THE LEVEL OF MORAL DECISION MAKING AMONGST UNIVERSITY RESIDENCE RUGBY PLAYERS

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STATEMENT

I, the undersigned, hereby declare that the work contained in this assignment is my own original work, and that I have not previously in its entirety or in part submitted it at any university for a degree.
ABSTRACT

The current study was an investigation into the moral development amongst rugby players in residence at the University of Stellenbosch. An adapted version of the Ethic of Care Interview was applied on thirty participants, 15 rugby players and 15 non-rugby players. Results were analysed using the Mann-Whitney U test and indicated that there was no significant difference in moral reasoning between the two groups. However, there was a significant difference (p<0.05) between the two groups when considering a sport specific moral dilemma. The rugby players employed a higher level of moral reasoning than the non-rugby players on this measure. These findings are viewed within the context of the theoretical frameworks of Piaget, Kohlberg, Gilligan and Haan.
OPSOMMING

Die huidige studie was 'n ondersoek oor die morele ontwikkeling van koshuis rugbyspelers aan die Universiteit Stellenbosch. 'n Aangepaste weergawe van die Ethic of Care Interview is op dertig deelnemers toegepas. Die steekproef het bestaan uit 15 rugbyspelers en 15 nie-rugbyspelers. Resultate is deur die Mann-Whitney U toets ontleed, en het aangedui dat daar geen beduidende verskille tussen die twee groepe se vlak van morele redenering was nie. Daar was wel 'n beduidende verskil (p<0.05) tussen die twee groepe wanneer 'n sport spesifieke morele dilemma in gebruik was. Die rugbyspelers het 'n hoër vlak van morele redenering as die nie-rugbyspelers op hierdie maatstaf gebruik. Hierdie bevindinge word in konteks geplaas van die teoretiese raamwerke van Piaget, Kohlberg, Gilligan en Haan.
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INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION

It has long been held that sport provides a setting for moral development. This belief is evident throughout much of history, from the writings of Plato to the contemporary declarations of politicians, educators, and theologians, sport has been portrayed as a builder of character. One aspect of character, namely moral development, and how it relates to sport participation, has received increased interest in recent years (Stephens, Bredemeier & Shields, 1997).

According to Bredemeier and Shields (1993), moral development refers to the evolving maturity of a person’s grasp of the interpersonal rights and responsibilities that characterise social life.

Sports have been used as contexts for studies of moral development by theorists such as Piaget whose classic model of moral development was based, in part, on his observation of children’s marble playing and his probing questions concerning their understanding of game rules. But sport is a unique context sometimes characterised as a ‘world within a world’ where the typical concerns and moral restraints of everyday life are temporarily set aside, thus the question arises whether sport constitutes a reliable context for the study of moral development (Bredemeier & Shields, 1986).

Former president of the United States J. Edgar Hoover was quoted as saying that next to religion, sport constituted the single greatest factor for good in the United States (Keating, 1988). In South Africa too, sport is widely regarded as an agent for good, contributing to unification in a diverse nation. It follows then, that top sportsmen and women shoulder a burden of responsibility as role models and ambassadors for the people of South Africa (Peters, 2001). The era of professionalism has brought the field of play and work into the same arena, testing the character of our athletes as they are expected to do ‘whatever it takes’ to win. As such, an investigation into the level of moral development amongst our sportsmen and women is warranted.

The aim of this study was to investigate the level of moral development among rugby players in residence at the University of Stellenbosch. More specifically, the primary aim was to determine if a difference existed between rugby players’ level of moral reasoning compared to their non-rugby playing peers. Secondly, to ascertain whether the rugby...
players and non-rugby players reasoned differently when faced with a sport specific moral dilemma compared to an everyday life dilemma.

Traditional wisdom holds that sport is a bastion of moral growth, as suggested by the cultural adage “sport builds character”. The strength of character of athletes, and more specifically, the level of moral development among athletes has become an increasingly important area of investigation. This is in large part due to the professional nature of sport today (Malloy, 1982). Investigating moral reasoning among rugby players at the University of Stellenbosch is an attempt to understand the influence which sport participation has on moral development.

THEORETICAL OVERVIEW

The area of philosophy traditionally known as ‘ethics’ or ‘moral philosophy’ is the attempt to arrive at an understanding of the nature of human values, of how we ought to live, and of what constitutes right conduct (Norman, 1983).

From a historical perspective, the study of morality is rooted in philosophic thought and should be revisited to contextualise current theories concerning the subject.

Philosophers today usually divide ethical theories into three general subject areas: Meta-ethics investigates where ethical principles come from, and what they mean. Normative ethics involves a more practical task, which is to arrive at moral standards that regulate right and wrong conduct. Finally, applied ethics involves examining specific controversial issues, such as abortion, environmental concerns, or nuclear war. By using the conceptual tools of meta-ethics and normative ethics, discussions in applied ethics try to resolve these controversial issues (Maritain, 1964).

The emergence of critical philosophical thought about ethics can be traced to the ideas of the Sophists who, since believing there to be no objective truth, argued that moral ideas were a matter of convention. Thus self-interest was pursued with little concern for moral prescriptions. The focus was not on how to act, but why one needs to act in a certain way or another (Hergenhahn, 1997).

Socrates attempted to uncover what characterised the ‘good life’, and why it should be lived. Though he never claimed to possess this knowledge he maintained that such
knowledge was by far the most important thing to strive for. Plato's early dialogues that reflect the activity of Socrates, portray him searching for definitions of the traditional virtues: temperance, courage, justice, piety. The theme which emerges is that if these are good qualities, this must be because they make for a good life for those who possess them, and underlying all the virtues must therefore be the ability to know what constitutes the human good. Plato's own attempt to answer that question obtains its classic formulation in 'The Republic' (Taylor, Hare & Barnes, 2001).

The theme of 'The Republic' is the nature of justice. The Greek word is 'dikaiosuné'. In English, the term is translated as 'justice', but the Greek concept is somewhat wider than that. The English word 'justice' primarily refers to ethical principles regulating the distribution of social benefits and burdens. It suggests the idea of people receiving what they might deserve (be it reward or punishment), and is closely linked with the idea of the law. 'Dikaiosuné' is used more widely so that it amounts to 'the disposition to act rightly' in one's dealings with other people, for 'dikaiosuné' is the social virtue above all others. The translation of 'morality' would be close to this ideal (Norman, 1983; Taylor, Hare & Barnes, 2001).

Much of Western thought on morality comes from the Church and Christianity. Jesus taught that knowledge of good and evil is revealed by God and that, once revealed, such knowledge should guide human conduct. He also commanded His followers to love God with all their hearts, and to love others as they loved themselves. In so doing, they would be employing the golden rule: Do unto others as you would have them do unto you. This golden rule is evident throughout most major religions today (Hergenhahn, 1997). Other influential theories include the theory of utilitarianism and those of Immanuel Kant. The theory of utilitarianism states that that action which procures the greatest good for the greatest number is best. In contrast to this thinking is the idea of respect for persons of Kant who believed that all persons are an end in themselves and never merely a means to an end (Hergenhahn, 1997).

Moral philosophy has influenced many aspects of modern day life, and sport is no exception, where sportsmanship has been considered as a moral category. All the prescriptions, which make up the code of sportsmanship are derived from a single, basic, practical maxim. That athletes should conduct themselves in such a manner that will
increase rather than detract from the pleasure to found in the activity, both the athlete's and the fellow participants (Keating, 1988).

But sportsmanship has long been viewed as something not merely limited to the field of play. This is evident in the words of Kennedy (1931):

> When you pass out from the playing fields to the tasks of life, you will have the same responsibility resting on you, in greater degree, of fighting in the same spirit for the cause you represent. You will meet bitter and sometimes unfair opposition. You will meet defeat but you must not forget that the great victory of which you can never be robbed will be the ability to say, when the race is over and the struggle ended, that the flag you fought under was the shining flag of sportsmanship, never furled or hauled down and that, in victory or defeat, you never lost that contempt for a breach of sportsmanship which will prevent your stooping to it anywhere, anyhow, anytime. (pp. 58-59)

To summarise, it is evident that the pursuit of understanding morality by the Greek philosophers was to identify what would bring about happiness, peace and joy; in short, the good life. This was not only that the individual might benefit, but that society as a whole might benefit as well. Subsequent understandings of morality have mirrored this perspective by focusing on the interactions between people.

Moral development has been of considerable interest to modern day theorists as well. What follows is a brief review of two theorists whose work has dominated the field of moral psychology, namely Jean Piaget and Lawrence Kohlberg. Two other theorists, Carol Gilligan and Norma Haan, are considered as their theories hold significance for the current study in terms of the ‘ethic of care’ and ‘game reasoning’.

Piaget (quoted in Bredemeier, Weiss, Shields & Shewchuk, 1986) stimulated interest about how children think about moral issues. By observing and interviewing children playing marbles, he sought to learn how they used and thought about the rules of the games they played. He maintained that moral development was linked to cognitive development, and that both developed through a series of stages. Children younger than about five years of age are regarded as pre-moral as they do not yet understand rules and
are therefore not able to judge whether or not a rule has been broken. Heteronomous morality is the first stage of moral development in Piaget's theory, occurring from approximately five to ten years of age. Rules are regarded as guidelines for acceptable behaviour and the transgression of rules should be punished, irrespective of the intention of the transgressor. This characteristic of is known as moral absolutism (Bredemeier et al., 1986). Another characteristic of this phase is children's belief in imminent justice, the concept that if a rule is broken punishment will be meted out immediately. By about age ten children reach the final phase of moral development, the phase of autonomous morality. Cognitive maturation as well as social experience within the peer group, where equal status contact with friends exists, leads to a more flexible morality because it decreases children's unilateral respect for adult authority figures as well as enhancing children's self-respect and respect for peers. Children in this phase no longer believe in immanent justice and understand that rules are arbitrary agreements that can be changed with the consent of the involved parties (Bredemeier et al., 1986).

Kohlberg's (cited in Bredemeier & Shields, 1993) groundbreaking stage theory of moral development (see Appendix A) is rooted in the structural developmental approach to psychology most prominently associated with Piaget. The theories of Piaget and Kohlberg have the following in common: Moral development progresses through stages and is based on cognitive development and relevant social experiences; clinical interviews and hypothetical questioning are used to study moral development. The difference in the theories concerns the age at which children reach moral maturity. While Piaget believed this to be in middle childhood, Kohlberg stated that moral development is still far from complete and that moral reasoning becomes progressively more complex during adolescence and early adulthood (Malloy, 1982).

According to Kohlberg, cognitive-moral conflict (cognitive disequilibrium caused by becoming aware of other moral viewpoints) and role-taking skills are two important factors that play a role in attaining higher levels of moral reasoning (Bredemeier, et al., 1986).

To clarify what is involved in moral reasoning, Kohlberg turned to philosophy and isolated four basic moral orientations used by various traditions of philosophy. Each moral orientation focuses on a critical element to help decide right and wrong. Firstly, the
normative order orientation focuses primarily on prescribed rules and roles. The consequence orientation focuses on the impact of various actions on the welfare of others and the self. The justice orientation highlights relations of liberty, equality, reciprocity, and contracts between people. Finally, the ideal-self orientation concentrates on an image of the actor as a good self, or someone with a conscience. Kohlberg’s theory is deeply embedded in his conviction that the justice orientation is the most adequate of the four. Only the justice orientation can lead to the formulation of a moral principle that can be used to decide fairly among competing moral claims in all situations (Bredemeier & Shields, 1993; Gump, Baker & Roll, 1998).

To summarise, there are certain universal moral issues that can give rise to moral conflict. Moral conflict can be dealt with through the use of one of four major decision making strategies, though one of these (the orientation to justice) is the most adequate. Kohlberg’s stage theory reflects his investigation into the developmental course by which people come into a mature understanding of justice.

A major critic of Kohlberg’s moral development theory was his colleague Gilligan who concluded that Kohlberg’s reliance on a male longitudinal sample and hypothetical dilemmas limited his developmental model (Fisher & Bredemeier, 2000). In Gilligan’s view, there are two gender related, if not gender specific, moral orientations. Justice and individual rights, which is more representative of men’s ethical judgement, and the ethic of care, which is more representative of women’s judgement (Skoe, 1998).

Gilligan (quoted in Linn, 2001) pointed out that Kohlberg’s system is drawn from Kantian philosophy that uses abstract principles of justice as the basis of advanced moral reasoning. This penalises those who focus on the interpersonal ramifications of a moral decision. Gilligan has argued that Kohlberg’s representation of women as fixated at Stage 3, which represents interpersonal morality, is flawed. Women’s reasoning, according to Gilligan, is contextual and deeply tied to relationships, and Kohlberg has undervalued the equally valid Aristotelian moral concerns voiced by women. She followed Piaget’s insight which stated that apart from our relations to other people, there can be no moral necessity (Linn, 2001). Thus, the emphasis on justice as the embodiment of morality appears to have underestimated the impact that interpersonal connectedness can have on moral decision-making (Gump, et al., 1998).
Gilligan, who employed ‘real life’ rather than hypothetical dilemmas, contends that women’s moral reasoning tends to reflect a care orientation which develops from the individual’s early childhood experiences of attachment to others. This perspective reflects an ideal of love, connection and mutual responsiveness. Whereas women traditionally are urged toward a morality of responsibility and care in relationships, men are socialised toward a morality of rights, a concern for autonomy in judgement and action as well as for freedom and non-interference with the abstract rights of individuals (Fisher & Bredemeier, 2000; Skoe, 1998).

Gilligan viewed women as progressing from initial selfishness to caring primarily for others and finally to an integration of concern for the needs of both self and other (see Appendix B). Her morality of responsibility emphasises attachments, allows for both self-sacrifice and selfishness, and considers connections with others as primary, while Kohlberg’s morality of justice emphasises autonomy, rules, and legalities, and considers the individual as primary (Gump, et al., 1998).

Gilligan has claimed that justice and care are two distinct strands of morality. Kohlberg disagreed, seeing them as facets of the same morality, and noted that care and justice imply different modes of judgement with different motivational implications. Caring proceeds from an awareness of one’s relationship with the other, and this relationship brings with it a sense of responsibility for the other’s welfare, whereas justice proceeds from an awareness of the other as an individual and with a limited sense of obligation to respect that other’s rights (Gump, et al., 1998).

Both Gilligan and Kohlberg acknowledge however, that a principal difference between justice and care is that they are generally practised in different spheres of life. Care is best suited for the private worlds of family and friends. It is a virtue of enduring and intimate relationships, and is characterised by attentive responsiveness. Justice is best suited for the public world of politics and work. It is a virtue of the impersonal social order, and is characterised by fairness (Fisher & Bredemeier, 2000).

These two patterns, of rights and justice versus responsibility and care as foci, are distinct approaches to moral judgement, according to Gilligan, and maturity involves greater understanding of both points of view (Skoe, 1998).
Although Gilligan should be praised for broadening moral research methodology to include real-life, as well as hypothetical, moral dilemmas, her theory can be critiqued on at least two grounds. Firstly, it appears to treat moral orientation as a trait-like variable related to gender. Secondly, it associates care with the private world of family and friends, failing to explain how professionals could experience attentive responsiveness and caring relationships in the work environment. Although several investigators have found support for Gilligan’s contention that care orientations are associated with women and justice orientations with men, there is little empirical evidence supporting Gilligan’s claim that Kohlberg’s moral reasoning measure is biased against women in terms of stage level (Fisher & Bredemeier, 2000; Skoe, 1998).

In summary, Gilligan’s perspective of morality emphasises the interpersonal connectedness between individuals. Socialisation has played a role in the manner in which men and women approach moral issues. While men tend to value the justice orientation, women value the care orientation.

Haan’s model of moral development can be distinguished from Kohlberg’s model in several important ways. Firstly it defines moral reasoning as embodied in moral action rather than abstracted from a specific context. Second, it reflects the development of capacities for inductive moral construction as opposed to Kohlberg’s emphasis upon the deductive reasoning used to determine moral judgements. Third, it is not grounded in a universal principle of justice that defines the right. Rather, Haan’s moral ground of respect for persons pertains to the procedures employed in negotiating the situational good. Finally it represents a more flexible interpretation of structuralism that is not based on a view of invariant, sequential, cognitively based moral stages (Bredemeier & Shields, 1986).

The basic concepts of Haan’s theory describe the structure of interpersonal moral action and were derived from extensive analysis of such interpersonal action in the context of simulation games. Communication is at the heart of Haan’s model of moral interaction. She contends that human exchange leads to the informal understandings or ‘moral balances’, that regulate moral life, defining mutual rights, individual and corporate responsibilities, and distributions of goods and services. Moral balancing is most readily understood in situations where equals interact to construct mutually satisfying resolutions.
to interpersonal conflicts. There are, however, other forms of moral engagement. Haan has identified legitimate and illegitimate imbalances as variations that occur within the basic fabric of moral life. Legitimate imbalances refer to mutual relationships, like that between parent and child. This imbalance is accepted as normal and appropriate by both parties and is recognised as such by the broader community. Illegitimate imbalances refer to instance in which differential giving and responsibility are imposed through coercion (Bredemeier, 1994; Bredemeier & Shields, 1986).

When moral imbalances occur, people use a variety of means to try to re-establish moral balance. Haan collectively called these efforts at restoring moral balance ‘moral dialogue’. The most obvious instance of moral dialogue is open, verbal negotiation. Adequate moral dialogue, according to Haan, requires that all parties give detailed attention and equal consideration to the needs of the self and all others involved in the negotiation. The primary vehicle for moral development is social disequilibrium. Haan argued that it is these social disruptions, not disequilibrium in abstract cognitive structures that provide the motivation for re-examining one’s way of constructing moral exchange. Haan has suggested that excessive stress, rigid social organisation, and limited availability of desirable options may systematically diminish the adequacy of moral thought and action (Bredemeier, 1994; Bredemeier & Shields, 1993).

According to Haan the maturing individual’s capacity to engage in constructive moral dialogue is thought to evolve through five levels (see Appendix C) of increasing adequacy that can be described in structural terms (Bredemeier & Shields, 1986).

Haan’s model follows the same basic contour of development as Kohlberg’s, but the two theorists differ significantly on their depiction of moral maturity. For Haan, no abstract principle of justice is adequate to deal with the specific situations of everyday moral life. Instead, the morally mature person recognises that moral dialogue must meet certain procedural criteria for guaranteeing equality if a moral balance is to be considered adequate. Mature moral dialogue allows all parties equal access to relevant information, includes all those who will be affected by decisions reached, seeks to achieve unforced consensus through non-dominated discussion, and reflects the particularities of the situation and the parties involved (Bredemeier, 1995).
Morality, according to Haan's interactional formulation, is rooted in negotiations about the situation-specific good that arises in response to interpersonal difficulties or potential conflicts of interest (Bredemeier & Shields, 1986).

To summarise, the theories of moral development can be classified into clusters. Firstly, those that define morality from an understanding of justice and rights such as Piaget and Kohlberg, who believe that moral development is linked to cognitive development. Secondly there are those that define morality from an interpersonal perspective such as Gilligan and Haan who believe that moral development involves a maturing understanding of the relationships between individuals. The current study relies on the second cluster, where the emphasis is on moral reasoning of an interpersonal nature.

**Literature Survey**

The area of research that investigates sport and morality is a new one. According to Bredemeier and Shields (1993), when approaching a new field of investigation, three interrelated categories of questions should be considered. The first focuses on description: what are the relationships among the variables under investigation? The second set of questions moves from description to explanation, with the responses often taking the form of theory building. Finally there are questions about the practical application of the research. Studies on sport and morality are considered as they relate to these three interrelated sets of questions.

A few investigators have published empirical research using Kohlberg's theory of moral development to assess the maturity of sport participants' moral reasoning. Hall (quoted in Bredemeier & Shields, 1993) for example, found that college basketball players' moral reasoning maturity was lower than that of their college peers.

Bredemeier and Shields (1993) have primarily used Haan's model as a measure of moral reasoning maturity in contexts of physical education and sport. In 1986 they compared athletes and non-athletes by testing the reasoning maturity of male and female basketball players and non-athletes at both the high school and college level (Bredemeier & Shields, 1986). The moral measure was designed so that respondents reasoned about two hypothetical dilemmas set in everyday life contexts and two in sport-specific situations,
yielding two distinct scores: one for ‘life’ moral reasoning, and one for ‘sport’ moral reasoning. Among the 50 college students, the non-athletes were found to have significantly more mature moral reasoning than the basketball players, a finding that held for both sport and life dilemmas. Among the 50 high school students however, no reasoning differences between athletes and non-athletes were found. The study also revealed gender differences. Both college and high school females reasoned at a more mature level than males in response to sport dilemmas, and high school females also exhibited more mature reasoning in response to the life dilemmas (Bredemeier & Shields, 1986).

In a related study, 20 swimmers were added to the college sample to determine whether the same athlete non-athlete relationship would hold for college athletes other than basketball players. Swimmers’ mean scores for ‘life’ and ‘sport’ moral reasoning were between those of the non-athletes and the basketball players. ‘Life’ reasoning differences only approached significance, but basketball players’ ‘sport’ reasoning was less mature than that of both the swimmers and the non-athletes. ‘Sport’ reasoning for the latter two groups did not differ significantly (Bredemeier & Shields, 1986).

These studies suggest that it is not experience in sport per se that is associated with less mature moral reasoning. A number of questions are suggested by these findings. Does the amount of physical contact, the length of involvement, the competitive level, or the type of interpersonal interaction in one’s sport experience influence the development of one’s moral reasoning?

Moral reasoning maturity is important, but more important is actual behaviour. The issues of moral behaviour in sport have been investigated primarily with reference to aggression. The International Society of Sport Psychology (ISSP) published it’s stance on aggression in sport and defined aggression as “the infliction of an aversive stimulus, either physical, verbal, or gestural, upon one person by another” (Tenenbaum, Stewart, Singer & Duda, 1996, p.229).

Bredemeier (1994) assessed assertive, aggressive, and submissive action tendencies in both everyday life and sport to 106 nine to 13-year old children. Results indicate that children’s moral reasoning scores were predictive of self-reported assertive and aggressive action tendencies in both sport and daily life. Assertion is a conflict resolution
strategy that reflects a balancing of one’s own needs with those of others, while aggressive responses place personal interests above the needs or rights of others. Therefore, it was hypothesised that assertion would be associated with more mature moral reasoning and aggression with less mature reasoning. Children who were relatively mature in their moral reasoning described themselves as more assertive and less aggressive in response to conflict situations than children with less mature reasoning.

In a related study the relationship of children’s sport participation and interest with their moral reasoning maturity and aggression tendencies was examined. Girls and boys in the fourth through seventh grades responded to a sport involvement questionnaire as well as moral reasoning and behavioural tendency measures. Analyses revealed that boys’ participation and interest in high contact sports and girls’ participation in medium contact sports (the highest level of contact sport experience girls reported) were associated with less mature moral reasoning and greater tendencies to aggress (Bredemeier, Weiss, Shields & Cooper, 1986).

These findings are important for at least two reasons. First, they point to the importance of identifying those factors within sport structures that are key to the relationships among sport involvement and morality variables. Differentiating sports by the amount of physical contact, for example, appears to be one helpful means of categorising types of sport experience. Second, gender differences in the study highlight the need for an interactive psychological model that considers both environmental influences and individuals’ meaning-construction processes. If the sport structure itself were the only factor mediating the relationship among sport involvement and morality variables, one would anticipate the same general pattern of relationships for females and males. Several interpretations of the gender differences are possible. One probable explanation is that since females have generally been excluded from high contact sports, their perceptions about physical contact in medium contact sports may be closer to that of males in high contact sports than to those of males participating in the same medium contact sports (Bredemeier & Shields, 1993).

A study of moral reasoning maturity and legitimacy judgements focused on children in the fourth through seventh grades. Interviewers showed 78 children slides of potentially injurious sport behaviours and administered moral interviews. The slide series featured
male athletes performing the following acts: a legal boxing punch, a legal football tackle, illegal basketball contact, an illegal soccer tackle, legal baseball contact, an illegal football tackle, an illegal basketball trip, illegal soccer contact, and a legal baseball slide. While some of the slides reflected activity within the rules of the sport, all involved action that was judged by the children to carry a high risk of injury. Children were asked to indicate approval or disapproval of the actions depicted. Results paralleled those with college students: children with less mature reasoning judged a significantly greater number of potentially injurious acts to be legitimate than their more mature peers (Bredemeier & Shields, 1993).

The second set of research moves beyond description and seeks to explain the interrelationships among sport involvement and morality variables. Research may reveal how sport experience creates different sets of consequences for different individuals. Explanatory theories inevitably involve the establishment of cause-effect relations among the variables under study. To date, these studies still lie in the future of sport morality research. However, existent research may set the stage for theory building about moral thought and action in sport settings (Bredemeier & Shields, 1993).

Structural developmental theorists have traditionally held that a person’s moral reasoning level will remain fairly constant across different types of situations. Nonetheless a few highly irregular situations have been shown to alter the person’s level of moral reasoning. Research conducted in prisons, for example, has demonstrated that inmates use lower strategies of reasoning in response to prison dilemmas than when they attempt to resolve standard hypothetical dilemmas. Kohlberg has hypothesised that when a group’s collective norms reflect a low stage of moral reasoning, then the constraining moral atmosphere may inhibit more advanced moral functioning even among those individuals capable of higher stage thought (Bredemeier, 1995).

It has been suggested that sport might also be one of those unusual contexts where moral reasoning undergoes a change in its underlying structure. This hypothesis was generated in light of the ‘set aside’ character of sport activity. Sport is set apart from everyday life both spatially, through marked boundaries, and temporally, by designated playing periods replete with ‘time-outs’. A variety of symbols such as whistles, buzzers, flags, uniforms, and special rituals and ceremonies are used to create and reinforce the
‘world within a world’ character of sport. The separated world of sport is governed by artificial rules and roles, and is orientated toward a goal with no intrinsic meaning or value (Bredemeier & Shields, 1986).

Bredemeier and Shields (1986) have proposed a theory of ‘game reasoning’ which holds that the unique context of sport elicits a transformation in moral reasoning such that egocentrism, typical of immature morality, becomes a valued and acceptable principle for organising the moral exchange. In terms of moral reasoning, they have hypothesised that sport offers a context for a ‘legitimated regression’ to a form of moral reasoning that is similar to less mature moral reasoning. The elaboration and validation of this theory of game reasoning awaits future research. For those athletes whose sport participation is a highly salient experience, game reasoning may begin to lose its set aside character and have undue influence on moral reasoning beyond the bounds of sport. Several factors may account for why this is more a factor for participants in some sports than in others. Participation in elite sports, particularly those for which professional opportunities are available, often includes external rewards dependent on performance. The infusion of ‘daily life’ rewards (e.g. money or educational opportunity) into the sport experience may encourage a blurring of the distinction between sport and everyday life. Also, some sports, like rugby, are characterised by a high degree of player interaction, requiring various forms of interpersonal exchange. Other sports, like swimming, require little or no interpersonal interaction during actual competition. Consequently, minimal possibility or necessity for moral exchange and negotiation exists. Experience in more interactive sports may more closely approximate everyday life encouraging a blending or confusion between ‘sport’ and ‘life’ moralities.

The final set of research questions is designed to predict what types of sport and/or physical education experiences will be advantageous to participants. What conditions and strategies facilitate participants’ moral growth, and what factors are detrimental to their moral development?

Most of the research in the field of application focuses on physical education rather than sport, and conclusions do not necessarily translate from one to the other. In a preliminary investigation to determine whether theoretically based instructional strategies can be efficacious in promoting moral growth, Bredemeier et al. (1986) conducted a field
experiment designed to explore the effectiveness of a moral development program in a summer sport camp. Children aged 5 to 7 were matched and randomly assigned to one of three conditions: a control group, a social learning group, and a structural developmental group. During the 6-week intervention program, each group used essentially the same curriculum and the same weekly moral themes (fair play, sharing, verbal and physical aggression, and righting wrongs). Instructors in the control group employed traditional physical education pedagogy, encouraging conformity to game or teacher prescribed rules. Children in the social learning class received reinforcement for pro-social behaviour that was also modelled by the instructor and peers. Structural developmental group instructors were trained according to Haan’s interactional model to facilitate children’s peer-orientated moral dialogue in response to dilemmas that arose in class. Measures of moral reasoning included a Piagetian intentionality instrument developed for this investigation and a distributive justice scale. Analyses revealed significant pre- to post-test gains in the reasoning maturity of children in the social learning and structural developmental groups, but no changes occurred for the control group. Although differences between the experimental and control groups only approached significance, the within-group results were encouraging and seemed to suggest that moral growth can be stimulated by implementing theoretically grounded instructional strategies (Bredemeier et al., 1986).

It is clear that there is much work to be done before we have a clear understanding of how sport and physical education experiences relate to the many processes involved in moral thought and action. To date, moral research in the context of sport has focused on only a very few sports and it is difficult to generalise beyond that narrow base. A broader range of both sport and physical education experiences across varying conditions and structures needs to be explored (Bredemeier & Shields, 1993).

The theory of game reasoning that Bredemeier and Shields have offered needs to be refined and further tested. Related to this project is the need to consider the role that group moral norms and the moral atmosphere play in sport and physical education settings. It may be, for example, that game reasoning involves an accommodation to the prevailing moral atmosphere of a particular sport context more than a simple internal
psychological shift in response to the sport structure itself. In turn, leadership styles may play a significant role in establishing and maintaining group moral norms.

In addition, researchers need to move beyond their tendency to isolate aspects of moral functioning – such as moral reasoning maturity or pro social behaviour – and to incorporate a holistic model of moral social psychology. Rest, for example, has offered a four-component model of moral action that may provide a useful paradigm in this regard, though it seems to underplay the impact of sociological variables (Kavussanu & Roberts, 2001).

To summarise, the literature on sport and morality can be divided into three categories of questions. The questions related to describing the relationship between morality and sport initially tended to show sport involvement was associated with lower levels of moral reasoning. However, the nature of the sport involvement needed careful consideration. Thus the second set of questions attempt to explain the interrelationship between sport and morality, leading to theory formation. An example of such a theory is that of game reasoning which maintains that sport allows for a temporary suspension of everyday moral considerations. A blurring of this game reasoning and everyday reasoning may lead to lowered levels of moral reasoning. The final set of research questions seeks to understand how sport involvement can promote moral growth. Findings indicated that the implementation of theoretically sound instructional programs does lead to moral growth.

Choice of measurement

The area of moral development has been dominated by figures such as Piaget and Kohlberg who essentially defined morality in terms of justice. Gender bias and gender differences are the foundation upon which Gilligan proposed an alternate theory of moral development. Gilligan did not herself deliver tools to test her hypothesis’ validity, and as such her contribution is mainly theoretical. There is also little empirical evidence supporting Gilligan’s claim that Kohlberg’s moral reasoning measure is biased against women in terms of stage level (Skoe, 1998).

Regarding justice versus care, research has provided mixed support for Gilligan’s claim of gender differences in moral orientation. Lyons (cited in Skoe, 1998) reported
that the majority of women used considerations of care whereas the majority of men used considerations of justice while discussing moral conflicts in their lives. With more refined analyses, Gilligan and Attanucci (quoted in Walker, Pitts, Henning & Matsuba, 1995) observed that most people use both care and justice perspectives, but care-focused dilemmas are more likely to be presented by women and justice-focused dilemmas by men. Other researchers such as Walker (in Skoe, 1998) failed to find gender differences in reasoning about real life moral problems. Ford and Lowery found no gender differences in students’ rating of the degree to which they used care or justice orientation in thinking about a moral conflict in their lives (Skoe, 1998).

These approaches have attempted to assess Gilligan’s proposed gender differences in moral orientation by analysing people’s reasoning about their own dilemma and/or about Kohlberg’s dilemmas. However, in Kohlberg’s dilemmas issues related to caring are not central: the focus is on justice and rights. Furthermore, in the real-life moral dilemmas used in some studies issues related to justice, rights, care or other moral or social conventional concerns all might be central. Because care-related issues are less relevant to some real-life moral dilemmas than others it is difficult to examine relative use of care-related reasoning.

To summarise, Walker et al. (1995) have noted the importance of the content or nature of the moral dilemma. Both men and women tend to use the care orientation more than the justice orientation when discussing personal/relational real-life dilemmas. Conversely, both genders tend to use justice more than care when discussing impersonal/non-relational dilemmas. Although this shows that type of conflict can predict moral orientation better than gender, overall women generate more relational conflicts than men, which means that women actually show more care responses than men. As such, it appears that the two moral orientations are not gender specific, but gender related (Skoe, 1998).

**Measuring instrument**

The large body of research examining gender differences on justice versus care orientations has tended to obscure a second very important implication of Gilligan’s
work: that care-based reasoning, like justice-based reasoning, also follows specific developmenta
dnal pathways and varies from individual to individual.

The Ethic of Care Interview (ECI) was designed by Marcia and Skoe to empirically test the de
developmental aspects of Gilligan’s theory. The ECI parallels Kohlberg’s model in that it measures hierarchical levels of development in the ethic of care. The levels of care move from an initial perspective of self-concern, through a questioning of this as a sole criterion, to primarily other concern, through similar questioning of this as a sole criterion, to a final perspective of balanced self-and-other concern (Skoe, 1998).

The ECI consists of four dilemmas administered in a structured interview format. In addition to a real-life conflict generated by the participant, there are three standardised interpersonal dilemmas, involving conflict surrounding unplanned pregnancy, marital fidelity, and care for a parent. They are scored according to the ECI manual which contains descriptions consistent with those outlined by Gilligan (see Appendix D) and sample responses for five ethic of care levels. The five levels involve a progressively more complex understanding of human relationships and an increasing differentiation of self and other. Thus, the ethic of care reflects a cumulative understanding of relationships based on the perception that self and other are interdependent and that activities of care benefit both others and self. Men are presented with a male protagonist while women are presented with a female protagonist (Skoe, 1993).

In an initial study of 86 college women, 17-26 years old, the ECI was found to be positively related to age and ego identity development as well as to a Kohlberg justice reasoning measure. The ECI was also found to be more closely related to ego identity than was the Kohlberg measure. A subsequent study of 58 men and 76 women (age 16 to 30 years) was conducted, examining the relations among ego identity, care-based, and justice-based moral thought, with the use of Kohlberg’s interview. This study showed that care-based moral reasoning, as measured by the ECI, was positively related to age, ego identity, and justice-based morality for both men and women. Also there were no significant gender differences on the ego identity, justice stages, and the ECI measures (Skoe, 1998).

The ECI was chosen for use in this study in large part due to the fact that it has been extensively tested on young adults. According to Sochting, Skoe, and Marcia (cited in
Skoe, Pratt, Matthews & Curror, 1996) the ECI has been found to be positively related to age, ego identity, Kohlberg’s justice stages, androgyny, and aspects of empathy.

For the purposes of this study an adapted version of the ECI was used to investigate the level of moral development amongst male rugby players in residence at the University of Stellenbosch (see Appendix E).

Firstly, instead of the ECI being presented in a structured interview format, it was adapted and presented to participants in the form of a questionnaire. Following each dilemma participants were presented with fifteen answers to the question posed: What should the particular protagonist do in the given situation. The answers were generated through consultation of the ECI manual which contained descriptions of the levels of moral development as well as sample responses to each dilemma and were assessed by three independent psychology researchers. Three answers per level of reasoning were generated and presented in random order. Participants were then asked to choose their top three answers out of the fifteen presented.

Secondly, as opposed to the participants generating their own real-life dilemma, as is the case with the ECI, participants were presented with a fourth dilemma. This dilemma was a sport specific dilemma set within the context of a rugby match. The interpersonal theme of the dilemma was consistent with that of the other three dilemmas. The participants were again presented with fifteen possible options to choose from.

The adapted version of the ECI as well as the fifteen options per dilemma was translated, and an Afrikaans version was given to all Afrikaans-speaking participants.

**Experimental procedure**

Three male residences at the University of Stellenbosch were randomly selected to take part in the study. After obtaining consent from the respective Resident Head to administer the questionnaire in the residence, contact was made with the Student Head in each residence. The Student Head assisted in the process of randomly recruiting volunteers to participate in the study and the collection of completed questionnaires. Participants were between the ages of 18 and 23 with a mean age of 20. The sample size in each residence was ten: five rugby players and five non-rugby players. Rugby players were defined as any person actively involved in any level of organised, competitive
rugby. This level varied from provincial level to residence league rugby. Non-rugby players were defined as any person who had never played competitive rugby before. However some participants were involved in other sports such as golf, cricket, tennis and swimming. Questionnaires were given to participants who were to complete it in their own time and return the completed questionnaire to the Student Head. Instructions were given both verbally to each participant as well as being presented on the questionnaires. Afrikaans translations were given to the 23 Afrikaans-speaking participants while English versions were given to the remaining seven English-speaking participants.

Scoring was done in accordance to the ECI manual, except that in the absence of verbal responses no rating took place. Mean scores were obtained from the three answers chosen per dilemma by each participant. To obtain the overall level of reasoning of each participant, an average across the four dilemmas was calculated.

The interview format was replaced with the questionnaire format due to time and resource constraints on both the parts of the researcher as well as the participants. The questionnaire format has the advantage of being easier to administer to a greater number of participants in a shorter space of time. It also allows for easier scoring and subsequent statistical analysis. However, there are various shortcomings involved in this method of research which cannot be overlooked.

The questionnaire format limits the participants answer to those presented. Therefore the answer gained is merely the participants favoured choice as opposed to their own individual reasoning. The course of action which each participant would take/reason is limited to the answer presented. The obvious shortcoming is that exploration into a particular response is limited. However, each answer represents an avenue of reasoning, detailing the reasons for the particular course of action. With the answers presented on the questionnaire, each participant had the opportunity to measure their immediate answer against those presented, either choosing the three that most accurately resemble their immediate response, or they have the opportunity to adjust the answer and consider other courses of action. Determining just how honest each participant was in answering is a difficult matter. The study investigated moral reasoning, not moral actions, and as such it was assumed that participants would answer honestly. It is assumed that the data obtained gives an indication of what each participant considers important in the dilemma.
(It is interesting to note that only one participant scored on the highest level in only one dilemma). Instead of asking participants to choose between the answers presented, the use of a Lickert Scale may have given an indication as to the how participants rated the various courses of action.

Standardisation of the sport specific dilemma is another consideration. It was however, consistent with the interpersonal nature of the other three dilemmas, as were the answers to the dilemma. It also worth noting that the dilemma was very similar in nature to a sport specific dilemma presented in the Judgements About Moral Behaviour in Youth Sport Questionnaire (JAMBYSQ) developed by Stephens and Bredemeier (1996).

Although the sample size of 30 is too small to draw any significant conclusions from, the study provided an interesting indication of the level of moral reasoning employed amongst rugby and non-rugby playing students at the University of Stellenbosch.

RESULTS

Descriptive statistics as indicated in Table 1 and Table 2 (page 22) below, show the mean scores and standard deviations of the Rugby players and Non-Rugby players across the four moral dilemmas. The ‘Derek’, ‘Erik’ and ‘Chris’ dilemmas are the three everyday life dilemmas as they appear in the ECI. The ‘John’ dilemma is the sport specific dilemma developed for this study.

Table 1

Descriptive Statistics: Rugby Players

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dilemma</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Derek dilemma</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2.1200</td>
<td>.3844</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Erik dilemma</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2.1907</td>
<td>.2979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chris dilemma</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2.1953</td>
<td>.3891</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John dilemma</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2.3953</td>
<td>.2660</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2

Descriptive Statistics: Non-Rugby Players

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dilemma</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Derek dilemma</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2.0987</td>
<td>.3829</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Erik dilemma</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2.3087</td>
<td>.3780</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chris dilemma</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2.3760</td>
<td>.3740</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John dilemma</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2.1393</td>
<td>.2954</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3 (page 23) represents the analysis of the scores obtained after completion of the questionnaire by Rugby Players and Non-Rugby Players according to the Mann-Whitney U Test. For the everyday life dilemmas, no significant difference was found between the Rugby Players and the Non-Rugby Players. However, on the sport specific dilemma, there was a significant difference between the two groups. Results indicate that the Rugby Players scored significantly higher than the Non-Rugby Players did on this dilemma.

No significant correlation was found to exist between any of the dilemmas for either the Rugby or Non- Rugby Players. This would seem to indicate that there is no difference in either group’s reasoning between the sport specific and the everyday life moral dilemmas.
Table 3

Analysis of the Results Obtained after Completion of the Questionnaire by Rugby Players and Non-Rugby Players

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dilemma</th>
<th>Group</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean Rank</th>
<th>Mann-Whitney U</th>
<th>Z</th>
<th>p</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Derek dilemma</td>
<td>Rugby</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15.63</td>
<td>110.5</td>
<td>-.084</td>
<td>.933</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Non-Rugby</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15.37</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rugby</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>14.40</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Non-Rugby</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>16.60</td>
<td>96.00</td>
<td>-.693</td>
<td>.488</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Erik dilemma</td>
<td>Rugby</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>13.47</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Non-Rugby</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>17.53</td>
<td>82.00</td>
<td>-1.280</td>
<td>.201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chris dilemma</td>
<td>Rugby</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>18.73</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Non-Rugby</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>12.27</td>
<td>64.00</td>
<td>-2.109</td>
<td>.035</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John dilemma</td>
<td>Rugby</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Non-Rugby</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

DISCUSSION

An adapted version of the ECI was employed to investigate the level moral reasoning of rugby players in Residence at the University of Stellenbosch. The ECI focuses on morality as defined within an ethic of care. As such, the dilemmas presented are of an interpersonal nature. A sport specific dilemma was presented alongside three everyday life dilemmas.

Results indicated that there was no significant difference in the level of moral reasoning employed by Rugby Players and their Non-Rugby Playing peers. Furthermore, no significant correlations were found to exist between any of the dilemmas for either the Rugby or Non- Rugby Players. This would seem to indicate that there is no difference in either group’s reasoning between the sport specific and the everyday life moral dilemmas. A significant difference was found however, between the Rugby Players and Non-Rugby Players level of moral reasoning on the sport specific dilemma. The Rugby Players generally reasoned on a higher level when faced with an interpersonal dilemma in a sport context than the Non-Rugby Players. As Walker et al. (1995) have noted, the ethic
of care orientation is more often used when reasoning about a personal dilemma. As such the nature of the sport dilemma may have held more relevance to the Rugby Players than to the Non-Rugby Players. Furthermore, it could be suggested that the Non-Rugby Players used another orientation, such as Kohlberg's justice orientation, when considering the sport specific dilemma. Another factor to be considered when reviewing these results is the size of the sample that is too small to make any generalisations. The reliability and validity of the sport specific dilemma, as well as the adapted version of the ECI both need further investigation and limit the certainty of the findings. Further research on this topic must make use of a larger sample, and efforts must be made to refine and standardise the adapted version of the ECI.

Although results of previous studies seem to indicate that sportsmen and reasoning about sport dilemmas operates on a lower level of moral reasoning than non-sportsmen and everyday life dilemmas, the results of this study indicate that the nature of the sport dilemma is an important factor to consider. Moral reasoning in the sport context that has an impact on interpersonal relationships seems to operate from an ethic of care, whereas moral reasoning about cheating, for instance, operates from a justice perspective. The nature of the specific sport should also receive increased attention. A sport such as rugby where aggression is very much a part of the game and viewed as a necessity for success can not easily be compared with a sport such as swimming where interpersonal contact between participants is at a minimum. There is a lack of research across sporting codes and aggressive sports, such as rugby require investigation. Research in the South African context, where other factors such as differing cultural perspectives are relevant, is also lacking. The level of sport involvement should also be considered. As Bredemeier and Shields (1986) have pointed out sport offers a context for a legitimated regression in moral reasoning and for professional athletes game reasoning may begin to lose its set aside character and have undue influence on moral reasoning beyond the bounds of sport. Programs designed to assist in moral development within the sport context need to consider the specific moral orientation being addressed. Both the justice and ethic of care orientations have a considerable role to play in the overall development of our sportsmen and women.
In conclusion, it has long been held that sport provides a setting for moral development. Yet the strength of character of athletes, and more specifically, the level of moral development among athletes has become an increasingly important area of investigation. Studies have tended to show that sport involvement is associated with lower levels of moral reasoning. However, the nature of the sport involvement needs careful consideration and the implementation of instructional programs within a sport context has been shown to promote moral growth. The study of moral development as it pertains to athletes is not only relevant, but also vitally important when one considers the impact sport has on individuals, communities and nations. A greater understanding of the interplay between morality and sport participation is needed if sport psychology is to contribute to the well being of athletes, not only at an elite level, but at the grassroots level as well.
REFERENCES


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APPENDIX A
Kohlberg’s stage theory of moral development

Level I: Pre-Conventional level
Children at this level conform to rules in order to avoid punishment and to obtain rewards. Moral development on the pre-conventional level comprises the following two stages:

Stage 1: Heteronomous morality-punishment and obedience orientation: During this stage, children find it very difficult to view a moral dilemma from different angles; they evaluate behaviour only on the basis of its consequences. Thus motives are not considered. Children are obedient for the sake of obedience and behave correctly in order to avoid punishment, but will not consider behaviour as incorrect if it is not discovered and punished.

Stage 2: Individualistic morality-instrumental goals and interchange: During this stage, children begin to develop the awareness that different people may have different viewpoints about a moral dilemma, but initially this awareness is very concrete. Children now feel that it is correct to obey rules if they are in someone’s immediate interest. It is thus right to act out of self-interest and to one’s own advantage. Obedience is still aimed primarily at obtaining some reward and gratifying personal needs.

Level II: Conventional-level: This level is also referred to as the morality of conventional role-conformity. The individual conforms to the social order and the expectations of others. Individual moral standards are therefore controlled externally. The individual is loyal to the social order, supports and justifies it actively. The expectations of the individual’s group, family or nation are upheld, supported and conformed to, no matter what the immediate consequences may be. The individual regards the upholding of the established norms as a moral duty to ensure positive human relationships and an orderly society. Behaviour is now judged according to motives. The two stages that can be distinguished at this level are:
Stage 3: Morality of interpersonal expectations, relationships and conformity: Moral behaviour is seen by persons in this developmental stage as behaviour that other people approve of. Persons in this stage therefore want to win the approval of others and avoid their disapproval. They attempt to maintain the affection of friends, family and significant others by being a good person.

Stage 4: Morality of social systems and conscience orientation: Moral behaviour is associated with doing one’s duty, respect for authority, and with the upholding of existing social law and order. Society’s laws cannot be disobeyed under any circumstances because they are crucial for the order in society. Individuals in this stage believe that society’s laws must be enforced in the same way for everyone. Therefore in moral judgements, society’s laws are taken into account. An act is wrong if it violates society’s laws or rules, or if it harms someone.

Level III: Post-conventional level: This is the highest level of moral development. It is also called the morality of self-accepted or autonomous moral principles. Few people reach this level of moral development.

The individual now defines and internalises moral values and principles independent from the groups or people who uphold these principles. For example the individual pays attention to abstract moral principles which are universally applicable and not only applicable to a particular social group. Existing social and political values are not accepted unconditionally and alternative moral principles are recognised note: groups like teams, moral atmosphere etc. All possibilities are investigated and individuals decide for themselves what their own personal moral code (values and behaviour) should be. Besides being aware of personal values and opinions, individuals nevertheless conform to established norms if these help promote human welfare. The following two stages are distinguished on this level:

Stage 5: Morality of social contract, usefulness and individual rights: Moral or immoral behaviour is defined in terms of laws or established rules relating to general rights and standards. These rules have a rational basis, they promote the welfare of society and are necessary for the optimal functioning of society. Apart from conforming to general standards, the individual’s personal values and beliefs also serve as guidelines
in determining what is correct or incorrect. Thus rules can be changed if the change is rationally, and socially justified, and if the individual and society have agreed to the change. If, however, there is conflict between the individual’s standards and society’s established rules or laws, the latter will be accepted because of the prevailing view that people are morally obliged to uphold society’s rules.

**Stage 6: Morality of universal ethical principles:** Individuals judge behaviour not only as the basis of society’s existing norms, but also on the basis of their own conscience or own internalised abstract ethical principles. These principles are not concrete moral rules, but rather universal principles of justice, equality of human rights and respect for the dignity of the individual. Persons who have reached this level of moral judgement act according to their own principles, no matter how other people may react to them. If they do not act according to their own ethical principles, they may experience guilt and condemn their own behaviour.
APPENDIX B

Gilligan’s theory of moral development

Phase 1: Orientation towards personal survival
The accent is on what the girl or woman finds best or most practical. At the same time there is a shift from selfishness to responsibility. This is reflected in a concern for what would be best for others.

Phase 2: Goodness as self-sacrifice
Girls and women start thinking that they should subordinate their own desires to other people. But there is also a transition from a perspective of goodness to a perspective of truth, when women realise that they can accommodate both their own needs and those of others.

Phase 3: Morality of non-violence
Women and girls come to realise clearly that it is immoral to harm other people and themselves. This realisation means that women assign themselves and others moral significance and think about moral issues in terms of the moral equality of all people.
APPENDIX C

Haan’s Levels of Interactional Morality

Assimilation Phase

Level 1: Power balancing
The person is unable to sustain a view of others’ interest apart from self-interest and vacillates between compliance with others when forced and thwarting others when able to do so. Balances reflect self-interest except for situations where the self is indifferent or forced to compromise.

Level 2: Egocentric balancing
The person is able to differentiate others’ interests from self-interest but does not understand that both may coincide in a mutual interest. People are viewed as essentially self-interested and out for their own good. To get what the self wants, trade-offs or compromises are made.

Accommodation Phase

Level 3: Harmony balancing
The person differentiates others’ interests from self-interest, but assumes that a harmony of these interests can be found since most people are believed to possess essentially altruistic motives. Balances are sought that rest on the good faith of all. People of bad faith are considered odd and dismissed from moral consideration.

Level 4: Common interest balancing
The person differentiates all parties’ self-interests from the common interest of the group. Balances of compromise are sought that conform to the system-maintenance requirements of the group. Because the moral culpability of all is recognised, externally regulated patterns of exchange are sought which benefit all while limiting personal vulnerability.

Equilibration Phase

Level 5: Mutual interest balancing
The person co-ordinates all parties’ self-interests and the common interest of the group in a search for a situationally specific moral balance that will optimise everyone’s interest. In such a search, the person recognises the need to consider the specific values and desires, strengths and vulnerabilities of the parties involved. Solutions may achieve harmony of interest or may represent compromises of interest, whatever the particularities of the situation and participants allow.
APPENDIX D
Descriptions of the five levels of moral reasoning in the ECI

Level 1: Survival (Caring for self)
This perspective is characterised by caring for the self in order to ensure survival and personal happiness. The person’s concern is pragmatic, and what the person “should” do is undifferentiated from what the person “wants” to do. The question of “rightness” emerges mainly if the person’s own needs are in conflict. The aims are basically to protect the self, to ensure one’s own happiness and to avoid being hurt or suffering. There is little, if any, evidence of caring for other people.

Level 1.5: Transition from Survival to Responsibility
Movement is toward responsibility that entails attachment to others. Concepts of “selfishness” and “responsibility” first appear. Although there now is some concern for other people, survival of the self is still the main aim.

Level 2: Conventions of Goodness (Caring for Others)
This perspective is characterised by a strong emphasis on responsibility, obligation and commitment. The person adopts societal values, and conventionally defined goodness becomes the primary concern because survival is now seen to depend on the acceptance of others. "Good" is equated with self-sacrificing caring for others, and 'right' is externally defined, for example, by the church, parents, or society. Conflict arises specifically over the issue of hurting, and others are helped or protected, often at the expense of self-assertion.

Level 2.5: Transition from Conventional to Reflective Care Perspective (From "Goodness" to Truth about Relationships)
This transition phase is marked by a shift in concern from goodness to truth and honesty. There is reconsideration of the relationship between self and other as the person questions the “goodness” of protecting others at one’s own expense.
Level 3: Ethic of Care (Caring for Both Self and Other)
This perspective emphasises the dynamics of relationships and achieves a balance between selfishness and responsibility through a new understanding of the complexity of connections between others and self. No longer restricted by social convention, individuals are able to make their own choices and accept responsibility for decisions as criteria for goodness move inward. There is now a balance of moral considerations between self and other, and both are included in the compass of care. Attempts are made to minimise hurt to all parties.
APPENDIX E
Adapted version of the ECI

The Derek Dilemma/Derek's Dilemma

Derek is a married, successful teacher in his late twenties. His life has been centred on his work and he has been offered a permanent position for next year. Recently, he has been involved in an intense love affair with a single woman who has just told him that she is pregnant and that it is his child.

What do you think Derek should do? Why?

1. ____ He should tell his wife the truth, as there is no way he can keep a secret like this even if he tried. It would just catch up with him later, causing him even more trouble.

2. ____ They should consult a professional person (a psychologist, a pastor, or a doctor) on the subject so that they can get good advice, but Derek should let the single woman decide what to do.

3. ____ He should stay with his wife, as he has no guarantee that the single woman has been faithful to him, in which case the baby might not be his and then he could quite easily tell her to get out of his life.

4. ____ He should leave his wife for the other woman and start a family with her. Besides, he can't be too happy in his marriage if he is having an affair.

5. ____ Derek should make the baby his primary responsibility. This doesn't mean that he has to get divorced or that he has to marry the single woman. But whatever happens, the baby is innocent and he should make sure that it is well taken care of.

6. ____ Derek and the single woman should make an analysis of their situation. She must be able to tell him what her needs are and what she is prepared to take on. Any decisions Derek makes must be based on her needs.

7. ____ Derek should tell his wife about the single woman and be prepared to face the consequences. He should never have had a relationship outside of his marriage, so whatever decision he now makes should not be an attempt to cover up his first mistake.
8. ___ If his reputation is ruined, he may lose his job and then there will be no way of supporting himself, never mind her and the baby. He should therefore tell her to have an abortion.

9. ___ Since abortion has been made legal in South Africa it is a perfectly acceptable, and legal option for Derek and the single woman to pursue.

10. ___ He should try to mend his relationship with his wife because the chances are that in the long run she will stand by him more often than the single woman will.

11. ___ If Derek's marriage is on the rocks (possible reason he is having an affair), and if the other woman loves him and is willing to make a commitment to him then he should consider getting a divorce and marrying the woman who is pregnant with his child. After all, life is too short to live unhappily.

12. ___ The single woman should decide what to do. If she wants to give the child up for adoption or have an abortion, then Derek must be willing to go along with her decision.

13. ___ He should tell the woman to have an abortion as he is not interested in divorcing his wife and there is no way he wants to support a child out of marriage.

14. ___ If the single woman has no desire of having or anyway of supporting a baby and if having the baby seriously jeopardises his marriage (which he wants to keep), then they should discuss the option of abortion.

15. ___ Since it goes against religious principles, Derek should ensure that the single woman does not have an abortion.

The Erik Dilemma/Erik's Dilemma

Erik, in his late thirties, has been married to Betty for several years. They have two children, 8 and 10 years old. Throughout the marriage Betty has been at home, looking after the house and children. For the last few years Erik has felt increasingly unhappy in the marriage relationship. He finds his wife demanding, self-centred and insensitive as well as uninterested in his needs and feelings. Erik has several times tried to communicate his unhappiness and frustration to his wife, but she continually ignores and rejects his attempts. Erik has become attracted to
another woman, Carol, a single teacher. Recently, Carol has asked Erik for a more intimate, committed relationship.

What do you think Erik should do? Why?

1. Erik shouldn't have to put up with Betty, especially if he has tried to sort things out. He can't live his life as an unhappy man, especially when he has the opportunity to be happy with someone else.

2. It goes against religious values to have an affair and his marriage vows stated that they would stay together "for better or for worse". If he has an affair then he is in the wrong and the blame will rest on him both socially and legally.

3. He should divorce his wife, besides, nowadays divorce isn't uncommon and the kids are old enough to understand what is going on.

4. If Erik feels that he has done everything he can to save his marriage, and can take responsibility for his children, then he should leave Betty for Carol where he will be happy.

5. Erik should get a separation from Betty. He can have time and space to evaluate what to do while showing Betty that he is serious.

6. Erik should consider that leaving his wife would probably have legal and financial consequences that would quite likely hurt him, such as not seeing his children and having to pay maintenance/child support. To avoid this, he should not leave his wife.

7. He should try talking to Betty one last time. If she doesn't want to change then he should divorce her, as there is no point in dragging out an unhappy marriage just for the sake of it.

8. It will be best for the children if he leaves, as then there will no longer be any tension or unhappiness in the house.

9. Erik should have a relationship with Carol. In this way he can see if Carol will make him happy without having to get a divorce first.

10. Erik should leave if he will take responsibility for supporting the family both financially and emotionally. But it is not his responsibility to stay unhappy just for the sake of it, especially when he has tried his best to save his marriage.
11. __Before leaving he should consider his children, if he thinks that his leaving will cause them too much hurt then he must try patch things up with Betty, otherwise he should go to Carol.

12. __Since he is already the provider, and all Betty does is look after the children, he should get divorced, pay maintenance/child support and have his relationship with Carol. In this way everything stays the same, just now he is able to have a legitimate relationship with Carol.

13. __Betty needs to do her part and try to compromise for the sake of the marriage. If she is unwilling to listen to Erik's frustrations then he must let her know where he stands: that he is on the brink of leaving her.

14. __Erik should explain the situation to his children and let them know that it is not their fault that he is leaving. He should also not leave the blame solely at Betty's feet either. He must be willing to accept the consequences of his actions.

15. __Erik should try harder to sort out his problems with Betty, after all leaving Betty will cause untold damage to the children, and not set a good example either. He should end the relationship with Carol.

The Chris Dilemma/Chris' Dilemma

Chris, a 26-year-old man, has decided to live on his own after having shared an apartment with a friend for the last three years. He finds that he is much happier living alone as he now has more privacy and independence and gets work and studying done. One day his father, whom he has not seen for a long while as they do not get along too well, arrives at the doorstep with two large suitcases, saying that he is lonely and wants to live with Chris.

What should Chris do? Why?

1. __If they don't get along then they will both be unhappy, especially Chris. He should either tell his father "no" or find another place for him to stay.

2. __His father had to put up with him all his life and in times like these, most people feel a responsibility to look after their ageing parents. Chris should therefore be prepared to help his father out at least for a while.
3. Chris must decide if his independence and privacy is more important than helping his father. He can do this by allowing a trial period of a couple of days or weeks in which he can make a decision.

4. Nowadays everyone places their parents in retirement homes. Chris should place his dad in one, as this is his responsibility as the child of an ageing parent in our modern society.

5. If his father really needs help then he can take him in and care for him. But if he is self-sufficient and this is just a whim, then Chris should only let him stay a week or two.

6. Chris should let him in, but he should then discuss the situation with his father and explain his position. This way his father can see that his staying there will only cause problems for Chris.

7. Chris should take him in for now anyway, after all he can't just turn his father away. But after a while he will have to sit his father down and explain why it is unfair for the father to just arrive like that. Then he can sort out other arrangements for his dad.

8. Chris should take him in for the night and explain that it is in both of their best interest to stay apart, as they don't get along well. Staying together won't be the best way to mend their relationship.

9. He should take his father in, as the chances are that Chris will be rewarded by way of inheritance at a later stage.

10. A good compromise will be for his dad to get his own place nearby. That way they can see each other regularly while not invading each others space and they are close enough in case of an emergency.

11. It would be nice of Chris to take his father in and to help him in his time of need, but he must make it clear that it is a short-term arrangement with an eye on him becoming independent again.

12. Chris should rather not take his father in and explain to him that if they were to live together that it would only cause more damage to their relationship. Chris must then start repairing the relationship by visiting his father regularly.
13. ____ Chris should let his father stay on a temporary basis, and figure out a relevant and quick way of helping him so that Chris can get on with his life.

14. ____ Chris should take his dad in even if he doesn't really want to. He can't just leave him there in a time of need. It doesn't have to be a permanent arrangement: he should stay there until they can figure out what to do.

15. ____ Chris should let his father stay on a temporary basis, but should explain to his father that his independence and privacy are important and that they should make another arrangement: one where they will be able to see each other in a way which will be beneficial to their relationship.

The John Dilemma/John's Dilemma

John plays flank for his rugby team. He only recently started playing for his current team and before that he played for another team, one in which his best friend David plays. David is a good player, but has a recurring injury that could end his rugby career. As it turns out, John's second game for his new team is against his old team. With time almost up John's team leads by four points. Suddenly John's old friend David makes a break for the try line. The only way that John can stop David scoring is if he tackles him illegally and he is aware that such a tackle could put David out of rugby for good.

What do you think John should do? Why?

1. ____ John should forget about his team, as he has only known them a short while, and should fake a tackle, allowing David to score and so ensure that his best friend will never hold a grudge against him.

2. ____ John's team is aware that he is playing against his old side, and he has to show where his loyalties lie. He should make the tackle for his new team.

3. ____ If it were not David running for the try line, John would probably not have even thought twice about tackling the player. If his friend is that important to him, then he shouldn't make the tackle.

4. ____ John can't let his team down, and doesn't want to be responsible for them losing the game. He should make sure that he tackles David before he scores.
5. If winning the game and staying loyal to his team-mates is important to John, then he should make the tackle. Chances are that at some stage David will get injured and then letting down his team will have been in vein.

6. Since rugby is a physical game, the chances are that at some stage David will get injured in which case John's throwing of the match will be in vain. John should make the tackle.

7. John should try to tackle David in a way that won't hurt him, if this means that he misses the tackle then so be it.

8. If his intention was to hurt David, then he shouldn't make the tackle, but if his intention is to play the game clean and hard, then he should make the tackle.

9. John shouldn't ever make an illegal tackle as it goes against the rules of the game, and it is unsporting to do so.

10. Missing the tackle and throwing the game is against the essence of competition in sport. He should make the tackle or else not play at all.

11. John can't protect David if he chooses to play rugby with a recurring injury and must therefore make the tackle despite what may or may not happen.

12. John can't afford to play badly as he will be dropped from the team, and should therefore make sure that he stops David no matter what.

13. John should forget about himself and miss the tackle. Getting dropped is nothing compared to ending your best friend's rugby career.

14. If making an illegal tackle goes against John's principles, and his team mates are aware that he is unwilling to "win at all costs", then he shouldn't feel pressured to make a tackle which could hurt his best friend.

15. Along with the crowd his coach is watching, and there are probably selectors too. John should do what is necessary to impress them.