The Role of Regional Co-operation in the Resolution of the Conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo

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Declaration

I, the undersigned, hereby declare that the work contained in this thesis is my own original work and that I have not previously in its entirety or in part submitted it at any university for a degree.
Abstract

Since the early 1960s, when the majority of African countries gained independence from colonial powers, the continent has been in turmoil. Conflicts have been extensive, and detrimental to economic, political and above all, social development. Today, Africa is under more pressure than ever to find solutions for these conflicts.

The situation is complicated by the complex and difficult challenges brought on by a rapidly globalising world. Also conflicts have often been characterised by internal, as well as regional proportions. Coupled with this, the threats facing Southern Africa are of such a nature that they transcend national boundaries, and have a tendency to effect entire regions as opposed to individual states. Thus threats no longer endanger states, but rather their people.

In view of this, conflict resolution requires a regional approach as well, in order to ensure a viable and lasting solution. This thesis attempts to evaluate the contribution of regional co-operation to conflict resolution in Southern Africa. Two concepts imperative to this evaluation are regionalism and security. Both are examined and juxtaposed. The author determines that the concepts have changed dramatically since the end of the Cold War period, and that new regionalism and new security approaches need to be considered in addressing conflicts, since traditional interpretations have become obsolete, particularly in the developing world.

Furthermore, an examination of the international, regional and sub-regional organisations, concerned with conflict management on the continent, is carried out. The United Nations and the Southern African Development Community, together with their efforts in Southern Africa analysed.
The author takes the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo as a case study, and concludes that the persisting conflict has ensued precisely because regional co-operation was inadequate. The states and leaders involved did not take into account the regional dimensions of the conflict, and also ignored threats to human security. Regional co-operation was at a minimal, and involvement has until now been predominantly unilateral and statist, marked by personal interests, and not those of the population.
Opsomming

Sedert die vroeë sestigerjare, toe die meerderheid Afrikalandle onafhankliheid van koloniale magte verkry het, was die kontinent in onrus gehul. Dit was omvattende konflik – konflik wat nadelig was vir ekonomiese, politieke en veral sosiale ontwikkeling. Vandag, meer as ooit tevore, is Afrika onder druk om oplossings te vind vir hierdie konflikte.

Die situasie word gekompliseer deur die uitdagings gestel deur 'n vinnig globaliserende wêreld. Die konflik word dikwels deur interne sowel as streeksafmetings gekenmerk. Hiermee saam is die bedreigings wat op Suidelike Afrika 'n invloed het van so 'n aard dat dit nasionale grense ignoreer en die geneigheid het om totale streke, in teenstelling met individuele state, te beïnvloed. Hierdie bedreigings stel dus nie state in gevaar nie, maar eerder hul mense.

Om 'n lewensvatbare en blywende effek te hê, benodig konflikoplossing dus ook 'n streeksbenadering aan te neem. Hierdie tesis poog om die bydrae van streeksverwant begin, ten einde konflikoplossing in Suidelike Afrika te bewerkstellig, te evalueer. Beide word ondersoek en in verband gebring. Die skrywer bevind dat die konsepte drasties verander het sedert die einde van die Koue Oorlog tydperk, en dat nuwe regionalisme en nuwe sekuriteit benaderings oorweeg moet word, aangesien tradisionele interpretasies verouderd, veral in die ontwikkelende wêreld, is.

Verder word internasionale, regionale en sub-regionale organisasies wat gemoeid is met konflikhantering op die kontinent, ook ondersoek. Die Verenigde Nasies en die Suidelike Afrika Ontwikkelings Gemeenskap (SADC), tesame met hul pogings in Suidelike Africa, word geanaliseer.
Die skrywer maak gebruik van die konflik in die Demokratiese Republiek van die Kongo as gevallestudie, en kom tot die gevolgtrekking dat konflik ontstaan het juis omdat regionale samewerking nooit werklik gerealiseer het nie. Die betrokke state en leiers het nie die streeksdimensies van die konflik in ag geneem nie, en ook menslike sekuriteit bedreigings ignoreer. Regionale samewerking was beperk tot ’n minimum, en betrokkenheid was tot nou toe oorwegend eensydig en staats georienteerd, en gekenmerk deur persoonlike belange, en nie dié van die bevolking nie.
Acknowledgements

this thesis is dedicated to

Andrzej, my father
for teaching me to question

Ewa, my mother
for her encouragement

I would like to thank my mentor, Professor Breytenbach,
for his patience, guidance, and valued advice.

I would also like to thank my friends
for keeping me sane.
<table>
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<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACRF/I</td>
<td>African Crisis Response Force/Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADFL</td>
<td>Alliance de Forces Democratiques pour la Liberation du Congo-Zaïre</td>
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<tr>
<td>AEC</td>
<td>African Economic Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASAS</td>
<td>Association of Southern African States</td>
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<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSSDCA</td>
<td>Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Co-operation in Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOMOG</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ex-FAR</td>
<td>Former Rwandan Armed Forces</td>
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<td>FAA</td>
<td>Forcas Armadas Angolanas</td>
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<td>FLS</td>
<td>Front Line States</td>
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<td>FTA</td>
<td>Free Trade Area</td>
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<td>GATT</td>
<td>General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade</td>
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<td>ICD</td>
<td>Inter-Congolese Dialogue</td>
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<td>ISDSC</td>
<td>Inter-State Defence and Security Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>JMC</td>
<td>Joint Military Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>MLC</td>
<td>Movement for the Liberation of Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>MLO</td>
<td>Military Liaison Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>MNC</td>
<td>Mouvement National Congolais</td>
</tr>
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<td>MONUC</td>
<td>United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>MoU</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
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<td>NEPAD</td>
<td>New Partnership for Africa's Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental Organisation</td>
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<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organisation of African Unity</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>ONUC</td>
<td>United Nations Peacekeeping Mission in the Congo</td>
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<td>OPDS</td>
<td>Organ on Politics, Defence and Security</td>
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<tr>
<td>PKF</td>
<td>Peace Keeping Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSC</td>
<td>Peace and Security Council</td>
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<td>PTA</td>
<td>Preferential Trade Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>REC</td>
<td>Regional Economic Community</td>
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<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
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<td>SADCC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCU</td>
<td>Sector Co-ordinating Units</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNCTAD</td>
<td>United Nations Conference on Trade and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNITA</td>
<td>União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola</td>
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<tr>
<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organisation</td>
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Chapter 1:
Introduction

1.1 Problem Statement

The African continent has been continuously submerged in violent animosities since the start of the withdrawal of colonial powers in the 1960s. Precious few states have been able to escape political instability and economic degradation. In Southern Africa, Lesotho has witnessed several coups, Mozambique has been ravaged by civil war, boundary conflicts have arisen between Namibia and Botswana, and the democratisation process has stalled in Swaziland.

In Zimbabwe a mockery has been made of democracy, with unrelenting land invasions by the War Veterans Association and an explicit hindrance of the principles of free speech and human rights in this year's presidential election. The antagonism doesn't end there. The civil war in Angola reached international proportions, as well as unflagging domestic ones, although it has abated since the death of rebel leader Jonas Savimbi in February 2002. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), despite the periods of relative stability, situations of antagonism have not been completely eliminated, and prospects for peace remain uncertain despite the withdrawal of some foreign troops from the country.

The different conflicts vary in intensity and character but all have been extremely detrimental to stability on the continent. During the Cold War era, African countries were preoccupied with attempting to eliminate threats to state security. These took the form of struggles for freedom and independence against external colonial control, and became synonymous with Africa of that period. In the post-Cold War period, however, threats to security have changed in character, and both inhabitants and states are threatened. Certain African states have become a threat to the security to their own populations because they are in danger of collapsing.
Threats facing the populations of Southern Africa include civil and ethnic unrest, diseases such as AIDS and malaria, drought, unemployment, and famine (Van Aardt, 1993: 84), as well as agricultural degradation, corruption and mismanagement, and enormous debt burdens (Mills, 1994: 5). Conflicts have therefore, become multifaceted, driven by poverty, corrupt governance and mercantilistic exploitation of scarce resources.

The fact that present-day threats are predominantly non-military and internal, is important to consider, because they transcend the traditional notion of security. The conventional approach to security, focusing exclusively on national safety and state military concerns (Booth, 1994: 3) is largely irrelevant to the developing world. The Cold War period fuelled by realist thinking, advocated the prominence of the state (Buzan, 1991: 21), and emphasised national security, war, balance of power and defence alliances. The state was the primary referent of security, and required a military-centred paradigm to achieve its objectives.

Today, however, an alternative approach to security needs to be considered if the people of Southern Africa are truly to be guaranteed freedom from threat. Africa must demonstrate the will to rely upon political rather than military responses to problems (Neethling, 1999: 32). The new security approach should be 'about and for the people' (Van Aardt, 1996: 23). Unless threats to human security are identified and considered primary to national interests, many conflicts in Africa will remain unresolved.

A common feature of all the previously mentioned threats is borderlessness, which transcends the boundaries of states and societies. Threats to human security are not longer constrained by national boundaries but are, instead, dilemmas affecting whole regions. As a result, national attempts at possible solutions could be, and have in the past, proved futile because these threats can easily spill over into neighbouring states, and exceed individual state capabilities.
Regional problems need to be addressed through regional means (MacLean, 1999: 945-946). A regional approach to address security issues in Southern Africa, however, has been difficult to establish.

It is against this background that the topic of the thesis was determined, namely: to assess the role of regional co-operation in the resolution of the conflict in the DRC. The thesis will not focus on the conceptualisation of conflict resolution. It will rather suggest, that resolution of conflicts in Southern Africa, cannot be sought without substantial attention given to regional co-operation and a broader approach to security.

In order to assess regional co-operation it is important to look at the concept of regionalism, since this concept implies the convergence in a region along various dimensions, the most prominent of which are economic, cultural, social and political (Hettne & Söderbaum, 1998: 7). In the post-Cold War period the concept has undergone dramatic changes and, has evolved into a new wave of regionalism. Exploring both the old and new approaches to regionalism will yield an understanding of the concept. More importantly it will assist in classifying the levels, manner and reasons for regional co-operation and how these have changed as well.

Conflict in Africa has been of an intrastate and interstate nature. The former refers to security threats that surpass national boundaries, while the latter refers to security threats that endanger the state itself. As already mentioned, security threats affect both the inhabitants and their states. In other words, the post-Cold War era has also produced a changing concept of security, one that needs to be analysed against a backdrop of the conventional approach. By exploring the old and new approaches to security, more appropriate parameters can be recommended for regional security arrangements to follow, in order to adequately address the security needs of their populations and their member states.
After an examination of the two concepts, the thesis will attempt to establish a connection between the new approaches to regionalism and security, and show why it would be advantageous for regional security organisations to advocate both concepts simultaneously in order to provide lasting solutions in conflict situations.

For a practical approach to security, the United Nations (UN) will be examined, because it is the primary world body concerned with the maintenance of international peace and security. Although it is not the focus of the study, the UN is important to consider, because all regional arrangements must comply with the principles of the UN, and adhere to the rules and regulations set out for them in Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, if they desire to be regarded as legitimate (Bennett, 1995: 232). Furthermore, regional organisations are prohibited from the use and threat of the use of force without the authority of the Security Council, excluding a few exceptions (Dugard, 2001: 413).

Due to the magnitude of UN involvement throughout the world, the confines of the thesis are restricted to Southern Africa. In this region the Southern African Development Community (SADC) is the only regional organisation equipped to deal with conflicts. Although SADC was initially established as a regional economic initiative, aimed at achieving greater development and economic growth in the region, threats to security constituted a stumbling block for development. This led to the formation of SADC’s Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS) in 1996, which was to address conflicts in the region through regional co-operation and the new security approach (Breytenbach, 2000: 85). The OPDS will be assessed to determine whether it managed to apply the central tenets of the new approach to human security.

The ultimate suspension of the Organ in 1997, further substantiates the importance of analysing the UN in the realm of the thesis, since regional organisations, either as a result of ineffective security structures or the lack of
necessary funds, have depended heavily on the UN. In fact many regional and state-based initiatives aimed at conflict resolution have called on UN support, without adequate UN involvement in discussions (Malan & Boshoff, 2001: 3-4).

Communication and interaction between the UN and regional organisations will also be discussed, since it has affected efforts in addressing conflict situations in Southern Africa. An inconsistency between the UN and regional organisations can be attributed to the vague reference to regional arrangements in the UN Charter, a dilemma that did not exist at the time of the UN's inception, but one that evolved with the changing circumstances in the world arena, and remains unresolved today. An assessment will be made of whether both organisations upheld the principles of new security, which is especially important since both are state-based.

Although the UN and SADC will be examined separately, to determine their functioning and subsequent weaknesses and strengths, the main focus will be on the conflict in the DRC and how both organisations worked to address and resolve the conflict. The conflict in the DRC has reached unrelenting proportions and is a prime example of one characterised by regional dimensions, and threats to human security and the security of the state. Due to the conflict's incessant character, the thesis will briefly explore the colonial origins of the conflict, and ascertain its present-day dimensions.

SADC's involvement in the DRC conflict will be evaluated, to determine whether it was a concerted regional one, and in terms of which regional security approaches it acted, the old state-centric approaches or the new human security approaches. The UN was called upon to assist in the conflict and the organisation has made substantial contributions in the working towards a resolution of the conflict in the Congo, although its contribution has not been without problems.
Regional initiatives, such as the Lusaka Peace Process and the Inter-Congolese Dialogue (ICD), aimed at addressing and resolving the conflict were launched by countries in Southern Africa, and will be reviewed to determine whether they were SADC inspired or bilateral initiatives. The latest of these regional initiatives was the Pretoria Agreement of 2002. The Agreement is important to consider because it managed to bring together previously unco-operative parties. As the situation in the DRC continues to be an unresolved issue, the thesis will not consider events after the Pretoria Agreement of July 2002.

An assessment will be made of whether the parties involved in the DRC conflict and the initiatives launched, adhered to the principles of new security and whether there was indeed any regional co-operation in the matter, and if not, did that result in a failure to resolve the conflict. Finally, the thesis will propose that in order for the conflict to be addressed and resolved successfully, a functioning regional security organisation is of utmost importance, one that will follow the principles of new security and truly co-operate on a regional level.

1.2 Purpose and Significance of Study

The purpose of the study is three-fold:

Firstly, to identify the differences between old and new regionalism through a conceptualisation of the concept. This will allow for a historical and sequential presentation of regionalism and will ascertain, not only the forms of regional co-operation and integration, but also the various types of regional organisations. Coupled with the conceptualisation of regionalism, an assessment of the notion of security will be carried out. This will, once again, illustrate substantial differences between the old and new security thinking. More importantly, it will establish that new security thinking, places people as the primary referents of security, and this is of utmost importance particularly in developing Southern Africa. A conceptualisation of both concepts will assist in linking the two.
Secondly, to consider and evaluate the international and regional organisations that have been present in Southern Africa, namely the UN and SADC. An examination of their conflict mechanisms will be made to determine where they complied with the principles of the human approach to security so important in Southern Africa, or whether state-centric approaches prevailed.

Thirdly, to examine and explore the conflict that has prevailed in the Democratic Republic of Congo, and to assess whether a broader approach to security was followed. Furthermore an assessment of the involvement of the various parties will be made, in order to determine which regional security approaches dominated, and whether international, regional, and national involvement was co-ordinated or added to the complexity of the conflict. This will assist in establishing what future actions should be taken to bring about peace and stability.

The study is significant because it attempts to determine why regional security initiatives have not been successful in addressing and resolving conflict in Southern Africa. It applies old and new security approaches to a relatively recent case of conflict resolution in the DRC, and furthermore, examines the role of regional co-operation in that conflict. The significance of the DRC is such, that it has effected the Great Lakes region, and repercussions of the conflict also emanate over much of Southern Africa.

1.3 Methodology

The thesis takes the form of an extensive literature study, which utilises a qualitative approach towards the research. It is firstly a descriptive study, asking the questions 'how' and 'who', and secondly an explanatory study determining 'why'. It is also an inductive study, because it began with a topic and undetermined concepts, that needed to be refined in order to identify a preliminary relationship.
Existing literature, concerned with various aspects of the research topic, was consulted in order to obtain a thorough background, and deepen the conceptual framework of the research. The literature review also served to identify the latest developments in this field of research, and was beneficial in pinpointing deficiencies and weaknesses, as well as establishing more sources for data collection.

The reading material, used as the primary source of research, deals with two principal concepts, namely regionalism and security. Both concepts are presented as changing phenomena, that are continuously being shaped by current global trends and activities and, therefore, need constant revision.

The literature on regionalism was examined first against a backdrop of universalism (Bennett, 1995: 232), where the latter became especially prominent with the formation of the United Nations in the post-World War II period.

The debate between the idealist and realist schools of thought is particularly important, because it illustrates the divergent responses to the question of conflict resolution and security promotion, which ultimately led to a contest between universal collective security and regional security (Van Nieuwkerk, 2001: 3). Hettne and Söderbaum (1998: 6-21) elaborate on the new wave of regionalism against a backdrop of the old concept of regionalism. A further account of regionalism also indicates the various forms of regional co-operation and integration, with a 'loose' functional type of co-operation at one end of the spectrum, and a 'tight' neo-functional type of integration at the other (Breytenbach, 1999: 70-72).

The literature concerned with security, is divided into various categories. The first of these can be understood from a realist perspective (Buzan, 1991), and refers to the conventional concept of security from the Cold War period, which propagated a statist-military approach. The period was characterised by simple defence alliances. The second bulk of literature criticises the conventional
approach. The literature also points to the transformation of the world in the post-
Cold War era, and demands a modification of the traditional concept of security,
one that will link political and military matters to economic and social ones. Here
the liberal school of thought is dominant. Booth (1994), Mills (1994), Van Aardt
(1993 & 1996) and Vale (1994) all advocate this standpoint.

Another category of the security literature is that, which deals with the developing
world and the identification of numerous, current threats. The literature reflects
the views of Ken Booth (1994), who was at the forefront of establishing
alternative notions of the traditional sense of security, and whose publications
have made important and valuable contributions to the international security
debate, and have resulted in the instituting and expansion of new security
thought in the developing world, such as Southern Africa.

Academic journals, essays and occasional papers concerned with the regional
security debate in Southern Africa have also been used in the study. These
include Africa Insight, Strategic Review for Southern Africa, Third World
Quarterly and the South African Journal for International Affairs. Articles issued
by institutions dealing with matters of international and regional security, such as
the Institute for Global Dialogue, were also consulted. Authors, whose work and
opinions have been applied in this thesis, are representative of the region of
Southern Africa, as well as from beyond.

The research is primarily descriptive and no empirical data or field research was
used or undertaken. A substantial amount of data was gathered at the JS
Gericke Library at the University of Stellenbosch. The internet was also a
significant source of information giving access to sources not available in the
library, and providing links with web-sites of various governmental and non-
governmental institutions.
Chapter 2: New Regionalism and New Security

2.1 The Regionalism Approach

2.1.1 Old and New Regionalism

Regionalism, is both complex and multidimensional. The one actuality that scholars of the discipline agree on, is that it is immensely difficult to find common and compatible definitions and theories of regionalism. This uncertainty extends into the old as well as the new regionalism approaches, but the distinction between the former and the latter does bring clarity to the concept.

In their essay on the new regionalism approach, Hettne and Söderbaum (1998: 6-9) distinguish between the old and new approaches. This offers more tangible characteristics of old and new, important in understanding both approaches. It also presents regionalism as a concept in progression, indicating how the approach has changed and how it might be effected by future world trends.

Following World War I, the major powers found it necessary to establish a security system, that would effectively curb any situations that could lead to further insecurity and conflict. Thus, the debate between idealists and realists, on an adequate mechanism for conflict prevention and resolution, began. Idealists propagated a universal collective system, while realists emphasised the important role that great powers could play in providing security for themselves and for smaller states (Van Nieuwkerk, 2001: 3). Although the League of Nations, the world’s first attempt at collective security failed, idealist thinking resurfaced strongly with the formation of the United Nations in 1945 (Van Nieuwkerk, 2001: 3).
During the time of the formulation of the UN Charter, however, those favouring regionalism were powerful enough to demand an accommodation for regional arrangements within the universal framework (Bennett, 1995: 232). Bennett (1995: 232-233) refers to regionalism under the United Nations Charter, and states that there was an acknowledgement that regional organisations could play an important role in promoting the aims of international peace and security.

Proposals to provide economic and social specifications for regional arrangements were defeated, however, and although Chapter VIII does make provisions for the functioning of regional organisations, it is limited to the role that such organisations can play in the maintenance of international peace and security. In fact, Chapter VIII contains only three articles concerning regional arrangements (Bennett, 1995: 233).

This vagueness and lack of precise definition of regional arrangements in the Charter (Malan, 1997: 16), coupled with the UN's failure to fulfil its promise of universal stability (Van Nieuwkerk, 2001: 3), led to the emergence of regionalism as an alternative mechanism for conflict management. Article 51, concerned with the inherent right to individual or collective self-defence against an armed attack, makes no mention of regional arrangements but, as Bennett (1995: 234) maintains, the reference to collective self-defence has allowed states to form and utilise alliance systems for this purpose.

The alliance systems, referred to by Bennett (1995: 234-235), were structured according to the realist thinking prevalent among the American-led Western alliance, namely the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), as well as the Soviet-communist alliance, namely the Warsaw Pact. The establishment of alliances in these two camps led to a bipolar power distribution.

The intent of the UN was that universalism should take precedence over regionalism in the case of any conflict of jurisdiction between a regional
organisation and the UN (Bennett, 1995: 233), and as a result multipurpose regional arrangements were made subordinate to the UN if they expected to be regarded as legitimate players in the global arena (Van Nieuwkerk, 2001: 3). Article 51, however, served as an “escape hatch from the obligations of universalism” (Bennett, 1995: 234), and the alliance systems, although internationally accepted, were not consistent with the values of collective security.

Tension and hostility between the two superpowers of the Cold War era entrenched the bipolar structure even further (Balaam & Veseth, 2001: 185). The conflict which ensued between the West and the East, although essentially an ideological struggle, featured a strong military contingent (Balaam & Veseth, 2001: 185).

According to Hettne and Söderbaum (1998: 6), old regionalism began in the 1950s and should be understood within a particular context and time, namely that of the Cold War period. The previously mentioned bipolar structure dominating the world, moulded old regionalism into a concept with a simple and narrow focus on trade agreements and security alliances (Hettne & Söderbaum, 1998: 7). Old regionalism was imposed from above and outside, and was also referred to as hegemonic regionalism (Hettne, 1998: 7).

Although trade agreements and security alliances were both examples of old regionalism during that period, they constituted different organisations. Defence alliances were formed by the superpowers without yielding to any international organisations, while trade agreements took their mandate from the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) formed in 1947, and secondly from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).

From the perspective of the developing world, or states commonly referred to in that period as Third World countries, regionalism of the Cold War period was
Initially, closed regionalism was practised in developing the South through the protection of infant industries against the North, using national and regional barriers (Handley, 1998: 13). Only once industries were strong and resistant enough to compete in the global world, would the barriers be discarded. The attempt of development through protectionism did not succeed, however, and gave rise to industries even more unsuited for competing in the global economy (Handley, 1998: 3).

This economic protectionism, coupled with the ideological political diversion of the Cold War, led to the ineffectiveness and ultimate failure of old regionalism (Handley, 1998: 3). Although there was a preliminary opposition of GATT by UNCTAD, the failure of protectionist policies made the latter less confrontational. At present UNCTAD co-operates fully with the World Trade Organisation (WTO), which is the successor of GATT.

Another element of old regionalism, was the introduction of functional co-operation on specific economic issues. Breytenbach (1999: 70-71) makes reference to functional co-operation as a 'loose' type of regional co-operation, with states acting as primary members. This loose co-operation was characterised by the creation of multipurpose organisations, such as the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) formed in 1963, that concerned themselves with broad aims and activities, linking political and military matters, with economic and social issues (Bennett, 1995: 236).

Breytenbach (1999: 71) explains, however, that functional co-operation, which took the form of regional co-operation, constituted only one end of the spectrum.
Tighter market integration, characterised by the formation of customs unions and common markets, represented the other neo-functionalist end (Breytenbach, 1999: 71), and marked the beginning of the new wave of regionalism.

This new regionalism, although also state-driven took its mandate from the authority of GATT, as opposed to that of the UN (Breytenbach, 1999: 71). This occurred as a result of a movement from functional co-operation towards neo-functional co-operation, which resulted in, not only tighter forms of cohesion, but also in an increased emphasis on multilateral and regional projects (Balaam & Veseth, 2001: 218).

Regional organisations concerned with economic and security issues, were now accountable to the WTO and the UN respectively. This evoked a certain incompatibility, because a single arrangement would have to adhere to the principles of the WTO regarding economic issues, whilst at the same time follow the principles of the UN when addressing security concerns.

Nevertheless, old regionalism faded away in the 1970s and was replaced by this new wave, which began emerging in the mid-1980s (Hettne & Söderbaum, 1998: 6). As with old regionalism, the new phenomenon is both shaped and induced by the prevalent world structure, which at present is characterised by the “interrelated structural transformation of the global system” (Hettne & Söderbaum, 1998: 6). The time period as well as the content of regionalism has changed dramatically, and it continues to be a process still very much in the making.

Contrary to the specific and simplistic nature of old regionalism, new regionalism is a world-wide phenomenon that is taking place in many areas of the world (Hettne & Söderbaum, 1998: 7). Hettne and Söderbaum define the new regionalism approach as, “implying the change of a particular region from relative heterogeneity to increased homogeneity with regard to a number of dimensions,
the most important being culture, security, economic policies and political regimes...convergence along these dimensions may be a natural process or politically steered or, most likely, a mixture of the two" (Hettne & Söderbaum, 1998: 7).

In other words new regionalism is more multifaceted, extending over many perimeters in a region, which results in change and modification of that region. Furthermore, the process occurs concurrently at various levels of analysis (Hettne & Söderbaum, 1998: 7). This is reiterated by Marchand et al (1999: 902), who state that regionalisation takes place simultaneously at three levels, namely the world system, the inter-regional sphere, and the internal pattern of a single region. This has resulted in a system of diversified patterns of interaction (Marchand et al, 1999: 904), also known as ‘variable geometry’.

Furthermore, a separation of ideology and empirical process is also of relevance. The term regionalism would pertain to the ideology of regionalism, namely the "urge for a regionalist order" (Hettne & Söderbaum, 1998: 9). Regionalisation indicates the actual empirical process. It is important to understand that regionalism as an ideology can exist without a parallel process of regionalisation, and visa versa (Hettne & Söderbaum, 1998: 9). As far as the process of regionalisation is concerned, Handley (1998: 2) makes the definition more concrete by stating that the process is implemented through the introduction and implementation of the same policies in a region, and may lead to a larger political and economic unit.

While examining the concept of regionalism, it is important to ascertain what is meant by the word ‘region’. A region is determined in relation to the degree to which it constitutes a distinct identity or unity, and how this unity allows it to discern itself from other areas or regions (Hettne & Söderbaum, 1998: 10). If the process converges in more than one field, as Hettne and Söderbaum (1998: 10) maintain, it’s distinctiveness increases and the region is more discernible.
Marchand et al (1999: 900), state that with deepening co-operation among regional actors, 'region-ness' or 'regionality' will emerge. This occurs because convergence in certain spheres, which is defined as being cultural affinity, political regimes, security arrangements or economic policies, allows the region to develop a relative sameness. The more spheres experience this sameness, the more the region will develop a particular identity, which ultimately results in the creation of a regional identity. Hettne and Söderbaum (1998: 10) echo this very thought by stating that “when different processes of regionalisation in various fields converge within the same area, the distinctiveness of the region in question, that is the level of regionness, increases”.

Hettne and Söderbaum’s (1998: 7) definition also focuses on the instigation of the process, and they conclude that although it can be directed from above, it will most likely be a mixture of the former, combined with spontaneous causes emerging from the region itself. One defining characteristic of new regionalism is that the process includes a multitude of actors from state and non-state sectors.

New regionalism has begun to recognise that regional interactions and organisations should not only focus on states (Marchand et al, 1999: 897). Marchand et al maintain that along with governments, civil societies and business sectors are adding to the growing multidimensional group of actors involved in the process (Marchand et al, 1999: 897). Although, governments are almost always actively involved in regionalisation, actors from these other spheres are becoming equally important (Marchand et al, 1999: 900), and could ultimately become the ‘drive’ behind the process.

The many regionalisms and regionalisations, result in competing definitions of regions. Söderbaum (1998: 76-77) clarifies this confusion to a certain extent, by defining the Southern African region. He affirms that a certain amount of flexibility must be maintained in the description, and therefore outlines the region with a
minimum and a maximum definition, the former referring to the SACU area, and the latter referring to the SADC area (Söderbaum, 1998: 76-77).

SADC is considered the maximum because it reaches beyond the geographical borders of Southern Africa by including Mauritius and the Seychelles, for example (Söderbaum, 1998: 77). Actual practices are also important considerations in determining the confines of a region, because informal actions contribute to increased regional interaction as much as formal ones (Marchand et al, 1999: 905-906).

2.1.2 Regionalisation and Globalisation

The new wave of regionalism is not the only phenomenon that has been gaining momentum and scope in the international sphere. Handley (1998: 1-2), refers to two parallel developments that are defining the current world structure, namely globalisation and regionalisation. The relationship between regionalisation and globalisation is important to consider, not only because both forces are prominent, but also because they appear to be contradictory.

A rapidly globalising world has, in the past decade, seen a liberalisation of markets through an astonishing increase in the mobility of trade and finance across national borders (Marchand et al, 1999: 898), driven by the multilateral rules of the WTO on the one hand, and the role of multinational corporations on the other. Together with a transfer of knowledge and technology, the world is no longer defined or inhibited by geographic location, but has become rather 'borderless' (Hettne, 1998: 48). Regionalism, on the other hand, can be explained as an instrument to enhance or protect the role of the state (Hettne & Söderbaum, 1998: 8).

Hettne and Söderbaum (1998: 8), however, view this relationship as being more 'symbiotic' than contradictory. They term the new regionalism approach as being
extroverted, and not inward looking as that of the old approach. Although the new approach may in fact enhance the role of the state, in antithesis to the old protectionist regionalism, the approach is globally orientated (Hettne & Söderbaum, 1998: 8-10). This is referred to as 'open regionalism' and constitutes one way, that states can cope with global transformation.

The new regionalism approach can indeed be viewed as a mechanism for states to address challenges, brought on by a rapidly globalising world. In an attempt to prevent marginalisation, that would otherwise occur due to a lack of resources or power from an individual national level, states 'pool sovereignty' in order to increase their capacity in the global world (Hettne & Söderbaum, 1998: 8). States recognise that unless goods are competitive in the global market place, they are not worth making (Clapham, 1998: 24-15). Promoting competitiveness is thus essential, and far easier through joint initiatives by states. The global political economy is indeed becoming globalised, but at the same time regionalised to address the daunting challenges of the former (Marchand et al, 1999: 898).

2.1.3 Classifying Regionalism

In his article on new regionalism in Southern Africa, Söderbaum (1998: 76) maintains that it is not always the levels of regional co-operation that are important, but rather the reasons and manner in which co-operation takes place. The conceptualisation of regionalism is, however, so complex and intricate, that many different types of regionalisms occur. To make identification and assessment easier, the various types of regionalisms should be divided into specific categories.

Hettne and Söderbaum (1998: 12-14) identify five main categories of regionalism namely, intergovernmental regional co-operation, state-promoted regional economic integration, market and society induced regionalisation, regional convergence and coherence, and finally, regional identity. The first two
categories are formally state induced initiatives, while the third category is more informal and undirected. The categories indicate convergence ranging from least to most, beginning with the first category, namely co-operation and ending with the fifth, namely regional identity, encompassing state, market and civil society.

Co-operation is essentially functional and project orientated (Breytenbach, 1999: 71), and refers to collaboration through practical and technological means in non-political spheres (Marchand et al, 1999: 901). Functionalists believe that an ever-increasing amount of economic and social co-operation, will eventually promote interaction and common values in the political arena (Bennett, 1995: 16-17). Loose regional co-operation among states is an example of functionalism, and is characterised by organisations, councils, committees and associations (Breytenbach, 1999: 71).

Integration is market orientated and based on various degrees of free-trade (Breytenbach, 1999: 71). Integration begins with tariff reductions that may result in preferential trade agreements (PTA), free trade areas (FTA), customs unions, common monetary areas and common markets. States, the primary members of regional organisations, may ultimately form a single currency bloc. This would result in a conceding of sovereignty, and the possibility of economic and political supranational institutions, such as parliaments, central banks and courts of justice (Breytenbach, 1999: 70). These various stages of market integration and political supranationalism, are part of neo-functionalism, because they exhibit tighter forms of coherence than functional co-operation.

Bennett (1995: 235-236) identifies four main groups of regional organisations, based on the nature and scope of their functioning, and the degree of integration that is sought. The first of these are the multipurpose organisations, so labeled, because they have broad ('loose') aims and activities concerning not only political and military matters, but economic and political concerns as well
Examples of multipurpose organisations would include the OAU, the League of Arab States, and the Council of Europe of 1949.

Alliance-type organisations, the second group, are those with military and political orientations, whose main concerns are to provide security against external actors. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the Warsaw Pact are defence alliances that fall into this category (Bennett, 1995: 236). The third group encompasses functional organisations, whose main concerns are to promote ('tighter') economic, social or political co-operation, with little or no interest in security matters. This group includes SADC, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the European Coal and Steel Community of 1952 and the European Community of 1957 (Bennett, 1995: 236-238).

The fourth group is that of United Nations Regional Commissions, placed in a distinct category, due to the fact that regional commissions form a link between the universal and regional systems, and promote universal objectives in specific geographical areas, thus fitting into no other category (Bennett, 1995: 236).

Regarding regional integration, Olivier (2001: 41) identifies two broad categories. The first is characterised by Ernst Haas as "a process whereby a new institutional centre is established, one that replaces previously existing sovereign states". This leads to supranationalism in a region. The second form of regional integration is easier to establish because it does not demand the relinquishing of sovereignty, but rather requires states to increase compatibility concerning major values. This type of integration, referred to by Karl Deutsch as a "pluralistic security community", requires governments to accommodate each other's needs and behaviours.

Van Nieuwkerk (2001: 3) refers to regional security communities, as a conception of regionalism that became prominent during the 1950s and 1960s. The understanding behind regional security communities is based on the liberal
school of thought, and is expressed through regional integration theory. Although there was never any formal link between integration and security, a connection was established through two central ideas.

The first is the notion of spillover, prominent in functionalist theory, which advocates that if regional groups can successfully foster economic integration, regional actors will learn, over time, to resolve conflicts peacefully and co-operate on security issues (Van Nieuwkerk, 2001: 3-4). This would then lead to regional security. The second of the two central ideas, security community, refers to the end product of such integration. If regional actors can successfully integrate to the point where the group develops strong and stable institutions and practices, it could assure stable expectations of peaceful change within its population (Van Nieuwkerk, 2001: 4). This will lead to a security community, as referred to by Deutsch.

Whatever the type of regional integration, coherence along one or more dimensions in a region will ultimately lead to regional convergence and coherence. This process, according to Hettne and Söderbaum (1998: 13-14), can be recognised by two primary occurrences. The first is when a region as a whole plays a defining role in the relations of the rest of the world, and the second is when the region serves as the organising basis across a wide range of issues within the region.

Finally, a distinction between formal and informal interaction should be made, and the influence of both must be analysed. As mentioned previously, informal relations in a region, refers to activities such as daily border movement and focuses on ordinary people and their actual daily activities.

In contrast, geographical proximity, and formal political and economic co-operation, make up the other end of the spectrum. It is obviously easier to record and analyse the latter, but both processes have an impact on regional
connections (Marchand et al, 1999: 905-906). Informal regionalisms, or “strong trans-state flows”, are consequential because they may undermine formal co-operation schemes (Van Nieuwkerk, 2001: 3).

2.2 The Security Approach

2.2.1 A Changing Concept

The notion of security has changed tremendously over the past few decades, and the conventional definition, centering around the military-political perspective, has been replaced by new approaches (Van Aardt, 1993: 82). According to Buzan (1991: 18), security can be defined as “the pursuit of freedom from threat” and this in essence, is the broadest sense of security. With this as the foundation, Van Aardt (1996: 19) explains that the concept of security, demands a revision in every era and should in fact be continuously altered, because “changing conditions and circumstance influence the content given to security”. What may be a serious threat to security now, could have been inconsequential in the past.

The conventional approach to security has become largely irrelevant particularly for the developing world. Van Nieuwkerk (2001: 82) writes that Africa’s people continue to suffer from a multitude of threats to their security, such as poverty and underdevelopment, and unless adequate attention is granted to these particular threats, security arrangements in the region will remain ineffective. Van Aardt (1993: 84) echoes this thought by stating that a one-dimensional focus on security in Africa will never take into account the many crises being experienced throughout the continent. Civil unrest, migration, diseases, drought, unemployment and famine are only some of the problems she mentions that pose a threat to the developing world.
Traditionally, security focused almost exclusively on states and their military concerns (Booth, 1994: 3), and conventional definitions of the concept centred around national security and defence. Buzan (1991: 16) cites other academics to reiterate this point. Michael Louw, for example, defines national security as including traditional defence policy, as well as non-military actions of a state, while Giacomo Luciani states that "national security may be defined as the ability to withstand aggression from abroad" (Buzan, 1991: 17).

The Cold War period, fuelled by realist thinking advocated the prominence of the state (Buzan, 1991: 21), which emphasised national security, war, balance of power and defence alliances, and coined phrases such as 'mutually assured destruction', 'flexible response' and 'containment' (Ngubane & Solomon, 2002: 58). The state was the primary referent of security, and required a military-centred paradigm to achieve its objectives.

The conventional notion of security, although dominant throughout the twentieth century, has been challenged by alternative approaches from as early as 1705 (Ngubane & Solomon, 2002: 58). German Philosopher Leibniz asserted the need for a state to provide common security for its citizens, while French philosopher Montesquieu, stated that true political freedom would only occur if people were secure (Ngubane & Solomon, 2002: 58).

Since then a broader conceptualisation, recognising non-military threats to security, has been propagated by several academics. McNamara proposed a definition of security that did not solely focus on military stability. His argument was that "security is development, and without development there can be no security" (Van Aardt, 1993: 2). Galtung, in turn, identified four major threats, namely war, hunger, repression and eco-disaster (Van Aardt, 1993: 82). The United Nations acknowledged as early as 1980, that military strength alone cannot provide real security (Van Aardt, 1993: 83).
Buzan (1991: 19-20) identifies five major threat categories that, as he expressed, affect the security of human collectives. These are military, political, economic, societal and environmental. Van Aardt (1993: 92) adds a sixth dimension to Buzan's list, namely development security, which according to her is of utmost importance to Southern Africa. She defines development security as tackling the extensive poverty, inequality and unemployment within the region by means of a concerted development and investment programme. She also states that development and environmental security are the two dimensions that are the basis of building and sustaining (Van Aardt, 1993: 92).

Ken Booth (1994: 5) argues, that the dilemma of traditional definitions of security, was that they equated security with state security, while Buzan elaborated that state security was often achieved at the expense of human security particularly in the developing world (Ngubane, 2002: 60).

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Peter Vale (1994: 4) asserts that security should be understood as security for the people, and that development should focus directly on and be woven around people, both as groups and as individuals. The economic, political and social dimensions of the individual, the family, communities, local and national life, and the international community should all be taken into account in order to elaborate on the concept of security (Gumbi, 1994: 16).

These dimensions broadening the concept of security, are not only important for finding possible solutions to conflict, but are also of importance when considering causes of conflict. Greg Mills (1994: 4) writes that there are few conditions of insecurity on the African continent that are of a "direct external military nature".

Factors creating conditions of civil unrest include environmental and agricultural degradation, drought, diseases such as AIDS and malaria, refugee crises, ethnic conflicts, civil strife and famine, corruption and mismanagement, and enormous debt burdens (Mills, 1994: 5). Mills' (1994: 4) extensive list mentions many
serious internal and non-military threats facing Africa, that may result in conditions of insecurity, and will, no doubt, have an enormous impact on conflict management in the future.

Similarly, natural resources are increasingly becoming causes of conflict on the continent. In her illustration of the importance of environmental security, Van Aardt (1993: 92-93) refers to the urgent need for water, which is so heavily in demand that it is becoming an even scarcer resource, and will therefore require adequate management so as to prevent future conflict over its demand and supply.

Van Wyk (1998: 14) reiterates the same notion of water availability and its contribution to regional instability. She emphasises that because no society can survive without water, coupled with the fact that water almost always crosses international boundaries and tends to be unevenly distributed, makes it an important regional security issue, one that is often neglected (Van Wyk, 1998: 11).

Although, as Turton (2000: 166) explains water wars have been rare, "the connection between water and political instability" is not. There is a great deal of conflict, or potential conflict, over water resources (Turton, 2000: 166). Since water is a migrant commodity, joint dependency on rivers indicates that the national security of all states is linked, and security from the traditionally national perspective needs to be revised (Van Wyk, 1998: 11-12).

In addition to water, other natural resources have gained a primary position in situations of conflict. Reno (2001: 3) writes that economic interests have become very dominant in post-Cold War conflicts, and that state resources are often used by many rulers as a means to retain power.
Evidently Southern Africa at present, is confronted by a series of threats that transcend the conventional notion of security. These threats are no longer reflective of the realism school that emphasises state-based security, but transcend from liberal thinking, which advocates human security as the principle focus. In order to successfully resolve these threats, national governments and regional security arrangements should take the new security approach into account, and identify and address all threats to human security.

The new approach should not, however, reject military or political dimensions, but recognise that all six dimensions are equally important in attaining ultimate security in any region. Buzan (1991: 16) notes that the various threats to security exist alongside one another, and need to be equally considered.

Mills (1994: 8-9) demonstrates that economic development, for example, is not necessarily a guarantee for security. According to him the reverse is true, namely that regional economic integration is dependent on political and military stability. In other words, all dimensions of security are linked and must be considered simultaneously in order to remove situations of insecurity.

This type of liberalist thinking, emphasising the importance of the individual rather than focusing exclusively on the state, led to a realisation of the need to link security with economic and political co-operation. The Helsinki Accord of 1975, the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (Dugard, 2001: 241), included principles guiding, not only co-operation, but also relations among states, fundamental freedoms and human rights (Bennett, 1995: 398). It propagated the need to develop economic co-operation and security matters simultaneously and not in isolation. This would require the acceptance of a multi-level, multidimensional concept of security. (Van Aardt, 1993: 93).
2.2.2 Human Security

In striving towards a multi-level and multidimensional approach to security, an important consideration is for whom this security is intended. Van Aardt (1996: 23) states that the question of "whose security?" should be answered unequivocally with "security of people". By making people the primary focus of security, it will not only allow for a broadening of the concept to include non-military threats, but will also make it possible to identify the complex relations between the various threats (Ngubane & Solomon, 2002: 60).

Nowadays, incumbents and academics concerned with issues of security agree that security is "about and for people", and that states or national governments should no longer be the main recipients of security (Van Aardt, 1996: 23). This broader human security approach, which began emerging in the post-Cold War era, is particularly relevant to the developing world, such as Southern Africa, where security revolves around problems of promoting and sustaining development (MacLean, 1999: 943).

The state's role in the provision and control of security is never completely reduced, however, and although human security should be striven for, the state remains a crucial actor in the process. However, if the state is no longer the primary focus it should not, in actual fact, be allowed to act without influences from civil society and those it is aiming to protect.

Also the broadening of the security approach, in many instances, is due to present day internal domestic conflicts which point to the fact that states themselves are sources of insecurity (Söderbaum, 1998: 80). This "new security dilemma" as referred to by Van Nieuwkerk (2001: 1), occurs because states are individually inadequately equipped to deal with transnational and international developments. State-centric regional co-operation could, therefore, become completely obsolete.
A strong civil society, is thus essential, one developed and independent enough to act as a 'watchdog' over the performance of the state (Van Aardt, 1996: 24). In an earlier article Van Aardt (1993: 93) also expresses the significance of a bottom-up approach that would start with developmental and environmental security. According to her, a more inclusive approach to security entails a bottom-up perspective as opposed to the top-down approach in conventional thinking (Van Aardt, 1993: 93).

Sandra MacLean (1999: 943) writes that a well developed civil society is crucial for any realistic efforts to build peace in Southern Africa. She states that regional dynamics have been part of the tension in many cases of conflict in Southern Africa and therefore play an important role in the solution (MacLean, 1999: 945-946).

Coupled with this, Southern Africa has turned towards regional affiliations as possible protective strategies against growing economic and social insecurities. According to MacLean (1999: 945), a regional solution will only be effective, however, if a certain amount of 'regionness' is attained. Regionness as discussed previously, is what emerges through deeper co-operation between regional actors (Marchand et al, 1999: 900). Convergence along various dimensions in a region may result in a regional identity (Marchand et al, 1999: 900) and allows for smoother regional action.

There are of course many factors that may impede on regionness such as inequalities amongst countries (Mills, 1994: 9) in a particular region, or incompatible values (Olivier, 2001: 41). This is why the strengthening of civil society is so important. The activities of non-governmental organisations (NGO), for example, are often most effective when co-ordinated at the regional level and may, therefore, advance the quality of regionness (MacLean, 1999: 949).
Civil society may contribute to regionness, through NGOs that are directly involved with or advocate a regional approach to security. Others that are not directly involved with security issues, but pool their expertise and resources from an entire region, or organise regionally for regional benefits, also establish and strengthen regional bonds. Regionness can also be enforced through civil society, when external actors deal with NGOs on a regional basis due to economies of scale (MacLean, 1999: 948).

2.3 Assessment

After conceptualising regionalism and security, and ascertaining the new approaches to both concepts, a link can be formed between the two.

The new wave of regionalism points to a convergence along various dimensions in a region, which illustrates a greater affinity towards regional co-operation and ultimately integration, unlike old regionalism that was merely concerned with simple trade agreements and defence alliances. Within the realm of new regionalism, regional organisations are more willing to co-operate and integrate, which may lead to a certain amount of regionness, and the eventual development of converging stances on certain matters. It must be remembered, however, that while co-operation is easily achievable among partners sharing a common system of values and the same level of development, this is not so when significant differences are evident (Solomon & Cilliers, 1996: 26).

Achieving a common regional stance, is precisely what is required for a working security agenda for the region, especially considering the new threats to human security that are imminent in Southern Africa. Serious issues, such as stateless people, refugees, and illegal immigrants go beyond the conventional confines of security because they transcend national borders. Threats to security can originate internally from within a region, and not solely arise from external danger. At the same time, the continent is experiencing wars of an interstate and
intrastate nature, which suggests that both states and their populations are in danger. A broader, regional approach to security is necessary, since states are no longer capable of protecting their citizens individually (Solomon & Cilliers, 1996: 6), and should not, therefore, remain the primary recipients of security.

Solomon and Cilliers (1996: 6) assert that by making people the primary referent of security, it becomes possible to identify threats to human security at sub-national, national and transnational levels. This is particularly important since a great deal of threats facing Southern Africa are of a regional nature. Common regional security will not be possible, unless it is pursued jointly by all states in the region in a multilateral and co-ordinated method (Van Aardt, 1993: 89). Intimate and co-ordinated regional co-operation is necessary for the provision of security, because of the mutual needs of people across state borders.

Regional security arrangements must give attention to regional threats if they desire to be successful in the provision of security and stability. To this end, state-centric regional co-operation is becoming obsolete, because regional solutions to new security threats will only be effective if regionness is attained. This cannot be done through regional state co-operation alone.

New regionalism recognises that regional interaction should not only focus on states but on all spheres, and that informal practices also contribute to regionness. In this regard, new regionalism is inseparable from new security, because of the comparability between both concepts on the views of the importance of civil society. In many cases the nature and sources of problems, like the responses, are regional, and internal conflict situations have important regional and civil society dimensions (MacLean, 1999: 945-946).
The proposition of a regional security arrangement for Southern Africa is of utmost importance, but it would have to be one that works towards regional co-operation and ultimately integration, and seriously comprehends and follows the principles of a broader approach to security.

There are no doubts as to the many advantages that regional economic co-operation holds for participating states. In Southern Africa, the importance of economic co-operation and integration are manifold. Integration can expand trade and enlarge local markets, as well as allow increased efficiency in the industrial sector by taking advantage of economies of scale. As far as investment is concerned, regional integration permits countries with small scale economies to pool resources and attract large-scale foreign direct investment (Editorial African Security Review, 2001: 1).

The question remains whether regional economic co-operation can successfully transpire into regional security initiatives, and whether the latter holds similar advantages as the former. An initial response to these questions is illustrated in the Kampala Declaration of 1991 adopted by the OAU in 2001, which states that security, stability and development in Africa are so interconnected, that only a simultaneous effort, albeit difficult and complicated, will provide a resolution of the issues (Mills, 1994: 12). Economic growth in any given country is dependent on the resolution of threats pertaining to unstable economic and political systems in the region (Mills, 1994: 10).

Addressing security and development simultaneously, the objective of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), is an arduous task, and one that will not be achieved through the capabilities of an individual state. Joint initiatives, will bring more success. Regional co-operation and integration is also significant, because internal problems spill over into neighbouring states, causing problems for regions in their entirety (Olivier, 2001: 43).
Furthermore, a higher level of regionness implies a lower degree of conflict because of increasing co-operative relations (Hettne & Söderbaum, 1998: 19). In the developing world, where conflict and development feed on each other, regional co-operation for development would reduce the level of conflict, and stability would allow for further development co-operation.

With Africa's ingrained belief in unity, regional integration should be "an almost natural policy choice" and a pragmatic method of tackling social and security issues, as well as a vital building block towards a more extensive pan-African ideal (Olivier, 2001: 40-43). Looking at various regional security initiatives in Southern Africa, however, points to a past characterised by mixed results.

Regional co-operation remains important to adequately address security threats currently present in Southern Africa. Chapter 3 examines the United Nations, the world's only organisation concerned with the maintenance of international peace and security, and also Southern Africa's only regional organisation equipped to deal with security issues. A general background of these organisations is presented to ascertain how they function, and how they are integrated in the global security arena. Furthermore an attempt is made to determine whether these two organisations advocated and followed broader security threats, and whether, in the case of SADC, regional co-operation in terms of new regionalism prevailed.
Chapter 3:
Security Structures in Southern Africa

3.1 The United Nations

3.1.1 Collective Security: the Charter of the United Nations

The end of World War I strengthened the idea of a universal collective security system (Van Nieuwkerk, 2001: 3). Collective security, as broached in chapter 2, assumes that all nations share a primary interest in maintaining peace, and that threats to peace anywhere, should be the responsibility of all members of the international system (Fetherson, 1994: 144), which should promote co-operation through international organisations, and not through defence alliances. For collective security to work effectively certain conditions are therefore necessary.

The most important of these is a commitment on the part of all members of the international community to place the maintenance of peace above all other interests, whether national or bilateral. The emphasis is on multilateralism. Members must be able to reach consensus on the initial co-ordination of the system, as well as on later collective agreements when identifying situations which threaten the peace, and be able to organise subsequent responses.

Universality is a significant and necessary characteristic of the system, because it increases the available resources within the organisation. More importantly, with a larger membership, it becomes harder for any single and powerful state to defy the collective (Fetherson, 1994: 144-146). In other words, bilateralism, or even worse, unilateralism, is disapproved in any system of collective security.

The League of Nations proved unsuccessful, but a second attempt was made at the end of World War II, and the UN, was formed in 1945, to promoted idealist principles and a collective security system (Van Nieuwkerk, 2001: 3).
Article 1 (1) of the United Nations Charter states that the primary purpose of the UN is "to maintain international peace and security" by means of "effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace" (Malan, 1997: 16). "Conformity with the principles of justice and international law" is also expected by members in order to bring about "adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace" (Malan, 1997: 16).

Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations states that members are prohibited from the use and threat of the use of force (Dugard, 2001: 413). Excluding the few exceptions such as anticipatory, responsive or collective self-defence, humanitarian intervention, and defence of nationals, states cannot exercise the use of force against another sovereign without the authorisation of the Security Council (Dugard, 2001: 413-425).

The Security Council, consisting of five permanent and 10 non-permanent members, holds the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security (Charter of the United Nations, articles 23 & 24). The powers granted to the Security Council are laid down in Chapters VI, VII, VIII, and IX, and members of the UN agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council (Charter of the United Nations, articles 24 & 25). Article 27 states that all decisions on non-procedural matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members, but this has to include the concurring votes of the permanent members (Charter of the United Nations, articles 27).

Chapter VI of the UN Charter, concerned with the peaceful settlements of disputes, declares in article 33 that parties to any dispute, which may endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall firstly "seek a solution by negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their
choice" (Charter of the United Nations, article 33). If parties fail to settle disputes through peaceful means, article 37 indicates that they shall refer it to the Security Council (Charter of the United Nations, article 37).

The Security Council is permitted to take legally binding decisions under article 25 directing member states to impose economic sanctions or to use force to maintain international peace (Dugard, 2001: 402). The Security Council determines under article 39 of Chapter VII, whether a particular situation constitutes a "threat to peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression" (Dugard, 2001: 403). Article 41 authorises the Security Council to direct member states to take measures not involving the use of force to implement decisions (Dugard, 2001: 404). Should article 41 be inadequate or insufficient in resolving situations, article 42 provides that the Security Council may use "...air, sea or land forces...to maintain or restore international peace and security" (Dugard, 2001: 405).

The Secretary General of the UN has an important role to play, particularly in the promotion of certain issues through addresses, and the submission of reports to the Security Council (Annan, 2000: 1). Dag Hammarskjold was very involved in promoting peace in the DRC. Boutros Boutros Ghali was responsible for the adoption of the concept of peace-building (or post-war reconstruction, such as landmine clearance) by the UN in 1991. More recently, Kofi Annan has been working towards peace in Africa and at his insistence the Security Council has often been required to take action. It was during his term that MONUC was deployed in the DRC in 2001.

3.1.2 Accommodation of Regional Arrangements in the UN Charter

Regional organisations can be accepted as collective security organisations in some of their functions (Fetherson, 1994: 145). This depends on whether they incorporate the fundamental conditions of consensus and commitment to peace
and collective response. Also the membership should encompass most states in the region, and attention should be directed against threats from within the region rather than from the outside.

Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter, was designed specifically to deal with regional arrangements. Although the contribution that regional organisations can make in the maintenance of international peace and security has been accepted and deemed important, in practice regional bodies are primarily concerned with economic and social issues (Bennett, 1995: 233). Furthermore, Chapter VIII has not been amended since the inception of the organisation and remains poorly developed (Malan, 1997: 16). The fundamental provisions concerning regional arrangements in the Charter, are found in only three articles (Bennett, 1995: 233), which hardly constitutes the decisiveness that is in fact required.

"Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security...provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations" (Charter of the United Nations, article 52).

In fact, as specified in the previous section, parties to disputes are encouraged to use regional or any other means of their choice to resolve local disputes, before referring them to the Security Council (Charter of the United Nations, article 33). But if, and when enforcement action is required for the settling of such disputes, the matter must be referred to the Security Council for the granting of authorisation (Charter of the United Nations, article 53).

Article 54 further specifies that the Security Council "shall be kept at all times informed of activities undertaken or in contemplation under regional arrangements or by regional agencies for the maintenance of international peace and security" (Charter of the United Nations, article 54).
Article 51, as mentioned in the preceding chapter, declares that states have the right to take measures against armed attack for collective as well as individual self-defence. Although no specific mention of regional arrangements is made in this article, the reference to collective self-defence has allowed for the creation and use of regional organisations in matters of collective security (Bennett, 1995: 234). Article 51 does emphasise the authority of the Security Council in matters of self-defence, but the article has, as Bennett (1995: 235) argues, "become an escape-hatch from the obligations of universalism toward a revival of an alliance system contributing to the...fragmentation of any potential global unity".

The difference between collective security and collective defence is that, although both are types of sub-regional security co-operation, the former refers to member states seeking to prevent conflict between each other, while in the latter states ally with each other for joint defence against external threats (Van Nieuwkerk, 2001: 88). Defence alliances, such as NATO and the Warsaw Pact, remained prevalent throughout the Cold War period for the reason that even after the establishment of a universal body, such as the United Nations, states were still reluctant to relinquish their sovereignty (Fetherson, 1994: 147).

Hegemonic regionalism, which emphasised the role that great powers could play in ensuring peace and security, remained dominant throughout the Cold War period (Van Nieuwkerk, 2001: 3), but did not reduce the influence of the UN in matters pertaining to security, or reduce the organisation’s capacity as "perhaps the most influential political body in the world" (Taylor, 1997: 1).

Uncertainty arises, however, due to a lack of explicit reference in the Charter to either peacekeeping or peace support operations (Malan, 1997: 16). In fact as Ogden (2000: 33) writes, the UN was not designed for peacekeeping and its strengths lie in agenda setting, i.e. preventative diplomacy and peace initiatives.
Peacekeeping has only existed since 1956, when UN Peace Keeping Forces (PKF) were sent to act in response to the Suez Crisis (Malan, 1997: 18). The PKFs were introduced by the Secretary General on the insistence of Canada. The term 'peacekeeping' was formalised in 1965, when the UN General Assembly established the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (Malan, 1997: 18). To this day, however, the UN Charter does not refer to PKF.

Coupled with this, the UN failed to establish a United Nations Force as envisaged by article 43, which would have been placed under the command of a Military Staff Committee provided for in article 47 (Dugard, 2001: 405). One reason for the UN's failure to fully develop its peacekeeping potential, was the inefficiency of the Security Council, which resulted from the permanent members' use of the veto right (Malan, 1997: 18). Because no force was established, peace-keeping operations undertaken by the General Assembly and the Security Council have been established in terms of ad hoc agreements between the UN, and contingents from contributing countries (Dugard, 2001: 406-408).

The failure to establish formal UN Forces has also resulted in an inadequate distinction between peacekeeping without the use of force, and enforcement action (Dugard, 2001: 408). UN operations dispatched to maintain peace in war torn areas have had to resort to force for reasons of self-defence, and to provide civilians with humanitarian assistance (Dugard, 2001: 408).

There is also no division of labour among conflict management agencies (Van Nieuwkerk, 2001: 4). Kofi Annan suggests that in order for the UN and the Security Council to maintain their credibility with consistent peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance, it is essential to form a partnership with Africa. (Annan, 2000: 3-4). This would mean point to an association with the OAU/AU, regional and sub-regional organisations, civil society and individuals.
3.1.3 UN Involvement in Southern Africa: Shared Responsibility

The United Nations has launched more peacekeeping operations in Africa, despite the absence of such references in the Charter, than in any other single region (Neethling, 1999: 27). In spite of growing political unwillingness and financial constraints (Vogt, 1999: 52), of the thirty peacekeeping operations established by the UN since 1988, fourteen, or nearly half, have been in Africa (Clapham, 1999: 25). Several operations, such as the ones in Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, Somalia and the DRC, have constituted important initiatives in peacekeeping and conflict resolution (Clapham, 1999: 25).

However, not all of these initiatives met with success. While Namibia and Mozambique were regarded as successes for the UN, Angola, Rwanda and Somalia were dismal failures. The outcome in the DRC is still uncertain, but progress in being made due to the latest South African initiative.

The many unresolved conflicts in Africa far outweighed the UN’s successes, and highlight the organisation’s weakness in areas such as diplomatic arbitration, peacekeeping and peace-enforcing (Neethling, 1999: 27). The UN is fragile and has become over-burdened with greater responsibilities, while constantly struggling with acute financial constraints, as well as the lack of political will (Cilliers, 1999: 150).

The UN should co-operate more effectively with African continental role-players to make peacekeeping operations more successful. The case of ECOMOG (Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group) in Liberia is a good example of co-operation between the UN and a sub-regional organisation, that could form positive foundations for the future (Neethling, 1999: 42) and should be considered by Southern Africa.
The UN now seems prepared to form partnerships with regional organisations, and Africa is, in fact, the first continent where extensive efforts have been made between the UN and the OAU to enhance the management of conflict (Annan, 2000: 4).

It is widely accepted that peacekeeping is essentially a UN responsibility, and any efforts made by regional organisations should conform to rules set out in the UN Charter (Neethling, 1999: 41). Yet regional organisations, whether, political or economic, are obliged to play an active role in regional security (Neethling, 1999: 38). The concept of shared responsibility and a layered response system is considered to be the only way forward in achieving effective conflict management (Malan, 2000: 170-171).

As mentioned, apart from Namibia, the UN’s mission in Mozambique was a success, and the organisation succeeded in bringing the Mozambican peace process to a conclusion by facilitating elections (Aldrich, 2000: 3-4). Among the contributing factors, as identified by Aldrich (2000: 4), two are of particular importance, namely: the confidence of the Mozambican people and government, and the support of the international community who contributed personnel. A willingness by international, regional and national actors to co-operate, and share responsibility, contributed to lasting peace.

Shared responsibility should not only refer to ground operations, but also to decision-making as well, particularly at the higher levels of the UN structure. The restructuring of the Security Council to achieve a fairer representation of developing states, would facilitate greater shared responsibility. It is an issue that is, however, not willingly broached by the present members of the Security Council, but one that is necessary for the UN to assert its moral authority (Mulikita, 2002: 36) and gain credibility in the eyes of the world.
Mulikita (2002: 36) states that there is a persistent suspicion that the UN is not substantially concerned with addressing peace and security challenges in Africa. The official position of the OAU on the reform of the Security Council, is that the present Council is not numerically proportionate to the distribution of General Assembly membership, and that the Council has become an instrument to further the policy interests of the world’s remaining superpower, the United States.

The Security Council’s reluctance to commitment to future peacekeeping operations in Africa (Vogt, 1999: 52), seemingly as a result of financial constraints and a desire to protect their soldiers from unnecessary aggression, is not evident in other areas of the world. Certain Western powers have lacked neither resources nor will, to commit to military involvement in Iraq, for example, in order to secure national oil interests (Mulikita, 2002: 36). Considering that two-thirds of the total UN membership are made up of countries from the developing world (Field, 1998: 1), the UN and its Security Council should think seriously about possible reform to become more representative, and perhaps ultimately more successful.

At this stage, it is worth mentioning the Brahimi Report, which reviews the UN’s peace operations, not only in respect of peace-keeping but also preventative action and post-conflict peace-building. Landsberg (2001: 3-4) writes that the many UN failures, particularly in Africa, led to a serious loss of confidence in UN intervention. The Report is aimed at improving efficiency of UN peace operations and restoring confidence in them.

During a workshop debating the Brahimi Report, two broad views were expressed (Landsberg, 2001: 3). The first, is that the UN should remain responsible for preserving global peace and security, but with a joint African-inspired effort. The second, is that Africa needs to show its own will and capacity to maintain peace, mainly due to the lack of political interest from western powers.
Africa is, however, not equipped to completely disregard UN intervention, and even such a suggestion is not grounded on sound statistics. A division of labour between the UN and sub-regional organisations, as mentioned earlier, would be a better option. The Brahimi Report, however, gives little attention as to the UN’s need to engage with sub-regional organisations, which points to a serious omission (Landsberg, 2001: 4).

3.1.4 UN, Regionalism and Security

The United Nations is still functioning very much according to the ideals of old regionalism and old security. The organisation was state-initiated, and remains state-based. It is therefore dominated by a state-centric approach, which has become obsolete, particularly in the developing world where threats to security are not limited to threats to sovereignty alone.

As previously mentioned, there has been no amendment of the functioning of the UN since its inception. Therefore, there is little chance of the organisation being suited to tackle threats to new security, especially since these new threats do not advocate the state as the primary referent of security. According to the UN, threats of security are is still mainly those that threaten the sovereignty of members states.

The Security Council is made up of 15 member states, who will logically put their national interests ahead of the interests of other states, despite the consequences that their decisions may have on humanity as a whole. Also, the Security Council can be described as “Western driven” (Neethling, 2000: 39-40). Decision-making in the UN does not include civil society, non-governmental organisations, or the business sector, which again points to a state-centric, and therefore, old regionalism and conventional security approach. There is no doubt that although restructuring, effecting the process of decision-making, would be an immense undertaking and definitely long term, it has to be considered if the
organisation is to be accountable to the circumstances of the present global structure. UN peace-building efforts, at least, should involve civil society organisations and local communities (Landsberg, 2001: 4).

States should not be seen as the 'guardians' of a global security system, since as established in the Chapter 2, they have themselves been sources of insecurity, particularly in Southern Africa.

There is no sign that circumstances are changing regarding the state-centric attitude of UN members. In fact, events point in completely the opposite direction, where particularly powerful states are reluctant to act in matters that have no direct national concern for them. The problem with a state-centric disposition is that it is ultimately a hindrance to the UN’s primary goal of the maintenance of international peace and security.

If the UN maintains old regionalism and conventional security practices, it sets the standard for the rest of the world. Also, if this global organisation, to who's principles all regional security organisations must adhere, is entirely state-based and even worse state-centric, how can regional organisations be expected to institute, let alone abide by the rules of a broader human security?

3.2 The Southern African Development Community

3.2.1 Background

The formation of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) was the culmination of a long process, through which the leaders of southern African countries wished to combine resources in order to achieve collective self-reliance (SADC Background, 2002: 1). The relatively small sizes of African economies, saw southern African countries wanting and hoping to achieve faster growth, sustainable development, political stability, and improved welfare in the region,
through an integration of their markets (Ramsamy, 2001: 33). SADC was formerly the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC), which was established in April 1980 to harmonise economic development in southern Africa, but at the same reduce economic dependence on South Africa.

The Declaration Treaty establishing SADC was signed in Windhoek, Namibia in August 1992, and laid down objectives that would:

- achieve development and economic growth, alleviate poverty, enhance the standard and quality of life of the people of Southern Africa and support the socially disadvantaged through regional integration;
- evolve common political values, systems and institutions;
- promote and defend peace and security;
- promote self-sustaining development on the basis of collective self-reliance, and the inter-dependence of Member States;
- achieve complementarity between national and regional strategies and programmes;
- promote and maximise productive employment and utilisation of the resources of the Region;
- achieve sustainable utilisation of natural resources and effective protection of the environment; and
- strengthen and consolidate the long-standing historical, social and cultural affinities and links among the peoples of the Region (SADC Background, 2002: 2).

After South Africa's first fully democratic election, the country became the eleventh member of the SADC group in 1994. Mauritius was admitted in 1995, followed by the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Seychelles in 1997, which constituted the final three to make up the fourteen-strong arrangement (SADC Background, 2002: 1).
The members of SADC are thus: Angola, Botswana, the DRC, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe (SADC Background, 2002: 1).

SADC was to move beyond SADCC’s approach of market integration through project co-ordination, towards a development integration approach in order to address existing inequalities within the region (Meyns, 2002: 62). Such an approach would, however, demand a strengthening of regional institutions (Meyns, 2002: 63-64). National institutions, in the form of Sector Co-ordinating Units (SCU), serving regional goals were, however, not abolished (Meyns, 2002: 64).

Thus, the emphasis from 1992 to 2002 remained on decentralised sectoral development in the implementation of regional policies, projects and programmes (Ramsamy, 2001: 35). Since 1992, some progress in regional governance was made with the establishment of the SADC Free Trade Area, but with national sovereignty at stake, compromises were hard to come by (Meyns, 2002: 77).

The challenge for SADC, is to establish clear goals and strategies that will guide the process of economic integration, remains. It will ultimately become necessary to develop consensus among member states and to mobilise the technical capacity required for deeper regional integration (Ramsamy, 2001: 36).

At this point it is worth mentioning the Lagos Plan of Action of 1980 and the Abuja Treaty of 1991, which created a vision of market integration continentally. The plans proposed regional markets that would combine and form African markets on the analogy of the European model.

The Abuja Treaty was an important strategy for Africa, since it established the African Economic Community (AEC), which would be set up through a process of co-ordination and progressive integration of the existing and future regional
economic communities (REC) in Africa. These REC’s, of which SADC constituted an existing example, were considered the building blocks of the AEC (Constitutive Act of the African Union, 2001: 3).


Although the primary objectives of SADC centre around economic and social aspects, “politics, diplomacy, international relations, peace and security” are listed by the SADC Treaty as one of the major areas of co-operation (Meyns, 2002: 69). De Coning (1997: 12) affirms that most regional organisations, such as SADC, evolved as economic blocs, and had to consider security because it constituted a stumbling block for development.

In July 1994, SADC held a Workshop on Democracy, Peace and Security in Windhoek, in an attempt to broaden SADC’s statute to incorporate political and security concerns (Van Aardt, 1997: 146). At the Gaborone Summit of 1994, the Heads of States and Government issued a document that detailed the institutional structure of "a new sector for Political Co-operation, Democracy, Peace and Security" (Van Aardt, 1997: 146). Two more years of meetings and deliberations, resulted in the founding of the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS) (Van Aardt, 1997: 147).

The subsequent launching of the Organ in June 1996, was executed with the intentions of addressing conflicts through a new security approach (Breytenbach, 2000: 85), where matters of security included socio-economic, political, ecological and military dimensions (Meyns, 2002: 69). Through the establishment of the Organ, to function as part of SADC, security was integrated into existing structures (Meyns, 2002: 70).

The establishment of the Organ, was also seen as a means to address the shortcomings of the SADC summit. The SADC Treaty declares, that the Council
of Ministers, responsible for the functioning and development of SADC and subsequent implementation of policies, is empowered by ministers of economic planning and finance (Brammer, 1999: 21-22). This meant that, unlike the majority of other regional organisations, there was no official forum within the SADC structures for foreign ministers to meet and discuss matters of a regional nature, concerned with promoting and defending regional peace and stability (Brammer, 1999: 1).

The SADC communiqué released on the 26th of June 1996 presented a variety of detailed objectives that demonstrated the way in which the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security would operate (Breytenbach, 2000: 86).

The founding of the Organ saw the start of SADC moving away from its decentralised sectors approach. There were doubts about dealing with sensitive security issues at the technical level of a Sector Co-ordinating Unit and handing it to a single member (Meyns, 2002: 70). The result was the forming of the Organ that would "operate at the summit, ministerial and technical level, independently of other SADC structures, [and] the chairmanship of the Organ shall rotate on an annual and a troika basis" (Brammer, 1999: 1). The troika arrangement meant that the current, immediate past and next chairs, would deliberate on issues pertaining to the operation of the Organ, as well as decisions related to security (Van Aardt, 1997: 152).

The Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC), which had been established at an earlier time, within the former Front Line States (FLS), met annually to discuss security concerns in three sub-committees of SADC, namely: State, Security, Defence and Public Security (Mills, 1994: 8). It became one of the institutions of the Organ on Politics, Security and Defence, acting as an ad hoc secretariat (Tsie, 1998: 1). At the suggestion of the Windhoek Workshop, the Association of Southern African States (ASAS), which replaced the FLS, was also incorporated into the new structure (Van Aardt, 1997: 146-147).
While the SADC Chairperson at that time was President Nelson Mandela of South Africa, President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe became the first Chairperson of the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (Meyns, 2002: 70).

3.2.3 Suspension of the Organ: 1997 - 2001

Despite the laborious process that led to the formation of the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security, by September 1997, barely 15 months after its inception, the Organ had been suspended (Breytenbach, 2000: 85). Several factors can account for the failure of the Organ.

An initial consideration is whether regional economic or development communities can be expected to succeed in their collaborative duties in the security realm. Anthoni Van Nieuwkerk (2001: 9-10) maintains that such an assumption should not be made, and that judging from the experiences of SADC, regional economic arrangements may not be adequately designed to address security threats. "Peace through mutually beneficial co-operation is not inevitable".

Malan (1999: 10) makes a similar point by stating that most sub-regional organisations originated as a result of a need for economic co-operation, and have only recently been expected to address issues of security co-operation and conflict management. This, according to him, has lead to a poor fit between roles and structures, evident in SADC's inability to operationalise its Organ, and the lack of institutionalised crisis prevention and management mechanisms (Malan, 1999: 3-10).

Another primary problem, contributing to the suspension of the Organ, was the vague communique on the institutional framework (Brammer, 1999: 1). This vagueness led to fundamental differences in interpretation of the operational functioning, and certain member states regarded the Organ as being responsible
to the SADC Summit, while others thought the Organ to be independent (Brammer, 1999: 1). Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe, interpreted the communique as meaning that the SADC Organ would operate autonomously, as the FLS had in the past; while President Nelson Mandela, insisted that the intention had always been for the Organ to be an integral part of SADC (Meyns, 2002: 70).

Van Aardt (1997: 151-158) identifies difficulties experienced by the Organ, that occurred due to a lack of structure and direction. Although the Organ placed heavy emphasis on political and diplomatic mechanisms for obtaining peace and security in the region, these mechanisms were least developed in terms of practical implementation and institutional structure, which lead to an informal, reactive response dealing with situations only after they became crises.

This in turn led to another set of problems concerning with early warning system. Because of the preventative diplomacy and disaster relief approach that SADC agreed upon for the Organ, it would have made sense to develop and determine the exact nature of a regional early warning system. This, however, was not done rendering the Organ useless in instituting the new security thinking (Van Aardt, 1997: 154).

Communication on all levels was poorly developed. Not only was there no clearly defined relationship with the OAU and UN, but the links between states were just as weak (Van Aardt, 1997: 153). Also, the lack of connection and formal interaction between the social and economic sectors of SADC, and the political and security sectors of the Organ was formidable, except at the Heads of States level which was located at the summit (van Aardt, 1997: 155-156). References to civil participation was unspecific in the Gaborone document of 1994, and therefore no formal interaction existed between the Organ and civil society (Van Aardt, 1997: 156-157).
Despite the organisation's declaration to "promote the political, economic, social and environmental dimensions of security" and to "encourage popular participation in its decision-making processes", Tsie (1998: 1) states that the new security paradigm had little impact on the approach of SADC to regional security problems. Breytenbach (2000: 88) highlights Goncalves' thoughts, who wrote that he did not believe that the SADC regional security arrangement would survive, because to him the intentions were too militaristic.

Van Nieuwkerk (2001: 89-91) makes the point that SADC's OPDS failed as a result of the suffocating influence of arrogant state elites, and asserts that elites don't want to see a powerful OPDS, so as to protect national interests and advance their own agendas. Hansohm and Peters-Berries (2002: 118) maintain that SADC has, for most of its existence, been "the club of the Heads of State", and that its constitution and structure has allowed for limited participation from non-governmental organisations.

SADC seems to have realised, that the active participation of private business, social, environmental, cultural and other non-state groups, is the only way to make SADC and its various structures function successful, but it will take a concerted effort to fully include civil society in proceedings (Hansohm & Peters-Berries, 2002: 118).

Furthermore, member states have remained reluctant to accept encroachments on their national sovereignty. The fact that SADC was more an inter-government arrangement rather than a supranational body, accounted for its very weakness (Solomon & Cilliers, 1996: 24). This was especially apparent during the SADC intervention of 1998 (De Coning, 2000: 39). King Letsie III dismissed the democratically elected Prime Minister, and in a bid to restore democracy, South Africa, Botswana and Zimbabwe coerced Letsie III to set down in favour of his son, and to reinstate the Prime Minister.
The dilemma lies in the fact that, although it was argued by the South African government that the mission was undertaken under a 1996 SADC decision, there was no explicit decision that SADC should intervene militarily (De Coning, 2000: 42). It now appears that the decision to intervene was taken at a meeting of defence ministers in Gaberone on 15 September 1998, but only South Africa and Botswana were present (De Coning, 2000: 43). The South African government was accused of initiating the intervention in order to safeguard their in the Katse Dam water scheme (Neethling, 2000: 141).

The attitude of the supremacy of sovereignty and national interests was, however, altered during the meeting in Maputo in 1999 (Meyns, 2002: 77). The turning point came when SADC leaders attempted to resolve the deadlock surrounding the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security, and overcoming this deadlock provided the pretext to tackle the reform of all SADC institutions (Meyns, 2002: 77).

Reviewing SADC institutions ultimately led to a replacing of the system of decentralised sector co-ordinating units, with four Directorates at the SADC Headquarters (Meyns, 2002: 76). This decision taken at the Extraordinary Summit held in Windhoek March 2001, can be seen as the culmination of a process, initiated at the time of SADC’s establishment in 1992, to strengthen regional institutions (Meyns, 2002: 77).

3.2.4 The Windhoek Summit and the Blantyre Protocol of 2001

The institutional problems that were prevalent in SADC and its Organ, were not ones that could be altered, and over the past two years SADC has undertaken to restructure its institutions. At a meeting in Windhoek in March 2001, Heads of State and Government adopted proposals for a major restructuring of the organisation, “involving the phasing out of existing commissions and sectors and the establishment of four directorates” (Meyns, 2002: 59).
At this Extraordinary Summit held on 9 March, a "Report on the Review of the Operations of SADC Institutions, including the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security" was adopted (Meyns, 2002: 76-77). It stated that the Troika system would be established for all policy organs, including the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (Meyns, 2002: 77). It was also stressed that the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security would have a clear position within rather than outside the SADC organisation (Hansohm & Peters-Berries, 2002: 109). The report also paid attention to regional integration, the lack of synergy between objectives and strategies, and regional resources.

Furthermore it was decided that the structure, operations and functions of the Organ would be restructured, and regulated by the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security which was submitted to the regular SADC Summit in Blantyre in August 2001 for approval and signature (SADC Background, 2002: 3).

The protocol provides that a plenary ministerial committee will operate below the Organ, together with two additional ministerial-level committees, namely: the ISDSC and a new politics and diplomacy ministerial committee (Berman, 2001: 55). The country that chairs the Organ will also chair the subsidiary structures, and will also provide its secretariat as an interim arrangement (Berman, 2001: 55).

At the Blantyre SADC Summit, Robert Mugabe was "eased out of the chairpersonship of the SADC Organ" (Meyns, 2002: 78). He will continue to be a member of the Troika leadership, with President Chissano of Mozambique as chairperson, and Tanzania's President Mkapa as his deputy (Meyns, 2002: 78).

The Committee of Ministers for the Organ met from the 18th - 19th December 2001 to discuss conflicts in the region. The meeting, which was held in Luanda, Angola, under the Chairpersonship of Hon. Dr Leonardo Santos Simao, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Co-operation of the Republic of Mozambique. Throughout
their discussions about efforts in Angola, the DRC, Lesotho, Zambia and Zimbabwe, it appeared that all were committed to working towards sustainable peace and security (SADC Communiqué, 2001: 1-4).

Van Nieuwkerk (2001: 90) writes that the SADC Organ’s ISDSC is promoting regional confidence-building, through progress with co-operation in areas of disaster management, satellite communications, peacekeeping training and doctrine, and public security issues such as drug trafficking and firearm smuggling. He also maintains that SADC appears to be working well on the technical levels of defence and security.

Apart from the changes in the structure of the Organ, progress has been made in other spheres. SADC ratified the trade protocol and put it into force on 1 September 2000, which together with its more centralised structure, indicate a desire to expand regional integration (Hansohm & Peters-Berries, 2002: 109).

While progress was made at the Windhoek Summit, uneasiness around a number of issues continues. Financing for the Organ’s activities and its potential future peace operations remains an uncertainty (Berman & Sams, 2001: 55). Also the continuing war in the DRC, coupled with the political crises in Zambia and Zimbabwe, are undermining economies and affecting growth (Hansohm & Peters-Berries, 2002: 124-125).

3.2.5 SADC, Regionalism and Security

Economic arrangements may not always be adequately equipped to deal with security issues. Security structures cannot be instituted simply because a region has an effective and competent economic arrangement, and successful economic integration will not necessary lead to successful political integration. Co-operative security bodies can only be established through consent, rather than imposed by threat of force (Cilliers, 1999: 149).
SADC planned to move towards development integration in order to address inequalities in the region. Although some progress in regional government has been made, with national sovereignty at stake, compromises were difficult to reach (Meyns, 2002: 77). Gerrit Olivier (2001: 39) maintains that the lack of success in regional initiatives in Southern Africa, should not be regarded as a fault of the concept, but rather "an indictment against short-sighted politicians and incompetent bureaucrats who never gave [these initiatives] a chance to work properly".

Solomon and Cilliers (1996: 21-27) expressed doubts as to whether Southern Africa even constituted a region. Their doubts, although expressed in 1996, are still relevant. SADC continues to display the characteristics of an inter-governmental government, and advancement towards a transnational body is slow indeed.

National self-interests continue to dominate over collective regional interests. Most importantly, there appears to be little political and economic homogeneity in Southern Africa, and according to Solomon and Cilliers (1996: 22-23), the region does not constitute a security community, such as explained in chapter 2. The region fails to exhibit common values or goals, which was obvious from the varied interpretations of the SADC communiqué establishing the OPDS, for example. Regionness, or a regional identity, is important for a functioning regional security structure, but regionness cannot be established without common values, that could ultimately lead to regional co-operation or regional integration.

Regional co-operation remains important to advance regional security precisely because co-operation follows from common regional views. A regional approach to security, as already established, is necessary to address new threats to security in Southern Africa. A broader security approach would have to be attained through multiple dimensions, including the economic, political and social.
Due to SADC’s state-centric approach, a truly regional option for broader regional and human security may not be impossible. From the Lesotho example it is clear that SADC was not truly co-operating in terms of a regional agenda. It is unacceptable that only two out of the 14 members of SADC, attended a meeting that supposedly decided on the use of military force in the region (De Coning, 2000: 43).

SADC failed to act according to the principles of new security. Although the Organisation and its OPDS, advocated the principles of new security, based on the Helsinki Accord, it failed to do so in practice. Principles for institution of new security approaches were an important part of the communiqué establishing OPDS, but this was only on paper and failed to transpire into the practical. This will be elaborated on in the following chapter, using the DRC as a case study.
Chapter 4:
Southern African Case Study: the Democratic Republic of the Congo

4.1 Assessment of the Conflict

4.1.1 Origins of the Conflict

Exploring the colonial origins of the crisis in the Congo is an attempt to understand why the conflict prevails to this day, and why it has been so difficult to resolve. These initial problems are important to consider because they are continually adding fuel to present-day hostilities, that have serious internal and regional dimensions (Sarkin, 2001: 67).

At the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885, European colonial powers took to carving Africa into colonies without consideration for settlement patterns or the people residing in the region, resulting in extremely heterogenous societies (Sarkin, 2001: 67-68). The borders of the Congo were fixed and King Leopold II of Belgium, who gained control of the area, plundered it for all its worth (Breytenbach et al, 1999: 33-36). This plundering was condoned by other powers, and the Belgian government assumed control in 1908 (Breytenbach et al, 1999: 33-38).

Belgian control, and their subsequent development of a system which led to the introduction of two separated legal systems, one civic and the other ethnic, laid the foundations for a problem that is, to this day, fuelling the DRC conflict (Sarkin, 2001: 68). Civil law was administered by the central state, while local authorities enforced ethnic power through customary law (Sarkin, 2001: 68). The result was a confusion and complexity of laws, that led to dual citizenship, which gave some membership of the state, while others a membership of a native authority. Although everyone was a citizen of the Congo since 1960, not everyone had ethnic citizenship or land rights (Breytenbach et al, 1999: 33-36).
The Banyamulenge, which referred to Tutsis living in the Kivu province of Congo, became a collective name given to all immigrants and refugees, none of whom possessed all the rights, despite having settled in the Congo hundreds of years before independence (Breytenbach et al, 1999: 33-36).

Another issue related to ethnicity, which again continues to be an immense problem today, was one that played the two dominant ethnic group against one another. Throughout the areas of the Congo and surrounding countries of Rwanda and Burundi, the aristocratic Tutsi minority ruled over the Hutu majority (Breytenbach et al, 1999: 34). As Sarkin (2001: 69) explains, ethnicity was not initially a cause for conflict amongst the tribes, and the Tutsi and Hutu were more or less on an equal footing and intermarriage was common. People could “shift” from being in one tribe to being in another, depending on their economic status (Sarkin, 2001: 69). Ethnicity became an issue when used by colonial powers for strategic purposes, an example of which is the Belgian introduction of identity cards that “emphasised a social hierarchy based on ethnicity” (Sarkin, 2001: 68-69).

It is worth noting the situation in the region as a whole. Although Germany colonised Rwanda and Burundi, the Belgians took over administration of the regions in 1916 after WW I, with a mandate from the League of Nations (Sarkin, 2001: 69). While under German control, the situation remained stable and peaceful, and the Germans used existing structures and operations to govern the countries through a system of “indirect rule” (Sarkin, 2001: 69). It was Belgian colonisers, with their system of “divide and rule”, who began the formal classification of Rwandans into racial categories in the 1930s (Sarkin, 2001: 69). These methods of governing entrenched distinctions between the various ethnic groups, and gave some groups more rights and privileges than others, depending solely on racial differences (Sarkin, 2001: 70). Needless to say, it furnished animosity between the groups that remains deeply ingrained, and has resulted in gross violations of human rights and human dignity.
The Belgians continued their policies based on racial distinction until Congo's independence. They managed to further aggravate the situation by initially supporting the Tutsis, and later abandoning their support when the Tutsis began demanding independence in the early 1950s (Sarkin, 2001: 70). The Hutus, as the majority, were the newly favoured group and began excluding the Tutsis from political, social and educational spheres, after having experienced oppression in the Congo and its neighbouring countries, for the past 60 years (Sarkin: 2001: 70).

4.1.2 Present Day Conflict

The conflict in the Congo has been one of the longest and most perplexing on the continent, affecting the bulk of central and southern Africa (Cleaver & Massey, 2001: 193). The DRC has experienced a turbulent civil war, two rebellions and a name change, since 1960.

Congo gained independence in 1960 (Breytenbach et al, 1999: 35) and general elections were held in May of that year, with Patrice Lumumba from the Mouvement National Congolais (MNC) forming the first national government and becoming Prime Minister (Sarkin, 2001: 70).

After independence, the mineral rich province of Katanga declared itself independent, and Lumumba requested the UN to intervene, shortly before being killed at the beginning of 1961 (Sarkin, 2001: 70). Between the years of 1960 and 1963 the Congo was a UN protectorate, and after several years of strife, Mobutu Sese Seko began his 32 year reign after a coup d'état in 1965 (Sarkin, 2001: 70).

Mobutu changed the name of the Congo to Zaire, but failed to introduce any other significant reforms and ruled the country in a militaristic fashion with the Belgian “divide and rule” technique (Sarkin, 2001: 70). In 1981, he passed the Citizenship Law, which once again certified those without ancestors born before
1885 in the Congo region, as civic citizens only, without the access to social and economic rights, in spite of the fact that some had been there for generation (Breytenbach et al, 1999: 33-36).

It deprived the Banyamulenge of South Kivu, and the Banyarwanda, a Rwandan-speaking population composed of Hutus and Tutsis in North Kivu, of their citizenship (Sarkin, 2001: 70). Coupled with food shortages and high population growths, the legislation saw the start of tribal clashes in the eastern province of Kivu in 1993 (Sarkin, 2001: 70).

Native authorities in the Kivu provinces created their own military, known as the Mai-Mai, which was encouraged and supported by the Zairian military to attack communities, displacing thousands of civilians (Sarkin, 2001: 71). The first rebellion had started, and lasted from 1993 until 1997, during which Mobutu collaborated with the former Rwandan Armed Forces known as ex-FAR, and helped them to rearm (Sarkin, 2001: 71). He also formed an alliance with the Hutu regime in Rwanda (Sarkin, 2001: 71). Between the start of the rebellion and 1996, hundreds of Tutsis were massacred, and in October of 1996, the Deputy Director of South Kivu Province stated that 300 000 Banyamulenge had to leave Zaire for Rwanda or they would be killed (Sarkin, 2001: 71).

Subsequently the Banyamulenge retaliated and their uprising was joined by Laurent Kabila and his Alliance de Forces Democratiques pour la Liberation du Congo-Zaire (ADFL) (Sarkin, 2001: 71). The anti-Mobutu struggle was also externally supported by Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi, who came to the aid of the Banyamulenge. They recognised that a chance of victory would rid them of Mobutu. (Breytenbach et al, 1999: 38-39). Both countries felt threatened by guerrilla forces acting against them in Zairian territory, and Mobutu had done precious little to control guerrilla activity and was, in fact, known to encourage it (Tsie, 1998: 9).
The external parties realised that in overthrowing Mobutu, they would have to find a replacement that would be recognised by the entire Zairian populace. Thus, in 1997 Laurent Kabila became president, of the newly named Democratic Republic of Congo (Sarkin, 2001: 71).

At that time, Kabila had a strong alliance with the Tutsi, but this association did not last long. In the hope of forming a new and more useful alliance with the Congolese population, Kabila began excluding the Banyamulenge and Tutsi from power, which he hoped would gain the formers' approval because of their continued hatred for the Banyamulenge (Breytenbach et al, 1999: 39). August the 3rd, 1998 saw the start of the second rebellion, which although again fueled by Banyamulenge insecurities was aimed at ousting Kabila (Breytenbach et al, 1999: 40).

Kabila had made several serious mistakes in his short term as president, one of them was the failure to maintain an alliance with his former allies, by being unwilling to assist them in improving their domestic matters (Tsie, 1998: 9). The other was the refusal to establish a legitimate democracy (Tsie, 1998: 9), and the alienation of the international community through a canceling of mining concessions with western multinationals (Naidoo, 2001: 18). International observers concluded that the second rebellion, although not officially supported by external parties, saw planning and execution directed by Rwanda, with Uganda and Burundi helping to remove Kabila from power (Tsie, 1998: 9). The second rebellion lasted from 1997 to 2001, and despite being shorter attracted more external intervention. Uganda, Chad and the Sudan all contributed to the conflict in the Congo, while certain members of SADC, namely Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe acted unilaterally, in support of Kabila and his government.

Laurent Kabila continued his reign of power until his assassination on 16 January 2001 (Naidoo, 2001: 18). Joseph Kabila, the 29 year old son of the former president, took over in a “swift and monarchial appointment” (Naidoo, 2001: 18).
Kabila Jnr introduced economic reforms and renewed severed ties with the international community (Naidoo, 2001: 18-19). It remains to be seen whether he will be able to institute political reforms successfully. State building, including the creation of institutions for proper governance, should be initiate as soon as possible.

4.1.3 The DRC Conflict in Review

The DRC conflict has been fuelled by violence and animosity, based on ethnicity. This occurred as a result of the two legal systems, as instituted by the Belgian colonisers, and the accentuation of ethnicity, by the power, in order to maintain authority. Ethnic injustice continues to be a threat to the people of the DRC, and protection of minorities is still not guaranteed under the new constitution.

Further conflict-related threats to the people of the DRC come in the form of civil unrest and military coups, and the ongoing weakness of the state through, amongst other reasons, a general failure to establish a legitimate democracy. Under Mobutu, the Congolese state collapsed, as a result of corruption, mismanagement and manipulation of power (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2001: 44-46). Although President Kabila introduced economic reforms at the beginning of his reign, sound political reforms are yet to be instituted. Political and economic instability remains prevalent.

Threats to the DRC state, in the form of external aggression, also characterise the conflict. Foreign invasions and military threats from surrounding states, including Uganda, Sudan, Rwanda, Burundi, Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola, have all placed the sovereignty of the DRC at risk. Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi, for example, have annexed vast parts of the Congo, and have been systematically pillaging the natural resources of the country (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2001:46).
Liongo (1999: 12-13) writes, that the Congolese people are convinced that the real reason why Rwandan and Ugandan troops are fighting each other in Kinsangani is to secure access to the area's mineral resources. The continuation of the war is blamed on outside forces.

The consequences of the conflict have also resulted in threats for the entire Great Lakes region, and in fact Southern Africa. Repercussions, such as the loss of investor confidence due to the ongoing conflict, is an issue for the whole region. Furthermore the exodus of Congolese people into surrounding countries, have caused economic, social and political problems in those countries.

The conflict in the Great Lakes region, is a war of resources, militaristic regimes, territorial expansion and economic exploitation (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2001: 47). All the threats to the population of the DRC and to the state itself, coupled with the threats to the region that transcend the borders of the DRC, indicate that the conflict exhibits attributes of conventional and new security threats. It, therefore, demands the need for a broader approach to security. The security approach would have to address the conventional, as well as the new threats, and would, therefore, require a multidimensional and regional focus.

Furthermore, the conflict is distinguished by internal and regional dimensions. A national solution would not be possible for this regional conflict, in the same way that a regional solution would not suffice for the internal hostilities. There cannot be peace in the Congo if there are no institutions to guarantee the security of neighbouring states (Liongo, 1999: 13). The success of a peaceful outcome in the DRC depends on the co-operation and compliance of all the parties to the conflict (Neethling, 2000: 40), internal and external. In other words a regional stance and effort, is a necessity for a viable solution for the conflict.
4.2 UN Involvement

4.2.1 UN Missions in the DRC

The United Nations has been engaged in the DRC conflict for a lengthy period of time. The Organisation was first involved in 1960, when the Congo was under the mandate of the UN (Sarkin, 2001: 70). The UN Security Council established the UN Peacekeeping Mission in the Congo (ONUC), to ensure the withdrawal of all Belgian and foreign forces, and to assist the government to maintain law and order (Sibanda, 2000: 95-96). The mandate was further modified to include the prevention of civil war, and the mission lasted from June 1960 to June 1964 (Sibanda, 2000: 95-96). The UN's involvement in the 1960s, together with its present operation, indicate the only instance of repeated UN engagement in a single country (Morjane, 2001: 86).

In November 1996, the Security Council concluded that the situation in the eastern part of the country was deteriorating and constituted a threat to international peace and stability (Friman, 2001: 67). This was again reiterated in April 1999. MONUC (United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo) was established at the request of the belligerents, as outlined in the Lusaka Agreement (Morjane, 2001: 86). In August 1999, the Security Council authorised the deployment of up to 90 UN military liaison officers (MLO) to the capitals of the parties to the agreement, with the aim of establishing and maintaining contacts with all the parties involved in the agreement, and providing assistance (Cilliers & Malan, 2001: 34). This was to be known as the first phase of MONUC (Cilliers & Malan, 2001: 34).

Lusaka signatories, however, were hopeful that the UN would play a role in peace enforcement, but MONUC was not provided with such responsibilities, and its main objective was rather to observe the implementation of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, through the monitoring of the progress made by the
belligerents in this regard (Malan & Boshoff, 2002: 5). MONUC was to be implemented in three phases, with the phase I and phase II focusing on “the cessation of hostilities and the disengagement/redeployment of the parties’ armed forces in the DRC” (Malan & Boshoff, 2002: 5).

The importance of the first phase was that it was to provide valuable information to the Secretary-General regarding the situation in the DRC. As it became apparent that the signatories of the Lusaka Agreement were not respecting the ceasefire and countless violations took place, the ability of the MLO to provide accurate information for further UN deployment became seriously limited (Cilliers & Malan, 2001: 35). Also, the mission was ineffectively deployed and was prevented from carrying out its mandate (Cilliers & Malan, 2001: 35).

In November 1999, the Security Council expanded the mandate of MONUC to include a civilian police component and an integrated civil-military section to coordinate operations relating to disarmament, demobilisation, repatriation and reintegration, as well as an expanded civilian component to deal with the monitoring of human rights (Friman, 2001: 67).

Lack of precise information effected the planning of the second phase of MONUC. Also continued violations of the ceasefire prevented the full deployment of MONUC. Parties to the agreement, however, saw UN involvement as the solution to such violations and called for a “fully-fledged UN peacekeeping mission without any further delay” (Cilliers & Malan, 2001: 35).

In January 2000 the Secretary-General urged the expansion of MONUC from the existing 77 MLOs to 5 537 military observers and peacekeepers, stating that due to the insecurity and difficult terrain, the deployment of 500 observers and civilian staff, in line with phase II of MONUC, would not be possible (Cilliers & Malan, 2001: 37). By June 2001, the UN had deployed a total of 2 366 military personnel, including 497 liaison officers and military observers (Cilliers & Malan,
A further 17 UN Officers provided planning support to the JMC in Lusaka, and on 15 March 2001, 280 military observers were deployed (Cilliers & Malan, 2001: 44).

MONUC felt that the commitment on all sides to redeployment was fairly firm, but by 8 June 2001, only Uganda and Angola had provided information regarding their forces (Cilliers & Malan, 2001: 45). Unless all parties upheld the Lusaka Agreement, conditions for the deployment of MONUC phase III would not be possible (Cilliers & Malan, 2001: 47). Malan and Boshoff (2002: 5) state, that the success of the whole peacekeeping process has hinged on the degree to which warring factions can be effectively disarmed, which historically has been one of the most difficult tasks to implement.

By April 2001, MONUC was planning a third phase that would introduce a process to “disarm, demobilise, repatriate, reintegrate all armed forces in the DRC; hand over mass killers, perpetrators of crimes against humanity and other war criminals; and disarm all Congolese civilians who were illegally armed” (Malan & Boshoff, 2002: 5). On 15 June, however, the Security Council extended the mandate of MONUC until 15 June 2002 (Cilliers & Malan, 2001: 51). MONUC thus envisaged that phase III would be executed over the period June 2002 to June 2003, in three stages (Malan & Boshoff, 2002: 5).

Malan and Boshoff (2002: 5-6) explain the three stages of MONUC phase III. Stage 1 of phase III will be concerned with transitional operations in which conditions for disarming, demobilising, repatriating, resettling, and reintegrating will be created. This will include gathering information, building confidence, and create conditions for voluntary disarmament and demobilisation. Stage 2 will focus on repatriation and resettlement which are to be facilitated by political and civilian actors, while military forces continue to disarm and demobilise. Although it is too early to predict the scope and scale of stage 3, it will concern subsequent operations.
To execute phase III MONUC will require four task forces in order to establish 16 disarmament camps and manage the disarmament and demobilisation process (Malan & Boshoff, 2002: 6). A force of 400 is in place in Kindu but the forward staging base is not likely to be completed before the end of October 2002. Phase III of the mission’s deployment remained delayed and on 14 June 2002 the Security Council called on UN member states to contribute resources to allow MONUC to achieve its authorised strength (Malan & Boshoff, 2002: 7).

More recently the UN sent a special envoy to the Great Lakes region, in an effort to contribute to the Inter-Congolese Dialogue (Cornwell, 2002: 41). This special envoy, led by Jean-David Levitte met with the governments of the DRC, Rwanda, Uganda, Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia, as well as with rebel groups in the Congo and the facilitator of the Dialogue (Cornwell, 2002: 41). Levitte reported that the establishment of a transitional government was crucial, and that disarmament of rebel groups and withdrawal of foreign troops from Congolese soil should follow immediately (Cornwell, 2002: 42).

For MONUC to be successful, it needs to adapt to the constantly changing situations in the DRC and surrounds (Cilliers & Malan, 2001: 74). It should also be based on a comprehensive peace agreement (Cilliers & Malan, 2001: 75), which means that despite current MONUC involvement, parties to the conflict should do their utmost to find and sustain an understanding, albeit national sacrifices need to be made.

4.2.2 Assessing the UN Approach

The logic behind MONUC has not been to deploy a robust force capable of conducting a peace enforcement operation. This, according to Neethling (2000: 39-40) points to a trend of waning UN involvement in complex emergencies that may require the use of force. Peacekeeping operations in Africa have absorbed an enormous amount of UN resources and energy, but have brought little in
Western countries are unwilling to become directly involved on the continent. This indicates that that the broader approach to security does not have the attention it deserves, and that national interests and national security remain dominant.

Furthermore, Africa is not a top priority for the US (Neethling, 2000: 39), and although the USA is not the UN's only influential player, their attitude is important to note considering that the country is the world's only superpower. It is worth mentioning the African Crisis Response Force/Initiative (ACRF/II), which was an initiative led by the Americans to address the conflict in the DRC. The failure of the initiative, can be attributed to the unilateral approach instituted by the USA. African leaders did not want such a strong unilateral influence from the superpower.

The ideal situation in addressing and resolving conflict, would be a partnership between the UN, and the OAU/AU, regional and sub-regional organisations and civil society (Neethling, 2000: 40). In this way, all the stake-holders would be guaranteed representation, and initiatives would not be solely state-led or dominated by national interests.

MONUC is a complex and elaborate mission, which needs the combined support of the region and the international community. For a successful implementation of the MONUC mandate, a climate of co-operation in the region is an essential pre-requisite (Neethling, 2000: 39).
4.3 Involvement of SADC

4.3.1 Unilateral Involvement of SADC Members States

The instability in the DRC was a clear indicator that the region needed to establish a regional mechanism that would deal with political issues in the region (Brammer, 1999: 1). Because the DRC was a SADC member, the Organ for Politics, Defence and Security was entitled to fill that role.

The DRC became a member of SADC in August 1997, which meant that although SADC had no mandate or responsibility to assist at the start of the first rebellion in 1993, the Organisation did have an obligation to assist at the time of the second rebellion, in terms of the protocol that established the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (Tsie, 1998: 9). But by September 1997, the Organ had been suspended (Breytenbach, 2000: 85) due to various structural and functional problems, and fundamental differences in interpretation of the operational functioning (Brammer, 1999: 1).

Besides the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security being unable to assist in the DRC conflict, SADC did not fare any better. On 23 August 1998, an emergency meeting of SADC leaders was convened, and a decision was reached to confirm recognition of the legitimacy of the government of the DRC and call for an immediate ceasefire (Malan & Boshoff, 2002: 3). Although President Nelson Mandela was to organise a ceasefire, the following month at the 18th SADC Summit, Zambian President Frederick Chiluba was appointed to lead mediation efforts (Malan & Boshoff, 2002: 3). Apart from this initiative, the organisation did not establish a unified declaration concerning the conflict, which led to the various member states engaging themselves on different sides. As a result the war became thoroughly internationalised (Geldenhuys, 2000: 44).
Kabila's government received unilateral military backing from SADC members, namely Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe, all of which sent troops to the DRC (Geldenhuys, 2000: 44).

For Kabila, Angola's intervention was valuable because of the influx of well-trained and experienced troops from the Forcas Armadas Angolanas (FAA), as well as the support of Angolan air power (Cleaver & Massey, 2001: 205). The Angolan government maintained that their involvement was to back Kabila's legitimate government against a foreign invasion (Cleaver & Massey, 2001: 205).

Another motivation, however, points to military intervention in the DRC to promote the interests of the Angolan government. Although Rwanda, Uganda and Angola had been allies during the rebellion of 1993, the Angolan government wanted to prevent the Uniao Nacional para Independencia Total de Angola (UNITA), the Angolan rebel movement, from reconstructing supply lines in southwest DRC. The Angolan government needed to find an pretext to fight its own rebels on Congo territory. This pretext came when the rebel alliance in the DRC, supported by Rwanda and Uganda, accepted UNITA assistance, and gave the Angolan government an excuse to intervene (Cleaver & Massey, 2001: 205).

Despite not sharing a common border, Namibia sent troops to the DRC in August 1998, in order to preserve peace and stability in the region and affirmed that African states should assist each other in striving for solidarity (Cleaver & Massey, 2001: 202-203). Aside from these valiant reasons, President Njoma's family, held stakes in the diamond operations in the DRC (Cleaver & Massey, 2001: 203). Involvement for Namibia proved costly (Cleaver & Massey, 203: 204).

Zimbabwe's involvement has been extensive and Robert Mugabe's regime and his country have suffered tremendously as a result. The war has cost Zimbabwe millions of dollars (Cleaver & Massey, 2001: 197-198) and has weakened the
country economically and politically. It is readily believed that Zimbabwean involvement has been for the benefit of the political elite, namely Mugabe and the Zimbabwean Defence Force, who undertook the exploitation of minerals and the rendering of protection to DRC forces in the garrison town of Mbandaka (Cleaver & Massey, 2001: 197).

4.3.2 Assessing the SADC Approach

De Coning (1998: 20) indicates that the primary elements of both peacekeeping and peace enforcement are neutrality and impartiality, and uses these factors to reiterate that SADC military intervention in the DRC was illegitimate and illegal since Angolan, Namibian and Zimbabwean troops entered the war on one side of the parties involved.

Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe legitimised their military involvement by alluding to the flawed justifications of the SADC Organ for Politics, Defence and Security and ISDSC decisions (Cleaver & Massey, 2001: 205). Initially the combined involvement was supposedly based on a decision of SADC’s Organ, where during a meeting it was proposed that the Organ become involved (Cleaver & Massey, 2001: 196). But because the Organ was already suspended in 1997, Mugabe despite being elected as the first Chairperson, had no capacity to speak or act on behalf of the structure (Cleaver & Massey, 2001: 196).

Similarly, it was stated that the intervention was authorised by a decision of the ISDSC at an ad hoc meeting in Harare in August 1998 (Cleaver & Massey, 2001: 196). But as Cleaver and Massey maintain, the ISDSC “never claimed a mandate for mutual defence intervention”, which coupled with the fact that only four of the fourteen members were present, undermined the legitimacy of the body (Cleaver & Massey, 2001: 197).
De Coning (1998: 21) reiterates, that although Zimbabwe argued that the DRC was a victim of foreign aggression, their intervention was illegal for two reasons. Firstly, no mutual defence agreement existed between the SADC countries, and secondly, the rebellion in eastern DRC was far more than a simple act of foreign invasion. Another argument used by Zimbabwe was that the rebel uprising was an attempt to overthrow the legitimate government and had to be prevented (De Coning, 1998: 22). Neither the OAU nor SADC have, however, formally adopted any resolutions that would constitute intervention in situations of unconstitutional changes of government (De Coning, 1998: 22).

Under international law an intervention is legitimate “if duly authorised by the international community” (De Coning, 1998: 21). In the case of SADC members intervening in the DRC, there was a lack of authorisation by the international community, which made the action illegitimate. Clear and transparent authorising procedures should be instituted at both the OAU and SADC level, to leave no ambiguity about when member states are authorised to intervene (De Coning, 1998: 22&31). SADC must also decide what kind of missions it is willing to deploy (De Coning, 1998: 31) and clarify at what level decisions are to be taken (De Coning, 1998: 22).

Involvement of the members states was determined through individual national policies, and there was no clear regional co-operation regarding intervention in the DRC within the realm of SADC. SADC even failed to establish a unified declaration regarding the conflict, which again indicated a lack of a concerted regional effort.

This points explicitly to the dominance of a state-centric approach, as opposed to a regional approach based on co-operation and integration, that should have been utilised according to the mandate of SADC. Unilateral involvement from the member states should not have been permitted without a mandate from a full-house SADC Heads of State Meeting. Despite SADC’s desire to integrate for the
good of the region, the unilateral involvement indicates that perhaps Southern African states were not ready to relinquish power, even for the good of the region.

The state-centric approach was also evident in the members attitude towards a security approach. Despite advocating principles of new security in the communiqué establishing the SADC OPDS, the organisation failed to transfer the human security doctrine into practice. This is evident from the fact that member states acted in terms of their personal best economic interests, without granting attention to human security threats in the region.

4.4 The Lusaka Peace Process, 1999 – 2002

Despite the unilateral intervention of SADC members, the inauguration of the new South African president, Thabo Mbeki, in mid-1999, became a window of opportunity, after the 18th SADC summit, to establish peace talks (Malan & Boshoff, 2002: 3). Even though this initiative was not SADC-inspired, regional leaders from Rwanda, Uganda, Libya and Kenya, as well as the 14 SADC members, met in Pretoria on 17 June 1999 (Malan & Boshoff, 2002: 3). This meeting, showing a far greater commitment to regional co-operation, paved the way for the DRC summit, which was to be held later in June for the purpose of signing a ceasefire (Malan & Boshoff, 2002: 3).

After three weeks of intensive negotiations, an agreement for a ceasefire in the DRC, was signed in Lusaka on the 10th July 1999 (Masire, 2001: 1). Angola, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe all joined the DRC in signing the Lusaka Agreement due to their direct involvement in the war, while Zambia, the OAU, the UN and SADC signed as witnesses (Masire, 2001: 1). Several non-state actors participated in a later signing of the Lusaka Agreement, such as Congolese formations and Kivu-based militias, as well as non-Congolese groups from Rwanda, Angola and Uganda (Wolpe, 2000: 27). The Accord was designed
to bring about a formal end to the country's civil war, and provide the first regionally authored and internationally sanctioned framework for the region's political future (Wolpe, 2000: 28). The inclusion of non-state actors was a crucial step in identifying all parties to the conflict, as opposed to solely state participants.

Howard Wolpe, the US Special envoy to Africa's Great Lakes region, pointed out three central causes of the Great Lakes crisis, namely: the absence of an effectively functioning state authority, a continuing threat posed by non-state rebel groups from the entire region, and unresolved conflicts in the countries neighbouring the DRC (Wolpe, 2000: 28). In view of this the Lusaka Agreement is meaningful in that it has attempted to address these very causes through a regional initiative.

Geldenhuys (2000: 47) notes that because political factors were among those that caused human suffering in the DRC, the machinery of the government required reparation. The Lusaka Agreement laid the foundation for various initiatives concerned with rehabilitating the DRC into a functioning state. The peace agreement provides for the re-establishment of the state-administration throughout the DRC, including a restructured national army (Geldenhuys, 2000: 47).

Also inter-Congolese negotiations, encompassing all the relevant political actors, were envisaged by the Agreement, to redress the absence of multiparty democracy for nearly forty years (Geldenhuys, 2000: 48). At the same time the Lusaka Agreement stipulates the involvement of the international community, in the form of all associated regional actors, to work co-operatively to secure common borders (Wolpe, 2000: 34), and one of its key aspects is its provision for the disarming of foreign armed groups functioning in the Congo, posing a threat to their host, and their countries of origin (Malan & Boshoff, 2002: 1).
As Wolpe (2000: 33) states, the significance of the Lusaka Agreement "lies in its embrace of all of the critical elements of a sustainable resolution of the Great Lakes Crisis" because it advocates the respect for sovereignty of all the regional states while aspiring to establish credible and inclusive institutions in the DRC.

The Joint Military Commission (JMC), composed of representatives of the various belligerents, and responsible for the implementation of the Ceasefire Agreement until such time as the UN peacekeeping force was deployed (Malan & Boshoff, 2002: 1), formed an integral part of the success of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement (Wolpe, 2000: 37). The JMC chaired by Algerian General Rashid Lallali, would be liable for the restoration of trust and confidence between parties. International support and resources are necessary for the JMC to succeed (Wolpe, 2000: 37). Ultimately, the JMC would work with the assistance of the UN and the OAU to establish mechanisms for "the tracking, disarming, cantoning and documenting of all armed groups in the DRC" (Friman, 2001: 68).

The Agreement only took effect on 31 August 1999, since the initial signatories of July 10th did not include any of the Congolese rebel groups (Malan & Boshoff, 2002: 3). Fighting between government and rebel forces was, however, still raging in December (Geldenhuys, 2000: 44). Although the ceasefire was in place, countless violations persisted from all sides, and thus the conditions stipulated by the UN for a realistic deployment were not met (Masire, 2001: 1). As a result, the UN has not been willing to deploy a credible military force to the DRC to enforce, or even verify, compliance with the Lusaka Agreement (Malan & Boshoff, 2002: 1).

Demands for changes to the Lusaka Agreement have been made, and the DRC government expressed doubts about certain aspects of the Agreement, stating that it was primarily a ceasefire with the democratisation process as an appendix (Masire, 2001: 2). Others maintained that the Agreement gave foreigners too much say, and excluded civil society (Masire, 2001: 2). Furthermore, the
Agreement did not establish a truth and reconciliation commission (Geldenhuys, 2000: 49), and omitted compensation for the victims of war (Masire, 2001: 2), which was seen as unacceptable.

Yet another uncertainty surrounding the Agreement is that the guidelines and structures it offers are very fragile. According to Malan and Boshoff (2002: 3), the Lusaka Process ignored the finer details of the situation in the DRC in an attempt to minimise problems, and placed tremendous expectations on a UN peacekeeping force (Malan & Boshoff, 2002: 3). Without including the UN in negotiations, the brokers of the agreement still counted on the UN to perform a multitude of difficult and complicated tasks, not knowing whether these tasks would be operationally achievable (Malan & Boshoff, 2001: 3-4).

Even if all the necessary parties have signed the Agreement, it does not suggest that peace and stability will automatically follow. Malan and Boshoff (2002: 3) assert that “diplomatic activity should not be mistaken for actual achievement”.

A positive consequence of the Lusaka Agreement was the Inter-Congolese Dialogue (ICD) held at South Africa’s Sun City resort. The goal of these talks was to negotiate a peaceful transition to democracy for the DRC (Mseteka, 2002: 6). In the run-up to the talks, the Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC) said it would boycott the event, because of insufficient representation for the opposition political parties (Mseteka, 2002: 6). The same questions of disarmament and the withdrawal of foreign troops from the Congo that hindered the Lusaka Agreement, surfaced again as a major factor in the derailment of the ICD (Malan & Boshoff, 2002: 1).

ICD negotiations were held and led to a partial agreement between Bemba’s MLC and Joseph Kabila’s government (Cornwell, 2002: 41). The negotiations lasted seven weeks and the agreement, reached on 19th April 2002, represented the end of the ICD (Cornwell, 2002: 41). The government and the MLC
announced that they would install a transitional government in Kinshasa on 15 May 2002 and declared the Lusaka Accords complete (Cornwell, 2002: 41). Further attempts to arrange additional talks have failed and although the ICD has officially ended, confusion about the DRC's future remains (Cornwell, 2002: 41).

The regional co-operation portrayed in the ICD played an important role in addressing and working towards a resolution of the conflict, but the fact that Zimbabwe and Angola, as SADC members, refused to withdraw their troops (Mseteka, 2002: 6), still indicates that a state-centric attitude prevails. Unilateral interests, especially evident in the continual mineral exploitation by the foreign armies in the DRC, remain dominant. In the end the Lusaka Peace Process constitutes a combination of mostly bilateral agreements, and although regional co-operation was present at times, it was not a SADC-inspired procedure.

4.5 The Pretoria Agreement: July 2002

The latest peace deal for the DRC has come in the form of the Pretoria Agreement, which by overcoming the deadlock of the ICD, restores credibility in the Lusaka Agreement (Malan & Boshoff, 2002: 10). During these proceedings a memorandum of understanding (MoU) was signed between the governments of the DRC and Rwanda on 30th July 2002 (Malan & Boshoff, 2002: 1). The MoU, concerned with the withdrawal of Rwandan troops from DRC territory and the dismantling of the Ex-FAR and Interahamwe forces in the DRC, has been praised as an end to the war (Malan & Boshoff, 2002: 1).

The Pretoria Agreement does present an acknowledgement by the DRC government that it had been supporting the Interhamwe and ex-FAR and that it will cease such support, while Rwanda, who has been brought back to the peace process, has committed itself to the withdrawal of forces from the DRC (Malan & Boshoff, 2002: 7&10). On account of this, both Uganda and Zimbabwe have announced that they intend to withdraw their troops from the DRC as soon as
possible (Malan & Boshoff, 2002: 10). A substantial problem with the Pretoria Agreement, however, is that it may break down over issues of implementation, since South Africa does not have an effective military expeditionary capability (Malan & Boshoff, 2002: 10).

Aside from the advantages and disadvantages of the Pretoria Agreement, the actuality of the deal being a South African initiative remains (Malan & Boshoff, 2002: 1-2). The Agreement was brokered by South African President Thabo Mbeki, and the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan. Although the Agreement may bring stability to the region, it does not hide the fact that it was arranged through a bilateral initiative, and that once again regional co-operation in the initiation of solutions to the DRC conflict was non-existent.

4.6 Assessment

The many initiatives and agreements, aimed at bringing an end to the conflict in the DRC, although partially successful, did not present Southern Africa with a concerted regional effort. SADC, the region’s only arrangement equipped to deal with conflicts, had very little relevance in the process of bringing peace to the region. It’s OPDS was non-existent at the start of the second rebellion in the DRC.

According to the conception of new regionalism, SADC members should have co-operated regionally to consider a course of action that would have best suited the region in its entirety. This was clearly not the case, indicating that individual SADC member states were not ready to relinquish sovereignty and work towards an integrated Southern African region. A state-centric approach to conflict in the DRC prevailed, denoting the presence of old regionalism ideas.

In exception to the Lusaka Agreement, that involved non-state actors, no other initiatives showed any signs of attempting to include civil society in negotiations.
All the initiatives discussed in the chapter were state-led and state-centric. This should not have been the case for either a broader approach to security or new regionalism, as both concepts advocate the importance of the inclusion of civil society.

Furthermore, participating parties did not consider the region as a whole, but attempted rather to tackle the internal conflict in the DRC, without realising that the conflict had unflagging regional proportions as well. Peace and stability in the Congo will be fickle, unless echoed in neighbouring countries particularly considering the nature of broader human threats found in the conflict. Besides the fact that SADC as a regional arrangement should have maintained its regional approach, regional-co-operation should have been promoted for the reason that the conflict in the Congo had not obeyed national boundaries, and therefore required a regional solution.

Principles of regional co-operation were not adhered to, and in reality SADC members legitimised their unilateral involvement in the DRC, by using the lack of clarity in the SADC structures. The lack of a functioning regional security initiative, one with clearly laid out principles, led to unilateral involvement and a complication of the conflict, and an ultimate failure to address and resolve it successfully.

Ketumile Masire (2001: 3) writes that the multitude of initiatives by both African and international actors, all aimed at putting an end to the continuing instability and conflict in the DRC, have in actual fact complicated the matter. It has resulted in a lack of focus, incoherency and a waste of precious time.

The Lusaka Agreement has been a monumental first step, since it shows the value of the need for a common regional goal to address regional security challenges (Wolpe, 2000: 40). Also, the Agreement has provided a tremendous opportunity to establish credible political institutions within the DRC, while
constructing a regional arrangement to address the common security issues of the regional states (Wolpe, 2000: 34). In accordance to the notion of human security, however, states should not be seen as the only referents of security.

The Pretoria Agreement is very important for President Mbeki, since it is his first peacemaking success in his capacity as chair of the AU (Malan & Boshoff, 2002: 2). Again in defiance of the broader human security, however, the Agreement was state-initiated and state-centered. The Pretoria Agreement did succeed in bringing previously unco-operative parties to the negotiation table, but failed to include civil society.

As far as SADC is concerned, if members had wanted to intervene for reasons of wanting to stop ongoing violence in the DRC they could have done so without military intervention. In fact, a military outcome will not produce the lasting peace required for reconstruction (Naidoo, 2000: 86). All the foreign parties involved had separate personal interests, and because of this they helped fuel the conflict instead of putting a stop to it (Cleaver & Massey, 2001: 207-208). Bilateral involvement in conflict, especially as a result of personal economic or political interest, should not be tolerated. If the members are truly committed to attaining regional integration they have to be willing to make some national sacrifices for the good of the region as a whole. Tsie (1999: 10) is quite right in saying that in future situations SADC should only intervene in regional conflicts "to restore stability and peace with the primary purpose of creating a climate conducive to the peaceful settlement of conflict".

Furthermore, SADC and its Organ for Politics, Defence and Security need to establish a clear mandate on intervention, and determine at what levels intervention will take place. Above all they must follow the rules set out by the international community. The more effective the regional effort, the less jurisdiction there will be for unilateral intervention (Wolpe, 2000: 32).
Combined with this, SADC should have immediately set down ground rules for Kabila's government, in an attempt to establish a common set of values for the region. This would have forced him to uphold certain principles in the establishment of a new government. One of the greatest mistakes that SADC made was to give Kabila free reign without ever directly demanding that he comply with the terms of a democracy. SADC could have easily made democratic governance in the DRC a conditionality, in return for the assistance he received from various SADC members.

The people of the Congo and the Great Lakes region have experienced war, hunger, ethnic persecution and dictatorship. Their security concerns have been ignored countless times. Their interest must be put first and their security guaranteed. Any other attitude should not be tolerated.
Chapter 5: Conclusion

The introductory chapter outlined the security problems prevalent in Southern Africa. Various states have, and still are, experiencing violent hostilities detrimental to economic growth and political stability, and devastating to the lives of the inhabitants. It is stated that most of the conflicts are of such a nature that they transcend the traditional notion of security, namely security of the state. In fact both the state and their people that are in danger. The understanding of security must shift from the statist perspective to that of broader human security concerns.

The threats prevalent in Southern Africa, and indeed the whole of Africa, present a challenge for the entire region because of their borderless characteristics. No longer can states approach and solve regional issues and conflicts, through national policies alone. Against the background of the new and human notion of security, it appears that regional approaches and, therefore, regional co-operation are necessary for regional conflicts.

In view of the above, the topic of the thesis was concerned with the assessment of the role of regional co-operation in the resolution of the conflict in the DRC, with an understanding of the importance of the concepts of new regionalism and new security.

The second chapter, saw the examination of regionalism as a concept, to establish the differences between old and new regionalism. This led to the conclusion that the world has evolved from simple co-operative agreements and alliances, to a concept where regionalism indicates an increased interest to co-operate and integrate in order to attain peace and stability. This willingness to integrate has been particularly evident in the wake of globalisation, where states have felt threatened when attempting to address global challenges due to
insufficient resources or the nature of these challenges. For Southern Africa, forming regional alliances has been of importance to prevent the ongoing marginalisation of the developing world, since the end of the Cold War Era. The new wave of regionalism has also brought with it an understanding of the importance of actors outside the realm of government. Civil society, in the form of the business sector and non-governmental organisations, can serve and must serve to integrate the region because of their focus beyond national boundaries.

Secondly, the concept of security was examined. It was determined that the concept has evolved significantly from a narrow confine referring to national security, to a new thinking that places emphasis on the security of people. Security is the pursuit of freedom from threat, and threats present in Southern Africa are not ones that face the state but rather the people. States or national governments should no longer be the main recipients of security. Threats to human security, if not addressed, will resurface with growing fatality.

A link was established between the new wave of regionalism and the new human approach to security. If the threats identified are not confined to national boundaries, national efforts will not address them adequately. Furthermore, the consequences of conflict also have a tendency to cross national borders, and the notion of spillover has become very evident particularly in Southern Africa.

The third chapter examined the security structures present on the African continent, namely: the United Nations, with its responsibility to maintain international peace and security, and the Southern African Development Community, concerned with addressing economic, political and security challenges in the sub-region, and the only regional arrangement equipped to deal with conflicts.

This chapter determined that both organisations required revision because of the constantly changing political, social and economic environments. Although SADC
has recently decided on more centralised structures, this is yet to become evident in the realm of security. The United Nations remains unchanged since its inception. Also the United Nations has shown increasing political unwillingness as far as missions in Africa are concerned. At the same time Africa has shown substantial interest to embrace peacekeeping but continue to rely heavily on UN support.

Through an examination of the mechanisms for peace and security, of the above mentioned organisations, it was determined that both have remained state-centric, and that the concept of old regionalism with its statist perspective dominates. Due to the statist attitude, it has become difficult for them to adopt the new and broader approaches to security, and regional threats remain unattended. The UN and SADC are not fully co-ordinated in their functioning, despite the requirements for the latter to adhere to the rules and regulations of the former. If the organisations were to improve their collaboration, they would be able to address each other's shortcomings and weaknesses. It was, therefore, determined that a layered response system is the only way forward regarding African peacekeeping. Such a system will require more communication and interaction between the organisations.

After an examination of the conflict in the DRC, as the designated case study for the thesis, it was established that the conflict was far beyond a national dilemma, and it had attributes of a national and regional nature. The conflict is not one dimensional, and has regional causes and consequences, affecting the security of states and people, in the whole region. In order to find a lasting peace, the region has to co-operate to find a solution for the entire region.

This was often not the case judging on the initiatives in the DRC conflict. There was a great deal of unilateral involvement for the sake of own and national interests. Initiatives were always state-initiated and state-led, with no SADC-inspired activity. Parties to the conflict did not act together and at times certain
belligerents were not willing to take part in negotiations. SADC could not even establish an initial common stance on the DRC conflict. Coupled with this, negotiations were primarily aimed at governments, and civil society was not invited to take part.

Initiatives in the Congo have not taken the regional nature of the conflict into account, and throughout the process a common position has not been developed. The Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, as the only real attempt at regional co-operation, did involve all parties to the conflict and saw the ceasefire as a solution to the conflict. It did not, however, address the underlying problems of threats to human security, such as ethnic discrimination. The interests of the people of the region should have been made the principle objective. Also, despite its certain level of regional success, it was not initiated by SADC.

Furthermore, it has been very difficult to generate the much needed international involvement and interest in the Great Lakes conflict. Western involvement has been waning and human security appears to be unable to generate the interest that is required.

There is a need for a functioning regional security organisation in Southern Africa, due to the regional nature of the conflicts. Such an arrangement could also allow for less dependent on UN, which as evident does have certain flaws regarding integration with regional organisations and shows a lack of interest in Southern Africa. But regional security initiatives will not be successful unless they exhibit characteristics of new security and new regionalism, because without these concepts they will be continually dominated by state-interests.

A working regional security mechanism is of utmost importance, one that will include all parties in the region, including civil society, and will provide the region with a regional perspective to regional problems.
Regional co-operation remains the only way forward if conflict situations are to be addressed and resolved successfully, but in order for regional initiatives to be effective they will have to be taken seriously. Regional co-operation and integration requires a region to develop common goals and values, and this has not occurred in Southern Africa. Common objectives, although evident on paper, have not transpired through actions, and individual states have acted unilaterally for the sake of private interests.

Due to SADC’s lack of regional engagement in the DRC conflict, it is even doubtful whether Southern Africa exhibits qualities that could lead to regionness or whether the region is homogenous enough to co-operate and integrate. More research should be carried out to determine whether the region does demonstrate the will and common values that are necessary for any working regional security arrangement.
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