The Risk of Humanitarianism: Industry-Specific Political-Security Risk Analysis for International Agencies in Conflict Zones

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Declaration

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Date: 01 September 2010
Abstract

International agencies are facing heightened levels of security risk in conflict zones. The nature of contemporary conflicts and the post-9/11 global political-security environment have contributed to a situation whereby the threat of attack as well as recurring criminal violence are a constant reality for their employees, hindering their work and obstructing their access to people in need. Moreover, the ability of international agencies to conduct strategic risk assessment has been called into question.

The central research question of this study concerns whether an industry-specific political-security risk model can be applied successfully in order to assist international agencies with strategic political-security risk analysis in conflict zones. In order to develop a political-security risk model for international agencies a number of supplementary research questions are asked. The first of these is what limitations the security risk models currently used by international agencies exhibit. The second question asks what factors and indicators should be included in an industry-specific political-security risk model for international agencies in conflict zones. So as to test the applicability of the model developed in this research study, the last question asks what the level of risk is for international agencies operating in the conflict zone in eastern Chad.

Using political risk theory, and drawing upon political risk models specific to the energy industry, this research study proposes an industry-specific political-security risk model for international agencies in conflict zones, in which the limitations of the current models used by international agencies to analyse security risks are overcome. The application of this model to eastern Chad returns an overall risk rating of extreme, which is the highest overall risk rating obtainable. By regularly utilising this model, international agencies are able to monitor the changing levels of security risk in a conflict zone and are therefore better placed to make informed strategic decisions when it comes to risk management and risk mitigation.
**Opsomming**

Internasionale agentskappe trotseer tans verhoogde vlakke van sekuriteitsrisiko in konfliksones. Die aard van hedendaagse konflikte en die post-9/11 globale politieke sekuriteitsomgewing het bygedra tot ’n situasie waar die bedreiging van aanvalle sowel as die herhalende aard van kriminele geweld vir hul werkers ’n voortdurende realiteit is. As gevolg hiervan word werkers verhinder om hul verpligtinge uit te voer en na mense in nood uit te reik. Boonop word internasionale agentskappe se vermoë om strategiese risiko-asessering uit te voer nou bevraagteken.

Die hoofnavorsingsvraag van hierdie studie is: kan ’n industrie-spesifieke politieke sekuriteitsrisikomodel suksesvol toegepas word om internasionale agentskappe by te staan met strategiese politieke sekuriteitsrisiko-analise in konfliksones, al dan nie. Ten einde ’n politieke sekuriteitsrisikomodel vir internasionale agentskappe te ontwikkels, word daar ook ’n aantal aanvullende navorsingsvrae gevra. Die eerste hiervan stel ondersoek in na die beperkings van die sekuriteitsrisikomodelle wat teenswoordig deur internasionale agentskappe gebruik word. Die tweede vraag vra watter faktore en indikators by ’n industrie-spesifieke politieke sekuriteitsrisikomodel vir internasionale agentskappe in konfliksones ingesluit behoort te word. Ten einde die toepaslikheid te toets van die model wat in hierdie studie ontwikkels is, stel die laaste vraag ondersoek in na die risikovlak vir internasionale agentskappe wat in die konfliksones van oostelike Tsjad werksaam is.

Met behulp van politieke risikoteorie en met gebruik van politieke risikomodelle wat spesifiek betrekking het tot die energie-industrie, propageer hierdie navorsingstudie ’n industrie-spesifieke politieke sekuriteitsrisikomodel vir internasionale agentskappe in konfliksones wat die beperkings van die modelle wat huidig deur internasionale agentskappe gebruik word, sal oorwin. Hierdie model se toepassing op oostelike Tsjad toon in die geheel ’n risikowaarde van ekstreem, die hoogste algehele risikowaarde moontlik. Deur hierdie model gereeld te gebruik sal dit internasionale agentskappe in staat stel om die veranderende vlakke van sekuriteitsrisiko in ’n konfliksone te monitor; dus sal hulle meer ingeligte strategiese besluite kan neem wat betref risikobestuur en – verligting.
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<tr>
<td>ACF</td>
<td>Action Contre le Faim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANS</td>
<td>Agence Nationale de Sécurité (National Security Agency)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANT</td>
<td>Armée Nationale Tchadienne (Chadian National Army)</td>
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<tr>
<td>BBC</td>
<td>British Broadcasting Corporation</td>
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<td>BP</td>
<td>British Petroleum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAR</td>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
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<td>CARE</td>
<td>Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere</td>
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<tr>
<td>CRS</td>
<td>Catholic Relief Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DGSSIE</td>
<td>General Directorate of Security Services for National Institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIS</td>
<td>Détachement Intégré de Sécurité (Integrated Security Detachment)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECHO</td>
<td>European Commission for Humanitarian Aid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUFOR</td>
<td>European Union Force Central African Republic/Chad</td>
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<tr>
<td>FPRN</td>
<td>Popular Front for National Rebirth</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<tr>
<td>GNNT</td>
<td>Garde Nationale et Nomade du Tchad (National and Nomadic Guard)</td>
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<tr>
<td>HIV/AIDS</td>
<td>Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome</td>
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<td>HRW</td>
<td>Human Rights Watch</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICC</td>
<td>International Criminal Court</td>
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<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
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<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Person</td>
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<td>INGO</td>
<td>International Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOSS</td>
<td>Minimum Operating Security Standards</td>
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<td>MPS</td>
<td>Mouvement Patriotique de Salut (Patriotic Salvation Movement)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MSF</td>
<td>Médecines Sans Frontières</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>NOC</td>
<td>National Oil Company</td>
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<tr>
<td>RDL</td>
<td>Rassemblement pur la Démocratie et la Liberté (Rally for Democracy and Freedom)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCUD</td>
<td>Socle pour le Changement, l’Unité et la Démocratie (Platform for Change, Unity and Democracy)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SRA</td>
<td>Security Risk Assessment</td>
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<tr>
<td>SRM</td>
<td>Security Risk Management</td>
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<tr>
<td>UFR</td>
<td>Union des Forces de Résistance (Union of Forces for the Resistance)</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
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<td>WB</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
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Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1. General introduction and statement of topic

A universal trait of contemporary conflict zones\(^1\) is the existence of a large contingent of international agencies\(^2\). Both the nature of contemporary conflicts and the post-9/11 global political-security landscape has meant that over the last two decades international agencies have been called to operate in increasingly hostile environments such as Afghanistan, Somalia, Sudan and eastern Chad. International agencies are thereby exposing their staff and operational infrastructure to greater security risks (Bollettino, 2008: 263 and Bruderlein, 2004: 1). According to the United Nations (UN) (IMDC, 2010) there were, for example, 192 serious attacks against humanitarian staff in eastern Chad between January and September 2009, including killings and abductions (IDMC, 2010).

The escalation of violence against aid workers is not limited to eastern Chad. According to Stoddard et al’s (2009: 33) seminal study - which tracks global incident data from all humanitarian aid contexts and identifies new trends in violence against aid workers - 2008 saw violent attacks against humanitarian aid workers reach the highest toll in the 12 years that the study has tracked these incidents. The increase in violence against aid workers identified by Stoddard et al (2009) has witnessed a corresponding investment by agencies into bolstering their security capabilities and systems. However, van Brabant (2001b: 31), Gassmann (2005: 3) and Bruderlein (2004: 1) respectively conclude that the risk assessment capabilities of international agencies are still limited, that most agencies admit a lack of knowledge of the contexts within which they operate, and that they have tended to increase their security capacity at a practical level without attention to the relevance of their security strategies. Limitations in the security architecture of international agencies are potentially devastating, especially given the highly insecure environments in which they operate on a daily basis.

Van Brabant (2001a: 1-2) reaches the crux of the matter in the following statement: “There is indeed an incompressible element of risk in humanitarian work, but good security management is also a tool to help agencies enter, and remain in danger zones, while the loss

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\(^{1}\) In this research study the term ‘conflict zones’ includes both active conflict environments as well as post-conflict environments.

\(^{2}\) In this research study international agencies are understood as organisations involved in the provision of “...assistance (developmental, humanitarian, technical, or political) to governments, civil societies and populations affected by an armed conflict... Although these organizations may function under specific and divergent mandates, their staff and activities face similar security challenges”. This definition does not include peacekeeping, peace enforcement, or other military-type operators (Bruderlein, 2004: 1).
of assets and especially staff, through accident or incident, impairs the ability of the agency to provide assistance”. It is here that the value of political risk analysis - and by definition, the sub-field of political-security risk analysis - as a tool that “aids in describing political phenomena in terms of factors of risk” and “tries to explain or understand the occurrence of political risk” can be realised for international agencies (Brink, 2004: 25). Political risk analysis is generally understood as “governmental or societal actions or policies, originating either within or outside the host country, and negatively affecting either a select group of, or the majority of, foreign business operations and investments” (Simon, 1982: 68). Hence, political-security risk analysis, as a sub-field of political risk, is concerned with the security elements of political risk, including transnational security, national security and human security (Lambrechts et al, Forthcoming and Fouché, 2003: 18).

This research study is concerned with the limitations exhibited by the current security risk models\(^3\) used by international agencies to assess the security environments associated with conflict zones. Consequently, the core of this study is the application of the theoretical and methodological precepts of industry-specific\(^4\) political risk analysis to that of the relatively under-researched field of political-security risk analysis for international agencies in conflict zones. In this regard a model is developed that aims to enhance international agencies’ capacity for political-security risk analysis and in turn, their competence at risk mitigation and management. Thereafter, the focal point of this research study is the conflict zone of eastern Chad\(^5\) which has been selected as a case study. The high number of attacks on international agencies in eastern Chad in 2009 coincided with calls for an increased international agency presence due to the humanitarian crisis (USAID, 2010, UNOCHA, 2010 and Kalin, 2009). Hence, international agencies’ ability to both identify and analyse security risk in eastern Chad is imperative for the successful provision of assistance and for the safeguarding of their employees’ lives.

1.2. Literature review

The literature on which this research study is based can be divided into three fields. The first is literature concerning political risk and political-security risk, which forms the theoretical basis of this research study. In terms of political risk analysis the main texts examined in this study are Brink’s (2004) *Measuring Political Risk: Risks to Foreign Investment*, Bremmer

\(^3\) In this study referred to as a *security risk model*, but labelled varyingly by international agencies as a “security risk assessment” (UN, 2008: 51) or a “safety and security assessment” (Macpherson, 2004), among others.

\(^4\) In this study referred to as *industry-specific* political risk, but can also be referred to as *micro* political risk.

\(^5\) In this study the name eastern Chad is used to refer to the geographical region of Chad.

In this respect, literature on the evolution and dynamics of the international agency industry is examined. Here, two related schools of thought stand out concerning the increasing insecurity of international agencies. Insecurity is attributed to the current political economy of conflict as well as to the post-9/11 global political-security landscape, both of which have contributed to the shrinking of humanitarian space and to the changing nature of assistance. On the nature and dynamics of contemporary conflicts in relation to international agencies, Sheehan (2008), Runge (2004), Bruderlein (2004), Fast (2007, 2010), and Kaldor (2006) are indispensable resources. Concerning the effects of 9/11 on the global political-security landscape, Mills’ (2005) *The Security Intersection: The Paradox of Power in an Age of Terror* is particularly relevant as it cogently summarises, reviews and investigates the major security challenges facing the world as a result of that event. With regard to the global political-security implications of 9/11 on the operations of international agencies, Krahenbuhl (2004), Harmer and Macrae (2003), and Hazan and Berger (2004) assist greatly. These authors address the themes of human security in post-9/11 humanitarian interventions, the

Lastly, literature on the conflict in eastern Chad is utilised. This literature ranges in its scope so as to facilitate as deep an understanding of the various social, political, economic and historical dynamics that have played a part in determining the current situation in eastern Chad. Integral publications include Human Rights Watch’s (HRW) (HRW, 2009) report, The Risk of Return: Repatriating the Displaced in the Context of Conflict in Eastern Chad, which presents an international agency view of the risks inherent to operating in eastern Chad as well as the situation of refugees in this region. Additional reports by HRW are used extensively. In this regard, Violence Beyond Borders: The Human Rights Crisis in Eastern Chad (HRW, 2006b) details the dynamics of the conflict and its effect on individuals in eastern Chad. Darfur Bleeds: Recent Cross-Border Violence in Chad (HRW, 2006a) is an in-depth report on the linkages between the conflict in eastern Chad and the neighbouring Darfur region of Sudan. In terms of the origin of the current conflict in eastern Chad, The Enough Team’s (n.d) analysis entitled Chad: Roots of the Crisis is highly informative. Additional sources on the conflict in eastern Chad include USAID’s (2008, 2010) reports on the current humanitarian situation, Ploch’s (2009) report on the nature, causes and effects of instability in Chad, The Enough Team’s (2009) article on the various obstacles to peacemaking in Chad, and Alusala’s (2007) article which homes in on Chad’s conflict-ridden history.

1.3. Research problem
As mentioned in the introduction, international agencies are operating in increasingly hostile contexts within which their employees face life-threatening risks on a regular basis. While international agencies have always operated in inhospitable environments, it is argued by Bollettino (2008: 263), Gassmann, (2005: 1), Fast (2010: 2), and Runge (2004: 233), among others, that the nature of their involvement and that of the context in which they operate has
changed over the last two decades. Since the 1990s the nature of conflict has shifted. Inter-state conflict has been supplanted by more amorphous forms of conflict, including intra-state conflict, terrorism, and criminal violence. The central feature of these conflicts is the involvement of non-state or non-traditional actors; the non-adherence of warring parties to international humanitarian law; the increased targeting of civilians by warlords and militia; the blurring of the distinction between combatants and civilians; the proliferation and therefore easy access for combatants to small arms and light weapons; and the central concern of parties to the conflict with the access to and control of strategic resources such as food, oil, diamonds, and water (Sheehan, 2008: 214, Bruderlein, 2004: 3-4 and Kaldor, 2006: 2).

Within this culture of impunity, international agencies are perceived as legitimate and soft targets that can be attacked without major consequence for the perpetrators (Runge, 2004: 234). Indeed, as supporter of the victims (who are often indistinguishable from the perpetrators) in conflict zones, international agencies are no longer regarded as impartial, neutral parties to the conflict (Runge, 2004: 234). Moreover, as providers of scarce humanitarian resources to vulnerable populations, aid has gained a strategic dimension in conflict zones due to the value attached to such resources by warring parties. The “shrinking of humanitarian space” and the politicisation of aid have also been accelerated by the events of 9/11 and the ensuing global political-security landscape (Hazan and Berger, 2004). International agencies have since come to be associated with a Western, often Christian agenda, as humanitarian aid has been used to engender support for military and political ambitions (Hazan and Berger, 2004). Within this milieu international agencies have become a “chosen, deliberate and direct” target for warring parties in conflict zones, thereby highlighting the imperative of excellent security management systems (Gassmann, 2005: 1).

While the above developments have elicited scrutiny and review of international agencies’ security management systems, risk analysis, which is a “necessity... as part of the very first needs assessment, prior to going into or returning to a dangerous zone” has been somewhat neglected and undervalued. Limitations in the capacity of international agencies to conduct risk analyses have been documented by Gassmann (2005), Bollettino (2008), Runge (2004), Fast (2007), van Brabant (2001b), and Bruderlein (2004). Moreover, international agencies are described as having “inadequate tools for conducting risk assessments”, and “limited” competence at risk assessment (Bollettino, 2008: 265, and van Brabant, 2001b: 5).

The “tools” currently utilised by international agencies are matrix-based security risk models, in which one simply plots risk on a graph based on the perceived impact of a threat.
and the probability of the threat occurring (Bollettino, 2008: 265). Depending on where the risk lies on the matrix, according decisions can be made (ECHO, 2004: 141, UN, 2008, and UNHCR, 2007: 23-24). These models, though easy to use and understand, do not provide the type of comprehensive and detailed industry-specific political risk analysis that is seen in organisations in the energy industry, the automotive industry, or the financial industry (see Howell, 2007, and Alon et al, 2006). Industry-specific political risk analysis in these industries enables organisations at minimum, to recognise and anticipate the political risks and thereby make informed decisions on how to deal with these risks. This study aims to apply the principles of industry-specific political risk analysis found in the energy industry to the development of an industry-specific political-security risk model for international agencies. Moreover, drawing from Brink (2004: 4) who suggests that the identification of internal (originating from inside the host country) and external political risk factors, as well as macro (generic) and micro (specific) factors are important for the development of a political risk model, it is hoped that this study, which is focused on the creation of a political-security risk model, will enhance the capacity of international agencies to recognise and anticipate the industry-specific political-security risks inherent to conflict zones in general, and eastern Chad in particular. Based on the above depiction of the issues faced by international agencies, as well as the documented shortcomings of their current security risk models, Brink’s (2004: 3) statement that there is “certainly a need for new research and novel approaches to the field of political risk analysis” is taken to heart. Thus, the main research question of this research study is:

- Can an industry-specific political-security risk framework be applied successfully in order to assist international agencies with strategic political-security risk analysis in conflict zones?

Three supportive research questions have also been identified:

- Looking at the current security risk models utilised by international agencies, what limitations can be identified?
- What are the political-security risk factors and indicators that should be included in a political-security risk model for international agencies?

While the above research questions are concerned with the development of an industry-specific political-security risk model for international agencies in conflict zones, the final

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6 The term risk factor is sometimes referred to as a risk variable, of which the components are risk indicators, which are also sometimes referred to as sub-factors or sub-variables. For the purposes of this study, the term risk factor will be used and the component parts will be referred to as risk indicators.
supportive research question tests the practical application of this model through a case study of the conflict zone in eastern Chad. International agencies in eastern Chad have been subject to incidents including carjackings, murders, banditry, and kidnappings. Moreover, criminal incidents against humanitarian staff increased to the highest level in recent years in 2009 with 192 serious attacks against humanitarian staff between January and September (USAID, 2010: 2). There have also been recent calls highlighting the need for an increased presence of international agencies in this conflict zone (USAID, 2010, UNOCHA, 2010, and Kalin, 2009). A political-security risk analysis of eastern Chad is thus both timely and relevant. The final research question is therefore:

- What level of political-security risk does eastern Chad pose for international agencies?

1.4. Objectives and relevance of the research study

The objectives of this research study are twofold. The general objective is to examine the links between the operation of international agencies in conflict zones and the political-security risks therein. Specifically, this study aims to enhance international agencies’ capacity for strategic risk analysis in conflict zones through the development of an industry-specific political-security risk analysis model. The relevance of this objective lies in the similar concerns expressed by the following authors. Firstly, van Brabant (2001b: 31) finds that “[agencies’] competence at risk assessment is still very limited”. Gassmann (2005: 3) notes that “[m]ost agencies admit that they have insufficient knowledge of the context in which they operate”, and lastly, Bruderlein (2004: 1) argues that “international agencies have been inclined to expand their security capacity at a technical level rather than reviewing the relevance of their security strategies”. The related conclusions reached by the above authors point to a weakness within the security architecture of international agencies and to a need for further research to be done in this field. Another factor contributing to the relevance of this study is the increasingly hostile and insecure circumstances in which international organisations are called to operate, as elucidated earlier in this chapter (Stoddard et al 2009: 33, Bollettino, 2008: 263, and Bruderlein, 2004: 1). Within such an environment there is a need for continuous and innovative scholarship which aims to enhance the capacity of agencies to recognise, identify, analyse, and ultimately manage these security risks.

Secondly, this research study aims to ascertain the level of political-security risk in eastern Chad through the application of the industry-specific political-security risk model.

7 See Appendix A: Chronology of recent incidents involving international agencies in eastern Chad.
The purpose, therefore, is to test the practical application and relevance of the model for international agencies in conflict zones as well as to measure the current level of political-security risk for international agencies in eastern Chad. Eastern Chad, which borders on the highly unstable Darfur region of Sudan, is a most relevant case study. Eastern Chad is identified by USAID (2010) as exhibiting “an increased need for humanitarian services” due to pervasive conflict, mass displacements and limited resources. This is corroborated by UNOCHA (2010) and Kalin (2009). In light of the scope of this thesis, eastern Chad is a highly topical case study as international agencies may be looking at both entering Chad and/or prolonging their presence in this conflict zone. Secondly, the humanitarian situation in Chad has deteriorated over the last year, due to an increase in incidents of armed attacks and kidnappings (USAID, 2010: 1). In fact, out of all aid worker attacks over the last three years, three-quarters took place in just six countries (in descending order: Sudan, Afghanistan, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Chad, Iraq and Pakistan) (Stoddard et al, 2009: 4). The above findings point to the fact that eastern Chad is a challenging conflict zone for international agencies to work in, especially given its geographical proximity to Darfur and the intertwined nature of these two conflict zones. Hence, international agencies’ capacity to perform strategic risk analysis in this area is of extreme importance in effectively safeguarding their employees and ensuring the successful completion of their mandates.

1.5. Research design and research methodology

The purpose of this research study is as a descriptive, exploratory and explanatory analysis of the political-security risks associated with international agencies in conflict zones. It is descriptive in the sense that it aims to paint a picture of the field of political risk and political-security risk, as well as the evolution of the international agency industry in conflict zones (Neuman, 2006: 35). It is explanatory as it endeavours to explain the links between political-security risk in general, and eastern Chad in particular, and the international agency industry. Lastly, it is explorative in that it explores the possibility of an industry-specific political-security risk model for the international agency industry based on a synthesis of the

8 Descriptive research is “research in which the primary purpose is to ‘paint a picture’ using words or numbers and to present a profile, a classification of types, or an outline of steps to answer questions such as who, when, where, and how” (Neumann, 2006: 35).

9 Explanatory research is “research in which the primary purpose is to explain why events occur and to build, elaborate, extend, or test theory” (Neumann, 2006: 35)

10 Explorative research is “research in which the primary purpose is to examine a little understood issue or phenomenon to develop preliminary ideas and move toward research questions by focusing on the ‘what’ question” (Neumann, 2006: 33).
more theoretical political risk models in the energy industry and the more practical models currently used by international agencies.

The methodology of this study is qualitative research, which makes use of the analysis of primary and secondary data. Chapter two of this study will make use of secondary data, including academic journals, books sourced from the University of Stellenbosch library, and international agency publications. This chapter provides the theoretical basis for the remainder of the study.

Chapter three will also make use of secondary data to analyse the international agency industry and the political-security risks associated with it. The information will be sourced, once again, from books and academic journals located within the University of Stellenbosch library, as well as from online sources such as international agency databases. In this chapter the strengths and limitations pertaining to international agencies’ security risk models will also be assessed, through the close analysis of three international agencies’ security risk models. The models originate from three primary sources: CARE International’s (2004) Safety & Security Handbook; The European Commission for Humanitarian Aid’s (2004) Generic Guide for Humanitarian Organisation; and the UN’s (2008) The Report of the Independent Panel on Safety and Security of UN Personnel and Premises Worldwide, and its (UN, 2004) Security Risk Management policy document. The examination of how these international agencies perform security risk analyses reveals limitations in the sense that their security risk models are simplistic and rather vague and are therefore inadequate for providing a rich analysis of the political-security risks prevalent in contemporary conflict zones. This indicates a need for further research into how these models can be enhanced and provides the motivation for the development of a more comprehensive industry-specific political-security risk model for international agencies.

Chapter four will make use of secondary data, including journal articles and books from the University of Stellenbosch library, online newspaper articles and international agency documents. Firstly, these sources will be used to provide a contextual analysis of the origin and drivers of the conflict in eastern Chad. Thereafter, they will assist in the application of the industry-specific political-security risk model developed for international agencies in chapter three, to the conflict zone of eastern Chad.

The level of analysis in this research study is micro in scope due to the fact that it focuses specifically on the international agency industry within the broader field of peacekeeping and conflict prevention actors, organisations and businesses that tend to emerge in and around conflict zones. The units of analysis, otherwise known by Neuman (2006: 58)
as “[parts] of social life that [are] under consideration” are, in this research study, international agencies operating in conflict zones.

1.6. Limitations and delimitations of the research study

A first limitation of this research study is related to the discipline of political risk. Consensus on the precise meaning of the term has not yet been achieved (Alon et al, 2006: 624). Indeed the subjective nature of this field and the tendency for definitions to “range between the general... and the specific”, makes this field rather difficult to conceptualise (Fitzpatrick, 1983: 249-250). Another related limitation is that the sub-field of political-security risk is, therefore, even less precisely defined and hence, more subjective. These limitations though, are not debilitating, and will be dealt with in chapter two of the research study by analysing various definitions in order to be able to suggest the most informed conceptualisation of these terms.

Secondly, although a full industry-specific political-security risk model for international agencies in conflict zones is developed in this research study, aspects pertaining to international agency-specific political-security risk \(^{11}\) will not form part of the political-security risk analysis of eastern Chad in chapter four. Particularities such as agency affiliations, history, culture, and ideology play a large part in determining international agencies’ exposure to political-security risk in a conflict zone. However, due to the fact that the political-security risk analysis in this research study is not being conducted for a particular agency, such knowledge is unobtainable. A related limitation concerns the political risk models used by the energy industry and which are drawn upon in order to facilitate the development of a political-security risk model for international agencies. The models used are not always available to the public as they are considered an intellectual property right of the company that produced them. Therefore, knowledge about these models is often incomplete, as scholars have determined the model’s characteristics through the actions taken by the companies that use them (Boshoff, 2010: 8).

As elucidated previously, the method of primary and secondary data analysis has been chosen over other methods based on the ability of this type of data analysis to best answer the research questions posed in this study. While the use of field research could have added an extra richness to this research study, the lack of funding to undertake this type of research

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\(^{11}\) As can be seen in Figure 3: Outline of industry-specific political-security risk analysis for international agencies in conflict zones and Figure 4: An industry-specific political-security risk model for international agencies in conflict zones.
made it impossible. In addition, the time constraints on the duration of this research study made it unfeasible for fieldwork to be done. An associated limitation concerns the language barriers of using eastern Chad as a case study. French and Arabic are the main languages spoken and this makes fieldwork in, and research on, eastern Chad difficult. However, the existence of a large body of English research and publications on eastern Chad means that the language limitation of using eastern Chad as a case study is not prohibitive.

This research study will be conducted within the following delimitations. Firstly, it is limited to the analysis of three international agencies’ security risk models. This is due to space constraints and the fact that the models are fairly similar and therefore analysing additional security risk models would prove repetitive. This study is also narrow in its scope as it only looks at political-security risk at the possible expense of other forms of risk such as country and financial risk. The reason for the narrow focus on security is firstly, due to the findings by Stoddard et al (2009), Brabant (2001), Gassmann (2005), Fast (2007), and Bruderlein (2004), among others, which point to an increased need for specific research into the security architecture of international agencies. A secondary concern relates to time and space constraints, which effectively prevent a larger scope for this study.

The period under consideration in eastern Chad is from January 2003 to May 2010. Thus, only data up to May 2010 is taken into consideration. The reasoning behind the choice of this period is that from 2003 onwards the international agency presence in eastern Chad intensified due to the influx of refugees from the neighbouring Darfur conflict zone. The presence of international agencies during this time also coincided with the onset of hostilities in eastern Chad in 2005 (IFRCRCS, 2009: 1 and USAID, 2010: 1). For the purpose of providing a background analysis of the origin and drivers of the conflict in eastern Chad in chapter four, this research study looks further back time.

A final delimitation concerns the scope of this research study. According to Bremmer and Keat (2009: 14), “Understanding risks is only half the game. They must also be effectively communicated”, followed by “[t]he final step in the process – mitigation”. This study addresses political-security risk analysis, which is but the first step in a process that includes political-security risk mitigation and management. The choice to focus on analysis only was made on the basis that it would facilitate in-depth research on this particular aspect of political-security risk which has been identified in this chapter as an aspect in need of academic attention. Another reason is due to space constraints, which rules out the inclusion of risk mitigation and management measures as part of this research study.
1.7. Chapter outline for the remainder of the research study

The focus of chapter two is on the underlying theory of political-security risk. Here, the key terms to be used in this research study are conceptualised, beginning with a brief look at decision-making and problem-solving theory, followed by central concepts such as risk, political risk, country risk, and of course, political-security risk. Essentially, this chapter provides a foundation from which an industry-specific political-security risk model for international agencies in conflict zones in general, and eastern Chad in particular, can be developed.

Chapter three’s focus is on political-security risk analysis specific to international agencies. Here the relationship between international agencies, contemporary conflicts and the post-9/11 global political-security landscape will be examined in order to illuminate the evolving dynamics between political-security risk and international agencies. Thereafter, a discussion and analysis of three political risk models from the energy industry will be undertaken with the aim of highlighting and extracting aspects of these models relevant to the development of an industry-specific political-security risk framework for international agencies. The security risk models currently used by three international agencies – CARE International, ECHO, and the UN – will then be detailed with an eye to identifying the limitations that they exhibit. Chapter three culminates in the formulation of a two-step political-security risk model specific to international agencies operating in conflict zones.

In chapter four, a political-security risk analysis will be presented of eastern Chad, in relation to the international agencies operating or planning to operate in this region. Firstly, step one of the political-security risk analysis for international agencies will provide a conflict analysis of eastern Chad focusing specifically on the origin and drivers of this conflict. Thereafter, in step two, the political-security risk model developed for international agencies in conflict zones will be tested by applying it in a case study of eastern Chad.

Chapter five concludes this research study with an initial overview of the course of this research study. Thereafter, the research embarked upon in chapters two, three, and four is evaluated in relation to the research questions and the stated aims and objectives of this study. Finally, a number of recommendations for further research in the field of political-security risk and international agencies are made.

1.8. Conclusion

This chapter serves as both a general introduction to the research study as well as a technical roadmap in terms of the research questions to be addressed, the objectives and relevance of
the study, the methodology and design, and the limitations and delimitations. This study is primarily concerned with whether an industry-specific political-security risk framework can be applied in order to assist international agencies with strategic political-security risk analysis. Through a case study of eastern Chad, the practical application of the model which is developed in this research study will be tested in order to gauge the current level of political-security risk pertaining to international agencies in this conflict zone. The following chapter will begin this journey by providing the theoretical perspective of this research study and conceptualising key terms.
Chapter 2: Theoretical perspective and conceptualisation

2.1. Introduction

In a world increasingly characterised by political insecurity and uncertainty, the discipline of political risk and the analysis thereof, is more relevant than ever for international organisations (Bremmer and Keat, 2009: 3). Organisations are required to deploy to areas of high political risk on a more frequent basis. This can be seen in the energy and extraction industry and the international agency industry in which the nature of organisations requires their operations to be situated in politically unstable environments or in the midst of a conflict zone. Thus, the demand for a way of “knowing what is out there” has been met through the development and application of political risk analysis, in which “[t]hese threats can then be observed and measured” (Brink, 2004: 3).

As a discipline, risk analysis has a long history, the evolution of which is aptly described by Jarvis (2008: 1) as comprising a “seemingly perennial body of literature that has boomed and waned in concert with events in the international political economy”. The relevance of political risk analysis and its recognition as a discipline first came about during the 1970s in the aftermath of the tumultuous events of the 1973 oil crisis. It was here that organisations realised the importance of considering political variables in their risk analyses. The field was thought to have reached its apex during the height of the Cold War and by the 1990s it seemed that it had lost much of its momentum. This stagnation was not matched by a decrease in demand for political risk analyses, quite the opposite actually, due to globalisation and the increasing complexity of the environment in which organisations were operating. Indeed, the world has experienced a distinct increase in political insecurity: “Increased uncertainty and the salience of non-traditional business and societal risks such as terrorism, corruption, climate change and global warming... have not only increased the awareness of risk in a complex environment, but have also increased the demand for risk analysis” (Hough et al, 2008: 6). Consequently, “[t]here is certainly a need for new research and novel approaches to the field of political risk analysis” (Brink, 2004: 3).

The purpose of the following chapter is to delve into the theory of risk and risk analysis in order to facilitate the eventual focus on political-security risk analysis and the development of an industry-specific political-security risk model for international agencies. In order to offer a concise and relevant conceptualisation of political-security risk and the analysis thereof, clarification and consensus needs to be reached on the notoriously “difficult to define” concept of political risk (Alon et al, 2006: 624). This will be done by looking at the
theoretical foundation of risk analysis, which is decision-making and problem-solving theory, and thereafter by locating political risk analysis within the field of risk and risk analysis.

2.2. Decision-making and problem-solving theory: A theoretical foundation

The roots of political risk analysis can be readily traced to problem-solving and decision-making theory. Problem-solving is described by Simon et al (1987: 11) as a process of “fixing agendas, setting goals, and designing actions”, with the next step being decision-making in which “evaluating and choosing among alternative actions” happens. At the same time, decision-making also displays values and interprets life and it is a central part of modern Western ideology, linked to the concepts of the “age of reason” such as the control over one’s destiny and human will (March, 1994: 225). In the decision-making process, individuals and organisations are taken to be rational and, therefore, risk-averse actors who aim to minimise their uncertainty with the help of detailed knowledge. Hence, a decision problem is defined by the options or acts among which one must choose, the potential outcomes or consequences of these options and the contingencies or conditional probabilities that relate outcomes to acts (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981: 453). Extrapolating from the above, political risk analysis, according to Brink (2004: 30), “draws the decision-maker’s attention to the various problems that political risks might pose to the profitability of the investment”, or, in the case of this research study, the success of the humanitarian mission. Political risk analysis is therefore a “rational attempt at problem solving” (Brink, 2004: 30).

Political risk analysis represents a first step in the decision-making process and a way through which a decision problem can eventually be resolved. There are a number of steps involved in decision-making: “conceptualizing the idea to invest or expand operations, conduct a feasibility study of possible outcomes, prepare detailed specification, implementation of the decision, and eventual operation of the preliminary concept” (Chicken, 1986). For example, in this research study, a political-security risk analysis would enable international agencies to ascertain the level of political-security risk in a given country. This is done through the collection of in-depth information and data on various aspects relating to the conflict zone, including the political-security elements of the conflict zone and their reciprocal impacts on the international agency. These are then processed into a meaningful picture, through the use of an industry-specific model made up of various risk factors and variables. On the basis of this detailed analysis, informed decisions can then be made as to the best course of action (Brink, 2004: 32). Indeed, understanding a decision in a specific situation clearly requires a great deal of concrete contextual knowledge, which March (1994:
vii) describes as “details about the historical, social, political, and economic worlds surrounding the decision and about the individuals, organizations, and institutions involved”. The relevance of political risk models in the decision-making process is that they are not static and they can be used continually as new information from constantly changing environments comes to light (Brink, 2004: 32). Rooting political risk analysis in decision-making and problem-solving theory is instrumental in showing how political risk analysis is, in essence, a logical attempt at dealing with the vast uncertainty that prevails in this world.

2.3. Conceptualisation of core terminology

The central aim of this section is to conceptualise the core terminology utilised in this research study. This will aid in furthering an understanding of political risk and political-security risk and assist in the development of an industry-specific political-security risk model for international agencies in chapter three. To commence this section, the concept of risk is looked at. This is followed by a discussion in which political risk and country risk will be differentiated. Due to the existence of many and varied definitions of political risk, some time will be spent on surveying various author’s conceptualisations in order to be able to posit a definition of political risk that will be used for the remainder of the study and that will assist in the conceptualisation of political-security risk. Thereafter, attention is paid to the differences between industry-specific (micro) and macro political risk. This is an important distinction to make, bearing in mind that this study is industry-specific in scope. The concept of political-security risk will then be addressed in some detail, as this definition will be used in designing a political-security risk model for international agencies. The discussion will then turn to the merits of qualitative and quantitative approaches to political-security risk analysis in an effort to explain and justify the development of a mixed-method model in the subsequent chapter. This chapter culminates in the conceptualisation of the terms, international agency and conflict zone.

2.3.1. Risk and risk analysis

There are numerous general definitions of risk. Hough et al (2008) posit that risk is the “undesirable and potential harm or danger to anyone that results from behaviour and action, or from a particular event, situation or issue”. Bremmer and Keat (2009: 4) define risk as the “probability that any event will turn into a measurable loss”, and Swaney (1996: 463) similarly defines it as the “likelihood that an agent or hazard will produce an unwelcome outcome or adverse effect and the severity of that adverse effect”. Hence, following Bremmer
and Keat (2009: 4), risk is made up of two variables - probability and impact. In this sense risk constitutes a probabilistic assessment and not an exact prediction (Hough et al, 2008: 10). It can also be gathered from the above definitions of risk, that the impact of risk on an organisation is usually negative. This can be seen through the terms that risk is associated with, such as danger, uncertainty, peril, jeopardy, instability and hazard. Though related to these terms, risk is not synonymous with them. This distinction needs to be made particularly clear with regard to the terms uncertainty and instability, with which risk is often wrongly equated. Uncertainty and instability can both be regarded as properties of risk. Instability refers to “unexpected or unforeseen” changes originating within the environment (Brink, 2004: 19). Hence, instability is a property of the environment, whereas risk is a property specific to the organisation (Kobrin, 1978: 114). Similarly, uncertainty refers to the existence of insufficient information and implies an inability to determine either the probability or the impact, or both, of a certain future event. The difference between risk and uncertainty is information. Information is therefore the crucial element in enabling organisations to convert uncertainty into risk that is at least, “measurable, insurable, and avoidable” (Haendel et al, 1975: 46 in Kobrin, 1979: 68). It also needs to be remembered that risk can be associated with possibility. Accordingly, risk is “not always a bad thing” as it may have good outcomes as well as negative ones (Bremmer, 2005: 60 and Hough et al, 2008: 10). However, it can be concluded from the above definitions that risk is generally understood to imply the possibility of negative results for an organisation rather than positive results.

Building on the above conceptualisation of risk, the term analysis indicates “historic, current, as well as future investigation, and aims to interpret something in terms of its effects” (Brink, 2004: 25). Therefore, a risk analysis is the result of an interpretation of risk in terms of its effects on a given organisation or entity. Risk analysis though, can be broken down into different sub-fields, of which political risk analysis is but one. In order to better understand what political risk entails, the concept of country risk needs to be addressed first.

2.3.2. Country risk

It is useful to distinguish between country risk and political risk at this early stage as the two terms are often used interchangeably (Alon, 2006: 624). Indeed, regarding the definition and attributes of country risk, much debate and disagreement exists between scholars. For the purpose of this research study, country risk is regarded as being of a larger scale than political risk. In this sense country risk is viewed, in the words of Brink (2004: 18), as a “specialized cousin” of political risk through its inclusion of economic, financial, social, and
political risk characteristics in its effort to forecast situations in which investors will find problems in the national circumstances of a country (Howell, 2007: 7 and Brink, 2004: 18). Brink (2004: 18), though stating that country risk factors could be included as variables in a political risk analysis, finds it more useful to distinguish country risk as “potential financial losses due to problems arising from macroeconomic events in a country” which include a country’s “sovereign, credit and transfer risk”. Building on the above, Cosset (1991: 135) views country risk as “the likelihood that a sovereign borrower will default on its debts”. Therefore, country risk analysis reflects a country’s general investment climate or ability to repay loans to banks, states, or monetary organisations (Brink, 2004: 22).

A useful way of thinking about the differences between country and political risk is that country risk is reflective of a country’s (in)ability to repay loans, while political risk relates to a country’s (un)willingness. What this means is that though a country may be perfectly able to repay a loan, due to political reasons such as ideology or the personal inclination of a leader, it may be unwilling to do so. For this reason, measures of country risk and those of political risk can reflect completely different levels (Brink, 2004: 23). Country risk is thus concerned with issues of finance and more precisely, the state of a country’s balance of payments. However, fluctuations in this regard are often symptomatic of deeper political problems that could best be identified in a detailed political risk analysis. The use of country risk analysis is, therefore, enriched by the use of political risk analysis and vice-versa as both contribute different elements to an analysis.

Related to the above, is the emphasis of country risk on a broad range of factors, such as economic, financial, political and social risks whereas, by definition, political risk has a singular focus on political risk factors. As Oetzel et al (2001: 120) argue, causation in country risk is often hard to determine as economic, political and social risk factors are frequently lumped into a single index, making it difficult to establish which variables are correlated with risk. Robock (1971: 8-9) also argues this point, stating that the lines between political and economic risk are often extremely blurred and that a decision-maker may get the most useful results by separating the political factors from the other factors. To conclude, in this research study, country risk can be explained as “potential financial losses due to problems arising from macroeconomic events in a country that are uncontrollable yet often inevitable. Political risk is more specific, referring to “factors caused by government policy (in)action or reaction”, which “can to some extent be managed if not avoided” (Brink, 2004: 175). As this research study is not intimately concerned with country risk, attention can duly be turned to political risk.
2.3.3. Political risk

In surveying the field of political risk one can begin by noting the diversity of existing definitions. Indeed, the use of political risk analysis is not limited to one field and thus the term has different connotations depending on whether it is used by international businesses, political institutions and organisations, development agencies, or NGOs (Jarvis, 2008: 2-3). Moreover, “[t]he nature and scope of political risk changes with respect to the specific time, home and host countries, and organizations involved” (Alon et, 2006: 626). What can be said with surety is that political risk analysis requires comprehensive knowledge of many different areas, including, but not limited to, the effects of politics on economics, international relations, law, history, culture, and finance. In order to conduct a valid and reliable political risk analysis, selecting relevant risk factors and their indicators from these different areas is imperative. Examples of risk indicators include failed states, conflict, external and internal border disputes, leadership and succession issues, military and paramilitary activity, and foreign policy and relations. Other less obvious indicators are literacy levels, the existence and activity of trade unions, and HIV/AIDS.

With regard to definition, the term political risk has been used in a broad sense to refer to an aggregate of policy, security, and economic risk and also in a narrow sense as an organisations’ loss of control or benefits due to government action in a host country (Alon et al, 2006: 624, and Fitzpatrick, 1983: 249). Nevertheless, what this research study aims to keep in mind in searching for a definition of political risk is Jarvis’ (2008: 1) suggestion that “political risk is best approached as a praxis-driven ontology and defined in relation to its practical application”. Thus, in searching for a definition, a number of conceptualisations of political risk shall be looked at in order to facilitate the development of the type of definition desired as the basis for political-security risk.

An early definition of political risk can be attributed to Robock (1971: 1) whose conceptualisation focuses on “changes” as the central feature of political risk. According to Robock (1971: 1), political risk exists when “discontinuities occur in the business environment... when they are difficult to anticipate and... when they result from political change”, and lastly, these changes must have a potential for “significantly affecting the profit or other goals of a particular enterprise”. In the same vein, Kobrin (1979:77) defines political risk as “the probability that changes in the political environment will reduce returns to the point where the project would be no longer acceptable on the basis of ex ante criteria”. Similarly, Howell (2007: 7) defines political risk as “the possibility that political decisions or political or social events in a country will affect the business climate in such a way that
investors will lose money or not make as much money as they expected when the investment was made”. The above definitions all describe political risk from a business and therefore profit-centred, perspective. Indeed, the business-oriented perspective dominates the literature on political risk, leaving little room for definitions which are inclusive of organisations that do not have profit as their raison d’être. A definition of political risk that encompasses international agencies, which by nature do not have profit as their central concern, is logically desired.

With this in mind, Brink (2004: 25) and Simon’s (1982: 68) definitions are turned to. Brink’s provides clarity on the origin of political risk in her definition of the term as “the probability that interrelated factors caused or influenced by government political decisions, (in)actions, reactions, or other unforeseen external or internal events will affect business and investment climates in a way that investors will lose money or not make as much money as they expected when the initial decision to invest was made”. Simon (1982: 68) achieves greater specificity regarding micro and macro political risk in his definition of political risk as “governmental and societal actions and policies, originating either within or outside the host country, and negatively affecting either a select group of, or the majority of foreign business operations and investments”. Simon’s definition also widens the scope of political risk which, in the words of Alon and Martin (1998: 11), “is germane to political risk assessment because the multinational firm faces political risks from the host country environment, home country environment, international environment, and the global environment”. Simon and Brink’s definitions, while still focused on the business environment, exhibit a number of characteristics that make them relevant, with the addition of a few modifications, for the purposes of this research study.

Firstly, unlike the conceptualisations of Robock, Kobrin and Howell, who attribute political risk to political change or political decisions, Brink (2004: 25) offers greater specificity on the origin of political risk as “interrelated factors caused or influenced by government political decisions, (in)actions, reactions, or other unforeseen external or internal events”. Brink also makes a distinction, which is taken further by Simon, between micro risk and macro risk (to be discussed in detail later). This distinction is central to this research study, which is industry specific, and thus micro in nature. Brink and Simon’s definitions are the most comprehensive and detailed of the above definitions as they reflect the key components necessary for a praxis-oriented, operational definition. However, they lack the feature that enables them to be used as a definition for organisations that do not have profit as their central motivation. For the purposes of this analysis, the focus is on the
conceptualisation of political risk by Brink (2004: 25) and Simon (1982:68), namely that political risk:

- is caused or influenced by government or societal political decisions, policies, (in)actions, reactions, or other unforeseen events.
- can originate either within or outside the host country.
- will impact either a select group of, or the majority of foreign organisations\(^\text{12}\).
- will most likely have a negative effect on organisations.

### 2.3.4. Industry-specific political risk

The distinction between macro political risk and industry-specific (micro) political risk is an important one to make at this juncture as this research study focuses on industry-specific political-security risk analysis. Robock (1971: 9), in his seminal article, defines macro political risk as “unanticipated and politically motivated environmental changes... broadly directed at all foreign enterprise”. Macro political risks are, therefore, countrywide, affecting all organisations in all sectors. Political risk is of an industry-specific nature when the “environmental changes are intended to affect only selected fields of business activity or foreign enterprises with specific characteristics”. Hence industry-specific political risk only affects a particular industry, for example, the international agency industry. Brink (2004: 38) similarly distinguishes between the two, stating that “macro risks are those risks that will affect all businesses in a specific country, where micro risks will only impact upon a certain industry, and not on others at all”.

Further, a distinction can be made between the internal and the external dimensions of macro political risk. In this regard, the internal causes of macro political risk are generated within the country, while the external causes are brought about by the home country, a third country, or the global environment (Robock, 1971: 9 and Alon and Martin, 1998: 12). For example, an external source of a macro political risk would be the widespread disinvestment campaign directed at companies operating in Sudan as a result of the genocidal conflict in Darfur that began in approximately 2003. An example of internal macro political risk is widespread political unrest that affects all entities operating in the country (Alon and Martin, 1998: 12).

While macro risks are more dramatic in nature, Robock (1971: 10) argues that industry-specific risks are more prevalent. Industry-specific political risk is actually the type

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\(^{12}\) In the definition of political risk in this research study, organisations refer to both business and not-for-profit organisations.
of risk encountered the most frequently by organisations. The nature and scope of industry-specific political risk varies from industry to industry with respect to time and the organisations involved (Alon et al, 2006: 626). Hence, as Robock notes (1971: 10) “the types of business operations with a high vulnerability to micro risk will vary from nation to nation and over time in the same nation”. Regarding industry-specific political risks, there are two further factors which can affect or compound the risk over time. The first of these is the number of foreign organisations operating in a specific industry. The greater the preponderance of foreign organisations in a specific industry, the higher political risk is likely to be. The second factor concerns the capacity of nationals to operate organisations in a specific industry. If a high capacity exists, this tends to correspond with a higher industry-specific risk in the industry (Robock, 1971: 10).

In order to understand the political-security risks associated with a specific venture, within a particular industry, industry-specific political risk analysis, which undertakes to understand risk from the standpoint of the affected organisation, is the key. Indeed, as Alon et al (2006: 627) conclude, “micropolitical risks are much more manageable and thereby more practically useful for modern-day companies”. The aspects of industry-specific political risk discussed above are essential in formulating a relevant and valid definition of political-security risk as this study focuses exclusively on industry-specific political-security risk for international agencies in conflict zones.

2.3.5. Political-security risk
With the increased demand for political risk analysis in the context of the 21st century, there has been a concurrent expansion of the field into different branches, of which political-security risk is but one (Lambrechts et al, Forthcoming). As this field has only recently become of interest, there is a dearth of detailed literature on the subject, especially with respect to definitional parameters. In this regard, Fouché (2003: 18) describes political-security risk as “those vulnerabilities that flow from political risks (policy responses to security threats) that are found in a specific country... these could include amongst others, political actions such as unpopular legislations leading to widespread unrest... labour actions and even terrorism”. Fouché’s focus is on the political-security elements of conventional political risk. While Fouché’s definition is a start, limitations lie in his exclusion of what the security elements of political-security risk actually are, and, therefore, what the operational parameters of political-security risk are. Fouché (2003: 16-18) does discuss the elements of security in his thesis; however, for definitional thoroughness these could be incorporated into
his operational definition. Lambrechts et al (Forthcoming) contribute to Fouché’s definition as they specify three different levels of security in political-security risk: transnational security, national security, and human security. Lambrechts et al (Forthcoming) provide a brief overview of the different levels of security within political-security risk. Hence, their conceptualisation of political-security risk, which is highly relevant for this research study, can be detailed further.

In reaching a definition of political-security risk for this research study the above elements are taken into consideration. Thus, the levels of political-security risk are expanded on first, using Lambrechts et al’s (Forthcoming) conceptualisation of transnational, national, and human security as a basis. Thereafter, drawing on this three-pronged definition of security, as well as both Fouché (2003) and Lambrechts et al’s (Forthcoming) definitions of political-security risk and the definition of political risk reached in the previous section, a definition of political-security risk as the foundation of this study will be reached.

The end of the Cold War is often thought of as the commencement of an essentially different global political economy. This can be detected in the post-Cold War preoccupation with security studies and the consequent reconsideration of the term security (Tarry, 1999: 1). Indeed, security has come to be defined in terms of traditional vs non-traditional conceptions in which the traditionalist perspective is entrenched in Cold War, statist notions of security, while non-traditionalist conceptions are much broader and more people-centred. Essentially, this is a discussion that encompasses the three levels of security which are, in this research study, transnational security, national security and human security (Uzodike and Isike, 2009: 104 and Tarry, 1999: 1).

The transnational and national levels of security fall within the more traditionalist perspective of security which is based on the old Westphalian notion of security as the prerogative of the state. In this sense, security is viewed from a political realist perspective, and thus, security threats mainly originate from the military realm (Tarry, 1999: 2). National security includes aspects such as the preservation of state territory against external threat, the preservation of constitutional and political order, the promotion of key national values, and the preservation of national interests and internal values. Threats to national security can originate both externally (for example, insurgency and territorial violations) and internally (for example, revolutionary activities, and political discontent) (Mathur, 1996: 233 and Lambrechts et al, Forthcoming). Transnational security, on the other hand, focuses on the region as the main actor and refers to security factors that will impact actors in the region. Examples include border disputes, aggression by neighbouring states and transnational
criminal or rebel networks (Lambrechts et al, Forthcoming). Indeed, according to Mathur (1996: 233) the security of a state demands an analysis of the “political and security environments of the region in which it is located”.

The last conception of security is human security which engages with issues that are ultimately not included in the definitions of transnational and national security. The concept of human security is a post-Cold War development that came about due to the perceived failings of the traditionalist perspectives of security. As Tadjbakhsh (2005: 4) writes: “a human security approach attempted to transform traditional notions of security, framed in terms of national and regional stability and the stability of political and economic systems, and to focus on human beings”. Human security therefore refers to the safety of the individual as the main actor and is concerned with threats such as violations of human rights, political discrimination, and ethnic rivalry. By definition, it can be seen that human security accommodates a “wide range of issues that not only constitute threats to human existence, but also breed insecurity and societal anarchy” (Uzodike and Isike, 2009: 106).

The three levels of security described above are not mutually exclusive. In fact, it is argued here, as Uzodike and Isike (2009: 107) do, that the three levels of security proposed in this research study are mutually reinforcing. This is due to the way in which each level contributes in a different and detailed way to ensure a well-rounded and comprehensive definition of security. The above conceptualisation of security cannot hope to have adequately captured the immense body of literature which exists on the genesis of security studies. However, it is hoped that at least, it has allowed a more detailed understanding of the division of the term into three levels and why this has been done. It remains then, to bring all the pieces of this discussion together in a definition of political-security risk that will be used throughout this research study. The definition of political-security risk developed below draws upon the definition of political risk posited earlier in this chapter, which is an amalgamation of Brink (2004: 25) and Simon’s (1982: 68) definitions. In addition, Lambrechts et al’s (Forthcoming) conceptualisation of political-security risk, and the ensuing discussion in this section on the meaning of security are used in the development of a definition of political-security risk. Thus, political-security risk:

- consists of interrelated security risks, including transnational, national, and human security
- is caused or influenced by government or societal political decisions, policies, (in)actions, reactions, or other unforeseen events.
can originate either within or outside the host country.
- will impact either a select group of, or the majority of foreign organisations.\(^{13}\)
- will most likely have a negative effect on organisations.

### 2.3.6. Qualitative vs quantitative political risk analysis

Erroneously, humans tend to believe quantitative data, which is more tangible, over qualitative data, which is more abstract. As Bremmer and Keat (2009: 176) note, people “assume that ‘numbers don’t lie’”. Political risk analysis though, relies heavily on qualitative methods in which *soft* variables are used, over quantitative methods in which *hard* variables are used. This is why the field has often tended to be ignored, as translating these risks into quantitative terms is often very difficult and even undesirable. Political risk analysis is done by collecting data and information and processing it into a “meaningful ‘picture’ of the elements and their relation to the host country” (Brink, 2004: 32). In this research study the meaningful picture is achieved through an approach which, though relying heavily on qualitative methods, also utilises qualitative methods.

In this regard, the point can be made that it is not only a qualitative approach that utilises numbers or mathematics. Indeed, Brink (2004: 12) shows how “qualitative variables can be measured and quantified, by attributing weights to risk factor indicators. These weights are then calculated to present a measured, probable chance that political risk might occur”. Further, qualitative analysis also tends to be “rich in detail, sensitive to context, and capable of showing the complex processes or sequences of social life (Neumann, 2006: 459). The problem inherent in quantitative analysis is that the intricacies of social (or political) life are difficult to quantify mathematically. Indeed, Brink (2004: 117) notes that political risk is not an “actuality that can be measured in terms of probability theory”. In political risk, terms such as “likelihood, chances and probability are judgements rather than mathematical calculations”. For this reason it can be said that political risk analyses are not ever truly quantitative or mathematical and though they may look as such, at a base level they are made up of subjective judgements. These judgements reflect the decisions of the analyst, and vary from the decision on how to weight certain factors, what factors to include in or exclude from the model, and which data and information sources to use. Qualitative analysis is also less hampered by the time-consuming nature of quantitative analysis, in which highly technical, mathematical, and rigid methods are often used. By virtue of these features, quantitative

\(^{13}\) In the definition of political risk in this research study, *organisation* refers to both business and non-profit entities.
analyses also tend to be rather static, and therefore more difficult to adapt than qualitative analysis to the fast-changing circumstances which often characterise the contexts in which political risk analyses are called for. This is not to say that qualitative analysis is fault free; it is not. The subjective nature of qualitative analysis means that the underlying biases of the analyst can affect the findings. Nevertheless, taking into account the above discussion on the merits and means of each method of analysis, this research study makes use of a mixed method. Hence, qualitative and quantitative methods are employed in order to develop an industry-specific political-security risk model for international agencies in conflict zones.

2.3.7. International agencies
For the sake of brevity, this research study uses the term international agencies to describe the organisations involved in the provision of humanitarian, political, technical and developmental assistance to governments, civil societies and populations affected by conflict (Bruderlein, 2004: 1). The reason why this research study draws on Bruderlein’s (2004: 1) conceptualisation is that it makes room for the inclusion of a number of related types of organisations that all have similar aims in assisting populations, governments and civil societies affected by conflict. Included in this definition are humanitarian organisations, NGOs, UN and non-UN agencies, International Red Cross and Red Crescent organisations, charitable groups and foundations that “operate internationally, and engage actively in conflict environments” (Bruderlein, 2004: 1). The terms, humanitarian organisation, NGO, INGO, and charitable organisation are often used interchangeably with the term international agency. However, the choice behind the use of this term is due to the fact that it performs an umbrella function, encapsulating the similar functions of the above-mentioned terms in single definition. Additionally, the similarity of the security challenges confronting the various organisations and agencies working in conflict zones is another reason why an umbrella term such as international agencies is deemed useful for this research study. For as Bruderlein (2004: 1) notes, even though international agencies function under “specific and divergent mandates, their staff and activities often face similar security challenges”.

This study is focused upon international agencies in conflict zones. However, international agencies do function across a much wider spectrum. The majority of NGOs are development orientated, operating in order to aid countries in achieving development goals such as the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) (Stoddard, 2003a: 1). International agencies also operate in disaster zones such as that seen in New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina. In addition, they function as advocacy organisations to create awareness and change
attitudes and beliefs. An example is HIV/AIDS awareness campaigns carried out by international agencies in many African countries. Indeed, according to Werker and Ahmed (2007: 3), NGOs “pursue activities to relieve suffering, promote the interests of the poor, protect the environment, provide basic social services, or undertake community development”. Hence, NGOs, and by definition international agencies, are not solely concerned with operating in conflict zones. They function in multiple capacities, under long-term and short-term mandates, in many and varied settings, from the depths of the conflict-infested DRC, to the streets of New Orleans in the highly developed US. They work both independently and alongside governments. And they range in size, from one person, to complex organisations with headquarters in every country in the world (Werker and Ahmed, 2007: 3).

In terms of their structure, international agencies can be nationally orientated, internationally orientated, or both. The majority of the world’s NGOs are based in the US and Europe, but most of their work is done internationally, in developing countries (Werker and Ahmed, 2007: 5). Indeed, the major international agencies include CARE International, World Vision, Oxfam, the Red Cross and Red Crescent societies, Save the Children, Doctors Without Borders, Catholic Relief Services (CRS), ECHO, and of course, the UN (Stoddard, 2003b: 25-26). International agencies such as these are often composed of a number of national affiliates, under various forms of confederation. Governance structures within these agencies vary depending on their organisational cultures. As Stoddard (2003b: 26) notes, some NGO federations began with a strong corporate model and others started out as looser umbrella organisations. However, since the 1990s a more confederated style of governance has come to characterise organisations, due mainly to the “perceived need for tighter policy coherence among national members, and the desire to increase southern participation” (Stoddard, 2003b: 26). While the structure and functions of international agencies may differ, in conflict zones they face similar security challenges. The conflict zones within which these security challenges are located remains to be defined.

2.3.8. Conflict zones

This research study uses the term conflict zone to refer to both active conflict environments and post-conflict environments. Obviously, the role of international agencies in active conflict zones is an integral one in terms of providing relief and aid in the form of food, shelter and medical attention and supplies to war-stricken populations, among others (Avant and Haufler, 2008: 17). The reasoning behind including post-conflict environments in the
definition of conflict zones is that a large proportion of international agencies’ work involves providing humanitarian, developmental, technical, and political assistance once active fighting has subsided. This can be seen in their facilitation of and continual manning of refugee camps, their involvement in disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) campaigns, their provision of food and medical aid, and their participation in reconstruction and development initiatives in war-torn countries.

A second reason behind including post-conflict environments in the definition of conflict zones is that post-conflict environments often present as great a security risk to international agencies as do active conflict environments. Indeed, the signing of a peace treaty or the abatement of formal hostilities by no means ensures a safer working environment for international agencies. Sources of post-war insecurity include, but are not limited to, the persistence of unaddressed root causes of the conflict such as ongoing grievances over resources; the difficulties of repatriating land to conflict affected populations, the lack of political rights in conflict-stricken zones; the scarcity of post-war opportunities for combatants; vested interests in the continuation of violence by certain parties who stand to lose social, economic or political power acquired during the conflict; lack of state capacity and poor economic growth, which perpetuates the grievances that prompted conflict in the first place; the spiralling security dilemma in which vulnerable groups attempt to ensure their security vis-a-vis other groups, often leading to localised fighting and even a resumption of hostilities; and the return of refugees and IDPs which may reignite hostilities over property and entitlement rights (Autesserre, n.d. 2-5). Hence, this research study includes both active conflict environments and post-conflict environments in its investigation into the political-security risks faced by international agencies in conflict zones and the development of a political-security risk model for international agencies in conflict zones. Indeed, this research study centres on a case study of the conflict zone in eastern Chad, which can be described as a combination of an active conflict and post-conflict environment (USAID, 2010: 1).

2.4. Conclusion

The objective of this chapter has been to provide a conceptualisation of the key terms relevant to this research study, as well to explore the underlying theory of political risk analysis that forms the theoretical grounding for this study. The foundations of political risk analysis and political-security risk analysis were located in decision-making and problem-solving theory. Thereafter, core concepts, including, risk, country risk, political risk, industry-specific risk and political-security risk were examined. Through this process a framework has
been created from which an industry-specific political-security risk model can be developed and applied in the following chapters. Chapter three will embark on the task of developing an industry-specific political-security risk model for international agencies. This will be done by first discussing the relationship between international agencies, contemporary conflicts and the post-9/11 global political-security environment. Thereafter, the focus will turn to the development of an industry-specific political-security risk model for international agencies in conflict zones.
Chapter 3: Industry-specific political-security risk analysis for international agencies in conflict zones

3.1. Introduction
This chapter has as its central focus the development of a political-security risk model specific to international agencies operating in conflict zones. Preceding the development of this model, a brief analysis of the relationship between international agencies, contemporary conflicts and the post-9/11 global political-security landscape will illuminate the evolving dynamics between political-security risk and international agencies. Thereafter, three political risk models specific to the energy industry will be analysed with the aim of highlighting and extracting aspects that will aid in the development of an industry-specific political-security risk framework for international agencies in conflict zones. The security risk models currently used by three prominent international agencies - CARE International, ECHO, and the UN - will then be detailed with an eye to identifying the strengths and, more importantly for this research study, the limitations that they exhibit. This chapter culminates in the development of an industry-specific political-security risk model for international agencies in conflict zones. This will be followed by the presentation of a simple risk grading scale for interpreting the model. At the heart of this chapter is the identification of the relevant risk factors and indicators that will be included in a political-security risk model for international agencies in conflict zones. They will form the crux of the model developed in this study and their identification and the way in which they are employed in the model is therefore of the utmost salience.

3.2. Political-security risk and international agencies: An evolving relationship
In assessing the evolving nature of political risk, Brink (2004: 9) notes that the analysis of it is “a dynamic subject, as both expected and unexpected events constantly take place against a backdrop of shifting trends and sudden occurrences”. The same can be said about political-security risk, which is by no means a static field. This is especially true when considered in relation to international agencies in conflict zones. Indeed, the nature and scope of the political-security risk facing international agencies in current times has, in the words of Fast (2010: 2), “bought humanitarian security to the front pages”. Incidents that have contributed to the headlining of this industry include the 1996 assassination of six International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) delegates sleeping in their beds in Chechnya; the 2003 suicide bombing of the UN headquarters in Baghdad; the brutal murder of 17 members of
Opinions differ on the exact causes underlying the increasing risk experienced by international agencies. However, two broad frameworks within which these causes can be located are: the nature of contemporary conflicts and the post-9/11 global political-security landscape. It is therefore the aim of this section to provide a broad description of the rising political-security risk faced by international agencies. The relevance of this section lies in the way in which our understanding of the causes underlying international agency insecurity influences our analysis of the political-security risks facing international agencies in conflict zones. For as Brink (2004: 26) notes concerning the occurrence and perception of political risk, “both internal and external events... are constantly influencing the severity and degree to which risk factors influence investment”. In order to develop a political-security risk model for international agencies that best represents reality, these underlying factors are integral and shall now be considered.

3.2.1. International agencies, contemporary conflicts and the post-9/11 global political-security landscape

Over the last two decades international agencies have had to contend with the considerable diminishment of their humanitarian space – that neutral and independent position from which they can assist vulnerable people in times of conflict. In this regard, the intensification of globalisation since the 1980s and the simultaneous end of the Cold War can be identified as important explanatory factors. Indeed, the shift from a generally polarised global political economy to a globalised one has brought about major changes in international relations. It has decreased the risk of global confrontation and inter-state conflict, while at the same time played a fundamental role in the increasing frequency of low-intensity, intra-state conflict. This trend in the nature of conflict has elicited much attention among conflict theorists, not least for the way in which the nature of contemporary conflicts impacts and influences peace efforts, particularly interventions by international agencies.

Of all the terms coming out of the attempts to try to understand and find solutions for the chaotic conflicts witnessed in the last few decades, Mary Kaldor’s (2006) “new wars” is one of the best known and most contested (Mao, 2010: 2). While the debate over Kaldor’s thesis is recognised in this research study, it is not the aim of this section to engage in it, but rather to describe the common traits of contemporary conflict. In this regard, elements of Kaldor’s (2006) thesis are useful in providing a general description of the nature of current
conflicts. Kaldor (2006) argues that current forms of conflict can be contrasted to earlier forms of conflict in terms of “their goals, the methods of warfare and how they are financed” (Kaldor, 2006: 7). She (Kaldor, 2006) posits that in addition to the more traditional forms of conflict, which are primarily concerned with competing ideologies, geo-politics and inter-state rivalries, more amorphous forms of conflict are becoming prevalent. Along with Kaldor (2006), other scholars\textsuperscript{14} have also either used the term “new wars” or pointed towards the similar characteristics of contemporary conflicts. These conflicts are characterised by traits such as identity politics, terrorism, criminal violence and the development of a globalised war economy (Sheehan, 2008: 214 and Runge, 2004: 234).

In the first instance, contemporary conflicts are often concerned with “identity politics in contrast to the geo-political or ideological goals of earlier conflicts” (Kaldor, 2006: 7). In this sense conflicts are often about claims to power on the basis of a particular identity, such as religious or ethnic identity, that is not necessarily connected to that of the state. Secondly, the strategies used in contemporary conflicts draw upon “the experience of guerrilla warfare and counter-insurgency... as a way of getting round the massive concentrations of military force which are characteristic of conventional war” (Kaldor, 2006: 8). Thus territory is captured through political control of the population rather than military advance. Further, the sowing of fear, hatred and terror through the mobilisation of extremist politics is a defining characteristic. Common tactics include mass killings, hostage-taking, recruitment of child soldiers, forced resettlement, as well as political, psychological and economic techniques of intimidation (Sheehan, 2008: 223). This is why contemporary conflicts have witnessed an increasing number of refugees and IDPs, and why most violence has been directed at civilians. In fact, distinguishing between perpetrators and civilians in contemporary conflicts is typically extremely difficult as the individuals fighting in these wars include a “disparate range of different types of groups, such as paramilitary units, local warlords, criminal gangs, police forces, mercenary groups and also regular armies, including breakaway units from regular armies” (Kaldor, 2006: 9).

Regarding the financing of contemporary conflicts, perpetrators have come to finance fighting through plunder; trafficking of people, weapons and drugs; money laundering; the black market; external assistance and through the extortion or theft of foreign aid, rather than through taxation which is often used to fund more traditional forms of conflict (Sheehan, 2008: 223). Moreover, this “globalized war economy” is supported through the proliferation

of advanced modern technology, such as cell phones, computers, and small arms and light weaponry, which all aid in the coordination, mediation and negotiation of fighting units (Kaldor, 2006: 9). Essentially, the conflicts that we are witnessing today are not clear-cut. They consist of myriad elements that are not easily distinguishable or quantifiable from the outside. Over and above the evolution in conflict dynamics, the tumultuous occasion of 9/11 has had a profound effect on shaping the global political-security landscape.

The event of 9/11 and its aftermath have served to compound the trends seen in conflict dynamics. 9/11 has contributed to a renewed polarisation and radicalisation of conflict environments (Krahenbuhl, 2004: 505). This can be seen in the discourse that has emerged around the ‘war on terror’, which has forced individuals, societies, and states, alike, to choose sides. The prime illustration of this can be found in President George Bush’s address to the US Congress in September 2001, in which he stated: “Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists” (quoted in Mills, 2005: 1). Polarisation is also apparent in the re-emergence of tensions between the so-called global North and the global South, which is also framed as a conflict between the West vs the Rest or Islam vs Christianity (Krahenbuhl, 2004: 505). And while the local causes of conflict, documented above, remain pervasive, “[t]actics concerned with the ‘fight against terrorism’, including acts of indiscriminate violence perpetrated by non-State entities and the spread of repressive policies in individual States, are at present much more in evidence” (Krahenbuhl, 2004: 506). This raises the issue of increased radicalisation post-9/11.

Radicalisation can be observed in the strategy of pre-emption through which the Bush administration and its allies responded to 9/11 and which has had major repercussions throughout world, both on international relations and on international humanitarian interventions. The call to pre-emptive action by the US represented a harsh response to a radical terrorist attack (Mills, 2005: 47). The existence of so-called failed states and the potential threat they pose to US, and Western interests has, since 9/11, provided the rationale for large-scale interventions premised on the desire to make the world a more peaceful and secure place. The global political-security environment that this type of strategy has fostered is one in which the lines between morality and self-interest have become blurred. As a result, it has become difficult to distinguish whether current interventions are based on pecuniary motivations or on creating a more peaceful global environment.

In sum, both the changing nature of conflict and the effects of 9/11 on the global political-security environment have played a key role in the increased exposure of international agencies to risk and insecurity. In this regard, four aspects are prominent.
Firstly, the blurring of the distinction between combatants and civilians and the active targeting of civilians that characterises contemporary conflict zones means that international agencies, as supporters of the victims of conflict, are no longer regarded as neutral parties to the conflict (Runge, 2004: 234). Moreover, since a significant role of international agencies is to transfer scarce resources (which are highly valued by warring parties) to needy populations, aid has gained an important strategic role in conflict zones (Runge, 2004: 234). International agencies have thus come to be viewed as actors in the conflict and therefore as legitimate targets for warring parties. Secondly, there is the growing perception of international agencies as instruments of state’s foreign policy and strategy (NGO Voice, 2009). Indeed, states are using aid campaigns in order to garner support for military actions. This has contributed to the perception of international agencies as Western institutions, and since the religiously charged event of 9/11, as institutions with a Christian-Western agenda. Thirdly, there is the increasingly explicit linkage of the security/military agenda and the humanitarian agenda. Since 9/11 and the shift towards greater interventionism, the humanitarian job traditionally reserved for international agencies has been increasingly undertaken by the military. Thus, due to the blurring of the distinction between the military and the humanitarian, international agencies are seen as legitimate targets in a conflict zone. They therefore face increasingly serious security risks, the likes of which are usually reserved for military actors who have the capacity and mandate to deal with such risks. Lastly, with the increasing non-compliance by warring parties to international humanitarian law and the accompanying culture of impunity characterising conflict zones, international agencies are often seen as competitors and as obstacles to the control of local populations by warring parties. The proliferation of international agencies over the last two decades in order to deal with the diverse aspects of contemporary conflicts has not helped this situation as it has engendered an increased exposure to security risks (Bruderlein, 2004: 3).

The causes of increasing international agency insecurity have been located within two related frameworks: the nature of contemporary conflict and the post-9/11 global political-security environment. It can be concluded that the sources of security risk are multifarious and that the types of insecurity that international agencies face today are a direct consequence of global developments. Indeed, as Bruderlein (2004: 1) aptly notes: “Many organizations... fail to acknowledge the changing perceptions of international assistance in some areas of the world and the changing profile of the security threats that endanger not only their operators but the recipient communities as well”. In order to develop a political-security risk model for
international agencies in conflict zones, the importance of understanding the origin of political-security threats cannot be understated.

3.3. From political risk to political-security risk – towards a model

Venter (1997: 6) writes that “[p]olitical risk events are discontinuous; in other words they are not predictable on the basis of statistically based generalisation – the events are too few and too disparate – to be the subject of such generalisations. But a fundamental descriptive analysis of political and social trends in a state can provide decision-makers with early warning signals of impending political risks”. The development in this section, of a political-security risk model specific to international agencies in conflict zones aims to provide a tool for industry employees that allows them to undertake the continuous descriptive analysis that Venter (1997) calls for. The problem for international agencies is that political-security risks are difficult for agencies to anticipate successfully. As Venter (1997: 5) notes about political risk in the tobacco industry, the same can be said for international agencies, that “[a] war, a civil uprising, a terrorist bomb attack on government installations and so on cannot be put under management control or even industry-wide control. But such events can and should be anticipated in the management operations of companies”. Anticipation of events is preceded by a model that accurately captures both the factors and indicators that are pertinent to the particular industry. It is to the development of such a model that this research study now turns.

3.3.1. Political risk models specific to the energy industry

Howell (2007: 11) notes that “[i]n designing a model, the relationship between abstract concepts, such as authoritarianism, and acts of damage to the investor need to be grounded in social science and research”. Further, he (Howell, 2007: 11) states that a “variety of approaches have been put forth by corporate analysts and by political organizations in their efforts to describe the circumstances of incipient loss”. In this section, three political risk frameworks specific to the energy industry are examined, including British Petroleum’s (BP) model, the IHS Energy Group’s model, and Boshoff’s15 (2010) model.

At a general level models from the energy industry are examined because this industry has a long history in the analysis of political risk (Alon et al, 2006). Therefore,

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invaluable insight can be gained with regard to time-tested methodologies and approaches towards model development, which can enhance the relatively under-researched field of international agency political-security risk analysis. A second general reason for examining three models from this industry is that each one makes use of a unique approach to political risk analysis. This means that wide-ranging insights can be gained. These insights will contribute to the development of an industry-specific political-security risk model that is both comprehensive in its approach and detailed in its analysis.

At a more specific level, the energy sector is, in many ways, similar to the international agency sector. Energy operations are described as the “most sensitive of all international corporate activities” because the resources involved are a country’s ‘national patrimony’, and such projects can impact a country more than other activities through the attendant wealth, international prestige, and power” (Alon et al, 2006: 631 quoting Moran, 1998: 70). Likewise, international agencies are involved in sensitive, often highly controversial conflict situations which are usually highly publicised and involve numerous international actors and interests. Moreover, in both industries, organisations are willing to accept a high degree of risk. For companies in the energy sector this is due to the fact that the benefits of operating in a high-risk environment outweigh the risks (Boshoff, 2010: 1). For international agencies, it is essential to their nature that they operate in conflict zones, providing assistance to needy populations. Due to the fact that both energy companies and international agencies operate in high-risk, high-probability environments, international agencies can apply many of the precepts used by the energy industry in their political risk models, to the development of an industry-specific political-security risk model.

3.3.1.1. BP’s model

While BP’s model is not fully available to the public, it is possible to view the company’s approach to risk management through the perspective of its operational security as Alon et al (2006: 633) do. For BP, risk assessment is a continuous process in which the “preliminary assessment sets the stage for operational decisions going forward, and periodic reassessments update the initial risk profile” (Alon et al, 2006: 633). BP focuses on successfully managing security risk, which is for them the greatest political risk associated with their operations. In order to deal with the volatile security environments within which it operates, BP has adopted certain security practices. The company has an internal security system in place, with specialists hired as consultants from different areas of security, including the police force, army, foreign offices, and even civilians. Additionally, BP’s security policy is tailored
according to the local requirements in a particular nation or situation. Here, specific emphasis is placed on “identifying threats and risks to operations on behalf of the business, helping businesses prioritize responses to threats, protecting information..., audits and investigation, contingency planning, organizing security exercises”. Moreover, the security network formed by the above approach, acts as a “semi-formal forum, making sure its own specialist areas interlock and security works smoothly together with other disciplines” (Knott, 1997: 32).

Attributes of BP’s model relevant to the development of an industry-specific political-security risk model for international agencies in conflict zones are:

• **Intelligence obtained from different areas of security - police force/army/military**: Aside from being valuable intelligence sources regarding security in conflict zones, it is important to include security forces as indicators under *national political-security risk*. In this regard, the composition, ability and stability of forces, existence of special units, populace’s attitude towards security forces, and the attitude of security forces to international agencies all need to be taken into account.

• **Highlights the importance of ongoing situational risk analyses**: This attribute is imperative for international agencies operating in conflict zones where the possibility of regular situational change is high. This implies a need for a political-security risk model that is easily adaptable and user-friendly.

• **Stresses the imperative of consulting numerous actors and sources in formulating a risk analysis**: For international agencies in conflict zones, it is important that political-security risk analyses are based on information gleaned from numerous actors and sources, at a local, national, regional and international level. The security situation in a conflict zone is difficult to predict and accurate analysis is often obscured by a lack of reliable information. In order to conduct a political risk assessment that is as objective, comprehensive and accurate as possible, as many sources as possible need to be consulted.

• **Risk analysis is uniquely tailored for the local requirements of a given operating situation**: In terms of operating in conflict zones, where circumstances are highly context-specific, this is an important point to keep in mind in order to develop a model that can be used in extremely divergent situations and still provide a comprehensive political-security risk analysis.
3.3.1.2. The IHS Energy Group’s model
The IHS Energy Group’s model provides a focused industry-specific analysis in which a comprehensive index to measure political risk is used (Howell, 2007: 373). The model is made up of three major risk factors: political, economic, and commercial petroleum. Each of these risks is further sub-classified, resulting in eleven distinct indicators. The host country is then ranked on a scale of 1 to 5 for each of these variables, with 0 being risk free and 5 signifying maximum risk potential. Weights are also assigned to each of the variables and the rating for each variable is then multiplied by its weight. Thereafter, the sum of the weighted ratings is then divided by 11 to give an overall rating for the country in terms of its risk potential. The 11 variables are (weighting in brackets), war and external threats (6%), civil and labour unrest (15%), internal violence (21%), regime instability (18%), economic instability (5%), energy vulnerability (4%), environmental activism (6%), ethno-linguistic factionalism (5%), investment constraints (7%), repatriation restrictions (5%), and threat of adverse changes in contracts/fiscal terms (8%). The IHS model is a qualitative model, despite the fact that the different variables of political risk are quantified. This is due to the ability of the analyst to assign different weights and scores to the variables (Alon et al, 2006: 634). According to Alon et al (2006: 634) the IHS index “offers easy quantification of the different variables of political risk”. Attributes of the IHS Energy Group’s model relevant to the development of an industry-specific political-security risk model for international agencies in conflict zones are:

- **War and external threats variable**: For international agencies operating in conflict zones the existence of inter-state war and external threats are integral indicators to be included under *transnational political-security risk*. International agencies need to take the following variables into account: regional/neighbouring state relationships, existence of rebel/terrorist/insurgent/bandit groups from neighbouring states, transnational organised crime networks, and neighbouring state’s policies and actions affecting international agencies.

- **Internal violence variable**: This variable corresponds with both *national political-security risk* and *human political-security risk*. In relation to *national political-security risk*, important indicators are the existence of insurgent/rebel/bandit/terrorist groups. With regard to *human political-security risk*, in a conflict zone where violence is often directed at international agencies, the indicators ambush/arrest/banditry/
detention/assault/bombings/hijacking/looting/kidnapping/landmines/rape/sexual violence/shooting should be included in a political-security risk analysis.

- **Threat of adverse changes in contracts/fiscal terms:** This variable is related to *national political-security risk*. Changes in government policies and actions may impact on international agencies’ security and status in a particular conflict zone.

- **Breaks risks down into groups and then assigns certain ratings and weights to each of the variables:** This “forces users to contemplate the configuration of circumstances surrounding a particular investment”, thereby contributing to a comprehensive political risk analysis (Howell, 2007: 378). Additionally, a numerical overall political risk rating is attained through the use of a weighting system that does not rely on complex or time-consuming mathematical calculations.

### 3.3.1.3. Boshoff’s model

Boshoff’s (2010) political risk model for the oil and gas industry is a “regional level industry-specific model... which takes on board both macro and micro indicators, which emanate from both the internal and external dimension” (Boshoff, 2010: 52). Boshoff’s (2010) model is comprised of two phases. Phase one is entitled “host country political risk”, and can be completed without knowledge of the investor. In this phase, the factors analysed are: political, economic, societal, and petroleum. Phase two consists of two types of political risk: “company political risk” and “international political risk”. Phase two can only be completed with knowledge of the investor (Boshoff, 2010: 53). In this model, each of the factors is given a percentage weight (of a total of a 100% combined). Thereafter, a score of 0 to 5 (0 – no risk, 5 – extreme risk) is awarded to each of the factor indicators. The sum of each factor’s indicators is added together to give a total score for the factor, which is then multiplied by the percentage weight assigned to that factor and then divided by the highest possible score of the factor. When all the factors’ scores are added together, a final total score is achieved for the country or region under examination.\(^{16}\) Boshoff (2010: 58) also provides a simple risk-grading scale through which the total score for the country or region under examination can be interpreted. Attributes of Boshoff’s model relevant to the development of an industry-specific political-security risk model for international agencies in conflict zones are:

- **Two-phase model:** A two-phase model facilitates an industry-specific analysis and an agency-specific analysis, depending on whether the analyst is part of a specific

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\(^{16}\) See Appendix B: List of factors and indicators in Boshoff’s model.
company or not. Accounting for agency-specific risks facilitates a comprehensive risk analysis.

- **Regime/political stability:** These indicators correspond with national political-security risk. Indicators include riots, violent outbursts and revolutions all of which impact on the security of international agencies by changing the nature of the conflict environment within which they are operating.

- **Corruption/poor governance:** These indicators correspond with national political-security risk. Corruption is an important indicator to take into account for international agencies in conflict zones as it can potentially lead to breaches in security, contracts and agreements.

- **Homogeneity, ethnic conflict:** These indicators correspond with national political-security risk. Ethnic, linguistic, racial, religious, gender and national divisions in the host country/conflict zone are important to consider when operating in a conflict zone, due to the fact that some agency employees may face increased security risks based on these aspects.

- **Standard of living:** This indicator corresponds with national political-security risk. Poor or deteriorating living standards of combatants, refugees, and others, in a conflict zone affects the security of international agencies as it may lead to increased attacks.

- **Nationality of company and host/home government relations:** These are international agency-specific indicators and thus can only be assessed with knowledge of the international agency. Indicators that are also important for international agencies include their religious, political and ideological affiliations as well as their history in the host country, and internal agency culture.

- **Mixed (qualitative and quantitative) methods used:** Similar to IHS, Boshoff’s model relies on mixed methods and the use of a simple weighting system to attain an overall political risk rating, which is easily calculable and understandable.

- **Scale for investment and political risk indication:** Boshoff’s risk-grading mechanism allows for the easy interpretation of his risk model. Similarly, for international agencies, a simple and efficient grading scale through which the industry-specific political-security risk model can be interpreted is desired.

In sum, this section has reviewed three political risk models specific to the energy industry. It has been shown that much can be taken from these models in terms of industry-specific ideas.
and attributes that will aid in the formulation of an industry-specific political-security risk framework for international agencies in conflict zones. Specifically, the precepts in Table 1: Summary of the relevant attributes of political risk models specific to the energy industry will be used in the development of an industry-specific political-security risk model for international agencies.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Summary of the relevant attributes of political risk models specific to the energy industry</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Methodological attributes</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perform ongoing situational risk analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consult numerous sources in formulating a risk analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tailor analysis for the local requirements of operating situation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Transnational political-security attributes</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War with neighbours; regional terrorist/ rebel/bandit/ insurgent groups; transnational criminal networks; regional relationships; policies and actions of neighbouring states; neighbour’s relationship with international agencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>National political-security attributes</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police /military composition, stability, and ability; special units; populace’s attitude towards them; relationship with international agencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Changes in host-government policies and actions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Human political-security attributes</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambush/arrest/detention/ assault/bombing/hijacking/ kidnapping/looting/banditry/ landmines/rape/sexual violence/shooting/terrorism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Summary of the relevant attributes of political risk models specific to the energy industry
3.3.2. International agencies’ security risk models

The aim of this section is to evaluate the security risk models currently used by three prominent international agencies, namely, CARE International, ECHO and the UN. In this regard, each agency’s approach to security risk assessment will be detailed, with a subsequent evaluation of the strengths and more importantly, the limitations, of the models. Focus will also be placed on the security risk factors and indicators deemed significant by these international agencies. This will aid in the identification of relevant risk factors and indicators to be included in the industry-specific political-security risk analysis framework developed later in this chapter.

3.3.2.1. CARE International’s model

CARE International is a humanitarian organisation with a central focus on the delivery of emergency aid to survivors in war zones (CARE International, 2010). CARE International’s Safety & Security Handbook written by the director of the CARE Security Unity, Bob Macpherson, is designed to “assist in improving the safety and security of CARE staff” and provides “general precautions and procedures” in this regard (Macpherson, 2004). CARE’s handbook is aimed at multiple organisational levels within the CARE system, from staff members in the field, to those in country offices, and those at a policy-making level (Macpherson, 2004: 10). CARE International’s safety and security assessment is a process that includes “an analysis of threats to CARE staff and property, the identification of vulnerabilities to these threats, and the development of threat indicators and thresholds to monitor changes in the security environment”. Safety and security assessment results are used to establish “overall risk levels for the country or area and to make informed decisions about which safety and security measures to adopt” (Macpherson, 2004: 9).

The first step in a safety and security assessment is an analysis of threats, defined as the “possibility that someone or something can injure staff or steal or damage CARE assets”. In the process of threat analysis, seven operating contexts are considered in terms of the threat factors that they could create. Operating contexts are, namely: geography, climate, political and economic, infrastructure, traditions, beliefs, customs and religious dynamics, social, and current security practices. With regard to types of threats, CARE stipulates three main types: crime (“performed through malicious, financial or personal motivation”); direct threats (“where CARE staff or property are the intended target”); and indirect threats (“where CARE is not the intended target”) (Macpherson, 2004: 11). Thereafter, an analysis of threat patterns and trends, including the location, frequency and intensity of each identified threat is
conducted. The next step in threat analysis involves determining the impact of each threat on staff and programming. CARE recommends scenario development in this regard. Once pattern, trend and impact are known for each threat, threat levels must then be determined (e.g. low, moderate, high or severe). The output of a threat analysis is “a list of possible threats with corresponding levels as well as a narrative discussion of the specific factors considered in determining each level” (Macpherson, 2004: 12).

The next aspect of the safety and security assessment process is a vulnerability analysis, defined as “the likelihood of encountering threatening incidents and having them result in harm to staff or loss of property” (Macpherson, 2004: 13). The following issues are considered when analysing vulnerabilities, namely: “why are staff and assets vulnerable?; “who or what are most vulnerable?”; “where are staff and assets most vulnerable?”; and, “when are staff and assets most vulnerable?” The handbook then stipulates that the same tools used to analyse threats can be used to analyse vulnerabilities. Further, with regard to indicators it is stated that “certain events may indicate changes in the safety or security environment, which could then suggest possible modification in safety and security measures”. These “indicators” should be identified during the assessment process, and should be observed on a daily basis in order to detect changes (Macpherson, 2004: 15).

In order to complete the security assessment, security thresholds should be identified for the particular operating area(s). A security threshold is “a readily identifiable ‘trigger’ event that, when it occurs, automatically brings about changes in... security measures” and it is usually closely linked to threat indicators (Macpherson, 2004: 15). The safety and security assessment process allows the determination of the level of risk in a given area or country. In this regard, risk ratings are based on the “presence of threats, the vulnerability of the staff to a specific threat, and the effectiveness of any safety and security measures already in place” (Macpherson, 2004: 16). Risk ratings are defined in the Safety & Security Handbook (Macpherson, 2004: 17) and are ranked on a scale, namely: low, moderate, high, and severe.

Attributes of CARE International’s safety and security assessment framework that are relevant to the development of an industry-specific political-security risk model for international agencies in conflict zones include:

- **Comprehensive background analysis of operating context is required:** This is highly relevant for international agencies in conflict zones due to the fact that in order to identify industry-specific political-security risks, comprehensive background or historical knowledge of the country and conflict zone is helpful.
Limitations of CARE International’s safety and security assessment framework:

- **Unstructured and therefore vague:** CARE International’s safety and security assessment process is detailed in writing only, and not illustrated conceptually or methodologically in a framework or model. This contributes to the process appearing unstructured and vague. As a result, it is also difficult to follow. A model encapsulating CARE International’s safety and security assessment process would make it more user-friendly, and provide greater clarity and direction with regard to a systematic security risk assessment.

- **Risk factors are not detailed:** While factors and indicators are listed with regard to analysing the general operating context, this is not done with regard to threat factors and indicators at the industry-specific level of operations. This means that the industry-specific nature of the assessment may be compromised. Indeed the threats analysed are based upon the analysts’ discretion, leaving room for subjectivity and gaps in the risk assessment.

3.3.2.2. The European Commission for Humanitarian Aid’s model

ECHO is the body of the European Union (EU)(Member States and the Commission) responsible for the provision of humanitarian aid. ECHO’s mandate is to provide emergency assistance and relief to the victims of natural disasters or armed conflict, outside the EU. ECHO has approximately 200 partners and it is to these partners and affiliated organisations that its *Generic Security Guide for Humanitarian Organisations* is directed. The *Generic Security Guide for Humanitarian Organisations* aims to help humanitarian organisations to manage their security well by “offering suggested guidance, tools and resources, designed to assist organisations to think through their security policies and procedures”. The primary intended audience of the guide is those responsible for the security management of humanitarian organisations, as well as field-based humanitarian managers and workers, visitors to the field and managers at headquarters (ECHO, 2007: 6).

With regard to security assessment, ECHO’s framework aims to enable humanitarian organisations to understand the security situation sufficiently so that they can plan their security measures appropriately (ECHO. 2007: 101). With regard to structure, ECHO advises that the following aspects are included in a security risk assessment: “location, date, and author; general situation; local authorities; threats (list of threats, the likelihood of each threat occurring, the likely impact of each threat if it occurred; our vulnerabilities to the threats;
security measures needed to minimise those vulnerabilities; what liaisons will be required with other organisations; conclusion (does the likely benefit of our work outweigh the security risk?, will the organisation’s presence endanger others?); recommendations”. In order to calculate security risks, ECHO advises that when considering “threats” in the security assessment, one can plot the “relative likelihood, and their impact if they occurred... on a chart” (ECHO, 2007: 141). Further, ECHO stipulates that one should rate threats and vulnerabilities on a scale of 1 to 5 (1 being very low and 5 being very high or catastrophic). On the “Threat Impact Chart” (see Figure 1), taken from The Generic Security Guide for Humanitarian Organisations (ECHO, 2007: 142), the curved lines represent thresholds of risk. The threshold of acceptable risk “varies according to what you expect to achieve”. Accordingly, if threats lie beyond the threshold of acceptable risk (which is determined by managers), action is required either to remove the threat, or to remove staff from the threat (ECHO, 2007: 142).

![Threat Impact Chart](image)

Figure 1: “Threat impact chart” (ECHO, 2007: 142)

Attributes of ECHO’s security risk assessment framework relevant to the development of an industry-specific political-security risk model for international agencies in conflict zones:

- **Local attitudes, local authorities, and security forces:** These indicators correspond with national political-security risk. These are all indicators that need to be considered in relation to international agencies in conflict zones.
- **Easy to use as it does not require complex calculations.**
Limitations of ECHO’s security risk assessment framework:

- **Risk factors are poorly defined:** For example, the factor, “threats”, is only accompanied by a list of possible questions that, according to ECHO (2007: 102), the person doing the assessment will want answered. These questions appear random and there is no indication of why and how they were selected as relevant. There is also no indication of which threat indicators should be assessed as part of a routine security assessment either and this choice is left to the analyst. The security risk assessment relies heavily on the input of the analyst in terms of the indicators included for each factor, contributing to a highly subjective assessment. Lastly, threats are not logically classified into groups or levels, making a systematic assessment difficult.

- **The “Threat Impact Chart” does not result in a comprehensive security risk assessment as the analyst can only analyse one threat at a time in order to gauge where it lies in relation to the acceptable threshold of risk:** In this sense it is overly simplistic and as a result it is incapable of providing an indication of the general level of security risk faced by an international agency in a conflict zone.

- **Impact scale (very low to catastrophic) and probability scale (very low to very high) on risk matrix are not accompanied by definitions of each level:** The difference between a “high” likely impact of an event and a “catastrophic” likely impact of an event is not made clear.

### 3.3.2.3. The United Nations’ model

The Security Risk Management (SRM) model is the managerial tool of the UN for the analysis of safety and security threats that may affect its personnel, assets and operations in conflict zones and other contexts. The Security Risk Assessment (SRA) is an integral part of the SRM process. All security decisions, security planning and implementation of security measures to manage security must be based on a thorough SRA (UN, 2008: 51). The SRM process consists of 8 stages, of which the first 5 make up the SRA: programme assessment; threat assessment; vulnerability assessment; risk analysis; selection of options; decision making; implementation and monitoring/review. The threat, vulnerability, and programme assessment stages incorporate the collection and deduction of relevant information required to determine risk. During the risk analysis stage, decisions are made based on the deductions provided from the assessments. Accordingly, “this is the most critical stage as it is here that
the level of risk, its acceptability, and the possible mitigation factors are determined” (UN, 2004: 14). The SRA can be conducted at the deep field, country, and headquarters levels.

Specifically, with regard to the components of the SRA, threat assessment provides both a general and a specific view of the operating environment, together with the identification of those threats that may impact the UN and its operations. Threat assessment consists of two parts: situation analysis and determination of threats. In the situational analysis, information is gathered from a “wide variety of sources such as United Nations organizations, non-governmental organizations, diplomatic missions, the host government, security forces, local populations and the media” (UN, 2004: 4). This information is grouped under several factors, namely: “social, economic, political, infrastructure, and security forces”. Secondly, in the determination of threats, all activities, circumstances, events, persons and actions that may have an adverse effect on the UN system, staff, facilities, or equipment, are considered. Threats are divided into 4 general types: perceived threats, actual threats, direct threats, and indirect threats. Vulnerability assessment also consists of two parts: determine vulnerabilities (weaknesses) and determine mitigating factors (strengths). Vulnerabilities or gaps in existing security arrangements are compared against mitigating factors, which are those factors that may lessen the impact of a threat (UN, 2004: 4). Programme assessment is an evaluation of “the relevance, urgency, needs and implementation methodology” of the UN activities in a particular environment. The programme should be assessed against the threats, vulnerabilities and risks on a continual basis (UN, 2004: 5). Risk analysis combines all the factors and deductions from the assessments and determines the possible impact on the UN, together with the likelihood that the particular adverse event will occur (UN, 2004: 5).

In a matrix format similar to ECHO’s, the UN grades “impact” and “likelihood” on a matrix-style graph. The UN (2004: 6-10) also provides definitions of the descriptors\(^\text{17}\) for “impact”, “likelihood” and “level of risk”. The last step in the SRA is selecting options. This process involves determining what course of action, or options, are possible to maintain the safety and security of the UN, its staff, and property (UN, 2004: 7). Attributes of the UN’s SRA framework relevant to the development of an industry-specific political-security risk analysis for international agencies in conflict zones:

- **The threat assessment component of SRA calls for a situational analysis, which results in a detailed review of the complete operating, living and security

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\(^{17}\) See Appendix C: UN definitions of descriptors, namely: Table 5: UN definitions of ‘impact’ descriptors, Table 6: UN definitions of ‘likelihood’ descriptors, and Table 7: UN definitions of ‘level of risk’ descriptors.
environment, including the following variables: political, economic, social, infrastructure, and security forces – military and police (UN, 2004: 4): Detailed knowledge of the general situation in the context of operations is vital for the development of a comprehensive political-security risk analysis for international agencies in conflict zones.

- **Detailed descriptions of the rankings of “impact”, “likelihood”, and “level of risk” are provided:** Regarding a political-security risk analysis model for international agencies in conflict zones, the development of a simple and clearly defined risk-grading scale enables an efficient analysis to be completed.

Limitations of the UN’s SRA framework:

- **Does not provide suggestions of what risks factors and indicators the analyst could/should consider in SRA:** This may result in gaps in the SRA due to the fact that, unintentionally, the analyst might not consider certain factors and indicators. It also means that the eventual SRA is highly subjective, as it is a reflection of what the analyst deems important.

- **Risk matrix only allows one threat to be plotted on it at a time:** This does not allow for a general level of risk to be ascertained as only the relative risk of a particular threat over time can be determined from the matrix.

- **The SRA process is “complex... and its implementation needs to be strengthened and improved” (UN, 2008: 51):** The SRA process could be made less complex through streamlining its multiple component parts into a more inclusive framework.

In sum, this section has described and analysed three security risk models currently used by international agencies. The focus was on identifying the limitations exhibited by these models so that an industry-specific political-security risk model for international agencies in which these limitations are overcome can be developed later in this chapter. Secondary to identifying limitations, attributes of these models that are relevant to the development of an industry-specific political-security risk model for international agencies were also discussed. The limitations and the relevant attributes of international agencies’ current security risk models are captured in Table 2: Summary of the relevant attributes and limitations of international agencies’ security risk models.
### Summary of the relevant attributes and limitations of international agencies’ security risk models

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>International agency</th>
<th>Care</th>
<th>ECHO</th>
<th>UN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Relevant attributes</strong></td>
<td>Operating context analysis is required</td>
<td>National security variables: local attitudes, local authorities, and security forces</td>
<td>Situational analysis of general operating environment is required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Easy to use and no complex calculations</td>
<td>Detailed description of rankings and risk categories</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Limitations</strong></td>
<td>Unstructured and therefore, vague</td>
<td>Risk factors are poorly defined</td>
<td>Risk factors and variables not specified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Risk factors and variables are not detailed</td>
<td>Only one threat can be plotted on threat impact chart at a time</td>
<td>Only one threat can be plotted on risk matrix at a time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Impact and probability scales are not defined</td>
<td>SRA process is complex</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Summary of the relevant attributes and limitations of international agencies’ security risk models

### 3.4. Step one and step two political-security risk analysis

According to Lax (1983: 113-114): “It is the role of the model... to refine the list and organise the variables – their relationships, flows, and consequences, into a useful analytical tool”. The above section has identified factors, indicators and methodologies relevant to the development of an industry-specific political-security risk model for international agencies in conflict zones. It is to the development of a model through which a successful industry-specific political-security risk analysis for international agencies in conflict zones can be achieved, that this research study now turns. This will be done by first outlining the general process of political-security risk analysis for international agencies in conflict zones. In this regard Figure 2 illustrates this two-step process, while Figure 3 is more detailed, outlining political-risk analysis for international agencies in conflict zones.

**Figure 2: The two steps of political-security risk analysis specific to international agencies in conflict zones**
Step one involves a conflict analysis, whereby the analyst establishes a basis from which the political-security risk model specific to international agencies in conflict zones can be applied in step two. The rationale for a two-step process lies in the importance of the analyst having an in-depth understanding of the conflict zone in which the international agency will be operating. Indeed, both the UN (2004: 4) and CARE International (Macpherson, 2004: 10) highlight the value of analysts having a detailed descriptive understanding of their operating contexts. Step one therefore, facilitates this understanding as it calls for a conflict analysis in which both the origin and the drivers of the conflict are described.

Thereafter, step two can be embarked upon. Through the use of the model in step two, a political-security risk analysis for international agencies in conflict zones is completed. The model encompasses four political-security risks with their corresponding factors (factors in brackets): transnational political-security risk (transnational risk factor), national political-security risk (political risk factor, military/police risk factor, internal conflict risk factor, societal risk factor), human political-security risk (human risk factor), international agency-specific political-security risk (home/host country relations risk factor, affiliations risk factor). The indicators corresponding to these factors are too numerous to be listed in the simple graphical representation in Figure 3. In this regard, the following sub-section will further detail the factors and indicators that comprise the two steps of a political-security risk analysis specific to international agencies in conflict zones. Thereafter, the complete model associated with the factors and indicators will be presented in the form of an industry-specific political-security risk model for international agencies in conflict zones.
3.4.1. Step one: Conflict analysis

A conflict analysis is the first step in a political-security risk analysis for international agencies in conflict zones. In this respect it is necessary for the analyst to have a thorough
knowledge of both the origin and drivers of the conflict within which it is operating. Indeed, the UN (2004: 4) and CARE International (Macpherson, 2004: 10) highlight this necessity, while Gassmann (2005: 3) notes that “[m]ost agencies admit that they have insufficient knowledge of the context in which they operate”. CARE International (2004: 10) refers to the need for a “good knowledge of the operating context”, while the UN (2004: 3) terms it a “situational analysis”. This step ensures that analysts have a background understanding of the conflict zone in which they are operating as well as knowledge of the causes motivating the particular conflict. Detailed knowledge of these aspects aids in the informed identification of political-security risks faced by international agencies when using the model in step two. The following variables comprise an analysis of the origin and drivers of a conflict:

- **Origin of Conflict**: History of the region in relation to the conflict, history of the country in relation to the conflict, and history of the conflict.
- **Drivers of Conflict**: Political, economic or pecuniary, social, and ideological factors that fuel the conflict.

### 3.4.2. Step two: Industry-specific political-security risk analysis for international agencies in conflict zones

**Transnational political-security risk**: Transnational political-security risk is concerned with the risk emanating from the regional level and affecting international agencies. It is comprised of the **transnational risk factor**, which is measured by the following indicators:

- **Transnational risk factor**: Policies and actions of neighbours regarding host state; regional sanctions, treaties and agreements; conflict/war with neighbours; existence of terrorist/rebel/bandit/insurgent groups; existence of transnational criminal networks; neighbour’s relationship with international agencies.

**National political-security risk**: National political-security risk is comprised of political-security risk emanating from the level of the host country. It can be further delineated by dividing it into four risk factors, namely: political, military/police, internal conflict, and societal which are measured by the indicators below:

- **Political risk factor**: Type of regime in power; the political system; political stability; government corruption; local attitudes towards government, riots, political violence; government’s relationship with international agencies, and changes in government policies and actions regarding international agencies.
• **Military/police risk factor**: Composition, stability, and ability of military/police; existence of special units; populace’s attitude towards police/military; police/military relationship with international agencies.

• **Internal conflict risk factor**: Civil war; existence of terrorist/bandit/insurgents/rebel groups.

• **Societal risk factor**: Ethnic/linguistic/racial/national/traditional/religious divisions; gender roles; standards of living in conflict zone.

**Human political-security risk**: Human political-security risk relates to the safety and security of individual international agency employees in a conflict zone. It is comprised of the human risk factor, which is measured by the following indicators:

• **Human risk factor**: Ambush/assault/banditry/bombing/detention/kidnapping/looting/rape/sexual violence/hijacking/carjacking/mines.

**International agency-specific political-security risk**: International agency-specific political-security risk involves risk stemming from aspects particular to an agency. It is comprised of two factors, namely, home/host country relations risk factor and affiliations risk factor, which are measured by the following indicators:

• **Home/host country relations risk factor**: Home/host country relations – receptive, diplomatic and accommodating relations, or unreceptive, hostile, and uncooperative; and home/host country treaties, agreements, and actions affecting international agencies in conflict zones.

• **Affiliations risk factor**: Religious/political/ideological/historical/cultural/historical affiliations of international agency.

### 3.4.2. 1. Practical application of the model in step two

In step two the industry-specific political-security risk model shown in Figure 4 is utilised, allowing the analyst to attain an overall risk rating for the conflict zone within which an international agency is operating. Each of the risks carries a percentage weight (out of a total 100% combined). For international agencies in conflict zones, the weight given to the four risks is as follows: transnational political-security risk – 20%, national political-security risk – 40%, human political-security security risk – 20%, and international agency-specific political-security risk – 20%. The risk factors are thus weighted as follows: transnational risk factor – 20%, political risk factor – 10%, military/police risk factor – 10%, internal conflict

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18 See page 56, Figure 4: An industry-specific political-security risk model for international agencies in conflict zones.
risk factor – 10%, societal risk factor – 10%, human risk factor – 20%, home/host country relations risk factor – 10%, and affiliations risk factor – 10%. The reason that national political-security risk is given a heavier weighting of 40% is that its factors indicators have the most bearing on the conflict zone within which international agencies are operating and, therefore, on the security of international agencies.

In order to utilise the model, a discrete\(^{19}\) rating of 1 to 4 is given for each factor on the industry-specific political-security risk model. The rating system is based on the following: 1 – Low Risk, 2 – Medium Risk, 3 – High Risk, 4 – Extreme Risk. In order to work out the weighted risk rating for each factor, the rating given to the factor is multiplied by the numerical weight of the factor and thereafter, this is divided by the maximum total rating of the factor (which is 4). In order to attain the overall risk rating for the conflict zone, the individual weighted ratings of all the factors are added together, resulting in a percentage overall risk rating of the conflict zone. The full mathematical formula for achieving an overall risk rating for a conflict zone is provided below:

\[
\text{ORR}_A = \sum_{i=1}^{n} R_i \cdot \frac{W_i}{MTR}
\]

\[
\text{ORR}_A = \frac{WR_1 + WR_2 + \ldots + WR_n}{MTR}
\]

\[
\text{ORR}_A = \sum_{i=1}^{n} \text{WR}_i
\]

\[
\text{WR}_1 = \left[ R_1 \cdot \frac{W_1}{MTR} \right]
\]

\[
\text{WR}_n = \left[ R_n \cdot \frac{W_n}{MTR} \right]
\]

\[
\text{ORR}_A = \left[ R_1 \cdot \frac{W_1}{MTR} \right] + \left[ R_2 \cdot \frac{W_2}{MTR} \right] + \ldots + \left[ R_n \cdot \frac{W_n}{MTR} \right]
\]

\[
\text{ORR}_A = \sum_{i=1}^{n} R_i \cdot \frac{W_i}{MTR}
\]

\(^{19}\) Discrete means that the score can only be an integer, i.e. 1, 2, 3, or 4.
For the analyst utilising the model in a conflict zone, it suffices to know the simple form of the equation explaining how to attain an overall risk rating, which is the fifth equation provided above, or:

\[
\text{ORR}_A = \left[ R_1 \cdot \frac{W_1}{MTR} \right] + \left[ R_2 \cdot \frac{W_2}{MTR} \right] \ldots \left[ R_n \cdot \frac{W_n}{MTR} \right]
\]
**STEP TWO: INDUSTRY-SPECIFIC POLITICAL-SECURITY RISK ANALYSIS FOR INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES IN CONFLICT ZONES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Risk rating</th>
<th>Transnational political-security risk (20%)</th>
<th>National political-security risk (40%)</th>
<th>Human political-security risk (20%)</th>
<th>International agency-specific political-security risk (20%)</th>
<th>Home/host country relations risk factor (10%)</th>
<th>Affiliations risk factor (10%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Transnational risk factor (20%)</td>
<td>Political risk factor (10%)</td>
<td>Internal conflict risk factor (10%)</td>
<td>Societal risk factor (10%)</td>
<td>Military/police risk factor (10%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 LOW RISK</td>
<td>There are annual incidents of fighting between host state and neighbouring state(s) including annual attacks by regional terrorist/insurgent/bandit/rebel groups. Criminal networks affect activity in the conflict zone. All policies and actions of neighbouring state are friendly to IAs.</td>
<td>Government policies and actions are friendly to IAs. Government has control in conflict zone. Low levels of corruption exist. Opposition to the government is not apparent.</td>
<td>Military and police are functional and competent in maintaining law and order in the conflict zone. Populace trusts them. Military and/or police provide good support to IAs.</td>
<td>Civil war exists, though actual fighting is infrequent. Terrorist/insurgent/bandit/rebel groups rarely strike in the conflict zone.</td>
<td>Civil war exists, though actual fighting is infrequent. Terrorist/insurgent/bandit/rebel groups rarely strike in the conflict zone.</td>
<td>International Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 MEDIUM RISK</td>
<td>There are monthly incidents of fighting between host state and neighbouring state(s) including monthly attacks by regional terrorist/insurgent/bandit/rebel groups. Criminal networks affect activity in the conflict zone. The policies and actions of neighbouring state are indifferent to IAs.</td>
<td>Government policies and actions are indifferent to IAs. Government has some control in conflict zone. Moderate levels of corruption exist. Monthly opposition to the government exists in the form of political violence and/or riots.</td>
<td>Military and Police are functional and fairly capable at maintaining law and order in the conflict zone. Populace displays some trust in them. Military and/or police provide some support to IAs.</td>
<td>There are monthly incidents of fighting due to civil war/international conflict. Terrorist/insurgent/bandit/rebel groups strike on a monthly basis in the conflict zone.</td>
<td>There are monthly incidents of the following incidents: assault/ambush/kidnapping/banditry/rapa/sexual violence/detention/hiijacking/carjacking/looting/bombing/landmines.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 HIGH RISK</td>
<td>There are weekly incidents of fighting between host state and neighbouring state(s) including weekly attacks by regional terrorist/insurgent/bandit/rebel groups. Criminal networks affect most activity in the conflict zone. Most policies and actions of neighbouring state are hostile to IAs.</td>
<td>Most government policies and actions are hostile to IAs. Government has little control in conflict zone. High levels of corruption exist. Weekly opposition to the government exists in the form of political violence and/or riots.</td>
<td>Military/police have little functional capability and will to maintain law and order in the conflict zone and/or are participating in conflict. Populace has no trust in them. Military/police provide no support to IAs.</td>
<td>There are weekly incidents of fighting due to civil war/international conflict. Terrorist/insurgent/bandit/rebel groups strike on a weekly basis in the conflict zone.</td>
<td>There are weekly occurrences of the following incidents: assault/ambush/kidnapping/banditry/rapa/sexual violence/detention/hiijacking/carjacking/looting/bombing/landmines.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 EXTREME RISK</td>
<td>There are daily incidents of fighting between host state and neighbouring state(s) including daily attacks by regional terrorist/insurgent/bandit/rebel groups. Criminal networks permeate all activity in the conflict zone. All policies and actions of neighbouring state are hostile to IAs**.</td>
<td>All government policies and actions are hostile to IAs. There is a complete breakdown of government control in conflict zone. Extreme corruption exists. Daily opposition to the government exists in the form of political violence and/or riots.</td>
<td>Military/police have no functional capability and will to maintain law and order in the conflict zone and/or are participants in conflict. Populace has no trust in them. Military/police provide no support to IAs.</td>
<td>There are daily incidents of fighting due to civil war/international conflict. Terrorist/insurgent/bandit/rebel groups strike on a daily basis in the conflict zone.</td>
<td>There are daily occurrences of the following incidents: assault/ambush/kidnapping/banditry/rapa/sexual violence/detention/hiijacking/carjacking/looting/bombing/landmines.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 4: An industry-specific political-security risk model for international agencies in conflict zones**

*Overall Risk Rating = \[ R_1 \cdot \frac{W_1}{MT R} + R_2 \cdot \frac{W_2}{MT R} + R_3 \cdot \frac{W_3}{MT R} \] ** International Agency
In order to interpret the result obtained through the use of the industry-specific political-security risk model for international agencies in conflict zones, the analyst needs a guideline or risk-grading scale. Table 3: Scale for operational and political-security risk indication is a simple risk-grading scale, the use of which gives the analyst a total operational and political-security risk indication of the conflict zone within which the international agency is operating. The next step would be to implement risk mitigation and management measures based upon the overall risk rating gained. However, as stated in chapter one, this research study is solely focused on political-security risk analysis and its scope therefore does not extend beyond providing a scale for interpreting the results of an industry-specific political-security risk analysis for international agencies in conflict zones.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Risk rating (%)</th>
<th>Operational indication</th>
<th>Political-security risk indication</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-19</td>
<td>Very low risk</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-39</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-49</td>
<td>Low to moderate risk</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-59</td>
<td>Moderate risk</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60-74</td>
<td>High risk</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75-100</td>
<td>Extreme risk</td>
<td>Extreme</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: Scale for operational and political-security risk indication

3.5. Conclusion

In conclusion, the primary focus of this chapter has been on the development of an industry-specific political-security risk model for international agencies in conflict zones. The objective was to develop a model based on the theory of political risk set out in chapter two. The development of this model was enhanced by the analysis of the relationship between international agencies, contemporary conflicts, and the post-9/11 global political-security landscape, which served to illuminate the evolving dynamics between political-security risk and international agencies. In addition, three political risk models specific to the energy industry were examined with the aim of extracting aspects relevant to the development of an industry-specific political-security risk model for international agencies in conflict zones.

20 See section 1.6 Limitations and delimitations of the research study.
Thereafter, the security risk frameworks currently utilised by three international agencies – CARE International, ECHO, and the UN – were analysed in order to evaluate their strengths and more importantly for this research study, their limitations. Subsequently, the factors, indicators and methodological aspects relevant to the building of a political-security risk model for international agencies in conflict zones were discussed and presented. This chapter culminated in the development of a political-security risk model specific to international agencies in conflict zones and a corresponding risk-grading scale for interpreting the results of the model.

Chapter four will focus on the application of the model developed in this chapter to the case study of international agencies in the conflict zone of eastern Chad. By undertaking the type of industry-specific political-security risk analysis that was specified in this chapter, a comprehensive picture of the political-security risks facing international agencies in eastern Chad will be painted.
Chapter 4: A political-security risk analysis for international agencies in eastern Chad

4.1. Introduction

The focus of chapter four is on testing the industry-specific political-security risk model developed in chapter three by applying it to the case study of international agencies in eastern Chad. For the purpose of acquainting the reader with the role of international agencies in eastern Chad, this chapter provides a brief introductory account of the international agency presence in eastern Chad from January 2003 until May 2010. Thereafter, the two steps of political-security risk analysis will be embarked upon. In step one, a conflict analysis of eastern Chad will be undertaken in order to facilitate the analyst’s in-depth knowledge of the origin and drivers of this conflict. Thereafter, using the model, step two, an industry-specific political-security risk analysis for international agencies in conflict zones will be completed.

Due to the fact that the following political-security risk analysis of eastern Chad is not being conducted for a particular agency, there is no knowledge of international agency-specific political-security risk and the factors and indicators comprising it. In order to test the applicability of the model, the average risk rating of the preceding factors will be used. This will allow an overall risk rating for eastern Chad to be achieved. The overall political-security risk rating attained in this chapter is therefore as accurate as possible in light of the lack of information about agency-specific particularities. Obviously, when conducted for a specific international agency in a particular conflict zone, the analyst will be able to produce an analysis that includes all the agency-specific elements.

4.2. International agencies in eastern Chad

Approximately 70 international agencies have been present in eastern Chad since the start of hostilities in Sudan’s Darfur region in 2003, which saw the migration of over 250 000 refugees to Chad (Afrol News, 2009). The ensuing conflict in eastern Chad from 2005 onwards has also created over 167 000 displaced Chadians. Furthermore, refugees fleeing conflict in the CAR have also contributed to the humanitarian crisis in eastern Chad (Ploch, 2009: 3). As a result, international agencies in eastern Chad are assisting in providing “refugee protection and assistance; psychosocial services; agricultural and food security

21 See Map 1: Map of eastern Chad
interventions; emergency food assistance; and health, nutrition, water, sanitation, and hygiene services”, among others (USAID, 2010: 1).

Map 1: Map of eastern Chad 22

In conjunction with the efforts by international agencies to address the humanitarian situation in eastern Chad, was the establishment in 2007 of a multinational UN-sanctioned presence in eastern Chad whose task it was to “contribute to the protection of refugees, IDPs and civilians in danger; facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance, and create favourable conditions for reconstruction and economic and social development”. This multinational presence was made up of two bodies, the UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT), which had no military force component until 2009 when it took over from the EU military force (EUFOR). EUFOR was tasked with providing general security for civilians and facilitating the free movement of humanitarian assistance personnel (Ploch, 22 Map sourced from the Nations Online Project (2010).
2009: 5). A decision was made in March 2010 to extend MINURCAT’s mission in Chad until 15 May 2010 (UNDPI, 2010). On 25 May 2010 the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) voted unanimously to reduce the military component of MINURCAT from its current 3300 troops to 2200 military personnel (1900 in Chad and 300 in the CAR) by 15 July 2010. Withdrawal of the remaining troops will begin on 15 October 2010 and all military and civilian personnel are to be withdrawn by 31 December 2010. This decision was made under pressure from Chadian president, Idriss Déby, who has reassured the UN that his government will take responsibility to protect civilians, including the humanitarian community (UN News Centre, 2010). The looming departure of the peacekeepers has elevated concerns of a major security vacuum in eastern Chad. This concern is compounded by the Chadian governments’ lack of a concrete plan to provide security in the absence of UN peacekeepers (IC News, 2010). The next section provides an in-depth analysis of the security risks facing international agencies in eastern Chad through the application of the two steps of industry-specific political-security risk analysis for international agencies in conflict zones.

4.3. Step one: Conflict analysis

The conflict analysis takes the form of a report commissioned by an international agency either planning on operating in eastern Chad or currently operating in eastern Chad. It is a discursive analysis of the origin and drivers of conflict in eastern Chad. The aim in this regard, is for the analyst to gain a background understanding of the conflict in order to facilitate informed analysis when it comes to industry-specific political-security risk analysis in step two.

4.3.1. Origin of the conflict in eastern Chad23

In order to understand the main aspects of this conflict, this section addresses the root causes of the conflict in this region. Specifically, the variables to be discussed in this section are: history of the region in relation to the conflict, history of the country in relation to the conflict, and history of the conflict.

Since 1960 when Chad gained its independence from France, it has faced extreme and often violent turmoil. Like its regional counterparts, this land-locked country is divided along ethnic, religious and regional lines. These divisions can be seen in the identification of the southerners with the Central African Republic (CAR), the northerners with Libya, and those

23 See Appendix D: Chronology of the origin and drivers of conflict in eastern Chad.
in the east, with the Sudanese region of western Darfur. The division between the mostly Arab-influenced north and the black African south is compounded by the relatively fertile character of the southern region. During the colonial period this meant that the southerners garnered the favour of the French and, therefore, political and military control of the state at independence (The Enough Team, n.d.: 1). The nature of French colonisation was to contribute to the unhappy state of affairs in which Chad now finds itself as the French did not pursue policies designed to unite Chad due to the fact that the country served as little more than a source of raw cotton and unskilled labour. France’s brand of colonisation meant that at independence Chad was a nation comprised of a vast and diverse territory, scant resources, a nearly non-existent market and a vast impoverished society with varied political traditions, ethnic and regional loyalties (Alusala, 2007: 58). With hindsight it can be said that the scene was set for armed conflict involving a host of players from the regional, national and local level.

Political instability in Chad manifested in earnest in 1965, when a tax protest led by northern Islamic groups turned into a rebellion against the southern Christian-dominated government (Ploch, 2009: 1). President Tombalbaye’s authoritarian approach alienated both northerners and easterners and in 1975, in the midst of a fully fledged war against his regime, Tombalbaye was assassinated in Chad’s first coup d’état. Thereafter, General Felix Malloum (1975-1979), Goukouni Oueddei (1979-1982) and Hissène Habré (1982-1990) were all deposed in a similar manner. The fortunes of Chad’s presidents have been intimately tied to the involvement of outsiders, including Libya, Sudan, the US, and France. Libya’s involvement started with its leader, Muammar Gaddafi’s alleged coup plot against Tombalbaye in 1971. Libya-Chadian relations were not all sour and in 1979, northerner Goukouni Ouddei, with the support of Libya, forced President Malloum out of power. Ouddei’s regime was short-lived as in 1982 Hissène Habré led a successful revolt against his Libya-backed government (The Enough Team, n.d.: 2). Libya has not been the only foreign interest in Chad. Indeed, the US and France backed Habré during the Cold War in a proxy war against Gaddafi. Habré’s brutal reign finally unravelled in 1990 in the aftermath of the Cold War and the suspension of Western funding and support. This paved the way for Habré’s former chief of staff, Idriss Déby, to launch a successful rebellion that saw him ascend to the presidency in 1990 (Ploch, 2009: 1). It is Déby’s links to eastern Chad and Darfur through the Zaghawa ethnic group, a semi-nomadic minority group whose population straddles the Chad-Sudan border, that have been instrumental in both his rise to power and the current crisis in eastern Chad. Indeed, Déby found much support from Sudanese Islamists.
and the Zaghawa in Darfur, both of whom had an interest in the defeat of the West-friendly Habré. Déby and his troops were armed and trained in Sudan and Déby launched his successful coup with the support of Libya and Sudan (Eriksson and Hagstromer, 2005: 35). The cross-border collusion between Sudan and Chad has engendered an explosive and violent relationship between the two countries, which shall be investigated in the next section in relation to the drivers of conflict in eastern Chad.

Déby is Chad’s longest-serving president and he came to power when the “wind of democratisation was blowing in over francophone Africa” (Eriksson and Hagstromer, 2005: 26). Though Déby pledged to create a multi-party democratic political system, any elements of democracy that were initiated during his rule have been overshadowed by his willingness to crack down brutally on any opponents or challengers and widespread presidential patronage to purchase support from warlords and clan leaders, among other nefarious practices (Ploch, 2009: 1 and The Enough Team, n.d.: 2). During Déby’s tenure, a number of presidential and legislative elections\(^\text{24}\) have taken place, though all have been marked by irregularities, fraud and extensive human rights violations, culminating in Déby’s amendment to the constitution in 2005 to allow himself a third term in power (Eriksson and Hagstromer, 2005: 27). Movement towards democratisation in Chad has largely been thwarted by the commencement of oil extraction in the country. Indeed, oil revenues have gone a long way to financing Déby’s regime, thereby keeping him in power (The Enough Team, n.d.: 2). Déby has also faced numerous coup attempts by a range of armed regional and political factions that have been in operation since 1990. More recently, in 2005 armed opposition to Déby in the form of rebel alliances made up of defectors from the Chadian army, the government, Sudan-sponsored Chadian rebels and others, has led to widespread conflict in eastern Chad, which has been compounded by the existence of conflict in Darfur from 2003 onwards.

**Evaluation:** In sum, regional relationships have played a pivotal role in the genesis of conflict in eastern Chad. The relationship between Chad and Sudan in particular, and President Déby’s links to Darfur through the Zaghawa ethnic group, can be singled out as integral to the development of conflict in eastern Chad. Conflict in eastern Chad is also attributable to the nature of French colonialism, which compounded divisions within Chadian society. Moreover, Chad’s history of dictatorships and widespread presidential patronage has fostered a climate within which violent opposition is the norm. The next section looks more closely at the drivers of the conflict in eastern Chad.

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4.3.2. Drivers of the conflict in eastern Chad
This section examines the drivers of conflict in eastern Chad. The variables to be discussed are: political, economic or pecuniary, social, and ideological. HRW (HRW, 2007: 21), which has undertaken comprehensive research on the conflict in eastern Chad and published a number of reports on the subject, underscores that the conflict is driven by access to “land and natural resources, particularly water, in an area of environmental extremes..., the destabilizing impact of the broader political tensions in Chad, the influence of the numerous armed groups in the region, many linked to the Darfur conflict, and the manner in which the Chadian government has responded to the insecurity”.

Firstly, a number of internal political factors contributed to events coming to a head in eastern Chad in 2005. The first of these was Déby’s refusal to provide direct support to his kinsmen, the Sudanese Zhaghawa rebels, against the government of Sudan in Darfur. This infuriated many Chadian government officials whom Déby had appointed based on their membership of the same group. This led to an attempted coup in May 2004. Compounding this was Déby’s 2005 decision to push for constitutional changes in order to allow him to serve a third term as president. In late 2005, members of the Chadian armed forces as well as close members of Déby’s own family defected to join Chadian opposition groups located in eastern Chad and Darfur. The defections were based on the burgeoning discontent described above, as well as the pecuniary aim to win oil concessions from Déby, who had so far jealously guarded Chad’s new oil revenues (HRW: 2006: 5). Hostilities began in earnest in December 2005 when Platform for Change, Unity and Democracy (SCUD) and Rally for Democracy and Freedom (RDL) rebels began their campaign of rebel incursions into eastern Chad from Darfur. Indeed, the raid on the strategic town of Adré in eastern Chad saw major hostilities between Chadian rebels and Chadian security forces supported by Sudan-sponsored Darfur rebels (HRW, 2007: 18). The government of Chad’s decision to withdraw the Chadian National Army (ANT) from the border areas in order to bolster strategic points in eastern Chad, such as the towns of Adré and Abéché, against rebel attacks meant that armed groups could operate unchecked. In addition, the Chadian government has largely ignored escalating communal violence and militia attacks in eastern Chad, either blaming the Sudanese government of orchestrating the attacks, or attributing them to a problem between agriculturalists and pastoralists. This security vacuum has had disastrous consequences for civilians and created the conditions for a proxy war to develop between rebel forces from both Chad and Sudan (HRW, 2007: 21).
Hostilities in Sudan’s western region of Darfur have been festering since 2003 when the government of Sudan and its Janjaweed militias launched a counterinsurgency in Darfur against ethnic Zaghawa, Fur, and Masalit rebel groups and civilians (HRW, 2006a: 2). Since the start of the conflict in Darfur, the term Janjaweed has become a catch-all phrase to describe militia groups operating in this region. Specifically, HRW (2007: 22) states that the term encompasses two distinct types of armed forces: “militia groups recruited, trained, armed, and supplied by the government of Sudan and used as proxy forces in the government’s military campaign against Sudanese rebel groups and primarily comprised of Sudanese and Chadian Arabs; and opportunistic armed elements taking advantage of the total collapse of law and order to settle scores, loot villages, and raid cattle and livestock”. The ethnic cleansing and war crimes committed in Darfur have led to a major humanitarian crisis with the displacement of more than two million Sudanese, the majority of whom have fled to eastern Chad as refugees (HRW, 2006a: 2). The influx of Sudanese refugees added to the already tenuous social and political landscape in eastern Chad, placed added pressure on scant local resources and further strained relations between Chad and Sudan.

Apart from the humanitarian disaster caused by the conflict in Darfur, Sudanese and Chadian relations also plummeted during this time, as both governments were supporting rebels active against the other along their common, 1360km border (Ploch, 2009: 3 and HRW, 2006a: 4). This culminated in the declaration of a “state of belligerence” in December 2005 and relations between the two countries have ranged from covertly antagonistic to overtly conflicting ever since (HRW, 2006b: 8). Indeed, the lawlessness and violent chaos that has characterised eastern Chad is aptly captured in the following description of affairs:

> Various militia groups including Janjaweed groups based in Darfur and Arab militias based in Chad and Darfur have raped and killed Chadian civilians, have looted and burned Chadian villages and stolen livestock and other property. Community-based Chadian self-defense groups have killed Chadian civilians. Self-defense groups and government of Chad-supported Sudanese rebel movement with bases in Chad have been responsible for the recruitment and use of child soldiers. The government of Chad has failed to take adequate action to protect civilians, has failed to bring perpetrators of human rights abuses to justice, and has allowed a climate of impunity to persist in eastern Chad (HRW, 2007: 24).

A less obvious driver of conflict in eastern Chad is related to the exploitable grievances of communities in eastern Chad. Eastern Chad, and particularly the Dar Sila region, has rich

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25 The Dar Sila region is located in the south-eastern border area of eastern Chad (HRW, 2006a: 9).
soil and plentiful water resources that allows profitable farming relative to other areas in Chad. This area attracted IDPs in the 1980s when a severe drought forced approximately 10% of the Chadian population to relocate. Additionally, mass livestock fatalities during this time drove Arab nomads to turn to agriculture in order to survive, making access to land and security of tenure an increasingly heated issue. Challenges to the customary land system in this part of eastern Chad were widespread and animosity between drought migrants and local communities over access to land began to unravel the social fabric in this region. This situation was exploited in the early 2000s for recruitment purposes by armed actors from both sides of the Chad-Sudan border (HRW, 2009: 18-19). The widespread conflict in eastern Chad, mass displacements, limited resources, and regional instability outlined in this section have created a “disaster... due to ongoing insecurity and humanitarian needs” (USAID, 2010: 1). Indeed, there is an acute demand in eastern Chad for the assistance of international agencies.

**Evaluation:** The main drivers of conflict in eastern Chad are, namely, the destabilising political tensions engendered by Déby’s patrimonial rule and the aggressive manner in which the Chadian government has responded to insecurity. The influence of numerous armed groups and bandits that operate with impunity in the border region between Chad and Sudan, as well as the fraught relationship between Chad and Sudan, are also central drivers of the conflict in eastern Chad. Further, social grievances over ethnic inequalities have been compounded by pecuniary conflict over land and natural resources. In the next section the industry-specific political-security risk model for international agencies in conflict zones will be applied in order to analyse the security risk facing international agencies in eastern Chad.

**4.4. Step two: Political-security risk analysis for international agencies in eastern Chad**

The following political-security risk analysis for international agencies in eastern Chad will, like step one, take the form of a report commissioned by an international agency either planning on operating in eastern Chad or already operating in eastern Chad. As mentioned earlier, for the sake of testing the model and arriving at an overall risk rating for international agencies in eastern Chad, the two factors of *international agency-specific political-security risk* will be allocated the average risk rating of the preceding factors. This is due to the fact that there is no knowledge of the *international agency-specific political-security risk* factors and indicators and, therefore, they cannot be measured. The political-security risk factors will
now be analysed in relation to international agencies in eastern Chad and rated accordingly on the model.

4.4.1. Transnational political-security risk
4.4.1.1. Transnational risk factor

The following sub-section discusses the following indicators: policies and actions of neighbours regarding host state; regional sanctions, treaties and agreements; conflict/war with neighbours; existence of regional terrorist/rebel/insurgent groups; existence of criminal networks; neighbour’s relationship with international agencies.

Of all its neighbouring states, the volatile relationship between Sudan and Chad has had and will continue to have, the greatest impact on the conflict in eastern Chad and, therefore, the security of international agencies operating there. The January 2010 agreement between President Idriss Déby and President Omar Hussein al-Bashir, in which Chad and Sudan agreed to end their proxy wars and engage in direct talks and joint development projects to rebuild the war-torn border area encompassing eastern Chad and Darfur, represented a positive step (Reuters, 2010). However, coming on the heels of a series of previously failed peace agreements, this latest agreement does not inspire any confidence in enduring peaceful relations between the two countries. As both countries face(d) important elections\textsuperscript{26} in 2010 and 2011, the peace agreement seems a way for Déby and al-Bashir to consolidate their regimes and according to Lipschutz (2010), “both regimes need [the peace agreement], but the underlying crises that triggered the end of their friendship in 2005 are not solved, only frozen”. By April 2010, the peace agreement was already called into question as intense fighting occurred near the Sudan border in which the Chadian army reportedly killed 105 insurgents, although rebels state that both sides lost lives. There are no independent reports of the skirmish, however, the British Broadcasting Corporation’s (BBC) Chad correspondent states that “it is unlikely that... the rebels could make serious inroads without backing from Sudan” (BBC News, 2010). Previously, in May 2009, Chadian rebels launched an attack on N’Djamena from Sudan. This led to Chad accusing Sudan of backing the Union of Forces for the Resistance (UFR), led by Timane Erdimi, a former advisor and nephew of Déby’s. In response to the attacks and mutual accusations, the Chadian and Sudanese air forces bombed each other’s territory in June (Amnesty International, 2010a).

\textsuperscript{26} Chad’s president Idriss Déby faces a parliamentary election in November 2010 and a presidential election is scheduled for May 2011 (IFES, 2010a). Sudan’s president Omar Hussein al-Bashir won the presidential election in April 2010 and there is a referendum scheduled for January 2011 to decide on the matter of southern Sudan’s secession (IFES, 2010b).
Further, the humanitarian situation in eastern Chad is likely to remain precarious due to the “likelihood of continued conflict in Darfur” (UNHCR, 2010). Though 2010 has seen fewer reported incidents of fighting in the border zone between Chad and Sudan, eastern Chad has witnessed the occurrence of 192 reported attacks against humanitarian staff in 2009 as well as frequent attacks on civilians, refugees, and IDPs by bandits or rebel groups whose allegiance to either Chad or Sudan is extremely difficult to ascertain (USAID, 2010: 1). The Sudanese government’s 2009 expulsion of 16 humanitarian organisations from Darfur and other regions in response the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) arrest warrant for Omar Hussein al-Bashir, reveal Sudan’s history of open hostility to cooperating with, and facilitating international agencies. Al-Bashir has gone so far as to openly accuse foreign agencies of spying for the ICC and collaborating with the rebels (El-faki, 2010). Al-Bashir’s policies and actions against international agencies have implications for the security of agencies operating in the porous border region of eastern Chad, especially given El-faki’s (2010) contention that, “[p]art of the policy to expel the remaining humanitarian bodies from Sudan is to stage fear and create atmospheres of insecurity for their staff by planned abduction and kidnapping of their foreign nationals and aid workers”.

The other regional relationship having implications for the security of international agencies in eastern Chad is the one between Chad and the CAR. Indeed, the CAR is the third party in the intractable regional conflict zone encompassing eastern Chad and Sudan. The north eastern region of the CAR, bordering south eastern Chad is a lawless zone, the villages of which are the frequent target of attacks and occupation by CAR rebels and bandits (UNDPI, 2009). Constant conflict in north eastern CAR has forced over 68 000 refugees into eastern Chad. There are reports of “occasional” cross-border clashes between the Chadian government forces and CAR rebels and bandits (OSAC, 2010). More common though, are cross-border raids and attacks on international agencies, civilians, refugees and IDPs. There are, however, no reports linking the CAR government to conflicts outside its own borders (Hanson, 2007). Upcoming elections in the CAR are proposed for October 2010 and are a major concern for the stability of the country, particularly the unpredictable region bordering Chad and Sudan and the consequent potential for a recurrence of inter-ethnic conflict there (ReliefWeb, 2009). In addition, regarding the government’s response to international agencies operating in the north eastern conflict zone in the CAR, it is noted by the UN (UDPI, 2009) that “efforts to bring peace and law and order into the area [are] welcome”.

Chad’s relationship with Libya is also a recent concern. Libya has over the years played an important role in determining Chad’s political trajectory, including aiding President
Déby’s ascent to power in Chad. Recently though, international observers have expressed increasing concern over Libya’s influence over Chad’s affairs, despite welcoming the country’s involvement in the past. Specifically, President Gaddafi has publically opposed the UN/EU peacekeeping presence in Chad and is thought to be supporting rebel groups as well (IDMC, 2010: 4).

A last regional factor concerns that of criminal networks impacting on the security of international agencies in eastern Chad. Chad shares borders with Libya, Sudan, the CAR, Cameroon, Nigeria, and Niger, and criminal networks involving the trafficking of small arms and light weapons are a significant threat to security in eastern Chad. Large amounts of less significant goods are also smuggled into Chad through its extremely porous borders. It is the easy availability of weapons, however, that is the greatest cause for concern (OSAC, 2010). Indeed, commenting on the findings of the recent Small Arms Survey, Isenberg (2010) notes that “[t]he UN arms embargo has not prevented weapons from reaching Darfur, due to the unwillingness of the governments of Chad, Sudan, and other parties to abide by the terms of the embargo”, and that “available information indicates that the governments of Chad, Libya, and Eritrea have been involved in arming non-state groups in Darfur either as part of an official policy or by turning a blind eye to such activities”. The criminal network involving the proliferation of weapons in the region of eastern Chad is clearly a serious security problem that has for the most part been ignored by states in the region.

Risk evaluation: The transnational political-security issues dealt with in this sub-section are a major concern to the overall stability of Chad in general and eastern Chad in particular. This is due to the intertwined and seemingly intractable nature of conflict in Sudan and, to a lesser extent, in the CAR. Attacks by, and conflict between, regionally-located bandits, rebel and insurgent groups and those located within Chad are a constant threat to international agencies operating in eastern Chad, occurring on a weekly basis. Prospects for future international agency operations in eastern Chad are bleak due to the increasing levels of conflict and insecurity in Darfur and the upcoming elections in Chad and Sudan. Moreover, the hostile policies and actions towards international agencies in Sudan and Libya are a serious threat to international agencies operating in the porous conflict zone of eastern Chad. Furthermore, criminal networks affect most activity in the conflict zone, with a serious concern being the trafficking of small arms and light weapons throughout the region.

Risk rating – High (3)
4.4.2. National political-security risk

4.4.2.1. Political risk factor

This sub-section discusses the following indicators: type of regime in power; the political system; political stability; government corruption; local attitudes towards government; riots; politically motivated violence; government’s relationship with international agencies and changes in government policies and actions regarding international agencies.

The government of Chad, led by President Déby is dominated by a strong executive branch which controls Chad’s political landscape. As stated previously, Déby, like many of his predecessors, came to power in a coup in 1990. He was re-elected in 1996 and 2001, and in 2005 he amended the constitution to allow himself to serve a third term in power. Chadian elections have all been marked by irregularities and fraud and Chad is by no means an electoral democracy. The 2006 election took place shortly after a rebel assault on the capital, and most opposition parties boycotted it in protest of Déby’s amendment to the constitution (OSAC, 2010). In 2007, the government initiated a dialogue with the political opposition, resulting in the August 13 Accords. The Accords emphasised the creation of conditions to foster good governance, allowed for a new census, and postponed the 2007 legislative elections from 2007 until 2009. Legislative elections are now expected in November 2010, and presidential elections are scheduled for May 2011. Déby’s commitment to political dialogue with opposition members has been called into question on numerous occasions. Indeed, the February 2008 arrest of several opposition and civic leaders contributed to widespread distrust of Déby. Déby’s appointment of a new prime minister in April 2008 and his appointment of four former political opponents to high-ranking cabinet positions suggested that the President might be leaning towards more inclusive governance, though others have viewed the appointments as an attempt to divide the opposition (Ploch, 2010: 2).

Moreover, regarding government corruption and accountability, Chad is ranked 175 out of 180 in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index 2009, which is an incremental improvement since 2005 when it was placed last (Transparency International, 2009). This corroborates views that corruption is rampant within in Déby’s inner circle (Freedom House, 2010).

In terms of opposition to the government, Déby faces continual armed opposition from groups, who, though deeply divided in terms of ethnicity and leadership, are united in their intention to overthrow him. Chad’s political arena is crowded with a multitude of

For additional details see section 4.3.1. Origin and drivers of the conflict in eastern Chad
opposition parties. Indeed, President Déby’s Patriotic Salvation Movement (MPS) is aligned with approximately 60 political parties, most of which are built around a single personality. Out of approximately 105 political parties active in Chad, only about 6 individuals have any real capacity as contenders in the upcoming 2011 presidential election (OSAC, 2010). Violent opposition to the government is common and with Chad’s history of regular coups, rebels have on a few occasions sought to dispose of Déby similarly. In fact, the latest coup attempt was in 2008. Most recent violent opposition has originated from the essentially lawless eastern Chad. This includes the 2009 coalition of 8 rebel factions into the UFR, led by Timane Erdimi. Since the formation of the UFR in January 2009, there has been frequent conflict involving the Chadian army and the UFR (Amnesty International, 2010a). The April 2010 fighting between the Chadian government forces and members of the rebel group Popular Front for National Rebirth (FPRN), who also oppose Déby’s presidency, is another indicator of the frequent violent opposition to the Chadian government (Clarke, 2010). The upcoming parliamentary and presidential elections, combined with Chad’s history of widespread and violent opposition to the government, present a constant threat to democracy and political stability in Chad.

Regarding the Chadian government’s policies and actions towards international agencies, recent events indicate a growing disregard for the safety and security of international agencies and other foreign actors operating in the country. In January 2010 the government of Chad requested the UNSC not to renew the mandate of MINURCAT, calling MINURCAT redundant and ineffective (Dunin, 2010). Indeed, according to Diplomacy and Power (2010), Déby has always viewed the international presence as an infringement on Chad’s sovereignty. Following discussions with the Chadian authorities, MINURCAT’s mandate was extended until the 15 May 2010. On 25 May 2010 the UNSC announced that, in line with President Déby’s requests, the full withdrawal of the military and civilian component of MINURCAT by 31 December 2010 would be completed (Amnesty International, 2010b). The Chadian government has assured that it will take responsibility to protect civilians, including the humanitarian community in eastern Chad, when MINURCAT leaves. The decision to withdraw MINURCAT was made just a month after UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, John Holmes, stated that he was “extremely worried” about the potential impact of the withdrawal on civilians (United Nations News Centre, 2010). Indeed, the exit of MINURCAT is likely to exacerbate the already volatile

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28 For additional details see section 4.4.1. Transnational political-security risk.
security situation in eastern Chad, creating a security vacuum which is unlikely to be filled by the Chadian security forces. Furthermore, Déby’s insistence on MINURCAT’s withdrawal, coupled with his recent peace agreement with Sudan, indicate that he might be planning a military offensive against rebel groups in eastern Chad (Dunin, 2010). While there has been little outright hostility in policy and action towards international agencies, the government’s insistence on MINURCAT’s exit reveals a blatant disregard for the welfare of international agencies in the obviously volatile eastern Chad. Even with MINURCAT troops present in eastern Chad, the security situation has been extremely unstable, including exceedingly high levels of violence against aid workers and civilians, with 2009 recording the highest level of attacks on aid workers (Dunin, 2010, IDMC, 2010).

Risk evaluation: The above analysis reveals that Chad is currently extensively threatened by domestic instability. The Chadian government has little control in the conflict zone. Opposition forces to the government remain active in the east where groups have congregated to launch offensives against the Chadian government. What little control the government has had in the conflict zone in the east has been facilitated to a large extent by MINURCAT, whose exit is imminent. High levels of corruption exist, though the fact that elections are occurring is, at least, an encouraging sign, as is Déby’s willingness to cooperate in a dialogue with the UN. Déby’s insistence on MINURCAT’s exit is, however, a worrying aspect as it illustrates a growing hostility in policy and action to international agencies.

Risk rating – High (3)

4.4.2.2. Military/police risk factor

The following sub-section discusses the following indicators: composition, stability, and ability of military/police; special units; populace’s attitude towards military/police and relationship of military/police with international agencies.

Chadian internal security forces are made up of the Chadian National Army (ANT), the gendarmerie, the national police, the National and Nomadic Guard (GNNT), the General Directorate of Security Services for National Institutions (DGSSIE), and National Security Agency (ANS). The Integrated Security Detachment (DIS) is the police force responsible for reducing insecurity in refugee camps and protecting refugees and IDPs and it is an important actor with regard to international agency security in eastern Chad (USDS, 2010). One of the central concerns of MINURCAT has been to provide training and support to the DIS (Amnesty International, 2010b). MINURCAT’s imminent withdrawal has elevated doubts about the capabilities of the DIS who are poorly equipped, under-qualified, often
unprofessional and inconsistent, and besieged by corruption and discrimination (Villaverde, 2010 and Clarke, 2010). Without MINURCAT’s presence and oversight, the possibility of a bidding war for protection duties between local Chadian commanders has been raised. Indeed, because the various forces “have more loyalty to their commanders than to the state, the region could be plunged into anarchy as bands of commercially-minded military commanders seek to make as much as possible” (Clarke, 2010). On a slightly encouraging note, it is reported that in the last few months of 2009 and early 2010 the DIS, with MINURCAT support, “has significantly improved its operations and conduct” (Villaverde, 2010: 11).

Regarding Chadian security forces in general, it is noted by the USDS (2010) that “the government or its agents committed arbitrary or unlawful killings. Civilians were killed in connection with the conflict in the east. Security forces committed politically motivated killings. Killings were often committed by ‘men in uniform’, and it was often not possible to determine whether perpetrators were members of the armed forces or police, and whether they were acting on official orders. The government generally did not prosecute or punish members of the security forces who committed killings”. Aside from the killings committed by the Chadian security forces, they have also been blamed for numerous disappearances, abductions, torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment and punishment, rape, arbitrary arrest and detention, use of excessive force and abuse, and arbitrary interference with privacy, family, home, and correspondence. There have also been reports of government forces using and recruiting child soldiers in eastern Chad (USDS, 2010 and The Fund for Peace, 2010)\(^\text{29}\). Furthermore, the ANS and the DGSSIE are two security forces that answer only to the president (The Fund for Peace, 2010). This means that they cannot be held accountable by civil society and as a result they can act with impunity. Another worrying aspect concerns reports that the defection of Chadian soldiers and police to rebel groups is a common occurrence. This is due to the fact that the salaries of security forces tend to go unpaid, thereby making defection to a rebel group a more lucrative option (The Fund for Peace, 2010).

**Risk evaluation:** The analysis of political and military indicators has shown that the Chadian military and police have no functional capability or will to maintain law and order in the conflict zone and provide no support to international agencies. Chadian security forces are more of a threat than a help to international agencies. They operate with total impunity in

eastern Chad and are both complicit and even often participants in the banditry and criminality characterising the conflict zone. Though the DIS has provided a semblance of security for international agencies operating in the conflict zone, this has been facilitated by the leadership of MINURCAT, whose assistance shall be shortly terminated. Given the departure of MINURCAT, the future of the DIS as providers of support and security to international agencies in eastern Chad looks increasingly dubious. The populace has no trust in the Chadian military and police as they are not able to hold them accountable in any manner and are continually abused by the military and police.

Risk rating – Extreme (4)

4.4.2.3. Internal conflict risk factor
The indicators to be discussed in this sub-section are: civil war; existence of terrorist/insurgents/bandit/rebel groups.

According to the Fund for Peace (2010), conflict in Chad “reached its nadir in 2008, when rebel groups assaulted N’Djamena in an attempt to overthrow President Déby”. Thereafter, January 2009 saw the afore-mentioned grouping of eight rebel factions form the UFR, who launched an offensive from bases in Darfur and continue to pose a credible threat to Déby’s regime (Freedom House, 2010). In 2010 internal conflict has been limited to the fighting in eastern Chad in April between the Chadian government and rebel groups, resulting in the death of approximately 105 FPRN rebels, the capture of 62 rebels, and the possible death of nine government soldiers (Clarke, 2010). The Chadian Communication Minister, Kedellah Younous, went so far as to announce that Chadian security forces now control the entire conflict zone of eastern Chad, though this is highly improbable. Indeed, as Roland Marchal (quoted in Clarke, 2010) at the Centre for International Studies and Research in Paris noted, “This is very doubtful... the rebels are now scattered near the three borders area with no basic equipment or logistics to get to the capital, N’Djamena. It is easier for them to stay near the [refugee] camps as they are not in a position to be very aggressive”. While the rebels may not now be in a position to launch a strong enough offensive to overthrow the Chadian government, the existence of low-scale conflict, banditry and criminality is endemic to eastern Chad. These forms of conflict have multiplied, despite the presence of MINURCAT in eastern Chad (IDMC, 2010: 3).

The targeting of civilians, IDPs, the local population, and humanitarian workers through banditry, criminality and low-scale conflict is rampant in eastern Chad (UNHCR, 2010). Indeed, Villaverde (2010: 6) captures the situation as follows:
All civilians, including local villagers, refugees, IDPs, humanitarian and UN staff have been victims of aggressive robberies, physical attacks and intimidation. Victims consistently describe bandits as ‘janjaweed’ or unidentified individuals wearing military uniforms carrying automatic machine guns... The large-scale intercommunal conflict that caused the displacement of over 180,000 people has diminished significantly since mid-2007... However the threat of renewed conflict remains as concentrated refugee and IDP populations outstrip available resources and IDPs try to return to their villages of origin.

Large-scale conflict is far less common at present than the less obvious, though no less serious, forms of conflict described above. Moreover, the potential for conflict as refugees and IDPs attempt to return to their places of origin is high, as land, homes, and villages have often been taken over by new families in their absence. Furthermore, the large population of refugees and IDPs ensures that bandits, rebels and criminals have a constant source of new victims to prey on.

Risk evaluation: In sum, the frequency of armed and inter-ethnic fighting is no longer a daily reality as it was up until 2007. Attacks and violence by bandits, rebel groups and criminals gangs on refugees, IDPs and humanitarian workers now characterises eastern Chad. The conflict in eastern Chad is, therefore, not an active civil war, but rather a lawless zone in which the widespread operation of violent bandits, criminal gangs and rebel groups is the norm.

Risk rating – Extreme (3)

4.4.2.4. Societal risk factor

In this sub-section the following indicators are analysed: ethnic/linguistic/racial/national/traditional/religious divisions; gender roles and standards of living in conflict zone.

According to Decalo (1980: 491), “So sharp indeed are Chad’s internal cleavages and inconsistencies that the major question about the post-independence era may well be why the territory did not disintegrate more rapidly”. As noted in step one, Chad is a country deeply divided along ethnic, religious and regional lines and all of these cleavages have been consistently exploited by successive leaders in order for them to gain or remain in power. President Déby has relied on “ethnic polarization to maintain power, monopolizing access to resources... pitt[ing] the northern region against the south and favour[ing] his ethnic group, the Zaghawa, over others” (Bessell and Campbell, 2008: 2). Ethnic factionalism is particularly intense in eastern Chad, where the Chadian government has sponsored Zaghawa-dominated rebel groups in Sudan in opposition to the Sudanese government, and the
Sudanese government has sponsored rebels in opposition to the Chadian government, while at the same time targeting ethnic Zaghawa in the conflict in Darfur and across the border in eastern Chad (HRW, 2009: 16).

Apart from the ethnically-based conflict involving Chad and Sudan, inter-tribal violence has characterised Chad’s own civil conflict. According to Refugees International (2007: 1), the number of IDPs in eastern Chad is in excess of 100 000 people, due entirely to inter-tribal violence. Furthermore, “[t]he displaced consistently characterise themselves as non-Arab and their attackers as Arab; these may refer more to status as settled farmers and nomadic herdsmen rather than specific ethnicities. Motivations for the attacks include... lack of a traditional homeland or grazing rights for some nomadic Arab tribes; an ideology of Arab superiority and solidarity emanating from the governments of Libya and, more recently, Sudan” (Refugees International, 2007: 1). Indeed, factionalism regarding the differences between Arabs and non-Arabs has overlapped with conflict over land tenure and access to resources, particularly within eastern Chad. HRW (2009: 18) sums up this complex state of affairs in the following: “From Goube, Nowaybe Arabs... conducted recruitment in Dar Sila for the militia groups that would come to be known as the Chadian Janjaweed, issuing a call to arms that resonated with landless groups including Arab nomads, Ouaddaiens, and other members of non-Arab ethnic groups that migrated to Dar Sila in the drought years”. Moreover, due to the insecure operating environment in eastern Chad, many aid agencies’ movements have been curtailed. This has resulted in an unintentional inequitable distribution of aid, which has served to compound tensions between Arab and non-Arab Chadians as many Arab Chadians believe that they are victims of bias (HRW, 2009: 37).

Violent factionalism is therefore highly evident with the most important aspects being race (African vs Arab), tribe, and profession (nomadic vs pastoralist). Furthermore, differences have been greatly magnified by conflict in eastern Chad, Sudan and the CAR which has resulted in a humanitarian disaster that has seen hundreds of thousands of refugees and IDPs descend on eastern Chad. Added tension has been particularly intense with regard to access to resources and land. The drought that has plagued the Sahel region from 2009 onwards has made an already dire food shortage situation in eastern Chad even worse (USAID, 2010: 2). Indeed, standards of living in eastern Chad are deteriorating, with the Global Hunger Index rating the situation as “extremely alarming”. More worrying is a World Food Programme report which states that “[w]ith no new harvest until October 2010, and with the lean season fast approaching, the situation will likely deteriorate (WFP, 2010: 4). Another pressing social concern is gender based. While gender roles are not strictly enforced
on a religious basis, there is significant gender violence in eastern Chad, especially rape and other forms of sexual violence, of which the perpetrators enjoy “virtual impunity” (Amnesty International, 2010a).

Risk evaluation: The analysis of societal political-security aspects reveals that the level of factionalism due to ethnic, racial, gender and tribal cleavages is high. The importance of racial and tribal affiliations in eastern Chad presents a pressing threat to international agencies that employ nationals of Chad and the surrounding regions. This is due to the potential for animosity to be directed at them on the basis of employees possessing the same or similar characteristics. Furthermore, there are high levels of gender-based violence in eastern Chad. This is a pressing concern for women working for international agencies in eastern Chad as perpetrators of these crimes operate with impunity in the conflict zone. The current drought in the region of eastern Chad is responsible for the deteriorating living standards among the refugee, IDP and general population in eastern Chad. This puts international agencies at an increased risk of banditry and looting as criminal gangs and rebel groups target the scarce resources that only international agencies possess.

Risk rating – High (3)

4.4.3. Human political-security risk

4.4.3.1. Human risk factor

This sub-section is measured through an analysis of the following indicators: ambush/assault/kidnapping/banditry/detention/hijacking/carjacking/looting/bombing/land-mines/rape/sexual violence.

The UN (UNOCHA, 2010: 44) lists the most pertinent risks for UN and other aid workers in eastern Chad as follows: “Humanitarians may fall victim to collateral damage of warfare in eastern Chad related to tensions with the Sudan; Break-in to compounds, armed robberies, carjackings as part of criminal activities; Ambushes by road bandits; Personal assaults such as violence and rape due to the lack of discipline among armed militia; Scattered unexploded ordinance; and kidnapping”. Indeed, official reports show that there have been many of these incidents. The 2008 figures show that between January and September, assailants carried out more than 120 attacks against relief agencies, including 5 fatal incidents (USAID, 2008: 2). This figure increased dramatically in 2009 when criminal incidents against humanitarian staff in eastern Chad increased to the highest level in recent years, including 192 serious attacks against humanitarian staff between January and September (USAID, 2010: 2). Though statistics for 2010 are not yet readily available,
USAID (2010: 1) reports that “[a]s of late March, relief operations in eastern Chad remain constrained due to insecurity”. More specifically, Dunin (2010) notes that “[a]ttacks and kidnappings targeting humanitarian workers became more common in late 2009 and in early 2010, reaching a frequency of one per week”. Moreover, USAID (2010: 1-2) observes that despite the recent peace agreement between Chad and Sudan, “insecurity in localities near the Chad-Sudan border continues to restrict humanitarian access” and “reports indicate that crime and armed banditry remain significant threats to humanitarian staff and assets, with a trend towards increased violence during attacks”. Regarding attacks on aid workers, it is also important to take into account the fact that in order to protect the right of privacy of employees, reports of incidents involving international agency staff are often not made public. The implication is that the above figures are a conservative estimate of attacks on international agencies in eastern Chad. Further, the regularity of the above types of incidents has caused some international agencies to restrict their programmes and/or relocate their staff, while others have suspended their operations in eastern Chad completely, though the need for assistance is as acute as ever (USAID, 2010: 2).

Risk evaluation: The above analysis of human security in eastern Chad clearly indicates that human security is a pertinent problem for international agencies. Currently the human security factor is the most real threat to international agencies as the situation has the potential to be extremely dangerous, even fatal, on a continual basis. Employees of international agencies face the reality of weekly occurrences of assaults, ambushes, banditry, kidnapping, rape, sexual violence, detention, hijacking and looting.

Risk rating – High (3)

4.4.4. International agency-specific political-security risk

As mentioned earlier in this chapter, international agency-specific political-security risk is not discussed in this particular political-security risk analysis. This is due to the fact that the nature of the information needed is agency-specific and thus unobtainable by an outsider. However, for the sake of testing the applicability of the model developed in this research study, the average rating of the six factors that have been analysed so far is given to the two factors of international agency-specific political-security risk, namely home/host country relations risk factor and affiliations risk factor. The rating allocated to these two factors is therefore 3. Furthermore, allocating the final two factors the average rating facilitates the most accurate overall risk rating of eastern Chad possible, given the limitation of being unable to obtain the international agency-specific information.
4.4.5. Calculating an overall risk rating for international agencies in eastern Chad

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political-security risk</th>
<th>Risk Factor</th>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Weighting</th>
<th>Risk rating</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Transnational</td>
<td>Transnational</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td>Political</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Military/police</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Internal conflict</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Societal</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human</td>
<td>Human</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International agency-</td>
<td>Home/host country relations</td>
<td>(3)*</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>specific</td>
<td>Affiliations</td>
<td>(3)*</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall risk rating</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>77.5%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: Calculating an overall risk rating for eastern Chad

*Average risk rating of the preceding six risk factors

4.4.6. Application of the scale for operational and political-security risk indication

The final step in a political-security risk analysis for international agencies in conflict zones is the measurement of the overall risk rating ascertained for international agencies in eastern Chad against the scale for operational and political-security risk indication.\(^30\) This will allow the overall operational and political-security risk indication to be ascertained. The overall risk rating of 77.5% attained above puts eastern Chad in the *extreme* risk bracket (75-100) on the scale for operational and political-security risk indication. Therefore, it can be said that the overall operational and political-security risk currently facing international agencies in eastern Chad is *extreme*.

In sum, there is a high probability that international agencies in eastern Chad will be exposed to weekly incidents of cross-border incursions by rebel groups and bandits from Sudan mainly, and to a lesser extent from the CAR. Criminal networks involving weapons trafficking greatly affect the security environment, and there is the added concern of Sudan and Libya’s hostility in policy and practice towards international agencies. Of further concern is Chad’s burgeoning hostility towards international agencies. This is compounded by the fact that the government has little control in eastern Chad and faces frequent violent opposition.

\(^{30}\) See page 57, Table 3: Scale for operational and political-security risk indication.
from rebel groups located there. Security in eastern Chad is further compromised by the fact that the military and police of Chad have no functional capacity or will to maintain law and order and are in most cases participants in the conflict and party to the banditry and criminality which characterise eastern Chad. Fighting, banditry and criminal violence due to Chad’s internal conflict continue to pose a serious threat to the security of international agencies. Additionally, the high degree of racial, religious and occupational factionalism, combined with deteriorating standards of living in the conflict zone, means that international agencies are exposed to an increasingly dire social situation that is likely to deteriorate further throughout 2010. Lastly, international agencies face the constant risk of violent attacks in eastern Chad, including assault, ambush, kidnapping, banditry, rape and sexual violence, detention, hijacking, carjacking, looting, bombing, and landmines.

4.5. Conclusion
The focus of this chapter was on the practical application of the political-security risk model developed for international agencies in chapter three, to the conflict zone of eastern Chad. The two-step process of political-security risk analysis was initiated with a conflict analysis in which the origin and drivers of the conflict in eastern Chad were discussed. Thereafter, the use of the model facilitated the analysis of the industry-specific risk factors in relation to the conflict in eastern Chad. An overall risk rating of 77.5% was obtained, which translated into an extreme operational and political-security risk indication for international agencies in eastern Chad. This is the highest level of risk obtainable in a political-security risk analysis and it indicates the extremely dangerous environment within which international agencies operate in eastern Chad.

Chapter five will conclude this study by providing an overview of the course that this research study has taken in chapters one, two, three, and four. Thereafter, the research study is evaluated in light of the research questions and the aims and objectives of the study. This chapter will also provide recommendations for further research in the field of political-security risk analysis for international agencies.
Chapter 5: Evaluation of the research study and concluding remarks

5.1. Introduction
This research study commenced with a passage in which it was noted that international agencies are operating in increasingly hostile environments. Eastern Chad was singled out as a particularly relevant example of a hostile environment, as attacks against aid workers in this region reached their highest level yet in 2009. Furthermore, attention was directed to assertions that international agencies’ risk assessment capabilities are limited; that they lack knowledge of the contexts within which they operate, and that they have tended to increase their security capacity at a practical level without due attention to the relevance of their security strategies. (van Brabant, 2001b: 31, Gassmann, 2005: 3, and Bruderlein, 2004: 1). The identification of such limitations formed the justification for asking the question as to whether an industry-specific political-security risk framework could be applied successfully in order to assist international agencies with strategic political-security risk analysis. In addition to answering this central research question, three supportive research questions were also identified. The first supportive question concerned what limitations the security risk models currently used by international agencies exhibit. The second supportive question addressed the practical aspects of model-building by asking what political-security risk factors and indicators should be included in a political-security risk model for international agencies. In order to test the applicability of the model developed in this study, the last research question asked what the current level of political-security risk in eastern Chad is for international agencies.

This chapter brings this research study to a conclusion by firstly, providing a brief outline of its progression up to this point. Thereafter, the research study is evaluated in light of the research questions and the objectives and relevance of the research study. The penultimate section addresses recommendations for further research in the field of political-security risk analysis for international agencies. A final conclusion brings this research study to a close.

5.2. Progression of the research study
Chapter one served as a general introduction. A literature survey of the research on which this study is based was followed by a discussion in which the research problem was outlined. The objectives of the study were then discussed. The first objective was to examine the linkages
between the operation of international agencies in conflict zones and the political-security risks in these conflict zones in order to enable the development of an industry-specific political-security risk model that would enhance international agencies’ capacity for strategic risk management and risk mitigation. The second objective was to ascertain the level of political-security risk in eastern Chad through testing the application of the industry-specific political-security risk analysis model developed in this research study. The research design and methodology of the study were then defined. Finally, the limitations and delimitations of the study were delineated.

The focus of chapter two was the theory of risk and the analysis thereof. In this chapter the conceptualisation of key terms to be used in the research study was the priority. Key terms included political risk, political-security risk, industry-specific risk, international agencies and conflict zones, among others. This chapter served as the basis from which an industry-specific political-security risk model for international agencies in conflict zones could be created.

Chapter three had as its central focus the development of an industry-specific political-security risk model for international agencies in conflict zones. This chapter commenced with an analysis of the relationship between international agencies, contemporary conflicts, and the post-9/11 global political-security landscape, in order to illuminate the evolving dynamics between international agencies and political-security risk. Thereafter, three political risk models specific to the energy industry were analysed and the attributes relevant to the development of a political-security model specific to international agencies in conflict zones were extracted. Then, three security risk models currently utilised by international agencies were discussed with the primary aim of identifying their limitations, in order that these could be subsequently transcended through the creation of a political-security risk model specifically for international agencies in conflict zones. This chapter culminated in the presentation of the relevant factors and indicators to be used in an industry-specific political-security risk model for international agencies in conflict zones, the presentation of the actual model, and that of a risk-grading scale for interpreting the results of the model.

In chapter four, a political-security risk analysis of eastern Chad was undertaken. Here, the primary aim was to test the applicability of the model developed in chapter three and also to ascertain the current level of political-security risk in eastern Chad. This involved applying the two steps of industry-specific political-security risk analysis and resulted in an
overall extreme political-security risk rating for international agencies in eastern Chad using Table 3: Scale for operational and political-security risk indication.

5.3. Evaluation of the research study

The central research question with which this study was concerned was whether an industry-specific political-security risk framework could be applied successfully in order to assist international agencies with strategic political-security risk analysis in conflict zones. In short, it has been shown that the answer to this central research question is, yes it can. More specifically, the three supportive research questions assisted in steering this research study so as to best answer the central research question.

By asking what the limitations of the security risk models currently used by international agencies are, a forum for discussion was opened up about the relevant attributes and more importantly, the limitations of CARE International’s, ECHO’s, and the UN’s approaches to security risk assessment. Building on the general critique by Bruderlein (2004: 1), Gassmann (2005: 3), van Brabant (2001b: 31), and Bollettino (2008: 265), concerning international agencies’ capacity for security risk assessment, the analysis of three international agencies’ security risk models revealed a number of limitations. It was found that the security risk models currently used by international agencies are inadequate as they only allow an analysis of one security threat at a time and cannot therefore account for multiple threats or provide an overall risk rating of a conflict zone. In addition, the models do not provide sufficient indication as to what risk factors and indicators should comprise an assessment, thereby leaving the risk analysis open to gaps. It also means that the models do not offer a comprehensive assessment of the overall security risk environment within which the international agency is operating. Examination of these models did, however, reveal the importance of security managers having an in-depth knowledge of the contexts within which they are operating and this aspect was later centrally incorporated into the final model.

The second research question asked what factors and indicators should be included in a political-security risk model for international agencies. This question facilitated the examination of three industry-specific political risk models from the energy industry, which was identified as exhibiting a similar risk profile to the international agency industry. In both industries, organisations are willing to accept a high level of risk and moreover, it is essential to the nature of such organisations that they operate in high risk, high probability environments. From these models, attributes including methods of model building as well as relevant factors and indicators were extracted, all of which aided in the development of an
industry-specific political-security risk model for international agencies in conflict zones. Both the second and third research question facilitated the identification of central political-security risk factors and indicators to be included in an industry-specific political-security risk model. These were then further delineated, resulting in a two-step political-security risk analysis process in which step one facilitates a thorough contextual knowledge of the conflict zone and step two, through the use of the political-security risk model, results in an overall risk rating of the conflict zone.

Research question four asked what the level of political-security risk in eastern Chad is. This facilitated testing of the applicability of the political-security risk model developed for international agencies in conflict zones and resulted in an overall risk rating of eastern Chad for international agencies. Moreover, the process of applying the model to eastern Chad tested its practical applicability as a user-friendly, praxis-orientated model. The application of the two steps of political-security risk analysis for international agencies in conflict zones resulted in an overall risk rating of eastern Chad of 77.5% which, after measurement against Table 3: Scale for operational and political-security risk indication, confirmed an overall operational and political risk indication of extreme. This result showed that the model developed in this study can be applied successfully in order to aid international agencies with strategic risk analysis.

Specifically, in terms of the aims and objectives of the study, the model that was developed sought to enhance international agencies’ capacity for strategic political-security risk analysis in conflict zones and to overcome the limitations identified in the security risk models currently used by international agencies. The aims and objectives were achieved in the following manner. Firstly, a model was posited that allows for more than one threat to be analysed at a time. Moreover, the model developed in this study permits an overall political-security risk rating of a conflict zone to be gained, in which a number of central factors and numerous indicators are analysed. This facilitates a comprehensive picture of the overall level of political-security risk faced by an international agency in a particular conflict zone.

Secondly, the model developed in this study ensures that an all-encompassing political-security risk analysis is completed, not one based entirely on the analyst’s subjective choice of factors and indicators. Indeed, it is obligatory to analyse the factors and indicators in both step one and step two. This means that the analyst embarks on step two with a thorough knowledge of the origin and drivers of the conflict within which the international agency will be, or is, operating. Taking into account Gassmann’s (2005: 3) critique that “most agencies admit that they have an insufficient knowledge of the context in which they
operate”, the mandatory conflict analysis was developed as step one of a political-security risk analysis. Step one was instituted in order to facilitate informed political-security risk analysis in step two in which four political-security risks, and the factors and indicators that comprise them, require analysis.

In response to Bruderlein’s (2004: 1) critique that “international agencies have been inclined to expand their security capacity at a technical level rather than reviewing the relevance of their security strategies”, the model developed in this study, in order to ensure its continuing relevance “against a backdrop of shifting trends and sudden occurrences”, was developed in light of the evolving relationship between political-security risk, international agencies, the changing nature of conflict, and the post-9/11 political-security landscape (Brink, 2004: 9). Moreover, the model has political risk theory as a framework. Therefore, it was not developed at a mere practical level, but as a model with a theoretical basis that is generally applicable in all conflict zones in order to aid international agencies with strategic political-security risk analysis.

The second objective of this research study was to test the practical applicability of the model through a case study of eastern Chad and to arrive at an overall risk rating of the conflict zone. This was successfully achieved. Both step one and step two industry-specific political-security risk analysis were shown to be practically and easily applicable and an overall risk rating of 77.5% was obtained, indicating that the overall political-security risk rating for international agencies in eastern Chad is extreme.

An evaluation of this research study would be remiss without mention of aspects that did not work out as successfully as hoped. Firstly, while the model developed in this study is practically applicable and testing showed that it provides an accurate political-security risk analysis of a conflict zone, it is not as aesthetically user-friendly as originally envisaged. Due to the large amount of information that had to be encapsulated in the model the font is small, making it difficult for the analyst to read.

Secondly, the model is unable to facilitate a risk rating of a particular factor that does not satisfy all the requirements of that rating. The question then arises as to what rating the analyst should give the factors in question, if aspects from both Low Risk – 2 and High Risk – 3 are present, as it is not possible to assign a rating that is in between or, numerically speaking, a rating of 2.5 out of 4. This may lead to a risk analysis that is not as accurate as desired. This problem has no easy solution as a more complex model which can account for greater complexity will unfortunately involve difficult mathematics and time-consuming methods, making it unfeasible for use by international agencies in conflict zones. A simpler
model such as the one presented in this research study has the regrettable drawback of being less able to account for such complexities.

In sum, the central research question in this study was successfully answered through the direction of three supportive questions. Importantly, the aims and objectives laid out in chapter one of this research study were achieved. Due to the limited scope of the research study, there are a number of recommendations for further research that can be made.

5.4. Recommendations for further research

In concluding, it must be noted that this research study has focused on one small aspect of a field which is characterised by its wide interdisciplinary nature. This is true for both the humanitarian field and that of political risk. The humanitarian field encompasses the fields of military studies, conflict and peace studies, international relations, and international law. Developments in these diverse disciplines are continually affecting the operation of international agencies and are therefore salient when considering the current and future nature of international agencies’ approach to security risk assessment. This research study did not capture the entirety of the field in terms of current academic debate and only a small section of this study was devoted to understanding the multifarious influences of these fields on the security risks faced by international agencies. The topic of political-security risk analysis for international agencies in conflict zones could be further enhanced by the incorporation of the theories, discourses and debates emanating from the above-mentioned fields.

The field of political risk is truly inter-disciplinary in nature, drawing upon international relations, economics, finance, development studies and security studies. Developments in these fields are constantly informing the theory and methods of political risk analysis and the different branches thereof, including political-security risk analysis. In this regard, there is a definite need for further research in which the subject of political-security risk is expanded upon. This research study drew attention to the fact that while political risk has a well-established theoretical base, the same cannot be said for political-security risk, which is a relatively under-researched field in comparison. Here, the links between security studies and political risk theory need to be further researched and strengthened. Though this research study discussed the elements of political-security risk and postulated a definition, there is wide scope for further research in this regard.

Another recommendation concerns the type of research needed in the field of political-security risk analysis for international agencies in conflict zones. In terms of identifying the strengths and limitations of international agencies’ security risk models as
well as the nature of the risk faced by international agencies, primary research is needed. Spending time in the field analysing first-hand the strengths and limitations of the security risk models currently used by international agencies would be extremely insightful in terms of understanding the processes involved and the concessions and compromises made. Primary research in the form of interviews with the security managers who apply these models on a daily basis would be invaluable. Primary research enabling a deeper understanding of the means, motivations and methods of rebel groups, insurgents and terrorists, would also be useful in informing the field of political-security risk analysis for international agencies in conflict zones. In sum, higher levels of primary research would contribute to producing knowledge of great depth, thereby facilitating better political-security risk models and analyses for international agencies in conflict zones.

Security is not just about analysing the risks facing international agencies in conflict zones; it is also about being able to perform risk mitigation and risk management. This research study did not include risk mitigation and management measures in its scope. Therefore, it is recommended that further research be done in which the links between political-security risk analysis for international agencies in conflict zones and risk mitigation and management measures for international agencies in conflict zones are explored. Indeed, the possibility exists for the two-step industry-specific political-security risk process developed in this study to be developed further by adding a step three (risk mitigation) and a step four (risk management). The addition of risk mitigation and risk management measures to the process would result in an all-encompassing political-security risk strategy for international agencies in conflict zones.

A last and highly important recommendation is for research to be carried out in which more and better quality data and statistics on humanitarian security in conflict zones is produced. In this study, data and statistics on incidents involving international agencies in eastern Chad was difficult to find. While there were many reports listing the number of overall incidents, actual details of all the incidents were not readily available. The nature of the humanitarian field, which is made up of thousands of independent agencies, may be to blame for the lack of information. Indeed, Bollettino (2008: 263) states that: “The absence of a systematic means of sharing incident data undermines the capacity of the humanitarian community to address proactively security threats. In discussion about humanitarian staff safety and security, the least common denominator remains cumulative anecdotal evidence provided by the many security personnel working for humanitarian organisations in the field”. There is therefore a need for greater reporting of incidents by international agencies
and also a need for a means through which this information is more readily accessible and intelligible.

5.5. Conclusion

International agencies consistently put themselves at risk in order to aid societies affected by conflict. The continuous assessment of political-security risk in a conflict zone is important in facilitating a successful mission and may mean the difference between life and death for employees of international agencies. This is especially so when one takes into account the nature of contemporary conflicts and the post-9/11 global political-security environment, which has seen the shrinking of humanitarian space, the growing politicisation and militarisation of aid and consequently, the increasing trend of attacks on aid workers as they are regarded as legitimate targets in conflict zones.

The very nature of international agencies means that they operate in high-risk, high-probability environments and that they move from conflict zone to conflict zone depending on the urgency of the needs identified within. Furthermore, the political-security risks facing international agencies are unique, consisting of factors and indicators pertaining specifically to individual international agencies. The ability therefore of an international agency to easily identify and analyse political-security risk in a conflict zone is imperative.

In this research study it was found that the security risk models currently used by international agencies exhibited a number of limitations. The aim was therefore to investigate whether an industry-specific political-security risk framework could be applied successfully in order to assist international agencies with strategic political-security risk analysis in conflict zones. This resulted in the development of a model in which the most salient risk factors and indicators for international agencies in conflict zones were selected and operationalised. The application of this model to the conflict zone in eastern Chad tested this model’s practical applicability and resulted in an extreme overall risk rating of eastern Chad.

The attainment of an overall risk rating for a conflict zone should, however, by no means facilitate a false sense of security for international agencies. Indeed, as the elements of risk are constantly changing, international agencies need to continually reassess the political-security risk levels in a conflict zone in order to ensure the safety and security of their employees and the success of their tenure. Moreover, every international agency operating in conflict zones in today’s world must consider the development of a comprehensive political-security risk analysis strategy as a priority. Indeed, the ever-present political-security risk characterising conflict zones need not result in the death of employees and the withdrawal of
international agencies. Through the adoption of an effective political-security risk analysis strategy, risk *can* be successfully understood, explained and eventually managed, thereby allowing international agencies to enter and remain in conflict zones.
Bibliography


Reuters. 2010. “Sudan, Chad agree to end proxy wars” in Mail and Guardian, 09 February (Online Edition). www.mg.co.za (05 April. 2010).


# Appendix A

## Chronology of recent\textsuperscript{31} incidents\textsuperscript{32} involving international agencies in eastern Chad

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Incident</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008 January-September</td>
<td>More than 120 attacks against aid workers (USAID, 2008: 20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 May</td>
<td>Fatal shooting of NGO Save the Children Director (USDS, 2010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 July</td>
<td>Armed assailants attack the MSF health facility, assaulting patients and staff (USAID, 2008: 2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 July</td>
<td>Armed men attack the Oxfam compound and attempt to burn down staff residences (USAID, 2008:2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 July</td>
<td>Armed attackers shoot and wound an employee of the ICRC after stopping 2 ICRC vehicles (USAID, 2008: 2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16- 30 September</td>
<td>Relief agencies report 10 security incidents, including 9 break-ins or attacks on humanitarian facilities and one carjacking (USAID, 2008: 2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009 January - December</td>
<td>More than 192 serious attacks against humanitarian staff occur (IMDC, 2010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 June</td>
<td>Vehicle of NGO Action by Churches Together is hijacked (ACT, 2010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 August</td>
<td>Armed men attack a MSF compound and abduct one local and one international staff member. The local staff member escapes soon after, while the assailants hold the international member until the 1 September 2009 (USDS, 2010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>Five Staff working for French NGO Première Urgence are kidnapped while travelling in convoy. The bandits only free staff when the vehicle they are travelling in is involved in an accident (UNHCR, 2009).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 October</td>
<td>Armed assailants target a clearly marked UNHCR vehicle, killing the head of the Chadian Commission National s’Accueil et de Réinsertion des Réfugees (USAID, 2010: 2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 November</td>
<td>Assailants fire on a vehicle carrying members of the NGO Solidarites, killing the driver (USAID, 2010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 November</td>
<td>Armed men kidnap an ICRC international staff member. He is only released on 6 February 2010 (USDS, 2010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 December</td>
<td>Armed men hijack a civilian vehicle travelling with a DIS-escorted MINURCAT logistics convoy (USAID, 2010: 2).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{31} Recent refers to the period between January 2008 and December 2009. At the time of writing, information about incidents involving international agencies in 2010 was unavailable.

\textsuperscript{32} Due to the great number of incidents occurring in 2008 and 2009, only the fatal or near-fatal incidents are included in the chronology.
Appendix B

List of factors and indicators in Boshoff’s model

Host country political risk (phase one)

**Political**

**Macro indicators**
- Regime/political stability: *Including the type of the regime in power and the political system (military, authoritarian, one party state, multiparty, state democratic)*
- War and security Issues: *Including kidnapping, insurgency and terrorism, theft and pilferage, sabotage, and incidents of violence*
- Repatriation restrictions
- Corruption/poor governance

**Micro indicators**
- Unclear legislation/security of tenure: *Including threat of adverse changes in contracts/fiscal terms, and changing royalty/tax regimes*
- Investment constraints: *Including reserve requirements, restriction on the flow of funds, import/export concerns, and free trade zones*

**Economic**

**Macro indicators**
- Economic performance: *Including levels of growth in gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, real GDP growth rate, and inflation (these indicators also assesses the economic stability or instability of the host country)*
- Balance of payments
- Credit worthiness
- Currency convertibility: *Including the foreign exchange position*

**Micro indicators**
- Energy vulnerability: *Including the importance of petroleum to the government revenues and the overall economy, the integration between the oil and gas industry and the remainder of the national economy, and the role of foreign oil and gas companies in the domestic economy*
- Current account deficit
- Public/private sector mix: *Including levels of privatisation*
**Societal**

**Macro indicators**
- Internal Violence
- Civil and Labour Unrest

**Micro indicators**
- Homogeneity: *Including ethno-linguistic/racial/national divisions*
- Ethnic conflict
- Community opposition/social licence to operate
- Standard of living
- Environmental activism

**Petroleum**
- Ownership
- Domestic reserves/production
- Host’s relative market position
- Level and destination of exports
- Strength of national oil company (NOC)
- Role of the foreign company in the national oil industry
- Oil and gas prices
- Domestic ability to operate the industry: *Including the necessary skills, technology, know-how, and capital*
- Ownership/contractual relationship between the firm and the host country

**Company political risk (phase two)**
- Nationality of the company
- World industry positioning: *Including sources of crude, reserves, production, and market outlets*
- Special bargaining advantage: *Including technology, managerial skills, services, and capital*
- Host government relations: *Including receptive, diplomatic, and open, or unreceptive, brusque, and unyielding*
International political risk (phase two)

- Host government international integration: Including participation in international treaties, conventions and organisations
- Host/home government relations: including the political/economic relationship between the host and the home government, encompassing security, trade, and aid issues
- World petroleum market: Including conditions relating to price, supply, and demand consumption
- World economic condition: Including current and projected levels of both economic growth and energy consumption
- The demonstration effect: Including developments in other oil-exporting countries
### Appendix C

#### UN definitions of descriptors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Descriptor</th>
<th>Definitions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Negligible</td>
<td>The consequences may result in minor disruption to UN system activities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minor</td>
<td>The consequences may result in some minor injuries to staff; possible damage or some loss of equipment and facilities; and limited delays to activities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>The consequences may result in injury to staff; some loss of equipment and facilities; and delays to activities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Severe</td>
<td>The consequences result in severe injury to staff; significant loss of equipment and facilities; and major delays and possible cancellation of activities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Critical</td>
<td>The consequences are catastrophic, resulting in death and severe injury to staff; major loss of equipment and facilities; and cancellation of activities.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 5: UN definitions “impact” descriptors** (UN, 2004: 6)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Descriptor</th>
<th>Definitions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unlikely</td>
<td>This event is considered as not having a realistic probability of occurring against the UN under the prevailing conditions, i.e., monitor the situation closely.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderately Likely</td>
<td>This event is considered to have a reasonable probability of occurring against the UN under the prevailing conditions. Effort should be made to reduce this probability, or the impact of the event occurring, i.e., review security procedures and arrangements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likely</td>
<td>This event is considered to have a high probability of occurring against the UN under the prevailing conditions. Significant effort is required to reduce this probability, or the impact of the event occurring, i.e. review Minimum Operating Security Standards (MOSS) compliance and training.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very Likely</td>
<td>This event is considered to have a very high probability of occurring against the UN under the prevailing conditions. Every available effort is required to reduce this probability, or the impact of the event occurring, i.e. relocate dependants or staff.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Certain/Imminent</td>
<td>This event is considered to be imminent and will occur. The Organization must take immediate and extreme measures to protect itself, i.e. evacuate to a safe haven.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 6: UN definitions “likelihood” descriptors** (UN, 2004: 6)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Descriptor</th>
<th>Definitions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Negligible</td>
<td>There is little likelihood of harm to the operation. Operations generally continue with minimum interruption. This risk is usually acceptable.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>There may be harm to the Organization either through indirect or unintentional means. However, the likelihood and outcome of adverse events is unlikely to result in significant damage, injury or delay. This risk can typically be mitigated and therefore is generally acceptable.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>There is significant concern for the well-being and security of the Organization. The degree of harm, or the likelihood of the adverse event is significant. Security officials must implement significant measures to ensure the security and safety of staff and the protection of the Organization. This risk is likely to be at the limit of acceptability.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>There is considerable concern for the security and safety of staff and the Organization. The situation is often unpredictable, and likely to end in violence. Very specific and robust security measures must be in place before the Organization can safely operate. Typically only security or emergency tasks are undertaken in this environment. This risk is unacceptable in most situations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Critical</td>
<td>The operating environment is extremely dangerous. Available risk mitigating factors have minimal positive effect or are ineffective. The probability of death, severe injury, total damage or failure is extreme. This risk is unacceptable except in extraordinary instances.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 7: UN definitions of “level of risk” descriptors** (UN, 2004: 10)
Appendix D

Chronology\textsuperscript{33} of the origin and drivers of conflict in eastern Chad

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Origin and drivers of conflict in eastern Chad</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1913</td>
<td>Chad becomes a French colony within French Equitorial Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>Chad becomes a French overseas territory with its own territorial parliament and representation in the French National Assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>Chad becomes independent and Francois Tombalbaye becomes president</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>Violent opposition by the Muslim north is triggered after opposition parties are banned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>Northern revolt develops into a guerilla war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>French troops aid the Chadian government in controlling the northern revolt, but guerillas continue operating throughout the 70s and 80s with the help of weapons supplied by Libya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>Tombalbaye is killed in a coup d’etat led by southern Christian, Felix Malloum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>Malloum is deposed in a coup d’etat, and a coalition government headed by a Muslim northerner, Goukouni Oueddei assumes power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>Libya provides troops to aid Oueddei in his fight against forces headed by former prime minister, Hissène Habré</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>Libyan troops withdraw at the request of Oueddei</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>Habré seizes power in a coup d’etat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>Oueddei’s forces continue resistance in the north with the help of Libya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>A combined effort of the Chadian Government with French and US assistance, force Libya out of the entire northern region, apart from the Aouzou strip</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Habré toppled by former ally, Idriss Déby in a coup d’etat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Déby wins Chad’s first multi-party presidential election</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Déby’s Patriotic Salvation Movement wins the legislative elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Armed rebellion led by Déby’s former Defence Minister Youssouf Togoimi begins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Déby wins controversial presidential election</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002 January</td>
<td>Chadian government and rebels sign Libyan-brokered peace deal to end three-year civil war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>Fighting between government and rebels breaks out again</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>Chad becomes oil exporter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>Chadian government and rebels sign another peace deal</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Thousands of Sudanese refugees begin arriving in eastern Chad to escape fighting in the Darfur region of Western Sudan</td>
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<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Thousands of Sudanese refugees continue arriving in eastern Chad</td>
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<tr>
<td>April - May</td>
<td>Chadian troops clash with pro-Sudanese government militias as fighting in Darfur spills over into Chad</td>
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<td>2005 June</td>
<td>Constitutional changes allow Déby to stand for a third term in power</td>
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<td>December</td>
<td>Rebels attack the town of Adré near the Sudanese border and Chad accuses Sudan of being behind the attacks</td>
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<tr>
<td>2006 January - June</td>
<td>Thousands of people flee eastern Chad as Arab Janjaweed militia from Sudan’s Darfur region penetrate eastern Chad</td>
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<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>An attempted military coup on the Chadian government is thwarted</td>
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<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>Rebels seeking to topple Déby battle government forces outside the capital, N’Djamena</td>
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<td>May</td>
<td>Déby wins presidential election, and opposition parties boycott the election</td>
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<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>State of emergency imposed in eastern Chad after a spate of ethnic violence</td>
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<tr>
<td>2007 May</td>
<td>Chad and Sudan agree to stop the conflict on their shared border, but this does not stop the violence</td>
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<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>UNSC authorises a UN-EU peacekeeping force to protect civilians from the ongoing hostilities spilling over into Chad from Darfur</td>
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<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>State of emergency declared in eastern Chad</td>
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<td>2008 February</td>
<td>Rebel attack reaches N’Djamena, coming close to the presidential palace</td>
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<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>Chad and Sudan sign a peace accord aiming to halt the five-year-long hostilities between the countries</td>
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<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>Hostilities between Chadian and Sudanese militias flares up, and Sudan cuts off all diplomatic and economic relations with Chad</td>
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<td>2009</td>
<td>Eight rebel groups unite to form a rebel alliance</td>
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<td>March</td>
<td>EU peacekeepers in eastern Chad hand over to a larger UN force called MINURCAT</td>
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<td>May</td>
<td>Major anti-government rebel offensive launched from eastern Chad</td>
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<td>2010 February</td>
<td>President Déby of Chad and Omar Hussein al-Bashir of Sudan hold peace talks and agree to deploy a joint force to monitor the situation along their shared border</td>
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<td>March</td>
<td>Chad agrees to let UN peacekeeping force MINURCAT stay until 15 May 2010</td>
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<td>May</td>
<td>UNSC votes unanimously to reduce the military component of MINURCAT from its current 3300 troops to 2200 military personnel by 15 July 2010. Withdrawal of the remaining troops will begin on 15 October 2010 and all military and civilian personnel are to be withdrawn by 31 December 2010</td>
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