

BASIC EMOTION WORDS IN SESOTHO

BY

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DECLARATION

I, the undersigned, hereby declare that the work contained in this thesis is my own original work and that I have not previously in its entirety or in part submitted it at any university for a degree.



SUMMARY

The purpose of this study is to identify the basic emotion verbs in Sesotho. Five basic emotions verb are identified: anger, anxiety, disgust, sadness, and fear. The verbs, expressions, as well as idiophones that express these emotions, are identified. Furthermore, the emotion words are semantically and syntactically analyzed.

The outlay of the nine chapters is as follows: Chapter One is an Introduction in which reference is made to the aim of this study, methods used in compiling the data, and the analysis of the data. Chapter Two offers an overview of the basic emotions. A psychological overview of the work of the following scholars is undertaken: Le Doux (1998), Johnson-Laird and Oatley (1992), Tomkins (1962), Plutchik (1980), and Izard (1971); as well as a linguistic overview of the work of the following scholars: Kövecses (1989), Wierzbicka (1989), Frijda (1986), and Goddard (1998). Chapter Three deals with the lexical semantics which will be used in analyzing the different emotion words.

Chapter Four deals with anger words. It starts with an overview of anger as treated by the following scholars: Taylor and Mbense (1998), Kövecses (1989), and Lakoff and Kövecses (1987). The treatment of the data (the expression of anger in Sesotho) starts with the definition of anger, followed by expressions of anger and the verbs of anger which are analyzed semantically and syntactically. Another form of the expression of anger, namely the threat, is also analyzed semantically and syntactically.

Chapter Five deals with anxiety, Chapter Six with disgust, Chapter Seven with sadness and Chapter Eight with fear. In all these instances, the definition of the emotion word is followed by relevant expressions and verbs which are semantically and syntactically analyzed.

The last chapter, Chapter Nine, offers conclusions regarding the five different types of emotion words in Sesotho.

OPSOMMING

Die doel van hierdie studie is om die basiese emosie-werkwoorde in Sesotho te behandel. Vyf basiese emosies word geïdentifiseer, naamlik toorn/woede, angstigheid, walging, droefheid en vrees. Die werkwoorde en uitdrukkinge, sowel as idiofone wat hierdie emosies uitdruk, word geïdentifiseer. Voorts word die emosie-woorde semanties en sintakties geanaliseer.

Die uitleg van die nege hoofstukke is soos volg: Hoofstuk Een is die Inleiding, met besonderhede betreffende die doel van die studie, metodes gebruik in die inwin en opstel van die data, sowel as die analise van die data. Hoofstuk Twee behandel die basiese emosies oorsigtelik. 'n Psigologiese oorsig soos verwant in die werk van die volgende deskundiges word onderneem: Le Doux (1998), Johnson-Laird en Oatley (1992), Tomkins (1962), Plutchik (1980) en Izard (1971); daar is ook 'n linguistieke oorsig van die werk van Kövekses (1989), Wierzbicka (1989), Frijda (1986) en Goddard (1998). Hoofstuk Drie behandel die leksikale semantiek wat in die analise van die verskillende emosie-woorde gebruik sal word.

Hoofstuk Vier behandel die woede-woorde. Dit begin met 'n oorsig van woede soos behandel in die werk van Taylor en Mbense (1998), Kovecses (1989) en Lakoff en Kovecses (1987). Die behandeling van die data begin met 'n definisie van woede, en word gevolg deur 'n semantiese en sintaktiese analise van uitdrukkinge en werkwoorde wat woede uitdruk. 'n Ander vorm van woede-uitdrukking, naamlik die dreigement, word ook semanties en sintakties geanaliseer.

Hoofstuk Vyf behandel angstigheid, Hoofstuk Ses walging, Hoofstuk Sewe droefheid, en Hoofstuk Agt vrees. In elke hoofstuk word 'n definisie van die emosie-woord gevolg deur 'n behandeling van relevante werkwoorde en uitdrukkinge wat semanties en sintakties geanaliseer word.

Die laaste hoofstuk, Hoofstuk Nege, bring sekere gevolgtrekkinge betreffende die vyf verskillende tipes van emosie-woorde in Sesotho

To
Mapulane,
Tumelo,
and
Kgothatso.

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BASIC EMOTIONS IN SESOTHO

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Aims of the study

The aim of this study is to:

- (i) identify basic emotion verbs in Sesotho
- (ii) identify basic emotion expressions in Sesotho
- (iii) discuss basic emotion verbs with regard to their semantics and syntax
- (iv) discuss basic emotion expressions with regard to their semantic and syntax.

1.2 Methods in compilation of data

The following methods will be used to compile data necessary for the study of basic emotion verbs in Sesotho:

- (i) Dictionaries
- (ii) Personal knowledge
- (iii) Discussion with Sesotho mother-tongue speakers

1.3 Analysis of data

The verbs and expressions will be analysed by using them in sentences, i.e. syntactically, and also by analysing their meaning, i.e. semantically.

CHAPTER 2: OVERVIEW OF BASIC EMOTIONS

2.1 Aim

The aim of this section is to review and analyse psychological and linguistic overview of basic emotions with the aim of collecting data about what researchers have found out about basic emotions.

2.2 Psychological overview

2.2.1 Le Doux (1998)

Themes about the nature of emotions

The first is that the proper level of analysis of a psychological function is the level at which that function is represented in the brain. The word “emotion” does not refer to something that the mind or brain really has or does. “Emotion” is only a label, a convenient way of talking about aspects of the brain and its mind. There is no such thing as the “emotion” faculty and there is no single brain system dedicated to this phantom function. We should not mix findings about different emotions all together independent of the emotion that they are findings about.

A second theme is that the brain systems that generate emotional behaviours are highly conserved through many levels of evolutionary history. Not all brains are the same. The implication is that our understanding of what it means to be human involves an appreciation of the ways in which we are like other animals as well as the ways in which we are different.

A third theme is that when these systems function in an animal that also has the capacity for conscious awareness, then conscious emotional feelings occur. This clearly happens in humans, but no one knows for sure whether other animals have this capacity. Absence of awareness is the rule of mental life, rather than the exception, throughout the animal kingdom. Emotional responses are, for the most part, generated unconsciously.

The fourth theme follows from the third. The conscious feelings that we know and love (or hate) our emotions by are red herrings, detours, in the scientific study of emotions. The system that detects danger is the fundamental mechanism of fear, and the behavioural, physiological, and conscious manifestations are the surface responses

it orchestrates. This is not meant to imply that feelings are unimportant; it means that if we want to understand feelings we have to dig deeper.

Fifth, if, indeed, emotional feelings and emotional responses are effects caused by the activity of a common underlying system, we can then use the objectively measurable emotional responses to investigate the underlying mechanism, and, at the same time, illuminate the system that is primarily responsible for the generation of the conscious feelings. Understanding emotions in the human brain is an important quest, as most mental disorders are emotional disorders.

Sixth, conscious feelings, like the feeling of being afraid or angry or happy or in love or disgusted, are in one sense no different from other states of consciousness, such as the awareness that the roundish, reddish object before you is an apple, or that you have just solved a previously insoluble problem in mathematics. There is but one mechanism of consciousness and mundane facts or highly charged emotions can occupy it. Emotions easily bump mundane events out of awareness, but non-emotional events (like thoughts) do not so easily displace emotions from the mental spotlight.

Seventh, emotions are things that happen to us rather than things we wish to occur. We have little direct control over our emotional reactions. While conscious control over emotions is weak, emotions can flood consciousness. This is so because the wiring of the brain at this point in our evolutionary history is such that connections from the emotional systems to the cognitive systems are stronger than connections from the cognitive systems to the emotional systems.

Finally, once emotions occur they become powerful motivators of future behaviours. They chart the course of moment-to-moment action as well as set the sails toward long-term achievements. But our emotions can also get us into trouble. Mental health is maintained by emotional hygiene, and mental problems, to a large extent, reflect a breakdown of emotional order. Emotions can have both useful and pathological consequences.

THE WAY WE WERE

The human brain is the product of evolutionary tinkering, where lots of little changes over extremely long periods of time have accumulated. The problem of figuring out how a brain works has been described by the linguist Steve Pinker as “reverse engineering”. We’ve got the product and we want to know how it functions. So we pick the brain apart in the hope that we will see what evolution was up to when it put the device together.

Although we often talk about the brain as if it has a function, the brain itself actually has no function. It is a collection of systems, sometimes called modules, each with different functions. Evolution tends to act on the individual modules and their functions rather than the brain as a whole. Attempts to find an all-purpose emotion system have failed because such a system does not exist. Different brain networks mediate different emotions, different modules, and evolutionary changes in a particular network don’t necessarily affect the others directly. The only way to understand how emotions come out of brains is to study emotions one at a time.

To Change or Not to Change, That Is the (Evolutionary) Question

The job facing evolutionary theorists is to try to understand how the mental function came to be in humans. Emotions are anything but uniquely human traits and, in fact, some emotional systems in the brain are essentially the same in many of the back-boned creatures, including mammals, reptiles, and birds, and possibly amphibians and fishes as well.

Rather than trying to figure out what is unique about human emotion, we need to examine how evolution stubbornly maintains emotional functions across the species while changing many other brain functions and bodily traits. Uniquely human traits are irrelevant to what goes on when we are faced with a sudden and immediate threat to our existence. What is important is that the brain has a mechanism for detecting the danger and responding to it appropriately and quickly. The particular behaviour that

occurs is tailored to the species (running, flying, swimming), but the brain function underlying that response is the same - protection against the danger.

Emotional Descent

It was through Charles Darwin's theory of evolution by natural selection that an understanding of how and why aspects of mind and behaviour might be commonly represented in humans and other species became clear. He noted that children resemble their parents, but differ from them as well. He proposed that, through heritability and variability, "descent with modification" occurs, a term transformed into "evolution" by Herbert Spencer.

According to Darwin's theory of natural selection, those traits that were useful to the survival of a species in a particular environment became, over a long run, characteristic traits of the species. And, by the same token, the characteristic traits of current species exist because they contributed to the survival of distant ancestors. This theory is most often thought of as an explanation of how physical features of species evolved, but Darwin argued that mind and behaviour are also shaped by natural selection.

In *The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals*, Darwin proposed that the chief expressive actions, exhibited by man and by the lower animals, are now innate or inherited, - that is, have not been learnt by the individual. As evidence for emotional innateness, he noted the similarity of expressions both within and between species. According to Darwin an important function of emotional expressions is communication between individuals- they show others what particular emotional state one is in.

Darwin also argued that although emotional expressions can sometimes be muted by willpower, they are usually involuntary actions. He pointed out how easy it is to tell the difference between a real, involuntary smile and one that is feigned. Within the general class of innate emotions, Darwin suggested that some have older evolutionary histories than others do. He noted that fear and rage were expressed in our remote

ancestors almost as they are today in humans. Suffering, as in grief or anxiety, though, he placed closer to human origins.

Basic Instinct

Many theorists emphasize on a set of basic, innate emotions, which are defined by universal facial expressions that are similar across many different cultures. Sylvan Tomkins proposed the existence of eight basic emotions: surprise, interest, joy, rage, fear, disgust, shame, and anguish, which were said to represent innate, patterned responses that are controlled by “hardwired” brain systems. Carroll Izard also proposed a similar theory involving eight basic emotions.

Paul Ekman proposed a shorter list consisting of six basic emotions with universal facial expression: surprise, happiness, anger, fear, disgust, and sadness. Robert Plutchik and Nico Frijda proposed a theory that does not rely exclusively on facial expressions, but on the primacy of more global action tendencies involving many body parts. Plutchik’s theory is similar to Ekman’s, with the addition of acceptance, anticipation, and surprise.

Philip Johnson-Laird and Keith Oatley approach the problem of basic emotions by looking at the kinds of words we have for talking about emotions. They came up with a list of five that overlap with Ekman’s six, dropping surprise. Jaak Panksepp has taken a different approach, using the behavioral consequences of electrical stimulation of areas of the rat brain to reveal four basic emotional response patterns: panic, rage, expectancy, and fear.

Most basic emotion theorists assume that there are also non-basic emotions that are the result of blends or mixes of the more basic ones. Izard, for example, describes anxiety as the combination of fear and two additional emotions, which can be either guilt, interest, shame, anger, or distress. Plutchik has a circle of emotions analogous to a circle of colors in which mixing of elementary colors gives new ones. The mixing of basic emotions into higher order emotions is typically thought of as a cognitive operation. According to basic emotion theorists, some if not all of the biologically basic emotions are shared with lower animals, but the derived or non-basic emotions

tend to be more uniquely human. Richard Lazarus, for example, proposes that pride, shame, and gratitude might be uniquely human emotions.

Being a Wild Pig

The cognitive emotion theory, which challenges the biologically primitive emotions theory, proposes that specific emotions, even those that are described as basic emotions, are psychological, not biological, constructions. Emotions, in this view, are due to the internal representation and interpretation (appraisal) of situations, not to the mindless workings of biological hardware. In the social constructivist approach, the theorists argue that emotions are products of society, not biology. Cognitive processes play an important role in these theories by providing the mechanism through which the social environment is represented and, on the basis of past experience and future expectations, interpreted. Emotional diversity across cultures is used as evidence in support of this position.

James Averill, a major proponent of social constructivism, describes a behaviour pattern, called "being a wild pig", that is quite unusual by Western standards, but is common and even "normal" among the Gururumba, a horticultural people living in the highlands of New Zealand. The behaviour gets its name by analogy. There are no undomesticated pigs in this culture, but occasionally, and for unknown reasons, a domesticated one will go through a temporary condition in which it runs wild. But the pig can, with appropriate measures, be re-domesticated and returned to the normal pig life among the villagers. And, in a similar vein, Gururumba people can act this way, becoming violent and aggressive and looting and stealing, but seldom causing harm or taking anything of importance, and eventually returning to routine life. According to Averill, being a wild pig is a social, not a biological or even an individual, condition. Westerners are prone to think of this as psychotic, abnormal behaviour, but for the Gururumba it is instead a way of relieving stress and maintaining community mental health in the village. Averill uses "being a wild pig" to support his claim that "most standard emotional reactions are socially constructed or institutionalised patterns of response" rather than biologically determined events.

Another example of an emotional condition that is not common in Western cultures is the state of mind called “amae” in Japan. Amae has no literal translation in Indo-European languages. It roughly means to presume upon another’s love or to indulge in another’s kindness. The Japanese psychiatrist Doi calls amae a sense of helplessness and the desire to be loved, to be a passive love object. The Japanese frequently amaeru (the verb form) but seldom talk about it because it is a non-verbal condition and it would be inappropriate to point it out in another. Doi says that Americans feel encouraged and reassured by such verbal exchanges, but the Japanese neither need it nor finds it desirable.

Display Rules

Basic emotions theorists do not deny that some differences exist in the way emotions are labelled and even expressed between cultures, or even between individuals within a culture. They simply say that some emotions and their expressions are fairly constant in all people. The social constructivists can then counter with the fact that a given individual may express a basic emotion, differently in different situations.

In an attempt to reconcile theories that emphasise the similarity of facial expression across cultures and those that emphasise differences, Paul Ekman proposed a distinction between universal emotional expressions (especially facial expressions), which are common to all cultures, and other bodily movements (emblems and illustrations, for example) that vary from culture to culture. He suggested that social constructivists might be focusing on learned cultural differences in emotional expression, while the basic emotions theorists have been focusing on the unlearned, universal expressions that occur in the movement of facial muscles during the occurrence of basic (innate) emotions in all cultures.

Ekman does not claim that basic emotional expressions always look exactly the same. He points out that learning and culture can regulate even universal facial expressions. They can be interrupted, diminished, or amplified by learned factors, or even masked by other emotions. He uses the term “display rules” to refer to the conventions, norms, and habits that people develop to manage their emotional expressions. Display rules specify who can show what emotion to whom and when and how much. He also

suggested that display rules can be personalised and override cultural norms. In his view, the concept of basic emotions accounts for the similarity of basic emotional expression across individuals and cultures and display rules take care of many of the differences.

Display rules are learned as part of one's socialisation and become so ingrained that, like the basic emotional expressions themselves, they occur automatically, which is to say without conscious participation. At the same time, an individual may sometimes deliberately choose to conceal emotions for a particular advantage in a specific situation.

Emotional Responses: Parts or Whole?

The combination of universal emotional expressions and display rules goes a long way toward accounting for individual and cross-cultural variation in the expression of basic emotions, but has not completely inoculated the idea of basic emotions against further challenge. Cognitive scientists Andrew Ortony and Terrance Turner have raised important questions about whether basic emotions can be defined by universal facial expressions, or any other means. They proposed that there might be basic, maybe even innate, response components that can be utilised in the expression of emotions, but that are used in other non-emotional situations as well. They point out that bodily expressions similar to those in an emotion can rise independent of emotions and that the expression typical of one emotion can appear during a different emotional state.

For Ortony and Turner, emotion involves higher cognitive processes (appraisals) that organise the various responses that are appropriate to the situation faced by the organism. They accept that component responses can be biologically determined, but place emotion itself in the world of psychological rather than biological determination. There are no emotional responses, there are just responses, and these are put together on the spot when appraisals are made – the particular response that occurs depends on the particular appraisal that occurs.

The reason for a difference between the innateness of emotional expressions and the innateness of response components according to Ortony and Turner is that, if there are no universal expressions characteristic of certain emotions, then the evidence that some emotions, the so-called basic emotions, are biologically determined is brought to its knees. And if emotions are not biologically determined, then they must be psychologically determined. Ortony and Turner make two unacceptable assumptions. First, just because an appraisal is mental does not mean that it is not also biological. Second, the innateness of individual response components does not preclude the possibility that higher levels of expression are also innate.

Although Ortony and Turner made it clear that basic emotion theorists could no longer continue to agree that basic emotions exist and at the same time disagree about what the basic ones are, some of the differences between the basic emotions lists of different investigators have to do with the words used rather than with the emotion implied by the words. The basic emotion theorists are not as divergent as they appeared, and, as we see, as for some emotions, the evidence for an innate, biological organisation is quite strong.

It Ain't Broke . . .

That different animals can act in very similar ways under similar circumstances, have led Darwin to propose that certain human emotions have their roots in our animal ancestors, and that behavioural commonalties between species can occur at several different levels, and that not all of them involve responses that look the same.

The reason that facial expressions of particular emotions look the same in different people is because everyone contracts and relaxes facial muscles in roughly the same way when exposed to a stimulus that characteristically evokes that emotion. This is because different people are contracting and relaxing the same or similar muscle groups. Also, the behaviours may be similar at some broader level, but not at the level of individual muscles. Most important, even when the behaviours are very different, the function achieved may be the same. According to Plutchik running, flying, and swimming from danger are different behaviours involving different muscles, but each

achieves escape. This implies that certain basic functions that are necessary for survival have been conserved throughout evolution.

The kind of body an animal has obviously limits the kinds of behaviours in which the animal can engage. Nevertheless, evolutionary solutions to problems that are common to many species may have some underlying functional equivalence that cuts across the behavioural differences imposed by the uniqueness of body forms. This is because the brain systems involved in mediating the function are the same in different species. We know that there is a great deal of similarity in brain organisation across the various vertebrate species. At the same time there are obvious differences between the brains of widely different groups of animals. Brain evolution is basically conservative, and certain systems, especially those that have been generally useful for survival and have been around for a long time, have been preserved in their basic structure and function. Evolution creates unique behavioural solutions to the problem of survival in different species, but it may do so by following a kind of “if it ain’t broke don’t fix it” rule for the underlying brain systems.

Specialized versus General-Purpose Neural Systems

According to modern evolutionary minded emotions theorists like Ekman, Johnson-Laird and Oatley, and Tooby and Cosmides, emotional responses evolved. In a sense, coming up with a list of the special adaptive behaviours that are crucial to survival would essentially be a list of basic emotions. Starting with universal behavioural functions is a better way of producing a list of basic emotions than the more standard ways – facial expressions, emotion words in different languages, or conscious introspection. It is ultimately important to understand what all the biologically derived and socially constructed emotions are, and to determine where the line should be drawn between them. It is also important to draw the line between mental phenomena that are emotions and those that are not.

To the extent that emotional responses evolved, they evolved for different reasons, and it seems obvious that there must be different brain systems to take care of these different kinds of functions. Lumping all of these together under the unitary concept of emotional behaviour provides us with a convenient way of organising things – for

distinguishing behaviours that we call emotional (for example, those involved with fighting, feeding, sex, and social bonding) from those that reflect cognitive functions (like reasoning, abstract thinking, problem solving, and concept formation).

The most practical working hypothesis is that different classes of emotional behaviour represent different kinds of functions that take care of different kinds of problems for the animal and have different brain systems devoted to them. If this is true, then different emotions should be studied as separate functional units.

At the neural level, each emotional unit can be thought of as consisting of a set of inputs, an appraisal mechanism, and a set of outputs. The appraisal mechanism is programmed by evolution to detect certain input or trigger stimuli that are relevant to the function of the network. These are called “natural triggers”. But the appraisal mechanism also has the capacity to learn about stimuli that tend to be associated with and predictive of the occurrence of natural triggers. These are called “learned triggers”. Because different kinds of problems of survival have different trigger stimuli and require different kinds of response to deal with them, different neural systems are devoted to them.

Why Fear?

The fear system is not, strictly speaking, a system that results in the experience of fear. It is a system that detects danger and produces responses that maximise the probability of surviving a dangerous situation in the most beneficial way. In other words, it is a system of defensive behaviour. Emotional behaviours, like defensive behaviours, evolved independently of, which is to say before, conscious feelings. Interactions between the defence system and consciousness underlie feelings of fear. Feelings of fear are a by-product of the evolution of two neural systems: one that mediates defensive behaviour and one that creates consciousness. Either one alone is not sufficient to produce subjective fear.

In considering why the defensive system of the brain and its associated subjective emotion, fear, is attractive starting points for the studying the emotional brain, three

points will be discussed: fear is pervasive, fear is important in psychopathology, and fear is expressed similarly in man and many other animals.

Fear Is Pervasive: We have traded in the dangers of a life amongst the wild things for other dangers that may, in the end, be far more harmful to our species than any natural predator. The dangers that we face are not fewer or less significant than those of our animal ancestors, they are just different. Man is one of the most fearful creatures, since added to the basic fear of predators and hostile co-specifics come intellectually based existential fears. Evidence of fear can be found lurking in the background of many kinds of emotions that on the surface might seem to be the antithesis of fear. Courage is the ability to overcome fear. Laws reflect our fear of social disorder.

Fear Plays an Important Role in Psychopathology: While fear is a part of everyone's life, too much or inappropriate fear accounts for many common psychiatric problems. Anxiety is a brooding fear of what might happen. Phobias are specific fears taken to extreme. Obsessive-compulsive disorder often involves extreme fear of something. Panic disorder involves the rapid onset of a host of physical symptoms. Fear is a core emotion in psychopathology.

Fear Is Expressed Similarly in Humans and Other Animals: There are only a limited number of strategies that animals can call upon to deal with danger, and Isaac Marks has summarised these as withdrawal (avoiding the danger or escape from it), immobility (freezing), defensive aggression (appearing to be dangerous and/or fighting back), or submission (appeasement). Research by the Blanchards and others has shown that the reaction pattern for a frightened human also occurs when rats are in danger: it is quite common to observe startle, orienting, then freezing or fleeing or attack, in the face of danger. Not only are some general patterns of behaviour similar in different animals, but so too are some of the underlying physiological changes that occur in dangerous or stressful situations. What distinguishes fear reactions in humans and other animals is not so much the ways in which fear is expressed as the different kinds of trigger stimuli that activate the appraisal mechanism of the defensive system. Each animal has to be able to detect the particular things that are dangerous to it, but there is an evolutionary economy to using universal response strategies – withdrawal,

immobility, aggression, submission – and universal physiological adjustments. Added cognitive power opens up the defensive hardware to new kinds of events, new learned triggers. Humans fear things that a rat could never conceptualise, but the human and rat body respond much the same to their special triggers.

Genetic Determinism and Emotional Freedom

There are two different implications of the genetics of emotional behaviour. On the one hand, there is the way genes maintain similar defensive functions across diverse species. This occurs because the neural system of defence is conserved in evolution. This view of emotional genetics tries to find the common ground of emotional reactions across individuals and species – the stuff that particular emotional systems evolved to do. On the other hand, there is the question of how genes contribute to differences between individuals. Differences between individuals in fearful behaviour are due, at least in part, to genetic variation. The first implication – that the way genes make emotional reactions similar amongst humans and between humans – has already been emphasised.

It is also important to also consider in some detail the ways in which genes make us different from each other. Temperament runs through bloodlines. From experiment conducted on rats it became easy to imagine how personality traits might come to be part of a family, or even a culture. Considerable evidence shows that there is a genetic component to fear in humans. For example, identical twins (even those reared in separate homes) are far more similar in fearfulness than fraternal twins. There's no denying that genes make each of us different from one another and explain at least part of the variability in the way different people act in dangerous situations. But we have to be very careful in interpreting differences in behaviour between different people.

The bottom line is that our genes give us the raw materials out of which to build our emotions. They specify the kind of nervous system we will have, the kinds of mental processes in which it can engage, and the kinds of bodily functions it can control. But the exact way we act, think, and feel in a particular situation is determined by many other factors and is not predestined in our genes. Some, if not many, emotions do have

a biological basis, but social, which is to say cognitive, factors are also crucially important. Nature and nurture are partners in our emotional life. The trick is to figure what their unique contributions are.

ONCE MORE, WITH FEELINGS

Responses occur during an emotion, but an emotion is something else, something more. An emotion is a subjective experience, a passionate invasion of consciousness, a feeling. It is now time to see what role consciousness has in emotion, and what role emotion has in consciousness. It is time to look at emotion once again, this time with feelings as part of the picture.

A Simple Idea

The idea about the nature of conscious emotional experiences is that a subjective emotional experience, like the feeling of being afraid, results when we become consciously aware that an emotion system of the brain, like the defence system, is active. We need a defence system and we need to have the capacity to be consciously aware of its activity. Emotional experience is a problem about how conscious experiences occur. Ever since William James brought up the business with the bear when he started with a question about why the sight of a bear makes us run away but ended up with a question about why we feel afraid when we see the bear, the study of emotion has been focused on where conscious feelings come from.

All areas of psychology have had to deal with consciousness, like perception and memory, for example, also involves conscious experiences. The difficulty of scientifically understanding the conscious content that occurs during perception, memory, or emotion is what led to the behaviourist movement in psychology. The success of the cognitive movement as an alternative to behaviourism was largely due to the fact that it could deal with the mind in terms of processes that occur unconsciously, and thus without having to first solve the problem of how conscious content is created. The study of emotion is still focused on where subjective feelings

come from rather than on the unconscious processes that sometimes do and sometimes do not give rise to those conscious states.

Emotional experiences are probably created that same way that other conscious experiences are – by the establishment of a conscious representation of the workings of underlying processing systems.

Short Stuff

Many of the theories that have been proposed in recent years are built around the concept of working memory. A mental workspace that has a limited capacity is called a working memory, a temporary storage mechanism that allows several pieces of information to be held in mind at the same time and compared, contrasted, and otherwise interrelated. Working memory is pretty much what used to be called short-term memory, but the term working memory implies not just a temporary storage system but an active processing mechanism used in thinking and reasoning.

Baddeley's experiment on short-term memory led him to reformulate the notion of short-term memory. He replaces the generic notion of short-term memory with the concept of working memory, which, he suggested, consists of a general-purpose temporary storage system utilised in all active thinking processes and several specialised temporary storage systems that are only called when specific kinds of information have to be held on to. Temporary storage mechanisms are sometimes referred to as buffers of which it is now believed that a number of specialised buffers exist. These specialised buffers work in parallel, independent of one another.

The general-purpose system consists of a *workspace*, where information from the specialised buffers can be held on to temporarily, and a set of so-called *executive* functions that control operations performed on this information. The executive functions take care of the overall co-ordination of the activities of working memory, such as determining which specialised systems should be attended to at the moment and shuffling information in and out of the workspace from these and other systems. Different kinds of information can be interrelated in working memory, and thanks to

“chunking”, another of George Miller’s many insights into the cognitive mind, the capacity limit of working memory can be overcome to some degree.

The stuff in working memory is the stuff we are currently thinking about or paying attention to. But working memory is not a pure product of the here and now. It also depends on what we know and what kind of experiences we’ve had in the past. In other words, it depends on long-term memory. Stored knowledge influences the workings of the lower level systems. The influence of memory on perception is an example of what cognitive scientists sometimes call top-down processing, which contrasts with the build-up of perceptions from sensory processing, known as bottom-up processing. In short, working memory sits at the crossroads of bottom-up and top-down processing systems and makes high-level thinking and reasoning possible.

The Here and the Now in the Brain

How, then, does working memory work in the brain? Studies conducted by C.F. Jacobsen and research that followed, using the delayed response task found that the prefrontal cortex came to be thought of as playing a role in temporary memory processes, processes that we now refer to as working memory. The lateral prefrontal cortex, which is believed to exist only in primates and is considerably larger in humans than in other primates, has most often been implicated in working memory.

Considerable evidence suggests that the lateral prefrontal cortex is involved in the executive or general-purpose aspects of working memory. The lateral prefrontal cortex has connections with the various sensory systems (like the visual and auditory systems) and other neo-cortical systems that perform specialised temporary storage functions (like spatial and verbal storage) and is also connected with the hippocampus and other cortical areas involved in long-term memory. In addition, it has connections with areas of the cortex involved in movement control, allowing decisions made by the executive to be turned into voluntary performed actions.

Recent studies, especially by Goldman-Rakic and associates, have raised questions about the role of the prefrontal cortex as a general-purpose working memory processor. They suggested that different parts of the prefrontal cortex are specialised

for different kinds of working memory tasks. While their findings show that parts of the prefrontal cortex participate uniquely in different short-term memory tasks, they do not rule out the existence of a general-purpose workspace and a set of executive functions that co-ordinate the activity of the specialised systems. It is also possible that the general-purpose aspects of working memory are not localised to a single place in the lateral prefrontal cortex but instead are distributed over the region. There is also evidence that the general-purpose functions of working memory involve areas other than the lateral prefrontal cortex. For example, studies have shown that working memory and related cognitive tasks also activates another area of the frontal lobe, the anterior cingulate cortex. One other area of the prefrontal cortex, the orbital region, located on the underneath side of the frontal lobe, has emerged as important as well. Humans with orbital frontal damage become oblivious to social and emotional cues and some exhibit sociopathic behaviour.

The Platform of Awareness

Working memory allows us to know that the “here and now” is “here” and is happening “now”. This insight underlies the notion, adopted by a number of contemporary cognitive scientists, like Stephen Kosslyn, John Kihlstrom, Philip Johnson-Laird, and Bernard Baars, that consciousness is the awareness of what is in working memory. Several contemporary theories equate consciousness with focused attention, which is achieved through an executive or supervisory function similar to that proposed in the working memory theories.

The conscious and unconscious aspects of thought are sometimes described in terms of serial and parallel functions. Consciousness seems to do things serially, more or less one at a time, whereas the unconscious mind, being composed of many different systems, seems to work more or less in parallel. Working memory is the limited-capacity serial processor that creates and manipulates symbolic representations. It is where the integrated monitoring and control of various lower levels specialised processors takes place. Working memory is, in other words, a crucial part of the system that gives rise to consciousness.

Emotion researchers need to figure out how emotional information gets represented in working memory. The rest of the problem, figuring out how the contents of working memory become consciously experienced and how these subjective phenomena emerge from the brain, belongs on the shoulders of all mind scientists.

The Emotional Present

The problem of emotional feelings is redefined as the problem of how emotional information comes to be represented in working memory. In order to understand what an emotion is and how particular emotional feelings come about we've got to understand the way the specialised emotion system operate and determine how their activity gets represented in working memory.

The working memory is used as an "in principle" way of explaining feelings. Feelings comes about when the activity of specialised emotion systems gets represented in the system that gives rise to consciousness, and is using working memory as a fairly widely accepted version of how the latter might come about. Much has been said about how one specialised emotion system, the defence system, works. Now let us see how the activity of this system might come to be represented in working memory and thereby give rise to the feeling we know as fear.

From Conscious Appraisals to Emotions: By way of connections between the long-term memory networks and the working memory system, activated long-term memories are integrated with the sensory representation of the stimulus in working memory, allowing you to be consciously aware of the object you are looking at. The cognitive representations and appraisals in working memory are not enough to turn the experience into a full-blown emotional experience. Something else is needed to turn cognitive appraisals into emotions, to turn experiences into emotional experiences. That something is the activation of the amygdala which is built by evolution to deal with danger.

What is it about the activation of amygdala outputs that converts an experience into an emotional experience? The consequences of turning on amygdala outputs provide the basic ingredients that, when mixed together in working memory with short-term

sensory representations and the long-term memories activated by these sensory representations, create an emotional experience.

Ingredient 1: Direct Amygdala Influences on the cortex: The amygdala has projections to many cortical areas. The projections of the amygdala to the cortex are considerably greater than the projections from the cortex to the amygdala. In addition to projecting back to cortical sensory areas from which it receives inputs. The amygdala also projects to some sensory processing areas from which it does not receive inputs. By way of connections like the hippocampal system and hippocampus, anterior cingulate cortex, and orbital cortex, with specialised short-term buffers, long-term memory networks, and the networks of the frontal lobe, the amygdala can influence the information content of working memory.

In sum connections from the amygdala to the cortex allow the defence networks of the amygdala to influence attention, perception, and memory in situations where we are facing danger. At the same time, though, these kinds of connections would seem to be inadequate in completely explaining why a perception, memory or thought about an emotional event should “feel” different from one about a non-emotional event. They provide working memory with information about whether something good or bad is present, but are insufficient for producing the feelings that come from the awareness that something good or bad is present. For this we need other connections as well.

Ingredient 2: Amygdala-Triggered Arousal: In addition to the direct influence of the amygdala on the cortex, there are a number of indirect channels through which the affects of amygdala activation can impact on cortical processing. An extremely important set of such connections involves the arousal system of the brain. A number of different systems appear to contribute to arousal. Four of these are located in regions of the brain stem. A fifth group is located in the forebrain near the amygdala.

Arousal is important in all mental functions. It contributes significantly to attention, perception, memory, emotion, and problem solving. Without arousal, we fail to notice what is going on – we don’t attend to details. But too much arousal is not good either. If you are over-aroused you become tense and anxious and unproductive. You need to have just the right level of activation to perform optimally.

Emotional reactions are typically accompanied by intense cortical arousal. Arousal occurs to any novel stimulus that we encounter and not just to emotional stimuli. The difference is that a novel but insignificant stimulus will elicit a temporary state of arousal that dissipates almost immediately but arousal is prolonged in the presence of emotional stimuli.

Ingredient 3: Bodily Feedback: The opportunities for bodily feedback during emotional reactions to influence information processing by the brain and the way we consciously feel are enormous. William James, the father of the feedback theory, had argued for the importance of somatic as well as visceral feedback. The somatic system has the requisite speed and specificity to contribute to emotional experiences, and theorists like Sylvan Tomkins and Carroll Izard noted this. James also said that he found it impossible to imagine an emotional experience occurring in the absence of the bodily responses that accompany it. Emotional systems evolved as ways of matching bodily responses with the demands being made by the environment, and there is no way that a full-blooded emotional feeling could exist without a body attached to the brain that is trying to have the feeling.

There is one way that involves what Damasio calls “as if” loops. In certain situations, it may be possible to imagine what bodily feedback would feel like if it occurred. This “as if” feedback then becomes cognitively represented in working memory and can influence feelings and decisions.

Feelings: The Bare Essentials

We now have all the ingredients of an emotional feeling, all the things needed to turn an emotional reaction into a conscious emotional experience. We’ve got a specialised emotion system that receives sensory inputs and produces behavioural, autonomic, and hormonal responses. We’ve got cortical sensory buffers that hold on to information about the currently present stimuli. We’ve got a working memory executive that keeps track of the short-term buffers, retrieves information from long-term memory, and interprets the contents of the short-term buffers in terms of activated long-term memories. We also have cortical arousal. And finally, we have

bodily feedback – somatic and visceral information that returns to the brain during an act of emotional responding. When all of these systems function together a conscious emotional experience is inevitable.

When some components are present and others lacking, emotional experiences may still occur, depending on what's there and what's not. Let us see what is dispensable and what is indispensable for the emotion fear:

- You *can't* have a conscious emotional feeling of being afraid without aspects of the emotional experience being presented in working memory. Working memory is the gateway to subjective experiences, emotional and non-emotional ones, and is indispensable in the creation of a conscious emotional feeling.

- You *can't* have a complete feeling of fear without the activation of the amygdala. In the presence of a fear-arousing stimulus, and the absence of amygdala activation (for example, if your amygdala were damaged), you might use your cognitive powers to conclude that in situations like this you usually feel “fearful”, but the fearful feeling would be lacking because of the importance of amygdala inputs to working memory, of amygdala-triggered arousal, and of amygdala-mediated bodily responses that produce feedback.

- You *can't* have a sustained feeling of fear without the activation of arousal systems. These play an essential role in keeping conscious attention directed toward the emotional situation, and without their involvement emotional states would be fleeting. Although all novel stimuli activate arousal systems, particularly important to the persistence of emotional responses and emotional feelings is the activation of arousal systems by the amygdala. Amygdala-triggered arousal not only arouses the cortex but also arouses the amygdala, causing the latter to continue to activate the arousal systems, creating the vicious circles of emotional arousal.

- You *can't* have a sustained emotional experience without feedback from the body or without at least long-term memories that allow the creation of “as-if”

feedback. The body is crucial to an emotional experience, either because it provides sensations that make an emotion feel a certain way right now or because it once provided the sensations that created memories of what specific emotions felt like in the past.

- You *can* probably have an emotional feeling without the direct projections to the cortex from the amygdala. These help working memory know which specialized emotion system is active, but this can be figured out indirectly. Nevertheless, the emotion will be different in the absence of this input than in its presence.

- You *can* have an emotional feeling without being conscious of the eliciting stimulus – without the actual eliciting stimulus being represented in a short-term cortical buffer and in working memory. The emotional responses and the conscious content are both products of specialized emotion systems that operate unconsciously.

What's Different About Thoughts and Feelings?

Conscious emotional feelings and conscious thoughts are in some sense very similar in that they both involve the sub-symbolic processes carried out by systems that work unconsciously. The difference between them is not due to the system that does the consciousness part but instead is due to two factors. One is that emotional feelings and mere thoughts are generated by different sub-symbolic systems. The other is that emotional feelings involve many more brain systems than thoughts. Emotions create a flurry of activity all devoted to one goal. Thoughts, unless they trigger emotional systems, don't do this.

Do Fish Have Feelings Too?

In simpler terms, “the problem of other minds” is the difficulty if not the impossibility of proving that anyone, other than oneself, is conscious. We are somewhat better off in the case of humans than other animals. One reason is that, depending on how strict we are (philosophically), we can usually convince ourselves that most other humans

have emotional feelings and other conscious states of mind because we can talk to them and compare notes about our mental experiences with them – this is one of the beauties of having natural language. Another reason is that, since all humans have pretty much the same kind of brain architecture we can assume that, barring pathological conditions, the same general kinds of functions come out of all human brains – if I'm conscious and you have the same kind of brain that I do, then you are probably conscious as well. This kind of reasoning holds for brain functions that we know something about (like perception and memory), so we might reasonably expect it to also hold for conscious awareness.

Our ability to hold conversations with other animals is somewhere between not at all and not much. And while our brain is, in many ways, incredibly similar to the brains of other creatures (this is what makes much of brain research possible), it also differs in some important ways. The human brain, most especially the cerebral cortex, is much larger than it should be, given our body size. This alone would give us reason to be cautious about attributing consciousness to other animals. However, there are other facts to take into account.

First, the part of the human cortex that has increased in size the most is the prefrontal cortex, which is the part of the brain that has been implicated in working memory, the gateway to consciousness. A brain that cannot form relations, due to the absence of a cortical system that can put all of the information together at the same time, cannot be conscious. There is behavioural evidence that only the higher primates, in whom the prefrontal cortex is especially well developed, are self-aware, as determined by their ability to recognize themselves in a mirror.

Second, natural language only exists in the human brain. Although the exact nature of the brain specialisation involved in making language possible is not fully understood, something changed with the evolution of the human brain to make language happen. The presence of natural language in humans alters the brain significantly. Often we categorise and label our experiences in linguistic terms, and store the experiences in ways that can be accessed linguistically.

Human consciousness is the way it is because of the way our brain is. Other animals may also be conscious in their own special way due to the way their brains are. And still others are probably not conscious at all, again due to the kinds of brains they have. At the same time, though, consciousness is neither the prerequisite to nor the same thing as the capacity to think and reason. Consciousness elevates thinking to a new level, but it is not the same thing as thinking.

Emotional feelings result when we become consciously aware that an emotion system of the brain is active. Any organism that has consciousness also has feelings. However, feelings will be different in a brain that can classify the world linguistically and categorise experiences in words than in a brain that cannot. The difference between fear, anxiety, terror, apprehension, and the like would not be possible without language. At the same time, none of these words would have any point if it were not for the existence of an underlying emotion system that generates the brain states and bodily expressions to which these words apply. Emotions evolved not as conscious feelings, linguistically differentiated or otherwise, but as brain states and bodily responses. The brain states and bodily responses are the fundamental facts of an emotion, and the conscious feelings are the frills that have added the icing to the emotional cake.

Qué Será Será

Where is evolution taking our brain? While it is true that whatever will be will be, we have the opportunity to take a peek at what evolution is up to. Evolution only has hindsight. However, we *are* evolution in progress and we can see what sorts of changes might be happening in our brain by looking at trends in brain evolution across related species.

As things now stand, the amygdala has a greater influence on the cortex than the cortex has on the amygdala, allowing emotional arousal to dominate and control thinking. Throughout the mammals, pathways from amygdala to the cortex overshadow the pathways from the cortex to the amygdala. Although thoughts can easily trigger emotions (by activating amygdala), we are not very effective at wilfully turning off emotions (by deactivating the amygdala).

At the same time, it is apparent that the cortical connections with the amygdala are far greater in primates than in other mammals. This suggests the possibility that as these connections continue to expand, the cortex might gain more and more control over the amygdala, possibly allowing future humans to be better able to control their emotions.

Yet, there is another possibility. The increased connectivity between the amygdala and cortex involves fibres going from the cortex to the amygdala as well as from the amygdala to the cortex. If these nerve pathways strike a balance, it is possible that the struggle between thought and emotion may ultimately be resolved not by the dominance of emotional centres by cortical cognitions, but by a more harmonious integration of reason and passion. With increased connectivity between the cortex and amygdala, cognition and emotion might begin to work together rather than separately.

2.2.2 Johnson-Laird and Oatley (1992)

Johnson-Laird and Oatley propose that just a few emotions are basic and that they have functions in managing action. When no fully rational solution is available for a problem of action, a basic emotion functions to prompt us in a direction that is better than a random choice. They contrast this kind of theory with a componential approach which they argue is either a version of the theory of basic emotions or else leads to the doctrine that emotions are mistaken tenets of folk psychology. They defend the psychological reality of the folk theory of emotions, and argue that universal basic emotions make it possible to understand people from distant cultures, and to translate emotional terminology from one language to another. Finally they show how theories of basic emotions can be tested.

Introduction

In answering the question of how many emotions there are one can reply by saying that the question is meaningless, which is akin to saying that emotions do not exist – that they are false tenets of folk theories. Another answer is that although individuals experience only a finite number of emotions in their lifetimes, there are indefinitely

many possible emotions that they might experience. The authors view folk psychology and scientific psychology as both having something in common. Folk psychology treats different experiences as instances of the same emotion while a science of emotion treat different emotional experiences as members of the same class.

The new question now is how many sorts of emotions are there. One answer is that there is a small finite set of distinguishable emotions that are the bases of all emotional experiences – theory of basic emotions. Another answer is that there are many sorts of emotion, but every distinct sort is generated from among the same finite set of components – componential theory. Both the theory of basic emotions and the componential theory postulate that an emotional experience depends on various elements. The crucial distinction is that no component can be an emotion per se in the componential approach, whereas one component of any emotional experience is always a basic emotion according to the basic theory. Both theories assume that a science of emotions is possible only if there is a finite basis for emotional experience, and that emotions can be taken to pieces analytically.

The neglect of function

Theorists have neglected the question of what function, if any, do emotions serve. To the authors it is the key to whether or not there is a small set of basic emotions: the hypothesis of basic emotions makes sense only if it elucidates problems faced by the cognitive system. Without any clear sense of the psychological function of emotions, it has been difficult to generate more than a patchwork of ideas and observations.

The pervasive influence of William James is the reason for the neglect of function. He classified emotions with perceptions: they are perceptions of events inside the body. Because emotions are percepts of bodily feedback from physiological changes, or from actions that have already taken place, emotions occur too late to affect either the control of these actions or the decisions that led to them. His theory contributed to the development of a powerful tradition: pleasantness and unpleasantness have become the crucial characteristics of emotions over and above their own strict individuality. It

is within this tradition that the possible existence of a set of basic emotions seems both unattractive theoretically and intractable empirically.

Rationality and the function of emotions

Analyses of mental processes in cognitive science assume that each process has functions independently of its particular embodiment. Function is best thought of in terms of the design of the system. The simplest possible design relies on “fixed action pattern” and is found in insects. This sort of design works well when classes of events can be mapped one-to-one on to appropriate responses. The other designs are those that are impeccably rational. They are maximally flexible because they enable the organism to determine which goals to pursue at any point in time, and to decide at each choice point the best course of action in pursuit of those goals. No contingency is unanticipated, and performance is invariably optimal.

In designs based on fixed action patterns or on impeccable rationality, there is no occasion for anything corresponding to an emotion. There are no surprises, no misunderstandings, and no irresolvable conflicts. Human beings are neither equipped with a set of responses each matched to an important stimulus, nor do they possess impeccable rationality. A fully rational system of thought is a paragon that cannot be realised by any finite device. A new design depends on a meta-principle: An inference is valid provided that there is no model of the premises in which its conclusion is false. This principle is defensible as a rational requirement for any system for deductive inference, although it alone does not guarantee the validity of inferences. The meta-principle is compatible with the observations of deductive failure, and with the arguments against impeccable rationality.

Oatley and Johnson-Laird, and other theorists proposed that the function of emotions is to fill the gap between fixed action patterns and impeccable rationality. Emotions enable social species to co-ordinate their behaviour, to respond to emergencies, to prioritise goals, to prepare for appropriate actions, and to make progress towards goals. They do so even though individuals have only limited abilities to cogitate. Emotions guide individual and group behaviour. Social mammals are unable to determine the best course of action at the many of the junctures in their lives. The

function of emotions is accordingly to bridge the gaps of rationality. This bridge is possible only if many specific junctures can be mapped into a few broad classes of reaction.

The cognitive evaluation of a juncture in action calls into readiness a small and distinctive suite of action plans that has been selected as appropriate to it. When the broad class of event occurs that indicate achievement of a subgoal that increases the probability of attaining a goal, then its cognitive evaluation initiates an internal emotional signal. The authors propose that emotion signals of this kind have no propositional content or syntactic structure: They have a control function rather than an informational function. The internal emotional signals have causal affects within the organism, preparing it physiologically for each general class of actions. In the case of human beings, the signals can in addition be experienced subjectively as emotions. The signal caused by a successful achievement is experienced as happiness, and the signal caused by the loss of a goal as sadness. An important consequence of the ensuing actions is the communication of the individual's emotional state to others in the same social group. The receipt of such external signals has emotional consequences for these other individuals too.

If the emotional guidance of action is to be rapid, successful, and independent of reasoning that is too time-consuming, then the cognitive evaluations must be coarse and the resulting suites of actions must be broad and flexible. The two key issues here are, first, many events in the world must be mapped on to a relatively small number of categories, which each elicit a distinct set of bodily, behavioural, and phenomenological consequences. Secondly, the small repertoire of actions triggered by a particular emotion must be useful to a wide class of specific triggering events.

This theory is based on computational considerations that are called "computational" because they are at a particular level of analysis in which knowledge of aspects of the social and physical environment is mapped on to a design for the kinds of operations that could cope with these aspects. Emotions function in real time to redistribute cognitive resources and to manage goal priorities. When an event has been detected that requires re-computing these priorities, an emotion occurs and it helps to manage either the continuation of the current course of action or the transition to another

sequence of action. Emotion helps to specify which goals will be actively pursued, and which abandoned, or assigned to a subsidiary or dormant status.

The following is a summary of the three propositions that are put forward by the authors:

Proposition 1

Events and their significance for goals are often unforeseen: because (a) finite organisms cannot be impeccably rational, and they have imperfect models of the world; (b) individuals with several goals are often unable to satisfy all of them simultaneously; and (c) social animals interact together in ways that cannot always be anticipated.

Proposition 2

It follows that junctures in action will occur at which an individual needs to act, but for which there is no fully rational method to select the next action.

Proposition 3

Emotions function to redistribute cognitive resources at junctures in action, particularly where neither cognition nor reflexes (the residue of fixed action patterns) determine an appropriate course of action. Because some action is probably better than becoming lost in thought, a biologically based system makes ready a small repertoire of actions appropriate to a recognisable type of goal-relevant event. The mechanism tends to constrain the individual to choose the next action sequence from this repertoire. Such a mechanism is a result of natural selection, and the repertoires of actions include both species-specific patterns and individually acquired habits.

Which emotions are basic?

Amongst the many proposed sets of basic emotions there are differences among the theories and among the sets of basic emotions. Most previous theories have not been

based on a functional analysis and have no empirical support, either subjectively or physiologically. The principal motivation was to bring order to disparate set of human emotions by seeking to derive them from a set of basic emotions, e.g. by postulating a set of opposites, by analogy to chemistry or to the mixing of colours.

Emotions are a result of coarse cognitive evaluations that elicit internal and external signals and corresponding suites of action plans. They are emotions because they have cognitive rather than physiological causes. The following set of basic emotions is proposed: happiness, sadness, anger, fear, disgust, and desire. Specific emotions are typically caused by the perceptions of general categories of event: happiness with perception of improving progress towards a goal; sadness when a goal is lost; anger when a plan is blocked; fear when a goal conflict or a threat to self-preservation occurs; disgust with a perception of something to reject; and desire with a perception of something to approach. These emotions are indeed basic – however, depending on how the evidence points, other emotions may be basic too.

The status of the basic emotions is corroborated in five ways. First, each of them is an emotion that appears to be universal, and to have universal concomitants, such as a corresponding facial expression. Second, each has either a bodily or phenomenological component that can be experienced without the individual knowing the cause of the emotion. Third, the semantics of the large emotional vocabulary of English can be explicated without having to appeal to any other emotions. Fourth, each term denoting a basic emotion is primitive in the sense that it is semantically unanalysable. Fifth, the apparent complexity of human emotional experience comes from the diverse cognitive evaluations, and that can differ from one culture to another. The accompanying cognitions are also reflected in the vocabulary of emotions.

Basic emotions vs. Components of emotions

The basic theory of emotion contrasts with the componential proposal made by Ortony and Turner, which is also computationally motivated. They reject the hypothesis of basic emotions and instead they consider it more profitable to analyse emotional expressions and responses in terms of dissociable components that are innate. Their theory is akin to the notion that the underlying components of facial

expressions, and other emotional responses, are governed by a system of production rules in the form:

If an event E1 occurs, then do action A1

If an event E2 occurs, then do action A2

... and so on.

Using the universal facial expression of anger, we can capture the essence of their claims in the following production rules:

If you become conscious of being unable to attain a goal, then furrow your brow.

If you desire to be aggressive towards the agent responsible for the blockage, then form an open, square mouth that shows your teeth.

If you are determined to remove the source of the goal blockage, then compress your lips.

If you devote considerable attention to the visual environment, then raise your upper eyelids.

There are several problems with this componential analysis. First, Ortony and Turner allow only external causes of co-occurrences of sub-components. Because the independence of sub-components is so fundamental to them, anything that might bind rules together internally is excluded. The system they discuss does not address the functional issue of filling the gap between fixed action patterns and impeccable rationality that have been discussed in the previous section. Second, their account takes a critical step towards treating emotions as a myth of folk psychology. They specifically argue against the possibility that there is a prototypical set of components underlying all experiences of anger. To reject common components is to reject, not just basic emotions, but all everyday categories of emotions, thereby forcing one to treat them as a myth of folk psychology.

Folk theories and scientific theories of emotions

There are theorists who regard folk psychology as based on errors that are as egregious as those that underlie naïve physics. According to this form of reductionalism, the ideas and terms of folk theory will be replaced by proper scientific explanations. In more recent times, there are folk theories that seek to explain and predict individual's actions. Just as naïve physics depends on the misleading idea of impetus, so folk psychology depends on the misleading idea that beliefs and desires cause behaviour. The psychology of belief and desire will be replaced by a proper scientific account of behaviour that will be based, not on such "intentional" concepts, but on the neurophysiology of the nervous system.

The view implicit in the basic theory of emotions is that folk psychology is not a myth. It embodies important truths: that individuals have beliefs and desires and needs, that they use their beliefs to decide what to do to attain their goals and then try to carry out these actions – and that emotions have effect on behaviour. An achievement of cognitive science is to rehabilitate mental terms following their banishment during "Behaviourism", and to show that the psychology of "beliefs and desire" can be modelled computationally. There is no warrant for the generalisation from naïve physics to the conclusion that all folk theories are mistaken. Psychological phenomena and physical phenomena are different. The subjective experience of an emotion is incorrigible in the sense that it is not a hypothesis that could be falsified by evidence in the way that hypotheses about the physical world may be.

When an emotion signal does impinge on consciousness it does not have to be interpreted to determine which emotion it represent. It does not represent an emotional state. A conscious emotion is the experience of an emotion signal, and such an experience leaves room for various kinds of doubt. But in straightforward cases where the emotion is felt strongly, there is no doubt about the nature of the emotion itself. So, in the structured diaries of 30 patients attending a gastrointestinal clinic, each asked to record four episodes of emotion of any kind, half of their emotion episodes were experienced in this way. This claim is also supported by the ready ability of children to learn and to understand the causal sequence of events underlying emotions – the chain from the perception of a goal-related event, to the emotion, and then to a

change in action. This defence of folk psychology is consistent with the existence of basic emotions.

Subjective experiences of having beliefs, desires, emotions, lie at the heart of folk psychology. As a theory, however, the folk theory of emotions provides little account of psychological mechanisms, or their physiological bases. The goal of a cognitive science of emotion is thus to spell out a mechanism that is at least consistent with common observations of the causes and consequences of emotions. The persistence over time of these observations does not indicate a stagnation of explanation as a result of isolation from evidence. The evidence is the set of observations of the causes and consequences of emotions to which people are continuously open.

Other researchers, with quite different theories, have come to the same conclusion about the hypothesis of a convergence between folk theory and scientific theory. Ortony and his colleagues argue that individuals can be usefully consulted about what terms refer to emotions, and that these everyday intuitions map on to the scientific theory of emotions. Other investigators also assume that people know that certain types of events related to goals cause emotions. They postulate a correspondence between the results of their studies and scientific categories, and their results support basic categories of emotions, which correspond to some degree to those that have been postulated.

This hypothesis of a convergence between folk theories of emotions and scientific theories of emotions is, like any other scientific claim, open to refutation. One is to argue that self-reports are neither reliable nor valid, and only objective reports of behaviour or physiology should have any part in science. There is evidence that shows that people are often poor judges of the causes of their judgements and behaviour. Thus, people do not know the causes of either their behaviour or of their mental states in any way that resembles a scientific account. Not only do they lack a privileged introspective access to how events cause behaviour, but also they are regularly misled by their introspections. They are subject to inbuilt mental deficits in reasoning that will necessarily lead them astray. Hence, folk psychology is not merely irrelevant to scientific theories, but to attend to it is positively misleading.

It is a mistake to eschew evidence based on self-reports as the following three inter-related reasons shows. First, as many of the psychologists studying the shortcomings of the human inferential system have themselves pointed out, their studies deliberately focus on cognitive illusions much as perceptual psychologists seeks visual illusions with the goal of revealing the workings of the cognitive system. Second, the brain models important entities, attributes, and relations in the world. If it had not converged on successful models of important sequences, we would not be able to operate in the world. Thought, behaviour, and communication, are successful more often than not – the central postulates of folk psychology are based on essentially correct, though radically incomplete, mental models. Actions are caused by goals in conjunction with beliefs. Third, emotions usually follow immediately after the events that cause them. Therefore, people will not ordinarily suffer the kinds of illusions of thinking just indicated.

Language and the universality of basic emotions

Another argument against the existence of basic emotions concerns language and cross-cultural studies. Theorists assume that there is a universality of categories and facial expressions that correspond to English terms. This ethnocentricity is immediately revealed if one takes an emotional term from some other culture and tries to apply it to an English-speaking culture. For example, the *Ifalk* emotion of *fago* (compassion-love-sadness) and *song* (justified anger) has no counterparts in English and should not be referred to by the corresponding English words.

When a theorist proposes that the emotion or facial expression of, say, “happiness” is a basic and thus universal emotion, the claim is that among the basic emotions, which have evolved in social mammals and which are experienced and communicated among humans, is one that in English is most closely referred to as “happiness”. The underlying emotion can be communicated between people nonverbally, and its communication can be effective despite deep gulfs of language and culture. In another language, the emotional terminology will be different, and whatever term corresponds most closely to “happiness” is likely to differ in its connotations.

There are different conscious attitudes to each emotion, cultural differences in its accusation, and differences in the form of morally acceptable behaviour to which it may lead. Moreover, most emotion terms in a language have a meaning that combines reference to a basic emotion with other semantic information, such as the cause of the emotion. Different languages are likely to focus on different causes and objects of emotion, and so emotional terms may be difficult to translate from one language to another. If emotion terms were fundamentally untranslatable, then it should be impossible for native speakers of incommensurable languages ever to learn one another's terminology. It may be difficult to translate words denoting emotions, but it is not impossible to empathise with a culture and to learn to experience the corresponding emotions.

In short, the general theory of the semantics of emotion terms, which was applied to English terms, should be equally applicable to other languages. It preserves the notions – common to both folk theories and scientific theories – that emotions are distinctive states; that they are caused by recognisable events of which people can be consciously aware, and that they can be directed to objects or to other people.

Is the theory testable?

In this section the authors will counter the criticism that the theory of basic emotions is too vaguely defined to be susceptible of empirical test. They believe that this criticism is prompted not by any conceptual difficulty in testing the existence of basic emotions, but by the practical difficulty of such investigations. Indeed, few investigations have been performed that fulfil the conditions to make a compelling case.

One way of falsifying the hypothesis of basic emotions would be to show that the apparent diversity of emotions cannot be reduced to a small basic set because different varieties of, say, fear, have no underlying components in common. What is needed is a set of cumulative studies that test for the universal existence of a small set of basic emotions corresponding to folk theoretical categories. These studies should investigate whether such emotions are experienced, communicated, and recognised universally; and they should investigate whether they have common components in

their underlying neuro-physiology. Hence, the studies need to examine different cultures, infants on whom culture has yet to impinge upon, and the physiological systems of animals and human beings. It is even possible that certain eliciting conditions for basic emotions will prove to be universal, or at least common to diverse cultures.

Studies of basic emotions are complex, difficult, and time-consuming, but various researchers have begun to undertake them. Ekman and his colleagues have carried out a paradigmatic set of studies that meet the necessary conditions. They have shown in particular that facial expressions of a basic set of emotions are common across diverse cultural groups, and that basic emotions have distinctive physiological accompaniments.

A stringent hypothesis is that basic emotions should be perceived categorically. Etcoff argued that if there are basic emotions, then the perception of facial expressions should also be categorical in the same way. Happy faces should be sorted into one category, sad ones into another, and so on. She argued that if she could create equal physical increments in scales ranging between different basic emotions, then there would be categorical boundaries. From the experiment she conducted, she observed an abrupt shift in discriminability between the faces in all the series except the one from surprise to fear. She also observed the same effect between the emotion faces and the neutral faces, although the gradations of the neutral faces were more discriminable than those between the emotion faces.

Conway and Bekerian have obtained a further corroboration of basic emotions. They found in studies of similarity judgements that emotion terms fell into groups corresponding to basic emotions: happiness/love/joy – misery/grief/sadness – fear/panic/terror – and anger/jealousy/hate. From the experiment in which they used lexical decision tasks to investigate the representation of these concepts in memory, the subjects' reaction times were faster for words from the same basic emotion group than for words from a different emotion group.

These two experiments corroborate basic emotions within a single culture. Because the theory postulates an innate and universal foundation for basic emotions, it predicts

that the phenomena observed by Etcoff and by Conway and Bekerian should generalise in the same way across different cultures.

Conclusion

A case has been made for the psychological reality of emotions and for their foundation on a small set of basic emotions: happiness, sadness, anger, fear, desire, and disgust. Each basic emotion depends on an innate and universal internal mental signal, which can be elicited by rapid and coarse cognitive evaluations that may be common to diverse cultures. These evaluations concern progress towards goals. The internal signals are causal precursors to external signals, such as facial expressions, that communicate the emotion to others. The theory can be contrasted with the rival hypothesis that there are no basic emotions, but instead more fundamental components, out of which all emotional experiences are constructed. On the one hand, if there are supposed to be components in common to all subjective experiences of, say, fear, including cases where individuals have no knowledge of the cause of the emotion and react in no outward way to it, then the theory is entirely compatible with basic emotions. On the other hand, if there are not supposed to be any components in common to all subjective experiences of an emotion such as fear, then the theory amounts to a rejection of the folk categories of emotion. Emotions are nothing more than naïve illusions. Once dispelled, they will cease to exist as useful pre-theoretical categories for cognitive science. It has been argued that there are no strong grounds for rejecting folk psychology. Yet, Ortony and Turner have questioned both the concept of the basic emotions, and what would count as empirical evidence for or against them. Their own componential theory, however, seems to be either a variant of the basic emotion hypothesis or else a repudiation of the folk theory. The case for basic emotions has not convinced everybody, but the tests that have been carried out appear to corroborate it.

2.2.3 Tomkins (1962)

THE PRIMARY AFFECTS

Tomkins calls emotions affects. According to him there is no consensus on what the primary affects are, how many there are, what they should be called, what are the conditions under which they are activated and reduced and what is their biological and psychological function. Despite this there is considerable consensus on the names and natures of the primary drives.

Although there is considerable variation concerning the proper names for each affect, he distinguishes the following affects by using, wherever possible, a joint name that includes the most characteristic description of the affect as experienced at low and as experienced at high intensity, followed by the component facial responses:

Positive

- 1) Interest-Excitement: eyebrows down, track, look, listen
- 2) Enjoyment-Joy: smile, lips widened up and out

Resetting

- 3) Surprise-Startle: eyebrows up, eye blink

Negative

- 4) Distress-Anguish: cry, arched eyebrow, mouth down, tears, rhythmic sobbing
- 5) Fear-Terror: eyes frozen open, pale, cold, sweaty, facial trembling, with hair erect
- 6) Shame-Humiliation: eyes down, head down
- 7) Contempt-Disgust: sneer, upper lip up
- 8) Anger-Rage: frown, clenched jaw, red face

2.2.4 Plutchik (1980)

Introduction

The psychoevolutionary theory being proposed here assumes that the eight basic adaptive patterns (acceptance, fear, surprise, sadness, disgust, anger, anticipation and joy) are the functional bases for all emotions recognized in humans and animals. A formal structural model will be presented. Such a model will utilize the basic postulates and will describe the relations among the primary emotions. It will provide a basis for identifying mixed or derivative emotions, and it will be used to show a connection between emotions and personality. Finally, it will provide a basis for an initial dictionary of emotions. As a guide for the development of ideas, the model will use analogy.

The particular analogy that will be used in the present theory may be found in the well-developed theory of color mixture. To develop this analogy it is necessary to conceive of the primary 8 emotions as analogous to hues, which may vary in degrees of intermixture (saturation) as well as intensity. The primary emotions vary in degree of similarity to one another, just as do colors. Emotions also have the property of bipolarity, or complementarity, as do colors. This set of characteristics of intensity, similarity, and bipolarity is the logical basis for the well-known three-dimensional color solid. The same characteristics justify conceiving of a three-dimensional emotion solid.

What is an appropriate language for describing emotions? The language of basic adaptive functions - such as protection, destruction, and reproduction - is the most general way to describe the primary emotional dimensions. Emotions can also be described in terms of certain common behaviors that are often associated with them. Thus, behaviors associated with the function of protection might include running away, retreating, and "playing dead". This behavioral language is narrower than the functional language in the sense that different species use different behaviors to accomplish the same goal. Another language that might be used to describe emotions is the subjective or introspective language. This refers to the words used by humans to describe inner-feeling states, such words as angry, happy, sad or curious. This language is narrower than the behavioral language in that it is available only to humans who have had certain kinds of social experiences.

However, the subjective language is capable of providing more subtle communications and describing more subtle mixtures than are the other languages. This is its advantage for human communications and the source of its many problems.

The following table illustrates the kinds of terms used to describe basic emotions in the subjective, behavioral, and functional languages:

TABLE 1

Three languages that may be used to describe emotional states

Subjective language	Behavioral language	Functional language
Fear, terror	Withdrawing, escaping	Protection
Anger, rage	Attacking, biting	Destruction
Joy, ecstasy	Mating, possessing	Reproduction
Sadness, grief	Crying for help	Reintegration
Acceptance, trust	Pair bonding, grooming	Incorporation or affiliation
Disgust, loathing	Vomiting, defecating	Rejection
Expectancy, anticipation	Examining, mapping	Exploration
Surprise, astonishment	Stopping, freezing	Orientation

This table illustrates several important points. The first is that the subjective language of emotions clearly implies an intensity dimension that is appropriate for each primary emotion. For example, the anger dimension can be described by such terms as annoyance, irritation, anger, rage, and fury. Although there are a large number of emotion words in any language, it is evident that many can be related, in some way, to one or another of the primary emotions at various levels of arousal. This intensity dimension also shows that feeling states can be graded from very low levels to very high levels, thus implying that inner-feeling states are continuously variable rather than discrete or digital in nature.

The second point to be noted is that the behavioral language also implies the existence of continuous variables. An animal's escape behavior may be fast or slow; the attack may be strong or weak; the grieving behavior may be loud or soft.

A third idea concerns the relations between the three languages. There is a sequence of implied events: a survival-related stimulus occurs; a cognitive process evaluates the stimulus; and the goal of protection and individual survival is served. However, it should be evident that partial reactions are possible as shown in the table below for emotional states of fear and grief.

STIMULUS EVENT	→	COGNITIVE APPRAISAL	→	SUBJECTIVE REACTION	→	BEHAVIORAL REACTION	→	FUNCTION
(Appearance of predator)	→	(Danger)	→	(Fear)	→	(Run)	→	(Protection)
(Loss of mother)	→	(Isolation)	→	(Grief)	→	(Cry for help)	→	(Reintegration)

TABLE 2

Sequence of events in an emotional reaction.

Another way to represent this idea is based partly on the work of Magda Arnold that suggests that all emotions presuppose evaluations of stimulus situation as "good" or "bad", as illustrated in the table below. Such appraisals are often "intuitive", and they then generate approach or avoidance tendencies depending upon which judgement is made.




FIGURE 1

Possible classes of reaction to “good” or “bad” evaluations of stimulus events.

The last implication concerns the notion of polarity. The idea of the postulation of bipolarity of emotions is reflected in the various terms used to describe emotions in the various languages. For example, fear and anger are bipolar in the subjective language, attacking and withdrawing are bipolar in the behavioral language, and protection and destruction are bipolar in the functional language. The concept of polarity cannot be considered in isolation from the concept of similarity, and this raises the question of how to arrange the eight basic emotions in terms of their relative degree of similarity. The ordering for degrees of similarity of emotions will depend to some extent on the types of measures used, and upon the kind of internal consistency and research implications provided by one grouping rather than another. On the basis of evidence to be described, the hypothetical circular sequence of emotions on the emotion circle is: *joy, acceptance, fear, surprise, sadness, disgust, anger, and anticipations*, as shown in the following figures.



FIGURE 2

A cross section of the emotion solid

The structural model

The following figure is a first approximation to a structural model of the emotions:




FIGURE 3

A multidimensional model of the emotions.

It shows the eight basic emotions dimensions arranged somewhat like the sections of half an orange, with the terms that designate each emotion at maximum intensity at the top.

The vertical dimension represents intensity, or level of arousal, and ranges from a

maximum state of excitement to a state of deep sleep at the bottom. The shape of the model implies that the emotions become less distinguishable at lower intensities.

The question of the exact form of the emotion solid is an empirical problem that can be answered only by studies of level of arousal of the primary emotions. Since this problem is subjective as well as behavioral and physiological, any one study of intensity of the primary emotions will provide only an approximation to the structure.

The judged intensity of emotion terms

A list of synonyms for each of the primary emotion dimensions was compiled, and the number of synonyms found for each dimension varied. Three of the four emotions with the most synonyms are negative or unpleasant emotions (i.e., disgust, fear, and grief), thus suggesting that we are able to make finer discriminations with negative emotions than with positive ones. These lists of synonyms were then presented to a group of thirty college students with the instruction of rating them in terms of the degree of intensity that they represent. The mean judged intensity was then obtained for each of the terms. Five of the emotions show maximum intensities in the range of 9 to 10, while the dimensions of *incorporation* and *exploration* are both relatively low on the intensity dimension. None of the minimum intensities are below a value of three, thus implying that no discriminations are made among emotions at very low intensity levels.

The mixing of primary emotions

There are various ways in which the primary emotions may be mixed in order to synthesize complex emotions. It is evident from the above figure that any adjacent pair of primaries could be combined to form an intermediate mixed emotion mixture of any two primaries may be called a dyad; of any three primaries, a triad. If two adjacent primaries are mixed, the resulting combination may be called a primary dyad. Mixtures of two primary emotions that are once removed on the circle may be called secondary dyads, while mixtures of two primaries that are twice removed on the circle may be called tertiary dyads. The same general method of designation would apply to triads as well.

It is not always easy to name the emotions that result from various mixtures. It may take psychologists a long time to determine the components of all mixed emotional states. The reasons for this may be that perhaps our language does not contain emotion words combinations, although other languages might. Certain combinations may not occur at all in human experience. The intensity differences involved in the combinations may mislead us in trying to decide on a suitable name; we may have to make up new names to describe certain compounds, since we may not yet have discovered all the emotional combinations of which humans are capable.

Another important point about the problem of naming emotion compounds is a problem almost identical with that faced by the international conference which set out to develop a system for the numerical specification of what a color looks like to the ordinary person under a given set of conditions. It was necessary to define a color match that would be acceptable to an average observer, and defining how a "standard observer" sees any particular color did this. This system has worked well and perhaps a similar system may be developed for the psychology of emotions.

The naming of emotional mixtures

With the concept of standard observers as a basis, there are at least three possible approaches to the process of naming emotion mixtures:

1. Present a group of judges (standard observers) with all possible pairs of primary emotions and ask them to suggest an appropriate name for the resulting mixture.
2. Present a group of judges with a long list of emotion names taken from our language and ask them to indicate which of the primaries are present.
3. Utilize the information from procedures 1 and 2 above, and in addition consider the need for internal consistency.

The second procedure was utilized and a group of 34 judges were asked to examine a long list of emotion terms and to indicate which two or three of the primaries are components. This list of tentative names for the primary, secondary, and tertiary dyads reveals several interesting things. It was possible to find emotion names for each of the mixtures of primary dyads, but not for one pair of the secondary dyads and not for two pairs of the tertiary dyads. This suggests that mixtures of emotions that are more widely separated on the emotion circle are harder to imagine or less likely to be experienced than those that are closer. The empty spaces in secondary and tertiary dyads may be considered as rare mixtures whose properties can still be estimated and may yet be discovered or produced.

Just as opposite colors when mixed in equal intensity act to neutralize one another to produce gray, so too do opposite emotions when occurring simultaneously in equal intensity act to inhibit or neutralize each other. The combination of emotions that are nearly opposite leads to greater conflict and immobilization than combinations of adjacent emotions. This implies that the tertiary dyads involve mixtures with more conflict than other types of dyads. The primary dyads refers mostly to more or less normal emotions of everyday life, while tertiary dyads refers much more to clinical or pathological emotions as illustrated in the following table which has been modified somewhat from the earlier listing of dyads to provide maximum internal consistency:

Primary dyads	Secondary dyads	Tertiary dyads
Love	Guilt	Anxiety
Submission	Curiosity	Resignation
Awe	Despair	Shame
Disappointed	?	Resentment
Remorse	Envy	Pessimism
Contempt	Cynicism	Morbidness
Revenge	Pride	Dominance (?)
Optimism	Fatalism	Delight

TABLE 3

Examples of Primary, Secondary, and Tertiary Dyads.

A given emotion mixed with two opposites should produce mixtures that also tend to be opposite. Thus, expectancy mixed with joy produces optimism, but when it is mixed with sorrow, it produces pessimism. A mixture of acceptance and fear produces submission, and acceptance and anger produce dominance. The use of such reasoning in naming the emotion mixtures provides greater coherence in the model as a whole. It may be noted, parathetically, that some of the variations in names for particular mixtures probably relates to the differing interpretations of intensity levels as well as the differences in the personal experiences of the judges. The following figure illustrates the primary dyads formed by combinations of adjacent pairs of basic emotions.




FIGURE 4

Primary dyads formed by the combination of adjacent pairs of basic emotions.

The problem of establishing names of emotion mixtures is not easily solved. It is somewhat like the problem of naming colors. The development of an appropriate and standard color language is called "colorimetry", and its presence enables people working in a number of different fields to speak a common language. It is hoped that one day the same standards will be established for the description of emotions and their mixtures - a science of emotionimetry.

A dictionary of emotions?

There have been very few attempts to provide an exhaustive list of words describing the domain of emotions, but some reports in the literature provide a start towards such a

dictionary. Davitz examined Roget's Thesaurus and selected over 400 words that he believed might be used to label an emotional state. These words were then read to a group of subjects who were asked to rate whether they would use each word to label an emotion. Davitz found that 137 terms were agreed upon as emotional labels by over half the judges. He then selected 50 words from the list on an "intuitive basis" to use in his "dictionary".

Russel and Mehrabian developed a "preliminary dictionary of emotional terms". They selected a list of 151 terms denoting emotional states. Judges were asked to rate these words on various semantic differential scales designed to assess pleasure, arousal, and dominance. A composite list based upon the reports of both Davitz, and Russell and Mehrabian was composed. It should be noted, first of all, that the longer Russell and Mehrabian dictionary does not include all of the 50 terms from Davitz's dictionary. Second, the longer dictionary has several puzzling redundancies. Third, several terms are clearly not emotions per se. The fourth point is that many of the terms that are supposedly meant to describe emotional states equally well describes personality traits.

The observation that some emotion words are also used to describe personality traits is not a trivial or irrelevant matter. It reflects a fundamental reality about the nature of emotions. The formation of personality traits is related to the development of mixed emotions, and since some degree of conflict is connected with the mixing of emotions, all personality traits imply components in greater or lesser conflict.

A preliminary approximation to the structure of the language of emotions

Since it appeared evident that many emotion terms could also be used to describe personality traits, it seemed reasonable to try to identify those emotion terms explicitly. In order to do this, a list of 140 terms were selected from the Thesaurus, as well as from various published lists of emotions, and presented to six judges. They were asked to indicate which words were used primarily as a description of emotional states, which words were used primarily as a description of personality traits, and which words were used to describe both emotions and personality traits. For example, the words "terrified" and "revolted" were considered by all judges to describe primarily emotional states. Terms like "anxious" and "suspicious" were unanimously considered applicable to both

emotional states and personality traits. Interestingly enough, no term was believed to apply primarily to personality traits and not to emotions. This observation is consistent with the idea that personality traits are derived from the more fundamental emotions.

The next step in the analysis of the language of emotions was to try to learn more about the relation of one emotion to another in terms of their similarity or degree of overlap of meaning. A procedure was developed and carried out with the collaboration of Hope Conte. On the basis of this method, angular placements were obtained for every emotion and a sample of the terms are presented in figure 4 on page 7.

The first thing to notice about the figure is that the emotion terms are distributed around the entire circle and there are no gaps. Many terms that are linguistically opposite are found to fall at opposite parts of the circle. For example, the terms *interested and disinterested* are almost 180 degrees apart, *accepting* is opposite *resentful*, and *happy* is opposite *unhappy*. A second important observation revealed by this table and figure is the particular sequence of terms. It is evident that emotions with similar meanings tend to cluster. For example, the terms *lonely, apathetic, meek, guilty, sad, sorrowful, hopeless, and depressed*, are located in consecutive positions covering a range of 88.3 to 125.3 degrees. Similar clusters are found for the other basic dimensions. A third interesting implication of this empirical emotional circle is its possibility of helping define the sometimes ambiguous language of emotions. For example, the term *worried* is often thought of in the context of fear; however, it was empirically located in the cluster of depression words. This suggests that dictionary definitions may not always correspond to the way people actually use emotion terms. Finally, it is evident that the eight basic emotion dimensions can be identified in terms of clusters, and these clusters have almost the circular ordering.

The sequence of emotion terms goes around the circle in a clockwise direction beginning with "acceptance", which is defined as 0 degrees. The sequence that is found is: acceptance dimensions, fear dimension, sadness dimension, surprise dimension, disgust dimension, anger dimension, and joy dimension. In order to determine the validity of this circular model for describing the structure of emotion terms, a representative subset of 40 emotions was analyzed by means of an *independent* method, that is, a factor analysis

of semantic differential ratings. The finding strongly supports the validity of this circular structure of emotions.

Concluding note

This chapter has presented a formal, structural, three-dimensional model of the emotions and has examined some of its implications. It has shown that basic emotions can be conceptualized in terms of at least three separate “languages”: the language of subjective feeling states, the language of behavior, and the language of functions.

The color solid is introduced as a possible analogical model for emotions, and the emotion equivalents of intensity, hue, and saturation are suggested. A particular ordering of primary emotions around the emotion circle is proposed, and support for it is given by the results of a study of perceived similarity of emotion words, as well as a factor analytic study based upon the use of the semantic differential technique.

Of particular interest is the fact that the mixture of emotions produces combinations that judges often consider to be personality traits. The hypothesis is proposed that all personality traits, defined in terms of interpersonal relations, be derived from mixtures of emotions. This raises the complex problem of how to define and label emotion mixtures, or in general, of how to develop an appropriate and standard emotion language. In this context, several attempts to develop a dictionary of emotions are reviewed. Finally, a study of the relative similarity of emotion words is described in order to provide a conceptual basis for a dictionary of emotions. In addition, this study provides an empirical and initial approximation for deciding on the sequence of emotions around the emotion circle.

2.2.5 Izard (1971)

The fundamental emotions

Each of the fundamental emotions has unique motivational properties, which are of crucial importance to the individual, and each adds its own special quality to

consciousness as it mobilises energy for physical or cognitive adventure. A functional emotion has an inherently adaptive function. Each fundamental emotion has three principal components: (a) a specific innately determined neural substrate, (b) a characteristic facial expression or neuromuscular-expressive pattern, and (c) a distinct subjective or phenomenological quality. In a sense, each fundamental emotion is a system made up of its three components and their interactions.

In addition to the three principal components of an emotion, there are a number of other organs and systems that become involved during emotion. Of particular importance are the endocrine, cardiovascular, and respiratory systems of the homeostatic network. It is known that emotion is accompanied by changes in the autonomic nervous system and in the visceral organs which it innervates (e.g., heart, blood vessels, glands). A great deal of research in the past has mistakenly treated autonomic-visceral processes as though they constituted emotion or were the best indexes of emotion. Some investigators still maintain that the fact that the autonomic-visceral processes accompany emotion means that they can serve as relatively reliable indicators of the presence of emotion. However, such indexes signify only arousal, which is often a function of emotion, but it is difficult to use measures of arousal to identify a particular discrete fundamental emotion or a particular pattern of emotion. At present there is only tentative evidence for discrete emotion-specific autonomic-visceral patterns, and such evidence exists for only a few of the fundamental emotions.

Although fundamental emotions are assumed to be innate, transcultural phenomena, it is recognised that idiosyncratic and sociocultural factors play a significant role in defining the antecedents and consequences of emotion expression. Each culture has its own display rules and their violation may have more or less serious consequences for the individual. These cultural rules may call for inhibiting or masking certain emotion expressions and the frequent display of others. Associated with these cultural display rules are significant cultural differences in attitudes toward emotion experiences.

The following ten fundamental emotions have been identified and defined empirically:

1. Interest-excitement

It is the most frequently experienced positive emotion, provides much of the motivation for learning, the development of skills and competencies, and for creative endeavour. Interest results from an increase in neural stimulation, usually brought about by change or novelty. In a state of interest the person shows signs of attentiveness, curiosity, and fascination. Since people are the most changing and unpredictable aspects of our world, the interest activated by other human beings facilitates social life and the development of affective ties between individuals.

2. Joy

It is a highly desirable emotion, though not necessarily a state to be desired continually. Joy seems to be more a by-product of events and conditions than a result of a direct effort to obtain it. It results from a sharp reduction in the gradient of neural stimulation. Joy together with interest guarantees that human beings will be social creatures. An active state of joy is characterised by a sense of confidence, meaningfulness, and a feeling of being loved. Receptive joy, a state that is extremely difficult to describe, is a feeling of trust and acceptance of the surrounding world.

3. Surprise

Surprise has some of the characteristics of an emotion, but it is not an emotion in quite the same sense as the others discussed here. Unlike the other emotions, surprise is always a transient state. It results from a sharp increase in neural stimulation, typically brought about by a sudden unexpected event. Surprise serves the very useful function of clearing the nervous system of ongoing emotion and cognition so that the individual can respond appropriately to the stimulus situation and the sudden change he has experienced.

4. Distress-Anguish

Throughout the remainder of life, separation remains a common and profound cause of distress or sadness. Another important and common cause of distress is real and imagined failure to live up to the standards set by self or by others (e.g., parents). In distress a person feels sad, downhearted, discouraged, lonely, out of touch with people, miserable. Distress serves highly useful functions by communicating to the self and others that all is not well and by motivating the person to do what is necessary to reduce the distress. Distress makes one responsive to one's own problems and to the problems of the world.

5. Anger

Anger often results from physical or psychological restraint, or from interference with goal-oriented activity. In anger the blood "boils" and the face becomes red. Rapidly mobilised energy tenses the muscles and provides a feeling of power, a sense of courage or confidence, and an impulse to strike out, but the emotion of anger should be distinguished from acts of aggression. Although anger served useful functions in the evolution of human beings, its positive functions have become less conspicuous. Mild to moderate anger can be justified when it becomes the added source of strength and courage necessary for response to oppression or a life-threat. Anger expressed in words with enough tact to keep from angering the other person or cutting off communication with him may facilitate a needed defence of personal integrity and improve a relationship.

6. Disgust

Disgust often occurs with anger but it has some distinct motivational-experiential features of its own. Physical or psychological deterioration ("anything spoiled") tends to elicit disgust. When disgusted one feels as though one has a bad taste in one's mouth, and in intense disgust one may feel as if one is "sick at the stomach". Disgust combined with anger may motivate destructive behaviour, since anger can motivate "attack" and disgust the desire to "get rid of". However, disgust with pollution, the

defacing of wilderness, and the wanton waste of natural resources may help provide motivation for a healthier atmosphere and ecology.

7. Contempt

Contempt often occurs with anger or disgust or both. These three emotions have been termed the "hostility triad". In evolutionary perspective contempt may have evolved as a vehicle for preparing the individual or group to face a dangerous adversary. Still today the situation in which the individual has a need to feel superior (stronger, more intelligent, more civilised) may lead to some degree of contempt. One of the dangers of contempt is that it is a "cold" emotion, one that tends to depersonalise the individual or group held in contempt. Hence it may motivate "cold-blood killing", or, as in the case of war, large-scale annihilation of people. It is difficult to find any useful or productive function for contempt in contemporary life, unless one considers it appropriate to express it toward conditions that foster waste, oppression, crime, or war.

8. Fear

Fear affects every individual. It tends to lock into the memory unforgettable experiences that can be re-lived through active recall or through dreams. Fear has great toxicity. It is actually possible to be "frightened to death". Fear is activated by a rather rapid increase in the density of neural stimulation, brought about by real or imagined danger. Apprehension, uncertainty, the feeling of a lack of safety and impending disaster accompany strong fear. Except for the rare and extreme fear that paralyses, this emotion mobilises energy and provides motivation for escape from danger. By anticipating danger and acting appropriately the individual often avoids intense fear.

9. Shame

Shame occurs typically, if not always, in the context of an emotional relationship. Shame motivates the desire to hide, to disappear. Shame can also produce a feeling of ineptness, incapability, and a feeling of not belonging. Shame can be a powerful force

for conformity, but if the individual's ties are to "out groups", then shame can lead to rebellion. While strong and chronic shame can shutter human integrity, this emotion often stands as a guardian of self-respect. An individual can go to great lengths to develop self-respect, self-esteem, and hence a self-concept that is less vulnerable to shame. Shame avoidance can foster immediate self-corrective behaviour as well as sustained programs of self-improvement.

10. Guilt

Guilt has a close relation to shame. Shame, shyness, and guilt are considered as different aspects of the same emotion. Guilt results from wrongdoing of a moral, ethical, or religious nature. It occurs in situations in which one feels personally responsible and comes from one's own acts and from within one's self. In guilt people have a strong feeling of "not being right" with the person or persons they have wronged. Guilt stimulates thought and cognitive preoccupation with the wrongdoing. Intense and chronic guilt can cripple the individual psychologically, but guilt may be the basis for personal-social responsibility and the motive to avoid guilt may heighten one's sense of personal responsibility.

Some common patterns or combinations of affects

The pattern of facial activity or the image of the corresponding pattern of proprioception is a chief determinant of the specific quality of any felt emotion. If the pattern is that of an innately programmed fundamental emotion there will be a corresponding specific emotion experience, i.e. a fundamental emotion will be felt. If there are two or more fundamental emotions experienced simultaneously or in rapid sequence the face may show a blend of two or more emotion expressions and the experience will be a pattern or combination of felt emotions. Two or more fundamental emotions which pattern frequently may produce over time a relative stable, well-defined emotion characteristic of the person that that may be considered an emotion trait. The development of such emotion traits is strongly influenced by the individual's genetic makeup and by his history.

Anxiety

Theorists and investigators have tended to think of anxiety as unidimensional despite the counter run from clinical experience. The professional attempting to understand and help individuals has never been convinced that anxiety is a singular and simple thing, either in terms of its motivational qualities or in terms of its effect upon adjustment and behaviour. Even authors, as revealed by experimental and clinical literature, who spoke of anxiety as unitary often include in their descriptions of anxiety two or more relatively independent components of some sort. It is now becoming more widely recognised that anxiety is not unipolar, unidimensional, or unifactor in nature.

Differential emotion theory defines anxiety as a combination or pattern of fundamental emotions including fear and two or more of the emotions of distress, anger, shame/shyness, guilt, and the positive emotion of interest – excitement. These six emotions are considered as variable components of a complex pattern. The relative importance of these emotions in the anxiety pattern varies with the individual and his life situation. Individual variations in the pattern of emotions in anxiety are a function both of hereditary and experiential determinants. One of the problems in studying anxiety results from its great complexity. It is a variable combination of elements; it has no single, characteristic behavioural-expressive component; and it has no singular phenomenology.

Depression

Karl Abraham saw anxiety and depression as having a relationship analogous to that between fear and grieve. According to him, depression follows when a sexual aim has to be given up without having obtained gratification. The depressed cannot love because hostility feelings (or hatred) interfere. The hostility that was once part of ambivalence toward a love object becomes both inner- and outer-directed hostility upon the loss of the love object.

Abraham laid a foundation for a differential emotion theory of depression.

Differential emotion theory posits distress-anguish, the emotion that predominates in

grief, as the key emotion in depression and the one with which other fundamental emotions interact. Depression is an even more complex pattern than anxiety. More emotions are activated and there are more possibilities for conflicts in the emotion – emotion dynamics. The fundamental emotions involved in depression are distress, anger, disgust, contempt, fear, guilt, and shyness. Anger, disgust, and contempt are expressed both toward the self and toward others, and since they may be related to hostility, they may be termed inner-directed and outer-directed hostility.

Besides fundamental emotions mentioned above, there are other affective factors which are frequently present – decreased physical well-being, decreased sexuality, and increased fatigue. These elements are considered as immediate affects or by-products of depression. They have motivational properties and, consequently, influence the other components of the depression and its course.

Love

Love commands a place of prominence in every human life. Parental love is typically steadfast and resistant to erosion and decay. After parental love comes love of brother or sister and then love of friends. Romantic love (dominated by interest, joy, and the sex drive) becomes a compelling force that must be dealt with in one way or another during the adolescent stage. Romantic love tunes the whole body and the mind to a high pitch and makes the person open to excitement and ecstasy and vulnerable to the affective-cognitive orientations we call possessiveness and jealousy.

Each of these types of love has unique features. Each is a particular pattern of affects and cognitions. Although the differences among them are considerable, love of any type binds one person to another, and this affective bond has evolutionary-biological, sociocultural, and personal significance. While fundamental emotions may have state and trait characteristics, love seems best described as an aspect of a relationship. Love's ingredients include emotions and drives, but it may be best described as an affective-cognitive orientation. Reciprocal love establishes a special bond and a special relationship that changes all other affective thresholds and alters perception, cognition, and action, particularly in relation to the loved one. Despite its great

importance in human life, love has received far less attention from scientists than has anxiety and depression.

Hostility and hate.

Hostility has been defined as the experiential/motivational underpinning of aggression. Just as motivation does not always lead to overt behaviour, hostility does not inevitably lead to aggression. The fundamental emotions of anger, disgust, and contempt interact in hostility, and the relative strength of these three emotions (together with cognitive and situational factors) probably determines the likelihood and the nature of aggression. For example, the greater the anger, the “hot” emotion in the triad, the greater the probability of impulsive acts of aggression. The prominence of disgust in the hostility triad may prompt a person to hurt another by shunning or avoiding him. Contempt, the “cold” emotion in the hostility triad, contributes to the aggressive acts associated with racial prejudice. Hostility has both state and trait characteristics. Intense hostility with strong anger illustrates state hostility. Prejudice and indifference are examples of trait hostility, a “compartmentalised” form of hostility. Hate, the more common term in the area, has a close kinship with hostility. It may be thought of as an affective-cognitive orientation in which the affect consists of some combination of the emotions in the hostility triad.

Summary

A fundamental emotion is defined as having neural, expressive, and experiential components. Each of ten fundamental emotions has been briefly described. Interest provides motivation for learning and creative endeavour. Joy is associated with a sense of confidence and a feeling of being loved. Surprise clears the nervous system of ongoing emotion and cognition so that the individual can respond to the sudden change he has experienced. Distress makes one responsive to the problems of the world. Anger may motivate destructive behaviour, but it may also prove adaptive as a source of strength and courage when it is necessary to defend personal integrity or one’s loved ones. Disgust can combine with anger in a dangerous blend of emotions, but it may help provide for maintaining personal standards, such as good body hygiene, as well as ecological standards, such as a cleaner atmosphere. Contempt can

lead to prejudice and even cold-blooded killing and its only positive function comes into play when it is directed against the enemies of human welfare. Fear motivates the avoidance of danger situations. Shame can produce feelings of ineptness and isolation, but shame avoidance can foster self-corrective activities and self-improvement. Guilt can dominate and torment the mind, but the anticipation and avoidance of guilt can serve as the basis for the development of personal-social responsibility.

In addition to the fundamental emotions operating as discrete motivational phenomena, they sometimes combine or interact to form fairly stable patterns of emotions. Such patterns often have stable interactions with a set of cognitions that help give the complex a certain character. Anxiety, depression, love, and hostility are examples of such affective patterns. In anxiety the key emotion of fear interacts with distress, anger, shame, guilt, or interest. In depression the key emotion of distress interacts with anger, disgust, contempt, fear, guilt, or shyness.

A love relationship is dominated by interest and joy but at one time or another it may involve virtually every one of the emotions. Hostility results from the interactions of anger, disgust, and contempt. When combined with a particular set of cognitions it may develop into an affective-cognitive orientation that is commonly called hate.

2.3 Linguistic overview

2.3.1 Kövecses (1989)

The phenomenon under investigation is the study of the language used about the emotions and what that language tells us about emotion concepts. The survey is divided into three sections: (1) words and emotion, (2) meaning and emotion, and (3) some issues that inevitably arise in the study of everyday conceptions of emotion.

Words and Emotion

The most general functions and organisation of emotion-related vocabulary will be discussed, and then focus attention on a large but neglected group of emotion terms.

EXPRESSION AND DESCRIPTION

A distinction has to be made between expressive and descriptive words (or terms or expressions). Some emotion words can *express* emotions. Examples include *shit!* When angry, *wow!* When enthusiastic or impressed, *yuk!* When disgusted, and many more. It is an open question whether all emotions can be expressed in this way, and which are the ones that cannot and why. Emotion words can also describe or name the emotions that “they are about”. Words like *anger* and *angry*, *joy* and *happy*, *sadness* and *depressed* are assumed to be used in such a way. We should note that under certain circumstances descriptive emotion terms can also “express” particular emotions. An example is “*I love you!*” where the descriptive emotion word *love* is used both to describe and express the emotion of love.

BASIC EMOTION TERMS

Within the category of descriptive emotion words, the terms can be seen as “more or less basic”. Speakers of a given language appear to feel that some of the emotion words are more basic than others. Basicness can mean two things. One is that these words occupy a middle-level in a vertical hierarchy of concept. The other sense of “basicness” is that an emotion category can be judged to be a better example of the emotion category than another on a single horizontal level. This horizontal level coincides with the basic level of the vertical organisation of concepts. These organisations of emotion terms have been extensively studied in the past decade for English, while cross-cultural research along these lines is just beginning. Frijda arrives at five general and possibly universal categories of emotion in eleven languages. These basic emotion categories include happiness, sadness, anger, fear, and love.

METAPHOR AND METONYMY

The words and expressions that belong in this group denote various *aspects* of emotion concepts, such as intensity, cause, control, etc. They can be metaphorical and metonymical. The metaphorical expressions are manifestations of conceptual metaphors. For example, *boiling with anger* is a linguistic example of the very productive conceptual metaphor ANGER IS A HOT FLUID. The linguistic expressions that belong in this large group can also be metonymical. Examples include *upset* for anger and *have cold feet* for fear. The first is an instance of the conceptual metonymy PHYSICAL AGITATION STANDS FOR ANGER, while the second is an example of the conceptual metonymy DROP IN BODY TEMPERATURE STANDS FOR FEAR. A special case of emotion metonymies involves a situation in which an emotion concept B is part of another emotion concept A. In cases like this, B can metonymically stand for A.

A brief comment on the three groups identified above. The first thing to note is that group three is by far the largest of the three, and yet it has received the least attention in the study of the language used about the emotions. These expressions are deemed completely uninteresting and irrelevant by most researchers, who tend to see the expressions as epiphenomena, fancier ways of saying some things that could be said in literal, simple ways. Further, we may note that the expressions in group one are usually considered literal and those in group three as figurative (i.e. metaphoric and metonymic). Given this, we can understand why the expressions in group three received scant attention.

Meaning and Emotion

Several distinct views are offered in an attempt to characterise emotional meaning.

THE “ LABEL ” VIEW

The label view of emotional meaning maintains that the meaning of emotion terms is simply an association between a label, like the words *anger* and *fear*, plus some real

emotional phenomenon, like physiological processes and behaviour. This view is the simplest lay view of emotional meaning. It is based on the folk theory of meaning in general according to which meaning is merely an association between sounds (forms) and things. This understanding of meaning in general also forms the basis of a scientific theory of emotion. Schachter and Singer proposed a view which is an improvement on the simplest lay view in that emotion involves three things: a label, plus something (emotionally) real, plus a situation. However, they both exclude the possibility that emotion terms can have much conceptual content and organisation, but several studies have shown that emotion terms have a great deal of conceptual content and structure.

THE “ CORE MEANING” VIEW

A distinction between core (denotative, conceptual, cognitive, etc.) and peripheral (connotative, residual, etc.) meaning will be made. Core meaning is characterised by a small number of properties, or components that are taken to define a category in an adequate manner. This means that core meanings should be capable of minimally distinguishing between the meanings of any two words; that is, by virtue of the smallest possible number of components. In this view the core meaning is thought of as the more important kind of meaning, while peripheral meaning is viewed as less important in giving the meaning of words and expressions. Peripheral meaning or connotation is usually seen as being made up of various social, situational, affective, and other properties – properties that are not taken to contribute to the cognitive content of words in a significant way. Connotations are assumed to vary from person to person and from culture to culture, and, according to some researchers like Osgood, certain connotations are universal.

The core meaning view of emotion categories typically assumes the idea that emotional meaning is composed of *universal* semantic primitives. A leading proponent of this view is Wierzbicka and one of the major points of his approach is that it is a mistake to think of emotion words in particular languages, such as English, as being universal. What are universal according to Wierzbicka are the semantic primitives that make up the conceptual content of particular emotion words in particular languages.

THE “ DIMENSIONAL ” VIEW

Emotional meaning is also viewed as being constituted by a fixed set of dimensions of meaning. Solomon postulates thirteen dimensions that are sufficient to describe any emotion, while Frijda distinguishes twenty-six dimensions. The core meaning and dimensional views are not always easy to distinguish. Thus, according to Frijda the dimensions that apply to a given emotion provide a “component profile” that uniquely characterises an emotion. Researchers who are working in the dimensional approach attempt to eliminate a major alleged pitfall of the core meaning view in general: the large gap between emotional meaning and emotional experience.

THE “IMPLICATIONAL” VIEW

While the core meaning and dimensional views are based on core meaning in general, the implicational view takes connotative meaning as its main point of departure. According to Shweder, to study what something means is to study what it entails, implies, or suggests to those who understand it. Meaning is connotative meaning, not denotative meaning. It is the periphery, rather than the core, that counts in this view of meaning. Connotative meaning, and in particular emotional meaning, varies considerably from culture to culture.

THE “ PROTOTYPE ” VIEW

It was previously mentioned that some emotion words are more basic, or prototypical than others. When we try to specify the structure and content of the best example of any of the lower-level categories (anger, fear, and love), we are working within the “prototype” view of emotional meaning as it relates to individual basic-level categories. Many researchers see the structure of emotion as a script, scenario, or model. For example, Lakoff and Kövecses describe *anger* as a sequence of stages of events. The particular *sequence* of events makes up the structure of the prototypical concept of any given emotion, like fear, while the particular *events* that participate in the sequence make up the content of the concepts. Sometimes the prototype approach is combined with some other view of emotional meaning (core meaning).

In the prototype approach, two kinds of views can be distinguished: the literal and the non-literal conceptions of emotion. Some researchers believe that metaphorical and metonymical understanding play a role while some of these researchers disagree. However, despite the disagreements, many believe that metaphors are important and discuss the role and possible contribution of conceptual metaphors and metonymies to the conceptualisation of emotional experience.

Finally, in a variety of publications Kövecses suggested that many emotions, such as love, fear, and happiness, have not just one, but several prototypical cognitive models associated with them (i.e. they have several prototypes). That is, the proposal is that several members (or cases) can acquire the status of “best example” within an emotion category. This is because one member can be typical, another can be salient, a third can be ideal, and so on.

THE “SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONIST” VIEW

Several scholars take emotion concepts to be social constructions. The model given by Lutz of *song* in Ifaluk is considerably different from the one associated with the English word *anger*. To account for the differences, Lutz claims that this model of Ifaluk *song* is a social-cultural construction whose properties depend on particular aspects of Ifaluk society and culture. The socio-constructionist view of emotion concepts is also based, at least in the work of its leading proponents (like Lutz and Averill), on the notion of prototype. The structure of most emotion concepts is seen as a highly conventionalised script from which deviations are recognised and linguistically marked in any given culture. Where the explicitly social-constructionist views differ from other prototype-based but non-constructionist approaches is their account of the content of emotion concepts.

THE “ EMBODIED CULTURAL PROTOTYPE” VIEW

Lakoff and Kövecses claim that to the degree that the metaphors (especially the ANGER IS A HOT FLUID metaphor) that constitute anger are motivated by physiological functioning (e.g. increased body heat), the concept will be motivated by

the human body, rather than being completely arbitrary, being just a social-cultural product. Kövecses goes beyond the view that the concept of anger is motivated by human physiology. It is suggested that it is *both* motivated by the human body *and* produced by a particular social and cultural environment. That is, an attempt is made to reconcile the two apparently contradictory views. In this way, social constructions are given bodily basis and bodily motivation is given social-cultural substance.

Some Issues

There are several issues that are particularly important in the study of emotion concepts and emotional meaning.

THE “ VALIDITY “ ISSUE

Which one of the views above *really* or *best* represents our everyday conceptions of emotion? This is a tough question, and it seems that at the present time we have no reliable criteria to decide which of the views listed above is the one that can be considered a psychologically valid representation of emotion concepts. Work in cognitive science in general suggests that prototypical cognitive models are our best candidates. “Prototype” views seem to offer the greatest explanatory power for many aspects of emotional meaning.

THE UNIVERSALITY OF EMOTION PROTOTYPES

Are emotion prototypes universal? That is, is the prototype (the central member) for emotion X in language Y a prototype (a central member) in other languages as well? Evidence that we have so far seems to suggest that it is not the case. Some constructionists argue that it is only natural that it is not the case, while others argue that prototypical scripts, or at least large portions of them, are the same across languages and cultures. Wierzbicka maintains that the emotion prototypes are different cross-culturally, but the semantic primitives with which these differences are expressed can be and are universal.

It can also be suggested that what is universal are some general structures within the emotion domain, corresponding, as Frijda puts it, to an “unspecified positive emotion” (the happy/joy range), to an “unspecified negative emotion” (the sadness range), to “an emotion of strong affection” (the love range), “an emotion of threat” (the fear range), and an anger-like range. In emotion the “focal” members of basic emotion categories in different languages differ from each other to varying degrees – despite the fact that the same general basic emotion categories exist in possibly all languages and cultures.

THE UNIVERSALITY OF CONCEPTUAL TOOLS

There are a variety of conceptual tools or elements that scholars utilised in their attempts to provide a cognitive representation of emotional meaning. These included semantic primitives (components), connotative properties, dimensions of meaning, scripts or scenarios, and conceptual metaphors and metonymies. Which of these conceptual elements are universal? Lakoff, and Johnson suggest that what is universal are certain basic image schemas, as these arise from certain fundamental bodily experiences, but Wierzbicka suggests that there is a small set of universal semantic primitives with the help of which all concepts (including emotion concepts) in all languages can be adequately described.

THE ROLE OF METAPHOR AND METONYMY

Lakoff and Johnson argued that many everyday metaphors are conceptual (not just linguistic) in nature and can actually create social, cultural, psychological realities for us. Are the conceptual metaphors constitutive of the cultural models associated with emotions or do they simply reflect them? Quinn proposes that the latter is the case and Kövecses takes the opposite tack and argues, on the basis of the prevalent container metaphor for anger that conceptual metaphors, together with other factors, can contribute to how an emotion concept, like anger, is constituted. However, Holland suggests that this “either/or” view might not be the best way of looking at the issue. Moreover, it seems closer to the truth to believe that some metaphors have the capacity to create reality, while others do not. Which one do and which ones don't can only be decided on the basis of detailed future research.

LAY CONCEPTIONS VS. SCIENTIFIC THEORIES

What is the relationship between everyday emotion concepts (as revealed in conventional language use) and scientific conceptions of emotion? That is, how are lay and scientific theories of emotion related? This is the issue that Parrot addresses in relation to the lay “heart-head” and the corresponding expert “emotion-cognition” distinctions. To arrive at conclusive findings concerning the exact nature of the relationship between folk and scientific theories, we have to do more intensive research on particular lay and expert theories, and, in the process, we have to take into account specific cultural-historical evidence.

2.3.2 Wierzbicka (1989)

Introduction

If we wish to study “emotions” it is more fruitful to start somewhere and then to proceed, through conceptual and empirical work in the area around the starting-point, to see where the “joints” are, and how the object between these joints is constituted. Emotion is an English word which does not have an exact (or even inexact) equivalent in many other languages of the world. If it can be argued that this word stands for some identifiable aspect of extra-linguistic reality, it can also be argued that it is a cultural artifact of one particular culture, which presents the relevant aspect of reality from one particular perspective. By recognizing that “emotion” IS an English word, and that it embodies a concept which is culture-specific, we put ourselves on guard against ethnocentrism, and clear the ground for an investigation which can proceed from a neutral, universal, culture-independent perspective.

English does not offer us a better window on human nature than other languages. It is only universal features of human languages that can offer us access to human nature, not their idiosyncratic aspects. Language is a light that illuminates certain aspects of reality, while leaving other aspects in darkness. We cannot study the reality without studying that light, and the effects it has on our vision of reality. By studying language in its universal aspects we can gain insight into the universal human nature; by

studying languages in their idiosyncratic aspects we can gain insight into individual cultures.

The study of emotions has suffered greatly from conceptual confusion, and this confusion is due in large part to the fact that not enough attention has been paid to the problem of language, and in particular to the distinction between the universal and idiosyncratic aspects of language. The aim of this paper is to clear some of that confusion. Kövecses wishes to defend the belief in human universals, and in possibility of studying universal aspects of human nature, human experience, and human cognition in unbiased, objectively valid ways.

Two kinds of concepts: universal and language-specific

The world of concepts can be accessed via languages and their lexical (as well as grammatical) resources. The absence of a word does not prove the absence of a concept, but the presence of a word does prove the presence of a concept.

Furthermore, the presence of a word proves that in that society the concept in question is a salient one – sufficiently so as to merit lexicalisation. Correspondingly, the absence of a word indicates that a given concept, if present at all – is not salient in that society. It is important for student of human nature not to speak about a universal value of a concept, for example “privacy”. It is equally important not to assume that “anger”, “anxiety”, or “sadness” are universals, because these, too, are English words, which are culture-specific, as for that matter, is “emotion”.

Not all words are language-specific. There are also universal human concepts, lexically embodied in all languages of the world. These concepts are not numerous, but they can function as elementary building blocks, in terms of which all other concepts, no matter how idiosyncratic and unique, can be defined and thus explained to cultural outsiders. The set of universal concepts includes no more than a few dozen elements, which fall into a number of different categories, for example [substantive] - I, YOU, SOMEONE, SOMETHING, PEOPLE. and [evaluators] – GOOD, BAD.

Thus the “mind” of the human neonate is not a tabula rasa, but a tabula imprinted with four or five dozens conceptual primitives and a mini-grammar specifying the rules of

their combination. This innately imprinted lexicon, and the mini-grammar which goes with it, are manifested in language in the form of lexical and grammatical universals.

‘Emotion’ as an artifact of the English language

‘Feel’ is indeed a universal human concept, but ‘emotion’ is not. If words such as ‘emotion’ are taken for granted, and if their English-based character is not kept in mind, they can reify inherently fluid phenomena which could be conceptualized and categorized in many different ways. We don’t have to turn to “exotic” languages and cultures to find evidence of different ways of conceptualizing and categorizing human experience. For example, in ordinary German there is no word for ‘emotion’ at all. In Polish too, there is just one noun, ‘uczucie’, corresponding to both emotion and feeling, and again, the plural of this noun – uczucia – is restricted to cognitively based feelings. The same is true of Russian, where the noun ‘čuvstvo’ corresponds to both feeling and emotion, and where the plural form ‘čuvstva’ suggests cognitively based feelings. French has the noun ‘sentiment’ which stands exclusively for a cognitively based feeling. The Italian word ‘emozione’ and the Spanish ‘emoción’ are not equivalent to the English emotion either. Linguistic evidence suggests, then, that the English concept of ‘emotion’ is language-specific. It is also culture-specific, in so far as it links the idea of cognitively based feelings with the idea of something like a “bodily disturbance”.

Wierzbicka is suggesting that while the concept of ‘feeling’ is universal and can be safely used in the investigation of human experience and human nature, the concept of ‘emotion’ is culture-bound, and cannot be similarly relied on. It is important to realize the complex and culture-specific character of the concept ‘emotion’ and not to absolutise it, bearing always in mind its dependence on the concept of ‘feel’ and on other conceptual primitives. Given a coherent semantic theory and well-developed semantic methodology, the meaning of words such as ‘feeling’ and ‘emotions’ can be stated in a non-arbitrary way open to inter-subjective assessment.

The use of English as a meta-language

Spiro believes that the common measure, which makes the different conceptual worlds commensurate, is the English language. This is not justified because talking about other cultures in terms of English words such as anger, anxiety, or sadness imposes on those cultures an Anglo-centric perspective. It is also not necessary because we do not have to rely on the English lexicon to describe, and interpret, other peoples' emotional lives in a meaningful and intelligible way. We can do so relying on shared concepts, that is to say, on universal conceptual primitives, in terms of which all concepts in all languages can be meaningfully and intelligibly described, and which can be accessed via any (natural) language whatsoever.

We do not need to try to talk about Ifaluk concepts in Ifaluk. We can use the English version of the "natural semantic meta-language", based on concepts shared by all human groups. Writing about Ifaluk or Ilongot for an English audience, we can rely on NSM words such as *feel*, *want*, *think*, or *know*, without having to fear ethnocentric distortions, because while words such as *anger* or *anxiety* stand for concepts which are not universal, words such as *feel*, *want*, *think*, or *know* stand for universal human concepts, lexicalised in all the languages of the world. Unlike real languages, language-specific versions of the natural semantic meta-language can be mutually isomorphic.

The doctrine of "basic emotions"

According to Spiro, there is no social group in which the so-called "basic" or "primary" emotions (love, joy, fear, anger, anxiety, curiosity, etc.) are not present. Van Brakel supports this when he says that perhaps the claim is that all humans experience and recognize the same basic emotions, independently of whether or not they have words to name these emotions.

Spiro does not claim that English should have a privileged position, just that the differences between emotion concepts encoded in different languages have been exaggerated, and that different peoples think of emotions in terms of similar concepts.

To assume that English happens to have lexical labels for “universal human emotions”, for which many other languages happen not to have any labels, is an ethnocentric illusion. Our shared human concepts, which are available to all people through all languages, give us a basis for mutual understanding, because all those innumerable concepts which we don’t share can be meaningfully and intelligibly defined in terms of those few which we do not share.

The “lexicalisation” thesis

Spiro does not distinguish between emotions (as raw experiences) and the conceptualization of emotions, and he accuses cultural constructionists of denying the existence of unnamed emotions. He agrees that the absence of an emotion term does not prove the absence of the emotion, and that an emotion concept expressed in one language by means of a word can often be expressed in another language by means of a locution. Any emotion concept of one language, no matter how unique and culture-specific, can be rendered by means of a paraphrase in other languages. He says that universal emotions can best be identified by means of concepts which happen to be expressed in single words in English, even though in some other languages they could only be expressed by means of complex phrases. But this amounts to giving English a privileged position among the languages of the world.

The power of lexicalisation: “anger” vs. “song”

The conceptual confusion surrounding the issue of “basic emotions” and the importance of lexicalisation is best illustrated by the controversy between Spiro and Lutz concerning ‘anger’ and the Ifaluk ‘song’. Lutz insists that the concept of ‘song’ is different from the concept of ‘anger’, and she points out that English, unlike Ifaluk, makes no obligatory lexical distinction between “justifiable anger” and “unjustifiable anger”. Spiro maintains that ‘song’ is just a particular type of anger, and that anger is a universal human emotion.

According to Wierzbicka ‘song’ is no more a “variety of anger” than “anger” is “a variety of anger”; and that while the two concepts overlap, neither of them can be reduced to the other. The continued use of the word “anger” with reference to “human

nature” illustrates the powerful influence that the lexicalisation patterns of our native language exercise over our interpretation of reality. A universal, language-independent perspective on emotions can be achieved when they are described and compared in terms of lexical universals. He concludes by saying that trying to avoid an ethnocentric bias in describing other peoples’ cultural concepts without having some universal concepts to hold on to, is like trying to pull oneself out of quagmire by one’s own bootstraps.

Anger vs. rabbia

The Italian word “rabbia” is glossed as “rage, anger, fury” with the following expressions as examples: la rabbia delle onde ‘the fury of the waves’; in un momento di rabbia ‘in a fit of rage’ and pieno di rabbia ‘filled with anger’. Although the word anger does appear among the English glosses, the other glosses (‘rage, fury’), as well as the examples cited, make it quite clear that the concept of ‘rabbia’ is really different from that of ‘anger’, and that it implies an intensity and a lack of control which place it closer to the English words ‘rage’ and ‘fury’ than to the English ‘anger’. The fact that ‘rabbia’ has also a second meaning ‘rabies’, and that the two meanings are perceived by native speakers as related, highlights the conceptual distinction. It is important to realize that this distinction is not only “quantitative” but also qualitative, that is, that “rabbia” does not mean something like ‘great anger’ or ‘intense anger’. “Rabbia” is not only intense, it is also uncontrolled (and almost uncontrollable), it is sudden, it is short term, it is hot, it is explosive, and it is overtly expressed.

In Italian culture ‘rabbia’ is seen as a basic human feeling, just as in Anglo culture, ‘anger’ (in contrast to ‘rage’ and ‘fury’) is seen as a “basic human feeling”. But it is not the same feeling; and while the experiential range of ‘rabbia’ may overlap with that of ‘anger’, the two concepts are quite different. It is not accidental that whereas Anglo culture has created the lexical and conceptual artifact of ‘anger’, Italian culture has produced ‘rabbia’, rather than vice versa. It is not just a question of the “Mediterranean temperament” and “Northern-European cold blood”; it is also a question of different cultural traditions and different “cultural scripts”.

Emotions: Inner feelings or socio-cultural facts?

In Spiro's view, arguing against Lutz's constructionist position, emotions are the internal states of individual action rather than socio-cultural facts. Wierzbicka agrees with Spiro's view, but points out that Spiro overlooked the important point that when people identify their emotions by means of English words, they are relying, unconsciously, on sociocultural facts enshrined in their own language.

Spiro's feelings about that he is depressed about his close friend's death, are no doubt his own, and only he, experiences. It is not just his emotional reactions that are informed by cultural themes and values, but also his interpretation of these reactions – a point he refuses to accept. A Russian and a Japanese wishing to report their feelings truthfully and accurately would not report feeling depressed in one case and anxious in the other. The concepts of “depression” and “anxiety” are simply absent from the Russian or Japanese kit of interpretive tools. In other words, even if the feelings were, in some sense, “exactly the same”, the Anglo-American, Russian, and Japanese observers would be looking at them through different-colored spectacles; and their self-reports would, consequently, be different. In fact, the feelings themselves, informed by different cultural themes and values, would be different too: the colored glass itself influences not only the experiencers' interpretation of their feelings, but also their inherent quality. Differences of this kind are difficult to verify intersubjectively. On the other hand, semantic claims – such as those concerning the language-specific character of the concepts ‘depression’, ‘anxiety’, ‘stress’, ‘toska’, ‘xandra’, ‘hiya-hiya’, or ‘hara-hara’ – are fully verifiable.

The “forced choice” strategy

In his wish to defend the “psychic unity of mankind” Spiro (like many others) steadfastly refuses to give up his simple faith in the power of English emotion terms as key to universal human experiences. Spiro like gives his subjects a restricted choice of words to choose (sadness and joy) when one has lost a loved one. Ekman did the same thing by presenting his subjects with six labels to choose from to match with different kinds of faces.

Van Brakel has aptly criticized the “forced choice” strategy with reference to Ekman’s practice of compelling informants to choose one of a few labels provided by the researcher. He maintains that such experiments cannot tell us whether a labeled facial expression corresponds with the “concept expressed”. Referring to the data on cross-cultural experiments in “reading human faces”, Van Brakel points that what the data may show is that people often make appropriate guesses at other people’s emotions, even cross-culturally, just as they often make appropriate guesses about people’s beliefs, intentions, and so on; but this is a far cry from stating there’s universal agreement on what, say, a prototypical sad expression is, let alone agreement on what, in general, is a sad expression.

But misleading as Ekman’s use of “forced choice” was, at least he gave his informants six labels to choose from (from one facial expression). By contrast, Spiro faces his imaginary respondents with just two possibilities: “sadness” and “joy” (for one existential situation – the death of a loved person); and if, not surprisingly, they choose “sadness” rather than “joy”, he concludes that “sadness” is the feeling universally felt in such a situation.

“Universal human situations”

Spiro’s use of “universal human situations” and “universal human reactions” reflects an odd assumption that all non-pathological humans have Anglo-Saxon emotional reactions. A Polish speaker would probably nominate *bó* (pain) or *rozpacz* (despair) instead of *smutek* (sadness) on the reaction to the death of a loved person. This difference in responses could of course be due to some personal individual differences between respondents, but there is also an important cultural difference. In many cultures “sadness” would seem an inappropriate word to choose with respect to tragic situations.

“Universal human emotions” cannot be identified in terms of “universal human situations” (such as, for example, the death of loved person), because “the same situation” can be construed, interpreted, and reacted in many different ways, not only because individual people are different, but also because different cultures encourage, and shape, different interpretations and attitudes. For human beings, there is really no

such thing as “the same situation”, because situations are differently construed, and the construal depends, to a large extent, on the culture.

Grammar and the interpretation of emotions

Most students of emotions are often not aware of the differences in the grammar of emotions. Lutz believes that emotional experience as well as its display may be intended. If we accept that emotional experience as well as display may be “intended”, it doesn’t follow that people could experience, at will, joy and love, or happiness and pride, “merely by intending to do so”. There is a difference between choosing the kind of emotions that we want to experience and giving in to an emotion which has descended upon us.

Different cultures suggest different attitudes to emotions, and cultural assumptions concerning the “intentionality” of emotions vary widely. For example, modern Anglo culture encourages the notion that emotions are unintended but can, and should, be controlled. By contrast, Russian culture does not encourage the view that emotions can, and should, be controlled. Rather, it suggests a view that emotions can be either passively endured, or actively wallowed in. These different attitudes to emotions are encoded in grammar. For example, in Russian the emotion of “sadness” or something similar to it can be conceptualized in three different ways. A discussion of the Russian grammar of emotions shows that the question whether the experience of emotion is intended or unintended is simply not the question to ask. People can perceive their feelings as more or less voluntary, and more or less controllable, and their views on this point are strongly influenced by their own culture.

Conclusion

The most important controversy in the study of emotions is that between “universalists” like Spiro and “culturalists” like Lutz. They are both defending an important aspect of the truth, but they both err in taking a partial truth for the whole truth, and that is where their conflict arises. The important truth that Spiro, among many others, is defending is that of the “psychic unity of humankind”. The important truth that Lutz, among many others, is defending is that “universal human nature”

must not be identified, unwittingly, with Anglo culture reflected in the English language.

The ‘Spiro-Lutz’ controversy stems from the fact that both sides feel they are defending an important truth. They are, but Spiro errs when he thinks that to defend the “universal human nature” he must defend the universality of concepts such as ‘anger’ or ‘sadness’ or, for that matter, emotion, and Lutz errs when she thinks that to combat ethnocentrism she must question the validity of concepts such as ‘feel’ or ‘think’ as basic conceptual tools in describing and comparing cultures; and also, when she implies that psychology is doomed to remaining, for ever, an “ethno psychology” since there are no universals in which a genuinely culture-independent psychology could find a foothold.

Any meaningful comparison presupposes the existence of a tertium comparationis. Different cultures reflect and promote different conceptions of ‘emotion’, that is, of those aspects of human life which are defined with reference to the concept “feel”; but all these different conceptions can all be meaningfully compared in terms of human universals encoded in all human languages. By affirming the existence of such universals, and demonstrating their reality through cross-linguistic investigations, we can defend the old faith in the “psychic unity of mankind” while at the same time helping to protect the psychology, anthropology, and philosophy of ‘emotions’ from the ever-present threat of ethnocentric misconceptions.

2.3.3 Frijda (1986)

Diversity in Emotion Lexicons

The relationship between emotions and emotion words can be viewed in two different ways. One can assume that there exist words (“emotion words”) that dictate the way things are seen; or one can assume that there exist things (“emotions”) that are given names and thus have words assigned to them. Frijda asserts that there exist things to be seen, collectively labelled by laymen and investigators in many languages as “emotions” or some close equivalent; and these things are given names, the various emotion words like *anger*, *ikari* or *boosheid*.

Frijda wants to argue that emotional phenomena exist, more or less regardless of what words there are to designate those phenomena. The phenomena are complex, and when using words, individuals as well as languages take their pick in what they wish to designate in those complex phenomena. The words, nevertheless, do designate aspects of the complex phenomena, and they reflect the nature of the phenomena that they refer to.

That emotion words are dictated by phenomena existing independently of language may seem to be contradicted by the diversity among the different emotion lexicons. Anthropological and psychological emotion literature is concerned with that diversity, and with the fact that so many emotion words in a given language cannot be neatly mapped onto the emotion words in another language. But, on the one hand, different lexicons may still be based upon independently existing emotional phenomena, if these phenomena show cultural diversity, or if cultures treat similar phenomena differently. On the other hand, the dissimilarity between emotion lexicons should not obscure the fact that a very considerable similarity between those lexicons also exists. A small set of emotion categories accounts for the most frequently mentioned emotion words in quite a few different languages. This conclusion is based upon a set of studies using a method first used by Fehr and Russell: ask subjects to mention as many emotion words as they can in five minutes, and count the percentage of subjects using each word.

Language categories as well as frequency of usage of those categories suggest that a major part of emotion language use is determined by a few very general – and perhaps universal – emotion categories, which for that reason may lay a claim to the notion of “basic” categories. What is shared across languages or cultures is a set of general emotional structures or structural ranges that form the fabric of major emotional phenomena. Each of those structures or structural ranges may or may not match a particular word in a given language, but each of them can be explicated. Frijda claims that a particular set of structures or structural ranges occurs over a wide range of cultures, and probably is universal, even if no words exist for certain of the structures in a particular language. A second claim is that the elements out of which any emotion structure is composed are also very general, and for an important part universal.

Emotional Phenomena

The existence of sets of emotional phenomena underlying emotion words and that are independent of language does not preclude that there still are good grounds for lexical diversity. The sets of phenomena that the word "emotion" designates do not consist of simple, unanalysable states but of complex patterns of phenomena. What we call emotions are "multicomponential phenomena". The word "emotion" (or any of its equivalents) was conceived to denote multicomponential sets of phenomena with particular properties, and individual emotion words, like *anger*, *marah*, *ikari*, *nguch*, to denote particular subsets of these.

These phenomena exist without such naming. To exist, they do not need words (that is, nouns or adjectives) to designate them. The multi-componential nature of the emotional phenomena favours all sorts of different ways to label one and the same set of phenomena. The responses to personally significant events primarily consist of changes in the interaction between an individual and his or her environment. Those interactions involve a number of distinct elements. The multi-componential patterns of the elements allow many different ways of labelling. Different emotion words in different languages, or even within a given language, may focus on different elements. Different languages may have different preferences for what they emphasize in their emotion lexicon, or they may just differ in what they focus within a particular emotional sub-domain.

The structure of Emotions

The hypothesis is that emotion words reflect emotion structures that exist independently from those words. These emotion structures can be described in terms of the elements mentioned. A discussion of some of the elements of emotion structures follows.

First, the types of *eliciting event*. Emotions are elicited, first of all, by basic and recurrent themes in the relations between individuals and their environment, the kind of thing that Lazarus has named "core relational themes". The vast majority of

emotion-arousing events can be seen as instantiations of a small number of such basic themes. Some of the examples of these themes are: "threat", "social rejection", "infringement", "obstruction".

Appraisal refers to the perception of properties in the event that constitutes its personal meaning. An event instantiating a given core relational theme is emotionally effective only to the extent that it is indeed appraised as representing such a theme, in a personally or socially relevant manner. "Something pleasant", "something evil" and "finality" are some examples of the kind of properties that appraisal is about. A person is not usually, or necessarily, aware of the process of appraisal; often, all he or she knows is what the event looks like.

According to the emotion theory, particular patterns of appraisal define the different emotions or, at least, what are the major emotions in Western emotion taxonomies. Current research has identified a particular set of appraisal dimensions that constitute these patterns, and thus define these emotions. These dimensions contribute importantly to differentiating emotions in widely different cultures, and perhaps everywhere. Major appraisal dimensions include the positive or negative valence of the emotion-eliciting event, its conduciveness to the individual's desires, aims or goals, its expectedness or unexpectedness, its controllability or agency, or responsibility, of someone else or the person him/herself.

Action readiness refers to changes in the state of readiness for relational behaviour. Emotional action readiness pertains to readiness or unreadiness for establishing particular kinds of relationship with an object in the environment. Action readiness changes may or may not lead to changes in actual behaviour. States of action readiness may differ more subtly than in terms of the modes listed in the questionnaire research, in a number of parameters such as the degree of vehemence they are readiness for, their tonicity, the degree of control over their expression, or one's certainty about the success of ensuing behaviour.

Hypotheses

The main hypothesis in the present discussion is that emotional experiences can, to a large extent, be described in terms of emotion components, and first of all in those of appraisal and action readiness. This implies that the meanings of emotion concepts in different languages can be characterised in terms of a common set of appraisal and action readiness dimensions. The same major elements, presumably, are to be found in the semantic structure of emotion words in different languages.

A second hypothesis is that the major emotion words in different languages have a similar structure. Emotion words in different languages can be more or less faithfully translated because, or to the extent that, they represent similar psychological structures. Because those major emotion words are not entirely equivalent, structural differences are to be found next to the similarities, but do not do away with the similarities in major structural aspects.

The third hypothesis is that dimensions of appraisal and action readiness are cross-culturally highly general, or even universal, because they are tied to adaptationally and socially basic relationships, to cognitive mechanisms attuned to those relationships, and to biological mechanisms. With regard to appraisal dimensions: they reflect basic structural properties of the human environment, such as the existence of uncertainty, of intending agents, of possibilities and impossibilities of effecting change, and the like. With regard to modes of action readiness, Frijda maintains the plausible assumption that the number of action readiness modes that can meaningfully be distinguished is limited, and very general, or even universal, because the number and kinds of possible relationships between an individual and his or her environment are limited, and universal, at least at some level of abstraction.

Comparative Study of Emotion Structures

The hypotheses in the previous section were investigated by examining the structure of emotional experiences denoted by emotion concepts in three different cultural groups: one from the Netherlands, one from Indonesia, and one from Japan. The subjects in these studies were asked to recall an instance of having experienced a particular kind of emotion, or of several emotions, as indicated by one or several

emotion words, and for each experience to fill out a questionnaire on appraisal and action readiness variables.

The data from the research supports the hypotheses. They suggest that appraisal and action readiness dimensions are relevant in emotion word distinctions in all three cultures, and that in fact the same variables, translation problems notwithstanding, are relevant in those three cultures. At the same time, however, they suggest that not all variables may be equally important or prominent in all three cultures.

The Structure of Appraisal and Action Readiness Dimensions

The question here is which underlying independent dimensions of appraisal and action readiness can be identified in the various appraisal and action readiness items, whether these underlying dimensions are the same for the three groups, and whether they correspond with the theoretical predictions from a priori considerations and previous empirical work. To answer these questions, a factor analyses of each of the questionnaires was performed.

From the analysis there is a clear overlap in factor contents in the appraisal factors. Furthermore, the corresponding factors are not all equally important in all three cultures. Finally, the structures are on the whole reasonably similar. The factor analysis of the action readiness variables suggests appreciable structural similarity in the three groups in this domain, too. Most of the major action readiness modes appear to form independent variables in all three cultures. It proved in fact impossible to construct a common factor structure for the three groups by Lisrel multi-group analysis. This latter result might be taken to mean that the structure of emotional action readiness shows to be different in the different cultures. With regard to the five most important factors, they suggest that specific modes of behaviour may have different relational significance in different cultures. The factors give evidence that the underlying dimensions of emotional behaviour, the relational aims of that behaviour, are cross-culturally largely similar, but at the same time, the specific modes of behaviour that implement these aims may differ, and the meaning of these behaviours may, consequently, differ.

The fact that certain action readiness questionnaire variables are part of one factor in one culture, and of another one in another culture stems from those variables being closer to overt behaviour than the hypothetical action readiness modes as reflected in the factors; and overt behaviour may have quite different meanings, be in within a given culture or in different cultures.

The Structure of Major Emotion Concepts

The various data provide us with patterns of features that characterise the different emotions cross-culturally. Those patterns consist of the features (the appraisal and action readiness dimensions) that have similar and meaningful values in all three groups.

From these data it appears that there is in all three samples an emotion, called “anger” in English, “kwaad” in Dutch, “marah” in Indonesia, and “ikari” in Japanese, consisting of the experience of something unpleasant and that has obstructed one’s reaching one’s goals, which event was felt to be unfair but inevitable, and for which someone else is to blame. It also involves the desire to undo the event and to protect oneself, makes one boil inwardly and to tend to oppose the agent, while having a feeling of being in command. It preoccupies and makes one feel tense.

Emotions under the English label “annoyed”, that also occur in all three languages, are somewhat similar, except that they are less, or not, felt to obstruct one’s goals or to be inevitable, and that there is not necessarily someone else to be blamed. It does not so much imply a tendency to undo what caused it, but rather to reject that event, that is, to keep it away. Emotions of “hatred” do not differ clearly from “anger”, with respect to the variables included in the study. There is more desire to be helped, more tenseness, and more attending than in “anger”.

The three notions of “anxiety” share strong negative valence and goal obstructiveness, and much anticipated effort. It is the same for the “fear” words. All three tend strongly to preoccupy, to render helpless, and to involve tendencies to oppose, and undo. “Fear”, in addition, involves a strong tendency to avoid and to protect oneself.

By contrast, emotions called “gelukkig”, “senang” and “siawase” (“happy” or “happiness” in English), in all three languages, are pleasant and concern events that are felt to be favourable for one’s goals, fair and interesting, for which one tends to deserve credit, that enhance the regard of others, and that correspond to one’s norms of behaviour. They involve the desire to move towards the object and lead to exuberance behaviour, such as singing, laughing and moving, and to the feeling of being in command. At the same time, they induce a sense of relaxation and of rest, and the desire to be tender towards someone.

The similarities mentioned justify the fact that the words are each other’s translation. The structures described are evidently major emotion structures in all three cultures. One may expect the same structures to exist, and be important, in the other cultures (or language groups) in which “equivalent” words belong to the frequently used emotion words. The structures describe what might, perhaps, be universal emotions, that may also exist in cultures that do not have a major word for them. At the same time, the data clearly indicate that these translations are not fully equivalent. Some features differ. They are based only on small numbers of subjects per word, so at present we cannot be sure what are true differences between the words, what may be due to translation differences between the questionnaire items, or chance variations.

All this is suggestive rather than definitive data. However, they may be solid enough to indicate the value of the approach in examining cross-cultural differences as well as similarities in word meanings, emotional experiences, or both.

Conclusion

The various data presented support the view that major forms of emotion occur in culturally widely varying surroundings, and that the structural elements that compose the various emotions do likewise. They thereby offer support for the hypothesis that there exists a set of quite general, and perhaps universal forms of emotion. The data, with all their deficiencies, also clearly show that cross-culturally identical emotion patterns coexist with important cross-cultural differences in the same emotion categories. The major emotions, in the languages examined, differ in consequential aspects, as well as showing similarities of such magnitude as to make them close kin.

There exists no conflict between cultural specificity of emotions, and the fact that these specific emotions (or some of them) are rooted in general (or universal) modes of appraisal and action readiness.

The specificities are not limited to the kind of cultural, or language, differences identified in the emotion structure comparisons given, but include the differences found in the factor analyses of appraisal and action readiness dimensions, and the location of specific variables in the factors. Given emotional behaviours may mean something different in different cultures. Moreover, the specific behaviours giving shape to particular modes of action readiness may cross-culturally differ, with vast emotional implications.

The existence of these cultural differences does not imply that these differences are a consequence of differences in the emotion lexicons. The data support the view that emotion words are not arbitrary products of cultural convention or historically determined emotionologies. The differences in lexicon can equally be understood as reflecting culturally different emotional phenomena, existing independently from those lexicons. Emotion words are the joint products of the phenomena of emotion as such, that themselves may differ because of cultural practices and values, and of what these cultures think is important to group together, discriminate, or emphasise. This is not to deny that emotion words may have an influence upon the emotional phenomena.

2.3.4 Goddard (1998)

We are studying emotions and colours because they highlight and sharpen theoretical and methodological conflicts in semantics, and because they illustrate how the study of linguistic semantics is influenced by other human science disciplines.

1. Theories of the emotions

In the last decade or so, the nature of emotions and the meaning of emotion terms have been much discussed in anthropology and psychology as well as in semantics.

Jamesian 'physicalism'

William James advocated a physicalist theory of emotion that viewed emotions as essentially physical (i.e. bodily) in nature. He thought that *fear*, for instance more or less consisted of the bodily symptoms of trembling, excitement, and so on, together with our awareness of them. Objections to this theory is that there are some emotions, such as *happiness*, that don't seem to have any characteristic (or prototypical) bodily signs associated with the, and that it is also hard to imagine that physical descriptions alone could capture distinctions as fine as those between *distressed*, *downhearted*, and *despondent*.

Many psychologists believe that there are some basic emotions which are inbuilt as part of our neuro-physiological make-up. *Anger*, *fear*, *surprise*, *sadness*, *joy*, *disgust* are the most widely accepted candidates. Other emotions are explained as amalgams of these, e.g. *delight* = *joy* + *surprise*. Proponents usually place great reliance on the proposition that each is linked with a specific facial expression, and these facial expressions can be accurately identified (that is, matched with the appropriate emotion) across language and culture barriers.

The basic emotion position is now under intense criticism within psychology itself. It has also been assailed by anthropologists, who have been investigating the emotional lives of people in other cultures, and discovering a surprising degree of variation and diversity.

Alternatives approaches

There are two main rivals to the basic emotions theory. The so-called cognitive approach to emotions holds that emotions depend in large part on mental processes; specifically, that when we say someone is *proud*, *angry*, *lonesome*, for instance, what we are doing is describing the kind of reaction that person is having to something they are thinking, or to something they want or don't want to happen.

The point of view known as social constructivism stresses the cultural aspect of emotions, saying that social judgement, cultural values, and other cultural practises

actually shape and create emotions. Clifford Geertz calls emotions 'cultural artefacts' embodying shared understandings of human nature and social interaction.

Trying to tackle the meaning of emotions across cultural divides raises the dilemma of how to ensure our enquiries are not distorted by ethno-centrism (i.e. culture-bias). One source of ethno-centrism in studies of emotion is the practise of using complex and English-specific terms as though they were a universal, culture-free meta-language. This would be imposing an English point of view. To overcome this problem is to resort to simpler English words, such as *feel, think, want, good, bad*, and others, which have counterparts in most, if not all, other languages.

2. Semantic components of emotion words

Iordanskaja's work on Russian emotions

According to Iordanskaja the fundamental requirement of semantics is the standardising of the semantic description of language units and accepting the need to formulate definitions in terms which are as uniform as possible and do not fall into circularity. The finding of Iordanskaja's work brings a clear realisation of two points. First, that the emotion terms of different cultures really do not match up; and secondly, that the challenge for semantic description is to analyse the meanings in question in a clear and complete way, accessible to a cultural outsider.

Iordanskaja's main proposal is that, in general, the definition on an emotion term should consist of two kinds of components: an 'internal description of the emotional state' and 'the reason for its occurrence'. The internal description takes in such things as whether the feeling is positive (a good feeling) or negative (a bad feeling), and whether or not it is 'active' or 'passive', i.e. whether or not it is coupled with a desire to do anything. The principal part of an emotion definition gives the reason or typical conditions for its occurrence, and the 'level' needs not actually to have occurred, so long as the person thinks it has occurred.

Iordanskaja classified Russian emotion words into six groups – *radost* ‘joy’, *gnev* ‘anger, rage’, *ogorcenie* ‘grief’, *strax* ‘fear’, *nadežda* ‘hope’, and *udivlenie* ‘surprise’. The main features she used for this classification were: the experiencer’s assessment of the likelihood of the triggering event, whether the experiencer evaluates the event as good or bad, and whether or not the experiencer wants to do anything in relation to the trigger event.

Wierzbicka on emotion concepts

On her work on emotions Wierzbicka employed the concept of prototypical scenario, taking her cue in this regard from literature. Her insight was that the emotion words of ordinary language are essentially individual and don’t have the force of generalisations, except that instead of linking feelings with illustrative situations they link them with hypothetical cognitive scenarios, involving thoughts and wants. For instance, *sadness* is a bad feeling linked with the thought ‘something bad happened’, *remorse* is a bad feeling linked with the thought ‘I did something bad’, *joy* is a good feeling linked with thought ‘something very good is happening now’.

There is an obvious similarity here with Iordanskaja’s notion that emotions are largely distinguished from one another by the (subjective) ‘reason’ for the occurrence, but there is also an important difference. It is quite impossible to feel some emotions (for instance, *sadness or happiness*) without being aware of the cause. This would be a problem if emotions had to be caused by certain thoughts, but it is quite compatible with an analysis based on a prototypical scenario.

3. Comparisons between some English emotions

Happy and related words

Happy is self-oriented or personal and it contains additional components making it akin in some way to *contentedness*. One could propose the following explication:

X feels *happy* =

Sometimes a person feels something like this:

Something good happened to me

I wanted this

I don't want other things now

Because of this, this person feels something good

X feels like this

This depicts *happy* as implying a perspective that is at once 'personal', and past perfective ('something good happened to me', as well as implying an absence of further desires ('I don't want other things now')).

These components can be contrasted with *joy*, with its unspecified and exuberant prototypical thought ('something very good is happening now'), which could apply to something other than oneself and which has a distinctly 'present' perspective:

X feels *joy* =

Sometimes a person thinks something like this:

Something very good is happening now

I want this

Because of this, this person feels something very good

X feels like this

The meanings of *pleased* and *contented* embody different combinations of similar components to those we have just seen. *Pleased* suggests that something has happened which one has been waiting to happen for some time:

X feels *pleased* =

Sometimes a person thinks something like this:

Something good happened

I wanted this

Because of this, this person feels something good

X feels like this

Contented has a similarly moderate tone, but a more 'present tense' orientation and also a certain passivity:

X feels *contented* =

Sometimes a person thinks something like this:

Something good is happening to me now

I wanted something like this

I don't want to do other things now

Because of this, this person feels something good

X feels like this

Happiness in a broader European perspective

Happy conveys a less intense emotion than that conveyed by German *glücklich* and French *heureux*. Speaking metaphorically, emotions such as German *glücklich* and French *heureux* fill a person to overflowing; leaving no room for any further desires or wishes. The following explication has been proposed for German *glücklich* and French *heureux*:

X feels *glücklich* (*heureux*)

Sometimes a person thinks something like this:

Something good happened to me

I wanted this

Everything is good now

I can't want anything more

Because of this, this person feels something good

X feels like this

This differs from the English meanings we have seen in two ways. It has an unfamiliar component 'everything is very good now'; and the component 'I can't want anything more' contrasts with 'I don't want other things'. These differences imply an intense but generalised and almost euphoric view of one's current existence.

It must as well be observed that the comparatively muted quality of the English words is consistent with the traditional Anglo-Saxon distaste for extreme emotions.

Sad and related words

The difference between being *sad* and being *unhappy* is that one can feel sad in response to a much broader range of events, while being unhappy suggests a more active frame of mind than sad. *Sad* contains components suggesting something like resignation and acceptance:

X feels *sad* =

Sometimes a person thinks something like this:

I know something happened

If I could, I would do something

I know I can't do anything

Because of this, this person feels something bad

X feels like this

Unhappy contains components suggesting an unaccepting and potentially active response:

X feels *unhappy* =

Sometimes a person feels something like this:

Something bad happened to me

I don't want this

If I could, I would do something

Because of this, this person feels something bad

X feels like this

Depressed differs from the other 'sad' words in including a judgemental, quasi-clinical perspective ('it is not good for someone too feel like this'):

X feels *depressed*

Sometimes a person thinks something like this for some time:

Nothing good can happen to me

I can't do anything good

Because of this, this person feels something bad

X feels like this

It is not good for someone to feel like this

Reprise: structure of emotion explications

In comparing the differences between English emotion words like *happy and sadness*, it becomes evident that the explications have a three –part structure. First, there is a prototypical cognitive scenario describing the state of mind of a hypothetical individual. After the scenario comes the statement that our hypothetical individual feels something as a result. Finally, the actual feeling of the real experiencer is likened to that of the person in the cognitive scenario.

This structure does not imply that the emotional experiencer necessarily goes through the particular thoughts depicted in the prototypical cognitive scenario. Rather, the scenario serves as a kind of 'reference situation' by which the nature of the associated feeling can be identified. It should also be pointed out that some emotion terms require slightly different explication structures, in order to accommodate subtle differences between different sub-classes of emotion meanings.

4. 'Culture – related' emotions

In a sense, all emotion terms are culture-related, in the sense of being culture-specific. According to Bruner every culture has a somewhat different folk psychology, and that we wind up as we are partly through having been socialised according to the view of human nature embodied in our folk psychology. The inventory of emotions labelled by the words of any language is one of the most important components of its folk psychology.

The following are three particularly clear examples of emotions, which can be directly related to the values, and practices of a culture:

Japanese amae

Amae is defined as 'to presume upon another's love'; 'to take advantage of another's kindness'; 'to depend and presume on another's benevolence'; 'to indulge in a feeling of security as a child feels with its loving mother'. The last explanation relies on the fact that the psychological prototype for *amae* is the way an infant feels for his or her mother. The desire to *amae* is not seen as childish but is expected and respected in a range of adult relationships.

The explication below is for the noun *amae*:

X feels *amae* (toward Y) =

Sometimes a person thinks something like this (about Y):

Y can do good things for me

Y wants to do good things for me

When I am with Y, nothing bad can happen to me

I don't have to do anything

I want to be with Y

Because of this, this person feels something good

X feels like this

Cross-cultural commentators often point out that Japanese culture places positive value on 'dependency' or 'interdependency' rather than on independence and autonomy, as in the West. This has been linked with Japanese child - raising, which is characterised by intimate contact with the mother. One linguistic barrier to cross-cultural appreciation is the lack of match-up between words for Japanese and English cultural concepts.

Polish *tęskni*

The Polish words *tęsnic* (verb) and *tęsknota* (noun) have no exact equivalents in English, though in different context they could be translated as *homesick*, *missing*, *longing*, *pining*, or *feeling nostalgic*.

The full meaning of Polish *tęsnic* can be explicated as follows:

X *tęsnic* ('feels *tęsknota*') (do 'towards' Y) =

Sometimes a person thinks something like this (about Y):

Y is far from me

When I was with Y I felt something good

I want to be with Y now

If I were with Y now I would feel something good

I know I can't be with Y now

Because of this, this person feels something bad

X feels like this

Wierzbicka explains the cultural salience of the words *tęsnic* and *tęsknota* in terms of the history of the Polish people.

Malay *marah*

Marah, which is often glossed as 'angry', is central to ordinary Malay interaction. From a Western point of view, one of the most salient things about the *marah* response is its muted, restrained nature. Malays are known, on the one hand, for the ease with which they take offence, and, on the other, for their reluctance to express it explicitly. Rather than the outburst of hostile words and physical symptoms characteristics of 'anger', there is a lingering period of sullen brooding described by the verb *merajuk*, which may last for days, weeks, or months before subsiding.

Explicit mentions of *marah* are very often linked with observations about tone of voice and facial expression. In literature the attribution of *marah* is often accompanied

by a comment on the demeanour of the character. So for the cognitive stimulus for *marah*, at first it appears to be the same as for English *angry*, namely the thought that 'someone did something bad'. But closer inspection suggests that there is something more personal about *marah*, more akin to English *offend* than to *angry*. 'Taking it personally' is an important aspect of the prototypical scenario for *marah*.

The first component of the cognitive scenario shows an important similarity between *marah* and *anger* – in both cases, the prototypical antecedent is the thought that someone has done something bad. The 'feeling tone' component is also the same as for *anger* – both are 'bad feelings'. But this is where the resemblance ends. A key feature of the scenario for *marah* is the experiencer's sense of personal affront. One experiences *marah* most sharply and clearly when one believes that the other person has knowingly disregarded one's wishes. Unlike *angry*, Malay *marah* has no component that seeks retaliation or retribution. Rather, what the experiencer wants is for the other person to recognise the hurt feelings which he or she has caused – without the experiencer having to explicitly say anything about it.

X rasa *marah* (pada) =

Sometimes a person thinks something like this (about Y):

Y did something bad

Y knows I do not want Y to do something like this

I feel bad because of that

I want Y to know this, not because I say anything about it

Because of this, this person feels something bad

X feels like this

5. Three 'anger' - words in Yankunytjatjara

This section looks at methods that can help draw out the similarities and differences between closely related words in an unfamiliar language. Yankunytjatjara is a dialect of the Western Desert Language spoken in the interior of Australia. In this language, there are three expressions that can be used to translate the English expression *He got angry at me*.

Paluru nganyuku {
pika - ri - ngu.
mirpan - ari - ngu.
kuya - ri - ngu.

He/she 1sgPURP -INCHO-PAST

'He/she gat angry at me.'

All three verbs are formed with the aid of the so-called INCHOative (or 'happening') suffix *-ri/-ari*. The roots *-pika*, *mirpan*, and *kuya* – can function as separate words: *pika* and *mirpan* may be active adjectives, meaning (roughly) 'angrily'; and *kuya* is a stative adjective 'bad'. The person or thing at which the emotion is directed appears in the PURPositive case, marked by *-kul/-mpa*.

Pikaringanyi

Semantically, *pikaringanyi* involves little more than the urge or readiness to fight or inflict pain; so, strictly speaking, it should not be regarded as an emotion at all. English words like *hostile*, *aggressive*, *feisty*, and *combative* often provide appropriate translation equivalents.

X *pikaringanyi* (Y-ku) =

X wants to fight/cause pain (to Y) now

The first piece of evidence for this structure comes from polysemy. The root *pika* can function as a noun with the possible meanings 'a sore', 'pain', or 'a fight'.

- Pika ala* 'a wound' (*ala* 'opening'); *pika warutja* 'a burn' (*waru* 'fire')
- Kututu pika ngarala, nyangakutu tjunkupai.*
 'If there's chest pain, you put (ointment) on here'.
- Pika nyaakun nyangatja ngarala nyanganyi?*
 'Why are you just standing here and watching the fight?'

The second piece of evidence comes from contextual restrictions. If a person gets frustrated with an inanimate object, such as a tool that won't work properly, *pikaringanyi* is not a suitable word to describe this state. The reason is presumably that it makes no sense to think of fighting or causing pain to inanimate objects.

<i>Putu palyara</i> <i>Palyara ngayulu</i>	}	<i>*pikaringu,</i> <i>Mumuna atura minya-minyanu.</i> <i>mirpanaringu,</i>
---	---	--

'After trying and trying to fix it, I got really annoyed, and I smashed it to pieces'.

Something similar applies in respect of children: though they may *pikaringanyi* among themselves, the angry reaction of an adult towards a child is unlikely to be described as *pika*. One does not usually want to 'fight' a child. Animals and young babies are capable of *pikaringanyi*, implying that judgement or appraisal is not a necessary component of its meaning.

<i>Papa/nantju palatja</i>	}	<i>pikaringanyi</i> <i>* mirpanarinyi</i>
----------------------------	---	--

'(Look out!) That dog/horse is getting aggressive.'

In sum, the evidence from polysemy and from contextual restrictions on distribution converges on an interpretation of *pikaringanyi* that does not involve any imputed act of judgement or evaluation, but merely the urge or tendency to be hostile.

Mirpanarinyi

The explication of *Mirpanarinyi* differs markedly from *pikaringanyi* in originating with an appraisal that 'this person is bad', which leads to two argues: first, not to oblige Y in any way; and second, to actively do Y some harm. Better translation

equivalents are provided by expressions such as *aggrieved, offended, having something against (him/her)*.

X *mirpaṅarinyi* (Y-ku) =

Sometimes a person thinks something like this (about Y):

Y is bad

I don't want to do anything good for Y

I want to do something bad to Y

Because of this, this person feels something bad

X feels like this

The capacity to *mirpaṅarinyi* is restricted to persons. This suggests that the exercise of judgement or appraisal is required, in the form of a simple act of evaluation, that 'Y' is bad. The formulation, not to oblige Y in any way and to actively do Y some harm, allows for the possibility of a delayed outburst, preceded by the sullen *mulyara* phase. It also allows that the eventual action may be sorcery, betrayal, character assassination, or some other form of indirect retaliation, rather than a physical confrontation, as implied by *pikaringanyi*.

Kuyaringanyi

It is suggestive that the root kuya when used alone means 'bad'. Significantly, the expression (kurun) unnungu kuyaringanyi, 'going bad inside (one's spirit)', is often used to explain the meaning of mirpaṅarinyi. These facts suggest that the explication for mirpaṅarinyi already fully contain kuyaringanyi.

According to the explication below, *kuyaringanyi* involves a negative appraisal of someone or something, leading to a disinclination to assist them, but it stops short of the active hostility of *mirpaṅarinyi*. Appropriate translation equivalents include *resent, go off, be pissed off with*.

X kuyaringanyi (Y-ku) =

Sometimes a person thinks something like this (about Y):

Y is bad

I don't want to do anything good for Y

Because of this, this person feels something bad

X feels like this

Kuyaringanyi need not imply any aggressive intentions: it may simply be a matter of not wanting to oblige. It may also lead to *mirpanarinyi*, as displeasure turns to active hostility. It is well suited as a euphemism or understatement for the stronger, more positively hostile feeling of *mirpanarinyi*.

CHAPTER 3: LEXICAL SEMANTICS

3.1 Aim

The aim of this section is to explain the different aspects of lexical semantics that will be used in describing and analysing the different emotion verbs and expressions.

3.2 Thematic roles

Linguistic expressions that are assigned theta role are called arguments and the potential arguments are the NP's. A θ -role is a synonym of argument. The semantic relations of words in a sentence are explained in terms of the predicate argument structure (PAS). The PAS of a verb indicates the number of arguments it takes, and it will be described as a one-place, two-place or three-place predicate. Each argument will have a specific variable corresponding to such an argument, or such variable may have certain semantic labels such as agent, theme, and recipient:

One-place predicate

ja: X
Theme

Two-place predicate

bapala: X (Y)
Agent (theme)

Three-place predicate


adima: X (Y) (Z)
Agent (recipient theme)

The assignment of θ -roles is governed by the projection principle and the θ -criterion. The projection principle ensures that a verb may only categorize for complements that it θ -marks. The θ -criterion imposes a one-to-one association between roles and arguments. Role assignment gives the association between the NP's in the argument position of a verb in the syntax and the variables in the PAS of the verb.

There are three modes of θ -role assignment: by a verb, a preposition and a VP via predication. The verb normally assigns a θ -role to at most one external argument. The NP argument that is assigned a θ -role by the VP via predication must be outside the maximal projection of the verb as required by the predication theory, and the argument is known as the external argument. The remaining arguments are realized internal to the maximal projection of the verb and are referred to as internal arguments. The NP argument that is assigned its θ -role directly by the verb is the direct NP argument and the NP argument that is assigned its θ -role by a preposition is an indirect NP argument. NP arguments are assigned their θ -role under government. Direct arguments must be governed by the verb; indirect arguments must be in relation of mutual C-command within the maximal projection of the verb.

The following sentence will be used to illustrate the notion above:

- (1) Ngwana o ja dijo.
 'The child eats food'



In (2) above the NP [Ngwana] is θ -marked by VP via predication, the NP [dijo] is θ -marked by the head verb because the verb **ja** is the governor of the NP object [dijo]. This NP object is θ -marked because structurally it is adjacent to the governing verb.

Inflection has been expanded and it now falls within the ambit of the X-bar theory and various functional categories have been recognized. They play a role in establishing dependencies between parts of a sentence and they are represented as heads projecting X-bar phrases. The development of these functional categories into phrases in X-bar schema, have put the external NP argument into a predicament where its position has to be reviewed. The position of the external NP argument will be under the VP in the new structural analysis of the sentences, and this position is known as the NP internal subject hypothesis.

θ -theory is concerned with a relation between a verb and a noun and this relation has three features:

Firstly, there is an obligatory relation: an NP in a sentence must be an argument of some verb:

- (3) [Ngwana] o ja [dijo].
 'The child eat food'

The verb **rata** is a two-place relation where the NP's [Ngwana] and [dijo] are arguments of the verb **rata**. Some arguments must be obligatorily filled: the subject argument is always obligatory.


- (4) [Moeketsi] o a robala.
'Moeketsi is sleeping'

The subject argument is [Moeketsi]. If the subject arguments are missing, an empty *pro* with subjectival agreement represents them:

- (5) [*pro*_i] o_i a robala.
'He is sleeping'

Secondly, the relation between an NP and the verb is unique in the sense that one NP may not be assigned two θ -roles at a time. In (3) above, [Ngwana] will be assigned the subject argument while [dijo] will be assigned the object argument by the verb **ja**.

Thirdly, the relation between the NP and the verb is structurally local, i.e. the verb and its arguments must be sisters:



In (6) above, **reka** and the NP object [dijo] are sisters because they fall under the same maximal projection that is VP.


The following issues are also found in θ -theory:

Directionality parameter: lexical θ -role assignment takes place from left to right:

- (7) Moeketsi o bina pina.
 'Moeketsi sings a song'

The verb **bina** assigns a θ -role to its complement [pina], which is on the right side of the verb.

The external argument: the subject argument is a sister of the maximal projection of the verb:



[Moeketsi] is the subject argument and this NP argument is a sister of VP that is the maximal projection of the verb **bina**.

Predication: The θ -role assignment between the VP and the subject NP is phrasal θ -role assignment: in (8) above, the VP assigns a θ -role to the subject argument [Moeketsi] because the VP is a predicate.

3.3 Argument structure

The argument structure for a word can be seen as a minimal specification of its lexical semantics. There are four types of arguments:

True arguments

True arguments define those parameters that are necessarily expressed at syntax. This is the domain generally covered by the θ -criterion and other surface conditions on argument structure.

The following is a representation of arguments for a lexical item in a list structure, where ARG1 and ARG2 are arguments for lexical item, D-ARG is a default argument and S-ARG is a shadow argument.

$$(1) \quad \left(\begin{array}{l} a \\ \text{ARGSTR} \end{array} \left(\begin{array}{l} \text{ARG1}=\dots \\ \text{ARG2}=\dots \\ \text{D-ARG1}=\dots \\ \text{S-ARG1}=\dots \end{array} \right) \right)$$

The argument structure of nouns depends on the number of different senses that a specific noun may have:

Ntja (dog): [ARG1= animal]

Setholo (deaf): [ARG1= animate, individual]
[ARG2= artifact]

The argument structure of verbs will look at the specifiers and complements of the verb to establish what may appear together with it:

Thimola (sneeze): [ARG1= animate, individual]

Hadika (roast): [ARG1= animate, individual]
[ARG2= food]

Default argument

These are parameters which participate in the logical expressions in the qualia, but which are not necessarily expressed syntactically. They are necessary for the logical well-formedness of the sentence, but may be left unexpressed in the surface structure:

- (2) Ke aha [ntlo ya majwe].
 'I built a stone house'

The argument structure of verbs with default arguments may be represented as follows with the verb [-ah-] (built) in (2) above as an example:

- (3)
$$\left(\begin{array}{l} \text{-ah-} \\ \text{ARGSTR} = \left(\begin{array}{l} \text{ARG1} = \text{animate, individual} \\ \text{ARG2} = \text{artifact} \\ \text{D-ARG1} = \text{material} \end{array} \right) \end{array} \right)$$

Shadow arguments

These are parameters that are semantically incorporated into the lexical item. They can be expressed only by operations of sub-typing or discourse specification.

- (4) Ke ikotlile [ka lejwe] monwaneng.
 'I hit myself with a stone on the finger'

In (4) above, [ka lejwe] is a shadow argument.

Shadow arguments may be represented as follows with the verb [-otl-] in (4) above as an example:

$$(5) \quad \left[\begin{array}{l} \text{-otl-} \\ \text{ARGSTR} = \left[\begin{array}{l} \text{ARG1} = \text{animate, individual} \\ \text{ARG2} = \text{physical object} \\ \text{S-ARG1} = \text{stone} \end{array} \right] \end{array} \right]$$

True arguments

These are parameters that modify the logical expression but are part of the situational interpretation, and are not tied to any particular lexical item's semantic representation. These include adjunct expressions of temporal or spatial modification:

(6) Ha re ya mmona [maobane].
'We did not see him yesterday'

(7) Moya o foka [thabeng].
'The wind is blowing in the mountain'

These arguments are associated with verb classes and not with individual verbs.

3.4 Event structure

The following categorization of aspectual types of verbs, verb phrases and sentences may be found: activities, event (accomplishments and achievements) and states (individual-level and stage-level). Events can be classified into at least three sorts: processes, states and transitions, where activities are now processes while accomplishments and achievements collapsed to transitions.

State (S): a single event, which is evaluated relative to no other event.

Examples: ho kula (be sick), lerato (love)


Structural representation:



Process (P): a sequence of events identifying the same semantic expression.

Examples: matha (run), sututsa (push)


Structural representation:



Transition (T): an event identifying a semantic expression, which is evaluated relative to its opposition.

Examples: fa (give), bula (open)

Structural representation:



The following is a representation of a listing of an event structure:

ARGSTR = ARG1, ARG2... ARG_n
 EVENTSTR = EVENT1, EVENT2... EVENT_n

Examples:

Nahana (think): [E₁ = state]

Hadika (toast): [E₁ = process]
 [E₂ = state]

3.5 Transitivity

3.5.1 Intransitive verbs

Intransitive verbs are verbs that do not take a direct object; i.e. they are regarded as one-place predicates, which assign only one θ -role to a linguistic expression such as a noun phrase or a clause. The argument has to appear as a subject argument.

Sefate se tla hola.
 'The tree will grow'

In (1) above, the predicate **hola** assigns only one argument that appears in the subject position, i.e. [sefate]. The lexical entry for the verb **hola** (grow) is as follows

Morphophonological form	hol
Categorical type	[+V, -N]
Sub-categorical feature	[-----]
θ -grid	θ_1

There are also intransitive verbs that assign two arguments: an agent argument in the subject position and an internal argument that is a locative noun phrase. These intransitive verbs are motion verbs.

Ngwana o **ya** sekolong.

'The child goes to school'

In (2) above, the predicate **ya** assigns two arguments, i.e. [ngwana] in the subject position, and a locative noun phrase, [sekolong], as an internal argument.

The following arguments may appear in the subject position: agent, experiencer, theme and patient.

3.5.2 Transitive verbs

Transitive verbs are two-place predicate, i.e. they allow two arguments where the one argument is an external argument and the second one an internal argument. These arguments have θ -roles, which may have the following semantic interpretation: agent/theme, agent/patient, theme/patient, experiencer/theme, and agent/recipient.

Mme o **reka** dijo.

'Mother buys food'

The lexical entry of the verb **reka** (buy) is as follows:

Morphophonological	rek
Categorical	[+V, -N]
Sub-categorization	[_____ NP]
θ -grid	θ_1 θ_2

The syntactic properties of the object are the following: word order, objectival agreement and the passive. There are also verbs that have a lexical representation with

an obligatory external argument and an optional internal one. These transitive-intransitive alternations reflect the fact that certain thematic roles can be represented in the lexicon but not in the syntax.

3.5.3 Ditransitive verbs

These verbs take two objects. This implies that there are two internal objects: a direct and an indirect object:

[Ntate] o fa [mme] [tjhelete].
 ‘Father gives mother money’

In (4) above, the subject, [ntate] has a θ -role of agent; the direct object, [Mme], which is the NP immediately adjacent to the verb, has a θ -role of recipient; and the indirect object, [tjhelete], which follows the direct object, has a θ -role of theme.

The lexical entry of the verb like **fa** (give) in (4) above has the following features:

Morphophonological	f
Categorical	[+V, -N]
Sub-categorization	[_____ NP NP]
θ -grid	θ_1 θ_2 θ_3

3.6 Lexical derivation

3.6.1 Applicative

a. Morphology

In applicative constructions there is no controller for the external argument, i.e. the external argument of the stem becomes the external argument of the whole. The applied affix **-el-** adds an extra accusatively marked internal argument to the verb it is

joined with. This argument may have different semantic roles like benefactive, direction, recipient, malefactive, etc.


- (1) Dinokwane di nkela [monna] thjelete.
 ‘Thieves take money away from the man’

The argument taken [monna] in (1) is dependent on the applicative **-el-** and it has a reading of malefactive here.

We may assign the affix **-el-** the following designations:

-el-: f(X)
 acc

Because **-el-** is a functor, all the arguments of the stem will be carried over. In addition the argument X of **-el-** will be an argument of the whole because **-el-** is the head of the whole. Further, the **-el-** argument will be realized as accusative. Because the head has no external argument and because it does not control the external argument of the stem, the external argument of the non-head will be the external argument of the whole as the stem will be the head with regard to external argument. These properties are illustrated as follows:



b. Syntax

(b) 1 Intransitive verbs

The applicative affix allows the non-subject arguments to be increased by one argument. If the applicative suffix **-el-** is then added onto the intransitive verb, it will change this verb to a transitive verb. The intransitive verb with **-el-** will then have an external and an internal argument.

- (3) a. [Ngwana] o a kgutla.
 ‘The child went back’
- b. [Ngwana] o kgutlela [motseng]
 ‘The child went back to the village’

Sentence (3)a has been changed to sentence (3)b through the affixing of **-el-** to the verb **kgutla**. This led to the addition of the internal argument [motseng].

The semantic role which is most commonly found with the applied affix is benefactive, which may be interpreted in three different ways, depending mostly on discourse factors:

- (4) Mpho o binela nkgono.
 ‘Mpho is singing for grandmother’

From (4) above, the first reading is a benefit reading, i.e. he is singing for the benefit of grandmother. The second reading is one of replacement or substitution, i.e. he is singing on behalf of /instead of grandmother. The third interpretation is malefactive, i.e. he is singing to make trouble for the grandmother.

It may sometimes be possible that the internal argument NP may be ambiguous in its interpretation:

- (5) Ke wela [ngwana]
 'I am falling for/on the child'

In (5) **ngwana** may be interpreted as either benefactive or location depending on the context and various discourse factors.

(b) 2 Transitive verbs

The effect of the affix **-el-** on the predicate argument structure of the verb is to add one extra internal argument to the predicate. When this argument is added to transitive verbs, ditransitive verbs will be the result. This extra internal argument is the indirect object and is always adjacent to the verb being dependent on the affix **-el-**:

- (6) Ke phehela [mme] [dijo]
 'I am cooking food for mother'

The internal argument that is dependent on the applicative affix **-el-** may be interpreted with the following semantic roles:

Beneficiary:

- (7) Ntate o rathela [mme] [patsi]
 'Father chops for mother wood'

Malefactive:

- (8) Tefo o nkela [monna] [tjhelete]
 'Tefo takes money away from the man'

Recipient:

- (9) Monna o lemela [morena] [tshimo]
 ‘Man ploughs for chief land’

An inanimate NP that is dependent on the applicative affix **-el-** may have an interpretation of purpose:

- (10) Ke phehela [mokete] [kgomo]
 ‘I am cooking a cow for the party’

The interrogative **eng** in the position of an indirect object that is dependent on the applicative affix **-el-** gives an interpretation of cause:

- (11) O phehelang dijo?
 ‘Why are you cooking food?’


The interrogative **eng** in the position of the direct object with applicative affix **-el-** gives an interpretation of purpose:

- (12) O rekela dijo eng?
 ‘You are buying food for what?’

3.6.2 Causative

a. Morphology

The head of a word derived by affixation determines the external argument of the word:



The structure (13) above represents a causative derivation through the causative verbal suffix **-is-**. This suffix has been added onto the verb **tseb**, giving a derived word **tsebis** (cause to know). This affix bears an external argument, the causative agent, and this argument becomes the external argument of the whole. The argument of the non-head verbal stem **tseb** including its external argument becomes the internal argument of the whole:

- (14) Titjhere o tsebisa bana molaetsa.
 ‘Teacher makes the children know the message’

In (14) above, [titjhere] is the causative agent and the new external argument of the whole. [Bana] is the old external argument of the verb **tseb**; i.e. the agent that has now become an internal argument of the derived word **tsebis**, as also the internal argument [molaetsa] of **tseb**, which is the theme.

predicate argument structure of verb is to introduce a special argument that is known as the **causative agent**. This argument is to be found in the subjects of sentences and is thus an external argument.

- (16) a. [Ngwana] o a pheha.
 ‘The child is cooking’
- b. [Mme] o phehisa ngwana.
 ‘Mother causes the child to cook’

In (16)a above, the intransitive verb **pheha** is changed to be **phehisa** in (16)b because of the causative affix **-is-**. The ‘old’ external argument [ngwana] has been internalized. The ‘new’ causative agent is [Mme] and the ‘old’ external argument becomes an internal argument of the causative predicate.

The new external argument can be interpreted with different semantic roles than that of being an agent, with the condition that it causes the action or state:

- (17) [Botle ba hae] bo a nthabisa.
 ‘Her beauty makes me happy’

This agent can also be interpreted as a permissive agent in whom the subject allows or permits the action to happen:

- (18) [Ntate] o tshehisa bana.
 ‘Father lets the children laugh’

Sometimes the agent can also be an assistive agent in which the agent assists or helps in the action:

- (19) [Teboho] o emisa lebota.
 ‘Teboho helps to erect the wall’

It is also possible that the same sentence may be interpreted with any of these three agents, depending on the specific discourse factors:

- (20) [Matshediso] o tshehisa Sello.
- (i) Matshediso causes Sello to laugh.
 - (ii) Matshediso allows Sello to laugh.
 - (iii) Matshediso helps Sello to laugh.

(b) 2 Transitive verbs

Transitive verbs become ditransitive verbs with two objects because of the addition of a causative affix **-is-** to the verb. The object which is dependent on the presence of the affix **-is-**, is the indirect object and is always adjacent to the verb:

- (21) Ntate o **rekisa** [mme] dijo.
 'Father causes/allows/helps mother buy food'

As can be seen in (21) above, the external argument [Ntate] can be interpreted with the semantic role of either causative agent, permissive agent or assistive agent. The 'old' external argument [Mme] retains its semantic role in this new position as internal argument.

3.7 Inalienable possession

This syntactic phenomenon is also known as the syntax of body parts. An inalienable body part may be used as an adjunct of an intransitive verb:

- (1) [Leoto] la monna le shwele.
 Monna o shwele [leoto]

The inalienable possession [leoto], that started off as a possession in the subject of the intransitive verb, **shwele**, ended up as adjunct of that verb. However, this adjunct

shares the theta-role to be found in the subject position, having no theta-role of its own.

It is quite possible to use the adjunct with a possessive pronoun of the object:

- (2) Ke rata [morwetsana] [sefahleho **sa hae**]
 'I like the girl her face'

The syntax of body parts is concerned with the use of the reflexive morpheme *iN-* together with body parts. It is accepted that reflexives are to be treated in the same way as the reciprocal affix *-an-*, i.e. they are dependent on argument binding and not syntactic binding. They will thus have no syntactic NP as object.

- (3) Ke itsheha monwana.
 'I cut myself a finger'

The body part [monwana] is as adjunct sharing a thematic role with the reflexive.

CHAPTER 4: ANGER

4.1 Aim

The aim of this section will be to review an overview of anger and to determine how the emotion of anger may be expressed in Sesotho.

4.2 Overview of anger

4.2.1 Taylor and Mbense (1998)

The authors wish to examine some of the expressions that Zulu use when talking about anger, with particular reference to expressions involving metaphors and metonymies. Background to the investigation is based on Kövecses's study of anger, and other emotion, as conceptualised by speakers of American English; and his

findings is that anger and other emotions, are not just primitive, amorphous feelings but do indeed have a rich content, structured by an elaborate network of metonymic and metaphoric construals.

The methodology used is in line with Kövecses's methodology. A broad range of expressions, which Zulu people commonly use to talk about anger, was assembled, and these expressions were then examined with a view to discovering the structure and content of the underlying concept(s) of anger.

Preliminary conclusions are drawn concerning the similarities and differences between 'anger' as experienced and conceptualised by speakers of two genetically unrelated languages, namely Zulu and English, languages which have been in contact for a century and a half at the very most. The affinities are to be found at the level of underlying "concept metaphors" of the kind ANGER IS HEAT, ANGER IS A DANGEROUS ANIMAL, THE HEART IS THE CONTAINER FOR THE EMOTIONS, while many of the differences have to do with specific elaboration of these metaphors. Both Zulu and English speakers frequently refer to anger metonymically, by naming its physiological, cognitive and behavioural effects and accompaniments, but metonymic expressions are more frequent in Zulu than in English, and that the range of metonymies is broader in Zulu. Another contrast between the two languages concerns the relative emphasis on various aspects of anger. Thus, Zulu expressions highlighting the ferociousness of anger and the devastation it may cause, appears to be perspectivised more frequently and more forceful in Zulu than English. In spite of these differences in content and emphasis, the "anger script" of Zulu and English are not at all dissimilar: anger is thought of in terms of a prototypical scenario comprising a series of distinct stages.

The approach in this paper differ to that of Wierzbicka where he focused mainly on the semantics of textcall items which name the emotions, with the conclusion that it is illegitimate to speak of “anger” in a cross-cultural context, since the very use of the English word projects an Anglo centric concept onto a foreign culture. Wierzbicka approach is severely limited in that it ignores the important fact that talk about the emotions does not require that the emotions be named. One can verbalise one’s anger, or verbally describe another’s anger, without using the word “anger” or “angry” (or their nearest translation equivalents in other languages) at all. Conceptual metaphors throw more light on the conceptualisation of the emotion than a contemplation of the semantics of the word “anger”. Since the conceptualisation of anger embraces much more than just the meaning of the word “anger”, a cross-linguistic comparison of emotion concepts cannot restrict to the semantics of emotion-meaning lexemes, it needs to pay as much, if not more attention to correspondences at the level of conceptual metaphors and metonymies.

There are limitations to the study undertaken here. A full account of the Zulu conceptualisation would need to be backed by a detailed ethnographic investigation. This means that the study would also need to firstly address the internal dynamics of present day South Africa and its recent past. Secondly, cultural differences between traditional and Westernised Zulu speakers, between conservatives and progressives, between the dispossessed and the relatively affluent, between rural and urban, and between old and young. Lastly, that Zulu speakers are influenced linguistically and culturally by other cultures they interact with.

1. The heart as the focus of anger

The conceptual metaphor that construes the body as a container for the emotions and the emotions as in the body is found in Zulu, as in English and many other languages.

Lo-muntu u-gcewel-e ulaka

This-person SC-fill.up-PERF anger

“This person is full of anger”

The heart (*inhliziyo*) is the body part that is associated with the emotions. It is the seat of the emotions and, like English, uses the metaphor of “breaking one’s heart”.

Lokho ku-ngi-hlaba inhlaba inhliziyo.

That SC-me-stab heart

“That stabs my heart” i.e. “That hurts/offends me”

In English, the heart is construed as a container especially for the emotions of love, joy and courage, while in Zulu, it is associated with a broader range of emotions including anger, (im) patience and (in) tolerance. An explanation for the dimensional metaphor of the heart is speculative because Zulu speakers are not in general, able to offer a spontaneous account of them.

2. Some further heart-related expressions

Squashing

A number of expressions associate a “squashing” in the heart with the onset of anger. The idiophone “*xhifi*” denoting “squashing”, and the ideophone “*hluthu*”, denoting “snatching” are associated with the onset of anger.

Inhliziyo I-th-e xhifi ngi-mo-bona

Heart SC-say-Perf *xhifi* I-him-see

‘(My) heart went *xhifi* when I saw him’, i.e. ‘I suddenly felt hot-tempered when I saw him.’

Inhliziyo i-mane ya-thi hluthi!

Heart SC-do.suddenly SC.PAST-say *hluthi*

‘(My) heart suddenly went *hluthu*’, i.e. ‘I suddenly felt an upsurge of anger.’

2.2 Anger and nausea

The idiophone *fithi*, denoting squashing something soft, and *canu* denoting ‘of nausea’, are associated with both anger and nausea.

Kwa-thi fithi enhlizi-y-weni

It.PAST-say *fithi* heart-LOC

'It went *fithi* in my heart', i.e. 'I suddenly felt nauseous/angry'

Ngi-m-bn-e qede kwa-thi canu

I-him-see-PERF then it.PAST-say *canu*

'As soon as I saw him it went *canu*', i.e. 'I felt a sudden upsurge of anger/nausea'

Anger can actually cause vomiting

Wa-gaj-wa ulaka.

He.PAST-make.vomit-PASS by.anger

'He was made to vomit by anger', i.e. 'He vomited from anger'

The association of anger and the physiological state of nausea appear to be mediated by the effects of bile:

Wa-m-thela nge-nyongo.

He.PAST-him-splash with-bile

'He splashed him with bile.'

2.3 Interference with breathing

The result of squashing too much into the container can be feelings of internal pressure in the heart/lungs/chest region of the body, and interference with the normal functioning of the heart and neighbouring organs.

Wa-thukuthela wa-cinana.

He.PAST-be.angry he.Past-choke

'He was so angry he choked.'

Extreme pressure is denoted in the following:

Wa-thukuthela *wa-ghuma*
 He.PAST-be.angry he.PAST-burst.
 ‘He was so angry he burst/exploded.’

The internal pressure expressions in English are motivated by the metaphor of increasing anger as the heating up of a pressurised liquid, but, in Zulu it appears to be motivated by a metaphor of the container having insufficient space for its contents.

2.4 Blood

Anger as an increase in blood

Inhliziyo *yami* *I-gcwel-e* *igasi.*
 Heart my SC-fill.up-PERF blood
 ‘My heart is full of blood.’

The heart changes to blood

U-gcwel-e *ihlule* *enhliziy-weni.*
 He-fill-PERF blood.clot heart-LOC
 ‘His heart filled with blood-clots.’

2.5 Red

Blood is associated with red colour

Wa-vuka *inja* *ambovu.*
 He.PAST-arise dog red
 ‘He turned into a red dog.’

Wa-thukuthela *wa-bheja* *igazi.*
 He.PAST-be.angry he.PAST-redden blood
 ‘He was so angry he became red with blood.’

The above expressions testify to the power of the conceptualisation of anger in terms of the body filling up with blood.

3. Metaphors of heart

Red is the colour of fire. The physiological effects of anger in Zulu is the increased body temperature, and an angry person is quite literally “hot”

Wa-shisa-bo.
 He.PAST-be.hot-INTENSIFIER
 ‘He was really hot.’

In fire metaphors, the intensity of the blaze correlates with the intensity of the emotion.

U-ya-vutha bhe!
 He.ASP-burn *bhe*
 ‘He is burning with roaring flames.’

Amaphoyisa a-dla amlangabi.
 Police SC-eat flames
 ‘The police are eating flames’, i.e. ‘The police are enraged.’

U-thela amafutha emlil-weni.
 You-put oil fire-LOC
 ‘You are adding oil to the fire.’

4. Perspiration

Perspiration is a common accompaniment of increased body temperature

Nga-m-bona qede nga-mfoma.
 I.PAST-him-saw then I.PAST-begin.to.perspire
 ‘As soon as I saw him, I began to perspire.’

A person can be “wet with anger”

Wa-ye-manzi te uku-thukuthela.
 He.PAST-ASP-wet te INF-be.angry
 ‘He became dripping with anger.’

In English perspiration and “wetness” are symptoms of fears and terror, rather than the metonymic association of sweating with the heat of anger as in Zulu.

5. Anger causes irrational behaviour

Zulu is rich in expressions that denote the behavioural consequences of anger.

Physical agitation

U-bhedla isihlalo.
 He-be.restless seat
 ‘He is wriggling around on his seat’, ‘He can’t sit still.’

Association of anger with tears

Wa-ye-nga-thukuthele wa-ye-hlengezela izinyembezi.
 He.PAST-ASP-NEG-be.angry he.PAST-ASP-weep tears
 ‘He wasn’t angry, he was close to tears.’

Irrational behaviour

Wa-thukuthela *wa-gana* *unwabu.*
 She.PAST-be.angry she.PAST-marry chameleon
 ‘She was so angry she married a chameleon.’

Both physical and mental ill-health

Wa-thukuthela *wa-gula.*
 He.PAST-be.angry he.PAST-become.ill
 ‘He became ill with anger.’

Wa-vuk-wa *uhlevane.*
 He.PAST-overcome-PASS skin.rash
 ‘He broke out in a skin rash.’

Interference with a person’s capacity to communicate with language

Nga-thukuthela *a-ngi-kwaz-anga* *uku-thi vu!*
 I.PAST-be.angry NEG-I can PAST INF.say *vu*
 ‘I was so angry I couldn’t go *vu* (ideophone denoting opening the mouth to speak), i.e. ‘I was so angry I couldn’t say a word.’

6. Anger is a dangerous animal

Zulu and English share the metaphor that conceptualises passions as wild beast inside a person. Therefore, angry people can be called animals, and angry behaviour can be described in terms of animal behaviour.

Inkosi *ya-phenduka* *isilo.*
 Chief SC.PAST-change.into wild.beast
 ‘The chief changed into a ferocious (carnivorous) animal.’

Storms

Wa-vele wa-gqingqa / wa-hwaqabala.

He.PAST-do he.PAST-darken / he.PAST-become.overcast

‘He suddenly darkened /became overcast (like the sky before a storm).’

“Angry sea” and “angry rivers”

(Ulwandle) lu-gubha amagagasi.

(Sea) SC-toss.wildly waves

‘The sea is tossing violently with waves.’

Umfula u-ya-ngenisa.

River SC-ASP-rise

‘The river is rising (in flood).’

Wind and dust

Wa-bhenguza yini?

He.PAST-blow.a.gale why

‘Why did he blow a gale?’

U-susa uthuli olubomvu lwe-zimpofu / uthuli lwe-ziChwe.

You-raise dust red POSS-elands / dust POSS-Bushmen

‘You raise the red dust of the elands / the dust of the Bushmen.’

9. The cause of anger is provocation

Physical provocation

U-ya-ngi-hlokoza.

You-ASP-me-prod

‘You are prodding me.’

Image of provoking a dangerous animal

U-sukela inyoka emgod-ini / isidleke so-mnyovu.

You-jump.on snake hole-LOC / nest POSS-black.wasps

‘You are jumping on a snake In its hole / on a nest of (poisonous) black wasp.’

Provocation expressed on terms of a person’s looks.

Wa-ngi-buka nge-so lo-mthakathi / nge-so le-ngulube.

He.PAST-me-look with-eye POSS-witch / with-eye POSS-pig

‘He looked at me with the eye of a witch / with the eye of a pig.’

Expressions used to challenge a provocation

Wena! U-zo-bona amehlo e-sibungu!

You you-FUT-see eyes POSS-worm

‘You! You will see the eyes of a worm.’

10. Anger is (hyper) activity

Umoya (spirit or soul) is the source of activity. Anger itself is conceptualised as “hyperactivity”.

Beka umoya phansi.

Put *umoya* down

‘Lower your *umoya*’, i.e. ‘Calm yourself down.’

Umoya wakhe wa-phakama.

Umoya his SC.PAST-rise

‘His *umoya* rose’, i.e. ‘He became agitated, angry.’

Anger can also “rise” and be “brought down”

Kwa-phakama ulaka.

It.PAST-rise anger

‘(His) anger rose up.’

Bamba / Fihla ulaka.

Hold / hide anger

‘Hold/ Conceal your anger.’

If not kept down and concealed, anger can “get free” or “belch forth”

Lu-m-phunyuk-ile ulaka, wa-ba-bhaxabula.

SC-him-escape-PERF anger, he.PAST-them-flog

‘His anger got free and he flogged them.’

11. Concluding remarks

There is a degree of similarity between the Zulu and English conceptualisation of anger. The Zulu conceptualisation is sanctioned by much the same range of conceptual metaphors and metonymies as are found in English. In Zulu, as in English, anger is conceptualised as fire, angry people are thought of as dangerous animals, and so on. It is also possible in both languages to refer to anger metonymically, by describing its effects. The stereotypical “anger scenario” consisting of five stages as sketched by Kövecses applies also to Zulu.

Specific elaborations of the metaphors and metonymies differ somewhat in the two languages. Some of the differences may be put down to a difference in emphasis with the following tentative observations due to the fact that the corpus tells us little about the frequency with which the expressions are likely to be used:

- (a) Zulu elaborates metonymic associations rather more than English.
- (b) Physiological accompaniment of anger seems to play an even greater role in the Zulu conceptualisation than in English.

- (c) The conceptual metaphor, which projects anger onto natural phenomena, is particularly developed in Zulu.

There are also some differences which may concern the content of the underlying conceptual metaphors. In other cases, it is difficult to decide whether differences between English and Zulu are difference of content, or merely difference in emphasis.

It would not have been possible to discuss the issues discussed in this paper if attention was restricted merely to the lexical semantics of Wierzbicka's studies. The findings that the English and Zulu conceptualisations are by and large commensurate confirm the viability of cross-linguistic comparison at the level of conceptual metaphors and metonymies, in contrast to exclusively lexical-semantic comparisons. An investigation of the kind undertaken here needs to go further by considering wider ethnographic issues. The plausibility of a positive evaluation of anger has to be weighted against the ferociousness and destructiveness of the emotion.

4.2.2 Kövecses (1989)

What is the role of metaphor in the naive or folk understanding of anger? This is the question that has to be answered and it also raises the more general issue of the nature of the relationship between metaphor and culture. There are two diametrically opposed views: in one, metaphor reflects cultural models (Quinn, 1991) and in the other metaphor constitutes cultural models (Lakoff and Kövecses, 1987). The author will therefore try to show that neither of these views is fully adequate to explain the relationship in the case of anger, and that a compromise view is both possible and necessary.

Kövecses defines culture as a set of shared understandings about the world. A particular understanding of an aspect of the world that is shared is a cultural model. He calls the whole that 'surrounds' a part 'cultural context' which in turn exerts some impact on particular cultural models. Cultures are different from each other, and some of them radically so. Therefore, as a result of the influence of culture as a whole on particular cultural models, the concept of anger and its counterparts will be very

different in cultures that are recognised by people as being radically different from each other. From the above, a prediction can be made. If metaphor simply reflects a cultural model, very different cultures must and will have very different metaphors for the abstract concepts of anger and its counterparts in the cultures involved. However, if it turns out that very different cultures have the same metaphor(s) of anger and its counterparts, this will support the view that metaphor constitutes cultural models.

What needs to be done is firstly, to look at some cultures that are recognised as being very different from each other and see if the understandings or conceptualisations of anger and its counterparts are indeed very different. Secondly, to look at the metaphors employed and see if they are indeed as radically different as the cultural understandings themselves are. If it turns out that the cultural understandings in very different cultures are more similar than different, then we should not expect the metaphors to be widely different. But in this case the author has reason to believe that it is the similar metaphor that leads to, or produces, or constitutes the similar cultural understanding.

Conceptual metaphors and metonymies play an important role in the conceptualisation of anger in English as showed by Lakoff and Kövecses (1987). They uncovered a number of conceptual metaphors such as anger as HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER, as FIRE, as DANGEROUS ANIMAL, as OPPONENT, as BURDEN, etc. and suggested that they largely constitute the concept.

Recently, several studies have been conducted to investigate the concept roughly corresponding to anger in languages belonging to non-Indo-European language families, using the methodology that Lakoff and Kövecses employed. King (1989) studied the counterpart of the concept of anger *nu* in Chinese; Matsuki analysed *ikari / hara* in Japanese; and Kövecses studied the Hungarian concept *düh*.

Folk understanding of danger and its counterpart in different languages and cultures

The following cognitive model of the naive folk understanding of anger in English was characterised by Lakoff and Kövecses as a prototypical cognitive model:

1. Offending event

Wrongdoer offends self.

Wrongdoer is at fault.

The offending event displeases self.

The intensity of the offence outweighs the intensity of the retribution (which equals zero at this point), thus creating an imbalance.

The offence causes anger to come into existence.

2. Anger

Anger exists.

Self experiences physiological effects (heat, pressure, agitation).

Anger exerts force on the self to attempt an act of retribution.

3. Attempt to control anger

Self exerts a counterforce in an attempt to control anger.

4. Loss of control

The intensity of anger goes above the limit.

Anger takes control of self.

Self exhibits angry behaviour (loss of judgement, aggressive actions).

There is damage to self.

There is danger to the target of anger, in this case, the wrongdoer.

5. Retribution

Self performs retributive act against wrongdoer (this is usually angry behaviour)

The intensity of retribution balances the intensity of offence.

The intensity of anger drops to zero.

Anger ceases to exist.

The main idea here was that the metaphors and metonymies associated with anger converge on and constitute the model, with the different metaphors and metonymies mapping onto different parts of the model.

English and Hungarian cultural model of anger yields the same results. Chinese have two models, which differs in stage 4 and 5 as follows:

First model:

4. Release of anger

Self releases anger by exhibiting angry behaviour.

5. Restoration of equilibrium

The amount of discharged anger balances the excess in the body.

The imbalance disappears and equilibrium is restored.

Second model:

4. Diversion

The force of anger is diverted to various parts of the body.

Self exhibits somatic effects (headaches, stomach-aches, etc.)

5. Compensating event

The compensating self pleases the self (this is usually sympathetic behaviour directed at self)

He intensity of compensation balances the intensity of the offence.

The somatic effects of anger disappear.

Anger ceases to exist.

In Japan the control aspect of *ikari/hara* is more elaborate: anger first appears in *hara*, then goes up to *mune*, and finally to *atama*. *Hara* is both a container and the emotion itself. *Mune* is the chest and *atama* is the head. If anger reaches *atama*, the angry person is unable to control anger.

All the above models have several things in common. They are composed of five stages and they have an ontological, a casual, and an expressive aspect. The first stage of the cognitive model as a whole is the casual part, which presents anger and its counterparts as an emotion that is caused, or produced by a certain situation. The second, the ontological part gives us an idea of the ontological status and nature of anger, which in all four languages, is a force inside the person that can exert pressure

on him or her. This part also includes some physiological processes associated with the respective emotion. Another part is the expressive component, that is, the ways in which anger or its counterpart is expressed in the different cultures. This combines stages 3, 4 and 5 since expression and control attempt are closely linked to each other. The basic structure that all four cultures share in their folk understanding then is: cause \Rightarrow existence \Rightarrow expression.

Although the four cultures share this basic image-schematic structure, there are still some differences on the folk understanding of anger and its counterparts at a more detailed or specific level. The Japanese model gives the angry person more chance to exercise control over anger than the Western model does. In Chinese, instead of the angry person losing control, he or she can and will choose not to express his or her anger by diverting it to various parts of the body. In the Western, anger is prototypically expressed as a form of retaliation against another person.

A conclusion, from the above observations, can be made that the four emotion concepts in four very different languages and cultures are remarkably similar as regards their basic structure. Possible explanations for this similarity are: by some incredible coincidence, the four cultures happen to have very similar folk understandings of anger and its counterparts; once the basic structure as a folk understanding emerged, it was transmitted to the other cultures; the basic structure is the product of metaphorical conceptualisation that is profoundly influenced by certain universal properties of the human body. It is this last option that will be tried to be developed here.

Why the similarities?

The short answer to the question of why the emotion concepts in diverse cultures shares the basic structure is that the cultures also share a central metaphor that informs and structures the concepts. This is the CONTAINER metaphor. The CONTAINER metaphor has two sub-metaphors: THE BODY IS THE CONTAINER FOR THE EMOTIONS and the ANGER IS A SUBSTANCE (FLUID) IN THE CONTAINER. These two metaphors are from the conceptualisation that all four cultures seem to

conceptualise human beings as containers and anger and its counterparts as some kind of substance (typically a fluid) inside the container.

Examples of the CONTAINER metaphor from the four languages:

English:

He has filled with anger

Chinese:

Man qiang fen nu (full cavity anger)

To have one's body cavities full of anger.

Japanese:

Ikari ga karadajyu ni jyuman shita (anger in my body to filled was)

My body was filled with anger.

Hungarian:

Tele van dühvel. (full is anger-with)

He is full of anger.

As we have just seen, the same general CONTAINER metaphor exists in the four cultures, meaning that anger and its counterparts are viewed in all of the cases as some kind of substance (fluid) inside a closed container that is the human body. However, the general metaphor seems to be elaborated in more or less different ways at a more specific level of metaphorical understanding.

ENGLISH

The metaphor that characterises English at this specific level is ANGER IS A HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER:

You make my blood boil

Simmer down

Let him stew

All of these examples assume a container (corresponding to the human body), a fluid inside the container, as well as the element of heat as a property of the fluid. It is the hot fluid that corresponds to anger.

The HOT FLUID metaphor gives rise to a series of metaphorical entailments:

1. When the intensity of anger increases, the fluid rises:
His pent-up anger welled up inside him.
2. Intense anger produces steam:
Smoke was coming out of his ears.
3. Intense anger produces pressure on the container:
He was bursting with anger.
And a variant of this that emphasises control:
I suppressed my anger.
4. When anger becomes too intense, the person explodes:
When I told him, he just exploded.
5. When a person explodes, parts of him go up in the air:
He hit the ceiling.

HUNGARIAN

The Hungarian version of the CONTAINER metaphor also emphasises a hot fluid in a container:

Forrt benne a duh. [boiled in-him anger]
Anger was boiling inside him.

The only difference between English and the Hungarian seems to be that in addition to the body as a whole, Hungarian also has the head as a container which can hold the hot fluid.

Most of the entailments of the HOT FLUID metaphor in English also apply in Hungarian:

1. When the intensity of anger increases, the fluid rises:
 Feltort benne a harag. [up-welled in-him the wrath/anger]
 Wrath built up in him.
2. Intense anger produces steam:
 Teljesen begozolt. [completely in-steamed-he]
 He was all steam.
3. Intense anger produces pressure on the container:
 Majd eldurrant a feje. [almost burst the head-his]
 His head almost burst.
4. When anger becomes too intense, the person explodes:
 Megpukkadt mergeben. [burst-he anger-in]
 He burst with anger.
5. When a person explodes, parts of him go up in the air:
 A plafonon van mar megint. [the ceiling-on is already again]
 He is on the ceiling again.
6. When a person explodes, what was inside him comes out:
 Kifkadt. [out-burst-he]
 He burst out.

JAPANESE

THE ANGER AS A HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER metaphor also exists in Japanese. The only difference between Japanese and the English and the Hungarian one is that in addition to the body as a whole, the stomach/bowels area (called *hara* in Japanese) is seen as the principal container for the hot fluid that corresponds to anger:

Ikari ga karada no naka de tagiru.
 Anger seethes inside the body.

The first four metaphorical entailments are also the same as in English and Hungarian, but the last two entailments do not carry over in the case of Japanese:

1. When the intensity of anger increases, the fluid rises:

Ikari-ga kokoro-no naka-de fukurande-itta.[anger in my mind /inside me was getting bigger]

My anger kept building up inside me.

2. Intense anger produces steam:

Atama kara yuge ga tatsu.

Steam rises up from the head.

3. Intense anger produces pressure on the container:

Atama ni chi ga noboru.

Blood rises up to the head.

4. When anger becomes too intense, the person explodes:

Haha wa toutou bakuhatsu shita.

My mother finally exploded.

The other metaphor in Japanese besides the HOT FLUID metaphor is THE *HARA* IS A CONTAINER FOR ANGER metaphor. The difference between these two seems to be that the HOT FLUID metaphor implies a pressurised container while the “*hara*” metaphor does so only marginally if at all.

Hara ga tatsu.[stomach to stand up]

Get angry.

Hara ni suekaneru.

Cannot lay it in stomach.

The “*hara*” metaphor has an elaborate control aspect. An increase in intensity of anger is indicated by *hara* rising, the chest (*mune*) getting filled with anger, and eventually anger reaching the head (*atama*). When the anger is in *hara* or *mune*, one is in a position to overcome, and thus hide one’s anger. However, when the anger reaches the head (*atama*), the angry person cannot control his anger. As regards the

conceptualisation of anger in Japanese, the significance of all this is that it shows the Japanese's concern with and emphasis on trying to hide and control one's anger.

CHINESE

The Chinese version of the CONTAINER metaphor makes use of and is based on the culturally significant notion of *qi*. *Qi* is energy that is conceptualised as a fluid that flows through the body and it can also rise and then produce excess. This is the case when we have the emotion of anger.

ANGER IS EXCESS *QI* IN THE BODY

Chen zhu qi [deep hold qi]

To hold one's qi down

Bu shi pi qi fa zuo [NEG make spleen qi start make]

To keep in one's spleen qi

Observations from the above "excess qi" metaphor:

- Anger *qi* may be present in a variety of places in the body, including the breast, heart, stomach and spleen.
- Anger *qi* seems to be a fluid that, unlike English, Hungarian, and Japanese, is not hot, with the resultant that it does not have the entailment involving the idea of steam being produced.
- Anger *qi* is a fluid whose build-up produces pressure in the body that leads to an explosion that corresponds to loss of control over anger.

ANGER IS THE MOVEMENT OF *QI*

This metaphor gives us a sense of what happens after the explosion:

Dong nu [move anger]

To move one's anger

Ta nu qi shao ping le [he anger qi a little level LE]
 His anger qi calmed down.

The excess *qi* is now gone and *qi* flows through the body harmoniously once again.

THE STRUCTURE OF THE “CONTAINER” METAPHORS

What is common to these CONTAINER metaphors is that the container is a pressurised container, with or without heat. The basic correspondences, or mappings of the metaphor include:

The container with the fluid is the person who is angry

The fluid in the container is the anger

The pressure on the fluid on the container is the force of the anger on the angry person

The cause of the pressure is the cause of the anger force

Trying to keep the fluid inside the container is trying to control the anger

The fluid going out of the container is the expression of the anger

The physical dysfunctionality of the container is the social dysfunctionality of the angry person

These mappings play a constitutive role in the construction of the basic structure of the folk understandings of anger and its counterparts in different cultures. Without them it is difficult to see how anger and its counterparts could have acquired the structure they seem to possess. Anger and its counterparts in four very different cultures are conceptualised in terms of roughly the same PRESSURIZED CONTAINER metaphor. This brings us to conclude that Quinn’s view of cultural model produce, or select metaphors as too strong to be a general account of the relationship between cultural models and their corresponding metaphors.

To conclude: the PRESSURISED CONTAINER metaphor can be viewed as accounting for a large portion of the similarity in the four concepts, similarities involving basic structure.

How do roughly the same metaphors emerge for anger and its counterparts?

How did languages and cultures so different as English, Hungarian, Japanese and Chinese produce a remarkably similar shared metaphor - the PRESSURISED CONTAINER metaphor? The reason is that, as linguistic usage suggest, these people appear to have similar ideas about their bodies and seem to see themselves as undergoing the same physiological processes when in the state of *anger*, *düh*, *ikari* and *nu*. They all view their bodies and body organs as containers; they respond physiologically to certain situations (causes) in the same ways; and they seem to share certain physiological processes including body heat, internal pressure and redness in the neck and face area.

The linguistic claim here is based on the linguistic examples to follow:

Body heat:

English

Don't get hot under the collar

Chinese

Woqide lianshang huolalade

My face was pepperily hot with anger.

Japanese

Atama o hiyashita ga ii [head cool should]

You should cool down.

Hungarian

Forrofeju

Hothead

Internal pressure:

English

When I found out, I almost burst a blood vessel.

Chinese

Qi po du pi [break stomach skin]

To break the stomach skin from qi

Japanese

Sonna ni ikiri tattcha ketsuatsu ga agaru yo [like that get angry blood pressure to go up]

Don't get so angry; your blood pressure will go up.

Hungarian

Felmegy benne a pumpa [up-goes in-him the pump]

Pressure rises in him.

Redness in the face:

English

She was scarlet with rage.

Chinese

Ta lian quan hong le yanjing mao huo lai [he face all red LE eyes emit fire come]

His face turned red and his eyes blazed.

Japanese

Kare wa makka ni natte okotta [he red to be get angry]

He turned red with anger.

Hungarian

Voros lett a feje. [red became the head-his]

His head turned red.

As can be observed from the above examples, all cultures (English, Hungarian, Japanese and Chinese) seem to share body heat, internal pressure, and redness in the neck and face.

From the above examples, it is reasonable to assume that it is mainly the blood that accounts for the fluid component in the CONTAINER metaphors, and that it is also responsible for the pressure element in the CONTAINER metaphors.

Conceptualised physiology (conceptual metonymies) provides cognitive motivation for the metaphorical conceptualisation of the angry person as a PRESSURISED CONTAINER. If conceptualised physiological responses include an increase in internal pressure as a major response in a given culture, people in this culture will find

the use of the PRESSURISED CONTAINER metaphor natural. In the case of anger, naturalness arises out of embodiment, which occurs when it is really the case, that people's temperature and blood pressure rise in anger.

There is evidence that anger does indeed go together with objectively measurable bodily changes such as increase in skin temperature, blood pressure, pulse rate and more intense respiration and that other emotions, like fear and sadness, go together with a different set of physiological activities. Through research done by Levenson and his colleagues, we find that the actual physiological experiences might be universal. This universality of actual physiological experiences leads to the similarities (though not equivalent) in conceptualised physiology, which might be the basis of the similarity in the metaphorical conceptualisation of anger and its counterparts.

Besides giving rise to motivation (i.e. naturalness) in the conceptualisation of anger, embodiment also puts certain limitations either directly or through naturalness, on the possible ways in which anger is conceptualised in nature. The implication here is that the embodiment of anger appears to constrain the kind of metaphors that can emerge as viable conceptualisation of anger, which seems to be the reason why very similar metaphors have emerged for the concept in a variety of different cultures. It is on the basis of this similarity that the metaphors in cultures can be viewed as forming a category of metaphors, a category that we have called the CONTAINER metaphor.

It is not claimed that whenever physiological responses that have to do with anger are perceived and named, a version of the CONTAINER metaphor for anger will necessarily exist, i.e. physiological responses do not automatically produce the metaphor. What is claimed then is that languages in which, say, body heat is richly elaborated will be more likely to have the HOT FLUID version of the CONTAINER metaphor than languages where it is not. Furthermore, there are cultures in the world where the CONTAINER metaphor for anger and its counterparts plays an insignificant role in comparison with folk conceptions that are very different from it.

In summing up, the view of the body as a container; the presence of blood and other fluids in that container; and the physiological response of internal pressure and body

heat, together make it very natural for human beings to conceptualise anger and its counterparts in other cultures as a (hot) fluid in a pressurised container.

Why the differences in folk theories and metaphors?

Despite the similarities in body and physiological functioning, there are considerable differences in conceptualisation (of both ontology and expression) across the four cultures. If we are so much alike physically and our physical make up matters so much in conceptualisation, how come English, Hungarian, Japanese and Chinese do not perceive anger in exactly the same way?

There are two reasons to answer the question. The first is that each of the four cultures has developed its own distinctive concepts that dominate explanations in the given culture and through which members of the culture interpret their (emotional) experiences. In the Euro-American tradition (including Hungarian) it was the classical-medieval notion of the four humours that led to the particular conceptualisation of anger that we have today. In Japan there seems to exist a culturally distinct set of concepts that is built around the concepts of *hara*. In Chinese the concept of *nu* is bound up with the notion of *qi*, that is, the energy that flows through the body. The four emotion concepts are in part explained in the respective cultures by the culture-specific concepts of the *four humours*, *hara*, and *qi*. It appears that the broader cultural contexts account for many of the differences among the four emotion concepts. The other reason is that subtle differences in the conceptualisation of physiology may also lead to differences in folk understandings. As we have seen, Chinese culture appears to place a great deal more emphasis on the increase in internal pressure in anger than on body heat.

Conclusion

The concept of anger and its counterparts are largely understood as having a “cause-force-expression” basic structure, which emerges from a PRESSURISED CONTAINER metaphor. The cross-cultural similarity in the conceptualisation of anger is in all probability attributable to similarities in the human body and its functioning in anger. These similarities can be clearly observed in the metonymies

used in connection with anger. Most metonymies of anger seem to be shared in the four cultures. These findings go against Quinn's view according to which metaphors simply reflect cultural models that are understood without any recourse to metaphor. Instead, we have found that the cultural models of anger and its counterparts share a basic structure.

The view of the relationship that was arrived at in this paper involves five elements: (possibly universal) actual human physiology; conceptualised physiology (metonymy); metaphor; cultural model (with its schematic basic structure); and the broader cultural context. It was also suggested that the cultural models of anger and its counterparts are the joint products of metaphor, metonymy (possibly universal), actual physiology and cultural context.

4.2.3 Lakoff and Kövecses (1987)

Introduction

Emotions are often considered to be feelings alone, and as such they are viewed as being devoid of conceptual content, giving rise to no inference at all, or at least none of any interest. Lakoff and Kövecses would argue that the opposite is true: emotions have an extremely complex conceptual structure, which gives rise to wide variety of nontrivial inferences.

The conventional expressions used to talk about anger seem so diverse that finding any coherent system would seem impossible. Many of these expressions are idioms, and they too seem too diverse to reflect any coherent cognitive model:

- Examples:
- He lost his cool.
 - She was looking daggers at me.
 - You make my blood boil.
 - When I told him he blew up.

The argument here will be that they are not random. It will be shown that there is a coherent conceptual organisation underlying all these expressions, and that much of it is metaphorical and metonymical in nature.

Metaphor and Metonymy

The following common cultural model of the physiological effects of anger is used to tell when someone is angry on the basis of their appearance:

- The physiological effects of anger are increased body heat, increased internal pressure (blood pressure, muscular pressure), agitation and interference with accurate perception.
- As anger increases, its physiological effects increase.
- There is a limit beyond which the physiological effects of anger impair normal functioning.

This cultural model, using the general metonymic principle – THE PHYSIOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF AN EMOTION STANDS FOR THE EMOTION - yields the following system of metonymies of anger:

BODY HEAT

INTERNAL PRESSURE

REDNESS IN FACE AND NECK AREA

AGITATION

INTERFERENCE WITH ACCURATE PERCEPTION

From the cultural model of physiological effects we get the most general metaphor of anger: ANGER IS HEAT, which has two versions. One is where the heart is applied to fluids; the other is where it is applied to solids. When it is applied to fluids we get: ANGER IS THE HEAT OF A FLUID IN A CONTAINER where the specific motivation for this consists of the HEAT, INTERNAL PRESSURE and AGITATION parts of the cultural model. When it is applied to solids, we get the version ANGER IS FIRE, which is motivated by the HEAT and REDNESS aspect of the cultural theory of physiological effects.

In our overall conceptual system we have the general metaphor:

THE BODY IS A CONTAINER FOR THE EMOTIONS.

He was filled with anger.

She was brimming with rage.

The ANGER IS HEAT metaphor, when applied to fluids, combines with the metaphor THE BODY IS A CONTAINER FOR THE EMOTIONS to yield the central metaphor of the system:

ANGER IS THE HEAT OF A FLUID IN A CONTAINER

You make my blood boil.

Simmer down.

Let him stew.

There are two ways in which a conceptual metaphor can be productive. The first is lexical: the words and fixed expressions of a language can code, that is, be used to express aspects of a given conceptual metaphor to a greater or lesser extent. In addition, the words and fixed expressions of a language can elaborate the conceptual metaphor. For example “stewing” indicates the continuance of anger over a long period, while “simmer” can be used to indicate a lowering of the intensity of anger.

A second way in which a conceptual metaphor can be productive is that it can carry over details of that knowledge from the source domain to the target domain. These carryovers are referred to as metaphorical entailments:

WHEN THE INTENSITY OF ANGER INCREASES, THE FLUID RISES:

She could feel her gore rising.

His pent-up anger welled up inside him.

INTENSE ANGER PRODUCES STEAM:

She got all steamed up.

I was fuming.

INTENSE ANGER PRODUCES PRESSURE ON THE CONTAINER:

He was bursting with anger.

I could barely contain my anger.

WHEN ANGER BECOMES TOO INTENSE, THE PERSON EXPLODES:

When I told him, he just exploded.

She blew up at me.

WHEN A PERSON EXPLODES, PARTS OF HIM GO UP IN THE AIR:

I blew my top.

He hit the ceiling.

WHEN A PERSON EXPLODES, WHAT WAS INSIDE HIM COMES OUT:

His anger finally came out.

She was having kittens.

The central metaphor focuses on the fact that anger can be intense, that it can lead to a loss of control, and that a loss of control can be dangerous. Just as a hot fluid in a closed container can only take so much heat before it explodes, so we conceptualise the anger scale as having a limit point. We can only bear so much anger before we explode, that is, loses control. This has its correlates in our cultural theory of physiological effects. As anger gets more intense the physiological effects increase and those increases interfere

with our normal functioning. Body heat, blood pressure, agitation, and interference with perception cannot increase without limit before our ability to function normally becomes seriously impaired and we lose control over our functioning. In the cultural model of anger, loss of control is dangerous, both to the angry person and to those around him. In the central metaphor, the danger of loss of control is understood as the danger of explosion

The structural aspect of a conceptual metaphor consists of a set of correspondences between a source domain and a target domain. These correspondences have two types: ontological and epistemic. Ontological correspondences are correspondences between the entities in the source domain and the corresponding entities in the target domain. Epistemic correspondences are correspondences between knowledge about the source domain and the corresponding knowledge about the target domain.

We can schematise these correspondences between the FLUID domain and ANGER domain as follows:

Source: HEAT OF FLUID IN CONTAINER

Target: ANGER

Ontological correspondences:

The container is the body.

The heart of fluid is the anger.

The heat scale is the anger scale, with end points zero and limit.

Container heat is body heat.

Pressure in container is internal pressure in the body.

Agitation of fluid and container is physical agitation.

The limit of the container's capacity to withstand pressure caused by heat is the limit of the anger scale.

Explosion is loss of control.

Danger of explosion is danger of loss of control.

Coolness in the fluid is lack of anger.

Calmness of the fluid is lack of agitation.

Epistemic correspondences

Source: The effect of intense fluid heat is container heat, internal pressure, and agitation.

Target: The effect of intense anger is body heat, internal pressure, and agitation.

Source: When the fluid is heated past a certain limit, pressure increases to the point at which the container explodes.

Target: When anger increases past a certain limit, pressure increases to the point at which the person loses control.

Source: An explosion is damaging to the container and dangerous to the bystanders.

Target: A loss of control is damaging to an angry person and dangerous to other people.

Source: An explosion may be prevented by the application of sufficient force and energy to keep the anger in.

Target: A loss of control may be prevented by the application of sufficient force and energy to keep the anger in.

Source: It is sometimes possible to control the release of heated fluid for either destructive or constructive purposes; this has the effect of lowering the level of heat and pressure.

Target: It is sometimes possible to control the release of anger for either destructive or constructive purposes; this has the effect of lowering the level of anger and internal pressure.

So far we have seen that the cultural theory of physiological reactions provides the basis for the central metaphor, and that the central metaphor characterises detailed correspondences between the source domain and the target domain – correspondences concerning both ontology and knowledge.

When the general metaphor of anger, ANGER IS HEAT, is applied to solids we get:
 ANGER IS FIRE:

She was doing a slow burn.
 He was breathing fire.
 That kindled my ire.
 He was consumed by his anger

This metaphor highlights the cause of anger (kindle), the intensity and duration (slow burn), the danger to others (breathing fire) and the damage to the angry person (consumed).

The correspondences between the FIRE domain and the ANGER domain can be schematised as follows:

Source: FIRE

Target: ANGER

Ontological correspondences

The fire is anger.

The thing burning is the angry person.

The cause of the fire is the cause of the anger.

The intensity of the fire is the intensity of the anger.

The physical damage to the thing burning is mental damage to the angry person.

The capacity of the thing burning to serve its normal function is the capacity of the angry person to function normally.

An object at the point of being consumed by fire corresponds to a person whose anger is at the limit.

The danger of the fire to things nearby is danger of the anger to other people.

Epistemic correspondences

Source: Things can burn at slow intensity for a long time and then burst into flame.

Target: People can be angry at a low intensity for a long time and then suddenly become extremely angry.

Source: Fires are dangerous to things nearby.

Target: Angry people are dangerous to other people.

Source: Things consumed by fire cannot serve their normal function.

Target: At the limit of the anger scale, people cannot function normally.

The other principal metaphors

The overlap between the cultural models of the effects of anger and the effects of insanity provides a basis for the metaphor: ANGER IS INSANITY

I just touched him, and he went crazy.

You're driving me nuts.

She went into an insane rage.

Given the metonymy INSANE BEHAVIOUR STANDS FOR INSANITY and metaphor ANGER IS INSANITY, we get the metaphorical metonymy:

INSANE BEHAVIOUR STANDS FOR ANGER:

When my mother finds out, she'll have a fit.

He's fit to be tied.

He's about to throw a tantrum.

According to our cultural model of anger, people who can neither control nor relieve the pressure of anger engage in violent frustrated behaviour. This is the basis for the metonymy:

VIOLENT FRUSTRATED BEHAVIOUR STANDS FOR ANGER

He is tearing his hair out.

The loud music next door has got him climbing the walls!

She's been slamming doors all morning.

The ANGER IS INSANITY metaphor has the following correspondences:

Source: INSANITY

Target: ANGER

The cause of insanity is the cause of anger.

Becoming insane is passing the limit point on the anger scale.

Insane behaviour is angry behaviour.

Source: An insane person cannot function normally.

Target: A person who is angry beyond the limit point cannot function normally

Source: An insane person is dangerous to others.

Target: A person who is angry beyond the limit point is dangerous to others.

Anger produces undesirable physiological reactions, leads to an inability to function normally, and is dangerous to others. The angry person, recognising this danger, views his anger as an opponent.

ANGER IS AN OPPONENT (IN A STRUGGLE)

I'm struggling with my anger.

He lost control over his anger.

I was overcome by anger.

Correspondences of the ANGER IS AN OPPONENT metaphor

Source: STRUGGLE

Target: ANGER

The opponent is anger.

Winning is controlling anger.

Losing is having anger control you.

Surrender is allowing anger to take control of you.

The pool of resources needed for winning is the energy needed to control anger.

There is another metaphor that focuses on the issue of control, but whose main focus is the danger to others. According to the PASSIONS ARE BEASTS INSIDE A PERSON metaphor, there is a part of each person that is a wild animal, and the behaviour of a person who has lost control is the behaviour of a wild animal. The beast presents a danger to other people.

ANGER IS A DANGEROUS ANIMAL

He has a fierce temper.

His anger grew.

He unleashed his anger.

His anger is insatiable.

Correspondences that constitute metaphor:

Source: DANGEROUS ANIMAL

Target: ANGER

The dangerous animal is the anger.

The animal's getting loose is loss of control of anger.

The owner of the dangerous animal is the angry person.

Sleeping for the animal is anger near the zero level.

Being awake for the animal is anger near the limit.

Source: It is dangerous for a dangerous animal to be loose.

Target: It is dangerous for a person's anger to be out of control.

Source: A dangerous animal is safe when it is sleeping and dangerous when it is awake.

Target: Anger is safe near the zero level and dangerous near the limit.

Source: A dangerous animal is safe when it is very small and dangerous when it is grown.

Target: Anger is safe near the zero level and dangerous near the limit.

Source: It is the responsibility of a dangerous animal's owner to keep it under control.

Target: It is the responsibility of an angry person to keep his anger under control.

Source: It requires a lot of energy to control a dangerous animal.

Target: It requires a lot of energy to control one's anger.

Other cases in which angry behaviour is described in terms of aggressive animal behaviour:

ANGRY BEHAVIOUR IS AGGRESSIVE ANIMAL BEHAVIOUR

He was bristling with anger.

He began to bare his teeth.

Don't snap at me.

AGGRESSIVE VERBAL BEHAVIOUR STANDS FOR ANGER

She gave him a tongue-lashing.

I really chewed him out good.

AGGRESSIVE VISUAL BEHAVIOUR STANDS FOR ANGER

He was glowering at me.

He gave me a dirty look.

Expressions that indicate causes of anger:

THE CAUSE OF ANGER IS A PHYSICAL ANNOYANCE

Don't be a pain in the ass.

Get of my back!

CAUSING ANGER IS TRESPASSING

This is where I draw the line!
 Don't step on my toes!

Another metaphor of anger:

ANGER IS A BURDEN

After I lost my temper, I felt lighter.
 He carries his anger around with him.

Some minor metaphors

Existence is commonly understood in terms of physical presence. You are typically aware of something's presence if it is nearby and you can see it.

EXISTENCE IS PRESENCE

His anger went away.
 My anger lingered on for days.

EMOTIONS ARE BOUNDED SPACES

She flew into a rage.
 He was in a state of anger.

The prototype scenario

The metaphors and metonymies that have been investigated so far converge on a certain prototypical cognitive model of anger. There are many models of anger, but they are minimal variants of the models that the metaphors converge on. This model is a scenario with a number of stages and it is called the "prototype scenario", the same as what De Sousa calls the "paradigm scenario". The person who gets angry will be referred to as S, short for Self.

Stage 1: offending event

There is an offending event that displeases S. There is a wrongdoer who intentionally does something directly to S. The wrongdoer is at fault and S is innocent. The offending event constitutes an injustice and produces anger in S. The scales of justice can only be balanced by some act of retribution. That is, the intensity of retribution must be roughly equal to the intensity of offence. S has the responsibility to perform such an act of retribution.

Stage 2: anger

Associated with the entity anger is a scale that measures its intensity. As the intensity of anger increases, S experiences physiological effects: increase in body heat, internal pressure, and physical agitation. As the anger gets very intense, it exerts a force upon S to perform an act of retribution. Because acts of retribution are dangerous and/or socially unacceptable, S has a responsibility to control his anger. Moreover, loss of control is damaging to S's own well being, which is another motivation for controlling anger.

Stage 3: attempt at control

S attempt to control his anger.

Stage 4: loss of control

Each person has a certain tolerance for controlling anger. That tolerance can be viewed as the limit point on the anger scale. When the intensity of anger goes beyond that limit, S can no longer control his anger. S exhibits angry behaviour and his anger forces him to attempt an act of retribution. Since S is out of control and acting under coercion, he is not responsible for his actions.

Stage 5: act of retribution.

S performs the act of retribution. The wrongdoer is the target for the act. The intensity of retribution roughly equals the intensity of the offence and the scales are balanced again. The intensity of anger drops to zero.

We are now able to see how the various metaphors discussed all map onto a part of the prototypical scenario. This enables us to show exactly how the various metaphors are related to one another, and how they function together to help characterise a single concept.

We will now make a rough sketch of the ontology of anger: the entities, predicates, and events required. Since anger has a quantitative aspect, the ontology must include a scale of anger, including intensity, a zero point, and a limit point. The basic anger scenario also includes an offending event and a retributive act. Each of these has a quantitative aspect, and must also include an intensity, a zero point and a limit. In the prototypical case, the offending event is an action on the part of a wrongdoer against a victim. The retribution takes the form of an act by an agent against some target.

The ontology of anger also includes a number of predicates: displeasing, at fault, exerts force on, cause, exist, control, dangerous, damaging, balance, and outweigh. There are also some other kinds of events: the physiological effects; the angry behaviour; and the immediate cause of anger, in case it is not the same as the offending event.

SUMMARY OF THE ONTOLOGY OF ANGER

Aspects of the person:	S Body Anger
Offence and retribution:	Offending Event Retributive Act
Scales of intensity:	Intensity of Anger Intensity of Offence

	Intensity of Retribution
End Points:	Zero Limit
Predicates:	Displease At Fault Cause Exist Exert Force on Control Dangerous Damaging Balance Outweigh
Other events:	Physiological Reactions Angry Behaviours Immediate Cause

Restatement of the prototypical scenario

Given the preceding ontology and principles of the cultural models, we can restate the prototypical anger scenario in terms that will facilitate showing the relationships among the wide variety of anger scenario.

PROTOTYPICAL ANGER SCENARIO

Constraints:

Victim = S

Agent of retribution = S

Target of anger = Wrongdoer

Immediate cause of anger = Offending event

Angry Behaviour = Retribution

Stage 1: Offending Event

Wrongdoer offends S

Wrongdoer is at fault

The offending event displeases S

The intensity of the offence outweighs the intensity of the retribution (which equals zero at this point), thus creating an imbalance.

The offence causes anger to come into existence.

Stage 2: Anger

Anger exists.

S experiences physiological effects (heat, pressure, and agitation).

Anger exerts force on the S to attempt an act of retribution.

Stage 3: Attempt to control anger

S exerts a counterforce in an attempt to control anger.

Stage 4: Loss of control

The intensity of anger goes above the limit.

Anger takes control of S.

S exhibits angry behaviour (loss of judgement, aggressive actions).

There is damage to S.

There is a danger to the target of anger, in this case, the wrongdoer.

Stage 5: Retribution

S performs retributive act against W (this is usually angry behaviour directed at W)

The intensity of retribution balances the intensity of offence.

The intensity of anger drops to zero.

Anger ceases to exist.

The non-prototypical cases

A large range of instances of anger cluster about the above prototype. The examples are in the following form: a non-prototypical anger scenario with its name in bold face, followed by an informal description; an account of the minimal difference between the given scenario and the prototype scenario; finally, an example sentence.

Insatiable anger: You perform the act of retribution and the anger just does not go away.

In stage 5, the intensity of anger stays above zero and the anger continues to exist.

Example: His anger lingers on.

Controlled response: You get angry, but retain control and consciously direct your anger at the wrongdoer.

S remains in control. Everything else remains the same.

Example: He vented his anger on her.

Slow burn: Anger continues for a long time.

Stage 2 lasts a long time.

Example: He was doing a slow burn.

There is another form of anger called a manipulative use of anger, where there are no conventional linguistic expressions. It is a case where a person cultivates his anger and does not attempt to control it, with the effect that he intimidates those around him into following his wishes in order to keep him from getting angry. This form of anger is fairly distant from the prototype and it is no surprise that we have no name for it.

The non-prototypical cases that were cited above could all be seen as variants of the prototypical anger scenario. There is no single unified cognitive model of anger. Instead there is a category of cognitive models with a prototypical model in the centre. This suggests that it is a mistake to try to find a single cognitive model for all instances of a concept. Kinds of anger are not all instances of the same model: instead they are variants on a prototypical model. There is no common core that all kinds of

anger have in common. Instead, the kinds of anger bear family resemblance to one another.

Metaphorical aspects of the prototype scenario

The analysis done so far is consistent with the traditional view of metaphor that, firstly, the concept of anger exists and is understood independently of any metaphors. Secondly, the anger ontology and the category of scenarios represent the literal meaning of the concept of anger, and thirdly, metaphors do no more than provide ways of talking about the ontology of anger. This view entails that the elements of the anger ontology really, literally exist, independent of any metaphors.

This is not the case with anger ontology. In the ontology, anger exists as an independent entity, capable of exerting force and controlling a person. This is what Lakoff and Johnson (1980) refers to as an “ontological metaphor”: ANGER IS AN ENTITY. A person’s anger does not really literally exist as an independent entity, though we comprehend it metaphorically as such. In the ontology, there is an intensity scale for anger, which is understood as being oriented UP, by virtue of the MORE IS UP metaphor. The intensity scale has a limit associated with it - another ontological metaphor. Anger is understood as being capable of exerting force and taking control of a person. The FORCE and CONTROL here are also metaphorical, based on physical force and physical control. The anger ontology also borrows certain elements from the ontology of retributive justice: offence and retribution, with their scales of intensity and the concept of balance. These are also metaphorical, with metaphorical BALANCE based on physical balance. In short, the anger ontology is largely constituted by metaphor.

The source domains of constitutive metaphors - ENTITY, INTENSITY, LIMIT, FORCE and CONTROL – all seem to be superordinate concepts, that is concepts that are fairly abstract. By contrast, the principal metaphors i.e. “basic - level metaphors”, that map onto the anger ontology - HOT FLUID, INSANITY, FIRE, BURDEN, STRUGGLE - appear to be basic-level concepts, that is, concepts that are linked more directly to experience, concepts that are information-rich and rich in conventional

mental imagery. Most of our understanding of anger comes via these basic-level metaphors. The HOT FLUID and FIRE metaphors give us an understanding of what kind of entity anger is. And the STRUGGLE metaphor gives us a sense of what is involved in controlling it. Without these metaphors, our understanding of anger would be extremely impoverished, to say the least. The basic-level metaphors allow us to comprehend and draw inferences about anger, using our knowledge of familiar, well-structured domains. The constitutive metaphors provide the bulk of anger ontology.

The embodiment of anger

From the preceding paragraphs we have seen that the concept of anger has a rich conceptual structure although Schachter and Singer (1962) claimed that emotions are purely cognitive with no physiological differences among them. But the results of Ekman, Levenson, and Friesen (1983) showed that pulse rate and skin temperature do correlate with particular emotions.

The analysis done here correlate positively with the Ekman group's results. The conceptual metaphors and metonymies used in the comprehension of anger are based on a cultural theory of the physiology of anger, the major part of which involves heat and internal pressure. The Ekman group's results suggest that our cultural theory of physiology of anger correspond remarkably well with the actual physiology: when people experiences anger their skin temperature and pulse rate rises.

Based on the Ekman group's results and the conceptual embodiment, the results predicts that if we look at the metaphors and metonymies for anger in the languages of the world, we will not find any that contradict the physiological results that they found.

Review

It has been shown that the expressions that indicate anger in American English are not a random collection, but rather are structured in terms of an elaborate cognitive model that is implicit in the semantics of the language. This indicates that anger is not just an amorphous feeling, but rather that it has an elaborate cognitive structure.

The following significant problems and questions remain:

First, there are aspects of our understanding of anger that our methodology cannot shed any light on. For example, our methodology reveals nothing of the range of offences that causes anger and the corresponding range of appropriate responses.

Second, the study of the language as a whole gives us no guide to individual variation. For example, we have no idea how people differ from one another.

Third, our methodology does not enable us to say much about the exact psychological status of the model we have uncovered. For example, do people base their actions on this model?

What seems to be clear is that most speakers of American English seem to use consistently the expressions that have been described and make inferences that appear to be consistent with our model. The fact that our analysis meshes so closely with the physiological study done by the Ekman group suggests that emotional concepts are embodied, that is, that the actual content of the concepts are correlated with bodily experience. The correlation is between the metaphors and the physiology, which provides confirmation of the claim by Lokoff and Johnson (1980) that conceptual metaphors are not mere flights of fancy, but can even have a basis in bodily experience.

In conclusion, cultural models are characterised by the following basic principles:

First, they make use of imaginative mechanisms-metaphors, metonymy and abstract scenarios.

Second, they are not purely imaginative; they can be motivated by the most concrete of things, bodily experience.

Third, linguistic evidence is an extraordinarily precise guide to the structure of such models.

4.3 The expression of anger in Sesotho

4.3.1 Aim

The aim of this section will be to determine how the emotion of anger may be expressed in Sesotho. For this purpose the emotion of anger has been divided into two categories i.e. those indicating **anger** and those indicating **threatening**. This section will furthermore be divided into two subsections, i.e. the expressions showing anger or threatening and the verbs showing anger or threatening.

4.3.2 Anger

4.3.2.1 Definition of anger

The concept of anger can be defined as a strong and sometimes violent feeling of displeasure, usually leading to a desire to hurt or stop the person or thing causing it. It may also express extreme annoyance with someone or something.

4.3.2.2 Expressions of anger

There are various expressions of anger in Sesotho which are more or less fixed in the sense that no extra internal argument may be added to them i.a. by means of a derivative affix such as the applicative. Any appropriate external argument may appear with these expressions, i.e. an external argument which can be interpreted as an **experiencer** who experiences, feels or perceives a psychological state of anger. Such experiencers are humans.

The expressions of anger in Sesotho may be divided into four subcategories according to the verb class in which the verbs which appear in the expressions of anger belongs:

Verbs of carrying

There are two verbs of carrying which may appear in expressions of anger, i.e. **rwala** (carry) and **fehisa** (cause to suspend). These verbs may only occur with body parts if they are to express anger. The verb **rwala** may then appear with **mahlo** (eyes):

- (1) Ho-rwala mahlo
(to carry eyes i.e. to be angry)

Such an expression as in (1) above may then appear with any human experiencer of anger in the position of the external argument i.e. the subject position:

- (2) Pule o-rwala mahlo ha a-hlolwa papading
(Pule becomes angry when he is beaten in sport)

The verb **fehisa** may appear with two body parts i.e. **mahlo** (eyes) or **matshwafo** (lungs):

- (3) Ho-fehisa mahlo/matshwafo
(to suspend the eyes/lungs, i.e. to cause to be angry)

The verb **fehisa** is a causative verb which is derived from **feha**. According to the conditions applicable to the presence of the causative affix [-is-] on the verb **fehisa**, the old external argument must become the new internal argument, and a new causative agent must be added in the subject position:

- (4) Mme o-fehisa ntate mahlo ka ho-fihla hae bosiu.
(Mother makes father angry by coming home late)

In (4) above the noun **ntate** is the experiencer of anger because he was the old external argument. **Mme** is now the new external argument which is the agent who causes the anger.

Verbs of change of state

Verbs indicating fullness

There are two verbs indicating fullness which may appear in the expressions of anger. These verbs may only occur with body parts if they are to express anger. The first verb indicating fullness is **tlallana** (be full). This verb may appear with two body parts i.e. **moya** (breath) and **pelo** (heart):

- (1) Ho-tlallana moya
(to be full of breath, i.e. to become speechless from anger)

Such an expression as in (1) above may then appear with any experiencer of anger in the position of the external argument, i.e. the subject position:

- (2) Monna o-ile a-tlallana moya ha ba-ntse ba-tswela pele ho mmuwa hampe.
(The man became speechless from anger when they went on talking ill of him)

- (3) Ho-tlallana pelo
(to be full of heart, i.e. to be angry)

Such an expression as in (3) above may also appear with any experiencer of anger in the position of the external argument i.e. the subject position:

- (4) Thabo o-tlallana pelo ha Puleng a mo rohaka.
(Thabo becomes angry when Puleng insult him)

- (5) O-tlalellane
(to be full, i.e. to be angry)

The intransitive verb **tlalellana** is derived from the transitive verb **tlalla**. The first derivative affix is [-el-] which is applicative, and the second affix is the reciprocal [-

an-]. Such an expression as in (5) above may also appear with any human experiencer in the position of the external argument, i.e. the subject position:

- (6) Teboho o-tlalellane hobane Sello a tabotse buka ya hae.
(Teboho is angry because Sello tore his book)

The second verb indicating fullness is **kgora** (to have plenty) with the body part **moya** (breath):

- (7) Ho-kgora moya
(to have plenty of breath, i.e. to be angry)

Such an expression as in (7) above may also appear with any human experiencer of anger in the position of the external argument, i.e. the subject position:

- (8) Dineo o-ile a-kgora moya ha Pulane a-mo-thesela.
(Dineo became angry when Pulane thumped her)

Verbs of temperature

There are verbs only that may appear in expressions of anger, i.e. **futhumala**(become hot), **bela**(boil), and **tjhesa**(burn):

- 1(a) O-futhumetse
(he is hot, i.e. he is angry)
- (b) O- a bela/tjhesa
(he is boiling/burning, i.e. he is angry)

Such expressions as in (1) above may appear with any human experiencer of anger in the position of the external argument, i.e. the subject position:

- 2(a) Dineo o-futhumetse hobane Tefo o-mo-hlapaotse.
(Dineo is angry because Tefo insulted her)

- (b) Mosuwe o-a-bela/tjhesa hobane baithuti ba-sa-etse mosebetsi wa bona.
(The teacher is angry because the learners are not doing their work)

The other verb that may appear in expressions of anger is **tuka**(burn briskly) with the cognate object **malakabe**(flames):

- (3) Ho-tuka malakabe
(to burn flames briskly, i.e. to be very angry)

Such an expression as in (3) above may appear with a human experiencer of anger in the position of the external argument, i.e. the subject position:

- (4) Mme o-ne-a-tuka malakabe ha a-fumana Morwesi a-apere mose wa hae o motjha.
(Mother was very angry when she found out that Morwesi was wearing her new dress)

Verbs of ingesting

There is one verb of eating which may appear in expressions of anger, i.e. **ja**(eat). This verb may appear with **diterentshe**(bridle) and **masooko**(plants):

- 1(a) Ho-ja diterentshe
(to eat the bridle, i.e. to be very angry)
- (b) Ho-ja masooko
(to eat plants, i.e. to be very angry)

Such expressions as in (1) above may appear with any human experiencer of anger in the position of the external argument, i.e. the subject position:

- 2(a) Ntate o-ne a-jele diterentshe ha a-fumana Thabo a-kganna koloi ya hae e ntjha.
(Father was very angry when he found Thabo driving his new car)

- (b) Ramosebetsi o-ne a-jele masooko ha a-fumana basebetsi ba-sa-phetha mosebetsi.

(The employer was very angry when he found that the employees did not finish the job)

Verbs involving the body

There is one verb involving the body that may appear in expressions of anger, i.e. **sena**(show one's teeth). This verb may appear with the cognate body part **meno**(teeth):

- (1) Ho-sena meno
(to show one's teeth, i.e. to show anger)

Such an expression as in (1) above may appear with any human experiencer of anger in the position of the external argument, i.e. the subject position:

- (2) Molemo o-ile a-sena meno ha ba-ne-ba-utswitse buka ya hae.
(Molemo showed anger when they had stolen his book)

4.3.2.3 Verbs of anger

The verbs of anger in Sesotho will be discussed with regard to their semantics and syntax.

4.3.2.3.1 The semantics of the verbs of anger

The verbs of anger may be divided into various subcategories depending on the degree of anger which is experienced by a person:

To experience anger

The following verbs are neutral with respect to the degree of anger experienced by a person:

[halefa]

Ntate o halefile haholo.

(Father is very angry)

[senella]

Monna o ile a senella ha ba mo hlapaola.

(The man became angry when they insulted him)

[haka]

Sello o ne a hakile hoba ba tabole dibuka tsa hae.

(Sello was angry when they teard his books)

[hwapa]

Ngwana o ile a hwapa ha ba hana ho mo thusa.

(The child became angry when they refused to help him)

[sheshema]

Puleng o ile a sheshema ha ba mo hlapaola.

(Puleng became angry when they insulted her)

[re hala]

Mosadi o ile a re hala ha a utlwa mashano ao ba a buang ka yena.

(The woman became angry when she heard about the lies they told about her)

[thohothelwa]

Malome o ile a thohothelwa ha a fumana ba utswitse dikgomo tsa hae.

(Uncle became angry when he found out about his stolen cattle)

[hahla]

Sello o ile a hahla ha Thabo a bua kgarebe ya hae hampe.

(Sello became angry when Thabo spoke ill of his girlfriend)

[qwalama]

Mme o ile a qwalama ha a sa fumane diphahlo tsa hae.

(Mother became angry when she could not find her belongings)

[re kwaqa]

Ngwana o ile a re kwaqa ha ba mo buisa hampe.

(The child became angry when they spoke badly with him)

To be very angry

The verb **tlokoma** expresses an extreme anger:

[tlokoma]

Teboho o ile a tlokoma ha a utlwela ka tsa polao ya malomae.

(Teboho became very angry when he heard about the murder of his uncle)

To show anger

The ideophone **peko** and the verb **pekotsa** allows one to show anger by means of words, by exchanging blows or by throwing anything that comes to hand.

[re peko]

Mosadi o ile a re peko ha a bona sera sa hae.

(The woman became angry when she saw her foe)

[pekotsa]

Mosadi o ile a pekotsa ha a utlwa hore ba otlile ngwana hae.

(The woman was wild and angry when she heard that they have beaten her child)

To be angry suddenly

The ideophone **kgwephe** indicates that one has a sudden experience of anger.

[kgwephe]

Pule o itse kgwephe ba sa labella.

(Pule became angry suddenly when they least expected it)

To be violent with anger

The verb **befa** indicates a violent anger.

[befa]

Moshemane o ile a befa ha ba mo qala.

(The boy became violently angry when they teased him)

To show signs of anger

The ideophone **hwaqa** and the verb **hwaqela** refer to showing signs of anger or frowning in anger.

[re hwaqa]

Neo o ile a re hwaqa ha ba mo rohaka.

(Neo showed signs of anger when they insulted him)

[hwaqela]

Ntatemoholo o hwaqela bana ba sa utlweng.

(Grandfather is angry with stubborn children)

4.3.2.3.2 The syntax of the verbs of anger

Syntactically the verbs of anger may be divided into three types of verbs, i.e. non-derived intransitive and transitive verbs, intransitive ideophones, and derived applicative verbs. These three types of verbs will be discussed below in five subsections depending on transitivity and derived verbs:

4.3.2.3.2.1 Intransitive ideophones

Assignment of arguments

There are three intransitive ideophones which expresses anger, i.e. **hala**, **kwaqa** and **kgwephe**. These ideophones have to appear with the verb **re** which accepts the inflection of the verb. The ideophone itself will assign the argument. In this case only an external argument is assigned which has the reference of an experiencer of anger:

[hala]: [X]
[experiencer]

[Mosadi] o ile a re hala ha a utlwa mashano ao ba a buang ka yena.

(The woman became angry when she heard about the lies they told about her)

In the sentence above the external argument is [Mosadi](woman) which is the experiencer of anger.

[kwaqa]: [X]
 [experiencer]

[Ngwana] o ile a re kwaqa ha ba mo buisa hampe.
 (The child became angry when they spoke badly with him)

In the sentence above the external argument is [Ngwana](child) which is the experiencer of anger.

[kgwephe]: [X]
 [experiencer]

[Pule] o ile a re kgwephe ba sa elellwa.
 (Pule became angry suddenly when they least expected it)

In the sentence above the external argument is [Pule] which is the experiencer of anger.

Selection restrictions

The subject argument above will have a selection restriction of [human], i.e. only humans may experience an emotion of anger:

[Ngwana] o ile a re kwaqa ha ba mo buisa hampe.
 (The child became angry when they spoke badly with him)

However, various other nouns, which are not human, may appear in this position as long as they are indicated as being under the human control:

[Amerika] e ile ya re kwaqa ha e utlwa hore Zambia e dumella tlhekefetso ya makgowa.
 (America became angry when she heard that Zambia is encouraging the attacking of whites)

[Koranta] e ile ya re hala ha e qosetswa mashano.

(The newspaper became angry when it was accused of lying)

Event structure

The ideophones above all indicate an event structure of state. The type of stative predicate above is a stage-level predicate because such states are non-permanent states of individuals:

$$\text{EVENTSTR} = \left(\begin{array}{l} E_1 = \text{process} \\ E_2 = \text{state} \end{array} \right)$$

Meaning of the ideophones

[kwaqa]

1. become angry

Ngwana o ile a re kwaqa ha ba mo buisa hampe.

(The child became angry when they spoke badly of him)

2. close as a trap

Lemati le ile la re kwaqa kamora bona mme ya ba ha ba sa kgona ho tswa.

(The door closed as a trap behind them and they could not get out)

[kgwephe]

1. become angry suddenly

Pule o ile a re kgwephe ba sa labella.

(Pule became angry suddenly when they least expected it)

2. startle

Moshemane o ile a re kgwephe dinonyana ya ba di a baleha.

(The boy startled the birds and they flew away)

3. pull the trigger

Ho ile ha utlwahala modumo o moholo fela ha monna a re kgwephe sethunya.

(A loud noise was heard when the man pulled the trigger)

[hala]

1. become angry

Mosadi o ile a re hala ha a utlwa mashano ao ba a buang ka yena.

(The woman became angry when she heard about the lies they told about her)

2. be eager

Mosuwe o hala ho thusa baithuti ba sokolang.

(The teacher is eager to help struggling learners)

3. be a glutton

Ngwana o a hala ha a bona dijo.

(The child becomes a glutton when he sees food)

4.3.2.3.2.2 Intransitive ideophone with a derived intransitive verb

Assignment of arguments

There is one intransitive ideophone with a derived intransitive verb, i.e. **peko** with the derived intransitive verb **pekotsa**. The intransitive ideophone have to appear with the

verb **re** which accepts the inflection of the verb. The ideophone itself will assign the argument. In this case only an external argument is assigned which has the reference of an experiencer of anger:

[re peko]: [X]
[experiencer]

[Mpho] o ile a re peko ha a bona sera sa hae.

(Mpho became angry when he saw his foe)

The external argument is [Mpho] which is the experiencer of anger.

[pekotsa]: [X]
[experriencer]

[Mosadi] o ile a pekotsa ha a utlwa hore ba otlile ngwana hae.

(The woman showed signs of anger when she heard that they have beaten her child)

The external argument is [Mosadi](woman) which is the experiencer of anger.

Selection restrictions

The subject argument of the ideophone will have a selection restriction of [animate]:

Humans can be angry:

[Mpho] o ile a re peko ha a bona sera sa hae.

(Mpho became angry when he saw his foe)

Animals can be angry:

[Ntja] e ile ya re peko ha e bona leshodu ka tlung.

(The dog became angry when it saw the thief in the house)

Other personified nouns:

[Afrika Borwa] e ile ya re peko ha Congo e bolaya batshwaruwa.

(South Africa became angry when Congo killed the hostages)

Event structure

The ideophone indicate an event structure of state. The type of stative predicate is a stage-level predicate because such states are non-permanent states of individuals:

$$\text{EVENTSTR} = \left(\begin{array}{l} E_1 = \text{process} \\ E_2 = \text{state} \end{array} \right)$$

Meaning

[re peko]

1. be angry

Mpho o ile a re peko ha a bona sera sa hae.

(Mpho became angry when he saw his foe)

2. kick

Pere e ile ya re peko moshemane dimpeng mona ka tlhako e ka morao.

(The horse kicked the boy in the stomach with the hind leg)

[pekotsa]

1. show one's anger by words, by blows, by throwing about everything that comes to hand

Mosadi o ile a pekotsa ha a utlwa hore ba otlile ngwana hae.

(The woman showed signs of anger when she heard that they have beaten her child)

4.3.2.3.2.3 Intransitive ideophone with a derived transitive verb

Assignment of arguments

There is one intransitive ideophone with a derived transitive verb, i.e. **hwaqa** with the derived transitive verb **hwaqela**. The intransitive ideophone have to appear with the verb **re** which accepts the inflection of the verb. In this case only an external argument is assigned which has the reference of an experiencer of anger:

[re hwaqa]: [X]
[experiencer]

[Neo] o ile a re hwaqa ha ba mo rohaka.

(Neo showed signs of anger when they insulted him)

In the sentence above [Neo] is the external argument which is the experiencer of anger.

The derived transitive verb **hwaqela** has two arguments: an external and an internal argument:

[hwaqela] [X,Y]
[experiencer, malefactive]

[Ntatemoholo] o hwaqela [bana ba sa utlweng]

(Grandfather is angry with stubborn children)

The external argument is [Ntatemoholo](grandfather) which is the experiencer of anger, and [bana ba sa utlweng] is the internal argument which is malefactive.

Selection restriction

The subject argument of the ideophone **re hwaqa** will have a selection restriction of [animate]:

[re hwaqa]

Humans can be angry:

[Neo] o ile a re hwaqa ha ba mo rohaka.

(Neo showed signs of anger when they insulted him)

Animals can be angry:

[Ntja] e ile ya re hwaqa ha e bona leshodu ka kampong.

(The dog showed signs of anger when it saw the thief in the camp)

Other personified nouns:

[Engelane] e ile ya re hwaqa ha Burundi e hlasela baphaphathehi.

(England showed signs of anger when Burundi attacked the fugitives)

The selection restrictions of the derived verb **hwaqela** is as follows:

Only nouns with the feature [animate] may appear as subject:

Humans can be angry:

[Ntatemoholo] o hwaqela bana ba sa utlweng.

(Grandfather is angry with stubborn children)

Animals can be angry:

[Ntja] e hwaqela bana ba e betsang ka majwe.

(The dog is angry with the children who throw stones at it)

Other personified nouns:

[Toropo] e hwaqela baahi ba sa lefeng ditshebeletso.

(The town is angry with residents who are not paying their services)

Only nouns with the feature [animate] may appear in the object position:

People > Monna o hwaqela [mosadi ya botswa]
(The man is angry with the lazy woman)

Animals > Moshemane o hwaqela [ntja e jeleng dijo tsa hae]
(The boy is angry with the dog that ate his food)

Personified nouns > Monna o hwaqela [koranta] ha e bua ka taba tsa hae.
(The man is angry with the newspaper when it writes about his doings)

Event structure

This ideophone indicates an event structure of state. The type of stative predicate is a stage-level predicate because such a state is a non-permanent state of an individual:

$$\text{EVENTSTR} = \left(\begin{array}{l} E_1 = \text{process} \\ E_2 = \text{state} \end{array} \right)$$

Meaning

[re hwaqa]

1. to show signs of anger, frown

Neo o ile a re hwaqa ha ba mo rohaka.

(Neo showed signs of anger when they insulted him)

[hwaqela]

1. to become angry with

Ntatemoholo o hwaqela bana ba sa utlweng.

(Grandfather is angry with stubborn children)

2. to shrink

Mosadi o hwaqela mose ka sekere.

(The woman shrinks the dress with scissors)

3. frown

Mosadi o hwaqela sera sa hae ha a se bona.

(The woman frowns at her enemy when she sees her)

4.3.2.3.2.4 Intransitive verbs

There are four intransitive verbs: **thohothelwa**, **tlokoma**, **hahla** and **qwalama**.

[thohothelwa](be angry)**Assignment of arguments**

This verb may appear with one argument: an external argument that is assigned by the verb phrase. This argument appears as a subject argument with the reference of an experiencer of anger:

[thohothelwa]: [X]
[experiencer]

[Malome] o ile a thohothelwa ha a fumana ba utswitse dikgomo tsa hae.
(Uncle became angry when he found out about his stolen cattle)

The external argument is [Malome](uncle) which is the experiencer of anger.

Selection restriction

Humans can be angry:

[Malome] o ile a thohothelwa ha a fumana ba utswitse dikgomo tsa hae.
(Uncle became angry when he found out about his stolen cattle)

Animals can be angry:

[Ntja] e ile ya thohothelwa ha bana ba e betsa ka majwe.
(The dog became angry when the children threw stones at it)

Personified nouns:

[Koranta] e ile ya thohothelwa ha e qosetswa mashano.
(The newspaper became angry when it was accused of lying)

Thus, the subject argument above will have a selection restriction of [animate].

Event structure

This verb indicates an event structure of state. The type of stative predicate is a stage-level predicate because such a state is a non-permanent state of an individual:

$$\text{EVENTSTR} = \left(\begin{array}{l} E_1 = \text{process} \\ E_2 = \text{state} \end{array} \right)$$

Meaning

1. to be angry

Malome o ile thohothelwa ha a fumana ba utswitse dikgomo tsa hae.
(Uncle became angry when he found out about his stolen cattle)

2. to speak violently

Monna o ile a thohothelwa ha a bua le mokgopi.
(The man spoke violently when addressing the gathering)

3. to try

Ngwana o thohothelwa ho thusa mmae ho hlatswa diaparo.
(The child tries to help her mother wash the clothes)

4. to insist

Ke thohothelwa hore o tsamaye le bona.
(I insist that you go with them)

[tlokoma](be very angry)

Assignment of arguments

This verb may appear with one argument: an external argument that is assigned by the verb phrase. This argument appears as a subject argument with the reference of an experiencer of anger:

[tlokoma]: [X]
[experiencer]

[Thabo] o ile a tlokoma ha a utlwela ka tsa polao ya malomae.

(Thabo became very angry when he heard about the murder of his uncle)

The external argument is [Thabo] which is the experiencer of anger.

Selection restriction

Humans can be angry:

[Thabo] o ile a tlokoma ha a utlwela ka tsa polao ya malomae.

(Thabo became very angry when he heard about the murder of his uncle)

Animals can be angry:

[Ntja] e ile ya tlokoma ha ba e betsa ka majwe.

(The dog became very angry when they threw stones at it)

Personified nouns:

[Koranta] e ile ya tlokoma ha e qosetswa mashano.

(The newspaper became very angry when it was accused of lying)

Thus, the subject argument above will have a selection restriction of [animate].

Event structure

This verb indicates an event structure of state. The type of stative predicate is a stage-level predicate because such a state is a non-permanent state of an individual:

$$\text{EVENTSTR} = \left(\begin{array}{l} E_1 = \text{process} \\ E_2 = \text{state} \end{array} \right)$$

Meaning

1. to be very angry

Thabo o ile a tlokoma ha a utlwela ka tsa polao ya malomae.

(Thabo became very angry when he heard about the murder of his uncle)

2. to grow quickly

Dimela di a tlokoma ha pula e na ka mehla.

(Plants grow quickly when it rains regularly)

[hahla](become angry)

Assignment of arguments

This verb may appear with one argument: an external argument that is assigned by the verb phrase. This argument appears as a subject argument with the reference of an experiencer of anger:

[hahla]: [X]
[experiencer]

[Sello] o ile a hahla ha Thabo a bua kgarebe ya hae hampe.
(Sello became angry when Thabo spoke ill of his girlfriend)

The external argument is [Sello] which is the experiencer of anger.

Selection restriction

Humans can be angry:

[Sello] o ile a hahla ha Thabo a bua kgarebe ya hae hampe.
(Sello became angry when Thabo spoke ill of his girlfriend)

Animals can be angry:

[Ntja] e ile ya hahla ha ba e betsa ka majwe.
(The dog became angry when they threw stones at it)

Personified nouns:

[Koranta] e ile ya hahla ha e qosetswa mashano.
(The newspaper became angry when it was accused of lying)

Thus, the subject argument above will have a selection restriction of [animate].

Event structure

This verb indicates an event structure of state. The type of stative predicate is a stage-level predicate because such a state is a non-permanent state of an individual:

$$\text{EVENTSTR} = \left(\begin{array}{l} E_1 = \text{process} \\ E_2 = \text{state} \end{array} \right)$$

Meaning

1. to become angry

Sello o ile a hahla ha Thabo a bua kgarebe ya hae hampe.
(Sello became angry when Thabo spoke ill of his girlfriend)

2. to become dry

Diaparo di tla hahla kapele ha di behwa letsatsing.
(The clothes will dry quickly when put in sunlight)

3. to coagulate

Madi a ya hahla ha a fumana serame.
(Blood coagulate when exposed to cold)

[qwalama](become angry)

Assignment of arguments

This verb may appear with one argument: an external argument that is assigned by the verb phrase. This argument appears as a subject argument with the reference of an experiencer of anger:

[qwalama]: [X]
[experiencer]

[Mme] o ile a qwalama ha a sa fumane mose tsa hae.

(Mother became angry when she could not find her dress)

The external argument is [Mme](mother) which is the experiencer of anger.

Selection restriction

Humans can be angry:

[Mme] o ile a qwalama ha a sa fumane mose wa hae.

(Mother became angry when she could not find her dress)

Animals can be angry:

[Ntja] e ile ya qwalama ha ba e betsa ka majwe.

(The dog became angry when they threw stones at it)

Personified nouns:

[Koranta] e ile ya qwalama ha e qosetswa mashano.

(The newspaper became angry when it was accused of lying)

Thus, the subject argument above will have a selection restriction of [animate].

Event structure

This verb indicates an event structure of state. The type of stative predicate is a stage-level predicate because such a state is a non-permanent state of an individual:

$$\text{EVENTSTR} = \left(\begin{array}{l} E_1 = \text{process} \\ E_2 = \text{state} \end{array} \right)$$

Meaning

1. to become angry

Mme o ile a qwalama ha a sa fumane mose wa hae.

(Mother became angry when she could not find her dress)

4.3.2.3.2.5 Intransitive verbs with the derived applicative suffix

There are six intransitive verbs in this category: **halefa**, **senella**, **haka**, **hwapa**, **sheshema** and **befa**. The intransitive verbs will be discussed below after which the derived applicative verbs will follow.

[halefa](become angry)

Assignment of arguments

This verb may appear with one argument: an external argument that is assigned by the verb phrase. This argument appears as a subject argument with the reference of an experiencer of anger:

[halefa]: [X]
 [experiencer]

[Ntate] o ile a halefa ha mme a fihla bosiu.

(Father became angry when mother came late at night)

The external argument is [Ntate](father) which is the experiencer of anger.

Selection restriction

Humans can be angry:

[Ntate] o ile a halefa ha mme a fihla bosiu.

(Father became angry when mother came late at night)

Animals can be angry:

[Ntja] e ile ya halefa ha ba e betsa ka majwe.

(The dog became angry when they threw stones at it)

Personified nouns:

[Koranta] e ile ya halefa ha e qosetswa mashano.

(The newspaper became angry when it was accused of lying)

Thus, the subject argument above will have a selection restriction of [animate].

Event structure

This verb indicates an event structure of state. The type of stative predicate is a stage-level predicate because such a state is a non-permanent state of an individual:

$$\text{EVENTSTR} = \left(\begin{array}{l} E_1 = \text{process} \\ E_2 = \text{state} \end{array} \right)$$

Meaning

1. to become angry

Mme o ile a halefa ha a sa fumane mose wa hae.

(Mother became angry when she could not find her dress)

[senella](become angry)

Assignment of arguments

This verb may appear with one argument: an external argument that is assigned by the verb phrase. This argument appears as a subject argument with the reference of an experiencer of anger:

[senella]: [X]
 [experiencer]

[Ngwanana] o ile a senella ha ba mo hlapaola.

(The girl became angry when they insulted her)

The external argument is [Ngwanana](girl) which is the experiencer of anger.

Selection restriction

Humans can be angry:

[Mme] o ile a senella ha a sa fumane mose wa hae.

(Mother became angry when she could not find her dress)

Animals can be angry:

[Ntja] e ile ya senella ha ba e betsa ka majwe.

(The dog became angry when they threw stones at it)

Personified nouns:

[Koranta] e ile ya senella ha e qosetswa mashano.

(The newspaper became angry when it was accused of lying)

Thus, the subject argument above will have a selection restriction of [animate].

Event structure

This verb indicates an event structure of state. The type of stative predicate is a stage-level predicate because such a state is a non-permanent state of an individual:

$$\text{EVENTSTR} = \left(\begin{array}{l} E_1 = \text{process} \\ E_2 = \text{state} \end{array} \right)$$

Meaning

1. to be angry

Mme o ile a senella ha a sa fumane mose wa hae.

(Mother became angry when she could not find her dress)

[haka](become angry)

Assignment of arguments

This verb may appear with one argument: an external argument that is assigned by the verb phrase. This argument appears as a subject argument with the reference of an experiencer of anger:

[haka]: [X]

[experiencer]

[Moshemane] o ile a haka ha ba tabotse dibuka tsa hae.

(The boy became angry when they had torn his books)

The external argument is [Moshemane](boy) which is the experiencer of anger.

Selection restriction

Humans can be angry:

[Mme] o ile a haka ha a sa fumane mose wa hae.

(Mother became angry when she could not find her dress)

Animals can be angry:

[Ntja] e ile ya haka ha ba e betsa ka majwe.

(The dog became angry when they threw stones at it)

Personified nouns:

[Koranta] e ile ya haka ha e qosetswa mashano.

(The newspaper became angry when it was accused of lying)

Thus, the subject argument above will have a selection restriction of [animate].

Event structure

This verb indicates an event structure of state. The type of stative predicate is a stage-level predicate because such a state is a non-permanent state of an individual:

$$\text{EVENTSTR} = \left(\begin{array}{l} E_1 = \text{process} \\ E_2 = \text{state} \end{array} \right)$$

Meaning

1. to become angry

Moshemane o ile a haka ha ba tabotse dibuka tsa hae.
(The boy became angry when they had torn his books)

2. to hook

Mme o haka diaparo terateng.
(Mother is hooking the clothes on the fence)

[hwapa](become angry)

Assignment of arguments

This verb may appear with one argument: an external argument that is assigned by the verb phrase. This argument appears as a subject argument with the reference of an experiencer of anger:

[hwapa]:[X]
[experiencer]

[Mosadi] o ile a hwapa ha ba hana ho mo thusa.
(The woman became angry when they refused to help her)

The external argument is [Mosadi](woman) which is the experiencer of anger.

Selection restriction

Humans can be angry:

[Mme] o ile a hwapa ha a sa fumane mose wa hae.

(Mother became angry when she could not find her dress)

Animals can be angry:

[Ntja] e ile ya hwapa ha ba e betsa ka majwe.

(The dog became angry when they threw stones at it)

Personified nouns:

[Koranta] e ile ya hwapa ha e qosetswa mashano.

(The newspaper became angry when it was accused of lying)

Thus, the subject argument above will have a selection restriction of [animate].

Event structure

This verb indicates an event structure of state. The type of stative predicate is a stage-level predicate because such a state is a non-permanent state of an individual:

$$\text{EVENTSTR} = \left(\begin{array}{l} E_1 = \text{process} \\ E_2 = \text{state} \end{array} \right)$$

Meaning

1. to become angry

Mosadi o ile a hwapa ha ba hana ho mo thusa.

(The woman became angry when they refused to help her)

2. to change one's mind

Moremi o ile a hwapa le ha a ne a se a ntshepitsitse hore o tla nthusa.

(Moremi changed his mind even though he had already promised to help me)

3. to grumble

Tlohela ho hwapa o etse mosebetsi.

(Stop grumbling and do the work)

[sheshema](become angry)

Assignment of arguments

This verb may appear with one argument: an external argument that is assigned by the verb phrase. This argument appears as a subject argument with the reference of an experiencer of anger:

[sheshema]:[X]

[experiencer]

[Puleng] o ile a sheshema ha ba mo hlapaola.

(Puleng became angry when they insulted her)

The external argument is [Puleng] which is the experiencer of anger.

Selection restriction

Humans can be angry:

[Mme] o ile a sheshema ha a sa fumane mose wa hae.

(Mother became angry when she could not find her dress)

Animals can be angry:

[Ntja] e ile ya sheshema ha ba e betsa ka majwe.

(The dog became angry when they threw stones at it)

Personified nouns:

[Koranta] e ile ya sheshema ha e qosetswa mashano.

(The newspaper became angry when it was accused of lying)

Thus, the subject argument above will have a selection restriction of [animate].

Event structure

This verb indicates an event structure of state. The type of stative predicate is a stage-level predicate because such a state is a non-permanent state of an individual:

$$\text{EVENTSTR} = \left(\begin{array}{l} E_1 = \text{process} \\ E_2 = \text{state} \end{array} \right)$$

Meaning

1. to become angry

Puleng o ile a sheshema ha ba mo hlapaola.

(Puleng became angry when they insulted her)

[befa](to be angry)

Assignment of arguments

This verb may appear with one argument: an external argument that is assigned by the verb phrase. This argument appears as a subject argument with the reference of an experiencer of anger:

[befa]: [X]

[experiencer]

[Moshemane] o ile a befa ha ba mo qala.

(The boy became angry when they teased him)

The external argument is [Moshemane](boy) which is the experiencer of anger.

Selection restriction

Humans can be angry:

[Mme] o ile a befa ha a sa fumane mose wa hae.

(Mother became angry when she could not find her dress)

Animals can be angry:

[Ntja] e ile ya befa ha ba e betsa ka majwe.

(The dog became angry when they threw stones at it)

Personified nouns:

[Koranta] e ile ya befa ha e qosetswa mashano.

(The newspaper became angry when it was accused of lying)

Thus, the subject argument above will have a selection restriction of [animate].

Event structure

This verb indicates an event structure of state. The type of stative predicate is a stage-level predicate because such a state is a non-permanent state of an individual:

$$\text{EVENTSTR} = \left(\begin{array}{l} E_1 = \text{process} \\ E_2 = \text{state} \end{array} \right)$$

Meaning

1. to become angry

Moshemane o ile a befa ha ba mo qala.

(The boy became angry when they teased him)

2. to be violent

Leshodu le ile la befa ha batho ba leka ho le tshwara.

(The thief became violent when the people tried to apprehend him)

With applicative

All the above six verbs may appear with the applicative suffix [-el-]: **halefela**, **senela**, **hakela**, **hwapela**, **sheshemela** and **befela**. In such a case, a new internal argument will be added which is dependent on the presence of [-el-]. In each sentence below, the new argument will be indicated as well as its interpretation. This new argument will be animate.

[halefela](become angry with)

Monna o halefela [ngwana ya sa mameleng]

(The man is angry with the naughty child)

The new internal argument is [ngwana ya sa mameleng] which is interpreted as malefactive.

[senela](become angry with)

Malome o ile a senela [moradi] ha a sa mo fe dijo.

(Uncle became angry with his daughter for not giving him food)

The new internal argument is [moradi] which is interpreted as malefactive.

[hakela](become angry with)

Sello o hakela [Thabo] hobane a mo nketse kgarebe ya hae.

(Sello is angry with Thabo for taking his girlfriend away from him)

The new internal argument is [Thabo] which is interpreted as malefactive.

[hwapela](become angry with)

Mosadi o hwapela [bana ba seleng]

(The woman is angry with silly children)

The new internal argument is [bana ba seleng] which is interpreted as malefactive.

[sheshemela](become angry with)

Teboho o ile a sheshemela [batho] ka bohale ha ba fihlile kamora nako.

(Teboho became angry with the people when they arrived late)

The new internal argument is [batho](people) which is interpreted as malefactive.

[befela](be violent with)

Ngwana o befela [bashemane ba mo qalang]

(The child became violent with the boys who tease him)

The new internal argument is [bashemane ba mo qalang] which is interpreted as malefactive.

4.3.3 Threats

4.3.3.1 Definition of a threat

The concept of threatening indicates the expression of a threat against someone, i.e. an expression of an intention to hurt, punish or cause pain, especially if one's instructions or demands are not obeyed.

4.3.3.2 The expressions of threatening

There are four expressions which indicate a threat. As in the case of the expressions of anger, body parts play a crucial role in these expressions of threatening. These expressions may appear with an external argument as well as an internal argument in the subject and object position respectively.

Ho-supu ka monwana**(to point with a finger, i.e. to threaten)**

(1) [Ntate] o-supu [bana ba-seleng] ka monwana.

(Father threatens naughty children)

In (1) above the external argument is **ntate** who is assigned by the VP with the interpretation of agent. The internal argument is **bana ba-seleng** and they are interpreted as patients, i.e. the entities which are affected by the act of threatening. The body part is **monwana** which appears as complement of the preposition **ka** in a PP.

Ho-tonela motho mahlo**(to look at someone with wide open eyes, i.e. to threaten)**

(2) [Malome] o-tonela [bahlankana] mahlo ha-ba-hana ho-sebetsa.

(Uncle threatens the young men when they do not want to work)

In (2) above the external argument is **malome** who is assigned by the VP with the interpretation of agent. The internal argument is **bahlankana** and they are interpreted as patients, i.e. the entities which are affected by the act of threatening. The body part is **mahlo** which appears as a direct internal object because of the presence of the applicative suffix [-el-] in the verb **tonela**.

Ho-eka sephaka**(to brandish an arm, i.e. to threaten)**

(3) [Monnamoholo] o-eka [bana ba-mo-qalang] sephaka.

(The old man threatens children who provoke him)

In (3) above the external argument is **monnamoholo** who is assigned by the VP with the interpretation of agent. The internal argument is **bana ba-mo-qalang** and they are interpreted as patients, i.e. the entities which are affected by the act of threatening. The body part is **sephaka** which appears as a noun in a NP.

Ho-taedisa kolobe**(to finish off the pig, i.e. to threaten)**

(4) [Monna] o-taedisa [mosadi] kolobe ka molamu.

(The man threatens the woman with a stick)

In (4) above the external argument is **monna** who is assigned by the VP with the interpretation of agent. The internal argument is **mosadi** and she is interpreted as a patient, i.e. the entity which is affected by the act of threatening. The indirect internal object is **kolobe**. The noun **molamu** is the complement of the preposition **ka** in a PP.

4.3.3.3 Verbs of threatening

The verbs of threatening will be discussed with regard to their semantics and syntax.

4.3.3.3.1 Semantics of verbs of threatening

The verbs of threatening may be divided into the following categories depending on the degree of threaten which is experienced by the person:

To threaten with a hand or weapon

[oma]

Pule o oma Maime ka molamu.

(Pule threatens Maime with a stick)

To threaten

[hwatela]

Monna o hwatela motho ya mo rohakileng.

(The man threatens the people who insulted him)

[shatela]

Mosadi o shatela monna hae ya sa robaleng hae.

(The woman threatens her man who sleeps out)

[seketsa]

Ranko o seketsa ngwana ya utswitseng bolo ya hae.

(Ranko threatens the child who stole his ball)

[purumela]

Mme o purumela banana ba sa sebetseng.

(Mother threatens the girls who are not working)

[rorela]

Rapolasi o rorela basebetsi ba sa sebetseng.

(The farmer threatens the workers who are not working)

[sokela]

Pule o sokela Sellwane hobane a mo sutuditse.

(Pule threatens Sellwane because she pushed him.)

[sothella]

Mosadi o ile a sothella bana ba hanang ho sebetsa.

(The woman threatened the children who refused to work)

To growl at

[honela]

Monna o honela batho ba nwang jwala ba hae.

(The man growls at people who drink his beer)

4.3.3.2 The syntax of the verbs of threatening

Verbs with the meaning of threatening as above are divided into two subsections if one considers their syntactic behaviour.

4.3.3.2.1 Transitive verbs

There are three transitive verbs with the meaning of threatening: **hwatela**, **oma** and **seketsa**.

Assignment of arguments

These verbs may appear with two arguments: an external argument which is assigned by the verb phrase and an internal argument which is assigned by the verb. The external argument will be interpreted as agent and the internal argument as patient:

[hwatela]: [X, Y]
[agent, patient]

[Mosuwe] o hwatela [bana ba sa ithuteng]

(The teacher threatens the children who are not studying)

The external argument is [Mosuwe](teacher) which is interpreted as agent, and the internal argument is [bana ba sa ithuteng] which is interpreted as patient.

[oma]: [X, Y]
 [agent, patient]

[Pule] o oma [Maime] ka molamu.
 (Pule threatens Maime with a stick)

The external argument is [Pule] which is interpreted as agent, and the internal argument is [Maime] which is interpreted as patient.

[seketsa]: [X, Y]
 [agent, patient]

[Ranko] o seketsa [ngwana ya utswitseng bolo ya hae]
 (Ranko threatens the child who stole his ball)

The external argument is [Ranko] which is interpreted as agent, and the internal argument is [ngwana ya utswitseng bolo ya hae] which is interpreted as patient.

Selection restrictions

On the external argument:

Humans can threaten:

Monna o hwatela mosadi.
 (The man threatens the woman)

Animals can threaten:

Ntja e seketsa ngwana.
 (The dog growls at the child)

Other personified nouns:

Zimbabwe e hwatela Borithani ka ho re e tla bolaya borapolasi.

(Zimbabwe threatens Britain by saying that she will kill the farmers)

Thus, only nouns with the feature [+animate] may appear as subject.

On the internal argument:

As above, only nouns with the feature [+animate] may appear in the object position, i.e. either humans or animals:

People > Monna o oma **mosadi** ka koto.

(The man threatens the woman with a knobkierie)

Animals > Mohlankana o oma **ntja** ka molamu.

(The young man threatens the dog with a stick)

Event structure

The verbs of threatening show two events in their event structure:

Event 1: activity

Event 2: state, i.e. a stage-level state in which a person feels threatened.

The event structure may be represented as follows:

$$\text{EVENTSTR} = \left(\begin{array}{l} E_1 = \text{process} \\ E_2 = \text{state} \end{array} \right)$$

Meaning

[hwatela]

1. to threaten

Mosuwe o hwatela bana ba sa ithuting.

(The teacher threatens the children who are not studying)

2. to prepare for fighting

Amerika e hwatela Iraq.

(America prepares for fighting Iraq)

[oma]

1. to threaten with the hand or weapon

Pule o oma Maime ka molamu.

(Pule threatens Maime with a stick)

[seketsa]

1. to threaten

Ranko o seketsa ngwana ya utswitseng bolo ya hae.

(Ranko threatens the child who stole his ball)

2. to brandish

Sekebekwa se seketsa batho ka thipa.

(The thug brandished a knife to the people)

4.3.3.3.2 Applicative verbs

There are a number of verbs which do not have the meaning of **threaten** when they appear without the applicative suffix: **hona, puruma, rora, shata, soka** and **sotha**:

[hona](snore)

Ngwana o a hona ha a robetse.

(The child snores when he is asleep)

[puruma](roar)

Tau e a puruma.

(The lion roars)

[rora](roar)

Tau e a rora.

(The lion roars)

[shata](resist)

Bana ba shata ho etsa mosebetsi.

(The children resists to do the work)

[soka](stir)

Mosadi o soka pitsa ya papa.

(The woman is stirring the pot of porridge)

[sotha](twist)

Pule o sotha Morwesi letsoho.

(Pule is twisting Morwesi's hand)

However, when these verbs appear with the applicative suffix [-el-], they may have the meaning of **threaten: honela, purumela, rorela, sokela, sothella** and **shatela**. In such a case, a new internal argument will be added which is dependent on the presence of [-el-]. In each sentence below, the new argument will be indicated as well as its interpretation. This new argument will be animate.

[honela](growl at)

[Monna] o honela [batho ba nwang jwala ba hae]

(The man growls at people who drink his beer)

The external argument is [Monna] which is interpreted as experiencer, and the new internal argument is [batho ba nwang jwala ba hae] which is interpreted as malefactive.

[purumela](threaten)

[Mme] o purumela [banana ba sa sebetseng]

(Mother threatens the girls who are not working)

The external argument is [Mme] which is interpreted as experiencer, and the new internal argument is [banana ba sa sebetseng] which is interpreted as malefactive.

[rorela](threaten)

[Rapolasi] o rorela [basebetsi ba sa sebetseng]

(The farmer threatens the workers who are not working)

The external argument is [Rapolasi] which is interpreted as experiencer, and the new internal argument is [basebetsi ba sa sebetseng] which is interpreted as malefactive.

[sokela](threaten)

[Pule] o sokela [Sellwane] hobane a mo sutuditse.

(Pule threatens Sellwane because she pushed him)

The external argument is [Pule] which is interpreted as experiencer, and the new internal argument is [Sellwane] which is interpreted as malefactive.

[sothella](threaten)

[Mosadi] o ile a sothella [bana ba hanang ho sebetsa]

(The woman threatened the children who refused to work)

The external argument is [Mosadi] which is interpreted as experiencer, and the new internal argument is [bana ba hanang ho sebetsa] which is interpreted as malefactive.

[shatela](threaten)

[Mosadi] o shatela [monna hae ya sa robaleng hae]

(The woman threatens her man who sleeps out)

The external argument is [Mosadi] which is interpreted as experiencer, and the new internal argument is [monna hae ya sa robaleng hae] which is interpreted as malefactive.

Selection restrictions

On the external argument

Humans can threaten:

Monna o sothella mosadi.

(The man threatens the woman)

Animals can threaten:

Ntja e honela ngwana.

(The dog growls at the child)

Other personified nouns:

Zimbabwe e shatela Borithani ka hore e tla bolaya borapolasi.

(Zimbabwe threatens Britain by saying that she will kill the farmers)

Thus, only nouns with the feature [+animate] may appear as subject.

On the internal argument:

As above, only nouns with the feature [+animate] may appear in the object position, i.e. either humans or animals:

People > Mme o purumela **banana ba sa sebetseng**.
(Mother threatens the girls who are not working)

Animals > Moshemane o shatela **ntja e mo boholang**.
(The boy threatens the dog that is barking at him)

Event structure

The verbs indicate an event structure of state. The type of stative predicate is a stage-level predicate because such states are non-permanent states of individuals:

$$\text{EVENTSTR} = \left(\begin{array}{l} E_1 = \text{process} \\ E_2 = \text{state} \end{array} \right)$$

Meaning

[honela]

1. to threaten

Mme o honela bana ba thibaneng ditsebe.
(Mother threatens naughty children)

3. to growl at

Monna o honela batho ba nwang jwala ba hae.
(The man growls at the people who drink his beer)

[purumela]

1. to threaten

Mme o purumela banana ba sa sebetse.
(Mother threatens the girls who are not working)

2. to scold

Monna o purumela ngwana ya botswa.
(The man scolds the lazy child)

[rorela]

1. to threaten

Rapolasi o rorela basebetsi ba sa sebetse.

(The farmer threatens the workers who are not working)

2. to scold

Monna o rorela ngwana ya botswa.

(The man scolds the lazy child)

[sokela]

1. to threaten

Pule o sokela Sellwane hobane a mo sutuditse.

(Pule threatens Sellwane because she pushed him)

[sothella]

1. to threaten

Mosadi o ile a sothella bana ba hanang hosebetsa.

(The woman threatened the children who refused to work)

2. to twist round

Ngwana o shothella kgwele thupeng.

(The child twists the string round the stick)

[shatela]

1. to threaten

Mosadi o shatela monna hae ya sa robaleng hae.

(The woman threatens her man who sleeps out)

2. to prepare to fight

Malome o shatela batho ba mo rohakang.

(Uncle prepares to fight people who insult him)

CHAPTER 5: ANXIETY

5.1 Aim

The aim of this section will be to determine how the emotion of anxiety may be expressed in Sesotho.

5.2 Definition of anxiety

The concept of anxiety can be defined as a state of uneasiness or tension caused by apprehension of possible future misfortune, danger, etc.

5.3 Expressions of anxiety

There are various fixed expressions of anxiety. Such expressions are fixed as verb phrases, i.e. a verb with some NP. Any external argument that may be an experiencer of anxiety may appear in the subject position. The expressions of anxiety in Sesotho may be divided into three subcategories according to the different meanings or levels of intensity of anxiety.

5.3.1 Expressions of trouble

The expressions of trouble can be defined as expressions referring to a state or condition of mental distress or anxiety, i.e. disorder or unrest.

Ho tjhella ka tlung

The verb [tjhella](burn in) appears with a prepositional NP [ka tlung](in the house), and this can be interpreted as [burn in the house]. Such an expression will then have the meaning of anxiety, i.e. 'to get into trouble'. Any experiencer of anxiety may appear as external argument in the subject position.

- (1) [Teboho] o tla tjhella ka tlung ha a ntse a bua mashano.
(Teboho will get into trouble if he goes on telling lies)

In (1) above, [Teboho] is the external argument which is interpreted as the experiencer of anxiety.

Ho pipitlela maikutlo

The verb [pipitlela](over-fill) appears with a noun [maikutlo](feelings), and this can be interpreted as [over-fill the feelings]. Such an expression will then have the meaning of anxiety, i.e. 'to trouble'. Any experiencer of anxiety may appear as external argument in the subject position.

- (2) [Sellwane] o pipitlela Teboho maikutlo ka ho se etse mosebetsi.
(Sellwane is troubling Teboho by not doing her work)

In (2) above, [Sellwane] is the external argument which is interpreted as the experiencer of anxiety.

Ho tshwara mamphele ka sekotlo

The verb [tshwara](seize) appears with a noun [mamphele](difficulties) together with a prepositional NP [ka sekotlo](by the back), and this can be interpreted as [seize difficulties by the back]. Such an expression will then have the meaning of anxiety, i.e. 'to be in trouble'. Any experiencer of anxiety may appear as external argument in the subject position.

- (3) [Pule] o tla tshwara mamphele ka sekotlo ha a ka se tle.
(Pule will get into trouble if he does not come)

In (3) above, [Pule] is the external argument which is interpreted as the experiencer of anxiety.

Ho ithwala medi hlohong

The verb [ithwala](wear oneself) appears with a noun [medi](two hands) together with an adverb [hlohong](on the head), and this can be interpreted as [wear one self's two hands on the head]. Such an expression will then have the meaning of anxiety, i.e. 'to fear that trouble may befall one'. Any experiencer of anxiety may appear as external argument in the subject position.

- (4) [Ngwana] o ile a ithwala medi hlohong ha kopi e tjhwatleha.
(The child feared that trouble might befall him when the cup broke)

In (4) above, [Ngwana](child) is the external argument which is interpreted as the experiencer of anxiety.

E se e le apola-o-kene

The verb [le](be) appears with a derived noun [apola-o-kene](open-and-enter), and this can be interpreted as [it is now open and enter]. Such an expression will then have the meaning of anxiety, i.e. 'to be in much trouble'. Any experiencer of anxiety may appear as external argument in the subject position.

- (5) [Thabo] o na le mathata a mangata hoo e seng e le apola-o kene.
(Thabo has so many problems that he is now much in trouble)

In (5) above, [Thabo] is the external argument which is interpreted as the experiencer of anxiety.

Ho siuwa lepalapaleng

The verb [siuwa](be left alone) appears with an adverb [lepalapaleng](in the desert), and this can be interpreted as [to be left in the desert]. Such an expression will then have the meaning of anxiety, i.e. 'to be left in trouble'. Any experiencer of anxiety may appear as external argument in the subject position.

- (6) [Metswalle ya hae] e mo siile lepalapaleng kajeno kamora hoba a tshwarwe.
(Today his friends has left him in trouble after he was caught)

In (6) above, [Metswalle ya hae](his friends) is the external argument which is interpreted as the experiencer of anxiety.

Ho kenya metsi ka moedi

The verb [kenya](put in) appears with a noun [metsi](water) together with a prepositional NP [ka moedi](through the boundary), and this can be interpreted as [put in water through the boundary]. Such an expression will then have the meaning of anxiety, i.e. 'to bring trouble in a house'. Any experiencer of anxiety may appear as external argument in the subject position.

- (7) [Lehlabaphio] le Kenya metsi ka moedi naheng ka ho rekisa makunutu.
(The spy bring trouble in the country by selling the secrets)

In (7) above, [Lehlabaphio](spy) is the external argument which is interpreted as the experiencer of anxiety.

Ho ja kgomo ya molatelle

The verb [ja](eat) appears with a noun [kgomo](cattle) together with a relative [ya molatelle](of a thing that follows), and this can be interpreted as [eat cattle of a thing that follows]. Such an expression will then have the meaning of anxiety, i.e. 'to bring trouble onto oneself by one's own action'. Any experiencer of anxiety may appear as external argument in the subject position.

- (8) [Monna] o ja kgomo ya molatelle ka ho se ye mosebetsing.
(The man is bringing trouble onto himself by not going to work)

In (8) above, [Monna](man) is the external argument which is interpreted as the experiencer of anxiety.

Dikgomo di kgaohetswe ke mehala

The verb [kgaohetswe](cut in relation to) appears with a prepositional NP [ke mehala](ropes), and this can be interpreted as [the cattle are to be cut in relation to ropes]. Such an expression will then have the meaning of anxiety, i.e. 'to be in trouble'. Any experiencer of anxiety may appear as external argument in the subject position.

- (9) [Kananelo] o utswitse dipompong mme jwale dikgomo di kgohetswe ke mehala.
(Kananelo has stolen the sweets and now he is in trouble)

In (9) above, [Kananelo] is the external argument which is interpreted as the experiencer of anxiety.

5.3.2 Expressions of distress

The expressions of distress can be defined as the expressions referring to an extreme pain or suffering, especially mental or emotional.

Ho ikakatelela molala

The verb [ikakatelela](support oneself) appears with a noun [molala](neck), and this can be interpreted as [support one self's neck]. Such an expression will then have the meaning of anxiety, i.e. 'to be in distress'. Any experiencer of anxiety may appear as external argument in the subject position.

- (10) [Ntate] o ile a ikakatelela molala kamora ho lahlehelwa ke koloi.
(Father was in distress after losing his car)

In (10) above, [Ntate](father) is the external argument which is interpreted as the experiencer of anxiety.

5.3.3 Expressions of anxiety

The expressions of anxiety can be defined as expressions referring to a state of uneasiness and distress about future uncertainties.

Ho jarwa ke matshwafo

The verb [jarwa](be carried by) appears with a prepositional NP [ke matshwafo](the lungs), and this can be interpreted as [be carried by the lungs]. Such an expression will then have the meaning of anxiety, i.e. 'to be anxious to speak'. Any experiencer of anxiety may appear as external argument in the subject position.

- (11) [Monna] o ne a jarwa ke matshwafo ha a bua le mokgopi.
(The man was anxious to speak when addressing the gathering)

In (11) above, [Monna](man) is the external argument which is interpreted as the experiencer of anxiety.

5.4 Verbs of anxiety

The verbs of anxiety will be discussed with regard to their semantics and syntax.

5.4.1 The semantics of the verbs of anxiety

The verbs of anxiety may be divided into the following categories depending on the degree of anxiety:

5.4.1.1 Anxiety

The concept of anxiety may be defined as a state of being uneasy with fear and desire regarding something doubtful.

[belaela]

Teboho o a belaela ha ba mo siile a le mong hae.

(Teboho becomes anxious when he is left alone at home)

5.4.1.2 Worry

The concept of worry may be defined as to be or cause to be anxious or uneasy, especially about something uncertain or potentially dangerous.

[hlora]

Thabiso o a hlora hobane a se na metswalle.

(Thabiso is worried because of not having friends)

[pira]

Mpho o pira batswadi ka ho hana ho nyala Morwesi.

(Mpho is worrying his parents by refusing to marry Morwesi)

[tuba]

Ngwana o tuba batswadi ka ho hana ho ya sekolong.

(The child is worrying the parents by refusing to go to school)

[hlodia]

Monna o hlodia mosadi ka ho hlola a tahlilwe ka mehla.

(The man is worrying the woman by being drunk everyday)

[horeletsa]

Pulane o horeletsa batho ka ho ba tshosa ka ho re o tla ipolaya.

(Pulane is worrying the people by threatening them with suicide)

[tshwenya]

Bana ba tshwenya batswadi ka ho nwa jwala.

(The children are worrying the parents by drinking beer)

5.4.1.3 Confusion

The concept of confusion may be defined as the act of confusing or the state of being confused.

[ferekana]

Ngwana o a ferekana ke ho botswa potso tse ngata ka nako e le nngwe.

(Being ask too many questions at the same time confuses the child)

[duba]

Karabelo o duba bana ka ho se ba bolelle nnete.

Karabelo is confusing the children by not telling them the truth)

5.4.1.4 Distress

The concept of distress may be defined as an extreme pain or suffering, especially mental or emotional.

[thaseha]

Matlama a ka thaseha ha ba ka ba hlolwa ho makgaolakgang a sejana sa Bobsave.
(Matlama can be distressed if they can loose in the finals of the Bobsave cup.)

[tsietsa]

Nkgono o ile a tsietsa mme ka ho hlabeha ka tshohanyetso.
(Grandmother distressed mother by becoming ill suddenly)

5.4.1.5 Trouble

The concept of trouble may be defined as a state or condition of mental distress or anxiety.

[tlobatloba]

Malome o ile a tlobatloba ka ho kganna koloi e se nang mafura a lekaneng.
(Uncle was in trouble for driving a car without enough fuel)

[sotleha]

Mpuse o a sotleha ke ho hloka batswadi.
(Losing her parents troubles Mpuse)

[hoqeha]

Monna o a hoqeha ha a sa kgone ho lefa melato ya hae ka nako.

(The man becomes troubled when he could not pay his bills on time)

[kgoleha]

Matsoso o ile a kgoleha ha Thato a mo fumana a ntse a bua le kgarebe ya hae.

(Matsoso was in trouble when Thato found him talking to his girlfriend)

[qakaneha]

Bana ba ile ba qakaneha ha ba sa fumane thuso ka pele.

(The children were in trouble when they could not get help in time)

[haratsa]

Ntate o haratsa mme ka ho fihla hae bosiu.

(Father is troubling mother by coming late at home)

[neka]

Thabiso o neka Morwesi ka ho hlola a mo ngollaka mangolo a lerato.

(Thabiso is troubling Morwesi by always writing love letters to her)

[perehanya]

Mashodu a perehanya setjhaba ka ho ba utswetsa thepa ka mehla le mehla.

(Thieves are troubling the nation by stealing their things everyday)

5.4.1.6 Agitation

The concept of agitation may be defined as mental anxiety or concern.

[eke/ekethe]

Mosadi o ile a re eke/ekethe ke ho teneha.

(The woman became agitated when she was disgusted)

[hlanahlana]

Sello o re hlanahlana ha a ferekane.

(Sello becomes agitated when he is disturbed)

[beleseha]

Monna o a beleseha ha a sa kgone ho qeta mosebetsi ka nako.

(The man becomes agitated when he cannot finish the work on time)

[fehleha]

Ngwana o a fehleha ha motho a ntse a mo hlapaola.

(The child becomes agitated when someone insults him)

[tsudubutla]

Modulasetulo o tsudubutla ditho ka ho se di fe sebaka sa ho botsa dipotso.

(The chairperson agitates the members by not allowing them to ask questions)

[fudua]

Sello o fudua Maria ka ho dula a mo kopa tjhelete ka mehla.

(Sello is agitating Maria by always asking her money)

[tsokotsa]

Ngwana o tsokotsa mmae ka ho se itlhakole mamina.

(The child is agitating his mother by not blowing his nose)

[hlokola]

Mosuwehlooho o hlokola basebetsimmoho ka boitshwaro ba hae bo hlephileng.

(The headmaster agitate his colleagues by his bad behaviour)

[hwerehana]

Thabo o a hwerehana ha motho a sa utlwisisi ha a mo kgalemela.

(Thabo becomes agitated when someone does not understand when he reprimands him)

5.4.1.7 Bother

The concept of bother may be defined as troubling (a person) by repeatedly disturbing.

[hlopha]

Ngwana o a re hlopha ka ho dula a re kopa tjhelete ka mehla.

(The child is bothering us by always asking money from us)

[kgathatsa]

Ngwana o kgathatsa batswadi ka ho ba kopa tjhelete kgafetsa.

(The child is bothering the parents by repeatedly asking for money)

5.4.2 The syntax of the verbs of anxiety

The verbs of anxiety may be divided into the following subcategories if one takes their behaviour in syntax into account:

5.4.2.1 Intransitive verbs

There are five intransitive verbs: **belaela**, **hlorá**, **ferekana**, **lealea** and **tlobatloba**.

[belaela](be anxious)

Assignment of arguments

This verb may appear with one argument: an external argument that is assigned by the verb phrase. This argument appears as a subject argument with the reference of an experiencer of anxiety.

[belaela]: [X]
[experiencer]

[Teboho] o a belaela ha ba mo siile a le mong.
(Teboho becomes anxious when he is left alone)

The external argument is [Teboho] which is the experiencer of anxiety.

Selection restrictions

Humans can be anxious:

[Teboho] o a belaela ha ba mo siile a le mong.
(Teboho becomes anxious when he is left alone)

Personified nouns:

[Amerika] e a belaela ha e sa memelwa kopanong ya dinaha tsa lefatshe.

(America is anxious when it is not invited to the meeting of the countries of the world)

Thus, the subject argument above will have a selection restriction of [human].

Event structure

This verb indicates an event structure of state. The type of stative predicate is a stage-level predicate because such a state is a non-permanent state of an individual:

$$\text{EVENTSTR} = \left(\begin{array}{l} E_1 = \text{process} \\ E_2 = \text{state} \end{array} \right)$$

Meaning

1. be anxious

Teboho o a belaela ha ba mo siile a le mong.

(Teboho becomes anxious when he is left alone)

2. to doubt

Ngwana o a belaela hore na e be o tla thuswa na.

(The child doubts whether he will be helped or not)

[hlora](be worried)**Assignment of arguments**

This verb may appear with one argument: an external argument that is assigned by the verb phrase. This argument appears as a subject argument with the reference of an experiencer of anxiety.

[hlora]: [X]
 [experiencer]

[Thabiso] o a hlora hobane a se na metswalle.
 (Thabiso is worried because of not having friends)

The external argument is [Thabiso] which is the experiencer of anxiety.

Selection restrictions

Humans can be anxious:

[Teboho] o a hlora ha ba mo siile a le mong.
 (Teboho becomes worried when he is left alone)

Personified nouns:

[Amerika] e a hlora ha e sa memelwa kopanong ya dinaha tsa lefatshe.
 (America is worried when it is not invited to the meeting of the countries of the world)

Thus, the subject argument above will have a selection restriction of [human].

Event structure

This verb indicates an event structure of state. The type of stative predicate is a stage-level predicate because such a state is a non-permanent state of an individual:

$$\text{EVENTSTR} = \left(\begin{array}{l} E_1 = \text{process} \\ E_2 = \text{state} \end{array} \right)$$

Meaning

1. be worried

Thabiso o a hlora hobane a se na metswalle.
(Thabiso is worried because of not having friends)

2. to suffer

Monna o hlora a ntse a thotse.
(The man is suffering in silence)

3. to be unhappy

Ke a hlora ke kamoo ba ntshwereng ka teng.
(I am unhappy about the way they treat me)

[ferekana](be confused)

Assignment of arguments

This verb may appear with one argument: an external argument that is assigned by the verb phrase. This argument appears as a subject argument with the reference of an experiencer of anxiety.

[ferekana]: [X]
 [experiencer]

[Ngwana] o a ferekana ke ho botswa potso tse ngata ka nako e le nngwe.
 (Being asked too many questions at the same time confuses the child)

The external argument is [Ngwana](child) which is the experiencer of anxiety.

Selection restrictions

Humans can be anxious:

[Teboho] o a ferekana ha ba mo siile a le mong.
 (Teboho becomes confused when he is left alone)

Personified nouns:

[Amerika] e a ferekana ha e sa memelwa kopanong ya dinaha tsa lefatshe.
 (America becomes confused when it is not invited to the meeting of the countries of the world)

Thus, the subject argument above will have a selection restriction of [human].

Event structure

This verb indicates an event structure of state. The type of stative predicate is a stage-level predicate because such a state is a non-permanent state of an individual:

$$\text{EVENTSTR} = \left(\begin{array}{l} E_1 = \text{process} \\ E_2 = \text{state} \end{array} \right)$$

Meaning

1. be confused

Ngwana o a ferekana ha a botswa potso tse ngata ka nako e le nngwe.
(Being asked too many questions at the same time confuses the child)

2. to become disturbed

Monna o a ferekana ha mosadi a sa mo fe dijo.
(The man becomes disturbed when the woman does not give him food)

[lealea](be distressed)

Assignment of arguments

This verb may appear with one argument: an external argument that is assigned by the verb phrase. This argument appears as a subject argument with the reference of an experiencer of anxiety.

[lealea]: [X]
 [experiencer]

[Teboho] o ile a lealea ha a utlwa ka kotsi e hlahetseng ngwanabo.
(Teboho was distressed when he heard about the accident that had befallen his brother)

The external argument is [Teboho] which is the experiencer of anxiety

Selection restrictions

Humans can be anxious:

[Teboho] o a lealea ha ba mo siile a le mong.

(Teboho becomes distressed when he is left alone)

Personified nouns:

[Amerika] e a lealea ha e sa memelwa kopanong ya dinaha tsa lefatshe.

(America becomes distressed when it is not invited to the meeting of the countries of the world)

Thus, the subject argument above will have a selection restriction of [human].

Event structure

This verb indicates an event structure of state. The type of stative predicate is a stage-level predicate because such a state is a non-permanent state of an individual:

$$\text{EVENTSTR} = \left(\begin{array}{l} E_1 = \text{process} \\ E_2 = \text{state} \end{array} \right)$$

Meaning

1. be distressed

Teboho o ile a lealea ha a utlwa ka kotsi e hlahetseng ngwanabo.

(Teboho became distressed when he heard about the accident that had befallen his brother)

2. to look on all sides

Ngwana o a lealea pele a tshela mmila.

(The child looks on all sides before he crosses the road)

[tlobatloba](be in trouble)

Assignment of arguments

This verb may appear with one argument: an external argument that is assigned by the verb phrase. This argument appears as a subject argument with the reference of an experiencer of anxiety.

[tlobatloba]: [X]

[experiencer]

[Malome] o ile a tlobatloba ka ho kganna kolo e se nang mafura a lekaneng.

(Uncle was in trouble for driving a car without enough fuel)

The external argument is [Malome](Uncle) which is the experiencer of anxiety.

Selection restrictions

Humans can be anxious:

[Teboho] o ile a tlobatloba ha ba ne ba mo siile a le mong.

(Teboho was in trouble when he was left alone)

Personified nouns:

[Amerika] e ile ya tlobatloba ha e ne e sa memelwa kopanong ya dinaha tsa lefatshe.

(America was in trouble when it was not invited to the meeting of the countries of the world)

Thus, the subject argument above will have a selection restriction of [human].

Event structure

This verb indicates an event structure of state. The type of stative predicate is a stage-level predicate because such a state is a non-permanent state of an individual:

$$\text{EVENTSTR} = \left(\begin{array}{l} E_1 = \text{process} \\ E_2 = \text{state} \end{array} \right)$$

Meaning

1. be in trouble

Malome o ile a tlobatloba ka ho kganna koloi e se nang mafura a lekaneng.
(Uncle was in trouble for driving a car without enough fuel)

2. to enter here and there

Bana ba ne ba ntse ba tlobatloba ha ba ne ba ntse ba bapala.
(The children were entering here and there when they were playing)

3. to act foolishly

Mosadi o a tlobatloba ha a halefile.
(The woman acts foolishly when she is angry)

5.4.2.2 Intransitive verbs with the applicative suffix [-el-]

The following intransitive verbs may appear with the applicative suffix [-el-]:

belaela, hlorela, ferekanela, lealeela and **tlobatlobela**. In such a case, a new internal argument will be added which is dependent on the presence of [-el-]. In each sentence below, the new argument will be indicated as well as its interpretation. This new argument will be animate as well as inanimate.

[belaela](be anxious about)

[Ntate] o belaela [Sello] ka ho se etse mosebetsi wa hae wa sekolo.

(Father is anxious about Sello for not doing his schoolwork)

[Thabo] o belaela [diketso tsa Mpho tse sa lokang]

(Thabo is anxious about Mpho's bad deeds)

The new internal arguments are [Sello] which is animate, and [diketso tsa Mpho tse sa lokang] which is inanimate. Both arguments are interpreted as theme. The external arguments are [Bana] and [Monna] which are interpreted as experiencer.

[hlorela](be worried about)

[Mosadi] o hlorela [bana ba sa mameleng batswadi ba bona]

(The woman is worried about the children who are not listening to their parents)

[Monna] o hlorela [boitshwaro bo bobele ba bana]

(The man is worried about the children's bad behaviour)

The new internal arguments are [bana ba sa mameleng batswadi ba bona] which is animate, and [boitshwaro bo bobele ba bana] which is inanimate. Both arguments are interpreted as theme. The external arguments are [Mosadi] and [Monna] which are interpreted as experiencer.

[ferekanela](be confused about)

[Ngwana] o ferekanela [banna ba aparang diaparo tsa basadi]
(The child is confused about the men who wear women's clothes)

[Pule] o ferekanela [diketso tsa ntatae]
(Pule is confused about his father's actions)

The new internal arguments are [banna ba aparang diaparo tsa basadi] which is animate, and [diketso tsa ntatae] which is inanimate. Both arguments are interpreted as theme. The external arguments are [Ngwana] and [Pule] which are interpreted as experiencer.

[lealeela](be distressed about)

[Mosadi] o ile a lealeela [ngwana ya tjhesitseng mose wa hae]
(The woman was distressed about the child who burnt her dress)

[Teboho] o lealeela [boitshwaro bo hlephileng ba malomae]
(Teboho is distressed about his uncle's loose behaviour)

The new internal arguments are [ngwana ya tjhesitseng mose wa hae] which is animate, and [boitshwaro bo hlephileng ba malomae] which is inanimate. Both arguments are interpreted as theme. The external arguments are [Mosadi] and [Teboho] which are interpreted as experiencer.

[tlobatlobela](be in trouble about)

[Mmusisi] o tlobatlobela [batho bao a ba hlokofaditseng]
(The governor is in trouble about the people he ill-treated)

[Ngwana] o ile a tlobatlobela [diketso tsa hae tse mpe]
(The child was in trouble about his bad behaviour)

The new internal arguments are [batho bao a ba hlokofaditseng] which is animate, and [diketso tsa hae tse mpe] which is inanimate. Both arguments are interpreted as theme. The external arguments are [Mmusisi] and [Ngwana] which are interpreted as experiencer.

5.4.2.3 Intransitive ideophones

There are two intransitive ideophones that expresses anxiety, i.e. **eke/ekethe** and **hlanahlana**.

Assignment of arguments

The above ideophones have to appear with the verb **re** which accepts the inflection of the verb: **re eke/ekethe**(be agitated) and **re hlanahlana**(be agitated). The ideophone itself will assign the argument. In this case only the external argument is assigned which has the reference of an experiencer of anxiety.

[re eke/ekethe] : [X]
[experiencer]

[Mosadi] o ile a re eke/ekethe ke ho teneha.
(The woman became agitated when she was disgusted)

The external argument is [Mosadi](woman) which has the reference of an experiencer of anxiety.

[re hlanahlana] : [X]
[experiencer]

[Sello] o re hlanahlana ha a ferekane.
(Sello becomes agitated when he is disturbed)

The external argument is [Sello] which has the reference of an experiencer of anxiety.

Selection restrictions

The subject arguments of the two ideophones will have a selection restriction of [animate].

[re eke/ekethe](be agitated)

Humans can be agitated:

[Mosadi] o ile a re eke/ekethe ke ho teneha.

(The woman became agitated when she was disgusted)

Animals can be agitated:

[Ntja] e ile ya re eke/ekethe ha ngwana a ntse a e betsa ka majwe.

(The dog became agitated when the child kept on throwing stones at it)

Personified nouns:

[Engelane] e ile ya re eke/ekethe ha Zimbabwe e sa lokolle boraditaba.

(England became agitated when Zimbabwe did not release the journalists)

[re hlanahlana](be agitated)

Humans can be agitated:

[Sello] o re hlanahlana ha a ferekane.

(Sello becomes agitated when he is disturbed)

Animals can be agitated:

[Ntja] e ile ya re hlanahlana ha ngwana a ntse a e betsa ka majwe.

(The dog became agitated when the child kept on throwing stones at it)

Personified nouns:

[Engelane] e ile ya re hlanahlana ha Zimbabwe e sa lokolle boraditaba.

(England became agitated when Zimbabwe did not release the journalists)

Event structure

The two ideophones indicates an event structure of state. The type of stative predicate is a stage-level predicate because such states are non-permanent states of individuals:

$$\text{EVENTSTR} = \left(\begin{array}{l} E_1 = \text{process} \\ E_2 = \text{state} \end{array} \right)$$

Meaning

[re eke/ekethe]

1. be agitated

Mosadi o ile a re eke/ekethe ke ho teneha.

(The woman became agitated when she was disgusted)

2. wave

Ntate o re eke/ekethe ka letsoho ho mme.

(Father is waving a hand to mother)

3. hesitate

Ngwana o re eke/ekethe ha a lokela ho bua le batho.

(The child is hesitating when he is supposed to address the people)

[hlanahlana]

1. be agitated

Sello o re hlanahlana ha a ferekane

(Sello becomes agitated when he is disturbed)

2. change often

Monna o re hlanahlana maikutlo a hae kamehla.

(The man changes his feelings often)

3. fly up and down in numbers

Dinonyana di re hlanahlana ka hodima difate.

(The birds are flying up and down in numbers above the trees)

5.4.2.4 Neuter-passive verbs

[beleseha](be agitated)

- (1) Monna o belesa diphahlo pokoleng.

(The man loads the goods on the freight animal)

- (2) Monna o a beleseha ha a sa kgone ho qeta mosebetsi ka nako.

(The man becomes agitated when he cannot finish the work on time)

In sentence (1) above, the verb **belesa** has the meaning of 'to load a pack animal'.

When the neuter-passive verb [-eh-] is added onto this verb it becomes **beleseha** with the meaning of 'to be agitated' as in (2) above.

The derivation of this affix will be as follows:

[e] V-eh- [NP] → [NP_i] V-eh- [t_i]

(3) O a beleseha monna.
[e] o a beles-eh-a [monna]

(4) Monna o a beleseha.
[Monna]_i o a beles-eh-a [t_i]

[fehleha](be agitated)

(5) Mosadi o fehla lebese.
(The woman is beating the milk)

(6) Monna o a fehleha ha a sa kgone ho qeta mosebetsi ka nako.
(The man becomes agitated when he cannot finish the work on time)

In sentence (5) above, the verb **fehla** has the meaning of 'to beat(eggs for instance)'. When the neuter-passive verb [-eh-] is added onto this verb it becomes **fehleha** with the meaning of 'to be agitated' as in (6) above.

The derivation of this affix will be as follows:

[e] V-eh- [NP] → [NP]_i V-eh- [t_i]

(7) O a fehleha monna.
[e] o a fehl-eh-a [monna]

(8) Monna o a fehleha.
[Monna]_i o a fehl-eh-a [t_i]

[sotleha](to be in troubled)

(9) Monna o sotla bana.
(The man harms the children)

- (10) Monna o a sotleha ha a sa kgone ho qeta mosebetsi ka nako.
(The man is in trouble when he cannot finish the work on time)

In sentence (9) above, the verb **sotla** has the meaning of 'to harm'. When the neuter-passive verb [-eh-] is added onto this verb it becomes **sotleha** with the meaning of 'to be in trouble' as in (10) above.

The derivation of this affix will be as follows:

$$[e] \text{ V-eh- [NP] } \rightarrow \text{ [NP}_i\text{] V-eh- [t}_i\text{]}$$

- (11) O a sotleha monna.
[e] o a sotl-eh-a [monna]

- (12) Monna o a sotleha.
[Monna]_i o a sotl-eh-a [t_i]

[hoqeha](to be in trouble)

- (13) Monna o hoqa moya o phodileng ka ntle.
(The man inhales fresh air outside)
- (14) Monna o a hoqeha ha a sa kgone ho qeta mosebetsi ka nako.
(The man is in trouble when he cannot finish the work on time)

In sentence (13) above, the verb **hoqa** has the meaning of 'to inhale'. When the neuter-passive verb [-eh-] is added onto this verb it becomes **hoqeha** with the meaning of 'to be in trouble' as in (14) above.

The derivation of this affix will be as follows:

$$[e] \text{ V-eh- [NP] } \rightarrow \text{ [NP}_i\text{] V-eh- [t}_i\text{]}$$

(15) O a hoqeha monna.

[e] o a hoq-eh-a [monna]

(16) Monna o a hoqeha.

[Monna]_i o a hoq-eh-a [t_i]

[kgoleha](to be in trouble)

(17) Monna o kgola batho ba mo utsweditseng.

(The man harms the people who stole from him)

(18) Monna o a kgoleha ha a sa kgone ho qeta mosebetsi ka nako.

(The man is in trouble when he cannot finish the work on time)

In sentence (17) above, the verb **kgola** has the meaning of 'to harm'. When the neuter-passive verb [-eh-] is added onto this verb it becomes **kgoleha** with the meaning of 'to be in trouble' as in (18) above.

The derivation of this affix will be as follows:

[e] V-eh- [NP] → [NP]_i V-eh- [t_i]

(19) O a kgoleha monna.

[e] o a kgol-eh-a [monna]

(20) Monna o a kgoleha.

[Monna]_i o a kgol-eh-a [t_i]

[qakaneha](to be in trouble)

(21) Monna o ka hara qakana ya maemo.

(The man is in an inextricable situation)

- (22) Monna o a qakaneha ha a sa kgone ho qeta mosebetsi ka nako.
 (The man is in trouble when he cannot finish the work on time)

In sentence (21) above, the verb **qakana** has the meaning of 'to be inextricable'. When the neuter-passive verb [-eh-] is added onto this verb it becomes **qakaneha** with the meaning of 'to be in trouble' as in (22) above.

The derivation of this affix will be as follows:

[e] V-eh- [NP] → [NP_i] V-eh- [t_i]

- (23) O a qakaneha monna.
 [e] o a qakan-eh-a [monna]

- (24) Monna o a qakaneha.
 [Monna]_i o a qakan-eh-a [t_i]

5.4.2.5 Transitive verbs

There are a number of transitive verbs with the meaning of anxiety: **pira, tuba, hlodia, horeletsa, tshwenya, tsudubutla, fudua, tsokotsa, hlokola, duba, haratsa, neka, perehanya, hlopha, kgathatsa** and **tsietsa**.

[pira](worry)

Assignment of arguments

This verb assigns two arguments: an external argument which is assigned by the verb phrase and an internal argument which is assigned by the verb. The external argument will be interpreted as agent and the internal argument as patient.

[pira] : [X, Y]
 [agent, patient]

[Mpho] o pira [batswadi] ka ho hana ho nyala Morwesi.
 (Mpho is worrying the parents by refusing to marry Morwesi)

The external argument is [Mpho] which is the agent of anxiety, and [batswadi] is the internal argument which is the patient of anxiety.

The verb **pira** may also be used without an internal argument:

[pira] : [X]
 [agent]

[Bana ba sa ithuting] ba a pira.
 (Children who do not learn are worrying)

Selection restrictions

Nouns with the feature [animate] and [inanimate] may appear as subjects:

[Mpho] o pira batswadi ka ho hana ho nyala Morwesi.
 (Mpho is worrying the parents by refusing to marry Morwesi)

[Boitshwaro ba hae bo hlephileng] bo a pira.
 (His loose behaviour is worrying)

Nouns with the feature [animate] may appear in the object position:

People > Mpho o pira [batswadi] ka ho hana ho nyala Morwesi.
 (Mpho is worrying the parents by refusing to marry Morwesi)

Animals> Ho kula ha Tshepo ho pira [ntja ya hae]
(Tshepo's illness worries his dog)

Personified nouns > Lehlabaphio le pira [Amerika] ka ho re ke sehlwela sa yona.
(The traitor is worrying America by saying that he is her spy)

Event structure

This verb shows two events in its event structure:

Event 1: activity

Event 2: state, i.e. a stage-level state in which a person feels anxious

The event structure may be represented as follows:

$$\text{EVENTSTR} = \left(\begin{array}{l} E_1 = \text{process} \\ E_2 = \text{state} \end{array} \right)$$

Meaning

1. worry

Mpho o pira batsadi ba hae ka ho hana ho nyala Morwesi.
(Mpho is worrying his parents by refusing to marry Morwesi)

2. annoy

Teboho o pira ntatae ka ho se ye sekolong.
(Teboho is annoying his father by not going to school)

[tuba](worry)

Assignment of arguments

This verb assigns two arguments: an external argument which is assigned by the verb phrase and an internal argument which is assigned by the verb. The external argument will be interpreted as agent and the internal argument as patient.

[tuba] : [X, Y]
 [agent, patient]

[Ngwana] o tuba [batswadi] ka ho hana ho ya sekolong.
 (The child is worrying the parents by refusing to go to school)

The external argument is [Ngwana] which is the agent of anxiety, and [batswadi] is the internal argument which is the patient of anxiety.

The verb **tuba** may also be used without an internal argument:

[tuba] : [X]
 [agent]

[Bana ba sa ithuting] ba a tuba.
 (Children who do not learn are worrying)

Selection restrictions

Nouns with the feature [animate] and [inanimate] may appear as subjects:

[Ngwana] o tuba batswadi ka ho hana ho ya sekolong.
 (The child is worrying the parents by refusing to go to school)

[Boitshwaro ba hae bo hlephileng] bo a tuba.

(His loose behaviour is worrying)

Nouns with the feature [animate] may appear in the object position:

People > Ngwana o tuba [batswadi] ka ho hana ho ya sekolong.

(The child is worrying the parents by refusing to go to school)

Animals> Ho kula ha Tshepo ho tuba [ntja ya hae]

(Tshepo's illness worries his dog)

Personified nouns > Lehlabaphio le tuba [Amerika] ka ho re ke sehlwela sa yona.

(The traitor is worrying America by saying that he is her spy)

Event structure

This verb shows two events in its event structure:

Event 1: activity

Event 2: state, i.e. a stage-level state in which a person feels anxious

The event structure may be represented as follows:

$$\text{EVENTSTR} = \left(\begin{array}{l} E_1 = \text{process} \\ E_2 = \text{state} \end{array} \right)$$

Meaning

1. worry

Ngwana o tuba batsadi ba hae ka ho hana ho ya sekolong.

(The child is worrying his parents by refusing to go to school)

2. oppress

Morena o tuba setjhaba sa hae.
 (The king oppresses his people)

3. torment

Teboho o tuba ntatae ka ho se ye sekolong.
 (Teboho is tormenting his father by not going to school)

4. harass

Monna o tuba mosadi wa hae.
 (The man is harassing the woman)

[hlodia](worry)

Assignment of arguments

This verb assigns two arguments: an external argument which is assigned by the verb phrase and an internal argument which is assigned by the verb. The external argument will be interpreted as agent and the internal argument as patient.

[hlodia] : [X, Y]
 [agent, patient]

[Monna] o hlodia [mosadi] ka ho hlola a tahlilwe ka mehla.
 (The man is worrying the woman by being drunk always)

The external argument is [Monna] which is the agent of anxiety, and [mosadi] is the internal argument which is the patient of anxiety.

The verb **hlodia** may also be used without an internal argument:

[hlodia] : [X]
[agent]

[Bana ba sa ithuting] ba a hlodia.
(Children who do not learn are worrying)

Selection restrictions

Nouns with the feature [animate] and [inanimate] may appear as subjects:

[Monna] o hlodia [mosadi] ka ho dula a tahlilwe ka mehla.
(The man is worrying the woman by being drunk always)

[Boitshwaro ba hae bo hlephileng] bo a hlodia.
(His loose behaviour is worrying)

Nouns with the feature [animate] may appear in the object position:

People > Monna o hlodia mosadi ka ho dula a tahlilwe ka mehla.
(The man is worrying the woman by being drunk always)

Animals > Ho kula ha Tshepo ho hlodia [ntja ya hae]
(Tshepo's illness worries his dog)

Personified nouns > Lehlabaphio le hlodia [Amerika] ka ho re ke sehlwela sa yona.
(The traitor is worrying America by saying that he is her spy)

Event structure

This verb shows two events in its event structure:

Event 1: activity

Event 2: state, i.e. a stage-level state in which a person feels anxious

The event structure may be represented as follows:

$$\text{EVENTSTR} = \left(\begin{array}{l} E_1 = \text{process} \\ E_2 = \text{state} \end{array} \right)$$

Meaning

1. worry

Monna o hlodia mosadi ka ho dula a tahlilwe ka mehla.

(The man is worrying the woman by being drunk always)

2. annoy

Teboho o hlodia ntatae ka ho se ye sekolong.

(Teboho is annoying his father by not going to school)

3. tire

Bana ba hlodia batho ba baholo ka ho bua haholo.

(The children are making the adults tired by speaking too much)

[horeletsa](worry)

Assignment of arguments

This verb assigns two arguments: an external argument which is assigned by the verb phrase and an internal argument which is assigned by the verb. The external argument will be interpreted as agent and the internal argument as patient.

[horeletsa] : [X, Y]

[agent, patient]

[Pulane] o horeletsa [baho] ka ho ba tshosa ka hore o tla ipolaya.

(Pulane is worrying the people by threatening them with suicide)

The external argument is [Pulane] which is the agent of anxiety, and [batho] is the internal argument which is the patient of anxiety.

The verb **horeletsa** may also be used without an internal argument:

[horeletsa] : [X]

[agent]

[Bana ba sa ithuting] ba a horeletsa.

(Children who do not learn are worrying)

Selection restrictions

Nouns with the feature [animate] and [inanimate] may appear as subjects:

[Pulane] o horeletsa batho ka ho ba tshosa ka hore o tla ipolaya.

(Pulane is worrying the people by threatening them with suicide)

[Boitshwaro ba hae bo hlephileng] bo a horeletsa.

(His loose behaviour is worrying)

Nouns with the feature [animate] may appear in the object position:

People > Pulane o horeletsa [batho] ka ho ba tshosa ka hore o tla ipolaya.

(Pulane is worrying the people by threatening them with suicide)

Animals> Ho kula ha Tshepo ho horeletsa [ntja ya hae]
(Tshepo's illness worries his dog)

Personified nouns > Lehlabaphio le horeletsa [Amerika] ka ho re ke sehlwela sa yona.
(The traitor is worrying America by saying that he is her spy)

Event structure

This verb shows two events in its event structure:

Event 1: activity

Event 2: state, i.e. a stage-level state in which a person feels anxious

The event structure may be represented as follows:

$$\text{EVENTSTR} = \left(\begin{array}{l} E_1 = \text{process} \\ E_2 = \text{state} \end{array} \right)$$

Meaning

1. worry

Pulane o horeletsa batho ka ho ba tshosa ka hore o tla ipolaya.
(Pulane is worrying the people by threatening them with suicide)

2. prevent

Mme o horeletsa bana ho se robale.
(Mother prevents the children from sleeping)

[tshwenya](worry)

Assignment of arguments

This verb assigns two arguments: an external argument which is assigned by the verb phrase and an internal argument which is assigned by the verb. The external argument will be interpreted as agent and the internal argument as patient.

[tshwenya] : [X, Y]
[agent, patient]

[Bana] ba tshwenya [batswadi] ka ho nwa jwala.
(The children are worrying the parents by drinking beer)

The external argument is [Bana] which is the agent of anxiety, and [batswadi] is the internal argument which is the patient of anxiety.

The verb **tshwenya** may also be used without an internal argument:

[tshwenya] : [X]
[agent]

[Bana ba sa ithuting] ba a tshwenya.
(Children who do not learn are worrying)

Selection restrictions

Nouns with the feature [animate] and [inanimate] may appear as subjects:

[Bana] ba tshwenya batswadi ka ho nwa jwala.
(The children are worrying the parents by drinking beer)

[Boitshwaro ba hae bo hlephileng] bo a tshwenya.
(His loose behaviour is worrying)

Nouns with the feature [animate] may appear in the object position:

People > Bana ba tshwenya [batswadi] ka ho nwa jwala.
(The children are worrying the parents by drinking beer)

Animals > Ho kula ha Tshepo ho tshwenya [ntja ya hae]
(Tshepo's illness worries his dog)

Personified nouns > Lehlabaphio le tshwenya [Amerika] ka ho re ke sehlwela sa yona.
(The traitor is worrying America by saying that he is her spy)

Event structure

This verb shows two events in its event structure:

Event 1: activity

Event 2: state, i.e. a stage-level state in which a person feels anxious

The event structure may be represented as follows:

$$\text{EVENTSTR} = \left(\begin{array}{l} E_1 = \text{process} \\ E_2 = \text{state} \end{array} \right)$$

Meaning

1. worry

Bana ba tshwenya batswadi ka ho nwa jwala.
(The children are worrying the parents by drinking beer)

2. oppress

Morena o tshwenya setjhaba sa hae.

(The king is oppressing his people)

3. tire

Bana ba tshwenya batho ba baholo ka ho bua haholo.

(The children are making the adults tired by speaking too much)

[tsudubutla](agitate)**Assignment of arguments**

This verb assigns two arguments: an external argument which is assigned by the verb phrase and an internal argument which is assigned by the verb. The external argument will be interpreted as agent and the internal argument as patient.

[tsudubutla] : [X, Y]

[agent, patient]

[Modulasetulo] o tsudubutla [ditho] ka ho se dule fatshe.

(The chairperson agitates the members by not sitting down)

The external argument is [Modulasetulo] which is the agent of anxiety, and [ditho] is the internal argument which is the patient of anxiety.

The verb **tsudubutla** may also be used without an internal argument:

[tsudubutla] : [X]

[agent]

[Bana ba sa ithuting] ba a tsudubutla.
 (Children who do not learn agitates)

Selection restrictions

Nouns with the feature [animate] and [inanimate] may appear as subjects:

[Modulasetulo] o tsudubutla ditho ka ho se dule fatshe.
 (The chairperson agitates the members by not sitting down)

[Boitshwaro ba hae bo hlephileng] bo a tsudubutla.
 (His loose behaviour agitates)

Nouns with the feature [animate] may appear in the object position:

People > Modulasetulo o tsudubutla [ditho] ka ho se dule fatshe.
 (The chairperson agitates the memvers by not sitting down)

Animals> Ho kula ha Tshepo ho tsudubutla [ntja ya hae]
 (Tshepo's illness agitates his dog)

Personified nouns > Lehlabaphio le tsudubutla [Amerika] ka ho re ke sehlwela sa
 yona.
 (The traitor agitates America by saying that he is her spy)

Event structure

This verb shows two events in its event structure:

Event 1: activity

Event 2: state, i.e. a stage-level state in which a person feels anxious

The event structure may be represented as follows:

$$\text{EVENTSTR} = \left(\begin{array}{l} E_1 = \text{process} \\ E_2 = \text{state} \end{array} \right)$$

Meaning

1. agitate

Modulasetulo o tsudubutla ditho ka ho se dule fatshe.

(The chairperson agitates the members by not sitting down)

2. plague

Monna o tsudubutla ngwana ka ho mo otlala.

(The man is plaguing the child by beating him)

[fudua](agitate)

Assignment of arguments

This verb assigns two arguments: an external argument which is assigned by the verb phrase and an internal argument which is assigned by the verb. The external argument will be interpreted as agent and the internal argument as patient.

[fudua] : [X, Y]

[agent, patient]

[Sello] o fudua [Maria] ka ho dula a mo kopa tjhelete.

(Sello is agitating Maria by always asking her money)

The external argument is [Sello] which is the agent of anxiety, and [Maria] is the internal argument which is the patient of anxiety.

The verb **fudua** may also be used without an internal argument:

[fudua] : [X]
[agent]

[Bana ba sa ithuting] ba a fudua.
(Children who do not learn agitates)

Selection restrictions

Nouns with the feature [animate] and [inanimate] may appear as subjects:

[Sello] o fudua Maria ka ho dula a mo kopa tjelete ka mehla.
(Sello is agitating Maria by always asking her money)

[Boitshwaro ba hae bo hlephileng] bo a fudua.
(His loose behaviour agitates)

Nouns with the feature [animate] may appear in the object position:

People > Sello o fudua [Maria] ka ho dula a mo kopa tjelete ka mehla.
(Sello is agitating Maria by always asking her money)

Animals > Ho kula ha Tshepo ho fudua [ntja ya hae]
(Tshepo's illness agitates his dog)

Personified nouns > Lehlabaphio le fudua [Amerika] ka ho re ke sehlwela sa yona.
(The traitor agitates America by saying that he is her spy)

Event structure

This verb shows two events in its event structure:

Event 1: activity

Event 2: state, i.e. a stage-level state in which a person feels anxious

The event structure may be represented as follows:

$$\text{EVENTSTR} = \left(\begin{array}{l} E_1 = \text{process} \\ E_2 = \text{state} \end{array} \right)$$

Meaning

1. agitate

Sello o fudua Maria ka ho dula a mo kopa tjhelete ka mehla.

(Sello agitates Maria by always asking her money)

2. stir

Mme o fudua metsi ka thupa.

(Mother is stirring water with a stick)

3. scramble

Mme o fudua mahe ka pitseng.

(Mother is scrambling the eggs)

[tsokotsa](agitate)

Assignment of arguments

This verb assigns two arguments: an external argument which is assigned by the verb phrase and an internal argument which is assigned by the verb. The external argument will be interpreted as agent and the internal argument as patient.

[tsokotsa] : [X, Y]
 [agent, patient]

[Ngwana] o tsokotsa [mmae] ka ho se hlakole mamina.
 (The child is agitating his mother by not blowing his nose)

The external argument is [Ngwana] which is the agent of anxiety, and [mmae] is the internal argument which is the patient of anxiety.

The verb **tsokotsa** may also be used without an internal argument:

[tsokotsa] : [X]
 [agent]

[Bana ba sa ithuting] ba a tsokotsa.
 (Children who do not learn agitates)

Selection restrictions

Nouns with the feature [animate] and [inanimate] may appear as subjects:

[Ngwana] o tsokotsa mmae ka ho se hlakole mamina.
 (The child is agitating his mother by not blowing his nose)

[Boitshwaro ba hae bo hlephileng] bo a tsokotsa.
 (His loose behaviour agitates)

Nouns with the feature [animate] may appear in the object position:

People > Ngwana o tsokotsa [mmae] ka ho se hlakole mamina.
(The child is agitating his mother by not blowing his nose)

Animals> Ho kula ha Tshepo ho tsokotsa [ntja ya hae]
(Tshepo's illness agitates his dog)

Personified nouns > Lehlabaphio le tsokotsa [Amerika] ka ho re ke sehlwela sa yona.
(The traitor is agitating America by saying that he is her spy)

Event structure

This verb shows two events in its event structure:

Event 1: activity

Event 2: state, i.e. a stage-level state in which a person feels anxious

The event structure may be represented as follows:

$$\text{EVENTSTR} = \left(\begin{array}{l} E_1 = \text{process} \\ E_2 = \text{state} \end{array} \right)$$

Meaning

1. agitate

Ngwana o tsokotsa mmae ka ho se hlakole mamina.
(The child is agitating his mother by not blowing his nose)

2. shake

Moya o tsokotsa difate.

(The air is shaking the trees)

3. stir

Moya o tsokotsa makala a difate.

(The air is stirring the branches of the trees)

[hlokola](agitate)**Assignment of arguments**

This verb assigns two arguments: an external argument which is assigned by the verb phrase and an internal argument which is assigned by the verb. The external argument will be interpreted as agent and the internal argument as patient.

[hlokola] : [X, Y]

[agent, patient]

[Monna] o hlokola [bana] ka boitshwaro bo hlephileng.

(The man agitates the children by his bad behaviour)

The external argument is [Monna] which is the agent of anxiety, and [bana] is the internal argument which is the patient of anxiety.

The verb **hlokola** may also be used without an internal argument:

[hlokola] : [X]

[agent]

[Bana ba sa ithuting] ba a hlokola.
 (Children who do not learn agitates)

Selection restrictions

Nouns with the feature [animate] and [inanimate] may appear as subjects:

[Monna] o hlokola bana ka boitshwaro bo hlephileng.
 (The man agitates the children by his bad behaviour)

[Boitshwaro ba hae bo hlephileng] bo a hlokola.
 (His loose behaviour agitates)

Nouns with the feature [animate] may appear in the object position:

People > Monna o hlokola [bana] ka boitshwaro bo hlephileng.
 (The man agitates the children by his bad behaviour)

Animals > Ho kula ha Tshepo ho hlokola [ntja ya hae]
 (Tshepo's illness agitates his dog)

Personified nouns > Lehlabaphio le hlokola [Amerika] ka ho re ke sehlwela sa yona.
 (The traitor is agitating America by saying that he is her spy)

Event structure

This verb shows two events in its event structure:

Event 1: activity

Event 2: state, i.e. a stage-level state in which a person feels anxious

The event structure may be represented as follows:

$$\text{EVENTSTR} = \left(\begin{array}{l} E_1 = \text{process} \\ E_2 = \text{state} \end{array} \right)$$

Meaning

1. agitate

Monna o hlokola bana ka boitshwaro bo hlephileng.

(The man is agitating the children by his bad behaviour)

2. wave

Mosadi o hlokola folaga.

(The woman is waving the flag)

3. jolt

Moshemane o hlokola ngwana ka lehetla.

(The boy jolts the child with his shoulder)

4. winnow

Mosadi o hlokola mabele.

(The woman is winnowing wheat)

[duba](confuse)**Assignment of arguments**

This verb assigns two arguments: an external argument which is assigned by the verb phrase and an internal argument which is assigned by the verb. The external argument will be interpreted as agent and the internal argument as patient.

[duba] : [X, Y]
[agent, patient]

[Karabelo] o duba [bana] ka ho se ba bolelle nnete.
(Karabelo is confusing the children by not telling them the truth)

The external argument is [Karabelo] which is the agent of anxiety, and [bana] is the internal argument which is the patient of anxiety.

The verb **duba** may also be used without an internal argument:

[duba] : [X]
[agent]

[Bana ba mashano] ba a duba.
(Children who tells lies confuses)

Selection restrictions

Nouns with the feature [animate] and [inanimate] may appear as subjects:

[Karabelo] o duba bana ka ho se ba bolelle nnete.
(Karabelo is confusing the children by not telling them the truth)

[Boitshwaro ba hae bo hlephileng] bo a duba.
(His loose behaviour is confusing)

Nouns with the feature [animate] may appear in the object position:

People > Karabelo o duba [bana] ka ho se ba bolelle nnete.
(Karabelo is confusing the children by not telling them the truth)

Animals> Ho kula ha Tshepo ho duba [ntja ya hae]
(Tshepo's illness confuses his dog)

Personified nouns > Lehlabaphio le duba [Amerika] ka ho re ke sehlwela sa yona.
(The traitor is confusing America by saying that he is her spy)

Event structure

This verb shows two events in its event structure:

Event 1: activity

Event 2: state, i.e. a stage-level state in which a person feels anxious

The event structure may be represented as follows:

$$\text{EVENTSTR} = \left(\begin{array}{l} E_1 = \text{process} \\ E_2 = \text{state} \end{array} \right)$$

Meaning

1. confuse

Karabelo o duba bana ka ho se ba bolelle nnete.
(Karabelo is confusing the children by not telling them the truth)

2. knead

Mme o duba hlama.

(Mother is kneading the dough)

[haratsa](trouble)**Assignment of arguments**

This verb assigns two arguments: an external argument which is assigned by the verb phrase and an internal argument which is assigned by the verb. The external argument will be interpreted as agent and the internal argument as patient.

[haratsa] : [X, Y]

[agent, patient]

[Ntate] o haratsa [mme] ka ho fihla hae bosiu.

(Father is troubling mother by coming home late)

The external argument is [Ntate] which is the agent of anxiety, and [mme] is the internal argument which is the patient of anxiety.

The verb **haratsa** may also be used without an internal argument:

[haratsa] : [X]

[agent]

[Bana ba sa ithuting] ba a haratsa.

(Children who do not learn are troublesome)

Selection restrictions

Nouns with the feature [animate] and [inanimate] may appear as subjects:

[Ntate] o haratsa mme ka ho fihla hae bosiu.
(Father is troubling mother by coming home late)

[Boitshwaro ba hae bo hlephileng] bo a haratsa.
(His loose behaviour is troubling)

Nouns with the feature [animate] may appear in the object position:

People > Ntate o haratsa [mme] ka ho fihla hae bosiu.
(Father is troubling mother by coming home late)

Animals> Ho kula ha Tshepo ho haratsa [ntja ya hae]
(Tshepo's illness is troubling his dog)

Personified nouns > Lehlabaphio le haratsa [Amerika] ka ho re ke sehlwela sa yona.
(The traitor is troubling America by saying that he is her spy)

Event structure

This verb shows two events in its event structure:

Event 1: activity

Event 2: state, i.e. a stage-level state in which a person feels anxious

The event structure may be represented as follows:

$$\text{EVENTSTR} = \left(\begin{array}{l} E_1 = \text{process} \\ E_2 = \text{state} \end{array} \right)$$

Meaning

1. trouble

Ntate o haratsa mme ka ho fihla hae bosiu.

(Father is troubling mother by coming home late)

2. annoy

Teboho o haratsa ntatae ka ho se ye sekolong.

(Teboho is annoying his father by not going to school)

3. embarrass

Ngwana o haratsa ntatae ka boitshwaro bo bobe.

(The child is embarrassing his father by his bad behaviour)

[neka](trouble)

Assignment of arguments

This verb assigns two arguments: an external argument which is assigned by the verb phrase and an internal argument which is assigned by the verb. The external argument will be interpreted as agent and the internal argument as patient.

[neka] : [X, Y]

[agent, patient]

[Thabiso] o neka [Morwesi] ka ho hlola a mo ngollaka mangolo a lerato.

(Thabiso is troubling Morwesi by always writing love-letters to her)

The external argument is [Thabiso] which is the agent of anxiety, and [Morwesi] is the internal argument which is the patient of anxiety.

The verb **neka** may also be used without an internal argument:

[neka] : [X]
[agent]

[Bana ba sa ithuting] ba a neka.
(Children who do not learn are troublesome)

Selection restrictions

Nouns with the feature [animate] and [inanimate] may appear as subjects:

[Thabiso] o neka Morwesi ka ho hlola a mo ngollaka mangolo a lerato.
(Thabiso is troubling Morwesi by always writing her love-letters)

[Boitshwaro ba hae bo hlephileng] bo a neka.
(His loose behaviour is troubling)

Nouns with the feature [animate] may appear in the object position:

People > Thabiso o neka [Morwesi] ka ho hlola a mo ngollaka mangolo a lerato.
(Thabiso is troubling Morwesi by always writing her love-letters)

Animals > Ho kula ha Tshepo ho neka [ntja ya hae]
(Tshepo's illness troubles his dog)

Personified nouns > Lehlabaphio le neka [Amerika] ka ho re ke sehlwela sa yona.
(The traitor is troubling America by saying that he is her spy)

Event structure

This verb shows two events in its event structure:

Event 1: activity

Event 2: state, i.e. a stage-level state in which a person feels anxious

The event structure may be represented as follows:

$$\text{EVENTSTR} = \left(\begin{array}{l} E_1 = \text{process} \\ E_2 = \text{state} \end{array} \right)$$

Meaning

1. trouble

Thabiso o neka Morwesi ka ho hlola a mo ngollaka mangolo a lerato.

(Thabiso is troubling Morwesi by always writing her love-letters)

2. bother

Teboho o neka ntatae ka ho se ye sekolong.

(Teboho is bothering his father by not going to school)

3. plague

Monna o neka ngwana ka ho mo otlala.

(The man is plaguing the child by beating him)

[perehanya](trouble)

Assignment of arguments

This verb assigns two arguments: an external argument which is assigned by the verb phrase and an internal argument which is assigned by the verb. The external argument will be interpreted as agent and the internal argument as patient.

[perehanya] : [X, Y]
[agent, patient]

[Mashodu] a perehanya [setjhaba] ka ho ba utswetsa thepa ka mehla le mehla.
(The thieves are troubling the nation by stealing their things everyday)

The external argument is [Mashodu] which is the agent of anxiety, and [sethjaba] is the internal argument which is the patient of anxiety.

The verb **perehanya** may also be used without an internal argument:

[perehanya] : [X]
[agent]

[Bana ba sa ithuting] ba a perehanya.
(Children who do not learn are troublesome)

Selection restrictions

Nouns with the feature [animate] and [inanimate] may appear as subjects:

[Mashodu] a perehanya setjhaba ka ho ba utswetsa thepa ka mehla le mehla.
(The thieves are troubling the nation by stealing their things everyday)

[Boitshwaro ba hae bo hlephileng] bo a perehanya.
(His loose behaviour is troubling)

Nouns with the feature [animate] may appear in the object position:

People > Mashodu a perehanya [setjhaba] ka ho ba utswetsa thepa ka mehla le Mehla.

(The thieves are troubling the nation by stealing their things everyday)

Animals > Ho kula ha Tshepo ho perehanya [ntja ya hae]

(Tshepo's illness is troubling his dog)

Personified nouns > Lehlabaphio le perehanya [Amerika] ka ho re ke sehlwela sa yona.

(The traitor is troubling America by saying that he is her spy)

Event structure

This verb shows two events in its event structure:

Event 1: activity

Event 2: state, i.e. a stage-level state in which a person feels anxious

The event structure may be represented as follows:

$$\text{EVENTSTR} = \left(\begin{array}{l} E_1 = \text{process} \\ E_2 = \text{state} \end{array} \right)$$

Meaning

1. trouble

Mashodu a perehanya setjhaba ka ho ba utswetsa thepa ka mehla le mehla.

(The thieves are troubling the nation by stealing their things everyday)

2. disturb greatly

Lefu la mohatsae le perehanya monna.

(The death of his wife disturbs the man greatly)

[hlopha](bother)

Assignment of arguments

This verb assigns two arguments: an external argument which is assigned by the verb phrase and an internal argument which is assigned by the verb. The external argument will be interpreted as agent and the internal argument as patient.

[hlopha] : [X, Y]

[agent, patient]

[Ngwana] o hlopha [ntatae]ka ho dula a mo kopa tjelete ka mehla.

(The child is bothering his father by always asking money from him)

The external argument is [Ngwana] which is the agent of anxiety, and [ntatae] is the internal argument which is the patient of anxiety.

The verb **hlopha** may also be used without an internal argument:

[hlopha] : [X]

[agent]

[Bana ba sa ithuting] ba a hlopha.

(Children who do not learn are bothering)

Selection restrictions

Nouns with the feature [animate] and [inanimate] may appear as subjects:

[Ngwana] o hlopha ntatae ka ho dula a mo kopa tjelete ka mehla.

(The child is bothering his father by always asking money from him)

[Boitshwaro ba hae bo hlephileng] bo a hlopha.

(His loose behaviour is bothering)

Nouns with the feature [animate] may appear in the object position:

People > Ngwana o hlopha [ntatae] ka ho dula a mo kopa tjelete ka mehla.

(The child is bothering his father by always asking money from him)

Animals> Ho kula ha Tshepo ho hlopha [ntja ya hae]

(Tshepo's illness is bothering his dog)

Personified nouns > Lehlabaphio le hlopha [Amerika] ka ho re ke sehlwela sa yona.

(The traitor is bothering America by saying that he is her spy)

Event structure

This verb shows two events in its event structure:

Event 1: activity

Event 2: state, i.e. a stage-level state in which a person feels anxious

The event structure may be represented as follows:

$$\text{EVENTSTR} = \left(\begin{array}{l} E_1 = \text{process} \\ E_2 = \text{state} \end{array} \right)$$

Meaning

1. bother

Ngwana o hlopha ntatae ka ho dula a mo kopa tjhelete ka mehla.

(The child is bothering his father by always asking money from him)

2. annoy

Teboho o hlopha ntatae ka ho se ye sekolong.

(Teboho is bothering his father by not going to school)

3. plague

Monna o hlopha ngwana ka ho mo roma kgafetsa.

(The man is plaguing the child by sending him regularly)

[kgathatsa](bother)

Assignment of arguments

This verb assigns two arguments: an external argument which is assigned by the verb phrase and an internal argument which is assigned by the verb. The external argument will be interpreted as agent and the internal argument as patient.

[kgathatsa] : [X, Y]

[agent, patient]

[Ngwana] o kgathatsa [batswadi ba hae] ka ho ba kopa tjhelete kgafetsa.

(The child is bothering his parents by repeatedly asking for money.)

The external argument is [Ngwana] which is the agent of anxiety, and [batswadi] is the internal argument which is the patient of anxiety.

The verb **kgathatsa** may also be used without an internal argument:

[kgathatsa] : [X]

[agent]

[Bana ba sa ithuting] ba a kgathatsa.

(Children who do not learn are bothering)

Selection restrictions

Nouns with the feature [animate] and [inanimate] may appear as subjects:

[Ngwana] o kgathatsa batswadi ba hae ka ho ba kopa tjhelete ka mehla.

(The child is bothering his parents by repeatedly asking for money)

[Boitshwaro ba hae bo hlephileng] bo a kgathatsa.

(His loose behaviour is bothering)

Nouns with the feature [animate] may appear in the object position:

People > Ngwana o kgathatsa [batswadi ba hae] ka ho ba kopa tjhelete kgafetsa.

(The child is bothering his parents by repeatedly asking for money)

Animals> Ho kula ha Tshepo ho kgathatsa [ntja ya hae]

(Tshepo's illness is bothering his dog)

Personified nouns > Lehlabaphio le kgathatsa [Amerika] ka ho re ke sehlwela sa yona.

(The traitor is bothering America by saying that he is her spy)

Event structure

This verb shows two events in its event structure:

Event 1: activity

Event 2: state, i.e. a stage-level state in which a person feels anxious

The event structure may be represented as follows:

$$\text{EVENTSTR} = \left(\begin{array}{l} E_1 = \text{process} \\ E_2 = \text{state} \end{array} \right)$$

Meaning

1. bother

Ngwana o kgathatsa batswadi ba hae ka ho ba kopa tjhelete kgafetsa.

(The child is bothering his parents by repeatedly asking for money)

2. annoy/worry

Teboho o kgathatsa ntatae ka ho se ye sekolong.

(Teboho is annoying/worrying his father by not going to school)

3. tire

Ho sebetsa ka thata ho a kgathatsa.

(To work hard tires)

[tsietsa](distress)

Assignment of arguments

This verb assigns two arguments: an external argument which is assigned by the verb phrase and an internal argument which is assigned by the verb. The external argument will be interpreted as agent and the internal argument as patient.

[tsietsa] : [X, Y]
 [agent, patient]

[Nkgono] o ile a tsietsa [mme] ka ho hlabeha ka tshohanyetso.
 (Grandmother distressed mother by becoming ill suddenly)

The external argument is [Nkgono] which is the agent of anxiety, and [mme] is the internal argument which is the patient of anxiety.

The verb **tsietsa** may also be used without an internal argument:

[tsietsa] : [X]
 [agent]

[Bana ba sa ithuting] ba a tsietsa.
 (Children who do not learn distresses)

Selection restrictions

Nouns with the feature [animate] and [inanimate] may appear as subjects:

[Nkgono] o ile a tsietsa mme ka ho hlabeha ka tshohanyetso.
 (Grandmother distressed mother by becoming ill suddenly)

[Boitshwaro ba hae bo hlephileng] bo a tsietsa.

(His loose behaviour is distressing)

Nouns with the feature [animate] may appear in the object position:

People > Nkgono o ile a tsietsa [mme] ka ho hlabeha ka tshohanyetso.
(Grandmother distressed mother by becoming ill suddenly)

Animals > Ho kula ha Tshepo ho tsietsa [ntja ya hae]
(Tshepo's illness is distressing his dog)

Personified nouns > Lehlabaphio le tsietsa [Amerika] ka ho re ke sehlwela sa yona.
(The traitor is distressing America by saying that he is her spy)

Event structure

This verb shows two events in its event structure:

Event 1: activity

Event 2: state, i.e. a stage-level state in which a person feels anxious

The event structure may be represented as follows:

$$\text{EVENTSTR} = \left(\begin{array}{l} E_1 = \text{process} \\ E_2 = \text{state} \end{array} \right)$$

Meaning

1. distress

Nkgono o ile a tsietsa mme ka ho hlabeha ka tshohanyetso.
(Grandmother distressed mother by becoming ill suddenly)

2. embarrass

Ngwana o tsietsa ntatae ka boitshwaro bo bobe.

(The child is embarrassing his father by his bad behavior)

3. puzzle

Ho re o phonyohile jwang kotsing eo ho a ntsietsa.

(How he survived from that accident puzzles me)

5.4.2.6 Causative verbs

When the causative suffix [-is-] is added onto a verb, the following conditions will be applicative:

- (a) The old external argument will become the new internal argument
- (b) A new external argument will be added
- (c) The new external argument may have the meaning of cause

The intransitive verb **hwerehana** becomes **hwerehanya** when the causative verb is added onto it.

[hwerehanya](agitate)

1(a) [Thabo] o a hwerehana ha motho a sa utlwisisi ha a mo kgalemela.

(Thabo becomes agitated when someone does not understand when he reprimands him)

(b) [Moshemane] o hwerehanya [Thabo] ka ho se utlwisisi.

(The boy agitates Thabo by not understanding)

The old external argument [Thabo] which is interpreted as experiencer in 1(a) above, becomes the new internal argument with the same interpretation of experiencer in 1(b)

above. The new external argument is [Moshemane] which is interpreted as a causative agent.

CHAPTER 6: DISGUST

6.1 Aim

The aim of this section will be to determine how the emotion of disgust may be expressed in Sesotho.

6.2 Definition of disgust

The concept of disgust can be defined as to sicken or fill with loathing.

6.3 Expressions of disgust

There are various fixed expressions of disgust. Such expressions are fixed as verb phrases, i.e. a verb with some NP. Any external argument that may be an experiencer of disgust may appear in the subject position. The expressions of disgust in Sesotho may be divided into six subcategories according to the different meanings or levels of intensity of disgust.

6.3.1 Expressions of madness

The expressions of madness can be defined as expressions referring to being temporarily overpowered by violent reactions, emotions, etc. Most of the nouns that appear after verbs in these expressions are the body part [hlooho](head).

Ho fapana/kopana hlooho

The verb [fapana/kopana](alternate/join) appears with a noun [hlooho](head), and this can be interpreted as [alternate/join the head]. Such an expression will then have the meaning of disgust, i.e. 'to become mad'. Any experiencer of disgust may appear as external argument in the subject position.

- (1) [Lesiba] o ile a fapana hlooho ha ba mmolella taba tseo.
(Lesiba became mad when they told him that news)

In (1) above, [Lesiba] is the external argument which is the experiencer of disgust.

Hohlakana/ferekana hlooho

The verb [hlakana/ferekana](mixed/disturbed) appears with a noun [hlooho](head), and this can be interpreted as [mixed/disturbed in the head]. Such an expression will then have the meaning of disgust, i.e. 'to be mad'. Any experiencer of disgust may appear as external argument in the subject position.

- (2) [Monna] o hlakana/ferekana hlooho ha mosadi a sa mo phehele dijo.
(The man becomes mad when the woman does not cook for him)

In (2) above, [Monna](man) is the external argument which is the experiencer of disgust.

6.3.2 Expressions of disgust

The expressions of disgust can be defined as expressions referring to a strong aversion. Most of the nouns that appear after verbs in these expressions are the body parts with the exception of one, i.e. [ipatle](to look for oneself)

Ho nyekisa pelo/dibete

The verb [nyekisa](cause nausea) appears with a noun [pelo/dibete](heart/livers), and this can be interpreted as [cause nausea in the heart/livers]. Such an expression will then have the meaning of disgust, i.e. 'to disgust'. Any experiencer of disgust may appear as external argument in the subject position.

- (3) [Thabo] o nyekiswa pelo ke batho ba ditshila.
(Dirty persons disgust Thabo)

In (3) above, [Thabo] is the external argument which is the experiencer of disgust.

Ho fedisa motho pelo

The verb [fedisa](finish) appears with a noun [motho](person) together with an adverb [pelo](heart), and this can be interpreted as [finish the person the heart]. Such an expression will then have the meaning of disgust, i.e. 'to disgust someone'. Any experiencer of disgust may appear as external argument in the subject position.

- (4) [Sello]o fedisa Dineo pelo ka ho se itlhatswe.
(Sello disgusts Dineo by not washing himself)

In (4) above, [Sello] is the external argument which is the experiencer of disgust.

Ho se ipatle

The verb [ipatle](look for oneself) appears without a noun but with the negative [se](not), and this can be interpreted as [not to look for oneself]. Such an expression will then have the meaning of disgust, i.e. 'to be very disgusted'. Any experiencer of disgust may appear as external argument in the subject position.

- (5) [Mpho] o ne a sa ipatle ke batho ba sa hlompheeng.
(Mpho was very disgusted by people who are unrespectable)

In (5) above, [Mpho] is the external argument which is the experiencer of disgust.

6.3.3 Expressions of nausea

The expressions of nausea can be defined as expressions referring to a feeling of sickness with an inclination to vomit.

Ho feroha dibete

The verb [feroha](have nausea) appears with a noun [dibete](livers), and this can be interpreted as [have nausea the livers]. Such an expression will then have the meaning of disgust, i.e. 'to have nausea'. Any experiencer of disgust may appear as external argument in the subject position.

- (6) [Mosadi] o ile a feroha dibete ha a bona dijo tse senyehileng.
(The woman had nausea when she saw the spoilt food)

In (6) above, [Mosadi](woman) is the external argument which is the experiencer of disgust.

Ho koqoha matshwafo

The verb [koqoha](rise) appears with a noun [matshwafo](lungs), and this can be interpreted as [rise the lungs]. Such an expression will then have the meaning of disgust, i.e. 'to have nausea'. Any experiencer of disgust may appear as external argument in the subject position.

- (7) [Mosadi] o ile a koqoha matshwafo ha a bona sera sa hae.
(The woman was nauseous when she saw her enemy)

In (7) above, [Mosadi](woman) is the external argument which is the experiencer of disgust.

6.3.4 Expressions of despise

The expressions of despise can be defined as expressions referring to looking on as inferior, worthless or contemptible.

Ho shebela fatshe

The verb [shebela](look towards) appears with a noun [fatshe](down), and this can be interpreted as [look towards down]. Such an expression will then have the meaning of disgust, i.e. 'to despise'. Any experiencer of disgust may appear as external argument in the subject position.

- (8) [Barui] ba shebela mafutsana fatshe.
(The rich despise the poor)

In (8) above, [Barui](the rich) is the external argument which is the experiencer of disgust.

Ho kapela motho mathe

The verb [kapela](emit for) appears with an indirect and direct NP's [motho](person) and [mathe](saliva) respectively, and this can be interpreted as [emit for a person saliva]. Such an expression will then have the meaning of disgust, i.e. 'to despise someone'. Any experiencer of disgust may appear as external argument in the subject position.

- (9) [Teboho] o kapela Sello mathe ka hobane a sa itlhatswe.
(Teboho despises Sello because of not washing himself)

In (9) above, [Teboho] is the external argument which is the experiencer of disgust.

Ho kgala ka mahlwanyana

The verb [kgala](conquer) appears with a prepositional NP [ka mahlwanyana](with small snow), and this can be interpreted as [conquer with small snow]. Such an expression will then have the meaning of disgust, i.e. 'to despise because of unimpressive appearance'. Any experiencer of disgust may appear as external argument in the subject position.

- (10) [Selwani] se kgala Hlapane ka mahlwanyana ho latela papadi tse fetileng.
(The fighter despises Hlapane because of unimpressive appearance in previous fights)

In (10) above, [Selwani](fighter) is the external argument which is the experiencer of disgust.

6.3.5 Expressions of annoyance

The expressions of annoyance can be defined as expressions referring to causing a slight anger or mental distress to someone.

Ho pipitlela maikutlo

The verb [pipitlela](over-fill the stomach) appears with a noun [maikutlo](feelings), and this can be interpreted as [over-fill the stomach with feelings]. Such an expression will then have the meaning of disgust, i.e. 'to annoy'. Any experiencer of disgust may appear as external argument in the subject position.

- (11) [Ntate] o pipitlelwa maikutlo ke boitshwaro bo bobe ba bana.
(Father is annoyed by the bad behavior of the children)

In (11) above, [Ntate](father) is the external argument which is the experiencer of disgust.

6.3.6 Expressions of insult

The expressions of insult can be defined as expressions referring to speaking to or treating with scornful abuse or indignity.

Ho supa ka monwana

The verb [supa](point) appears with a prepositional NP [ka monwana](with a finger), and this can be interpreted as [point with a finger]. Such an expression will then have

the meaning of disgust, i.e. 'to insult'. Any experiencer of disgust may appear as external argument in the subject position.

- (12) [Monna] o supa bana ba thibaneng ditsebe ka monwana.
(The man insults insubordinate children)

In (12) above, [Monna](man) is the external argument which is the experiencer of disgust.

6.4 Verbs of disgust

The verbs of disgust will be discussed with regard to their semantics and syntax.

6.4.1 The semantics of the verbs of disgust

The verbs of disgust may be divided into the following categories depending on the degree of disgust which is experienced by a person:

Despise

The concept of despise may be defined as looking on as inferior, worthless or contemptible.

[eisa]

Barui ba eisa mafutsana.
(The rich despises the poor)

[kgesa]

Baithuti ba kgesa moithuti wa sehole.
(The learners despises a crippled learner)

[nyonya]

Ntate o nyonya bana ba sa hlompheng.
(Father despises disrespectful children)

[nyedisa]

Sello o nyedisa Thabo hobane feela a sa ruteha.
(Sello despises Thabo just because he is not learned)

[tella]

Bana ba kgohlahetseng ba tella batho ba baholo.
(Naughty children despises adults)

Disgust

The concept of disgust may be defined as sickening or filling with loathing.

[tena]

Sello o tena batho ba baholo ka ho hlola a rohakana.
(Sello disgusts adults by always being insulting)

[kgobohela]

Moshemane o kgobohela batho ka ho hlola a utswitse.
(The boy disgusts the people by always stealing)

Annoy

The concept of annoying may be defined as causing slight anger or mental distress to someone.

[farasela]

Fafa o ile a farasela ha a fumana papadi e se e qadile.

(Fafa became annoyed when he found that the play has already started)

[faraseha]

Mme o a faraseha ke bana ba sa itlhatsweng.

(Mother becomes annoyed because of children who do not wash themselves)

[hlopha]

Ntate o hlopha mme ka ho hlola a fihlile bosiu.

(Father bothers mother by always coming late at night)

[pheqa]

Ngwana o pheqa batswadi ka ho se mamele ha a kgalemelwa.

(The child annoys the parents by not listening when reprimanded)

[tontontsha]

Dirontsho o tontontsha Pontsho ka ho bua haholo.

(Dirontsho annoys Pontsho by talking too much)

[kgathatsa]

Ngwana o kgathatsa ntatae ka ho kopa tjelete ka mehla.

(The child bothers his father by always asking for money)

Dislike

The concept of dislike may be defined as a feeling of aversion or antipathy.

[qena]

Dineo o qena banana ba buang hampe ka batho ba bang.

(Dineo dislikes girls who gossips about other people)

[nena]

Tau o nena bana ba sa hlompheng batswadi.

(Tau dislike children who do not respect parents)

[hloya]

Monna o hloya batho ba mo buang hampe.

(The man dislike people who talk ill of him)

Insult

The concept of insult may be defined as an offensive or contemptuous remark or action.

[nyefola]

Sello o nyefola Sellwane hobane a sa mo rate.

(Sello insults Sellwane because he hates her)

[komotela]

Ntswaki o komotela Kgabane hobane a bua hampe ka batswadi be hae.

(Ntswaki insults Kgabane because he speak badly about her parents)

[rohaka]

Ngwana ya kgohlahetseng o rohaka bana ba bang.

(A naughty child insults other children)

[hlapaola]

Sello o hlapaola Teboho.

(Sello insults Teboho)

[fetsheola]

Morwesi o fetsheola Pulane ka batswadi ba hae.

(Morwesi insults Pulane by her parents)

Mock

The concept of mocking may be defined as behaving with scorn or contempt (towards).

[soma]

Malome o soma ngwana ya sa ithuting.

(Uncle mocks the child who is not studying)

[phoqa]

Mosadi o phoqa mohlankana ya seleng.

(The woman mocks the naughty young man)

Scorn

The concept of scorn may be defined as open contempt for a person or thing.

[qhesa]

Morwesi o qhesa Pulane hobane feela a apara bohlaswa.

(Morwesi scorns Pulane just because she dresses carelessly)

Scold

The concept of scold may be defined as finding fault with or reprimand (a person) harshly.

[nyatsa]

Thabo o nyatsa ngwana ya boitshwaro bo bobe.

(Thabo scolds a naughty child)

[kgoba]

Ntate o kgoba ngwana ya utswitseng tjhelete.

(Father scolds the child who stole the money)

Mad

The concept of madness may be defined as being temporarily overpowered by violent reactions, emotions, etc.

[hlanya]

Monna o a hlanya ha ba bua mosadi wa hae hampe.

(The man becomes mad when they talk badly about his wife)

6.4.2 The syntax of the verbs of disgust

The verbs of disgust may be divided into the following subcategories if one takes their behaviour in syntax into account:

6.4.2.1 Transitive verbs

There are twenty four transitive verbs: **eisa**, **kgesa**, **nyonya**, **nyedisa**, **tella**, **hlopha**, **pheqa**, **tontontsha**, **kgathatsa**, **qena**, **nena**, **hloya**, **nyefola**, **komotela**, **rohaka**, **hlapaola**, **fetsheola**, **soma**, **phoqa**, **qhesa**, **nyatsa**, **kgoba**, **tena**, and **kgobohela**.

[eisa](despise)

Assignment of arguments

This verb assigns two arguments: an external argument which is assigned by the verb phrase and an internal argument which is assigned by the verb. The external argument will be interpreted as agent and the internal argument as patient.

[eisa] : [X,Y]
 [agent, patient]

[Barui] ba eisa [mafutsana]
 (The rich despises the poor)

The external argument is [Barui] which is the agent of disgust, and the internal argument is [mafutsana] which is the patient.

The verb **eisa** may also be used without an internal argument:

[eisa]: [X]
 [agent]

[Monna] o a eisa.
 (The man despises)

Selection restrictions

Nouns with the feature [animate] and [inanimate] may appear as subjects:

[Barui] ba eisa mafutsana.

(The rich despises the poor)

[Diketso tsa hae] di a eisa.

(His actions despises)

Nouns with the feature [animate] may appear in the object position:

People > Barui ba eisa [mafutsana]

(The rich despises the poor)

Animals > Moshemane o eisa [ntja e sa lomeng]

(The boy despises a dog that does not bite)

Personified nouns > Malawi e eisa [Lesotho] hobane le se na dibetsa.

(Malawi despises Basutoland because she does not have weapons)

Event structure

This verb shows two events in its event structure:

Event 1: activity

Event 2: state, i.e. a stage-level state in which a person feels disgusted

The event structure may be represented as follows:

$$\text{EVENTSTR} = \left(\begin{array}{l} E_1 = \text{process} \\ E_2 = \text{state} \end{array} \right)$$

Meaning

1. to despise

Barui ba eisa mafutsana.

(The rich despises the poor)

[kgesa](despise)

Assignment of arguments

This verb assigns two arguments: an external argument which is assigned by the verb phrase and an internal argument which is assigned by the verb. The external argument will be interpreted as agent and the internal argument as patient.

[kgesa] :[X,Y]

[agent, patient]

[Baithuti] ba kgesa [moithuti wa sehole].

(The learners despises a crippled learner)

The external argument is [Baithuti] which is the agent of disgust, and the internal argument is [moithuti wa sehole] which is the patient.

The verb **kgesa** may also be used without an internal argument:

[kgesa]: [X]

[agent]

[Monna] o a kgesa.

(The man despises)

Selection restrictions

Nouns with the feature [animate] and [inanimate] may appear as subjects:

[Baithuti] ba kgesa moithuti wa sehole.

(The learners despises a crippled learner)

[Diketso tsa hae] di a kgesa.

(His actions despises)

Nouns with the feature [animate] may appear in the object position:

People > Baithuti ba kgesa [moithuti wa sehole].

(The learners despises a crippled learner)

Animals > Moshemane o kgesa [ntja e sa lomeng]

(The boy despises a dog that does not bite)

Personified nouns > Malawi e kgesa [Lesotho] hobane le se na dibetsa.

(Malawi despises Basutoland because she does not have weapons)

Event structure

This verb shows two events in its event structure:

Event 1: activity

Event 2: state, i.e. a stage-level state in which a person feels disgusted

The event structure may be represented as follows:

$$\text{EVENTSTR} = \left(\begin{array}{l} E_1 = \text{process} \\ E_2 = \text{state} \end{array} \right)$$

Meaning

1. to despise

Bithuti ba kgesa moithuti wa sehole.

(The learners despises a crippled learner)

[nyonya](despise)

Assignment of arguments

This verb assigns two arguments: an external argument which is assigned by the verb phrase and an internal argument which is assigned by the verb. The external argument will be interpreted as agent and the internal argument as patient.

[nyonya] :[X,Y]
[agent, patient]

[Ntate] o nyonya [bana ba sa hlompeng].

(Father despises disrespectful children)

The external argument is [Ntate] which is the agent of disgust, and the internal argument is [bana ba sa hlompeng] which is the patient.

The verb **nyonya** may also be used without an internal argument:

[nyonya]: [X]
[agent]

[Monna] o a nyonya.

(The man despises)

Selection restrictions

Nouns with the feature [animate] and may appear as subjects:

[Ntate] o nyonya bana ba sa hlompheng.

(Father despises disrespectful children)

Nouns with the feature [animate] may appear in the object position:

People > Ntate o nyonya [bana ba sa hlompheng].

(Father despises disrespectful children)

Animals > Moshemane o nyonya [ntja e sa lomeng]

(The boy despises a dog that does not bite)

Personified nouns > Malawi e nyonya [Lesotho] hobane le se na dibetsa.

(Malawi despises Basutoland because she does not have weapons)

Event structure

This verb shows two events in its event structure:

Event 1: activity

Event 2: state, i.e. a stage-level state in which a person feels disgusted

The event structure may be represented as follows:

$$\text{EVENTSTR} = \left(\begin{array}{l} E_1 = \text{process} \\ E_2 = \text{state} \end{array} \right)$$

Meaning

1. to despise

Ntate o nyonya bana ba sa hlompheng.
(Father despises disrespectful children)

2. to be disgusted with

Ke nyonya motho ya sa itlhatsweng.
(I am disgusted with a person who does not wash himself)

[nyedisa](despise)**Assignment of arguments**

This verb assigns two arguments: an external argument which is assigned by the verb phrase and an internal argument which is assigned by the verb. The external argument will be interpreted as agent and the internal argument as patient.

[nyedisa] :[X,Y]
[agent, patient]

[Sello] o nyedisa [Thabo] hobane feela a sa ruteha.
(Sello despises Thabo just because he is not learned)

The external argument is [Sello] which is the agent of disgust, and the internal argument is [Thabo] which is the patient.

The verb **nyedisa** may also be used without an internal argument:

[nyedisa]: [X]

[agent]

[Monna] o a nyedisa.

(The man despises)

Selection restrictions

Nouns with the feature [animate] and [inanimate] may appear as subjects:

[Sello] o nyedisa Thabo hobane feela a sa ruteha.

(Sello despises Thabo just because he is not learned)

[Diketso tsa hae] di a nyedisa.

(His actions despises)

Nouns with the feature [animate] may appear in the object position:

People > Sello o nyedisa Thabo hobane feela a sa ruteha.

(Sello despises Thabo just because he is not learned)

Animals > Moshemane o nyedisa [ntja e sa lomeng]

(The boy despises a dog that does not bite)

Personified nouns > Malawi e nyedisa [Lesotho] hobane le se na dibetsa.

(Malawi despises Basutoland because she does not have weapons)

Event structure

This verb shows two events in its event structure:

Event 1: activity

Event 2: state, i.e. a stage-level state in which a person feels disgusted

The event structure may be represented as follows:

$$\text{EVENTSTR} = \left(\begin{array}{l} E_1 = \text{process} \\ E_2 = \text{state} \end{array} \right)$$

Meaning

1. to despise

Sello o nyedisa Thabo hobane feela a sa ruteha.

(Sello despises Thabo just because he is not learned)

[tella](despise)

Assignment of arguments

This verb assigns two arguments: an external argument which is assigned by the verb phrase and an internal argument which is assigned by the verb. The external argument will be interpreted as agent and the internal argument as patient.

[tella] : [X,Y]

[agent, patient]

[Bana ba kgohlahetseng] ba tella [batho ba baholo].

(Naughty children despises adults)

The external argument is [Bana ba kgohlahetseng] which is the agent of disgust, and the internal argument is [batho ba baholo] which is the patient.

The verb **tella** may also be used without an internal argument:

[tella]: [X]
[agent]

[Monna] o a tella.
(The man despises)

Selection restrictions

Nouns with the feature [animate] and [inanimate] may appear as subjects:

[Bana] ba kgohlahetseng ba tella batho ba baholo.
(Naughty children despises adults)

[Diketso tsa hae] di a tella.
(His actions despises)

Nouns with the feature [animate] may appear in the object position:

People > Bana ba kgohlahetseng ba tella [batho ba baholo].
(Naughty children despises adults)

Animals > Moshemane o tella [ntja e sa lomeng]
(The boy despises a dog that does not bite)

Personified nouns > Malawi e tella [Lesotho] hobane le se na dibetsa.
(Malawi despises Basutoland because she does not have weapons)

Event structure

This verb shows two events in its event structure:

Event 1: activity

Event 2: state, i.e. a stage-level state in which a person feels disgusted

The event structure may be represented as follows:

$$\text{EVENTSTR} = \left(\begin{array}{l} E_1 = \text{process} \\ E_2 = \text{state} \end{array} \right)$$

Meaning

1. to despise

Bana ba kgohlahetseng ba tella batho ba baholo.

(Naughty children despises adults)

[hlopha](annoy)

Assignment of arguments

This verb assigns two arguments: an external argument which is assigned by the verb phrase and an internal argument which is assigned by the verb. The external argument will be interpreted as agent and the internal argument as patient.

[hlopha] :[X,Y]

[agent, patient]

[Ntate] o hlopha [mme] ka ho hlola a fihlile bosiu.

(Father annoys mother by always coming late at night)

The external argument is [Ntate] which is the agent of disgust, and [mme] which is the patient.

The verb **hlopha** may also be used without an internal argument:

[hlopha]: [X]
[agent]

[Monna] o a hlopha.
(The man annoyses)

Selection restrictions

Nouns with the feature [animate] and [inanimate] may appear as subjects:

[Ntate] o hlopha mme ka ho hlola a fihlile bosiu.
(Father annoys mother by always coming late at night)

[Diketso tsa hae] di a hlopha.
(His actions annoyses)

Nouns with the feature [human] may appear in the object position:

People > Ntate o hlopha [mme] ka ho hlola a fihlile bosiu.
(Father annoys mother by always coming late at night)

Personified nouns > Malawi e hlopha [Lesotho] ka ho e kopa ditjhelete.
(Malawi annoys Basutoland by asking money from her)

Event structure

This verb shows two events in its event structure:

Event 1: activity

Event 2: state, i.e. a stage-level state in which a person feels disgusted

The event structure may be represented as follows:

$$\text{EVENTSTR} = \left(\begin{array}{l} E_1 = \text{process} \\ E_2 = \text{state} \end{array} \right)$$

Meaning

1. to annoy

Ntate o hlopha mme ka ho hlola a fihlile bosiu.

(Father annoys mother by always coming late at night)

2. to bother

Ngwana o hlopha batswadi ka ho utswa.

(The child is bothering the parents by stealing)

3. to plague

Monna o hlopha mosadi ka ho se robale hae.

(The man is plaguing the woman by not sleeping at home)

[pheqa](annoy)

Assignment of arguments

This verb assigns two arguments: an external argument which is assigned by the verb phrase and an internal argument which is assigned by the verb. The external argument will be interpreted as agent and the internal argument as patient.

[pheqa] :[X,Y]

[agent, patient]

[Ngwana] o pheqa [batswadi] ka ho se mamele ha a kgalemelwa.
 (The child annoys the parents by not listening when reprimanded)

The external argument is [Ngwana] which is the agent of disgust, and the internal argument is [batswadi] which is the patient.

The verb **pheqa** may also be used without an internal argument:

[pheqa]: [X]
 [agent]

[Monna] o a pheqa.
 (The man annoyses)

Selection restrictions

Nouns with the feature [animate] and [inanimate] may appear as subjects:

[Ngwana] o pheqa batswadi ka ho se mamele ha a kgalemelwa.
 (The child annoys the parents by not listening when reprimanded)

[Diketso tsa hae] di a pheqa.
 (His actions annoyses)

Nouns with the feature [human] may appear in the object position:

People > Ngwana o pheqa [batswadi] ka ho se mamele ha a kgalemelwa.
 (The child annoys the parents by not listening when reprimanded)

Personified nouns > Malawi e pheqa [Lesotho] ka ho e kopa tjhelete.
 (Malawi annoys Basutoland by asking money from her)

Event structure

This verb shows two events in its event structure:

Event 1: activity

Event 2: state, i.e. a stage-level state in which a person feels disgusted

The event structure may be represented as follows:

$$\text{EVENTSTR} = \left(\begin{array}{l} E_1 = \text{process} \\ E_2 = \text{state} \end{array} \right)$$

Meaning

1. to annoy

Ngwana o pheqa batswadi ka ho se mamele ha a kgalemelwa.

(The child annoys the parents by not listening when reprimanded)

2. to torment

Moshemane o pheqa ngwana ka ho mo hopotsa ka lefu la mmae.

(The boy is tormenting the boy by reminding him about his mother's death)

3. to deceive

Teboho o pheqa bana ka hore o tla ba thusa.

(Teboho is deceiving the children by saying that he will help them)

[Diketso tsa hae] di a tontontsha.

(His actions annoyses)

Nouns with the feature [human] may appear in the object position:

People > Dirontsho o tontontsha [Pontsho] ka ho bua haholo.

(Dirontsho annoys Pontsho by talking too much)

Personified nouns > Malawi e tontontsha [Lesotho] ka ho e kopa tjhelete.

(Malawi annoys Basutoland by asking money from her)

Event structure

This verb shows two events in its event structure:

Event 1: activity

Event 2: state, i.e. a stage-level state in which a person feels disgusted

The event structure may be represented as follows:

$$\text{EVENTSTR} = \left(\begin{array}{l} E_1 = \text{process} \\ E_2 = \text{state} \end{array} \right)$$

Meaning

1. to annoy

[Dirontsho] o tontontsha [Pontsho] ka ho bua haholo.

(Dirontsho annoys Pontsho by talking too much)

2. to bother

Ngwana o tontontsha batswadi ka ho utswa.

(The child is bothering the parents by stealing)

3. without consistency

Mosadi o a tontontsha.

(The woman is without consistency)

[kgathatsa](annoy)

Assignment of arguments

This verb assigns two arguments: an external argument which is assigned by the verb phrase and an internal argument which is assigned by the verb. The external argument will be interpreted as agent and the internal argument as patient.

[kgathatsa] :[X,Y]

[agent, patient]

[Ngwana] o kgathatsa [ntate] ka ho mo kopa tjhelete ka mehla.

(The child is annoying father by always asking for money)

The external argument is [Ngwana] which is the agent of disgust, and the internal argument is [ntate] which is the patient.

The verb **kgathatsa** may also be used without an internal argument:

[kgathatsa]: [X]

[agent]

[Monna] o a kgathatsa.

(The man annoyses)

Selection restrictions

Nouns with the feature [animate] and [inanimate] may appear as subjects:

[Ngwana] o kgathatsa ntate ka ho mo kopa tjhelete ka mehla.

(The child is annoying father by always asking for money)

[Diketso tsa hae] di a kgathatsa.

(His actions annoyses)

Nouns with the feature [human] may appear in the object position:

People > Ngwana o kgathatsa [ntate] ka ho mo kopa tjhelete ka mehla.

(The child is annoying father by always asking for money)

Personified nouns > Malawi e kgathatsa [Lesotho] ka ho e kopa tjhelete.

(Malawi annoyses Basutoland by asking money from her)

Event structure

This verb shows two events in its event structure:

Event 1: activity

Event 2: state, i.e. a stage-level state in which a person feels disgusted

The event structure may be represented as follows:

$$\text{EVENTSTR} = \left(\begin{array}{l} E_1 = \text{process} \\ E_2 = \text{state} \end{array} \right)$$

Meaning

1. to annoy

Ngwana o kgathatsa ntate ka ho mo kopa tjhelete ka mehla.
 (The child is annoying father by always asking for money)

2. to bother

Ngwana o kgathatsa batswadi ka ho utswa.
 (The child is bothering the parents by stealing)

3. to tire

Mosebetsi o boima o a kgathatsa.
 (Heavy work tires)

4. to worry

Ngwana o kgathatsa batswadi ka ho se ye sekolong.
 (The child is worrying the parents by not attending a school)

[qena](dislike)**Assignment of arguments**

This verb assigns two arguments: an external argument which is assigned by the verb phrase and an internal argument which is assigned by the verb. The external argument will be interpreted as agent and the internal argument as patient.

[qena] :[X,Y]

[agent, patient]

[Dineo] o qena [banana ba buang ka batho ba bang]
 (Dineo dislikes girls who gossips about other people)

The external argument is [Dineo] which is the agent of disgust, and the internal argument is [banana ba buang ka batho ba bang] which is the patient.

The verb **qena** may also be used without an internal argument:

[qena]: [X]
 [agent]

[Monna] o a qena.
 (The man dislikes)

Selection restrictions

Nouns with the feature [animate] and may appear as subjects:

[Dineo] o qena banana ba buang ka batho ba bang.
 (Dineo dislikes girls who gossips about other people)

Nouns with the feature [animate] may appear in the object position:

People > Dineo o qena [banana ba buang ka batho ba bang]
 (Dineo dislikes girls who gossips about other people)

Animals > Moshemane o qena [ntja e sa lomeng]
 (The boy dislikes a dog that does not bite)

Personified nouns > Malawi e qena [Lesotho] hobane le se na dibetsa.
 (Malawi dislikes Basutoland because she does not have
 weapons)

Event structure

This verb shows two events in its event structure:

Event 1: activity

Event 2: state, i.e. a stage-level state in which a person feels disgusted

The event structure may be represented as follows:

$$\text{EVENTSTR} = \left(\begin{array}{l} E_1 = \text{process} \\ E_2 = \text{state} \end{array} \right)$$

Meaning

1. to dislike

Dineo o qena banana ba buang ka batho ba bang.

(Dineo dislikes girls who gossips about other people)

2. to avoid

Bana ba qena dijo tse babang.

(The children avoids bitter food)

3. to shun

Batho ba qena motho ya mekgwa e mebe.

(The people shun a person with bad manners)

4. to give up a trip

Monna o qena ho ya toropong.

(The man gives up the trip to go to town)

[nena](dislike)

Assignment of arguments

This verb assigns two arguments: an external argument which is assigned by the verb phrase and an internal argument which is assigned by the verb. The external argument will be interpreted as agent and the internal argument as patient.

[nena] :[X,Y]
[agent, patient]

[Tau] o nena [bana ba sa hlompheng batswadi].

(Tau dislikes children who do not respect parents)

The external argument is [Tau] which is the agent of disgust, and the internal argument is [bana ba sa hlompheng batswadi] which is the patient.

The verb **nena** may also be used without an internal argument:

[nena]: [X]
[agent]

[Monna] o a nena.

(The man dislikes)

Selection restrictions

Nouns with the feature [animate] and [inanimate] may appear as subjects:

[Tau] o nena bana ba sa hlompheeng batswadi.
 (Tau dislikes children who do not respect parents)

Nouns with the feature [animate] may appear in the object position:

People > [Tau] o nena bana ba sa hlompheeng batswadi.
 (Tau dislikes children who do not respect parents)

Animals > Moshemane o nena [ntja e sa lomeng]
 (The boy dislikes a dog that does not bite)

Personified nouns > Malawi e nena [Lesotho] hobane le se na dibetsa.
 (Malawi dislikes Basutoland because she does not have
 weapons)

Event structure

This verb shows two events in its event structure:

Event 1: activity

Event 2: state, i.e. a stage-level state in which a person feels disgusted

The event structure may be represented as follows:

$$\text{EVENTSTR} = \left(\begin{array}{l} E_1 = \text{process} \\ E_2 = \text{state} \end{array} \right)$$

Meaning

1. to dislike

Tau o nena bana ba sa hlompheng batswadi.

(Tau dislikes children who do not respect parents)

2. to refuse

Ngwana o nena ha a rongwa.

(The child refuses when he is sent)

[hloya](dislike)

Assignment of arguments

This verb assigns two arguments: an external argument which is assigned by the verb phrase and an internal argument which is assigned by the verb. The external argument will be interpreted as agent and the internal argument as patient.

[hloya] :[X,Y]

[agent, patient]

[Monna] o hloya [batho ba mo buang hampe]

(The man dislikes people who talk ill of him)

The external argument is [Monna] which is the agent of disgust, and the internal argument is [batho ba mo buang hampe] which is the patient.

The verb **hloya** may also be used without an internal argument:

[hloya]: [X]

[agent]

[Monna] o a hloya.
 (The man dislikes)

Selection restrictions

Nouns with the feature [animate] and [inanimate] may appear as subjects:

[Monna] o hloya batho ba mo buang hampe.
 (The man dislikes people who talk ill of him)

Nouns with the feature [animate] may appear in the object position:

People > Monna o hloya [batho ba mo buang hampe]
 (The man dislikes people who talk ill of him)

Animals > Moshemane o hloya [ntja e sa lomeng]
 (The boy dislikes a dog that does not bite)

Personified nouns > Malawi e hloya [Lesotho] hobane le se na dibetsa.
 (Malawi dislikes Basutoland because she does not have
 weapons)

Event structure

This verb shows two events in its event structure:

Event 1: activity

Event 2: state, i.e. a stage-level state in which a person feels disgusted

The event structure may be represented as follows:

$$\text{EVENTSTR} = \left(\begin{array}{l} E_1 = \text{process} \\ E_2 = \text{state} \end{array} \right)$$

Meaning

1. to despise

Monna o hloya batho ba mo buang hampe.
(The man dislikes people who talk ill of him)

2. to hate

Ke hloile batho ba utswang.
(I hate people who steal)

[nyefola](insult)

Assignment of arguments

This verb assigns two arguments: an external argument which is assigned by the verb phrase and an internal argument which is assigned by the verb. The external argument will be interpreted as agent and the internal argument as patient.

[nyefola] :[X,Y]
[agent, patient]

[Sello] o nyefola [Sellwane] hobane a sa mo rate.
(Sello insults Sellwane because he hates her)

The external argument is [Sello] which is the agent of disgust, and the internal argument is [Sellwane] which is the patient.

The verb **nyefola** may also be used without an internal argument:

[nyefola]: [X]
[agent]

[Monna] o a nyefola.

(The man insults)

Selection restrictions

Nouns with the feature [animate] and [inanimate] may appear as subjects:

[Sello] o nyefola Sellwane hobane a sa mo rate.

(Sello insults Sellwane because he hates her)

[Diketso tsa hae] di a nyefola.

(His actions insults)

Nouns with the feature [animate] may appear in the object position:

People > Sello o nyefola [Sellwane] hobane a sa mo rate.

(Sello insults Sellwane because he hates her)

Animals > Moshemane o nyefola [ntja e sa lomeng]

(The boy insults a dog that does not bite)

Personified nouns > Malawi e nyefola [Lesotho] hobane le se na dibetsa.

(Malawi insults Basutoland because she does not have weapons)

Event structure

This verb shows two events in its event structure:

Event 1: activity

Event 2: state, i.e. a stage-level state in which a person feels disgusted

The event structure may be represented as follows:

$$\text{EVENTSTR} = \left(\begin{array}{l} E_1 = \text{process} \\ E_2 = \text{state} \end{array} \right)$$

Meaning

1. to insult

[Sello] o nyefola [Sellwane] hobane a sa mo rate.

(Sello insults Sellwane because he hates her)

2. to speak badly of

Mosadi o nyefola monna hae.

(The woman speak badly of her man)

3. to abuse

Monna o nyefola bana ba hae.

(The man is abusing his children)

[komotela](insult)**Assignment of arguments**

This verb assigns two arguments: an external argument which is assigned by the verb phrase and an internal argument which is assigned by the verb. The external argument will be interpreted as agent and the internal argument as patient.

[komotela] :[X,Y]
 [agent, patient]

[Ntswaki] o komotela [Kgabane] hobane a bua hampe ka batswadi ba hae.
 (Ntswaki insults Kgabane because he speaks badly about her parents)

The external argument is [Ntswaki] which is the agent of disgust, and the internal argument is [Kgabane] which is the patient.

The verb **komotela** may also be used without an internal argument:

[komotela]: [X]
 [agent]

[Monna] o a komotela.
 (The man insults)

Selection restrictions

Nouns with the feature [animate] and [inanimate] may appear as subjects:

[Ntswaki] o komotela Kgabane hobane a bua hampe ka batswadi ba hae.
 (Ntswaki insults Kgabane because he speaks badly about her parents)

[Diketso tsa hae] di a komotela.

(His actions insults)

Nouns with the feature [animate] may appear in the object position:

People > Ntswaki o komotela [Kgabane] hobane a bua hampe ka batswadi ba hae.
(Ntswaki insults Kgabane because he speaks badly about her parents)

Animals > Moshemane o komotela [ntja e sa lomeng]
(The boy insults a dog that does not bite)

Personified nouns > Malawi e komotela [Lesotho] hobane le se na dibetsa.
(Malawi insults Basutoland because she does not have weapons)

Event structure

This verb shows two events in its event structure:

Event 1: activity

Event 2: state, i.e. a stage-level state in which a person feels disgusted

The event structure may be represented as follows:

$$\text{EVENTSTR} = \left(\begin{array}{l} E_1 = \text{process} \\ E_2 = \text{state} \end{array} \right)$$

Meaning

1. to insult

Ntswaki o komotela Kgabane hobane a bua hampe ka batswadi ba hae.
(Ntswaki insults Kgabane because he speaks badly about her parents)

[rohaka](insult)**Assignment of arguments**

This verb assigns two arguments: an external argument which is assigned by the verb phrase and an internal argument which is assigned by the verb. The external argument will be interpreted as agent and the internal argument as patient.

[rohaka] :[X,Y]
 [agent, patient]

[Ngwana ya kgohlahetseng] o rohaka [bana ba bang].
 (A naughty child insults other children)

The external argument is [Ngwana ya kgohlahetseng] which is the agent of disgust, and the internal argument is [bana ba bang] which is the patient.

The verb **rohaka** may also be used without an internal argument:

[rohaka]: [X]
 [agent]

[Monna] o a rohaka.
 (The man insults)

Selection restrictions

Nouns with the feature [animate] and [inanimate] may appear as subjects:

[Ngwana ya kgohlahetseng] o rohaka bana ba bang.
 (A naughty child insults other children)

[Diketso tsa hae] di a rohaka.

(His actions insults)

Nouns with the feature [animate] may appear in the object position:

People > Ngwana ya kgohlahetseng o rohaka [bana ba bang].
(A naughty child insults other children)

Animals > Moshemane o rohaka [ntja e sa lomeng]
(The boy insults a dog that does not bite)

Personified nouns > Malawi e rohaka [Lesotho] hobane le se na dibetsa.
(Malawi insults Basutoland because she does not have
weapons)

Event structure

This verb shows two events in its event structure:

Event 1: activity

Event 2: state, i.e. a stage-level state in which a person feels disgusted

The event structure may be represented as follows:

$$\text{EVENTSTR} = \left(\begin{array}{l} E_1 = \text{process} \\ E_2 = \text{state} \end{array} \right)$$

Meaning

1. to insults

Ngwana ya kgohlahetseng o rohaka bana ba bang.
(A naughty child insults other children)

2. to curse

Ngwana o rohaka bana ba bang.

(The child is cursing other children)

[hlapaola](insult)

Assignment of arguments

This verb assigns two arguments: an external argument which is assigned by the verb phrase and an internal argument which is assigned by the verb. The external argument will be interpreted as agent and the internal argument as patient.

[hlapaola] :[X,Y]

[agent, patient]

[Sello] o hlapaola [Teboho].

(Sello insults Teboho)

The external argument is [Sello] which is the agent of disgust, and the internal argument is [Teboho] which is the patient.

The verb **hlapaola** may also be used without an internal argument:

[hlapaola]: [X]

[agent]

[Monna] o a hlapaola.

(The man insults)

Selection restrictions

Nouns with the feature [animate] and [inanimate] may appear as subjects:

[Sello] o hlapaola Teboho.

(Sello insults Teboho)

[Diketso tsa hae] di a hlapaola.

(His actions insults)

Nouns with the feature [animate] may appear in the object position:

People > Sello o hlapaola [Teboho].

(Sello insults Teboho)

Animals > Moshemane o hlapaola [ntja e sa lomeng]

(The boy insults a dog that does not bite)

Personified nouns > Malawi e hlapaola [Lesotho] hobane le se na dibetsa.

(Malawi insults Basutoland because she does not have weapons)

Event structure

This verb shows two events in its event structure:

Event 1: activity

Event 2: state, i.e. a stage-level state in which a person feels disgusted

The event structure may be represented as follows:

$$\text{EVENTSTR} = \left(\begin{array}{l} E_1 = \text{process} \\ E_2 = \text{state} \end{array} \right)$$

Meaning

1. to insult

Sello o hlapaola Teboho.

(Sello insults Teboho)

2. to curse

Ngwana o hlapaola bana ba bang.

(The child is cursing other children)

[fetsheola](insult)

Assignment of arguments

This verb assigns two arguments: an external argument which is assigned by the verb phrase and an internal argument which is assigned by the verb. The external argument will be interpreted as agent and the internal argument as patient.

[fetsheola] :[X,Y]

[agent, patient]

[Morwesi] o fetsheola [Pulane] ka batswadi ba hae.

(Morwesi insults Pulane by her parents)

The external argument is [Morwesi] which is the agent of disgust, and the internal argument is [Pulane] which is the patient.

The verb **fetsheola** may also be used without an internal argument:

[fetsheola]: [X]

[agent]

[Monna] o a fetsheola.

(The man insults)

Selection restrictions

Nouns with the feature [animate] and [inanimate] may appear as subjects:

[Morwesi] o fetsheola Pulane ka batswadi ba hae.

(Morwesi insults Pulane by her parents)

[Diketso tsa hae] di a fetsheola.

(His actions insults)

Nouns with the feature [animate] may appear in the object position:

People > Morwesi o fetsheola [Pulane] ka batswadi ba hae.

(Morwesi insults Pulane by her parents)

Animals > Moshemane o fetsheola [ntja e sa lomeng]

(The boy insults a dog that does not bite)

Personified nouns > Malawi e fetsheola [Lesotho] hobane le se na dibetsa.

(Malawi insults Basutoland because she does not have weapons)

Event structure

This verb shows two events in its event structure:

Event 1: activity

Event 2: state, i.e. a stage-level state in which a person feels disgusted

The event structure may be represented as follows:

$$\text{EVENTSTR} = \left(\begin{array}{l} E_1 = \text{process} \\ E_2 = \text{state} \end{array} \right)$$

Meaning

1. to insult

Morwesi o fetsheola Pulane ka batswadi ba hae.

(Morwesi insults Pulane by her parents)

[soma](mock)

Assignment of arguments

This verb assigns two arguments: an external argument which is assigned by the verb phrase and an internal argument which is assigned by the verb. The external argument will be interpreted as agent and the internal argument as patient.

[soma] :[X,Y]

[agent, patient]

[Malome] o soma [ngwana ya sa ithuting].

(Uncle mocks a child who is not studying)

The external argument is [Malome] which is the agent of disgust, and the internal argument is [ngwana ya sa ithuting] which is the patient.

The verb **soma** may also be used without an internal argument:

[soma]: [X]
[agent]

[Monna] o a soma.

(The man mocks)

Selection restrictions

Nouns with the feature [animate] and [inanimate] may appear as subjects:

[Malome] o soma ngwana ya sa ithuting.

(Uncle mocks a child who is not studying)

[Diketso tsa hae] di a soma.

(His actions mocks)

Nouns with the feature [human] may appear in the object position:

People > Malome o soma [ngwana ya sa ithuting].

(Uncle mocks a child who is not studying)

Personified nouns > Malawi e soma [Lesotho] hobane le se na dibetsa.

(Malawi mocks Basutoland because she does not have
weapons)

Event structure

This verb shows two events in its event structure:

Event 1: activity

Event 2: state, i.e. a stage-level state in which a person feels disgusted

The event structure may be represented as follows:

$$\text{EVENTSTR} = \left(\begin{array}{l} E_1 = \text{process} \\ E_2 = \text{state} \end{array} \right)$$

Meaning

1. to mock

Malome o soma ngwana ya sa ithuting.

(Uncle mocks a child who is not studying)

2. to make a game of

Moshemane o soma ngwana ya botswa.

(The boy makes a game of a lazy child)

3. to scoff at

Mme o soma banana ba botswa.

(Mother scoffs at lay girls)

[phoqa](mock)

Assignment of arguments

This verb assigns two arguments: an external argument which is assigned by the verb phrase and an internal argument which is assigned by the verb. The external argument will be interpreted as agent and the internal argument as patient.

[phoqa] :[X, Y]

[agent, patient]

[Mosadi] o phoqa [mohlankana ya seleng].

(The woman mocks the naughty young man)

The external argument is [Mosadi] which is the agent of disgust, and the internal argument is [mohlankana ya seleng] which is the patient.

The verb **phoqa** may also be used without an internal argument:

[phoqa]: [X]

[agent]

[Monna] o a phoqa.

(The man mocks)

Selection restrictions

Nouns with the feature [animate] and [inanimate] may appear as subjects:

[Mosadi] o phoqa mohlankana ya seleng.

(The woman mocks the naughty young man)

[Diketso tsa hae] di a phoqa.

(His actions mocks)

Nouns with the feature [human] may appear in the object position:

People > Mosadi o phoqa [mohlankana ya seleng].

(The woman mocks the naughty young man)

Personified nouns > Malawi e phoqa [Lesotho] hobane le se na dibetsa.
 (Malawi mocks Basutoland because she does not have
 weapons)

Event structure

This verb shows two events in its event structure:

Event 1: activity

Event 2: state, i.e. a stage-level state in which a person feels disgusted

The event structure may be represented as follows:

$$\text{EVENTSTR} = \left(\begin{array}{l} E_1 = \text{process} \\ E_2 = \text{state} \end{array} \right)$$

Meaning

1. to mock

Mosadi o phoqa mohlankana ya seleng.
 (The woman mocks the naughty young man)

2. to play with

Ngwana o phoqa katse.
 (The child plays with a cat)

3. to speak much

Monna o a phoqa.

(The man speaks much)

4. to deceive

Mpho o phoqa bana ka ho re o tla ba thusa.

(Mpho deceives the children by saying that he will help them)

[qhesa](scorn)**Assignment of arguments**

This verb assigns two arguments: an external argument which is assigned by the verb phrase and an internal argument which is assigned by the verb. The external argument will be interpreted as agent and the internal argument as patient.

[qhesa] :[X,Y]

[agent, patient]

[Morwesi] o qhesa [Pulane] hobane feela a apara bohlaswa.

(Morwesi scorns Pulane just because she dresses carelessly)

The external argument is [Morwesi] which is the agent of disgust, and the internal argument is [Pulane] which is the patient.

The verb **qhesa** may also be used without an internal argument:

[qhesa]: [X]

[agent]

[Monna] o a qhesa.

(The man scorns)

Selection restrictions

Nouns with the feature [animate] and [inanimate] may appear as subjects:

[Morwesi] o qhesa Pulane hobane feela a apara bohlaswa.

(Morwesi scorns Pulane just because she dresses carelessly)

[Diketso tsa hae] di a qhesa.

(His actions scorns)

Nouns with the feature [animate] may appear in the object position:

People > Morwesi o qhesa [Pulane] hobane feela a apara bohlaswa.

(Morwesi scorns Pulane just because she dresses carelessly)

Animals > Moshemane o qhesa [ntja e sa lomeng]

(The boy scorns a dog that does not bite)

Personified nouns > Malawi e qhesa [Lesotho] hobane le se na dibetsa.

(Malawi scorns Basutoland because she does not have
weapons)

Event structure

This verb shows two events in its event structure:

Event 1: activity

Event 2: state, i.e. a stage-level state in which a person feels disgusted

The event structure may be represented as follows:

$$\text{EVENTSTR} = \left(\begin{array}{l} E_1 = \text{process} \\ E_2 = \text{state} \end{array} \right)$$

Meaning

1. to scorn

Morwesi o qhesa Pulane hobane feela a apara bohlaswa.

(Morwesi scorns Pulane just because she dresses carelessly)

2. to disdain

Thato o rata ho qhesa ha a bona batho ba bang.

(Thato likes to disdain when he sees other people)

[nyatsa](scold)

Assignment of arguments

This verb assigns two arguments: an external argument which is assigned by the verb phrase and an internal argument which is assigned by the verb. The external argument will be interpreted as agent and the internal argument as patient.

[nyatsa] :[X,Y]

[agent, patient]

[Thabo] o nyatsa [ngwanana ya seleng].

(Thabo scolds a naughty girl)

The external argument is [Thabo] which is the agent of disgust, and the internal argument is [ngwanana ya seleng] which is the patient.

The verb **nyatsa** may also be used without an internal argument:

[nyatsa]: [X]
[agent]

[Monna] o a nyatsa.
(The man scolds)

Selection restrictions

Nouns with the feature [animate] and [inanimate] may appear as subjects:

[Thabo] o nyatsa ngwanana ya seleng.
(Thabo scolds a naughty girl)

[Diketso tsa hae] di a nyatsa.
(His actions scolds)

Nouns with the feature [animate] may appear in the object position:

People > Thabo o nyatsa [ngwanana ya seleng].
(Thabo scolds a naughty girl)

Animals > Moshemane o nyatsa [ntja e sa lomeng]
(The boy scolds a dog that does not bite)

Personified nouns > Malawi e nyatsa [Lesotho] hobane le se na dibetsa.
(Malawi scolds Basutoland because she does not have weapons)

Event structure

This verb shows two events in its event structure:

Event 1: activity

Event 2: state, i.e. a stage-level state in which a person feels disgusted

The event structure may be represented as follows:

$$\text{EVENTSTR} = \left(\begin{array}{l} E_1 = \text{process} \\ E_2 = \text{state} \end{array} \right)$$

Meaning

1. to scold

Thabo o nyatsa ngwanana ya seleng.

(Thabo scolds a naughty girl)

2. to blame

Mosadi o nyatsa diketso tse mpe tsa banana.

(The woman blames the bad behaviour of the girls)

3. to reproach

Ntate o nyatsa bashemane ba botswa.

(Father reproaches lazy boys)

4. to criticize

Moruti o nyatsa diketso tse mpe tsa phutheho.

(The preacher criticizes the bad behaviour of the congregation)

5. to disapprove

Ke nyatsa boitshwaro ba hae bo hlephileng.

(I disapprove of his loose behaviour)

[kgoba](scold)

Assignment of arguments

This verb assigns two arguments: an external argument which is assigned by the verb phrase and an internal argument which is assigned by the verb. The external argument will be interpreted as agent and the internal argument as patient.

[kgoba] :[X, Y]

[agent, patient]

[Ntate] o kgoba [ngwana ya utswitseng tjhelete]

(Father scolds the child who stole the money)

The external argument is [Ntate] which is the agent of disgust, and the internal argument is [ngwana ya utswitseng tjhelete] which is the patient.

The verb **kgoba** may also be used without an internal argument:

[kgoba]: [X]

[agent]

[Monna] o a kgoba.

(The man scolds)

Selection restrictions

Nouns with the feature [animate] and [inanimate] may appear as subjects:

[Ntate] o kgoba ngwana ya utswitseng tjhelete.

(Father scolds the child who stole the money)

[Diketso tsa hae] di a kgoba.

(His actions scolds)

Nouns with the feature [animate] may appear in the object position:

People > Ntate o kgoba [ngwana ya utswitseng tjhelete]

(Father scolds the child who stole the money)

Animals > Moshemane o kgoba [ntja e sa lomeng]

(The boy scolds a dog that does not bite)

Personified nouns > Malawi e kgoba [Lesotho] hobane le se na dibetsa.

(Malawi scolds Basutoland because she does not have weapons)

Event structure

This verb shows two events in its event structure:

Event 1: activity

Event 2: state, i.e. a stage-level state in which a person feels disgusted

The event structure may be represented as follows:

$$\text{EVENTSTR} = \left(\begin{array}{l} E_1 = \text{process} \\ E_2 = \text{state} \end{array} \right)$$

Meaning

1. to scold

Ntate o kgoba ngwana ya utswitseng tjhelete.

(Father scolds the child who stole the money)

2. to bark very long, fiercely

Ntja e ile ya kgoba ha e bona mashodu.

(The dog barked very fiercely when it saw the thieves)

[tena](disgust)

Assignment of arguments

This verb assigns two arguments: an external argument which is assigned by the verb phrase and an internal argument which is assigned by the verb. The external argument will be interpreted as agent and the internal argument as patient.

[tena] : [X,Y]

[agent, patient]

[Sello] o tena [batho ba baholo] ka ho hlola a rohakana.

(Sello disgusts adults by always being insulting)

The external argument is [Sello] which is the agent of disgust, and the internal argument is [batho ba baholo] which is the patient.

The verb **tena** may also be used without an internal argument:

[tena]: [X]
[agent]

[Monna] o a tena.
(The man disgusts)

Selection restrictions

Nouns with the feature [animate] and [inanimate] may appear as subjects:

[Sello] o tena batho ba baholo ka ho hlola a rohakana.
(Sello disgusts adults by always being insulting)

[Diketso tsa hae] di a tena.
(His actions disgusts)

Nouns with the feature [human] may appear in the object position:

People > Sello o tena [batho ba baholo] ka ho hlola a rohakana.
(Sello disgusts adults by always being insulting)

Personified nouns > Malawi e tena [Lesotho] ka hobane e hlekefetsa batho ba yona.
(Malawi disgusts Basutoland because she does not have weapons)

Event structure

This verb shows two events in its event structure:

Event 1: activity

Event 2: state, i.e. a stage-level state in which a person feels disgusted

The event structure may be represented as follows:

$$\text{EVENTSTR} = \left(\begin{array}{l} E_1 = \text{process} \\ E_2 = \text{state} \end{array} \right)$$

Meaning

1. to disgust

Sello o tena batho ba baholo ka ho hlola a rohakana.

(Sello disgusts adults by always being insulting)

2. to tire

Mosebetsi o boima o a tena.

(Hard work tires)

[kgobohela](disgust)

Assignment of arguments

This verb assigns two arguments: an external argument which is assigned by the verb phrase and an internal argument which is assigned by the verb. The external argument will be interpreted as agent and the internal argument as patient.

[kgobohela] :[X,Y]
 [agent, patient]

[Moshemane] o kgobohela [batho] ka ho hlola a utswitse.

(The boy disgusts people by always stealing)

The external argument is [Moshemane] which is the agent of disgust, and the internal argument is [batho] which is the patient.

The verb **kgobohela** may also be used without an internal argument:

[kgobohela]: [X]
 [agent]

[Monna] o a kgobohela.

(The man disgusts)

Selection restrictions

Nouns with the feature [animate] and [inanimate] may appear as subjects:

[Moshemane] o kgobohela batho ka ho hlola a utswitse.

(The boy disgusts people by always stealing)

[Diketso tsa hae] di a kgobohela.

(His actions disgusts)

Nouns with the feature [human] may appear in the object position:

People > Moshemane o kgobohela [batho] ka ho hlola a utswitse.

(The boy disgusts people by always stealing)

Personified nouns > Malawi e kgobohela [Lesotho] hobane le se na dibetsa.
 (Malawi disgusts Basutoland because she does not have weapons)

Event structure

This verb shows two events in its event structure:

Event 1: activity

Event 2: state, i.e. a stage-level state in which a person feels disgusted

The event structure may be represented as follows:

$$\text{EVENTSTR} = \left(\begin{array}{l} E_1 = \text{process} \\ E_2 = \text{state} \end{array} \right)$$

Meaning

1. to disgust

Moshemane o kgobohela batho ka ho hlola a utswitse.

(The boy disgusts people by always stealing)

6.4.2.2 Transitive verbs with the applicative suffix [-el-]

- A. The following transitive verbs may appear with the applicative suffix [-el-]: **eisetsa, kgesetsa, nyedisetsa, hlophela, pheqela, tontontshetsa, kgathaletsa, hloela, nyefolela, komotelela, rohakela, hlapaolela, fetsheolela, somela, phoqela, qhesetsa, nyatsetsa** and **kgobela**. In such a case, a new internal argument will be added which is dependent on the presence of [-el-]. In each sentence below, the new argument will be indicated as well as its interpretation. This new argument will be animate as well as inanimate.

[eisetša](despise because of)

- 1(a) [Thabo] o eisetša monna [mafutsana] ao a a sotlang.
(Thabo despises the man because of the way he treats the poor)
- (b) [Thabo] o eisetša monna [bohlaswa] bona ba hae.
(Thabo despises the man because of his carelessness)

The new internal arguments are [mafutsana] which is animate, and [bohlaswa] which is inanimate. Both arguments are interpreted as cause. The external argument is [Thabo]

[kgesetša](despise because of)

- 2(a) [Mosuwe] o kgesetša bana [moithuti] eo ba mo somang.
(The teacher despises the children because of the way they treat the learner)
- (b) [Mosuwe] o kgesetša bana [boitshwaro bo bobe]
(The teacher despises the children because of their bad behaviour)

The new internal arguments are [moithuti] which is animate, and [boitshwaro bo bobe] which is inanimate. Both arguments are interpreted as cause. The external arguments is [Mosuwe]

[nyedisetša](despise because of)

- 3(a) [Ntate] o nyedisetša Dibakiso [Thabo ya tahwang]
(Father despises Dibakiso because of Thabo's drunkenness)
- (b) [Ntate] o nyedisetša Dibakiso [botahwa bona ba hae]
(Father despises Dibakiso because of her drunkenness)

The new internal arguments are [Thabo ya tahwang] which is animate, and [botahwa bona ba hae] which is inanimate. Both arguments are interpreted as cause. The external arguments is [Ntate]

[hlophela](annoy because of)

4(a) [Mosadi] o hlophela monna [bana ba ditshila]
(The woman annoys the man because of dirty children)

(b) [Mosadi] o hlophela monna [boitshwaro boo a tshwereng ngwana ka teng]
(The woman annoys the man because of the way he treats the child)

The new internal arguments are [bana ba ditshila] which is animate, and [boitshwaro boo a tshwereng ngwana ka teng] which is inanimate. Both arguments are interpreted as cause. The external arguments is [Mosadi]

[pheqela](annoy because of)

5(a) [Monna] o pheqela mosadi [metswalle ya hae e mebe]
(The man annoys the woman because of his bad friends)

(b) [Monna] o pheqela mosadi [diketso tse mpe tsa hae]
(The man annoys the woman because of his bad deeds)

The new internal arguments are [metswalle ya hae e mebe] which is animate, and [diketso tse mpe tsa hae] which is inanimate. Both arguments are interpreted as cause. The external arguments is [Monna]

[tontontshetsa](annoy because of)

6(a) [Monna] o tontontshetsa mosadi [batho ba bohlaswa]
(The man annoys the woman because of careless people)

- (b) [Monna] o tontontshetsa mosadi [boitshwaro bo sa lokang]
 (The man annoys the woman because of his bad behaviour)

The new internal arguments are [batho ba bohlaswa] which is animate, and [boitshwaro bo sa lokang] which is inanimate. Both arguments are interpreted as cause. The external arguments is [Monna]

[kgathaletsa](annoy because of)

- 7(a) [Mosadi] o kgathaletsa Teboho [bana ba sa hlompheing]
 (The woman annoys Teboho because of the disrespectful children)

- (b) [Mosadi] o kgathaletsa Teboho [botahwa bona ba hae]
 (The woman annoys Teboho because of her drunkenness)

The new internal arguments are [bana ba sa hlompheing] which is animate, and [botahwa bona ba hae] which is inanimate. Both arguments are interpreted as cause. The external arguments is [Mosadi]

[hloela](dislike because of)

- 8(a) [Pule] o hloela Teboho [bana ba hae ba utswang]
 (Pule dislikes Teboho because of his children who are stealing)

- (b) [Pule] o hloela Teboho [boshodu bona ba hae]
 (Pule dislikes Teboho because of his stealing)

The new internal arguments are [bana ba hae ba utswang] which is animate, and [boshodu bona ba hae] which is inanimate. Both arguments are interpreted as cause. The external arguments is [Pule]

[nyefolela](insult because of)

9(a) [Monna] o nyefolela mosadi [bana ba seleng]
(The man insults the woman because of the silly children)

(b) [Monna] o nyefolela mosadi [diketso tsa hae tse fosahetseng]
(The man insults the woman because of her wrong deeds)

The new internal arguments are [bana ba seleng] which is animate, and [diketso tsa hae tse fosahetseng] which is inanimate. Both arguments are interpreted as cause. The external arguments is [Monna]

[komotelela](insult for)

10(a) [Pule] o komotelela Sello [Morwesi ya buang mashano ka yena]
(Pule insults Sello for Morwesi telling lies about him)

(b) [Pule] o komotelela Sello [mashano ao a a buang]
(Pule insults Sello for those lies he tells)

The new internal arguments are [Morwesi ya buang mashano ka yena] which is animate, and [mashano ao a a buang] which is inanimate. Both arguments are interpreted as cause. The external arguments is [Pule]

[rohakela](insult because of)

11(a) Ntate] o rohakela mme [bana ba seleng]
(Father insults mother because of silly children)

(b) [Ntate] o rohakela mme [boitshwaro bo hlephileng]
(Father insults mother because of her loose behaviour)

The new internal arguments are [bana ba seleng] which is animate, and [boitshwaro bo hlephileng] which is inanimate. Both arguments are interpreted as cause. The external arguments is [Ntate]

[hlapaolela](insult because of)

12(a) [Mpho] o hlapaolela ngwana [Sello] hobane a mo tshaba.

(Mpho insults Sello for the child because he is afraid of him)

(b) [Mpho] o hlapaolela ngwana [ketso tsa hae tse mpe]

(Mpho insults the child for his bad deeds)

The new internal arguments are [Sello] which is animate, and [ketso tsa hae tse mpe] which is inanimate. Both arguments are interpreted as cause. The external arguments is [Mpho]

[fetsheolela] (insult because of)

13(a) [Monna] o fetsheolela mosadi [ngwana ya seleng]

(The man insults the woman because of the silly children)

(b) [Monna] o fetsheolela mosadi [boitshwaro ba hae bo bobbe]

(The man insults the woman for her bad behaviour)

The new internal arguments are [ngwana ya seleng] which is animate, and [boitshwaro ba hae bo bobbe] which is inanimate. Both arguments are interpreted as cause. The external arguments is [Monna]

[somela](mock for)

14(a) [Ntate] o somela malome [bana ba kulang]

(Father mocks uncle for the children who are sick)

- (b) [Ntate] o somela malome [botswa bona ba hae]
 (Father mocks uncle for his laziness)

The new internal arguments are [bana ba kulang] which is animate, and [botswa bona ba hae] which is inanimate. Both arguments are interpreted as cause. The external arguments is [Ntate]

[phoqela](mock for)

- 15(a) [Dipuo] o phoqela Mosa [ngwana ya sa hlompheng]
 (Dipuo mocks Mosa for the disrespectful child)

- (b) [Dipuo] o phoqela Mosa [mekgwa ya hae e fosahetseng]
 (Dipuo mocks Mosa for her wrong ways)

The new internal arguments are [ngwana ya sa hlompheng] which is animate, and [mekgwa ya hae e fosahetseng] which is inanimate. Both arguments are interpreted as cause. The external arguments is [Dipuo]

[qhesetsa](scorn for)

- 16(a) [Monna] o qhesetsa mosadimoholo [ngwana ya bohlaswa]
 (The man scorns the old woman because of the careless child)

- (b) [Monna] o qhesetsa mosadimoholo [mashano a hae]
 (The man scorns the old woman for her lies)

The new internal arguments are [ngwana ya bohlaswa] which is animate, and [mashano a hae] which is inanimate. Both arguments are interpreted as cause. The external arguments is [Monna]

[nyatsetsa](scold because of)

17(a) [Sello] o nyatsetsa Pule [bana ba hae ba utswang]
(Sello scolds Pule because of his stealing children)

(b) [Sello] o nyatsetsa Pule [dihlapa tsena tsa hae]
(Sello scolds Pule because of his insults)

The new internal arguments are [bana ba hae ba utswang] which is animate, and [dihlapa tsena tsa hae] which is inanimate. Both arguments are interpreted as cause. The external arguments is [Sello]

[kgobela](scold because of)

18(a) [Pule] o kgobela Mpho [Thabo ya seng a hlanya]
(Pule scolds Mpho for Thabo who is now mad)

(b) [Pule] o kgobela Mpho [diketso tsa hae tse mpe]
(Pule scolds Mpho because of his bad deeds)

The new internal arguments are [Thabo ya seng a hlanya] which is animate, and [diketso tsa hae tse mpe] which is inanimate. Both arguments are interpreted as cause. The external arguments is [Pule]

- B.** The following verbs do not appear with the applicative: **nyonya**, **tella**, **tena**, **kgobohela** and **qena**. The following verb **nenela** can be used with the applicative suffix but with a change in meaning as can be seen in the example sentence below:

[nenela](leave aside for)

Mosadi o nenela bana ba botswa thoko.
(The woman rejects lazy children completely)

6.4.2.3 Intransitive verbs

There are four intransitive verbs: **farasela**, **faraseha**, **phatsama** and **hlanya**.

[farasela](be annoyed)

Selection restrictions

This verb may appear with one argument: an external argument which is assigned by the verb phrase. This argument appears as a subject argument with reference of an experiencer of disgust.

[farasela] : [X]
[experiencer]

[Fafa] o ile a farasela ha a fumana papadi e se e qadile.

(Fafa became annoyed when he found that the play has already started)

The external argument is [Fafa] which is the experiencer of disgust.

Selection restrictions

Humans can be disgusted:

[Fafa] o ile a farasela ha a fumana papadi e se e qadile.

(Fafa became annoyed when he found that the play has already started)

Other personified nouns:

[Malawi] e ile ya farasela ha Borithani e hloleha ho tla kopanong.

(Malwai became annoyed when Britain failed to attend the meeting)

Thus, the subject arguments above will have a selection restriction of [humans].

Event structure

This verb indicates an event structure of state. The type of stative predicate is a stage-level predicate because such a state is a non-permanent state of an individual:

$$\text{EVENTSTR} = \left(\begin{array}{l} E_1 = \text{process} \\ E_2 = \text{state} \end{array} \right)$$

Meaning

1. to be annoyed

Fafa o ile a farasela ha a fumana papadi e se e qadile.

(Fafa became annoyed when he found that the play has already started)

2. to hesitate

Ngwana o ile a farasela ha a lokela ho bua.

(The child hesitated when he was supposed to speak)

3. to go from side to side

Monna ya tahlweng o ne a farasela ha a tsamaya.

(The drunken man was going from side to side)

[faraseha](be annoyed because of)

Selection restrictions

This verb may appear with one argument: an external argument which is assigned by the verb phrase. This argument appears as a subject argument with reference of an experiencer of disgust.

[faraseha] : [X]
 [experiencer]

[Mme] o a faraseha ke bana ba sa itlhatsweng.

(Mother becomes annoyed because of the children who does not wash themselves)

The external argument is [Mme] which is the experiencer of disgust.

Selection restrictions

Humans can be disgusted:

[Mme] o a faraseha ke bana ba sa itlhatsweng.

(Mother becomes annoyed because of children who does not wash themselves)

Other personified nouns:

[Malawi] e ile ya faraseha ke ha Borithani e hloleha ho tla kopanong.

(Malwai became annoyed because of the failure of Britain to attend the meeting)

Thus, the subject arguments above will have a selection restriction of [humans].

Event structure

This verb indicates an event structure of state. The type of stative predicate is a stage-level predicate because such a state is a non-permanent state of an individual:

$$\text{EVENTSTR} = \left(\begin{array}{l} E_1 = \text{process} \\ E_2 = \text{state} \end{array} \right)$$

Meaning

1. to be annoyed because of

Mme o a faraseha ke bana ba sa itlhatsweng.

(Mother becomes annoyed because of children who does not wash themselves)

[phatsama](be annoyed)

Selection restrictions

This verb may appear with one argument: an external argument which is assigned by the verb phrase. This argument appears as a subject argument with reference of an experiencer of disgust.

[phatsama] : [X]
[experiencer]

[Malome] o a phatsama ke bana ba sa hlompheng.

(Uncle becomes annoyed because of disrespectful children)

The external argument is [Malome] which is the experiencer of disgust.

Selection restrictions

Humans can be disgusted:

[Malome] o a phatsama ke bana ba sa hlompheng.

(Uncle becomes annoyed because of disrespectful children)

Other personified nouns:

[Malawi] e ile ya phatsama ha Borithani e hloleha ho tla kopanong.

(Malwai became annoyed when Britain failed to attend the meeting)

Thus, the subject arguments above will have a selection restriction of [humans].

Event structure

This verb indicates an event structure of state. The type of stative predicate is a stage-level predicate because such a state is a non-permanent state of an individual:

$$\text{EVENTSTR} = \left(\begin{array}{l} E_1 = \text{process} \\ E_2 = \text{state} \end{array} \right)$$

Meaning

1. to be annoyed

Malome o a phatsama ke bana ba sa hlompheng.

(Uncle becomes annoyed because of disrespectful children)

[hlanya](be mad)

Selection restrictions

This verb may appear with one argument: an external argument which is assigned by the verb phrase. This argument appears as a subject argument with reference of an experiencer of disgust.

[hlanya] : [X]
[experiencer]

[Monna] o a hlanya ha ba bua mosadi wa hae hampe.
(The man becomes mad when they talk badly about his wife)

The external argument is [Monna] which is the experiencer of disgust.

Selection restrictions

Humans can be disgusted:

Monna o a hlanya ha ba bua mosadi wa hae hampe.
(The man becomes mad when they talk badly about his wife)

Other personified nouns:

[Malawi] e ile ya hlanya ha Borithani e hloleha ho tla kopanong.
(Malawi became mad when Britain failed to attend the meeting)

Thus, the subject arguments above will have a selection restriction of [humans].

Event structure

This verb indicates an event structure of state. The type of stative predicate is a stage-level predicate because such a state is a non-permanent state of an individual:

$$\text{EVENTSTR} = \left(\begin{array}{l} E_1 = \text{process} \\ E_2 = \text{state} \end{array} \right)$$

Meaning

1. to be mad

Monna o a hlanya ha ba bua mosadi wa hae hampe.

(The man becomes mad when they talk badly about his wife)

CHAPTER 7: SADNESS

7.1 Aim

The aim of this section will be to determine how the emotion of sadness may be expressed in Sesotho.

7.2 Definition of sadness

The concept of sadness can be defined as the quality or condition of being sad or unhappy, i.e. expressing a state of feeling, showing or causing grief or sorrow.

7.3 Expressions of sadness

There are various fixed expressions of sadness. Such expressions are fixed as verb phrases, i.e. a verb with some NP. Any external argument that may be an experiencer of sadness may appear in the subject position. The expressions of sadness in Sesotho may be divided into five subcategories according to the different meanings or levels of intensity of sadness.

7.3.1 Expressions of grieving

The expressions of grieving can be defined as expressions referring to a deep or intense sorrow or distress, especially at the death of someone. Most of the nouns that appear after verbs in these expressions are the body part [pelo] (heart).

Ho hlomola pelo

The verb [hlomola](make sad) appears with a noun [pelo] (heart), and this can be interpreted as [make sad the heart]. Such an expression will then have the meaning of sadness, i.e. 'to grieve'. Any experiencer of sadness may appear as external argument in the subject position.

- (1) [Bana] ba hlomola pelo kamoo ba hlophehileng ka teng.
(The children make one sad the way they are suffering)

In (1) above, [Bana] (children) is the external argument which is the experiencer of sadness.

Ho palesa pelo

The verb [palesa](blossom) appears with a noun [pelo] (heart), and this can be interpreted as [blossom the heart]. Such an expression will then have the meaning of sadness, i.e. 'to grieve'. Any experiencer of sadness may appear as external argument in the subject position.

- (2) [Monna] o palesa pelo ke lefu la mosadi wa hae.
(The man grieves the death of his wife)

In (2) above, [Monna] (man) is the external argument which is the experiencer of sadness.

Ho hlaba pelo

The verb [hlaba] (spear) appears with a noun [pelo] (heart), and this can be interpreted as [spear the heart]. Such an expression will then have the meaning of sadness, i.e. 'to grieve'. Any experiencer of sadness may appear as external argument in the subject position.

(3) [Malome] o hlajwa pelo ke ka moo ba timetseng ka teng.

(Uncle grieves the way they died)

In (3) above, [Malome] (uncle) is the external argument which is the experiencer of sadness.

7.3.2 Expressions of sadness

The expressions of sadness can be defined as expressions referring to feelings of sorrow or regret, usually caused by loss or disappointment. All the nouns that appear after verbs in these expressions are body parts.

Ho tshera pelo

The verb [tshera] (become lean) appears with a noun [pelo] (heart), and this can be interpreted as [become lean heart]. Such an expression will then have the meaning of sadness, i.e. 'become sad'. Any experiencer of sadness may appear as external argument in the subject position.

(4) [Ngwana] o ile a tshera pelo ha ntja ya hae e shwele.

(The child became sad when his dog died)

In (4) above, [Ngwana] (child) is the external argument which is the experiencer of sadness.

Ho swenya melomo/dinko

The verb [swenya] (contract) appears with a noun [melomo/dinko] (mouths/noses), and this can be interpreted as [contracting mouths/noses]. Such an expression will then have the meaning of sadness, i.e. 'look sad'. Any experiencer of sadness may appear as external argument in the subject position.

(5) [Bana] ba swenya melomo/dinko ha ba utlwa ka tsa kotsi ya batswadi ba bona.

(The children looked sad when they heard about their parents' accident)

In (5) above, [Bana] (children) is the external argument which is the experiencer of sadness.

Pelo e tletse mahloko

The verb [tletse] (full) appears with a noun [mahloko] (pains), and this can be interpreted as [heart is full of pains]. Such an expression will then have the meaning of sadness, i.e. 'one is extremely sad'. Any experiencer of sadness may appear as external argument in the subject position.

(6) [Thabo] pelo e tletse mahloko hobane a shwetswe ke batswadi ka bobedi.

(Thabo is extremely sad because he lost both his parents)

In (6) above, [Thabo] is the external argument which is the experiencer of sadness.

Ho shwela hodimo mahalapeng

The verb [shwela] (die for) with an adverb [hodimo] (high up) appears with an adverb [mahalapeng] (in the palate), and this can be interpreted as [die for high up in the palate]. Such an expression will then have the meaning of sadness, i.e. 'remain silent although sad'. Any experiencer of sadness may appear as external argument in the subject position.

(7) [Monna] o shwela hodimo mahalapeng le ha a shwetswe ke mosadi.

(The man remains silent although sad about his wife's death)

In (7) above, [Monna] (man) is the external argument which is the experiencer of sadness.

7.3.3 Expressions of depression

The expressions of depression can be defined as expressions referring to an emotional state of mind characterised by feelings of gloom and inadequacy, leading to withdrawal.

Ho tana pelo

The verb [tana] (become tired) appears with a noun [pelo] (heart), and this can be interpreted as [become tired heart]. Such an expression will then have the meaning of sadness, i.e. 'to be depressed'. Any experiencer of sadness may appear as external argument in the subject position.

(8) [Palesa] o ile a tana pelo ha a utlwa hore ha a atleha dihlahlobong.

(Palesa became depressed when she heard that she has failed the examinations)

In (8) above, [Palesa] is the external argument which is the experiencer of sadness.

Ho isa pelo mafisa

The verb [isa] (take to) appears with a noun [pelo] (heart) together with a noun [mafisa] (animal), and this can be interpreted as [take heart to animal]. Such an expression will then have the meaning of sadness, i.e. 'become despondent'. Any experiencer of sadness may appear as external argument in the subject position.

(9) O se ke wa isa pelo mafisa le ha o utsweditswe koloi.

(Don't become despondent even though your car is stolen)

In (9) above, the second person is the external argument which is the experiencer of sadness.

7.3.4 Expressions of mourning

The expressions of mourning can be defined as the expressions of deep sorrow, especially for a dead person, by the wearing of solemn dress.

Ho rwala thapo

The verb [rwala] (wear) appears with a noun [thapo] (mourning badge), and this can be interpreted as [wear mourning badge]. Such an expression will then have the meaning of sadness, i.e. 'be in mourning'. Any experiencer of sadness may appear as external argument in the subject position.

(10) [Bana] ba rwala thapo ya batswadi ba bona.

(The children are in mourning for their parents)

In (10) above, [Bana] (children) is the external argument which is the experiencer of sadness.

Ho kgaola thapo

The verb [kgaola] (cut) appears with a noun [thapo] (mourning badge), and this can be interpreted as [cut mourning badge]. Such an expression will then have the meaning of sadness, i.e. 'cease to be in mourning'. Any experiencer of sadness may appear as external argument in the subject position.

(11) [Bana] ba kgaola thapo ya ntata bona.

(The children cease to be in mourning for their deceased father)

In (11) above, [Bana] (children) is the external argument which is the experiencer of sadness.

Ho pheha moyeng

The verb [pheha] (cook) appears with an adverb [moyeng] (in the wind), and this can be interpreted as [cook in the wind]. Such an expression will then have the meaning of sadness, i.e. 'be in mourning'. Any experiencer of sadness may appear as external argument in the subject position.

(12) [Mosadi] o pheha moyeng ha monna a hlokahetse.

(The woman is in mourning when the husband is dead)

In (12) above, [Mosadi] (woman) is the external argument which is the experiencer of sadness.

Ho pheha ka mamina

The verb [pheha] (cook) appears with a prepositional phrase [ka mamina] (with slime), and this can be interpreted as [cook with slime]. Such an expression will then have the meaning of sadness, i.e. 'be in mourning'. Any experiencer of sadness may appear as external argument in the subject position.

(13) [Sello] o pheha ka mamina hobane a shweletswe ke ntatae.

(Sello is in mourning because he has lost his father)

In (13) above, [Sello] is the external argument which is the experiencer of sadness.

Ho dula ka bofifi

The verb [dula] (stay) appears with a prepositional phrase [ka bofifi] (with mourning), and this can be interpreted as [stay with mourning]. Such an expression will then have the meaning of sadness, i.e. 'to mourn'. Any experiencer of sadness may appear as external argument in the subject position.

(14) [Mosadi] o dula ka bofifi ha a shweletswe ke monna.

(The woman mourn the death of her husband)

In (14) above, [Mosadi] (woman) is the external argument which is the experiencer of sadness.

7.3.5 Expressions of pity

The expressions of pity can be defined as expressions referring to a feeling of sorrow for the sufferings and misfortune of others.

Ho utlwela motho bohloko

The verb [utlwela] (feel for) appears with an indirect and direct NP's [motho] (person) and [bohloko] (pain) respectively, and this can be interpreted as [feel for person pain].

Such an expression will then have the meaning of sadness, i.e. 'to feel pity for someone'. Any experiencer of sadness may appear as external argument in the subject position.

(15) [Mosuwe] o utlwela Thabo bohloko ha a lahlehetswe ke buka ya hae.

(The teacher feels pity for Thabo for loosing his book)

In (15) above, [Mosuwe] (teacher) is the external argument which is the experiencer of sadness.

Ho lla letsetse

The verb [lla] (cry) appears with a noun [letsetse] (louse), and this can be interpreted as [cry louse]. Such an expression will then have the meaning of sadness, i.e. 'have pity'. Any experiencer of sadness may appear as external argument in the subject position.

(16) [Thulo] o lla letsetse ka bana ba sa keneng sekolo.

(Thulo has pity for children who are not attending school)

In (16) above, [Thulo] is the external argument which is the experiencer of sadness.

7.4 Interjections of sadness

There is one interjection of sadness:

Hee! (expressing sadness)

Hee, ka tla ka shwellwa ke batswadi ke sa le monyane!

(Hee, I lost my parents while I am still young!)

7.5 Verbs of sadness

The verbs of sadness will be discussed with regard to their semantics and syntax.

7.5.1 The semantics of the verbs of sadness

The verbs of sadness may be divided into the following subcategories depending on the degree of sadness:

Pity

[hauha]

Ke a hauha ha ke bona kamoo ba hlophihileng ka teng.

(I have pity when I see the way they are suffering)

[qenehela]

Ke qenehela bana ba sa atlehang.

(I have pity for the children who did not succeed)

Grieve

[hlokofala]

Ke a hlokofala ha motho a mpua hampe.

(I become grieved when someone talks ill of me)

[fafola]

Ditaba tse bohloko tseo di ile tsa mo fafola.

(That bad news caused him to grieve)

[hwaya]

Lefu la moahisani wa hae le a mo hwaya.

(His neighbour's death grieves him)

Sad

[hlomoha]

Ke a hlomoha ha ke utlwa ka tse bohloko tse mo hlahetseng.

(I become sad when I hear about the sad things that happened to him)

[perama]

Mme o ile a perama ha a utlwa ka tse mpe tse ba hlahetseng.

(Mother became sad when she heard about the bad things that happened to them)

[selebala]

Ke ile ka selebala ha ke utlwa ka lefu la hae.
(I became sad when I heard about his death)

[siama]

Lerato o ile a siama ha ba mmolella ka lefu la Tshepo.
(Lerato became sad when they told her about Tshepo's death)

[swaba]

Kgauta o ile a swaba ha ba mmolella hore ha a atleha dithutong tsa hae.
(Kgauta became sad when they told him that he had failed)

[tana]

Mosadi o ile a tana ha ngwana a hlokahalla matsohong a hae.
(The woman became sad when the child died in her arms)

[sera]

Ke a sera ha ke hopola ka tsa kotsi eo ya koloi.
(I become sad when I remember about that car accident)

[ntshofala]

Ngwana o ile a ntshofala ha a utlwa tse bohloko tseo.
(The child became sad when he heard about the bad news)

[re potlo]

Monna o ile a re potlo ha a utlwela ka lefu la mohatsa hae.

(The man became suddenly sad when he heard about his spouse's death)

[re shwaka]

Hlopheho o ile a re shwaka ha ba mmolella taba tsa hae.

(Hlopheho became sad when they confronted him about his deeds)

Miserable

[hloro]

Ngwana o a hloro ha a setse a le mong.

(The child become unhappy when he is left alone)

[sotofala]

O ile a sotofala kamora phatlalatso ya sephetho.

(He became miserable after the announcement of the results)

[re bothe]

Ntate o ile a re bothe ha a utlwela hore koloi ya hae e utswitswe.

(Father became depressed when he learnt that his car has been stolen)

7.5.2 The syntax of the verbs of sadness

The verbs of sadness may be divided into the following subcategories if one takes their behaviour in syntax into account:

7.5.2.1 Transitive verbs

There are two transitive verbs with the meaning of grieve and one with the meaning of pity: **fafola**, **hwaya** and **qenehela**.

[fafola] (grieve)

Assignment of arguments

This verb assigns two arguments: an external argument which is assigned by the verb phrase and an internal argument which is assigned by the verb. The external argument will be interpreted as cause and the internal argument as experiencer.

[fafola] : [X, Y]
[cause, experiencer]

[Ditaba tse bohloko] di fafola [ngwana]
(That bad news grieved the child)

The external argument is [Ditaba tse bohloko] which is the cause of sadness, and [ngwana] is the internal argument which is the experiencer of sadness.

The verb [fafola] may also be used without an internal argument:

[fafola] : [X]
[cause]

[Ditaba tse bohloko] di a fafola.
(Bad news grieves)

Selection restrictions

Nouns with the features [animate] and [inanimate] may appear as subjects:

[Monna] o fafola ngwana ha a mo hopotsa ka lefu la ntja ya hae.

(The man grieves the child when he reminds him about his dog's death)

[Ditaba tse bohloko] di fafola ngwana.

(That bad news grieves the child)

Nouns with the feature [animate] may appear in the object position:

People > Ditaba tse bohloko di fafola [ngwana]

(That bad news grieves the child)

Animals > Lefu la Tshepo le fafola [ntja ya hae]

(Tshepo's death grieves his dog)

Personified nouns > Ditaba tse bohloko di fafola [Engelane]

(That bad news grieves England)

Event structure

This verb shows two events in its event structure:

Event 1: activity

Event 2: state, i.e. a stage-level state in which a person feels sad.

The event structure may be represented as follows:

$$\text{EVENTSTR} = \left(\begin{array}{l} E_1 = \text{process} \\ E_2 = \text{state} \end{array} \right)$$

Meaning

1. grieve, hurt morally

Ditaba tse bohloko di fafola ngwana.
(That bad news grieves the child)

2. hurt, sprain

Molamu oo o bobebe o tla o fafola letsoho.
(That light stick will sprain your hand)

[hwaya] (grieve)

Assignment of arguments

This verb assigns two arguments: an external argument which is assigned by the verb phrase and an internal argument which is assigned by the verb. The external argument will be interpreted as cause and the internal argument as experiencer.

[hwaya] : [X,Y]
[cause, experiencer]

[Lefu la moahisani wa hae] le hwaya [monna]
(His neighbour's death grieves the man)

The external argument is [Lefu la moahisani wa hae] which is the cause of sadness, and [monna] is the internal argument which is the experiencer of sadness.

The verb [hwaya] may also be used without an internal argument:

[hwaya] : [X]
[cause]

[Lefu la moahisani wa hae] le a hwaya.

(His neighbour's death grieves)

Selection restrictions

Nouns with the features [animate] and [inanimate] may appear as subjects:

[Monna] o hwaya ngwana ha a mo hopotsa ka lefu la ntja ya hae.

(The man grieves the child when he reminds him about his dog's death)

[Lefu la moahisani wa hae] le hwaya monna.

(His neighbour's death grieves the man)

Nouns with the feature [animate] may appear in the object position:

People > Ditaba tse bohloko di hwaya [ngwana]

(That bad news grieves the child)

Animals > Lefu la Tshepo le hwaya [ntja ya hae]

(Tshepo's death grieves his dog)

Personified nouns > Ditaba tse bohloko di hwaya [Engelane]

(That bad news grieves England)

Event structure

This verb shows two events in its event structure:

Event 1: activity

Event 2: state, i.e. a stage-level state in which a person feels sad.

The event structure may be represented as follows:

$$\text{EVENTSTR} = \left(\begin{array}{l} E_1 = \text{process} \\ E_2 = \text{state} \end{array} \right)$$

Meaning

1. grieve

Ditaba tse bohloko di hwaya ngwana.

(That bad news grieves the child)

2. cultivate much

Monna o hwaya masimong.

(The man cultivate much in the fields)

[qenehela] (feel pity for, pity)

Assignment of arguments

This verb assigns two arguments: an external argument which is assigned by the verb phrase and an internal argument which is assigned by the verb. The external argument will be interpreted as cause and the internal argument as experiencer.

[qenehela] : [X, Y]

[experiencer, theme]

[Monna] o qenehela [bana ba sa atlehang]
 (The man feels pity for the children who failed)

The external argument is [Monna] which is the experiencer of sadness, and [bana ba sa atlehang] is the internal argument which is the theme.

Selection restrictions

Only nouns with the feature [animate] may appear as subject:

Humans pity:

[Monna] o qenehela bana ba sa atlehang.
 (The man feels pity for the children who failed)

Animals pity:

[Ntja] e qenehela monga yona ya lemetseng.
 (The dog feels pity for its owner who is hurt)

Other personified nouns:

[Amerika] e qenehela Ethopia e hlophehileng.
 (America feels pity for poor Ethiopia)

Nouns with the feature [animate] may appear in the object position:

People > Ke qenehela [bana ba sa atlehang]
 (I feel pity for the children who did not pass)

Animals > Ke qenehela [kgomo eo monga yona a sa e hlokomeleng]
 (I have pity for the cow that is not cared for by its owner)

Personified nouns > Mandela o qenehela [Ethopia e sotlehileng]

(Mandela feels pity for Ethiopia that is suffering)

Event structure

This verb shows two events in its event structure:

Event 1: activity

Event 2: state, i.e. a stage-level state in which a person feels sad.

The event structure may be represented as follows:

$$\text{EVENTSTR} = \left(\begin{array}{l} E_1 = \text{process} \\ E_2 = \text{state} \end{array} \right)$$

Meaning

1. feel pity for

Monna o qenehela bana ba sa atlehang.

(The man feels pity for the children who did not pass)

2. be unwilling to part with

Ntate o qenehela bana ha a lokela ho ya mosebetsing.

(The father is unwilling to part with his children when he should be going to work)

7.5.2.2 Intransitive verbs

There are ten intransitive verbs: **selebala, siama, swaba, tana, sera, ntshofala, hlora, sotofala, perama** and **hlokofala**.

[selebala] (become sad)

Assignment of arguments

This verb may appear with one argument: an external argument that is assigned by the verb phrase. This argument appears as a subject argument with the reference of an experiencer of sadness.

[selebala] : [X]
 [experiencer]

[Teboho] o ile a selebala ha a utlwa ka tsa lefu la Sello.
 (Teboho became sad when he heard about Sello's death)

The external argument is [Teboho] that is the experiencer of sadness.

Selection restrictions

Humans can be sad:

[Teboho] o ile a selebala ha a utlwa ka tsa lefu la Sello.
 (Teboho became sad when he heard about Sello's death)

Animals can be sad:

[Ntja] e a selebala ha monga yona a e siya e le nngwe.
 (The dog becomes sad when its owner leaves it alone)

Personified nouns:

[Borithani] e ile ya selebala ha e lahlehelwa ke mopresidente wa yona.
 (Britain became sad when she lost her president)

Thus, the subject argument above will have a selection restriction of [animate].

Event structure

This verb indicates an event structure of state. The type of stative predicate is a stage-level predicate because such a state is a non-permanent state of an individual:

$$\text{EVENTSTR} = \left(\begin{array}{l} E_1 = \text{process} \\ E_2 = \text{state} \end{array} \right)$$

Meaning

become sad

Teboho o ile a selebala ha a utlwa ka tsa lefu la Sello.

(Teboho became sad when he heard about Sello's death)

[siama] (be sad)

Assignment of arguments

This verb may appear with one argument: an external argument that is assigned by the verb phrase. This argument appears as a subject argument with the reference of an experiencer of sadness.

[siama] : [X]

[experiencer]

[Lerato] o ile a siama ha ba mmolella ka tsa lefu la Tshepiso.

(Lerato became sad when they told her about Tshepiso's death)

The external argument is [Lerato] that is the experiencer of sadness.

Selection restrictions

Humans can be sad:

[Teboho] o ile a siama ha a utlwa ka tsa lefu la Sello.

(Teboho became sad when he heard about Sello's death)

Animals can be sad:

[Ntja] e ile ya siama ha monga yona a e siya e le nngwe.

(The dog became sad when its owner left it alone)

Personified nouns:

[Borithani] e ile ya siama ha e lahlehelwa ke mopresidente wa yona.

(Britain became sad when she lost her president)

Thus, the subject argument above will have a selection restriction of [animate].

Event structure

This verb indicates an event structure of state. The type of stative predicate is a stage-level predicate because such a state is a non-permanent state of an individual:

$$\text{EVENTSTR} = \left(\begin{array}{l} E_1 = \text{process} \\ E_2 = \text{state} \end{array} \right)$$

Meaning

be sad

Teboho o ile a siama ha a utlwa ka tsa lefu la Sello.

(Teboho became sad when he heard about Sello's death)

[swaba] (be sad)

Assignment of arguments

This verb may appear with one argument: an external argument that is assigned by the verb phrase. This argument appears as a subject argument with the reference of an experiencer of sadness.

[swaba] : [X]

[experiencer]

[Kgauta] o ile a swaba ha ba mmolella hore ha a atleha dithutong tsa hae.

(Kgauta became sad when he learnt that he had failed)

The external argument is [Kgauta] that is the experiencer of sadness.

Selection restrictions

Humans can be sad:

[Kgauta] o ile a swaba ha a utlwa ka tsa lefu la Sello.

(Teboho became sad when he heard about Sello's death)

Animals can be sad:

[Ntja] e a swaba ha monga yona a e siya e le nngwe.
(The dog becomes sad when its owner leaves it alone)

Personified nouns:

[Borithani] e ile ya swaba ha e lahlehelwa ke mopresidente wa yona.
(Britain became sad when she lost her president)

Thus, the subject argument above will have a selection restriction of [animate].

Event structure

This verb indicates an event structure of state. The type of stative predicate is a stage-level predicate because such a state is a non-permanent state of an individual:

$$\text{EVENTSTR} = \left(\begin{array}{l} E_1 = \text{process} \\ E_2 = \text{state} \end{array} \right)$$

Meaning

1. be sad

Kgauta o ile a swaba ha a utlwa ka tsa lefu la Sello.
(Kgauta became sad when he heard about Sello's death)

2. wilt

Semela se a swaba ha se sa tshellwe.
(The plant will wilt if it is not watered)

3. fade (away)

Seaparo se a swaba ha se hlatsuwa kgafetsa.

(The dress fades when it is washed regularly)

[tana] (become sad)**Assignment of arguments**

This verb may appear with one argument: an external argument that is assigned by the verb phrase. This argument appears as a subject argument with the reference of an experiencer of sadness.

[tana] : [X]

[experiencer]

[Mosadi] o ile a tana ha ngwana a hlokahalla matsohong a hae.

(The woman became sad when the child died in her hands)

The external argument is [Mosadi] (woman) which is the experiencer of sadness.

Selection restrictions

Humans can be sad:

[Mosadi] o ile a tana ha a utlwa ka tsa lefu la Sello.

(Teboho became sad when he heard about Sello's death)

Animals can be sad:

[Ntja] e a tana ha monga yona a e siya e le nngwe.

(The dog becomes sad when its owner leaves it alone)

Personified nouns:

[Borithani] e ile ya tana ha e lahlehelwa ke mopresidente wa yona.

(Britain became sad when she lost her president)

Thus, the subject argument above will have a selection restriction of [animate].

Event structure

This verb indicates an event structure of state. The type of stative predicate is a stage-level predicate because such a state is a non-permanent state of an individual:

$$\text{EVENTSTR} = \left(\begin{array}{l} E_1 = \text{process} \\ E_2 = \text{state} \end{array} \right)$$

Meaning

become sad

Teboho o ile a tana ha a utlwa ka tsa lefu la Sello.

(Teboho became sad when he heard about Sello's death)

[sera] (be sad)**Assignment of arguments**

This verb may appear with one argument: an external argument that is assigned by the verb phrase. This argument appears as a subject argument with the reference of an experiencer of sadness.

[sera] : [X]
 [experiencer]

[Ngwana] o a sera ha a hopola ka kotsi eo ya koloi.
 (The child becomes sad when he thinks about that car accident)

The external argument is [Ngwana] (child) which is the experiencer of sadness.

Selection restrictions

Humans can be sad:

[Ngwana] o ile a sera ha a utlwa ka tsa lefu la Sello.
 (The child became sad when he heard about Sello's death)

Animals can be sad:

[Ntja] e a sera ha monga yona a e siya e le nngwe.
 (The dog becomes sad when its owner leaves it alone)

Personified nouns:

[Borithani] e ile ya sera ha e lahlehelwa ke mopresidente wa yona.
 (Britain became sad when she lost her president)

Thus, the subject argument above will have a selection restriction of [animate].

Event structure

This verb indicates an event structure of state. The type of stative predicate is a stage-level predicate because such a state is a non-permanent state of an individual:

$$\text{EVENTSTR} = \left(\begin{array}{l} E_1 = \text{process} \\ E_2 = \text{state} \end{array} \right)$$

Meaning

be sad

Teboho o ile a sera ha a utlwa ka tsa lefu la Sello.

(Teboho became sad when he heard about Sello's death)

[ntshofala] (become sad)

Assignment of arguments

This verb may appear with one argument: an external argument that is assigned by the verb phrase. This argument appears as a subject argument with the reference of an experiencer of sadness.

[ntshofala] : [X]

[experiencer]

[Ngwana] o ile a ntshofala ha a utlwa tse bohloko tseo.

(The child became sad when he heard about the bad news)

The external argument is [Ngwana] (child) which is the experiencer of sadness.

Selection restrictions

Humans can be sad:

[Teboho] o ile a ntshofala ha a utlwa ka tsa lefu la Sello.
(Teboho became sad when he heard about Sello's death)

Animals can be sad:

[Ntja] e a ntshofala ha monga yona a e siya e le nngwe.
(The dog becomes sad when its owner leaves it alone)

Personified nouns:

[Borithani] e ile ya ntshofala ha e lahlehelwa ke mopresidente wa yona.
(Britain became sad when she lost her president)

Thus, the subject argument above will have a selection restriction of [animate].

Event structure

This verb indicates an event structure of state. The type of stative predicate is a stage-level predicate because such a state is a non-permanent state of an individual:

$$\text{EVENTSTR} = \left(\begin{array}{l} E_1 = \text{process} \\ E_2 = \text{state} \end{array} \right)$$

Meaning

become sad

Ngwana o ile a ntshofala ha a utlwa tse bohloko tseo.

(The child became sad when he heard about the bad news)

[hlorā] (be unhappy)**Assignment of arguments**

This verb may appear with one argument: an external argument that is assigned by the verb phrase. This argument appears as a subject argument with the reference of an experiencer of sadness.

[hlorā] : [X]

[experiencer]

[Ngwana] o a hlorā ha a setse a le mong.

(The child becomes unhappy when he is left alone)

The external argument is [Ngwana] (child) which is the experiencer of sadness.

Selection restrictions

Humans can be sad:

[Ngwana] o a hlorā ha a setse a le mong.

(The child becomes unhappy when he is left alone)

Animals can be sad:

[Ntja] e a hlor a ha monga yona a e siya e le nngwe.

(The dog becomes unhappy when its owner leaves it alone)

Personified nouns:

[Borithani] e ile ya hlor a ha e lahlehelwa ke mopresidente wa yona.

(Britain became sad when she lost her president)

Thus, the subject argument above will have a selection restriction of [animate].

Event structure

This verb indicates an event structure of state. The type of stative predicate is a stage-level predicate because such a state is a non-permanent state of an individual:

$$\text{EVENTSTR} = \left(\begin{array}{l} E_1 = \text{process} \\ E_2 = \text{state} \end{array} \right)$$

Meaning

be unhappy

Ngwana o a hlor a ha a setse a le mong.

(The child becomes unhappy when he is left alone)

[sotofala] (become miserable)

Assignment of arguments

This verb may appear with one argument: an external argument that is assigned by the verb phrase. This argument appears as a subject argument with the reference of an experiencer of sadness.

[sotofala] : [X]
 [experiencer]

[Moithuti] o ile a sotofala kamora phatlalatso ya sephetho.

(The learner became miserable after the announcement of the results)

The external argument is [Moithuti] (learner) that is the experiencer of sadness.

Selection restrictions

Humans can be sad:

[Moithuti] o ile a sotofala kamora phatlalatso ya sephetho.

(The learner became miserable after the announcement of results)

Animals can be sad:

[Ntja] e a sotofala ha monga yona a e siya e le nngwe.

(The dog becomes miserable when its owner leaves it alone)

Personified nouns:

[Borithani] e ile ya sotofala ha e lahlehelwa ke mopresidente wa yona.

(Britain became miserable when she lost her president)

Thus, the subject argument above will have a selection restriction of [animate].

Event structure

This verb indicates an event structure of state. The type of stative predicate is a stage-level predicate because such a state is a non-permanent state of an individual:

$$\text{EVENTSTR} = \left(\begin{array}{l} E_1 = \text{process} \\ E_2 = \text{state} \end{array} \right)$$

Meaning

1. become miserable

Moithuti o ile a sotofala kamora phatlalatso ya sephetho.

(The learner became miserable after the announcement of results)

2. unlucky

O tla sotofala ha o sa hlomphe baholo ba hao.

(You will be unlucky if you do not respect your elders)

[perama] (be sad)

Assignment of arguments

This verb may appear with one argument: an external argument that is assigned by the verb phrase. This argument appears as a subject argument with the reference of an experiencer of sadness.

[perama] : [X]
 [experiencer]

[Mme] o ile a perama ha a utlwa ka tse mpe tse ba hlahetseng.

(Mother became sad when she heard about the bad things that happened to them)

The external argument is [Mme] (mother) which is the experiencer of sadness.

Selection restrictions

Humans can be sad:

[Teboho] o ile a perema ha a utlwa ka tsa lefu la Sello.

(Teboho became sad when he heard about Sello's death)

Animals can be sad:

[Ntja] e a perema ha monga yona a e siya e le nngwe.

(The dog becomes sad when its owner leaves it alone)

Personified nouns:

[Borithani] e ile ya perema ha e lahlehelwa ke mopresidente wa yona.

(Britain became sad when she lost her president)

Thus, the subject argument above will have a selection restriction of [animate].

Event structure

This verb indicates an event structure of state. The type of stative predicate is a stage-level predicate because such a state is a non-permanent state of an individual:

$$\text{EVENTSTR} = \left(\begin{array}{l} E_1 = \text{process} \\ E_2 = \text{state} \end{array} \right)$$

Meaning

become sad

Mme o ile a perema ha a utlwa ka tse mpe tse ba hlahetseng.

(Mother became sad when she heard about the bad things that happened to them)

[hlokofala] (be grieved)

Assignment of arguments

This verb may appear with one argument: an external argument that is assigned by the verb phrase. This argument appears as a subject argument with the reference of an experiencer of sadness.

[hlokofala] : [X]
[experiencer]

[Pule] o a hlokofala ha motho a mmuwa hampe.

(Pule becomes grieved when someone talks ill of him)

* The external argument is [Pule] that is the experiencer of sadness.

Selection restrictions

Humans can be sad:

[Teboho] o ile a hlokofala ha a utlwa ka tsa lefu la Sello.
(Teboho became grieved when he heard about Sello's death)

Animals can be sad:

[Ntja] e a hlokofala ha monga yona a e siya e le nngwe.
(The dog becomes grieved when its owner leaves it alone)

Personified nouns:

[Borithani] e ile ya hlokofala ha e lahlehelwa ke mopresidente wa yona.
(Britain became grieved when she lost her president)

Thus, the subject argument above will have a selection restriction of [animate].

Event structure

This verb indicates an event structure of state. The type of stative predicate is a stage-level predicate because such a state is a non-permanent state of an individual:

$$\text{EVENTSTR} = \left(\begin{array}{l} E_1 = \text{process} \\ E_2 = \text{state} \end{array} \right)$$

Meaning

1. be grieved

Pule o a hlokofala ha motho a mmuwa hampe.

(Pule becomes grieved when someone talks ill of him)

2. become sore

Letsoho la hao le tla hlokofala ha o sebetsa nako e telele ka lona.

(Your hand will become sore if you work with it for a long time)

7.5.2.3 Intransitive verbs with the applicative suffix [-el-]

The following intransitive verbs may appear with the applicative suffix [-el-]: **peramela**, **seleballa**, **siamela**, **swabela**, **tanela**, **serela**, **ntshofalla**, **hlorela** and **sotofalla**. In such a case, a new internal argument will be added which is dependent on the presence of [-el-]. In each sentence below, the new argument will be indicated as well as its interpretation. This new argument will be animate as well as inanimate.

[peramela] (be sad about)

[Bana] ba peramela [mosuwe ya tswileng kotsi]

(The children are sad about the teacher who is hurt)

[Monna] o peramela [boitshwaro bo bobo ba ngwana hae]

(The man is sad about his child's bad behaviour)

The new internal arguments are [mosuwe ya tswileng kotsi] which is animate, and [boitshwaro bo bobo ba ngwana hae] which is inanimate. Both arguments are interpreted as theme. The external arguments are [Bana] and [Monna], and they are interpreted as experiencer.

[seleballa] (be sad about)

[Ntai] o seleballa [Kgotso ya hlahetsweng ke tse bohloko]

(Ntai became sad about Kgotso whom bad things had happened to him)

[Ngwana] o seleballa [ketso tse sa lokang tsa ngwanabo]

(The child is sad about his brother's bad actions)

The new internal arguments are [Kgotso ya hlahetsweng ke tse bohloko] which is animate, and [ketso tse sa lokang tsa ngwanabo] which is inanimate. Both arguments are interpreted as theme. The external arguments are [Ntai] and [Ngwana], and they are interpreted as experiencer.

[siamela] (be sad about)

[Botle] o siamela [Fedile ya lahlehetsweng ke batswadi]

(Botle became sad about Fedile who lost her parents)

[Malome] o siamela [boitshwaro ba ngwana hae bo hlephileng]

(Uncle is sad about his child's loose behaviour)

The new internal arguments are [Fedile ya lahlehetsweng ke batswadi] which is animate, and [boitshwaro ba ngwana hae bo hlephileng] which is inanimate. Both arguments are interpreted as theme. The external arguments are [Botle] and [Malome], and they are interpreted as experiencer.

[swabela] (be sad about)

[Mme] o swabela [banana ba itshwereng hampe]

(Mother is sad about the girls' bad behaviour)

[Hadiyo] o swabela [boitshwaro ba hae bo bobo]

(Hadiyo became sad about her bad behaviour)

The new internal arguments are [banana ba itshwereng hampe] which is animate, and [boitshwaro ba hae bo bobe] which is inanimate. Both arguments are interpreted as theme. The external arguments are [Mme] and [Hadiyo], and they are interpreted as experiencer.

[tanela] (be sad about)

[Pule] o tanela [malomae ya tahwang]

(Pule is sad about his uncle's drunkenness)

[Mosadi] o tanela [maitshwaro a monnae a hlephileng]

(The woman becomes sad about her husband's bad behaviour)

The new internal arguments are [malomae ya tahwang] which is animate, and [maitshwaro a monnae a hlephileng] which is inanimate. Both arguments are interpreted as theme. The external arguments are [Pule] and [Mosadi], and they are interpreted as experiencer.

[serela] (be sad about)

[Bana] ba serela [motswalle wa bona ya utswang]

(The children are sad about their friend who steals)

[Monna] o serela [diketso tsa hae tse mpe]

(He is sad about his bad deeds)

The new internal arguments are [motswalle wa bona ya utswang] which is animate, and [diketso tsa hae tse mpe] which is inanimate. Both arguments are interpreted as theme. The external arguments are [Bana] and [Monna], and they are interpreted as experiencer.

[ntshofalla] (be sad about)

[Moshemane] o ntshofalla [kgaitsedi ya hae e botswa]

(The boy is sad about his sister who is lazy)

[Pule] o ntshofalla [diketso tse mpe tsa motswalle wa hae]

Pule is sad about his friend's bad actions)

The new internal arguments are [kgaitsedi ya hae e botswa] which is animate, and [diketso tse mpe tsa motswalle wa hae] which is inanimate. Both arguments are interpreted as theme. The external arguments are [Moshemane] and [Pule], and they are interpreted as experiencer.

[hlorela] (be unhappy about)

[Ngwana] o hlorela [mmae ya kulang sepetlele]

(The child is unhappy about her sick mother in hospital)

[Mosadi] o hlorela [bosiyo ba monna hae]

(The woman is unhappy about her man's absence)

The new internal arguments are [mmae ya kulang sepetlele] which is animate, and [bosiyo ba monna hae] which is inanimate. Both arguments are interpreted as theme. The external arguments are [Ngwana] and [Mosadi], and they are interpreted as experiencer.

[sotofalla] (be miserable about)

[Palesa] o sotofalla [ngwana ya boitshwaro bo bobe]

(Palesa is miserable about the child's bad behaviour)

[Moithuti] o ile a sotofalla [sephetho sa dihlahlobo]

(The learner became miserable about the examination results)

The new internal arguments are [ngwana ya boitshwaro bo bobo] which is animate, and [sephetho sa dihlahlobo] which is inanimate. Both arguments are interpreted as theme. The external arguments are [Palesa] and [Moithuti], and they are interpreted as experiencer.

7.5.2.4 With causative suffix [-is-]

When the causative suffix [-is-] is added onto a verb, the following conditions will be applicable:

- (a) the old external argument will become the new internal argument
- (b) a new external argument will be added
- (c) the new external argument may have the meaning of cause.

[selebatsa] (make sad)

1(a) [Kgotso] o ile a selebala ka tse bohloko tse mo hlahetseng.

(Kgotso became sad about the bad things that happened to him)

(b) [Thato] o selebatsa [Kgotso] ka ho mo hopotsa ka lefu la ngwanabo.

(Thato makes Kgotso sad by reminding him about his brother's death)

The old external argument [Kgotso], which is interpreted as experiencer in 1(a) above, becomes the new internal argument with the same interpretation of experiencer in 1(b) above. The new external argument is [Thato] with the meaning of cause.

[siamisa] (make sad)

2(a) [Lerato] o ile a siama ha ba mmolella ka lefu la Tshepiso.

(Lerato became sad when they told him about Tshepiso's death)

(b) [Monna] o siamisa [Lerato] ka ho mmolella ka lefu la Tshepiso.

(The man makes Lerato sad by telling her about Tshepiso's death)

The old external argument [Lerato], which is interpreted as experiencer in 2(a) above, becomes the new internal argument with the same interpretation of experiencer in 2(b) above. The new external argument is [Monna] with the meaning of cause.

[swabisa] (make sad)

3(a) [Hadiyo] o ile a swaba ha ba mmolella hore ha a atleha dithutong tsa hae.

(Hadiyo became sad when she learnt that she has failed)

(b) [Mosuwe] o swabisa [Hadiyo] ka ho mmolella hore ha a atleha dithutong tsa hae.

(The teacher makes Hadiyo sad by telling her that she has failed)

The old external argument [Hadiyo], which is interpreted as experiencer in 3(a) above, becomes the new internal argument with the same interpretation of experiencer in 3(b) above. The new external argument is [Mosuwe] with the meaning of cause.

[tantsha] (make sad)

4(a) [Mosadi] o ile a tana ha ngwana a hlokahalla matsohong a hae.

(The woman became sad when the child died in her arms)

(b) [Monna] o tantsha [mosadi] ka ho mo hopotsa hore ngwana o hlokahalletse matsohong a hae.

(The man makes the woman sad by reminding her that the child has died in her arms)

The old external argument [Mosadi], which is interpreted as experiencer in 4(a) above, becomes the new internal argument with the same interpretation of experiencer in 4(b) above. The new external argument is [Monna] with the meaning of cause.

[serisa] (make sad)

5(a) [Pule] o a sera ha a hopola ka tsa kotsi eo ya koloi.

(Pule becomes sad when he thinks about that car accident)

(b) [Thabo] o serisa [Pule] ka ho mo hopotsa ka tsa kotsi ya koloi.

(Thabo makes Pule sad by reminding him about the car accident)

The old external argument [Pule], which is interpreted as experiencer in 5(a) above, becomes the new internal argument with the same interpretation of experiencer in 5(b) above. The new external argument is [Thabo] with the meaning of cause.

[ntshofatsa] (make sad)

6(a) [Ngwana] o ile a ntshofala ha a utlwa tse bohloko tseo.

(The child became sad when he heard about the bad news)

(b) [Malome] o ntshofatsa [ngwana] ka ho mmolella tse bohloko.

(Uncle makes the child sad by telling him the bad things)

The old external argument [Ngwana], which is interpreted as experiencer in 6(a) above, becomes the new internal argument with the same interpretation of experiencer in 6(b) above. The new external argument is [Malome] with the meaning of cause.

[hlorisa] (make unhappy)

7(a) [Ngwana] o a hlorisa ha a setse a le mong.

(The child becomes unhappy when he is left alone)

(b) [Mpho] o hlorisa [ngwana] ka ho mo siya a le mong hae.

(Mpho makes the child unhappy by leaving him alone at home)

The old external argument [Ngwana], which is interpreted as experiencer in 7(a) above, becomes the new internal argument with the same interpretation of experiencer in 7(b) above. The new external argument is [Mpho] with the meaning of cause.

[sotofatsa] (make miserable)

8(a) [Moithuti] o ile a sotofala kamora phatlalatso ya sephetho.

(The learner became miserable after the announcement of results)

(b) [Mosuwe] o sotofatsa [moithuti] ka ho mmolella hore ha a atleha.

(The teacher makes the learner miserable by telling him that he has failed)

The old external argument [Moithuti], which is interpreted as experiencer in 8(a) above, becomes the new internal argument with the same interpretation of experiencer in 8(b) above. The new external argument is [Mosuwe] with the meaning of cause.

[hlokofatsa] (grieve for)

9(a) [Bana] ba a hlokofala ha ba hopola ka lefu la mma bona.

(The children become grieved when they think about their mother's death)

(b) [Monna] o hlokofatsa [bana] ka ho ba hopotsa ka lefu la mma bona.

(The man grieves the children by reminding them about their mother's death)

The old external argument [Bana], which is interpreted as experiencer in 9(a) above, becomes the new internal argument with the same interpretation of experiencer in 9(b) above. The new external argument is [Monna] with the meaning of cause.

7.5.2.5 Intransitive ideophones

There are three intransitive ideophones that express sadness, i.e. **potlo**, **shwaka** and **bothe**.

Assignment of arguments

The above ideophones have to appear with the verb **re** which accepts the inflection of the verb: **re potlo**(be sad suddenly), **re shwaka**(be sad) and **re bothe**(be depressed).

The ideophone itself will assign the argument. In this case only an external argument is assigned which has the reference of an experiencer of sadness.

[re potlo] : [X]
[experiencer]

[Monna] o ile a re potlo ha a utlwela ka tsa lefu la mohatsa hae.
(The man became sad suddenly when he heard about his wife's death)

The external argument is [Monna](man) which has the reference of an experiencer of sadness.

[re shwaka] : [X]
[experiencer]

[Hlopheho] o ile a re shwaka ha ba mmolella taba tsa hae.
(Hlopheho became sad when they confronted him about his deeds)

The external argument is [Hlopheho] which has the reference of an experiencer of sadness.

[re bothe] : [X]
[experiencer]

[Ntate] o ile a re bothe ha a utlwa hore koloi ya hae e utswitswe.
(Father became depressed when he learnt that his car has been stolen)

The external argument is [Ntate](father) which has the reference of an experiencer of sadness.

Selection restrictions

The subject arguments of the three ideophones will have a selection restriction of [animate].

[re potlo] (be sad suddenly)

Humans can be sad suddenly:

[Monna] o ile a re potlo ha a utlwela ka lefu la mohatsa hae.
(The man became sad suddenly when he heard about his wife's death)

Animals can be sad suddenly:

[Ntja] e ile ya re potlo ha monga yona a tsamaya.
(The dog became sad suddenly when its owner left)

Personified nouns:

[Borithani] e ile ya re potlo ha e lahlehelwa ke mopresidente wa yona.
(Britain became sad suddenly when she lost her president)

[re shwaka] (be sad)

Humans can be sad:

[Hlopheho] o ile a re shwaka ha ba mmolella taba tsa hae.
(Hlopheho became sad when they confronted him about his deeds)

Animals can be sad:

[Ntja] e ile ya re shwaka ha monga yona a tsamaya.
(The dog became sad when its owner left)

Personified nouns:

[Borithani] e ile ya re shwaka ha e lahlehelwa ke mopresidente wa yona.
(Britain became sad when she lost her president)

[re bothe] (be depressed)

Humans can be depressed:

[Ntate] o ile a re bothe ha a utlwa hore koloi ya hae e utswitswe.
(Father became depressed when he heard that his car has been stolen)

Animals can be depressed:

[Ntja] e ile ya re bothe ha monga yona a tsamaya.
(The dog became depressed when its owner left)

Personified nouns:

[Borithani] e ile ya re bothe ha e lahlehelwa ke mopresidente wa yona.
(Britain became depressed when she lost her president)

Event structure

The three ideophones indicates an event structure of state. The type of stative predicate is a stage-level predicate because such states are non-permanent states of individuals:

$$\text{EVENTSTR} = \left(\begin{array}{l} E_1 = \text{process} \\ E_2 = \text{state} \end{array} \right)$$

Meaning

[re potlo]

1. be sad suddenly

Monna o ile a re potlo ha a utlwela ka lefu la mohatsa hae.

(The man became sad suddenly when he heard about his wife's death)

2. wither

Dipalesa di ile tsa re potlo ke ho hloka metsi.

(The flowers withered due to lack of water)

[re shwaka]

1. be sad

Hlopheho o ile a re shwaka ha ba mmolella taba tsa hae.

(Hlopheho became sad when they confronted him about his deeds)

2. seize

Lepolesa le ile la re shwaka leshodu le neng le baleha.

(The policeman seized the thief that was running away)

[re bothe]

1. become depressed

Ntate o ile a re bothe ha a utlwela hore koloi ya hae e utswitswe.

(Father became depressed when he heard that his car has been stolen)

2. form a depression

Hloho ya mmutlanyana e ile ya re bothe ha monna a e otlala ka koto.

(The head of the hare formed a depression when the man hit it with a knobkierie)

7.5.2.6 Derived verbs from ideophones

With the applicative

The verb **shwaka** may appear with the applicative suffix [-el-]. In such a case, a new internal argument will be added which is dependent on the presence of [-el-]. The derived verb will then be **shwak-el-**. In the sentences below, the new argument will be indicated as well as its interpretation. This new argument will be animate as well as inanimate.

[shwakela] (be sad about)

Mosadi o shwakela [bana ba lahlehetsweng ke batswadi].

(The woman is sad about the children who lost their parents)

Teboho o shwakela [mekgwa e mebe ya ngwanabo].

(Teboho becomes sad about his brother's bad behaviour)

The new internal arguments are [bana ba lahlehetsweng ke batswadi] and [mekgwa e mebe ya ngwanabo], and they are animate and inanimate respectively. They are both interpreted as theme.

With the neuter

The neuter suffix [-h-] may be added onto the intransitive ideophone. The meaning of the external argument will remain the same: experiencer of sadness. The derived verb is **bothe-h-**.

[re bothe], [botheha]

Ntate o ile a [re bothe] ha a utlwa hore koloi ya hae e utswitswe.

(Father became depressed when he heard that his car has been stolen)

Ntate o ile a [botheha] ha a utlwa hore koloi ya hae e utswitswe.

(Father became depressed when he heard that his car has been stolen)

The external argument [Ntate] in both the sentences remains the same with the meaning of the experiencer of sadness.

7.5.2.7 Transitive/Intransitive alternation

[hauha] and [hauha]

The verbs **hauha** and **hauha** exemplify regular alternation as intransitive and transitive verbs, linked to the occurrence of the verbal derivational suffixes [-h-] and [-l-] respectively.

Consider the following example sentences:

(1) [Morwesi] o hauha [ngwana].

(Morwesi causes the child to feel pity)

(2) [Ngwana] o a hauha.

(The child has pity)

The transitive suffix [-l-] in the verb [hauha] in sentence (1) above bears the semantic feature causative, whereas the intransitive suffix [-h-] in the verb **hauha** in sentence (2) above has anticausative semantic feature.

The deep structure of sentence (1) above is as follows:

- (3) [NP] INFL [VP -hauha Morwesi ngwana]
 ‘feel pity to’ ‘Morwesi’ ‘child’

By moving the agent argument [Morwesi] to the subject position, we arrive at the following S-structure representation:

- (4) [Morwesi] INFL [VP -hauha t_i ngwana]
 ‘Morwesi’ ‘feel pity for’ ‘child’

The transitive suffix [-l-] bears causative assignment features, thus it assigns case to the experiencer [ngwana].

The deep structure of sentence (2) above is as follows:

- (5) [NP] INFL [VP -hauha ngwana]
 ‘have pity’ ‘child’

The patient object argument [ngwana] is moved to the subject position where it can be assigned nominative case by the agreement element of inflection, as shown in the S-structure below:

- (6) [Ngwana_i] INFL [VP -hauha t_i]
 ‘child’ ‘have pity’

The intransitive suffix [-h-] suppresses the agent argument and prevents it from occurring; i.e. the intransitive suffix lacks case assignment features.

[hlomoha] and [hlomola]

The verbs **hlomoha** and [hlomola] exemplify regular alternation as intransitive and transitive verbs, linked to the occurrence of the verbal derivational suffixes [-h-] and [-l-] respectively.

Consider the following example sentences:

(7) [Karabelo] o hlomola [batho].

(Karabelo makes people sad)

(8) [Thabo] o a hlomoha.

(Thabo become sad)

The intransitive suffix [-l-] in the verb **hlomola** in sentence (7) above bears the semantic feature of causative, whereas the intransitive suffix [-h-] in the verb **hlomoha** in sentence (8) above has anticausative semantic feature.

The deep structure of sentence (7) above is as follows:

(9) [NP] INFL [VP-hlomola Karabelo batho]
 ‘make sad’ ‘Karabelo’ ‘people’

By moving the agent argument [Karabelo] to the subject position, we arrive at the following S-structure representation:

(10) [Karabelo] INFL [VP hlomola t_i batho]
 ‘Karabelo’ ‘make sad’ ‘people’

The transitive suffix [-l-] bears causative case assignment features, thus it assigns case to the experiencer [batho].

The deep structure of sentence (8) above is as follows:

- (11) [_{NP}] INFL [_{VP} -hlomoha Thabo]
 ‘be sad’ ‘Thabo’

The patient object argument [Thabo] is moved to the subject position where it can be assigned nominative case by the agreement element of inflection, as shown in the S-structure below:

- (12) [Thabo_i] INFL [_{VP} -hlomoha t_i]
 ‘Thabo’ ‘be sad’

The intransitive suffix [-h-] suppresses the agent argument and prevents it from occurring, i.e. the intransitive suffix lacks case assignment features.

With applicative

The verbs **hauha** and **hlomoha** may appear with the applicative suffix [-el-]. In such a case, a new internal argument will be added which is dependent on the presence of [-el-]. In each sentence below, the new argument will be indicated as well as its interpretation. This new argument will be animate as well as inanimate.

[hauhela]

Ke hauhela [batho ba hlophehileng].

(I have pity for poor people)

Monna o hauhela [koloi e sa hlokomelweng]

(The man has pity for the unkept car)

The new internal arguments are [batho ba hlophehileng] and [koloi e sa hlokomelweng] and they are animate and inanimate respectively. They are both interpreted as theme.

[hlomohela]

Ke hlomohela [Thabiso] ka lefu la ntatae.

(I am sad about the death of Thabiso's father)

Monna o hlomohela [koloji e sa hlokomelweng].

(The man is sad about the unkept car)

The new internal arguments are [Thabiso] and [koloji e sa hlokomelweng] and they are animate and inanimate respectively. They are both interpreted as theme.

CHAPTER 8: FEAR

8.1 Aim

The aim of this section will be to determine how the emotion of fear may be expressed in Sesotho.

8.2 Definition of fear

The concept of fear can be defined as a painful emotion excited by danger, usually leading to a desire to run away from the person or thing causing it.

8.3 Expressions of fear

There are various fixed expressions of fear. Such expressions are fixed as verb phrases, i.e. a verb with some NP. Any external argument that may be an experiencer of fear may appear in the subject position. Most of the nouns that appear after verbs in these expressions are body parts with the exception of one, i.e. [ditaba] (news):

Ho feha mahlo

The verb [feha] (hang) appears with a noun [mahlo] (eyes), and this can be interpreted as [hang the eyes]. Such an expression will then have the meaning of fear, i.e. 'be frightened'. Any experiencer of fear may appear as external argument in the subject position.

(1) [Bana] ba ile ba feha mahlo ha ba bona noha.

(The children became frightened when they saw the snake)

In (1) above, [Bana] (children) is the external argument which is the experiencer of fear.

Ho feha matshwafo

The verb [feha] (hang) appears with a noun [matshwafo] (lungs), and this can be interpreted as [hang the lungs]. Such an expression will then have the meaning of fear, i.e. 'be frightened'. Any experiencer of fear may appear as external argument in the subject position.

(2) [Teboho] o ile a feha matshwafo ha a bona tau.

(Teboho became frightened when he saw the lion)

In (2) above, [Teboho] is the external argument which is the experiencer of fear.

Ho feroha matshwafo

The verb [feroha] (be nauseous) appears with a noun [matshwafo] (lungs), and this can be interpreted as [be nauseous the lungs]. Such an expression will then have the meaning of fear, i.e. 'be frightened'. Any experiencer of fear may appear as external argument in the subject position.

(3) [Ngwana] o ile a feroha matshwafo ha ba mo tshosa ka tweba.

(The child became frightened when they frightened him with a mouse)

In (3) above, [Ngwana] (child) is the external argument which is the experiencer of fear.

Ho kgofoha matshwafo

The verb [kgofoha] (take out whole) appears with a noun [matshwafo] (lungs), and this can be interpreted as [take out the whole lungs]. Such an expression will then have the meaning of fear, i.e. 'be frightened'. Any experiencer of fear may appear as external argument in the subject position.

- (4) [Morwesi] o ile a kgofoha matshwafo ha a bona sekgo.
(Morwesi became frightened when she saw the spider)

In (4) above, [Morwesi] is the external argument which is the experiencer of fear.

Ho haroha letswalo

The verb [haroha] (become torn) appears with a noun [letswalo] (diaphragm), and this can be interpreted as [become torn the diaphragm]. Such an expression will then have the meaning of fear, i.e. 'be frightened'. Any experiencer of fear may appear as external argument in the subject position.

- (5) [Bana] ba tla haroha letswalo ha ba ka bona sebata seo.
(The children will be frightened when they could see that beast)

In (5) above, [Bana] (children) is the external argument which is the experiencer of fear.

Ho qata mohatla

The verb [qata] (to tighten) appears with a noun [mohatla] (tail), and this can be interpreted as [tighten the tail]. Such an expression will then have the meaning of fear,

i.e. 'be afraid'. Any experiencer of fear may appear as external argument in the subject position.

(6) [Pulane] o ile a qata mohatla ha a bona mashodu a mo atamela.

(Pulane became afraid when she saw the thieves approaching her)

In (6) above, [Pulane] is the external argument which is the experiencer of fear.

Ho rwala mahlo

The verb [rwala] (to carry) appears with a noun [mahlo] (eyes), and this can be interpreted as [carry the eyes]. Such an expression will then have the meaning of fear, i.e. 'be frightened'. Any experiencer of fear may appear as external argument in the subject position.

(7) [Ditsomi] di ile tsa rwala mahlo ha di bona tau e hlaha.

(The hunters became frightened when they saw the lion appear)

In (7) above, [Ditsomi] (hunters) is the external argument which is the experiencer of fear.

Ho sidila ditaba

The verb [sidila] (rub) appears with a noun [ditaba] (news), and this can be interpreted as [rub news]. Such an expression will then have the meaning of fear, i.e. 'be afraid of speaking out'. Any experiencer of fear may appear as external argument in the subject position.

(8) [Sello] o ile a sidila ditaba ha a lokela ho fereha Puleng.

(Sello became afraid of speaking out when he was supposed to court Puleng)

In (8) above, [Sello] is the external argument which is the experiencer of fear.

8.4 Verbs of fear

The verbs of fear will be discussed with regard to their semantics and syntax.

8.4.1 The semantics of the verbs of fear

The verbs of fear may be divided into the following categories depending on the degree of fear which is experienced by a person:

Fear

[tshaba]

Lehana o tshaba noha.

(Lehana is afraid of the snake)

[tshoha]

Ke tshoha noha ha ke e bona.

(I fear a snake when I see it)

[qwaya]

Ke qwaya ntja e bohale.

(I fear a fierce dog)

To be afraid or frightened

[perema]

Mpho o ile a perema ha a bona tau.

(Mpho became afraid when he saw the lion)

[neneta]

Bereng o ile a neneta ha a mpona.
(Bereng took fright when he saw me)

[qwatsama]

Ke a qwatsama ha ke bona noha.
(I become afraid when I see a snake)

[tsitloha]

O ile a tsitloha ha sekgo se hlaha mona pela hae)
(He became frightened when the spider appeared near him)

[tshoha]

Ngwana o ile a tshoha ha a bona noha.
(The child became frightened when he saw the snake)

To tremble with fright

[tetema]

Ngwana o ile a tetema ha ba mo bontsha noha.
(The child trembled with fright when they showed him the snake)

[thothomela]

Banna ba ile ba thothomela ha ba bona sebata)
(The men trembled when they saw the snake)

[tlakasela]

Leshodu le ile la tlakasela ha le utlwa hore mapolesa a ntse a le batla.

(The thief trembled when he heard that the police are still looking for him)

To jump in fright

[qetsema]

O ile a qetsema ha a bona sekgo.

(He jumped in fright when he saw the spider)

To be startled

[nyaroha]

Thabo o ile a nyaroha ha a bona ngwana a tjheleng.

(Thabo was startled when he saw the burnt child)

[hlasimoloha]

Mme o ile a hlasimoloha ha a bona senqanqane.

(Mother was startled when she saw the frog)

8.4.2 The syntax of the verbs of fear

The verbs of fear may be divided into the following subcategories if one takes their behaviour in syntax into account:

8.4.2.1 Transitive verbs

There are three transitive verbs with the meaning of fear and one with the meaning of frightening: **tshaba**, **tshoha**, **qwaya** and **nonosa**.

[tshaba] (fear)**Assignment of arguments**

This verb assigns two arguments: an external argument which is assigned by the verb phrase and an internal argument which is assigned by the verb. The external argument will be interpreted as experiencer and the internal argument as theme.

[tshaba] : [X; Y]
 [experiencer, theme]

[Lehana] o tshaba [noha].
 (Lehana is afraid of the snake)

[Lehana] is the external argument which is the experiencer of fear, and [noha] is the internal argument which is the theme.

The verb **tshaba** may also be used without an internal argument:

[tshaba]: [X]
 [experiencer]

[Monna] o a tshaba.
 (The man is afraid)

Selection restrictions

Only nouns with the feature [animate] may appear as subject.

Humans can fear:

[Monna] o tshaba tau.

(The man is afraid of the lion)

Animals can fear:

[Katse] e tshaba tau.

(The cat is afraid of the lion)

Other personified nouns:

[Malawi] e tshaba Amerika hobane e le matla.

(Malawi is afraid of America because she is strong)

Nouns with the features [animate] and [inanimate] may appear in the object position:

People > Ngwana o tshaba [batho ba baholo]

(The child is afraid of adults)

Animals > Ngwana o tshaba [ntja]

(The child is afraid of the dog)

Objects > Ngwana o tshaba [terene]

(The child is afraid of the train)

Event structure

This verb shows two events in its event structure:

Event 1: activity

Event 2: state, i.e. a stage-level state in which a person feels afraid.

The event structure may be represented as follows:

$$\text{EVENTSTR} = \left(\begin{array}{l} E_1 = \text{process} \\ E_2 = \text{state} \end{array} \right)$$

Meaning

1. fear, be afraid of

Ngwana o tshaba noha.

(The child is afraid of the snake)

[tshoha] (fear)

Assignment of arguments

This verb assigns two arguments: an external argument which is assigned by the verb phrase and an internal argument which is assigned by the verb. The external argument will be interpreted as experiencer and the internal argument as theme.

[tshoha] : [X; Y]

[experiencer, theme]

[Ngwana] o tshoha [noha] ha a e bona.

(The child is afraid of the snake when he sees it)

[Ngwana] is the external argument that is the experiencer of fear, and [noha] is the internal argument which is the theme.

The verb **tshoha** may also be used without an internal argument:

[tshoha]: [X]
[experiencer]

[Monna] o a tshoha.
(The man is afraid)

Selection restrictions

Only nouns with the feature [animate] may appear as subject.

Humans can fear:

[Ngwana] o tshoha noha.
(The child fears a snake)

Animals can fear:

[Ntja] e tshoha tau.
(The dog fears the lion)

Other personified nouns:

[Malawi] e tshoha ha Burundi e reka dibetsa tse ntjha.
(Malawi became afraid when Burundi bought new weapons)

Nouns with the features [animate] and [inanimate] may appear in the object position:

People > Monna o tshoha [batho ba utswang]
(The man fears people who steal)

Animals > Monna o tshoha [tau]
 (The man fears the lion)

Objects > Monna o tshoha [sethunya]
 (The man is afraid of a gun)

Event structure

This verb shows two events in its event structure:

Event 1: activity

Event 2: state, i.e. a stage-level state in which a person feels afraid.

The event structure may be represented as follows:

$$\text{EVENTSTR} = \left(\begin{array}{l} E_1 = \text{process} \\ E_2 = \text{state} \end{array} \right)$$

Meaning

1. fear, be afraid of

Malefu o tshoha noha e kgolo.
 (Malefu is afraid of a big snake)

[qwaya] (fear)**Assignment of arguments**

This verb assigns two arguments: an external argument which is assigned by the verb phrase and an internal argument which is assigned by the verb. The external argument will be interpreted as experiencer and the internal argument as theme.

[qwaya] : [X; Y]
 [experiencer, theme]

[Teboho] o qwaya [ntja e bohale].
 (Teboho fears a fierce dog)

[Teboho] is the external argument that is the experiencer of fear, and [ntja e bohale] is the internal argument which is the theme.

The verb **qwaya** may also be used without an internal argument:

[qwaya]: [X]
 [experiencer]

[Teboho] o a qwaya.
 (Teboho is afraid)

Selection restrictions

Only nouns with the feature [animate] may appear as subject:

Humans can fear:

[Mosadi] o qwaya ntja.
 (The woman is afraid of the dog)

Animals can fear:

[Katse] e qwaya ntja.

(The cat is afraid of the dog)

Other personified nouns:

[Kenya] e qwaya Afrika Borwa.

(Kenya is afraid of South Africa)

Nouns with the features [animate] and [inanimate] may appear in the object position:

People > Mosadi o qwaya [monna ya bohale]

(The woman is afraid of an angry man)

Animals > Mosadi o qwaya [tau]

(The woman is afraid of the lion)

Objects > Mosadi o qwaya [lefifi]

(The woman is afraid of the dark)

Event structure

This verb shows two events in its event structure:

Event 1: activity

Event 2: state, i.e. a stage-level state in which a person feels afraid.

The event structure may be represented as follows:

$$\text{EVENTSTR} = \left(\begin{array}{l} E_1 = \text{process} \\ E_2 = \text{state} \end{array} \right)$$

Meaning

1. fear, be afraid of

Teboho o qwaya ntja e bohale.

(Teboho fears a fierce dog)

2. look out, be on one's guard

Mapolesa a qwaya mashodu a thobileng tjhankaneng.

(The police are on the look out for escaped thieves)

[nonosa] (frighten)

Assignment of arguments

This verb assigns two arguments: an external argument which is assigned by the verb phrase and an internal argument which is assigned by the verb. The external argument will be interpreted as agent and the internal argument as experiencer.

[nonosa] : [X; Y]

[agent, experiencer]

[Ntate] o nonosa [bana ba robalang bosiu]

(Father frightens the children who sleep late)

[Ntate] is the external argument that is the agent of frightening, and [bana ba robalang bosiu] is the internal argument which is the experiencer of fright.

Selection restrictions

Only nouns with the feature [animate] may appear as subject.

Humans can fear:

[Ntate] o nonosa bana ba robalang bosiu.

(Father frightens the children who sleep late)

Animals can fear:

[Katse] e nonosa dinonyana tshimong.

(The cat frightens the birds in the garden)

Other personified nouns:

[Zimbabwe] e nonosa Borithani ka hore e tla bolaya borapolasi.

(Zimbabwe frightens Britain by saying that she will kill the farmers)

Nouns with the features [animate] may appear in the object position:

People > Monna o nonosa [bana]

(The man frightens the children)

Animals > Monna o nonosa [katse]

(The man frightens the cat)

Personified nouns > Baferekanyi ba nonosa [Amerika] ka bomo ya athomo.

(The communists frightens America with an atomic bomb)

Event structure

This verb shows two events in its event structure:

Event 1: activity

Event 2: state, i.e. a stage-level state in which a person feels afraid.

The event structure may be represented as follows:

$$\text{EVENTSTR} = \left(\begin{array}{l} E_1 = \text{process} \\ E_2 = \text{state} \end{array} \right)$$

Meaning

1. frighten, scare

Ntate o nonosa bana ba robalang bosiu.

(Father frightens the children who sleep late)

8.4.2.2 Intransitive verbs with derivations

There are seven intransitive verbs with derivations that expresses fear, i.e. **tetema**, **thothomela**, **tlakasela**, **perema**, **neneta**, **qwatsama** and **qetsema**. The intransitive verbs will be treated below after which the applicative and causative derivation will follow.

[tetema] (tremble with fright)

Assignment of arguments

This verb may appear with one argument: an external argument that is assigned by the verb phrase. This argument appears as a subject argument with the reference of an experiencer of fear.

[tetema] : [X]

[experiencer]

[Teboho] o ile a tetema ha ba mo bontsha noha.

(Teboho trembled with fright when they showed him the snake)

The external argument is [Teboho] which is the experiencer of fear.

Selection restrictions

Humans can fear:

[Teboho] o ile a tetema ha a bona tau.

(Teboho trembled with fright when he saw the lion)

Animals can fear:

[Katse] e a tetema ha e bona ntja.

(The cat trembles with fright when it sees the dog)

Other personified nouns:

[Amerika] e ile ya tetema ha e bona dibetsa tsa Jeremane.

(America trembled with fright when she saw Germany's arsenal)

Thus, the subject arguments above will have a selection restriction of [animate].

Event structure

This verb indicates an event structure of state. The type of stative predicate is a stage-level predicate because such a state is a non-permanent state of an individual:

$$\text{EVENTSTR} = \left(\begin{array}{l} E_1 = \text{process} \\ E_2 = \text{state} \end{array} \right)$$

Meaning

1. shake, tremble

O ile a tetema ha a bona noha.

(He trembled with fright when he saw the snake)

2. soft, tender

Mosadi o phehile nama e tetemang.

(The woman cooked tender meat)

[thothomela] (tremble with fright)

Assignment of arguments

This verb may appear with one argument: an external argument that is assigned by the verb phrase. This argument appears as a subject argument with the reference of an experiencer of fear.

[thothomela] : [X]
 [experiencer]

[Banna] ba ile ba thothomela ha ba bona sebata.
 (The men trembled with fright when they saw the beast)

The external argument is [Banna] which is the experiencer of fear.

Selection restrictions

Humans can fear:

[Ngwana] o ile a thothomela ha ntja e hlaha.
 (The child trembled with fright when the dog appeared)

Animals can fear:

[Nyamatsane] e a thothomela ha e bona tau.
 (The antelope trembles with fright when it sees the lion)

Other personified nouns:

[Lesotho] le a thothomela ha Afrika Borwa e halefile.
 (Basutoland trembles with fright when South Africa is angry)

Thus, the subject arguments above will have a selection restriction of [animate].

Event structure

This verb indicates an event structure of state. The type of stative predicate is a stage-level predicate because such a state is a non-permanent state of an individual:

$$\text{EVENTSTR} = \left(\begin{array}{l} E_1 = \text{process} \\ E_2 = \text{state} \end{array} \right)$$

Meaning

1. tremble

Ngwana o a thothomela ha a bona ntja.

(The child trembles with fright when he sees a dog)

2. become angry

Monna o ne a thothomela ke kgalefo.

(The man was trembling with anger)

[tlakasela] (tremble)

Assignment of arguments

This verb may appear with one argument: an external argument that is assigned by the verb phrase. This argument appears as a subject argument with the reference of an experiencer of fear.

[tlakasela] : [X]

[experiencer]

[Leshodu] le ile la tlakasela ha le utlwa hore mapolesa a ntse a le batla.

(The thief trembled when he heard that the police are still looking for him)

The external argument is [Leshodu] which is the experiencer of fear.

Selection restrictions

Humans can fear:

[Ngwana] o a tlakasela ha a bona tau.

(The child trembles when he sees the lion)

Animals can fear:

[Nyamatsane] e a tlakasela ha e bona tau.

(The antelope trembles when it sees the lion)

Other personified nouns:

[Zambia] e a tlakasela ha Afrika Borwa e e tshosa.

(Zambia trembles when South Africa threatens her)

Thus, the subject arguments above will have a selection restriction of [animate].

Event structure

This verb indicates an event structure of state. The type of stative predicate is a stage-level predicate because such a state is a non-permanent state of an individual:

$$\text{EVENTSTR} = \left(\begin{array}{l} E_1 = \text{process} \\ E_2 = \text{state} \end{array} \right)$$

Meaning

1. tremble, shake, shiver, shudder

Ngwana o ile a tlakasela ha ntja e hlaha.

(The child trembled when the dog appeared)

2. hover

Nonyana e ne e ntse e tlakasela sefateng.

(The bird was moving about near the tree)

[perema] (afraid)

Assignment of arguments

This verb may appear with one argument: an external argument that is assigned by the verb phrase. This argument appears as a subject argument with the reference of an experiencer of fear.

[perema] : [X]

[experiencer]

[Mpho] o ile a perema ha a bona tau.

(Mpho became afraid when he saw the lion)

The external argument is [Mpho] which is the experiencer of fear.

Selection restrictions

Humans can fear:

[Mpho] o ile a perema ha a bona tau.
(Mpho became afraid when he saw the lion)

Animals can fear:

[Katse] e a perema ha e bona tau.
(The cat become afraid when it sees the lion)

Other personified nouns:

[Malawi] e ile ya perema ha Burundi e reka dibetsa tse ntjha.
(Malawi became afraid when Burundi bought new weapons)

Thus, the subject arguments above will have a selection restriction of [animate].

Event structure

This verb indicates an event structure of state. The type of stative predicate is a stage-level predicate because such a state is a non-permanent state of an individual:

$$\text{EVENTSTR} = \left(\begin{array}{l} E_1 = \text{process} \\ E_2 = \text{state} \end{array} \right)$$

Meaning

1. fear, be afraid

Mpho o ile a perema ha a bona tau.

(Mpho became afraid when he saw the lion)

2. be shy

Ngwana o a perema ha a lokela ho kopa thuso.

(The child becomes shy when he should ask for help)

[neneta] (afraid)**Assignment of arguments**

This verb may appear with one argument: an external argument that is assigned by the verb phrase. This argument appears as a subject argument with the reference of an experiencer of fear.

[neneta] : [X]

[experiencer]

[Bereng] o ile a neneta ha a mpona.

(Bereng took fright when he saw me)

The external argument is [Bereng] which is the experiencer of fear.

Selection restrictions

Humans can fear:

[Bereng] o ile a neneta ha a mpona.
(Bereng took fright when he saw me)

Animals can fear:

[Katse] e a neneta ha e bona ntja.
(The cat becomes afraid when it sees the dog)

Other personified nouns:

[Malawi] e a neneta ha Burundi e reka dibetsa tse ntjha.
(Malawi becomes afraid when Burundi buy new weapons)

Thus, the subject arguments above will have a selection restriction of [animate].

Event structure

This verb indicates an event structure of state. The type of stative predicate is a stage-level predicate because such a state is a non-permanent state of an individual:

$$\text{EVENTSTR} = \left(\begin{array}{l} E_1 = \text{process} \\ E_2 = \text{state} \end{array} \right)$$

Meaning

1. take fright

Bereng o ile a neneta ha a mpona.

(Bereng took fright when he saw me)

[qwatsama] (afraid)

Assignment of arguments

This verb may appear with one argument: an external argument that is assigned by the verb phrase. This argument appears as a subject argument with the reference of an experiencer of fear.

[qwatsama] : [X]
[experiencer]

[Moshemane] o a qwatsama ha a bona noha.

(The boy becomes afraid when he sees the snake)

The external argument is [Moshemane] which is the experiencer of fear.

Selection restrictions

Humans can fear:

[Moshemane] o a qwatsama ha a bona noha.

(The boy becomes afraid when he sees the snake)

Animals can fear:

[Katse] e a qwatsama ha e bona ntja.

(The cat becomes afraid when it sees the dog)

Other personified nouns:

[Zambia] e a qwatsama ha Libiya e e tshosa.

(Zambia becomes afraid when Libya threatens her)

Thus, the subject arguments above will have a selection restriction of [animate].

Event structure

This verb indicates an event structure of state. The type of stative predicate is a stage-level predicate because such a state is a non-permanent state of an individual:

$$\text{EVENTSTR} = \left(\begin{array}{l} E_1 = \text{process} \\ E_2 = \text{state} \end{array} \right)$$

Meaning

1. start, be frightened

Moshemane o a qwatsama ha a bona noha.

(The boy becomes frightened when he sees the snake)

[qetsema] (jump in fear)**Assignment of arguments**

This verb may appear with one argument: an external argument that is assigned by the verb phrase. This argument appears as a subject argument with the reference of an experiencer of fear.

[qetsema] : [X]
 [experiencer]

[Moshemane] o ile a qetsema ha a bona sekgo.
 (The boy jumped in fright when he saw the spider)

The external argument is [Moshemane] which is the experiencer of fear.

Selection restrictions

Humans can fear:

[Moshemane] o ile a qetsema ha a bona sekgo.
 (The boy jumped in fright when he saw the spider)

Animals can fear:

[Katse] e ile ya qetsema ha e bona sekgo.
 (The cat jumped in fright when it saw the spider)

Other personified nouns:

[Zambia] e ile ya qetsema ha Engelane e e tshosa.
 (Zambia jumped in fright when England threatened her)

Thus, the subject arguments above will have a selection restriction of [animate].

Event structure

This verb indicates an event structure of state. The type of stative predicate is a stage-level predicate because such a state is a non-permanent state of an individual:

$$\text{EVENTSTR} = \left(\begin{array}{l} E_1 = \text{process} \\ E_2 = \text{state} \end{array} \right)$$

Meaning

1. jump in fright

Moshemane o ile a qetsema ha a bona sekgo.
(The boy jumped in fright when he saw the spider)

2. stand aside

Moshemane o ile a qetsema ha koloi e atamela.
(The boy stood aside when the car came nearer)

8.4.2.2.1 With applicative

All the intransitive verbs above may appear with the applicative suffix [-el-]: **tetemela**, **thothomella**, **tlakasella**, **peremela**, **nenetela**, **qwatsamela** and **qetsemela**. In such a case, a new internal argument will be added which is dependent on the presence of [-el-]. In each sentence below, the new argument will be indicated as well as its interpretation. This new argument will be animate as well as inanimate.

[tetemela] (be afraid of)

Tebello o tetemela [noha e shweleng]

(Tebello is afraid of the dead snake)

Moshemane o tetemela [letsolo]

(The boy is afraid of lightning)

[Noha e shweleng] and [letsolo] are the new internal arguments, and they are animate and inanimate respectively. They are both interpreted as theme. The external arguments are [Tebello] and [Moshemane].

[thothomella] (be afraid of)

Pheello ha a tlo thothomella [batho ba mo etsang hampe]

(Pheello will not be afraid of people who causes him harm)

Ngwana o thothomella [koloji e kgolo]

(The child is afraid of the big car)

[batho ba mo etsang hampe] and [koloji e kgolo] are the new internal arguments, and they are animate and inanimate respectively. They are both interpreted as theme. The external arguments are [Pheello] and [Ngwana].

[tlakasella] (be afraid of)

Moshemane o tlakasella [ntate] hobane a utswitse tjhelete.

(The boy is afraid of father because he stole the money)

Ngwana o tlakasella [terene]

(The child is afraid of the train)

[ntate] and [terene] are the new internal arguments, and they are animate and inanimate respectively. They are both interpreted as theme. The external arguments are [Moshemane] and [Ngwana].

[peremela] (be afraid of)

Ngwana o peremela [ntja e boholang]

(The child is afraid of the barking dog)

Moshemane o peremela [koloji]

(The boy is afraid of the car)

[ntja e boholang] and [koloji] are the new internal arguments, and they are animate and inanimate respectively. They are both interpreted as theme. The external arguments are [Ngwana] and [Moshemane].

[nenetela] (be afraid of)

Monna o nenetela [kgomo e hlaha]

(The man is afraid of a wild cow)

Mosadi o nenetela [lehadima]

(The woman is afraid of lightning)

[kgomo e hlaha] and [lehadima] are the new internal arguments, and they are animate and inanimate respectively. They are both interpreted as theme. The external arguments are [Monna] and [Mosadi].

[qwatsamela] (be afraid of)

Mpho o qwatsamela [phoofolo e hlaha]

(Mpho is afraid of the wild animal)

Thato o qwatsamela [dithunya]
 (Thato is afraid of guns)

[phoofolo e hlaha] and [dithunya] are the new internal arguments, and they are animate and inanimate respectively. They are both interpreted as theme. The external arguments are [Mpho] and [Thato].

[qetsemela] (be afraid of)

Ngwana o qetsemela [sekgo se seholo]
 (The child is afraid of the big spider)

Moshemane o qetsemela [koloji]
 (The boy is afraid of the car)

[sekgo se seholo] and [koloji] are the new internal arguments, and they are animate and inanimate respectively. They are both interpreted as theme. The external arguments are [Ngwana] and [Moshemane].

8.4.2.2.2 With causative

When the causative suffix [-is-] is added onto a verb, the following conditions will be applicative:

- (a) the old external argument will become the new internal argument
- (b) a new external argument will be added
- (c) the new external argument may have the meaning of cause

[tetemisa] (frighten)

1 (a) [Bana] ba a tetema.
 (The children tremble with fright)

- (b) [Monna] o tetemisa [bana]
 (The man frightens the children)

The old external argument [Bana] which is interpreted as experiencer in 1 (a) above, becomes the new internal argument with the same interpretation of experiencer in 1 (b) above. The new external argument is [Monna] with the meaning of cause.

[thothomedisa] (frighten)

- 2 (a) [Banna] ba a thothomela ha ba bona sebata.
 (The men tremble with fright when they see the beast)

- (b) [Tau] e thothomedisa banna.
 (The lion frightens the men)

The old external argument [Banna] which is interpreted as experiencer in 2 (a) above, becomes the new internal argument with the same interpretation of experiencer in 2 (b) above. The new external argument is [Tau] with the meaning of cause.

[tlakasedisa] (frighten)

- 3 (a) [Bana] ba a tlakasela.
 (The children tremble with fright)

- (b) [Sello] o tlakasedisa bana.
 (Sello frightens the children)

The old external argument [Bana] which is interpreted as experiencer in 3 (a) above, becomes the new internal argument with the same interpretation of experiencer in 3 (b) above. The new external argument is [Sello] with the meaning of cause.

[peremisa] (frighten)

4 (a) [Mpho] o a perema ha a bona tau.
(Mpho becomes afraid when he sees the lion)

(b) [Dineo] o peremisa [Mpho] ka tau.
(Dineo frightens Mpho with the lion)

The old external argument [Mpho] which is interpreted as experiencer in 4 (a) above, becomes the new internal argument with the same interpretation of experiencer in 4 (b) above. The new external argument is [Dineo] with the meaning of cause.

[nenetisa] (frighten)

5 (a) [Bereng] o ile a neneta ha a mpona.
(Bereng took fright when he saw me)

(b) [Mosadi] o nenetisa [Bereng] ka thipa.
(The woman frightens Bereng with a knife)

The old external argument [Bereng] which is interpreted as experiencer in 5 (a) above, becomes the new internal argument with the same interpretation of experiencer in 5 (b) above. The new external argument is [Mosadi] with the meaning of cause.

[qwatsamisa] (frighten)

6 (a) [Phoofolo] e a qwatsama ha e bona tau.
(The animal becomes afraid when it sees the lion)

(b) [Monna] o qwatsamisa [phoofolo] ka molamu.
(The man frightens the animal with a stick)

The old external argument [Phoofolo] which is interpreted as experiencer in 6 (a) above, becomes the new internal argument with the same interpretation of experiencer in 6 (b) above. The new external argument is [Monna] with the meaning of cause.

[qetsemisa] (frighten)

7 (a) [Ngwana] o ile a qetsema ha a bona noha.

(The child jumped in fright when he saw the snake)

(b) [Ntja] e ile ya qwatsamisa [ngwana]

(The dog frightened the child)

The old external argument [Ngwana] which is interpreted as experiencer in 7 (a) above, becomes the new internal argument with the same interpretation of experiencer in 7 (b) above. The new external argument is [Ntja] with the meaning of cause.

8.4.2.3 Intransitive ideophones with derivations

There are two intransitive ideophones that expresses fear, i.e. **tsitlo** and **nyaro**.

Assignment of arguments

The above ideophones have to appear with the verb **re** which accepts the inflection of the verb: **re tsitlo**(become frightened) and **re nyaro**(be startled). The ideophone itself will assign the argument. In this case only an external argument is assigned which has the reference of an experiencer of fear.

[re tsitlo] : [X]

[experiencer]

[Ngwana] o ile a re tsitlo ha ba mo tshosa ka noha.

(The child became frightened when they frightened him with the snake)

The external argument is [Ngwana] which has the reference of an experiencer of fear.

[re nyaro] : [X]

[experiencer]

[Mosadi] o itse nyaro ha a bona noha.

(The woman became startled when she saw the snake)

The external argument is [Mosadi] which has the reference of an experiencer of fear.

Selection restrictions

The subject argument of the two verbs will have a selection restriction of [animate].

[re tsitlo] (be frightened)

Humans can fear:

[Ngwana] o ile a re tsitlo ha ba mo tshosa ka noha.

(The child became frightened when they frightened him with the snake)

Animals can fear:

[Ntja] e ile ya re tsitlo ha tau e hlaha.

(The dog became frightened when the lion appeared)

Other personified nouns:

[Zimbabwe] e ile ya re tsitlo ha Engelane e e tshosa.

(Zimbabwe became frightened when England threatened her)

[re nyaro] (be startled)

Humans can fear:

[Mosadi] o itse nyaro ha a bona tau.

(The woman became startled when she saw the lion)

Animals can fear:

[Katse] e ile ya re nyaro ha e bona ntja.

(The cat became startled when it saw the dog)

Other personified nouns:

[Amerika] e ile ya re nyaro ha Borithani e shebisa dikanono ka ho yona.

(America became startled when Britain pointed the cannons at her)

Event structure

The two ideophones indicates an event structure of state. The type of stative predicate is a stage-level predicate because such states are non-permanent states of individuals:

$$\text{EVENTSTR} = \left(\begin{array}{l} E_1 = \text{process} \\ E_2 = \text{state} \end{array} \right)$$

Meaning

[re tsitlo]

1. become frightened

Ngwana o ile a re tsitlo ha ba mo tshosa ka noha.

(The child became frightened when they frightened him with the snake)

[re nyaro]

1. become startled

Mosadi o itse nyaro ha a bona noha.

(The woman became startled when she saw the snake)

Derived verbs from ideophones**With the suffix [-s-]**

When the suffix [-s-] is added onto an intransitive ideophone, a new external argument is added with the meaning of cause. The old external argument then becomes the new internal argument.

[re tsitlo]

- 1(a) [Ngwana] o ile a **re tsitlo** ha ba mo tshosa.

(The child became frightened when they frightened him)

- (b) [Monna] o **tsitlosa** [ngwana] ka noha.

(The man frightens the child with the snake)

The old external argument [Ngwana] in 1(a) above becomes the new internal argument in 1(b). The new external argument is [Monna] with the meaning of cause. The derived verb is **tsitl-s-**:

[re nyaro]

2(a) [Mosadi] o itse **nyaro** ha a bona noha.

(The woman became startled when she saw the snake)

(b) [Moshemane] o **nyarosa** [mosadi] ka noha.

(The boy startles the woman with the snake)

The old external argument [Mosadi] in 2(a) above becomes the new internal argument in 2(b). The new external argument is [Moshemane] with the meaning of cause. The derived verb is **nyaro-s-**.

With the suffix [-h-]

The suffix [-h-] may be added onto the intransitive ideophone. The meaning of the external argument will remain the same: experiencer of fear.

[re tsitlo]

1(a) [Ngwana] o ile a **re tsitlo** ha ba mo tshosa.

(The child became frightened when they frightened him)

(b) [Ngwana] o ile a **tsitloha** ha ba mo tshosa.

(The child became frightened when they frightened him)

The external argument [Ngwana] remains the same in both sentences with the meaning of the experiencer of fear. The derived verb is **tsitlo-h-**.

[re nyaro]

2(a) [Mosadi] o itse **nyaro** ha a bona noha.

(The woman became startled when she saw the snake)

(b) [Mosadi] o ile a **nyaroha** ha a bona noha.

(The woman became startled when she saw the snake)

The external argument [Mosadi] remains the same in both sentences with the same meaning of the experiencer of fear. The derived verb is **nyaro-h-**.

8.4.2.4 Transitive/Intransitive alternation

The verbs **hlasimolla** and **hlasimoloha** exemplify the regular alternation as transitive and intransitive verbs, linked to the occurrence of the verbal derivational suffixes [-l-] and [-h-] respectively.

Consider the following example sentences:

1. [Mpho] o hlasimolla [ngwana]

(Mpho startles the child)

2. [Ngwana] o a hlasimoloha.

(The child is startled)

The transitive suffix [-l-] in the verb **hlasimolla** in sentence 1 above, bears the semantic feature causative, whereas the intransitive suffix [-h-] in the verb **hlasimoloha** in sentence 2 above has an anticausative semantic feature.

The deep structure of sentence 1 is as follows:

3. [NP] INFL [VP -hlasimolla Mpho ngwana]

‘startle’ ‘Mpho’ ‘child’

Anger verbs can be divided into verbs denoting anger or threat. Furthermore, these verbs can be divided into the following sub-categories depending on the degree of anger or threat experienced: to experience anger, to be very angry, to show anger, to be angry suddenly, to be violent with anger, and to show signs of anger. Verbs denoting anger can appear with intransitive ideophones, intransitive ideophone with a derived intransitive and transitive verb, intransitive verbs, intransitive verbs with the derived applicative suffix. Verbs denoting threat can appear with transitive verbs and applicative verbs.

Anxiety emotion words can be semantically divided into the following categories: anxiety, worry, confusion, distress, trouble, agitation, and bother. The verbs of anxiety can appear with intransitive verbs, intransitive verbs with the applicative suffix [-el-], intransitive ideophones, neuter-passive verbs, transitive verbs, and causative verbs.

Disgust emotion words can be divided into the following categories depending on the degree of disgust which is experienced by a person: madness, disgust, dislike, mock, scorn, scold, nause, despise, annoyance, and insult. The verbs of disgust can appear with transitive verbs, transitive verbs with the applicative suffix [-el-], and the intransitive verbs.

Sadness emotion words can be divided into the following categories depending on the degree of sadness: pity, grieve, depression, mourning, sad, and miserable. The verbs of sadness can be expressed with an interjection. These verbs can appear with transitive verbs, intransitive verbs, intransitive verbs with the applicative suffix [-el-] and causative suffix [-is-], intransitive ideophones, derived verbs from ideophones, and transitive/intransitive alternation.

Fear emotion words can be divided into the following categories depending on the degree of fear experienced: fear, to be afraid or frightened, to tremble with fright, to jump in fright, and to be startled. The verbs of fear can appear with transitive verbs, intransitive verbs with the applicative and the causative, intransitive ideophones with derivations, and transitive/intransitive alternation.

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