

PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN NATIONAL DEFENCE FORCE: THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY ACADEMY

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DECLARATION OF ORIGINALITY

I, the undersigned, hereby declare that the work contained in this dissertation is my own original work and that I have not previously in its entirety or in part submitted it to any university for a degree.

Signature_____

Date_____

SUMMARY

The study represents a descriptive analysis of the tensions that drive the need for an educated military in South Africa and, more specifically the role of the South African Military Academy in the provision thereof. The purpose of the research was to demarcate the proper role of the South African Military Academy in the academic and professional preparation of officers for the South African National Defence Force (SANDF). This purpose necessitated, firstly, an analysis of the need for education in armed forces in general and in South Africa in particular, with specific reference to the tensions underpinning military education and training. It secondly called for a broad assessment of the nature of professional military education in the SANDF at large to contextualise the role and function of the South African Military Academy. These discussions are based on a literature overview, document analysis and unstructured interviews with decision-makers.

In the first part of the study, a framework is developed for the education of officers. The framework is based on the assumption that modern military professionalism is rooted in a need for training to develop military skills, education to understand and develop the military body of knowledge and experience as the application of skills and knowledge. It is also based on the identification of four knowledge clusters that need to be the focus of officer education, namely the external security environment within which armed forces operate, the nature of armed forces as organisations, the professional employment of armed force(s), and the physical environment within which armed forces operate. The framework highlights three levels of officer development: the making of lieutenants, the making of colonels, and the making of generals.

This framework is used for the analysis of education, training and development in the SANDF. Both the positive and negative attributes as well as trends in training and education in the SANDF are discussed. The discussion serves as the departing point for an outline of the debate about the role of the Military Academy since democratisation in 1994. It is argued that there is no clarity about the role and function of the Military Academy. Critical questions are also asked about the nature of the academic programmes offered to officers at the Military Academy. The departmental-level agreement between the Department of Defence and the University of Stellenbosch is pointed out as the *raison d'être* for many of the problems with which the Military Academy is confronted.

The study finally highlights the need for education as a requirement for officership in the SANDF, a reconsideration of military socialisation at the Military Academy, the difficult position of the Faculty of Military Science, the need for a core academic programme, and structural changes that are needed at the Military Academy. It is recommended that, like many foreign military academies, the future existence of the Military Academy be assured through national legislation. The involvement of the University of Stellenbosch in the education of young officers at the Military Academy should not be terminated. However, the existence, functioning, organisation and structure of the Military Academy should not be based on a “goodwill-approach” between the University and the Department of Defence.

OPSOMMING

Die studie bied 'n beskrywende analise van die spannings wat die behoefte aan 'n opgevoede weermag in Suid-Afrika onderlê en, meer spesifiek, die rol van die Militêre Akademie in die voorsiening van opvoeding in dié verband. Die besondere oogmerk van die navorsing is die afbakening van die werklike rol van die Suid-Afrikaanse Militêre Akademie in die akademiese en professionele voorbereiding van offisiere vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Nasionale Weermag (SANW). Hierdie oogmerk vereis, eerstens, 'n ontleding van die noodsaaklikheid vir die opvoeding van weermagte in die algemeen en in Suid-Afrika in die besonder, met spesifieke verwysing na die spannings wat militêre opvoeding en opleiding onderlê. Dit noodsaak, tweedens, 'n breë waardering van die aard van professionele militêre opvoeding in die SANW om die rol en funksie van die Suid-Afrikaanse Militêre Akademie te kontekstualiseer. Die besprekings is gebaseer op 'n literatuuroorsig, dokumentontleding en ongestruktureerde onderhoude.

In die eerste deel van die studie word 'n raamwerk vir die opvoeding van offisiere ontwikkel. Dié raamwerk is gebaseer op die aanname dat moderne militêre professionalisme gebaseer is op militêre opleiding om vaardighede te ontwikkel, opvoeding om die militêre kennisliggaam te verstaan en ontwikkel, asook ervaring as toepassing van vaardighede en kennis. Die raamwerk omvat ook die identifisering van vier fokus kennisareas, naamlik die eksterne omgewing waarin weermagte opereer, die organisatoriese aard van krygsmagte, die professionele aanwending van krygsmag(te), en die fisiese omgewing waarin krygsmagte opereer. Die raamwerk beklemtoon voorts drie vlakke van offisiersopvoeding: die ontwikkeling van luitenant, die ontwikkeling van kolonels, en die ontwikkeling van generaals.

Die raamwerk word vervolgens vir 'n ontleding van opvoeding, opleiding en ontwikkeling in die SANW gebruik. Beide die positiewe en die negatiewe kenmerke sowel as tendense van opleiding en opvoeding in die SANW word bespreek. Dié bespreking dien as vertrekpunt vir 'n ontleding van die debat oor die rol van die Militêre Akademie sedert demokratisering in 1994. Daar word aangevoer dat daar geen duidelikheid oor die rol en funksie van die Militêre Akademie bestaan nie. Kritiese vrae word gevra oor die aard van die akademiese programme wat aan offisiere by die Militêre Akademie gebied word. Die departementele ooreenkoms tussen die departement van Verdediging en die Universiteit Stellenbosch word voorgelê as die *raison d'être* van baie probleme waarmee die Akademie gekonfronteer word.

Die studie beklemtoon die behoefte aan opvoeding as 'n vereiste vir offiserskap in die SANW, die heroorweging van militêre sosialisering by die Militêre Akademie, die heroorweging van die posisie van die Fakulteit Krygskunde, die behoefte aan 'n akademiese kernleerplan, en strukturele veranderinge wat by die Militêre Akademie vereis word. Daar word aanbeveel dat, soos in die geval van verskeie buitelandse militêre akademies, die toekoms van die Militêre Akademie deur nasionale wetgewing verseker word. Die betrokkenheid van die Universiteit Stellenbosch in die opvoeding van offisiere moenie daardeur beëindig word nie. Die bestaan, funksionering, organisering en struktuur van die Militêre Akademie moet egter nie op 'n "welwillendheidsooreenkoms" tussen die Universiteit en die Departement van Verdediging gebaseer wees nie.

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Having grown up in the middle of the Karoo, writing this thesis in my second language has been a tremendous challenge on a personal level. I could not have done this without the help and contribution of a number of individuals and institutions.

The South African National Defence Force (SANDF) afforded me the opportunity to do the research. This in itself is a reflection of the kind of institution it is and the inherent willingness of the SANDF to become a learning and intellectual organisation. This is part of the reason why I have always been proud to serve in the South African military. The study would not have been possible without the willingness of a large number of officers to be interviewed for this study. Most of them are senior officers for whom time is a valuable commodity. I also had long discussions with a number of officers whose names are not listed as interviewees but who allowed me to “pick their brains” – often late at night. I am particularly grateful to the retired deputy chief of the South African Army, Maj Gen (ret) Johan Jooste as well as Brig Gen JD Malan and Brig Gen Kobus Smit for their interest and support.

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My ouers was nog altyd 'n leidende lig in my lewe. My ma is in alle opsigte 'n voorbeeld van medemenslike hardwerkendheid; my pa die denkende patriarg in die gesin. Hulle was nog altyd en is steeds vir my 'n groot bron van inspirasie. My pa en al die kleurryke lede van die ontbinde

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No person who takes on a project like this can do it without higher order inspiration. I am glad that I can draw that inspiration out of my belief in an unfaltering God, Jesus Christ.

DEDICATION

This study is dedicated to my wife Lizl.

Her willingness to become an authority on military education is exceptional.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ANC	African National Congress
APLA	Azanian People's Liberation Army
AU	African Union
BMil	<i>Baccalaureus Militaris</i>
CEMIS	Centre for Military Studies
COLET	College for Education Technology
DOD	Department of Defence
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
ENSP	Executive National Security Programme
ETD	Education, Training and Development
FY	Financial Year
GNP	Gross National Product
ICTT	Interpersonal, Conceptual, Technical, Tactical
IDASA	Institute for a Democratic Alternative for South Africa
JCSP	Junior Command and Staff Programme
JSCSP	Joint Senior Command and Staff Programme
LCAMP	Leadership, Command and Management Programme
MBA	Master in Business Administration
MK	<i>Umkhonto we Sizwe</i> (Military wing of the ANC)
MMil	<i>Magister Militaris</i>
MOOTW	Military Operations Other than War
MTPD	Military Training and Professional Development
MUE	Military University Educator
NCO	Non-commissioned Officer
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NQF	National Qualification Framework
NSB	National Standards Body
PAC	Pan-African Congress
PME	Professional Military Education
SAAF	South African Air Force
SADC	Southern African Development Community

SADF	South African Defence Force
SAMS	South African Medical Service
SAN	South African Navy
SANDC	South African National Defence College
SANDF	South African National Defence Force
SANWC	South African National War College
SAQA	South African Qualification Authority
STB	Service Training Branch
TRADOC	Training and Doctrine Command (U.S. Army)
UDF	Union Defence Force
UN	United Nations
UNITA	<i>União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola</i>

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

It is not genius which reveals to me suddenly and secretly what I should do in circumstances unexpected by other; it is thought and preparation.

Napoleon¹

1.1 BACKGROUND AND PROBLEM FORMULATION

War, conflict and the use of force for various purposes are central to our understanding of the world and the way in which it has evolved. Despite the dubious morality of using military force in situations of conflict and war to achieve personal or political aims, the fact remains that it has been used to do just that throughout recorded history. During most of history, the use of military force was regarded as a craft or an art. The idea that it has a substantial theoretical and intellectual foundation that could and should be studied was a product of the Enlightenment and the philosophical period that was dominated by the Romantic philosophers.² The history of military professionalism from the 18th century onwards is, thus, also the history of the development and growth of military education. Today, Hauser argues, the military profession is not a particularly intellectual one, but it cannot afford to be anti-intellectual either.³

Since the Second World War, the need for increasingly refined expertise and education is a universal characteristic of all professions, including the military profession.⁴ Van Creveld pointed out that two factors underpinned the nature of the military profession in this particular era: the expansion of civilian higher education and the shifting definition of war. In combination, these factors led to a world-wide revolution in education within armed forces, to the extent that today, most armed forces require their officers to be educated – to have a university degree. Indeed, if a long-term military career is foreseen, one that will culminate in high rank, officers are being advised to have an advanced degree.⁵

¹ Hunerwadel, JP, "Planning to Win: A Study in Strategy and Operational Art", *Air & Space Power Chronicles*, 26 February 2002. Available at <<http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/cc/hunerwadel.html>> [27 January 2004]

² Malik, JM, "The Evolution of Strategic Thought", In Snyder CA (ed.), *Contemporary Security and Strategy*, Routledge, New York, 1999, pp. 17-18.

³ Hauser, WL, "Professional Writing: A Professional Obligation", *Military Review*, August 1974, p. 42.

⁴ Reddel, CW, "Preface", In Converse, EV (ed.), *Forging the Sword: Selecting, Educating, and Training Cadets and Junior Officers in the Modern World*, Imprint Publications, Chicago, 1998, p. xi.

⁵ Van Creveld, M, *The Training of Officers: From Military Professionalism to Irrelevance*, Free Press, New York, 1990, p. 102.

Military officers should have the intellectual expertise required to employ a nation's armed forces – all its military resources – in support of and within the larger totality of a nation's security. They have to understand and deal with military, economic, technological and other societal changes in an intellectual manner, otherwise, as Corbett warned, militaries will "rot".⁶ Preston, thus, argued that throughout history and across all nations, military education had only one purpose: "... encouraging open minds to accept the need for continual adaptation".⁷

Not many militaries has gone through the kind of turmoil and transformation the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) faced since the democratisation of the country in 1994. Within the South African military, much attention has been focused on the idea of Education, Training and Development (ETD)⁸ as a means of transformation. Training in particular was an important driver of the changes that were brought about since 1994. In contrast to the role of training, the general attitude towards education was rooted in the view that intellectual excellence as such is not what the military is all about.⁹ This general attitude was an important legacy from the apartheid military that was carried over to the SANDF. The former South African Defence Force had a very tactically- and operationally-minded focus on training and experience. This stands in stark contrast to the general approach in revolutionary armed forces, such as Umkhonto we Sizwe – the military or armed wing of the African National Congress – who very often have a broad and more intellectual attitude towards their tasks. A high emphasis on training within armed forces also reflects the assessment of one particular school of thought concerning the preparation of armed forces – with Martin van Creveld as its main disciple. Van Creveld emphasised the idea that militaries should focus on the development of military practitioners capable of running a country's defence force. Officers, this school of thought maintained, should not be developed at all to engage in intellectual debates or academic writing about defence forces and security issues.¹⁰

The tension between the training and education of officers is acute in situations of limited resources where a defence force has to make some trade-offs. In South Africa in particular, the military has

⁶ Borowski, HR (ed.), *The Harmon Memorial Lectures in Military History*, Office of Air Force History, United States Air Force, Washington D.C., 1988, p. 269.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 270.

⁸ Please note that the SANDF makes use of the notion "Education, Training and Development" (ETD) as an overarching umbrella concept to describe all learning and teaching activities in the Department of Defence. The abbreviation ETD will thus be used throughout this document when discussing learning and teaching in the SANDF.

⁹ Esterhuyse, AJ, "Ten Years of Democracy and the Return of Bad Times: Studying Security, Strategic and Military Affairs in South Africa", *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol 29, No 3, December 2005, p. 161.

¹⁰ Van Creveld, M, *op. cit.*, p. 102.

been confronted with a very small defence budget and a growing operational schedule since 1994, specifically in the sphere of peace missions. Thus, allowing young officers to study at the South African Military Academy in Saldanha for three years is, in the view of some, probably deemed to impinge upon the budgetary and operational requirements of the SANDF. In the recent past, the closure of the Military Academy has been discussed on senior command and management level in the SANDF. Indeed, SANDF officers are very often sceptical about the need for a military academy in South Africa.¹¹ The opinion that is generally held is that there is sufficient time later in the career of an officer to engage in studies. Thus, the problem statement of the study is rooted in the tensions that underpin the need for educated armed forces in general and in South Africa in particular.

1.2 IDENTIFYING SUB-PROBLEMS

Through a thorough study of the literature, own experience and interviews with academics and military personnel, at least four areas of tension (sub-problems) have been identified for the purposes of this study.

Firstly, given that military expertise is the result of the interplay between military experience, training and education,¹² no armed force can neglect either the training or the education of its officers. There is a natural tension between training and education that most armed forces have difficulty to manage and very often prefer to ignore.¹³ For a variety of reasons, militaries are comfortable with and have a natural preference for training. Military training focuses on the provision of skills – teaching the officer "what to think" not "how to think". Education, on the other hand, aims at developing a mental flexibility to look beyond the horizon, to anticipate and to shape the future. The tension between training and education is intensified by the challenge, pointed out

¹¹ An opinion of the author based on personal discussions, interviews and personal conversations with a number of mid-level and senior officers of the SANDF. It is a commonly held view in the military that if it were not for pressure from the policy environment, the SANDF would already have closed the Military Academy.

¹² Huntington, SP, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1957, p. 13.

¹³ See the following articles in this regard: Mason, RA, "Innovation and the Military Mind", *Air University Review*, Jan-Feb 1986, Available at <<http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1986/jan-feb/mason.html>> [16 February 2005] and Kline, JA, "Education and Training: Some Differences", *Air University Review*, Jan-Feb 1985. Available at <<http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1985/jan-feb/kline.html>> [25 February 2005]

by Downes, that it is more difficult for the trained man to gain a general scientific education than it is for the educated man to undergo military training.¹⁴

A second concern, rooted in the difference between training and education, is the tension between the military world with its disciplined regimental ethos and the academic world with its ethos informed by the need for freedom of thought.¹⁵ This tension is acute at institutions that have to address both the training and educational needs of the military – military academies and defence colleges in particular. The one world aims at developing "... critical, creative, broad-gauged visionaries with the intellect to dissect the status quo, grasp the big picture, discern important relationships among events, generate imaginative possibilities for action, and operate easily in the conceptual realm".¹⁶ The other world emphasises the need for disciplined skills to operate and "... largely discourages independent thought and critical inquiry".¹⁷ Consequently, Foster maintains, the military's undue emphasis on obedience, loyalty, pervasive doctrine, regulations, and operating procedures breeds an orthodoxy that drives out any need for original thought.

The third tension that underpins military education concerns its focus. Military personnel have to be true professionals in the profession of arms while, because the profession of arms is also a government bureaucracy, they also have to be good bureaucrats. Underpinning this dualistic nature of the military profession is the question concerning the way in which officers should be educated so as to address both worlds.¹⁸ Military education on the one hand has to prepare officers as professionals in the management of violence, the management of defence and the management of peace but, on the other hand, also to be good bureaucrats. At most military education institutions this boils down to a tension between academic studies focusing on issues such as strategy, security and military affairs; and those related to the management sciences. Even at military training institutions there are often debates about the relevancy of particular programmes for combat elements on the one hand, and combat support and combat service support elements of armed forces on the other.

¹⁴ Downes, C, *Special Trust and Confidence: The Making of an Officer*, Frank Cass, London, 1991, p. 200.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 135.

¹⁶ Foster, GD, "Research, Writing, and the Mind of the Strategist", *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Spring 1996, p. 112.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 112.

¹⁸ See the discussion of this problem by Snider, DM and Watkins, GL in the introductory chapter in Snider, DM & Watkins, G (eds.), *The Future of the Army Profession*, McGraw-Hill, New York, 2002 and in Esterhuysen, AJ, "Management and Command in the SANDF: Changing Priorities", *Strategic Review for Southern Africa*, Vol XXVI, No 1, May 2004.

A last tension concerns the debate of whether the focus of military education should be on the "making of lieutenants" or the "making of colonels."¹⁹ The one view – a long-term strategic view – emphasises the need for the military profession, like all other professions, to educate its members as a pre-requisite for entering the profession of arms. This school of thought places a high premium on the availability of military academies with a large academic component as part of its programme for the development of officers. The other view – a short-term tactical view – emphasises the immediate need of the military for junior leaders and the necessity to expose them to the realities of the military world as early as possible in their careers. Proponents of this view argue that tactical training and experience form the bedrock of a junior officer's world and that the need for education becomes more important as the individual progresses towards the strategic environment. This school of thought is based on the assumption that the officer needs to earn his commission through practical leadership and that there is sufficient time later in the career of an officer to busy himself with academic studies. There is thus a tension within militaries between pre-commission liberal (academic) education and professional (military) education. On a higher level, this tension concerns the interplay between a general scientific academic formative education and a professional vocational education in the making of officers.

1.3 PURPOSE AND OUTCOMES OF THE RESEARCH

The study is a descriptive analysis aimed at demarcating the proper role of the South African Military Academy in the academic and professional preparation of officers for the SANDF. This aim calls for, firstly, an analysis of the need for educated armed forces in general and in South Africa in particular, with specific reference to the tensions underpinning military training and education. It, secondly, requires a broad assessment of the nature of professional military education in the SANDF at large to contextualise the role, function and challenges of the South African Military Academy.

The purpose of the study aims at providing a number of outcomes. This includes conceptual clarity on:

- the need for the education of armed forces in general and the SANDF in particular;
- the focus of academic and professional education of officers;

¹⁹ See the discussion of this problem in Crackel, TJ, "On the Making of Lieutenants and Colonels", *The Public Interest*, No 76, Summer, 1984. See also the remarks by Galvin, JR, "What's the Matter Being a

- the problems that most militaries – and particularly the SANDF – experience in the provision of military education; and
- a theoretical framework for educating militaries.

In addition, the study makes recommendations to the SANDF in general and the Military Academy in particular about education in the South African military. The study constitutes and provides a framework or basis for future research on the education of the military in South Africa in particular and Africa in general. The research of this study will also be published in accredited academic journals and used for debate at academic conferences. The study is furthermore intended as a background for a debate and discussion of the future nature and contribution of the Military Academy to education in the South African military. The following research outputs have resulted from research that was done in preparation for this study:

- one paper published in an international academic journal;²⁰
- five papers published in national accredited journals;²¹
- one paper in a non-accredited journal;²²
- one conference paper delivered at a national conference;²³ and
- a conference paper at an international conference.²⁴

Strategist?", *Parameters*, Vol XXV, No 2, Summer, 1995, p. 161.

²⁰ Esterhuysen, AJ, "Professional Military Education and Training: Challenges Facing the South African Military", *Defence Studies*, Vol 6, No 3, Sep 2006, pp. 377-399.

²¹ Esterhuysen, AJ, "The South African Military Academy: A Time for Debate and Change", *Strategic Review for Southern Africa*, Vol XXVIII, No 2, November 2006, pp. 89-106; Esterhuysen, AJ, "Educating for Professionalism: A New Military for a New South Africa", *Scientia Militaria*, Vol 34, No 2, 2006, pp. 21-43; Esterhuysen, AJ, "The Military Educational Predicament: Identifying Core Educational Requirements", *Strategic Review for Southern Africa*, Vol XXVII, No 2, November 2005, pp. 100-122; Esterhuysen, AJ, "Ten Years of Democracy and the Return of Bad Times: Studying Security, Strategic and Military Affairs in South Africa", *Journal for Contemporary History*, Vol 29, No 3, December 2005, pp. 148-167; Esterhuysen, A.J. "Management and Command in the SANDF: Changing Priorities", op. cit., pp. 40-60.

²² Esterhuysen, AJ, "Military Training and Education: Understanding the Difference and Tension", op. cit., pp. 9-10.

²³ Esterhuysen, AJ, "Ten Years of Democracy and the Return of Bad Times: Studying Security, Strategic and Military Affairs in South Africa", Paper delivered at the SASA Congress in Bloemfontein, 28 June 2004.

²⁴ Esterhuysen, AJ, "Ten Years of Democracy: Education and the Rise of Professionalism in the South African National Defence Force", Paper delivered at the 72nd Meeting of the Society of Military History, *The Rise of Military Professionalism*, Hosted by The Citadel – The Military College of South Carolina, 24-27 February 2005.

1.4 RESEARCH QUESTION

Based on the purpose of the research, the central research question is formulated as follows:

How can the tensions that underpin the need for an educated military in South Africa, be dealt with in general and at the South African Military Academy in particular?

It is foreseen that, by pursuing this goal, an answer will be found to the question on how the South African Military Academy can adequately prepare officers for the SANDF through the study of military and strategic affairs.

The study is underpinned by two propositions. Firstly, the continuous focus on training and experience in the development of young officers in the SANDF will create an increasing inability to educate mid-level and senior officers in the SANDF. Secondly, the South African Military Academy will increase its relevancy for the SANDF by drawing a clear line of demarcation between training and education on the one hand and, on the other hand, focusing on the vocational needs of the South African military through the development of a core curriculum.

1.5 TERMINOLGY AND CONCEPTS

Although the different concepts that are used in the making of officers will be explained in detail in the study, it is necessary to provide short definitions of the most prominent conceptions.

Military training is understood as the activity that armed forces use to develop the necessary *skills* to perform effectively on the technical and tactical levels of war.²⁵ Military training is rooted in the need for action. It places the focus on the primary function of the military – warfighting – and the skills required to do that well. In the military domain, training is required to teach soldiers all the skills they need to be good at fighting, or, in the realm of peace missions, the skills required from soldiers in their capacity as peacekeepers. Thus, military training aims at the provision of skills – fighting skills in particular.²⁶

²⁵ Sarkesian, SC, Williams, JA and Bryant, FB, *Soldiers, Society, and National Security*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, 1995, p. 17.

²⁶ Esterhuyse, AJ, "Military Training and Education: Understanding the Difference and Tension", *African Armed Forces Journal*, April 2004, p. 9.

Professional Military Education (PME) is a higher order umbrella concept that describes all the higher order education and developmental activities within the armed forces. It is used specifically to describe all the educational and developmental activities that armed forces itself provide to their officers from the beginning until the end of their careers. The term is used primarily to distinguish between the educational and developmental activities provided by the military itself on the one hand and civilian higher education on the other. Military education underpins the existence of a so-called body of military knowledge, and is rooted in the need for constant reflection.²⁷

The term *broad liberal education* is used to describe education of a general scientific nature. In most instances, it is education provided to the military through participation of members of the armed forces in civilian educational programmes. This type of education usually takes place at an individual level with members of the armed forces participating in civilian (higher/tertiary) education programmes at civilian universities or at military universities.²⁸

A *military academy* is a military institution responsible for the training, education and socialisation of officer cadets before appointment and in preparation for a career as an officer in the armed forces. The emphasis at military academies is strongly on the provision of under-graduate education.

A *military university* is a military educational institution responsible for the education of commissioned officers of the armed forces, where such education facilitates passage to higher ranks. Military universities do not offer functional training, often allow for the enrolment of civilian students, and have a strong post-graduate focus.

The idea of *military professionalism* categorises the military as a Huntingtonian organisation with a specific professional expertise, societal responsibility and organisational corporateness.

1.6 THE NEED FOR THE RESEARCH

Showalter emphasised that education provides credibility at all levels of society at large as a mark of merit.²⁹ Education in the SANDF – and with that the role of the military as an educator –

²⁷ Ibid., pp. 9 & 10.

²⁸ Sarkesian, SC et al., op. cit., p. 172.

²⁹ Showalter, DE, "No Officer rather than a Bad Officer': Officer Selection and Education in the Prussian/German Army, 1715-1945", In: Kennedy, GC & Nielson, K (eds.), *Military Education: Past, Present, and Future*, Praeger, Westport, 2002, p. 56.

underpins the standing of the military in the eyes of the broader South African society. In South Africa, this is an extremely important notion since unequal access to jobs and education and consequently extreme levels of income inequality were some of the defining characteristics of apartheid.³⁰ Consequently, the provision of military education determines the success of the SANDF in the same manner that the provision of education in general is at the heart of a successful New South Africa. There is thus a clear need for research focusing on the education of the military in South Africa.

One of Africa's major security challenges is fragile civil-military relations and unprofessional militaries.³¹ Very often, this translates into military intervention in politics. Military education is an important factor in keeping professional militaries in the barracks.³² Stated differently, an uneducated South African National Defence Force (SANDF) may threaten the very democracy it is trying to protect and uphold in South Africa. The Military Academy in Saldanha, housing the Faculty of Military Science of the University of Stellenbosch, is the most important educational institution of the SANDF. Indeed, the interaction between the University of Stellenbosch and the Defence Force represents a unique civil-military interface for the education of officers. Very recently, both the Commandant and the Dean of Military Science at the Military Academy were replaced, highlighting civil-military, educational and other tensions at the institution.³³

The need for research is also rooted in the role of education as a facilitator of security sector reform in Southern Africa in general and a democratic South Africa in particular. This particularly concerns the way in which the military has to transform itself to fulfil its role in a democratic South African society and how it should operationalise ideas such as human security that has become a cornerstone concept in the South African security architecture. It is also important to reconsider military education in South Africa against the background of the reform of the educational landscape in the country in general.

In addition, the role of education should be considered as a tool in preserving South African strategic and military knowledge. This has never been a priority in the South African military. The

³⁰ Handley, A, "The New South Africa, a Decade Later", *Current History*, Vol 103, No 673, May 2004, p. 196.

³¹ Howe, HM, *Ambiguous Order: Military Forces in African States*, Lynne Rienner, London, 2001.

³² See Chapter 7 of the following study: Malan, MR, *Civilian Supremacy over the Military: Guidelines for Embryonic Democracies*, Thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree Master of Military Science (Political Science) at the University of Stellenbosch, September 1994.

³³ Anon, "Rektor Sit Voet Dwars by Krygskunde", *Kampusnuus*, Staff Newspaper of the University of Stellenbosch, 13 April 2006, p. 1.

role of education in this regard is critical in ensuring that the flame is kept burning; that the SANDF remains intellectually prepared for any eventuality it might face in future. The need for research is furthermore rooted in the need for education to prepare the military in South Africa for the typical kind of operations that is expected from militaries in democratic societies in times of peace when vital interests are not at stake. From this perspective, the need for education in the preparation of the military to engage the polity actively in a mutually beneficial but asymmetrical civil-military interaction and to participate actively in the defence budgetary process should be considered.

1.7 DELIMITATIONS

The study focuses on the education of professional military practitioners – soldiers, sailors and airmen who served as officers in their respective services. The schooling of technical musterings is not considered. The education of professional engineers, artisans, tradesmen and the like is consequently also not addressed; neither is musterings in the medical services, which are controlled by professional bodies. In addition, in consideration of education in the SANDF in general the emphasis is on those military institutions that are involved in the provision of military schooling of an educational nature. Institutions, such as corps schools that operate clearly in the training realm, are also excluded from the study.

The interviewees reflect a predominance of army personnel. This is a reflection of the position of the army as the senior service in the SANDF and, more importantly, the predominance of army personnel in the joint services environment. The Joint Training Division and most of the senior ETD institutions form part of this joint services environment. The description of the command and control of the Joint Training Division itself and as it relates to the SANDF at large is described as it is at the time of writing. Certain changes were made in this regard towards the beginning of 2007. These changes are not going to affect the nature of education in the SANDF in general and at the Military Academy in particular and, consequently, the changes were not incorporated into the study.

No effort is made during the study to provide a structured overview of the academic programmes offered by most outstanding military academies across the world. The approach in this study is to focus on the philosophical roots of military education in general and the knowledge clusters on which some of these institutions focus in the development of their academic programmes. Although not included in this study, an overview of the nature of these academies (joint or single service), the duration and structure of their programmes, and how the programme is imbedded in

the ETD system of the particular defence force might be particularly useful in establishing a benchmark against which the programmes of the South African Military Academy can be evaluated. This is indeed one of the weaknesses of this study since it focuses on what military academies ought to do, not what they actually do.

The study is primarily concerned with the content and the structure of officer education in general and in the South African Defence Force in particular. The issue of *who* should educate the military in South Africa is not comprehensively addressed in this study. Though the matter receives some attention throughout the study, it is not dealt with in a comprehensive in-depth manner. It is believed that this particular problem should be addressed in a more comprehensive way in a separate study.

It should also be noted that the masculine form of language is used throughout the study. This is not an effort to downplay the important role of woman within armed forces these days, but merely to simplify the writing process. Thus, all arguments are intended as to be applicable to all individuals serving in the armed forces.

1.8 RELATED LITERATURE

Much has been written on military education in general. Consequently, an extensive literature on military education is available. However, the research that has thus far been done on the education of the military in South Africa is limited – almost non-existent. A review of the general literature on military education reveals three broad themes, namely historical literature, theoretical literature and future-orientated literature.

The historical literature focuses on the development of military education in general or provides chronological overviews of the development thereof at specific military educational institutions or in specific defence forces. In the case of the latter, military education *per se* is not necessarily the object of analysis. It does, however, provide some insight into the difficulties that these institutions experience in the provision of military education. Besides the work of Visser³⁴ that was done on the history of the South African Military Academy, the most well-known studies in this regard include

³⁴ Visser, GE, *Die Geskiedenis van die Suid-Afrikaanse Militêre Akademie, 1950-1990*, Unpublished PhD dissertation, Universiteit van Stellenbosch, Stellenbosch, November 2000.

the books by Downes on education in the British armed forces³⁵ and those by Lovell on the American service academies.³⁶ An extensive list of literature is also available on the education of the German armed forces in the period between the Napoleonic wars and the Second World War.

Theoretical literature on military education aims at providing answers to the challenge of military education in general or addresses particular problems in military education from a theoretical perspective. The work by Converse – *Forging the Sword*³⁷ – is an important contribution to the need for military education from a theoretical perspective. Most of the literature in this regard is, however, published as articles in academic journals. Military education from this perspective is in most instances also discussed as part of the bigger transformational challenges that face armed forces in general. The use of education in the transformation of the United States military in the aftermath of the war in Vietnam is a well-known example in this regard. The work of Moskos on post-modern militaries is typical of academic work in this context.³⁸ In South Africa, Heinecken has done research focusing on the post-modern nature of the SANDF, specifically on the need for education to prepare the SANDF for so-called "... soft missions".³⁹ The necessity of education to prepare soldiers for these missions was also the focus of articles by Neethling.⁴⁰

Future-orientated literature aims at outlining the importance and specific challenges that military education has to deal with in future. Books edited by Snider and Watkins *The Future of the Army Profession*⁴¹, Smith *Preparing Future Military Leaders*⁴² and Kennedy and Nielson *Military Education: Past, Present, and Future*⁴³ are the most prominent in this regard. No research in South Africa has yet been done that focus exclusively on the education of the military for future challenges.

³⁵ Downes, C, op. cit.

³⁶ Lovell, JP, *Neither Athens Nor Sparta? The American Service Academies in Transition*, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1979.

³⁷ Converse, EV (ed.), *Forging the Sword: Selecting, Educating, and Training Cadets and Junior Officers in the Modern World*, Imprint Publications, Chicago, 1998.

³⁸ Moskos, CC & Wood, FR, *The Military: More Than Just a Job?*, Pergamon-Brassey's, Washington, 1988 and Moskos, CC et al. (eds.), *The Post-Modern Military: Armed Forces after the Cold War*, Oxford University Press, New York, 2000.

³⁹ Heinecken, L, "Preparing for Operations Other than War: How Equipped is the SANDF to Deal with 'Soft Missions'", *Strategic Review for Southern Africa*, Vol XXIV, No 1, June 2002.

⁴⁰ Neethling, T, "The South African Military and Peacekeeping: Reflections on Conditions, Capacity Building and Prospects", *Scientia Militaria*, Vol 31, No 1, 2003.

⁴¹ Snider, DM & Watkins, G (eds.), op. cit.

⁴² Smith, H (ed.), *Preparing Future Leaders: Officer Education and Training for the Twenty First Century*, Australian Defence Studies Centre, Australian Defence Force Academy, Canberra, 1998.

1.9 RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

The study is a **descriptive analysis** and as such combines two research approaches. Neuman noted that descriptive research focuses on “how” and “who” questions (“How does it look?” “Who is involved?”)⁴⁴ However, Earl Babbie noted in his book *The Practice of Social Research* that descriptive studies are seldom limited to a merely descriptive purpose. Scientists usually go on to examine *why* the observed patterns exist and, more importantly, what they imply.⁴⁵ The research in this study falls into the above category since it includes an explanatory component or analysis. The first part of the research in this study is therefore explanatory by nature while the last part is more descriptive by nature. It should be noted, however, that the study is primarily descriptive by nature in the sense that it provides a detailed and highly accurate picture of education in the SANDF and at the Military Academy.⁴⁶

There is firstly a need for a **conceptual analysis** of military education. A theoretical understanding of the nature and the need of military education and its role in professional armed forces necessitate such an approach. Of central concern is the need for conceptual difference between the nature and need for training, experience, and education in armed forces. This analysis includes a discussion of the realist theory or tradition that underpins the so-called “military mind”. Understanding the military mind – the military way of thinking – is an important tool in understanding the need for military education. This analysis also demarcates the need for a general scientific education vis-à-vis professional military education in armed forces.

In addition, the study focuses on the development of a theoretical **framework** as a means for explaining, understanding and analysing education in the SANDF in general and at the Military Academy in particular. The framework is developed by means of deductive argumentation in which a number of factors about the education, nature and use of military forces are considered. This includes (*inter alia*) consideration of basic military education, military doctrinal education and politico-military education, as well as consideration of Africa as a theatre of operations, and the bureaucratic and professional nature of armed forces. The conceptual analysis and theoretical framework is used to **describe the nature of education** in the SANDF and at the Military

⁴³ Kennedy, GC & Nielson, K (eds.), op. cit.

⁴⁴ Neuman, WL, *Social Research Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches*, A and B, Boston, 2003, p. 30.

⁴⁵ Babbie, E, *The Practice of Social Research*, Thomson and Wadsworth, Belmont, 2007, p. 89.

⁴⁶ See the discussion of this kind of study in Neuman, WL, op. cit., p. 29.

Academy. The framework in the end provides the SANDF with a useful conceptual tool for coherent restructuring of education in the SANDF. The whole study, however, is a descriptive analysis and as such is qualitative by nature.

The research was conducted by means of a literature study, document analysis and interviews. A **literature overview** of primarily secondary sources directed towards outlining the philosophy, focus and nature of military education, the need thereof in armed forces and the problems in the provision thereof is an important part of the study. However, it is augmented through **document analysis**: research of primary sources focusing on an analysis of primary documents containing information on education within the SANDF. The focus is on primary documents that direct and/or underpin education in the SANDF in general and at the South African Military Academy in particular, such as policy documents from the national level and from within the SANDF. The curricula and other educational documents of the different SANDF institutions that are involved in education, training and development are also included in the document analysis. This is expanded to include **unstructured interviews** with officers and other officials involved in the education of the military in South Africa. Please note that the decision to interview particular individuals in the SANDF was based on the position or post they held within the organisation and not on considerations such as gender, rank or race.

The use of interviews is notorious for their high value but also the dangers they contain. The entrapments of interviews are well documented and the author has familiarise himself with these challenges as they are described in a number of publications on research methodology. The interviewer is in a unique position since he is also a member of the military and the Military Academy. This provides the interviewer with a sound understanding of the organisation and institution to be able to design effective interviews. However, most of the members who are interviewed are older, have more experience and are higher in rank than the interviewer. Getting access to these people for interviews is a problem. Military bureaucracy remains a problem and several “gatekeepers” need to be overcome in an effort to interview senior officers. The need for confidentiality of the interviewees’ identity is a requirement by the SANDF. All interviews are recorded and transcribed to ensure effective capturing of data.

1.10 ETHICAL STATEMENT

The research and study were done with the written informed consent of the South African National Defence Force. The conduct of the study within the Defence Force in particular was cleared with the Chief of Defence Intelligence. His concurrence forms part of the letter of informed consent that was received from the Chief of the Joint Training Division. It should be noted that the Defence Force insisted on the anonymity of all the defence force personnel that was interviewed for purposes of this study. Consequently, particular views and specific facts provided by military personnel during interviews were not attributed to these individuals in the text. This does not apply to serving and retired members of the Faculty of Military Sciences of the University of Stellenbosch that were interviewed. The names of Defence Force personnel who were interviewed are listed in the final bibliography. Though it is impossible to predict the outcome of a study like this, the intention was never to harm the general image of the Defence Force in any way through the results of the study. In cases where anomalies or irregularities are highlighted it is done in order to make recommendations about what should be done to rectify the problems that were identified.

1.11 CHAPTER BREAKDOWN

The chapter breakdown of the study was done by means of very specific questions. The introductory chapter is an exposition of the focus and nature of the study, as well as an explanation of the methodological features of the study. The second chapter addresses the reasons why militaries need to be educated. Chapter Three represents an effort to find an answer to two very specific questions: What should be the focus of military education and how should education be presented within militaries? The in-depth discussion of these two matters led to a general synopsis of education in armed forces that are used as a framework for analysis of education, training and development in the SANDF in Chapter Four. The purpose of the fourth chapter is to answer the question: What are the nature, structure and philosophy of education, training and development in the SANDF? This discussion provides a broad introduction and background to Chapter Five in which an effort is made to explore the debate about the role of the Military Academy in the education, training and development of the SANDF since 1994. The purpose of Chapter Five, more specifically, is to highlight the issues that have underpinned the debate concerning the future role of the Military Academy over the last ten years. These issues are taken one step further in Chapter Six. Chapter Six addresses the following question: How can the structure, focus and functioning of the South African Military Academy be optimised to provide quality education, training

and development to young candidate officers in the SANDF? The chapter consequently explores the unique civil-military relations between the Defence Force and University of Stellenbosch; the challenges that are facing the Military Academy at present; and ways in which these challenges can be dealt with. The last chapter contains a synthesis and conclusion of the most important recommendations of the study.

CHAPTER 2

PHILOSOPHY OF OFFICER PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT: PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EXPERTISE AND THE NEED FOR EDUCATION IN ARMED FORCES

Who is this that darkens counsel by words without knowledge?

Job 38:2

2.1 INTRODUCTION

The attention of the world's media is currently (2006) focused on the wars in the Middle East – Iraq and Lebanon to be specific. Thus, it will not be wrong to argue that the interest in military and strategic affairs is at present as deep or as strong as it has ever been. Galvin, however, pointed out that it is ironic and even disappointing that virtually all the reputed “experts” on strategic and military affairs familiar to the public are civilian academics, consultants, and journalists. He argues that the great military minds of our day are too busy to care about what is happening in the world around them.¹ In line with this view, Foster is of the opinion that military professionals work extremely hard and feel good about it, though most of their work is far more consumptive than productive. Though military professionals put great effort into their work, Foster points out, they leave in the end little more in their wake than new work for others.² Yet, for the military to be effective in the strategic realm it has to produce its own strategic thinkers – people who care about what is going on in the world around them. This demands an institutional commitment to education that includes serious and sustained attention to study, research and writing in the domain of military and strategic affairs. This, though, is something that militaries do not always give much attention to in the development of military strategists. Galvin outlines the problem by indicating that

*... the wealth of literature on strategy makes the discussion on how we beget strategists all the more puzzling, for surely the development of military strategists is a vital important issue which should be subjected to the interchange of ideas and constructive critiques, just like strategy itself. Strange that it is not.*³

¹ Galvin, JR, “What's the Matter with Being a Strategist?”, *Parameters*, Summer 1995, p. 161.

² Foster, GD, “Research, Writing, and the Mind of the Strategist”, *Joint Forces Quarterly*, No 11, Spring 1996, p. 115.

³ Galvin, JR, op. cit., p. 161.

The question needs to be asked whether militaries are concerned about this particular issue. Furthermore, why do militaries steer away from the use of education as a developmental tool? Opinions about what needs to be done to prepare military strategists for their very challenging task, differ. There are even conflicting political views in this regard with which the military has to contend. Those on the left of the political spectrum, for example, might fear that an educated military would dominate the national security domain and the policies that flow from that. Those on the right might argue that military officers who are taught in the classroom to question and analyse security and defence policy cannot be depended upon to carry it out on the battlefield.⁴

It is often said that people are the most critical element in the military.⁵ This is, to some extent, in contrast with the current very prominent debates about the so-called “Revolution in Military Affairs” and the accompanying prominence of technology in societies in general and within militaries in particular. In the end, the emphasis on technology should be balanced with the need for highly schooled people within militaries. Technology provides the military with the tools to do what ought to be done. Military strategists should optimise the use of military technological and other means to be successful in whatever is required from the military. Some argue that classical military strategy has been overtaken by technology. Settlement by war of a dispute between two (industrialised) societies has lost its political sense. In addition, nation-states are no longer in a position to guarantee their own security in isolation, and are dependent upon a security system often in a framework of regional alliances. Solidarity within the regional security system now very often takes the place of the assertion of the interests of the nation-state.⁶ In short, the role of the military strategist is becoming increasingly more complicated.

The aim of this chapter is to demarcate the need for and challenge of education in armed forces from a philosophical and theoretical perspective. The discussion is introduced with a brief overview of the history of education in modern armed forces. It is followed by a discussion of the nature of the military profession and the need for education that flows from that. The central theme is that militaries cannot be professional without being educated. The need for education in militaries is considered within the context of the preparation and development of military forces through training, education and experience. The idea of a military mind – a unique military way of thinking – and its

⁴ Taylor, WJ & Bletz, DF, "A Case for Officer Graduate Education", *Journal of Political and Military Sociology*, Vol 2, Fall 1974, p. 265.

⁵ Kelley, JW, "Brilliant Warriors", *Joint Forces Quarterly*, No 11, Spring 1996, p. 104 and Snider, DM & Watkins, GL, "Introduction", In Snider, DM & Watkins, G (eds.), *The Future of the Army Profession*, McGraw-Hill, New York, 2002, p. 3.

⁶ Baudissin, WG, "Officer Education and the Officer's Career", *Adelphi Papers* 103, 1973, p. 38.

influence on the education of armed forces is also analysed. The discussion concludes with an analysis of the institutional, cultural and other challenges that have to be overcome in order to educate the military. The discussion centres on the education of military officers and in particular their education for their future role as military strategists. The words officer and (military) strategist are, thus, used interchangeably in the discussion.

Before commencing with a discussion of education in armed forces it needs to be emphasised that there is a school of thought that claims that an armed force can be professional, and that it can acquire all the knowledge and skills it needs to be professional through thorough training. Mileham argues that until recently most British officers viewed the military profession in terms of "... a career in soldiering".⁷ Mileham is of the opinion that the British Army used to view itself as an organisation whose function is largely practical and based on common sense, not necessarily on intellectual activity.⁸ Strachan also argues that the military profession is not primarily a literate or an academic one. He points out that it is the challenge of out-door life, not that of desk-bound theory, that attracts young people to the military profession.⁹ This is also the view of the well-known Israeli military historian and theorist, Martin van Creveld. Van Creveld, in his book *The Training of Officers: From Military Professionalism to Irrelevance*, uses the armed forces of Israel and Vietnam as examples to argue that armed forces need to focus on training in preparing officers as military professionals.¹⁰ Without looking at the specific arguments of this particular school of thought, an effort will be made to outline the reasons why officers – in their capacity as military strategists – should be educated. The discussion will provide a general understanding for the need of education in armed forces, but not to the detriment of the need for training.

2.2 THE HISTORICAL ROOTS OF MODERN MILITARY EDUCATION

Conflict and war is a defining characteristic of mankind. The role of military force, though, has altered throughout recorded history by virtue of changing political and other demands. However, the emergence of the professional military officer in the 19th century has to a large extent regularised that role. The idea of a professional military officer can be traced to a Prussian government proclamation of 6 August 1808 declaring that:

⁷ Mileham, P, "Fifty Years of British Army Officership 1960-2010. Part 1: Retrospective", *Defence & Security Analysis*, Vol 20, No 1, March 2004, p. 80.

⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 71-72.

⁹ Strachan, H, *European Armies and the Conduct of War*, Unwin Hyman, London, 1983, p. 1.

¹⁰ Van Creveld, M, *The Training of Officers: From Military Professionalism to Irrelevance*, Free Press, New York, 1990. pp. 2-3.

*The only title to an officer's commission shall be, in time of peace, education and professional knowledge; in time of war, distinguished valor and perception. From the entire nation, therefore, all individuals who possess these qualities are eligible for the highest military posts. All previously existing class preference in the military establishment is abolished, and every man, without regard to his origins, has equal duties and rights.*¹¹ [emphasis added]

The intention of the proclamation was to ensure that officer commissions would in future be based on professional military knowledge and competence.¹² The proclamation was not fully observed in Prussia. Yet, its formulation marked an abrupt end to the hereto scarcely questioned assumption that only by noble birth was a man entitled to claim military command, or endowed with the intuitive capacity to exercise it. The proclamation led to the development of the so-called "Jena" model of officer education. in reaction to the Prussian defeat at Jena in 1806.¹³ The smashing Prussian victories of 1864-1871 in the end convinced most of Europe's armed forces of the need for military education. In Britain, for example, the debacle of the Crimea in the 1850s and the successes of the Prussian Army in the 1860s led to a realisation that "... the British officer corps sorely needed the professionalism that only promotion by merit, not money, could secure."¹⁴ Thus, before 1800 there was virtually no such thing as an educated professional officer corps anywhere. After 1900 no sovereign power of any significance was without one.¹⁵

Hackett pointed out that a number of conditions favoured the growth of military professionalism and education in the 19th century. This includes:

- the great increase in the complexity of the military skills required;
- the growing economic strength and competitiveness of the major nation states;
- the growth in power of the middle class at the expense of landed aristocracy; and

¹¹ Radbruch, HE, "From Scharnhorst to Schmidt: The System of Education and Training in the German Bundeswehr", *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol 5, 1978-79, p. 607.

¹² Pocklington, JH, "Professionalism and the Canadian Military", *Air University Review*, March-April 1976. Available at: <http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1976/mar-apr/pocklington.html> [16 Nov 2004]

¹³ Foot, P, "European Military Education Today", *Baltic Defence Review*, No 5, Vol 2001, p. 13.

¹⁴ Moorcraft, PL, "Clausewitz and Sandhurst: Officer Training in Britain", *Militaria*, Vol 8, No 1, 1978, p. 25.

¹⁵ Hackett, J, *The Profession of Arms*, Macmillan, New York, 1983, p. 99.

- the development of democratic political institutions which demanded a more responsive articulation in armed forces.¹⁶

The professional development of military officers grew to maturity within the context of three 19th century revolutions, all of which come to fruition by the beginning of the First World War. The political, industrial and military revolutions of the late 18th and early 19th century made possible the mobilisation of an unprecedented amount of human and material resources to support a war effort. To be specific, the *political revolution* of the 19th century gave people a voice in governmental decisions. In return, military service became a duty since people had the obligation to support and defend the nation-state and its policies. In this way, the nation's total resources became available for the conduct of war.¹⁷ The *industrial revolution* meant that the human and material resources could be processed and utilised to equip mass armies. In addition, the application of steam and steel to transportation by means of railways and steamships meant that the mass armies could be transported to wherever they were needed. The sustained support that was needed by the mass armies and the availability of mechanised transport revolutionised not only logistics, but also the whole conduct of war. These armies had to be recruited, equipped, trained, transported, fed and commanded during battles. This led to a *military revolution* and particularly the creation of special general staff systems for thinking about and preparing for war in peacetime; as well as the conduct of war during times of conflict.¹⁸ High command consequently became much more than a question of leading troops in the field. Instead, it became a matter of mobilising, deploying and transporting large mass armies. This, according to Van Creveld, could best be done with the aid of a large-scale map situated in a well-equipped office complex. The result was that by the end of the 19th century, fundamental changes had occurred in the manner Western nations made war.¹⁹

The political, industrial and military revolutions of the 19th century thus blended elements of modern society into a potent military structure where it was no longer possible to distinguish between war and home front. Military strategists needed as much knowledge and understanding of politics and civil society as they did of warfighting proper. The need for well-trained and highly educated military staffs for the preparation and conduct of war was obvious.²⁰ The introduction of a general staff system as a means through which educated and capable staff officers could provide a free

¹⁶ Ibid., pp. 133-135.

¹⁷ Baucom, DR, "Historical Framework for the Concept of Strategy", *Military Review*, March 1987, pp. 5-6.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Van Creveld, M, *The Training of Officers: From Military Professionalism to Irrelevance*, op. cit., p. 99.

²⁰ Mills, W, *Arms and Men: A Study in American Military History*, GP Putnam's Sons, New York 1956, p. 206.

and steady flow of ideas throughout the armed force "institutionalised excellence" within the military.²¹

The removal of the class barrier and the 19th century revolutionary changes brought the need for a liberally educated body of officers (*ein gebildetes Offizierkorps*) to the fore. This was followed by the need for a professionally educated body of officers (*ein berufsgebildetes Offizierkorps*) with a structure of promotion in which criteria of competence predominates.²² These developments – the creation of a professionally educated body of officers and the entrance of professional and scientific knowledge into the military and strategic spheres – were rooted in two 19th century phases of philosophical thought. The era of Enlightenment, emphasising rational objective scientific analysis and search for clarity, was followed by an era in which German idealists and romantic thinkers focused on the psychological, emotional, subjective and intuitive dimensions. Within the military, the Swiss Antonie Henri Jomini (1779-1869) embodied the Enlightenment in his search for certain and fixed principles in the use of force. The Prussian Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831), however, combined the best of the Enlightenment and the German Romantic tradition in his writings.²³ Mills explains the outcome of these developments as follows: "War was now in the hands, not simply of professionals, but of highly trained, technical expert professionals who could in crisis levy upon every industrial and manpower resource of the now highly integrated state."²⁴

Until 1945, the Prussian (German) *Kriegsakademie* (war academy) embodied the idea of military education and excellence.²⁵ For a very long time the *Kriegsakademie*, established in 1810 in Berlin, was the only institution in Europe for the advanced study of war (*ein berufsgebildetes Offizierkorps*) and the higher education of officers in non-warlike disciplines (*ein gebildetes Offizierkorps*). In Prussia, attendance at the academy became a prerequisite for high command.²⁶ Character and intellect underpinned the German approach towards the military profession.²⁷ The

²¹ Dupuy, TN, *A Genius for War: The German Army and General Staff, 1807 – 1945*, Macdonald and Jane's, London, 1977, pp. 300-307.

²² Hackett, J, op. cit., p. 103.

²³ Malik, JM, "The Evolution of Strategic Thought", In Snyder, CA (ed.), *Contemporary Security and Strategy*, Routledge, New York, 1999, pp. 17-18.

²⁴ Mills, W, op. cit., p. 206.

²⁵ See the following chapter for an excellent in-depth discussion on education in the Prussian/German Army before 1945: "No Officer Rather Than a Bad Officer': Officer Selection and Education in the Prussian/German Army, 1715-1945", In Kennedy, GC & Nielson, K (eds.), *Military Education: Past, Present, and Future*, Praeger, Westport, 2002, pp. 35-61.

²⁶ Hackett, J, op. cit., pp. 103-104.

²⁷ Demeter, K, *The German Officer-Corps in Society and State, 1650-1945*, Translated by Malcom, A, Praeger, New York, 1965, pp. 63-108 provides an overview of the focus on character and intellect in the education of officers at the *Kriegsakademie*.

Germans, however, did not have a monopoly on an understanding of military theory or the ability to analyse operational experience. Nor did they have a monopoly on military competence. However, what they did have was a monopoly on consistently reliable and excellent performance throughout the army in accordance with well-developed military doctrine and theory.²⁸ The *Kriegsakademie* was at the heart of these doctrinal and theoretical developments in the German Army. A number of factors, Van Creveld points out, led to the success of the *Kriegsakademie*, namely –

- the rigorous system for selecting students;
- the three-year integrated curriculum, which for all the changes it underwent never lost sight of the fact that its overriding function was to prepare officers for conducting war in the field;
- the high status – and pay – enjoyed by the faculty, both in the army at large and vis-à-vis the students;
- the system whereby the academy itself served as a vehicle for selection – that is, not all those who graduated were taken into the general staff;
- the preferred promotion given to graduates; and
- the high social prestige enjoyed by the army in general, which meant that study at the academy was considered at least on a par with attendance at any civilian university.²⁹

The German *Kriegsakademie* embodied the "Jena" model of officer education. The basic motto of the "Jena" model of officer education is, Foot argues, "Never Again" – referring to the 1806 Battle of Jena. Foot argues that the idea of "never again" implies that:

- unintended war should not occur;
- defeat should not happen;
- the military leadership should have access to strategic decisions;
- military leadership and proper planning have to ensure success;
- military forces have to be properly trained;
- enemies have to be deterred through the robustness of the military forces; and
- should deterrence fail, the capability to enforce their will through war should guarantee success.³⁰

²⁸ Dupuy, TN, op. cit., p. 302.

²⁹ Van Creveld, M, *The Training of Officers: From Military Professionalism to Irrelevance*, op. cit., p. 101.

³⁰ Foot, P, op. cit., p. 13.

Foot argues that such a system of officer education works well in a stable strategic context, a legitimate political culture and a highly professional officer corps. It is seen as an in-house option for military education. The established assumption is that the military profession, or specific service, should be taught by its most talented officers – those fast-tracked, uniformed individuals who embody the professional attributes and personal virtues held to be most militarily valuable for the officer corps. Participation in training and education is seen as essential for promotion, and being on the directing staff of the institutions of higher learning is itself evidence of a special set of career expectations. The role of civilian academics, bureaucrats and policy-makers is minimised, although they still participate in exercises and lectures. However, the weight of activity is military-specific and inward-looking. The quality of thought among students is mostly admired when it conforms to "staff solutions" or a set of answers drafted by, and for, the military.³¹ Consequently, the "Jena" model of officer education is rooted in professional military education and training (*ein berufsgebildetes Offizierkorps*) provided by the military itself.

A number of factors led to the development of education in armed forces in the 20th century. The globalisation of conflict and technology was an important driver. Van Creveld in particular argues that the education of military professionals since 1945 was dominated by the significant expansion of civilian higher education and the shifting definition of war. A number of considerations underpin the upsurge in higher education in armed forces since 1945. The first of these was the adoption by most armed forces of an "up or out" personnel management system. Increasingly officers were expected to retire at a relatively young age. Most of them experienced difficulty in securing second careers. Foot, for example, pointed out that

*... as marriages happened, children appear and years seem to pass more rapidly, attention shifts marginally to what time spent in the military will produce by way of preparations for the next stage of an individual's career, beginning roughly any time from ages 30 to 50.*³²

Consequently officers increasingly began to look for pathways to prepare themselves for second careers while they were still serving in the armed forces. A recognisable academic qualification provided the most direct and obvious route into a second career.³³

³¹ Ibid. p. 14.

³² Foot, P, op. cit., p. 13.

³³ Van Creveld, M, *The Training of Officers: From Military Professionalism to Irrelevance*, op. cit., p. 102.

The post-Second World War introduction of nuclear weapons and the arrival of the age of deterrence led to a de-militarisation of war in which the military dimensions of armed conflict were de-emphasised in favour of the non-military dimensions. An understanding of the wider security ramifications and implications of the use of force became necessary.³⁴ The fear that the use of conventional weapons could lead to or escalate into a nuclear war brought to the fore a limitation on the use of force in a conventional manner. This was one of the contributing factors in the rise of low-intensity conflicts – the so-called wars of national liberation. The political-strategic emphasis and nature of these conflicts led to the re-invention of a “new” military strategic school of thought: counter-insurgency. In most theories about revolutionary wars and counter-insurgency, the military dimensions of conflict are de-emphasised in favour of the political, economic, and psychological dimensions of the struggle.³⁵

The rise of irregular warfare was accompanied by an increasing emphasis, first, on defence and, later, on the security of the state. Ministries of Defence replaced Ministries of War while defence policies and later security policies replaced military policies. The role of armed forces was extended to peacetime. The introduction of the notion of security presupposed an extension of defence and military-related matters to other spheres of society. Within the framework of the Cold War, almost every conceivable aspect of human existence was securitised. The role of academic education and the concomitant need to conceptualise these matters was almost self-evident.

Van Creveld argues that the post-1945 geo-strategic situation necessitated that armed forces all over the world retained disproportionately large numbers of middle-ranking officers in service. These officers constituted a pool of experience for an accelerated mobilisation process in case war broke out. In the strategic context of the Cold War, such an eventuality was always a possibility. Over time, the numbers of these officers rose to a point where it became a serious problem for armed forces. Questions were being raised about how to keep officers busy in a constructive manner. Higher education as a solution to these and other problems seemed to be distinctly economic. Officers who studied, Van Creveld argued, required neither units to command nor equipment to run

³⁴ Ibid., pp. 101-102.

³⁵ McCuen, JJ, *The Art of Counter Revolutionary War*, Stackpole Books, Harrisburg 1966; Thompson, R, *Defeating Communist Insurgency: Experiences from Malaya and Vietnam*, Macmillan Press, London, 1966; Fairbairn, G, *Revolutionary Guerrilla Warfare: The Countryside Version*, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1974.

down. Sending officers to study was cheaper than almost anything else they could be made to do.³⁶

The limitations of the "Jena" model of military education – professional military education – became increasingly more evident during the latter stages of the Cold War. In the new geo-strategic and geo-political environments, what militaries did could not be divorced from the social, educational, economic and political contexts. The need to expose the officer corps to a wider agenda of security thought became obvious during the 1980s. It brought the need for graduate and post-graduate education in defence- and security-related matters to the fore.³⁷ This need was accompanied by a growth in military bureaucracy and the necessity for officers to understand their role as modern civil servants. Modernisation and globalisation reiterated the necessity and the need for increasingly refined expertise and education. Militaries, however, lagged in their appreciation of these developments' pertinence to the military profession. Reddel argues that this is due to arguments about "... the relative virtues of brain and brawn, about the value of education over training, and about the need for independent decision-makers vs disciplined subordinates".³⁸

To conclude, the Prussian military educational system served as the example for the development of military education in Europe in the 19th century. The German successes in a number of 19th century wars ensured the assimilation of the idea of professional military education by most armed forces. Since 1945 education has been an established feature of the military systems of most countries of the world. However, political, social, cultural, technological, and other forces have influenced officer formation from the time that systematic preparation originated in 17th and 18th century Europe to the present day. The rate of advance in professionalising the armed forces in different countries depended on the degree to which national security was threatened or was thought to be threatened.³⁹ This is an extremely important notion, since it emphasises the intimate relationship between military professionalism and the accompanied need for education on the one hand, and a particular country's approach to the understanding and management of its own security on the other hand. With the widening of the security agenda in the wake of the Cold War – emphasising the non-military dimensions of security – military professionalism, like military security,

³⁶ Van Creveld, M, *The Training of Officers: From Military Professionalism to Irrelevance*, op. cit., p. 72-73.

³⁷ Foot, P, op. cit., p. 14.

³⁸ Reddel, CW, "Preface", In Converse, EV (ed.), *Forging the Sword: Selecting, Educating, and Training Cadets and Junior Officers in the Modern World*, Imprint Publications, Chicago, 1998, p. xi.

³⁹ Hackett, J, op. cit., p. 133.

moved to the periphery of the agenda. Academic education likewise became more prominent than professional military education and training in the schooling of armed forces.

2.3 MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM AND THE NEED FOR EDUCATION

A better understanding of the military profession and its educational needs necessitates conceptual comprehension of the idea of a profession as well as the link between military professionalism and the need for education.

2.3.1 Defining the military as a profession

Dickenson and Joyce⁴⁰ contend that modern societies view the idea of professionalism in a positive light. Defining people, practices and concepts as being professional, Dickenson and Joyce pointed out, suggest that they are considered as moral, upright and virtuous. The use of the word *professional*, as in "professional status", "professional standards", and "professional courtesy", provides good examples. The Oxford Paperback Dictionary defines a profession *inter alia* as an occupation that "... involves knowledge and training in a branch of advanced learning".⁴¹ The *Verklarende Handwoordeboek van die Afrikaanse Taal*⁴² defines "professie" (profession) *inter alia* as "... 'n beroep – veral gebruik vir werk van intellektuele aard."⁴³ Under the entry "professional" in most thesauri, sub-lists are listed under the titles "proficient", "capable", "expert", "specialist", "authority" and "scholastic." The Canadian Department of Defence defines a profession as

... an exclusive group of people who possess and apply a systematically acquired body of knowledge derived from extensive research, education, training and experience. Members of a profession have a special responsibility to fulfil their function competently and objectively for the benefit of society. Professionals are governed by a code of ethics that establishes standards of conduct while defining and regulating their work.

⁴⁰ Dickenson, RA & Joyce, CT, "The Military as a Profession: An Examination", *CFLI Contract Research Report #CR01-0104*, Paper prepared for the Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, Kingston, May 2002, p. 3, Available at <http://www.cda-acd.forces.gc.ca/cfli/engraph/research/ocpf_e.asp> [17 March 2004]

⁴¹ Hawkins, JM (compiler), *Oxford Paperback Dictionary*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1990 (3rd edition), p. 644.

⁴² Odendal, FF, Schoonees, PC, Du Toit, SJ & Booysen, CM, (eds.), *Verklarende Handwoordeboek van die Afrikaanse Taal*, Perskor, Johannesburg, 1988, p. 860.

⁴³ Translated freely it means "occupation – used in work of an intellectual nature".

*This code of ethics is enforced by the members themselves and contains values that are widely accepted as legitimate by society at large.*⁴⁴ [emphasis added]

The Canadian perspective on this matter is particularly important since the Canadian armed forces went through a rigorous process of professionalisation since the early 1990s.⁴⁵

Downes identifies eight “enduring characteristics” that distinguish professions from other occupational groups. She pointed out that:

- the profession maintains a monopolistic control over a body of defined theoretical knowledge and the practical abilities that accompany such knowledge;
- aspirants to the profession must undertake intensive, lengthy, formal and practical education and training; on completion of which, their performance, learned competencies and skills are assessed by qualified practitioners through formal examinations, which lead to the award of a professionally- and societally-recognised qualification;
- the activities of the profession are located areas of vital concern to humankind;
- the relationship between the profession and society, between practitioner and client, is based upon altruistic service by the former to the latter;
- the profession retains a considerable degree of autonomy over matters such as recruitment and training practices, the behaviour expected of its members, and the maintenance of professional standards;
- the profession is organised into a form of community, with an occupational consciousness expressed often through a professional association;
- the profession is seen as a full-time, permanent career-oriented form of occupation; and
- society sanctions the activities of the profession as morally praise-worthy and accords to the professions a status of high esteem, respect, confidence, prestige and, not infrequently, privilege.⁴⁶

⁴⁴ Canadian Department of Defence, Chief of Defence Staff, *Duty with Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada*, Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, Canadian Defence Academy, 2003, p. 6.

⁴⁵ These changes were made in reaction to newspaper reports about an incident in Somalia in May 1993 where a number of Canadian paratroopers on a peacekeeping mission interrogated a member of the local population in an aggressive and cruel way. This led to a public outcry in Canada and resulted in fundamental changes to Canadian civil-military relations and the Canadian military structure – including fundamental changes to the education of their officers.

If the military profession is analysed by means of the criteria laid down for professions, it is clear that "... it possesses to the greatest degree the characteristics usually cited for a profession."⁴⁷ There is no reason to believe that the military is not a profession in the true sense of the word. However, definitions vary as to what constitutes modern military professionalism. It is believed, though, that every individual soldier or armed force would like to view itself as being professional, if only for the positive view of professionalism in society. For Foster, Edmunds and Cottey, professional soldiers are those who

*... accept their role is to fulfil the demands of the (civilian) government of the state (rather than themselves engaging in domestic politics or seeking to determine the overall direction of defence policy), who focus on conducting their professional military activities in an effective and efficient manner and whose organisation and internal structures reflect these twin assumptions.*⁴⁸

Sarkesian and Connor specifically argue that, firstly, the military profession has a defined area of competence based on expert knowledge and, secondly, there is a system of continuing education designed to maintain professional competence.⁴⁹

Thus, Huntington explains: "The modern officer corps is a professional body and the modern military officer a professional man".⁵⁰ The military professional, he pointed out, is an expert with specialised knowledge and skill in a significant field of human endeavour. The military professional is furthermore a responsible expert, working in a social context and performing a service that is essential to the functioning of society. The military professional is, lastly, a member of a corporate group, who shares a unique social responsibility and who considers himself apart from other groups or members of society. A distinct sphere of military competence exists, which is common to most

⁴⁶ Downes, CJ, "To Be or Not To Be a Profession: The Military Case", *Defence Analysis*, Vol 3, Sept 1985, pp. 147-148.

⁴⁷ Hartle, AE, *Moral Issues in Military Decision Making*, University of Kansas Press, Lawrence, 1989, p. 17.

⁴⁸ As quoted in Young, T, "Military Professionalism in a Democracy", Unpublished paper, Center for Civil-Military Relations, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, 2004, p. 2. Available at <http://www.ccmr.org/public/library_file_proxy.cfm/lid/5152> [14April 2004]

⁴⁹ Sarkesian, SC & Connor, RE, *The US Military Profession into the Twenty-First Century: War, Peace and Politics*, Frank Cass, London, 1999, p. 21.

⁵⁰ Huntington, SP, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1957, p. 7.

officers and which distinguishes them from civilians.⁵¹ Huntington argues that the military body of knowledge is ingrained in Harold Lasswell's phrase "... the management of violence"⁵² or as Hackett explains "... the ordered application of force."⁵³ From the idea of the management of violence flows the function and duties of the military officer. This, Huntington explains, is the direction, operation, and control of a human organisation whose primary function is the application of violence. Huntington specifically emphasises that the expertise of the officer is the management of violence, not the application thereof.⁵⁴

Huntington is of the opinion that the military function requires a level of expertise that can only be acquired through considerable "training and experience". His use of the word *training* draws specific attention. He outlines and explains the context within which the term is used by arguing that the expertise of the officer is neither a craft – which is primarily mechanical – nor is it an art – which requires unique and non-transferable talent. Rather, it is in his view "... an extraordinary complex intellectual skill requiring comprehensive study and training" [emphasis added].⁵⁵ Huntington's definition of the expertise of the military profession can be criticised as being very narrow, focusing only on the warfighting role of military forces. There is, however, no reason to question his idea that the expertise of the profession is of an intellectual nature and that it can only be acquired through in-depth and prolonged *study* and training. This need, according to Huntington, is rooted, firstly, in the limited opportunity of the officer to acquire his expertise through practical experience and, secondly, in the extreme complexity of military expertise.⁵⁶

Writing after the publication of Huntington's work, Janowitz simply took for granted that the military is a profession marked by expert skill acquired over time.⁵⁷ He distinguishes between two types of military professionals: firstly, the "absolutists": those members of the military who think in terms of the traditional conceptions of warfighting and military victory on the battlefield, and secondly, the "pragmatists": members of the military concerned with the measured application of military force and its political consequences, also in situations short of war.⁵⁸ He argues that the latter downplay their role as "heroic warriors" in pursuit of absolute military victory to emphasise their roles as pragmatic managers of force necessary to achieve political settlements and to maintain viable

⁵¹ Ibid., pp. 11-18.

⁵² Ibid., p. 11.

⁵³ Hackett, J, op. cit., p. 7.

⁵⁴ Huntington, SP, op. cit., p. 11.

⁵⁵ Ibid., p. 13.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Janowitz, M, *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait*, Free Press, New York, 1960, p. 5.

⁵⁸ Ibid., pp. 264-265.

international relations. The outcome of the interplay between these two schools of thought is a convergence of the civilian and military organisation in what Janowitz calls a *constabulary force*; the interpenetration of the civilian and the military resources of the state in preparing for and dealing with complex emergencies.⁵⁹ It becomes appropriate to speak of the “civilianisation” of the military profession.⁶⁰ Consequently, the boundaries between the military and the political spheres are blurred by the changing nature of war. This, Janowitz maintains, will eventually “politicise” military officers and challenge the idea of civilian supremacy. How should professional militaries deal with this challenge? Janowitz argues that educational programmes that link professional knowledge to national and trans-national purposes provide the only way in which the commitment of professional soldiers to civilian control can be strengthened.⁶¹

Burk⁶² is of the opinion that the armed forces’ claim to expert military knowledge is a foundation of its professional identity. He argues that security is no longer only a function of military strength. The role of the military and thus its professional knowledge is widening. The military professional is still centrally concerned with the management of violence between armed forces in a situation of war. The role and function of military forces were, however, expanded in the era after the Second World War to the management of defence and, after the Cold War, the management of peace.⁶³ In the management of defence the aim is to avoid the outbreak of general war through a strategy of deterrence. The military’s management of peace – not alone, but with others – aims at limiting armed conflict and using the absolute minimum of force to promote a political settlement of differences, maintain respect for human rights, and provide humanitarian relief. The challenge is that the military does not have the same abstract knowledge about how to deter war and conduct humanitarian missions that it has for waging war. In addition, the military does not and cannot pretend to possess a monopoly of expert knowledge relevant for success in the management of defence and peace. These roles require the military profession to co-operate and compete with other professions to be successful in its missions.⁶⁴

The ideas of Huntington, Janowitz and Burk – representing only three particular views – give a clear demarcation of the nature of the military profession in general and its body of knowledge in

⁵⁹ Ibid., p. 418.

⁶⁰ Ibid., p. xi.

⁶¹ Ibid., pp. 74-76.

⁶² Burk, J, “Expertise, Jurisdiction, and Legitimacy of the Military Profession”, In Snider, DM & Watkins, G (eds.), *The Future of the Army Profession*, McGraw-Hill, New York, 2002, p. 29.

⁶³ Gates, JM, “The ‘New’ Military Profession”, *Armed Forces & Society*, Vol 11, No 3, Spring 1985, pp. 427-436.

⁶⁴ Burk, J, op. cit., p. 32.

particular. Yet it is clear that the military body of knowledge is dynamic in nature having, in Burk's opinion, expanded from the management of violence to the management of defence to the management of peace. Two remarks are necessary in this regard. Firstly, the dynamic nature of the military body of knowledge by implication necessitates a higher order understanding thereof. This is particularly true if the military (officer corps) wants to be an active partner in the expansion of the military body of knowledge through research and other means. The higher order understanding and the expansion of the military body of knowledge can only be attained through prolonged academic study. Secondly, the nature of future military endeavours – from warfighting to humanitarian missions – will necessitate greater cognitive flexibility from officers than in the past when the emphasis was primarily on warfighting in which training was deemed to be adequate preparation.

It is interesting to note how the balance and interaction between the need for the military to prepare itself for warfighting and the need for the military to prepare for so-called peace missions have led to a debate about the nature of the modern officer corps. Academics such as Moskos have gone so far as to refer to the post-modern nature of the officer corps. Academics have in particular highlighted the way in which the military profession has become more vocational than institutional by nature. The debates about the military in this regard are discussed in Chapter 3.

2.3.2 The fundamental nature of the military profession

Two fundamental considerations shape military professionalism and its required expertise. Indeed, any serious examination or analysis of military organisations and the employment of military force(s) is rooted in these two assumptions. These considerations are not always very explicit, but their influence is nonetheless exceptional. These two characteristics distinguish the military profession from other professions and from society in general.

The first of these fundamental considerations may be politically unpopular but fundamental to the existence of force and the use thereof. Militaries are created as instruments of war and should at all times prepare themselves realistically for that role. They need to prepare to apply force whenever they are called upon to do so. In short, the *raison d'être* of the military is to fight and win wars. Throughout modern history the general characteristics of the military profession and its body of knowledge have been shaped by this primary purpose of the military. What has changed over time is the concept of what constitutes war, of the successful use of armed force(s), and of the military's relationship with society. It is this fundamental nature of military force that Gray has in

mind when he warns that it is possible to shift the decent, liberal and scholarly focus on strategy and security too far from the battlefield.⁶⁵ The existence of militaries to fight and to win wars gave rise to a characteristic that is very unique to the military profession: the military professional, unlike other professionals, should prepare and be inclined to give his or her life if necessary to achieve professional goals. This consideration underpins the specific culture and ethos of the military profession, the natural inclination of the military profession towards the practical dimensions of soldiering, as well as the natural tension between military commanders, politicians, military staff officers and military theorists.⁶⁶

The second fundamental consideration about military organisations and power is the driving principle that the military have to serve society. In a democratic society, military power should at all times be employed rationally, for a public purpose and with public consent.⁶⁷ Without this imperative the military organisation and the use of military power become an end in itself and a self-destructive instrument of power. This is the essential difference between violence and the use of military force. Reynolds⁶⁸ describes this notion in philosophical terms when he argues that "... violence is either evil or irrational as a means of achieving political ends ... when it escapes control and becomes indiscriminate." Consequently, the state is not only the controlling authority of armed force; it also provides armed forces with a rationale for existence. Clausewitz refers to this fundamental truth as the *logic* of war.⁶⁹ In short, the state provides the environment within which the military profession must function:

*An army is an emanation of the nation it serves, reflecting social, political, and technological foundations. To study an army is to gain insights into the nation it serves because a nation and its army are interdependent. An army is not a mirror image of the nation, nor a microcosm – the nation writ small; it is in organization, purposes, attitudes, and behavior conditioned by the sustaining state.*⁷⁰

Thus the profession of arms should at all times be examined in the context of the political, economic and societal system from which it evolves. The values, principles and character of the

⁶⁵ Gray, CS, *Modern Strategy*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999, p. 38.

⁶⁶ Gray, CS, "Why Strategy is Difficult", *Joint Forces Quarterly*, No 22, Summer 1999, p. 11.

⁶⁷ Young, T, op. cit., p. 1.

⁶⁸ Reynolds, C, *The Politics of War*, St Martin's Press, New York, 1989, p. 29.

⁶⁹ Clausewitz, C, *On War*, Edited and Translated by Howard, M & Paret, P, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1976, p. 605.

⁷⁰ Menard, OD, *The Army and the Fifth Republic*, University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln, 1967, pp. 5-6.

political system within a country serve as the mould for the universal principles of military professionalism within a particular country. The fundamental truth is that, unlike other professions, the military profession has only one client: the state.

The role of militaries as instruments of war in service of society demarcates the parameters and primary focus of professional military expertise and the challenge of education in armed forces. In the modern era, the military profession is confronted by a variety of challenges. One of the most critical of these challenges is the rising scepticism from the polity regarding issues of national security.⁷¹ In a situation where there is a clearly defined (external) threat, the armed forces have a clear purpose that reinforces and expands the notion of a military profession committed to the service of a country. In a situation where the military is faced with a variety of complex and difficult issues arising from the domestic and international environments, that sense of purpose falls by the wayside. In such a situation, the military serves as a reservoir of national skills and should provide the intellectual skills for a variety of ill-defined threats and challenges.⁷² Thus, the fog of peace – to explain this challenge in Clausewitzian terms – could well be much more demanding to the military profession than the reality of armed conflict.

The real challenge is that the importance of higher education, the reality of second careers and military-social issues have become important parts of military professionalism.⁷³ Notwithstanding the fundamental nature of military forces, fighting skills are not enough for the military professional to respond to the new challenges the military as a profession is facing. The warfighting ability of armed forces will not be enough to ensure the continuing relevance of military power in the contemporary era. To limit military professional competence to fighting skills will deny the military professional the ability to understand, analyse and respond to the contemporary conflict and security environment. It is an environment that is becoming more complex by the day and which is shaped by a variety of non-military considerations.

To conclude, historians, sociologists, political scientists and sometimes even military practitioners openly debate the question of what the constituent elements of a profession are. There seems,

⁷¹ Sarkesian, SC, et al., *Soldiers, Society, and National Security*, op. cit., p. 74.

⁷² Ibid., pp. 151-152. Also see the discussion of this phenomenon by Desch, MC, "Threat Environments and Military Missions", In Diamond, L & Plattner, MF (eds.), *Civil Military Relations and Democracy*, John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1996, pp. 12-29.

⁷³ See for example the discussion of these matters by Beevor, A, "The Army and Modern Society", In Strachan, H (ed.), *The British Army: Manpower and Society in the Twenty-First Century*, Frank Cass, London, 2000, pp. 63-66.

though, to be general agreement among academics and theorists that expertise – a body of theoretical and practical knowledge and skills – is one of the defining characteristics of a profession, including the military profession. It can, thus, be argued that military professionalism is the systematic creation of a class of people for whom the management of violence, deterrence and peace is a profession, and who pursue general and sub-specialisations in the art and science of conflict and peace management. The term *military profession* applies primarily to the officer corps of the armed forces as a collective. It is mostly the officer corps that interacts with civilian groups and institutions, shaping civil-military relations in a particular country. It is also the officer corps that is accountable and responsible for military effectiveness and the institutional character of the military. In the words of Caforio: “The officer corps has always been a vital component of the armed forces: it is their leadership, it possesses and imparts professional expertise, it determines the military mind set, and it upholds and revises the military ethic.”⁷⁴ In short, it is the officer corps that ought to be educated.

2.4 MILITARY TRAINING AND EDUCATION: UNDERSTANDING THE DIFFERENCE

Military expertise has a body of defined theoretical knowledge and practical skills. The difference and interaction between theoretical knowledge and practical skills is rooted in the interaction between action and reflection; and between experience on the one hand and training and education on the other. To re-phrase this idea, the blueprint for the development of military leaders has three key ingredients: training, education, and experience. Military experience – the application of knowledge and skills – is rooted in the military realities of the past. Training – the development of military skills – is underpinned by the military realities of the present. Education – the expansion of knowledge – prepares soldiers to deal with the military realities of the future. (See Figure 2.1) This means that officers need to be historically-minded in order to deal with present realities and challenges. Yet, they have to deal with present realities in such a manner that they shape the future. Radbruch⁷⁵ consequently points out that a professional military educational system should be a dichotomy between ideal and reality, between theory and practice, and between present and past.

⁷⁴ Caforio, G, “Military Officer Education”, In Caforio, G (ed.), *Handbook of the Sociology of the Military*, Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers, New York, 2003, p. 255.

⁷⁵ Radbruch, HE, op. cit., p. 608.

The “making of officers” – their training, education and experience – is rooted in military socialisation.⁷⁶ Military socialisation aims at providing people within the military with the right values, norms and attitudes. (See Figure 2.1) Military socialisation is a higher order notion than military training and education since it encompasses much more than these two notions. Military training and education, however, cannot be done without military socialisation. Military socialisation ties the three considerations – experience, training and education – together and provides cohesion to the making of officers. In considering military socialisation, it is important to keep in mind that the schooling of people in the military is not directed towards the provision of jobs or adventure. The aim is to develop them into effective managers of organised force to ensure successful strategic effect. If this is not done in a proper manner, people die.⁷⁷




Figure. 2.1 Military training, education and experience

For militaries, it is important to understand the difference and tension between training and education because they have to cope with it.⁷⁸ The military cannot afford to neglect either the training or education of its forces since each has its own importance underpinned by its own

⁷⁶ Lawson, K, “Introduction: The Concepts of 'Training' and 'Education' in a Military Context”, In Stephens, MD (ed.), *The Educating of Armies*, St Martin's Press, New York, 1989, p. 4.

⁷⁷ Kelley, JW, op. cit., p. 104.

⁷⁸ It is necessary to have a pragmatic approach in understanding the difference. The Commandant of the Irish Reserve Forces, Cmdt Frank McGoldrick, for example pointed out that it is easy to understand the difference if you ask someone whether he or she wants his/her daughter to be sexually trained or educated! Conversation with McGoldrick, Bucharest, Romania, 12 August 2003.

domain. It is after all possible to lose a war without losing a single battle. This is the military world of tactics where the training of forces is decisive. Becoming involved in dangerous conflicts in a war-torn continent like Africa because of bad strategic choices, can also be disastrous. This is the world of strategy where education is essential. Consequently, military training and education should receive an equal amount of attention, time and resources within militaries. It is also important for militaries to understand that, though military training is the exclusive domain of the military, it is not necessarily the case with military and strategic education. Since the Second World War, an increasing number of civilians have busied themselves with the study of strategic and military affairs. Indeed, the most well known strategic experts and theorists in the world today are civilians.⁷⁹ Their role is of critical importance in and for any democratic country and the education of its military.

Militaries often experience difficulty in drawing a distinction between military education and training. Militaries in fact often approach the problem by ignoring the difference. The underlying philosophy and the fundamental aims and objectives of education, to be precise, clash with those of the military in general and military training in particular. Thus, there is an inherent tension between military training and education. Mason delineates this tension:

*Inevitably, there are the seeds of tension when conformity and questioning are being taught side by side. It should come as no surprise that military education can occasionally give rise to uneasiness within the military as a whole. There are many apparent incompatible objectives: discipline and individuality, conformity and initiative, responding and innovating, determination and flexibility, imagination and objectivity, fire and dispassion.*⁸⁰

Drawing a distinction between education and training is difficult because in everyday conversation, people often use the terms interchangeably. The best way of understanding the difference between education and training is to focus on the three domains of learning: psychomotor or doing, cognitive or thinking and affective or feeling. Training places the focus on the psychomotor domain of learning. In the military domain, that means that training is required to provide soldiers with the mental and physical skills and discipline required to be good at fighting and to succeed in the face

⁷⁹ Brodie, B, *War and Politics*, Cassell, London, 1973, pp. 436-438.

⁸⁰ Mason, RA, "Innovation and the Military Mind", *Air University Review*, Jan-Feb 1986. Available at <<http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1986/jan-feb/mason.html>> [14 July 2004]

of great danger, uncertainty and confusion on the battlefield and in situations of conflict.⁸¹ In the realm of peace missions, the skills required from individual peacekeepers are also rooted in training. Training that is done in the cognitive domain is generally at the knowledge level and the lower part of the comprehension level. Education, on the other hand, teaches a minimum of psychomotor skills, but instead concentrates on the higher cognitive levels of comprehension and above. Affective learning – the inculcation of values, norms and attitudes – is a product of both training and education.⁸² Thus, the environment within which military education takes place at institutions of higher learning should promote military values and norms.⁸³ It is important though, not to confuse the need for military socialisation and a military regimental influence at military academic institutions with military domination of the academic curricula of such institutions.

2.4.1 Military training: Teaching officers *what to think*

Training is often associated with "narrow" forms of learning as the direct opposite of "broad" forms of learning which are regarded as education. This does not degrade learning in the training milieu to the level of irrelevance. The "narrowness" of training is a description of its limited range of applications. What is learned during training is specific to a given type of situation and there is little cognitive understanding involved.⁸⁴ (See Table 2.1) In the military, training is rooted in the disciplined execution of drills – as in weapon, fighting and other drills – as well as standard operational procedures.⁸⁵ Criterion objectives are most appropriate for training. Normally these objectives require that under a given set of conditions a student will exhibit a specific behaviour to a certain predetermined level of standard.⁸⁶ The trained response to orders is immediate and precise, and instructions are followed implicitly.⁸⁷ A trained man, Moorcraft⁸⁸ points out, does what he is told to do. Training does not teach the officer "how to think" but rather "what to think".⁸⁹ Thus,

⁸¹ Drew, DM, "Educating Air Force Officers: Observations After 20 Years at Air University", *Airpower Journal*, Vol 11, No 2, Summer 1997, p. 38.

⁸² Kline, JA, "Education and Training: Some Differences", *Air & Space Power Chronicles*, Jan-Feb 1985. Available at: <http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1985/jan-feb/kline.html> [1 April 2004]

⁸³ Preface and acknowledgements in Kennedy, GC & Nielson, K (eds.), *Military Education: Past, Present, and Future*, Praeger, Westport, 2002, p. x.

⁸⁴ Lawson, K, op. cit., p. 4.

⁸⁵ Esterhuysen, AJ, "Strategy, Operational Art and Tactics: Who is Responsible for What in the SANDF?", *African Armed Forces Journal*, July 2000, p. 32.

⁸⁶ Kline, JA, op. cit., p. 1.

⁸⁷ Lawson, K, op. cit., p. 4.

⁸⁸ Moorcraft, PL, op. cit., p. 29.

⁸⁹ Kline, JA, op. cit., p. 1.

good training produces officers who will respond instinctively in anticipated, recognisable circumstances in a manner circumscribed by their training.

Training is, therefore, a closed system since the trained individual is easily recognised as knowing the "right answers", and doing things the "approved way", or arriving at the "right solution". The results of each trained individual in every situation can be expected to look the same.⁹⁰ There are correct and incorrect ways of doing things and the distinction between right and wrong is clearly defined. Training allows little room for variation in movements, or procedures.⁹¹ In military training, in particular, the need to be functionally relevant and job-specific dominates. Or, as Kelley⁹² explains, training creates competence in using machines or tools required for tasks. Training focuses on matters that are known. It tends to be group-orientated, requiring the individual to subject his personal identity, needs and wants to that of the group. The emphasis is on teamwork and immediate, co-ordinated obedience to externally imposed directives. Military training methods usually involve verbal instruction and demonstration⁹³ with an emphasis on conformity, constraint and order to ensure that "... fear is instilled, aggression evoked, and disorder prevented."⁹⁴

Training, according to Bashista,⁹⁵ refers to technical and tactical competence of military leaders on all levels. Training may also be used to inculcate a particular institutional culture or ethos. One example in this regard is the efforts from most armed forces in the world today to use their training resources as a tool for the cultivation of *Auftragstaktik*. *Auftragstaktik* – mission tactics – is generally considered one of the building blocks of the successful pre-1945 German field army. It emphasises a culture of decentralised command in armed forces and is considered an indispensable organising and operational element in modern armed forces, especially on lower command levels.⁹⁶

⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁹¹ Lawson, K, op. cit., p. 4.

⁹² Kelley, JW, op. cit., p. 104.

⁹³ Lawson, K, op. cit., p. 4.

⁹⁴ Downes, C, *Special Trust and Confidence: The Making of an Officer*, Frank Cass, London, 1991, p. 135.

⁹⁵ Bashista, RJ, "Auftragstaktik: It's More Than Just a Word", *Amor*, Vol CIII, No 6, Nov-Dec 1994, p. 19. Also see the following article: Silva, JL, "Auftragstaktik: Its Origin and Development", *Infantry*, September-October 1989, pp. 6-9.

⁹⁶ Bunting, J, "The Humanities in the Education of the Military Professional", In Korb, LJ (ed.), *The System for Educating Military Officers in the U.S.*, International Studies Association, Pittsburg, 1976, p. 158.

Auftragstaktik requires that the training of officers be well grounded in the workings of their own technical branch's capabilities as well as the capabilities of other branches.⁹⁷ Officers need to understand the application of all battlefield operating systems and should be able to synchronise all available combat multipliers. Training in armed forces can only be effective if it focuses on "combined arms" warfare.⁹⁸ The training of military personnel, therefore, goes beyond training in the specifics of their particular tasks or jobs. Training in the co-ordination of those specific tasks as part of a larger unit or formation is also necessary.⁹⁹

Military training should be done in a way that highlights the importance of obedience, independence of action and self-esteem. Obedience in this context refers to the importance of strict adherence to the intention of the higher commander, expressed in terms of purpose (what ought to be done) and end-state (what it will look like once it has been done). Within the context of the higher commander's intention, the subordinate should be allowed to exploit the initiative through independence of action. Training should focus on the development of the self-confidence and self-esteem of all subordinate leaders. Without self-esteem there will be no initiative on the part of the individual, and therefore no independent action. Thus, military training has to be done in such a manner that subordinates are not made to see it as a failure if they exploit initiative and are not successful.¹⁰⁰

Military training is a continuous process that not only includes the learning or acquisition of initial skills, knowledge, attitudes and understanding necessary for the performance of tasks and roles, but also frequent rehearsals and practice. The daily life of soldiers, airmen and sailors is itself a process of training in which they simultaneously do their job and learn to improve their performance. There is frequent change and development in doctrine, procedures, technology and roles. Military training thus involves not only frequent retraining, but also periodic rehearsals and exercises.¹⁰¹ Periodic military exercises – manoeuvres, as it is called in some countries – are a well-established feature of the training of armed forces in combined arms warfare.

⁹⁷ Bashista, RJ, op. cit., p. 19.

⁹⁸ The Military Dictionary of the South African National Defence Force defines *combined arms warfare* as "... warfare in which more than one tactical branch of the armed forces is used together in operations i.e. infantry and artillery or armour and close air support". South African National Defence Force, *Military Dictionary (MD) South African National Defence Force*, Pretoria, s.a. p. 78.

⁹⁹ Lawson, K, op. cit., p. 2.

¹⁰⁰ Bashista, RJ, op. cit., p. 19.

¹⁰¹ Lawson, K, op. cit., p. 2.

An important characteristic of particularly military training, Lawson¹⁰² argues, is that it does not conceptually require that the ends it serve to be morally good, though it may be good. The classic example of this particular idea, Lawson points out, is that of weapons training: "... the purpose of all weapons training is to kill the enemy". In short, it is not required of trainers to make moral judgements about the worthwhileness of the ends which they serve. The trainer can therefore be regarded as a technician judging the effectiveness of the training he provides and not the purpose it serves. Though, as an individual he may have doubts about the moral justification of the task in which he is engaged.

2.4.2 Military education: Teaching officers *how* to think

In the education of armed forces, a distinction is made between academic education and professional military education. For the purposes of this discussion, though, the emphasis is on an understanding of education as a concept in a military context. Education, Micewshi¹⁰³ argues, should be understood within the framework of three considerations:

- the fulfilment of an occupational qualification;
- a continuous and in itself never-ending process by which an individual develops mentally and finds autonomous realisation; and
- the acquisition of knowledge characteristic of a certain culture or society.

Elements of all three considerations are contained in the idea of military education. Military education prepares military members for higher rank and responsibility. In that sense, education is done for the fulfilment of occupational qualifications. People in the military, however, also study for reasons of personal growth and the acquisition of professional knowledge of the military culture and society.

In education, the focus is on cognitive objectives written at the appropriate level of learning – knowledge, comprehension, application, analysis, synthesis, or evaluation – to develop the individual's ability to think.¹⁰⁴ Foster explains that thinking requires the higher order intellectual skills of analysis (dissecting and illuminating concepts), synthesis (combining concepts and

¹⁰² Ibid., p. 7.

¹⁰³ Micewski, ER, "Education of (Military) Leadership Personnel in a Post-modern World", *Defence Studies*, Vol 3, No 3, Autumn 2003, p. 1.

¹⁰⁴ Kline, JA, op. cit., p. 1.

generating new ones) and evaluation (establishing criteria and making judgements).¹⁰⁵ Education, thus, instils the mental flexibility to look beyond the horizon, to anticipate and to shape the future. As Moorcraft explains, educating soldiers produces a sharp paradox: officers need to understand "... the value of what they may have to destroy".¹⁰⁶

Education is an open process in which learning is continuous with no cap or ceiling on how well individuals may be prepared to handle new responsibilities. Right answers and right ways of doing things often do not exist in education – only better ones or worse.¹⁰⁷ Downes emphasises that the underlying philosophy in education supports reflection, reasoning and the communication of ideas and thought in both written and verbal format.¹⁰⁸ Unlike training where the emphasis is on the training of the group, education focuses on individual and personal intellectual growth. In education, it is possible for the individual to shift his development according to current interests and aspirations.¹⁰⁹ Much of what is studied may often have little functional relevance to the final employment pursuit taken up by the individual. Pocklington¹¹⁰ argues that education can be distinguished from functional training in that the spectrum of knowledge that is addressed during education is applicable to all aspects and spheres of the profession of arms. Consequently, education, for the bigger part, relates to those aspects of military knowledge that has applicability in all the different services of the armed forces.

An understanding of the intimate link between education and experience is important. (See Table 2.1) Military experience – a chest full of medal ribbons or a battle scar or two – is highly respected in the military as a sign of competence. This, of course, is not necessarily the whole truth. There is the much quoted example of Frederick the Great in this regard. He pointed out that his mule carried a pack on several campaigns, but has no better understanding of war because of that.¹¹¹ One is also reminded of Bismarck's view of "... fools say they learn by experience – I prefer to learn by other people's experience".¹¹² Lambert is of the opinion that the lack of practical experience is the single greatest driver of the need for military education. He argues that to learn from the

¹⁰⁵ Foster, GD, op. cit., p. 111.

¹⁰⁶ Moorcraft, PL, op. cit., p. 29.

¹⁰⁷ Kline, JA, op. cit., p. 1.

¹⁰⁸ Downes, C, *Special Trust and Confidence: The Making of an Officer*, op. cit., p. 135.

¹⁰⁹ Evans, RM, "Military Curriculum Development", *Educational Leadership*, November 1981, p. 121.

¹¹⁰ Pocklington, JH, op. cit.

¹¹¹ Drew, DM, "Educating Air Force Officers: Observations After 20 Years at Air University", op. cit., p. 44.

¹¹² Liddell Hart, BH, *Why Don't We Learn from History?* George Allen and Unwin, London, 1946, p. 10.

experiences of others in the same profession is the only substitute for own experience.¹¹³ In the case of training, experience provides maturity of judgement. Education, however, is the provision of filtered or analysed experience to broaden an individual's own experience and judgement. It allows individuals to take part in the experiences of others at different times and in far-off places. Experience also serves as an important building block for the development of new theory and doctrine that may serve as guidance for future action. Thus, the analysis of experience is of critical importance for the education of members of the military. Reasoned analysis of experience develops the ability to think broadly, deeply and critically.¹¹⁴ This, though, is not something that is always encouraged in the military.¹¹⁵

Table. 2.1 Summary of the differences between military training and education

Military training	Military education
Process	
Closed process Group focus Disciplined regimental environment Focus on conformity, constraint and order Exclusive military domain and focus Done in relative short periods of time Predetermined level of standard	Open process Individual or personal focus Free-thinking environment Focus on independence, reasoning and communication Integrated military and civilian domain and focus Done over protracted periods of time No cap or ceiling on how well a student may do
Content	
Criterion objectives Focus on action, psychomotor and doing Focus on present realities and the known Technical and tactical nature	Cognitive objectives Focus on reflection, cognitive and thinking Focus on future realities and the unknown Managerial and strategic nature
Outcome	
Right or wrong answers Narrow learning: functional relevant and job-specific Practical skills <i>What</i> to think	Better or worse answers Broad learning: general application Theoretical knowledge <i>How</i> to think

¹¹³ Lambert, A, "History as Process and Record: The Royal Navy and Officer Education", In Kennedy, GC & Nielson, K (eds.), *Military Education: Past, Present, and Future*, Praeger, Westport, 2002, p. 85.

¹¹⁴ Liddell Hart, BH, op. cit., p. 38.

¹¹⁵ Foster, GD, op. cit., p. 112.

Within the context of this argument, the reason for the widespread use of military history – the academic study of military experiences – as a tool for the education of officers is obvious.¹¹⁶ Prof Dennis Showalter recently pointed out that indeed all officers need to be military historians, especially those of general rank. He argued that a historical mind is a well-travelled mind and a well-travelled mind is an educated mind.¹¹⁷ Enough, however, has been written about the “... use and abuse of military history”.¹¹⁸ One important argument by Howard on the use of military history, though, needs to be emphasised. Howard argues that there are three guidelines that the militaries should keep in mind in the “use and abuse” of military history for the education of officers. Military history needs to be studied in width (the way warfare has developed over time), in depth (thorough analysis of particular campaigns), and in context (understanding the broader societal environment of conflict).¹¹⁹

2.4.3 Military training and education: The military predisposition

Lawson¹²⁰ explains that military organisations are unique in that their normal daily preoccupations, for much of the time, are focused on training and preparation for action. Reflection, however, is not something that is done on a daily basis. There are two historical impulses, Reddel argues, that push the preparation of military forces towards training with its emphasis on discipline and the destructive capabilities of military forces to the detriment of education. Firstly there is the need of military personnel, outlined earlier in this discussion, to be willing to sacrifice life itself for a higher cause. Reddel calls this notion the *sine qua non* of the military profession. There is no way, Reddel argues, that civilian or military leaders, in either a democracy or autocracy, will compromise on this point.¹²¹ It is the obligation of the officer, Mason¹²² argues, to follow orders in the face of an enemy and to do his duty despite the risk of death and injury. It is this operational liability, with the

¹¹⁶ See, for example, the chapter by Evans, M, “Military History in the Education of Western Army Officers”, In Smith, H (ed.), *Preparing Future Leaders: Officer Education and Training for the Twenty First Century*, Australian Defence Studies Centre, Australian Defence Force Academy, Canberra, 1998.

¹¹⁷ Remarks in his address to the 2006 West Point Summer Seminar in Military History, USMA West Point, 7 June 2006.

¹¹⁸ See the chapter on the “Use and Abuse of Military History” in Howard, M, *The Causes of War and Other Essays*, Unwin Paperbacks, London, 1984. For a South African perspective on the issue, see the article by Visser, GE, “Militêre Professionalisme en die Onderrig van Krygsgeskiedenis in die Suid-Afrikaanse Nasionale Weermag: 'n Historiese Perspektief”, *Scientia Militaria*, Vol 27, 1997.

¹¹⁹ Howard, M, *The Causes of War and Other Essays*, op. cit., pp. 215-216.

¹²⁰ Lawson, K, op. cit., p. 1.

¹²¹ Reddel, CW, op. cit., p. xii.

¹²² Mason, RA, “The Challenge of the Twenty-first Century: Balancing General Education, Military Training, and Professional Studies”, In Converse, EV (ed.), *Forging the Sword: Selecting, Educating, and Training Cadets and Junior Officers in the Modern World*, Imprint Publications, Chicago, 1998, pp. 389-390.

possibility of self-sacrifice accepted by every soldier, which marks the armed forces as being essentially different from the rest of society and also predisposes the military towards the training environment. A distinction should however be made between the willingness of the military profession to pay the highest price and the extent to which society at large will accept such sacrifice. High casualties, in situations where the interests of a country are not clearly at stake, are increasingly politically unacceptable.¹²³

Secondly, there is a need for military forces to have not only the most advanced technology available, but also to be able to optimise its use. It may be true that war, as George Clemenceau remarked, is too important to be left to the generals. But, the military is primarily responsible for the physical conduct of war. The idea of *jus ad bellum*¹²⁴ lies primarily in the sphere of international relations and as such is the responsibility of politicians. Politicians, militaries and societies in general consider it unprofessional for soldiers to question in public the reasons behind the use of force. The principle of *jus in bello*¹²⁵, however, is rooted in the conduct of war and the role of the military in war itself. Militaries are almost legally responsible to focus on the conduct of war and the skills that are required to do that well!¹²⁶ Soldiers, therefore, see themselves as real-world decision-makers who act, not as scholars who ponder¹²⁷ or politicians who fudge.¹²⁸ Consequently, militaries prefer to train rather than to educate. This leaves a question concerning the need for education in armed forces.

2.5 WHY MILITARY EDUCATION? THE NEED FOR EDUCATED ARMED FORCES

The discussion on the need for education in armed forces since 1945 demarcates a number of geo-strategic and other reasons for the prominence of education within militaries during the Cold War era. This discussion, however, aims at outlining philosophical and theoretical reasons why militaries in particular need to be educated. Gray's seventeen dimensions of strategy served as a framework for the purposes of the discussion.¹²⁹ The underlying assumption – pointed out earlier in

¹²³ Johnsen, WT, "Redefining Land Power for the 21st Century", *Strategic Studies Institute Monograph*, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, 7 May 1998, p. 15.

¹²⁴ The law towards war, in other words, fighting a just war.

¹²⁵ The law in war, in other words, conducting war in a just manner.

¹²⁶ Morris, J & McCoubrey, H, "Law, Politics, and the Use of Force", In Baylis, J et al., *Strategy in the Contemporary World: An Introduction to Strategic Studies*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002, pp. 52-55.

¹²⁷ Foster, GD, op. cit., p. 111.

¹²⁸ Gray, CS, "Why Strategy is Difficult", op. cit., p. 11.

¹²⁹ Gray, CS, *Modern Strategy*, op. cit., p. 24.

the discussion – is that the military has to produce its own strategic thinkers if it wishes to be effective in the strategic realm. Proficiency in each of the dimensions of strategy contributes to overall strategic effectiveness. Consequently it may be argued that each of these dimensions provides a reason why strategists in general and officers in particular need to be educated.

Gray's seventeen dimensions of strategy are clustered into three categories.¹³⁰ The first category, *People and Politics*, includes 1) people 2) society 3) culture 4) politics and 5) ethics. The second category, *Preparation for War*, comprises 6) economics and logistics 7) defence organisation 8) military administration 9) information and intelligence 10) strategic theory and doctrine and 11) technology. The last category, *War Proper*, consists of 12) military operations 13) command 14) geography 15) friction 16) the adversary and 17) time. In comparing the different categories, an interesting progression is detected – at least from a military perspective. (See Figure 2.3) The first category is almost on the periphery of the military world. The focus is on those particular issues considered to be part of security. The second category falls clearly within the realm of defence. The emphasis in this category is on those issues usually considered to be part of the defence establishment of a country. The third category is clearly at the centre of all military activities and emphasises those issues that are related to the military's primary role – warfighting.




Figure. 2.2 Security, defence and military knowledge

¹³⁰ Ibid.

2.5.1 Security thinking: Comprehension of the Clausewitzian trinity – armed forces, people and politics

Education underpins the need for military forces to be prepared at all times and to have the ability to adapt to changing strategic and operational environments. Consequently Hauser, Orndorff and Rawls argue that militaries need to study the use of force in the context of the social, political, economic, technological and moral factors that influence military institutions and operations.¹³¹ In this particular argument, the ability to cope with the ever-present threat of conflict and the need to minimise the likelihood and severity of international violence forms the bedrock of the need for strategic and military knowledge. With the acceptance of war and violence as constant features of the international system, this outlook represents a very realistic view on the need for education and knowledge on strategic and military affairs. Contemplation of these influences is based on horizons and perspectives not bound by military considerations, and encompass the view that political, psychological, social and economic factors are an integral part of the use or threat to use force. The alternative to this intellectual understanding of military affairs is a military isolated from society and detached from the realities of the international security landscape.¹³² This intellectual sophistication and development cannot be provided by the military system in any other way than through academic studies. The intellectual expertise and maturity acquired through prolonged academic studies is the only vehicle providing the understanding and sensitivity necessary to deal with the complex security landscape. Keeping in mind that education is something that the military cannot do on its own, Sarkesian et al. argue that education offers a channel for mutual beneficial interaction between the military and the broader society and between the military and the academic community in particular. In the long term, this interaction benefits both the military and society. In particular, it helps breaking down rigid stereotypes in broad society, the academic and the military worlds.¹³³

The strategic culture of a nation has a decisive influence on the development of successful strategic courses of action – ways to optimise the use of a nation's resources to ensure its own security. Gray emphasises that "(n)o one and no institution can operate 'beyond culture'"¹³⁴ and "... culture is as culture does".¹³⁵ Strategic culture not only shapes a country's attitude towards the military instrument of power, it also affects decisions about its employment. Strategic culture,

¹³¹ Hauser, PF, Orndorff, JC and Rawls, JC, "Lesson from the Kriegsakademie: A Reflection of the Present? A Road Map for the Future?", *Airpower Journal*, Special Edition 1996, p. 61.

¹³² Sarkesian, SC et al., *Soldiers, Society, and National Security*, op. cit., p. 158.

¹³³ Ibid., p. 156.

¹³⁴ Gray, CS, *Modern Strategy*, op. cit., p. 129.

¹³⁵ Ibid., p. 141.

defined as "... the persisting socially transmitted ideas, attitudes, traditions, habits of mind, and preferred methods of operation that are more or less specific to a particular geographically-based security community that has had a unique historical experience,"¹³⁶ is the product of the interplay between historical experience, geography and political tradition.¹³⁷ An individual can only become historically-minded by means of extensive academic study, thereby developing an in-depth understanding of geo-political matters.

Military power will always have a crucial role to play in the security of states and the management of its defence – which is not necessarily a warfighting role. The role of the military from this perspective is seen as being constructive – to contribute to peace and security within societies – and not as a replacement for peace and security. The military and strategic knowledge that flows from this emphasises the use of military power for the prevention and ending of conflict in the international system. This view of military and strategic affairs is rooted in the quest for knowledge on how military power could be used in a positive and responsible manner. In the 1980s and 1990s, this line of thought was associated with the peace studies school of thought. Ideas, such as non-offensive defence and non-threatening defence that rose to prominence in Europe and elsewhere – also in South Africa – emanate from this school of thought. These ideas represent an inherently idealistic outlook on the need for knowledge on military and strategic affairs. In view of the nature of South African security thinking, this argument alone should feature very prominently in an educated SANDF's need for military and strategic knowledge.¹³⁸

This more positive role of military force in the security of states is related to the kind of advice that militaries provide to governments. There seems to be a rising need for enhanced military advice to governments. Governments expect militaries to provide better and more imaginative strategic and policy alternatives. This can only be done if militaries have the cognitive flexibility to move beyond the traditional paradigm of military advice. Military and strategic education is the key in this respect. Taylor and Bletz describe the traditional paradigm for military advice:

In the past, military professionals have tended to view pessimistically threats to national security (the 'worst case syndrome'), to report optimistically on military capabilities to

¹³⁶ Ibid., p. 131.

¹³⁷ Drew, DM & Snow, DM, *Making Strategy: An Introduction to National Security Processes and Problems*. Air University Press, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, 1988, p. 57.

¹³⁸ See the study by Jordaan, E, *South African Defence since 1994: A Study in Policy-Making*, Unpublished MMil thesis, Stellenbosch University, Stellenbosch, December 2004.

*get the job done (the 'can do syndrome'), and to show progress toward achieving objectives by whatever measures their civilian masters establish.*¹³⁹

The calibre of advice that military leaders provide should at all times reflect an understanding that knowledge and ideas, and the ability to generate them, are more important than weapons, economic potential, political acumen or technological advantage. Foster avers that it is imperative to develop, nurture and engage strategic thinkers throughout the whole of the defence force. He is of the opinion that strategic-minded officers are critical, creative, broad-gauged visionaries with the intellect to dissect the status quo, grasp the bigger picture, discern important relationships among events, generate imaginative possibilities for action, and operate easily in the conceptual realm. Thus, he argues, "... any institution that relies on professionals for success and seeks to maintain an authentic learning climate for individual growth must require its members to *read* (to gain knowledge and insight), *discuss* (to appreciate opposing views and subject their own to rigorous debate), *investigate* (to learn how to ask good questions and find defensible answers), and *write* (to structure thoughts and articulate them clearly and coherently)".¹⁴⁰ These notions contain some of the essential characteristics of the educational process. It is impossible to perform these with an emphasis on training. These indispensable elements empower and nurture strategic thinking. It is needed to develop the ability to grapple with the underlying questions of whether, why, and what if.

One of the defining characteristics of a post-modern military is a growing civil-military gap. Militaries are becoming increasingly isolated within societies and in the activities in which they engage.¹⁴¹ This growing civil-military gap is rooted in a number of considerations. Most countries have done away with conscription, which used to be a vital link between the military and the broader society. The ending of conscription was accompanied by a growing apathy in (Western) societies towards political and bureaucratic institutions in general and the military in particular. With the end of the Cold War and the democratisation of a significant number of countries in the world, militaries have been scaled down to the extent that people begin to question the need for the continued existence of some of these forces.¹⁴² Militaries have become increasingly less prominent as an instrument of policy in international relations and the domestic environment. This also holds

¹³⁹ Taylor, WJ & Bletz, DF, op. cit., p. 254.

¹⁴⁰ Foster, GD, op. cit., p. 111.

¹⁴¹ Heineken, L & Gueli, R, *Defence, Democracy and South Africa's Civil-Military Gap*, Proceedings, SASA Congress, Bloemfontein, 28 June 2004.

¹⁴² This is also the case in South Africa. During a visit by the South African Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Defence to the Military Academy on 19 January 2005 one of its members, Dr Gerhard Koornhof, made a comment about members of the South African Parliament who question the need for a defence force in South Africa.

true for its role in domestic policy-making processes. It is believed that the events of 9/11 and subsequent terrorist threats the world over are due to change this trend. There may be a return to military force being a more prominent instrument of international affairs. The present wars in Afghanistan and Iraq are probably the first signs in this regard.

Betts¹⁴³ argues that civil-military relations will always necessitate an in-depth understanding of the checks and balances necessary for healthy relations between society and the military in general and between the military and the government in particular. Feaver¹⁴⁴ outlines this as knowledge about the need to have protection *by* the military and the need to have protection *from* the military. A military can never discard its accountability in this regard and should at all times be aware of the boundaries of its responsibility in and towards society. It should, however, also be knowledgeable on when and how to actively engage politicians on policy issues and their application that concerns the military. Such interaction should be underpinned by a thorough understanding of the asymmetrical but mutually beneficial relationship between the military and the polity. Knowledge of civil-military relations is, therefore, important both within and outside the military for a proper understanding of the role of the military within and towards society. This is especially true of new democratic societies like South Africa, situated in a region plagued by bad civil-military relations.

The expertise of senior officers – in other words, military strategists – is not restricted to narrow knowledge and arcane technical, tactical and operational detail. It is also not defined in terms of dutiful obedience to authority. It is clearly rooted in a sophisticated understanding of complex security issues and a capacity to influence major events.¹⁴⁵ Reddel, referring to the military, argues that no other profession incorporates such a wide range of decision-making challenges posing profound implications for nations and their societies.¹⁴⁶ This holds true for the national, regional and international strategic environments. Military decisions in the contemporary era have a potential for ethical, economic, social and political ramifications far beyond those of the nineteenth century, when military officers were more narrowly focused on warfighting concerns and when weapons were far less lethal than today.

¹⁴³ Betts, RK, "Should Strategic Studies Survive?", *World Politics*, Vol 50, October 1997, p. 8.

¹⁴⁴ Feaver, PD, "The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of Civilian Control", *Armed Forces & Society*, Vol 23, No 2, Winter 1996, p. 154.

¹⁴⁵ Foster, GD, op. cit., p. 112.

¹⁴⁶ Reddel, CW, op. cit., p. xi.

The trend of increasing complexity in decision-making is due to continue as military forces are faced with advanced military technology, especially chemical, biological and nuclear technologies of mass destruction, and rapidly changing and, sometimes, disintegrating societies. Reddel is thus of the opinion that the question is not whether armed forces should be educated. The question should rather be: which education could possibly prepare officers to meet these challenges successfully in order to serve the security of society? Officers need to be educated to deal with the demands of changing and complex security environments. Dealing with these demands requires an expertise beyond the scope of battlefield and other traditional skills. Education is the indispensable starting point for acquiring this expertise.¹⁴⁷

2.5.2 Defence thinking: The need to prepare armed forces for action

Education is an essential ingredient of military and operational readiness. Operational readiness – preparation for war – delineates the need of military forces to be prepared at all times to deploy on short notice or to react to emergencies that may arise. The preparation of military forces is rooted in the availability of both military hardware and military software. States normally take great care in the procurement or development of military hardware – ships, aircraft, tanks etc. The software side of the coin – military doctrine – is very often neglected. The need for an updated military doctrine and an ethos characterised by a fighting spirit often fall victim to a bureaucratised peacetime military. An educated, informed, and holistic understanding of what is needed for peacetime forces to be operationally prepared is thus of paramount importance.¹⁴⁸

Military doctrine is rooted in a careful analysis of past operations and military theory. The need for military education, specifically in peacetime, is closely linked to the need for military doctrine and an understanding of the role and utility of military and strategic theory. Why should officers be schooled in theory, i.e. the world of ideas? Gray¹⁴⁹ points out that wherever one looks in modern strategic history, testimony is found of the influence of ideas. Clausewitz explains:

Theory cannot equip the mind with formulas for solving problems, nor can it mark the narrow path on which the sole solution is supposed to lie by planting a hedge of principles on either side. But it can give the mind insight into the great mass of

¹⁴⁷ Ibid., p. xi.

¹⁴⁸ Esterhuysen, AJ, *Landpower: SA Army Vision 2020*, Presentation to the SA Army Command Council Workgroup on Strategy 2020, Pretoria, 24 January 2005.

¹⁴⁹ Gray, CS, *Modern Strategy*, op. cit., p. 35.

*phenomena and of their relationships, then leave it free to rise into the higher realms of action.*¹⁵⁰

It could be argued that theory serves a useful purpose to the extent that it collects and organises the experiences and ideas of other men, and sorts out which of them may have a valid transfer value to new and different situations. It also helps the practitioner to expand his vision in an orderly, manageable and useful fashion, and then to apply it to the reality with which he is faced.¹⁵¹ Military theory, according to Strachan,¹⁵² has two purposes. It provides, firstly, an understanding of conflict and war, and secondly, insight into the military mind. In contrast, an intuitive understanding of military and strategic matters, as opposed to an educated and analytical understanding thereof, negatively influences the military in two ways. Firstly, it restricts the vision of the strategists. A more general theoretical appreciation provides a wider span to the vision of the strategist and his understanding of conflict and war. Secondly, it blocks the exchange of ideas and almost automatically inhibits appreciation of the ideas of others. "The remarkable thing is not that there is so much disagreement in the Pentagon," Wylie points out, "but that there is so much agreement."¹⁵³

Military officers are not strategic theorists; they are rather military and strategic practitioners. Officers have to translate strategic theory into workable plans, from the highest strategic and operational levels to the lowest tactical and technical levels. Doctrine is the means by which soldiers bridge this gap between theory and reality. Sound doctrine is the only basis upon which large numbers of people can be trained with equipment in standard methods of behaviour to be predictable instruments of the military commander. Doctrine is written for and used throughout the military to ensure that military forces are structured, trained and equipped to apply technology.¹⁵⁴ Doctrine needs to be written not only on and for the joint strategic and operational levels, but it is also necessary within the different services on tactical and even the lower technical levels. Officers on all levels thus need to be able to contribute to the writing of military doctrine, both in terms of its content and its physical writing. It stands to reason that the officer's writing and analytical skills are of critical importance in this regard. Writing doctrine is probably one of the most important tasks of

¹⁵⁰ Clausewitz, C, op. cit., p. 578.

¹⁵¹ Wylie, JC, *Military Strategy: A General Theory of Power Control*, Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, New Jersey, 1967, p. 35.

¹⁵² Strachan, H, op. cit., p. 2.

¹⁵³ Wylie, JC, op. cit., p. 32.

¹⁵⁴ Sanderson, J, "The Way Ahead", In Smith, H (ed.), *Preparing Future Leaders: Officer Education and Training for the Twenty First Century*, Australian Defence Studies Centre, Australian Defence Force Academy, Canberra, 1998, p. 229.

an officer. The importance of doctrinal writing centres on the need for doctrine to be based on the correct historical lessons and strategic theories. Most military disasters occur because of wrong lessons being learned, or the right lessons being adhered to long after the lapse of their use-by date.¹⁵⁵

An armed force's ability to adapt to changing circumstances and to shape itself for future eventualities is rooted in the need and capability for research of contemporary and future security, defence and military challenges. In short, research is needed to incorporate all the relevant lessons of the past while preparing the armed forces for current demands and likely future eventualities. This is especially true in rapidly changing technological, political and strategic environments. Fabyanic¹⁵⁶ argues that research and writing comprise one of the "... four pillars of wisdom" in armed forces. Without research, Fabyanic declares, there can be no in-depth understanding of war. He argues that the primary objective of research and writing is to put war in a clearer focus so that efforts to deter or fight could be made consistent with war as it occurs. A constant re-examination of war is essential for the professional officer for several reasons, the most important of which is that "... every age [has] its own kind of war, its own limiting conditions, and its own particular preconditions".¹⁵⁷ It is interesting to note how a large number of civilian academics and theorists in the strategic studies and security environment have succeeded in influencing government and other policies through research and writing. In South Africa, for example, the two Pretoria-based institutes, the Institute for Strategic Studies and the Institute for Security Studies, together with the ANC think-tank of the early 1990s, the Military Research Group (MRG), have been very prominent in the re-orientation of governmental security and defence thinking in the 1990s.¹⁵⁸ This has happened to the extent that the South African military almost abdicated its responsibility in this regard. There may, however, be a theoretical explanation for this phenomenon.

Militaries in general experience some difficulty in redefining themselves professionally, institutionally and as individual soldiers in the so-called post-modern military environment. The

¹⁵⁵ Smith, H, "The Education of Future Military Leaders", Smith, H (ed.), *Preparing Future Leaders: Officer Education and Training for the Twenty First Century*, Australian Defence Studies Centre, Australian Defence Force Academy, Canberra, 1998, p. 149.

¹⁵⁶ Fabyanic, TA, "War, Doctrine, and the Air War College: Some Relationships and Implications for the U.S. Air Force", *Air University Review*, January-February 1986. Available at <<http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1986/jan-feb/fabyanic.html> > [5 October 2004]

¹⁵⁷ Clausewitz as quoted in Fabyanic, TA, op. cit.

¹⁵⁸ See Jordaan, E, op. cit., for an in-depth discussion in this regard.

notion of post-modern militaries arose in the aftermath of the Cold War. Academics argue that the post-modern nature of military forces has a profound influence on the nature and use of armed force. The progression towards post-modern militaries is reflected in a wide array of issues: threat perceptions, force structure, mission definition, the nature or type of the soldier required, public attitude towards the military, media relations, and the roles of civilian employees, women, homosexuals, military spouses and conscientious objectors.¹⁵⁹ This redefinition of military force occupies the (political and) military leaders of most countries of the world. In South Africa in particular, it led to an inward organisational focus with an emphasis on issues such as transformation, restructuring and professionalisation. These transitional stresses, brought along by the end of the Cold War and democratisation in many countries, led to a search for ways in which the military in general and military professional in particular could deal with a wide variety of complexities.¹⁶⁰ In the past, education has often been an important tool to deal with such complexities.

Betts¹⁶¹ emphasises that the nature of defence budgets affects the fiscal, social and foreign affairs of a country. It is, on the one hand, important for the military to have expertise and an understanding of these matters at hand. It is, on the other hand, essential that politicians and society involved or interested in these affairs should have a thorough understanding of the military and the environment in which it has to operate. The recent and ongoing debate on the procurement of new weapon systems for the South African National Defence Force has again brought this point to the fore. The level of the interest and debate on the strategic weapon packages is an important indicator of the need for knowledge about military and strategic affairs in the SANDF and the broader South African society. The nature and impact of defence and military decisions are accompanied by a need for management expertise. Military officers need to manage huge defence budgets and sizeable amounts of manpower and material resources in the preparation and conduct of military operations. The only way to inculcate such expertise lies in an increasing and urgent need within militaries for education in military and defence management.¹⁶²

¹⁵⁹ Moskos, CC, Williams JA and Segal DR (eds.), *The Post-Modern Military: Armed Forces after the Cold War*, Oxford University Press, New York, 2000, p. 15.

¹⁶⁰ Reddel, CW, op. cit., p. xii-xiii.

¹⁶¹ Betts, RK, op. cit., p. 8.

¹⁶² Taylor, WJ & Bletz, DF, op. cit., pp. 255-265.

2.5.3 Military thinking: The deployment and employment of military force(s)

Military professionals should not only have a higher order understanding of the security and defence environments; a higher order understanding of the military instrument and its role is also of great importance. Militaries exist to a large extent for one reason only: controlled and organised armed force. Their immediate task is to understand armed combat, to prepare for it and to prevent or deter it. In fact, the most fundamental and vital task of any professional officer is to understand war. This task, Fabyanic argues, takes precedence over all others. No officer, whatever his military occupation, can be exempted from this responsibility. Yet, Fabyanic maintains, militaries in the contemporary era are confronted with the challenge that "... technical skills (take) precedence over the ability to conduct war".¹⁶³

Betts¹⁶⁴ argues that armed conflict or the threat of armed conflict is a permanent characteristic of human life. This is especially true in a war-torn continent like Africa. According to Betts, this reason alone fully justifies "... keeping the flame burning". Gray¹⁶⁵ argues along these same lines when he emphasises two particular points: "... bad times will always return" and "... there will always be thugs out there". It is, according to Gray,¹⁶⁶ not fashionable to emphasise this particular matter, but its political incorrectness renders it unusually important. There is thus a need to have military knowledge and expertise available in the event of conflict recurring. Obviously, this need for the availability of knowledge is underpinned by an understanding of the constantly evolving nature of military and strategic doctrine based on changes in technology, political doctrine, geopolitics, and all factors that may affect the employment of force. Education is the only appropriate vehicle for exploring and preparing for such changes and future eventualities.

Betts¹⁶⁷ also highlights the need for knowledge about the role of military forces in non-traditional scenarios. In brief, it is not always clear what the role of the military should be in non-warfighting scenarios. This is becoming increasingly important in an era emphasising the use of military force not to bring about peace, but rather to keep the peace that has already been created. This also

¹⁶³ Fabyanic, TA, op. cit., p. 2.

¹⁶⁴ Betts, RK, op. cit., pp. 7-8.

¹⁶⁵ Gray, CS, "Villains, Victims, and Sheriffs: Strategic Studies and Security for an Interwar Period", *Comparative Strategy*, Vol 13, No 4, October-December 1994, p. 360.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid.

¹⁶⁷ Betts, RK, op. cit., p. 7.

holds true for South Africa against the background of a debate concerning the so-called primary¹⁶⁸ and secondary roles of the SANDF over the last decade.¹⁶⁹ As Betts explains in the context of the USA, "... confusion continues about what U.S. foreign policy should expect military power to do for less vital interests".¹⁷⁰ With an increasing emphasis on the co-lateral utility of military forces¹⁷¹ there is also a growing need for education and knowledge about these activities and of the environments within which force will be utilised in this regard. Most militaries do not have wide-ranging experience in these domains and in most cases a comprehensive doctrine for the preparation of forces for these kinds of missions are not yet fully developed. The only remaining alternative is to dispose of a theoretical approach, underpinned by the need for research and education.

Dixon¹⁷² argues that the employment of force is primarily concerned with two types of activities – the delivering of energy and the communication of information. The former is primarily a mechanistic activity based on the warfighting skills of individuals, their use of military hardware and their co-operation in the military. Commanders are responsible to make decisions, based on intelligence, about who, where and when to employ the potential energy available in military forces. It is important to understand that this refers to both positive (constructive) and negative (destructive) energy.¹⁷³ The decision of the commander is based on a large conglomerate of facts – about the strategic, operational and tactical situation, the enemy, own forces, geography and weather, to name but a few. The commander should manage this information in such a way as to make an informed, rational and sound decision. These decisions are rooted in the ability to manage large amounts of information, on an institutional (the so-called C³I system¹⁷⁴) and individual level.

In the operating environment in particular, a set of complete knowledge on which to base decisions will never be available. Officers should make deliberate efforts in peacetime to develop their cognitive abilities to process large amounts of information in a short time. In addition, they need to

¹⁶⁸ Defence against (foreign) aggression is considered as the primary role of armed forces.

¹⁶⁹ Williams, R, "How Primary is the Primary Function?: Configuring the SANDF for African Realities", *African Security Review*, Vol 8, No 6, 1999.

¹⁷⁰ Betts, RK, op. cit., p. 7.

¹⁷¹ These missions are nowadays referred to under the umbrella term MOOTW (Military Operations Other Than War).

¹⁷² Dixon, NF, *On the Psychology of Military Incompetence*, Futura, London, 1975, pp. 27-29.

¹⁷³ Esterhuysen, AJ, *Landpower: SA Army Vision 2020*, op. cit.

¹⁷⁴ Command, Control, Communications and Information.

develop their military intuition and imagination¹⁷⁵ to help them to develop a full mental picture of situations where complete knowledge is not available. Leser¹⁷⁶ argues that intuition develops the officer's ability "... to see the battlefield without knowing all there is to know". Imagination, however, "... is the ability to consider possibilities that intuition does not see". Whereas academic studies are the principal means of acquiring the ability to manage information, the development of a *fingerspitzengefühl*, is derived from the interplay between education, training and experience.¹⁷⁷

Kohn¹⁷⁸ argues that in future military officers will need to be "... broad and deep as well as tough and competent – men and women of judgement, wisdom, and balance – to conduct more disparate missions". He argues that officers should develop the ability to adjust to accelerated change not just in technology, but also in concept and strategy. This will necessitate a larger proportion of "... thinkers over doers" in the world's armed forces. Kohn also argues that the world is entering a post-capitalist age in which knowledge is the only meaningful resource. In this era, the decisions of officers, particularly senior officers, will be the determining factor in the use of armed force, more so than in the past.

To conclude, officers need to be well schooled in the skills and knowledge of the use of force. They should be able to assist in all matters of strategy, policy, resource allocation and operations. Officers, in particular, need to be military leaders and skilled military specialists, open-minded and adaptable, knowledgeable about military history and the armed forces of the world, and well-versed in the complexities of bureaucratic decision-making and the interests of the country. Furthermore, if military officers refrain from joining the public dialogue on defence matters, and specifically if they fail to write for publications, they abdicate the shaping of the military's future to civilians.¹⁷⁹ This is indeed what had happened in South Africa! In fact, South African views on the need for military education besides that of the South African Military Academy in general and of the writings of Visser¹⁸⁰ in particular, are simply non-existent. The military will only be able to fulfil their proper and

¹⁷⁵ The German *Wehrmacht* of the Second World War refers to this ability as *fingerspitzengefühl*.

¹⁷⁶ Leser, JWS, "Battle Command: Vision for Success", *Military Review*, Mar-Apr 1997.

¹⁷⁷ Turlington, JE, *Learning Operational Art*. U.S. Army War College, 1986 Joint Chiefs of Staff Essay Competition, p. 210; Turlington, JE, "Truly Learning the Operational Art", *Parameters*, Spring 1987, p. 61.

¹⁷⁸ Kohn, RH, "An Officer Corps for the Next Century", *Joint Forces Quarterly*, No 18, Spring 1998, p. 77.

¹⁷⁹ Todd, G, "Becoming a Better Military Writer", *Airpower Journal*, Fall 1992. Available at: <<http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/todd.html>> [14 Jul 2004]

¹⁸⁰ Visser, GE, *Die Geskiedenis van die Suid-Afrikaanse Militêre Akademie, 1950-1990*, Unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Stellenbosch, Stellenbosch, November 2000. Visser also published a number of articles on education at the South African Military Academy. Most of the articles were of a historical nature and based on his dissertation.

full role if they are well-educated. The education of the military though has to contend with one very particular issue – a phenomenon that is often referred to as "the military mind".

2.6 THE ABILITY TO THINK? UNDERSTANDING THE MILITARY MIND

Understanding the military's disposition towards knowledge and expertise in general and education in particular, requires an understanding of the military way of thinking. It is a way of thinking that has often been described as a "military mind". Huntington,¹⁸¹ for example, argues that there are three ways of understanding the military mind. The first is a reflection on the ability or quality of the military mind. Huntington argues: "The intelligence, scope, and imagination of the professional soldier have been compared unfavourably to the intelligence, scope, and imagination of the lawyer, the businessman, [and] the politician".¹⁸² However, it would be difficult to justify these kinds of claims. The second understanding defines the attributes or qualities constituting a military mind or personality. The military mind is thought to be "... disciplined, rigid, logical [and] scientific" but not "... flexible, tolerant, intuitive [and] emotional".¹⁸³ The military mind, Foster maintains, largely discourages independent thought and critical inquiry. He is of the opinion that pervasive doctrine, regulations and operating procedures breed an orthodoxy in the military that dispels any need for originality. Military officers are seen as victims of a system that values non-objective advocacy, adheres to routine staff procedures, and relies on rigid protocols.¹⁸⁴ A third definition of the military mind focuses on the attitudes, values and views of military men. To be specific, it defines the distinctive and persistent habits of thought that have developed within the military over a very long period of time. This places the emphasis on the intellectual roots, the sources of the military mind. The question arises as to whether it is possible to demarcate the intellectual roots of the military way of thinking.

Baylis and Wirtz¹⁸⁵ argue that all the scholars, soldiers and policy-makers who study strategy have the same intellectual roots and, consequently, belong to the same intellectual tradition. They share a set of philosophical underpinnings and assumptions about the nature of international political life, and the kind of reasoning that could best handle political-military problems. These philosophical underpinnings and assumptions are rooted in the conservative realist school of thought. The realist

¹⁸¹ Huntington, SP, op. cit., p. 59.

¹⁸² Ibid.

¹⁸³ Ibid., p. 60.

¹⁸⁴ Foster, GD, op. cit., p. 112.

¹⁸⁵ Baylis, J & Wirtz, JJ, "Introduction", In Baylis, J et al., *Strategy in the Contemporary World: An Introduction to Strategic Studies*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002, pp. 6-7.

approach to international politics could be summarised as a theory, which holds that states struggle for power and security in an anarchical environment.¹⁸⁶ This means that realists are pessimistic about human nature, seeing people as "... inherently destructive, selfish, competitive and aggressive".¹⁸⁷ In their view, war is not something that can be eradicated. Rather the ever-present threat of conflict should be dealt with by minimising the likelihood and severity of international violence. The harsh realities of world politics are emphasised, and the power and interests of states feature prominently in the realists' view of the world. They also have a pessimistic view of world politics, with states being involved in a relentless competitive struggle. Might is right in international relations, realists argue. Thus, realists contend that international and regional institutions have only a limited capacity to prevent international conflict. Realists claim that the history of these institutions shows that when it really mattered, they were not able or capable of acting against the interest of their member states.¹⁸⁸

Drew and Snow¹⁸⁹ outline a number of characteristics underpinning realist military thinking. Firstly, military thinking has a fundamental nature. To be precise, armed forces have as its primary objective the military security and protection of a country and its citizens from those with harmful intentions. Every citizen has an interest in this basic purpose. Failure to live up to expectations in this regard may well be fatal for a nation as a whole.¹⁹⁰ In the political realm, this issue translates into the so-called guns vs butter debate.¹⁹¹ It concerns the question regarding what percentage of the national budget needs to be spent on defence to secure the nation and how the military should utilise its budget to optimise its capabilities.

Secondly, the external or foreign nature of its task directs realist military thinking. Drew and Snow¹⁹² argue that it is "... generally directed towards foreign problems rather than domestic priorities". The foreign nature of the task is influenced by a lack of knowledge of this realm. Defence officials are likely to be less knowledgeable about the motives and influences of foreign governments and non-governmental groups than is the case vis-à-vis domestic policies. This is even more so in situations where that particular government or non-governmental group is a

¹⁸⁶ Lynne-Jones, SM, "Realism and Security Studies", In Baylis, J et al., *Strategy in the Contemporary World: An Introduction to Strategic Studies*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002, p. 54.

¹⁸⁷ Baylis, J & Wirtz, JJ, op. cit., p. 6.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid.

¹⁸⁹ Drew, DM & Snow, DM, op. cit., pp. 47-62.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid., pp. 47-48.

¹⁹¹ See, for example, the article by Henk, D, "Guns and Butter: Reframing South Africa's Arms Industry", *African Security Review*, Vol 13, No 3, 2004, pp. 13-31.

¹⁹² Drew, DM & Snow, DM, op. cit. p. 48.

potential adversary. The task is complicated by the fact that militaries do not have control over events outside their country's borders and can only hope to influence foreign governments and groups.¹⁹³ The external nature of (traditional) military missions also places support from the general public for such missions under the spotlight, since the public may well have even less knowledge of particular foreign issues and the role their military may be able to play in resolving these issues.

Thirdly, the negative nature of the objectives that are pursued influences realist military thinking.¹⁹⁴ It is negative to the extent that the purpose is not so much to promote positive goals as it is to prevent others from engaging in hostile, harmful actions. It remains a question, for example, whether the absence of conflict in Burundi could be ascribed solely to the presence of the South African peace mission contingent. In short, it is difficult to demonstrate the success of negative objectives. Positive objectives are relatively easy to measure. An example would be encouraging other states to become democracies. In other words, they have to conform to your expectations.

Realist military thinking is, fourthly, characterised by "... a built-in conservative bias".¹⁹⁵ Military thinking is influenced by the possible negative consequences of what may flow from a military miscalculation. The conservative nature of military thinking tends to manifest itself in the political strategic domain as realist thinking. In the operational realm it reveals itself as the well-known worst-case planning syndrome. In most instances, the worst-case planning syndrome leads to an exaggeration of the threat beyond what it may actually be. This may indeed have negative consequences if the worst-case preparations exceed the capabilities and intentions of an adversary and, instead, become provocation. Worst-case planning could also be very expensive and may lead to a focus on one particular scenario – conventional war planning, for example.¹⁹⁶

On a lower level, the military mind is also characterised by a paradoxical nature: discipline and disunity.¹⁹⁷ Discipline flows from the subordination of the military to governmental policy and the need to execute such policy, while disunity is rooted in inter-service rivalry between the different services and organisational entities. In South Africa at present, for example, the problem of

¹⁹³ Ibid.

¹⁹⁴ Ibid., pp. 49-50.

¹⁹⁵ Ibid., p. 51.

¹⁹⁶ Ibid., p. 52.

¹⁹⁷ Besley, RD, "The Need for Military Officers as Strategic Thinkers", *Air University Review*, March-April 1973. Available at: <<http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1973/mar-apr/besley.html>> [6 March 2004]

discipline is manifested in a follow-the-leader mentality. This mentality has its roots in political affiliations (support for the ruling ANC to be specific), on the one hand, and the need to have so-called "struggle credentials", on the other.¹⁹⁸ Any form of criticism, initiative and originality is looked upon with disapproval. This problem, however, is typical of transforming states. These states are inclined to make political appointments to the high command in order to ensure "... the regime's political security rather than the professional competence of its military forces"¹⁹⁹ and these states then suffer the consequences when those commanders face their first real test.

Inter-service rivalry, however, is rooted in the difference in strategic outlook of soldiers, airmen and sailors. The best known arguments in this regard are those of Wylie.²⁰⁰ He argues that two factors shape the soldier's conception of strategy: geography – terrain in particular – and the soldier's continuous and direct relationship with combat. Armies are confined and constrained by the harsh realities of the terrain, which limit their speed and manoeuvrability. Moreover, in war their central problem is often immediate because the enemy is right in front of them. As a result, the soldier's conception of war and strategy is sharply constrained, often limited to the immediate (battlefield) problem. The worldview of maritime forces is constrained only by the shorelines of the world's oceans. The air force's view of the world is limited only by the capabilities of its equipment and has expanded over time, as capabilities have expanded.²⁰¹ As a consequence, the land power strategist thinks in terms of theatres, campaigns and battles,²⁰² while the air power and maritime strategists tend to think in terms of the whole world.²⁰³

The services also differ in their experience and conception of combat. Airmen and sailors experience war as a separate series of encounters from which they withdraw or pursue as appropriate. Pilots would typically drink cold beer every night and navy officers would dress up for dinner! Once engaged, the soldier, however, tends to stay in contact with the enemy. Each piece of terrain is gained at the cost of life and effort. While the sailor and airman tend to move through

¹⁹⁸ Kenkel, KM, "Academic Security Experts and the Policy-Making Process: The Case of the 1996 South African White Paper", Paper presented at the 19th International Political Science Association (IPSA) World Congress, Durban, South Africa, 29 June-4 July 2003, p. 20.

¹⁹⁹ Murray, W, "Innovation: Past and Future", In Murray, W & Millett, AR (eds.), *Military Innovation in the Interwar Period*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1998, p. 319.

²⁰⁰ Wylie, JC, op. cit., pp. 48-57.

²⁰¹ Drew, DM, "Joint Operations: The World Looks Different From 10,000 Feet, Published *Aerospace Power Journal*, Fall 1988. Available at:
<<http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj88/drew.html>> [17 March 2004]

²⁰² It is interesting to see how this manifests in the concepts used by soldiers. For example, areas of operations, areas of responsibility, areas of influence and areas of interest.

²⁰³ Wylie, JC, op. cit., p. 49.

their respective geographical mediums of water and air, their medium plays a relatively small role in the actual use of force. For this reason, navies and air forces seek to exercise control over their mediums while land power occupies its medium.²⁰⁴ The soldier's conception of war and battle is very much Clausewitzian by nature: the occupation of terrain and the destruction of the enemy in battle in order to bring the war as rapidly as possible to a decisive end. The destruction of forces and occupation of terrain takes place on the tactical and technical levels of war.²⁰⁵ Consequently, soldiers have a natural inclination to master the tactical domain with its emphasis on the development of military skills through training. Considering the worldviews of navies and air forces, as well as their respective focuses on *strategic* blockade and *strategic* bombing, they have a natural inclination towards the higher levels of war and concomitantly a focus on education.

This reality is further underlined by the nature of the different forces. Land power is a people-centred instrument of military power. "Land power" Johnsen²⁰⁶ argues, "more than the other components of military power, depends on human interaction or innovation". Maritime and air power, on the other hand, are technologically-based instruments of power. As Johnsen explains, "[a]ir and sea forces essentially are built around weapon systems or support platforms".²⁰⁷ One cannot exercise any air power if there are no aircraft, and one cannot dispose of maritime power in the absence of ships. Personnel are needed to operate these technological platforms. However, personnel alone does not provide power in these domains that could typically be expressed in terms of an example of a country with a navy of 50 ships or an air force of 500 aircraft but an army of one million men. In itself, this reflects something of the nature and difference between the armed services. From an educational point of view though it is understandable why sailors and airmen are more interested in technological-related education and soldiers more in the so-called soft or human sciences.

There is also a difference in the role of land, air and maritime power in the development of strategic effect. "The land matters most," Gray²⁰⁸ argues, and "defeat on land equals victory or defeat in war". Underlying this argument is the Clausewitzian notion of war being an act of violence to compel your enemies to do your will.²⁰⁹ These enemies live on land. Consequently, strategic effect

²⁰⁴ For navies, command of the sea, or at least control thereof, is an important step in the use of sea power for strategic purposes, while air forces strive for air superiority or some form of control of the airspace.

²⁰⁵ Wylie, JC, op. cit., pp. 50-51.

²⁰⁶ Johnsen, WT, op. cit., p. 9.

²⁰⁷ Ibid.

²⁰⁸ Gray, CS, *Modern Strategy*, op. cit., p. 212.

²⁰⁹ Clausewitz, C, op. cit., p. 75.

or strategic leverage is needed on land and only land power can occupy terrain. Yarger argues that "... ultimately the resolution of armed conflict among nation states is always predicated on land armies defeating the opposing armies and physically occupying or threatening to occupy the enemy's territory, thereby controlling its government and its ability to resist one's will".²¹⁰ This is highlighted by the reality that no war has ever been won by maritime and air power on their own. Maritime and air power in their purest forms are only enabling instruments – "... navies and air forces are in support roles delivering men, supplies, and fire support or creating conditions allowing land power to be applied".²¹¹ This does not mean that air and maritime power is not of the utmost importance as indirect coercive instruments. The reality, however, is that each of the different services has its own strategic outlook and importance. This is demonstrated by the geo-strategic inclination of countries to be either continental or maritime powers – France and Germany traditionally being continental powers and Britain, a traditional maritime power. South Africa is also viewed as a continental power.

The education of military strategists has to contend with these differences in thought and outlook that more often than not underpin the inter-service rivalry in armed forces. It is rooted in the difference in strategic outlook or worldview, the difference in outlook on combat, and the differences and unity in the strategic effect of the different instruments of military power. In the end, military education should reflect an understanding that the military, theoretical and strategic outlook of soldiers, sailors and airmen respectively is coloured by a green, white or blue lens.

On a more positive note, Richardson²¹² argues that militaries have to develop these different views and be military-minded if they seek the proficiency that will first keep the peace and then prevail, should war occur. The military or anyone else should not see the existence, development and nature of a military mind as a negative trait. It ought to be actively developed and pursued by militaries in a positive manner. The real question concerns the nature of the military mind that needs to be cultivated. Richardson²¹³ is of the opinion that it should be

... a mind steeped in the methods, procedures and fundamentals of the profession, but bold, original and creative in their application; a mind that is tactically competent and

²¹⁰ Yarger, HR, "Land Power: Looking Toward the Future Thought Green Lens", *Strategic Review*, Vol XXII, No 1, Winter 1999, p. 25.

²¹¹ Ibid.

²¹² Richardson, WR, "Officer Training and Education", *Military Review*, October 1984, p. 24.

²¹³ Ibid.

technological current yet sensitive to the variable and incalculable human factors in war; a mind that understands the uses of knowledge and intelligence, the importance of fitness and the power of good character. It must be a mind tempered by systematic training broadened by progressive education and deepened by increasing experience, both real and vicarious. In short, it must be a mind that rigorously and continuously pursues mastery of the art of war.²¹⁴ [emphasis added]

From this discussion, it should be clear that militaries share a common framework of thinking about the world that surrounds them, and more particularly the role of military force and forces in the world. Militaries have a unique approach in thinking about their task in a world characterised by complexity and change. It is a way of thinking that tends to be conservative and to a certain extent also dogmatic. However, the uniqueness of the military mind does not mean that it cannot or should not be educated. It remains a question how to educate in order to inculcate the military mindset that is a necessary phenomenon, as Richardson would call it, but also develop the ability to "think outside the box" if need be.

2.7 CHALLENGES IN EDUCATING THE MILITARY MIND

Garnet²¹⁵ points out that no other issue in the study of international relations has attracted as much interest than questions concerning the use of armed force. The reason for this, Garnet argues, is because war is generally considered a human disaster, a source of misery on a catastrophic scale, and in the nuclear age, a threat to the entire human race. One of the biggest challenges in studying the use of force, though, is the use of the term *war* itself. *War*, Garnet²¹⁶ argues, is a blanket term that is used to describe a very wide range of diverse activities. These activities include total and limited wars, regional and world wars, nuclear, conventional, low-intensity and community wars, high technology and low technology wars, inter-state and civil wars, insurgency and ethnic wars. In short, all wars are exceptional – their exceptionalism is what links them together. It is difficult to study such a wide range of activities that are linked only through the fact that they are concerned with organised military violence. The irony is that civilian scientists have done most of the studies that have been conducted on war. As Brodie²¹⁷ points out: "Soldiers have always cherished the image of themselves as men of action rather than as intellectuals, and they

²¹⁴ Ibid.

²¹⁵ Garnet, J, "The Causes of War and Conditions of Peace", In Baylis, J et al., *Strategy in the Contemporary World: An Introduction to Strategic Studies*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002, p. 68.

²¹⁶ Ibid., p. 69.

²¹⁷ Brodie, B, op. cit., p. 436.

have not been very much given to writing analytical inquiries into their own art". In fact, Brodie argues that military men have in the past turned a certain degree of obloquy on those of their colleagues who were in their eyes too scholarly about war.

Gray²¹⁸ points out that it is difficult, if not impossible, to develop someone to become a strategist. According to Gray, "... no educational system puts in what nature leaves out".²¹⁹ One of the reasons why the education of strategists is a contentious but not a debated issue should, thus, be sought in the nature of strategy itself. Strategy concerns neither strictly political nor strictly military issues. Rather, it bridges the gap between the political and military worlds.²²⁰ The fundamental question about the education of strategists, therefore, concerns the crossing of the bridge between the political and military worlds and what is influencing this interactive process. This problem is furthermore accentuated through the uneasiness of the political world with military-minded or military sensitive politicians and the uneasiness of the military world with politically-minded or politically sensitive officers.²²¹

The study of military and strategic affairs is also complicated by the pragmatic and practical nature of military theory and strategy – "strategic theory is a theory of action," argues Brodie.²²² He points out that military strategists have to deal with one fundamental question: Will the idea work? The study of military and strategic affairs is therefore a "how to do it" study, a guide to accomplishing something and doing it efficiently.²²³ "Strategic studies," according to Gray,²²⁴ "is a practical subject and not a fine art". The pragmatic and practical nature of military force and strategy often leads to critique that the study thereof is not a scholarly subject but rather a pseudo-science, using apparent scientific methods to give it a spurious air of legitimacy. In addition, because of the practical nature of strategy and because strategists often advise governments, strategists are criticised for operating in a manner incompatible with the integrity of scholarship. This particular point of criticism is taken one step further when strategists are criticised for being involved in policy advocacy. Strategists are seen as being an appendage of government on account of the fact that they spend their time either providing governments with advice on how to achieve policies or

²¹⁸ Gray, CS, "Why Strategy is Difficult", op. cit.

²¹⁹ Ibid., p. 10.

²²⁰ Baylis, J & Wirtz, JJ, op. cit., p. 2.

²²¹ Betts, RK, op. cit., p. 25.

²²² Brodie, B, op. cit., p. 452.

²²³ Ibid.

²²⁴ Gray, CS, "Villains, Victims, and Sheriffs: Strategic Studies and Security for an Interwar Period", op. cit., p. 355.

justifying dubious objectives.²²⁵ The study of military and strategic affairs is therefore often impeded by questions about the legitimacy of the particular field of study.

The making of officers is also made difficult by the fact that strategy, the employment and the utility of military force are best studied from an interdisciplinary approach and perspective. Gray's²²⁶ idea concerning the different dimensions of strategy has been discussed. Howard²²⁷ also identifies four so-called "forgotten dimensions of strategy": the operational, the logistical, the social and the technological. The dimensions of strategy as outlined by different authors brought to the fore the complex nature of war and strategy. In order to acquire an in-depth understanding of military strategy and war, it is necessary to know something about all those factors that may have an influence on the use or the threat to use military force. In thinking about military and strategic education and the making of strategists, it is therefore important to keep this diverse nature of military force and strategy in mind. It is understandable though why academics are uncomfortable with a field of study that does not neatly fit into their world of compartmentalised academic disciplines. It leads to insinuations about military education being "... a mile wide and an inch deep"²²⁸ or that it is "... more a shock treatment than a broadening of intellectual horizons".²²⁹

The education of officers is also tremendously complicated by the nature of the military itself. To be specific, the bureaucratic nature of armed forces makes it not very receptive for academic studies. Firstly, the compartmentalisation that is a necessary outcome of military secrecy often makes it difficult to engage in a free exchange of ideas. The cloud of secrecy usually associated with all military activities inhibits free debate about contentious strategic and military affairs within and outside the military. Secondly, military organisations by definition are designed to operate in a medium of very great uncertainty, namely armed conflict. The need to be successful in such an uncertain environment has always caused militaries to put a premium on subordination, discipline, hierarchy and rigid social structures, all of which represent the direct opposite of flexibility. This is not really an organisational culture and climate that is conducive for academic studies. Thirdly, the need to operate in highly uncertain, confused, and stressful environments has caused armed forces through the ages to invent their own form of communication. It is a form of communication that is, as far as possible, stripped of ambiguity and redundancy. The military, for example, is well known

²²⁵ Baylis, J & Wirtz, JJ, op. cit., p. 9.

²²⁶ Gray, CS, *Modern Strategy*, op. cit., pp. 16-47.

²²⁷ Howard, M, op. cit., pp. 101-115.

²²⁸ Crackel, TJ, "The Making of Lieutenants and Colonels", *The Public Interest*, No 76, Summer 1984, p. 26.

²²⁹ Moorcraft, PL, op. cit., p. 30.

for their use of acronyms. Militaries, in general, try to create a form of language that is the opposite of what the academic world consider as indispensable for free, undirected thought.²³⁰ Finally, the responsibility to be operationally capable – the need to prepare for present challenges – often promotes negative attitudes within the military towards education. Being short of money, manpower and equipment, the military often views education as a luxury. The education of militaries then often falls victim of “short-termism” and “a flavour of the week mentality”.²³¹

The problem with the military educational system does not end with “short-termism” and “a flavour of the week mentality”. Education of officers is also complicated by the nature of the military education system. Some are of the opinion that officers entrusted with delivering professional military education are not always capable of defining and implementing a true educational system. Even in the contemporary era, whenever officers are gathered together for the purpose of education, some elements of training are imposed into the curriculum. In most cases, this is done for no other reason than to remind learners that they are part of a military establishment and not just members of the general population. The result in most cases is that the idea of training predominates and the overall effort to educate in a "pure" fashion is eroded and compromised. This results in an officer corps that has not been able to prepare properly for their task in peacetime. During times of conflict they then fail very often because of their inability to think effectively.²³²

The education of officers is also complicated by the military need to use education for specific purposes. Academics argued that “... practical experience reveals, however, as has often been the case throughout the history of military education, that what has been taught in civilian universities has been corrupted at military schools to fit the ‘needs’ of the military”.²³³ This influence, together with distortion via a dictated curriculum, moving standards of pass/fail, and a host of other “client- or patron”-led differences, marks the traditional differences between military and civilian educational institutions. It is these influences, together with the demand from the military for a better “product”, which has distorted the fabric of the educational process at military educational institutions. Civilian educators always have an indispensable role in pointing the military in the right direction and being a vital part of the success of the whole educational process. It is maintained that the military often

²³⁰ Van Creveld, M, *Technology and War: From 2000 B.C. to the Present*, The Free Press, New York, 1991, p. 220.

²³¹ Preface and acknowledgements in Kennedy, GC & Nielson, K (eds.), *op. cit.*, p. x.

²³² *Ibid.*

²³³ *Ibid.*, p. xi.

forget that education is all about people and ideas and bringing the two notions together in an environment that encourages the free flow of ideas between people.²³⁴ It is obvious that the military in general accept that education is necessary but then do not do justice to it. The real challenge is thus not only resistance to education by the military but, rather, either bad or superficial education or credentialism instead of the real thing.

Brodie,²³⁵ in his book *War and Politics*, recounts the story of how Marshall Maurice de Saxe remarked that most commanding generals displayed the utmost confusion on the battlefield. He asked himself: "How does this happen?" and then continued to answer himself: "It is because very few men occupy themselves with the higher conduct of war. They pass their lives drilling troops and believe that this is the only branch of military art. When they arrive at the command of armies they are totally ignorant, and in default of knowing what should be done, they do what they know". It is however understandable why military forces world-wide are more interested in the training of their forces than their education. The reason is obvious. Training tends to focus on tactical level issues – the execution of drills. Failure in the realm of tactics by losing a battle is immediately visible and the result disastrous in terms of the destruction and losses to a nation and its armed forces. Losing a war, however, allows the armed forces the scope to blame someone or something else. That we have seen in Germany after World War I and to a certain extent also in the United States of America after the war in Vietnam. Losing battles and engagements, however, cannot be blamed on anyone but the military. Militaries, thus, take greater care of their preparation to fight.

The last factor that complicates military education is a restricted budget. Money will always be a factor in all environments. Yet, in the education of officers it sometimes becomes the single determining factor. This often leads to a restriction and narrowing of the skills and knowledge that are required from officers to permit the contraction of many programmes, the sabotage and non-expansion of others, and the "introduction" of new schemes through the retrenchment and abandonment of others. It is a matter of robbing Paul to pay Peter, Downes explains, since the money has most often been used to procure new equipment or to deploy forces on operational duty. The military itself does not realise that equipment can only be of value if they know how to use it. In the education of officers, a minimalist budgetary approach often centred on three activities:

- quantifying the minimum competencies required by members in the service;

²³⁴ Ibid.

²³⁵ Brodie, B, op. cit., pp. 433-434.

- establishing the minimum time required to learn these skills, knowledge and attitudes; and
- determining the minimum number of staff required to impart these competencies.²³⁶

2.8 CONCLUSIONS

This chapter tried to find an answer to the question regarding why militaries need to be educated. The question led to a wide number of considerations. The history of modern war is rooted in the need for knowledge. Indeed, the need for knowledge about military and strategic affairs is one of the building blocks of the modern military profession. The military profession does not differ in any way in this regard from any other profession in modern society. A body of professional expertise is a defining characteristic of any profession – also of the military profession.

Professional expertise consists of a body of defined theoretical knowledge and practical skills. This body of theoretical knowledge can only be mastered through prolonged and in-depth study, while practical skills are acquired through training. Thus, professional military competence is reflected to the extent to which the individual has, firstly, been trained in tactical and other military skills, and secondly, mastered the body of theoretical military knowledge through education. Militaries have a natural preference for the training environment and with that the development of their military skills. The military is the only role-player in the training of its forces. The education of the military, however, has to be done in co-operation with the general academic community. The military, thus, does not have full control over the education of its members. This is one of the reasons why militaries in general are uncomfortable with education and the educational environment.

Two very specific factors define the uniqueness, the focus and the parameters of the military profession and its quest for knowledge. The first is the unique purpose of the military profession – warfighting. The military profession is the only legitimate instrument in society for the ordered application of force. This consideration is rooted in the idea of unlimited liability – the military professional should be willing to sacrifice his life in the achievement of professional goals. The military professional does not get the opportunity to apply his professional competence very often, and if he gets the opportunity to do so, it may be the only or the last opportunity. In short, professional expertise cannot only be developed through actual combat. The only way, besides warfighting, by which the military professional can build up its own professional competence and

²³⁶ Downes, C, *Special Trust and Confidence: The Making of an Officer*, op. cit., p. 135.

expertise is through military training and education. This particular need for education is rooted in the idea of *ein berufsgebildetes Offizierskorps* or a professional *military* education. This need is rooted in the need for knowledge about the military and its own professional task. It is almost an inward-looking need for education. In addition to the provision of technical skills and professional knowledge, the military should also focus on the development of qualities such as judgement, intuition, imagination and instinct.

The second defining characteristic of professional military knowledge is the need for military forces and force to be of service to the whole society. Military power should at all times be employed in a rational manner and with the consent and in the interest of the whole society. The military should, thus, have an in-depth and unique understanding of its own society and the place and role of the state it serves in a world of other states. This particular need for education is rooted in the idea of *ein gebildetes Offizierskorps* or a broad *liberal/general* scientific education. This requirement is rooted in the need for knowledge about society and the world(s) within which the military exists. From a military perspective, this is an outward-looking need for knowledge. The military professional should develop an understanding of the world and issues that surround the military profession.

These two factors also influence the military way of thinking and its search for knowledge. More specifically, the nature of their task requires a unique approach from military forces. It is an approach that is rooted in discipline, and that is characterised by a conservative – almost dogmatic – realistic appreciation of the military's role in society, of society itself and of the interaction between society and the rest of the world. Such an approach manifests itself in a focus on current realities. Militaries deal with current realities by having well-trained forces available at all times. This, once again, reiterates the military's natural preference for training. A need to shape future realities and to prepare itself for future realities is not an institutional characteristic of the military. In fact, it is often said that militaries always prepare for the previous war. The only way in which the military can ensure that it shapes itself for the future, is through education.

There are, however, a number of challenges that have to be overcome in the education of military forces. These obstacles are diverse, ranging from cultural reasons (they see themselves as men of action), to institutional reasons (militaries are huge bureaucracies), to theoretical reasons (an interdisciplinary approach is needed), to budgetary reasons (education is seen as a nice-to-have). These reasons should not, however, overshadow the need for education in armed forces. The

need of the military to deal with higher order security issues, to be proactive, effective and efficient in defence planning and to be properly prepared for its main and other tasks, underpins the importance of education in modern armed forces. Thus, the real question is not *why* the military has to be educated, but rather, *how* to educate the armed forces of a state.

CHAPTER 3

EDUCATION IN ARMED FORCES: A PROPOSAL ON THE CONTENT AND STRUCTURE OF OFFICER EDUCATION

The nation that will insist on drawing a broad line of demarcation between the fighting man and the thinking man is liable to find its fighting done by fools and its thinking by cowards.

Sir William Francis Butler¹

3.1 INTRODUCTION

Armed forces are unique institutions with specific characteristics. As instruments of war they enjoy a virtual monopoly of weaponry and substantial coercive power that make their loyalty a necessity for state survival. Militaries are modelled as tightly organised and highly disciplined entities characterised by a hierarchy of ranks and a culture of obedience. Viewed from this perspective, they are highly effective bureaucratic organisations, even to the extent that they may breed inflexibility and discourage innovation and initiative. In addition, militaries are characterised by a unique culture, a set of values, and an *esprit de corps* that prepares their members to fight, kill, and possibly, die. Armed forces are often seen, and regard themselves, as being *above* politics – a-political in nature – since they are the repository of the national interest. They guarantee the security and integrity of the state, not that of the government of the day.²

As institutions, armed forces have to operate in an environment of ambiguity and uncertainty. Their uniqueness as institutions and the environments within which militaries operate likewise necessitate a unique approach to the education of their members. Their preparation should provide officers with the requisite cognitive skills to understand the military's uniqueness as institution and to navigate, at an individual and organisational level, in an environment of near anarchy. Ultimately, the use of military force and the employment of armed forces for various purposes are something that is *done* by people. Like politics, the use of force is a practical endeavour and, like politics, also an art and a science. Hence successful application of force relies on the one hand on knowledge of the science of war, described by Strachan as "... what is technically feasible",³ and on the other

¹ Quoted in Yingling & Nagl, J, "The Army Officer as Warfighter", *Military Review*, January-February 2003, p. 10.

² Heywood, A, *Politics*, Macmillan, London, 1997, p. 360.

³ Strachan, H, *European Armies and the Conduct of War*, Unwin Hyman, London, 1983, p. 3.

hand, an intuitive understanding of the art of war, linking primarily with the Clausewitzian notion of military genius⁴.

The education of members of armed forces and the study of military art and science link the military and academic worlds. Two particular questions are of central concern in the link between the two worlds. Firstly, *what* ought to be the focus of academic and military professional studies if a military wants to master the art and science of war – i.e. what should officers study? Secondly, *when* in the career-path of officers do militaries have to educate them to ensure that they become knowledgeable about war and the use of force – i.e. when should officers study? This chapter aims at finding an answer to these two particular questions. It should be noted at the beginning of this chapter that two features of general intellectual competency are of specific relevance to the military in general. The first of these is scientific methodology, which is of great value both in the analysis of the use of force and in solving complex or complicated military tactical, operation or strategic problems. The second is the management of information. Information is of primary concern to both the academic and the military worlds. The academic world processes information into knowledge. The military world converts information into intelligence.⁵ Both these notions, the ability to solve complex problems and the need for intelligence, underpin the contemporary era of 'knowledge-intensive warfare'.⁶

3.2 WHAT TO LEARN: IDENTIFYING CORE EDUCATIONAL REQUIREMENTS

Academic institutions responsible for the education of the military at all times have to deal with the necessity that their education should be relevant to the military. This need for relevancy is often rooted a short-term military requirement that military education should be need- and task-driven. In most cases, this translates into a military quest that the educational system should "... produce the right product"⁷ for immediate employment. The military does not always appreciate the long-term benefits of a general academic education. The demand for the right product shoves the more

⁴ See Chapter 3, Book 1 of Clausewitz, C, *On War*, Edited and Translated by Howard, M & Paret, P, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1976.

⁵ Smith, H, "The Education of Future Military Leaders", In Smith, H (ed.), *Preparing Future Leaders: Officer Education and Training for the Twenty First Century*, Australian Defence Studies Centre, Australian Defence Force Academy, Canberra, 1998, pp. 149-150.

⁶ Latham, A, "Re-imagining Warfare: The 'Revolution in Military Affairs'" In Snyder, CA (ed.), *Contemporary Security and Strategy*, Routledge, New York, 1999, p. 219.

⁷ This is a phenomenon that educational institutions worldwide experience. See the discussion of the problem in Canada in Haycock, RG, "The Labors of Athena and the Muses: Historical and Contemporary Aspects of Canadian Military Education", In Kennedy, GC & Nielson, K (eds.), *Military Education: Past, Present, and Future*, Praeger, Westport, 2002, p. 177.

comprehensive and holistic approach of a general scientific education into the technical and tactical considerations of the military training environment.⁸ In contrast, a long-term educational view emphasises the universal intellectual competencies that are of relevance to the military in general.

The central question that flows from this is – What should be the focus of officer education? Surely, it would not be erroneous to argue that mastery of the art and science of war constitutes the essence of professional military knowledge. War (the use of armed coercion) has so many different dimensions and is influenced by such a diverse range of factors that almost any academic discipline may be justified in the education of officers.⁹ The question then arises as to what the areas of knowledge are that all officers should be educated in except, maybe, for a small minority of dual professionals, such as military lawyers and doctors. Is it possible to determine this at all? Asking the military what their needs are tend to produce lists covering almost every imaginable subject. This said, it is argued in this discussion that all officers should dispose of at least a basic knowledge and understanding in four core areas:

- the external (security) environment;
- the armed forces as an organisation;
- the employment of armed force(s); and
- the physical operating environment of armed forces.

3.2.1 Understanding the external environment: Security as the defining purpose of armed forces

The need to clarify the external context within which armed forces operate is one of the important challenges military leaders traditionally face. To ensure strategic effect and effective defence management officers need to have a thorough grasp of the security and strategic context of the armed forces and the state. This context critically affects the nature of military knowledge and its use in the application of armed force. National security policy, strategic culture and the principles that govern a country's strategic choices demarcate this context.¹⁰ Strategic and military matters

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ See for example the exposition by Gray of the different dimensions of war and strategy in Gray, CS, *Modern Strategy*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999, pp. 23-47.

¹⁰ Kaufman, DJ, "Military Undergraduate Security Education for the New Millennium", In Smith, JM et al., "Educating International Security Practitioners: Preparing to Face the Demands of the 21st Century International Security Environment", *Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) Monograph*, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, July 2001, p. 8.

are always intertwined with a wide range of non-military elements and cannot be considered in isolation. Even tactical situations require an understanding of the wider social, cultural, political and economic context. At the higher strategic levels, the extent and span of the required understanding are even broader. Furthermore, the military has a responsibility to explain to the community what it is about, for its own benefit and as a duty to society.¹¹

Snyder is correct in arguing "... one cannot simply study the military implications of war without understanding the roots of the rivalry between actors, such as considerations of power, status, ideology and wealth".¹² As an academic field of study, the study of strategic and military affairs fits into a wider conceptual framework of political sciences and international politics. Snyder, in addition, pointed out that "... the broad scope of security studies provides academic legitimacy while strategic studies provide intellectual coherence to the military core"¹³. Moreover, it is accepted that the study of military history is an important part of war and military studies. (See Figure 3.1)




Figure 3.1: The meta-theoretical environment of military studies¹⁴

¹¹ Smith, H, op. cit., pp. 150 & 152.

¹² Snyder, CA, "Contemporary Security and Strategy", In: Snyder, CA (ed.), *Contemporary Security and Strategy*, Routledge, New York, 1999, p. 3.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ As adapted from a sketch that appear in Baylis, J & Wirtz, JJ, "Introduction", In: Baylis, J et al., *Strategy in the Contemporary World: An Introduction to Strategic Studies*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002, p. 12.

Since the end of the Cold War there has been an increasing shift in emphasis away from the centre to the periphery; from military and also strategic studies towards the study of security. The underlying assumption is that a focus on strategic and military studies is too narrow and increasingly less relevant in an era when major wars are declining and threats to political, economic, social and environmental security interests are increasing. Security is seen as a better organising framework for understanding the complex, multi-dimensional threat environment of the contemporary era.¹⁵ The developing regions of the world, also sub-Saharan Africa, seem to provide fertile ground for the development of these thoughts.¹⁶

Security, the idea of security studies in particular, is a vague concept. "I am not hostile to security studies," Gray argues for example, "but I do not know exactly what they are or how I would proceed to find out."¹⁷ However, security studies are of critical importance from both a military educational as well as a military operational point of view. Security provides the higher order theoretical framework for the study of strategic and military affairs and also the "bigger picture" within which military professionals operate. Security links the military affairs of a country to all other state affairs as well as national and international policy considerations. Linking military education to security ensures at all times a reflection on the part of officers of the global, regional and national changes in security thinking and construction. Security also ties the armed forces to the other two notions of the Clausewitzian trinity: government and society.¹⁸

Baylis and Wirtz¹⁹ warn that security in general and security policy in particular require a careful consideration of military affairs. "Military power," they contend, "remains a crucial part of security and those who ignore war to concentrate on non-military threats to security do so at their peril." Yet, the shift in emphasis from military and strategic affairs to security issues is accompanied by a need for a better or higher order understanding of those aspects that relate to the security of a country. It may be possible to some extent to become knowledgeable about military affairs by means of an

¹⁵ Mandel provides an overview of the reasons for, and the nature of the broadening of the security agenda. See the introduction and first two chapters of Mandel, R, *The Changing Face of National Security: A Conceptual Analysis*, Greenwood Press, Westport, 1994.

¹⁶ See the article by Solomon, H & Ngubane, S, "Southern Africa's New Security Agenda", *Africa Insight*, Vol 32, No 1, March 2002, pp. 58-64.

¹⁷ Gray, CS, *Strategy for Chaos: Revolutions in Military Affairs and the Evidence of History*, Frank Cass, London, 2002, p. 4.

¹⁸ Clausewitz, C, op. cit., p. 89. Clausewitz refers to the "remarkable trinity" consisting out of 1) the people; 2) the commander and his army; and 3) the government.

¹⁹ Baylis, J & Wirtz, JJ, op. cit., pp. 11-12.

exclusive focus on military training. A clear understanding of the higher order conception of security, including its non-military dimensions, without any education is almost impossible.

The nature of security in the post-Cold War era and its emphasis on non-military threats suggests threats to the security of the state and the international system is much more obscure. To be precise, shifting international political and security domains resist easy classification and management. Hence, armed forces in the post-Cold War era need to prepare for a wider array of possible threats and dangers than ever before.²⁰ This is also true of their cognitive preparation to deal with these threats and dangers. Militaries are increasingly called upon to take on new roles of military humanitarianism, crime fighting, drug control and peacekeeping.²¹ This translates into a need for officers to display greater mental flexibility in order to deal with the complex security environment and the nature of the threats that arise. It suggests the need for greater emphasis on academic education versus military training as the foundation of life-long learning and adaptation within armed forces.²² Therefore, security – within its international relations and political context – is the first important domain that should be focused upon in the education of officers.

An understanding of security, particularly the non-military dimensions of security, is of even greater importance in the African context. This view corresponds with Dandeker's argument that global security looks and feels differently depending upon the regional context.²³ In the case of Africa – sub-Saharan Africa in particular – there is a critical need for militaries to have a higher order understanding of Africa's military and security problems and the role of African armed forces in society. Officers, irrespective of what armed force they belong to, will not be able to operate successfully on the African continent if they do not have a solid theoretical understanding of Africa's military and security problems. Almost all of Africa's security problems are of a non-military nature. In fact, the traditional Western definition of security with its external orientation and military bias is almost of no use in the African context.²⁴ Furthermore, in Africa the military itself is often part of the

²⁰ Lacquement, R, *Strategic Leadership of the Army Profession for the 21st Century*, Centre for Naval Warfare Studies, US Naval War College, New Port, Rhode Island, 5 June 2002, p. 55.

²¹ Rosenau, JN, "Armed Force and Armed Forces in a Turbulent World", In Burk, J (ed.), *The Adaptive Military: Armed Forces in a Turbulent World*, Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, 1988, p. 65. See also Huntington SP, "New Contingencies, Old Roles", *Joint Forces Quarterly*, No 2, Autumn 1993, pp. 6-11.

²² Lacquement, R, *Strategic Leadership of the Army Profession for the 21st Century*, op. cit., p. 55.

²³ Dandeker, C, "Building Flexible Forces for the 21st Century: Key Challenges for the Contemporary Armed Forces", In Caforio, G (ed.), *Handbook of the Sociology of the Military*, Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers, New York, 2003, p. 407.

²⁴ The traditional Western concept of security focuses on external threats that are addressed through the development of a powerful military capability.

problem.²⁵ The security of African states is to a large extent shaped by their own vulnerabilities. Consequently the education of officers should provide them with insight into the subtle differences between the security of the developed states of the (Western) world and the security of the developing states of the African continent. The most elementary conclusion is that African officers should be educated in order to have a thorough understanding of the macro environment within which they have to operate, within which the military as an organisation has to exist, and within which military force will be used to secure the state, the African continent and the global environment.

3.2.2 Understanding the internal environment: Armed forces as organisations

The study of security, strategic and military affairs is embedded in the study of military strategy. Strategy is a complex decision-making process aimed at finding pathways to balance the political, security, military and operational objectives of states with their available resources. Gray defines it as the "... theory and practice of the use, and the threat of use, of organised force for political purposes".²⁶ Lykke expresses this complexity in a very simple equation: strategy = ends + ways + means.²⁷ The role of the military strategists is to find ways – i.e. courses of action – in which the use of scarce military resources can be optimised to attain politically defined security and other objectives. The underlying notion is that officers, irrespective of the level at which they operate, should have the mental flexibility to:

- manage the ends-ways-and-means process;
- deal with the conglomerate of influences on the management of this particular process; and
- understand their own positions on the continuum in terms of higher and lower processes and how the different levels of strategy interact.

The management of the ends-ways-and-means process, though, is more complicated than it seems at first glance. On the military strategic level, for example, decisions about military means – the size, nature and readiness of military resources – are made in the domestic political realm. The domestic political realm is the world of interest groups, political parties, and social dynamics. This necessitates a higher order understanding of the domestic political, policy and policy decision-

²⁵ See for example the chapter on "The Roots and Results of African Military Unprofessionalism" in Howe, HM, *Ambiguous Order: Military Forces in African States*, Lynne Reinner, London, 2001, pp. 27-71.

²⁶ Gray, CS, *Modern Strategy*, op. cit., p. 1.

²⁷ Lykke, AF, "Defining Military Strategy", *Military Review*, Jan-Feb 1997.

making environment. In particular, it necessitates an active participating role by military strategists in structural decisions about what military resources should be procured, developed, prepared and mobilised. In contrast, decisions about the pursuit of specific security and military objectives are usually made within the context of international politics – in other words, the world of power politics, alliances and national interests. Strategic decisions made in this realm directly affect the responsibility of armed forces, their deployment and employment.²⁸ Strategy then becomes the art of linking structural decisions made in the domestic context with strategic decisions in the (mainly) international context.

The military's orchestration of the interplay between the attainment of strategic objectives and the availability of strategic resources underpins the need for academic education in a number of ways. Firstly, military strategists need to understand both the structural and the strategic environments – the worlds of domestic and international politics. In the military realm, structural issues inform the development of so-called force development or force preparation strategies. Strategic decisions, however, are linked to the development of so-called force employment strategies. The higher order understanding of these particular milieus can only be acquired through in-depth and prolonged academic studies. Secondly, the challenge, nature and importance of integration, orchestration and equilibrium between the structural (force development) and strategic (force employment) environments needs to be understood. Military strategies characterised by controversy and change (if not failure) are usually those in which resources and responsibilities are not aligned with each other.²⁹ In the military context, this is seen as a strategic planning gap – disequilibrium between the force development and force employment strategies.³⁰ The military strategist should develop his intuitive ability – through theory and practise – to know where to accept the risk of a strategic planning gap through stretching of the resources or risking of objectives or both. Academic studies constitute an important part of the development of this discerning ability.

The dual nature of strategy provides for an interesting interaction on military organisational level; giving militaries a *Janus*³¹-like appearance. Armed forces are, on the one hand, vocational professions focused on developing expert knowledge on the use of force and, on the other hand, hierarchical bureaucracies focused on applying routine knowledge through operating routines,

²⁸ Huntington, SP, "The Two Worlds of Military Policy", In Horton, FB, Rogerson, AC & Warner, EL (eds.), *Comparative Defence Policy*, John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1974, pp. 107-110.


²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 110-112.

³⁰ Lykke, AF, *op. cit.*

³¹ A god in the Greek mythology thought to be the guardian of doorways, gates, and beginnings, usually shown with two faces looking in opposite directions. The month January is named after him.

procedures and checklists. Officers are, therefore, always confronted with a duality. They have to be true professionals in the profession of arms while – since the profession of arms is also a state bureaucracy – they also need to be good bureaucrats. (See Table 3.1) Unlike professions, bureaucracies focus on routine applications of non-expert knowledge, usually through rigid policies and regulations, more than through the professional expertise of their employees. Indeed bureaucracies usually invest very little in the professional expertise of their employees.³² Military professional expertise, on the contrary, is underpinned by the ability to think and act creatively in the employment of military power.³³

Table 3.1: The bureaucratic and professional military worlds



According to Snider,³⁴ the dual nature of military forces is unavoidable. When the bureaucratic military world becomes more prominent than the strategic realm, there is cause for immense tensions for individual professionals and for the military as a whole. Armed forces that do not resolve this tension in favour of the strategic or professional side could indeed "die" in the professional sense. If bureaucracy continues to dominate the defence force of a country, as in South Africa at present, military professionals are squeezed into bureaucratic moulds, becoming mere employees and obedient military bureaucrats. This may well lead to a situation in which the defence force becomes so entangled with bureaucracy that the military loses its professional ability – the ability to employ military force. In short, it becomes an organisation unto itself with no value

³² Snider, DM, "Officership: The Professional Practice", *Military Review*, January-February 2003, p. 4.

³³ Kaufman, DJ, op. cit., p. 10.

³⁴ Snider, DM, op. cit., p. 4.

to the greater society. Education, together with training, is the principal means of focusing military forces on professional issues – ensuring it does not "die".

Peacetime militaries, to be specific, have a natural tendency to become more bureaucratic – to emphasise routine expert knowledge and not professional knowledge. This gives rise to a very unique military problem:

It is a remarkable yet explicable phenomenon, that precisely in those armies where the commander is afforded the fewest opportunities to acquire practical experience, the number of those is great who imagine that they were intended for generals, and who consider the practice of this vocation easy. But in the school of golden practice such impressions are, or course, quickly rectified through experience of failure, difficulties, and misfortune.³⁵

In operational circumstances, i.e. times of war, commanders are evaluated in terms of their operational effectiveness as military leaders and their professional capability – not necessarily their efficient management of resources. This leads to a logical conclusion about the nature of the education of armed forces. There is a need for both bureaucratic and professional military knowledge and education in armed forces. Officers should be able to operate with ease in both realms. Professional military education within armed forces should reflect this reality. There should be a balance between bureaucratic and professional military education of officers. One form of education should never be neglected in favour of the other. However, since peacetime militaries have a natural tendency to become bureaucratic and officers are not given the opportunity to gain professional military experience, a deliberate effort should be made in peacetime to educate officers in the professional realm – the study of war.

In addition, military organisations, though bureaucratic, have to adapt to geo-strategic and other changes in war and peace. Consider for example the wide range of organisational changes that were required in the South African National Defence Force since democratisation in 1994. Military organisations have to align themselves with their social role and operational responsibility. It is something of which military professionals should be aware and which they should be able to manage. The changes in the post-Cold War geo-strategic environment had a tremendous impact

³⁵ Baron Colmar von der Goltz as quoted in Turlington, JE, "Truly Learning the Operational Art", *Parameters*, Spring 1987, p. 56.

on the nature of military organisations and the use of military force in this era. Two noticeable changes are, firstly, the end of conscription and the movement to small professional armed forces and, secondly, the need for armed forces to prepare for a whole spectrum of possible activities i.e. the need for flexible forces. Taken together, these changes pushed manpower costs up and reduced popular identification with the military.³⁶ Moreover, questions are being raised about the need for militaries to change their warrior culture to perform non-warfighting military missions.³⁷ Military force structures were changed in the post-Cold War era to execute these types of missions.

The emphasis on military diplomacy, military humanitarianism and non-military missions significantly changes the role of the military professional. The dominant need for the military professional to be a good military bureaucrat and skilled military technician or war-fighter is increasingly augmented by the need for a soldier-diplomat and soldier-scholar. "What has changed for the soldier in recent times," Smith contends, "is the greater need for knowledge of the wider circumstances in which military action occurs."³⁸ This is an important shift in emphasis and something that was not traditionally reflected in the schooling programmes of militaries. The underlying notion is that militaries cannot be successful in the contemporary strategic environment without well-educated soldiers that fit easily into the role of military-diplomat.³⁹ The changes in military organisation in the post-modern environment reiterate the need for soldiers to study the nature and management of public organisations also. This, though, should never be done to the detriment of the study of the professional role of armed forces in society.

3.2.3 Understanding the professional military environment: War as the central focus of military forces

Militaries are called upon to execute a wide variety of missions. None of these missions is as demanding as the use of armed force for the purpose of war. Thus the immediate task of the military is often defined in terms of the need to understand, prepare for and, ultimately, to wage war appropriately and successfully across the broad spectrum of conflict. In short, warfighting – the defence of the nation against foreign conventional threats – remains the central focus of most militaries, irrespective of their size and nature. Consequently, militaries most often see and define

³⁶ Black, J, *War and the World: Military Power and the Fate of Continents, 1450-2000*, Yale University Press, New Haven, 2000, p. 275.

³⁷ Dandeker, C, op. cit., pp. 408-409.

³⁸ Smith, H, op. cit., p. 150.

³⁹ Cottey, A & Foster, A, "Reshaping Defence Diplomacy: New Roles for Military Cooperation and Assistance", *Adelphi Paper 365*, April 2004, p. 5-7.

warfighting as their primary purpose. Even in Africa the emphasis is often on the preparation for external warfighting in an effort not to divide the military along ethnic and other societal divisions. Interestingly, though, comprehension of the nature of war does not appear to be the *sine qua non* of the professional officer corps – a predicament widely recognised by astute observers within and without the officer corps.⁴⁰

This particular predicament is brought about by a number of specific challenges armed forces face in the study of war. Firstly, how to balance the need to prepare for conventional warfighting with the need to be prepared for unconventional, low-intensity, revolutionary warfare. Secondly, how to balance the need to understand and prepare for war with the demands to understand and prepare for missions other than war. These missions are often described as secondary tasks or non-traditional roles. This does not mean that these missions are less important, but rather that militaries often view them as subordinate to their primary purpose of warfighting. In fact, there is an increasing emphasis on the so-called dual role militaries. Lastly, though it is accepted that the basic function of peacetime militaries is to prepare for war, technical skill almost always takes precedence over the ability to conduct war.⁴¹ Militaries prefer to train for battle, not to study war.

War between developed states and democracies is not something that occurs very often in the contemporary strategic era. However, the consequences of such an occurrence, which is always possible, may be devastating in terms of the destruction that is brought about. Dandeker⁴² thus argues that states have to prepare for war and should base their organisations on that prime purpose, even if paradoxically interstate wars are the least likely scenarios they will face in future. In contrast, militaries frequently deploy in military operations other than war, though if something goes wrong in these kinds of operations – and it often does – the outcome for the state is not as fatal. Hence there is an interesting interplay between the frequency and the intensity or consequences of the warfighting and non-warfighting roles of armed forces. (See Table 3.2) For militaries, it is prudent to prepare for war since such a possibility can never be discounted entirely. The capacity to respond to the need for a warfighting capacity cannot be built up overnight. During

⁴⁰ Fabyanic, TA, "War, Doctrine, and the Air War College: Some Relationships and Implications for the U.S. Air Force", *Air University Review*, January-February 1986. Available at <<http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1986/jan-feb/fabyanic.html>> [24 March 2004]

⁴¹ Baucom, DR, "The Air Force Officer Corps in the 1980s: Receding Professionalism," *Air University Review*, Sep-Oct 1983, pp. 52-53. See also the editorial of that edition written by the same author.

⁴² Dandeker, C, op. cit., p. 408.

peace missions, soldiers also often face potentially very dangerous warfighting scenarios, to which they have to respond appropriately.⁴³

Table 3.2: The frequency and intensity of military operations⁴⁴

	Frequency	Intensity
Warfighting	Low	High
Non-warfighting	High	Low

How should armed forces go about studying war? The logical answer is that it should be done through a consideration of the nature of war. However, not all things in war are logical and it is extremely difficult to define the nature of war. There are no quick and easy approaches to the study of war. Fabyanic⁴⁵ argues that if an officer truly wants to understand war and make it part of his thought process it should be grasped at two different levels. The first level is that of rational intellectual thought; the other, which is of equal importance, is the level of intuition and imagination or what the Germans refer to as *fingerspitzengefühl*.⁴⁶ Clausewitz, the German military philosopher, provides the best example of an understanding of the nature of war through a consideration of both its intellectual and its intuitive dimensions.⁴⁷

In addition, a study of the changing nature of war prepares armed forces in general and officers in particular for future war. The future is by definition unknown. Thus, the general tendency amongst armed forces is to prepare for the previous war. However, by focusing on the changing nature of war it is possible to identify trends of change that could direct the preparation of armed forces for the future. It was through the identification of such trends that the current very prominent debate concerning the so-called Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) rose to prominence. The RMA debate was triggered by the convergence of a number of very prominent trends or revolutions. These include *inter alia* the technological revolution, the information revolution and the communications revolution. There is not a single future scenario for which one could confidently prepare. Instead, the key is to recognise that multiple future scenarios are possible and likely to occur

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ As adapted from a sketch that appears in Till, G, "Maritime Strategy in the Twenty-First Century", *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol 17, No 1, Mar 1994, p 180.

⁴⁵ Fabyanic, TA, op. cit., p. 1.

⁴⁶ Turlington, JE. op. cit., p. 61.

⁴⁷ Clausewitz, C, op. cit., p. 75.

simultaneously. In this vein, Roxborough and Eyre argue that the future is never one-dimensional, but always multi-dimensional.⁴⁸

At present, the changing nature of war is, on the one hand, characterised by a technological and information-driven RMA and, on the other hand, by anarchic conflict – so-called "community wars".⁴⁹ This problem is not new though. Soldiers throughout the ages were confronted with the duality of having to study contemporary conventional war and unconventional, low-intensity war. The only difference is that the probability that conventional war will manifest itself in future is diminishing, while there is a rise in the frequency of anarchic conflict. In addition, in Africa, the changes that officers will have to deal with the low-intensity end of the spectrum of conflict are much higher than the opposite. The need for African officers to clearly understand changes at the lower end of the conflict spectrum is thus clearly of critical importance. Paradoxically all the different advocates of change are correct, and consequently the challenge for armed forces is to design forces and force structures in such a way that armed forces are prepared for all possible future eventualities. Officers should prepare themselves mentally and intellectually, irrespective of the changes that manifest themselves in the nature of war.

3.2.4 Understanding the operating environment: The defining features of the battlefield

The operating environment of military professionals is defined by a large number of factors that may influence the outcome of battle or the success of military action in operations short of war. The notion of an "operating environment" is used to describe the physical environment of the battlefield or other places where the officers will have to operate. Five specific factors are important for the cognitive preparation of officers for the operating environment:

- tactics;
- geography;
- leadership and command;
- technology;
- cohesion and morale.

⁴⁸ Roxborough, I & Eyre, D, "Which Way to the Future", *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Summer 1999, p. 28.

⁴⁹ Seaquist, L, "Community War", *Proceedings*, August 2000, pp. 56-59. In addition, see the well-known article by Kaplan, RD, "The Coming Anarchy: How Scarcity, Crime, Overpopulation, Tribalism, and Disease are Rapidly Destroying the Social Fabric of our Planet", *The Atlantic Monthly*, February 1994, pp. 1-8.

Tactics, "the use of armed forces in battle",⁵⁰ defines the use of force in the operating environment. In general, tactics is described as a continuous search for better ways for setting up or deploying forces and equipment in order to gain the maximum benefit from the available forces and equipment.⁵¹ Needless to say, this also includes the physical deployment and use of force in situations short of war, including military humanitarian operations. Officers — especially those working on the lower levels of command — have to be masters of tactics. They need to have a detailed knowledge and understanding of current tactical doctrine. Officers have to *study* the tactical doctrine and *train* themselves in its execution. They also need to busy themselves with (a) continuous (re)search for better ways to employ forces and equipment in the operating environment.

Geography "speaks" to soldiers in a number of ways: "to mind and imagination, as well as to eye and limb".⁵² The influence of geography on what Clausewitz refers to as the *grammar of war* is inescapable. Military professionals always have to contend with physical geography in the operating environment. This includes considerations of space, distance, time, terrain, vegetation and weather.⁵³ The dilemma regarding geography, Gray points out, is that its influence is both everywhere, yet discernible nowhere.⁵⁴ A rising geographical issue in the tactical realm, for example, is the impact of military operations on the geography of the environment. *Environmental responsible defence*⁵⁵ in itself has become an issue of strategic importance in the post-modern military context. A higher order understanding of geographical matters underpins the success or failure of all military endeavours. Africa's harsh geographical nature and lack of infrastructure will always define the nature of operations on this continent. No military practitioner can ignore this reality in the study of the use of armed forces, irrespective of the level of such deployment.

Direct and physical **command and leadership** are essential elements of success in the operating environment. The command and control⁵⁶ of armed forces are as old as war itself and remain essential for their successful employment. Command, specifically battle or operational command,

⁵⁰ Clausewitz, C, op. cit., p. 128.

⁵¹ Esterhuysen, A.J. "Strategy, Operational Art and Tactics: Who is Responsible for What in the SANDF?", *African Armed Forces Journal*, July 2000, p. 32.

⁵² Gray, CS, "Inescapable Geography", *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol 22, No 2/3, June/Sep 1999, p. 161.

⁵³ Vego, M, *Operational Warfare*, United States Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island, 2000, pp. 123-145

⁵⁴ Gray, CS, "Inescapable Geography", op. cit., p. 162.

⁵⁵ See the discussion of military operations and environmental concerns in the following article: Jacobs, JA. Janse van Rensburg, HS and Smit, HAP, "Military Geography in South Africa at the Dawn of the 21st Century", *South African Geographical Journal*, Vol 82, No 2, 2002, pp. 195-198.

⁵⁶ Known within militaries worldwide by the acronym C².

is a subject that traditionally attracts significant scholarly attention and a large number of books and articles have been produced on the topic. Scholarly discussions of command seem to fall into three categories – all of which are important in the study thereof: an analysis of the *processes and procedures* involved in the command and control of armed forces; an analysis of the *responsibilities* of a commander; and an analysis of "... all those gifts of mind and temperament that in combination bear on military activity".⁵⁷ [Emphasis added] The point is simple – there are a considerable number of qualities that commanders ought to develop if they wish to be successful on the battlefield. Most of these attributes relate to the cognitive development of the military professional. As military professionals, officers should have a thorough understanding of all the elements of command. This means that officers should make a thorough study of the processes, procedures and responsibilities of command. Yet, officers should also deepen their understanding of command through physical experience; a study of the nature of command at all levels; and by a deliberate effort to develop the personal traits deemed to be important for command.

Military equipment and technology are an important part of the battlefield experience of military professionals. In fact, we tend to think of our age as a technological age *par excellence*. Van Creveld argues that "... behind military hardware there is hardware in general, and behind that again there is technology as a certain kind of knowhow [sic], as a way of looking at the world and coping with its problems".⁵⁸ In the military, the very prominent debate concerning the RMA (or the Revolution in Military Technology⁵⁹) is placing renewed emphasis on technology on the battlefield and, more specifically, the shift in emphasis from industrialised or mechanised warfare to *knowledge-intensive warfare*.⁶⁰ The military professional studying the role of technology in war has to contend with two opposing views. There are on the one hand the *generic critics*, as Gray calls them, who at all times "... champion the virtues of the warrior over the purported power of machines". The *generic enthusiasts*, on the other hand, discern the solution to every human problem in new marvels of science and engineering.⁶¹ In an era where, as Quincy Wright⁶² already in 1942 pointed out, technology is the principle shaper of war, military officers need to have a thorough understanding of the role of technology in the operating environment. This requirement transcends the ability to be skilful in the use and employment of technology in war, which, needless

⁵⁷ Clausewitz, C, op. cit., p. 100.

⁵⁸ Van Creveld, M, *Technology and War: From 2000 B.C. to the Present*, The Free Press, New York, 1991, p. 1.

⁵⁹ Buzan, B, *An Introduction to Strategic Studies: Military Technology and International Relations*, Macmillan Press, London, 1987, p. 17.

⁶⁰ Latham, A, op. cit., pp. 213 & 219.

⁶¹ Gray, CS, *Modern Strategy*, op. cit., p. 37.

⁶² Wright, Q, *A Study of War*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1942.

to say, is also of critical importance. What is needed is a holistic understanding of technology in war; what technology is capable of and what not.

Military theorists and soldiers have for centuries recognised the importance of **cohesion and morale** on the battlefield. These traits are closely linked to the presence of a particular military or fighting ethos. It is difficult to demarcate the influence of these intangible factors on the outcome of battle. As Keating argues, military ethos is difficult to quantify and put into monetary terms, but it counts most when the preparation of forces has stopped and operations begin. Keating explains that "[o]perational capability not only has to be developed, but fielded when it counts, and ethos contributes significantly on the day – regardless of the training cost".⁶³ There are a host of factors that encourage action and discourage apathy in armed forces. Officers should not only study the influence of intangible factors in the operating environment, but should also develop a feeling thereof in order to instil this in their own subordinates.

To conclude, this discussion delineates the core educational requirements for the education of members of the armed forces. This represents *one* view of how to structure a cohesive academic educational programme for officers. The underlying argument is that a multi-layered approach is needed in the education of officers. Such an approach should prepare officers to firstly clarify the external environment within which armed forces operate. This should be done by providing officers with a thorough understanding of the political, security and other higher order environments in which the military finds itself. Their education should, secondly, empower officers to facilitate the organisational development of armed forces and their professional employment. Consequently there should be thorough understanding of the need for bureaucratic and professional military knowledge within the military organisation itself. Most importantly, the education of officers should in particular enable them to be masters of the operational environment in which military force is used for strategic effect. This should focus specifically on an understanding of the nature of and changes in war. Lastly, soldiers should have an in-depth academic understanding of their lower order-operating environment – the battlefield. This should be done *inter alia* through an analysis and study of tactics, the influence of geography, military technology, command and leadership, and cohesion and morale. It is possible to explain these four meta-theoretical knowledge clusters by means of a sketch. (See Figure 3.2)

⁶³ Keating, M, "Training Leaders: The Australian Approach", In Smith, H (ed.), *Preparing Future Leaders: Officer Education and Training for the Twenty First Century*, Australian Defence Studies Centre, Australian Defence Force Academy, Canberra, 1998, p. 113.




Figure 3.2: The cognitive domains of officers' education

It needs to be emphasised that, like the character and context of war, the importance and the content of each core educational requirement will vary over time and from one military to the next. If these core educational requirements are considered in the context of academic disciplines it is obvious that they are not totally self-contained and that specific academic disciplines will cover more than one core education requirement. A study of military technology, for example, will provide insight into all four educational areas. The same could be said about history. The usefulness of a study of military management, on the other hand, will be more limited. Clearly, the knowledge required to become a master of war is diverse. Yet, the overall balance favours the study of the so-called "soft sciences". This is a reflection, Smith⁶⁴ argues, of the fact that war is fought between people and not machines. War, in Clausewitzian terms, is after all a political activity and politics is in essence a characteristic of human life.

The question, though, is whether there are other ways to structure the knowledge that is required from officers.

3.2.5 Identifying core educational requirements: A view from abroad

This section aims at providing a broad overview of military knowledge clusters as identified by different armed forces and scholars. The underlying question is whether the ideas of different armed forces and scholars on this particular matter coincide or, more importantly, affirm the view that the education of officers should be dealt with by way of the external, organisational, professional and operating environments.

⁶⁴ Smith, H, op. cit., p. 156.

The U.S. Army identifies three elements in the development of military leaders at all levels:

- military leadership begins with what the leader must **be**: the values and attributes that shape a leader's character;
- the competence of the leader is defined in terms of the things that he must **know**: competencies that are required for leadership on a direct, organisational and strategic level; and
- the military leader should, lastly, have the attributes to **do** what is required: actions are seen as the essence of military leadership.⁶⁵

The abilities to be, to know, and to do are intimately connected through education. Only through education can the personal values and attributes be developed to be a leader and to teach those values and attributes to subordinates. The U.S. Army Field Manual 22-100 explains the role of knowledge as the link between character (knowing the right thing to do) and leadership (doing or influencing your people to do the right thing).⁶⁶ This link requires competency in four knowledge areas:

- **Interpersonal skills**: knowledge of people and how to work with them. The educated officer should be able to coach, teach, counsel, motivate and empower people with whom he comes into contact.
- **Conceptual skills**: the ability to develop, understand and apply doctrine and other ideas needed by military professionals to do their jobs. The central focus is the ability to handle ideas. Sound judgement as well as the ability to think creatively and reason analytically, critically and ethically is required.
- **Technical skills**: the ability to use equipment. The focus is on basic soldier skills and the expertise necessary to accomplish assigned tasks and functions.
- **Tactical skills**: the ability to make decisions about the employment of military resources. Tactical skills in its purest form solve tactical problems, that is, the employment of military

⁶⁵ U.S. Army, *Field Manual No. 22-100 The US Army Leadership Field Manual: Be, Know, Do*, McGraw-Hill, New York, 2004, pp. 3-5.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 47.

units in combat. In the broader understanding of this notion it is interpreted as the ability to solve military problems.⁶⁷

Table 3.3: The U.S. Army knowledge skills of military leaders.

Political-military level		ICTT*	
Organisational level		ICTT*	
Direct level		ICTT*	
	To Be	To Know	To Do

*Interpersonal; Conceptual; Technical; Tactical

According to the U.S. Army Field Manual 22-100, these four knowledge areas correspond with what military leaders at all levels should know in order to be successful. Three specific levels are identified: *direct*, *organisational* and *strategic*. The *direct level* is defined as first-line military leadership where the military leader functions on a face-to-face basis with subordinates and colleagues.⁶⁸ The *organisational level* emphasises the competencies and actions to be a successful leader at an institutional level.⁶⁹ The *strategic level* highlights the highest level of thinkers, war-fighters and political-military experts in a military organisation.⁷⁰ The relationship between these levels and the knowledge areas can be explained by means of a sketch. (See Table 3.3)

The political-military level corresponds to a large extent with the external knowledge cluster; the organisational level with the internal organisational knowledge cluster; and the direct level with the operating environment knowledge cluster. The four domains – interpersonal, conceptual, technical and tactical – are closely related to what we include in the operating environment. It can, therefore, be argued that there is a large amount of congruity between the focus that is proposed and that of the U.S. Army.

In Britain at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, the intellectual development of officers is the responsibility of only three academic departments:

- the Department of Communication and Management Studies;

⁶⁷ Ibid., pp. 8 & 47.

⁶⁸ Ibid., p. 75.

⁶⁹ Ibid., p. 121.

⁷⁰ Ibid., p. 154.

- the Department of Defence and International Affairs; and
- the Department of War Studies.⁷¹

The specific departments provide insight into the academic emphasis on the education of officers at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst. An analysis of the emphasis and kind of education that each department provides is proof of a very practical approach to the education of officers in the British Army. The Department of Communication and Management Studies is responsible for the schooling of future army officers in communication skills and techniques, including media awareness, media interviews, negotiation in the military environment, personnel interviewing skills, and presentational and written skills. This department also provides awareness raising in management themes and issues such as equal opportunities, leadership theories, change management and diversity, stress management, the nature of teams and individuals, and resource management.⁷² The Department of Defence and International Affairs provides an awareness, knowledge and understanding of the international, political and strategic context in which the British Army operates through "tertiary level education in defence and international affairs."⁷³ The Department of War Studies defines as its most important function, the provision of tertiary level education in the study of war and modern military history.⁷⁴

Most officers recruited by the British Army are in possession of an academic qualification. The British Army, therefore, focuses its whole effort on professional military education and not on academic education per se. The four knowledge clusters as identified above are thus much more comprehensive than the British approach at the Royal Military Academy. Though, there is still some correlation between the external knowledge cluster and defence and international affairs; the internal organisational cluster and management studies; and the professional knowledge cluster and war studies.

In Australia, the educational focus of the armed forces is on three particular areas, namely "... the nature of the actor, the physical nature of military action and the purpose for which action is

⁷¹ Webpage of the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, *The Commissioning Course*, Available at <<http://www.atra.mod.uk/atra/mas/courses/commissioning.htm>> [17 Mar 2005]

⁷² Webpage of the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, *The Department of Communications and Management Studies*, Available at <<http://www.atra.mod.uk/atra/mas/academics/cms.htm>> [17 Mar 2005]

⁷³ Webpage of the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, *The Department of Defence and International Affairs*, Available at <<http://www.atra.mod.uk/atra/mas/academics/dia.htm>> [17 Mar 2005]

⁷⁴ Webpage of the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, *The Department of War Studies*, Available at <<http://www.atra.mod.uk/atra/mas/academics/wss.htm>> [17 Mar 2005]

taken".⁷⁵ Smith argues that knowledge of this kind is relevant to any war or any situation in which action is taken.⁷⁶ Four topics of education are identified in each of the above-mentioned areas:

1. **Armed forces**

The nature and character of the armed forces and their business, namely the application of force:

- nature of war and strategy (history/politics);
- Australia's military history (history);
- leadership and behaviour studies (sociology/psychology); and
- standards of individual behaviour (ethics/law)

2. **Physical elements of war**

The physical elements of war, including force itself:

- weapons and weapons systems (science/engineering);
- management of materiel (management/logistics)
- management of information (information sciences); and
- physical environment (geography/engineering).

3. **Purpose of armed forces**

The nature of Australian society and its political system in a global context:

- Australian society and politics (economics/sociology/politics/history);
- Australian defence and foreign policy (politics/history/economics);
- Australia's region (politics/history/economics); and
- the global politico-economic system (politics/history/economics).⁷⁷

The Australian approach is interesting and unique. However, it is possible to argue that the idea of the "purpose of armed force" forms part of the security knowledge cluster, that the notion of "armed forces" is part of the military organisational knowledge cluster, and that the "physical elements of war" are contained in the knowledge cluster of the military operating environment. From this perspective, the four knowledge clusters is all-encompassing framework for the education of armed forces.

⁷⁵ Smith, H, op. cit., p. 156.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Ibid., p. 157.




Figure 3.3: Clusters of expert military knowledge

The views of a number of academics on the education of officers are also of interest. Snider⁷⁸ and Lacquement,⁷⁹ for example, argue that officers have four roles to fulfil and that each role requires a particular domain of knowledge from the modern officer. The four roles identified are that of:

- war-fighter;
- leader of character;
- member of the profession of arms; and
- servant of the nation.

Each role has a unique “cluster of expert knowledge”. (See Figure 3.3) For the officer to fulfil the role of war-fighter, he needs to be schooled in military-technical knowledge. The officer as a leader of character needs to be schooled in military ethics. Knowledge of human development will help the officer to be a member of the military profession, since he has to develop individual practitioners capable of applying their expert knowledge when and where possible. The last role, servant of the

⁷⁸ Snider, DM, op. cit., pp. 6-7.

⁷⁹ Lacquement, RA, "Understanding Professional Expertise and Jurisdiction", *Military Review*, March-April 2003, pp. 62-64 and Lacquement, RA, "Army Professional Expertise and Jurisdiction", *Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) Monograph*, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, October 2003, pp. 13-14.

nation, highlights the need for political-social knowledge in order to ensure that the armed forces are resourced and serve the interests of the nation as a whole. Snider,⁸⁰ however, reiterates the basic tasks of armed forces: "... prepare to kill, kill, prepare to die and, if necessary, die". Thus, he concludes, a society needs soldiers who are well schooled and effective in the art of warfighting. With this notion, Snider advances the simple truth that warfighting constitutes the essence of the military profession.




Figure 3.4: The three tiers of military knowledge

Sarkesian and Connor⁸¹ also identify three tiers comprising – in their view – the totality of the military profession. Each of the tiers constitutes a sub-domain of the totality of the military professional body of knowledge. (See Figure 3.4) The first tier is the military orbit at the highest levels and relationships to the society in general. This tier is rooted in the need for military members to be well acquainted with the values, the nature and the functioning of society at large and its political apparatus in particular. The second tier is military professionalism as it is viewed and practised within the military system in general. It is accepted that this tier focuses on the professional nature and task of the military organisation in general, i.e. warfighting and the use of military forces for various purposes. The third tier defines military professionalism as it functions within the immediate local unit and as it is reflected within the local command structure and immediate military community. The individual soldier, sailor and airman constitute the totality of military professionalism at this level. It is the aggregate of these relationships and tiers that encapsulate the totality of the modern military profession and its knowledge base, Sarkesian and Connor argue.

⁸⁰ Snider, DM, op. cit., p. 5.

⁸¹ Sarkesian, SC & Connor, RE, *The US Military Profession into the Twenty-First Century: War, Peace and Politics*, Frank Cass, London, 1999, pp. 23-24.

There is great correspondence between the ideas of, firstly, Snider and Lacquement and, secondly, Sarkesian and Conner and the notion put forward of four different knowledge clusters. (See Figure 3.2) The importance of the ethical dimension of an officer career stands out in the ideas of Snider and Lacquement. However, the moral development of officers is an important by-product of both academic and professional military education. Ethical knowledge is important to the extent that it underpins all the different knowledge clusters. However, ethical knowledge is of particular importance in the operating environment. Morale and cohesion – to a large extent – are rooted in ethical behaviour and knowledge. The ideas of Sarkesian and Connor compare favourably with the idea of four different focus areas in the education of officers as outlined above. There are, however, two important differences. Firstly, the idea of an external environment is much more comprehensive than the political-military interaction outlined by Sarkesian and Connor. Secondly, the notion of an operating environment is much more knowledge-based than the basic military knowledge and skills of the micro military environment outlined by Sarkesian and Connor. It is also important to distinguish between the military professional and operating environments. Yet, it is clear that there is a great deal of congruence between different scholars on the nature of knowledge on which the education of military officers should focus. Using an idea of four clusters of military knowledge as the basis for such a discussion and the development of a comprehensive framework on military education is in line with international thinking about military education. How can one then integrate the views on military knowledge clusters into the educational system of military forces?

3.3 HOW TO LEARN: A FRAMEWORK FOR OFFICER EDUCATION IN THE POST-MODERN WORLD

Most military educational systems provide three types of education to officers:

- pre-commissioned basic military education;
- military doctrinal education; and
- politico-military education.

Each of these areas has a unique purpose and outcome. Implicit in this categorisation is the recognition that education, training and experience are all important in the making of an officer, but also that this does not necessarily take place at the same institution and at the same time. Indeed,

professional military education is rooted in a process of progression with the aim of providing the officer with the education that is needed at a particular point in time in his career.

The military educational system is often compared with a pyramid. (See Figure 3.5) Pre-commissioned basic education provides the broad base at the lower end of the pyramid. Moving upwards towards the apex of the pyramid, it narrows from the pre-commissioned base indicating that fewer officers need to progress through the more advanced levels of education. At the broad base at the lower end of the pyramid the officer's understanding of the military as a bureaucracy and a profession, as well as his ability to employ specific military technologies and small units in the operating environment, is emphasised.




Figure 3.5: The levels of military education

On the higher levels, a broader approach is required. Movement towards the higher levels in the military command sphere requires from the officer to become less of a specialist and more of a generalist. Experience also becomes more important as the officer functions at a higher level. The mid-level ranks in particular require from officers an understanding of a wide range of military functions, capabilities and technologies to make possible the orchestration of complex military operations and campaigns as part of a major war effort or of military humanitarian deployment. The highest level focuses on the weaving of military expertise into the politico-military equation. The politico-military level emphasises *what* is to be done with military power in the resolution of some

national problem, as opposed to the *how*.⁸² Clausewitz, for example, argues that "[t]he influence of the great diversity of intellectual qualities is felt chiefly in the higher ranks, and increases as one goes up the ladder".⁸³ The development of these intellectual qualities should commence at a very early stage in the career of an officer to allow him to manage his acquired experience in a manner that would benefit both the organisation and the individual.

3.3.1 The making of lieutenants

The first step in the development of professional military officers is a process referred to as "the making of lieutenants".⁸⁴ This involves a process whereby recruits are brought into the military and the schooling they receive to become commissioned officers. This schooling is rooted in the provision of the appropriate military skills, knowledge and attitudes for candidate officers to be commissioned into one of the services. As such, three processes underpin the making of lieutenants. (See Figure 3.6)

Firstly, *attitudes*: candidate officers need to embrace the military ethos and become military-minded – a process that sociologists refer to as secondary socialisation.⁸⁵ These candidate officers have to learn to think and act like soldiers and officers. Individual officers need to be inculcated with and accept the military ethos and ethics as a way of living. In fact, there are different levels of ethos with which the young officers should become acquainted. This includes *inter alia* the military ethos, a service specific ethos and, in most cases, also a regimental or corps ethos.⁸⁶ Caforio points out that on this level special procedures are used in order to induce strong normative compliance, such as community life, discipline, hierarchical authority, rules of public and private behaviour, as well as a system of sanctions.⁸⁷ The example of mentors and other role models within the military is of critical importance in this regard. It can be argued that military socialisation aimed at providing candidate officers with a "military mind" – a unique way of thinking.

Secondly, *military skills*: candidate officers, whether in the army, navy or air force, have to be prepared for their primary function as military professionals. They will serve as junior leaders in

⁸² Bletz, DF, *The Role of the Military Professional in U.S. Foreign Policy*, Praeger Publishers, New York, 1972, p. 144.

⁸³ Clausewitz, op. cit., p. 139.

⁸⁴ TJ, Crackel, "On the Making of Lieutenants and Colonels," *The Public Interest* 76, Summer, 1984.

⁸⁵ Caforio, G, "Military Officer Education", In Caforio, G (ed.), *Handbook of the Sociology of the Military*, Kluwer Academic / Plenum Publishers, New York, 2003, p. 255.

⁸⁶ Keating, M, op. cit., p. 113.

⁸⁷ Caforio, G, op. cit., p. 255.

one of the services and should be prepared for their primary function in that service. These functions are diverse, ranging from combat pilots to weapons officers on ships to infantry platoon leaders. This requires an emphasis on the training domain to equip these candidate officers with the necessary basic military skills to operate as junior leaders in their respective geographical domains – land, air or sea.




Figure 3.6: The making of lieutenants

Thirdly, *professional knowledge*: candidate officers need to acquire the ability to understand the military profession, its role in society and the role of military force in the resolution of national security problems. In short, they have to learn to think conceptually about higher order military and strategic issues – war – and how to deal with it. This necessity is rooted in a need for education. Bletz⁸⁸ argues that it is important to understand the necessity for education on this level. This provides the newly commissioned officer with a broad undergraduate background as a meaningful intellectual base upon which the individual can build a career. Already in 1964, Fergusson⁸⁹ expressed the opinion that at an early point in their careers, officers should be encouraged to *think* and *write* on strategy and military affairs. This does not mean that they are strategists. Rather, it is an indication that they have the ability to think strategically, even in tactical situations.

Undergraduate education in particular is necessary to provide officers with the intellectual foundation necessary to carry out the responsibilities of a commissioned officer. Such education should prepare officers with an understanding of the world and society, as well as the organisational environment in which they will serve. Kaufman⁹⁰ argues that pre-commissioned education should be directed by two fundamental questions: Firstly, what should officers be able to

⁸⁸ Bletz, DF, *The Role of the Military Professional in U.S. Foreign Policy*, op. cit., p. 148.

⁸⁹ Fergusson, CM, "Strategic Thinking and Studies", *Military Review*, April 1964, p. 21.

⁹⁰ Kaufman, DJ, op. cit., p. 9

do in future? Secondly, how does pre-commissioned education contribute to the development of officers who reflect the attitudes that are deemed to be important for the military? Needless to say, the education that emanates from the above is dependent upon how wide one defines what officers should be capable of and which attributes they would need to have. An overview of the attributes that the U.S Military Academy deemed as important reflects a liberal approach towards education on pre-commissioned level. This includes *inter alia* the ability to think and act creatively, to develop thought processes, to communicate effectively (verbally and in writing), and to demonstrate the capability for and a willingness to pursue progressive and continued educational development.⁹¹

There are interesting tensions in the making of lieutenants. The most obvious is the traditional strain between education and training. An emphasis on education at the pre-commission level reflects a long-term strategic focus. It necessitates a high capital investment, but lays the foundation for a long-term military career. In contrast, emphasis on training reflects a short-term tactical focus, is less capital intensive and prepares junior officers for their first assignments as junior leaders. In the case of the education of officers on this level, there is an increasing emphasis on the broadening and liberalising of the curricula. The training of lieutenants, however, is traditionally very narrow and concentrates on special military skills and techniques and the technical aspects of military life and operations.⁹² The inherent tension between the convergence of the training process and the divergence of the educational process is obvious.

This is especially true at institutions that should provide both the training and the education of these candidates. Military socialisation plays a critical role in bringing these two processes together. If training and education are done at different institutions, as in South Africa at present, the potential for disequilibrium in the ethos of the different institutions is very high. The training institution usually places a high emphasis on the development of a military regimental ethos characterised by military hierarchy and discipline. The educational institution, however, prefers an academic ethos characterised by intellectual creativity and freedom of thought. The disorientation of the young officer in this regard may have dangerous consequences at a critically important time in the development of officers.

A great deal can be learned from the Canadian Forces and their military educational transformation towards broad liberal education in the aftermath of the 1993 Somalian incident. The danger,

⁹¹ Ibid., p. 10.

⁹² Bletz, DF, *The Role of the Military Professional in U.S. Foreign Policy*, op. cit., p. 132.

Haycock points out, is that changes in the education of armed forces are usually driven by the “... last traumatic experience”.⁹³ In the Canadian Forces, the emphasis on training was rooted in a variety of considerations. A chronic criticism by the military was the notion that the educational costs at a military academic institution (i.e. a military academy) were much higher than in civilian circles. This, Haycock argues, turned out to be a very oversimplified charge that was made very often. There was a related charge from the operational branches of the military that they were not getting the candidate officers soon enough and “... that they knew too few military things” for having spent such a long time in the educational environment. The military argued that academic institutions had to put the military back in military education since the candidate officers were arrogant and “... did not fit into the appropriate military culture”.⁹⁴ In short, the military complained that the military educational institutions did not deliver “the right product”. There was also no overarching departmental policy to guide and integrate military education into the armed forces, resulting in frequent rumours that one or more of the educational institutions would be closed for financial reasons. In the Canadian Forces, many well-educated officers simply left the services because of an “... institutional anti-intellectualism” that developed over time. The personnel management system did not know how to utilise or employ officers to take advantage of their education while senior officers did not know “how to use their brain trust”.⁹⁵

Another tension in the making of lieutenants concerns the nature of the education itself. Firstly, officer education requires both a liberal education (*ein gebildetes Offizierkorps*) and a military professional education (*ein berufsgebildetes Offizierkorps*).⁹⁶ This often leads to a tension in military educational institutions – military academies in particular – between the provision of a broad liberal education and the provision of a professional military education. Smith describes it as a tension between *academic education* and *professional studies*.⁹⁷ Broad liberal education at undergraduate level is fundamental for the development of generic intellectual competence, while professional military education is the key to military effectiveness on higher levels.⁹⁸ In this regard, Caforio points out that two main orientations today are prevalent at military academies throughout the world. The one presupposes a typical military education, with less space for general university culture.⁹⁹ The other brings officer education closer to the national university system, including the

⁹³ Haycock, RG, op. cit., p. 168.

⁹⁴ Ibid., p. 179.

⁹⁵ Ibid., pp. 177-178.

⁹⁶ Hackett, J, *The Profession of Arms*, Macmillan, New York, 1983, p. 103.

⁹⁷ Smith, H, op. cit., pp. 153-154.

⁹⁸ Ibid., pp. 155 & 160.

⁹⁹ Associated with a divergence between military education and the general or national educational system.

awarding of a true university degree with value on the civilian market.¹⁰⁰ There are a number of general reasons why defence forces opt for the latter orientation. It is argued that such an educational experience:

- better integrates the officer into the context of the surrounding society and facilitates his collaboration with officials and agents of other institutional sectors;
- provides the officer with cultural knowledge that makes him better prepared for operating in non-traditional military missions;
- better position the officer for a second career; and
- enhances the prestige, status and attractiveness of the military by awarding the officer a more widely recognised degree in the national environment.¹⁰¹

However, even in countries where there is a general movement towards the provision of a more broad liberal education, military academic education is still provided in an environment that is quite different from that of civilian universities. In this regard, Caforio describes military academies as total institutions characterised by:

- a rational orientation towards a goal – it is a rational means towards an end that otherwise would be realised with difficulty;
- the presence of (physical and psychological) barriers between the institution and the outside world;
- the work and private life of the students are integrated;
- all activities are scheduled; and
- students and staff are segregated.¹⁰²

The value of a broad liberal academic education in the making of lieutenants, though, is undeniable. Lacquement¹⁰³ argues that it is impossible to continue with any form of education in armed forces if young officers do not receive a liberal education at the beginning of their

¹⁰⁰ Described as a convergent process: bringing pre-commissioned military education in line with the general requirements for degree education in the national education system.

¹⁰¹ Caforio, G, op. cit., p. 260.

¹⁰² Ibid., p. 262.

¹⁰³ Conversation with Lt Col Richard Lacquement, U.S Army, Charleston, South Carolina, 26 February 2005. Lt Col Lacquement is a widely publicised author on military education and at present part of a commission appointed by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff to investigate the education and careers paths of officers in the U.S. armed forces.

professional careers. Thus – no military doctrinal education and politico-military education (i.e. professional studies) – are possible without some form of liberal education at a pre-commissioned level. In the education of lieutenants, relevance to the military career should take second place to the critical aim of academic education, namely that of developing general intellectual skills and to inculcate the ethical values inherent in education.

Cowan agrees with Lacquement and outlines three specific reasons why liberal education is necessary in the making of lieutenants.¹⁰⁴ Firstly, in most democracies the public has come to view any significant failure of judgement within the profession of arms as a genuine catastrophe. Junior officers in command of small groups or formations make most in-action decisions in the operating environment. The public opinion cannot be dismissed as merely an anti-military bias and an appetite for scandal. Instead, it should be seen as inextricably tied to the rising emphasis on human rights issues in both foreign and domestic policy in most democracies of the world. Secondly, the remarkable acceleration of technological change and the virtual explosion of knowledge have the potential to be a vast force multiplier of numerically small forces. This fact amplifies the need for complexity of thought and maturity of judgement to avert catastrophe and it drives that requirement further down the chain of command than ever before. The necessity for education on the lower levels of command that flows from the above is obvious. Lastly Cowan argues that the military tendency to view training as the preferred way to avert catastrophe is misplaced. Skills are not sufficient since judgement is required. In Cowan's words, judgement is "... that odd distillate of education". Judgement is what remains once memorised facts have been forgotten or have been smoothed into a point of view. It cannot be taught directly, but has to be learned. As Cowan explains:

*Without the mature judgement that flows from education, we fall back on reflexes, which are damned fine things for handling known challenges, but are manifestly unreliable in the face of new ones. And there will be new ones.*¹⁰⁵

The underlying notion that should also be grasped in the "making of lieutenants" is that liberal education is an important first step in the making of military strategists and the preparation of

¹⁰⁴ Cowan, JS, "Education, Public Perception and the Profession of Arms in Canada", In Last, D, Pinch, F, Bland, DL and Okros, A, *Challenge and Change for the Military: Social and Cultural Change*, McGill-Queen's University Press, Montreal, 2002, p. 133.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 133.

officers for high command. Lambert¹⁰⁶ in particular points out that officers can only benefit from professional education if they have a broad liberal education to provide the context within which their particular expertise will be applied. If something goes awry in the provision of a liberal academic education, the whole military professional education, training and development process is distorted. In a recent study done in the U.S. on strategic leadership competencies, a specific recommendation was made in this regard: "Begin growing strategic leader capability on precommissioned level".¹⁰⁷ It was argued that several of the strategic leadership competencies begin with the seeds sown during pre-commissioned education. A liberal education on this level empowers junior officers with the ability to participate in their own development through participation in a wide variety of (also civilian) activities, reading (not only military works but also, for example, books about the corporate world) and exploitation of other knowledge pathways (the internet for example).

3.3.2 The making of colonels

Smith argues that a liberal education on pre-commissioned level empowers the individual officer to take responsibility for his professional studies. Professional studies "... occupy a position between academic education and military training".¹⁰⁸ Professional studies relate to the core of being a military professional since it includes areas of learning that all officers need to know about, at least at a basic level. The individual officer should focus in his own professional studies on topics such as the law of armed conflict, leadership, military history, current affairs and military ethics. Professional studies, Smith maintains, need to be practical while resting on a sound intellectual foundation.¹⁰⁹ Chances are slim that this intellectual foundation would develop without a broad liberal academic education on pre-commissioned level. Professional studies are the essence of military doctrinal education – "the making of colonels", in the words of Crackel.¹¹⁰ Indeed, it is argued that the making of colonels and the processes required for doing so constitute the most critical phase in the development of officers. In most armed forces of the world, this represents the

¹⁰⁶ Lambert, A, "History as Process and Record: The Royal Navy and Officer Education", In Kennedy, GC & Nielson, K (eds.), *Military Education: Past, Present, and Future*, Praeger, Westport, 2002, p. 85.

¹⁰⁷ Wong, L, Gerras, S, Kidd, W, Pricone, R and Swengros, R, *Strategic Leadership Competencies*, U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, September 2003, p. 11.

¹⁰⁸ Smith, H, op. cit., p. 154.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

¹¹⁰ Crackel, TJ, op. cit.

highest level at which the majority of officers participate in formal professional education. This is often referred to as the *command and staff level*.¹¹¹

A discussion of military doctrinal education necessitates an understanding of the nature and role of military doctrine. The pliability of the word *doctrine* though makes it difficult to define. The nature of a specific doctrine is often qualified: political-military doctrine; strategic doctrine; or operative warfighting doctrine. Grant's definition of *military doctrine* has as its essence what military doctrinal education is all about:

*Doctrine is a formal expression of military knowledge and thought, that the Army¹¹² accepts as being relevant at a given time, which covers the nature of current and future conflicts, the preparation of the Army for such conflicts and the methods of engaging in them to achieve success.*¹¹³

Clearly, military doctrinal education should provide officers with an in-depth understanding of both national and international current knowledge and thought about the employment of military force. In addition, military doctrinal education should provide officers with a platform for considering the current and future use of force and the preparation of the armed forces for future employment and conflict. Thus, Viotti argues, military doctrine is not only a body of theory that *describes* the environment within which the armed forces must operate, but it also *prescribes* the methods and circumstances of their employment.¹¹⁴ This descriptive and prescriptive nature of doctrine serves as the starting point of military doctrinal education. The nature of military doctrine as the bridge between thought and action defines the nature of military doctrinal education. Military doctrine has traditionally been concerned with the employment of military forces for the purposes of warfighting. In typical post-modern fashion, military doctrine is also described as the military software that is necessary for the effective employment of military hardware. Doctrine, in short, interprets the higher conceptualisation of war, embodied in strategic theories and operational plans, into working guidelines for action. This results in a complex process in which many different influences combine

¹¹¹ Bletz, DF, *The Role of the Military Professional in U.S. Foreign Policy*, op. cit., p. 134.

¹¹² The use of the word *army* in this definition should be seen, for the purposes of this discussion, as having a broad meaning referring to all the different military services.

¹¹³ Grant, C, "The Use of History in the Development of Contemporary Doctrine", In Gooch, J (ed.), *Occasional Paper No 30 – The Origins of Contemporary Doctrine*, Strategic and Combat Studies Institute, Camberley, September 1997, p. 8.

¹¹⁴ Viotti, PR, "Introduction, Part III: Military Doctrine", In Horton, FB, Rogerson, AC & Warner, EL (eds.), *Comparative Defence Policy*, John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1974, p. 190.

to produce a *standard operating procedure*.¹¹⁵ In the modern era, military doctrine has been widened to incorporate the use of the military in so-called military operations other than war (MOOTW).

The educational value of military doctrine is imbedded in three particular characteristics.¹¹⁶ Doctrine, firstly, has an *intellectual* component. This component draws principles from the experiences of earlier successful armed forces, their use and their commanders. The study of military history is, therefore, a critical element in professional studies and military doctrinal education.¹¹⁷ The challenge is not to fall into the trap of using the lessons of history to win the last war! Evans, for example, argues that the interplay between past, present and future in military education makes the use of military history an important part of professional studies and officer development.¹¹⁸ Doctrine, secondly, has a *practical* and dynamic component. It interprets the experiences of the past in the light of current circumstances to ensure armed forces are properly prepared in peacetime, and has the guidance they need to make the best use of their forces during operations. From this perspective, doctrine focuses on the employment of existing military capability. Consequently, this component of doctrine is rooted in a detailed understanding of current doctrine and the need for officers to develop judgement in its application. Doctrine, lastly, has a *predictive* component since it develops and prepares forces for the future. Consequently, doctrine has to look towards the future to determine how military force and forces might be used in times to come. From this perspective, doctrine not only guides, to some extent, the development of technology, but it also influences the development of the armed forces in such a manner that they are able to meet future challenges.¹¹⁹ Like the incremental introduction of new military capabilities, the development of new doctrine is incremental in nature. Armed forces – though – need to focus on the development of new doctrine at all times. Militaries need to indoctrinate all its members to have a full comprehensive and detailed understanding of existing doctrine. The officers in a particular armed force should be able to apply its doctrine judiciously when called upon to do so.

¹¹⁵ J. Gooch, "Military Doctrine and Military History", In Gooch, J (ed.), *Occasional Paper No 30 – The Origins of Contemporary Doctrine*, Strategic and Combat Studies Institute, Camberley, September 1997, pp. 5-6.

¹¹⁶ Grant, C, op. cit., pp. 8-9.

¹¹⁷ Ibid., p. 8.

¹¹⁸ Evans, M, "Military History in the Education of Western Army Officers", In Smith, H (ed.), *Preparing Future Leaders: Officer Education and Training for the Twenty-First Century*, Australian Defence Studies Centre, Australian Defence Force Academy, Canberra, 1998, p. 133.

¹¹⁹ Grant, C, op. cit., pp. 8-9.

The purpose of military doctrinal education is to provide officers with all the competencies they need to deploy and employ military formations from platoon to whatever size forces are needed in accordance with military doctrine. To be more specific, the aim is to school officers to be tactically¹²⁰ and operationally-minded¹²¹ and to operate with ease in these realms. Tactics ensure success in the operating environment. Operational art underpins the success of major military operations and campaigns. Operational doctrine links tactical successes to strategic effect.

Military doctrinal education should in the first instance provide officers with all the doctrinal and other expertise that is required from a leader and his staff to be successful in battle. The doctrinal schooling of officers should, in the second instance, culminate in the ability of the officer to be a campaign planner and/or an operational commander. At this level, the officer is also exposed to the roles and missions of the other services and the fundamentals of joint and combined operations.¹²² The making of colonels is – thus – a process with two elements: the development, firstly, of the officer as a tactician and, secondly, as a campaign level staff officer or commander. While military training is the most appropriate tool for the development of tacticians, professional education underpins the development of campaign level staff officers or commanders. Because of the emphasis on training and professional military education, as well as the employment of military officers in this particular phase in their careers, there is some doubt as to the availability of time to engage in any serious academic education.

The essence of military doctrinal schooling is the development of the ability of military leadership on tactical and operational level to solve complex military problems irrespective of whether those problems are faced on a battlefield, in a military humanitarian environment, or in a military organisational context. The making of colonels, therefore, covers a wide range of military training and professional education – from platoon level tactics to formation level operational art. Consequently, there needs to be a gradual shift or progression from training towards professional education as the primary and appropriate vehicle for the transfer of tactical and operational skills, knowledge and attitudes in the making of colonels. Whereas training is the most appropriate tool

¹²⁰ Tactics is the art and science of employing forces *on the battlefield* to achieve national security objectives. Tactics is often described as *the ability to fight*.

¹²¹ Operational art or the operational level of war and strategy is defined as the art and science of planning, orchestrating, and directing *military campaigns* within a specific theatre of operations to achieve national security objectives. It is the link between tactics and strategy and is often describe as *campaign level strategy*.

¹²² Bletz, DF, *The Role of the Military Professional in U.S. Foreign Policy*, op. cit., p. 134.

for doctrinal schooling on the lower tactical levels of command, professional education becomes increasingly more important at the higher levels of command. (See Figure 3.7)

Armed forces experience a range of difficulties in the provision of professional education at this level. Firstly, Van Creveld¹²³ argues that participation in military doctrinal education on the higher command and staff level depends on candidates' general career pattern. In most cases, the colleges responsible for military doctrinal education have no say in the selection of those who will participate in the training and educational programs, nor do the proven academic records of the candidates play a role. There are no clearly identifiable selection criteria. To state it bluntly, it is a free-for-all at this level.




Figure 3.7: Military doctrinal education

Secondly, the duration of the professional education programmes at command and staff colleges is relatively short – usually a year or less. Hence the amount of time that students have to spend in class attending lectures, seminars, workshops and exercises make in-depth study virtually impossible. The education is mostly group-oriented and not individualised, as is the case in liberal educational institutions.¹²⁴

Thirdly, command and staff colleges often experience a great deal of tension in the presentation of their programmes. In most cases it is the result of questions about the amount of time that needs to be spent on joint or service-specific education, as well as the amount of time spent in learning about combat, combat support or combat service support functions. There are also different views pertaining to the amount of time that should be spent on the preparation for warfighting proper and

¹²³ Van Creveld, M, *The Training of Officers: From Military Professionalism to Irrelevance*, Free Press, New York, 1990, pp. 80-81.

¹²⁴ Ibid.

the time spent on low-intensity and military humanitarian operations. The consequence is programmes and curricula that change annually.¹²⁵

Fourthly, the standard of these programmes is in doubt. In the words of Van Creveld "... nowhere are those who take the examinations failed, or those who submit a thesis rejected".¹²⁶ Haycock also points out that the time of students is jammed "... with visiting speakers, and there is little mind stretching, in terms of in-depth reading and writing". In addition, Haycock argues that syndicate discussions often demand little in academic preparation.¹²⁷ The underlying argument is that the military will not terminate the career of an officer whose training, as a pilot for example, has cost them a lot of money simply because he has failed a military college examination. Consequently, Van Creveld argues, the atmosphere at most of these colleges is very different from that of first-rate academic institutions. The point is that if insufficient time and energy are put into professional studies, studies cease to be relevant and thought-provoking, becoming instead routine exercises, reluctantly undertaken and reluctantly taught.¹²⁸ Haycock summed it up as, "... no papers, no heavy reading; just one visiting expert after another and occasional group reports on problems looked into between junkets to the Far North, East and South and a whopper to Europe and the Middle East".¹²⁹

Fifthly, it is not clear on what basis the instructors at most of these colleges are selected. They have no real expertise as teachers and in most cases are not part of a distinct elite. The amount of time they spend with the students in class also does not afford them an opportunity for any serious research or academic studies. Students do not see their instructors as role models. Indeed, questions about the absence of the authority and knowledge relationships that characterise academic institutions could well be posed. In combination these factors lead to a situation where most command and staff colleges in the world are not accredited and do not have the ability to present military doctrinal education at a post-graduate level. They provide professional education of an academic nature, not academic education.¹³⁰

¹²⁵ Ibid.

¹²⁶ Ibid., p. 81.

¹²⁷ Haycock, RG, op. cit., p. 180.

¹²⁸ Smith, H, op. cit., p. 154.

¹²⁹ Haycock, RG, op. cit., p. 178.

¹³⁰ Van Creveld, M, *The Training of Officers: From Military Professionalism to Irrelevance*, op. cit., pp. 80-81.

3.3.3 The making of generals

The careers of most officers up to the rank of colonel are restricted to the purely military environment. As generals, however, these officers have to operate almost exclusively in the politico-military sphere. The purpose of politico-military schooling is therefore to assist officers to prepare themselves for high command. Whereas basic military and doctrinal schooling is directed at the making of lieutenants and colonels, politico-military schooling aims at the making of generals, which in turn focuses on the need for senior officers to become strategically and politically-minded. Generals have to be prepared to work with leading defence officials and political office bearers in managing and controlling the country's military resources in accordance with the security needs of the country and in subordination to the polity.¹³¹ In most cases, schooling on this level is not only joint and combined, i.e. includes officers from all the different services and different nations, but civilian public service officials also participate.

The adjective "politico-military" should be seen as the convergence of the purely political and the purely military points of view. This is the level at which the ultimate concern is military and national strategy. At this level, the bridge between the military and political worlds is built in the name of strategy. In the Clausewitzian paradigm, it could be argued that this is the environment within which the *logic* of politics and the *grammar* of war are brought together for the *purposes of war*.¹³² This is also the level of command at which officers become strategists in the true meaning of the word. Strategic leaders are those leaders who are entrusted with increased responsibility for an organisation as a whole, who are concerned with internal as well as external spheres of influence, and who are surrounded by ambiguity and complexity.¹³³ The careers of senior officers are based on the provision of the necessary experience as well as tactical and operational knowledge to be the "military experts" in the national strategic context. At the politico-military level, all the different dimensions of strategy come into play.¹³⁴ At this level, the education of officers should culminate in an understanding of all the dimensions of strategy. It will not be too far-fetched to argue that this level benefits from practical experience, military training, academic and professional military education that the officer has received throughout his career. Learning through experience, training

¹³¹ Bletz, DF, "Military Professionalism: A Conceptual Approach", *Military Review*, May 1971, pp. 9-17.

¹³² Clausewitz, C, op. cit., p. 605.

¹³³ Wong, L, et al., op. cit., p. 1.

¹³⁴ Gray, CS, *Modern Strategy*, op. cit., p. 24.

and education combine to provide officers with insight into all the different dimensions of strategy. On the strategic level, the pen and the mind really become mightier than the sword.¹³⁵

The ultimate aim of the politico-military world, Bletz argues, is to effect the integration of a nation's foreign and defence policy. Consideration of a country's domestic and financial policies though is also of critical importance in the politico-military realm. The notion of a politico-military world suggests the appropriate insertion of political and military considerations into the thought process in a given security and political situation in light of all factors relevant to that situation.¹³⁶ The consideration of all the factors affecting a particular situation is important from an educational point of view. Since the end of the Second World War there has been a gradual increase of participation of the military in the formulation and the implementation of the foreign policy process of most nations.¹³⁷ This process received renewed impetus since the end of the Cold War and the increase in so-called military operations other than war. This is especially true in situations where the role of the military is not to create peace, but to sustain the peace that has already been created – stability and military humanitarian operations in particular.

Politico-military education should confirm the ability of the officer to read and write on strategic and military matters. In most cases, politico-military education is associated with the completion of a post-graduate qualification.¹³⁸ Indeed, in most armed forces of the developed world, and in some instances also the developing world (India, for example), it has to some extent become an accepted norm for general officers to have at least a masters qualification. The logic behind this is very obvious. Academic studies are the only way by which officers can prepare themselves for the complexity with which they will have to deal in the politico-military environment.

3.3.4 A possible framework for the education of officers

The different levels of military education need to be considered in the framework of the relevant emphasis on each level. In the making of lieutenants, the emphasis is on a broad liberal education, basic military training and the inculcation of military ethics, values and norms. The latter is achieved through both military training and academic education, though it is accepted that

¹³⁵ Foster, GD, "Research, Writing, and the Mind of the Strategist", *Joint Forces Quarterly*, No 11, Spring 1996, p. 111.

¹³⁶ Bletz, DF, "Military Professionalism: A Conceptual Approach", op. cit., p. 7.

¹³⁷ Janowitz, M, *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait*, Free Press, New York, 1960, pp. 348-349.

¹³⁸ Van Creveld, M, *The Training of Officers: From Military Professionalism to Irrelevance*, op. cit., p. 78.

professional education may also be of value in this regard. In the words of Smith, "[t]he value of education lies not simply in contributing to expertise but also in developing ethical values that are conducive [*sic*] to effective cooperation within an organisation".¹³⁹ The primary emphasis in the making of lieutenants, though, is on military training and academic education. The making of colonels comprises two processes: training of tacticians; and training and (professional) education of operational level commanders and staff officers. The making of generals is rooted in education: mostly of an academic nature but also professional education.

It is possible to use a 5-point scale to illustrate the emphasis between military training, professional military education and broad liberal academic education in the making of officers and military strategists. (See Table 3.4) The distribution of the five points at each particular level (represented by XXXXX) represents the educational and training focus at that level. It is an indication of whether the main or the secondary focus is on academic or military professional education or military training.

Two considerations are of particular interest. The first is the need for a skills, attitude and knowledge foundation on pre-commissioned level. Without such a foundation further training and education, specifically professional education, is almost impossible. This foundation is rooted in a general truth, pointed out by Downes, namely that "... it is more difficult for the trained man to gain a liberal education than it is for the educated man to undergo military training".¹⁴⁰ Downes argues that in the military, the trained man is socialised to expect and require order, discipline and direction. In gaining a liberal education, he has to step outside the bounds of these fundamental tenets. A broad liberal education, "... in its effort to develop a broad-based, flexible and questioning framework of thinking and attitudes in a person, can challenge the very foundations of the trained person's identity and his relationship to his peers, superiors and subordinates".¹⁴¹ The fundamental truth about the making of officers and military strategists, though, is that it should be rooted in a solid foundation of military training and academic education without which no professional education is possible.

¹³⁹ Smith, H, *op. cit.*, p. 151.

¹⁴⁰ Downes, C, *Special Trust and Confidence: The Making of an Officer*, Frank Cass, London, 1991, p. 200.

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 201.

Table 3.4: Military training, professional and academic education

	Military training	Professional education	Liberal academic education
The making of generals: politico-military education		XX	XXX
The making of colonels: military doctrinal education: operational	XX	XXX	
The making of colonels: military doctrinal education: tactical	XXX	XX	
The making of Lieutenants: pre-commissioned basic education	XX	X (Military socialisation)	XX

In this context, another important matter concerning the making of lieutenants is brought to the fore: how to structure the need for military training, academic education and the inculcation of military values and norms given the difference in ethos between the training and academic worlds. There is greater conformity between the values and norms of the military and the training worlds. In fact, the training role is performed by the military itself, while an external institution usually provides academic education. From this perspective, it makes more sense to complete the academic education of candidate officers before they begin with training to become commissioned officers. This will not only operationalise the notion of education before training, but will also ensure congruence of the values and norms of the training and the military worlds. This does not exclude a short military orientation before the commencement of academic studies.

Another point of interest in the figure is the gradual shift in emphasis from training to professional education to academic education in the careers of commissioned officers, i.e. after completion of pre-commissioned basic military education. This shift in emphasis is a result of the difference in organisational needs at the different levels. This is a reflection, to put it another way, of what is expected of the individual on the different levels of command from within and outside the military – from an organisational and professional point of view. In the conventional warfighting paradigm, the shift reflects the need to prepare the individual for command in battle, campaign and war as he progresses through his career.




Figure 3.8: The military educational framework

The training and education of officers should also be considered within the framework of the different clusters of knowledge. Four different clusters of knowledge were identified: the security knowledge cluster, the military organisational knowledge cluster, the military professional knowledge cluster, and the military operating knowledge cluster. (See p. 85.) An integration of the four clusters of knowledge and the three levels of military education (See pp. 93 & 94.) make possible the development of a framework for the education of officers. This framework should be viewed within the framework of military training and professional and academic education as outlined above. (See pp. 108 & 109) In fact, an in-depth understanding of the three considerations (the different levels [pp. 93 & 94], the knowledge clusters [p. 85] and the need for training and education [Chapter 2]) require a juxtaposing of Table 3.4 and Figure 3.2.

A number of particular important considerations need to be pointed out. (See Figure 3.8) Firstly, the traditional tension between education and training is particularly noticeable at the lower levels of command where military training is of particular importance, specifically at the pre-commissioned and the tactical doctrinal levels. On the operational doctrinal and the politico-military levels where the educational content dominates, the tension between military training and education is almost non-existent. In addition, the tension between training and education is less prominent where the emphasis is on professional military education rather than on a broad liberal education. This results in a particular high level of tension at the pre-commissioned level where the emphasis needs to be on military training and a broad liberal education.

Secondly, military training, professional education and liberal education are needed in making officers knowledgeable about the different clusters of knowledge, though, the emphasis may differ from cluster to cluster. For example, training may be a very effective tool for introducing officers to, and providing them with insight into, the operating environment. A balance of military training and professional and liberal education may be the best suited to gain expertise in the internal organisational knowledge cluster. Liberal education, though, is the probably the best pathway to knowledge in the external security knowledge cluster.

Lastly, there will always be factors in the military that shove military education away from its focus on security, strategic and defence related matters. A particular danger is a need from the military itself that military education becomes “need- and task-driven”, thus concerning itself mainly with technical and tactical considerations rather than being comprehensive and holistic in nature. In liberal democracies, new ones in particular, militaries will always be faced with societies and

governments emphasising national development and social programmes. There is no reason to question this focus even though it restricts military budgets and very often leads to a bureaucratic emphasis within the armed forces. The end result is an emphasis on business or public administration – the bureaucratic military world – as the central focus in officer education. This usually culminates in what Haycock refers to as a “... lack of command intellect”.¹⁴²

3.4 CONCLUSIONS

This chapter was aimed at finding answers to two specific questions. Firstly, *what* ought to be the focus of academic and professional studies in the quest to master the art and science of war? Secondly, *how* should militaries educate their leadership in order to ensure that they become knowledgeable about the art and science of war – the use of armed force(s)? The answers to these questions should content with two specific considerations:

- the uniqueness of the armed forces and military institutions as well as the unique environments within which they exist and operate; and
- the unique nature of the military’s primary task – the defence of society – if need be through warfighting.

Warfighting, being an art and a science, can only be mastered partially through academic and professional studies. Consequently, in seeking an answer to the questions *what* and *how* to study the art and science of war, the training and experience of armed forces cannot be ignored.

What should officers be studying? The unique nature of the art and science of war justifies almost every conceivable subject in the education of officers. Militaries themselves cannot translate their educational needs into coherent academic areas of focus. Thus, it was argued that armed forces should study at least four core areas:

- security as the defining higher order environment within which armed forces operate;
- the bureaucratic and professional nature of military organisations;
- war as the primary activity of armed forces; and
- the battlefield and other operating environments within which military force are operationalised.

¹⁴² Haycock, RG, *op. cit.*, p. 177.

A broad overview of the educational focus of armed forces from different parts of the world confirms the need to focus on these four core educational requirements.

To ensure that armed force is utilised for strategic effect and that the defence management of a nation, state, region or alliance is done in an efficient and effective manner, military leadership needs to clarify and understand the external context within which it needs to operate. Security is the defining notion in the military's understanding of their external environment. It not only links the military to social, political and economic affairs, but also allows for sub-state, state, trans-state and global consideration thereof. At the most basic theoretical level, security is probably the most important link in the Clausewitzian trinity – linking the military, the government and society. An understanding of security provides officers with a unique understanding of the role of military force in support of society and under instruction of the polity.

Traditionally, foreign threats, military capability and the decision-making capacity of states are at the heart of security. Such an approach does not provide sufficient explanation for the African security problematique. Any armed force who wants to be effective in Africa needs to educate its officers not only in the traditional understanding of security, but also the distinct feature of the African security environment. It is an environment within which states and the military itself are often a central part of the security problematique; within which the social and economic challenges predominate; and within which the role of foreigners is usually destructive. Education is the cardinal means for the development of the sensitivities and needs to ensure successful utilisation of armed forces in such a complex and challenging region.

Education should also provide officers with an understanding of the careful organisational balance between the military as a bureaucracy and the military as a profession. The military educational system should develop officers as military bureaucrats in order to ensure military organisations are well managed and efficient. This is the only way through which the capacity for military force can be developed. Military educational systems should develop officers, however, as military professionals in order to ensure military forces are well led and commanded, and are effective in doing what is required from military force in a strategic context. This is the only way armed forces can ensure strategic effect through the employment of their inherent capability.

As organisations, militaries are also confronted with very unique challenges in the post-modern environment. The most outstanding is the rise to prominence of the need for so-called flexible

forces – dual role militaries – in an era in which the size (and capability) of military forces and budgets is declining. The need for flexible forces is rooted in the increasing utilisation of the military in humanitarian, diplomacy and other missions – generally known as military operations other than war (MOOTW). These missions are executed in view of rising public scepticism and apathy towards the military. In all, these challenges brought to the fore the need for officers to take on the role of *soldier-diplomats* or *soldier-scholars*. The need for *soldier-diplomats* or *soldier-scholars* is rooted in a need for officers to approach the nature of their tasks in a more cognitive manner. The internal management of military organisations is also much more complex since officers have to contend with challenges such as declining budgets and rising operational responsibilities, the outsourcing of certain military capabilities to civilian contractors and professions, and the integration of women, minorities and homosexuals into the military. The academic preparation of officers is in the contemporary era, thus, not something that is in any doubt.

Officers, though, cannot neglect the cognitive preparation for their primary role of warfighting. Militaries in particular should make an effort to steer away from their natural inclination to prepare for battle and to neglect the study of war. This is not supposed to mean that militaries should neglect the training for battle. Instead, the strategic success of the armed forces is as much dependent on the education of its leaders as on the training of those who are led. The education of officers for war should be focused on an understanding of the nature thereof – an understanding of both its tangible and intangible, its mutable and immutable nature. In short, officers should study both the science and the art of war.

On the lower levels of command, a critical holistic understanding of the battlefield and physical operating environments should be the primary focus of officer education. The academic preparation of officers for the operating environment should specifically focus on an understanding and development of tactics and technology; the study of geography, leadership and command; and the importance of cohesion and morale. These are some of the most important elements that underpin a cognitive understanding of military forces on the lower levels of war.

The second question addressed in this chapter concerned the way in which officers should be educated. It was argued that there should be three specific focal points for education in the career path of officers: pre-commissioned basic military education, military doctrinal education and politico-military education. In pre-commissioned basic military education, the focus needs to be on

training and academic education in preparation of a military career. Once the officer has been commissioned, he needs to become an expert on military doctrine. This requires the training of the officer in the tactical doctrine for success in the operating environment and the professional education of the officer in the operational doctrine to prepare him for operational staff or command. The last phase of officer education is the preparation of the officer for high command. At this level, the focus should be on education, particularly academic education, to prepare the officer for the complexities with which he will have to deal with in the politico-military environment. These different focal points in the making of officers made possible a meaningful integration of education, training and experience to equip officers with the necessary expertise needed at specific junctures in their careers.

Furthermore, bringing the *what* to learn and the *how* to learn together, it is possible to develop a useable framework for the education, training and development of officers in armed forces. Such a framework allows for the education of officers at a pre-commissioned level before they are trained, while at a doctrinal level it necessitates the training of members before they begin with professional military education. Through the sequencing of these activities and a focus on the four core educational requirements that were identified, it is believed that the military will receive the “right” product from its educational system. It will be a product that is well educated and trained and also rooted in the ethos, values and norms of the military profession. The question that flows from this is whether the South African National Defence Force makes use of a well-structured educational framework, and if not, what should be done to bring the education, training and development of its officers in line with this particular framework?

CHAPTER 4

THE PHILOSOPHY, STRUCTURE AND NATURE OF EDUCATION, TRAINING AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN NATIONAL DEFENCE FORCE

*I thought it was splendid, excellent.
Thinking back the only thing they didn't teach us much about was soldiering*
Lt Col MRL Grove¹

4.1 INTRODUCTION

In 2004, South Africa celebrated ten years of democracy and the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) looked back on ten years of “defence in a democracy” as outlined in the 1996 White Paper on Defence.² Approved in May 1996, this White Paper aimed, *inter alia*, at the restoration of the military to its rightful place in society. This required the simultaneous implementation of two seemingly divergent notions. The military had to become less prominent in policy-making and societal processes, while at the same time, restore its legitimacy within the South African society. Both these notions are contained in the traditional understanding of military professionalism and embedded in an educated military's understanding of its position and role in a democratic society. This was no easy task as the former South African Defence Force (SADF) featured prominently in the preservation of the policy of apartheid. At the same time, anti-apartheid revolutionary movements such as *Umkhonto we Sizwe* and *Azanian People's Liberation Army* (APLA), who were outspokenly political and ideological instruments in service of revolutionary movements (the ANC and PAC respectively), had to reorient themselves as well.

In the implementation of these notions the South African military had to shift its focus from a force with an offensive posture organised for defence of South Africa's territorial integrity to one with a defensive posture – becoming as Lindy Heinecken puts it, “... a military literally in search of a mission”.³ This shift was rooted in a debate concerning the dichotomy facing the SANDF: to what extent with its limited resources should it be directed towards maintaining the capability to execute the so-called primary function (warfighting), versus the necessity to execute so-called secondary functions (military operations other than war [MOOTW]). This led Heinecken to the

¹ A remark by a British officer reflecting on his military training and education before the Second World War. See French, D, "Officer Education and Training in the British Regular Army, 1919-39", In Kennedy, GC & Nielson, K (eds.), *Military Education: Past, Present, and Future*, Praeger, Westport, 2002, p. 123.

² South African Department of Defence, "Defence in a Democracy", *South African White Paper on Defence*, as approved by Parliament on 14 May 1996, 1 Military Printing Regiment.

question about the most traumatic process for the SANDF since 1994: redesigning the forces to cope with the new strategic environment, or adapting to the new political climate?⁴

Since its inception in 1994, the SANDF has focused almost exclusively on structural issues. This included the integration of pre-1994 belligerent forces into a cohesive defence force, the transformation of the military to reflect the democratic ethos of society, organisational restructuring to fit a declining defence budget, and doctrinal changes to reflect South Africa's new role on the African continent. The doctrinal changes, in particular, were augmented on the basis of a rising need in the SANDF to understand South Africa's new geo-strategic position and role, which included an understanding of Africa, of South Africa's interests and those of its partners in the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) and the African Union (AU), and of the threats to these interests and the constraints on South Africa's ability to deal with the threats. This took place against the background of a realisation of the importance to balance representivity in the SANDF, while retaining expertise and professionalism.

This chapter aims at providing a broad introductory overview of the nature, structure and philosophy of Education, Training and Development (ETD) in the South African National Defence Force. The discussion is introduced with an overview of educational, geo-strategic and policy changes and challenges in South Africa in general and the SANDF in particular. This is followed by an in-depth discussion of the history of education in the South African military in general from both a statutory and non-statutory perspective. The chapter, lastly, provides a broad outline of the process and structure of education in the SANDF at present by making use of the framework presented in the previous chapter. The discussion does not aim at providing an in-depth analysis of the curriculum of the different institutions. Rather, an effort is made to highlight the changes that were made in the curriculum of these institutions since 1994. The chapter concludes with an analysis of (some of) the factors or issues that have driven and influenced ETD in the South African military since 1994.

The discussion serves as a broad background and general introduction for an analysis of the position and role of the South African Military Academy in the next two chapters. The chapter follows the international division of armed forces as consisting of land, maritime and air forces. The South African Medical Service (SAMS) is thus deliberately excluded from the discussion.⁵ The critical approach that is followed throughout the discussion is not intended to be negative.

³ Heinecken, L, "South Africa's Armed forces in Transition: Adapting to the New Strategic and Political Environment", *Society in Transition*, Vol 36, No 1, 2005, p. 2.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 1 & 3.

⁵ Most of the ETD that is done in the SAMS relates to professional education of medical personnel, i.e. doctors and nurses.

Rather, it is believed that the criticism will, as Churchill believed, serve the same function as pain in the sense that it hurts, but more importantly, that it identifies that which needs attention.

4.2 THE SOUTH AFRICAN EDUCATIONAL ENVIRONMENT: DEMARCATING THE CHALLENGE OF EDUCATION, TRAINING AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE SANDF

The history of education in South Africa in general and in the military is complex. During the apartheid era, education in South Africa in general was conditioned by two considerations. The whole system of apartheid, on the one hand, was designed largely to serve the interests of the white minority.⁶ Consequently, the apartheid state "... limit[ed] African education to the needs of the white community",⁷ so-called "gutter education".⁸ A very prominent South African historian, Herman Giliomee, argued that, "... by modernizing the provision of education to the subordinates (*black South Africans*), however incomplete, the apartheid state was sowing the seeds of its own destruction" [emphasis added].⁹ It should, however, also be noted that irrespective of the use of black education for its own purposes, the apartheid state did improve the general educational situation of the South African black population. In 1948, only 24 percent of blacks of school-going age were enrolled in schools compared to 84 percent in 1994. The revolutionaries fighting the apartheid government, on the other hand, used education to mobilise the masses with the idea of liberation before education. Mobilisation of the youth of school-going age was an important part of the internal dimension of the struggle against apartheid. A whole generation of people in the aftermath of the 1976 Soweto riots refused to return to school or attended only intermittently and had difficulty assuring work in the formal economy. This so-called "lost generation" was due to become an (educational) problem for the pre- and post-1994 governments in South Africa.¹⁰

It is thus no wonder that education in South Africa during the first ten years of democracy was one of the most controversial (political) issues in society as the government tried to give as great a proportion as possible of the South African society access to quality education. This transformation was undertaken against an international change in student populations that was seen as a revolution in itself. Indeed, the traditional character and culture of higher education world-wide changed dramatically over the last decade or more. The digital revolution and globalisation created for the first time a new world of education and knowledge without borders.

⁶ Meredith, M, *The State of Africa: A History of Fifty Years of Independence*, Jonathan Ball, Johannesburg, 2005, p. 647.

⁷ Ibid., p. 419.

⁸ Giliomee, H, *The Afrikaners: Biography of a People*, Tafelberg, Cape Town, 2003, p. 509.

⁹ Ibid., p. 507.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 613.

Together with the lifting of academic sanctions against South Africa, these trends provided new momentum to change. In South Africa, these changes were brought about without any serious or major (racial) turbulence on any of its campuses.¹¹

The post-1994 government inherited a fragmented educational system based on race, ethnicity and language. South Africa had a scientific system of relative high quality with South African academics and scientists respected internationally. The system was, however, mainly directed towards the social well-being of white South Africans in general and defence research in particular. There was an urgent need in the educational sphere since 1994 to redeploy, re-equip, re-plan, and reconstruct.¹² Since 1994, the trend has been towards the reintegration of South African higher education with global trends. Key milestones have been the publication of the report of the National Commission on Higher Education in 1996¹³, the White Paper¹⁴ and Higher Education Act of 1997¹⁵, and the release of the National Plan for Higher Education in 2001.¹⁶ The 1997 White Paper and Higher Education Act of 1997 form the basis for the creation of a single, national, co-ordinated system of education instead of the 15 independent structures under apartheid.¹⁷

Jansen, however, pointed out that managerial, cultural, behavioural, and symbolic changes in the South African educational system needed to be balanced with the necessity for universities to be world-class research institutions embedded in a curriculum and culture that is global, inclusive and competitive in orientation towards national, regional and continental developmental problems.¹⁸ Smit argues that sound educational policies were not always producing the required outcomes: “Gebrek aan ervaring en kapasiteit het egter veroorsaak dat die komplekse beleidsvoorstelle, sterk uit die buiteland beïnvloed en deur intellektuele burekrate ontwerp, moeilik toegepas word”.¹⁹ The idea of outcome-based education seems to be a good example in this regard.

¹¹ Smit, F, “Hoër Onderwys kry A’s en E’s. Baie Vernuwung, Maar Oorhastige Besluite Rig Skade Aan”, *Die Burger*, 5 March 2005, p. 15.

¹² De Vries, A, “SA Skole sal so moet herskik, herbeplan”, *Rapport*, Vol 36, No 29, 17 July 2005, p. 4.

¹³ South African Ministry of Education, National Commission on Higher Education, *Report: A Framework for Transformation*, HSRC Publications, Pretoria, 1996.

¹⁴ South African Ministry of Education, *White Paper on Higher Education Transformation*, Pretoria, 1996.

¹⁵ South African Ministry of Education, *Higher Education Act No. 101 of 1997*, Government Gazette No. 18515, Notice 1655, Government Printers, Pretoria, 19 December 1997.

¹⁶ South African Ministry of Education, *National Plan for Higher Education*, Pretoria, 2001.

¹⁷ South African Ministry of Education, *Higher Education Act No. 101 of 1997*, Government Gazette No. 18515, Notice 1655, Government Printers, Pretoria, 19 December 1997.

¹⁸ Jansen, J, “Die Verhaal van Twee Kampusse – Een Wit, die Ander Swart”, *Rapport Perspektief*, 6 March 2005, p. vi.

¹⁹ Smit, F, “Hoër Onderwys kry A’s en E’s. Baie Vernuwung, Maar Oorhastige Besluite Rig Skade Aan”, *op. cit.*

Changes in the higher education and scientific systems had to be directed towards the main objectives of transformation: creating a better standard of living for all the inhabitants of South Africa and raising the country's international competitiveness. The need to give a greater number of South Africans from disadvantaged societies access to higher education was probably the biggest driver in the transformation process. By 2000 the percentage of black students attending university has risen from 32 percent of the total number of university students in South Africa in 1990, to 60 percent. At technicons²⁰, it changed from 32 percent in 1990 to 72 percent in 2000. The number of white students decreased with 60 000 between 1993 and 1999. This figure is even higher for 1994. However, it is an open question whether these changes were brought about through governmental policy measures or through the initiatives of educational institutions themselves. Some academics are of the opinion that the higher educational institutions contributed more to these changes than did government policy.²¹ In addition, these figures were augmented through a natural progression of students from previous disadvantaged (black) educational institutions to the traditional white institutions that were seen as having a higher standard of education.

Financial challenges – the need to do more with less – were also one of the primary drivers behind the restructuring of education and the provision of specifically higher education. Financial considerations were linked to two very specific questions concerning higher education in South Africa: firstly, to what extent should higher education be of a general formative nature (*algemeen vormende aard*) and, secondly, should universities be responsible for vocational-oriented courses (*beroepsgerigte kursusse*)?²² This is precisely the challenge that militaries face in the education of their personnel. Needless to say that in society in general vocational-oriented education is demand- and market-driven. However, academics in the more traditional formative sciences – languages, history, philosophy, mathematics – are increasingly concerned about the “de-scientification” of universities. Burger,²³ for example, argued that the monetary value of knowledge became increasingly more important with the academic freedom associated with universities under pressure and being questioned. In the long run this emphasised the need for research that is of immediate value and utility – so-called contract research – at tertiary institutions. Thus, he warns, research will in future only be directed at those with money to make even more money. The course content at universities similarly will be determined through the interest of those with money.

²⁰ All the technicons in South African have been transformed over the last four years into what is now known as Universities of Technology.

²¹ Ibid.

²² De Vries, A, “Eers Huiswerk, Dán Studeer”, *Rapport*, 23 October 2005, p. 19.

²³ Burger, W, “Strewe na Wins nie Universiteit se Doel”, *Rapport Perspektief*, 20 February 2005, p. i.

All these changes did not necessarily create a more effective educational system in South Africa. Smit specifically points out that the South African research output is declining with a rise in the research output of academics older than 50. This, he argues, is the result of a number of factors including a rising lecturing burden for academics, a general brain drain from South Africa in general since the early 1990s, salary handicaps that result in more academic personnel doing contract research, research of questionable quality being done by some academics, and a number of specifically young white academics who do not see a future for themselves in the South African academic and scientific environment. Since 1992, South Africa has dropped 19 places on the world competitive index with the country's contribution to scientific journals that was surpassed by 12 other countries. No other country in the world has seen such a decline.²⁴

The number of participating registered students in the higher education system as a percentage of the total number of the population aged 20 to 24 has declined from 17 percent in 1993 to 16 percent in 2000. The target of 20 percent that the South African government has set for itself has not been reached. The ability to keep students in the system has also declined. Approximately 40 percent of all first-year students fail while only 15 percent of all students graduate annually. If the target of 20 percent graduation is reached, 30 000 more students will graduate from the system. The objective of directing more students towards science, engineering and technology is not reached, with only 26 percent of all students graduating from these fields of study. More than 52 percent of all students still graduate from human science fields of study while unemployment of graduates has become a new phenomenon in the South African labour market. This is especially true of graduates from the historically black universities in South Africa.²⁵

A recent research report prepared for the Council of Higher Education noted that contemporary South African higher education has lost some of its notoriously unique characteristics that defined it during the apartheid era. While the major post-apartheid challenges of access and equity remain, current South African debates about educational governance mirror the issues that are currently more generally in higher education and, in particular, the concern to develop appropriate models of governance at the institutional level, and appropriate relationships between the state and the higher education sector as a whole.²⁶

²⁴ Smit, F, "Verdwyn SA agter Internasionale Wetenskap Horison?", *Die Burger*, 8 Desember 2004, p. 15.

²⁵ Smit, F, "Hoër Onderwys kry A's en E's. Baie Vernuwing, Maar Oorhastige Besluite Rig Skade Aan", op. cit.

²⁶ Hall, M, Symes, A and Luescher, TM, Governance in South African Higher Education, Research Report Prepared for the Council on Higher Education, May 2002, p. 22. Available at <http://che.ac.za/documents/d000006/Governance_Research_Report.pdf> [29 January 2007]

In this regard, it is important to emphasise the role of education in the broader South African society as it relates to education in the military. Education plays a fundamental role in the interplay between the military and the broader society. As Showalter²⁷ explains, education provides credibility at all levels of society at large as a mark of merit. In short, education in the SANDF – and with that the role of the military as an educator – underpins the standing of the military in the eyes of the broader South African society. This is an extremely important notion in South Africa, since unequal access to jobs and education and, consequently, extreme levels of income inequality were among the defining characteristics of apartheid.²⁸ As a result, the provision of military education will determine the success of the SANDF in the same manner that the provision of education in general is at the heart of a successful New South Africa.

4.3 EDUCATING THE SANDF WITHIN A CHANGING GEO-STRATEGIC AND POLICY ENVIRONMENT

From a politico-strategic perspective, the world has been transformed over the last two decades. The end of the Cold War and the 9/11 attacks stand out as defining moments ushering in eras of rethinking and reorientating security. New technology has accelerated globalisation, while regionalism has offered new alternatives for states in the international arena. New threats have emerged, expanding the continuum of conflict. The demise of superpower influence and the end of apartheid in Africa have removed ideological boundaries, producing fertile circumstances for power struggles along tribal, ethical and religious grounds. Wars over resources and warlordism have risen to prominence. Thus, intra-state conflicts with surprisingly little inter-state conflict still characterise the battlefields of the African continent.²⁹

As in most new democracies, the first democratic government in South Africa has had to deal with a vast array of problems. Very few, if any, of these problems were of a military nature. South Africa did not face any significant traditional direct (military) threat from either the international or domestic environment. South African political, security and strategic thought and approaches therefore tended to be idealistic in nature. There was a deliberate effort to steer away from a more competitive, realist, nationalistic outlook on domestic and international

²⁷ Showalter, DE, "No Officer Rather Than a Bad Officer': Officer Selection and Education in the Prussian/German Army, 1715-1945", In: Kennedy, GC & Nielson, K (eds.), *Military Education: Past, Present, and Future*, Praeger, Westport, 2002, p. 56.

²⁸ Handley, A, "The New South Africa, a Decade Later", *Current History*, Vol 103, No 673, May 2004, p. 196.

²⁹ See the discussion of these so-called "new wars" in Snow, DM, *Uncivil Wars: International Security and the New Internal Conflicts*, Lynne Rienner, London, 1996.

security affairs.³⁰ Ferreira and Henk specifically point out that South Africa has strenuously eschewed any appearance of unilateralism in the use of its military forces and that the country has gone the “extra mile” to depict itself as a cooperative regional partner.³¹ Such an approach is understandable, given apartheid South Africa’s history of the securocratisation³² and militarisation of society and the cancerous role of the apartheid government’s security forces in the region.³³

A great number of policy documents outlining the government’s approach in dealing with security and military affairs have been produced since 1994. Most noticeable are the White Papers on Defence, Defence Related Industries in South Africa, and South African Participation in International Peace Missions. These documents were created in the aftermath of the publication of the 1993 and 1994 annual Human Development Reports of the United Nations Development Programme that promulgated the “human security” paradigm.³⁴ The idea of human security was quickly embraced by a South Africa in search of a new security paradigm. As a result, most of the South African security-related policy documents were rooted in the idea of human security in general and non-offensive defence or non-threatening defence in particular.³⁵ This actually translates into a human security approach domestically and a collaborative security approach externally.³⁶ These notions, Ferreira and Henk argues, direct attention away from the military and other traditional security instruments towards those that most directly promote development, opportunity and well-being of local communities and individual citizens.³⁷

It is, however, important to note that it is extremely difficult to “operationalise” human and collaborative security and to translate such complex, ambitious concepts into policy that

³⁰ Esterhuysen, AJ, "Ten Years of Democracy and the Return of Bad Times: Studying Security, Strategic and Military Affairs in South Africa", *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol 29, No 3, December 2005, pp. 148-149.

³¹ Ferreira, R & Henk, D, *Military Implications of Human Security: The Case of South Africa*, Paper presented to the 45th Anniversary Biennial International Conference of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces & Society, Chicago, 21 October 2005, p. 27.

³² Every conceivable aspect of the daily life of average South African citizens was linked to an influence by the (military) security situation and sector in South Africa.

³³ The book by Chris Alden provides an excellent in-depth analysis of the securocratisation and militarisation of the South African society in the 1970s and 1980s. See Alden, C, *Apartheid’s Last Stand: The Rise and Fall of the South African Security State*, Macmillan Press, London, 1998.

³⁴ United Nations, *Human Development Report*, United Nations Development Program, 1993. Available at: <http://undp.org/hdro/93.htm> [12 October 2005]; United Nations, *Human Development Report*, United Nations Development Program, 1994. Available at: <http://undp.org/hdro/94.htm> [12 October 2005]

³⁵ Jordaan, E, “South African Defence Since 1994: Practising what we do not Preach”, Paper presented at the *4th War and Society in Africa Conference* presented at the South African Military Academy, Saldanha, 4-6 September 2003.

³⁶ Cawthra, G, “Security Governance in South Africa”, *African Security Review*, Vol 14, No 3, 2005, p. 96.

³⁷ Ferreira, R & Henk, D, op. cit., p. 1.

mobilises institutions, instruments and sectors.³⁸ Thus, even in a scenario where human security seems to be the overarching organising idea, military power maintains its characteristic as the last option instrument of security. This line of reasoning most probably explains the recognition by the South African government that, irrespective of its very idealistic policy outlook on peace and security, "bad times will return".³⁹ The underlying argument is that even peace has to be secured on a war-torn continent like Africa and that the best way to do this is to have a professional, competent military force at hand. As Gray points out, there are rare occasions when force, and only force, can satisfy the security needs of a nation. This view is closely linked to the German view that you always have an army on your soil – either your own or someone else's. From this perspective, armed forces are like an airbag in your car – generally unneeded but life-preserving on that one day in a thousand when the peril is truly acute.⁴⁰ This need for and role of well-prepared professional military forces in society are not always well understood in Africa.⁴¹

It is also critical for the New South Africa to recognise the importance of understanding, articulating and debating the complexities of security, strategic, defence and military affairs in a democratic society – especially if security is structured around such an ambiguous notion like human security. Underlying this notion is the importance of a public discourse on security, defence and military matters guided by informed assumptions. In any democratic society, new ones like South Africa in particular, this is an especially important notion, since it is driven by the need to foster a culture of transparency, and of free and open debate on security, defence and military matters. Such a debate is in itself an important component of the human security agenda. Not only should the military be an important locus of such a discourse, it should also be an active participant in the debate. The record that the SANDF has built up in this regard over the last ten years is not very positive.⁴²

The South African Constitution, adopted by Parliament on 8 May 1996, identifies education in the preamble as a national imperative by indicating that one of the purposes of the constitution

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Gray, CS, "Villains, Victims, and Sheriffs: Strategic Studies and the Security for an Interwar Period", *Comparative Strategy*, Vol 13, p. 360.

⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 354.

⁴¹ Bjorn Moller of the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (COPRI) outlined this problem in Africa while speaking to students at the South African Military Academy on 15 April 2003. Also see the discussion of "undermilitarisation" in Africa in Martin, ML, "Operational Weakness and Political Activism: The Military in Sub-Saharan Africa", In: Lovell, JP & Albright, DE, *To Sheathe the Sword: Civil-Military Relations in the Quest for Democracy*, Greenwood Press, London, 1997, pp. 81-98 and Howe, HM, *Ambiguous Order: Military Forces in African States*, Lynne Rienner, London, 2001, pp. 27-71.

is to "... improve the quality of life of all citizens and free the potential of each person". Chapter 11 dictates that "[t]he security services must act, and *must teach*⁴³ and require their members to act in accordance with the Constitution and the Law, including customary international law and international agreements binding on the Republic" [emphasis added].⁴⁴ The Constitution also states that the SANDF should be structured and managed as a disciplined force. Its primary object is to defend and protect the Republic, its territorial integrity and its people in accordance with the Constitution and the principles of international law. It is obvious that the Constitution requires SANDF members to have a higher order understanding of their operating environment than that which is normally provided through training. This includes *inter alia* an understanding of the Constitution itself, an in-depth knowledge of South Africa and its people, and geo-strategic insights into national and international laws that govern South Africa as part of the global union of nations.

The 1996 South African White Paper on Defence was titled "Defence in a Democracy".⁴⁵ The title itself provides some indication of what is expected from the SANDF in general and its officer cadre in particular: a higher order comprehension of both the ideas of defence and democracy and how these two concepts relate to one another. This is only possible if the officer corps is educated in a holistic understanding of both notions and of what is required in order to operationalise these notions within the South African military. The South African White Paper on Defence, under a heading titled "Education and Training", also indicates that education and training are cardinal means of building and maintaining a high level of professionalism in the armed forces.⁴⁶ The White Paper furthermore stipulates that the SANDF should be capable of executing its tasks effectively and efficiently. The need for the SANDF to be a well-educated armed force is implicit in these provisions. The use of the words "effective" and "efficient" in the military context is also important since it highlights the bureaucratic and the professional nature of the South African military (see Chapter 3). The stipulation in the South African White Paper on Defence therefore emphasises the need for bureaucratic and professional military education in the SANDF as a policy imperative.

⁴² Esterhuysen, AJ, "The South African Armed Forces and the Media: A Difficult Marriage?" in Ionescu, ME, *War, Military and the Media from Gutenberg to Today*, Military Printing House, Bucharest, 2004, pp. 147-148.

⁴³ It is interesting that in the Afrikaans translation of the Constitution the word "teach" is translated as "oplei". Normally "teach" is translated as "opvoed" and "train" as "oplei." The official Afrikaans translation of this section reads as follows: "Die veiligheidsdienste moet optree, en moet hul lede oplei en van hul vereis om op te tree, ooreenkomstig die Grondwet en die reg, met inbegrip van die volkeregterlik gewoontereg en internasionale ooreenkomste wat die Republiek bind".

⁴⁴ South African Government, *Constitution of the Republic of South Africa*, Act 108 of 1996, As adopted on 8 May 1996 and amended on 11 October 1996 by the Constitutional Assembly, Section 199(5).

⁴⁵ "Defence in a Democracy", op. cit.

To a large extent, the White Paper on Defence also laid the foundation for the role of the military in South Africa's foreign policy, i.e. foreign policy largely demarcates the responsibilities of the armed forces of a country.⁴⁷ This means that an analysis of the foreign policy of a country may provide a good indication of what its military should prepare for, as well as how and for what it should educate and train.

Since 1994, the South African foreign policy in general was rooted in a quest for a truly African identity on account of its role in the post-apartheid era and in a search for a sense of belonging and legitimacy on the African continent. This gave rise to a broad range of Afro-centric foreign policies and the SANDF being an instrument for the enhancement of South Africa's influence and prestige on the continent. The enhanced credibility serves as "... a great source of political leverage on the continental bargaining table".⁴⁸ This manifests itself *inter alia* in South Africa being named as the seat for the African Parliament, South Africa playing a prominent role in the African Union, and in support for South Africa's bid for a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council. These initiatives were backed by South African endeavours to create peace and stability on a war-torn continent and were rooted in South Africa's belief that a strong and safe Africa will translate in its own strength and safety.

President Thabo Mbeki, like Nelson Mandela before him, personified South African foreign policy.⁴⁹ In international affairs, Nathan argues, Mbeki is as much an ideologist as a pragmatist. Ideologically, Mbeki's outlook is rooted in three paradigms: democracy, Africanism and anti-imperialism. Lathan argues that the Africanist and anti-imperialist paradigms are seldom if ever in conflict with one another. However, it is maintained that both these notions are often in conflict with the democratic paradigm, and in most cases democracy falls by the wayside if tension arises.⁵⁰ The decision to become involved in Lesotho, Burundi and the DRC but not in Zimbabwe, is a prime example of such an inconsistency. An emphasis on conflict-resolution, peacekeeping, good governance, and the promotion of national interests conditioned foreign policy under Mbeki from a more pragmatic realist perspective.⁵¹ It was these more practical

⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 10.

⁴⁷ Huntington, SP, "The Two Worlds of Military Policy", In Horton, FB, Rogerson, AC & Warner, EL (eds.), *Comparative Defence Policy*, John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1974, pp. 107-110 provides a comprehensive overview of this argument.

⁴⁸ Motsi, I, "Peace Support Missions: Opportunity and Risk?", *CIPS Electronic Briefing Paper No 23/2005*, Centre for International Political Studies, University of Pretoria, 2005, pp. 1-2.

⁴⁹ Some commentators even compare him to Field Marshal Jan Smuts, South African Prime Minister during the Second World War who, some believe, lost the 1948 elections in South Africa because of his prominence as a world leader and lack of interest for domestic problems and politics. See for example Gumede, WM, "Mbeki Loop die Gevaarpad van Jan Smuts", *Die Burger*, 26 July 2005.

⁵⁰ Nathan, L, "Consistency and Inconsistencies in South African Foreign Policy", *International Affairs*, Vol 81, No 2, 2005, p. 363.

⁵¹ Cawthra, G, "Security Governance in South Africa", op. cit., p. 96.

features of the South African foreign policy that conditioned the SANDF's external involvement in Africa in particular.

It is clear from South African foreign policy initiatives that the demands placed on the leaders of the SANDF since its inception has grown in scope and intensity. These demands extend well beyond the traditional responsibility of preparing forces for and executing combat and other types of operations. Since 1994, the SANDF has had to deal with unique internal structural and external strategic challenges. Yet, the history of the post-apartheid period in South and Southern Africa has reinforced the need for military officers who are not only technically and tactically proficient, but also well versed in strategy, history, geo-politics and, in particular, in the complex cultures and politics of the African continent. In broad, the higher order policy environment confronted the SANDF from an educational perspective with two particular sets of simultaneous challenges, namely –

- the need to promote greater representivity and therefore to accommodate a larger and more diverse student population; and
- the need for a well balanced, modern, affordable and technologically advanced military force, capable of executing a wide range of tasks effectively and efficiently in a very fluid (human?) security environment like the African continent.⁵²

4.4 THE HISTORICAL LEGACIES OF EDUCATION IN THE INTEGRATED ARMED FORCES: A DISDAIN FOR EDUCATION

No comprehension of ETD in the SANDF is possible without taking note of the history of education in the old South African military and in the guerrilla forces that were brought together in the new South African military. This discussion aims at giving a brief exposition of education in these forces as well as the need for education in the SANDF since 1994.

4.4.1 Education in the South African Defence Force

The Union Defence Force (1912-1961) and the South African Defence Force (1961-1994) were born out of the struggle for political and cultural domination between the two white races in South Africa – the Afrikaners (Boers) and the English. The widely divergent military traditions of the English and the Afrikaners had to be reconciled in thinking, organisation and training in the

⁵² South African Department of Defence, *An Appreciation for Chief of Joint Training on Tertiary Education in the Department of Defence*, Military Academy, MA/R/501/6/1, 26 May 1998.

development of these forces.⁵³ The organisational culture of the Union and the South African Defence Force (SADF) was, thus, an interesting blend of British military regimentalism and Boer frontierism. By 1994, the SADF was the largest, most up-to-date, and most organisationally sophisticated military force in Southern Africa.⁵⁴ The collective memory of this force was shaped primarily by its participation in three wars – the First and Second World Wars and in what in South Africa became known as the “Border War”.⁵⁵ However, the military were employed within the country’s borders on various occasions since the early 1960s and almost permanently since the early 1980s. It conducted these operations with reluctance and saw the South African Police as the primary actor in this drama. The SADF was strongly influenced by the French experience, specifically in Algeria, and it can be argued that the military was afraid of political contamination through participation in internal operations.⁵⁶ In the 1970s and 1980s, the SADF as an organisation focused primarily on what it considered to be its focus of main effort – the external campaign against the ANC, the counter-insurgency campaign in Namibia, and its conventional operations in support of UNITA⁵⁷ in Angola.

The military nonetheless featured very prominently in sustaining the apartheid system and, though it was professional and effective by international standards, became politically contaminated. The SADF employed non-whites in various roles. Its leaders, however, in general were unwilling to mobilise the non-white South African majority to fight the country’s regional and internal wars. The idea of part-time soldiering (the nation-in-arms concept), characteristic of most frontier societies in the world, was an important part of the history of the white (Afrikaner) population and determined to a large extent the composition of the SADF. Hence, structurally the SADF was organised around part-time, (possibly better educated) white regimentalised citizen-soldiers. Huge numbers of university graduates were conscripted each year, while senior academics, industrialists and business people served in the reserve force regiments and commandoes – mostly in a leadership capacity. This interaction with the broader

⁵³ Visser, GE, "British Influence on Military Training and Education in South Africa: The Case of the South African Military Academy and its Predecessors", *South African Historical Journal*, Vol 46, May 2002, pp. 63-64.

⁵⁴ Winkates J, "The Transformation of the South African National Defence Force: A Good Beginning", *Armed Forces & Society*, Vol 26, No 3, Spring 2000, p. 452.

⁵⁵ The counter-insurgency campaign by the SADF in the northern border regions of South West Africa/Namibia during the 1970s and 1980s, as well as its support to UNITA in the Angolan civil war, was referred to by the general public in South Africa as the Border War with the conscripts doing duty “on the border.”

⁵⁶ It is a well-known fact that the two officers who were primarily responsible for the SADF’s strategic conception from the 1960s onwards (Genls CF Fraser and MA. de M Malan) were strongly influenced by the French. Fraser served as military attaché in Paris while Malan visited Algeria in the 1960s. The writings of the French military theorist, Andre Beaufré, eventually became very influential in shaping apartheid security thinking. See for example Seegers, A, *The Military and the Making of South Africa*, Tauris Academic Studies, London, 1996. p. 133.

well-educated part of the South African society positively influenced the intellectual organisational climate in the SADF in general.⁵⁸

This, however, was truncated by another characteristic of frontier societies – the can-do mentality. In the SADF, this characteristic was institutionalised through the well-known Afrikaans notion of “'n boer maak 'n plan”.⁵⁹ The influence of well-educated reserve forces with a can-do mentality had a profound defining influence on the organisational culture and climate of the SADF. The can-do mentality emphasising training and experience in particular transformed the SADF into a very tactically and operationally minded force.

In general, education in the SADF was seen as a “nice to have”. Education was never an integral part of the career paths of its officers. The SADF, in essence, was a warfighting force with an emphasis on operational and tactical matters,⁶⁰ or, as Seegers explains, “military experience counted more than intellectual or staff ability” and “the action was in the line”.⁶¹ The SADF favoured tactical training and experience. Only a few members of the SADF (the generals sitting on the State Security Council, in particular) involved themselves with the broader political, strategic and economic challenges of the apartheid state. For the greater part of the SADF it was a matter of focusing on the immediate operational and tactical challenges with which it was confronted. Indeed, it can be argued that this attitude was reflected in the findings of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa. The SADF, in short, had no real culture of military education. Visser, for example, points out that by June 1991 only about 37% of the SADF officers with the rank of Brigadier General and higher were graduates of the Military Academy and very few had any post-graduate qualifications.⁶² The Military Academy did not even offer a course in strategy until 1991. In fact, no military-related subjects were compulsory for any student at the Military Academy.⁶³ This made it possible to graduate from the Academy without any military-related education – almost like a medical school where

⁵⁷ *Uniao Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola*. The Angolan resistance movement formed in 1966 under the leadership of Jonas Savimbi.

⁵⁸ Anon, “A People’s Army”, *Armed Forces*, Vol 2, No 12, Dec 1977, p. 20.

⁵⁹ Translated directly it means ‘a farmer makes a plan’. *Umkhonto we Sizwe* and other revolutionary armies often referred to the white population in general and the SADF in particular as “the boers” – the farmers. Seen from this perspective, the notion of “'n boer maak 'n plan’ can be translated literally into “the SADF makes a plan”.

⁶⁰ Esterhuyse, AJ, “Management and Command in the SANDF: Changing Priorities”, *Strategic Review for Southern Africa*, Vol XXVI, No 1, May 2004, pp. 47-48.

⁶¹ Seegers, A, op. cit., p. 141.

⁶² Visser, GE, op. cit., p. 81.

⁶³ Subjects with a military or military-related content that are presented at the Military Academy include, *inter alia*, Military History, Military Strategy, Military Technology, and Nautical Science.

graduates have not received any medical education! Officers in the SADF who were seen as being too academically inclined were considered unsuitable for command positions.⁶⁴

It is interesting to note that the well-known South African military commentator, Helmoed-Römer Heitman, published an article in *Militaria* in 1980 titled "Is the Army Literate?"⁶⁵ Heitman concluded that the SADF neither read nor wrote and that it was suffering from mental stagnation. He identified three possible reasons for officers in the SADF neither reading nor writing:

- the bureaucratic process to obtain security clearance for anything that was written;
- the absence of suitable local military journals; and
- the absence of any professional, financial or other form of incentive.

In the end, the emphasis on training and experience in the SADF, together with a can-do mentality, resulted in a very tactically minded force, even to the extent that regular officers in general were politically very naive.⁶⁶ It can be argued that such an approach suited the strategic purposes of the time.⁶⁷ However, since the officers did not read or write, professional (military) knowledge was not widely shared within and outside the SADF and, in fact, had very little depth. One analyst, for example, pointed out that officers in the SADF "... spent far more time discussing the sport field than the battlefield".⁶⁸ Moorcraft in particular argues that there was "... a dearth of competent strategic studies specialists in South Africa" during that time. He compares South Africa with Israel, a country whose security also did not allow for much manoeuvring during the 1980s but where strategic studies specialists flourished.⁶⁹

4.4.2 Education of the non-statutory forces that fought the apartheid state

What about the non-statutory forces⁷⁰ that fought the apartheid state's military machine and became part of the SANDF after 1994? Most of these non-statutory forces came from a

⁶⁴ Seegers, A, op. cit., p. 141.

⁶⁵ Heitman, H, "Is the Army Literate?", *Militaria*, Vol 10, No 1, 1980, p. 48.

⁶⁶ A senior South African Army general expressed this view. He rose to the rank of colonel in the SADF. Interviewed at the Military Academy, 7 Dec 2004.

⁶⁷ Discussion with a senior South African Navy Officer, Johannesburg, 2 June 2005.

⁶⁸ Engelbrecht, L, "'Going Ballistic' – The SANDF Six Years On", *Defence Systems Daily*, 21 August 2000. Available at <<http://defence-data.co/features/fpage40.htm>> [15 November 2005]

⁶⁹ Moorcraft, PL, *African Nemesis: War and Revolution in Southern Africa, 1945-2010*, Brassey's, London, 1990, See footnote 16 on p. 181 of the article.

⁷⁰ None of the forces that fought the apartheid state were part of a bureaucratized professional statutory armed force. They were the armed wings of political movements: *Umkhonto we Sizwe* (MK), the armed wing of the ANC; the Azanian People's Liberation Army (APLA), the armed wing of the PAC;

revolutionary environment. Revolutionary wars by nature necessitate a political and strategic orientation. Revolutionaries do not become politically and strategically minded through training and tactical experience in warfighting. World-wide and throughout history, revolutionary armies have been known for their political education or rather political indoctrination. Liebenberg, for example, argues that revolutionary soldiers do not only "... have a broader understanding of the political world" but they are also "... more analytical, creative, adaptive, and pragmatic".⁷¹ This was indeed the case in South Africa. However, given that military expertise is the result of the interplay between military experience, training and education, military education – through political indoctrination – alone does not epitomise real professional military knowledge.

The ideological basis of the struggle against apartheid included a strong element of Marxism that was reinforced by training in communist countries.⁷² The non-statutory forces who were integrated into the SANDF were highly politicised⁷³ and very "streetwise".⁷⁴ For decades, part of their ingrained culture had been to resist, defy, test, protest and challenge official authority. Thus, questions should be asked about their military training, expertise and experience. Some of these forces were trained and (in some cases) educated in various places in the world.⁷⁵ This provided them with a broader worldview than most of their colleagues from the SADF. A senior officer from one of the armed forces of the former Warsaw Pact though pointed out that these countries did not always have a clear understanding of what kind of military training to give to these cadres from Africa. The result was, he explained, that they concentrated in most cases on the political indoctrination of these forces.⁷⁶

Meredith maintains that the value of the armed struggle against the apartheid state was rooted in its high propaganda value aimed at re-establishing a political following among the black population and raising its morale. Though it may be that Meredith confuses the aim of the struggle with its outcome, he nonetheless argues that the purpose of the armed struggle was

the KwaZulu Self-Protection Force (KZSPF), the armed wing of Inkatha. Since 1994, these forces are referred to as the "non-statutory forces".

⁷¹ Liebenberg, I, "The Integration of the Military in Post-Liberation South Africa: The Contribution of Revolutionary Armies", *Armed Forces & Society*, Vol 24, No 1, Fall 1997, p. 107.

⁷² Higgs, JA, "Creating the South African National Defence Force", *Joint Forces Quarterly*, No 25, Summer 2000, p. 48.

⁷³ Heineken, L, "South Africa's Postmodern Military: Adapting to the New Strategic and Political Environment", Paper presented at the First Cranfield University International Conference on Defence Management, Cranfield University, Shrivenham, United Kingdom, 24-25 April 2003, p. 10.

⁷⁴ Interview with senior SA Army general at the Military Academy, 7 Dec 2004.

⁷⁵ Twenty-three nations hosted non-statutory force training, from nearby Lesotho to the Soviet Union and Cuba. See Higgs, JA, op. cit., p. 48.

⁷⁶ Conversation with Maj Gen (ret.) Dr Mihail E. Ionescu, Director of the Romanian Institute for Political Studies and Defence and Military History, Madrid, Spain, 24 August 2005.

not to threaten the South African economy or white security.⁷⁷ Consequently, Crocker argues, the ANC's "armed struggle" never amounted to anything more than a costly inconvenience to the security forces of the apartheid state. This inconvenience, Crocker maintains, was gradually eliminated during the course of the 1980s.⁷⁸ Alden, thus, describes the armed struggle against the apartheid regime as nothing more than a campaign of "armed propaganda."⁷⁹ The reality of the military struggle against the apartheid state was rooted in the difficulty of confronting the (relative effective) apartheid military machine and its offensive approach in which the SADF tried to take the fight to foreign soil – South Africa's neighbouring states to be specific. There should, thus, be serious doubts about the real tactical warfighting experience of the majority of the non-statutory force members who were integrated into the SANDF. It is accepted, though, that some non-statutory force members were trained and gained tactical experience in fighting revolutionary wars in places like Angola.

Perlmutter and Bennet explain the challenge that revolutionary forces, like the non-statutory forces that were integrated into the SANDF, pose to a professional armed force:

The dilemma of the military in postrevolutionary times is that the revolutionary soldiers must be politically disarmed and professionally re-armed. The transition for revolutionary soldiers is difficult, especially for those officers who become romantic and nostalgic for the heady revolutionary days. Soldiers, like party ideologists who find themselves bored and impatient with the mundane chores of government, become political liabilities for the regime. On the whole, government finds alternative roles for them; but if they insist on continued military service, they must submit to the professionalization and routinization process that engulfs the military in the postrevolutionary period. Ideally, the postrevolutionary army should become routinized, depoliticized, and professionalized.⁸⁰

The revolutionary forces' lack of knowledge and experience of the nature and functioning of a bureaucratized military was recognised by the ANC's *Umkhonto we Sizwe* when they began their discussions and negotiations with the SADF after the disbanding of the ANC in 1990. This was, for example, one of the primary reasons for the creation of the Military Research Group (MRG) before 1994. As Cawthra points out, the MRG filled the need in the ANC in terms of a

⁷⁷ Meredith, M, *The State of Africa: A History of Fifty Years of Independence*, Jonathan Ball, Johannesburg, 2005, p. 426.

⁷⁸ Crocker, CA, *High Noon in Southern Africa: Making Peace in a Rough Neighborhood*, Jonathan Ball Publishers, Johannesburg, 1992, p. 309.

⁷⁹ Alden, C, op. cit., p. 92.

defence transformation planning capacity and many of its recommendations were used (almost verbatim) in negotiations with the SADF and government, for ANC conferences and, after the ANC came to power, for policy documents.⁸¹ Furthermore, *Umkhonto we Sizwe's* inclination to consider anyone a member who claimed to be so, baffled the bureaucratized military planners of the SADF/SANDF.⁸² This bureaucratic impecuniousness was also clearly evident from the inability of the revolutionary forces to produce a Certified Personnel Register in 1993, although, it should be added that, for obvious political and other reasons they were probably reluctant to place such a register in the hands of the South African military of the time.⁸³ Frankel in addition points out that *Umkhonto we Sizwe* did not have the "administrative capacity" to provide full details of its arms – stored or hidden – whilst it also accepted the strategic planning process in use by the SANF.⁸⁴ In fact, Cawthra argues it will be more correct to talk about the absorption of the guerrilla forces into the bureaucratized South African military than to talk about the integration of the different forces into one statutory armed force. These forces had problems accommodating themselves to a conventional (bureaucratized) armed force.⁸⁵

To conclude, the argument by Perlmutter and Bennet was as true of the non-statutory forces in South Africa as it is for any other revolutionary soldiers. Indeed, some analysts are of the opinion that most of the non-statutory forces personnel "... were not suitable for a modern conventional army".⁸⁶ Others, like Liebenberg, argued that they were more intellectually inclined and "... greatly enrich[ed] the conventional defence community".⁸⁷ It is nevertheless true that these forces were not used to operating in and as a professional bureaucratized military force. The former non-statutory members that became part of the SANDF after 1994, thus, not only had to be professionalised; they also had to be bureaucratized. The training and education they received were very ad hoc and not rooted in a process of progression, correlation and cohesion throughout the whole of their careers. This is probably the core characteristic of the framework of academic and professional military education and training outlined in Chapter 3. There is thus no doubt that the integration of these former revolutionary soldiers into the newly created

⁸⁰ Perlmutter, A & Bennet, AV (eds.), *The Political Influence of the Military*. London: Yale University Press, 1980, p. 23.

⁸¹ Cawthra, G, "From 'Total Strategy' to 'Human Security.' The Making of South Africa's Defence Policy 1990-1998", *Journal of Peace, Conflict and Military Studies*, University of Zimbabwe, Vol, 1, No 1, March 2000, p 118.

⁸² Frankel, P, *Marching to the Millennium: The Birth, Development and Transformation of the South African National Defence Force*, South African Department of Defence Communication Service, Pretoria, 1998, p. 13.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, p. 26.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 14 & 24.

⁸⁵ Cawthra, G, "Security Governance in South Africa", *op. cit.*, p. 98.

⁸⁶ Kruys, G, "Some Major Factors Influencing Military Efficiency in the South African National Defence Force", *ISSUP Bulletin 4/2004*, Institute for Strategic Studies, University of Pretoria, p. 2.

⁸⁷ Liebenberg, I, *op. cit.*, p. 107.

SANDF required a high emphasis on ETD in an effort to "... disarm them politically and re-arm them professionally".⁸⁸

The history of education and training in both the former statutory and non-statutory forces in South Africa highlights the reality that the SANDF in world terms lags behind most modern bureaucratic armed forces in terms of the educational profile of its officers.⁸⁹ Although these forces were well trained and (sometimes) effective, neither the SADF nor the guerrilla forces that fought the apartheid state had an intellectual foundation rooted in a strong tradition of military education. Since 1994, the new military in South Africa had to deal with these challenges in the development of its human resources.

4.4.3 Education in the South African National Defence Force: Quo vadis?

Cawthra points out there was in reality a very high level of continuity between the SANDF⁹⁰ and the SADF.⁹¹ After 1994, the tradition of education as a "nice to have" was carried over to the SANDF. One analyst pointed out that the SANDF, like the SADF, did not commission officers – it "... trained functionaries, uniformed civil servants".⁹² Education is still not an integral part of the career of an officer in terms of being institutionalised and thus a requirement to become an officer or for promotion to higher rank. There are, though, a noticeable number of officers who have embarked on academic studies at tertiary institutions throughout the country since 1994.⁹³ The 2003/2004 annual report of the Department of Defence gave an indication of the number of its members who had involved themselves during that particular year with some form of academic studies:

- full-time tertiary studies at military institutions (like the Military Academy): 434
- full-time tertiary studies at external academic institutions: 717
- part-time tertiary studies at military institutions (like the Military Academy): 225
- part-time tertiary studies at external academic institutions: 3 334⁹⁴

⁸⁸ Perlmutter, A & Bennet, AV (eds.), op. cit., p. 23.

⁸⁹ Heinecken, L, "South Africa's Armed Forces in Transition: Adapting to the New Strategic and Political Environment", op. cit., p. 5.

⁹⁰ Until 1994, the South Africa military was known as the South African Defence Force. In 1994, the name was changed to the South African *National* Defence Force.

⁹¹ Cawthra, G, "Security Governance in South Africa", op. cit., p. 98.

⁹² Engelbrecht, L, "SANDF at 10: An Assessment", *African Armed Forces Journal*, February 2004, pp. 9-10.

⁹³ Interview with senior SA Army general at the Military Academy, 7 Dec 2004.

⁹⁴ South African Department of Defence, *Annual Report 2003/2004*, Formeset, Cape Town, 2004, p. 31

It is impossible to tell how many of these students are in fact uniformed members of the Department of Defence and how many are officers in the SANDF. Taking into account the total strength of the SANDF, it is clear that not a large percentage of members are engaged in academic studies – about 6,2 percent.⁹⁵ It should also be kept in mind that the majority of these studies fall outside the realm of the study of security, strategic and military affairs. One analyst, for example, indicates that the SANDF has an “... MBA culture” and that “... many of the military’s generals ... seem to have an unhealthy obsession with the management sciences”.⁹⁶ This view should be linked to the fact that academic qualifications are not held in high regard and are not a requirement for promotion in the SANDF as yet.⁹⁷ From this perspective it seems as if most of the studying in the SANDF is done by credential-craving opportunistic individuals.

Since 1994, professional military education in the South African military was required to unite and build a single cohesive defence force, to redress the wrongs of the past and to restructure and transform the defence force for the future. These, primarily, were the needs that brought members of the different pre-1994 belligerent forces together in the classrooms of the newly created SANDF. It was primarily in the classrooms of the different ETD institutions that most of the members of the pre-1994 belligerent forces were introduced to each other for the first time. It was in these institutions that they were first confronted by their fears, where prejudices and old views were challenged and where a new team spirit was developed.⁹⁸ These ETD institutions, therefore, needed to be robust enough not only to provide ETD in the traditional sense of the word, but also to address and facilitate a completely different set of dynamics before and as part of the educational process. The South African Military Psychological Institute played a cardinal role in helping ETD institutions to deal with these processes.⁹⁹

The South African government placed a very high premium on the availability of military forces for peace missions as visible proof of its collaborative security agenda in and commitment to Africa. This had a profound influence on force preparation in the SANDF. Thus, the need to prepare for peace missions was a prominent driver of ETD in the SANDF since 1994. Neethling, for example, highlighted the fact that the ETD of SANDF officers continued to focus on conventional warfighting but also commented that there was a growing emphasis on the

⁹⁵ On 31 March 2004, the Department of Defence consisted of 60 444 uniformed members in the regular force of the SANDF and 15 469 Public Service Act Personnel. South African Department of Defence, *Annual Report 2003/2004*, Formeset, Cape Town, 2004, p. 12

⁹⁶ Engelbrecht, L, “‘Going Ballistic’ – The SANDF Six Years On”, op. cit.

⁹⁷ Links, SB, “The Battle for Recognition”, *SA Soldier*, June 2001, pp. 22-23, 37.

⁹⁸ The author experienced these processes at first hand when he completed a command and staff programme at the South African Army College in Thaba Tswane, Pretoria, from June to December 1998.

⁹⁹ Discussion with a senior officer of the Military Psychological Institute in Pretoria on 13 September 2004.

preparation for so-called Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW).¹⁰⁰ The South African Minister of Defence specifically pointed out that the SANDF needs "... a professional body of men and women, schooled in the arts of defence, who can use their skills in peacekeeping roles and post-conflict reconstruction and development". He further argued that "... the key to successful peacekeeping was to provide multi-disciplinary training (sic) for our officer corps".¹⁰¹

The White Paper on South African Participation in International Peace Missions specifically stipulates that South African forces participating in international peace missions should be well equipped and trained "... to the highest standards". The White Paper also indicates that the development of personnel should be encouraged through attendance of peacekeeping-related courses in foreign countries with the aim of building up a pool of knowledge and expertise among officers and soldiers to enrich the quality of existing and planned training programmes for peace operations.¹⁰² It should be noted that education is an important tool in providing officers with the political, cultural, linguistic, geographical and other knowledge that is needed for successful peace missions. This should, however, be augmented with a rigorous training programme to inculcate the military and other skills required for the execution of typical peace support tasks: cease-fire monitoring and maintenance, check-point operations, crowd control, the apprehension of criminals, mediation and negotiation skills, and consensus-building skills – to name but a few.

The demands of the information age and the Revolution in Military Affairs also shaped the training and educational needs of the SANDF. The idea of information age technology in the African context may be seen as far-fetched until problems that high technology forces may face in this harsh continent and the islands of high technology that they may encounter in Africa, are taken into account. This became increasingly important with the wide range of new technologies procured for the SANDF since 1994 of which some has not yet been delivered. Training and education not only concern the employment of these technologies, but also the maintenance and operation of these systems by the SANDF.

The requirement for the SANDF to develop a more flexible personnel system in which employment within the military does not necessarily translate into a long-term career also

¹⁰⁰ Neethling, T, "The South African Military and Peacekeeping: Reflections on Conditions, Capacity Building and Prospects", *Scientia Militaria*, Vol 31, No 1, 2003, pp. 101-102.

¹⁰¹ South African Parliament, *Defence Budget Vote*, Speech by the Minister of Defence, Mr Mosiuoa Lekota, National Assembly, Cape Town, 8 April 2005, Available at <<http://www.info.gov.za/speeches/2005/0504111615001.htm>> [5 Oct 2005]

¹⁰² South African Department of Foreign Affairs, *White Paper on South African Participation in International Peace Missions*, Approved by Cabinet on 21 October 1998, Tabled in Parliament on 24 February 1999, p. 24.

influences its education and training. It was argued that alternative career opportunities should be identified "... for SANDF members who do not have further career advancement prospects because of advanced age and other factors leading to their stagnation in the ranks",¹⁰³ This emphasised the necessity for the SANDF to gear itself to fall in line with national training and educational policies and requirements. These policies and requirements are rooted in the philosophy of skills development and the accreditation of courses outlined in the National Qualifications Framework (NQF) contemplated in the South African Qualifications Authority Act.¹⁰⁴

The nature of a nation's armed forces is to a large extent the result of its experience, training and education. To put it differently – much can be learnt about the nature of a country's armed forces through an analysis of its training and education. Moreover, the attitude of military members towards their profession is to a large extent shaped through their training and education. The South African military faces an array of challenges in the training and education of its members. The way in which they address these will to a large extent determine the future nature of the South African military. How did the SANDF structure the ETD of its officers to overcome these obstacles and to shape the attitude of its members towards the military profession?

4.5 EDUCATION, TRAINING AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE SANDF: UNDERSTANDING THE PHILOSOPHY AND STRUCTURE

An officer from the Chief Joint Training Formation in the SANDF recently expressed the view that nobody in the Department of Defence has a holistic view of ETD within the department and, also, that it is very difficult to develop such a perspective.¹⁰⁵ It is accepted that this opinion relates to the totality of ETD that is done in the department. Yet, in some instances – like that of the making of officers – it is indeed possible to trace the process and to develop a more holistic understanding thereof. Like most defence forces, the SANDF provides a wide variety of ETD opportunities to its officers. For the purpose of this study, the nature of ETD in the SANDF since 1994 will be analysed by means of the framework for the education of officers discussed

¹⁰³ South African Department of Defence, "The DOD HR Strategy 2010: Distinguishing Fact from Fiction", *DOD Bulletin*, No 52/05, 7 September 2005.

¹⁰⁴ Heineken, L, "South Africa's Armed forces in Transition: Adapting to the New Strategic and Political Environment", *op. cit.*, 2005, p. 5.

¹⁰⁵ View expressed by Brig Gen JJ Smit during discussions with the School for Security and Africa Studies at the Military Academy, 10 August 2005.

in Chapter 3.¹⁰⁶ The analysis is introduced with a broad overview of the role of the Chief Joint Training Formation in the SANDF.

4.5.1 The role of the Joint Training Formation of the South African National Defence Force

The role of the Joint Training Formation should be seen, on the one hand, within the framework of the mission of the Department of Defence – “To provide, manage, prepare and employ defence capabilities commensurate with the needs of South Africa as regulated by the Constitution, national legislation, and Parliamentary and Executive direction”.¹⁰⁷ ETD in the department forms part of the preparation of the defence capabilities, including its manpower capability. The role of the Joint Training Formation and the general approach and philosophy of the SANDF towards ETD is based upon a broad general military strategy that was designed to translate government policy concerning the nature and use of the South African armed forces into tangible objectives, resources and processes (Strategy = Ends + Ways + Means). This strategy was an important tool for the SANDF to address the dichotomy it faces: warfighting or MOOTW. It is essentially a difficulty that all armed forces need to address, but which is more pertinent in a small defence force where scarce resources are the primary decision-making driver. For the SANDF, the decision boils down to a choice between the need to be a *deterrent force* rooted in an ability to mobilise itself as an effective *warfighting force* versus the need to be a *stabilising force* rooted in an ability to mobilise itself as an effective *force-projection force* for the execution of military operations other than war within South Africa itself and in what the SANDF often refers to as “the African battle space”.

The SANDF uses a “mission-based approach” in the development of its military strategy. All the missions that the SANDF foresee it will fulfil in future are configured around three objectives:

- Defence against aggression. The provision of self-defence in accordance with international law against any external aggression that may endanger the stability of South Africa.
- Promoting security. The provision of external deployment or support to enhance the security in support of decisions by the political office bearers in South Africa.

¹⁰⁶ Please note that this categorisation pertains only to the non-technical mustering of the SANDF. Therefore neither the education of professional engineers, artisans, tradesmen and the like, nor the mustering in the medical services that are controlled by professional bodies, is addressed.

¹⁰⁷ *Annual Report 2003/2004*, op. cit., p. 4.

- Supporting the people of South Africa. Supporting the population of South Africa by means of operations other than war, during periods when the responsible state departments do not have the capacity to do so.¹⁰⁸

The military strategy is very specific in demarcating the missions that are expected from the SANDF and in linking it to the above-mentioned objectives. (See Table 4.1) In pursuing these different objectives, the SANDF does not allot them the same priority. In the 2003-2004 annual report of the Department of Defence, for example, it is clearly stipulated that the promotion of regional security is the primary concern of the Minister of Defence and, thus, of the SANDF. The promotion of regional security should be aimed, it is argued, at securing a collective approach to defence in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and also effective participation of the Department of Defence in the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) programmes. Whereas previously the SANDF was extensively involved in internal security and support to the people of South Africa, the aim is to reduce this role systematically to a zero level.¹⁰⁹ Consequently, there is gradual shift from internal support for the police and border patrol duties towards the promotion of security in the region through South African foreign policy initiatives – peace and humanitarian missions in the rest of Africa. This is clearly illustrated through the declared intention of the South African government that the SANDF should be a senior partner and that it should have a major role in the development of the African Standby Force. This force should provide Africa with its own ability to intervene rapidly in future to avert conflict of the nature that occurred over a decade ago and is still troubling the Great Lakes region.¹¹⁰

Underlying this shift in emphasis is the necessity for the SANDF to transform itself from an internal stability force – or a force in search of a mission – to a force that has all the attributes required for force projection over long distances in a continent that is characterised by a lack of infrastructure. It is possible to argue that there is some similarity in the nature of the internal stability operations executed by the SADF/SANDF over many years within the borders of South Africa, on the one hand, and humanitarian and peace missions that the SANDF participate in regionally, on the other. The skills that are required from individual soldiers are more or less the same in both kinds of operations. This specifically concerns the requirements of impartiality and minimum force. Yet, there are structural and other differences between an internal stability

¹⁰⁸ South African Department of Defence, *South African National Defence Force Military Strategy*, Corporate Staff Division, Department of Defence Joint General Publication: JGP 201, DS CCS/D STRAT/R/302/2/1, Pretoria, 6 August 2001, pp. 5-1 & 5-2.

¹⁰⁹ See the speech by the South African Minister of Defence, Mr Mosiuoa Lekota, during the *Defence Budget Vote* in the National Assembly, Cape Town, 8 April 2005. Available at <<http://www.info.gov.za/speeches/2005/0504111615001.htm>> [5 Oct 2005]

force and an expeditionary force for peace missions that cannot be ignored. One of the most prominent features in this regard is the need for a higher order understanding and knowledge of the particular situation that necessitates the operation. This is usually a blend of historical, geopolitical, cultural and, very often, also religious factors. An educated mind is an indispensable requirement in such a scenario. This underlying argument demarcates the critical role of the Joint Training Formation of the SANDF in the SANDF's ability to promote regional security.

Table 4.1: Mission classification and priorities in the SANDF military strategy¹¹¹

Defence against aggression	Promoting security	Supporting the people of South Africa
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Defence against biological and chemical onslaught ▪ Pre-emptive operations ▪ International peace-making ▪ Regional peace observers ▪ Repelling conventional onslaught ▪ International peace-enforcement ▪ International peace-building ▪ International disaster relief and humanitarian assistance ▪ International search and rescue ▪ International observers 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Regional peace-building ▪ Regional humanitarian intervention ▪ Repelling non-conventional onslaught ▪ Presidential tasks ▪ Regional disaster relief and humanitarian assistance ▪ Show of force ▪ Protection of foreign assets ▪ Regional peace enforcement ▪ Search and rescue ▪ Regional search and rescue ▪ Repelling unconventional onslaught 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Co-operation with the South African Police Services ▪ Borderline control ▪ Supporting military diplomacy ▪ Special operations ▪ Disaster relief and humanitarian assistance ▪ Defence against an information onslaught ▪ Maritime support ▪ VIP transport ▪ Regional peacekeeping ▪ Support to government departments

The work of the Joint Training Formation is rooted in the "... shared values of the DOD", professionalism, human dignity, integrity, leadership, accountability, loyalty, and patriotism.¹¹² It is interesting to note that all these values relate to what the SANDF, and specifically its members, should be. The values do not necessarily concern what the SANDF should do or

¹¹⁰ *Annual Report 2003/2004*, op. cit., pp. 1&4.

¹¹¹ *South African National Defence Force Military Strategy*, op. cit., p. 8-3.

¹¹² *Annual Report 2003/2004*, op. cit., p. 4.

how it should do it. Since the core values of the SANDF focus primary on what its members should be, it should be seen as important drivers of both the process and the nature of ETD in the SANDF. This specifically relates to the notions of professionalism and leadership. In the human resources strategy of the SANDF, the level of training and education of personnel is recognised as one of the factors that determine the "... human resources quality dimension".¹¹³

The human resources strategy specifically points out that there is at present a mismatch between the quality of education of most school leavers and the educational qualifications required by the SANDF as a technology-based employer. In addition, the SANDF faces the reality that many highly trained and experienced personnel leave the force, whilst top performing school leavers do not necessarily join the SANDF.¹¹⁴ It is argued that the personnel needs of the SANDF are rooted in the necessity to have a "Flexible Service System" (FSS) which is responsive to the needs of the individual, the military and the society. This system should be designed in such a way that "... working people have to undergo life-long learning and continuous re-skilling to enable them to migrate through a number of career changes, whilst adding value – bmo (sic) enhanced competency – to each successive career". Such a system, if it is maintained, will re-direct the current emphasis on a long-term career in the regular forces to one in which military service is a "... launch pad to acquire valuable skills and experience which they then profitably apply in civilian society". It is recognised that such a system necessitates processes ("enablers") such as vocational ETD that will enable military personnel to re-integrate into civilian society as productive citizens.¹¹⁵ This is an important argument for the SANDF to consider in the effort to find a balance between broad liberal education and professional military education in the ETD of its officers.

The Secretary of Defence, as Head of the Department, in cooperation with the Chief of the SANDF is responsible and accountable for ETD in the Department of Defence. The "ETD System" of the department consists of an "ETD System Owner" component, a "Delivery System" component, and a "Systems Integrity" component. The Joint Training Formation is the "ETD System Owner" and as such it is in control of the whole process.¹¹⁶ Joint Training Formation falls under the direction of the Joint Support Division of the SANDF. The Chief of Joint Training, as delegated by the Chief of the SANDF through the Chief of Joint Support, fulfil its role with the

¹¹³ South African Department of Defence, *Department of Defence Human Resources Strategy 2010*, Policy and Planning Division, Department of Defence Instruction: Pol and Plan No 52/2001, DC/PPP/D HR PLAN/R/101/6/B, Pretoria, 2001, p. 11.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 18.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 13.

¹¹⁶ Kleyhans, AS, "Overarching Policy for Education, Training and Development (ETD) in the Department of Defence (DOD)", In Pretorius, M (ed.), *SANDF Bulletin for Education Technology*, South African National Defence Force College for Educational Technology, January 2003, p. 10.

help of the Training Staff Council. Certain ETD institutions fall directly under the command of the Chief of Joint Training because of the “jointness” of the institutions. The Chief of Joint Training is responsible for ETD in which members of all the services participate. These institutions include *inter alia* the Military Academy, the National Defence College, the National War College, and the College for Educational Technology (COLET). ETD that is service- or division¹¹⁷-specific is the responsibility of the different services or divisions.¹¹⁸ The ETD that is done by the different services, however, is still guided by the policies, directives and strategies of the Joint Training Formation. The Chief of the Joint Training Formation of the SANDF defines its responsibility as follows:

- Providing ETD strategic direction, corporate ETD policy, advice and corporate ETD plans and reports to the Department of Defence. This should comply with national legislation, customary international law and international agreements binding on the RSA.
- Negotiating, coordinating and maintaining training agreements between the South African Department of Defence and other military forces.
- Creating and maintaining liaison with the statutory ETD and related bodies in order to ensure alignment of Department of Defence ETD policies, strategies and doctrine with the national framework. These bodies include *inter alia* the Education and Training Quality Assurer (ETQAs), the South African Qualification Authority (SAQA) and the National Standards Body (NSB).
- Providing Department of Defence with ETD information regarding training for internal, external and foreign training providers.
- Managing the ETD component – the learning programmes – of the South African Department of Defence foreign relation’s policies and strategies.
- Providing specifications, with which ETD practitioners are to comply in order to ensure that they are suitable, qualified and registered in alignment with national legislation.
- Managing the development, the compilation and the implementation of both common and joint curricula for assessable official professional ETD programmes.
- Providing guidelines for Civic Education for all professional development learning opportunities.
- Managing special, common, joint and multinational ETD projects in the South African Department of Defence.

¹¹⁷ Specifically the Joint Operations and the Defence Intelligence Divisions.

¹¹⁸ South African Department of Defence, *Department of Defence Instruction on Overarching Policy for Education Training and Development in the Department of Defence*, Joint Training Division, Department of Defence Instruction: TRG/00004/2001 (edition 1), DS/TRG/R/103/1/P, Pretoria, April 2005, p. 5.

- Creating and maintaining an ETD management information database in the Department of Defence with all the relevant information required for reporting and planning purposes.
- Establishing, managing and maintaining a research and development capability for the Department of Defence.
- Providing advice on ETD to higher authorities in the Department of Defence.
- Monitoring the compliance of subordinate and other divisions in the Department of Defence with ETD instructions and regulations.¹¹⁹

All these responsibilities culminate in a number of outcomes pursued by the Joint Training Formation. These outcomes are written as, what the military refers to, “endstates”. An endstate is a description of what an objective will look like once it has been achieved.¹²⁰ The following endstates are defined for the Joint Training Formation in the Department of Defence:

- all ETD systems and processes are well established and characterised by professional service delivery and integrity, which is aligned with national and international best practices and legal prescripts;
- the ETD requirements of the department are satisfied by accredited educational, functional and developmental learning opportunities;
- the ETD in the department is strategically directed;
- jointness and interoperability are enhanced through ETD initiatives;
- the department optimises all ETD initiatives, interoperability and multi-nationalism to promote regional peace, security and stability;
- efficient resource management and allocation ensure the effective, efficient and economical achievement of the ETD objectives and commitments; and
- appropriately qualified and “registered” ETD practitioners are available for ETD in the department.¹²¹

The “Delivery System” makes provision for the creation of environments within ETD institutions that are conducive for learning, provide facilitators for the learning programme (directing staff), and create the learning opportunities for the “learner body”. The “Systems Integrity” component is responsible for the quality, integrity, vitality and sustainability of ETD in the DOD. This

¹¹⁹ Ibid., pp. 2-3.

¹²⁰ This is a technical military concept that has its roots in the warfighting environment where commanders should be able to provide subordinate commanders with precise descriptions of the features of the battlefield – how the battlefield will look like – once an objective was achieved.

¹²¹ *Department of Defence Instruction on Overarching Policy for Education Training and Development in the Department of Defence*, op. cit., p. 3.

includes on the one hand an evaluation of the ETD system itself and, on the other, an assessment of the product of the system.¹²²

In an analysis of these three systems and their objectives, a number of characteristics, or rather current thoughts about the nature of ETD in the SANDF, are clearly visible. It is, firstly, very obvious that there is an effort to provide focused ETD. All ETD in the SANDF should, consequently, be guided by the higher order policies and strategies – and missions – of the Department of Defence in general and the SANDF in particular. This is clearly visible in the emphasis on the provision of strategic guidance. This requirement is linked to a second need, namely that all ETD in the SANDF should form part of a larger process. There should be “method in the madness” to the extent that there should be progress in the development of individuals in the SANDF. Thirdly, there is clearly an effort to align ETD in the Department of Defence and the SANDF with broad governmental and international policies and requirements, in particular regarding educational policies. This requirement is clearly rooted in the need to accredit all ETD that is done in the SANDF and to give it a broader application – so-called “transferability of skills”. The need for a dynamic personnel system is clearly visible in this thinking. Fourthly, there is a recognition of the importance of “training the trainers”. The only way through which the SANDF can ensure high-quality ETD is through an effort to address the competency level of its ETD practitioners. It is possible to argue that the depth and nature of military thought in the SANDF is directly linked to the quality of the trainers and educators in the system. Thus, if the SANDF wants to lay the foundations for the transformation of the military to become more intellectually minded (versus being operationally minded) it needs to begin with its ETD practitioners. Lastly, ETD in the SANDF is clearly infused with the need to be efficient and to do more with less. A senior member of the Joint Training Formation recently pointed out that there is an “urgent need” to professionalise ETD in the Department of Defence. Yet, the lack of resources has a definite detrimental effect on efforts to bring about this change.¹²³

4.5.2 The making of lieutenants in the South African National Defence Force

The first step in the process of the making of professional military officers, as was pointed out in Chapter 3, is the provision of a basic, professional military ETD, or “... the making of lieutenants”.¹²⁴ This involves the process through which recruits are brought into the services and the schooling they receive to become commissioned officers. Three processes underpin the making of lieutenants – socialisation, military training and academic education.

¹²² Kleynhans, AS, op. cit., pp. 11-14.

¹²³ View expressed by Brig Gen JJ. Smit during a briefing to members of the Faculty of Military Science at the Military Academy, 12 August 2005.

In the SANDF, the first two processes are the primary focus of the Naval College and the Air Force and Army Gymnasiums.¹²⁵ At present, one year is utilised for the initial military training and socialisation. At the Army Gymnasium in particular, the emphasis is on the provision of a solid infantry grounding as a foundation for corps training. Being military minded also implies an understanding by candidate officers of the notion of "defence in a democracy" and of "developing the political and ethical dimensions of military professionalism" as outlined in the South African White Paper on Defence.¹²⁶ Insight into these higher order conceptions can only be acquired through academic study, defining the vital role of academic studies at the South African Military Academy. After one year of military training and regimentalised socialisation at the junior leader training institutions, the candidate officers are transferred to the Military Academy where the bulk of their time is taken up by academic studies. Ideally, officers should graduate with a first degree and a commission as a lieutenant in a particular service after one year of training and three years of study. (See Figure 4.1)

The duration of a specific individual's tenure of study at the South African Military Academy, however, depends on the graduate's own record of achievement and the needs of the services. The ideal is that as many as possible of the candidate officers should stay at the Military Academy for three years of study. After three years, the potential officer is commissioned with a long-term contract from the Department of Defence. If not, the candidate officer may choose or be directed towards a one-year certificate in military studies at the South African Military Academy with an accompanying short- or medium-term contract. In such a case, completion of studies through correspondence or distance education and switching to a long-term contract remains a possibility.¹²⁷

The role of jointness in the making of lieutenants in the SANDF has to be emphasised. Whereas the training and initial socialisation is service- and even corps-specific, education at the South African Military Academy is a joint endeavour. Unlike most of the world's armed forces, South African officers are bred in jointness. The advantages and disadvantages of such an approach are open for debate. The emphasis on jointness, for example, has an erosive effect on the service-specific military socialisation of the first year of training. This is an especially thorny issue considering the fact that the South African Military Academy has an academic rather than a military regimental ethos.

¹²⁴ Crackel, T.J, "On the Making of Lieutenants and Colonels", *The Public Interest*, No 76, Summer 1984.

¹²⁵ In South Africa, the use of the term "Gymnasium" to describe military training units is based on the Afrikaans use of the word "gimnasium" to describe a secondary school. This is derived from the German tradition of the 1800s to refer to a secondary school as a "Gymnasium".

¹²⁶ "Defence in a Democracy", op. cit., p. 10.




Figure 4.1 Education and training in the South African National Defence Force

What has changed since 1994? Firstly, there was a deliberate effort by the different services to develop a single curriculum for the first year of training offered to candidate officers at the different institutions. This single curriculum makes provision for service-specific socialisation and training, but ensures that the same standard is adhered to throughout.¹²⁸ Secondly, whereas, in the case of the army, each corps school used to train its own officers, a single training institution – the Army Gymnasium – was given responsibility for the initial training of all the candidate officers of the army after 1994. Thirdly, since the recruitment of the Defence Force is now specifically directed towards communities that were to some extent excluded from service in the past, there is a deliberate effort to give people from previously disadvantaged communities an opportunity to acquire a basic tertiary education at the Military Academy. Within the SANDF there has, therefore, been an increasing need for and emphasis on education since 1994. As a developmental tool, education has become increasingly important.

¹²⁷ Interview with a previous Commandant of the South African Military Academy, Pretoria, 8 June 2004.

¹²⁸ South African Department of Defence, *Project Centurion*, Tasking Instruction, SANDF C PERS/DPD/103/1/R, 23 February 1999.

In some circles, there are even visions of a first degree as a prerequisite for entrance into the officer corps.¹²⁹

4.5.3 The making of colonels in the South African National Defence Force

The purpose of military doctrinal ETD is to give officers all the competencies they need to deploy and employ military formations from a platoon to, in the case of South Africa, a division. The aim is to school officers to be tactically and operationally minded and to operate with ease in these realms. The doctrinal ETD of officers culminates in the ability of the officer to be a campaign-level staff officer or planner and an operational commander. Crackel refers to ETD at this level as the "making of colonels".¹³⁰ Important to understand, though, is that the making of a colonel starts as soon as the officer receives his commission – or even before that.

Two (types of) institutions are primarily responsible for doctrinal ETD in the SANDF: the different service colleges¹³¹ and the South African National War College (SANWC). (See Figure 4.1) The different service colleges are the main tactical ETD institutions in the SANDF. These colleges have a service-specific focus in their ETD, since the aim is to give officers a thorough schooling in the tactics of land, maritime and air warfare and the use of land, naval and air power in military operations other than war (MOOTW). In the case of the army, the course is split into a distance education phase of six months and a residential phase of twenty-four weeks.¹³² Officers attending these so-called "Junior Command and Staff Programmes" (JCSP) are senior majors – lieutenant-commanders in the case of the Navy.¹³³

The newly created SANWC offers lieutenant-colonels a twelve-month "Joint Senior Command and Staff Programme" (JSCSP).¹³⁴ The programme focuses on campaign level warfare and prepares students to be operational level staff officers and commanders.¹³⁵ To be specific: the programme aims at preparing "... selected officers for senior appointments at the operational

¹²⁹ The possibility of a B degree as a minimum academic qualification for entrance to an officer corps was raised by a wide variety of SANDF officers who were interviewed. There is doubt, however, about the practicality of such a requirement. A senior SA Army general interviewed at the Military Academy on 7 Dec 2004 emphasised that it remains a long-term vision.

¹³⁰ Crackel, TJ, op. cit.

¹³¹ The Naval Staff College is in Muizenberg, near Cape Town, and the Army and Air Force Colleges are in Thaba Tshwane, near Pretoria.

¹³² Department of Defence, SA Army Training Formation, "Draft Curriculum: SA Army Junior Command and Staff Duties Course Residential Module", SA ARMY TRG FMN/103/1/8/1/2, December 2003, p. 1.

¹³³ Interview with members of the directing staff of the Army Junior Command and Staff Course, SA Army College, Thaba Tshwane, 7 July 2004.

¹³⁴ South African Department of Defence, *Establishment of the South African National War College*, Joint Training Formation, J TRG/R/103/1/8/1, 28 December 2001.

¹³⁵ Interview with members of the directing staff of the SANWC, Pretoria, 7 July 2004.

level by developing their command, staff and analytical skills, and by broadening their professional understanding of single-service, joint and combined operations, the management of defence and the wider aspects of conflict".¹³⁶ The programme consists of four main modules: core military studies, advanced military studies, defence management studies, and strategic studies. These four modules are split up into 21 main subjects such as: operational art in joint and combined operations, military history, leadership and command, campaign planning, national security, operations other than war, civil-military relations, technology, human, financial and logistics management, international security, global conflict, regional security, and land, sea and air power.¹³⁷

The biggest and most obvious change since 1994 has been the creation of the SANWC, officially opened on 28 January 2002, and the introduction of the JSCSP.¹³⁸ Whereas each service previously presented its own "senior staff course", the emphasis at the SANWC is on jointness. In 1994, the "senior staff course", inherited from the old SADF, had an almost exclusive focus on the tactical level with an accompanying emphasis on training. Not only has the emphasis since 1994 shifted towards the operational level of war, but the curriculum now also reflects a developmental and educational methodology. The study of military history features very prominently in this regard.¹³⁹ The larger emphasis on education necessitated a greater input from academics into the development and presentation of the course. As from 1997, a military historian with doctoral qualifications has been appointed at the South African Army College. He is not only responsible for teaching military history at the SANWC and the Army College at present, but also facilitates an annual staff ride for SANWC students to the most important battlefields of the Anglo-Zulu and the Anglo-Boer Wars in northern KwaZulu-Natal.¹⁴⁰

A number of other important changes are also noticeable. One is the provision for military bureaucratic education in the curricula of the different colleges. In the past, the emphasis was almost exclusively on military professional education. In the case of the SANWC, this has been formalised through an agreement with the Tshwane University of Technology concerning the presentation of a diploma in military management as part of JSCSP.¹⁴¹ A second very important change has been the interaction with foreign staff colleges from all over the globe, Africa in

¹³⁶ South African Department of Defence, *Joint Implementation Instruction on the Joint Senior Command and Staff Programme (JSCSP) Curriculum*, Joint Training Formation, Joint Training Instruction No 15/2001, J TRG/R/103/1/8/1, 21 November 2001, p. 2.

¹³⁷ Ibid.

¹³⁸ Siyongwana, F, "Flagship Military Institution of Learning Opens", *South African Soldier*, March 2002, pp. 28 & 29.

¹³⁹ Interview with members of the directing staff of the SANWC, Pretoria, 6 July 2004.

¹⁴⁰ Interview with the Resident Military Historian of the SA Army College, Thaba Tshwane, 6 July 2004.

particular, since 1994. These interactions not only had a formative influence on the curricula of the colleges; it also led to the exchange of students and directing staff. This has become an important part of military diplomacy in the SANDF, especially in its relationship with other defence forces on the African continent.¹⁴² A third change comprised a shift from a high emphasis on training at the different service colleges to a more educational approach in the presentation of the different JCSPs. Such an approach is understandable, to some extent, in the case of the navy and air force because of the nature of their tasks and the worldviews of sailors and airmen (see Chapter 3). In the case of the army, though, this is not necessarily a positive change. If officers who are primarily responsible for battlefield and other tactics are not being trained during the primary tactical course of the army, the question may indeed be asked whether they are trained at all. Where do these officers learn the skills to command an all-arms battle formation if they are not trained to do it at the Army College? These skills cannot be inculcated through professional or liberal education. Training is necessary.¹⁴³ However, scepticism about the Army's ability at present to provide training at this level became noticeable. Questions are indeed being asked about the availability of officers in the South African Army with the necessary experience and skills to present this kind of training.¹⁴⁴ The experience of army officers in combined arms operations is also minimalised through the dismantling of combined arms units, such as 61 Mechanised Battalion Group and the down-scaling of conventional exercises at the SA Army Combat Training Centre at Lohathla.¹⁴⁵

4.5.4 The making of generals in the South African National Defence Force

The purpose of politico-military ETD is to assist officers to prepare themselves for high command. Whereas basic military and doctrinal ETD is directed towards the making of lieutenants and colonels, politico-military ETD aims at the making of generals. The making of generals focuses on the need for senior officers to become strategically and politically minded. They have to be prepared to work with leading defence officials and political office bearers in managing and controlling the country's military resources in accordance with the security needs of the country and in subordination to the polity.¹⁴⁶

¹⁴¹ Interview with members of the directing staff of the SANWC, Pretoria, 7 July 2004.

¹⁴² Interview with members of the directing staff of the SANWC, Pretoria, 6 July 2004.

¹⁴³ This particular point was raised by a number of officers who were interviewed.

¹⁴⁴ Two generals expressed this view on different occasions. Interviewed in Pretoria on 20 July and 2 August 2005.

¹⁴⁵ Telephonic interview with a senior officer from the SA Army Combat Training Centre, 21 August 2006.

¹⁴⁶ See the discussion on the need for this kind of education in: Bletz, DF, "Military Professionalism: A Conceptual Approach", *Military Review*, May 1971, pp. 9-17.

The South African National Defence College (SANDC) offers the "Executive National Security Programme" (ENSP) to colonels earmarked for promotion to general. (See Figure 4.1) Prior to the introduction of the ENSP, the SANDC presented the "Joint Staff Course" aimed at "... educating, primarily, senior SANDF officers, at the military strategic level".¹⁴⁷ Due to the changed political, geo-strategic and other circumstances in South Africa, a need was identified for officers to be exposed to the national strategic level and to become acquainted with the functioning of other state departments, foreign defence perspectives and the civilian sector. In particular, officers had to develop an understanding of human security. The ENSP focuses on national security issues in a regional and African context against the background of global issues. The central theme, however, is national security.¹⁴⁸

Though the decision to migrate from the joint staff course to the ENSP was sound, some problems seem to emerge. The first is rooted in the difference between an educational and a training approach in the presentation of the programme. To be specific, the programme at present does not make provision for an active educational process and the students do not necessarily go through a process of internalising newly acquired knowledge. Haycock described a similar situation in 1976 at the Canadian National Defence College: "... no papers, no heavy reading; just one visiting expert after another and occasional group reports on problems looked into between junkets to the Far North, East and South and a whopper to Europe and the Middle East".¹⁴⁹ It should be emphasised that the ENSP is an excellent compact programme, comparable to similar programmes elsewhere. The problem concerns the way in which it is presented, since the internalisation of knowledge is time-intensive. Compared to similar programmes presented elsewhere, there is not enough time to debate the issues addressed to the extent that is required for analysis. Students need more time to debate, disagree, argue, criticise and adjust opinions with regard to particular issues. Not enough emphasis is placed on the cultivation and development of a personal informed opinion. Though the scope of the programme is extensive, its academic depth is under suspicion.¹⁵⁰ This particular point is rooted in the lack of a formal process of evaluation. At present, nomination to attend the programme is all that is needed to pass.¹⁵¹ As Van Creveld explains, career-

¹⁴⁷ Siyongwana, F, "Executive National Security Programme: The Fourth to be Held at the SA Defence College", *SA Soldier*, September 2001, p. 29.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid.

¹⁴⁹ Haycock, RC, "The Labors of Athena and the Muses: Historical and Contemporary Aspects of Canadian Military Education", in Kennedy, GC & Nielson, K (eds.), *Military Education: Past, Present, and Future*, Praeger, Westport, 2002, pp. 178.

¹⁵⁰ A view expressed by a senior SA Army general. Interviewed at the Military Academy, 7 Dec 2004.

¹⁵¹ This particular problem was highlighted by a number of senior officers who have completed the ENSP. It was also pointed out by academics who acted as guest speakers on the ENSP and some of the directing staff at the SANDC.

conscious officers are not "... necessarily motivated to serious study in an institution where there is no competition and from which everybody who enters is certain to graduate".¹⁵²

A second problem concerns the level at which the programme is focused. At present, the SANWC focuses on the operational level of war in its presentation of the JSCSP, whilst the SANDC focuses on national security in the presentation of the ENSP. It is clear that the military strategic level is not addressed in any depth in any of these programmes.¹⁵³ A senior officer, in fact, was very explicit recently in stating that "the management of defence" is not addressed in any of the programmes of the Department of Defence.¹⁵⁴ Whether this ought to be the responsibility of the SANWC or the SANDC is open to debate. The issue is further complicated by the fact that the average officer has already spent a vast amount of time on formal ETD by the time he reaches general rank, and, secondly, that there is a need to extend the time spent on the ENSP. Thus, not only is it not clear where the responsibility for military strategic ETD should be located, but where to find the time to address the dilemma, is also a problem. Taking into account that the military is primarily responsible for the military component of national security, the military strategic level of war is not something that can be discarded or overlooked. World-wide – also in Africa – it seems as if there is a return to the more traditional understanding of security, with the military holding a more prominent position in the provision of security. But more than that, though it is important for officers to understand the higher order conceptions of security, their main business remains the role of the military in addressing the security needs of society. Military strategic issues can never be neglected by the military.

The challenge of addressing the military strategic level of war became an even bigger challenge with the acceptance of human security as the organising conception of South African security. As was noted earlier, human security is not only difficult to operationalise, but also directs attention away from the military as an instrument of security. The SANDC's use of civilian academic guest lecturers, primarily from the political sciences domain, further compounds the problem. These academics are usually well acquainted with the higher order political dimension of security and human security in particular. However, questions need to be asked about their knowledge and expertise in operationalising the military domain of human security and in addressing the management of defence in support of human security.¹⁵⁵

¹⁵² Van Creveld, M, *The Training of Officers: From Military Professionalism to Irrelevance*, Free Press, New York, 1990, p. 103.

¹⁵³ Discussion with a senior member of the directing staff of the National Defence College at the Military Academy, Saldanha, 25 July 2006.

¹⁵⁴ View expressed by Brig Gen JJ Smit during a briefing to members of the Faculty of Military Science at the Military Academy, 12 August 2005.

4.6 FACTORS INFLUENCING AND CHARACTERISING EDUCATION, TRAINING AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN NATIONAL DEFENCE FORCE SINCE 1994

It is not easy to outline all the factors that influence ETD in a particular armed force and at any specific time. There are, though, a number of very definite considerations, some more obvious than others, that influence ETD in the SANDF at present and which have influenced it since 1994. However, it should be noted that it is difficult to determine the precise extent to which these factors have influenced the ETD system in the SANDF. The list of influencing factors is, thus, far from complete.

4.6.1 Education, training and development as a singular idea

The first real training and educational challenge the SANDF faces is the use of the term ETD – Education, Training and Development. Grouping together training, education and development in one organising idea gives rise to the danger that the military does not differentiate between these different notions and that neither training, nor education, or development is being done well. Most ETD institutions in the SANDF should, in the words of the Deputy Chief of the South African Army, “... be refined to allow better education and development” to complement the training that is done.¹⁵⁶ Thus, the majority of the senior ETD institutions in the SANDF – the exception being the Military Academy – at present aspire towards the development of an educational capacity. Some do it through outsourcing of sections of its academic programme. This may be an indication that they question their own capacity to educate.¹⁵⁷ The attributes that are needed at these institutions for an educational ethos are lacking. In fact, most ETD institutions in the SANDF at present lack the ability to present students with a real educational experience. One senior SA Army general describes the nature of the ETD in the SANDF as “mechanistic” and points out that it is “mark sheet-driven”.¹⁵⁸ This is a clear indication of the emphasis on training in the schooling activities of the SANDF.

The absence of academic faculties at the ETD institutions in the SANDF is noticeable. At present there is, for example, only one PhD-qualified officer responsible for military history education at the National War College, who is also responsible for military history education at

¹⁵⁵ Discussion with Col (ret) Prof JS Kotze at the Military Academy, 28 October 2005.

¹⁵⁶ Jooste, J, “Keynote Address: Knowledge Management in the SA Army”, Landward Defence Institute, Vol 1, March 2003, p. 6.

¹⁵⁷ The South African National War College, for example, has outsourced the management component of their programme to the Tshwane University of Technology.

¹⁵⁸ Telephonic interview with a senior SA Army general, 2 August 2005. He described education in the SANDF in Afrikaans as “meganies” and “merkstaat verkog”.

the Army College, the Warrant Officers Academy and the Army Formative Course.¹⁵⁹ The presence of a suitably qualified (civilian) academic faculty has become the norm at staff colleges and institutions of higher military education globally. With the exception of the Military Academy, no institution of higher learning in the SANDF has any such academic faculty. In addition, Cawthra points out, the level of consultation by the SANDF with civil society in general and academics in particular has declined over the last number of years.¹⁶⁰ At the Military Academy, for example, civilian guest lecturers and speakers are no longer welcome – especially if they are white and from the developed countries of the Western world. The difficult bureaucratic process for inviting and paying such people further aggravates the situation.¹⁶¹

A noticeable challenge that almost all the ETD institutions in the SANDF face, is the lack of academically qualified directing staff. Most of the officers serving on the directing staff of ETD institutions – the Military Academy once again being the exception – do not have suitable graduate and post-graduate academic qualifications. In a study that was done in 1997, for example, it was found that 69,23 percent of the directing staff members of the Senior Command Course had a (3-year) B degree and 7,69 percent a (4-year) Honours degree. In the Junior Command and Staff Course, only 20 percent of the directing staff had a B degree and on the Joint Staff Course 15 percent had a Masters and 33 percent a B degree.¹⁶² There is no reason to believe that this situation has changed fundamentally at the time of writing.

The result is that most of the ETD institutions in the SANDF are faced with a situation of institutional paralysis: a willingness to be an academic institution, but an inability to become that. At present, the directing staff at these ETD institutions does not busy themselves with the kind of activities with which academics normally occupy themselves, namely teaching, research and writing. Members of the directing staff are nothing more than glorified administrators and bureaucrats, their days being filled by all kinds of organising activities to keep the different programmes running.¹⁶³ This leaves them with very little time for constructive research and development, the lifeblood of any academic institution. This in turn gives rise to a situation where the military runs the risk of, in the words of the Deputy Chief of the South African army,

¹⁵⁹ E-mail correspondence with the residential historian of the National War College in Pretoria, 28 November 2005.

¹⁶⁰ Cawthra, G, "Security Governance in South Africa", op. cit., p. 100.

¹⁶¹ Lecturers at the Military Academy had been rebuked by the Commandant of the Military Academy for inviting guest lecturers, while requests by others to invite guest lecturers have been turned down.

¹⁶² South African Department of Defence, *Die Uitdagings wat die Departement van Verdediging die Hoof moet bied tydens die Onderrigproses met die Aanbied van Hoër Onderwys binne die Raamwerk van die Suid-Afrikaanse Grondwet, die Heropbou en Ontwikkelingsprogram, die Wet op die Kwalifikasie Outoriteit en die Witskrif op Verdediging*, Staff Paper for the South African National Defence College, Brig Gen J.J Smit, 1997, p. 20.

“... letting urgencies override priorities and even of falling into an activity trap”.¹⁶⁴ Thus, there is a real danger that the ETD institutions of the SANDF are neither institutions of training or of educational or of developmental excellence.

4.6.2 The quality of experienced professional directing staff

One of the primary problems concerning education and training in the SANDF is the lack of a body of professional directing staff at ETD institutions.¹⁶⁵ In the case of professional officers serving as directing staff members, the rotation of officers is often too quick for individual officers to become professional trainers and educators. Most directing staff members serve for no more than two to three years in that capacity. Often members who are appointed on the directing staff have not yet built up a comprehensive body of professional military and bureaucratic knowledge and experience required for educating and training members of the military. Knowledge and expertise about teaching and learning are not even brought into the picture. The SANDF appoints members to the directing staff at a too early stage in their careers at a time at which they are not as yet developed as specialists. In addition, there is a lack of programmes in the SANDF to “train the trainers” and to develop them into “ETD practitioners”.¹⁶⁶ Bless argues that this absence of programmes to train the trainers is rooted in a number of considerations:

- there is a lack of awareness and appreciation of the relevance and effect that such programmes may have on the eventual end product;
- there is also a lack of information on learning opportunities that are provided in this regard by the SANDF through the College for Educational Technology (COLET);
- time to attend the training and developmental courses will always be a problem for trainers, instructors and educators;
- a lack of funds and the availability of specialists to offer this kind of learning opportunity in the SANDF are a serious challenge.¹⁶⁷

¹⁶³ This problem was pointed out during interviews with members of the directing staff of both the SANWC and the SANDC, July 2004.

¹⁶⁴ Jooste, J, op. cit., p. 4.

¹⁶⁵ See the discussion of this challenge in the SANDF in the article by Bless, C, “Creating Partnerships in the DOD”, In Pretorius, M (ed.), *SANDF Bulletin for Education Technology*, South African National Defence Force College for Educational Technology, January 2003.

¹⁶⁶ This problem has been pointed out in a number of interviews with members of the directing staff of the arms of service colleges and the National War College. The problem seems to manifest itself specifically at lower level ETD institutions. Also see Bless, C, op. cit., p. 26-27.

¹⁶⁷ Bless, C, op. cit., p. 27.

The result is a lowering of both the productivity of the directing staff and the depth and quality of the training and education. A foreign member of the directing staff of a senior ETD institution in the SANDF, for example, contends that he will run the same programme on the same standard with a much smaller number of people if they work on the productivity and knowledge level that is accepted as the norm at most of the staff colleges of the (Western) world.¹⁶⁸

Officers in the SANDF are commissioned at a very young age. Their corresponding immaturity and lack of life skills could be linked to the relative ease with which senior non-commissioned and warrant officers can become senior officers and the lack of an officer culture in the SANDF.¹⁶⁹ In combination, these factors have a detrimental effect on experience in the SANDF. Most often, for example, officers who excel in a particular course are appointed on the directing staff of that same institution for the next course. It therefore often happens that a student has absolutely no operational or bureaucratic experience, but has excelled academically on a course and is thus considered good quality directing staff material. In 1997, for example, 79,92 percent of the directing staff members responsible for the Junior, Senior, and Joint Command and Staff Course indicated that they were appointed directly after completion of the course they were directing at that stage.¹⁷⁰ Members who excel in the working and operational environments are not very often taken out of their positions to serve as members of the directing staff of the ETD institutions. In addition, the SANDF have no clear career path for the development of individual officers to expose them to particular working and operational environments in order to appoint them as directing staff members at these institutions later.¹⁷¹ It seems as if it might be safe to conclude that “non-performers” often end up as members of the directing staff at ETD institutions.

The lack of experience in the training and educational system is compounded by the up-or-out personnel systems of the SANDF – though it should be noted that the SANDF has some problems with the “out” part of the system; “getting rid of the troublemakers and underachievers in its midst”.¹⁷² In addition, the different military ranks in the SANDF are linked to specific

¹⁶⁸ Interview with a European officer serving on the directing staff of a senior military ETD institution in Pretoria, 22 June 2005.

¹⁶⁹ Engelbrecht, L, “Going Ballistic’ – The SANDF Six Years On”, op. cit.

¹⁷⁰ *Die Uitdagings wat die Departement van Verdediging die Hoof moet bied tydens die Onderrigproses met die Aanbied van Hoër Onderwys binne die Raamwerk van die Suid-Afrikaanse Grondwet, die Heropbou en Ontwikkelingsprogram, die Wet op die Kwalifikasie Outoriteit en die Witskrif op Verdediging*, op. cit., p. 21.

¹⁷¹ A brigadier-general on the joint training staff of the SANDF specifically referred to the example of Kenya where potential directing staff members for their staff college are identified and a particular two- to three-year career path for the individual is developed in preparation of his appointment at the staff college. Interviewed in Pretoria, 21 June 2005.

¹⁷² Engelbrecht, L, “Going Ballistic’ – The SANDF Six Years On”, op. cit. It is a widely known fact that the SANDF has problems in retiring personnel that are supernumerary because of the protection of

(public service commission) salary levels. This implies that the only way by which an individual can better his own personal financial position is by acquiring a higher rank.¹⁷³ Such a system usually leads to rank inflation within a military system, while it also tends to draw some of the most experienced and professional non-commissioned officers – the backbone of any armed force – into the officer corps. There is no tradition like that of the British Army, for example, through which experienced and well-trained individuals are kept in the system at relatively low rank (lieutenant colonel) but with increased salary, pension and other benefits. Employment of retired military officers as civilians in the training and educational environment, like the U.S. armed forces, is another effective way of capturing experience and feeding it into the system.¹⁷⁴ A retired general that also has the relevant academic qualifications, for example, is an ideal candidate to serve as a member of the directing staff of an ETD institution. Yet, nowhere does the South African military employ such people.¹⁷⁵

To make matters worse, there are almost no incentives for any member of the SANDF to serve as a directing staff member at ETD institutions. At most military training and educational institutions in the world, appointment as a directing staff member often implies that the armed force recognises the quality of the specific individual and that the appointment opens a whole new career path in terms of promotion and appointments for the individual officer. At present an instructor's allowance (R522,50 per month) is paid to the directing staff members of (some) ETD institutions. Yet, there is no correlation between the amount being paid and the extra responsibility and efforts that are demanded from the directing staff of these institutions.¹⁷⁶

these people by the very rigid South African labour laws. It should also be kept in mind that there is no "tradition" of retiring from the military in South Africa at such an age that allows for a second career in the private sector or another part of the public sector. There are no incentives, like pension benefits, that encourage people to retire, while South Africa is also a country with a very high unemployment rate.

¹⁷³ It should be noted that, in the case of professional officers like doctors, military lawyers and military university educators (the academic staff of the Military Academy, as an example), salaries are not linked to rank. Thus, this statement applies primarily to what in the SANDF is referred to as the "military practitioners".

¹⁷⁴ Rhynedance, GH, *More Civilians on the West Point Faculty: Good for the Army, or Not?* Thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree Masters of Military Art and Science, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1993.

¹⁷⁵ Please note that this has been tried for a short while at the SA Army College. However, the practise was abandoned for some unknown reason. Discussion with a general from the Joint Training Formation of the SANDF at the Military Academy, 11 August 2005.

¹⁷⁶ An opinion expressed by a senior member of the directing staff of the South African Defence Intelligence College, Pretoria, 24 June 2005.

4.6.3 Balancing representivity and affirmative action

It is argued that politics in the New South Africa is often viewed through the lens of the liberation struggle with racism as the basic problem and black solidarity as the only answer.¹⁷⁷ Racism is indeed a serious problem in the SANDF.¹⁷⁸ Yet, the general approach towards racism in the SANDF, and at the ETD institutions in particular, seems to be one of "... do not prosecute, do not punish, do not forgive, and, above all, do not forget".¹⁷⁹ An unnatural (but politically necessary) emphasis on the need for representivity and affirmative action led to race being very prominent in the appointment of directing staff and the composition of the learner body at ETD institutions in the SANDF. In the initial period after 1994, the biggest driving factor behind this phenomenon at ETD institutions was the requirement to address representivity at higher levels of command in the SANDF without delay. To ensure representivity in the command and staff echelons of the SANDF a large number of (black) statutory force¹⁸⁰ and non-statutory force members had to be qualified at these ETD institutions as quickly as possible. The discrepancy between the composition of the learner body (mainly black and former non-statutory forces) and the directing staff (mainly white and former statutory forces) specifically heightened racial tension at ETD institutions in the initial period after 1994.

This racial tension was accentuated by suspicion and distrust between the different integrated armed groupings. When the SANDF started to appoint members of the non-statutory forces as members of the directing staff at ETD institutions, another form of disequilibrium was created. On the whole, these former non-statutory force members had very little bureaucratic military experience and they often found it difficult to understand the nature and functioning of a bureaucratized professional military. They very often did not have much conventional military experience either. However, the majority of the former statutory force members grew up in a bureaucratized military and were well-trained (or at least exercised) in conventional warfighting. Thus, the non-statutory members of the directing staff often were perceived by previous members of the SADF as not having much legitimacy as directing staff at ETD institutions.

ETD institutions also experience pressure from higher authorities to present "user-friendly" courses. Financial constraints necessitate cost-effectiveness – there is no money for members to repeat courses in which they were not successful. There was also a big back-log of SANDF

¹⁷⁷ Herbst, J, "Mbeki's South Africa", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol 84, No 6, Nov/Dec 2005, pp. 93-105.

¹⁷⁸ Engelbrecht, L, "'Going Ballistic' – The SANDF Six Years On", op. cit.

¹⁷⁹ Huntington, SP, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*, University Press Oklahoma Press, Norman, 1991, p. 231. I have to thank Lt Col Niel Bennet, British Royal Marines, a member of the Directing Staff of the SANWC for pointing out this phenomenon in the SANDF. Interview in Pretoria, 22 June 2005.

members who had to do these courses. Problems further arose as a result of perceptions by former statutory force members of the directing staff that everything was blamed on racism if members of the learner body did not adhere to the required standard and it was pointed out as such. The result was a brain-drain since a large number of well-trained, often well-educated and experienced members left the military.¹⁸¹ The exodus of people from the SANDF, though, was welcomed in the name of downsizing, representivity and affirmative action.

It is interesting to note that some analysts draw historic parallels between what is happening in the defence force at present and what happened when the National Party assumed power in 1948. Experienced English-speaking officers were driven out of the defence force in very much the same manner as that in which the post-1994 defence force got rid of white soldiers. Engelbrecht, for example argues:

What we have now is an "oak tree" defence force: despite healthy outward appearances, it is weak and hollow in the middle. Indeed, there is growing opinion that we are back to the bleak days of the 1950s – the time after the infamous "Erasmus purges". Then defence minister Frans Erasmus had stripped the Union Defence Force (UDF) of much of its capacity by sacking capable English-speaking (sic) officers and replacing them with indifferent Afrikaners, often newly-promoted sergeants.¹⁸²

However, a positive spin-off of the emphasis on affirmative action and representivity was the cultural sensitivity and understanding for differences that it brought along. As one officer pointed out, it is only through his experience of differences that he built up a recognition and appreciation for his own uniqueness.¹⁸³ One of the defining characteristics of apartheid was ideological, physical and emotional separation of the South African society. As Owen pointed out in 1986, "White South Africans tend to profess an undying love for a country they hardly know, whose people often frighten them, and whose stark beauty they constantly try to change in imitation of Europe".¹⁸⁴ Thus, an appreciation was developed by members of the South African military for the depth and richness of the South African society. This in itself was a very

¹⁸⁰ This specifically includes members of the armed forces of the former homeland states: Venda, Transkei, Bophuthatswana and Ciskei.

¹⁸¹ These are the opinions of the author based on his own experience as a student at the SA Army College and other ETD institutions and as a member of the Faculty of Military Science (South African Military Academy), Stellenbosch University. It was confirmed in discussions with a number of SANDF members from both the former statutory and non-statutory forces.

¹⁸² Engelbrecht, L, "SANDF at 10: An Assessment", *African Armed Forces Journal*, February 2004, p. 9.

¹⁸³ Discussion with a senior officer at the South African Military Academy, 2 August 2005.

¹⁸⁴ Owen, K, "The Way Forward: The Press", In Jacobs, G (ed.), *South Africa: The Road Ahead*, Ball, Johannesburg, 1986, p. 231.

educational experience for especially white members of the SANDF, who for a very long time isolated themselves from the broader South African society.

4.6.4 A skewed education, training and development budget

Budgetary constraints will always remain a challenging reality for armed forces in general and for their ETD in particular. In the SANDF, this is an especially thorny issue with the military in the New South Africa struggling with an egregious lack of resources to meet its minimum requirements. In general, the lack of resources is associated with three particular considerations. There was, firstly, a clear shift in government priorities. The South African national budget has a clear welfare focus aimed at increasing the standard of living of the average South African. Defence spending was one of the areas that were eroded to finance the welfare-focused budget. The Department of Defence budget allocation for the financial year (FY) 89/90 was 3.9% of the gross national product (GNP). In the FY 94/95, this was reduced to 2.2% and in the FY 00/01, it was further reduced to 1.5% of the GNP.¹⁸⁵ In 2003, Tanzania was the only country in the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) with a lower military expenditure as a percentage of GDP than South Africa: 1,5 percent versus the South African 1,6 percent.¹⁸⁶ In the FY 04/05, South African defence spending was 1,4 percent of GDP.¹⁸⁷ Secondly, the enormous cost of integrating and downsizing the human resources of the SANDF in the wake of the 1994 democratisation exacerbated the challenge of coping with a shrinking defence budget. Lastly, the South African government utilised the military extensively for advancing its visions of an African Renaissance and participation in the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD). South Africa's participation in regional peace missions in particular strained the financial resources of the SANDF.¹⁸⁸ From this perspective the real challenge was not how to deal with the shrinking budget but rather how to cope with the rising operational commitments of the SANDF in view of the smaller budget. This led to a situation where the financial allocations to the different internal SANDF structures were eroded and minimised in order to keep up with operational commitments.¹⁸⁹ Increasingly questions were being asked about combat readiness in the SANDF.¹⁹⁰

¹⁸⁵ Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Military Expenditure Database. Available at <http://first.sipri.org/non_first/milex.php> [10 April 2006]

¹⁸⁶ Harris, G, "Towards More Rational Military Budget Formation in Sub-Sahara Africa: The Relevance of Security Sector Reform", *Strategic Review of South Africa*, Vol XXVII, No 1, May 2005, p 68.

¹⁸⁷ For a comprehensive analysis of the South African Defence Budget as percentage of the GDP see the analysis of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Military Expenditure Database. Available at <http://first.sipri.org/non_first/milex.php> [10 April 2006]

¹⁸⁸ Gibson, E, "Vredesoldate van SA Moet Langer Bly", *Die Burger*, 5 September 2005.

¹⁸⁹ Gibson, E, "SA Weermag 'Verteer Homself'", *Die Burger*, 24 August 2005.

¹⁹⁰ Gibson, E, "Weermag in Verknorsing oor Geldkrisis", *Die Burger*, 22 August 2005.

There is no doubt that the cutbacks of the ETD budget over a period of time have affected the quality of ETD in the SANDF.¹⁹¹ The budget allocation for the Joint Training Formation for the FY 04/05 was R101 108 m. With a funding requirement of R133 621 m, this implied that the Formation was only 75 percent funded.¹⁹² An amount of R132 465 m was required for the FY 05/06 of which only R107 672 m was allocated, i.e. 81 percent of the required funding.¹⁹³ A senior member of the SA Army College also pointed out that they at all times experience pressure from higher headquarters to be “... as affordable as possible” in the running of the programme.¹⁹⁴ The lack of funding is further exacerbated by the existence of four service colleges, the War College and the Defence College – 6 colleges to qualify SANDF officers from tacticians to strategists. A country like Britain, for example, has beside the Royal Military Academy only one ETD institution that is responsible for officer training and education on all levels. The Chief Joint Training of the SANDF is very explicit in indicating that the under-funding of ETD in the South African military should be seen in a very serious light as the impact thereof will only become visible in the medium to long term. “As the under-funding relates directly to the professional development of the members and employees of the DOD,” it is stated, “the situation will arise whereby the DOD might not have competent personnel as required by the Constitution and other legislation.”¹⁹⁵ It is also pointed out that the shortage of funds means that posts that are vacant will remain vacant until additional funding has been allocated. The upgrading of ETD facilities, in particular, seems to be a major problem.

4.6.5 Doctrinal development in the South African National Defence Force

Major military doctrinal changes influenced ETD in the SANDF since 1994. Three changes featured prominently in this regard.¹⁹⁶ The first of these was the recognition that future military operations will require an increased joint and multi-national focus – operations in which the ability of more than one of the services and more than one country will be needed. An emphasis on jointness always has a positive effect on the problem of inter-service rivalry. This, for example, led to the creation of the National War College at which not only officers from different services were trained together, but where the presence of foreign officers also became

¹⁹¹ See, for example, the remarks by Hartley on the difficulty the SANDF experienced in funding the regional military commitments along with routine training and maintenance. Hartley, W, “African Peace Burden Cannot be SA’s Alone Warns Lekota”, *Business Day*, 16 February 2005.

¹⁹² South African Department of Defence, *Joint Training Formation Level 2 Strategic Business Plans FY 2005/6 to FY 2007/8*, Joint Training Formation, 27 May 2004, p. 3.

¹⁹³ South African Department of Defence, *Joint Training Formation Level 2 Strategic Business Plans FY 2006/7 to FY 2008/9*, Joint Training Formation, 20 April 2005, p. 4.

¹⁹⁴ Interview with a member of the directing staff of the SA Army College, Pretoria, 7 July 2004.

¹⁹⁵ *Joint Training Formation Level 2 Strategic Business Plans FY 2006/7 to FY 2008/9*, op. cit., p. 4.

the rule rather than the exception. The increased need for military diplomacy and for the South African military to be an active role player on the African continent in support of governmental initiatives and visions were the dominant drivers in the development of this emphasis.

The defence force, secondly, has had to adapt itself to project force over very large distances. Strategic and operational force projection was and still is a very unique challenge in the African theatre of operations with its lack of infrastructure. The extent to which this challenge has influenced military thinking and education, if at all, is not clear. Its influence on the SANDF's ability to conduct operations is, however, beyond any doubt. It was also a driving factor in recent decisions by the South African government on the procurement of new equipment for the South African military. For example, the decision to buy new transport aircraft, replacing the aging South African Air Force fleet of C130s, is directly related to the need to deploy and sustain forces over long distances in Africa.

Lastly, the need to use military forces in so-called non-traditional roles became important and was reflected in new doctrine and in the curricula of the ETD institutions. Indeed, this became a debated issue, even in academic circles, with questions being asked about how primary the primary mission of the SANDF really is.¹⁹⁷ It has since been accepted that the secondary roles¹⁹⁸ – MOOTW – will be an important part of the job description of the South African armed forces in future. In particular, the use of military power not to create peace but to keep the peace that has already been created features very prominently on the operational agenda of the SANDF in Africa.

The need for new doctrine in the SANDF also emphasised the need to equip experienced members with the ability to develop such doctrine. Doctrinal writing is an active process, "... a cocktail – often mixed by relatively junior officers".¹⁹⁹ The development of doctrine is rooted in the interplay between experience (military history), active debate (about military futures) and (theoretical) academic writing (about military tactical, operational, strategic and other issues). The ability to develop well-rounded doctrine is, thus, to a large extent rooted in the intellectual capacity and nature of a specific military. To put it differently, the quality of a military's doctrine is a reflection of the quality of its thinking. This in turn will be a reflection of its operational

¹⁹⁶ For a more in-depth discussion of these changes see the following article: Esterhuyse, AJ, "The Death of Six Soldiers in the DRC: The SANDF on the Domestic Political Agenda", *Electronic Briefing Paper no 19/2004*, Centre for International Political Studies, University of Pretoria, 23 April 2004.

¹⁹⁷ See, for example, the following article: Williams, R, "How Primary is the Primary Function? Configuring the SANDF for African Realities", *African Security Review*, Vol 8, No 6, 1999.

¹⁹⁸ Defence against foreign aggression is seen as the primary role.

ability. In the words of Gooch, "... the way an army acts ... is determined to a very considerable degree by the way it thinks".²⁰⁰ There is serious doubt about the institutional capacity of the SANDF for quality doctrinal development. Consider, for example, the small number of South African officers who actively engage in any serious research and writing, the general anti-intellectual organisational culture in the SANDF, the obvious lack of debate and interest of anything military within and without the military in South Africa, and the tendency to copy foreign doctrine.²⁰¹

A senior army general pointed out that the writing of doctrine in the SANDF in general and in the SA Army in particular is impeded by the lack of strategic guidance from the political environment on what is required from the military in future. There is no clear governmental security policy,²⁰² whilst operationalising idealised political ideas like human and collaborative security into concrete military concepts and roles also presents a problem. The result was a difficulty to identify clearly what the military should prepare for in future. There was thus no lower order vision within the services of what they should look like or how they should operate (fight) in future. From a doctrinal perspective, the problem is accentuated by a tendency in the SANDF to have a bottom-up approach in the writing of doctrine – a legacy from the SADF – a tendency that was rooted in the notion that new technology is the primary driver in doctrinal change.²⁰³

Another factor in the development of doctrine in the SANDF is the lack of a dedicated institution or command with the responsibility to write doctrine. At present, it is the responsibility of different commands and formations. The Joint Operations Division, for example, is responsible for the writing of joint doctrine, while the individual services are responsible for service-unique doctrine. Doctrine is further fragmented within the services. In the SA Army, for example, Infantry Formation is responsible for infantry doctrine and Armour Formation for armour doctrine. The doctrinal directorates within the different headquarters have to manage the development of the doctrine that is produced by these different commands and institutions.

A number of remarks need to be made in this regard. Doctrine, firstly, is not the primary responsibility of these formations and commands. Needless to say, in the military context a

¹⁹⁹ Gooch, J, "Introduction: Military Doctrine and Military History", In Gooch, J (ed.), "The Origins of Contemporary Doctrine", *Strategic and Combat Studies Institute Occasional Paper Number 30*, Camberley, September 1997, p. 6.

²⁰⁰ Ibid.

²⁰¹ Foreign military manuals are often seen at ETD institutions in the SANDF. It is also obvious to see that South African doctrine is sometimes quite literally the exact same as that in foreign doctrinal manuals – British manuals to be specific.

²⁰² Jordaan, E, *South African Defence since 1994: A Study in Policy-Making*, Unpublished MMil thesis, Stellenbosch University, Stellenbosch, December 2004.

²⁰³ Telephonic interview with a senior SA Army General, 2 August 2005.

secondary responsibility is mostly only dealt with if there is time available – which is almost never the case. One officer responsible for doctrinal writing in the SA Army, for example, pointed out that his biggest challenge is “... finding people with the ability to write”.²⁰⁴ A mid-ranking naval officer also pointed out that there is “... no shortage of good ideas and opinions in the Navy, but (that) there is an unwillingness (*or inability*) to write it down” (emphasis added).²⁰⁵ Secondly, there is almost no interaction between the ETD institutions and those responsible for new doctrine, as is the case in most modern armed forces. This leads to questions about the practicability or feasibility of the doctrine that is written; whether it is “tested”, in war games for example, before it becomes official doctrine. War games, or “battle simulation” as it is referred to in the SANDF, focus primarily on the planning of military operations and not on the testing of doctrine.²⁰⁶ Therefore, questions need to be raised about whether new doctrine in the SANDF is put through a process of debate and critique to ensure it is refined. Lastly, the management process for the development and promulgation of new doctrine is very bureaucratic. It is an accepted fact that the more bureaucratic a process, the less room there is for professional critique and debate about the changes that are proposed and the more difficult it is to make that changes in a quick and efficient manner.²⁰⁷

4.6.6 The two worlds of military discipline

The birth of the New South Africa with its roots in the negotiated settlement of 1994 had a profound impact on the nature of military authority and discipline. This change and impact were brought about (*inter alia*) by the integration of the different forces and their accompanying cultures in the SANDF. There has been a clear move away from authoritarian domination towards a reliance on explanation, persuasion, negotiation and group consensus.²⁰⁸ Observed from within the organisation and compared to the period immediately before 1994, members of the military at present appear to be inclined to be more considerate and to practise caution and prudence to avoid misunderstandings, tension and ill feeling. On a personal level, they are called upon to use diplomatic skill, to seek compromises by means of consensus and to be tolerant of others. These are also the attributes that underpin a true educational and professional ethos. The attributes encourage debate, critical questioning and diverse views, and challenges old paradigms. This approach to discipline is enshrined in the South African Constitution.

²⁰⁴ Telephonic interview with a SA Army officer, 2 August 2005.

²⁰⁵ Personal conversation with the captain (SAN) responsible for maritime doctrinal development in the South African Navy, Military Academy, 31 October 2005.

²⁰⁶ E-mail correspondence with the residential historian of the National War College in Pretoria, 28 November 2005.

²⁰⁷ Telephonic interview with a senior SA Army General, 2 August 2005.

However, this approach to discipline and education is questioned within conservative circles among both the former non-statutory and the statutory forces. The central concern is whether it will be a suitable approach in the warfighting milieu. Indeed, discipline is identified as one of a number of serious challenges the SANDF is facing at present.²⁰⁹ This doubt is also rooted in the seemingly inability of the SANDF to clearly demarcate the line between professional military discipline and misplaced loyalty to higher (party-political and military) authority – finding the right balance between military and civilian societal cultures.²¹⁰ Professional military discipline is inherent undemocratic in nature. Inevitably, tensions arise because democratic states have to rely on undemocratic institutions in order to protect democracy. It is, however, important for democratic states to distinguish between the need to tolerate undemocratic security institutions and the need to manage these institutions in a democratic manner.

The cohesion and other attributes that are required for military forces to be successful in the application of force require a unique approach to discipline that sometimes may be the direct opposite of the norm and approach to discipline in democratic civilian societies. Langston, for example, pointed out that the American public admires their armed forces for their "... famously non-democratic organisational culture".²¹¹ In short, the military should have a disciplined understanding of the (conservative) organisational values that are required to protect (liberal) societal values. Such an approach seems to be absent in the SANDF. It is interesting, for example, to note that in a report in 2001 by the commander of the British Military Advisory Training Team some of the problems in the SANDF that were pointed out specifically relate to discipline. These include *inter alia*:

- the standards had dropped, discipline had suffered and the effectiveness and deployability of the SANDF was lower than it should have been;
- as many as 8 000 members were awaiting court martial;
- the unwillingness to accept responsibility and the dubious level of staff work between the levels of lieutenant colonel and major general;
- the most common grievance in units was frustration about promotion, because the complainants wanted additional pay but not the responsibility associated with it;

²⁰⁸ Interview with a senior SANDF officer, Bloemfontein, 28 June 2004.

²⁰⁹ Engelbrecht, L, "'Going Ballistic' – The SANDF Six Years On", op. cit.

²¹⁰ The view of a senior officer at 43 Brigade of the SA Army. Conversation at 46 Brigade Headquarters, Kensington, Johannesburg, 2 June 2005.

²¹¹ Langston, TS, "The Civilian Side of Military Culture", *Parameters*, Vol XXX, No 3, Autumn 2000, p. 24.

- the SANDF was too accommodating to individual circumstances, for example, to uncommitted members who regard the military as a day job and not a career commitment; and
- too many of the officers and non-commissioned officers had become wary of imposing discipline in case they were going to be accused of being racist.²¹²

The training and educational system of a military is the only available “tool” for the inculcation of a culture of discipline and an understanding of the nature of military discipline. The ETD institutions of the SANDF should be the leaders in this regard. At present, it is unfortunately not the case.

4.6.7 English as the language of command

Another factor that influenced the nature of ETD in the SANDF was the acceptance of English as its language of command.²¹³ The decision was clearly based on operational needs and the necessity to have one language as a command and operating language. This need is understandable and there is no reason to question the decision. It is however important to recognise that a multilingual environment always complicates training and education.²¹⁴ This is especially true in a country that has eleven official languages.²¹⁵ Training and educating people in an environment where English is neither the first language of the trainees nor of the trainers and educators, will certainly have a detrimental impact on the quality of the education. Instructors, directing staff and educators at ETD institutions often express the need for the development of English language skills, particularly writing skills, in the SANDF.

4.6.8 The anti-intellectual organisational climate

Quality ETD is not possible without research, and quality research forms the bedrock of an intellectual organisational climate and quality training and education. Research is being done at a number of centres and organisations within the SANDF. One such institution is the Centre for Military Studies. For a variety of reasons, however, the research output of the Centre for

²¹² Parliamentary Monitoring Group, “BMATT Report – February 2001”, *Defence Joint Standing Committee Integration Report: Briefing 13 June 2001*, Appendix 2. Available at <<http://www.pmg.org.za/viewminute.htm?id=711>> [10 August 2005]

²¹³ Harmse, M, "The New Language Policy" *Salut*, June 1998, pp. 14-17.

²¹⁴ South African Department of Defence, “Summary of Factors that Influence the Transfer of the Lecturer’s Message (and Ultimately Student Performance) in a (multilingual) Lecturing Situation”, Submission to the Teaching and Learning Committee: 20 July 2005, Attachment to the Agenda of a Faculty Board Meeting at the Military Academy on 27 July 2005.

²¹⁵ English is the first language of about 10% of the members of the SANDF. Interview with senior SA Army general at the Military Academy, 7 December 2004.

Military Studies has declined remarkably over the last number of years.²¹⁶ Indeed, research and writing are not seen as part of the professional make-up of officers in the SANDF. The dualism between doers and thinkers in the SANDF may provide some understanding of this problematique.²¹⁷

In the SANDF, the operationally inclined culture that was inherited from the SADF – the predominance of the doers – has been enforced by a number of factors. There is, for instance, no academically-oriented journal that encourages officers to write and debate doctrinal and other issues.²¹⁸ There is also no incentive for officers to engage in serious research and writing, and security is a controversial issue.²¹⁹ Reading, the basis for any form of research, is not “... the in thing” at all, and there is no “... habit of reading” in the South African military.²²⁰ This stands in stark contrast to the defence force of a country like Ghana, for example, where officer cadets are required to read about 20 books as part of their education. They have to purchase these books out of their own salaries as the basis of their professional libraries.²²¹

There is no co-ordinating body and budget for research in the SANDF, while the SANDF often interferes in the research output of academics in the military system.²²² The result is that most of what has been written about the SANDF was done by (sometimes uninformed) academics and journalists outside the defence force. In principle, there is nothing wrong with academics and other researchers outside the military writing about the SANDF. A problem arises however when most of the prescribed literature of a defence force is acquired from outside sources, with officers not debating the issues that concern the heart of their profession.²²³

²¹⁶ This is clearly evident from an analysis of the annual reports of the Centre for Military Studies and the tendency to appoint very junior (black) academics with almost no research experience and output in research posts. This is done mostly because of the need for affirmative action.

²¹⁷ Doers – operationally inclined officers, and thinkers – academically inclined officers.

²¹⁸ *SA Soldier* is nothing but a popular magazine, while *Scientia Militaria*, on the other hand, is a purely Department of Education accredited academic research journal that publishes peer-reviewed academic articles. There is an urgent need for a journal that is aimed somewhere between these two extremes in the genre of the *Military Review* published by the U.S. Army General Command and Staff College.

²¹⁹ Department of Defence, CSANDF, *Communication Instruction No 01/2000: Uncontrolled Release of Information*, August 2000, CSANDF/CDCC/511/2. Authorisation is required from the Minister of Defence "for the release of other forms of information like speeches, presentations, etc. at public seminars and all public appearances".

²²⁰ Jooste, J, op. cit., p. 7.

²²¹ Engelbrecht, L, “Going Ballistic’ – The SANDF Six Years On”, op. cit.

²²² This specific problem has been experienced by academics at the Military Academy.

²²³ Brig Gen J. Smit, for example, pointed out that almost no “positional” or “staff papers” are being written within the Department of Defence except those that are written as part of formal programmes at the different ETD institutions. View expressed during discussions with the School for Security and Africa Studies at the Military Academy, 10 August 2005.

The lack of a culture of research is rooted in an anti-intellectual organisational climate that predominates in the SANDF, and the reality of the SANDF not being a learning organisation. One of the directing staff members of the SANWC, for example, explains the nature of this problem by indicating that the SANDF has these “excellent ETD institutions”. However, periods between visits to these centres are times of intellectual death for the majority of officers simply because they do not engage in any military reading or debating of higher order military issues at an intellectual level.²²⁴ Another officer describes the SANDF as being “conceptually bankrupt”.²²⁵ In a recent study done by Heinecken, it was found that 14,8 percent of the SANDF officers attending programmes at the Army and War Colleges have a degree and 9,4 percent a post-graduate qualification. In the United Kingdom, the corresponding percentages are 21,9 and 52,8, in Germany 54,7 and 37,2, and in Canada 61,2 and 28,2 respectively.²²⁶ In an investigation into operational level staff courses that eventually led to the creation of the National War College, it was noted that “... a more practical and competency-based approach is required, with learners exiting the course with a set of competencies as opposed to a large amount of conceptual knowledge. Thus the focus should be at the level of skills acquisition, with the final evaluation of the acquired competence occurring within the workplace or possibly within an assessment centre”.²²⁷ The emphasis on a skills-driven and not an intellectually based approach on such a senior course reflects the general attitude of the SANDF towards knowledge.

A senior general of the SA Army pointed out that the lack of intellectualism and the challenge of the SANDF not being a learning organisation need to be seen as a strategic problem within the organisation, a problem that requires the attention of the highest command levels in the SANDF. However, most of the senior officers in the SANDF, i.e. those from both the previous non-statutory and statutory forces, grew up in organisations that were operationally inclined and anti-intellectual by nature. One analyst explains it in computeristic terms by indicating that “... senior officers, warrant officers and NCOs [in the SANDF] have been programmed with corrupt software in their earlier careers”.²²⁸ Members with a background in the non-statutory forces – thus the majority of the current SANDF leadership – have an even bigger disadvantage since they have no in-depth experience, knowledge and understanding of the inherent nature of a bureaucratised professional armed force and its operations. Consequently, it will be correct to

²²⁴ Interview with a member of the directing staff of the SANWC, 6 July 2004

²²⁵ Discussion with a colonel from the Joint Operations Division of the SANDF at the Military Academy, 24 October 2005.

²²⁶ Heinecken, L, *Military Unionism and the New Dynamics of Employee Relations*, Unpublished PhD dissertation, Kings College, Department of War Studies, London, 2005, p. 227.

²²⁷ South African Department of Defence, Joint Training Formation, “Project Profusion Presentation: Military Training for Officers Part 2”, *Project Profusion: Military Training for Officers Part Two (MTO-2)*: SA Navy, J TRG/R/103/1/8/1, October 2001, p. 3.

conclude that the SANDF at present does not have an understanding firstly of what the constituent elements of a learning organisation are, and secondly what is required to transform the SANDF into a learning and more intellectual type of organisation.²²⁹

4.6.9 The bureaucratic nature of the South African military

There seems to be a general agreement amongst analysts that the SANDF has become increasingly more bureaucratized and operationally impotent since 1994, in other words, it has become a staff-driven and not a command-driven defence force. There are multiple and diverse reasons for this phenomenon; some more obvious than others. The auditing firm-driven reorganisation of the SANDF in the mid-1990s does feature as a prominent reason. The absence of a culture and ethos of regimentalised military leadership and traditions is another prominent reason. The principle of commanders reporting to commanders and staff officers to staff officers was not operationalised in the restructuring of the SANDF, thus creating a vagueness concerning command and control. In many of the training and education programmes, management is presented as a separate subject. Military or defence leadership, however, does not feature in any of the programmes as a clearly demarcated component. This translates into a defence force with one of the highest tooth-to-tail ratios in the world – huge number of generals, staff officers and higher headquarters in relation to commanders and employable formations. The presence of an occupational and not an institutional approach in the management of personnel transforms the SANDF in another 9-5 employment agency. In a recent study done by Heineken 29,9 percent of the officers who were questioned in the SANDF indicated that they joined the military because they wanted a job with regular working hours and good fringe benefits. This is in stark contrast to the 6,1 percent in the United Kingdom, 16,5 percent in Canada, and 10,3 percent in Germany.²³⁰

In the mid-1990s, the SANDF initiated a programme to foster a mission-driven approach to command in the SANDF. This so-called Leadership, Command and Management Programme (LCAMP), however, itself became a victim of the highly centralised directive approach to command in the SANDF. The reliance on a directive and not a mission-driven approach in the SANDF is the result of two considerations. As in all defence forces, the SANDF cannot sustain

²²⁸ Engelbrecht, L, “‘Going Ballistic’ – The SANDF Six Years On”, op. cit.

²²⁹ Telephonic interview with a senior general from the SA Army, 2 August 2005. It is also very evident from the nature of the current debate concerning ETD in the SANDF and the inability of the military to determine what precisely needs to be done in order to rectify the challenges that are experienced in the system. One senior officer working in the Joint Training Division that is involved in this process, for example, phoned the author and asked what (training) course they need to develop in order to develop the ability of officers to think analytically.

²³⁰ Heineken, L, *Military Unionism and the New Dynamics of Employee Relations*, op. cit., p. 229.

a mission-driven command approach if there is any doubt about, firstly, the trust between and, secondly, the competency of its members. There is indeed serious doubt about the level of trust in the SANDF – between the members themselves and between leaders and subordinates. One of the root causes for this is the high level of crime in South Africa in general and in the SANDF in particular. This is nowhere more visible than in the control measures that are used in the SANDF to ensure that money is spent in an appropriate manner. Stringent control measures make it almost impossible for formations, units and individuals to spend budgets.

The problem is that bureaucracy has staying power – once established, it is difficult to get rid of it again. It will be extremely difficult to change the prevalent culture of management through consensus in the SANDF into one of sound military leadership, the current structure of undecodable command affiliations into clear command and control arrangements, and the current logistical system that has spawned personal fiefdoms into one of “just-in-time” delivery?²³¹ The current bureaucratized nature of the SANDF influenced its training and education in two ways. Firstly, bureaucracies always reflect a resistance to change. Therefore, the more bureaucratized the SANDF, the more difficult will it be to make the changes necessary for a rigorous ETD system. Secondly, the ETD system provides an important pathway for change from a bureaucratized organisational culture to a command-driven strategic culture. This necessitates an urgent appreciation of the curricula of the different colleges to find the right balance between management to command.

4.6.10 Politics and merit in the South African National Defence Force

Since 1994, the political and strategic leadership of the military in South Africa has been transformed to the extent that the Minister of Defence, his deputy, the Secretary of Defence and the chief of defence all come from the same political party and liberation movement background.²³² This may contribute to political stability and ensuring the subordination of the military. However, it has the potential of creating a brotherhood culture. The SANDF indeed did not escape the higher order political culture that developed within South Africa since 1994. This culture is rooted in a number of considerations.

Loyalty to higher political authorities and struggle credentials became increasingly more important in the SANDF than individual competency, skill and expertise. This misplaced loyalty

²³¹ Engelbrecht, L, "SANDF at 10: An Assessment", op. cit. p. 8.

²³² Cawthra, G, "Security Governance in South Africa", op. cit., p. 98.

is augmented by a tendency to see everything through a racial lens.²³³ Herbst, for example, argues that, according to the world-view of Thabo Mbeki and the ANC – formed by years of struggle and unaffected by over a decade of democratic politics – racism is still the driving force behind all social dynamics, and racial solidarity is still the only answer to many of the basic problems in South Africa.²³⁴ Underlying this argument is the view that Euro-Africans (white South Africans) do not and cannot understand the African way of doing. Euro-Africans are seen as still feeling disempowered, having lost the political power in South Africa and, in general, they are regarded as biased in their view of the ability of their fellow (black) South Africans to manage and govern. Misplaced loyalty and racism are, thirdly, justified through an uncritical acceptance of the fact that apartheid was evil and the struggle noble – without any nuance in the understanding of any of the notions.²³⁵

The challenge is that these accepted wisdoms have been raised to an ideology and, as always, there will be ideologists who take things too far. It is also a fact that the more ideologically infused a specific process is, the less room there is for finding pragmatic solutions to complicated problems. In short, political expediency has become an important consideration and in some instances it has replaced merit in the SANDF. The politically inclined organisational culture of the non-statutory forces has to a large extent replaced the meritocracy of the SADF in the newly formed SANDF.²³⁶ This, without a doubt, had a profound influence on training and education in the SANDF, particularly as regards who are allowed to attend courses and for what reason and which views are tolerated and which not.²³⁷ This, in turn, had an influence on the learning experience provided to the students. The question can indeed be asked whether anything has changed in this regard in the South African military since the 1980s, that is except the political authorities and the kind of topics that are allowed for discussion.

Most of the SANDF ETD programmes available to officers have no criteria for admission, except appropriate rank and a nomination that is done based on a list of seniority – the exception being the Military Academy, which requires a formal application, proper screening and an acceptance by a selection board. The point, though, is that there is no testing of the intellectual,

²³³ Sonn, F, “SA se Wenresep ly skade: Dreigende Gevaartekens van nuwe Swart Nasionalisme”, *Die Burger*, 8 August 2006, p. 17; Du Plessis, T, “n Siek Politieke Kultuur in die ANC”, *Rapport*, Vol 36, No 28, 10 July 2005, p. 18.

²³⁴ Herbst, J, “Mbeki’s South Africa”, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol 84, No 6, Nov/Dec 2005, pp. 93-105.

²³⁵ Du Plessis, T, “n Siek Politieke Kultuur in die ANC”, *Rapport*, Vol 36, No 28, 10 July 2005, p. 18. The book Gumede, WM, *Thabo Mbeki and the Battle for the Soul of the ANC*, Zebra Press, Cape Town, 2005 also provides some insight into this particular phenomenon.

²³⁶ This particular point was raised by a number of officers who were interviewed in the SANDF. See also Kruys, G, op. cit., p. 9.

²³⁷ Gibson, E, “Weermag moet Kennis bo Transformasie ag”, *Die Burger*, 6 July 2006, p. 9.

professional and other abilities of candidates prior to any programme. The directing staff of the different institutions has, therefore, no indication whatsoever about a specific individual's ability to be successful in a specific programme. This is a vital challenge if the diverse nature of the people within the officer corps at present is considered in terms of backgrounds, educational qualifications and professional standards. This is an even bigger challenge if the expectation – indirect pressure – from higher headquarters of a 100 percent success rate is taken into account. Academic qualifications did not feature prominently during the integration process and the creation of the SANDF, an arrangement that served the political requirements of the period immediately after 1994. Experience and training were the only factors that were considered. The result is a huge discrepancy in the educational qualifications of individual officers of the same rank and to the extent that some officers have PhDs while others doing the same course have only basic literacy – to use an extreme example. This is not an optimal condition for the development of a learning curve for all members on course.²³⁸

It seems as if the SANDF is aware of most of these shortcomings. The South African Minister of Defence, Mr Mosiuoa Lekota, recently stated, “[s]ome of our efforts must now focus on the transformation of our training. This review must encompass the syllabi and different methods of training. Attention must also be given to our military training institutions, which need to be properly equipped, maintained and in many cases renovated”.²³⁹ A senior officer in the SANDF outlined some of the problems that need to be addressed. He indicated the following problems:

- certain ETD institutions (providers) and facilities are not optimally utilised due to their dispersed location;
- there is a lack of coordination and a shortage of qualified and current ETD practitioners;
- the professional development of the reserve forces is being neglected;
- ETD facilities are not sustained or upgradeable;
- there is little or no focus on research and development;
- there is a lack of compliance with the NQF (SAQA-recognised qualifications and accreditation);
- a lack of capacity for the education of non-commissioned and warrant officers as well as civilian employees of the DOD is being experienced;
- training is not outcome-based; and

²³⁸ Telephonic conversation with a general officer of the Chief Joint Training Formation of the SANDF, 29 September 2005. He indicated that the SANDF is aware of this particular problem and is in the processes of developing measures to address it. He specifically referred to the development of an assessment centre to test the language, cognitive and other abilities of individual officers before they are allowed on course.

²³⁹ *Defence Budget Vote*, op cit.

- there is a lack of “common and joint ETD”.²⁴⁰

4.7 CONCLUSIONS

Education in South Africa has a long history of turmoil and friction. Since 1994, this translated into an urgent need to transform education in South Africa in an effort to allow more people access to the system. This process of change was driven by important policy changes as contained in various White Papers. However, the transformation had to face a number of tensions that threatened to derail the process of transformation. The lack of financial resources is an important consideration in this regard. Competency and other capacity issues also negatively affect the implementation of the policies. It is against this background of need for education, on the one hand, and challenges in the presentation thereof, on the other, that the need for military education in South Africa should be understood and discussed.

The geo-strategic and policy environment of the SANDF has changed dramatically since 1994. These changes were to a large extent driven by, on an external strategic level, the notion of collaborative security and, on an internal policy level, human security. Not only has the foreign and domestic external environment of the SANDF been changed. Internal organisational changes were required in an effort to amalgamate previously belligerent forces, to ensure representivity at all levels, to downscale the SANDF, and to adapt the SANDF to a shrinking defence budget and changed defensive posture. In all, the SANDF was confronted with an agenda of transformation from a wide spectrum of environments.

The SANDF faced momentous difficulties from an ETD perspective. None of the previous belligerent forces had an organisational culture or tradition of education. The SANDF, thus, turned out to be anti-intellectual by nature and is struggling to transform itself into a learning organisation. Yet, much time and vast resources have been spent on ETD in the SANDF over the past ten years. At a practical level, it was in the classrooms of the different ETD institutions of the SANDF that most of the members of the former belligerent groups were first brought together in a formal environment. Thus, ETD institutions in the SANDF provided the platform for the creation of a single cohesive armed force in South Africa. There is little doubt that the nature of the future of the SANDF will also be moulded primarily in the classrooms of its different ETD institutions.

²⁴⁰ Kleynhans, AS, op. cit., pp. 8-9.

The SANDF, however, is very far from the dream of a truly professional force. There are ETD challenges that the SANDF needs to address on its path to a higher level of professionalism. The most challenging in this regard is the anti-intellectualism prevalent in the SANDF. The current anti-intellectual organisational climate impedes the transformation of the SANDF into a real learning organisation. Addressing the anti-intellectual climate in the SANDF will go a long way towards promoting education as the true vehicle for transformation and professionalism in the SANDF. An important first step in this regard would be to afford education a standing of its own instead of integrating it with training and development. Another step will be to professionalise SANDF education through the creation of academic faculties at the different colleges or to at least ensure that the directing staff is academically educated. These faculties should not be overburdened with organisational and administrative tasks, as is the case with the directing staff at present. Other important steps would be to broaden the interaction between the SANDF and the academic community and the exchange of staff and students with foreign armed forces. The vision of an educated officer corps should be actively pursued. An important first step in this regard would be to start at the lowest levels and to optimise the role, capabilities and contribution of the South African Military Academy with its Faculty of Military Science. This will be the focus of the next two chapters.

CHAPTER 5

UNCHARTED PATHS, UNCERTAIN VISION: DEBATING THE MAKING OF LIEUTENANTS AT THE SOUTH AFRICAN MILITARY ACADEMY, 1994 TO THE PRESENT

The future will be high technology, plus appropriate education, plus military service in the name of democracy

Ronnie Kasrils¹

5.1 INTRODUCTION

By 1994, the South African Military Academy was a de facto military university. In its existence of almost 50 years, though, the Academy went through different phases of institutional development. At times, it developed into an archetype military academy; at other times, it reflected the attributes of a typical military university. In 1969, for example, the Malan reforms were introduced. This transformed the institution into a typical archetype military academy with a clear function to train, educate and socialise officers as a prerequisite for entering the defence force as commissioned officers. The need for junior officers, because of South Africa's involvement in South West Africa/Namibia, changed this situation to the extent that from 1976 onwards the Military Academy developed once again into the direction of a military university.

These institutional changes that characterised the Military Academy's whole existence as an institution were and still are a reason for concern and a reflection of an absence of a clearly demarcated vision of its role and function in the education, training and development of officers for the South African military. Since 1994, the pendulum once again started swinging towards the transformation of the Military Academy into an archetype military academy. It can indeed be argued that nothing has changed in terms of the clarity of vision with which the Military Academy fulfils its function in a transformed South African democracy and military. The South African Military Academy is indeed an institution beset with many challenges and difficulties. It is still an institution in search of a clear vision and role in the education, training and development of officers of the South African military.²

¹ Kasrils, R, "The South African Professional Soldier: A Profile of the Future", Paper presented at the international conference and workshop on *The Future of Military Education in a Democratic South Africa* jointly hosted by the Military Academy and IDASA at the SANDF Military Academy in Saldanha, 1 and 2 June 1995. p. 4.

² The study by Visser on the history of the South African Military Academy provides an overview of these challenges from its inception until 1990. See Visser, DE, *Die Geskiedenis van die Suid-Afrikaanse Militêre Akademie, 1950-1990*, Dissertation presented for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy (History) at the University of Stellenbosch, November 2000.

This chapter is not intended and should not be seen as a historical narrative of the Military Academy since 1994. Rather, it provides a broad overview of the institutional debate and development of the Military Academy during the specific timeframe in an effort to identify the most salient drivers or ideas of the debate and the eventual development that took place. An effort is made to identify those underlying factors that need to be addressed if the role of the Military Academy is to be brought in line with the framework of military education, training and socialisation of military officers outlined in the previous chapters.

This chapter comprise the analysis of four specific themes. The discussion is introduced by an analysis of the influence of a MMil thesis by Mark Malan in 1994. During the 1994 transition, the thesis led to a debate on the role of the Military Academy in a newly transformed South African military and society. The debate culminated in 1995 at a conference on the future of the Military Academy. As a result, the second part of the discussion highlights the contributions of the different participants at the conference in an effort to provide an exposition of the ideas that were raised. The third part of the chapter focuses on the underlying issues that were addressed in the Potgieter Report of the late 1990s. Specific proposals made in the report led to important changes at the Military Academy. As a result, the last part of the chapter is an analysis of the proposals that led to the development of new academic offerings at the Military Academy.

5.2 THE MALAN THESIS: INTRODUCING A DEBATE ON THE FUTURE OF THE MILITARY ACADEMY

In 1994, a debate developed on the future of the Military Academy. Such a debate could have been expected given the broader political and other changes that were taking place, not only in the broader South African society, but also within the Defence Force. The debate also took place in the aftermath of two investigations regarding the Military Academy in the latter half of the 1980s. These two investigations, Project Kingsrow in 1987 and Project Wimpole in 1989, both highlighted the lack of clarity on the nature and role of the Military Academy in the development of officers for the South African military.³ The primary reason for the unfolding of a debate on the future of the Military Academy was, however, a study that was done on civil-military relations in a democracy and the important role of an educated officer corps in this regard.

In September 1994, Mark Malan completed a thesis titled “Civilian Supremacy over the Military: Guidelines for Embryonic Democracies” in the Faculty of Military Science of the University of

³ Visser provides an in-depth analysis of the nature of these two investigations. See Visser, DE, “Die Geskiedenis van die Suid-Afrikaanse Militêre Akademie, 1950-1990” op. cit., pp. 477-500.

Stellenbosch.⁴ The study was done under the supervision of Prof WJ Breytenbach from the Political Science Department of the University of Stellenbosch and Prof C Nelson, a professor in Political Science at the Faculty of Military Science. In 1996, Nelson became the Dean of Military Science.⁵ He was a key figure in the development of the debate concerning the future of the Military Academy before taking up the post of the Dean of Military Science.

The idea of “embryonic democracies” in the title of the study is of great importance, given the date of completion of the study and the historic realities that unfolded in South Africa at the time. In 1994, South Africa was, and it still is, a good (if not the best) example of an embryonic democracy. For the South African military in general and for the Military Academy in particular, it was a time of great uncertainty, turmoil and debate. On the one hand, the military was an important instrument of stability in a drastically changing South Africa and its transitional society. On the other hand, though, it was seen as one of the important pillars of the apartheid regime that needed to be transformed itself. An understanding of the content of the Malan thesis as it concerns military education is of importance for an understanding of the debate that eventually unfolded on the future of the Military Academy.

5.2.1 The contribution of the Malan thesis to the debate on the future of the Military Academy

In his study, Malan argued that stable civil-military relations are critical in the process of democratisation. For developing nations in particular, sound civil-military relations ensure civilian supremacy over its military during an era of transition. Consequently, one of the aims of the study was a critical investigation into the measures that have to be implemented to remove the most salient threats to civilian political supremacy in democratic societies.⁶ The measures concern the structure and role of the military, the culture of military organisations, and the relationship between the polity and the military. Chapter seven of Malan’s study specifically focuses on guidelines for reducing the dissonance between the military mind and the principle of civil supremacy. Malan analysed and discussed military education as an important tool for the reconciliation of democratic and military values in order to reduce this dissonance. This discussion of the importance of education for sound civil-military relations in emerging democracies eventually served as an important academic framework for the ensuing debate

⁴ Malan, MR, *Civilian Supremacy over the Military: Guidelines for Embryonic Democracies*, Thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree Master of Military Science (Political Science) at the University of Stellenbosch, September 1994.

⁵ The Faculty of Military Science of the University of Stellenbosch is the academic faculty of the South African Military Academy. The Military Academy has three primary organisational components: The Faculty of Military Science, The Section Military Development, and the Support Services.

concerning the role of the Military Academy. In the discussion, Malan touched upon the demanding nature of officership, the necessity for higher education, and the vehicle for and content of officer education.

Malan argued that sound civil-military relations in a democracy call for a clear distinction between military organisational and political culture. Military organisational culture is based on universal military values: discipline, stamina, skill, loyalty, duty, courage, selfless service, integrity, and commitment. These are values, Malan argued, with no intrinsic threat to the survival of a democracy. "It is only when military values are promoted through the deliberate or implicit denigration of alternative values," he pointed out, "that the military becomes intolerant of the political process."⁷ Thus, he noted, in the interest of cohesion and compliance in a democracy soldiers have to internalise the clear set of values encapsulated in the military culture. In addition, and in the interest of external integration, officers have to understand and accept the values inherent in the political culture towards which civil society is striving. In 1994, the nature of this political culture was an issue of contention – a subject of debate at all levels in the South African society.

Malan emphasised that the internalisation of military organisational values is done through a process of military training and socialisation. However, the comprehension and acceptance of societal values that underpin the political culture in a democracy is more problematic because civilian control lies ultimately in the minds of the military.⁸ In an embryonic society like South Africa, the matter is even more complex "... because the fairness and virtues of a democratic political system will not become apparent through the mere observation of a civil society as it struggles with the process of democratic transition".⁹ This brought to the fore the need for the process of military training and socialisation to be supplemented – though not supplanted – by some form of "... broad political socialisation" to inculcate these democratic societal values. This should not be confused with political indoctrination to accept party political doctrine that does not have legitimacy and the support of the society in general. The process of general democratic socialisation should ensure that the military is strongly committed to the basic assumptions of a democratic polity. It is the task of civic education in the military establishment to satisfy this requirement. Malan emphasised that this process of general socialisation – the inculcation of broad societal values – should take place at an early stage of the officer's career since officers' attitudes tend to harden during the advanced stages of their careers.¹⁰

⁶ Malan, MR, *Civilian Supremacy over the Military: Guidelines for Embryonic Democracies*, op. cit., p. 7.

⁷ Ibid., p. 135.

⁸ Ibid. p. 137.

⁹ Ibid., p. 135.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 136.

Malan uses the philosophy of *Innere Führung* in the German *Bundeswehr* as an example to elucidate his ideas regarding the inculcation of officers with democratic societal values. The purpose of *Innere Führung*, Malan argues, "... is to illustrate that the basic order of the state and its constitution are worthy of protection".¹¹ Malan quotes Wittman who pointed out that *Innere Führung* promotes the ability of military personnel to recognise and reflect on their role in state and society. *Innere Führung* furthermore guides military personnel in asserting their civil rights, to recognise the political importance of their duties and to act accordingly.¹²

In his discussion of the demanding nature of officership in a democracy, Malan pointed out that officers are affected – personally and corporately – by societal politics and that all officers will have certain political preferences and attitudes. Thus, an understanding of the political system, its values and democratic theory is essential if officers are to perform their role effectively in an emerging democracy, whilst remaining disengaged from political activity, which is beyond the scope and level, which is acceptable in society.¹³ In addition to these intellectual demands, Malan also highlighted the unique moral burdens that confront the career officer in a democracy:

- the ability to control a vast potential for destruction and the will to use it if necessary;
- the tension between the "rationality" of the techniques of destruction and the total irrationality of modern warfare;
- learning to resolve conflicts with violence in a society that has as one of its central norms that conflict should be resolved without violence;
- the constant testing of military strength without being allowed to posit an enemy;
- the defence of a form of society which is distinguished not only by positives but also clearly by antagonisms and disorder;
- being the object of public scrutiny;
- the pressure to legitimate prescribed authoritarian behaviour within the military while participatory behaviour is generally highly valued in society;
- the readiness to internalise norms oriented to the common good and to express these norms through one's behaviour in a society in which the main overt values are organised around the pursuit of personal gain; and

¹¹ Ibid., p. 138.

¹² Wittman, F, "Integration of Armed Forces in a Democratic State Under the Rule of Law", *African Defence Review*, No 14. Available at <<http://www.iss.co.za/ASR/ADR14/WITTMAN.html>> [8 March 2004]

¹³ Malan, MR, *Civilian Supremacy over the Military: Guidelines for Embryonic Democracies*, op. cit., p. 140.

- special sacrifices inherent to the nature of military service.¹⁴

Malan concluded that the intellectual and moral demands of officership are a clear indication that a democratic society depends not only upon the functional skills of the officer (acquired through training and experience), but also upon his intellectual advancement.¹⁵ He pointed out that the general calibre of a nation's resources, budgetary constraints, and military manpower needs may combine to create an overwhelming temptation among defence planners to commission and promote the type of people who are incapable of meeting the demands, which should be met by military officers in a democratic polity. The members of a society, Malan maintained, who possess the qualities of moral and intellectual competence, talent, and vocational fulfilment are normally those who have had a sound upbringing, including some form of higher education.¹⁶

In his analysis of the necessity for higher education, Malan highlighted several factors that guide the need for the education of officers. Firstly, it is only through a tertiary education that officers acquire the necessary background to understand both the domestic and international political environment, and through which they develop the necessary insight to comprehend the nature and limits of defence policy and military operations. Secondly, tertiary education plays an important role in developing the capacity for independent thought. Military training encourages a high degree of conformity. Consequently, Malan pointed out, the military traditionally tends to be wary of independents or non-conformists. It is ironic though that the prevalence of conformists within the profession may have deleterious effects for both civilian control and military professionalism. Malan provided an exposition of the dichotomy of traits between conforming subjects and those who are inclined towards independent judgement. (See Table 5.1) Thirdly, the education of officers is necessary to maintain corporate balance within the military. Corporate balance, Malan argued, is achieved when the structure of the profession adequately reflects its role as a public institution and the solutions to its operational problems. Without officer enlightenment, structural adjustments to the military profession are extremely difficult to implement. Fourthly, higher education is necessary to help officers accept public criticism of the military, where it is due, as a normal part of the democratic process. From this perspective, the question can indeed be posed as to whether the sensitivity for public criticism amongst the leadership cadre of the SANDF at present is a reflection of an anti-intellectual organisational climate prevalent within the South African military. Fifthly, there is also an educational imperative to maintain a meaningful distinction between officers and enlisted ranks

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 141.

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 141.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 142.

within the military. A marked difference in the levels of general education between officers and non-commissioned officers upon entry to the service and in the breadth of subsequent professional education and training demarcates the difference between these two professional groupings. Lastly, Malan argued that education is necessary for the officer to reconcile the necessity for training and education and to be comfortable with both.¹⁷

Table 5.1: The dichotomy of traits distinguishing conforming subjects and independent judgementalists¹⁸

Independents	Conformists
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ are effective leaders; ▪ take an ascendant role in their relations with others; ▪ are persuasive and tend to win other people over to their point of view; ▪ are turned to for advice and reassurance; ▪ are efficient, capable, and able to mobilise resources easily and effectively; ▪ are active and vigorous; ▪ are expressive ebullient people; ▪ seek and enjoy aesthetic and sensuous impressions; ▪ are natural, free from pretence, unaffected; and ▪ are self-reliant, independent in judgement, able to think for themselves. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ with respect to authority, are submissive, compliant and overly accepting; ▪ are conforming, and tend to do the things that are prescribed; ▪ have a narrow range of interest; ▪ over-control their impulses and are inhibited; ▪ are unable to make decisions without vacillation or delay; ▪ become confused, disorganised and un-adaptive under stress; ▪ lack insight into their own motives and behaviour; and ▪ are suggestible, overly responsive to other people's evaluations rather than their own.

Malan further remarked that there seems to be agreement internationally on the necessity for tertiary education but that the vehicle and content of this education vary from country to country. Countries often recruit university graduates as officer candidates. Yet, most developed countries have military academies dedicated to educating those soldiers who aspire towards commissioned rank but who are not in possession of an academic qualification. Malan though pointed out that precisely what the missions of these institutions should be has long been a subject of discussion and argument in military circles. Of particular concern is the question whether these institutions should equip students for their first assignments after graduation, or

¹⁷ Ibid., pp. 142-145

whether they should prepare them for the challenges of a life-long military career – an inherent tension between training and education.¹⁹

According to Malan, critics argue that candidate officers can be educated at civilian universities at a fraction of the cost if education is liberalised at the expense of military ethics and skills. Yet, if functional training and cost-effectiveness are pursued at the expense of a broad liberal education, the purpose and academic status of military academies are undermined.²⁰ In a developing country, this challenge is further exacerbated through a number of constraints, including:

- resource scarcity;
- a high potential for internal political instability;
- ethnic imbalances in educational standards;
- an underdeveloped political culture;
- a high level of demand for skilled and educated manpower in the civilian sector; and
- competing national priorities, such as nation-building, reconstruction and development.²¹

Malan's biggest contribution to the debate concerning the future of the South African Military Academy was his distinction between military academies and military universities as the ultimate resolution of the inherent tension between military training and education in the development of officers. (See Table 5.2) Malan highlighted two factors that determine a country's choice with regard to a military academy or university. Firstly, the archetypical military academy is a poor vehicle for broadening the military mind. However, military universities often neglect the training and socialisation of the officer corps. Secondly, the system of manpower provision determines to a large extent whether a particular country will have a military academy, or not. Traditional military academies presuppose a long-term military career since it requires (in most cases) a costly four-year induction before commissioning. The cost and time involved make this an unsuitable choice for a defence force that recruits potential officers on short-term contracts. This is very often the case in developing countries. Such a scenario often requires that, once career officers have been identified, initial training and socialisation be supplemented by an education provided through a military university.²²

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 143.

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 145.

²⁰ Ibid., p. 146.

²¹ Ibid., pp. 147-148.

²² Ibid., p. 149.

Table 5.2: Characteristics of military educational institutions²³

Military academy	Military university
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ develops cadets ▪ serves as right of passage for commissioning as officer ▪ plays fundamental role in military training and socialisation ▪ awards military degree/qualification: academically autonomous ▪ enrolment exclusively military ▪ curriculum and presentation largely determined by military leaders ▪ foundation of military education: youthful students ▪ undergraduate emphasis 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ educates officers ▪ facilitates passage to higher rank ▪ presents no functional training; peripheral socialisation ▪ civilian university confers degrees ▪ civilians may enrol ▪ civilians play a leading role in curriculum and presentation ▪ intermediate military education ▪ strong post-graduate emphasis

Malan also contributed to the debate about the future of the South African Military Academy by pointing out that every officer's education should at least include concepts associated with the following:

- a sense of history;
- the conflicts within society between individual rights and system imperatives;
- an understanding of the ideals and actualities of the national political system;
- the political consequences of military decisions and military actions;
- the moral and ethical issues of professional service and standards of moral behaviour; and
- the problems of political change and economic development.²⁴

However, Malan argued that it is unlikely that the normal system of university education in a developing country would be able to meet these minimal educational requirements in a fairly homogeneous fashion for all members of the military profession. The military corps schools and colleges are also unsuitable vehicles for broad liberal education. Indeed, Malan warns that without a strong intellectual base, the inculcation of political ideas and political analysis among military leaders may lead to political activities and views resting on oversimplified perceptions of

²³ Ibid., p. 148

democracy and politics. Malan maintained that the solution to the problem of meeting the educational requirements of military officers in a cost-effective manner in developing democracies lies in civil-military co-operation. He proposed three possibilities in this regard:

- creation of a unique educational institution (a military academy or university), which caters primarily for military educational needs at university level;
- addition of a civilian-style academic faculty to an existing military educational or training institution; or
- accommodation of military students at a civilian university, which is prepared to offer a unique curriculum and to accept a measure of military input and oversight with respect to course content and the activities of such students.

The South African Military Academy at present reflects a combination of the first two possibilities.

5.2.2 The Malan thesis: A critical perspective

What critique can be levelled against the ideas of Malan in his thesis and as expressed in the report that was eventually drawn up with the help of his colleagues? The majority of Malan's ideas were very progressive, well-articulated and very sound. However, if his ideas and that of his colleagues are compared with the framework for the education of officers as outlined in Chapter three, a number of remarks are possible. Malan in his studies has not drawn a clear distinction between *broad liberal academic education* and *professional military education*. Though he emphasised the need for broad, liberal education in general, his neglect to draw a proper distinction between these two notions had a very pertinent influence on his ideas as they eventually unfolded. A distinction between these two kinds of education is of critical importance for an understanding of the intellectual and professional development of officers and the role of academics in the provision thereof. Academics are involved in both liberal and professional education. In some countries (Britain for example), military academies provide only professional military education, training and socialisation. In such cases, recruitment focuses on people who are already liberally educated. In other countries (Australia for example), military academies provide a broad liberal education together (in some instances) with the training and socialisation that are required for entrance into the profession of arms.

²⁴ Ibid., p. 150.

The effect of the neglect to recognise the difference between liberal and professional education shaped the misplaced argument about the “professor-general”. According to Malan, the notion of a “professor-general” is an impossibility. However, it is widely recognised that all military forces in the world comprise both “doers” and “thinkers” (or “operators” and “theorists”). The military profession has a need for both these two groups of people. In all militaries, the role of both doers and thinkers is of critical importance. It is also an accepted fact that doers become more prominent and influential in armed forces during times of greater turmoil and high operational deployment. During times of relative peace, the more salient influence of the thinkers (professor-generals, in the words of Malan) usually is more visible.

The history of the U.S. Army over the last fifty years is an interesting case study in this regard. The “operators” were very prominent during the 1950s and 1960s in the aftermath of the Second World War and in fighting the wars in Korea and Vietnam. However, the outcome of the war in Vietnam and the example of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War emphasised the need for new innovative conceptual thinking about how the U.S. Armed Forces were to fight in future. This manifested itself in several organisational developments and restructurings. Some of the most important in this regard was the creation of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrinal Command (TRADOC) with a senior four-star general in command and the development of the School for Advanced Military Studies at the U.S. Army Command and Staff College.²⁵ What was of particular significance was the prominence of thinkers in the U.S. Army during the 1970s and 1980s. More specifically, education became a very important tool for the transformation of an operationally and conceptually bankrupt military in the aftermath of the war in Vietnam. It translates into success in the 1991 Gulf War. The experience of the U.S. armed forces in Iraq since 2003 though led to renewed arguments about a “... Second Learning Revolution”.²⁶ Against this background, it was interesting to note that a large majority of defence force personnel that can be described as “doers” – the so-called “fighters” of the SADF – resigned from the SADF/SANDEF in the early 1990s. This was followed by a rise to prominence of more

²⁵ Gabriel, RA, and Savage, PL, *Crisis in Command: Mismanagement in Armed Forces*, Hill and Wang, New York, 1978 is an excellent analysis of the problems with which the U.S. Army were confronted in the early 1970s. The book by James Kitfield, on the other hand, provides interesting insights into the intellectual and organisational changes that were made in the aftermath of the war in Vietnam, culminating in the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Defence Reorganization Act, which structurally changed the whole command structure of the U.S. Army. See Kitfield, J, *The Prodigal Soldier: How a Generation of Officers Born of Vietnam Revolutionised the American Style of War*, Simon & Schuster, New York, 1995.

²⁶ Scales, RH, “The Second Learning Revolution”, *Military Review*, January-February 2006, pp. 37-44.

intellectually inclined officers and accompanied by a realisation by some members of the SANDF of the importance of having an academic qualification.²⁷

5.2.3 Spreading the message: The impact of the Malan thesis

In what way did Malan contribute to the debate on the future of the Military Academy? Malan made use of a number of forums to propagate his ideas on the nature of military education in general and the future of the Military Academy in particular. Ideas on military education from his thesis were published almost verbatim in the *African Security Review* in an article titled "Officer Education: The Democratic Imperative".²⁸ In another article, Malan emphasised the importance of civic education to inculcate a culture of civic consciousness in armed forces.²⁹

Malan's ideas also appeared in a number of reports within the Faculty of Military Science and the Department of Defence.³⁰ The most important was a working paper that was drafted on own initiative by Malan and two colleagues, Cdr (Dr) A Roux and Maj H Hurter.³¹ The paper was submitted to a meeting of the Council of the Faculty of Military Science on 7 June 1994. At a meeting of the council on 26 June 1994, it was unanimously accepted as the "... position of the Faculty of Military Science on the restructuring of the South African Military Academy".³² The report was signed by both the Dean of Military Science, Col (Prof) JC Kotzé, and the Officer Commanding the Military Academy, Brig PO Verbeek and, thus, should be seen as not only the position of the Faculty but as the official view of the Military Academy. In their report, the authors proposed the restructuring of the Military Academy according to, what they referred to as, a "Conceptual Model of a SANDF Institute of Professional Military Education". The proposal for an Institute of Professional Military Education embodied an interesting blend of the

²⁷ See the following article in this regard: Williams, R, "Integration or Absorption: The Creation of the South African National Defence Force", *African Security Review*, Vol 1, No 2, 2002. Williams provides an interesting analysis of the interplay between the more operationally inclined officers of the "counter-insurgency" school of thought of the SADF and the officers of the more intellectual "conventional war" school of thought.

²⁸ Malan, M, "Officer Education: The Democratic Imperative", *African Security Review*, Vol 4, No 2, 1995.

²⁹ Malan, M, "Leadership, Integration and Civic Consciousness: From *Innere Führung* to *Ubuntu*", *African Security Review*, Vol 4, No 3, 1995.

³⁰ South African Department of Defence, Military Academy, *Report on the Restructuring of the South African Military Academy*, MA/R/505/1/6/3, 26 July 1994. The report was signed by the Dean of Military Science, Col (Prof) J.C. Kotzé, and the Officer Commanding the Military Academy, Brig P.O. Verbeek. However, the report was drafted by Lt Col Mark Malan, Lt Cdr (Dr) André Roux and Maj Henry Hurter. See also South African Department of Defence, South African Military Academy, *Position of the Faculty of Military Science on the Restructuring of the South African Military Academy*, MA/R/103/17, 23 October 1995. The Committee on Institutional Development of the Faculty of Military Science drafted this report. Yet, a section titled "The Vehicle and Content of Officer Education in Emergent Democracies" was taken verbatim out of Malan's thesis.

³¹ South African Department of Defence, Military Academy, *Working Paper on the Ethos and Structure of an Institute for Professional Military Education in a Changing South Africa*, no file reference, n.d.

³² *Report on the Restructuring of the South African Military Academy*, op. cit.

characteristics of a military academy and a military university in order to cater for both officer cadets and officer students.³³

The report also discussed external influences for change at the Military Academy as well as factors that contributed to the "... sub-optimal functioning of the Military Academy". Since these influences and factors underpinned the debate that eventually unfolded at the Military Academy and elsewhere in the Department of Defence in the era after 1994 about military education in general and the role of the Military Academy in particular, it is important to consider these briefly. The following "... external forces for change" were identified:

- the political imperatives for an officer corps which is representative of a broad population, reflecting diverse educational backgrounds;
- the greater salience granted at that particular time to the issue of exercising civilian control over the military;
- the political primacy granted to the funding of a reconstruction and development programme, potentially at the expense of the defence budget;
- the amalgamation and integration of armed forces with widely varying standards of military professionalism to form the SANDF;
- the restoration of international legitimacy which creates both opportunities and commitments for South Africa, some of which are defence-related (the exchange of military technology and the need for South Africa to develop a peacekeeping capacity were emphasised in this regard);
- a shift in the system of manpower provisioning from a cadre-conscript system to a volunteer system, implying flexible contracts for officers rather than the concept of life-long service; and
- an extension of the internal mission of the SANDF to include secondary roles related to socio-economic upliftment programmes.³⁴

³³ Ibid., pp. 8-14.

³⁴ Ibid., p. 6.

The factors that the working paper outlined as contributing to the "... sub-optimal functioning of the Military Academy" included the following:

- inconsistency in the system of commissioning and promoting military officers;
- an apparent inability to both understand and reconcile the conflict between education and training. The numerous and sometimes perplexing changes to the format and content of both education and training at the Military Academy are symptomatic of this issue;
- at times, the Military Academy has displayed the characteristics of an archetypical military academy and at others that of a military university;
- the heterogeneous student body in terms of age, rank, functional musterings and military experience. This has led to a high level of internal conflict amongst students, which was generated by the status inconsistency, and which has inhibited the development of a clear philosophy on military training;
- a heterogeneous lecturing corps has evolved to include male and female civilians, military practitioners and "... military university educators"³⁵. Generally speaking, there is no clearly defined relationship between military rank and academic prowess. Moreover, avenues for both military and academic promotion are somewhat limited;
- a perception shared by students, members of the Faculty of Military Science, and the broader military and academic community that the lecturers at the Military Academy have academic profiles that are inferior to those of their counterparts at civilian institutions of higher learning;
- the Military Academy has been vulnerable to periodic intervention by the services and different corps in respect to the content and conduct of both military training and academic studies, resulting in philosophical drift regarding the true nature and meaning of the institutional function;

³⁵ The paper describes the military university educators at the Military Academy as "... a diverse body of people of varying academic qualifications, military expertise, rank, qualification and experience; all entitled to lay claim to the military status inherent in their rank". See *Working Paper on the Ethos and Structure of an Institute for Professional Military Education in a Changing South Africa*, op. cit. p. 6.

- as a result of the concentration of command responsibilities and power in the person of a rotating officer commanding, the Faculty of Military Science suffered from a dearth of management ability, continuity and experience;
- budgetary constraints that have consistently created conflict between line and support functions, often to the detriment of academic excellence within the Faculty of Military Science;
- the perception that other academic institutions have embarked upon a process of "... hijacking potential Military Academy students" through the presentation of alternative, Defence Force-sanctioned higher educational programmes;
- as an academic qualification, the BMil degree has never formed an integral part of the system of military qualifications for advancement to higher levels of the military hierarchy; and
- although partially addressing the occupational needs of individuals (e.g. preparation for a second career), the Military Academy has denied both the existence and desirability of these needs. This conflict will escalate in a possible manpower provisioning system that does not offer life-long employment in the SANDF.³⁶

In the end, the report emphasised that these considerations can be condensed into three fundamentally principles for planning the education of an armed force. Firstly, it was argued that it is important to take cognisance of the basic distinction between the educational philosophy of a military academy and that of a military university. Secondly, academic excellence (as defined by the academic community) and military excellence (as defined by the military elite) are mutually exclusive since both demand total focus and dedication to a unique set of values. This is not to say that a soldier cannot be enlightened or that a scholar cannot be disciplined, but that the "professor-general" is a myth. Those soldiers who have achieved academic excellence (as defined by the academic community) have either resigned their commissions or have retired from the profession of arms. Any individual in pursuit of excellence in both these careers will ultimately have to make a choice between the pen and the sword. Thirdly, there is a demonstrated need for a South African system of professional military education that satisfies the functions fulfilled by both a military academy and a military university. It was argued that members of the various services have expressed preferences for

³⁶ *Report on the Restructuring of the South African Military Academy*, op. cit., pp. 6-7.

either one or the other. Since a military academy and military university serve different needs in different modes, utmost care has to be taken when attempting to reconcile these needs within a single institution.³⁷

Another important outcome of the Malan thesis was a debate that unfolded amongst the civilian members of the Faculty of Military Science concerning the role of civilians in the education of officers. The debate was clearly reflected in two articles published in academic journals by E Kotze³⁸ and R Steele³⁹ on the participation of civilian academics in officer education in South Africa. Like in the case of Malan, their arguments highlighted the importance of civilian and political control over the armed forces in a democratic society and the role of (civilian) education in the provision of behavioural or subjective control measures and conditions for civil-military control. Kotze and Steele identified the following determinants for maintaining and enhancing balanced civil-military relations:

- The presence of an informed and assertive civilian populace, well versed in democratic values, such as individual freedom, public accountability, responsibility and efficiency, effectiveness, probity and honesty in a just and fair society, who associate civilian control over the military with the establishment and preservation of freedom.
- The presence of a liberally educated professional officer corps versed in the understanding of the population's social values.
- The presence and availability of university education opportunities to the military officer corps at military educational institutions as a professional prerequisite for the inculcation of democratic and military values, with the objective of reconciling the latter by preventing partisan indoctrination and socialisation of military leaders.
- The importance of civilian participation in military education and leadership development may be regarded as a contemporary contribution to the balanced socialisation of military leaders.⁴⁰

³⁷ Ibid., p. 8.

³⁸ Lecturer (later professor) in the Department of Industrial Psychology in the Faculty of Military Science.

³⁹ Departmental chair of the department of Public and Development Management in the Faculty of Military Science in 1995.

⁴⁰ Kotze, E & Steele, R, "Behavioural Determinants of Civilian-Military Control: Military Tertiary Education and Civilian Educators", *Administratio Publica*, Vol 6, No 1, June 1995, p. 51; Kotze, E & Steele, R, "Civilian Participation in the Education and Development of Officers", *African Security Review*, Vol 4, No 4, 1995, p. 24.

In considering the need for tertiary education in armed forces, Kotze and Steele argued that a general education ensures that officers remain part of their community. The subsequent intellectual development and a common cultural and value system shared by the community and the military will ensure the construction of the behavioural and subjective instruments for balanced civil-military relations.⁴¹ “Liberal education,” though, it is stated, “can never take place in an atmosphere where free debate is inhibited”.⁴² The authors then provide elaborate arguments asserting that there is a de facto lack of academic freedom at the South African Military Academy. They subsequently argued that the research and publication record of the Faculty of Military Science has become a source of embarrassment for the Faculty and the University of Stellenbosch. This was accentuated, they argued, by the low percentage of members of the Faculty in possession of a doctorate. Kotze and Steele pointed out that the identical situation is found at foreign military academies with a low percentage of civilian academics. Consequently, they argued in favour of greater participation of civilian academics in the education of officers at the South African Military Academy.⁴³

The Malan thesis and the subsequent debate and reports that emanated from it eventually led to a conference and workshop on education in the South African military at the Military Academy, presented in co-operation with the Institute for a Democratic Alternative for South Africa (IDASA). This conference was the next important stepping stone in the debate on the future of the Military Academy since between 1994.

5.3 DISCUSSING THE FUTURE OF THE MILITARY ACADEMY AT THE 1995 CONFERENCE ON MILITARY EDUCATION

The 1995 conference on “The Future of Military Education in a Democratic South Africa” at the Military Academy was nothing but a search by the Faculty of Military Science for its true meaning and purpose. In fact, it was an effort by the Military Academy in general and the Faculty of Military Science in particular to mobilise (political) support and energy for a broader debate in the military, the University of Stellenbosch and the broader South African society on the future role of the Military Academy. This is obvious if names, positions and knowledge of those who were invited to present papers at the conference, are considered. The programme made provision for an academic conference and a workshop in an effort to generate inputs from all stakeholders on the future role and function of the Military Academy.

⁴¹ Kotze, E & Steele, R, “Civilian Participation in the Education and Development of Officers”, *African Security Review*, op. cit., p. 24.

⁴² Kotze, E & Steele, R, “Behavioural Determinants of Civilian-Military Control: Military Tertiary Education and Civilian Educators”, op. cit., p. 61.

5.3.1 Variety of opinions: The ideas of the participants at the 1995 Conference

Mr Ronnie Kasrils, the South African Deputy Minister of Defence, opened the conference with an address that ostensibly was written by Dr Laurie Nathan of the Centre for Conflict Resolution in Cape Town. Kasrils, firstly, emphasised the need for soldiers to be technologically attuned. This requires smart soldiers who are educated, Kasrils argued. However, this education should be based on the reality that very often the peasant soldier or urban resistance fighter challenges the technologically sophisticated military professional. Consequently, Kasrils maintained, education enhanced the qualities that soldiers require to deal with technological and social progress as well as with diversity of people and cultures, uncertainty and ambiguity.⁴⁴ Kasrils, secondly, highlighted the need to develop initiative in armed forces. Initiative, Kasrils argued, is a "... human quality that speaks of a flexibility of mind that a techno-barbarian, imprisoned within the misconception that technology is *über alles*, cannot comprehend".⁴⁵ The need for initiative, Kasrils warned, should remind the soldier never to scorn grass-roots or people-oriented creativity, which is a tremendous source of strength and inspiration. Kasrils, thirdly, warned that the duty of the professional soldier in a democracy is deeply rooted in national and international law; not in the views of his military commander or political leadership.⁴⁶ Educational programmes therefore have to be supplemented by issues such as a code of conduct, military disciplinary procedures and the correct attitude of senior officers. Kasrils concluded that four particular myths about military education should be dispelled:

- *"Academic freedom is not appropriate or applicable at a military academy.* If an academic institution restricts critical thinking on the part of its students and faculty, and if it censors or bans the publication of research, then it is engaged in indoctrination rather than academic pursuits.

- *Education for democracy within the military will undermine the soldier's will to fight.* The educational programme is therefore intended to ensure that military personnel operate at all times within the confines of the Constitution, defence legislation and international law on armed conflict. This is a constitutional imperative and not an act of subversion.

⁴³ Kotze, E & Steele, R, "Behavioural Determinants of Civilian-Military Control: Military Tertiary Education and Civilian Educators", op. cit., p. 66; Kotze, E & Steele, R, "Civilian Participation in the Education and Development of Officers", op. cit., p. 28.

⁴⁴ Kasrils, R, op. cit., pp. 2-3.

⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 3.

⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 4.

- *Education for democracy will politicise the military.* This argument confuses non-partisan (which is essential) with apolitical (which are scarcely possible). The SANDF is bound to operate within the parameters of the Constitution, a profoundly political document.
- *Civilians should not be involved in military education.* This is contrary to international practise. Civilian lecturers are able to inject valuable perspectives into military education. Parliament has a constitutional mandate to investigate and make recommendations on military training.”⁴⁷

Two international scholars were invited to participate in the conference, Dr John Allen Williams of the Loyola University of Chicago and Vice-Chairman and Executive Director of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society and Colonel Friederich-W. Dieckhoff, the Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff of the *Zentrum Innere Führung* in the Federal Republic of Germany.

Williams argued that there is no conflict between military professionalism properly understood and patriotism, humanism and support for the democratic state. Military practitioners should have a profound appreciation of their professional responsibilities to society in order to defend the democratic state and not to run it. This being said, he argues that even in a democratic society the military cannot be completely democratic because of its willingness to risk life and limb for the state and to obey the legal orders of lawfully constituted civilian authorities. This requires a broadening educational experience that is vital for the officer corps and for the military profession.⁴⁸

The paper by Dieckhoff outlined the role of *Innere Führung* in the *Bundeswehr* as a concept which sets the fundamental values of the constitution as a frame of reference for the armed forces providing guidance on the way in which they are to fulfil their tasks and missions. He defined the objectives of *Innere Führung* as:

- to substantiate military service ethically, politically and legally and to convey the mission of the armed forces;
- to integrate the armed forces and the soldier into the state and society;

⁴⁷ Ibid., pp. 5-6.

⁴⁸ Williams, JA, “The International Image of the Military Professional”, Paper presented at the international conference and workshop on *The Future of Military Education in a Democratic South Africa* jointly hosted by the Military Academy and IDASA at the SANDF Military Academy in Saldanha, 1 and 2 June 1995, p. 5.

- to encourage the volunteer soldier to serve loyally, to fulfil his military duties, to accept responsibility, to co-operate and to maintain discipline in his unit; and
- to create an internal order in the armed forces which is orientated towards human dignity, the order of law, and military efficiency.⁴⁹

Dieckhoff pointed out that the idea of *Innere Führung* sets high standards for education in armed forces. Command and leadership on the one hand, and training and education on the other, should not be regarded as separate tasks. Instead, it is one integrated task to be performed by one and the same individual. Consequently, every officer or non-commissioned officer entrusted with the responsibility of command does not only lead the soldiers placed under his command. He also executes a training and educational mission aimed firstly at providing the necessary qualifications for fulfilling the military requirements. Secondly, it should be so comprehensive that after discharge from the *Bundeswehr*, former military members benefit from their training in civilian vocations.⁵⁰ Military education and training is also the best preparation, Dieckhoff asserts, for the integration of international staffs and the major formations of NATO. "Language skills, training in procedures, and extended knowledge about other countries' people, history, traditions and habits are as important as good manners and polite behaviour and tolerance," he argued. Dieckhoff emphasised that education represents an additional cost burden to the *Bundeswehr* but that there are very important reasons for its continuation, including:

- improvement of military task accomplishment and of military efficiency;
- attractiveness of military service; and
- responsibility assumed by the state with regard to the welfare of its servicemen.⁵¹

Prof W Claassen, Vice-Rector Academic of the University of Stellenbosch, offered an interesting overview at the conference as representative of the "academic partner" of the South African Military Academy. He firstly highlighted some trends in university education. These include the trends towards mass higher education, internationalisation and globalisation, increasing cutbacks from governments, increasing competition between institutions of higher learning, and an identity crisis in some institutions. Institutions of higher learning in South Africa in particular have to deal with continuing cutbacks in government subsidies to universities, the need for

⁴⁹ Dieckhoff, FW, "The Role of Military Education in the Integration and External Adaptation of a National Defence Force", Paper presented at the international conference and workshop on *The Future of Military Education in a Democratic South Africa* jointly hosted by the Military Academy and IDASA at the SANDF Military Academy in Saldanha, 1 and 2 June 1995, pp. 4-5.

⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 6.

⁵¹ Ibid., p. 6.

academic development programmes to ensure greater access and support, a higher emphasis on the importance of technical training, and the need for greater mobility between institutions of higher learning.⁵²

Claassen, secondly, emphasised the need for a close relationship (or symbiosis) between teaching and research at universities, as well as the primary focus on education for degree purposes. Claassen explained, "... education leading to a degree is aimed at instilling a theoretical and scientific approach to problem solving and at broadening students' intellectual horizons and quickening and refining their understanding, imagination and sense of values".⁵³ It is important for the military to understand that preparation for certain professions does constitute an important dimension of the teaching programmes of universities. However, a university is not in the first place "... a vocational school". Instead, society in general expects certain qualities from a person who has received a general scientific/academic formative education. (See Table 5.3)

Table 5.3: Attributes of an educated person⁵⁴

Scientific	Philosophical	Personal
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ a respect for facts ▪ knowledge of certain basic or recognised subject fields ▪ an interest in knowledge and the ability to gather it, to master it and to generate it ▪ the ability to make intelligent generalisations and to see connections between phenomena ▪ the ability to reason. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The ability to apply knowledge and ideas outside familiar contexts ▪ the insight that all is not as it appears to be ▪ a healthy scepticism ▪ the ability to see things in a wider context ▪ a skill to analyse ideas ▪ skill in the identification and handling of values. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ the disposition to enjoy intellectual exertion ▪ adherence to general civilised norms. ▪ a readiness to engage in critical dialogue.

Claassen, thirdly, argues that the interaction between these general formative qualities and vocational needs is the cause of tension (or ambivalence) in the relationship between

⁵² Claassen, WT, "Civilian Academia: Adversary or Ally in Military Education", Paper presented at the international conference and workshop on *The Future of Military Education in a Democratic South Africa* jointly hosted by the Military Academy and IDASA at the SANDF Military Academy in Saldanha, 1 and 2 June 1995, pp. 2-3.

⁵³ Ibid., p. 4.

universities and professional interest groups such as the military. Universities are intent upon ensuring their autonomy regarding academic matters. Professions have an interest in expanding their ranks by people adequately qualified at universities.⁵⁵ The autonomy of universities is central to their being and existence as academic institutions. This autonomy is closely link to a number of issues:

- control over the admission of students;
- academic control over curricula and the presentation thereof;
- control over examinations and the granting of degrees;
- appointment and dismissal of staff; and
- internal management – including management of its own budget.⁵⁶

Claassen considered the military in the same light as the statutory professional councils with which universities interact in the provision of professional vocational education. The interaction between these councils and the universities is based on a number of principles. These principles, Claassen argued, should also constitute the foundation of, or inform the interaction between the military and the academic community concerning the education of military officers in South Africa. These principles are as follows:

- the autonomy of post-secondary educational institutions, to the extent that it is laid down in their Acts, should be respected;
- the statutory autonomy of the statutory professional councils should be acknowledged;
- powers granted to the professional councils and the educational institutions should relate to their functions;
- the universities should proceed with their task of general scientific/academic formative education in preparation of people for their professional careers;
- control over subject matter should be exercised both on an interdisciplinary basis within the educational institutions and in consultation with the professions;
- professional education should be directed towards long-term career education;
- consultation between the educational institutions and the statutory professional councils should be based on the assumption that the parties to the discussion are on equal statutory footing, but in due recognition of the different functions of each party; and
- consultation should be continual and structured.⁵⁷

⁵⁴ Ibid., pp. 5-6.

⁵⁵ Ibid., p. 6.

⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 7.

Brig M. Rutsch, the most senior SANDF officer primarily responsible for liaison with the Military Academy, presented a paper that provided an overview of military education in the SANDF. The paper, however, is to some extent an example of official (SANDF) military writing – a huge aggregation of facts without any depth of argumentation or thorough analysis. Though he clearly defines training and education in the introductory part of his paper, the discussion does not differentiate between training and education in the SANDF at all. The paper in essence is an overview of, or an effort to demarcate the developmental needs of the SANDF. Rutsch's (mis)understanding of education in general and military education in particular is reflected in his opinion that "... no civilian organisation can provide military education for the military (since) it is not their trade".⁵⁸ He subsequently asserts that military education is interesting for the onus is on the military to educate⁵⁹ itself to norms set by non-military civilians.⁶⁰ Rutsch outlines the "...academic training needs of the SANDF" by arguing that:

- the SANDF has a need for academically qualified officers in professional positions such as engineers, doctors and project managers;
- the SANDF has a need for officers who have the ability to "... exercise their minds at the highest level of thinking/reasoning". The SANDF, it is argued, is no different than most other organisations in this regard;
- academic education is also an important recruiting incentive, specifically as far as the previously disadvantaged communities in South Africa are concerned; and
- the trend in modern armed forces is for all officers to have some form of tertiary education.⁶¹

Rutsch furthermore pointed out that it is not at all clear when officers in the SANDF should receive such education. He argued that if such education is provided to junior officers, career-oriented disciplines with a high emphasis on natural sciences are required. If the education is provided at a later stage in the career of an officer, such education should be rooted in the management sciences. If the education is to prepare officers for a second career, Rutsch argued, officers should have a choice as to what to study.⁶² This argument brings to the fore questions about those disciplines that concern the heart of the military profession and that in

⁵⁷ Ibid., pp. 6-7.

⁵⁸ Rutsch, M, "Overview of Military Education in the SANDF", Paper presented at the international conference and workshop on *The Future of Military Education in a Democratic South Africa* jointly hosted by the Military Academy and IDASA at the SANDF Military Academy in Saldanha, 1 and 2 June 1995, p. 1.

⁵⁹ Rutsch used the phrase "to train himself", which is a further indication of his lack of conceptual clarity on the difference between training and education;

⁶⁰ Rutsch, M, op. cit., p. 1.

⁶¹ Ibid., p. 5.

⁶² Ibid., p. 6.

general fall within the realm of the humanities. There seems to be general agreement between armed forces globally that an emphasis on human sciences – military history, political science, security and strategic studies in particular – should be at the heart of officer education. The human sciences, though, do not even feature in Rutsch's argument.

The Dean of Military Sciences at the time, Col (Prof) JC Kotzé, in his address provided an overview of the role of certain foreign military academies and educational institutions that he and the Officer Commanding of the South African Military Academy visited during March and April 1995.⁶³ Kotzé highlighted the balance between civilians and military personnel at the different educational institutions, the focus and content of their academic programmes, and the qualifications that are eventually granted by the different institutions.

Kotzé's general impressions and concluding remarks were of critical importance for the debate concerning the future of the Military Academy. Kotzé argued that most of the institutions visited placed a high premium on military training. It is accepted though that tertiary education, and in particular university education, is essential for all future officers – as a solid academic foundation for military careers and in preparation for second careers should they leave their particular defence forces. There is thus a very strong emphasis in most European (and U.S.) armed forces on military training *in conjunction* with tertiary education. Kotzé asserted that military training and education are regarded as a national asset in all the countries visited.⁶⁴

Kotzé highlighted the prominence of physical science disciplines in the curricula of the educational institutions together with a noticeable absence of managerial disciplines. Kotzé stressed the need for the Faculty of Military Science at the South African Military Academy to make disciplines more militarily applicable. He asked the question whether a "general" BMil degree should not be developed instead of the BMil degree course in the different directions (at that time natural, management and human sciences). Such a development might lead, he pointed out, to a reduction in the number of disciplines offered by the Faculty of Military Science. This might necessitate a reconsideration of the status of the BMil. A demand for

⁶³ The visit schedule included the following countries and institutions: the United States of America (West Point Military Academy; United States Naval Academy, Annapolis); the United Kingdom (Royal Military Academy Sandhurst; Britannia Royal Naval College, Dartmouth; Royal Military College of Science, Shrivenham); Germany (Offizierschule des Heeres, Hannover; Universität der Bundeswehr, Hamburg; Führungsakademie der Bundeswehr, Hamburg); Hungary (Bolyai Janos Military Technical Academy, Budapest; Kossuth Lajos Military Academy, Szentendre; Szolnoki Air Force Academy, Szolnok); Austria (the Theresian Military Academy, Wiener-Neustadt); and Egypt (the Army Military Academy; the Command and Staff College; the Nasser Higher Military Academy).

⁶⁴ Kotzé, JC, Professional Military Education: The Role of Military Academies", Paper presented at the international conference and workshop on *The Future of Military Education in a Democratic South*

greater military professionalism in the SANDF perhaps justifies the introduction of a four-year professionally directed degree. Such a move might, however, have far-reaching financial implications that might be difficult to accommodate within the current Defence budget.⁶⁵

In most countries, student bodies are organised for purposes of control according to military custom in companies and battalions. Much is also done, Kotzé noted, at these foreign educational and training institutions to accommodate foreign cadets and students. Special efforts are also made by these countries to recruit the top students of the school system for training and education at these military training and educational institutions. The academic faculties of the institutions visited differ in their composition depending on the kind of institution. Kotzé noted that it appears as if the more archetype military academies are less inclined to use civilian lectures on their staff.⁶⁶

A number of issues were raised in the workshop that followed on the conference. Dr Laurie Nathan of the Centre for Conflict Resolution in Cape Town reiterated the fact that liberal education in armed forces has two purposes: firstly, to inculcate the knowledge required for a specific profession and secondly, in a more general sense, to develop "... enquiring minds, critical and creative thinking, all of which are regarded as essential for informed decision-making."⁶⁷ Nathan noted that liberal education brings with it certain responsibilities, such as academic freedom and openness. He posed the question whether the young soldier should be exposed to these values or whether he should first be socialised to accept military values, before being subjected to more liberal values. The purpose of liberal education within the armed forces was articulated as follows:

- It provides the impetus for a culture of life-long learning, which is regarded as essential, considering the variety of roles and functions the soldier is expected to fulfil during the course of his career.
- It provides the officer with an intellectual basis for his future career. This is indispensable for a military career characterised by a high degree of post rotation and the need for a diversity of skills and knowledge.

Africa jointly hosted by the Military Academy and IDASA at the SANDF Military Academy in Saldanha, 1 and 2 June 1995, pp. 12-13.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 14.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 13.

⁶⁷ Nathan, L, "Notes on the Activities of Work Group #1", Remarks made at the international conference and workshop on *The Future of Military Education in a Democratic South Africa* jointly hosted by the Military Academy and IDASA at the SANDF Military Academy in Saldanha, 1 and 2 June 1995, p. 1.

- It develops flexibility in leadership style, the ability to evaluate opinions and to respond accordingly and to equip the soldier with the moral courage to deal with complex problems.
- It inculcates the officer with a value system that will enable him to make decisions based on the principles outlined in the Constitution.⁶⁸

Prof Gavin Cawthra from the University of the Witwatersrand, who like Nathan headed one of the workshops, noted that the participation of civilian lecturers in military education is a form of civilian control over the military. Civilians are seen, he explained, as people who "... have not bought into the system".⁶⁹ He argued that civilian institutions that have a vested interest in military education institutions should have representation in these institutions. Control need to be exercised over military education through external evaluations by civilian counterparts. Civilian insight into military curricula, Cawthra explained, is important to address the fear of military indoctrination.⁷⁰

One of the most interesting features of the conference in general, was the difference in view between the contributions of the international and civilian participants at the conference and the views of the SANDF. The official representatives and contributions of the South African military were in favour of the militarisation of officer education.⁷¹ The SANDF therefore saw a bigger role for itself in the education of officers in the Military Academy.⁷² Stated differently, the defence force clearly was not content with the situation at the Military Academy. "Under this scheme," Brig Rutsch pointed out, "we run the risk of educating potential leavers, with little additional advantage for the SANDF."⁷³ Underlying this view was the inability of the Military Academy to provide in the needs of the broader military community in South Africa. The education provided at the Military Academy did not form part of the broader system of education and training in the South African military.⁷⁴ These views were directly the opposite of those

⁶⁸ Ibid., p. 2.

⁶⁹ Cawthra, G, "Notes on the Activities of Work Group #4", Remarks made at the international conference and workshop on *The Future of Military Education in a Democratic South Africa* jointly hosted by the Military Academy and IDASA at the SANDF Military Academy in Saldanha, 1 and 2 June 1995, p. 2.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Kotze, E & Steele, R, "Civilian Participation in the Education and Development of Officers", op. cit., p. 22.

⁷² This view is still prevalent in the South African military. The Commandant of the Military Academy, for example, reiterated the importance of militarising the Military Academy. The Commandant expressed the opinion that if he should have a free hand in the reorganisation of the institution, he will break all links with the University of Stellenbosch. Interview with the Commandant of the Military Academy, Saldanha, 17 February 2006. Please note that this particular individual was replaced as the Commandant of the Military Academy in a cloud of controversy in April 2006.

⁷³ Rutsch, M, op. cit., p. 6.

⁷⁴ Interview with Col (ret) Prof JS Kotze, Saldanha, 2 February 2006. Col (ret) Prof Kotze used to be the head of Human Sciences at the Military Academy.

expressed by international and civilian participants at the conference. These participants were clearly in favour of the "... democratisation and civilianisation of particular aspects of military tertiary education".⁷⁵

5.3.2 The impact and result of the conference on the future of the Military Academy

An interesting feature of the debate at the Military Academy about education in the military in general and at the Military Academy in particular during the 1990s, was its abrupt end in 1996. The most obvious reason for the end of the debate was the resignation and retirement of some senior members of the Faculty of Military Science who had been instrumental in the debate since the early 1990s. Mark Malan resigned to take up a post with the Institute of Security Studies in Pretoria. His two co-authors of the report in which a new "Conceptual Model of a SANDF Institute of Professional Military Education" was proposed, also resigned from the Military Academy. Cdr (Dr) A Roux later took up the position of Director of the Institute for Futures Research at the University of Stellenbosch Business School (USB). The four most senior faculty members who retired in 1995 and 1996 were Col (Prof) JC Kotzé, Col (Prof) JS Kotze, Col (Prof) PIJ van Rensburg, and Col (Prof) RA O'Connell. Col (ret) Prof JS Kotze is of the opinion that all the members of the Faculty who had a passion for military education and the transformation of the Military Academy to provide quality education to members of the SANDF, had left the Military Academy.⁷⁶ The Military Academy, indeed, lost a huge part of its institutional memory when these people resigned and retired in the mid-1990s.

A key individual in the debate, Prof C Nelson, became the Dean of Military Science in 1996. During his term of office, important changes were proposed and made regarding the *Personnel Management Code for Military University Educator*⁷⁷ and the educational structure of the Military Academy. The newly appointed Flag Officer Commanding of the Military Academy, Rear Adm (jg) PC Potgieter, who replaced Brig PO Verbeeck in 1996 as the Commanding Officer of the Military Academy, however, was the key person in these changes.

The conference and the ensuing debate, however, led to a tasking instruction from the Chief of Personnel of the SANDF to the Chiefs of Personnel of the Army, the Air Force, the Navy and the Medical Service as well as the Intelligence Division on 19 October 1995.⁷⁷ A number of issues were highlighted in the tasking instruction concerning institutional development at the

⁷⁵ Kotze, E & Steele, R, "Civilian Participation in the Education and Development of Officers", op. cit., p. 22.

⁷⁶ Interview with Col (ret) Prof JS Kotze, Saldanha, 2 February 2006.

⁷⁷ South African Department of Defence, Chief of Staff Personnel, *Takingsinstruksie: Hersiening van Offisiersontwikkelingsprogram*, HSP/DPO/103/1/B, 19 October 1995.

Military Academy. Firstly, it was noted that a tertiary educational qualification was not required from all officers in the officer development programme of the SANDF as is the case in most developed countries of the world.⁷⁸ Secondly, the position of the Military Academy should be reconsidered as part of the total officer development programme in the SANDF in terms of its cost-effectiveness and officer training and socialisation (generally known in the SANDF as “formative training”). The unique requirements of each service should also be considered as part of the officer development programme.⁷⁹ Lastly, as soon as an agreement has been reached within the task group on the role and position of the Military Academy within the officer development programme, an additional task group should be created under the auspices of the Officer Commanding of the Military Academy. This task group has to make recommendations with regard to changes to the structure of the Military Academy and its academic offerings.⁸⁰

5.4 THE POTGIETER REPORT AND REFORMS AT THE MILITARY ACADEMY

During 1996 and 1997, the entire training, educational and development system in the SANDF was reconsidered. This re-appreciation of Education, Training and Development (ETD) in the Department of Defence culminated in a number of reports and decisions by the Defence Staff Council⁸¹ and eventually led to a directive to operationalise the ideas expressed in these reports.⁸² It was noted in this implementation instruction that training and education in South Africa and in the Department of Defence are dynamic and undergoing significant and ongoing change. It represented “... the wonderful opportunity for mutual learning and the accreditation of appropriate learning opportunities in the Department of Defence”.⁸³ The management thereof, though, was (and still is) a considerable challenge for the SANDF. The instruction consequently pointed out that the implementation programme regarding joint training and education should seek a systematic integration of all joint and common education and training

⁷⁸ Ibid., p. 1.

⁷⁹ Ibid., p. 2.

⁸⁰ Ibid., pp. 3-4.

⁸¹ See the following documents: South African Department of Defence, Chief Joint Training, *Department of Defence (DOD): Education, Training and Professional Development (ETD in Transformation: First Report of the ETD Projects Team*, DOD/CJ TRG/501/6/1, 28 August 1997; South African Department of Defence, Chief Joint Training, *Chief Joint Training, Follow-up Report to the First Report of the ETD Project Team*, DOD/CJ TRG/501/6/1, 19 September 1997; South African Department of Defence, Chief Joint Training, *Second Report of the ETD Project Team: Possible Quick Wins*, DOD/CJ TRG/501/6/1, 20 September 1997; South African Department of Defence, Chief Joint Training, *Department of Defence Transformation Design Workshop Report (Draft 4)*, DOD/CJ TRG/501/6/1, 1 December 1997.

⁸² South African Department of Defence, Chief Joint Training, *Transformation: Implementation Directive 1/98: Transformation of the Joint Training System Element*, DOD/CJ TRG/501/6/1, 4 February 1998.

⁸³ Ibid., p. 2.

issues in a sensitive and sensible way. Decisions in relation to roles, responsibilities, and facilities need to be made with particular care.⁸⁴

This implementation directive led to a number of so-called “sub-project directives” to deal with the transformation of specific dimensions of ETD in the Department of Defence. One such sub-project directive focuses on tertiary education in the Department of Defence.⁸⁵ As a result of this sub-project directive, a project team was convened under the chairmanship of the Flag Officer Commanding of the Military Academy “... to relate tertiary education to the greater delivery system for joint and common education, training and development”.⁸⁶ The project team consisted of members of the Faculty of Military Science, representatives of the different services, and a representative from each of the Centre of Military Studies (CEMIS), the Military Psychological Institute, the reserve forces and civilians in the Department of Defence. The team was to address the following issues:

- military professionalism and ETD against the backdrop of the Higher Education Act;
- selection methodology and criteria for tertiary education opportunities;
- tertiary education as acculturation mechanism;
- tertiary education as influence on military service orientation;
- tertiary education as foundation for higher level learning and command and staff qualifications;
- tertiary education as enabler for functional training;
- Department of Defence needs in terms of tertiary education content;
- the need of the different services in terms of tertiary education content;
- structural options and scheduling of undergraduate and post-graduate courses;
- tertiary education and the civilian resource component of the Department of Defence;
- the outsourcing of the educational needs of the Department of Defence; and
- any issue relating to tertiary education in the Department of Defence that the project team may deem necessary to address.⁸⁷

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ South African Department of Defence, Chief Joint Training, *Sub-Project Directive JT2/2/1/98: Tertiary Education in the DOD*, DOD/CJ TRG/R/501/6/1, 27 February 1998.

⁸⁶ Ibid., p.1.

⁸⁷ Ibid., p. 2.

5.4.1 Considering different systems of military training and education for the future of the Military Academy

The work of the project team culminated in the Report to the Chief of Joint Training on Higher Education in the Department of Defence on 8 June 1998. The report eventually led to fundamental changes in the role, structure and academic programmes of the Military Academy. It is thus necessary to consider the ideas of this report in more detail as it relates to the future of the Military Academy. In the introduction of the report it is recognised that since tertiary education normally spans several years, the timing and content of such education play a consequential role in the acculturation or socialisation of military students. This education should be of a universal nature and applicable to all the services. The report recognised the fact that tertiary education forms the foundation for all subsequent functional training provided by the different services. It is stated that tertiary education in the South African Department of Defence is not a means unto itself. It is part of the greater delivery system for joint and common education, training and development of the Department's human resource pool.⁸⁸

The report noted that an effort should be made by the Department of Defence to promote public understanding for the role, function and responsibilities of the military officer towards the nation and the state. In addition, the recruitment and selection of candidate officers should consider their intellectual acuity, social representivity, physical ability and commitment to military service. Military education and training should be promoted for its intrinsic and market-related value to enable smooth transition to civilian life for members leaving the SANDF on expiry of their service contracts. However, caution should be exercised not to over-invest in the education of young men and women who are not really committed to a long-term military career. The report pointed out that the normal system of corps schools and military colleges is an unsuitable vehicle for providing a liberal education to the officer corps. It is noted that the solution to the problem of meeting the educational demands of the military in a cost-effective manner in emerging democracies lies in civil-military co-operation in the education of military officers.⁸⁹

The report touched on a number of very important issues in higher education in the Department of Defence that were not considered in detail in the initial post-1994 debates on the Military Academy. This includes the need for the different services to accept ownership of the education of the officers at the Military Academy. In particular, the services should have a clear understanding of their educational needs and should be in continuous interaction with the

⁸⁸ South African Department of Defence, Military Academy, *Report for Chief Joint Training on Higher Education in the Department of Defence*, MA/R/501/6/1, 8 June 1998, p. 2.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, p.5.

Military Academy to ensure that these needs are satisfied. The services should also hold the Military Academy responsible for the military socialisation of their junior officers in an academic environment.⁹⁰ The report also highlighted the fact that officer education does not terminate at undergraduate level. It is a continuous process in the officer's progress through the ranks and during his entire length of service. South African staff courses, though, "... have no academic standing, are not recognised by any institution of higher education and therefore are not accredited nationally".⁹¹ By contrast, it was argued that similar studies at foreign military and war colleges lead to the awarding of honours, masters and doctoral degrees respectively.

The report analysed a number of "... vehicles for higher education" in the SANDF:⁹²

- outsourcing – through recruitment of graduates from civilian universities;
- outsourcing – by providing military higher education through scholarships at civilian universities;
- insourcing – through the development of a military university; and
- insourcing – through the development of a military academy or a combined military academy/university.

Each one of the above-mentioned options was evaluated by means of an analysis of both the advantages and disadvantages of each structural alternative. A detailed cost analysis of the various options was also done.

The British armed forces was considered as the primary example of a military outsourcing its educational needs through the recruitment of graduates who, upon selection, attend a training institution such as the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst. In addition, it is noted that British staff courses are linked to post-graduate qualifications provided by a number of British universities. The report argued that in such a system, the locus of military higher education is outside the military – the military does not budget or develop the infrastructure for the provision of such education. The individual takes responsibility for his own initial education and the payment thereof. The state may, however, support the individual student with subsidies and other forms of grants.⁹³

⁹⁰ South African Department of Defence, Military Academy, *Appreciation for the Chief of Joint Training on Tertiary Education in the Department of Defence*, MA/R/501/6/1, 26 May 1998, pp. 16-17.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, p.18.

⁹² South African Department of Defence, Military Academy, *Costing the Options of Higher Education in the Department of Defence*, Enclosure 1 to MA/R/501/6/1, 8 June 1998.

⁹³ *Report for Chief Joint Training on Higher Education in the Department of Defence*, op. cit., p. 11.

The report maintained that such a system leaves the military vulnerable to market forces. In South Africa in particular, it is argued, a huge number of people from the previously disadvantaged communities are excluded from entering the officer corps. Market forces dictate how many students volunteer for military service. After completion of tertiary studies, most people's value systems and viewpoints are formed to such an extent that military socialisation may be a challenge. In such a system, it was argued, the military have to pay more market-related salaries especially in those occupational categories where skills are in short supply. The report also expressed the opinion that universities do not necessarily provide the contextualised education that is required by the military. It is argued that pressure on universities to meet the needs of the market-place, implies that current university courses are more specifically aimed at filling a specific niche in the private or business sector. In addition, there is no military utilisation or exposure during undergraduate study in such a system. The report argued that graduates who have never been exposed to the military but who have legitimate aspirations may be loath to serve or function on lower levels of officer responsibility (such as that of an infantry platoon commander) where the going is often very hard.⁹⁴ In short, the way the discussion was done reflected an opinion that this option was not suitable in the South African context or that it may be difficult to implement in this country.

Militaries may also outsource military higher education to civilian universities, specifying its higher educational requirements and requesting universities or colleges to compile programmes that would meet the ETD needs of the military. A big advantage of such a system is that civilian students may also enrol for such programmes, thus making a bigger segment of civilian society knowledgeable about strategic, defence and military affairs. Military students benefit from the views of and exposure to their civilian colleagues. A larger pool of academics will provide tertiary education to military students giving these students greater intellectual exposure. In addition, a greater diversity of higher education options with regard to subject content and courses is available to students under such an approach. In addition, the Department of Defence will no longer have to carry the administration and logistical cost of its own higher education institutions.⁹⁵

Outsourcing military tertiary education to civilian universities also has some disadvantages. It is argued in the report that such an arrangement limits the time for military socialisation. In addition, it exposes military higher education to market forces, changes in higher education and the standards of education of the respective institutions. It is claimed that the retention rate after the initial period of service has ended, is lower for graduates from civilian universities than

⁹⁴ Ibid., pp.11-12.

⁹⁵ Ibid., p. 13.

for those who have graduated through a military academy.⁹⁶ The cost of such a system may also be very high. The military has to consider the accommodation of students, tuition fees or scholarships, cost of university educators providing contextualised military education such as military history, and the possible establishment, staffing and equipping of Departments of Military Science at selected universities.⁹⁷

The third option considered in the report was insourcing by means of a military university. The report pointed out that the military university option presupposes the existence of other avenues of fundamental military socialisation. It is therefore accepted that the officer should first be trained and socialised, and even that he should gain some military experience before entry into the military university. It is pointed out in the report that the system in use within the SANDF (in 1998) is a de facto military university in that it educates officers and offers limited professional development and only peripheral socialisation. A civilian university degree (albeit contextualised) is conferred at present in the South African scenario. It is primarily focused on the occupational needs of the individual and not on the professional requirements of the military. The report noted that the system in use differs from the “ideal type” military university in that civilians cannot enrol, higher education does not necessarily facilitate passage to higher rank and the emphasis is on undergraduate rather than post-graduate studies. Post-graduate studies are voluntary and not linked to professional military staff qualifications.⁹⁸

The biggest advantage of such a system is the development by the military of its own institutions of higher education (and control thereof). Academic programmes may be tailored to the needs of the military. In addition, the military has control over who enrolls and what academic qualifications are awarded. Military staff qualifications are usually linked to the academic qualifications. This however, the report noted, is not the case in South Africa at present. The biggest disadvantage is that the military needs to develop an additional system for initial officer training and socialisation, which, in most cases, translates into higher operating and other costs. Within the military system itself, this may lead to divisiveness between officers who have such education and those who do not. This is to a certain degree true of the South African military. It may also take many years for such a military academic institution to establish a credible academic reputation – if ever.⁹⁹

⁹⁶ The report refers to a study by Lakhani in this regard. See: Lakhani, H, “Junior Officers – A Multidisciplinary Analysis”, *Journal of Political and Military Sociology*, Vol 19, Summer 1991, pp. 1-27.

⁹⁷ *Report for Chief Joint Training on Higher Education in the Department of Defence*, op. cit., p. 14 and *Costing the Options of Higher Education in the Department of Defence*, op. cit., p. 18.

⁹⁸ *Report for Chief Joint Training on Higher Education in the Department of Defence*, op. cit., pp. 14-15.

The last option that was considered in the report is the insourcing of military education to all future officers on a residential basis at a combined military academy/university. The system considered in this regard corresponds to a large extent with the “Conceptual Model of a SANDF Institute of Professional Military Education” advocated by Malan and his colleagues in 1994/95. Since this system of training and education at a combined military academy/university was recommended by the workgroup and eventually accepted and introduced as the preferred educational system and training for a military that was essential amidst a process of transformation, it needs to be discussed in greater detail.

5.4.2 The proposal for a combined military academy/university system for the South African military

The report outlined the fact that military academies make provision for the education, training and socialisation of young (candidate) officers and that the education that is provided is generally contextualised to meet the needs of the military. The “... market of the military academy”, it is emphasised in the report, “is the *military professional*” and “... it does not make provision for civilian students on undergraduate level because of the need for military socialisation”.¹⁰⁰ It is also stated that there are many different kinds of military academies the world over, but their value lies in the combination of education, training and socialisation of the “... youthful officer corps” as a foundation for their future military careers. The military academy/university system proposed for the SANDF, the report noted, should consider that:

- neither the present schooling, higher education system nor the SANDF, provides a solid basis for the type of intellectual and ethical qualities expected of members of the military profession;¹⁰¹
- the resource scarcity currently faced by the South African military given the competing national priorities;
- the present educational imbalances in the education of the different racial groupings in South Africa; and
- the need to foster a political culture that respects civil supremacy over the military.¹⁰²

The report stated that such a system provides for residential military training and professional development as well as a balanced, liberal higher education for all candidate officers of the

⁹⁹ Ibid., pp.15-16.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., p.16.

¹⁰¹ It should be noted that this might be a highly questionable view. The study does not provide any scientific proof to substantiate the statement.

¹⁰² *Report for Chief Joint Training on Higher Education in the Department of Defence*, op. cit., p. 16.

armed forces. It also makes provision for post-graduate education to all serving uniformed officers (including those of the reserve forces) and civilian personnel by means of distance or modular (residential) education. The latter, it is foreseen, should later be linked to the different staff colleges to make provision for post-graduate education on staff college level. The institution, it is noted, will manifest itself on the one hand as an archetypal military academy for candidate officers and on the other hand as a non-residential military university for other uniformed and civilian personnel in the Department of Defence.¹⁰³ (See Figure 5.1)




Figure 5.1: The combined military academy/university system¹⁰⁴

The system of ETD that was proposed differs in a number of ways from the way in which the Military Academy was so far utilised. The first important difference was the enrolment of primarily candidate officers who have just completed the formative training phase of the different services. At the time the report was drawn up (1998), students in most cases first spent some time in the military – some of them up to ten years – before commencing with their studies. The result however was a very heterogeneous student body in terms of rank and age. This had

¹⁰³ Ibid., pp. 16-17.

some advantages in terms of the socialisation, command and control, and the responsibility of students at the Military Academy since most students had a thorough understanding of the military system in general. There was also a natural mentorship system in place amongst the students with the older more experienced students who often exercised control (formal and informal) over younger more impetuous students. Nevertheless, doing constructive military training with such a heterogeneous body of students was almost impossible. Training at the Military Academy was therefore almost non-existent. Taking all the students directly from the training institutions, as proposed in the report, meant that a more homogeneous student body would allow for a greater training input from the services during the time that young officers spend at the Military Academy. The expansion of the military training staff was therefore proposed with the establishment of unique service training wings at the Military Academy consisting of officers, instructors and training staff from the different services.¹⁰⁵

A second important difference was the different exit levels that were proposed. In cases where students experience difficulty coping with the workload and academic studies on first-year level, a student may be requested to end his studies at the Military Academy while being awarded a Certificate in Military Studies and a short-term contract in the Department of Defence. The same may happen after two years of study when a medium-term contract and a Diploma in Military Studies may be awarded. Such a system, it was argued, will ensure that only graduate students remain as long-term career officers in the military. The system also made provision for an academic development programme during the first year of training at the service training institutions. This would ensure that young officers make a smooth transition from school to university education, specifically raising the possibility for successful academic studies for candidate officers from previous disadvantaged communities.¹⁰⁶

A third change proposed, concerned the academic curriculum of the Military Academy. An analysis was made of the educational imperatives and needs of the Department of Defence in general and the different services in particular.¹⁰⁷ Based on this analysis, it was proposed that the Military Academy moved towards degree courses with a so-called core curriculum. The core curriculum is a compulsory academic component in the curriculum of the degree courses at the Military Academy. All students at the Military Academy, irrespective of the direction of

¹⁰⁴ Adapted from a figure in *Report for Chief Joint Training on Higher Education in the Department of Defence*, op. cit. p. 17.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 13.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 11.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 3-4.

their studies, should enrol for the disciplines prescribed as part of the core curriculum.¹⁰⁸ The core curriculum proposed for the Military Academy in the report, was structured around three very particular notions. In the first year of studies the emphasis needed to be on what was referred to as “Military and Environmental Studies”, in the second year of study on “Military Leadership, Command, Management and Public Administration”, and in the third year on “Future War”. (See Table 5.4)

Table 5.4: Proposal for a core curriculum to meet the needs of the SANDF¹⁰⁹

Preparatory year	1st year Military and Environmental Studies	2nd year Military Leadership, Command, Management and Public Administration	3rd year Future War
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Compulsory modules ▪ Inter-disciplinary academic skills ▪ Information Literacy & Computer Skills. ▪ Language skills. ▪ Mathematics Special. ▪ Physics Special. ▪ Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC). ▪ Military Leadership. ▪ War and Politics. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Military History (War and Society) ▪ Military Geography (War and Environment) ▪ Military Strategy 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Public and Developmental Management (War and Public Management) ▪ Accounting (Accounting for Military Practitioners) ▪ Computer Information Systems (Information Management) ▪ Statistics (Statistics for Military Practitioners) ▪ Economics (War and the Economy) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Military Technology (Military Technology and Future War) ▪ Military Strategy (Military Strategy in Future War)
Additional modules	Three additional disciplines offered by the Faculty. The Services may specify the subject.	Two majors from the disciplines offered by the Faculty.	Two majors from the disciplines offered by the Faculty.

¹⁰⁸ At that time, the three directions in which BMil degrees were awarded were natural sciences, management sciences and human sciences. There was, though, a wide range of subjects from which students could choose in completion of their degrees.

¹⁰⁹ Adapted from a figure in South African Department of Defence, Military Academy, *Higher Education in the Department of Defence: The Combined Military Academy/University Model*, MA/R/501/6/1, 8 June 1998, p. 9.

The report discussed in great detail the advantages and disadvantages of a combined military academy/university system. In terms of advantages, it is pointed out that cost may be saved if basic and officer training are “co-located” and academically linked to a subsequent higher education. The military also maintains a high level of autonomy over the provision of educated personnel to fill its ranks of leadership and management. A high level of contextualisation of the educational content of the tertiary programmes becomes possible with greater immediate relevance to the military milieu.¹¹⁰ Such a system would also make possible the provision of some form of accredited higher education by means of a degree, diploma or certificate to all officers.

This will meet not only the functional requirements of the SANDF for tertiary education, but will also facilitate an easier transfer to civilian life when short- and medium-term contracts are terminated. It is also possible to plan the annual programme of the combined military academy/university in such a way that provision is made for academic education and military training. In addition, both military education and training are conducted in an environment that is consonant with the military culture.¹¹¹

The combined military academy/university system makes possible the secondment of military practitioners with the necessary educational qualifications to the Military Academy to provide functional contextualised training and education if required. Furthermore, the academic programme of such an institution “...is geared specifically for the ‘niche’ of military professionals”.¹¹² In addition, such an approach may accommodate members of the reserve forces, given the modular nature of the academic programme is presented by means of distance education. The Military Academy may become the alma mater of the complete future officer corps of the SANDF if all officers at some stage in their careers passed through the Military Academy. An additional advantage is the possibility of linking all the staff courses in the SANDF to some form of post-graduate qualification. A high level of jointness and common reference for officers in the SANDF is also established at a very early stage of their careers.¹¹³

A considerable disadvantage of the combined military academy/university system is that the cost of higher education is higher than recruiting graduates or sending candidates to a civilian

¹¹⁰ This is a debatable view and very much depend on the military experience and research of the academics at the Military Academy. A noticeable increase in the number of civilian lecturers with no military experience and no interest in doing research that has the military as its primary object at the Military Academy, makes the notion of contextualised education only an ideal.

¹¹¹ *Report for Chief Joint Training on Higher Education in the Department of Defence*, op. cit., pp. 17-18.

¹¹² *Ibid.*, p. 18.

university. However, if the military training and socialisation function of such an institution is considered and benchmarked against international studies in this regard, the return on investment for military academy graduates is indisputably higher than that from civilian universities.¹¹⁴ It was noted in the report that academic personnel will have to be remunerated at a level that commensurate with the remuneration of academics at civilian institutions if they are to be retained. Such a system does not make provision for the enrolment of civilian students in undergraduate programmes. In addition, the participation of the different services was required in order to facilitate the introduction of the preparatory academic course at the different officers' training institutions.¹¹⁵

Potgieter's proposals were presented to the Military Command Council of the SANDF on 17 May 1999. At a Faculty Council Meeting at the Military Academy on 5 August 1999, Potgieter reported that the proposal for a combined military academy/university system was "... favourably accepted" by the different services and that "... the future of the Military Academy is thus once more confirmed".¹¹⁶ In the meantime, however, two other issues had been raised to the level that required the urgent attention of the command cadre of the Military Academy. The one was the dispensation under which the Military University Educators (MUEs) – the academic personnel in the Faculty of Military Science – are employed. The other was the new academic programmes that the Faculty had to develop as an integral part of the process of programme development required from the University of Stellenbosch by the South African Qualifications Authority (SAQA).

5.5 THE SERVICE CONDITIONS OF THE MILITARY UNIVERSITY EDUCATORS

Lecturing personnel in the Faculty of Military Science are all employed under supervision and control of the SANDF and subject to the approval of the University. The University is responsible for academic supervision and control. Uniformed members of the academic staff are subject to the Military Disciplinary Code of the SANDF while civilian members are subjected to the Personnel Code for Civilian Employees in the Public Sector. The functional status of employment of lecturing personnel at the Military Academy is determined by one of three categories. Military members who are appointed from within the SANDF or elsewhere may serve in the Faculty as "... military practitioners" – the same dispensation under which all

¹¹³ Ibid.

¹¹⁴ See Lakhani, H, op. cit., in this regard.

¹¹⁵ Ibid., p. 18.

¹¹⁶ South African Department of Defence, Military Academy, *Minutes of a Faculty Council Meeting Held at the Military Academy 051330B August 1999 in Room 53*. MA/R/103/1/8/2/3 (Faculty Council Meeting), 5 August 1999, p. 6.

serving officers in the SANDF are appointed. Civilian academics who are appointed at the Military Academy have a choice in being either uniformed MUEs or civilian MUEs.

This complicated system brought along differentiation and disparity regarding salary and other benefits, resulting in the civilian option being less beneficial. Militarised members of the faculty sometimes participated in a number of non-academic assignments and administrative tasks that could have been delegated and distributed amongst faculty members. In addition to academic qualifications, some of the faculty members (military practitioners in particular) were expected to attend command and staff courses for promotion in the SANDF. While they were attending these courses, their academic workload was distributed between their colleagues in the academic department to which they belong.¹¹⁷

Since 1996, a deliberate effort had been made to develop and improve the dispensation under which lecturers at the Military Academy are appointed. This included, *inter alia*, the introduction of some form of flexible working hours, the improvement of the service conditions of MUEs in general, the minimisation of the military activities of uniformed MUEs and unit activities of MUEs in general, and the restructuring of the leave system to allow MUEs to utilise the recess periods more effectively for research and study purposes.

The different post and salary levels in the Faculty of Military Science were linked, for the first time in the history of the institution, to the academic rank levels of the University:

- post level MUE 1 on salary level 7 and 8 was linked to the university post of junior lecturer;
- post level MUE 2 on salary level 9 was linked to the university post of lecturer;
- post level MUE 3 on salary level 10 was also linked to the university post of lecturer;
- post level MUE 4 on salary level 11 was linked to the university post of senior lecturer;
- post level MUE 4 on salary level 12 was link to the university post of associate professor;
- post level MUE 4 on salary level 12 was linked to the university post of professor.¹¹⁸

¹¹⁷ Memorandum by the Departmental Chair Mercantile and Criminal Law, Lt Col PF Brits, to the Service Conditions Committee, "Service Conditions of Civilian Lecturers at the Military Academy", Attachment to South African Department of Defence, Military Academy, *Minutes of a Faculty Council Meeting Held at the Military Academy 111330B Feb 2000 in Room 53*. MA/R/103/1/8/2/3 (Faculty Council Meeting), 11 February 2000, p. 63.

¹¹⁸ South African Department of Defence, Military Academy, *Minutes of a Faculty Council Meeting Held at the Military Academy 14 November 2001 in Room 53*. MA/R/103/1/8/2/3 (Faculty Council Meeting), 10 February 2002, p. 4.

Table 5.5: Appointment and promotion criteria for military university educators in the Faculty of Military Science¹¹⁹

Rank level	Salary level	Academic qualifications	Assessed experience
Departmental assistant	6	Appropriate B degree	None
MUE 1	7	Appropriate honours degree	None
MUE 1	8	Appropriate honours degree	A minimum of one year assessed experience
MUE 2	9	Appropriate honours degree	A minimum of three years' assessed experience after obtaining an honours degree
MUE 2	9	Appropriate masters degree	None
MUE 3	10	Appropriate masters degree	A minimum of six years' assessed experience after obtaining an honours degree
MUE 3	10	Appropriate doctorate	None
MUE 4	11	Doctorate in an appropriate discipline plus limited research capability to a minimum weight of six points ¹²⁰	A minimum of eight years assessed experience after obtaining an honours degree
MUE 4	12	Doctorate in an appropriate discipline plus limited research capability to a minimum weight of twenty five points ¹²¹	A minimum of eight years assessed experience after obtaining an honours degree

Progressive changes were made in the appointment measures, career dispensation and service conditions for military university educators. The different posts for military university educators used to be organised in typical bureaucratic hierarchical fashion. This implied that someone had to move out of a post for the next person to be promoted to the next higher level. This has been changed to the extent that all the MUE posts at the Military Academy have been opened for promotion to the level of MUE 4 on salary level 12. Promotion to a higher MUE level is now dependent on the individual's own qualifications, experience and research record.¹²² Figure 5.6

¹¹⁹ Adapted from South African Department of Defence, Military Academy, "Appendix A: Appointment Measures and Career Pathing for Military University Educators", *Promotion and Appointment Measures: Military University Educators*, CPP/CDHRPP/DSS/104/1/1(908), June 2003, p. A1-A2.

¹²⁰ See Figure 5.7

¹²¹ See Figure 5.7

¹²² South African Department of Defence, Military Academy, *Personnel Management Code for Military University Educators (MUE)*, C PERS/DMPP1/R/104/1/B(13), 19 April 1999.

provides an exposition of what is at present required for appointment and promotion in the Faculty of Military Science. (See Figure 5.5)

A new merit assessment procedure for the faculty was also developed. It is based on the assumption that desired behavioural output should be assessed and not generalised attitudes or inferred personal attributes. The desired behavioural output is defined in terms of the strategic priorities and the core business of the University and the Faculty: teaching, research and community service.

Table 5.6: Relative weights of research outputs for merit assessment in the Faculty of Military Science.¹²³

Research output	Relative weight
▪ Article (not refereed)	0,5
▪ Article (Not accredited/Refereed)	1
▪ Article (Accredited/National journal)	4
▪ Article (Accredited/International journal)	5
▪ Paper (National conference)	2
▪ Paper (International conference)	3
▪ Supervision (Masters students)	2
▪ Supervision (Doctoral students)	3
▪ Chapter in text book	2
▪ Complete academic text book	10
▪ Publication in subsidised conference proceedings	4
▪ Publication in subsidised international conference proceedings	5

The merit assessments are based on a peer rating system within which a defined subgroup of peers (a specific MUE level) rate the performance of a faculty member in comparison with that of its peers. Each year a faculty member has to submit a performance list, moderated by the chair of his subject group or school, which reflects his performance with respect to teaching activities, research, community service and the activities directed at self-development which have not been covered in the other three categories. A relative weight is allocated to each activity that has been performed. In the domain of research, for example, a clear indication is provided of the relative value of different research outputs and this guides the faculty member towards the pursuit of the most desirable outcomes. (See Figure 5.6) This procedure, it is

¹²³ Memorandum by the Dean of Military Science, Prof DJ Malan, to the Flag Officer Commanding of the Military Academy, Rear Adm (jg) PC Potgieter, "Proposed Merit Assessment Procedure for Civilian and Uniformed Academic Staff", 17 November 1999, Attachment to *Minutes of a Faculty Council Meeting Held at the Military Academy on 111330B Feb 00 in Room 53*, op. cit., p. 15.

argued, not only focuses the attention of faculty members on desired outcomes, but also reinforces activities directed toward these outcomes.¹²⁴

There is no doubt that the service conditions of the academics in the Faculty of Military Science are in general far better than it used to be in the era before 1996. The inability of the Faculty, firstly, to maintain the services of academics from previously disadvantaged components of our society and, secondly, to fill the posts of particularly scarce, highly competitive or highly paid fields of study (statistics and accountancy for example), led to questions about the level of remuneration within the Faculty. In a recent study done by the Staff Development and Service Conditions Committee in the Faculty, it was found that the salaries of the faculty have indeed fallen behind that which is normally considered to be the norm at universities in South Africa in general. Recommendations have been made to the SANDF and other stakeholders in this regard. However, this has not as yet resulted in any change in the remuneration of faculty members of any kind.¹²⁵

5.6 THE DEVELOPMENT OF NEW DEGREE PROGRAMMES IN THE FACULTY OF MILITARY SCIENCE

On 7 August 1998, the Dean of Military Science informed a meeting of the Faculty Council of the contents of a letter received from the Vice-Rector (Academic) of the University of Stellenbosch regarding the planning and development of new academic programmes in accordance with SAQA requirements. He specifically pointed out that the development of the new programmes had to be completed by March 1999 for submission to the Senate of the University by April 1999. The meeting mandated the Curriculum Development Committee of the faculty to undertake an evaluation of the existing academic programmes as well as the programmes proposed by the Sub-Workgroup on Education and Training in the Department of Defence. The Curriculum Development Committee needed to determine whether these programmes satisfy the requirement laid down in the Academic Planning Framework of the University, or whether it needed further development.¹²⁶

At a meeting of the Faculty Council on 5 February 1999, the Dean pointed out that he had prepared a document regarding future tuition programmes according to the format prescribed by the University of Stellenbosch. This document made provision for twelve academic

¹²⁴ Ibid., pp. 14-16.

¹²⁵ Discussion with Lt Col (Prof) W Janse van Rensburg, Chair of the Staff Development and Service Conditions Committee in the Faculty of Military Science, Saldanha, 20 February 2006.

¹²⁶ South African Department of Defence, Military Academy, *Minutes of a Faculty Council Meeting Held at the Military Academy on 071330B Aug 98*, MA/C/103/1/8/2/3 (Faculty Council Meeting), 7 August 1998, p. 4.

programmes at the Faculty of Military Science on under- and post-graduate level. The basic point of departure was to translate the existing academic offering (degrees) of the Faculty of Military Science into a programme format. This approach was followed since the SANDF was still undecided regarding the exact nature of future officer training and education.¹²⁷ In a report by the Academic Planning Committee of the University to the Senate on the programme developments of faculties for implementation in 2000, it was proposed that these programmes of the Faculty of Military Science be accepted as an interim arrangement. It was expected from the faculty to develop and present new academic programmes to the Academic Planning Committee for recommendation to the Senate as soon as there was clarity regarding the future training and educational needs of the SANDF.¹²⁸

Following the SANDF's favourable acceptance of the proposals of the Potgieter Report, about which the Flag Officer Commanding the Military Academy informed the Faculty Council on 5 August 1999, the table was eventually laid for the development of new academic programmes in the Faculty of Military Science. The development of the new programmes became the first strategic assignment for the newly appointed Dean of Military Science, Prof DJ Malan, who took office in September 1999. The three themes for the education of officers that were identified by the Potgieter Report (See Figure 5.5) served as the theoretical framework for the development of the new academic programmes. Malan described the three themes in terms of an emphasis on military technology, military management, and war and society.¹²⁹

There was, however, a difference between the programmes that were developed by the Faculty and the proposals of the Potgieter Report. The Potgieter Report was based on the idea of a core curriculum as a basis for the BMil degree. This implied that *all* students in the Faculty of Military Science should be exposed to certain military-related subject matter during the duration of their studies.¹³⁰ (See Figure 5.4) These three themes or focus areas should therefore constitute the basis of *all* academic programmes or be incorporated into all the different programmes at the Faculty of Military Science. The programmes that were eventually developed deviated from this central notion to the extent that different programmes were developed for each of these theoretical themes. All the programmes that were developed were

¹²⁷ South African Department of Defence, Military Academy, *Minutes of a Faculty Council Meeting Held at the Military Academy on 051330B Feb 99*, MA/C/103/1/8/2/3 (Faculty Council Meeting), 5 February 1999, p. 6.

¹²⁸ University of Stellenbosch, "Verslag van die ABK aan die Senaat oor die Programvoorleggings van die Fakulteite vir Implementering vanaf 2000", Document attached to South African Department of Defence, Military Academy, *Minutes of a Faculty Council Meeting Held at the Military Academy on 141330B May 99*, MA/C/103/1/8/2/3 (Faculty Council Meeting), 14 May 1999, p. 20.

¹²⁹ Interview with Prof DJ Malan, Dean of Military Science, Saldanha, 15 February 2006.

¹³⁰ Department of Defence, Military Academy, *Higher Education in the Department of Defence: The Combined Military Academy/University Model*, MA/R/501/6/1, 8 June 1998, p. 9.

linked to either the notion of military technology, military management, or war and society. Students who enrolled for the programmes developed in the field of military technology were therefore never exposed to the other theoretical themes. Thus, it did not change the reality of the South African Military Academy graduating some students who have never been academically exposed to the core disciplines in the study of the military profession. This omission would return to haunt the Faculty in a number of subtle ways in years to come.

In addition, a critical mistake was made in the development of the programmes when the three focus areas proposed for the core curriculum in the Potgieter Report were reinterpreted. The proposal for a focus on military and environmental studies was redefined as a focus on war and society, while military leadership, command, management and public administration were rationalised and compounded to the idea of military management, and the proposal concerning an emphasis on future war was reinterpreted as to mean a focus on military technology. The result of this reinterpretation of the proposed focus areas had a fundamental impact on the programmes that were eventually developed. The approach that was followed in the development of the new programmes was nothing but a search for ways in which the existing academic departments at the Military Academy could be accommodated in the three redefined focus areas. It can indeed be argued that the academic departmental structure at the Military Academy led to the redefinition of the three focus areas. No existing academic disciplines were phased out or new disciplines introduced.

The study of military leadership, command, management and public administration, for example, necessitates an interdisciplinary approach. It seems highly unlikely to study military leadership, command and management without also including a military historical approach or an analysis of the role of command and military leaders in the execution of military strategy or a consideration of military ethics. An inclusion of military ethics in the study would have required, for example, the introduction of military sociology as an academic discipline at the Military Academy. In contrast, however, the study of this focus area was restricted to the managerial disciplines offered at the Military Academy in the past. It resulted in a situation where military command and leadership, except for peripheral attention in disciplines such as military history and strategy, are not studied at the Military Academy at all. Management is primarily studied from a business (MBA) perspective. It is not that officers should not be exposed to management in the broader sense of the word. However, these students will have to apply their knowledge in a particular sphere. To ignore that sphere totally is also a grave omission in the study of (military) management.

The proposal on the study of future war in the report provides another good example of misinterpretation. In the development of the new programmes, the emphasis was almost exclusively on technology and technology-related disciplines in the study of future war. Students will thus never be exposed to the study of future war and the present Revolution in Military Affairs as it is studied, for example, in the realm of strategic studies and military history. The study of what was redefined as war and society was restricted to the study of military history, strategy and politics. In short, a golden opportunity was lost for the Military Academy to develop programmes that really provide in the needs of the SANDF.

Malan maintains that the “learner-readiness” of the students that the Military Academy received from the SANDF had an influence on the nature of the programmes that were developed. The idea of a preparatory certificate at the different service colleges as proposed in the Potgieter Report did not materialised. This placed additional pressure on the degree programmes at the Military Academy since it became necessary to include academic modules such as basic English Language and Computer Skills in all academic programmes. Malan argues that the inclusion of these “generic courses” left very little room for manoeuvring in a three-year academic programme already under pressure from the need to allow as much time as possible for non-academic military activities as well at the Military Academy. The general approach that was followed in the end, Malan pointed out, was to minimise those kinds of educational activities to which the student will be exposed during the course of his career at training institutions in the SANDF – before or after his attendance of the Military Academy.¹³¹

The critique levelled against the newly developed academic programmes should also be viewed against the SAQA requirements for the development of academic programmes through the University of Stellenbosch. Indeed, the nature of the academic programmes of the Military Academy that were developed was highly influenced by the requirement from the University for a programme-specific focus and academic coherence in the programmes. Dr Jan Botha from the Academic Planning Committee of the University spent considerable time at the Military Academy during the development of the programmes to ensure that the programmes adhere to the requirements of the University in this regard. These requirements underpin to a large extent the tension between a general scientific/academic formative education and a vocational education in the development of the academic programmes. In short, no balance has been reached between these two requirements as regards the development of the new academic offerings at the Military Academy with their emphasis primarily on scientific/academic education.¹³²

¹³¹ Discussion with Prof DJ Malan, Dean of Military Science, Saldanha, 7 March 2006.

¹³² Interview with Lt Col (Dr) DE Visser, Saldanha, 2 March 2006.

Questions should be asked as to why the need for vocational education was ignored in the development of academic programmes at the Military Academy. Could it be that there was no adherence to the principles for the interaction between the University and the statutory professional councils referred to by Claassen at the 1995 conference at the Military Academy, or the interaction between the University of Stellenbosch and the SANDF, in the case of the Military Academy? This led to a question concerning the physical involvement of the SANDF in the development of the academic programmes. Though guidelines have been provided by the SANDF by means of the Potgieter Report, the question remains whether these programmes were developed in a climate of debate and interaction between the University and the SANDF to ensure a balance between broad generalised scientific/academic education and more narrow specialised vocational education.

The Faculty Council eventually approved and recommended the following programmes for submission to the Programme Evaluation Committee of the University of Stellenbosch:

- a programme in Human and Organisational Development;
- a programme in Organisational and Resource Development;
- a programme in Technology;
- a programme in Security and Africa Studies;
- a programme in Technology and Management; and
- a programme in War, Environment and Technology.¹³³

On 5 April 2000, a letter was received from the General Planning Committee of the University indicating that the Programme Evaluating Committee had accepted all programmes submitted by the Faculty of Military Science on 31 March 2000. These programmes had also been submitted for approval to the Senate of the University of Stellenbosch.¹³⁴

In addition to and in line with the development of these programmes, a reorganisation process was begun within the Faculty whereby the different existing academic departments were amalgamated into different schools. In future, the different schools within the Faculty would

¹³³ South African Department of Defence, Military Academy, *Minutes of a Special Faculty Council Meeting Held at the Military Academy on 151330B March 00 in Room 53, MA/C/103/1/8/2/3* (Faculty Council Meeting), 15 March 2000, pp. 7-8.

¹³⁴ *Minutes of a Faculty Council Meeting Held at the Military Academy on 111330B Feb 00 in Room 53*, op. cit. Attached letter by Dr Jan Botha, Director: University Education, Stellenbosch University, to Prof DJ Malan dated 5 April 2000, p. 22.

consist of different “subject groups”.¹³⁵ Each school had to select its own chair. Provision was made for the payment of a special allowance to chairs of schools.¹³⁶ In a meeting by the Faculty Council of the Faculty of Military Science, it was agreed that the subject chairs would be responsible to the chair of the school for the following duties, apart from assuming responsibility for their teaching, research and community service responsibilities:

- planning, supervising and co-ordinating teaching, research and community service within the subject group in accordance with policy and standards as laid down;
- planning, supervision and co-ordination of the preparation, revision and updating of all teaching material of the subject group;
- planning, supervision and co-ordination of the timeous adaptation of the subject-specific curricula to keep pace with the needs of the SANDF;
- planning, supervision and co-ordination of academic support to students enrolled for the subject;
- maintenance of discipline amongst staff and students associated with the subject;
- planning, supervision and co-ordination of interaction with the comparable departments of the University of Stellenbosch and other academic institutions;
- planning, supervision and co-ordination of external evaluations in collaboration with the chair of the school; and
- clearance and security of mutually shared supplies and equipment issued to the subject group.¹³⁷

The following schools were created from the existing academic departments:

- “School for Technology” from the Physics, Mathematics, Aeronautical Science and Military Technology, and Nautical Science Departments;
- “School for Geospatial Studies and Information Systems” from the Military Geography and Computer Information Systems Departments;
- “School for Security and Africa Studies” from the Military History, Military Strategy and Political Science Departments;

¹³⁵ South African Department of Defence, Military Academy, *Minutes of a Faculty Council Meeting Held at the Military Academy on 041330B Aug 00 in Room 53, MA/C/103/1/8/2/3* (Faculty Council Meeting), 4 August 2000, pp. 4-5.

¹³⁶ South African Department of Defence, Military Academy, *Minutes of a Faculty Council Meeting Held at the Military Academy on 191330B Feb 01 in Room 53, MA/C/521/3/1*, 15 March 2001, p. 7.

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

- “School for Defence Organisation and Resource Management” from the Accounting and Auditing, Economics, Military Management, and Public and Development Management Departments; and
- “School for Human, Organisational and Legal Studies” from the Academic Development, Industrial Psychology and Commercial and Criminal Law Departments.¹³⁸

It was indicated that these names were only temporary and that they were to be replaced by names selected by the school.¹³⁹ In February 2001, the name of the “School for Technology” changed to the “School for Science and Technology” and the “School for Human, Organisational and Legal Studies” to the “School for Resource Development.”¹⁴⁰

A Programme Co-ordinating Committee was created for each of the programmes in the Faculty. These committees were responsible to for ensuring the maintenance of programme identity, attainment of the programme goals; successful presentation of the programmes, monitoring of student throughput through the different programmes, evaluation of student feedback about the programmes, and continuous liaison with representatives of the SANDF about their evaluation of and recommendations regarding the programmes.¹⁴¹

The Faculty also applied to the Council on Higher Education (CHE) for the Military Academy to be registered as a provider in order to facilitate the eventual SAQA accreditation of the non-degree qualifications offered by the Faculty of Military Science. This specifically applied to the recommendations of the Potgieter Report for the presentation of a Preparatory Certificate in Military Studies, a Certificate in Military Studies, and a Diploma in Military Studies. This application was required since the University of Stellenbosch indicated that it would not be able to offer qualifications at undergraduate certificate and diploma level, and it therefore instructed the Military Academy to offer these qualifications under its own authority.¹⁴² The Council on Higher Education referred the application to the University of Stellenbosch with a request that the University should give its official support to the application of the Military Academy as a service provider, that the Preparatory Certificate in Military Studies be registered as a military

¹³⁸ South African Department of Defence, Military Academy, *Minutes of a Faculty Council Meeting Held at the Military Academy on 161330B Aug 00 in Room 53, MA/C/103/1/8/2/3* (Faculty Council Meeting), 16 August 2000, pp. 2-3.

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

¹⁴⁰ *Minutes of a Faculty Council Meeting Held at the Military Academy on 191330B Feb 01 in Room 53*, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

¹⁴¹ *Minutes of a Special Faculty Council Meeting Held at the Military Academy on 151330B March 00 in Room 53*, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

¹⁴² Letter by the Dean of Military Science, Prof DJ Malan, to the Secretary of the Council for Higher Education, Kirti Menon, “Registration of the Military Academy of the SANDF as Provider, May 2000,

qualification, and that the University registered the Preparatory Certificate as an alternative admission route.¹⁴³

In order to broaden the opportunities for serving members of the SANDF as well as the Secretariat for Defence to study at the Military Academy, the Faculty Council recommended that from 2002, undergraduate programmes for the BMil programme should also be offered by means of distance education. The Faculty Council tasked the Committee for Learning and Teaching to investigate the development and implementation of distance education at the Military Academy. The Committee recommended that a Distance Education Office be opened at the Military Academy and that a full-time project manager and co-ordinator for distance education be appointed at the Military Academy.¹⁴⁴

In May 2001, the Faculty Council approved a trial project for the presentation of certain undergraduate academic programmes by means of distance education. The trial project was registered to offer the programmes in Organisation and Resource Management, Human and Organisation Development, and Security and Africa Studies. The focus was limited to a target group of approximately 30 candidates (10 per programme) who had access to the internet and who were geographically centred in an urban locality like Pretoria. It was noted, though, that the commencement of the project depended on the appointment of the required key personnel and the availability of funding for the project.¹⁴⁵

Small changes have since been made in the programmes that were developed initially. By 2006, the academic offerings of the Faculty were structured around five programmes. The BMil *Programme in Human and Organisational Development* has Industrial Psychology and Public and Development Management as its core disciplines. In the BMil *Programme in Organisation and Resource Management* students are educated in Military Management, Economics, Financial Accountancy. The BMil *Programme in War, Environment and Technology* requires a choice from students in terms of two groups of disciplines: Aeronautical Science, Military Geography or Nautical Science on the one hand, and Military History or Military Strategy on the

Minutes of a Faculty Council Meeting Held at the Military Academy on 111330B February 2000 in Room 53, op. cit., pp. 24-47.

¹⁴³ *Minutes of a Faculty Council Meeting Held at the Military Academy on 041330B Aug 00 in Room 53, op. cit., p. 3.*

¹⁴⁴ South African Department of Defence, Military Academy, *Motivation for the Appointment of a Full-time Project Manager/Co-ordinator for Distance Education at the Military Academy*, MA/R/503/1/6/9102, September 2000.

¹⁴⁵ South African Department of Defence, Military Academy, *Minutes of a Faculty Council Meeting Held at the Military Academy on 161330B March 01 in Room 53, MA/C/103/1/8/2/3 (Faculty Council Meeting)*, 17 May 2001, p. 3.

other.¹⁴⁶ The BMil *Programme in Technology* has Military Technology, Military Geography or Nautical Science in combination with either Mathematics or Physics as its majors. In the BMil *Programme in Security and Africa Studies*, the student has to major in at least two disciplines from a choice between Military History, Military Strategy and Political Science.¹⁴⁷

5.7 CONCLUSIONS

The discussion in this chapter aimed at providing a broad overview of the institutional debate and development of the Military Academy since 1994 in an effort to identify the most salient drivers or ideas of the debate and the eventual development that took place. An effort was made to identify those underlying factors or tensions that generated the debate and discussions on the Military Academy, and that need to be addressed if the role of the Military Academy is to be brought in line with the framework of military education, training and socialisation of military officers outlined in the previous chapters.

The debate on the future of the Military Academy since 1994 was in part rooted in the need for change that swept through the newly democratised South African society. However, the deliberations were informed by the historical legacy of almost fifty years of doubt and dispute on what the proper role of the Military Academy ought to be in the making of South African officers. This legacy is rooted in the Military Academy, at times being more of an archetype military academy while at other times reflecting the attributes of a military university. An easy way to explain this phenomenon is to argue that it is an inability to reconcile the need for a general scientific/academic formative education with the need to provide military students with a military vocational education. This may provide some understanding since the South African Military Academy has always placed a higher premium on the occupational needs of the individual students than on the professional requirements of the military in general. In addition, the Military Academy in the past has been exposed to incoherent and ill-considered periodic intercessions by the military in general in respect to the content and conduct of both military training and academic studies, resulting in philosophical drift regarding the true nature and meaning of the institutional function.

An interesting feature of the debate about the future of the Military Academy in the early and mid-1990s was its inability to attract the attention and interest of the broader South African

¹⁴⁶ This specific programme was phased out by the end of 2006. It was replaced with the *BMil in Technology and Defence Management*. This programme requires from students to have Aeronautical Science, Military Geography or Nautical Science in combination with two other disciplines as their majors: Military Management, Military History, Military Strategy or Computer Information Systems.

¹⁴⁷ University of Stellenbosch, *Calendar 2006, Part 13: Faculty of Military Science*, pp. 12-21.

military and academic worlds, or for that matter, the broad South African society. The debate did not really form part of broader deliberations about the need for an educated officer corps in South Africa. It was a debate in essence restricted to the Military Academy *about* the Military Academy and its continued existence. The net result of this absence of involvement of the broader SANDF and the University of Stellenbosch was that the great amount of positive recommendations generated by the debate were never considered or implemented by the Defence Force or the University. The changes that were eventually made were the result of processes that were initiated on the part of, firstly, the SANDF and later, driven by the need for SAQA programme registrations, the University.

Since 1994, the debate was driven by two particular questions. Firstly, is there a need for graduate study in the SANDF? Should the SANDF have its own institution for graduating these officers? And what should be the nature of this institution? Secondly, what should be the content and focus of the graduate programme(s) presented to these officers?

In debating the first issue, whether officers in the SANDF should be graduated, there was a dualism of views. The academics at the Military Academy and elsewhere, particularly civilian academics, were convinced of the necessity of higher education for officers in general. Given the particular timeframe within which the debate unfolded, academics highlighted the need for (civilian) higher education as a means of civil control of the military in a democratic society. The military did not necessarily share this enthusiasm for (civilian) higher education to those in uniform. The military's traditional aversion for independently and critically minded individuals and its preference for conformists can in part explain this lack of enthusiasm. The South African military's long tradition of anti-intellectualism, outlined in the previous chapter, may also provide some explanation. The views of military officers were also influenced by the rapidly declining defence budgets of the 1990s and a search for ways to deal with this lack of funds in the SANDF in general and for ETD in particular. The question that should be answered, though, is whether the military's view reflected a certain amount of dissatisfaction with the Military Academy, and what was being done at the institution, or whether it was an aversion of graduate studies in the SANDF in general. In other words, was it an institutional problem or an organisational cultural problem?

One of the important outcomes of the Potgieter Report and its recommendations in the late 1990s and the eventual acceptance thereof by the command cadre of the SANDF, was the implicit approval of the Military Academy to be a military academy and not a military university. This decision is in line with the framework for the development of officers as proposed in this study. In the case of the SANDF, however, this decision should be well designed and carefully

considered. As was pointed out in the discussion, the system of manpower provision determines to a large extent whether a particular country will have a military academy or not. Traditional military academies presupposed a long-term military career since it requires (in most cases) a costly four-year induction before commissioning. The cost and time involved make this an unsuitable choice for a defence force that recruits potential officers on short-term contracts, such as the SANDF. The question needs to be asked whether a system should not be developed for the SANDF whereby career officers should first be identified, trained and socialised before they are put through a system of academic education at a military university.

Nevertheless, the decision to develop the Military Academy into an archetype military academy has been made. In spite of this, the South African Military Academy is still very far from being such an institution. The only element of the attributes of such an institution that seems to be in place is the educational component. The Military Academy does not provide any coherent career-driven training to the young officers attending the institution, nor does it fulfil its role in socialising the officers militarily. Indeed, as was pointed out in an earlier chapter, there is at present disequilibrium between the kind of socialisation that is being done at the training institutions attended by students before entering the Military Academy and the way in which students are socialised at the Military Academy. The Military Academy at present is still hardly anything more than a military university for very young candidate officers. In short, there is at present an imbalance between the nature of the students and the nature of the institution. It is necessary to answer the question on what should be done in order to transform the institution into an archetype military academy.

The result of the decision to transform the institution into a military academy has not in any way provided any clarity on the role, position and autonomy of the Faculty of Military Science at the Military Academy. Any academic institution that restricts critical thinking on the part of its students and faculty, and that censors or bans the publication of research is engaged in indoctrination rather than academic pursuits. The participation of civilian academics in military education, it was pointed out, has become international practise. Civilian academics are able to inject valuable perspectives into military education. At the South African Military Academy, the situation in this regard is dubious with some academics who maintain that there is a de facto lack of academic freedom at the South African Military Academy. The research and publication record, as well as the absence of senior doctorated academics in the Faculty of Military Science, in particular seems to be a source of embarrassment for some. This in general gives rise to a perception shared by students, members of the Faculty of Military Science, and the broader military and academic community that the lecturers at the Military Academy have

academic profiles that are inferior to those of their counterparts at civilian institutions of higher learning.¹⁴⁸

The balance between military and civilian lecturers within the Faculty and the need for academic freedom to do the research and to participate in activities that are expected from an academic fraternity, are rooted in the issue of autonomy. The academic autonomy of the Faculty has become an increasing source of discontent and embarrassment within the Faculty itself and for the University of Stellenbosch. An issue that is closely linked to the autonomy of the Faculty as an academic faculty of the University of Stellenbosch is the position of the Dean of Military Science at the Military Academy. This in particular concerns the position and role definition of the Dean of Military Science in its relationship with the Commandant of the Military Academy. The Commandant is in command of the institution as a whole. It has been noted that, as a result of the concentration of command responsibilities and power in the person of a rotating officer commanding, the Faculty of Military Science often suffered from a dearth of management ability, continuity and experience. In addition, budgetary constraints have consistently created conflict between the faculty, the military training branch and the support functions at the Military Academy, often to the detriment of academic excellence within the Faculty of Military Science.

In debating the second issue, the content and focus of the graduate programmes at the Military Academy, the SANDF did provide much clearer guidance on what should be offered to the candidate officers at the Military Academy on the basis of the Potgieter Report. Once again, the underlying question in this regard concerns the balance in the academic offerings between a general scientific/academic education and the professional and vocational educational needs of the military profession. The answer in this regard has been clouded by questions about the occupational needs of the individual students (e.g. preparation for a second career). The military, by means of the Potgieter Report, tried to resolve the tension through a proposal for a core academic curriculum at the Military Academy.

The Military Academy did not fully adhere to the guiding principles that were provided in this regard or preferred to ignore these, and developed its new academic programmes in a way that was clearly inconsistent with the recommendations of the Potgieter Report. The guidelines from the University of Stellenbosch in terms of the programme-specific focus and the coherence of the programme was a significant factor in this regard. The question that needs to be answered

¹⁴⁸ Please note that this is a perception. Over the last couple of years, major advances were made in addressing the academic and research profile in some of the school and departments within the Faculty of Military Science. By 2006, for example, more than 70% of the academic personnel in the School for Security and Africa Studies were doctorated. However, in certain schools and departments the academic and research profiles of personnel remain a serious problem.

is this: Why did the SANDF allow this gross violation of a direct request – indeed an order – to go by unnoticed? The SANDF did not question the nature of the new academic programmes. This is indeed a manifestation of a much larger phenomenon that necessitates further investigation: why does it seem as if the SANDF does not take ownership of the Military Academy in the same way that it is taking ownership of the National Defence and War Colleges and their programmes? Again, this question should be linked to another question: to what extent does the SANDF at large and the services in particular involve themselves with the Military Academy to ensure that the product they receive from this institution provide in their needs?

CHAPTER 6

FROM HERE TO WHERE? OPTIMISING THE STRUCTURE, FOCUS AND FUNCTION OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN MILITARY ACADEMY

*History suggests God is on the side of the bigger battalions –
unless the smaller battalions have a better idea.*

William Lind¹

6.1 INTRODUCTION

Educational institutions are characterised by evolutionary rather than revolutionary change. These changes are rooted in what Haycock refers to as "... soul and role introspection". Much of this is centred on what is taught and what ought to be taught at these institutions. The military's resistance to change, which is one of the manifestations of its ingrained conservative nature, is also well known and described. Military change is most often based on what Haycock refers to as, the "... last traumatic experience". No changes will be made until a new traumatic experience occurs.² Change at the South African Military Academy, situated in the nexus between the academic and the military worlds, is therefore not something that will be brought about easily.

For a variety of historical reasons, most South Africans have little interest in the military in general and the South African armed forces in particular. Indeed, it can be argued that the military in the post-apartheid South Africa exists and operates to a large extent in a domestic vacuum. The majority of the white population, after their traumatic experience with the military and military service in the 1970s and 1980s, tried to distance themselves as far away from the military as possible since 1994. The military, having been one of the cornerstones of the apartheid regime, is still perceived by the majority of the black population with a lot of scepticism.³ A small contingent of South African politicians goes so far as to question the need for a military in South Africa.⁴ In addition, there are indications of a growing civil-military gap in South Africa that is exacerbated by the inability of the military to communicate effectively with the broader South African public via the media and other means. Indeed, it can be argued that most of what is reported by the media on the military in South Africa has negative undertones.⁵

¹ Lind, WS, *Manoeuvre Warfare Handbook*, Boulder, Westview, 1985, p. 2.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 168-169.

³ Interview with the South African Minister of Defence, Mr Mosiuoa Lekota on national television, SABC2, Programme: "Morning Live", 7 April 2006.

⁴ Remarks made by the Chair of the South African Portfolio Committee of Defence during a visit to the South African Military Academy, 19 January 2005.

⁵ Heineken, L & Gueli, R, *Defence Democracy and South Africa's Civil-Military Gap*, Proceedings, SASA Congress, Bloemfontein, 28 June 2004.

Against this background, it is obvious that there is very little interest from the general public in what is happening at the Military Academy. Although the Military Academy is a public institution, whether changes are made at the Military Academy or not will not attract much interest from the public in general.

Accompanying the post-1994 increasing disinterest of the general public in the South African military, is a rising involvement of the military in Africa's evolving military and security landscape. Africa is known as a continent steeped in armed conflict and other forms of instabilities, the sources of which are both diverse and endemic. Most of these instabilities are intra-state in nature with a high level of anarchy leading to despair, destitution, poverty, disease, refugee problems and internally displaced persons. This anarchy and contingencies attract the interest of regional and international role-players. Militaries on the African continent are therefore under increased pressure to participate and prepare themselves for participation in conflict resolution, peacekeeping and other positive constructive activities that are needed for durable peace, political resolutions and economic development. For African militaries, it is imperative to prepare themselves for participation in these kinds of security operations given the close link between security, political stability and economic development on the African continent. The military educational resources of African states are of great significance in this regard. The South African Military Academy, being one of a small number of military educational institutions on the African continent, has a unique opportunity to become an important role-player in this regard and can be positioned strategically to make this happen. The first step, however, is to become a strategically important educational institution for the South African National Defence Force (SANDF). How can this be done?

This chapter aims at providing an exposition of ways in which the structure, focus and functioning of the South African Military Academy can be optimised. The first part of the chapter analyses the policy framework within which the Military Academy exists and operates. Specific attention is paid to the relationship between the University of Stellenbosch and the Defence Force that determines the nature of the Military Academy. This is followed by a discussion of challenges and problems the Military Academy is facing at present. The discussion highlights problems concerning the budget, lack of organisational ownership and lack of influence on the career paths of officers. The last section of the chapter contain proposals to optimise the structure, focus and functioning of the Military Academy as part of Education, Training and Development (ETD) in the Defence Force in general.

6.2 A UNIQUE CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONSHIP: THE MILITARY ACADEMY'S ROOTS OF EXISTENCE

The nature and purpose of the Military Academy are based on a unique civil-military arrangement between the University of Stellenbosch, as expressed in the Faculty of Military Science, and the South African Department of Defence through the SANDF. To understand the precise role and function of the Military Academy, it is necessary to make an in-depth analysis of the agreements that determine this unique civil-military arrangement. This arrangement is rooted in three specific documents:

- the agreement between the Department of Defence and the University of Stellenbosch signed on 31 January 1961;⁶
- the addendum to this agreement between the Department and the University signed on 7 December 1999;⁷ and
- the Department of Defence's Joint Training Implementation Instruction on the Management of the Military Academy signed for implementation by the Chief of Joint Training on 1 June 2001.⁸

The initial agreement between the University and Department signed in 1961 is very brief and does not contain much detail on how the relationship between the University and the Department at the Military Academy should be structured and directed. Nor does it contain much detail on what the Military Academy as an institution should be doing or how it should be organised and operated. It is stipulated that the Military Academy houses the Faculty of Military Science and that all the lecturers are members of a Faculty Council of Military Science of the University of Stellenbosch. This Council functions as a normal committee of the Senate of the University and makes recommendations concerning academic affairs in the Faculty to the Senate. The students of the Military Academy are seen as students of the University and as such have access to all the facilities the University avails to its students on campus. An important stipulation in the agreement is the clause stating that the Department of Defence is fully responsible for the financial demands of the Military Academy, including:

⁶ South African Department of Defence, *Ooreenkoms Tussen die Departement van Verdediging en die Universiteit van Stellenbosch*, Signed by Prof HB Thom on behalf of the University of Stellenbosch and JP de Villiers on behalf of the Department of Defence, 31 January 1961.

⁷ South African Department of Defence, *Addendum Supplement to and Exposition of the Agreement Between the Department of Defence and the University of Stellenbosch Signed on 31 January 1961*, Signed by Prof AH van Wyk on behalf of the University and Mr JL Gründeling on behalf of the Department of Defence, 7 December 1999.

- payment of the lecturers;
- provision of a library and laboratories; and
- provision of buildings for accommodation and academic purposes.

The Defence Force is obliged, on the one hand, to approve the appointment of lecturers in the Faculty of Military Science after their appointments had been deliberated in the university context and communicated as a recommendation to Defence Force. In the appointment of the Commanding Officer of the Military Academy, on the other hand, the university has to approve the individual earmarked by the Defence Force. The University exercises control over the academic work of the lecturers in the Faculty. This includes supervision of the University regarding:

- content of the academic courses;
- drafting of examination papers and conducting of exams; and
- conferring of the necessary degrees and certificates.⁹

The very broad nature of the 1961 agreement between the University and the Department of Defence together with the large amount of societal and other changes in South Africa since the signing of this agreement made a revision of the existing agreement in the 1990s imperative. In December 1999, after a period of intense discussion and deliberation between the University and the Department, an addendum to the 1961 agreement was signed. This addendum became the basis for the re-positioning and development of the Military Academy for its future role in a democratised South Africa. Under a heading titled “Status, Powers and Responsibilities of the Military Academy, Faculty of Military Science, Commandant, Dean and Other Members of the Faculty”, it is stated that the Military Academy is a military unit of the Department and is under the command of a Commanding Officer – generally known as “The Commandant”.¹⁰ The Department of Defence is responsible for the provision and maintenance of the buildings and other facilities at the Military Academy. In addition, the Defence Force is responsible for all the “... operational needs of the institution”. The University assumes full responsibility for the execution of the academic functions of the Faculty.¹¹

⁸ South African Department of Defence, Joint Training Formation, *Joint Training Implementation Instruction on the Management of the Military Academy*, DS/TRG/R/103/1/8/2/3, 1 June 2001.

⁹ *Ooreenkoms Tussen die Departement van Verdediging en die Universiteit van Stellenbosch*, op. cit.

¹⁰ *Addendum Supplement to and Exposition of the Agreement Between the Department of Defence and the University of Stellenbosch Signed on 31 January 1961*, op. cit., p. 3.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 10.

The position of the Faculty of Military Science is defined as an academic faculty of the University of Stellenbosch that is accommodated by the Military Academy in Saldanha. The position of the Dean of Military Science is described as the academic head of the Faculty of Military Science. As such, and in line with the general policy laid down by the University, the Dean is responsible for teaching, research and community service in the domain of Military Science and related subjects. The Dean, together with all other faculty members, is an academic member of the University and, as such, works within the framework of the University's relevant policy, instruction, research and community service in the domain of Military Science. It is the responsibility of the University to ensure that the level of the teaching, research and community service in the Faculty is of the quality to which the University strives. The University has to do this through:

- involvement in the appointment and promotion of academic staff in the Faculty;
- involvement in the activities of academic staff;
- moderation of the quality of service that the academic staff renders through quality assurance measures;
- approval of the development, institution, adaptation and discontinuance of courses and course content in the Faculty, and
- involvement in the quality of student selection by the Department.¹²

The addendum also made provision for the creation of a Joint Advisory Committee responsible to both the Department of Defence and the University. The Committee consists of the following individuals:

- the Rector and Vice-Chancellor of the University;
- the Dean of Military Science;
- the Commandant of the Military Academy;
- the Vice-Rector (Tuition) of the University;
- the Vice-Rector (Operations) of the University;
- two persons nominated by the Faculty of Military Science; and
- three persons nominated by the Department of Defence.

This committee has to convene at least once a year under the rotating chairmanship of the Rector, the Dean and the Commandant. It acts only in an advisory capacity to advise the University and the Department on the policy, management and functioning of the Faculty. It

¹² Ibid., pp. 3-4.

also advises the Department and University on budgetary and other staff and equipment-related issues, as well as issues concerning the maintenance of academic standards. The committee also serves as an instrument of consultation between the University and the Department of Defence pertaining to the relationship between the parties in respect of teaching, research and service rendering.¹³

The biggest part of the addendum deals with the handling of personnel matters in the Faculty of Military Science. The 1961 arrangement concerning the appointment of personnel in the Faculty of Military Science was maintained. This implies that all faculty members are appointed as members of the Department of Defence and not of the University. As such, the Department accepts responsibility for their remuneration as well as their service conditions and career progression.¹⁴ The academic promotion of faculty members, however, takes place in accordance with the University's requirements and promotions.¹⁵ The agreement makes provision for the University to bestow any appropriate academic title on a member in collaboration with the Department without necessarily creating financial implications for the Department.¹⁶

It is noted in the addendum that the Department has to ensure parity as far as possible in the service conditions and payment between the academic staff of the Faculty and the academic staff of the University. Applications for appointment as academic staff in the Faculty are referred to the Appointments Committee (Senate) of the University for confirmation by the rector. A subcommittee of the Appointments Committee does the initial recommendation to the Appointments Committee. This subcommittee to the Appointments Committee consists of:

- the Dean Of Military Science, who acts as convenor;
- the Commandant of the Military Academy;
- at least two members of the Faculty of Military Science;
- at least two members appointed by the University;
- at least two members from other faculties of the University; and
- additional persons as required for the proper filling of a post.¹⁷

The appointment of the Dean of Military Science takes place in accordance with the University's requirements and procedures, after which the nominations are recommended to the Department

¹³ Ibid., pp. 4-5.

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 6.

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 7.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 9.

¹⁷ Ibid., pp. 6-7.

of Defence for approval and appointment, taking into consideration existing Public Service and other specific military requirements.¹⁸ The University has to be consulted by the Defence Force in the appointment of the Commandant. It should be noted that over time this practise has fallen into disuse to the extent that the University was not consulted at all in the appointment of recent commandants. The result, it is noted in a fairly recent report by the Portfolio Committee on Defence, is that the University does not have any say in the appointment of the Commandant. This resulted in at least one particular case in which an individual with no academic qualifications and no understanding of the need for and nature of the academic world was appointed as Commandant.¹⁹ The Dean, as academic head of the Faculty, is responsible for the management of teaching, research and community service within the Faculty. The Department of Defence liaises directly with the Dean with reference to the management of the Faculty. The Commandant, as representative of the Department, liaises directly with the Dean with regard to the management of the Faculty and directly with the Rector with regard to the application of the agreement between the University and the Department.²⁰

As far as discipline is concerned, it is stipulated in the addendum that academic staff of the Faculty be subjected to the disciplinary codes of the University as far as actions in their academic capacity are concerned. The application of discipline in terms of the University's disciplinary codes, however, takes place in consultation with the Commandant of the Military Academy. In respect to all other disciplinary matters, action is taken in accordance with requirements of the Department of Defence.²¹

The agreement between the University and Department and the addendum to the agreement are obviously typical legal documents that allow wide interpretation. In an effort to provide clearance on the overall operation, management and functioning of the Military Academy, the Department of Defence through the Chief of Joint Training has put forward the "Joint Training Implementation Instruction on the Management of the Military Academy". The Instruction was obviously drawn up within the framework of the agreement and the addendum to the agreement between the University and Department. At the same time, however, the Instruction provides clarity on the detail for the everyday running of the Military Academy. In particular, the instruction aims at regulating the function of the Military Academy with regard to:

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

¹⁹ Parliamentary Monitoring Group, Tabled Committee Reports: 2002 to 2006, Portfolio Committee, *Defence Draft Report to the National Assembly on the South African Military Academy*, 2005, p. 8. Available at <<http://www.pmg.org.za/docs/2005/comreports/050414pcdefencereport.htm>>

²⁰ *Addendum Supplement to and Exposition of the Agreement Between the Department of Defence and the University of Stellenbosch Signed on 31 January 1961*, op. cit., p. 8.

- delineation of the command, control and support functions governing the management of the Military Academy;
- integration of the Military Academy into the ETD system of the Department of Defence;
- providing guidelines to the different services and divisions, as well as "... other clients of the Military Academy" in terms of their responsibility towards the Military Academy; and
- furnishing the Military Academy with the required legal and ethical foundation for its effective and efficient management.

Under a heading "Philosophical Foundation" in the Instruction, it is argued that the core business of universities is evolving and that the Military Academy consequently finds itself having to play a greater role in the delivery of life-long learning and the development of "... a civic culture among its graduates" at the advent of the 21st century. At the same time though, the Military Academy is functioning in a niche market, having to provide a service to "... a specialist client", and is influenced by a different set of factors compared to other providers of higher education. The first among these, it is pointed out, is the national security context within which the Military Academy operates.²²

The Instruction points out that the primary focus of the Military Academy is the academic development of military officers. The need for academic development is explained by means of Huntington's argument on military professionalism: a need for expertise, a need for responsibility towards society, and a need for a corporate spirit. Based on Huntington's view, it is maintained in the Instruction that the learning outcomes of the Military Academy cannot be of an intellectual nature only. Instead, the learning outcomes of the Military Academy "... must be balanced among the cognitive, affective and psychomotor domains".²³ In particular, it is stipulated that the Military Academy should "... assist in internalising the DOD's value system, which should serve as a foundation for its members'/employees' behaviour in general and for the DOD's operational conduct in particular".²⁴ Consequently, it is argued that the Military Academy differs from other institutions of higher learning in South Africa, since it has to participate in the development of the military's unique organisational culture.

The Instruction defines the aim of the Military Academy as the development of military professional competencies of its students through education, training and development programmes that are integrated and contextualised. The vision of the Military Academy – "academic excellence in professional military education, training and development" – clearly

²¹ Ibid.

²² *Joint Training Implementation Instruction on the Management of the Military Academy*, op. cit., p. 2.

²³ Ibid.

places the emphasis on the need for academic excellence.²⁵ The emphasis on the academic role of the institution is even more clearly highlighted in its mission:

*The Military Academy offers contextualised academic programmes at certificate, diploma, graduate and postgraduate levels. Professional development of leaders of the DOD and foreign defence forces takes place through technologically supported residential and distance education, research is conducted and community service for the military and the broader society is performed.*²⁶ [emphasis added]

With the emphasis that is placed on the three functions that the Faculty has to fulfil, namely teaching, research and community service, the scene is set for an uneven emphasis on education in the development of officers at the Military Academy to the detriment of military training and professional development. The arguments on training and the development of a corporate spirit are not reflected in the official mission statement of the Military Academy at all.

In the discussion of its functions in the Instruction, it is noted that the Military Academy has to provide continued formative training and to facilitate the continued functional training of its students at the training units of their respective services and divisions. All residential students of the Military Academy have to:

- be instilled with the appropriate military ethos as expressed in the SANDF's Code of Conduct;
- remain proficient in conducting regimental and divisional duties characteristic of the military units of their respective services;
- be assisted in the development of general psychomotor skills, physical fitness and the maintenance of a healthy military lifestyle; and
- upon graduation, have to advance to the greatest extent possible in attaining the competencies required for a person of his rank and applicable mustering in the relevant service.²⁷

The Instruction moreover provides an exposition of the responsibilities that different role-players have in the functioning of the Military Academy. One of the "... command and staff functions" of the Chief of Joint Training of the SANDF is to ensure that "... the Academy's graduates and

²⁴ Ibid., p. 3.

²⁵ Ibid., p. 7.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Ibid., p. 8.

other products meet the needs and requirements of the DOD".²⁸ The Chief of Joint Training is also responsible for moral, administrative and material support to the Academy. This makes the Chief of Joint Training responsible for, *inter alia*, the annual budget allocation to the Military Academy. Like the Chief of Joint Training, the different services and division are also responsible for the provision of direct advice and management guidelines to the Military Academy to ensure that its graduates meet their needs and requirements. In addition, the services and divisions are responsible to ensure the contextual relevance of the academic programmes at the Military Academy. Moreover, the services and divisions need to provide the Military Professional Development Branch at the Military Academy with suitable personnel for continued formative training of the students of the Military Academy.²⁹

The Instruction provides what it refers to as principles of design for the development of the academic programmes at the Military Academy. It is stated that the so-called principle of depth has to be applied in determining the primary focus of the academic programmes in order to reflect the emphasis on the primary disciplines within each programme. The purpose thereof, it is argued, is to facilitate articulation with post-graduate programmes. The so-called principle of width has to be applied to ensure that auxiliary disciplines foster the context of the programme. The Instruction furthermore emphasises the fact that the curriculum content of the academic programmes should be of such a nature that it conforms to national and international norms in this regard. The services and divisions also have a role to play in authorising their respective learners' academic programmes after consideration of their own needs, the specific learner's aptitude and interests, and the recommendations of the Faculty of Military Science. In addition, the services and divisions have to decide which disciplines will be compulsory for their respective learners.³⁰

The Military Academy is also instructed to conduct (formative) military training in order to ensure that the junior officers at the Military Academy are qualified on completion of their studies for their role as military practitioners. This should be done by means of four specific activities:

- maintaining a regimented military unit routine;
- conducting physical training, sport and recreation programmes typical of the military;
- conducting leadership and adventure training exercises; and

²⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 11.

- appointing, guiding and supervising candidate officers and junior officers in leadership positions on student management organisations.³¹

These four activity areas have to be supported through the employment of candidate officers and junior officers during the mid-year recess throughout the SANDF to ensure the development of their professional military skills and competencies. Four priorities apply when the employment of students during the mid-year recess has to be decided upon:

- detached duty for conducting functional courses by students at various training units throughout the SANDF when the mid-year recess coincides with particular functional courses or when courses are scheduled for that purpose;
- detached duty to various units throughout the SANDF for the employment of students in various roles;
- participation of students in a variety of activities, projects and courses that are planned or conducted by the Military Academy. Various activities are planned by the Faculty and the Section Military Development at the Military Academy. This ranges from battlefield tours within the country, to visits to foreign military academies, to HIV/AIDS and other programmes at local schools and communities on the West Coast; and
- students are allowed to take vacation or special leave if there is a specific reason. This has been the case in the past, for example, in situations where students have planned their own (unofficial) foreign tours and visits.³²

It should be noted that, due to financial shortages and bureaucratic deficiency, not many students have been sent on courses and detached duty to military units throughout the Defence Force in the last couple of years. This had a detrimental impact on their mission and combat readiness after three years of study at the Military Academy. It also impacted negatively on the students' military socialisation since they do not come into contact with other members of the military often enough.

The agreement, addendum to the agreement and the instruction on the management of the Military Academy underpin its present organisational structure. It is a structure in which the Commandant is the primary actor with almost dictatorial powers in the management of the Military Academy, including the Faculty of Military Science. The position of the Dean of Military Science is subordinate to that of the Commandant, even to the extent that the Dean is nothing but an administrative official with almost no executive powers. The Dean functions at the same

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 12.

³² *Ibid.*, p. 13.

level within the organisation as the Commander of the Military Development Section, responsible for military training at the Military Academy, and the Chief of Staff, who is responsible for all the support services in the unit. (See Figure 6.1) The predicament of the position of the Dean of Military Science will be discussed in greater detail in the next section.




Figure 6.1: Present structure for command and control at the Military Academy³³

6.3 UNIQUE CIVIL-MILITARY PROBLEMS: UNDERSTANDING THE CHALLENGES FACING THE MILITARY ACADEMY

Much has been said in this study about the need for military education and the nature of military education and professional military educational institutions. Mollo³⁴ argues that there are three requirements for successful military education in addition to the recognition of the importance of professional military education, especially at the tertiary level. The first concerns the **budget** and the crucial need for institutional support in this regard. Mollo maintains that militaries often go to great lengths to procure the newest and best technology – in most cases to the detriment of educational budgets. Instead of viewing military education as competing with technological improvement, the former should rather be complemented by the latter. It should be noted, however, that no educational institution can provide high quality education on a restricted budget.³⁵

³³ Adapted from: Department of Defence, Military Academy, "Proposed Organogram", *Minutes of a Meeting Held in the Office of the Commandant Military Academy on 26 January 2004 at 15:30 to Decide on the Unite Structure*, MA/R/503/1/6/9102, 26 January 2004.

³⁴ Maj Gen LS Mollo served as the Commandant at the Military Academy from 2000 to 2003 before his promotion and appointment at Defence Headquarters.

³⁵ Mollo, LS, "Tertiary Military Education: Current Trends and a Look in the Future with Specific Reference to South Africa", in Pretorius, M (ed.), *SANDEF Bulletin for Education Technology*, South African National Defence Force College for Educational Technology, January 2003, p. 114.

The second requirement is the need for **relevancy**. Mollo notes that military education could only be successful if the education that is provided responds to the ever-changing security and military-scientific environment.³⁶ If this is not the case, a particular military may well distance itself from the need for military education. This argument needs to be taken one step further, since educational institutions need to reflect the societal, economic and other trends of the world within which they exist. In particular, educational institutions should be responsive to changes in the higher or tertiary educational environment. Consequently, educational institutions should be vibrant institutions that not only challenge existing ideas, knowledge and paradigms, but which also generate ideas and knowledge and adjust themselves accordingly. This requires a certain amount of responsiveness from these institutions and a need to operate continually on the cutting edge with new ideas and paradigms.

The last requirement is for military education to be an integral part the **career paths** of officers.³⁷ Stated differently, a minimum level of higher education should be a requirement either to become an officer or to be promoted beyond a particular rank. There is no doubt that military education should be linked to the particular career and promotional path of military officers. This not only places a continued obligation on military educational institutions to ensure the relevance of their academic and other programmes, but also elicits continued linkage and interaction between the educational and operational components of the defence force. These three considerations – budgetary problems, educational relevancy and career integration – are used to analyse civil-military educational challenges at the South African Military Academy in Saldanha.

6.3.1 Managing the Military Academy budget

A lack of funds is the single most inhibiting characteristic pervading the history of the South African Military Academy. The initial creation of the Military Academy in Pretoria in the early 1950s, Visser noted, was accompanied by a lack of funds that impeded the development of the Military Academy by denying it its own official posting, building complex and separate staff establishment.³⁸ When in the late 1950s the Military Academy was moved to the Saldanha Bay area, the lack of funds impeded the development of an institution with the necessary facilities to allow for both the joint education of officers and service-unique training.³⁹

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Ibid., p. 115.

³⁸ Visser, GE, "Die Geskiedenis van die Suid-Afrikaanse Militêre Akademie, 1950-1990", *Supplementa ad Scientia Militaria I*, Dissertation presented for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy (History) at the University of Stellenbosch, November 2000, p. 509.

³⁹ Ibid., p. 511.

An institution such as the Military Academy should be created, developed and sustained on military-philosophical grounds. These philosophical issues have traditionally been well debated and sometimes even well understood in the South African military. Nevertheless, once this theoretical emphasis was shifted to the concrete environment where these ideas had to be implemented, the driving factor became one depending on the funds that were available. A number of investigations on the role and function, as well as the functioning of the Military Academy, have been conducted since its inception.⁴⁰ Most of these investigations contained very sound recommendations, which the Defence Force (and the University) approved for implementation. However, the failure to implement these recommendations has throughout been rooted in the lack of money. One example in this regard was the common recommendation by a number of these reports for the development of particular disciplines in the Faculty of Military Science to address specific needs in the Defence Force. For instance, the Potgieter Report referred to the subject areas of anthropology and military sociology. Elements of these disciplines were subsequently introduced as part of other disciplines. The management of diversity, for example, has been incorporated into the curriculum of the Subject Group Industrial Psychology, while certain elements of military sociology have been introduced as part of the academic offerings of the Subject Group Military Strategy.⁴¹ But they have, however, not been introduced as independent disciplines at the Military Academy.

In the *Portfolio Committee on Defence Draft Report to the National Assembly on the South African Military Academy* published in 2005, serious questions were posed regarding the funding of the institution. In particular, it was noted that the budget of the Military Academy is insufficient for the student intake levels and needs.⁴² Several problems were pointed out that could be attributed to the unavailability of funds. There is specific strain on infrastructure, in particular the living quarters of the students and the availability of classrooms, because of growing student numbers. The long delays in the repair, maintenance and upgrading of such facilities were highlighted in the report. It was noted in the report that some facilities do not even meet government safety regulations any more.⁴³ In addition, a number of concerns were

⁴⁰ The Hartzenberg Report (1968), the Malan Report (1969), Project Kingsrow (1987) and Project Wimpole (1989). See the discussions of the reports in Visser, GE, "Die Geskiedenis van die Suid-Afrikaanse Militêre Akademie, 1950-1990", op. cit., pp. 297, 315, 477 and 485.

⁴¹ Heinecken, L, & Visser, GE, *Officer Education at the South African Military Academy: Social Science but not Sociology?* Paper presented at the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, Chicago, 24-26 October 2003.

⁴² *Defence Draft Report to the National Assembly on the South African Military Academy*, op. cit., p. 7. Please note that, though this report was published in 2005 and both the Commandant and the Dean have been replaced, nothing has inherently changed with regard to the issues addressed in this report.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

registered in relation to the physical infrastructure and resources, including the lack of access to laboratory and computer equipment, sport facilities and the internet.⁴⁴

The report is quite blunt in pointing out that the academic stature, performance and education of the Faculty of Military Science are undermined by the lack of funds, even to the extent that vacant posts are not filled as a matter of priority.⁴⁵ It very often takes up to two years to fill such posts. The appalling condition of the library with its dire shortage of books and periodicals is highlighted as a major alarming sign of the absolute absence of basic conditions for successful quality education. Very few new books were acquired during the last three years, while the budget for the procurement of academic journals and periodicals has been cut to the extent that it is almost impossible to purchase any foreign academic journals and periodicals. The very bureaucratic state tender processes followed for the procurement of these books and journals further exacerbate the situation. Invariably the process is so lengthy that it takes up to six months or even a year for new books and journals to arrive. This has led to a situation where very often not all the editions of specific journals are available in the library.⁴⁶

Almost no money is available for the payment of visiting and guest lecturers. The payment of such persons is furthermore such a bureaucratized process that lecturers in the Faculty of Military Science are reluctant to invite eminent persons, since the scope of the paperwork that has to be completed requires inordinate time and effort. This leads to a situation where academics and others become unwilling to participate in suchlike endeavours if they are aware that they will only be paid in three to six month's time. In addition, lecturers have experienced situations in the past where the Commandant at the Military Academy received well-known academics from abroad in a very negative way because of their ethnic and regional background (and this relates mostly to white Europeans). There is thus pressure on academics to invite the "right" guest speakers. This does not convey the notion of an environment conducive for a true educational experience. This situation is reflected in the number of guest speakers at the Military Academy. During 2002-03, the Military Academy hosted only two international guest speakers, four in 2003-04, and two 2004-05.⁴⁷ In most cases, these speakers were not invited to the Military Academy per se, but they visited the Academy as part of a broader programme. This is particularly true of high-ranking foreign military dignitaries visiting the Academy. They do not address students in specific classes about specific academic issues. Rather, the principle of "... hiring a crowd" is applied to have as many students as possible in the audience, with all

⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 12.

⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 7.

⁴⁶ Discussion with the Library Personnel of the Military Academy on 29 March 2006. The author also serves on the Library Committee of the Faculty and is therefore intimately aware of these problems.

⁴⁷ *Defence Draft Report to the National Assembly on the South African Military Academy*, op. cit., p. 13.

the associated negative attributes that are obviously not in line with good educational practises. The report noted that an institution, such as the Military Academy, depends on international academic support since it is imperative for students to be exposed to as broad a range of views as possible.⁴⁸

The participation of academics of the Faculty of Military Science in activities that are normally associated with successful academic careers has become the exception rather than the rule because of the aforementioned lack of funds. Only small amounts of funds are available for participation in academic conferences domestically and abroad. The allocation of funds by the military for such endeavours, especially for the attendance of foreign workshops, conferences and seminars, is also highly influenced by the need for transformation. State regulations and levels of payment in this regard, linked to the use of specific prescribed travel agencies only, entail such a costly endeavour, that in most cases two or three people can attend a conference if they personally have the opportunity and the means to arrange their visits. Most often academics in the Faculty of Military Science have to rely on their own private funds and the research funds that they have accrued at the University of Stellenbosch through their own research for the attendance of such activities.

The lack of available funds is, however, not only due to restricted budget allocations. Bureaucratic and geographical factors also play a role in this regard. Since the Academy is outside the immediate "Pretoria sphere of influence", this very often complicates matters. Most financial and other authorisations have to be signed by senior officers at the Defence Headquarters in Pretoria. For the Military Academy, situated about 1500 km from Pretoria, this usually requires a great deal of time, whereas if a different military unit, such as the Defence College for example, that is situated in Pretoria, has a problem, it is in a position to clear it up immediately with the relevant persons. The same is true of bargaining power for the allocation of additional funding for specific projects. The unit who is in a position to bargain for these funds *in person* has a huge advantage over those units who have to rely on the telephone and other means of communication with Defence Headquarters.

In addition, because the Faculty of Military Science does not manage its own budget, this allows for substantial organisational uncertainty and other tensions. At the Military Academy, the Commandant is ultimately responsible for the management of the budget, but he very often delegates the management of the budget to a person he deems suitable or capable. It stands to reason that the management of the budget should be undertaken in such a way that the

⁴⁸ Ibid.

interests of the supporting staffs, the military training branch and the Faculty are served, but the primary mission of the Military Academy needs to be emphasised. Before the recent changes in the command structure, concerns had been raised in the Faculty with regard to the transparency with which the budget is managed. These concerns were rooted in the reluctance on the part of the Commandant and the budget manager to brief the unit as a whole, and the Faculty in particular, on the management and spending of the budget.⁴⁹ In addition, these concerns were and still are rooted in the total absence of an inclusive and proper budgetary process for the institution as a whole the past couple of years.

A former Dean of Military Science emphasised that the University of Stellenbosch is very hesitant not to be seen as too prescriptive to the Faculty of Military Science, since it does not control its budget.⁵⁰ Such an approach is understandable. Because the Dean of Military Science does not control the funds available to the Faculty, this has a defining negative influence on his position as the primary manager of the Faculty and his management reference power in this regard. This relegates the position of the Dean of Military Science to that of a mere administrative official. A senior professor in the Faculty of Military Science argues that one of the biggest problems in the Faculty has always been the fact that the Faculty is dependent on the Defence Force for its budget and financing. She is of the opinion that the budgetary and financial management system of the Defence Force is not flexible and responsive enough for the needs of an academic faculty. This, she argues, has always been the biggest inhibiting influence on the autonomy of the Faculty.⁵¹

It should be noted that the budget is a common problem facing all military units. It is the responsibility of the Commandant of the Military Academy to manage the budget effectively according to particular objectives and to indicate to the Defence Force which objectives cannot be achieved because of the lack of funds. The problems relating to the budget of the Military Academy are as much a management problem as it is a problem of size. Often money allocated to the Military Academy is withdrawn to address priorities elsewhere in the Defence Force. In the past, budget cuts have often been a bigger problem than the size of the original budget. Ultimately, the size of the Military Academy budget and the cuts that are often made are a reflection of the lack of ownership by the Defence Force.

⁴⁹ On numerous occasions the previous Commandant of the Military Academy, for example, was asked during his monthly communication sessions to brief the staff of the Military Academy on the budget. This never materialised though.

⁵⁰ Interview with Col (ret)/Prof C Nelson, Retired Dean of Military Science, Saldanha, 25 January 2006.

⁵¹ Interview with Prof ME Kotze, Saldanha, 24 January 2006.

The Defence Force never has and still does not view the Military Academy as a strategic institution with a role in the wider, overarching system that is highly valued. Higher education may perhaps be a priority for the Defence Force, but the role of the Military Academy as a provider of higher education is not. This could be ascribed to the fact that for a major part of the history of the Defence Force the system provided a career to officers without the need for higher education, in other words there was no need for officers to have at least a B degree. The training provided by the Defence Force was seen as of strategic importance – more important than education provided by an institution that does not form part of the broader Defence Force system. Seen from this perspective, the Military Academy served as an exit mechanism for members of the Defence Force who saw the Defence Force as a steppingstone or gateway to a career in business or somewhere else in society.⁵²

6.3.2 Organisational relevancy and ownership of the Military Academy

The organisational relevancy of an institution, such as the Military Academy, relates to two very specific considerations. The first is the need for the kind of education, training and development provided at such an institution to be of relevance to the organisation at large. This requirement is linked closely to the need for its curriculum to be relevant. The underlying question in this regard is whether the academic offerings of the Military Academy provide in the needs of the SANDF. The second is the need for such an institution to be 'part of the system' and to the extent that the end-product fits into and adheres to the requirements and expectations of the end-user system. This particular matter is closely allied to the notion of ownership of the larger organisation. The underlying question is whether the South African military at large takes ownership of the Military Academy.

A former Dean of Military Science noted that operational requirements have always influenced the military educational offerings of the Military Academy and the Defence Force's attitude towards education.⁵³ In a recently published article, Visser explored the changes in the academic curriculum of the Military Academy against the background of the general threat perception of the Defence Force. Visser in particular analysed the former South African government's perception of the Cold War and the liberation struggle as a framework for an understanding of "... the Military Academy's response to the revolutionary onslaught" from the late 1960s onwards. An analysis of post-Cold War and post-apartheid developments likewise was used in the article for an exposition of the changes in the academic curriculum of the

⁵² Interview with Col (ret)/Prof JS Kotze, Saldanha, 2 February 2006.

⁵³ Interview with Col (ret)/Prof Chris Nelson, op. cit.

Military Academy since the early 1990s.⁵⁴ Visser concluded that the Military Academy was not altogether successful in responding to the changing security and military scientific environment. Even though the academic offerings of the Military Academy reflected the societal, economic and other trends of the world within which it exists to a degree, there has never been a compulsory core curriculum for all candidate officers at the institution that introduced the candidate officers to the essence of the military profession.

Consequently, the salient question is whether these changes came about in reaction to changes in the broad geo-strategic political environments, or whether these changes were made to provide in the specific needs of the Defence Force. Kotze maintains that recent changes in the degree programmes of the Military Academy in 2000 were nothing but a re-organisation of the existing subjects and subject matter – it did not solve anything.⁵⁵ What then is the problem that was not addressed or that the curriculum failed to address? Kotze and a number of other academics and soldiers who were interviewed were of the opinion that the current academic offerings of the Military Academy do not contribute to the development of a military professional ethos in the Defence Force. Military professionalism is rooted in the interaction between military education, training and socialisation. In considering what the Military Academy ought to be, it is important to enquire as to what its primary mission should be, namely the development of an ethos of military professionalism. Hence, the academic offerings should be aligned to address this particular issue.

The Military Academy's role in the development of such an ethos should be viewed against the absence of any purposeful and coherent military training and socialisation at the Military Academy. This has a defining influence on the services' neglect to take ownership of the institution. The issue of training at the Military Academy is rooted in the challenge of students who arrive at their different units after completion of their studies at the Military Academy and who are not judged based on their intellectual agility, for example, whether they are able to "... think outside the box". Rather they are judged on whether, for example, they are able to command a platoon or whether they can function as administrative officers.⁵⁶

Visser emphasised that the Defence Force had never taken ownership of the Military Academy.⁵⁷ This is indeed one of the historic problems at the Military Academy. The result is

⁵⁴ Visser, GE, "The South African Military Academy's Educational Offerings and the National Threat Perception", *Scientia Militaria: South African Journal of Military Studies*, Vol 32, No 2, 2004, pp. 68-95.

⁵⁵ Interview with Col (ret)/Prof JS Kotze, Saldanha, 2 February 2006.

⁵⁶ Interview with Lt Col (Dr) GE Visser, Saldanha, 2 March 2006.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

that there was never any urgency on the part of the Defence Force to implement any proposed changes at the Military Academy or to follow up decisions that had been taken. This, Visser argues, related to a large extent to the lack of continuity of persons who deal with the Military Academy on behalf of the Defence Force and the absence of regular interaction between the Military Academy and the Defence Force in general. Historically, the Defence Force viewed the Military Academy as a military university, which, indeed, it has been for most of its existence. The Defence Force consequently did not deal with the Military Academy as a proper military unit, but rather as a civilian institution and an extension of the University of Stellenbosch.⁵⁸

A related, but also important issue concerns the command and control arrangements with which the Military Academy is confronted with in the Defence Force. As a rule, military command and control systems are structured hierarchical in such a way as to allow commanders to report to lower and higher-level commanders and that staff officers take the responsibility to communicate with other staff officers. A situation where lower level commanders report to staff officers and receive their commands from higher level staff officers are avoided at all costs. Yet, for the biggest part of its existence, the Military has been confronted with a situation where it was organisationally linked to a staff department within the Defence Force. In short, a staff officer “commands” the Military Academy from higher headquarters. In the SADF, the Military Academy was for command and control purposes under the direction of the Chief of Staff Personnel. In the SANDF, the Military Academy was placed under the Chief of Joint Training. However, decisions about the Military Academy budget and personnel, for example, are not made by the Chief of Joint Training. These decisions are made by staff officers within the Joint Training Division. In short, the Commandant of the Military Academy is held responsible by staff officers for the way in which he manages and commanded the Military Academy.⁵⁹

The SANDF’s instruction on the management of the Military Academy clearly defines the institution’s vision and mission. However, Visser argues that the SANDF never internalised this vision and mission.⁶⁰ In addition, some academics argued that the lack of ownership on the part of the Defence Force was reflected in the lack of a proper and clear policy framework within which the Military Academy could or should function. A senior member of the Faculty of Military Science argued, for example, that most military academies in the world function under an autonomous policy framework established on governmental or national level. In South Africa,

⁵⁸ This particular point was raised in a number of interviews with members and former members of the Faculty of Military Science. It was brought to the author’s attention in two specific interviews: the interview with Lt Col (Dr) GE Visser, Saldanha, 2 March 2006 and the interview with Col (ret)/Prof Chris Nelson, Saldanha, 25 January 2006.

⁵⁹ Interview with Col (ret)/Prof JS Kotze, Saldanha, 2 February 2006.

⁶⁰ Discussion with Lt Col (Dr) GE Visser, Saldanha, 10 April 2006.

the existence of the Military Academy, or more specifically the Faculty of Military Science, has its roots in a departmental “agreement of goodwill” between the Department of Defence and the University of Stellenbosch. The result of this agreement is a situation where both the University and the Defence Force are reluctant to involve themselves too deeply in the management of the Faculty in fear of overstepping the line and offending the other party to the agreement. This is especially true of the University. The situation that unfolds creates a vacuum of ownership within which the Faculty of Military Science exists, with both the University and the Defence Force being apathetic towards the management and control of the Faculty.⁶¹ The result is a total absence of higher order strategic management of the Faculty of Military Science.⁶²

The former Dean of Military Science was of the opinion that other educational, training and development institutions in the SANDF also experience some form of alienation. This, he argued, is clearly evident in the silence of the broader SANDF and particularly its leadership elements in current programme presentations by these institutions to the South African Qualifications Authority (SAQA). Their frustrations are rooted in a total absence of coherent inputs from the rest of the Defence Force in the development of these programmes. This lack of input may be attributed to the present lack of personnel with an institutional memory in the Defence Force and the absence of expertise to make judgements on the inputs that should be provided.⁶³ Though this may provide some perspective on the current situation with which the Military Academy is confronted, there is a major difference in the sense that there is a historic dimension in the Military Academy’s lack of ownership by the Defence Force that is not present at the other ETD institutions.

In addition, Malan pointed out that the (educational) needs of the Defence Force are expressed in terms of its training requirements. Whenever the Defence Force becomes enthusiastic about a particular academic programme, it invariably indicates where preceding training ceases and where training that is done later in the careers of the officers, may be linked to the specific programme. There is a general lack of understanding in the Defence Force of the broad formative nature of education, which Malan describes as the “... ability to conceive of alternative realities”. There is on the whole very little understanding that education exposes the individual to a broad spectrum of views on a particular matter that he should be able to evaluate critically. The Defence Force has at all times made an effort to link the education at the Military Academy thematically with the training that is done in the Defence Force in general.⁶⁴

⁶¹ Interview with Prof ME Kotze, op. cit.

⁶² Interview with Col (ret)/Prof Chris Nelson, op. cit.

⁶³ Interview with Prof DJ Malan, Previous Dean of Military Science, Saldanha, 15 February 2006.

Kotze argued that the creation of the Military Academy was driven by the need for higher education for officers, namely that officers in the Defence Force should have at least a first or B degree.⁶⁵ Yet, Kotze argued, "... nobody really understood what it meant and what they were in for". The Military Academy was established, initially offering two study directions (natural and human sciences) but with a high emphasis on natural sciences – rooted in an understanding by Brig P.G.J. de Vos, the first Commanding Officer and Dean, of what was required by the military. Since its inception, however, the Military Academy failed to satisfy the needs of the Defence Force leading to its alienation and lack of ownership. This inability of the Military Academy to provide in the needs of the Defence Force has underpinned all the subsequent investigations and studies about the role and function of the Military Academy conducted since the late 1950s. In other words, the purpose of all these studies and investigations was to determine how to bring the academic offering of the Military Academy in line with the needs of the broader Defence Force.⁶⁶

The Malan Report of the late 1960s followed on what was considered at the time a scandal at the Military Academy with students going "overboard". The report in essence indicated that the Officer Commanding the Military Academy, Brig De Vos, did not provide the military guidance and direction that was needed for the Military Academy to be of value to the Defence Force at large. Malan thus proposed a new model for the Military Academy. Kotze subsequently argued that the Malan Report and all subsequent reports on the Military Academy, including the Kingsrow Report of 1989, were nothing but investigations about the legitimacy of the institution. The Military Academy was and still is not a legitimate military unit within the broader Defence Force. Stated differently, the Defence Force has never accepted ownership of the Military Academy because the Military Academy never satisfied or addressed its needs. Although each of these reports attempted to determine the role and function of the Military Academy, this particular issue has not yet been resolved. The Military Academy still has no clearly defined place within the broader Defence Force system.⁶⁷ The underlying question though is whether the Defence Force is capable of and indeed has communicated its educational requirements to the Military Academy in a clear and unambiguous fashion. The exchange of information is the

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Col (ret)/ Prof JS Prof Kotze served as the Head of Humanities in The Faculty of Military Science before his retirement in 1995. Since 1995, however he has been constantly called up to serve as a lecturer in Military Strategy and History in view of the staff shortage in this regard. Prof Kotze was also one of the supervisors of Lt Col (Dr) GE Visser in his PhD study on the history of the South African Military Academy.

⁶⁶ Interview with Col (ret)/Prof JS Kotze, op. cit.

⁶⁷ Ibid. Kotze explains that a system consists of a given number of interacting component systems and is defined by the exchange of information between the components and by the flow of information between the system and its environment. Thus, a system influences its environment and is

glue that brings the different component systems together as a whole in a systems approach. If this interaction is effective, the system becomes bigger than the sum of its components.

This situation was and still is clearly visible in remarks made frequently by very senior officers in the Defence Force. These would include remarks such as, “What are you doing at the Military Academy?” or “The people we get from the Military Academy are not employable (*aanwendbaar*) by the Defence Force”. In addition, alumni of the Military Academy complained that they are not employed in the Defence Force in accordance with the subject knowledge and education they had received at the Military Academy. The question that drives these complaints is whether the students understand the role of the Military Academy – not as an institution that prepares them for specialist posts in the Defence Force – but as an institution that should prepare them for a military career – as military professionals. The Defence Force often complained that after three years of studies at the Military Academy, the student’s “... military knowledge is obsolete”. As a result of the inadequate exchange of information in the system, there is lack of mutual understanding between the Military Academy and the rest of the Defence Force, and thus there is an absence of seamless integration of graduates from the Military Academy into the Defence Force at large.⁶⁸

Many questions have been posed about the “... product of the Military Academy” – the students who graduate from the institution each year.⁶⁹ It seems that different individuals have different opinions about the attributes that a Military Academy graduate should have. No empirical study has yet been done regarding the acceptability of non-acceptability of these students for the SANDF. Malan consequently argued that the majority of complaints raised in this regard concern the lack of an understanding between training and education. In most cases, there is an expectation that the Military Academy should prepare students for their first assignment.⁷⁰

Since Military Academy alumni do not constitute a critical mass or fundamental number of officers in the SANDF, it is very difficult for the SANDF to develop an understanding of the nature of the Military Academy and its role. The large number of Military Academy alumni who have resigned from the SANDF in the last decade has exacerbated this situation. This should be linked to a situation where the majority of senior officers in the SANDF do not have any higher educational qualifications and, in most cases, also do not have an appreciation for the

influenced by it; a component system influences other component systems and is in turn influenced by them. A system is typically mapped by tracing the systemic information flow.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ It was interesting to note that almost everybody interviewed in the Defence Force for purposes of this study has some opinion about the “Military Academy product”.

⁷⁰ Interview with Prof DJ Malan, op. cit.

need and value of such an education. These officers have been denied the opportunity to study under the previous political dispensation. Officers not in possession of any academic qualifications often feel threatened and see the need to degrade the Military Academy as a form of – what psychologists refer to as – projection. Officers consequently project their own shortcomings on some extraneous object. This could well be ascribed to the lack of a tradition of education in the SANDF and the resulting unintellectual organisational climate.⁷¹

Kotze argued that this situation was dealt with for only a very small part of its history, which was in the period immediately after the Malan reforms in the early 1970s.⁷² Malan proposed the transformation of the Military Academy into an archetype Military Academy for the training, socialisation and education of young candidate officers at a single institution.⁷³ Consequently, Malan integrated the Military Academy into the broader system of officer development in the Defence Force. The most important element of the Malan reforms in the 1970s was the transfer of initial officer formative training to the Military Academy. Officers first had to pass the officer formative training course at the Military Academy in order to be commissioned. However, although the education that followed on the formative training at the Military Academy was not compulsory to become an officer, it established the Military Academy as the alma mater of all the officers in the Defence Force.

Geographical isolation also seems to have influenced the Defence Force's lack of ownership of the Military Academy. Visser was of the opinion that the Military Academy is geographically removed from the attention and interest of the policy and decision-makers in Pretoria. If an institution does not happen to be located in Pretoria and does not have a specific custodian, such as one of the services, this gives rise to a situation where no one cares about such distant unit. This is exacerbated by the inability of the lecturers of the Military Academy to involve themselves with some of the programmes of the other Defence Force education, training and development institutions because of these institutions' geographical locality and the lack of money to travel frequently between Saldanha and other centres, specifically Pretoria.⁷⁴ Neethling was also of the opinion that the lecturers in the Faculty of Military Science become intellectually very isolated in Saldanha over time. He contrasted his tenure as a lecturer in Saldanha with the time that he served as a senior researcher in the Gauteng Branch of the Centre for Military Studies in Pretoria. Being in Pretoria as an academic, not only allowed for

⁷¹ Interview with Lt Col (Dr) GE Visser, 2 March 2006, op. cit.

⁷² Interview with Col (ret)/Prof JS Kotze, op. cit.

⁷³ Visser provides an in-depth overview of these reforms in his study of the history of the Military Academy. See Visser, GE, "Die Geskiedenis van die Suid-Afrikaanse Militêre Akademie, 1950-1990", op. cit., pp. 297-395.

⁷⁴ Interview with Lt Col (Dr) GE Visser, 2 March 2006, op. cit.

interaction with a vibrant academic environment because of the great number of academic institutions in the Gauteng region, but also allowed for interaction with governmental and other policy-makers, since Pretoria is the bureaucratic hub of South Africa.⁷⁵

A last factor that provides some understanding of the SANDF's lack of ownership of the Military Academy, and one that the author considers as of critical importance, is the neglect in the academic offerings of the Military Academy to expose all students to those disciplines that constitute the heart of the military profession, such as Military History and Strategy. Only a very small percentage of Military Academy students are channelled into those programmes where they are exposed to these disciplines. Very few Military Academy students consequently have the opportunity to be introduced to, to ponder and to debate those issues that constitute the heart of the military profession. Without any doubt, this influences students' development of an occupational or institutional approach to their military careers. It is a matter of grave concern that the majority of South African Military Academy graduates have never been exposed to any military-related disciplines while studying at the institution!

6.3.3 Promotional relevancy of the Military Academy

As was pointed out earlier in the study, no academic education of any nature is required for commissioning as an officer in the SANDF. In the same manner that education has never been a requirement for officer commission, graduation from the Military Academy has never been a requirement for promotion. The percentage of officers who have graduated from the Military Academy in the past is very small indeed. The Military Academy, or more specifically graduation from the Military Academy, has never been a significant part of the career path of officers in the SANDF.

There is, though, a growing concern about the lack of knowledge development in the SANDF. This could be ascribed to the growing concern in the Defence Force about the average South African officer's lack of any academic qualifications.⁷⁶ The continued academic education of officers throughout their careers has become increasingly important as the South Africa military repositions itself after years of isolation. This notion was driven home by the need for career officers to prepare themselves for military diplomacy and international peacekeeping.

The need for military diplomacy is highlighted through the increasing interaction between the SANDF and other foreign military forces. Through this interaction, officers were exposed to

⁷⁵ Discussion with Prof Theo Neethling, Subject Chair of Political Science, Saldanha, 23 March 2006.

⁷⁶ Interview with the Commandant of the South African Military Academy, Saldanha, 17 February 2006.

international military professionalism and its educational foundation. This was especially true of the comparatively substantial number of South African officers who attended command and staff and other courses abroad. In general, these officers fared quite well in these courses. It was, however, more a reflection of their military experience than anything else. These officers returned with the realisation that something needed to be done about the educational profile of the average South African officer if the SANDF was to be serious about new military missions, such as military diplomacy, that have become an important part of the job description of the military in the contemporary era.⁷⁷ The need for academic education to be an integral part of the professional preparation of officers for their careers became an acceptable fact. The Commandant of the Military Academy in particular pointed out that education plays an important role in providing officers with confidence in their interaction with foreign armed forces.⁷⁸

The second factor that highlighted the need for education to be part of the professional preparation of officers for their careers is South African participation in peace missions in Africa. This drives home the fact that circumstances, such as the weather, religion and culture differ vastly elsewhere in Africa from the situation at home. Soldiers, for example, find it difficult dealing with complex issues such as child soldiers and armed civilians especially if they are not able to communicate with these people in the local language.⁷⁹ If these factors are considered in their totality, education becomes a prerequisite for the preparation of officers for their military careers.

Steps have been taken in the recent past to make some form of education at the Military Academy a prerequisite for commissioning. With the recent introduction of the Military Skills Development (MSD) programme by the SANDF, completion of the first year of military training at the officer training units of the different services, as well as completion of at least one year of academic studies at the Military Academy has become a requirement for appointment as officers. This will provide an officer with a short or medium-term contract. If he has an intention to remain in the SANDF as a career officer, it is recommended that he completes the remaining two years of academic study at the Military Academy, either residentially or by means of distance education, or to complete a degree course at an academic institution somewhere else. It should be noted, however, that the motivation for the introduction of the MSD programme is rooted in political and not necessarily in strategic or military considerations. It is questioned within the military and is seen as a simplistic short-term solution to a complicated challenge.

⁷⁷ Discussion with a Lieutenant Colonel of the SA Army after his return from Germany and completion of a staff course in the Bundeswehr, SA Army College, Thaba Tswane, 2 June 2005.

⁷⁸ Interview with the Commandant of the South African Military Academy, op. cit.

⁷⁹ Gibson, E, "SA 'nie Gepanser vir Afrika': Weermag se Eerste Ontplooiing in Moslem-land Skep Unieke Probleme", *Die Burger*, 29 March 2006, p. 13.

The Army is the largest beneficiary of the MSD programme, with the highest number of students who form part of the programme being in the Army. The Army is in great need for junior officers and it remains to be seen whether this service is going to persist with the policy of not commissioning these candidate officers if they are not successful in their first year of study. The question arises: How long will these members remain as candidate officers in the Army before the Army promotes them on account of the shortage of junior officers? In addition, how are these students to repeat the academic courses of their first year of study and be successful in it by means of distance education if they have not succeeded during their residential studies?

The Army, unlike the Air Force and Navy, is however notorious for keeping its distance and not actively engaging the Faculty of Military Science concerning the kind and nature of education that its students are supposed to receive. The Air Force, for example, has recently charged the Faculty of Military Science to be responsible for the “ground-school phase” of their pilot and navigator training. These pupil pilots and navigators thus have to complete at least one year of academic education if they wish to continue with their training as pilots or navigators. They should complete the remaining part of the degree course after completion of their training either through returning to the Military Academy or by means of distance education. This has not happened as yet. Indeed, there are serious questions about whether this will, in fact, come about once these students have been allowed into the cockpits of their aircraft. The result is that there are almost no Air Force students in their second and third years of study at the Military Academy. In addition, without doubt the division into two periods of the educational experience of students has a detrimental impact on the general formative nature of education. However, by actively engaging the Faculty of Military Science, the Air Force ensures that during their one year at the Military Academy students receive an education that serves as a basis for further training within the service. This is in stark contrast to the approach of the Army.

The Navy is also in the process of deliberating with the Military Academy for the development and tailoring of an academic programme in such a way that it addresses the specific needs of the Navy. Its completion would be a requirement for the appointment of at least the combat officers in future. The Navy's requests have already been incorporated into the academic offerings of the Military Academy and are due to be introduced in 2007. This includes *inter alia* the development of subjects, such as Naval Technology and Maritime and Shipping Law, as part of the Programme in Technology and Defence Management. The Navy has also requested the addition of so-called “zero credit modules” to the programme. The students have to complete these modules as part of the graduate programme at the Military Academy, but these are in fact practical modules to be completed during recess times on ships or in various naval

units. This co-operation between the Navy and the Military Academy is an import step for the Navy in taking ownership of the Military Academy and its students at the Military Academy. The Academy will be responsible for an important component of the commissioning of the Navy's candidate officers in future.⁸⁰

With these initiatives, the Air Force and the Navy have provided important indications to the Military Academy regarding the way it should approach its own future and how it could be of value to the South African military in general. In particular, these initiatives highlight the difference in the needs of the services and the importance for a joint institution, such as the Military Academy to continue addressing the needs of the different services. The example of the tailoring of both these programmes for the Air Force and the Navy also provides interesting insights into the balancing of a general formative education with a vocational education.

6.4 DEALING WITH THE CHALLENGES: POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS FOR THE DIFFICULTIES FACING THE MILITARY ACADEMY

It is easy to criticise and to deconstruct. The real challenge is to find solutions and to draw up constructive proposals to deal with very complex problems such as those that are confronting the Military Academy at present.⁸¹ Any concrete proposals to address such a complex challenge are bound to be controversial and in itself an object of critique. It is within this context that the proposals and recommendations contained in this chapter should be seen. It is hoped that this contains the seeds for a constructive debate that would eventually lead to better solutions. Therefore, it is not implied that the suggestions and recommendations that are made constitute the sole or the full solution. It is important to consider a number of influencing factors that should guide any thinking about the future of the Military Academy. These factors have been identified throughout the whole of this study.

6.4.1 Education as a requirement for officership

An important requirement for successful military education is that such education should form an integral part of the career paths of officers. Modern military professionalism requires from

⁸⁰ Discussion with Lt Cdr Louw Uys, Military Academy, 30 March 2006. Lt Cmdr Uys heads the Subject Group Nautical Science at the Military Academy. The author also participates in the deliberations with the Navy in this regard. An interesting feature of this discussion was the understanding between the Military Academy and the Navy delegation that these two are dependent on one another for their future development and role.

⁸¹ In the recent past, these challenges were reflected in both the Commandant of the Military Academy and the Dean of Military Science being relieved of their commands by the SANDF and the University of Stellenbosch respectively.

officers a minimum level of academic education. World-wide, possession of a first degree (B degree) has become the minimum requirement for academic entry regarding appointment as an officer. An advanced degree has become the norm for appointment at senior levels. The SANDF is far behind the rest of the world in this regard. A first degree should also become a minimum requirement for officers in the SANDF – for those already in the system, and also for those who are newly appointed.

How should the requirement for an educated officer corps be introduced into the SANDF? There are two routes to follow. The first is to stipulate that if someone aspires to promotion beyond a specific rank, that person should have a degree. For example, anyone who wants to become a senior officer and be promoted beyond the rank of major should have a degree. Another way to introduce such an arrangement is to allow a specific period of time, five years for example, after which nobody may be promoted without a degree. This would allow those who wish to remain in the military sufficient time to obtain such a degree or to seek an alternative career. Canada used this option with great success in the 1990s.⁸²

6.4.2 The need for military regimental socialisation at the Military Academy

The Defence Force in general and the different services in particular, will not accept ownership of the Military Academy if the Military Academy does not become responsible for the whole process of the making of lieutenants. The making of lieutenants entails the training, socialisation and education of candidate officers in preparation for their commissioning as officers. A careful reading of Visser's study of the history of the Military Academy clearly indicates that the services have always resisted such an arrangement.⁸³ Their resistance was based on the notion that the services first have to socialise and regimentalise their candidate officers in a service-unique culture *before* they commence with their studies at the Military Academy. Strangely enough, the services have never been concerned about the socialisation and regimentalisation of their candidate officers at the Military Academy itself. Or, it can be argued that this was one of the reasons why the services have never truly taken ownership of the Military Academy: they do not have control over the socialisation of their officers in the educational environment of the Military Academy. It is, however, true that one year of socialisation in a regimentalised training environment does not stand up to three years of socialisation in an academic environment. Something needs to be done about the

⁸² See the next chapter for a discussion in this regard: Haycock, RC, "The Labours of Athena and the Muses: Historical and Contemporary Aspects of Canadian Military Education", in Kennedy, GC & Nielson, K (eds.), *Military Education: Past, Present, and Future*, Praeger, Westport, 2002.

⁸³ Visser, GE, *Die Geskiedenis van die Suid-Afrikaanse Militêre Akademie, 1950-1990*, op. cit.

disequilibrium in the socialisation of candidate officers between their one year of training at the service colleges and their three years of study at the Military Academy.

Some element is lacking in the socialisation of candidate and junior officers at the Military Academy that would ensure their smooth and successful integration into the SANDF after three years of academic study at the Military Academy. At present, there is disequilibrium between the academic socialisation of candidate officers and junior officers at the Military Academy and the regimental socialisation at the service colleges, which is required by the SANDF. In the past, the midyear recess training of students at various military units throughout the SANDF was supposed to fill this void. With the Military Academy's stringent budget of the last couple of years, however, regimentalised military training has fallen by the wayside.

Training and the regimentalised military training environment represent a convergent approach to socialisation. The individual is specifically socialised for a specific environment – the military environment in general and the warfighting environment in particular. Education allows for a divergent approach where the individual is socialised to operate with ease in a range of social and other environments. Whereas these two forms of socialisation form an integral part of the making of young officers at most foreign military academies, the emphasis is almost exclusively on academic socialisation at the South African Military Academy.

If the two processes of socialisation cannot be done concurrently, then at least it would make more sense to first complete the broad general socialisation process before preparation and socialisation for a specific career, namely that of the military. This implies a change in the sequence of the process as it is done at present. It also provides a strong argument for transferring the formative training function of the different services to the Military Academy and extending the three-year period for education at the Military Academy to a four-year process of education and training. Or, if this is not possible, to first complete the academic education before these candidate officers are sent for more specific regimentalised military training at the service colleges. If the training of officers is transferred to the Military Academy, the current structure of the Military Academy needs to be changed to allow the military training branch to play a much more prominent role in the way that candidate officers are being dealt with at the Military Academy.

Training cannot take a more prominent position at the Military Academy within the timeframe of the current three years of education for degree purposes and with the current basic skeleton personnel of the military training branch. The services will have to strengthen the training branch with officers and non-commissioned officers who are able to serve as training staff and

mentors for the cadets and who can take responsibility for the cadets' whole existence outside the classrooms at the Military Academy. A four-year period of development for these candidate officers at the Military Academy would seem to be the very basic requirement for such an approach to be successful. This is the process and timeframe that are followed at most foreign military academies. Under the current three-year system, there is not sufficient time available for successful quality education, training and socialisation. Since the University of Stellenbosch is involved in the quality assurance of the academic programme at the Military Academy and since the Defence Force minimises its involvement with the candidate officers at the Military Academy, training and socialisation currently fall by the wayside at the institution.

6.4.3 The position of the Faculty of Military Science

For the Military Academy to optimise its functioning, both the military and the academic components of the institution should be allowed to behave and conduct themselves according to their nature. This means that military training and development at the Military Academy have to be militarised by presenting it in a more disciplined and regimentalised fashion. A greater input and control of the military training at the Military Academy by the SANDF are required for this to materialise. This also implies that the academic component of the Military Academy – the Faculty of Military Science – should be allowed to function according to its nature as an academic faculty. The functioning of universities as academic institutions is rooted in the notion of autonomy.⁸⁴

At present, the idea of a military hierarchy dominates the interaction between the University and the SANDF where this interaction converges in the Faculty of Military Science to the extent that the academic autonomy of the Faculty and the optimal functioning of the Dean in his position as chair of an academic faculty of the University are kept in check by the military. Unfortunately, there is currently very little understanding in the SANDF in general for the position and authority of the Faculty of Military Science in general and that of the Dean in particular.⁸⁵

Academic autonomy is rooted in an understanding that the ability of the Faculty of Military Science to make its academic offerings of relevance to the military is situated in liaison between the Faculty and the Defence Force. This autonomy is however not situated in the control by the Defence Force of the Faculty and its academic offerings. An autonomous Faculty and greater

⁸⁴ Claassen, W T, "Civilian Academia: Adversary or Ally in Military Education", Paper presented at the international conference and workshop on *The Future of Military Education in a Democratic South Africa* jointly hosted by the Military Academy and IDASA at the SANDF Military Academy in Saldanha, 1 and 2 June 1995, pp. 2-3.

⁸⁵ Interview with Prof DJ Malan, 15 February 2006, op. cit.

militarisation of the training branch do not imply “greater distance” between the Faculty and the Defence Force. Rather, it is a clarification of the function and control of the different components of the Military Academy of their particular fields of expertise. It allows the different components to focus on their core business. This implies *inter alia* that the budget and staff of the Faculty of Military Science have to be managed independently and autonomously by the Dean of Military Science under the auspices of the University.

The previous Dean of Military Science emphasised that such an approach necessitates a co-operative endeavour in which the two key role-players, the Dean and the Commandant of the Academy, are in touch with each other in an informal, collegial manner. This should be done in such a way that they do not institutionally affect one another negatively. The approach is underpinned by two considerations: professional authority and authority of the role positions. As the system functions at present, the professional academic authority of both the Faculty as well as the role-players in the Faculty is eroded. In addition, there is at present no clear definition and demarcation of the respective fields of authority of the Commandant of the Military Academy and the Dean of Military Science.⁸⁶

The Commandant and the Dean should ideally function at the same hierarchical level in the organisation. The relationship between the Commandant and the Dean requires a strategic alliance that is determined by a certain level of emotional and social intelligence of the incumbent individuals. This is the reason why the SANDF should be very careful in the selection and appointment of the Commandant of the Military Academy. As a minimum, it should be somebody who reflects all the attributes of a professional officer. In particular, it is recommended that the candidate should at least be in possession of a masters degree. This is necessary to ensure that the Commandant has an understanding of the nature of the academic world in general and the functioning of an academic faculty in particular.

6.4.4 The development of academic programmes

It stands to reason that a partnership between the Defence Force and the Faculty of Military Science is of extreme importance in the development of the academic programmes at the Military Academy. This would ensure a fine balance between general scientific/academic formative education on the one hand and the vocational needs and education of officers for their military careers on the other. Both these elements are of vital importance in the preparation for professional vocations the world over. The Faculty of Military Science, without doubt, will

⁸⁶ Ibid.

emphasise the general scientific/academic formative nature of education in its interaction with the Defence Force. The SANDF in general, and the different services in particular, would necessarily emphasise their vocational needs. It is, therefore, of critical importance that the services involve themselves with the education of their candidate officers at the Military Academy. Clear signs of such involvement are visible in the recent tailoring of academic programmes for the Air Force and the Navy in the Faculty of Military Science. The process though, has to become formalised and be expanded to include the Army and the Military Health Service.

A first and very important requirement for interaction of this kind is an understanding that such interaction between the Faculty and the Defence Force is rooted in the recognition of the autonomy of the Faculty of Military Science as a faculty of the university. As pointed out earlier, the autonomy of universities is central to their being and existence as academic institutions. In addition, the interaction between the University in general and the Faculty in particular and the SANDF should be based on the guidelines that form the basis of co-operation between all the statutory professional councils with which universities interact in the provision of professional vocational education. The interaction between the Faculty and the Defence Force, also, should be based on an understanding that some form of tension is the norm in this kind of interaction and not the exception. The Defence Force and the University are ultimately two entities that are different in nature, and tension between them could therefore be expected to be the norm and not the exception.

The Defence Force's understanding of the need to balance general scientific/academic formative education with its own vocational needs is already clearly visible in the guidelines for the development of academic programmes in the Faculty of Military Science. These guidelines in the Department of Defence's *Joint Training Implementation Instruction on the Management of the Military Academy* make provision for so-called primary disciplines that need to provide depth and auxiliary disciplines, which constitute the width of the programmes.⁸⁷ However, this stipulation should be extended further to make provision for a core curriculum in the programmes of the Faculty of Military Science.

At most military academies the world over, such a core curriculum constitutes the essence of the academic programme. It is interesting to note, for example, that even in military academies designed according to what Caforio calls a "... convergent approach to education", the university subjects at military academies coincide to a remarkable extent with those studied in

⁸⁷ *Joint Training Implementation Instruction on the Management of the Military Academy*, op. cit., p. 11.

Political Science programmes at civilian universities. Those institutions that reflect a convergent approach in the making of officers tend to bring officer education closer to the national university system. Caforio, though, emphasised that the underlying question in this regard is, “How close is a country’s basic education system for officers to that for the other professions?”⁸⁸

6.4.5 The need for a core academic curriculum

A core curriculum for each of the services is an important first step to balance general scientific/academic formative and vocational education and to ensure ownership of the Defence Force of the Military Academy. In most military educational institutions, such a core curriculum is designed to introduce officers to the philosophical roots of the military profession. There are a number of ways to design such a curriculum. One way to design such a curriculum is to use military professionalism as the driving principle. This ensures that the candidate officers are introduced to those academic disciplines that constitute the essence of military professionalism. Academic disciplines that are included in such a curriculum should provide students with an understanding of four knowledge clusters, identified earlier in this study, that are seen as the core of military studies:⁸⁹

- the higher order security environment;
- the internal bureaucratic military organisational environment;
- the professional military environment; and
- the military operating environment.

The underlying philosophy is a service-unique degree programme for each of the different services at the Military Academy. Degree programmes in the Faculty of Military Science typically should include three types of modules that constitute the whole programme. There are, firstly, those modules that all students in the Faculty have to include in their degree programmes irrespective of their service. These modules are on the one hand those that constitute the heart of the profession, such as military history and strategy. On the other hand, they comprise those that are required for better facilitation of the educational process, such as English and Basic Computer Literacy. The former Dean of Military Science emphasised that the quality of secondary school education in South Africa necessitates the inclusion of the latter type of modules. These modules, however, consume valuable time in the degree programmes. This is time that should have been used for other academic modules. However, this is a unique

⁸⁸ Caforio, G, “Military Officer Education”, in Caforio, G (ed.), *Handbook of the Sociology of the Military*, Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers, New York, 2003, pp. 260-261.

South African problem with its roots firmly in the history of the country and is bound to be part of the educational landscape for the foreseeable future.⁹⁰

There are, secondly, those modules associated with the nature of military power in a specific geographical sphere that a particular service needs to include in its degree programmes. These modules need to constitute and provide depth to a specific service's degree programme. This will differ from one service to another. The Navy, for example, will require that all its officers do some modules regarding Nautical Science. The SA Army, for example, might decide that all Army students at the Military Academy should do a specific course in Military Strategy, Military Management or Mathematics.

Thirdly there are those types of modules that might be included in the programmes as electives. These are modules in which students may exercise a choice. This would enable students to include modules in their studies that reflect their own interests, such as Psychology.

The essence of the proposal for a core curriculum is the need for the different services to identify those modules that are of central importance to that specific service. In other words, the different services will have to make an analysis of the academic attributes that are required from officers in that specific service. Since navies and air forces are technological instruments of military power, the education of their officers will be driven primarily by academic disciplines from the natural sciences environment. Armies, being manpower-driven organisations, will primarily emphasise academic disciplines focusing on management and humanities in the education of its officers. These attributes should then be linked to the different academic disciplines in the Faculty that are able to provide such attributes.

The University in general, and the Faculty of Military Science in particular, should show some flexibility in the design of these programmes. This specifically holds true for the coherence of the different disciplines in the specific programmes. The Army, for example, might request that different modules that are associated with the natural sciences, the management sciences and the humanities be included in their programme. Questions would be posed about the academic coherence of such a programme. However, the centre of gravity regarding such coherence will shift from coherence between the different disciplines that constitute the programme to coherence in the professional expertise that is required from officers in the different services. Such a core curriculum should be carefully developed in consultation with the higher education

⁸⁹ Also see Esterhuysen, A J, "The Military Educational Predicament: Identifying Core Educational Requirements", *Strategic Review for Southern Africa*, Vol XXVII, No 2, November 2005, p. 122.


⁹⁰ Interview with Prof DJ Malan, op. cit.

authorities in South Africa in order to find a balance between the directives for programme development emanating from the higher education environment and the needs of the SANDF.

6.4.6 Structural changes for the introduction of a core curriculum and military training

Balancing the need for training and education at the Military Academy and the general scientific/academic formative education in the Faculty of Military Science with military vocational education, necessitates a four-year programme for candidate officers at the Military Academy. It will never be possible to introduce a core curriculum and to include a strong training component at the Military Academy without extending the tenure of training and education at the institution to four years. This will allow not only for quality education and training, but will also permit the necessary military socialisation of candidate officers at the Military Academy. A four-year programme should be supported by important organisational changes at the Military Academy in which the different services accept ownership of the training and socialisation of their candidate officers at the Military Academy to ensure the development of a service-unique culture among students from a particular service. The autonomy of the Faculty will also be an important consideration in such a structure. It should be asked how this can be achieved.

An important first step is to have a clear line of demarcation between the academic and military components at the Military Academy. To translate this into reality the Dean of Military Science and the Commandant of the Military Academy have to function as equal partners on the same level within the organisational structure. (See Figure 6.2) Each should be responsible for the management of the resources being allocated to that specific component. Managing the budget of the Faculty through the University will allow the Faculty flexibility to operate as a proper academic faculty with emphasis on the right strategic priorities. Such an arrangement is used with great success at the Australian Defence Force Academy and its interaction with the University of New South Wales.⁹¹ It is also being used with considerable success at professional military education institutions in Britain.⁹²






Figure 6.2: Proposed system of command and control at the Military Academy

Each of the services needs to develop a very strong Service Training Branch at the Military Academy, namely an Army Training Branch, an Air Force Training Branch, a Naval Training Branch and a Medical Service Training Branch. These training branches should become responsible for all student activities, in fact the candidate officers' whole existence outside of the classrooms at the Military Academy. The responsibility of the training branches will end the moment the student walks into an academic class, and will become their responsibility once again the moment the student walks out of that class. In particular, the training branches should be responsible for all the training and socialisation of their particular service's candidate officers at the Military Academy.

The training branches should be staffed with high quality officers and non-commissioned officers that can serve as role models and mentors for their candidate officers. The different

⁹² See the webpage of King's College, University of London, Defence Studies Department, Joint Services Command and Staff College. Available at <<http://www.kcl.ac.uk/depsta/wsg/dsd/>> [29 March 2006]

year groups of candidate officers of each service should have at least an officer with the rank of major and a sergeant major to command that specific year group. The Army Training Branch, for example, should typically consist of a colonel as its commander and at least four officers with the rank of major or captain for the control of each year group of students. Each of these four officers should be supported by a sergeant major or senior non-commissioned officer. The students' management organisation should function under close scrutiny of the structures. (See Figure 6.2)

A very senior colonel (captain [SAN]), with a masters degree as a minimum academic qualification, should be appointed to head the training branch of each service. Command of a service's training branch implies a dual appointment. Such a person should on the one hand command the Service Training Branch and be responsible for the training and socialisation of the candidate officers of a specific service at the Military Academy. He, on the other hand, should be responsible for the management of that specific service's input into its academic programme in the Faculty of Military Science. This should be done in co-operation with a senior faculty member who is responsible for that service's programme in the Faculty. Together, this senior academic (preferably a professor) in the Faculty, and a senior, well experienced and well-educated colonel (captain [SAN]) should firstly manage the academic programme of that service at the Military Academy under the auspices of the Dean of Military Science.⁹³ Each service will therefore have a professor in the faculty who accepts responsibility for that service's programme. The commanders of these different Service Training Branches should, on the one hand, be members of the Faculty Council and, on the other hand, be in command of their specific service's training branch at the Military Academy. Secondly, the professor and colonel (captain [SAN]) of each branch together should manage the time of students at the Military Academy in such a way that a balance is found in terms of time spent on academic, training and socialising activities.

The commanders of the different Service Training Branches should have the intellectual and other attributes to build the bridge between the academic and military worlds. These officers should, therefore, be very carefully selected by the military as the primarily link between the Military Academy and the specific service. They should be officers that really have an understanding of the nature of the academic world as well as the nature of the military

⁹³ It is interesting to note that the SA Navy recently appointed a senior captain in the subject Nautical Science with no post-graduate qualifications, but with the responsibility to oversee the newly proposed programme for naval officers at the Military Academy. This emphasised the need of the services to provide a bigger input to the Faculty to manage its academic programmes in such a way as to provide in the needs of the Defence Force. It is also a clear sign of the Navy taking ownership of its programme and its students at the Military Academy.

profession. Under such a system, the different services become responsible for the training and socialisation of their candidate officers at the Military Academy and provide a strong input into the nature of education these candidate officers will receive as part of their degree programmes in the Faculty of Military Science. More importantly, the Military Academy in general, and the Faculty in particular, will have a close feedback system from the Defence Force. Such a system will allow the Military Academy to tailor its training, socialisation and education to the needs of the Defence Force. In short, the system will oblige the Defence Force to take responsibility for an institution that has been created for no other purpose than to serve the needs of the Defence Force.

6.4.7 Post-graduate studies and research

The introduction of a core curriculum should be carefully planned in order to facilitate progression towards post-graduate studies. This includes a careful balancing between liberal and vocational education in the choice of majors during the last year of study. Academic subjects should be structured in such a way as to allow for post-graduate study later in the career of an officer at civilian universities.

If young candidate officers spend four years in preparation of their careers at the Military Academy, they should not be allowed to engage in any full-time post-graduate studies immediately after their graduation from the Military Academy, as is the practise at present. This does not mean that they should not engage in post-graduate studies later in their careers. A culture of life-long learning should become an essential element of their careers. However, operational experience is also of critical importance in the making of officers and after four years of study, candidate officers have to be introduced to the military operational environment.

An important shift in emphasis is required from the Faculty of Military Science in its post-graduate offerings. Such a shift necessitates an understanding of the close connection between the academic education provided at the Military Academy and the role and function of the South African National Defence College outlined in the framework proposed in Chapter three. In short, the post-graduate courses of the faculty should be tailored in such a way as to accommodate officers who are participating in the Executive National Security Programme (ENSP) at the National Defence College. This will not only contribute to the Defence Force taking ownership of the Military Academy, but will also allow the Military Academy to make an active contribution to the education of the senior officers in the SANDF.

A small step has already been taken in this regard with the involvement of the Faculty in the evaluation of the research projects of the senior officers doing the ENSP⁹⁴. In addition, initial steps have been taken as regards the involvement of the students of the National Defence College in the academic programmes of the Military Academy with the development of the MPhil Programme in Security Management. The first seven students (senior colonels and junior brigadier generals) who completed the ENSP in 2005 have been accepted for the MPhil Programme in 2006. The academic offerings of the Military Academy should, however, be expanded to other disciplines to provide a wider choice of programmes to the students of the National Defence College. Initially, this process will be a challenge because of the general anti-intellectual organisational climate in the Defence Force and the small number of officers with a first degree who can be allowed to the MPhil programmes. Other budgetary, logistical and bureaucratic difficulties will also influence the process. However, the long-term benefits are vast, not only for the SANDF, but also for students from Africa and other parts of the world who could be accommodated in such a programme.

Allowing the Faculty to operate according to its nature, will result in the Defence Force not only benefiting from the under and post-graduate academic studies at the Military Academy. It will also allow the Faculty to align post-graduate education with research in the Department of Defence. Post-graduate education and research can greatly assist in ensuring the continued interaction between the operational and educational components of the Defence Force. It is important to guide the research activities of the Faculty to respond to the needs of the Defence Force. It is believed that linking post-graduate military education and research will be more appropriate and cost-efficient than for the Defence Force to make use of external service providers in this regard. The value of such an arrangement has already been proven, for example by the Centre for Military Studies (CEMIS).⁹⁵

The important guiding principle concerning research is that academics be allowed to make their research findings known to the world by means of conference papers and publications in books and accredited academic journals. The way in which CEMIS functions has demonstrated that such an arrangement is possible. It requires from the Defence Force to refrain from interference in the research findings of academics. Without the publication of their research, academics are not able to build up their own stature, which is of critical importance for their credibility as

⁹⁴ At the National Defence College this is known as the "Commandant's Research Papers" (CRPs).

⁹⁵ The Centre for Military Studies forms part of the Faculty of Military Science of the University of Stellenbosch. It is a research centre primarily responsible for military, defence and security-related research in the South African Department of Defence. The Centre has a branch situated at the Military Academy in Saldanha and the Gauteng branch situated at the National Defence College in Thaba Tswane, Pretoria.

academics. The acceptance of a certain degree of transparency by the Defence Force as well as the acceptance of legitimate criticism is an important first step in a process of transforming the organisation in such a way that its function is ultimately optimised.

6.5 CONCLUSIONS

The chapter aimed at providing an exposition of ways in which the structure, focus and functioning of the South African Military Academy can be optimised. This was done through an explanation and analysis of the policy and legal environment within which the Military Academy exists, the primary challenges with which the institution is confronted, and proposals on ways to address these challenges to optimise the institution's functioning.

A unique civil-military interface between the University of Stellenbosch and the Department of Defence defines the existence and nature of the Military Academy. The Military Academy is therefore on the one hand a normal military unit of the SANDF, while on the other hand it is the home of the Faculty of Military Science of the University of Stellenbosch. This unique civil-military arrangement for the education of officers for the South African military reflects the tensions that are typical of civil-military relations the world over. At an organisational level, the tensions are exacerbated by the absence of an overarching governmental policy framework regulating the functioning of the institution. The existence of the Military Academy at present is rooted in a departmental agreement between the University and the Department of Defence that allows for wide interpretation. The SANDF has issued a departmental level instruction to the command cadre of the Military Academy in an effort to provide clearer guidelines on the functioning of the Military Academy. There are, however, still a number of challenges that create tension within the institution and between the two higher order partners – the University of Stellenbosch and the South African Department of Defence.

Three primary challenges have been identified. There is, firstly, an absence of sufficient funds for the optimum functioning of specifically the Faculty of Military Science. The budgetary situation is worsened by the military component of the Military Academy, having almost dictatorial powers over its management. The Faculty of Military Science, responsible for the core function of the Military Academy, is dependent on the military for its funding while the University supports its functional priorities. The Military Academy, and in particular the Faculty of Military Science, secondly, finds itself in a situation where neither the University nor the SANDF takes ownership of the institution. The reasons for this lack of ownership are diverse. It includes *inter alia* the presence of an anti-intellectual organisational climate in the SANDF, academic programmes that are not attuned to the needs of the SANDF, the lack of a

regimentalised institutional culture at the Military Academy and a tension in the role definitions of the Dean of Military Science and the Commandant of the Military Academy. Lastly, academic studies at the Military Academy (or anywhere else for that matter) are not part of the career paths of officers in the SANDF. This gives rise to the idea that attendance of the Military Academy is needed to prepare soldiers for a second career instead of preparing them for the profession of arms and a military career.

In debating solutions for the challenges confronting the Military Academy in general and the Faculty of Military Science in particular, a number of considerations have to be kept in mind. The requirements for officership in the South African military need to be brought in line with international best practises by making academic studies a prerequisite for entry. Training and education of officers at the Military Academy should be done in such a way that successful candidates integrate with ease into the general regimentalised military system. It can only be done if the primary focus on education at the Military Academy is supplemented with sound training and military socialisation at the institution. An elementary prerequisite for the successful integration of education, training and development at the Military Academy is an extension of the present three-year education to a four-year ETD process.

The position of the Dean and that of the Faculty of Military Science should be optimised by allowing these the opportunity of functioning according to their nature. Academic institutions can only be successful if they operate in an environment that gives them a certain amount of autonomy and independence. This necessitates an understanding on the part of the Defence Force of the nature of higher education and the attributes of the vehicle required for the provision of quality higher education. In addition, academic programmes should be designed in such a way as to maximise the value of the education that is provided at the Faculty of Military Science for the SANDF. A search for ways in which to balance general formative academic education and vocational education should determine the nature of programmes that are designed in the Faculty. The tension in the balance between these two demands should be accepted as normal and healthy. However, the services should make a careful analysis of their educational needs in order to identify those disciplines that should be included in a programme that addresses the specific needs of that particular service. These disciplines should constitute the core curriculum of the education provided to members of that particular service at the Military Academy. This necessitates the active involvement of the services in the nature of the education provided to their young candidate officers.

Structural changes have to be made at the Military Academy to accommodate a programme that makes provision for military training, education and socialisation as well as the active

participation of the services in determining the nature of the education that should be provided to the candidate officers. These changes should be made in such a way as to clarify the position, role and function of the academic and training contingents, as well as the Dean of Military Science and the Commandant of the Military Academy respectively. The Faculty of Military Science has to consider its role very carefully so as to provide not only in the needs of the Defence Force at under-graduate level, but also at post-graduate level and taking into consideration the research needs of the Defence Force. Close co-operation between the Military Academy and the National Defence College is an important vehicle for such an endeavour. The SANDF should facilitate such an endeavour through the provision of the necessary institutional support.

It is believed that these proposals will allow the Military Academy its rightful place in the education of officers, not only for South Africa, but also for the continent as a whole. Tertiary education will in future be of paramount importance to facilitate greater regional co-operation, to engender sound civil-military relations and to serve as an important confidence-building mechanism between African defence forces. More importantly, the strengthening of South Africa's military educational capability at the South African Military Academy will contribute towards reducing African military's widespread dependence on foreign institutions to provide quality education to its officers. Indeed, the development of the South African Military Academy into a military educational institution suited for the demands of the African defence environment has become indispensable.

CHAPTER 7

SYNTHESIS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Education is not the panacea but the sine qua non of military effectiveness.

RC Haycock¹

7.1 INTRODUCTION

The study embodies a descriptive analysis of the tensions that underpin the need for an educated military in South Africa and, more specifically, the role of the South African Military Academy in providing this education. The purpose of the research was to demarcate the proper role of the South African Military Academy in the academic and professional preparation of officers for the South African National Defence Force (SANDF). This purpose necessitated, firstly, an analysis of the need for education in armed forces in general and in South Africa in particular, with specific reference to the tensions underpinning military education and training. It, secondly, called for a broad assessment of the nature of professional military education in the SANDF at large to contextualise the role and function of the South African Military Academy.

Four specific areas of tension in the education of officers in South Africa are identified in the introductory chapter. An understanding of these underlying tensions and their causes provides some explanation as to why the education of the military in South Africa seems to be a controversial issue. The first tension is the interplay between experience, training and education in the expertise required by armed forces. For a variety of reasons, armed forces prefer to place emphasis on experience and training in the development of their manpower to the detriment of education. This preference is highlighted through the second tension – a difference in the disciplined regimentalised ethos of the training establishment and the general scientific ethos of the academic world rooted in the need for freedom of thought. The third tension concerns the academic world in particular, though traces thereof can also be found in the training environment. This is the tension concerning the focus of officer education or, more specifically, the question regarding which academic disciplines constitute or should constitute the essence of modern military education. For example, should education prepare officers primarily to be efficient as military bureaucrats or to be effective as military professionals? The last tension that is highlighted

¹ Haycock, RC, "The Labours of Athena and the Muses: Historical and Contemporary Aspects of Canadian Military Education", In Kennedy, GC & Nielson, K (eds.), *Military Education: Past, Present, and Future*, Praeger, Westport, 2002, p.. 171.

concerns the debate on when officers should be educated. The specific question that is asked is whether the focus of military education should be on the making of lieutenants or the making of colonels. This question is rooted in the notion that the military profession, like most other professions, should educate its members as a pre-requisite for entering the profession of arms. This view is opposed by the notion that the education of officers should take place later in their careers when, apparently, they have more time to busy themselves with academic studies. In a more general sense, this represents a tension between pre-commission liberal academic education and professional military education within militaries. On a higher level, this tension concerns the interplay between a general scientific academic formative education and a professional vocational education in the making of officers.

Chapters two and three of the study address these concerns from a theoretical and philosophical perspective. This theoretical and philosophical discussion concludes with a proposal at the end of Chapter three of a framework to understand and manage education in armed forces. Chapter four comprises an analysis of education in the SANDF by means of this framework in an effort to outline both the positive and the negative attributes of the current system of education in the SANDF. The last two content chapters of the study examine the role of the South African Military Academy in the education of officers for the SANDF. More specifically, Chapter five is a historical overview of the debate since 1994 of what should be the proper role and function of the Military Academy. Chapter six provides an analysis of the challenges facing the Military Academy at present and what ought to be done to deal with it in constructive manner. This chapter is therefore divided into a synthesis and conclusion of the theoretical discussion of military education and a discussion of education in the SANDF and at the Military Academy. The last part of the chapter outlines some broad recommendations.

One of the challenges posed by the research was the noticeable disinterest of SANDF personnel in general. This in itself was proof of the need for a study on education in the South African military. In addition, it was sometimes difficult to balance the emotional and political biases of service personnel to provide an objective account and analysis of education in the SANDF. To address this problem, an effort was made to look past the present and to project particular issues towards the future operational effectiveness of the SANDF. This was also done in an effort to minimise any personal prejudices that might have influenced the study. All matters that may be controversial, politically or otherwise, were therefore approached with the question on how it will affect the operational effectiveness of the South African military in years to come. This specifically relates to

the matters addressed in Chapter 4. Though the SANDF supports the research, no resources other than normal support services at unit level were forthcoming from the SANDF. This support was restricted to local travelling and printing facilities. The study subsequently resulted in an individual effort from its commencement to its completion, with little if any institutional support by the SANDF.

7.2 TENSIONS UNDERPINNING MILITARY EDUCATION

The “Western Way of War” has a long tradition of officer development by means of both training and education.² Modern military education has its roots in the Western European context, particularly in the military reforms in Prussia and elsewhere that followed on the Napoleonic wars. The political, industrial and military changes of the 19th century together with the globalisation of conflict and technology in the 20th century provide further impetus to the need and the expansion of education in the development of military officers. The increasing need and use of education in the development of officers brought to the fore the difference between training and education in the military context. It also outlined the difference between a general scientific education (*ein gebildetes Offizierkorps*) and a professional military education (*ein berufsgebildetes Offizierkorps*). In the modern context, it is of critical importance for militaries to incorporate all three notions – training, professional military education, and general scientific education – in the professional preparation of armed forces. A balance between these notions ensures tactical and strategic agility, in other words, the ability of military forces to do the right things in the right way.

A balance between training, professional military education, and general scientific education is rooted in an understanding of the nature of the three notions and the role of each one in the preparation of officers. The nature of the three notions, on the one hand, highlights the tension between them. An understanding of the role of each notion, on the other hand, emphasises the interaction between training, professional military education, and general scientific education in the preparation of officers. Thus, the three notions are different by nature, but interdependent in the professional preparation of officers throughout the whole of their military careers.

² Parker provides specific reasons on why the “Western Way of War” has become dominant throughout much of the world. Consequently, the statutory armed forces of the majority of states in the world operate and organise themselves according to the “Western Way of War.” See Parker, G, *The Cambridge Illustrated History of Warfare: The Triumph of the West*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1995, pp. 2-9.

Modern military professionalism calls for the intellectual mastering of the military body of knowledge and the physical development of the military skills that allow officers to be effective in the management of violence, the management of defence and the management of peace. Training is essential for inculcating military skills. Professional military education facilitates the comprehension of and insight into the military body of knowledge. However, no effective professional military education is possible without a sound foundation of general scientific education. Militaries have a natural inclination to train. This inclination is rooted in the nature of training, the fundamental nature of the military profession and the military being the only role-player in the training realm. This is augmented by the reality that training provides soldiers with skills that are needed for the tactical challenges with which they are confronted at present. The socialisation and experience of most soldiers are also primarily restricted to scenarios directly related to the training domain.

A general scientific or broad liberal education equips officers with the attributes needed for higher order intellectual thinking and analysis. It provides the individual with the necessary scientific, philosophical and personal qualities to facilitate knowledge-driven processes, whether in the application or utilisation of scientific knowledge or in its the development. The need for scientific knowledge in the military in general and the officer corps in particular is rooted in the understanding that military (fighting) skills alone are not enough to prepare officers for the role of the military in a modern democratic society. An understanding of security, people and politics, defence and the preparation of armed forces for defence, as well as the deployment and employment of military forces across the whole spectrum of conflict, necessitates the higher order cognitive preparation of officers by means of a general scientific academic education. It is only through the general scientific development of the military mind that the negative attributes of the military way of thinking can be transformed into something that is of value to the greater society.

Whereas a general scientific education normally is provided by civilian institutions of higher learning or military academies and universities, professional military education is the domain of military, war and defence colleges. Professional military education bridges the gap between military training on the one hand and general scientific education on the other. This means that no professional military education is possible without a foundation of broad liberal education. Stated differently, a general scientific education is a prerequisite for successful professional military education. This is the primary reason why a general scientific academic education together with training should constitute the minimum requirement for entry into the officer corps.

A general scientific education at the beginning of an officer's career is vital in order to counter the negative attributes that shape the "military mind" or the "military way of thinking". Military mindedness is inculcated primarily through the training process that in most cases is also used as the primary vehicle for military socialisation. Being military minded is an essential ingredient of any successful military. However, taking the idea of military mindedness too far may breed orthodoxy and may therefore lead to a military being very dogmatic in its approach to complex security, military and other challenges. The outcome of a general scientific education is diametrically opposed to such a rigid approach to complex issues. It is therefore understandable why militaries are uncomfortable in an environment rooted in an educational ethos. However, education is as much an essential prerequisite for successful militaries as is the need to be military minded. Both the regimental military ethos of the training environment and the critical open-minded ethos of the educational world are essential ingredients of a successful military establishment.

If a general scientific education is a prerequisite for professional military education, and since professional military education needs to bridge the gap between a broad liberal education and training, two specific questions need to be answered. Firstly, what should be the focus of military education in general? Secondly, when in the career of an officer should he be exposed to general scientific education, professional military education and training?

The military's emphasis on training to deal with present and current challenges also influences its approach to education and the need for education not to be of a general formative nature, but to be of specific relevance. The difficulty concerning which academic disciplines really constitute the essence of the art and science of war further complicates the education of the military. Almost any academic discipline can be justified in the education of officers. Officers, though, should have a higher order academic understanding of at least four knowledge clusters:

- the broad security environment within which armed forces in general operate in the world;
- the nature, characteristics and features of military organisations;
- the employment of armed forces across the whole spectrum of conflict; and
- the physical battlefield or operating environment within which they will have to operate as soldiers, sailors, and airmen.

From this perspective, it is no longer a question whether armed forces should be educated in all four these domains. On an individual level, though, it may be a matter of organisational necessity

and personal preference that possibly orientates the individual to emphasise one of these domains in his personal academic education.

In a world where the military is called upon to take on new roles such as military humanitarianism, border patrol, crime fighting, drug control, and peace missions, officers need to display greater mental flexibility in order to deal with the complex security environment and the nature of the threats that arise. As organisations, militaries need to develop the ability to adapt to geo-strategic and other societal changes in war and peace, while at the same time maintaining their bureaucratic efficiency and operational effectiveness. One of the challenges militaries need to manage to ensure operational effectiveness is to balance the need to prepare for warfighting with the need to prepare for a variety of so-called “soft missions”, and to balance the need to train for battle with the need to prepare for war. The need to prepare for different missions, including warfighting, is rooted in an understanding of the operating environment within which military staff operates. Tactics, geography, leadership and command, technology, and cohesion and morale are some of the factors that may have a defining influence on military operations and which should be instrumental in the preparation of officers to prepare for the operating environment. These ideas on what should constitute the essence of officer education correspond to a large extent with the approach that is followed by a number of leading armed forces worldwide.

Most armed forces of the world have three different focus levels in the education, training and development of their officers. Pre-commissioned basic military education focuses on the making of lieutenants. It includes the necessary training and socialisation young officers need to operate at that specific level. In addition, young officers are academically educated at civilian institutions of higher learning or at military academies to enable them to deal with the intellectual nature of the military professional and as a prerequisite for successful professional military education provided by military, war and defence colleges. Military doctrinal preparation concentrates on the tactical training of officers to be successful on the battlefield and professional military education to ensure success as operational level campaign commanders. Politico-military education is primarily of a general scientific nature, focusing principally on the social sciences and humanities, to prepare officers for the challenges of high command. Looking at the preparation of officers from this perspective, it is clear that questions about education in the career paths of officers are a matter of focus. The real issue at stake is the kind or nature of education that is provided to officers at different times in their careers.

Combining the idea of general scientific education, professional military education and military training with the different focus levels in the preparation of officers in armed forces and superimposing that on the idea of different knowledge clusters in the education of officers, allows for the development of a framework of officer education. Such a framework may be used as a guideline for the structuring of officer development in the armed forces. It also allows for an analysis of officer development in the armed forces, such as the South African National Defence Force.

7.3 SOUTH AFRICAN MILITARY EDUCATION AND THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY ACADEMY

Since democratisation in 1994, the South African National Defence Force had to align itself with a new strategic environment and adapt to a new political climate. This required a careful balance to ensure the SANDF is representative of the society at large while maintaining expertise and professionalism. From an educational perspective, the black population in particular was deeply affected by apartheid. The apartheid government did not invest great amounts of money in black education, while at the same time the liberation movement mobilised the youth of school-going age as part of the liberation struggle. The general pool of available educated black people that was essential for the SANDF to align itself with the new strategic and political environment since 1994 was, therefore, not only very small but the SANDF also competed on the general labour market for these scarce human resources.

Fortunately, for the SANDF, South Africa did not face any significant threats from either the domestic or the international environment since democratisation. The SANDF was therefore in a position where it could focus its attention on organisational and structural issues such as the integration of pre-1994 belligerent forces, the downsizing of the force to reflect the significantly smaller defence budget, the Africanisation of the organisational ethos, and the development of doctrine for the kind of operations that were foreseen for the future. Time was also at hand for the re-orientation, re-training and re-education of forces to reflect the non-offensive and non-threatening ideas on defence that were reflected in most of the defence policy documents since 1994.

The SANDF did not inherit a history of general scientific or professional military education. Neither the old SADF nor the revolutionary forces that were brought into the military since 1994 had a strong tradition of education. The SADF was largely tactically and operationally minded in its

orientation – which suited the strategic realities with which it was confronted. In contrast, the revolutionary forces – as revolutionary forces the world over – were very political in orientation. Their political mindedness, typical of revolutionary armed forces, was rooted in political indoctrination. In general, though, these forces brought various positive attributes into the SANDF. They had a better understanding of the political world and were in general more analytical, creative, and adaptive, which made them more receptive for an educational approach to officer development than was the case with their counterparts from the SADF. However, they were not used to operate in a bureaucratised armed force with its regimentalised and more disciplined ethos. In addition, officers from the SADF who stayed on in the military since 1994 increasingly recognised that military training is not enough for a career in a peacetime and peace mission-oriented military. The result was an increase in the number of officers involved in academic education.

Part of the restructuring of the SANDF was the creation of a Joint Training Division responsible for co-ordinating education, training and development (ETD) in the Department of Defence. The Joint Training Division is responsible for aligning ETD in the Department of Defence with the SANDF's military strategy. The Joint Training Division faces a number of very serious challenges in the provision of ETD. The SANDF is in essence an anti-intellectual organisation with no distinction being made between education, training and development of officers, even to the extent that questions are raised about the quality of both training and education. The SANDF also faces a challenge concerning the availability of well-trained, educated and experienced directing staff at most of its senior training and educational institutions. This concern on the one hand is rooted in the need for representivity and affirmative action (a positive consideration), and on the other hand in the replacement of merit with political affiliation in the promotion of officers (a negative consideration). Rising operational budgets and deployments because of peace mission commitments in Africa are also negatively affecting ETD in the SANDF to the extent that serious questions should be raised about the suitability of forces for these assignments. This matter is aggravated by the increasing bureaucratic nature of the SANDF making it almost impossible to spend the money available in the budgets. This particular challenge is shaped by the question of discipline and a lack of trust in Defence Force personnel. The lack of discipline and trust is linked to the societal problems of general ethical disintegration and criminality in the broad South African society.

The analysis of ETD in the SANDF by means of the framework proposed in Chapter three, makes possible some interesting positive observations. The SANDF does train and educate young

officers for their entry into the officer corps. Training and education, though, are not being done at the same institution, as is the norm in the rest of the world. There is nothing wrong with such an approach if the education programme is a joint endeavour attended by members from all the different services. However, the process of socialisation should then be managed in a very careful and deliberate manner to ensure the inculcation of students at the training and education institutions with the right organisational ethos. This will not only ensure the smooth integration with the Defence Force at large, but will also positively influence the organisational ethos of the military in general and the services in particular. This seems to be a particular problem at present. The nature of education provided to these young officers at the Military Academy also needs to be reconsidered.

Doctrinal training and education are offered at the different service colleges and the National War College. The creation of the National War College greatly contributes to the professionalisation of officers in the SANDF. The use of professional military education at the National War College regarding doctrinal education that focuses on operational or campaign level military operations was a great leap forward in the creation of ETD institutions for the preparation of officers for the SANDF. The presence of international students and the inclusion of military bureaucratic education in the curriculum is recommendable and in line with international best practices. The service colleges responsible for tactical training seem to face a challenge at present, with the Army College facing a particular problem in this regard. Nothing can replace training as the primary vehicle on the tactical level of war that relies primarily on the execution of drills and standard operational procedures. Yet, it seems as if the colleges, with the Army College as the primary example, are increasingly moving into the direction of professional military education. The corps schools are responsible for corps training. The question then arises as to who should be responsible for the training of officers in combined arms operations. This is an especially thorny issue since the dismantling of combined-arms units such as 61 Mechanised Battalion Group and the downscaling of combined arms exercises at the SA Army's Combat Training Centre at Lohathla.

Politico-military education is provided at the National Defence College by means of the Executive National Security Programme. Though questions are being asked about the quality of the education that is provided, the Defence College should be credited for their efforts to develop the programme into a real academic programme. Efforts to link the programme with a masters-level qualification at the Military Academy is also a huge step forward in transforming the SANDF into a learning and more intellectual organisation. Concerns need to be raised about the focus of the

programme since no institution in the SANDF at present takes responsibility for providing officers with an understanding of military strategic matters from an academic perspective.

Since 1994, the role of the Military Academy is a heavily debated issue. The debate focuses on issues such as whether the Academy should be a military university or a military academy, what the role of civilian academia in the development of officers should be, what the nature of the academic programmes at the Academy should be, whether the Military Academy should develop a core curriculum, whether the Academy should also fulfil a training function, and what the nature of the Military Academy “product” should be. Many of the problems the Military Academy is faced with point towards the departmental level agreement between the Department of Defence and the University of Stellenbosch on which the existence of the Academy is based.

The agreement between the Department of Defence and the University of Stellenbosch gives rise to the problem that neither the SANDF nor the University takes ownership of the institution. This also translates into an inadequate budget for the Military Academy and the academic qualifications of the Military Academy not being of professional and promotional relevance to the SANDF. These challenges can only be effectively addressed if education – i.e. a first degree – becomes a requirement for officership, the socialisation process for students attending the Academy is addressed, the organisational position of the Faculty of Military Science at the Military Academy is reconsidered, a core academic curriculum for all students attending the Military Academy is introduced, and structural changes are made to draw a clear line of demarcation between the academic and military apparatus at the Academy to allow them to operate according to their nature.

7.4 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVED MILITARY EDUCATION IN SOUTH AFRICA

The first obvious recommendation that should flow from this study is the necessity for the SANDF to develop a clear understanding of the need for an educated officer corps. The history of modern war is rooted in the need for knowledge. Indeed, the need for knowledge about military and strategic affairs is one of the building blocks of the modern military profession. In this regard, the military profession does not differ in any way from any other profession in a modern democratic society. A body of professional expertise that is rooted in training and education is a defining characteristic of any profession – also the military profession.

A second important recommendation is the importance of the SANDF to understand the difference between training and education. If the SANDF is serious about being a professional armed force,

an effort is needed to cultivate a body of professional expertise. Professional expertise consists of a body of defined theoretical knowledge and practical skills. The body of theoretical knowledge can only be mastered through prolonged and in-depth study, while the practical skills are acquired through training. Thus, professional military competence in South Africa will be reflected in the extent to which the individual members of the SANDF have, firstly, been trained in tactical and other military skills and, secondly, have mastered the body of theoretical military knowledge through education.

The SANDF should also be conscious of its natural preference for training and with that the development of military skills. The SANDF is the only role-player in the training of its forces in South Africa. The education of its personnel, in contrast, is something that can only be done in co-operation with the general academic community in South Africa. The SANDF should cultivate an ethos of co-operation with and understanding of the academic community in South Africa. The SANDF should also refine its bureaucracy to be flexible enough to facilitate the education of its members, either by sending them to civilian academic institutions or to incorporate the help of civilian academics in the ETD provided at military institutions throughout South Africa.

The need for an understanding of the difference between training and education should be linked to the need for the SANDF to develop an appreciation for the role of training, professional military education and academic education. It does not seem as if anybody in the SANDF really knows what is implied by the idea of “development” in the SANDF’s organising notion of “Education, Training and Development”. It is proposed that the SANDF clearly define the idea of development to imply the professional military education of officers. An understanding of the role and importance of professional military education is rooted in the recognition that professional military education cannot be done in an effective and efficient manner unless it is rooted in a thorough general scientific academic education.

From this argument flows another important recommendation: all officers in the SANDF should have some academic education as a minimum entry requirement into the officer corps. A minimum academic qualification of a first degree (B degree) should be the recommended requirement. This might be a tall order in a country in which education is a contentious issue because of the legacy of apartheid, the defence budget that has been minimised, and the operational responsibilities of the SANDF that have increased significantly over the last number of years. However, being part of the African continent where African military unprofessionalism has been one of the legacies of

colonialism and the root cause of many problems in most of the African states, this might not be too high a price to pay for peace in a democratic South Africa. The outcome of the alternative – an uneducated and unprofessional defence force – is too ghastly to contemplate.

The SANDF needs to understand that the education of the military is conditioned by, firstly, the uniqueness of the military forces and military institutions as well as the unique environments within which they exist and operate and, secondly, the unique nature of the military's primary task – the defence of society, if need be through warfighting. The SANDF will therefore have to overcome a number of obstacles. These obstacles are diverse, ranging from military or organisational cultural reasons (officers see themselves as men of action), to institutional reasons (militaries are huge bureaucracies), to theoretical reasons (an interdisciplinary approach is needed), to budgetary reasons (education is seen as a nice-to-have).

The unique nature of the art and science of war justifies almost every conceivable academic discipline in the education of officers. Militaries, including the SANDF, do not have the institutional capacity to translate their educational needs into coherent academic areas of focus. Thus, it is recommended that the SANDF should focus on the four knowledge clusters referred to earlier. A broad overview of the educational focus of armed forces from different parts of the world confirms the need to focus on these four core educational requirements.

One of the most important recommendations of this study is the need for the SANDF to structure its ETD according to the proposed framework in Chapter Three. Aligning the SANDF's ETD system with the proposed framework will ensure the right kind of ETD is provided to individuals at specific times during their careers and that the ETD that is provided has the right focus in terms of content. This means, for example, that the education of young officers is of an academic nature and focuses on all four identified knowledge clusters. The training that is provided on this level, though, needs to focus almost exclusively on the “operational environment” knowledge cluster. The making of colonels, i.e. the development of officers for operational command, will include both training and professional military education. Training and professional military education will build the bridge between three knowledge clusters: the operating environment, the military professional environment, and the internal organisational environment. The education of officers for high command will be of an academic nature with a focus on the external and security knowledge cluster. The proposed framework, consequently, allows the SANDF to co-ordinate and integrate

the training, professional and academic education provided to officers at different times during their careers into a coherent structure and whole.

The analysis of ETD in the SANDF indicates that a large segment of the preparation of officers is aligned to the proposed framework. A number of changes, however, need to be made. Though it was not the purpose of this study to examine the socialisation of officers, it is obvious that the socialisation of young officers in the SANDF in general and at the Military Academy in particular requires some further research. A particular question that needs to be answered is whether it will not be better to educate young officers at the Military Academy first before their service-specific training at the different service training colleges. This might require an adjustment of the academic programme for first-year students at the Military Academy to include a short training course orientating future candidate officers to the military environment. However, it will ensure that young officers are aligned with their specific service cultures at the service training colleges for young officers before they enter the different services. This is more or less the development process for young officers in most armed forces of the world.

Another recommendation that flows from the proposed framework is the need to re-align the service colleges³ to focus on training in the development of officers for tactical command and combined-arms operations. The colleges should make a deliberate effort to prepare officers in the tactics of combined arms operations by means of training. If the service colleges do not train officers in tactics, it is not being done in the SANDF at all since the corps schools focus on corps-specific training, while the War College focuses on professional education to prepare officers for operational level campaign staff and command.

In addition, it is recommended that the National Defence College makes provision in its programme to address the military strategic level of command and the management of defence. None of the different colleges addresses this particular issue at present and it is of critical importance to officers in military high command. It is important that the National Defence College maintains its focus on (human) security as the defining, organising and focusing concept for its programme. However, this focus should be enhanced or supplemented by a focus on military strategic issues and defence management.

³ The Army, Naval and Air Force College.

A number of recommendations need to be made about the specific role of the Military Academy in the education and preparation of young officers. It is obvious from the discussion that the current agreement between the Department of Defence and the University of Stellenbosch is insufficient as a constituent document for the creation and existence of an institution of such strategic importance as the Military Academy. Many, if not all the organisational and functional problems experienced by the Military Academy since its creation, that once again came to the fore over the past couple of years, are rooted in the shortcomings of this departmental-level agreement. The Military Academies of most countries are constituted and regulated by means of national legislation. It is therefore recommended that the future existence of the Military Academy be assured through national legislation. The existence, function, organisation and structure of the Academy should be clearly defined in this legislation. This does not mean that the involvement of the University of Stellenbosch in the education of young officers at the Military Academy be terminated. However, it does imply that the existence, functioning, organisation and structure will not be based on a “goodwill-approach” between the University and the Department of Defence.

Underpinning the idea of national legislation to constitute the Military Academy is the importance to institute the changes in the organisation and structure as outlined in this study. Two particular recommendations need to be carefully considered as part of the legislation process. The first is the employment of the academic staff of the Faculty of Military Science as members of the University of Stellenbosch. Such an arrangement will go a long way in clearly defining the role and function of the Faculty of Military Science at the Military Academy. In addition, it will draw a clear line between the academic and military apparatus of the Military Academy and will allow each one of these components to operate according to its nature.

A second important consideration concerns the budget of the Military Academy. It is clear that not only is the size of the Military Academy budget a problem, but the highly bureaucratic nature in which the defence budget is managed is highly unsuited for the purposes of and way in which an academic institution functions. Ring-fencing the budget of the Military Academy as part of the Defence budget might be one possibility to contemplate. Another possibility might be to ring-fence it as part of the national education budget. The management of the budget of the Faculty of Military Science, though, should be done through the University of Stellenbosch. This is however a matter that requires careful consideration and further research.

From a military perspective, it is recommended that the command and control structure through which the SANDF manages the Military Academy be carefully considered. The training, education and socialisation of young officers are of critical and strategic importance for the professional nature and the organisational culture of the SANDF. Of critical importance is the need to incorporate the Military Academy into the direct command structure of the SANDF and not to deal with the Military Academy via the staff structure. This is a matter of organisational restructuring for the SANDF and requires some careful consideration and further research. This should preferably not be done by a commercial consultation company that does not understand the military culture, ethos and needs.

Did the study solve the problem that was outlined in the research question? The individual tensions that determine the need for an educated military were clearly outlined and analysed. A specific effort was made in the proposed framework for the education of officers to explain how these tensions can be dealt with in the training, professional education and general scientific education of officers in the military. An effort was made to discuss the tensions in the SANDF by means of this particular framework. The impact of these tensions on the South African Military Academy was also outlined. The proposed recommendations suggest ways to deal with these tensions in the provision of education in the South African military in general and at the South African Military Academy in particular. It is believed that education in the SANDF and, more particularly, the Military Academy can be optimised if the proposed recommendations are implemented.

South Africa is situated in a region and on a continent plagued by military unprofessionalism. One of the building blocks of a professional military is education. The future role and success of the military in a democratic South Africa is dependent on the extent to which the South African National Defence Force reflects the attributes of an educated military. It is in the interest of a democratic South African society that the South African National Defence Force makes a deliberate effort to ensure its members are well trained and educated.

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