AN IMPLEMENTATION MODEL
FOR INTER-STATE PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

by

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the requirements for the degree of
Master in Public Administration at
the University of Stellenbosch

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DECLARATION

I, the undersigned, hereby declare that the work contained in this thesis is my own original work and that I have not previously in its entirety or in part submitted it at any university for a degree.
SUMMARY

Since the advent of democracy in 1994, domestic and international expectations have steadily grown regarding the role of a new South African as a responsible and respected member of the international community. These expectations have included the hope that South Africa will play a leading role in a variety of international, regional and sub-regional forums and that the country will become an active participant in attempts to resolve various regional and international conflicts.

The nature of international activities aimed at international conflict prevention, management and resolution has changed dramatically over the past decade. A radically post-Cold War security environment has seen the transformation of classical peacekeeping operations into complex, multi-dimensional conflict management activities with a political focus in which the military is but one of many participants. Whilst South Africa has, as a member of bodies such as the United Nations, the Organisation of African Unity, the African Union and the Southern African Development Community, begun to play an active role in diplomatic resolution initiatives, the country is also expected to contribute to wider multi-national peace missions.

Contemporary peace missions are fundamentally political initiatives, despite the complex mixture of political, humanitarian and military concerns and means. South Africa must therefore make a careful appraisal of the political and strategic environment within which peace missions are to be launched and the principles governing South African participation in such efforts. A clear understanding is required of the type of mandate, which governs peace missions in order to facilitate a detailed articulation of acceptable entry and exit criteria and to determine the scope, level and type of resources that South Africa is willing to commit to future peace missions. This will provide a clear indication to the international community and the regional and sub-regional partners of South Africa's stance on participation in peace operations.
South Africa has limited but valuable resources to offer the international community for the conduct of peace missions. These include civilians with a diverse range of skills and experience appropriate to peace processes, professional and experienced police officers and well trained and disciplined military capacity. If these resources are to be utilised by the international community in the cause of peace, their approximate nature and size must be defined through an appropriate readiness system for each component.

On the other hand, a number of key conditions must be met before these potential resources are deployed in support of a particular peace mission. Some of the responsibility for meeting these conditions lies at the level of the international community – such as the formulation of a clear and realistic mandate. On the other hand, it is a national obligation to support and budget for such participation.

After an assessment of the South African National Defence Force, operation BOLEAS in Lesotho, a clearly articulated *Aide de Memoire* is recommended as a model for Peace Support Operations, which will cover all aspects in relation to South African National Defence (SANDF) participation in peace initiatives. This *Aide De Memoire* aim to set conditions that should be met before any peacekeeping operation can be implemented. It will provide clarity on matters relating to the scope of South African peace missions; the question of mandates, joint task organisation and legal responsibilities.
OPSOMMING

Sedert die aanvang van demokrasie in 1994 was daar 'n stelselmatige groei in eie en internasionale verwagtinge oor die rol van 'n nuwe Suid-Afrika as verantwoordelike en gerespekteerde lid van die internasionale gemeenskap. Hierdie verwagtinge het die hoop ingesluit dat Suid-Afrika 'n leidende rol sou speel in 'n verskeidenheid van internasionale, streek en sub-streek forums en dat die land 'n aktiewe rolspele sal word in pogings om oplossings te vind vir verskeie streeks- en internasionale konflikte.

Die aard van internasionale bedrywighede, wat gemik was op die voorkoming van internasionale konflik, bestuur en besluitneming, het oor die laaste dekade drasties verander. 'n Radikale post-koue oorlogse sekerheidsomgewing het die transformasie beleef vanaf klassieke vredesoperasies na komplekse, multi-dimensionele konflikhanteringsaktiwiteite met 'n politieke fokus waarin die militêre arm van die staat maar een van baie deelnemers is. Terwyl Suid-Afrika, as lid van organisasies soos die Verenigde Nasies, die Organisasie van Afrika Eenheid en die Suider-Afrikaanse Ontwikkelingsgemeenskap, 'n meer aktiewe rol begin speel het in diplomatieke besluitnemingsinisiatiewe, word daar ook van die land verwag om 'n bydrae te lever by groter multi-nasionale vredesendings.

Kontemporêre vredesendings is in beginsel politieke inisiatiewe, ten spyte van die komplekse mengsel van politieke, humanitêre en militêre belange en middele. Suid-Afrika is dus verplig om 'n versigtige beoordeling te maak van die politieke en strategiese omgewing waarin vredesoperasies hul afspeel, asook die beginsels wat Suid-Afrikaanse deelname aan hierdie pogings vereis. 'n Juiste begrip van die tipe mandaat wat vredesendings beheer, word vereis sodat 'n gedetailleerde uitspraak van aanvaarbare toetree- en uittreemaatstawwe vergemaklik kan word. Ook die bestek, vlak en tipe van hulpbronne waartoe Suid-Afrika bereid is om homself in die toekoms te verbind moet bepaal word. Dit sal 'n duidelike aanduiding vir die internasionale gemeenskap, streek en substreekvennote gee van wat Suid-Afrika se standpunt ten opsigte van deelname aan vredesoperasies is.
Suid-Afrika het beperkte maar waardevolle hulpbronne wat aan die internasionale gemeenskap gebied kan word vir die uitvoering van vredesendings. Dit sluit in: burgerlikes met ‘n verskeidenheid van vaardighede en ondervinding wat geskik is vir vredesprosesse; ervare en professionele beleidmakers, asook goed opgeleide en gedissiplineerde militêre vermoëns. Indien hierdie bronne deur die internasionale gemeenskap in die bevordering van vrede aangewend sou word, moet die beraamde aard en omvang daarvan vasgestel word met behulp van ‘n toepaslike gereedheidstelsel vir elke komponent.

Aan die ander kant moet ‘n aantal sleutelvereistes nagekom word voordat hierdie potensiële hulpbronne as steun vir ‘n spesifieke vredesending ontplooi word. Sekere verantwoordelijkhede om by die beginsels te hou, berus op die vlak van die internasionale gemeenskap – soos die formulering van ‘n duidelike en realistiese mandaat. Dit is egter ‘n nasionale verantwoordelijkheid om vir so ‘n deelname te begroot en dit te ondersteun.

Na die beoordeling van OPERASIE BOLEAS deur die Suid-Afrikaanse Nasionale Weermag, stel die navorsing ‘n duidelik geartikuleerde Aide de Memoire vir Vredesteunoperasies voor wat alle aspekte in verband met die Suid-Afrikaanse Weermag se deelname aan vredesinisiatiewe sal insluit. Hierdie Aide de Memoire beoog om voorwaardes te stel wat nagekom moet word voordat enige vredesoperasies geïmplimenteer kan word. Dit sal duidelikheid verskaf oor aangeleenthede rakende die bestek van Suid-Afrikaanse vredesendings; die kwessie van mandate; gesamentlike taakorganisasie en regsverantwoordelijkhede.
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CHAPTER 1

METHODOLOGY

1.1 Introduction

Peacekeeping is a global occurrence, which has increasingly become prevalent on the African continent, as well as in Europe, the Middle East and the Americas. Since the demise of the Cold War, a steady increase in peacekeeping operations has been observed. Evident however, is the inconsistent manner in which peacekeeping operations are being conducted in the nineties in comparison to the manner in which they were conducted before. The controversial nature of this global phenomenon calls for a re-examination of peacekeeping policy, practices and principles as well as its operational nature and character.

It is an indisputable fact that Africa is the continent most plagued by conflict. In Africa the nature of recent and current threats relates to less conflict between nations than to conflict within states. Civil wars fuelled by deep-seated hatred and involving armed factions and the availability of weapons and ammunition (so often experienced in Africa) present peace forces of all kinds with serious challenges and a non-permissive operational environment. In such volatile situations mandates must provide for sporadic change in the nature of operations and the military action to be taken.

After many years of isolation from the international community, South Africa has been welcomed back into the community of nations and has joined or rejoined a host of regional and international organisations. The most significant among these are the United Nations (UN), the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), the African Union (AU) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC). The country has also entered into a number of international and regional bilateral or multilateral defence agreements. Moreover, as a fully-fledged member of the community of nations, South Africa is now preparing to fulfil its responsibility to participate in international and regional peace support operations.
In South Africa the possibility of a future peace support role for the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) was clearly enclosed at the highest political level by former President Mandela himself. Defence-related policy statements repeatedly emphasised that South Africa's security policy was founded upon compliance with and adherence to international law, the Charter of the UN and policy guidelines emanating from the UN Security Council, while also taking the policy of the OAU into account. To demonstrate its commitment to peace initiatives, the country contributed a substantial amount to the UN to provide financial assistance for international peacekeeping in Africa (Neethling, 1997:37).

Against this background, it is anticipated that, sooner or later the South African military will play a leading role in the security requirements of Southern Africa. The Department of Defence and other role-players consequently proceed to anticipate policy and developments in relation to future peace support operations. Significant spadework has already been done in this regard although some questions are still unanswered.

1.2 Motivation for Research Project

In the light of the above, clear relevant mandates and rules of engagement are necessary. As multinational operations in the name of peace and security reside in the interface between political and military affairs, the need for a clear mandate is paramount. Against this background, the experience of military forces in many theatres highlights a critical issue concerning the contemporary challenge of operations in internal conflicts, namely the problem of formulating mandates of which the humanitarian and political objectives are effectively understood and reinforced by the forces on the ground (Berdal, 1993:27).

There is more than one reason for countries to become motivated to participate in peace support operations. As far as the South African position is concerned, former President Mandela stated in a speech to the UN that peace, society and stability and the prevention, management and resolution of conflict could not be regarded in military terms alone. He further said "... hundreds of millions of ... politically empowered masses are caught in the deadly trap of poverty, unable to
live life in its fullness. Out of this are born social conflicts which produce insecurity and instability, civil wars and other wars that claim many lives and millions of desperate refugees .." (as quoted by Pahad, 1995:154).

Accordingly, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Aziz Pahad, stated that any meaningful effort to deal with conflict prevention and resolution must, among others, consider the following issues:

- The promotion of human rights, democracy and good governance.
- The promotion of the political, economic and social well-being of the poor, based on the creation of "people centred societies".
- The protection of the environment.
- The prohibition and control of arms of proliferation.
- The control of arms smuggling, drug trafficking, refugees, mass migration, disease, drought and other natural disasters.

This is linked to a conviction held in military circles that the SANDF has a duty as well as the ability to set an example in Africa which could assist the African continent to find a way out of the current widespread disorder.

Against this background it would appear that the factors related to morality, altruism, national interest as well as international interest in African affairs will largely determine South Africa's short and medium term goals in relation to peace missions. South Africa is, however, seemingly aware of the dangers of acquiring an excessive role in the Southern African region or the continent at large and is therefore concentrating and planning for the participation in the conducting of international peace support operations on a multilateral basis through the UN and on the sub-continent through the OAU and the SADC.

The Department of Defence has clearly indicated that South Africa, as a full-fledged member of the international community, will fulfil its responsibility to participate in international peace support operations. In order to prepare for peace missions, the SANDF is investigating the development of appropriate doctrines,
operational procedures and training programmes in co-operation with foreign partners. South Africa's destiny, however, lies within Southern Africa. For political, strategic and geographical reasons, the Government regards security and defence co-operation in Southern Africa as a priority and in terms thereof, it is especially committed to the development of a common security approach in the region (South Africa, Department of Defence, 1996:22).

1.3 Objectives of Research Project

This research project has a number of objectives. One of these is to determine the most viable theoretical approach to analyse the Southern African peacekeeping phenomenon. To accomplish this objective, a policy content analysis approach with comparative analysis as analytical focus will be pursued. This will be done in Chapter 2.

A second objective is to examine the nature of conflict and the management thereof. This examination will enable this researcher to study peacekeeping in terms of implementation practices in Southern African with the aim of comparing reality with the United Nations Charter Chapters VI and VII as well as the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 Chapter 11 and the South African White Paper on Defence 1996 Chapters 4 and 5. Comparisons will be drawn to Southern African peacekeeping implementation practices and theories. To achieve this goal the Southern African example of the intervention in the Republic of Lesotho (OPERATION BOLEAS) will be used as a case study. This objective will be dealt with in Chapter 3 and 4.

A third objective is to propose an Aide de Memoire for Peace Support Operations covering all aspects in relation to SANDF participation in peace initiatives. As such it will provide clarity on matters relating to the scope of South African peace missions; the question of mandates; joint task organisation and legal responsibilities. The proposed Aide de Memoire, which aims to set conditions that must be met before any peacekeeping operations can be implemented, will be described in Chapter 5.
The fourth objective is to ensure a coherent product. This objective will be achieved by ensuring that linkages are established between the various chapters in order to provide for a systematic progression from one theme to the other. In the chapters of this research project the aim is to build on the central theme by exploring an all-embracing mandate for peacekeeping operations. The central theme will be concluded in Chapter 6 in which a number of recommendations will be made for the way forward with regards to future involvement of the SANDF in conflict in Southern Africa.

1.4 Problem Statement and Research Hypothesis

Given South Africa’s relative strength in Southern Africa, the country can clearly be regarded as a leader and inevitable concomitant responsibility flow from its position of economic and military strength. As the South African government is expected to play a leading role on the African continent, it has to carefully consider any commitment to participation in peace support operations. There are a number of questions that are bound to be raised of which the most significant of these are:

- In what circumstances should South Africa risk participation in such operations?
- In what ways should the South African military contribute to peacekeeping?
- What is 'financially viable participation' in peace support operations?

Any decision to deploy troops will have to justify the risks involved while the Department of Defence will have to be satisfied that certain conditions are met (Neethling, 1997:43).

Past experiences of UN forces highlight a critical issue concerning the contemporary challenge of peacekeeping in internal conflicts, namely the problem of formulating mandates whose humanitarian and political objectives are effectively understood and reinforced by the presence of peacekeeping forces (Berdal, 1993:27).
As far as the intervention in Lesotho by the SANDF during OPERATION BOLEAS was concerned, the forces were mandated to conduct a military intervention operation to establish control over the South African - Lesotho border, to protect South African assets and to stabilise Maseru in order to create a safe environment in which Lesotho's problems could be negotiated (Sutton - Pryce et al, 1998:26). The task of the SANDF was therefore to prevent any further anarchy, negate the threat of a military coup and create a stable environment within which a political settlement could evolve. From a political perspective it was also stated that the operation did not intend to "prop up" either the Lesotho government or the opposition. The intervention was intended to squash a military coup, which would have prevented the people of Lesotho from democratically resolving any conflict dividing the majority and its opposition (Buthelezi, 1998:6).

In a post mortem on its foray into Lesotho, the SANDF did, however, claim that the Government lacked a clear national security policy and that it was not made clear to the SANDF that OPERATION BOLEAS was an intervention operation as opposed to a peace support operation (South African National Defence Force, 1998:1).

Williams (1995:90 - 91) states that peacekeeping is in the midst of a practical and paradigmatic transition. Traditional peacekeeping is increasingly being challenged by peace enforcement operations where the use of force to prevent conflict applies. In addition many analysts maintain that no effective mechanisms or appropriate doctrine have yet been devised for responding to what is regarded as a "grey zone" in peacekeeping, namely the slippery area between peacekeeping and peace enforcement.

A lack of clarity on this issue could prove to be very dangerous with potentially disastrous consequences. In any peace operation, it is imperative to determine what actions are appropriate for forces to undertake. Without agreeing on what is exactly meant by "peacekeeping" and "peace enforcement", the forces engaged in such missions would end up attaching their own national or operational perspectives to each operation or situation (Roos, 1993:14).
RESEARCH HYPOTHESIS

The research hypothesis prompting this research paper is the following:

The foreign policy of the current Government of the Republic of South Africa as well as appropriate doctrines, operational procedures and training programmes of the SANOF do not spell out clearly and unambiguously the mandate and responsibilities of the SANOF when engaged in peace support operations.

1.5 Research Methodology

This research focuses on the policy and mandate of peacekeeping operations from an analytical and comparative perspective with the aim of identifying prerequisites and conditions for peace support operations. In support of this methodology a section on policy theory is included to contextualise the theoretical premise of this research project. The practices of African peacekeepers are examined to determine what conditions must be met in order to wage peacekeeping operations effectively.

It is evident therefore that peacekeeping operations against the background of the current lack of clear and unambiguous mandating policy are the main foci. Evidence in support of this focus will be obtained through a quantitative review of relevant literature. In turn, the literature is evaluated against a scenario in which a clear and commonly practised foreign policy prevails that mandates inter-state peacekeeping operations by the SANDF. The unstable and volatile political environment of the Mountain Kingdom of Lesotho will fall within the scope of this research and provided the context for it. This context is also analysed to establish the need for proper and clear policy mandating intra-state peacekeeping operations. From these research findings a conclusion is drawn about the nature of the prerequisites that must be prescribed in mandating policy.

A variety of techniques are utilised during the research process to ensure that valid arguments are formed based on of sound conclusions. An assessment is made of literature on the concepts and related terminology of peacekeeping in order to acquaint the reader with the different concepts prevailing in peacekeeping
jargon. An assessment is also made of the literature on the case study of the Lesotho Republic to establish the causes of conflict, the nature of peacekeeping operations and the need for intervention.

The research is both deductive and inductive as it is based on both theoretical and empirical as well as primary and secondary data sources that suggest a fresh look at the mandate for peacekeeping. The main focus of this research is a comparative analysis of the currently practised peacekeeping operations in the Southern African region and peacekeeping operations against the background of a properly and all-encompassing policy that duly mandate inter-state peacekeeping operations. The ultimate aim of the researcher is to propose an Aide de Memoire that could perhaps aid attempts to resolve inter-state conflict in an evolving continental peacekeeping paradigm.

1.6 Conclusion

Western powers are seemingly disengaging from peacekeeping in Africa as a result of a number of factors. This approach results in a situation whereby Southern African countries involved in inter-state conflict appear to have been left to their own perilous devices which suggests that they themselves need to sort out their own internal problems. Western powers are keen to support training initiatives that may contribute to strengthen Africa’s own capabilities to deal with conflict situations. However, they are reluctant to engage in peacekeeping operations themselves when the lives of outsiders are perceived to be put at risk. Every effort must be made to ensure that Southern African states will be able to interfere with multi-national forces committed by the region for the region. Lasting peace, (something that has evaded the region for decades) is a continental requirement for political stability and economic development and peacekeeping or even peace enforcement is a vehicle for achieving this.
CHAPTER 2

GENERAL POLICY ANALYSES FRAMEWORK

2.1 Introduction

Since the objectives outlined in Chapter 1 require a general orientation in terms of the theory of policy analysis, the focus of this chapter is on an assessment of the methodological approaches to policy analysis and on selecting an appropriate analytical focus and approach. The selected approach will be used to contextualise and guide the thought-processes and research required for this paper.

2.2 Methodological Approaches to Policy Analysis

According to Links (2000:13) policy is a contentious issue. The main reason for this seems to be disagreement on what exactly constitutes this discipline. This chapter therefore focuses on the theoretical approaches to policy analysis and on selecting an appropriate theoretical application. The selected theoretical approach provides the fundamental theoretical linkage to the research in support of the methodology. The aim of this chapter is thus:

- to construct a broad framework by describing what policy, public policy, policy analysis and comparative policy constitute;
- to describe the analytical approach, focus and instruments of comparative policy analysis; and
- to select an appropriate policy application that can be employed as a structural component and theoretical point of departure for the research.

2.2.1 Policy

In an attempt to define the concept of policy, Fox and Meyer (1995:96) state that policy is "... a guide of action on statement goals that should be followed in an institution to deal with a particular problem or phenomenon". They propose
furthermore that policy should be regarded as "... a guide to action ... to provide consistency of decisions" and as "goals and objectives within a given situation and the methods to realise them". Koenig (1986:2) supports this view when he states that policy is "... a long-term rather than a short-term guide of action". What is evident from the cited definitions is that policy entails a proposed action by an institution such as government and such action is aimed at achieving a desired outcome.

2.2.2 Public Policy

According to Links (2000:14), two key concepts are related to policy. One is the environment in which we live and the other refers to the problems generated by it. The problems stemming from environmental factors result in a need for policy. Policies thus originate in response to societal phenomena. Public policies should be viewed as formal expressions (legislation, executive orders, rules and regulations) of decisions and choices made and actions taken in response to societal phenomena (Links, 2000:15). Fox and Meyer (1995:107) define public policy as "... authoritative statements made by legitimate public institutions about the way in which they propose to deal with policy problems". One important aspect to realise is that policies require adaptation, because no two environments or sets of circumstances are identical.

2.2.3 Policy Analysis

One well-known definition of policy analysis is offered by Dye (1976:1) when he defines it as "... finding out what governments do, why they do it, and what difference it makes". In defining policy analysis, Dunn (1994:84) offers a more comprehensive definition. He defines it as "... an applied social science discipline that uses multiple methods of inquiry in contexts of argumentation and public debate, to create, critically assess, and communicate policy relevant knowledge". This definition accentuates the practical nature of policy analysis as "... a response to recurrent problems and crisis facing governments" (Dunn, 1994:62).


2.2.4 Comparative Policy Analysis

The objective of this research project is to draw a comparison between the ideal scenario in which proper mandating policy principles prevail and the current African peacekeeping practices. In order to provide insight into the art of comparative policy analysis, it is necessary to clarify what this concept constitutes. Before attempting to define this concept, the objectives of comparative analyses need to be considered. According to Hitchner and Levine (1981:5) three objectives can be distinguished, namely:

- to develop a verifiable body of knowledge on government and politics in general;
- to evaluate political experience, institutions, behaviour and processes in terms of cause and effect and desirability and undesirability; and
- to ultimately be able to predict events, tendencies and consequences.

The value of comparison is emphasised by Hague and Harrop (1987:15). They assert that “... [c]ausal relationships should always be analysed by comparing situations where given factors are present with those where they are absent”. In reference to what comparative policy analysis is and should be it may be viewed as the study of how, why and to what effect various governments pursue particular courses of action or inaction.

2.2.5 Approaches to Policy Analysis

In an attempt to contextualise this research project, it is necessary to review the different approaches to policy analysis in a broad context. For this purpose the various approaches to policy analysis is explained by means of a model. Figure 1 represents a summary by Wissink (1988:75) of the different approaches, analytical foci and analytical instruments that may be employed as points of departure in the study of policy analysis.
When examining the bold sections (see Figure 1), it is evident that the analytical approach that the researcher is using constitutes a policy content analysis. According to Links (2000:17) the analytical focus has a dual purpose, as it firstly seeks to analyse the content of peacekeeping policy and secondly it provides the framework within which historic peacekeeping policies can be compared with current practices. In terms of the scope of this research project, the policies and practices of properly mandated peacekeeping are compared to the practices of African peacekeeping. The comparative approach in this study attempts to gain a
deeper understanding of peacekeeping policies by explaining why a need exists for such a global practice and to propose a procedure for dealing with the causes and consequences of conflict.

Links (2000:18) also states that the policy-formulation process is closely linked to policy analysis. Howlett and Ramesh (1995:10-11) put forward a particularly useful model in support of the objective of this study and one that may have value in dealing with intra-state conflict. The model they propose (Figure 2), contains the various policy stages and reflect its relationship to applied problem solving.

**FIGURE 2: FIVE STAGES OF THE POLICY CYCLE AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO APPLIED PROBLEM-SOLVING**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PHASES OF APPLIED PROBLEM-SOLVING</th>
<th>STAGES IN THE POLICY CYCLE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Problem Recognition</td>
<td>1. Agenda Setting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Proposal of Solution</td>
<td>2. Policy Formulation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Choice of Solution</td>
<td>3. Decision-making</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Putting Solution into Effect</td>
<td>4. Policy Implementation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Monitoring Results</td>
<td>5. Policy Evaluation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Howlett and Ramesh (1995:11)

### 2.3 Conclusion

Policy issues differ widely and each one requires a unique approach. In this chapter a theoretical framework is outlined that aims at setting the tone for a discussion in the forthcoming chapters of the issues relating to the nature of peacekeeping. The approach, focus and instruments selected in this chapter provide the structural components for a comparative analysis of the context of the Southern African way of peacekeeping and peacekeeping against the background of clearly stated policy mandating peacekeeping operations.
CHAPTER 3

THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON PEACEKEEPING

3.1 Introduction

The aim of this chapter is not only to define the various peacekeeping concepts used by so many scholars in modern peacekeeping literature but also to contextualise peacekeeping per se. Peacekeeping will be viewed in its wider context.

The contextualisation of peacekeeping is necessary because, as Cilliers (1999:20) observes. "... [t]he concept of peacekeeping was designed to deal with conflict between states and not with internal conflict in countries". What we increasingly observe in Africa, however, is that the peacekeeping playing fields are not level and the rules of the peacekeeping "game" have undergone major changes over the last decade of the previous century.

It could be argued that the African circumstances dictate an approach where the emphasis on keeping the peace needs to be shifted from more passive engagement to actual enforcement. Such an approach would ultimately suggest greater emphasis on the use of force to restore or maintain order and limited or partial regard for consent.

3.2 Clarification of Concepts

In order to understand and contextualise peacekeeping and related concepts referred to in the research, clarification of certain key concepts is necessary. The following concepts are therefore clarified:

3.2.1 Preventive Diplomacy

Preventive diplomacy involves diplomatic action taken in advance of a predicted crisis to prevent or limit violence. In particularly tense situations, preventive
deployment of military forces may support such action. The deployment may be aimed at deterring violence; assisting local authorities to protect threatened minorities; securing and maintaining essential services; and ensuring access to an area of operation (South Africa, Department of Defence, 1996:23).

3.2.2 Peacemaking

Peacemaking is a process of diplomacy, mediation, negotiation or any form of peaceful settlement of conflict that seeks to end disputes and resolve the issues that give rise to conflict. Military forces may be required to support this process (South Africa, Department of Defence, 1996:23).

According to the UN, peacemaking is “... actions to bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially through such means as foreseen in Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations” (Gumbi, 1995:28). Peacemaking involves the deployment of diplomats and politicians to achieve a negotiated settlement in a conflict situation prior to or even after the commitment of a peacekeeping force. Other skills employed include persuasion, mediation, non-military coercion (which may consist of diplomatic isolation and sanctions), multi-lateral discussions and conciliation. Peacemaking usually takes place after conflict has erupted and aims at establishing a peaceful settlement.

3.2.3 Peacebuilding

Peacebuilding consists of post-conflict actions that strengthen and rebuild civil infrastructures and institutions in order to provide a lasting peace. Military forces may assist in restoring the civil authority; rebuilding physical infrastructures; conducting elections; demobilising former belligerents and collecting and controlling small arms (South Africa, Department of Defence, 1996:23)

Cilliers (1995:58) defines peacebuilding as “... post conflict action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify a political settlement in order to avoid a return to conflict”. Peacebuilding mechanisms include the identification and support of structures that will consolidate peace, advance a
sense of confidence and wellbeing and support economic reconstruction, which may involve the military, and civilians. According to Kofi Annan (1998:21), the current Secretary General of the UN, "... Peacebuilding involves integrated and coordinated actions aimed at addressing the root causes of violence - whether political, legal, institutional, military, humanitarian, human rights-related, environmental, economic and social, cultural or demographic". This activity normally takes place after peace has been restored and is thus regarded as a long-term conflict-prevention strategy.

3.2.4 Peacekeeping

Peacekeeping involves military or para-military operations undertaken with the consent of the disputant parties. The operations aim to monitor and facilitate the implementation of an existing peace or truce agreement and to support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term settlement. Peacekeeping activities include observation, monitoring and supervision of the provisions of peace agreements. These typically relate to cease-fires; arms control; withdrawal and demobilisation of combatants; denial or freedom of movement and elections (South Africa, Department of Defence, 1996:23).

According to Mboma (1995:115) peacekeeping can be defined as, "... [t]he prevention, containment, moderation and termination of hostilities between or within states, through the medium of a peaceful third party intervention organised and directed internationally, using multinational forces of soldiers, police and civilians to restore and maintain peace".

The UN Secretary General defines peacekeeping in its “Agenda for Peace” as "... [t]he deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all parties concerned, normally involving United Nations military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well. Peacekeeping is a technique that expands the possibilities for both the prevention of conflict and the making of peace (Gumbi, 1995:28)."
The US Defence Force distinguishes between traditional and aggravated peacekeeping. **Traditional** peacekeeping refers to "... the deployment of an UN, regional organisation, or a coalition presence in the field with the consent of all parties concerned, normally involving UN regional organisations, or coalition military forces and/or police and civilians". **Aggravated** peacekeeping is undertaken with "... minimal consent of all belligerent parties but which are complicated by intransigence of one or more of the belligerents, ... peacekeeping forces are authorised to use force in self-defence and in defence of the mission they are assigned, which may include monitoring and facilitating implementation of an existing truce agreement in support of diplomatic efforts ... or supporting or safeguarding humanitarian relief efforts" (Gumbi, 1995:29). Also important is that peacekeeping is dependant on a commitment by the willing and able.

### 3.2.5 Peace Enforcement

Peace enforcement is the application or threat of military force, authorised by the UN Security Council, to compel compliance with Security Council resolutions. The aims are to maintain or restore peace and to support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term settlement. Unlike other peace support operations, peace enforcement may include combat action. Military missions may include the restoration and maintenance of order and stability; guarantee or denial of movement; enforcement of sanctions; establishment and supervision of protected zones and forcible separation of belligerent parties. (South Africa, Department of Defence, 1996:23).

According to Gumbi (1995:29) and Cilliers (1995:58) peace enforcement refers to peace operations conducted without the consent of one or more parties concerning one or more aspects of, or concerning the entire UN mandate. Peace enforcement action takes place under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and involves the use of military means to restore peace in an area of conflict. Such means may include dealing with an inter-state conflict situation to meet a humanitarian need or when state institutions have largely collapsed.
Peace enforcement operations often fall outside the scope of UN command and control capabilities. Such operations often bear the label of unilateral action, since they are conducted in coalition or with the endorsement of organisations such as the UN, the OAU and even the SADC. The operation of SADC forces in Lesotho is a classical example of a peace enforcement operation.

3.2.6 Conflict Intervention

Conflict intervention refers to the actions of a third party interfering in a situation where at least two warring factions are engaged in hostile acts against each other. The ultimate objective is to establish peace by forceful or peaceful means. The concept of conflict intervention is closely linked to conflict prevention, which includes activities ranging from diplomatic initiatives to the deployment of troops in order to prevent further hostilities. According to Dobbie (1994:124) conflict intervention includes early warning, surveillance, stabilising measures and preventative deployment. It may also include fact-finding missions, consultation, warnings, inspections and monitoring.

3.2.7 Armed Intervention

Armed intervention refers to conflict intervention, which involves the threat to use and the actual use of force in order to stabilise an already volatile situation. In most conflict stricken regions in Africa, armed intervention often takes place unilaterally and under the guise of peacekeeping - often without UN sanction.

The following three concepts constitute the foundation upon which peacekeeping is founded. It will only briefly be discussed here since a more comprehensive discussion will follow later in this Chapter.

3.2.8 Consent

Consent is viewed as one of the cornerstones of peacekeeping, together with impartiality and the absence of force. It is defined by Malan (1997a:18) as “...
reaching of agreement, the granting of permission or approval by parties to the conflict ... it is given and may also be withdrawn”.

3.2.9 Impartiality

The impartiality of a military force interfering in a conflict situation is of cardinal importance to ensure that the trust and confidence of the disputing parties is maintained. In order to ensure impartiality, any force established to intervene in a conflict situation must be a multi-national one and must be represented as broadly as possible. Malan (1997a:25), simply defines impartiality as “... [the] absence of bias”.

3.2.10 Absence of Force

Peacekeeping is based on the premise that all peaceful methods shall at all times be explored to establish lasting peace. However, this is not always possible, even though it may be desirable. The absence of force therefore implies the pacific resolution of conflict. The pacific resolution of conflict may include negotiation, mediation, arbitration and other peaceful means.

3.3 Overview of the UN and Peacekeeping

In 1941, during the Second World War (1939-1945), Franklin D. Roosevelt, President of the United States and Winston Churchill, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, met aboard a battleship in the Atlantic Ocean to plan for the establishment of an international organisation. The aim of this meeting was to ensure that by means of the international organisation global peace and security would prevail and that an occurrence like World War II would not be repeated (United Nations, 1998a:4). Within the global context of a world population still stunned by the devastating effects of World War II, a genuine need for peace and security prevailed. In terms of the UN Charter, which can be considered an international treaty, member states are obliged, “... to settle their disputes by peaceful means, and in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered” (United Nations, 1998b:68). Since its inception in 1945, the UN has
grown from 51 to 185 members. This growth can be attributed to the global realisation that peace and stability can only be achieved through collective effort.

One of the primary purposes for the establishment of the UN and a central part of its mandate was, and still is, the maintenance of international peace and security. There is no doubt that over many decades the UN has fulfilled its mandate by preventing conflict from escalating into war, by persuading opposing parties to use the conference table rather than force and by assisting in restoring peace where conflict has erupted (Links, 2000:22). Even though this has been the case, the recurrent eruption of global intra-state conflict, hostilities between ethnic groups and recent genocide practices have left deep scars on the image of the UN as a messiah duty-bound to save humanity.

In the final analysis, the UN ‘scorecard’ in the last decade of the previous century in terms of Africa, does not look impressive at all. During this period it became increasingly evident that the UN is reluctant to become involved in African peacekeeping, while maintaining that the Security Council must sanction any operation aimed at establishing peace. This position is controversial as it implies that the UN wishes to be both conductor and musician at the same time.

3.4 UN Peacekeeping Principles

According to Gumbi (1995:45) peacekeeping is a complementary measure to resolve tension existing between states. This implies that peacekeeping can neither be regarded as a peaceful method of conflict resolution nor can it be the ultimate solution for peace and security. In terms of conflict resolution, the UN Charter classifies the pacific settlement of disputes as Chapter VI operations, whilst more forceful action is classified as Chapter VII operations. The advent of peacekeeping as a peaceful means of conflict resolution must be regarded as a technique and concept developed by the UN in response to a global need for peace and security.

The UN distinguishes two broad categories of peacekeeping operations (United Nations 1998c:2). These are:
military observer missions with small numbers of unarmed officers charged with such tasks as monitoring cease-fires, verifying troop withdrawals or patrolling borders or demilitarised zones; and

peacekeeping forces composed of national contingents of troops deployed to perform tasks similar to those of military observers, who often act as a buffer between hostile parties.

Between 1948 and 1998 a total of 16 peacekeeping missions were established on the African continent that represents one third of all missions conducted to date (Links 2000:27). During this period only one UN peacekeeping intervention (in the Congo in 1960-1962) took place. This number is a matter of concern for two reasons. Firstly one could argue that this inaction by the UN suggests a reluctance to become involved. It may also serve as a possible deliberate signal to African security organs, such as the OAU and SADC, to resolve their own internal problems. Secondly, the UN's inaction could be interpreted as an admission that it lacks the capacity and political will to solve intra-state conflicts. This view is supported by Malan (1998:11) when he remarks that, "... [t]he UN has not been able to react effectively to the imperative to intervene in failed states in the throes of civil war".

This lack of commitment displayed by the UN Security Council can be attributed to the absence of a clear mandate when it comes to interference in intra-state affairs. The main driving force for committing a peacekeeping force has, in most cases, been the moral obligation to intervene when humanitarian considerations prompt action by an outside force.

UN peacekeeping has been founded on three universal principles, namely:

- the consent of the parties;
- the impartiality of the peacekeepers; and
- a prohibition on the use of force.
3.4.1 The Principle of Consent

A distinction must be made between consent for an operation (consent acquired prior to an operation) and consent within an operation (during the conducting of an operation). Consent for an operation refers to the consent that a peacekeeper may expect to have obtained proportionally from certain people, for certain activities, for certain periods of time (Dobbie, 1994:122-123).

A requirement for peacekeepers deployed in a conflict area, is the consent of the parties to the conflict. The consent acquired through the various techniques may be partial or comprehensive. If consent is absent, the operation becomes peace-enforcement. The SADC intervention in Lesotho is an example of a peacekeeping operation that may be coined “a peace-enforcement operation” due to the absence of consent from all parties to the conflict.

Consent within an operation pertains to the permission given by conflicting parties during the execution phase of a peacekeeping operation. Consent obtained in this manner is the product of ongoing negotiations, mediation, bargaining and lobbying between a party of negotiators or a peacekeeping force and conflicting parties. The consent mustered within an operation is necessary if the initial terms of engagement are later defined as a result of changing circumstances (Links 2000:29).

The scenario explained here works perfectly in theory, but seldom in practice. The nature of African conflict holds serious consequences for consent as a principle of classical peacekeeping. According to Malan (1997b:2) it has become increasingly difficult to depend on consent as a prerequisite for intervention in contemporary humanitarian crises. In many cases, it is impossible to obtain consent because of the collapse of authority or the proliferation of groups claiming authority. Under such circumstances, agreements are worthless and non-existent because international law and conventions are openly disregarded. In this regard, Nhlapo (1999:3) remarks that, “… peacekeeping operations without consent by the belligerent parties hold little prospect for success in the long term …”. In a peacekeeping operation, consent for and within an operation is closely linked to
impartiality since, without consent, breaches of trust and potential conflict of interest is possible and likely to occur.

3.4.2 The Principle of Impartiality

As a principle of UN peacekeeping, impartiality needs to be adhered to by interventionist forces in order to ensure the absence of bias. According to Dobbie (1994:133) it requires the widest and most significant application as a fundamental determinant of a peacekeeper's role. The impartiality imperative can only be adhered to if a multinational force is deployed under the banner of peacekeeping, while having a clear and unambiguous mandate and broad representation (Cilliers, 1995:59).

In recent UN operations it became clear that the principle of impartiality was sorely neglected in the wake of violent inter-state conflict intervention. The intervention in Lesotho can be cited as a more recent example. The difficulty of remaining impartial is demonstrated when operations are mounted under the banner of peacekeeping and then turn out to be nothing other than interventions to serve the national interests of a state or states. It would be fair to assume that the African approaches to conflict situations have neglected this very important cornerstone of peacekeeping. In addition, it should thus be regarded as one of the main reasons for the failure of peacekeeping attempts to resolve conflict effectively.

3.4.3 The Principle of Absence of Force

According to Links (2000:31) peacekeeping forces are not supposed to use force. In instances where force needs to be applied, it should be in self-defence and as a last resort. A peacekeeping force should never be expected to rely only on force to achieve its ends. Should such a situation arise, it would loose its status of peacekeeper and it would cease to be above the conflict. According to Cilliers (1995:95), peace support operations are based on the premise that peaceful methods will generally be used to achieve a mission's goal. Another premise he adds is that, "[a]ny use of force must be justified and carefully controlled". It is
evident that, as in the case of impartiality, peacekeepers should uphold the principle of the absence of force as a critical mission success factor.

3.5 Financing of Peacekeeping Operations

In terms of the financing of peacekeeping operations, the usual practise for member states is to share the cost proportionally. The General Assembly of the UN apportions expenses according to a special scale of assessment (payment) applicable to peacekeeping. The assessment scale takes into account the relative economic strength of member states. The permanent members of the Security Council of the UN are required to pay a greater share because of their special responsibility for maintaining international peace and security.

Countries may also volunteer to provide personnel, supplies or other support for a peace mission for which they are reimbursed in accordance with agreed upon rates (United Nations, 1998c:6). A participating country's own government pays peacekeeping soldiers according to their own national rank and salary scale. Countries volunteering personnel to participate in peacekeeping operations are reimbursed by the UN at a flat rate of about US $1 000 per soldier per month. This situation may lead to corruption on a massive scale as some countries, which experience huge value differences in their exchange rates to the US dollar, pay their soldiers far below the proposed flat rate. It could therefore be argued that even though countries participating in peacekeeping cannot afford to send a peacekeeping contingent (especially in Southern Africa), they do so in the hope of making a lucrative profit from the reimbursements by the UN. In this regard Corum (1995:122) states that "... many developing nations have turned to peacekeeping as a source of revenue".

Apart from financing an operation, the UN also reimburses countries for equipment and personnel contributions. Reimbursement to these countries are often deferred owing to cash shortages caused by members failure to pay their dues (Links, 2000:36). From a financial point of view, this could be a contributing factor to the UN's evident reluctance to become involved in peacekeeping especially on the African continent where the prolonged nature of conflicts tends to increase
peacekeeping operational costs. It can therefore be concluded that even though the UN may wish to become involved, the extent of its involvement is often determined by financial constraints beyond its control - adding another "justification" to their growing inventory of "justifications".

3.6 The Changing Nature of African Conflict

Civil wars or regional conflicts have plagued all the major regions of the developing world. Ayoob (1995:47) is of the opinion that two major sources of inter-state conflict can be observed. One source is the intermeshing of domestic insecurities with inter-state antagonisms and the second source relates to the autonomous dynamics of regional conflict, which is often centered on the aspirations of pre-eminent regional powers. In many instances the latter is a legacy of the colonial era.

According to Steyn (1998:26) African states are caught up in both domestic and cross-border conflict. Such conflicts originate from age-old feuds, foreign interest, arms smuggling and mercenary soldiering. Malan (1998:4) states that African conflict is caused by a combination of internal and international conflict with the local civilian populations suffering serious human rights violations on a large scale. These conflict situations result in a large number of refugees and displaced persons that can be attributed to the following factors:

- a lack of coincidence between nations and states, ethnic tension and the suppression of minorities;
- corrupt and dictatorial regimes;
- support for such regimes by international arms traders;
- chronic poverty and under development; and

In addition to these causes, one could also add the involvement of neighbouring states that form alliances with conflicting parties. An example of such an alliance is found in the conflict-ridden Democratic Republic of the Congo where Zimbabwe, Angola, Namibia and Chad supported the 'legitimate' government of President
Lawrent Kabila while Zambia, Uganda and Rwanda support the opposition (UN Secretary General, 1999).

3.7 The Emergence of the African Peacekeeping Approach

Africa has emerged as the most dangerous and challenging environment for conducting peacekeeping operations (Malan, 1999a:4). In an African context, the emergence of peace enforcement as an alternative to peacekeeping warrants a deeper investigation than mere mentioning. Upon examining the abundant literature on conflict and peacekeeping in Africa, it becomes evident that peacekeeping has been hijacked to describe and justify new approaches, such as peace enforcement, peacemaking, peace restoration, peacebuilding, preventative diplomacy and a host of other approaches not envisaged in the UN Charter. According to Malan (1998:2) these multinational approaches have borne little or no resemblance to true blue helmet operations. Also evident is that these approaches have been inadequate in terms of the principles of consent, impartiality and absence of force.

3.8 Regional Responses to Inter-state Conflict

The challenge to Southern-African peacekeeping has created a dilemma for both the UN and regional organs. Peacekeeping, as it was conceived and practised prior to the last decade of the previous century, has undergone major changes in its methods, composition and mandate.

3.8.1 Institutional Responses

"Institutional responses" refer to the abundance of regional institutions, agencies and organs responsible for the maintenance of peace and security. These institutions consist mainly of military, inter-governmental and non-governmental institutions that are involved in some way or another with the issues of peace and security.
Article 52 of the UN Charter makes provision for the establishment of "... regional arrangements or agencies ..." under the authority of the Security Council (UN, 1997:34). In terms of Article 53, the UN may utilise these regional organs for enforcement action, with the provision that no such action shall take place without the authorisation of the Security Council. The UN Charter also explicitly states in Article 33 that disputants should exhaust regional possibilities before invoking UN measures.

The principle regional bodies responsible for peace and security in Southern Africa are the Organisation for African Unity (OAU), now the African Union (AU) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC). The importance of these organisations as regional security organs as well as their current and future involvement in conflict resolution, cannot be underestimated. This view is supported by Malan (1997a:1) when he remarks that "... [t]he nature and scope of contemporary humanitarian emergencies generated by conflict in Africa continue to exceed the international community's will and capacity to respond". This statement by Malan effectively signifies that the capacity of regional organs for dealing with African conflict will have to be enhanced and expanded.

3.8.1.1 The OAU

The OAU was founded in 1963 on the vision of Pan-Africanism to foster political and economic co-operation. Its operational philosophy is based on the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of member states (Wiseman, 1983:359). In a regional capacity, the OAU depends largely on the techniques of negotiation, mediation and arbitration as conflict-resolution measures. This is also explicitly confirmed in Article 3 of the OAU Charter, where it is stated that the OAU will not interfere in the internal affairs of states. This clause may prove to be a serious drawback, should the OAU be forced to interfere in humanitarian crises, because it will not have the mandate in terms of its own charter.

In order to strengthen its capacity to deal with intra-state conflict and to manage conflict more effectively, the OAU adopted the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution in 1993. This OAU Mechanism provides for:
a central decision-making body, the Central Organ, consisting of about 16 member states and selected states representing the sub-regions of Africa which meet at head of state, ministerial and ambassadorial level; and
the establishment of a Conflict Management Division within the OAU Secretariat (Vogt, 1998:6).

In terms of its mandate this mechanism is to provide the Secretary General with the initiative to manage conflict within the region and to mobilise resources from within and outside the continent. Vogt (1998:4) is of the opinion that the establishment of this mechanism has resulted in the development of the capacity of the OAU:

- to anticipate and prevent conflict through a wide range of early warning systems;
- to deploy special envoys to mediate and shepherd conflict resolution processes; and
- to deploy peacekeeping forces, civilian police, military observers and political officers in conflict areas.

The UN's financial and institutional support for the OAU should therefore be interpreted as a deliberate attempt to invest in the development of a regional capability in Africa to deal with African conflict. It is however believed that the OAU lacks the institutional capacity to interfere with a peace force in a conflict situation because, as Malan (1997c:3) observes "... sub-regional organisations in Africa were established for co-ordination of economic development, and their political and security frameworks are very immature". A conclusion that can be drawn from this is that the UN should not abdicate its mandated responsibility to seek global peace and security by relegating this responsibility to regional organs.

3.8.1.2 Transition from the OAU to the African Union (AU)

The Assembly of Heads of State and Government accepted by acclamation an invitation from Colonel Muhammar Ghadafi to the 4th Extra-ordinary Summit in Sirte on the 9th September 1999. The purpose of the Extra-ordinary Summit was
to amend the OAU Charter to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the OAU. This Summit aimed at:

- effectively addressing the new social, political and economic realities in Africa and the world;
- fulfilling the peoples' aspirations for greater unity in conforming with the objectives of the OAU Charter and the treaty establishing the African Economic Community (AEC);
- revitalising the continental organisation to play a more active role in addressing the needs of the people;
- eliminating the scourge of conflicts;
- meeting global challenges; and
- harassing the human and natural resources of the continent to improve living conditions (Republic of South Africa, 2002:2).

To achieve these aims the Summit decided to establish an African Union in conformity with the objectives of the charter of the OAU and the provisions of the treaty establishing the AEC.

3.8.1.2.1 Objectives of the AU

In general the objectives of the AU are different and more comprehensive than those of the OAU. The OAU has served its mission and was due for replacement by a structure geared towards addressing the current needs of the continent. The aims of the OAU are:

- to promote the unity and solidarity of African States;
- to co-ordinate and intensify their co-operation and efforts to achieve a better life for the peoples of Africa;
- to defend their sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence;
- to eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa; and
- to promote international co-operation.
Comparatively, the objectives of the AU as contained in the Constitutive Act, are to:

- achieve greater unity and solidarity between the African countries and the peoples of Africa;
- defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of its member states;
- accelerate the political and socio-economic integration of the continent;
- promote and defend African common positions on issues of interest to the continent and its peoples;
- encourage international co-operation, taking due account of the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights;
- promote peace, security and stability on the continent;
- promote democratic principles and institutions, popular participation and good governance;
- promote and protect human peoples' rights in accordance with the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights and other relevant human rights instruments;
- establish the necessary conditions which enable the continent to play its rightful role in the global economy and in international negotiations;
- promote sustainable development at the economic, social and cultural levels as well as the integration of African economies;
- promote co-operation in all fields of human activity to raise the living standards of African peoples;
- co-ordinate and harmonise the policies between the existing and future regional economic communities for the gradual attainment of the objectives of the Union;
- advance the development of the continent by promoting research in all fields, in particular in science and technology; and
- work with relevant international partners in the eradication of preventable diseases and the promotion of good health on the continent (Republic of South Africa, 2002:4).
3.8.1.2.2 Design of the AU

Of crucial importance in the establishment of the organs of the Union is the challenge to move away from the overly state-centric character of the OAU and its concomitant lack of civil participation. The co-operation of African NGO’s, civil societies, labour unions and business organisations are essential in the process of co-operation. Several references were made to the AU being loosely based on the European Union model in which respect it was said that Africa should not re-invent the wheel. It was therefore agreed that the AU should be something new with the emphasis on an African experience.

Where as the OAU was in principle a political organisation that also discussed matters of economic and social concern, the AU should be an organisation aimed at economic integration and social development that should lead to political unity.

It is therefore of crucial importance that member States are active in the design and implementation of the AU. In this way it will foster a sense of ownership and the member states will be able to address those aspects of the day-to-day functioning of the organisation which will streamline the implementation of decisions.

3.8.1.3 The SADC

In 1980 the SADC was established as the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC). According to the Institute for Security Studies (ISS, 1998:1) the SADCC operated without a legal framework, treaty or protocol for the first twelve years of its existence. The South African Development Community (SADC) was formally constituted with the signing of ‘The Declaration and Treaty of the SADC’ in Windhoek (Namibia) in 1992 (Malan and Cilliers, 1997:1). Under the auspices of the SADC, a specific organ deals with matters of peace and security. This body, which was established in January 1996 at a meeting with SADC ministers in Gaborone, is known as the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security. Its objectives are, among others, to:
protect the people and safeguard the development of the region against instability arising from the breakdown of law and order, inter-state conflict and external aggression;

promote political co-operation among member states and to develop a common political value system and institutions;

develop a common foreign policy as regards matters of mutual concern and interest and to lobby, as a region, on issues of common interest at international forums;

coopoperate fully as regards regional security and defence through conflict prevention management and resolution;

mediate in inter-state disputes and conflicts;

use preventative diplomacy to pre-empt conflict in the region - both within and between states - through and early warning system;

seek an end to conflict through diplomatic means and, when such means fail, to take "punitive" measures;

promote and enhance the development of democratic institutions and practises within member states by encouraging the observance of universal human rights;

promote peacemaking and peacekeeping in order to achieve sustainable peace and security;

develop a collective security capacity and to conclude a mutual defence pact for responding to external threats and a peacekeeping capacity within national armies that could be called upon within the region, or elsewhere on the continent; and to


At present this organ essentially exists only at head of state and the Interstate Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) levels (Malan and Cilliers, 1997:2). Compared to the OAU, the SADC still has to go some way to reach the same functional levels of inter-action and inter-operability. This could prove to be a serious hindrance to its effectiveness as a regional organ to act pro-actively in the spheres of both the peace and security.
It is evident that the mandate of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security provides a framework of good intentions and is described by the ISS as "... lofty goals with very little ... substantial guidelines" (ISS, 1998:1). This description emphasises the need for sufficient mechanisms to put its mandate into effect. Unfortunately, even with the best intentions, policies are doomed to failure if the pre-implementation and post-implementation infrastructure is lacking (Links 2000:47). A review of the SADC track record as a regional organ for peace and security thus far, reveals that its performance as a peace enforcer surpasses that of peacekeeper. The Lesotho invasion under the pretext of peacekeeping, conjures up vivid images in support of this notion.

3.9 Future Challenges for African Peacekeeping

African peacekeeping is at a crossroads and a transition needs to be made from UN peacekeeping principles to an approach that satisfies current demands. One school of thought argues in favour of regional responses to conflict resolution while another argues in favour of sustained UN intervention. Both these arguments are fundamentally flawed: where one is evidently reluctant and lacks the political will, the other lacks the institutional capacity required to meet the challenge. Landsberg (1999:47) supports this view: "Too often those states with the resources lack the will and those with the will lack the resources; the able are unwilling and the willing are unable". Accordingly, this creates a "... paralysing paradox".

In short the following may be regarded as the challenges for African peacekeeping:

- maintaining the division between peacekeeping and peace enforcement with clear mandates for operational deployments;
- enhancing the political, institutional, financial and operational capacity of regional organs;
- political commitment, unity of purpose and trend establishment by the willing and able;
the provision of adequate equipment and material by regional and international organisations;

- networking to revitalise the continental debate on peace and security;
- strengthening the capacity of existing initiatives, i.e. The African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI), to deal with conflict in the region; and
- revitalising the early warning system as a method of intervening to avoid the implementation of comprehensive intervention measures (Links, 2000:51).

3.10 Conclusion

The preceding discussion reveals that peacekeeping as a means of resolving conflict has had its successes and failures. The UN's apparent reluctance to become involved has left Africa to find solutions to its own problems. In many instances these solutions have contributed insignificantly to improving the situation. African organs responsible for peace and security have come forward as an inadequate but willing response to regional peacekeeping needs.

An obstacle that unfortunately detracts from African peace initiatives is that conflict is not resolved in accordance with classical peacekeeping principles. On the negative side, the reluctance by the UN to act may prove to be a serious threat to the future of UN peace initiatives in Southern Africa, but on the positive side it may well serve as a much-needed impetus for enhancing the capacity of regional organs.
4.1 Introduction

In Chapter 1 it is hypothesised that the current Southern African practice of resolving conflict is executed without clear and unambiguous mandates and is inconsistent with the classical peacekeeping principles of consent, impartiality and the absence of force. The aim of this chapter will be to evaluate the SADC’s intervention in the Republic of Lesotho. The evaluation will be done in terms of the principles of peacekeeping with the aim of establishing the level of compliance and also to illustrate the misinterpretation of classical peacekeeping principles in the Southern African context.

The analysis will be done within the parameters of the following framework:

- an overview of events preceding the operations;
- an overview of the operational mandates and objectives;
- a comparison of peacekeeping principles to the practices of the SADC force(s); and
- a conclusion based on these assessments

4.2 The SADC Intervention in the Republic of Lesotho (OPERATION BOLEAS)

4.2.1 General Overview

The Republic of Lesotho, a mountain kingdom surrounded by South Africa is not new to “... violent power struggles, politically motivated assassinations and coups” (Makoa 1996:13). Lesotho is also not new to political instability because, even as far back as 1965/66, the Basotho Congress Party (BCP) refused to recognise the Basotho National Party (BNP) and “... [t]he ensuing political instability claimed scores of lives” (Makoa 1996:16). Numerous struggles for political power
characterise the political history of this nation-state, and it seems as if these power struggles recurrently erupted into violent take-overs. Examples of such take-overs are the one in 1970 by Jonathan's BNP and military coups in both 1986 and 1991 by Lekhanya and Ramaera respectively (Van Nieuwkerk, 1999:4).

Uprising and unrest seem to be an integral part of the political landscape of Lesotho. Illegal border crossing, endemic smuggling of contraband and cattle rustling across the RSA / Lesotho border obliges the South African government to maintain deployments along the 550 kilometre border, all at the South African tax payers’ expense. There have been times that the South African military forces could have intervened in Lesotho but did not do so because it is not South African policy to intervene in the internal affairs of a neighbouring country. South Africa also had no mandate to intervene and would not act outside the dictates of the law.

4.2.1.1 Peaceful Co-existence

Over the years the RSA supported various Lesotho governments in an attempt to maintain stability and develop the country economically as well as in various other ways. Examples of these are the following:

- The extensive role that South Africa is playing in developing the Lesotho Highland Water project.
- Developing of border infrastructure in the vicinity of Fouriesburg, Ficksburg and Ladybrand.
- Agricultural assistance and socio-economic assistance especially during heavy snowfalls.

However, disputes about the general elections held in May 1998 in Lesotho caused dissatisfaction among the opposition groups in that country. They felt that
the elections had been rigged, but no evidence of this could be found during formal investigations (Molefe, 1998:1). It was not South Africa's call to dispute the authority of the democratically elected government of another country, but as the time passed the political opposition and the military became more and more dissatisfied with the status quo.

4.2.1.2 Conditions Amounting to a Virtual Coup

One has to see all the combined events preceding the intervention in combination to realise how serious the situation actually became. Military take-over, violent unrest, absolute lawlessness and a helpless Lesotho government had created an untenable situation inside the country.

4.2.1.2.1 Military Take-over

Dissatisfaction among the opposition groups spilled over into unrest leading to an uprising in the Royal Lesotho Defence Force (RLDF) in September 1998. Before the SADC forces moved into Lesotho the situation was becoming more serious by the hour. Mutinous members of the RLDF, aided and abetted by the political groupings in opposition to the elected government, seized arms and ammunition and expelled or imprisoned their command cadre. A large number of senior officers of the RLDF were forcibly incarcerated.

4.2.1.2.2 Violent, Disruptive Unrest

The palace grounds had been occupied by an intransigent mob. Demonstrators, urged by their leaders, held Maseru to ransom. The lives of ministers were threatened, government vehicles hijacked, the civil service disrupted and the Royal Lesotho Mounted Police (RLMP) cowed into submission. Rampaging demonstrators stoned ministers' vehicles. The broadcasting station was closed down and senior RLDF officers were forced to take refuge in South Africa.

The situation worsened even further. Workers were being stopped from going to work. The rampaging demonstrators congregated at various offices denying...
workers entry and threatening to occupy Government offices. Public statements were made to the effect that Parliament and Government had been closed. Ministers were not able to enter their offices. There were take-overs and theft of government vehicles.

4.2.1.2.3 Absolute Absence of Law Enforcement Capability

The public of Lesotho was held hostage by unruly and looting elements. The RLMP was not in control of law and order because of intimidation. The government was unable to govern. There were genuine fears that a military coup was imminent (Sutton-Pryce at all, 1998:26). In short, anarchy reigned and Lesotho plunged into chaos.

4.2.1.2.4 No Possibility of Unaided Return to Normality

By this time, the legitimately elected authorities of Lesotho had clearly completely lost control of the situation and the RLDF was in fact in command of Lesotho. It could simply not be disputed that a virtual take over of a democratically elected government had taken place. It was highly doubtful that the proper Lesotho authorities could ever have restored order and proper government on their own without the co-operation of those whom had taken charge of Lesotho. Even before the formal request for help was made, it was doubtful if the SADC had any choice but to intervene. It would have been immoral not to respond (South African National Defence Force, 2000:3).

4.2.1.3 An Authorised Legitimate Response to the Request for Help

The Prime Minister and Head of Government of Lesotho, Mr Pakalitha Mosisille, appealed in writing to the SADC for military assistance. The SADC requested Botswana, Mozambique, South Africa and Zimbabwe, all countries of the acknowledged, legitimate SADC, to provide the assistance required. These were four of the SADC countries that had come to an agreement to defend one another in case of undemocratic attempts at take-over. As it happened only South Africa and Botswana responded to this request. In reference to the Botswana Defence
Force’s (BDF) involvement, Tapfumanyei (1999:23) observes that “South African enlisted Botswana’s token support to invade Lesotho with hardly any SADC sanction.”

At a meeting of the Ministers of Defence of South Africa and Botswana in Gabarone on 15 September 1998, these two countries were ordered to plan military intervention in Lesotho under the auspices of the SADC in accordance with the SADC agreement to prevent military coups. On 16 September 1998 the South African President’s Office instructed the SANDF to conduct contingency planning.

4.2.1.3.1 Vigorous Attempts at Reaching a Non-Violent Solution

In order to attempt further negotiations with the dissidents, South Africa agreed to postpone the military intervention from 18 September 1998 to 22 September 1998. Efforts were again made to resolve the crisis by peaceful means, but these were unsuccessful. Much trouble was taken with this. At one stage South African officials, including a minister of state, visited the mutineers in their barracks, urging them to reserve their action. There were also extensive consultations with regional players.

It must be stressed that even though the intervention was based on the RSA’s and Botswana’s commitment to the SADC and standing agreements made with it, the SADC as a group had first done absolutely everything in its power to resolve the dispute in a peaceful fashion. There would have been ample opportunity for the mutineers to resolve the dispute at the negotiation table for South Africa already showed its willingness to assist with peaceful conflict resolution and would surely have done everything in its power to carry non-violent dispute resolution forward to the point of solution. Until very late in the process the military mutineers were still given the choice to take the peaceful option. They did not do so and, eventually, a number of them were arrested by SADC forces and were tried by Lesotho Military Courts-Martial.
4.2.1.3.2 A SADC Combined Task Force (CTF) Dedicated to Restoring Stability

Acting under orders from the President's Office of the South African Government, a CTF made up of the combined and co-operating forces of the SANDF and the BDF entered Lesotho on 22 September 1998. In accordance with the SADC agreement, the RSA and Botswana were authorised to prevent any further anarchy and to create a stable environment for the restoration of law and order.

The military operations conducted in Lesotho were closely linked to the sole mission of restoring stability in Lesotho. However, although underestimating the level of hostility, the SANDF knew that it would nevertheless face a hostile RLDF. Therefore a safe environment first had to be created first by securing and controlling the Maseru Bridge border post, the RLDF military bases, the radio broadcasting station, embassies, the SA High Commission, the Royal Palace, airports, government buildings and power- and water supply facilities. Securing the Maseru central business district and stabilising the rest of the country was another priority. The military dissidents were simply to be disarmed and no violent actions were planned against their persons. No military objective fell outside the mandate to restore stability in Lesotho.

As an extension of this mission, the final and most important objective once stability had been achieved, was to enable the RLMP to restore and maintain law and order in conjunction with the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) of the SADC. All this was done with the full blessing of the SADC. As soon as this had been done, the SANDF and BDF would withdraw from Lesotho.

Unfortunately, the time available for planning and preparation to execute all the possible tasks of such an operation had been insufficient, causing an outcry in the national and international media with the SANDF bearing the brunt of criticism accusing it of unprofessional, reckless action (South African National Defence Force, 2000:4).
4.2.2 The South African Government’s Philosophy on Participation in Peace Missions

4.2.2.1 Support for International Conflict Management and Resolution

There is no single, simple or short-term approach to resolving crises. Peace missions should therefore be viewed as long-term endeavours, which include a significant investment in peacebuilding and not merely as short-term engagements. Peacebuilding involves the inculcation of respect for human rights and political pluralism, the accommodation of diversity, building the capacity of state and civil institutions and promoting economic growth and equity. These measures are the most effective means of preventing crises and are therefore as much pre-crisis as post-crisis priorities. In all cases, peace missions should aim at the empowerment of people and be based on local traditions and experiences rather than the imposition of foreign modes of conflict management and governance.

Preventative diplomacy, peacebuilding and peacekeeping must form the essential pillars of any peace mission. South Africa will endeavour to support such efforts aimed at addressing the causes of crises when and where possible and appropriate and to the extend that resources allow it. The South African government must also assist the international community in managing the symptoms of crises. Since the UN has very limited assets of its own to run field operations, member states are the main providers of the resources required for such operations. Such support is sometimes provided by collectivities of UN member states, acting under the auspices of regional or sub-regional organisations or security arrangements or sometimes as mere ad hoc UN authorised 'coalitions of the winning'. As a responsible member of the UN, the OAU and the SADC, South Africa must prepare for active participation in peace missions and, where appropriate and authorised humanitarian interventions. Such participation will not only serve the cause of international and regional peace and security, but will also be in pursuit of our national interests (Republic of South Africa, 1998a:14).
4.2.2.2 Peace Missions and National Interests

South Africa provides the international community with a unique example of how a country, having emerged from a deeply divided past, can negotiate a peaceful transition based on its own conflict-resolution techniques and its own vision of meaningful and enduring development. The South African approach to conflict resolution is thus strongly informed by its own recent history and this strong national interest and experience in the peaceful resolution of seemingly intractable conflicts compels us to participate in peace missions to alleviate the flight of other people who are struggling to resolve similar conflicts.

South Africa's emerging national interests are underpinned by the values enshrined in the Constitution, which encompass the security of the state and its citizens, the promotion of the social and economic well-being of its citizenry, the encouragement of global peace and stability and participating in the process of ensuring regional peace, stability and development. South Africa's foreign policy as an important component of this definition of national interest, is based on six key principles:

- A commitment to the promotion of human rights.
- A commitment to the promotion of democracy.
- A commitment to justice and international law in the conduct of relations between nations.
- A commitment to international peace and to internationally agreed-upon mechanisms for the resolution of conflicts.
- A commitment to the interests of Africa in world affairs.
- A commitment to economic development through regional and international co-operation in an inter-dependant world.

In short, it is in the South African national interest to assist people who suffer from famine, political repression, natural disasters and the scourge of violent conflict. South Africa may thus provide civilian assistance and armed forces in common international efforts when properly authorised by international authorities to help in such efforts (Republic of South Africa, 1998a:15).
4.2.3 Overview of the Operational Mandate and Objectives

The South African government insisted that the military invention did not constitute an invasion (Buthelezi, 1998:6). The decision was based on and justified by the fact that the SADC was directly approached by the Prime Minister of Lesotho, Pakalitha Mosisili, who requested intervention; that the intervention was based on agreements reached in the SADC; that all attempts at peacefully resolving the dispute had failed and that South Africa had intervened to protect certain South African interests such as the Katse Dam water scheme. It was furthermore stated that the Lesotho government was democratically elected (despite certain irregularities during the election process) and that it was increasingly required of South Africa to play a role in regional peacekeeping efforts. In addition it was stated that the decision had notified ambitious elements in the military forces in the region that in no member state would political aspirations of any military faction be tolerated and that South Africa’s commitment to this policy was also a commitment to develop the region (Haysom, 1998:6).

The mission of the combined task force was “... to interfere militarily in Lesotho to prevent any further anarchy and to create a stable environment for the restoration of law and order” (South African National Defence Force, 1998:4). The battle concept was described as “... [t]he deployment of forces in order to locate and identify destabilisers and destabiliser resources, to disarm and contain them and to strike where applicable with the necessary force to eliminate the threat” (Hartslief, 2 October 1998). The desired result was:

- to create a stable environment in Lesotho; and
- to restore law and order to enable negotiations to take place between the political parties in Lesotho (South African National Defence Force, 1998:4).

The Lesotho invasion cannot be classified as a ‘true’ peacekeeping operation. OPERATION BOLEAS would have required a UN Chapter VII mandate. Despite the absence of an UN mandate, the operation went ahead with a SADC mandate based on the perceived critical humanitarian need for an intervention. The SADC mandate, although obtained before the intervention, was from the onset clouded in
suspicions regarding the manner in which it was obtained. This situation resulted in strong media reaction which targeted particularly the South African government’s “poor planning” and “flawed execution” (Van Nieuwkerk, 1999:1). In a post mortem on its foray into Lesotho, the SANDF did however claim that the Government lacks a clear national security policy and that it was not made clear to the SANDF that OPERATION BOLEAS was an intervention operation as opposed to a peace support operation (South African National Defence Force, 1998:4).

4.2.4 Comparison of the Principles of Peacekeeping with the Practices of the SADC Forces

The assumption is made that African peace organs lack the coherence, ability and capacity to perform operations under the banner of peacekeeping. In view of this assumption, the operation in Lesotho will be analysed from a policy content perspective in order to establish a framework for comparing the operation to both the principles of peacekeeping (consent, impartiality and the absence of force) and the practices of the forces involved.

4.2.4.1 Consent

In view of the above-mentioned criterion for intervention, it can be argued that the SADC force had partial consent. The request by the "legitimate" government of Lesotho, which followed the elections, although clouded by allegations of dishonesty, provided the partial consent that required for intervention. However, no consent was obtained from or granted by the Lesotho opposition or any other party to the dispute. According to Hansen (1999:3), consent is akin to legitimacy, in which the latter relates to “... the acceptance of the peace force [intervention force], as well as its mandate ... by the international community and by the parties to the conflict”. In Lesotho’s a case this is evidently not true, because the armed Lesotho opposition countered the SADC intervention. Another factor to consider regarding the issue of legitimacy is the call for assistance from what opposition parties perceived to be "illegitimate" government following the disputed election result.
Consent and legitimacy should also be viewed from a SADC perspective. In this regard consent was obtained by means of "... a series of phone calls between the relevant heads of state" (Neethling, 1999:12). This state of affairs places a big question mark over the institutional capabilities and transparency of the SADC as a regional organ entrusted with decisions to sanction military intervention. The intervention in Lesotho was never authorised by the UN Security Council (Malan, 1999b:94).

4.2.4.2 Impartiality

As has been stated previously, the concept of impartiality is a prerequisite for successful intervention. The mere fact that South Africa geographically surrounds Lesotho confirms that the South African government cannot be regarded as impartial (Links, 2000:57). South Africa's national interests in terms of its capital investment in Lesotho (specifically the Lesotho Highlands project, its fuel depots and key buildings), as well as the devastating effect that displaced citizens may have on the South African economy, support this notion. By own admission one of the stated reasons for South Africa's intervention was "... to protect South African assets ..." (Neethling, 1999:3). If viewed in terms of peacekeeping principles, the SADC intervention in Lesotho did not meet the requirements of impartiality and, as such, the legitimacy of the intervention is questionable.

4.2.4.3 The Use of Force

In an assessment of the use of force in the Lesotho intervention, one significant feature was the level of force employed by the SADC force. The authorisation of force in Lesotho came about as a measure to curb the acts of aggression by the Lesotho opposition (Links, 2000:57). In a SANDF Info Bulletin (No 57/98) the force levels used in the intervention operation are described in detail. A summarised version of the various forces includes:

- the South African Army, which deployed a mechanised battalion (inclusive of armoured personnel carriers, infantry contingents and military police), with an airborne company in reserve;
the South African Air Force, which deployed six Oryx transport helicopters, two Alouette III gunships, two Alouette helicopters and a Cessna Caravan (aircraft);

the South African Military Health Services which deployed a medical task group; and

the BDF, which deployed a mechanised infantry, company.

The entire SADC force constituted a manpower component of 800 soldiers. From the beginning, the SADC force (in fact it was initially only the SANDF contingent) was met with strong armed resistance from the RLDF, which resulted in eight casualties and numerous injuries among SANDF ranks. The total number of casualties was thirty-nine (Van Nieuwkerk, 1999:1). It can therefore be concluded that in terms of peacekeeping principles, the SADC intervention in Lesotho cannot be classified as a peacekeeping operation. The force levels that were engaged in the operation constitute a force large enough to make war not peace. The SADC’s invasion in Lesotho should much rather be viewed as a peace enforcement operation falling within the ambit of a Chapter VII mandate (Links, 2000:58).

4.2.5 Comparison of the Practises of the SADC Forces with the Principles for South African Participation

If South Africa is to fulfil its obligations under the Charters of the UN, the OAU or the future AU and the SADC in a responsible manner, it must be prepared for the contingencies and requirements of a broad range of peace mission scenarios. This preparedness should be signalled to the region and the international community. Whenever South Africa is requested to participate in a peace support operation, the following must apply:

The request will be routed to the Department of Foreign Affairs. That Department will liaise closely with the National Intelligence Co-ordinating Committee and the Department of Defence through the Minister of Defence, with regard to the nature of South Africa’s potential involvement.

Additional agreements relating to the determination of the mission and objectives of the operation will also be negotiated by the Department of
Foreign Affairs in consultation with the Department of Defence.

- The Departments of Foreign Affairs and Defence will advise Cabinet on the matters referred to above. Cabinet is responsible for final decisions.

- In terms of the Constitution, the employment of the SANDF in peace support operations requires the authorisation of the President. Parliament is empowered to review the President's decision regarding such employment (South Africa, Department of Defence, 1996:24).

While South Africa has an outline for a National Security Policy specified in the Defence White Paper, the transitional state of the nation and of the Department of Defence meant that this policy was not fully defined and that the necessity to perform a military intervention came as something of a surprise to the South Africa military establishment. Though South Africa and Botswana did have a SADC mandate for the intervention in Lesotho, this mandate did not adequately cover or plan for the full range of contingencies, which had to be met. Co-ordination between different levels of the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Department of Defence were not completely synchronised. Given the time constraints, it was not possible to brief all role players ahead of the operation, while all role players should have been involved at the commencement of planning (South African National Defence Force, 1999:1).

As far as authority and determination of mandates are concerned, the following measures should apply:

- The UN Security Council would decide on the establishment of a peace operation and is responsible for extending or terminating the mission.
- A resolution of the Security Council would authorise the operation and determine the mandate.
- The overall direction would be in the hands of the Secretary General who would act on behalf of and report to the Security Council.
- The Force Commander is responsible to the Secretary General for the efficient operation and administration of the multi-national peace force. He/she exercises operational control of the national forces of participating countries and national commanders are directly responsible and answerable
In evaluating OPERATION BOLEAS, the aspect that has to be emphasised is that the SANDF acted at all times solely on the instructions of the SADCC and the South African President's Office. The SADCC is a Southern African coalition of states of which South Africa is but one member. The South African Government can therefore at no stage act unilaterally and neither can its military forces do so. All its actions in neighbouring states must have the blessing of the SADCC as the legitimate Southern African mandating authority. The SANDF in its turn remains subordinate to the South African Government and intervened in Lesotho on the instructions of the President of the Republic of South Africa (South African National Defence Force, 2000:1).

Acting under orders from the President's office of the South African Government, a CTF made up of the combined and co-operating forces of the SANDF and the BDF entered Lesotho on 22 September 1998. In accordance with the SADCC agreement, the RSA and Botswana were authorised to prevent any further anarchy and to create a stable environment for the restoration of law and order (South African National Defence Force, 2000:4).

Being aware of the necessity to determine criteria on guidelines for the involvement in international peace support operations, the policy-makers in the Department of Defence have also proclaimed with the White Paper on Defence as approved by Parliament in May 1996 that South Africa will only become involved in specific peace initiatives if the following conditions are met:

- There must be parliamentary approval and public support. This requires an appreciation of the associated costs and risks, including the financial costs and the risk to military personnel.
- The operation should be authorised by the UN Security Council.
- Operations should be sanctioned by the SADCC and undertaken in conjunction with other SADCC states. Similarly, operations in Africa should be sanctioned by the OAU.
There should be realistic criteria for terminating the operation (South Africa, Department of Defence, 1996:25).

SANDF deployment must not be to the disadvantage of the country and must be feasible and sustainable in the face of competing national and departmental demands (Kritzinger, 1995:55).

After an appeal for military assistance by the Prime Minister of Lesotho to the SADC, only South Africa and Botswana responded to the request. At a meeting of the Ministers of Defence of South Africa and Botswana in Gaberone on 15 September 1998, these two countries were ordered to plan military intervention in Lesotho under the auspices of the SADC and in accordance with the SADC agreement to prevent military coups (South African National Defence Force, 2000:3).

No finances were available prior to the operation. Finance for logistics must be made available before an operation commences and financial staff must be included in planning and deployed on all operational levels. Stock level planning for operational reserves was not carried out. This resulted in ad hoc demands straining the supply system. Contingency planning on corporate level did not include the stockpiling of war reserves (South African National Defence Force, 1999:1-2).

The CTF continued its peaceful approach after the operation. It participated in security and economic structures to deepen stability and allow economic growth to recommence in Lesotho. The decision to withdraw depended on an adequate political solution being reached in Lesotho. It was a SADC decision and not a South African one (South African National Defence Force, 1999:1-2).

In the White Paper of Defence as approved in May 1996, the Department of Defence has furthermore proclaimed that the following issues should be addressed before committing SANDF forces to a peace support operation:

- There must be realistic appreciation of the extent of the SANDF’s involvement in the light of its capabilities and other commitments.
The following considerations must be taken into account with regard to the area of operations:

- The political, financial, social and technical risk to South Africa if it deploys in neighbouring countries; and
- The need for sovereign assistance should forces be deployed beyond the operational reach of the SANDF (South Africa, Department of Defence, 1996:24-25).

While evaluating the actions of the CTF of Operation BOLEAS, it should be borne in mind that the situation in Lesotho developed quickly and there was very little time available between the call for help to the SADC and the necessity for action. As mentioned earlier while South Africa has an outlined National Security Policy specified in the White Paper on Defence, the transitional state of the nation and of the Department of Defence meant that this policy was not fully defined and that the necessity to perform a military intervention came as something of a surprise to the military environment. Given the time constraints it was not possible to consider all relevant factors or to brief all role players ahead of the operation.

It needs to be noted that participating states in an international peace operation, retain their autonomy and sovereignty. Such contending national priorities have the potential to translate themselves into problems of command and control, rules of engagement, standard of forces, disciplinary measures and personnel procedures. Differences of opinion in a volatile situation can potentially result in political differences and disagreement between the participating states (Williams, 1995:92).

Being acutely aware of the challenges in this regard, the Department of Defence has accordingly recommended that the following issues be addressed before committing SANDF troops to a peace operation:

- Planning and execution of operations must be compatible with UN operating doctrines.
A clear command and control system must be established and rules of engagement must be determined.

Standardisation and compatibility must be established with other peacekeeping forces regarding drills; telecommunications; language and doctrines and procedures for combined operations (Defence Review Drafting Team, 1997:33-34).

The two countries participating in the Operation suffered a severe lack of sufficient time for proper preparation. There are normally certain minimum time requirements for the necessary deployment drills leading up to an operation. Normally, including detailed planning, orders and movements on a tactical level, these are:

- Seven days in the case of a conventional operation, and
- Eight weeks in the case of a support operation.

The South African Chief of Joint Operations did not yet have sufficient staffing levels to mount an operation of this kind on such a short notice. Because of South Africa’s minimal previous exposure to this sort of operation, certain specialised staff was limited in their experience. Due to the short time scales of the deployment, observation teams could not confirm certain crucial tactical information in time. Due to this being the first operation undertaken in cooperation with the BDF, intelligence liaison with them was limited. The limited times scales meant that there was insufficient time for force preparation and stock piling (South African National Defence Force, 1999:1-2).

Many commanders often choose to ignore the media and that is a dangerous strategy because the role of the media is to inform and to educate (Anyidoho, 1997:45). When properly dealt with, the media can be a very powerful instrument for commanders in a distressful and desperate situation. As regards media liaison the following must always be kept in mind:

- there must be clear strategic guidelines;
- there must be a cohesive corporate communication strategy in place; and
external communication must be pro-active rather than re-active.

It should also be noted that external communication is enhanced by:

- the direct involvement of commanders in this role;
- high levels of truth and transparency; and
- the arrangement of visits to the area of operations for journalists.

While the openness of the external communication aspects of OPERATION BOLEAS was laudable, it brought with it certain problems. Regarding to Media Liaison:

- There was a lack of clear strategic guidelines.
- There was no cohesive corporate communication strategy in place.
- External communication tended to be re-active rather than pro-active in nature.

The communication structures in place passed information to the media, which was not in accordance with the provisions of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). The CTF lost the psychological and media war at all levels – especially the strategic level! (South African National Defence Force, 1999:3-4).

4.2.6 Conclusion

The intervention in Lesotho is indicative of the deterioration of regional initiatives in the absence of a proper operational mandate. What happened in Lesotho is unjustifiable and falls within the realm of the powerful policing of South Africa’s backyard, although it may be argued that the intentions were noble and based upon humanitarian considerations. This evident unilateral action, as a means to contain intra-state conflict, should not be allowed to supersede the political resolution of conflict and multinational involvement.

OPERATION BOLEAS was in contravention of South Africa’s own stance on preventative diplomacy as contained in the White Paper on Participation in
International Peace Missions (Republic of South Africa, 1998:12). In this regard the official view is “... persuasion or show of force, rather than ... the use of force”. The intervention was also undertaken without an UN sanctioning resolution or mandate.

Any justification for military intervention, including the use of force or a threat to use force (Chapter VII of the UN Charter) on the grounds that it is in the interest of peace, must proceed from the assumption that such action is an absolute last resort. If a decision is made to act on humanitarian grounds, then a peace enforcement or intervention operation should be mounted in order to have a justified legal mandate that allows for deviation from UN principles of peacekeeping.
CHAPTER 5

AN AIDE DE MEMOIRE FOR SOUTHERN AFRICAN CONFLICT INTERVENTION AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION

5.1 Introduction

In Chapter 4 the case of OPERATION BOLEAS was discussed where peacekeeping measured in terms of classical principles, proved to be irrelevant, undesirable and unsuitable because of its limited application in Southern African intra-state conflict situations. If it is thus argued that classical peacekeeping has limited applicability in Southern Africa, then what is the correct approach? In answering this question, the aim of this chapter is to put forward a dual-purpose Aide de Memoire that can be used both as a framework for conflict intervention and a check-list that covers all relevant aspects and considerations that must be appreciated and adhered to before any peacekeeping operation albeit intervention can be properly appreciated, planned and executed.

This Aide de Memoire will consist of:

- a Cyclic Conflict Intervention and Conflict Resolution Model; and
- a Checklist containing the prerequisites that must be met in order to carry out successful intra-state peacekeeping operations in South Africa.

5.2 Cyclic Conflict Intervention on Conflict Resolution Model

5.2.1 Conceptualising the Model

In his quest for effective intervention and resolution in view of the nature of African conflict, viz the recurrent eruption into violence, which often results in the horrors of gross human rights violations even after peace agreements have been signed, Stalin Links developed the Cyclic Conflict Intervention and Conflict Resolution Model (2000:65). Due to the fact that all conflict situations are unique, the model suggests that mission success will depend on the mandate and the objectives of
The model attempts to illustrate that this may be one approach, based on humanitarian considerations, to resolving recurrent and seemingly unresolved conflict situations. In this regard and with specific reference to the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention versus state sovereignty, Seymour (1996:2) is of the opinion that the plight of the people caught in conflict situations should be of paramount concern. He puts forward three critical factors that favours legitimised intervention above state sovereignty, namely:

- the right of individuals to receive humanitarian assistance;
- the right of international organisations (in certain instances) to gain access to conflict ridden areas in order to provide such assistance; and
- the right and obligation of the international community to interfere in widespread gross human rights violations.

Should the forceful (military) solution of a conflict situation serve as the ultimate solution, then it should at least be applied in accordance with some or other set of guidelines and principles that will elicit what Seymour (1996:2) terms "... coherent and consistent responses". In this regard the model accommodates the emerging regional security paradigm of "coalitions of the willing and able" and is intended to fill a specific hiatus in the realm of conflict resolution. It is also contended that Africans will have to take responsibility for conflict prevention and resolution on their continent. The model is schematically represented in Figure 3.

5.2.2 Model Phase

As can be concluded from Figure 3, the proposed model consists of three distinct phases. These phases constitute a pre-intervention phase, the intervention per se and a post-intervention phase. Apart from these phases, a number of actors, a process and a strategy are also distinguished. The proper cause of action is determined by the factors considered during the pre-intervention phase of an
FIGURE 3: CYCLIC CONFLICT-INTERVENTION AND CONFLICT-RESOLUTION MODEL

Source: Links (2000:67)
operation. The consideration of all these elements will make it possible to draw up an intervention plan that is based on sound principles and objectives (Links, 2000:68).

5.2.3 Considerations Pertaining to Phase 1

5.2.3.1 The Nature of the Conflict

African conflict situations are protracted, violent and costly and according to De Coning (1999:3) "... highly volatile" and in the foreseeable future will need a "... Chapter VII type peace enforcement mandate". The main causes of African conflict can be attributed to intra-state tension and disputes between warring factions which, in most instances, stem from age-old feuds, foreign interest, ethnic divisions, arms smuggling, mercenary soldiering and from cross-border insurgencies.

5.2.3.2 The Sanctioning Authority

Authorisation for an operation is a critical aspect of the legitimacy of such operations. The UN remains the principal sanctioning authority for peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations (Hansen, 1999:5 and Vogt 1998:8). From a regional perspective, the Sanctioning Authority may call upon the OAU as regards a wider African context and upon the SADC as regards a regional Southern African context. The UN Charter (Chapter VIII, Article 53:1) however specifically expresses the need for regional arrangements and states that "... no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorisation of the Security Council ...".

This clause creates a dilemma because the "willing and able" participants in a regional conflict situation may have to act swiftly and decisively (from a humanitarian point of view) yet valuable time is initially lost while waiting for an UN resolution to be passed and for a peacekeeping force to be deployed. All these inadequacies result in a "post facto authority syndrome" in which authorisation is often granted only after a force has been deployed.
Links (2000:70) proposes a solution to this dilemma by establishing a **Permanent Peace Secretariat** within each regional security organ that will enhance the capacity of such organs to deal with volatile situations. This mechanism must have direct links with the UN Security Council and consequently maintain continuity in its operations. It will provide regional organs with a mechanism for effective planning and decision implementation.

### 5.2.3.3 The Parties Involved

In a conflict situation, two distinct parties can be distinguished. One is the disputing parties that are responsible for any given conflict situation and the other includes those endeavouring to bring an end to hostilities and to establish peace. In an intra-state conflict situation, the disputants usually include warring parties, belligerents, rebellious factions, dissidents, sympathisers and ethnic groups (Links, 2000:71).

The parties aiming to resolve such conflict include actors such as:

- military and civilian observers;
- non-governmental organisations (NGO's);
- peacekeeping and/or peace enforcements contingents;
- politicians and diplomats; and
- special envoys representing regional and international organisations.

### 5.2.3.4 The Early Warning System

An early warning system includes any mechanism, action or process designed and established to share intelligence capabilities between regional and international organisations. The definition offered by Anderlini and Nyheim (1999:20) is “... the systematic collection and analysis of information coming from areas of crisis for the purposes of: (a) anticipating the escalation of violent conflict; (b) development of strategic responses to these crises; and (c) the presentation of options to critical actors for the purposes of decision making”. In the conflict area an early warning system has the potential of preventing the loss of life and the destruction
of property by virtue of the fact that decisions to act can be made timeously.

5.2.3.5 Intervention Planning and Strategy

If a decision to interfere is made by the sanctioning authority, it signifies a commitment to engagement. Forces with a predetermined mandate will now be committed for inter-positioning in strategic areas. *Intervention planning* is a task that requires "... a high degree of co-ordination between various contributing nations and bodies" (Neethling 1999:2). It is thus clear that such planning must be undertaken jointly, timeously and meticulously by the organisation authorising the intervention.

Owing to the unpredictability of peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations, clear entry and exit criteria and mission guidelines and objectives must accompany any intervention. A sound *intervention strategy* and proper intervention planning will reduce risk and casualties and will ensure a higher degree of success. The success of a mission will be determined by, among others, the:

- ability of deployed forces to persevere under difficult and unfamiliar circumstances;
- ability of the deployed forces to restrain themselves in the wake of an armed onslaught; and
- ability of the deployed forces to unite in an effort to attain the mission objective within the framework of the mandate.

5.2.4 Considerations Pertaining to Phase 2

5.2.4.1 The Intervention Process

The intervention process consists of the deployment of an intervention force in strategic areas. Such a force will have to be of a multinational nature preferably committed by regional states in close proximity to the conflict area to ensure rapid deployment and unity of effort. A vital task of an intervention force will be to secure strategic areas or "hot spots" by forceful intervention in order to ensure that
warring parties are coerced to the negotiation table. Once this is achieved, negotiations can begin and all factions can form part of the signing of a cessation of hostilities. If a peace agreement has been violated, warring disputants can be disarmed and demobilised as a first step to restoring civil authority and to achieving a political end-state (Links, 2000:74).

5.2.4.2 The Intervention Force

In order to ensure legitimacy, the main requirement for an intervention force is that it should be multinational. No unilateral action by individual states should be permitted. A pre-determined mandate must be adhered to and should be strictly enforced. A requirement would be an accurate estimate of adequate force levels for deployment in order to prevent a recurrence of a "Lesotho"-type intervention in which an inadequate number of troops were met with fierce resistance. Other considerations include joint exercises to ensure inter-operability of systems and procedures, a common command and control plan and the use of an operational language understood by all forces. Another important consideration is the conformity to the principles guiding the conduct of parties entering into armed conflict. In this regard, the international law concerning the conduct of hostilities (The Hague and Geneva conventions) must be adhered to (Links, 2000:75).

5.2.5 Considerations Pertaining to Phase 3

Phase 3 depends entirely on the outcome of the strategy and processes of Phase 2. This implies that two distinct courses of action may be forthcoming. One course of action depends on the successful resolution of the conflict and the second takes effect if the outcome is unsuccessful.

If the situation has been satisfactorily resolved, an environment conducive for post-conflict peacebuilding initiatives and the implementation of an effective monitoring system could be established. The opportunity for a lasting peace agreement to be implemented would then have been created. The establishment of lasting peace will inevitably bring about an environment for a political end-state within which civil society may return to 'normal' and the intervention force can be
withdrawn in accordance with a pre-determined exit strategy.

Should this aforementioned scenario not be realise and depending on the nature of the unresolved matters, the process may have to be referred back to the sanctioning authority for a post-mortem of the strategy and processes employed in Phase 2. One course of action would be to call all the actors together in order to negotiate a "new" peace-agreement, to employ a "new" strategy process and to obtain a "new" intervention mandate based on the outcome and findings of the post-mortem. An analytical problem-solving approach will be required for such an exercise (Links, 2000:76).

5.2.5.1 Post-Conflict Peacebuilding Initiatives and Monitoring

Peacebuilding is regarded as critical in the aftermath of a conflict, Monnakgotla (1996:59) writes that "... post-conflict peacebuilding ... will lay the foundation for longer term stability and eradicate the conditions that originally caused the conflict". A distinct characteristic of peacebuilding is the strong emphasis placed on civil-military co-operation. In this respect peacebuilding is used collectively to define those activities aimed at restoring state structures in order for a state to return to civilian rule after a period of conflict and war. The activities referred to will include addressing issues such as:

- fostering respect for human rights and political tolerance;
- building a state capacity and mechanisms for good governance;
- building and restoring a civil society capacity; and
- ensuring meaningful economic growth and development.

Linked to these activities are a long-term monitoring process and function that needs to be performed by the sanctioning authority or a group designated for this purpose.

5.2.5.2 Failed Peace Agreements

Peace agreements - especially in African conflict situations - are often not worth
the paper they are written on. It only serves as "a breathing gap" for conflicting parties to plan yet another offensive (Powell, 1999:23). For this reason no guarantee exists that a peace agreement will be permanent. It is therefore contended that the planning and strategy for an intervention operation should take cognisance of this probability.

A host of factors may contribute to a failed peace agreement. Among others, these include:

- a lack of commitment from disputants;
- a lack of understanding of the historic origin and the root causes of the conflict;
- the unpredictability of the actions of conflicting parties;
- the lack of clarity of purpose, mandates and principles;
- the often underestimated influence exercised by disputants and sympathisers;
- the lack of support from the local population;
- the difficulty in obtaining consent; and
- the perceived lack of legitimacy versus the sovereignty of the state (Links, 2000:78).

5.2.5.3 Evaluation of the Strategy and Processes

A failure of Phase 2 calls for an evaluation of the strategy and the processes through a "lessons learnt approach". The sanctioning authority in collaboration with the force commanders and planning staff, should do such an evaluation. A step-by-step scenario analysis may reveal the weak links in the strategy and process and corrective measures should be instituted to eliminate the factors that gave rise to a failed peace agreement. The strategy should also involve measures to prevent a repetition of similar occurrences (Links, 2000:78).

5.2.5.4 Re-negotiation of the Peace Agreement

To re-negotiate a failed peace agreement is easier said than done. Firstly all
disputants must be summoned to a neutral venue to resume peace talks. Secondly, neutral parties acceptable to all disputants must be found. A third concern is the time factor, which may prove to be instrumental in maintaining the momentum generated by initial peace agreements (Links, 2000:78).

5.3 Considerations for South African Engagement

It is an indisputable fact that Africa is the continent most plagued by conflict. In Africa the nature of recent and current threats relates less to conflict between nations than to conflict within states. Civil wars, fuelled by deep-seated hatred and involving armed forces and the availability of weapons and ammunition (as often experienced in Africa) present peace forces with all kinds with serious challenges and a non-permissive operational environment. In such volatile situations mandates must provide for sporadic change in the nature of operations and the military action to be taken.

In the light of the above, clear mandates and rules of engagement are relevant. As multi-national operations in the name of peace and security reside in the interface between political and military affairs, the need for a clear mandate is paramount. Against this background, the experience of military forces in many theatres highlights a critical issue concerning the contemporary challenge of operations in internal conflicts, namely the problem of formulating mandates in which humanitarian and political objectives are effectively understood and reinforced by the forces on the ground (Gamba and Potgieter, 1997:73).

5.3.1 Policy Considerations

As the South African government is expected to play a leading role on the African continent, it has to carefully consider any commitment to participation in peace support operations. There are a number of questions that are bound to be raised, of which the most significant are:

- In what circumstances should South Africa risk participation in such operations?
In what ways should the South African military contribute to peacekeeping?
What is financially viable in participation in peace support operations?

Any decision to deploy troops will have to justify the risk involved while the Department of Defence will have to be satisfied that certain conditions are met (Neethling, 1997: 43).

5.3.1.1 The Question of Mandates and Parameters of Engagement

In Somalia, for example, confusion was experienced even at the political level in the US over the exact parameters of the UN mission. Although it was originally designated as a peacekeeping mission, the operation in Somalia swiftly evolved into a combat operation. This appears to have caused confusion and a lack of understanding between the UN and the participating member states, resulting in the US decision to withdraw from Somalia (Roos, 1993:15). Against this background Nöffke (1995:15) remarks that the US and other major powers normally do not interfere militarily in regional conflicts unless political advantages could be attained, their security and economic interests are threatened and/or an acceptable level of safety of their intervention forces can be assured.

The experience of the UN forces highlights a critical issue concerning the contemporary challenge of peacekeeping in internal conflicts, namely the problem of formulating mandates which humanitarian and political objectives are effectively understood and reinforced by the presence of peacekeeping forces (Berdal, 1993:27).

As a rule, the UN Security Council decides on the establishment of a peace support operation and is responsible for extending or terminating the mission. Peace enforcement operations which takes place under the auspices of the OAU or SADC require prior endorsement by the UN Security Council. A resolution of the Security Council authorises the operation and determines the mandate. The resolution typically cover the terms of reference for the mission; the appointment of the Force Commander; force levels and contributing countries and administrative, logistical and budgetary arrangements (South Africa, Department
of Defence, 1996:24). Where South Africa is requested to participate in a peace support operation, the following will apply:

- The request will be routed to the Department of Foreign Affairs. That Department will liaise closely with the National Intelligence Co-ordinating Committee and the Department of Defence through the Minister of Defence, with regard to the nature of South Africa's potential involvement.
- Additional agreements relating to the determination of the mission and objectives of the operation will also be negotiated by the Department of Foreign Affairs in consultation with the Department of Defence.
- The Departments of Foreign Affairs and Defence will advise Cabinet on the matters referred to above. Cabinet is responsible for final decisions.
- In terms of the Constitution, the employment of the SANDF in peace support operations requires the authorisation of the President. Parliament is empowered to review the President's decision regarding such employment (South Africa, Department of Defence, 1996:24).

As far as authority and determination of mandates are concerned, the following measures would apply:

- The UN Security Council would decide on the establishment of a peace operation and is responsible for extending or terminating the mission.
- A resolution of the Security Council would authorise the operation and determine the mandate.
- The overall direction would be in the hands of the Secretary General who would act on behalf of and report to the Security Council.
- The Force Commander is responsible to the Secretary General for the efficient operation and administration of the multi-national peace force. He/she exercises operational control of the national forces of participating countries and national commanders are directly responsible and answerable to him/her (Defence Review Drafting Team, 1997:32).
5.3.1.2 The Establishment of Transparent Criteria for the Commitment of South African Forces

It is clear that, before the SANDF can become involved in peace support operations or providing aid to other states, a few considerations need to be taken into account, such as the determination or clarification of the type of involvement. Apart from clarifying the type and nature of a peace support mission, it is furthermore advisable that the following questions be addressed when considering a response to a request for engagement as they could be regarded as generic to all peace support operations:

- Are the circumstances so unacceptable to South Africa and its people that they demand action?
- Do political, diplomatic or economic actions/sanctions require military force?
- Will the resort to military force improve the situation?
- Can a credible coalition or multinational force be created?
- What will be the desired end state (an event that determines the end of the crisis situation)?

The above-mentioned questions boil down to a determination by the relevant decision makers as to whether direct involvement is necessary and if so, what type of influence should be used (Kearns, 1994:38).

As far as the positioning of the South African military is concerned, the Department of Defence has determined that participation in peace support operations will not be limited to the deployment of troops. It could also take the form of providing equipment; logistical support; humanitarian aid; engineering services; communication systems and medical personnel and facilities (South Africa, Department of Defence, 1996:25).

Being aware of the necessity to determine criteria or guidelines for involvement in international peace support operations, the policy-makers in the Department of Defence have also proclaimed in the White Paper on Defence that South Africa will only become involved in specific peace initiatives if the following conditions are
There must be parliamentary approval and public support. This requires an appreciation of the associated costs and risks, including the financial costs and the risk to military personnel.

The operation should be authorised by the UN Security Council.

Operations in Southern Africa should be sanctioned by the SADC and undertaken in conjunction with other SADC states. Similarly, operations in Africa should be sanctioned by the OAU.

There should be realistic criteria for terminating the operation (South Africa, Department of Defence, 1996:25).

SANDF deployment must not be to the disadvantage of the country and must be feasible and sustainable in the face of competing national and departmental demands (Kritzinger, 1995:55).

The Department of Defence has furthermore proclaimed that the following issues should be addressed before committing SANDF forces to a peace support operation:

- There must be realistic appreciation of the extent of the SANDF’s involvement in the light of its capabilities and other commitments.
- The following considerations must be taken into account with regard to the area of operations:
  - the political risk to South Africa if it deploys forces in neighbouring countries; and
  - the need for sovereign assistance should forces be deployed beyond the operational reach of the SANDF.

The participation of African forces in multinational operations to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts present a range of different problems of which an important one is finding the necessary funds to finance such involvement. South Africa is currently in need of financial assistance for conducting regional operations in order to maintain peace and security (Arnold, 1997:33). Channels of finance must be
opened both with the UN and between the relevant South African government departments and financial arrangements must be finalised in the contract (Defence Review Drafting Team, 1997:33).

As a result of financial constraints, many Southern African armed forces experience logistical and organisational problems. Furthermore, Southern African armed forces are generally plagued by obsolete and worn-out military equipment while training difficulties are also experienced (Mwila, 1994:3). As such, the lack of resources bears upon many Southern African countries to participate in multinational operations, as most countries experience difficulties in respect of the ground, air and sea transportation required for timely long-distance deployment. South African forces must be supported logistically from own resources for at least 28 weeks after which only then UN support is available (Defence Review Drafting Team, 1997:34).

Effective logistical support, as an essential element of any operation, cannot be overemphasised. A lack of the necessary logistical support leaves soldiers feeling abandoned and incapable of operating optimally. Inadequate logistic support has consequently and possibly been the most crucial handicap for the Southern African soldiers in the past.

5.3.2 Operational Considerations

The primary function of the SANDF is to defend South Africa against external military aggression. In terms of the current mandate of the SANDF, participation in peace support operations is a secondary function. Accordingly, South Africa shares the view with many of its neighbouring countries that the creation of a standing peacekeeping force is not required or feasible. The country is therefore likely to engage in peace support operations on an ad hoc basis if the need arises (South Africa, Department of Defence, 1996:24).

5.3.2.1 The Need for Joint Command and Control Arrangements

It needs to be noted that participating states in an international peace operation,
retain their autonomy and sovereignty. Such contending national priorities have the potential to translate themselves into problems of command and control, rules of engagement, standard of forces, disciplinary measures and personnel procedures. Differences of opinion in a volatile situation can potentially result in political differences and disagreement between the participating states (Williams, 1995:92).

Challenges concerning a lack of co-ordination between and within missions severely impinge on the processes that are often required within the mandate of missions. Such a lack of co-ordination can pose a great number of military problems, particularly given different training standards, operating procedures and suspicions about intelligence sharing (Mills, 1998:17).

Being acutely aware of the challenges in this regard, the Department of Defence has accordingly recommended that the following issues be addressed before committing SANDF troops to a peace operation:

- Planning and execution of operations must be compatible with UN operating doctrines.
- A clear command and control system must be established and rules of engagement must be determined.
- Standardisation and compatibility must be established with other peacekeeping forces regarding drills; telecommunication; language; and doctrines and procedures for combined operations (Defence Review Drafting Team, 1997:33-34).

5.3.2.2 Formulating Clear Rules of Engagement (ROE)

ROE provide political direction within legal parameters and guidance to commanders at all levels governing the use of force. It provides the peacekeepers with a legal basis and assists them with legal authority. Moreover, it provides peacekeeping forces with international status and ground rules. At all times forces involved in peace support operations must operate in full compliance with the rules of the law of armed conflict. As such it furnishes principles of responsibility to
guide the conduct of the peace mission (Cilliers, 1995:75).

During peace support operations most ROE are "conduct-based". That is actions that are based on a situation or threat that indicates a hostile act or intent. The threat may be from a variety of groups or individuals but will not usually be an "enemy" in the "war fighting" sense (Joint War fighting Centre, 1995:82).

ROE have to be uniformly and strictly applied. An uneven application of ROE can potentially alienate the belligerents and may cause friction in relations between participating nations. All military personnel must know and understand ROE and it should therefore be simple and accessible in terms of content. As far as possible, personnel should be introduced to ROE prior to deployment (Williams, 1995:102).

From a South African viewpoint it is therefore of the utmost importance that its military functionaries working together with other nations or structures in the creation of multinational peace forces, should succeed in determining ROE, as this will be of particular relevance for the successful conduct of future peace support operations.

5.3.2.3 Training of Forces

Since the undertaking of multinational operations for the maintenance of peace and security is a daunting challenge in any terms, proper standards of training, quality and the professionalism of soldiers can hardly be over-emphasised. It is imperative that professional armed forces, commanded by professional soldiers, properly trained and well-disciplined for their primary mission, are the only forces to be deployed for such operations (Gamba and Potgieter, 1997:76).

Peace support operations are fundamentally different from "traditional" approaches to fighting wars. The differences are manifest in the mission, objectives and doctrine of these operations and the role and tasks of the forces involved therein. The skill attitudes and expectations of SANDF personnel therefore need to be addressed through thorough training prior to deployment. They must be briefed properly on the political, cultural, linguistic and geographic
features of the country of deployment. Failure to understand and respect the nuances of local culture and politics will undermine the efficacy and perceived impartiality of the peacekeepers. Personnel also require training in mediation, negotiation and consensus-building skills. They should be psychologically prepared to "back down" and "lose face" in certain circumstances. They should appreciate the importance of impartiality, patience, tolerance and political sensitivity.

Training should be based on typical peace support operation tasks. These include cease-fire monitoring and maintenance; check-point operations; medical assistance to the civilian population; crowd-control at food distribution points; apprehension of criminals and performing certain of the responsibilities of the civil authority if it has collapsed. Military forces involved in peace operations should comply strictly with international humanitarian law and must be mandated to oversee compliance with this law by the belligerent parties. It is therefore essential that SANDF personnel deployed in such operations are familiar with the relevant provisions of the law and with the application thereof in situations of conflict (South Africa, Department of Defence, 1996:26).

5.3.2.4 Standard of the Joint Forces

Since the undertaking of multinational operations for the maintenance of peace and security is a daunting challenge in any terms, proper standards of training, quality and the professionalism of soldiers can hardly be overemphasised. It is imperative that professional armed forces, commanded by professional officers, properly trained and well-disciplined for their primary mission, are the only forces to be deployed for such operations (Gamba and Potgieter, 1997:62-63).

As far as the quality and standard of African armed forces are concerned, there can be little doubt that vast differences exist between the level of skills, training and education of the South African forces and those of the rest of Africa. The haunch reality is that the quality and standards of South African soldiers excels those of their counter parts in other Southern African states by far (Cilliers and Malan, 1997:341). In order to guarantee success during peace support
operations, combined training should be undertaken with the forces of countries with which South Africa is likely to be involved in such operations.

5.3.2.5 The Role of Meaningful Intelligence

Contemporary peace initiatives have shown that politically fluid and militarily complex situations may require more advanced resources and procedures for collecting, assessing and distributing intelligence. Intelligence on the military power and disposition of forces, the location of minefields, the level of violence and other features in a deployment area are essential for planning and conducting military operations (Berdal, 1993:27). In order to effectively exercise his/her mandate, a military commander needs to be able to detect the movements of the belligerent forces, determine the location of arms cashes and anticipate the plans and tactics of those who intend to violate agreements and jeopardise the execution of the mission mandate.

In almost all Southern African peace efforts troops have been dispatched to mission areas with inadequate intelligence on the local inhabitants, their cultures, beliefs and customs. Even basic geographic information has been a problem as few Southern African countries have up-to-date maps, especially maps providing geographic information that is essential for meaningful military planning (Anyidoho, 1997:44).

5.3.2.6 The Role of Media Coverage

It is important that the media are in a position to have a clear understanding of the operation and of the operational issues within the mission territory. Media coverage can enhance perceptions - positive or negative - among both the peacekeepers themselves and the people in whose area they are deployed as well as among the public at large. An ability to deal with the media may be crucial in determining how peace initiatives are perceived (Shaw, 1994:14).

Military commanders often choose to ignore the media and that is a dangerous strategy because the role of the media is to inform and to educate (Anyidoho,
1997:45). When properly dealt with the media can be a very powerful instrument for commanders in a distressful and desperate situation. As regards media liaison the following must always be kept in mind:

- there must be clear strategic guidelines;
- there must be a cohesive corporate communication strategy in place; and
- external communication must be pro-active rather than re-active.

It should also be noted that external communication is enhanced by:

- the direct involvement of commanders in this role;
- high levels of truth and transparency; and
- the arrangement of visits to the area of operations for journalists.

It must always be kept in mind that better communication tempers the criticism and negative reflections on the part of reporters (Stofberg, 1998:9).

5.3.2.7 The Need for Sound Civil-Military Relations

The deployment of peace forces of all kinds demands a delicate and critical relationship with the host government and other parties in the conflict such as with the local population. Any type of third party intervention requires a sensitive approach in situations of internal conflict, especially as it reminds of the deployment of a ruling force from the outside (De Brito, 1997:61-64). The fact that members of peace forces are often or frequently in contact with the local population also calls for a great deal of caution and prudence on their part in order to avoid misunderstandings, tension or even collusion. They will be called upon to use diplomatic skills, seek compromises by means of negotiation and to be tolerant of others. Such attributes required an additional dimension to a soldier’s professional life (Hundt, 1996:38). The establishment of a civil-military operations centre will help to shape a more positive image of an operation from the viewpoint of civil-military relations.
5.3.2.8 Linguistic Problems and Diverse Military Cultures

The effective command and control of any military operation depends heavily on its communication ability. It is necessary to furnish authorities at all levels with timely information on the direction and co-ordination of all activities at ground level. In Southern Africa the military of the various states have all inherited the languages of the former colonial powers as well as their various military cultures. Previous command and control problems experienced during multi-national operations to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts in Southern Africa were often related to linguistic diversity (Anyidoho, 1997:44).

5.4 Principles of South African Participation

When any South African Force is committed to any kind of peace mission, the principles of participation as stated in the White Paper on South African Participation in International Peace Missions as approved by Cabinet on 21 October 1998 must be adhered to. These principles are derived largely from the lessons learned by more experienced contributing countries and the UN Secretariat. This means that South Africa should feel fairly secure in contributing to an established UN mission and that careful consideration of principles is far more important when the country is approached to contribute towards the establishment of a new mission. These principles are:

- level and size of contribution,
- a clear international mandate,
- sufficient means,
- a domestic mandate and budget,
- voluntarism,
- clear entry and exit criteria,
- regional co-operation, and
5.4.1 Level and Size of Contribution

The level and size of any contribution to any particular peace mission will depend on how closely the mission relates to the national interests and the type of demand that exists for the type of contributions outlined above. Indeed, where core national interests are clearly at stake, the level and size of the South African contribution may well exceed that of the investigated potential contributions. Police contributions will be somewhat more politicised and military contributions ever more so. The larger the contribution in terms of weight of personnel and the equipment deployed, the more politicised the decision to deploy will become.

5.4.2 A Clear International Mandate

The framing of a realistic and appropriate mandate for any peace operation is essential to the success of any mission. If a peace operation has a clear and realistic mandate and the means to achieve this mandate, then there is every chance that the mission will be successful. The mandate for the peace mission in question must therefore be clear and agreed to between the UN, regional bodies, the host country, conflicting parties and contributing countries. The mandate should be linked to concrete political solutions.

South African participation in peace missions should only occur when there is a clear threat to and/or breach of international peace and security and/or a disaster of major humanitarian proportions and/or endemic causes of conflict which, unless addressed, may cause long-term instability. South Africa therefore requires a clear mandate, which can be translated into a detailed operational plan, leaving no room for ambiguity on differing perceptions as to the roles and tasks of various elements and national contingents. Once a commitment is made to participation, South Africa will insist on being consulted before any substantial changes are made to the original mission mandate.

5.4.3 Sufficient Means

The commitment of South African forces to service in peace missions is contingent
upon comprehensive mission planning with the relevant national and international authorities to ensure that the form and function of forces committed to such operations are both necessary and sufficient to attain the stated goals and objectives. South Africa will not commit itself to participation in any peace mission which is patently underresourced and which does not have sufficient means to achieve the set mandate.

At national level, military resources and police personnel earmarked for contribution to peace missions must be available for international service and should not be committed elsewhere. The possible expansion of the SANDF’s other secondary roles – for instance, support to the SAPS and border protection – should be considered prior to any agreement to participation in a particular peace support operation.

5.4.4 A Domestic Mandate and Budget

The securing of a mandate for South African participation in a new peace mission involves three distinct spheres:

- the international mandate as provided by the UN;
- the regional or sub-regional mandate; and
- the securing of a domestic mandate for South Africa’s participation in the peace mission.

The principle of shared responsibility dictates that participation in peace missions is never the prerogative of one state department or one set of actors alone. Contemporary peace missions require a combination of political, civilian, military and police elements and South Africa may contribute to one, more or all of these elements in one or more missions. The key players in authorising such participation are Parliament, the President’s Office, the Department of Foreign Affairs, diverse civilian state departments, the Department of Defence and the Intelligence community.

Parliament must authorise finances for South African participation in peace
missions. Acceptance of the White Paper on South African Participation in International Peace Missions by the Cabinet will be regarded as sufficient authorisation for Departments to fund the participation of individuals within such Departments in peace missions within reasonable limits and provided that such funding is included in the annual Departmental Budget. Where troop contingents, equipment and other personnel are made available for UN missions, South Africa will be reimbursed for such participation.

Bridging finance will, however, be required for participation in UN operations to sustain the contingent until the UN logistic system 'kicks in' and to cover the delay in UN reimbursements. Moreover, if the operation is only endorsed and not conducted by the UN, alternative mechanisms of funding will have to be explored for the reimbursement of some or all of the costs of South African participation. This could include collateral payment or alternative payment by countries not participating in the operation but supportive of the operation in question.

In all cases, the Department of Foreign Affairs will take the lead in securing finances for South African participation in specific peace missions. The Department of Defence and the Department of Safety and Security will be responsible for budgeting for meeting the pre-deployment costs as well as a six month post-deployment cost of the potential contribution earmarked for each department.

5.4.5 Volunteerism

The Defence Act currently provides that SANDF personnel may only be compelled to serve outside the borders of the RSA "in time of war against the enemy". Individual officers may thus apply voluntarily for international service as military observers through the SANDF readiness system in much the same way as civilians or police personnel will apply for such service.

The principle of volunteerism must however, be applied somewhat differently with regard to military units or sub-units that are required to train together as a team for long periods in order to be proficient. Individuals must therefore volunteer for
service in those units or formations, which are, earmarked for participation in
international peace support operations with the full knowledge that they are likely
to be deployed on such operations during their time of service.

5.4.6 Clear Entry and Exit Criteria

Entrance into the mission area of any multi-national peace mission should be
preceded by a sound assessment of the situation within which South African
forces is proposed to be deployed. The intelligence community must provide
decision makers with a thorough evaluation of the nature of the conflict at hand,
the prospects for political resolution of the conflict and the extent to which third
party political and military involvement will facilitate or impede conflict resolution.
Clear exit criteria refers to the achievement of a desirable political end-state to the
involvement within an acceptable period of time, rather than to the technicalities of
any military withdrawal plan.

5.4.7 Regional Co-operation

South Africa will continue to co-operate with regional partners, especially those
within the SADC in enhancing its capacity to participate in international peace
missions. This is particularly important with regards to the SANDF. In the spirit of
coop-eration, it is important that information on South Africa’s capabilities,
intentions and deployment with respect to peace missions be shared with
secretariats of all three organisations.

5.4.8 Foreign Assistance

In principle, South Africa will not depend on any single donor for the provision of
assistance with participation in peace missions. All such assistance should be
compatible with regional interests in the realm of peace and security and none
should be accepted which may be interpreted as threatening by our regional
5.5 Procedures for Military Deployment

Once the Permanent Mission to the UN has received a request to contribute a military contingent to a peace mission, the extra territorial employment of South African Forces, in fulfilment of an international obligation to participate in a peace mission, will, in terms of the Constitution, require authorisation. The President, acting on advice from the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Defence, will decide in principle whether or not to authorise the deployment of the required military forces. Where the mandate involves the potential use of military enforcement measures, under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the President will authorise the employment of the required forces to that end once Parliament has approved, in principle, the proposed participation in such an operation upon the recommendation of the Executive at the request of the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

In all cases, in terms of the Constitution, Parliament is empowered to review the President's decision regarding such deployment. Prior to tabling a proposal in parliament for notifying the participation of a South African military contingent in a particular peace support operation, the following procedures must be followed:

- The President will promptly and in appropriate detail inform the Parliament as to the reasons for the employment; the place where the force is to be employed; the number of persons involved and the expected duration of the employment.
- The Parliamentary Committees with direct interest in South Africa's involvement in peace support operations should be briefed on the preparation for the peace support operation in question.
- The Parliamentary Committees must be informed of the proposed entry and exit criteria and risks involved and the Treasury Committee on the financial implications of the operation.
- The Parliamentary Committees should be informed of the proposed command and control arrangements and the detail of the proposed force as well as the proposed Rules of Engagement and the proposed withdrawal plans for the force in action.
Documentation must be provided to the parliamentarians in a timely fashion to expedite their decision.

A clear understanding of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) between the UN and the host country concerned must be communicated by the Department of Foreign Affairs to those other South African agencies committed to the peace support operation. An agreement must be reached between South Africa and the UN. Such agreements are technical and administrative in nature. Under the guidance of the Department of Foreign Affairs, the following should be clearly outlined in such an agreement:

- The authority under which the force resorts and the details of the appropriate command and control arrangements.
- Administrative, financial and personnel matters relating to the deployment and utilisation of South African troops and equipment.
- The applicability of international conventions to the force.
- The settlements of disputes between the troop contributing country and UN should such disputes emerge and the mechanisms via which this will be addressed.
- The frames under which South African personnel are prepared to participate in the operation and the withdrawal procedures once their deployment period has been terminated.

Once the mandate and SOFA has been clarified and determined, ROE must be developed and included in the Agreement between the UN and the troop contributing country. These ROE must take careful cognisance of the following:

- Relevant provisions of international law and their implications for the ROE.
- Standardisation of ROE within the multi-national forces in question.
- Familiarisation of all South African personnel involved in the operation with the ROE.
- A clear outline of the circumstances under which ROE can be changed within a particular operation.
Once an agreement has been concluded to participate in a peace support operation, the Department of Foreign Affairs will lead responsibility for overseeing and co-ordinating continuing South African involvement in the operation at a national and international level. Given the fact that all peace support operations are essentially political operations, such oversight and co-ordination will involve the determination of the political contours of the operation, diplomatic liaison with the UN and other regional bodies and diplomatic liaison with all troop contributing countries and/or those countries who are committing resources to the operation.

Once deployed, national contingents participating in UN peace support operations are placed under the operational control of the force commander, but remain under national command. South African participation in international peace support operations is always voluntary and troops can be withdrawn at any stage of the operation subject to the details of the agreement between the UN or other relevant international organisation and South Africa (Republic of South Africa, 1998b:23-25).

5.6 Conclusion

In the final analysis it should be borne in mind that peacekeeping is essentially an UN responsibility, that it should be endorsed by the world body and conducted in accordance with the internationalist ethos of the UN Charter. This would imply that any justification for military intervention on the grounds that it is in the interest of peace, must proceed from the assumption that it is not contradictory to the UN Charter. Some analysts suggest that regional organisations or military alliances or even a single nation under the political authorisation of the UN should lead intervention operations. However this would imply that the formulation of UN mandates should not inhibit swift intervention in internal crisis and that regional or sub-regional organisations should clearly provide for guidelines as regards military responses to internal conflicts within the framework of sound objectives.

No military intervention should ever go beyond the ambit of international law, since the international community or regional groupings are obviously in no position to engage or interfere in any country's domestic affairs in unqualified terms.
What is also significant is the fact that the UN now seems prepared to form partnerships with willing regional organisations and alliances in Africa as far as operations for maintaining peace and security are concerned. This relates to the idea of a shared responsibility between the UN and continental stakeholders for the effective management of conflict in Africa.

However many issues remain unclear as regarding an ideal arrangement between the UN, regional organisations and other role players. If these issues remain unclear, the justification and motives of interventionists in regional conflicts are likely to be called into question and consequently the military aspects of such operations are also likely to be subjected to a greater deal of criticism and scrutiny. OPERATION BÖLEAS is probably a case in point as many reporters and analysts seemed to be unclear on the mission’s exact intention and on the ambit of South Africa’s foreign policy framework in respect of peace making efforts.
CHAPTER 6

SYNTHESIS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

6.1 Introduction

In this chapter concluding remarks on all the issues addressed in the preceding chapters will be made. To accomplish this the aim of this chapter is to:

- revisit the problem statement and the research hypothesis formulated in Chapter 1;
- achieve a synthesis of the main themes;
- make recommendations based on the research findings;
- put forward proposals for future research; and
- draw final conclusions regarding the research.

6.2 Problem Statement and Research Hypothesis

It is the view of the researcher that the research findings conducted in this paper conclusively validates the research hypothesis as formulated in Chapter 1. It is therefore contended that: The foreign policy of the current Government of the Republic of South Africa as well as appropriate doctrines, operational procedures and training programmes of the SANDF does not spell out clearly and unambiguously the mandate and responsibilities of the SANDF when engaged in peace support operations.

The case study on the SADC intervention in the Republic of Lesotho showed that the non-compliance or partial compliance with the UN principles of consent, impartiality and the absence of force to deal with intra-state and inter-state conflict, have done serious damage to the capacity of regional organs to address and resolve conflict issues. Where enforcement action was used it lacked a mandate and a consistent approach.
6.3 Synthesis

The researcher set out to study the phenomenon of peacekeeping from a Southern African perspective. Chapter 1 explains the research methodology used in the research, while the selection of an appropriate approach to the study is the objective of Chapter 2. A comparative policy content analysis was found to be the best approach to deal with the concept of peacekeeping. Chapter 3 is the most comprehensive since a general overview of the concepts is provided, the concept of peacekeeping is explained, reviewed and compared in terms of its 'classical' meaning and the 'modern' approaches expanded in current practices. The comparative policy content approach proved to be a useful tool in this regard, as some interesting conclusions regarding peacekeeping can be drawn from the findings in this particular chapter. A case study is provided in Chapter 4 in order to compare measures for peacekeeping practice with the theoretical foundation espoused in Chapter 3.

The research project has three overall objectives to satisfy. One of these is an evaluation of the evolution, principles and characteristics of peacekeeping and the conditions resulting in the need for peacekeeping. The second objective is to compare the various concepts, contentions and views of numerous writers on the subject of peacekeeping. A third objective is to propose and aide de memoire for intervention in conflict situations which includes a description of the elements, actors, conditions and the requirements for conflict intervention for South African circumstances and the resolution thereof.

It is the contention of this researcher that all the above-mentioned objectives have been achieved satisfactorily and based on these, the ensuing recommendations are put forward.

6.4 Recommendations Based on the Research Findings

The view held by this researcher should contribute to an existing body of knowledge by supporting the findings of previous research through putting together prerequisites as derived from previous experience in a user-friendly
format to serve as guidelines for successful peace support operations. These guidelines should be accessible for all parties involved in or responsible for peace support operations. In this regard recommendations are proposed for the different levels of responsibility.

6.4.1 Recommendations Concerning the International Community

- International organisations dealing with peace and security should renew their commitment towards the resolution of conflict on the African continent by enhancing the capacity of regional organs through their assistance.
- International commitment should include assistance with establishing appropriate structures, new and ongoing training and may extend to assistance with equipment and deployment.
- Security organs, such as the UN and the OAU (or its successor the AU) should not view peace enforcement as a threat to peacekeeping. It should rather be viewed as an alternative approach to situations where it is evident that peacekeeping will not succeed.

6.4.2 Regional Responsibility

- Southern Africa should rely on its own strengths to deal with conflict prevention and resolution through enhancing the capacity of regional organs such as the SADC.
- Peace and stability should be regarded as a regional imperative that require commitment from all regional role players.
- The conduct of conflict management operations should be approached from a holistic perspective and should be sanctioned by a regional body in accordance with the UN Security Council.
- A peace support operation centre under the auspices of regional defined structures must be established to develop and co-ordinate planning, training, logistics, communication and field liaison teams for multi-national forces.
6.4.3 The South African Government’s Responsibility

☐ The level and size of the South African contribution must be on par with the financial backing available.
☐ The Financial Policy must be specific in terms of the budgeting responsibilities of the different departments involved in peacekeeping.
☐ Political decision-makers must ensure that South African involvement will not be open-ended and that such involvement will not be regarded as part of a larger diplomatic or political failure.

6.4.4 The SANDF’s Responsibility

☐ During exercising its training responsibility, the SANDF should shift its main focus of effort to training for peace support operations.
☐ The SANDF must not only train for peace support but it must equip itself for this kind of operations in order to mobilise swiftly and effectively when the call is made.

It does not matter what recommendations are made, all of it will be null and void if peace initiatives continues to address the symptoms of conflict and not the root causes.

6.5 Recommendations for Future Research

Considering the broader scope in which this research could have been done, this study, however, only touched on the surface of peacekeeping and a number of issues were not discussed in detail. Bearing this in mind, the following recommendations are made that aim to augment the context of this text.

☐ The case study of the intervention operation in the Republic of Lesotho revealed a need for a comprehensive approach that addresses the matter of a clear, unambiguous mandate that is accepted by all parties involved. It must also be clear and accepted by all which institution must issue this mandate.
The question of funding a peacekeeping operation must also be cleared. The research revealed that uncertainty exists about exactly who is responsible to pay how much for what. The question of the scales of remuneration for the personnel involved and the currency in which they are reimbursed must be stated clearly. The study revealed that different scales and different currencies are used currently for remuneration that leads to the reality that the personnel of the different contributing countries with the same responsibilities, is reimbursed differently. This proves to be a substantial demotivator for peacekeeping forces.

The question of whom is responsible for what was also revealed. No establishment tables exist to guide supporting countries as to what equipment they are responsible to supply.

6.6 Conclusion

This research paper has sought to explain the nature and scope of contemporary peace missions and to define the parameters for South African participation in such missions. South Africa is obliged to support international efforts at conflict management and resolution and it is clearly in the national interest to do so. South Africa will therefore participate in such missions where there is a clear need for our national contribution and where there is a legitimate and realistic international mandate for executing the mission.

South Africa has limited but valuable resources to offer to the international community for conducting of peace missions. These include civilians with a diverse range of skills and experience appropriate to peace processes and professional, well-trained and disciplined military officers. If these resources are to be utilised by the international community in the cause of peace, their approximate nature and size must be defined through an appropriate readiness system for each component.

While government should do everything in its power to facilitate voluntary international service by individual South Africans, the deployment of a military contingent in support of an international peace mission will always be subject to
more rigorous procedures. While such procedures have been suggested in this research paper, they will have to be refined by growing experience of deploying in international service. Such experience can only be gained by converting potential resources into actual capabilities. It is hoped that this research paper will initiate such a process.
# ABBREVIATIONS

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<th>No.</th>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>ACCORD</td>
<td>African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes</td>
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<td>2.</td>
<td>ACRI</td>
<td>The African Crisis Response Initiative</td>
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<td>3.</td>
<td>AEC</td>
<td>African Economic Community</td>
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<td>4.</td>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<td>5.</td>
<td>BCP</td>
<td>Basotho Congress Party</td>
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<td>6.</td>
<td>BDF</td>
<td>Botswana Defence Force</td>
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<td>7.</td>
<td>BNP</td>
<td>Basotho National Party</td>
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<td>8.</td>
<td>CTF</td>
<td>Combined Task Force</td>
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<td>ISDSC</td>
<td>Inter-state Defence and Security Committee</td>
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<td>ISS</td>
<td>Institute for Security Studies</td>
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<td>11.</td>
<td>RLDF</td>
<td>Royal Lesotho Defence Force</td>
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<td>RLMP</td>
<td>Royal Lesotho Mounted Police</td>
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<td>13.</td>
<td>ROE</td>
<td>Rules of Engagement</td>
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<td>SADCC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference</td>
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<td>15.</td>
<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.</td>
<td>SANDF</td>
<td>South African National Defence Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.</td>
<td>SOFA</td>
<td>Status of Forces Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.</td>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organisation for African Unity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19.</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
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