


The Changing Role and Identity of the Nonaligned Movement (1955-1998)

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Thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts at the University of Stellenbosch



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DECLARATION

I, the undersigned, Jean Léonard Buhigiro, hereby declare that the work contained in this thesis is my own original work and has not previously in its entirety or in part, been submitted at any university for a degree.

ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study is to determine how the role and identity of the Nonaligned Movement (NAM) changed during and after the Cold War. The demise of the Movement in the post-Cold War era, predicted by some scholars, is discussed.

This study examines whether the Movement merely offered an alternative grouping during the Cold War. The issue that becomes evident with respect to the Cold War is to show the terror it brought about and how the Third World became the battleground of the Superpowers.

The question as to what extent the role played by the Movement defused the Cold War is investigated. It is shown that the Movement sent emissaries to Washington and Moscow to resolve the German Crisis in 1961 and to reduce the arms race.

A historical overview of the Movement is offered, which determines the role of Afro-Asianism in the birth of the Nonaligned Movement. It is explained that the 1955 Bandung conference gathered leaders from independent African and Asian states – with different foreign policies - which created energies that in the following years greatly affected Third World politics and the shaping of nonalignment. This study traces also the role of different gatherings of the Movement up to the Durban Summit of 1998. At issue are also participating countries in the 1961 Belgrade Summit, which are described, as well as the growth of the Movement's membership.

Different goals of the Movement are examined. Some, like nuclear disarmament, the right to self-determination, peaceful coexistence, and the right for the Palestinians to a homeland, were adopted during the Cold War and still remain valid. Others, like protection of the environment, and the struggle for human rights, were implemented during the post-Cold War era. The détente allowed the Movement to launch a New International Economic Order. An attempt is made to show the failure and success of the Movement in this respect.

Opsomming

Die doel van hierdie studie is om te bepaal hoe die rol en identiteit van die Onverbonde Beweging (NAM) tydens en na die Koue Oorlog verander het. Die ondergang van die Beweging in die na-Koue Oorlogse era soos deur sommige kenners voorspel is, word ook ondersoek.

Die studie het probeer vasstel of die Beweging 'n alternatiewe groepering tydens die Koue Oorlog teweeg gebring het. Die kwessie met betrekking tot respect tot die Koue Oorlog bewys dat terreur meegebring word en hoe die Derde Wêreld die slagveld van die Supermoondhede gemaak het.

Daar word ook gepoog om vas te stel tot watter mate die Beweging 'n rol gespeel het in die ontlooting van die Koue Oorlog. In die verband word onder andere verwys na die Beweging se pogings om die Duitse Krisis (1961) te ontloot en die wapenwedloop te beëindig deur die stuur van afgevaardigdes na Washington en Moskou.

In 'n historiese oorsig van die Beweging word die rol wat 'n Afro-Asiatiese gevoel/gees in die stigting van die Onverbonde Beweging gespeel het, ondersoek. Die studie toon aan hoe die Bandung Konferensie van 1955 leiers van onafhanklike state van Afrika en Asië, wat uiteenlopende buitelandse beleidsrigtings gehad het, bymekaar gebring het. Hierdie uiteenlopendheid het 'n dinamika geskep wat Derde Wêreldse politiek en die aard van onverbondenheid wesenlik beïnvloed het in die jare na die Konferensie. Verskeie byeenkomste van die Onverbonde Beweging tot en met die Durbanse spitsberaad (1998) word ontleed. Die samestelling en verloop van die spitsberaad in Belgrado in 1961 en die groei in die lidmaatskap van die Beweging kom onder andere onder die loep.

Verskeie van die Beweging se doelwitte wat tydens die Koue Oorlog beslag gekry het en steeds geldig is, word onder die soeklig geplaas. Kernkrag ontwapening, die reg op selfbeskikking, vreedsame naasbestaan en die Palestyne se reg op `n eie staat/tuisland is voorbeelde in die verband. Ander doelwitte van die beweging wat veral in die na-Koue Oorlogse era geïmplementeer is, soos die bewaring en beskerming van die omgewing en die stryd om menseregte, word ook ondersoek. Die loodsing van `n Nuwe Internasionale Ekonomiese Orde deur die Beweging wat deur die détente van die na-Koue Oorlogse era moontlik gemaak is, word ook bespreek en die sukses en mislukking daarvan geëvalueer.

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ABBREVIATIONS

- ACP: African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States
CENTCOM: Central Command
CENTO: Central Treaty Organisation
CMEA: Council for Mutual Economic Aid
CTBT: Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
EEC: European Economic Organisation
FCCC: Framework Convention on Climate Change
FLNC: Congolese National Liberation Front
FNLA: Angolan National Liberation Front
FRELIMO: Mozambican Liberation Front (Frente de Libertação Moçambique)
GATT: General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GPRA: Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic
IMF: International Monetary Fund
INF: Inter-Governmental Negotiating Committee
LDCs: Least Developed Countries
NAM: Nonaligned Movement
NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NICs: Newly Industrialised Countries
NOLDCs: Non-Oil Developing Countries
NIEO: New International Economic Order
OAU: Organisation of African Unity
OECD: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OPEC: Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries
PAIGC: African Party of Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (Partido Africano de Independência de Guiné e Cabo Verde)
PLO: Palestine Liberation Organisation
SALT: Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
SEATO: Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation
TRIMs: Trade Related Investment Measures
TRIPs: Trade World Related Property Rights
UNCED: United Nations Conference on Environment and Development
UNCTAD: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development

UNICEF: United Nations Children's Fund

UNO: United Nations Organisation

USSR: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

WTO: World Trade Organisation

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

At the end of the Second World War, the wartime alliance between the Soviet Union and the Western Powers began to disintegrate. The competitive and conflicting interaction that had previously characterised the relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States re-emerged. The Soviet Union controlled seven Eastern European countries whose absorption had been prepared for during the last years of the war. Josef Stalin, the Soviet leader, was neither prepared to withdraw nor to introduce evolved human values of democracy and liberalism into Eastern Europe.

The United States declared universal war on Stalin's communist expansion through a policy of containment. This policy assumed that the Soviet Union would expand by every possible means and that such pressure must be met with force on all fronts. Consequently, the Soviet Union responded to containment by calling the Truman Doctrine *capitalist encirclement*. Both superpowers recruited allies throughout the world, creating alliances based on ideology.

In this bipolar world, new nations emerged, first in Asia and then in Africa, who in their firm determination to maintain a distance from the two major blocs, gave birth to the Nonaligned Movement (NAM).¹ A point to be raised concerns the people who write about the NAM. They are mostly from nonaligned countries and are socialist scientists; very few scholars of American tradition, with the exception of RL Jackson, LW Martin, DC Thomas, AW Singham and S Hune², have really studied the NAM.

¹ "Non-Aligned" and "non-alignment" are only used throughout this study, for title of books with these spellings.

² The late Professor AW Singham was born in Burma (also called Myanmar) of Sri Lankan parents. He spent his childhood in Burma and Sri Lanka. He went to the United States in the mid-1950s to study and obtained his Ph. D. in Political Science from the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. He taught at the University of the West Indies in Jamaica before returning to the the United States at the University of Michigan, Haward University and Brooklyn College of the City University of New York. His colleague, S Hune is a third generation Canadian of Chinese descent who has lived most of her adult life in the United States, where she obtained her Ph. D. in History.

As western countries do not find much interest in the NAM countries, there is almost a completely one-sided historiography of this Movement. The most frequently discussed subjects in the literature of this Movement are its historical evolution and Afro-Asian politics in the United Nations.³ There are, for example, the studies by D Kimche, an Israeli diplomat and former Mossad Chief, and GH Jansen, an Indian political scientist. GH Jansen shows how since the Second World War, the newly independent countries of Asia and Africa have come together and had dealings with one other after a century of isolation imposed by imperial systems. This Afro-Asian recovery began prior to the conferences of Bandung (1955) or Belgrade (1961). One of the starting points was the Asian Relations Conference of New Delhi in 1947, which deliberated anti-colonial politics and suggested "neutralism" in the event of war. The cooperation between the Afro-Asians in international affairs, which continued through the Afro-Asian group at the United Nations, was characterised by an independent policy. Jansen's study explains how this Afro-Asianism gave birth to nonalignment and the problems which occurred within the Afro-Asian group due to the search by the Soviet Union and China for allies in their ideological struggle.⁴ D Kimche examines the history of the Afro-Asian Movement, discussing the causes of its birth and decline. At the same time, he conducts a number of case studies of India, Indonesia and Tanzania to show their role in the shaping of Afro-Asianism.⁵ scholar

The Bandung Conference has also received the attention of scholars such as Y Alimov, DC Thomas and RA Mortimer.⁶ Y Alimov specifically emphasizes the fact that the NAM is a new, unique phenomenon in the system of international relations. As AW Singham and II Kovalenko show, how the Movement developed organisationally. These authors do not agree that a lack of a permanent secretariat and a charter are a hindrance to the Movement. This organisational problem is also

³ DC Thomas: *The Theory and Practice of Third World Solidarity*, pp. 2-3.

⁴ GH Jansen: *Non-Alignment and the Afro-Asian States*.

⁵ D Kimche: *The Afro-Asian Movement*.

⁶ Y Alimov: *The Rise and Growth of the Non-Aligned Movement*; DC Thomas: *The Theory and Practice of Third World Solidarity*; RA Mortimer: *The Third World Coalition in International Politics*.

discussed by MS Rajan, an Indian political scientist, who finds it unnecessary to re-structure the Movement. For him, it is the moral influence of a cause that counts.⁷

II Kovalenko, V Benevolensky, socialist scientists, and AW Singham, a political scientist, and S Hune, a historian, concentrate on the different gatherings of the Nonaligned Movement from the 1961 Belgrade Summit to the 1986 Harare Summit. AW Singham and Shirley Hune provide an invaluable credit for giving an overview of the international situation prior to each summit or conference. Thus their documentary analyses took into account political, economic and social events that were taking place in the world system at that time. Their study describes the period from the First Summit Conference of heads of state or government of nonaligned countries held in Belgrade in 1961 to the Fourth Summit in Algiers in 1973 as a period in which the Movement was taking form and establishing itself as a coalition. After 1973 the Movement enters a period of high international activity and becomes a major actor in world politics by calling for a New International Economic Order (NIEO). The problems faced by the Movement, such as organisational and internal conflicts, limited the effectiveness of the Movement in the 1970s. In turn, AW Singham and S Hune examined the struggle of the Movement for self-determination. In this regard, Singham and Hune's study illustrates how the questions of Palestine and Namibia were brought at the United Nations.

In addition, the Government of India published the major documents of the Movement up to 1982 in a volume, *Two Decades of Non-Alignment*. This documentation is extremely useful in that it also provides detailed indexes on different declarations of the Movement, such as the Final Communiqué of the 1955 Asian-African Conference or the 1970 Lusaka Declaration on Peace. However, none of the above studies goes beyond 1986.⁸ It should be noted that each Summit Conference published a set of documents and on the meeting itself, but the volumes on the early

⁷ MS Rajan: *The Future of Nonalignment and the Nonaligned Movement*.

⁸ II Kovalenko and RA Tuzmukhamedov: *The Non-Aligned Movement*; V Benevolensky: *The Non-Aligned Movement*; AW Singham and Shirley Hune: *Non-Alignment in an Age of Alignments*.

summits are difficult to obtain. Recently, the South African Department of Foreign Affairs published the *Basic Documents of the XIIth Summit Conference of Heads of State or Government of the Nonaligned Movement* held in Durban in 1998. This document deals with an analysis of the then international situation, economic issues as well as social issues. The shift in emphasis was that the Movement discussed humanitarian problems, such as refugees, repatriated and internally displaced persons, the situation of children, elderly people, international drug control and human rights.

There has been a trend to confuse the idea of neutrality with nonalignment or to use the terms interchangeably. G Liska, a student of the American tradition, misunderstands the nonaligned concept of anti-bloc politics. However, for JW Burton, *neutrality*, a term commonly used before the Second World War implies non-involvement in international relations while *nonalignment* involves abstention from the Cold War.⁹

Some scholars have been concerned also with the theory and practice of nonalignment.¹⁰ Some have used quantitative methods to separate the practice from the theory. The vote in the United Nations (UN) became an important source of data. An example of this kind of research is Jackson's study of the nonaligned countries at the UN.¹¹ Similarly, the British scholar P Willets has utilised this methodology to describe both the coalition and the break up of coalitions within the nonaligned system.¹² Like AW Singham, a political scientist, it is my belief that this type of data collection and analysis has a limited value in understanding the complexities of a movement like the NAM.¹³ Moreover, R Jackson, II Kovalenko, V Benevolensky,

⁹ JW Burton: *Nonalignment and Neutrality*.

¹⁰ L Mates: *Nonalignment Theory and Current Policy*.

¹¹ RL Jackson: *The Non-Aligned, the UN and the Superpowers*.

¹² P Willets: *The Non-Aligned Movement*.

¹³ AW Singham and Shirley Hune: *Non-Alignment in an Age of Alignments*, p. 387.

MS Rajan and R Allison deal with divergent American and Soviet policies toward the NAM and nonaligned perceptions of the superpowers.¹⁴

II Kovalenko and V Benevolensky, socialist scientists, found the Soviet Union to be a "natural ally" of the Movement. However, R Allison analyses why Soviet leaders had little interest in sustaining nonalignment in the 1950s and the 1960s and how thereafter they elaborated strategies to use the uncommitted countries in the competitive struggle between East and West. The Soviet conception was different from the spirit of nonalignment: the nonaligned states were not to participate in Western alliances, instead, these states were to rely on Soviet protection.¹⁵

In this bipolar world, MS Rajan, an Indian political scientist, proposes China's membership of the NAM even though this country is a nuclear-weaponed power and a Permanent Member of the Security Council. This membership might promote the NAM goal of détente between the Cold War blocs and pressurise the superpowers to hasten the process. It might also help other objectives of NAM, such as decolonisation, racial equality and Third World economic development, because China itself claims to be a Third World country and works with other nations in international forums.¹⁶

MS Rajan's essays show how the NAM stands for greater "democratisation" of international relations. For the Movement, decision-making on issues of vital concern to all countries of the world can no longer be the prerogative of a small group of countries, however powerful they may be. Thus the NAM believes that all countries should be independent, sovereign and equal among themselves, irrespective of their size, or economic and military strength.¹⁷

¹⁴ MS Rajan: *The Future of Nonalignment and the Nonaligned Movement*; R Allison: *The Soviet Union and the Strategy of Non-Alignment*.

¹⁵ R Allison: *The Soviet Union and the Strategy of Non-Alignment*, p. 3.

¹⁶ MS Rajan: *The Future of Nonalignment and the Nonaligned Movement*, p. 80.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

A number of case studies can be referred to that relate to Yugoslavia, India and Algeria.¹⁸ L Mates, a Yugoslav author, former diplomat and the Secretary-General of the Belgrade Conference, highlights the ideological nature of Yugoslavia's nonaligned policy.¹⁹ P Jevremovic, a political scientist, disagrees with Mates' thesis of the absence of a utilitarian component in Yugoslavia's option for the policy of nonalignment, since it was security reasons that had led Yugoslavia to join the nonaligned nations when it was expelled from Cominform and thereafter became a "diplomatic superpower".²⁰

According to A Lassassi, a former political student, Algeria was among the most diplomatically active members of the Movement. One assumption of his study is that, with the rise of Algerian nationalism, Algeria continued to struggle against permanent economic, social and cultural subordination. This struggle coincided with the goal of nonalignment. This attitude in the Algerian context has its roots in the Algerian anti-colonial struggle. A Lassassi also explains the connection between the FLN (National Liberation Front) and nonaligned policy. The attention and support directed by Algeria toward the liberation movements in Africa, Asia and Latin America is interpreted as a strategy to create unity and to confront injustice because they were colonised for a long time. The study examines the Algerian relationship with the superpowers and concludes that Algeria rejected the ideological dispute between them. However, its anti-American policy is perceived as solely the result of America's own attitudes toward issues with which the Algerian government was concerned. The Algerian diplomacy of protest reflects, according to this author, a plausible conception of Algeria's nonalignment and independent policy, which can only be realised through change in the international system.²¹

¹⁸ W Zimmerman: *Open borders, Nonalignment and the Political Evolution of Yugoslavia*; A Lassassi: *Non-Alignment and Algerian Foreign Policy*; RR Ramchandani: *NAM and Third World Development Dilemma in the Post-Cold War Era*.

¹⁹ L Mates: *Nonalignment Theory and Current Policy*.

²⁰ P Jevremovic: Nonaligned Movement, in *International Studies*, p. 279.

²¹ A Lassassi: *Non-Alignment and Algerian Foreign Policy*, pp. xii-xiii.

The plea for a New International Economic Order (NIEO) created in turn a literature on the NAM. C Murphy's idea is that the NIEO ideology developed as an understandable response to real problems experienced by Third World states as a result of the creation and operation of Bretton Woods system. This study shows five distinct phases in North-South conflict, from the creation of the Bretton Woods system in the 1940s until after 1975.²² DC Thomas' study pays special attention to the Third World struggle to challenge the North-South division of labour through their quest for a NIEO and how these actors failed to achieve this goal as a result of global economic restructuring, the Second Cold War and the increase in militarised conflicts throughout the southern hemisphere.²³ RA Mortimer's study emphasizes the creation of the NAM and the Group of 77 and shows how these groups launched the NIEO. The techniques used by the Third World to claim equity, such as the "Oil Weapon", are described. Moreover, different results of the UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development) gatherings are addressed.²⁴

The role of the Movement in the 1990s is not well documented. Available studies emphasize the need for strengthening South-South cooperation and synchronisation of points of view on international problems in the new world order. RR Ramchandani examines aspects of the NAM, Third World state formation and underdevelopment problems in a comparative frame of the sub-Saharan states and India, and revisits the ups and downs of the fifty years of India-sub-Saharan economic cooperation to project the findings onto emerging post-Cold War paradigms. On the other hand, C Mahesh, a South African student, outlines issues in which the NAM should play a leadership role in this changing world, such as UN peace-keeping operations, global environmental issues and an increasing unwillingness on the part of the major

²² C Murphy: *The Emergence of the NIEO Ideology*.

²³ DC Thomas: *The Theory and Practice of Third World Solidarity*.

²⁴ RA Mortimer: *The Third World Coalition in International Politics*.

economic powers to abide by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)/ World Trade Organisation (WTO) rules.²⁵

The emphasis in this study, *The Changing Role and Identity of the Nonaligned Movement*, relates to the changing objectives of the NAM, before and after the Cold War (from its inception up to the 1998 Durban Summit). The study concentrates, mainly on the anti-war alternative advocated by nonalignment, but also on the Movement's other goals such as self-determination, cooperation among all nations and economic development as well as environmental issues and human rights. In order to understand better the rise of nonalignment and the Nonaligned Movement, it is necessary to focus our attention on the Cold War. For this reason, the second chapter of this study describes the Cold War with all the fears it brought to humanity. This description will entail determining how the superpowers used the Third World as a battleground as well as attempting to show how the Third World used the superpowers to further their domestic as well as foreign political agendas.

The leaders of anti-colonial movements realised that the Allied victory in the Second World War had not solved all their problems. For this reason, they wanted to benefit from the fatigued condition of the colonial powers to promote their independence. Thus three groups of countries appeared after the Second World War: the former allies divided into two camps between whom arose the Cold War confrontation, and the third force, represented first by the liberation movements in the colonies, and followed thereafter by the newly independent states that refused to join either of the two sides of the Cold War, in a policy called nonalignment.²⁶ The third chapter of this study will therefore examine the historical roots of nonalignment and the emergence of the Third World. For this purpose, special attention will be given to the Bandung Conference of 1955. This first important meeting of leaders from

²⁵ RR Ramchandani: *NAM and Third World Development Dilemma in the Post-Cold War Era*.

M Chetty: *A New Role For the Non-Aligned Movement in a Post-Cold War Era*; Rhodes University Electronic Thesis Collection at <http://www.ru.za/library/thesis/2000/chetty>, on 08/11/2001.

²⁶ L Mates: *Nonalignment and Current Policy*, p. 33.

independent Asian and African states created political energies that in the following years significantly influenced Third World politics and the shaping of nonalignment. A historical overview of the Nonaligned Movement is described up to the Durban Summit of 1998, the third summit conference in the post-Cold War era.

It is also interesting to see how role-players in this bipolar world handled the creation of an alternative force. Did the United States and the Soviet Union demonstrate different reactions due to their difference of ideology? Some specific cases in which the Nonaligned Movement contributed to bringing peace to the world are addressed in the fourth chapter. At issue is a discussion of the duty chosen by the Movement to tackle some acute problems provoked by the Cold War. The Nonaligned Movement's strategy was to encourage negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union or to create a nonaligned communication link between them. To what extent were these strategies successful?

By the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the demise and marginalisation of the NAM was envisaged by some observers. The question thus arises whether the Movement was only an alternative to the Cold War. The fifth chapter will examine main problems faced by the Movement since its origin. The most important of these is economic cooperation. The newly independent states located in the South (two-thirds of the world) are poorer than their former colonisers and the United States in the North. North-South cooperation became therefore the main division in world economics after 1991. The fifth chapter explains the NAM's struggle against the major powers' domination in decision-making on world issues of vital interest. For this reason, the struggle for the democratisation of the international institutions will be addressed as a perspective on the Movement's efficacy.

CHAPTER 2: UNDERSTANDING THE COLD WAR

The Cold War constituted a unique situation characterised by an ideological, political, economic and military confrontation between two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, after the Second World War and which continued well into the 1980s. This confrontation was not a conventional war, but the superpowers confronted each other indirectly in the Third World and in unusual terrains such as technology and the arms race. Thus the Cold War brought the whole world into a grip of terror that lasted nearly 50 years and influenced the whole spectrum of international relations. It is therefore essential to understand this unique international situation in order to understand the rise of the Nonaligned Movement.

In general, ideology played an important role in the Cold War. Considering American strength in 1945, the United States wanted to play an active international role in order to create a world in "accordance with American interests with freer trade and democracy, with evolved human values, such as free parties or self-determination".¹ From a communist ideological viewpoint, the Soviet Union in turn wanted to overthrow the Western way of life based on capitalist liberalism. However, in the interwar years, the Soviet Union was militarily too weak to effectively challenge the West. But after 1945, Moscow gained both the military power and the political will to export revolution – first to Eastern Europe, where its troops were already present by V-day, and then to states in the developing world.²

The two systems of the superpowers, capitalism and communism, were incompatible social systems. It was inevitable that the two superpowers would compete since they both possessed a universal drive to recreate themselves on a global scale. Capitalism needed economic growth and constantly expanding markets; Soviet communism needed to expand to legitimise the revolution.³ The primary American interest during

¹ G Lundestad: *East, West, North, South*, pp. 61-62.

² M Bowker: *Russian Foreign Policy and the End of the Cold War*, pp. 243-244.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 246.

the twentieth century had been to keep key centres of military-industrial capability from falling under hostile control. After 1945, this interest required that Western Europe and Japan be protected against an ambitious Soviet Union.⁴ Thus the elimination of each other was necessary and imperative. The two superpowers were therefore obliged to enter a military struggle for pre-eminence.

2.1 THE ORIGINS OF THE COLD WAR

The tension between the USA and Russia was not just purely a result of the Second World War, or even the Communist victory of 1917. These two countries did not at the outset come into conflict because one was communist and the other capitalist. The first confrontation was on the plains of north China and Manchuria in the late nineteenth century when both countries were expanding their colonial influences: America westward and the Russians into Asia.⁵

Until this confrontation, no significant conflict had marred the relations between the USA and Russia. Whenever conflicts did occasionally arise over settlements in California and Alaska, the Russians retreated before the demands of the American expansionists.⁶ The two countries had therefore satisfactory relations as the first trade contacts between Russia and the young American republic are usually considered to have been established toward the end of the War of Independence.⁷ The first trade agreement was signed in 1803⁸ and diplomatic relations were established between 1808 and 1812.⁹ What is more, negotiations for the Alaska treaty between Secretary

⁴ JL Gaddis: The Evolution of Containment, in TL Deibel and JL Gaddis: *Containing the Soviet Union*, p. 2.

⁵ W LaFeber: *America, Russia and the Cold War*, p. 1.

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 1-2.

⁷ NN Bolkhovitinov: *The Beginnings of Russian-American Relations*, p. 11.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 96.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 187.

of State, William S. Seward and Baron Edward Stoeckl, the Russian Minister to the United States - the Russians wanted to unload Alaska and Seward as the most ardent expansionist in America history wanted to acquire Alaska - were simple, direct, friendly, intimate.¹⁰

However, in the late 19th century, Americans began finding many faults with their former friends. First, the Russian empire was centralised by an oppressive and brutal bureaucracy. In contrast, the American commonwealth of states was decentralised, with states joined in a federation enjoying considerable freedom. The Russian empire condemned political opponents to Siberian prison camps and accelerated massacres against Russian Jews. As a result, anti-Russian feelings started spreading across the United States. Americans also disagreed with Russia on a new colonial economic policy. While both countries wanted to benefit from an open world marketplace, the Russians imposed political control rather than creating a commercial empire. Russia tried to control its influence and lands in Asia by closing these markets to the other businessmen with whom they could not compete. Thus, Russians were eager to colonise and close off Manchuria.¹¹

Consequently, the United States tried to contain Russian expansion, from the 1890s until 1917, by supporting Japan whose rapid population growth and imperialist ambitions could also gain from an open Manchuria policy. The United States was unhappy with Russia's policy in Asia and even though the Czar allied with England and France against Germany in the First World War, this meant little to American business. For the Americans, the Allies' victory meant domination by Russia on the continent of Europe and even less chance of economic concessions in Asia.¹²

¹⁰ JG Whelan: *Soviet Diplomacy and Negotiating Behavior*, p. 31.

¹¹ W LaFeber: *America, Russia and the Cold War*, pp. 2-3.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 3.

Another reason for the deterioration of American-Russian relations was the threat of Russian Communism. During the First World War, Vladimir Lenin's Bolshevik movement used the extreme poverty in Russia as a lever to seize power from Czar Alexander. Lenin and the other founders of the Russian Revolution were convinced that capitalism was on the eve of collapse as predicted by the theories of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. Instead, the wide publication and public denouncement of capitalism by the leaders of the revolution led to disgust in capitalist countries.¹³

The Bolsheviks were not only against the war, but also promised "bread, land and peace" to the desperate population in Russia.¹⁴ Furthermore, Bolshevik propaganda caused many strikes among Allied forces. As a result, France was obliged to dismiss the Chief Commandant of its troops and appointed General Philip Pétain to reorganise the French Army. Due to the ideologically based hatred of war and imperialism and the clear lack of finances, the Russian revolutionary government abandoned the European war effort in late November and a peace treaty with Germany was ratified by the Congress of Soviets, legally the highest body of the country, in March 1918.¹⁵ The Russian withdrawal meant that the failure of the Allied forces would implicate Americans since the latter were fighting on the side of the Allies.

The Western powers were dismayed by the Bolshevik revolution and the ensuing peace treaty with Germany. In Russia, the ownership of land that had been seized by Russian peasants was legitimised, private trade was forbidden, and all industry was nationalized. Russia was the first state to implement Marxist doctrine, and the Allies felt obliged to intervene as this was a direct attack on the "capitalist way": England sent troops to northern Russia to support anti-Bolshevik armies; French, Japanese, Canadian and American troops tried to intervene too; the Polish army invaded the Ukraine and seized Kiev. But the Allied intervention failed to stop the Bolsheviks.¹⁶

¹³ W LaFeber: *America, Russia and the Cold War*, p. 3.

¹⁴ Y Denis: *Le monde d'Aujourd'hui*, p. 24.

¹⁵ BA Ulam: *Expansion and Coexistence*, p. 73.

¹⁶ I Jeremy and D Taylor: *The Cold War*, p. 5.

For the long term, the intervention confirmed the Soviet leaders belief that “capitalist encirclement” was directly aimed at strangling the communist regime.¹⁷

Another source of mistrust between the Soviet Union and Western countries was the Versailles Peace Conference. In 1919, the Allies tried to isolate the Soviets by creating buffer states such as Poland, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia in Eastern Europe.¹⁸ At the same conference, President Woodrow Wilson projected American values into the heart of world politics by the establishment of the League of Nations. A League of Nations was founded with the aim of guaranteeing political independence and territorial integrity. Russia was excluded, first because of its ideology and, then because it had signed a separate peace treaty with Germany.¹⁹

The Second World War became another source of misunderstanding. During this war, European countries forged their alliances on the basis of strategic interests rather than a common ideology. In time, when Adolf Hitler, became the German Chancellor, he intended to avenge the humiliation brought on Germany by the Versailles Treaty, to occupy Eastern Europe, and to destroy communism. France and Britain stood by passively while Germany reoccupied the Rhineland, which had been demilitarised during the Versailles Treaty, and annexed Austria.²⁰ It was clear that in order to destroy communism, the western countries would have to support Hitler. However, Germany had high expansionist ambitions.

The Soviet Union’s relations with the Western powers totally disintegrated after the Munich conference of 1938, at which Hitler’s claims to Czechoslovakia and the Sudeten regions were recognized. As BA Weisberger, an American historian, argues, the Munich agreement – the formal pact to give Germany Czechoslovakia's

¹⁷ W LaFeber: *America, Russia and the Cold War*, p. 3.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

¹⁹ I Jeremy and D Taylor: *The Cold War*, p. 8.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 9-10.

Sudetenland border region – was a profoundly tragic experience for the world. For the Russians, it seemed that French and British reactionaries had decided to turn the frenetically anti-Bolshevik Hitler eastward. To the former, a Balkan peninsula of Nazi satellites was a better bargain than a deal with Communism.²¹ This indolence allowed Hitler to invade Poland. Surprisingly, the communist Soviet Union and Nazi Germany, two ideologically opposed governments, announced a non-aggression pact in 1939. The unlikely partnership of Hitler and Stalin agreed to divide Poland and the Balkans between themselves. Thus, Hitler had no enemy who would attack from the East and could concentrate his war efforts on the Western front.²²

During this period, Russian-American relations were problematical. The Soviet invasion of Finland provided a strategic buffer for Stalin, but confirmed to America that the Soviet Union brutalised its small neighbours.²³ The United States did not immediately enter the Second World War, but when Hitler defeated and occupied France, American President, Franklin Roosevelt, began financing Britain's war effort. England was expecting an invasion from Germany and it had a proven historical and economic collaboration with the USA – it was only a matter of time before the United States would be drawn into the war.²⁴

Despite Britain's disgust with the Soviet Union's ideology, British Prime Minister and noted anti-communist, Winston Churchill, welcomed the Soviet Union as a partner in the war on the side of the Allies, after the German invasion into Russia. Yet, as the Nazis drove deeper into the Soviet Union in 1942, the United States and Britain twice reneged on a promised bridgehead in Eastern Europe.²⁵ Instead of intervening, Britain and the USA discussed reports of a separate Soviet peace with Germany and the need for launching this as an interim military operation in Western

²¹ BA Weisberger: *Cold War Cold Peace*, pp. 200-201.

²² I Jeremy and D Taylor: *The Cold War*, p. 10.

²³ W LaFeber: *America, Russia and the Cold War*, pp. 6-7.

²⁴ I Jeremy and D Taylor: *The Cold War*, p. 10.

²⁵ W LaFeber: *America, Russia and the Cold War*, p. 8.

Europe in the event of a Russian collapse.²⁶ They discussed these plans with Soviet officials in order to distract Stalin from his territorial demands. This approach was also a way of weakening communism. They only cooperated with the Soviet Union because France was weak and they feared that Germany could be revived. An encircled Germany would be easily invaded.²⁷

2.1.1 Stalin and the Problem of Security

Although ideology played an important role in the Cold War conflict, the tensions that erupted between the Soviet Union and the United States were partially the result of different conceptions of the postwar world order. The Soviet Union controlled seven Eastern European countries whose absorption had been prepared during the last years of the war. Stalin was neither prepared to withdraw nor to introduce evolved human values of democracy and capitalism-liberalism into Eastern Europe. As a result, Soviet power extended over half of the European continent and communist expansion became a threat to Western countries.²⁸

Stalin and the other Soviet leaders often stressed the fact that Soviet policy in Eastern Europe was motivated by considerations of national security. As G Lundestad argues, there is little reason to doubt this was the case. During the preceding 30 years alone, Russia had been attacked by Germany twice. Besides this, there had been Western intervention in the Russian civil war and the war with Poland. The First World War had caused the fall of the Czar's regime. The Second had nearly resulted in the collapse of Stalin's rule.²⁹ In reality, the devastation had been enormous: in the First World War 1 700 000 Russians were killed, 4 900 000 wounded and 2 500 000 jailed by the enemy. During the Second World War, nearly one-third of Soviet former

²⁶ LE Davis: *The Cold War Begins*, p. 33.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 24.

²⁸ DC Thomas: *The Theory and Practice of Third World Solidarity*, p. 189.

²⁹ G Lundestad: *East, West, North, South*, p. 62.

wealth had been destroyed, thirty-two thousand factories were in ruins, 65 000 kilometers of railway track were rendered useless, an estimated 27 million people died, 1 710 towns were destroyed, and 70 000 villages and hamlets were burnt to the ground.³⁰ Thus for Stalin, security came through eliminating opponents and protecting the Soviet Union by exerting his control over world communism. The only problem was that security for one country tended to be insecurity for another.³¹

Before the United States entered the Second World War, rumors had affirmed commitments between Britain and the Soviet Union for postwar territorial arrangements in Eastern Europe.³² These rumors led Britain and the United States to state some principles known as the Atlantic Charter. In this agreement, both countries affirmed to seek no political or territorial aggrandizement before the end of the war. Moreover, any nations affected by hostilities had to choose the form of their government and determine their own postwar frontiers.³³ But the Charter signed later by the governments at war against Germany, including the Soviet Union did not produce a definition of any specific American goals or interests in this part of the world.³⁴

Efforts by the Soviet and British governments during 1941-42 to settle territorial questions were not the only causes for concern about Eastern Europe among American officials. At the Yalta conference in 1945, the areas of agreement and disagreement among the Allies concerning Poland were obvious. There was a dispute about the shape of postwar Poland. The British wanted to install the pro-Western government that was in exile in London; the Soviets wanted the rival pro-Soviet government that had been set up in Lublin, in South East Poland.³⁵ As Stalin insisted

³⁰ I Jeremy and D Taylor: *The Cold War*, p. 23.

³¹ G Lundestad: *East, West, North, South*, p. 63.

³² LE Davis: *The Cold War Begins*, p. 12.

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 15.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 384.

³⁵ BA Weisberger: *Cold War Cold Peace*, p. 31.

on clarity on the question of security, Roosevelt agreed to the Soviet's territorial demands in Poland dating back to 1941. Stalin wanted to keep what he had seized, both on the grounds of security and because he claimed the territory had been unfairly detached from the Soviet Union in 1920.³⁶ Roosevelt advocated the establishment of a government in Poland that would command the support of the three great powers and would include members of all Polish political groups. In contrast, Stalin stated that Soviet strategic security required friendly relations between Poland and the Soviet Union. During a war, Red Army lines of communication and supply in Poland had to be protected. Poland had to be established as a bulwark against Germany, since Poland had always been a corridor for German attack against the Soviet Union.³⁷

At Yalta, the United States, British, and Soviet governments defined a particular type of political future for Eastern Europe. They agreed to enforce in liberated Europe the principles of the Atlantic Charter, through the formation of representative governments and the holding of free elections. However, in the weeks following the conference, it became clear that the implementation of these principles would be difficult in the ex-German satellites of Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary. Stalin wanted to ensure that Russia would never be invaded from Europe again. As the Red Army liberated territories, Stalin had instructed his henchmen to set up pro-Soviet regimes. Even where the communists were in the minority, Stalin's tactics were the same.³⁸ Stalin insisted that communist exiles who spent the war in Moscow occupied the key ministries of economic planning, justice, and the interior. This ensured that control of the police and internal security was in the hands of his accomplices. Slowly, the communists worked at eliminating the opposition, edging each satellite country towards their goal of one party communist rule, under Soviet hegemony.³⁹

³⁶ BA Weisberger: *Cold War Cold Peace*, p. 31.

³⁷ LE Davis: *The Cold War Begins*, pp. 177-178.

³⁸ I Jeremy and D Taylor: *The Cold War*, p. 26.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 28.

By the end of 1945, conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union over Eastern Europe escalated. American officials read Soviet actions in this part of the world as Soviet intentions to expand outside of Eastern Europe, and as Soviet methods of world domination.⁴⁰ They linked the Eastern European case to the rest of the Soviet Union's behaviour. For instance, there was the matter of Azerbaijan. During the war, the Soviets had, by agreement, occupied the northern half of Iran. They were scheduled to withdraw in stages as 1945 came to an end. But the Soviet people delayed their departure from the northern province of Azerbaijan, because separatist rebels there were conducting uprisings, which endangered the security of the area. Iran protested that this was a fragile excuse to continue the Soviet military presence.⁴¹ This unresolved conflict provoked a re-examination by American officials of all their ideas about the Soviet Union and the future of Soviet-American relations.

2.2 THE NATURE OF THE COLD WAR

Between 1945 and 1947, Soviet influence increased in Eastern Europe and the satellite states were created. In Bulgaria, a Communist majority was returned to the parliament at the end of 1946. In Hungary, Prime Minister Ferenc Nagy was ousted in favor of a Communist in the spring of 1947. In Poland, Peasant Party leader Stanislas Mikolajczyk complained to the British and American ambassadors in 1946 that 13 members of his executive Committee and 791 party members were in jail, and at least 95 had been executed. In Yugoslavia, the only candidates for the parliament were members of the loyal communist, Josip B. Tito. In Rumania, a coalition "National Liberation Front" was gradually turned red.⁴²

The situation further deteriorated with a speech by Stalin in which he took an uncompromising Marxist-Leninist line, claiming that capitalism made war

⁴⁰ LE Davis: *The Cold War Begins*, p. 333.

⁴¹ BA Weisberger: *Cold War Cold Peace*, p. 53.

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 52.

inevitable.⁴³ On the other hand, Churchill, in a speech delivered at Fulton, Missouri, called on the English-speaking world to unite in an alliance against Soviet communism. The United States response was built on the latter philosophy. Thus in 1947, American President Harry Truman launched a crusade against Communism. Soviet pressures were to be met with force.⁴⁴ For this purpose, the United States adopted a strategic embargo designed to refuse goods that could be used to build up the Soviet military. Thus the Truman Doctrine was born. As a restrictive policy was impossible, the United States sought European and Japanese consent.⁴⁵

Through this Truman Doctrine, the United States took over from Britain - which had economic problems - the responsibility for protecting Greece and Turkey from communism.⁴⁶ In addition, the Marshall Plan was launched to recover the European economy weakened by the war. The objective of the Marshall Plan was ultimately to restore Europe's economies through American aid. Initially, this aid was offered to both Eastern and Western Europe. However, the Soviet Union rejected the Marshall Plan for Eastern European countries, an action that resulted in further anti-communist implications.⁴⁷

The Soviet Union responded to American involvement in Europe by creating the Kominform and Comecon. First, the Kominform was an office created to organise and harmonise the policies of communist parties.⁴⁸ Secondly, the Comecon was the Soviet Union's own counterpart to the Marshall Plan. Beginning in 1949, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania and the Soviet Union formed the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon or CMEA). The countries of Eastern Europe

⁴³ I Jeremy and D Taylor: *The Cold War*, p. 29.

⁴⁴ Y Denis: *Le Monde d' Aujourd'hui*, p. 52.

⁴⁵ AE Stent: Economic Containment, in TL Deibel and JL Gaddis: *Containing the Soviet Union*, p. 60.

⁴⁶ DC Thomas: *The Theory and Practice of Third World Solidarity*, p. 190.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 191.

⁴⁸ Y Denis: *Le Monde d' Aujourd'hui*, p. 54.

began to adopt long-range development plans based on the Soviet's model and to direct their trade toward the Soviet Union.⁴⁹ Two separate camps were therefore set up in political, economic as well as military opposition, but without a general confrontation.

This confrontation between the superpowers was characterised by a nuclear arms race with the possibility of escalation into a series of regional crises, which included Berlin (1948-1949 and 1958-1963), Korea (1950-1953), Cuba (1954-1962) and the Middle East. For instance, regarding the arms race, the United States had acquired an atom bomb before the end of the Second World War. By 1949, the Soviet Union had also acquired this technology and the first bomb was built. Moreover, American nuclear scientists built a super bomb – a thermonuclear device that was roughly a thousand times more powerful than the atom bomb - which was finally ready for testing in 1952. Surprisingly, in 1953, the Soviets tested their own thermonuclear bomb. Thus the arms race continued into the decades that followed.⁵⁰

The United States was involved in the above crisis to prevent Soviet expansionism. From the 1960s, however, there were a number of reasons that prevented the world from falling into a direct confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. As both superpowers had acquired the atom bomb, no leader could think in terms of winning a nuclear war. Therefore, military strategists no longer planned for victory, but for the avoidance of war. The fear of escalation also encouraged leaders to act with greater caution. The result of any breakdown in nuclear deterrence would have been global destruction.⁵¹ The superpowers could not risk a nuclear war. On the contrary, the Cold War was fought in a conventional military manner in the Third World. The NAM tried to avoid being used in this manner. The Movement was thus a way of managing the rules of the Cold War.

⁴⁹ DC Thomas: *The Theory and Practice of Third World Solidarity*, p. 191.

⁵⁰ I Jeremy and D Taylor: *The Cold War*, pp. 144-148.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 231-232.

The Cold War confrontation of the Stalinist years was replaced by negotiations. Nuclear threat was replaced by general agreements over the managements of the arms race of a divided world. Thus a "hotline" was set up in 1963 to improve communications between the Kremlin and the White House,⁵² the Non-Proliferation Treaty was signed in 1968, and in the 1970s the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaties (SALT) were signed, along with a whole series of other agreements on crisis management and prevention.⁵³

Gorbachev's reform or *perestroika* (restructuring) and *glasnost* (openness or transparency), and his surrender of communist rule in Eastern Europe were considered too much and too fast. But they did lead to liberation within the Soviet Union and to a Commonwealth of Independent States, which replaced the Soviet Union in 1991. When Communism fell, the Cold War simultaneously came to an end. In contrast, some consider the end of the Cold War to have occurred when the Berlin Wall came down in 1989. Communism did not fall only because the Reagan administration began a new phase of rearmament in the late 1980s on such a colossal scale that the Soviet Union, due to its economic problems could not follow, but also simply because Western society existed as a viable, alternative system. At least from the 1960s, the political freedoms found mainly in the West, the consumer society and the youth culture were envied by an increasing number of people in the East.⁵⁴

2.2.1 Pacts or Increase in Tension

In its narrowest sense, the term "alliance" can be taken to mean only those relationships in which there is a treaty obligation of protection against attack. But to so limit the definition would leave out virtually all security commitments formed in recent years. If "alliances" were defined in their broadest sense, however, one would

⁵² RW Stevenson: *The Rise and Fall of Détente*, p. 120.

⁵³ M Bowker: *Russian Foreign Policy and the End of the Cold War*, p. 251.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 253.

almost need to include any country with which the United States has a defence relationship, clearly a scope too broad for meaningful evaluation.⁵⁵

To be effective, alliances have to reflect a certain solidarity with other like-minded nations based on a real community of interest and outlook. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand and the United States) treaties of 1951 fulfilled these conditions. This first group of alliances, named Truman/Acheson alliances, was designed to achieve the first stage of containment, that of the protection of non-communist centres of world industrial capacity.⁵⁶

Firstly, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation was created in 1949 by means of a treaty signed by 12 Western countries, including the United States.⁵⁷ In 1948-49 the United States had opposed including countries in NATO that did not border on the Atlantic Ocean. Italy was the only exception. In 1952, the link to the Atlantic Ocean was weakened even more by the inclusion of Greece and Turkey. In 1955, after the French National Assembly had rejected the plans for a European army with German participation, West Germany became a member of NATO.⁵⁸

NATO resulted in a European effort to involve the United States in the containment of a rehabilitated Germany when it became clear that that nation would have to be rebuilt quickly if Europe was to resist Soviet pressures. As the Europeans were America's "real and natural allies", officials of the Truman administration were willing to give an American guarantee of European security, not primarily because they considered it necessary for deterrent purposes, but because of its psychological value in

⁵⁵ TL Deibel: Alliances for Containment, in TL Deibel and JL Gaddis: *Containing the Soviet Union*, p. 101.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 106.

⁵⁷ DC Thomas: *The Theory and Practice of Third World Solidarity*, p. 192.

⁵⁸ G Lundestad: *East, West, North, South*, p. 84.

maintaining the self-confidence Europe needed to continue with its economic and political rehabilitation.⁵⁹

President Truman requested \$1.45 billion for military aid, most of it for NATO allies. In this act, the United States demonstrated its willingness to arm its allies against communist expansion.⁶⁰ Ultimately, when in 1950, North Korea's attack on South Korea seemed to demonstrate that the Soviets really might begin a third world war, NATO was transformed from a political, confidence-building measure into an alliance-in-being with substantial numbers of American troops and an organisation headed by an American military commander.⁶¹ An attack on Western Europe would inevitably involve the United States. Moreover, the expansion of NATO and transference of the pact model from Europe to Asia was encouraged by the Korean War. This war rendered the evaluation of Soviet intentions even more negative than previously. Through an accelerated rearmament, the United States also acquired an instrument to pursue even more comprehensive commitments in ever new regions.⁶²

As early as during the Second World War, it had become evident that Australia and New Zealand would in security matters, orient themselves towards Washington and away from London, due to American involvement in the Pacific War. In 1951 the Truman administration was ready to consider this type of scheme. The intention was to work out an agreement between the United States, Japan, the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, and perhaps Britain and Indonesia as well. The US army was still sceptical about commitments on the Asian mainland.⁶³

⁵⁹ TL Deibel and JL Gaddis: Alliances for Containment, in TL Deibel and JL Gaddis: *Containing the Soviet Union*, pp. 106-107.

⁶⁰ DC Thomas: *The Theory and Practice of Third World Solidarity*, p. 194.

⁶¹ TL Deibel: Alliances for Containment, in TL Deibel and JL Gaddis: *Containing the Soviet Union*, p. 107.

⁶² G Lundestad: *East, West, North, South*, p. 84.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 82.

There was particularly strong opposition to including Japan. After the peace treaty with Japan was signed in 1951, the United States and Japan made a separate defence agreement which gave the United States the right to have bases in Japan. A second agreement was made with the Philippines. Then the United States, Australia and New Zealand entered into the ANZUS pact in September 1951. Britain was not a party to ANZUS.⁶⁴ Historically, Britain has played a leading role in this region, now this was gradually changing. The United States took over the role of former colonial powers and was determining policy in this region.

2.2.2 The Role of the Korean War

Korea was the first example of how superpowers used the Third World as a "battle-ground" for the Cold War conflicts. It was a former colonial country under superpower control. After the outbreak of this war, the United States entered into treaties and made commitments in a number of different regions and the number of its defence bases rose sharply.

For many centuries, Korea was governed as a unified area (from AD 665 to 1945). In 1885, China and Japan agreed to maintain the independence of Korea, but each was to have the right to send troops into the country upon giving notice to the other. In 1894 the Chinese sent troops into Korea to assist the King of Korea in crushing a revolt. Notice was sent to Japan with reference to that agreement. The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 occurred because the Japanese feared that the Chinese intended to conquer Korea, so the Japanese also sent troops. The Japanese, with their modern weapons were easily victorious.⁶⁵

The close geographical proximity of the Japanese home islands and Korea resulted in Japanese determination to assert herself in Korea so as to ensure the more effective

⁶⁴ G Lundestad: *East, West, North, South*, p. 82.

⁶⁵ GW Southgate: *Europe: 1870-1945*, p. 97.

defence of Japan herself. In addition, it was hoped to exploit Korea economically. But full Japanese rule was imposed in 1910 after a Korean nationalist had killed Ito, the Japanese resident general. The early Japanese governors-general were military men, distinguished by their narrow, intolerant attitude to their subjects. The first decade of annexation witnessed the most rigorous phase in which draconian punishments were enforced for resistance to Japan.⁶⁶

The prospects for Korea regaining its independence lay in the defeat of Japan during the Second World War: only two powers could achieve this, the United States and the Soviet Union. It was unclear as to what the fate of Korea would be at the end of the Pacific War, since Korean affairs would be subsumed in the profound questions involving the future of Japan and the eventual intervention of the Soviet Union, with much depending on the character of American-Soviet relationship at that time. In the United States, it was widely held that the Koreans would not be ready for independence when the war ended: memories of the closing phase of the Yi dynasty did not inspire confidence in Korean ability for effective government and the era of Japanese dominance had been so repressive as to necessitate a period of readjustment. The application of trusteeship offered the most satisfactory solution.⁶⁷

Earlier in the war, Franklin D. Roosevelt, the American President, had also given his tacit approval to a State Department Plan for a four-power trusteeship for Korea consisting of the United States, Great Britain, China and the Soviet Union that might last for twenty or thirty years. It would probably not be necessary to station troops in Korea during that period.⁶⁸

When Harry Truman took office in April 1945, he found a confusing assortment of contradictory policies and unfinished business. Like most Americans, Truman knew little about the postwar plans for Korea. Roosevelt's desire to bring the Soviets into

⁶⁶ P Lowe: *The Origins of the Korean War*, pp. 1-2.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

⁶⁸ MS Gallichio: *The Cold War Begins in Asia*, p. 4.

the Pacific War and his apparent refusal to involve American troops on the mainland meant that the Soviets would have the dominant voice in Korea's future.⁶⁹

American contemplation of Korea intensified in the course of July 1945, aimed at the deeper considerations of the most effective method of terminating the Pacific War. The State Department planners believed that significant American participation in the trusteeship was essential for a free and democratic Korea. First envisaged as a means of balancing competing American interests on the peninsula, American participation in a four-power trusteeship gradually evolved into a means of preventing Soviet hegemony in Korea.⁷⁰ For this purpose, General George Marshall and his colleagues in the Joint Chiefs of Staff believed the United States must occupy at least part of Korea in order to increase American power in the postwar balance between American and Soviets interests in the Far East. The 38th parallel was already being envisaged as a possible division but no decision was taken in July to propose it formally.⁷¹

The acquisition of an atom bomb offered Truman a chance to avoid a repetition of events in Eastern Europe. Convinced a Japanese surrender could be achieved without Soviet assistance, Truman sought to steal a march on the Soviet Union by landing troops in Korea. Altogether, it seems that Truman wanted to prevent a unilateral occupation of the peninsula by the Soviet Union. Truman and his advisors decided to abandon trusteeship in anticipation of a rapid end to the Pacific war that would forestall Soviet occupation.⁷²

When the first atom bomb was dropped, the American State Department planners were still discussing the means of control that would be employed to administer Korea. The Soviet Union, which had declared war on Japan only a day before

⁶⁹ MS Gallichio: *The Cold War Begins in Asia*, p. 24.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

⁷¹ P Lowe: *The Beginnings of the Korean War*, p. 12.

⁷² MS Gallichio: *The Cold War Begins in Asia*, p. 25.

Nagasaki was bombed, marched through Manchuria and entered Korea. But with the war coming to a sudden end, the United States proposed to the Soviet Union the division of the Korean peninsula at the 38th parallel.⁷³ This line would ensure that the United States obtained control of two important ports and the capital of Korea.⁷⁴ The United States occupied the South, while the Soviet Union the North. Stalin was satisfied with this agreement and was not tempted to violate it. Really, he adhered to the agreement because he wished to maintain satisfactory relations with the United States if possible and perhaps because he felt sooner than later Korea would fall into the Soviet sphere in any case.⁷⁵ The Soviet Union had sponsored Korean liberation groups and there were 100 000 Koreans - many of them devoted to Stalin - in Central Asia, ready to go back. Stalin could then control the peninsula with Soviet-trained proxies.⁷⁶

Between 1945 and 1947, the situation in Korea polarised as the two power blocs, North and South, became established. Both sides constantly expressed their desire for national unity, but in practice, re-unification became an ever remoter goal. As in Europe, the difficulties of postwar reconstruction plunged much of Korea into economic chaos and hardship.⁷⁷ The United Nations became more involved in Korean affairs from the beginning of 1948 as a consequence of the acceptance by the UN General Assembly of the American proposal that elections should be held in both parts of Korea to achieve a national assembly and then a unified government for Korea. The Soviet Union made clear its firm opposition to this proposal, maintaining that UN intervention was unnecessary and that Korea could advance to independence through the withdrawal of foreign forces and agreement reached among the Koreans themselves.⁷⁸ Elections eventually went ahead only in the South, and with the

⁷³ I Jeremy and D Taylor: *The Cold War*, p. 83.

⁷⁴ MS Gallichio: *The Cold War Begins in Asia*, p. 77.

⁷⁵ P Lowe: *The Beginnings of the Korean War*, p. 20.

⁷⁶ MS Gallichio: *The Cold War Begins in Asia*, p. 25.

⁷⁷ I Jeremy and D Taylor: *The Cold War*, p. 85.

⁷⁸ P Lowe: *The Korean War Begins*, p. 43.

Communists boycotting the polls. Rhee Syngman and his right-wing supporters won a majority of seats in Korea's new constitutional assembly and he became president of the new Republic of Korea. A month later the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was proclaimed in Pyongyang.⁷⁹

During 1949 the border between the two Korean regimes became tense as both sides made incursions across it. Radio propaganda from the North constantly predicted imminent invasion. In the South left-wing activists by the thousands were arrested and imprisoned. Meanwhile, the Red Army maintained left only a few advisers in the North and in 1949 the United States withdrew from the South, as its officials were involved in the Berlin crisis.⁸⁰

In June 1950, Stalin, who had originally opposed a North Korean attack on the South, now feared the risks of American intervention in view of the underdeveloped North Korean military, and agreed on the attack of North Korea, because of the Communists' victory in China. In January 1950, the formation was under way in Moscow of an alliance between the Soviet Union and the newly established People's Republic of China. Moreover, Stalin's approval to attack must have been at least in part a response to the new defence policy announced by Secretary of State, Dean Acheson on January 12, 1950, that placed South Korea outside the American defence perimeter in the Pacific.⁸¹ Furthermore, the Soviet Union had acquired an atom bomb in 1949. Stalin felt then more confident that the United States would hesitate to intervene in a distant war. The attack was interpreted by the United States as a step to throw the United States and its Allies out of Asia. To the extent that Stalin was pulling the strings of Kim Il Sung, the communist leader of North Korea, this judgment was justified. On the other side, the attack was justified by another material advantage. Some documents reveal that Stalin was ready to help North Korea. These

⁷⁹ I Jeremy and D Taylor: *The Cold War*, p. 85.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

⁸¹ K. Weathersby: *To Attack or not to Attack? Stalin, Kim Il Sung and the Prelude to War* at <http://cwhip.si.edu/cwhiplib.nf>, on 24/05/2002.

stated that the matter "needs large preparations" and "must be organised so that there would not be too great risk". Stalin then requested that Kim provide the Soviet Union with at least 25,000 tons of lead per year.⁸² G Kennan argues also that the evident determination of the United States to keep its military forces in Japan, and to keep Japan in the Western alliance system was "among the various considerations that might have impelled Stalin to authorise" the Korean attack".⁸³

The United Nations, called on by the United States for the first time, voted to send troops to assist one country attacked by another. At first, North Korea was victorious. But when American troops led by MacArthur pushed Kim to the North, Pyongyang fell to a combined force of United Nations and South Korean troops, the only communist capital to fall to the West in the Cold War. Consequently, Chinese People's Volunteers were also obliged to intervene on behalf of North Korea.⁸⁴

The Korean War ended in 1953 with heavy consequences. The United States lost 54 000 men; the other nations of the UN force lost more than 3,000 men, the South Korean Army lost 415 000 men; the North suffered nearly a million deaths and a further 100 000 were wounded; the Chinese lost 112 000 men. There were terrible civilian losses from American bombing of the North and at least 5 million refugees were left homeless in the South. Seoul, Pyongyang and many other cities had been flattened. The world, during the Korean War, came close to a second Hiroshima, but both sides showed restraint. Yet, the Japanese economy grew;⁸⁵ China was elevated to the status of a world power from being able to stop the fall of North Korea, and the United States halted the spread of communism.⁸⁶ However, Korea remained divided

⁸² K. Weathersby: *To Attack or not to Attack? Stalin, Kim Il Sung and the Prelude to War* at <http://cwhip.si.edu/cwihplib.nf>, on 24.05.2002.

⁸³ G Kennan: *Memoirs 1950-1963*, vol II, p. 39, in TL Deibel and JL Gaddis: *Containing the Soviet Union*, p. 108.

⁸⁴ I Jeremy: *The Cold War*, p. 95.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 104.

⁸⁶ Y Denis: *Le Monde d' Aujourd' hui*, p. 54.

at the 38th parallel: an example of how the independence and sovereign integrity of small countries became compromised by the involvement of superpowers in the Third World. The United States' presence in Asia increased and a new strategy of alliances was adopted.

2.2.3 The Strengthening of Pacts

As a result of the Korean War, the Eisenhower administration (1953-1961) placed even greater emphasis than its predecessor on building up a bulwark against Communism in Asia. For this purpose, the United States established other security pacts to guarantee the safety of the member states against any attack, whether from a resurgent Japan, a belligerent Indonesia, or an expansionist People's Republic of China.⁸⁷ Through the Taiwanese and South Korean alliances, SEATO (South East Asian Treaty Organisation) and CENTO (Central Treaty Organisation), John Foster Dulles, American Secretary of State, connected NATO with the Pacific defences he had earlier negotiated, politically, by tying the developed European and Pacific powers into SEATO and CENTO, and geographically, by completing the arc of allies from South Korea, Taiwan, and four Indochinese nations through Pakistan to Iran, Iraq and Turkey. In reality, Dulles' core strategy was not global alliances, but massive retaliation.⁸⁸ The more countries that were included in these agreements, the stronger the West would become and the smaller the chances of communist aggression would be. Definite zones had to be drawn up. If the Soviet Union or one of its allies overstepped these regions, the West, led by the United States, would respond in military terms.⁸⁹ This strategy shows that the Asian continent was encircled by two opposing powers, which made for an uncertain situation.

In 1953, an alliance with Korea was signed to reinsure the precarious armistice, which had just ended the Korean War, by making it clear that the United States would come

⁸⁷ DC Thomas: *The Theory and Practice of Third World Solidarity*, p. 199.

⁸⁸ TL Deibel and JL Gaddis: *Containing the Soviet Union*, p. 111.

⁸⁹ G Lundestad: *East, West, North, South*, p. 82.

to Korea's defence in case of a second armed attack.⁹⁰ Taiwan too had long been eager for closer contact with the United States. In this respect, the United States stepped up its verbal support for Chiang Kai-Shek, the KMT-leader who fled to Taiwan, after the 1949 Revolution in China. The American fleet was withdrawn from the Formosa Straits, which would make it easier for Chiang to carry out operations on the mainland. In September, the Communists began to bombard the island of Quemoy, which was located just off the mainland and far from Taiwan, which controlled it. Despite initial reservations on the part of President Dwight Eisenhower, Washington agreed to enter into a security agreement with Taiwan in December 1954.⁹¹ Although the Eisenhower administration was vague as to precisely which of the offshore islands it intended to defend, the treaty's purpose was to dissuade the People's Republic of China from going too far in pressing its military case against the Chiang regime on Formosa.⁹² China's attack was a reaction to the pending signing of a security agreement with Taiwan. Thus one of the leading Third World countries was drawn into the Cold War struggle as a result of the domestic issue of Taiwan.

The above-mentioned SEATO came to fruition as an American scheme to hold the line against further communist gains in Indochina after the collapse of the entire French effort and the negotiated partition of Vietnam at the 1954 Geneva Conference.⁹³ SEATO had fewer members than Washington had hoped for. India and Indonesia had no desire to belong. The British protested against including Taiwan. France would not accept South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. According to the Geneva agreement, the latter three were to be neutral in any case, although, they were partially covered by the SEATO pact. Finally, the members were the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand and Pakistan.⁹⁴

⁹⁰ TL Deibel and JL Gaddis: *Containing the Soviet Union*, p. 111.

⁹¹ G Lundestad: *East, West, North, South*, p. 83.

⁹² TL Deibel and JL Gaddis: *Containing the Soviet Union*, p. 110.

⁹³ *Ibid.*

⁹⁴ G Lundestad: *East, West, North, South*, p. 84.

After the establishment of SEATO, the largest gap in the alliance system was in the Middle East and western Asia, between Turkey in NATO and Pakistan in SEATO. Both South East Asia and the Middle East were regions where many new independent states were to emerge. Both regions were characterised by local and domestic conflicts. The United States thus had to build a strong presence and create a strong role in these regions as a player in the Cold War. To some extent, the United States perceived the British presence as a factor that contributed to making the countries there more radical, thus making the establishment of a front against communism more difficult. But in 1955, the Baghdad Pact was established with the United Kingdom, Turkey, Pakistan, Iran, and Iraq as members.⁹⁵ This pact was initiated by the British to maintain their presence in the region as Gamal Abdul Nasser had expelled them out of Egypt⁹⁶ and the United States was only indirectly linked to the new system. The pact resulted in the polarisation of the Middle East. Those states that were not included tended to be in a position of rivalry in relation to those that were members. Washington wanted to maintain relations with the countries that at least partially considered the Baghdad Pact to be an extension of British colonialism.⁹⁷

The new organisation brought about by the pact was not a success. The British felt betrayed by the Americans. In July 1958, General Abdul Karim Kassem seized power in Iraq and changed entirely the course of Iraqi foreign policy. The country took the path of nonalignment and left the Baghdad Pact. That was a heavy blow to the policy of blocs pursued by the Western powers in Asia. To save what remained of the pact, its organisers, the United States, moved the headquarters of the bloc to Ankara in Turkey and renamed the pact CENTO, the Central Treaty Organisation.⁹⁸

⁹⁵ G Lundestad: *East, West, North, South*, p. 80.

⁹⁶ TL Deibel and JL Gaddis: *Containing the Soviet Union*, p. 111.

⁹⁷ G Lundestad: *East, West, North, South*, p. 85.

⁹⁸ Y Alimov: *The Rise and Growth of the Non-Aligned Movement*, p. 39.

GH Jansen argues that Pakistan's reasons for joining both the Baghdad Pact and SEATO were very simple: it wanted arms and political support against India – which was a threat to it, especially because of their dispute over Kashmir.⁹⁹ The United States and India had held differing views on several issues during the Korean War; they disagreed over the peace treaty for Japan, and not least over the establishment of SEATO, which brought the United States into a close relationship with India's rival, Pakistan.¹⁰⁰ In addition, Thailand's reason for joining SEATO was a direct fear of Communist China. A leftist Thai leader, Pridi Panomyang, had been granted asylum there. The Philippines were also afraid of China, but their worries were not very serious. Perhaps they hoped to gain economic assistance from the United States.¹⁰¹ Thus some Third World countries wanted to benefit from the Cold War by solving their own problems.

Due to this American involvement in the Third World, the Soviet Union reorganised all its military alliances into the Warsaw Pact of 1955, in order to coordinate and control its satellites forces.¹⁰² In the 1950s, the Soviets had advocated a system of collective security in Europe and Asia as a basis for destroying the Western-inspired pacts, NATO, SEATO, and ANZUS, and the bilateral pacts that the United States had concluded with South Korea, the Philippines and Japan.¹⁰³

Was it possible to avoid this Cold War, which brought countries into threatening alliances, changed countries into a battleground for the superpowers and prevented them from enjoying their sovereignty? It is not easy to speculate on the possibility of the prevention of the Cold War. However, this conflict resulted, as explained above, by a situation created mainly by the Second World War. As the end of the war approached, it became clear that only the United States and the Soviet Union could

⁹⁹ GH Jansen: *Non-Alignment and the Afro-Asian States*, p. 134.

¹⁰⁰ G Lundestad: *East, West, North, South*, p. 88.

¹⁰¹ GH Jansen: *Non-Alignment and Afro-Asian States*, p. 135.

¹⁰² DC Thomas: *Theory and Practice of Third World Solidarity*, p. 194.

¹⁰³ R Allison: *The Soviet Union and the Strategy of Nonalignment*, p. 184.

fill the vacuum left by the fascist regimes. At the outset, Americans had not thought about the balance of power in Europe; they continued to be committed to certain principles – the respect for the right of all peoples to determine freely the composition of their governments at the conclusion of hostilities and to convince their allies to postpone the resolution of the difficult political and territorial questions in Europe until after the war, without thinking very carefully about why they were doing so.¹⁰⁴

In 1945, when the Soviet Union began creating minority governments, American officials could have defined clearly for the Soviet Union what they hoped the political future of Eastern Europe would look like and could have spelled out precisely why they opposed Soviet actions. They could have undertaken to diminish Soviet fears of a resurgent Germany by keeping their forces in Europe after the war.¹⁰⁵ If this did not produce Soviet agreement to the holding of free elections, the United States could have used all its available influence, for instance lend-lease aid and postwar reconstruction assistance, to ensure the establishment of truly representative governments. American officials could clearly have informed the Soviet Union that the United States did not want to threaten Soviet security interests in this part of the world.¹⁰⁶

On the other hand, Stalin also had choices to make. As he did not have more than one party, he could easily have imposed on his country a peaceful co-existence with Western countries. Communism would then have expanded by democratic means and not by the violence advocated by Marx or Lenin. As I Jeremy argues, Stalin did not give up the concept of world revolution;¹⁰⁷ Soviet actions in Europe therefore would not have been the indicative of Soviet intentions around the world. As a result, having no mutual way of filling the vacuum, conflict was inevitable.

¹⁰⁴ LE Davis: *The Cold War Begins*, p. 371.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 393.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 373-374.

¹⁰⁷ I Jeremy and D Taylor: *The Cold War*, p. 7.

In reaction to this fact, the aim of the new nations that emerged first in Asia and then in Africa was a firm determination to keep at a distance from the two major blocs. Standing outside the two alliances gave them a stronger feeling of not being dominated again by powerful centres of military and economic might. The interposition of an important zone playing the role of no man's land did, in fact, restrain the extent and the intensity of the superpower confrontation in the Third World. Numerous confrontations resulted, but a general confrontation with massive alignments was avoided.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁸ L Mates: Security through Non-Alignment, in *Bulletin of Peace Proposals*, p. 169.

CHAPTER 3: THE NONALIGNED MOVEMENT: A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

The historical roots of the Nonaligned Movement lie in the decade immediately following the end of the Second World War. The end of hostilities did not, as many had expected or desired, regenerate a world of peace, cooperation and prosperity. The outbreak of the Cold War confrontation was the pivotal key player for the formation of the Nonaligned Movement.

As II Kovalenko and RA Tuzmukhamedov, socialist scientists, argues, it would be a mistake to believe that external factors alone are responsible for the emergence of nonalignment; internal social, political and economic factors also played a part. There was above all the resolve of the colonial and dependent countries to do away with the vestiges of foreign domination and gain complete freedom and independence; break out of poverty, eradicate illiteracy and oppression, raise the working people's living standard and rebuild society on new democratic principles.¹ This chapter outlines the historical process of the newly- independent countries of Africa, Asia, and Latin America as they launched a middle ground within this bipolar world order toward nonalignment. The difference of this policy and neutrality are defined as well as different goals assigned to the Nonaligned Movement up to the 1998 Durban Summit, the third in the post-Cold War Era.

3.1 DEVELOPMENT OF AFRO-ASIANISM

The Nonaligned Movement took its origins in "*Pan-Africanism*" and "*Pan-Asianism*", which became thereafter the Afro-Asian Movement. Firstly, "*Pan-Africanism*" is generally taken to mean that set of political ideas asserting that Africa is a single entity which must unite. All the peoples of the continent are fundamentally similar. Most of them bore the burden of colonialism. The idea of Pan-Africanism first arose

¹ II Kovalenko and RA Tuzmukhamedov (ed.): *The Non-Aligned Movement*, p. 21.

as a manifestation of fraternal solidarity among Africans and peoples of African descent.² It was introduced to Dr William Dubois, an Afro-American intellectual, by a West Indian barrister named Henry Williams, who summoned the first Pan-African Conference in London in mid-July of 1900. In July 25, 1900, a memorial was addressed to Queen Victoria protesting the treatment of Africans in South Africa and the then Rhodesia.³

Pan-Africanism was in practice and right from the start, a set of ideas geared to combating the aggressive policies of colonisers in Africa. The first Pan-African Congress' resolution in 1919 embraced a variety of themes, but one emerged particularly clearly. The delegates insisted above all, on the right of the colonised peoples of Africa for self-determination, their right to own their own lands, and their right not to be exploited by investment capital. The Congress demanded that the former German colonies in Africa be placed under international control, a demand which was later distorted by the League of Nations when it imposed its system of mandates on countries such as Cameroon, Namibia, Tanganyika and Togo. As a consequence, a group of African intellectuals, "Liga Africana", emerged in Lisbon and were looking for reforms. This Liga was the political ancestor of what was later to become the Committee of Nationalist Organisations in the Portuguese colonies, of which the PAIGC of Guinea Bissau, the MPLA and Mozambique's FRELIMO were all members.⁴

Secondly, "Pan-Asianism" gained its momentum partially from the Japanese victory over the Russians in 1905. Asian countries gained self-confidence in their struggle to eliminate foreign rule. Under the direction of Sun-Yat-Tsen, a Pan-Asian front created out of the Black Dragon Secret Society played a dynamic role in China's politics. This organisation sought to end European penetration in China and the rest

² E M'Buyinga: *Pan-Africanism or Neo-Colonialism*, p. 28.

³ C Legum: *Pan-Africanism*, p. 25.

⁴ E M'Buyinga: *Pan-Africanism or Neo-Colonialism*, pp. 30-31.

of Asia. Japanese nationalists began thereafter to seek an association for a united Asia. Indian nationalists also rallied around the cause of Pan-Asianism.⁵

It is clear that the relationship between Pan-Africanism and the Arabs and Asians is that of sharing the common experience of the white superiority of colonialism, and of discrimination,⁶ and of wanting to eliminate this foreign rule to gain independence and unity. These movements, however, remained largely isolated from one another until after the Second World War, since the colonial powers had maintained their colonies with links only to the relevant metropolis in Europe. However, despite this isolation, intellectual elites from Africa and Asia found opportunities for meeting in European universities.⁷

The Bolshevik victory in 1917 also provided the Afro-Asian Movement with an ideological weapon with which to attack Western colonialism.⁸ Lenin's dictum against colonialism impressed African and Asian anti-imperialists. Both the communists and the far-left radicals of Western Europe served as important catalysts in bringing together the Asian and African nationalists in Europe.⁹ For example, in the Brussels Conference of Oppressed Peoples in February 1927, the Asian and African participants decided to cooperate in their struggle for independence. In this sense, the Brussels meeting was the father of Afro-Asian solidarity, and the forerunner of the conference at Bandung.¹⁰ Among the delegates were Afro-Asian leaders, such as Jawaharlal Nehru from India, Ho Chi Minh from Vietnam, Muhammad Hatta from Indonesia, Madame Sun Yat-Tsen from China and Leopold Sedar Senghor from Senegal.

⁵ DC Thomas: *The Theory and Practice of Third World Solidarity*, p. 37-38.

⁶ C Legum: *Pan-Africanism*, pp. 90-91.

⁷ D Kimche: *The Afro-Asian Movement*, p. 2.

⁸ DC Thomas: *The Theory and Practice of Third World Solidarity*, p. 32.

⁹ D Kimche: *The Afro-Asian Movement*, p. 3.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

Many Pan-African congresses were also organised by Dr William Dubois. The majority of participants were Americans and Indians, but African students in Europe also took an interest in Dubois' activities, including Jomo Kenyatta and Dr Namdi Azikiwe of Nigeria.¹¹ This momentum in Afro-Asianism appeared to weaken in the 1930s because of the 1929 Depression and the fascist regimes,¹² and colonial administrations. For example in Asia, Japan's conflict with China weakened the Pan-Asian ideals which had been generated mainly by both China and Japan. In addition, in India Nehru spent long periods in prison, while the Indian National Congress was occupied increasingly with its own struggle against the British. In Indonesia, the three leading nationalists, Ahmed Sukarno, Hatta and Soetan Sjahrir spent most of the 1930s in a detention camp.¹³ However, G Jansen noted that conferences and manifestoes, strikes and campaigns of civil disobedience became part of the accepted pattern of life in Egypt and the Arab countries, also in India and Burma (also called Myanmar), Indonesia and Indochina.¹⁴

The advent of the Second World War brought about fundamental changes in European colonial power. People in Africa and Asia began to perceive the weakness of their colonial masters as German armies occupied France. The introduction of African and Asian troops in this war further undermined Europe's hegemony in its colonies, by destroying the myth of the Europeans' invincibility.¹⁵ As a consequence, an Asian conference was held in New Delhi in 1947. The idea of holding a conference had been fermenting for some time in the minds of several Asian leaders such as Nehru. Even if this conference brought no tangible results, it marked the break with Asia's subservience to Europe and provided the opportunity for the leaders of Asia to assemble and get to know one other. Opening the conference, Nehru said: "Perhaps one of the notable consequences of the European domination of Asia has been the isolation of the countries of Asia from one another... As that domination

¹¹ D Kimche: *The Afro-Asian Movement*, p. 9.

¹² GH Jansen: *Non-Alignment and the Afro-Asian states*, p. 25.

¹³ D Kimche: *The Afro-Asian Movement*, p. 8.

¹⁴ GH Jansen: *Non-Alignment and the Afro-Asian states*, p. 25.

¹⁵ DC Thomas: *The Theory and Practice of Third World Solidarity*, p. 51.

goes, the walls that surrounded us fall down and we look at each other again and meet as old friends long parted... But in order to have "One World", we must also in Asia think of the countries of Asia co-operating together for that larger ideal."¹⁶ Thus the New Delhi conference accelerated the process of inter-Asian cooperation, which was to lead to Bandung and to the birth of Afro-Asianism.¹⁷ The Africanism was brought together with Asianism since Africa and Asia had a common heritage of colonial subjugation and the concomitant struggle for national independence.¹⁸

3.2 BANDUNG OR THE EMERGENCE OF THIRD WORLD SOLIDARITY

The Bandung Conference captured the imagination merely by its size. Twenty-nine delegations came to Bandung in April 1955. According to DC Thomas, the Asian-African conference was composed exclusively of the poorer and less-developed countries of Asia and Africa whose people together constituted more than half the world's population. It was a conference of the non-white nations of the international community.¹⁹ Equally impressive was the reputation of many of the leaders who came to Bandung: Prime Minister Nehru of India, the senior statesman of Asian independence; Prime Minister Chou En-Lai, extricating China from diplomatic isolation; Egyptian and Indonesian Presidents Nasser and Sukarno, representatives of an emergent neutralism; Princes Nordom Sihanouk of Cambodia and Faisal, traditional leaders advancing toward growing international roles alongside renowned nationalists like the Burmese U Nu and Mohammed Ali from Indonesia.²⁰ Did the combination of personalities heighten the accomplishments of the conference? What was the aim of this conference? Were the discussions the assertion of independence? Were they a reaction to the Cold War? Were they the ambition and vision of

¹⁶ Asian Relations Organisation, New Delhi, India, 1948, p. 8, in II Kovalenko: *The Non-Aligned Movement*, p. 10.

¹⁷ D Kimche: *The Afro-Asian Movement*, p. 33.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 18.

¹⁹ DC Thomas: *The Theory and Practice of Third World Solidarity*, p. 103.

²⁰ RA Mortimer: *The Third World Coalition in International Politics*, pp. 6-7.

individual leaders who wanted to play a strong international role? What was Africa's role in this gathering? I will be answering these questions.

3.2.1 Motivations, Agenda and Identities of Participants

The preparatory meeting for this conference of newly independent and developing countries was held in Bogor, Indonesia in December 1954, and was attended by the prime ministers of five Asian states: Ceylon (as Sri Lanka was known at the time), Burma, India, Pakistan and Indonesia. They had previously met in Colombo and in Kandy and it was at these early meetings that the idea of an Asia-Africa conference was conceived. Mr Ali Sostroamidjojo, the then Prime Minister of Ceylon proposed that the group of Colombo should hold an Asian-African conference to discuss some common concerns.²¹ At Bandung, it was the first time that a group of former colonial territories had met together without any of the European powers and, to all those taking part, this was an assertion of their independence.²²

Two interrelated factors had helped to decide Nehru's mind regarding the need for having the conference at all. One was the policy of military pacts pursued by the American Secretary of State, Dulles; the other was the lengthening shadow of Communist China over Asia. The American policy of containment of the communist bloc had been largely directed by the events in the Far East. The United States had, in the preceding two years, gone to the brink of war three times over Asian questions – in Korea in June 1953, in Indochina in April 1954 and in the Formosa Straits in the autumn of 1954. By the mid-1950s the United States had created a vast system of alliances throughout the world, which included forty-two sovereign states. As tension increased, so did the pressure which Dulles brought to bear on the non-committed nations, especially those of Asia. Thus, the holding of a conference would be the reply of the non-committed to the efforts of the West to establish a system of military

²¹ DC Thomas: *The Theory and Practice of Third World Solidarity*, p. 95.

²² B. Vickers: *Political History of the Non-Aligned Movement* at <http://.igd.org.za/nam>, on 08/11/2001.

alliances.²³ Secondly, there was in Asia the growing power of Communist China, which gained new significance after the Vietminh victory at Dien Bien Phu in 1954 and the creation of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. This communist encroachment created new political tension in South East Asia.²⁴

The Colombo participants saw the conference as an opportunity to lay a firmer foundation for China's peaceful relations with the rest of the world, not only with the West, but also especially with themselves and other areas of Southeast Asia peripheral with China. In Nehru's view, a country's particular ideology should not affect its membership in the international community and therefore China should participate as an equal member.²⁵ They had also three important objectives: first, avoiding war, especially between the United States and China; second, developing China's relations independently of the Soviet Union; and finally, containing Chinese and Vietnamese military power and influence at the southern borders of China and the eastern boundaries of Cambodia and Laos, and combating subversive communist activities in their own countries.²⁶

These countries had also individual objectives. For example, India sought to establish an "area of peace" between the two superpowers and would seek endorsement of "peaceful coexistence" by uncommitted countries of Africa and Asia. India sought also to keep Cambodia and Laos from establishing links with the SEATO, or the United States. Indonesia attracted attention to the promotion of its case in the dispute with the Netherlands over the western Guinea issue, while Pakistan saw an opportunity for building up its position for leadership in the Arab world by championing Arab grievances against Israel.²⁷ The Chinese attached importance to the Bandung Conference because they saw it as an opportunity to be accepted and

²³ D Kimche: *The Afro-Asian Movement*, p. 59.

²⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁵ AW Singham and Shirley Hune: *Non-Alignment in an Age of Alignments*, p. 66.

²⁶ D Kimche: *The Afro-Asian Movement*, pp. 61-62.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 62-63.

recognised by Asia. Furthermore, the Chinese sought to reassure non-communist Asians that they had nothing to fear from her, despite the communist victory in Vietnam.²⁸

The participants agreed to discuss economic cooperation, which included the peaceful use of atomic energy, cultural cooperation, human rights, self-determination and the question of Palestine. They also considered the problem of dependent peoples, including discussions on Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco and the problem of peace and cooperation, including disarmament and weapons of mass destruction.²⁹

However, as far as specific issues were concerned, the alignments within the context of the Cold War proved stronger than any feeling of Afro-Asian togetherness. The United States had urged its friends to take a positive and constructive attitude at the conference, and to resist only proposals that were anti-American. These friends were listed as the Philippines, Japan, South Vietnam, Laos, Thailand, Turkey, Pakistan, Ethiopia, Libya and the Central African Federation.³⁰ Regarding Chinese influence, Iran spoke of subversion and ideological interference; for Pakistan, ideological domination was a new and more insidious form of imperialism.³¹

Another example of the influence of Cold War alignments was that of the idea raised by Sir John Kotelawala, the then Sri Lankan Prime Minister, to condemn a new form of colonialism, that of the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe. This issue provoked many reactions from socialist countries.³² Chou En-Lai immediately reserved his right to speak on that issue the following day. Nehru and others anxious to maintain unity lobbied with Sir Kotelawala through the night to drop his proposal. The Chinese

²⁸ DC Thomas: *The Theory and Practice of Third World Solidarity*, p. 101.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 103.

³⁰ GH Jansen: *Non-Alignment and Afro-Asian states*, p. 186.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 284.

³² *Ibid.*, p. 203.

leader did not accept the assertion of a "new colonialism" by the Soviet Union, while Mohammed Ali of Pakistan found it unrealistic to condemn French colonialism while ignoring Soviet imperialism. Iraq and Turkey supported Pakistan's position. Finally, the participants agreed to condemn all types of colonialism.³³

The participants at Bandung were heterogeneous and deeply divided in their foreign policy orientations, due to their colonial past but also due to the bi-polar post 1945-world system that emerged. For instance, Turkey was a member of NATO and thus involved in the political and military organisation of Europe. Japan was a highly industrialised state, having little in common with the developmental needs of the rest of the Bandung participants. China was the world's most populous state, whose potential national power placed it much closer to the situation of the great powers than to that of the Third World. This heterogeneity was only less pronounced among the remaining 26 participants. Several were formal members of the Western system of alliances (Pakistan, Iraq, Iran, Thailand and the Philippines), while North Vietnam had a comparable relationship to the communist bloc.³⁴

In contrast to the above, specific African problems received little attention, with the exception of the issues of Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco. No particular reference was made to any of the numerous colonies south of the Sahara.³⁵ What is more, no African delegation participated on a subcommittee dealing with colonialism, although most of Africa south of the Sahara was still colonised.³⁶ In regard to Africa, Ethiopia was the only non-Arab independent African state represented; Ghana, the then Gold Coast sent observers.³⁷ The Ethiopians, Libyans and Liberians generally followed the pro-West camp, while the delegate from the Gold Coast was hardly heard at all.³⁸

³³ DC Thomas: *The Theory and Practice of Third World Solidarity*, p. 112.

³⁴ RA Mortimer: *The Third World Coalition in International Politics*, p. 8.

³⁵ D Kimche: *The Afro-Asian Movement*, p. 72.

³⁶ DC Thomas: *The Theory and Practice of Third World Solidarity*, p. 113.

³⁷ C Legum: *Pan-Africanism*, p. 39.

³⁸ D Kimche: *The Afro-Asian Movement*, p. 72.

This was a negative point for the Afro-Asian group. However, in the 1960s many African countries such as Sudan, Ethiopia and Liberia, would join the group after the acquisition of their independence. The equation of Afro-Asian feeling with nonalignment, as Nehru had envisaged, did not happen at Bandung.³⁹

Significantly, at Bandung, the participating countries refused to form a third bloc and it is important to understand the reasons for this. As L Mates, a political scientist and diplomat, argues, no single country held such a dominant position as to be able to claim to be the centre of the bloc, and it is difficult to imagine an organised bloc without a centre similar to the central powers in the two existing alliances. Furthermore, a bloc is an organisation based on power politics. It is unlikely that these countries could impress the outside world with their material power, either military or economic, and so the creation of a military-political alliance based on little material power would be entirely unconvincing. Thus, there were no real grounds for forming a bloc, even had these countries wished to.⁴⁰ The bloc as military alliance requires institutionally mature and stable countries. The countries in a bloc must share a common danger, or assumption that such danger exists, and there must be a possibility of reaching a consensus on concrete actions in foreign affairs, so that the bloc organisation could act effectively on day-to-day issues.⁴¹ In the case of the participants at Bandung, it was impossible to unite such scattered countries with different views.

3.2.2 Achievements of Bandung

Bandung was not entirely negative. As RA Mortimer, a political scientist and B. Boutros-Ghali, the ex-General Secretary of the United Nations argued, the aspiration

³⁹ D Kimche: *The Afro-Asian Movement*, p. 73.

⁴⁰ L Mates: *Nonalignment Theory and Current Policy*, p. 221.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 223.

to forge a common Third World consciousness emerged from Bandung.⁴² For instance, China was brought more into the Asian orbit. The real significance of Bandung was that 29 nations of Asia and Africa had assembled together to discuss their common future. Bandung symbolised the emergence of a force that could no longer be ignored. As these new states were admitted at the United Nations, a fundamental change occurred in the method of forming majorities and minorities in voting in the organs and bodies of world organisation. Various issues on the agenda were no longer resolved by an agreement between the two blocs, because there had appeared a third, independent voting force which was constantly growing. It was no longer realistic to expect that the world would split up into two military camps.⁴³ Bandung informed the world that the newly independent states of Africa and Asia, though small or medium-sized and developing, were determined not to allow the major powers alone to decide the future of humankind.⁴⁴

The Asian and African delegations came to the conclusion that effective cooperation for world peace required that membership in the United Nations be universal. They asserted that the United Nations as a living organism should grow and evolve in order to be fully representative of the diversity of the world community. The delegates appealed for a fair representation of Afro-Asian states in the Security Council. Thus the Afro-Asian states touched on the question of the democratisation of the United Nations. Full support was also declared for the fundamental principles of human rights - as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration of Human Rights that they should be a common achievement for all nations. They also supported the principle of self-determination for all peoples and nations.⁴⁵ A result of

⁴² RA Mortimer: *The Third World Coalition in International Politics*, p. 9 and

B. Boutros-Ghali: *The Renaissance of Non-Alignment* at <http://southmovement.alphalink.com.au>.

⁴³ L Mates: *Nonalignment Theory and Current Policy*, p. 232.

⁴⁴ AW Singham and Shirley Hune: *Non-Alignment in an Age of Alignments*, p. 67.

⁴⁵ DC Thomas: *The Theory and Practice of Third World Solidarity*, p. 121.

the Asian-African conference was the adoption by the United Nations of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.⁴⁶

In this regard and in view of the unsettled situation in North Africa and of the persistent denial to the people of North Africa of their right to self determination, the Asian-African conference declared its support for the rights of the peoples of Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia to self-determination and independence, and urged the French government to bring about a peaceful settlement of this issue without delay.⁴⁷ Regarding peace and cooperation, the conference concluded that universal disarmament and a ban on the production, experimentation and use of nuclear weapons was imperative to save human civilisation. Delegates acknowledged the desirability of intra-Asian and African economic and technical cooperation, but they also acknowledged the difficulty of implementing such goals of self-reliance.⁴⁸

The Conference also announced ten principles of international relations:

First: Respect for fundamental human rights and for the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

Second: Respect for the sovereignty and the territorial integrity of all nations.

Third: Recognition of the equality of all races and of the equality of all nations, large and small.

Fourth: Abstention from intervention or interference in the internal affairs of another country.

Fifth: Respect for the right of each nation to defend itself singly or collectively, in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations.

Sixth: a) Abstention from the use of arrangements of collective defence to serve the interest of any big power.

⁴⁶ NS Sutresna: A Review of the NAM, in G Mills: *South Africa and the Future of the Non-Aligned Movement*, p. 8.

⁴⁷ DC Thomas: *The Theory and Practice of Third World Solidarity*, pp. 110-111.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 121-122.

b) Abstention by any country from exerting pressure on other countries.

Seventh: Refraining from acts or threats of aggression or the use of force against the territorial integrity or the political independence of any country.

Eighth: Settlement of all international disputes through peaceful means, such as negotiation, conciliation, arbitration or judicial settlement as well as other peaceful means of the parties' own choice, in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations.

Ninth: Promotion of mutual interest and co-operation.

Tenth: Respect for justice and international obligations.⁴⁹

These principles require a brief comment. It is important to notice that the Bandung Declaration was formulated by both socialist countries such as the People's Republic of China and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and capitalist countries such as Japan, Saudi Arabia, Thailand, and Turkey. Moreover, the conference brought together countries that had declared themselves nonaligned like Afghanistan, Egypt, India, Indonesia etc, and those linked to the superpowers by military agreements of alliance such as Pakistan, the Philippines, South Vietnam, Japan.⁵⁰ Thus this declaration reflects the idea of belonging to different groups and its principles were formulated to apply for all time and to all nations.⁵¹

Firstly, the nonaligned countries at Bandung succeeded in having the Bandung Declaration confirm the principles of peaceful coexistence: these are the seven principles of the United Nations. In the order in which they appear in the Charter of the UN, these principles are: equality and self-determination of nations, cooperation between states to realise the United Nations' objectives, sovereign equality of states,

⁴⁹ B. Vinchers: *Political History of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)* at <http://www.igd.org.za/nam>, on 08/11/2001.

⁵⁰ II Kovalenko and RA Tuzmukhamedov (ed.): *The Non-Aligned Movement*, p. 40.

⁵¹ NS Sutresna: A Review of the NAM, in G Mills: *South Africa and the Future of the Non-Aligned Movement*, p. 9.

and conscientious fulfilment of the commitments assumed under the UN Charter. These principles of peaceful co-existence make incumbent on all countries, as the Declaration itself said, "to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbors, and to develop friendly cooperation".⁵² Thus the participants at the Bandung Conference made the decision to live in harmony in a growing hostile Cold War international climate.

Secondly, the nonaligned states, for the first time and on a broad basis, confirmed what later became known as "the nonalignment principle". At the time of Bandung Conference, the superpowers were creating military blocs. A general argument referred to in the context of the treaties creating those blocs was "the right to individual or collective defense".⁵³ Those aligned with the United States insisted that respect for this right should be among the ten principles of the Bandung Declaration (Principle 5), invoking the UN Charter Article 51 in so doing. Those countries that were opposed to participation in such blocs managed to ensure that a safeguard principle was included: the principle intended to protect young states from the use of the preceding principle that could be used to encroach on the independence and sovereignty of Afro-Asian countries. The former principle was in essence a demand being made of the imperialist superpowers, including bloc members: "abstention from the use of arrangements of collective defense to serve the particular interests of any of the big powers". The latter principle was directed primarily at other countries participating in military blocs: "abstention by any country from exerting pressure on other countries".⁵⁴ It was therefore not sufficient to denounce the interference of the stronger in the affairs of the weaker and the use or threat of force, but also to assert

⁵² Charter of the UN, New York, p. 1, in II Kovalenko and RA Tuzmukhamedov (ed.): *The Non-Aligned Movement*, p. 40.

⁵³ II Kovalenko and RA Tuzmukhamedov (ed.): *The Non-Aligned Movement*, p. 41.

⁵⁴ NA Conferences. Basic Document, 1961-1975, compiled and published by Bandaranaike Center for International Studies, Colombo, 1976, p.v, in II Kovalenko and RA Tuzmukhamedov (ed.): *The Non-Aligned Movement*, p. 41.

that small and generally threatened countries should have a recognised right to defend themselves.⁵⁵

Soon after Bandung the policy of blocs and the policy of nonalignment with blocs became so incompatible that the countries that had taken part in the conference were again divided. Turkey remained in NATO, the Philippines, Thailand and Pakistan remained in SEATO; and Iraq, in the Baghdad pact.⁵⁶

At the same time, India, Egypt and other countries proceeded along the path of nonalignment and independence in world politics. Yugoslavia, which was interested in nonalignment, joined the African and Asian countries. In 1956, Nehru and Nasser met with Tito on the Brioni Island in Yugoslavia, and together they charted the path towards nonalignment as a political trend in international activity, which was ultimately to be broader than an Afro-Asian movement.⁵⁷ The first conference of Nonaligned Heads of State, at which 25 countries were represented (from Asia, Africa, Latin America and Europe) was convened at Belgrade in September 1961. However, smaller and less powerful countries, such as Cuba, Cyprus and Indonesia, also played a critical role in the evolution of the Nonaligned Movement.⁵⁸

3.3 FROM BELGRADE TO BELGRADE: FORMATIVE YEARS, INSTABILITY AND CONSOLIDATION (1961-1989)

The Belgrade Summit was attended by 26 participating countries and 3 observers. The working definition of a nonaligned state as accepted at Cairo in June 1961 was that such a state pursued a foreign policy of national independence based on peaceful

⁵⁵ L Mates: *Nonalignment Theory and Current Policy*, p. 243.

⁵⁶ Y Alimov: *The Rise and Growth of the Non-Aligned Movement*, p. 37.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 37-38.

⁵⁸ B. Vickers: *Political History of the Non-Aligned Movement* at <http://www.igd.org.za/nam>. on 08/11/2001.

coexistence, supported national liberation movements, and abstained from the multilateral military alliances (NATO, Warsaw Pact, CENTO and SEATO) and bilateral alliances with the great powers.⁵⁹ These criteria are discussed below and show that the Movement did not want to be involved in East-West conflict.⁶⁰ This summit conference took place in a period of nuclear testing and increased East-West tensions over Berlin, Laos, and Cuba. In the Congo, Patrice Lumumba, the then prime minister, had been murdered and the American Central Intelligence Agency was implicated as being responsible for his assassination. Wars of national liberation continued in Vietnam, Algeria and Angola.⁶¹

According to the criteria of nonalignment mentioned above, 16 of the 29 states that attended Bandung Conference qualified for Belgrade: Afghanistan, Burma, Cambodia, Ethiopia, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Lebanon, Nepal, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka (Ceylon), Sudan, Yemen and the United Arab Republic which in 1961 represented both Egypt and Syria. Half of the Bandung participants were out: in terms of alignment there were the Soviet allies, China and North Vietnam on the one hand, and the members of the Western multilateral alliances on the other plus South Vietnam, Laos, Jordan, Liberia, Libya and Japan. However, there were six new independent African states: Morocco, Tunisia, Guinea, Mali, Somalia and Democratic Republic of Congo (former Zaire). The seventh was Algeria, the only non-independent state to be invited, which was represented by its provisional government-in-exile, the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic (GPRA). The last three participants were Cyprus, Cuba and Yugoslavia. RA Mortimer, a political scholar, considers the Belgrade participants as a radical group, more inclined to challenge the Western powers in the developing world.⁶² I will discuss in this study that his assertion was correct.

⁵⁹ RA Mortimer: *The Third World Coalition in International Politics*, p. 13.

⁶⁰ See *infra*, p. 66.

⁶¹ AW Singham and Shirley Hune: *Non-Alignment in an Age of Alignments*, p. 81.

⁶² RA Mortimer: *The Third World Coalition in International Politics*, pp. 13-14.

Considering the strained situation in the early 1960s, the Belgrade conference delegates made a separate Statement on the Danger of War and Appeal for Peace.⁶³ For this purpose, they made a plea to eliminate foreign military bases and to work for a universal and complete disarmament and a ban on nuclear weapons tests. Moreover, they emphasised the need to oppose colonialism, neo-colonialism and racial discrimination and apartheid. The national liberation movements were to be supported. Furthermore, they pressed for an end to economic inequality and for the development of effective economic and trade cooperation among developing countries.⁶⁴ The United Nations and its General Assembly were pointed out as the logical venue for the practical attainment of the objectives set by the nonaligned agenda. In the decades that were to come, the Belgrade delegates would indeed exert a meaningful influence in the world organisation.⁶⁵ In sum, the Belgrade summit formulated the goals of nonalignment.

Within three years after this conference, 30 independent states, mostly from Africa, emerged and joined the Movement. As a result, the voice of the NAM was increasingly heard at the United Nations and at the major international forums. The significance of the Cairo Summit in 1964 was the expansion of the NAM's support for the national liberation movement by defending the legitimate right of a people to take up arms, if necessary, to obtain independence. In addition, the inalienable right of the Palestinians to their homeland was made a central objective of the Movement's activities. The Movement broadened peace efforts by calling for the creation of peace zones.⁶⁶

Six years were to pass before a third nonaligned summit conference was held. In the Third World more militant nationalist governments, like that of Mouamar Qaddafi in Libya, began to make their appearance. The situation had deteriorated in Palestine,

⁶³ *Two Decades of Non-Alignment*, p. 9.

⁶⁴ II Kovalenko and RA Tuzmukhamedov (ed.): *The Non-Aligned Movement*, p. 26.

⁶⁵ P Jevremovic: The Nonaligned Movement, in *International Studies*, p. 281.

⁶⁶ AW Singham and Shirley Hune: *Non-Alignment in an Age of Alignments*, p. 94.

Cyprus, several Latin American countries and throughout southern Africa and the Portuguese African colonies. Owing to this deterioration, the United States made a massive assault on the Third World in order to control social and political change. For instance, intensified efforts were made to defeat the Communist Vietnamese by means of air war. In addition to these external pressures, many nonaligned countries had to deal with international matters. India, for example, had border conflicts with China and Pakistan. Activists leaders like Modibo Keita of Mali, U Nu of Burma, and Sirimavo Bandaranaike of Ceylon were replaced by conservative regimes. However, the NAM continued to work at the United Nations, its traditional forum, dealing with peace, disarmament and economic development.⁶⁷

The Lusaka Summit was held then in 1970 after a long break of six years. President Nasser of Egypt did not attend this summit. He was mediating in inter-Arab conflicts over the Palestinians, and died a few weeks after the Lusaka Summit while still engaged in this task.⁶⁸ This conference ended the formative years of the NAM since it initiated an organisational mechanism within the Movement to co-ordinate activities.⁶⁹ As a result, more and more meetings of the nonaligned countries were held between two summit conferences, either at the level of ministers or high officials, with general or special topics on their respective agendas. The only permanent organisational form was the Coordinating Bureau introduced at the fourth summit conference in Algiers (1973). The centre of its activities was to be the seat of the United Nations in New York. After the Lusaka Summit, it became customary to hold summit conferences once every three years. Since that summit, the definition of nonalignment has been modified at every conference, most often by adding new elements and expanding the list of priorities of the Movement, depending on the changes taking place in international relations.⁷⁰

⁶⁷ AW Singham and Shirley Hune: *Non-Alignment in an Age of Alignments*, pp. 95-96.

⁶⁸ P Jevremovic: Nonaligned Movement, in *International Studies*, p. 282.

⁶⁹ II Kovalenko and RA Tuzmukhamedov (ed.): *The Non-Aligned Movement*, p. 27.

⁷⁰ P Jevremovic: Nonaligned Movement, in *International Studies*, p. 283.

Moreover, a concept of and programme for mutual economic co-operation among the nonaligned, later to be known as self-reliance, was initiated. For the first time, national liberation movements attended the summit. Consequently, intensive efforts were made to accelerate the process of decolonisation, and solidarity with the newly liberated countries in the consolidation of their independence.⁷¹

The 1976 Colombo Summit emphasised to the developed countries the serious economic situation in the South. The world was not just divided into the East-West conflict, but also the North-South division based on nonalignment and economic and social problems. This situation required more involvement by the rich North. This summit meeting went the farthest in this respect with its projects of cooperation between nonaligned countries.⁷² Another important result was the decision to set up a News Agencies Pool to keep within bounds the West's dissemination of information in the newly independent countries and to strengthen the national mass media.⁷³ The Western press has largely ignored the significance of the work of the Movement. This was a concern since the NAM should be taken seriously so that there can be more vigorous public support by the governments of developed countries in cooperating with the NAM.⁷⁴

The following summit in Havana in 1979 took place in a complicated international situation. Firstly, the United States sought to prevent the conference from being held in Cuba and New Delhi due to their stance vis-à-vis the United States.⁷⁵ Secondly, the expansion of the Soviet Union created a divisive situation for the nonaligned countries. This country provided military, political and economic support to certain newly liberated countries which attained independence in the final, delayed stages of

⁷¹ II Kovalenko and RA Tuzmukhamedov (ed.): *The Non-Aligned Movement*, p. 27.

⁷² P Jevremovic: Nonaligned Movement, in *International Studies*, p. 284.

⁷³ II Kovalenko and RA Tuzmukhamedov: *The Non-Aligned Movement*, pp. 28-29.

⁷⁴ NS Sutresna: A Review of the NAM, in G Mills: *South Africa and the Future of the Non-Aligned Movement*, p. 19.

⁷⁵ MS Rajan: *The Future of Nonalignment*, p. 82.

decolonisation, as well as to regimes ideologically close to the Soviet Union that had come to power. It is on the basis of this relationship with the Soviet Union that the so-called radical wing was formed within the Nonaligned Movement. The most important member was Cuba, one of the founders of the Movement, which led a wide circle of nonaligned countries and which believed that the Soviet Union could truly be an ally and pillar of the Movement. Against this group was a silent majority, which the former Yugoslavia tried to animate and invigorate.⁷⁶

The disagreements of both groups surfaced at the Sixth Summit Conference at Havana in 1979 since, according to P Jevremovic, a political scientist, the rationality of political messages was largely lost in verbosity.⁷⁷ This conference produced the longest definition of principles of the policy of nonalignment. The definition included a long list of old and new enemies of nonaligned countries such as imperialism, colonialism, neocolonialism, racism (including Zionism), all forms of expansionism and hegemonism.⁷⁸

During the 1980s, the NAM loose momentum. The greatest threat was the battle for leadership between Tito and Castro, or between those countries that could tilt toward the Soviet Union. Another threat to solidarity was the division over oil between OPEC and Non-OPEC Less Developed Countries.⁷⁹ After the culmination of radicalism the Nonaligned Movement entered a stage of consolidation and at New Delhi (1983) and Harare (1986) it went back to its normal activities. For instance, a significant achievement was the "Harare Declaration on the Strengthening of Collective Action" in furtherance of the political and economic solidarity of the nonaligned nations. Consequently, a Solidarity Fund for Southern Africa was created to help frontline states to resist possible retaliation by South Africa since the

⁷⁶ P Jevremovic: Nonaligned Movement, in *International Studies*, p. 282.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 287.

⁷⁸ *Two Decades of Non-Alignment*, pp. 405-406.

⁷⁹ DC Thomas: *The Theory and Practice of Third World Solidarity*, p. 412.

Movement had advised imposing voluntary sanctions against South Africa because of its apartheid regime and its policy on Namibia.⁸⁰

Another summit meeting was held in Belgrade in 1989. Two months after this meeting the Berlin wall was pulled down. The waning of the Cold War was soon overtaken by the turn of events in the Soviet Union and East Europe. The Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact disappeared. The security system based upon the balance of nuclear power of the two superpowers, which had given rise to the Nonaligned Movement, disappeared. Despite Yugoslavia's political problems and the crumbling of the country, Yugoslavia's chairmanship brought the summit to a successful end. It was only later that within the Movement, people started feeling the lack of dynamism that this country had been instilling in it for decades.⁸¹

3.4 THE POST-COLD WAR ERA AND NEW AIMS

At the Tenth Foreign Ministerial Conference held in Accra, Ghana, in August 1991, many participants worried about the future role and position of the Movement in a changed world. Moreover, there were fears about possible negative effects upon the developing world in economic matters since the collapse of the Soviet Union and its allies increased the number of countries needing assistance. Nevertheless, it was decided to retain the name "the nonaligned policy and movement", although one of the sides from which the Movement had distanced itself was gone.⁸²

As the Tenth Ministerial Conference stated, the end of the bi-polar world of the post-Cold War era required the developing countries, especially the nonaligned countries, to re-assert themselves, individually and collectively, in order to ensure an equal participation in the creation of such new relations in the world as would preserve and

⁸⁰ MS Rajan: *The Future of Nonalignment*, pp. 82-83.

⁸¹ P Jevremovic: Nonaligned Movement, in *International Studies*, p. 295.

⁸² *Ibid.*

consolidate their independence and sovereignty and protect their political and economic interests. At the same time, the member countries of the Movement should identify positive aspects of the changes with the view to taking advantage of them.⁸³

At the Jakarta Summit in 1992, these concerns were expressed once again. The conference found imperative and urgent for the Movement to play its due role in defining and shaping the emerging international realities, to adapt to change and to articulate and implement appropriate strategies and approaches. The Movement decided to participate in the building of the new world order, rather than to leave this task to the larger political and economic powers.⁸⁴ Thus at the Jakarta Summit the NAM changed its approaches and orientation from one that was often viewed as denunciatory and confrontational to one that was unmistakably conciliatory and cooperative.⁸⁵

3.4.1 Environmental Issues

A significant feature of the post-Cold War international system has been the increasing prominence of common global environmental issues on the global agenda. The Jakarta Summit stressed that the main environmental problems demanding urgent action by the international community included the critical life-threatening issues of climate change, the depletion of the ozone layer, together with the degradation of the global life support systems, water and air pollution, soil degradation, drought, deforestation, and the extinction of numerous animal and plant species, acid rain, marine pollution, the proliferation and mismanagement of toxic products and illegal traffic in toxic wastes, and the threat posed by the testing of nuclear weapons.⁸⁶

⁸³ *Tenth Ministerial Conference of the Non-Aligned Countries*, p. 21.

⁸⁴ P Jevremovic: Nonaligned Movement, in *International Studies*, p. 296.

⁸⁵ N.S. Sutresna: *The Movement of Non-Aligned Countries* at <http://www.dfa.deplu.go.id/english/gnb.html>, on 08/11/2001.

⁸⁶ *Tenth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries*, p. 27.

The nonaligned and developing states participated in the negotiations within the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INF) in Washington, DC, in February 1991. These negotiations were preliminary to the signing of a treaty at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in 1992, the Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC). However, this 1992 Conference on the Environment and Development, also known as the Earth Summit, held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, reflected the fact that developed and developing states had different agendas with respect to common environmental issues. The developed states wished to address issues such as ozone depletion and climate change. The developing countries, however, focused on the relationship between environmental degradation and underdevelopment. While the Northern States did acknowledge the relationship between the environment and development, and did pledge to make some financial commitments, they did not commit themselves to specific measures to reduce their industrial pollution yet continued to pressure developing states to protect their forests and wildlife.⁸⁷

At the 1995 Cartagena Summit, in Colombia, the NAM noted with some concern that the financial commitments pledged by the developed states at Rio had not yet become a reality. The Movement called on the developed states to implement Agenda 21, which was an action plan for sustainable development, through the allocation of increased financial resources and the adoption of measures to facilitate the transfer of environmentally sound technologies on terms preferential to the developing states. The Movement stated again that environmental issues should not be employed to intervene in the internal affairs of developing states and that additional environmental conditionalities should not be imposed on developing states.⁸⁸

Climate change is however an evolving issue on the international agenda. Thus during the Kyoto Conference in 1997, the Group of 77, which includes the

⁸⁷ M Chetty: *A New Role of the Non-Aligned Movement in a Post-Cold War Era*, pp. 56-57.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 57.

Nonaligned Movement, reiterated its stance that it wanted the developed states to take the lead and make significant cuts to their greenhouse gas emissions. The significance of the Kyoto Protocol within the evolving issue of climate change is that it represented the first significant step by the developed states in taking the lead in reducing their greenhouse gas emissions. This positive development however has been overshadowed by the intransigent position of the United States' Senate, which announced that it would not ratify the Protocol unless it contained significant commitments by developing states to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions.⁸⁹

3.4.2 Human Rights

Another issue discussed at Jakarta (1992) was the respect for human rights. The concern for human rights has been increasing globally since the 1989 Belgrade Summit. Most member countries of the Movement have clearly been giving prominence to the respect for human rights, both collective and individual, in national and international activities. Taking cognisance of the changes in various parts of the world, and motivated by democratic principles, the Movement called for the full, unrestricted and unconditional respect for basic human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the inalienable right of peoples under foreign or colonial occupation to self-determination. The right of each people to establish its own political system and institutions freely in peace, stability and justice on the basis of the principles of sovereignty and non-interference in international affairs was also reaffirmed.⁹⁰

At Jakarta, the Heads of State or Government urged the international community to accede to or ratify the Convention on the Rights of Children and to incorporate the provisions thereof in their respective legislation, with a view to ensuring its effective implementation. In this connection they stressed that the holding of an international

⁸⁹ <http://www.enn.com/enn-features-archive/1998/03/032698/wwatch.asp>, in M Chetty: *A New Role for the Non-Aligned Movement in a Post-Cold War Era*, pp. 70-71.

⁹⁰ *Tenth Ministerial Conference of the Non-Aligned Countries*, p. 39.

sponsors conference on aid to the children of Africa, under the auspices of the OAU and UNICEF, in Dakar, Senegal, in November 1992, constituted an important step towards an effective exercise of children's rights.⁹¹ This is all evidence of a changing agenda, due to a changing world with different problems.

In all, by the end of the Cold War, the Movement continued to deal with all problems of international concern discussed at the United Nations. Moreover, its membership continued to increase. From 25 at the first summit, the membership increased to 47 at the second summit in Cairo, 53 in Lusaka, 75 in Algiers,⁹² and the membership reached 113 in 1998, with 12 Observers and 27 Guest Countries, six Observer International Organisations and 18 Guest International Organisations. (Observers are eligible to join the Movement while Guests are interested spectators.⁹³) Both Russia and China have begun to find their links useful, as did states seceding from the former Soviet Union. For example of the latter's Asian states, both Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan are now members. All the former East European countries now have links with the Movement. A number of Western-oriented countries continued to maintain links as guests of the Movement, including Australia, Canada and New Zealand.⁹⁴

3.5 NONALIGNMENT AND NEUTRALITY

There has been a great deal of ambiguity and debate on the concept of "nonalignment" since it was propounded by Jawaharlal Nehru in his speech on 7 September, 1946 - a year before India was declared independent. But one former Indian Foreign Secretary, in 1946, felt that the genesis of nonalignment was found even before Nehru's statement. This Foreign Secretary pointed out "the principle of nonalignment

⁹¹ *Tenth Ministerial Conference of the Non-Aligned Countries*, p. 32.

⁹² DC Thomas: *The Theory and Practice of Third World Solidarity*, p. 369.

⁹³ NS Sutresna: A Review of the NAM, in G Mills: *South Africa and the Future of the Non-Aligned Movement*, p. 9.

⁹⁴ S Morphet: The Non-Aligned and their 11th Summit at Cartagena in *The Round Table*, p. 457.

was accepted by the Congress at Hariputra plenary session in 1939. Here India was resolved to maintain friendly and cooperative relations with all nations and avoid entanglement in military and similar alliances which tended to divide up the world into rival groups and thus, endangered world peace".⁹⁵

An extract from Nehru's speech runs as follows:

"In the sphere of foreign affairs, India will follow an independent policy, keeping away from the power politics of group aligned one against another. She will uphold the principle of freedom for dependent peoples and will oppose racial discrimination wheresoever it may occur. She will work with other peace-loving nations for international cooperation and goodwill without the exploitation of one nation by another. It is necessary that with the attainment of her full international status India should establish contact with all the great nations of the world, and that her relations with her neighboring countries in Asia should become still closer."⁹⁶

A few months later, in January 1947, Nehru specified what he meant by the above ideas, saying that India wanted to remain independent and free of allegiance to any blocs, and to cooperate with all countries on equal terms.⁹⁷

This independent Indian foreign policy was initially described as "*positive neutralism*" (neutrality). Nehru, however, described it as a policy of nonalignment - with the military-political blocs of states being drawn into military-political groupings - and as a struggle for international peace and security, and national and economic independence.⁹⁸

Was "*neutrality*", equivalent to "*nonalignment*"? G Liska, a student in international relations of the American tradition, suggests that in many ways the Nonaligned

⁹⁵ RS Yadav: NAM in the New World Order in *India Quarterly*, p. 62.

⁹⁶ Keesings Contemporary Archives 1946-1948, p. 8169 India Office Bulletin, in L Mates: *Nonalignment Theory and Current Policy*, p. 48.

⁹⁷ Y Alimov: *The Rise and Growth of the Non-Aligned Movement*, p. 22.

⁹⁸ V Benevolensky: *The Non-Aligned Movement*, p. 76.

Movement was a contemporary form of the type of neutralism that manifested itself earlier in Europe and yet it has some distinctive features. He even goes so far as to suggest that nonalignment was nothing more than the need to satisfy the psychological, political, and economic interests of the newly emerging colonial elite.⁹⁹

As JW Burton, an Australian scholar, argues, it is unfortunate that nonalignment was originally termed "neutrality". Neutrality is the condition of a country at peace while others are at war. In international law, the obligations of a neutral government are abstention from any participation in the conflict and impartiality towards belligerents. A neutral government must also restrain its citizens from engaging in acts regarded as violations of neutral obligations, for neutrality affects not merely the State, but also each of its citizens. In return, the independence and sovereign integrity of a neutral state are respected by all belligerents. Neutrality properly refers to the policies of countries such as Switzerland, because Switzerland assumed that in another war it would seek to preserve its neutrality and so it attracts the term even in time of peace.¹⁰⁰ For L Mates, a Yugoslav author and former diplomat, neutrality does not exclude maintaining efficient military forces of an acceptable size. Neutrality implies, however, abstaining from policies that might antagonise powerful states or from expressing bias in controversies among them.¹⁰¹

According to Nehru, Nasser and Kwame N'krumah, had each selected a policy of positive neutralism and nonalignment towards either the Communist bloc or the Western coalition. Each wanted to maintain political independence and freedom of action in the world of Cold War rivalries. But each maintained that nonalignment did not mean moral neutrality.

⁹⁹ AW Singham and Shirley Hune: *Non-Alignment in an Age of Alignments*, pp. 381-382.

¹⁰⁰ JW Burton: *Nonalignment*, pp. 21-22.

¹⁰¹ L Mates: Security through non-alignment, in *Bulletin for Peace Proposals*, p. 169.

At Bandung, Nehru said:

"I belong to either (bloc) and I propose to belong to neither whatever happens in the world... I submit to you, every pact has brought insecurity and not security to the countries which have entered into them. They have brought the danger of atomic bombs and the rest of it nearer to them than would have been the case otherwise. They have not added to the strength of any country, I submit, which it had singly. It may have produced some idea of security, but it is a false security."¹⁰²

First, Nehru considered the nonaligned group as a camp of peace and goodwill. For his part, Nasser refused to become the stooge or satellite of anybody, saying that his policies may help the cause of peace and end the Cold War. For N'krumah, the Ghanaian leader, nonalignment could be understood in the context of the atomic arms race and the Cold War. Thus, nonalignment does not mean indifference to the great issues of the day and is in no way anti-Western, nor is it anti-Eastern.¹⁰³ This is also Nehru's view since this stance does not mean sitting on the fence, or "equidistance" from all great powers and their alliances. "There is no question of sitting on the fence. It is not a middle-of-the-road policy. It is a positive, constructive policy", Nehru said.¹⁰⁴ For Rajiv Gandhi, nonalignment symbolises the courage to be himself, because it proclaims one's faith in a new kind of world – a world of equals - because it is a compact with peace.¹⁰⁵

In Africa and Asia, nonalignment has never meant neutralism or the desire to be left alone or isolated. It is the assertion of the right of a nation to freedom of decision in international affairs, and the right to make choices on the basis of the merits of each

¹⁰² *Prime Minister Nehru: Speech at Bandung Conference, Political Committee at*
<http://www.fordham.edu/holsall/mod/1955nehru-bandung2.html>, on 08/11/2001.

¹⁰³ L W Martin (ed.): *Neutralism and Nonalignment*, p. 95.

¹⁰⁴ Jawaharlal Nehru: *India's Foreign Policy*, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, Delhi, 1961, in Y Alimov: *The Rise and Growth of the Non-Aligned Movement*, p. 23.

¹⁰⁵ R Gandhi: *An Overview of Non-Alignment in Black Scholar*, p. 38.

individual issue, regardless of the interests of the Cold War alliances.¹⁰⁶ Again as Nehru said in 1946 and as was reaffirmed by the leaders of Burma, Indonesia, Yugoslavia and some other countries, nonalignment was an active policy, which in given situations required opting out or abstaining, but which always, whenever major problems were at stake, called for an active position and initiative. The concept of nonalignment meant much more than a passive attitude. The aim of these countries was not just to avoid involvement in a conflict, but also to mobilise their forces against the outbreak and escalation of conflicts and against the formation and strengthening of the blocs.¹⁰⁷

According to M Brecher, one of Nehru's political biographers, beyond the above points, nonalignment contributes to the maintenance of peace and relaxation of tension; the nonaligned countries had economic motives for adopting this policy. Brecher, "India's economic weakness and the basic goal of development provide powerful inducements to the policy of nonalignment. The doors must be open to all possible sources of aid, Western and Soviet, if desired economic targets are to be achieved... Nonalignment is considered essential to the fulfilment of India's economic revolution, and avoids alienation of India's two powerful neighbors, China and Russia..."¹⁰⁸

Thus it can be seen that nonalignment meant a different policy for different people at different times. Further, nonalignment or positive neutralism did not mean the same as the concept of traditional neutrality, as that concept was known to the European nations before the world was polarised into two-bloc politics.¹⁰⁹ Traditional neutrality was a passive, isolationist policy of non-involvement and was generally practised¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁶ JW Burton: *Nonalignment*, pp. 56-57.

¹⁰⁷ L Mates: *Nonalignment*, p. 105.

¹⁰⁸ M Brecher: Nehru: A Political Biography by P Jevremomic: Nonaligned Movement, in *International Studies*, pp. 276-277.

¹⁰⁹ RR Ramchandani: *NAM and Third World Dilemma in the Post-Cold War Era*, p. 27.

¹¹⁰ P Willets: *The Non-Aligned Movement*, p. 20.

by stable states. In contrast, nonalignment was practised by new states that rejected the view that the Cold War is everybody's business and rejected the attempts to have alien ideas imposed on them. Nonalignment could never stop the participating countries from agreeing on a policy on major world problems, but their policies on concrete issues that directly affected their national interests often differed and even conflicted.¹¹¹

The nonaligned states, collectively and explicitly, have rarely given a concise definition of nonalignment. One of the few occasions at which the Nonaligned have done so was at the Cairo Preparatory Meeting in June 1961. The Foreign Ministers proposed the following criteria for invitation to the Belgrade Summit Conference:

- (i) an independent policy, based on the co-existence of states with different political and social systems and non-alignment, or a trend towards such a policy
- (ii) consistent support for movements for national independence
- (iii) non-membership of a multilateral military alliance concluded in the context of the Great Power conflicts;
- (iv) in the case of a bilateral military agreement with a Great Power, or membership of a regional defence pact, the agreement or pact should not be one deliberately concluded in the context of Great Power conflicts; and
- (v) in case of the lease of military bases to a foreign power, the concession should not have been made in the context of Great Power conflicts.¹¹²

These criteria of nonalignment show how the nonaligned nations identified themselves not only according to a lack of military alignment in the Cold War, but also as characterised by peaceful coexistence and anti-colonialism. The first criterion shows that the NAM adopted a flexible approach to the question of membership so that it become not only a Third World or Afro-Asian movement, but also a movement of countries in Europe and Latin America, be they communist or capitalist. AW

¹¹¹ L Mates: *Nonalignment*, p. 224.

¹¹² *The Non-Aligned Movement* at <http://www.nam.gov.za>.

Singham, a political scientist and Shirley Hune, a historian, argue that this aspect was to strengthen the Movement as a permanent force in world politics.¹¹³ This flexibility of membership is a very important statement, as NAM is still in existence after the Cold War. The second criterion, that of supporting movements for national independence shows that the movement is not passive. Member states had to support people struggling for self-determination. But the Movement was opposed to the recurring use of force in international relations, except in accordance with the UN Charter.¹¹⁴ In the last criterion, the NAM does not reject a collective defence as in the case of the UN Charter, but rejects all the Great Powers' implications to avoid being involved in the Cold War. But in terms of this principle it is not clear if all Great Powers' conflicts represent the Cold War. Thus nonalignment must be not merely nonalignment with respect to Great Powers, but with respect to other nonaligned countries also.¹¹⁵

In all, neutrality involves abstention from all conflicts,¹¹⁶ whereas nonalignment or positive neutralism involves only abstention from the Cold War. Thus the countries gathered at Belgrade were neither anti-Western nor anti-Eastern, but only sought not to be involved in the Cold War. Nonalignment has not implied neutrality in the anti-colonial struggle, nor in conflicts between the developing and the developed nations. In this case, relations between nonaligned and Western countries were sometimes conflicting. Indeed, the claim has often been made that nonalignment may involve active participation in Cold War disputes, provided that each issue is decided on its merits, rather than by regular support of a bloc leader.¹¹⁷

¹¹³ AW Singham and Shirley Hune: *Non-Alignment in an Age of Alignments*, p. 42.

¹¹⁴ MS Rajan: *The Future of Nonalignment*, p. 64.

¹¹⁵ JW Burton: *Nonalignment*, p. 20.

¹¹⁶ A Lassassi: *Non-Alignment and Algerian Foreign Policy*, p. 10.

¹¹⁷ P Willets: *The Non-Aligned Movement*, p. 20.

CHAPTER 4: THE NONALIGNED MOVEMENT AND THE COLD WAR

The Superpowers tended to divide up the world into their own spheres of influence during the Cold War, and to impose confrontation in all domains, from politics and the economy to culture and ideology. More threatening was the arms race which brought humankind to a real brink of terror. Nuclear escalation arose over Berlin, Cuba, and the Middle East while the Third World became mainly a battleground resulting from this confrontation. Some of these aspects were discussed at length in the second chapter. Nonalignment, as P Willets, a British scholar, argues, was adopted not only because the Third World was struggling against colonialism, but also because nonaligned countries were not prepared to be involved in the Cold War. One of the many things that the founders of the Movement, such as Egypt, Yugoslavia and India, had in common was their opposition to Great Power alliances. Egypt was opposed to the Baghdad Pact; India was opposed to the Baghdad Pact and to SEATO; while Yugoslavia was opposed to the Warsaw Pact.¹ Accordingly, the answers to these Cold War problems can be found in the careful analysis of the history of its Nonaligned Movement and their relations with the Superpowers.

4.1 THE SUPERPOWERS AND THE NONALIGNED COUNTRIES

For both America and the Soviet Union, the emergence of the new states and their adoption of nonalignment have posed challenging tests.² In respect of the Nonaligned Movement, the United States adopted an ambivalent attitude – of distrust, even confrontation on the one hand, and of declared support on the other, including holding identical views on certain matters. These oscillations were primarily due to the fact that, after the Second World War, all American foreign policy had to bow to the priority of isolating and containing the influence of the Soviet Union.³ I Kovalenko, a socialist scientist, describes this American fight against Communism as a means for

¹ P Willets: *The Non-Aligned Movement*, p. 22.

² LW Martin (ed.): *Neutralism and Nonalignment*, p. xvii.

³ P Jevremovic: Nonaligned Movement, in *International Studies*, p. 290.

the United States to turn independent states into a political appendage of imperialism, since it was unwilling to accept the independent foreign policy of the states of Asia, Africa and Latin America in the modern world.⁴

The new nations have also presented the Soviet Union with difficult problems of adjustment. At the end of the Second World War, the Communists had no adequate doctrine to deal with the success of national movements in colonial areas.⁵ In the Stalinist era, Soviet strategy had focused on the creation of local Communist parties rather than on relations with the Third World governments. By the 1960s, however, Moscow increasingly realised that exclusive reliance on orthodox Communist parties limited its opportunities for penetration of the Third World.⁶ There was a clear danger that the lead in anti-colonialism might be taken over by a force independent of Communism.⁷ Soviet strategy shifted therefore, to support for nationalist regimes and liberation movements. The new approach was also compatible with Soviet interest in the NAM, since ideology no longer prevented the Soviets from working with nonaligned states like Algeria, which were deeply anti-Western but differed from Soviet policy.⁸ Due to the difference in ideology between the United States and the Soviet Union, each manifested different reactions to the nonalignment. It is interesting to see how role-players in this bi-polar world handled the creation of an alternative force.

4.1.1 American Policies in the Third World

In the immediate postwar years, American attention was focused chiefly on Europe, although there was a preoccupation with the Communist take-over of China. The

⁴ II Kovalenko and RA Tuzmukhamedov: *The Non-Aligned Movement*, p. 199.

⁵ LW Martin (ed.): *Neutralism and Nonalignment*, p. xix.

⁶ RL Jackson: *The Non-Aligned, the UN and the Superpowers*, pp. 194-195.

⁷ LW Martin: *Neutralism and Nonalignment*, p. xix.

⁸ RL Jackson: *The Non-Aligned, the UN and the Superpowers*, pp. 194-195.

Truman administration gave principal priority to Europe and did not try to develop an integral approach towards developing countries and thereby, nonaligned nations. As far as Africa and South Asia were concerned, Americans regarded decolonisation with favourable emotions, based on dubious analogies with their own history.⁹

Thereafter, the United States, recognising that the nations of Africa and Asia could no longer be considered as colonies, faced the danger that these new nations could aid the Communist powers, either by joining them or by independently undermining Western interests. Thus, in the early 1950s, nonalignment was not welcomed by American officials, who described it as immoral and nonsense.¹⁰ On the other hand, military intervention by the Dwight Eisenhower administration (1953-1961) in Iran (1953), Guatemala (1954) and Lebanon (1958), as well as the alliances of the Dulles era, all intended to curtail Communism, were seen as menacing by states moving toward nonalignment. CENTO and SEATO in particular, brought the Cold War to the Third World.¹¹

The Eisenhower administration saw in Bandung Conference a vehicle for the extension of Chinese, and ultimately Soviet influence, and opposed the conference from the outset. As stated earlier, Washington nevertheless encouraged friendly states that attended, namely Pakistan, Turkey, and the Philippines, to refute criticism of the West. In a frequently quoted speech of June 9, 1956, Dulles labelled the idea of nonalignment or neutrality as "an immoral and shortsighted conception" equating it with "indifference to the fate of others".¹² He postulated a bipolar world in which those not actively assisting the West in its fight against Communism were regarded as

⁹ LW Martin (ed.): *Neutralism and Nonalignment*, p. xvii.

¹⁰ RS Yadav: NAM in the New World Order, in *India Quarterly*, p. 49.

¹¹ RL Jackson: *The Non-Aligned, the UN and the Superpowers*, pp. 210-211.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 211.

hostile, and the favoured form of assistance was an alliance.¹³ This was in the period when Dulles was concerned with the creation of alliances in Asia to contain communist expansion, especially with countries bordering on the Soviet Union.¹⁴

On the other hand, there were those in the United States who favoured a careful approach to nonalignment. Among them was the then American ambassador to India, Chester Bowles. Together with other bourgeois liberals, they regarded India's nonalignment slogans as a desire on the part of the Indian government to refrain from active participation in world affairs while the young states were being formed. Furthermore, they regarded India as a possible model for tearing the socialist countries of Europe and Asia from the Soviet Union in the future.¹⁵

Summing up American policy toward the Nonaligned Movement during that period, progressive Indian publicist, Hari Jaisingh, writes: "it was in the context of this anti-Communist hysteria in the United States, led by Senator Joseph McCarthy, that the nationalism of the newly independent countries, with its anti-imperialist stance, came to be identified with Communism. No one in America, not even Eisenhower, dared challenge these new forces of the ultras in America and everyone took cover under some anti-communist organisation."¹⁶

The early 1960s saw a new stage in the United States' relations with nonaligned countries. By that time some aspects of the American position required a new approaches toward nonaligned concepts. This 1960s' shift, as II Kovalenko argues, was connected above all with general changes in the world regarding armed forces.

¹³ Commencement address delivered at Iowa State College, 9 June 1956, reprinted, in the New York Times, 10 June 1956, quoted from P Jevremovic: *Nonaligned Movement*, in *International Studies*, p. 290.

¹⁴ V Benevolensky: *The Non-Aligned Movement*, p. 13.

¹⁵ II Kovalenko and RA Tuzmukhamedov: *The Non-Aligned Movement*, p. 201.

¹⁶ Non-Aligned Conferences: Basic Documents 1961-1965, in II Kovalenko and RA Tuzmukhamedov: *The Non-Aligned Movement*, p. 204.

During the 1950s, the defence potential of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries strengthened considerably; the Soviet army acquired powerful nuclear delivery vehicles, which directly threatened American territory and cast doubt on the value of the military bases and blocs that were being created around the territory of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.¹⁷

Moreover, American allies among the former colonising countries did not support Washington's effort to combat the Nonaligned Movement. They wanted to maintain relations with their former colonies and the Nonaligned Movement was not a great obstacle for them. Furthermore, membership of the Movement was increasing among the young countries themselves. The influence of these new ideas began to carry great political weight and therefore required a more careful approach to American officials.¹⁸

The United States renounced hostile pronouncements with respect to the Nonaligned Movement and used a different tactics. Already in the late 1950, different government and research bodies in the United States undertook an in-depth study of the problems of preserving the position of capitalism in Asian and African countries and worked out measures capable of resisting the pressure of communism on these countries. The John F. Kennedy administration (1961-1963) quite explicitly concluded that a policy of independence on the part of the new states would adequately serve American interests. Kennedy expressed this opinion in his policy statement of 1962 when he spoke about the need to gain new frontiers and to revise some of the old-fashioned ideas of the world.¹⁹

American president Kennedy and his supporters viewed the Nonaligned Movement as largely objective in character. They regarded it principally as a desire on the part of the young countries to be equidistant from the two world systems and not to be

¹⁷ II Kovalenko and RA Tuzmukhamedov (ed.): *The Non-Aligned Movement*, p. 205.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ V Benevolensky: *The Non-Aligned Movement*, pp. 94-95.

involved in their conflicts in the world arena. Consequently, the most influential nonaligned countries, such as Egypt and India, received generous aid from the United States.²⁰ According to V Benevolensky, this aid was a means of the United States to preserve and strengthen as far as possible the dependence on the emergent states and to consolidate American positions at the expense of former colonial powers.²¹

The Belgrade Summit seemed therefore preferable to Bandung, excluding the Chinese and enhancing Yugoslavia's independence from Moscow. As a result, President Kennedy sent an encouraging message to the conference. Nevertheless, the United States' reaction was negative, since the summit failed to condemn Soviet violation of the moratorium on atomic weapons testing or to take a firm position on the Berlin wall. But the Belgrade Summit criticised the United States for example, because of its base of Guantanamo in Cuba.²²

Due to the American fiasco in the Bay of Pigs as well as the Cuban missile crisis, the United States limited its enthusiasm for dealing with an organization of which Cuba was a founding member. Furthermore, early Third World gatherings had been exclusively Afro-Asian, but expanded at Belgrade to include Cuba, as well as observers from Brazil, Bolivia, and Ecuador, posed a potential threat of the gravest concern to American interests in Latin America.²³

The policy followed by Kennedy's successor, Lyndon B. Johnson (1963-1968), differed sharply from one of "reconciliation" with nonaligned countries. Firstly, the United States launched an attack on Indo-China, rousing the indignation of the whole world, including the nonaligned countries. Secondly, the United States was displeased at the results of the second nonaligned summit in Cairo, which deplored

²⁰ II Kovalenko and RA Tuzmukhamedov (ed.): *The Non-Aligned Movement*, p. 206.

²¹ V Benevolensky: *The Non-Aligned Movement*, p. 95.

²² RL Jackson: *The Non-Aligned, the UN and the Superpowers*, p. 211-213.

²³ *Ibid.*

American influence in Indo-China, the Congo and Cyprus, and opposed the deployment of foreign troops in the territory of other countries against the will of those countries.²⁴ The United States' attempt to lobby in several Latin American capitals against attendance of this summit was a failure. This persistence and enlargement of the NAM were cause of concern in Washington.²⁵

In the late 1960s, when it became clear that the United States was to suffer defeat in Vietnam and in the conditions of a changed alignment of forces in the world, American administration was forced to revise all aspects of its foreign policy, including relations with the Soviet Union, to reconsider the terms of partnership with the West European countries and Japan and to devise new forms of relations with the nonaligned states. According to the Nixon Doctrine, the American tactic of the period did not envision American withdrawal from those regions. American administration intended to change the balance of world forces in their favour, particularly with the help of the regimes dependent on it economically, and by tying developing countries to Western powers. This tactic influenced some of the nonaligned countries, and the positions they adopted, attempted to undermine the anti-colonialist nature of resolutions passed by the nonaligned.²⁶

Some people believe that in Vietnam the United States was trying to teach the entire national liberation movement a lesson, to demonstrate its strength and convince nonaligned countries of the need to follow in the wake of American policy.²⁷ Thus, Richard Nixon's administration (1969-1974) underestimated the role of the Nonaligned Movement in the modern world and ignored it as a foreign policy factor. RL Jackson, an American analyst and former diplomat, in a rare study on the Nonaligned Movement published in the United States admits the fact that the policy

²⁴ II Kovalenko and RA Tuzmukhamedov: *The Non-Aligned Movement*, p. 207.

²⁵ RL Jackson: *The Non-Aligned, the UN and the Superpowers*, p. 212.

²⁶ V Benevolensky: *The Non-Aligned Movement*, pp. 98-99.

²⁷ II Kovalenko and RA Tuzmukhamedov: *The Non-Aligned Movement*, pp. 207-208.

of the United States, as well as of the industrialised countries, contributed to the intensification of anti-West and radical feelings among nonaligned countries.²⁸

As the Movement was hostile to American interests and was the largest political bloc at the United Nations, President Gerald Ford (1974-1977) and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger initiated a new tactic, which consisted of responding to attack by counterattack in order to break the Movement up. Both groups confronted each another at the United Nations without the expected results. The NAM's demise did not happen, in contrast NAM radicals and the Soviets portrayed the United States as the number one enemy of the Third World.²⁹

Between 1974 and 1975, the nonaligned countries launched an offensive for their rights with concerted demands for the New International Economic Order.³⁰ The Ford administration, unable to oppose all the developing states' demands, declared that their actions were simply a result of Soviet "subversion". Further, the Americans tried to demand that the Soviet Union ends its support for the liberation movements on the Indo-Chinese peninsula, in southern Africa and in the Middle East, arguing that they were not in keeping with the "spirit of détente".³¹ Kissinger was forced by the oil price shock and the Algiers Summit to recognize the Movement's impact and adjust American policy to take it more fully into account. Speaking at New Delhi in October 1974, he recognized nonalignment and declared that American relations with the Movement would be another pillar of American foreign policy.³²

A more moderate approach was therefore adopted in the late Ford administration. This administration was coming to an end and the American government was in the

²⁸ P Jevremovic: Nonaligned Movement, in *Internatinal Studies*, p. 291.

²⁹ RL Jackson: *The Non-Aligned, the UN and the Superpowers*, pp. 214-215.

³⁰ See *infra* 5.3.3, p. 130.

³¹ II Kovalenko and RA Tuzmukhamedov: *The Non-Aligned Movement*, p. 209.

³² RL Jackson: *The Non-Aligned, the UN and the Superpowers*, p. 214.

process of regaining the executive authority lost temporarily as a result of the Vietnam War and the Watergate crisis. In this transition period, the influence of the "hawks" in the American government was reduced for a time, limiting direct military intervention in the Third World.³³ Regarding a new approach, the United States consulted with selected nonaligned states in their capitals or in the United Nations. This consultation was effected mainly before the 1976 Colombo Summit. As a result of this rapprochement, the anti-American sections increased the number of reservations on the issues such as Korea and the Middle East at this conference.³⁴

The Carter administration (1977-1981) continued a moderate American foreign policy in respect of the Nonaligned Movement. President Jimmy Carter had begun implementing such intentions as reducing tension with the Soviet Union, limiting military growth, and promoting a multi-polar view of the world through developing ties with other capitalist countries like Western Europe and Japan. Regarding the Third World, he attempted to improve America's image with progressive and moderate Third World countries by retreating from complete support of oppressive military regimes through linking aid with human rights.³⁵ Overall, the Carter administration was aware that the NAM represented a diplomatic entity capable of independent actions which could influence American foreign policy objectives.³⁶

Another result of American moderation was that President Tito of Yugoslavia was welcomed at the White House in March 1978. Both Presidents shared the view that the nonaligned countries could and should make an active contribution to the resolution of international problems and to the more favourable evolution of international relations. AW Singham interpreted the difference in the treatment by the United States of Cuba and Yugoslavia, two original members, which were also the oldest socialist countries within the Movement, as an intention to divide the

³³ AW Singham and Shirley Hune: *Non-Alignment in an Age of Alignments*, p. 149.

³⁴ RL Jackson: *The Non-Aligned, the UN and the Superpowers*, p. 215.

³⁵ AW Singham and Shirley Hune: *Non-Alignment in an Age of Alignments*, p. 169.

³⁶ II Kovalenko and RA Tuzmukhamedov: *The Non-Aligned Movement*, pp. 210-211.

coalition.³⁷ For RL Jackson, an American political scientist, after the 1960s, American policy toward the NAM was changing. But a change of mind in American policy did not necessarily correspond to developments within the NAM.³⁸ For example, the Carter administration attempted rapprochement at the moment when, in the Horn of Africa, Cuban troops and Soviet supplies assisted Ethiopia in its struggle with Somalia during the détente period.³⁹ This administration questioned, therefore, Cuba's credentials as a nonaligned country and its capacity to be chair.⁴⁰ These Cuban-Soviet involvements in the Third World again aggravated American relations with the Movement.

Under the Reagan administration (1981-1989), American policies and actions towards the Third World and the nonaligned nations were considered by MS Rajan, an Indian political scientist, so outrageous and pathologically self-righteous that they were utterly self-defeating and self-deceptive.⁴¹ This administration also linked the Nonaligned Movement to Soviet influence. As the latter had benefited from the détente to increase its armaments and its influence throughout the world, the Reagan administration adopted a strong strategy against the Movement. Moreover, the Reagan administration stepped up its subversion of the Movement in the early 1980s because the Movement's stance for a new economic order and its anti-imperialist slogans were becoming increasingly advanced. The disbandment of the SEATO bloc in 1977 and the liquidation of the CENTO bloc in 1979 following the anti-shah revolution in Iran were severe blows for the American administration.⁴²

One of the American strategies to weaken the Movement was an anti-Cuban campaign launched by the American administration. Cuba was the then chairman and

³⁷ AW Singham and Shirley Hune: *Non-Alignment in an Age of Alignments*, p. 179.

³⁸ RL Jackson: *The Non-Aligned, the UN and the Superpowers*, p. 224.

³⁹ I Jeremy and D Taylor: *The Cold War*, p. 317.

⁴⁰ AW Singham and Shirley Hune: *Non-Alignment in an Age of Alignments*, p. 163.

⁴¹ MS Rajan: *The Future of Nonalignment*, p. 103.

⁴² II Kovalenko and RA Tuzmukhamedov (ed.): *The Non-Aligned Movement*, pp. 212-213.

succeeded in mobilizing a radical anti-Western group in the Movement.⁴³ The United States mounted a campaign aimed at isolating Cuba from the other nonaligned countries. The Cuban administration was described as a centre of international terrorism, spreading its policy among other nonaligned countries and discrediting the Movement's leadership.⁴⁴

At the United Nations, officials of the Reagan administration initially followed a policy of not dealing directly with or even referring to the NAM in order not to further improve and legitimize its status in the United Nations system. Instead, American delegates attempted to work with regional groups or directly with individual countries.⁴⁵ The Reagan administration has also made it clear that the voting practices of countries at the United Nations would be taken seriously and that the United States aid policy would be guided by their voting pattern.⁴⁶ But group dynamics at the United Nations were by then too strong, and the integration of regional groups within the structure of the NAM too advanced, to reverse these trends.⁴⁷

Another American reaction was to counteract nonaligned support to member countries with regard to their sovereign right, their own form of development, and foreign relations. President Reagan announced in a speech that he was diverting additional funds to the Caribbean and Central American regions, to assist local groups in opposing liberation movements, which were being instigated by external interests, largely Marxist-Leninist groupings. The nonaligned, on the other hand, argued that the crisis in Central America was brought about by "the traditional repressive power structure and by national economic structures that produce poverty, inequality and misery", aggravated by "interference and interventions since the end of the 19th century". Reagan's warning of retaliation against governments in the region and his

⁴³ P Jevremovic: Nonaligned Movement, in *International Studies*, p. 286.

⁴⁴ II Kovalenko and RA Tuzmukhamedov (ed.): *The Non-Aligned Movement*, p. 46.

⁴⁵ RL Jackson: *The Non-Aligned, the UN and the Superpowers*, p. 219.

⁴⁶ AW Singham and Shirley Hune: *Non-Alignment in an Age of Alignments*, p. 49.

⁴⁷ RL Jackson: *The Non-Aligned, the UN and the Superpowers*, p. 219.

claim of Central America and the Caribbean as the "fourth border" of the United States alarmed many heads of states.⁴⁸

Jackson's study includes the famous letter of October 6, 1981 sent by Ambassador Jeanne Kirkpatrick to 64 Permanent Representatives of the nonaligned countries to the United Nations, addressing the behaviour of the nonaligned countries at their meeting, especially the discrepancy between their nonaligned behaviour and their behaviour at the United Nations. This letter pointed out that a nonaligned communiqué of September 28, 1981 criticised the United States no less than "nine times by name and dozens of times by implication" while refraining from any mention of the Soviet Union despite "continuing military occupation of Afghanistan, Kampuchea, Chad – all with the support of the USSR". This declaration did not, according to her, represent an "accurate reflection" of most governments' positions, and that they should therefore, dissociate from this and future unbalanced NAM positions.⁴⁹

The Kirkpatrick letter was considered by RL Jackson, an American political scientist, as the "first" instance of the United States initiating official recognition of the organisation's role and the attention paid to it by the United States. Reaction to the letter varied. For instance, Malawi, Saudi Arabia, Saint Lucia and Tunisia pointed out their absence from the meeting. Others reported that they had dissociated themselves from the nonaligned communiqué. However, this letter had two positive effects. It helped to persuade the non-activist majority of the Movement that NAM's position should be taken seriously in a wider context, including its relations with the United States. It also demonstrated that the United States took the Movement seriously and treated its positions as the considered product of mature and sovereign states.⁵⁰

⁴⁸ AW Singham and Shirley Hune: *Non-Alignment in an Age of Alignments*, p. 326.

⁴⁹ RL Jackson: *The Non-Aligned, the UN the Superpowers*, p. 220.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 220-221.

During the 1983 Delhi Summit, many observers took the view that India would promote a more moderate and constructive nonaligned position than Cuba. The expectation of officials within Reagan administration was that India would help guide the Movement back to the normal approaches of nonalignment of a previous period. Furthermore, it was anticipated that this kind of nonalignment would be less anti-American. President Reagan himself sent a congratulatory letter to Mrs Indira Gandhi indicating the long-term commitment of the United States to the principles upon which nonalignment is based.⁵¹

As the Delhi Conference of 1983 centred on how to counteract the activities of imperialism and neocolonialism against the nonaligned countries, Washington tried to influence the conduct of the conference itself and the drafting of its documents in a direction that suited the United States. Even though the New Delhi Summit was less anti-Western and less radical, this attempt failed. American reaction was to refuse to purchase some traditional Indian goods, textiles in particular, while the Asian Development Bank, in which Americans have considerable influence, refused to grant loans to India.⁵²

The United States was also unhappy with the condemnation pronounced on it by the 1986 Harare Summit. To show its displeasure against Zimbabwe, the new American government cut off a substantial part of its aid during the summit.⁵³ The documentation used during this study does not indicate the American position after Zimbabwe's chairmanship. But, MS Rajan, an Indian political scientist, indicates that in the 1990s, the Great Powers were no longer hostile to the policy of nonalignment. They tolerated this new foreign policy as during a *détente* period.⁵⁴

⁵¹ AW Singham: *Non-Alignment in an Age of Alignments*, p. 308.

⁵² II Kovalenko and RA Tuzmukhamedov (ed.): *The Non-Aligned Movement*, p. 216.

⁵³ MS Rajan: *The Future of Nonalignment*, pp. 103-104.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 48.

After the Cold War, the American attitude was not very positive. The former American ambassador to the United Nations, Richard Holbrooke, tried to divide the Movement. He asked African countries to reconsider their association with the Nonaligned Movement, "I have not seen a single issue in which Nonaligned Movement positions actually benefited the Africa group."⁵⁵ This stance was motivated mainly by the Movement's position in the North-South dialogue and its numerical influence at the United Nations.⁵⁶

4.1.2 The Soviet Union's Tactics in the Third World

At the outset, Stalin, with the famous "those who are not with us are against us" stance, did not trust nonalignment.⁵⁷ However, long before the Nonaligned Movement came into being, the Soviet Union resolutely defended the right of all nations to self-determination⁵⁸ and welcomed anti-colonialism as an attack on the back of the capitalist enemy and an opportunity for Communists to infiltrate the colonial areas. But it conceived no special role for the emerging national regimes.⁵⁹ Diverse aid was given by world socialism to several national liberation movements, which subsequently gave birth to the Nonaligned Movement.⁶⁰

After Stalin's death in 1953, the Soviet Union adopted a more active diplomatic strategy in the Third World. It became less exclusively orientated towards Europe in its policies since the Soviets found that the countries which came into the greatest opposition with the United States would seek to improve relations with the Soviet

⁵⁵ D. Thalif: *NAM fights against divide and rule* at <http://www.is.lk/times> and

D Thalif: Holbroke told off, in *New African*, p. 13.

⁵⁶ See *infra*, 5.3, p. 126.

⁵⁷ RS Yadav: NAM in the New World Order, in *India Quarterly*, p. 49.

⁵⁸ V Benevolensky: *The Non-Aligned Movement*, p. 110.

⁵⁹ LW Martin (ed.): *Neutrality and Nonalignment*, p. xix.

⁶⁰ V Benevolensky: *The Non-Aligned Movement*, p. 110.

Union. Moreover, as the number of new nations was also growing rapidly, and the majority of them chose to remain nonaligned, at best a reevaluation could result in closer cooperation against "imperialism and colonialism".⁶¹

In this regard, Moscow endorsed the pacific coexistence strategy of new nations in 1955, and although excluded from the Afro-Asian conference, because the Soviet Union was not an Afro-Asian country, it commented favourably on the results of Bandung. In contrast to the silence from Washington, Soviet President Kliment Voroshilov and other officials sent greetings to Bandung and, in its aftermath, worked closely with China to gain a foothold in the new grouping. This support was viewed in the West as a strategy of exploiting the Movement to destroy the capitalist system for Soviet interests.⁶²

Despite the Soviet campaign for influence in the Third World, the Nonaligned Movement appeared to Moscow as more of a threat than an opportunity. By 1961, the Soviets were somewhat disillusioned with the lack of Third World support at the United Nations for Soviet positions on the Congo crisis, Lebanon, and the replacement of the secretary-general with a troika system. A further negative factor for the Soviets was the early preeminence of Yugoslavia among the nonaligned.⁶³ Tito had used nonalignment as a strategy to implement an independent foreign policy in Europe,⁶⁴ an area which the Soviet Union wanted as a buffer zone for its own security.

The inclusion of conservative states like Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Morocco and Ethiopia was also a concern for Moscow. At the Cairo Summit (1964), the Soviet press was favourable since the Movement was considered as a vehicle to limit Chinese influence

⁶¹ G Lundestad: *East, West, North, South*, p. 8.

⁶² RL Jackson: *The Non-Aligned, the UN and the Superpowers*, p. 192.

⁶³ *Ibid.*

⁶⁴ R Allison: *The Soviet Union and the Strategy of Non-Alignment*, p. 32.

in the NAM. Relations between the Soviet Union and China developed into an open rupture, beginning in 1959. In the 1960s, the Cuban missile crisis was a Soviet expansion in the Third World. The Soviet Union changed deeply its vision toward the nonaligned countries in the 1970s, since strident nonaligned criticism of the United States and the rest of the West on the issues of the Middle East, southern Africa, and economic reform, which dominated the United Nations agenda, coincided closely with Soviet long-term goals. The Movement became, in Moscow's view, a positive mechanism to be used to isolate the United States and to gain acceptance for Soviet global aims.⁶⁵

It is also my opinion that Soviet policy vis-à-vis the Movement was a means of gaining a foothold in the new nations. For instance, after the Algiers Summit of 1973, the Soviet Union often oriented its positions to give the impression of identifying with the interests of the nonaligned. In this regard, the Soviet Union, together with the Movement, supported the idea of an Indian Ocean Zone of Peace. This Plan would close down American and British bases at Diego Garcia, and would also block further Soviet use of naval facilities at Massawa, Aden, Perim Island, Assab, Socotra and the Dahlak Islands. Yet knowing that agreement is highly unlikely, Moscow has consistently backed the plan in order to win nonaligned favour and to draw attention away from Afghanistan.⁶⁶

The Soviet leaders encouraged the nonaligned nations to adopt a political programme that would conform to Soviet strategic interests in the Third World. For instance, at the beginning of the Colombo Summit Conference in 1976, Soviet observers expressed concerns about press rumors, that some states intended to propose the candidatures of states that were either members of military blocs or maintained broad military and political relations with the United States and Britain, such as Australia, New Zealand, Portugal, Pakistan, Turkey, South Korea and China. Those in favour of this proposal argued that the inclusion of such countries in the Movement would assist

⁶⁵ RL Jackson: *The Non-Aligned, the UN and the Superpowers*, pp. 193- 194.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 195-196 and for the Indian Ocean See *infra* 5.2.2, p. 113.

in the dissolution of the blocs. The Soviet response was that this could lead to a breakup of the Movement into contradictory groupings.⁶⁷

Political circumstances in Africa during the 1970s encouraged Soviet exploitation of regional conflicts, and the Soviets gained wide-spread approval among African states because they helped to defend national frontiers in Ethiopia, for instance, and to support the cause of black majority rule in Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa. However, Soviet intervention in Afghanistan cost the Soviet Union loss of confidence and friendship among the nonaligned. This crisis contributed to the re-emergence of political issues and to the military factors of the Cold War impacting on the Nonaligned Movement. Moreover, the Afghanistan Crisis was the final blow to Cuban efforts to implement the thesis of the Soviet Union as a "natural ally" of the nonaligned nations. Many leaders in the Movement began to equate Soviet expansion and intervention in Afghanistan with Western imperialism.⁶⁸

By early 1980 the Soviet Union accused the nonaligned nations of ignoring the activities of members whose foreign policies, in many respects, contradicted the principles of nonalignment. The American military agreements with Egypt, Morocco and Saudi Arabia, and Western military bases in nonaligned states were referred to by the Soviet Union as evidence that easing the criteria of entry into the Movement had had a negative effect on the Movement's effectiveness.⁶⁹ But these bases had not been established against each country's will. On the other hand, the Soviet Union vindicated the continued membership of Afghanistan in the Nonaligned Movement after the entry of Soviet troops into this country. Moreover, the United States increased its presence in the Third World due to the Soviet Union which used détente to its advantage to increase its armaments and its presence outside of Europe.⁷⁰

⁶⁷ R Allison: *The Soviet Union and the Strategy of Non-Alignment*, p. 38.

⁶⁸ DC Thomas: *The Theory and Practice of Third World Solidarity*, pp. 414-417.

⁶⁹ R Allison: *The Soviet Union and the Strategy of Non-Alignment*, p. 39.

⁷⁰ I Jeremy and D Taylor: *The Cold War*, p. 317.

In the 1980s, Mikhail Gorbachev, the Soviet leader, was eager to continue détente and supported the NAM's goal. He proposed that every permanent member of the United Nations Security Council should assume an obligation not to draw the newly-independent states into military blocs. This action would help to remove tension and promote the peaceful settlement of a number of conflicts in Asia, Africa and Latin America. A Soviet specialist had even proposed unofficially that global détente be secured through "Nonalignment Pacts".⁷¹

The question is to discern which strategy was used by the Soviet Union to implement its policy vis-à-vis the NAM. To succeed in its policy toward the Third World, Moscow selected the largest and most powerful countries such as Egypt, India, Indonesia and Algeria. They received large-scale Soviet military and economic assistance and their leaders were called regularly to Moscow in the 1970s, during the détente period, where the more compliant were rewarded with Lenin Peace Prizes. But, the complexity and size of these states made them resistant to Soviet control and denied Moscow a direct voice or input within the Movement.⁷²

Cuba was vulnerable to Soviet influence because of the Bay of Pigs invasion. With this country chosen as an instrument, Moscow broadened its base at the Colombo Summit with the membership of Vietnam, North Korea, Angola, and the Palestine Liberation Organisation. In addition to these countries, there were Afghanistan, Grenada, Laos, Libya, Madagascar, Mozambique, South Yemen and Syria. This group represents an evolution in Soviet strategy toward the Nonaligned Movement away from concentration on the largest states and toward reliance on smaller, but controllable members. They were called to block consensus on positions damaging to Moscow foreign policy. For example, Cuba was able, in its chairmanship, to limit damage to Moscow from the latter's invasion of Afghanistan and to promote support

⁷¹ R Allison: *The Soviet Union and the Strategy of Non-Alignment*, p. 182.

⁷² RL Jackson: *The Non-Aligned, the UN and the Superpowers*, p. 197.

for the Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea. All 12 countries opposed a General Assembly resolution calling for Soviet troop withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1982.⁷³

In all, Communist expansion led the United States to adopt some policies toward the Third World. Most of the time, the United States was portrayed as an enemy of the NAM. However, American strategies toward the NAM changed and sometimes without necessarily corresponding to the developments within the NAM. For instance, the Carter administration attempted rapprochement at a time of maximum Cuban and Soviet influence. On the other hand, the Soviet Union found in the Movement an ally and used the NAM to express their criticism of the United States on the issues of the Middle East, southern Africa, and the New International Economic Order.

4.2 THE NONALIGNED MOVEMENT FACING SOME COLD WAR CONFLICTS

At issue here is a discussion of the duty chosen by the Movement, to tackle some acute problems provoked by the Cold War. The conflict that most fully engaged the attention of the nonaligned group in the 1960s was the dispute over Berlin and the political configuration of Germany. The strategy normally adopted by the nonaligned countries in dealing with the dangers posed by Great Power rivalry was: first, to encourage negotiations between the Superpowers and, where possible, to create a nonaligned communication link between them; second, to strengthen collective security arrangements at the global and regional levels, and finally, to work for general and complete disarmament.⁷⁴ The degree of success of these strategies as dealt with in this chapter does not concern the disarmament issue, which is discussed in the last chapter of this study.

⁷³ RL Jackson: *The Non-Aligned, the UN and the Superpowers*, pp. 198-200.

⁷⁴ R Allison: *The Soviet Union and the Strategy of Non-Alignment*, p. 68.

4.2.1 Germany and Negotiation as a Strategy

The problems of Germany and the city of Berlin arose during the Second World War. The Potsdam Conference of July-August 1945, which divided Germany among the victorious allies into four zones of military occupation: British, French, Soviet and American, also divided the city of Berlin, the capital of all Germany before this event.⁷⁵ Even though the United States, France and Britain had discussed dismembering Germany into several small states as late as their meeting at Yalta, in the following months all three would commit themselves to keeping Germany as one unit.⁷⁶ France wanted to keep Germany weak to safeguard itself from another occupation, while the Soviet Union wanted a strong central government in Germany able to pay larger reparations to the Soviet Union for Germany's previous attacks.⁷⁷

The State Department planners had argued that practically there could be no stability in postwar Europe, if Germany remained divided. Experiences of the interwar years had seemed to show that the Germans would never accept permanent partition of their country.⁷⁸ Thus the United States and Britain were opposed to reparations for the Soviet Union and the United States stopped paying them from the American zone in May 1946. This cessation resulted from the fact that the Soviet Union had begun to organise its zone according to the Eastern European pattern.⁷⁹ Moreover, the Soviet Union rejected the idea of a disarmed Germany. This negative response from Moscow seemed to confirm the fears of those who had argued that the Soviet Union's determination to impose spheres of influence reflected offensive rather than defensive intentions. Consequently, the Americans planned the consolidation of a defensible Western position in Germany.⁸⁰

⁷⁵ I Jeremy and D Taylor: *The Cold War*, p. 63.

⁷⁶ G Lundestad: *East, West, North, South*, p. 53.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 63.

⁷⁸ JL Gaddis: *The Long Peace*, p. 53.

⁷⁹ G Lundestad: *East, West, North, South*, p. 55.

⁸⁰ JL Gaddis: *The Long Peace*, p. 54.

The United States' proposition to merge different zones was accepted, first by Britain, and secondly by France. This process illustrated that consensus as to Germany was in the process of disintegrating entirely and the United States had assumed leadership in Western countries. Thereafter, a constitutional assembly was to be convened and a federal Germany government to be established for the three Western zones. In return, agreement was reached that the Ruhr, the major industrial area, should have an international controlling authority.⁸¹

Seen from Moscow, these developments were threatening. The Soviet Union was excluded from the Ruhr and from most of Germany. In June, the Western powers implemented a monetary reform which made unmistakably evident that Germany was no longer an economic unit. Western Germany would be integrated into Western European cooperation. The Berlin blockade was Moscow's response to these events. All rail, water and highway routes through East Germany to West Berlin were blocked by the Soviet Union.⁸² Washington believed that Moscow's basic intention was to throw the West out of the city. But, for General Lucius Clay, commanding general of the American zone, if the United States gave in on Berlin, it would dishearten its supporters elsewhere.⁸³ However, the Western countries saved West Berlin by means of an airlift.⁸⁴ Khrushchev was afraid of the West German chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, who wanted to reunite Germany. A unified Germany, armed with nuclear weapons and supported by the United States, would be a threat to the Soviet Union.⁸⁵

The situation deteriorated when the Soviet Union grounded an American spy plane over the Soviet Union. Khrushchev again made demands to Kennedy for a peace

⁸¹ G Lundestad: *East, West, North, South*, p. 57.

⁸² *Ibid.*

⁸³ BA Weisberger: *Cold War Cold Peace*, p. 91.

⁸⁴ I Jeremy and D Taylor: *The Cold War*, p. 72.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 165-166.

treaty and recognition of East Germany. The American president refused to lose Western occupation rights over Berlin and the Soviet leader then threatened Kennedy with the calamitous consequences of nuclear war. The American administration increased its defence spending and armed forces and rejected the Soviet calls for talks.⁸⁶

What position did the Nonaligned Movement take towards this East-West conflict? The answer is that they did very little. Although the Final Communiqué of the Bandung Conference in 1955 did not mention the German question, Tito had already referred to the issue of German reunification during this conference. In his belief, it was necessary “to give the Germans themselves the opportunity to express their own views”. He predicted that they would find “their own form of democracy, which may be neither purely Western nor purely Eastern”. As chairman of the Belgrade Nonaligned Summit in 1961, Tito delicately steered clear of this topic.⁸⁷

On the other hand, The Nonaligned Movement worked out its own view on the German question. The declaration finally agreed on at Belgrade was circumspect, since it only called upon the parties concerned not to threaten or resort to the use of force to solve the German question or the problem of Berlin.⁸⁸

In addition, the Belgrade conference made a separate statement at the suggestion of Nehru that was directed at the United States and the Soviet Union, that they might, in an age of nuclear weapons and the possibility of total global destruction, immediately suspend their preparations for war and begin negotiations for disarmament and peace.⁸⁹ Furthermore, the nonaligned states deputised Nehru and Nkrumah to Moscow and Sukarno and Modibo Keita of Mali to Washington on a peace mission.

⁸⁶ I Jeremy and D Taylor: *The Cold War*, p. 174.

⁸⁷ R Allison: *The Soviet Union and the Strategy of Non-Alignment*, p. 80.

⁸⁸ *Two Decades of Non-Alignment*, p. 9.

⁸⁹ AW Singham: *Non-Alignment in an Age of Alignments*, p. 85.

The text of both messages delivered to the Superpowers' leaders was identical and appealed to them for direct negotiations, since that continuing strained East-West relations contributed to a general deterioration of the global situation.⁹⁰ This message probably had only a marginal effect on the outcome of the crisis, but Khrushchev replied to the letter, reaffirming that the Soviet Union would be prepared to negotiate towards a German peace treaty and a normalisation of the situation in West Germany on this basis.⁹¹ Another serious crisis, which occurred in the 1960s, was the Cuban missile crisis.

4.2.2 The Cuban Missile Crisis and Mediation as a Strategy

Cuba was a source of tension between the Soviet Union and the United States. This case is one of the most dangerous episodes in the Cold War, in which a nonaligned country was at the centre. On that Caribbean island, Fidel Castro had overthrown Fulgencio Batista, a pro-American dictator, and launched a land reform programme. To the United States, a revolutionary, left-leaning government so near its coast was an unbearable affront. In 1961, the attack by anti-Castrist exiles organised by the United States failed in the Bay of Pigs debacle.⁹² Cuba then became vulnerable to Soviet influence because of this invasion. There is reason to believe that Cuba would initially have preferred a Soviet military guarantee of its security, even at the cost of expulsion from the Movement.⁹³

As the United States had missiles in Europe that were capable of reaching the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union introduced theirs in Cuba, to protect the island from an attack and to equalise the balance of power in nuclear weapons. The United States planned either to bomb the missile sites or to pursue some other effort to dismantle them.

⁹⁰ *Two Decades of Non-Alignment*, pp. 9-10.

⁹¹ R Allison: *The Soviet Union and the Strategy of Non-Alignment*, p. 81.

⁹² A Yoder: *The Conduct of American Foreign Policy since World War II*, p. 78.

⁹³ RL Jackson: *The Non-Aligned, the UN and the Superpowers*, p. 198.

Another alternative was a naval blockade. This would prevent the Soviets from landing any further shipments, although stopping ships on the high seas was tantamount to an act of war.⁹⁴ As a result, tension mounted very high between the two countries, both of which were ready to launch their missiles at each other. For the Soviet troops in Cuba, the use of nuclear warheads was categorically forbidden without permission from Moscow.⁹⁵

The steps taken by the nonaligned countries compromised their appeal to Sithu U Thant, the United Nations Secretary General, to do his utmost to resolve the crisis. This appeal helped not a little towards warding off disaster.⁹⁶ U Thant, under pressure from 40 nonaligned states, sent letters to Kennedy and Khrushchev urging the suspension of the blockade and the stopping of shipments to Cuba for two or three weeks. The letter pleaded with both governments to refrain from any action that would provoke war. Many diplomatic contacts were initiated via Anatoly Dobrynin, the Soviet ambassador in Washington. Finally, the Soviet Union agreed to dismantle its offensive arms after the United States had agreed not to invade Cuba. Moscow dismantled its missiles and, in 1963, the United States missiles were quietly removed from Turkey.⁹⁷

Despite this praise worthy effort, the nonaligned states were comparatively helpless during this crisis. India was in fact at war with China. An escalation of the crisis was averted by Soviet restraint and concessions. Both superpowers were afraid of using their nuclear arms. The crisis ended with a collective sigh of relief. Both the West and Moscow had a choice between a compromise and a nuclear war – neither side chose war. The superpowers refrained from attacking each another because of the

⁹⁴ I Jeremy and D Taylor: *The Cold War*, p. 194.

⁹⁵ M. Kramer: *Tactical Nuclear Weapons, Soviet Command Authority, and the Cuban Missile Crisis* at <http://www.ciao.net.com>, on 25/04/2002.

⁹⁶ R Allison: *The Soviet Union and the Strategy of Non-Alignment*, p. 81.

⁹⁷ I Jeremy and D Taylor: *The Cold War*, p. 202.

certainty of mutual destruction, rather than breaking under the pressures of any movement, group or individual.

4.2.3 The Middle East and the Palestinian Problem

The Middle East is a classic example of the important role of economic and strategic considerations in the Cold War. Moreover, this case is of major concern for the nonaligned nations since it encroached one principle of the Movement, that of self-determination. The Middle East is in contact with three continents, Africa, Asia and Europe. The area is important for both the United State and the Soviet Union. The issue here is to examine how the Middle East became a zone of Cold War confrontation, and the role of the Nonaligned Movement. Firstly, the United States had to continue their containment policy and thus needed to join their European alliance with Asian ones. On the other side, the Soviets wanted to increase their presence in the Third World. For both, the area was rich in raw material,⁹⁸ important after a disastrous war. The Nonaligned realised this and supported the oil embargo to help sort out the problem in the area due to this Cold War confrontation.

After the Second World War, France granted independence to Lebanon and Syria, two Middle Eastern countries under its trusteeship; the British did the same in Jordan. But in Palestine, decolonisation turned tragic, causing a continuing war up to the present. At that time, Palestine had two different communities in conflict: 1, 2 million Arabs on the one hand and 560, 000 Jews on the other. These Jews had begun their immigration at the end of the 19th century, motivated by Zionism, a movement encouraging them to return to their homeland⁹⁹ and in 1917, by the Balfour Declaration, the British government expressed support for the establishment in Palestine of national home for the Jewish people.¹⁰⁰ The British who wanted to leave the area because of Jewish pressure in 1945-46 and due to their economic crisis

⁹⁸ See *infra* 5.2.2, p. 113.

⁹⁹ Y Denis: *Le Monde d'Aujourd'hui*, p. 62.

¹⁰⁰ *Question of Palestine* at <http://www.un.org/Dpts/dpa/ngo/historyhtml>, on 25/02/2002.

brought about by the Second World War had no alternative for the inevitable conflict that would arise between two nations in one country.¹⁰¹

On February 7, 1947, Ernest Bevin of Great Britain proposed a plan that called for five years of British trusteeship, during which Palestine would be prepared for independence and ruled by both Arabs and Jews. From the beginning, the Bevin Plan was a failure, since the Arabs did not agree to Jewish self-government that would further Jewish immigration, while the Jews did not accept the proposal because it did not promise an eventual Jewish state. As a result of Bevin's failure to implement a British solution to the Palestine problem, the whole problem of Palestine was referred to the United Nations.¹⁰²

The United Nations approved a resolution in November 1947 that Palestine be divided into a Jewish state, an Arab state and the international zone of Jerusalem, which was to be placed under United Nations control. This plan was accepted by the Soviet Union and the United States but England and the Arabs announced their opposition.¹⁰³ On their side, the British announced their opposition to partition for reasons related to Britain's economic and political influence in the Arab world. Strategically, the Soviet Union accepted the creation of a Jewish state as an answer to the inclusion of Turkey within Truman's containment policy. The intention was also to cause friction between the United States and Britain over the Palestine question. Finally, through their support of Zionists in Palestine, the Soviets thought that a Jewish-Arab war would sooner or later accelerate Arab social upheaval which would eventually overthrow the feudal regimes in the Arab world,¹⁰⁴ which were pro-West, and would cause Britain to leave the Middle East as quickly as possible.

¹⁰¹ W LaFeber: *America, Russia and the Cold War*, p. 32.

¹⁰² IH Alsaeed: *The Origins and Meaning of America's Special Relationship with Israel*, pp. 380-381.

¹⁰³ Y Denis: *Le Monde d'Aujourd'hui*, p. 62.

¹⁰⁴ IH Alsaeed: *The Origins and Meaning of America's Special Relationship with Israel*, pp. 406-407.

When the United States announced the Marshall Plan in June 1947, pledging to curtail Communism in Western Europe through a programme of economic recovery, the new American move created additional elements to American foreign policy toward the Palestinian question. Arab oil became an important economic and strategic factor for implementing the Marshall Plan. It became clear during this time that a solution to the Palestine problem would involve not only the Arabs and Zionists but also the question of raw materials and the relations between the East and West. With this development, a new phase of the Palestine question and Zionist aims emerged, giving them a Cold War aspect, based on the national interests of both the United States and the Soviet Union. The establishment of a Jewish state required thus the support of American interests for the State Department.¹⁰⁵

When Ben Gurion proclaimed the creation of Israel on May 14, 1948 in the regions given to the Jews by the United Nations, Arab states that did not want a Jewish state in Palestine sent their armies into Palestine. This first Arab-Israeli war ended with an Israeli victory.¹⁰⁶ One result of the Arab defeat was a massive Arab exodus from Palestine to the other Arab countries. Many Palestinian refugees left their property behind them, thus giving the Israelis the chance to control nearly 60 per cent of the country's cultivated area.¹⁰⁷

Regardless of cultural and environmental differences between the United States and Israel, a special relationship between Israel and American Jewry had crystallised after the establishment of Israel. American Jews preferred to play an effective role in American politics. Jewish political pressure protected Israel's existence when it was challenged by Arab forces.¹⁰⁸ As Israel soon followed a clearly Western-oriented course, Soviet-Israeli relations cooled. Even so, Moscow hesitated to improve

¹⁰⁵ IH Alsaeed: *The Origins and Meaning of America's Special Relationship with Israel*, p. 385.

¹⁰⁶ Y Denis: *Le Monde d'Aujourd'hui*, p. 62.

¹⁰⁷ IH Alsaeed: *The Origins and Meaning of America's Special Relationship with Israel*, p. 476.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 485.

relations with the Arab countries. The fact that many of the latter pursued reactionary policies was one explanation.¹⁰⁹

By the late 1950s, the Middle East was established as an important front in the Cold War. This front extended to Israel in the late sixties. Firstly, the Arab-Israeli conflict opened up unique opportunities for Moscow in the Middle East. In the 1950s, the new Egyptian President, Nasser, saw the formation of CENTO as an attempt to isolate Egypt. As his dream was to unite the Arab world, he turned to the Soviet Union for help. Soon Egypt received arms from Eastern Europe, amongst others from Yugoslavia.¹¹⁰

Due to this Soviet support, Britain and the United States withdrew their support for the Aswan water project in Egypt. Consequently, Nasser announced the nationalisation of the Suez Canal. The Suez Canal Company was an international company in which Britain and France were the main sponsors. Britain and France decided to intervene militarily together with Israel. The latter first launched an attack on Sinai in 1956, and was joined afterwards by France and Britain. These countries withdrew their troops both because of the Soviet threat of a "rocket attack" and because of American pressure. However, the American attitude toward the crisis was ambivalent. On one hand, Washington was not pleased with Nasser's reaction. On the other, Americans wanted England removed from the Middle East. But neither could the Americans allow the Soviets a sphere of influence in the region through opposing the invasion.¹¹¹ Thus the British-French fiasco undermined Britain's position in the Middle East. Moscow's threats represented considerable propaganda in the Arab countries, and the Kremlin influence was on the increase.¹¹² This is a nonaligned country in the centre of the Cold War "game". It is also a good example

¹⁰⁹ G Lundestad: *East, West, North, South*, p. 90.

¹¹⁰ A and K Dawisha: *The Soviet Union in the Middle East*, p. 26.

¹¹¹ IH Alsaeed: *The Origins and Meaning of America's Special Relationship with Israel*, p. 521.

¹¹² G Lundestad: *East, West, North, South*, p. 92.

of how nonaligned countries tried to take advantage of the situation and get as much from the great powers through aid.

In response to this situation Eisenhower proclaimed the so-called Eisenhower Doctrine in 1957. Eisenhower maintained that American troops would be used to protect nations in the region from countries that were controlled by International Communism. The United States was to fill the vacuum the British-French withdrawal had created. When Washington sent troops to Lebanon and Jordan respectively the following year to support conservative governments there against the after-effects of Kassem's seizure of power in Iraq, Moscow could only protest.¹¹³

In 1967, the Soviet Union decided to exercise greater influence in the region by developing closer ties with militant, anti-Israeli elements, while the United States was busy with the Vietnamese question. In the face of American support for Israel, the Soviet Union provided military supplies to Arab countries. The escalation in tension began when the Soviet Union – probably to help the Syrian government – spread rumors that Israel was preparing an attack on Syria. This action contributed to tensions in the area. In order to prevent such an attack, Egypt mobilised forces in Sinai. When Nasser closed the Tiran Straits to Israeli ships, Israel suddenly launched an attack and in the course of six days Egypt, Syria and Jordan were defeated. In the short term, the war represented a defeat for the Soviet Union.¹¹⁴ As a result of this Six Days War, Israel occupied the remaining territory of Palestine, until then under Jordanian and Egyptian control (the West Bank and Gaza Strip). This area included the remaining part of Jerusalem, which was annexed by Israel. The war brought about a second exodus of Palestinians, estimated at half a million.¹¹⁵

The superpowers used these unstable circumstances to further their own positions. In this regard, Soviet policy was more active in 1973 than in 1967 to eliminate Western

¹¹³ G Lundestad: *East, West, North, South*, p. 92.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 118-119.

¹¹⁵ *Question of Palestine* at <http://www.un.org/Dpts/dpa/ngo/history.html>, on 25/02/2002.

influence in the Middle East. Until the late 1960s and early 1970s, Moscow was sorely deficient in military forces suitable for rapid and versatile projection of power abroad. This deficiency naturally limited the scope and magnitude of the Soviet Union's involvement in the Third World conflicts. By the 1970s, however, nearly two decades of massive involvement in mobile forces began to yield results, enabling the Soviet Union to begin acting as a truly global power in world affairs.¹¹⁶

Even though there is no reason to believe that Moscow wanted a war in the Middle East, it did nothing to prevent the Arab-Israel war in 1973. Information as to Arab intentions was not given to the United States, according to an agreement of 1972 between both superpowers during the *détente* period. After the war had broken out, the Soviet Union advocated an immediate cease-fire that would have benefited the Arabs considerably. When Israel did not respect the cease-fire agreement that the Soviet Union and the United States effected, the Soviet Union threatened to intervene directly on the side of the Arabs. The United States, which had also increased its assistance to Israel, placed its troops on alert. Both superpowers were on the brink of war in the Third World. The conflicts ended when the Israelis stopped their advance before the Egyptians were defeated completely.¹¹⁷

Many Arabs were disappointed with the insufficient Soviet support. Consequently, Egypt returned to a pro-Western course for a diplomatic solution. As BD Porter argues, once Egypt turned to the West, Moscow's influence began to raise once again in the more militant Arab countries. Libya, Syria, and Iraq received large quantities of Soviet arms and Soviet influence remained strong.¹¹⁸

On the other side, Kissinger shuttled between the capitals of the Middle East. He obtained minor Israeli concessions, such as more American aid in exchange for a partial withdrawal from Sinai. But Kissinger did not address the key issue of

¹¹⁶ BD Porter: *The USSR in Third World Conflicts*, p. 36.

¹¹⁷ G Lundestad: *East, West, North, South*, p. 120.

¹¹⁸ BD Porter: *The USSR in Third World Conflicts*, p. 144.

Palestinian nationalism and the Palestinian people's need for a homeland. The conflict came no nearer resolution. However, the United States became the main key player in the Middle East.¹¹⁹

4.2.3.1 An Independent Palestine as a Solution

For the Nonaligned Movement, the central issue of the Middle East crisis was the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination, including their right to a homeland. The question of Palestine was a question of world peace since the wars in the Middle East have increased tensions between the superpowers with the potential for nuclear confrontation. On the other side, Israel militarily attacked nonaligned countries and its incursions were slowly splintering Lebanon and Jordan. Iraq nuclear installations were bombed by Israel. Indeed, all countries within the region face the constant threat of Israeli militancy.¹²⁰

Nonaligned countries have historically had an active role in promoting the concerns of the Palestinian people to the international community. For instance, at Bandung conference, the Asian-African Conference declared its support for the rights of the Arab people of Palestine and called for the implementation of the United Nations resolutions on Palestine and the achievement of the peaceful settlement of the Palestine question.¹²¹ This question was discussed by the heads of state at their First Summit in Belgrade, in September 1961. The Conference reaffirmed the Bandung Declaration and gave support for the full restoration of all the rights of the Arab people of Palestine in conformity with the Charter and resolutions of the United Nations.¹²²

¹¹⁹ I Jeremy and D Taylor: *The Cold War*, p. 286.

¹²⁰ AW Singham and Shirley Hune: *Non-Alignment in an Age of Alignments*, pp. 261-262.

¹²¹ DC Thomas: *The Theory and Practice of Third World Solidarity*, p. 110.

¹²² *Two Decades of Non-Alignment*, p. 7.

In 1967, the Arab-Israel war created new problems for refugees. The Nonaligned countries made new efforts to bring the cause of the Palestinian people to the international community. The Movement issued a communiqué pledging support for national liberation movements at a consultative meeting of special government representatives in Belgrade in 1969 and PLO representatives addressed this meeting.¹²³ Regarding the war, the 1967 Middle East crisis was defused primarily through the moderating influence of the superpowers on the belligerents. The nonaligned nations performed only a secondary role and found themselves unable to remain impartial during this crisis, since Egypt and Syria were members of the Movement.¹²⁴

However, in December 1969, nonaligned countries helped to bring the concerns of the Palestinian people before the United Nations. Resolution 2535, supported in large by the Movement, was adopted by the 24th General Assembly. It recognised for the first time that the problem of Palestinian Arab refugees has arisen from the denial of their inalienable rights. This was the beginning of international recognition of the Palestinian cause and of the centrality of Palestine to the tensions in the Middle East.¹²⁵

The record of the Movement as a crisis manager in relation to the Middle East crisis in 1973 was not encouraging. The political stand of the superpowers effectively blocked attempts by nonaligned states to push through a ceasefire resolution in the United Nations. A ceasefire became possible only after the superpowers had reached an agreement between themselves and jointly moved a resolution in the Security Council, and both had agreed on the creation of a UN Emergency Force.¹²⁶

¹²³ AW Singham and Shirley Hune: *Non-Alignment in an Age of Alignments*, pp. 264-265.

¹²⁴ R Allison: *The Soviet Union and the Strategy of Non-Alignment*, p. 82.

¹²⁵ AW Singham and Shirley Hune: *Non-Alignment in an Age of Alignments*, p. 265.

¹²⁶ R Allison: *The Soviet Union and the Strategy of Non-Alignment*, p. 82.

In the meantime, the Arab countries used their "Oil Weapon" as a front against the West. Whenever they had a specific demand on Israel or the West, the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) would increase the oil price or cut their oil production. This led the United States and its allies to work harder to appease the Arabs: Britain stopped supplying arms to Israel; Japan stopped its support of Israel.¹²⁷

As agreed at the 1973 Algiers Summit, nonaligned countries joined in the successful request to place the question of Palestine on the UN General Assembly. In October 1974, the Arab heads of state declared the PLO to be the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.¹²⁸ At the same time, the General Assembly conferred on the PLO the status of observer in the General Assembly.¹²⁹

The foreign ministers' meeting at Lima in 1975 welcomed the PLO as a full member of the Nonaligned Movement and suggested that the Palestine question be accorded a place as a standing item on the agenda at their meeting.¹³⁰ In January 1976, the Security Council discussed the issue of political rights for the Palestinian people for the first time, with the participation of the PLO. Six countries, four of them nonaligned members (Benin, Guyana, Panama, Pakistan, Romania and Tanzania), introduced a draft resolution affirming the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people as established by the General Assembly. Although the resolution was blocked by Western powers in the Security Council, for the first time this organ discussed this Palestinian issue.¹³¹

¹²⁷ J Brooman: Conflict in Palestine, in CJ Visser: *The Role of Terrorism in the Cold War*, pp. 166-167.

¹²⁸ AW Singham and Shirley Hune: *Non-Alignment in an Age of Alignments*, p. 269.

¹²⁹ *Question of Palestine* at <http://www.un.org/Dpts/dpa/ngo/history.html>, on 25/02/2002.

¹³⁰ *Two Decades of Non-Alignment*, p. 166.

¹³¹ AW Singham and Shirley Hune: *Non-Alignment in an Age of Alignments*, p. 270.

After the Cold War, the Jakarta Conference noted the pressing need to restore to the Palestinian people, who were waging a struggle against Israel, their right to justice and self-determination, and their right to establish an independent and sovereign state in accordance with United Nations resolutions. They stressed that peace in the Middle East cannot be achieved unless Israel withdraw from all the occupied territory, including Al Quds (Jerusalem), the Syrian Golan and Southern Lebanon.¹³²

A series of negotiations culminated in the mutual recognition of the State of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organisation, the representative of the Palestinian People, and both signed, the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self Government in Washington in 1993. These arrangements led to the partial withdrawal of Israeli forces, the elections to the Palestinian Council and the Presidency of the Palestinian Authority, and the establishment of a functioning administration in the areas under Palestinian self-rule.¹³³

However, the Middle East problem was not finally sorted out. The decision of the Government of Israel in June 1981 to take further steps to expand the jurisdiction and planned boundaries of Jerusalem complicated this problem. The Nonaligned Movement condemned this act as well as Israel's illegal decision of December 1981 to alter the physical and demographic status of the occupied Golan and its institutional structure by applying Israeli jurisdiction and administration there.¹³⁴

In all, the nonaligned countries have reacted to international conflict without great success. Most of the time the Movement has used peaceful settlement of disputes as one of its principles. The superpowers chose to defuse their tensions mainly without consideration of the Nonaligned Movement. Only Stalin promised to consider their appeal in the 1960s. The superpowers' role in the Third World did not prevent

¹³² *Tenth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries*, p. 4.

¹³³ *Question of Palestine* at <http://www.un.org/Dpts/dpa/ngo/history.html>, on 25/02/2002.

¹³⁴ *XII Summit Conference of Heads of State and Government of the Non-Aligned Movement*, pp. 70-71.

nonaligned member countries from being involved in the Cold War, the Middle East being a case. Due to the Movement's involvement, the Palestinian question was discussed at the United Nations and their right to a homeland was recognised by this world organisation. However, strong measures were not taken against Israel since the Movement was confronted by the force of major powers. This problem could remain unsolved for a long time, since the United States still needs Israel to counter extremist Muslims in the Middle East. The superpowers found also in the Movement a force that can influence their decision-making in foreign policy. The Soviet Union backed the NAM to weaken the Western bloc and used Third World countries like Cuba to counter American influence. The United States also wanted to benefit from the developing countries in order to contain Soviet communism. However, American policy toward the Nonaligned Movement was ambivalent, once wanting to break it up, since nonalignment was against American involvement in the Third World, and other times supporting the Movement even during serious tension of the Cold War, for example during the Carter period, to exclude the Soviet Union from these countries.

CHAPTER 5: SUCCESSES AND WEAKNESSES OF THE NONALIGNED MOVEMENT

The Movement has grown substantially, since the Belgrade Conference in 1961. One third of the member states are very small and, economically, all of them are developing countries. Most of them are also very weak militarily and their armed forces are symbolic. These negative factors mean that a majority of the nonaligned countries are not of great significance, except possibly a few of the larger states, for example Egypt, India, Yugoslavia, Pakistan and South Africa, in the international hierarchy of powers. However, they do command the majority of votes in the United Nations and other international organisations. In the bodies with limited membership, such as the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, and the executive of other international organisations, they command considerable political and moral weightage.¹ However, the main power of decision-making on world issues of vital interest to all countries is monopolised by the big powers.²

Due to this weakness, the durability of the Nonaligned Movement can be explained only by the fact that it has concentrated on problems that are bound to remain the substance of world politics over a longer period of time. In fact, the Movement has concentrated on the eradication of colonialism, peace and cooperation among all nations, economic development and racial equality. The Movement used the United Nations as a platform to express its policy and to influence decision-making on some issues. On the other hand, it is important to discern how the Movement functions, to know how decisions were taken within the Movement and to what extent they could influence the conduct of the member states. It is also interesting to examine how the Movement influenced decision-making in other international forums. This will entail a discussion of the role played by the Movement in changing the international economic order. Thus the NAM's organisation will be discussed. Even though, in some cases, the Movement challenged large powers, problems as a result of internal

¹ MS Rajan: *The Future of Nonalignment*, pp. 10-11.

² P Willets: *The Non-Aligned Movement*, p. 25.

conflicts handicapped its good running. This chapter examines these issues to see to what extent the Nonaligned Movement was successful.

5.1 INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENT

For AW Singham and Shirley Hune, one of the most remarkable achievements of the Nonaligned Movement has been its capacity to transform itself from a small protest movement into a major international social movement in world politics.³ In the system of structural and organisational formations in modern international relations, the Nonaligned Movement is not an international conference. Unlike a conference, it does not consider just one problem. The agenda of its meetings include practically all the main questions considered at the United Nations. Furthermore, the Movement has no time limits or deadlines for discussing the question.⁴ However, for AW Singham, the NAM is not totally a social movement, since it is a state-centred movement.⁵

On the other hand, the Movement is not an international organisation. Compared with classical institutions, the Nonaligned Movement has no charter spelling out its goals, principles and structure or strictly regulating its functions and the operation of its organs. Bodies and posts like Secretary-General are absent from the Movement's structure. Moreover, at the outset, the Movement did not have an established hierarchy or a strict delimitation of functions among the main political bodies. All the functions within the Movement are performed by statesmen of the member countries.⁶

At the outset, the Movement had no headquarters and no obligatory membership fees,⁷ and had no person to act on its behalf in international legal relations. The only

³ AW Singham and Shirley Hune: *Non-Alignment in an Age of Alignments*, p. 33.

⁴ II Kovalenko and RA Tuzmukhamedov (ed.): *The Non-Aligned Movement*, p. 250.

⁵ AW Singham and Shirley Hune: *Non-Alignment in an Age of Alignment*, p. 5.

⁶ Y Alimov: *The Rise and Growth of the Non-Aligned Movement*, pp. 63-64.

⁷ II Kovalenko and RA Tuzmukhamedov (ed.): *The Non-Aligned Movement*, p. 250.

permanent organisational form was the Coordinating Bureau, which was introduced at the fourth summit in Algiers.⁸ At the 1976 Colombo Summit, a standing committee and a Co-ordinating Committee and a chair of the Movement were created out of necessity. The Movement agreed to maintain the Co-ordinating Bureau as a permanent organ.⁹

The question arises here whether the lack of structures did not affect the working of the Movement. AW Singham and Shirley Hune argue that the founders of the Nonaligned Movement and their successors had recognised that the Movement would have been destroyed if it had created a formal structure, such as a constitution and an internal secretariat. A multicultural, transnational organisation with different ideologies and purposes could never create a rational administrative structure to implement its policies that all could accept.¹⁰ There was also a danger that the NAM's bureaucracy could constrain the flexibility and authority of heads of states and governments and foreign ministers who represent member states.¹¹ Moreover, the Movement did not need additional spokesmen, since two-third of the United Nations were members of the Movement. Many of the members have represented themselves as spokesmen of the Nonaligned Movement in the United Nations Security Council on issues of deep concern to the Movement, such as the Palestine and the Namibian problems.¹²

Its organisational forms are derived from the experience of the United Nations and the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), since many countries in the Movement belong to these organisations – the OAU proclaimed nonalignment to be a major principle of

⁸ II Kovalenko and RA Tuzmukhamedov (ed.): *The Non-Aligned Movement*, p. 27.

⁹ AW Singham and Shirley Hune: *Non-Alignment in an Age of Alignments*, p. 162 and <http://www.nam.gov.za/background/background.htm>, on 23/06/2002.

¹⁰ AW Singham and Shirley Hune: *Non-Alignment in an Age of Alignments*, p. 33.

¹¹ MS Rajan: *The Future of Nonalignment*, p. 59.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 54.

its Charter.¹³ Resolutions, including those on organisational and procedural matters that are passed during the NAM's meetings, make up a code of principles that could be formalised in something like a charter,¹⁴ which could specify the roles and missions of each body of the NAM.

The Conference of the Heads of States or Governments of the nonaligned countries is considered as the supreme body of the Movement, although its power has not yet been defined completely in an official document. Every conference analyses the main international problems and developments, charts the strategic guidelines for the nonalignment policy, elaborates the joint position of the nonaligned countries at the United Nations, adopts policy-making documents for the Movement, and decides on major issues or activities.¹⁵

As from 1970, the host country is declared to be the coordinating country and its leader is elected chairman of the conference until the next summit.¹⁶ Nonaligned administration is rotational, providing all member states, regardless of their size and importance, with an opportunity to participate in global decision-making and world politics. This rotating chairship enabled small countries to acquire "big power" status in world politics.¹⁷

The chairman of the Movement, without any supra-state power, ensures continuity in the development of the Movement, takes all necessary steps to maintain contacts among member states and sees to it that the Movement's decisions are carried out. In addition, a Coordinating Bureau is elected that is presided over by the coordinating

¹³ Y Alimov: *The Rise and Growth of the Non-Aligned Movement*, p. 52.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 64.

¹⁵ AW Singham and Shirley Hune: *Non-Alignment in an Age of Alignments*, p. 34.

¹⁶ Y Alimov: *The Rise and Growth of the Non-Aligned Movement*, p. 34.

¹⁷ AW Singham and Shirley Hune: *Non-Alignment in an Age of Alignments*, pp. 33-35.

country. The foreign minister of that country chairs the ministerial meetings held in New York.¹⁸

Another important body is the “conferences” and “meetings” of foreign ministers. Firstly, the term “conference” is used for a summit attended by all foreign ministers of all the nonaligned countries every 18 months. These conferences make a general assessment of the world situation, chart the common line of the nonaligned countries in international political and economic matters, and solve organisational problems. Their decisions on organisational matters may be very important. For instance, they recommended that meetings of nonaligned countries be held regularly at ministerial level at the United Nations headquarters in September. These September meetings discuss the agenda of the current session of the UN General Assembly and map out common tactics for the nonaligned countries on the most pressing issues. Their significance for the alignment of forces in the UN is important, since they are held almost simultaneously with similar ministerial meetings of the Group of 77, at which all developing countries are coordinated.¹⁹

Secondly, there are ministerial meetings attended by a limited number of delegates, most of which are held in the framework of the Coordinating Bureau of the Movement. This Bureau has many different duties, such as to follow the implementation of the decisions adopted by the conferences of nonaligned countries; to hold Bureau meetings to consider international problems; to prepare the conferences of heads of states or governments or other meetings of the nonaligned countries; to coordinate the joint activities of the nonaligned countries in the United Nations; and contacts with the Group of 77.²⁰ The Group of the Nonaligned Countries and the Coordinating Bureau in New York stand out for actually being continually functioning bodies, because the participants in their meetings are permanently present at the UN headquarters and may gather for a meeting at any time.

¹⁸ Y Alimov: *The Rise and Growth of the Non-Aligned Movement*, pp. 65-66.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp.68-69.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 71-72.

At Havana, the Bureau seats were increased from 25 to 36 to permit the following regional distribution: Africa -17 seats, Asia -12 seats, Latin America -5 seats, Europe - 1 seat. The 26th seat would be shared between Africa and Europe and would be occupied for one and a half years by each of the members chosen.²¹

Participation in the Nonaligned Movement in any capacity is voluntary. The founders defined the criteria in 1961.²² These criteria are not very strict. Thus the Movement avoids being an exclusive group. A country may be striving to apply the principles of nonalignment, while objectively still being bound to a particular bloc structure.²³ This raises the problem whether it is not a weakness of the Movement not to force member states to observe nonalignment principles. As MS Rajan has pointed out, some members have not been punished by, for example, suspension of their membership, even though they have permitted foreign military bases and foreign armed forces on their soil. For instance, Afghanistan was allowed to remain member of the Movement even though, Soviet forces occupied the country from 1979 to 1989. Moreover, the category of guests and observers includes some former-formally aligned nations, such as Australia, the Philippines, Portugal, Greece, Romania and Spain. Some members, such as Egypt and Pakistan, became partners in the American strategic consensus, CENTCOM (Central Command).²⁴

Even though participation is voluntary, reaction to the participation at the NAM forums of a nonaligned country in which a coup or an armed conflict took place was acute. For instance, the military junta which had overthrown Salvador Allende was not invited in 1975. The question of Kampuchea also caused great difficulties in the late 1970s. The Havana Summit denied the Pol Pot regime, which was overthrown by

²¹ DC Thomas: *The Theory and Practice of Third World Solidarity*, p. 410.

²² See *supra* 3.5 p. 66.

²³ AW Singham and Shirley Hune: *Non-Alignment in an Age of Alignments*, p. 42.

²⁴ MS Rajan: *The Future of Nonalignment*, p. 72.

the Kampuchean people, the right to attend its meeting, but failed to come to a consensus on handing down its seat to the People's Republic of Kampuchea.²⁵

From the outset, the procedure of drawing up and adopting decisions in all organs of the Movement was based on the consensus principle. The nonaligned countries understand consensus as "mutual accommodation on the basis of which agreement can emerge by a sincere process of adjustment among member nations... a process and a final compromise formula... general convergence and harmonisation of views reflecting the broadest consent of the Conference or meeting".²⁶ Thus, the aim of the consensus method is to enhance or at least preserve the unity and strength of the Movement.²⁷ A consensus requires ample opportunity for discussion. In international politics, however, there is often insufficient time for prolonged discussions. It is indeed remarkable that the Movement has achieved consensus on so many difficult problems in world politics over the years. The process worked out by the Nonaligned Movement is to begin with a working group of officials, then to move the subject onto the level of ambassadors, then to the level of ministers, and finally to the heads of state.²⁸

The uneven development of the mode of operation is typical of the Movement: some of its aspects were determined earlier, others later, and still others are just taking shape. Thus, this organisational form has allowed the Movement to take important decision on many world issues, such as peace and security, the democratisation of international relations, a search for a New International Economic Order, etc. However, the positions of the Movement's members in decision-making in some organs, such as the Security Council, are weakened by the lack of veto, which is monopolised by the large powers.

²⁵ Y Alimov: *The Rise and Growth of the Non-Aligned Movement*, p. 87.

²⁶ *Two Decades of Non-Alignment*, p. 222.

²⁷ Y Alimov: *The Rise and Growth of Non-Alignment*, pp. 91-92.

²⁸ AW Singham and Shirley Hune: *Non-Alignment in an Age of Alignments*, p. 44.

5.2 STRUGGLE FOR PEACE AND SECURITY

The Nonaligned Movement is not a security system. Yet, one of the main preoccupations of the members was indeed the security of their own countries in the light of their awareness of the growing tensions and instability caused by the Cold War as a result of ideological, economic, political and military issues. None of the nonaligned nations had the ability to bring substantial changes in the world.²⁹ Did the nonaligned countries' reactions as a group to the arms race, nuclear threat and instability as a whole bring about a significant solution?

5.2.1 NAM and Disarmament

The nonaligned countries, at their gatherings in the United Nations and elsewhere, have always devoted attention to the question of disarmament. Yet, in their joint action, disarmament usually did not hold a very prominent place. For example, in one of two declarations published at the conference at Bandung, disarmament was mentioned in one sentence followed by the "Bandung principles". Activity in Bandung, Belgrade and Cairo remained, as regards disarmaments, at the level of general proclamations, bringing nothing new to the world discussions, since disarmament was one of the first issues that came up before the United Nations immediately after its foundation. The two well-armed groups in the Cold War, each refusing to reduce its armament before equalising force, overshadowed these early discussions.³⁰

The above point of view of Mates, former Yugoslav diplomat and the Secretary-General of the Belgrade Conference, seems to minimise the role of the Nonaligned Movement in the matter. As discussed in the fourth chapter, the nonaligned group recognised as early as during its formative years that the dissolution of blocs and

²⁹ R Allison: *The Soviet Union and the Strategy of Non-Alignment*, p. 141.

³⁰ L Mates: *Nonalignment Theory and Current Policy*, p. 249.

alliance systems and the renunciation of the practices associated with them were closely linked to the issue of Great Power disarmament.³¹ At Belgrade in 1961, the nonaligned defined disarmament as the elimination of the armed forces, armaments, foreign bases and arms manufacturing facilities, the total prohibition of the manufacture, possession and use of thermonuclear, bacteriological and chemical weapons, and the liquidation of launchers designed for weapons of mass destruction.³²

Already in their first declaration issued at the Belgrade Conference in 1961, the participants rejected the view that war, including the Cold War, was inevitable.³³ The Conference, in its message to the leaders of the Superpowers, appealed for further talks³⁴ for the immediate conclusion of a treaty on general and complete disarmament. In addition, the main communiqué devoted six of its 27 points to questions of disarmament and demanded that the nonaligned nations should be represented at all further world conferences on disarmament. They also demanded a stop to the testing of all nuclear weapons. At the time, the Asians were worried about tests in the Pacific and the Africans were furious about French atomic tests in the Sahara.³⁵ Khrushchev agreed that a group of uncommitted nations could be added to the existing disarmament committee.³⁶

The participants at the Belgrade Conference met in a situation burdened by considerable tensions between the Soviet Union and the United States. The strained situation, with no significant contacts made between the two superpowers, deteriorated even further when the Soviet Union announced the resumption of nuclear testing.³⁷ As a result of the NAM's effort, a resolution proposed by a number of

³¹ R Allison: *The Soviet Union and the Strategy of Non-Alignment*, p. 95.

³² Y Alimov: *The Rise and Growth of the Non-Aligned Movement*, p. 121.

³³ *Two Decades of Non-Alignment*, p. 5.

³⁴ P Willets: *The Non-Aligned Movement*, p. 24.

³⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁶ R Allison: *The Soviet Union and the Strategy of Non-Alignment*, p. 96.

³⁷ L Mates: *Nonalignment Theory and Current Policy*, p. 256.

nonaligned states was adopted at the 16th Session of the United Nations General Assembly in 1961, calling for a prohibition on the use of nuclear arms and authorising the United Nations General Secretary to ascertain the possibility of convening a conference to establish such a prohibition. After long negotiations, the Soviet, American and British delegations signed a partial nuclear test ban treaty in August 1963.³⁸

The Nonaligned Movement welcomed the signing of the Soviet-American SALT 2 treaty and the relaxation of European tensions as recorded in the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, signed in Helsinki in 1975.³⁹ The treaty signed in Vienna in June 1979 basically codified the agreements reached between Ford and Brezhnev at Vladivostok in 1974. Both sides accepted an upper limit to their nuclear arsenals of 2 400 missiles, to be reduced to 2 250 by 1981. Both sides accepted a ceiling of 1 200 ICBMs and SLBMs. MIRVs were drawn into the agreement, with a maximum number of ten warheads, which they already carried.⁴⁰

In their resolutions on disarmament, the nonaligned countries continued to seek world disarmament. As a result, a Special Session of the UN General Assembly on Disarmament was convened on its initiative in 1978.⁴¹ The Conference on Disarmament was established in 1979 as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum of the international community. It has 66 members and its terms of reference include practically all multilateral arms control and disarmament problems.⁴²

³⁸ R Allison: *The Soviet Union and the Strategy of Non-Alignment*, p. 95.

³⁹ Y Alimov: *The Rise and Growth of the Non-Aligned Movement*, p. 126.

⁴⁰ I Jeremy and D Taylor: *The Cold War*, p. 322.

⁴¹ Y Alimov: *The Rise and Growth of the Non-Aligned Movement*, p. 137.

⁴² *Conference on Disarmament* at <http://www.un.org/Dpts/dda/-18>, on 25/04/2002.

After the 1983 New Delhi Summit, the Prime Minister of India, in his capacity as chairperson, had taken the initiative to convene, a six-nation conference, of Prime Ministers and Presidents from Greece, Mexico, Argentina, Norway and Tanzania, at New Delhi in 1985. This conference urged a moratorium on nuclear tests, especially by the superpowers. They also offered to monitor the moratorium. The Soviet Union, which had, a little earlier unilaterally announced a moratorium in August 1985, responded to the appeal by the six nations not to hold any tests until the end of the year. On the following appeal, the Soviet Union agreed to extend the moratorium until 1987. But, during this period, the United States failed to respond to the NAM leader's moratorium.⁴³

The nonaligned countries took on the struggle against the arms race not only because the destructive power contained in nuclear stockpiles can kill human life many times over and might well prevent its reappearance for ages to come, but also the NAM supported disarmament due to its economic spending. The military expenditure could help developing countries boost their economy. The Delhi Political Declaration stated that the increase in military spending had sped up inflation, hiked the budget deficits and further reduced the already decreasing economic aid to developing countries. For instance, a nuclear aircraft carrier, it was noted at the Conference, cost \$4 billion, which is more than the GNP of 53 countries. According to UN experts, in 1981 alone the world spent more per minute for military purposes than the sum required to feed over 2 000 children for one year in the developing countries.⁴⁴ For every 100 000 people in the world there were 556 soldiers, but only 85 doctors. For every soldier, the average world military expenditure was US \$20 000, while for every school age child the average public education expenditure was a paltry US \$380.⁴⁵

⁴³ AW Singham and Hune Shirley: *Non-Alignment in an Age of Alignments*, p. 94.

⁴⁴ II Kovalenko and RA Tuzmukhamedov (ed.): *The Non-Aligned Movement*, p. 79.

⁴⁵ RG Mugabe: The State of the Non-Aligned Movement, in *Black Scholar*, p. 11.

5.2.2 Security of the Indian Ocean

All the nonaligned meetings have attached great importance to ending the arms race, achieving general and complete disarmament under strict international control and creating peace and nuclear-free zones, including in the Indian Ocean. The Cairo Conference of 1964 found that these bases in the Indian Ocean were a calculated attempt to intimidate the emergent states of Africa and Asia and an unwarranted extension of the policy of neocolonialism and imperialism.⁴⁶ Geographically, the Indian Ocean basin is an aggregate of several subregions, including South Asia, part of the Middle East, South East Asia and the Australasian continent, the Horn of Africa, East Africa and the South Eastern region of the African continent.⁴⁷

Both the United States and the Soviet Union had bases in this area because of their strategic and economic interest. For instance, these bases help foreign powers to keep an eye on the Persian Gulf. This region is by far the largest reservoir of oil in the world. In 1985, the region accounted for 17.41% of world supplies. By 1995, the figure rose to 26.59 %, reflecting the growing dependence of the world economy on oil from the Persian Gulf.⁴⁸ On the other hand, the Indian Ocean is a vast lake with only three entrances: the Suez Canal which is easily blockaded and has lost its importance by being too small for the supertankers of today; the straits of Malacca, which are also vulnerable, as well as being too remote for Western traffic; and the Cape of Good Hope, around which many ships with vital cargoes for Europe and the United States sail annually.⁴⁹

On the basis of these interests, after the conclusion of the Asian war, the Soviet Union established major bases at Berbera in Aden and Umm Qsar in Iraq, which have given

⁴⁶ Y Alimov: *The Rise and Growth of the Non-Aligned Movement*, p.122.

⁴⁷ Y Nikolayev: *Make the Indian Ocean A Peace Zone*, p. 5.

⁴⁸ G Bahgat: Peace in the Persian Gulf, in *International Studies*, p. 307.

⁴⁹ L Beebe: *Soviet Strategy Toward South Africa*, p. 4.

it commanding facilities in the Persian and Aden Gulf, as well as domination over the Southern entrance to the Suez Canal. Moscow also earned the right to the submarine base at Andra Pradesh and the naval facility at Vishakhpatnam in India. In addition, the Soviets placed a number of deep water moorings in the ocean at either end of the Mozambique Channel, one off Durban, and at least two in the vicinity of the American base at Diego Garcia. These provided the Soviet Union with excellent surveillance points from which to monitor the Western traffic in the Indian Ocean.⁵⁰

On the other side, the Americans placed top priority for the military development of the region in the vicinity of the American base on Diego Garcia Island. The Chagos Archipelago, including the Diego Garcia Island, was seized by the United Kingdom from Mauritius and declared a British Possession in the Indian Ocean in 1965; later it was leased to the United States. The Diego Garcia base had an airfield with landing facilities for the B-52 strategic bombers carrying nuclear weapons, the B-1B. The base had enormous storages of fuel and ammunition, a major communications centre, a monitoring station and a storage facility for nuclear warheads. Apart from Diego Garcia, the United States had about 30 military bases and facilities in the Indian Ocean area.⁵¹

For the nonaligned countries, the establishment and maintenance of foreign military bases, particularly against the express will of states, was a gross violation of their sovereignty. According to N'krumah, "the danger is increased when there are foreign military bases. These bases are for strategic purposes which are counter to our national interests. They serve as much as instruments of pressure on the countries where they are stationed, as for departure points for aggressions against third parties. The bases of Cyprus, Aden and Guantanamo Bay (Cuba), to name but a few, are examples."⁵²

⁵⁰ L Beebe: *Soviet Strategy Toward South Africa*, p. 4.

⁵¹ Y Nikolayev: *Make the Indian Ocean A Peace Zone*, pp. 27-28.

⁵² *Cuba in the Second Conference of Non-Aligned Nations*, p. 45.

It was Sri Lanka that first raised the question of making the Indian Ocean a zone of peace. Initially, it proposed the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in the region, which was approved by the Second Conference of the Heads of State and Government of nonaligned countries held in Cairo in 1964. Later, Sri Lanka supplemented its proposal of a nuclear-free zone with the idea of creating a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean. The idea was supported by the Lusaka Summit in 1970. From that time on, the nonaligned states have devoted a great deal of attention to this question, which is constantly on the agenda of various forums of the Nonaligned Movement, even up to now. For instance, the Movement submitted a draft resolution containing a Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace for consideration by the 26th Session of the UN General Assembly.⁵³

The next important stage in the struggle for making the Indian Ocean a zone of peace was the decision of the 29th session of the General Assembly in 1974, taken on the insistence of the nonaligned countries, concerning the convening of an international conference on the Indian Ocean. As a result, a Meeting of the Littoral and Hinterland States of the Indian Ocean Basin was convened in July 1979 and attended by 44 delegations from the states of the Indian Ocean region, as well as from China, Greece, Japan and Panama. The Soviet Union attended as an observer. The participants drew up a common approach to the solution of establishing a zone of peace. The participants called upon the great powers not to further strengthen their existing military bases, nor to acquire new military bases, not to explode nuclear devices, etc.⁵⁴

The overall trend from 1961 to 1970 shows that, while a belief in disarmament and the promotion of peaceful inter-state relations were still honoured as part of the ideology of nonalignment, this component had clearly declined from a near pacifist crusade at the beginning of the decade to being of only secondary importance at the end of the decade. Indeed, the big powers seemed to monopolise the decision-making

⁵³ Y Nikolayev: *Make the Indian Ocean A Peace Zone*, p. 8.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 12-13.

on world issues that were of vital interest to all countries.⁵⁵ However, the prestige of the NAM grew, since it was recognised as a large anti-war and anti-militaristic force – a positive factor in international relations. The hopes for the prevention of war and for peaceful coexistence are associated, to a certain degree, with the realisation of the principles and goals of the Nonaligned Movement and its extensive activity.⁵⁶ The implementation of the initiative of the nonaligned countries to make the Indian Ocean a zone of peace will depend on their cohesion and clarity of purpose.

5.2.3 Disarmament in the 1990s

The question that arises here is whether this peaceful image of the Nonaligned Movement corresponded with the Movement in the 1990s. How can the development of an arms race between member states like India and Pakistan be interpreted against the background of this Movement?

With the end of the Cold War, the Movement continued to struggle for peace. It found that there was no justification for the maintenance of nuclear arsenals, or for concepts of international security based on promoting and developing military alliances and policies of nuclear deterrence. The opportunity now exists for the international community to pursue nuclear disarmament as a matter of highest priority, since the nuclear weapons continue to represent a threat to the survival of mankind.⁵⁷

At the 1995 Cartagena Summit, the nonaligned countries called on the Conference on Disarmament to establish an *ad hoc* committee to begin negotiations on nuclear disarmament in 1996 and stated that they would introduce a draft resolution to this effect at the General Assembly. Despite French pressure, they firmly rejected all

⁵⁵ P Willets: *The Non-Aligned Movement*, p. 25.

⁵⁶ Y Alimov: *The Rise and Growth of the Non-Aligned Movement*, p. 137.

⁵⁷ *XII Summit Conference of Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Movement*, p. 46.

kinds of nuclear testing and strongly deplored the resumption and continuation of nuclear testing. They reiterated their support for a UN fund for the clearance of mines.⁵⁸

Nevertheless, two nonaligned countries, India and Pakistan, tested nuclear weapons in 1998. There were persistent concerns about Pakistan's nuclear weapons. Foremost among these were Pakistan's refusal to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty or to endorse the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT); the risk of nuclear war between Pakistan and India over Kashmir; and Pakistan involvement in the development of an "Islamic bomb" – Pakistan's endeavour to project itself as the first Islamic nuclear power, entitled, in some sense, to assume the leadership of the Muslim World. The most immediate worry among many nations was that such competition would encourage other aspiring nuclear countries – including Iran, Iraq, Libya and North Korea - to pursue clandestine nuclear weapons programmes.⁵⁹

As the Movement had no other means to constrain its members, the 1998 Durban Summit considered as positive the commitment by the parties concerned in the region to exercise restraint, which contributes to regional security, to discontinue nuclear tests and not to transfer nuclear weapons-related material, equipment and technology. The summit further stressed the significance of universal adherence to the CTBT, including all Nuclear Weapons States, and the commencement of negotiations on fissile materials in the Conference on Disarmament.⁶⁰

⁵⁸ S Morphet: The Non-Aligned and their 11th Summit, in *The Round Table*, p. 458.

⁵⁹ S Farzina: Pakistan's nuclear bomb: beyond the non-proliferation regime, in *International Affairs*, pp. 30-31.

⁶⁰ *XII Summit Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries*, p. 45.

5.2.4 Internal Conflicts

Conflicts between member states threatened the unity and security of member nations. In the 1960s, the Congo crisis of 1960, differences in language, and the content and form that Pan-African unity should have, were issues of disagreement. In spite of these differences, the African states saw the need to pursue Pan-African unity through the OAU, which was based on nonalignment.⁶¹ However, in the 1970s, a conflict grew out of Angola's accession to independence. The internal struggle for power between the two major guerilla organisations, Agostinho Neto's Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and Holden Roberto's Angolan National Liberation Front (FNLA), split Africa into two camps. The involvement of Cuba and the Democratic Republic of Congo (formerly Zaire), who each backed a different claimant to power, exacerbated tensions between the Third World and the great power partisans of each formation. The incursions in 1977 and 1978 into Congo's Shaba province by rebels trained in Angola were a prolongation of this competition.⁶² Several Third World governments, such as Morocco, Egypt and Sudan, hastened to Mobutu Sese Seko's aid. This involvement in Angola was interpreted as a Cuban, and hence a Soviet, probe against a vulnerable Western-oriented regime, since the Cubans were in Angola.⁶³

A second conflict with diplomatic ramifications broke out over Western Sahara. Morocco and Mauritania partitioned this former Spanish colony, while Algeria armed and gave asylum to the Polisario front, which claimed independence for the territory. Each side sought support in Africa and from Arab countries.⁶⁴ The Sahara question, in particular, was the subject of a long debate in committee in the Movement, with numerous states aligning themselves behind each camp, while a third group of states laboured to work out a compromise declaration. At the Bureau meeting held in

⁶¹ DC Thomas: *The Theory and Practice of Third World Solidarity*, p. 172.

⁶² RA Mortimer: *The Third World Coalition in International Politics*, p. 85.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 112.

⁶⁴ RA Mortimer: *The Third World Coalition in International Politics*, p. 85.

Algiers in 1976, Algeria clashed with Senegal and Congo (allies of Mauritania and Morocco) on the question of Sahara. This question was finally left at the discretion of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). The nonaligned countries expressed the hope that the OAU Summit Conference to examine this question would be convened at the earliest opportunity with a view to achieving a just and durable solution.⁶⁵

The Havana Summit welcomed the Islamic Republic of Mauritania's decision to withdraw its forces from Western Sahara. At the same time, they deplored the extension of the armed struggle by Morocco into the southern part of Western Sahara previously has been administered by Mauritania. However, the delegates were satisfied with the efforts of the Sixteenth OAU Special Committee to provide and guarantee the Saharan peoples' right to self-determination.⁶⁶

Another conflict was the civil war in Lebanon, in which the Palestine Liberation Organisation and Syria were deeply embroiled and which turned out to be a very divisive issue. The roots of the Lebanese crisis lay in the anachronistic traditional political system that had, in the name of pluralism, concentrated power in the hands of a narrow segment of its population, which happened to be predominantly, though not exclusively, Marovite Christian. A system based on traditional elite bargaining dominated by landlords and traditional political bosses had been living on borrowed time. Increasingly, an urban and radicalised population required a different form of government. Left to its own devices, the Lebanese political system was bound to face a crisis of major proportions.⁶⁷ Syria's military advance deep into Lebanon in 1976 was a blow to the Palestinians and their allies on the Lebanese left, and this brought Iraq, Egypt, Libya and Algeria into conflict with Damascus. The cumulative effect of these three trouble spots was a political malaise that could only weaken the collective action of the developing countries.⁶⁸

⁶⁵ *Two Decades of Non-Alignment*, p. 253.

⁶⁶ DC Thomas: *The Theory and Practice of Third World Solidarity*, p. 406.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 367-368.

⁶⁸ RA Mortimer: *The Third World Coalition in International Politics*, p. 85.

The threat to group cohesion posed by these conflicts was greatly exacerbated by Cuba's role in Africa. In the Horn of Africa, Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam took power in Ethiopia. He was a Marxist eager to break the last American ties with Haile Selassie who was overthrown in 1974. The Ethiopian Revolution also opened up new opportunities for the Soviet Union in East Africa. The Somalian leader, Mohammed Siad Barre, had changed sides and looked for an alliance with Washington and, in addition, had territorial ambitions for the Ogaden region of eastern Ethiopia. Moscow and its allies, notably Fidel Castro in Havana, decided they could not stand by and watch this strategically important country being defected by an ally of the West.⁶⁹

The Ethiopian leader was now engaged in a war on two fronts: against ethnic Somalis in Ethiopia's Ogaden region, who sought a union with Somalia, and against Eritreans seeking independence for their province. When Cuba backed Mengistu, the new regime came into conflict with Somalia and into indirect conflict with Sudan, Saudi Arabia and other Arab governments, which were friendly to the Eritreans and uneasy about a Marxist government in Addis Ababa.⁷⁰

The question that arises is whether this Cuban involvement in Africa was an extension of Soviet foreign policy. On one the hand, the answer is negative, since Cuba had a policy of providing support to Africa since the early years of the revolution, including aid to Algeria in 1963 and Zanzibar in 1964.⁷¹ But, as Jorge Dominguez has put it, "through these events, Cuba has continued to coordinate policy with the USSR in ways that make it difficult to determine who leads and who follows, even though it remains clear that neither the Angolan nor the Ethiopian operations could have been conducted in the absence of either."⁷²

⁶⁹ I Jeremy and D Taylor: *The Cold War*, p. 308.

⁷⁰ RA Mortimer: *The Third World Coalition, in International Politics*, p. 111.

⁷¹ PS Falk: *Cuban Foreign Policy*, p. 83.

⁷² JI Dominguez: Cuban Foreign Policy, in Foreign Affairs quoted by RA Mortimer: *The Third World Coalition in International Politics*, p. 111.

This Soviet use of proxies managed to weaken the NAM by dividing members on important strategical and political issues and foreign policy. For example, Somalia led the critical attack against Cuba at the 15th Summit Conference of the OAU in Khartoum in 1978, and even called for Cuba's expulsion from the Nonaligned Movement. On the other hand, Algeria, Angola, Ethiopia, Libya, Mozambique and others similarly objected to the presence of French troops in Chad, Congo (formerly Zaire) and Mauritania. Finally, most of nonaligned countries agreed at Belgrade that the issue of Cuban troops in Africa was a state-to-state matter. Angola or Ethiopia had the right to make their own decision as to the nature and extent of support they were to receive from countries outside Africa.⁷³

These conflicts became aggravated in 1979. First, Somalia and Ethiopia went to war, and then Cambodia and Vietnam did the same. The FLNC again marched into Shaba. The guerrilla wars in Western Sahara and Eritrea continued. Moreover, the coups in Kabul and Yemen destabilised relations with the regional neighbours (Pakistan, Iran, North Yemen, Saudi Arabia) and heated up the international climate in general.⁷⁴

The Iran-Iraq war was a major concern for the Nonaligned Movement in the 1980s. In the late 1970s, Iran still occupied three small pieces of territory along the Iran-Iraq border that were supposed to be returned to Iraq under the treaty of 1975. Moreover, the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the spiritual leader of the Iranian Revolution, listed Iraq amongst the countries where the government was to be overthrown and replaced by an Islamic regime. As the 1975 agreement was violated, the Iraqi Army invaded Iran. Two member states of the Nonaligned Movement opposed each other in this conflict. In addition, this costly war weakened the broad Middle East coalition that had developed over the years against Israeli oppression and in support of the Palestinian people.⁷⁵

⁷³ AW Singham and Shirley Hune: *Non-Alignment in an Age of Alignments*, pp. 187-189.

⁷⁴ RA Mortimer: *The Third World Coalition in International Politics*, p. 113.

⁷⁵ AW Singham and Shirley Hune: *Non-Alignment in an Age of Alignments*, p. 236.

A NAM Committee of Good Offices was set up to sort out this issue and made about 15 trips to the capitals of Iran and Iraq in 1980, without success.⁷⁶ This was a demonstration of the failure of the Movement and of the United Nations, since both protagonists did not heed the Movement's plea to respect its principles, namely those of not acquiring or occupying territories by use of force. Moreover, both belligerents were to respect the resolution of conflict by peaceful means in respect of these principles.⁷⁷ It was not until 1990 that both Iraq and Iran finally agreed to settle their differences on the basis of the 1975 agreement and carry out the terms of UN Resolution 598.⁷⁸ This is all examples of how the Third World became the battleground for the Cold War. It was difficult to escape the Cold War. Moreover, the nonaligned countries lacked political will and means to implement their decisions. Furthermore, nonalignment was a difficult position to adopt, due to the economic situation in the South.

In the 1990s, the Cold War disappeared. It is interesting to examine the nature of the NAM's struggle for peace in this changing world. The good climate between East and West did not mean an end to all conflicts. We have already mentioned the tension between India and Pakistan over Kashmir. In 1990, these two countries were on the brink of war. The antagonism between India and Pakistan went back to the period of independence in 1947 and flared up from time to time. Even though the United States and the Soviet Union would have liked to have good relations with India and Pakistan, the United States was linked to Pakistan through SEATO and CENTO, while the Soviet Union tried to establish close relations with India in particular. Indian-Soviet relations were strengthened in the 1970s because of Pakistan's good relations with China and the danger of a civil war in which India supported the independence of East Pakistan.⁷⁹

⁷⁶ AW Singham and Shirley Hune: *Non-Alignment in an Age of Alignments*, p. 236.

⁷⁷ MS Rajan: *The Future of Nonalignment*, p. 97.

⁷⁸ *The New Encyclopedia Britannica*, p. 969.

⁷⁹ G Lundestad: *East, West, North, South*, p. 118.

A further conflict that erupted in the 1990s was the invasion and annexure of Kuwait by Iraq. The United States and a number of Western European, Arab and other countries sent troops to the Persian Gulf. The Soviet Union also cooperated against Iraq, Moscow's former ally.⁸⁰ This collective security cooperation to liberate Kuwait can be viewed as a focal point in distinguishing peace-keeping operations in the Cold War and in the post-Cold War era.⁸¹

Two other conflicts degenerated into a humanitarian disaster. One was that in Somalia. In response, the Movement established a Task Force on Somalia that was active in addressing the issue at the United Nations. The NAM Chairman sent Special Envoys on fact-finding missions to Somalia, charging them to participate in the endeavour to bring about a just and comprehensive political settlement to the internecine dispute, but unfortunately, this did not reach a long-term peaceful solution.⁸²

Another humanitarian disaster in which the Movement actively tried to help was that which befell Bosnia and Herzegovina from the early to mid-1990s. At one time, Indonesia, as Chairman of the NAM, offered its good office to facilitate a peace process based on direct negotiations among the leaders of the states involved in the conflict on the basis of the principles that the NAM has always stood for. According to NS Sutresna, the leaders concerned were apparently prepared to avail themselves of this offer, but soon thereafter the United States took the initiative of launching a peace process.⁸³

⁸⁰ G Lundestad: *East, West, North, South*, p. 152.

⁸¹ M Chetty: *A New Role For the Non-Aligned Movement in a Post-Cold War Era*, p. 40.

⁸² NS Sutresna: A Review of the NAM, in G Mills: *South Africa and the Future of the Non-Aligned Movement*, pp. 16-17.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, p. 17.

As M Mandelbraun argues, American interventions in Somalia and in Bosnia-Herzegovina can be seen as characteristic of interventions in the post-Cold War era. A characteristic of these interventions authorised by the United Nations, was that they represented a shift from the military interventions in the Cold War era. While military interventions during the Cold War era were undertaken in terms of the East-West conflict, these intra-state conflicts were largely due to internal conflicts between tribes over the question of sovereignty or of leadership.⁸⁴

The peace-keeping operations were undertaken on behalf of the international community and under the auspices, or with the consent, of the United Nations by other "international forces", which had the necessary military power and political weight. Today because of its failure in Somalia, the United States reluctantly is only as the remaining superpower, with different combinations of allies that participate in these operations. Thus, for P Jevremovic, the Nonaligned Movement does not stand a chance of being a corrective or, even less so, an alternative to such development. It did not manage to play such a role in previous situations either, such as in the Iran-Iraq War or in the dispute between Algeria and Morocco over Western Sahara, which were violent conflicts between members.⁸⁵

At the Jakarta Summit in 1992, the nonaligned countries supported the Agenda for Peace of the UN Secretary-General and the proposed preventive diplomacy of the United Nations in averting local conflicts by eliminating their deeper socio-economic and political causes. However, at their Eleventh Summit meeting in Cartagena (1995) as well as at the ministerial conference in Cairo in mid-1994, the nonaligned nations expressed reservations, about the trend of converting peace-keeping operations into other types of military actions that are not authorised in conformity with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.⁸⁶

⁸⁴ M Mandelbaum: *The Reluctance to Intervene*, in *Foreign Policy*, quoted by M Chetty: *A New Role For the Non-Aligned Movement In a Post-Cold War Era*, p. 40.

⁸⁵ P Jevremovic: *Nonaligned Movement*, in *International Studies*, p. 302.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

In Durban in 1998, the Movement reiterated its concern over the staffing structure of the Development of Peace-keeping Operations of the UN Secretariat in which NAM member countries were insufficiently represented. The summit stressed that, on the basis of equitable geographical representation, personnel from nonaligned countries be sufficiently represented amongst the personnel for the new posts to be created in lieu of phasing out gratis personnel.⁸⁷

The Movement's support for peace-keeping operations rests on the fact that the NAM does not have the enforcement powers or the institutional capacity to enforce peace on disputants, or to undertake peace-keeping itself.⁸⁸ Thus, the further evolution of the NAM and its adjustment to changed international relations will be closely connected to the development of the United Nations.

5.3 ECONOMIC DEPENDENCE

The main concern of the nonaligned group of states in the 1960s had been the eradication of Great Power conflicts and the elimination of colonialism. By the early 1970s, the period of détente and the successful decolonisation of much of the world had reduced the urgency of these objectives. As there was détente between the superpowers, the nonaligned states turned their attention to the fundamental source of their insecurity – their economic dependence on the developed Northern states, their weakness in international economic and monetary systems and the general backwardness of their economies.⁸⁹ It is of interest to discuss these economic problems of the newly independent states and the methods used by the Third World to seek global interdependence.

⁸⁷ *XII Summit Conference of Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Movement*, p. 35.

⁸⁸ MS Rajan: *The Future of Nonalignment*, p. 42.

⁸⁹ DC Thomas: *The Theory and Practice of the Third World Solidarity*, p. 226.

5.3.1 Colonial Influence

During the colonial era, the economies of the colonies were integrated parts of the colonial power's economy. A glance at a pre-1960 map of Africa, for example, reveals that the road networks of, for example, the Ivory Coast, and the Gold Coast stop considerably short of the common frontier between them. Communication between the two colonies was extremely difficult and, even in 1972, there still was no road between Abidjan and Accra, while telephone communication between these two capitals, so close to each other, was still conducted via Paris and London.⁹⁰

In general, colonies had simple dual economies, with a wide subsistence agricultural sector and a narrow monetary sector consisting of a few cash crops or mineral commodities for export. Yet, this dependence varied from region to region due to the pre-colonial situation. For instance, a dominant feature of the pre-colonial sub-Saharan economies was "household self-sufficiency". A household produced enough from the field surrounding the hut for the need of the house. This subsistence economy was characterised by a lack of regular production of marketable surplus, a lack of specialisation on a significant scale, and a static technology. At best, trading was known only in some parts of ancient West African empires, such as Ghana, Mali and Songhai, and in some portions of Eastern Africa, such as Kilwa and Zimbabwe. The subsequent growth of an exchange economy in the colonial period resulted in a dual economy in which a monetary economy gradually evolved, but in which subsistence survival continued to occupy a large part of the African population.⁹¹

On the other hand, by the time of their colonisation the Asian countries, already had evolved their own production mechanisms and trading devices. Due to the decaying Asian socio-economic fabric and a forceful Western onslaught, the European metropole emerged as the new centres of industrial production, while the traditional

⁹⁰ D Kimche: *The Afro-Asian Movement*, p. 2.

⁹¹ RR Ramchandani: *NAM and Third World Development Dilemma in the Post Cold War era*, pp. 42-45.

Asian industrial centres were reduced to the role of peripheral market places. Unlike Africa and Asia, the Latin American region was largely peopled by immigrants from the Iberian Peninsula and displayed the backward characteristics of those economies.⁹²

As a result of an unequal exchange, which favoured the metropole in that it enjoyed more favourable terms of trade, the pre-colonial indigenous economic frame disintegrated and growth became unbalanced, rendering the colonial possessions critically dependent on the industrial development of the metropole. For more than two centuries, Asian and African countries suffered the consequence of the system. The formation of the Group of 77 and the Nonaligned Movement is a result of the Third World's awareness of the exploitative nature of the colonial system that their countries were subjected to in the past, and the related mechanism of a dependent pattern of development under which most of them continue to suffer to this day, since the technologically advanced mechanisms and the accompanying processes continue to be located largely in the North.⁹³

5.3.2 First Steps for a New International Economic Order

North-South conflicts in international economic relations were not a contentious issue on the global agenda in the 1950s and 1960s, due to the fact that developing states appeared to enjoy rising levels of economic growth and were politically stable. Third World elites were consequently optimistic about the future because of the existence of a fairly stable economy that was characterised by rising levels of trade and aid.⁹⁴ However, due to the expulsion of Asian, African and Latin American countries from the postwar institutions dealing with trade in postwar regimes and growing income and trade gaps between rich (North) and poor nations (South), the Third World

⁹² RR Ramchandani: *NAM and Third World Development Dilemma in the Post Cold War era*, p. 51.

⁹³ *Ibid.*, p. 36.

⁹⁴ M Chetty: *A New Role for the Non-Aligned Movement*, p. 81.

proposed an array of new policies to increase their share of global trade.⁹⁵ Demands for a new economic world order became increasingly prominent. The developing countries used the United Nations as a platform to discuss this issue, and the arrival in the 1960s of more African states definitively shifted the weight in the General Assembly voting to the developing world.⁹⁶

As a result, as early as in 1964, the nonaligned countries became instrumental in bringing about the first United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the Group of 77.⁹⁷ The formation of UNCTAD represented an important step toward collective bargaining between the industrialised North and the underdeveloped South.⁹⁸ What the 77 developing nations wanted were greater opportunities for development finance, tariff reductions, expansion of their market opportunities, stabilisation of raw material prices,⁹⁹ an increase in the amount of development aid from the advanced industrialised states, and a stronger voice in the specialised agencies – the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, etc. – that had been created to deal with monetary and developmental issues.¹⁰⁰

On the other hand, the Western industrial powers had agreed to the UNCTAD Conference with reluctance and they did not wish to establish a distinct new organisation for trade and development. They preferred to rely on an instrument such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT, technically a multilateral treaty designed to regulate and harmonise trading relations), which had given little explicit attention to development issues. As consensus was to be used in UNCTAD

⁹⁵ C Murphy: *The Emergence of the NIEO Ideology*, pp. 59-60.

⁹⁶ RA Mortimer: *The Third World Coalition in International Politics*, p. 15.

⁹⁷ G Lundestad: *East, West, North, South*, p. 283.

⁹⁸ DC Thomas: *The Theory and Practice of Third World Solidarity*, p. 300.

⁹⁹ RA Mortimer: *The Third World Coalition in International Politics*, p. 16.

¹⁰⁰ Y Arafat: *The Tyranny of the Minority*, in *Canada and the World Backgrounder*, p. 12.

for decision-making, the North protected its bargaining power, through the obligation to reach consensus, while the South gained a new bargaining forum.¹⁰¹

As a result of a ministerial conference of the Group of 77, the Algiers Charter was drawn up in October 1967. Regarding raw material, the text called for the creation of regulatory stocks of key commodities in order to avoid the extreme price fluctuations that brought disaster to Third World revenues. The second major sector dealt with trade in manufactured and semi-finished products. The major demands were for the generalisation of preferences and for a more rapid transfer of technology to the developing countries. The third major issue was development finance. The Third World called for the developed countries to pledge a fixed level of development funding (1% of gross national product) and international action to ease the burden of Third World indebtedness. Algeria was particularly convinced that the Conference of 77 was a critical opportunity for the developing countries to once again get themselves moving as a collective force in international politics.¹⁰²

Following Algiers, the UNCTAD II held in New Delhi in 1968 was a disappointment for Third World countries. Only one accord, regarding a gradual application of a generalised system of preferences for Third World manufactures, was reached. Over, the next several years, various European states enacted legislation granting such tariff advantages. The United States put such a system into application only in 1976. The net result was an increase in the sense of a cleavage between North and South.¹⁰³

5.3.3 United Front on North-South Issues (1970-1976)

After the disappointment of UNCTAD II, the Lusaka Summit of 1970 called upon all nonaligned nations to establish new means for collective political and economic

¹⁰¹ RA Mortimer: *The Third World Coalition in International Politics*, pp. 16-17.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, pp. 27-28.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, p. 29.

action in a world dominated by big powers. The summit therefore adopted the thesis that, in order to achieve greater autonomy and impact on the international system, the nonaligned nations must attain greater self-reliance.¹⁰⁴ By the late 1960s, the African leadership was also stressing the need for greater self-reliance in economic matters. The then Tanzanian President, Julius Nyerere, stated in radical terms that, "in order to maintain our independence and our peoples freedom we ought to be self-reliant in every possible way and avoid depending upon other countries for assistance".¹⁰⁵

The Lusaka Summit Declaration was the first to insist that "the poverty of the developing nations and their economic dependence... constitute a structural weakness in the present world economic order" and that "the persistence of an inequitable world economic system inherited from the colonial past and continued through present neo-colonialism poses insurmountable difficulties in breaking the bondage of poverty".¹⁰⁶

The summit specified various forms of mutual planning, trade, and technical cooperation among developing countries themselves. For instance, they planned to identify products and countries in which production could be stimulated and expanded with a view to increasing existing income and trade exchange. Secondly, they decided to facilitate transit traffic for the diversification and expansion of the external trade of landlocked countries. They also decided to exchange information on the needs and resources of different developing countries in respect of technical know-how, research, consultancy services, experts and training facilities.¹⁰⁷ As a result, a Centre for South-South Technical Cooperation was officially inaugurated in Jakarta in January 1998 to facilitate activities and programmes of technical cooperation between

¹⁰⁴ DC Thomas: *The Theory and Practice of the Third World Solidarity*, p. 297.

¹⁰⁵ Ujamaa: Essays on Socialism, in RR Ramchandani: *NAM and Third World Development Dilemma*, p. 86.

¹⁰⁶ *Two Decades of Non-Alignment*, p. 48 and *Resolutions of the Third Non-Aligned States*, p. 21.

¹⁰⁷ *Resolutions of the Third Non-Aligned States*, pp. 22-23.

NAM and other developing countries.¹⁰⁸ In order to prepare a common Third World position for UNCTAD III, the summit called for the convocation of a second ministerial meeting of the Group of 77. Thus, the nonaligned group began to fix a working relationship between the two Third World frameworks.¹⁰⁹

In the 1970s, a number of factors contributed to making North-South relations a contentious issue in international politics. With the advent of the 1970s, developing and nonaligned states increasingly faced tougher domestic problems. The number of poor living near the poverty line appeared to be increasing within the developing states, aid from the North was decreasing and conventional development strategies, such as import substitution, had failed to achieve the growth rates initially envisaged, particularly within Latin America. A contributing factor to the increasing problems faced by developing and nonaligned states was the advent of a global economic recession. The roots of the recession lay in the combination of a number of factors, such as the decision of the United States to opt out of the fixed rate system agreed to at Bretton Woods, which ushered in an era of flexible exchange rates. Another factor was the OPEC oil crisis of the 1970s, whereby increasing oil prices had a negative effect on global economic growth rates.¹¹⁰

Meanwhile, UNCTAD III met in Santiago in 1972 and, aside from a vague agreement to create a special aid programme for the 25 most disadvantaged countries, the various contentious issues were referred back to the committees and study groups. The United States in particular insisted that institutions such as GATT and IMF retain their traditional decision-making power and led opposition to the establishment of a link between the creation of international monetary liquidity in special drawing rights (SDRs) and developmental credits.¹¹¹ Thus UNCTAD III failed to change North-

¹⁰⁸ NS Sutresna: A Review of the NAM, in M Gills: *South Africa and the Future of the Non-Aligned Movement*, p. 16.

¹⁰⁹ RA Mortimer: *The Third World Coalition in International Politics*, p. 32.

¹¹⁰ M Chetty: *A New Role for the Non-Aligned Movement In a Post-Cold War Era*, p. 81.

¹¹¹ RA Mortimer: *The Third World Coalition in International Politics*, 34.

South relations, but it marked an important step in Third World solidarity in the 1970s.

Consequently, the nonaligned group met in Georgetown in 1972. This meeting was ready to mobilise a more radical posture on the issues facing the Third World. An Action Programme for Economic Cooperation, which stressed the need for the states nonaligned to implement the ideal of "self-reliance" both in and among developing countries, was adopted. This programme affirmed permanent sovereignty over natural resources and direct control over strategic economic activities. In this vein, Algeria set forth to nationalise all foreign oil companies.¹¹²

The changing orientation of the Movement, from East-West conflict to North-South conflict on economic issues, corresponded with a change in the leadership. With the advent of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War and the introduction of oil power in the international system, Arab and Muslim countries began to play a more dynamic role in the Movement.¹¹³ As Algeria became the chair of the Movement in 1973 and under its leadership, the Third World was able to take advantage of the disarray and divisions among major Western industrial countries over oil prices and supply to take the diplomatic offensive within the United Nations and to seek more serious attention to their concerns.¹¹⁴

Regarding oil costs, the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) hiked the prices in 1973 to push Western powers to agree their demands. For the first time, the hike was determined outside the Western counsels. This had a worldwide impact. The industrialised countries reeled under the pressure. Their growth rate was arrested and the world economy drifted into a deep recessionary lapse.¹¹⁵ However,

¹¹² DC Thomas: *The Theory and Practice of Third World Solidarity*, p. 315.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 322.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 317.

¹¹⁵ RR Ramchandani: *NAM and Third World Development Dilemma in the Post-Cold War Era*, p. 90.

the annual growth rate of South-South trade improved marginally from 6.41 % during 1960-1973 to 6.43 % during 1973-1980. It appeared, then, that the economies of the South were finally on the way to break their dependency-oriented external trade and growth links with the economies of the North.¹¹⁶

As a response to the energy crisis of 1973 and the general international crisis, a Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly was convened at the initiative of the Algerian President, Houari Boumediene. With the support of OPEC and the Soviet bloc, a resolution was adopted (April 1974) calling for the establishment of a New International Economic Order (NIEO). In December 1974, during the regular 29th session of the General Assembly, the "Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States" was adopted. Thus, the United Nations became a major battleground for a new order.¹¹⁷

The Declaration and Programme of Action on the establishment of a new international economic order adopted at the United Nations was based on equity, sovereign equality, interdependence, common interest and cooperation among all states irrespective of their economic and social system, to correct inequalities and redress existing injustices, make it possible to eliminate the widening gap between the developed and the developing countries and ensure steadily accelerating economic and social development and peace and justice for present and future generations. The Declaration emphasised the right of every state to full permanent sovereignty over its natural resources and each state is entitled to exercise effective control over its natural resources and their exploitation using means suitable to its own situation, the transference of technology and financial resources to developing countries and the promotion of a more active United Nations role in creating a new world economic order.¹¹⁸

¹¹⁶ RR Ramchandani: *NAM and Third World Development Dilemma in the Post-Cold War Era*, p. 92.

¹¹⁷ RA Mortimer: *The Third World Coalition in international Politics*, pp. 49-50.

¹¹⁸ DC Thomas: *The Theory and Practice of Third World Solidarity*, pp. 333-334.

The essential task for the Third World following the Sixth Special Session was to begin to implement their demands for a new international economic order. This task was difficult since the distribution of power, mainly in financial institutions, did not favour for the Third World, and the General Assembly therefore was the logical place to renew pressure for change. The Nonaligned Movement held over 35 formal meetings at various levels and different groupings to permit broad participation between the Fourth and Fifth Summit conferences. A powerful weapon that could be used by the developing countries to change this state of affairs was to defend their natural resources by participating actively in the fixation of their prices on the international market and to grasp the fact that it was only by combining their forces to strengthen their negotiating power that they would ever succeed in obtaining their rights to just and equitable treatment.¹¹⁹

In the mid-1970s, the Nonaligned Movement became more defined as a voting group in the United Nations, and groups such as the member states of the European Community, the Nordic countries and Japan were increasingly reluctant to directly oppose or risk offending the nonaligned.¹²⁰ France was the first major Northern country to endorse the idea of a new international economic order. Moreover, it proposed a producers-consumers dialogue as an alternative to the United States policy of confrontation. The European Community (EEC) signed the Lome Convention in February 1975 with 46 associated African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states whereby an agreement was reached to increase aid to ACP countries and give them an important role in aid management. The agreement provided for preferential access for ACP products to EEC markets, without reciprocal advantages for EEC products, and created a compensatory finance scheme to stabilise the exports earnings of associated states for 12 key commodities.¹²¹

¹¹⁹ AW Singham and Shirley Hune: *Non-Alignment in an Age of Alignments*, p. 136.

¹²⁰ RL Jackson: *The Non-Aligned, the UN and Superpowers*, p. 105.

¹²¹ DC Thomas: *The Theory and Practice of Third World Solidarity*, p. 350.

On the other hand, the United States also began to change its posture on linking issues of energy and the new economic order. By the autumn of 1975, the North-South conflict was evolving into a dialogue. In the Third World, some of the moderate Third World leaders, such as that of Sri Lanka, who desired a less conflicting approach, felt that the participation of the United States was essential to implement their demand for a new order. The industrial states, led by the United States, made a political commitment, even though in some instances this was solely to study the issue.¹²²

5.3.4 Impasse in North-South Dialogue (1976-1992)

By 1974, the North-South conflict had replaced the East-West conflict. During this period, the NIEO issue was an arena in which states with divergent politico-social systems and ideologies, as well as divergent approaches to economic development, could unite in a united Third World front against the industrialised North. Yet, by 1977, increased Third World diversity in the economic, political and ideological sphere led to conflict over the means to achieve a new order. One major issue that threatened solidarity was the increasing economic gap between OPEC and the non-oil developing countries (NOLDCs) and the potential conflict over the price the NOLDCs had to pay for oil. Some Third World leaders called in vain for lower prices for the LDCs and higher prices for the northern states.¹²³

Another potential source of Third World fragmentation was the relative success of OPEC and the NICs in comparison to the least developed countries. The NICs and OPEC represented the rise of the semi-periphery as major actors in the world capitalist system. The first group suffered from petroleum price fluctuations when exporting their manufactured goods. The Northern states attempted to integrate the NICs and OPEC into the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development

¹²² RA Mortimer: *The Third World Coalition in International Politics*, p. 68.

¹²³ DC Thomas: *The Theory and Practice of Third World Solidarity*, p. 383.

(OECD) in order to maintain the existing international system with moderate changes, rather than engaging in structural transformation.¹²⁴

A further source of conflict was differences in development strategies toward the North-South conflict. In the 1970s, a number of socialist countries, such as Ethiopia, Somalia, Angola, Zimbabwe, Kampuchea and Afghanistan, emerged as an important component of the Third World. Some leaders and theoreticians in the Third World assumed that, by eliminating capitalism at home, they would disengage from the international capitalist system, while another group opted for increased integration into the world capitalist system as a method to enhance their economic development. On the other hand, the lack of consensus between the developed countries on the question of the purposes and the management of the international economic order remained.¹²⁵

By the end of 1980, the many demands resulted in a few significant changes for the developing countries. New programmes of assistance were initiated for the very poorest developing countries. A commodity fund was established in 1980.¹²⁶ The gap between demands and results was illustrated by the fact that, whereas the developing countries had proposed a 6 billion dollar fund, the programmes that eventually materialised had 750 million dollars at their disposal.¹²⁷ All attempts to change the decision-making locus on international economic issues from IMF, GATT and the World Bank to UNCTAD or the United Nations General Assembly were vigorously opposed by Western countries.¹²⁸

¹²⁴ DC Thomas: *The Theory and Practice of Third World Solidarity*, p. 385.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 386-387.

¹²⁶ S Woodby and ML Cottam: *The Changing Agenda*, p. 125.

¹²⁷ G Lundestad: *East, West, North, South*, p.293.

¹²⁸ DC Thomas: *The Theory and Practice of Third World Solidarity*, p. 382.

After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Carter administration returned to the Cold War as the most important issue confronting policy-makers in Washington.¹²⁹ The Reagan administration removed the issue of North-South relations from the agenda in the 1980s, following the collapse of North-South dialogue at the Cancun Summit of 1981. The Reagan administration's strategy involved measures such as enhancing the role of private markets by restarting the Overseas Investment Corporation, as well as interacting with developing states on a more bilateral basis. This strategy involved attempting to shift the focus of multilateral negotiations from the United Nations and UNCTAD to conservative financial institutions, such as the IMF.¹³⁰ Other industrialised countries also chose the developing country they would co-operate with on the basis of which developing country happened to have the resources they needed. Thus, the poorest of the developing countries became even poorer because of their isolation. At this time, the developing countries were unable to react because of their lack of unity and their debt burden.¹³¹ For instance, in 1987 the World Bank estimated that the accumulated debt of all the developing countries has risen to \$812 billion and that the debt service payments alone accounted for 61.2 % of the overall payments of debt.¹³²

5.3.5 Dialogue as a Strategy in the Post-Cold War Era

Global poverty remained the critical challenge for much of the developing world and was at the forefront of the NAM's agenda since the 1992 summit. A 1997 UNCTAD study showed that the differences in income per capita between the seven richest and seven poorest countries worldwide had nearly doubled between 1965 and 1995, from 20 to 39 times.¹³³ With increasing debts, many nations of the South were back where

¹²⁹ DC Thomas: *The Theory and Practice of Third World Solidarity*, p. 441.

¹³⁰ M Chetty: *A New Role for the Non-Aligned Movement in a Post-Cold War Era*, p. 82.

¹³¹ NS Sutresna: A Review of the NAM, in G Mills: *South Africa and the Future of the Non-Aligned Movement*, p. 11.

¹³² RG Mugabe: The State of Non-Aligned Movement in *Black Scholar*, p. 12.

¹³³ G Mills: *South Africa and the Future of the Non-Aligned Movement*, p. VI.

they had started and the dialogue became more pressing than during the Cold War, when developing countries had profited by playing one superpower up against the other. Both the United States and the Soviet Union were eager to buy friends wherever they could find them. Countries such as Ethiopia, the Philippines, Indonesia, Angola and El Salvador were happy to be friendly with whichever superpower would build them a hydroelectric dam or arm their military with the latest weapons.¹³⁴

There were new fears that the emerging new world order might further fortify the Northern global economic domination by subjecting much of the South. These fears in the Southern states were based on the shifting paradigm from land-based colonisation to a more sophisticated, knowledge-based. Under the impact of the global technological bind, the world system was now more prone to the "global market" and global knowledge signals emanating from the North because the neo-economic liberalism did not, on its own, promise the structural transformation of the South. It was essentially under pressure from widening technological frontiers that the Second World, led by the former Soviet Union, collapsed in 1991. That is why, during the creation of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) during the Uruguay trade rounds of the 1994 GATT Conference at Marrakech in Morocco, the South was very concerned about the insensitivity of the industrialised countries towards its disadvantaged position.¹³⁵ However, the increasing participation by developing states in the Uruguay Round signalled that they recognised that a weakening of GATT would impact adversely on their interests.¹³⁶

The North had consistently been raising tariffs on products such as footwear, garments, food items, etc., - the products that mostly were exported by Southern countries to the Northern markets. The South also resented dumping attempts by the

¹³⁴ Y Arafat: *The Tyranny of the Minority*, in *Canada and the World Backgrounder*, p.15.

¹³⁵ RR Ramchandani: *NAM and Third World Development Dilemma in the Post-Cold War Era*, p. 271.

¹³⁶ M Chetty: *A New Role For the Non-Aligned Movement in a Post-Cold War Era*, p. 5.

North and the growing power of the Multi-National Corporations. For example, it was estimated that, in 1997, the sales of the world's top six firms, at \$716 billion, exceeded the combined GDP of South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa.¹³⁷ The implications of Trade World Related Property Rights (TRIPRs) and Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) had, therefore, assumed special significance for the South, since the Southern countries feared that the granting of TRIPs would make technology transfer from North to South more difficult and inequitable than under the traditional intellectual property system.¹³⁸

The Tenth Summit in Jakarta heralded a new process of dealing with all global issues. Development issues, with their equally significant economic, political and social aspects, were singled out because of their importance. A new orientation, that of dialogue and cooperation with the North, prevailed over the previous radicalism. However, the nonaligned countries were sceptical of the North's reaction, since, while a significant number of developing countries had carried out a structural adjustment process and had opened their economies with a view to putting them in line with the new conditions for investment and world commerce, a lack of reciprocity was observed in the developed countries.¹³⁹

From their experience of the impact of globalisation and interdependence, the developed countries have begun to realise that the problem of poverty would later find a way of transferring itself to the developed world. The developed world needed the developing world to have vast new markets. Consequently, at the end of the 1993 Tokyo summit, the positive response of the leaders of the Group of 7 to the Nonaligned Movement was an offer of cooperation and constructive dialogue. Their subsequent summits led to a virtual resumption of the North-South dialogue. Thus, working with the Group of 77 and other like-minded countries, including the

¹³⁷ RR Ramchandani: *NAM and Third World Development Dilemma in the Post-Cold War Era*, p. 171.

¹³⁸ RR Ramchandani: *NAM and Third World Development Dilemma in the Post-Cold War Era*, p. 272.

¹³⁹ P Jevremovic: Nonaligned Movement, in *International Studies*, p. 297.

developed countries, NAM initiated a draft resolution entitled Renewal of the Dialogue on Strengthening International Cooperation for Development through Partnership. The adoption of that resolution by consensus proved that the international community supported the basic strategy of NAM for achieving a more equitable international economic order.¹⁴⁰

The Movement decided to continue its consultative process on external debt at a high level, and they formulated policy guidelines that were presented by the NAM Chairman to the leaders of the Group of 7 on the eve of their Tokyo Summit in July 1993. In addition, as a result of the Chairman of the Movement's appeal to James D. Wolfensohn, President of the World Bank, in 1995, a Trust Fund was established to which the World Bank initially contributed US \$500 million for reducing the overall debt burdens of highly indebted poor countries to sustainable levels. The developed countries concerned reaffirmed their support for this proposal and the next task was to raise the funds to transform the proposal into reality.¹⁴¹

The 1998 Durban Summit stressed that, due to new, evolving economic, investment and institutional arrangements among major world economies, South-South cooperation should become a more dynamic part of ensuring the equitable participation of developing countries in the emerging global economic order. Increasing globalisation, liberalisation and interdependence were all making that cooperation more imperative than before. Varying development experiences in developing countries, as well as similar needs and problems to be solved, offered an opportunity for greater bilateral, regional and interregional cooperation among developing countries. South-South cooperation would also strengthen the harmonisation of position of developing countries in the regional and global system and would afford them a measure of collective strength.¹⁴²

¹⁴⁰ NS Sutresna: A Review of the NAM, in G Mills: *South Africa and the Future of the Non-Aligned Movement*, pp. 12-13.

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 15.

¹⁴² *XII Summit Conference of Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Movement*, p. 134.

CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION

The Nonaligned Movement was formally established in Belgrade in 1961, but, well before that, the 1955 Afro-Asian Conference of Bandung took place. The participants in this conference were heterogenous and deeply divided in their foreign policy. For example, Turkey was a member of NATO, a military organisation of Western countries. Japan was far more industrialised than the rest of Bandung and China was the most populous state in the world. The Bandung Conference also was attended by both socialist countries, such as the People's Republic of China and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and by capitalist countries such as Japan.

This conference brought together the leaders of two continents of non-white people, who identified and addressed the problems of the world at that time, such as peace and economic cooperation, cultural cooperation, colonialism and the democratisation of international institutions. From Bandung, thus rose an inexorable tide of sentiment in favour of independence, since various parts of the world were still under colonial domination, and the participants decided to claim their rightful place within the community of nations.

This conference was a major factor in the adoption, by the United Nations, of the Declaration on Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. Another achievement was the adoption of a new ethos of peaceful coexistence that would govern the relationship between and among nations great and small. These came to be known as the ten principles of international relations and they were formulated to apply to all principles of international relations and to apply for all time and to all nations.

The Nonaligned Movement was formally organised and sustained by these principles. This came six years later, when the leaders of 25 newly independent countries, from not only Asia and Africa, but also Europe and Latin America, established the NAM at the Belgrade Summit of 1961. Half of the Bandung countries were left aside, since

the Movement decided to keep aloof of the Cold War rivalry by adopting a policy of nonalignment. Countries with military alliances with Great Powers were excluded. Since then, the Movement has grown to its present strength of 113 members and, among its guests and observers are some former aligned nations, such as Australia, the Philippines, Portugal, Greece, Romania and Spain. Moreover, some member countries, such as Egypt, Morocco and Saudi Arabia concluded military agreements with the United States. Nearly all the countries that succeeded the former Soviet Union, including the Russian Federation, the legal successor of the Soviet Union, manifested an interest in the Movement.

This study therefore examined the creation of the Nonaligned Movement as a result of the emergence of a competitive and conflicting interaction between the Western powers and the Soviet Union after the Second World War. Two antagonistic blocs were organised economically, politically and even ideologically. The idea of the new nations emerging in Africa and Asia was to keep a distance from the two major blocs. Standing outside these two alliances gave them a stronger feeling of not being dominated by powerful centres of military and economic might. The interposition of the nonaligned countries restrained the intensity of superpower confrontation in the Third World.

The Movement adopted a series of strategies to defuse Cold War tensions. Delegations were sent to Washington and Moscow to defuse the Berlin crisis and to re-initiate contacts between the American and Soviet leaders in respect of disarmament. They were not very successful; however, the pressure on the Secretary-General of the United Nations during the Cuban crisis helped to decrease the tension between both superpowers and compelled them to make concessions.

Another area of concern for the Nonaligned Movement was its effort towards complete disarmament, since the Cold War and its aftermath were characterised by the arms race. There has been a substantial reduction in weapons through various bilateral agreements between the superpowers. Many resolutions regarding disarmament were sent to the General Assembly of the United Nations. A General

Assembly of the UN was held on disarmament as a result of a plea by NAM and, consequently, a Conference on Disarmament is operational. However, the growth of new weapons systems in both nuclear and conventional weapons is continuing. It therefore becomes pertinent for the Nonaligned Movement to exert more pressure so that future limits on proliferation will be imposed on the development of nuclear weapons and that clandestine nuclear development will be stopped. In recent years, however, the endeavour for global disarmament has suffered a delay with the testing of nuclear devices by two members of the Movement, India and Pakistan. Moreover, some countries have authorised the establishment of foreign military bases on their soil or entered into military alliances. It is in my belief that this signals a failure by the Movement. It should take strong measures such as a suspension, to force its members to respect membership principles.

The peaceful settlement of disputes and peaceful coexistence by member nations also has failed since many member countries, such as Iran and Irak, Somalia and Ethiopia and countries in the Middle East went to war and mediation by the Movement was unsuccessful. However, the struggle by the Palestinian community for self-determination and territorial integrity will continue to be one of the primary international political issues of the Movement.

NAM has continued to deal with all international problems discussed at the United Nations. As the political-military pressures of the Cold War were decreasing at the beginning of the 1970s, economic development began to receive greater attention. A united Third World front was forged around North-South conflict. The Nonaligned Movement and the Group of 77 have attempted to implement the demands for a New International Economic Order and change the locus of decision-making concerning international economic issues from GATT, IMF and World Bank to UNCTAD and the United Nations General Assembly. By the early 1980s, about the only achievement that could be cited as the result of this effort was the establishment of the Common Fund for Commodities, a much watered-down version of the original idea.

The process of globalisation has opened up new forms of a neo-colonial division of labour between the North and the South due to wide gaps in the qualitative and quantitative advancement of research and development in the industrialised and Third World countries. The new approach of dialogue and cooperation taken by the Movement in the post-Cold War era seems to be more successful than the confrontational position taken in the 1970s. As a result, the Common Fund and Trust Fund were adopted when tension was low between North and South. Another possible solution to alleviate economic problems followed by the South was to increase South-South cooperation.

A further role played by the Nonaligned Movement in the post-Cold War era was the struggle in respect of human rights. The member countries stressed their commitment to promoting and protecting all aspects of human rights, including human dignity, and to securing a decent standard of living and well-being for all.

Another area of concern of the Nonaligned Movement was environmental issues. The protection of the ozone layer and the control of climate change became common international issues after the Cold War. Developing and nonaligned states participated in the negotiations that led to the signing of a treaty at the United Nations Conference on the Environment and Development in 1992. The role of the Group of 77, which includes the Nonaligned Movement, during the Kyoto Protocol, was that of urging the developed countries to take the lead in cutting their greenhouse gas emissions, even though the United States overshadowed this issue. Thus, the Movement needs collective efforts to improve the position of developing countries in the global system and in dealing with other issues of common concern, such as international terrorism, drug trafficking and Aids.

ADDENDUM

Membership of the Nonaligned Movement			
The year given in parenthesis after each country indicates the first summit conference that they attended as a full member of the Movement. The total is 113 members, of which all except Palestine are members of the United Nations.			
Afghanistan (1961)	Ecuador (1983)	Mali (1961)	Singapore (1970)
Algeria (1961)	Egypt (1961)	Malta (1973)	Somalia (1961)
Angola (1976)	Equatorial Guinea (1970)	Mauritania (1964)	South Africa (1995)
Bahamas (1983)	Eritrea (1995)	Mauritius (1973)	Sri Lanka (1961)
Bahrain (1973)	Ethiopia (1961)	Mongolia (1992)	St. Lucia (1983)
Bangladesh (1973)	Gabon (1963)	Morocco (1961)	Sudan (1961)
Barbados (1983)	The Gambia (1973)	Mozambique (1976)	Surinam (1979)
Belize (1983)	Ghana (1961)	Myanmar (1961)	Swaziland (1970)
Benin (1964)	Grenada (1979)	Namibia (1992)	Syria (1961)
Bhutan (1973)	Guatemala (1992)	Nepal (1961)	Tanzania (1964)
Bolivia (1979)	Guinea (1961)	Nicaragua (1979)	Thailand (1995)
Botswana (1970)	Guyana (1970)	Niger (1973)	Togo (1964)
Brunei Darussalam (1992)	Honduras (1995)	Nigeria (1964)	Trinidad and Tobago (1970)
Burkina Faso (1973)	India (1961)	North Korea (1976)	Tunisia (1961)
Burundi (1964)	Indonesia (1961)	Oman (1973)	Turkmenistan (1995)
Cambodia (1961)	Iran (1979)	Pakistan (1979)	Uganda (1964)
Cameroon (1961)	Iraq (1961)	Palestine (1976)	United Arab Emirates (1973)
Cape Verde (1976)	Jamaica (1970)	Panama (1976)	Uzbekistan (1992)
Central African Republic (1964)	Jordan (1964)	Papua New Guinea (1992)	Vanuatu (1983)
Chad (1964)	Kenya (1964)	Peru (1973)	Venezuela (1989)
Chile (1992)	Kuwait (1964)	Philippines (1992)	Vietnam (1976)
Colombia (1983)	Laos (1964)	Qatar (1973)	Yemen (1961)
Comoros (1976)	Lebanon (1961)	Rwanda (1970)	Yugoslavia (1961)
Congo (1964)	Lesotho (1970)	Sao Tomé and Príncipe (1976)	Democratic Republic of the Congo (1961)
Côte d' Ivoire (1973)	Liberia (1964)	Saudi Arabia (1961)	
	Libya (1964)		
	Madagascar (1973)		
	Malawi (1964)		

Cuba (1961) Cyprus (1961) Djibouti (1979)	Malaysia (1970) Maldives (1976)	Senegal (1964) Seychelles (1976) Sierra Leone (1964)	Zambia (1964) Zimbabwe (1983)
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Argentina was a member from the 1973 summit until an announcement in September 1991 that it had withdrawn. • Myanmar (Burma) was a founder member in 1961, withdrew in October 1979 after the Havana Summit and rejoined in September 1992 at the Jakarta Summit. • North Yemen was a founder member in 1961 and South Yemen joined at the Lusaka summit in 1970, North and South Yemen united on 22 May 1990. • Yugoslavia was a founder member in 1961. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) is still regarded as a member. The NAM countries decided at the Jakarta Summit in September 1992 that they would conform to any decision of the subsequent UN General Assembly. Yugoslavia's membership was suspended and it was not represented at any Nonaligned meeting thereafter. 			
<p>Source: The Annual Register 1995. London: Cartemill, 1995, p. 386 in G Mills: <i>South Africa and the Future of the Non-Aligned Movement</i>, p. VII.</p>			

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