highest levels of government, the state of emergency was re-imposed on June 12, 1986. In contrast to the earlier state of emergency, the measure broadened the definition of domestic subversion to include virtually every anti-apartheid group.230 The emergency led to the arrest and detention of over 20,000 people of all races and ages. Major UDF and trade union leaders were arrested and charged with treason. Furthermore, Pretoria imposed strict media regulations on both the domestic and foreign press, banning coverage of the unrest in the black townships. Domestic journals such as the New Nation and the Weekly Mail were either permanently or temporarily closed.
Although the unrest had slackened by May 1987, it surged again in 1988, claiming the lives of 883 more people. By February 1989, 52,000 South Africans had been arrested under the state of emergency and over 4000 had died. Worse, the unrest began to pit black South Africans against each other. Violence among rival apartheid groups reached shocking new levels, especially in the area of Pietermaritzburg:

Killing has become such a norm . . . Death has become so common that people scan newspapers for violent stories like punters gunning for a tip. . . . Even at the worse in Soweto, bursts of firing would be guaranteed to make people rush to lock doors and close curtains, but here people just shiver and tense up and go on with what they were doing, as if very fatalistic. The imprint of such violence on South Africa’s youth added to the horror of the situation. A psychiatrist who examined ex-South African detainees claimed that the youth of South Africa had begun to fantasize about violence as a symbol of their desperation.

Even the ANC threatened to exacerbate South Africa’s volatile domestic order. ANC guerrilla activity emphasized increased sabotage activity, including targets in white areas. After several undisciplined guerrilla attacks that killed civilians in supermarkets, fast-food restaurants, and a sports stadium, the ANC publicly repudiated its policy of striking civilian targets. More importantly, in 1988, the ANC released its constitution for a post-apartheid South Africa that called for a multiparty democracy in a multiracial state. By doing so, the ANC acquired the status of a potential government in exile.

4.5 Regional Cooperation—A Constellation of States

The Total National Strategy also gave a new direction to Pretoria’s foreign policy. The primary objectives of the Total Strategy were (1) to ensure that neighbouring states would refrain from actively supporting the armed liberation struggles led by the African National Congress in South Africa, (2) to force those states to prohibit political activity by South African expatriates residing in their territory, and (3) to accept South Africa’s leadership in the region. Once Pretoria imposed its will on surrounding states, by persuasion or by force, its neighbours would have to acknowledge South Africa as the de facto regional hegemon.
Using the incentive of what he termed “formative action,” P. W. Botha sought to create a network of dependencies that would coerce neighbouring countries into cooperating with Pretoria and convince them to abandon their “Marxist onslaught.” Against those countries that would not cooperate, destabilization and overt military action would be used. Botha likened this strategy to a “southern Africa Monroe Doctrine,” with South Africa assuming “special responsibilities” in the region.

As the first step of the Total Strategy’s foreign policy component, South African regional policy was pursued through the idea of the Constellation of Southern African States (CONSAS). Recognizing that apartheid was a barrier to normal diplomatic relations with neighbouring states, Pretoria raised the spectre of communist subversion in order to generate a counter-strategy. It was argued that all the states in the region faced a common “Marxist” enemy and that a unified front would be required to combat this threat. As General Magnus Malan stated, “No self-respecting country that had the welfare and security of its people at heart” would allow “Marxist organizations to jeopardize its future.” Pretoria proposed “regional solutions” to this allegedly “regional problem,” which essentially boiled down to the creation of a regional political and economic alliance, centred on South Africa. This alliance was to be accomplished in part by the promotion of collaborative economic projects and development assistance that touted the superiority of South African capitalism over socialist alternatives. Additionally, regional states were to be coerced into “non-aggression pacts” with Pretoria, the first step toward forging the basis for what Foreign Minister Pik Botha termed a “common approach in the security field, the economic field, and even the political field.” Such a confederation of southern African forces would include the “independent” Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda, Namibia, Rhodesia, and possibly BLS and other states in the region.

The constellation accorded with the overall emphasis of the Total Strategy. By proposing a constellation, Botha hoped to reorder the political landscape of the subcontinent to deny the ANC a base of operations. At the Carlton Conference in 1979, where Botha formally outlined the constellation idea to the South African business elite, he declared:

Nothing can overcome us if we employ our assets of technological expertise, resources and, above all, our human material, in an orderly manner and in the interests of this southern land, if we stand united and accept joint responsibility for our region, and if we create institutions
that will abolish any fear of domination by one over another. Then we need have no fear of the future.242

Specifically, the constellation of states would offer South Africa significant benefits in the political, economic, and security realms, all of them vital to the success of the Total Strategy.

Botha also hoped that a successful constellation would render South Africa’s domestic policies acceptable to the international community. By including the “independent” homelands in the constellation framework, he hoped to achieve implicit acceptance of its policy of separate development. Recognition by some African states of the homelands would pave the way for diplomatic recognition by the West and other nations. Thus, South Africa would achieve what it had sought for thirty years—international legitimacy for the doctrine of separate development.243 Moreover, a constellation would benefit the South African economy. Further economic cooperation and integration would bring the requisite stability for the profitable trade and investment carried on between South and southern Africa. Likewise, closer economic integration with the region would offer South African manufacturers a larger market for their exports, thereby stimulating increased industrial production for the stagnant South African economy.

Finally, and most importantly, the type of regional economic cooperation envisaged by a constellation was believed essential in improving Pretoria’s security environment. In particular, Pretoria could leverage strengthened economic links to its security advantage and reduce the threat posed by hostile border-states. By delaying the delivery of regional commodities or by providing efficient services on lenient terms of credit, Pretoria could leverage its neighbours to moderate their anti-apartheid rhetoric and curtail operation of anti-South African forces within their territories.244 Thus, the accessibility of groups like the ANC to South African territory would diminish, vastly improving the security situation for South Africa.

Furthermore, South Africa believed that a constellation of states constituted a basis for rapprochement with the West. By promoting stability through regional economic integration, a constellation appeared as an attractive method to solicit Western support. In the late 1970s, for instance, a successful constellation scheme might have benefited South Africa’s bargaining position with the West in the stalled Namibia talks. At the Carlton Conference, Mr. Harry Oppenheimer, then-chairman of Anglo, reiterated the importance of positively influencing South Africa’s relations with
the West through the constellation: “I hope, and I believe, that the government’s policy in regard to this constellation is being developed in the context of an effort to mend our fences with the countries who used to be our friends and who I still believe are.”

Thus, in terms of improving the security of South Africa, Pretoria hoped that a constellation would both undermine regional support for the ANC and enhance South Africa’s status with the West. This approach was endorsed by the Reagan Administration that wanted South Africa’s “regional dominance to acquire a legitimate form.”

The success of CONSAS largely depended on Zimbabwe’s achieving independence under the pro-South African “internal settlement” government of Bishop Abel Muzorewa. Zimbabwe could then join CONSAS—obliging Zambia, Zaire, and probably Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland, which were already linked to South Africa in the Southern African Customs Union—to do the same. South Africa disavowed U.N. Resolution 435, which would have provided for an independent Namibia, with U.N.-supervised elections and a U.N. peacekeeping force, and concentrated on creating its own “internal settlement” under the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA). However, the victory of Robert Mugabe in the 1980 Zimbabwean elections, followed quickly by the formation by nine regional states of the Southern African Development Coordinating Conference (SADCC), which was designed to reduce economic dependence on South Africa, represented a clear defeat for CONSAS.

By 1981, the idea of a constellation of states had completely unravelled. South and southern Africa did not share the common philosophical ground necessary for such an association of states. Predictably, the leaders of the prospective member states overtly vetoed any formal link with South Africa. President Kaunda of Zambia called it “an evil plan which envisages tying us to the apron of South Africa,” and Lesotho’s Prime Minister Jonathan said that he “feared even the intrinsically sound idea of an economic association of Southern African states mooted by South Africa, because of its apartheid undertones.”

The most obvious objection of the southern African states to a constellation with South Africa was the way it implied approval of South Africa’s domestic policies, by belonging to a constellation that included the “independent” homelands. Under no circumstances would any black African state, no matter how conservative, join in an association that included the Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda, or Ciskei. For them, membership in a constellation meant accepting separate development under another
Thus, a formal constellation of southern African states was bound to fail, for its political goals clashed fundamentally with notions of a black African state. Thus, one of the primary components of the Total Strategy implemented in the late 1970s to early 1980s yielded no positive results for Pretoria.

4.6 The End of the Decade, the Advent of Destabilization

The collapse of the constellation of states represented only one of the many security challenges that South Africa faced at the beginning of the 1980s. The region committed itself to economic independence from South Africa; Rhodesia became Zimbabwe; SWAPO infiltration in Namibia escalated; and sophisticated ANC sabotage caught white South Africa off guard. For Prime Minister Botha, past efforts at regional cooperation were seen as insufficient to stem the “total onslaught.” A new and drastic policy was necessary.

First, the rejection of economic cooperation with South Africa coincided with the establishment of the SADCC. With the overarching goal of reducing South African regional hegemony, SADCC incorporated the black-rulled states of southern Africa, including the most conservative, into an anti-South Africa economic unit. Overtly rejecting economic links with Pretoria, SADCC represented a threat to Pretoria. In particular, the possibility of SADCC states providing each other with the goods and services currently obtained from South Africa, especially those on which South African businesses depended, had the potential to harm the South African economy.

Second, the domestic upsurge of guerrilla acts in Namibia did not bode well for South Africa. From Angola, SWAPO guerrillas had infiltrated Namibia and proceeded to attack power lines, vehicles, and farms—acts that rendered armed convoys necessary to move traffic in northern Namibia. More significantly, a May 1980 SWAPO mortar attack destroyed military aircraft at a South African Air Force base in Namibia. Likewise, SWAPO demonstrated improvement in its weapons and training.

Third, the independence of a radical, Marxist-inspired Zimbabwe ended Pretoria’s hopes that a client state would emerge north of the Limpopo. For South Africa, the optimal outcome of Rhodesian independence would have been the election of the moderate black, Bishop Muzorewa. After the Lancaster House Agreement, which brought independence to Rhodesia in December 1979, South Africa supported the Muzorewa campaign both politically and financially. For instance, Pretoria provided
Muzorewa with 400 motor vehicles for his campaign and, through Anglo, gave him $5 million (US).  

The overwhelming victory of Mugabe and his Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), capturing 57 of the 80 contested seats in Parliament, caught South Africa totally by surprise. With Mugabe came unwavering support for SWAPO, the ANC, and the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC). Moreover, Zimbabwe became a member of SADCC and the Front Line States, both of which were committed to the end of apartheid in South Africa. Not surprisingly, fear and anxiety swept the Republic with Zimbabwe’s independence. Pretoria was convinced that the Soviet Union had committed Zimbabwe to play a role in the “onslaught” against South Africa. Similarly, seventy percent of white South Africans surveyed agreed that the government of Zimbabwe constituted a central threat to South Africa’s safety.

Domestically, the independence of Zimbabwe gave new strength to local resistance. Black South Africans overwhelmingly supported Mugabe. His reputation as a freedom fighter and a promoter of black interests endeared him to South Africans struggling for majority rule. The findings of opinion surveys in KwaZulu/Natal concluded that Zimbabwe’s independence suggested “to black South Africans that there is a possibility of a violent overthrow of the government, provided that the neighbouring African countries were to lend support to insurgency.”

Finally, the upsurge of ANC sabotage within South Africa eroded the confidence of the white electorate in the government’s ability to protect South African national security. By 1980, the ANC had permission to maintain a sizeable number of personnel throughout southern Africa. Operating from neighbouring states, ANC actions inside South Africa increased dramatically, from nineteen in 1980 to fifty-five in 1981. Sophisticated sabotage of the Sasol plant near Johannesburg and the Koeberg nuclear complex underscored the threat posed by the ANC.

Thus, despite the strides South Africa had made developing itself and its military capability, whites were less certain than ever of their control over the country. In its initial phase, the Total National Strategy, based on militarization and economic integration, had done little to improve the poor security environment that South Africa faced in 1977. In fact, the situation had worsened appreciably. The militarization of South Africa seemed misguided within the cooperative framework of a constellation of southern African states. Both to achieve the goals of Total Strategy and
to reduce the threat of the “total onslaught,” Pretoria decided to reorient its relations with southern Africa by militarily and economically dominating its neighbours.

This regional component would be the key to linking Constructive Engagement to the Total National Strategy. As the leader in the struggle against the Soviet Union, Reagan defined most events in international politics in terms of the East-West conflict. Southern Africa was no exception. Thus, for the Reagan Administration, southern Africa was an area in which the activity of the Soviet Union threatened vital strategic and economic interests of the United States. For that reason, Reagan sought to back South Africa as an anticommunist bulwark: “The enemy is not racism, it is Communism.” Understandably, this attitude was perfectly understood by Pretoria. As the protector of the West’s interests in southern Africa, Pretoria could justify destabilization as an anticommunist crusade. In return, Constructive Engagement could achieve its major goal of reducing Soviet influence in the region using the power of the SADF.

1“Our nation, our land, and her people are today experiencing the total onslaught of the lust for power of Marxist expansionism.” W. Botha, Address to the NP Congress in the Transvaal, 1 September 1980, in 1980 SAYIL, 182.
2 See the excerpts from W. Botha’s 12 September 1983 addresses to the House of Assembly in 1983 SAYIL, 187.
3 This is how Magnus Malan characterized the onslaught in his 24 September 1981 speech to the House of Assembly, 1981 SAYIL, 173.
4Scholtz, Fighter and Reformer: Extracts from the Speeches of W. Botha, 34.
5 For details of the tactics used in the Soviet onslaught, see the 1982 and 1984 issues of the White Paper on Defence and Armaments Supply (Pretoria, South Africa: Department of Defence).
6 Malan has cited the 300% increase in ground forces, 200% increase in both tanks and airplanes as representative of the Soviet arms buildup in the region. See 1983 SAYIL, 200.
7Scholtz, Fighter and Reformer: Extracts from the Speeches of W. Botha, 35.
8 See Botha’s 29 September 1987 address to the Cape Congress of the National Party, cited in the 1987-1988 SAYIL, 216.
9Scholtz, Fighter and Reformer: Extracts from the Speeches of W. Botha, 72.
10 In 1975, Britain terminated the Simonstown agreement, which since 1955 had served as the basis for joint South African-British military cooperation. Another action resented by South Africa was France’s decision to stop circumventing the international arms boycott of South Africa.
13Ibid., 355.
141986 White Paper, 12.
151982 White Paper, 2.
161977 White Paper, 5.
17 Ibid.
21Ibid., 80-91.
22 Botha first began to cite Beaufre in 1971 in Debates of the House of Assembly as Reported in Cape Times, February 9, 1971, 546-47.
231977White Paper, 3-5.
25 Finance was later merged into Economic Affairs; Internal Affairs was later called Constitutional Affairs.
26 Grundy, Militarization, 38.
27 Geldenhuys, Diplomacy, 92.
28 Grundy, Militarization, 49.
29 For example, although Dr. J. G. H. Loubser was not an official SSC member, his role as the head of the South African Transport Services (SATS) afforded him the status of a co-opted member.
30 Most probably, this list included the President (formerly the Prime Minister) and the ministers of the following departments: foreign affairs, defence, law and order, justice. Also, several standing members and other top ranking civil servants in key departments served as members of the SSC.
31 Historically, the Department of Defence (DOD) and the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) struggled for primacy in foreign policy formulation, most notably after the Portuguese coup.
32 Geldenhuys, Diplomacy, 94-95.
331982 White Paper, iii. Capitals and italics appear in the original.
34 This paragraph relies heavily on pages 63 and 64 of Jaster, South Africa’s Narrowing Security Options, and Chapter 2 of Grundy, Militarization.
36 Grundy, Militarization, 19.
38 The 1982 White Paper lists the following: artillery guns and rockets; artillery fire-control equipment; short-range guided missiles; mini-computers; mine detectors and detonators; mine resistant vehicles; operational vehicles; armoured vehicles; tactical telecommunications equipment; anti-personnel, anti-vehicle, and programmed ground mines; arms and ammunition.
39 See Frankel, Pretoria’s Praetorians, 83; Grundy, Militarization, 46.
40 Frankel, Pretoria’s Praetorians, 85.
41 Geldenhuys, Diplomacy, 142.
42 Grundy, Militarization, 46.
43 Cited in Geldenhuys, Diplomacy, 142.
52 P.W. Botha in his 28 January 1981 address to the House of Assembly, cited on page 183 of the SAYIL.
53 This poll was conducted for the Geldenhuys study, “What Do We Think,” (Braamfontein: South African Institute for International Affairs, 1984). 72.9% of the black elite supported this statement.


61 Ibid.


70 “S African Comment on Communist Influence in ANC.” Johannesburg Home Service in English 0500 gmt 7 Oct 86 Text of commentary Capital radio in English 1500 gmt 6 Oct 86.


72 The Role of the Soviet Union, Cuba and East Germany in Fomenting Terrorism in Southern Africa. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism. United States Senate, 22 March 1981.

73 Historical Antecedents of Soviet Terrorism. Hearings Before the Senate Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism, June 11 and 12, 1981, 1-86.

74 Ibid.


77 Grundy, Militarization, 58.

78 These examples appear in Frankel, Pretoria’s Praetorians, 98; Grundy, Militarization, 59.

79 Grundy, Militarization, 59.

80 See the 1984 White Paper for details concerning “area-protection.”

81 Frankel, Pretoria’s Praetorians, 63.


83 Jaster, South Africa’s Narrowing Security Options, 40.


86 Deon Geldenhuys, A Survey of White Opinion on Foreign Policy Issues (Braamfontein, South Africa: South African Institute of International Affairs, 1982).

87 Frankel, Pretoria’s Praetorians, 69.

The Twelve-Point Plan was first spelled out by Botha in his address to the National Party Congress in Durban on August 15, 1979. See J. J. Scholtz, ed., *Fighter and Reformer: Extracts from the Speeches of P. W. Botha*, 1-3.

90 Ibid.
91 Ibid.
92Ibid., 13-15.
94Ibid., 280.
95Frankel, “Race and Counterrevolution,” 283-84.
98 Fisher, 51-52.
99Ibid., 52.
100 Crocker, “U.S. Policy on South Africa,” 8.
101 Crocker, “U.S. Policy on South Africa” 3.
102 Ungar and Vale, 243.
103 Details of the congressional drive for sanctions against South Africa are covered in Chapter 5.
107 It should be noted that the ANC never actually entertained any strong hopes that an armed struggle, especially one waged from outside South Africa, could bring down the apartheid government. Thus, from the time it was forced into exile, the organization laboured to find ways through which it could establish a political presence within South Africa.
115 Ibid.
116 Ibid.
120 Lodge and others, *All, Here, and Now*, 181.
121 Ibid., 181-182.
122 Ibid., 178, 182.
123Marx, 159.
126Ibid., 2.
127 Avoiding casualties in armed operations had been paramount for MK since its inception.
128 Lodge and others, All, Here, and Now, 181.
130 Ibid.
131 Ibid., 46.
139 Patrick Buchanan, 5 July 2011, (e-mail message to author).
140 Crocker, Chester A. Interview by Author. September 19, 2011.
141 Ibid.
148 Ibid, 201.
150 Ibid.
For a firsthand account of the fallout from the Rubicon Speech, see Papenfus, *Pik Both and His Times*, 395-401.


Ibid., 15-16.

Ibid., 15.


Ibid.


Ibid.

Ibid.


Ibid.


186 Memorandum, Monica Charen to Patrick Buchanan, July 29, 1985, ID #437840, CO141, WHORM Subject File, Ronald Reagan Library, Simi Valley, CA.

194 Crocker, High Noon in Southern Africa, 316.
195 Ibid., 317.

204 Ibid.
206 Ibid., 321.
207 Ibid., 322.
208 Memorandum, Monica Charen to Patrick Buchanan, July 29, 1985, ID #437840, CO141, WHORM Subject File, Ronald Reagan Library, Simi Valley, CA.
210 Ibid.
211 Patrick Buchanan, 2 July 2011, (e-mail message to author).
212 Crocker, Chester A. Interview by Author. September 19, 2011.

213 Ibid.


223 When the SADF’s “Operation Duel” was launched in 1982, aimed at eliminating SWAPO prisoners and SADF informants, Special Forces Colonial Johan Theron was tasked with murdering approximately 200 prisoners, then dumping their bodies into the Atlantic Ocean. Also, in 1985, four SWAPO detainees held at Reconnaissance Regiment headquarters were injected with a cocktail of poisons supplied by Basson and their bodies discarded in the Atlantic Ocean. Burgess and Purkitt, 35.

224 Ibid., 34.

225 Burgess and Purkitt, 35.

226 Ibid.

227 Ibid., 35, 38.

228 Ibid., 34-35.

229 Hough, 395.


245 Harry Oppenheimer, Address to the Carlton Conference, cited in Breytenbach, 24.

246 Secretary George Schultz, Cable for All Diplomatic Posts, “Southern Africa: What a About Change in South Africa and What Happens to the ANC?” National Security Archive, Doc. 50.


249 Geldenhuys, “Twin Pillars of Political Reform,” in Breytenbach, 47.

250 Ibid.

251 The SADCC member states included Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.


253 Information in this paragraph relies on Jaster, *Defence*.

254 Jaster, *Defence*, 87.


259 The honeymoon with the West did not last long. Destabilization contributed to the imposition of economic sanctions, especially in the U. S. Congress. This topic will be covered in Chapter 5.
262 Ungar and Vale, 239.
CHAPTER V

5.1 The Total National Strategy and Regional Hegemony

As detailed in Chapter 4, by the end of the 1970s, the Republic of South Africa had failed to achieve its objectives in southern Africa. Volster’s attempt at détente had not seen any real results, and the constellation of states had been rejected by the country’s neighbours. The Republic was also the last white-ruled country on the continent, and demographics within South Africa indicated a rapidly growing black population that would be increasingly difficult to dominate. Consequently, the National Party needed a potent means of confronting the threats to the apartheid state without damaging its considerable interests in southern Africa. Thus, South Africa resorted to military and economic destabilization to force its neighbours to accept its plan for regional integration, which Pretoria had until that time expected the region to embrace voluntarily.1

Since 1978, the destabilization of its neighbours had become one of the most frequently employed tactics used by the South African leadership. It was in 1981, however, that this program was fully implemented. The goals of destabilization were simple: to reduce the ANC threat and solidify the region’s dependence on South Africa.2 In this manner, Pretoria hoped to achieve the regional security that had eluded South Africa since the 1974 Portuguese coup. Where détente and the constellation had failed, the 1980-1984 destabilization campaign would partially succeed. By 1984, South Africa had pushed back the ANC to Zambia, and Mozambique and Swaziland had signed treaties of nonaggression and economic cooperation. Although South Africa certainly suffered major setbacks in this period, especially in its war with Angola and in the upsurge of domestic protest, destabilization appeared to offer South Africa substantial security benefits.

The program of destabilization would not be without risks. The promotion of instability and dislocation through a destabilization campaign threatened to spill over into South Africa. While South Africa could sponsor unrest in certain southern African states, it did not have the power to ensure that this process remained under Pretoria’s guidance. As one contemporary noted, “Destabilisation is not control. South Africa can throw its weight about the subcontinent; but it cannot rule it. Its achievement will be anarchy.”3
Yet South Africa chose to destabilize its neighbours, in large measure because circumstances at the beginning of the 1980s seemed to intimate an opening for aggressive military action. Regionally, South Africa felt confident that it could take advantage of dissident movements within southern Africa to further its destabilization campaign. In Angola, UNITA continued to represent a credible insurgency group through which Pretoria could wage war on both SWAPO and the MPLA. Similarly, with the onset of Zimbabwean independence, South Africa took control of the Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO) from Rhodesian intelligence. In the RENAMO, Pretoria nurtured a willing instrument of destabilization. In addition, Pretoria found that it could capitalize on dissent in Lesotho through the Lesotho Liberation Army (LLA). Likewise, tensions in Zimbabwe between ZANU and ZAPU guerrillas were easily exploitable.

Ultimately, the cost of these military and economic actions was staggering. SADCC estimated the costs of South African destabilization from 1980-1985 at over $10 billion. This figure exceeded the total foreign grants and loans to the region, 40% of the region’s exports revenue, and 10% of the GDP for this five-year period.4

5.1.1 Angola

The primary target for Pretoria’s campaign of violence would be Angola. South Africa’s motives for destabilizing Angola were obvious. Since its independence, Angola represented a direct security and conventional threat to South Africa. As a Marxist, Soviet-backed African state, Angola had been a major source of support and sanctuary for the ANC and SWAPO. In addition, the Soviet Union spent over $500 million to install and strengthen the MPLA in Luanda and repeatedly supplied Angola with sophisticated arms and ammunition, including early-warning radar systems and ground-to-air missiles.5 More importantly, Angola threatened South Africa’s economic dominance of the region. With substantial oil reserves and an alternative port and railway system, Angola could aid regional attempts at economically delinking from South Africa.

To minimize the Angolan threat, South Africa opted for large-scale military destabilization. SADF involvement in Angola began in earnest with Operation Reindeer in 1978 through massive strikes against SWAPO bases in southern Angola. The success of these strikes, destroying over twelve SWAPO camps in Angola and Namibia, gave rise to more ambitious SADF actions in the 1980s. The largest of these
actions was Operation Protea, launched on August 23, 1981, and involving 11,000 men, 90 Centurion M-41 tanks, 210 armoured cars, surface-to-surface missiles, and ninety planes and helicopters. This invasion resulted in the occupation of more than three years of the southern portion of Angola’s Cunene province. Several months later, the SADF followed with Operation Daisy, launched 150 miles into Angolan territory. These operations symbolized a new approach in South Africa’s Angola strategy. For the first time, South Africa directed its high-speed bombing strikes at Angolan forces rather than solely those of SWAPO.

South Africa’s destabilization of Angola did have setbacks. For instance, the December 1983 Operation Askari resulted in heavy losses for the SADF. These problems would not derail the larger program. Indeed, the mere presence of UNITA and South African soldiers promoted the destabilization necessary to undermine Angolan development. With 4000 intrusions into Angolan airspace, 168 bombing missions, 234 airborne troop landings, 74 ground attacks, and 7 full-scale invasions coupled with UNITA sabotage, South African involvement devastated Angola. The war displaced over 500,000 Angolans from their homes; Operation Protea produced 80,000 refugees in three weeks. Additionally, over 200,000 Angolans died because of war and famine caused by South African and UNITA actions. The destruction of health facilities, schools, and relief convoys prevented any relief for the displaced population. Land mines had also given Angola the dubious distinction of having the world’s greatest proportion of amputees—a number between 20,000 and 50,000.

In addition, the Angolan economy had been laid waste by war. Defence spending had absorbed 75% of Angola’s national budget and 50% of its export revenue. The war had disrupted internal trade, production, and planting; fields were abandoned, and large numbers of cattle were intentionally destroyed, killed by land mines, or starved. Additionally, Angola’s once profitable mining sector was generally abandoned in 1975, with an estimated foreign exchange loss of $2.1 billion.

5.1.2 United States, South Africa and Support for UNITA

While Washington closed its doors to the ANC, SWAPO, and the MPLA, it showed a keen interest in communicating with and supporting those African groups that had no attachments to Moscow. In particular, Chief Gatsha Buthelezi’s Inkatha Freedom Movement in South Africa, the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), and Jonas Savimbi’s UNITA movement in Angola were praised as cautious...
and restrained nationalists whose hostility to Moscow was an added bonus for the protection of Western interests. This would work in harmony with Botha’s Total National Strategy, which helped foster and support the same African groups.  

The first official contact between UNITA and the Reagan Administration appears to have been a March 1981 meeting between Savimbi and Senior Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Lannon Walker in Morocco. This meeting was followed by several visits to the White House, where Savimbi met with the President and several top government officials. During these contacts, Savimbi made it his primary objective to sell his anti-communist credentials, stating:

The goals of UNITA are clear and open. . . . We will drive the Cubans and Soviets and Eastern-bloc personnel from Angola. . . . We reject foreign ideologies that presuppose masses of industrial workers and men without souls. . . . The political program of UNITA is simple and clear. We fight for an independent Angola, free from all foreign troops. We believe that peasants, not the state, should own farm land. We favor democratic elections, freedom of religion and respect for tribal customs and languages.  

Working within the friendly confines of conservative publications, Savimbi wrote articles detailing his commitment to aiding the United States in defeating their common enemies, the Soviet Union and Cuba. He explained “Our struggle in Angola . . . is the battle for the West and its values” and asked that the United States not let Angola become the “Munich of Africa,” explaining:

the refusal to aid UNITA in its fight against the Cubans and the Soviets, will be taken as a signal by all the countries in the region that the United States has abandoned them to the Soviets as the West abandoned Czechoslovakia and Eastern Europe to Hitler in 1938.

Desiring to push the Cubans and Soviets from southern Africa, presidential candidate Reagan was explicit in his support for UNITA, declaring that he “would provide them [UNITA] with weapons.” After the election, the Reagan Administration assured Savimbi of its recognition of UNITA as a “legitimate political force” and of “Washington’s wish to see the Cubans . . . leave Angola.” Throughout his administration, President Reagan would continue to support UNITA as bulwark against communism and integral to resolving the impasse on Namibian independence. As he would explain to the Washington Times:

What Secretary Crocker’s been doing is actually having to do with
Namibia – Namibia and its independence. And there is the 435 Resolution of the United Nations about Namibia’s right to become a country. Well, right now, it’s South Africa territory. Now, South Africa is willing for Namibia to become independent, but not while on the northern border of Namibia sits Angola with the Cubans and the possibility remains of Namibia becoming another satellite of the Communist bloc. So, what he’s back and forth negotiating is that – for to create Namibia, for Angola to agree to remove the Cuban troops, and South Africa has agreed that they will move out, and they will be helpful in making this a state. And he’s made quite a bit of progress. For the first time, Angola has made a declaration that they are prepared to bring about the withdrawal. It’s a negotiating matter. They want to phase it, and they have some conditions on doing this. And so, he has come back just recently, but he’ll be going back again.19

Again, when Savimbi returned to Washington in 1986, Crocker urged Secretary of State Shultz “to assure Savimbi that we support him . . . and we will not abandon him . . . to seek his views on the role of American business in Angola . . . and to assure him that we will continue to monitor the situation on the ground, and his needs, carefully.”20 He would reiterate his belief that UNITA was critical to solving the Namibian issue, telling the media in 1984:

This is all part of the Namibian package that we’ve been negotiating. Now, the Savimbi forces are not a part of the negotiations; haven’t been. But at the same time, Savimbi supports the removal of the Cubans from Angola and says there is no chance of reconciliation as long as they’re there. So once the Cubans leave, UNITA and the Angolan Government would have a better chance of coming to a reconciliation.21

By the time Reagan came to power, there was reason to believe UNITA could be a useful ally in the administration’s geopolitical objectives. UNITA had distinguished itself among its “freedom fighting” peers with a robust black market trade in the commodities of Angola. Critical to UNITA’s viability was the selling of elephant ivory and rhino horns. A U.S. environmental group testified before Congress that, between 1976 and 1988, UNITA had killed as many as 100,000 elephants to subsidize the war effort.22 Extensive ivory harvesting by UNITA was confirmed by SADF Colonel Jan Breytenbach—who had established the “32 Buffalo” Battalion designed specifically for action in Angola—when in November 1989 he stated publicly that UNITA had “conducted a massive extermination campaign” against Angola’s elephants for the purpose of funding military operations.23
Director of Central Intelligence William Casey was tasked with providing aid to UNITA in violation of the Clark Amendment. Casey, however, never intended to fund UNITA to victory, only to play the global game of keeping the Soviet Union busy with small unwinnable wars as part of an eventual rollback. Since his service in the Board of Economic Warfare in World War II, before he joined the OSS, Casey was “interested in the economic infrastructure of adversary countries . . . how the economic jugular could be squeezed.”

From the beginning, Casey worked to provide aid to the UNITA anti-communist fight, regardless of congressional restraints. Casey was interested in Africa as a region and had re-opened CIA stations in several countries there. In September 1982, he visited Africa to “see for himself how the new pipelines were working,” including South Africa, where aid to the Contras and the Afghan mujahedeen were discussed. Casey was fully aware of the cooperation between UNITA and the South African government and apparently supported it. The August 1981 “Operation Smokeshell” entailed 15,000 SADF soldiers with tanks and air support advancing 200 kilometres into Angola’s Cunene province. The Republic defended this action as an operation against SWAPO guerrilla bases. However, the real intention was to create a “liberated zone” where UNITA could create its own government inside Angola.

Presumably, SADF operations against communist forces like SWAPO and the MPLA were also discussed during Casey’s visit. Given the SADF support to Savimbi and the fact that a propaganda operation by the South African government to promote Savimbi was in play, it seems likely that Casey was presented with a very positive impression of Savimbi and, through his own channels to the President, communicated as much. Casey, however, appears to have preferred no overt public statements about Savimbi by the administration in order to reduce the glare on American-South African cooperation in southern Africa and the role UNITA played in their regional ambitions.

Because UNITA could help apply pressure to the MPLA, South Africa would do more than any country in funding Savimbi. The Republic sent $80 million worth of assistance each year during the 1980s and served as UNITA’s principal source of arms, logistical, and intelligence support. The SADF also provided training to UNITA recruits in both Namibia and southern Angola. In a move nearly identical to American efforts to disguise Russian weapons captured by the Israelis then smuggled to the mujahedeen in Afghanistan, it was reported in 1980 that South Africa had purchased
$8.1 million of Soviet arms from Bulgaria and Poland and flown them into Angola so that “UNITA troops could then claim to have captured them from the Cubans.”

As early as 1981, Director of Central Intelligence Casey and Secretary of State Alexander Haig began to use the National Security Planning Group to support UNITA through surrogates and covert funding. Following a pattern set by the much maligned Carter Administration, Reagan policy “explicitly encouraged South Africa, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Zaire and Israel to lend UNITA assistance.”

Morocco’s ties with UNITA stretched back to the Carter Administration but it was during the Reagan Administration that cooperation between the United States, Morocco, and UNITA would take on a new, more sophisticated dimension. In the first year of the Reagan Administration, U.S. economic assistance to Morocco nearly doubled. Shortly thereafter, Morocco hosted UNITA military training efforts. The $50 to $70 million per year training operation was funded by another financial supporter of the Reagan Doctrine, Saudi Arabia. In 1983, the Congressional testimony of California businessman Sam Amieh indicated that Saudi Arabia made at least one “$15 million cash payment to UNITA” through Morocco at the encouragement of CIA Director Casey. Perhaps not coincidentally, the first Reagan budget nearly tripled foreign military sales credits for Morocco from $34 million to slightly over $100 million.

Another important player in the CIA program for UNITA was Zaire. Mobutu was the beneficiary of military and economic assistance from the United States and appears to have diverted a portion of that funding to UNITA. Additionally, Zaire provided logistical support and intelligence to UNITA throughout the Reagan Administration. By 1989, however, Zaire grew weary of supporting UNITA and abruptly withdrew aid.

Other types of funding for operations in Angola were more complicated than simply arranging for allies to divert American assistance to UNITA. An example of these efforts was provided by Sam Bamieh, a businessman and wealthy Reagan supporter, who claimed at a Clark Amendment hearing that Saudi Prince Bandar described to him an arrangement by which an offshore company would buy oil from Saudi Arabia, resell to South Africa at a profit of up to a dollar a barrel and then direct the proceeds to Angola. Thus South Africa could evade the oil embargo and covertly finance its intervention in Angola.
Israel also reportedly took part in a series of meetings with South Africa, UNITA, and the CIA in May 1983 and February 1984 in Kinshasa and in March 1984 and October 1985 in Morocco. Though much of the U.S.-Israel and South African cooperation appears to have been part of the administration’s effort to fund and arm the Contras, John Stockwell gave an interview to the *Jerusalem Post*, published December 19th, 1986, stating that the United States had funded the inoperable Grail missiles that were sent by Israel to UNITA, along with the more sophisticated Redeye missiles. Further, the World Anti-Communist League (WACL), when chaired by retired General John Singlaub, directly solicited Israel for captured Soviet arms for all of the four Reagan Doctrine cases, including UNITA, and he coordinated contacts with UNITA, which had earlier also joined the WACL.

Another example of how the United States funded UNITA is found in an operation that occurred in 1984. A CIA-supported company, Southern Air Transport, contracted with the MPLA government Diamond Company (DIAMANG) to fly in to the diamond mining areas and receive diamonds to deliver to Luanda. While unloading the diamonds, the CIA would deliver weapons taken in battle by South Africa to UNITA forces.

These types of arrangements between an informal network of countries and organizations that could do “favours” for the United States in return for needed aid or policy positions were effective. Income for UNITA during the Clark Amendment years is roughly estimated to include a straightforward $80 million a year from South Africa, $50 to $70 million from Saudi Arabia through Morocco for UNITA training, at least one and possibly more direct allocations of up to $15 million from the CIA, a variety of assistance in kind by countries like Zaire and South Africa, and income earned by UNITA’s own economic and smuggling activities.

To further strengthen this new official military relationship, the administration submitted a proposal to Congress seeking the repeal of the Clark Amendment. Testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in January 1981, Secretary of State-designate Alexander Haig stated that the amendment was “a self-defeating and unnecessary restriction on the executive branch in its attempt to carry out a successful American foreign policy.” Two months later, asked whether the United States should resume its assistance to UNITA, President Reagan echoed Haig’s words, saying, “of course, our hands are a little bit tied right now. A President of the United States is restricted by the so-called Clark Act that does not give us freedom to deal. . . .The
Angolan government is dominated by the presence of Cubans, surrogates of the Soviet Union.”

By seeking to repeal the amendment, Washington sought to increase UNITA’s military capacity; a move that the administration hoped would force the MPLA to agree to share power with UNITA. A secret CIA memorandum stated that the MPLA could “not afford to lose more than 5,000 to 7,500 members of the Cuban military force without suffering appreciable territorial loses to UNITA.” As earlier as 1982, there were those in Washington and Pretoria that believed that UNITA could win militarily and the presence of the Soviets in southern Africa eliminated. Historian Theresa Papenfus would write that Pik Botha:

foresaw dire problems for the Russians. He predicted that ultimately the realities of black Africa would defeat them. The scales were already tipping against them. Unita, which South Africa supported, was now much stronger than in 1981 and South Africa and the West had the capability to defeat the Marxist alliance.

The notion that Savimbi could win the war in Angola was largely a pipedream. A secret memorandum from George Schultz to President Reagan in June 1983 warned that it was “essential that our views get directly to Savimbi, and not through the filter of the South African military which is taking the line with him and others that a military solution in Angola is possible.” This opinion was shared by Chester Crocker who called the notion that Savimbi and the South Africans could “push the Soviets from Luanda” as “bullshit.” Nevertheless, South Africa would still have been the major beneficiary of American support for Savimbi, for a stronger UNITA would have compelled the MPLA to concentrate all its resources toward meeting that challenge, abandoning in the process its efforts to give assistance to SWAPO.

Although the administration’s initial efforts failed, it did successfully get the Clark Amendment repealed in 1985. Chester Crocker said that repeal was most important for Savimbi, who needed to “diversify his options” and acquire some “level of autonomy from South Africa” least he been seen as a “cat’s paw” for Pretoria.

Though never expressly articulated as such, within the Reagan Administration, UNITA had the officially accepted purpose of not winning militarily but remaining a viable force to keep pressure on Luanda to participate in the Namibian independence negotiations and eventually to send the Cuban troops home. The strategy seemed to be paying dividends in 1986 when President Reagan stated:
In Angola, Jonas Savimbi and his UNITA forces have waged an armed struggle against the Soviet-and Cuban-backed Marxist regime, and in recent years UNITA has steadily expanded the territory under its control. . . . In southern Africa, the recent announcement by the South African government of a date for the creation of an independent Namibia provides a new test of its own and of the Angolan regime’s interest in a settlement that truly begins to reduce the threats to security in this region.48

Crocker himself noted in 1988, “Our role in Angola is to try and get a signal across that we represent a political solution. . . . We want Cuban forces out of Angola so that Angolans themselves can for the first time discover themselves.”49 However, behind Crocker’s thin humanitarian veneer there was the zero-sum calculus of the Cold War. As Crocker would admit, “If they obstructed our settlement terms, the price and the pain would grow.”50 President Reagan would point to the strategy when he remarked:

In Angola in the past few weeks, Jonas Savimbi’s freedom fighters inflicted another crushing defeat on the Soviet-backed MPLA forces. This fall’s Communist offensive, the biggest ever in Angola, ended in a rout for the Soviets and their protégés. The heroes of the Lomba River did it again, pushing back the massive Soviet assault, capturing hundreds of operational trucks and tanks, and shooting down a substantial number of helicopters and Cuban-piloted planes. The Soviets truly are beginning to feel the sting of free people fighting back.51

This obvious bias in Washington’s relations with the region’s black nationalists further reveals Constructive Engagement’s real ambition, the rolling back of Soviet influence in southern Africa. Though the administration often engaged the MPLA in negotiations for power-sharing with UNITA and for Cuban withdrawal, the United States did not cease to perceive Eduardo dos Santos’ MPLA government as the enemy. By 1987, even when Cold War tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union had been greatly reduced, Washington’s policy toward Angola remained fixed in its emphasis “to reduce and, if possible, eliminate Soviet and Soviet proxy influence, military presence and opportunities in Angola and southern Africa.”52

5.1.3 Mozambique

Mozambique would also become a focus of South Africa’s destabilization campaign. South Africa’s clearest attack on that country was its backing for Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (RENAMO), which was moved to South Africa under Botha. RENAMO was founded in Rhodesia in 1974 by Rhodesian security forces to punish
Mozambique for supporting the Patriotic Front. It was initially composed entirely of Portuguese ex-colonials and Mozambican exiles who had worked for FIDE. In 1980, RENAMO moved its base of operations to South Africa at the behest of South African Military Intelligence (SAMI). Once there, RENAMO president Alfonso Dhlakama boasted to journalists that he had been assured, “Your Army is now part of the South African Defence Forces.”

In October of that year, SADF Colonel van Niekerk instructed RENAMO to begin striking at targets in southern Mozambique, launching a build-up that would paralyze that country. South African destabilization meant that development projects were destroyed and economic growth slowed. The Mozambican government estimated the total cost of RENAMO attacks at over 300 million dollars for 1982 alone.

After 1982, RENAMO activities were stepped up. Torture of civilians was commonplace, and relief workers complained that RENAMO paralysis of roads and communications were responsible for many of the famine deaths. RENAMO also made appeals to ethnicity in its propaganda. Because the Shona suffered severe dislocations during colonialism and endured the worst of the drought, many became disillusioned with the government. They were also geographically isolated from the party during the liberation struggle and were under-represented in the government.

Indeed RENAMO’s strongholds were in Tete, Manica, and Sofala provinces—traditionally Shona areas.

South Africa had several reasons for its destabilization of Mozambique. First, Mozambique was a potential transport hub in southern Africa, offering the region the possibility to reduce its transport dependence on South Africa. The ports of Maputo, Beira, and Nacala could service all of Zimbabwe’s and Malawi’s trade, including cargo from other landlocked states. Although South African firms from the northern Transvaal profited from exporting through Maputo, the smooth operation of Mozambique’s ports could greatly facilitate the region’s access to non-South African, well-equipped deep water ports—a goal central to SADCC efforts to delink from South Africa. Furthermore, Mozambique rested at the terminus of the Beira Corridor, a parallel system of rail, road, and oil pipeline links connecting landlocked southern Africa to the sea and providing these states with their petroleum needs. A stable Mozambique would be able to develop the potential of these transport links at the expense of South African transport facilities.
Second, Pretoria cited the presence of the ANC in Mozambique as justifying South African support for RENAMO, as Pik Botha explained, “There was of course a time when we helped to train RENAMO and assisted it. There was such a time. Why? More than 90% of all violent attacks on South Africa . . . were planned and carried out from Mozambican territory. . . . It was the main channel for ANC terrorists.” With FRELIMO abetting ANC actions within the Republic, Pretoria decided to reciprocate through the RENAMO.

RENAMO actions devastated the fragile Mozambican economy and left its infrastructure in shambles. Roads, rails, trains, bridges, oil tanks, port facilities, the CahoraBassa dam, food distribution, villages, government officials, schools, cotton and tea processing facilities, local population groups—everything was affected by RENAMO sabotage. Similarly, the RENAMO attacked SADCC traffic from both Zimbabwe and Malawi. In three years, 93 locomotives and 250 wagons were destroyed leaving 150 rail workers dead. In addition, roads and railways were mined, destroying vans, trucks, and private cars indiscriminately.

More severe was the horrific RENAMO impact on the Mozambican population. The RENAMO burned peasant grain stores and destroyed 900 rural shops in 1982 and 1983. In 1982 alone, the RENAMO burned 140 villages, destroyed 102 medical centres and rural health posts, forced the closure of 489 primary schools, and hacked the ears off of school teachers. Additionally, the RENAMO and its compatriots employed murder, abduction, forced labour, rape, and mutilation to terrorize Mozambique’s population.

The economic links between South Africa and Mozambique made it comparatively easy for South Africa to put pressure on the FRELIMO government. One example is the reduction in the number of mine contracts awarded to Mozambican workers. It was Vorster who abrogated South Africa’s gold agreement with Mozambique in 1978; by breaking this arrangement, South Africa cost Mozambique two-and-half billion dollars in lost revenue. At a high cost to itself and despite the protests of the business community, South Africa reduced exports through the port of Maputo to a fraction of the former level, entirely eliminating some categories of high tariff commodities such as steel, copper, and nickel. As a result, Mozambique lost another 250 million dollars in uncollected duties. Some of the sanctions adopted by Pretoria were petty, yet their toll was terrible. When an epidemic of cholera broke out in Mozambique, South Africa suddenly stopped shipments of chlorine.
Natural disasters compounded the crisis, exposing the vulnerability of Mozambique’s economy; alternating years of drought and flooding cost Mozambique an estimated 250 million dollars. In 1982, rainfall was less than half of the normal amount over the entire country. Suddenly Inhambane and Tete provinces began to face famine. Famine is estimated to have taken between 30 and 100 thousand lives during 1982-1983. However, communication with the capital was so slow that officials were not aware of the crisis until people were already dying. It was not until January 1983 that the world became aware of what was going on and Mozambique made a plea for emergency assistance.

In an effort to control the deteriorating situation, FRELIMO resorted to authoritarian measures. Flogging, a punishment not seen since colonial times, was reintroduced for political crimes, and the death penalty was extended to economic crimes. Six RENAMO guerrillas were publicly executed without trials. A far worse move on the part of FRELIMO was “Operation Production.” Initially conceived as a resettlement program for urban migrants fleeing rural unemployment, Operation Production deteriorated into a forced explosion. Fifty to one hundred thousand people were moved from Maputo and Beira in a few weeks and dumped in Zambia province, where they were supposed to start working in agriculture. These moves generated so much resistance that they were quickly halted, but serious damage was done to FRELIMO’s credibility, and RENAMO’s case against the government began to take on new meaning.

In 1982, Mozambique had a debt to the noncommunist world of one-and-a-half billion dollars. It was facing arrears on its payments for the first time and had to approach its creditors asking for a rescheduling of its payments. FRELIMO found itself unable to find alternatives to its position in the global economy. The economic structures inherited by independent Mozambique continued to create poverty after liberation. This poverty made Mozambique vulnerable to natural disasters and to political disasters as well: Mozambique not only needed to feed its people, it had to be able to defend its experiment if it were to succeed.

The costs were staggering for Maputo. Economically, Mozambique lost approximately $4 billion from the dislocation of its economy. The human costs were worse. Over 500,000 Mozambicans died between 1980 and the signing of Nkomati, half of which were children under five. Furthermore, RENAMO disruption of food production placed 5.9 million people at risk of imminent starvation. Mozambique’s
refugee problem was also enormous, with 700,000 Mozambicans fleeing the country by April 1988.65

5.1.4 Lesotho

Similarly, along with the SADF raids and border restrictions, South Africa had supported the dissident Lesotho Liberation Army (LLA), which had operated from bases in the Orange Free State, QwaQwa, and the Transkei.66 South Africa also conducted cross-border operations into Lesotho against purported ANC targets, such as the December 9, 1982, raid on Maseru in which 37 people were killed. Economic pressures on Lesotho, which as a landlocked country entirely surrounded by South Africa was highly vulnerable, resulted in the expulsion of ANC personnel.

Non-military economic destabilization was more subtle, especially in terms of transport diplomacy. Likewise, efforts to strangle economically the states of southern Africa were effective. In fact, such moves led to the collapse of Chief Jonathan’s government in Lesotho. After several years of growing friction between Pretoria and Maseru, South Africa hardened its stance toward the anti-apartheid government of Lesotho. In response to a land mine incident near the Lesotho border that claimed the lives of six South African civilians in 1985, South Africa launched an SADF raid. Two weeks later, South Africa completely closed Lesotho’s border—restricting all commercial traffic. As a result, Lesotho’s fragile economy reached an absolute standstill. A few weeks later, on January 20, 1986, a military council ousted Jonathan in a near-bloodless coup. After the military council expelled sixty ANC activists five days later, South Africa lifted the economic blockade and reopened the Lesotho economy to the world.67 Although not as blatant as SADF operations in Angola, this form of destabilization certainly brought Pretoria positive political results.

5.1.5 Zambia

For its part, Zambia had been described by South Africa as a centre for subversion and as a “Marxist” satellite state engaged in a Soviet-inspired conspiracy against the Republic. In response to the alleged Zambian threat, South Africa reportedly trained up to 600 Zambian dissidents and was involved in at least two conspiracies in that country after 1980. In addition, South Africa had also engaged in economic destabilization against Zambia. After 1980, direct attacks were made against Zambian economic targets from the Caprivi Strip, including one in April 1982 by two battalions
of the SADF that resulted in a decline in agricultural production and a deterrence of mineral prospecting in the area. In July 1982, southern Zambia was declared a disaster zone, partly due to these deprivations.

Similar actions included transport disruptions. After the Commonwealth agreed to impose limited sanctions in August 1986, South Africa immediately placed a steep levy on all goods passing through the Republic en route to Zambia. The ensuing effects on their economies provoked food riots in Zambia. After Zambia had not imposed sanctions by the January 1, 1987, deadline, South Africa eased its transport restrictions.68

5.1.6 Botswana

Most incidents involving Botswana were clashes between Botswana and South African forces around the Caprivi Strip and attacks on South African refugees in Botswana. Protests by Botswana elicited little response from South Africa, or in most cases, the Republic simply denied that any incident ever occurred. Despite these incidents, Botswana did not suffer the same kinds of attacks that other neighbours of South Africa had. One possible reason for this was that Botswana kept tight control over South African refugees and was careful to discourage any attempts either to smuggle arms across the border to South Africa or to allow armed attacks against South Africa or Bophuthatswana to originate in Botswana.69

5.1.7 Swaziland

Swaziland had, like Botswana, always been careful in not giving unnecessary offense to South Africa. Alarmed by the Maseru raid, Swaziland reacted by rounding up ANC refugees and either expelling them or removing them to a detention camp at Makerns.

5.1.8 Zimbabwe

Zimbabwe was a special case for South Africa. It was the only state in the region where a reasonable possibility existed of establishing a stable, multi-racial society. It was seen by South Africa to be the only state in the region outside of the Republic capable of becoming an industrial power.

Shortly after Zimbabwean independence, South Africa transported a number of former black Rhodesian troops and ZIPRA guerrillas to camps in the northern
Transvaal, from where the Ndebele language “Radio Truth” operated. In Zimbabwe, South Africa was also involved in sabotage, such as the destruction of two-thirds of the country’s air force at Gweru in July 1982, and the heavy-handed use of economic pressures, such as the withdrawal-of railroad equipment needed to haul the country’s record harvest in 1981.70

South Africa could hardly deny involvement in the so-called “month of the hawks” in December 1982, when the destruction of the oil depot at Beira by commandos, sabotage to the rail route between Maputo and Chincualacuiala, and a supposed labour dispute on the South African railway lines to Zimbabwe all combined to put a serious economic squeeze on Zimbabwe. While fuel supplies did eventually reach the country, South Africa had shown just how much pressure it could apply.71

Although less profound than that directed at Angola and Mozambique, South African military action likewise affected Zimbabwe. South Africa’s alleged support for the Super-ZAPU dissidents in the Matabeleland province of Zimbabwe had been the subject of much concern for the Mugabe leadership, especially in the early 1980s. More direct was the destruction of the strong and potentially threatening Zimbabwean Air Force in July 1982 by guerrillas armed with South African equipment.

Like the military component of destabilization, economic destabilization illustrated Pretoria’s effort to maintain regional economic dependence and secure political concessions. As mentioned earlier, a key form of economic destabilization was military, especially acts of sabotage of transport and oil links. For instance, South Africa’s decision to cut off Zimbabwe’s oil shipments nearly shut down the Zimbabwean economy in December 1982. Similarly, RENAMO disruptions of the Beira and Limpopo rail links cost the region extra in rerouting their goods to South African ports. Fortification of these routes against South African sponsored sabotage was done at great expense. For instance, to defend the Beira route against RENAMO attacks, Zimbabwe spent over half a million dollars per day.72

5.2 Non-criticism of South Africa’s Destabilization Campaign

Throughout his tenure, Reagan not only avoided criticizing the South African government but, in addition, shielded Pretoria from international isolation and ridicule. When South African forces attacked and destroyed an ANC-occupied building in Maputo in early 1981, President Reagan seemed to sympathize with the operation even though the administration later expressed regret over the incident. Called before a U.S.
House Subcommittee, Secretary Crocker was accused of tacitly supporting the raid by failing to condemn South Africa’s military actions. Crocker replied that it was “not our view that public confrontation . . . was necessarily going to produce any productive result of a kind we would like to see.” He would go on to say the administration “deplored the raid,” but “we put it in a broader context” of Angola allowing SWAPO guerrillas to remain in Angola. In a subsequent statement on the matter, U.S. delegate Charles M. Lichenstein asserted that it was the presence of “foreign combat forces in Angola, particularly the large Cuban force, and the provision of Soviet-originated arms to SWAPO” that explained South African actions.73

The issue would flare up again following another raid into Angola in 1982. The U.S. House African subcommittee condemned the raid in the strongest terms and pulled the Secretary back to answer for the administration’s assumed duplicity. Crocker refused to concede the South Africans were at fault, lecturing the House members that “There is a guerrilla war going on, launched from Angolan territory against the people and property of Namibia, and as long as that continues, South Africa will go after them.” Additionally, the Reagan Administration would support South Africa’s right to “self-defence” and recognized “no state’s right to harbor plotters or perpetrators of violence across borders and against other lands.”74

A similar South African attack was conducted in Lesotho in May of 1983. The Reagan Administration protested the South African actions, but largely foisted the blame on the ANC for two car bombings in the Republic that were thought to have been planned and directed from within Lesotho.75 The administration would show similar restraint in criticizing Pretoria after the South African government destroyed a black squatter camp outside of Cape Town in 1981.76

Crocker’s talking points on each of these raids closely mirrored those used by Pretoria after each military incursion into a neighbouring country. For instance, as the Secretary was addressing members of congress, General Constand L. Viljoen, Chief of the South African Defence Force, defended his nation’s actions as legitimate counter-terrorist measures and warned southern African states of the inevitable consequences of harbouring the ANC.77 It appears that the South African leadership was disposed to follow such a belligerent course because it realized that the Reagan Administration looked at these measures as reducing communist influence in the region.78 In fact, South African commandos first struck at ANC diplomatic facilities in Matola,
Mozambique, on January 30, 1981, only days after Reagan made a speech in which he called South Africa an “old friend.”

In 1981 alone, out of 14 anti-apartheid resolutions discussed at the United Nations, the United States cast a “No” vote twelve times and abstained twice. Additionally, on April 30, the United States, together with Britain and France, vetoed five Security Council resolutions that, in addition to recommending punitive sanctions including an oil embargo, sought to pressure South Africa into submitting to the implementation of UN Resolution 435. Exiled ANC President Oliver Tambo condemned the Western allies for vetoing sanctions against South Africa and complained a year later:

The problem about the imposition of sanctions against South Africa emanates from a few Western countries which reap lucrative profits from the apartheid system and the human crimes associated with it. It is common knowledge that Britain, West Germany, Italy, France and the United States, together, and hundreds of transnational corporations have vested interests in the perpetuation and survival of the apartheid system. . . . The United States has entered the picture as the latter-day leader of the group which has, like the racist regime of South Africa, never accepted the independence of African countries.

Among the most strident critics of the Reagan Administration’s policies in southern Africa were the OAU countries, which in late June 1981 unanimously condemned the United States for its “overt and covert collusion with the South African racists.” Specifically, the Reagan Administration was accused of trying to “turn the clock back” on the whole issue of Namibian independence by its linkage to a Cuban withdrawal with a concurrent settlement. Sam Nujoma, the head of SWAPO, called for continuing sanctions against the South Africans, and if the United States did not support them, he would ask the OAU and Nigeria to implement economic sanctions against the West.

The Nigerians, for their part, responded with near identical threats. In an interview with the *New York Times*, Chuka Okadigbu, a senior policy advisor to then-President Shehu Shagari, accused Reagan of desiring to “give more credence to the apartheid regime in South Africa and to slow down independence in Namibia.” According to Okadigbu, Nigeria would respond by mobilizing opposition to the new American policy within the OAU and by using “when necessary . . . economic measures to persuade the United States to understand our position with a view to
stopping it being so patently anti-African. This means oil and other economic measures.” On the other hand, some thought “that as a result of a temporary glut in the world oil market, Nigeria will have to jettison its foreign policy. That is naive. A temporary situation should not be considered a permanent situation.”

Following Operation Protea in Angola and the refusal of the Reagan Administration to unreservedly condemn it, the African view of American policy became even more critical. After the African states introduced a harsh motion of condemnation against the Republic in the Security Council—which was promptly vetoed by the United States—the Angolan delegate, Elisio di Figueiredo, publicly stated the U.S. veto was “nothing short of support for South Africa’s racism, South Africa’s flouting of UN resolutions, and South Africa’s disregard for human dignity and life.” Despite the protestations of the Republic’s neighbours, it would soon become clear that the policy of regional destabilization paid dividends for South Africa and the United States.

5.3 The Diplomatic Tract

In early 1984, the United States and South Africa believed there were promising developments in the region that tended to validate their efforts, at least as they concerned the geopolitical objectives of the Total National Strategy and Constructive Engagement. After years of constant strife, the region was growing weary of instability and dislocation. Southern African governments had come to realize that the costs of maintaining order in the face of external threats and internal unrest were well beyond their immediate capabilities. In short, peace with South Africa, even on the Republic’s terms, was less devastating than the continuance of war.

South Africa, too, had begun to grow weary. The colonization of Namibia annually drained more than R1 billion, approximately U.S. $600 million in 1983, from an already strained treasury. South Africa’s invasion of Angola in December 1983 resulted in casualties that shocked both the government and the white population. And for the first time, pro-regime Afrikaans newspapers began to print hesitant calls for a withdrawal from Namibia. Additionally, the sweeping destabilization campaign began to cause serious damage to one of South Africa’s principal allies, the United States. By mid-1983 the Reagan Administration was actively pushing for rapprochement in southern Africa in terms of its regional security doctrine. In 1984, after prolonged negotiations, South Africa signed the Lusaka Agreement with Angola and the Nkomati
Accord with Mozambique, inaugurating a new phase of The Total Strategy and Constructive Engagement.

For South Africa, the peace accords signed at Lusaka and Nkomati seemed to signal a triumph for its military campaign. Destabilization had achieved what no previous policy had—South African hegemony over it neighbours. As for the Reagan Administration, the negotiating process could not have come at a better time. With criticism coming from the U.S. Congress and international community, Crocker needed positive developments in southern Africa to mute criticism of the Republic’s racial policies.

In 1983 and 1984, South Africa faced a new set of domestic, regional, and international conditions that heightened the appeal for peace settlements. Domestically, the South African public had become less threat-conscious, more conciliatory toward South Africa’s enemies, and less gloomy about South Africa’s future. For example, in 1982, seven out of every ten white South Africans viewed Zimbabwe as a threat to the Republic’s national security. In 1984, not only did the number of people subscribing to this feeling drop but the intensity of agreement also declined. In 1982, 22.7% of white South Africans polled “definitely” saw Zimbabwe as a principal threat, whereas in 1984 this number decreased to 14.9%. The white public even began to view Mozambique in a favourable light, with over two-thirds of the white population sympathetic to Marxist Maputo’s plight.

Furthermore, the South African economy began to show signs of severe strain. In a deep economic recession characterized by falling gold prices, drought, rising interest rates, inflation, and a declining rand, the South African economy was struggling to afford the high cost of destabilization. With recession cutting into a declining defence budget, increased SADF actions in the region undermined the acquisition, modernization, and preparedness programs necessary for South African defence:

Objectives in respect of preparedness programmes and the manufacture of arms could not be fully achieved owing to a restricted SADF budget during the past five years and also as a result of the economic recession.

Regionally, South Africa suffered setbacks in its destabilization campaign. The 1983 Operation Askari in Angola ended in significant South African losses in both material and men, necessitating an early South African withdrawal. Likewise, the costs
of Angola involvement, estimated at $4 million per day, began to seem prohibitive. Even relations with the West signalled to Pretoria the benefits of peace. The United States and its European allies desperately needed to see some movement in the region and began to draw closer to the Republic’s neighbours. France hosted Angolan leader Dos Santos in 1981, and Mozambican President Machel made a triumphant tour of Europe, attracting the sympathies of Thatcher and Mitterrand. Likewise, the EEC and Scandinavian countries actively backed SADCC efforts. Even Washington began to modify its stance as new policy makers replaced the ultra-right wingers in the Reagan Administration. As a result, statements of Constructive Engagement became more belligerent, and Washington-Maputo relations thawed significantly.

Thus, destabilization was no longer as attractive to Pretoria. Instead, South Africa, as Pik Botha outlined, embarked on a more cooperative stance in the region:

Winds of change are again blowing through Africa. There is an irresistible attraction of new forces and new continental realities. There is a growing realisation that South Africa is not on the defensive. South Africa is an increasingly confident regional power which has the will, the power and the resources to play the role it has been invited to fulfill in the search for peace in the region.

With such an outlook, South Africa and the United States attempted to capitalize diplomatically on the Republic’s destabilization campaign.

5.3.1 Namibia: The Captive State

The issue of Namibian independence provides what may be one of the best illustrations of the Reagan Administration’s use of Pretoria in achieving its geopolitical objectives in southern Africa. As briefly discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, South Africa’s control over Namibia became an issue of international focus long before Reagan came into office. After World War I, the League of Nations declared Namibia a mandated territory to be administered by South Africa on behalf of Britain. At the close of the Second World War, all mandated territories were placed under U.N. trusteeship with the objective of ensuring their gradual progression toward total independence. South Africa, however, planned to incorporate Namibia and make it part of the Union, a move that the U.N. General Assembly resisted. In 1969, the Security Council demanded South Africa’s total withdrawal from Namibia, and in 1971, the International Court of Justice declared Pretoria’s control over the territory illegal. Nevertheless, South Africa
defied all international efforts and continued to occupy and extend its apartheid policy into Namibia.\textsuperscript{93}

A significant U.S. involvement in the mediation process began with the Carter Administration. At Carter’s initiative, the United States, Britain, Canada, France, and West Germany formed a Western Contact Group (WCG), which began a series of multilateral talks with South Africa, SWAPO, and the Frontline States.\textsuperscript{94} The efforts of the WCG resulted in elaborate proposals for a settlement that included a cease-fire between South Africa and SWAPO, withdrawal of South African troops, disbanding of local police forces, and the appointment of a U.N. Transition Action Group (UNTAG) to administer the territory until elections were held under U.N. supervision. The U.N. Security Council accepted these proposals and adopted them as UN Resolution 435 in August 1978.\textsuperscript{95}

South Africa, however, rejected the resolution and, through a series of manoeuvres, frustrated its implementation. As Robert Jaster put it:

South Africa’s diplomats played an astute game of calculated ambiguity. . . . They would agree in principle with, or to cooperate with various elements in the negotiations, yet avoid making binding commitments. On several occasions, after winning a major concession, they raised a new objection.\textsuperscript{96}

Pretoria also stepped up its attacks on SWAPO fighters who operated from bases in southern Angola.

South Africa’s publicized objection to Resolution 435 was that it favoured SWAPO, but there was more at stake.\textsuperscript{97} First, Pretoria feared that if elections were allowed to take place in Namibia, SWAPO, which commanded a large following among the Ovambo, the country’s largest ethnic group, would trounce its rivals. One of these opponents was the South African backed Democratic Turnhalle Alliance, a party that comprised Namibia’s largely conservative white minority and most of the conservative tribal chiefs from the rural areas. Prime Minister P. W. Botha was aware that a SWAPO victory would result in a mass exodus of those right-wingers into South Africa, a move that would have swelled the ranks of his main challengers within the National Party.\textsuperscript{98}

No less important was Namibia’s geographical location to the west of South Africa and south of Angola. This location made the territory a suitable buffer against possible guerrilla or conventional incursions into South Africa. Therefore, a South
African withdrawal, according to Defence chief Magnus Malan and Minister for Foreign Affairs Pik Botha, would “place the enemy closer to the heartland of the Republic.”

Thus, contrary to the conventional explanation that the Namibian talks reached a stalemate because the WCG had leaned too much toward SWAPO, the failure to reach a settlement during the Carter Administration should be understood in the context of South Africa’s own intransigence and fear of the political costs that Namibian independence would have engendered. In short, South Africa was just not prepared for or even interested in a settlement.

When the Reagan Administration assumed power in 1981, it altered the recommendations of Resolution 435 and dropped the WCG’s multilateral approach in favour of a bilateral policy that linked the issue of Namibian independence to the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. Thinking largely within a Cold War framework, Assistant Secretary of State Crocker, through his linkage policy, precipitated a protracted diplomatic struggle that delayed Namibia’s independence for a full eight years, thus granting South Africa’s desire for continued control over the territory a major boost.

The new approach adopted by Reagan and his aides was a clear indication of the administration’s conviction that the major problem in southern Africa was the Soviet Union and its Cuban proxy. As a result, the presence of 30,000 Cuban troops in Angola became the central focus of Washington, not Namibian independence. A secret communiqué from Alexander Haig to President Reagan following his meeting with Pik Botha outlined “our [the administration’s] framework for a settlement.” The key elements included:

- constitutional arrangements and guarantees prior to the elections. The South Africans are not pressing for a full-fledged constitution but want full assurances that the settlements will not simply lead to a one-man, one-vote, one-time” outcome. We agree.

- no Soviet flag in Windhoek. Translated into diplomatic terms, this will require a provision for Namibia’s non-alignment (no foreign bases or troops) as part of the settlement package. While neither the South Africans nor ourselves want a SWAPO victory, both sides recognize SWAPO must be included in the settlement if it is be internationally acceptable.

- consultations with the internal parties. The South Africans cannot be
seen to be forcing a settlement down the throats of the internal parties. We assured the South Africans that we have every intention of helping them on this by talking directly to the internal parties.

no deadlines. We explained that at this point we wanted to obtain South Africa’s good faith commitment to the search for an internationally acceptable settlement but we’re not interested in posing deadlines on the process. We have given them time. At the same time, they understand we do not want to be manipulated or to have this item on our agenda for the immediate future.

On Angola, there is a common understanding that the first requirements is to establish momentum on Namibia and to avoid explicit public linkage of the Angolan and Namibian situations. Once momentum is obtained, our leverage with the Africans in general and the Angolans in particular will geometrically increase to get the Cuban forces out of Angola. The South Africans recognize this is our hand to play.

At first, administration officials denied that the new approach originated from the White House. They maintained that linking Cuban withdrawal from Angola with South Africa’s pull-out from Namibia had been advocated by Pretoria. However, a set of policy documents leaked to the press in May 1981 exposed the administration’s determination to make Namibian independence contingent upon Cuba withdrawing from Angola, the MPLA agreeing to share power with UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi, and the possibility of excluding SWAPO from any future government in Namibia, thus curbing the spread of Soviet influence in the region.

These documents, which were prepared by Crocker and subsequently approved by Secretary of State Alexander Haig and the White House, indicate a desire to rollback Soviet and Cuban influence through diplomacy. At one stage, Crocker wrote that “we would insist that Namibian independence and Cuban withdrawal are unrelated, but in fact they would be mutually reinforcing, parallel tracks of an overall strategy. . . . We would avoid linking the two publicly.” Crocker further asserted:

African leaders would have no basis for resisting the Namibia-Angola linkage once they realize that they can only get a Namibia settlement through us. . . . As for the Soviet-backed government in Angola, it would be told that Moscow could not help it economically; that Washington could; that recognition is out unless the Cubans leave and they cut a deal with Savimbi.

Again, a memorandum from Crocker to Shultz in 1982 reiterated the administration’s primary objective behind the linkage policy: “Our objective remains the withdrawal of all Cuban combat forces from Angola” and to make UNITA “a key factor in the
negotiations. . . . UNITA is a viable force which must be taken into account in Angola.  

The administration, it appears, was quite aware of the numerous problems inherent in its linkage strategy. Crocker’s memo to Shultz stated that, while the MPLA, SWAPO, and the frontline states wished to see progress in Namibia, they rejected outright a formula that predicated Namibian independence on the withdrawal of Cubans forces from Angola. The reason for this objection is obvious. Crocker’s linkage strategy failed to take into account the MPLA’s concern about its own security, particularly if South African troops were to remain in Namibia until elections were held. To be sure, the MPLA did look forward to the Cubans’ departure from Luanda, largely because of the heavy financial costs incurred from subsidizing such a large military presence there. However, as long as South Africa maintained a strong military presence in Namibia, the MPLA government consistently held to the position that “Cuban troops would be sent home as soon as Namibia gained independence and the threat of a South African attack had been removed.”

Meanwhile South Africa, by insisting that Cuban withdrawal should take place before it removed its forces from Namibia, did not make things any easier for Crocker and other advocates of linkage. Moreover, Pretoria was very sceptical about allowing the Namibian elections to take place because it was obvious to everyone that SWAPO would win. As Crocker told Shultz:

Part of the problem is persistent South African doubt about the value of an experience which appears likely to place a SWAPO government in office. Additionally, South African demands on the sequence of Cuban withdrawal . . . all Cubans out within twelve weeks, are completely unsalable in the context of the phased, confidence-building concept we have presented to the Angolans.

Notwithstanding these problems or perhaps the impracticality of the linkage strategy, Washington nevertheless went ahead with its implementation. Central to Crocker’s plan was to allay South Africa’s fears by assuring it of the Reagan Administration’s “commitment to achieving Cuban withdrawal” while lying deliberately to the U.N., the OAU, the Frontline states, and other parties opposed to linkage “by defining the Angolan issue as separate, not formally linked and not part of Security Council Resolution 435.”
The hypocrisy displayed by the administration in dealing with the Namibian issue was nothing if not a revelation of the bankruptcy of the whole policy of Constructive Engagement. While the United States went to all lengths—even to the extent of lying—in order to ease South Africa’s proclaimed security concerns, it received no cooperation from South Africa insofar as working toward a settlement was concerned. Instead, Pretoria used Washington’s linkage policy as a bargaining chip to prolong its presence in Namibia. As would Pik Botha would remark to Brand Fourier, South Africa “would get pretty far with Reagan administration when they were trying to halt Russian expansion.”

South Africa deliberately increased its support of UNITA by stepping up its incursions into Angola, thereby making it difficult, if not impossible, for the MPLA to even contemplate letting the Cubans go. Chester Crocker acknowledged this, saying the South African campaign necessitated the Cubans doing something “dramatic” and that the subsequent doubling of Cuban forces “upped the ante . . . creating a herding stalemate.” George Shepherd, Jr., provides a good summary of how South Africa exploited the linkage policy:

The South African military and political leaders were not slow in adopting this strategy as they realized more quickly than the Reagan brain trust that this provided them with an excuse to remain in Namibia as long as they kept sufficient pressure on the Angolan government, thus requiring them to keep the Cubans to help with internal security. They, therefore, stepped up assistance to Savimbi and his UNITA enabling them to provide increasing guerrilla harassment of roads, railways and villages.

Strategic considerations blinded the Reagan Administration to the realities of southern Africa. Not only did American officials fail to appreciate the MPLA’s concerns about its own security, but they seem to have ignored the fact that South Africa’s occupation of Namibia was illegal, while the Cubans were in Angola at the invitation of that country’s sovereign government. Crocker would answer this criticism by claiming that the “feckless” Angolans were “not independent” and had to “look over their shoulder at Moscow or Havana” to make any decision. Writing a decade later, Crocker left little doubt that his linkage policy was, indeed, a product of geopolitical rationalization aimed at Soviet containment and concern over SWAPO’s Moscow-Luanda connection:
A winner-take-all SWAPO victory posed risks for the West, especially if it continued to enjoy cross-border support from the Communist powers ensconced in Angola. Ronald Reagan had not been elected to make Africa safer for Marxism, still less to work for yet another Marxist takeover in the wake of the 1975-78 Soviet-Cuban gains in Angola, Mozambique and Ethiopia and the Mugabe victory in Zimbabwe.\(^{114}\)

This was a clear indication that the Reagan Administration’s interest in southern Africa was primarily geopolitical, with little or no concern for the aspirations of black Africans. The major objective of linkage was the removal of Cuban forces from Angola, not the attainment of independence for Namibia. David Winder of *The Christian Science Monitor* noted the administration’s principal interest in the Namibian settlement: “the removal of some 30,000 Cuban troops from Angola whose presence contributes to the Reagan administration’s concerns about Soviet expansionism and the degree to which it is achieved through Cuban proxies.”\(^{115}\) Crocker vindicated Winder when he later stated, “We believed that we were promoting that which best served American interests . . . the likely reduction of communist influence in the region; a serious constraint on SWAPO; and a likely boost for UNITA.”\(^{116}\)

### 5.3.1 The Lusaka Agreement

Early in 1984, Crocker’s strategy seemed to be producing the desired results. In December of 1983, Crocker and Pik Botha met in Rome, where the United States reportedly convinced the South Africans that, in order to move the negotiations forward, they should offer both a ceasefire and a withdrawal of South African forces from southern Angola if Angola would reciprocate in kind.\(^{117}\) Consequently, in mid-December, the South Africans sent a letter to the U.N. Secretary-General, Javier Perez de Cuellar, advancing such an agreement and proposing that it commence at the end of January 1984. While the proposal offered a “disengagement” for only a one-month trial period, it did agree to extend its provisions if the Angolans and the Cubans did not “exploit the resulting situation” by mounting or supporting attacks on Namibia.\(^{118}\) Although the letter arrived at the U.N. one day before a scheduled Security Council debate on the latest South African incursion into Angola, the United States praised the South African offer as a generous proposal that would lead toward an improved climate for further negotiations on Namibia and that would meet previous Angolan demands that South African troops withdraw from its territory before Luanda consider negotiations leading toward Cuban withdrawal.\(^{119}\)
In order to pursue this initiative, Crocker left Washington on January 25 for discussions in South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia, and Mozambique and then travelled to Europe to brief the various members of the Contact Group. Meanwhile, Crocker’s deputy, Frank Wisner, met with the Angolans at Cape Verde and then went to Lisbon in order to brief the Portuguese—who were attempting to re-establish closer ties with both Angola and Mozambique—, after which he was to return to Africa in order to speak with the Angolans in Luanda. The purposes of these visits were to make sure that the South Africans did not scuttle the initiative, to obtain support from the frontline states for the initiative, to request that those same African states pressure Angola to respond favourably to the South African proposal, to coordinate the Angolan plan with the concurrent South Africa-Mozambique peace effort, and generally to persuade all concerned that this initiative was the best hope for a peaceful outcome in southern Africa.

On January 27, Crocker met with Pik Botha in Cape Town and attempted, unsuccessfully, to pressure the South Africans into transforming their proposal into a firm commitment without conditions to withdraw from southern Angola and to expand their offer of a ceasefire from 30 to 90 days. Crocker’s primary worry was that the Angolans would not publicly accept the South African conditions, especially the required movement of Angolan troops within Angola, because they could undoubtedly be interpreted as a sovereignty question, and without such an Angolan acknowledgement, the South Africans would refuse to withdraw, essentially dooming the initiative. After two days of negotiations, however, Botha, while refusing to broaden South Africa’s proposal of a 30-day ceasefire, did concede Crocker’s point concerning Angola’s public acceptance of prior conditions and offered instead to accept American “assurances” that the Angolans would abide by Pretoria’s conditions. After the Angolans told Wisner that they would agree to the South African conditions in private but not in public, that potential difficulty appeared to be resolved and the initiative remained on track.

Following Crocker’s visit to South Africa, Prime Minister P. W. Botha announced in Parliament that the SADF was beginning its “disengagement” from southern Angola. In early February, at the conclusion of a meeting of the SADCC that included all of the members of the frontline states, that organization’s final communiqué welcomed “signs of a less aggressive stance from South Africa” and alluded favourably to the recent Botha disengagement speech in the South African
Parliament. This SADCC communiqué appeared to indicate that Crocker was successful in obtaining frontline support for his initiative. More tellingly, not only were the ANC and SWAPO not invited to the meeting, but both Angola and Mozambique reportedly went to great lengths to encourage moderation at the conference in favour of the settlements underway.124

On February 16, 1984, South Africa, Angola, and the United States met together in Lusaka for the first time since the three-way bilateral talks began in 1981. In order to preserve the ceasefire that was essential if the process was to lead to a full settlement, Crocker proposed the formation of a so-called Joint Monitoring Commission (JMC) to be composed of South Africans, Angolans, and a small group of American military and diplomatic personnel. To be stationed at Cuvelai, Angola, the JMC force would be comprised of 600 Angolan and South African soldiers (300 from each nation) who would jointly patrol southern Angola in order to prevent SWAPO infiltration into Namibia. The dozen or so American members would act as mediators in case of disagreement.125

The resultant Lusaka Accord was duly signed by representatives from both Angola and South Africa and appeared to signify a major American accomplishment and a positive first step in the Administration’s new policy toward a Namibian settlement. As Secretary of State Shultz stated the day before the Lusaka meeting began, the U.S. task was “to consolidate what has started and build upon it in the weeks and months ahead.”126 According to Crocker, this is the work of persistent, “quiet diplomacy” with the United States in the role of “an honest broker.” In fact, Crocker and the United States viewed the whole enterprise both as a practical arrangement that prevented SWAPO from taking advantage of the South African withdrawal and as a first step towards a Cuban withdrawal. If the initiative could be held together, the United States would achieve both a significant diplomatic triumph and a stunning strategic victory.

5.3.2 The Nkomati Accord

Whatever pressures the United States and South Africa felt concerning moving forward on the diplomatic process, it paled in comparison to that felt by Mozambique. Mozambique made the first move toward peace in 1981, soon after the United States pull-out from that country, when Samora Machel met with Wayne Smith of the U.S. Interests Section in Cuba and asked how bilateral relations with the United States could
be improved. The following year, three Mozambican diplomats visited Washington, D.C., to tell Secretary of State George Schultz, “Relations would be improved immediately if, instead of remaining silent, the United States condemned South African aggression.”127 This campaign for international understanding, which would come to be called the “diplomatic offensive,” was carefully planned by Mozambique and had as its goal a cessation of South Africa’s aggression and the cultivation of new sources of aid.

Mozambique’s inquiries laid the ground for an exploratory mission by Special Envoy Frank Wisner to Maputo in December 1982. During the visit, Wisner reflected continuing Reagan Administration concern that Mozambique would move closer to the Soviet Union by warning against the “internationalization” of the regional conflict.128 The State Department was particularly worried that Mozambique might call for Cuban troops to guard against RENAMO. However, a significant breakthrough did occur in that Wisner agreed that Mozambique had legitimate regional security problems, an element of Chester Crocker’s policy. This breakthrough was followed by a congressional study mission to Mozambique that was in the country on the 14th and 15th of January 1983 and a multi-agency delegation led by Chester Crocker from the 23rd to the 28th. At Mozambique’s request, the representatives reportedly told South African diplomats on a stopover in Pretoria that destabilization had become excessive.129 Thereafter, Mozambique and the United States began a rapid rapprochement.

Behind the scenes, Chester Crocker was playing a leading role in increasing western influence in Mozambique by informing that country’s diplomats that regional stability in southern Africa would clear the way for more western aid. Crocker is reported to have put pressure on South Africa to sit down with Mozambique, and FRELIMO credits him with bringing about a more responsive attitude from South Africa,130 although no details of what leverage the United States used have been released.131 Given the fact that 1982 and 1983 were years of close cooperation between the United States and South Africa, it is doubtful that any warnings were issued. South Africa and Mozambique had, in fact, already held talks at Komatiport in December at which, Mozambique claims, South Africa rejected a proposal for an agreement, demanding that the ANC be expelled first.

By January, however, Botha announced his willingness to talk again and new meetings were held in May. South Africa wanted any regional détente to be on its own terms and was willing to jeopardize the process to force the ANC out of Mozambique.
While efforts were being made to secure a pact, SADF planes bombed Matola again in May 1983, killing six people and wounding forty. In October, yet another commando raid was launched. Afterwards, Defence Minister Magnus Malan announced that a “Lebanese style” occupation of Mozambique might occur.132

Mozambique, at that point, had no intention of expelling the ANC and stepped up the diplomatic offensive to bring more pressure on Pretoria. Chissano played to western fears about the Cuban presence in order to bring attention to the crisis:

> If international measures are not taken to stop South Africa from escalating its aggression, Mozambique, in the long run, may require more and more military assistance from the socialist countries that supported us during our struggle for independence.133

With the economic crisis deepening and South Africa growing more aggressive, the FRELIMO leadership sought understanding of their plight from the international community. In October, Samora Machel capped the diplomatic offensive with a six-nation tour of Europe. There is no general agreement concerning whether the tour was a success. Taking their lead from the United States, European nations had reduced aid as Washington cut back. At first, the tour of Europe produced only a slight improvement. However, Machel won agreement from heads of state to pressure Botha on a nonaggression pact when Botha toured Europe himself the following month.134 After his trip, Botha did agree to new talks.

Other nations figured prominently in the movement toward an accord. In February 1983, Chester Crocker met with Soviet diplomats who were known to be concerned about Mozambique’s international position and had agreed to reschedule Mozambique’s debt while providing 13 million dollars in consumer goods plus new fuel credits and grain donations.135 However, it was Portugal that did the most to encourage the United States to deepen its involvement in Mozambique. In 1982 and 1983, Portugal and Mozambique had signed several agreements on foreign aid, trade, and mutual security, setting an example for the United States. Portugal had even agreed to train Mozambican troops. In 1983, Portuguese president Ramalho Eanes had made an historic first post-colonial tour of Mozambique. Eanes and his staff met with their counterparts in the United States in August, and Eanes encouraged Reagan to respond positively to Mozambique when they met during Reagan’s tour of Europe in September.136 Thus, the United States continued to deepen its involvement in Mozambique. In September 1983, the two nations exchanged ambassadors. In
November, George Shultz announced that U.S. aid to Mozambique was in the national interest, clearing the way for emergency food supplies. President Reagan was an enthusiastic advocate for rapprochement with Mozambique, writing in his diary that now that the Soviets had failed the country, he “told our gang to get underway and ride to the rescue.” This change in policy, however, was not supported by all members of the administration. A personal note scrawled on the bottom of a memorandum to Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger warned about Samora Machel’s communist bent and said the “Administration needs to review the whole issue. I’m not sure that the President isn’t getting a sold a bill of goods with this guy.”

Despite scientism by some within the administration, rapid motion toward an accord became apparent by late 1983. On December 20, South Africa and Mozambique again met in Mbabane, Swaziland. Both were intent on getting an agreement. South Africa, facing growing internal economic pressure and international political pressure, recognized that it would get what it wanted from an agreement. Mozambique, on the other hand, had received assurances from the United States that it would receive the aid it required to extricate itself from its deepening financial crisis. Robert Gelbard, Director of the Office of Southern African Affairs in the State Department, explained:

> While we made no specific inducements to the government of Mozambique to implement Nkomati, we indicated that the entire process of reaching agreement with South Africa, liberalizing their economy and opening it up to the West (for example by joining the World Bank and IMF) would lead to new possibilities for dealing with their critical economic problems.

By the end of the meeting the two nations had, in principle, agreed to each other’s minimum demands—that South Africa cut off aid to RENAMO and that Mozambique stop ANC infiltration. Four commissions were established to discuss mutual security, economic relations, the supply of electricity, and tourism. Later, at a new year’s banquet for the diplomatic corps in Maputo, Samora Machel hailed cooperation with the west. During a speech, he said the only barrier to peace with South Africa was Pretoria’s support of RENAMO, which had signalled its distain for the peace process by massacring 50 people on a bus on Christmas day.

Throughout January ministerial-level meetings were held in both Maputo and Pretoria between the two countries. Washington added to the momentum. Senator John Danforth met with Ronald Reagan after returning from a tour of Africa and reported on
Mozambique’s drought and efforts at securing help. Reagan agreed to release the first instalment of what would be a huge increase in United States aid.\textsuperscript{143}

Furthermore, Chester Crocker shuttled between the two southern African capitals in early February meeting with Machel and Botha.\textsuperscript{144} On February 20, Machel and Botha met in Cape Town, clearing the way for a final round of ministerial-level meetings there that established the final wording of the accord. On March 16, 1984, amid great fanfare, the two presidents met at Komatiport and signed Nkomati, agreeing in part:

The High Contracting Parties shall not allow their respective territories, territorial waters or air space to be used as a base, thoroughfare, or in any other way by another state, government, foreign military forces, organizations or individuals which plan or prepare to commit acts of violence, terrorism or aggression against the territorial integrity or political independence of the other or may threaten the security of its inhabitants.\textsuperscript{145}

After the signing, Mozambique tried to present the accord publicly in the best possible light. Aquino de Braganca, a close adviser of Machel, explained that Nkomati was “a step backward which will permit us to consolidate our power toward the liberation of all southern Africa in different ways—through economic and political struggle.”\textsuperscript{146}

Reaction by southern African heads of state was mixed, but there was general agreement that it was inevitable. Even the ANC, although it reacted “like a jilted, petulant lover,”\textsuperscript{147} admitted that there was little else Mozambique could do. A State Department official was blunter, explicitly stating that Nkomati was a victory for the South African program of destabilization.\textsuperscript{148}

South Africa felt the same way. A white paper published in April indicated, “Firm SADF action laid the basis for peace.”\textsuperscript{149} Nkomati was seen as an important step in building the constellation of states. “South Africa, after Nkomati, is standing on the brink of the most dramatic breakthrough in its efforts to ensure peace in our part of the continent,” claimed an editorial.\textsuperscript{150}

Apparently Mozambique had not realized how much pressure would be put on it to expel the ANC. In February, a month before Nkomati was signed, Chief Mozambican negotiator Jacinto Veloso said the ANC would not have to leave the country. The ANC announced that it was aware of Mozambique’s vulnerable position and that “discussions are continuing in a spirit of comradeship.” When talk of expulsion surfaced, Alfred Nzo, ANC Secretary General, angrily denounced it as a “lie.”\textsuperscript{151}
However, Nkomati Accords’ Article 3, committed both South Africa and Mozambique to prevent their territories from being used as “a base, thoroughfare, or in any other way by another state, government, foreign military forces . . . that may threaten the security of its inhabitants.” For South Africa, it meant Mozambique’s denying support for the ANC; conversely, Nkomati bound South Africa to restrict its support for the RENAMO. Consequently, within weeks of the signing, Mozambican troops had searched all ANC offices, closed most down, and had detained all but a few essential staff members for deportation.

With the expulsion of more than 800 ANC activists from Mozambique and the reduction of the ANC presence to a 10-man Maputo office, the ANC threat from Mozambique disappeared overnight. The reaction of the ANC National Executive revealed the blow Nkomati struck the ANC.

Economically, Nkomati brought the hope of increased trade and investment between South Africa and Mozambique. Since the enactment of Nkomati, South African business constituencies such as the South African Foreign Trade Organization, the South African Agricultural Union, the Afrikaner Handelsinstitut, and individual South African businessmen were actively exploring the prospects of greater economic links. As the Financial Times noted, South African business interests became quite significant, especially in both tourism and the revitalization of plants and machinery. Thus, South African businessmen developed an enormous stake in the success of the peace initiatives in southern Africa, especially in Mozambique. Moreover, South African businessmen hoped that South Africa’s improved international image would generate new loans and investment. For the first half of 1984, international credit terms for South Africa eased, and loans were extended for five to eight years—acts that would have been unthinkable a year earlier.

One of the most significant gains won by Nkomati was the international diplomatic credit P. W. Botha received, evidenced primarily by his 1984 tour of Europe. From May 29 to June 9, Botha conducted high-level talks in Lisbon, Bern, London, Bonn, Brussels, and Rome, selling South Africa’s new image as the “peacemaker” in southern Africa.

After the conclusion of Nkomati, South Africa and Swaziland publicized the signing of a similar treaty of nonaggression that sought to prevent the installation and maintenance of a foreign military presence within their respective territories. With the Swazi agreement, Nkomati, and the Lusaka Accord, it was clear that southern
Africa had been humbled and forced into treaties with South Africa out of desperation. Destabilization, combined with severe drought and economic recession, rendered questionable the region’s economic viability and political survival. As President Kaunda explained, “Yes, humble Swaziland agrees, humble Mozambique accepts, humble Zambia hosts meeting of unequal neighbours like South Africa and Angola. What else can we do? But we are not doing it with happy hearts. We do it out of fear.”

In short, a regional Pax Pretoriana seemed to have emerged. By beating the region into submission, the Republic achieved its longstanding desire of peace on South African terms, the ANC no longer directly threatened South Africa, and economic integration progressed at a rapid pace. For many in South Africa, such results vindicated the destabilization policy. The numerous SADF raids, support for UNITA and the RENAMO, transport diplomacy, and economic strangulation appeared to create the *modus vivendi* for which South Africa had searched since the Portuguese coup.

For the United States, the diplomatic success was a vindication for Constructive Engagement and a major step towards removing communist influence in southern Africa. In a cable to all African diplomatic posts, Secretary George Schultz stated that Nkomati represented a blow to the “notion of – Armed Struggle – as the solution to South Africa’s Apartheid system” and the never viable “juggernaut theory of African liberation.” Schultz gave a nod of approval to the Total National Strategy, noting that after “carefully calculating the odds and assessing national interests” the FLS decided to rethink their support for the ANC and would “prevent violent actions from their territory.” Just as important as denying “guerrilla strategist” a safe-zone, the agreement helped to “reduce South Africa’s pariah status . . . Thus enabling South Africa’s regional dominance to acquire a legitimate form.” He added that the ANC—who he described as a “hardened Soviet-back terrorist cadre and teenagers with AK-47s . . . but also urban activists and . . . grandmother in rockers”—needed to focus on “inside South Africa where the real job remains to be done.” This would prove prophetic. After Nkomati, the ANC would move the resistance into the Republic itself and do so with devastating effect.

5.4 The Resumption of Destabilization

In 1985, after “sponsoring peace” in southern Africa the previous year, South Africa resumed its destabilization campaign. On May 21, 1985, an Angolan military
patrol foiled the attempt of a South African commando unit to sabotage the Gulf Oil installations in Cabinda that the Republic said was necessitated by ANC saboteurs in the country. Though the raid was a “setback” to American efforts to maintain stability after Lusaka, several weeks later, Pretoria launched another SADF raid on Gaborone.\textsuperscript{162} Furthermore, in overt violation of the Lusaka Accord, the SADF re-entered Angola, ostensibly to attack SWAPO units. By September, South African forces were again engaged with Angolan troops, providing UNITA with SADF reinforcements and SAAF air cover in its defence against advancing Angolan divisions.

The Lusaka Agreement was soon abandoned on the pretext of an Angolan violation. By mid-1984, South Africa appeared confident that Angola’s MPLA government would soon disintegrate, and support for UNITA drastically increased. In Namibia, a new “internal settlement” plan was put forward, and attacks against SWAPO forces were drastically increased. These actions were now possible because South Africa had freed itself of the stigma of “destabilization.”\textsuperscript{163}

Mozambique had been naive about Pretoria’s intentions. As Nkomati was being signed, 1,500 newly South African resupplied RENAMO troops crossed into Maputo province. In April, power to the capital was cut for the first time. Soon outages were constant. As RENAMO strength climbed to over 10,000, roads became impassable,\textsuperscript{164} but as late as May 16, Information Minister Luis Cabap was still maintaining that RENAMO was withering without South African support.\textsuperscript{165}

Mozambique began a second campaign, this time to save the accord. South African businesses anxious to begin saving money by exporting through Maputo were told by Mozambique they would have to wait because of the security problems. Effected corporations complained to the South African government and an outcry grew in the press. RENAMO activities began to hurt South Africa directly. Forty pylons on the CahoraBassa lines were down, making a farce of electricity agreements. In September, Jacinto Veloso, after a fruitless meeting with Jorge Correira, RENAMO European spokesperson, warned the United States and South Africa that Nkomati was in danger.\textsuperscript{166}

RENAMO insisted that it would renegotiate only if there were a government of national unity. Finally, South African Foreign Minister Botha convinced RENAMO to talk to FRELIMO, and the two groups met in Pretoria. After a week of negotiating in October 1984, Botha announced that Mozambique and RENAMO had agreed to a ceasefire. According to Botha, RENAMO had recognized Machel as Mozambique’s
head-of-state, dropping demands for a government of national unity, and Mozambique had agreed to amnesty for the guerrillas. They also agreed to continue discussions on integrating RENAMO into the Armed Forces of Mozambique (FAM). The negotiations, however, were all for naught. Fernandes vowed to fight on the day after the announcement, and the war continued.

By the end of 1984, it was clear that South Africa was willing neither to rein in RENAMO nor to provide economic assistance to Mozambique. Authorities in Maputo accused South Africa of continuing its clandestine aid to the RENAMO. Despite South African assurances to the contrary, the increased strength of the RENAMO suggested that South Africa still supported its Mozambican proxy. In September 1985, Maputo released the RENAMO Vaz diaries, captured in a joint Mozambican-Zimbabwean offensive in the Gorongosa area of Mozambique in August. These diaries provided conclusive evidence of South African violations of the Nkomati Accord. For example, the diaries revealed that South Africa had carried out twenty-five pre-Nkomati supply drops to fortify the RENAMO for at least six months after the conclusion of the accord. After Nkomati, South African planes flew arms and other supplies to the RENAMO base and shuttled RENAMO and South African officials between South Africa and the Gorongosa base. In fact, the then-Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Louis Nel, flew to Gorongosa for meetings with the MNR three times during June, July, and August 1985. At a press conference on September 18, 1985, Pik Botha confirmed many of the infractions contained in the Vaz diaries, including the Nel visits to Gorongosa and various South African supply drops.

For all intents and purposes, the accord collapsed. Mozambique continued to adhere to the bargain, but by early 1985, Pretoria had abandoned any pretence of political solutions in the region and had resorted once again to economic and military action. The continued destabilization of Mozambique; the threats against Zimbabwe; the commando raid against Angola’s Cabinda oil installation in May and the large-scale invasion of southern Angola in September-October; the SADF attacks against Botswana in June and Lesotho in December; the threat in December to invade Botswana yet again; and the January 1986 blockade of Lesotho, which precipitated a coup d’état followed by a rapidly concluded security agreement and the expulsion of all ANC members, all pointed to a new militarized phase in the Total National Strategy.
5.5 Conclusion

By 1984, it was obvious to even the most ideologically blinkered observer that apartheid South Africa was not willing to live peacefully with its neighbours and had never had that intention. The Total National Strategy was about power, not peace. The regime’s regional policy had sought to internationalize its domestic problems and force its neighbours to recognize South African hegemony in the region. Despite the fact that the ANC was denied effective access to Mozambique, its armed actions did not correspondingly decrease, and by the end of 1984, Pretoria was confronted with a growing urban revolt. The Nkomati Accord, like all of South Africa’s region actions, had done nothing to stem the violence and conflict within South Africa. By 1985, the Total Strategy had failed to stem the internal revolt and further isolated the country in the international arena. The Botha government’s attempt to export apartheid’s problems through the Total Strategy had shown some promise, but ultimately, it was not enough to stem the country’s internal problems.

Therefore, in view of South Africa’s failure to honour both the Lusaka and Nkomati Accords, Washington’s claims of victory for its policy of Constructive Engagement were hallow. In both instances, its trusted ally, the Botha Administration, proved to be ungrateful for the confidence bestowed upon it by the Reagan Administration and was only interested in those aspects of Constructive Engagement that complemented the Total National Strategy. Not only was this an indication of the flaws inherent in Constructive Engagement concerning the source of violence in southern Africa, but it also made the United States look like a collaborator in South Africa’s regional destabilization strategy as a means to protect white minority domination. According to a Washington Post article, critics of Constructive Engagement also asserted that the policy made the United States look “very foolish. A friendly government for which it did a great favor has duped it. . . The Reagan policy . . . is embarrassed on the very ground where its greatest triumph had been proclaimed.”

Not only did the South African government extend its stay in Namibia by hiding behind Western fears of communism, but it also launched a spirited assault on SWAPO, the ANC, and the governments of Angola and Mozambique, all in the name of anti-communism. James Mittelman, a specialist on southern Africa, correctly evaluated the impact of the U.S.-South African anti-communist alliance on U.S. policy toward southern Africa:
Our policy . . . tells us more about anti-communist preconceptions in the U.S. than it does about problems in the sub-continent. A careful examination of the policy demonstrates that American insistence on South African and Cuban troop withdrawals . . . gives South Africa a pretext to linger in Namibia.172

The outcome should have come as no surprise. The Reagan Administration was preoccupied with getting the Cubans out of Angola, thus reducing the threat of Soviet expansion in the region. As part of this process, the administration sought to increase the sway of South Africa over all states in the region and openly sought to change the direction of states it regarded as inimical to U.S. interests, such as Angola and Mozambique. By the beginning of 1985, however, the region was still at war. Without substantive progress at securing regional stability, the Reagan Administration’s policy of Constructive Engagement would be increasingly hard to defend on the domestic front, especially after uprisings began in South Africa in 1984.

2 Ibid., 15-16.
3 Jenkins, 28.
8 Jaster, Defence, 94.
9 The declining fortunes of South Africa in Angola will be detailed in Chapter 6.
16 Ibid., 82.
17 Ibid.
20 Chester Crocker, Briefing Memorandum to Secretary George Shultz, “Your meeting with UNITA leader, Jonas Savimbi,” South Africa and the United States, National Security Archive, doc. 52, February 5, 1986, 2.
24Persico, 298.
29Wright, 110.
30Wright, 110.
36Hunter, “Israel in Africa,” 43.
38Wright, 110.
39Persico, 253.
42 Assistant Secretary of State-Designate Chester A. Crocker, Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, “The Role of the Cubans in Angola,” 97th Cong., 1st sess., April 6, 1981.
44Papenfus, Pik Botha and His Times, 552.
46Crocker, Chester A. Interview by Author. September 19, 2011.
47 Ibid.
53 Ibid.
59 Statistics cited in Hanlon, Beggar, 141.
60 RENAMO terrorism is graphically depicted in Johnson and Martin, “Mozambique: Victims of Apartheid,” in Johnson and Martin, 46-51.
61 Ibid., 15.
64 This figure also includes the devastation caused by drought, cyclones, and floods. Cited in John de St. Jorre, “Destabilization and Dialogue: South Africa’s Emergence as a Regional Superpower,” CSIS Africa Notes, 26, (April 17, 1984), 3.
67 The Lesotho coup is described in Jaster, Defence, 15.
68 Jaster, Defence, 15.
69 Christopher Coker, “South Africa: A New Military Role,” 63.
70 Ibid., 229-230.
71 For example, Zimbabwe has paid an additional $60 million per year in freight costs by diverting traffic to South Africa; see Johnson and Martin, “Zimbabwe,” 91.
76 Jaster, South Africa in Namibia, 68.
78 Ungar and Vale, 248.
80 Ibid., 189.
81 Ibid., 150.
86 Deon Geldenhuys, “What Do We Think” (occasional paper, South African Institute for International Affairs, 1984), 2. This paragraph relies on the Geldenhuys study.
87 Ibid.
88 The defence budget declined from 5.5% of GDP in 1977 to 4.2% in 1982.

91 For example, moderate Frank Wisner joined Crocker’s staff in April, 1982. Likewise, the “realist” Robert McFarlane replaced the far-right William Clark as Reagan’s national security advisor. In addition, the Democrats increased their majority in the House after the November 1982 election.

92 Pik Botha cited in 1984 SAYIL, 247.


95 Ibid., 132.


97 South Africa had long since become sceptical about dealing with the U.N. on the Namibian issue, especially after the U.N. had declared SWAPO the only legitimate representative of the territory’s inhabitants in 1968. Unger and Vale, 10.

98 Ibid., 34.

99 Ibid., 33.

100 Danaher, 201. Testifying before the House Committee on Africa on February 15, 1983, Crocker admitted that the linkage policy had been formulated by the Reagan administration.


102 “U. S. Seeks Angola Compromise.”

103 Ibid.


105 Ibid., 3.


107 Chester Crocker, “Your Meeting With the President,” 5.

108 Ibid., 3, 5.

109 Papenfus, *Pik Botha and His Times*, 545.

110 Crocker, Chester A. Interview by Author. September 19, 2011.


113 Crocker, Chester A. Interview by Author. September 19, 2011.


133 Chissano, “Joaquim Chissano,” 44.

134 Hanlon, Under Fire, 253.


139 Information Memorandum for Secretary of Casper Weinberger, “Your call on President and Field Marshal Samora Machel of Mozambique,” 19 September 1985, Declassified History, doc. 49.


146 Ibid.

147 Hanlon, Under Fire, 258-260.


150 Die Transvaler, 5.


152 Article 3, Section 1 of the Nkomati Accord, March 16, 1984. For the full text see Appendix I of Msabaha and Shaw.


156 Hanlon, *Beggar*, 41.


158 This agreement appears on page 255 of *1984 SAYIL*.


161 Ibid.

162 Ibid.


169 Ibid., 12.


Chapter VI

6.1 The Demise of Constructive Engagement

As publicly spelled out by Assistant Secretary of State Chester Crocker, the central objectives of the policy of Constructive Engagement were fourfold: first, to achieve a settlement for Namibian independence; second, to promote regional peace and security in southern Africa; third, to encourage the white-led reform process in South Africa; and fourth, to curb Soviet expansion and influence in the region by getting the Cubans out of Angola.\(^1\) The fourth objective, which was clearly the most important in the estimation of Reagan the Administration, necessitated that the third objective, the process of political reform, did not go so far as unseating the Nationalist Party, whose Total National Strategy would serve as the “anvil” of American diplomacy in southern Africa.

By the end of the Reagan Administration’s first term, none of the central objectives of Constructive Engagement had been achieved. Namibia had not attained its independence and would not do so until two years after Reagan’s departure from office. Regional peace was still far from being a reality, largely because South Africa’s incursions into neighbouring countries continued unabated. Not only were Cubans troops still in Angola, but they were also increasing in numbers. Even more important, political repression and violence in South Africa was at its highest point in fifty years. One can conclude, therefore, that Constructive Engagement had not achieved its stated objectives.

Consequently, as it moved into its second term, the Reagan Administration was assailed at home and abroad for failing to deliver on its promise to promote orderly change in southern Africa. The administration’s critics charged that Constructive Engagement made the United States a sponsor of the apartheid regime rather than a broker for peace and stability in the region.\(^2\) In the United States, discontent with the administration’s embrace of South Africa’s white minority government manifested itself through a growing public campaign and demonstrations at the South African Embassy in Washington, DC. By mid-1985, the tide of public protest had spread to other cities and university campuses across the country.\(^3\) This public outcry was channelled largely through the Free South Africa Movement, a Washington-based coalition of over two hundred groups, including prominent political leaders, trade
unionists, athletes, and television personalities. The movement also appealed directly to the U.S. Congress to pass legislation imposing economic sanctions against South Africa.  

Meanwhile, inside the White House and on Capitol Hill, the administration’s entire southern African strategy was coming under increasing attack from both Republicans and Democrats alike. As violence continued within the Republic during the second Reagan term, the move to disassociate with the Republic’s domestic and regional policies grew even stronger, driving the Administration into a defensive position from which it would never recover. Hoping to mitigate these criticisms, the Reagan Administration attempted to persuade Pretoria to relax its suppression of political unrest, but to no avail. Convinced that, to relax its control over its black minority would lead to chaos within the Republic, the South African government made no moves toward liberalization of the political system. Rather, Pretoria continued to crack down on the opposition with draconian security measures. Such actions, in turn, gave momentum to the American opposition’s push for legislative action. Punitive sanctions, when implemented, destroyed the basis of the administration policy, and the U.S. foreign policy of Constructive Engagement and South Africa’s Total National Strategy could no longer function as mutually reinforcing policies.

### 6.1.1 Mobilization of the Opposition in the United States

The impact of television and other media reports about South Africa’s draconian security measures had an immediate and profound influence on world opinion. The American public, in particular, became convinced that their government’s claim to significant change taking place in the Republic as a result of Constructive Engagement was illusory if not deceptive. As a result, demonstrations against the administration’s southern African policy increased and spread to almost every corner in the United States. The demonstrators called upon U.S. companies and universities to withdraw their investments from South Africa and urged Congress to grab the initiative from the administration by legislating economic sanctions.

Several American state and city administrations also added to the pressure on these companies by adopting divestment legislation. For example, in early 1985, New York City passed legislation forbidding city deposits in banks that offered loans to the South African government. Later that same year, New York and Pittsburgh passed measures that restricted city purchases from companies involved in South Africa. By
the end of the year, “fourteen states, nine counties and 58 cities [across the U.S.] had adopted policies either withdrawing funds or limiting other business with banks making loans to South Africa.”

In addition, by the end of 1985, major international and local banks, including Seafirst, Chase Manhattan, Citibank, The Bank of Boston, and First Bank System, stopped short-term loans to the South African government and the private sector. Most importantly, North Carolina Bank Corporation, which held the largest loan to South Africa and was the only regional bank with an office in that country, cancelled all new loans. Pretoria was confronted by a serious financial crisis and was compelled to declare a one-year moratorium on its foreign debt payments, amounting to almost $20 billion. South Africa’s economic woes became even more critical following a drastic drop in the value of the rand, whose exchange rate reached below U.S. $0.40.

Furthermore, by the mid-1980s, several Western governments had begun serious consideration of imposing economic sanctions against South Africa. In July 1985, France placed a ban on new investments and introduced a resolution in the U.N. Security Council imploring member states to adopt similar action. In October 1986, foreign ministers from the twelve European Community countries met in Luxembourg to discuss further sanctions against South Africa.

Thus, the Reagan Administration, as it settled into its second term, found itself confronted by a combination of domestic and external forces that were too powerful to ignore. As a result, Washington concluded that it had to do something about its southern African policy or risk standing alone as the sole world sponsor of the apartheid regime. The shifts that occurred in U.S. policy toward South Africa in the late 1980s should, therefore, be understood in the dual contexts of this increasing pressure and of the Reagan Administration’s attempt to prevent Congress from limiting its options in the conduct of foreign policy in southern Africa.

6.1.2 The U.S. Congress Goes on the Attack

The onset of violence within the Republic and its coverage in the American news media led to a renewed effort by the anti-South African forces within the United States not only to disseminate their convictions regarding the South African regime and the policy of Constructive Engagement but to enlist the U.S. Congress in taking the lead on policy in southern Africa. Emboldened by dramatic events within the Republic, the opposition staged protests at the South African Embassy with the press in tow. It
was at the height of these actions that Bishop Desmond Tutu, recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize, came to the United States to add his voice to the growing attacks against Constructive Engagement and the Total National Strategy.

Introduced to the American public by Harold Wolpe, the chairman of the House subcommittee on Africa, Tutu brought the “South African black” perspective, which had been ignored in the Reagan Administration’s pursuit of geopolitical objectives in southern Africa. The bishop’s views mirrored those held by congressional critics of Constructive Engagement and the Total National Strategy, attacking directly the constitutional “reform” as “an instrument of the politics of exclusion” that denied rights to 73% of the South African population. Similarly, Tutu asserted that the Reagan Administration’s policy of Constructive Engagement was “immoral, evil, and totally un-Christian. . . . You are either for or against apartheid and not by rhetoric. You are either in favour of evil or you are in favour of good. You are either on the side of the oppressed or on the side of the oppressor. You can’t be neutral.” He warned that it was in America’s best interest to change course in South Africa because “we shall be free, and we will remember who helped us to become free. That is not a threat. It is just a statement of fact.” If the United States would not help, it was inevitable that South African blacks would turn to the Soviet Union, for while “blacks deplore communism as being atheistic and materialistic . . . they would regard the Russians as their saviors, were they to come to South Africa, because anything in their view would be better than apartheid.” Accordingly, Tutu urged the U.S. Congress to pursue punitive economic sanctions against the Republic and put an “end to collaboration with the perpetrators of apartheid.”

On December 7, 1984, Bishop Tutu, who the President would later privately admit he did not like, was invited to the White House to share his views with Reagan. While the president acknowledged Tutu’s sincerity, he believed he was “naive” and did not understand or appreciate the American approach that had achieved “considerable progress with quiet diplomacy.” Writing in his diaries, he added:

There are S. Africans who want an end to Apartheid & I think they understand what we are doing. American owned firms in S.A. treat their employees as they would in Am. This has meant a tremendous improvement for thousands & thousands of S.A. Blacks. There have been other improvements but there is still a long way to go. The Bishop seems unaware, even though he himself is Black, that part of the
problem is tribal not racial. If apartheid ended now there still would be civil strife between the Black tribes.20

Because of the publicity associated with the South African unrest and the visit to Washington by Bishop Tutu, it was inevitable that the Congress would focus its attention on the carnage in the Republic. Even the Republican controlled Senate, which had normally deferred to the administration’s judgment on foreign policy, began to waver in its support of President Reagan’s policies in southern Africa. The first of dozens of hearings by the Senate Subcommittee on Africa began in September of 1984, with the outbreak of violence. High profile members of the Senate would also lend their stature to political protests organized by Transafrica at the South African embassy in Washington. Beginning in November 1984, Transafrica, organized by the Congressional Black Caucus, proved extremely savvy at focusing the public’s attention on South Africa’s racial policies. Using Democratic Party politicians and high-profile actors and musicians, the group’s demonstrations resulted in arrests that were followed closely by print and television media.21

The demonstrations were followed by Senator Edward Kennedy’s January 1985 visit to South Africa. Presented to the public as a fact-finding mission to “highlight the harshness of apartheid,” Kennedy, accompanied by the media, visited townships, squatter camps, and resettlement areas with Allan Boesak and Desmond Tutu. Speaking outside Pollsmoor prison, Kennedy praised the political prisoners’ “commitment to freedom” and asked South African officials for a meeting with Nelson Mandela. Denied access to Mandela, Kennedy announced that the apartheid regime was not committed to making “meaningful progress” in its racial policies.22 Joined by Republican Lowell Weicker (R-Conn.), Kennedy introduced a bill that would ban all new bank loans to the South African government and to the South African private sector, prohibit all new investments in the Republic, terminate the importation of gold Kruggerand coins into the United States, and stop the sale of American computers to the South African government.23

Declaring Constructive Engagement a “catastrophic failure,” Kennedy demanded that “this system of apartheid not be furthered or strengthened anymore by American investment and by American support.”24 While he took pains to point out that his proposed legislation was not a “disinvestment bill,” Kennedy did feel that implementing punitive measures against the South Africans would
make our policy consistent with American values. Because of Constructive Engagement, we have not only lost the rightful position as a moral leader on the questions of rights and liberties, but also we endanger our position in South Africa for the future. South Africa will be free some day and, make no mistake about it, those in that government when it is free are going to ask whether the United States was the last country to go down with apartheid . . . . It certainly appears to blacks in South Africa today that this is the case. 

Companion legislation within the House to the Kennedy-Weicker bill was introduced by William Gray, with the acknowledged assistance of Steven Solarz and Howard Wolpe. According to Gray, the primary purpose of the legislation was to prevent indirect American financing of apartheid by forbidding American investment, loans, and imports of South African gold, which theoretically allowed the government to “cover” its expanded budget requirements due to its enforcement of its racial system. Like Kennedy, Gray stressed that the legislation was by no means a divestment bill that would force American firms to pull out of South Africa: 

“The argument that this legislation would cause divestment is absolutely wrong . . . absurd and ludicrous” and “is like arguing you cannot end slavery because you will have an unemployment problem.” Black leaders like Tutu and Boesak had stated that they were already suffering and, thus, were “crying out” for economic sanctions against the South African government. It was the moral duty of the United States to accommodate them. 

Not to be outdone by Congressional Democrats, Senate Republicans also expressed their doubts about the administration’s policy and were eager to reflect their concerns in a tangible manner. Senator John Heinz (R-Penn.), the chairman of the International Finance and Monetary Policy Subcommittee, which like the Foreign Relations Committee was reviewing the possibility of South African sanctions, warned the Administration that Congressional action was imminent and that the Administration would be “well advised” to do everything it could “within its policy framework to get better results . . . because it is results—or I should say the lack of them—that has the majority of the House and Senate very, very concerned.” In Heinz’s view, there was “a substantial amount of House and Senate bipartisan support for doing something more than we are doing now.” This was, in part, “related to the fact that the perception of Constructive Engagement as an effective force in bringing about peaceful change in South Africa is simply not yielding the results that [the administration] would like it to yield.”
Although Nancy Kassebaum, the Republican chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Africa, shared many of the above problems with the Administration’s policy, she did think it important that any proposed legislation “not do something that could perpetuate the violence in such a way that any attempt for constructive . . . involvement by the United States becomes irrelevant.” In Kassebaum’s view, “if we throw down a gauntlet with demands, we will be met . . . by an intransigence. I think it has to be done in such a way that we are not appearing to be dictating a policy that . . . has to be met, or else.

Aware of these difficulties but nonetheless, like their Democratic-counterparts, wishing to become directly and publicly involved, Senate Republicans introduced their own legislation that, in a sense, was a compromise between the strict Democratic legislation and the well-known Administration aversion to sanctions. Introduced by Senator Richard Lugar (R-Ind.), the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the Republican legislation intended, in Lugar’s words, to provide a “strong mix of concern, encouragement, and incentive to guide our policies toward South Africa.” Bristling because the Washington Post had called his legislation “an Administration bill,” Lugar maintained that his proposed legislation was purely an initiative of Republicans within the Senate and that its purpose was both to demonstrate American support for the black population of South Africa and to impose select punitive sanctions against that state.

Although Lugar’s bill was less severe than the Democratic version, it was indicative of general Republican uneasiness over the Administration’s policy—especially as well-publicized violence and unrest continued within the Republic. Lugar’s proposed legislation had two aspects. First, it proposed that the U.S. government show its support toward black South Africans by granting $15 million for scholarships to be used both in the United States and in South Africa and $1.5 million per year to be used especially for legal purposes by the U.S. human rights program in the Republic. It similarly directed that American government facilities and agencies support and assist black South African businesses and that the Sullivan principles—voluntary “fair employment” codes for American firms operating within South Africa—become mandatory for all U.S.-South African subsidiaries that employed 25 or more employees.

Second, the Republican legislation advocated a number of punitive sanctions with the promise of more to come in eighteen months if the South African government
failed to make “significant progress” toward abolishing apartheid. Including such provisions as banning loans to the South African government, prohibiting the sale of computers and similar technology to government agencies involved in the enforcement of apartheid, and forbidding nuclear trade between the United States and the Republic, the Republican sanctions were in reality quite mild because they paralleled either existing practices (American bank loans to the South African government) or areas in which the executive branch had current restrictions in effect (sales of computers and nuclear cooperation).\textsuperscript{34} They did, however, indicate to the Administration that Republican Senate support for its policy was lukewarm at best and, consequently, that if Republicans within the Senate did eventually fail to support the Administration’s position on its South African policy, harsh sanctions and the resultant destruction of Constructive Engagement were probable in the immediate future. It was with these thoughts in mind that the Administration launched a comprehensive assault on its critics and a spirited defence of its policy in the spring of 1985.

6.1.3 Pre-empting Sanctions

In order to prevent Congress from taking the initiative in the unfolding South African debate, the Reagan Administration attempted a series of manoeuvres that were aimed at creating the impression that it was, indeed, doing something to alter its southern African strategy. In September 1985, President Reagan issued Executive Order 12532, which invoked trade restrictions, prohibited U.S. financial institutions from granting loans to the South African government, and outlawed the sale of South African Krugerrands in the United States.\textsuperscript{35} It also banned

all export of computers, computer software, or goods . . . intended to service computers or for use by . . . the military, the police, the prison system, national security agencies, Armscor and its subsidiaries...and any apartheid enforcement agency.\textsuperscript{36}

The President’s Executive Order, which was to take effect on November 11, 1985, was followed by the appointment of an advisory committee to the Secretary of State. The committee was given a mandate to study and recommend “guidelines for a U.S. policy toward South Africa that was most likely to further the peaceful elimination of apartheid and the creation of a nonracial democratic political system”.\textsuperscript{37}

The administration had hoped that the advisory committee would uphold its policy of Constructive Engagement and recommend against adopting a confrontational
approach toward the South African government. \(^\text{38}\) However, much to the President’s disappointment, when the committee submitted its report in January 1987, it declared that “the administration’s strategy of Constructive Engagement has failed to achieve its objectives,” and it urged the President to take the lead in helping to enforce more substantial economic sanctions against South Africa. \(^\text{39}\)

Also, in an effort to disarm its critics, the Reagan Administration resolved to adopt strong rhetoric denouncing South Africa for its naked brutality against its political opponents and for its persistent cross-border attacks into neighbouring countries allegedly in search of “ANC terrorists.” For instance, in May 1985, a U.S. Representative to the U.N. Security Council condemned South African raids into Botswana, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. The South African attacks, the official noted, were reprehensible, irresponsible and inexcusable. The United States condemns them, without reservations, and calls upon Pretoria to examine the consequences of its latest aggression. . . . Instead of taking steps to bridge the gaps separating [it and its] neighbors, who have so many reasons to live in peace, South Africa has chosen to lash out at Sovereign states. . . . It is . . . employing these strong-arm tactics to prop up apartheid, a system my government is committed to eliminate by every peaceful, appropriate measure at our disposal. \(^\text{40}\)

The administration also issued official statements urging Pretoria to lift the state of emergency and to “enter into a dialog with black nationalist leaders, to work out a negotiated settlement to the problems that exist in South Africa.” \(^\text{41}\)

As already noted, the actions taken by the Reagan Administration at the beginning of its second term were not aimed at altering its policy toward South Africa. These measures constituted to a large extent shifts in strategy rather than a reversal of the overall policy. Though clearly President Reagan was unsettled by South Africa’s brutality towards its neighbours, the administration had not changed its views on how to influence change in southern Africa and still regarded South Africa as critical in rolling back Soviet influence in the region. \(^\text{42}\) Thus, the administration’s strong anti-apartheid rhetoric was often mixed with a determined effort to frustrate any congressional effort to invoke sanctions against Pretoria. It is in this context that the President’s Executive Order 12532 should be understood as a calculated bid to preempt a stronger congressional sanctions bill that could have led to a total U.S. embargo against South Africa. \(^\text{43}\) As Secretary of State George Shultz noted in his memoirs:
Neither the President, nor I, had changed our views on the importance of maintaining an American business presence in South Africa, but I saw the Executive Order as a necessary response to South African behaviour and compatible with a continued American presence.44

6.1.4 Sanctions

The changes made by the Reagan Administration to its southern African policy proved insufficient to discourage the Congressional drive for harsher economic sanctions against Pretoria. Throughout 1986, a string of bills dealing with the issue of sanctions against South Africa were introduced in Congress. In June, the House Foreign Affairs Committee endorsed the bill sponsored by Congressman Gray.45 When debate on the bill began, House members voted to substitute for the Gray bill a much tougher bill sponsored by Congressman Ronald Dellums (D-California). The new bill called for a complete trade embargo against South Africa and ordered all U.S. companies there to withdraw their investments within 180 days after enactment.46

In August, the Senate passed its own version of the economic sanctions bill by a vote of 84 to 14. Prepared by Republican moderate and Senate Foreign Relations Committee chairman, Richard Lugar (R-Indiana), the Senate bill incorporated the major provisions of the President’s 1985 Executive Order and called for a ban on new investments in South Africa and on new loans to the Pretoria government.47

Under normal procedures, a House-Senate Conference Committee would have been formed to reconcile the Senate and House bills. However, after Lugar informed the House leadership that he would not accept any changes to his bill, the House, in order to avoid a political showdown, chose by a vote of 308 to 77 to accept without amendments Lugar’s bill.48 The Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 (CAAA), as the compromise bill came to be called, was approved by both the Senate and the House in September 1986.

Despite the fact that the provisions of the final version of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act were mild compared to the bill proposed by House Democrats in June, the President still opposed several measures included in the Act. Consequently, on September 26, Reagan vetoed the bill despite advice to the contrary from Senator Lugar and other Republican leaders who feared that a presidential veto would arouse public discontent. Three days later, President Reagan wrote a letter to Congress offering to sign a new Executive Order expanding the provisions of his 1985 Executive Order. He also promised to launch a comprehensive multi-year program that would
promote economic reform and development in the black-ruled states of southern Africa. In October 1986, President Reagan lobbied Congressional Republicans to sustain his veto or “risk undermining the President’s position as the chief executive responsible for the conduct of foreign affairs—just prior to meeting the head of state of the world’s other superpower.” In a phone conversation with Republican Frank Murkowski, President Reagan argued that since the veto “I’ve proposed taking some significant actions similar to measures taken by our allies—coupled with some positive measures of assistance for victims of apartheid and a multi-year program for economic reform and development of black-ruled southern African states.” Despite the congressional offensive, the President’s compromise was overwhelmed by bipartisan support for the sanctions bill sitting in front of Congress. On October 2, the U.S. Congress overrode President Reagan’s veto by a wide margin to pass the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986.

The circumstances surrounding the passage of this act epitomized the great disagreements that prevailed during the mid-1980s between the executive and legislative branches over apartheid in South Africa. While the President and his aides continued to emphasize South Africa’s strategic and economic importance to the United States, Congress was prepared to look past the Cold War rivalry and to concentrate on Pretoria’s racial policies.

The CAAA enumerated a list of U.S. policy goals whose overall purpose was to apply economic pressure on South Africa, forcing it to take fundamental steps to abolish apartheid and to establish in its place a nonracial, democratic form of government. Among other things, the CAAA demanded the release of political prisoners, including Nelson Mandela, and the repeal of the state of emergency and other key laws that enforced apartheid. Perhaps more importantly from the viewpoint of the Reagan Administration, it urged Pretoria to begin negotiations with representatives of all racial groups in South Africa and to terminate its acts of aggression against neighbouring countries.

The CAAA also listed areas of trade that would no longer be permitted between the United States and South Africa, including a ban on the importation of South African coal, iron, steel, uranium, and sugar as well as nuclear and arms trade. It also prohibited air traffic between the two countries along with new U.S. investments in South Africa, and it terminated the tax treaty that protected transnational corporations operating in South Africa from “double taxation.” Finally, the act threatened to invoke further
sanctions if South Africa did not make substantial progress toward reform. Legally obliged to implement the CAAA, despite his open hostility toward it, President Reagan, on October 27, issued Executive Order 12571 instructing “all affected Executive departments to take all steps necessary, consistent with the [American] Constitution, to implement the requirements of the act.”

On paper, the CAAA appeared to be a powerful piece of legislation capable of hobbling the South African economy. However, shortly after it came into force, the act revealed a number of loopholes that blunted its effectiveness. For example, article 501(c) of the CAAA stated that further sanctions were to be imposed only if and when the President determined that the Pretoria government had not done enough to dismantle apartheid. Keeping in mind that Reagan was opposed to economic sanctions against South Africa, for him to be the sole enforcer of that rule was almost tantamount to assuring the South African government that further sanctions were unlikely. Consequently, throughout the remainder of his term, President Reagan used article 501(c) to block further sanctions despite evidence that the South Africans were determined to keep the structure of apartheid intact.

Another key problem with the CAAA lay in the lax interpretation of terms and implementation of its regulations, particularly when it came to deciding which of South Africa’s minerals were strategically important to the United States. Moreover, Congress gave the executive branch a free hand to compile its own list of such minerals, which were then exempted from the CAAA ban. Left to its own devices, “the executive branch . . . formulated a broad definition of strategic minerals, thereby exempting a greater number of South African exports than the Congress probably intended.” Because mineral exports were among South Africa’s most crucial sources of income, Pretoria was able to postpone any major economic setbacks that may have occurred as a result of a more effective U.S. embargo or similar sanctions by other important Western nations.

Definitional problems in the CAAA were even more apparent in determining which U.S. investments qualified as “new investments” and which did not. For instance, reinvestment of profits into existing operations was not defined as “new investment” and became, therefore, an exception to the prohibitions of the CAAA. In addition, financial and other forms of transactions necessary to allow existing operations to continue were exempted from the ban. Furthermore, apart from the fines that could be imposed on companies found to be violating any of the provisions of the
CAAA, there were no safeguards to ensure against possible evasion of the act. Companies, therefore, found it possible to circumvent the CAAA through a variety of methods. For example, several companies opted to disinvest by relocating to other countries, reducing the South African operations to the levels of subsidiaries. These companies also formed trusts, and because they were then based outside South Africa, they could legally make loans to those trusts. That situation enabled them to purchase the subsidiaries’ assets and then use the dividends from the subsidiaries to pay off the loans to the parent companies. Haider Khan, among others, correctly pointed out that this kind of arrangement allowed U.S. companies to “avoid the moral stigma of being involved in apartheid, skirt the foreign exchange regulations . . . and sidestep the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act, all at the same time.”

Due to the flaws in its format and implementation, the significance and impact of the CAAA became arguably more symbolic than real. Because the leverage to transform that symbolic character into something more powerful rested with a President who was opposed to sanctions, Pretoria could afford to take the risk and regard the initial measures of the CAAA as “the maximum to expect.” Moreover, the ineffectiveness of the CAAA lifted the pressure from President Botha, who not only ignored its specific demands but also stuck to his own list of minor reforms that had been derided by anti-apartheid groups as a farce.

Consequently, the act served primarily as a demonstration to Pretoria that stronger actions could be taken if the white minority government did not take significant steps to do away with apartheid. However, its ineffectiveness notwithstanding, the passage of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act over the President’s veto did mark an important turning point in the history of United States-South African relations. To begin with, Congress by the CAAA sent a clear message to the South African government that the United States could, when it chose, use both sticks and carrots to conduct its foreign policy. Conversely, had it failed to pass the act, Congress would have sent the wrong message to Pretoria. The most significant legacy of the act, perhaps, lay in the fact that it brought a totally new dimension to the American political debate over sanctions against South Africa. For the first time, a president was abandoned by members of his own party, most notably in the Republican controlled Senate, in the passage of a sanctions bill over his veto.

6.1.5 Effects of the CAAA on Constructive Engagement
The passage of the CAAA with its token impact reopened the political debate over the effectiveness of sanctions as a political tool to pressure South Africa into dismantling apartheid. The limited nature of its impact provided the administration and others who were against sanctions with ammunition against congressional proponents of additional economic sanctions. In his report to Congress a year after the CAAA had been enacted, President Reagan declared:

I regret that I am unable to report any progress leading to the end of apartheid and the establishment of a nonracial democracy in South Africa. . . . The two sets of economic sanctions imposed against South Africa to date . . . have sent a clear message to the ruling white community that the American people are outraged by the institutional injustice of apartheid. . . . [T]he South African leadership has reacted defiantly toward these measures. . . . Yet the most important goal of the [Anti-Apartheid Act] was to pressure the South African government to meet the unambiguous prescriptions of the act itself. . . . Significant progress has not been made . . . in the last twelve month period since the enactment of the act. . . . My conclusion is that the imposition of additional economic sanctions . . . would not be helpful.68

Congressional proponents of economic sanctions shared the President’s view that the CAAA had failed to achieve its stated objectives. However, they differed with him on the issue of further sanctions. Instead, they insisted that he impose additional sanctions as required by article 501(c) of the act. However, because the gap between the views of the executive and legislative branches could not be bridged, the debate over additional sanctions became a highly politicized and never-ending subject of proposed legislation for the remainder of Reagan’s tenure as President.69

The failure of the CAAA to draw any major concessions from the South African government, it may be argued, did not necessarily mean that economic sanctions lacked the effectiveness required to pressure Pretoria into dismantling apartheid. On the contrary, it gave much credence to the argument made by Congressman Ronald Dellums (D-California), among others, that “only full and comprehensive sanctions, implemented internationally, will cause the South African government to change its policy.”70

Not only was the CAAA too weak to accomplish its goals, but its design also destined it to serve merely as a warning to the South African government to choose between making the required changes under limited pressure or “suffer painful economic consequences” at a later stage for not doing so.71 In short, the CAAA could
be seen as the first of a double-phased congressional strategy, in which the second phase was to follow if and only if South Africa defied the demands of the first. Nevertheless, because the President held the keys to the second phase and his opposition to sanctions was well known, Pretoria had a very strong reason to hope that the second phase would not be implemented as long as Reagan remained Chief Executive of the United States. That message was reinforced further when in 1988 congressional efforts to pass a new bill entailing tougher sanctions failed. Subsequently, other bills also seeking further sanctions were introduced in 1989, but they too failed to be enacted into law.\textsuperscript{72}

### 6.2 U.S. Dialogue with the ANC

If the Reagan Administration was able to hold the line in the political debate over economic sanctions against South Africa, a more telling shift in its South African policy occurred in its relations with South African black nationalist movements, particularly the ANC. Throughout the first half of the 1980s, the White House staged a virtual boycott of contacts with the ANC, which it accused of being a terrorist organization working to bring the Republic into the communist orbit. However, by mid-1986, some administration officials and most senators and congressmen understood it was necessary to reach out to the ANC. They urged the South African government to begin negotiations with the organization with the aim of charting a political future for a multi-racial and apartheid-free South Africa.\textsuperscript{73}

Secretary of State Shultz was one key administration official spearheading the effort to open negotiations with the ANC. Nothing could have driven Shultz in that direction more than his realization that the history of black political opposition in South Africa was clearly taking a new and different course. The emergence in the mid-1980s of the UDF, trade unions, and other organizations closely linked to the ANC increased the local challenge to apartheid. Paradoxically, however, even though the apartheid regime had managed to diplomatically deprive the ANC of bases near South Africa’s borders, the renewed local challenge helped the ANC to achieve one of its most sought goals since going into exile—to establish a strong political presence within the country. As David McKean noted, “in the United Democratic Front, the ANC . . . created that presence.”\textsuperscript{74} It is evident, therefore, that the changing political climate in South Africa itself had a significant bearing on the Reagan Administration’s decision to consider opening talks with South Africa’s oldest black nationalist movement. The ANC’s
potential as the only organization capable of staging a serious political challenge to white minority domination was finally being acknowledged in Washington. 75

Officials in the Reagan Administration also realized that, if Pretoria were to heed their advice to begin talks with the ANC, Washington itself had to overcome its ideological bias and establish contacts with the organization. As Secretary Shultz revealed in his memoirs, “I wanted to place the United States firmly behind negotiation, including talks with the ANC. We would have to talk with the ANC ourselves if our advice was to have credibility.” 76

Asked if he had made a miscalculation in assuming the ANC could not consolidate the black opposition, Chester Crocker cautioned “not to look at history backward.” 77 He said that when the policy of Constructive Engagement was formulated, it was a “different situation” and the opposition groups had “difficulty sorting out the difficulties among themselves.” According to Crocker, it was the “struggle that created the conditions for unity.” He added that the administration had concerns about the ANC’s use of “terrorist tactics” but “never had any doubt the organization was legitimate” and went to great lengths to make certain the group was not compared to the PLO and other terrorist organizations. 78

Not only was the ANC the oldest black nationalist organization in South Africa, but it was also the most popular and the most respected. An article in The New York Times Magazine quoted an editorial comment from Sowetan, one of South Africa’s prominent black newspapers, which declared that, “The people are talking ANC, the [South African] government is talking ANC, everybody is talking ANC.” 79 It was only logical, therefore, for Secretary Shultz to come to terms with the undeniable fact that no lasting solution to South Africa’s political crisis could be found without the involvement of the ANC. When asked if the township uprisings had helped break the political impasse in the Republic, Chester Crocker replied that the violence “made clear that Pretoria could not govern but it also couldn’t be pushed out.” 80 Moreover, it seemed inevitable that, sooner or later, the United States could find itself having to negotiate a new political and economic relationship with an ANC-dominated government.

As a first step to co-opt the ANC, the administration in 1986 appointed Edward Perkins as its Ambassador to South Africa. Described by Shultz as “a distinguished and magnetically capable Foreign Service officer, a pro,” Perkins’ principal mission was to establish U.S. contacts with “the African National Congress and the Pan Africanist
Congress and a wide array of internal black opposition groups as part of the effort to broaden American access to all parties in South Africa. At his confirmation hearings, Perkins even refused to use the label “Constructive Engagement” to describe American policy in southern Africa.

On January 28, 1987, Secretary Shultz met with ANC President Oliver Tambo in Washington. According to Shultz, he made the decision to meet Tambo despite “political pressure on [him] to extend a PLO-type ban on American contacts with the ANC.” A statement issued by the State Department after the meeting revealed that the discussion between Shultz and Tambo had focused largely on the future of South Africa. The meeting, the statement went on, “represented a continuation of [the administration’s] efforts to talk with all of the key players in South Africa. . . . In this context, we regard the ANC as an important . . . player in the South African situation.”

However, despite the determination to chart a new course for U.S.-ANC relations, Shultz could not conceal his concerns about the ANC’s links with Moscow and the South African Communist Party (SACP). In a carefully crafted statement, Shultz urged Tambo to spell out the ANC’s “vision of the future with more specificity” and emphasized the Reagan Administration’s “opposition to the replacement of the apartheid system by another form of unrepresentative government.”

Apart from worrying about the ANC’s contacts with the Soviets and the SACP, the administration also sought to convince the ANC leader to renounce violence and the armed struggle. Shortly before the Shultz-Tambo meeting, several conservative Republican Senators, notably Jesse Helms (R-North Carolina), had tried to influence the Secretary of State to hold off the meeting until such time that the ANC officially and publicly renounced violence. His objections were mirrored by Jack Kemp (R-New York), who declared that the meeting would send a signal that “the US has abandoned those who are working for peaceful and democratic change in South Africa. The Marxist ANC represents only a tiny minority of black South Africans.” Presumably Kemp was referring to Zulu Chief Gatsha Buthelezi, who was recognized as a potential alternative to the ANC. A secret White House memorandum to Reagan reveals the administration’s intention:

Buthelezi’s visit to the US comes as forces are gathering steam in Congress toward the passage of anti-South African legislation, including penalties and restrictions on US business with South Africa. During his
various meetings. . . . [H]e will be a forceful advocate opposing any punitive legislation. 87

For the administration, however, the reality on the ground suggested that contacts with the ANC must be increased until a more viable option presented itself. For the administration, however, any improved relations must be accompanied by a commitment from the ANC to renounce violence.

Neither Oliver Tambo nor any ANC leader could find an incentive to renounce violence, especially in the face of an increasing South African police crackdown on black political unrest. In 1985, the South African government had tried to convince Nelson Mandela to renounce violence. State President P. W. Botha announced in parliament that Mandela could regain his freedom only if he “unconditionally rejected violence as a political instrument.” 88 However, Mandela refused, not for the first time, to have any conditions attached to his release. In his response to the government’s offer, Mandela spoke for virtually every victim of apartheid when he threw the charge of violence back at the South African government. In a statement read by his daughter, Zindzi, at a UDF rally on February 10, 1985, Mandela rejected the government’s offer:

I am surprised at the conditions that the government wants to impose upon me. I am not a violent man. . . . Let Botha show that he is different from Malan, Strijdom and Verwoerd. Let him renounce violence. Let him say that he will dismantle apartheid. Let him unban the people’s organization, the African National Congress. 89

More than anything else, the Reagan Administration’s unwillingness or inability to pressure South Africa into making fundamental political reforms justified the growing chorus declaring its policy of Constructive Engagement a failure. The lack of results gave rise to growing public doubts about the sincerity of President Reagan’s opposition to white rule in South Africa. By the mid-1980s, it had become apparent to most administration officials in the foreign policy-making establishment that what the administration needed was a clear demonstration that Washington and Pretoria were at opposite ends of the issue of statutory racism.

Unfortunately, however, the shift in the administration’s rhetoric was made for reasons other than that of invoking a sincere and complete reorientation of its policy toward the Pretoria government. The strong anti-apartheid statements were combined with persistent efforts to frustrate congressional and U.N. drives to impose stronger sanctions against South Africa. This track was taken despite widespread evidence that
the Botha government was not willing to make significant concessions and agree to power-sharing with South Africa’s black majority. Even worse, by continuing to praise Pretoria for its limited reforms, which, as has been noted, were not aimed at making fundamental changes to the status quo, Washington sent a wrong message to the Botha regime, thus encouraging it to adopt sophisticated and more extreme forms of perpetuating apartheid. Assistant Secretary of State Crocker and other administration officials did not have to look any further than Pretoria’s violent crackdown on black protesters in order to see that the prospect for peaceful change in South Africa was far from being a reality. Indeed, the President himself touched on the Botha Administration’s increasingly violent methods, writing in his diary that he had evidence that the “Govt. of So. Africa is planning terrorist operations against the A.N.C. We’re looking in how we can turn that off.”

Consequently, after almost five years (1981-86) of offering an extended hand of friendship to the South African government, the Reagan Administration, through its Constructive Engagement policy, essentially did not achieve anything that amounted to influencing positive change in South Africa’s race relations. By the time of the Schultz-Tambo meeting, Pik Botha was dismissing the U.S. as “increasingly irrelevant among its friends and enemies alike in Africa” and declared “this government does not negotiate with terrorists over the future of our country.” Sanford Unger and Peter Vale, among others, maintained that “having been offered many carrots by the United States . . . as incentives to institute meaningful reforms, the South African authorities had simply made carrot stew and eaten it.” Perhaps no other body may have been more effective in conveying the message to the Reagan Administration that its policy was not working than the report of the Secretary of State’s Advisory Committee in January 1987, which stated in part:

The time for easy and comfortable choices in South Africa has run out. . . In dealing with South Africa, the United States must have a coherent and credible strategy that can be sustained over time. A strategy that meets these criteria must be based on a recognition that replacing the existing racially-based political system with a nonracial, democratic system is only necessary first step in what inevitably will be a long and difficult process in building a unified nation. . . . The immediate challenge facing Western nations is to assist South Africa’s politically disenfranchised and economically disadvantaged minority remove apartheid and end exclusive white rule.
Nevertheless, despite the origin, nature, and purpose of the modifications made to its relations with South Africa’s apartheid regime, it is important not to lose sight of the fact that the Reagan Administration was eventually, albeit slowly, bowing to the political realities of South Africa’s destiny. Even more important, Washington’s efforts to reach out to the ANC marked a significant turning point in U.S. relations with black political opposition in South Africa. Even though it cannot be said with much certainty what this change meant for long-term U.S. policy, it did indicate the administration’s awareness of the significance of the realignment of political forces in South Africa.

In addition, developments on the ground in South Africa itself, especially the resurgence of a strong black political opposition, clearly indicated to the Reagan Administration that the terms of negotiation had to be altered. Therefore, the narrow, self-serving definition of Constructive Engagement as a policy that could bring about peaceful change—when it was in effect a cover-up for giving military, political, and economic support to the apartheid regime—had been rendered irrelevant by the chain of events.

Furthermore, by opening its doors to the ANC and to other black political opposition groups in South Africa, Washington sent a clear message to the Pretoria government that the United States no longer perceived it as the only force for the status quo in South Africa, whose existence was vital for the protection of Western interests in that country and in the region. As Crocker’s testimony before a Subcommittee of the House Foreign Relations Committee revealed:

[T]he situation in South Africa remains balanced on a knife-edge between hope and despair. . . . It is perhaps fair to state that, at long last, the many messages being sent to that government—primarily by the people of South Africa themselves—are being heard. . . . In South Africa we face a moving target where events unfold quickly, unpredictably and beyond our control. In a sense, there is no status quo in South Africa. 95

Moreover, it became evident in early 1986 that there was a growing concern within the Reagan Administration that the violence that erupted in South Africa in the mid-1980s was threatening to escalate into a bitter and bloody civil war. Therefore, it was deemed prudent by Shultz, Crocker, and others in the Reagan administration to move more quickly in efforts to encourage negotiations before the violence reached uncontrollable proportions.
Some administration officials, such as Secretary Shultz, had come to realize that Washington had wasted too much time by placing too much emphasis on negotiating solely with the white minority government while underestimating the ability of black South Africans to mount a serious challenge to white political control. Because Pretoria had consistently proved to be unable to compel black South Africans to accept the new political dispensation, the next best move for Washington, these officials felt, was to make attempts to acknowledge the legitimacy of black nationalists to participate in the negotiations about the future of their own destiny and to place itself in a position that would enable it to influence the outcome of such negotiations.

Even more important, by 1986 it had become obvious that the black political opposition in South Africa had not been defeated and was determined to make South Africa ungovernable until multi-racial democracy was achieved. Oliver Tambo urged black South Africans to create

> a united mass army of liberation, an army that must grow in strength ... able to deliver ... at every stage ... with its eyes firmly fixed on the goal of the destruction of the apartheid regime and the transfer of power to the people. ... The charge we give to Umkhontowe Sizwe and to the masses of our people is to attack, advance, give the enemy no quarter; an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth.  

Finally, by the mid-1980s, key officials in Washington had come to understand that, in order to reduce the threat of civil war, the cooperation of black opposition groups had become just as important, if not more so, than that of the white political leadership to Washington’s efforts to achieve peaceful, evolutionary change in South Africa. Therefore, there was nothing that the Reagan Administration could gain from continuing arguments about the ideological orientation of the ANC or any other important nationalist group that could become part of a future South African democratic government.

### 6.3 Resolution of the Diplomatic Impasse in Southern Africa

The Reagan Administration began in 1981 with a high priority, at least in policy rhetoric, to achieve independence for Namibia and to secure the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. Nevertheless, for the whole of its first term and most of its second, there was little optimism among observers and the administration’s critics that those goals would be achieved. A number of reasons accounted for this failure, the most important of which was the flawed analysis made by President Reagan’s regional and
security experts about the real cause of instability in southern Africa. For years, Reagan officials believed that the main obstacle to regional peace was the Soviet Union and its Cuban proxy. In addition, not only did Washington become preoccupied with entertaining Pretoria’s fears over Cuban presence in Angola, but its guiding assumption was that the United States and South Africa shared a common set of regional interests.

During the last two-and-a-half years of the Reagan Administration, however, a significant shift had occurred in the way the United States viewed its interests in southern Africa vis-a-vis those of South Africa. The shift was triggered primarily by South Africa’s resumption of its policy of regional destabilization. The purpose of this policy was to protect South Africa’s economic and military domination in the region by altering through economic pressure and/or military action the policies of neighbouring governments.

The American brokered Lusaka and Nkomati Accords signed in 1984 had bolstered the Reagan Administration’s confidence in its southern African strategy. Washington’s optimism that its efforts to achieve peace in the region were eventually paying off was short-lived, as South Africa deliberately stalled its withdrawal from Angola and violated the Nkomati Accord by continuing its assistance to RENAMO.

Consequently, as it became apparent that South Africa’s regional destabilization activities threatened to engulf the whole region in a vicious cycle of violence, officials in the Reagan Administration were compelled to reconsider their initial position that the United States and South Africa shared similar regional interests. Even if it may not have been announced publicly, it was evident that Washington, during this period, was at pains to find ways through which it could rehabilitate its tarnished image as a collaborator in South Africa’s regional destabilization strategy. One way to do so was to seek alternative options for bringing peace in southern Africa instead of waiting for and relying on Pretoria’s cooperation.

The clearest manifestation of the administration’s shift in its regional strategy was its efforts to improve its relations with Mozambique. As Assistant Secretary Crocker noted in his testimony to a subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, relations between the two countries had deteriorated drastically immediately following Reagan’s inauguration. In late January 1981, after a South African raid into the Maputo suburb of Matola, President SamoraMachel expelled four American officials who worked at the American Embassy in Mozambique. Frederick B. Lundahl, Louis L. Oliver, Arthur Russell, and Patricia Russell were expelled for
spying for the CIA and for allegedly having identified to members of the SADF houses that belonged to ANC members in Maputo. President Reagan responded to the expulsions by suspending all forms of U.S. assistance to Mozambique. Relations between the two countries, Crocker maintained, remained hostile until the 1982 U.N. General Assembly, when Secretary Shultz met with Mozambique’s Foreign Minister Joaquim Chissano.

The renewal of diplomatic relations resulted in the resumption of much needed U.S. economic aid to Mozambique whose economy and infrastructure had been ravaged by a decade of fighting between government troops and the South African backed RENAMO. In 1984, the United States supplied Mozambique with food and other forms of aid amounting to $8 million, with another $30 million following in 1985.

The Reagan Administration’s reasoning was that by giving aid to Mozambique’s beleaguered economy the United States could possibly reduce Moscow’s influence on the FRELIMO government, induce President Samora Machel into sharing power with RENAMO, and win Mozambique’s support for its Angola-Namibia linkage strategy. As described in a memorandum to Defence Secretary Casper Weinberger during Machel’s September 1985 visit to Washington, the United States hoped to use its economic leverage to accomplish the following:

- Encourage FRELIMO to negotiate power-sharing RENAMO;
- Seek FRELIMO’s cooperation in achieving an Angola/Namibia settlement;
- Press FRELIMO toward serious economic reform - Moderate Mozambique’s anti-U.S. votes in the Nations . . . ;
- Press FRELIMO for] a concrete movement away Soviets and Marxist principles, real economic genuine efforts to allow political expression factions in Mozambique.

The administration’s approach of warming up to Mozambique’s FRELIMO government came under serious attack from conservatives and the far right both in Congress and the White House. However, Secretary Schultz justified this strategy as necessary to wean Mozambique away from the Soviet bloc, thus increasing Washington’s chances of drawing concessions from the communists. Schultz briefed President Reagan about the importance of improving U.S. diplomatic ties with Mozambique shortly before Reagan’s meeting with Samora Machel in the Oval Office.
He stressed the importance of “Machel’s evolving defection from Marxism and Moscow toward our own strategy for withdrawal of foreign troops from Angola and for Namibian independence. Margaret Thatcher, I reminded him, was very much in favor of this approach to Mache1.”

While Machel’s untimely death may have threatened to disturb the administration’s rapprochement with Mozambique, relations between the two countries on the whole continued to improve even after he had been succeeded by Joaquim Chissano. Most importantly, Washington’s strategy seems to have borne some fruit because it gained Chissano’s support to continue its bilateral diplomacy in Angola and Namibia. As noted by Assistant Secretary Chester Crocker:

Mozambique . . . quietly but effectively supported U.S. efforts to negotiate with the MPLA regime in Angola-negotiations aimed at obtaining the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola and the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 435 for the independence of Namibia. . . . No country in southern Africa has worked more consistently than Mozambique with the United States to further the course of peace and stability in southern Africa.

Washington’s treatment of Mozambique’s Marxist government differed dramatically from its attitude toward the MPLA government in Angola. Not only did the United States, even when it made serious efforts to step up contacts between the two governments, consistently refuse to recognize the MPLA as Angola’s legitimate government, but it also embarked on a somewhat confusing track by reviving covert military assistance to UNITA. The most important reason for this confusion in U.S. policy toward Angola lay in the fact that the Reagan Administration continued to view the Angolan conflict within the context of the Cold War and, therefore, still saw the MPLA government as an enemy that had to be forced into sharing power with the more pro-Western UNITA. As a result, Washington felt inclined to turn a blind eye on South Africa’s anti-SWAPo military activities in southern Angola because it hoped that would weaken the MPLA’s operations against UNITA. This perception about the advantage of letting the South African forces remain in southern Angola was made clear in a State Department memorandum to Secretary of State George Shultz:

We believe the SADF is conducting substantial operations in southern Angola. . . . Anti-SWAPo operations in Angola also provide cover for assisting UNITA, by occupying Angolan forces which otherwise could be used against Savimbi’s troops, and as a cover for SADF or joint
SADF/UNITA operations against preparations for the next government offensive.\textsuperscript{112}

However, if any inference could be drawn from the administration’s policy toward Mozambique during the mid-1980s as a policy for the whole region, Washington would have been expected by then to strongly condemn South Africa’s support to UNITA, just as it had done when it realized that Pretoria had violated the Nkomati Accord. But since Angola was still seen by those on the far right in Washington as a Cold War battleground unrelated to South Africa, it was necessary to downplay concerns about South Africa’s continuing regional aggression.

Thus, far from provoking additional U.S. pressure, South Africa’s military activities in Angola won official U.S. endorsement. A memorandum written by Assistant Secretary Crocker to Secretary of State Shultz in early 1986 indicated the administration’s hope that increasing UNITA’s military challenge would “pressure . . . the MPLA into a negotiated settlement for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from the region.”\textsuperscript{113}

The administration, it may be argued, failed to realize two specific problems with this kind of approach. First, it was almost inevitable that a stronger UNITA along with increasing South African military activity in southern Angola would make it even more difficult for the MPLA government to succumb to U.S. demands for Cuban troop withdrawal. Second, by continuing to link the presence of Cuban troops in Angola to Namibian independence, Washington was constantly eroding the chances of achieving a quick settlement in Namibia. It was not surprising, therefore, when the Angolan government suspended all negotiations with the Reagan Administration in 1985.

Although the MPLA was blamed for betraying the spirit of negotiation, it is evident that the situation was dictated in large part by Washington’s own decision to resume covert military assistance to UNITA. As Michael Clough and Donald Jordan noted:

Although the State Department officials refused to acknowledge it, the decision to provide military aid to UNITA put an end, at least momentarily, to a five year effort to establish a modus vivendi with the MPLA government that would [have] permit[ted] a negotiated settlement in Namibia and a phased Cuban withdrawal from Angola.\textsuperscript{114}

In sum, Washington’s failure to treat the Angolan conflict as an issue outside the context of its geopolitical battle with the Soviet Union continued to be a significant
obstacle in its efforts to influence change in southern Africa. In addition, there was still no indication that extending a hand of friendship to South Africa for almost seven years had fulfilled the expectation of change in its policy that those who pursued Constructive Engagement had assumed. Instead of working with the United States to achieve regional peace and stability, as Assistant Secretary Crocker and others like him had hoped, South Africa, in an effort to perpetuate its dominance over its neighbours, had embarked on acts of destabilization that drew the region into a spiral of violence. That fact had exposed the false assumption behind Constructive Engagement concerning the underlying source of conflict in southern Africa, which it, and the Total National Strategy, had attributed to the Soviet Union.

6.3.1 Independence of Namibia

By late 1987, a new round of negotiations had been opened between Angola and the United States, which eventually led to a successful resolution of the diplomatic impasse over Namibian independence. A major breakthrough occurred in late January 1988, when the United States and Cuba made an exchange deal in which Cuba agreed to withdraw its troops from Angola in return for participating in the negotiation process. Meanwhile in Luanda, Assistant Secretary Chester Crocker was involved in direct talks with Cuban officials and the MPLA government. Those talks produced a new set of proposals through which the Angolan government agreed in principle to total Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola. It was also agreed that these proposals were made within the overall objective of an agreement that would also lead to South Africa’s pull-out from Namibia.

Over May 3 and 4, 1988, Assistant Secretary Crocker convened a meeting in London between Angola, Cuba, and South Africa—with the United States playing the role of mediator. Representatives of the parties agreed to work out a formula for the withdrawal of both Cuban and South African forces from Angola and Namibia, respectively, thus paving the way for the implementation of U.N. Security Council Resolution 435 (UNSCR 435). In the months that followed, subsequent talks by representatives of the parties involved were held in different countries. Delegations from Angola, Cuba, South Africa, and the United States met in Cairo on June 24 and 25. Apart from reaffirming the spirit of the London talks, the parties agreed to meet again on the week of July 11 in the United States. In that meeting, which took place over July 11 to 13 at Governor’s Island, New York, the parties agreed “on a set of
essential principles to establish the basis for peace in the southwestern region of
Africa.” These fourteen principles, which were seen as essential to reaching a
settlement in the region included an agreement by Angola, Cuba, and South Africa to
work out and recommend to the Secretary-General of the United Nations a date for the
commencement of the implementation of Security Council Resolution 435. The three
governments also agreed to cooperate with the Secretary-General in ensuring that
Namibian independence elections would be free and fair, and they also acknowledged
the Namibian people’s right to self-determination, independence, and equality of rights.

In early August, the parties met in Geneva to continue their efforts to find a
solution that could lead to Namibia’s independence and the withdrawal of foreign
troops from Namibia and Angola. Building on the progress made in previous talks, the
delegates from Angola, Cuba, and South Africa signed a trilateral agreement in which
they agreed to recommend to the U.N. Secretary-General that November 1, 1988, be
the date for the commencement of the implementation of UNSCR 435.

A critical barrier was overcome in a round of talks held in Brazzaville, Congo,
between August and December 1988. On December 13, the parties, along with the
United States in its capacity as the official mediator, signed a protocol confirming their
commitment to act in accordance with the principles for a peaceful settlement in south-
western Africa. On December 22 in New York, Angola, Namibia, and South Africa
signed the Angola/Namibia Accords, thus concluding the many months of serious
efforts to find a peaceful resolution to the impasse over Namibian independence.

Officially known as The Tripartite Agreement of December 22, 1988, the
Angola/Namibia Accords established a formal and official basis for a peaceful
transition to independence in Namibia. They called upon Angola and South Africa to
refrain from the threat or use of violence against each other, provided for the
withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola, and permitted the U.N. Secretary-General to
seek immediate authority from the U.N. Security Council to commence the
implementation of UNSCR 435 on April 1, 1989. Cuba and Angola further signed a
bilateral agreement that set a timetable for a phased withdrawal of Cuba’s 50,000
troops from Angola, beginning with a 3,000 troop reduction on April 1, 1989.
Meanwhile, the remaining troops were to be redeployed north of the 15th parallel by
August 1. Another 25,000 troops were to be withdrawn by November 1, with the
remainder moved north of the 13th parallel. Total Cuban troop withdrawal was to be
completed by July 1, 1991.
The agreements cleared the way for Namibian independence. Therefore, once they were concluded, preparations for the immediate implementation of UNSCR 435 were begun. A U.N. Transitional Assistance group (UNTAG) was formed to supervise the agreements and monitor the process of transition in Namibia. The provisions of UNSCR 435 were expanded to include the reduction of South African troops in Angola to 1,500 men, to be confined to two bases, within three months of the signing of the agreements.124

The peace process was slightly disturbed, however, when on April 1, 1989, more than 1,000 armed SWAPO guerrillas crossing from Angola into Namibia were attacked by South African security forces. Over 300 SWAPO troops were killed during the two weeks of fighting that followed.125 Fortunately, Angola, Cuba, and South Africa responded by quickly resuming talks in an effort to put the peace process back on track. Those talks were successful, and registration of voters began on July 3 under the supervision of UNTAG.126 Over November 7 to 11, Namibia’s first democratic elections were held under U.N. supervision. SWAPO, led by Sam Nujoma, was propelled to victory by winning 57% of the total ballots cast, claiming 41 of the 72 seats in the Constituent Assembly. Full independence under a SWAPO government was declared on March 21, 1990.127

Even though the whole process that led to Namibia’s independence was completed in 1990, it is evident that most of the groundwork had been done by the time the Reagan Administration left office. Hence, the important role played by Chester Crocker and George Shultz, among others, in bringing the negotiations to fruition cannot be denied. However, in spite of arguments to the contrary, this dramatic resolution of the Namibian independence impasse should not be seen as an exoneration of Constructive Engagement. Had the Reagan Administration not abandoned the multilateral approach of the Western Contact Group (WCG), it is most likely that Namibia would have obtained its independence earlier than 1990, but because Constructive Engagement’s bilateral strategy allowed South Africa to extend its hold over Namibia for as long as it chose, the world was, in effect, kept waiting for eight years before Pretoria would finally give its consent. As Fen Osler Hampson noted:

It would be a mistake to characterize Constructive Engagement and the bilateral approach to the problem adopted by the Reagan administration as a complete and unqualified success—unless an eight-year delay is part of one’s definition of success. Not only did Pretoria successfully
exploit its new relationship with Washington by playing the linkage card, thus capitalizing on the Reagan administration’s Cold War sensitivities, but it was also able to press ahead with its own military and internal political solution in Namibia without incurring Washington’s wrath.\textsuperscript{128}

It is possible that supporters of the Reagan Administration’s bilateral strategy would raise the argument that the WCG’s carrot-and-stick approach had also failed to produce any positive results in southern Africa. However, that theory is itself arguable, because by the time Reagan left office, his administration itself had resorted to using both carrot and stick in its dealings with South Africa. It is, therefore, interesting to speculate what would have happened had President Reagan not moved quickly to distance himself from the policies of his predecessor in the White House. Had he made a clear indication that he intended to apply more pressure by working with the WCG or even by threatening stronger sanctions, it is most likely that South Africa would have responded more quickly to international pressures and relinquished its hold over Namibia.

In regards to UNITA, the United States was not willing to abandon the organization and stepped up support in the late-1980s. Even after the 1988 Brazzaville Accords, the Reagan Administration would not give up on its rationale for supporting UNITA. Secretary Crocker claimed it was continued Soviet involvement in the region that necessitated American intransigence: “Our attitude toward UNITA is unchanged . . . We have no intention of disengaging unilaterally from the Angolan situation at a time when others continue to provide large amounts of hardware to the other Angolan party . . . our relationship with UNITA is not a subject for negotiation.”\textsuperscript{129} President Reagan would continue to stress the importance of UNITA to achieving U.S. goals in southern Africa:

In Angola, Jonas Savimbi’s UNITA has been fighting for 13 years against the Marxist regime and its Cuban protectors. In 1975, President Gerald Ford wanted to help, but some in Congress felt our standing with the freedom fighters would only prolong hostilities. A law was passed that made aid illegal, and the war dragged on — the Cubans multiplied. In 1985 Congress repealed the law and began supporting UNITA. Now the Cubans are talking of a pullout. They’re doing business because we showed them we meant business. We’ve proved that we can stand united as a country that means business — business for peace.\textsuperscript{130}
As other parties started to disengage and move towards peace, the Reagan Administration tasked the CIA with pushing “in extra supplies before the November 1988 Bush-Dukakis election” in the event that the Vice President lost the election. Simultaneously, South Africa began to increase deliveries of petroleum and arms to UNITA to ensure the organization could continue fighting after the Republic’s agreement to stop funding Savimbi came into effect in December 1988. According to UNITA, South Africa's shipments were sufficient to supply “30,000 regular troops and 45,000 guerrillas for two years.”

While the MPLA and UNITA signed a peace agreement in June 1989, by August Savimbi had resumed the war. UNITA and the MPLA again entered negotiations in 1990 and signed the Bicesse accords on May 31, 1991, which was followed by the Lusaka Protocol in 1994. Despite these agreements, each time Jonas Savimbi was faced with the prospect of losing power, he returned to war with the stores of weapons and money he accrued in the 1980s and 1990s from his benefactors and the liquidation of natural resources. The chief patrons of UNITA were of course the United States and South Africa. Though the United State stopped sending military and financial assistance to UNITA in 1993, the fact Jonas Savimbi ignored the elections and continued to fight until his death in a fire-fight with the Angolan government in February 2002, suggests Constructive Engagement’s real legacy in Angola was not stability and negotiated peace, but a generation of crippling economic destabilization and civil war.

6.4 Abandonment of the Total National Strategy

To say that the significance of the Reagan Administration’s diplomatic mission in southern Africa should not be overestimated raises the broader issue of establishing those forces that may have actually influenced the events that occurred in the region in the late 1980s. It is clear that the peace accords that gave Namibia its independence and led to the evolution of the democratic process in South Africa were facilitated in large part by interplay of a new set of regional and international realities that bore no relation to Constructive Engagement.

Socially, South African society witnessed a reversal in the trend toward militarization. White South Africans tired of a war environment and were eager for peace. A 1988 poll conducted by the South African Institute of International Affairs revealed that a majority of white South Africans were war weary and believed that
defence spending and militarization had gone far enough. Support for a negotiated settlement in Namibia rose from 38% in 1982 to 55% in 1988.\textsuperscript{134}

The largest showing of this feeling surfaced in reaction to conscription. Many English- and Afrikaans-speakers began to view the extension of conscription and increased military activity in southern Africa as potentially threatening their own lives.\textsuperscript{135} With such an attitude, the growth and popularity of the End Conscription Campaign (ECC) was not surprising. The primary goal of the ECC had been to convince South African authorities to introduce a viable alternative for those who object to service in the SADF on moral, religious, or political grounds.\textsuperscript{136} Pretoria did not react favourably to the ECC. In fact, the Defence Minister Malan linked the motives behind the ECC to the communist and terrorist impulse designed to undermine the qualities of valour and justice intrinsic to the SADF.\textsuperscript{137} Moves to crush the ECC led to the arrest of 143 South African whites from around the country who refused to serve in the SADF. These men faced jail sentences of up to six years.\textsuperscript{138}

Similar problems emerged within the SADF. Increasing rates of desertion and draft evasion along with the persistent use of drugs illustrated the widespread dissatisfaction with national service.\textsuperscript{139} Likewise, the Defence Minister reported to the House of Assembly that the suicide rate in the SADF had risen to astronomical proportions. In 1989, 294 national servicemen attempted suicide, eleven of whom were successful.\textsuperscript{140} Even the number of court martial cases exploded, partly as a result of pressures from discipline produced by increased active combat duty in Namibia.\textsuperscript{141}

Furthermore, protests by ethnic Namibian soldiers over deployment in the war against SWAPO did not bode well for South African defence. In November 1987, a protest among two black Namibian battalions resulted in the expulsion of forty-seven members of the 101 Battalion. This dissatisfaction clearly had profound implications for the Defence Force because South Africa depended on Namibian ethnic units to counter SWAPO insurgency. Moreover, the majority of the 101 Battalion being Ovambo, the ethnic group from which SWAPO drew major support, underscored the danger that the protests held for the SADF’s counterinsurgency moves.\textsuperscript{142}

Even South Africa’s mighty arms industry was not immune to problems. Although ARMSCOR development had made South Africa the tenth largest arms producer in the world, by 1988 it suffered serious problems in the air industry. Specifically, ARMSCOR was unable to produce spare parts for highly sophisticated air equipment.\textsuperscript{143} Moreover, with the phasing out of the Shackleton maritime aircraft in
1984, South Africa no longer possessed long-range air reconnaissance capabilities. A similar worry was the obsolescence of existing models that were already a generation old. Most equipment that was once bought in Europe could not be replaced domestically.

Likewise, regional and international events no longer rendered destabilization attractive. Regionally, South Africa both met mounting resistance in its conventional war in Angola and lost control of its proxy in Mozambique. Internationally, South Africa faced a hostile world willing to impose economic sanctions. The threat to South Africa was again increasing, and the means by which Pretoria had hoped to counter this threat proved ineffective.

First, South African military power disintegrated as Pretoria’s adversaries in southern Africa steadily improved their conventional capabilities. This reality was most evident in Angola. After South Africa reinvaded Angola in 1985, the Soviet Union provided Luanda with modern weapons, including sophisticated aircraft suitable for supporting ground attacks. Moreover, the Soviets constructed an air umbrella over Angola with 1500 anti-aircraft weapons and 800 surface-to-air missiles. Furthermore, Soviet and Cuban training and supplies transformed the Angolan army from an ill-disciplined guerrilla band into a well-equipped, conventional force.

South Africa clearly felt this metamorphosis. By 1987, South Africa had begun to suffer serious setbacks in its Angola war. A record twenty-three SADF servicemen were killed in a two-week period as the SADF attempted to stem the advance of Angolan forces. Furthermore, SAAF planes, not readily replaceable, were steadily grounded. Mounting pressure emerged within South Africa demanding an explanation for such losses: “the sacrifices which our young men have to make require that their families—and the South African nation—be told what is going on.”

In 1988, this situation deteriorated further. Between October 1987 and June 1988, South African and Angolan/Cuban forces became engaged in what has been termed the fiercest conventional battle on African soil since El Alamein. With Cuban ground forces deployed for the first time, Angola withstood major SADF assaults on January 23, February 25, and March 23, 1988. Instead of victory, 9000 South African soldiers with tanks and artillery were trapped 300 miles from the Namibian border in a failed effort to capture Cuito Cuanavale. Under heavy rains, South African tanks were bogged down in mud with no means to redeploy while Angolan/Cuban forces moved to drier ground along the Namibian border.
addition, with most of its planes inoperative, South Africa lost its air superiority. Moreover, on June 27, 1988, the Angolan Air Force bombed South African positions in the Calueque area of the Cunene Province in southern Angola, causing the deaths of twenty-six white South African soldiers and the destruction of four Ratel combat vehicles.\footnote{154}

Although the Americans and South Africans would continue to say that “the idea that Cuito Carnevale was a smashing victory (for the Cubans) is a joke,” the battles at Cuito and Calueque had a decisive impact on South Africa. As Pik Botha would tell the South Africa generals after the battle, “If you really want to saddle yourself with one of the biggest burdens ever, take it (Cuito Cuanavale). You will be heroes, headlines in the newspapers here for a day or two until food, electricity, water, medical supplies have to be flown in. Then within a day or two you will pray for someone to take it off your hands immediately.”\footnote{156} Even if not inclined to believe Botha’s version of events at Cuito, and it is irrefutable that the SADF were more than capable of handling any and all comers in the region in the near term, it is undeniable that Pretoria could no longer expect to get away with military destabilization without incurring high costs.\footnote{157} The war in Angola drained millions of dollars per day from South Africa’s coffers. More importantly, war had become highly unpopular in South Africa, especially as an increasing number of white South Africans returned home from Angola in body bags.\footnote{158} To fight and win in Angola would have required unprecedented white casualties, carrying tremendous political reverberations. Moreover, a military stalemate would have further eroded white confidence in Pretoria’s ability to defend the Republic’s national security. Thus, for the first time ever, Pretoria had reached the limits of its military power.\footnote{159} Military destabilization was not the solution.

Second, Pretoria proved unable to police its own peace initiatives in Mozambique. Officially, Pretoria had sponsored peace talks in 1984 between FRELIMO and the MNR, resulting in the Pretoria Declaration of October 3, 1984.\footnote{160} Likewise, Pretoria provided FRELIMO with vehicles and equipment to help defend Mozambique from MNR sabotage.\footnote{161} Despite such efforts to achieve peace in Mozambique, the MNR continued its activities, at first with Pretoria’s blessing but later seemingly independent of official South African guidance.\footnote{162} The MNR even committed acts of sabotage that undermined South Africa’s attempts to secure uninterrupted flows of electricity generated at Cahora Bassa. Once supported by
Pretoria, the MNR seemed to be receiving aid from sources in Portugal, Germany, the Middle East, and private South African groups through the Comoros Islands, Tanzania, and Malawi. Pik Botha repeatedly tried to persuade suspected governments and individuals to terminate their assistance to the MNR in order to bring about some meaningful peace in southern Africa.  

Nevertheless, the covert support continued, enabling the MNR to free itself from Pretoria’s pressure. In fact, in a statement released in Lisbon in early 1989, the MNR explicitly refused to accept South African mediation in Mozambique because of Pretoria’s growing economic and security links with FRELIMO. Thus, what was once a pliant tool of South Africa destabilization had slipped from Pretoria’s control and acted increasingly against the interests of South African foreign policy in Mozambique. Additionally, the EC imposed modest sanctions upholding the oil and arms ban and withdrawing military attaches from South Africa. Sweden and Norway adopted a total trade ban in 1987. Even Japan imposed modest sanctions. More ominously, during the October 1989 summit in Kuala Lumpur, the Commonwealth voted for sanctions, despite objections from Thatcher.  

The imposition of sanctions and the cost of the country’s destabilization campaign had a profound impact on the Republic’s economy. Although the South African economy grew by 3.2% in 1988, it soon decelerated. Predictions of near stagnation or negative growth were expected in 1990, with a real GDP growth of perhaps .5%. Additionally, South Africa faced a number of specific economic problems that were unlikely to improve in the short term. First, with the slowdown in economic growth, black unemployment had reached crisis proportions. Nearly 1,161,000 blacks, 17.5% of the economically active black population, remained unemployed. Because this figure is an official South African number, it excluded the unemployed in the “independent” TBVC homelands, thereby rendering the above statistic a gross underestimate. In certain regions of the country, the problem was even worse. Nearly 57% of the economically active population of Port Elizabeth and Uitenhage was unemployed. Likewise, the figure for the Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging industrial area was 18.1%. Future projections were equally discomfoting. A study by the Institute for Futures Research estimated that South Africa would enter the 1990s with only 45% of the economically active population being employed.  

Second, the depreciation of the rand contributed to heavy inflation. With the unit value of exports decreasing by 22% from 1980 to 1985, Pretoria hoped that a lower
exchange rate would help overcome the damaging impact South Africa’s trade situation had on the profitability of its exports, especially gold, which accounted for 50% of South Africa’s total export earnings. A depreciated rand, however, cost South Africa dearly in terms of inflation. As the rand value sank, inflation rose.

Third, South Africa’s credit problems undermined international confidence in the South African economy. According to Finance Minister Barend du Plessis: “There was an international capital war against us.” Because of the deteriorating security situation within South Africa and anti-apartheid pressure in the West, foreign banks stopped lending long-term money and refused to renew South Africa’s short-term debt. By mid-1985, South Africa had $22 billion in foreign debts, $12 billion of which was due in six months or less. Therefore, du Plessis announced a repayments freeze on August 27, 1985, admitting to the world that South Africa could no longer pay its debts: “mighty South Africa had defaulted.” As a result, international confidence waned. With a depreciating rand, soaring inflation, and economic recession, South Africa did not possess an attractive investment climate. In fact, the violence and brutal suppression of 1984-1986 gave South Africa the dubious distinction of being an area of too great a risk for Western investment. Not surprisingly, South Africa experienced much capital flight, amounting to $2.09 billion in 1984 and $1.2 billion in 1985.

Such a poor economic situation started to affect the average South African taxpayer. Because mine and corporate revenue had fallen substantially in the recession, South African taxpayers were paying most of the burden necessary to meet current expenditures. As a result, white taxpayers experienced a 20% fall in their living standards from 1984-1987. With such a negative economic environment, a costly policy like destabilization was not in South Africa’s best interest. Acts of destabilization required the most extensive mobilization of the country’s forces and resources since World War II. Botha estimated that the 1984-1985 cost of holding Namibia was R1143 million ($600 million in 1985 dollars). Even though not all acts of destabilization cost as much as those against Namibia, economic woes rendered any such costs prohibitive. Furthermore, with Botha and de Klerk committing huge sums of money to social services and to support the TBVC states, the money once spent on destabilization was not readily available. Thus, from the standpoint of South Africa’s stagnant economy, the Total National Strategy was not cost effective.
6.5 Changing Threat Environment

In 1990, South Africa faced a less hostile and threatening region. First, the image of the Soviet Union had changed profoundly from the days of the total onslaught. Soviet budgetary and political constraints rendered many of its Third World proxy states of less importance to the Soviet Union’s vital economic and strategic interests. As a result, Moscow restrained its aid flows to Angola and Mozambique to a bare minimum. Pik Botha praised Moscow’s decision to withdraw from regional conflicts as a sign of the positive changes in the USSR. The favourable view of the Gorbachev leadership boded well for Soviet-South African relations: “If this leads to improved relations and to more trade, then why should we be against this?” In 1989, the first high-level Soviet-South African meeting since 1956 occurred between Pik Botha and a Soviet ambassador and minister plenipotentiary, regarding the joint committee on Namibia.

Second, with increased Western interest in the economic development of southern Africa, especially in Mozambique, the region no longer posed a direct threat to Western social and economic values. Since 1986, Britain offered military training to Mozambican soldiers in Zimbabwe. In mid-1987, the Commonwealth established a technical fund for Mozambique and pledged to assist large-scale development projects such as the Limpopo rehabilitation. By 1988, other western nations were providing technical and economic assistance to the Beira Corridor. France and West Germany channelled similar assistance to Mozambique, including the sale of helicopters. Likewise, the United States, once a bitter critic of Maputo, offered Mozambique economic aid for nonlethal purposes and made commitments to the rehabilitation of Mozambique’s transport corridors, including a $15 million grant to the Limpopo project.

With decreased Soviet involvement and increased Western interest, the region no longer appeared as threatening to Pretoria. Thus, both P. W. Botha and de Klerk made several high-level visits to southern Africa. Before Botha stepped down, he travelled to Malawi, Mozambique, and Zaire, proclaiming major breakthroughs in constructing a peaceful regional order. President de Klerk was even more committed to peaceful relationships with Africa. In 1989, he twice visited Mozambique and journeyed to Zaire, Zambia, and the Ivory Coast. These moves were part of what the South African press labelled “Klerknost” and “Pretoriastroika.”
Specifically, the visits to regional states were designed to promote regional cooperation and economic integration. Efforts with Mozambique were the most substantial. At the Chissano-Botha summit at Cahora Bassa on September 12, 1988, South Africa promised to maintain the security of the dam and to involve substantial South African capital in Mozambican economic development. Both leaders also pledged to cooperate in reactivating the railway from Maputo to the Transvaal and the highway from Maputo to the South African border. Similar pledges from de Klerk at the December 15, 1989, summit in Maputo confirmed South Africa’s role in developing the Mozambican economy.

Likewise, $4 million worth of South African nonlethal equipment, including medicines and food, arrived in Beira on November 28, 1988. Additionally, in 1989, South Africa and Mozambique signed a trade agreement in which South Africa agreed to abolish all taxes on such Mozambican products as fish, cashews, citrus, cigarettes, wood furniture, and palm oil. This move, combined with a 3% reduction in all customs taxes, allowed Mozambique to earn an extra $19 million (USD) per year.

In the same time period, Pretoria entered into similar agreements with other states in southern Africa. In Botswana, South Africa proceeded with plans for the Sua Pan soda ash project. To guarantee the success of the project, Pretoria agreed to levy a 10% duty on imported soda ash in addition to providing 820 million (USD) in export credit. Such moves made South Africa virtually dependent on imports of Botswana’s soda ash and forced joint cooperation between Pretoria and Gaborone on the Sua Pan project. Likewise, South Africa and Lesotho concluded the Highlands Water Project treaty in 1987, with South Africa contributing $100 million to the $2 billion development plan.

Such cooperation and economic integration mirrored the changes occurring in South Africa’s perception of its security threat. Eager to reach some sort of peaceful arrangement with both the region and South African blacks, President de Klerk stated that “the season of violence is over . . . the time for reconstruction and reconciliation has arrived.” Committed to this approach, de Klerk took steps that had profound repercussions for South Africa’s regional policy. Most significantly, the unbanning of the ANC and the subsequent release of Nelson Mandela in 1990 completely altered Pretoria’s characteristic stance with respect to its neighbours. With the ANC now operating legally within South Africa, the region no longer represented a shelter for anti-apartheid terrorist subversion. Thus, strikes into neighbouring states to prevent
regional support for the ANC were no longer necessary. In fact, General Malan announced in a speech on December 2, 1989, foreshadowing the unbanning of the ANC, that Pretoria no longer had reason to launch SADF cross-border raids or to support anti-government groups in the neighbouring countries.186

The other major event of the late 1980s that signalled the new direction in South African foreign policy was Pretoria’s decision to relinquish Namibia. Such a move represented a tremendous watershed in the region, creating an independent Namibia out of the last African colony on March 21, 1990. Although South Africa had been promising such independence since Vorster, Pretoria never seemed willing to agree to any terms that would have led to a SWAPO-led Namibia. With the costs of holding Namibia becoming more and more prohibitive and the war in Angola turning against South Africa, settlement in Namibia proved most sensible.

The New York Accords codified South Africa’s acceptance of a new regional order in which it would play a vital role:

For this country, the new situation holds many important developments and consequences. The negotiations have brought us into closer contact with Russia, which could lead to significant future developments. This places South Africa in a new relationship vis-a-vis southern Africa. South Africa has proven its good faith and honour; it is quite clear that no agreement would have been possible without her. The possibility of greater stability and cooperation between South Africa and other states in the region has been created.187

South Africa acted in good faith with respect to the Namibian transition. Pretoria had ample opportunity to derail the process, especially in April, 1989, when an unexpected large-scale infiltration of SWAPO nationalists returned to Namibia. However, South Africa chose to abide by the peace process and allowed the scheduled elections to take place in November, 1989, in which SWAPO, once South Africa’s most feared and hated enemy, won forty-one of the seventy-two seats in the Constituent Assembly. The South African press hailed this election as surpassing all expectations: all fears of intimidation, disruption, or military incursions went unfounded.188 Similarly, de Klerk accepted the results of the election and cooperated fully with an independent Namibia “in a spirit of good-neighbourliness, in order to enhance and develop peace and prosperity in the sub-continent.”189

It is impossible to overstate the significance of Namibian independence to South African regional policy. For years, Namibia provided a key psychological buffer to
white South Africa. Only the existence of the Namibian controversy prevented the international community from focusing all of its attention and pressure on the injustices of a minority-ruled South Africa. Moreover, white South Africa linked the future of South West Africa to that of continued white rule. Determination to retain Namibia seemed to mirror Pretoria’s resolve to preserve the status quo in South Africa.

As such, the decision to relinquish Namibia would have seemed to represent a significant setback for South Africa. Nevertheless, Pretoria capitalized enormously on Namibian independence. At the independence ceremonies, foreign leaders—including the Presidents of Egypt, Mozambique, Angola, Nigeria, Mali, Zambia, and Yugoslavia as well as the foreign ministers from the Soviet Union, Ireland, Finland, West Germany, Sweden, and Spain—visited with President F. W. de Klerk. These “diplomatic coups” afforded de Klerk the most extensive and varied diplomatic contacts any South African leader had experienced since 1948.

With the independence of Namibia, South African foreign policy entered the 1990s in no way reminiscent of Pretoria’s policy a decade earlier. The South African government turned to cooperation and economic integration as the best way to achieve its modus vivendi with southern Africa. As a result, Pretoria expanded its diplomatic and economic links with its black neighbours. Direct contact between de Klerk and African heads of state expanded dramatically as did South African economic investment in southern Africa. Furthermore, neither the ANC nor SWAPO posed an external, communist-inspired threat to the national security of South Africa; instead, the former became a legal entity within South Africa, and the latter led an independent, multiracial, and democratic Namibia into the future. Even the Soviet Union was not regarded with the same fear and hostility that governed the total-onslaught years. With such monumental changes occurring in South Africa’s external environment, South Africa’s destabilization campaign was abandoned in favour of regional cooperation in the 1990s.

6.6 Conclusion

As defined by the Botha Administration, the Total National Strategy was implemented to counter revolutionary warfare fomented by the Soviet Union by marshalling all the resources available to the apartheid state. In order to move forward on an “evolutionary” approach to reform, South Africa had to be made safe from revolutionary upheavals that threatened the interests and power of white South
Africans. This would be accomplished regionally by destabilizing neighbouring states that gave sanctuary to the ANC and other anti-apartheid groups operating outside the boundaries of the Republic. Using the formidable military assets of the SADF and proxy military groups, in conjunction with economic pressure, South Africa would bludgeon its neighbours into expelling the ANC and accepting the Republic’s role as hegemon of southern Africa. Within the country, security forces would counter internal unrest with a counter-revolutionary strategy that would break the anti-apartheid forces while the government opened up a dialogue with “moderate” black South Africans that would concede to a reform process that ensured that power stayed in white hands.193

By the signing of the 1988 Brazzaville Accords, Pretoria had seemingly achieved a level of physical security that was unthinkable a decade before. In the townships the state of emergency had taken a heavy toll on the anti-apartheid movement and eliminated the possibility of a revolutionary takeover of the government. Regionally, the Cubans were exiting Angola and the Soviet Union no longer saw any benefit in involving itself in the affairs of southern Africa. In Namibia, the presence of a government run by SWAPO, a traditional fear of the Republic, no longer seemed as daunting with communism waning in southern Africa. As for the rest of the FLS, the destabilization campaign had forced them to evict the ANC, denying that organization a military sanctuary outside South Africa.

South Africa’s security, however, was an illusion. The fact that the township uprisings did not pose an imminent threat to white minority rule obscured the fundamental fact that the Botha government was incapable of controlling the black majority and violence in the streets would eventually return. Ultimately, the apartheid government had to decide whether the reliance on brutal counter-revolutionary tactics, a crumbling economy and its international pariah status was a price worth paying to cling to power for another few years. The experiences of the 1980s proved it was not. The National Party could suppress the township rebellions, and it could push the ANC from the Republic’s borders, but not forever and it could only do so at a high cost. The white minority faced a reality that violence would return and that chaos within the country would eventually overwhelm the security apparatus.194 The Total National Strategy could not bring the black majority to the bargaining table on P.W. Botha’s terms and it could not effectively protect white power and interests using counter-revolutionary violence.

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The Total National Strategy’s inability to decisively end the unrest in the townships and to break the ANC helped push the white government to negotiations. Even though the eventual negotiations were a response to a combination of civil unrest, economic recession, labour opposition by black trade unions, and international sanctions and pressure, it is nevertheless accurate to say that the intensification of all aspects of the struggle in the 1980s was largely a result of the township unrest that forced the Republic to use brutal repression, which “served to highlight the moral poverty of even ‘reformed apartheid’” which in turn led to increased international isolation, which in turn led to plummeting investor confidence and economic sanctions. Perhaps the greatest evidence for the impact of the unrest and increased violence on the mindset of at least some National Party leaders was the fact that the first discussion of negotiations with the ANC began during the township uprisings.

More importantly, the ANC’s strategic decision to encourage the township uprisings, including arming the participants, helped ensure the legitimacy of that organization in the eyes of black South Africans. As the vanguard of the liberation movement, the ANC was seen as the heir apparent to power when white minority rule ended. Just as P.W. Botha recognized Nelson Mandela as the right person to begin talks with in 1985, so too did foreign governments recognize the power of the ANC and its centrality to legitimizing the reform process in the Republic. Despite a military balance that favoured the apartheid government, the ANC’s legitimacy among black South Africans and the international community proved more decisive than Botha had imagined and his goal of fostering a “moderate” alternative was made obsolete. Thus, no matter what conclusions one draws about the actual effectiveness of the 1980s uprisings from a military standpoint, it is undoubtedly true that the ANC’s strategic shift towards a popular, loosely organized struggle—ironically necessitated by the counter-revolutionary strategy of the Total National Strategy—secured its place at the head of the liberation movement and chief rival to the Botha Administration.

By the mid-1980s, it became obvious to certain members of the Botha Administration that the ANC had to be drawn into the reform process. In May 1988, Botha created a secret contact group, lead by Niel Barnard and Mike Louw, of the National Intelligence Service (NI) and the Department of Foreign Affairs respectively, to begin talks with Nelson Mandela and the ANC. Despite a positive report from the contact group, Botha was not inclined to personally meet with Mandela and talks with the ANC languished.
Despite these first tentative steps towards unbanning the ANC, P.W. Botha was intent on seeing his reform process through without substantial changes or input from the black majority. By maintaining the Group Areas Act, Population Registration Act and Separate Amenities Act, Botha signalled to black South Africans and the international community that he was unwilling to attack the foundations of apartheid and its corresponding racist assumptions. As he would assure a National Party crowd in Pietermaritzburg in April 1987:

> We are not prepared to accept Black majority rule in South Africa. We are prepared to, however, accept the principal of majority rule on a diversified basis. We are prepared to bring about devolution of power, and we are prepared to share power about matters of common concern, but we are not prepared to renounce power in such manner that we do not have a future for ourselves and our children in this country.\(^{199}\)

Even if the Prime Minister had gone further than any of his predecessors in reforming the apartheid system, it was equally true that he needed a new, bold approach to the reform process to gain credibility among black South Africans. As author Christi van der Westhuizen would write: ‘These reforms merely added fuel to the fire, and boycotts of rent and electricity fees converged with struggles around education, unemployment, price increases and a rejection of the tricameral dispensation . . . it all came down to the underlying problem: even such limited reforms remained half-hearted, because the real intent was to sustain white domination. And black people knew that, as the insurrection showed.\(^{200}\)

Botha, however, continued to sell the idea of a “system that will combine both federal and confederal components” where black South African were represented through the Bantustans and local authorities and warned that “Africa is full of examples of we should shun like the plague when you see what they have done to their peoples. From our budding system of regional governments, we must see to it that devolution of power is practiced and then I can see structures where people can come together to discuss joint problems and find joint solutions.”\(^{201}\)

From the moment it was introduced, the ANC dismissed Botha’s “bogus” reform process, stating:

> We are convinced that the Botha regime has neither the desire nor the intention to engage in any meaningful negotiations. On the contrary, everything this regime does is directed at the destruction of the national liberation movement, the suppression of the democratic movement and
the entrenchment and perpetuation of the apartheid system of White minority domination.

The racist regime has raised the issue of negotiations to achieve two major objectives. The first of these is to defuse the struggle inside our country by holding out false hopes of a just political settlement which the Pretoria regime has every intention to block. Secondly, this regime hopes to defeat the continuing campaign for comprehensive and mandatory sanctions by sending out bogus signals that it is ready to talk seriously to the ‘genuine representatives of our people.

Fundamental to the understanding of the apartheid regime’s concept of negotiations is the notion that it must impose its will on those it is talking to and force them to accept its dictates. In practice, the Botha regime is conducting a determined campaign of repression against the ANC and the mass democratic movement. This includes the assassination of leaders, mass detentions, military occupation of townships and a programme of pacification carried out by the so-called Joint Management Centres (JMC’s).

The racists are out to terrorise our people into submission, crush their democratic organisations and force us to surrender.202

While Botha busied himself with passing The Promotion of Constitutional Development Act, a negotiating forum that provided limited political participation for black South Africans through representatives of the independent homelands and African local authorities, he directed the security establishment to step up attacks on the ANC, effectively doubling down on the counter-revolutionary strategy. This was entirely predictable given Botha’s sincere belief that counter-revolutionary violence was necessary to maintain safety and order in the Republic. Returning to a familiar theme of his administration, Botha warned his fellow National Party members in May 1987:

The war being waged against us by the South African Communist Party and the ANC, with financial assistance from abroad, is not a struggle for the rights of the Black communities in our country. It is a struggle for political power. They want to put a clique in power in South Africa, not a democratic government, but a dictatorship of Communist origin. They are not interested in the so-called underprivileged in this country.203

With Botha’s Cold War myopia creating an impasse that was crippling the South African economy and threatening an endless cycle of violence, in July 1987 the Institute for a Democratic Alternative in South Africa (IDASA) joined the National Intelligence Service in opening up contacts between the Afrikaner community and the
ANC. The meeting proved to be a major breakthrough that called for the unbanning of
the ANC, the releasing of all political prisoners and the beginning of a negotiated
settlement.\textsuperscript{204}

Though he had originally supported the talks, Botha considered the
recommendations of the IDASA a bridge too far and informed the House of Assembly
that the “Government will not sit down at the negotiating table at the point of a gun,
with the handing over of power to the revolutionaries as the only item on the agenda . .
. We are prepared to reform, but we are not prepared to abdicate.”\textsuperscript{205} He would later
refer to those that participated in the IDASA meeting as “useful idiots” of the
communists that naively “went to co-ordinate strategies” for the ANC’s “revolutionary
takeover of power.”\textsuperscript{206}

In the final months of 1987, the Botha Administration became increasingly
irrelevant as the Afrikaner business community and political groups sidestepped the
government and opened up their own talks with Mandela and the ANC. While the
agenda slipped from his grasp, Botha continued to entrench, warning the members of
the House of Assembly: “If there is one issue on which we all ought to agree, it is that
we will not hand over this country to the dictatorship and to the rotten conditions which
the ANC-SACP alliance wants to force on this country.”\textsuperscript{207} While Botha deserves
credit for opening talks with Nelson Mandela and the ANC, it is equally true that he
distrusted the very notion of majority rule. As Botha would tell the Congress of the
Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut in May 1987, “Probably the greatest weakness of
democracy is that in its struggle against revolutionary forces against the forces of
domination that want to establish power cliques, it does not have at its disposal the
ways and means it needs to act effectively.”\textsuperscript{208} Talking to the House Assembly in 1988,
he would reiterate his suspicion of power sharing with the black majority stating, “I
believe in a strong democracy, not in a \textit{laissez faire} democracy. I believe in a
democracy that is able to defend itself against other systems. A weak democracy cannot
do that.”\textsuperscript{209} Even late in the negotiations with ANC, he was warning white South
Africans:

\begin{quote}
I believe in reform that brings about change and allows all people to
share in the good of the future. But I also believe in reform that takes
into account the good of the past. I believe in orderly reform, and I am at
a loss to understand the haste of the present consultations and
negotiations. I cannot support a spirit of gradual abdication.\textsuperscript{210}
\end{quote}
On January 18, 1989, Botha suffered a debilitating stroke but doggedly held onto office, determined to retake the initiative from his disgruntled cabinet. In July 5, 1989, Botha finally meet with Nelson Mandela. The half hour meeting was little more than an introduction, with nothing of substance discussed. As Robert Harvey would write in 2001: “By seeing Mandela for just half an hour and apparently discussing nothing at all, Botha hoped to get the best of both worlds: to demonstrate he was not the unbending conservative portrayed in the media, to secure the agreement of the black Africans to his own constitutional settlement. . . . This was the reverse of the truth, of course; but Botha could put it that way.” By the time of the Mandela meeting, however, Botha was facing a fearsome challenge from the ANC that had declared 1989 a “year of action.” Fearful of a repeat of the uprisings of 1985 and 1986, Botha’s cabinet moved quickly to remove the Prime Minister in what one observer called a “brave, clinical coup.” With his cabinet asking him to step-down, on August 14 Botha resigned his office without appointing an acting president.

Botha’s resignation from government was followed by the emergence in 1989 of a new and reform-minded leadership within the ruling National Party government in South Africa. F. W. de Klerk came to power fully aware that apartheid could no longer survive in the new global realities that prevailed when he took office in August 1989. As one writer would succinctly put it, “de Klerk, although no sentimentalist, was nothing if not a realist.” The change in leadership was critical to move the process of political liberalization forward. As William Pretorius, a prominent Stellenbosch businessman that participated in the Mells Park meetings with the ANC would later comment: “He [Botha] got people to think and make concessions,” however, Botha “would not have been the one to preside over the transition to majority-rule—although he may have accepted that it was inevitable. Nor would Botha ever have negotiated with the Communists as de Klerk did.”

Understanding the situation for what it was, de Klerk, therefore, quickly made known his intentions to begin talks with all the parties involved in the continuing South African crisis. Within two months of coming to office, President F. W. de Klerk, abandoned Botha’s Total National Strategy and immediately shuttered the National Security Management System. In 1990, he lifted the ban on black political organizations and took steps to release all political prisoners, including Nelson Mandela. Subsequent announcements beginning in early 1990 by de Klerk of his intentions to repeal most of the apartheid laws, including those that formed the
cornerstone of white minority rule (the Group Areas Act, the Population Registration Act, and the Reservation of Separate Amenities Act), were clear indications that South Africa had begun an irreversible process toward a multiracial democracy.

3Clough, Free At Last?, 105.  
4Ottaway, “Apartheid Opponents.”  
7Minter, 312.  
8 Ibid.  
10Ibid., 81.  
11Minter, 313.  
12 Ibid.  
13Ibid. The resolution passed by a 13-to-0 vote with only two abstentions, the United States and Britain.  
15 House Committee on Foreign Affairs, The Current Crisis in South Africa: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 98th Cong., 2nd sess., December 4, 1984, 5.  
16Ibid., 8.  
17 Ibid.  
18Ibid., 6-14.  
20 Ibid., 285.  
24 Ibid., 9-10.  
30 Ibid., 27.  
31Ibid., 4.  
32Ibid., 133; The Anti-Apartheid Act of 1985, 1.  
33 Ibid.  
36 Ibid.
38 Clough, Free At Last?, 105.
39“U.S. Policy toward South Africa, Report of Secretary of State’s Advisory Committee.”
41“U.S. Reaction to Declaration of a State of Emergency,” Statement Read by the President’s Principal Deputy Press Secretary, June 12, 1986, in WCPD, June 16, 1986, 787-788.
44 George Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1993), 118.
46 Ibid.
47 Schraeder, 230.
48 Clough and Jordan, A 255.
49 Ibid., A 256.
51 Clough, Free At Last?, 105.
52 Nanda, “Multilateral Sanctions against Apartheid,” 11-12.
53 Ibid., 12.
55 Clough and Jordan, A 255.
57 Ibid., 14.
60 Ibid., 24.
61 Nanda, “Multilateral Sanctions against Apartheid,” 12. Violation of any of the provisions of the CAAA could lead to individual fines of up to $50,000 and ten years’ imprisonment along with corporate penalties of up to $1,000,000.
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid.
65 Minter, 315.
66 Ignoring Both Carrot and Stick.”
67 Schraeder, 232.
69 Michael Clough, “Southern Africa: Challenges and Choices,” Foreign Affairs 66 (1988): 1070. Even though Clough wrote this essay while the Reagan Administration was still in office, his prediction that the sanctions debate between the administration and Congress was unlikely to be solved during President Reagan’s tenure did, indeed, come true.
70 Schraeder, 233.
71 Ignoring Both Carrot And Stick.”
73 Clough, Free At Last?, 106.
74 McKeen, 32.
76 Shultz, *Turmoil And Triumph*, 122.
77 Crocker, Chester A. Interview by Author. September 19, 2011.
78 Ibid.
79 Ibid.
80 Ibid.
82 Shultz, *Turmoil And Triumph*, 1123.
84 Shultz, *Turmoil And Triumph*, 1123. In his memoirs, Shultz states his intended message more succinctly; “I urged him to cut loose from Soviet influence, ‘It’s a loser,’ I told him.”
85 Clough and Jordan, A 254.
88 Ibid.
89 Mandela, 454.
90 Ibid., 453. It was obvious that anything short of full political rights could not have satisfied black South Africans. Nelson Mandela made this very clear to every international diplomat who paid a visit to him in prison. For example, asked by Samuel Dash, a former counsel to the U.S. Senate Watergate Committee and Professor of Law at Georgetown University, whether he was encouraged by the government’s announcement that it would repeal mixed-marriage laws and other segregation laws in early 1985, Mandela spoke for all when he replied saying, “This is a pinprick. . . . It is not my ambition to marry a white woman or swim in a white pool. It is political equality that we want.”
92 Papenfus, Pik Botha and His Times, 557.
93 Unger and Vale, 234.
94 “U.S. Policy toward South Africa,” Report of the Secretary of State’s Advisory Committee on South Africa.
96 Mandela, 453.
98 As has been noted in Chapter 4, officials in the Reagan Administration saw the Nkomati Accord as an exoneration of the policy of Constructive Engagement. However, notwithstanding the mild significance of the accord (even though it had a devastating impact on the ANC), at no point did opponents of Washington’s southern African policy acknowledge the U.S. mediated nonaggression pact between South Africa and Mozambique as evidence that American efforts to achieve peace in southern Africa were paying off. Most noticeably, the FRELIMO government itself refused to treat the accord as a gain for American regional diplomacy. Addressing the African-American Conference in Libreville, Gabon, in early 1985, a Mozambican delegate emphasized his government’s position by stating that, “We would like to make it clear that the signing of the [Nkomati] Accord was not part of Constructive Engagement. It was rather a sovereign decision which responded to the needs of the Mozambican people.” (See Novicki, 24.)
101 Senate Committee, *U.S. Policy toward Mozambique*.
102 President Samora Machel died in a plane crash in October 1986. He was succeeded by the then Minister for Foreign Affairs, Joaquim Chissano.
103 William J. Pomeroy, 82.
104Senate Committee, U.S. Policy toward Mozambique.
107Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, 1116. According to Shultz, the President seemed reluctant to meet with Samora Machel, even to the point of asking Shultz, “When did I agree to meet this guy?” After the meeting, however, Reagan seemingly could not conceal his favourable impression of the Mozambican leader after Machel had regaled him “with anti-Soviet jokes and derogatory anecdotes about communism gleaned from his trips to Moscow.” Reagan told his Secretary of State, “I don’t want to sound naive, but I think that guy [Machel] is sincere,” to which Shultz responded by saying “If we can take him away from the Soviets, that would be a ten-strike” (Shultz, 1117).
108 It is not known whether the administration feared that Machel’s death could jeopardize its strategy of extracting Mozambique from the Soviet bloc. However, one can speculate from the statements of certain officials, particularly Secretary of State Shultz, that in their view, Machel as an individual was crucial to the success of their approach toward Mozambique. In Turmoil And Triumph (1117), Shultz states in a footnote that following Machel’s death, he (Shultz) regretted that Machel did not live long to lead his country further along.
109Senate Committee, U.S. Policy Toward Mozambique.
113 Chester A. Crocker, Briefing memorandum to Secretary George Shultz, “Your Meeting with UNITA Leader, Jonas Savimbi, February 6, 1986, 6:30 m-7:00 m,” 5 February 1986, South Africa and the United States, National Security Archive, doc.52, 2.
114Clough and Jordan, A 257.
115Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, 1124.
116 Ibid.
117Clough, “The Superpowers in Southern Africa,” 126. Why South Africa decided to move away from a strongly held position in relation to southern Africa will be discussed in detail in the proceeding section of this chapter.
120Ibid., 11.
121Ibid., 13.
122 Ibid.
123 Ibid.
125Hampson, 136.
128Hampson, 137.

133 Ibid.


137 For such statements, see the 1982 *White Paper* and *FBIS*, November 15, 1988, 11.

138 Reported in *FBIS*, August 4, 1988, 12.

139 Coker, *South Africa’s Security Dilemmas*, 45. Of the 577 men held in military detention centers in 1981, 519 were serving because they refused field-duty or went absent without leave.


141 Frankel, *Pretoria’s Praetorians*, 135.

142 Jaster, *Defence*, 102-103.


144 The neighbouring countries increased their number of tanks, fighter aircraft, and helicopters by 343%, 274%, and 398% respectively since 1977. See 1986 *White Paper*.

145 Specifically, Angola received 23 Mi G-23s, 17 Mi G-21s, and 10 SU-22s. Coker, *South Africa’s Security Dilemmas*, 74.


148 One-half of South Africa’s Mirage fighter planes were grounded because of a shortage of equipment and spare parts; most Buccaneer bombers had either crashed or were out of service. See Jaster, *Defence*, 101.

149 “The Citizen” as cited in Holness, 149-150.


154 Reported in *FBIS*, July 1, 1988, 3.


156 Papenfus, *Pik Botha and His Times*, 569.

157 Ibid, 568-569.

158 Campbell, 13.

159 C. Clough and Herbst, 22.

160 The Pretoria Declaration called for the cessation of armed activity, MNR recognition of FRELIMO, and future South African mediation.


162 Although Pik Botha admitted to violations of the Nkomati Accord in 1985, the aid that the MNR received from South Africa also came from private, unofficial sources in the military or in South Africa’s Portuguese community.


164 Reported in *FBIS*, February 16, 1989, 14.

165 Pretoria’s reformist domestic policy was probably crafted to encourage the West to relax sanctions as Britain did after Mandela’s release.


171Pillay, 315.
173 Ibid.
174 Ibid.
176Reported in *FBIS*, May 1, 1989, 13.
177 Information in this paragraph relies on Jaster, *Defence*, and Johnson and Martin, “Mozambique.”
178Wolpe, 63.
180Reported in *FBIS*, November 18, 1988, 23.
181 See *FBIS*, December 19, 1989, for a description of the de Klerk-Chissano summit.
182Reported in *FBIS*, September 8, 1989, 45.
183Reported in *FBIS*, December 30, 1988, 18.
184Jaster, *Defence*, 153.
186Reported in *FBIS*, December 4, 1989.
189 President F.W. de Klerk, reported in *FBIS*, November 15, 1989, 18.
194Dubow, 95-96.
195Seekings, 286.
197Dubow, 98.
201 Ibid.
203 Ibid., 35.
205Scholtz, *Fighter and Reformer: Extracts from the Speeches of W. Botha*, 35.
207Scholtz, *Fighter and Reformer: Extracts from the Speeches of W. Botha*, 35.
208 Ibid., 93.
209 Ibid.
212Ibid, 184-185.
213 Ibid, 186.
Chapter VII

It is an undeniable privilege of every man to prove himself right in the thesis that the world is his enemy; for if he reiterates it frequently enough and makes it the background of his conduct he is bound eventually to be right.

George F. Kennan, American Diplomacy

1.1 Conclusion

As articulated by Chester Crocker, Constructive Engagement was a “centrist and idealistic conception” crafted to lend American support to P.W. Botha’s “evolutionary” process of change within the Republic of South Africa. As part of this goal, the most important American aim was to minimize Soviet influence within the Frontline states of southern Africa and the removal of the Cuban troops from Angola. Other aims included effecting normalized relations between the Republic and black ruled states in the region—particularly Mozambique—and enabling “South Africa’s regional dominance to acquire a legitimate form.” According to Crocker, once the region had attained a sufficient level of stabilization, the Reagan Administration felt South Africa would proceed more rapidly with internal change, the details and timing of which would be left to the Botha Administration.

According to Chester Crocker, one of the most important steps to resolving regional instability was the removal of Cuban forces from Angola. The Reagan Administration said it introduced the Cuban issue for two reasons. First, the administration believed the Cuban withdrawal from Angola would provide Pretoria with adequate incentive to effect its own withdrawal from Namibia and do so on terms favourable to the Republic. Without such a presence, the South Africans would not be faced with the incessant threat of future Soviet and Cuban intervention in or subsequent radicalization of an independent Namibia. Without a communist “balance of forces” in Angola, South Africa could ensure Namibia’s dependence and pliability, even under a SWAPO government, by its overwhelming military, political, and economic presence across the border.

The second and primary reason that the Reagan Administration introduced its plan to link Namibian independence with a Cuban withdrawal from Angola concerned Crocker’s and the Administration’s hopes regarding a desired “rollback” of Soviet
influence in southern Africa and throughout the developing world. By achieving a Cuban withdrawal, the administration believed it would finally be redressing the festering wound of unilateral Soviet geopolitical gain in the wake of Congressional indecision following the Vietnam War. As Reagan official Richard Perle would explain in an interview: “we considered that the United States . . . was threatened any time the Soviet Union enlarged its influence, its control over resources, and there were important resources in Angola and to a lesser degree in Mozambique . . . when the other side made gains, we sustained a loss.”

Driven by the zero sum calculations of the Cold War, the Reagan Administration was determined to see the Cubans out of Angola. Once this objective was achieved and the region achieved stabilization with the economic and military power of South Africa serving as the hegemon of the region, southern Africa could become a vital part of the West and an integral example of the method in which the Reagan Doctrine could aid the developing world in shedding their oppressive, anti-capitalist ideologies and allies. This break would be of enormous benefit to a newly invigorated United States that was ready to vigorously defend its interests and allies throughout the world.

According to Crocker, Constructive Engagement’s second stated goal was to encourage and support an ongoing process of evolutionary reform within the Republic. Within this goal, the most essential aim of the Reagan Administration was to instil a sense of South African confidence in the United States in affairs regarding the Republic. Administration policy, therefore, concerned itself with “normalizing” its relationship with South Africa to the fullest extent possible given the existing circumstances.

Since the United States had only limited influence to affect South African behaviour, the administration said it was critical to support P.W. Botha’s “evolutionary” reform process and to shield that course from its detractors, both within the United States and internationally. Within this goal, the most essential goal was to forestall economic sanctions directed at the South African state. On the future disposition of the apartheid state, Chester Crocker would ask that critics concentrate on the “process of reform” rather than “distant objectives.”

Judged by its own stated goals in southern and South Africa, the verdict on the Constructive Engagement must necessarily be that it failed. The policy was ultimately unsuccessful because of a number of misperceptions, misjudgements and incorrect assumptions concerning southern Africa, the domestic environment within South Africa, the nature of evolutionary change and its relationship to political violence, and
ultimately, because the policy was too closely linked to the fortunes of P.W. Botha’s Total National Strategy.

The first and necessary goal of Constructive Engagement, the stabilization of southern Africa, was most dependent on achieving Namibia independence from South Africa. The American “linkage” of the Cuban presence in Angola with the continuing South African occupation of Namibia, however, introduced a number of problems which did little to increase the probability of the plan’s success. Although the administration’s coupling of Namibia and Angola was understandable given President Reagan’s desire to rollback communist influence in the region, its introduction complicated an already difficult negotiation process and made certain assumptions about southern Africa that had no basis in reality.

As Secretary Crocker was no doubt aware, the Cuban presence in Angola was not so much to defend Angola from South Africa as it was to protect the Marxist MPLA regime from the UNITA insurgency. By advocating a Cuban withdrawal the United States was asking the MPLA government to weaken its own position in the Angolan civil war. This was unrealistic. Although the Reagan Administration promised American recognition and economic aid to Angola if it sent the Cubans home, the American demands regarding UNITA and power sharing in Angola were, from the MPLA perspective, too high. While the MPLA was exhausted by the civil war with UNITA, and while it may have entertained doubts about the high cost of maintaining the Cuban military presence, it was determined to not form a transitional government with Jonas Savimbi. This inevitably led to a situation where American demands were rebuffed by Angola. When this happened, as Crocker anticipated, Constructive Engagement would rely on Botha’s Total National Strategy to make the “price and pain grow.” However, the fact that Cuban troop levels in Angola increased from 15,000 to 50,000 over the course of the Reagan Administration should have suggested to Crocker that the American strategy was flawed.

Though Namibia would finally achieve independence, it could hardly be suggested that another eight years of tortured negotiation and conflict to see SWAPO take power represented a victory for Constructive Engagement. Putting aside the moral implications of linking the democratic aspirations of the Namibian people to American geopolitical ambitions, it was the SADF’s pyrrhic victory at Cuito Caanavale and the high cost of war with Angola, not Chester Crocker’s diplomatic tract, that forced the South Africans to reconsider the terms of a negotiated settlement.
After Namibian independence was successfully negotiated, the Reagan Administration expected the Angolan government to negotiate and to form a transitional government with the UNITA opposition. Although UNITA and the MPLA were in negotiations in the late-1980s, the CIA increased its aid to UNITA from $30-$45 million in 1988 to $50-$60 million in 1989. Despite ongoing efforts to reach a negotiated settlement, U.S. covert aid to UNITA came to an estimated $220 million between 1988 and the end of aid in 1994. Taken with the amount of aid sent to Savimbi in the last year of the Reagan Administration, UNITA was well positioned to begin the civil war with Angola again in 1992 when the rebel movement lost the elections that followed the Bicesse Peace Accord. Though the death of Jonas Savimbi would come four years after the Reagan Administration had exited the scene, the final chapter for UNITA and the descent of Angola into a ruinous conflagration could hardly be considered a victory for Constructive Engagement.

Turning to the region as a whole, Constructive Engagement had the stated goals to foster a regional environment that removed the prospect of “revolutionary violence” aimed at the republic through the ANC and to enable “South Africa’s regional dominance to acquire a legitimate form.” As such, the United States' biggest stated priority in southern Africa was achieving a stable regional order with South Africa as the “regional superpower.” For the Reagan Administration, regional destabilization was inimical not only to the investment climate of South and southern Africa but also to the development of the region's infrastructure in which the United States and its allies had much at stake. According to Chester Crocker, with neither the Soviet “proxy” ANC nor the communists destabilizing the region, South African policy could focus on those links shared between South and southern Africa in an effort to develop fully the potential of the region and live at peace with its neighbours. This goal would be achieved through P.W. Botha’s Total National Strategy, which would receive support from the Reagan Administration at every turn.

Constructive Engagement had hoped that through American economic investment and diplomatic support, South Africa could achieve its goal of being the economic leader and guarantor of stability in southern Africa. Instead, by the second term of the Reagan Administration, South Africa found itself isolated from both the region and the world community. Despite removal of the liberation movements from neighbouring countries, the ANC threatened to foment disorder within the Republic and render the country ungovernable. Though the Total National Strategy’s destabilization
campaign forced the Republic’s neighbours that harboured the ANC to “opt differently after carefully calculating the odds and assessing national interests,” Pretoria’s quest to achieve cooperation and economic integration with its neighbours as the best way to preserve the power and privilege of white South Africa was rejected by the FLS. As such, the southern African nations committed themselves firmly to the dismantling of apartheid and took a leading role in advocating for sanctions against Pretoria. By 1988, with the South African economy crippled by divestment and sanctions, and the FLS unwilling to acquiesce to South African dominance, the United States had no choice but to accept the obvious. The days of Constructive Engagement relying on the Total National Strategy to achieve an acceptable regional order were gone for good.

Constructive Engagement had also attempted to shield Pretoria from sanctions on the grounds that it would primarily harm black South Africans and forestall P.W. Botha’s “evolutionary” reform process. Here again Constructive Engagement fell short. The combination of domestic unrest and destabilization produced an insurmountable cry for sanctions in the West. Despite the Reagan Administration’s best efforts, including a veto, the U.S. Congress passed into law in October, 1986 the Anti-Apartheid Act banning new investments and loans, landing rights for South African Airways, and imports of coal, steel, iron, uranium, agricultural products, and textiles.

Internationally, the administration used its place on the Security Council to repeatedly veto sanctions levelled against Pretoria, forcing the sanctions debate outside the United Nations. In 1985, the Commonwealth agreed to ban Krugerrand imports and end government loans to South Africa. Similarly, the EC imposed modest sanctions upholding the oil and arms ban and withdrawing military attaches from South Africa. Sweden and Norway adopted a total trade ban in 1987. Even Japan imposed modest sanctions. And at its October 1989 summit in Kuala Lumpur, the Commonwealth voted for sanctions, despite objections from Margaret Thatcher.

Constructive Engagement also failed to understand the internal dynamics of the Republic. The South African attempt to initiate domestic reform acceptable to all South Africans and an American policy to support such an initiative, in Crocker’s view, had a fair chance of success because of the nature of both Afrikaner and black politics within the Republic. While Crocker viewed the Afrikaner community as a unified political and social force, the Secretary saw the various black constituencies as hopelessly divided. Because the black majority was split along tribal, economic and regional lines, Crocker assumed they could not form a united front against the apartheid government. This
division would provide the apartheid regime a decisive advantage in determining the final disposition of the Republic. While Crocker was aware that the Botha Administration would never accept full political enfranchisement for the black majority, he believed that the evolutionary process would create a more democratic society acceptable to all South Africans, though perhaps grudgingly, while not threatening American geopolitical objectives in the region by turning the reins of government over to the ANC.

As events in the Republic began to unfold in the mid-1980s, Crocker’s assumptions regarding the internal dynamics of South Africa proved false. As the Botha Administration proceeded with reform, it was the Afrikaner community, not the black polity, which became divided by the reform process. Previously reliable supporters of the Botha Administration looked to the Conservative Party as the reform process proved incapable of providing the safety and certainty that the many South Africans desired. And though the National Party’s electoral loses were insignificant, they were enough to force P.W. Botha to worry about his right flank and move even more cautiously on reform than he might have otherwise. A far more important development occurred in 1985 when the Botha Administration faced a challenge from elements in the Afrikaner community that wanted to break the political impasse by opening negotiations with the ANC. This included elements in the administration that were quietly pushing the Prime Minister to consider releasing Nelson Mandela, unbanning the ANC and the initiation of serious negotiations with the organization.

By contrast, as the government proceeded with its reform plan, black South Africans became more rather than less unified and turned increasingly to the ANC as the vanguard of the liberation movement. Although other black groups and organizations continued to exist in tandem with and in opposition to the ANC, the organization was able, to a remarkable degree, to mobilize blacks against the Botha Administration and marginalize or coerce elements of the black community that opposed its revolutionary strategy. The presence of the ANC, its opposition to the government’s new constitutional scheme, and the outbreak of violence in the townships in 1984 exposed Crocker’s assumptions regarding the eternal dynamics of the Republic as erroneous.

A third crucial Crocker mistake was his implicit assumption that evolutionary change that did not take into account the opinions of the majority of South Africans could progress without instigating revolutionary violence. While Crocker did anticipate that violence would play an important role during the process of evolutionary change—
in fact he said the best time for bargaining was after the Total National Strategy had “broken the back” of the liberation movement—he did not expect it to reach the level or the intensity which it eventually attained during the township uprisings. This was a fatal mistake.

Despite the fact that the reforms that Botha offered were a break from the previous thirty years of apartheid policy the fundamental pillars of apartheid remained and social segregation remained heavily slanted to the sensibilities of the white minority. Ironically, Botha’s evolutionary reform process caused both rising expectations and corresponding frustration among the black population when such changes were perceived as inadequate and deliberately slow in their implementation. The introduction of Botha’s byzantine parliamentary arrangement, which included Asians and coloureds but which excluded black South Africans, led directly to the ANC as the most vocal and best organized anti-apartheid organization within the Republic. The commencement of two years of protest and associated violence, moreover, began on the day that the Tricameral parliament was established. The ANC’s opposition role in mobilizing this political discontent—initially as a protest against the new constitutional scheme—and its ascendancy to the clear leader of the liberation movement during the township uprisings swept aside the Total National Strategy and Constructive Engagement’s “evolutionary versus revolutionary” reform strategy that excluded “terrorist, pro-Soviet groups” like the ANC.

Faced with such rising and potentially destabilizing discontent, the South African regime responded brutally to the township unrest. Violence erupted, caused both by the regime’s attempt to reestablish control over the black majority and by the ANC’s attempt to encourage and exploit the chaos in the townships to their advantage. Given its history of suppression, the regime’s brutal counter-revolutionary strategy was entirely predictable. Once the Botha Administration declared a state of emergency, the Total National Strategy/Constructive Engagement goal to avoid and prevent “a scenario in South Africa of revolutionary violence” became increasingly untenable.4

Even if Crocker had abandoned the moralistic and legalistic rhetoric of Constructive Engagement and emphasized U.S. strategic interests as the primary driver of Constructive Engagement, as conservative elements in the Reagan Administration had advocated, it seems inconceivable that the United States could have followed through on such a policy for more than a few years, even in favourable circumstances. Once violence overwhelmed the townships and the United States media began its daily
reporting on the crisis any chance that Constructive Engagement could have staved off the sanctions campaign was gone. The chaos of the South African domestic scene became irresistible fare for the American and international press, a media that seemed especially eager to report on Pretoria’s violent actions against the protestors. Worse still, the situation in the Republic was accurately reported as a revolution in progress, effectively undermining the Total National Strategy’s promise to bring stability and peaceful change. Given the violence in the streets, Chester Crocker could no longer count on the Botha Administration to provide a process of change that was acceptable to all South Africans. All that was left for the Botha Administration was naked force. It was this violence which, in the final analysis, revealed P.W. Botha’s Total National Strategy as a failure and destroyed the American policy of Constructive Engagement.

1 Crocker, High Noon in Southern Africa, 93.
3 Crocker, High Noon in Southern Africa, 112.
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