THE LINK BETWEEN POOR PUBLIC PARTICIPATION AND PROTEST: THE CASE OF KHAYELITSHA

by
Ntuthuko Albert Mchunu

Thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree Master Public Administration in the Faculty of Economic and Management Sciences (School of Public Leadership) at Stellenbosch University

Supervisor: Francois Theron

December 2012

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

DECLARATION

By submitting this thesis electronically, I declare that the entirety of the work contained therein is my own original work, that I am the sole author thereof (save to the extent explicitly otherwise stated), that reproduction and publication thereof by Stellenbosch University will not infringe any third party rights and that I have not previously in its entirety or in part submitted it for obtaining any qualification.

Date……..

Copyright © 2012 Stellenbosch University

All rights reserved

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

ABSTRACT

The upsurge in the number of public protests in most South African municipalities, including the City of Cape Town, continues unabated. While public protest is a democratic right, provided for in the Constitution (RSA 1996), the violent nature and persistence of protests at municipal level are a cause for concern. The associated violence often leads to the destruction of both public and private property, disruptions in economic activities, loss of lives and severe injuries to innocent victims.

The prevalence of public protests continues despite the fact that the new democratic dispensation ushered in a paradigm geared for transforming local government from a racially-segregated institution into a democratic and autonomous sphere of government, with a broad developmental mandate. This new dispensation gave birth to the "invited spaces" of participation, which are aimed at providing scope for the public to influence, direct, control and own the development and decision-making processes.

In order to determine factors that contribute to public protests in Khayelitsha the study adopted a qualitative research paradigm. Personal interviews, focus group discussion and participatory observation were some of the research methods used to collect primary data.

The study indicates that lack of authentic and empowering public participation opportunities in the decision-making processes of the City of Cape Town alienates the public and leads to public disengagement from available municipal processes.

It has been during this period of alienation that the public have been "inventing own spaces" of participation, in the form of public protests demanding that public voices be heard. The study also indicates that poverty, unemployment and glaring gaps of social inequality, reinforced by comparison to available examples in the neighbourhood, are root causes of public protests.

The new public participation model that has been developed from this research should be adopted by South African municipalities as an essential public participation strategy. It empowers the public to negotiate a new "social contract" with the authorities primarily based on the public's terms. It is only when authentic and empowering public participation is practised by municipalities that violent public protests can be minimised. Such authentic and empowering public participation provides latitude for the public to influence, direct, control

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

and even own their “own” development and decision-making processes.

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

OPSOMMING

Die toename in voorvalle van openbare protes in byna alle Suid-Afrikaanse munisipale gebiede, insluitend die van die Stad Kaapstad, duur onverpoosd voort. Terwyl openbare protes weliswaar ’n demokratiese reg is wat in die Grondwet (RSA 1996) verskans word, is die huidige ingeburgerde en gewelddadige aard daarvan rede tot ernstige kommer. Hierdie gewelddadigheid lei dikwels tot vernietiging van sowel openbare as private eiendom. Ook ekonomiese aktiwiteite word ontwrig; daar is lewensverlies en ernstige beserings aan onskuldige slagoffers .

Die hoë voorkoms van openbare protes duur voort, ondanks die feit dat die nuwe demokratiese bestel ’n paradigmaskuif ten gunste van transformasie in die plaaslike regeringstelsel beteken het. Alles was in plek om weg te beweeg van rasgesegregeerde instellings na ’n demokratiese, outonome regeringsfeer met ’n breë, ontwikkelingsgedrewe mandaat. Hierdie nuwe bedeling het “genooide ruimtes” vir deelname geskep, wat geleentheid sou skep om invloed en rigtinggewende beheer te verkry oor daardie prosesse van besluitneming wat deelnemers se eie lewens raak.

Om die faktore te bepaal wat tot openbare protes in Khayelitsha bydra, is ’n kwalitatiewe navorsingsparadigma gekies. Persoonlike onderhoud, fokusgroepbespreking en deelnemende waarneming is van die navorsingsmetodes wat ingespan is om primêre data te versamel. Hierdie navorsingstudie het bevind dat, ondanks die “genooide ruimtes”, daar steeds ’n gebrek aan egte en bemagtigende openbare deelnemingsgeleenthede in die besluitnemingsproses van die Stad Kaapstad bestaan, en dat dit die publiek vervreem en daartoe lei dat burgers hul aan die beskikbare deelnemingsgeleenthede onttrek.

Gedurende hierdie periode van vervreemding het die publiek van Khayelitsha hulle eie “geskepde ruimtes” ontwikkel. Dit was gegiet in die vorm van openbare protes, waar die stemme van die algemene publiek gehoor kon word. Die studie het ook aangedui dat armoede, werkloosheid en opvallende voorbeelde van sosiale ongelykheid (te vinde in die onmiddellike omgewing) aanleidende faktore vir protesaksie was.

Die nuwe openbare deelnemingsmodel wat uit die navorsing ontwikkel is, kan aan alle Suid-Afrikaanse munisipaliteite ’n onontbeerlike geleentheid bied om ’n doeltreffende openbare deelnemingstrategie te ontwikkel. Dit bemagtig die publiek om ’n nuwe onderhandelde “maatskaplike kontrak” met die owerhede, hoofsaaklik op die publiek se terme, te sluit.

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

Slegs wanneer die publiek aan egte, bemagtigende openbare deelname blootgestel word, sal daar sprake van ’n vertrouensverhouding met die owerhede wees en sal gewelddadige protesaksie tot die minimum beperk kan word. Sodanige egte en bemagtigende openbare deelname skep ruimte vir die publiek om hulle “eie” ontwikkeling te beïnvloed en mede-beheer te bekom oor die besluitnemingsprosesse wat daarmee gemoeid is.

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Firstly, I would like to express my sincere appreciation and gratitude to my thesis supervisor, Mr Francois Theron for his astute guidance, input and motivation.

Thank you to Ms Jennifer Saunders for assistance with technical editing and Mr Pierre Du Preez for language editing.

I am indebted to the research participants i.e. the public in Khayelitsha, City of Cape Town Councillors and officials for their zeal to participate in the study.

I would like to thank the library staff at Stellenbosch University Bellville campus for their kind assistance with the relevant study material.

Lastly, thank you to my friends and relatives for your encouragement and support.

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

CHAPTER THREE: THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONTEXT OF PUBLIC PARTICIPATION

CHAPTER FOUR: POLICY CONTEXT, REGULATORY FRAMEWORK OF PUBLIC PARTICIPATION AND PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS REGARDING LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

CHAPTER FIVE: PUBLIC PROTESTS IN CONTEXT

CHAPTER SIX: RESULTS PRESENTATION, INTERPRETATION AND FINDINGS

CHAPTER SEVEN: RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

LIST OF FIGURES

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

LIST OF TABLES

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

LIST OF ACRONYMS

ANC	:	African National Congress
CBO	:	Community Based Organisation
COCT	:	City of Cape Town
COJ	:	City of Johannesburg
COGTA	:	Co-operative Governance and Traditional Affairs
COSATU	:	Congress of South African Trade Unions
DA	:	Democratic Alliance
DEAT	:	Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism
DLG	:	Developmental Local Government
DPLG	:	Department of Provincial and Local Government
DWAF	:	Department of Water Affairs and Forestry
FOCOS	:	Forum of Chairpersons of Sub-Councils
GGLN	:	Good Governance Learning Network
HSRC	:	Human Sciences Research Council
IAP2	:	Internal Association of Public Participation
IDASA	:	Institute for Democracy in South Africa
IDP	:	Integrated Development Plan
IEC	:	Independent Electoral Commission
IJR	:	Institute for Justice and Reconciliation
IKS	:	Indigenous Knowledge System
KDF	:	Khayelitsha Development Forum
LGTS	:	Local Government Turnaround Strategy
MOU	:	Memorandum of Understanding
NEDLAC	:	National Economic Development and Labour Council
NGO	:	Non-Governmental Organisation

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

NPC	:	National Planning Commission
NT	:	National Treasury
OWS	:	Occupy Wall Street
PAGAD	:	People Against Gangsterism and Drugs
PAR	:	Participatory Action Research
POS	:	Political Opportunity Structure
PR	:	Proportional Representative
RD	:	Relative Deprivation
RDP	:	Reconstruction and Development Programme
RM	:	Resource Mobilisation
SANCO	:	South African National Civic Organisation
SARBS	:	South African Reconciliation Barometer Surveys
SASAS	:	South African Social Attitudes Surveys
TAC	:	Treatment Action Campaign
UN	:	United Nations
WC	:	Ward Committee

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

SCHEMATIC PLAN OF RESEARCH

(See section 1.7: outline of chapters)



Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION AND STATEMENT OF THE RESEARCH PROBLEM

1.1 Introduction

From the 1980's, the South African apartheid government was faced by a number of protests aimed at bringing about change in the political administration. The objective was to install a democratic dispensation. During the apartheid era, participation of blacks in policy decision-making processes was severely lacking and was mainly limited to compliance (Masango 2002:54). In other words, the public, particularly blacks were subjected to "participation in the form of a tyranny" (Cooke & Kothari 2001:1).

The marginalisation of blacks led to perceptions that government was undemocratic, and as a result, government was viewed as illegitimate. This brought about frustration which was often manifested through public protests (Masango 2002:54). Phago (2008:239) points out that public participation from the previously disadvantaged backgrounds was achieved through mass movements. Heller (2009:18) concurs and contends that besides the critical role the social movements played, "they entered democratic era with significant organisational capacity, enormous popular support and a lot of momentum".

The enactment of the Local Government Transitional Act (209 of 1993) (RSA 1993b) marked the beginning of the new local government dispensation. This legislation ushered a new paradigm geared at transforming local government from a racially segregated institution into a democratic and autonomous sphere of government with a broad developmental mandate. The new dispensation sought to radically create new democratic arenas (Cornwall & Coelho 2007:9) that would include the grass-roots in decision-making processes.

The White Paper on Local Government (Notice 423 of 1998) (RSA 1998a) put the Constitution's (RSA 1996) developmental agenda into practice as it crystallised "the vision of a developmental role for local government centred on working with the public[1] to find sustainable ways to meet their needs and to improve the quality of their lives" (Davids & Maphunye 2009:60).

[1] The terms public, community, citizens and people will be used interchangeably in the text, although attempts will be made to use "public" throughout the text

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

Democratic transition was further galvanised in 1996 by the local government elections in seven of the nine Provinces (Harrison 2008:323). The democratically elected representatives faced a mammoth task of building democracy and ensuring the equitable distribution of resources to all of the City of Cape Town (COCT) public, including ensuring their meaningful participation in the decisions affecting their lives. This necessitated the creation of democratic participatory strategies and capacitating the public to ensure their ability to influence, direct, control and even own development and decision-making processes (Hickey & Mohan 2004:3).

To give effect to the above and to pave the way for authentic and empowering public participation (the latter seemed to be lacking at local government level), legislation was enacted to create instruments suitable for public participation. At a national level of government, the National Economic Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC), the five Presidential Working Groups and sectoral bargaining councils were established (Edigheji 2006b:8).

At local government level, the Municipal Structures Act (117 of 1998) (RSA 1998b) provided for the establishment of Ward Committees (WCs) to create a bridge between the public and municipal councils and to bring government closer to the public. Further legislation was the Municipal Systems Act (32 of 2000) (RSA 2000) which introduced the principle of Integrated Development Planning (IDP). This measure would allow the public's views and aspirations to be integrated into municipal development plans.

To further enhance public participation at a municipal level, the International Association of Public Participation[2] (IAP2) (2002) formulated public participation principles that development change agents should observe and integrate into municipal public participation strategies. This would ensure that the beneficiaries of development were at the centre of development affecting their lives. This approach was in line with The Manila Declaration (1989)[3], which called for the adoption of a people-centred developmental approach, so that the beneficiaries of development would influence, direct, control and own those developmental interventions.

The measures above were meant to guarantee authentic participation of the previously

[2] Website: www.iap2.org.
[3] The Manila Declaration on People's Participation and Sustainable Development (1989), Phillippines, ANGOC.

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

disenfranchised in the decisions that were intended to shape citizens' future and ensure they benefit economically. The success of public participation would have been attributed to the change agent's understanding and effective implementation of the Manila Declaration principles (Theron 2009b:117). However reality at grass-roots level indicates low levels of public participation and measures intended to enhance the participatory process are seemingly ineffective.

Despite the above mentioned legislative and international strategic interventions to ensure authentic public participation at a municipal level, Khayelitsha, like townships in most municipalities in South Africa, is still plagued by public protests. These protests could be caused by lack of authentic and empowering public participation, which could be attributed to the authority's complete disregard of public participation legislation and principles as espoused by IAP2 and the Manila Declaration (1989). To this end, Oldfield (2008:493) argues that people's "patience to work within state driven and controlled processes has withered and oppositional protests tactics have become routine".

Based on the researcher's observation, Khayelitsha's vulnerability to public protests could also be explained in terms of the worst possible socio-economic conditions under which people are living there. Khayelitsha Township was established in 1983 as a result of a plethora of apartheid legislation aimed at restricting the number of blacks in urban areas (Thompson & Nleya 2010:228). The intention was to forcefully remove black people from urban centres and exclude them from participating in decision-making processes. The forced relocation of people was met with resistance in the form of mass mobilisation. According to Thompson and Nleya (2010:228), the remnants of these past struggles of black people are still evident today. The current public protests in Khayelitsha should therefore be interpreted as the culmination of a series of historical continuities that embedded poverty along racial lines in distinct geographical areas (Thompson & Nleya 2010:228).

A myriad of studies have been conducted in an attempt to explain the problem of persistent protests. Commentators point out that reasons for protests vary. On the one hand, Ramjee and Van Donk (2011:11), Van Donk (2012) and Nleya (2011) argue that perpetual protests in Khayelitsha are exacerbated by COCT's failure to respond effectively to repeated community grievances and their ineffective utilisation of mandatory participation channels i.e. IDPs and WCs.

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

On the other hand, Allan and Heese (2008) and Mathekga and Buccus (2006:4) assert that communities are venting their anger in protest over unsatisfactory delivery of basic services. In response to this protest stalemate, authorities have emerged with different interventions i.e. declaring Khayelitsha a Presidential Urban Renewal Node, Project Consolidate, the Planning, Implementation and Management Support Programme, Project Viability and most recently, the Local Government Turnaround Strategy (LGTS) and Business-adopt-a-Municipality campaign (De Visser 2009:18; Ramjee & Van Donk 2011:11). All the above mentioned interventions are meant to reverse past imbalances, build municipal capacities and contain escalating public protests. But do they allow authentic and empowering public participation?

The origins and reasons for the violent nature of the protests need to be carefully studied. In order to manage these protests properly, thorough understanding is a necessity. It is clear that the public in Khayelitsha is perturbed, as Theron (2009b:113) remarks, "we see frustrated and disillusioned beneficiaries going to the streets to protest, and resolution after the other new resolution to get the people to participate, but how this challenge will be met in South Africa"?

The violent nature of the protests could be explained by means of psychological and sociological analysis. On the one hand, Gurr (1968:250) asserts that violence associated with protests is caused by "relative deprivation", i.e. exclusion from the polity, unemployment, poverty and other related factors. According to Gurr (1968:250) and Hough (2008:1), relative deprivation functions as a precondition for violence and, if it is severe, the greater the probability and intensity of violence.

Burger (2009:2) utilises the theory popularly known as the "Davies J curve" to explain the incongruity between reality and expectations of humans about levels of progress. He argues that, under normal circumstances, the situation the individual finds himself or herself in does not result in "conflict" or "frustration", but it is only when there is a sudden change that a huge gap is created between expectations and reality. This gap leads to "frustration" and "discontent" and, ultimately, to protests. The situation regarding public protests in Khayelitsha could therefore be explained as a sudden change which has not been addressed by the COCT or properly explained to the public. Prolonged frustration as part of apartheid legacy, on the part of the public has now boiled over into violent protests.

A study needs to be conducted to assess the extent to which the lack of public participation

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

contributes to public protests. As few studies have investigated how the level of public participation contributes to public protests, it is the intention of this study to fill the information gap that exists in literature.

1.2 Problem statement

According to Brynard and Hanekom (2006:16), scientific investigation can only begin once the statement of the problem has been defined. This will then serve to guide the research process.

The upsurge in public protest in the COCT, particularly in Khayelitsha, continues unabated. While protests are a democratic right and provided for in the Constitution (RSA 1996), their persistence and violent nature at municipal level are a cause for concern. This violent nature often leads to the destruction of public and private property, disruptions in economic activities, loss of life and severe injuries to innocent victims.

The prevalence of public protests is despite the fact that the democratic local government legislation i.e. Constitution (RSA 1996), White Paper on Local Government (RSA 1998a), Municipal Structures Act (RSA 1998b) and Municipal Systems Act (32 of 2000) explicitly emphasise the importance of public participation in the activities of the municipality. The persistence of public protests indicates that a gulf exists between public participation theory (WCs and IDPs strategies) and practice (implementation by change agents[4]) (Cooke & Kothari 2001:4).

The legislation referred to above emphasises that development must be people-centred and participatory in nature, premised on the notion that people can and are able to drive their own development in line with their aspirations (Theron & Ceasar 2008:104). Furthermore, legislation provides for the public to participate through electoral representation, WCs and IDPs to ensure that the public is able to influence, direct, control and even own development interventions. This is the ideal situation, meant to distinguish between apartheid and a democratic system of governance, but this seldom happens in practice, as the people of Khayelitsha prefer to ignore these “invited spaces” (Cornwall & Coelho 2007) of participation. When the system seemingly fails, the public become disillusioned and mobilise

[4] As per Theron (2008:1-22), change agent refers to government (local) officials in this study

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

against the COCT authorities and “invent own spaces” (Cornwall & Coelho 2007) for voicing their dissatisfaction with the COCT participation mechanisms (invited spaces).

Numerous researchers have been conducting studies with an aim of finding the causes and answers to the problem. Findings indicate a myriad of factors that contribute to public protests i.e. slow pace of delivery of basic services, governance factors, including lack of public participation (Van Donk 2012:21, Mathekga & Buccus 2006:11; Allan & Hees 2008:1). Moreover, among the factors put forward as reasons for public protests, are issues about services that can be delivered by other government spheres, for example the provincial and national government. This indicates that anger over the (alleged) failure by other government spheres is vented within the local sphere and could be a symptom of lack of purposeful cooperative governance between the three spheres, as envisaged by the Constitution (RSA 1996).

The aim of this study is to assess the extent to which public participation contribute to public protests in Khayelitsha. The assessment will assist the COCT and other municipalities in South Africa in dealing and responding effectively when confronted by public protests.

The study will seek to achieve the following objectives:

1. To analyse the developmental approaches that underpin public participation in local government.
2. To evaluate the theoretical and legislative framework currently in place for public participation in local government.
3. To determine the extent to which the perceived lack of public participation in the COCT contributes to public protests.
4. To analyse the probable factors that cause public protests to be violent.
5. To assess if public protests are set to remain the preferred public participation tool, so that management of such protests can be improved on.

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

1.3 Research hypotheses

According to Bless *et al*. (2006:39), a hypothesis "is a suggested, preliminary, yet specific answer to a problem, which has to be tested empirically before it can be accepted as a concrete answer and be incorporated into a theory". Moreover, Brynard and Hanekom (2006:21) posit that, a hypothesis seeks to establish a relationship between at least two variables i.e. dependant and independent. In this instance, the hypothetical position of this study is that "*until such time that authentic and empowering public participation is practiced at local government level, public protests will persist"*. Authentic and empowering public participation will enable the public to influence, direct, control and own development and decision making processes.

The two variables identified in this study are public participation and public protests. The independent variable in this instance is *public participation*, through the available channels i.e. WCs and IDPs. Authentic and empowering public participation has been selected in order to determine its relationship with *public protest*, which constitutes a dependent variable.

This study seeks to empirically test the relationship between public protests and lack of authentic and empowering public participation. The study utilises a deductive hypothesis as it starts from an existing theoretical point of view, namely that lack of authentic and empowering public participation causes public protests.

Gwala and Theron (2012:2) argue that authentic and empowering participation entails the creation of participatory spaces in which the participating public, as beneficiaries of a particular programme, project or process, can (i) influence (ii) direct (iii) control (iv) own the process. If legislation promise the above, but the practice delivers something completely the opposite, can we blame the public if they take the protest route?

The public protests and their violent nature in Khayelitsha can be attributed to the continuous lack of authentic and empowering public participation through the "invited spaces" of participation. This has led to disillusionment on the part of the public in Khayelitsha, which has prompted them to "invent own spaces" for participation.

The State reports such as Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs (COGTA): The State of Local Government Report (COGTA 2009b:8-10), National Treasury's Local

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

Government Budget and Expenditure Review (2011:24) and the National Development Plan of the National Planning Commission (NPC) (2011:365) confirm the assertion that lack of a municipal-public interface is what causes the public to "take to the streets" to protest and recommend that the WC model, for example, be refined to give effect to participatory democracy at local government level (Mottiar & Bond 2011:18; Van Donk 2012:21).

The shortcomings of the "invited spaces" (WCs and IDPs) defeat their good intentions, in the sense that, if people feel that they are ineffective and take political sides, people will lose hope, disengage and resort to other means of making their voices heard such as engaging in public protests. The current situation in South African municipalities necessitates the public to adopt a more proactive approach (i.e. protest) to demand an increase in the present levels of their participation impact and resulting influence in decision-making.

From the researcher's observation, it is at the tokenism-participation level in Arnstein (1969) ladder of public participation and the Gwala and Theron (2012) levels of public participation that the public in Khayelitsha demand that their voices be heard by utilising protest action as a public participation strategy. In light of the ever-escalating public protests in Khayelitsha, it is high time that protest action is viewed and documented in statutory literature as a public participation strategy.

If public participation practitioners or the change agents in the COCT can adhere to IAP2 (2002) and Manila Declaration (1989) principles, the problem of public protests could be minimised. The COCT has a legislative obligation to direct its "change agents" (officials) to empower the public to participate meaningfully in the affairs of the municipality and to engage on issues that affect their lives. A participatory planning structure and partnership between the COCT's change agents and the public will go a long way in ensuring efficient and effective delivery of services (Theron 2008:29).

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za



Figure 1.1: Diagrammatic representation of what this study will attempt to do

Source: Adapted from Bless *et al*. (2006:16)

1.4 Research design and methodology

According to Mouton (2001:55) a research design serves as a plan or "blueprint" of how research will be done. Webb and Auriacombe (2006:589) state that research design is the way proposed by the researcher on how the hypotheses will be tested. Qualitative research is suitable for this study because, in order for the researcher to be able to test the hypotheses, the study requires that the researcher have direct contact with the public in Khayelitsha to gather information on their views. Qualitative research in the form of Participatory Action Research (PAR), particularly observation will be used for this study and primary data will be analysed (Burkey 1993, Chambers 1997).

Schurink (2009:803) argues that qualitative research provides the researcher with flexibility in terms of manipulating the size of the sample to suit the requirements of the study. Brynard and Hanekom (2006:37) states that "qualitative methodology allow the researcher to know the respondents personally, to see them as they are and to experiment their daily struggles when confronted with real life experiences of people". This will enable the researcher to

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

interpret and describe the actions of the public. Webb and Auriacombe (2006:592) further state that "the advantage of qualitative methods is that they generate rich, detailed data that leave the participant's perspective intact and provide a context for understanding behaviour".

The limitation is that the collection and analysis of data will require many resources and is time consuming. The researcher may encounter challenges in setting up appointments for personal interviews with the COCT officials due to their busy work schedules. It may also prove to be difficult to get the public in Khayelitsha to attend focus group discussions. The researcher will take precaution for a possible shortfall by recruiting more respondents to attend the focus group discussions.

As of 2005, Khayelitsha had a population of 406 779 and twelve wards (COCT 2005:72). Four personal interviews will be conducted with four COCT officials and four with Ward Councillors, two Councillors from the African National Congress (ANC) and Democratic Alliance (DA) respectively. Theron and Saunders (2009:180) states that interviews provide an opportunity for the researcher to "probe more deeply" on the questions posed to the interviewee. The interviews will be administered in order to assess the respondent's views regarding the reasons for public protests, whether the lack of authentic and empowering public participation have any bearing on them and to solicit suggestions on how the problem of public protests could be addressed. Among the COCT townships, Khayelitsha had on several occasions been plagued by public protests.

Theron and Saunders (2009:182) maintain that focus groups are advantageous in the sense that they provide a platform where questions are discussed and answered in a dynamic and mutual social learning context. Therefore focus group discussion comprising of Ward Councillors, WC members, civic organisations, religious groups, disabled, ratepayers' associations, businesses, general public and local economic development forums will be utilised. There will be four focus groups comprising members from each organisation. Each focus group will be made up of ten participants who will be purposively selected. The researcher as an employee of the COCT will conduct observations in the IDP consultation workshops and on how public protests are started in Khayelitsha.

To further add to the credibility of the study and in supplementing other research techniques, secondary data in the form of academic books and journals, dissertations, academic papers,

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

newspaper articles, COCT documents, internet searches and South African legislative provisions will be consulted.

1.5 Mind-map and the identification of key analytical concepts



Figure 1.2 Mind-map and the identification of key analytical concepts
Source: By Author (2012)

According to Brynard and Hanekom (2006:62), a mind map is valuable in the sense that it "enables the researcher to identify topics (data) critical to the particular investigation, it helps to simplify the search for, and the collection of, topic relevant data needed for in-depth analysis".

Moreover, it is important to clarify and explain key concepts that are used in this study, these are:

1. **Developmental local government:** Local government which is committed to working with citizens and groups within the community so as to find sustainable ways to meet their social, economic and material needs and to improve the quality of their lives (Parnell *et al.* 2002; Van Donk *et al.* 2008; White Paper RSA: 1998a).
2. **Mobilisation:** This refers to the mobilisation of the civilian population as part of contentious politics. Mass mobilization is often used by grassroots-based social movements, including revolutionary movements, but can also become a tool of elites and the state itself. The process usually takes the form of large public gatherings such as mass meetings, marches, parades, processions and demonstrations. Those gatherings usually are part of a protest action (See Occupy Wall Street Movement).

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

3. **People-centred development:** Korten (1990:67) defines people-centred development as a "process by which the members of a society increase their personal and institutional capacities to mobilise and manage resources to produce sustainable and justly-distributed improvements in their quality of life, consistent with their own aspirations". For Theron (2009b:121), a people-centred development approach is a means of bringing development to its rightful owners (the public) since they are, as a consequence, capable of driving their own development in line with their desires. Kotze and Kellerman (1997:36) further argue that in a people-centred development approach, government policy will give confidence and even support the public's endeavours and ensure that they have ownership and control of their own development.

4. **Self-reliance:** Refers to the positive effects derived from participating in a development intervention. The knowledge that one has the know-how and means to perform certain actions and duties independently, out of one's own ability. People's participation in a programme/project helps "break the mentality of dependence" (Oakley 1991:17). In this way people begin to have confidence in their own abilities (knowledge and skills), identification of problems, providing solutions and improving the quality of their own lives (Burkey 1993:50).

   Self-reliance can be seen as an end product that can be derived from Meyer and Theron's (2000) building blocks of development i.e. public participation, social learning, capacity building, empowerment and sustainable development.

5. **Participatory development:** Is defined as "…the self-sustaining process to engage free men and women in activities that meet their basic needs and, beyond that, realise individually defined human potential within socially defined limits…" (Gran 1983: 327). This means that beneficiary communities themselves must be able to control their own development (Theron 2009b:108) and that they must be able to influence, direct and ultimately own the development intervention (Theron & Ceasar 2008:100-123).

6. **Participatory governance:** Is described as "a regulatory framework in which the task of running public affairs is not solely entrusted to government and the public administration, but involves co-operation between state institutions and civil society

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

groups" (Institute of Labour Studies 2005 in Friedman 2006:4; Cooke & Kothari 2001).

7. **Protests:** The Concise Oxford English Dictionary (2006) defines "protest" as a "formal statement or action of dissent or disapproval, it is a demonstration of objection to official policy". This can take the form of a protest march where citizens mobilise and hand over a memorandum or petition to the (local) authorities. Francisco (1995:270) in Nam (2007:98) defines protest as "an act of defiance, challenging the political or economic regime".
8. **Service delivery:** It is related to the provision of basic services to residents in the municipality, i.e. water supply, street lighting, parks and recreational facilities, roads and storm water, electricity and gas supply, health services, refuse removal, sewage collection and disposal. Job creation and housing are the most common issues demanded by citizens from the municipalities, even though these are primarily competencies of both Provincial and Central Government.
9. **Social movement:** Is defined as "a set of opinions and beliefs in a population which represent preferences for changing some elements of the social structure and/or reward distribution of a society" (McCarthy & Zald 1977: 217-18).
10. **Violence:** Refers to the use of unnecessary and unwanted physical force against the bystanders or non-participants, police, officials and/or property during the collective or mass action. Violence usually takes various forms, i.e. physical attack against other people and/or destruction of private and public property.

1.6 Limitations to the study

The limitation to the study relates to the inability of the researcher to secure appointments with top management of the COCT for interviews. It also proved difficult to get the previous WC members whose term of office has expired and who were more experienced to participate. However the researcher managed to conduct interviews with the IDP and public participation practitioners who are involved with public participation on the daily basis. The researcher also had to conduct focus group discussions with the new WC members together with the public, to make up for lack of experience. As a result of this, inferences about the population from the sample data can be made for other communities.

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

1.7 Outline of chapters (See schematic plan of research , p. xvi)

Chapter 1 serves to introduce the research topic of the study. This chapter contains the introduction, problem statement and objectives of the study, hypothesis, research methodology, limitations to the study, clarification of key concepts and the chapter outline.

Chapter 2 deals with public participation in the international context. This chapter will explain public participation as a concept. It will also examine the factors that influence authentic and empowering participation, i.e. principles of public participation by the International Association of Public Participation (IAP2), the Manila Declaration on Peoples Participation and Sustainable Development, and the African Charter for Public Participation in Development and Transformation (1990). Lastly, public participation as an instrument to democratise local government in South Africa will be discussed.

Chapter 3 will examine the South African context of public participation. This will be done by unpacking public participation and the building blocks of development and typologies and modes of public participation. Obstacles to public participation and the benefits of public participation will also be discussed in this chapter.

Chapter 4 examines the local government policy context and regulatory framework that encourages public participation in South Africa, i.e. the Constitution (RSA 1996), the White Paper on Local Government (RSA 1998a), the Municipal Structures Act (117 of 1998), the Municipal Systems Act (32 of 2000) and the Municipal Finance Management Act (56 of 2003). This chapter will also examine the public perceptions of local government in light of the persistent public protest engulfing most municipalities in South Africa.

Chapter 5 examines public protests that have been a cause for concern in Cape Town and Khayelitsha in particular. This chapter will provide definitions of protests and social movements. The theories of protests will be discussed in order to provide a theoretical grounding of protests. It will seek to explain whether protests are about service delivery or public service, the reasons behind public protests and the linkage between public participation and public protests. This chapter will attempt to provide mechanisms through which public protest can be managed.

Chapter 6 focuses on data presentation and interpretation of research results.

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

Chapter 7 provides the summary, recommendations and conclusions reached in the study.

1.8 Conclusion

This chapter presented arguments as to why it is relevant and crucial for this study to be conducted. It pointed out that the upsurge in public protests in Khayelitsha is as a result of the lack of authentic and empowering public participation. The chapter argued that the state sponsored (invited spaces) public participation tools such as the WCs and IDP participation fall short of the ideal and as a result the public invent own spaces for participation as mechanisms to champion their cause.

This chapter argued that the persistence of public protests, particularly those that turn violent pose a threat to the public and private property and has a potential of disrupting business and schooling activities. While protests should be used as a public participation strategy, better management mechanisms for public protests must be found, to mitigate protest risks.

This study will advocate for the acceptance and adoption of public protests as one of the public participation strategies at a local government level. A new public participation model, adapted from Arnstein's (1969) ladder of public participation will be developed to motivate why public protests should be one of the public participation strategies.

The study will test the finding in every chapter against the stated hypothesis of this study that, *until such time that authentic and empowering public participation is practiced at a local government level, public protests will persist.*

The next chapter deals with public participation in the international context. This chapter will explain public participation as a concept. It will also examine the factors that influence authentic and empowering participation, i.e. principles of public participation by the International Association of Public Participation (IAP2), the Manila Declaration on Peoples Participation and Sustainable Development, and the African Charter for Public Participation in Development and Transformation (1990). Lastly, public participation as an instrument to democratise local government in South Africa will be discussed.

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

CHAPTER TWO

PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT

2.1 Introduction

With most countries the world over abandoning autocratic governance to follow democratic practices, public participation becomes a way of life. On the one hand, such participation raises hopes of a positive future, especially for the poorest of the poor and the marginalised. This means that the manipulative participatory approaches as alluded to by the so-called "tyranny debate" (Cooke & Kothari's 2001:1) are being replaced by authentic and empowering participatory approaches, that will enable the marginalised to "enter and engage in participatory arenas" (Cornwall & Coelho 2007:9).

Governments around the world are realising that allowing the public to shape decisions that affect their lives is of paramount importance. Governments are increasingly becoming aware that public participation is not only beneficial to the public, but can go a long way in ensuring that the governments are seen as responsive to the public needs and improves the quality of public services. Moreover, Van der Walt (2007:28) in Mzimakwe (2010:509) asserts that "established democracies around the world have found that public participation is essential for transparency and accountability in governance."

To this end Theron (2009b:112) argues that the international and national rationale for promoting public participation rests on the belief that, if the public take part in development interventions, the latter will be viewed as legitimate and will stand a better chance of being sustainable. The upsurge in the so-called "Arab Springs, Occupy Movements" and public protests provides sufficient proof that participatory approaches are not living up to the promise of empowerment and transformative development for marginal people (Hickey & Mohan 2004:3).

Furthermore, it is argued by Chambers (1997), Korten (1990) and Theron (2008) that if the beneficiaries of development are made part of the decision-making processes, "they will become self-reliant, empowered and assertive about their ability to become masters of their own development" (Theron 2009b:112). This calls for a "local government-beneficiary planning partnership", which must utilise social capital and local knowledge systems of the beneficiaries and a promise of incorporation of the public's contribution in future interactions

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

(Gwala & Theron 2012:2). The resultant ideal situation will be the ability of the public to influence, direct, control and eventually own development interventions meant for them (Hicky & Mohan 2004:8), in line with the principles of the Manila Declaration (1989) and IAP2 core values of participation (Gwala & Theron 2012:2).

This chapter discusses the international rationale of public participation; in particular, it explores factors that influence authentic and empowering public participation, i.e. IAP2 (2002), The Manila Declaration on Peoples Participation and Sustainable Development (1989) and The African Charter of Public Participation in Development and Transformation **(**1990). This is done in order to learn about international public participation practices and in the light of public protests that plague Khayelitsha, as well as to determine the extent to which these can assist in improving the quality of public participation in the COCT.

2.2 Defining public participation

Cooke and Kothari (2001), Hickey and Mohan (2004), Cornwall and Coelho (2007), (see Kotze and Kellerman 1997:37; IAP2 2002; 2007:4, Theron 2009b:115) assert that public participation is a complex and elusive concept. This implies that it is difficult to package as a single concept, thus opening it up to different interpretations. Theron (2009b:115) argues that this is positive, as concepts like “public participation” should not be seen as “blueprints” but as a “social learning process”, facilitating dialogue at the grass-roots level.

According to Kotze and Kellerman (1997:43), the social learning process embraces a “bottom-up decision-making and a partnership approach”, where stakeholders (beneficiaries of development and the State) are brought together. Through this approach, the success of participation will be assessed by the levels of influence that the public are able to exert over development and governance issues affecting their lives (Mzimakwe 2010:502). The public’s levels of influence should ideally translate to and enable them to direct, control and even own the development and decision-making processes.

In the light of the absence of a widely accepted definition of public participation, public participation scholars, as will be seen below, have done extensive research on the concept, which has broadened our understanding. It is therefore important that different definitions and contextualisation be explored with an aim of contributing to the public participation discourse to ensure that it becomes more than a buzzword (Leal 2010: 89-100).

In this vein, IAP2 (2002) defines public participation as “the process by which an

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

organisation consults with interested or affected individuals, organisations and government entities, before making a decision". In essence, participation gives "voice" to the voiceless and "agency" to attend to the needs of the marginalised, in this way the public's needs come first through positive development (Govender *et al*. 2011:186). Moreover, "public participation is a two-way communication and collaborative problem-solving tool, with the goal of achieving better and more acceptable decisions" (IAP2 2002).

Creighton (2005:7) defines public participation as "the process by which public concerns, needs and values are incorporated into governmental decision-making; a two-way communication and interaction with the overall goal of better decision-making, supported by the public". Mzimakwe (2010:503) emphasises the point that a two way process provides more scope for the public to influence decisions as compared to consultation.

The World Bank (1996:3) defines participation as "a process through which stakeholders influence and share control over development initiatives and the decisions and resources which affect them". The starting point here, is to acknowledge that the largest possible way through which the public can participate in decision-making processes, is the acceptance and embrace of the principle, that the public have a democratic right to participate in decision-making that impacts on their lives, including governance issues (Gildenhuys & Knipe 2000:126 in Mzimakwe 2010:503).

According to Kumar (2002:23), public participation means different things to different people, depending on the context in which it is used. Kumar (2002:24) argues that this is evidenced by the Economic Commission for Latin America (1973) which welcomes voluntary contribution to public programmes/projects, but the public have no say in decision-making. Nanz and Dalferth (2010:3) defines public participation as "the deliberative process by which interested or affected public, civil society organisations, and government actors are involved in policy-making, before a political decision is taken. It is collaborative problem-solving with the goal of achieving more legitimate policies". This means that the participants actively participate in an initiative and action that is inspired by "their own thinking and deliberation and over which they can exert effective control" (Mzimakwe 2010:502). In this respect Siphuma (2009:20) contends that what constitutes (popular) participation is a collective effort by the participants to pool their efforts and resources for the attainment of the set goals.

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

According to Siphuma (2009:21), the UN Department of Economics and Social Affairs (1963:4) asserts that participation by the public, in efforts to improve their living standards is expressed in programmes, planned to accomplish a broad range of specific improvements. In this respect, participation and development need not to be separated. For the above to be achieved, the public must be part of development planning from the outset through to implementation, rather than after choices have been committed (Nzimakwe & Reddy 2008:669). Govender *et al.* (2011:193) posit that "dialogue is the first necessary engagement to deliberation as it enables participants to navigate through differences brought together in groups and subgroups". This means that dialogue lays a foundation for deliberations to take place.

The Deliberative Democracy Consortium (2004:3) in Govender *et al.* (2011:193) defines deliberation as "a discursive approach to decision-making in which the public come together in a non-coercive environment to identify and discuss public problems and possible solutions". However, Theron *et al.* (2007:8) assert that in South African municipalities, the opposite is happening, consultation is promoted and linked with development planning which is very problematic. This is so because consultation simply asks the public to give input, but the problem and solution is defined by change agents, thus leaving the public out of the participation process meant to change their lives.

As public participation is interpreted differently in various quarters, it has prompted the development of typologies and modes within which public participation can be judged. For IAP2 (2002) in Theron (2009b:117), public participation should be "presented along a spectrum that shows progression from passive participation (public told what to do) at one end and self- mobilisation (public control) at the other". This interpretation of public participation is in line with Oakley's (1991:7) interpretation of the concept as a means to an end, which can be equated to passive participation and an end in itself, classified as active participation (Theron 2009b:117).

The Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (DWAF) (2001:iv) defines public participation as "an on-going interaction between role players that is aimed at improving decision-making during the planning, design and implementation of DWAF's development projects and processes. It requires the involvement of all stakeholders; including groups that are often marginalised, such as women and the youth. Decision-makers have to consider the views of stakeholders during the decision-making process".

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

Furthermore, DWAF (2001: iv) state that "the nature of the planned public participation process will depend on what is planned and the goal of public participation. This means that, in some instances, the public needs to be informed about certain initiatives or aspects. Other initiatives require public opinions in order to improve decisions and sustainability of the initiative. This implies that there is no "one size fits all", each development intervention requires a specific and/or a set of public participation strategies suitable for that particular initiative (Gwala & Theron (2012) refers to this as an "appropriate mix".

The definitions above emphasise that public participation is a two way process and that collaboration between the authorities, public and interested and affected parties in finding solutions and making decisions is necessary. Collaboration thus is an essential element of the IAP2 spectrum of public participation, the seven typologies of Pretty *et al.* (1995) and the four modes of Oakley and Marsden (1984).

According to Theron and Ceasar (2008:120), Nzimakwe and Reddy (2008:669), the aim of collaboration is to be in partnership with the public at each level of decision-making, from exploring different options to the problem of finding the solution, in order to ensure the transfer of skills, knowledge and ownership of the process to the public (Draai & Taylor 2009:114). This means that democracy is deepened to the actual citizens since they are given a say in the making of decisions that have an impact on their well-being.

As DWAF (2001:1) points out, public participation does not mean that decisions are made by the State and the public combined, but that the State reserves the right to take final decisions after considering public views and opinions. Mzimakwe (2010:503) disagrees with the notion of the State being the final decision-maker and cautions that the essence of authentic participation is that "power" is shared between the public authority and the participating public. The question is whether the power holders will willingly relinquish power and share with the public, which is merely regarded as the recipient of services (Gutas 2005:35). The researcher is of the view that the DWAF (2001:1) approach is more relevant in the event where technical decisions need to be taken. In this respect Osmani (2006:21) cautions that "participation may sometimes be injurious to technical efficiency, if people do not have the capacity to make informed judgments on technical matters".

According to Osmani (2006:21), participation is valued for both intrinsic and instrumental reasons. On the one hand, "the intrinsic value refers to the idea that the act of participation is

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

valuable in itself, quite apart from any value it may have in helping to achieve other good things". On the other hand, the instrumental role of participation is that it can reduce conflict during policy-making and decision-making processes (The Deliberative Democracy Consortium 2004:3 in Govender *et al.* 2011:193).

The instrumental rationale of participation can be further clarified by examining its relationship with two other concepts, namely empowerment and social capital, which also features prominently in the Deliberative Democracy Consortium (2004:3) rationales of deliberation (Govender *et al.* 2011:193). "These two may be thought of as intermediate variables through which participation promotes efficiency and equity" (Osmani 2006:21).

According to Theron (2008:9), social capital refers to people and public assets (access, information and influence) acquired by people through social cohesion and relationships they form and sustain among themselves. This implies that public participation plays a central role in the creation of social capital. Osmani (2006:26) asserts that social capital is not only established within and between community members, but it is also strengthened by networks of relationships between different individuals and groups operating outside the market sphere. This means outsiders, such as consultants are expected to impart their expert knowledge and skills to community members. The Deliberative Democracy Consortium (2004:3) in Govender *et al.* (2011:193) sums this up succinctly by stating that in the process of building social capital, public participation "cultivates a mutual understanding, builds bonds of trust among citizens, decision makers and governing institutions, and can effect changes in political attitudes and behavior".

Through the very act of bringing people together and allowing them to interact with each other in the course of decision-making activities outside the market, participatory governance gives people an opportunity to strengthen these networks and build new ones (Osmani 2006:27). The intrinsic value of public participation mirrors authentic public participation as it emphasises social capital and empowerment. These two are crucial to the attainment of sustainable development.

For Govender *et al*. (2011:183) "participation should be viewed from a perspective of representative democracy and its off-shoot, deliberative democracy", where the former means that the public participate through representatives elected in the periodic elections and the latter emphases "consensus seeking or trade-offs on policy issues". Tshabalala and Lombard

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

(2009:397) see public participation "as a means of empowering people by creating a space for them to engage in developing their skills and abilities to negotiate their needs in the face of forces that often appear to obstruct and discourage them".

As stated previously, it can be confirmed that public participation is interpreted differently in accordance with the context within which it is used. This makes it necessary that the researcher formulates a working definition in line with the hypothesis of this study and as a point of departure, that "until such time that lack of authentic and empowering public participation is practiced at local government level, public protests will persist".

According to Google.com., a working definition is devised in the event where an established definition is not known, in this regard the author utilise a working definition to clarify the meaning of the concept or phrase to avoid misunderstandings, as well as to indicate what he/she thinks, what it should mean, despite of the current common usage. In the light of the above, the researcher defines public participation as a *collaborative effort among the mobilised public, to rightfully demand from the authorities a stake in the decisions affecting their lives. It is a public demand for the rights to influence, direct, control and eventually to own the development and decision-making processes that affects their lives.*

2.3 Factors that influence authentic and empowering participation

2.3.1 Principles of public participation – The International Association of Public Participation (IAP2)

The international community has contributed to the public participation debate by formulating strategies and guidelines to ensure that public participation is rooted in the communities whose lives it is meant to change. IAP2 (2002), spells out a "Code of Ethics" that guides public participation practitioners on how they should conduct themselves during public participation facilitation.

According to Theron (2009b:114) and IAP2 (2002) developed seven core values of public participation, to be used in the development and implementation of public participation processes, namely:

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

1. The public should have a say in decisions about actions that affect their lives

Briad (2011:1) notes the prescriptive form of this core value (value 1) in comparison to other core values. This could indicate the importance attached to incorporating public views in the decision-making process. In essence this means that public participation should not only be limited to voting for public representatives during local government elections, but to all issues that have an impact on people's lives. This can be anything from what is perceived to be insignificant by some in authority, such as allowing the public to choose the public good that meets their needs and aspirations. Clearly this is not happening, as the public in Makhaza (Khayelitsha), for example, alleged that the decision to erect open toilets was taken unilaterally by COCT, not in participation with the community (Silber & Peter 2010:4).

The researcher, as an employee of the COCT, observes that this claim, that the public do not have a say in the affairs that affect their lives is true, as this is evidenced by the prevalence of public protests in Khayelitsha. The public in Khayelitsha embark on protest to demand that the COCT allow them to influence, direct, control and own decision-making and development interventions. Theron *et al*. (2007:6), point out that "the amount of say that the public have, and the extent of their influence, are negligible, if not non-existent".

2. It should include the promise that the public's contribution will influence the decision

Core value 2 is well intentioned. However, the persistent public protests in Khayelitsha could indicate that potential public input has not yet been incorporated into decision-making, because primary input was lacking.

The researcher observed during the IDP consultation workshops convened by the Mayor of the COCT, that the meeting, meant to solicit public views on development planning, ended up in chaos after the projects presented by the Mayor were disputed by the public in Khayelitsha. In the first place "consultation" does not imply that the public views will be incorporated into decision-making (Theron *et al*. 2007:8). In this instance these workshops tended to be "window dressing" and an act of compliance with the legislative requirements as it was the case with the Mayor's Listening

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

Campaign (Gutas 2005:61).

Briad (2011:3) asserts that to be given an opportunity to participate in decision-making is not enough, as this does not ensure that the public will participate effectively. It is necessary for the authorities to ensure that beneficiaries of development are competent to participate and/or coaxed into participating in decisions that affect their lives.

3. It promotes sustainable decisions by recognising and communicating the needs and interests of all participants, including decision-makers

Sustainability depends on the notion of responsible decision-making. The inclusion of all stakeholders in the decision-making process encourages robust debate between stakeholders. A robust debate enables stakeholders to be receptive to voices of dissent. This means that voices of dissent are accommodated by reaching compromise and, subsequently, reaching consensus. This implies that the final decision binds all stakeholders and such decisions are unlikely to impact negatively on future generations as there is complete "buy-in" from all stakeholders.

The lack of authentic and empowering public participation in the decisions affecting the public in Khayelitsha is evidenced by public protests. This is also confirmed by the study undertaken by Gutas (2005:56) titled the Mayor's listening campaign in the Integrated Development Planning Process. This study found that there is lack of communication and accountability by some Councillors and officials. The question that arises is whether the blatant lack of communication will in any way lead to sustainable decisions. It can thus be argued that the public in Khayelitsha embark on protests to demand that their voices be heard, for them to be able to influence, control, direct and own the development process aimed at improving their lives. Once this is achieved, decisions will have some degree of credibility and to a certain extent be sustainable.

4. It seeks out and facilitates the involvement of those potentially affected by or interested in a decision to be taken

Core value 4 is problematic as it includes "involvement" which does not guarantee that the views of those potentially affected by or interested in a decision will be

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

included in final decision-making. Theron (2009b:119) argues that such "involvement" is "associated with co-option, placation, consultation, informing and similar slippery concepts", which manifest itself through protests in Khayelitsha.

The COCT authorities and officials must go out of their way to solicit the views of those who are potentially affected by or interested in a decision. A dedicated municipal Councillor or official will not only rely on official participation channels, but will utilise the public's "invented spaces" (Cornwall & Coelho 2007) of participation to solicit public views and see that they become part of the record.

As the "Street Committees" are the most popular form of public participation in Khayelitsha, the COCT should work with this structure in order to address the problem of lack of public participation. This could also go a long way in addressing the problem of protest, as it can be argued that it is through this grassroots structure that public protests emanate and are planned. Briad (2011:3) submit that, the essence of democracy centres on the notion that all those who will be affected by the decision must be part of the decision-making process.

5. It seeks input from participants in designing how they should participate

According to Thompson and Nleya (2010:224), the most popular form of political and social organisation in Khayelitsha is "Street Committees". The COCT must recognise and legitimise this form of community organisation too. Street Committees are powerful public structures, where issues are discussed and decisions taken; as opposed to WCs which the public view as dysfunctional. This implies that crucial information could be gathered through this structure and utilised in the process to avert public protests.

The researcher has observed that, besides WCs' perceived dysfunctionality, the appointment of WCs alone has some shortcomings. WCs are drawn from the existing community organisations, which is problematic as not all wards have community organisations. By virtue of being not represented in the WC structure, therefore means that those wards are left out of the public participation process. It is the researcher's view that, should the COCT have undertaken to establish the best possible participation design from the public itself, it would have re-looked at the

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

procedure for the appointment of WCs rather than just switching from the only COCT "Ward Forum" title, to popularly used WCs.

Furthermore, the COCT would have learned from the public in Khayelitsha that the effective way of getting the public to participate in the affairs of the COCT would be to go to public transport interchanges, taxi ranks/interchanges, train stations, makeshift selling stands where the public spend the better part of the day fending for their families. Gutas (2005:44) assert that the COCT must realise the importance of "using public social networks i.e. pub/shebeen or beauty parlour to get the public to participate in grassroots decision making". In this way the COCT will be in a better position to gain input to inform its design of participation strategies thus curbing the escalation of public protests.

6. It provides participants with the information they need to participate in a meaningful way

Core value 6 calls for the empowerment of the public to allow them to participate meaningfully in decisions affecting their lives. Friedman (2006:22) argues that the best way of empowering the public to participate meaningfully in government affairs, is to inform them of government actions in a way that will make them understand the choices the public can make.

As argued above, for Khayelitsha residents to participate meaningfully in the decisions that affect their lives they must be able to influence, control, direct and own the decision-making process. Gutas (2005:56) warns that as long as the COCT relies on a top-down approach to participation as opposed to a bottom-up approach, the public in Khayelitsha will continue to feel disempowered and alienated in the decision-making processes. It is the researcher's view, that the public's inability to participate meaningfully in municipal affairs will prompt them to invent their own spaces for participation, where protests will be used as a weapon to demand meaningful participation in decision-making.

7. It communicates to participants how their input affected the decision

This core value calls for constant contact between authorities and the public in Khayelitsha. This could be in the form of regular public meetings that in most

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

instances occur under intense police presence and end in chaos like the Mayor's IDP consultation workshop referred to above. These public meetings will provide feedback to the public on progress made.

Gwala and Theron (2012:1) and Gutas (2005:44) caution that public meetings alone are incapable of ensuring meaningful public participation. A combination of participation strategies must rather be adopted. Having highlighted the manner in which the COCT can get the public in Khayelitsha to participate, the COCT, in addition to its current communication strategies needs to select the most effective strategies appropriate for Khayelitsha from the IAP2's (2006) and the World Bank's (1996) participation toolboxes.

2.3.2 The Manila Declaration on Peoples Participation and Sustainable Development

According to Theron (2009b:113), the Manila Declaration (1989) provides four public participation principles which are echoed in the African Charter for Popular Participation in Development and Transformation[5] (1990). These are:

1. Sovereignty resides with the people, the real actors of positive change. It is the people themselves who know what is best for them and what will bring about positive change in their lives. If sovereignty resides with people, development must be community driven, community led and community owned (Korten 1990:44).

2. The legitimate role of government is to enable the people to set and pursue their own agenda. This calls for the recognition from government officials that people are not passive recipients of change, but active participants in their own development. The ideal situation is a partnership between government and the beneficiaries of development whereby government empowers people to implement their own development successfully. The opposite of this can be described as mobilisation rather than empowerment (Korten 1990:44, Theron 2008:41-73).

[5] Africa's development thinking since independence – a reader. 2002. Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa (pp 295-309)

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

3. To exercise their sovereignty and assume responsibility for the development of themselves and their communities, the people must control their own resources, have access to relevant information and have the means to hold the officials of government accountable.

4. Those who would assist the people with their development must recognise that it is they who are participating in support of the people's agenda, not the reverse. The value of the outsider's contribution will be measured in terms of the enhanced capacity of the people to determine their own future.

2.3.3 The African Charter for Popular Participation in Development and Transformation (1990)

The International Conference on Popular Participation in the Recovery and Development Process in Africa was held in Arusha, the United Republic of Tanzania, from 12 to 16 February 1990. This was a rare, collaborative effort between African people's organisations, the African Governments, non-governmental organisations and United Nations Agencies. The aim of the conference was to search for a collective understanding of the role of popular participation in the development and transformation of the region (Davids *et al*. 2009:215). The conference also provided an opportunity for delegates to articulate and give renewed focus to the concepts of democratic development, people's solidarity, creativity and self-reliance and to formulate policy recommendations for national governments, popular organisations and the international community in order to strengthen participatory processes and patterns of development.

According to Davids *et al.* (2009:215), the objectives of the conference were as follows:

1. To recognise the role of public participation in Africa's recovery and development efforts.

2. To sensitise national governments and the international community to the dimensions, dynamics, processes and potential of a development approach, rooted in popular initiatives and self-reliant efforts.

3. To identify obstacles to public participation in development and define appropriate approaches to the promotion of popular participation in policy formulation, planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of development programmes.

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

4. To recommend actions to be taken by governments, the United Nations system, as well as public and private donor agencies in building an enabling environment for authentic popular participation in the development process and encourage people and their organisations to undertake self-reliant development initiatives.

5. To facilitate the exchange of information, experience and knowledge for mutual support among people and their organisations, and

6. Propose indicators for the monitoring of progress in facilitating public participation in Africa's development.

It has to be noted that the conference took place during the apartheid era when popular participation was non-existent in South African governance. Since the dawn of a democratic dispensation in South Africa, progress has been made towards the implementation of the recommendations of the conference, for example, various legislations have been enacted to encourage popular participation. However, a lot still needs to be done to ensure that authentic popular participation in development initiatives is realised, as it is currently non-existent.

2.4 Public participation as an instrument to democratise local government in South Africa

The optimism brought about by the dismantling of apartheid in South Africa has given way to pessimism among the public since democracy was attained (Van Donk 2012:12). The hard-won democracy continues to be an elusive reality, particularly at the grass-roots level, as evidenced by the ever-increasing public protests (Hough 2008:2; Atkinson 2007:54). These public protests can be attributed to what Van Donk (2012:12) calls the "governance deficit".

This is in stark contrast with the optimism expressed by former President Mbeki (2006) in his State of the Nation address, that the South African public "is convinced that our country has entered its Age of Hope" (Roberts *et al*. 2010:1). By this he meant that, the public appreciate that the country was in the right path towards the achievement of a developmental state. Tseola (2012:167) argues that public participation is central to a democratic developmental state, as it holds the view that "the delivery of public services is contingent upon the full exercise of citizenship". Once the above has been achieved, arguments about the attainment of the developmental state could be made.

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

The present democratic government inherited an assortment of "administrative, financial, economic and political structures emanating from the legacy of decades of apartheid rule" (Mogale 2003:271), of which its remnants are still evident today. The previous oppressive regime discouraged any form of participation, particularly at the grass-roots level, in decision-making; instead, participation was defined along racial lines (Edigheji 2003:68).

The new democratic government had to reverse the ills of apartheid, including the inheritance of non-participation at local government level by many. This was to be done by enacting social and economic policies geared at "promoting cooperative governance and shared growth that will benefit all South Africans irrespective of race and gender" (Edigheji 2003:68). According to Edigheji (2003:68), cooperative governance involves building a strong relationship between social partners (civil society and trade unions) and government.

At local government level the democratisation process began with the enactment of new legislation. The new legislation sought to make public participation compulsory in governance processes. The introduction of the principle of developmental local government, declaring local government an autonomous sphere of government through decentralisation and democratisation, as well as instilling a culture of participatory governance, proved the seriousness of government in attempting to reverse the apartheid scourge (Parnell *et al*. 2002; Van Donk *et al*. 2008). The question is whether these ideals have been achieved?

As noted above, South African democratic local government is built on the foundation of various legislation, such as the Constitution of South Africa (1996), White Paper on Local Government (RSA 1998a), Municipal Structures Act (117 of 1998) (RSA 1998b) and the Municipal Systems Act (32 of 2000) (RSA 2000) (See chapter 4). These are aimed at transforming local government from segregated and non-responsive state machinery to an all-inclusive, participatory and developmental local government that effectively responds to the development needs of the people, particularly the previously disenfranchised. The latter was the ideal. What has since transpired is far from ideal.

The White Paper on Local Government (RSA 1998a) gave practical meaning and content to the Constitutional provisions by bringing the DLG principle to the fore. The White Paper (RSA 1998a) stresses the importance of a partnership between government, the public and community organisation in finding viable and long lasting ways that will address their economic, social and material needs and consequently bring about improvements in their well-being (Davids & Maphunye 2009:60).

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

According to Pearce (2004:484), the levels of poverty, unemployment and inequality in South Africa, like those in Latin American countries, put more strain on democracy. This means that a partnership between government and the public, as envisaged in the White Paper on Local Government (RSA 1998a), is undermined by these deficiencies (poverty, unemployment and inequality) as evidenced by high levels of disillusionment among the public and the subsequent protests. This shows that the public want citizenship. As Pearce (2004:484) argues: public participation in democratic elections alone is insufficient; "democracy requires civic participation and social citizenship (a society free from inequality, poverty)".

CIVICUS[6] (2011:31) supports this view and adds that democracy involves participation in decision-making processes that affect the lives of the public, between elections, through a wide variety of means and mechanisms. These are "community forums, interface meetings with government and participatory planning, budgeting and evaluation mechanisms" CIVICUS (2011:31), as well as holding a public meeting at which the Councillors explain to the public how they spent the money entrusted to them for the benefit of the community (Osmani 2006:6).

In clarifying the concept of democratisation, Cornwall (2008:13) differentiates between three components that underpins it, i.e. **"franchise"** – both public officials and community representatives should possess the necessary skills and experience i.e. listening, articulating, negotiation and collaboration to be able to increase the number of people to participate in decision-making, this requires capacity-building. **"Scope"** relates to boundaries of public engagement, for example, the public may be part of technical decision-making but cannot have a final say. The public may make use of mass mobilisation tactics to demand the expansion of engagement scope.

The last component of democratisation "**authenticity of control"**, involves demands for decentralisation and power-sharing between government and the public. In essence Cornwall (2008:13) identified three critical issues, i.e. capacity-building, boundaries in decision-making and decentralisation and collaboration. For the above to be achieved, change in organisational culture, attitudes and behaviour of the authorities is required, while local

[6]CIVICUS is not an acronym. It is a Latin term meaning "of the town" or "of the community." The first Board of Directors of CIVICUS believed that this term adequately reflected the values and mission of CIVICUS when it was formed.
Website: https://www.civicus.org

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

government champions must be innovative in seeking ways of engaging and empowering the public for local government to be democratised (Theron *et al*. 2007:2).

Another important element in the local government democratisation process is the legitimacy of government. Diamond (1994:5) opines that for government to be seen to be democratic, the public must view it as legitimate, particularly if it is based on the "rule of law". To this end, the mass mobilisation that characterised the fight against apartheid and orchestrated by political formations, organised labour, church groups, individuals at a grass-roots level and from civil society, could indicate that public viewed the apartheid regime as illegitimate (Phago 2008: 239). Fortunately, the public in Khayelitsha still view the COCT as legitimate, as they are able to vote in periodic democratic elections, hand over petitions and engage in collective action.

The researcher is of the opinion that, if the prevailing lack of public participation in the COCT persists, legitimacy approval can be short-lived. For the COCT to maintain its legitimacy status, new thinking, as proposed by Theron *et al.* (2007:2), is required. This "new thinking" calls for the democratic regime to distinguish itself as having removed itself from the apartheid dispensation by continuously encouraging authentic and vibrant public participation in the affairs of governance. This is in line with Friedman's (2006:1) argument that the struggle against apartheid necessitated the incorporation of both grass-roots citizens and affluent interests in decision-making. In essence, the struggle against apartheid was a demand for authentic participation in decision-making processes.

Davids (2005:18) asserts that for democracy to prevail, it is essential that the public participates "especially if the society in question is a developing society in a process of consolidating its democracy". Davids (2005:18) argues that in South Africa public participation has two objectives to fulfil, (i) "upholding the principles and systems of participatory democracy and ensuring the legitimacy of the state at local level through the public as voters being encouraged to participate in formal political processes, such as elections and referendums" and (ii) participation in local government aims to aid the development of the public to alleviate poverty through the delivery of services and local economic development (Davids 2005:18). For these objectives to be realised, the public, in order to give them control over development and governance processes and outcomes and to achieve greater administrative efficiency, must be empowered to participate. This way, will enable the public to become self-reliant.

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

According to Edigheji (2006a:94), COGTA (2009:9) and Atkinson (2007:53), South African municipalities are under such strain that it is impossible for them to meet the above-mentioned objectives. Figure 2.1 below depicts an ideal situation where the public, according to Davids (2005:19-20), can have a meaningful say in "development and governance"; where their voices would be heard and responded to (the authorities having both administrative and financial capacity to respond to their grievances).



Figure 2.1: Translating "voice" into "influence"

Source: Davids (2005:20)

Davids (2005:20) posits that when the above is achieved, "voice becomes influence". However, Davids (2005:20) warns that "for the voice to be translated to influence, there has to be action from below and from above". Here municipalities are responsive to the public's needs and the public having meaningful influence over policy decisions. This can be referred to as authentic public participation. Authentic public participation, through participatory partnerships, will result in the reduction of poverty, improved service delivery, see grievances attended to and new policies accepted (Davids 2005:20, Theron 2008: 41-73).

2.4.1 Democratising local government through decentralisation

Decentralisation is another instrument that can be used to democratise local government. Schonwalder (1997:757) argues that popular participation enhances decentralisation at a local government level, particularly when the public mobilise local resources for their benefit, thus aiding decentralisation efforts. The Department for Communities and Local Government (2010:2) argues that "the best contribution that central government can make is to devolve power, money and knowledge to those best placed to find the best solutions to local needs". This means that the public should be empowered to do things for themselves and where they

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

are lacking, the government should build their social capital to enable them to influence, direct, control and own development meant for their betterment, in the process establishing participatory partnerships.

According to Schonwalder (1997:757), one way of democratising local government through public participation is political decentralisation. This means allocating central government powers and resources to the lower sphere, which has happened in terms of South African local government. Manor (1999:55) in Pieterse (2002:2) supports this view and adds that South African local government legislation has all four ingredients necessary for successful decentralisation. These are:

1. The public is able to influence policy decisions at a political level (through voting for their preferred political party during elections), including development interventions.

2. The local government sphere receives a fair share of budget allocation from central government for development purposes.

3. Local government has administrative capacity to exercise its duties, and

4. There are sufficient checks and balances to ensure accountability.

The Department for Communities and Local Government (2010:2) adds to ingredients that local government can use to give power back to the public, i.e. opening up government to public scrutiny by releasing government information into the public domain, so that the public can know how their money is spent, how it is used and to what effect. The burden of bureaucracy must be lifted – by removing the cost and control of unnecessary red tape and regulation, whose effect is to restrict local action (The Department for Communities and Local Government 2010:2).

Despite good intentions and promising decentralisation in South Africa, there is still an astonishing high level of public protests that continue to plague municipalities, which according to Heller (2009:3) is caused by the little leverage that be public have over political society (local government). This means that the public is not yet participating fully in the affairs of governance due to democratic practices that have been eroded, and the public finds itself politically disempowered (Heller 2009:3)

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

According to Edigheji (2006a:94), decentralisation has emerged as important arenas of political participation. However, municipal councillors and officials lack capacity to meet the new responsibilities being entrusted to them, as well as to represent their people effectively. "They also lack the skills and knowledge to set implementable goals, undertake financial planning and human resource development, consult with local communities and promote sustainable development" (Edigheji 2006a:94). This defeats the purpose of decentralisation, being that of deepening democracy, bringing government closer to the public and ensuring that they are able to influence, direct, control and own development and decision-making processes. In this vein, Heller (2009:5) posits that "democratic deepening requires striking a delicate balance between the aggregate logic of political society and deliberative logic of civil society."

Schonwalder (1997:757) cites benefits associated with decentralisation, i.e. decreasing dependence from the central government, leading to administrative efficiency; local governments are perceived to be more responsive and accountable to the people and decentralisation opens up new channels for popular participation at grass-roots level, supplementing electoral participation brought about by representative democracy. This will serve to include the popular masses as part of the political system, providing what he calls "practice grounds for democracy". These will allow for direct input from popular and social movements (One World Action 2008:4; Schonwalder 1997:757).

Given their participatory and democratic character, social movements can be used to safeguard issues such as corruption and maladministration. In this way persistent violent public protests could be minimised in areas such as Khayelitsha. Boisier (1987:134) in Schonwalder (1997:761), argues that "local and regional governments are seen as places where a potential social contract between the state and civil society can be negotiated", owing to their proximity to grass-root citizens, but this seldom happens in South African local government.

The researcher argues that after the demise of the apartheid government, the South African population had an expectation that the negotiated settlement will yield a democratic state sympathetic to the plight of the poor. This was expected to be even more so, in recognition of the sweat equity lent to the struggle against apartheid through mass mobilisation. The reward expected by the masses was not in monetary terms, but for their voices to be heard and for

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

full inclusion of their views in decision-making processes. Simply put, the reward was to be fully included in a form of participatory governance.

2.4.2 Democratising local government through participatory governance

Edigheji (2006b:2) assert that participatory governance "is seen as a means to overcome governmental deficits, reduce information gaps and to build consensus around policy, lead to smoother implementation of state policies, ensure accountability and transparency in governance, as well as to enhance the credibility and sustainability of programmes, and to enhance developing countries' global competitiveness".

The Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA) (2010:3) states that participatory governance seeks to ensure active and total participation of the public in governance matters as one way of enhancing democracy at a local level of governance. Participatory governance means the inclusion of the public or groups in policy-making and implementation processes (Friedman 2006:4). Participatory governance is about empowering the public to influence and share control in processes of public decision-making that affects their lives (CIVICUS 2006:4). It has to be noted then, that though this is one of the reasons why people fought against apartheid, they still find themselves in a similarly powerless situation today.

A notable participatory structure in South Africa, born out of the negotiated settlement, is the National Economic Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC). NEDLAC, established in 1995 as a bargaining council to deliberate on economic policies, is composed of organised labour, business and government (Friedman 2006:4). It is not clear how much of a voice the grass-roots groups have in this structure, as it is composed mostly of organised social formations. The grass-roots in most cases are not organised; instead they have their own self-invented spaces of participation, which could mean they are effectively excluded. Friedman (2006:1) supports this view and argues that the biggest mistake was to assume that the public, particularly the unorganised grass-roots groups, are properly represented in this structure by a single organisation.

A development chamber was established in response to concerns of the possible exclusion of the poor, particularly the unorganised. These are now represented by key civil society organisations that are assumed to be representative (Edigheji 2003:78). This practice is in conflict with the ideals of participatory governance. Participatory government is biased

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

towards ensuring social inclusion of the often marginalised societal groups and individuals (women, poor people, rural people, children and people with disabilities) (CIVICUS 2006:4).

Since the extent to which the grass-roots groups are able to influence decision-making in the above-mentioned structure is not known, it can be assumed that they are participating. Tadesse *et al.* (2006:6) caution that the existence of public participation in governance alone is not enough, but the significance exists if there is authentic public participation. In other words, representative democracy (i.e. periodic voting in the elections) does not guarantee public participation in policy formulation and implementation. Therefore participatory governance seeks to address the shortcomings of representative democracy by "reducing information gaps and building consensus around policy, smoother implementation of state policy, ensuring accountability and transparency in governance as well as to enhance the credibility and sustainability of programmes" (Edigheji 2006b:2).

In giving credence to the above, Pimbert and Wakeford (2001: 23) in Creighton (2005:2), argue that democracy without citizen deliberation and participation is ultimately an empty and meaningless concept, hence the need to ensure authentic public participation in the COCT. If this happens, the public in Khayelitsha will be empowered to do things for themselves and ultimately become self-reliant. They will be in a better position to influence, direct, control and even own the development and decision-making processes meant for their betterment.

Besides NEDLAC, another participatory governance tool that the COCT can use to reach out to the grassroots is the Integrated Development Plan (IDP). The COCT defines an IDP as a principal strategic planning instrument, which guides and informs its ongoing planning, management and development actions (COCT IDP 2007-2012). Pieterse (2002:5) states that the IDP is the "chief democratisation instrument in local government and it also provides the integrative logic for almost all the components of the new policy dispensation". The public is expected to take centre stage in the development of the IDP, but this seldom happens.

Furthermore, the advantage of the IDP is that it distinguishes between the new democratic dispensation and the old one. It does this by bringing together democratising elements, such as "democratic governance, participatory planning and efficient, modern, managerial practice" (Pieterse 2002:5). This seems not to be happening in most municipalities, however.

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

The intentions of the IDP are clear and look good on paper. However, the critics point to a number of shortcomings, for example, Harrison (2008:327) sees IDPs as reinforcing a top-down approach; they tend to be prescriptive and are driven by municipalities which then exclude the input of the beneficiaries from the ensuing development. Pieterse *et al.* (2008:7) adds that IDPs were meant as platforms through which the public will be engaged with regard to policies and programmes, but instead the public is being fed with information, rather than seeking their input. In the difference between informing and consulting lie the public appearance and the ideal, authentic public participation process (Theron 2009b:119). Local government seldom engages in public participation which empowers the public: it mostly informs or consults the public.

According to Pieterse (2002: 7), the Rio Summit of 1992, which was sponsored by the United Nations (UN), crystallised significant principles aimed at democratising local government, i.e. participation by the poor in decisions affecting their lives, safety nets for poverty reduction, economic growth, labour intensive production methods, democratisation, localisation, environmental protection and sustainability, etc. These democratisation principles emerged during this era, together with the argument that they provide answers to the expectations that local government is responsive to the public's needs and can provide participation opportunities, particularly for the poor.

It was during this Summit that two strands of expected participation characteristics emerged, i.e. that participation is crucial for legitimising state actions and compliance. The other strand focused on the empowerment of the public, to give them the confidence to take charge of their own development and see state democratisation as the primary function of participation (Pieterse 2002:7). This is the ideal situation, as noted above, but although these terms look good on paper, they are hardly practised in South African municipalities. The reality at grass-roots, i.e. IDPs in municipalities, is that consulting and involving strategies are higher regarded than those which empower the public, i.e. authentic public participation.

Section 72 of the Municipal Structures Act (RSA 1998b) provides for the establishment of WCs to enhance participatory democracy within the local government sphere. WCs can only be established by categories A and B municipalities (Cameron 2005:335) in Phago (2008:240). WCs are meant to create a bridge between the public and the political and administrative structures of municipalities. According to Buccus and Hicks (2008:526) and Oldfield (2008:490) like IDPs, WCs are fraught with problems ranging from politics of

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

representation at WC level, structural limits to WC powers and WCs being involved in party politics.

The above-mentioned shortcomings of WCs defeat their good intentions in the sense that, if the public feel that they are ineffective and take political sides, they will lose hope and resort to other means of making their voices heard such as engaging in protests. Gwala and Theron (2012:3) argue that authentic and empowering participation entails the creation of participatory spaces (see Cornwall & Coelho:2007:2-25), in which the participating public, as beneficiaries of a particular programme, project or process, can (i) influence (ii) direct (iii) control and (iv) own the process. If legislation promises the above and the practice delivers something completely opposite; can we blame the public if they take the protest route?

Moreover, Oldfield (2008:493) contends that "patience of some community organisations and movements to work within state-driven and controlled participatory processes has withered and oppositional protests tactics have become routine". Buccus and Hicks (2008:52) sum this up succinctly by stating that participation approaches will fail if people believe that their contribution is used to "rubber stamp" the decisions that have already been made or if they feel that their contribution will not be considered, which is happening in COCT.

CIVICUS (2006:4) puts forward factors that can support or hinder the success of participatory governance approaches, i.e. social, cultural, political, institutional, legal, and economic. Figure 2.2 (below) depicts conditions that influence the success of participatory governance interventions, which CIVICUS seeks to promote. These conditions are relevant in the South African context and need to be enhanced, i.e. (i) the capacity of civil society and (ii) government actors in promoting the development of (iii) effective and innovative systems, mechanisms and tools.

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za



Figure 2.2: Key factors influencing participatory governance

Source: CIVICUS (World Alliance for Citizen Participation) (2006:5)

Having put forward the key factors influencing participatory governance, it is important to note that government and the public stand to gain by working in a collaborative and harmonious manner. In this vein, Friedman (2006:4) provides justifications for government to allow civil society groups in governing, i.e. prevention of resistance from organised groupings as their exclusion will frustrate the government goals it seeks to achieve, to oversee policy implementation and sell it to constituencies.

According to Friedman (2006:4), these are not meant to deepen democracy but to make government "smoother", because only the already organised voices are heard. Another rationale is a genuine commitment from government to "broaden/deepen democracy". In this rationale the grass-root groups are engaged though their structures, such as the Street Committees in Khayelitsha and WCs (where they are properly functioning).

Other examples of participatory governance through context specific public participation strategies that can enhance democracy at a local government level, are participatory planning, participatory tax collection, participatory budgeting, public posting and reporting of local expenditures, participatory community score cards and citizen oversight committees (CIVICUS 2006:3) (see also IAP2 Public Participation Toolbox 2006; World Bank Participation Toolbox 1996). Friedman (2006:4) sums this up succinctly by stating that social policy is hampered by a "representational gap in which the needs of the poor are unknown", and that "participatory governance should seek to deepen democracy through grass-roots not the organised". Friedman cites the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC)\as one

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

example of participating in government, as it was able to force government to provide antiretroviral drugs. The protest march that was led by COSATU in Johannesburg against labour broking and e-tolling is the recent case in point.

2.5 Conclusion

The success of public participation will depend on effective utilisation and application of public participation ideals as spelt out by the IAP2 (2000) core values and the Manila Declaration (1989). The South African government will be forced to adhere to these principles only if it agrees to regard protest as one of the public participation strategies propounded by Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism (DEAT) (2002:3) and supported by the researcher.

This chapter argued that for local government to be democratised, participation should be supplemented by democratisational instruments, such as adhering to developmental principles, as envisaged in the White Paper on Local Government (RSA 1998a), political decentralisation and participatory governance. There is also a need to strengthen the "vehicles for public participation" (IDPs and WCs) in an attempt to deepen democracy and to achieve authentic and empowering public participation.

Theron (2009b:132) sums this up by stating that IDP in South Africa provides an opportunity for the communities to "reclaim their stake in government" and that public participation is a cornerstone principle in the democratisation process and good governance.

The following chapter discusses public participation in a South African context. The discussion will focus on the building blocks of development, typologies and modes of public participation by locating protest action in the spectrum of public participation. A new public participation model will also be developed. This will be done to establish whether it can be used as a public participation strategy. Potential benefits and obstacles of public participation will also be discussed in this chapter. Protest action has become a common practice in South African municipalities and Khayelitsha in particular.

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

CHAPTER THREE

THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONTEXT OF PUBLIC PARTICIPATION

3.1 Introduction

Prior to the introduction of a democratic dispensation in South Africa, the apartheid system of governance was hostile towards the inclusion of the public in decision-making. The hostility meant that the benefits of public participation were enjoyed by one race group only, to the detriment of the majority. This deprived the majority of citizens of a history of authentic public participation in policy-making and implementation (Masango 2002:52).

The democratic government had the responsibility to transform local government into an inclusive, democratic, developmental oriented and participatory sphere, which effectively responds to the needs of the public. As Davids (2009:18) points out, the democratic government's policy reflects an “integrated, people-centred, development approach” and commitment to promoting a “democratic, non-racial, non-sexist society”, characterised by integration between decision-makers, private and voluntary sectors and the intended beneficiaries of development.

This chapter discusses the South African context of public participation in relation to the ideals of a “people-centred development approach”, formulated as the building blocks of development and its impact on the grass-roots masses that are often marginalised. As public participation lies at the heart of democracy, it is important that public participation strategies are discussed i.e. typologies and modes of public participation, as well as the obstacles and benefits they bring.

This chapter will also attempt to locate “protest” within a newly constructed public participation model. Moreover, “protest” will be located within an IAP2 public participation model to motivate why “protest” should be seen as a public participation strategy. This will go a long way in ensuring that the change agents and the intended beneficiaries of development will practise a brand of authentic public participation that will benefit even the poorest of the poor.

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

3.2 Public participation and the building blocks of development

According to Theron (2009a:105) and Swanepoel and De Beer (2011:9), the new local government dispensation has ignited the development debate that has seen various approaches, such as community development, people-centred development, participatory development and capacity-building with bottom-up approaches coming to the fore. Theron (2009a:105) asserts that the development debate is as a result of the failure of development agents and the development industry at large to accept that "authentic, micro-level development means that people themselves must take centre stage in the development debate and its philosophy, theory, strategy and policy".

Davids (2009:18) asserts that the White Paper on Reconstruction and Development of 1994 redefined the development principle, leading to an "integrated people-centred development" approach, to such a degree that it has become a buzzword in the development fraternity (Leal 2007:539, Leal 2010: 89-100) . Korten (1990:67) defines people-centred development as a "process by which the members of a society increase their personal and institutional capacities to mobilise and manage resources to produce sustainable and justifiably distributed improvements in their quality of life, consistent with their own aspirations".

Theron and Ceasar (2008:104) argue that for a people-centred development approach to yield the desired result, the public must be capacitated to be able to participate in the development process, so that they are ultimately able to drive, control and even own the end product. Theron (2009b:121) and Theron and Ceasar (2008:104), see a people-centred development approach as bringing development to its rightful owners (the public) since they are, as a consequence, capable of driving their own development in line with their desires.

Kotze and Kellerman (1997:36) further argue that in a people-centred development approach, government policy will add confidence and even support for the public's endeavours, ensuring that they have ownership and control of their own development. This implies that the "beneficiaries of development" have full participation in decision-making processes and have capacity to make informed decisions. Fokane (2008:36) maintains that this is possible, as a people-centred development approach, provides the public with the freedom to unleash their creative capabilities, as opposed to being passive recipients of development.

Oakley (1991:4) maintains that public participation requires a move away from using external agents to steer change to the locals, but that the locals themselves should steer change.

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

Theron (2009a:107) clarifies that "participation means dismantling the top-down, prescriptive and often arrogant one way knowledge transportation and communication styles, which are imposed on communities by outsiders".

From the arguments raised above, it is clear that the exclusion of the public from development interventions, or imposing it on them, cannot be regarded as development. It is this confusion that has led to the debates on what participatory development means (see Cooke & Kothari 2001-"tyranny debate"; Hickey & Mohan 2004; Cornwall & Coelho 2007). Oakley (1991:6) foresaw this confusion, as he puts it bluntly: "It has now become impossible to come up with a development strategy that is not participatory". This call fell on deaf ears and now seems to be happening in Khayelitsha where lack of public participation has contributed directly to the growing and persistent level of public protests. This implies that the change agents[7] fail to understand that public participation forms an integral part of the people-centred development approach.

Davids (2009:17) maintains that the principles of a people-centred development approach are premised around Meyer and Theron's building blocks of development, which are public participation, social learning, empowerment and sustainability. According to Theron (2009b:123), "people centred development, like the principle of developmental local government, shifts the emphasis in development interventions to the public and away from objects, service delivery and production". It does this by enhancing public skills and capacity, through acknowledging and utilising "own context specific indigenous knowledge systems (IKS) and social capital", for the public to be able to participate in its own development (Theron 2009b:123).

Numerous postgraduate students[8] have also used the building blocks of development as analytical guidelines to contextualise public participation. In the same vein the building blocks of development features prominently, as one of the nine themes of development (Theron 2008:229). This makes it necessary that the change agents and beneficiaries of development should "conceptualise and contextualise the building blocks towards planning a development process" (Theron 2008:229).

Theron (2009b:121) cautions that the building blocks of development are logically connected, meaning it is a step-by-step process. Meyer and Theron (2000:4) assert that "in whatever

[7] As per Theron (2008:1-22), change agent refers to government (local) officials in this study
[8] Gutas (2005:9), Nampila (2005:10), Davy (2006:5), Nekwaya (2007:25) and Siphuma (2009:45)

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

context the complex development concept is used, it must be seen as a building block" as shown below:



Figure 3.1: Building blocks of development

Source: Meyer and Theron (2000:5)

3.2.1 Public participation

According to Theron (2008:14), "the holistic nature of development has, as one of its first point of departure to development planning and facilitation the building block of participation". This is attributed to the fact that public participation is a critical element in the process of human growth, hence it has been placed deliberately as the first building block of development (Theron 2009b:122). This implies that the process of public participation is as complex as human nature itself, because it is an integral part of human development (Theron 2009b:122). Moreover, Liebenberg and Theron (1997:124-127) assert that when Max-Neef (1991) analyses fundamental human needs, he identifies public participation as one of the nine basic human needs that must be satisfied by the development process.

As noted above, for a development intervention to be regarded as authentic, people themselves must take centre stage in the development process in an endeavour to satisfy a basic human need. Authorities thus have an obligation to ensure that every individual, particularly the poorest of the poor, is part of the decision-making mechanism regarding development (Swanepoel & De Beer 2011:50) due to inherent Constitutional rights that

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

apply. For basic human need to be satisfied by a developmental intervention, the public and the development agents alike must be empowered to enable them to make informed decisions. Swanepoel and De Beer (2011:51) warn against the elite wanting to use participation for their own benefit, at the expense of the poor. Should this happen, participation will be reduced to mere "co-option". Hickey and Mohan (2004:9) and Cooke and Kothari (2001:5) argues that these actions of the elite defeat the purpose of participatory development, i.e. that of counteracting the "shortcomings of top-down development approaches".

Participatory development has an important role to play in ensuring that a development intervention impacts on basic human needs. This is more so because participatory approaches to development seek to make the public "central to development by encouraging beneficiary participation in interventions that affect them and over which they previously have limited control or influence (Cooke & Kothari 2001:5). This means that participatory development is biased towards increasing participation of the socially and economically marginalised public in decision-making over their own lives.

As noted above, Gran (1983:327) refers to participatory development as a "self-sustaining process" where development is driven by the community for its betterment (Theron 2009b:120). For Burkey (1993:58), "participatory development implies a collective process of self-improvement". This implies that people who have the same goal come together to share ideas for the attainment of that particular goal.

Furthermore, people learn from their mistakes and end up being experts in their own development. Theron and Ceasar (2008:104) assert that participatory development starts with a smaller group, or "the ring leaders", and gradually reaps the rewards which attract and encourage other members to join in the project. Mosse (2001) in Theron and Ceasar (2008:105) argues that "the key principle of participatory development is the incorporation of local people's knowledge into programme/project planning". The ultimate goal of participatory development will be for the public to become self-reliant. Cooke and Kothari (2001:5) sum this up succinctly, that participatory approaches to development are "justified in terms of sustainability, relevance and empowerment".

Oakley (1991:17) states that self-reliance refers to the gains that people derive as a result of participating in development efforts. For self-reliance to come to the fore, people need to feel that they are driving their own development (Burkey 1993:50). Participation empowers

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

people to gain confidence in their own knowledge and skills and their ability to identify problems and find solutions in order to make improvements (Oakley 1991:17, Burkey 1993:50). This implies that by participating in a programme/ project, the public will learn from their mistakes and eventually become masters of their own development.

3.2.2 Social-learning process approach

As noted above, the building blocks of development are logically connected, meaning it is a step-by-step and incremental process (Theron 2009b:121). In line with this, is the social-learning process approach; the second building block of development. According to Korten (1990:484), the social-learning process approach aims to meet the need for "... a flexible, sustained, experimental, action-based, capacity-building style of assistance..." This approach, according to De Beer (1997:28), extends the principle of bottom-up planning by avoiding the restrictions of a blue-print (top-down) approach. Theron (2009b:123) argues that public participation, through change agents and development organisations, should adopt a learning attitude for programme/ project initiation.

The COCT needs to adopt this approach to ensure that the beneficiaries of development are not brought in as spectators in the social learning process, but as active participants in their own development (Theron 2009b:123). Swanepoel and De Beer (2006:33) argue that, to ensure that change agents and development organisations adhere to a social learning process approach, change agents must be sent to communities with an "empty agenda". In other words, they should approach the public with "empty slates", ready to instil the culture of the learning process in them. The World Bank (1996:2) supports this assumption and states that:

Over time development experience has shown that when external experts alone acquire, analyse and process information and present this information in reports, social change usually does not take place, whereas the kind of social learning that stakeholders generate and internalise during the participatory planning and/or implementation of a development activity does enable social change.

To instil the culture of social mutual learning and partnership between the public in Khayelitsha and the COCT, as highlighted by Korten (1983:213-214) in Theron (2009b:123), three elements must be integrated into project design, planning, implementation and monitoring, i.e.

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

1. The community and the development intervention: The wishes of the community and the project's output must be compatible and integrated.

2. The community and the organisation (COCT): The formulation of the needs and grievances by the people and the decision-making process of the organisation should be integrated.

3. The programme and the organisation (COCT): The programme objectives must be in line with the capacity of the organisation.

The social-learning process approach provides the beneficiaries of development with an opportunity to contribute in the design of a development intervention through their IKS, social capital and local, context-specific knowledge (Theron 2009b:124).

3.2.3 Capacity-building

The third building block of development is capacity-building. Swanepoel and De Beer 2011:26) assert that capacity-building means the strengthening of personal and institutional ability to undertake tasks. According to De Beer (1997:21), capacity-building "rests on the premise that people can lead their own change processes". This can be achieved by adopting a learning-process approach, aimed at capacitating the beneficiaries of development to eventually take control of their own development (Korten 1980:502 in De Beer 1997:21). This calls for collaboration (planning together and learning from each other's mistakes) between the beneficiaries of development and authorities.

According to Mohaneng (2000:135), capacity-building comprises three main components. Firstly, it provides access to information and knowledge, social mobilisation and the material and financial resources required for meaningful participation by the public in decisions that affect their lives. DWAF (2001: 20) stresses the need for the previously disadvantaged to be part of public participation processes because they possess "experience and knowledge, both indigenous knowledge and modern," and they know their own situation better than external change agents (Theron 2008:1-22).

The second component involves making productive resources available to the underprivileged, entailing equitable distribution of economic resources and access to land and financial resources. In this way the negative effects, emanating from the imbalances of the past, are minimised and the public gradually realises its potential. Of significance is that the

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

capacity-building process must take into consideration and accommodate the variety of societal, economic and cultural differences found in that particular community, while it must also be grounded in the contextual realities applicable in the particular municipality (Swanepoel & De Beer 2011:26).

The last component of capacity-building relates to the effectiveness of both administrative and institutional structures (Bryant &White 1992:15). In essence this means that a municipal political structure must be accountable and responsive to the needs of the people. It must be free from corruption and services must be delivered in an efficient manner.

According to De Beer (1997:22), government, primarily, must bring about capacity-building, but only as an enabler, not hands-on. "Non-governmental organisations, voluntary organisations, community-based organisations and the private sector" must also assist in capacity-building, depending on the extent of their participation in development interventions (De Beer 1997:22). This assistance, according to Korten (1990:484), must be part of a learning process characterised by a flexible, sustained, experimental, action-based, capacity-building approach. The observation by Parnell *et al.* (2002) and Van Donk *et al.* (2008) however shows that the "development" ideal in "developmental local government" is currently just an ideal.

Swanepoel and De Beer (2011:26) warn that, while it is important that the capacity-building process be developed in participation with the participants, there must be a structure capacitated by capable people, to avoid the danger of attracting ill trained trainers with no support system to assist them. If training proceeds under such conditions, participants will be frustrated and resort to protest action.

3.2.4 Empowerment

The fourth building block of development is empowerment. According to Watt *et al.* (2000:120) in Theron (2009b: 124), the issues of public participation and empowerment in the planning process for service delivery are essential to sustainable development. This implies that, for sustainable development to take place, the public should have power to drive its own development. Because, according to Swanepoel and De Beer (2011:52), people empowerment is a process fed by information, knowledge and experience which leads to the public having confidence in their own abilities. This is in line with Liebenberg and Theron's (1997:124) assertion that the process of empowerment is aimed at increasing personal and

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

institutional capacities of the public, in order to mobilise and manage resources towards meeting their basic needs.

According to Theron (2008:16), empowered participation entails the requirement through participation of "leverage" for the participants in a development process. There are two conditions for this to occur (Oakley 1991:9), (1) the public is empowered through their skills and abilities, for them to be able to do things for themselves, i.e. management and negotiation skills, (2) the public is equipped to be able to take decisions and to take actions in a development process. Once this is done, the public must be continuously supported, by providing necessary information to make good decision-making possible (Swanepoel & De Beer 2011:52). This ensures that the public is empowered to be able to assume power in development interventions and decisions.

It is important that the public in Khayelitsha, for example, have the means to assume the power that they end up demanding through public protests. Public protests are mainly about the demand to be able to influence, direct, control and eventually own the development intervention. This calls for information systems and training opportunities to be put in place, as Swanepoel and De Beer (2006:30) put it, "empowerment is a mixture between the right to make decisions and the ability to make decisions".

3.2.5 Sustainability

Sustainability is the last building block of development. The World Commission on Environment and Development (1987:43) defines sustainable development as "development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs" (Theron 2009b:125, Treurnicht 2000:63).

According to Swanepoel and De Beer (2011:53) sustainability issues are a result of a "revolutionary paradigm shift in science and development practice", which they call the "view of holism". This means that human nature and the rest of nature form a oneness, a whole, which if not properly managed, all living things will diminish (Swanepoel & De Beer 2011:53). This calls for the revitalisation of knowledge systems that help to sustain environmental systems over long periods of time and be shared in a reciprocal way (Swanepoel & De Beer 2011:53).

"Sustainable development is not a destination, but a dynamic process of adaptation, learning

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

and action. It is about recognising, understanding and acting on interconnections - above all, those between the economy, society and the natural environment" (UN 2012:8). Swanepoel and De Beer (2011:55) warn that "learning for sustainable development must be open ended and people should realise that collectively and individually they seldom have the knowledge to approach development with confidence".

Liebenberg and Theron (1997:126) argue that participation and empowerment are central components of sustainable development on the basis that sustainable development should be based on advantageous realisation of access to and mobilisation of resources by the marginalised, in order to tackle their basic needs.

Saide (2006:32) correctly points out that the other four components of the building blocks of development form an integral part of sustainable development, i.e. participation, social-learning, capacity-building and empowerment. Sustainable development at local government level in South Africa will not be achieved if municipalities do not manage to establish local government-community planning partnerships (Khan & Cranko 2002:262-275), through which the public are empowered to influence, direct, control and own their "own" development.

3.3 Typologies and modes of public participation

Theron's (2009b:114) assertion that "today it is almost impossible to suggest a development strategy which is not in some way participatory", suggests that public participation occupies a central place in development thinking and practice (Kumar 2002:23). This, however, does not mean that development practitioners, policy makers or the public agree on what public participation is and how it should be implemented (Theron 2009b:115). Public participation is understood, interpreted and enlisted differently, depending on the context in which it is used (Theron 2008:106; Kumar 2002:24; Chambers 2005:104). According to Theron (2009b:116), this has prompted researchers like Arnstein (1969) and Pretty (1994) to develop typologies of public participation within which public participation can be conceptualised and put into practice. Chambers (2005:105) cautions that typologies, ladders and modes of public participation are not cast in stone, but act as a guide and can be adapted to suit the prevailing situations, contexts and needs.

In assessing the value of typologies and models of public participation, the researcher's contention is (see building blocks) that the public should be able to influence, direct, control

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

and “own” their own development.

Pretty *et al.* (1995) provide the following typologies of public participation:

1. **Passive participation:** Authorities unilaterally take decisions on the public’s behalf, in other words, the public have no say in, nor get to know about, projects meant for their development. They are told only once a decision has already been taken or are told beforehand what is to be decided. This is in contrast with the core values of IAP2 (2000), i.e. the public should have a say in decisions about actions that affect their lives.

2. **Participation in information giving:** The public participate by answering questions posed in questionnaires or respond to telephone interviews or similar “participation strategies” mostly utilised by external change agents. The public do not have the opportunity to influence proceedings as the findings are neither shared nor evaluated for accuracy.

3. **Consultation:** The public participate by being consulted by external people (i.e. not members of their community). These change agents, in a top-down manner, define both the problems and possible solutions and may modify these in the light of responses gathered. This type of a consultative process does not give the public a share in decision-making nor are the external change agents under any obligation to incorporate the input received (See Gutas 2005).

4. **Participation for material incentives:** The public participate by being provided in return for food and cash or other material incentives. This is prevalent in the farming community where farmers provide the fields but the public is not involved in the experimentation or the process of learning. People have no stake in prolonging the activities when the incentives end.

5. **Functional participation:** The public participate by forming groups to meet predetermined objectives related to the project, which may involve the development or promotion of externally-initiated social organisations. This type of involvement tends not to occur at the early stages of project cycles or planning, but only after major decisions have been taken.

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

6. **Interactive participation:** The public participate in joint analysis, development of action plans and formation or strengthening of local institutions. Participation is seen as a right, not just a means of achieving project goals.

7. **Self-mobilisation:** The public participate by taking initiatives, independent of external institutions and change agents. They develop contacts with external institutions for resources and the technical advice they need, but retain control over how resources are used. Such self-initiated mobilisation and collective action may or may not challenge existing inequitable distribution of wealth and power.

Oakley and Marsden (1984) provide four modes of public participation (which overlap with Pretty *et al.'s* (1995) typologies above). The four are:

1. **Anti-participatory mode**. Public participation is considered a voluntary *contribution* by the public to a programme/project which will lead to development, but the public is not expected to take part in shaping the programme/project content and outcomes.

2. **Manipulation mode**. Public participation includes *involvement* in decision-making processes, implementing programmes/projects, evaluating such programmes/projects and sharing the benefits.

3. **Incremental mode**. Public participation is concerned with organised efforts to increase *control* over resources and regulative institutions in given social situations for groups or movements excluded from such control.

4. **Authentic public participation**. Public participation is an active process by which the public *influence* the direction and execution of a programme/project with a view to *enhancing* their well-being in terms of income, personal growth, self-reliance or other values which they cherish.

For Theron (2009b:117) public participation should be "presented along a spectrum that shows progression from passive participation (public told what to do) at one end and self-mobilisation (public control) at the other" as shown if Figure 3.2 below. The ideal situation is when the public is able to influence, direct, control and own the decision-making process and the development intervention.

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za



Figure 3.2: A Spectrum of public participation

Source: Kumar (2002:25)

The striking phenomenon in this spectrum is the variation in the participation process control between the public and outsiders. For example, moving from passive participation to self-mobilisation, outsiders dominate the process, while control of local people is minimal if not non-existent (Kumar 2002:26). At the other end (self-mobilisation), local people have total control, as opposed to outsiders' minimal control. This can be regarded as authentic participation.

From the researcher's observation, it is at the "participation by consultation" level that the people of Khayelitsha demand that their voices be heard by utilising protest action as a public participation strategy. Protest action is used to draw the attention of the COCT authorities to their endeavours and to compel the Council to include them in development planning and implementation. This inclusive approach is currently non-existent.

Following Kumar (2002:26), the public in Khayelitsha is demanding that power be transferred to them. In other words, they are demanding interactive participation and participation through self-mobilisation, as they view these options as empowering and being the only way to gain control over their resources and lives (Kumar 2002:26). This interpretation/distinction of public participation is in line with Oakley's (1991:7) interpretation of the concept - a means to an end which can be equated to passive participation and an end to itself, classified as active participation, as depicted in Table 3.1 below (Theron 2009b:118).

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

Table 3.1: Comparative Analysis: Participation as means and/or as an end

Participation as a means	Participation as an end
Implies the use of participation to achieve some predetermined goal or objective	Attempts to empower people to participate in their own development more meaningfully
Attempts to utilise existing resources in order to achieve the objective of programmes/projects	Attempts to ensure the increased role of people in development initiatives
Emphasises achieving the objective rather than the act of participation itself	Focuses on improving the ability of the people to participate rather than just achieving the predetermined objectives of the programme/project
More common in government programmes/project, where the main concern is to mobilise the community and involve them in improving the efficiency of the delivery system	Finds relatively less favour with government agencies. NGO's in principle agree with this viewpoint
Generally a short term process	Generally a long term process
Appears to be a passive form of participation	Relatively more active and dynamic than participation as a means

Source: Kumar (2002:26)

In addition to the above distinctions and in demonstrating different conceptions of public participation, it is also important to differentiate between "involvement" and "empowerment".

According to Swanepoel and De Beer (2006:28), participation does not mean involvement. They argue that: "When we **involve** people in projects, we allow them in, under certain conditions, to take part in certain actions in a prescribed way". This, according to Theron (2009b:118) is a "weak form of participation which can be equated to co-option/mobilisation/an anti-participatory and manipulative mode of participation / placation /consultation / informing and other slippery concepts". The strong interpretation of participation equates participation to empowerment (Bryant & White 1982:16, 205, De Beer 2000:272 in Theron 2009b:119). Swanepoel and De Beer (2006:31) argue that "empowerment does not necessarily mean possessing certain skills and token representation in, for example, a committee, but to have "decision-making power" (Taconni & Tisdell 1993:413 in Swanepoel & De Beer 2006:30).

In the light of the above presentation it is important to note the different purposes of public participation conceptions and strategies. In the same vein, Cornwall (2008:270) argues that "typologies are a useful starting point for differentiating degrees and kinds of participation". This is shown by, for example, the Arnstein's (1969) ladder of public participation that seeks to measure the extent of the public contribution in the public participation process, as

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

opposed to Pretty *et al.'s* (1995) demonstration of different conceptions of public participation, as well as Oakley and Marsden's (1984) depiction of ranges or bands of public participation. This confirms the assertion that public participation is a complex concept and approach and that it is understood, interpreted and enlisted differently, depending on the context in which it is used (Theron 2008:106, Kumar 2002:24, Chambers 2005:104). However, it is important to note that all three models are able to show non-participation at the extreme left (bottom) and authentic participation at the extreme right (top).

Comparing Pretty *et al.'s* (1995) seven typologies and Arnstein's (1969) ladder of participation against Oakley and Marsden's (1984) modes of public participation, there is an overlap that can be deduced, i.e. an anti-participatory mode can be associated with Arnstein's (1969) manipulation and Pretty *et al.'s* (1995) passive participation. Manipulation is equated to Arnstein's (1969) placation, consultation, informing and therapy and Pretty *et al.'s* (1995) functional participation and participation in information giving. Oakley and Marsden's (1984) incremental mode is similar to Arnstein's (1969) delegated power and Pretty *et al.'s* (1995) interactive participation. Lastly, authentic public participation is similar to public control and partnership (Arnstein 1969) and Pretty *et al.'s* (1995) self-mobilisation as depicted in Table 3.2 below.

Table 3.2: Comparison of Arnstein's (1969), ladder and Pretty *et al.'s* (1995) typologies of public participation against Oakley and Marsden's (1984) modes of public participation

1.Anti-participatory mode	• Manipulation	• Passive participation
2. Manipulation mode	• Placation • Consultation • Informing • Therapy	• Functional participation • Participation in information giving
3. Incremental mode	• Delegated power	• Interactive participation
4. Authentic public participation	• Public control • Partnership	• Self-mobilisation

***Source*:** By Author (2012)

In a South African context, public participation is concentrated on two modes, i.e. anti-participatory mode and manipulation mode which closely overlaps with the "involvement" and "consultation" strategies often used. This is evidenced by the fact that most municipalities find it difficult to adhere to the principles of the IDP, which is supposed to be

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

the embodiment of participation in the municipality. According to Theron (2009c: 141) an IDP "is the principal strategic planning instrument which guides and informs all planning, budgeting, management and decision-making in a municipality". It is an all-encompassing instrument that also acts as a participation vehicle at a local level of government.

Public participation in the IDP process comprises of five phases, through which the public must take part (Tshabalala & Lombard 2009:397). These phases according to Tshabalala and Lombard (2009:397) range from the analysis of local needs, identification and establishment of priorities, leading to the definition of the local vision, project design and integration with other programmes, to the final adoption of the IDP. It has to be noted that public participation should form an integral part of all these phases.

The Municipal Systems Act (RSA 2000) spelt out participatory obligations for local government and imposed a new concept of IDP over various other pieces of legislation. The reality however is, that public participation of the intended beneficiaries at municipal level in South Africa seldom reaches the ideals presented in the above models. What is referred to as "public participation" in the majority of IDPs, seldom go beyond "involving" and "consulting" the public.

As a public participation vehicle (IDPs), it is expected that local authorities will ensure the integration of public views and aspirations into an IDP, in line with the provisions of the Municipal Systems Act (RSA 2000). This seldom happens. The intentions of the IDP are clear and look good on paper, however the critics point to a number of shortcomings. Tseola (2012:165) argues that "IDP service delivery planning has alienated the public by closing down the scope for political deliberations and thwarting the potential for joint supply, non-rivalness, non-excludability and non-rejectability".

Furthermore, Harrison (2008:327) and Tshabalala & Lombard (2009:397), state that IDPs reinforce a top-down approach, tend to be prescriptive and are driven by municipalities, thus excluding the input of the beneficiaries of development. According to Tseola (2012:165), this is caused by the "hegemonic planning approach" underlying municipal IDPs, which allow programme/project planning to supersede public views, needs and wishes. This brings about anger and disillusionment on the part of the public and protests follow. Pieterse *et al.* (2008:7) add that IDPs were meant as platforms for engaging the public regarding policies and programmes. However, rather than seeking their input, the public is being fed

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

information which is equivalent to the anti-participatory mode discussed above. In this lies the difference between "informing" and "consulting" the public (i.e. the manipulation mode) and the ideal, authentic public participation (Theron 2009b:119).

This confusion on what constitutes "public participation", according to Theron (2009b:120), could primarily be attributed to Arnstein's (1969) level 5: consultation (manipulation mode), which is often the point of departure in IDP (Watt *et al.* 2000:121 in Theron 2009:120). Tshishonga and Mbambo (2008:772) add that "from the Arnstein's (1969) ladder of public participation, it is evident that those who pay lip service to the notion of participation subjugate communities in consulting, informing, therapeutic as well as manipulative modes of participation". The dangers associated with this practice are that the public's culture to engage critically, is eroded and people are used to rubber stamp decisions that has already been made (Tshishonga & Mbambo 2008:772).

The above emanates from a "new culture", as argued by Theron (2009b:120) that the manner in which "consultation" is used in South African policies, is as if it will ultimately result in "social equity". The researcher argues that it is during the non-participation (anti-participatory mode) and degrees of tokenism (manipulation mode) levels, that the public is "fed up" and utilise protest power to forcefully graduate to public power (see Mchunu Public Participation Model below). At this level (protest power) of the ladder, the public mobilise and protest to demand their right to influence, direct, control and own development and decision-making processes. Tshishonga and Mbambo (2008:772) succinctly sum this up by stating that "power to the people results from continuous engagement and challenging power relations that extend the tendencies of relegating the poor and disenfranchised outside the decision-making and power structures".

As explained above, public participation is a complex concept that is understood and interpreted differently, depending on the context within which it is used; the same applies to its strategies. According to Theron (2009b:127) public participation strategies must not be seen as "blueprints", instead they must be used to suit the prevailing circumstances, as each public participation process will necessitate "specific, relevant, or a combination of strategies". In other words it is of the essence "to pay closer attention to who is participating, in what and for whose benefit" (Cornwall 2008:269).

Having analysed Arnstein's (1969) ladder of public participation, Oakley and Marsden's

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

modes of public participation and Pretty *et al.'s* (1995) typology, the distinction lies in a power struggle between the public's attempt to influence, direct, control and own development and decision-making processes that rightfully belong to them and the municipal authorities avoiding and resisting public power.

The researcher has developed the Mchunu Public Participation Model. Protest in the Mchunu Public Participation Model is located between "public power" and "tokenism", indicating that the public's frustrations and disillusionment caused by non-participation and tokenism compels them to protest and demand public power. Swanepoel and De Beer (2011:50) argue that tokenism is practiced when the public is mobilised and then having its participation limited or prescribed. Moreover, when we involve people in programmes/projects, we allow them in, under certain conditions, to take part in certain actions in a prescribed way. According to Swanepoel and De Beer (2011:50), this therefore means that the whole process is pre-planned by the change agents and authorities.

The ideal situation is when the public is mobilised to participate fully and in all aspects of the development programme/project, which leads to the public being part of the decision-making and planning of the programme/project. In other words, the public is part of the implementation and evaluation of the programme/project and have meaningful participation in the management of the development intervention (Swanepoel & De Beer 2011:50).

Figure 3.3 below provides an outline of the public participation model which is advocated by this study and within which public participation will be evaluated.

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

Levels of participation	Types	Characteristics
Public power	Public control	The public is in a position to influence, direct, control and own development and decision-making processes.
	Delegated power	Decisions are taken through negotiations between the public and authorities. The public has majority stake and have delegated authority.
	Partnership	Decisions are no longer taken unilaterally but the public and authorities have equal decision-making power.
Protest power	Protest	The public is frustrated with "tokenism" and as a last resort; peaceful protests are staged to demand authentic and empowering public participation. The public mobilise to demand the right to influence, direct, control and own development and decision-making processes. If all else fails, the public resort to violent protest action to draw the attention of the authorities to its plight.
Tokenism	Placation	The public demands are ignored and the public is beginning to have some little influence. Members of the public are handpicked and co-opted to serve on committees, but the authorities still retain the power to make final decisions.
	Consultation	The public is given an opportunity to make input in decisions but there is no guarantee that their input will be incorporated into final decisions. The public input is used to legitimise decisions that have already been taken.
	Informing	The public is informed about development that is taking place in their locality. Emphasises a one way flow of information with no mechanisms to channel feedback. This level can be equated to "window dressing".
Non-participation	Therapy	The public is used to mask therapy as public participation, it is dishonest and arrogant.
	Manipulation	The members of the public are co-opted to serve on Ward Committees but are used to rubber-stamp Council decisions. Participation is used as pretence since the public is unable to influence, direct, control and own decision-making processes.

Figure 3.3: Mchunu Public Participation Model

Source: By Author (2012)

In the same vein IAP2 (2007) provides the "spectrum" of public participation which is aimed at increasing the impact of the public in making decisions. This "spectrum" clarifies various forms of public participation:

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

The above-mentioned overview emphasises a need for public officials to keep contact with the public in a manner that increases the levels of influence, direction, control and ownership of the public. DEAT (2002:3) asserts that the IAP2 (2007) spectrum for public participation provides a starting point for addressing confusion surrounding the concept of public participation. This relates to the levels of influence that the beneficiaries of development should exert in decision-making processes. DEAT (2002:3) is of the opinion in that the IAP 2 spectrum must be modified by adding in "protest" as the first level in the spectrum (see figure 3.4 below).



Figure 3.4: The spectrum of public participation

Source: DEAT (2002:4)

DEAT (2002:3) argues that in most instances "protest" is viewed as emanating from the breakdown of trust between the beneficiaries of development and authorities, yet "protest" is a useful strategy of ensuring that the public will have an impact on decision-making processes. Van Donk *et al*. (2008:152) contend that "the upsurge in popular protests and non-violent, direct action is an integral part of participatory local democracy and fully in line with the scope for democratic expression envisaged in the Municipal Systems Act (RSA 2000)".

Based on the researcher's observation and as an employee of the COCT, the decision to erect open toilets in Khayelitsha was reversed by the Western Cape High Court as a result of protest action by the public in Khayelitsha. Another example of (successful) protest action relates to high-profile, municipal-boundary and demarcation disputes such as that of Khutsong and Matatiele. In this case, protest action by the public was the "first stage in full-fledged delegitimation of the local state" (Mottiar & Bond 2011:18). The cases above illustrate the "power of protest action".

Besides the fact that protest action played a major role in bringing about democracy in South Africa, Mottiar and Bond (2011:18) correctly point out that, "Sometimes the rationale for

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

protest follows decades-old cultural traditions, which, like during the apartheid era, reflect an inadequate opportunity for local political participation". Theron (2008:120) concurs and adds that the frustrated "beneficiaries of development" are left with no option but to protest, especially if formal participation structures such as the IDP, fail. In fact, the option to protest has historically been part of public participation and democracy in South Africa and is also enshrined in the Constitution (RSA 1996). This trend continued in a new democratic dispensation, as in the late 1990s when Nelson Mandela's government was protested against after only a brief "honeymoon" (Bond 2000: 217-223 in Mottiar & Bond 2011:3).

In light of the ever escalating public protests in Khayelitsha, it is high time that protest action is viewed and documented in statutory literature as a public participation strategy. The question that needs to be asked is whether the South African authorities are willing to accept and institutionalise "protest" as a public participation strategy. If not, it could be because "protests and system monitoring are not popular activities among those who are protective of what they may perceive to be their prerogative to abuse the power they hold" (Korten 1990:187).

In India, public protests are widely accepted as part of normal politics and viewed as a way of getting into contact with the authorities (Mottiar & Bond 2011:18). In essence, protest in India is viewed as complementing the official channels of political participation, such as the role WCs and Councillors are meant to play in South Africa (Mottiar & Bond 2011:18). Based on the researcher's observation, this seldom happens in South Africa with protests rather seen as the work of criminals which must be suppressed and be dealt with harshly.

Regardless of the harsh realities protest action has endured, we have seen the "power of protest action" at play, for example, in the recent Local Government Turnaround Strategy (COGTA 2009:19) and the Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Coordinated Oversight on Service Delivery, 2010:47), both specific government responses to protest in South Africa. These reports state that a lack of municipal-public interface is what causes the public to "take to the streets and protest" and recommend that the WC model be refined to give effect to participatory democracy in communities (Mottiar & Bond 2011:18).

Furthermore, protest action plays a pivotal role in soliciting reaction, drawing attention of the authorities to the public plight and even forcing authority's hand to allow public participation in decision-making processes. The South African authorities need to follow the Indian

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

example and regard protest as a public-participation strategy. As Mottiar and Bond (2011:18) posit: "If social protest is taking hold as a way for aggrieved poor and working-class South Africans to articulate and enforce their interests, then a range of understandings of this phenomenon should be considered".

It is the opinion of the researcher that we will otherwise continue to witness the emergence of more confrontational approaches, such as the so-called "Arab Springs", "Occupy Wall Street" (Schneider 2011:2) movements in the United States of America and here at home, the "Occupy Rondebosch Common" (Ndenze 2012). The current situation in South African municipalities in this regard (lack of authentic and empowering public participation opportunity) necessitates the public to adopt a more proactive approach (i.e. protest) to demand an increase in the present levels of their participation impact and resulting influence in decision-making, as shown in figure 3.3 and 3.4 above.

Having located "protest" in the Mchunu Public Participation Model (see figure 3.3 above) and at the lowest level of the IAP2 spectrum (see figure 3.4 above) in support of DEAT's (2002:3) modification of the spectrum, it is important to look at other elements of the spectrum. Confusion around public participation and its strategies rages on and is further compounded by the DEAT (2002:3) resolve to replace the term "participation" with "engagement". In the same vein an email conversation between Larry Susskind and the IAP2 members (Carson 2008:67) provide insight into the concerns about the effectiveness of the IAP2 spectrum in increasing the levels of impact on decisions (see Theron *et al.* 2007).

To begin with, "inform". The confusion surrounding it relates to it not being regarded as public participation, as it represents a "passive role" for the public. To have information disseminated to you does not mean you are participating in a meaningful way, although it is not seen as "passive" from a decision-maker point of view (Carson 2008:76). Theron (2005:117) argues that the manner in which concepts such as "inform", "consult" and "involve" "are defined and implemented in South Africa, do not constitute authentic public participation". For DEAT (2002:4) "inform" is indeed a one-way information flow, however, it is not meant to influence or change opinions and attitudes, but to help "stakeholders to understand an issue at hand, alternatives, solutions or the decision-making process" (IAP2 2000).

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

Furthermore, for DEAT (2002:4) “inform” forms an integral part of its initiatives, in the sense that some instances require that people are informed, consulted, involved, etc. In other words, the project level, or the task at hand, dictates the course of action (DWAF 2005:10; Association for Water and Rural Development 2009:2). As noted above, in South African local government, particularly in relation to the IDP, consultation is promoted, but for some it connotes a pseudo process in which people are asked to give input, but the change agents define both the problem and the solution (Theron *et al.* 2007:8). This is more so because there is no obligation on the part of a change agent to respond to people’s needs; all he/she has to do is consult (Theron *et al.* 2007:8). The reason for this is, as the World Bank (1996:4) states, that “consult” is an essential element of participation, but should not be equated to “participation”, because the element of learning, from the beneficiary’s side, is still missing in “consult”. Consultation explicitly excludes the beneficiaries of development from decision-making (Theron *et al.* 2007:8).

Involvement in South African local government does not fulfil the IAP2 intended requirements, in the sense that it suggests “co-optation, placation, manipulation and the like” (a manipulative mode of public participation) (Theron 2005:17 in Theron *et al.* 2007:9). Carson (2008:77) correctly argues that concepts like “involve” and “consult” should be combined, as the difference is subtle.

The Association for Water and Rural Development's (2009:2) spectrum of public participation provides the first four levels of the IAP2 (2002) spectrum, but omits “empower” as an autonomous decision-making process. According to the Association for Water and Rural Development (2009:2), autonomous decision-making is non-existent in the South African legal context; only a collaborative manner of decision-making qualifies. This is true for South Africa and confirms the primary purpose of the spectrum; that it is not a “blue-print”, does not give instructions on the correct way of conducting public participation, but acts as a reflection of various processes to aid decision-makers on how much input and influence they can count on and have to commit to (Carson 2008:77).

Theron *et al.* (2007:11) maintains that “centralised, top-down legislation and administration create obstacles to grassroots, bottom-up participation of the collaborative sort”. As a result, administrative structures like the IDP value control highly and are constrained by rigid, blue-print style guidelines set out in legislation” (Davids 2005:52-74 in Theron *et al.* 2007:11).

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

Theron *et al.* (2007:11) assert that "such structures are in conflict with the requirements of the hope-to-be empowered public, as they are inconsistent with collaboration", although the first three can be regarded as being in line with the manipulation mode discussed above. South African local government legislation envisions the aspects of the spectrum of public participation. The Municipal Systems Act (RSA 2000), for example, requires that the public must participate in the development of the IDP. In practice this seems to be lacking, as evidenced by the prevalence of public protests in Khayelitsha.

A possible solution to this problem as Theron *et al.* (2007:11) suggest, will be for public participation practitioners in South Africa to adapt the "IAP2 principles" and the "spectrum" to apply to their development initiatives, as this will provide a solid platform for the development of public participation strategies and tools.

While it is important to consider international guidelines for public participation, it is appreciated that participation facilitators must always (first) assess the local context(s) before an "appropriate mix" of strategies can be decided upon (Gwala & Theron 2012:8). Appropriate strategies will ensure that the public is provided with the scope to influence, direct, control and even own development interventions and decision-making processes.

3.4 Obstacles to public participation

The inclination for the public in Khayelitsha to resort to unconventional means of public participation indicates that there is a stalemate between the public and authorities representing the COCT. It is therefore important to consider the factors that negatively affect public participation. Oakley (1991:11) recognises three factors as obstacles to public participation, as it occurs in a highly-contestable, socio-political environment. These are: structural obstacles, administrative obstacles and social obstacles.

3.4.1 Structural obstacles are prevalent in governments with a centralised political system. This system discourages grassroots participation in decision-making. As Kumar (2002:29) points out, it is "typified by a top down development approach". Fortunately, at least on paper, the South African government has enacted laws that encourage public participation. The local government sphere, perceived to be closer to the people, has been entrusted with the responsibility of ensuring that the public participate meaningfully in the affairs that affect their lives. This is done through

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

IDP's and the establishment of WCs.

3.4.2 **Administrative obstacles** are caused by centralised administrative structures, which tend to have absolute control over decision-making and development planning and the allocation of resources, information and knowledge (Oakley 1991:11). This leaves the beneficiaries of development outside of the redevelopment interventions that are meant for their benefit. In essence, a set of guidelines are put in place, adopting a blue-print approach that usurps local people's say in the decisions affecting their lives and which even swallows up their resources (Kumar 2002:29) .

3.4.3 **Social obstacles**, like the mentality of dependence and culture of silence also impede. Domination by the local elite or even gender inequality militates against people's participation" (Kumar 2002:29).

3.5 Benefits of public participation

As indicated above the dawn of democracy in South Africa raised hopes that the marginalised will finally enjoy the benefits of public participation, which previously benefited the selected few. These hopes emanated from the introduction of progressive laws such as the Constitution (RSA, 1996), Municipal Systems Act (RSA, 2000), Municipal Structures Act (RSA, 1998b) and a host of others. The legislation made public participation a democratic and fundamental right, as Mzimakwe (2010:504) points out in that "public participation is fundamental in order to sustain democracy and promote good governance".

The researcher argues that the prevalence of public protests in Khayelitsha is caused by lack of authentic and empowering public participation, that will enable the public to influence, direct, control and own the development and decision-making processes meant to take them out of poverty. Because public participation in decision-making increases buy-in into government policies and ensure that the public understands the constraints within which service delivery occur (Nleya 2011:5). This means that if the public in Khayelitsha was made part of decision-making processes, public protests will not be as widespread as they are currently.

If the public in Khayelitsha is allowed an opportunity to decide on what is best for themselves and make decisions that affect their lives, the decisions stand a better chance of being accepted and embraced by the broader Khayelitsha citizenry. From the researcher's

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

observation, the opposite is happening in Khayelitsha. The public is made to embrace predetermined decisions, which contradicts the rationale of public participation. The public should be allowed participation from the formative stages rather than when the choices have already been made by the authorities (Mzimakwe 2010:504).

Public participation in Khayelitsha will help resolve problems related to basic services delivery. On the one hand, the public will be in a position to understand the operations of the municipality such as budget allocations, different government spheres competencies and mandates and related constraints. On the other hand the COCT will be in a position to understand the immediate needs and priorities of the public in Khayelitsha.

Furthermore, Irvin and Stansbury (2004:3) provide the benefits that can be derived from public participation to both public participants and government in decision-making processes, as shown in Figure 3.5 below:



Figure 3.5: Advantages of public participation in government decision-making

Source: Irvin and Stansbury (2004:3)

Kangwane (2008:19) lists the following potential benefits for public participation:

1. It enhances allocative efficiency.
2. It increases the chances of effectiveness by applying local knowledge in implementing public programmes and projects.

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

3. It improves equity, since the ability and willingness to pay for services are better assessed at a local level.

4. It enhances accountability, because if it is authentic empowering participation, local people can strongly demand transparency.

According to Creighton (2005:17), public participation is designed to give an opportunity to decision-makers to engage in dialogue with the intended beneficiaries, before a final decision is taken. If this happens, it will mean that authentic public participation is practised and Khayelitsha residents, for example, will have no reason to embark on public protests.

Creighton (2005:17) lists the following potential benefits that can be derived from public participation, i.e.:

1. **Improved quality of decisions** – Deliberations between authorities and the public allow for the exploration of alternatives, thus choosing the best option. The public have a better understanding of their locality and possess crucial information that may improve quality of decisions. It can authenticate available information on local needs, capacity and realities, which may lead to effective and efficient implementation of development interventions (Van der Waldt & Knipe 1998:144 in Davids 2009: 20).

2. **Minimising costs and delays** – The public-participation process is time consuming (Davids 2009: 20), but time taken in following a process to a considered outcome, far outweighs the consequences of unilateral decisions. Unilateral decisions are made quickly, but may be very expensive to implement. They are prone to resistance, litigation and delays as evidenced by persistent public protests in Khayelitsha. Authentic public participation also creates a basis for understanding affordability issues and creating the necessary conditions for cost recovery (Davids 2009: 20).

3. **Consensus building** – Strengthening partnerships between the public and authorities minimises controversies and gives legitimacy to government decisions.

4. **Increased ease of implementation** – Participating in decision-making gives people a sense of ownership (Khosa 2000:227). Communities tend to commit themselves to such an extent, when there is public participation that they want to see and ensure that it works. In this way people accept responsibility for their development, thus promoting self-reliance (Burkey 1993:40).

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

5. **Avoiding worst-case confrontations** – Early enough participation by Khayelitsha residents in decision-making could reduce adversarial confrontations that usually come about as a result of the public protests, often leading to loss of lives and destruction of property.

6. **Maintaining credibility and legitimacy** – Authorities in some instances have to make controversial decisions, for example the COCT erected open toilets for Khayelitsha residents. If residents were part of the decisions, they would have understood the rationale behind the decision, instead of resorting to costly mass action.

7. **Anticipating public concerns and attitudes** – On-going public participation helps to educate and enlighten authorities about residents' preferences, grievances and important issues, thus averting confrontations before they occur.

8. **Developing civil society** – Public participation provides opportunities for the public to learn processes of decision making, prepares and nurtures leaders, develops a pool of future leaders, builds social cohesion and teaches problem solving skills which are most needed in Khayelitsha. This means that public participation as shown by the building block theory, leads to capacity-building and empowerment, especially at an organisational level (Bryant &White 1982:15-16 in Davids 2009: 19).

3.6 Conclusion

Although there is high-level confusion about the concept of public participation around the globe (Leal 2010:89 – 100), in South Africa this confusion is compounded by heavy reliance on terms such as "inform, consult and involve", as if they will result in authentic public participation (Theron 2009b:119). Hence the development of typologies and theoretic modes of public participation aimed at providing clarity on what constitutes authentic public participation.

This chapter has shown that lack of authentic and empowering public participation has deprived South Africans of dignity and an opportunity to have a say in decision-making processes. The dawn of democracy presented South Africans with an opportunity to reverse apartheid policies through the introduction of an integrated people-centred development approach; the principle of public participation being expected naturally to be part of such a

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

philosophy.

This chapter argued that the people-centred development approach is premised in the building blocks of development, i.e. participation, the social-learning process approach, capacity building, empowerment and sustainable development. This means that the public should participate in development that affects their lives, leading to a social learning process where the public will be empowered to take charge of their own development. This will result in assuring the sustainability of development interventions.

This chapter has also argued that "protest" should be accepted as one of the public participation strategies in South Africa. The new Mchunu Public Participation Model located protest between "public power" and "tokenism" to indicate that protest action is used when all else have failed and for the public to graduate to public power (the ideal level of public participation) they have to exert protest power to compel the authorities to accede to their rightful and legitimate grievances.

DEAT (2002) correctly locates "protest" as the first level of the spectrum, due to the fact that it has proven to be an effective tool to ensure that the authorities listen and act on the public's grievances. In other words, even with public participation legislation and policies in place, "a culture of public participation is elusive" (Theron 2009b:132) and "authentic and empowering public participation will only become a reality if it becomes a process generated from within. The public themselves must be the primary actors in establishing the required "culture" so that the public is able to influence, direct, control and own decision-making and development interventions.

Policy-makers must realise that if the formal structures for public participation for some or other reason (continues) to fail, that the intended beneficiaries of participation (often) have no other recourse than protest. More so, if the public realise that protest delivers quick and direct results, then the South African government sits with a major legitimacy challenge.

In the next chapter, the focus will be on key policy and regulatory framework for public participation in South Africa. The next chapter will also seek to analyse public attitudes to local government. Masango (2009:127) argues that "public opinion reinforces and sustains democracy since it contributes towards legitimacy and stability of the democratic process."

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

CHAPTER FOUR

POLICY CONTEXT, REGULATORY FRAMEWORK OF PUBLIC PARTICIPATION AND PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS REGARDING LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA

"When we introduced the new system of local government in 2000, we correctly positioned this as the sphere of government that is best placed to give practical meaning and substance to the basic political commitment that the People Shall Govern. We said to our people, through local government, together with you, we shall bring democracy to where you live. In our conceptualization of local government, we placed it at the cutting edge of addressing such basic national challenges as underdevelopment, unemployment, stagnation and poverty (Mufumadi 2005:1)".

4.1 Introduction

The above quotation gives substance to the present government's resolve to reverse social and service-delivery imbalances of the past, through local government. It provides an undertaking that government will ensure that the grass-roots themselves are at the centre of any development meant to pull them out of poverty and inequality (Masango 2009:127).

Apartheid policies and concomitant South African legislation perpetuated a race-based local government system, according to which black people were subjected to neglect and inferior and inadequate delivery of basic services (Edigheji 2006b:2). These policies and legislation laid a framework of extensive segregation, leaving blacks to live in inhumane conditions and face huge service delivery discrepancies. This subjected blacks to race-based poverty, inequality and exclusion from mainstream activities (Edigheji 2006b:2), much of which is still evident today as shown by persistent public protests in Khayelitsha.

One of the important aims of the new democratic local government dispensation, which came into being in 1994, has been to reverse the apartheid scourge. The primary vehicle for redress has been a plethora of new local government legislation, by which government has sought to bring about equitable delivery of municipal services to the public, irrespective of race, colour and location (Masango 2009:129). These new policies and related legislation have been geared towards achieving a developmental, democratic and participatory local government.

As much as apartheid local government was perceived to be illegitimate – particularly by the

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

black population component, as evidenced by their mass actions that characterised its tenure and was instrumental in its subsequent demise – the new democratic local government seems not to have been living up to expectations. The prevalence of public protest in Khayelitsha indicates diminishing trust in the COCT authorities and the public is demanding improved performance and greater accountability (Andoh 2011:119).

It has now been 17 years since democracy was attained, but varied public attitudes to local government are discouraging. Ippolito, Walker and Kolson (1976:302) in Masango (2009:127) argue that public opinions and attitudes are the building blocks upon which democracy stands. Moreover, Masango (2009:127) argues that "public opinion reinforces and sustains democracy since it contributes towards legitimacy and stability of the democratic process". These public attitudes have manifested themselves in distinct ways. One popular manifestation has been a country-wide wave of public protests, the scale of which often engulfing municipalities, which is similar to those during the apartheid era.

The question arises whether the public is merely exercising their democratic right of public participation, as Hemson (2007:10) points out, that the public can participate through "invited spaces of participation", i.e. through WCs and participation in IDP or through "self-invented spaces" of participation, i.e. social movements, protests, etc., or is the public now disillusioned with the new system of governance, which shapes their perceptions regarding local government?

The purpose of this chapter is to identify and discuss key policy and legislative prescripts that shape the new South African local government dispensation. These are the Constitution (RSA 1996), the White Paper on Local Government (RSA 1998a), the Municipal Structures Act (1998b), the Municipal Systems Act (RSA 2000) and the Municipal Finance Management Act (RSA 2003).

The importance of the above-mentioned policy and legislation in determining public participation is emphasised by the DPLG (2005:11) which states that these "provide a powerful legal framework for participatory local democracy". This chapter will also analyse public attitudes to local government, using data from the prominent public attitudes institutions and individual researchers.

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

4.2 Public perceptions of local government

In gauging public attitudes to local government, this section draws on background research conducted by Roefs and Atkinson (2010) for the South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS). This will be supplemented by internationally-benchmarked and nationally-representative surveys by the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC), South African Reconciliation Barometer Survey (SARBS), Afrobarometer, Idasa, Good Governance Learning Network (GGLN) and other organisations and individual researchers. The selection and utilisation of the above-mentioned data sources is based largely on the fact that they employ similar tools when gauging public attitudes.

Roefs and Atkinson (2010:6) utilise the philosophy of DLG to gauge public attitudes. This is partly due to Draai and Taylor's (2009: 115) assertion that DLG, arguably, hinges on public participation. DLG emphasises the public's active participation in finding sustainable ways to meet their basic needs and improve the quality of their lives. For the ideals of DLG to be realised, the public must be able to vote in elections, must have knowledge of participatory mechanisms (WCs and participation in IDP formulation); the public must be satisfied with the performance and must be able to influence, direct, control and own decision-making processes of the municipality. Andoh (2011:123) cautions that "it is possible for a municipality to be judged successful in managing programmes and complying with regulations, whilst the overall wellbeing of the community may not have improved". This seems to be happening in Khayelitsha.

Public participation in these participatory mechanisms will enable the public to hold local government accountable and ensure that it is responsive to their needs, thus influencing municipal decision-making processes. Masango (2009:128) argues that responsiveness of policy-makers to public needs hinges on three important requirements i.e. 1) the public should be able to express their needs 2) policy-makers should adequately acknowledge the expressed public need and 3) policy-makers and public officials should not only be willing to take the identified and expressed public needs into account during the policy-making and implementation processes, but should actually take them to account. If the above is achieved, the public will gradually direct, control and own development interventions meant for their wellbeing. In this way, the public will not be seen "as simply customers of municipal

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

services, but owners, co-producers of public services and evaluators of municipalities" (Andoh 2011:119; Govender *et.al* 2011:185).

Responsiveness refers to the willingness of leaders to register the preferences of their constituents by paying attention to their requests and complaints and acting on them (Bratton 2010:5). Accountability relates to municipalities holding participatory meetings with the public, i.e. izimbizo, mass meetings and Street Committee meetings, to account for plans, decisions and actions (GGLN 2008:18).

In essence, the above indicators will be utilised to determine the public's decision to vote or abstain from voting in the local government elections. This section seeks to determine the relationship between voting patterns and degree of satisfaction with the delivery of public goods and the public's attitudes towards local government as influenced either by their participation or non-participation in municipal participatory mechanisms.

4.2.1 Citizens' knowledge of participatory mechanisms (WCs)

As noted above, WCs were established to bridge the gap between the public and Municipal Councils. Public perceptions regarding WCs seem to indicate dissatisfaction with their functioning. According to Piper and Deacon (2008:42), WCs are meant to attend to a broad range of public's problems in a non-partisan way, such as campaigning for service payments, propagating the IDP process, the budgetary process, fostering decisions about service provision, by-laws and delimiting and chairing zonal meetings, yet they are embroiled in party politics.

Smith and De Visser (2009:16) and Piper and Deacon (2008:41) contend that WCs are now viewed as the extensions of political party structures and do not represent the interests of the public they are meant to serve. Smith and De Visser (2009:16) attribute this state of affairs to nomination and election processes that are "deeply flawed", thus compromising the quality of representation on WCs. Roefs and Atkinson (2010:52) support this assertion and add that, in an event where a WC member resigns, Ward Councillors simply handpick a replacement to fill the vacant position.

Furthermore, a crucial "missing link" in WCs is the lack of detailed "terms of reference and operating procedures" which makes WCs suffer credibility in the eyes of the public (Roefs

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

& Atkinson 2010:6; Nyalunga 2006:45). Due to a lack of clarity on their roles, this leads to further tensions between WCs and Ward Councillors (Nyalunga 2006:45).

In the light of the above-mentioned critical deficiencies, it would be unreasonable to expect WCs to function optimally. This state of affairs is reflected in the findings of the study conducted by DPLG (2005) to evaluate the WCs (Roefs & Atkinson 2010:54). In this study DPLG (2005), municipal representatives confirmed that WCs are not accountable to the public. At least 23 per cent of the respondents felt that WCs are not responsive, 26 per cent stated that less than half of WCs held regular meetings, 25 per cent of respondents said that only a minority of their Councillors hold regular meetings. WC members themselves felt that their Councillors are not responsive and not interested in the public messages that should be conveyed to Council (Roefs & Atkinson 2010: 54).

Furthermore, a recent study conducted in 2011 by Thompson (2012:101) indicates that the *status quo* remains. Table 4.1 below shows that, on the one hand, a huge gap exist between Khayelitsha inhabitants and the COCT in terms of representative democracy at grass-roots level. On the other hand, there is an awkward relationship between the Ward Councillor and the public with regard to public participation in municipal governance (Thompson 2012:101).

Table 4.1 also shows that 74 per cent of the Khayelitsha public feel alienated from the COCT participation mechanisms with 70 per cent of the respondents believing that they are not made part of the development programmes meant to change their lives. With regard to the handling of public complaints, Khayelitsha Ward Councillors and COCT officials fared badly at 74 per cent.

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

Table 4.1: Perceptions of Ward Councillor's ability to deal with public development issues in Khayelitsha

How well or badly would you say your ward Councillor is handling the following:	Percentage %
Allowing citizens like yourself to participate?	
Badly/Very badly	75
Well/ Very well	20
Don't know	5
Making council's programmes known to ordinary people?	
Badly/Very badly	70
Well/ Very well	24
Don't know	7
Providing effective ways to handle complaints about Councillors and officials?	
Badly/Very badly	74
Well/ Very well	20
Don't know	7

Source: Adapted from Thompson (2012:102)

It is therefore not surprising that the public in Khayelistha is to a certain degree disillusioned, particularly with the ethical behaviour of their Ward Councillors so much so that they have lost confidence and view them as incompetent (Thompson 2012:101). From the researcher's observation, municipalities view the Batho Pele principles as only applicable to other government spheres. It is the researcher's considered view that the opposite is true. Municipalities must inculcate these principles in the minds of municipal officials and Councillors as they are more relevant today than ever before (The White Paper on the Transformation of the Public Service, RSA 1997).

Table 4.2 below shows that the above picture (lack of accountability and non-responsiveness) should not come as a surprise, in the light of Hemson's (2007:11) findings that only 43 per cent of respondents have knowledge of the existence of WCs in their locality, 23 per cent have no knowledge, while 34 per cent indicated that they do not know. This study shows that less than half of the respondents know about the existence of WCs, hence the public feel that they are not accountable and are non-responsive.

Table 4.2: Knowledge of Ward Committees

Yes	No	Don't know	Total
13, 108,409	6,974,074	10,474,172	30,556,655
43 %	23%	34%	100%

Source: Hemson (2007:11)

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

According to Hemson (2007:11), those who do not know, may evenly be divided between those who in fact have a WC or do not have one at all. But what is important is to note that less than half of the adult population agree that a WC exists in their locality, which is not an ideal situation. This situation is worrisome, as WCs are supposed to act as "conduits" for active participation in municipal affairs. This means that public participation is lacking, which compels the public to seek participation through unconventional means (self-created spaces of participation).

At a provincial level, of the nine provinces polled, Western Cape had the lowest score at 19 per cent of those who have knowledge of WCs, as opposed to Eastern Cape's 66 per cent. The Eastern Cape, Limpopo, Free State and Kwazulu-Natal provinces are mostly rural, as opposed to Western Cape and Gauteng that are urban. The survey indicates that rural provinces tend to have greater knowledge of WCs, as they fared best at a more than 60 per cent knowledge level, compared to only 40 per cent in urban provinces. Roefs and Atkinson (2010:52) concur and add that the proportion of respondents that had never heard about WCs was largest amongst Coloured and Whites (at 28 per cent) and smallest among Africans (at 8 per cent).

According to Roefs and Atkinson (2010:52), this discrepancy, that Coloureds and Whites has less knowledge of WCs is indicative of one or more of the following: (a) general indifference as a result of a lack of political interest, (b) Whites and Coloureds never having been made part of WCs and/or (c) that report backs on the functioning of WCs are not made in these neighbourhoods.

Based on the researcher's observation, Whites and Coloureds are generally less enthusiastic about participating in governance issues. This can be traced back to the apartheid era when, to the virtual exclusion of the Black masses, Whites in particular, and, to a certain extent, Coloureds too, enjoyed preferential treatment in terms of voting rights and access to development services. The urge for participation in day-to-day issues of governance was consequently stunted and kept dormant.

Further analysis of data in terms of type of settlement (see Table 4.3 below) and income levels reveals that, in line with rural province bias (as discussed above), settlements with high rates of poverty and deprivation are more likely to have knowledge of WCs (above 59 per cent) than formal settlement and small holdings (less than 40 per cent) (Hemson 2007:11).

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

Table 4.3: Knowledge of Ward Committees by type of settlement

Type	% Yes
Urban informal	61%
Tribal	59%
Hostels	57%
Urban formal	35%
Small holdings	22%
Farms	10%

Source: Hemson (2007:11)

The same revelations are witnessed among those respondents with "no or very little" income who have greater knowledge of WCs (51 per cent) and those who are "better off" and record low levels of knowledge of WCs (32 per cent) (Hemson 2007:11). It has to be noted that, as the informal settlements are inhabited by mostly poor Blacks, the assumption therefore is that Blacks in general have more knowledge of WCs than other race groups. This indicates government endeavour in putting more effort into bringing the poor to mainstream participatory governance. This is evidenced by the HSRC (2011:9) study conducted in 2010, which indicated that the situation is steadily improving, as at least 58 per cent of the public was aware of WCs. However, the greater awareness is still among the poor.

The question that needs to be answered is whether knowledge of WCs by the poor translates into authentic participation in local government affairs. According to Hemson (2007:12), greater knowledge of WCs does not lead to greater confidence or trust in the municipalities. In fact, between the periods 2004 and 2005, among the more knowledgeable poor, there was a sharp decline in the levels of confidence from 61 per cent to 50 per cent, whereas among those where WCs were not generally known, there was only a slight percentage decline in trust, from 37 per cent to 36 per cent (Hemson 2007:12).

The above situation means that knowledge of WCs does not lead to greater confidence that municipalities will listen to and act on the needs of the poor. Thompson (2012:102) concurs and adds that qualitative research conducted in Khayelitsha in 2011 shows "that participation is regarded as a form of information sharing that has little to do with substantive community

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

input, as if community buy-in means keeping everyone informed". Hemson (2007:12) sums this up by stating that the "WC system is not strengthening confidence in local government, since these are not functioning as they should". This indicates that government is attempting to focus its energies on ensuring that the poor have meaningful participation in municipal affairs affecting their lives, but that the change agents tasked with this duty are somehow lacking in their ability to deliver on this expectation.

As we take note of the steadily declining level of the public trust in municipalities, it will be interesting to see if this translates into voters shunning the ballot box during municipal elections. As Mangcu (2011:1153) warns, "While elections give people a sense that they have some measure of influence over authorities, a heightened degree of political efficacy in turn leads to higher levels of electoral participation". On the other hand, shunning the ballot box will be in line with the assertion of Greenberg and Mathoho (2010:14) that: "If citizens become increasingly sceptical and distrustful of political parties and institutions, and/or view them as corrupt, there is declining political participation." This outcome will be tested below under the heading "Voting in the municipal elections".

4.2.2 Participation in the IDP process

The IDP, as a principal democratising instrument in local government, is meant to promote public participation in municipal planning and policy-making. As IDPs are regarded as the cornerstone of DLG in South Africa (GGLN 2008:53), it is incumbent upon every municipality to ensure that the public know and participate meaningfully in the IDP processes.

Like WCs, IDPs are fraught with problems. Due to their complex nature, which "militates against meaningful participation" (GGLN 2008:53), municipalities are unable to draft workable models. This is so because most municipalities have opted for a more "technocratically-driven approach" to the IDP, which limits the ability of municipalities to engage widely with the public on matters affecting their lives and thus stay in line with the provisions of the Municipal Systems Act of 2000 (GGLN 2008:53). It is therefore not surprising that the public perceive IDP as exclusionary, and as being in a similar vein as WCs.

According to Roefs and Atkinson (2010:55) a survey conducted in 2005 to gauge the extent of public participation in IDP processes, indicated that only 8 per cent participated. Roefs

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

and Atkinson (2010:55) further state that the lowest participation rate (3 per cent) was recorded in the Western Cape, together with Gauteng and Mpumalanga. A recent study conducted by Thompson (2012:103) in Khayelitsha proves that the situation is not improving. Despite a carefully designed process of communication devolved to the level of Sub-Councils, "the degree to which an average resident is even aware of participatory processes related to the development of IDPs remains minimal" (Thompson 2012:103).

The highest participation rate was recorded in KwaZulu-Natal at 17 per cent, with the remaining provinces trailing at between 7 and 11 per cent. The most popular participation methods were izimbizo and public meetings (Roefs & Atkinson 2010:55).

As may be expected, the two participatory mechanisms, i.e. WC and IDP, are closely aligned. The survey confirmed that participation in IDP is strongly related to awareness of WCs (Roefs & Atkinson 2010:55). About 94 per cent of those who participated know about WCs, *versus* 66 per cent among those who did not participate. The 6 per cent who participated in the IDPs, but have no knowledge of WCs, could be attributed to over reporting or is an indication of dysfunctionality of WCs in their areas. Of those who participated, 96 per cent were willing to vote as opposed to 82 per cent of those who did not participate.

With this confirmation, it remains to be seen whether the poor's high levels of knowledge of WCs means that they will also participate in IDP processes. On the other hand, the behaviour or attitude of those who seem to be less engaged in politics, needs to be analysed, as this behaviour may be due to disillusionment with the local government system.

Table 4.4 depicts the two groups of respondents (high participation and low participation groups) who were subjected to a survey to analyse public attitudes to local government in South Africa.

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

Table 4.4: Two political types

Statement	High participation	Low participation
No. of respondents	23.5 million	7.2 million
Age group	Older than 16 years	Older than 16 years
Voting commitment	High	Low (do not know, do not want to vote, declined to answer)
Social status	Poor	"Better off"
Income levels	Less than R5000 (89%)	Less than R5000 (77%)

Source: By Author 2010

Hemson's (2007:12) analysis of the two political types provides some answers to the above questions. The first group comprises 23.5 million respondents who are older than 16 years and are committed to voting in municipal elections (high participation) group. The second group of 7.2 million respondents (low participation) are less interested in voting in municipal elections. The latter group comprises those "who do not want to vote, do not know or declined to answer" (Hemson 2007:12). It is important to also note that the group that has high participation potential, are mostly poor, with 89 per cent having a personal income of less than R5 000, as opposed to 77 per cent of the low participation group with income of less than R5 000 (Hemson 2007:12).

Table 4.5 below demonstrates that the high participation group, in comparison to the low participation group with almost non-existent participation, has more knowledge of IDP and participation in its formulation, although, in general, participation is very low.

Table 4.5: Knowledge of Integrated Development Plan

Question regarding IDP	High Participation(%Yes)	Low Participation (%Yes)
Do you know of an IDP for your municipal area?	12%	7%
Do you participate in formulation of IDP for your municipal area?	5%	1%

Source: Adapted from Hemson (2007:13)

As for the levels of confidence in local government, Table 4.6 below shows that the high participation group has high confidence levels at 52 per cent, knowledge of WC at 49 per cent and knowledge of a Councillor at 51 per cent. The low participation group trails behind the high participation group in all aspects. This would indicate that there is a link between knowledge of participatory structures and voting, as shown in Tables 4.5 and 4.6. This

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

mirrors the WC situation above, where knowledge of WCs is strongly related to voting intentions, meaning that the likelihood of voting is higher among those who have knowledge of WCs, as opposed to those who do not have the knowledge.

Table 4.6: Attitudes to local government

Questions	High Participation (%Yes)	Low Participation (%Yes)
Do you trust your local government in South Africa?	52%	34%
Do you have a Ward Committee in your locality?	49%	26%
Do you know a Councillor in your local municipality/Council?	51%	30%

Source: Adapted from Hemson (2007:13)

4.2.3 Efficacy/ perceived influence on local government

According to Roefs and Atkinson's (2010:56), further analysis in the 2005 SASAS survey indicates that 91 per cent of those who participated in IDP processes felt they had "some" to "much" influence on local government decision-making. This was compared to only 28 per cent of those who had not participated. Western Cape recorded the lowest and Limpopo the highest percentage. Thirty eight per cent of Africans felt they have significant influence *versus* only 15 per cent of Coloureds and 14 per cent of Indians and Whites. Of those who felt they have influence, 93 per cent would vote, *versus* 81 per cent of those who thought they did not.

This intention to vote trend is further illustrated by Table 4.7 below. In the analysis of the two political types voting attitudes, the high participation group unanimously agree that it is the duty of the public to vote in the municipal elections, at 86 per cent as compared to 67 per cent of the low participation group. This is indicative of the public's perceptions that voting in the elections affords the public some degree of influence in municipal decision-making processes (power of the vote). Of interest is the low participation group's disapproving voting attitudes. Forty four per cent of the low participation group feels that voting makes no difference and that politicians cannot be trusted. This means that the low participation group is not convinced that their vote will translate to their ability to influence municipal decision-making mechanisms.

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

Table 4.7: Voting attitudes

Statement	High Participation (% Agreement)	Low Participation (% Agreement)
It is the duty of all citizens to vote in the election	86%	67%
Whether I vote or not makes no difference	25%	44%
Voting is meaningless, because no politician can be trusted	28%	44%
After being elected all parties are the same, so voting is pointless	24%	38%

Source: Adapted from Hemson (2007:13)

In a different study conducted by the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation (IJR) namely the SA Reconciliation Barometer Survey (SARBS) (IJR 2011:14), the perceived influence on decision-making declined when compared to the Hemson (2007:13) survey findings. Only 40 per cent of the public feel that they have the power to influence decisions made by local government that affect their neighbourhood (IJR 2011:14).

A further 27 per cent disagreed and 33 per cent were uncertain. Interestingly, on average voters in the North West agreed the most strongly that voting made a difference (on a scale of 1 to 5, m = 3.97) and that the public could influence local government decision-making (on a scale of 1 to 5, m = 3.50), though turnout at elections in that province (53.47 per cent) was lower than the national average (see Figure 4.1 below).



Figure 4.1: Average mean, political efficacy by province

Source: Adapted from SA Reconciliation Barometer Survey (IJR 2011:14)

Furthermore, Figure 4.1 above shows that the public in the nine provinces of South Africa feel very strongly that to vote in the municipal elections matters, as seen by it surpassing the perceived power to influence decisions. It is also encouraging to note that above average

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

respondents feel that they have power to influence decisions made by local government. This signifies that democracy is maturing within the South African local government framework.

A recent study conducted by Thompson (2012:106) in Khayelitsha (Western Cape) paints a different picture (see Figure 4.8). A staggering 61 per cent of respondents feel that they have no influence over what government does. This is more so because 87 per cent of respondents feel that politicians do not care much about what the public think. This is a "sorry state of affairs" which vividly indicates that the spaces provided for by the invited spaces are closed, hence the public resort to inventing their own spaces, from which they find solace.

Table 4.8: Perceptions of personal agency in relation to government and political leaders in Khayelitsha

Strongly agree/agree	Percentage %
People like me do not have any influence over what government does	61
Politicians do not care much about what people like me think	87

Source: Adapted from Thompson (2012:106)

As hinted above, it is important to assess where the low participation group finds solace. Is it through association with social movements or taking an "I-don't-care" attitude? The latter is possible, as indicated by low levels of participation in participatory structures. Greenberg and Mathoho (2010:14) posit that "people may feel that their views will not be taken into account and that participation is a worthless exercise and linked to political power plays". If this happens, citizens will be "put off" "invited spaces" and create their own spaces of participation; often seen by authorities as confrontational and subsequently suppressed – as seen by the alleged use of excessive force and spraying of blue dye by the police against the marchers during the so-called "Occupy Rondebosch Common" event, within COCT limits (Ndenze 2012:1).

Table 4.9 below, depicts a strong feeling among both groups that the public have a right to form or join organisations freely. The enthusiasm for the right to freely organise is not matched by the assertion that mass action is acceptable in expressing one's democratic rights, as only 35 per cent of the low participation group agree to this notion, in contrast with a staggering 76 per cent of the high participation group. This indicates that it is likely that half of the low participation group will participate in protest action if they find "invited spaces" of participation less attractive.

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

Table 4.9: Attitudes to social mobilisation

Statement	High participation (% Agreement)	Low participation (% Agreement)
Citizens should have a right to form/join organisations freely	86%	84%
Mass action is an acceptable tool to express views in a democracy	76%	35%
I talk about politics often or very often	20%	15%

***Source*:** Adapted from Hemson (2007:14)

The low levels of "talk about politics" among South Africans, as both groups show in Table 4.9 above, is worrisome. This indicates that frequency of political conversations among South Africans is at a very low ratio as opposed to protest action. Mattes (2002:32) confirms this assertion by stating that "South Africa now has one of the most passive citizenries in Southern Africa". According to Mattes (2002:32), in year 2000 only 11 per cent of respondents indicated frequent engagement in political conversations and only 12 per cent agreed to paying attention "always" or "most of the time" to current political events and government in general. This is the lowest recorded figure for the seven Southern African countries (Mattes 2002:32). This state of affairs is worrisome in the sense that South Africa has better communication media, i.e. radio, television and newspaper coverage, when compared to its Southern African counterparts.

Based on the researcher's observation, municipal participatory structures are dysfunctional, so much so that the enthusiasm brought about by the new democratic dispensation has dissipated. High expectations regarding the improvements in the public's socio-economic conditions remains a "pipe dream", hence the public's resolve to invoke unconventional means of participation, similar to those used to bring the apartheid government to "its knees".

Table 4.10 below confirms the assertion that the public is less interested in political activity. Khayelitsha residents prefer to associate themselves with religious activities (at 64 per cent) as opposed to 30 per cent of association with political activity. Street committees and school governing bodies are also not popular with the Khayelitsha residents (at 6 per cent respectively).

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

Table 4.10: Levels of participation in organised groups in Khayelitsha

Participation in organised groups (this question covered any level of involvement from leaders and members to no-members who attend meetings)	Percentage %
A religious group	64
A political party	30
A community policing forum	5
A street committee	6
A school governing body	6

Source: Thompson (2012:105)

This is indicative of the levels of public disillusionment with the COCT public participation approaches. If the municipality does not improve, Khayelitsha will continue to be labelled a "protest prone area" (Nleya 2011:3; Thompson 2012:100).

It is however, important to note that this disillusionment is translated to protest action as Nleya (2011:11) points out that the participation rate in protests by informal settlement inhabitants is 50 per cent, compared to 36 per cent in formal housing.

4.2.4 Voting in the municipal elections

The South African local government elections have consistently experienced relatively low voter turnout. This trend had been the norm for the first two democratic elections and only recently, in the 2011 municipal elections, was this trend broken. The municipal elections of 2000 and 2006 attracted only 48.06 per cent before a 9 per cent increase pushed it to 57.6 per cent for the 2011 elections (Herzenberg 2011:1). This is in sharp contrast with both national and provincial elections which have consistently had higher voter turnouts (Herzenberg 2011:1). These disparities are indicative of an international trend, where local elections are viewed as less important. However, this trend seems to be changing in South Africa, as evinced by the 9 per cent increase in the latest turnout.

There are a myriad of factors that determine the levels of voter turnout during elections, particularly in South Africa. For Struwig *et al.* (2011:1122), the role of the Independent Electoral Commission of South Africa (IEC) is pivotal in ensuring credible, free and fair elections. This is achieved through proper management of elections i.e. prevention of fraudulent behaviour and irregularities, as well as the supervision of the occurrence of intimidation, coercion and violence (Struwig *et al.* 2011:1122). This means that a conducive voting environment contributes to influencing voter turnout.

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

Alongside the proper management and supervision of elections, it is the responsibility of the IEC to conduct voter education campaigns and communication networks, to prepare voters for the elections (Struwig *et al.* 2011:1122). It is also the duty of the IEC to educate the public how the electoral system works, including registration and voting procedures (Struwig *et al.* 2011:1122). In this regard the media plays a pivotal role. Fakir and Holland (2011:1149) attributes the high levels of voter turnout, especially to the run up to 2011 local government elections, to the media placing greater emphasis on the elections and the quality of media coverage. According to Fakir and Holland (2011:1149) this contributed to the vibrancy of the elections.

Furthermore, the HSRC (2011:8) points out that previous participation in elections and an interest in politics, as well as satisfaction with political leadership, accountability, responsiveness and efficacy are all factors that positively impact on the intention to vote. On the other hand, Friedman (2004:2) and Habib and Naidu (2004:5) are of the view that the South African public still vote according to identities, i.e. race, language and religion. It is highly likely that an unfamiliar candidate will deter them from voting and thus contribute to low voter turnout. This practice is referred to by Friedman (2004:2) as irrational.

For Mangcu (2011:1155), the presumed irrational voter behaviour declines with the passage of time, particularly if public needs are not met. Thus, “the public adopt a rational decision making process that takes into account past experiences with those political parties” (Mangcu 2011:1155). The 9 per cent increase in the number of voters in 2011 elections signals a new trend in voter behaviour. In the same vein, a one (1) per cent increase in the Democratic Alliance (DA) voters’ share is indicative of the new trend in voter behaviour.

According to Friedman (2004:2) identity voting has both advantages and disadvantages. “It can inhibit government accountability and responsiveness if it guarantees an electoral majority to a party”. On the other hand, identity voting behaviour “bodes well for community/social cohesion within homogenised communities” (Fakir & Holland 2011:1150). Also, on a positive note, low voter turnout is overcome as identity voting triggers enthusiasm for electoral participation (Friedman 2004:2). Rule (2004:9) concurs with the issue of identities shaping voter behaviour. He however cautions that race plays a minimal role, but names an assortment of issues, such as “a better life, jobs, liking the party, trust or belief in and affection for a party”.

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

According to Herzenberg (2011:2), in the South African context, there are other reasons that contribute to low levels of voter turnout. She cites "Comparative National Elections Project 2009 national survey" and "IEC/HSRC 2010 survey". These surveys pointed out that the public have less trust in the three spheres of government, compared to other political institutions. The other reason she blames for low voter turnout relates to the public's annoyance and discontent with delivery of services. This, it is said, led to the upsurge of public protest in the run up to the elections.

It is therefore important to point out that, although the above mentioned factors are not an exhaustive list, they nonetheless provide an indication of the determinants for low or high voter turnout in the municipal elections. This means that the prevailing factors during any given voting period will dictate the levels of turnout.

In the light of the above, it is clear that satisfaction with the delivery of services and trust in local government alone, will not translate into participation in politics and elections, as the public's decision to vote will be shaped by, among others, the "identities". This assertion is collaborated by Roefs and Atkinson (2010:63) study which found that "higher levels of dissatisfaction with services and higher levels trust in national government, correlated with a higher willingness to vote in the 2006 local elections".

The prospects that the upsurge in public protest would negatively affect voter turnout as an act of vengeance against the ruling party proved to be unfounded, as the 2011 elections turnout increased by 9 per cent. It is interesting to note that those areas which experienced an upsurge in protest action, recorded an increase in voter turnout (Herzenberg 2011:2, Fakir & Holland 2011:1147).

The question that arises as a result of this paradox is why the public turn out in numbers to vote when they have clearly shown displeasure with the incumbent government? Mattes (2002:33) argues that South Africans understand democracy to mean the delivery of a range of socio-economic goods, even when progress is very slow. This could mean that protests are meant to exert pressure on government to speed up delivery, and should not be seen as an indication of a possible shift in allegiance to the governing political party.

The researcher has observed that the recent mass action by the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), demanding an end to labour broking and the e-toll system, which the COSATU Secretary General referred to as an "Occupation of the City of Johannesburg",

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

not a protest, was meant to put pressure on government to accede to its demand, not really to render the province ungovernable. Herzenberg (2011:2) supports this view and adds that citizens utilise protest action as "leverage to attract government's attention and make their demands known".

The different view put forward by Friedman (2004:210) that "a mobilised, politically-active citizenry may mean that democracy is flourishing or that the public is motivated by deep dissatisfaction with an undemocratic society", does not detract the public from participatory politics. The high voter turnout indicates that, despite the difficulties, the public still view local government as legitimate.

According to Mattes (2002:33), the apartheid struggle inculcated a culture of protest in the public's mind, meaning they are likely to protest at every given opportunity. He further argues that the low participation rates in between elections is caused by the lack of incentives to do so, as the study shows that less than one in a sample of 400 COCT residents could name the Mayor, let alone their Ward Councillor, and very few attend public meetings or voiced opinion on local issues yet viewed their Ward Councillor as not responsive (Seekings *et al*. 2004:16). The researcher has observed that this situation is steadily improving in the light of the 9 per cent increase, although the level of engagement between politicians and the public is only visible to the run up to the elections, when their votes are sought.

It is this gap (between politicians and public) that the public exploit to invent their own spaces of participation in municipal affairs. Greenberg and Mathoho (2010:13) succinctly sum this up by submitting that "by definition, these invited spaces are at the state's behest and on its terms, even if the government may genuinely be interested in hearing from the grassroots". The public will wait for government to approach them, but, if not, they will resort to "self-invented spaces" in the form of protest action. This is because the public is willing and open to participation, but government is often inaccessible.

On the question of voting patterns in local government, Booysen (2011:3) states that the Thomas, Neilson and Sores Research Survey (2011) assert that those respondents who voted for the candidate in 2009 "are more than twice as likely to vote as those no longer happy with their 2009 choice". Furthermore, Booysen (2011:3) cites previous studies by Idasa and AC Nielson, conducted just before the 2006 elections, where it was already known that the public was not happy with service delivery. New research confirms that those who intend voting are

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

more likely to be the ones who are happy with service delivery than those who are unhappy (Booysen 2011:3). This indicates that "South Africans are not ready to storm out and use the ballot to oust incumbents and install new governments" (Booysen 2011:3).

Figure 4.2 below illustrates this point. Africans and Coloureds are less likely to ditch their party, but would rather abstain from voting. Fifty per cent of Whites and Asians are willing to ditch their party rather than abstain from voting.



Figure 4.2: If you felt that you could not vote for the political party that you normally support, would it be wise to…? By Race (N=3851)

Source: Electoral Commission of South Africa (2009:24)

According to Davids (2010:73), in a survey carried out in 2003, only 38 per cent of the public were satisfied with local government. In 2006 there was a slight improvement in the levels of satisfaction to 39.5 per cent. In 2011 a perception (satisfaction survey) conducted by Idasa (2010) in the run up to the local elections, indicated that only one in 10 citizens was satisfied with local government. In the light of the fact that government stepped up its efforts, this is a significant decrease compared to 2006, which would indicate that satisfaction levels should forthwith increase dramatically. Van Hoof (2011:1-2) cites three reasons for this decline.

Firstly, there is an increasing "service delivery gap" that exists between people's expectations and what municipalities are realistically able to deliver. According to Van Hoof (2011:1-2), the increase in the expectancy gap is not caused by demographic factors such as migration and population growth, but the expectation on the part of the public is that government

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

should do more than before, as a result of politicians' unfulfilled promises of delivery of free services.

Secondly, lack of responsiveness from Councils in dealing with public issues that were already raised some years back, contributes to the decline in satisfaction levels. Van Hoof (2011:1-2) asserts that a backlog is caused by competing demands where municipalities have to satisfy national government's defined priorities and the public issues within municipalities' "limited power and discretionary resources". This stretches municipalities' capabilities as the public is continuously demanding services. This is further compounded by dysfunctional participatory structures and lack of accountability mechanisms, which result in disillusionment on the part of the public and consequently violent protest follows (Van Hoof 2011:2).

Lastly, the public witness negative factors e.g. lack of communication, lack of transparency, increased levels of corruption and nepotism in their municipalities. These contribute to a lack of delivery of quality services, which in turn leads to public protests. As one protester put it: "We are burning stuff because those who are our Mayors took money for themselves" (Van Hoof 2011:2).

The state of local government in South Africa explained above, is confirmed by the report of the State of Local Government in South Africa (GOGTA, 2009b) which acknowledges that "much of local government is in distress and that this state of affairs has become deeply rooted within our system of governance" (Van Hoof 2011:2). According to an Idasa (2010:3) citizen's survey, distress is caused by politicians' contempt for "basic democratic governance principles and values, which, in most instances, are forgone for individual self-enrichment and political power (Van Hoof 2011:2).

4.3 Review of local government legislative framework

According to Nyalunga (2006:16), the new democratic government inherited a local government system that racially delivered municipal services for the minority Whites to the detriment of the majority Blacks, who were subjected to neglect in terms of access to employment, health and other basic services. This meant that the democratically-elected government had to do away with oppressive laws to make way for new laws that could address and undo the apartheid legacy.

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

The new local government dispensation began in 1993 with the enactment of the Local Government Transitional Act (209 of 1993), the so-called "Genesis" of democratic local government. This legislation ushered a new paradigm, geared for transforming local government from a racially segregated institution into a democratic and autonomous sphere of government.

The other important legislation necessary for the transformation of local government was the Development Facilitation Act (67 of 1995) which, according to Nyalunga (2006:16), sought to change the "mind-set" of local government and was to guide them to be more participatory in the delivery of public goods and services. Moodley and Govender (2006: 825) submit that Act 67 is aimed at facilitating a transparent developmental process that benefited both participants and local government.

It was through the Development Facilitation Act (RSA 1995) that the DLG principle was coined, symbolising a paradigm shift (Nyalunga 2006:16). The Municipal Demarcation Act (No. 27 of 1998) (RSA 1998c) sought to reconfigure the racially-arranged geographical areas to ensure that every area fall within a democratically-elected, local government, the so-called "wall-to-wall local government" (Nyalunga 2006:16).

The Constitution (RSA 1996) galvanised local government as a developmental sphere of government by pronouncing on its autonomy as a "distinct government sphere with executive, legislative authority and powers" (Nyalunga 2006:16). These legislative abilities set the tone for a new DLG to address inequality, poverty and any resistive apartheid legacies.

The following section deals with the White Paper on Local Government (RSA 1998a) and legislative frameworks for public participation in South African local government. In this vein, the Ward Committee Resource Book (DPLG 2005:11) asserts that the Constitution (RSA 1996) and key legislation such as Chapter 4 of the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act (RSA 2000) and Chapter 4 of the Local Government: Municipal Structures Act (RSA 1998b) provides a powerful legal framework for participatory local democracy.

4.3.1 The Constitution (Act 108 of 1996)

The Constitution (RSA 1996) is the principal legislation that supersedes other legislation. This means that any legislation passed should not be in conflict with it. The Constitution (RSA 1996) spells out broad parameters in relation to participation. In so doing, it paves the

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

way for subsequent local government legislation that provides details of the manner in which public participation should be placed at the centre of municipal governance.

This is to ensure a harmonious relationship between the authorities and the public and to guide the public participation discourse in the municipalities. Local government, as a sphere that is closest to grass-roots, is poised to ensure the attainment of sustainable, democratic and developmental local government, in line with the objects of local government as outlined in section 152 (1) of the Constitution (RSA 1996), which are to:

1. Provide democratic and accountable government for local communities.
2. Ensure the provision of services to communities in a sustainable manner.
3. Promote social and economic development.
4. Promote a safe and healthy environment.
5. Encourage the involvement of communities and community organizations in the matters of local government.

For municipalities to achieve these objectives, Section 153 of the Constitution (RSA 1996:81-82) emphasises that municipalities must play a developmental role, in that they must:

1. Structure and manage their administration and budgeting and planning processes so as to give priority to the basic needs of the community and promote the social and economic development of the community.
2. Participate in national and provincial development programmes.

The Constitution (RSA 1996) emphasises the importance of basic values and principles in governance as stipulated in Section 195 (1) (c) “public administration must be developmental-oriented” and (e) that “people’s needs must be responded to and the public must be encouraged to participate in policy-making”. This means that municipalities must be democratic, responsive and accountable to the citizens.

On the status of municipalities and in relation to other spheres of government, Section 151 of the Constitution (RSA 1996) provides that:

1. The local sphere of government consists of municipalities, which must be established for the whole of the territory of the Republic.

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

2. The executive and legislative authority of a municipality is vested in its Municipal Council.

3. A municipality has the right to govern, on its own initiative, the local government affairs of its own community, subject to national and provincial legislation, as provided for in the Constitution.

4. The national or relevant provincial government may not compromise or impede a municipality's ability or right to exercise its powers or perform its functions.

The public's right to protest feature prominently in the Constitution (RSA 1996). Section 17 of the Constitution (RSA 1996) stipulates that "everyone has a right, peacefully and unarmed, to assemble, to demonstrate, to picket and to present petitions". Furthermore, Section 18 guarantees public's right to freely associate.

It has, however, to be borne in mind that the Gatherings Act (205 of 1993) regulates the staging of protests. The Gatherings Act (RSA 1993a) defines a gathering as a march, picket, or parade of more than 15 people taking place in a public space, such as a street, park or on the steps of a building, etc. This Act (RSA 1993a), for the first time in South African history, affirmed the public's right to participate in demonstrations and protest marches (De Vos 2011:1).

The Act (RSA 1993a) also provides for the procedures to be followed in the event that the protest is staged. According to De Vos (2011:1), the Act (RSA 1993a) provides that there should be discussions between the authorities and the organisers of the protest action. This is to ensure an orderly procession and minimal disruption for the non-participants and members of the public. The right to protest is crucial for the strengthening of democracy, in that it guarantees the public a continuous right of participation in-between the elections normally held every five years.

The above-mentioned constitutional provisions provide local authorities with a base for opening up new spaces for the public's direct participation in the formulation of participatory governance policies and legislation and to further the aims of DLG agenda. On the other hand, however, it also provides the public with the mechanisms to demand responsiveness and accountability from their local authorities and affords them a right to provide input for decision-making processes that are meant to shape their future.

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

If the above-mentioned constitutional provisions are not realised, they are likely to further alienate the public from decision-making and possibly lead to loss of trust in the municipal processes noted above.

4.3.2 White Paper on Local Government, (Notice 423 of 1998)

The White Paper on Local Government (RSA 1998a) gave practical meaning to the Constitutional provisions by bringing DLG principle to the fore. According to Patel (2004:1), the introduction of the new system of DLG is the most fundamental part of local government transformation. Davids and Maphunye (2009:60) and Smith and Vawda (2003:29) assert that DLG is underpinned by four pillars, i.e. "cultivating citizens through participation in service delivery, good governance, democratising development and fostering economic growth". Schmidt (2008:121) and Moodley and Govender (2006:829) add "integration, coordination, leading and learning, focus on vulnerable groups and environmental sustainability" as pillars underpinning DLG (See Parnell *et al*. 2002, Van Donk *et al*. 2008).

These pillars guarantee the public rights of access to basic services and active participation of individuals and the public in deciding on the appropriate mechanisms for the delivery of services (Smith & Vawda 2003:29). Everett *et al*. (2010:224) submit that the White Paper (RSA 1998a) provides for the introduction of a "pro-poor DLG" where the public participate effectively in municipal activities. In other words, the White Paper (RSA 1998a) advocates a shift away from a situation where the public is just the passive recipient of municipal plans, including the IDP, but rather becoming active participants.

The White Paper (RSA 1998a) stresses the importance of a partnership between government, the public and community organisations in finding viable and long-lasting ways that will address their economic, social and material needs and subsequently bring about improvements in their well-being. These ideals form part of the elements required for successful DLG.

According to Davids and Maphunye (2009:60), municipalities must be developmentally focused. The White Paper (RSA 1998a) also suggests that municipalities should develop mechanisms to ensure public participation in policy initiation and formulation and the monitoring and evaluation of decision-making and implementation.

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

The National Policy Framework for Public Participation (DPLG 2007:9) provides the following approaches that can assist in achieving this:

1. Forums to allow organised formations to initiate policies and/or influence policy formulation, as well as participate in monitoring and evaluation.
2. Structured stakeholder involvement in certain Council committees, in particular if these are issue-oriented committees, with a limited lifespan rather than being permanent structures.
3. Participatory budgeting initiatives aimed at linking public priorities to capital investment programmes.
4. Focus-group, participatory-action research, conducted in partnership with NGOs and CBOs, can generate detailed information about a wide range of specific needs and values.

In this endeavour, according to Smith (2007:7), municipalities must prioritise and "promote the participation of marginalised and excluded groups in public processes". Smith (2007:7) further states that the White Paper (RSA 1998a) envisaged the potential barriers to authentic public participation, particularly for women. To counter these barriers, municipalities must "adopt inclusive approaches to foster public participation, including strategies aimed at removing obstacles to, and actively encouraging, the participation of marginalised groups in the local community" (Smith 2007:7).

Furthermore, the White Paper (RSA 1998a) warns that participatory processes could impede development processes and the elite could enrich themselves and benefit, at the expense of the marginalised (Smith 2007:7). In this regard, municipalities must devise participation strategies that enhance, rather than impede the delivery processes (Smith 2007:7).

The White Paper (RSA 1998a) envisages active participation of the public at four levels, i.e.:

1. As voters: to ensure maximum democratic accountability of the elected political leadership for the policies they are empowered to promote.
2. As citizens: who express, *via* different stakeholder associations, their views before, during and after the policy development process, in order to ensure that policies reflect community preferences as far as possible.
3. As consumers and end-users: who expect value-for-money, affordable services and courteous and responsive service.

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

4. As organised partners involved in the mobilisation of resources for development *via* for-profit businesses, non-governmental organisations and community-based institutions (DPLG 2007:9).

4.3.3 Local Government Municipal Structures Act (Act 117 of 1998)

As noted above, the Constitution (RSA 1996) provides broad parameters in relation to participation. The Municipal Structures Act (RSA 1998b), in line with the Constitutional provisions, particularly Section 152(1) (a & e), provide for the establishment of different categories of municipalities and governance structures of each municipal category, as well as the establishment of participatory structures, such as Sub-Councils and WCs.

According to DPLG (2005:14), the Municipal Structures Act (RSA 1998b) also provides for:

1. A framework for the powers and functions of WCs.
2. The term of office.
3. Procedures for dealing with vacancies.
4. A ruling on remuneration.
5. Procedures for dissolution of ward committees.

It is only the Metropolitan municipalities that can establish Sub-Councils, while both categories A and B municipalities can establish Ward Participatory Systems (Cameron 2005:335). Due to their proximity to the public, WCs are the structures that make it possible to narrow the gap between municipalities and the public since WCs have the knowledge and understanding of the public they represent (DPLG 2005:11).

The COCT is one of the metropolitan municipalities that utilises the system of Sub-Councils as one way of bringing government closer to the public. It has 22 Sub-Councils decentralised across the Metro. They have the responsibility of participating with the public and disseminating information on service delivery issues to their ward or through WCs (Mfundisi 2007:67). According to Mfundisi (2007:67), for Sub-Councils to be established, a bylaw needs to be passed by the Council of the municipality, thus legitimising its existence and ensuring it comprises Ward Councillors and other Councillors elected through proportional representation.

As for the WCs, they are chaired by the Ward Councillor and must comprise not more than ten members representing different interests in the ward, with “women equitably represented”

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

(Piper & Deacon 2008:4). With regards to their role, Section 74 (a) states that WCs "may make recommendations on any matter affecting its ward (i) to the Ward Councillor, or (ii) through the Ward Councillor, to the Metro or local council, the executive committee, the Executive Mayor or the relevant Metropolitan Sub-Council".

According to Piper and Deacon (2008:41), the WC's role is further clarified in Ministerial Notice 965 of 2005, which states that the "duties and powers" delegated to WCs may not include executive powers (Section 5(3) (d), but instead emphasise their role in communication and mobilisation.

4.3.4 Local Government Municipal Systems Act (Act 32 of 2000)

After the enactment of the Municipal Structures Act (RSA 1998b), that ushered in Sub-Councils and WCs, the mammoth task to democratise local government continued with the introduction of the Municipal Systems Act of 2000. The Municipal Systems Act (RSA 2000) spelt out participatory obligations for local government, like the creation of formal participatory structures such as the IDP.

According to Pieterse (2002: 64), "IDP as a chief democratising instrument in local government distinguishes itself from previous local government in that it combines democratic governance, participatory planning an efficient modern managerial practice". Theron (2009c: 135) hails "the IDP, in a DLG context, as a theoretically best thought out framework to engage in municipal-community partnership".

Patel (2004:1) asserts that IDP was born out of deliberations on the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) and was elaborated upon in the White Paper on Local Government (RSA 1998a). The formal introduction of IDP was in the Municipal Systems Act (RSA 2000) which became a requirement for the 2000 local government elections (Patel 2004:1).

Section 16 of the Municipal Systems Act (RSA 2000) is explicit in prescribing the need for municipalities to "develop a culture of municipal governance that complements formal representative government with a system of participatory governance" and must, for this purpose, encourage and create conditions for the public to participate in the affairs of the municipality, including in the:

i) Preparation, implementation and evaluation of IDP.

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

ii) Performance management system.

iii) Monitoring and review of performance in preparation of the budget.

iv) Strategic decisions regarding municipal services.

It is the responsibility of incumbent municipalities to contribute to capacitation of the public to participate meaningfully in municipal affairs and for the Councillors and officials to foster public participation (Davids & Maphunye 2009:62).

With regards to the mechanisms, processes and procedures necessary for public participation, Section 17 of the Municipal Systems Act (RSA 2000) requires, among others:

1. Public participation of the public in municipal affairs must take place through:
    a) Political structures for participation in terms of the Municipal Structures Act (117 of 1998) and
    b) The mechanisms, processes and procedures for participation in municipal governance established in terms of the Municipal Systems Act (32 of 2000).
2. A municipality must establish appropriate mechanisms, processes and procedures to enable local communities to participate in the affairs of the municipality and must, for this purpose, provide for:
    a) Receipt, processing and consideration of petitions, complaints lodged by members of the public.
    b) Notification and public comment procedures when appropriate.
    c) Public meetings, hearings by the municipal council and other political structures and political office bearers of the municipality when appropriate.
    d) Public participation sessions with locally organised public organisations and, where appropriate, traditional authorities, and
    e) Report back to the public.

On communication of public participation information, Section 18 calls, *inter alia*, for the municipality to communicate to the public, information concerning:

a) The available mechanisms, processes, procedures to encourage and facilitate public participation.

b) The matters with regards to which public participation is encouraged.

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

c) The rights and duties of members of the public, and

d) Municipal governance, management and development.

4.3.5 The Municipal Finance Management Act (Act 56 of 2003)

Having discussed the local government legislative framework that spelt out different mandates for local government, it is pivotal that the public participate in municipal budgetary processes and thus ensure that municipal finances are guided by a set of regulations to counter any undesired behaviour in financial management.

The DPLG (2005:17) provides the following in relation to the purpose of the Municipal Finance Management Act (RSA 2003):

1. Brings about transparent and effective financial management in municipalities and municipal public entities.
2. Sets up a Municipal Financial Recovery Service to allow the National Treasury (NT) to intervene where a municipality faces a financial emergency.
3. Shows the difference between short-term borrowing and long-term capital investment.

Section 22 of the Municipal Finance Management Act (56 of 2003) is explicit in providing for the publication of annual municipal budgets and inviting the public to make representations in relation to the budget. Furthermore, Section 23 provides for the public being consulted on tabled budgets. It is a requirement of this legislation that the Mayor of the municipality must be given an opportunity to respond to submissions made and, if necessary, to revise the budget and accordingly table amendments for consideration by the full Council.

According to De Visser (2009:11), the Municipal Finance Management Act (RSA 2003) "established a robust framework for local government finance, dealing with financial management, accounting, revenue, and expenditure and debt management responsibilities for accounting officers and mayors as well as financial supervision by national and provincial governments". This provision provides for financial checks and balances in municipal finances to ensure prudent financial management.

4.4 Conclusion

The above discussion shows that the public has lost confidence in local governance. This is caused by lack of public participation and corruption. These shortcomings have resulted in

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

municipalities spurning their responsibilities to be accountable and responsive to their citizens. The public's response to this stalemate has been to embark on public protests to demand that their voices be heard, in order to be able to influence, direct, control and own development that is meant for their economic and social upliftment.

This chapter has also argued that, despite these difficulties, the public still turn up in numbers to exercise their democratic right to vote. What is amusing though is that they still seem to vote for the very same party that they have lost confidence in. This is caused by the fact that the South African electorate still votes according to identity (Friedman 2004:2).

In this chapter it has been shown how public institutions function within the confines of legislative frameworks that guide their operations. Local government is not immune to this rule. The legislative frameworks above provide a basis for a transformed, democratic, participatory, effective and efficient local government structure, geared at actively providing services to the public that ultimately lead to the betterment of their lives.

The mandates of local government are explicitly defined in legislation. These mandates include a developmental approach, a need for public participation through participatory structures i.e. WCs and IDPs, as well as financial prudence. This chapter has argued that municipalities should not rely only on "invented spaces" for participation, but must seek to utilise effectively and even legitimise the "self- invented (public)" spaces of participation.

While the "invented spaces" have proved to be ineffective, attempts must be made to ensure that they live up to expectations, in line with the recommendations contained in the State of Local Government in South Africa (GOGTA, 2009b). It can also be argued that municipal authorities' enforcement, application and compliance with local government legislation will go a long way in ensuring that the public participate in decision-making, thus reducing or curbing public protest.

The next chapter will examine public protests that have plagued Cape Town in general and Khayelitsha in particular. It will also briefly discuss the theories of protests in order to provide a theoretical grounding of protests. It will further explain the reasons behind public protests and the linkage between public participation and public protests. Lastly, the next chapter will provide the mechanisms through which public protest can be managed.

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

CHAPTER FIVE

PUBLIC PROTESTS IN CONTEXT

5.1 Introduction

South Africa's public participation discourse draws mainly on two ingredients: the anti-apartheid struggle and the new Constitution (1996) (Skenjana & Kimemia 2011:55). On the one hand, the struggle against apartheid challenged the apartheid regime's suppression of public participation, particularly by the Blacks, which inadvertently infused a culture of protests to the public discourse. On the other hand, the Constitution (RSA 1996) legitimised and affirmed the right to protest.

In contrast with the ideals of the Constitution (RSA 1996) and the international trends of opening up participatory spaces so that the public could participate in decisions meant to improve their lives (Cornwall 2008:11), South African municipalities, including the COCT are mired in dysfunctional "invited spaces", of their own making, for participation, thus curtailing the democratic rights of the public (COGTA 2009b:8). It has now been 17 years since democracy was attained, but this is sufficient proof that participatory approaches are not living up to the promise of empowerment and transformative development for marginal people (Hickey & Mohan 2004:3).

Furthermore, the preceding chapter alluded to the fact that the public has lost confidence in the municipal "invited spaces" (WCs and IDPs) for participation. In the same vein Masiko-Kambala *et al*. (2012:68) contend that "the current edifice of public participation provided for by local government legislation, is largely inadequate for facilitating meaningful and inclusive expressions of voice, particularly for the poor and the marginalised". As a result, the public has sought to invent their own spaces of participation as reliable vehicles to champion their cause. These invented spaces have been in the form of public protests which at times turn violent.

The persistent and violent nature of public protests in most South African municipalities and the COCT's attainment of the status of a protests prone municipality has been a cause for concern. This concern emanates from and is exacerbated by the similarity of the current protests to those that brought about democracy and allegations of political agitation of protests raised by the COCT Executive Mayor. Pillay (2011:1) posits that "during a highly repressive pre-1994 period, it was mass action at a local level that brought the state to its

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

knees". The question that needs to be asked is: Could this be interpreted as the recurrence of the pre-1994 era, or is this a signal that the conventional mechanisms of state-public engagement have failed and that alternatives must be explored?

The latter may be true, in line with the contention of Van Donk (2012:18) and Gwala and Theron (2012) that the current state of affairs in municipalities (dysfunctional participation mechanisms) can be attributed to the fact that, in practice, public participation has more often than not been approached as an activity, an event or perhaps even a regrettable legislative requirement, with little bearing on local priority-setting and development. To this end Mogale (2003:223) points out that "invariably, participation has degenerated into a kind of a feel-good slogan, coined to convince local audiences that local government has recognised the necessity for involvement of people in development activities".

The above-mentioned "sorry tales" of participation gives credence to Cooke and Kothari's (2001:1) case for "participation as tyranny of participatory processes undertaken ritualistically, which had turned out to be manipulative, or which had in fact harmed those who were supposed to be empowered". These "sorry tales" are manifesting through the emergence of a relatively new trend of social movements, such as the so called Arab Spring, the Occupy Movements and persistent, world-wide public protests.

This calls for a better understanding of protests and their violent nature, the causes/reasons for protests occurrences, theoretical constructs of public protests, as well as how protests can be managed as one of the valuable strategies for public participation.

5.2 The meaning of public protests

The phenomenon of public protests is not new. Pillay (2011:1) and Nleya (2011:3) pointed out that it was one of the apartheid struggle instruments that brought about democracy, but the expectation has been that, with the dawn of democracy, the public will effectively utilise invited spaces of participation, instead the public inventing its own spaces (protests). The effectiveness of the invited spaces would have resulted in the envisioned ideal situation that is succinctly summed up by Carrim (2011:1):

"If communities are more involved in local government, they are more likely to have an understanding of the possibilities and limits of service delivery and take greater

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

responsibility for both the achievements and the failures of delivery. They are more likely, in other words, to have a sense of ownership of the programmes of a municipality".

The preceding chapters provided theoretical grounding for public protests; however it is important to define protests and to draw distinctions between protests and social movements as concepts, as well as to define the theories underlying these concepts.

Table 5.1 below provides definitions of protests obtained as a result of the comparative research done by the researcher.

Table 5.1: Definitions of protest

The Concise Oxford English Dictionary (2006) defines protest as a "formal statement or action of dissent or approval, it is a demonstration of objection to official policy".
Francisco (1995:270) in Nam (2007:98) defines protest as "an act of defiance challenging the political or economic regime".
"An expression or declaration of objection, disapproval, or dissent, often in opposition to something a person is powerless to prevent or avoid" (Definitions.net 2012:1).
According to Wilki.answers.com "a protest means to get your point across about something that has bothered you personally/physically". Example: The man protested about the law just passed. Usually it's in a formal manner.

Source: The Author: (2012)

The definitions above point out that for a protest to occur there have to be an objection, disapproval or dissent over something that the public has no power to prevent and avoid. As explained in Chapter 2, a working definition is devised in the event where an established definition is not known; in this regard a working definition is used to clarify the meaning of the concept or phrase to avoid misunderstandings (Google.com.). Based on this and on the above comparative research on the definitions of protests, the researcher formulates a working definition for protest in line with the hypothesis of the study:

A physical act of demonstrating discontent to the authorities over public concerns (some long-standing) aimed at compelling authorities to accede to public grievances and change the status quo. It is a demand for dignity, acknowledgement of basic human rights and return of power that has been stripped from the public. It is a demand to be able to influence, direct, control and own the development and decision-making processes.

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

Moreover, there is a need to define a social movement, so as to clarify its relationship with protest. According to McCarthy and Zald (1977: 217-18) in Meyer (2007:8), a social movement is "a set of opinions and beliefs in a population which represents preferences for changing some elements of the social structure and/or reward distribution within a society". Meyer (2007:10) sees social movement "as collective and sustained efforts that challenge existing or potential laws, policies, norms or authorities, making use of extra institutional political tactics". For Oberschall (2000:26) a social movement is a "challenger that seeks a collective good for a constituency by means of a variety of tactics, some of which entail unconventional, even illegal, pressurising of the target".

It is clear from the definitions above that the public do not mobilise in cavity but in response to a crisis situation. In other words, social movements advocate for a radical change to the *status quo*; in this case, poor service delivery and lack of public participation. Due to similarities between protests and social movements, it is surmised that protest is a tool used by social movements to coerce authorities to conform to public demands. Therefore these concepts will be used interchangeably in this study.

Furthermore, the emergence of new social movement activities, such as the so-called "Occupy Movements" and "Arab Spring", necessitate that a distinction be drawn between different types of protests, in order to locate accurately public protests, the subject of this study.

In this vein, Fakir (2007:10) declares that public protests can be categorised into four types, i.e. (1) a social movement/civic activity, (2) a spontaneous, unorganised activity, (3) spontaneous eruptions grounded in specific need(s) and a definite alternative policy and (4) a political trajectory opposed to current dispensation.

The researcher has observed that Fakir's (2007) categorisation of protest omits the emerging social movement activity, i.e. Arab Springs. The researcher has also noted that this (Fakir 2007:10) categorisation makes provision for the so-called Occupy Movement type of activities, but the latter differs from the former in terms of the tactics and strategies. Therefore, the researcher adds the insurrectionary, well-organised, civic-activity category that relates to the so called Arab Springs:

1. **Social movement/civic activity:** This type of public protest sometimes demonstrates aggressive / unpleasant / offensive characteristics which, in itself are indicative of a

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

desperate position. Participants have a strategy which may be lacking in substance. They may have an alternative policy and a political objective. Their political activity is organised, indicating a distinct ideological and political position. In this type of civic action the movement is usually well organised, i.e. has a political identity, has organised structures (such as branches) and holds regular meetings. Examples from this category are the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC), People Against Gangsterism and Drugs (PAGAD) and Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU).

2. **Insurrectionary, well-organised civic activity:** This category is characterised by revolutionary, armed, popular uprisings such as that of the so-called Arab Springs, which seek to overthrow the incumbent government. This is evidenced by the major slogan used by these demonstrators in the Arab world: *ash-shab yurid isqat an-nizam*, meaning "the people want to bring down the regime". Participants have a strategy with some substance, which is to employ pro-democracy rebellions to topple autocratic rulers (Zader 2012:1). Their political activity is well organised and planned in advance; well before the actual start of the armed rebellion (Zader 2012:1). It is therefore clear that the Arab Springs phenomenon differs from the Occupy Movement due to the fact that the latter depends on peaceful protests.

3. **A definite alternative policy and political trajectory, opposed to the current dispensation:** In this activity, in terms of the South African scenario, some protests are instigated by an opposition party or some other small party with political intent; some emerge from the African National Congress (ANC) and its alliance partners. This type of activity often occurs as a result of not being placed in a favourable position on a party list, being replaced by another candidate or having been kicked out of the party for ill-discipline, corruption or non-performance. Recent examples of this category is the United Democratic Movement (UDM) which came into being as a result of its current leader's expulsion from the ANC and then the formation of the Congress of the People arguably, as a result of the ANC's recall of former President Thabo Mbeki.

4. **Spontaneous eruptions grounded on specific needs:** This activity is triggered by perceptions of a slow pace of delivery, which may be due to the government's lack of capacity. Public protests fit into this category, as they are usually described as being sporadic. These protests are furthermore described as low to medium key and are

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

triggered by annoying/disgusting occurrences in a neighbourhood with significant social ties. During the protest action, participants can raise grievances such as corruption, lack of delivery of basic services and lack of proper public participation.

According to Alexander (2010:26), methods used during such protest actions involves acts of mass action, streets blockades, burning of tyres and torching of vehicles, private and public buildings, construction of barricades, delivering memorandums and petitions to local authorities, toyi-toying, processions, confrontations with police and demand for removal and resignation of elected public officials.

In this category of protests, democracy is viewed as deficient and manifests itself in the crisis of a perceived lack of representation. Participants feel that government is out of touch with the public needs. Government is seen as not responsive to the needs of the people and is deemed unaccountable. A protest about service delivery only is a misnomer; protests are also about public service. Community organisations such as Abahlali Basemjondolo (shack dwellers), Backyarders Associations of the Cape Flats and the Western Cape Anti-Eviction Campaign, fall in this category of social movements.

5. **Spontaneous, unorganised activity:** This activity takes place through social movements. In this type of activity there are no organised structures, branches, meetings, fixed identity, policy and political project. It is concerned with seeking alternatives to current neo-liberal state trajectory (the poor becoming poorer and the rich richer) in a peaceful manner. Even if there is improvement in service delivery, the participants in this activity will not be satisfied, unless the gap between the poor and the rich is narrowed.

The so-called “Occupy Movements” are a case in point here. The Occupy Wall Street (OWS) is a “diffuse group of activists who say they stand against corporate greed, social inequity and the corrosive power of major banks and multinational corporations over the democratic process” (Barron & Moynihan 2011:2). The OWS were instigated by the emergence of the so-called Arab Springs as Barron and Moynihan (2011:2) point out that the idea, according to some organisers, was to camp-out for weeks or even months to replicate the kind, if not the scale, of protests that had

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

erupted earlier in 2011 in places such as Egypt, Spain and Israel.

According to Barron and Moynihan (2011:2) the protesters demands are straightforward and criticise a financial system that favours the rich and large corporations at the expense of the poor. In this way the occupiers want the rich to pay higher taxes, the banks to be held accountable for reckless practices and the provision of jobs for the unemployed.

The criticism levelled against the OWS is the lack of specific policy demands despite Schneider's (2011:1) assertion that OWS protesters employ a diversity of tactics as its official *modus operandi* and that the use of violence is discouraged at all cost. This, according to Schneider (2011:1), is seen in the protest march guidelines promulgated by the occupation's Direct Action Committee, i.e.: (1) Stay together and KEEP MOVING! (2) Don't instigate fights with cops or threaten pedestrians with physical violence. (3) Use basic hand signals. These folks are empowered to make directional decisions and guide the march. (4) We respect diversity of tactics, but consider how our actions may affect the entire group.

As noted above, central to OWS movement's "Diversity of Tactics" is non-violent protest action. Participants are to decide on their own on what they want to do and how to do it and are not obliged to take orders from any person from the top. In other words, they challenge top-down decision-making and organising and empower participants to take direct actions in the world around them. This type of action setting encourages a sense of consensus and direct democracy.

According to Graeber (2011:1) and Schneider (2011:2), non-hierarchical, lack of practical demands and decentralised structures are synonymous with anarchist principles. Graeber (2011:1) explains "anarchism as a political movement that aims to bring about a genuinely free society-that is, one where humans only enter those kinds of relations with one another that would not have to be enforced by the constant threat of violence". In other words anarchism envisions a society based on equality and solidarity, which could exist solely on the free consent of participants.

Other anarchist principles used by OWS are the refusal to recognise the legitimacy of existing political institutions. The occupiers have never handed a memorandum to the

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

authorities because to do this will be seen as recognising the legitimacy or the power of the authorities. In this vein anarchists differentiate between protest action and direct action (Graeber 2011:1). Protest is seen as an appeal to authorities to behave differently, while direct action is the defiant insistence on acting as if one is already free (Graeber 2011:2).

The second principle that is related to the first one, relates to the refusal to accept the legitimacy of the existing order, instead conforming to the moral order. The illegal occupation of the park is an act of disobedience in the belief that those laws should in the first place not exist. Thirdly, the refusal to create an internal hierarchy, but instead create a form of a consensus – based on direct democracy – ensures the avoidance of co-option or being coerced (Graeber 2011:2). This also means that the majority cannot bend the minority to its will, as decisions are made through general consent.

Moreover, Schneider (2011:3) points out that this seemingly chaotic situation is in fact a pragmatic tactic. He points out that law-enforcement agencies receive high-level intelligence information on the activities of the OWS. In the event the occupiers veer from their plans which police had prepared for, the police resort to violence, which reinforces the non-violence of the occupiers and subsequently leads to further growth in support.

Lastly, there is the embrace of pre-figurative politics[9]. The encampment at Zuccotti Park and subsequent encampments became spaces of experiment in creating the institutions of a new society – not only general assemblies, but kitchens, libraries, clinics, media centres, all operating on anarchist principles of mutual aid and self-organisation (Graeber 2011:2).

The power of "diversity of tactics" is also confirmed by Atlee (2011:3) by positing that "the logic is similar to guerrilla warfare in that, if a movement like this is unpopular, it will be defeated. But if a significant sector of the population supports it, then demonstrating the illegitimacy and ineffectiveness of the powers-that-be will ultimately force those powers to change or be replaced".

[9] According to the **Wikipedia.org**, the term pre-figurative politics is widespread within various activist movements, and it describes modes of organization and social relationships that strive to reflect the future society being sought by the group

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

Schneider (2011:3) sums this up succinctly by quoting "a widely-cited Freedom House report from 2005, which found that movements which rely on non-violence methods are considerably more likely to result in democratic outcomes, rather than simply replacing one type of authoritarianism with another".

5.3 Are protests about service delivery or public service?

The protests afflicting municipalities in South Africa are generally poorly understood so much so that there are conflicting views on what public protests are about. This has fuelled speculation on why protests occur. Maytham (2012) and Heese (2012) argue that the phrase "service delivery protests" is used by the media as a "catch all phrase" that covers a wide variety of issues facing the public. For example, and as observed by the researcher, the protest that turned violent in Kagiso (Gauteng) was triggered by the lack of speed bumps on the road which led to the road accident which incensed the public at a local government level. On the other hand the violent protests in Sweet Home Farm in Cape Town appear to have been triggered by the lack of communication between the public and authorities (Maytham 2012). In other words the public seem not to have been aware about progress on the question of the land in dispute. The above examples illustrates that protests in the two areas were triggered by service delivery and governance issue respectively.

One school of thought argues that public protests are about service delivery or lack thereof (Booysen 2007:33; Mathekga & Buccus 2006:4). Another school of thought attributes public protests to public service (Seokoma 2010:1; Nemeroff 2005:2). This confusion has the potential of deflecting government's attention from the real problem and the subsequent taking of corrective measures. It is therefore important that this be clarified before the discussion on the reasons and causes of public protests.

According to Booysen (2007:23), protests do not follow the same pattern in all communities, but change from one to the next and, furthermore, there will always be a myriad of reasons for protests by the public. On the one hand, Booysen (2007:24) and Mathekga and Buccus (2006:4) argue that protests are about service delivery and Allan and Heese (2008:1) agree and warns that to link protests to only service delivery is not accurate, but only serves to describe what is occurring at a local level and which is fuelled by lack of service delivery.

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

On the other hand, Seokoma (2010:1) and Nemeroff (2005:2) opine that protests are about public service, particularly the huge gap that exists between the public and authorities. Pithouse (2007) in Alexander (2010:25), sharply differs with the view regarding service delivery and argues as follows, "Protests are about 'citizenship', understood as the material benefits of full inclusion... as well as the right to be taken seriously when thinking and speaking through public organisations". These sentiments are also echoed by Ludwig and Nagel (2012:1) when they state that, "there is a lack of political will in terms of engaging with the public directly. The public is not viewed as subjects, but instead as objects and passive recipients of service delivery by the City (COCT)".

Friedman (2009:1) agrees that it is incorrect to label protest, service delivery protests. He does this by differentiating between service delivery and public service concepts. According to Friedman (2009:1), service delivery entails officials taking decisions for people and imposing these on them. In other words the public is not given an opportunity to provide input or choose regarding the nature of the service delivery. Public service, on the other hand, begins with the recognition that in a democracy, government is not expected merely to deliver, but to listen to the people and respond to their needs and, if it is impossible to respond effectively, government must work with the people to do what is at least closer to what they ask (Friedman 2009:1).

Friedman (2009:1) further argues that protest about public service is public participation in governance. While to protest is a democratic right, enshrined in the Constitution (RSA 1996), democracy is about allowing the public to take part in decision-making and action, taken collectively, particularly on issues affecting the lives of the beneficiaries. In other words authentic and empowering public participation provide the public with the scope to influence, direct, control and even own decision-making and development intervention.

Based on the different points of views expressed above, the researcher surmises that public protests are about both public service and service delivery. In this instance public service relates to issues of governance, i.e. public participation (in the sense of direct contact with the public by the authorities) and reaching consensus on issues affecting themselves, mutual accountability and responsiveness of the authorities to public needs. Service delivery relates to timeous provision of municipal public basic goods, such as water, sanitation, houses, etc.

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

5.3 Theories of public protests

Having defined and clarified protests and social movements, it is important to utilise protest theories to explain how and why social movements are formed and why the public participate. Dalton *et al.* (2009:3) cautions that extensive research on social movements has emerged from the highly-industrialised countries, as opposed to the developing countries. This makes it difficult to generalise, as political, social and economic conditions differ tremendously. According to Dalton *et al.* (2009:3), theories of protests and mass movements are categorised into two groups, i.e. macro and micro levels and tend to provide political, psychological and socio- economic explanations on mass movements.

For the purposes of this study, focus is on four main, macro-level theories that provide political and socio-economic explanations of protests, i.e. political opportunity, theory of collective action, relative deprivation and resource mobilisation theories. These theories provide sufficient arguments for explaining protest formation and participation in this study.

To begin with the Political Opportunity Structure (POS) theory, which provides a political explanation to mass movements, puts forward three factors that must be present for the successful development of social movement, namely deprivation, resources and political opportunity (Meyer 2004:134). POS theory argues that the availability or the non-availability of political opportunity in the political structure determines the actions of the protest participants (Meyer 2004:134).

Tarrow (1989) in Meyer (2004:134), defines political opportunity as "consistent but not necessarily formal or permanent dimensions of the political struggle that encourage the public to engage in contentious politics". In other words, political opportunity relates to the degree of political openness or inaccessibility of the political structure. Oberschall (2000:31) adds that political opportunity has huge positive impact on participation, in the sense that when the probability of success is high, the cost of participation decreases. This may function as an incentive for protest participants.

Eisinger (1973) in Meyer (2004:128), states that governments that are both "open" and "closed" for the public to participate are most likely to encounter protests. This implies that governments that are open to public participation will invite participation to address grievances through conventional means, while those that suppress public participation will be

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

repressive (Meyer 2004: 128). Kitschelt (1986) in Dalton *et al*. (2011:3) disagrees and argues that the inaccessibility of the structure serves to induce the public to abandon the conventional means of communication and engage in protest action. This is even more so in South Africa, where the apartheid government, which was perceived to be "closed", was challenged through mass mobilisation and was eventually brought down. In this new democratic dispensation, polity is perceived to be "open" to public participation, but this does not deter the public from engaging in protest action. It is therefore clear that the openness or accessibility of polity has no bearing on protest action.

Secondly, the theory of collective action moves from the premise that citizens who are excluded from political activity choose between conventional and non-conventional means to demand a say in the policies that are meant to shape their future (Oberschall 2000:25). According to Oberschall (2000:25) the perceived intransigence of the regime provokes the public to utilise unconventional means, such as pickets, marches, protest and disorder to persuade government to accede to its demands. Oberschall (2000:28) add that four conditions must be met for collective action to take place, namely discontent, beliefs, capacity (i.e. resources) and political opportunity. However, the unavailability of one condition makes collective action unlikely.

The above-mentioned conditions reflect the situation that Khayelitsha inhabitants find themselves in. As noted above on numerous occasions, commentators argue that the prevalence of protests in Khayelitsha is as a result of dissatisfaction with the non-delivery of basic services. Inhabitants attempt to use "invited spaces" of public participation, but these do not yield the desired results. As a result, citizens' beliefs filter and frame their dissatisfaction as they witness delivery occurring in other and neighbouring townships. These observations have been transformed into grievances against the municipal authorities. The public are seemingly, from their own perspective, left with no other alternative but to resort to "self-invented" spaces of participation (e.g. Street Committees and protests).

The theory of collective action assumes that the public have the capacity to act collectively through Street Committees, have access to the means of mass communication and freedom to organise. Political opportunity in this instance functions as a "bargaining tool" for the public, i.e. the public in Khayelitsha is perceived to be loyal to the African National Congress (ANC) in a Democratic Alliance (DA) run municipality. This increases the probability that the goals and demands of the protesters will be achieved because they are being staged in anticipation

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

of timely delivery of public goods that will induce voting for the DA in future elections.

Thirdly, the Resource Mobilisation (RM) theory moves from the premise that, for people to mobilise there must be inequalities and grievances (Canel 1997:191). The formation of a social movement is dependent on the availability of sufficient resources and changes in opportunities (Tilly1978:99 in Canel 1997:191). These are utilised to mobilise against the authorities, in order to coerce it into tackling inequality and grievances. Resources include money, media coverage, knowledge, solidarity and internal and external support of the elite. Changes in the opportunities relate to rationality, where individuals first weigh the costs and benefits of movement participation (Nleya 2011:4). For them (individuals) to participate, benefits must outweigh the costs.

Oberschall (2000:31) argues that it is not only resources that are crucial in the formation of mass movements. In the absence of resources, the public can still engage in a protest action by using shared symbols and falling back on protest repertoires embedded in their culture. Canel (1997:191) points out that placing inequality as a precondition for the occurrence of protest weakens RM theory, in the sense that inequality and dominance is found at every level of society. RM critics cite its heavy reliance on resources, in particular financial resources. The researcher has observed that the public in Khayelitsha do not need financial resources to mobilise, instead rely on the power of the collective, in other words, the high number of the participants in a protest action increases the probability that their voices will be heard.

Lastly, Gurr's (1968) theory of Relative Deprivation (RD) provides explanation on the violent behaviour associated with protests. Gurr (1968:251) makes three psychological assumptions that act as sources of violence, namely that violence is instinctual, learned and innate. This means that these would have to be provoked by external factors such as unemployment and/or corruption for them to manifest.

According to Gurr (1968:250) this behaviour is explained by the frustration-aggression theory that assumes that the perception of frustration provokes anger, which functions as a drive. Therefore extreme and continuous anger may function as an autonomous drive, leading to aggression. RD functions as a precondition for violence and, if RD is severe, the probability and intensity of violence is high. The RD approach shows weak association with protest, particularly in developed countries, but stronger correlation is present in low-income

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

countries (Dalton 2010 in Nleya 2011:4).

Flowing from the discussion above, POS, RD and the theory of collective action the conclusion can be drawn that there is unanimous agreement that deprivation plays a role in the formation of mass movements and in enticing the public to participate in protest action. RM emphasises the availability of resources as a precondition to mass movement formation and participation. RM acknowledges that there must be inequality and grievances for a mass movement to be formed.

It can thus be argued that these two factors, i.e. inequality and grievances emanate from deprivation. Political opportunity appears in both the theory of collective action and POS. This signifies that it is one factor that must be considered when contemplating protest action, as it may be a risk factor in the event that the regime suppresses public participation. This study will therefore move from the premise that deprivation and political opportunity are necessary preconditions for both the formation of mass movements and participation in protest action.

5.4 The reasons/causes of public protests

There are different points of view put forward by commentators on the reasons or causes for the public to abandon conventional ways of voicing their dissatisfaction with local government authorities (Oldfield 2008:493; Van Donk 2012:7; Mathekga & Buccus 2006:4). As noted above, the right to protest is enshrined in the Constitution (RSA 1996). In other words, protest is regarded as one form of public participation which must be embarked upon in a manner that does not infringe on the right of the non-participants.

There are conventional ways, such as voting in the democratic elections held every five years, that can be used to voice dissatisfaction with the authorities. There are also invited spaces or participatory mechanisms such as WCs and IDPs that are meant to provide a platform for interaction between the public and authorities.

As shown in the preceding chapter, however, these participatory mechanisms do not instil a sense of trust in the general public, so much so that it has compelled sections of the public to resort to self-invented spaces of participation (in the form of public protests) to voice their dissatisfaction. The number of public protests seems to be increasing at an alarming rate which indicates that protest is increasingly becoming an acceptable way for the public to put

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

forward their grievances. This calls for the identification of reasons and causes why the public resort to public protests. Figure 5.1 below illustrates major public protests from year 2004 to July 2012.



Figure 5.1: Major public protests by year (2004 to July 2012)

Source: Municipal IQ Municipal Hotspots Monitor[10] (2012)

The Municipal IQ (2012:1) data shows that protests ballooned in years 2009 and 2010 and declined slightly in 2011 (see Figure 5.1). This decline is attributed to the municipal elections of May 2011 which, as noted above, introduced a higher public participation rate since the first local government elections (Van Donk 2012:14; Herzenberg 2011:1). Based on the researcher's observation, this decline can also be attributed to the fact that the run-up to the elections is normally characterised by political campaigns where politicians listen to public grievances and present their respective party manifestos. In other words during this period (high interaction between the public and politicians), the public abandon protest action in anticipation of improved public service after the municipal elections. It can thus be argued that if this high participation activity can be sustained even after the elections, the levels of public protests activity in Khayelitsha can be minimised thus serving as one of the protests mitigating mechanism.

[10]As per the Municipal IQ (2012), the Municipal IQ Hotspots Monitor records major protests either violent or peaceful, staged by the public against a municipality, as recorded by the media, raising issues that are the responsibility or perceived responsibility of local government (such as councillor accountability, the quality and pace of basic service delivery, and in metro areas, housing). Issues falling outside of local government's service delivery mandate such as demarcation, industrial relation disputes or internal political party issues (including candidate lists) are excluded. Where protests are sustained over several days or weeks, these are recorded as a single entry, with qualitative details updated on the database. Municipal IQ"s reliance on media reports lends it to inaccurate reporting as some protests may not be captured by the media, particularly when they are perceived not to be newsworthy.

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

This year (2012) has seen one hundred and thirteen public protests which, according to the Municipal IQ (2012:1), shows that 2012 accounts for 22 per cent of protests recorded between January 2004 and July 2012, with 1 January to 31 July 2012 recording more protests than any other year since 2004 (see Figure 5.1 above). In essence this means 2012 have set a new record in protest activity rate in South African municipalities since the dawn of democracy.

Moreover, Figure 5.2 below shows that from January to July 2012, the Western Cape is leading in the number of public protests, at 24 per cent, even surpassing Gauteng's 12 per cent, a province known to be prone to protests. On the other hand, Figure 5.3 illustrates the point that Gauteng has always been leading in the number of protests. From 2004 to 2012 Gauteng has had 28 per cent of public protests, followed by Western Cape at 17 per cent. As noted above, this high number of protests indicates that a gulf exists between public participation theory (WCs and IDPs strategies) and practice (implementation by change agents) (Cooke and Kothari 2001:4). The question is why a significant drop in Gauteng and a sudden increase in the Western Cape?



Figures 5.2 Public protests by province: January - July 2012



Figure 5.3: Public protests by province: 2004 – Quarter 1 2012

Source: Municipal IQ Municipal Hotspots Monitor (2012)

Furthermore, in figure 5.4 below, Cape Town accounts for 72 per cent of public protests in the Western Cape, as compared to a decline in Gauteng, under which the City of Johannesburg (COJ) falls. Despite some high-profile protests in Gauteng (COJ), it has had a far quieter year in terms of protests than is typically the case. The researcher argues that the distinction lies in the different approaches that the municipalities use to mitigate the levels of public protests.

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

Gauteng government called upon the Speakers of Municipal Councils and the Speaker of Gauteng Legislature to sign a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the view of working together to hold government accountable for service delivery and to improve public participation in both the local and provincial legislatures (South African Government Information (SAGI 2012). According to the SAGI (2012) the MOU committed the Speakers to set up provincial frameworks for oversight, public participation and law making. This was followed by the adoption of a five year strategic plan which among others provided for the reduction of violent public protests in Gauteng through meaningful public participation (SAGI 2012).

Moreover, the reduction in the number of public protests in Gauteng can be attributed to the COJ's road shows driven by officials to encourage the public to use constructive democratic mechanisms to raise their grievances (Heese 2012). The researcher has observed that the Gauteng Member of the Executive Committee (MEC) for COGTA is often the first at the protest scene. This sentiment is also echoed by the Municipal IQ (2012:1) which further attribute the reduction in the number of protest in Gauteng to rapid and high-level political engagement with protestors and also to what the Municipal IQ (2012:1) refers to as a "policing solution[11]", which appears to be paying off.

The Municipal IQ (2012:1) argues further that a policing solution to contain violence and destruction of property is critical, but it is also important for politicians, particularly councillors to acknowledge protests as legitimate without condoning violence and to be seen acting on public grievances. The Gauteng's approach can be regarded as a "soft approach[12]" to mitigating the levels of protests.

However, the opposite seem to be happening in Cape Town. It can be argued that although protest action is partially accepted as expressing legitimate grievances of the public this is not fully acknowledged in the COCT. The Executive Mayor, in response to a question on whether protests were not related to service delivery, declared that protest were "organised illegal ANC demonstrations with the express purpose to destroy property" (Nkomo, 2012).

[11] As per Allan (2012), this policing solution involves the use of non-confrontational strategies that seeks to contain violence and the destruction of property.

[12] For the purposes of this study the "soft approach" refers to a non-confrontational approach to dealing with protests and that seeks to inculcate the culture of authentic and empowering public participation in municipal affairs.

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

This is despite confirmation from the senior police official that "there is no evidence that the ANCYL was behind recent protests" (Nkomo, 2012).

It also appears as if protest action is regarded as an irritant, as the Mayoral Committee member for safety and security (COCT) puts it that protests had displaced the City's stretched resources and that "instead of people getting the policing that ratepayers are paying for, the metro police are at service delivery protests" (Mtyala 2012:3).

The rapid response to attend to the protesters in the COCT seem to be coming from the law enforcement agencies who are first to be at a protest scene which can be associated with the "hard approach[13]" to protests mitigation. It appears that the politicians respond to protests when they turn violent, for example the Executive Mayor responded to the plight of Sir Lowry Pass later, a day after the protests started (Maditla 2012:1). This point is further clarified by Booi (2012:1) of Eye Witness News in that it is the law enforcement agencies that respond immediately to protests, followed by the COCT officials who met with the leaders of the Sweet Home Farm informal settlement a day after the public have clashed with the police from the previous day.

In contrast with the COJ, the high level political engagement of the protesters in the COCT, seem to be through tallying the costs of protests damage, seeking to interrogate theories of political agitation on certain public protests (De Lille 2012:1) and instituting criminal charges against political opponents. It can thus be argued that the COCT must learn some lessons from the COJ "soft approach" to mitigating protests. Moreover, Heese (2012) asserts that the COCT officials need to encourage COCT politicians to follow the COJ example. The researcher has observed that the public in the COCT is raising legitimate grievances that must be attended to urgently. These grievances are not unique to Cape Town but exist throughout South African municipalities. The distinction lies in the manner in which protests are mitigated. The COCT must (first) fully acknowledge protests as raising legitimate grievances, a demand for the public in the COCT to influence, direct, control and even to own decision-making processes and development interventions meant for the betterment of their lives.

Flowing from data illustrated in Figure 5.1, 2 and 3, the researcher argues that the gulf that exists between the COCT participation strategies and implementation alienates the public,

[13] The "hard approach" relates to a confrontational approach of responding to public protests, including the law enforcement agencies use of excessive force to deal with protesters. The local politicians respond when protests turn violent.

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

leading to public disengagement from the participation discourse, hence fuelling the persistent public protests in Khayelitsha and elsewhere. De Lille (2012:1) confirms the gulf as mentioned above and adds that there is a breakdown in the relationship between government and the public and that the public feels excluded and neglected by the COCT. In other words, the public in the main, is disillusioned with the delivery rate of basic public services, but increasingly, governance factors such as lack of public participation, maladministration, nepotism, fraud and corruption, have been brought to the fore (GGLN 2012:7).

Governance factors (including lack of public participation) as contributory factors to the upsurge in public protests, are also reaffirmed in State reports such as COGTA: The State of Local Government Report (2009b:8-10), National Treasury's Local Government Budget and Expenditure Review (2011:24) and the National Development Plan (National Planning Commission 2011:365), GGLN (2012:7) and Van Donk (2012:13). This is government's acknowledgement that there is a disconnect between the public and the COCT in what Cornwall (2008:11) and Van Donk. (2012:15) call "governance deficit".

IDASA (2010:4) and Booysen (2007:23) assert that public protests differ and take various forms from one municipality to the other, but in all instances members of the public want to be "heard and taken seriously", as they are aware of their rights and demand those rights. This assertion is also echoed by Heese (2012:1) by stating that 90 per cent of public protests are fuelled by public frustrations with government. CIVICUS (2011:12) concurs and asserts that protesters strive for dignity and question the current rules of engagement (WCs and IDPs). In other words, in as much as these participatory mechanisms governing the relations between the public and authorities are not delivering, a "social contract" (CIVICUS 2011:48) must be renegotiated, but this time, primarily on the public's terms. This call seems to fall on deaf ears.

IDASA (2010:4) states that "protesters are adamant that, for as long as government officials continue to assume that the mandate they get at the polls gives them right to act in a unilateral and top-down manner, these protests will continue. This means that the public feel alienated from decision-making processes. Protests are aimed at reminding the authorities that the public's right to be heard is sacrosanct.

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

According to Allan (2010:20), public protests cannot be forecasted and points out that public protests do not take place in South Africa's poorest municipalities, as alleged. In supporting this argument, Allan (2010:20) cites the Census 2001 data which pointed out that between 2004 and 2009, 48 per cent of households earned less than R800 a month, but less so than a national average of 57 per cent.

Furthermore, public protests are not very prevalent in municipal wards with the worst service-delivery backlogs. For example, "of the 23 per cent not receiving access to basic services they are still on aggregate better off than the national citizen, where an average 27 per cent of ward residents did not receive basic levels of service delivery in 2001" (Allan 2010:20). According to Allan (2010:20) the above picture shows that it is neither absolute deprivation nor the very poorest of the poor that are behind the public protests.

Protests are fuelled by relative deprivation measured against neighbours in wealthy municipalities (Van Donk 2012:21). Data also shows that rapidly-growing urban areas, with high levels of inequality levels, implied by higher levels of economic growth on the one hand and deep unemployment on the other, are at risk of being engulfed by public protests (Allan 2010:21).

The discussion above absolves being the poorest of the poor and suffering absolute deprivation as being the causes of public protests, so then, what are the real reasons for and causes of these persistent public protests? According to CIVICUS (2011:55) the root causes of the public protests can be traced from the economic crises which have exacerbated unemployment rates and inequality, to the manner in which politicians and change agents implement development interventions. This assertion is echoed by Allan (2010:20) who states that public protests have taken place at wards with high unemployment levels – at 43 per cent – although poverty levels and access to services there are not worse than the national average.

According to Allan (2010:20), "there is a link between public protests and the performance of the local economies and municipalities as measured on the Municipal IQ Productivity Index". The Western Cape Province score in the Municipal IQ Productivity Index is currently (2010) "high at 74.47 per cent more than expected" (Allan 2010:20). Therefore, the higher the aggregate provincial score, the greater the level of public protests. This is seen by high levels of migration from poor-performing provinces to better performing. Allan (2010:20) points

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

out that there is a link between people entering a municipal area for economic opportunities and public protests. The COCT is not immune to this trend.

The points above are illustrated in the IDP (COCT 2007-2012). Over the last 20 years the COCT experienced rapid urbanisation which has resulted in its population almost doubling to its current total of 3.5 million people. The COCT (2007-2013) attributes this growth rate to the 1 per cent annual growth through natural family formation and the continued influx of approximately 50 000 people (18 000 households) per year. The influx is mainly from the Eastern Cape Province, to Cape Town in the hope for employment opportunities.

According to the IDP (COCT 2007-2012) "this urbanisation trend presents Cape Town with a number of major challenges, particularly when one considers that around 91% of households in the city earn less than R6 400 per month, and therefore depend on the state for their housing needs". This explains why protests are prevalent in COCT and Khayelitsha (at 72 per cent) as opposed to other districts in the Western Cape (see Figure 5.4 below). In essence, protests do not occur as a result of an area being considered the worst for service delivery or a municipality as one of the worst performing.

Figure 5.5 below illustrates the worsening/climaxing of public protests during winter months (June, July and August) in the Western Cape, when the shacks in the informal settlements get flooded as a result of frequent rain and are prone to fire hazards, due to increased levels of open-fire heating (Allan 2010:19; Van Donk 2012; Karamoko 2011:8).



Figure 5.4: Western Cape protests by district: February 2007 – May 2011
Source: Karamoka (2011:8)



Figure 5.5: Protests by month in Western Cape (to end September 2009)
Source: Municipal IQ (2012:19)

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

Oldfield (2008:493) and Buccus and Hicks (2008:528) are of the view that the public resort to protests when frustrated with a municipality's participatory processes. The confusion is caused by what the State (more so, local government) calls "public participation", which is nothing more than a limited "consultation" and "involvement" process, which is not empowering (Theron 2009b:119). When the public feel that they are being asked to approve and accept decisions that have already been made and they subsequently feel that they will not be able to get what they want, they resort to protests. This means that the public is able to make rational decisions based on the choices presented to it.

This is explained by the fact that social movements are often led by activists who are "socially well connected, better educated" than the followers. In this way they are able to make rational decisions. This may be true as, for example, during the "toilet saga" in Khayelitsha, the "ring leader", who was a member of the ANC Youth League, is now serving as a Ward Councillor. Meyer (2007:2) argues that "to a large degree the government shapes the kind of opponents it will face, the tactics they will employ and the issues they will press". Thompson and Nleya (2010:223) argue that the public is well aware of the various approaches that can be used to voice their dissatisfaction, but these are exhausted first and protest comes as a last resort. Meyer (2007:3) concurs and adds that when the "ring leaders" decide on a course of action, they sift through a myriad of tactics ranging from political violence to mainstream political participation and they are well aware of the strengths and weaknesses of each tactic.

The public do not just decide to mobilise, but as a result of a culmination of numerous frustrations, often building up over a long period of time (Atkinson 2007:58). There are triggers that initiate and lead to mass action and differ from one municipality to the other. Botes *et al.* (2007:6) argue that "no community will wake up and suddenly decide to protest". Mathekga and Buccus (2006:11) state that: "while part of the problem at local government level can be explained as a matter of poor service delivery, the problem is also perpetuated by lack of public participation and engagement at local government level". Carrim (2010:2) agrees and emphasises that "people are protesting because they do not have adequate access to councillors, council officials, WCs and other municipal structures". In other words, participation spaces are relatively "closed".

The above sources indicate that there is a huge gap between the authorities and change agents on the one hand, and the beneficiaries of development on the other hand. According to

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

Kornhauser (1959) in Meyer (2007:3), this discrepancy makes the public feel that they are not sufficiently connected to the government through their social groupings, hence their decision to protest. Mathekga and Buccus (2006:15) raise the issue of "community orientations" which refers to the rich culture of public participation in South Africa that developed and became entrenched during the fight against apartheid. This culture is evoked by the top-down approach which prevailed during the apartheid era and is still evident in most municipalities in South Africa, including the COCT.

Booysen (2007:21) explains a top-down approach as a process through which policies, their implementations and budgets are determined by the authorities. It can be alleged that the public's frustrations are as a result of the top-down approach, as it alienates them from the centres of power. In other words it denies the public an opportunity to influence, direct, control and own development processes.

The discussion above shows that there are a myriad of reasons for public protests. It is clear that although not all of them manifest themselves in the run-up to a particular protest, they all have the following dimensions, i.e. structural, systemic, governance, political, economic and psychological (Carrim 2010:1). Figure 5.6 below depicts the above-mentioned dimensions of public protests, though the list is not necessarily exhaustive.

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za



Figure 5.6: Dimensions of public protests

Source: By Author (2012)

5.5 The violent nature of protests

The apartheid dispensation's intransigent system of local government gave birth to an insurrectionary-minded civil society which continues to haunt the democratically elected government. Insurgency has infused itself in the minds of the public as an "integral element of civil society mobilisation and of struggles for citizenship" (Von Holdt 2011:5). Public protests provide the public with an opportunity for expanded citizenship as enshrined in the Constitution (RSA 1996). However the staging of such protests is often accompanied by violent acts, which result in the destruction of public and private property, severe injuries and loss of lives, disruptions in schooling and economic activities, as well as confrontations between armed police and stone throwing crowds.

According to Carrim (2010:1), the violent nature of some protests reflects a far more fundamentally alienated version of the public form of democracy. It further "suggests an

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

acute sense of marginalisation and social exclusion". This is not an ideal situation in the light of the fact that violence does not lead to a "win-win" situation and, as GGLN (2008:19) declares, "the most extreme form of public participation is violent public protests". On the one hand, public protest and violent protest can be viewed as acts of expressing one's democratic rights, complementing the democratic practices of elections, while also making up for the deficits inherent to the latter (GGLN 2008:19). On the other hand, direct violence demeans a society and devalues democratic practices. In other words, it reverses the gains that have already been achieved.

Figure 5.7 below depicts the number of violent protests that has occurred between the periods 2007 and 2010. The figure below shows a pattern of an increase in violent protests during winter months (June/July/August) as opposed to other seasons in the year depicted as "remainder" (non-winter). In 2007, nearly 50 per cent of violent public protests were recorded in winter. Compared to 2007, there is nearly a 10 per cent decline in violent winter protests in 2008 (Karamoko 2011:14).



Figure 5.7: Proportion of protests turned violent, winter versus rest of the year
Source: Adapted from Karamoko (2011:14)

The 2009 period saw a slight increase (compared to 2008) in violent public protests, followed in 2010 by the greatest increase in the periods under review, reaching a peak of nearly 60 per cent. It is important to note that winter months surpass other seasons in violent public protests. From the researcher's observation, winter months are characterised by wet and cold weather, with shacks being flooded by rain water particularly in the informal settlements. This added discomfort renders the situation unbearable for the public in Khayelitsha.

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

As noted above, violent protests are more prevalent during winter months. This correlation, however, does not imply that those that occur during the remainder of the year cannot be violent (Karamoko 2011:14). It indicates that the upsurge in the number of protests in winter months has an increased probability of violence. It can thus be argued that the former apartheid government (service delivery backlogs) alone cannot be blamed for this state of affairs. If the democratic dispensation is in harmony with the needs of the public, violent protests will be minimal if not non-existent.

According to Tseola (2012:161), the violent public protests, particularly by the impoverished public can be attributed to the lack of an advocacy planning approach. Tseola (2012:161) argues that the current "regulatory planning approach" emphasise the attainment of "the optimal allocation of resources between all of the competing needs or users within a society", leading to the delivery of impure goods to the impoverished. The advocacy planning approach according to Tseola (2012:161) will ensure equal access for the impoverished in terms of quality and quantity, as the approach itself seeks to mobilise and channel resources to new social objectives or a major re-alignment of existing objectives.

Tseola's (2012:161) advocacy planning approach is closely related to the "third sector" approach as propounded by Sibanda (2011:814). The third sector organisations (voluntary and non-profit organisations) are mainly preoccupied in seeking new ways of delivering public services through civil society participation in governance, so that the active citizenry can emerge and drive the delivery of public services. According to Sibanda (2011:815), a stalemate that exists between the public and authorities in Khayelistha can be remedied. Sibanda (2011:815) argues that "third sector organisations are not only seen as offering choice and responsiveness in service delivery, but also as providing opportunities for general trusts, civic virtue and social capital through participation in community and public life".

The researcher argues that Tseola's (2012:161) advocacy planning and Sibanda's (2011:817) third sector approaches can go a long way in addressing the "scramble" for minimal services in the COCT and will ensure the equitable distribution of resources to the public in Khayelitsha. These two approaches are synonymous with a "bottom-up" approach to development in the sense that they are people-centred. Furthermore, these approaches guarantee the public authentic participation that will provide scope for the public to influence, direct, control and even to own the development processes.

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

It has to be noted that the COCT as part of the national government directive has approved an Informal Settlement Master Plan Framework in November 2007, which aims to integrate informal areas with the broader urban fabric to overcome spatial, social and economic exclusion (COCT IDP 2007-2012). This initiative accommodates an estimated 230 informal settlements in Cape Town, accommodating almost half of the city's households. Central to this plan is the provision of *in situ* essential services, such as water, sanitation and electricity. These services will be delivered in phases, aiming for upgrades of existing informal settlements through equitable participation (COCT IDP 2007- 2012). It can be argued that if the COCT can adopt the two approaches mentioned above, the violent public protests in Khayelitsha can be minimised as the public itself will be owning the development processes. However these two approaches should not be seen as a panacea to the social ills but as contributing to the minimisation of the triggers of violent public protests.

Further analysis of the violent nature of protests relates to psychological interpretations. To explain the violent nature of the protests, Burger (2009:2) utilises the theory popularly known as the Davies J Curve to explain the discrepancy between reality and expectations of humans concerning levels of progress. Burger (2009:2) argues that under normal circumstances, the situation the individual finds himself or herself in does not result in "conflict" or "frustration"; it is only when there is a sudden change that a huge gap is created between expectations and reality.

The huge gap leads to "frustration" and "discontent" and, ultimately, to protests. Prolonged frustration, in turn, will lead to violence. Hough (2008:1) concurs with Burger (2009:2) and states that "the more severe and widespread the deprivation, the greater the possibility of violence". The nature of public protests in Khayelitsha could be explained as action resulting from a sudden change which has not been addressed by the authorities/ leaders or properly explained to the public. Prolonged frustration on the part of the public has now boiled over into violent protests.

The question that needs to be answered is what is this sudden change? What are these prolonged frustrations that have resulted in frustration and ultimately public protests? Allan and Heese (2008:2), Seokoma (2010:2) and Booysen (2007:2) are unanimous in indicating that the prolonged frustrations that lead to public protests are caused by lack of authentic and empowering public participation. In other words the public finds it difficult to influence, direct, control and even own the development and decision-making meant for its betterment.

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

Furthermore, Bandeira and Higson-Smith (2011:15), provide a model within which collective violence needs to be understood. The model for collective violence traces the root causes of violence. Bandeira and Higson-Smith (2011:14) argue that collective violence does not occur within a vacuum; there has to be a combination of a set of events and or conditions for it to occur. To explain the occurrence of collective violence, Table 5.2, below provides a model for understanding it and differentiate between three factors that play different roles in the occurrence of collective violence, i.e. root causes, proximate and immediate factors.

Table 5.2: A model for understanding collective violence



Source: Adapted from Bandeira and Higson-Smith (2011:15)

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

Root causes, such as poverty, unemployment, inequality and a history of violent interaction between the state and the public, act as prerequisites for collective violence to occur (Bandeira & Higson-Smith 2011:14). The above mentioned factors are structural and affect the public on a daily basis. Due to their intrinsic nature, they elicit social tensions, that, when combined with other conflict behaviour, result in collective violence. It has to be noted that these factors cannot be eradicated within a short space of time; hence they require long term prevention measures.

Unlike the root causes, proximate causes, such as poor service delivery, political conflict and political entrepreneurship and poor local governance, require medium-term prevention, as they can be solved by an accountable and responsive local government structure. These factors increase the probability of collective action, as the public perceives them to stem from ineffective municipalities. As noted above, these factors form part of the list of grievances in Khayelitsha.

Bandeira and Higson-Smith (2011:14) caution that accelerators, like the role of the police in a public protest, political entrepreneurship, criminal and political opportunism and the role of the youth, may not be causally related to the conflict, but, can instead accelerate the process. In other words, these factors serve as determinants of whether or not the situation is conducive for collective violence.

Decelerators include such factors as the role of the police and that of the leaders. Police, who are there to maintain law and order and who are not provocative, may reduce the risk of violent action. Similarly, public leaders, who are able to control their followers and are respected by the public, can deter violent action before it occurs.

Furthermore, a Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Coordinated Oversight on Service Delivery (2010) confirmed the above arguments and attributed the violent nature of protests to the following factors:

1. Aggression fuelled by intense frustrations.
2. A sudden downturn in the economy, triggering frustration and discontent, often leading to social unrest.
3. The reinforcement of violence as being acceptable in families and communities, often leads to a vicious cycle of violence in those families and communities.
4. Vindictiveness, anger, arguments and provocation can lead to violence.

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

5. Lack of confidence, due to the legacy of apartheid, perceived racism and/or discrimination; as well as threatened masculinity in gender relations.
6. Substance or alcohol abuse can lead to increased aggression.
7. The existence of gangs and criminal activities within a community can result in the exploitation of protests by criminal elements for their own objectives.

The above conditions closely relate to social, economic and psychological factors that are prevalent in Khayelitsha. It can thus be argued that the violent nature of protests in Khayelitsha can *inter alia* be attributed to these factors.

5.6 The management of protests

The management of protests in this study refers to the mechanisms that can be used to control/mitigate public protests to avoid a situation where they turn violent. The preceding chapters have shown that the public is frustrated with the invited spaces of participation available to it. As a result of the failure of these spaces to deliver on the promise of participatory development, the public has resorted to protestations through invented spaces. Gaventa (2004:27) points out that protests are an international phenomenon, which shows governance deficits. This, calls for better public participation strategies to ensure that democracy can be deepened.

South Africa has made significant strides in deepening democracy through WCs, participation in IDPs, regular municipal elections, as well as through legislation to ensure that local government is accountable and responsive to the needs of the marginalised. These interventions, however, are not yielding the desired results, hence the escalation of violent protests. From the researcher's observation, bearing in mind that South African municipal legislation has been labelled one of the most progressive globally, there is evidence of lack of political will on the part of politicians to ensure the deepening of democracy.

To this end, Gaventa (2004:27) calls for the reconceptualisation of public participation. This requires that new strategies aim at bridging the public-State gap by "recasting citizenship as practised, rather than as a given". As Cornwall and Gaventa (2000) in Gaventa (2004:29) put it, "active citizenship will recognise the public as *makers and shapers*, rather than as *users* and *choosers* of interventions or services designed by others". This calls for local government authorities to allow the public to influence, direct, control and own development and

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

decision-making processes. If the above is achieved, there will be no reason for the public to become violent as they will be the "makers and shapers" and even owners of development interventions meant for their betterment.

These active citizenry and social compact sentiments are also echoed by the NPC (2011:429). It requires inspirational leadership at each level of society. This will enable the public (or parts of the public) to be "mobilised to take charge of their future, raise grievances and assume responsibilities for outcomes" (NPC 2011:429). In the event where the public raises their grievances through protests, the authorities need to listen and act swiftly on the grievances. In other words, the authorities need to seriously deem protests as a legitimate form of public participation as the response to protest action is the key determinant of how destructive they become (Smith 2007:29). This means that the channels of communication are open and everyone is part of the problem and of finding a solution, with the resultant proper management of protests. Andoh (2011:118) sums this up by declaring that "participation is an important response, in an environment where the public displays a diminishing trust in the municipality".

Smith's (2007:29) assertion above that authorities response to protests determine and shape protests, for example the alleged use of force by law enforcement agencies when responding to protests, calls for the enhancement of negotiation, mediation and conflict resolution skills, not only on the part of these agencies, but the change agents as well. According to Smith (2007:30) such an approach will go a long way in diffusing tensions before escalating to the extent of violence.

As noted above, the invited spaces are state sanctioned, while the invented spaces are a public response to the deficits of invited spaces. The irony is that the invited spaces are a product of the struggle against apartheid, in other words the demise of apartheid ushered in local government legislation, such as the Municipal Structures Act (RSA 1998b) which provided for the establishment of WCs, the Municipal Systems Act (RSA 2000) that spelt out participatory obligations for local government for the public to participate in IDP processes and the Constitution (RSA 1996) with the entrenched right to electoral participation. This calls for the reconfiguration of both these types of spaces to ensure their mutual and productive coexistence.

In the light of the above, Carrim (2011:1) argues that there is a need for both the invited and

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

invented spaces of participation to co-exist; after all, the invited spaces were not created by the government alone. Moreover, it was through the original invented spaces (mass action) that the invited spaces were born. The reconfiguration of these spaces should ensure, according to Cornwall (2008:60), that the public are allowed to invent their own spaces so that they can construct and consolidate positions, gain confidence to speak up and gain access to a broader constituency of support. In this respect, "the invented spaces should contribute to widening and changing invited spaces for the better and these spaces could in turn be used to invent more space" (Carrim 2011:1). In other words, the public voice must be amplified. This therefore calls for what (Carrim 2011:1) refers to as "a dialectical relationship between invited and invented spaces".

The co-existence or a dialectical relationship between these spaces of participation should not be viewed as an endeavour of co-option of the invented spaces, but as an attempt to open-up closed spaces of participation, to strengthen and empower them, ensuring that they are capacitated to deal with public development issues. Not all the invited spaces are dysfunctional, so the idea should be to extract the lessons, both positive and negative, and build on them. In essence, the invented spaces should seek to influence the direction of the invited spaces and play a monitoring role. This type of an arrangement does not diminish the public's constitutional right to protest, but provides for the early indication of warning signs of possible occurrence of public protests, thus providing an opportunity to develop mechanisms for their management.

The essence of opening up spaces for the public to participate in, is to provide for the establishment of a reciprocal relationship, a partnership in learning (Kotze & Kellerman 1997:39). This provides the stakeholders in a development process opportunity to adapt, share and learn from each other's mistakes and past experiences. Similarly, the coexistence of these spaces will allow for deliberations, consensus and forecasting of public protests. Public protests will therefore occur only in the event of a deadlock in deliberations. In this way the beneficiaries of development will be in a better position to influence, direct, control, and eventually, to own the development interventions meant for their upliftment.

Through public participation people develop and establish dignity and self-esteem and share in, belong to and own the development process (Bryant & White 1982: 205-228). For dignity to be established, rights must first be attained as enshrined in the Constitution (RSA 1996). Cornwall (2008:20) points out that inviting the public to participate should not be seen as a

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

favour or a privilege, but a basic right, one that is fundamental to claiming many other rights. Gaventa (2004:29) concurs and suggests that "if the rights and citizenship are attained through agency, not only bestowed by the state, then the right to participate – for example, the right to claim rights – is a prior right, necessary for making other rights real". If the change agents in the COCT understand, accept and believe in these fundamentals, public protests will be managed, if less so, the public will be obliged to demand their basic rights by embarking on protest action. In the event where protest action is suppressed and basic rights denied, the public have a right to seek relief in the courts of law. The open toilet saga in Khayelitsha is a case in point, as noted above.

Cooke and Kothari (2001:3) explain that a gulf exists between public participation theory and practice. The researcher argues that South African municipalities have fallen into this trap due to heavy reliance on concepts like involvement/consultation (Theron 2009b:119), which even confuse the COCT officials and lead to frustration. The invited spaces of participation frustrate the beneficiaries of development, hence the escalation of violent public protest. This is collaborated by Gutas (2005) who found that the COCT officials do not understand the holistic development context in which participatory strategies should be planned and implemented. As argued above, these concepts fall short of authentic public participation. This calls for change agents to be trained to inculcate the culture of public participation.

To this end, Chambers (2002) asserts that establishing a culture of public participation calls for the training of change agents who engage with beneficiaries of development interventions. This means that change agents are to be empowered to empower the beneficiaries of development. The beneficiaries of development need to be empowered to participate meaningfully in their own development. Their meaningful participation will provide them with the scope to influence, direct, control and own decision-making processes and development meant for their betterment.

Cornwall (2004) reminds us that spaces for participation are not neutral but are themselves shaped by power relations that surround and enter them. Gaventa (2004:34) introduces the issue of boundaries that shape spaces and determine who enters with which identities, discourses and interests. He maintains that saying it is for everyone to participate, is a misnomer. This means that "development activists" as such must be identified and be empowered to enlighten the public on the development discourse. It has to be noted that not all members of the citizenry are able to drive development, but democratically-elected public

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

representatives drive development on their behalf and are directly accountable to the public.

The researcher argues that the public's frustration can be managed by keeping constant contact with the public. As President Zuma stated in his address at the New Age /SABC Business Briefing in Bloemfontein, the State, through its policies and programmes, endeavours to speed-up the delivery of basic services. The problem lies with the lack of regular communication of plans, progress made and challenges to the public at ward level, which "leaves the public uninformed and vulnerable" (Government Communication and Information System 2012:1). Public participation enables citizens to be part of the problem, thus becoming part of the solution. It can thus be argued that until such time as authentic and empowering public participation is practiced public protests, some violent will persist. The authorities will devote much of their time devising public protest management strategies instead of developing development strategies in collaboration with the public. Authentic and empowering public participation has a potential for dealing with and minimising the violent public protests within the COCT area, Khayelitsha in particular.

5.7 Conclusion

This chapter argued that the deficiencies of the invited spaces of participation compels the public to invent own spaces as a reliable vehicle to champion their cause. These participatory mechanisms, governing the relations between the public and authorities are not living up to expectations; as such this "social contract" must be renegotiated, but primarily on the public's terms. It has been shown that the root causes of public protests are poverty, inequality and unemployment. These are aggravated by the in-migration of people from other provinces in search of employment opportunities. This does not only add to the existing service delivery backlogs but also over-stretches the limited resources of the COCT.

This chapter has shown that disillusionment on the part of the public is caused by lack of public participation. In other words the COCT fails to listen to the public's grievances which lead to protests. The ideal situation will be for the COCT to explain its difficulties to the public in Khayelitsha, so that the public fully understand the municipal delivery mechanisms. As such two approaches, i.e. advocacy planning and third sector, though there is a need for further development, can play a role in bringing about authentic public participation, thus minimising violent public protests in Khayelitsha.

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

This chapter argued for a need for the invited and invented spaces of participation to co-exist. In other words a dialectical relationship between these two spaces will encourage reciprocity, where the rules of engagement will be centred on deliberations and consensus seeking. This arrangement will enable the public to influence, direct, control and own development and decision-making processes, without which, violent public protests will persist in Khayelitsha.

The next chapter will present the research result, interpret and present findings obtained through personal interviews, focus group discussions and observation.

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

CHAPTER SIX

RESEARCH FINDINGS, INTERPRETATION AND PRESENTATION

6.1 Introduction

The researcher has obtained different perspectives on other research findings related to the topic of this study. It is incumbent upon the researcher to establish whether the lack of authentic and empowering public participation contributes to public protests in Khayelitsha. In the research problem, the researcher posed five objectives the study sought to achieve: (1) to analyse the developmental approaches that underpin public participation in local government, (2) to evaluate the theoretical and legislative framework currently in place for public participation in local government, (3) to determine the extent to which the perceived lack of public participation in the COCT contributes to public protests, (4) to analyse the probable factors that cause public protests to turn violent and, lastly, (5) to assess if public protests are set to remain a preferred public participation tool, so that management of protests can be improved on. Secondary data had to be gathered to achieve the above mentioned objectives of the study.

In line with the research methodology explained in chapter 1, this chapter presents an analysis of primary data obtained from personal interviews with: two COCT officials, i.e. an IDP Practitioner and a Public Participation Practitioner; two Ward Councillors aligned to the main opposition party, the African National Congress (ANC), and two Proportional Representative Councillors aligned to the governing Democratic Alliance (DA). It is important to note that the ANC won all wards in Khayelitsha during the last local government elections. The selection of Councillors from the two main political parties was done in order to obtain a balanced view of the prevailing conditions in Khayelitsha in relation to public participation and public protests and to minimise bias.

Personal interviews were also conducted with the chairperson of the social movement known as Abahlali Basemjondolo, the chairperson of the South African National Civic Organisation (SANCO) was also interviewed in order to get a balanced view and to avoid bias. Moreover, both SANCO and Abahlali Basemjondolo are popular organisations in Khayelitsha and SANCO has close links with the popular grassroots structure in Khayelitsha called Street Committee.

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

Four focus group interviews were conducted with the newly-appointed WC members. Each focus group comprised of a WC member and members of the public, ranging from four to fifteen participants. The researcher, as an employee of the COCT, had the opportunity to observe, amongst others, the IDP consultation workshops (that had been organised by the Executive Mayor) and public protests in Khayelitsha. The researcher also engaged in some informal discussions with COCT officials and the general public to enhance the researcher's "insider view". The researcher compiled a list of questions that were used as a guide for conducting the interviews (See annexure A).

6.2 Analysis of the COCT officials' responses

According to the respondents, the COCT strives to explore strategies/mechanisms that work best in ensuring that government is brought closer to the public. One such strategy was the establishment of Sub-Councils, decentralised through 24 areas within the COCT, and subsequent formation of WCs. Sub-Councils are open to any member of the public to attend and address it on any matter. The working of each Sub-Council is coordinated by a structure called the Forum of Chairpersons of Sub-Councils (FOCOS). It is this structure that continuously explores and advises on the best possible strategies for public participation.

The respondents noted that the COCT public participation strategies seek to speak to the public wherever they are. For example, the Council uses e-participation strategies to communicate with the public in affluent areas. On the other hand, in areas such as Khayelitsha, Street Committees are utilised to communicate with the public. Over and above these strategies/mechanisms the COCT's public consultation is via e-mails, newsletters and public meetings.

The COCT has both public participation and IDP offices, whose roles are to advise line departments and their functionaries on the best possible strategies to engage with the public. This means that the responsibility to engage with the public in terms of development programmes/projects lies with the line departments. According to the respondents this system works well, as line departments are experts in their respective fields, and, as such, know better concerning the appropriate strategies to engage the public in their development endeavours.

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

The respondents acknowledged that the COCT public participation strategies smack of a top-down approach and that the ideal is a bottom-up approach, which will be centred at the grass-roots level and will respond to the public directly.

It was the respondents' view that WCs need to be capacitated to respond better and understand their duties. However, the respondents pointed out that the functioning of WCs differs from one area to another, for example, WCs work well in affluent areas, due to better socio-economic conditions and satisfactory levels of literacy. In Khayelitsha, the same cannot be said. The socio- economic conditions are worse and the public have to contend with the reality of not being given proper feedback in languages they can understand, all of which may contribute to protest actions.

According to the respondents regarding the IDP, the process is considered little more than "lip service" to participation, despite it managing to reach more than a million members of the public, including Khayelitsha, The public is invited to participate in IDP planning processes only once plans and budgets have already been finalised. This practice contributes to public protest, as it means having had no part in developmental planning. It is therefore difficult for the public to identify with the IDPs and they find it difficult to understand the concept.

Furthermore, the respondents felt that the COCT officials' "silo approach" to planning and their Councillors' apathetic unresponsiveness fuel public protests, particularly when Councillors ignore that they were elected by the public. The respondents are of the view that, if a Councillor is not physically present in the community or when the members of the public in Khayelitsha feel he/she shows little interest in those issues that are of communal concern, the public may disengage the formal system, resulting in public protests.

According to the respondents, the legacy of apartheid plays a major role in fuelling protests. In other words the COCT inherited an apartheid city with huge service-delivery backlogs and glaring inequality gaps. The City's resources are too stretched to cope with these backlogs, further strained by a constant in-migration or influx of people from other provinces to the City. The inability of the City to resolve these issues speedily causes the disenchanted public to protest as they have run out of patience.

This situation is exacerbated by foreigners in the area who compete with the locals for scarce resources; hence public protests are often accompanied by an upsurge in xenophobic attacks.

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

The respondents noted that the public in Khayelitsha see some people in their neighbourhood living under better conditions than themselves. This prompts them into protesting their conditions, in the hope that this will somehow help to improve theirs so as to match those of others in their neighbourhood.

The respondents contended that violence is caused by the police/law enforcement agencies, who feel they have power over the public, as they have bullet proof vests and firearms. Criminal elements and delinquent youths who participate in public protests are also behind some of the violence that often accompanies protestations in Khayelitsha. The respondents felt that the public need to use creative ways of engaging the COCT, such as the so-called "Occupy Movement's encampments", popular in European countries.

When asked as to whether protests action is set to become an acceptable public participation strategy in the City, the respondents felt that, as protest is a right as such, it can become a public participation strategy, provided it is done in a peaceful manner.

6.3 Analysis of the focus groups' responses

Participants at the focus group discussions in Khayelitsha indicated that, although the WCs are used as one of the public participation strategies, the most popular forms of participation are Street Committees. These are participation structures that had been used in the fight against apartheid. The Street Committees are affiliated to South African National Civic Organisation (SANCO) that is aligned with the ANC. The Street Committee representatives report to the Block Committee, which in turn reports to SANCO. This tiered structure enables the public to participate at street or grass-roots level, at the same time gaining representation at higher levels of influence.

The focus group's participants felt that the criterion for appointing WCs is problematic, in the sense that members are drawn from Community Based Organisations (CBO's). For example, the focus group's participants pointed out that their CBO was asked by City officials to nominate a member to represent them in Council. The result was that the ward members were ignorant of the CBO member's elevation to a ward representative. In some instances, wards do not have CBOs, which means that they are excluded from the participation process through representation in WCs; as such Street Committees experience that gap. The focus group's participants were divided on the knowledge of WCs. Some participants have no knowledge of WCs and their functions, while some do. Those who have no knowledge have

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

faith in Street Committees. A strong suggestion from the focus group's participants was that the COCT must organise awareness workshops to educate the public about the WCs existence and their functions. Most focus group participants indicated that they are confused about which participation mechanism to use, as there are many structures. In the same vein, the focus group's participants indicated that they had never heard of the IDP, which partly explains resorting to protests.

The majority of focus group participants know their Ward Councillors, but were divided on whether Ward Councillors report back to the public and call meetings. Participants who agreed that Ward Councillors did provide feedback indicated that the Ward Councillors experience problems in raising public concerns in Council, where there is no keen interest in pro-ANC Khayelitsha. Overall, the majority of participants felt that their Councillors do not report back on progress made in addressing their grievances, which leads to frustrations and subsequent protests. The participants felt strongly that a Councillor needs to report back to them even if he/she encounters problems, so that the public knows about his/her problems, rather than avoiding public participation.

Most participants in the focus group's discussion lamented the lack of contact, information and minimal political education from Ward Councillors. The participants felt a sense of betrayal, as Ward Councillors, who once used to be part of their day-to-day struggle during the fight for delivery of services, now that they were in a position of power, ignored their grievances and disregarded the needs of the public.

The majority of participants felt that City officials contribute to protests in that they are very slow at delivery, but good at corrupt practices, such as selling the so-called RDP houses and plots for building. The City officials also seem to be representing political parties in the execution of their duties, rather than being neutral.

The focus group's participants indicated a myriad of reasons why they protest: e.g. the public have no voice in municipal affairs; the COCT authorities do not listen to them when they are polite, so they have to mobilise in order to amplify their voice; there is lack of transparency in the Council's affairs and promises are not kept; the major problems relate to lack of housing, unemployment and information.

Similarly to City officials' responses above, focus groups' participants felt that frustrations and anger caused by poverty are compelling reasons for resorting to violent protests. In this

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

respect, a participant remarked that, “we have been voting for years; the term of office of the Councillor comes to an end and the new Councillor is elected, but there is no change to our lives”. The participants pointed out that they have on numerous occasions demanded that the unemployed database, introduced by the COCT, be discontinued, as the administration of the database is fraught with nepotism – instead of equally distributing employment opportunities among the public in Khayelitsha, only a select few benefit.

Furthermore, the participants were of the view that they first need to destroy property in order for the authorities to listen. The participants acknowledged that, in most cases, public protests attract criminal elements that get an opportunity to further their own aims.

When asked whether violence yields the desired results, the response was that “in some instances violence works because it draws the attention of the authorities to our problems, in fact they even come to address our concerns. We have seen it happening in other areas where people end up getting what they were fighting for. The problem with violence is that when the police catch you, you will end up in jail and with criminal records”.

The focus group participants noted that protestations and the subsequent violence come as a last resort – they first explore different avenues, like demanding answers from the Ward Councillor or demand that the Executive Mayor come and address their concerns. If all else fails, the public in Khayelitsha engage the COCT through violent protestations.

According to the focus group’s participants, public protests can be mitigated through timeous response from Councillors to public grievances and their constant contact with the public.

6.4 Analysis of Khayelitsha social movement’s responses

6.4.1 Abahlali Basemjondolo

Abahlali Basemjondolo observed that the COCT relies on the invited spaces of participation, i.e. WC and the IDP, as the standard approach to public participation. This social movement sees these invited spaces as mainly dysfunctional and therefore suitable as tools for the ANC to gain political support. These structures are not democratic enough to further the aims of participatory democracy. Instead of closing the gap between the public and the municipality, they widen it further, as they are highly partisan and not catering for the different political formations in Khayelitsha, but only favour ANC members.

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

The respondent sees the IDP process as closed to free public participation. The IDP is mainly for compliance purposes and more of a “public relations exercise” in the sense that its projects/programmes and the budget are approved before inviting the public to participate in the IDP processes.

The respondent contended that Street Committees were popular during the apartheid era and once played a pivotal role in mobilising the public against the oppressive regime. During the dawn-of-democracy, the Street Committees were aligned to SANCO, an ANC alliance partner. This alignment weakened the efficiency of Street Committees as it meant that they had to further the aims of a political party, not the needs of the broader public in their areas.

This respondent was adamant that the COCT needs to come up with a new participatory mechanism, i.e. an Urban Democratic Forum that comprises apolitical public organisations, such as the Western Cape Anti-Eviction Campaign and Abahlali Basemjondolo.

On the question of Ward Councillors and their contribution to protests, the respondent felt that a Ward Councillor, as an individual, has no powers, but derives his/her power from the collective. The Ward Councillor’s status and power to deliver services to the public is therefore determined solely by his/her status in the collective, since decisions are taken by the collective. In other words Ward Councillor’s views must be convincing enough in the collective for them to be actioned.

This respondent felt that public protests are caused by lack of public participation in developmental planning processes, as the manner in which such projects are conceptualised deter the public from natural participation. The officials fail to understand complex community dynamics but are sold on the notion of “wanting to do more for less”. The lack of, or failure to commit adequate time and resources to an understanding of community dynamics, leads to officials imposing “development” on the public. According to the respondent, this practice is contrary to the aims of a participatory development approach, which requires that the public must be able to influence, direct, control and even own development meant for their advancement. For development to be sustainable, it must take into account the views and aspirations of the people involved. In this way the public will come to “own” development, resulting in the reduction of a need for public protests.

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

On the violent nature of protests, the respondent was of the opinion that the law-enforcement agencies lack the capacity to handle public protests, for example, the indispensable element of community policing. The law-enforcement agencies have to attend to other policing matters as well, such as shooting rubber bullets in order for protesters to disperse, which leads to them provoking members of the selfsame community. It was the view of the respondent that it is during this confrontational period that the protesters' hard-line stance is emboldened and protests turn violent.

Furthermore, violence is caused by prolonged protests that drag on for days as a result of the initial non-responsiveness of the authorities. The protesters get frustrated because of the feeling of neglect and uselessness. According to the respondent, violence is used as a strategy to draw the attention of the authorities to their cause, i.e. by the closure of, for example, the N2. They know well enough that closure of such a major road disrupts normal public life and crucial business activity in the metropolitan area. The disruption of business activities will always compel the authorities to attend to, or even to accede to, the demands of the protesters.

The respondent concurs with the focus groups' participants that, it is difficult for the organisers of a protest action to control who participates in the protests, in this way criminal elements gets an opportunity to infiltrate and further their aims. There is an element of frustration on the side of ANC Councillors, caused by the DA being in such a commanding position. These Councillors communicate and transmit their accumulated frustrations of impotence to the masses and thus protests are started to force the hand of the DA to accede to ANC Councillors' demands.

The respondent felt that, by declaring that protests happen spontaneously and are instigated by COCT officials not attending to their rightful demands, the authorities can be proactive and depoliticise the protests. By attending to the public's demands, protests can be mitigated and potentially explosive situations defused timeously.

6.4.2 South African National Civics Organisation (SANCO)

The respondent supports the use of WCs as a public participation tool and is of the view that a move from Ward Forums to WCs will make a difference. When asked about the differences between Ward Forums and WCs, the response was that there were no real differences, except that Ward Forums would have up to 20 members, as

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

opposed to the maximum of 10 of WCs, and that the DA run COCT established Ward Forums for political reasons, mainly to defy national government's legislation.

The respondent is of the opinion that it is only now that the WCs can be effective, as the Ward Councillors have ensured that the Street Committee members will swell the ranks of WCs. When asked on the partisan nature of SANCO, i.e. that it caters for only ANC members as alleged by Abahlali Basemjondolo, the response was that SANCO is of the view that Street Committees are not partisan but represent all political organisations' members at the grass-roots level.

The respondent stressed the point that capacity-building, given to WCs, must be provided for Street Committees as well, as they form an integral part of the tools of participation, due to their proximity to the grass-roots and ability of mitigating the shortcomings of WCs, i.e. that WCs are drawn from CBOs – which not all Wards have.

The respondent lamented the ineffectiveness of the IDP process. For example, the 2011/12 IDP process, particularly as dealt with in Khayelitsha, was just meant for compliance purposes, as the Executive Mayor only presented the outstanding list of projects to the public, which had had little input from the public. The respondent noted that the ANC Ward Councillors took the issue up with the full Council, but the Speaker of the COCT referred the matter to the vote where they were outnumbered by the majority members of the DA. According to the respondent, this means that for the next 5 year IDP cycle, the public in Khayelitsha will be excluded in the development process of the City as they were not given an opportunity to be heard.

The factors that contribute to public protests, according to the respondent, are: lack of housing, mushrooming of foreigners' shops in Khayelitsha and unemployment. The people of Khayelitsha are, however, divided on the foreign ownership of shops, as a part of the community feels that their presence is a welcome relief, as they provide goods at an affordable rate and are able to provide loans to the locals during difficult times.

The respondent felt that violent protests are caused by the non-responsiveness of the authorities. The respondent cited an example of the recently-built Khayelitsha Hospital, where the public demanded that 60 per cent of employees in the hospital be

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

drawn from Khayelitsha. The Provincial government failed to give such an undertaking as demanded, where after, the public demanded that the Premier of the province come to address them. What transpired was that the Premier kept on promising that she would, but failed to arrive. It was then that the people of Khayelitsha felt that they were not being taken seriously and resorted to violence, just to put pressure on the Premier to come and address their concerns.

The respondent also lamented the poor intergovernmental relations. The example cited for this, was an instance where the national Police Minister called for an imbizo in Khayelitsha, but his provincial counterpart also organised a parallel meeting in Khayelitsha. SANCO's interpretation is that the DA-run provincial government defies and refuses to work with the National Government.

The respondent was asked about the possibility of making public protests an official public participation strategy. The response was that this could encourage the public to protest willy-nilly, and that, in essence, protests are an indictment of the relevant Ward Councillor. According to the respondent, "protest action say, we are talking to you but you are not listening (sic)". The respondent felt that protest action should come as a last resort. In other words, only when all else fails, the public may embark on protest action.

6.5 Analysis of Khayelitsha Councillors' responses

6.5.1 Ward Councillors (ANC) responses

Ward Councillors utilise ward meetings, WCs and Block Committees/Street Committees to communicate with the public of Khayelitsha. As ward Councillors their responsibility is to serve all of Khayelitsha's public, irrespective of their political affiliation.

WCs are selected from CBOs in Khayelitsha. The Councillors acknowledged that the selection criteria for WCs have the potential of excluding some members of the public. The Ward Councillors took it upon themselves to alert community establishments, like crèches and religious organisations about the appointment of WCs, to ensure a wider reach of public representation. The respondents also acknowledge the fact that wards are too big to be served by one Ward Councillor, hence the need to strengthen Block/Street Committees for them to support the Ward

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

Committees, as they are closer to the grass-roots. Ward Councillors attend the Block Committee meetings to share Council's development plans and information.

Another public participation structure that the Ward Councillors in Khayelitsha utilise, are Ward Development Forums. These forums are the sub-structures of the Khayelitsha Development Forum (KDF). This structure is composed of community sector structures, similar to the ones that the WCs are composed of. Its effectiveness is derived from it having wider representation of sub-structures and other stakeholders in Khayelitsha.

According to the respondents, when the Executive Mayor called an IDP consultation workshop, the public promptly responded to the call and the venue was full to capacity. The public felt this would provide them with an opportunity to report the WC and Ward Councillor failures and to share their concerns with the Executive Mayor and her Executive Team. The Executive Mayor communicated development projects that had already been implemented. The public felt this was a disservice to them, hence the meeting ended before crucial issues could be communicated to her. According to the respondents, public protests were caused by that happening, as the final IDP documents do not reflect the aspirations and demands of the people.

Overall, in South Africa, both the invited spaces and invented spaces of participation work well, but the problem in Cape Town is that Khayelitsha's public aspirations are ignored by Council, because Khayelitsha is served by ANC Councillors and Khayelitsha residents are, by extension, seen as their supporters. They are implying that there is some form of official and political victimisation at work here, which denies Khayalitsha's citizens their rightful position and treatment.

The respondents unanimously agree that public protests in Khayelitsha are caused by a myriad of factors that are beyond Ward Councillors' control, i.e. lack of housing and sanitation facilities, a high unemployment rate, Councillors' alleged nepotism and involvement in the allocation of building sites and houses, ever-increasing in-migration or influx of people from other provinces, feelings of being neglected by the powers-that-be and high rates of crime in the area. The respondents felt that the major problem is that originally Khayelitsha was not properly planned for purposes of human settlement and habitation and COCT development planning continues to exclude Khayelitsha inhabitants. The respondents cited the example that Khayelitsha,

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

as the biggest township in the area, continues to receive an inequitable share of only three per cent of the COCT budget. Khayelitsha residents are aware of this; which is why they protest.

According to the respondents, violent protests are caused by disillusionment on the part of the public. The public is tired of promises that are not kept. The accessibility of public protestations attracts different people with different motives, including criminals, who participate in order to pursue their own (criminal) agendas. Ill-discipline, particularly among the youth is a major problem. The public is very strong at mobilising others; protests action is therefore one of its strong points in drawing the attention of the authorities. In most cases protests are peaceful; they only turn violent when provoked by the police who undermine the protesters by shooting rubber bullets at them.

The respondents felt that protest action has always been an effective participation tool, as it delivers good results. It is therefore the responsibility of Ward Councillors to encourage and advise the public to draft memorandums and participate in peaceful processions. Protests are an effective public participation strategy, as long as they are peaceful and well managed.

It is also the responsibility of the protest organisers to ensure that protests remain peaceful, in line with the Gatherings Act (RSA 1993a) and COCT regulations, to avoid deaths and destruction of property. On the other hand, Ward Councillors must advise the public to engage by peaceful means. It is important for the Ward Councillors to be visible and available to the public and report constantly to the public. The COCT wants Ward Councillors to report to the public on a quarterly basis, but Khayelitsha Councillors claim they provide reports to the public on a monthly basis.

6.5.2 Proportional Representation (PR) Councillors (DA) responses

The respondents agree that WC, and Block and Street Committee meetings are used to communicate with the public in Khayelitsha. However, according to them, these structures are failing for not providing proper information to the public, as they are bent on portraying the DA-run municipality as a failure in the eyes of the public. The respondents maintain that this lack of information being denied the public in

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

Khayelitsha is the main cause of public protests. The respondents are, however, also mindful of the fact that it is the public's democratic right to protests.

The respondents apportion the blame for the lack of dissemination of proper information to ANC Councillors who fail to communicate to the public the municipal programmes aimed at alleviating poverty, such as the Indigent Grant Policy.

The respondents are dismissive of the participation of certain structures, such as WCs and Street Committees, as being mere political tools of the ANC. WC members are appointed by the ANC, who in turn put only their comrades and family members in a position to serve in these structures. In other words, the system of appointing to the WCs is easily manipulated as Councillors decide who should serve. This act defeats the purpose of WCs; as such a WC fails to communicate Council policies to the public. It is done in an attempt to derail development and pit the public in Khayelitsha against the COCT.

The respondents feel that these participatory structures have a potential to be effective, but there are gaps that need to be filled, i.e. the functioning of WCs is not monitored in terms of report-back reports and reporting lines are vague. The Street Committees also need to be depoliticised if they are to be effective. The present ineffectiveness of these participatory structures contributes to public protests in Khayelitsha.

The respondents cite an example of an IDP consultation workshop where the Ward Councillors fed the Executive Mayor with inaccurate information to deliver to the public, hence the distribution of forms for the public to list their priorities for inclusion in the final IDP documents. The IDP is meant for the public to participate in the development that affects their lives, if the members of the public do not see their input on the IDP reflected, they are likely to protest. The public can rightfully protest because they are effectively excluded from their own development. The resultant behaviour is public protests in Khayelitsha. The respondents agree that the public in Khayelitsha have so many demands that they cannot be solved in one IDP circle. This requires that the public be taught on the functioning of the IDP.

The respondents identified the following reason for protestations in Khayelitsha, i.e. ANC Councillors are not fit for the purpose; they are unable to deliver services

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

efficiently to the public in Khayelitsha. The voting public were given Councillors that were not selected by them and they are now revolting against these Councillors. This refers to the new ANC system, where the public nominate potential Ward Councillors but the final decision for nomination rests with the leaders of the organisation. The respondents allege that protests are instigated by ANC politicians in an attempt to make the COCT ungovernable. The Ward Councillors make promises that they cannot fulfil, therefore the public now see them as liars and have lost confidence in governance, which in turn detaches the public from development processes. The general public does not know how the representative system functions.

According to the respondents, protests turn violent as a result of anger over being betrayed by the Councillors who used to be part of their community before being elected. Politicians are reluctant to address the public during protests. This further fuels anger as they feel neglected. Protests are instigated by ANC politicians in an attempt to make the COCT ungovernable. The police's confrontational actions lead to violence. During protests, youngsters and criminal elements get an opportunity to further their aims.

6.6 Researcher's observation

The researcher has observed that the IDP consultation workshop, attended by the Executive Mayor and some Mayoral Committee members, did not serve its purpose of soliciting public views for incorporation in the final IDP and budget. The meeting ended before the public in Khayelitsha could tell the Executive Mayor of their immediate problems. The first part of the meeting was dedicated to the Executive Mayor, who used a power-point presentation to tell the public of Khayelitsha of the programmes/projects that the COCT will be implementing. The public was not happy with the presentation, citing as reasons that the programmes/projects had already been implemented. This led to the meeting being discontinued.

The interviews with the Ward Councillors were done after the Executive Mayor's consultation workshop. The Ward Councillors indicated that there was no follow-up consultation workshop and that they hope Khayelitsha's public views will be obtained through comment forms that were distributed before and during the workshop. It is the researcher's view that it will be difficult to blame the public if they resort to

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

protests, as it is clear that they had not been given sufficient opportunity to influence the development planning process.

The researcher has observed that it often takes considerable time for the authorities to respond to public demands from Khayelitsha – if they are ever respond to. In most cases it is the police who react by arriving at the protest scene before municipal authorities do, but it is only when protests turn violent that the politicians are quick to respond.

The researcher has had an opportunity to observe the beginning of a protest action in rainy, cold Cape Town weather, when a small group of youths gathered and started singing political songs. The group soon grew to a large crowd and then started burning tyres which they had on hand. When the researcher asked why they were gathering and burning tyres, the response was that they wanted the new Executive Mayor to come and hear their demands, as the former Executive Mayor, who had not kept his promises, was gone. The researcher's conversation with the protesters was disrupted by the arrival of the police who demanded that the crowd disperse before they would use force to disperse them.

6.7 Research findings

1. Research shows that 98 per cent of the respondents are not satisfied with the functioning of the WCs. WCs are supposed to encourage participation of the marginalised in the COCT's development planning. As the DPLG (2005:11) point out, due to their public proximity, WCs are the structures that make it possible to narrow the gap between municipalities and the public, since WCs should have knowledge about and understanding of the public they represent, but the opposite is happening.

2. As a result of the ineffectiveness of the WCs, the public in Khayelitsha see the gap and invent their own spaces of participation, in this case the Street Committees that they utilise as a tool to engage in public protests. The respondents therefore unanimously agreed that Street Committees are their preferred way of participating, due to sensing them as being within close proximity and the fact that Street Committees are "owned" by themselves. The COCT is still of the view that it was

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

doing them a favour when it introduced and opened the now dysfunctional WCs. Cornwall (2008:20) points out that inviting the public to participate should not be seen as a favour or a privilege, but a basic right – one that is fundamental to claiming many other rights.

3. Pieterse *et al.* (2008:7) contend that IDPs were meant as platforms for engaging the public with regards to policies and programmes, but the public in Khayelitsha are being fed information one-sidedly by the COCT, rather than the latter seeking their input, which is equivalent to the anti-participatory mode discussed above. As a result of this practice by the COCT, 95 per cent of the respondents feel that the public is invited to participate in IDP planning processes only when the plans and budget have already been concluded. Harrison (2008:327) confirms this shortcoming in the IDPs by positing that IDPs reinforce a top-down approach, which tends to be prescriptive and is driven by municipalities, thus excluding the input of the beneficiaries of the development. This explains why the public in Khayelitsha find public protests a suitable mechanism to demand that they be enabled to influence, control, direct and own the decision-making process leading to development.

4. The research shows that the majority of respondents are agreed on the following factors as being the main causes of protests, i.e.

- The inability of the COCT to ensure that the public authentically participate in the decisions and development that affects their lives.
- Poverty and lack of employment opportunities that exist.
- Lack of proper housing and sanitation facilities for the public in Khayelitsha that remain unresolved.
- Corruption related to and interference by Councillors in the process of allocation of houses.
- The glaring gaps of inequality that exist, while neighbours are visibly leading much better lives.
- The legacy of apartheid that persists (as identified by all Councillors and City officials).

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

- The increased competition for limited resources caused by the continuous in-migration or influx to Cape Town of people from other provinces and African countries.
- The unemployment data base, created by the City that is unjustly selective in proving employment opportunities.
- Councillors who seldom provide progress reports.

5. The research found that the respondents unanimously agree that violent protest are instigated by the police and law enforcement's use of unreasonable levels of force during public protests. The respondents contended that most of the public protests are peaceful, only turning violent in retaliation to the police's use of unnecessary force. The respondents contend that public protests turn violent after being frustrated by the refusal of the authorities to recognise and attend to their demands. This fortifies the realisation that using violence will compel the authorities to attend to their demands. As one respondent pointed out, the usual course of action is "venting anger on anonymous private persons – for when important persons are affected, authorities start panicking and attend to our demands".

It is interesting to note that the majority of respondents felt that violence does not always work for them, as it derails development and in most cases people get arrested and, when sentenced, end up with criminal records blotting their names.

The respondents lamented the fact that it is difficult for participants to monitor and control protests and as criminal elements are aware of this they will, as a result, use protest to further their criminal activities by for example looting foreigners shops in the area. The element of ill-disciplined youth as a contributory factor to violence during protestations came out strongly.

6. The respondents unanimously agreed that public protest has always been a public participation strategy/tool and should remain so as long as protests are peaceful.

7. Lastly, the respondents feel that public protests can be managed if Ward Councillors are visible and provide constant feedback. The COCT must be quick in responding to the demands of protesters.

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

6.7 Generalisations

The findings of this research are applicable and can be generalised to all South African municipalities and, to a certain extent, some overseas (foreign/) countries who share a similar system of local governance. It is important to note that, though they can be generalised, one should take cognisance of the fact that the COCT is one of the few municipalities in South Africa that is administered by the DA, which claims that it has an individual approach to governance. However this study could not find any unique approach employed in the COCT, except that it is the only municipality that introduced the system of Sub-Councils and that the previous political administration opted for a Ward Forum participatory approach (which has now been changed by the new administration) as opposed to a WC approach used throughout South Africa. In fact in the first quarter of 2012, the COCT recorded a high number of public protests, surpassing the COJ.

Nleya (2011) asserted that the Street Committees in Khayelitsha are no longer a popular participation strategy, but the respondents in this research unanimously agreed that Street Committees are still popular and they are the only structures that are considered to be close enough to the grass-roots and, consequently, in which the public have faith – opposed to the City's invited spaces of participation that are rejected.

Furthermore, research done on the Mayor's Listening Campaign in 2005 (Gutas 2005) concluded that, although the campaign was the first major attempt to open up spaces for public participation, it emphasised consultation which is not sufficient for authentic and empowering public participation.

Lastly, the public grievances, particularly those related to service delivery, at times falls outside the scope and competency of local government but to other spheres of government i.e. provincial and national governments. This raises the question of whether intergovernmental relations functions as envisaged in the Constitution (RSA 1996). It will be important for this factor to be explored through empirical research, particularly in relation to its contribution to public protests.

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

CHAPTER SEVEN

RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION

7.1 Introduction

The main purpose of the study was to determine the factors that contribute to public protests in Khayelitsha. The study hypothesised that the lack of authentic and empowering public participation in the decision-making and development processes lead to public protests in Khayelitsha. In other words, the study sought to show that authentic and empowering participation entails the creation of participatory spaces in which the participating public, as beneficiaries of a particular programme, project or process, can influence, direct, control and own the process.

Based on the analysis of the research findings, the researcher will make recommendations that can assist South African municipalities and the COCT in particular, to minimise or even successfully curb public protests in areas such as Khayelitsha.

7.2 Recommendations on how public protests can be better managed

7.2.1 The practice of public participation

The COCT's strategy of decentralising public participation through Sub-Councils and FOCOS must be lauded; however, it falls short of authentic and empowering public participation. Municipal officials must be capacitated to evoke valid public participation. To have a public participation unit official advising a line function, the public participation process is not sufficient; instead, a public participation official must participate throughout the complete public participation process.

The officials that deal with public participation, i.e. in both the IDP and public participation unit, must be capacitated for the purposes of public participation through courses offered by the institutions of higher learning, such as that of the University of Stellenbosch. The number of public participation officials in the unit must be increased to match the actual demands for public participation and the reputed importance allocated, by the City, to an effective participatory process.

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

7.2.2 The functioning of invited spaces of public participation

This research has revealed that the COCT's invited spaces of participation, i.e. WCs and IDP participation processes; smack of lip service to authentic participation and these processes demonstrate a top-down approach. The COCT seems instead to be engaging the public mostly for compliance purposes. This deprives the public in Khayelitsha of an opportunity to influence, direct, control and own the development process meant for the betterment of their lives. The insufficient inclusion of resident's own priorities, views and aspirations in the final IDP, leaves them with no alternative but to demand, through public protests, proper inclusion of their views in development planning. The COCT therefore needs to ensure that there is authentic and empowering participation in Khayelitsha. This can be achieved by adhering to point 7.2.3 below.

The appointment of WCs leaves much to be desired. Mere sourcing of WC members from community organisations is insufficient if democracy has to be deepened. Wards are too big to be serviced by a WC member, hence a need to make effective use of social movements and Street Committees, as discussed in 7.2.3 below.

7.2.3 The recognition and effective utilisation of social movements and community organisations

Public protests in Khayelitsha have been organised under the auspices of social movements, such as Abahlali Basemjondolo and the Western Cape Anti Eviction Campaign. In the same vein, most of the protests are facilitated by a grassroots community structure, called Street Committees. These two community structures are popular in Khayelitsha. The COCT needs to recognise and utilise these participation structures in order to reach the grass-roots, when public protest occurs. This will be necessary in order to deepen democracy down to the grass-roots.

Once having recognised the structures, the COCT must build capacity and empower these structures. This capacity-building must include training regarding the different mandates of the three spheres of government, in terms of powers and functions delegated to each sphere. Training similar to the WCs will be ideal for these

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

structures. The COCT must not seek to co-opt these structures but to empower them to play a meaningful role in public participation processes.

7.2.4 Management of public protests

Public protests are caused by a myriad of factors; however the findings above indicate that there is a gulf that exists between the public and the municipal authorities. The public voice seems not to be heard by authorities, which leads to the public engaging in public protests. Public protests come only as a last resort, after all public participation avenues have been exhausted including the failure of the authorities to respond timeously to public demands. It is the City's failure to respond to public demands that leads to frustrations on the part of the public. The COCT needs to consider doing the following in order to curb the scale of and mitigate the resentment inherent to violent public protests:

1. The COCT need to explore ways for both the invited spaces and invented spaces of participation to co-exist. This will provide for early detection (warning signs) for the levels of frustrations and subsequent protests.

2. COCT authorities must respond to public demands for relevant information, by providing regular public progress reports.

3. In the event of a protest already occurring, the COCT must dispatch top politicians to explain the problems hindering the delivery of services.

4. The COCT must include the youth in development programmes that emphasise skills development.

5. A specialised law-enforcement unit must be established to deal with protests. They must be capacitated to address public protests effectively, in order to quell violent protestations, using a minimum of force.

6. It is the responsibility of municipal authorities to educate the public about the consequences of violence.

7. The public must be educated about policies regulating public protests, with the view of empowering them rather to explore alternative constructive and creative means of engaging municipal authorities.

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

8. The COCT must consider educating the public about other possible complaints and dispute resolution mechanisms i.e. the Human Rights Commission, Public Protector and even the court of laws.

7.3 Conclusion

Based on the evidence that has been gathered, legislatively all efforts to turn around local government have been made and continue to be put in place. However, as shown, there is an urgent need for Councillors and municipal officials to take public participation seriously, by not merely decentralising public participation to line functionaries within municipalities, but to ensure that officials are capacitated to better understand authentic public participation and its proper implementation.

Lack of authentic public participation is the key factor contributing to public protests. This is attributable to a huge gap existing between the public and authorities, due to ineffective usage of the available invited spaces and the implied disregard by the COCT for the potential of invented spaces. It is incumbent upon the COCT to take the lead and capacitate WCs and the public to understand IDP and budget; thus ensuring that they fully understand how the local government machinery functions.

This study indicates that if public participation in the COCT can be strengthened and not done only for compliance purposes, the public will be able to hold Ward Councillors accountable for their actions and they (public) will be in a better position to influence, direct, control and even own the development and decision-making processes.

The study presented here will be of assistance to the City of Cape Town (as well as other municipalities who are faced with similar challenges) to deal with public protests effectively.

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

REFERENCES

Allan, K. 2010. *Data management for improved service delivery*: The Local Government Experience (abridged paper). South Africa: Development Bank of South Africa (DBSA).

African Charter for Popular Participation in Development and Transformation 1990. 2002. *Africa's development thinking since independence. A reader*. Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa.

Allan, K. & Heese, K. 2008. *Understanding why service delivery protests take place and who is to blame*. [Online]. Available: www.municipaliq.co.za/articles/Sunday-indep.pdf (Accessed 17 October 2010).

Alexander, P. 2010. Rebellion of the poor: South Africa's service delivery protests- a preliminary analysis. *Review of African Political Economy*, 37(123): 25-40.

Andoh, K.S. 2011. Improving performance in local government with citizen participation. *Journal of Public Administration*. 19(4):118-133.

Arnstein, S. 1969. A ladder of community participation. *American Institute of Planners Journa*l, 35:216-224.

Association for Water and Rural Development. 2009. *A public participation framework for the development of Catchment Management Strategies.* Pretoria: Research Water Commission.

Atkinson, D. 2007. Taking to the streets: has developmental local government failed in South Africa? In Buhlungu, S., Daniel, J., Southhall, R, & Lutchman, J. (eds). *State of the Nation, South Africa.* Cape Town: HSRC Press.

Atlee, T. 2011. Sources of the Occupy Wall Street Movement-Part One. [Online] Available: http://tom-atlee.posterous.com/sources-of-the-occupy-movement-part-one. (Accessed: 2 March 2012).

Bandeira, M. & Higson-Smith, C. 2011. *Responding to the smoke that calls: Principles of community-level interventions for the prevention of collective violence*. Johannesburg: Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation.

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

Barron, J. & Moynihan, C. 2011. *City re-opens Park after protesters are evicted*. The New York Times. [Online]. Available: http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/16/nyregion/police-begin-clearing-zuccotti-park-of-... (Accessed: 17 November 2011).

Bless, C., Higson-Smith, C. & Kagee, C. 2006. *Fundamentals of social research methods: an African perspective*. 4th ed. Cape Town: Juta.

Booi, M. 2012. Phillipi protesters and officials meet. *Eye Witness News*, 31 July 2012.

Booysen, S. 2007. With the ballot and the brick: The politics of attaining service delivery. *Progress in Development Studies*, 7(1): 21-32.

Booysen, S. 2011. *Prof. Susan Booysen comments on TNS findings* – 11 May 2011. [Online]. Available: http://www.sabc.co.za/wps/portal/news/pages/details?id=EA7FB28046D0D1FAACDEFD5CC. (Accessed 15 February 2012).

Botes, L., Lenka, M., Marais, L., Matebesi, S.Z. & Sigenu, K. 2007. *Cauldron of Local Protests: Reasons, Impacts and Lessons Learned*. Centre for Development support. University of Free State. [Online]. Available: www.ufs.ac.za/faculties/documents/staff/56_cv.doc. (Accessed 15 February 2012).

Bratton, M. 2010 (Ed.). *Citizen perceptions of local government responsiveness in Sub-Saharan Africa*. Afrobarometer Working Papers. No. 119. [Online]. Available: www.afrobarometer.org. (Accessed 20 February 2012).

Briad, M. 2011. Democracy at the core: Recalling participation's raison d'être. The *International Journal of Public Participation*, (September), 1:1-15. [Online]. Available: http:www.iap2.org/associations/4748/files/Journal-Issue 1.viewpoint/.pdf. (Assessed 1 September 2011).

Bryant, P.A. & White, L.G. 1982. *Managing development in the Third World*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Brynard, P.A. & Hanekom, S.X. 2006. *Introduction to research in management related fields*, 2nd Ed. Pretoria: Van Schaik.

Buccus, I. & Hicks, J. 2008. Democratisation with inclusion: revisiting the role of ward committees. In Van Donk, M., Swilling, M., Pieterse, E. & Parnell, S. (Eds). *Consolidating developmental local government. Lessons from the South African experience*. Cape Town: UCT Press.

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

Burger, J. 2009. The *reasons behind service delivery protests in South Africa*. Institute of Security Studies, Tshwane (Pretoria). [Online]. Available: http://www.polity.org.za/print-version/the-reasons-behind-service-delivery-protests-in-south-africa. 2010, (Accessed 21 October 2010).

Burkey, S. 1993. *People first: a guide to self-reliant participatory rural development*. London: Zed Books.

Cameron, D. 2005. Bringing Government Closer to the People'? The Daily Experience of Sub-councils in Cape Town. *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, 6: 465-478.

Canel, E. 1997. New Social Movement and Resource Mobilization: The Need for Integration. In Kaufman, M. and Dilla, H. (eds.) *Community Power and Grassroots Democracy*, London: Zed Books.

Carrim, Y. 2010. *Towards a better understanding of service delivery protests*. Speech made during the occasion of debate on 2010/11 budget vote. [Online]. Available: http:www.info.gov.za/speech/DynamicAction?pageid+461&sid=10483&tid=10500. (Accessed 12 April 2012).

Carrim, Y. 2011. *Towards Accelerating Service Delivery.* National Council of Provinces (NCOP) Budget vote debate. [Online] Available: http://www.cogta.gov.za/index.php/component/content/article/174-yunus-carrim/288-towards-accelerating-service-delivery.html. (Accessed: 29 April 2012).

Carson, L. 2008. The IAP2 spectrum: Larry Susskind in conversation with IAP2 members. *International Journal of Public Participation,* 2(2): 67-84.

Chambers, R. 1997. *Whose reality counts? Putting the first last*. London: ITP.

Chambers, R. 2002. *Participatory workshops: A sourcebook of 21 sets of ideas and activities*. London: Earthscan.

Chambers, R. 2005. *Ideas for development*: London: Earthscan.

City of Cape Town. (COCT) 2005. *A population profile of Khayelitsha: Socio-economic information from the 2001 census*. Cape Town: Information and Knowledge Management Department.

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

City of Cape Town. (COCT). IDP Document (2007-2012). Cape Town. [Online] Available: www.capetown.gov.za. (Accessed 25 February 2012).

CIVICUS, 2006. *CIVICUS participatory governance programme: Concept note 2006-2008*. [Online] Available: http://www.civicus.org/downloads/pg/PG_Annex6_ConceptNote.pdf. (Accessed: 20 August 2011).

CIVICUS, 2011. *Regional workshop on democratising governance through citizen participation.* 25-26 October. Johannesburg.

Concise Oxford English Dictionary, 2006 Vol 11, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Cooke, B. & Kothari, U. (eds) 2001. *Participation: The new tyranny?* London: Zed Books.

Cornwall, A. 2004 "Spaces for transformation? Reflections on issues of power and difference in participation and development." In Hickey, S. and Mohan, G (Eds) *Participation: From Tyranny to Transformation: Exploring New Approaches to Participation in Development*, London: Zed Books.

Cornwall, A. 2008. *Democratising engagement. What can UK learn from international experience.* London: Creative Commons.

Cornwall, A. & Coelho, V. (eds) 2007. *Spaces for change? The politics of citizen participation in new democratic arenas*. London: Zed Books.

Creighton, J.L. 2005. *The public participation handbook: Making better decisions through citizen involvement.* USA: John Wiley & Sons.

Dalton, R., Van Silckle, A. & Weldon, S. 2009. *Individual – Institutional Nexus of Protests Behaviour*. Cambridge: University Press.

Davids, I. 2005. Development theories: past and present. In Davids, I., Theron, F. & Maphunye, K.J. *Participatory development in South Africa: A development management perspective.* Pretoria: Van Schaik.

Davids, I., Theron, F. & Maphunye, K.J. 2005. *Participatory development in South Africa: a Development management perspective.* Pretoria: Van Schaik.

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

Davids, I. 2009. Development theories: past and present. In Davids, I., Theron, F. & Maphunye, K.J. *Participatory development in South Africa: A development management perspective.* Pretoria: Van Schaik.

Davids, I. & Maphunye, K.J. 2009. The public sector: promoting development and good governance. In Davids, I., Theron, F. & Maphunye, K.J. *Participatory development in South Africa: A development management perspective.* Pretoria: Van Schaik.

Davids, Y.D. 2010. Democratic governance versus democratic citizens: What do South Africans think? In Roberts, B., Kivilu, M. & Davids, Y.D. (eds.) *South African Social Attitudes. 2nd Report: Reflections on the age of hope.* Pretoria: HSRC Press.

Davy, J. 2006. *Assessing public participation strategies in low-income housing: The Mamre housing project*. MPA-thesis, School of Public Management and Planning, Stellenbosch University.

De Beer, F. 1997. Participation and community capacity building. In Liebenberg, S. & Stewart, P. (Eds.) *Participatory Development Management and the RDP*. Cape Town: Juta.

De Lille, P. 2012. *What's behind "service delivery protest" in Cape Town?* Cape Town This Week: A weekly newsletter by the Executive Mayor of Cape Town [Online] Available: http://cityweb.capetown.gov.za/en/Pages/displayEnforms.aspx?spid=6961. (Accessed: 30 July 2012).

Definitions.net. STANDS4 LLC, 2012. 28 April. 2012. [Online]
Available:http://www.definitions.net/definition/protest. (Accessed 15 January 2012).

Department for Communities and Local Government. 2010. *Decentralisation and the localism bill: an essential guide.* London. [Online] Available: www.communities.gov.uk. (Accessed 12 June 2012).

Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs (COGTA). 2009a. *Local Government Turn Around Strategy*. Pretoria: COGTA.

Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs (COGTA). 2009b. *State of Local Government in South Africa*. Overview Report. Pretoria: COGTA

Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism (DEAT). 2002. *Screening*. *Information Series 3*, Pretoria: DEAT.

Department of National Treasury, 2011. *Local Government Budget and Expenditure Review:*

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

2006/7 – 2012/13. Pretoria: NT.

Department of Provincial and Local Government (DPLG). 2005. *Ward Committee Resource Book: Making Ward Committees Function. Best practice and lessons learnt for municipal officials, Councillors and local governance.* Pretoria: Government Printers.

Department of Provincial and Local Government (DPLG). 2007. *National Policy Framework for Public participation*. Pretoria: DPLG.

Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (DWAF). 2001. *Generic public participation guidelines*. Pretoria: Government Printers.

Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (DWAF). 2005. *Stakeholder participation*. Pretoria: Government Printers.

De Visser, J. 2009. Developmental local government in South Africa: Institutional fault lines. *Commonwealth Journal of Local Governance*, 2: 7-25.

De Vos, P. 2011. *A problematic limitation on the right to freedom of assembly*. Constitutionally speaking. [Online]. Available: http://constitutionallyspeaking.co.za/2011/10/06/. (Accessed 08 March 2012).

Diamond, L. 1994. Towards democratic consolidation. *Journal of Democracy*, 5(3), 4-17.

Draai, E. & Taylor, D. 2009. Public participation for effective service delivery: A local government perspective. *Journal of Public Administration*, 44(1.1): 112-122.

Economic Commission for Latin America. 1973. Popular participation in development. *Community Development Journal*, 8(2): 77-93.

Edigheji, O. 2003. State society relations in post-apartheid South Africa: the challenge of globalisation on cooperative governance. In Mhone, G. & Edigheji, O. (Eds), *Governance in the new South Africa: the challenge of globalisation*. Harare: Sapes.

Edigheji, O. 2006a. Political representation in Africa: Towards a conceptual framework. *Africa Development,* XXXI (3): 93–119.

Edigheji, O. 2006b. *The discourse of the developmental state and "people's contract" in South Africa. Policy, issues and actors*. Johannesburg: Centre for Policy Studies.

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

Electoral Commission of South Africa, 2009. *The Results of the 2008 Voter Participation Survey*, Cape Town: HSRC.

Everett, D., Marais, H. & Dube, N. 2010. Participation...for what purpose? Analysing the Depth and Quality of Public Participation in the Integrated Development Planning Process in Gauteng. *Politikon*, 37(2): 223-249.

Fakir, E. 2007. *The nexus between democracy and development*. Paper delivered at the multi-stakeholder conference: Reflections on the state of electoral democracy in South Africa. Johannesburg.

Fakir, E. & Holland, W. 2011. Changing voting patterns. *Journal of Public Administration,* 46(31): 1139-1152.

Fokane, M.E. 2008. *An assessment of the Rosendal-Mautse participation in the IDP process of Dihlabeng Municipality*. MPA-thesis, School of Public Management and Planning, Stellenbosch University.

Friedman, S. 2004. *Why we vote: The issue of identity*. Election Synopsis 2(2):2-4. [Online] Available: http://intranet.hsrc.ac.za/knowledgebase/eResources/digitalLibrary/electionSynopsis02.pdf. (Accessed 15 April 2012).

Friedman, S. 2006. *Participatory governance and citizen action in post-apartheid South Africa*. Discussion paper. International Institute for Labour Studies.

Friedman, S. 2009. People are demanding public service, not service delivery. *Business Day*, 29 July. [Online]. Available: http://abahlali.org/node/5548 (Accessed 14 August 2009).

Gaventa, J. 2004. *"Strengthening Participatory Approaches to Local Governance: Learning Lessons from Abroad,"* National Civic Review, 93(4):16-27.

Gaventa, J. 2006. Finding the new spaces for change: A power analysis. *IDS Bulletin*, 37(5): 23-33.

Good Governance Learning Network (GGLN). 2008. *Local democracy in action. A civil society perspective on local governance in South Africa.* Pretoria: SOLGP.

Good Governance Learning Network (GGLN). 2012. *Putting participation at the heart of development//putting development at the heart of participation. A civil society perspective on local governance in South Africa.* Pretoria: SOLGP.

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

Govender, J., Reddy, P.S. & Pillay, P. 2011. Dimensions of participation and implementation in South African local government. *Administratio Publica*, 19(3):183-208.

Government Communication and Information System (GCIS), 2012. *Cabinet calls for more interaction with citizens*. Buanews. 17 May 2012. [Online] Available: http://www.buanews.gov.za/news/12/12051710251001. (Accessed: 17 May 2012).

Graeber, D. 2011. *Occupy Wall Street's anarchist roots*. Aljazeera.com. [Online]. Available: http://aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2011/11/201111287287283590450 8.html. (Accessed: 2 March 2012).

Gran, G. 1983. *Development by people: Citizen construction of a just world*. New York: Praeger.

Greenberg, S. & Mathoho, M. 2010. *Conceptual framework on public participation and development.* Participation and development from the perspective of the poor. Johannesburg: Planact.

Gurr, T. 1968. Psychological factors in civil violence. *World Politics*, 29(2): 245-278.

Gutas, T. 2005. *The mayor's listening campaign in the IDP- City of Cape Town*. Unpublished MPA thesis. School of Public Management and Planning, Stellenbosch University.

Gwala, M. & Theron, F. 2012. Beyond community meetings: Towards innovative participation in developmental local government. Conference Paper. 13th International Winelands Conference, 2-4 April 2012. Stellenbosch.

Habib, A. & Naidu, S. 2004. *Are South Africa's elections a racial census?* Election Synopsis 2(2):2-4. [Online] Available: http://intranet.hsrc.ac.za/knowledgebase/eResources/digitalLibrary/electionSynopsis02.pdf. (Accessed 12 May 2012).

Harrison, P. 2008. The origins and outcomes of South Africa's Integrated Development Plans. In Van Donk, M., Swilling, M., Pieterse, E. & Parnell, S. (Eds). *Consolidating developmental local government. Lessons from the South African experience.* Cape Town: UCT Press.

Heese, K. 2012. Service delivery protests. *Cape Talk*. 31 July 2012.

Heller, P. 2009. *Democratic deepening in Brazil, India and South Africa: Towards a*

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

comparative framework. Paper prepared for "Building Sustainable Democracies". Indiana: University-Bloomington.

Hemson, D. 2007. *Can participation make a difference? Prospects for people's participation in planning. Critical* Dialogue-Public participation in review. [Online]. Available: http://www.cpp.org.za/publications/critical_2007/chapter2.pdf. 03/03/2012. (Accessed 9 May 2012).

Herzenberg, C. 2011. *Change or continuity? South Africa's 2011 Municipal Elections*. Corruption and governance programme. Institute of Security Studies. Cape Town. [Online]. Available: http://www.iss.co.za/iss_today.php?ID=1298. (Accessed 03 March 2012).

Hickey, S. & Mohan, G. (eds.) 2004. *Participation: From tyranny to transformation? Exploring new approaches to participation in development*. London: Zed Books.

Hough, M. 2008. *Violent protest at local government level in South Africa: Revolutionary potential?* University of Pretoria. [Online]. Available: http://ajol.info/index.php/smsajms/article/viewfile/42646/9514.(Accessed 19 October 2011).

https://sites.google.com/site/narswang/EBook/topic-list/working-definition

http://occupywallst.org/.

Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC). 2011. *IEC Voter participation survey 2010/11: An overview of results.* Centurion: Election House.

IAP2. 2002. International Association for Public Participation. [Online] Available at www.iap2.org/corevalues/corevalues.htm. (Accessed 5 July 2011).

IAP2. 2007. *IAP model (spectrum*) [Online] Available at: http://www.iap2.org. (Accessed 5 July 2011).

IAP2. 2006. *IAP2's Public Participation Toolbox. Techniques to share information*. [Online] Available at: http://www.iap2.org. (Accessed 5 July 2011).

IDASA, 2010. *The state of local government and service delivery in South Africa: issues, challenges and solutions.* Report submitted to the Portfolio Committee on Co-operative Governance and Traditional Affairs for public hearings: Co-ordinated service delivery. Pretoria: IDASA.

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

Institute for Justice and Reconciliation. 2011. *SA Reconciliation Barometer Survey*. Cape Town: IJR.

Irvin, R. & Stansbury, J. 2004. Citizen participation in decision making: Is it worth the effort?. *Public Administration Review*, 64(1): 55-65.

Kangwane, T.T. 2008. *Assessment of different approaches to public service provision by the City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality*. MPA Thesis, School of Public Management and Planning, Stellenbosch University.

Karamoko, J. 2011. *Community protests in South Africa: Trends, analysis and explanations.* [Online] Available: http://www.ldphs.org.za/publications/publications-by-theme/local-government-in-south-africa/community-protests/Community_Protests_SA.pdf. (Accessed: 23 August 2011).

Khan, F. & Cranko, P. 2002. Municipal-community partnerships. In Parnell, S., Pieterse, E., Swilling, M. & Wooldridge, D. (eds.) *Democratising local government: The South African experiment.* Cape Town: UCT Press.

Khosa, M. (Ed.) 2000. *Infrastructure mandates for change 1994-1999*. Pretoria: HSRC.

Korten, D.C. 1990. *Getting to the 21st century: Voluntary action and the global agenda.* West Harford: Kumarian Press.

Kotze, D.A. & Kellerman, G.E.J. 1997. Participation and managerial approaches to development. In Kotze, D.A. (eds.) *Development administration and management: a holistic approach*. Pretoria: Van Schaik.

Kumar, S. 2002. *Methods for community participation: a complete guide for practitioners*. London: ITDG Publishing.

Leal, P. A. 2007. Participation: The ascendancy of a buzzword in the neo-liberal era. *Development in Practice*, 17(4-5): 539-548.

Leal, P. A. 2010. Participation: the ascendancy of a buzzword in the neo-liberal era. In Cornwall, A. & Eade, D. (eds.) *Deconstructing development discourse. Buzzwords and fuzzwords*. Rugby: Practical Action Publishing.

Liebenberg, F.S. & Theron, F. 1997. Assessing basic needs for the effective implementation of the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP). In Liebenberg, S. & Stewart, P. (eds.) *Participatory Development Management and the RDP*. Cape Town: Juta.

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

Ludwig, C. & Nagel, J. 2012. *Poverty is political*. Abahlali Basemjondolo of the Western Cape. [Online] Available: http://www.khayelitshastruggles.com/. (Accessed: 21April 2012).

Maditla, N. 2012. Battle of Sir Lowry's Pass. *Cape Argus*, 11May 2012.

Mangcu, X. 2011. Elections and political culture: issues and trends. *Journal of Public Administration*, 46(31):1153-1168.

Manila Declaration. 1989. *The Manila Declaration on People's Participation and Sustainable Development.* Philippines: ANGOC.

Masango, R.S. 2002. Public participation: a critical ingredient for good governance. *Politeia.* 21(2): 52-65.

Masango, R.S. 2009. Public participation: An imperative for sustainable democracy and effective service delivery. *Journal of Public Administration*, 44(1.1): 123-132.

Masiko-Kambala, P., Gorgens, T. & Van Donk, M. 2012. Advancing 'networked spaces': Making a case for communities of practice to deepen democracy. In Good Governance Learning Network (GGLN). *Putting participation at the heart of development/Putting development at the heart of participation.* Cape Town: GGLN.

Mathekga, R. & Buccus, I. 2006. *The challenge of local government structure in South Africa*: *Securing community participation.* Centre for Public Participation. Critical dialogue-Public Participation in Review: IDASA.

Mattes, R.B. 2002. South Africa: Democracy without the people? *Journal of Democracy*, 13(1): 22-36.

Max-Neef, M. A. 1991. *Human scale Development: conception, application and further reflection.* New York: Apex Press.

Maytham, J. 2012. Service delivery protests. *Cape Talk*. 31 July 2012.

Mc Carthy, J.D. & Zald, M.N. 1977. Resource mobilisation and social movements: A partial theory. *American Journal of Sociology*, 82(6): 1212-1241.

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

Meyer, D.S. 2004. *Protest and Political Opportunities*, *Annual Review of Sociology*, 30: 125-145.

Meyer, D.S. 2007. *The politics of protests: Social movements in America*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Meyer, I. & Theron, F. 2000. *Workbook. Public participation in local government: A framework for action.* Bellville: SOPMP, University of Stellenbosch.

Mfundisi, N. E. 2007. *Public participation in the budget process of the City of Cape Town (2004-2006)*. Unpublished MA Thesis. School of Public Management and Planning. Stellenbosch: Stellenbosch University.

Mohaneng, T. 2000. Community development and empowerment. In De Beer, F. & Swanepoel, H. *Introduction to development studies. Cape Town*: OUP.

Mogale, T.M. 2003. Developmental local government and decentralised service delivery in the democratic South Africa. In Mhone, G. & Edigheji, O. (Eds), *Governance in the new South Africa: the challenge of globalisation*. Harare: Sapes

Moodley, S. & Govender, J. 2006. Local government participation policy and development. *Journal of Public Administration*. 41(4.1): 875-887.

Mottiar, S. & Bond, P. 2011. *Social protests in South Africa*. Centre for Civil Society. University of Kwazulu Natal. [Online] Available: http://ccs.ukzn.ac.za/files/Social%20Protest%20in%20South%20Africa%20sept2011.pdf. (Accessed 16 November 2011).

Mtyala, Q. 2012. Service delivery protests overrun Cape Town. *Times Live*, 5 June 2012.

Mouton, J. 2001. *How to succeed in your Master's & Doctoral Studies. A South African guide and resource book.* Pretoria: Van Schaik.

Mufumadi, S. 2005. Speech by Ministry of Provincial and Local Government. Pretoria: Government Printers.

Municipal IQ Municipal Hotspots, 2012. A worrying peak in service delivery protests. Press Release, 6 June 2012.

Mzimakwe, T. 2010. Public participation and engagement in local governance: A South African perspective. *Journal of Public Administration*, 45(4): 501-519.

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

Nampila, T. 2005. *Assessing community participation: the Huidare informal settlement*. Master Thesis, School of Public Management and Planning, Stellenbosch University.

Nam, T. 2007. Rough days in democracies: Comparing protests in democracies. *European Journal of Political Research.* 46, 97-120.

Nanz, P. & Dalferth, S. 2010. *Making citizens' heard-and listened to. Thoughts on public participation in Europe.* [Online] Available: http://www.participationinstitute.org/wpcontent/uploads/2010/12/Making_their_voice_heard_FINAL2010.pdf. 2010.(Accessed 27 April 2010).

National Planning Commission (NPC). 2011. Diagnostic Report. Pretoria: The Presidency.

Local Government Budget and Expenditure Review. 2011. National Treasury.

Ndenze, B. 2012. Its Occupy Rondebosch Common. *Cape Times*, 17 April 2012.

Nekwaya, J.H. 2007. *Assessing public participation in development planning and service delivery- a case study of Omusati Regional Council*. MPA Thesis, School of Public Management and Planning, Stellenbosch University.

Nemeroff, T. 2005. Probing the protests and understanding service delivery protests. Idasa. [Online]. Available: www.idasa.org.za (Accessed 27 May 2011).

Nkomo, S. 2012. Zille calls on President to condemn ANC Youth League. *Cape Argus*, 16 August 2012.

Nleya, N. 2011. Linking service delivery and protests in South Africa: an exploration of evidence from Khayelitsha. *Africanus* 41(1), 3-33.

Nyalunga, D. 2006. The Revitalisation of Local Government in South Africa. *International NGO Journal* 1(2): 15-20. [Online]. Available: http:www.academicjournals.org/1NGOJ. (Accessed 5 April 2012)

Nzimakwe, T.I. & Reddy, P.S. 2008. Community participation in eThekwini Municipality with particular reference to ward committees. *Journal of Public Administration*, 43(4.1): 667-679.

Oakley, P. (ed.) 1991. *Projects with people-the practice of participation in rural*

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

development. Geneva: ILO.

Oakley, P. & Marsden, 1984. *Approaches to participation in rural development.* Geneva: International Labour Office.

Oberschall, A. 2000. Social movements and the transition to democracy. *Democratisation*, 7 (3): 25 – 45. London: Frank Cass.

Oldfield, S. 2008. Participatory mechanisms and community politics: building consensus and conflict. In Van Donk, M., Swilling, M., Pieterse, E. & Parnell, S. (Eds). *Consolidating developmental local government. Lessons from the South African experience.* Cape Town: UCT Press.

One World Action, 2008. *Citizen participation and local governance in South East Asia. Bradley's close:* London. [Online] Available: http:www.eldis.org/9BEB7D38-4BDD. (Accessed 16 November 2011).

Osmani, S. 2006. *Participatory governance: An overview of issues and evidence*. Participatory Governance and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). United Nations: New York.

Parliament of the Republic of South Africa, 2009. *A report on the current service delivery protests in South Africa*. Commissioned by House Chairpersons Committees, Oversight & ICT. Pretoria: Research Unit, Parliament.

Parnell, S., Pieterse, E., Swilling, M., Woodridge, D. & Van Donk, M. (Eds.) 2002. *Democratising local government: the South African experiment*. Cape Town: UCT Press.

Patel, Y. 2004. *The next cycle of IDP*. Discussion document. [Online]. Available: http://www.thedplg.gov.za/subwebsites/idp/doc (Accessed 23 August 2011).

Pearce, J. 2004. Debate Collective action or public participation? Complementary or contradictory democratisation strategies in Latin American. *Bulletin of Latin American Research*, 23 (4): 483-504.

Phago, K.G. 2008. Community participation during the 21st century South Africa: Modes, attitudes and trends. *Journal of Public Administration*. 43(21): 239-251.

Pieterse, E. 2002. Participatory local government in the making: opportunities, constraints and prospects. In Parnell, S. & Pieterse, E., Swilling, M. & Wooldridge, D. (Eds). *Democratising local government: the South African experiment*. Landsdown: UCT Press.

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

Pieterse, E., Parnell, S., Swilling, M. & Van Donk, M. 2008. Consolidating developmental local government. In Van Donk, M., Swilling, M., Pieterse, E. & Parnell, S. (Eds). *Consolidating developmental local government. Lessons from the South African experience.* Cape Town: UCT Press.

Pillay, U. 2011. Delivery protests: national problem requires local, tailor-made solutions. *Business Day*, 01 April 2011.

Piper, L. & Deacon, R. 2008. *Partisan ward committees, elite accountability and community participation: the Msunduzi case.* A Journal on Public Participation in Governance, 8 (4): 41-46.

Pretty, J.N. 1994. Alternative systems of enquiry for sustainable agriculture. *IDS Bulletin*, 25(2): 37-48.

Pretty, J.N., Guijit, I., Scoones, I. & Thompson, J. 1995. *A trainer's guide for participatory learning and action.* IIED participatory methodology series. London: IIED.

Ramjee, M. & Van Donk, M. 2011. Introduction: Recognising Community Voice and Dissatisfaction. In GGLN (Good Governance Learning Network). *Recognising Community Voice and Dissatisfaction: A Civil Society Perspective on Local Governance in South Africa*. Cape Town: GGLN and Isandla Institute.

Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Coordinated Oversight on Service Delivery, 2010. Parliament of the Republic of South Africa.

Republic of South Africa, 1993a. *Gatherings Act (Act 205 of 1993).* Pretoria: Government Printer.

Republic of South Africa, 1993b. *Local Government Transitional Act (Act 209 of 1993)* Pretoria: Government Printer.

Republic of South Africa, 1996. *Constitution of the Republic of South Africa*. Pretoria: Government Printer.

Republic of South Africa, 1995. *Development Facilitation Act (Act 65 of 1995)*. Pretoria: Government Printer.

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

Republic of South Africa, 1997. *White Paper on the Transformation of the Public Service.* Pretoria: Government Printer.

Republic of South Africa, 1998a. *White Paper on Local Government (Notice 423 of 1998)* Pretoria: Government Printer.

Republic of South Africa, 1998b. *Municipal Structures Act (Act 117 of 1998).* Pretoria: Government Printer.

Republic of South Africa, 1998c. *Municipal Demarcation Act (Act 27 of 1998).* Pretoria: Government Printer.

Republic of South Africa, 2000. *Municipal Systems Act (Act 32 of 2000).* Pretoria: Government Printer.

Republic of South Africa, 2003. *Municipal Finance Management Act (Act 56 of 2003).* Pretoria: Government Printer.

Roberts, B., Wa Kivilu, M. & Davids, Y. D. 2010. Reflections on the age of hope. In Roberts, B., Kivilu, M. & Davids, Y.D. (Eds.) *South African Social Attitudes. 2nd Report: Reflections on the age of hope.* Pretoria: HSRC Press.

Roefs, M. & Atkinson, D. 2010. Public perceptions of local government. In Roberts, B., Kivilu, M. & Davids, Y.D. (Eds.) *South African Social Attitudes. 2nd Report: Reflections on the age of hope.* Pretoria: HSRC Press.

Rule, S. 2004. *Motivations behind voting behaviour in South Africa*. Election Synopsis 2(2):2-4.[Online] Available:http://intranet.hsrc.ac.za/knowledgebase/eResources/digitalLibrary/electionSynopsis02.pdf. (Accessed 3 June 2011).

Saide, E. M. 2006. *Community building for economic empowerment in rural Mozambique: an exploratory study in the Maganja da Costa District*. Unpublished MA Thesis. School of Public Management and Planning. Stellenbosch: Stellenbosch University.

Schneider, N. 2011. *What 'diversity of tactics' really means for Occupy Wall Street*. [Online] Available: http://wagingnonviolence.org/2011/10/what-diversity-of-tactics-really-mean-for-occ... Accessed: 2 March 2012.

Schurink, E. 2009. Qualitative Research Design as tool for trustworthy research. *Journal of Public Administration*, 44(4.2): 803-823.

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

Schmidt, D. 2008. From Spheres to Tiers – Conceptions of Local Government in South Africa in the period 1994-2006. In Van Donk, M., Swilling, M., Pieterse, E. & Parnell, S. (Eds). *Consolidating developmental local government. Lessons from the South African experience.* Cape Town: UCT Press.

Schonwalder, G. 1997. New democratic spaces at the grassroots? Popular participation in Latin American local governments. *Development and Change*. 28, 753-770.

Seekings, J., Alexander, K., Jooste, T. & Matzner, I. 2004. *The 2003 Cape Area Study (CAS 3): A User Guide*. Cape Town: Centre for Social Science Research: University of Cape Town.

Seokoma, B. 2010. *Service delivery protests: People need services*. [Online]. Available: www.ngopulse.org/.../service-delivery-protests-people-need-services [Accessed 1 April 2010].

Sibanda, M.M. 2011. Civil society participation in government: re-examining the third sector in global perspective. *Journal of Public Participation*, 46(1.1): 814-833.

Silber, G. & Peter, A. 2010. The destructive effect of poor communication. *Cape Times*, 27 May 2010.

Siphuma, Z.R. 2009. *An assessment of the role of public participation in IDP. The Thulamela Municipality.* MPA thesis, School of Public Management and Planning, Stellenbosch University.

Skenjana, N. & Kimemia, P. 2011. *Existing mechanisms for public participation at local government level. In Recognising community voice and dissatisfaction.* Good Governance Learning Network (GGLN): Cape Town..

Smith, T. 2007. *Community participation and empowerment within the realm of local governance in South Africa: An assessment of current practice and possibilities for strengthening participatory local governance*. Input paper for the DPLG review of the White Paper on Local Government. Isandla Institute.

Smith, T. & De Visser, J. 2009. *Are ward committees working? Insights from six case studies*. Cape Town: Community Law Centre. University of Western Cape.

Smith, L. & Vawda, A. 2003. Citizen vs. customer: Different approaches to public participation in service delivery in Cape Town. *Urban Forum*, 14(1): 26-52.

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

South African Government Information. 2012. *Gauteng Speakers collaborate to improve government's accountability.* [Online] Available: http://www.info.gov.za/speech/DynamicAction?pageid=461&sid=27793&tid=69900. (Accessed 31 July 2012).

South African National Civic Organisation. (SANCO) 2011. [Online] http://www.sanco.org.za/index.html (Accessed 20 August 2011).

Struwig, J., Roberts, B. & Vivier, E. 2011. A vote of confidence: Election management and public perceptions of electoral processes in South Africa. *Journal of Public Administration*, 46(31): 1122-1152.

Swanepoel, H. & De Beer, F. 2006. *Community development: breaking the cycle of poverty*. Landsdown: Juta.

Swanepoel, H. & De Beer, F. (eds.) 2011. *Community development: breaking the cycle of poverty*. (5th edition). Cape Town: Juta.

Tadesse, E., Ameck, G. & Christensen, C. 2006. *The people shall govern*. A research report on public participation in policy processes and violent conflict: Responsive and participatory governance in South Africa. Johannesburg: Centre for Study of Violence and Reconciliation.

Theron, F. 2005. Public participation as a micro-level development strategy. In Davids, I., Theron, F. & Maphunye, K.J. 2005. *Participatory development in South Africa: a Development management perspective.* Pretoria: Van Schaik.

Theron, F. (Ed.). 2008. The development change agent: a micro level approach to development. In Theron, F. (Ed.) *The development change agent: a micro level approach to development.* Pretoria: Van Schaik.

Theron, F. 2009a. Reflecting upon micro-level development: an assessment of concepts, principles and strategies for change. In Davids, I, Theron, F. & Maphunye, K.J. *Participatory development in South Africa: A development management perspective.* Pretoria: Van Schaik.

Theron, F. 2009b. Public participation as a micro level development strategy: the principles and context for authentic and empowering development. In Davids, I, Theron, F. & Maphunye, K.J. *Participatory development in South Africa: A development management perspective.* Pretoria: Van Schaik.

Theron, F. 2009c. Contextualising integrated development planning: an opportunity for

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

public participation in developmental local government. In Davids, I, Theron, F. & Maphunye, K.J. *Participatory development in South Africa: A development management perspective.* Pretoria: Van Schaik.

Theron, F. & Ceasar, N. 2008. Participation: a grassroots strategy for development. In Theron, F. (Ed.) *The development change agent: a micro level approach to development.* Pretoria: Van Schaik.

Theron, F., Ceaser, N., & Davids, I. 2007. Participation According to IAP2 Principles: Opportunity or Challenge for Integrated Development Planning in South Africa? [Online]. Available: http://www.iap2.org/displaycommon.cfm?an=1&subarticlenbr=193 (Accessed 3 July 2011).

Theron, F. & Saunders, J.J. 2009. Scientific writing skills and social research methodology: an introduction of basic techniques. In Davids, I, Theron, F. & Maphunye, K.J. *Participatory development in South Africa: A development management perspective.* Pretoria: Van Schaik.

Thompson, L. 2012. *Reflections on governance and service delivery surveys in Khayelitsha. Langa and Delft.* In Good Governance Learning Network (GGLN). Putting participation at the heart of development//Putting development at the heart of participation. South Africa. GGLN.

Thompson, L. & Nleya, N. 2010. Passivity or protests? Understanding the dimensions of mobilization on rights to services in Khayelitsha, Cape Town. In Von Lieres, B. & Coelho, V. S. (Eds). *Mobilising for democracy*? London: Zed.

Treurnicht, S. P. 2000. Sustainable development. In De Beer, F. & Swanepoel, H. (Eds.), *Introduction to Developmental Studies.* 2nd ed. Cape Town: Oxford University Press.

Tshabalala, E.L. & Lombard, A. 2009. Community participation in the Integrated Development Plan: A case study of Govan Mbeki Municipality. *Journal of Public Administration*, 44(2): 396-409.

Tshishonga, N. & Mbambo, M. 2008. Forging democracy from below: The challenges and imperatives for crafting community participation and engagement. *Journal of Public Administration*, 43(4.1): 767-780.

Tseola, J.P. 2012. Theorising a democratic developmental state: Issues of public service delivery planning and violent protests in South Africa. *Journal of Public Administration*, 47(1): 161-179.

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

United Nations Secretary-General's High-Level Panel on Global Sustainability (2012). *Resilient people, resilient planet: A future worth choosing, Overview*. New York: United Nations.

Van Donk, M. 2012. *Tackling the "governance deficit" to reinvigorate participatory local government.* In Good Governance Learning Network (GGLN). Putting participation at the heart of development//Putting development at the heart of participation. South Africa: GGLN.

Van Donk, M., Swilling, M., Pieterse, E. & Parnell, S. (eds) 2008. *Consolidating development local government: Lessons from the South African experience.* Cape Town: UCT Press.

Van Hoof, P. 2011. *The people rate local government*. [Online]. Available: http:www.mg.co.za/article/2-11-04-01_the-people-rate-local-government (Accessed 15 Feb 2012).

Von Holdt, K. 2011. *The smoke that calls: Insurgent citizenship, collective violence and the struggle for a place in South Africa*. Johannesburg: Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation.

Webb, W. & Auriacombe, C.J. 2006. Research Design in Public Administration: Critical Considerations. *South African Journal of Public Administration*. 41(3.1): 589-601.

World Bank. 1996. *The World Bank participation sourcebook.* Washington: World Bank.

World Commission on Environment and Development. 1987. *From one earth to one world: An Overview*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. [Online] Available: http://public.wsu.edu/~susdev/WCED87.html. (Accessed: 13 March 2012).

Zader, I. S. 2012. *Whatever happened to the Arab Spring? Revolution vs. Counterrevolution*. [Online] Available: http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=30293. (Accessed: 4 May 2012).

Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

ANNEXURES

Annexure A: Interview and focus group discussion guide questions

1. Which public participation strategies does the City of Cape Town use to engage the public at a ward level?

2. Do you think lack of public participation plays any role in public protests?

3. In your opinion, what is the role of participatory approaches (Ward Committees and Integrated Development Plans?

4. Do Ward Committees and public participation in the formulation of Integrated Development Plans have any bearing on public protests?

5. To what extent do the City of Cape Town officials contribute to public protests?

6. To what extent do you think Councillors contribute to public protests?

7. What do you think are the reasons behind public protests?

8. What do you think causes protests to turn violent?

9. Are there any other factors outside of the City of Cape Town (external), you think contribute to public protests?

10. Do you think the City of Cape Town should adopt protest as one of the public participation strategies?

11. How can these public protests be managed?