DEPENDENCY THEORY AND URBANISATION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA: A CONCEPTUAL CRITIQUE

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DECLARATION

I the undersigned hereby declare that the work contained in this dissertation is my own original work and has not previously in its entirety or in part been submitted at any university for a degree.
ABSTRACT

Marxist development theory has been in trouble recently. As it has been applied in Southern Africa, this theoretical stream originated in the theories of André Gunder Frank and Immanuel Wallerstein. From the critique against these theories, most notably by Ernesto Laclau and Robert Brenner, a new theoretical direction arose. This was called modes of production theory. However, today this theory is also in crisis as a result of EP Thompson's withering attack on Althusser. Amid the debris of such old theories, some writers feel that Marxist development theory is at an impasse. New directions are being sought in Weber and various micro-theories.

These writers are being unnecessarily pessimistic. New theories are already emerging from the ruins of the old, as one would expect them to.

The central concern of this thesis, then, is the new direction in which Marxist development theory might move in order to go beyond its present dilemmas in its consideration of the Southern African context. There are three main elements necessary for viable renewal. All of these draw on Anthony Giddens' structuration theory.

The first is a theory of the postcolonial or peripheral state which avoids instrumentalist and functionalist notions. These latter see the state as subjected to the interests of the ruling class or to the logic of capitalist development. But state incumbents in peripheral countries have distinct enough interests and anxieties, on the one hand, and sufficient resources, on the other hand, to make them a separate class with a significant measure of independence over and against both national and international bourgeoisies.

The second innovation in Marxist development theory concerns the relationship between core and periphery. Core-periphery interaction is conceptually worth retaining on condition that it jettisons the stagnationist, quantitative, unidimensional and uninodal assumptions introduced by Frank and Wallerstein. Core and periphery thus interact at international, national, regional and intra-urban levels. Such
levels are superimposed ‘on to’ each other and operate simultaneously. In addition, cores exercise their dominance over peripheries in multifarious ways which include both trade and class mechanisms. Exploitation is therefore not a quantative, zero-sum game, but a qualitative relational one. Finally, once one moves beyond neat notions of discrete systems each with a single core, it becomes possible to think of multiple systems, not only superimposed ‘on top of’ each other, but also existing ‘next to’ each other. The interaction between defies neat boundaries.

The final innovation in Marxist development theory concerns the notion of structure. Earlier Marxist writers, following Althusser and Poulantzas, were strongly structuralist and positivist. Later Marxists, particularly among social historians in South African, by contrast, have been influenced by subjectivist and relativist theories.

Structuration theory rejects both of these polarities. Giddens proposes that social analysis must start with subjective meaning, as subjectivist theories would say. Unlike subjectivist theories, structure must be seen as constitutive of subjective meaning. At the epistemological level Giddens also rejects relativism. In this view a form of critical theory which applies to both the object and the subject of theory can replace vicious with virtuous cycles of knowledge.
Marxistiese ontwikkelingsteorie was in die laaste tyd in die moeilikheid. Soos in Suider-Afrika toegespas, het hierdie teoretiese stroom sy oorsprong gevind in die werk van André Gunder Frank en Immanuel Wallerstein. Uit die kritiek teen hulle teorieë, veral deur Ernesto Laclau en Robert Brenner, het ’n nuwe teoretiese rigting ontstaan. Dit was modes van produksie teorie. Maar vandag is hierdie teorie ook in krisis as gevolg van EP Thompson se skryende aanval op Althusser. Tussen die oorlyfsels van sulke ou teorieë voel sommige skrywers dat Marxistiese ontwikkelingsteorie in ’n doodloopstraat is. Nuwe rigtings word nou in Weber en verskeie mikro-teorieë gesoek.

Hierdie skrywers is onnodiglik pessimisties. Nuwe teorieë is reeds besig om te verskyn uit die splinters van die oue, soos mens ook sou verwag.

Die hooftema van hierdie proefskrif gaan dan oor die vernuwings wat in Marxistiese ontwikkelingsteorie nodig is om in sy analise van die Suider-Afrika konteks sy huidige dilemma’s vry te spring. Daar is drie hoofelemente nodig vir lewensvatbare vernuwing. Hulle kom almal uit Anthony Giddens se struktureringsteorie.

Die eerste is ’n teorie van die na-koloniaal of periferale staat wat instrumentalistiese en funksionalistiese idees vermy. Sulke idees sien die staat as onderworpe aan die belange van die heersersklas of aan die logika van die kapitalisties sisteem. Staatsakteurs in periferale lande het, aan die een kant, noemenswaardige belange en spanninge, en aan die ander kant, voldoende magsbronne om van hulle ’n aparte klas te maak teenoor beide nasionale en internasionale bourgeoisie.

Die tweede vernuwing in Marxistiese ontwikkelingsteorie gaan oor die verhouding tussen kern en periferie. Kern-periferie interaksie kan as konsep behou word mits die stagnasionistiese, kwantitatiewe, eendimensionele en enkelkern idees van Frank en Wallerstein verwerp word. Kern en periferie is, naamlik, op internasionale, nasionale, streeks- en intrastedelike vlakke in interaksie. Sulke vlakke word
'op' mekaar geplaas en fungeer gelykydig. Kerne oefen daarbewenens hulle dominasie oor periferie uit op verskeie maniere wat beide handels- en klassemeganismes insluit. Uitbuiting is derhalwe nie 'n kwantitatiewe, zero-somspel nie, maar 'n kwantitatiewe relasionele een. Laastens, wanneer mens wegbeweeg van netjiese konsepte van aparte sisteme elke nie 'n enkele kern, word dit moontlik om veelvoudige sisteme nie net 'bo op' mekaar geplaas, maar ook 'langs' mekaar te bedink. Die interaksie tussens sisteme pas nie binne netjies grense nie.

Die laaste vernuwing in Marxistiese ontwikkelingsteorie gaan oor die idee van struktuur. Vroeere Marxisties skrywers, in navolging van Althusser en Poulantzas, was sterk strukturalisties en positiwisties. Latere Marxistie, veral onder sosiale historici, daarteenoor, is deur subjektiwistiese en relatiewistiese teorie beinvloed.

Struktureringsteorie verwerp albei hierdie polariteit. Giddens stel voor dat sosiale analise met subjektiwse betekenis moet begin, soos subjektiwistiese teorie sou sê. Maar, anders as in subjektiwistiese teorie, is subjektiwse betekenis en struktuur onderling konstituerend. Op die epistemologiese vlak verwerp Giddens ook die relatiewisme. Met 'n soort kritiese teorie wat beide op die objek van sosiale analise as op die sosiaalwetenskaplike self van toepassing is, kan, volgens hom, 'n bose met 'n deugsame kringloop van kennis vervang word. Sodoende kan probleme van relatiewisme vermy word.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The lines of thought which are the roots of this thesis go a very long way back. They occupy the greatest part of my academic life. That perspective gives some idea of the number of people who have influenced my thinking.

Nevertheless, the crystallisation of that thinking into what is now a thesis occurred largely during my time in the Research Unit for the Sociology of Development in the Sociology Department at the University of Stellenbosch. In that time I benefited substantially from discussions with members of the Stellenbosch Sociology Department. I was also very fortunate to have the help, advice and backing of Prof. SP Cilliers, the Director of the Research Unit. He has the ability to make impossible things happen.

At the time of their original production, four of the five chapters in this thesis had financial aid from various institutions. Chapters Two and Three came out of work done for the Unit for Futures Research at the University of Stellenbosch. Chapter Four received backing from the Centre for Policy Studies at Wits University, as well as from the funders of the volume in memory of Jill Nattrass, entitled Perspectives on the Political Economy of South Africa. Chapter Five was, in its original form, written for, and aided by the Bureau of Research at the University of Namibia. I am grateful for their help.
"I have never doubted the truth of signs, Adso; they are the only things man has with which to orient himself in the world. What I did not understand was the relation among the signs. I arrived at Jorge through an apocalyptic pattern that seemed to underlie all the crimes, and yet it was accidental. I arrived at Jorge seeking one criminal for all the crimes and we discovered that each crime was committed by a different person, or by no one. I arrived at Jorge pursuing the plan of a perverse and rational mind, and there was no plan, or, rather, Jorge himself was overcome by his own initial design and there began a sequence of causes, and concourses, and of causes contradicting one another, which proceeded on their own, creating relations that did not stem from any plan. Where is all my wisdom, then? I behaved stubbornly, pursuing a semblance of order, when I should have known well that there is no order in the universe." (William of Baskerville to Adso of Melk in The Name of the Rose, Umberto Eco. London. Picador. p.492)

"Weber argues that only a tiny fragment of reality is knowable and that the whole remains hidden, a methodological agnosticism which lead him to write, pessimistically, 'that the path of human destiny cannot but appal him who surveys a section of it [and] he will do well to keep his small personal commentaries to himself ... unless he knows himself to be called and gifted to give them expression in artistic or prophetic form.'" Swingewood, A (1975) Marx and Modern Social Theory. London. MacMillan. p.51

"I really do believe that our scope for influencing the course of history is extremely limited. Why, then, do I join practically every march that is going, park myself and my posters in front of foreign embassies ....? The answer is simple, but does not really warrant any sophisticated construction of new theory: I do it to save my soul. I believe that we must fight, not in order to win (I do not think we can) but in order to retain our human dignity." (Hoogvelt (1982) The Third World in Global Development. London. MacMillan.p.211-2)
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INTRODUCTION

1. Summary

This thesis operates at a number of levels, each building on and going beyond the foregoing. At its most facile level it is a critique of old-style Frankian dependency theory as it has been employed in the Southern African context. That task is facile because it has been done continuously and effectively since the early 1970's. But I persist in what might be seen as flaying a very dead horse for a number of reasons.

1.1. Dependency Theory and Metatheory

Firstly, despite determined efforts from formidable writers like Robert Brenner, Ernesto Laclau, Colin Leys, Henry Bernstein and David Booth, dependency theory is not dead. Chapter One explains why this is so, but, more importantly, why we should not be surprised that it is so. For I understand both Popper and Kuhn to be saying in their different ways that theories do not disappear because their anomalies appear too damning. Theories persist for reasons which have little to do with evidence and logic.

The point is illustrated by a detailed consideration of David Booth's attempt to bury dependency theory finally. I shall argue that Booth does not achieve his aim because he attacks an outdated (stagnationist) version of dependency theory, because his critique is often flawed and selective, and because his assessment of teleological thinking is too harsh.

Teleological thinking is one form of functionalist thinking, and is a central concern of this thesis. It needs delicate handling, but need not, as Booth wishes, be rejected on principle.

1.2. Critique and Reconstruction

The second reason for persisting with dependency theory is that
Marxist analysis of development and underdevelopment in Southern Africa was nurtured and grew on Frankian milk. As much as it has matured since then, contemporary Marxist development theory shows its origins, and that is most evident in instances of functionalism. We are not yet rid of Frank or functionalism, and that needs emphasizing.

CHAPTER TWO, then, shows the damaging impact of Frank on writers like Bundy, Legassick, Southall and Charton, but begins the task of reconstructing a set of principles for more robust and viable development theory. CHAPTER THREE continues that task of reconstruction by examining modes of production theory. This theory has, after all, been the single major source of critique against old dependency theory. It has also provided a rich vein of more sophisticated theoretical elements from which a new synthesis may be refined. CHAPTER FOUR addresses the same agenda. Both dependency theory and modes of production theory have been either silent or intolerably crude in thinking of state institutions in peripheral countries. This chapter suggests a more satisfying way of filling this vacuum with specific reference to bantustan state institutions.

But I am going too fast. We need to consider the arguments in Chapters Two, Three and Four in more detail.

1.3. Dependency Theory: Origins and Critique

CHAPTER TWO sketches the origins of dependency theory in the work of Prebisch/Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA), and shows the elements of it which Frank added. It considers briefly the alternatives proposed by Brenner/Laclau and Banaji. The main thrust of the chapter is, however, to show the impact that Frankian ideas have had on ideas of development and underdevelopment in Southern Africa. The conclusions which are important for our later discussion are as follows.

(1) Both in its definition of, and theorising about capitalism, dependency theory has placed too much emphasis on unequal exchange or the market. That has led dependency theory to a sterile, quantitative
and zero-sum theory of exploitation. The degree to which the core extracts surplus from the periphery is, in this view, the measure of development in the former and underdevelopment or stagnation in the latter.

(2) A quantitative notion of underdevelopment makes it easy to think away the differences between different kinds of exploitation. If exploitation occurs through the transfer of a quantitative surplus, it is of little importance whether that be between countries or between urban and rural areas. Surplus is surplus.

(3) Emphasis on the market has also led to neglect of actors or classes. The rise of, and conflict between classes is consequently seen as secondary to movements in the market. Suppression of actors with concrete interests and limited resources opens the way to notions of absolute ruling class power (functionalist thinking) and of intrinsic system dynamics (teleological thinking).

(4) Zero-sum theories of development and of power, combined with a conflation of international and national levels of exploitation, lead to silly prescriptions for ‘autocentric’ development for bantustans. Integration into a broader system does not mean universal functionality or total domination or chronic poverty.

These points of critique do not mean that dependency theory can now be consigned to the scrap-heap. Even if writers cease to use it (which they do not), there are a number of aspects which need to be retained.

(1) It is futile to attempt to reject the market as a site of exploitation. Production and realisation of surplus value are separate moments of the same process. They can only be analytically distinguished. That means that certain forms of microtheoretical modernisation theory are useful as an adjunct to political economy types of analysis.

(2) Development and underdevelopment occur within a broader context.
Dependency theory sees the context as the world capitalist system. I shall argue in the final chapter that the world context needs to be retained as one of a number of system levels.

1.4. Modes of Production theory

Modes of production theory, the successor to dependency theory, brought with it the potential for considerable advance in the hands of writers like Jack Lewis and Harold Wolpe in understanding underdevelopment. They have, however, tended to replicate the stagnationist assumptions of the earlier dependency writers, and have also failed to develop a notion of the bantustan state. The important aspects from CHAPTER THREE are the following.

(1) The value of Lewis is that he puts into Bundy's picture concrete classes with specific positions within a relational structure. Exploitation becomes a qualitative matter between social actors rather than a quantitative effect of the market.

(2) But there is something enclosed and formalistic in Lewis' picture. A precapitalist mode of production is anchored, pure and pristine, in its lineage form by the essential, and essentialist, tension between older and junior males. As long as that critical key remains, other changes in the forces of production, trading activities, social relations, and ideology make very little difference. That is why precapitalist agents can, in this view, remain 'uncaptured', even 'untouched' by the capitalist mode of production. Lewis, in effect, loses the broader context and the transcending dynamic which incorporates precapitalist modes of production into a wider relationship of articulation. In this sense Lewis has regressed to the position of the dual economy thesis which Bundy so efficiently demolished.

Such myopia quickly leads into definitional problems. Precapitalist modes of production have, in consequence, multiplied alarmingly, and modes of production theorists have retreated into
(v)

metatheoretical introversion.

(3) Although Lewis 'brought men back in' (that was, after all the cardinal point on the modes of production theory agenda), Wolpe and Wellings & Sutcliffe demolished them again. Both these writers lapse into crude notions of absolute ruling class power and capital-logic, also known as functionalist thinking and teleological thinking. In the process they both use and abuse the conservation-dissolution metaphor. It is a short step from there back to Frank's stagnationism. It is perhaps no coincidence that in both these instances precapitalist modes of production are eventually dispensable to their argument.

In short, beyond a new notion of exploitation, Wolpe and Wellings & Sutcliffe make hardly any progress at a theoretical level beyond dependency theory. We need to go to later historians, like Beinart, to reap the full benefit of a sustained theoretical advance in this theoretical sphere.

For the purposes of our later argument we may summarise (and translate) the above points as follows.

(1) Social analysis must start from the consciousness of individual agents. Such agents have particular interests and limited power. Both their interests and their power is structured by the broader context, the 'mode of production', through which they conduct their social existence. That applies to both dominant and dominated classes. They are, after all, mirror-images of each other. They structure each other's existence.

(b) The structure which is expressed by social existence defines exploitation between classes in qualitatively different ways. 'The market' in capitalism means something quite different from 'the market' in precapitalist modes of production. The market is furthermore one moment in the exploitative process. Market relations and class relations are mutually constitutive.

(c) Exploitation occurs at a number of levels, the world, the
country, the urban complex. Wolpe and Wellings & Sutcliffe give detailed analyses of these latter two levels. We shall see how Wallerstein sees things at a world level in Chapter Five.

1.5. Theorising the Bantustan state.

As is evident from the foregoing summary, many Marxist writers either ignore bantustan state institutions altogether or treat them as puppets. This is one of the crudest forms of functionalist thinking to be found in contemporary Marxist writing. The task of CHAPTER FOUR, then, is to formulate an alternative. An important task here is to rescue the notion of agency while retaining the idea of domination.

Within the framework of a capitalist system, the state must be taken seriously as a separate actor, and not just as a reflection of class alliances or capital logic albeit with 'relative autonomy' - for a number of reasons. First, it has a monopoly of the means of legal violence and taxation. For bantustans, that implies access to very considerable resources - the full panoply of coercive machinery like police, army, security police, courts, prisons, as well as a budget of between R1 - 2bn. Second, it has at its disposal the opportunities for patronage and surveillance which a fully differentiated bureaucracy lend. Giddens argues that the modern capitalist state's capacity for collecting and storing information about its citizens gives it immense coercive power.

Bantustans are, however, also states which fall within a particularly South African framework. For bantustan leaders this implies a chronic crisis of legitimacy and security. The present bantustan leaders were given power precisely because they did not have links with the broadly popular mass movements like the ANC and PAC. In addition, they come from very shaky class backgrounds. They are completely dependent for access to (previously undreamt of) wealth on their continued hold on state power. For both of these reasons, elections and the democratic process are very threatening. Bantustan leaders are pushed into using quite ugly methods of survival.
Bantustan leaders are also aware of the moral opprobrium attached to separate development. They themselves have suffered from racist discrimination. In addition, the South African state has until recently been very skimp in providing finances to run their administrations and develop their countries. Both of these factors have made bantustan leaders recalcitrant and irritable allies for the SA state.

2. Core-Periphery as Structure

The third reason for staying with dependency theory is that, however shoddy its origins, I wish to retain the core-periphery structure as an analytical tool. In a climate where ‘structure’ is a contested concept, its retention must be done with considerable care. The task of CHAPTER FOUR is to show the conditions under which a structuralist perspective may be retained, and why it is important that it be retained. I shall argue that a reconstructed theory of development should contain the following elements.

(1) The Southern African region can be seen as functionally differentiated between core and periphery. In addition, different parts of the periphery are tied to the core in different ways. Thus, for example, the Transkei supplies male migrant labour to the gold mines and to the Western Cape. The Natal midlands, by contrast, provide young, female, non-unionised commuters to the textile industry. Bantustan fragments with less binding ties to the core (Venda) are in the outer periphery. Over time there has been a functional substitution of one part of the periphery (Mozambique etc.) with another part (Transkei, Lesotho).

(2) The forms of labour exploitation in the Southern African region must be put in the context of the world system. Suffice it to say, there is very little Radical analysis which analyses the interaction of world and regional levels in the Southern African region, mediated to some extent by South Africa’s own TNC’s.

(3) Relationships between core and periphery are instantiated by the interaction between concrete classes with specific interests and
limited power. The dangers of ‘deep’ structuralist, functionalist and teleological thinking enter when social analysis is separated from individual consciousness.

In particular, bantustan analyses in the past have tended to be unspecific and melodramatic in this. Pretoria has been seen to be in a unilinear and omnipotent relationship with bantustans.

Bantustan ruling classes, for one, are not automatically or always ‘captured’. Both the Transkeian and SA state institutions are made up of various departments and interests who may be in conflict/cooperation with each other, and with other non-state interests/classes. Given the variety of interests and resources at play in this area, relationships between them will be multiple, ambiguous, contradictory and reciprocal.

(4) Relationships between core and peripheral classes must be seen in a qualitative, relational rather than merely a quantitative sense. That means that exploitation occurs both in the market and in relations of production. And it occurs in different ways at different levels, whether this be at the world, regional, national or intra-urban level. At each level the nature and texture of relationships must be spelt out.

It also means that peripheral classes can with great difficulty be seen to exist outside of the capitalist system, ‘uncaptured’ and ‘untouched’ by it. That replicates an old, discredited dualism. To the extent that relations of production redolant of precapitalist modes exist, they are frequently new and unique social forms created on the foundation of old forms. They operate, as Coquery-Vidrovitch says, according to different mechanisms, in pursuit of different goals, and with different logic. She captures a central part of this thesis’ argument as follows.

"Relations of production (or of non-production!) in effect originate which, although referring to elements inherited from the two modes mentioned above (capitalist and pre-capitalist), correspond to different mechanisms, are used for different
purposes, with a different logic: thus, 'clientelism' no longer
refers to relations from precolonial lineage modes of production
(which no longer exist as such), but aim to ensure a certain
redistribution of bread-crumbs from the profits made by notables
of the 'peripheral bourgeoisie' on the margin of the dominant
capitalism. .... (This is) a 'peripheral' mode of production to
the extent that its dependence on the western capitalist mode of
production is evident (the existence of the latter conditioning
the possibilities of the former), but a mode of production
notwithstanding because it concerns a coherent whole, entailing
particularly a structured (and not dualist) articulation between
so-called 'modern' and 'informal' sectors ...." (Coquery-
Vidrovitch, 1985:15-6) (my translation from the French) (my
emphasis)

(5) Dependency is not an absolute state inevitably leading to
underdevelopment and poverty. Industrial decentralisation is, in this
sense, analogous to NIC semi-peripheral development in the Far East.
It is dependent enclave development, but it entails tangible
benefits.

(6) Core-periphery relationships are not exclusively or in any
'ultimate' sense about the exploitation of labour. They also entail
relationships between ruling classes. This is what makes
core-peripheral systems multinodal. There is no single, uncontested
centre of power. Frequently those centres of power can be spatially
pinpointed, so that it makes more sense to talk of relations between
Pretoria and Bisho, rather than South African and the Ciskei. And
those relationships occur both in and outside of the market.

(7) If we are to retain the notion of core-periphery as structure, we
need to take seriously the caveats which social historians of a
Thompsonian bent have raised about structure.

I suggest that structures should be seen as structuring, existing out
of time. They only exist at the moment that they are actualized by
concrete actors. That is why structures cannot be seen as
ontologically prior to agents. They are mutually constitutive.
The problems of epistemological relativism, and the trivialisation of knowledge which flows from that, can be countered by Giddens' notion of critical theory. It is not only the objects of social theory which should be the focus of critical analysis, but also the subjects, social theorists themselves.

3. Multiple Paradigms

There is a fourth, broader reason for persevering with dependency theory which flows from a commitment to a pluralist or multiparadigmatic epistemological approach.

In this I am part Mannheimian and part Popperian. I follow Mannheim in the view that there are substantial epistemological gains to be made from a multiparadigmatic perspective. (le Roux, 1979) Modernisation theory, in other words, has a lot to contribute, and can exist alongside dependency theory. The two paradigms address social reality from different angles which are not necessarily contradictory, and often complementary.

I follow the Popperian line that the logical dismantling (or falsification) of a theoretical paradigm is difficult, and that applies as much to modernisation theory as it does to dependency theory. Further, modernisation theory is itself evolving in new directions in response to earlier criticisms. The basic needs strategy is precisely one such response.

The result of these two considerations, from Mannheim and Popper, is that it is difficult to establish the superiority of one theory over another, particularly where one's expertise is heavily anchored in one paradigm rather than another.

3.1. Eclecticism and Relativism

Does such a pluralist position not lead necessarily into precisely the trivialisation of knowledge which I discussed earlier on, a multiplicity of analytical tools to be used randomly as occasion
demands, otherwise known as relativism and eclecticism?

If this latter, eclecticism, is a crime, then crime is on the rise among Marxist writers. Faced with a 'crisis' or 'impasse' in development theory, Marxist writers are, as I shall show in Chapters One and Five, busily incorporating elements from Weber, Wittgenstein, Goffman and Giddens, to name only a few. The question is whether Marxism can so easily be tampered with, or reconstructed without running the risk of trivialisation.

The solution to that dilemma is that the dangers of eclecticism should be taken seriously, but not too seriously. The danger is that disparate elements of theory will be thrown together 'like a bunch of old shoes in the bottom of a closet'¹, that they will jar and contradict each other. To be worthwhile, reconstructive surgery must cut deep, into the philosophical and metatheoretical foundations of theory. On the other hand, eclecticism cannot be taken too seriously, unless we are consistent and, by this standard, reject many of the founding fathers of social theory. Marx, Weber and Durkheim were, after all, in many ways, unashamedly derivative.

While one can, to some degree, be tolerant of eclecticism, I am much less so with regard to relativism, and its nominalist extreme in poststructuralist theory². (Anderson, 1983; Giddens, 1979) There are two reasons for that. For one, the poststructuralist statement that 'all knowledge is relative' inevitably undermines itself. In addition, the strict logical criteria of incommensurability are frequently and validly breached in practice. For Marxist and Liberal writers (illegally) talk to each other, use each other's information and influence each other. (Giddens, 1976:145)

4. Urbanisation

So much for the first part of the title of this thesis, viz.

¹ The expression is from Randall Collins (1985).

² Relativists would say that there are no valid criteria to choose between theories. Their relationships with reality are equally valid or tenuous. Nominalists would say that theories create reality. 'Reality' has no separate existence.
dependency theory. The other two parts can be dealt with more briefly. Urbanisation is not a substantive focus of this thesis so much as a perspective which feeds into, and enriches dependency theory. Geographers and urban and regional planners are much more alive to the implications of systems, nodes, networks and spaces than other developmentalists. Here, too, Anthony Giddens has facilitated the cross-pollination, for he has become an important theoretical source for geographers. (Gore, 1984)

In addition, analysis of urban dependence (or dependent development) has been an important antidote to the crudenesses of rural dependence (dependent underdevelopment). The urbanisation perspective can, in short, have a significant sophisticating impact on old-style dependency theory.

5. Agent and Structure

The final part of the title of this thesis, 'conceptual critique', is also the most crucial, for this thesis is centrally about renewal in Marxist theory. It is therefore not only an investigation of how 'new' dependent development principles work, but also how these principles, too, need reconceptualisation.

This renewal moves along two central axes. They concern the duality of agent and structure, and functionalism. At its most abstract level this thesis is about agent and structure. Where Marx and many Marxists started social analysis from a structural perspective, from the totality, that has too often led into the traps of functionalism, essentialism and realist epistemology. (Swingewood, 1975:chap 2)

Weber and modern hermeneutics, by contrast, show us that social analysis must start from the level of individual meaning, and work back to structures. Agent and structure are, in this perspective, not in interaction but mutually constitutive. This way micro- and macroperspectives may be combined without one dominating the other. Elsewhere I have explained how Anthony Giddens' structuration theory conceptualizes this move. (Graaff, 1987) This thesis follows Anthony Giddens very closely.
We shall, in the course of the discussion, see that there are numerous examples of this problematic separation of agent and structure. Wolpe (1988) wishes to bring political structures and working class struggles into interaction. Modes of production theorists often say that structures (e.g. lineage modes) determine the lives of agents, but are not influenced by them until a critical switch point. (Lewis, 1984) Cardoso & Faletto (1979) wish to subsume dependency theory under theories of imperialism, which is tantamount to saying that working class theories should be subsumed under ruling class ones. And so on.

5.1. Functionalist thinking

The artificial separation of agent and structure leads into the second axis of this thesis, namely, a critique of functionalist thinking. For functionalist thinking flows from notions of 'objective' structure, structure as fact rather than facticity, in which systems are seen to operate independently of the actors which constitute them.

In the course of my discussion I shall distinguish two kinds of functionalist thinking, the first related to notions of absolute power and perfect systems, and the other related to teleology. The first kind is easier to identify, and is commoner than the second.

In the first conception of functionalist thinking, ruling classes are imbued with power that working classes are unwilling or unable to resist. Ruling intentions are collapsed into final consequences. This view of power often entails a homogeneous and unified ruling class, without fractions, with congruent interests, in complete control of the state. These ruling classes live in a manichean world in which there is total conflict between their own and working class interest. Power, in consequence, is a zero-sum game.

Allied to a homogeneous, omnipotent and malevolent ruling class is a system whose various parts are seamlessly and perfectly integrated into service of the whole. Such a perfect system implies a single
controlling node or core, clear and inclusive system boundaries.

The second form of functionalist thinking I shall distinguish by calling it teleological thinking. In this kind of thinking, systems operate behind the backs and beyond the ken of even the ruling classes. Despite this ignorance, the system often works unfailingly to the advantage of the ruling class. Such a system has 'essential', 'intrinsic' principles or laws which operate independently of actors' intentions. Where, in the first form of functionalism, final consequences are collapsed into intentions (ruling classes get exactly what they want), in this second form it is intentions which disappear (systems get exactly what they want).

Both these forms of functionalism work with positivist and realist epistemologies. In this view systems actually exist out there. They correspond to theories about them. They are ontologically prior to the agents within their influence.

Put together like that, the picture I have just sketched must end up looking like a caricature. Unfortunately, while not all the elements are always found together, I shall provide examples of each one of these various bits in South African Marxist writing of the 1970's and 1980's. The picture is not so false.

Having said that we may begin the serious business of the thesis.
CHAPTER ONE: METATHEORY AND DEPENDENCY THEORY: IMPASSE? WHAT IMPASSE?

1. Introduction

Within the broader context of this thesis, the task of this chapter is to show that, despite wideranging critique, dependency theory can and does survive quite robustly. It does survive because, at a theoretical level, old Frankian dependency theory has been transcended. Newer, subtler forms of dependency theory are available, as I shall show in subsequent chapters.

More importantly, it can survive, because, at a metatheoretical level, it is very difficult to demolish or falsify operating paradigms. David Booth's attempt to do that shows just how difficult it is. (Booth, 1985) It needs underlining that a whole thesis about what might be seen as defunct theory, is not a perverse exercise.

There is an important trend in recent writing on development theory to focus on issues of a metatheoretical (or philosophical or methodological) nature, as witnessed by the appearance of a special issue of the journal, World Development (1986), dedicated to examining 'methodological issues' of development theory. At the same time there is a growing consensus that dependency theory, in particular, and Marxist development theory, in general, has reached an impasse. It is, bluntly speaking, said to be in deep trouble. So we have a trio of recent articles 'interpreting', 'transcending' and going 'beyond' the impasse. (Booth 1985; Sklair 1988; Vandergeest & Buttel 1988)

These two concerns, metatheory and the impasse, are not unconnected. It is, after all, understandable that, where theories are persistently and over a wide range breaking down in the face of anomalous evidence (which is what we understand by an impasse), theoreticians be examining the struts and stays which support their theories. In these circumstances it is not enough (to change the

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1 I am indebted to Johann Groenewald for some extremely incisive comment on an earlier version of this chapter.
2 For the purposes of my discussion I consider these to be synonyms, but I shall use the word, metatheory. It conveys nicely the sense of issues 'behind theory'.
metaphor) to build new walls on old foundations. The foundations themselves need re-examining.

South African developmentalists have been notably reticent to involve themselves and publish, in theoretical, and, a fortiori, in metatheoretical areas. This is partly because developmentalists see themselves as 'practical' people, involved, if anything, in applied research and theory. That is a dangerous excuse. Practical people tend to be less aware of their own theoretical prejudices. They tend to work with unexamined assumptions and axioms. Which is what John Maynard Keynes was warning about in 1936.

"Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influences, are usually the slaves of some defunct economist." (Keynes, 1936)

We should sit up and take note of these metatheoretical debates because they have crucial implications for the continued pursuit of Development Studies. This chapter aims to bring out some of these issues and to show why they are important, also for practical people.

I shall hang my discussion on the arguments of David Booth (1985) in his attempt to demolish dependency theory once and for all. I wish to argue that Booth is guilty of straw-man tactics. He has constructed a rather easy target to knock over. Given the Cardosian and Fröbelian elements for new Marxist development theory sketched out in subsequent chapters, the question is whether an impasse exists at all. Either way I argue that theories are slippery things, far too slippery to be simply grasped and eliminated so easily.

At the same time I hope to show that, while practical people need to be more aware of their own hidden metatheoretical foundations, they can also be less shy of their own everyday attempts to make sense of how developmental issues work.

2. Booth's Critique of Dependency Theory

David Booth is one of the well-known dependency theory deserters. He has over a decade changed from being a formidable defender of
dependency theory, to a formidable, even ruthless, critic. (Booth 1975; 1985) For his aim in 1985 is not just to criticize dependency theory, but to lay it finally to rest. And he does that by showing both that ‘the dependency position ...(is).... untenable on a combination of logical, analytical and theoretical grounds’ and ‘how these mistakes came to be made’. (Booth 1985:764-5) The reason why dependency theorists, indeed all Marxists, make these mistakes, says Booth, is the fallacy of functionalist (what I shall call, teleological) thinking to be found at the heart of Marxism.

"Behind the distinctive preoccupations, blind spots and contradictions of the new development sociology there lies a metatheoretical commitment to demonstrating that the structures and processes that we find in the less developed world are not only explicable but necessary under capitalism." (Booth 1985:776)

I believe that Booth’s demolition project is logically misconceived and sociologically fruitless. Let me explain that point first at a more general level, and then with regard to Booth’s individual arguments.

One of the lessons I would draw from the philosophy of science revolution of the 1970’s is that theoretical paradigms cannot be demolished. I refer, of course, to the writings of Thomas Kuhn and Karl Popper. Popper’s argument is that, at a logical level, the verification and falsification of theories is highly problematic. (le Roux 1979) It follows that once established as an operating theory, dependency theory can with great difficulty be dislodged by logical argument. To this we can add Kuhn’s argument that theoretical paradigms stand or fall for reasons that have very little to do with their logical standing or explanatory power. For the real roots of paradigm conviction are ideological and emotional. (le Roux 1979)

Vanderveest & Buttel (1988) and Sklair (1988) have agenda’s which differ radically from that of Booth. For they wish to illustrate ways out of the impasse rather than nestling into it. The strategies they use to do this, however, also go to show just how difficult it is to pin down or demolish theories. Despite their declared intent of getting out of the impasse, I shall argue that their strategies have the contradictory effect of anchoring them more firmly in it. More precisely, the effect of their strategies is to trivialise and
relativise knowledge. In consequence, transcending and moving beyond, even conceiving of, an impasse becomes meaningless.

Let us turn now to Booth's specific arguments on dependency theory, which operate, he tells us, at logical, analytical, theoretical and metatheoretical levels. It is not at all clear to me why he uses these labels, or indeed how he distinguishes one from the other. I shall here concentrate on the substance of his arguments without trying to match them to his labels.

2.1. The Problem of Tautology

Booth's first argument is that there is a fatal tautology at the very kernel of dependency theory. Frank wishes to say that dependence causes underdevelopment. Since 'proper' development itself entails economic self-sufficiency or independence, what he ends up saying is: dependence is underdevelopment. And that, says Booth, is not a statement capable of generating 'a set of substantive hypotheses linking proposed causal factors to independently identified effects', i.e. it cannot be a theory. (Booth 1985:763) There is no relationship of cause and effect which can be extracted from this statement for testing by empirical evidence. The terms of the argument are already given in the definition.

Tautology is usually seen as a problem in logical argument when a definitional statement is disguised as a causal one, as in the example mentioned above. Booth clearly sees tautology as a fallacy, as a deviation from the strict canons of scientific argument, and in one sense he is correct. If one is looking for relationships of cause and effect, the unpacking of definitions will not suffice. But that is a big 'if'. For we should note an important current of opinion in the social sciences which would expand the boundaries of permissible explanation and theory to include hermeneutic theory. That means, explanation through the unpacking of connected or implicit meanings rather than in terms of cause and effect.

In Peter Winch's famous example, we cannot 'understand' why drivers stop at a traffic-light unless we realise that a red light in this
context means "Stop!". (Winch 1958) Without that, it would be insufficient to say that a red light caused drivers to stop. As Alan Ryan says, "Meaning is not a category open to causal analysis". (Ryan 1970) In a social world almost totally reliant on meaning-bearing signs (like language and writing) for interaction, the unpacking of meaning is a crucial theoretical exercise. And that applies both to the objects of investigation (the driver of the car), and to the subjects (the social scientist watching him/her). (Anthony Giddens calls this repeated act of interpretation, the double hermeneutic (1979)) So that when Booth requires from dependency theory that it link 'causal factors to independently identified effects' he is working with a restricted notion of what is good science.

Booth is, however, careful not to rest his case here. Frank has, of course, always been an easy target for critics. More sophisticated dependency writers like dos Santos, Cardoso & Faletto, and Sunkel do, in fact, he says, generate testable hypotheses linking, on the one hand, income distribution, social 'marginalisation' and authoritarian politics with, on the other hand, the role of multinational companies, inappropriate technology and cultural alienation. For these hypotheses, says Booth, the evidence is ambivalent and 'patchy'. (Where writers appear who muster more compelling evidence, Booth is quick to exclude them from the dependency theory team (Booth 1985:778 footnote 13)).

Now, this is hardly a devastation of dependency theory. For Booth is saying little more than that, on the evidence at hand, the case for dependency theory is neither proven nor disproven.

2.2. Dependency Theory and Economic Theory

Booth’s second argument is that dependency theory works 'from an extraordinarily weak base in economic theory'. (Booth 1985:763) The economic ideas which there are, are out of date and discredited among most writers, except for 'a rump inside certain international bureaucracies'.

Once again, this argument seems to concentrate on Frank and his
notions:

(i) that participation in world trade is likely to be 'secularly impoverishing',
(ii) that the target of development should be 'self-sustaining growth',
(iii) that development is blocked by a lack of local savings and capital.

Booth says nothing at this point about other more subtle dependency writers. Nor does he say anything about dependency theory's base in non-economic ideas.

Booth's third argument concerns the dependency principle that the problems of peripheral countries are caused by external rather than internal factors. More specifically, the failure of industrialisation by import substitution (ISI) policies were attributed to the influence of manufacturing multinationals. In fact, says Booth, the available evidence goes overwhelmingly the other way to show that these problems were 'inherent in the ISI policy package', or at least, 'their more extreme manifestations'. That is, deepening dependency was caused by internal factors (the ISI policy) rather than external ones (multinationals).

Crucial qualifications to this argument appear once again tucked away in a footnote. For here Booth explains that very convincing writing by Martin Fransman and Rafael Kaplinsky on the impact of TNC's is not really dependency theory. (Booth 1985:779 footnote 19) Their writings also 'do not seem incompatible with the present critique', ie. Booth agrees with them. I shall return to this point in the discussion on Bill Warren.

2.3. Bill Warren's Critique of Dependency Theory

The coup de grace for dependency theory, according to Booth, is the work of Bill Warren. Booth summarises Warren in the following way (Booth 1985:765).

(i) 'Contrary to current Marxist views, empirical evidence suggests that the prospects for successful capitalist development in many underdeveloped countries are quite favorable..'
(ii) 'The period since the end of the Second World War has witnessed a major surge in capitalist social relations and productive forces in the Third World.'

(iii) 'Direct colonialism, far from having retarded or distorted indigenous capitalist development that might otherwise have occurred, acted as a powerful engine of progressive social change.'

(iv) 'Insofar as there are obstacles to (capitalist) development, they originate not in current relationships between imperialism and the Third World, but in the internal contradictions of the Third World itself.'

(v) 'The overall net effect of the policy of “imperialist” countries and the general economic relations of these countries with the underdeveloped countries actually favours the industrialisation and general economic development of the latter.'

(vi) 'Within the context of growing economic interdependence, the ties of “dependence” (or subordinate) binding the Third World and the imperialist world have been and are being markedly loosened with the rise of indigenous capitalism.'

For the purposes of our argument, I wish to collapse these six points into two fundamental criticisms of dependency theory. I shall call these the anti-distortionist and anti-stagnationist principles. The first of these means that, where dependency writers saw peripheral countries as structurally patterned by their insertion into the world economy with concomitant evils like the maldistribution of wealth, political authoritarianism, unemployment and enclave development, Warren argues that these evils flow rather from misguided internal national policies. By anti-stagnationism I mean that, where Frank and Amin saw dependency as causally linked to non-growth or stagnation, Warren shows the opposite.

Now, Booth has serious problems with Warren. First, he says, the anti-distortionist principle remains ‘controversial’. But it will not do to dismiss this part of Warren’s thesis so easily since it is exactly at this point that more sophisticated post-Frankian dependency writers have staked their claim. The important work by Fröbel et al., The New International Division of Labour, provides a very powerful defense of the distortionist principle. It is summarised as follows (Browett 1985:796):

"(t)he techniques involved (in industrial growth in the peripheral nations) will keep them dependent on the technology, equipment, managerial know-how and markets of the traditional industrial centres.... There are few linkages towards further development, such as the training of a skilled labour force, the encouragement of local industries with a local content input ... the free production zones, in particular, must be regarded more as an industrial enclave, only tenuously connected to the local economy, rather than an engine of growth and development."
On the anti-stagnationist argument, Warren is stronger, says Booth, but he ignores 'important systematic variations within the general pattern' of world development. Some countries, notably the newly industrialising countries (NIC's), have done very well, while others have done quite poorly. Despite his insistence on the importance of 'internal contradictions', says Booth, Warren is particularly sparse on internal national policies and institutional arrangements, as a cause of particular variations.

Finally, and most crucially, says Booth, Warren's central theory is based on the rather vague 'capitalist mode of production and its dynamics'. All of which makes Warren's work 'virtually unusable as a framework for social science research, let alone politics or policy formation' (Booth 1985:767).

In summary, in Booth's opinion, although Warren says things which are fatal to dependency theory, he has no viable theory with which to replace it. His critique of dependency theory must be used at an empirical level, and then mainly with regard to his anti-stagnationist argument. But, I would argue, Booth also underplays an important part of the dependency debate concerning the distortionist principle.

3. Teleological thinking

Having to his own satisfaction wiped dependency theory from the map, Booth wishes to diagnose 'how these mistakes came to be made' in Marxist development writing. For it is not only dependency theory which is presently in crisis, but also its successors, modes of production theory and subsumption under capital theory. And the root of a great many of these problems is Marxism's 'metatheoretical commitment to demonstrating that what happens in societies in the era of capitalism is not only explicable, but also in some stronger sense necessary'. (Booth 1985:773)

There are two forms of this kind of thinking, says Booth. The first concerns the belief that 'the significant characteristics of national economies and social formations may be 'read off' from the
characteristics, especially the 'laws of motion', of the capitalist mode of production'. This tendency to overgeneralise is found in the works of both Samir Amin and Bill Warren. For Booth, ".. the room for maneuver (sic) and scope for differential performance by national governments and power groups deserve to be taken far more seriously than this approach allows". (Booth 1985:773-74)

The second kind of mistake involves teleological type thinking, namely 'that given socioeconomic processes in the Third World persist and take the particular form that they do because of the way they contribute to the process of capital accumulation in the wider system'. '.. it is wrong to pretend that functional claims are explanatory' (Booth 1985:774). He would like to see them excised from Marxist development theory.

I think Booth is being unnecessarily harsh in his judgement of teleological thinking. There is no doubt that it is, for Marxists, an attractive form of thinking and that it leads to all manner of obfuscation. Booth is right to emphasize that developmentalists need to be much more aware of the pitfalls involved. We need to look at teleological thinking more carefully to grasp what is at stake. (Cf. Giddens 1981, 1982, 1984; Wright 1983; Cohen 1978, 1982; Elster 1982)

Let me illustrate the point at issue with a biological analogy, which is where a great deal of teleological thinking originates. In everyday life we say that we eat in order to stay alive. (The function of eating is to keep us alive.) However, that is not what we intend when we sit down to a meal or take up a glass of beer. In most cases we say, "I am hungry", or "A beer would taste good now", or simply, "It's time for lunch". We are, in short, motivated to eat and drink by habit or by the signals our bodies send us, but not in most cases by the conscious goal of staying alive. Our bodies do that for us independently of our intentions with a built-in feedback mechanism.

Translated into social terms, we often say that families have children in order to reproduce society. (The function of childbearing is to maintain population numbers.) Again, the relationship between
function and intention is problematic. It is quite clear that people have children for a great many reasons, both economic and emotional, but they rarely do so with one eye on the national population growth rate.

Societies have no interest in maintaining themselves over and above the intentions of the people inhabiting them. There is nothing in and of ‘society’ to stop a population, for example, shrinking quite considerably. The problem is compounded if we say, as Booth accuses Marxists of saying, that families are the way they are because of the way they contribute to the population growth rate. That looks patently wrong. One can understand that families contribute to population growth rates, but how do population growth rates shape the size of families?

In modern society, it is usually governments who do that job. They respond to negative features of population growth rates and implement incentives to inhibit or encourage population growth. They consciously make the connection between population growth rates back to family size. Here there is a clear feedback mechanism visible. Beyond that, however, population growth rates are an unintended consequence of what people, in their micro-situations, intend.

The difficult relationship between function and intention led Robert Merton to differentiate between latent and manifest function. Manifest function is when people come to realize the consequences of their actions. As a rule, however, teleological thinkers of this kind, were more interested in latent (unacknowledged) functions. (Giddens, 1977:100)

Which is how functionalist anthropologists went about analysing the ‘role’ of the rain-dance in certain tribes. Since the rain-dance quite evidently does not cause rain, they argued, it must have another role, namely to enhance tribal solidarity. But society in and of itself has no interest in maintaining solidarity. It is more probably tribal chiefs (with the help of witch-doctors) who decide on the timing of rain-dances, and for reasons which have very little to do with tribal solidarity or conflict.
It is important to note that this kind of teleological statement is not wrong, of necessity. A substantial part of sociology is, after all, devoted to explaining how society operates behind people’s backs, how things happen which people did not intend. But it is quite another thing to say that social events occur without actors’ intentions being part of that occurrence. Which is why critics of teleological thinking, like Giddens (1979, 1981), demand a specified feedback mechanism to show how people’s intentions and actions interact with social events even when those events are contrary to what they planned. (Booth’s point on feedback mechanisms is confusing. "It has not been established, and there are strong reasons for doubting that it ever will, that there are ‘feedback’ mechanisms in the social order of the type whose existence is necessarily presupposed by a strictly teleological statement which purports to be an explanation." (Booth 1985:775) I have far fewer doubts that feedback mechanisms do exist.)

Omitting to take people’s intentions and motives into account explains the failure of many macro-development theories, like Rostovian stages of development, or the Marxian transition from feudalism to capitalism, or other First World imports into Third World contexts. It also underlines the importance of the hands on experience of practical people in assessing sensitively enough, and in listening to, the motives and intentions of the communities they work with. People who cannot listen make both bad theorists and bad developmentalists.

3.1. Teleological Thinking and Bantustans

Let us turn to a domestic Marxist example. Philip Nel distinguishes three different ways in which Harold Wolpe expresses the functional relationship between bantustan periphery and industrial core in South Africa (Nel 1987).

First, Wolpe says that bantustans provide cheap labour to the South African economy. In teleological language, bantustans have the benefit for the South African core-area that subsistence agriculture
allows labour to be paid less. The role (or significance, meaning, function) of bantustans to capitalism is to provide cheap labour. In Wolpe’s words -

"(a)partheid ... can best be understood as the mechanism ... of maintaining a high rate of capitalist exploitation through a system which guarantees a cheap and controlled labour-force." (Wolpe 1972:433).

Elsewhere, however, Wolpe expresses the relationship in a second way. He says, namely, that South African capitalists consciously intended bantustans to play that role. Bantustans were conceived and planned that way, and the plan succeeded. To quote Wolpe again:

"Apartheid is the attempt of the capitalist class to meet the expanding demand for cheap African labour." (Wolpe 1972:427)

So far so good. But Marxists, in general, and Wolpe, in particular, much like functionalists of an earlier vintage, often have trouble with actors’ conscious intentions. So he must resort to a third kind of relationship between core and periphery. The problem is especially acute in the case of racially motivated intention since that disguises the essentially economic nature of social causation. So in order to proceed, Wolpe needs to reinterpret racially motivated language. "...racial laws actively operate to mask ... the capitalist nature of society altogether." (Wolpe 1972:431). And in a 1975 article: "The point is that to base an analysis on the criteria (race, religion, etc.) by which groups define themselves and the conflict between them is to take as given precisely what needs explanation" (Wolpe 1975:238).

In short, individual actors’ overt rhetoric, their understanding of the way society operates is often misguided. So that what Dr. Verwoerd says bantustans are for is in the end not what ‘really’ happens. He might talk about political outlets for African nationalism. But Marxists know that ‘actually’ bantustans are there to provide cheap labour. And if Dr. Verwoerd did not intend it to happen that way, the capitalist system has a deeper-lying imperative which will make it happen independently of individual actors’ intentions. This third form of teleological thinking is problematic precisely because it simply negates intentions. (Wright 1983, Levine
et al. 1987) The 'built-in', 'inherent' imperatives, needs or necessities of the system appear to ensure of their own that certain results appear. There is something seriously wrong with this kind of proposition.

"Social systems, unlike organisms, do not have any need or interest in their own survival, and the notion of 'need' is falsely applied if it is not acknowledged that system needs presuppose actors' wants." (Giddens 1977:110)

So, what's wrong with teleological thinking, then? It employs vague 'system needs' and hidden imperatives instead of specific feedback mechanisms. That means that it signals the start of an investigation, not the end of it. The use of teleological explanation is, therefore, not necessarily wrong, but it indicates sloppy thinking, and so runs a great risk of being wrong. But for dependency theory there is no reason why its elliptical gaps may not quite validly be filled in. In sum, Booth is too hasty (not to say ambitious) in wishing to excise teleological thinking from Marxist development theory.

4. The Trivialisation of Knowledge

In this section I wish to examine another kind of attempt to escape from the accumulating anomalies of Marxist development theory, what I shall call instrumentalism\(^3\). Unlike Booth, instrumentalists wish to say that theory is beyond disproof. The only thing that can be challenged is a theory's sphere of application. In the face of contradictory evidence, theories merely shift the boundaries of within which they are valid. They cannot be falsified, as Booth wishes.

However, I take theory more seriously than that. It is true that, in a post-Popperian era, we need to be suspicious of theories which propose too close a correspondence between our ideas and 'external reality'. Nevertheless, it is not necessary to lapse into the trivialisation of theory as evidenced by instrumentalism and relativism. As I shall argue in Chapter Five, a revised notion of critical theory does offer us a way out of this.

\(^3\) This is epistemological instrumentalism. It is something quite different from the instrumentalism discussed with regard to theories of the state in Chapter Four.
Let us turn to the other writers who are concerned about the impasse, the ones I have called the trivialisers. Both Sklair (1988) and Vandergeist & Buttel (1988) are saying something quite similar, viz. that Marxist development theorists have attempted to insulate their theories from empirical testing. Vandergeist & Buttel say that theories (which they identify with Weberian ideal-types) are, wrongly, presented as representations of reality; they become reified, whereas they are no more than 'instruments of analysis' which can be used to 'understand' but not 'explain'.

Sklair, for his part, says that Marxist development theorists 'gave their theories metatheoretical pretensions' by putting them beyond attack from falsification, and in the realm of necessity or teleological explanation. Metatheory, he says, 'refuses to accept any burden of empirical proof by displacing the burden of empirical proof on to theories that are logically deducible from it'. (Sklair 1988:697). All this is very close to what Booth is saying about Marxists, namely that:

(i) reality is (wrongly) 'read off' from universal (read metatheoretical) laws.
(ii) aspects of capitalist development are seen as necessary.

Not that Sklair dislikes metatheory. On the contrary, he wishes to maintain the distinction between theory and metatheory to explain the apparent anomalies in Marxist development theory. The fact that, for example, NIC's have shown remarkable growth does not disprove dependency theory, says Sklair. It simply shows that different outcomes are possible under capitalism, namely dependent underdevelopment (DU), dependent development (DD) and dependence reversal (DR). Each of these outcomes is deducible from the metatheoretical assumptions of Marxist theory, like historical materialism. As a result, these differing outcomes do not contradict each other nor their common metatheoretical foundations. They must, for Sklair, be used as partial rather than universal laws. That is, under certain conditions theory A applies and, under other conditions, theory B, although Sklair is not able at this point to specify what those conditions are.
At the same time, and in contradiction of his first argument above, Sklair wishes to defend teleological explanation. He calls it a 'partial defense' and wishes to have only 'limited use' of it but his exposition of it comes out pretty fullblooded and unqualified. For example, "The global capitalist system does have its built-in ends ... The prime necessity of a teleological explanation is for the needs of the system to be met", and "(t)he growing internationalization of production (complementing the earlier internationalization of finance) both highlights the needs of the system and the structures and processes that have to be created in order to meet these needs." This kind of explanation, he tells us, is 'much stronger' and 'makes better sense' of development (Sklair 1988:700-1).

But Sklair is doing contradictory kinds of things here. The internationalization of capital is said to be 'necessary' and universal. By contrast, the various outcomes of development (DU, DD, DR) are reliant on contingent circumstance. Some theories, it seems, need to be treated with a lot less respect than others. But it is not at all clear how one decides which is which, since he says that there is a fluid boundary between metatheory which 'refuses to accept the burden of empirical proof' and theory which is open to disproof. "If a theory is correct then its logical consequences are necessary in the sense that they cannot be otherwise." (Sklair 1988:699) It is then treated as metatheory.

Until this point I have argued that Sklair and Vandergeest & Buttel, on the one hand, and Booth, on the other hand, have very different approaches to 'the impasse'. Booth has demolition on his mind. The others wish to rescue what they can (although, as I have shown, Sklair does very different kinds of things). But there is more to it than that. The way one handles the anomalies that arise out of theoretical discussion has very important implications for the way one approaches knowledge. Booth, I will argue, takes knowledge much more seriously. Dependency theory has run its course, he says, and must make way for a more sophisticated and advanced form of theory. The other three writers have a less elevated view of the progress of knowledge, if one can indeed speak of progress at all. For them,
theories can be picked up and used as the occasion demands, and then thrown away. They are mere tools of the trade with no connection to truth. Let me explain that.

I refer here to Popper's distinction between essentialist, instrumentalist and falsificationist approaches to knowledge. (Popper, 1968: chap 3) Instrumentalist theories of knowledge will say that scientific knowledge is nothing more than an aid in understanding the world. It does not correspond to anything real. And it is acceptable as long as it works for however narrow a sphere of application. In consequence this kind of knowledge cannot be refuted. Popper quotes Heisenberg: "It follows that we do not say any longer: Newton's mechanics are false ... Rather, we now use the following formulation. Classical mechanics .. is everywhere exactly 'right' where its concepts can be applied." (Popper 1968:113) In this scenario, there can be no progress of knowledge. All we get is a proliferation of tools of varying ranges of application, none closer to the truth than any other.

Essentialist knowledge, by contrast, is that which is 'neither in need nor susceptible of further explanation'. Theories of this kind are 'ultimate explanations' (Popper 1968:104). Certain views of Newton's law of gravity tend in this direction. They would say that gravity is inherent in matter. It is the essential nature of matter. But, says Popper, that effectively closes off further investigation by eliminating the possibility of questions like "What is the cause of gravity?"

Which is exactly what a great deal of teleological language does. Not only does it shortcircuit important investigations. It actually prohibits discussion of them by lodging them in the inaccessible world of necessity where they sullenly 'refuse to accept any burden of empirical proof'. This is why Sklair can talk of capitalism's 'built-in (read 'inherent','essential') ends', and 'structures and processes that have to be created to meet these ends'. Samir Amin has similar language:"The law of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall remains the essential and therefore the permanent expression of the basic contradiction of the system." And "the general law of
accumulation and of impoverishment expresses the tendency inherent in the capitalist mode of production, the contradiction between productive forces and productive relations. This contradiction rules out an analysis of the capitalist mode of production in terms of harmony ...." (quoted in Smith 1980:14, my emphasis)

Now, in Popper's falsificationist view there is indeed a reality beyond the level of appearances (which instrumentalists will deny). There are, in fact, many levels of reality. We can never be sure of reaching that reality. But by falsificationist attempts of a crucial kind we show certain theories to be closer to that reality than others. We can make progress, although we cannot be sure of getting to the truth.

Back to development theory. It is clear that Vandegeest & Buttel's view of Weberian ideal-types as nothing more than instruments runs the risk of multiplying ideal-types of varying ranges of applicability. The same applies to Sklair's attempts to relativize the different outcomes of capitalist development in the Third World. Each of these theories (DU,DD,DR), he says, has varying spheres of applicability which he cannot specify. That effectively insulates them from refutation.

Any defense of necessity, teleological explanation, by contrast, is an essentialist move. By lodging the concepts in the sphere of metatheory we postulate knowledge which 'refuses the burden of empirical proof'. It is obscurantist in that it closes off further questioning.

Booth, by these standards, has a more consistent and realist argument. For he believes that a theory can be finally refuted because it can be shown to be out of line with reality. He also rejects the 'necessary' and 'self-evident' implications of teleological argument. The point is that for Booth there can be an impasse. Theory can conflict with reality. In the world of instrumentalism there is no such reality, and hence no possibility of having an impasse. Sklair and Vandegeest & Buttel may think they are going 'beyond' the impasse, or 'transcending' it. They are, in fact,
not going anywhere. Their instrumentalist line denies them the possibility of movement.

More important, it also denies them the possibility of policy-making. If theories are nothing more than mental constructs which happen to work in relating social phenomena to each other, viable proposals for practical action cannot be deduced from them. The conflation of correlational and causal relationships is a good example of this. Thus, we may discover that families with fewer children tend to have a higher average education. It is wrong and quite irresponsible to propose, on this basis, that family planning is the way to raise a country's educational level.4

In summary, although I have been critical of Booth's assassination attempts I prefer his approach to that of the trivialisers. We do not need to plump for this kind of back door to escape contradictions. The better way is, as I shall argue in chapter Five, a reformulation of the notion of critical theory.

5. Conclusion

Let us summarise Booth's multifaceted assassination of dependency theory.

I have argued that the accusation of tautology against naive Frankism probably can be sustained. But for the more sophisticated versions of dependency theory quite valid hypotheses linking cause and effect can be formulated, and on these Booth is equivocal. However, this presumes a notion of causal theory. If we take into account 'hermeneutically informed' ideas about theory, Booth's requirement that dependency theory show causal factors linked to separately identified effects becomes unnecessarily restrictive.

In his second argument, Booth again focuses quite narrowly on Frank's economic notions, and ignores more subtle political economy ideas

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4 I am indebted to Pieter le Roux for this insight. His example is more telling. There is, it seems, a fair correlation between the incidence of human births and the size of the stork population in Sweden. Sweden's population growth could hardly be controlled by killing off storks.
from later writers. Booth's discussion of dependency theory's
treatment of industrialisation by import substitution has concessions
curiously hidden in a footnote, while thoroughgoing defenses of
dependency theory by Kaplinsky and Fransman are dismissed as not
falling within the ambit of dependency theory.

Warren's major broadside against dependency theory turns out to be
theoretically vacuous, and empirically limited to the stagnationist
principle of dependency theory, which, in turn, has been abandoned by
most contemporary dependency theorists.

Finally, the issue of teleological thinking. I would agree with Booth
that this tendency among Marxist writers has led them into many
mistakes and sterile research. Nevertheless, to the extent that
dependency theory does trespass in this area, a strict assessment
must be that teleological thinking is not necessarily wrong, simply
premature. In this regard, Simon & Ruccio's (1986) assessment that
Frank has a case that still needs proving, is better than Booth's.

Marxist development theory has moved a long way since the early heady
days of Andre Gunder Frank. A great deal of what Frank proposed has,
as Booth rightly points out, been consigned to the rubbish-bin.
Nevertheless, however much demolition Booth succeeds in achieving,
eyearl naíve Frankism has been superseded by more sophisticated
notions, particularly those of Cardoso & Faletto, and Fröbel et al.

The attempts by Sklair and Vandergeest & Buttel to transcend and go
beyond the impasse in Marxist development theory are confusing and
contradictory. Their instrumentalist line has the effect of
eliminating the possibility of theoretical progress, and also, more
dangerously, of undermining the viability of policy deduced from
theory.

For the purposes of my later discussion and the reconstruction of
dependency theory (in Chapter Five) I wish to underline the following
conclusions of this chapter.

(1) We need to abandon positivistic criteria for evaluating theory,
such as separately identifiable cause and effect. We need, instead, to take account of hermeneutically informed theory. In Chapter Five I shall argue for the retention of dependency theory within a structuration theory framework. At the same time we need to avoid epistemological relativism inherent in Weberian ideal-types and certain subjectivist theories. That leads to an unacceptable trivialisation of theory.

(2) Teleological thinking (with its counterpart functionalist thinking, discussed extensively in the following chapters) has been a curse to Marxist theorising. We should, however, be careful not to lapse into the converse error of rejecting the regularity of unintended consequences. A great deal of social theory is about what happens behind people's backs. But, in order eventually to understand what is unintended, we need to start with what is intended, i.e. the conscious behaviour of concrete actors. The mistake in teleological thinking is to allow 'intrinsic', 'essential', 'inherent' systemic dynamics to go unquestioned.

Having spent some time arguing for the survival of dependency theory, the next chapter changes tack quite sharply. It shows, namely, just how wrong and confused dependency theory has been in the past, and why it ought to be transcended.
1. Introduction

In this chapter I shall trace the origins of one stream of dependency thinking, that which starts with Raul Prebisch and the Economic Commission for Latin America and continues with André Gunder Frank and Immanuel Wallerstein. That is the stream which substantially influenced early analyses of underdevelopment in Southern Africa, and has continued to make its somewhat irksome influence felt right into the 1980's.

There is a great deal that is wrong with this kind of dependency theory. Most of it has do with dependency theory's emphasis on the market as the crucial defining element, and the fundamental dynamic in capitalism. That has led to a neglect of the role of, and interaction between concrete actors with specific interests and limited power. One form of this neglect is evident in functionalist and teleological thinking.

The market, or unequal exchange, is a particularly quantitative and zero-sum view of exploitation. That is why development in the core and underdevelopment in the periphery are necessarily mirror-images of each other; why underdevelopment is a static and absolute state of stagnation; and why the qualitative differences between international, national, and regional and intra-urban levels of exploitation could be collapsed.

That is also why prescriptions for development lead to suggestions of 'autocentric' development, if not the total removal of a country from the capitalist system through socialist revolution. Such a policy prescriptions attains absurd proportions when applied to bantustans.

On the other hand, dependency theory has been too much part of our intellectual development to reject out of hand. Apart from liberating us from the hegemony of modernisation theory ideas, it has left us with (at least) three important elements for further consideration. The first is the world capitalist system as an important, but not
sole, context within which development and underdevelopment occur. The second is the core-periphery metaphor which crosscuts the capital-labour contradiction in capitalism. Lastly, there is the idea that exploitation does occur through the market, although that needs to be integrated with other forms of exploitation.

This chapter has three main sections. The first traces the roots of dependency theory in Prebisch/ECIA's structuralism and Frank/Wallerstein's world system theory. Here I will also look at the critique by Robert Brenner and by Jarius Banaji. They offer crucial insights for our later argument. In the second section I shall show how Bundy was influenced by dependency ideas in his analysis of nineteenth century African peasants and some of the problems that caused. In the final section I shall show how dependency misconceptions have stayed with us in analyses of contemporary bantustan underdevelopment with writers like Roger Southall and Nancy Charton.

2. The Origins of Frankian Dependency

2.1. ECIA Structuralism

Historically speaking, the fundamental elements of dependency theory were set out by Raul Prebisch and the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECIA) during the 1950's. Here we find, to start with, the proposal that relationships between countries must be seen within the framework of a structured world economy. In contrast to conventional economic analysis which saw international trade as composed of individual separate economies 'symmetrically linked in a mutually beneficial set of relationships' (Jameson, 1986:225), a 'structuralist' approach sees the world economy as being arranged in a pattern of asymmetric relationships in which different national economies play different roles in the functioning of the world capitalist system. The old picture, therefore, of entities participating freely in an open market needed to be replaced by one in which the form of participation (either as core or periphery) is determined prior to entry into the market.
Because of their differential positioning, peripheral economies have a quite specific patterning which reflects an external orientation. Peripheral economies are therefore, for example, typically focused around a dominant urban complex, a primate city, which concentrates 'modern' economic activities like manufacturing, commerce, finance, technology and labour relations. The primate city, often the capital and main harbour, is closely integrated with one or more metropolitan economies for it is strongly export-oriented. By contrast, this centre has weak links with its own rural hinterland, where economic activity comprises mainly agriculture operating at a low level of technical development and with pre-capitalist labour relations. Weak internal links and strong external ones have occasioned the term, a disarticulated economy. (Sunkei, 1973)

The kernel of Prebisch's analysis centred on the unequal trade relations between core and periphery. There is a continuous flow of capital from periphery to core which retards growth in the former and subsidizes it in the latter. Periphery products become over time cheaper in relationship to metropolitan ones, mainly because peripheral country wages, in the absence of trade unions and with subsidization of wages by subsistence agriculture, are lower than those in core countries. More and more products of the one need to be sold in order to pay for the products of the other. In economic terms, this process leads, in peripheral countries, to rising inflation, unemployment, income inequality and government debt, together with falling incomes among substantial sections of the population.

Because surface phenomena are determined by underlying structures, a change in superficial conditions will merely reproduce in a different way the same asymmetry. This can be illustrated by the changes brought about by industrialisation in peripheral countries. In the past, the relationship of unequal exchange between core and periphery was determined by the falling (and unstable) prices of agricultural and mineral products; these being exchanged for more expensive industrial products. However, policies of import-substituting industrialisation (ISI) in peripheral countries have only served to
replicate the condition, mainly because ISI has entailed the import of expensive production goods and technology. (Cf. Roxborough, 1979:32ff.) The form of production in the periphery has changed quite extensively, but the underlying asymmetry and unequal exchange has remained. (Leys, 1983)

2.2. André Gunder Frank: the chain-link metaphor

Given the sound and fury unleashed by the writings of André Gunder Frank, it is often surprising to learn how little he added to the original Prebisch/ECIA thesis. For our purposes, two points stand out: first, Frank's extension of the exploitative relationship between countries into the rural areas of each country. As Frank put it in a now famous passage:

"...it is this exploitative relationship which in chain-link fashion extends the capitalist link between the capitalist world and national metropolises to the regional centres (parts of whose surplus they appropriate), and from these to local centres, and so on to large landowners or merchants who expropriate surplus from small peasants or tenants, and sometimes even from these latter to landless labourers exploited by them in turn. At each step along the way, the relatively few capitalists above exercise monopoly power over the many below, expropriating some or all of their economic surplus..." (quoted in Leaver, 1983:117)

2.3. André Gunder Frank: Disappearing Feudalism

Frank's second major contribution to the Prebisch/ECIA thesis was the addition of an historical dimension in which Latin American countries were shown to have been capitalist ever since their economies became oriented towards production for sale in the world market. It is around this aspect that the most energetic critique has been directed at Frank, for it has posed several fundamental questions.

What constitutes a capitalist mode of production? Does capitalism relate to a market relationship, in which surplus is transferred from one country to another (as Frank and Wallerstein would have it), or does capitalism relate primarily to a way of organising labour ("if proletariat, then capitalist", to quote Wallerstein)?

It is in the nature of definitional disputes, of which this is a
prime example, that they are insoluble. Some part of the attack on Frank and Wallerstein by, for example, Laclau (1972), Brenner (1977) and Banaji (1977) can be dismissed as tautological. To say that Frank has the wrong definition of capitalism, or is not Marxist (which he has never claimed), or that exploitation does not occur through exchange relationships, is neither here nor there as far as substantive theoretical argument is concerned. (cf. Leaver, 1983) And it is at this level that the dependency theory controversy has returned to plague its modes of production theory successor. For, as we shall see, definitional disputes have threatened to undercut any theoretical advance which modes of production theory has to offer.

2.4. Frank, Wallerstein and the World System

A far more profitable approach to the Frank/ Wallerstein - Brenner/ Laclau debate lies in the juxtaposition of theories rather than definitions. Or, if we accept that theories and definitions cannot be separated, first theories, then definitions. In brutal summary\(^2\) the Frank/ Wallerstein theory proposes that, given rational profit-maximising individuals, the opportunity for profit which arises through the establishment of trade-links sets in motion a chain of fundamental changes in feudal society. Out of the commercial nexus arise urban concentrations dominated by a bourgeois class of merchants who expand their trading network to include many different forms of labour organisation - slave, feudal, capitalist - a division of labour on a world-scale, which functions to siphon surplus from those areas with less efficient labour-forms (slavery, feudalism - the periphery) to those with more efficient forms (wage-labour - the core). On the foundation of capitalist labour relations arise powerful nation-states which act to entrench their position of power against other nations.\(^2\)

It is important to underline the significance of Frank/ Wallerstein's unit of analysis, namely, the world system, composed as it is of different labour relationships all contributing in various ways to the integrated operation of the whole. Thus, slave plantations in the West Indies, Latin American landlords demanding crops, labour or cash

\(^2\) The following summary follows Brenner's (1977) version of the debate.
from tenants as rents, or tribal potentates in West Africa supplying slaves to European traders should not be seen as functioning within separate modes of production, as earlier Marxist writers would have it. The situation is more complex than that, but also more simple.

Its complexity arises from the fact that:

"a single worker (might be) simultaneously (i) owner of his own land, (ii) sharecropper on another's land ... (iii) tenant on a third's land, (iv) wage worker during harvest time on one of these lands, and (v) independent trader of his own home produced commodities." (Frank quoted in Foster-Carter, 1978b:241)

If we say that each of these situations is a distinct mode of production, we land up with a multitude of minisystems each operating with its own dynamic, or laws of motion. We also land up with the problem of keeping them separate for they are connected by individuals who move continually between them linking them into a single system.

Once we draw back from this welter of micro-situations things get a lot simpler. We see then that they are all tied together in a single trading network which spans continents and countries, a system dominated by a few powerful nations. The world system, says Wallerstein, is the proper unit of analysis. And it is the conflicts between nations within this system which determine its dynamic.

For Jarius Banaji (1977), Frank's problem of individuals oscillating between various forms of ownership is to be solved neither by multiplying micro-positions nor in collapsing them all into a single undifferentiated whole, as Frank wished to do. The mistake Frank makes is to confuse individual forms of ownership and labour organisation (relations of exploitation) with a mode of production. One should rather deduce the nature of these forms from their inner dynamic, their laws of motion.

From this perspective it is clear that eighteenth century West Indian sugar plantations were capitalist enterprises. Despite archaic modes of labour organisation and low or stagnant levels of technology, they were nevertheless driven by the compulsion to produce surplus value. Latin American latifundia, by contrast, produced in order to satisfy
their needs for generosity, display and consumption. They were feudal enterprises.

2.5. Laclau and Brenner and Relative Surplus Value

The Laclau/ Brenner theory, in contrast to Frank, sees change in feudal society as arising from a quite different source. Opportunities for trade typically do little more than push feudal ruling classes to expand the sphere and scope of existing operations to increase profit (extraction of absolute surplus value). In practical terms that would mean cutting further into the surpluses which serfs or tenants on feudal land retain for themselves, or by expanding working hours and cultivated area. Capitalism can only arise when the bourgeois classes are driven to compete on the basis of ever more efficient combinations of production factors (extraction of relative surplus value). And this in its turn can only occur when production factors, like labour, land and capital, are freed for combination in the market; particularly when workers no longer have access to land and are driven to sell their labour for wages. Bourgeois capitalists produce in the market rather than for it (as Frank/ Wallerstein would have it).

The thrust for change in feudal society, therefore, comes not from the appearance of trading opportunities for rational profit-maximising individuals, but from a bourgeois class in whose interests it is to set up more efficient relations of production. Out of their struggle against feudal classes comes an environment in which profit-maximisation for the capitalist classes, and wage-labour for the working class, are not only possible but necessary. Homo oeconomicus is not an apriori given in human nature, but a condition which is structurally determined.

For Laclau/ Brenner, therefore, underdevelopment in the Third World arises from the impact of mercantile capital which pushes precapitalist modes of production into expanding absolute surplus value production, but is unable to effect the transition to capitalism. The result in sixteenth century Poland, says Brenner, was severely impoverishing for feudal peasants. This same argument was
taken up by Kay to explain impoverishment in colonial Third World countries. (Kay, 1975; Bernstein, 1975/6)

For Wallerstein/ Frank, by contrast, underdevelopment is a quantitative rather than a qualitative affair. Through the mechanism of unequal trade relationships, surplus is transferred from periphery to core. The periphery subsidizes core growth.

2.6. The Need for Agents

It now becomes clear how Marxists can accuse Frank and Wallerstein of static economism, mechanistic determinism or, in Palma's convoluted language, mechanico-formalistic theorising. (Palma, 1981) By according primary causal weight to the commercial nexus - first trade, then classes - they remove human activity and struggle from their analysis. It is not true that (the later) Frank excludes classes from his analysis altogether, but, as Hoogvelt argues: "The critical issue is not whether local elites consciously or unconsciously collaborate with foreign interests, but whether or not 'social classes are seen as completely derivative of economic forces, and whether these economic forces appear to be having a "necessary logic", thus denying the possibilities of struggles against imperialism'. (Hoogvelt, 1982:170)

3. The Burden of André Gunder Frank

The influence of Frank's dependency theory on Southern African analysis can most clearly be seen in the work of Colin Bundy. In this section, I wish to argue that Bundy used dependency theory to devastating effect in criticising conventional modernisation theory (Bundy 1972; 1977). But we have, as a result of Frank's influence, been saddled with shaky ideas which have coloured our thinking on bantustan development for some time.

Bundy was concerned to disprove the, then, conventional wisdom as propagated by Hobart Houghton, Edgar Brookes and C.W. de Kiewiet that the backwardness of African agriculture was the result of the pernicious influence of tribal custom. The 'shackles of tradition'
inhibited African farmers from responding to market incentives, from employing new technology and from diversifying their crop production. Falling squarely within the modernisation theory (or dual economy thesis) perspective, this view attributed the lack of development in African agriculture to the insufficient spread of the modern economic sector into the subsistence sector.

The modernisation theory interpretation was flawed, argued Bundy, by very clear evidence from 1830 onwards of an African peasantry which evolved out of the pastoralist tradition. This peasantry, i.e. some 'middle peasantry' and some 'small commercial farmers' (Bundy 1972:378), responded with alacrity to market opportunities arising from the diamond boom. Contrary to the assumptions of the dual economy thesis, they employed new farming technology (for example, in the form of the plough), and diversified production from grain to vegetables, tobacco and wool. In particular areas of the Ciskei and the Transkei, they competed with, and even outproduced, their white neighbours. A traveller to the Glen Grey district in 1880 commented:

'...man for man the Kafirs of these parts are better farmers than the Europeans, more careful of their stock, cultivating a larger area of land, and working themselves more assiduously.' (Bundy 1972:377)

For colonists such peasants served as a useful buffer against less peaceful tribes to the north.

Over time, however, the industrialisation of South Africa ushered in by diamonds and gold engendered new needs in the economy, specifically for more labour on both farms and mines. This need produced a concerted effort to undermine the independence of peasant farmers and push them on to the labour market. The result was taxation, pass laws, vagrancy laws, location laws and restriction of access to land, culminating in the 1913 Land Act. At the same time, white farmers were the beneficiaries of substantial state subsidy, support and improved transport facilities. In consequence, once prosperous African peasants were gradually converted into wage-labourers. The 'backwardness' of African agriculture was not, Bundy argued, due to an unwillingness or inability to respond to modern sector opportunities; it was an active and purposeful strategy to 'underdevelop' the rural areas so that they should more
efficiently serve the needs of capitalist development at the core. Development and underdevelopment were two sides of the same coin.

Now, Bundy took over from Frank three problematic notions. The first was that CC relations through declining terms of trade could be extrapolated on to UR relations. In consequence he laid the principal burden of underdevelopment through surplus extraction on the White traders operating in the Transkei's rural areas.

Secondly, Bundy accepted the notion that contact with the industrial core, in this case, the newly discovered diamond and gold mines, would, as a matter of principle, produce underdevelopment or stagnation. Relatively prosperous peasant farmers were transformed into lowly paid migrant workers. This stagnationist theme has been carried forward by numerous other writers, both Marxist and Liberal. (Bromberger & Hughes 1987, Giliomee & Schlemmer 1985)

Lastly, the hidden assumption behind all this, that rural areas could be treated as countries was not made explicit by Bundy. It was, however, taken up by subsequent writers who wished to argue that development in the bantustans ought to be 'autocentric' or non-dependent.

Let us consider each of these aspects in turn.

3.1. Exploitation through the Market

Bundy's debt to Frank is quite explicit. First, and most prominent, Bundy understood the mechanisms of exploitation which occurred within a country to be the same as those between countries. Put another way, Bundy swallowed hook, line and sinker Frank's chain-link metaphor by which exploitation occurs in homogeneous fashion from metropolis to peripheral city, from city to rural areas, "to large landowners or merchants who expropriate surplus from small peasants or tenants...".

Bundy spells out in detail the role played by local traders in appropriating peasant surplus. They were, for Bundy, "the most important single agents of economic change, the influential envoys of
the advanced economy’. Traders advanced credit for goods and cash for loans at ‘punitive interest rates’. They bought goods from cash-strapped peasants often at severely depressed prices, and acted as recruiting agents for mine labour. "Trader and peasant enacted in microcosm the adverse terms of trade of a colonial relationship." (Bundy 1972:387)

Now, this is consistent with dependency theory principles in seeing exploitation occurring through a highly unequal market relationship. Peasants without access to transport would be forced to use traders as a market-outlet for obtaining cash. Peasants compelled to pay hut-tax or to buy clothes would have little other source of cash. Having entered the market peasants narrowed their economic base and became very vulnerable to market fluctuations and political intervention.

3.2. Impoverishment vs. Underdevelopment

A second conceptual problem inherent in Colin Bundy’s argument relates to his conception of ‘underdevelopment’. For Bundy the process of underdevelopment occurred through the transformation of the majority of independent peasant farmers into migrant labourers. These peasants lost their ‘surplus-generating capacity’ and their ‘control over the disposal of their surplus’ (1972:388). They were effectively proletarianised.

Now it is not altogether clear why, for a Marxist, the process of proletarianisation should be a regressive step in capitalist development. For Marx the productive power of the capitalist mode of production derived precisely from its capacity to combine production factors in ever more efficient forms, i.e. in the generation of relative surplus value. The ‘freeing’ of peasants from their access to land and their subsequent compulsion to labour was an essential part of this process. It only becomes a factor of underdevelopment when the Transkei or Ciskei are implicitly taken to be discrete economies or countries needing ‘separate’ development or when one focuses on peasant agriculture as opposed to industrial development and commercial agriculture.
4. Frank and Separate Development

Let us turn our attention to the problems caused by dependency theory with regard to bantustan development in more recent times. Here I shall focus on three aspects relating to:

(i) underdevelopment through the market;
(ii) migrant labour as a mechanism of underdevelopment or stagnation;
(iii) the supposed need for independent bantustan development.

4.1. The Market and Migrant Labour

In Southern African both country to country (CC) and urban-rural (UR) relationships are often dominated by migrant labour. Migrant labour is the main export commodity from countries like Lesotho and Botswana, and also constitutes the main link between the South African industrial core and regions like the Transkei, Lebowa and Bophuthatswana.

Can declining terms of trade, as initially set out by Frank, be equated with the exchange of labour for wages? Given the dominance of migrant labour in the Southern African regional economy, are relationships with Lesotho/ Botswana the same as relationships with Transkei/ Lebowa, and can either of these be compared with UR relationships in Latin America where the administrative boundaries which migrant labour crosses are not as sharply defined?

In regard to the first question, I have argued elsewhere (Graaff, 1986) that if one is to think of underdevelopment of the rural areas in terms of trade, one way to do it is through the declining power which migrant labourers had to negotiate wage-levels on mines and farms. As both the capacity of the rural areas to sustain peasant households and the power of tribal chiefs decreased, so the opportunity of holding out for, and negotiating higher wages receded into the distance. Migrant labour changed from being an optional to a necessary activity. Migrant wages, in turn, diminished. In short,
Market conditions for labour turned progressively against the migrant, and household income declined in proportion.

However, when we use language of this sort, it is evident that we are discounting a most important set of factors which set the parameters within which the market for labour and for agricultural products operates. The limits to agricultural production mentioned by Bundy - shortage of land, access to markets, compulsion to pay hut-tax, lack of public investment - are all factors which do not derive from the market. They are extra-market factors deriving from the struggle to provide labour for mines and farms. The same can be said for the deteriorating terms on which migrants sold their labour. Declining wages is itself a reflection of the maldistribution of power between mine-owners and mine-workers. It is the structural parameters which strongly condition the declining market rather than vice versa.

This is not to say that market prices are fully determined by such structural factors. Price fluctuations cannot be universally reduced to extensions of class struggle. For this reason it is, as I shall argue later, important to retain the concept of the market as a site of exploitation.

This perspective on market-based theories of development serves as an important corrective to a great deal of modernisation theory writing which, it will be seen, bear more than a passing resemblance to that of dependency theorists. Let us consider an example.

Francis Wilson’s ‘push-pull’ model of the relationship between the industrial core and rural periphery enjoyed considerable currency during the 1970’s (Wilson 1972). By his construction the continuing movement of migrant labour in South Africa could be explained by four sets of factors which:

1. pushed people away from the rural areas;
2. pulled them towards the urban areas;
3. pushed them away again from the urban areas; and finally,
4. pulled them back towards the rural areas.
The relative strength of these factors in the South African context kept people circulating between urban and rural areas for considerable lengths of time.

It is clear, however, that push and pull factors are only operative within the broader context of the South African political economy. If urban areas are more attractive than rural areas, it is because of an underlying dependency relationship. Rural areas have, as Bundy argued, been made less attractive.

We should, on the other hand, beware not to jettison push-pull models on the basis of this critique, just as we should be careful not to discount the market as a site of exploitation. To say that factors determining or ‘behind’ the market explain what happen in it, runs into serious problems. Because we could then ask what determines the factors determining the market, and so on ad infinitum. Going further ‘back’ in the causal chain does not decide priority and leads one into a futile search for the start of the chain.3

The same critique applies to development writing which (wrongly) calls itself dependency theory or uses the term, dependency, but is not dependency theory, even in old Frankian terms. It does not express any balance in declining terms of trade. Nor does it, for the purposes of our later discussion, discuss the political economy parameters within which the trade operates.

One example is the serious concern with cash-flow leakages from bantustan economies. That means that writers are worried that wages which are earned by commuters in employment outside the bantustans are also spent there. And even when they are earned inside the bantustan, they are spent outside them. (Maasdorp 1974:20; Butler et al. 1977:138ff.)

Another example refers to the fact that the major part of an area's income originates outside its own borders. This is expressed as the relationship of GDP (Gross Domestic Product, income generated within its borders) to GNI (Gross National Income, total income accruing to...
the area). Transkei, Bophuthatswana and Kwazulu figures (GDP/GNIx100) for 1976 were 42%, 37% and 25% respectively. For Lesotho, Swaziland and Botswana the figures were 20%, 50% and 66% (Lipton 1980). In all of these cases it was only Botswana where internally generated income was higher than that externally generated.

It should be clear that all of these examples concentrate on market factors and ignore the class and power relationships with which they are enmeshed.

4.2. Migrant Labour and Underdevelopment

Let us turn to the deleterious effect of migrant labour on bantustan development, or the stagnationist theme. Migrant labour is, in these terms, often seen as either suppressing the growth of Black agriculture in the bantustans, and/or transferring developmental potential from periphery to core. Both ways bantustan development suffers.

It is, for example, said that since migrants are typically younger, more educated and male, the migrant labour system deprives the periphery of skilled, innovative and physically capable manpower needed for viable agriculture. Since men are also usually household heads, their absence puts obstacles in the way of effective decision-making (Giliomee & Schlemmer 1985:337).

Now, even on its own terms we need to be sceptical about this explanation of underdevelopment. First, at the very least it needs to take account of regional variations. Evidence from Lesotho, for example, (which in this regard operates very much like a bantustan) is that migrants are usually less educated and older. Many migrants make weekend visits home or communicate regularly by letter, so that decision-making processes are less disrupted than proposed by the underdevelopment model. One would expect communication (and decision-making) to be far more difficult, for example, between Khayelitsha in Cape Town and Tsolo in the Transkei, than between New Brighton in Port Elizabeth and the Ciskei.
Even if migrants were to stay home, family income from farming would rise only minimally. The family benefits financially far more by their continued participation in wage-labour. Furthermore, it needs to be shown that agriculture actually does suffer from labour shortages at harvest times. Finally it is resettlement and the subsequent overcrowding in peripheral areas rather than migrant labour as such which is responsible for the collapse of bantustan agriculture.

"Here we would only observe that stoppage of migration will do nothing by itself to rejuvenate a depleted soil, reduce overcrowding in a limited land area, and distribute livestock more equally among rural households – factors which almost certainly have more to do with the perilous state of Lesotho agriculture than the absence of half the male labour force throughout the year." (ILO 1979:63)

If the underdevelopment argument is overstated in its own terms, it becomes even more problematic from a more critical perspective. Why should Black agriculture be developed anyway? Small-scale agriculture cannot match the income of a regular salary. Nor can it compete with the efficiency of commercialised agricultural goods marketed through supermarkets. Supermarket food is usually cheaper than that which is home-grown. Developing peasant agriculture is not rational from either a food production or an income perspective. It only becomes so when one assumes that bantustans need to be agriculturally ‘self-sufficient’, i.e. when bantustans are accepted as separate development units.

4.3. Autocentric Development

Other writers require not only agricultural development but also industrial development to be self-sufficient. Roger Southall is very sceptical about bantustan development because ‘the pattern and structure of the industrial programme have done little to decrease Transkei’s dependence upon the white economy, and would seem to have little capacity for encouraging its self-sustaining development in the future.’ (Southall 1982:240) Nancy Charton’s picture of industrialisation in the Ciskei is a nice example of this.

"However, (industrialisation) has increased rather diminished the dependence of the Ciskei on South Africa. To begin with, the most
Important industries are located in 'white' areas, thus outside the jurisdiction of the Ciskeian government. Those located within the Ciskei require capital, technology, skilled personnel, raw material from and markets in the Republic. Ciskeians take few of the economic decisions which affect the industrial life of the territory; they cannot decide what should be produced, how to produce it or where to market the product; because markets are situated elsewhere they cannot decide on the distribution of surplus on their terms, for the surplus does not belong to them.

"... The economy of the Ciskei remains an outward oriented economy, whose function in the total Southern African system is merely to produce cheap labour power. ... lacking any internal autonomous dynamic it is open to all the ills of the wider system which dominates it; it cannot command the bargaining power to compel decisions in its own interests." (Charton 1980:230)

The point to underline is that bantustan development would be far better served if it jettisoned the duplication of development efforts in each bantustan and worked to maximise the benefits of integration into the Southern African regional economy.

5. Conclusion

This chapter has sketched the origins of dependency theory in the work of Prebisch/ECIA, and showed the elements of it which Frank added. It considered briefly the alternatives proposed by Brenner/Laclau and Banaji. These will be pursued further in the next chapter. The main thrust of the chapter has, however, been to show the impact that Frankian ideas have had on ideas of development and underdevelopment in South Africa through the work of writers like Bundy, Southall and Charton. The conclusions which are important for our later discussion are as follows.

(1) Both in its definition of and theorising about capitalism, dependency theory has placed too much emphasis on unequal exchange or the market. That has led dependency theory to a sterile, quantitative and zero-sum theory of exploitation. The degree to which the core extracts surplus from the periphery is the measure of development in the former and underdevelopment or stagnation in the latter.

(2) A quantitative notion of underdevelopment makes it easy to think away the differences between different kinds of exploitation. If exploitation occurs through the transfer of a quantitative surplus, it is of little importance whether that be
between countries or between urban and rural areas. Surplus is surplus.

(3) Emphasis on the market has also led to neglect of actors or classes. The rise of, and conflict between classes is consequently seen as secondary to movements in the market. Suppression of actors with concrete interests and limited resources opens the way to notions of absolute ruling class power (functionalist thinking) and of intrinsic system dynamics (teleological thinking). This has led, in particular, to extremely crude conceptualisations of the postcolonial state, in which a comprador bourgeoisie is 'captured' by metropolitan capital and serves as its extension. In Chapter Four I shall present an alternative theory of the state which does more justice to state managers as actors rather than puppets.

(4) Zero-sum theories of development and of power combined with a conflation of international and national levels of exploitation lead to silly prescriptions for 'autocentric' development for bantustans. Integration into a broader system does not mean universal functionality or total domination or chronic poverty.

These points of critique do not mean that dependency theory can now be consigned to the scrap-heap. Even if writers ceased to use it (which they do not), there are a number of aspects which need to be retained.

(1) It is futile to attempt to reject the market as a site of exploitation. Production and realisation of surplus value are separate moments of the same process. They can only be analytically distinguished. That means that certain forms of microtheoretical modernisation theory are useful as an adjunct to political economy types of analysis.

(2) Development and underdevelopment occur within a broader context. Dependency theory sees that context as the world capitalist system. We shall see that modes of production theory wishes to substitute a more limited framework, a capitalist
social formation, and that it struggles in consequence. I shall argue in the final chapter that the world context needs to be retained as one of a number of system levels.
CHAPTER THREE: THE CONTRIBUTION FROM MODES OF PRODUCTION THEORY

1. Introduction

Dependency theory has been profoundly influenced by the critique from the modes of production theory school. It has led many writers to abandon the dependency theory framework. In this chapter I shall argue that modes of production theory has brought important advances in thinking about underdevelopment, but that it has landed up being seriously hamstrung by its own problems of definition, functionalism, economism and epistemological relativism.

This chapter has three main sections. The first traces the origins of modes of production theory through particularly the writings of Pierre-Philippe Rey. The second part shows how Harold Wolpe used the theory to think about cheap migrant labour. I shall argue that, following Hindson’s critique, Wolpe’s cheap labour theory has survived better than the modes of production theory on which it was based. I shall also argue that the debate between ‘productionists’ and ‘circulationists’ is a false one. The third part considers the use of the Charles Bettelheim’s conservation-dissolution metaphor in analysing the informal sector. I shall argue that Wellings & Sutcliffe’s (1984) use of the metaphor is not what Bettelheim intended, it is functionalist and it is too narrowly cast.

While modes of production theory has performed the important tasks of reintroducing agents into development theory and emphasizing production relations rather than unequal exchange, it still falls foul of functionalist thinking. In addition, it has abandoned both the international context of development and the notion of structure.

2. Origins

In seeking alternatives to the misconceptions and crudenesses of dependency theory, modes of production theory drew strongly on the writings of Althusser, and the French economic anthropologists, Meillassoux, Rey, Terray and Godelier, to name only the best known.
They were bound in a common belief in the primacy of theoretical over empirical knowledge, a new positivism. The puncturing of this scientific aspiration, not to say arrogance, and particularly, the collapse of the Althusserian bubble, inevitably brought with it the deflation of modes of production theory. (Ruccio & Simon, 1986; Kahn & Llobera, 1980; Létourneau, 1985)

Another source for modes of production theory, more accessible to the Anglo-Saxon world, came through the work of Iaclau and Brenner during the 1970's. However, by the mid-1980's this theoretical stream had dried up. 'Hard' theory had been exchanged for 'soft' ideal-types, and 'suggestive questions'. (Clarence-Smith, 1985)

It is not necessary for us to follow all the branches of this theoretical delta. For my argument, I shall follow only one or two tributaries. I shall start with some consideration of the major conceptual shifts involved in the changeover from dependency to modes of production theory, and then give some attention to the work of Pierre-Philippe Rey, who was particularly important in conceptualising modes of production in articulation. I shall also look briefly at the Brenner/Iaclau argument. As in other chapters, I shall then move to discuss some prominent examples of the application of this theory in South Africa.

Modes of production theory reconceptualised both the units of interaction and the way they interact. Instead of countries (or national economies) interacting within a single capitalist mode of production through the mediation of the market, modes of production theory saw different modes interacting through class conflict.

2.1. Changing Boundaries

Following conventional theories of imperialism, modes of production theory saw the capitalist mode as directed outside itself in order to survive. For some writers, the functions which precapitalist modes of production performed for capitalism were necessary for its continued existence.
We saw above that Laclau accused Frank of using the 'wrong' definition of capitalism. Frank confused a mode of production with a market operation; production in the market with production for the market. This, said Laclau, had the unfortunate effect of completely erasing non-capitalist modes of production from the sixteenth century onwards, and of defining away the problem of the transition from feudalism to capitalism.

"So far from banishing precapitalist forms, (capitalism) not only coexists with them but buttresses them, and even on occasions devilishly conjures them up ex nihilo." (Laclau, 1972)

The central problem in understanding developing countries is not, as in dependency theory, the analysis of unequal exchange, but 'how far and by what means has the capitalist mode of production expanded at the expense of non-capitalist forms of production, and what are the effects of this historical process of capitalist development on contemporary Third World countries?' (Ruccio & Lawrence, 1986:211)

Far from eliminating the transition from feudalism to capitalism as a problem, modes of production theory places it, therefore, at the very centre of analysis - and this is an analysis of class conflict both within and between different modes of production. Different modes of production produce different kinds of class groups and different kinds of interests. The dynamics within modes of production and their interaction with each other will, therefore, vary significantly from country to country.

The dependency theory problematic, then, is redefined by modes of production theory in two ways. First, the unit of analysis is no longer the nation-state but the mode of production. The crucial boundary between interacting units shifts from international trade to urban-rural class relationships.

The second shift is one of scale: from inter-nation to inter-class relationships. (See Diagram 1 over the page.)
Diagram 1

Dependency Theory                    MOP Theory

CMOP

A

B C D E

A2

B1 C1 D1 E1

B2 C2 D2 E2

PCMOP’s

A = metropolitan country; B, C, D ... = peripheral countries.
CMOP = capitalist mode of production
PCMOP = precapitalist mode of production

In terms of Diagram 1, the central analytical focus in dependency theory concerns the relationship between countries.

A <--------> [B, C, D, E] all within the CMOP

In modes of production theory this single relationship becomes a set of diodes, parts of each country divided between different modes of production

A1 <--------> A2
CMOP
B1 <--------> B2
C1 <--------> C2
D1 <--------> D2
PCMOP
2.2. Articulating ‘Articulation’

Given the importance, then, in modes of production theory of the relationship, or ‘articulation’, between modes of production, how is this articulation to be conceptualised? More importantly, how are we to arrive at a theory of articulation between modes? One of the central writers in this regard is Pierre-Philippe Rey who argues for the ‘homoficence’ of capitalism wherever it is found, that is, its uniform drive to destroy other modes of production with which it comes into contact.

"(the) fundamental law of capitalism, as true today as on the day when Marx discovered it: Capitalism has as its final goal the destruction at every point on the globe of antecedent modes of production and relations of production, in order to substitute for them its own mode of production and its own relations of production." (quoted by Foster-Carter, 1978b:220)

However, this transition differs significantly according to context. Whereas European feudalism acted as a ‘cocoon for embryonic capitalism’, elsewhere it arrived from outside ‘déjà grand et bien armé’. In both cases the articulation between capitalist and pre-capitalist modes of production went through three stages: one in which the link was through exchange and pre-capitalist modes of production were reinforced; a second in which the capitalist mode of production became dominant, while still making use of the pre-capitalist mode; and a last in which pre-capitalist modes of production are eradicated, even in the agricultural sector, a stage which has only been reached in the United States. (Foster-Carter, 1978b:218)

In the Third World, however, the alliance between capitalist and precapitalist classes is a very difficult one, and this accounts both for the very long duration of the second stage of articulation, as well as for the necessity of violence during the colonial phase of capitalist penetration. Although, therefore, capitalism's basic thrust remains uniform, its conflict/cooperation with, or cooptation of, precapitalist classes produces very different results in specific instances.

Translated into the language of theories of imperialism, at different
stages in its development capitalism has different external requirements, and at each stage it strives to push precapitalist modes into supplying them.

"The development of the noncapitalist modes of production is explained in terms of their ability to satisfy the needs of capital. In turn, the development of the capitalist mode of production is understood to be enabled or hindered in terms of the ability of the noncapitalist modes of production to satisfy capitalism's posited needs." (Ruocci & Lawrence, 1986:215)

There is in that explanation more than a hint of the teleological thinking we discussed in Chapter One with regard to Wolpe's use of modes of production theory.

2.3. From Theory to Ideal Types

By the 1980's modes of production theory had run its course, or that was the general consensus at a workshop convened by the Canadian Journal of African Studies in 1985 (vol. 19(1)) Here I shall mention only two of the problems responsible for its decline.

First, by emphasizing the link between different modes of production as the crucial one, modes of production theory appears to be saying that the resources, facilities or class alliances made possible by the presence of precapitalist modes are more important than those within the capitalist mode. In other words, land, agricultural products, cheap labour and non-capitalist classes are the critical inputs/ alliances in determining the shape of Third World development, and underdevelopment is determined by the degree of survival of precapitalist modes. In Brenner's language, underdevelopment is the inability to make the transition from absolute to relative surplus value production. Kay would emphasize the role of mercantile capital in anchoring that inability to transform. (Kay, 1975; Bernstein, 1975/6)

If, however, one starts removing the initial assumptions of this scenario; if, for example, feudal or tribal fractions are not dominant in the ruling alliance, as is the case in the dictatorships of the Far East NIC's; if, for example, precapitalist modes have effectively ceased to exist, as in Hong Kong or the South African
If, as Bradby argues, precapitalist inputs are quite irrelevant to capitalist accumulation; how are we to explain underdevelopment then? Does underdevelopment disappear when precapitalist modes disappear? (Bradby, 1980) Underdevelopment, by definition, ceases to exist once the transition to relative surplus value production has been made.

It is at this point that NIDL theorists take up the argument for, to them, underdevelopment is internal to the capitalist mode itself. Precapitalist modes are necessary neither to development nor to underdevelopment. (Ruccio & Simon, 1986:216) To take Wolpe's argument about the role of the African reserves in subsidizing migrant wages - there are many ways of ensuring lower wages. Employing migrants from areas with subsistence agriculture is only one of them.

NIDL theorists also reintroduce the international context, which modes of production theorists tend to forget by their concentration on internal class dynamics. But more of this later.

The second point we need to make in assessing the usefulness of modes of production theory is one concerning definitions. Modes of production theory was born out of a definitional critique of dependency theory. Frank, said Laclau, had the wrong definition of capitalism, and, for that matter, of a mode of production too. Finally, however, modes of production theorists themselves are finding it more and more difficult to agree on what a mode of production is. Relations of production, relations of exploitation, free wage-labour, a market in land, generalised commodity production, social formations etc. are being combined in ever multiplying permutations without any real regard for the theory which they are intended to serve. (Foster-Carter, 1978) The question whether subsistence agriculture, for example, subsidizes the reproduction costs of migrant labour can be answered quite adequately without resorting to the notion of a mode of production.

The confusion over the definition of a mode of production, as well as its epistemological status has led theorists to opt for 'soft' theory. Modes of production were, after all, said Clarence-Smith,
nothing more than models, ideal types, which suggest useful questions. And it served no purpose to keep multiplying the models, not only for the capitalist mode, but also for tributary, domestic, slave, Asiatic and lineage modes as well.

"The confusion between model and reality has been one of the main problems with the use of modes of production in African studies ... the central purpose of the model is to isolate a few key variables and demonstrate the logical and hierarchical connections between them. To create a new mode of production every time minor surface elements of real societies diverge from the model is to destroy the heuristic value of the whole exercise." (Clarence-Smith, 1985:19)

While this conception of a mode of production is an advance on the positivist and realist notions propagated by some modes of production theorists, it lapses into problems of relativism. I shall return to that issue in Chapter Five.

With this as background we are in a position to return to a consideration of the debate around Colin Bundy.

3. Colin Bundy under Fire

Reaction to Colin Bundy by fellow-historians (Ranger 1978, Cooper 1981, Lewis 1984, cf. Bundy 1988 for a summary of these) has followed the main lines of critique against Frank and Wallerstein:

* too much reliance on the market as a mechanism of change;
* too little attention to the internal, class dynamics of peripheral societies; and
* an underestimation of the degree to which the capitalist mode of production has preserved and used precapitalist modes of production rather than transforming or destroying them.

The most pointed critique of Bundy is that by Jack Lewis (1984). Lewis serves as a good example of all three points of critique mentioned above. Lewis focused quite strongly on the internal 'dynamics of the pre-capitalist mode of production in southern Africa' rather than the impact of external factors like the market relationship.
Let us note that Lewis's argument concerns both the empirical and theoretical aspects of Bundy's thesis. Lewis wished to question both the duration and extent of the prosperity enjoyed by the Transkeian and Ciskeian peasants. If these peasant did enjoy a period of prosperity, said Lewis, it was quite short. Our concern, however, is more with Lewis' theoretical argument. We shall limit our discussion to this aspect.

The basic unit of the pre-capitalist mode of production in Southern Africa, said Lewis, was the umzi or homestead composed of a number of households. By expanding the membership of his homestead, the homestead head (who may or may not be a headman or chief also) extended his access to production resources - land, cattle (meaning milk and draught-power) and labour (especially women and children).

Younger men, however, also aspired to extend their own resources and households, and, where possible, establish their own homesteads, thereby initiating a tendency towards expansion to new land and a re-arrangement of elite positioning. This conflict between junior males and entrenched heads constituted, for Lewis, the fundamental dynamic of the pre-capitalist mode of production. 1

There was a brief period of prosperity in the Ciskei, says Lewis, specifically between 1865 and 1875, but this was not a response to the market. With the defeat of the Gcaleka in the southern Transkei and the appropriation of their land by the colonial authorities, 30 000 peasants left the Ciskei to take up this land, vacating their Ciskeian land. The remaining Ciskeian farmers, fearing the confiscation of the now empty farming area by the colonists, immediately expanded their activities to occupy it, raising average household farming area from 2.7 to 3.3 hectares. Naturally, production per household increased, but was soon curtailed by rebellion and drought in the late 1870's. In short, where there was surplus production among Ciskeian peasants, it was in direct response to political and demographic circumstance - the struggle between I

The theory of elder dominance in a lineage mode of production has, from early on, been the subject of critique by Clammer (1975). It is not our concern to pursue that critique here.
chiefs; between homestead heads and junior males; or between Xhosa and colonists.

Now, other historians have gone beyond Lewis in a number of ways. For a start, where Lewis saw a (singular) Southern African precapitalist mode of production, other writers have discovered more. (Eg. Beinart et al. 1986) For our purposes it is sufficient to note that finding and defining precapitalist modes of production has been a debilitating problem, and that the modes of production theory based on such definitions has foundered in consequence (Foster-Carter 1978b:218; Clarence-Smith 1985).

More important for our analysis are the advances over dependency theory to which this kind of analysis gives access. The most important of these is the replacement of blind economic laws with real live people. (Palma 1981) coined the awful term, mechanico-formalist theorising, to describe this aspect of old dependency theory.) As we have seen, dependency theory works with a conception of people as always and everywhere imbued with the profit-motive. It only takes the appearance of trading or other profit-making activities to set in train powerful forces of change. Orthodox Marxist theories, like modes of production theory, by contrast, conceive of people defined by the structural opportunities and constraints within which they find themselves. Profit-making occurs mainly as a result of compelling circumstance within the parameters of capitalist competition and class struggle. The profit-motive is a consequence, not a cause, of the transition to capitalism.

As a result, Lewis's conception of peasants differs fundamentally from that in Bundy's work. Lewis's picture is one of individuals finely differentiated by their conflict and cooperation with one another. Within the tribal framework they occupied different class positions, had varying and variegated interests, took decisions and made choices. 'Profit' or the accumulation of cattle had a different meaning altogether.
That is a picture which helps to avoid many of the pitfalls of functionalist thinking. It also helps us avoid simplistic notions of one-sided and absolute power. Given the interest of the entrenched homestead heads in the preservation of the pre-capitalist mode of production, it is clear that the colonial policy of maintaining chiefs and traditional land tenure systems was not wholly imposed from outside on the Transkei. Some responsibility for the system of 'indirect rule' must be born by the Transkeian ruling class themselves. (Beinart, 1985)

4. From Devastated Peasantry to Cheap Labour

At this point we need to make a number of shifts:

* from Colin Bundy and Jack Lewis to Harold Wolpe and Doug Hindson;
* from the late 19th and early 20th centuries to mid-20th century;
* from the provision of a labour supply for labour-starved farms and mines to the supply of cheap and docile workers to a labour-surplus economy;

Wolpe's cheap labour thesis (CLT) is well-known and has been the topic of extensive debate. (Wolpe 1972; Hindson 1987) Wolpe proposed that subsistence agriculture in the bantustans contributed to the upkeep of migrant labourers' families and allowed employers to pay a wage which was significantly lower because it needed to support only a single male and not his whole family.

The collapse of bantustan agriculture in the 1940's and 1950's, said Wolpe, put migrant families under considerable pressure and resulted in waves of protest against apartheid in the two post-war decades. This process was substantially aggravated by the structural and growing unemployment caused by mechanisation in agriculture and industry during the 1960's. In the absence of a subsistence input from bantustan agriculture, apartheid resorted to naked repression in enforcing low levels of subsistence.
In many ways Wolpe's thesis was an explicit rejection of dependency theory principles. For a start, said Wolpe, the neo-colonial (read dependency) relationship between countries could not be transposed on to that between groups, areas or classes (as the theory of Internal Colonialism wished to do).

Second the relationship of exploitation needed to be made clear. Wolpe quotes Bettelheim (1972) with approval in dealing with both these points.

"Because the concept of exploitation expresses a production relation - production of surplus labour and expropriation of this by a social class - it necessarily relates to class relations (and a relation between 'countries' is not and cannot be a relation between classes)." (Wolpe, 1975:240)

Wolpe's position on this point is not altogether clear since, on the one hand, he states this principle quite dogmatically (we should be wary of any argument based on unexplained necessity), but, on the other hand, concedes (albeit in a footnote) that exploitation can occur through 'the exchange of non-equivalents', i.e. through the market. And that is not an unreasonable line to take.

"Exchange is not ... something that complements production at a level external to the latter, and at most a condition for capitalist production: it is an essential moment of this production." (Emmanuel quoted in Foster-Carter, 1978)

The theory which Wolpe puts up as an alternative entails three elements. First, racial and ethnic groups must be differentiated into their class components. Two, these class components relate to each from within different modes of production, capitalist and precapitalist. Three, the salient relationship to be analysed between them is that of exploitation between capitalists in the capitalist mode of production, and migrant workers from the precapitalist mode of production. Exploitation is essentially 'directly or indirectly the extraction of surplus from the direct producers'.

In the case of South Africa the exploitative relationship between the modes of production has gone through two phases. In the period prior to World War II exploitation occurred between capitalist and precapitalist modes of production via the subsistence and welfare
functions which the African reserves fulfilled for the families of migrant labourers. Despite attempts by the industrial core to maintain this welfare and subsistence subsidy, says Wolpe, African reserve economies gradually weakened and following World War II were no longer able to fulfil their previous functions. The relationship between capitalist and precapitalist modes of production was replaced by one between different sectors of a single capitalist mode of production.

4.1. Wolpe under Fire

For our purposes the most important critique of Wolpe is that by Doug Hindson (1987). This covers a number of areas, but the crux of it is this. Wolpe’s cheap labour thesis (CLT) is valid, says Hindson, for a particular period in South African history (from the late nineteenth century until the 1950’s) and for a particular sector of the economy (mining). It is wrong to generalise the CLT outside of these boundaries, as Wolpe did.

Mainly, Wolpe lost sight of a settled urban African proletariat which had no rural ties, says Hindson, and thus no subsistence input. Such a population existed in South African towns and cities from the 1920’s onwards, and was explicitly provided for in legislation. The tightening of the pass laws from the 1960’s onwards did not drive Africans back to rural subsistence, but resulted in a very substantial ‘displaced’ urban population.

Apartheid, says Hindson, consciously differentiated between urban ‘insiders’ and migrant ‘outsiders’. That was a result, on the one hand, of the competition for labour between agriculture/mining and industry, and, on the other hand, of the attempt to manipulate competition between sections of the working class. This differentiation reached its highpoint with the Riekert Report in the early 1970’s, but was subsequently undermined by the growth of bantustan-based commuter populations, cross-border trade union organisation, and the regional restructuring brought about by the Good Hope Plan (GHP). In addition, gold mine wages rose substantially making the input from bantustan agriculture somewhat unnecessary.
Nor is it necessary, said Hindson, for Wolpe to work with the somewhat melodramatic image of an apartheid state bent on brute repression and/or genocide. Bantustan agriculture has, for Hindson, long since been replaced by other forms of reproduction for the overwhelming majority of the South African labour force.

Wolpe's theory of resistance which flows from his CLT is fatally undermined by his timing of the collapse of bantustan agriculture. Relying heavily on Charles Simkins' 1982 article, Hindson shows that bantustan agricultural production was, in fact, constant or rising at precisely the time Wolpe saw it as falling.

Christian Rogerson wishes to perpetuate the CLT in slightly varied form by arguing that bantustan labour is cheap because the South African state has passed significant parts of its welfare and educational responsibilities on to bantustan administrations (1982:62). Bantustans must now carry the costs of feeding, educating and caring for people who commute or migrate to work in the core area. However, the South African state almost wholly finances bantustan budgets. (Cf. Chapter Four) In addition, it would be far cheaper to provide those services in high density, metropolitan areas than in rural, squatter or small town areas. Transferring welfare to bantustan administrations was not done to make labour cheaper.

We shall see below that there is indeed a viable CLT related to the decentralisation of light industries. But that involves bantustan administrations in quite different ways.

In the sections which follow I wish to argue that the CLT is indeed a valuable perspective, but that it needs to be, first, substantially pruned, and, second, uncoupled from its modes of production framework. Hindson has helped us a great deal in this task, but he has not gone far enough.

4.2. Migrant Labour and Gold Mining

What has happened, then, to our picture of bantustans in the shift
from Bundy to Wolpe and Hindson? All three writers postulate extreme impoverishment as a consequence of incorporation into the capitalist mode of production. But there is an important difference. In the Frankian dependency perspective that impoverishment flows as a matter of principle. In Wolpe's view impoverishment is linked to the needs of capitalists for cheap labour. That need is, for Wolpe, universal and indiscriminate. It is in the nature of capitalism to need, and go about attaining, cheap and docile labour. The implications for the fate of bantustan development are, in the end, very similar for both Wolpe and Bundy.

Hindson's view is valuable in that, in contrast to the others, it links the need for cheap migrant labour to specific capitalists in a specific period of time. Were those needs, or those capitalists, to change the results for bantustans could be quite different.

Let us look at the birth of the gold-mining industry and the way that this affected the incorporation of tribal economies into service of the core as an example. (Richardson & Van-Helten 1982; Innes 1984; Harries 1982; Marks & Rathbone 1982) In the 1880's and early 1890's migrant labour from the African reserves and Portuguese East Africa was not cheap. (Portuguese East Africa supplied about half of the labour for the South African mines during this period.) South African mine wages compared favourably with those of agricultural workers in England and were double those of Irish workers. (Harries, 1982:143)

This was the result of a number of factors. On the one hand, small diamond and gold diggers used quite simple machinery and very little labour to exploit their claims. The costs involved in these operations were quite low. On the other hand, migrants had access to viable agricultural resources to which they could withdraw if wages were too low. Tribal chiefs were also often strong enough to negotiate with recruiters (labour-touts) for higher wages. They, after all, had a substantial interest in mine wages, since no small part of it came through to them by way of taxation, tribute, fines or lobolo payments. During this period employment on the mines was quite a profitable exercise which young men used to accumulate money to pay for guns, wives and other articles.
The discovery of deep-level gold reefs on the Witwatersrand, however, placed gold-mining within a radically different context. Two factors stand out here. Because gold was used as the world's monetary standard, there was an unlimited market for it. The market could absorb everything the mines could produce. But the price of gold was fixed. Production costs could not be passed on to the buyers. In addition, and this is the second cardinal factor, the Witwatersrand goldbearing reefs were of quite a low-grade ore and they lay very deep. As a result there were enormous costs, sophisticated machinery, some skilled labour and a lot of unskilled labour needed in opening up and operating these mines. All this meant that huge profits were available for those who could extract gold from this depth below a threshold cost.

The story of early gold-mining on the Rand is the story of the struggle to build mining corporations and groups of corporations large enough to carry the financial and technological burdens of this operation; as well as to obtain sufficient labour that was cheap enough to expand operations but keep costs under the threshold level.

Efforts by mining houses to reduce costs by cutting migrant wages were strenuously and successfully resisted by those migrants and their chiefs until after the turn of the century. Black miners went on strike, blew up mine installations or withdrew their labour in substantial numbers. (Richardson & Van-Helten, 1982:92) It was only with the replacement of the Kruger administration by British imperial government after the Anglo-Boer war, and the shortlived importation of 64,000 Chinese labourers (between 1904-7), that mining houses began to gain the upper hand in their attempts to break down migrants' negotiating power. The balance of power is to some extent reflected in the fluctuations in mine wages. The average African wage was £2 19s 10d per month in 1889; up to £3 10s in 1896; significantly down to £2 3s 6d in 1897; and dramatically down at £1 11s 1d in 1901. (Mine wages regained their 1896 level in 1955!) (Harries, 1982:159)

We do not need to follow the development of gold mining and its labour practices further to underline this basic point. The
destruction of precapitalist tribal economies in order to obtain sufficient quantities of cheap labour was the result of a very particular context. In South Africa it was a destruction which was more complete, more violent and affected larger numbers of people than anywhere else on the African continent. In 1890 only 15,000 Africans were employed on the goldfields. By the end of 1897 the daily total was 69,000, and by 1907 105,000. (Richardson & Van-Helten, 1982:83)

Imagine a whole number of different circumstances: that South African gold-mining remained a low technology surface operation; that European monopoly capital was not available to finance the mines; that the market for gold could be saturated and the price fall - in all of these situations conflict with the imperatives of tribal economies might have been far less intense; a modern agricultural sector might have included wealthy Black peasants in its foundations, as was the case in Kenya.

To repeat, underdevelopment and stagnation are not necessary or universal correlates of incorporation into a capitalist mode of production. In order to explain the outcome of core-periphery interaction, we need to understand in some detail, first, the sources of core power and the lines along which it is constrained to move. These will be the major but not the only determinants of the final outcome.

Second, we need similarly to understand the resources at the disposal of peripheral ruling classes and their particular interests and values. It is in the detailed unravelling of the conflicts and alliances within and between core and periphery that developmental and underdevelopmental results will be understood. We shall in the following Chapter Five see how the rise to dominance of the manufacturing sector in the South African economy has resulted in substantially different pressures and clashes.

4.3. The Spatial Implications of Migrant Labour

As we have seen, Hindson wished to prune down Wolpe’s CLT by saying
that the subsistence input from bantustan agriculture was limited in time and according to economic sector. But it is also limited in space. Different parts of the periphery play different roles in maintaining the different sectors of the core. In addition, the Southern African system must be seen as functionally differentiated and interdependent. Changes in one part will reverberate through the whole system. The rise in the gold-price in the mid-1970's is a good example.

With the independence of Angola and Mozambique in the mid-70's, South African mines felt the reliability of their foreign migrant labour supplies to be threatened. This was highlighted by Pres. Banda's withdrawal of Malawian migrants from the South African mines following a plane crash in 1974. The rapidly rising gold price enabled the mines to offer wages which were more competitive on the internal labour market with the result that Mozambican, Angolan, Zimbabwean and Malawian mine workers were replaced by Transkeians. The total number of foreign migrants working on the mines dropped from 297,000 in 1973 to 182,000 in 1980. Average annual cash wages increased ninefold between 1970 and 1980 (three and a half times in real terms). (Lipton, 1980) The number of Transkeian migrants working on the mines jumped from 33,000 to 245,000 (Graaff, 1986). Today a significant proportion of Transkei's economy, which is almost wholly dependent on migrant labour, is determined by wage fluctuations on the gold mines.

Migrants in the Western Cape are also drawn mainly from four or five districts on the southwestern border of the Transkei. In short, the fate of particular areas in the Transkei will be substantially influenced by the interests of Western Cape industries and the gold mining industry. The developmental impact of migration on other parts of the periphery will be determined by different interests and resources.

One last remark in shaping the CLT for future use. Wolpe's CLT has fared far better than the modes of production theory on which he built his argument. As I argued above, modes of production theory has been dissipated by definitional disputes. The CLT can, however, and
does survive independently of it. After all, a precapitalist mode of production does not cease to exist at the moment when its agriculture ceases to provide subsistence as Wolpe wished to say.

5. The Informal Economy

This may seem a strange place to find a section on the informal economy lurking. But it is here, and it is right to be here, for one obvious reason, and one more obscure reason.

The obvious reason is that there is a strong current of writing on the informal sector which falls squarely within the modes of production framework. More specifically, it centres around the use of the conservation-dissolution metaphor suggested by Charles Bettelheim (1972) in thinking about the way modes of production might articulate. That metaphor has found wide use both in theorising the informal sector (Davies, 1977; LeBrun & Gerry, 1975; McGee, 1979; Wellings & Sutcliffe, 1984) and elsewhere. (Alavi, 1982; Wolpe, 1972)

Within the South African context that metaphor has received powerful support by Wellings & Sutcliffe (1984). In using this metaphor they mean to say that dependent parts of the system are tightly monitored, micro-adjusted to each shift in the broader system's needs. The system conserves or strengthens specific parts when these are needed, and dissolves or curtails them when they become dysfunctional. We shall see in a moment that that is not quite what Bettelheim meant.

The second, less apparent, reason for considering theories about the informal sector here flows from this misapplication of the conservation-dissolution metaphor. For at a time when modes of production theory is on the retreat, and those who used to use it are now proposing 'soft' theory, it is strange to find modes of production theory being used in such a 'hard', and let it be said, functionalist, way. In this, and in other ways, Wellings & Sutcliffe's thinking is very like Wolpe's CLT.
5.1. 'The Reformist Paradigm and its Fallacies'

Wellings & Sutcliffe (W&S) start by noting the explosion of literature on the informal sector and a sharply changed attitude to it from both the South African state and the private sector. This is manifested, inter alia, by the state's establishment and substantial funding of the Small Businesses Development Corporation. (Cf. also Rogerson, 1988)

W&S, however, are sceptical of both the motives behind this new enthusiasm and of the chances for successfully developing the informal sector. State motives are suspect since they aim at drawing off opposition to the more fundamental societal contradictions in South Africa. Development initiatives in this area will merely treat the outward symptoms of a deeper lying problem.

But, say W&S, apart from being morally suspect, these initiatives will not work because they are theoretically misconceived. And what they have to say is reminiscent of Brenner's critique of neoclassical economics (i.e. modernisation theory).

Without being explicit about it, their critique amounts to the assertion that state initiatives (and modernisation theory which is the state paradigm) are based on an atomistic view of individual informal sector entrepreneurs who can, with the help of some deregulation, training and loan capital, mop up substantial unemployment and expand into substantial businessmen in a free market environment. They are 'infant capitalists' and potential 'Black Harry Oppenheimers'.

That view is naive and overoptimistic, in their opinion, because it fails to situate the informal sector within the context of the capitalist system. The informal sector is dependent on, functional to and limited by the formal economy. That means the opportunities for expansion will be severely constrained. The formal economy is in a dialectical relationship with the informal sector, conserving and strengthening it for certain purposes, and dissolving and constraining it for other purposes at other times. In this way the informal sector is retained at a continually optimal size which maximizes its functionality for capitalist accumulation.
Putting it in this conceptual summary form makes it all sound a bit easy. We shall see in a moment that, even on its own terms, it is not at all easy. In addition, I shall also argue that W&S's use of the conservation-dissolution metaphor ends up being excessively structuralist.

5.2. Informal Dependence

In the following paragraphs I shall explain how, in W&S's terms, the informal sector comes to be dependent on, functional to and limited by the formal capitalist economy.

The informal sector is dependent on the formal economy in the sense that informal sector sales rely on the availability of money via people with permanent jobs in the formal sector. In addition, the raw materials going into these activities are purchased or gleaned from the formal sector. This applies equally to small-scale hawkers as to rubbish-dump scavengers. Finally informal sector activities are at times the result of subcontracting from larger formal sector concerns.

5.3. Informal Functionality

The ways in which the informal sector is functional to capital is a matter for some debate. Some writers argue that the informal sector population is, for a start, an urban reserve army of labour. They get drawn into formal employment in times of high demand and are retrenched at other times. Employers benefit from these 'wage-labourers in waiting' since it raises competition for jobs and depresses the wages of those in employment.

W&S do not think that this argument applies to the South African environment because:

(a) South African unemployment is concentrated in the rural areas;
(b) most of the informal sector population are long established
members of it;
(c) because the informal sector's low entrepreneur/employee ratio means that it has low capacity to release workers; and
(d) because informal sector workers are seldom registered at labour bureaux as unemployed, i.e. they are not actively looking for work.

All four of these points are suspect. With regard to (a): Wherever unemployment might be concentrated, unemployment levels in urban areas are quite high enough to operate as a reserve army. Following the abolition of influx control in mid-1986 (W&S's article was published in 1984), the location of unemployment may also have shifted from rural to urban areas. Also, the level of unemployment is not necessarily linked to the level of informal sector activity. In fact, the argument might easily have gone the other way on this point. One might say, for example, that it is people who cannot participate in the informal sector who are forced to take the jobs they can get. Those who do have informal sector incomes can, to some degree, afford to wait until better opportunities are offered. In that case, informal sector employment would bid wages up rather than depress them.

With regard to (b): W&S's survey on how long informal sector workers had been engaged in their activities appeared to concentrate on hawkers. Other kinds of informal sector workers might not be so long established. With regard to (c): The low employment ratio in the informal sector says something about its ability to shed employees. It says nothing about informal sector entrepreneurs' willingness to accept alternative wage employment. With regard to (d): labour bureaux are not the only, or even the most popular, way of finding employment in urban areas. Registration at labour bureaux is then quite a bad way of measuring how keen the unemployed are to work.

W&S do not make another more telling point in this context (although they make it elsewhere), namely, that a great many participants in the informal sector are not unemployed. They could not possibly be members of the reserve army of labour if they already have jobs.
In the final analysis, on the arguments reviewed here, it is not clear to what extent the informal sector plays a role in either depressing, or bidding up, urban formal sector wages. Either way we would need to specify to which parts of the informal sector any of these principles apply.

If W&S do not like the reserve-army-of-labour theory, they do not like the welfare substitute theory much either. Some writers would argue, namely, that where unemployment levels are high, and wages and social security low, informal sector activities provide the necessary resources for survival. The informal sector, in other words, relieves the state of its welfare responsibility and cuts the reproduction costs of labour. This means also that participation in the informal sector is a ‘desperation strategy’.

That principle is true, say W&S, for only a minority of informal sector workers. For the majority of the respondents in their study (who were hawkers, it seems) the informal sector was not a desperation strategy, but an activity preferred above formal wage employment. (Cf. also Cross & Preston-Whyte, 1983) They felt they could make more money, were self-employed, had flexible hours, and were free from White/Indian supervision.

There is, however, another way in which the informal sector lowers the cost of reproduction of labour. That is by providing cheaper goods and services to workers than the formal economy does. In this case, say W&S, prices must be defined to include transport costs, as well as the opportunity to buy in smaller quantities (i.e. to break bulk). Even if they may pay more money for the article/service than in the formal sector (which is not always the case), informal sector purchasers are actually getting a good deal. The informal sector does, in the end, make things cheaper for them and operates to the benefit of capital.

While the foregoing are ways in which the informal sector may be functional to capital in general, there is one obvious way in which it is of benefit to particular businesses. That is when informal sector workers operate as subcontractors or outworkers for particular
concerns. In commerce, streetsellers reach markets at times, locations and in quantities which the formal economy find unprofitable. In manufacturing, subcontractors are less expensive because they work for lower wages, without security benefits and without trade unions. Certain kinds of ‘scavengers’ collect recyclable goods like paper, plastics and glass for manufacturing concerns.

5.4. Limiting the Informal Sector

So far I have discussed ways in which the informal sector is dependent on, and functional to the formal sector. These are, W&S would say, the ways in which the informal sector is conserved. But what about the other face of the systems metaphor, the dissolution?

The active limitation of informal sector activities comes from the people who perceive a threat from street-hawkers, like smaller commercial dealers. In Umtata, they used their influence with the municipal council to initiate police harassment of the hawkers, and to institute bye-laws limiting their activities. (Nattrass, 1984) Were they to expand substantially, informal sector operators would find themselves competing with established smaller dealers or supermarkets.

This makes W&S quite sceptical about the possibilities of developing members of a Black middle-class from the informal sector, even though this is an express state objective. "...mini-entrepreneurs would be projected into direct confrontation with well-established formal businesses, more experienced in production and in the market place". (p.542)

W&S summarise the matrix of conservation-dissolution forces in their analysis as follows.

"Thus as far as formal-sector capitalists are concerned, the informal sector should not become so small that the rising cost
of the reproduction of labour begins to have a significant effect upon wages, or so small that they begin to suffer from lost business in the low-income market, or so small that its effect upon the unemployment problem is minimal. At the same time, though, it must not develop to such a size that it becomes competitive in the formal sector. ... In addition, it should not grow to a size where it begins to absorb too much labour on a relatively permanent basis which is needed for capitalist accumulation. Informal-sector expansion would therefore confront concrete class interests manifest in the 'hegemony of the oligopolistic capitalist mode of production'... Thus 'it follows that reforms in favour of the informal sector are impracticable without a prior shift in political power'...." (p.541)(own emphasis)

5.5. Critical Assessment

We need to make a number of remarks on the W&S position. For a start, this is not how Bettelheim (filtered through McGee (1979)) conceived of the conservation- dissolution dynamic. In a social formation with more than one mode of production, says Bettelheim, where the capitalist mode is dominant, precapitalist modes of production tend to be partly dissolved, or 'restructured', and subordinated to capitalist relations (conserved) for a time before their disappearance. (Bettelheim, 1972:293-299)

Now, W&S acknowledge that in the South African situation the informal sector is not a separate mode of production, but they insist on the fact that there are parts of it which constitute a separate form of production. These parts are different by virtue of the presence of extended families, the 'social' reasons which these family members give for participating in the informal sector (family, God, freedom, satisfaction) and by the commodities which they sell (African medicines, certain foods, religious paraphernalia). Further on W&S refer to 'important forms of stratification and social relations which are not necessarily capitalist' (p.537), and are 'untouched' by the capitalist mode of production (p.535). These are the signs of the almost completed historical process of dissolution by capitalism.

Whatever one makes of W&S's shifting and confusing descriptions of this part of the informal sector, it is clear that it is a marginal part of their argument and that the crux of the conservation-dissolution process is not here. It is far more centrally in the mechanisms listed in the long quote above, curtailing competition, lowering welfare and reproduction costs etc. This is a very different
kind of conserving and dissolving from that discernible with regard to precapitalist vendors of herbs and muti's. In W&S's description, the informal sector is not a precapitalist mode, nor is it being transformed, prior to its disappearance. When hawkers are arrested by local police, their activity is simply contained, not transformed.

Secondly, contrary to W&S's predictions, there has been a very substantial 'shift in political power' in favour of the informal sector, and that by the South African state. Commercial dealers and local government interests are not the only forces impinging on this economic sector, otherwise it would indeed be strange that the informal economy currently enjoys so much support in South Africa, a support which five years ago was conspicuously lacking. At that time the informal economy, broadly identified with informal settlements or squatter camps, was seen by the state as an arena for criminal activities, breaching the status of temporary sojourners appended to Black urbanites, and stimulating development outside rather than inside homelands.

The change of heart in state thinking corresponds quite closely with the decline of Verwoerdian grand apartheid and the rise to prominence of the securocrats under PW Botha. These latter see the informal economy as the opportunity for building a bulwark against Communism via a wealthy Black middle class. The phenomenal proliferation and success of markedly conservative Black taxi businesses and legalised shebeens has only served to confirm this way of thinking. Passing the state's welfare responsibility on to the informal sector, as W&S envisage it, would be quite contrary to the state's security concerns.

Central to the state's upliftment programme of the mid-1980's has been an acceptance of many of the costs of reproducing labour. (Boraine, 1988) Without any mention of JMC's or RSC's, W&S's discussion has a distinctly sterilized and economic feel to it.

Thirdly, although W&S argue that 'the informal sector is far from homogeneous' and give a great deal of evidence for differential incomes and inequality within it, they often still lapse into
generalities about a qualitatively undifferentiated informal sector. They fail to specify the relationships between the informal sector and particular parts of the formal sector.

Rogerson (1988), for example, draws a distinction between 'desperation' and 'multiplier informal sector activities. 'Desperation' activities are those followed by the permanently or temporarily unemployed who have no other alternatives. These are low-paying, precarious and often social unacceptable activities, like begging, theft, prostitution, beer-brewing or garbage-picking.

'Multiplier' activities, by contrast, are directly linked to, and extensions of, formal sector activities. Rogerson lists four different types of such activities. (1) Many street hawkers may be outworkers or sellers for formal sector shops, working on a commission basis. (2) Certain kinds of 'scavengers' collect recyclable goods like paper, plastics and glass for manufacturing concerns. They are, says Rogerson, effectively proletarians 'who labour under the illusion of self-employment'. (Rogerson, 1988:9) (3) The construction industry often makes extensive use of subcontracting arrangements which avoid the expenses entailed in trade unions, labour regulations and permanent employment. (4) Other industries which make use of subcontracting in South Africa include (in Bophuthatswana) rural handicrafts and the production of school uniforms.

Each of these areas has a somewhat different relationship with the formal sector economy and, Rogerson argues, will be variably affected by, for example, an economic recession. This event would most likely bring about a curtailment of certain kinds of subcontracting. Such activities would simply not be available to be subcontracted. Conversely, it might entail an expansion of desperation-type activities among a growing unemployed population.3

Now, there is an important distinction to be made between these two
3 It is not all clear that Rogerson's logic is correct in this prediction. If subcontracting entails a cheaper form of labour than regular wage-labour, an economic recession might bring about more, rather than less subcontracting.
hypothetical outcomes of an economic recession. For the first is intended and the second unintended. We might argue in the first case that an expansion of desperation-type activities in the informal sector following on a recession is functional to capital in that it blunts the politically destabilising effect of unemployment. (It would take quite a bit of argument to establish that point (cf. Bienen, 1984), but be that as it may.) However, it makes a substantial qualification on how precisely or optimally the informal sector can be conserved or dissolved in capital's interests. If the growth of desperation-type activities is not specifically monitored by concrete class interests, there will be no purposeful conserving or dissolving. We might then easily end up in a situation where the size of this section of the informal sector is dysfunctional to capital.

The point to underline is that talk of vague functionality to capital-in-general soon lapses into unacceptable functionalism. As I have stressed above, to be viable, this kind of analysis needs to indicate specific actors with limited powers and particular interests. Radical writing on this topic has tended to concentrate on local business interests as determinant of the limits and functions of informal activity. They have often ignored the state's interest, or, where they have considered the state, have seen it as homogeneous.

And, worse, these writers have succumbed to the temptations of universal functionalism. Whether the informal sector is indeed functional, to which sector of state or capital it is thus functional, whether this results in cheaper labour or political stabilisation, or whether in fact the state or capital concern themselves at all with the informal sector, are all matters for empirical verification.

Fourthly, so beguiled are W&S by the systemic logic of their conservation-dissolution metaphor that any untidy class dialectic disappears completely from their discussion. Members of the informal sector may indeed be among the least powerful of the urban African classes. That should not lead us to see them as limp, willess objects
to be ‘conserved’ or ‘dissolved’ at the whim of particular state or local ruling classes.

In their enthusiasm to counter the excessive developmental optimism of the modernisation theory paradigm, W&S lapse into the opposite structuralist extreme, what Terence Ranger once called ‘radical pessimism’. Members of the informal sector have their own interest in ‘conserving’ these activities. There are even cases of informal sector operators successfully making the transition to petty capitalism. (Rogerson, 1988). To anticipate our discussion below, ".. the development of small-scale production is not just an outcome of pressures and constraints but also of opportunity and initiative." (Schmitz quoted in Rogerson, 1988a)

Fifthly, if W&S are interested in including ‘concrete class interests’ they should be going beyond the material benefit and higher profit which dominates their discussion. That is an extremely primitive notion of the way ideology works. As Rogerson (1988a) notes, local authorities in many Third World countries, and in South Africa, operate, inter alia, with an image of "the city beautiful". They are concerned, he says, "to create an orderly, zoned, tranquil ‘Garden City’ with relatively low population densities, smooth traffic flows, an absence of congestion and a strict separation of housing functions from those of manufacturing and commerce". An important part of informal sector studies must be the internal, interior structures and textures of class interests. These cannot simply be read off from their relationship to the means of production.

Sixthly, what has happened to bantustan subsistence agriculture in all this? As I have shown, Wolpe (1972) argued that in the pre-war period, subsistence agriculture played the role of carrying or lowering the reproduction costs of labour. After WWII and the collapse of bantustan agriculture, the state, according to Wolpe, resorted to naked coercion to maintain low wage levels.

Are W&S saying that the informal sector has now replaced subsistence agriculture as a welfare substitute, and that it is no longer
necessary for the state to use coercive methods to lower wages?

However one sees it, the urban informal sector must be complemented with a bantustan leg for certain sectors of the African population. Many urban children go to school in the bantustans. Male migrants have wives, young children and parents staying there watching over small numbers of livestock and some land. Some migrants invest in rural assets for later retirement. Both McGee (1973) and Wolpe (1972) wished to premise urban unrest on the collapse of subsistence agriculture.

Both LeBrun & Gerry (1975) and Davies (1977) wish to put the informal sector into an even wider framework. They wish to argue that a substantial informal sector is the result of peripheral capitalism. Since the periphery (and the semi-periphery) are, as a rule, dominated by metropolitan monopoly capital which utilizes inappropriate technology in a labour-surplus economy, there are typically high levels of unemployment. Such unemployment generates informal sector activity. Wolpe & Legassick (1977), following Quijano (1975), applied that argument to the Southern African context, with the modification that South African capital is not dominated by metropolitan interests.

What I am saying is that informal sector studies, even of the radical, systems kind, has not cast its net wide enough. The system into which urban informal sectors fit goes much broader than urban formal sectors. They include homeland rural areas, White farming sectors, 'squatter' settlements outside bantustans.

To summarise, then, I have criticized Wellings & Sutcliffe's use of the conservation-dissolution metaphor on four counts. First, with a metaphor that implies fine, detailed control of the comings and goings of informal sector entrepreneurs, they have employed very broad brushstrokes. The actors in the formal and informal sectors, and in the state, are all very vaguely specified. That has led them into equally unspecified functionality for capital-in-general. Second, they exclude any notion of power from members of the informal sector. Ruling class dominance is absolute. Third, they have very
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economic ideas of the content of ruling class ideology and motivation. And, finally, they have cast their net too narrowly in attempting to understand the resources and constraints on informal sector operators. They have, in other words, not been structuralist enough in this last aspect, while they have been excessively so with regard to the first-mentioned aspects.

6. Conclusion

A concluding section needs to be a bit like a chameleon, not in its ability to change colour, but in keeping its eyes going simultaneously in different directions. For here we need to consider the interesting juxtaposition of Lewis, Wolpe and Wellings & Sutcliffe, with one eye, while keeping the other fixed on the longer, broader aim of the thesis. Some chameleon-like remarks, then, to summarise the discussion in this chapter, and to keep us going in the task of rethinking development theory.

(1) The value of Lewis is that he puts concrete classes with specific positions within a relational structure into Bundy's picture. Exploitation becomes a qualitative matter between social actors rather than a quantitative effect of the market. 4

(2) But there is something enclosed and formalistic in Lewis' picture. A precapitalist mode of production is anchored, pure and pristine, in its lineage form by the essential, and essentialist, tension between older and junior males. As long as that critical key remains other changes in the forces of production, trading activities, social relations, and ideology make very little difference. That is why precapitalist agents can, in this view, remain 'uncaptured', even 'untouched' by the capitalist mode of production. Other writers call this economism. (Kahn & Llobera, 1980) I think essentialism is a better term. 5

4 Of course, Bundy is, in the detail of his presentation not as crude as that, but we need to be a bit unfair to make the point.
5 This is a somewhat different meaning of the word, essentialism, from Popper's use of the term, as discussed in Chapter One.
Lewis, in effect, loses the broader context and the transcending dynamic which incorporates precapitalist modes of production into a wider relationship of articulation. In this sense Lewis has regressed to the position of the dual economy thesis which Bundy so efficiently demolished.

Such myopia quickly leads into definitional problems. Precapitalist modes of production have, in consequence, multiplied alarmingly, and modes of production theorists have retreated into metatheoretical introversion. I shall argue in Chapter Five that some form of structural coherence can be retained (whether one calls it a mode of production or not) via the idea of a transcending dynamic or law of motion, as put by Banaji, Coquery-Vidrovitch and Alavi, in their different ways.

(3) Although Lewis ‘brought men back in’ (that was, after all the cardinal point on the modes of production theory agenda), Wolpe and Wellings & Sutcliffe demolished them again. Both these writers lapse into crude notions of absolute ruling class power and capital-logic, also known as functionalist thinking and teleological thinking. In the process they both used and abused the conservation-dissolution metaphor. It is a short step from there back to Frank’s stagnationism. It is perhaps no coincidence that in both these instances precapitalist modes of production are eventually dispensable to their argument.

In short, beyond a new notion of exploitation, Wolpe and Wellings & Sutcliffe make hardly any progress at a theoretical level beyond dependency theory. We need to go to later historians, like Beinart, to reap the full benefit of a sustained theoretical advance in this theoretical sphere.

For the purposes of our later argument we may summarise (and translate) the above points as follows.

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6 It is a little unfair to put Wolpe and Wellings & Sutcliffe together like this. Wolpe was, after all, writing in the mid-1970’s, and has moved substantially since then. (Wolpe, 1988) Wellings & Sutcliffe write in the mid-1980’s. They ought to know better.
(a) Social analysis must start from the consciousness of individual agents. Such agents have particular interests and limited power. Both their interests and their power is structured by the broader context, the 'mode of production', through which they conduct their social existence. That applies to both dominant and dominated classes. They are, after all, mirror-images of each other. They structure each other's existence.

(b) The structure which is expressed by social existence defines exploitation between classes in qualitatively different ways. 'The market' in capitalism means something quite different from 'the market' in precapitalist modes of production. The market is furthermore one moment in the exploitative process. Market relations and class relations are mutually constitutive.

(c) Exploitation occurs at a number of levels, the world, the country, the urban complex. Wolpe and Wellings & Sutcliffe give detailed analyses of these latter two levels. We shall see how Wallerstein sees things at a world level in Chapter Five.

Modes of production theory has introduced a welcome relational, qualitative aspect to analysing underdevelopment. But it has got trapped into a single, often urban-rural, dimension. That one needs to be complemented with others, both larger and smaller.
CHAPTER FOUR: THINKING ABOUT THE BANTUSTAN STATE: COMPRADOR, TRADITIONALIST OR RECALCITRANT?

1. Introduction

The somewhat comical events which made up the Bophuthatswana coup and counter-coup, both within the space of fifteen hours on Wednesday, 10th February, 1988, provided the opportunity for numerous academics, reporters and politicians to parade similarly comic theories about what had happened. The government mouthpiece in the Cape, Die Burger, reported that the ANC were probably involved in the failed coup. For Prof. Mike Hough from Pretoria University the coup was a huge surprise. Bophuthatswana had, after all, been seen as a model homeland. Nevertheless military coups were a quite widespread phenomenon in Africa, although it had not occurred in South Africa before. (He had apparently forgotten the four previous coups and attempted coups in the Ciskei and Transkei.) Brian Pottinger of the Sunday Times put it well:

"The standard response from many white South Africans is simply to shrug shoulders and say 'that's Africa' - the suggestion being that there is something inherent in the people of the continent that tends to corruption, incompetence and instability... Since the Second World War, after all, there have been 71 coups in Africa. The Transkei contributed merely another two and Bophuthatswana an attempted 74th." (S/Times 21/2/1988)

Two days later Pik Botha, Minister of Foreign Affairs, was at great pains to explain the differences between the Transkei coup (which Pretoria probably knew about, but did not interfere with) and the Bophuthatswana coup (which they did not know about, but did interfere with). "The most important factor is that the Transkei government did not ask us for assistance - they did not even inform us." (Cape Times 12/2/88)

For some members of the SA police, military and intelligence the surprise was more unpleasant. "Widespread 'backside-kicking' was apparently taking place in at least one intelligence-gathering organization as a result of its analysts' failure to forecast the rebel action." (Cape Times 12/2/88)

For more critical commentators, on the other hand, the event was

1 I am indebted to Doreen Atkinson, Willie Breytenbach and Francine de Clercq for extremely helpful comment on earlier drafts of this paper.
viewed with quite evident pleasure. "No longer is it possible to pretend there is more than a bogus independence in the 'independent' states", said the Sunday Tribune. "However naive the perpetrators of the coup may have been in expecting any sort of sympathy or co-operation from the puppet master of Bophuthatswana, at least their actions revealed the extent of the puppeteer’s mastery." (14/2/88) The Weekly Mail noted FW Botha's 'tell-tale slip'. "We are tonight back in full control." He hastily added: "The president of Bophuthatswana is in full control." (12/02/88)

For Prof Jeremy Keenan of Wits University there was something much more conspiratorial to Pretoria's intervention. They feared that much worse corruption would be revealed. President Mangope had ‘played a major role in the anti-sanctions lobby abroad and been a charismatic defender of the homelands policy, which suited the SA government perfectly’. (Sunday Tribune 14/2/88)

This chapter argues that both the conservative and radical kinds of theory illustrated here need to be sharply reassessed. For a start, there are important reasons for saying that bantustan leaders are not puppets in the sense used above. Nor does everything they do ‘suit the SA government perfectly’. There is a great deal which the SA government appear not to know, and which they find quite embarrassing.

The interests of bantustan leaders are in important ways at odds with those of Pretoria/SA capital because (i) they are caught in capitalist state-type institutions which entail particular interests, and a monopoly of the means of violence and of taxation; (ii) they are caught in South African state-type institutions with a history of extreme powerlessness and vulnerability to intervention; (iii) their state institutions suffer from a serious crisis of legitimacy which drives their incumbents to ugly methods of survival; (iv) their class origins makes them wholly dependent on the state for capital accumulation which does the same; (v) they have for a considerable time been starved of financial aid; and (vi) their intercalary position periodically calls for public stances which are hostile to Pretoria. They have, in short, both the motives and the means to be
thoroughly recalcitrant at times.

If bantustan leaders have been seen as puppets of Pretoria/capital, they have also been seen as caught in the chains of 'African' tradition. These culturalist theories of politics are, I shall argue, intuitively attractive, but are so flawed by problems of definition and formulation that they remain ineffectual. In the hands of more conservative writers they serve ideological ends in softening the moral opprobrium directed at apartheid. This is allied to Third World language which serves the same end by drawing close parallels between 'corrupt', 'unstable' African countries and bantustans.

2. André Gunder Frank again

Frankian dependency theory has both explicitly and implicitly been at the bottom of a great deal of thinking about bantustans for some considerable time. As I have indicated in Chapter One, we see the first explicit influence of Frank in the work of Colin Bundy in 1972. Alongside the economic ideas of stagnation and dependence, is that of tight control at the political level. Whether comprador, nationalist or populist, Third World ruling classes were, in the dependency framework inevitably 'captured' by foreign capital or transnational corporations (TNC's). Post-colonial ruling classes were both unable and unwilling to oppose the interests of the metropolitan bourgeoisie. Translated into SA terms, bantustan leaders became puppets, 'paid functionaries', 'camp commandants of the bantustan labour camps' etc. In a certain ineluctable way, the insidious contagion of apartheid infected those in contact with it, and left them, much like Dracula's victims, drained of moral fibre and the will to resist.

A lot has happened over the last decade in the bantustans to shake up older dependency notions of stagnation and the captured bourgeoisie. For a start, bantustan analysts have noted significant nodes of economic growth arising at selected spots both within and on the borders of bantustans. (More about those in Chapter Five.)

\[2\text{Cf. Innes \\& O'Meara, 1976; Molteno, 1977; Southall (1982) talks, inter alia, of Transkei's leaders being bound hand and foot.}\]
More significant for our purposes, however, have been developments at a political level. For a ruling class which is supposed to be captured and bound hand and foot, bantustan leaders have exhibited a cavalier disregard for their puppet-masters. Bophuthatswana and Transkei have shared the distinction of being both financially bankrupt and wracked by military coups. Ciskei has had attempted coups and has abolished company tax.

The variety of responses to the bantustan system is an indication that we can no longer be satisfied with simple determinist explanations of what is happening. What we need more than anything else, I would argue, is a theory of bantustan politics, in general, and of the bantustan state, in particular.

In order to reach this goal I shall discuss three questions in Marxist theory. First, how should we conceptualise the separation of ‘economics’ and ‘politics’ under capitalism? There is a great deal of Marxist writing concerned with the ‘relative autonomy’ of the state from its economic base. Second, how should we understand the relationship of the state to class relations? This question acquires special interest in Third World situations where indigenous bourgeoisie have often been seen as ‘captured’ by the metropolitan or foreign bourgeoisie. And third, would any other kind of theory serve us better in understanding what happens in bantustan politics?

3. Marxist theories of the State in Developed Countries

The autonomous nature of the capitalist state has been something of a dilemma for Marxist theory outside of development studies. Some early Marxist writers conceived of the state as doing little more than performing certain useful functions for the capitalist system (a functionalist notion), or alternatively, as acting in the name, if not at the behest of, the dominant class or class fractions (an instrumentalist notion). This latter notion of the state is often thought to be well expressed by the formulation by Marx and Engels: "The executive of the modern state is but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie." (quoted in Gulalp, 1987:289)
Later Marxist writers have been concerned to break out of these functionalist and structuralist straitjackets for the state. Thus Poulantzas argued for the idea of the state as a site of struggle between fractions of the dominant classes. "The State's autonomy .. is concretely manifested in the diverse, contradictory measures that each of these classes and fractions, through its specific presence in the State and the resulting play of contradictions, manages to have integrated into State policy." (quoted Gulalp, 1987:295)

Miliband, for his part, was concerned to specify the mechanisms and structural constraints of the state's autonomy. ".. an accurate and realistic ‘model’ of the relationship between the dominant class in advanced capitalist societies and the state is one of partnership between two different, separate forces, linked to each other by many threads, yet each having its own separate spheres of concern." (quoted Gulalp, 1987:300; my own emphasis)

4. Theories of the Postcolonial State.

The problem of establishing some measure of autonomy for the state has overflowed into Third World political writing. There has, in consequence, been considerable debate on the ‘postcolonial state’ among writers like Alavi (1972), Leys (1976,1978), Saul (1979), Samoff (1983), Beckman (1980,1981,1982) and von Freyhold (1977), to name only the most influential. Out of that whirlpool I wish to draw four basic ideas in an attempt to show how postcolonial states might be seen as less ‘captured’, ‘instrumentalist’ or ‘functionalist’ than they often are in Marxist writing.

(i) The capitalist state, by virtue of being capitalist, acquires substantial independent power via its monopoly of the means of legal violence and of taxation. Basic to a Marxist conception of the state in a capitalist, as opposed, for example, to a feudal, system is, to use Giddens’ term, the extrusion of coercion from the labour contract.

The legal and constitutional protection of individual rights means
that a capitalist employer, unlike a feudal lord, has no claim over the personal life of his employee. It is the state which is concerned with 'maintaining law and order' under capitalism. The right to physical coercion, i.e. 'the monopoly of the means of violence', rests with state institutions - the police, the army, the security forces, the courts.

And in the modern, industrial capitalist state, the means of violence, of surveillance, of control, have been exponentially expanded by the state's capacity for collecting and storing information on, and monitoring the behaviour of its citizens. (Giddens, 1981) In a capitalist system we are dealing with a state institution which has quite different resources, in both quality and quantity, from governing institutions in feudal or tribal systems.

(ii) If the state has its own resources, it also has its own interests and concerns which distinguish it from other ruling classes. In their concern to remain in power, it is in the interest of state managers to ensure 'developmental' conditions for the expansion of capital in general. Different sets of state managers may pursue these ends in different ways, but in the end they are bound by what Alavi calls a 'structural imperative'. In concrete terms this might mean a concern for the development of infrastructure, education, health, energy, transport etc. The strength of the state depends, after all, on the strength of the economy. State managers must in their own interests work for economic growth.

As a result, the self-interest of state managers tends to converge with the interests of the capitalist class. Let us recall Miliband's view of the state as being in 'partnership' with the bourgeois classes; "two different, separate forces, linked to each other by many threads, yet each having its own separate spheres of concern." This is a view that I shall strongly support.

(iii) A strong assumption underlying much writing on the postcolonial state is that the state and foreign bourgeoisie are of necessity in conflict. That is why the state needs to be 'captured'. But we can dispense with that assumption. As Beckman writes of Nigeria.
"... the Nigerian state is not a comprador state in the sense that it is primarily an agent of social forces external to the society. These forces have been internalised. Nor is it a 'national' state in the sense of being a carrier of national resistance to foreign domination. The relations of domination originating from outside have been built into the fabric of domestic class relations." (Beckman, 1982:50)(my own emphasis)

Given the presence of a number of contending classes in the arena, there is also the possibility of shifting alliances and conflicts between them. In this situation, says Alavi (1972), the state is able to play an independent and mediating role in the conflicts between other classes.

(iv) Finally, the state, as an institution is critical to Third World ruling classes for their access to power and wealth. In consequence, they do not 'capture' the state from a position of power outside of it. The accumulation of resources on their part is almost completely dependent on their control of state institutions. In fact, they more often move from state positions to capture resources outside of it. In these circumstances, Sandbrook says, "class relations ... are determined by relations of power, not production". (Sandbrook, 1985:72)

African polities are also artificial entities in a number of ways, says Sandbrook. Colonial rule set off ethnic groups against each other, and operated for the most part by authoritarian methods. There is very little tradition of constitutional government. Capitalist development was confined to urban enclaves, leaving the country not proletarianised, but peasantised. Economic development and urbanisation likewise eroded the authority of traditional leaders. The moral authority of government leaders does not, as a result, stretch very far into the countryside.

These are critical steps on the road to authoritarian and corrupt patron-client rule by individual strongmen, or what Sandbrook calls 'neo-patrimonialism'. Shorn of the usual economic and normative foundations on which First World leaders build their rule, and consequently driven by insecurity, Third World, and particularly African, leaders must resort to other means.
Ensuring compliance and loyalty among citizens and bureaucrats in these circumstances becomes a matter of force, patronage, paranoia, nepotism, clientelism, bribery, personality cults, and delivering tangible developmental benefits. Where government funds are scarce, even development and bribery become more difficult. What remains are the ingredients for a particularly unlovely governmental form. (Sandbrook, 1985)

In the following sections of this chapter I intend to take ideas developed up to this point and put them to work in looking at South Africa's bantustans. Let us review them briefly.

In contrast to older Marxist views, I have argued that the capitalist state as an institution is never necessarily in service of either the ruling classes (the instrumentalist view) or the economic system (the functionalist view). State managers have different interests and resources from those of the private sector. They control the means of coercion and of taxation. Their concern, and a very varied concern it is, is for the economy as a whole, rather than for individual interest groups. That does not mean they can do as they like. Not only do their interests tend to overlap with those of the ruling classes in general, but there is significant power exercised by the ruling classes on them.

This picture of the capitalist state is significantly modified by African conditions. African governments do not have the usual means of ensuring loyalty and compliance among their followers. Moreover, state incumbents are very dependent on their positions for gaining access to wealth. All this makes it extremely difficult for them to contemplate giving up power. So they end up using authoritarian and corrupt methods to retain power.

5. Bantustans as state-type organisations.

Let us now turn our attention to bantustans as administrative and political institutions. The question we need to ask here, indeed the question at the crux of this chapter is this: is there any conceptual advantage to be gained by seeing bantustans as capitalist states or
state-type institutions? Put another way, do we gain insight into bantustan government actions by saying that their resources and interests are similar to those of other postcolonial capitalist states? Or should bantustans be regarded as nothing more than beefed up Tribal Councils or Black Local Authorities? (Mangope for Mayor!) Consider the following aspects.

First, bantustans enjoy a legal monopoly over the means of violence within their designated territorial spheres. The military-security apparatus handed over at ‘independence’ was by no stretch of the imagination ‘overdeveloped’, as Alavi described for postcolonial regimes. (Alavi, 1972). Pretoria had not built up armies or police forces for each bantustan area. But bantustan leaders have put considerable effort into developing their own military-security apparatuses with the help of Pretoria, ex-Rhodesians and Israeli’s. Where these have been seen as inadequate, bantustans have in one or two cases resorted to vigilante organisations.

Second, bantustans have no control over money supply, exchange rates, interest rates etc. They have no central or reserve bank. But they do enjoy a monopoly of taxation, which entails control over amounts (in 1986/7) ranging from R493m. in the case of the Ciskei to R1052m. in the case of the Transkei. 3

It also entails a concern not only for the collection of tax income, but also the nurturing of tax bases. That entails in three bantustans a considerable interest in and cooperation with the tourist-casino business - an interesting division of labour between Pretoria and the bantustans. It also means a concern for the complicated formulae by which Pretoria’s Customs Union contributions to the bantustans are calculated, as well as the funding prescriptions of the World Bank lookalike, the Development Bank of SA (DBSA). In Bophuthatswana’s case there is also concern for the price of platinum.

In all, budgetary resources and concerns are quite similar to other postcolonial states.

3 The following section draws heavily on an unpublished mimeo by David Bridgmann. He provided invaluable advice in the initial formulation of this chapter.
To this must be added a strong colonial element in the funding provided directly by Pretoria as under the head of ‘statutory agreements’. This source of funding was intended to cover the money central government and provincial administrations had spent in maintaining services in the year of independence. The amount grew extremely slowly until 1985/6. Nor was inflation taken into account in calculating the amount from year to year. The arbitrary and cynical nature of this formula need not concern us here. More important is that bantustan governments, starved of funds to maintain basic services, have resorted to private sector loans. This has been relatively easy since Pretoria stands surety for these loans.

The irony of it is that precolonial financial arrangements have then resulted in postcolonial debt-crisis situations. In 1984/5 government debt of the four ‘independent’ bantustans had risen to R1.4 billion.

5.1. A Poverty of Legitimacy

Thirdly, bantustan leaders operate on a very fragile legitimacy base. None have emerged from pre-existing political movements with grass roots bases. In fact, the aim of creating bantustans was precisely to bypass the existing Black political movements like the ANC. The ideal of ‘orderly progress to independence’ so prized by Nationalist politicians is exactly the condition which has deprived bantustan polities of political coherence.

Most bantustan leaders have risen and are dependent for support from traditional authority systems which have been seriously undermined by incorporation into Pretoria’s administrative grid. Chiefs and headmen have been arbitrarily appointed or replaced on the grounds of their compliance with Pretoria’s policies. They are, presently, paid functionaries stripped of any meaningful administrative power. I shall argue below that this picture of traditional leaders is too simple. Nevertheless, for the purposes of the argument here, let us note that bantustan leaders are, and are right to be, anxious about their political support-base.
5.2. State Incumbent or Petite bourgeoisie?

Up to this point I have analysed the behaviour of bantustan leaders in terms of their membership of a particular institution. But what of their relationship to the means of production, or their class position? Charney (1988) wishes to argue that the South African black urban (non-bantustan) elite display the traits of a typical Poulantzian petite bourgeoisie, oscillating between the working and ruling classes, now supporting Black Consciousness ideologies, and then the ANC. They are unreliable, fissiparous, cooptible and compromised. Maré & Hamilton (1987) also describe the Inkatha superstructure as petite bourgeois aspiring to bourgeois status. But that is far too simple. 4

If one is to explain ideological shifts among black elites, I am inclined rather to go with Shula Marks' analysis of the 'ambiguities of dependence'. (Marks, 1988) She argues that, whether they are traditional authorities, christianised petite bourgeois, or trade union organisers, the position of South African black elites is fraught with multiple ambiguities that have to do with blackness (Biko's 'two-faced' blacks), nationalism (Janus-faced), the survival of traditional authority in urban context, and administrative positions caught between White rulers and Black voters.

However one sees it, the relationship to the means of production of the bantustan elite is crucially mediated by, and secondary to, their access to state positions. Put more simply, even when they have traditional origins, most bantustan leaders originally had very little economic base beyond ownership of cattle and sheep. Other incumbents have mostly been professionals, teachers, clerks, at most, traders. Their access to wealth, like commercial farming land, trading concerns, directorships, and housing has been very dependent on their control of political power.

The opportunities for robust development of a South African black

4 That appears to be a very economistic interpretation, even of Poulantzas. Wolpe (1988) argues that, for Poulantzas, relationship to the means of production is a very 'abstract' determination of class, and that the 'concrete' content of class action will be determined by practice, discourse and organisation.
bourgeoisie are to be found rather outside the bantustans in the metropolitan and large urban areas. Urban concentrations which are something more than dormitory areas are a very recent phenomenon inside bantustans. (Graaff, 1986) There seems to be little chance that the bourgeoisie which has been able (belatedly) to grow in non-bantustan urban areas will feed back into bantustan politics and development. The crystallisation of bourgeoisie classes has, contrary to the apparent intention of official policy, been smothered inside bantustans.

In this situation, a very recognizable neo-patrimonialist pattern of insecure and authoritarian government follows. The management of the state cannot be put up for competition in democratic elections. It becomes, in fact, both downright dangerous and unprofitable to be in opposition. Compliance with government rule must be ensured by patronage, nepotism, bribery, emergency regulations, developmental benefits and force. As I have argued above, development funds are either quite scarce or determined by DBSA criteria. And this decreases opportunities for both development and bribery. Much like other postcolonial governments of the neo-patrimonialist variety, bantustan governments must rely on ugly methods of survival.

However, it needs emphasizing that bantustan leaders are as a result very vulnerable and very sensitive to threats to their legitimacy. Anti-Pretoria rhetoric on issues like territorial consolidation, the addition of extra land, population resettlement, SA citizenship for bantustan residents and financing should not be seen as an opportunistic and transparent ploy to improve their images both internally and internationally. While they are clearly dependent for their very existence as leaders on the maintenance of the bantustans, their status as leaders is very seriously threatened by the way Pretoria manages and manipulates them. They are a bit like abandoned sailors paddling furiously to keep a very leaky boat afloat. They cannot abandon the boat. But they can be extremely bitter at how many holes there are in it.  

5 During the independence runup Mangope had the following to say about Pretoria's treatment of him. "We .. have recently experienced the full blast of .. painful humiliation and disillusionment .. it is the question mark about the motives of the .. Government which is trying to trick us into an independence which smells of fraud." (Treviran, 1984:151)
With such poorly crystallised classes and in the absence of any ‘independence’ struggle, political parties tend to lie in the shadow of prominent personalities rather than follow policy differences. For example, almost all political parties supported bantustan ‘independence’ in the beginning. (Trevisan, 1984: 116) They are powerless, listless organisations operating as an extension of, and justification for, what happens in government offices.

"The reality is that the decisions are taken by the leader who at most has to obtain the consensus of the political elite. Such consensus is generally not difficult to obtain given the almost total inexistence (sic) of organised political opposition in the bantustans." (Trevisan, 1984: 129)

From this perspective it is easier to understand why bantustan leaders find the prospect of international recognition so irresistible. It offers the chance of breaking out of Pretoria’s stranglehold, at least in a financial sense. It also offers prestige. And what keeps this chimera alive is a string of thoroughly dishonest uhuru-hoppers who pretend to sell both international recognition and finance.

Bophuthatswana’s famous uhuru-hopper, Shabtai Kalmanovitz, appears to have convinced Pretoria, Sol Kerzner as well as Mangope of the value of his wares. Africa Confidential (voll. 27-9) seems convinced that Bophuthatswana has attained added importance over other bantustans by providing a conduit whereby sanctions-busting and casino negotiations might more easily be pursued. Hence Pretoria’s overkill reaction to the wobbly coup attempt in Mmabatho. Mangope is more than just the golden boy of bantustan development. And that might give him a significant bargaining resource against Pretoria.

6. Bantustans as Black Local Authorities

At this point it might be useful to ask why we need to go to all the trouble of dragging out theories of the state when we could just as

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6 In this chapter I have frequently used the term, leader, in place of ruling class, to indicate the extraordinary personal power which these dominant personalities exercise.

7 ‘Uhuru-hopper’ is a term coined, as far as I know, in the bantustans, to describe the dishonest types who hop from one newly independent country to another exploiting the naivety of inexperienced leaders.
well have used local government models. We could, if nothing else, have diminished their dignity by writing them down/off as glorified Black Local Authorities.

Which is, after all, exactly what they were since military defeat by colonial powers in the nineteenth century. The Glen Grey Act of 1894 established a system of elected councils in the Ciskei which gradually spread throughout the Transkei, and eventually become the United Transkeian Territorial General Council (the Bunga). The explicit aim of this system was to strip traditional chiefs of their tributary, judicial, tax and state (ability to declare war) powers. A grid of 26 magistrates was put in place to bypass the chief and to administer the territory through village headmen. Councils and the overarching Bunga, in which chiefs had sitting, had little more than advisory powers and negligible budgets. (Hammond-Tooke, 1975; Carter et al., 1967)

The Black Authorities Act of 1951 (applied four years later in the Transkei) brought the chief back into the administrative network, restored some his traditional powers but subjected his legitimacy to contamination by association with the apartheid system. There are many instances of chiefs being deposed and replaced with individuals who enjoyed no hereditary claim to authority. In 1959 the Promotion of Bantu Self-government Act instituted Territorial Authorities with legislative assemblies dominated by a majority of nominated chiefs. This majority has frequently been used to reverse election defeats for incumbents. These Territorial Authorities rapidly accumulated administrative powers during the 1960's and 1970's. In the late 1970's and early 1980's four Territorial Authorities acquired the additional trappings of 'statehood'.

This is a well-known history but I repeat it here to emphasize two points. First, it is often said on the basis of this runup that chiefs enjoy minimal political legitimacy, and that a political and administrative system built on this base must be exceedingly wobbly. I think that conclusion is too easy.

There is no doubt that a great many chiefs in both independent and
self-governing bantustans are corrupt, lazy, indigent, impecunious, powerless, discredited, and deeply resented by their people. On the other hand, there are many instances of chiefs being at the centre of resistance to the ravages of separate development. The resistance to pass laws, Bantu Authorities and land conservation in the late 1950's (in Pondoland, Zeerust and Sekhukhuneland) all centred round chiefs. (Lodge, 1983:chapter 11) Resistance to population resettlement in the 1970's and 1980's at, to name just a few in the Western Transvaal, Magopa, Mathopestad, Leeuwfontein, Braklaagte, has likewise integrally involved chiefs. At other places chiefs have regained power by access to alternative financial resources like platinum royalties in the Pilanesberg area, land rentals in expanding peri-urban areas, commercial farming, trading licenses etc. Zulu chieftainship has in places assumed the mantle of Inkatha warlord. Nor have chiefs been tightly encapsulated into rural areas. They have cooperated and allied themselves with trade unions and mass democratic organisations. (Marks, 1988)

The point to make is that the institution of chieftaincy has in significant degree adapted to changing circumstance, acquired urban trappings, responded to new needs. Inkatha may be the beneficiary of state repression, but it is a good example of a reinvigorated, adapted traditional institution. The massive spread of informal settlements on metropolitan fringes has immensely extended that adaptive process. Nor should we assume that chiefs automatically support bantustan governments. Chieftainship, whether we still care to call it traditional or not, is far too ambiguous a force to dismiss as devoid of political legitimacy.

Beinart (1985:97) wishes to make a stronger point. Chiefs, as both leaders and symbols of popular resistance to White rule, exercised a significant constraint on White power. 'Certainly', he says, 'capital and state ... had only limited power to shape social relationships in those areas which were left under African occupation.' Even in the pre-independence period it is too facile to speak of puppets.

The more important point to make is that over a period of fifteen years the administrative and political structure of bantustans has
changed radically from a penniless, advisory council system occupying itself with nothing weightier than dipping and fencing, to an institution imbued with a fully differentiated state bureaucratic-military machinery, budgetary resources upwards of R1bn. to back it up, and concerns and anxieties ranging from foreign affairs to winning elections. The implications of statehood, and the contrast with models of local government, could not be more starkly illustrated. Bantustan governments cannot be written off/down as nothing more than Black Local Authorities.

7. Disentangling State and Nation-state

A great deal of confusion in thinking about bantustans derives from the criteria used for defining what an ‘independent’ state is. By that I mean that we often require a ‘proper’ state to have a high level of discreteness and sovereignty vis-a-vis other states. Zimbabwe is a country with clearly delineated boundaries which separate it unambiguously from its surrounding neighbours. Within its borders it exercises unquestioned authority and control.

And that, after all, we might say, is what is wrong with bantustans as states. They are impossibly fragmented geographically. Their territorial boundaries are extraordinarily porous, because substantial parts of their ‘citizenry’ spend more time outside their boundaries than inside. In fact, the activities of Pretoria’s administration are usually more relevant and more pressing to their day to day lives than those of Mmabatho or Umtata. The ties between a Mmabatho or a Bisho with Pretoria are so dense and powerful that one struggles to discern any embryonic sovereignty or independence.

Now, there are (at least) two things wrong with this kind of scenario. It confuses the ideas of state and nation-state. And it makes the notion of nation-state do too much work as a unit of analysis.

Let us change metaphors. Instead of focusing on countries, i.e. territorial units which like billiard balls of varying sizes and weights bump against each other, think of nodes in a regional
These nodes, which might consist of cities, state institutions, transnational companies, regions or subcontinents are connected to each other by multiple strands. And these networks are layered on to each other, separable only by analytical crystallisation.  

This image has advantages for our thinking about bantustans. It focuses our attention on states as institutions, anchored at a particular geographical location, spreading their tentacles outwards as far as they can both within and beyond their designated territorial limits. Their control might not effectively cover their whole territory. Conversely, they might have tighter bonds with nodes outside of those boundaries than with remote parts inside them.

It is obvious, for example, that the interaction between the Oci/Moretele regions of Bophuthatswana with the PWV complex is far more dense and powerful than that with their political capital, Mmabatho. Conversely, the links between Mmabatho and Pretoria are far stronger than those between Mmabatho and Thaba 'Nchu.

But saying all this does not stop us thinking about bantustan leaders as operating within a state-type context. We can, in other words, let go of the notion of a nation-state, a discrete, independent territorial unit but still retain the idea of an institution whose incumbents act like state managers elsewhere in the world. Which is why it is helpful to speak of Bisho's relations with Pretoria rather than Ciskei's relations with South Africa.

8. Morality and Theory

That conceptual shift also relieves us of the moral dilemma of 'legitimating' bantustans as separate, independent entities. They are not separate entities, either politically, socially, economically, geographically or any other way. But they do have institutions which induce people to act in certain ways, state-type ways.

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Radical writers have, rather coyly, been wary of propagating theory which might, directly or indirectly, help to legitimate bantustans as discrete economic or political entities. Such a move would ‘concede to state ideology’ that the bantustans might be separate units (Innes & O'Meara, 1976) or would ‘accept the SA regime’s own definition that the independent bantustans are in fact states, and thus (albeit unintentionally) serve to legitimize state ideology and, more importantly, the fragmentation of the Republic into its white core and black peripheral ‘states’ (with all the oppressive consequences that go with that)’. (Southall, 1982:9)

But, even in their own terms, I think they have set themselves unnecessarily stringent limits. Even if we could predict how the SA state was going to utilise our academic writing (which we can’t), it would be a silly position if ‘they’ could deny critical writers access to any number of useful analytical concepts simply by (threatening to) incorporate them, in however truncated or distorted form, into official ideology. The irony of it is that despite their sensitivities and caveats, numerous Radical writers have landed up seeing bantustans as separate entities anyway. (Graaff, 1984)

My argument is that Radical writers need not tie themselves into knots about bantustan independence and separateness at all, however well or badly they do that. The dilemma is a false one.


The picture that I have been sketching of the way bantustan governments work could be called a structural one. This picture picks out the situational constraints and inducements on people to act in a certain way as the salient ones. It says, crudely, put people in similar contexts and they will act in similar ways.

There is, however, a powerful stream of writing which wishes to question this view. Such writers would wish to focus attention on culture instead of structure in explaining political behaviour. These writers would say, for example, that individuals are socialised into
a universe of subjective values, symbols, beliefs, or norms which define the context within which political structures operate. As such this subjective realm has an important impact on the objective behaviour of political actors. Relevant in this regard are people's attitudes to trust, hierarchy, liberty and community loyalty. (Jeppe, 1987)

Translated into African terms, these writers would argue that 'Western' constitutional arrangements are incompatible with African culture. This explains why governments have been so unstable in Africa, and democracy so rare. Political institutions should be closer to 'traditional' African patterns of government.

"The concept of an institutionalised opposition is altogether incomprehensible and irreconcilable with the social (kinship and communal) values as well as the hereditary principles and religious values about leadership." (Jeppe, 1987:10)

"The typical dominant one-party or no-party political systems of Africa is a further political characteristic which conforms with indigenous political culture..." (Jeppe, 1987:21)

In formal language, this theory says that culture is the prime determinant of both political behaviour and political structure. It is not structure which determines culture. (Almond & Verba, 1980)

This type of analysis lies easily alongside an emphasis on the importance of ethnicity in political life and has often been used to justify the existence of separate ethnic bantustans to cope with interracial conflict in South Africa. (Carter, Karis & Stultz, 1967)

In popular terms form these ideas can shade into simple racism. "Give Africans political power and you get Idi Amin."

Now, no social scientist worth their salt would deny that culture is an important element in social and political life. But the culture-determines-structure thesis as posed above is, even on its terms, full of holes. First, there is no single African political culture. African polities, for example, range from the militarised and highly stratified kingdom of Shaka Zulu based on kinship groups and age-cohorts to the acephalous, weakly stratified communities of central Nigeria.
Second, African political leaders are often of very untraditional origins. They have been brought up and educated in elite urban, even metropolitan, environments. To say that their constituents are rural people, and that they therefore ‘are forced to accommodate Afrocentric political values and processes’ (Jeppe, 1987:21) is to disguise a structuralist argument as a cultural one. Urban and urbanised politicians respond to traditionalism out of necessity and constraint, not from the strength of their own traditional values. That is a simple structuralist argument.

If this thesis struggles on its own terms, it is even weaker by external criteria. It would be extremely presumptuous, for example, to say with any degree of certainty, that culture determines structure rather than the reverse. Could we not say that, for example, Western colonial structures, rather than traditional culture, have influenced people in Africa to govern in authoritarian ways? That the experience of colonial structures has significantly changed their political values and behaviour? (Almond & Verba, 1980)

There are, furthermore, some writers who would seriously question the possibility of separating culture and structure in social life. They may be distinguished analytically and definitionally, but not in practice. How would one, for example, explain a politician's speech during a parliamentary election? The structure of democracy is constituted by his performance as speech-maker. Conversely, his normative (cultural) belief in democracy is articulated by his participation in the structure of an election. Culture and structure are intimately integrated into the same social reality. It is not possible to separate them in order to discern a causal relationship.

Charney (1987) wishes to come a culturalist conclusion by, as in most of his writings, a Poulantzian route. In many African societies, he says, political activity is expressed in tribal language (‘lineage-type discourse’) and clientelist behaviour. That is because exchange relations (the capitalist mode of production) have not completely displaced the lineage mode of production; the typically capitalist separation between economic and political instances has not been totally carried through. In these circumstances the ruling
class utilises ‘lineage-type discourse’ to legitimate the state and disguise exploitation

Apart from being a highly functionalist view of culture and discourse, it sounds naive to say that tribalism/ethnicity survives in political language and behaviour because the ruling class have not yet learned to distinguish politics and economics. What is one to make of this kind of language and behaviour in an urban context? Have exchange relations not yet penetrated into factories and townships, particularly in a South African context where precapitalist formations have been virtually eliminated? We have already, in Chapter Three, noted the problems associated with talking of ‘uncaptured’ classes ‘untouched’ by capitalism.

More important, does the use of lineage-type discourse indicate lineage-type structures and ideologies? Laclau suggests another interpretation which I find far more acceptable when he talks of rural ‘symbols and ideological values’ which migrants bring with them to the city.

"Superficially this would appear to be the survival of old elements, but in reality, behind this survival is concealed a transformation: these rural elements are simply raw material which the ideological practice of the new migrant transforms in order to express new antagonisms. In this sense, the persistence of certain ideological elements can express exactly the opposite of traditionalism: a refusal to accept capitalist legality." (quoted in Marks, 1986:113) (my emphasis)

I shall return to this topic in Chapter Five. Suffice it say that Charney’s attempt to explain the survival of ‘traditional’ discourse rips it out of the context of conservation-dissolution through which capitalist and precapitalist classes interact.

10. Conclusion

Elsewhere I have argued for the view that ‘independent’ bantustans need to be seen in a quite different light from ‘self-governing’ ones. (Graaff, 1984) The granting of ‘independence’ shifted the control conduit from the old, verkrampte Department of (then) Plural Affairs/ Corporation for Economic Development (CED) diad to that of the verligte Department of Foreign Affairs/ DBSA. That move
represented a transfer of control from the right wing to the left wing of the Nationalist Party, a not insignificant shift. It also meant freedom of access to the private sector, particularly Sol Kerzner's tourist industry, and in Bophuthatswana's case, JCI's platinum group and a variety of light industries located to the north of Pretoria.

In this new environment, Bophuthatswana was able to bypass restrictions laid down by ultra-conservative white mineworkers' union, the Western Transvaal farming lobby, the Dutch Reformed Church etc. and introduce both casinos and significant changes in the apartheid structure. They could, for example, abolish Group Areas, integrate schools, write a Bill of Rights into the constitution (for what that is worth today) and introduce a race-free apprenticeship training system. (Cf. also Hirsch, 1987 on the Ciskei.)

That scenario of mine attempted to go beyond the functionalist and instrumentalist writing about bantustans which had prevailed until then. I also argued that, while control from Pretoria undoubtedly existed, the stringency of that control varied considerably across different areas. It was tightest in areas like defence, security, and the mass media (Bop TV). It was much looser in areas like education, agricultural and urban development. Since the revelations about corruption and inefficiency, control is today far tighter in developmental areas. But in the end, I was unknowingly operating with ideas very close to Alavi's on a bureaucratic-military ruling class mediating between metropolitan and local bourgeois classes.

That view, it is now apparent, needs to be supplemented by a perspective which takes into account the resources, interests and anxieties which go with administering a postcolonial capitalist state with an extremely fragile legitimacy basis and with significant colonial elements. There is a serious danger that bantustan leaders will be dismissed as mirror-images of a corrupt, immoral, authoritarian and contagious Apartheid regime. "What else would one expect from puppets?"

I would argue instead that bantustan leaders' activities need to be
understood within the context of other kinds of structural constraints. The point is that, however, artificially, however cynically, the incumbents of bantustan 'governments' have been placed in a situation where they are structurally constrained to behave as if they were managers of a recognizable capitalist state. (Which is something quite different from saying they should be granted any kind of moral recognition.) This is, to some degree, what Pretoria intended, and their plan has succeeded. There is, however, a great deal happening which they neither intended nor foresaw.
CHAPTER FIVE: THE IMPORTANCE OF BEING STRUCTURALIST: A SYSTEMS PERSPECTIVE ON DEPENDENCY AND URBANISATION.

1. Introduction

This chapter ought to be a grand finale of sorts. In the ideal world of Hollywood moviedom, boy gets girl after chasing her half way round the world, the baddies get their comeuppance, theoretical anomalies are ironed out, loose ends are tied up and a new synthesis is presented, wrapped and ribboned, to the world. Well, not quite. I retain too much of Fellini's cynicism about film-making, and too much of Weber's wariness of theory-building for that.

Nevertheless, this chapter will pull together some of the threads which have been weaving their way through this thesis. I shall do that in two ways. The first is to consider more recent dependency theory as presented by writers like Wallerstein, Cardoso & Faletto, Pröbel et al. and Johnson. There is a viable amalgam to be made from these theories which avoids the objections to both old dependency theory and modes of production theory. However, that is not quite enough. The notion of structure is, itself, being contested by South African 'social historians'. I shall argue, quite briefly, that Giddens' structuration theory provides a way to recast our ideas of structure.

With regard to the first task, then, the construction of a new look dependency theory, I shall argue that the internal, class analysis or 'productionist' approach (derived from modes of production theory) needs to be combined with an external, world, 'circulationist' and, more importantly, structuralist approach (derived from world system theory and NIDL). Put another way, the core-periphery metaphor may be retained on condition that the relationship between core and periphery be seen to operate at different levels superimposed 'on top of' each other, at the international, regional, national and intra-urban levels. In addition, a core-periphery system must be seen to contain a number of nodes existing 'next to' one another. These

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1. I am grateful to Pieter le Roux and Peter Wilkinson for extremely valuable comment on an earlier draft of this chapter.

2. In this chapter I shall use the terms system and structure, interchangeably, although I am aware that Giddens would have objections to that.
may consistent of different modes or relations of production.

Another way to look at the theoretical synthesis presented here, is to say that it dissolves the old distinction between theories of imperialism (which looked at core areas) and dependency (which looked at peripheral areas). Cardoso & Faletto (1979) wished to say that, because core areas were more powerful, there is no such thing as dependency theory, only situations of dependency. Johnson (1986) also wishes to emphasize the importance of external, world structures by saying that they are determinant in a 'general' rather than a 'proximate' sense. But all these distinctions, external - internal, general - proximate, are misleading in the same way that separate theories for ruling classes and working classes would be. All these dichotomies are relational in the sense that they are determined by a single set of structures, the capitalist system.

As has been my practice in previous chapters, I shall follow the general theoretical discussion with a consideration of how these theoretical perspectives have been applied in the Southern African context. South African radical analysis has been through an important shift from the old notion of dependent underdevelopment (DU) (from André Gunder Frank) to more recent ideas of dependent development (DD) and the new international division of labour (NIDL).

This shift runs parallel to the change in government policy with regard to bantustan industrialisation in the late 1970's. The old Verwoerdian plan of half-hearted investment in border industries and selected deconcentration points has given way to the full-blooded encouragement of decentralisation via the Good Hope Plan. This has followed closely on the heels of formal bantustan independence, the crystallisation of bantustan state or state-type institutions and the rise of new bantustan classes and leadership structures.

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3 Border industries are points designated for the encourageent of industrial development near to, but outside of, bantustan borders. (Example, Brits) Deconcentration points, by contrast, lie inside bantustans but close to, and as extensions of, existing metropolitan areas. (Example, Baballegi) Decentralisation points are those towns designated for industrial development somewhat removed from metropolitan areas. (Example, Butterworth)
While South African radical writing has reconceptualised the first 'economic' area, it has severely neglected the second 'political' area, as I showed in Chapter Four. In both of these areas it is still markedly functionalist. I shall argue that South African radical writing in this sphere needs to be both broader and narrower; narrower because more attention needs to be paid to individual corporations and economic sectors; broader because we require more information on the international context of industrial decentralisation.

Up to this point I have tried to show how modes of production theory, world system theory and NIDL theory may be combined by means of a multidimensional, multinodal core-periphery structure. There are, however, a number of broader, metatheoretical issues that we need to address. Three of these lie together.

First, Wallerstein claims that the core-periphery structure is fundamental to capitalism in the same way that the capital-labour relationship is. That is an ambitious claim that needs to be taken seriously. I do not think that until now Wallerstein has provided sufficient evidence to substantiate it. The second issue concerns Brenner's criticism that dependency theory is 'individualistic', 'psychologistic', in short, it is a microtheory. I shall argue that Brenner is confused in his conception of what microtheory is. Thirdly, Leys dislikes structuralist theory because it is mystificatory. Because it relies on market mechanisms, it cannot explain the underlying dynamic of social change. It must fall back on 'deep' structure. Defined that way, Leys is correct about structuralism. He encapsulates a great deal of what is wrong with quantitative conceptions of core-periphery relationships. But, given a different, qualitative notion of structure, Leys' objection falls away.

Finally, I shall look at a perspective deriving from Thompsonian social history. For a number of South African social historians, are
pursuing a line which is not only anti-functionalist, but anti-structuralist\(^4\). Within that context it would be unwise to propose an unexamined structuralism, in core-periphery form.

The last section of this chapter, then, examines the status of core-periphery as ‘structure’. I shall argue that we need to reverse Wallerstein’s method in starting from a preexisting or apriori whole. As in Weber, social analysis must start from individual meaning. Simultaneously, we need to be careful of the traps of relativism, ‘thick’ historical description and inadequate action theories implied in Thompsonian social history. Intrinsic in this attempt is the thinking of Anthony Giddens.

In the present anti-structuralist climate, then, we can retain notions of structure only under certain strict conditions. Social analysis must, firstly, start from the texture and interiority of individual consciousness. Second, we must separate notions of structure from the limitations of one dimension or one coherent whole with clearly demarcated boundaries. Structures must be seen to be operating simultaneously at several levels. The networks which bind societies must also be seen as multinodal with messy, ‘old-carpet’ edges between them. Finally, structures exist in a virtual sense, out of time. They are re-alized, instantiated, at specific time-space moments by acting agents.

2. Wallerstein as Structuralist.

Wallerstein calls himself a world system theorist. Nowhere, to my knowledge, does he explain what he means by system. The way he uses it, and the way Johnson (1983) has applied it, conforms quite closely to a Piagetian notion of structure. In his summary presentation of that idea, Hawkes (1977:16) describes two elements of it, the idea of wholeness, and the idea of transformation, as follows.

"By wholeness is meant the sense of internal coherence. The arrangement of entities will complete in itself and not something that is simply a composite formed of otherwise independent elements. Thus a structure is quite different from an

\(^{4}\)I hesitate to call them ‘anti-structuralist’ since they have been more than a little reticent in following an explicit theoretical line. I do not think I am unfair in calling them Thompsonian, but even that term is, I suspect, too easy.
aggregate: its constituent parts have no genuinely independent existence outside the structure in the same form that they have within it.

(Further on he expands on this: "In consequence, the true nature of things may be said to lie not in things themselves, but in the relationships which we construct, and then perceive, between them." (p.17))

"The structure is not static. The laws which govern it act so as to make it not only structured, but structuring. Thus, in order to avoid reduction to the level merely of passive form, the structure must be capable of transformational procedures, whereby new material is constantly processed by and through it.

In this section I shall show how Wallerstein's world system theory may be interpreted in a structuralist way, whatever he intended. He presents a system which is functionally differentiated between core, semi-periphery and periphery, and between various peripheries. This is better than Frank's static and stagnationist notion. It is also better than the modes of production notion that precapitalist modes can, from their original and pristine state, resist incorporation into the system, and act as a block on its development.

Wallerstein's system is, however, unidimensional and has but one node. I shall argue that, to be viable, we need a system that is multidimensional and multinodal. That allows for a Southern African system within the world system, and an urban system which contains formal and informal sectors.

Wallerstein's conception of transformational procedures or change relies on quite a narrow and pessimistic notion of 'historical conjuncture'. NIDL theory provides a broader view which allows for the role of Third World transnational corporations, the state and investment by metropolitan INC's.

The trouble with structures of this kind is that they often tend to be seen as 'closed' without reference outside themselves for validation. (Hawkes, 1977:17) In consequence, subjects are 'decentred'. They exist only in their relationships with other subjects, in a 'difference of absences'. In more recognizable language, that entails the problems of functionalism and teleological thinking which we have discussed previously.

The task of social theory, says Giddens, is to rescue the idea of a
subject without abandoning the idea of structure as structuring. (Giddens, 1979:9-49) I shall insist further on that social analysis must, in consequence, follow Weber in starting from individual consciousness.

This is a rather brutal summary of some very complex topics which I have dealt with more extensively elsewhere. (Graaff, 1987) I wish to concentrate rather on the problems of development and underdevelopment, but it is important to indicate that that cannot be done without an awareness of the broader issues involved. This and the last section of this chapter does no more than suggest the direction which further work will need to take.

2.1. Functional Differentiation

Immanuel Wallerstein argues that the world capitalist system is functionally differentiated two ways, horizontally and vertically. Horizontally the system is divided between core, semi-periphery and periphery. (See Diagram 1) By virtue of its greater power, the core has a central and directive role with regard to the peripheries. Peripheries, by contrast, are derivative and externally oriented. At an international or world level, for example, this means that core countries have integrated economies spanning the full range of primary, secondary and tertiary sectors. Peripheral economies lack forward and backward linkages between sectors. They are enclave or partial economies, and are heavily dependent on export. (Wallerstein, 1981; Sunkel, 1973)

Semi-peripheral countries occupy an intermediate position, both economically and politically. Economically they are intermediate because they are exploited by more powerful core countries, at the same time as they exploit weaker peripheral countries. Politically they occupy a buffer position by drawing off hostility against the core on to themselves. They play a stabilising political role. (Wallerstein, 1981)

The world system is vertically divided since peripheral (and semi-peripheral) countries play different roles in the system. Peripheries
are not uniform in their participation in the system, precisely because they are partial economies. They can occupy a great number of different positions within the system, whether it be to supply the core with cheap labour, raw materials or markets. In systems language, the whole is greater than the sum of its parts.

That angle throws a different light on some older dependency arguments about development and underdevelopment. For a start it is now clear why dependency theory writers can say that development and underdevelopment are two sides of the same coin. In a differentiated system, all countries cannot occupy the same position, whether it be one of wealth or one of poverty. Some countries are rich precisely because others are poor. It follows from this that recently industrialising countries cannot emulate the stages of development followed by older economies (as Rostow wished them to do). Such development paths are excluded by their historical, spatial and relational position in the system.

Secondly, inequality is both quantitative and qualitative. Peripheral countries are all poor and exploited in relation to core countries. But they are not poor or exploited in the same way. A country whose economy is based on mineral exports, like Zambia, occupies quite a different position of poverty from one whose economy relies on migrant labour, like Lesotho. Quantitative measures of poverty, like per capita GNP, life expectancy, educational levels or even gini-coefficients of inequality do not convey the crucial difference of position which countries occupy within the system.

In Wallerstein's seventeenth century example, the division of labour between different parts of the world system occurred on the basis of different kinds of labour organisation. The system's core was in newly industrialising England which exhibited the beginnings of proletarianised wage-labour. Feudal Eastern Europe contributed wheat, tribal West Africa provided slaves, and the West Indies produced sugar and tobacco based on plantation slave-labour. Proletarian wage-labour (what orthodox Marxists would call capitalism) was very much more efficient and formed the base on which England's core power was built. The point to underline is that Eastern Europe, the
West Indies and West Africa were all part of the periphery, but their relationships with the core were qualitatively different. (Fröbel et al., 1979)

Third, as a consequence of the interdependence of the system’s parts, changes in one part will ripple through into others. The formation of OPEC among a number of oil-producing countries in the early 1970’s had reverberations throughout the world economy. Samir Amin would, in fact, argue that the important changes in the world economy occur through struggles by peripheral countries against their domination by core countries. (Hoogvelt, 1982)

By the same token, the fact that West European multinationals relocate some of their labour-intensive operations to NIC’s has different but complementary consequences for these two parts of the system. For the counterpart of the resultant unemployment in Germany is enclave development in Singapore. Class structures in the Far East are a mirror-image of those in Europe. (Henderson, 1986)

That has important implications for Marxists’ notion of structure and agency. Very briefly (because I shall return to this further on) the notion of class as a relationship between social groups defined by ownership of the means of production must be conceived more widely. For a world systems perspective shows us that only certain constellations of capitalist classes are likely in peripheral economies. Peripheral economies, as a consequence of the manner of their insertion into the world economy, very often lack heavy industries or hi-tech, R & D, decision-making activities.

It is worth emphasizing, contra Leys and Fröbel et al., that there is nothing intrinsic, inherent or ‘capital-logical’ about this. Individual TNC’s choose to relocate parts of their production process to peripheral areas because they can there make use of cheaper labour and state incentives, and escape stringent health, sanitation, pollution and labour regulations. All of this is made possible by new communication and transport technology, and the deskilling and fragmentation of production processes. (Henderson, 1986, 1986a)
Fourth, escaping from underdevelopment is not easy. Peripheral countries cannot, as in the wonderfully optimistic world of modernisation theory, change their position in the hierarchy simply by the efficient exploitation of their natural and human resources. There are a limited number of possibilities for moving higher up the system. Countries compete with each other to move into these positions. And Wallerstein argues, there are also a limited number of ways by which such movement occurs.

Of course, the system does not remain static over time. The world economy goes through cyclical contractions and expansions, and it is at these moments that peripheral countries with strong state institutions may take the opportunity to change their positions in the system. (Wallerstein, 1981; Hoogvelt, 1982:190-6; Garst, 1985)

There have, of course, been incisive critiques of Wallerstein's ideas of how exploitation between countries occurs, and how countries change levels. (cf. Hoogvelt, 1982; Bettelheim, 1972; Leys, 1983) Part of Wallerstein's problem is that he follows Braudel's use of 'historical conjuncture', what Henderson calls 'the spatial convergence of a series of historical accidents'. (Henderson, 1986) That allows for very narrow opportunities for change.

NIDL theory, by contrast, proposes that significant peripheral investment occurs when metropolitan TNC's relocate some of their operations to peripheral areas in search of cheaper labour. In addition, Third World multinationals contribute substantially to changing the balance of power between peripheral states and TNC's. Overall, however, it is state intervention in the economy which has been critical in creating the conditions for development. This is particularly true of NIC development in the Far East. NIC states have been involved in protection of infant industries, control of foreign capital movements and of technological transfer, state entrepreneurship, and regulation of trade union activity. (Colclough, 1982; Henderson, 1986)

However, we do not need to follow Wallerstein in establishing one basic principle. The fact that countries are indeed able to jump
levels and industrialise establishes an important gap between Frank, on the one hand, and Wallerstein and NIDL writers, on the other. As I have argued above, Frank was a 'stagnationist' in the sense that he saw no chance of Third World countries breaking out of their peripheral status unless it was by socialist revolution. Dependency was a static and absolute position. For Wallerstein, by contrast, dependency is not absolute but relational. It is not low income or inequality which defines underdevelopment. It is an economy's position vis-a-vis others.

The reason why old dependency theorists get caught in stagnationist or zero-sum conceptions of development is because they work with a quantitative notion of exploitation through unequal exchange. Peripheries are said to subsidize core growth. That is one reason why the measure of the core's growth is also the measure of the peripheries underdevelopment.

If, however, we work with a qualitative notion of exploitation that relies on the relational bond/tension between classes it is becomes possible to think of dependent development in the periphery. For transformation in the larger system is expressed through, and structured by, changes in class relations. (Brenner, 1977)

2.2. Multiple Dimensions

The construction of a Southern African system within a greater world system illustrates a second broad aspect of systems thinking. That is the recognition that systems occur at more than one level. While Wallerstein and Samir Amin tend to concentrate on the world level system, we need to take account of subcontinental, national, regional and intra-urban systems. And these systems operate simultaneously. They are super-imposed on to each other.

Which helps us to understand Wallerstein's preference for the term

Although Probel et al. are fairly pessimistic as well, partly because they are committed to a capital-logic approach. "The new international division of labour is an 'institutional' innovation of capital itself necessitated by changed conditions and not the result of changed development strategies by individual countries or options freely decided upon by so-called multinational companies." (quoted in Henderson, 1986:72)
'semi-periphery' rather than terms like 'sub-metropole' or 'sub-imperial power'. (Wallerstein, 1981) For while SA forms the core of a subcontinental system, it is still a junior partner in the context of the world. It is still, itself, subject to exploitation.

André Gunder Frank was the first dependency writer to fudge the issue of multidimensionality when he equated country-country relations with those between cities and towns, and between cities/towns and rural areas. In his famous chain-link metaphor he did not distinguish the exploitation which occurred between these various links.

We should make it quite clear that disadvantageous terms of trade between countries which, for example, exchange manufactured goods for raw materials, is quite different from the underdevelopment which a specific rural area suffers at the hands of cities/towns. By the same token, the exploitation experienced by sectors of the informal economy at the hands of the formal economy operates by different mechanisms and different actors again. The dependency in which each of these many peripheries is caught varies qualitatively from level to level.

The way in which these levels interact via, say, the impact of the world context on the national, is an important determinant of the possibilities for change. Here I wish to consider the ways in which this interaction might be conceptualised.

Johnson (1983) wishes to call world and local levels of analysis respectively, 'general' and 'proximate' determinants of the historical process.

"If historical movement is analysed first as a process of class struggle, then it is methodologically wrong to ascribe causality to primarily economic impulses proceeding from the world-system level. However, the political economy of the world-system exercises a general causality insofar as territorial classes are structured by international forces and these classes are locked into relationships of subordinated dependency that extend beyond national frontiers.... These processes are actualized in the class practices of center bourgeoisies, in the decisions of transnational corporations, in the international policies of center governments, and in the activities of international financial institutions." (Johnson, 1983:241-2) (my own emphasis)

Johnson's view of structure being 'actualized' is precisely my own
view. Nevertheless, his central difficulty is epitomized by his attempt to distinguish ‘general’ causality from any other kind of causality; an international level which structures, but is not structured by, local classes.

Henderson has a similar kind of problem. He criticizes the notion of mechanical and unilinear determination used by Fröbel et al. to describe the impact of the world system. He prefers the notion of the world context ‘setting structural limits to ... possibilities for variation’. (Henderson, 1986:73)

This is similar to old modes of production theory ideas whereby the existence of precapitalist modes of production within a capitalist dominated social formation explained the variation between peripheral countries; the deviation from the world system determined norm.

From the Giddensian perspective I am proposing here, none of these solutions is acceptable. They all recapitulate a sterile dualism of agent and structure, as if TNC’s are not themselves structured by the practices of peripheral states. There is something wrong in saying that the rather poisonous impact of a corporation like Union Carbide (of Bhopal fame) is any less ‘proximate’ than repression by Indian state police. As I have argued above, cheap female labour in Hong Kong is the mirror-image of unemployment in Germany. How shall we say that one is more structured than the other? Or that the ruling classes are more structuring than the working classes?

The point is that in a capitalist system both ruling and working classes are structured by their relationship to the means of production. By the same token, transnational corporations and Third World states are all part of the same game. They are subject to the same set of rules. TNC’s are as much a result of the capitalist system as Third World ruling classes are. Which is precisely why, as I argued in Chapter Four, their interests so frequently overlap.

It is something quite different to say that TNC’s have more power than peripheral states. It would be far more productive analysing the nature and extent of their respective power than getting entangled in
abstract theories of causality.

2.3. Multiple Nodes

Of course, systems need not only be seen as existing at various levels, one 'on top of' the other. Societal systems can also be seen to coexist 'next to' each other. And these systems may be countries, regions or modes of production. Using this metaphor to think about the problem poses the critical issue of system boundaries. At what stage do two coexisting systems fuse into one? At what stage does 'contact' shade first into 'influence' and then into 'domination'? When does one become a subsystem within a larger system? When does one start playing periphery to the other's core?

Wallerstein dislikes this way of thinking about the problem. For he wishes to say that inclusion into the world trading network transforms precapitalist modes of production and, to the extent that they become directed toward production for the market, makes them capitalist. As is his wont, he puts it in quite blunt form.

"... it is not the case that two forms of social organisation, capitalist and feudal, existed side by side, or could ever so exist. The world-economy has one form or the other. Once it is capitalist, relationships that bear certain formal resemblances to feudal relationships are necessarily redefined in terms of the governing principles of a capitalist system." (Wallerstein quoted in Pieterse, 1988)

We know that Wallerstein was severely criticized by Laclau and Brenner on this latter aspect. (Brenner, 1977; Pieterse, 1988; Giddens, 1985:161-170) Wallerstein misdefined capitalism. Modes of production theory, by contrast, postulated the persistence of precapitalist modes of production in contact with capitalism. Their subordination and transition to capitalism was much longer and more problematic than Wallerstein thought. Precapitalist modes of production remained 'uncaptured', even 'untouched', for significant periods of time. In addition, said Laclau, defining away precapitalist modes of production so fast made it very difficult to periodise and specify the stages of development which capitalism went through following its first contact with precapitalist modes of production. (Laclau, 1971) In short, where Wallerstein prematurely collapsed precapitalist modes of production into one system, modes of
production theory wished to retain a multiplicity of systems, going through a much more difficult integration into the greater whole.

Now, both of these positions are problematic, but I think the substance of Wallerstein's argument can be rescued via a reconstructed conservation-dissolution metaphor.

Let us deal with the problems of modes of production theory first. I have argued in Chapter Three that modes of production theory got entangled in a profusion of modes of production. Their mistake was excessive formalism in defining a mode of production.

In his critique of dependency theory, Banaji offered a critical corrective to this by showing how dependency theory ignored the underlying dynamic of particular modes. The details of specific relations of production were less important than the transcending laws of motion of the larger system. By concentrating on the systemic context he could show that in seventeenth century West Indian sugar plantations, for example, a slave labour system was driven by a capitalist dynamic.

Banaji's broader systems perspective reveals how modes of production theory recapitulated a dualism very similar to that propagated by an earlier modernisation theory. For precapitalist modes of production were seen as original, pristine states gradually being drawn into service of capitalism.

At the same time we can, from this perspective, see how 'essentialist' modes of production theory was. For modes of production were seen to occupy one of two positions. They were either precapitalist or capitalist. There were no intermediate positions.

We can illustrate these points by looking at the game of musical chairs which writers of various theoretical persuasions have played in analysing the nineteenth century South African peasantry.

Early modernisation theorists, for example, viewed 'traditional culture' as a persistent obstacle to rational responses to economic imperatives. Traditional peasant farmers, they argued, could not
prosper since their understanding of the value of cattle was set in non-economic values like religion. (cf. Bundy, 1972)

Early dependency theorists, like Colin Bundy, by contrast, were able to show that early African peasants were highly competent profit-makers in certain parts of the subcontinent. But they ran up against the labour needs of White farmers and mineowners who manoeuvred the effective destruction of peasant economies. Underdevelopment and poverty, said Bundy, were a necessary counterpart of development. Africans were actively obstructed from being competent capitalists. (Bundy, 1977)

In his critique of Bundy, Lewis (1984) focused on the internal dynamic of the lineage mode of production, which brought young men into conflict with chiefs and older men. That internal conflict, argued Lewis, is far more important in understanding peasant responses to colonialism than the external fact of trade.

Now, in the first case mentioned above, African peasants are criticized for not thinking and acting the way ‘we’ do. In the second, it is assumed that they do think and act the way we do. In the third case, Lewis’, the assumption is that, despite very extensive contact with colonialists, the lineage mode remained unchanged since the fundamental internal dynamic remained unchanged. Other changes of ideology, surplus accumulation, class differentiation noted by both Bundy and Lewis were insignificant — until the critical switch, the mode of production, was triggered. Both before and after the switch change was seen as insignificant. Capitalism is capitalism, tribalism is tribalism.

That image is also at the base of the notion of precapitalist modes of production as blockages to development (another shadow of modernisation theory). Caught up in precapitalist structures and ideologies (prior to the critical switch) precapitalist ruling classes resisted, often violently, the transition to capitalism.

Two elements are necessary to break out of this staccato notion of social change, a reconstructed conservation-dissolution metaphor,
combined with a central system dynamic which transcends narrowly defined modes of production.

We saw how Wellings & Sutcliffe's use of the conservation-dissolution metaphor landed up being excessively functionalist through the exercise of absolute ruling class power. But we get a different picture if conservation-dissolution is seen rather as a dialectical process of class interaction producing continual and gradual change. (Alavi, 1982) Classes are all subject to, and structured by a transcending system dynamic, which is itself in continual change.

With such a notion of change it becomes easier to understand how, for example, traditional chiefs in South Africa's reserves negotiated the terms by which migrants were recruited to the mines; how that result itself transformed tribal practices of lobolo, tribute and elder control over younger men; how miners' experiences underground became incorporated and reinterpreted into tribal initiation beliefs; how these new practices again changed the way mines recruited their labour. At the same time chiefs were being coopted, bullied or persuaded into a new system of colonial administration subsequent to military conquest. In this their interests in maintaining aspects of traditional authority coincided with those of colonial rulers.

Up to this point I have argued that the myopic and formalistic definition of modes of production needs to be replaced by a broader focus on system dynamics. In short, Banaji takes us back from modes of production theory towards Wallerstein. However, in order to get Wallerstein's conception working we need to go further than Banaji. For Banaji still wishes to label Latin American haciendas in the eighteenth century as feudal, which Wallerstein would deny.

In Wallerstein's conceptualisation there is but one system dynamic, which like a contagious disease, corrupts precapitalist modes by very slight contact. They immediately become infected by the capitalist spirit, subjected to service in the broader whole.

Modes of production theorists, by contrast, are caught in a trap.
They wish to say not only that precapitalist modes persist, but also that they are functional to capitalism. Can precapitalist modes of production retain a distinct dynamic at the same time as they serve capitalism's needs, particularly when these modes have been created ex nihilo, or extensively recreated by capital? Can they, for that matter, be both functional to capital and an obstacle to capitalist accumulation? The point is that they are no longer precapitalist, they are, as Johnson points out, new and unique.

"There exists in Latin America and elsewhere a historical legacy of servile, slave and other precapitalist production relations. But in the recent period in particular we definitely are not dealing with the articulation of different modes of production or with precapitalism retarding capitalist development. Archaic forms have been twisted into novel forms of production relations that feed capital accumulation and forms of 'superexploitation' of labour that are new and unique, rather than retrograde, features of dependent and underdeveloped societies." (Johnson, 1983:253)

A number of writers, like Alavi (1982) and Coquery-Vidrovitch (1985), propose a solution which avoids the problems of Wallerstein's all-embracing, unitary system, on the one hand, and Banaji's, which is still anchored in quite a narrow conception of mode of production, on the other. These writers argue for a peripheral mode of production which operates according to a dynamic which is distinct from both precapitalist and capitalist modes. Coquery-Vidrovitch expresses a great deal of what I intend to convey as follows.

"Relations of production (or of non-production!) in effect originate which, although referring to elements inherited from the two modes mentioned above (capitalist and pre-capitalist), correspond to different mechanisms, are used for different purposes, with a different logic: thus 'clientelism' no longer refers to relations from precolonial lineage modes of production (which no longer exist as such), but aim to ensure a certain redistribution of bread-crumbs from the profits made by notables of the 'peripheral bourgeoisie' on the margin of the dominant capitalism. ...... (This is) a 'peripheral' mode of production to the extent that its dependence on the western capitalist mode of production is evident (the existence of the latter conditioning the possibilities of the former), but a mode of production notwithstanding because it concerns a coherent whole, entailing particularly a structured (and not dualist) articulation between so-called 'modern' and 'informal' sectors ......" (Coquery-Vidrovitch, 1985:15-6) (my translation from the French) (my emphasis)

From this perspective it is clear that the impact of capitalism has been far wider and more intrusive than modes of production theorists have been prepared to admit. We need, for example, to seriously question Wolpe's cheap labour thesis on the basis of precapitalist
inputs to labour reproduction. For one thing, Wolpe wished to identify the existence/ persistence of a precapitalist mode of production with its continued production of subsistence. That is shaky even by a more formalistic definition of a mode of production. It looks a lot shakier measured by Coquery-Vidrovitch's standards. (cf. also Alavi, 1982)

Nor can rural resistance and protest be taken as evidence for the persistence of precapitalist modes. For that protest has itself been structured and recast by insertion into a capitalist context.

Breaking out of Wallerstein's coercive and neat unitary system makes things a bit messy. Modes of production theory presents us with an image of many systems coexisting, some making contact with, dominating or swallowing up, others. But it needs to get a lot messier. In fact, we need to be a great deal more careful with the notion of a clear system boundary, and concentrate rather on the influence of nodes which constitute the system core. It is more appropriate to see systems as old carpets which unravel and run at the edges, lie 'on top' of and 'below' one another.  

This is the idea I tried to convey in my description of bantustan state institutions as spatially located nodes. Their influence spreads in a patchy way within and across their designated boundaries. At some places 'their' populations are more significantly tied to other nodes, like Pretoria or Bloemfontein. The interaction between the networks centring in Mmabatho or Pretoria cannot be easily unravelled. They have very messy edges.

3. Dependency Theory as Structure

In this section we shift from theoretical to metatheoretical concerns. Here I wish to deal with three related issues. First, Wallerstein claims that the core-periphery structure is fundamental to capitalism in the same way that the capital-labour relationship  

6 Giddens underlines this point with regard to poststructuralism. "The boundaries of the 'whole' that is Saussure's langue, or that is Chomsky's linguistic corpus ... are exceedingly difficult to draw ... More important than the principle of the establishing of the coherence of the totality is the endeavour to examine the nature of difference itself." (Giddens, 1984:82)
is. That is an ambitious claim that needs to be taken seriously. I do not think that until now Wallerstein has provided sufficient evidence to substantiate it.

The second issue concerns Brenner’s criticism that dependency theory is ‘individualistic’, ‘psychologistc’, in short, it is a microtheory. I shall argue that Brenner is confused in his conception of what microtheory is.

Thirdly, Leys dislikes structuralist theory because it is mystificatory. Because it relies on market mechanisms, it cannot explain the underlying dynamic of social change. It must fall back on ‘deep’ structure. Defined that way, Leys is correct about structuralism. He encapsulates a great deal of what is wrong with quantitative conceptions of core-periphery relationships. But, given a different, qualitative notion of structure, Leys’ objection falls away.

3.1. Micro- and Macro-theory

Let us start with Brenner’s criticism. For Brenner accuses Wallerstein (plus Adam Smith, Sweezy and Frank) of falling into psychologistic and atomistic individualism. Brenner puts this point forcefully when he says:

"It is not difficult to get to the bottom of (Wallerstein’s) deterministic system. For its logical premise is the extra-historical universe of homo oeconomicus, of individual profit-maximisers competing on the market, outside of any system of social relations of exploitation." (Brenner, 1977:58; also pp.37-8 on Adam Smith; pp.45,48 on Sweezy; and pp.82-3 on Frank).

Brenner wishes to say that Wallerstein is a not a structuralist at all, he is a microtheorist. Alternatively, individuals are more determined by social structures than determining. Homo oeconomicus is, in Brenner’s view, a product rather than a cause of capitalist social relations. Brenner is mistaken on both counts.

For a start, Brenner simply misunderstands the distinction between micro- and macrotheory. Brenner says that Wallerstein starts from the same anthropological axiom as Adam Smith, namely that the profit-motive is universal in human beings, ‘a natural propensity in
Having established that point, which I think is correct, Brenner thinks he can automatically make a second move, that Wallerstein is a microtheorist who views agents as more determining of, than determined by, structures. He has then only to show that Marx was a structuralist for whom the profit-motive was a consequence, not a cause of capitalism, and he has established an unbridgeable theoretical divide between Marx and Wallerstein. Wallerstein, then, has, for Brenner, exactly the same fundamental premisses as neoclassical economics and modernisation theory.

The problem is that Brenner’s second move does not follow from his first. To say that Wallerstein starts out with the premiss that people are universally susceptible to the profit-motive, they are all homo oeconomicus, is correct. But it is quite apparent, even from Brenner’s own summary of Wallerstein, that structures are clearly dominant over agents. How else can Brenner also accuse Wallerstein of omitting agents, or classes in his analysis? How else can other writers accuse him of functionalism? Wallerstein’s primary point of departure is, after all, the world system, functionally divided into core, periphery and semi-periphery. The actors in this view, whether they be countries, states or multinational corporations, are brought in as parts in a greater whole. Wallerstein’s problem is to avoid making the system too determining of the parts, not vice versa. This latter is the microtheorist’s problem.

Brenner forgets that every theory has an anthropology, a view of human beings, which has, in most cases, an axiomatic and metaphysical nature. One needs to establish what a theory does with that before jumping to microtheoretical conclusions. Yes, Wallerstein and modernisation theory have similar anthropologies. They are, however, fundamentally different kinds of theory.

3.2. The Problem with Structuralism

There is an intriguing contrast between Brenner’s critique of
dependency theory and that by Colin Leys (1983). Where Brenner wishes to reject dependency theory because it is not structuralist enough, Leys wishes to do the same because it is too much so.

The problem, says Leys, is that dependency theory proposes an unspecified underlying structure which replicates itself in different surface forms. Even if, for example, peripheral countries move from primary to secondary industrialisation through import substitution, their dependent position remains. Frank does not then have to periodise his analysis, for the inherent structure of unequal exchange remains constant.

What is missing, says Leys, is a ‘systematic analysis of the interplay of political and social as well as economic forces which resulted in the geographical extension of the sway of capital, or of the new struggles generated by this process’ (p.38), what he calls ‘genuine theory’ (p.47). In other words, Frank gives a description of how exploitation occurs, but not why; he has no theory of imperialism. Nor, says Leys, is it sufficient simply to graft on an analysis of classes, for, within a structuralist framework, classes remain ‘ultimately residual and passive’ (p.37).

From the perspective I am presenting here, Leys is right to reject the kind of structuralism which hides behind ‘deep’, ‘hidden’ or ‘intrinsic’ foundations. At the same time, he is wrong to think that that is the only kind of structure available, or that class struggle and structure are separable. The world capitalist system is instantiated by, inter alia, concrete multinational corporations with specific interests and limited resources. There is nothing ‘deep’ or hidden about them. Nor is there anything automatic about their dominance, as I have argued in the last chapter.

3.3. Core-Periphery as ‘Basic’ Structure

If we are to insist that core-periphery be legitimately retained as structure, we need to go further and ask what kind of structure. For Marxists it is the foundational structures and tensions of capitalism which are determinant in modern society. Relationship to the means of
production, the contradiction between socialized production and private appropriation of wealth - these are the bases from which agents are constrained to act.

But, on its own, that is an unnecessarily endogenous view of capitalism's dynamics. (Foster-Carter, 1978) For it ignores capitalism's disposition towards spatial inequality at the various levels I have indicated before. The "disarticulated" partial economies of the periphery entail a certain limited range of class differentiation, which is mirrored in the more fully integrated patterns of the core.

Put another way, the relationship of labour to capital which lies at the heart of capitalism is itself filtered through another relationship, that between core and periphery. These two relationships must be taken into account in spelling out the specific ways in which classes manifest themselves. It is not just capital and labour which stand in a particular relationship with each other, but particular constellations of capital and labour respectively.

Does this mean that the core-periphery relationship can be regarded as equivalent to the capital-labour relationship in capitalism? Wallerstein seems to think so.

"The operation of the (capitalist) system, once established, revolved around two basic dichotomies. One was the dichotomy of class, bourgeois versus proletarian. The other basic dichotomy was the spatial hierarchy of economic specialization, core versus periphery. The genius, if you will, of the capitalist system is the interweaving of these two channels of exploitation which overlap but are not identical and create the cultural and political complexities (and obscurities) of the system." (Wallerstein, 1976:351)

Postulating that the core-periphery relationship has the same status as the capital-labour relationship is, within Marxist analysis, an ambitious claim, for it implies an important rethinking of the foundational and definitional aspects of the capitalist mode of production. Most writers have criticized Wallerstein for his emphasis on exchange in defining capitalism. That criticism has to some degree been answered in his later work. (Garst, 1985) Wallerstein's critics have not focused on this much more dramatic claim that the...
core-periphery relationship is basic to capitalism.

We can approach that claim in two ways. We may focus either on the meaning of the word 'basic' in social theory (as a synonym for terms like 'abstract' or 'deep') or we may consider the nature of space in social interaction. Such discussions would take us beyond our present concerns. Let me say merely this here. The theorisation of space in social theory has all too often been the preserve of geographers and urban theorists. As Giddens (1984) argues, space is central to all social theory. Whether we accept Wallerstein's use of it or not, there is a great deal of theoretical thinking about the core-periphery relationship that needs to be done.

Giddens' comments on the core-periphery aspects of urban development are suggestive for reinterpreting Influx Control in the South African context. While most Marxist writers have seen Influx Control, in particular, and apartheid, in general, as an instrument to ensure cheap labour, such spatial closure can also be seen as the exclusion of some sections of the population from locations of power.

"Those who occupy centres 'establish' themselves as having control over resources which allow them to maintain differentiation between themselves and those in the peripheral regions. The established may employ a variety of forms of social closure to sustain distance from others who are effectively treated as inferiors or outsiders." (Giddens, 1984:131)

4. System, Method and Epistemology

Leys' critique of 'deep' structure would find considerable support among contemporary South African social historians. Structure is a much contested notion among South African Marxists at present.

Some writers like Morris (1987), Wolpe (1988), Charney (1987,1988), Hindson (1987) and Wellings & Sutcliffe (1984) have sought to retain stronger notions of structure, some of them under a Poulantzian umbrella. In methodological terms, they start from the larger whole and work, via ideas of class struggle, dialectic and ideology, towards an inclusion of individual consciousness and meaning.
Others falling within the culturalist social history school have been more dramatic in their break with Althusser, and have echoed EP Thompson’s fulminations against ‘the poverty of theory’. They have (as far as one can make out, for they are more than a little reticent in making their position explicit) in many cases, taken the converse methodological route. They have, namely, started from individual consciousness (which is, to my mind, the right place to start) and, via writers like EP Thompson, Raymond Williams, Gramsci, Erving Goffman and Alfred Schutz, started out on the path back to structure. (Cf. the various contributors to Bozzoli, 1983)

Some writers, like Beinart, Freund, Clarence-Smith have also taken ‘soft’ Weberian epistemological positions. For them, the mode of production (for which read, structure) is nothing more than a ‘model’, ‘an ideal-type’, ‘a sensitizing device’ or suggestive of ‘useful questions’. (Clarence-Smith, 1985; Beinart, 1985; Jewsiewicki, 1985; Freund, 1985)

This is not the place to discuss the huge issues broached by these questions. That would take another thesis. Two broad points will be sufficient at this stage, one concerns relativism and the other, dualism of agent and structure.

In Chapter One, I have argued the Popperian line that Weberian epistemology leads via problems of relativism to a trivialisation of knowledge and theory. If ideal-types are nothing more than mental constructs which take a partial slice out of an infinite empirical universe, then any number of such constructs can be churned out. Some commentators have interpreted Weber to be not only relativist, but nominalist, in the sense that theory creates reality. (Aaron, 1970)

The dilemma of relativism is, of course, common to most subjectivist theories, like phenomenology, verstehen, hermeneutics and symbolic interactionism. If individual consciousness is an interpretation of ‘reality’ in need of unpacking, so is social theory. Theory, then, has no superior status to common sense.

The way out of this vicious circle of knowledge, says Giddens, is via
a development of critical theory.

"The greater the range of knowledge that is made available to actors, such that previously unacknowledged grounds of action become available to the reflexive monitoring of their conduct, the greater the scope of the rational autonomy of action. The social scientist can contribute to extending the compass of such knowledge; it follows, for such authors, (he is referring to Apel, Habermas and Lorenzer) therefore, that his reflexivity should be tied to an awareness of the potentialities of social theory as critical theory." (Giddens, 1977:178) (my own parenthetical comment)

The second problem, namely that of dualism between agent and structure is most apparent among methodological individualists. For them structure is something outside of the micro-situation, and to be construed from aggregates, combinations or the unintended consequences of micro-situations. (Cf. Elster, 1984) Weber, for example, wished to distinguish social and other kinds of action. Social action was that particular kind which was oriented towards other people. The problem is that it is virtually impossible to think of any action which is not oriented directly or indirectly towards other people. In fact, micro- and macro-, agent and structure cannot be separated. They are mutually constitutive.

If that is accepted, then it is not possible to talk of structure as an aggregation of individual actions, or of a dialectic between agent and structure, or, as Wolpe (1988) does, of an interaction between struggle and structure. Despite the value of EP Thompson's critique of Althusser, both Thompson and Perry Anderson land up in the same trap, although in opposing positions. Thompson wishes to say that agency is more determining than structure, while Anderson wishes to reverse that priority. (Cf. my discussion of this in Graaff, 1987; Giddens, 1987:220)

In the light of the above what can we say about the core-periphery structure? First, that we need to reject Wallerstein's methodological approach. One cannot start analysis from the assumption that structures exist prior to (or worse a priori) individual meaning. In this we must reject Marx and follow Weber. Analysis must start with the interior patterns and textures of consciousness, particularly how people theorise the world around them. But it can inevitably not end there. Nor does the final analysis need to be compatible with either
the content or the logical structure of individual meaning. Anthropologists observing a tribal rain-dance do not need to accept that it actually produces rain.

At the same time we need to be wary of somewhat romantic Thompsonian notions of ‘thick’ history. "We can only describe the social process", says Thompson, ".. by writing history." (quoted in Giddens, 1987:209) But the amount of ethnographic detail necessary is entirely dependent on the scope and purpose of the investigation. "A richly suggestive style will not compensate for inadequacies of analysis." (Giddens, 1987:210)

Conversely, a great amount of nonsense in development theory, and much that goes under the label of functionalist thinking, may be avoided by accepting two principles. One, systems may only be analysed by looking at the kinds of people who make it operate. The essence of functionalist thinking lies in conceptions of systems which acquire ‘inherent’, ‘intrinsic’ or ‘essential’ momentum. For our purposes, the key to understanding any system lies in examining the interests and resources of the important actors in it. These actors are, for our purposes, states, corporations (often large or transnational), classes and ethnic groups.

Marxists have often had trouble conceptualising the state in relationship to the economy as a whole, and to the ruling classes in particular, trying by various means to establish its ‘relative autonomy’. As I have mentioned elsewhere, I take a post-Weberian position here which sees the state as a crucial and separate actor with its own interests and resources.

Second, while some of these actors may be more powerful than others - and it is basic assumption of dependency theory that core actors dominate peripheral ones - power and dependence are reciprocal despite being unequal. It is never the case that control is so complete that one actor/group has no power at all, or that their interests are completely eliminated. It is precisely the role of development theorists to analyse the relative interests and resources of social actors in order to sketch the means by which dominated
groups may improve their positions vis-a-vis the ruling classes. I take that to be one of the central moral tasks of development theory.

5. From Dependent Underdevelopment to Dependent Development

During the late 1970's and the 1980's, the attention of Radical writing has shifted sharply from underdevelopment based on migrant labour to new forms of exploitation based on commuter labour. The dependent underdevelopment (DU) language of the Frankian stage has been replaced by dependent development (DD) notions derived from the NIC's and the spatial implications for South Africa of the new international division of labour (NIDL). Explicit references are made to the experience of countries like Hong Kong or Taiwan while the talk is of free enterprise zones (FEZ's) and export production zones (EPZ's) (Tomlinson & Addleson, 1987).

Important parts of this new process have been the explosion of urbanised populations in the bantustans, and industrial expansion at deconcentrated and decentralized growth points. These aspects are intimately linked and it is important to sketch the historical stages through which the spatial spread of industrial growth has occurred in South Africa.

Daryl Glaser (1987) argues that during the 1950's labour-intensive industries in South Africa responded to the rising costs of metropolitan expansion by suburbanising and deconcentrating their operations. That entailed moving out to locations where the cost of land was lower, but where they were still within reach of essential services, like financing, maintenance, communication, transport etc.

"In the 1950's, capital moved, for example, from Johannesburg to Isando and the East Rand; from Cape Town to Bellville; and from Durban to Pinetown. From the early 1960's and with the direct assistance of the state's border industry programme, industrialists also moved to growth points situated close to metropolitan complexes and large towns simultaneously qualified as border industrial areas, notably Rosslyn and Hammarsdale, later Pietermaritzburg and Brits. ... Corresponding to this deconcentration of industry was increased spatial economic specialisation within the existing metropolitan conurbations." (Glaser 1987:36)

By the 1970's, says Glaser, textiles and clothing industries were coming under considerable pressure from the world market. These
labour-intensive industries sought to maintain profits by seeking new forms of cheap labour. That entailed decentralising to smaller towns on the borders of, or inside bantustans, in order to make use of non-unionised, and abundant female labour. This movement was substantially strengthened by the state's Good Hope Plan incentives announced in 1982. By 1982/83 69,914 jobs p.a were being created in the bantustans, compared to the 100,596 created in the whole period between 1960 and 1974. A large proportion of these have concentrated in the Natal Midlands at places like Isithebe (in KwaZulu), Madadeni (at Newcastle) and Ezakheni (at Ladysmith).

Parallel to the process of industrial expansion has been a phenomenal growth of urbanised populations within bantustans. In 1960 there were 3 officially proclaimed towns with a population of 33,500. By 1980 there were close on 80 towns with a population of 2 million. There were, in addition, commuter populations outside of officially proclaimed towns of 1.8 million people. (Graaff, 1986)

Of particular interest to Radical writers in the post-1982 dispensation have been three aspects of state policy:

(a) new forms of control on labour mobility, particularly following the abolition of the pass laws in mid-1986;
(b) the division of South Africa into nine planning regions, and a new package of decentralization incentives in the Good Hope Plan of 1982; and
(c) new forms of government at the second and third tiers, via the replacement of provincial councils and the creation of Regional Service Councils. (Cf. Cobbet et al., 1987)

Radical writers have intended to show how these reforms have been functional to capital accumulation. This has been seen to occur through state encouragement of 'enclave' development at selected industrial growth points. Cobbet et al. summarise this aspect as follows.

"The objective of this policy is to link such (deconcentrated) residential areas to industrial decentralisation points not subject to stringent wage and health regulations and high tax structure of the core metropolitan areas, and to promote the growth of employment and income through the fostering of informal sector activities." (Cobbet et al., 1987:9)
In short, Wolpe's cheap labour thesis and Hindson's differentiated labour thesis have been replaced by an enclave labour thesis premised on non-unionised, African, female commuter labour. Industrial growth at deconcentration and decentralisation points some distance away from metropolitan areas have, it is emphasized, minimal impact on the surrounding areas. Industries at these points typically pay low wages, and have no forward or backward linkages into the region.

Some Radical writers emphasize the degree to which such industrial decentralisation is premised on state incentives, and would disappear without them. (Wellings & Black, 1987) Trevor Bell, however, has argued a purer DD line. He wishes to say that, even without state incentives, in fact prior to existence of state incentives, certain light industries (clothing and textiles) were, in response to world market competition, relocating to places like the Natal Midlands in order to make use of cheap, female labour. (Bell, 1987)

The similarity of these industrial centres to other points in the world periphery is put into sharp focus by investment from transnational corporations from the Far East. One member of a Taiwanese trade mission to South Africa expressed it as follows:

"A number of labour intensive industries are no longer competitive in my country because per capita income has reached US $3700 compared with less than $200 forty years ago. It seems logical to relocate our production abroad in order to retain our competitive strength and prolong the life cycles of our products. I must point out that SA is our top choice. This emphasis is well backed by your good incentive package, lower wage rates, our full diplomatic ties and the common use of English." (quoted in McCarthy & Wellings, 1989:19)

6. Critical Assessment and Synthesis

Now, the details of Radical argument on this topic are much more complex than this pruned down summary. But we have sufficient material to make a number of critical remarks on Radical analysis of industrialisation and urbanisation in the bantustans. Many of these, it will be seen, recapitulate criticisms made of earlier DU analyses.
6.1. Charton, Poverty and Power

Firstly, the new DD language relinquishes at least one problematic area of DU, namely, that incorporation into the capitalist system necessarily entails poverty and stagnation. The migrant labour system does presently have a deleterious effect on bantustan agriculture in some regions. In others, however, bantustan agriculture would not survive without it. Population resettlement is without doubt the most consistently impoverishing factor in all the peripheral areas.

But for many among their resident populations the main purpose of bantustan agriculture is not to grow cash-crops. It operates as one leg of a multifaceted survival strategy which spans and binds urban, squatter and rural areas.

Industrial decentralisation, by contrast, has brought considerable employment benefits to particular peripheral areas. But this is typical of peripheral ‘enclave’ development. It has very few linkages integrating it into and stimulating the local economy. The fact that, in a context of widespread rural unemployment, it is women who are employed, has serious implications for the restructuring of families.

Certain Radical writers wish to question the benefits of bantustan industrialisation. Nancy Charton’s picture of industrialisation in the Ciskei is a nice example of this.

"However, (industrialisation) has increased rather diminished the dependence of the Ciskei on South Africa ... Ciskeians take few of the economic decisions which affect the industrial life of the territory; they cannot decide what should be produced, how to produce it, or where to market the product ... The economy of the Ciskei remains an outward oriented economy, whose function in the total Southern African system is merely to produce cheap labour power. ... lacking any internal autonomous dynamic it is open to all the ills of the wider system which dominates it; it cannot command the bargaining power to compel decisions in its own interests." (Charton 1980:230)

But there are important hints among other Radical writers that enclave development does entail some advantages. The point is that even extreme dependence and powerlessness do not necessarily mean poverty. Industrial growth points do, for example, draw new investment from foreign transnational corporations. (Rogerson, 1987)
Such growth points are not only the result of industries relocating from elsewhere in the country in order to make use of state incentives, and shedding labour on the way.

Secondly, the most crucial deficiency in all of this writing is the lack of any serious consideration of bantustan state institutions. Most writers in this area make no mention of bantustan states at all. Cobbett et al. (1987) envisage their ‘reincorporation into a single national SA state’, i.e. their effective disappearance.

Charton (1980), for her part, does discuss the bantustan state, but in caricature form. She recapitulates old Frankian notions of a ‘captured’ bourgeoisie. She paints a picture of comprehensive and unremitting powerlessness in pre-independence Ciskei. Crucial aspects of her picture include fiscal review and administrative secondment.

Thus, 79% of Ciskei’s budget was supplied by the Republic, all budgetary estimates had to be approved by the Republic’s Minister of Finance, and all accounts had to be audited by the South African auditor-general. On the administrative side, key posts in the administrative hierarchy were occupied by seconded White officials who had expertise and information which they did not always pass on to politicians. Where public servants were Black, they were often tied by the bonds of patronage and nepotism. Not much scope for influencing the processes of industrialisation here.

In the previous chapter I argued that we need a notion of the bantustan state as a separate class of actors with distinct interests and significant resources at their disposal. There is also an important case to be made against the disappearance or ‘reincorporation’ of bantustans as part of state policy. (McCarthy & Wellings, 1989)

There are (at least) three things seriously wrong with Charton’s description. First, the exercise of Pretoria’s power over its bantustan servants is seen as absolute and unilinear. There is no possibility envisaged of bantustan leaders resisting, deviating, avoiding or even reversing Pretoria’s commands. The emphasis on
absolute power and control rather than functional integration into an unequal system exemplifies the confusion between dependence (which is a power concept) and dependency (which is a more subtle political economy concept).

Second, both 'Pretoria' and 'bantustans' are seen in very undifferentiated ways. Each of these is seen as a single actor. McCarthy & Wellings' notion of functionalism is very close to my own objection to Charton's ideas. "... the basic problem", they say, "is that of an overly monolithic conception of state and capital, where the ruling monolith is often endowed, through a language of system-determinism, with coherent aims and intentions". (McCarthy & Wellings, 1989:21)

Third, and most centrally, it is a commonplace of the development literature that states can and do make a significant difference to developmental outcomes in particular countries. In Chapter Four I argued that bantustan state institutions must be treated as separate actors with distinct interests and significant resources at their disposal. If that position is accepted, then important conclusions flow from it. Not only should we stop seeing bantustan states as puppets, we should also acknowledge that they can make a difference to the way investors operate. Industrial decentralisation is not simply a reflection of either SA state planning initiatives or private sector market responses.

Bophuthatswana, for example, has abolished sales tax, introduced a progressive apprentice training scheme, permitted gambling casino's and placed restrictions on the growth of trade unions. Other examples could be added. The point to make is that these are all typically state-type activities which have a significant impact on the economic context.

6.2. Economism, Functionalism and spatial Fetishism.

A third aspect of the way Radical writers have treated industrial decentralisation comes from McCarthy & Wellings' critique of Cobbett et al. Apart from functionalism, which I have discussed above, they
also accuse Cobbett et al. of economism and spatial fetishism.

Economism, for McCarthy & Wellings, is the collapse of political aims into economic motives. In this specific instance, Cobbett et al. see new administrative structures as being 'in the interests of capital', which is odd given the hostility which important sections of capital have had to RSC's. (McCarthy & Wellings, 1989:19)

In McCarthy & Wellings' view the new regional dispensation has a more important political aim. That is 'one in which a reactionary White working class is possibly bypassed as an ally in favour of new alliances with more conservative blacks'. (McCarthy & Wellings, 1989:17) As I have argued elsewhere (Graaff, 1984), that goal gives bantustan leaders important leverage and manoeuvrability. Yet another reason why they should not be seen as puppets.

Being geographers, McCarthy & Wellings have a special concern for spatial fetishism, the notion that space can be regarded as a causal factor independent of social actors. "Put simply, its basic fault is the assumption that '... if spatial structure is considered cause, it is open to manipulation by planning to achieve desired goals'. (Gore, 1984:183)" (McCarthy & Wellings, 1989:15)

7. Towards a Reconstituted Core-Periphery

With the material in this chapter, and in the context of my discussion in the earlier parts of this thesis, let me propose some principles of a newer dependency theory which may be considered still valid. As is the case in the rest of this chapter, this can be proposed at two levels, a theoretical and a metatheoretical. I shall start with the theoretical level.

First, the Southern African region can be seen as functionally differentiated between core and periphery. (See Diagram 2) In addition, different parts of the periphery are tied to the core in different ways. Thus, for example, the Transkei supplies male migrant labour to the gold mines and to the Western Cape. The Natal midlands, by contrast, provide young, female, non-unionised commuters to the
DIAGRAM 2: SA CORE & PERIPHERY

CORE

PERIPHERY

MOZAMBIQUE
MALAWI
ZIMBABWE

TRANSKEI
LESOTHO

ODI/MORETELE
MDANTSANE
UMLAZI

MATAL
MIDLANDS

OUTER PERIPHERY

DWAQWA
VENDA
GAZANKULU
textile industry. Bantustan fragments with less binding ties to the core (Venda) are in the outer periphery. Over time there has been a functional substitution of one part of the periphery (Mozambique etc.) with another part (Transkei, Lesotho).

To some degree these forms of labour exploitation correspond to the historical stages through which industrial decentralisation has moved in South Africa, from suburbanisation in the 1950’s, through border industries, and deconcentration points on the edges of metropolitan areas in the 1960’s to decentralised growth points at points removed from metropolitan areas in the 1980’s.

Secondly, the forms of labour exploitation in the Southern African region must be put in the context of the world system. Suffice it to say, there is very little Radical analysis which analyses the interaction of world and regional levels in the Southern African region, mediated to some extent by South Africa’s own TNC’s. Two examples follow.

Following Wallerstein’s line, Legassick argues that South Africa made the leap from periphery to semi-periphery during the convulsions in the world system produced by the Depression and WWII. Steered by a powerful and Afrikaner Nationalist-inspired state, South Africa developed a significant heavy industrial sector. In the process it was able to break the dominance of British imperial capital and establish greater control over its own economic fate. The resultant power enabled South Africa to integrate the surrounding countries into its own sub-imperial system. (Legassick, 1977)

The spatial distribution of (light) industries within the Southern African region is significantly affected by developments in the world capitalist system. The labour benefits to be gained by moving to decentralisation points like Isithebe, Osizweni or Ezakheni in the Natal midlands are very similar to those found in the industrial enclave economies of the Far East. These movements are the result of price pressures emanating in the world market for clothing and textiles.
Thirdly, relationships between core and periphery are instantiated by the interaction between concrete classes with specific interests and limited power. The dangers of 'deep' structuralist, functionalist and teleological thinking enter when social analysis is separated from individual consciousness.

In particular, bantustan analyses in the past have tended to be unspecific and melodramatic in this. Pretoria has been seen to be in a unilinear and omnipotent relationship with bantustans. (Diagram 3, top section)

Bantustan ruling classes, for one, are not automatically or always 'captured'. Both the Transkeian and SA state institutions (shaded circles in Diagram 3) are made up of various departments and interests who may be in conflict/ cooperation with each other, and with other non-state interests/classes. Much like Lewis' peasants, they operate within a set of constraints, anxieties and opportunities which can put them at odds with the various dominant fractions of both Pretoria and capital. Given the variety of interests and resources at play in this area, relationships between them will be multiple, ambiguous, contradictory and reciprocal.

Fourthly, relationships between core and peripheral classes must be seen in a qualitative, relational rather than merely a quantitative sense. That means that exploitation occurs both in the market and in relations of production. And it occurs in different ways at different levels, whether this be at the world, regional, national or intra-urban level. At each level the nature and texture of relationships must be spelt out.

It also means that peripheral classes can with great difficulty be seen to exist outside of the capitalist system, 'uncaptured' and 'untouched' by it. That replicates an old, discredited dualism. To the extent that relations of production redolant of precapitalist modes exist, they are frequently new and unique social forms created on the foundation of old forms. They operate, as Coquery-Vidrovitch says, according to different mechanisms, in pursuit of different goals, and with a different logic.
Diagram 3: Relationships of Power in SA

RSA → TRANSKEI

- Foreign Affairs
- President
- Development Bank
- Chiefs
- Military
- Bureaucracy
- Mining
- Sol Kerzner
- E. Cape Farmers
- Israeli Whuru-hoppers
- Migrants
Furthermore, dependency is not an absolute state inevitably leading to underdevelopment and poverty. Industrial decentralisation is, in this sense, analogous to NIC semi-peripheral development in the Far East. It is dependent enclave development, but it entails tangible benefits.

Core-periphery relationships are not exclusively or in any ‘ultimate’ sense about the exploitation of labour. They also entail relationships between ruling classes. This is what makes core-peripheral systems multinodal. There is no single, uncontested centre of power. Frequently those centres of power can be spatially pinpointed, so that it makes more sense to talk of relations between Pretoria and Bisho, rather than South African and the Ciskei. And those relationships occur both in and outside of the market.

There is no doubt, for example, that core dominance in Southern Africa is anchored by economies of agglomeration, i.e. market considerations. An investor would think twice before sinking capital into Maseru rather than Johannesburg.

At the same time, however, ‘extra-economic’ measures have been responsible for the suppression of competition in neighbouring frontline states. Kowet (1978:111-2) mentions cases of a fertilizer plant in Swaziland, automobile and hydroelectric projects in Lesotho, and a soap factory in Botswana - all closed or suppressed in embryo by South African action. Agricultural imports from the BLR countries have also, despite the free trade clause in the South African Customs Union agreement, been subjected to restrictive tariffs, quotas and ‘health’ clauses. (cf. also Rogerson, 1981)

At the metatheoretical level, I have argued that the objections by Leys and Brenner to dependency theory cannot be upheld. Leys dislikes ‘deep’ structure. So do I. That does not mean we have to abandon structuralism. For his part, Brenner does not know the difference between micro- and macro-theory. The challenging claim by Wallerstein that the core-periphery relationship is as basic to capitalism as that between capital and labour needs further argument before we can
Finally, if we are to retain the notion of core-periphery as structure, we need to take seriously the caveats which social historians of a Thompsonian bent have raised about structure.

I have suggested that structures should be seen as structuring, existing out of time. They only exist at the moment that they are actualized by concrete actors. That is why structures cannot be seen as ontologically prior to agents. They are mutually constitutive.

The problems of epistemological relativism, and the trivialisation of knowledge which flows from that, can, I have proposed, be countered by Giddens' notion of critical theory. It is not only the objects of social theory which should be the focus of critical analysis, but also the subjects, social theorists themselves.

In the present anti-structuralist climate, then, we can retain notions of structure only under certain strict conditions. Social analysis must, firstly, start from the texture and interiority of individual consciousness. Second, we must separate notions of structure from the limitations of one dimension or one coherent whole with clearly demarcated boundaries. Structures must be seen to be operating simultaneously at several levels. The networks which bind societies must also be seen as multinodal with messy, 'old-carpet' edges between them. Finally, structures exist in a virtual sense, out of time. They are re-alized, instantiated, at specific time-space moments by acting agents.
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