COMPARATIVE DEMOCRACY: ISSUES OF CONSOLIDATION IN SOUTH AFRICA AND ZIMBABWE

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DECLARATION

I, the undersigned, hereby declare that the work contained in this assignment is my own original work and that I have not previously submitted it in its entirety or in part at any university for a degree.

Signature

Date
ABSTRACT

Democracy is understood by many to be a government for the people by the people. As far as academic or scholarly traditions are concerned however, this is a rather populist depiction of the concept. According to the intellectual tradition, democracy is such when a system of governance meets several conditions. For the purpose of this study, the institutionalist tradition or theory of democracy which sees democracy as being dependent on institutions of contestation (elections) and participation (parliament) as well as others, is an important variable.

However, the very same theory on democracy is not limited to institutions as the sole requirements for democracy. For the economic determinists, the point is that whilst institutions are important for democracy, they are not sufficient. In order for there to be such, favourable socio-economic conditions are important as well and these include affluence amongst other issues.

The scientific orientation of this study being comparative, it seeks to take both the institutionalist variable of elections and the economic determinist variable of affluence as operational measures of the state of democracy in South Africa and Zimbabwe. As an additional operationalisation, the issue of civil and political liberties as per Freedom House classifications is also investigated in a similar comparative manner.

The outcomes of the study show that at an electoral level, South Africa's model of proportional representation in the seat allocation system gives minorities a voice as opposed to Zimbabwe's fast past the post system based on the winner takes all principle. It was also established that the electoral machinery in Zimbabwe is more chaotically arranged and thus susceptible to abuse than in South Africa.

At a socio-economic level, conditions have also been found to be a lot more favourable to the consolidation of democracy in South Africa than in Zimbabwe because of a wide array of issues, the most serious one being the declining income patterns for the average Zimbabwean as compared to the South African. Though the issue of high income inequality in South Africa should be highlighted as a threat, it should also be noted that in Zimbabwe, the apparent disrespect of the rule of law has an added negative implication for Zimbabwe as Freedom House has highlighted the
declining of the country from partly free of 3.4 in 1980 to a partly free of 6.5 in 2000. The overall analysis comes to the conclusion that given the findings above, it seems South Africa's democracy can still hold stronger given an accelerated equitable distribution of wealth whilst for Zimbabwe, the revitalisation of democracy needs to start from the re-engineering of institutions to the regeneration of the concept of respect for the rule of law. Thus the comparison seems to show a democracy better suited for consolidation than the other.
Demokrasie word deur talle verstaan as regering van die volk deur die volk. Hierdie is egter 'n populêre voorstelling van die konsep. Volgens intellektuele tradisies, moet 'n demokrasie aan sekere vereistes voldoen. Vir die doel van hierdie studie, word die institutionele denke aanvaar wat die demokrasie as afhanklik van sulke instellings soos mededinging (verkiesings) en deelname ('n parlement) beskou.

Dieselfde denke beklemtoon ook dat instellings nie die enigste vereistes is nie, byvoorbeeld vir ekonomiese deterministe, is instellings nodig maar nie genoegsaam nie. Dit beteken dat gunstige sosio-ekonomiese toestande ook moet geld, spesifieke relatiewe hoë welvaartspeile.

Die wetenskaplike orientasie van hierdie studie is vergelykend. Dit vergelyk sowel ekonomiese as institutionele kriteria, asook twee state, Suid-Afrika en Zimbabwe. 'n Addisionele saak word ook geoperasionaliseer, te wete burgerlike vryhede en politieke regte. Hier word Freedom House se klassifikasies aanvaar.

Die studie toon dat op die vlak van verkiesings, Suid-Afrika se proporsionele verteenwoordigingstelsel kleiner partye en minderheidspartye verteenwoordig bied, teenoor Zimbabwe se wenner-vat-alles-stelsel. Die Zimbabwiese stelsel was meer vatbaar vir wanbestuur en onvrye en onregverdige verkiesings.

Op die sosio-ekonomiese vlakke is toestande vir die konsolidasie van demokrasie in Suid-Afrika veel beter as in Zimbabwe, waarvan die vernaamste die afname in welvaartspeile in Zimbabwe is. Hierteenoor is die styging van ongelykheidsvlakke in Suid-Afrika 'n negatiewe faktor. In Suid-Afrika is vryheidsindekse van Freedom House egter steeds op 'n hoë vlak, terwyl die Zimbabwiese vlakke drasties agteruitgaan, byvoorbeeld vanaf 3.4 in 1980 tot 'n onvrye vlak van 6.5 in 2000 waar 'n punt van 7 totaal onvry is.

Die konklusie is dat demokrasie in Suid-Afrika konsolideerbaar is, terwyl Zimbabwe ook instellings sal moet red van ondergang. Die herstel van regsoewereiniteit kan 'n beginpunt wees. Die vergelykings wys dus uit dat Suid-Afrika veel beter daaraan toe is as Zimbabwe.
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ACDP-African Christian Democratic Party
AIDS-Acquired Immuno Deficiency Syndrome
ANC-African National Congress
AEB-Afrikaner Eenheidsbeweging
AWB-Afrikaner Weerstands beweging
AZAPO-Azanian Peoples Organisation
BSAC-British South Africa Company
CIO-Central Intelligence Organisation
COSATU-Congress of South African Trade Unions
CPSA-Communist Party of South Africa
DEIC-Dutch East India Company
DP-Democratic Party
EISA-Electoral Institute of Southern Africa
ESAP-Economic Structural Adjustment Programme
ESC-Electoral Supervisory Commission
FA-Federal Alliance
FF-Freedom Front
GDP-Gross Domestic Product
GNP-Gross National Product
GNU-Government of National Unity
HDI-Human Development Index
HIV-Human Immuno-Deficiency Virus
ID-Identity Document
IEC-Independent Electoral Commission
IFP-Inkatha Freedom Party
IMF-International Monetary Fund
MDC-Movement For Democratic Change
MF-Minority Front
MMT-Mass Media Trust
MP-Member of Parliament
NA-National Assembly
NCOP-National Council of Provinces
NDI-National Democratic Institute of International Affairs
NGO-Non-Governmental Organisation
NNP-New National Party
NP-National Party
NUSAS-National Union of South African Students
OAU-Organisation of African Unity
PAC-Pan Africanist Congress
SADTU-South African Democratic Teachers Union
SAIC-South African Indian Council
SANNC-South African Native National Congress
SASO-South African Students Organisation
UANC-United African National Council
UCDP-United Christian Democratic Party
UDF-United Democratic Front
UDM-United Democratic Movement
UNDP-United Nations Development Programme
UNO-United Nations Organisation
UP-United Party
ZANU-Zimbabwe African National Union
ZANU-PF-Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front
ZAPU-Zimbabwe African Peoples Union
ZAPU-PF-Zimbabwe African Peoples Union-Patriotic Front
ZBC-Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation
ZNA-Zimbabwe National Army
ZRP-Zimbabwe Republic Police
ZUM-Zimbabwe Unity Movement
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Problem Statement

Democracy in its most fundamental form is understood by many as a political system of governance which is characterized by the concept of government for the people by the people. This however, is a more populist definition of democracy. The Oxford dictionary defines democracy as government by all the people, direct or representative or a form of society ignoring hereditary class distinctions and tolerating minority views. This of course is a very fundamental definition of democracy and for the purposes of this study a reflection on the various theories on democracy will be carried out.

According to the institutionalist school of thought, the creation of institutions of a democratic order informs the starting point for democracy. Such institutions include normally: an electoral system based on the concept of free and fair elections, an independent judiciary, a legislature and independent watchdogs like the Public Protector, Auditor-General and the Human Rights Commission as examples in our South African context. Robert Dahl is a central figure in this school of thought where emphasis is placed on the concepts of institutions of participation as in the legislature and contestation as in elections, the rule of law, accountability, constitutional adherence and other closely related practices.

Dahl’s book *Polyarchy: Participation and opposition* (1971:2) provides the two main conditions for a political system to qualify as a democracy: contestation of regular elections by oppositional parties and the full participation of the adult population in all aspects of public life. These requirements characterise what he calls a polyarchy to set it apart from the ideal democracy, a word which he reserves for a state in which a government is completely or almost completely responsive to all its citizens.

Breytenbach (1997:17) notes that according to Dahl, the preferable route for democracy is to create institutions for public participation first and only thereafter introduce institutions for full contestation. Dahl in his book, *Democracy, Liberty and Equality* (1986:195-196) also makes reference to the centrality of the concepts of voting equality and effective participation in the democratic process wherein he notes that where voting equality is concerned, this means that the decision rule for
determining outcomes at the decisive stage must take into account, and equally so, the expressed preferences of each member of the demos as to the outcome of the voting process. By effective participation, Dahl makes reference to a situation where throughout the process of making binding decisions, everyone has an adequate and equal opportunity for expressing his or her preferences as to the final outcome.

This is also pointed out by Bratton (1998: 51) who notes that elections are a central aspect in the consolidation of democracy although as already indicated not in an exclusive manner. This is indicated by the acknowledgement that elections are not synonymous with democracy. "But while elections and democracy are not synonymous, elections remain fundamental, not only for installing democratic government, but as a necessary requisite for broader democratic consolidation".

Huntington (1991) is another theorist of note within this school. Huntington locates his conception of democracy within the Schumpeterian notion that the central procedure of democracy is the selection of leaders through competitive elections by the people they govern. Huntington’s perspective of democracy is therefore very much from the institutionalist tradition although not exclusively so as in addition he also identifies the role of civil and political freedoms as being critical to democracy and its consolidation.

As Huntington (1991:7) notes, “Following in the Schumpeterian tradition, this study defines a twentieth-century political system as democratic to the extent that its most powerful collective decision makers are selected through fair, honest and periodic elections in which virtually all the adult population is eligible to vote. So defined, democracy involves the two-dimensions-contestation and participation that Robert Dahl saw as critical to his realistic democracy or polyarchy. It also implies the existence of those civil and political freedoms to speak, publish, assemble and organise that are necessary to political debate and the conduct of electoral campaigns”.

Added to these requirements therefore, is the issue of civil as well as political liberties which are regarded as important benchmarks of democracy and its consolidation. Schedler (1998:93) also talks about the concept of a democratic system that manages to hold (more or less) inclusive, clean and competitive elections but fails to uphold the political and civil freedoms essential for liberal democracy. This is what he refers to
as an "electoral democracy" where an institutional requirement of democracy in the form of elections has been met whilst other requirements like the political as well as civil liberties are a question which still hangs in the balance.

This is where the Freedom House rankings become relevant to this study as they show in a relative manner, how free or not free a particular country is in terms of these liberties which also guides analysis on the prospects for consolidation in the particular country. These rankings as will be indicated below are of utmost significance since they are an international benchmark of rating the observance of civil and political liberties.

This is reinforced by Linz and Stepan (1996:17) who point out that five conditions which are interconnected and mutually reinforcing must be present or be created in order for a democracy to be consolidated. These also include the issue of civil and political liberties as highlighted thus far by Huntington and Schedler.

Linz and Stepan note that firstly, the conditions must exist for the development of a free and lively civil society. Secondly, there must be a relatively autonomous political society. Thirdly, all political actors, especially the government and the state apparatus must effectively be subjected to the rule of law for protection of individual freedoms and associational life. Fourthly, a state bureaucracy usable by the new democratic government must also be present and the fifth and last issue is that there must be an institutionalised economic society which can comment and contribute on and to economic policy debates and proposals without fear of sanctions.

This definition of democracy is grounded in the institutionalist tradition, whilst institutions are important, they are not sufficient for it to be a democracy in the full sense, or to be called a consolidated democracy, hence Dahl (1971) made use of the concept of polyarchy and not democracy. It has been pointed out by Schedler (1998:97) who says that whilst many new democracies face the danger of illegal or pseudo-legal overthrow by anti-democratic forces, this is not the real danger, many new democracies have to contend with the danger of erosion, of less spectacular, more incremental, and less transparent forms of regression. Here, he makes reference to Guillermo O'Donnell who brings up the salience of silent regressions of democracy.
This is where Schedler (1998:97) points out that, "While the former (illegal overthrow) referred to classical coup politics, O' Donnell described the latter as "a progressive diminution of existing spaces for the exercise of civilian power and the effectiveness of the classic guarantees of liberal constitutionalism" as a "slow and at times opaque" process of successive authoritarian advances", which would in the end lead to a democradura, a repressive, façade democracy".

This is where issues of sufficiency in addition to the institutional arrangements become part of the democratic discourse, that is to bring about the consolidation of an otherwise institutionally sound political system. Other theoretical orientations become important in this regard and amongst them is the economic determinist tradition as well as the social structuralist tradition. For the purpose of this study, particular attention will focus on the economic determinist theory whilst the social structuralist theory will also be deliberated upon.

To consolidate means to strengthen, so consolidation of democracy means the strengthening of democracy. Diamond, quoted in Gouws and Gibson (2000:2) defines the consolidation of democracy as the process by which democracies becomes so broadly and profoundly legitimate among its citizens that it is unlikely to break down. Hence Linz and Stepan (1996) refers to this as "the only game in town".

This is the field of consolidology as it has been referred to by some theorists and a broader theoretical discussion follows with reference to the economic determinist and social structuralist theories in particular. Garcia-Rivero (2000:64) points out that it is important to note that whilst this literature defines the consolidation of democracy, it is not focused on the study of consolidation in particular, but rather on factors which determine the consolidation of democracy (i.e. favourable or unfavourable) and this should therefore be a reminder for scholars in this field. Thus for this study, the literature seeks to broaden the scope of what is democracy in addition to the views of the institutionalists whilst it also puts forward the conditions for its consolidation at the same time.

The economic determinist school of thought sees a strong link between democracy and favourable socio-economic conditions, one of which is for the purpose of this study, affluence. As the fundamental focus of this study is based on affluence as bringing about sufficiency in addition to the institutional requirements of vehicles for
contestation and participation, the *economic determinist* school is therefore of utmost significance to this study.

From this point of view, Adam Przeworski is one of the theorists who identify the role of affluence as being central to the consolidation of democracy. To paraphrase, Przeworski et al (1996:41) note that a country's level of economic development has a very strong effect on the probability that democracy will survive. Poor democracies, they note, particularly those with annual per capita income of less than $1000, are extremely fragile, based on this study, the probability that one will die during a particular year is 0.12. This rate falls to 0.06 in the $1000 to $2000 range, to 0.03 between $2000 and $4000 and to 0.01 between $4000 and $6000. For states with per capita incomes of more than $6000 chances are excellent, because, according to Przeworski et al, no state in this category has ever become undemocratic.

Hence Lipset (1960:31) was correct to assert that the more well to do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy. As Lipset (1960:31) elaborates, "From Aristotle down to the present, men have argued that only in a wealthy society in which relatively few citizens lived at the level of real poverty could there be a situation in which the mass of the population intelligently participate in politics and develop the self-restraint necessary to avoid succumbing to the appeals of irresponsible demagogues". Thus by implication, the more developed a country is coupled with an equitable distribution of wealth, the better the prospects for the consolidation of democracy in that country.

Przeworski et al (1996:50), whilst being from an economic determinist orientation, also refer to the salience of institutions as a prerequisite for democracy by noting that the secret of democratic desirability seems to lie in economic development, not under dictatorship, but under affluence and parliamentary institutions. Thus the consolidation of democracy for Przeworski et al, also involves a close relationship between economic progression and the functioning of institutions of the parliamentary kind.

Linz and Stepan (1996:21) also note that, "The final supportive condition for a consolidated democracy concerns the economy, an arena that we believe should be called "economic society". They point out that there cannot be and has never been a consolidated democracy with a command economy, nor has ever been or will ever be
a consolidated democracy with a pure market economy. "Modern consolidated democracies require a set of socio-politically crafted and accepted norms, institutions and regulations-what we call "economic society"-that mediate between the state and the market".

The social structuralist theory of democracy also encapsulates the role of class and civil society and the ethnic structures as conditions of democracy; an independent civil society is seen as crucial in the making of a democracy. Class as already indicated above, is also important for this school of thought. Paes (1999:4) points out that Moore emphasises the role of the middle class where he points out that, "no bourgeoisie, no democracy", "without the middle class, there is no democracy", its presence is therefore crucial for the democratic process.

Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens (1992) on the other hand whilst concurring with Moore on the issue of class, emphasise the middle class without the 'bourgeoisie' whom they see as being conservative and more concerned with the maintenance of the status quo and not change. The middle class for them comprises of the urban working class as well as the small business, professionals and the bureaucracy.

The ethnic structure theorists also emphasise the importance of ethnic homogeneity for democracy in a society. Breytenbach (1997:23) notes that this group maintains that there is a possible link between the ethnic homogeneity and stability on the one hand, and ethnic heterogeneity and instability on the other.

However, whilst acknowledging that ethnic conflict and disappointed popular hopes for economic improvement are dangers to democracy in states undergoing simultaneous political and economic reform, Linz and Stepan (1996:23), also point out that careful political engineering can go a long way in solving these problems. They refer to the concept of consociational democracy where a proportional representation system instead of large single-member districts with first-past-the-post elections, can facilitate the representation of geographically dispersed minorities.

As Linz and Stepan (1996:26) note, "Phrased more positively, our hypothesis is that in a multi-national, multi-cultural setting, the chances of consolidating democracy are increased by state policies that grant inclusive and equal citizenship and give all citizens a common 'roof' of state-mandated and state-enforced individual rights". The issue of electoral system being just the one whilst another is the issue of a federal
form of government in order to accommodate the rights of the minorities, which might have regional manifestations, hence the concept of federalism.

As the orientations of the study shows, the social structural approach will not form a major consideration herein, these issues do however remain important in outlining the broad theoretical framework on the issue of democracy and its consolidation thereof. Where appropriate, some of the issues will be touched on as conceptions of class, ethnicity, as well as civil society have an influence on the economic, social as well as political spheres in the countries being studied here, South Africa and Zimbabwe.

An analysis of these accounts of democracy reveals that institutions and socio-economic dynamics constitute defining characteristics of democracy; one is necessary (institutions), but not sufficient whereas the other (socio-economic factors) serves to create the sufficient condition.

It is a central objective of this study to investigate the role of elections, as an institutional issue and affluence, as a socio-economic issue, in their hypothetical role as determinants of the consolidation of democracy as informed by the theoretical perspectives cited in this paper which include the institutionalists who see elections as necessary and the economic determinists whose focus on favourable conditions bring the issue of affluence into the picture. Over and above this the preservation of civil and political liberties is seen as another requirement in addition to the two as pointed out by amongst others Schedler as well as Linz and Stepan.

Thus the focus of this study takes both elections as well as affluence as independent variables impacting on the dependent variable, which is the consolidation of democracy. The issue of political and civil liberties also come into the picture as part of the variables impacting on the dependent variable, the consolidation of democracy. Clearly, these are some of the questions, which require major attention and inform the relevance of this study to contemporary political debate. Having considered the above arguments, this study will take the following as its point of focus: Investigating the role of elections and affluence as measurements of the prospects for the consolidation of democracy in South Africa and Zimbabwe.
1.2 Aims and Significance

The aim/s of this study as outlined above in the literature review is basically to study closely the question of the consolidation of democracy in both South Africa and Zimbabwe. In short it is central to this study that we investigate the role of elections and affluence as well as the liberties as measures of prospects for the consolidation of democracy in South Africa and Zimbabwe.

This study is important primarily because it is focusing on two countries that have quite similar experiences to democratization although also somewhat different in other respects. Importantly, the fact that they are neighbours where what happens next door is likely to have an impact of some kind on the other country, makes this study all the more important.

South Africa’s democratisation having come through in a way that has been referred to as a miracle within some quarters with a background of low intensity civil warfare between the authorities and the liberation movements whilst Zimbabwe experienced one of the most bloody wars of independence.

Thirdly, this is a study looking at two countries which share a significant characteristic, emancipation from white minority rule and this forms the fundamental link between the two countries on which the justification in part for this study lies.

Lastly, most literature has focused on the issues separately, Garcia-Rivero (2000) focuses on the role of class towards consolidation of democracy in South Africa, Paes (1999) focuses on the issue of economic policies on Zimbabwe whereas Wessels (1999) focuses on the issue of election costs in South Africa. None of these studies has a comparative orientation and this study therefore seeks to link both institutional and economic issues in a comparative analysis model of South Africa and Zimbabwe.

1.3 Methodology

This is a comparative study with both empirical and theoretical orientations based on library work. Landman (2000:4) notes that there are essentially four reasons informing the comparative study of politics with each particular segment fitting into a particular scholar’s intentions as a researcher in that field. The four objectives are firstly the contextual description which is concerned with knowing what other countries are like.
Secondly is *classification* which makes the world of comparative politics less complex. Thirdly is *hypothesis-testing* which allows for the elimination of rival explanations about particular events and finally a comparison allows for *prediction* about the likely outcomes in other countries not in the original comparison.

For the purpose of this study, comparison as a methodological measure seeks to broaden the author’s, and indeed the reader’s knowledge of a particular country in relation to South Africa, thus adopting the role of a *contextual description*, which is in this case, Zimbabwe. Also, it can also be pointed out as well that the study also fulfills the *classification* objective within the comparative tradition in that it informs us for instance about what kind of a democracy South Africa is or what category does Zimbabwe for instance occupy in terms of Freedom House Rankings or HDI rankings as a result of its levels of human, social and economic development.

To this end, a comprehensive review of existing literature and archive material as primary sources will be pursued. The use of existing statistics for instance in analyzing voting trends is a strategy which will be also used even though perhaps to a minimal extent. This in a way becomes a descriptive study of the current status of democracy in these two countries based on an analysis of the development of democracy in the two countries over a period of time.

As has been specifically identified throughout this study, a tracing of the role of elections as well as affluence are two dynamics which inform the methodology of this study. In this regard, the elections in both these countries to date: Zimbabwe (1980-2000) and South Africa (1994 and 1999) will be part of this study. In looking at affluence, per capita incomes and the Human Development Index (HDI) will be used to look at developments over the number of years, from 1980 to 2000.

In addition to these, the issue of political and civil liberties will also be followed closely as this is also an important precondition for democracy. In this regard, the Freedom House Rankings, which evaluate how free a society is, will be used with specific reference to the years 1980, when Zimbabwe became independent, pre 1994 and 1995 after South Africa became a democracy and finally in 2000 as the cut-off point for this study.
CHAPTER 2: ZIMBABWE

2.1 Historical Background

Zimbabwe's flirtation with European influence dates back to the 16th century during the days of the Mwene Mutapa and Rozwi empires. This is a period where forms of trade between the Portuguese and the Shona as well as the Swahili was expanding along the north-eastern corner that is present day Zimbabwe and Mozambique respectively. But perhaps the biggest and most profound form of involvement came during the establishment of the Ndebele Empire in the southern parts of the country. This is a time in point where the first British influence crept its way into the country now called Zimbabwe under the leadership of Cecil John Rhodes.

According to the Commonwealth Yearbook (2001:355), "Contact with Europe began in the 1500s, with visits from Portuguese explorers and the missionaries. In the 19th Century, the British Christian missionary, Robert Moffat (who became a close personal friend of King Mzilikazi) visited the country several times; subsequent missionaries included his son-in-law, David Livingstone. Interest from the explorer and businessman, Cecil Rhodes, led to the grant of mineral concessions by King Lobengula, son and heir of Mzilikazi, in 1888 ". When the BSAC started acting beyond the borders of the agreement, tensions with the local people ensured.

As the New African Yearbook (2000:517) notes, "By the 1880's, the Ndebele were becoming increasingly pressed by European encroachment from the south. In 1888 Lobengula (their leader) signed the so-called Rudd concession with representatives of Cecil Rhodes, who formed the British South Africa Company (BSAC), the following year. What for Lobengula was seen only as agreement for the company to mine gold was interpreted by Rhodes as virtually turning over soverignty to the company and in 1890 the famous 'pioneer column' invaded the country, setting up its capital at Salisbury (now Harare)".

Predictably, the native people were angered by these developments and war broke out between Lobengula and the BSAC in 1893. However, the Ndebele people were defeated even though they had teamed up with their sworn enemies, the Shona in
1897 in the ancestral episode of the *Chimurenga* (war of liberation), these developments signaled the ascendance of white man's rule in Zimbabwe.

As also noted by the Zimbabwe Election Update (2000:3), "After crushing the Africans in the 1896-7 revolt, Whites acted as conquerors and under the leadership of the BSA Company began to move blacks away from the best farming land to newly created tribal reserves. By the time the uprising ended, some 15 million acres of the country's total of 96 million acres had been taken from Africans without any form of compensation".

An important reason for this was the rapid increase in the settler population such that by 1911, they numbered around 25,000. This legislation was however passed in favour of a seriously disproportionate allocation of land. According to the World Guide (1999/2000:599), "In 1960, settlers of European origin accounted for hardly five percent of the population but owned more than 70 per cent of the arable land".

Subsequently, according to the New African Yearbook (2000:518) the territory became a self-governing colony in 1923 and from this point until liberation in 1979, an increasing number of legislation which advantaged the white man were put in place at the expense of the local (black) people. An example here would be the Land Apportionment Act of 1920 which excluded Africans from that half of the country that contained the best farming land, despite Africans constituting over 95% of the population.

The Industrial Conciliation Act of 1934 on the other hand banned Africans from entering skilled employment, thus forcing Africans to work for mere subsistence wages on white farms, mines and factories in virtual servitude. Organised resistance took a rather haphazard piece-meal formation in the period up to the 1950's. It was only after 1960 that some serious African movements based on the concept of African Nationalism began to emerge.

The year 1961 saw the formation of the Zimbabwe African People's Union or ZAPU as it is popularly known, followed by the breakaway Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), both were however banned in 1964 and their leaders were imprisoned. After their outlawing, these movements had no option but to resort to an armed struggle from below, led by ZANU. As the New African Yearbook (2000:518) indicates, "In March 1970 Rhodesia declared itself independent, in the mean time
both ZANU and ZAPU had opted for a strategy of armed struggle. Guerilla incursions began in 1966 on the initiative of ZANU and continued rather sporadically over the next few years”.

The impact of the liberation struggle began to be felt increasingly as ZANU began to open up a new front in the north-east, operating out of Mozambique with co-operation of the Frelimo forces as pointed out earlier. It is these efforts together with the release of one Robert Mugabe after the Lusaka Declaration of 1974, that intensified the Chimurenga in Zimbabwe. The guerilla war, carried on primarily by the Mugabe-led forces based in Mozambique was causing a rapid deterioration in the Rhodesian governments position. This forced the Prime Minister at the time, Ian Smith, to seriously consider the notion of majority rule where the Geneva talks resulted largely influenced by American pressure through Henry Kissinger, the then US Secretary of State.

The liberation forces, especially ZANU and ZAPU decided to a form a patriotic front in order to present a common front for the purpose of these negotiations. This was however, plunged by internal fighting including the assassination of top leaders within these parties. Because of this no clear win situations on all sides, the internal settlement of 1977 was Smith's last-ditch effort to salvage some substantial peace of the cake for the white settler community. As noted by the Zimbabwe Election Update (2000:4), "By early 1979, economic difficulties caused by the war coupled with white emigration forced the Smith government to seek a negotiated settlement". This however, caused further problems because it did not include all-important stakeholders like Robert Mugabe but only moderates like Joshua Nkomo of the ZAPU and other minority liberation groupings.

Clearly, the stage was not set for a peaceful resolution of the issue as Mugabe in particular was furious and felt that those who joined were betraying the struggle, consequently, he refused to hold secret negotiations with Smith. (New African Yearbook 2000:520). Even though Smith's government pressed ahead and submitted a new constitution to a referendum of white voters who supported it and thus paved the way for the holding of inclusive parliamentary elections. However, the British government as well as the United Nations Security council declared these elections to be illegal.
Subsequent internal and external pressures led to the Commonwealth meeting in Lusaka in August 1979 which offered once more a last chance for an amicable settlement to the dispute. This time around both the ZANU and ZAPU hesitantly joined in the process and the Lancaster House talks were agreed upon. (New African Yearbook 2000:521). These talks were to prove to be the founding stone for the liberation of Rhodesia which was renamed Zimbabwe upon independence. "After 14 weeks of negotiations, the Lancaster House agreement was finally signed on 17 December 1979. It was agreed that independence would be achieved in stages. First on 28 December there would be a laying down of arms, followed by free elections, the formation of an African government and at long last independence" (New African Yearbook 2000:523). Despite incidents of intimidation and violence, the elections, in which many parties including the ZANU-PF led by Robert Mugabe, ZAPU under Nkomo, the United African National Council (UANC) under Bishop Muzorewa as well as the ZANU under Ndabaningi Sithole amongst others participated in were held and Mugabe surprised many by winning 63% of the votes cast and 57 seats thereof. He was followed by Nkomo's ZAPU-PF with 24% of the votes and 20 seats. As later accounts will show, these elections, where nearly 94% of the country's black electorate participated in are in the history of the country the most popular in terms of voter turnout.

On 18 April 1980, the country gained independence from Britain and the sovereign Republic of Zimbabwe was formally instituted as such. Later developments will follow in the subsequent sections to trace the development or lack of thereof, of Zimbabwe's democracy since independence up to present day happenings.

2.2 Focus on Elections

2.2.1 The Electoral System

The centrepiece of the Electoral System in Zimbabwe is the Electoral Act No. 14 of 1979 which has been amended several times since then. This act provides for the appointment or establishment of electoral institutions and officers like the Electoral Supervisory Commission and the Registrar General of Elections as well as the system
for allocating parliamentary seats itself. According to the Zimbabwe Election Update (2000:1), "Elections in Zimbabwe are governed by the Electoral Act No.14 of 1979. This act though amended to several times, continues to govern the general conduct of elections since independence in 1980. The act deals with the appointment and functions of the Delimitation Commission, the Election Directorate, the Electoral Supervisory Commission and the Registrar of Elections."

On gaining independence, the initial electoral system that was used was the proportional representation system which was used for the 1980 elections with a 5 per cent threshold in the allocation of seats as a minimum requirement. This was however a big disadvantage to the minority parties such that only the big three parties, ZANU-PF, ZAPU PF and the UANC managed to get enough votes for the threshold. This led to the changing of the system to the single-member-district constituency basis for the subsequent elections, a situation which did not help the smaller parties in any way.

As Sachikonye (2000:187) notes, "In late 1979, the Lancaster House independence constitution was hammered out paving the way for the 1980 elections which ushered in Zimbabwe's first government which was internationally recognised. Again the PR (proportional representation) system was used. In the 1980 elections, a 5 per cent threshold was used in allocating seats in eight provinces. Only three parties, ZANU PF under Robert Mugabe, PF ZAPU under Joshua Nkomo and the UANC under Bishop Abel Muzorewa won seats. The ZANU-PF which won 57 of the 80 common roll seats captured 63% of the vote while PF ZAPU obtained 20 seats and the UANC some 3 seats. However, this was the last election in which the PR system was used. Subsequent elections as a result, 1985, 1990 and 1995 were held on the single-member-district-constituency basis following the amendment of the electoral act".

As pointed out earlier, the act made provision for the establishment of several electoral institutions whose function is in the main to ensure that free and fair elections are held as well as the subdivision of the constituencies as according to the constituency-based seat allocation system. These institutions are consequently going to be discussed and in the process try as far as possible to explain their functions and their ability to carry out these functions.

Sachikonye (2000:184) notes that the principal components of Zimbabwe's electoral system as laid out in the Electoral Act are (a) the Delimitation Commission, (b) the
Electoral Supervisory Commission (ESC), (c) the Election Directorate and the Register-General of elections. The Delimitation Commission is the first electoral institution that shall be looked at closely in this analysis. The function of this body as set out in Section 60 of the constitution is to determine the boundaries and the number of constituencies into which the country shall be divided. This commission reports to the president of the country about its work which may or may not be a hampering factor in ensuring that it executes its duties efficiently.

Secondly, the Electoral Supervisory Commission is another institution that falls within the country's electoral system. This body is tasked with the responsibility of the supervision of the registration of voters and the conduct of elections of members of parliament. Thirdly, there is the Electoral Directorate whose responsibility consists of 'co-coordinating' the activities of ministries and departments of government in regard to the delimitation of constituencies, the registration of votes, the conduct of polls and all other matters connected with elections.

According to the Zimbabwe Election Update (2000:2), the last institution herein is the Registrar-General of Elections. "Part III of the Electoral Act, Section 6(1) provides for the appointment of the Registrar-General of Elections, whose office shall be a public office. In accordance with section 6(2) of the Act, the Registrar will exercise his duties independent of the direction or control of any person or authority other than the Electoral Directorate, but shall have regard to any report or recommendation of the ESC".

An important feature of the Zimbabwean electoral system is the distinction between parliamentary and presidential elections. These two dimensions are important in order for us to try and understand the system with regard to these institutions that have been discussed above. They are significant because they shed a light on what the influence of the executive or the presidency can be on their mandates. The fact that there is a clear distinction between parliamentary and presidential against the context of the powers that the president has over these institutions will be an important point of focus for this chapter as the next section seeks to establish.
2.2.2 Free and Fair Elections?

In determining the extent to which this can be established, it is important to undertake an analysis of the modus operandi of the electoral institutions within a context-sensitive approach. The context referred to here is mainly the Zimbabwean political system from the independence era in 1980 to the present day. Relevant provisions and subsequent amendments to the electoral system bear an undisputable impact in this regard. As such this chapter will seek to try and outline as well as reflect on these, specifically with an individual focus on each of these organs where necessary. It is also important that particular events in the periods preceding the elections over the years be highlighted as well in order to offer a broader perspective on the nature of electioneering in Zimbabwe.

As pointed out earlier, it is the prevailing political system that bears the ultimate importance in determining the extent to which one can realistically talk about the elections and the electoral process being 'free and fair'. Sachikonye (2000:190-194) provides a useful analysis or what he calls 'an audit of the Zimbabwean electoral system' with regard to the power relations which exist between these institutions and the executive. However, in addition to the writings of Sachikonye on the topic, other writings will be included so as to broaden the scope of literature used in this regard.

Firstly, Sachikonye (2000) points this out with regard to the Delimitation Commission which determines the constituencies in Zimbabwe. Sachikonye points to the centrality that the president has over the functioning of the institution. As Sachikonye (2000:192) noted, "The Commission is convened by the President at five-yearly intervals, or prior to the holding of the next election. The last Delimitation Commission's Report was presented in 1995 prior to the election of that year".

Clearly, questions can be raised about the objective execution of its mandate as set out in the constitution, more so in the context of a Zimbabwe which has been ruled by a single leader since independence and to whom they have to account. Issues of partisan interests in this regard become real and undeniable concerns. Secondly, the Electoral Supervisory Commission is also another body within the electoral system whose objective execution of duties has been questioned. Two issues in the main inform these concerns. Firstly, the commission is appointed by and reports to the president, and secondly, it is funded by Parliament through the Ministry of Justice.
Again, it is debatable as to whether the commission can be seen to be independent because they report to the president and secondly they get money from the government, within a particular department as noted. In a way, the commission can be said to be an extension of the ruling government’s control over the electoral process. Sachikonye (2000: 190) notes that, "The ESC is funded by Parliament through the Ministry of Justice. However, its budget is determined by the ministry which decides how the allocated funds are to be used. Effectively, therefore, the ministry controls the use to which funds may be put and the ESC is treated in the same way as other departments of the ministry are treated".

This by implication could mean that the commission will only act in the way most appropriate for the Zimbabwean government, failure of which they won't be able to work as they are funded directly by the government. Over and above this, at the end of each election, the commission submits a report to the president on the election. They essentially have the power to pronounce whether the elections were 'free and fair' or not.

It is this particular situation that has led to the commission being perceived in a negative manner within the domestic and international communities, a situation which the ESC itself is only too aware of, albeit uncomfortably so. In its report to the president, the commission indicated that its lack of autonomy is a source of great concern to the members of the institution itself. Moyo (1992:52) also refers to this incapacity by pointing out that, "It is a considered judgment of this study that an Electoral Supervisory Commission without executive powers serves no useful purpose in a meaningful electoral process". As Sachikonye (2000:193) points out, "In an interview with a staff member, he pointed out that, Zimbabwe needs an election machinery which is independent and is seen by the public to be so. The ESC is too dependent on the government of the day to enjoy such a public perception. Its funding, staff, offices, transport and other resources are all seen to be government, controlled to a point where the commission is seen as a department of the ministry".

The third institution according to Sachikonye (2000:191) within the electoral system is the Election Directorate which is made up of civil servants under the chairmanship of the Public Service Commission. This body generally co-ordinates the activities of the ministries and departments of government with regard to electoral issues. Moyo (1992:53) points out that Section 4 (1)(a) of the Electoral Act No.7 of 1990 provides
for an Election Directorate with the responsibility of 'co-coordinating the activities of Ministries and Departments of Government in regard to the delimitation of constituencies, the registration of voters, the conduct of polls and all other matters connected with elections'.

The problem identified with the functioning of this body is that it adds to an increasing number of players involved in the electoral process thereby splitting the responsibility still further. However, without the present election directorate, no one commands sufficient authority to secure the resources necessary for the effective and efficient management of elections.

This measure, whether intended or not makes the accountability process a nightmare at worst and a ridiculous practice at best since no single institution has the determining powers and therefore the responsibility to shoulder exclusively on its own. Finally the Registrar-General of Elections is as pointed out earlier a public servant whose office is under the Ministry of Home Affairs. He is however, functionally in the electoral process, answerable to the Ministry of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs. Since the funding of this officer is from Home Affairs, his office concurrently reports, and is answerable to both ministries.

His functions in practice include the management of the whole electoral process and in a more active manner including the setting up of polling stations, provision of ballot papers, electoral staff, etc all of which make the Registrar General of Elections very central and therefore powerful in the entire electoral process. At the same time, any weaknesses or limitations in discharging these functions can undeniably have negative effects on the rest of the electoral process. Sachikonye adds that the Registrar of Elections will provide the ESC with such reports relating to the registration of voters and the conduct of elections and keep the ESC informed on matters relating to the exercise of his functions in terms of the electoral act. However, in practice the Registrar tends to act more independently from the commission.

From this context, the anxiety caused thereof as a result of the issue of possible partisan tendency amongst the civil servants who run these institutions during elections indicates that the issue of 'free and fair ' elections might still be a distant reality given the current electoral system. Having looked at the institutional arrangements within the electoral machinery of the country, it is important to look at
other social and political factors so as to provide a broader analysis of the possible impediments to a free and fair voting scenario. A persistently defining feature of Zimbabwe's electoral landscape since independence has been the issue of violence and intimidation.

Sachikonye notes that every election since independence has witnessed varying degrees of intimidation and violence. Most of these incidents occurred in the 1985 and 1990 elections and was mostly between supporters of ZANU-PF and security operatives like the Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO), the police and the army on the one hand and opposition party supporters on the other. This violence and intimidation was to continue in the run-up to the 1995 elections albeit on a smaller scale.

Sachikonye (2000:200) notes that every election since independence has witnessed varying degrees of intimidation and violence. Laakso (2002:345) also points out that it was hardly surprising that in the rural areas especially, intimidation permeated the very first elections, particularly in areas that supported the then main opposition party, the ZAPU party. Power sharing between the two parties with regional support, and between the two leaders, proved to be impossible and peace was restored to the country only by eliminating the two-party system through the merger. Since then, coercion has continued to play a role in the elections and was again very open in 2000. Breytenbach (2000:50) notes, "After a campaign of intimidation in the rural areas, especially where the war veterans had invaded commercial farms, and against the backdrop of an unfair electoral system, the election took place on 24-25 June 2000."

This violence has according to Sithole (1997:132), its origins in the pre-independence concept of Gukurahundi, a Shona word for a policy for annihilating all opposition, black and white alike which advocated for the destruction of the white settler regime, the internal settlement puppets and the capitalist system during those days of the Chimurenga (war of liberation). The Zimbabwe Election Update (2000:9) notes that international observers from the National Democratic Institution for International Affairs (NDI) concluded that in the run-up to the 2000 parliamentary elections, free and fair elections were not possible due to mounting government sponsored violence, which killed at least 23 people. This is an issue also raised by the Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum (2001:2) which notes that, "The Mugabe government has
previously shown its readiness to resort to violence against political opponents. Soon after it assumed power in 1980, it was responsible for the killing and torture of thousands of unarmed civilians in Matebeleland, the stronghold of its main rival party, the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU).

This violence against the opposition has in later day been manifested through the various confrontations, killing and torturing of supporters and officials of the main opposition which is the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) under Morgan Tsvangirai. As Krieger (2000:446) points out, "The MDC and supporters of the opposition parties were potential targets of terror which the ruling party both sanctioned and instigated. The main victims were farm workers, white farm owners, and MDC candidates, their families and supporters".

This is also pointed out by Dansereau (2001:408) who notes that the ZANU-PF youth allegedly participated in the farm invasions and in violent actions against the opposition in the run-up to the elections. Government refused to sanction these actions and President Mugabe declared: To the war veterans I say remain on the occupied farms until we start redistributing the land to our people in the next few months. No police officer nor soldier would be sent to erect you.

With reference to the run-up to the 2000 election in particular, pressures brought about by the defeat in the referendum for constitutional reform seems to have fuelled the violence. As Compagnon (2000: 449) points out, "Although Mugabe and his close lieutenants had certainly planned long ago to use land as their main campaign theme, the massive farms invasions and the organized violence that went with them were a direct consequence of the referendum. White farmers had to be punished for their alleged alliance with the MDC, and rural masses who had shown some treasonous leniency towards the opposition had to be cowed back into submission".

This is also echoed by MacLean (2001:189) who points out that, "In the prelude to the 2000 election, groups led by war veterans began to occupy white-owned farms demanding immediate settlement of land claims. To date, the violence associated with the land occupations has resulted in the loss of several lives, but has been excused, even condoned, by Mugabe and largely ignored by the police". These acts of violence have gone beyond the opposition to include violence and intimidation against businesses and foreign aid organizations, foreign embassies, the judiciary, the
independent media, judges, non-governmental organisations, etc. The perpetrators of
this violence as briefly alluded to above have been in the main, the government, the
war veterans, Zimbabwe Republic Police, Zimbabwe National Army, Central
Intelligence Organisation, ZANU-PF youth as well as the civil service (Human Rights
NGO Forum: 2001). It is evident by just looking at the wide range of sources of
intimidation and violence to point out that it is difficult to say elections where free
and fair when even security forces take a partisan stand in dishing out violence.

Over and above this, the ZANU- PF-Mugabe led government also enjoys the support
of the state-owned media as well as the recruitment and training of electoral staff.
Sachikonye (2000:201) points out that since independence there has been unequal
access to the media like radio and television, newspapers as well as magazines
because of the monopoly of ownership and control. Through the Mass Media Trust,
the government owns and controls the major newspaper chain, ZimPapers, which runs
two dailies, two Sunday papers as well as several weeklies. It also virtually controls
the main television and radio network, the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation
(ZBC).

He goes on to point out that inevitably, the issue of access and partisanship becomes
heated during the election campaigns where opposition parties have complained that
the press was by and large, supportive of the establishment and that it was not active
in disseminating information on election which he also re-affirms by pointing out that
the state-owned media has tended to be partisan in its coverage of election campaigns.

In this regard, Moyo (1992:74-75) in his analysis of access to the media specifically
in the 1990 elections also points out that even though in theory access to the media
seems open to every party, in reality, and judging by observations made by this study
during the 1990 elections, the presumption of unlimited access to the media is
seriously flawed, especially since there is no agency with the executive powers to
ensure that all contestants in the elections have equal access to the media. Sachikonye
(2000: 109-203) identifies several arrangements within the broader social and political
arena in Zimbabwe which make it difficult for the free expression of ideas to be
possible. Firstly, he points to the funding system for political parties where he has
noted that the system that was used was opposed vehemently because it favoured the
ZANU-PF. This funding mechanism, introduced in 1990 under the Political Parties
Finance Act, prescribed funding for political parties which won a minimum of 15 seats in parliament.

This was clearly unfair since the ZANU-PF had held 117 seats out of the 120 between the 1990 and 1995 elections and therefore the only party eligible to draw funds under the act. For the smaller parties, this was a detrimental arrangement which was however altered after a court battle by an opposition party in the Supreme Court. As a result, the court ruled that a threshold of 5% for the votes received should be the minimum amount for the allocation. As Sachikonye (2000:199) notes, "Access to funding determines the capacity of a political party to field as many candidates as it wants to, access to media through advertising, transport and other necessary material for campaigning, most opposition parties have been seriously handicapped due to lack of these resources".

Clearly, without proper funding the opposition cannot carry out their campaigns efficiently and effectively and to add to that one party alleged that the state had blocked external funding destined to it, whilst the ZANU-PF received funding from external funders. In terms of funding therefore, it can be said that the smaller parties have not really fared well and this structurally limits them to offer any serious challenge to the ruling party with the MDC as the only realistic formidable opposition.

A second issue which Sachikonye points to is the issue of electioneering or the holding of public meetings in the run-up to the elections. Here, he notes that generally, opposition parties agree that the freedom to hold political meetings has generally been accepted although they alleged that there were instances in which the Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) had intimidated the rural folk from attending meetings. In other instances the police would provide an 'excuse' of non-availability of facilities like stadiums as a strategy to frustrate a party which intended to hold a meeting. Moyo (1992:76) also refers to this issue wherein he points out that there were widespread reports from opposition parties that they were denied the opportunity to hold rallies and meetings. Officials of these parties alleged that their attempts to hold rallies were often, if not always, hindered by the attitudes of different authorities, including the police. Quite clearly, the context within which the electoral system operates, the accompanying violence and intimidation as well as the nature of the media point to a rather skewed situation in favour of the ZANU-PF and therefore
Robert Mugabe and his government. Specifically, the power relations that exist between the government and institutions within the electoral system, the state-sponsored violence and intimidation against the opposition and the overwhelming state ownership of the most important media institutions in the country mean that in an objective sense, the concept of a 'free and fair' election in Zimbabwe is highly unlikely.

Laakso (2002:325) also refers to the above as she points out that, "As much as multi-party elections can be made meaningful, they can also be made meaningless. Thus elections were made 'just a formality by institutional design, manipulation of the registration process, gerrymandering of the constituency boundaries, government control over the media and by different levels of state coercion. By the same token, elections are an important means to legitimize government power.

In this respect, the need to represent the electoral process as 'free and fair' is still evident". In the same vein, Moyo (1992:75) points out that, "one need not therefore labour the point that free and fair elections, however they may be defined, cannot exist in an environment where values of violence and the fear that usually accompanies them are allowed to permeate the political process and popular culture via the mass media during election campaigns". In essence these quotes capture the manipulations which make the electoral process in Zimbabwe biased in favour of the ruling party at the expense of the opposition.

2.2.3 Election Results: Five Elections (1980-2000)

As the sub-title suggests, this section will present a descriptive as well as analytical account of elections in Zimbabwe inside the parameters of this 20 years period. The inherent patterns over the number of years will as a deliberate part of the process also be focused on in some detail. A defining feature of the election results as from independence in 1980 is that the ZANU-PF under Robert Mugabe has tended to dominate the elections, a situation which ensured that Mugabe is still in power up to this day. As Breytenbach (2000:45) notes," During this time (1980-1995), the political party of which Mugabe is the leader, the ZANU-PF won all the elections with vast majorities, mainly through the Mashonaland support"(emphasis mine). The party's dominance in these parliamentary elections seems to have wavered over the years though; this was most clearly indicated by the slight victory in the 2000 parliamentary
elections. Central to this gradual loss of support is the economic decline which has characterised the country for over a decade now. To clearly reflect on the results since 1980, this section will focus on the individual elections periods as indicated in the topic above. Special reference will be made to figure 1 which shows the election results over the number of years in full.


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<td>48% and 62</td>
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<td>ZAPU</td>
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<td>UANC</td>
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<td>ZANU Sithole/Ndonga</td>
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<td>Independent/other</td>
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<td>European List</td>
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Source: EISA: *Zimbabwe Election Update 2000*
The February 1980 elections were set within the context of the Lancaster House constitution which reserved 20 seats for the white minority. So, in actual effect, the parties were contesting about 80 seats on the common voters roll whereas whites had a separate voters roll. Zimbabwe Election Update(2000:6). These elections were amongst the most actively participated in, probably due to the fact that they were a sign of liberation after years of white minority rule. As pointed out earlier this overwhelming turnout was amongst the black electorate who were previously denied the franchise.

About 90% of the black electorate of about three million voted. These elections were contested by seven parties which included the ZANU-PF under Mugabe amongst others. As the table above shows, the ZANU-PF under Mugabe obtained a clear majority winning 63% of the votes thus getting 57 out of the 80 seats. The ZAPU-PF under Joshua Nkomo came second with 24% of the votes giving them 20 seats meaning that 13% of the votes and three seats were left which duly went to the UANC Bishop Muzorewa.(www.eisa.org.za/WEP/zimelect3.htm) 29-11-2001.

The June/July 1985 elections indicated a growing support for Mugabe’s party/ regime where the contest was in the main between the ZANU-PF and the ZAPU-PF. At this point in time, the 20 seats reserved for white minorities were still in effect so the parties were contesting once more the 80 'common' roll seats. The voting for this election was most certainly the highest with around three million votes cast for the 80 black 'common roll' seats. The results once more indicated, to a greater degree this time, the dominance of the ruling party. In these elections the ZANU-PF won 76% of the votes thus 64 seats in the parliament, ZAPU-PF won 19% votes and got 15 seats in the process whereas the ZANU party won only one seat. This clearly indicated a growing support base for the ruling party.

In the March 1990 elections, participation was estimated to be in the region of 54 to 65% and had as such declined sharply in comparison with turn-outs of 95% and above in the previous elections. Four parties contested and the only serious opponent for the ZANU-PF was a new party called the Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM) led by one Edgar Tekere. In an outcome indicating the further consolidation of support for Mugabe’s party, they won 81% of the votes which gave them 117 seats out of the now 120 seats as shall be explained shortly, ZUM won 18% of the votes and two seats, the ZANU-Ndonga party won one percent of the votes with one seat ensured
whereas the UANC won less than a percentage of votes and therefore no seat. Zimbabwe Election Update (2000:7) Most importantly here is the fact that these elections took place after the constitution had been amended to in 1987 to abolish the 20 seats reserved for white minorities in the House of Assembly and 20 in the Senate, so the pool was now 120.

Another influential factor which boosted the support base of the party was the merging of ZANU-PF and ZAPU-PF to eradicate ethnic tensions between the Shona who supported mainly the former and the Ndebele who supported mainly the latter. Under this arrangement, as Breytenbach (2000:47) noted, Mugabe became the president with Nkomo becoming the Vice whilst the former party, ZAPU-PF, by virtue of joining forces became part of the executive.

The April 1995 elections proved to be not very dissimilar from those conducted five years earlier in that again the ruling party won by an overwhelming majority. The elections, held on the 8th and 9th of April were boycotted by eight opposition parties including the Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM) and the UP (United Party). The voter turnout percentage was just about around the same as for the 1990 elections with only 57% of the electorate voting.

These elections were contested by six opposition parties and as already mentioned the ZANU-PF won the polls easily with 76% of the votes translating into 117 seats once more out of 120. The ZANU-Ndonga party only managed six percent of the votes which gave them two seats whilst an independent in the form of a woman called Margaret Dongo managed a single seat.

If one could have based their analysis of future prospects for the ZANU-PF based on this result, one would most certainly predict that they were going to easily win the next three to four elections. However, reality proved otherwise as the 2000 elections have showed. A variety of factors have led to the deteriorated support which the 2000 referendum on Constitutional reforms exposed. The declining economic situation being one of them. As a result the 2000 elections came against the context of a Mugabe under siege who had lost the referendum in the wake of growing discontent as a result of mainly economic hardship.

Coming to the election itself, as pointed out earlier, the outcome of this election was not as one-sided as the previous ones. To be sure, the ZANU-PF won, but only just it
can be said. However, only three parties were again serious contenders. The ZANU-
PF won 48.8% of the votes giving them 62 seats, 'the new kid on the block', the MDC
won 46% of the votes and 57 seats as a result whereas ZANU won 0.6% of the votes
and one seat thereof. Clearly, these elections were by far the most closely contested in
the history of the country and they go to show just how much Zimbabwean politics
have changed mostly as a result of economic decline. As shall be later discussed, it is
this economic decline which has intensified opposition to Mugabe's rule coupled with
the emergence of a strong civil society.

2.2.4 Political Liberties

Given a history of politically fuelled violence since independence, especially during
election time, it is difficult to say that political liberties are a characteristic of the
Zimbabwean political arena. Various forms of violence perpetrated by a wide range of
actors have characterised the political terrain since independence in 1980 and these
intensified in the period up to the 2000 elections as a result of a referendum which
did not go as planned or anticipated for Mugabe as earlier referred to.

This section will make analytical reference to various acts of violence and
intimidation throughout the electoral history of Zimbabwe. As has been established
before, violence has had a central stage in the Zimbabwean electioneering process and
based on the above information, it can be said to a certain considerable extent that
political liberties have not been a foregone conclusion within Zimbabwe's 'democratic
arrangements' even though as a form of a democracy, this is one of the expectations.

According to the Freedom House Rankings, at independence in 1980, Zimbabwe had
a partly free score of 3.4 due probably to the liberation war and white minority rule. In
1995, the score had degenerated to 5.5 also as a partly free depiction, but in 2000,
probably as a result of the violence which has been extensively discussed in the
chapter, Zimbabwe was at a partly free low of 6.5. In an analytical sense, it can be
said that Zimbabwe's rankings as according to Freedom House indicate a society
which has always been partly free due to the violence which ensured during almost
every electoral and indeed other non-electoral periods including the 2000 scenario.

The major distinction though is that unfortunately, acts of violence and intimidation
seem to have increased, such that even though it is still a partly free society, the 3.4,
5.5 and 6.5 scores between 1980, 1995 and 2000 where 1.1 is the ultimate or free society and 7.7 is the least desirable or not free society, shows that it is fast deteriorating into a not free society as other countries like Vietnam(1999-2000) had a not free score of 7.7 whilst Yugoslavia(1998-1999) had a not free score of 6.6 almost the same as Zimbabwe's score for 2000. In a nutshell, these trends seem to suggest that Zimbabwe is fast deteriorating into a not free society without respect for civil and political liberties.

Moving on from the issue of violence, the issue of media and access to it, its ability to report information objectively is also central in the context of operationalising political liberties. In Zimbabwe, it is perhaps an unfortunate or 'inadequate' fact that the most influential media is state-owned and that by and large it reflects the views of the state in its coverage of news and events.

The Zimbabwe Election Update(2000:10) notes that this a fact also observed by monitoring groups like the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI). "The NDI report notes that the state controlled Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation (ZBC) holds a monopoly on radio and television broadcasting and that government controlled media news coverage has been found to be grossly biased in favour of the ruling party". Adding salt to the injury is the issue of intimidation and violence against the independent media meaning that objective reporting and analysis of events is not really possible as some areas are no-go areas where ZANU-PF supporters are in control.

The bias in news coverage that is prevalent is seen to be having negative effects on political liberties in that firstly, it conditions the electorate's attitudes with biased information, which negates the rights of citizens to seek and receive the information needed to make a free and informed choice when voting. Secondly, bias it is argued can also easily negate the effect of information supplied by political parties and candidates through free media access messages and paid political advertisements.

Thirdly and lastly, the intimidation and violence against the independent media means that an objective eye to the prevailing situation during election periods and in non-election time is effectively curtailed, thus one cannot talk about political liberties in this context. Given that the scales are heavily tipped to the side of the ZANU-PF in this regard, any other opinion which is not that of the party is by implication not given
a proper and adequate platform through which it can voice its ideology to the electorate. Thus the concepts which have been explored in Zimbabwe, provide us with a picture which shows that political liberties like the freedom of expression are for instance limited through the lack of funding, violence and intimidation affecting the opposition political parties, especially the main rivals like the ZANU, ZAPU-PF in the past and the MDC in the present, the independent media, as well as the direct state involvement in media control through its ownership of institutions like the Mass Media Trust and the ZBC.

2.3 Affluence

2.3.1 Per Capita Income and Trends

Being a country starting afresh after years of white minority rule, Zimbabwe was predictably characterized by disparity in terms of per capita income at independence. According to the World Bank's *Trends in Developing Economies* (1994: 195), at independence Zimbabwe faced a number of difficult issues as the population expected rapid progress in redressing severe inequalities in income, capital, landholding, and access to social services. This is unfortunately a condition which has not been effectively tackled since those early days of independence. It has been noted that average per capita incomes have been stagnant since the early 1980's.

Breytenbach (2000: 48) notes that, "In 1980 Zimbabwe had a total population of 7.5 million people with a per capita income of US$740. A decade later in 1990, the per capita income was slightly lower at US$710. But in 2000, the per capita income was US$540. These are drastic reductions implying stagnation and instability in the country". Several situations have been blamed for this scenario. The World Bank's *Trends in Developing Economies* (1994: 196) notes that Zimbabwe's development strategy yielded mixed results in the 1980's.

While it had made great strides in education, health and smallholder agriculture, its per capita income remained stagnant because of disappointing economic growth averaging about 3.2% per year. Breytenbach (2000: 48) points out that part of the problem was Mugabe's insistence on socialist ideals which he could not adhere to as a result of the Lancaster House constitution. As a result of Mugabe's half-hearted
approach to neo-liberal market programmes, the IMF's Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) failed.

Breytenbach (2000) goes on to add that other reasons for the failure include high interest rates, high inflation and the fall of the Harare Stock Exchange by 65% in late 1991 notwithstanding droughts and economic mismanagement which had already fuelled a negative growth rate. As Breytenbach (2000:49) notes, "In 1997, inflation stood at 19%, foreign debt amounted to US$ 414 billion and low growth resulted in declining per capita income. Since 1980, the Zimbabwe dollar has also lost 8000% of its value against the US dollar. The situation has only worsened in the past year. Inflation is now between 50% and 60%, unemployment between 33% and 50% and the state is unable to pay for petrol and electric power".

Clearly, this situation depicted above indicates a gradual deterioration rather than improvement in terms of per capita incomes and this predictably has led to an increasingly aggravated Zimbabwean population facing economic hardship. This is best indicated by the World Outlook (1998:188), a publication of The Economist Intelligence Unit which notes that the government's credibility had already taken a knock in August 1997 when Mr. Mugabe capitulated to war veterans pay demands which will cost the exchequer Z$ 3.5-5 billion. As a result, more domestic unrest is likely as other workers, unhappy with their deteriorating living standards, will have learnt that militancy pays off.

Added to all these problems is the chronically important issue of unemployment. Without employment, per capita income levels cannot be expected to improve, if anything they will deteriorate. The World Bank's Trends in Developing Economies (1996:568) points out that formal sector employment in Zimbabwe has only increased by 1.5% a year since independence, so the majority of new entrants to the work force have had to seek income earning opportunities in small-scale farming and informal sector activities. Instead of growing, against the above background, the GDP per capita fell by about 2% a year between 1991 and 1995. According to both 1995/96 as well as the 1997/98 edition of Africa at a Glance, an Africa Institute of South Africa publication, the per capita income of the country was at US$ 540 much lower than what the economic determinists have established as a cut-off point, US$1,000.
From the above information, it becomes quite clear that as a rule, per capita income in Zimbabwe has not experienced any growth since independence in 1980 and for the vast majority of Zimbabweans, who had been deprived even before that, the situation has hardly improved. This informs why the Zimbabwean political scene has been characterized by growing discontent, especially within the masses as the events in 2000, both the referendum and the elections have shown.

2.3.2 Human Development Index: Trends

According to the 2001 Human Development Report, the Human Development Index (HDI) is a composite made up of the following components. These are, life expectancy at birth, adult literacy, combined primary, secondary and tertiary gross enrolments as well as GDP per capita. The report indicates that with the data available at the time (1999), Zimbabwe is classified as a country belonging to the Medium Human Development category. Its HDI rank at this point in time is 117 out of 162 countries in total. This section will look at these rankings with reference to the country's HDI positions for the year 1980 at independence and other years in between like 1995 and 1996 before as well as in 2000 to show in what direction these had changed.

In so far as the HDI rankings for Zimbabwe are concerned, it is important to note that overall, these have been characterized by fluctuations between improvement and deterioration. According to the United Nation Development Programme's (UNDP) Human Development Report (1990), the ranking for Zimbabwe at this point in time, inclusive of the period from independence until 1990 was 52, falling under the HDI's medium human development category. At this point, Zimbabwe's position it can be said was quite good, mainly because of economic policies initiated at independence to redress the inequalities of the white minority rule system, with examples in the health and education sectors.

As the Human Development Report (1990:55) states, "Zimbabwe's improvements in human development can therefore be attributed to social sector expenditures which were moderate to high before independence in 1980. At the time of independence, Zimbabwe had inherited a highly inequitable health-care system reflected for example, in the fact that 44% of publicly funded services went to sophisticated central
hospitals that served only 15% of the population, whilst only 24% went to rural health services for the majority of the population”.

However, as pointed out earlier, after independence the government gave greater prominence to social sector meso policies and restructured its social spending towards activities having a greater impact on human development, targeting those in need. The improvements therein included increased expenditure which ensured that infant mortality fell from 82 per thousand live births in 1980 to 67 by 1990, life expectancy rose from 54 to 58 years. Education also showed an improvement. According to the *Human Development Report* (1996:83), "There was a similar push in education. Before independence black school enrolment was 50% or less. The new government made new primary education free and compulsory for all, and built thousands of new schools. As a result, school enrolment shot up to 100% of eligible school children".

These improvements were short-lived however, job creation was inadequate as between 1980 and 1989 formal sector jobs grew from 1 million to only 1.25 million, while the labour force increased from 2.5 million to 4 million. This predictably increased the inequality of income. By around 1995, according to the *Human Development Report* for that year, Zimbabwe’s HDI ranking had dropped to 121, still in the medium human development category however.

Slow economic growth has been identified as the culprit in this regard. In 1991, the government had decided to adopt a structural adjustment programme which according to the *Human Development Report* (1996:83) undermined the many gains made in social development. As an example, by 1995 infant mortality was still 67% per thousand live births and life expectancy had fallen to 53 years. And in education, budget cuts and the introduction of school fees reduced both enrolment and completion rates. This figure further dropped to 124 for Zimbabwe in the HDI rankings as according to the 1996 *Human Development Report*.

Finally, according to the 2001 *Human Development Report*, Zimbabwe’s HDI ranking improved somewhat to 117 as compared to the 124 in 1996. however, the medium human development category had been further sub-divided into medium-high and medium-low human development so Zimbabwe, even though it was still in the medium human development category, was number 58 out of 68 countries and therefore belonged to the medium low human development category.
Clearly, problems of poor economic performance offer an illustration of the Zimbabwean situation which promised a lot but delivered very little. According to the 1996 Human Development Report, this is summed up as a case of two steps forward and two back for the country or as pointed out by the author at the beginning of this section, a 'back to square one' scenario.

In many respects, it can be said that this is indeed a 'back to square one' situation as almost all the improvements were almost completely reversed within a 25-year period. Taking the above figures into account, it can be said that as far as they can tell, the HDI trends show a picture characterized by initial promise and prosperity, which unfortunately has deteriorated in recent years.

This means that literally, the Zimbabwean people have, instead of experiencing prosperity encountered growing misery as a result of a combination of factors including the rampant inflation rate, unemployment as well as the depreciation of their currency and the HDI trends largely reflect this. The Common Wealth Yearbook (2001) confirms this as it notes that the per capita GNP shrunk by 0.6% p.a between 1980 and 1995 and by 0.2% between 1990 and 1998.
CHAPTER 3: SOUTH AFRICA

3.1 Historical Background

South Africa's history of racial domination, tensions and confrontations can be traced back to the arrival of the Dutch in the Cape in 1652. This widely reported and documented era signaled the changing of the then South African society in a way that was unprecedented. Central to this ‘new era’ was the Chamber of 17, controllers of the Dutch East India Company (DEIC) under Jan Van Riebeeck, which wanted to establish a refreshment station for their eastbound ships. As Davis (1978:19) points out, "Jan van Riebeeck, under instruction from the directors of the Dutch East India Company, arrived at the Cape with three ships in April 1652. His instructions were to erect a fort for seventy men, to build a wooden building for sick soldiers and sailors, to establish vegetable gardens for passing ships, and to treat the Khoi-Khoi with kindness. There was no immediate intention to colonise the Cape but merely to provide a refreshment station for the company".

In order to undermine the existing structure of the community in their efforts to transform them into wage labourers or slaves, the company employed the barter system in a monopolistic sense, that is, the locals were to barter exclusively with the company and no one else. However, growing resistance from the Khoi-Khoi to impoverishment through this system forced the Chamber of 17, controllers of the company, to order Jan van Riebeeck, the Cape leader of the company to free some company servants so that they could explore the interior. Concurrently, the first slaves were imported from the East Indies, West Africa, Madagascar and Mozambique to provide labour for the development of the Dutch settlement based on farming. Because of land requirements, constant confrontations between the Dutch farmers and the locals ensured violence, where the locals ended-up on the losing side more often than not.

Even though the liberal perspective in history refers the emergence of apartheid to the clash of two irreconcilable cultures, the roots of racism are materially based as they evolved in the country when the Boers (Dutch-Afrikaner Farmers) methodologically robbed the indigenous peoples of their land, destroying their economic independence.
and forcing them into the growing network of social relations arising from the imposition of a system of private ownership of land and other means of production. However, the collapse of the DEIC in 1806 paved open the way for the entrance of the British into the history of South Africa. As Chazan et al (1999:467) notes, "When the British seized the colony from the Dutch in 1806, tensions arose between the Boer settlers and the new colonial authorities. The Cape became part of the British Empire during the most dynamic period of Britain's industrial revolution. Although the British seized the Cape to secure the sea route to Asia, on which so much of their trade depended, they quickly sought to establish a prosperous, capitalist colony there. Violence soon erupted between Boer slave-holding farmers and the British, who implemented legislation conducive to the free labour market requirements of the new era. The British colonial government experienced a series of minor rebellions by Boer farmers in the first three decades of the 1800s and abolished slavery in 1834".

This era of British rule brought with it problems for the 26 000 Dutch settlers and in 1834 the British ordered the emancipation of the 40 000 slaves in the colony. As a result, many of the settlers in the eastern parts of the colony objected to being dispossessed of 'their property' and the drift northwards accelerated markedly, giving rise to the Great Trek. Freund (1984:77) notes that after several resistance attempts against the British proved futile, many frontier farmers decided to move north. Direct resistance for them towards the British appeared hopeless. Instead scouts began to explore the possibilities of a leap beyond the colonial frontier to the north. In 1834 the first parties of some 10 000 emigrants initiated the Great Trek from the colony, establishing themselves through much of what has become the Republic of South Africa". After various conquests over the local people across the Orange River, in present day Free State, Kwazulu-Natal, North West as well as Gauteng, the Boers established themselves in these areas.

Tensions between the Boers and the British gradually led to the outbreak of two wars including Anglo-Boer War. Of central concern was the discovery of diamonds in 1869 in Kimberley and gold in the late 1880’s in the Witwatersrand respectively. As the World Guide (1999/2000:511) reports, “Conflict between the Boers and the British Crown erupted in the late 19th century when rich gold and diamond deposits were discovered in the interior. The realization that the area had great strategic importance led the British to propose a federation between the Cape Colony, Natal
and the Orange Free State. The proposal was rejected by the Boers and later in 1899, war broke out. Britain had the backing of most of its colonies whilst the Boers had the support of Germany”.

When the gold and diamond mines came into operation, the large European interests which controlled them had to rely on white workers who had some training and educational background. Many of them were former Boers who had lost out in the war, and others were coming from Europe, attracted by the gold rush. Both groups, used to the workings of the industrial capitalist system, demanded economic rewards and labour rights. This situation was ably manipulated by the mining companies who promised benefits to the white workers provided that they become accomplices in the exploitation of the black labour force. As a result, the so-called colour bar was established throughout the mining sector and in major urban centers.

In 1910, as James and Lever (2000:45) noted, the constitution of the Union of South Africa (a federal union of the Cape Province, Natal, the Orange Free State and the Transvaal) deprived most black people of the right to vote or to own land. After this period segregationist legislation gradually increased. The Natives Land Act of 1913 set aside 7% of the nation’s land for blacks as reserves, which became home to 35 – 40% of the country’s population. Much of the remaining land was reserved for ownership by whites, who represented only 20% of the population. Other segregationist legislation came into effect like the Industrial Colour Bar, to protect unskilled whites from competition in the job market, as well as the Native Urban Act of 1923 which tightly regulated blacks’ lives in cities which were considered to be white strongholds to the townships and also introduced the migrant labour system as well as denial of trade union rights for the black workers.

The economic downturn caused by the Great Depression of 1922 together with the recession that followed after 1945 ensured constant ‘poor white’ rebellion when faced with the possibility of losing their jobs. Racism once again flourished, under the slogan Gevaar KKK (beware of Blacks, Indians and Communism-Kaffir, Koelie, Kommunism). Predictably enough, the Nationalists formed a government by themselves after winning in the 1948 the elections and imposed even harder restrictions on black people. Such policies included the Bantu Education Act (1952) which made provision for a separate education system for blacks, Groups Areas Act, which prescribed residential areas for coloureds and Indians as well as the Immorality
Act, which made cross-race relationships unlawful and the Separate Amenities Act amongst other which made provision for separate public utilities for whites and blacks.

Whilst all the business of ‘white politics’ was going on in the early years of the twentieth century, resistance attempts manifested themselves as early as 1912 with the establishment of the African National Congress (ANC). This movement, which adopted a passive approach to resistance on its inception, was the product of a group of black former students from schools run by missionaries. Among its founders were several people who had studied or gained degrees in American or European universities. Davenport and Saunders (2000:262-265) provide a useful background on the establishment of the ANC which started out in March 1912 in Bloemfontein as the South African Native National Congress (SANNC). The period just before the ascendancy of the Nationalist Party to power in 1948 marked the emergence of more aggressive a stance towards resistance politics.

Beginning in 1943, the Youth League branch of the ANC launched a more aggressive programme under Anton Lembede and other youth leaders, including Nelson Mandela and Oliver Tambo who gradually attained positions of leadership within the ANC. However in 1958, sectors of the ANC that did not agree with the multi-racial policy of the movement created the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) under Robert Sobukwe.

As Bundy (2000:61) points out, “There is no doubt that the 1940s mark a watershed in the development of African politics in South Africa. Resistance quickened and diversified. New bodies were formed, and older ones staked out fresh ideological ground. Political developments included efforts to unify African, Coloured as well as Indian political structures or to build radical popular fronts of all races, including whites, an unprecedented influence attained by the Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA), the passive resistance campaign by the Natal Congress in 1946; and the formation of the South African Indian Congress (SAIC). But the greatest long-term significance lay in the revitalisation of the ANC and the injection of pragmatic urgency delivered by its Youth League”.

The year 1960 also marked another periodisation of resistance politics in the country. Central here was the Sharpeville massacre which followed after the PAC had organized a demonstration in the town to protest against the pass law which required
black people to carry identification wherever they went in the urban centres. The brutal police repression which followed ensured that 70 people were left dead. Subsequently the PAC and other political organizations, including the ANC, were banned by the government.

After this government repression became excessive and as a result, the struggle had to go underground. This became the period of violent-guerilla type attacks on the government by the liberation movements after both the ANC and PAC had established military wings called the Umkhonto we Sizwe and Poqo respectively. This was the beginning of the armed struggle as it has been widely documented. Freund (1984:269) notes that the ANC and PAC were banned in 1960, and obliged to go underground, a step for which they had few plans. They both opted for a policy of armed struggle based on sabotage that would lead ultimately to guerilla warfare. This however, failed to bring about as hoped, an effective way of popular risings. In 1964, much of the internal leadership of the ANC and congress movement was surprised and arrested at a farmhouse in Rivonia. Consequently most were found guilty and sentenced to long gaol (jail) terms, including Nelson Mandela. Added to this, the ferocity of state repression and co-operation of ‘buddy governments’ in the southern African region amongst other things also limited the effectiveness of this campaign.

The 1970s period was characterized by Black Consciousness, worker struggles and the Soweto uprisings. The era of black consciousness was perhaps an unintended product of the Bantu Education system. As Bundy (2000:67) points out, “Bantu education and ethnic universities made the education of blacks cheaper and separate. But they also created a critical mass of educated young people. Black school enrollments rose from 1 million in 1955 to more than 2.5 million in 1969, and the black universities created after 1960 produced ‘hothouse conditions for the growth of a new spirit of resistance’. After walking out of the non-racial National Union of South African Students (NUSAS) conference, the black students, who were housed off-campus, followed this up with the formation of the South African Students Organisation (SASO) led by Steven Bantu Biko”.

The Black Consciousness movement initially embodied confrontation with the state, violent means and anti-capitalist rhetoric. Instead, it evolved into an eclectic, intense ideology of psychological emancipation, black self reliance and assertiveness inspired by amongst others international intellectuals such as Fanon, Nkrumah, Nyerere as
well as contemporary black power theorists. Generally, this different dynamic animated the other major vector of opposition in the early 1970s.

A trickle of wildcat strikes by black workers became a flood in 1973, when a rolling wave of stoppages engulfed Durban and other areas in Natal. Even though these were largely spontaneous and lacked identifiable leadership, they fused with fledging advice offices and worker education to create the impetus for the rapid rebuilding of a trade union movement that was to play a significant role in the defeat of apartheid. Whilst concentrating on bread and butter issues, their pragmatism won them the legal space, ensured them a foothold on the factory floor, and opened the door to negotiations with employers for worker gains.

Thirdly and lastly, the student uprisings which started in 1976 in Soweto as a result of the imposition of Afrikaans as a second language of instruction in black schools have been widely documented; hence their symbolic significance will be a central preoccupation here. As Davenport and Saunders (2000: 449) point out, "On 16 June an illegal student march in Soweto, near Johannesburg, was stopped by police bullets, with some loss of life, after the firing of two warning shots and the use of tear gas had been met by some stone throwing. This incident was to set in motion a chain of revolts throughout the country which continued spasmodically until 1980, and then returned in a different form in 1984-5". At the heart of this protest as already pointed out was a demand by pupils for the abrogation of the compulsory use of Afrikaans as a medium of instruction in black Transvaal schools.

The period between 1979 and 1989 was basically referred to as the decade of defiance, partly because of the resurgence of the armed struggle but mainly due to the unprecedented levels of internal protests against the apartheid regime. This is a period when the government of P.W Botha embarked on a ‘Total Strategy’ which included intensive repressive measures like the state of emergency era in 1985-86. However, a measure which precipitated this intensive level of protest was the establishment of a tricameral parliament which made provision for white, coloured as well as Indian chambers whilst excluding blacks. In direct defiance, the United Democratic Front (UDF) was formed and was an umbrella body of more than 500 organisations.

As Bundy (2000:68) points out, this measure was largely influenced by the fact that the ANC had re-emerged as a major internal political force in the first half of the
1980s, the movement's official and somewhat formulaic explanation was to cite the Four Pillars of the anti-apartheid struggle and international solidarity work. Consequent events resulted in what scholars described as an 'unstable equilibrium' meaning that neither side had a clear-cut advantage over the other. Bundy goes on to elaborate that the South African state remained militarily powerful but was becoming politically weak. It could repress but could not persuade. The liberation movement led by the ANC on the other hand remained politically powerful but militarily inefficient. This stalemate recognized by both sides, together with and perhaps because of the collapse of the Soviet Bloc are widely documented as being responsible in large part, for the democratization of South African society.

Du Toit (2001:56-57) provides a good account of the sense of a stalemate that was perceived on both sides. As Du Toit (2001:57) noted, "The year 1985 was a benchmark for polarisation and confrontation. The ANC committed itself to the people's war and declared itself available to 'negotiate' about 'the modalities of the transfer of power'. P.W. Botha, in turn declared the first state of emergency of the 1980s. Publicly, neither could dare to talk to the other, yet both sensed the need to find out more about the other and to get behind the façade of the demonised caricatures they held of each other".

Du Toit goes on to quote Alex Boraine, one of the group of erstwhile white South Africans who went to Dakar to have talks with ANC representatives, on why the well known Dakar 1987 conference was held. "Alex Boraine explained the Dakar 'mission/pilgrimage in late 1987 as follows: to emphasise the need for urgent genuine negotiations and to highlight the futility of ignoring the ANC as a political entity, we planned the Dakar conference. It was a serious attempt to address the stalemate which exists in our country".

As Davidson and Strand (1993:6) also noted, "The one realization which was mutually relevant for the two main opponents was that neither could defeat the other by force. Although the military operations by the ANC increased in numbers throughout the 1980s, the movement was never near a military defeat of the state. Likewise, despite severe repression by the state, local as well as national organizations and labour unions had strengthened their positions inside the country and the ANC enjoyed undisputed international recognition as a legitimate
representative of the majority of South Africans. The conflict between the two had reached a stalemate”.

Coupled to this, the collapse of the Soviet Bloc was a major determinant which persuaded the South African government to engage the ANC and others in negotiations. This was not only because the influencing ideology behind the ANC had crumbled, but also because this meant a shrinking source of support, in terms of finance for the ANC.

As all too well known, subsequent on and off multi-party negotiations, preceded by the unbanning of all political organizations, release of political prisoners, including Mandela as well as the dismantling of the repressive and segregationist legislation, led to the establishment of the first democratic Government of National Unity (GNU) after the historic first ever democratic elections of April 27 1994. Most importantly, this government was based on a compromise which entailed the notion of power sharing between the left (ANC) and the right (NP). This is what has been referred to within some quarters as a government strong enough to govern but weak enough not to rule against important interests.

Taylor (2001:32) refers to the Dahlian conception of democracy as a polyarchy or elite rule. He points out that in its contemporary milieu, however, it might be advanced that polyarchal forms of democracy are not about promoting democratic input into the everyday life of citizens, but rather have become a useful mechanism to soothe social and political pressures that are created by the neo-liberal order, thereby creating a state of low-intensity democracy’. He concludes by noting that such systems reinforces the notion that 'the construction of a corporate dominant order requires the neutralisation of social forces precipitating persistent and effective questioning of an established order. This is the notion of elite pacting as applied to both cases.

Davenport (1998: 4-23) provides a detailed account of the negotiation process, with its many false starts, partly due to misunderstanding and disagreements between the ANC and NP, but also due to right-wing elements. These included resistance efforts by the ultra-rightwing Afrikaner Weerstands beweging (AWB) or Afrikaner resistance movement as well as violence in Cape Town and Eastern Cape areas against white people including the role of the Inkatha Freedom Party with its Zulu factionalism approach. As Kotze (2000:1) noted, “During the past 10 years South Africa has been
through a period of unprecedented change. The process of democratization that began in 1990 has resulted in more political, economic and social change than was experienced during the period of 70 years following the establishment of the South African state in 1910”.

3.2 Focus on Elections

3.2.1 The Electoral System

As a starting point, it is perhaps important to note that historically South Africa never had a proportional representation system. In the Cape and Natal colonies for instance, black people could vote if they met strict qualifications. After 1910, the Cape system lasted until the 1930s. But all the time, the first-past-the-post, or plural majority system applied. The tricameral parliament was divided into three houses (Indians, Coloureds and Whites), but the elections for each was also the first-past-the-post system.

For the 1994 elections however, South Africa’s electoral system was based on the Interim Constitution of 1993 and made provision for proportional representation based on closed ordered party lists. This system provided for a parliament composed of a 400 member National Assembly and a 90 member Senate (National Council Of Provinces) or the NCOP as it is commonly referred to. As Faure (1999:6) points out, "The Interim Constitution provides for a parliament composed of a 400 member National Assembly and a 90 member Senate which is indirectly elected by political parties in the nine provincial legislatures. Two hundred MPs (Members of Parliament) are elected using national party lists, while the other 200 are elected on the basis of regional party lists with a fixed number of representatives for each province; the size of each legislature also reflecting the relative population size of the province, with the proviso that such a legislature shall have a minimum of 30 members".

Faure goes on to point out that members of parliament and the legislatures of the various provinces are elected in terms of a continental-like system of proportional representation using closed ordered party lists. He also points out that even though the 1993 constitution was interim and therefore also its provisions, the 1996 final constitution does not concern detailed prescriptions with regard to the electoral system that should be used for the election of the central and provincial legislatures of
the country. As Faure (1999:10) notes, "The final constitution provides for the election of these legislatures in terms of a number of principles only. Simultaneously however, the final constitution contains a number of transitional arrangements which, among others, specify that the next general election in 1999 must be conducted in terms of the electoral system specified in schedule 2 of the interim constitution". Thus by implication, the 1999 elections were essentially governed by the same system as applied to the 1994 elections. The significance of an electoral system is that it determines the way in which votes cast in an election are translated into seats in the legislature.

According to the Electoral Institute of Southern Africa's (EISA) website (www.eisa.org.za), South Africa uses a proportional representation system as noted before, based on party lists at the national and provincial level. This means that a political party receives a share of its seats in parliament in direct proportion (or equal to) the number of votes cast for the party in the election. One advantage of the proportional representation system is that it guarantees smaller parties representation in the legislature, but the disadvantage is that elected representatives are not accountable to the voters, but to the party that compiled the party list.

Lodge (1999:19) also notes that, "The 1996 constitution, like the 1993 constitution, requires a structure which results in general, in 'proportional representation'. The principles underlying the system of representation in the 1999 election were the same as those in 1994 and derived from the 1993 constitution. In both, South Africa's voters choose their representatives through a party list system". Institutionally, the electoral system makes provision for a clear local government electoral procedure as well as the electoral commission. As Faure (1999:11) notes, "The constitution is much more specific and prescriptive about the election of municipal councils. For these, a system of proportional representation based on a municipality's segment of the national common voters' roll must be used".

In addition, the final constitution provides for an Electoral Commission along with a number of other institutions to strengthen constitutional democracy. Faure (1999:11) notes further that, "The Electoral Commission will manage elections of national, provincial and municipal legislative bodies in accordance with national legislation; ensure that those elections are free and fair; and declare the results of these elections within a period that will be prescribed by national legislation and which will be as
short as reasonably possible". These arrangements are fortified by the Electoral Act of 1998 which together with other legislation implemented some of the provisions of the final constitution. (such as the national legislature's second chamber, the NCOP and the size of provincial legislatures with the former having 90 members, 10 from each of the nine provinces)

With regard to the National Assembly, these principles state that elections shall be conducted in terms of an electoral system that is prescribed by national legislation, is based on the national common voters roll and provides for a minimum voting age of 18 years, and results in general, in proportional representation. As this made provisions for two legislatures, the National Parliament and the Provincial Legislatures, two ballot papers for each of the two characterises the system.

According to the Electoral Institute of Southern Africa's (EISA) Election Results Manual (1999:4), "The voting system used for the National Assembly and the Provincial Legislature elections was a closed list proportional representation system, seats being allocated among the competing parties using a Droop quota and the highest remainder principle. Each voter was required to cast his/her ballots in the voting station in the voting district in which he/she was registered, and completed two ballot papers, one for the National Assembly, the other for the provincial legislature for the province in which he or she was voting".

### 3.2.2 Free and Fair Elections?

In assessing the extent to which the elections can be said to be free, it is important to differentiate between the two electoral periods, 1994 and 1999, as the political context during these periods proved to be very different. Accordingly, this section will first look at the 1994 election and also the 1999 election. A general overall analysis will in the process also form part of this account. The April 1994 general election as Seekings (1997:287) points out, was a turning point in the country's political history. For the first time, South Africans could participate in the election of a legislature without regard to race, gender or class. Localising this analysis to the 1994 elections, the extent to which free and fairness of these elections can be factored in rests on several issues. Firstly, the political violence which preceded and continued sporadically during the elections and secondly, the procedural issues regarding the
running of the elections by the Independent Electoral Commission. Thirdly, its relations with government also form part of the analysis.

Where the issue of violence and intimidation is concerned, the province of Kwazulu-Natal stands above the rest, especially in the two years prior to the 1994 elections. As Schlemmer (1994:17) points out, "All indications up to March 1994 were that to hold elections in South Africa was perhaps the country's greatest risk venture. Political violence mounted steadily. Fears were widespread that there could be a right-wing rebellion and also that there could have been a civil war in Kwazulu-Natal". This is also reiterated by Gouws (1996:28) when she notes that, "If there is a province in South Africa that is consistently singled out for visible intolerance, it is Kwazulu-Natal. The violence there is tangible and the statistics for violent deaths higher than in any other province. In some weeks in 1995, the death toll was as high as 110 people and this violence is more often than not attributed to political intolerance between supporters of the ANC and the IFP".

This landscape of violence is also highlighted by Hofmeyr (2000:61) who points out that, "In the run-up to the 1994 polls it once again increased in intensity, and boiled over in tragic events like the Shell House shootout and deaths in confrontation between ANC and IFP supporters as well as in the case of ANC protesters and police of the former homeland of Ciskei. So much therefore depended on a successful outcome of the election that few dared to contemplate anything to the contrary". The issue of violence and intimidation can therefore be regarded as having had an impact on the outcome of the 1994 election, especially in Kwazulu-Natal and the East Rand where the highest death rates were recorded countrywide.

In terms of the running of these elections, Hofmeyr (2000) points out that there were some administrative flaws which cast doubt into the free and fairness of these elections. In this regard fingers pointed directly at the IEC. Reynolds (1994:62-63) provides an account of some the administrative flaws which drew criticism from both the ANC and opposition parties like the National Party. In one instance, then ANC member Major-General Bantu Holomisa complained about the lack of voting equipment in the former Transkei areas. Other complaints came from the ANC in the border region about some alleged efforts to sabotage voting and also in the Northern Transvaal where similar complaints were raised by the PAC.
Comments by international observers like the Organisation for African Unity (OAU) (now defunct) as well as the Secretary General of the United Nations Organisation (UNO) also referred to irregularities and administrative shortcomings that were exposed during the process. He also points out that the Commonwealth in its separate statement acknowledged the unique context within which the process had taken place. Aspects mentioned here include short deadlines, lack of population data, and complex legal structures.

As Hofmeyr (2000: 60) notes, "In its final report on the South African elections, the Commonwealth also highlighted aspects like the IEC's inability to provide about 20% of polling stations with electoral materials in time, irregularities that took place during the voting process, and the slow and sloppy counting of the votes". Despite these apparent flaws, the overall decision that generally, these elections reflected the will of the people is according to Hofmeyr, a lenient judgment influenced by the overwhelming anxiety, locally and internationally, for the elections to be successful in the light of other electoral failures elsewhere and also because of its symbolic significance of ending apartheid rule. A brief analysis of the 1994 situation would be that the elections were sufficiently free but questions will always be asked about the fairness where irregularities and administrative shortcomings, in the case of the IEC as well as incidents of violence and intimidation, occurred.

For the 1999 elections, structural inadequacies/irregularities more than violence were pinpointed as potential hazards to the free and fairness of the elections. Reynolds (1999:174) notes that these elections were in as far as violence and intimidation was concerned very different from the 1994 elections. In Kwazulu-Natal where violence was highest in 1994, the most worrying election day deadline was 'verbal intimidation fails to mar peaceful poll' and this shows the remarkably calmer way in which the 1999 elections were conducted as compared to five years earlier. The campaign period was characterized by dignity, a lack of violence and a vastly increased political tolerance, which makes a significant difference from the 1994 elections, this is a point also raised by amongst others Southall (2000:449). The irregularities mentioned above, structural or otherwise concerns revolved mainly around the electoral commission, regarding its powers and external influences/forces that were seen to be negatively impacting on them. In this regard, several issues raised by amongst others Lodge (1999), Humphries (1999) as well as Hofmeyr (2000) become important.
As pointed out, these structural irregularities largely centred around the workings of the Independent Electoral Commission. As Humphries (1999: 65) notes, "Throughout much of the election campaign, the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) was never far removed from public controversy over a range of key electoral administration issues. Political parties constantly queried its decisions on issues as diverse as registration requirements, staffing procedures, voter education or the funding of election campaigns". The tensions with parties withstanding, the commissioners found themselves also in constant conflict with the government.

Lodge (1999:24) points out that the first 'irregularity' was the issue of the commissions' financial independence. Legally, the IEC was expected to report to parliament on its budget, but from the body's inception it was engaged in a bureaucratic struggle with the Department of Home Affairs over financial control. Johann Kriegler, the chairperson of the commission was always in tension with Home Affairs and the Department of State Expenditure over this issue.

Lodge goes on to point out that his anxieties (Kriegler) were vindicated in October 1997 when the Minister of Home Affairs submitted to his cabinet colleagues an Electoral Commission Amendment Bill, which would have formalised his department's budgetary control. However, this matter was apparently shelved after the commission's obstinate refusal and protestations. Lodge adds that with regard to funding, even though Kriegler seemed to have convinced Home Affairs and State Expenditure to a budget of R965 million in 1997 for 1998, this was changed to R 500 million with lesser sums in succeeding years. Essentially, the commission was expected to run the 1999 elections and compile a voter's roll at a cost of about two-thirds of the 1994 poll's expenditure. Clearly, this was an incapacitating measure for the IEC.

A second issue concerned the controversy around the green 'bar-coded' ID books. This was a result of an Electoral Bill tabled by the Minister of Home Affairs, Mr. Mangosuthu Buthelezi in parliament. This bill limited franchise to citizens and South African residents with these ID books and made no provision for special voting. To qualify for entry on to the voters roll, citizens would have to possess the green 'bar-coded' identity books which had been issued by the department since 1985.
As Pottie (2001:147) noted, "For the 1999 elections, South Africans were able to register as voters only upon presentation of a bar-coded identification book issued by the government. The bar-coded ID requirement became the focal point of a series of counter-charges by the political parties, the IEC and the Department of Home Affairs. Opposition parties charged that their supporters did not have the required documents whereas ANC supporters did, that the Department of Home Affairs was unable to issue the documents, and ultimately, that the requirement was an unnecessary infringement on the right to vote".

Even though the IEC originated with the bill and this provision, they later changed their stand on the issue as they felt it unfairly excluded those without these and also due to mounting pressure from opposition political parties. As Lodge (1999:27) notes, "By the beginning of August Judge Kriegler was willing to endorse publicly criticism of the bill. 'It would be unrealistic and unfair' to limit voter registration to those with the bar-coded books, he conceded". Despite these protestations, the bill was passed as such and its 'fairness' has been a matter of extensive debate.

Humphries (1999:68) notes that within opposition parties, the issue of the independence of the IEC, both at national and provincial levels and amongst its staff and in internal communication emerged in many interviews as problematic. The issue of the IEC's independence highlighted two issues: its almost corporate nature and its employment of staff. This corporate nature was especially cited by political parties mainly with respect to its budget and its relationship with the department of Home Affairs. The main bone of contention here was anxiety over the fact that the IEC reported to and was funded by government. Along these lines, it was generally felt that this compromised its impartiality since it is a government organ and thereby extension, more inclined towards the ruling party.

Secondly, opposition parties objected on issues regarding the appointment of IEC functionaries. Virtually all parties complained that they could detect a partisanship among some IEC officials. In similar vein, as Humphries (1999:69) points out, "AZAPO complained that the IEC had sought volunteers from ANC-aligned structures such as SADTU and was thus biased in favour of the ruling party. The Federal Alliance (FA) on the other hand indicated that some IEC officials in the Northern Province were affiliated to parties and that such practices should be avoided".
Hofmeyr (2000:78) also points out that the 1999 election was so different from the 1994 mainly due to the context within which it took place. Apart from clashes between the UDM (United Democratic Movement) and the ANC in Richmond, Kwazulu-Natal, the 1999 election campaign was conducted in a far more peaceful atmosphere than in 1994. The stakes were not nearly as high as in the 1994 elections and therefore it can be asked whether the standards applied to judge the recent election were more stringent than the first time around.

Having said this, it becomes clear that the shortcomings of the elections in 1999 unlike five years earlier concerned structural or organisational irregularities more than violence and intimidation, many of those which occurred being of minor centrality. Logically, it makes sense to summarise by saying that the 1999 election, as compared to the 1994 one, leaned more towards free and fair than its predecessor given the context and unfolding events as has been shown above. Olivier and Rule (1999:233) in their post-election study of perceptions about the free and fairness of the 1999 election came to the conclusion that the vast majority of South Africans were of the opinion that the elections were free and fair. This remarkably cut across colour lines such that there was consensus about the legitimacy of the election process across these lines.

3.2.3 Election Results: Two Elections (1994 and 1999)

As the sub-title suggests, this section will present a descriptive as well as to a certain extent analytical account of election results for both the 1994 and 1999 elections. As noted earlier, the 1994 elections took place within a politically very volatile environment characterized by violence and intimidation, most of it in Kwazulu-Natal and also on the Reef. These acts of violence continued up to, although considerably receding, the election period itself. This is pointed out by Lodge (1999:6) who says that, "In the first months of 1994 which led up to the election on 27 April, the monthly toll of politically-related killings reached an historical peak. Political parties with their roots in liberation movements remained heavily influenced by the ethos of insurgent struggle in which opponents were perceived as enemies or traitors". This is also referred to by Schlemmer (1994:18) who cites incidents like the IFP activists
preventing the use of a booked stadium in Durban by the ANC, attacks on, or murders of, local leaders of the IFP, the ANC and other parties as well as an intensification of violent attacks on each other by the IFP and ANC factions, mainly on the East Rand and all over Kwazulu-Natal.

Coming to the election itself, it was contested by 19 parties which included the ANC, NP, IFP, PAC, DP, the Freedom Front and other smaller parties. However, as the results table shows, the real contest proved to be between the ANC, NP and the IFP. These being the founding elections, they attracted a very high voter turnout at approximately 87% and Lodge (1999:3) accounted for these as having the highest voter turnout in founding elections on the African continent in the 1990s. Coming to the results, as pointed out, the ANC, NP and IFP by and large dominated the results, so much so that about 90% of the votes went to the three parties out of a total of 19 parties contesting these elections. Here the ANC got 62.6% of the votes and 252 National Assembly seats. The NP got 20.4% of the votes and 82 National Assembly seats and lastly, the IFP got 10.5% of the votes, as well as 43 National Assembly seats. The rest of the parties roughly accounted for 7% of the votes, and 23 National Assembly seats.

When coming to the 1999 elections, two issues become clear here, procedurally, these elections were much better organized than the 1994 ones, this was epitomized by the presence of a common voters roll which ended up registering just over 18 million voters. This according to Lodge (1999:53) was a very important accomplishment and it ensured that this was a much more orderly poll than the previous one. The second issue concerns violence and intimidation. Unlike in 1994, the political situation in 1999 was much calmer, Lodge (1999:201) notes that comparisons with 1994 records suggest that a considerably calmer atmosphere prevailed and statistics provided by the Human Rights Committee seem to confirm this. Politically motivated violence in Kwazulu-Natal in the first month of 1999 for example were less than a tenth of those in a comparable period in 1994.

Concerning the election itself, according to the EISA Election Results Manual (1999:8), in all, 29 parties fought the elections on June 2. Sixteen contested the National Assembly elections, of these, 15 also contested provincial legislature elections, whilst one party contested just the assembly. The voter turnout for these elections was even higher than those for 1994 with a total of 89.3% of voters casting
their votes. In terms of the results, the picture is not very different from that in 1994. however, unlike in 1994 when it was mainly the ANC, NP and IFP, this time the Democratic Party (DP) came into the picture as well. Surprisingly to many, they got the second highest percentage votes after the ANC, overtaking both the NP and IFP in the process. Specifically, the ANC won 66.3% of the votes, giving them 266 National Assembly seats, the DP won 9.5% of the votes, giving them 38 National Assembly seats, the IFP got 8.5% of the votes, giving them 34 National Assembly seats whereas the NNP (New National Party) got 6.8% of the votes translating into 28 National Assembly seats.

Overall, these percentages still present a picture dominated by less than a handful parties with the four parties mentioned above accounting for still around 90% of the votes and about 366 National Assembly seats whereas all the remaining parties had the roughly 10% of votes left to share amongst themselves, and about 34 seats to fight for. In a nutshell, these results quite clearly show that competition is a matter of the very few and even then, the ANC hardly has any 'serious' competition as in both cases it garnered over 60% of the votes cast whereas the closet rival managed only 20% and that in 1994, whereas in 1999, this was only 9% achieved rather surprisingly, by the DP.

The election results for both 1994 and 1999 show rather strong trends towards a one party democracy or dominant party state as commonly referred to. This has been widely analysed as a potential threat to the consolidation of democracy, not only in the case of South Africa, but in other countries as well. It has been established through studies in other countries that the likelihood of a reversal to authoritarian tendencies is quite strong. This dominant party scenario and its consequences is elaborated on by amongst others Booysen (1999); Koelble (1999); Southall (2000); as well as Carothers (2002) and Mattes (2002).
TABLE 2  South Africa's Parliamentary Elections (1994 and 1999)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parties</th>
<th>1994</th>
<th>1999</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% votes and seats</td>
<td>% votes and seats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>62.6% and 252</td>
<td>66.3% and 266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFP</td>
<td>10.5% and 43</td>
<td>8.5% and 34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DP</td>
<td>1.7% and 7</td>
<td>9.5% and 38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAC</td>
<td>1.3% and 5</td>
<td>0.7% and 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACDP</td>
<td>0.5% and 2</td>
<td>1.4% and 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCDP</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.7% and 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDM</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3.4% and 14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NP/NNP</td>
<td>20.4% and 82</td>
<td>6.8% and 28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AEB</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.2% and 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FA</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.5% and 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MF</td>
<td>0.07% and 0</td>
<td>0.3% and 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FF</td>
<td>2.1% and 8</td>
<td>0.8% and 3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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(Source: EISA Election 99 Results Manual)

3.2.4 Political Liberties

With regard to political liberties, the Freedom House Rankings which rate the extent to which a society can be said to be free are important. As indicated in the previous chapter, these rankings award 1.1 as the ultimate 'free society' and 7.6 as the 'totally not free society'. Thus South Africa will be analysed within this context and in this
regard, the issue of political violence and intimidation as well as the interference of
the state in the workings of the electoral commission can be regarded as important
developments herein, possibly impacting on perceptions of freedom, however, more
of this will be elaborated later.

From a historical point of view, and mainly perhaps because of the apartheid state and
its policies, South Africa had, before 1994 never really been a free society. At worst
in 1972-73, the Freedom House ranking was a not free 5.6 at the peak of the
oppressive apartheid state and between 1974 and 1993, South Africa had a partly free
erating ranging between 4.5; 5.4 and 6.5 respectively. Around the period before the
1994 elections, i.e. the years from 1990 to 1993 had a partly free score of 5.4 mainly
because of the political violence at the time as a negative factor and the negotiations
towards democracy on the other hand as a positive factor.

After the second elections, with democracy and its provisions, i.e., institutions,
constitution, etc in place, South Africa's rating showed a greatly improved score of
1.2 as being free which is very different from the partly free 5.4 of between 1990 and
1993 and also the 2.3 free of around 1994. It was only after the 1994 transition period
that South Africa attained a free rating of 2.3 which had improved to a first world
House scored South Africa's political liberties as a partly free 5, then a great
improvement to 2 in 1994/95. Since then, a totally free 1 throughout the Mandela and
Mbeki years has been awarded.

Having said this, it is also important to look at the two issues highlighted as being
potential deviant developments in an otherwise stable and tolerant society. These are
the issues of violence and intimidation as well as governmental interference with the
electoral commission as earlier alluded to. As noted earlier, the period before and up
to the 1994 election is most central in this regard where violence and intimidation is
concerned. Lodge (1999:6) notes this by pointing out that in the first months of 1994,
vioence and intimidation incidents between parties reached a peak as the election
drew closer. Accordingly, political parties often sought to exclude representatives of
other parties from the vicinities in which they were strongly established. The IEC
report refers to 165 such 'no-go' zones. Seventy(70) of these were in Kwazulu-Natal,
thirty two (32) in Gauteng, twenty six (26) in the Free State, eleven(11) in the North-
West, nine (9) in the Western Cape and only two (2) in the Eastern Cape and
Mpumalanga. Schlemmer(1994:18) also provides an account of several incidents which in his view made campaigning and therefore voting in a free and fair manner a high-risk effort. The incidents include instances where DP, NP and PAC recruiting and mobilisation campaigns were forcefully disrupted by politically opposed township youth and young adults; sabotage of NP and ANC offices; presumably by rightwing elements; threatened attacks on ANC election linked marches in smaller towns; an intensification of violent attacks on each other by ANC and IFP factions-mainly on the reef and in Kwazulu-Natal including the much publicised IFP and Zulu show of force in central Johannesburg and violent retaliation in the vicinity of ANC headquarters, as well as a broad range of other similar incidents.

Other than violence and intimidation, issues of flawed procedure and state intervention also cast a dark spell on the verdict towards these elections. A most prominently accounted for issue here is has been the funding and independence of the commission. At inception, the IEC was expected to report to parliament, but they later learned that they had to account to Home Affairs and State Expenditure instead. As noted earlier, having seriously objected to this, the measure was abandoned, so they would be independent after all. However, it was concerning the issue of funding that great controversy ensured. The IEC, having initially secured a budget of R 965 million from Home Affairs and State Expenditure in 1997 for 1998, were stunned to learn that this was later changed in 1998 to R 500 million with lesser amounts in succeeding years. Though R 100 million was added in October, essentially, the commission was expected to run the 1999 elections at a cost of about two-thirds of the 1994 expenditure.

Yet another issue, and perhaps more controversial in nature, was the green 'bar-coded' ID book saga which basically required citizens to have these particular type of identity documents in order to register for the elections. Being an IEC initiative, this venture was severely criticised by opposition parties as they felt that it excluded those without these 'bar-coded' ID documents unfairly. Even though the IEC later turned against this provision in the Electoral Bill of 1998, which it had drafted, the government passed it as law after Home Affairs insisted that most citizens were in possession of the 'bar-coded' ID books and that those who didn't as yet possess one could apply and this would be processed timeously before the elections. This scenario eventually led to the resignation of the IEC's Chair, Judge Johan Kriegler. In summary,
it is within this context of violence and intimidation as well as state interference that any limitation to political liberties can be located. On civil liberties, Freedom House reported that these were consistently slightly "less free" than political rights during the apartheid years. However, for the period of the transition when political rights were as yet not in place, civil liberties were higher because of the scrapping of all the social segregation laws, such as the Immorality Act, the Mixed Marriages Act and the Group Areas Act. From 1995 towards the present, Freedom House accorded a ranking of 2 to South Africa's civil liberties, still free, but not as totally free as political rights. Restrictive labour laws, the denial of access for HIV/AIDS patients to appropriate medicines, etc., may have to do with this differential ranking.

3.3 Affluence

3.3.1 Per Capita Income and Trends

According to the *Africa at a Glance Report* 96/97, per capita income around 1994 amounted to a figure of US$2900. Much higher than the Przeworskian et al minimum of US$1000 for the strengthening of democracy as this figure is, it doesn't show us the massive inequalities that characterise South African society. As the *Africa Competitiveness Report* notes (2000/01:202), "South Africa has one of the highest GDP's in Southern Africa, at the same time, it also has one of the most unequal income distributions in the world".

Per capita income trends in South Africa has been and continues to be characterized by huge disparities along racial lines. This of course can be traced back to the apartheid system which has left behind so polarised a society that it has been referred to as a 'two-nations' within one nation country as President Mbeki so famously highlighted. Indeed this is a situation which the new government of national unity inherited when it came to power in 1994. This is a scenario which has been put across by many scholars in their analytical accounts of the South African situation. Accounts in this regard include those by Lundahl (1999); Garcia-Rivero (2000), Habib and Padayachee (2000) as well as Van Der Berg (1989, 1997 and 1998).

This is an issue which has been seen as posing a potential danger to the consolidation of democracy in the country. As Van Der Berg (1998:252) noted, "The fiscal
dilemma is only one of many confronting the new South African democracy, albeit an important one. Support for democracy in South Africa will partly depend on black perceptions of improvements in their material situation. Mattes (2002: 22) notes that whilst interracial inequalities have been reduced as a result of increasing black incomes and the redistributive effects of government spending, inequality within all races groups have increased. Amongst blacks the top one-fifth of all households have made impressive strides whilst the bottom two fifths have moved backwards.

Mattes also points out that this is not good for democracy as the instrumental value of democracy ( tangible benefits) which no doubt would manifest more strongly amongst the historically deprived is seemingly not being transferred to where it is needed the most. For instance, by July 2000 optimism about the country's economic future had declined from 63 to 35 per cent amongst the black population. Again in comparison, Mattes notes that the percentage of those who saw themselves as economically worse off was 32 per cent in 1995 and by mid 2000 had increased to 50 per cent. Essentially, this means growing discontent with the economy amongst black people in particular and the implications of this for the ANC could include dwindling support in membership, reduced voter percentages, internal divisions and others closely related developments.

Directly linked to the issue of per capita income is the high unemployment scenario which South Africa currently finds itself in. The high unemployment rate which according to COSATU is currently around 30% is a problem here. According to COSATU's submission on Industrial Policy (2002:5), formal employment has fallen rapidly since 1990. This combined with the growth in the labour force as the population expands, led to a dramatic rise in unemployment, especially amongst young people. Between 1995 and 2001 for instance, unemployment rose from 16% to 30%. The data also shows that just between February 2000 and September 2001, unemployment rose from 26.7% to 29.5% .

Hawkins (1994:7) also notes that the most important economic problems facing the new government are inequality and unemployment. In the 1960s over 80% of new entrants to the labour market found work in the formal sector. By the early 1990s, this had fallen to below 10%. The Reserve Bank's Quarterly Bulletin (1994:7) provides a picture of the pre-democracy employment situation. Here, it is noted that total employment in the formal sector was severely influenced by the recession of 1989 to
1993 as well as the restructuring programmes which led to labour shedding. Thus employment decreased by 8.9%, or by about 350 000 jobs from the first quarter of 1989 to the first quarter of 1993. The above scenario had a very negative impact on income distribution since 1994 in a society which is, as already pointed out, abnormally unequal. According to the UNDP, South Africa still has one of the worst distribution of income in the world.

As Hawkins (1994:8) notes, "What sets South Africa apart from the other countries is its high inequality and unemployment rates. If employment generation is the top priority, the narrowing of income differences comes a close second. At present, the average white household has an income ten times greater than that of black households and three or four times greater that those of Indian and Coloured households. These gaps are explained by the combination of racial wage differentials, higher unemployment amongst non-whites (especially amongst blacks) and skewed ownership of wealth".

Yet the country's economy is unique in that as much as it displays these unfavourable traits, it is comparable to the first world in some respects. Hawkins (1994:5) notes that the South African economy defies categorisation. The prosperity and sophistication of its (almost exclusively white) first world sector-in mining, where it is a world leader, or in services such as banking-stand out against mass unemployment, deprivation and poverty.

With a GNP of some $112bn(1994), South Africa ranks as one of the world's top 30 economies, but its income per head-and many other facets of its economic and social structure, such as population growth of 2.6% a year against a background of massive unemployment puts it squarely among the upper-middle income developing countries. Just before the 1999 elections, the situation had not changed very much if at all. According to the Africa Competitiveness Report 2000/2001 as well as the Africa at a Glance Report, an Africa Institute of South Africa publication, per capita income hardly showed any improvement between 1994 and 1998, just before the 1999 elections. The high unemployment scenario had not, just after the 1999 elections improved in any significant manner either. The Reserve Bank's Quarterly Bulletin of March 2000 notes that there was no indication of a pick-up in the demand for labour by the end of the third quarter of 1999.
As pointed out earlier, the effects of unemployment show themselves most clearly on income levels. According to the *Institute of Race Relations Survey 2000/2001*, whilst the poorest section of the population (blacks) had shown some improvement in terms of proportions in the top three income groups between 1975 and 1996, there was an overall rise in inequality between 1995 and 1998. The 2001/2002 edition shows that as a direct result of unemployment, particularly amongst Africans, inequality has been perpetuated even further. Unemployment, strictly defined, rose from 17% in 1995 to 23% in 1999 to 27% in February 2000, that is by 59% between 1995 and 2000.

Clearly, the data here shows a direct correlation between rising unemployment and income inequality. In summary therefore, of greatest concern and significance to South Africa in as far as per capita income levels and trends are concerned is income inequality and unemployment levels which are very high as a result of mainly history, but also other contemporary 'side-effects'. Income redistribution in an equitable manner and job creation seem to be utmost priority in this regard. As Hawkins(1994) concludes, the politics and economics of inequality will have a profound impact on the pattern of economic growth into the 21st century.

### 3.3.2 Human Development Index: Trends

The position of South Africa in the Human Development Index (HDI), a composite of the variables measuring life expectancy, adult literacy as well as the GDP per capita will be analysed or described with regard to the 1994 and 1999 periods with an intermediate look at 1996 so as to offer a broader range of analysis over time. According to the *Human Development Report 1995*, South Africa belonged to the medium human development category where it occupied position 95 out of a total of 174 countries in the overall HDI rankings. The breakdown of this HDI shows that in this period, South Africa's life expectancy at birth was 63 years, the adult literacy rate at 81% whilst the GDP per capita measured about US$3799 using data for the year 1992. For the *1996 Human Development Report*, with its data based on the year 1993, South Africa's still belonged to the medium human development category, however, its position had gone down to 100 out of the 174 countries in these rankings. The HDI composites of life expectancy had marginally improved to 63.2 years, adult literacy was still at 81% whilst the GDP per capita had gone down to US$ 3127. Lastly, for
the 2001 Human Development Report based on data for 1999, the election year, South Africa found itself in position 94 still in the medium human development category, and out of a total of 162 countries in the overall HDI rankings.

However the HDI composites of life expectancy showed a marked decline to just 54 years from the 63 years in around 1996, a drastic decrease probably best explained by the incidence of HIV/Aids. Adult literacy on the other hand had improved to about 85% whereas the GDP per capita had also improved to 8 908 US dollars, the massive income inequality characteristic of South Africa withstanding.

In summary, the HDI trends for South Africa in the 7 year period between 1992, just before democracy, and 1999, after the second elections, shows that generally, an improved GDP per capita, thus influencing the country's HDI ranking positively, and an improved adult literacy rate are counterbalanced by a seriously declining life expectancy, decreasing by at least eight years within a period of seven years probably due to HIV/Aids as has been mentioned. Clearly, this is not a good picture for the country and whilst other areas have improved, the dangers of HIV/Aids are quite clear. This generally shows a country with potential to pull itself out of the apartheid quagmire but also a country seriously challenged by HIV/Aids.
CHAPTER 4: COMPARISONS

4.1 Elections Compared

When comparing elections in South Africa and Zimbabwe, it is important to bear in mind that an overall comparative model of not only the results but also the electoral system and similar concerns is in order here. As pointed out, this analysis will look first at the issue of the electoral system employed in both these countries over a period of time, especially with regard to the electoral periods which in the case of Zimbabwe is from 1980 up until 2000 and in the case of South Africa 1994 and 1999 respectively.

As far as Zimbabwe is concerned, we have highlighted that on gaining independence, the electoral system which was used for the 1980 elections was the proportional representation model which was changed to the single-member district constituency after the 5 per cent threshold was seemingly of benefit to the three major parties only. For South Africa on the other hand, much of the pre-democracy era when whites only elections were held, the electoral system employed was the first-past-the-post system which ensured absolute if not overwhelming victories for the dominant party, the NP. However, with democracy, the electoral system which was employed here was the proportional representation model. Unlike in the case of Zimbabwe, to guard against the exclusion of minority interests, the threshold for representation was much lower than in Zimbabwe with the particular figure between 1.5 and 2% which has somewhat ensured that minorities have a share, despite the lion's share enjoyed by the ANC.

Still focused on the issue of the electoral system, the institutions which govern the conduct of the elections are important as well. In the case of Zimbabwe, we have noted a wide array of bodies and officers charged with running the elections, but whose lines of duty at times seem to be unclear. As Sachikonye (2000) and Moyo (1992) amongst others noted, these include the Electoral Supervisory Commission, the Registrar of Elections, the Delimitation Commission, etc. As the literature in this regard has shown, institutions of the electoral system in Zimbabwe show a hazy and entangled picture of responsibility and jurisdiction. In the case of South Africa, the picture is somewhat different. Here, the Independent Electoral Commission is the
single body charged with the responsibility of ensuring the smooth running of elections. Although with its nine provincial heads, they all still account to the chair of the commission who is the chief electoral officer. In somewhat a similar fashion with Zimbabwe's institutions, the administration, accountability and jurisdiction of this commission as Lodge (1999), Humphries (1999), Hofmeyr (2000) as well as Pottie(2001) amongst others have noted has been brought into question.

Pottie (2001:147-152) for instance highlights the issue of challenges facing the system in three Southern African countries. The politicisation of the common voters roll in South Africa, the 1998 volatile elections in Mozambique over voter registration as well as the failure of the Angolan elections to end conflict more than serving to reignite the civil war in the 1990's. Pottie concludes by noting that should the region merely focus on procedural agents of democracy, whilst neglecting the crucial issue of popular participation in economic choices, then the resulting reliance on a form of 'low intensity democracy' will threaten even those achievements. This is a caution which perhaps Zimbabwe and South Africa should do well to seriously consider given the land question in Zimbabwe and the high income inequality in South Africa. The vulnerabilities herein lie very deep and the land grab campaign in Zimbabwe just goes to show how easily procedural democracy can be undermined due to neglected economic choices.

This comparative analysis of the electoral system has purposefully taken a two-pronged approach. An approach that one, focused on the representation system, as in the allocation of seats and secondly, an approach which focused on the institutions provided for by the electoral system. It has in the process been established that barring a few similarities, by and large the electoral systems employed in both these two countries are decidedly different. Coming to the elections themselves, Zimbabwe has held five elections since 1980 whereas South Africa has held two in 1994 and 1999. A strong similarity as noted throughout the paper has been the overwhelming dominance of the liberation movement in the outcome of these elections. In Zimbabwe, the ZANU-PF has dominated almost every election since independence in 1980, whereas in South Africa, the ANC has had a clear dominance over the first two elections in the democratic era.
However, a rather different and interesting feature within this dominant party system is that whereas in South Africa race has been seen to be a major variable in explaining voting patterns, in Zimbabwe ethnicity has been highlighted as the major variable for explaining the various voting patterns up until 1995. Breytenbach (2000: 47) has noted that up until 1995, ethnic politics played a large role in Zimbabwe. Election results from 1980 to 1995 correspond strongly with ethnic demographics. The fact that the Mashona form the power base of the original ZANU and make-up about 77% of the total population lead to the Mashona-based parties jointly obtaining about 72% of votes cast in 1980 and 75% for those in 1985. However, Morgan Tsvangirai's Movement For Democratic Change has shown itself to be a multi-racial party with a broad based support base.

This being the case, South Africa's electoral outcome pattern since 1994 has been to a large extent based on the demographic character of the country. It is what has been referred to within some quarters as a racial census. As Du Toit (1999:6) notes, "In a purely descriptive sense, race was obviously very strongly associated with voting behaviour in 1994. According to data presented by Reynolds (1994: 182-220), the ANC drew 94% of its voters from African voters, the IFP 85%, most of that from Zulu speaking ranks whilst the support for the DP and the FF on the other hand came overwhelmingly from white voters, with only the NNP managing significant support from whites, Indians and coloured voters.

Another significant feature of the elections in Zimbabwe has been the issue of violence and intimidation during electoral periods, more so against opposition to the ZANU-PF. A host of writers on Zimbabwe amongst others Breytenbach (1997), Sithole (1997), Moyo (1992) and Sachikonye (2000), have highlighted the fact that every election since independence has witnessed varying degrees of intimidation and violence and that this has been one of the influential factors behind the dominance of the ZANU-PF. Paes (2000:38) also notes that the dominance of the ZANU-PF largely relies on patronage, repression, as last year's campaign showed, control of the state media and occasional vote-rigging for electoral victories.

In the case of South Africa, whilst widespread mass violence and intimidation campaigns preceded and continued during the 1994 elections, the second elections in 1999 were conducted in a peaceful environment. Reynolds (1999), Lodge (1999),
Southall (2000) as well as Hofmeyr (2000), point out that the 1999 elections were in as far as violence and intimidation was concerned very different from the 1994 elections which Schlemmer (1994:17) described as possibly the greatest risk venture given the violence which was widespread in Kwazulu-Natal and on the Reef. Analyzing the elections in a comparative manner herein, two issues seem to stand out. The voting patterns in both these countries have tended to be ethnically and racially enduced whilst the issue of violence and intimidation has been a constant feature in Zimbabwe, especially during elections, whereas in South Africa, this has up to date been largely confined to the 1994 era.

4.2 Affluence Compared

Affluence generally refers to per capita income levels and the Human Development Index in general where per capita income, longevity and adult literacy are measured. As such, this section seeks to compare per capita income trends in South Africa and Zimbabwe with specific reference to the post democratisation era. That is post 1980 in the case of Zimbabwe and post 1994 in the case of South Africa. Where per capita income is concerned, these two countries historically and perhaps even contemporarily share the one characteristic of huge income inequalities. But before this, a comparison between the per capita income figures for these two countries at any time reveals a very contrasting background. Around independence in Zimbabwe, the total per capita income was US$740. In 1988, this was slightly lower at US$710. Ten more years added, that is in 2000, this had gone down dramatically to US$540 and these figures generally show economic stagnation and instability in the country.

For South Africa on the other hand, around 1994, the per capita income was US$2900, whilst improving somewhat to US$3160 in between 1994 and 1999, just before the 1999 elections as the Africa at a Glance Report has shown, it had gone back to US$2900. Clearly, when comparing US$540 for Zimbabwe and US$2900 for South Africa, there is a big difference to be appreciated herein. The per capita income figure for Zimbabwe of US$540 in 2000 is well below that of Przeworski et al's minimum requirement for the survival of a democracy at US$1000 whilst for South Africa, it is well above at US$2900. However, much as these figures differ, the
conditions which prevail in both these countries, at least at an economic level, are as much a threat to democracy in South Africa as they are in Zimbabwe. As Table 4.2.1 shows:

**TABLE 4.2.1 Per Capita Income Trends (1990-1999)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1990</th>
<th>1994</th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>Trend</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>US$740</td>
<td>US$570</td>
<td>US$540</td>
<td>Decline</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>US$4981</td>
<td>US$3127</td>
<td>US$2900</td>
<td>Decline</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Central here is the issue of the skewed distribution of wealth. South Africa, whilst having its good per capita income figure, is at the same time marked by high income inequalities, thus the majority of South Africans experience very much the same living conditions as the Zimbabweans who have experienced declining per capita incomes. The similarities in these two countries are made all the more real by the conditions which fuel this sustained scenario of income inequality. Zimbabwe's situation is a mixture of economic stagnation and instability which in turn has brought about massive unemployment. As noted by the World Bank's *Trends in Developing Economies* (1996:568), formal sector employment in Zimbabwe has only increased by 1.5% a year since independence.

As Knight (1996:227) noted, the greatest challenge facing any Zimbabwean government is the country's financial situation. "The greatest threat to stability in Zimbabwe is the failure of the economy to provide security. If firms continue to liquidate, if 100 000 high school graduates fail to find employment each year, and if inflation continues to put most goods out of the reach of most of the people, the prospects for a peaceful country will be undermined". Venter (2000:10) adds by noting that, "the story of the Zimbabwean economy is a long litany of problems, and ironically, in the aftermath of the elections, any lasting transition to a greater measure of democracy will depend on a recovery of the economy".
For South Africa, high unemployment has also been highlighted as an issue. Habib and Padayachee (2000) as well as Friedman (1998) have pointed out that income inequality, if not properly managed, could lead to an unstable environment for democracy. Directly linked to per capita income levels is the issue of high unemployment which currently prevails in the country. This high unemployment rate, totaling around 30% according to various sources, is a central problem in the fight against poverty.

As Friedman (1999:12) noted, "The prospects for democracy in the next five years will depend on primarily, not an improved public administration and enhanced delivery (although these remain important), but on the degree to which the fight against poverty and inherited inequality is pursued in a manner that recognizes that democratic intangibles matter to citizens as much as material improvements".

This close relationship between affluence and the consolidation of democracy is a point also argued by amongst others Przeworski et al (1996), Breytenbach (1998), Grundy (1995) as well as Handley and Herbst (1997). Lastly, in as far as the general living conditions as according to the Human Development Index rankings are concerned, there is a marked difference between Zimbabwe and South Africa.

For the periods 1990, 1994 and 1999, South Africa scored consistently higher than its neighbour in the HDI rankings showing that generally, living conditions in both these countries are rather different. Specifically, Zimbabwe has always found itself in a position of constant fluctuations between improvement and deterioration. Factors influential here include poor economic performance amongst other issues. For South Africa, the picture is that of a fairly stable country in this regard with the greatest instability being the threat posed by the HIV/AIDS pandemic. As Table 4.2.2 shows:
TABLE 4.2.2 HDI RANKINGS (1990-1999)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1990</th>
<th>1994</th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>Trend</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>Decline &amp; Improvement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>Decline &amp; Improvement</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


4.3 Assessment and Evaluation

This section will offer a broad analysis of the electoral system, civil and political liberties as well as affluence in a comparative manner whilst also exploring the possible implications of such developments for democracy in both South Africa and Zimbabwe, whether positive or negative and in the process, possible solutions will be tentatively discussed. Institutionally, we have compared South Africa's electoral system with that of Zimbabwe and in the process have noted that whilst Zimbabwe's seat allocation system, the first past the post single constituency model favours the dominant party, the ZANU-PF, South Africa's model of proportional representation on the other hand offers smaller parties a fair chance to be represented in the legislatures. The threshold discussed in this regard is of paramount significance in catering for the less influential groupings.

Besides the seat allocation model, the institutions of the electoral system in both South Africa and Zimbabwe, with specific reference to how they function, clearly have implications for the consolidation of democracy. Zimbabwe's institutions are plagued by controversy over issues of accountability, partisanship, their powers, etc. South Africa's institutions on the other hand, whilst to a lesser extent, have also been accused of similar practices which don't seem to support multi-party democracy.
Yet another significant aspect in this regard is the issue of political and civil liberties. As table 4.3.1 shows:

**TABLE 4.3.1 CIVIL AND POLITICAL LIBERTIES (1980-2000)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>3.4PF</td>
<td>4.6PF</td>
<td>6.4PF</td>
<td>5.5PF</td>
<td>6.5PF</td>
<td>Decline</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>5.6PF</td>
<td>5.6PF</td>
<td>5.4PF</td>
<td>1.2F</td>
<td>1.2F</td>
<td>Improved</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Freedom House (www.freedomhouse.org) 08 August 2001

Throughout this paper, we have noted that Zimbabwe's record in this regard is not impressive with a partly free rating of 6.5 as according to Freedom House, a possible result of the land grab campaign which has intensified over the last two years, but also perhaps as a result of the issue of violence and intimidation throughout the electoral periods in that country. South Africa's record here has as pointed out earlier, improved since the end of apartheid and its repressive and segregationist policies.

It is clear that if one tries to determine the prospects for consolidation through an evaluation of civil and political liberties in these two countries, such prospects are gloomy in Zimbabwe as compared to South Africa. Instead of improving, these prospects are quickly deteriorating as current events in Zimbabwe go to show whilst for South Africa the prospects are not as bad barring a few developments like legislation set to regulate the media and the lack of access to HIV/Aids medication as per government policy being the only negative issues of note.

Arguably, these kind of developments have the potential, at least in the long term, to pull South Africa somewhat towards Zimbabwe. Lastly, as according to the thesis of the economic determinist tradition, which sees a strong link between democracy and favourable socio-economic conditions, the issue of affluence, a variable central to this study in addition to elections, was also explored. As pointed out through much of the paper, South Africa has a high-income inequality despite its favourable per capita income which is higher than the minimum argued by Przeworski et al (1996). This is a
result of mainly the history of the country as is all too well known as well as the soaring unemployment rates which exacerbate the issue on the economic front whilst socially, the HIV/Aids situation threatens to spiral out of hand.

Zimbabwe's economic situation also does not project a positive image. In fact, the economy in that country is in a far worse state of affairs as compared to her southern neighbour. The per capita income for instance falls far short of the Przeworskian et al minimum of US$1000 at about US$540 in 2000. South Africa's per capita income of US$2900 at around the same time, whilst being on the safe side of this minimum requirement, masks high inequality and this is possibly the greatest threat that faces the country's democratic dispensation if not properly addressed.

Analytically, as far as affluence is concerned, and if the economic determinist theory holds true, then South Africa and Zimbabwe still has a lot of work to do to get to a stage where democracy can be said to be consolidated. This is already evidently clear in Zimbabwe as the deprivation of the masses in that country has turned into a powerful political tool for Mugabe and his party under the guise of the land grabbing campaign.

With regard to the elections, given a background of violence and intimidation, mal-administration, partisanship, vote-rigging, an unfair seat allocation model as well as media suppression, Zimbabwe's electoral system does not inspire much confidence in terms of the prospects for the consolidation of democracy since what happens during voting has a lot to do with what the ruling party wants. For South Africa, the provisions of the electoral system, with the exception of accusations of mal-administration once more, partisanship as well as violence and intimidation in the run-up to the 1994 elections, looks a fair instrument upon which democracy can be built. In this regard, South Africa seems to be better able to accommodate multi-party democracy than her northern neighbour.
CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION

It has been established that democracy is primarily a form of government where the will of the people through certain procedural arrangements, rules the particular society. As such, it has generally been agreed upon that democracy is a government for the people by the people. At an intellectual level, the field of democracy has received much attention. As a result, various theories on democracy abound. For the purpose of this study, the institutionalist tradition, argued for by Huntington (1991) amongst others, and the economic determinist tradition, argued by Przeworski et al (1996) amongst others, are important. These theoretical frameworks present conditions which according to them ensure or whose presence brings about the democratization and consolidation thereof process in a society.

According to the institutionalist theory of democracy, institutions are important for democracy. These institutions are normally such structures as a parliament, elections, an independent judiciary and several other support structures like the Human Rights Commission, Auditor-General as well as an Electoral Commission in the case of South Africa as examples. Dahl (1971) is also an important figure of note in this tradition where emphasis is placed on amongst others, the concept of institutions of participation as in parliament and contestation as in elections, the rule of law, accountability, constitutional adherence and other closely related aspects.

The economic determinist theory of democracy on the other hand brings another dimension to the concept of democracy. Whilst acknowledging the importance of institutions, they argue that this is not sufficient. Institutions are necessary but they only partially fulfill the requirements for a democracy, let alone a consolidated one. The economic determinist theory sees a strong link between democracy and favourable socio-economic conditions, one of these being affluence, hence the adoption of this variable for this study. Of prominence in this tradition is Przeworski et al (1996:41) who established through a study across many developing and developed nations that the prospects for new democracies are not good when they fall into the range of per capita incomes of US$1000 or less. For states with per capita incomes of more than US$6000, chances are excellent because according to them, no
state in this category has ever become undemocratic. From this background, the study adopted an investigative look at democracy in both South Africa and Zimbabwe regarding prospects for its consolidation. To operationalise this, elections as an institutional arrangement were used whilst affluence as a socio-economic measure was also used. The findings of the study have shown that at an institutional level, i.e., elections, South Africa has in place a system which affords minorities the opportunity to be represented in an otherwise dominant party system through the proportional representation model as well as a reasonably well functioning electoral commission. Zimbabwe's system on the other hand, the first past the post single member constituency model has been shown to be very restrictive for minorities in a political system were one party has been dominant for many years. This being a winner takes all situation, the ZANU-PF has, with the exception of 2000, been literally taking all since independence in 1980.

Over and above this, it was also established that in Zimbabwe, institutions of the electoral system have been the centre of controversy regarding their independence and transparency over the years whilst in South Africa, the electoral commission was at times also found to be inefficient in its duties and also accused of partisanship tendencies. Regarding the elections themselves, it was found that the ZANU-PF has dominated every election since 1980 with the exception of 2000 and also that violence and intimidation has been a central feature of elections since independence, mostly from supporters and members of the ruling party. In South Africa, the ANC has also dominated the two elections in the democratic era and unlike Zimbabwe though, the violence and intimidation was only rife prior to and in 1994 with 1999 being largely peaceful.

The issue of civil and political liberties also formed a part of the scope of this study, though as more of an intermediate operational measure. Here, South Africa has according to Freedom House, a free society with a rating of 1.2 in the democratic era which compares favourably with first world democracies. Zimbabwe on the other hand had in 2000 a partly free society with a ranking of 6.5 due to the violence and intimidation during elections but also because of state repression of the independent media as well as the land grab campaign, thus probably progressing towards not free in view of recent developments in that country. Lastly, affluence was an issue also
under the spotlight as pointed out earlier. In this regard, the study showed that whilst South Africa's per capita income of around US$2900 in 1999 is well above the minimum survival of US$1000, the figure masks massive income inequality with just a few owning the wealth of the country whilst the vast majority are poor. In this regard, high unemployment rates only help to worsen the situation and the prevalence of HIV/AIDS is also yet another threat, albeit at a social level. With Zimbabwe, the picture is much more negative. To start with, their per capita income, at US$570 is well below the minimum. The economy has been declining for a number of years and much like in South Africa, unemployment is rife. Added to this, social issues health, life expectancy, etc have also deteriorated as the HDI trends have shown. As figure 5.1 shows:

**FIGURE 5.1 DEVELOPMENT AND DEMOCRACY MODEL**

Given the above, what then are the prospects for the consolidation of democracy in South Africa and Zimbabwe? The study has shown that the future of democracy for both countries rely quite heavily on the correction of the problem of affluence such that living conditions and economic prospects like employment improve dramatically for the ordinary South African and Zimbabwean on the street. Over and above this, it
will also depend on, especially in the case of Zimbabwe, a restructuring of the electoral system to ensure more fair a chance for smaller parties through a new seat allocation model, possible review and reduction of electoral institutions and on the respect of the rule of law. Thus the purpose of this study, which was to employ the use of two variables, elections and affluence, as well as liberties somewhere in between, as a way of trying to determine the prospects for the consolidation of democracy has been to a large extent accomplished.

This is because the data gathered here has shown several issues which in the case of Zimbabwe in particular, could undermine democracy completely, let alone its consolidation or attempts along those lines. The first issue is that through an audit of the electoral machinery, this study has shown that the rule of law is severely undermined in that country. The violence that has characterized the elections since 1980, repression of the media as well as the land grab campaign goes a long way in showing this. Secondly, the economic turmoil which the country currently finds itself in also proves to be a fertile ground for political manipulation as Mugabe has clearly shown with his land grab campaign since the 2000 referendum which he lost. The comparative orientation of the study highlighted how similar in many respects, for instance, history, economic and social issues, etc the two countries are.

It should also be pointed out however that the very same comparative nature of the study possibly means that greater detail could not be covered and possible bias could as a result be detected in the study. Whilst the study focused on the role of elections and affluence in operationalising the prospects for the consolidation of democracy, it did not for instance, focus on the role of other important issues like civil society, ethnicity and other related issues which would probably have yielded a different dimension to the one in evidence here. The study also did not look at issues like nation-building efforts or opposition politics in operationalising these prospects.

Clearly, the two issues focused on did show their limitations. Elections for instance can be held but not necessarily democratically or in strengthening democracy, but as a perpetuation of undue dominance due to a wide range of irregularities within the political system as Zimbabwe has shown. Affluence is also central and whilst being useful, it does not offer a valid picture of the chances that a democracy has for survival and consolidation in a country. Whilst Przeworski et al maintain that a per
capita income of US$1000 is sufficient for democracy; South Africa has a per capita income of US$2900 and at the same time has one of the highest income inequalities in the world. Can we still concur with the economic determinists and say South Africa will survive as a democracy because it meets this requirement? Similarly the institutionalist also do fall short in that institutions can be there, as in Zimbabwe, but mean nothing more beyond a formality, not necessarily democracy in practice nor its consolidation thereof.

Lastly, the limitations of these theories and methods are apparent, but in similar vein, the approach has also shed us some light into the whole question of democracy where these two countries are concerned. As pointed out earlier, perhaps different operational measures could have been employed, but what we can say is that as far both institutional and socio-economic arrangements are concerned, Zimbabwe's homework is huge whereas South Africa, whilst still very much on track need not to relax but work hard towards consolidating the democracy. In fact, where affluence is concerned in particular, the homework is seemingly as big as that of Zimbabwe up north.
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