THE SIZE AND COMPOSITION OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN MIDDLE CLASS: IMPLICATIONS FOR A CONSOLIDATING DEMOCRACY

CARLOS GARCIA RIVERO

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Promoter: Prof. H. Kotzé
Co-promoter: Prof. P. Du Toit

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Department of Political Science
University of Stellenbosch
DECLARATION

I, the undersigned, hereby declare that the work contained in this dissertation is my own original work and that I have not previously in its entirety or part submitted it at any other university for a degree.

Signature: Date:
ABSTRACT

This study attempts to reach some conclusions about the possibility of the South African democracy to endure. It does so through entering into the so-called preconditions for democracy field, concretely, by the observation of the changes in and the composition of the South African middle class as a feature of democratic consolidation.

Middle classes are regarded as an important political actor in democratisation and it is difficult to find a stable democracy without a well-developed and large middle class. Actually, the democratisation movements have mostly been led by middle classes. Moreover, the size of the middle class in a particular society is also indicative of the level of income inequality, which is another important indicator for the success of democratisation.

From a theoretical perspective, the study presents the different existing approaches to democratisation in general, and to middle class democracy in particular. Then, it focuses on a case study: South Africa. The variables for the research then are, "middle class" as an independent variable; and "democratic consolidation" as a dependent variable. The hypothesis that links them therefore is as follows:

The larger the middle class, the greater the chance for the consolidation of democracy.

From an empirical perspective the research tests the above hypothesis by making use of extensive quantitative data. Both variables are then operationalised and their tendencies of growth are measured, presented and explained. Middle class is operationalised in terms of occupation. Consolidated democracy is operationalised in terms of political tolerance and trust in the institutions. Political tolerance refers to the procedural part of democracy, whereas trust relates to the substantive dimension of democracy.

The major findings arrived at are that, on one hand the middle class in South Africa is increasing in size and incorporating previously excluded sectors – mainly Blacks – but, on the other hand, democracy seems to be consolidating from a
procedural point of view – increase in political tolerance –, but not from a substantive one – decrease in trust in the institutions. Consequently, the original hypothesis is reformulated as follows:

*An increase in the middle class in the first years of democracy indicates that democracy is consolidating “procedurally”.*

Against the background of these findings, room is left for further research that will provide information about whether a democracy can consolidate only procedurally or whether the substantive dimension of democracy is essential for successful consolidation. Further research will also confirm whether or not the recent increase in trust during 1999 signifies a real turning-point or whether it is due to other reasons.
OPSOMMING

Hierdie studie poog om tot 'n aantal gevolgtrekkings te kom oor die waarskynlikheid dat die Suid-Afrikaanse demokrasie in stand sal bly. Dit is benader deur 'n ondersoek na die voorvereistes vir demokrasie en, konkreë, deur die waarneming van verandering in die samestelling van die Suid-Afrikaanse middelstand as 'n verskynsel van demokratiese konsolidasie.

Die middelstand word as 'n belangrike politieke rolspeler in demokratisering beskou en dit is moeilik om 'n voorbeeld van 'n stabiele demokrasie waar daar nie 'n groot middelstand is nie, te vind. In werkelike is demokratiese bewegings meestal deur die middelstand geleli. Verder is die omvang van die middelstand binne 'n besondere gemeenskap ook aanduidend van die vlak van inkomste-ongelykheid, wat 'n verdere belangrike aanduiing vir die sukses van demokratisering is.

Vanuit 'n teoretiese perspektief bied die studie die verskillende bestaande benaderings tot demokratisering in die algemeen, en tot middelstand-demokrasie in besonder, aan. Dan verskuif die aandag na 'n gevallestudie van Suid-Afrika. Die veranderlikse vir die navorsing is "middelstand" as onafhanklike veranderlike en "demokratiese konsolidering" as afhanklike veranderlike. Die hipotese waardeer hulle in verband gestel word, is as volg:

**Hoe grater die middelstand, hoe grater die waarskynlikheid vir die konsolidasie van demokrasie.**

Vanuit 'n empiriese perspektief toets die navorsing die bogenoemde hipotese deur gebruik te maak van uitgebreide kwantitatiewe data. Albei veranderlike word ge-operasionaliseer en hul groeitendense word gemeet, aangebied en verduidelik. Middelstand word in terme van *beroep* ge-operasionaliseer. Gekonsolideerde demokrasie word in terme van *politieke verdraagsaamheid en vertroue* in instellings ge-operasionaliseer. Politieke verdraagsaamheid bon verband met die procedurele aspek van demokrasie, terwyl vertroue verband bon met die substantiewe dimensie van demokrasie.
Die vernaamste bevindings waartoe gekom is, is, aan die een kant, dat die middelstand in Suid-Afrika besig is om uit te brei en voorheen uitgeslote sektore - veral Swartes - te inkorporeer en, aan die ander kant, dat demokrasie besig is om vanuit 'n prosedurele oogpunt - toename in politieke verdraagsaamheid - te konsolideer, maar nie vanuit 'n substantiewe oogpunt - afname van vertroue in die instellings - nie. Gevolglik word die oorspronklike hipotese soos volg herformuleer:

'n Toename in die middelstand gedurende die eerste jare van demokrasie dui aan dat die demokrasie besig is om "prosedereel" te konsolideer.

Teen die agtergrond van die bevindings is daar ruimte vir verdere navorsing wat inligting sal verskaf aangaande die moontlikheid daarvan dat 'n demokrasie net maar prosedereel kan konsolideer, en of die substantiewe dimensie essensieel is vir suksesvolle konsolidasie. Verdere navorsing sou ook kon bepaal of die voorafgaande toename in vertroue gedurende 1999 'n werlike ommekeer aandui, en of dit aan ander redes toegeskryf moet word.
Die vernameste bevindings waartoe gekom is, is, aan die een kant, dat die middelstand in Suid-Afrika besig is om uit te brei en voorheen uitgeslote sektore - veral Swartes - te inkorporeer en, aan die ander kant, dat demokrasie besig is om vanuit 'n prosedurele oogpunt - toename in politieke verdraagsaamheid - te konsolideer, maar nie vanuit 'n substantiewe oogpunt - afname van vertroue in die instellings - nie. Gevolglik word die oorspronklike hipotese soos volg herformuleer:

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TO MY PARENTS, ISABEL AND ANTONIO
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Needless to say, this study would have never been completed without the enduring support of my family.
# CONCISE TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abstract</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opsomming</td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concise table of contents</td>
<td>ix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detailed table of contents</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List of tables</td>
<td>xiv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List of figures</td>
<td>xvii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List of acronyms</td>
<td>xviii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 1. Consolidated democracy and middle class: An overview</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 2. Middle class and democratic consolidation: Theory and background</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 3. Middle class operationalised</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 4. Democratic consolidation operationalised</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 5. The South African middle class and consolidated democracy: Results analysed</td>
<td>192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 6. Concluding remarks</td>
<td>262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bibliography</td>
<td>271</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# DETAILED TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abstract</th>
<th>iii</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Opsomming</td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concise table of contents</td>
<td>ix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detailed table of contents</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List of tables</td>
<td>xiv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List of figures</td>
<td>xvii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List of acronyms</td>
<td>xviii</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Chapter 1. Consolidated democracy and middle class: An overview

| 1.1 Introduction                | 1   |
| 1.2 Democratisation: Its background | 1  |
| 1.3 Latin America: A political laboratory | 7  |
| 1.4 Conditions for democracy    | 17  |
| 1.4.1 Economic development      | 19  |
| 1.4.2 Political attitudes and behaviour | 21 |
| 1.4.3 Inter-elite relations     | 22  |
| 1.4.4 Social structures and interactions between social groups | 22 |
| 1.4.5 Political institutions    | 24  |
| 1.4.6 External influences       | 25  |
| 1.4.7 Evolution theory          | 26  |
| 1.4.8 Mixed approaches          | 27  |
| 1.4.9 Others                    | 32  |
| 1.4.10 Sequences in development | 32  |
| 1.4.11 Critical approaches      | 33  |
| 1.5 Statement of problem and hypothesis | 35 |
| 1.6 The limitations and delimitation | 37 |
| 1.7 Research methodology        | 38  |
| 1.8 Assumptions                 | 39  |
| 1.9 Contribution to the field   | 39  |
| 1.10 Chapter outline            | 40  |
| 1.11 Summary                    | 40  |

## Chapter 2. Middle class and democratic consolidation: Theory and background

| 2.1 Introduction                | 44  |
| 2.2 Conceptualisation           | 45  |
| 2.2.1 Class                     | 45  |
| 2.2.2 Middle class              | 48  |
| 2.2.2.1 The South African case  | 50  |
| 2.2.3 Democracy                 | 50  |
| 2.2.3.1 Confusion with other ideas | 51 |
| 2.2.3.2 Democracy: In search of a definition | 52 |
| 2.2.4 A new angle: Democratic consolidation | 62 |
Chapter 3. Middle class operationalised

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3.1 Introduction</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2 Analytic validity</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3 Operationalisation: Different approaches</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.4 Class and occupation</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.4.1 Neo-Marxist criticism</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.4.2 Feminist</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.4.3 Sectoral criticism</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.5 Stratification operationalised: Different choices</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.5.1 The choice of a conceptual scheme</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.5.2 The choice of unit of analysis</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.5.2.1 Male-head approach</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.5.2.2 Joint classification</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.5.2.3 Average method</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.5.2.4 Dominance principle</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.5.2.5 Multiple indicator</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.5.3 The choice of the degree</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.5.4 Interrelations between the three choices</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.6 Middle class</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.6.1 Middle class and occupation</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.7 Data on occupation in South Africa</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.8 Middle class operationalised: Methodology</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.8.1 Selection of conceptual scheme</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.8.2 Unidimensional or multidimensional operationalisation</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.8.3 The degree of coverage</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.8.4 The unit of analysis</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.9.1 The economic filter</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.9.2 Middle class in South Africa: Its configuration</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.10 Summary</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chapter 4. Democratic consolidation operationalised

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4.1 Introduction</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2 Public opinion: Its nature</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3 Public opinion in South Africa: The data</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.4 Political culture: Genealogy of a concept</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.5 Political culture and democracy</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.6 Political culture: Measurement methodology</td>
<td>152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.7 Earlier research on political culture</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.7.1 Trust</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.7.2 Tolerance</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.7.3 General perception of personal life; general situation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4.7.4 Participation in politics (vote, influence in government) 166
4.7.5 Civil society 166
4.8 Apartheid and public opinion 168
4.9 Political culture: Its measurement 168
4.9.1 Tolerance 169
4.9.2 Trust 175
4.9.3 Capacity of influence 177
4.9.4 Participation in politics: Vote for and proximity to parties 178
4.9.5 Vote for party 182
4.9.6 Interest in politics 185
4.9.7 Membership of independent organisations 187
4.10 Summary 190

Chapter 5. The South African middle class and consolidated democracy: Results analysed

5.1 Introduction 192
5.2 Middle class: A reminder 194
5.3 Middle class analysed by occupation 196
5.4 South Africa's middle class: Evolution analysed 200
5.5 Measures of income inequality 211
5.6 Unemployment in South Africa 213
5.7 Wages 216
5.8 Consolidated democracy: Trust and tolerance analysed 219
5.8.1 Tolerance in South Africa: An analysis 221
5.8.1.1 Tolerance in South Africa, 1983 223
5.8.1.1.a Race 223
5.8.1.1.b Age 224
5.8.1.1.c Income 227
5.8.1.1.d Education 228
5.8.1.1.e Occupation 230
5.8.1.1.1 Tolerance in South Africa in 1983: Summary 232
5.8.1.2 Tolerance in South Africa, 1994 233
5.8.1.2.a Race 234
5.8.1.2.b Age 236
5.8.1.2.c Income 237
5.8.1.2.d Education 237
5.8.1.2.e Occupation 238
5.8.1.2.1 Tolerance in South Africa in 1994: Summary 239
5.8.1.3 Tolerance in South Africa, 1998 240
5.8.1.3.a Race 241
5.8.1.3.b Age 242
5.8.1.3.c Income 243
5.8.1.3.d Education 244
5.8.1.3.e Occupation 245
5.8.1.3.1 Tolerance in South Africa in 1998: Summary 246
5.8.2 Trust in South Africa, 1994-1999 247
5.8.2.1 Trust in government in South Africa, 1995 248
5.8.2.1.a Race 248
Chapter 6. Concluding remarks

6.1 Introduction 262
6.2 The study: A recapitulation 262
6.3 Concluding remarks 267
6.4 Future research 269

Bibliography 271
LIST OF TABLES

Table 1.1. Eclipse of democracy 42
Table 1.2. Conditions conducive to democracy 43

Table 3.1. Means of income in South Africa 131
Table 3.2. Economic filter to delimit the old middle class 132
Table 3.4. Old middle class 135
Table 3.5. New middle class 135
Table 3.6. Total middle class 135

Table 4.1. Allow least-liked to live in your neighborhood, 1983-1998 171
Table 4.2. Allow least-liked to give political speech in your neighborhood, 1994-1998 173
Table 4.3. Support for violent actions to pursue political goals, 1983-1999 175
Table 4.4. Trust in government, 1994-1999 176
Table 4.5. People like you can influence the government, 1994-1999 178
Table 4.6. Closeness to political party, 1994 181
Table 4.7. Closeness to political party, 1998 181
Table 4.8. Closeness to party (distribution of parties), 1994 182
Table 4.9. Closeness to party (distribution of parties), 1998 182
Table 4.10. National level vote, 1994 183
Table 4.11. National level vote, 1988 183
Table 4.12. Closeness to and vote for party, 1994-1998 184
Table 4.13. Talk about politics once or more times a day, 1994-1999 186
Table 4.14. Membership of organisations, 1983 187
Table 4.15. Membership of organisations, 1994 188
Table 4.16. Membership of organisations, 1999 188
Table 4.17. Membership of organisations, 1983-1999 188

Table 5.1. Old middle class 195
Table 5.2. New middle class 195
Table 5.3. Total middle class 195
Table 5.4. Middle class 1970 (occupational composition) 197
Table 5.5. Middle class 1994 (occupational composition) 197
Table 5.6. Middle class, 1995 (occupational composition) 197
Table 5.7. Middle class, 1997 (occupational composition) 198
Table 5.8. Middle class, 1999 (occupational composition) 198
Table 5.9. Gini index South Africa, 1990-1995 213
Table 5.10. Non-agricultural private and public employment, 1990-1996 215
Table 5.11. Unemployment in South Africa, 1994-1997 215
Table 5.12. Allow least-liked to live in your neighbourhood, 1983-1998 222
Table 5.13. Allow least-liked to give political speech in your neighbourhood, 1994-1998 222
Table 5.14. Allow “a least-liked group” to live in your area, 1983 223
Table 5.15. Target group, 1983 224
Table 5.16. Tolerance by age, Black, 1983 225
Table 5.17. Tolerance by age, White, 1983 225
Table 5.18. Tolerance by age, Coloured, 1983 225
Table 5.19. Tolerance by age, Indian, 1983 226
Table 5.20. Tolerance by income, Black, 1983 227
Table 5.21. Tolerance by income, White, 1983 227
Table 5.22. Tolerance by income, Coloured, 1983 227
Table 5.23. Tolerance by income, Indian, 1983 228
Table 5.24. Tolerance by education, Black, 1983 229
Table 5.25. Tolerance by education, White, 1983 229
Table 5.26. Tolerance by education, Coloured, 1983 230
Table 5.27. Tolerance by education, Indian, 1983 230
Table 5.28. Tolerance by occupation, Black, 1983 231
Table 5.29. Tolerance by occupation, White, 1983 231
Table 5.30. Tolerance by occupation, Coloured, 1983 231
Table 5.31. Tolerance by occupation, Indian, 1983 232
Table 5.32. Social tolerance, 1983-1994 234
Table 5.33. Political tolerance, 1983-1994 234
Table 5.34. Distribution of target group, 1994 235
Table 5.35. Political tolerance by age, 1994 236
Table 5.36. Social tolerance by age, 1994 236
Table 5.37. Social tolerance by income, 1994 237
Table 5.38. Political tolerance by income, 1994 237
Table 5.39. Social tolerance by education, 1994 238
| Table 5.40. | Political tolerance by education, 1994 | 238 |
| Table 5.41. | Social tolerance by occupation, 1994 | 239 |
| Table 5.42. | Political tolerance by occupation, 1994 | 239 |
| Table 5.43. | Social tolerance, 1983-1998 | 241 |
| Table 5.44. | Political tolerance, 1983-1998 | 241 |
| Table 5.45. | Social tolerance by race, 1998 | 241 |
| Table 5.46. | Political tolerance by race, 1998 | 242 |
| Table 5.47. | Social tolerance by age, 1998 | 242 |
| Table 5.48. | Political tolerance by age, 1998 | 243 |
| Table 5.49. | Social tolerance by income, 1998 | 243 |
| Table 5.50. | Political tolerance by income, 1998 | 243 |
| Table 5.51. | Social tolerance by education, 1998 | 244 |
| Table 5.52. | Political tolerance by education, 1998 | 244 |
| Table 5.53. | Social tolerance by occupation, 1998 | 245 |
| Table 5.54. | Political tolerance by occupation, 1998 | 245 |
| Table 5.55. | Trust in government, 1994-1999 | 248 |
| Table 5.56. | Trust in government by race, 1995 | 249 |
| Table 5.57. | Trust in government by age, 1995 | 249 |
| Table 5.58. | Trust in government by income, 1995 | 250 |
| Table 5.59. | Trust in government by education, 1995 | 250 |
| Table 5.60. | Trust in government by occupation, 1995 | 251 |
| Table 5.61. | Trust in government, 1995-1999 | 252 |
| Table 5.62. | Trust in government by race, 1999 | 252 |
| Table 5.63. | Trust in government by race, 1995 | 253 |
| Table 5.64. | Trust in government by age, 1999 | 253 |
| Table 5.65. | Trust in government by income, 1999 | 254 |
| Table 5.66. | Trust in government by education, 1999 | 254 |
| Table 5.67. | Trust in government by occupation, 1999 | 255 |
## LIST OF FIGURES

| Figure 3.1. | Correlation Education and Occupation, Black population, 1983 | 118 |
| Figure 3.2. | Correlation Income and Occupation, Black population, 1983 | 118 |
| Figure 3.3. | Correlation Education and Occupation, White population, 1983 | 119 |
| Figure 3.4. | Correlation Income and Occupation, White population, 1983 | 119 |
| Figure 3.5. | Correlation Education and Occupation, Coloured population, 1983 | 120 |
| Figure 3.6. | Correlation Income and Occupation, Coloured population, 1983 | 120 |
| Figure 3.7. | Correlation Education and Occupation, Indian population, 1983 | 121 |
| Figure 3.8. | Correlation Income and Occupation, Indian population, 1983 | 121 |
| Figure 3.9. | Correlation Education and Occupation, Total population, 1999 | 122 |
| Figure 3.10. | Correlation Income and Occupation, Total population, 1999 | 122 |
| Figure 3.11. | Correlation Education and Occupation, Black population, 1999 | 123 |
| Figure 3.12. | Correlation Income and Occupation, Black population, 1999 | 123 |
| Figure 3.13. | Correlation Education and Occupation, White population, 1999 | 124 |
| Figure 3.14. | Correlation Income and Occupation, White population, 1999 | 124 |
| Figure 3.15. | Correlation Education and Occupation, Coloured population, 1999 | 125 |
| Figure 3.16. | Correlation Income and Occupation, Coloured population, 1999 | 125 |
| Figure 3.17. | Correlation Education and Occupation, Indian population, 1999 | 126 |
| Figure 3.18. | Correlation Income and Occupation, Indian population, 1999 | 126 |
| Figure 3.19. | Representation of Gini index, Lorenz curve and perfect egalitarian society (USA 1968-1992) | 130 |
| Figure 4.1. | Allow least-liked group to live in your neighbourhood, 1983-1998 | 171 |
| Figure 4.2. | Allow least-liked group to give political speech in your neighbourhood, 1994-1998 | 173 |
| Figure 4.3. | Support for violent actions in politics, 1983-1999 | 175 |
| Figure 4.4. | Trust in government, 1994-1999 | 177 |
| Figure 4.5. | Influence in government, 1994-1999 | 179 |
| Figure 4.6. | Closeness to and vote for party, 1994-1998 | 184 |
| Figure 4.7. | Interest in politics, 1994-1999 | 186 |
| Figure 5.5.1. | Lorenz Curve South Africa, 1990-1995 | 212 |
| Figure 5.6.1. | Unemployment in South Africa, 1994-1999 | 216 |
| Figure 5.7.1. | Evolution of wages in South Africa, 1994-1999 | 217 |
## LIST OF ACRONYMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACDP</td>
<td>African Christian Democratic Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AD</td>
<td>Acción Democrática (Democratic Action)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AME</td>
<td>Average Monthly Earnings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BC</td>
<td>Before Christ</td>
</tr>
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<td>Comité de Organización Política Independiente (Committee of Independent Political Organisation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COSATU</td>
<td>Congress of South African Trade Unions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSS</td>
<td>Central Statistics Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D’k</td>
<td>don’t know</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DP</td>
<td>Democratic Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAP</td>
<td>Economically Active Population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FF</td>
<td>Freedom Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOSATU</td>
<td>Federation of South African Trade Unions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEAR</td>
<td>Growth, Employment and Redistribution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GINI</td>
<td>General Inequality Index</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNP</td>
<td>Gross National Product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HDI</td>
<td>Human Development Index</td>
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<tr>
<td>HSRC</td>
<td>Human Sciences Research Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICA</td>
<td>Industrial Conciliation Act</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDASA</td>
<td>Institute for Democracy in South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IEC</td>
<td>Independent Electoral Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>IFP</td>
<td>Inkhata Freedom Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>MDB</td>
<td>Movimiento Democrático do Brasil (Democratic Movement of Brazil)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEF</td>
<td>National Economic Forum</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Non-Governmental Organisations</td>
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<tr>
<td>NP</td>
<td>National Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>OAS</td>
<td>Organisation of American States</td>
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<tr>
<td>OHS</td>
<td>October Household Survey</td>
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<tr>
<td>PAC</td>
<td>Pan Africanist Congress</td>
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<tr>
<td>PLN</td>
<td>Partido de Liberación Nacional (National Liberation Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>PMDB</td>
<td>Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (Brazilian Democratic Movement Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRI</td>
<td>Partido Revolucionario Institucional (Institutional Revolutionary Party)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRN</td>
<td>Partido Revolucionario Nacional (National Revolutionary Party)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSD</td>
<td>Partido Socialista Democrático (Democratic Socialist Party)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PUN</td>
<td>Partido de Unificación Nacional (National Unity Party)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Q</td>
<td>question</td>
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<tr>
<td>RDP</td>
<td>Reconstruction and Development Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>SA</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
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<td>South African Congress of Trade Unions</td>
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<td>South African Data Archive</td>
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<td>South African Institute of Race Relations</td>
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<tr>
<td>SARB</td>
<td>South African Reserve Bank</td>
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<td>SASO</td>
<td>South Africa Student's Organisation</td>
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<td>SIF</td>
<td>Salvation Islamic Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>STATS SA</td>
<td>Statistics South Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>STEE</td>
<td>Survey of Total Employment and Earning</td>
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<tr>
<td>UDM</td>
<td>United Democratic Movement</td>
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Chapter 1. Consolidated democracy and middle class: An overview

1.1 Introduction

This Chapter aims to introduce the reader to the aims and the structure of this research. Firstly, the general determinants of the democratic process are outlined. The Chapter describes when the first regimes became democracies and how this was achieved. Examples are used to demonstrate that some of these political regimes remained democratic while others did not, and that even the same country goes through different democratisation processes, some of which are successful – they stabilise – and others are not. The general problems facing a political regime in becoming democratic and stabilising are presented to the reader.

After this, the different approaches to the so-called preconditions of democracy and critiques of these approaches are introduced. Special emphasis is placed on the "relation" between democracy and social structure/inequality.

This is followed by the statement of the problem, the methodology to be used in this study, the delimitation and limitations of the research and the contribution to the discipline. Finally, the reader finds the Chapter outline.

1.2 Democrratisation: Its background

Political history shows that, generally, democracy does not occur in "isolation" but at the same time in several areas. These democratisation processes have been named "waves" (Huntington, 1991a) or "swings" (Pastor, 1989a) of democracy. Each wave is a group of political changes happening close together in time in different countries. What defines a democratic or anti-democratic wave is that "during a certain stretch of historical time the changes in governments are preponderantly of one or the other kind" (Markoff, 1996: 10).

The emergence of modern democracy at the national level of government appeared first in the United States in the early nineteenth century, with the extension of the suffrage to a large proportion of the male population. During the following century democratic regimes gradually emerged in Western and Northern Europe, the British controlled territories, and in a few countries in Latin America (Markoff, 1996:
In 1910 from two to eight states could have been called democracies, depending on how strict the definition was. From about 1910 until 1920 there was great progress in democratic claims by government: Parliamentary reforms in Europe, extension of suffrage to women in several countries and emulation in weaker countries of the constitutional forms of victorious democratic powers. This democratic trend appeared to be irreversible (see, for instance, Bryce, 1921). However, and to the contrary, the year of 1920 was the "crest" of democratic development among the independent nations of the world. In the following two decades, the 1920s and 1930s, fascist movements, authoritarian monarchs and anti-democratic militaries banished democratic forces from the political stage in much of Europe and Latin America. Democracy was extinguished in Germany, Italy, Austria, Poland, the Baltic States, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Argentina, Brazil and Japan. As Huntington (1984: 196) wrote: "The war fought to make the world safe for democracy seemed instead to have brought its progress to an abrupt halt and to have unleashed social movements from the right to the left intent on destroying it". The undemocratic German state conquered most of the rest of democratic Europe during World War II (Huntington, 1991a: 12-13).

The aftermath of World War II, on the other hand, saw the multiplication of democratic regimes. Democracy was instituted in West Germany, Austria, Italy and Japan and there was an attempt to do so in South Korea. Coincidentally, the process of decolonisation got underway with newly independent countries usually adopting, at first, the political forms of the imperial powers. In at least some cases, such as India, Israel, Ceylon and the Philippines, the form of democracy was accompanied by the substance also – not merely elections. From the 1960s the trend was mixed. The number of democratic regimes seemed to expand in the 1950s and early 1960s to shrink again in the middle-late 1960s and early 1970s (Markoff, 1996: 77-79).

The military defeat of the fascist powers, in the 1940s and 1950s, resulted in a diffusion of the political systems of the victors – either a democratic or a communist model. Democracy, for instance, was established in Western Germany, Japan, Italy and Austria. Yalta-produced Berlin Wall was meant to "freeze" the division of the world (Huntington, 1984: 197).
Latin America followed the multicontinental trends in the 1940s and the 1950s and several important countries embraced democracy. The Brazilian military ended the authoritarian regime of Getulio Vargas, who had ruled since 1930. Venezuela made its first genuine attempt at democratic government in its history in 1945 (Lamounier, 1989: 124-5). In 1956-7 Colombia terminated its extraordinary *Violencia* with a series of pacts that adhered to formal democracy (Tickner, 1998: 61-65; Richani, 1997: 38).

The 1960s also saw the *end of ideologies* (Bell, 1968) and the "overload of democracies" (see, for instance, Habermas, 1976). It was also a time when cultural explanations of political differences were attempted (i.e. the anti-democratic culture in Latin America deriving from medieval Spain and Portugal). Some argued that democracy depended on unusual cultural characteristics and areas like Asia and Latin America were infertile soil for the growth of democracy. Others saw the patterns of economic development in the most recently industrialising countries as inimical to democracy and debated the earlier perception of social scientists who saw development as a stimulus to democratisation.

By the 1960s and the 1970s most of Latin America was under the sway of very different kinds of anti-democratic forces. Mexico had long been ruled by "Partido Revolucionario Institucional" (PRI hereafter), whose official slogan of "effective suffrage" was contradicted by the reality of its elections. The application of force and fraud was so pervasive that no opposition party had ever been permitted to win a state governorship in Mexico, let alone seriously aspire to the presidency (Klesner, 1997: 703-5). On the other hand, even the more economically developed countries of South America seemed to be falling under undemocratic regimes controlled by the army. The most shocking case was Chile, with a long and deep democratic tradition that came to an end in a coup in 1973 – although an analysis of the United States' policy toward Latin America at that time could help to explain this (Valenzuela, 1989: 182-6; Leonard, 1996: 195-200). Uruguay, proud of a tradition of peace and democracy that led to its being known as the "Switzerland of Latin America", had also a breakdown of democracy – perhaps not so abrupt or immediate as Chile, but similar.

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1 O'Donnell’s (1973) *Modernisation and bureaucratic-authoritarianism* was a pioneering work in this regard.
in barbarity (torture, etc.) (Gillespie & González, 1989: 214-220). By the mid-1970s only three Latin American countries, Costa Rica, Colombia and Venezuela could fairly apply the label “democratic” to their politics (Diamond & Linz, 1989: 2-9).

In Africa initial hopes for postcolonial democracy crumbled as one country after another threw out its initial democratic constitution, often derived from some European models. Some African governments declared that the rule of one party was more appropriate for their circumstances, that a great leader of the independence struggle should be “President for Life” or that military rule was essential for progress. The army of the largest independent African country, Nigeria, overturned its democratic constitution in 1966 (Diamond, 1989: 43-45). The European power with the most significant remaining African colonies, Portugal, was a non-democratic state itself. Portugal did nothing to encourage democracy in Angola or Mozambique; moreover, “it fought a protracted war against socialist revolutionaries who hardly looked themselves like sources of democracy.... The most industrialised country of the continent, South Africa, rigidly insisted on the permanent exclusion of the great majority of its citizens from any democratic participation” (Markoff, 1996: 7).

The Communist East seemed remarkably successful in repressing dissent and controlling opinion through the state mass media and the direct backing of the Russian army, such as occurred with the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, for instance (Eidlin, 1984: 89-90). Communist parties had been able to fight the United States to a deadlock in Korea. And the Caribbean island of Cuba (with Soviet missiles in its territory) demonstrated that a determined revolutionary government of even a very small country could stand up to the wealth and power of the United States (Swan, 1988: 391-407).

In retrospect the entire debate between those who emphasised economic explanations and those who favoured cultural ones was profoundly ironic, as the Chilean and Argentinean coups well proved. In the mid-1970s democracy once again began to gain strength while scholars, not yet noticing, continued to elaborate and debate their cultural and structural accounts of the anti-democratic character of many countries. Events cast doubt on many of their conclusions (Markoff, 1996: 9-10).

The late 1970s and early 1980s again witnessed the expansion of democracy. In
1974 the “Revolution of the Carnations” in Portugal began a democratic revolution that went through all non-democratic Southern Europe. Peru, Ecuador, Ghana, Nigeria and Turkey seemed to oscillate back and forth between democratic and undemocratic systems (Ozbudum, 1989: 207). In East Asia, Korea, Singapore, and Indonesia became less democratic while Taiwan remained undemocratic; Thailand and Malaysia remained partially democratic (Samudavanija, 1989: 312-315; Ahmad, 1989: 360-368).

Poland began the movement toward democracy in Central and Eastern Europe in the late 1980s. Finally, in the early 1990s, the collapse of the Soviet Union brought along the democratisation of Russia and the rest of Central and Eastern Europe. One communist regime after another was replaced by at least ostensibly democratic government. Rumania was more problematic. When the Soviet Union collapsed and fragmented into fifteen self-governing states, many of those fragments claimed to be struggling to establish democracy (Alarcón-Orguiz, 1994: 66-86; Pribicevic, 1993: 345-359).

Massive opposition overthrew the government of Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines in 1986. Electoral politics replaced the military regime in South Korean in 1987 (Smith & Lee, 1990: 164-179). Less fortunate was the Chinese pro-democratic demonstration in China; it was dramatically suppressed by force. The Burmese movement's electoral success of 1990 was not recognised by the military regime. In Haiti, the first president elected by the first credible elections in its history, was inaugurated in 1990; although he was overthrown by the Haitian military, he was later returned to office by external force (Von Hippel, 1995: 11-13).

Islamic movements, in the 1990s, accepted democratic procedures in their struggle for power in North Africa and the Middle East. The Salvation Islamic Front (SIF hereafter) was certain to gain a very important success in the first contested national elections in the history of Algeria. The military cancelled the elections and staged a coup in 1992 (Amirouche, 1998: 82-86). In several other Muslim countries, such as Tunisia and Egypt, Islamic opposition movements have also called for open electoral competition (Sadiki, 1995: 249-250; Makram-Ebeid, 1994: 83-86). Further to the South, in Africa, democracy has also progressed. Opposition leaders won elections in 1991 in two former Portuguese colonies, the Cape Verde Islands and Sao
Tome and Principe. Kenneth Kaunda, who had been ruling Zambia since 1964, lost the 1991 presidential elections to the opposition leader, Frederick Chiluba. (Ihonvbere, 1994: 83-84; Beck, 1997: 1-6). In Mali, General Moussa Traoré was deposed after 23 years in power and elections were held in March 1992. There have been democratic movements in Kenya and Mozambique has ended its long and traumatic civil war and has attempted to introduce democracy (House-Midamba, 1996: 289-291; Isaacs, 1995: 13-15). Finally, no discussion would be complete, especially in this study, without mentioning the long and painful process that South Africans concluded in the early 1990s to end apartheid and bring democracy to all. The first elections, in which all adult South Africans could participate, took place in 1994 (Stoddard, 1997: 83-84; 90-93) and the second in 1999 (see Reynolds, 1999).

In Latin America, also in the mid-1970s, the Brazilian military began negotiating a relaxation – abertura – of its authoritarian style and by the end of 1983 Brazil had made substantial progress back towards a democratic system. The coup there in 1964 had become the paradigmatic case of anti-democratic rule for industrial Latin America (Fleischer, 1986: 12-14). The organisations on the left did not trust the military’s overtures. However, this process led Brazil to the election of a civilian president a decade later (Lamounier, 1989: 111-112). At the end of 1983 Argentina had a democratically elected government (Arceneaux, 1997: 327-331).

By the 1980s, military government had disappeared from South America. Some fell precipitously, as in Argentina after Great Britain defeated a military attempt to occupy some disputed islands (Waisan, 1989: 59-63); other governments began a return to a civilian rule, as in Uruguay. Even Paraguay's non-democratic regime underwent the same process. Chile was the last undemocratic country in South America to democratise when the first civilian president was elected democratically in 1989 after a cruel dictatorship that lasted 15 years. However, the former dictator, Pinochet, remained as the head of the army and, later, as a life-long senator (Loveman, 199: 35-37; Angell, 1993: 563-564). In Central America the Nicaraguan Sandinistas, a revolutionary socialist party, made a surprise move by, first, calling for a general election and, later, accepting the electoral victory of its opponent, Violeta Chamorro (González Guerrero, 1991: 449-453; Paterson, 1997: 380-381).

By the early 1990s every state south of Mexico was at least nominally
democratic, a state of affairs unprecedented since the wars of independence of the early nineteenth century. The only significant Latin American countries to hold on to non-democratic rule in the mid-1990s were Cuba and Mexico. The president of Mexico claimed, however, to be opening up the system. For the first time publicly announced election results meant victory for candidates from opposition parties. In July 1999 the opposition “Alianza por el Cambio” won an important victory against the all-powerful Partido Revolucionario Institucional (Institutional Revolutionary Party) and gained the governorship of the State of Nayir, and in the State of Mexico the governing PRI won a very narrow victory. Finally, PRI lost the presidential elections held in June 2000 against Partido de Accion Nacional (El Pais, 02-6-00). There are two main reasons for the ongoing political changes in Mexico. The first is the change in the international context after the fall of Soviet empire and, second, the rise of a modernising society, which is the result of the economic growth which led to an “increasing participation of the middle classes in the benefits of the economic development” (Randall, 1996: 10).

1.3 Latin America: A political laboratory

With reference to democratization process, Latin America’s political history is very peculiar. Since independence Latin America has often experienced a swing between democracy and dictatorship, but the contemporary consciousness has been shaped by three swings of the pendulum since the World War II. Each of these swings went further toward democracy than the previous one. The first swing – at the beginning of 1944 – was the most precarious, but it still left an important psychological imprint on the youth of the region and probably made the second swing toward democracy in the late 1950s deeper. Similarly, the third one occurred in the 1970s (Munck, 1989: 25-26; Diamond & Linz, 1989: 1-2; see also Meyer, 1989).

The first swing begun in Guatemala in 1944. Venezuela followed in 1945. In Venezuela the dictator was overthrown and elections were held soon after; Costa Rica also joined the democratic club. In 1954 the army in Venezuela stopped following the orders of Jacobo Arbenz and gave their support to an insurgence financed by the

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United States. In 1948, when the democratic pendulum “swung back”, only Costa Rica remained democratic. In 1955 Perón fell in Argentina and other dictators also fell like dominoes – Gustabo Rojas Pinilla in Colombia, Marcos Pérez Jiménez in Venezuela, Manuel Odria in Peru, Getulio Vargas in Brazil, Fulgencio Batista in Cuba. Before Dominican democracy could even settle down after Trujillo’s death, Argentina’s military overthrew the government in March 1962. The military then also intervened in Peru. In the Dominican Republic in September 1963 the newly elected government was toppled by the military. A coup followed in Honduras, and, finally, the military intervened in Brazil in 1964. The military took power in fifteen out of twenty-one Latin American nations. When the pendulum swung back again, Venezuela and Colombia joined Costa Rica and other long-lasting democracies like Chile and Uruguay. The journey back to democracy started slowly but more uniformly.

In the 1970s the third swing towards democracy started. In 1974 General and President Ernesto Geisel gradually opened the Brazilian political system – abertura – until January 1985, when an opposition leader was elected president. In 1978 the Dominican Republic became democratic. In 1979 a social democrat leader was elected in Ecuador. In May 1980 Fernando Belaunde won the presidential election and was duly inaugurated. Other military governments in Honduras, Panama, El Salvador and Bolivia had agreed to open up their political systems. Argentina also democratised after the collapse of the military in the Malvinas war. In 1979 in Central and South America only Costa Rica, Venezuela, Colombia and Suriname were democratic. By 1988 all of South America was democratic, except Chile and Paraguay – they joined the club later – and Guyana and Suriname were taking steps toward democracy (Pastor, 1989b: 3-11; Smith, 1974: 241; Paz: 1983: 9; for comparative approaches see, for instance, Linz & Stepan, 1989 and Whitehead, 1989).

Generally, scholars have been more effective in explaining the previous swing of the pendulum than in predicting the next swing. The first swing was viewed as evidence of a universal movement toward democracy that accompanied the defeat of Germany, Italy and Japan. The reversal was interpreted in terms of the region’s chronic instability. Scholars understood the second swing in the 1960s in terms of a middle class challenging the agrarian oligarchy. It was seen as both a positive and an
inevitable result of the breakdown of a feudal political and economic system (see Porter & Alexander, 1961; Pastor 1989b). Scholars such as Huntington (1968), O'Donnell (1973), Smith (1974), Wiarda (1986), to mention but a few, did not foresee the return of democracy in the late 1970s.

A closer look at some examples may enable the reader to understand better the processes of the rise and collapse of democracy. The following examples have been chosen because they show how some democracies break down and others stabilise.

Venezuela October 18, 1945. A coup deposes government of President Isaias Medina Angaria. A Junta (military committee) led by the provisional President Rómulo Betancourt takes office. Important political and economical reforms are established. In January 1946 the Christian Democratic party, Comité de Organización Política Electoral Independiente, is established and becomes the most important party in opposition to Acción Democrática. On 15 March 1946 the electoral law is passed granting universal suffrage. On 14 December 1947 Rómulo Gallegos, Acción Democrática presidential candidate, wins the presidency. On 24 November 1948 a military coup overthrows the government of Rómulo Gallego. During the trienio (three-year period) this democracy had an extremely fragile base of legitimacy. The country had no previous experience in democracy (see Dahl, 1971). Few organised social or political groups had the skills or resources of mass organisation necessary to challenge the power of the new regime. Several important actors, particularly those whose interests had been protected under previous regimes, had not abandoned their ties to authoritarianism (Gibson, 1989: 159-163; Karl, 1987: 63-67; Levine, 1985: 47-89; 1989: 247).

Guatemala, 1954. Rebellions break out against the thirteen-year-old dictatorship of Jorge Ubico. A three-person Junta, which includes reformist officer Jacobo Arbenz and conservative officer Jorge Arana, assumes power and calls for elections. In December 1945 Juan José Arevalo is elected president with 85 % of the vote. A Democratic-reformist regime is inaugurated. On July 1949 Jorge Arana is murdered. Arbenz’s associates are implicated in the murder. Armed fights break out between the government and Arana’s supporters. Jacobo Arbenz assumes the presidency. In June 1952 the most extensive agrarian reform law in Guatemalan history is enacted. Part of the land held by the US-owned United Fruit Company is expropriated. Other
measures are taken to counter US economic influence in Guatemala. In January 1953 Dwight D. Eisenhower is inaugurated as president in the United States. Conflict with the US grows. During May-June 1954 the US exposes Czech arms shipment to Guatemala and denounces the government as a “communist beachhead in the Americas”. An anti-Arbenz invasion force, supported by the US government, enters Guatemala. On 27 June 1954 Arbenz resigns from the presidency following an ultimatum from his military high command. The 1954 overthrow of the constitutionally elected President of Guatemala, Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán, presents a clear case of a democratic regime breaking down through external force (Gibson, 1989: 169-172). As Linz and Stepan (1989: 41-61) noted, a democratic regime requires not merely the passive support of its followers, but their aggressive support in times of crisis.

Argentina, September 1955. The army stages a coup against Juan D. Perón and the government is overthrown. Two and half years later General Pedro Aramburu calls for presidential elections. Arturo Frondizi wins the election with over 50% of the vote. He is overthrown by a military coup following Peronist victories in congressional elections. From September 1962 to April 1963 armed clashes take place between the ‘Gorila’ faction of the armed forces, favouring the establishment of a military government and the ‘legalist’ faction. Clashes result in a decisive ‘legalist’ victory. Arturo Illia is elected to the presidency in March 1963. In March 1965 the Peronists gain decisive votes in congressional elections. In June 1966 President Illia is overthrown by a military coup. General Ongania is named president by the military Junta. The key task of democratic leaders between 1958 and 1966 was to expand the legitimacy of a system whose consolidation represented their only long-term hope of preserving political power. Their causes of failure to do so lay largely in the constraints imposed on them by the military and other powerful sectors (Gibson, 1989: 173-177; Waisan, 1989: 69-72).

Brazil, August 1961. Jânio Quadros, president of Brazil, resigns unexpectedly after half a year in government. In September, 1961 the Vice-President, assumes the presidency. In mid-1963 the stabilisation plan fails and the economic crisis grows. Political instability and mobilisation affect most of the country. On 13 March 1964 President Goulart tries to enact basic reforms in the nation’s constitution and
economy. He calls for massive demonstrations and nation-wide strikes to pressure Congress to support the reforms. In March 1964 an enlisted men's naval mutiny takes place in support of the Goulart government. The government guarantees amnesty to the mutineers. On 31 March 1964 a military coup overthrows the government of President Jânio Quadros. The collapse of the Brazilian constitutional regime in 1964 was a direct result of actions taken by the incumbent leadership, particularly during the final weeks of the regime, which eroded the legitimacy of the government and generated a critical mass of support for a military coup. The mobilisation, far from serving as a manifestation of support, gave the impression that the political process was no longer being controlled by the constitutional leadership. This case also exemplifies the possibility of a democratic breakdown in an industrialising country (Mauceri, 1989: 217-221; Lamounier, 1989: 124-127).

Costa Rica, 1948. In presidential elections Otilio Ulate (PUN party) gains a short-lived victory over Dr. Rafael Angel Calderón Guardia (PRN party). PRN-controlled Congress overturned the results claiming fraud in the elections and declared Calderón Guardia the winner. During March 1948 to April 1948 the opposition candidates José Figueres Ferrer (PSD) and Otilio Ulate (PUN) formed an alliance and established an army to defeat Calderón. Civil war conditions arise in San José. In May 1948 a Junta is established with Figueres as president. Constituent Assembly elections result in Ulate's forces controlling the assembly. An invasion by PRN forces from Nicaragua is defeated. The new constitution abolishing the armed forces is adopted and Ulate assumes the presidency. In July 1953 Figueres and his newly formed PLN win the presidency with 65 % of the vote and enact a reform program involving new taxes and wage increases. In early 1955 remnants of Calderón's forces invade Costa Rica with four hundred men and support from Somoza. The invasion is terminated after the United States and the Organisation of American States (OAS hereafter) censure it. In July 1958 Mario Echandi (PUN) is elected president with 46 % of the vote. The PLN remains the largest party in the Legislative Assembly with twenty seats, though a Calderón-Ulate alliance gives control to the government. July 1962-1966: Presidency of Francisco Orlich Bolmarcich (PLN). July 1966-1970: Presidency of José Joaquín Trejos (PUN). July 1970: José Figueres Ferrés (PLN) is elected president for a second time with 55 % of the vote. Costa Rica has a long history of democracy after the 1948 Revolution. Since
1949 several peaceful transfers of presidential power have occurred (Mauceri, 1989: 204-208; López, 1996: 115-120). According to Huntington’s (1993) “two turn-overs” thesis 3 this country could be considered as democratically consolidated.

Venezuela, December 1957-January 1958. A meeting in New York among Venezuela’s three major party leaders leads to an agreement on cooperating for a transition to democracy. This was followed by the publication of a “Declaration Concerning the National Political Situation” in which business leaders urge an end to the dictatorship. In late January 1958 the regime of General Pérez Jiménez is overthrown and a transitional Junta is installed. Between July 1958 and October 1958 two coup attempts by forces loyal to the former dictator are thwarted. The Pact of “Punto Fijo” (fixed point), in which the parties decide to co-operate during the consolidation period is signed. In December 1958 Rómulo Betancourt of Acción Democrática (AD) receives 49.2 % of the vote in the presidential elections and leads a coalition government of AD and Comité de Organización Política Independiente (COPEI). An agrarian reform law is enacted. Splits in AD over the Cuban issue lead to urban disturbances and insurgency. In December 1963 Raúl Leoni (AD) is elected president with 32.8 % of the vote: He governs with COPEI co-operation. In December 1968 Rafael Caldera is elected president and power is transferred peacefully for the first time. The insurgent groups are largely defeated and given the option of entering the electoral system, which most accept. In May 1973 the Presidential candidacy of former dictator Pérez Jiménez is prohibited by constitutional reform. In December 1973, Carlos Andrés Pérez is elected president with 48.6 % of the votes. Venezuela’s stable democracy rests on a strong multiparty system that promotes the sharing of democratic norms and acts as conflict regulator in society. Since 1958, it has maintained its democracy through several peaceful transfers of presidential power (Mauceri, 1989: 217-221). However, in 1999 General Hugo Vázquez – the President – claimed that people “were requesting” the president to stage a Fujimorazo (executive coup), although surveys reveal that more than 80 % of the population supports democracy and few people supported his various attempts at staging a coup in previous years (before winning the elections) (El País, 02-7-99). In July 1999, the electorate banished traditional parties from the political sphere and gave nearly

3 This theory implies that a democracy in which political power has been transferred peacefully twice can be considered as consolidated (see Huntington, 1993).
complete power to Hugo Vázquez (El País, 27-7-99; McCoy, 1999: 64-65; see also Norden, 1989: 43-44; 161-162).

_Brazil, January 1974- November 1974._ General Ernesto Geisel is inaugurated as president and initiates a policy of _abertura_. The opposition party MDB captures sixteen of twenty-two contested Senate seats in congressional elections. In April 1977 the “April package” is announced by Geisel, reducing the congress and the opposition power. This is followed by riots and demonstrations during the summer. In December 1977 new laws are enacted, substituting the former Institutional Acts. The reform of the party system is also announced. In January 1978 President João Figueiredo is inaugurated. In elections in November 1982 the opposition parties gain twenty of twenty-two governorships, while the regime maintains its majorities in Congress and the state assemblies. In January 1984 a demonstration of two hundred thousand people in São Paulo pushes for presidential elections. An amendment demanding direct elections is defeated in the regime-controlled Congress. In January 1985 Tancredo Neves, the leader of the opposition party (PMDB) is elected president in the electoral college by a 450-180 margin. After the death of Tancredo, his vice-president José Sarney is inaugurated. In February 1986 President Sarney announces “Plan Cruzado” (Crossed Plan), a economic programme to control persistent inflation (Mauceri, 1989: 222-225; Munck, 1989: 130-136).

_Argentina_, March 1981- July 1981. General Roberto Viola assumes the presidency. Viola’s overtures to the opposition consisted of the formation of the _Multipartidaria_ (party alliance) to negotiate a return to democracy. In December 1981 Galtieri (hard-line faction) replaces Viola in the _Junta_ and he is inaugurated as president. He imposes an austerity program. Talks of transition come to an end. Anti-regime demonstrations begin and the parties toughen their positions. During April 1982 to July 1982 Argentina invades the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands. The British naval forces arrive and surround Argentina’s troops, who surrender at Port Stanley. Galtieri resigns and is eventually replaced by General Bignone. Between September 1982 and December 1982 demonstrations and strikes increase and an election timetable is announced. In October 1983, Raúl Alfonsin wins the presidency with 52% of the vote. In June 1985, “Plan Austral” is approved by President Alfonsin to

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4 Argentina is used again. Now it serves as an example of stable democracy.
control inflation and increase economic confidence. The austerity measures include a
new currency, wage and price freezes and budgets cuts. Between March and April
1987 a series of rebellions by junior military officers takes place, protesting
prosecutions for actions taken during the rule of the military regime. Argentina’s road
to democracy was characterised by deep cleavages both in the military and among
political parties. The country remains democratic (Munck, 1989: 102-122; Mauceri,

It is remarkable that Latin American democracies have survived at all considering
the enormous stresses that they have experienced over the past decade – economic
recession, increase in poverty, drug trade, violence and corruption. This can be
viewed as a sign of the regularisation and maturation of democratic politics not seen
in previous eras. However, stagnation and erosion are offsetting liberalisation and
consolidation. Many of the new democracies are in serious trouble in the 1990s
(Arimateia de Cruz, 1993: 145-147). For instance, the autogolpe (coup staged by the
president) of President Alberto Fujimori of Peru was preceded by years of steady
deterioration in political rights and civil liberties. Historically, the path to military
coups and other forms of democratic breakdown has been strewn with problems such
as the growth of corruption, malfunctioning of democratic institutions, popular
disaffection with politics, etc. (Palmer, 1992: 378); Colombia’s politics comes close
to what may be defined as civil war and, in general, there are “important signs of
violent democratic involution and anything can be expected” (Página 12, 13-7-99);
and, in Ecuador, also in 1999, the Minister of Defence, General José Gallardo, has
hinted at the risk of a coup against the president, Jamil Mahuad (El País, 17-7-99).
This finally occurred in January 2000 (El País, 22-01-00).

As seen above, the road to democratisation is not easy path and countries have to
face many problems if stability is to be reached. The main causes, reasons or
problems that, historically, challenged democracy can be summarised as follows. The
first long “wave of democratisation” (Huntington, 1991a) that begun in the early
nineteenth century led to the triumph of democracy in some 30 countries by 1920.
However, authoritarianism and the rise of fascism in the 1920s (beginning with
Mussolini’s march on Rome) and the 1930s reduced the number of democracies in the
world to about a dozen by 1942. The second, short wave of democratisation after the
second World War again increased the number of democracies to over 30, but this too was followed by the collapse of democracy in many of these countries. The third wave of democratisation that begun in Portugal in 1974, with the “Revolution of the Carnations”, has seen democratisation occur much faster and on a scale far surpassing that of the previous waves. Two decades ago less than 30 % of the countries in the world were democratic; now more than 60 % have governments produced by some form of open, fair and competitive elections. Nevertheless, by 1990 at least two third-wave democracies, Sudan and Nigeria, had reverted to authoritarian rule; the difficulties of consolidation could lead to further breakdowns in countries with favourable conditions for sustaining democracy (Huntington, 1996: 3-4; Diamond, 1996: 30-33). Moreover, in Latin America the signs of “involution” can be seen all over (Página 12, 13-7-99).

Among the factors leading to the breakdown of democracies one can mention the low commitment to democracy among both the elite and the general public; an economic crisis that intensifies social conflict and heightens the popularity of remedies that can be imposed only by authoritarian governments; and terrorism, insurgency, intervention, conquest or “reverse snowballing” (Huntington, 1996: 7).

Coups can be carried out by the army or by the executive itself. Military coups are responsible for the end of democratic systems in the new countries of Eastern Europe and in Greece, Portugal, Argentina, Japan, Indonesia, Pakistan, Greece, Nigeria, Turkey and in many countries in Latin America. Executive coups occurred in Korea, India, the Philippines or Peru. In Asia and the Middle East elected leaders themselves have also been responsible for ending democracy, Syngman Rhee and Park Chung Hee in Korea, Adnan Menderes in Turkey, Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines, Lee Kwan Yew in Singapore or Sukarno in Indonesia (Huntington, 1996: 9).

A reverse snowballing can also be of great importance. If a non-democratic country (i.e. China) greatly increased its power and began to expand beyond its borders, this too could stimulate authoritarian movements in other countries. For

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*For instance, the economic progress of an undemocratic country may incite others to follow the same track.*
instance, the establishment of an authoritarian regime in India could have a
significant demonstration effect on other Third World countries. In this regard Italy
and Germany in the 1920s and the 1930s and Brazil and Argentina in the 1960s and
1970s were leading countries in introducing these new forms of non-democratic rule
and became the examples to be emulated by anti-democratic groups in other countries
(Huntington, 1996: 16).

The cultural obstacles also need to be taken into account. The Western culture
thesis has direct implications for democratisation. Western Christianity, feudalism,
the Reformation, the Enlightenment, the French Revolution and liberalism (all of
them implicit in the notion of democracy) are Western European ideas, not Asian or
African, which may entail an extra handicap if democracy is to be introduced in these
areas. In this regard the words of Mr Anyaoku, former Nigerian Secretary-General of
the Commonwealth, are interesting: “I do not know of any African language whose
political lexicon includes the concept of a ‘leader of a loyal opposition’. Instead there
is a clear concept of political enemy” (The Economist, 22-02-99).

Nationalism also plays a role. The election process pushes political leaders to
compete for votes. In many situations the easiest way to win votes is to appeal to
tribal, ethnic and religious constituencies (Casas-Pérez, 1996: 71-72; MacFarlane,
1997: 400-401; 411-417; Denitch, 1996: 459; McCracken, 1998: 231-249). In this
context politicians competing for office have little choice and finally end up asking
for votes in these terms (Burg, 1991: 6-14). In non-western societies the introduction
of democracy facilitates the coming to power of groups that appeal to indigenous
ethnic and religious loyalties and are very likely to be anti-Western and anti-
democratic. The Algerian case in 1992 is a good example of this (Mortimer, 1997:
231-235; see also Brumberg, 1991).

Threats to present-day democracies are likely to come from participants in the
democratic process. These are the political leaders and groups who win elections, take
power and then manipulate the mechanisms of democracy. In the past, when
democratic regimes fell as a result of coups or revolutions, there was no doubt as to
what had occurred. The authoritarian regime was implanted clearly and drastically.

The problem now is not overthrow but erosion, in other words the intermittent or gradual weakening of democracy by those elected to lead it. The erosion of Argentina's democracy is a clear example (O'Donnell, 1994: 67). The return of former communist parties to some countries in Central and Eastern Europe, such as Poland, also needs to be considered. In Central and Eastern Europe this should be understood as simply "political punishment" by the electorate of the parties in office as a result of the lack of improvement in the economic situation and not as a willing to return to a Communist system (Olias, 1996: 89-91).

Another potential threat to new democracies comes from the electoral victory of parties or movements apparently committed to anti-democratic ideologies. This possibility arises most strongly with Islamic fundamentalist groups. In Algeria in 1992 the army cancelled the election that the Islamic Salvation Front (ISF) was certain to win (Mortimer, 1997: 231-235).

Also dangerous is executive arrogation, which occurs when an elected chief executive concentrates power in his own hands, subordinates or even suspends the legislature, and rules largely by decree. In 1995 the president of Colombia, faced with charges of massive drug-related corruption, declared a state of emergency and announced that he would rule by decree for the next three months. Four years later the situation in Colombia was close to civil war. In the most extreme case President Alberto Fujimori carried out a full-scale executive coup in Peru. He suspended the legislative and judicial branches and political parties, imprisoned politicians and intellectuals, censored the media, and drastically curtailed human rights (Mauceri, 1995: 7-33). In the same way President Ménem of Argentina was re-elected largely on the basis of results he achieved by the use of undemocratic means such as constitutional amendments to allow himself to be a presidential candidate again, etc. (O'Donnell, 1994: 67; Schmitter, 1994: 61). In Venezuela there was an attempt to stage a coup by the army (El País, 07-7-99) and in Ecuador a coup was finally staged in January 2000 (El País, 22-01-00).

1.4 Conditions for democracy

As mentioned above, democracy is clearly not always part of the natural order of life. This non-democratic condition remained the situation in virtually all the countries
of the world until well into the nineteenth century. There is no proof that democracy is inevitable, irrevocable or a historical necessity (Schmitter, 1994: 57). Why, then, did the situation change?

In searching for clues it is possible for the social scientist to point out the differences in the countries where democracy now prevails compared with the days when it did not. Most of these countries underwent industrialisation, migration to urban areas, vast educational expansion, longer life expectancy and, of course, improvements in material well-being and increased leisure time. This enabled people to think more of their requirements and aspirations beyond mere survival. Society has also been transformed in terms of the social groups which exist and the ways in which they interact with each other. While the former relationship between lord and peasant could remain virtually static for years, the relations between different sections of the middle and working classes are today less bound by tradition and are more likely to be characterised by conflicting demands, which governments are expected to resolve. The political attitudes and actual behaviour of these social groups are also to be considered as there is an expectation of governmental responsiveness rather than fatalistic acceptance, especially if the groups have the means of articulating their demands and threatening sanctions if they are not met. Such articulation and the governmental responses to it are possible because of the existence of a complex network of political institutions both within the formal state structure and in the "political sub-system" of groups from the wider society interacting with it. Finally, it follows that if the economic conditions and the political structure in a society are different from those prevailing in pre-democratic times, a variety of different changes must have occurred at different times to bring about this transformation.

It has not been the intention of this research so far to demonstrate that democracy was the result of a process of cause and effect. It has simply noted a correlation between democratic development and other developments, but even here there are exceptions. Nevertheless, in trying to generalise, it is possible, at least, to enumerate the "ingredients that are commonly found in the democratic cake, even if we are not yet in a position to specify the proportions in which they may be best combined, or to offer a recipe to show how they should be processed" (Pinkney, 1994: 20).

There are numerous theories and explanations of democratisation but it has been
difficult for researches to agree on the most appropriate theoretical interpretation of democratisation. Actually, various theoretical approaches compete with each other. The necessary conditions (if any) to be achieved by a democratic regime that strives to remain stable in time have been one of the main subjects of study of political scientists. Among these conditions are economic development; political attitudes; inter-elite relations; social structure and interactions between social groups; political institutions; sequences in development and external influences. These conditions are explained below.

1.4.1 Economic development

It is certainly true that virtually all the countries of Western Europe, North America and the Old Commonwealth have achieved substantial economic development and arrived at the democratic destination despite their different starting points, different problems along the way and the different beliefs and responses of political actors, but the question of causality has still not been resolved.

Aristotle already associated variations in political systems with variations in social conditions, particularly the relative strength of the rich, the poor and the middle class. He assumed that the best type of political system would be possible in circumstances in which wealth in the hands of the few would lead to extreme democracy, oligarchy or tyranny (see Aristotle, 1962).

Schumpeter (1947) was sure that modern capitalism led to modern democracy, but he was not sure about how democracy was related to socialism. However, he concluded that "socialist democracy may eventually turn out to be more of a sham than capitalist democracy ever was" (Schumpeter, 1947: 284, 296-297, 103; see also Heilbroner, 1981; Haberler, 1981).

Lipset (1959; 1981), whose work was based on Schumpeter's ideas, was one of the first researchers to set some social requirements for democracy if any democracy was to remain stable. Economic development emerges as the main determinant for the future stability of the political democracy. Thus he states that "the more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy" (Lipset, 1959: 56). However, he noted that it would be very difficult to ascertain any one factor critically associated with the emergence of democracy, because many factors may represent the
initial conditions of democracy (Lipset, 1959, 1963). He refers (1981) to several authors who have found a positive relationship between economic development and democracy, confirming the findings of his original study (1959). Thus, for him the association between stable democracy and indicators of national wealth, communication, industrialisation, education and urbanisation has been amply confirmed. He thinks that democratic attitudes and beliefs serve as intervening mechanisms between economic development and democracy. It should be noted that, in addition to economic development, he stresses the significance of political development, the significance of political culture, legitimacy and suitable institutions as conditions of democracy (Lipset, 1994).

In a later study (Lipset et al., 1995) confirmed his original findings but emphasises that economic development alone does not produce democratisation. Other relevant factors including national idiosyncrasies, the role played by historical, cultural and political factors and the behaviour of leaders – all of them discussed below – in advancing or obstructing democratisation in a country. However, he still regards economic development as the crucial factor.

Schweinitz (1964) is of the opinion that the emergence of political democracy in the Western world was intimately related to industrialisation. It created new social classes and empowered workers and other unprivileged groups educationally, economically and organisationally to enable them to demand a greater share of welfare and political power. Economic growth provided the means to make compromises. The extension of the franchise and the reforms of the representative institutions of government were responses to pressure from below. He assumes that, because of the many obstructions to development and growth, countries undertaking industrialisation in the present century are not likely to follow the same road to democracy.

Diamond (1992) showed that there is a strong causal relationship between economic development and democracy. Furthermore, he thinks that economic development continues being the most powerful predictor of the likelihood of democracy. Diamond (1992) re-evaluated Lipset's (1959) thesis and tested it against new empirical evidence. The development-democracy linkage was even stronger when the Human Development Index (HDI) constructed by the United Nations
Development Program (1991) was used as an indicator of development. The HDI had a substantially higher correlation (0.71) with the combined index of political freedom than GNP (0.51). Diamond argued that a country’s level of human development or physical quality of life predicts its likelihood of being democratic and its level of political freedom better than its per capita level of income. He finally re-formulates Lipset’s thesis in a different way: “The more well-to-do the people of a country, on average, the more likely they will favour, achieve, and maintain a democratic system for their country” (Diamond, 1992: 125-128).

1.4.2 Political attitudes and behaviour

Almond and Verba’s (1963) *The Civic Culture* shifted the focus from the economy to the desire of people to accept government by consent as a means of resolving conflict. There is no obvious reason why such a willingness should entail having a high per capita income. The ancient Greeks managed to sustain such a culture, whereas relatively wealthy people in modern Cyprus or Northern Ireland have been unable to agree on who should rule over whom or by what means. Greater wealth may help to take the rough edges off political conflict because differences between winning and losing are less a matter of life and death, but whether one is willing to compromise with one’s adversaries and to concede advantages to them as a result of majority decisions or the working of constitutional checks and balances will depend on a variety of cultural and historical factors.

Pennock (1979) remarks that it may be impossible to say of any particular condition that it is either “necessary” nor “sufficient” for either the establishment or the maintenance of a democratic regime. This is so because most of the conditions are matters of degree and they tend, within limits, to be mutually interchangeable. Besides, the conditions for democracy are not necessarily the same at all times and in all places. Pennock refers to many types of assumed conditions for democracy. They are classified into historical and political factors, socio-economic factors and political culture, which includes a collection of individual characteristics, values, attitudes, beliefs, myths, sentiments and ideologies. For him, “the most likely candidates for ‘necessary’ are to be found under the heading ‘political culture’, whereas none of the items discussed under the headings ‘history’ or ‘socio-economic conditions’ qualifies as necessary” (Pennock, 1979: 210). He analyses Aristotle’s work and asserts that,
according to him, Aristotle believed that for the most part political attitudes were determined by economic interest – not the quantity, but the distribution of wealth (Pennock, 1979: 206-259).

Gastil (1985) argues strongly that democratisation may depend on the diffusion of democratic ideas more than on any socio-economic factors. The future of democracy is, then, related to the continuing strength of this diffusion (see also Fossedal, 1989).

1.4.3 Inter-elite relations

For Rustow (1970) certain ingredients are indispensable for democracy: A sense of national unity; the termination of entrenched and serious conflict; a conscious adoption of democratic rules; and, politicians and the electorate must be habituated to these rules.

Rustow (1973), like Almond and Verba, puts the emphasis on a willingness to compromise by admitting democratic rules, but with a greater emphasis on groups as collective bodies or on elites leading the groups than on a collection of individual attitudes. In Rustow’s model a prolonged and inconclusive struggle between groups ends when neither genocide nor expulsion (nor, presumably secession) is possible. Decisions are thus taken to come to terms with the situation by agreeing to peaceful competition for power. This requires the adoption of democratic rules, including the appropriate checks and balances, and the protections of rights. Once such a framework is in place, it may be consolidated by subsequent generations of politicians, elites and voters, and may be adapted to bring previously excluded groups, such as the poorer classes, into the political process.

O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986) also pay attention to the crucial role of the political leadership in the final stages of transitions from authoritarian rule to democracy.

1.4.4 Social structures and interactions between social groups

Moore (1966) studied the social origins of dictatorships and democracies in England, France, the United States, China, Japan and India. He attempted especially
to explain the diverse political roles played by the landed upper classes and the peasantry in the transformation from agrarian to modern industrial societies. He stated five conditions that have apparently been crucial to the development of democracy. They are the development of a balance to avoid a too strong crown or a too independent landed aristocracy; a shift towards an appropriate form of commercial agriculture; the weakening of the landed aristocracy; the prevention of an aristocratic-bourgeois coalition against the peasantry and workers; and, a revolutionary break with the past. He assumes that western feudalism contained certain institutions that distinguished it from other societies in such a way as to give it democratic potential. The main aspect of western feudalism was “the growth of the notion of the immunity of certain groups and persons from the power of the ruler, along with the conception of the right of resistance to unjust authority”. He emphasises the role of revolution (Moore, 1966: 415; 430-431; 505-508).

Moore, like Rustow, focuses on the interaction between groups in society, but with greater emphasis on whole social groups rather than elites (Moore, 1966: 413-470). While Rustow sees democracy as evolving out of reconciliation, Moore sees it as emerging out of revolution, with the victories of the Puritans in England, the Jacobins in France and the antislavery states in the United States paving the way for democratic development. He offers an elaborated model in which democracy is facilitated by the emergence of a strong bourgeoisie, or an aristocracy engaging in commerce and a curtailing of feudal tendencies by the counterweight of the monarchy, in contrast to the communist model, where the aristocracy remained indifferent to commerce and a large peasant mass survived, thus facilitating revolution in the absence of a safety valve of bourgeois democracy. This is also in contrast to the fascist model, where the upper class used political and social levers to keep the labour force on the land and make the transition to commercial farming in this (non-market-oriented) way. This, together with industrial growth, which was again presumably controlled by the levers of state power rather than market forces, again left limited room for an autonomous bourgeoisie (Moore, 1966: 413-422). Democracy today, has spread through conquest and contagion to many lands, as Moore suggests, but its survival can not be attributed to conquest and contagion alone.

Karl (1991) applies Moore’s (1966) thesis to explain Latin America’s different
political trajectories in Central America. Specifically, democracy is supposed to have emerged in Costa Rica due to the creation of a yeoman farmer class, while the persistence of authoritarian rule in Guatemala and El Salvador is attributed to the continued dominance of the landed aristocracy.

Kornhauser (1960) assumed that democracy originates in a pluralist society. He states that "where the introduction of democratic rule is based on a pluralistic society, especially a balance of classes and religious groups, it will tend to be strong and viable, but where its introduction is not accompanied by multiple independent groups capable of fighting for the sustenance of individual rights, and at the same time ready to support a basic framework of authority, democracy may readily lose out to new forms of autocracy" (Kornhauser, 1960: 131, 141).

Wittfogel (1963) traced the origins of Oriental despotism to the extreme concentration of the control of the strategic means of production, especially cultivable land, in the hands of the Oriental state. He associated democracy with multicentered society.

1.4.5 Political Institutions

Systems of representation, arrangements for the division and supervision of powers and methods of organising interests, as well as legal doctrines and the rights and obligations associated with citizenship, can and do vary widely among regimes that are generally recognised as democratic. This raises the question: Which institutions have what effect under which historical conditions? More concretely, it is possible to ask whether it can be expected that a democracy will last longer under presidentialism than under parliamentarism. Linz addresses this question and gives several reasons why parliamentary democracies should prove more durable than presidential ones (see Linz, 1990a; 1990b).

Under presidentialism, the election is a race, which can only have a single winner. In a presidential democracy the loser has no role in politics afterwards, and will most probably not even be a member of the legislature, whereas in parliamentary democracy the defeated candidate for the premiership will be the leader of the opposition. Furthermore, the fixed term of office under a presidential democracy is generally longer than in parliamentary regimes. Finally, in a presidential system "the
chief of the executive is at the time the head of the State, thus being able to portray the president's partisan interest and thereby undermine the legitimacy afforded to the opposition" (Przeworski, 1991: 44; see also Linz, 1990a; 1990b).

Another reason why presidential democracies may be less durable is that they are more likely to generate legislative paralysis. However, this can occur under any regime, since in a parliamentary democracy it may happen that no majority is formed.

Heper (1991) argues that material wealth, democratic attitudes and an interdependent relationship between social groups will be of little use in facilitating democracy unless institutions evolve that can translate political choices, demands and decisions into actual "outputs" via institutions such as parties, pressure groups, legislature and bureaucracies, whose roles and existence are accepted by most of the population. Stephens' (1989) study of Latin America offers a useful detailed complement to Heper's work.

1.4.6 External Influences

No scholar, to the author's knowledge, has offered external influences as a primary explanation of democratisation, but it is obvious from what has been said that democracy would have not taken root when it did in many countries without the impact of external forces. These may be direct, as with the allied occupation of the former fascist countries after 1945, or they may involve sanctions against non-democratic governments in the form of trade boycotts and the withholding of aid and investment, actual or threatened, as in Chile and South Africa, or they may merely be the influence of ideas and political practices (Pinkney, 1994: 24).

This is not to say that "Western" pressure has been entirely on the side of the democrats. United States support for the Contra terrorists who opposed the elected government in Nicaragua had much to do with the electorate's eventual decision to remove the Sandinista Government in the hope of ending terrorism and the economic deprivation that went with fighting terrorism. It is also possible to argue that American support for the ruling elites in Guatemala and El Salvador has provided them with a life-line and enabled them to use repression rather than reconciliation in dealing with the opposition, which in turn has continued to resort the violence in the belief that it would not be allowed to compete in free and fair elections (see Mauceri,
External pressures can quite easily be brought to bear on a country to democratise through means such as economic sanctions and support for subversion or even invasion, but their ability to create a democracy is more limited. By its nature external pressure cannot be imposed, as can authoritarianism, and external forces can only help if some of the preconditions are already present (Huntington, 1991a: 14).

1.4.7 Evolution theory

The work of some authors such as Hamilton (1978) or Alexander (1979a; 1979b) is based on an evolutionary theory. This implies the assumption that various forms of political systems have evolved in the continuous struggle for power. Political systems can be regarded as behaviour patterns characteristics of a species.

In an attempt to explain this view Vanhanen (1984: 16) asserts that “a power structure reflects the way in which power is distributed among various sections and competing groups in a society. This structure is tested in the daily struggle for power and is continually adjusted to actual changes in the relative strengths of competing groups. The process of continuous change is analogous to a process of differential reproduction of variants”. The elements and characteristics of political systems that are “better adjusted to actual relations of strength between competitors tend to appear more frequently and gradually to become predominant. If one group is able to subjugate other sections of the population and to establish its hegemony, we can expect structures and institutions to emerge reflecting this state of affairs. On the contrary, if no single group is able to achieve a hegemonic position in the struggle for power, it is expected that political institutions that regulate the sharing of power between the principal competitors will emerge. Thus, natural selection in politics leads to the survival of the better adapted power structures” (Vanhanen, 1984: 16).

Darwin's (1981) theory states that the scarcity of resources makes the struggle for survival universal and inevitable. The struggle for power is but one form of the general struggle for existence. We struggle for power because we can use it to get other scarce resources. In politics natural selection implies daily and hourly scrutiny throughout the political world, rewarding with greater power those who are stronger or in some other way better adapted to their environment and removing power from
those who are weaker or in some way less well adapted to their environment. The struggle for power is the main mechanism of this selection. Consciously or not, the participants in this struggle try to use all available means to increase their own power. The more effective power resources a group has, the more power it will get. Actual power structures vary greatly, but this "behavioural characteristic" is common to all of them. It forms the constant thread, which runs through all power structures and makes them regular and predictable. According to this, political systems are products of evolution through the struggle of power. That struggle is universal and inevitable because all living organisms have evolved to compete for scarce resources. Natural selection in politics selects and supports power structures, which are in harmony with the actual relations of strength among the competitors. Power relations are in accordance with the distribution of power resources. When sanctions are widely distributed, conditions are favourable for the sharing of power; if, on the contrary, they are concentrated, conditions are favourable for more hegemonic and autocratic power structures. Democracy will emerge under conditions where power resources have become so widely distributed that no group is any longer able to suppress its competitors or to maintain its hegemony. Under those conditions the competitors have to agree to share power with each other. For Vanhanen this is a condition of incipient democracy (see Dawkins, 1979; Barash, 1981; Vanhanen, 1984; 1997).

1.4.8 Mixed approaches

Some other authors offer a "mixed recipe" for the democratic "cake".

Bryce (1921) did not provide any precondition for democracy, but he gave various reasons for the progress of popular government from its beginning in the eleventh century in Italy to its status in the early 1900s. The first is the influence of religious ideas; second, the discontent with royal or oligarchic misgovernment and consequent efforts at reform; the third is social and political conditions favouring equality, etc.

Dahl (1971), in his well known Polyarchy, argues that democratisation cannot be explained by any single causal factor and that several different conditions should be taken into account. He differentiated several sets of conditions and assumed that if all of them were favourable, a country would have many opportunities to establish and
maintain polyarchy, and vice versa. In his later study, *Democracy and its critics* (1989), he continues the same line of argument. He links democracy to environmental conditions, but not to any single explanatory factor. The first favourable condition is that the means of violence are dispersed or neutralised. The second condition concerns the nature of a society. A modern dynamic pluralist society, in which wealth, income, education and status are dispersed among groups and individuals, provides a favourable condition for democracy. Such a society disperses power sufficiently to inhibit its monopolisation by any single group, although it does not necessarily eliminate significant inequalities in the distribution of power. Thirdly, cultural homogeneity facilitates democracy, while cultural differences obstruct it. However, he notes that under certain conditions democracy can survive, despite sub-cultural pluralism. The fourth condition deals with the beliefs of the political activists. A country is very likely to develop and maintain democracy if it possesses a political culture and values, particularly among the political leaders, which support the institution of democracy. The next condition would be foreign control or influences.

All the conditions set by Dahl are relevant for democracy, although the problem is how to operationalise and measure/compare them. Beside, some of these conditions are not equally relevant for all countries (see O'Regan, 1992, Vanhanen, 1997).

Huntington (1984) is of the opinion that it is not easy to explain democratisation with any coherent theory because there are too many factors that can promote/obstruct democratisation. He refers to Rustow (1970), who criticised studies that focus on the preconditions of democracy and regard them primarily as economic, social, cultural and psychological, but he also emphasises the significance of the political process of democratisation. Concerning preconditions, he points out that the emergence of democracy is helped by higher levels of economic well-being, the absence of extreme inequalities in wealth and income, greater influence vis-à-vis the society of existing democratic states and a culture that is less monistic and more tolerant of diversity and compromise. However, he notes that no single one of these conditions can lead a country to democracy, although a market economy may be a necessary condition. Regarding the political process, he says that a central requirement would be that either the established elites after an authoritarian regime or the successor elites after an authoritarian system collapses see their interests served by the introduction of
democratising institutions. Pessimistically, he assumed in 1984 that the limits, with a few exceptions, of democratic development in the world might have been reached (Huntington, 1984). The collapse of the Soviet Empire a few years later, for instance, proved Huntington’s (1984) prophecy to be wrong.

The prospects for democracy have always been difficult to predict. Six years before Huntington’s article, Buultjens (1978) had presented even gloomier predictions on the future of democracy. He regarded democracy as an endangered species and argued that, in the modern world, democracy is fast losing out to other political orders and there is little indication of any mass movement toward the full restoration of democracy where it has been lost or even its revitalisation where it exists. He failed, as did Huntington (1984), in his prediction.

In a later work Huntington (1991a) analyses the “three” waves of democratisation since the last century and tried to explain the causes and the consequences. He reiterates his idea that causes of democracy differs substantially from one place to another and from one time to another (Huntington, 1991a: 30-38). Therefore, it is hardly possible to find – according to him – a common independent variable that could explain democratisation in all countries. The following summarises his arguments:

No single factor is sufficient to explain the development of democracy in all countries or even a single country. Furthermore, no single factor is necessary for the development of democracy in all countries. Moreover, democratisation in each country is the result of a combination of causes. Actually, the combination of causes producing democracy varies from country to country and generally the combination of causes responsible for one wave of democratisation differs from that responsible for other waves. The causes responsible for the initial regime changes in a democratisation wave are likely to differ from those responsible for later regime changes in that wave (Huntington, 1991a: 38).

He explains the third wave of democratisation by referring to many different causal factors, including the declining legitimacy of non-democratic rule, economic development effects (or snowball effect), the significance of political leaders and a strong middle class. Particularly, he pays attention to the process of democratisation
and draws a distinction between broad-based economic development involving significant industrialisation and development based on the sale of oil (Huntington, 1991a: 65). This is especially interesting since he directs attention to the structural consequences of economic development, i.e. to the fact that the control of economic resources becomes diversified (Vanhanen, 1997: 17).

Sancton (1987: 28) set as necessary conditions a “fairly high level of economic development, a strong middle class, a tradition of tolerance and respect for the individual, the presence of independent social groups and institutions, a market-oriented economy and the existence of elites willing to give up power” (Sancton, 1987). Sancton’s formulation represents the central arguments of the development paradigm. However, *The Latin American Dependency* by Frank (1967) challenged development theory in the 1960s and claimed that global capitalism was the cause of underdevelopment in the Third World (see also O’Donnell, 1973; dos Santos, 1993; Wallerstein, 1982; 1993).

Diamond, *et al.* (1988) sought to explain whether, why and to what extent democracy has evolved and taken root in the vastly different cultural and historical soils of twenty-six nations. They assume that multiple factors can facilitate or obstruct the emergence, installation and consolidation of democracy. As a starting point, they refer to the theoretical dimensions associated with democracy in various theoretical and empirical works: (1) political culture, regime legitimacy and effectiveness; (2) historical developments (specifically the colonial experience); (3) class structure and the degree of inequality; (4) national structure (ethnic, racial, regional and religious cleavage) and state structure, centralisation and strength (including the state role in the economy, the roles of autonomous voluntary associations and the press, federalism and the role of the armed forces); (5) political and constitutional structure (parties, electoral systems, the judiciary); (6) political leadership; (7) development performance; and, (8) international factors.

In a later study based on twenty-six countries, Diamond *et al.* (1990) listed the following facilitating and obstructing factors for democratic development: (1) legitimacy and performance; (2) political leadership; (3) political culture, social structure and socio-economic development; (4) associational life, state and society; (5) political institutions; (6) ethnic and regional conflicts; (7) the army; and, (8) the
international factor.

Their list of relevant factors does not constitute any clear theory of democratisation, but implies that there is not any single factor by which democratisation can be explained in any country (see Cammack, 1994).

Others like Przeworski and colleagues (Przeworski et al., 1996) enlarge the scope of conditions and include aspects related to the income share, the international climate, the "political learning" and the role played by institutions. They find that democracies tend to remain more stable in those countries where income inequality decreases over time. (According to their analysis, democracies are expected to endure 84 years in declining-inequality countries and 22 years in increasing-inequality countries.)

International conditions are an important factor to be taken into account. Furthermore, according to them such conditions can predict regime survival better than level of economic development does. Although they cannot distinguish statistically the different mechanisms by which the international climate becomes transmitted to particular countries, the proportion of other democracies in the region and in the world affect the survival of democracy in any particular country. As a result, the larger the proportion of democracies on the globe and in the region during a particular year, the more likely democracy is to survive in any particular country. His findings provide evidence that "contagion operates independently of the direct influence of Western governments and various international institutions" (Przeworski et al., 1996: 43).

Political learning also plays an important role. It is often argued that the absence of democratic traditions impedes the consolidation of new democratic institutions and that democracy is more stable in countries that have enjoyed it in the past (see Dahl, 1971). Russia and Chile, respectively, can be considered as clear examples. But this argument produces the following one: If a country had a democratic regime, it is a "veteran" not only of democracy but also of the "successful subversion" of a democracy. An overthrow of democracy at any time during the past history of a country shortens the life expectancy of any democracy in that country.
1.4.9 Others

Chilcote (et al., 1992) attempted to apply the concepts of a Marxist class theory of state to transitions from dictatorship to democracy in Spain, Portugal and Greece, but their country analysis did not produce any clear, defined, stable theory or hypothesis on the transition to representative democracy. In fact, he was more concerned with the problem of why the transition to socialism did not take place in those countries.

McColm (1992) attributes the democratic changes of the past decade to “a wide-range of impersonal historical factors such as the integration of the global economy, the cross-boundary appeal of new information technologies and the growing desire of nation-states to become re-integrated into larger regional economic and political communities” (McColm, 1992: 49). However, to the author's knowledge, no attempt has been made to test this assumption empirically.

Held (1992) edited the study, Prospects for Democracy: North, South, East, West. This book is concerned with the evaluation of alternatives to liberal democracy as well as with the assessment of liberal democracy itself. Problems of democracy are discussed from many different perspectives but the book does not produce any clearly stated testable theory of democracy or democratisation, although various assumptions on the conditions of democracy are discussed and formulated.

1.4.10 Sequences in development

Having considered what are said to be the basic ingredients of the democratic “cake” and having noted the extent of disagreement as to the “proportions” in which they should be combined and the distinctive “flavour” which each contributes, we are left with the question of the sequence in which the ingredients should be added. Dahl explored these questions in 1971 and concluded that polyarchies fared best if political competition preceded inclusiveness (Dahl, 1971: 203).

The contributors to the volume edited by Binder (et al., 1971) look at a wider range of chronological orders of events. They suggest that a country may be confronted with a variety of “crises” in the process of “political development”: Crises of identity, participation, penetration, legitimacy and distribution. An ideal path on the
road to democracy would, perhaps, be one along which the question of identity is resolved at an early stage, as in Rustow's model, with the question of legitimacy also resolved before the demands for increased participation and a redistribution of resources to less privileged groups put too much pressure on the system.

This was the path followed by Western Europe, firstly, by sorting out the national-building issues; secondly, by introducing a market economy; and finally by inaugurating democratic structures. The whole process lasted more than five centuries. In Eastern Europe politicians and international organisations pretended that the whole area underwent the same process – the introduction of democratic governments in areas with national borders not firmly settled and without previous experience in a market economy – and in a very short period of time. These are probably some of the reasons why the area is still unstable and democracy has not finally taken root yet (see Olias, 1996).

1.4.11 Critical approaches

The theories presented above are not at all immune to criticism. One of the leading and classical works in this regard is O'Donnell's (1973) *Modernisation and bureaucratic-authoritarianism*, which attempts to question the previously discussed conditions for democracy in Latin America. In general, he thinks that economic development brought authoritarianism to the political scene in Latin America.

A later critical study, also focused on Latin America, is Karl's (1991). For Karl the experience of Latin American countries challenges all presumptions about preconditions. Peru's transition was characterised by stagnant growth rates, extreme foreign debt, persistent balance of payments problems and a regressive distribution of income. Nor can they explain why the abnormally high levels of per capita GDP were persistently accompanied by authoritarian rule. As the Catholic church took an increasingly active role in opposing authoritarian rule, especially in Brazil, Chile, Peru, Central America and Panama, the argument about the so-called “anti-democratic bias” of Catholicism became increasingly implausible. These anomalies indicate a pressing need for important revisions, even reversals, of the way democratisation in contemporary Latin America is understood.

First, there may be no single precondition that is sufficient to produce such an
outcome. The search for causes rooted in economic, social, cultural or international factors have not yielded a general law of democratisation. What has been conceived in the literature in the past as being preconditions may be better conceived in the future as the outcomes of democracy. In other words, what has been emphasised as independent variables in the past might be more fruitfully conceived as dependent variables in the future (Karl, 1991: 5).

Latin America, at one time or another, has experienced all four modes of transition. Generally, efforts from below, which have been characterised by unrestricted contestation and participation, have met with subversive opposition from unsuppressed traditional elites, as the cases of Argentina (1946-1951), Guatemala (1946-1954) and Chile (1970-1973) demonstrate. Revolutions generally produce stable forms of governance (Bolivia is an exception) but such forms have not yet evolved into democratic patterns of fair competition, unrestricted contestation and participation (Karl, 1991: 8). Where democracies "that have endured for a respectable length of time appear to cluster is in the cell defined by relatively strong actors who are prepared to engage in strategies of compromise, i.e. Venezuela (1958), Colombia (1958), Uruguay (1984) and Chile (1932). These foundational pacts are generally negotiated by the military, economic and party leaders on the basis of explicit institutional arrangements" (Karl, 1991: 9).

According to Karl, there are two critical tasks initially facing Latin American democratisers. First, to arrive at a sufficiently strong consensus about the rules of the game, so that no major elite is tempted to call upon the military to protect its vital interests and, second, to begin to design conscious strategies from the establishment of qualitatively new civil-military relations appropriate to future stable civilian rule. Political democracy in Latin America may be rooted in a fundamental paradox. Ironically, the conditions that permit democracies to persist in the short run may constrain their potential for resolving the enormous problems of poverty and inequality that continue characterising the south of the continent (Karl, 1991: 1-4; 12-13).

All the above points imply that no single factor can be considered as the single
cause responsible for democratisation in any country\(^7\). On the contrary, there are many democratising agents, which interact at the time, to be considered when exploring the democratisation process of any country. However, the fact that certain conditions may facilitate the introduction and later consolidation of democracy is, in one way or another, implicit in most of the theoretical and empirical studies. One of the main conditions appears to be economic development. This has been measured several times in terms of personal income (see, for instance, Przeworski \textit{et al.}, 1996).

The case of the oil-exporting countries proves clearly that it is necessary to take into account the existing income inequality (for instance, GINI index). This leads to the following proposition: To control for economic development itself is not enough, but it is also necessary to control for income inequality. Economic development itself should produce a decrease in income inequality if stabilisation is sought (a reduction in the GINI index. A perfect egalitarian society would have a zero Gini index). Empirical studies prove that income inequality is generally focused in the middle, which means that if the income is divided into quintiles, for instance, the higher the inequality, the smaller the third (the middle) quintile (Rubinson & Quilan, 1977: 615). This is indicative of a weak and small middle class. In his study of the origins of dictatorship and democracy, Moore (1966) clearly states: No middle class, no democracy\(^8\).

1.5 Statement of problem and hypothesis

Against this background this study proposes to identify and describe the South African middle class before and after 1994 to establish whether it has grown larger or smaller. South Africa's new democracy implies that all citizens can participate in politics regardless of their race, sex, religion, etc. (South Africa, 1996). It is difficult to find a stable democracy without a relatively strong middle class. With reference to this, the middle class in South Africa needs to be analysed to determine, firstly, its composition in the former regime and secondly, the changes in its composition and


\(^8\) This relation between the middle class and democracy is amply explained in Chapter 2.
size in the period 1970-1999\(^9\) (before and after the first democratic election). By analysing the changes from 1970 (which will give us the size and composition of the middle class under the former regime) to 1999, the year of South Africa’s second democratic election, it would be possible to make a prognosis about the possible consolidation of democracy.

South Africa’s first democratic elections produced, among other things, two effects: First, the end to economic sanctions; second, the possibility of incorporating formerly excluded people into the traditional middle class. It is therefore expected that the middle class will change in terms of both its composition and its size. The expectation is that an increase in the independent variable “middle class” will affect the dependent variable “consolidated democracy”. As Lipset (1963: 51) stated “...middle classes temper conflicts by rewarding moderate and democratic parties and penalising extremist groups.”

Accordingly, the hypothesis of this study is as follows: The larger the middle class is, the greater the chance for consolidating democracy.

Lipset (1981) stated that economic development is closely associated with increases in level of education, which in turn promotes political attitudes conducive to democracy, such us interpersonal trust and tolerance of opposition. Second, economic development alters the pyramid-shaped social stratification system, in which the majority of the population is lower class and poor, to a diamond shape, in which the majority of the population is middle class and relatively wealthy. This social change moderates the intensity of the class struggle by reducing the proportion of the population that is susceptible to anti-democratic parties and ideologies and by increasing the proportion of the population that supports moderate pro-democratic parties. Moreover, because middle-class occupations require an educated population, the middle class will hold political attitudes conducive to democracy that are acquired through formal education (see Huntington, 1984; 1991a; 1993; Lipset, 1959; 1963; Moore, 1966; Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens, 1992; Muller, 1995a).

\(^9\) This period has been selected on the basis of the availability and comparability of the data. The 1970 Census provides the closest comparable data to post-1994 data. The 1980, 1991 Census did not include the former Independent Homelands. Other surveys conducted before 1994, such as the Omnibus surveys of the Human Sciences Research Council do not cover the former Independent Homelands either. The exact data sets will be explained later in Chapters 4 and 5.
It is important also to state that this is a descriptive study. In this sense, it aims at
(i) describing the middle class in South Africa; (ii) describing the consolidation (if consolidating) of its democracy – as will be explained later, in terms of political tolerance and trust; (iii) describing the evolution of these two variables (middle class and consolidation of democracy); (iv) showing the correlation existing between them; and, (v) making some prognosis about the future of democracy in South Africa. However, there is no intention to explain any cause-effect relation. Stated differently, it is a descriptive and predictive study but not explanatory\textsuperscript{10}.

1.6 The limitations and delimitation

The important role that middle classes can play in the transitional process to democracy is well known. However, this study does not pretend to research the role of the middle class in the South African transition to a democracy. It focuses on the description of the size and composition of the South African middle class as a feature of the stabilisation of the new democracy. The aim of this study is to establish whether, with reference to the composition and size of its middle class, South Africa's new democracy is stabilising and consolidating. As previously mentioned, a large and strong middle class is one of the indications of a consolidated democracy. An increase in the size of the middle class would be indicative of an increase in the commitment to democracy.

Another important aspect to clarify is that the study will make use of indicators of political culture in South Africa to show the trend over time as an indicator of democratic consolidation. This, however, does not imply that this is a study on South African political culture. That would imply coverage of a wide range of issues, some of which are not even related to democratic consolidation. This research uses those indicators most related to democratic consolidation (tolerance and trust)\textsuperscript{11} to show its evolution over time. This would allow for making a prognosis about the future democratic consolidation in South Africa.

The first limitation is that there is no consensus on the concept “middle class”. All definitions are imprecise. If we opt to define it in terms of employment, income,

\textsuperscript{10} See Keyness, (1979) and Kane, (1985).
\textsuperscript{11} See Chapters 4 and 5 for detailed justification of its use.
education and the like, it will always depend on the researcher to set what groups of people belong to the middle class. On the other hand, we can opt to ask people to include themselves in one or another class division, but this will depend on the personal criteria of the interviewees to assign themselves to one or another social group. In this study, the middle class will be defined in terms of occupation (see Wright, 1985; Golthorpe, 1987; So, 1995; Evans & Mills, 1999).

The second limitation is that the 1994-1999 period – the democratic period – was not long enough for the middle class to mature and reach the level of other consolidated democracies. However, a longitudinal survey on that period may point out the tendency of growth, a trend which will allow us to make a prognosis about the consolidation of democracy in South Africa. It will not be possible to state whether the democracy is consolidated or not, but whether democracy is being consolidated or not (in this sense, this study conceives consolidation of democracy as a process).

1.7 Research methodology

In this study, both qualitative and quantitative approaches as described by Leedy (1993) will be used.

The literature on the middle class-democracy link is firstly reviewed to support the study theoretically. After this, the middle class is conceptualised and operationalised. Various approaches are offered and the final choice is selected and justified. Consequently, the conceptual variable “middle class” will be converted into an operational variable (into a percentage of the South African population) and it will be measured for 1970, 1994, 1995, 1997 and 1999. It will be tested whether the middle class increased or not and whether formerly excluded people were being included. After that, the idea of “consolidated democracy” will be defined and operationalised. As done with middle class, several approaches are offered. The final one will be selected and justified. Finally, the results are interpreted and some concluding remarks offered.

12 With reference to this, see Cole, (1955).
13 The study deals with the idea of “consolidated democracy” later in the Chapter.
14 1996 and 1998 surveys show problems with the biographical data. The middle class figures resulting from the analysis of 1996 and 1998 surveys are inexplicable – very low percentage of middle class. This may be the result of a wrong coding. Thus, they are excluded.
The necessary data will be gained from the South African Data Archive (SADA hereafter), the Institute for Democracy in South Africa (Idasa hereafter) and the HSRC Social Movements in South Africa Project. The exact description of the data sets will be done in Chapters 3 and 4.

1.8 Assumptions

At this point, it is necessary to explain what is assumed in this study and why.

The first thing to be assumed is that democracy is desirable, a good thing. There would be little sense in studying the consolidation of something which is not good. Secondly, if we want to test whether democracy in South Africa is consolidating or not, we have to suppose that South Africa's regime is fully democratic.

The first and the second democratic elections held in South Africa on the 27 April 1994 and the second on the 2 June 1990 fulfilled all the necessary requirements for the political system be declared democratic since the “most powerful collective decision makers [were] selected through fair, honest and periodic elections in which candidates freely compete[d] for votes and in which virtually all the adult population [was] eligible to vote” (Huntington: 1991a: 6-7). Also, as Linz says, it allowed the free formulation of political preferences, through the use of basic freedoms of association, information, and communication, for the purpose of free competition between leaders to validate at regular intervals by non-violent means their claim to rule without excluding any effective political office from that competition or their preference (Linz, 1978: 5).

Accordingly, it can be assumed that South Africa's political regime satisfies the necessary requirements to be labelled as (at least procedurally)\(^{15}\) democratic.

1.9 Contribution to the field

The aim of this study is, on the one hand, to survey the evolution of the degree of inequality in South Africa from a different angle: To investigate the size and composition of the middle class and monitor the evolution of aspects of its political

\(^{15}\) The differences between procedural and substantive democracy will be explained in Chapter 2.
culture as an indicator of democratic consolidation. On the other hand, it also intends to develop an analytical tool to test the consolidation of any democracy.

1.10 Chapter outline

The first Chapter intends to introduce the reader briefly to the project. The statement of the problem is given, as well as the limitations and delimitations of this study. This is followed by the presentation and justification of the methodology adopted. Finally, the hypotheses to be tested and verified, and the contribution of the study to the field close this Chapter.

The second Chapter deals with the link between democratic consolidation and the middle class. It firstly includes a framework definition to enable the reader to understand the major concepts as they are used in this study. It finally embodies a review of the existing literature on the relation between the dependent variable, democratic consolidation, and the independent one, middle class.

The third Chapter addresses the operationalisation of the variable middle class. The South Africa's middle class is converted into an operative variable (a percentage of the Economically Active Population). It is then measured in 1970, 1994, 1995, 1997 and finally in 1999.

The fourth Chapter gives the operationalisation of the variable democratic consolidation and attitudinal surveys are analysed.

The fifth Chapter is concerned with the interpretation of the collected and analysed data of the previous Chapters. The validation of the hypothesis is also tested in this Chapter.

Finally, the sixth Chapter presents the concluding remarks.

1.11 Summary

At this point it is worth summarising for the reader the key aspects presented in this Chapter.

Firstly, it was said that modern democracy began in the nineteenth century and
since then it has spread all over the world but with various swings back and forth between consolidation and breakdown. A historical review has been carried out with the help of some examples for a better understanding of these processes, and the causes of the "birth" and "death" of democracy.

Tables 1.1 and 1.2 show the main aspects presented in the Chapter. They attempt to present some hypothesis on the reasons why the initial, and sometimes the second and the third attempts at democracy failed. Many of the variables involved (Table 1.1) can be seen as the mirror image of those that were suggested previously (Table 1.2) to be conductive to democracy. Thus economic development "can 'lubricate the wheels' of democracy, while economic decline can intensify a crude struggle for power; consensus between dominant groups and construction of effective institutions can contribute toward effective democracy, while irreconcilable conflict and the absence of effective channels for mediating conflict can contribute to praetorianism. Social structure also arises strongly as a determining factor. But the forces making for the rise and decline of democracy are not symmetrical. The creation of democracy, by its nature, requires a process of steady building rather than a "big bang", whereas its destruction can come much more suddenly through an economic crisis, a careless decision by political actors or a military coup. The root causes of these events may, of course, have been festering for some time, but their actual occurrence still depends largely on man-made choices" (Pinkney, 1994: 65).

Finally, the reader may have been overwhelmed with an avalanche of concepts such as democracy, democratic process, consolidation of democracy, breakdown and others. Clarification of all the main concepts used in this study is attempted in the following Chapter.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EXPLANATION</th>
<th>ARGUMENTS</th>
<th>REGION MOST RELEVANT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>1. Early stages of economic development involve greater inequality; this makes government by consent increasingly difficult.</td>
<td>1. Latin America, South Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Changes in the economic structure are to the (short-term) disadvantage of the mass of the population; they can only be overseen by authoritarian governments.</td>
<td>2. Latin America, South Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Economic changes produce a more articulate working class that places new demands on the political system, which government cannot or will not meet.</td>
<td>3. Latin America, South Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. Economic resources decline in already poor countries leaving fragile governments with fewer resources to distribute, and leaving the public indifferent to their fate.</td>
<td>4. Tropical Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social</td>
<td>1. A growing range of conflict was difficult to deal with after independence.</td>
<td>1. Tropical Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. The social structure provided few democratic controls.</td>
<td>2. Tropical Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. The bulk of the population was largely indifferent to democracy.</td>
<td>3. Tropical Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. Narrow pluralism was discredited; new middle-class nationalists, including army officers, rejected Western institutions.</td>
<td>4. Middle East</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional</td>
<td>1. Parties failed to adapt from opposition to government.</td>
<td>1. Tropical Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Bureaucracies lost their 'legal-rational' role without gaining a 'democratic' one.</td>
<td>2. Tropical Africa</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>3. Institutions lacked autonomy from the state, and therefore offered limited resistance to authoritarian attacks.</td>
<td>3. Latin America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Behavioural</td>
<td>1. New rulers saw little need to respect people's 'rights'</td>
<td>1. Tropical Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. New rulers failed to deliver material benefits</td>
<td>2. Tropical Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Therefore population was largely indifferent to the removal of governments by undemocratic means.</td>
<td>3. Tropical Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. Elected politicians chose to use undemocratic methods.</td>
<td>4. Latin America, Turkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>1. Soldiers acquired a greater sense of corporate identity</td>
<td>1. Tropical Africa, Pakistan</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>2. Soldiers acquired greater confidence in their ability to intervene</td>
<td>2. Tropical Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Soldiers perceived threats to their immediate interests</td>
<td>3. Ghana, Bangladesh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. Officers developed ideological beliefs which became increasingly distant from those or ruling politicians.</td>
<td>4. Latin America, Middle East</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External</td>
<td>1. The United States aided those which were willing to challenge 'ideologically unacceptable governments'.</td>
<td>1. Latin America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONDITIONS</td>
<td>ARGUMENTS</td>
<td>PROBLEMS</td>
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<td>------------------------------------</td>
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<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Economic development              | Correlation between wealth and democracy; increased national wealth makes competition for resources less desperate. | 1. Correlation is not the same as cause.  
2. Greater wealth may strengthen the resources of authoritarian rulers.  
3. Process and rapidity of economic growth are not specified clearly. |
| Political attitudes                | Democracy requires a willingness to accept government by consent as a means of resolving conflict. | 1. Attitudes may be shaped by social and economic circumstances.         |
| Inter-elite relations              | Democracy emerges when elites agree to the rules of the political game rather than risk national disintegration; these rules can subsequently be adapted to accommodate non-elites. | 1. Why is a point reached where national unity is preferred to violent conflict or disintegration?  
2. How can elite attitudes be ascertained? |
| Social structures and interaction between social groups | Democracy is most likely to evolve where the monarchy checks the power of the nobility and aristocracy goes in commerce.  
Certain social classes promote democracy. | 1. How to explain the existence of democracy in countries with a diversity of social antecedents. |
| Political Institutions             | Development requires the development of institutions (especially pressure groups and political parties) | 1. Danger of historical determinism.  
2. Role of economic changes, external influences, and even society, not clear. |
| Sequences in development           | Democracy is easier to establish if political competition precedes mass participation and if major conflicts over the role of the state are resolved one at a time. | 1. Danger of historical determinism.  
2. Problems of recognising and quantifying the variables. |
| External influences                | Foreign government, institutions or individuals may supply ideas, offer inducements or apply sanctions. | 1. Influence can only be indirect; democracy cannot be imposed |
Chapter 2. Middle class and democratic consolidation: Theory and background

2.1 Introduction

In the previous Chapter, the reader was introduced to the general aspects of democratisation. The problems that regimes have to solve to become democratic and the conditions that favour the inauguration and consolidation of democracy were explained, as were those that favour its decline. This Chapter goes further and concentrates on one of the conditions that favour the consolidation of democratic regimes, namely the social structure. Furthermore, it attempts to demonstrate that, in order to survive, democracies have to develop a large middle class.

The first thing to be done is to explain what it is meant by both middle class and consolidated democracy. Middle class and consolidated democracy are ambiguous concepts as it is evidenced in any attempt to define them. This, plus the fact that both concepts are part of wider notions, namely "class" and "democracy", respectively, makes it absolutely necessary to define and delimit them carefully and accurately in order to avoid any misunderstanding that could lead to erroneous interpretations and confuse the reader.

The conceptualisation section starts in each case with those broader ideas of which they are part, namely "class" and "democracy". "Class" and "middle class" are conceptualised in the subsections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2. Afterwards, the concepts "democracy" and "consolidated democracy" are conceptualised in the subsections 2.2.3 and 2.2.4.

After clarifying, defining and delimiting these two main concepts, the linkage between them is explained in the next section. The proper conceptualisation of the variables will enable the reader to understand the link between them much better than if the linkage is explained before the conceptualisation of the variables.
2.2 Conceptualisation

This section starts with the definition of “class”, a notion that includes “middle class”. The understanding of the former (class) will help the reader to understand the latter (middle class). Finally, an attempt is made to comprehend the South African case. After this the concept “consolidated democracy” undergoes the same process for its definition: “Democracy” first, and then “consolidated democracy”.

2.2.1 Class

Even cursory reading in the field of class and stratification reveals terminological and conceptual controversy. Thus, the terminological confusion reigning in the field of social class and stratification will be the point of departure.

All societies are stratified. That is one of the few general statements that are possible in social science (Raynor, 1967: 5). Complex societies are characterised by the unequal distribution of material and symbolic rewards. It is also true, as Crompton (1993: 1) states, that “no persisting structure of economic and social inequality has existed not having some kind of meaning system(s) which seeks both to explain and justify the unequal distribution of societal resources”.

Social stratification, which is the term that describes these structures of inequality, has been explained in pre-industrial societies as deriving from “the divinely ordained structuring of society or nature” (Crompton, 1993: 2). In these societies, relative economic stagnation was also associated with social rigidity concerning stratification. However, these societies did not endure, and were deeply transformed by the development of capitalist industrialism throughout the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. There is a feature common to the writings of all authors who are characterised as working within the conflict approach to social stratification in these new industrial and post-industrial societies: All of them identify social classes as the primary actors within stratification systems (see Collins 1971; Dahrendorf, 1959; 1988; Lockwood, 1974; Marshall, 1963, or Rex, 1961; 1986). However, there is a marked lack of precision or agreement as to the definition and meaning of “class” (Crompton, 1993: 9).
The term class was already used to refer to the division of the Roman population on the basis of property for fiscal and military purposes, but Marx's and Weber's theories are the two "towering contributions to the conceptualisation and theorisation of class. Moreover, their theories have been extensively reinterpreted and reformulated by successive generations" (Edgell, 1993: 10).

Marx was responsible for the first and most important sociological theory of class. There is no doubt about the centrality of class in Marx's work (see Marx & Engels, 1962). For him, class relationships are embedded in production relationships; more specifically, in the patterns of ownership and control that characterise these relationships. Thus, the two great classes of capitalist society are bourgeoisie and proletariat, - the former being the owners and controllers of the material means of production, the latter owning only the labour power, which they are forced to sell to survive. However, Marx neither gives a precise definition of the class concept 1, nor had, as has been suggested many times, a two-class model of society. Furthermore, he referred to many other classes 2. The Marxist concept of class is based upon a psychological characteristic - consciousness of class.

Weber, in contrast to Marx's opposition to industrial capitalism, approved of the rationality of modern capitalism and was opposed to socialism. He was an explicit methodological individualist, which means "...that all social collectivities and human phenomena have to be reducible to their individual constituents, and explained in these terms..." (Crompton, 1993: 29). His idea of class rests on functionalist characteristics.

Besides noting that, the expectation was the petty bourgeoisie to decline and white-collar workers to expand with the development of industrial capitalism (Weber, 1968: 305). Weber did discuss class divisions and conflict (Edgell, 1993: 12). Weber stressed, more than Marx did, the class advantages flowing from knowledge or skills. Moreover, while Marx concentrated on the role of conflict and the polarisation of class structure, Weber focused on the problematic nature of class action and the

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1 His last manuscript breaks off just at the moment when he appeared to be on the point of giving such a definition (Marx, 1974: 886).
2 This is clearly evidenced in various works, but most notably in The eighteenth brumaire of Louis Bonaparte.
fragmentation of the class structure (Edgell, 1993: 15).

The importance of Marx’s and Weber’s account of the meaning of class is reflected in the “... continuity between their perspectives and virtually all-subsequent attempts to understand the key concept of class” (Edgell, 1993: 16). Clear examples of this are Wright’s and Goldthorpe’s social theories. They have influenced the development of class schemes that have been used in recent empirical research. More specifically, Wright’s contribution involves a revision of Marx’s model of class and has been successfully operationalised in sociological studies of the American, Swedish and British class structures (see Wright, 1985; Edgell & Duke, 1991). On the other hand, Goldthorpe’s contribution is a revision of Weber’s model of class and has been used to study the British social structure and other modern industrial societies (see Goldthorpe, 1987; Marshall et al., 1988; Erikson & Goldthorpe, 1992; Foessa Foundation, 1984). However, the borderline between them is not very clear and it is possible to find attempts at synthesis, like the “New socio-economic category”\(^3\); those “who do not renounce to the most orthodox methods (R. Miliband, 1969); those who focus on certain and specific aspects (such as the state (T. H. Marshall, 1970), or corporatist organisations (C. Offe, 1984))” (quoted in Foessa Foundation, 1994).

Summarising, it is possible to say that it is a fact that among sociologists and other social scientists different words are used for the same object. It is also a fact that they mean, or seem to mean, different things by the same word. Centers (1949), to quote one single example, reserves the term class for psycho-social grounding, collections of people held together by class consciousness and class identification. He deplores the practice of other writers of applying the term to objectively defined categories, for instances such as equal income, similar occupations, or the same amount of education. For such objectively defined categories, Centers (1949: 74; see also Wesolowski, 1979; Béteille, 1996) employs the term strata. The term class is rich in emotive content, and plays a role in political propaganda. Here, probably, resides much of the terminological confusion. This may serve as a summary of the social

\(^3\) Termed by the authors of the project “Estructura, Conciencia y Biografia de clase” directed by J. Carabaña, which is part of the international project on social classes directed by E. O. Wright (see Foessa Foundation, 1994).

What does it mean, then, to define a term that admittedly is used in a variety of senses? It might be futile and presumptuous to ask for the definition of class. As far as previous usage is concerned, not one but many definitions are admissible. One definition may be found better than another because it proves more fruitful or rewarding, leads to more interesting research, etc. No definition of class is unique to the extent that it deserves to be called the definition (Carlsson, 1958). It is dangerous, as Marshall (1950) already pointed out some time ago, to start with the assumption that because the word “class” is commonly used it must express a definable concept. It is perhaps natural for consumers of definitions to make this mistake. Most sociologists and other social scientists are probably perfectly aware of the situation, and when they talk of the definition, they probably intend to say, in most cases, that they use class in a certain way, and they think it advisable to do so for a variety of reasons.

In an attempt to avoid any ideological shortcoming, this study conceives social class as an individually decomposable group of people, with similar levels of income, education and occupation. Consequently, it adopts a functionalist point of view – Weber’s tradition.

2.2.2 Middle Class

Notwithstanding their differing emphases, both Marx and Weber argued that the ownership of property for exchange and being propertyless are the basic categories of all class situations (Edgell, 1993: 116). According to this, when we use the word class or class situation, we are referring to a person’s economic or market position. Then occupation serves as its primary index. As Runcinman (1966: 23) wrote, “... to speak of a person’s class is to speak of his approximate shared location in the economic hierarchy as opposed the hierarchies of prestige and power.”

Against this background, the term middle class refers to a concrete and certain position in the economic hierarchy, to a person’s economic or market position. It is necessary to distinguish between old (propertyed) middle class and new (non-
propertied)\(^4\) middle classes.

For Marxists, the former (old – propertied – middle class) simultaneously works and owns the means of production, and sometimes employs others, generally relatives. Marx referred to this as “the lower strata of the middle class” (Marx, 1972: 62-63) and Weber as “the lower middle class”\(^5\). They both also expected this sector to be “extinguished by the fire of competition from big capitalists”. However, whereas Marx emphasised their decline into the expanding proletariat, Weber argued that their best option was to become technically trained (Edgell, 1993: 63)\(^6\).

On the other hand, the latter (new middle class) refers to white-collar employees (office workers). For Marx (1974: 300), they “... belong to a better paid class of wage-workers...” and due to the advance of the “division of labour ... the supply of this type of worker would increase and their wage would fall....” In contrast to this, Weber expected the opposite trend to prevail. He argued that the “increasing bureaucratisation of administration enhances the importance of the specialist examination...” and that the consequent “universal clamour for the creation of educational certificates in all fields makes for the formation of a privileged stratum in bureaus and offices...” (Weber, 1961: 241). Thus, Marx and Weber noted the emergence of white-collar workers. Both were correct (although they interpreted it in different ways): The new middle class has split into two distinct groups, a “deskilled” routine white-collar fraction and a skilled specialist fraction (Edgell, 1993: 66; see also Abercrombie & Urry, 1983).

As said above, this study follows the Weberian theory of class. All societies can be fractionated into its individual members. Subsequently, the Weberian concept of middle class will be used.

As a result, middle class is understood in this study as a social group mainly integrating professionals, businessmen and clerks, – white collar workers – both in the public and private sector and civil service, plus those individuals running their own

\(^4\) Also called petit bourgeoisie or white-collar workers, respectively.
\(^5\) Others, such as Mills (1956: 28), referred to it as the “lumpen-bourgeoisie”. See also Tezanos, (1975).
\(^6\) As Edgell (1993) said, this is an early version of what was to become a major debate in the sociology of class, namely proletarianisation versus embourgeoisement (Bogenhold & Staber, 1991; Burrows & Curran, 1989; Scase & Coffee, 1980; Storey 1983).
businesses with similar income.

In principle, this definition could be considered as very simplistic since, it does not take into account, explicitly, two of the three main characteristics of middle class, which are high education and high income – only occupation. But delving into it carefully, it is possible to observe that all of them are taken into consideration since those occupations imply a certain remuneration (a second characteristic) and a certain level of education (the third one) (on detailed characteristics of middle class see Glassman, et al., 1993; 1997).

2.2.2.1 The South African case

South Africa’s social structure, as in most African countries, is characterised by a high level of ethnic heterogeneity. This situation in the African countries dates from the colonial times, “when boundaries were drawn artificially and heterogeneity became the standard” (Breytenbach, 1998a: 7). In South Africa, this is especially reflected in its labour structure, mainly due to the apartheid labour policy – what can be called “ethnic labour division”.

Due to this, the middle class during the former regime was mostly consisted of white population. This study aims to analyse whether, after the demise of apartheid, Black, Coloured and Indian people are being integrated in it. Consequently, the middle class in South Africa is conceived, in this study, as said above, as a social group composed of professionals, businessmen, and clerks, both in the private and public sector and civil service, plus those individuals running their own business, with similar income.

2.2.3 Democracy

In this section the term “democracy” is explained before the concept “consolidated democracy” is conceptualised. Understanding the former (democracy) helps the reader to understand the latter (consolidated democracy). It is handiest, as it was done with the concepts class and middle class.

The initial problem facing any student of democracy is how to define the term. The word is constantly used in the news media and every discourse to define our own
culture and to shape our policies toward others, who are said to be delinquent if they are undemocratic. It has to be considered as a "good thing" since happiness is aroused when it is heard that "development of democracy throughout the world" was proclaimed in December 1995 by United States and the European Union as one of their main goals of pursuit (quoted in Stromberg, 1996: 3). It is presented as a cure-all for troubled peoples and lands although there is much confusion in the usage of the term. It is generally confused with liberalism or constitutionalism or social equality or national independence. Democracy is invoked as a model and used to legitimise different causes for different reasons.

Throughout the world everybody invokes it; even tyrants claim to be democrats. Sheik Meijimar Rahmar of Bangladesh explained in 1975 that banning opposition parties and strikes was necessary in order to ensure democracy. Fujimori carried out an executive coup in Peru 1992 to save democracy. In July 1999, Venezuela's president, Hugo Vázquez, asserted that people were requesting a Fujimorazo (executive coups like Fujimori's one) in the country to save Venezuela's democracy (although people expressed no public manifestation in that sense (see El País, 05-7-99)). In former Communists systems, the regime was called "people's democracy". Those members of the extreme nationalist party, which many called fascists and which, in combination with ex-Communists, strove to overthrow the precarious reform government of Boris Yeltsin, called themselves the Liberal-Democrats (Markoff, 1996: 14).

2.2.3.1 Confusion with other ideas

In this new arena of argumentation the concept has become confused or amalgamated with other ideas. It is, for instance, often assumed that equality and democracy are identical (see for instance Parlmer, 1982), but they are certainly not. The fact that one might produce the other does not imply that both are the same thing.

Another confusion is found between democracy and liberalism. Nowadays democracy is sometimes used when referring to human rights. Let's remember that Hitler was brought to power democratically in Germany. On the other hand, England, for instance, developed a passion for individual liberty, perhaps unique in the world, while governed by a hereditary monarchy and a legislature, one branch of which was
hereditary and the other elected by a severely restricted suffrage. All this means that we may nowadays be talking about contexts – or conditions –, in which – or thanks to which – democracies endure but may be not understood as being the same thing.  

2.2.3.2 Democracy: In search of a definition

The definition of the term often depends on local conditions and special circumstances. Such indiscriminate use of a word risks turning it into a nonsense expression. Actually, this word has been so abused by propaganda that it has ceased to have value for a reason. It has gone so far that it is not difficult to find that contemporary academics concerned with analysing the processes of government or the nature of society tend to avoid the term or show their embarrassment by putting it in quotations marks. It is too hopelessly vague that professors, who must aspire to the status of scientists, nowadays have come up with other terms such as pluralism or polyarchy. Thus the usage of the word has come out the scientific arena to the meaningless-general-public realm (Stromberg, 1996: 3-6).

When seeking a definition of democracy one usually ends up distinguishing between types. Macpherson, (1977: 2-8) for instance, found four models of historically-successive democracy, namely, (i) protective democracy, (ii) developmental democracy, (iii) equilibrium democracy and (iv) participatory democracy. But it is Schumpeter's (1947: 250-284; 232-302) division between procedural and substantive democracy which has become most deeply embedded into the contemporary theory of democracy (Dahl, 1989: 163-167).

The word “democracy” was coined in the fifth century BC and since that time until roughly one century ago, it has been a political concept. That is to say, democracy meant political democracy. As Finer (1962a: 67) wrote, “the term has come to mean so many things, some very hostile to each other, that it needs careful analysis if misunderstanding and idle controversies are to be avoided”. That implies that it is very difficult to delimit. Nevertheless, the basic idea underlying democracy seems to have remained the same for the past 2000 years.

7 For more details about democracy’s meaning through history see Stromberg, (1996).
8 This differentiation between types of democracies will be explained later in this section.
9 Nowadays we hear about economic democracy, industrial democracy, etc.
According to Bryce (1921: 23) the word “democracy has been used since the time of Herodotus to denote that form of government in which the ruling power of a State is legally vested, not in any particular class or classes, but in the members of the community as a whole”. This means, in communities which act by voting, that “rule belongs to the majority, as no other method has been found for determining peaceably and legally what is to be deemed the will of a community which is not unanimous” (Pennock, 1979: 3).

In later times democracy was defined in different ways, but the idea of the rule of the majority has mostly been included in definitions, as have references to competitive elections, equality and liberty (see Schumpeter, 1947: 269-273; Lipset, 1963: 27-28; Ranney & Kendall, 1969: 46-61).

One of the most important and most widely known definitions of democracy was set up by Schumpeter fifty years ago, in his Capitalism, socialism and democracy (Schumpeter, 1947: 232-302). Today it still is a necessary and unavoidable point of reference, without which any attempt to explain democracy would be incomplete.

He begins by explaining the essence of the eighteenth century philosophy of democracy, which is understood as the “institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions which realise the common good by making the people itself decide issues through the election of individuals who are to assemble in order to carry out its will” (Schumpeter, 1947: 251; italics added). This implies, for him, the existence of a common will and a singular people. He criticises this, arguing that there is no common good, “no such thing ... that all people could agree or be made to agree on by the force of rational argument” (Schumpeter, 1947: 251). This is due to the fact that the common good means different things to different individuals. Moreover, – he continues – even if a sufficiently definite common good could be approved for all, it would not give “equally definite answers to individual issues”. For Schumpeter, the will of the people is “frankly derived from the good of the individuals” (Schumpeter: 1947: 252).

Rationality of thought does not guarantee rationality of action. Furthermore, the latter can be present without the existence of the former. This implies a lack of sense of reality, which involves a reduction of responsibility and effective volition.
Once he explains why the classical doctrine of democracy is not operating, he speculates about why such a contrary-to-fact theory can survive so strongly. He finds the answer in the fact that, although the classical doctrine of democracy might not be supported by the empirical analysis, it “is powerfully supported by that association with religious belief....” Classical theory of democracy “embodies essential features of the faith of Protestant Christianity and was in fact derived from that faith. For the intellectual who had cast off his religion the utilitarian creed provided a substitute” (Schumpeter, 1947: 264). Thus, turned into the rank of religion, this doctrine changes its real substance. There is no need for logical doubts about the Common Good and Ultimate Values. It is the voice of the people, the voice of God. The main problem he finds is that “the people” can not, as it is supposed, hold a definite and rational opinion about every individual question....” For Schumpeter “the utilitarian rationalism is dead” (Schumpeter, 1947: 265). Furthermore, democracy is not democracy itself but “Democratic process”, “Democratic method”, which consists in an “institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote" (Schumpeter, 1947: 269; italics added).

The following premises can be gathered from the preceding paragraph:

- The people are meant to be the electorate
- Their primary function is to produce a government
- The main substance of the democratic process is a competitive struggle for the vote.

Implicit in Schumpeter's explanation of democracy, is a division in the theory of democracy that has remained alive until today. The contemporary debate on democracy still deals with method and values, norm and procedure, idea and reality, in other words, what was to be called empiricism versus rationalism.

This division has been developed by many scholars and students of democracy. Without a doubt one of the most rich, fruitful and explanatory works in the field is that of Sartori.
Sartori (1969) defines democracy as the opposite of autocracy: “In democracy no one can choose himself, no one can invest himself with the power to rule, and therefore no one can arrogate to himself unconditional and unlimited power. The difference between democracy and its opposite lies in the fact that in a democracy power is scattered, limited, controlled and exercised in rotation: whereas in an autocracy power is concentrated, uncontrolled, indefinite and unlimited” (Sartori, 1969: 36).

His theory of democracy is compactly presented although well abridged, in his The theory of democracy revisited (Sartori, 1987). In this re-authored book on democracy, he warns about the problems of hyperrealism. He alerts about the excessive procedural definitions of democracy that can oversimplify the concept. When democracy is made to seem very simple, “we can be sure that the simplification has gone too far, that we are disserving, rather than serving democracy” (Sartori, 1987: 13).

He firstly establishes the differences between empiricism and rationalism. Rationalism is defined as “the opposite of empiricism or in contradistinction to empiricism”. Both realism and rationalism are conceived as “mental orientations, mental mechanism”. A first difference is that the empiricist mentality “stays in the middle of the things, close to what can be touched, seen and tested, whereas the rationalist mentality soars to a far higher level of abstraction, to a level that is far removed from the facts” (Sartori, 1987: 49). Thus, the empiricist tends to work back from reality; the rationalist attempts to remake the real world as a reflection of reason. An empiricist tries to look at how things work out and rationalism tries to remake everything “starting from tabula rasa”. For empiricism, when things do not work properly in practice, there must be something wrong in the theory. The case is the opposite for rationalism. Therefore, when something is wrong, the problem is located in the practise. Rationalism is concerned with the construction of orderly logical relationships, regardless of the connection of those relationships with the real world. Empiricism is tentative, is improved from the experience; rationalism is definitive and tests everything. According to Sartori, in the end, empiricism becomes more reasonable than rationalism, for which logical rigour is above everything, even at the expense of being unreasonable (Sartori, 1987: 50). The empirical mind conceives
problems from a practical angle. On the other hand, rationalism is not willing to explain how the world works but interested in constructing prototypes and searching for definitive solutions.

The preceding conclusion makes Sartori differentiate between empirical and rational democracy. The former is obviously realistic, whereas the latter is meant to be anti-realistic. From this point, his argument shifts to the distinction between rational and empirical democracies. He identifies, historically, the former as the French-type democracy and the latter as the Anglo-American type. A first difference is that the French type was brought about by a revolution, whereas the Anglo-American democracy is the result of a cautious and consistent process of historical development. The English Revolution "did not vindicate, politically, a fresh start but the restoration of the Englishman's 'birthright' that in a pristine Anglo-Saxon Constitution had been affirmed against the Norman Kings in the Magna Carta and had been trampled upon by the Tudor and Stuart usurpations. As for the American Revolution, it was not, in truth, a revolution – it was a secession. The American declaration of independence of 1776 was, in essence, a claim for the right to advance along the path of the liberties already existing in England. The French Revolution was, instead, a very deliberate break with, and rejection of, the past" (Sartori, 1987: 52). Furthermore, he argues that English constitutions do not recognise any entity as "people" with constitutional status. By contrast, the Constitution of the Weimar Republic, for instance, says that the power of the state is derived from the people upwards. "People" is a plural in English and a singular in Continental-European languages (French, German, Spanish, and Italian). French "peuple" is a conceptual idea, whereas English people are specific persons. Moreover, in the English-speaking countries it is customary to speak of "government" while Continental-Europeans speak about "State". Once more, it shows a difference in the level of abstraction. For Sartori, the difference that separates a rational from an empirical democracy "can be ultimately reduced to whether the chain of argument is tight or loose, rigid or flexible. That is to say that rational democracies are constructed deductively and rigorously from premise to consequence, joining one link of the chain to the next as tightly as possible; whereas the construction of empirical democracies largely results from feedbacks and, in this sense, from inductive elements" (Sartori, 1987: 53).
To illustrate this, he states that, in Continental Europe, a large number of the democracies evolved in the direction of parliamentary systems, whereas neither a similar progress took place in England (where — he argues — parliamentary government is not a proper name for a cabinet system), nor in the United States (Sartori, 1987: 54). He finds further proof in the fact that those Western Continental European democracies "have abandoned (or never adopted) the single-member district and have basically settled for electoral systems of proportional representation. If the people's power premise is developed with deductive rigour, it follows that (a) true representation is, and can only be, proportional representation; (b) parliament must be the real site of representative sovereignty; and (c) government should only be (as the wording says) 'executives'.... In a deductive chain of reasoning all of the above is a must, a set of necessary logical consequences" (Sartori, 1987: 54). Then, he speculates about why the Anglo-American democracies are not obliged to such a must. His answer is that empirical democracies are not assembled deductively but on the experience that effective and efficient government is important, that assembly systems are malfunctioning systems and that proportional representation will probably create more problems than it may solve. Empiricism is "impressed — he finishes — neither by 'democratic consistency' nor by the display of a 'well reasoned' democracy" (Sartori, 1987: 54).

Bryce (1921: 208) already pointed out that French people adopted democracy "not merely because the rule of the people was deemed the completest remedy for pressing evils ... but also in deference to general abstract principles, which were taken for self-evident truths".

In the same direction, Tocqueville (1856: 222-223) stated that "while in England those who wrote about politics and those who engaged in it shared the same life ... in France the political world sharply divided into non-communicating provinces.... In one [the politicians] administered, in the other [the writers] formulated abstract principles. Above the real society ... little by little an imaginary world took a shape in which everything seemed simple and coordinated, uniform, just and rational".

Many other definitions have been set up but this distinction is either clearly maintained or one of them is directly adopted over the other (empirical or rational definitions).
Dahl (1989: 90-91) also follows this criterion, when he distinguishes between democratic ideal and reality, substance and process. He refers to ideal, normative or rational democracy as substantive democracy and to empirical, descriptive, realistic democracy as procedural democracy.

He alerts the reader about the fact that, taken to an extreme, the substantive democracy can become a justification for anti-democratic performance in the form of dictatorships (Dahl, 1989: 163). To support this, it can be argued that, in South America, dictators referred to their regimes as “tutored democracies”\textsuperscript{10}; in Spain, Franco referred to his regime as “organic democracy” and the former Communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe were known as “people's democracies”. The balance to be reached between substance and process, idea and reality takes up most of his work (see Dahl, 1989).

Lipset (1963) sides with Schumpeter (1947) and prefers a procedural definition of democracy. Democracy, for Lipset (1963: 45), consists in a “political system which supplies regular constitutional opportunities for changing the governing officials, and a social mechanism which permits the largest possible part of the population to influence major decisions by choosing among contenders for political office” (see also Lipset, 1959: 71; 1981: 27; Diamond & Marks, 1992b: 1-14).

Pennock, (1979: 6-7) in the same debate, differentiates the ideal definition of democracy from the procedural one. The former establishes the ideals and values that are used as criteria when political systems are evaluated. The latter definition uses as its criteria a set of procedures. According to this one, a democracy is rule by people where the “people” includes all adult citizens, with some exceptions, and “rule” means that public policies are determined either directly by vote of the electorate or indirectly by officials freely elected at reasonable intervals.

\textsuperscript{10} In these regimes, a society is perceived as an organic whole with common interests. Leaders claim to know what these interests are (the general will) and the state exists to execute the general will without being inhibited by constitutional checks to protect minorities or even by majorities who have a false perception of their real interest (Pinkney, 1994: 9). These regimes were found in the former soviet systems in Central and Eastern Europe, but also countries like Kenya and Tanzania and Cuba showed a “more opened guided democracy” allowing a choice between parliamentary candidates of the same party. Military governments in Brazil and Indonesia have permitted rival parties to compete for seats in the legislature. Also Franco, in Spain, conducted some referendums on punctual aspects.
Kirkpatrick’s (1981) work on democracy contributes to clarify the differences between both approaches. She makes the same kind of distinction between normative and descriptive democracy. The former approach “postulates norms against which institutions can be measured, ideas of the good life or the good theory or the good government”. This vision of democracy tends to identify democracy with the vision of the perfect society, whereas those in favour of the descriptive definition use the term as “a symbol for specific patterns of behaviour of persons in political contexts. The theory resulting from this approach is based on descriptions of electoral systems, legislative process, interest groups, administrative behaviour, voting behaviour, political parties and related institutional practices” (Kirkpatrick, 1981: 326). Elections are crucial to Kirkpatrick’s descriptive theory of democracy. Democratic elections are competitive, periodic, and inclusive. She concludes that when people who are to make and enforce rules for the society are embraced by democratic elections, the resulting government is termed “democratic” (Kirkpatrick, 1981: 326-331).

Beetham (1992) means by democracy “a mode of decision-making about collectively binding rules and policies over which the people exercise control, and the most democratic arrangement to be that where all members of the collectivity enjoy effective equal rights to take part in such decision-making directly – one, that is to say, which realises, to the greatest conceivable degree, the principles of popular control and equality in its exercise”. For him the opposite of democracy is “a system of rule where the people are totally excluded from the decision-making process and any control over it” (Beetham, 1992: 40; see also Beetham, 1993). In the expression “mode of decision-making” can be found the key to catalogue Beetham’s definition as procedural (empirical, realistic or descriptive).

Parekh (1992) argues that democracy has been defined and structured within the limits set by liberalism and that western liberal democracy can not claim universal validity. According to him, liberal democracy basically means a form of government in which people wield the ultimate political authority, which they delegate to their freely chosen representatives and which they retain the right to withdraw if the government were grossly to violate its trust” (Parekh, 1992: 45). He implies that democracy might take a different form in non-western societies, but he does not specify those alternative forms of democracy, nor does he give examples of them.
Hadenius (1992) formulates political democracy at the national level as follows: "Public policy is to be governed by the freely expressed will of the people whereby all individuals include three principles of democracy: A general principle of sovereignty; a principle of freedom and a principle of equality. He emphasises that "it only makes sense to speak of democracy as a mode of decision-making" (Hadenius, 1992: 9). Then he makes an important conclusion: "Hence, it naturally follows that political democracy must mean the same thing irrespective of the state or part of the world where it is examined. East, West, North, South – economically developed or less developed country –, it makes no difference how the concept is to be defined" (Hadenius, 1992: 35).

At this point, he clearly differs from Parekh (1992), who claims that there cannot be a "universalist" concept of democracy.

Huntington, (1993) following Schumpeter, prefers a procedural definition of democracy. He defines "a twentieth-century political system as democratic to the extent that its most powerful collective decision makers are selected through fair, honest and periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes and in which virtually all the adult population is eligible to vote" (Huntington, 1993: 6-7).

In this regard, the Marxist analysis distinguishes between bourgeois and socialist democracy and complains that the former does not profess the values of democracy. Under capitalism, democracy is a democracy for the minority, but not for the majority, and nominal equality before the law in bourgeois society is a cover for social inequality. On the other hand, socialist democracy is the highest form of democracy, being a democracy for working people (Pennock, 1979: 443; Parry & Moran, 1994: 3; see also Kelle & Kovalson, 1973). Socialist democracy is meant to go beyond the mere proclamation of broad rights and freedoms. It guarantees their execution by providing the relevant material potential. However, socialist democracy does not include the freedom to create competing political parties. The Communist Party "is the directing and guiding force within society's political system" (Chkikvadze, 1960: 61-62; see also Topornin, 1979; Babiy & Zabigailo, 1979). For Vanhanen, the most crucial difference between the Western and the Marxist definition of democracy "concerns the need and right to form legal opposition parties".
This distinction between procedural and ideal (Pennock, 1979); descriptive and normative (Kirkpatrick, 1981) or empirical and rational democracy (Sartori, 1987) lead us to the distinction identified by Diamond (1996: 23) between what he calls electoral democracy and liberal democracy. Electoral democracies have governments produced by free and fair elections, but they lack the protection mechanisms for rights and liberties existing in liberal democracies. These not only have elections but also restrictions on executive power, independent judiciaries to maintain the state of law, protections for individual rights and liberties of expression, association, belief and participation, respect for the rights of minorities, limitations to the capacity of the ruling party to influence the electoral process, etc.

With few exceptions, elections are considered to be the key concept for definitions of democracy. This implies that the only thing upon which social scientists have agreed after 2500 years of using the word democracy is the necessity of periodical, free and fair elections in a context of the rule of law.

If, after more than 2500 years, scholars have not yet agreed about what democracy is and is not, it would probably be impossible to set up a definition of democracy that gains general approval. Surely, after assessing such a definition, and bearing in mind that, as Finer (1962a: 67) stated, “the term has come to mean so many things”, many democracies would cease to be called democracies. Due to this, this study’s definition of democracy is a minimalist one. Consequently, democracy is understood in this study as a political regime in which rulers are elected by – and accountable to –, the ruled in fair, free, competitive and periodical elections, where citizens have the right to freely express, associate, create political parties, pressure organisations, without fearing being repressed by the state for doing so, and where the electoral losers’ rights will be protected by the Rule of Law.

Accordingly, South Africa’s political regime can be labelled as democratic, as it

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12 Mueller (1992), for instance. In his article, he does not only say that elections are not the key concept of democracy but that democracy may exist even in the absence of such a process.
accomplishes the above-cited requirements of this study's definition\textsuperscript{13}.

2.2.4 A new angle: Democratic consolidation

The previous section attempted to delimit "democracy" and its different approaches, the democratic process and the ideals that guide that process.

The weakness of Latin American democracies, for instance, proves that the establishment of electoral processes is not enough to expect a regime to remain democratic over time. This opens up a new angle in the debate: The consolidation of democracy.

Firstly, it is necessary to differentiate between transition to and consolidation of democracy. Both are conceptually distinct aspects of democratisation, although, they may temporally overlap or sometimes even coincide. Transition begins with the breakdown of the former regime and ends with the establishment of a relatively stable configuration of democratic institutions within a democratic regime. Consolidation refers to the achievement of substantial attitudinal support for and behavioural compliance with the new democratic institutions and the rules of the game that they establish. The outcomes of these processes are also different. Transition results in the creation of a new regime; consolidation happens in the stability and persistence of that regime, even in the face of serious challenges (Gunther, Diamandauros and Puhle, 1995: 3). Consolidation is rather more complicated and distinctly lengthier than the preceding phase of democratic transition. Generally, the consolidation of democracy, which is based on the development of a social consensus, is preceded by the phase of emergence, characterised by struggle with an uncertain outcome between the dominant actors and groups, and the phase of effective installation of democracy, which is characterised by compromise among the moderate elements of the dominant groups (Kaufman, 1986: 100-107; Baloyra, 1987: 297-302).

"Democratic consolidation", as a concept and analytical framework, has so far suffered from a poverty of theory. Compared to regime transition it is a much more nebulous phenomenon, and there is considerable uncertainty about its point of ending (Pridham, 1990: 8). While some monographic studies have gone beyond the

\textsuperscript{13} For a description of the South African system see its Constitution (South Africa: 1996).
traditional focus on transition to explore processes of democratic consolidation, very few explicitly comparative studies have done so. Actually, while different theories of regime or democratic transition are to some extent viable for comparative studies, the few studies published to date which have conceptualised the consolidation of democracy as a distinct process categorically different from the transition, have not gone beyond noting the structure of the problem and asking important questions (Mainwaring, 1992: 294-341; Whitehead, 1989: 76-95). For instance, most of the comparisons between Southern Europe and Latin America, and increasingly since 1989, Eastern Europe, have so far not gone much beyond typological comparisons and have principally focused on the problems of the transition (clear examples are Nohlen & Solari, 1988 or Przeworski, 1991 for the Eastern European case).

With regard to this, some authors concentrate their research of democratic consolidation on institutional variables. These studies centre on the political factor when explaining the consolidation of democracy (i.e. Apter, 1991: 464-478; Smith 1991: 609-633), like political parties (Diamond et al., 1987: 5-19, Lechner, 1991: 541-553; Dahl, 1989: 157-158; 275-277; MacLeod, 1990: 321-328). Parties are considered to be effective and significant intermediary structures in liberal democracies, crucial as political and organisational linkages between state and society (Bar, 1984: 134-136; Ware, 1987: 23-30). This idea, that political parties are of great importance when dealing with consolidation, has been challenged by authors such as Boschi (1990: 214-235) who attach much importance to social movements\footnote{See also Mainwaring, (1989; 1987); Boschi, (1987; 1988); Tironi, (1987); Campero, (1988); Filgueira, (1988). On this topic and regarding the African situation the view of Gyimah-Boadi, (1996) about the difficulties of these organisations (social movements, NGOs, etc.) in Africa in general and in South Africa in particular is of great importance.}, interest groups and media in contemporary democracies.

Others centre on the electoral system (Lijphart, 1990: 2-13; Blais & Dion, 1990: 250-266; Horowitz, 1990: 73-79). The debate on the electoral system is concentrated on which representation best enhances the chances for democratic consolidation. Proportional representation is accused of producing two problems: Instability and irresponsibility. Instability is a result of the multiplication of parties represented in parliament. No party has a majority of seats and a coalition is needed. These coalitions are fragile and weak. In such situations small centrist parties have great
negotiating power. Irresponsibility occurs in extremist parties that can not form part of any coalition, and participate in the downfall of the various attempts to build an enduring allegiance. On the other hand, plural elections in a single-member election are supposed to lead to a two-party system. However, it is not as simple as that (Laasko & Taagepera, 1979: 3-5). The plurality systems are meant to enhance government stability and responsibility but exacerbate feelings of alienation among minority groups and pave the way for a single-party system (see Blais & Dion, 1990: 255-258; Lijphart, 1990: 4-8, 11; 1991c: 42-48).

Some other authors focus on the relationship between the executive and legislature. The extensive literature on this reflects the importance assigned to this matter by many scholars (Linz, 1990a; 1990c; Riggs, 1997; Lijphart, 1991a; Di Palma, 1990b; Diamond et al., 1990; Hagopian, 1990; Suárez, 1987; Lechnier, 1991, to mention but a few). Here, the discussion is centred on the debate between presidentialism, semipresidentialism and parliamentarism. Parliamentary systems allow parties to exercise maximum control over political life. Multiparty systems, where no party can form a government alone, provide the parties, and particularly the small parties of the centre, with a great deal of bargaining power. On the other hand, presidential systems, because of the separation of powers, encourage institutional rivalries, which the president can exploit to limit the control parties have over the decisional process. In semipresidential systems, the constitution gives independent powers to a president elected by universal suffrage and forces the government to be responsible before both the parliament and the president (on this see Duverger, 1978; Rigg, 1997).

Party leaders have also been in the centre of attention during research on consolidation (Pasquino, 1990: 54-56; Hagopian, 1990: 149-152).

Another important standpoint is the so-called theories of modernisation. These theories state that the consolidation of democracy depends on structural factors, such as economic development, modernisation, urbanisation, etc. (see, for instance, Lipset, 1959; Adelman & Morris, 1967; Apter, 1965; Deutsch, 1961; Gerschenkron, 1962; Giner & Sevilla, 1980; Lipietz, 1985; Hermet, 1990).

Although these studies generally give a definition of consolidated democracy,
they can not be regarded as focused on consolidation but on (f)actors that may help democracy to consolidate. However, in the recent years, a growth in the literature focused on consolidation itself has occurred (see Gunther et al., 1995, or Linz & Stepan, 1996a, for instance). These studies concentrate on what consolidation is and how it comes to pass – not on those factors, variables or (pre-)requisites of democratic consolidation.

This extension of the literature on consolidation might be due to the fact that the so-called third wave of democratisation may have come to an end. Many countries immersed in this pro-democratic swing have reverted to dictatorship and some of them are having trouble to consolidate (Huntington, 1997: 6-7; Diamond, 1996: 30-32). Thus, the attention has shifted from the transition to the consolidation of remaining democratic regimes.

The point at which a new democracy becomes consolidated has generated considerable scholarly debate. However, no consensus has emerged and it is clear that one of the reasons is the lack of a common definition of "consolidated democracy" (Gunther et al., 1995: 5).

Gunther (et al., 1995: 5) state that the starting point should be the recognition of the fact that the concept of "democratic consolidation is double-barrelled". In order to conclude that democratic consolidation has succeeded in a particular case, it is necessary, first, to ascertain whether the regime is fully democratic and then to determine if that regime is consolidated. As both democracy and consolidation are ideal types, both must be closely approximated before one can conclude that democratic consolidation has occurred.

There is ample discussion about what democratic consolidation is and when a democracy is consolidated, although no agreement has been reached. This lack of agreement on a definition of "consolidated democracy" should not be surprising. There being no agreement on the term democracy, it is understandable that there should be lack of agreement on a more complex concept.

Schmitter (1985: 10) says that a regime is consolidated when "...social relations become social structures, i.e. patterns of interaction can become so regular in their occurrence, so endowed with meaning, so capable of motivating behaviour that they
become autonomous in their internal function and resistant to externally induced change”. Generally, this can be obtained either by looking at the attitudes of the political parties – elite level – to the democratic institutions, or at the political culture and to the social values of the society – mass level.

O'Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead (1986: IV) state that consolidation of democracies is characterised by free expression of divergent interests due to the atomisation of civil society; formation of majority governments and peaceful alternation in power due to the development of political parties that are pluralist, unified, and legitimate; enhancement of the legitimacy of organisations belonging to civil society and of the efficiency of political representation of interests due to the deepening of relations between political parties and interest groups; acceptance of the constitution by the majority of citizens, interest groups ad political parties; and, setting up of mechanisms, formal or informal, limited or permanent, of consultation (concertation) between the state, the political parties and the principal interest groups and deepening of effective recognition of the principle of citizenship.

Whitehead (1989: 79) asserts that the essence of the consolidation process is that “the new regime becomes institutionalised, its framework of open and competitive political expression becomes internalised and thus, in large measure, the preceding uncertainties are overcome. It is unlikely that such a process can ever be fully accomplished in less than a generation”.

Przeworski (1991: 23) states that “democracy is consolidated when under given political and economic conditions a particular system of institutions becomes the only game in town; when no one can imagine acting outside the democratic institutions, when all the losers want to do is to try again within the same institutions under which they have just lost”.

Gunther (et al., 1996: 153) considers a democracy sufficiently consolidated when “...all politically significant groups\textsuperscript{15} in a new democracy acknowledge its political institutions as the only arena for political contestation and adhere to their behavioural

\textsuperscript{15} Regarding this, they state that “...as with all ideal types, there is no real world case in which all citizens or political groups strictly obey democratic rules of the game and fully acknowledge the legitimacy of the political institutions and principles under which they live...” (Gunther et al., 1995: 7).
norms...."

O’Donnell (1996: 34-51) determines whether a democracy is consolidated by means of the following indicators: “1) alternation in power between former rivals; 2) continued widespread support and stability during times of extreme economic hardship; 3) successful defeat and punishment of a handful of strategically placed rebels; 4) regime stability in the face of a radical restructuring of the party system; 5) the absence of a politically significant antisystem party or social movement” (see also O’Donnell, 1989: 76; 1992: 21)\(^{16}\).

On the other hand some scholars, like Pridham (1995: 169), insist on the adherence to democratic norms and values by most individuals in a society as a measure of consolidated democracy. Pridham distinguishes between “positive consolidation” and “negative consolidation”. Negative consolidation implies the achievement of a significant or partial degree of consolidation, but it is positive consolidation, which ultimately completes the process. Negative consolidation includes the solution of any problems remaining from the transition process and, in general, the containment or reduction of any serious challenges to democratisation. Negative consolidation is achieved when the presence or impact of groups or individuals characterised as antisystem, becomes numerically or politically insignificant. Obviously, this dimension of consolidation refers to elites, political parties and their behaviour during regime consolidation. Positive consolidation places more emphasis on attitudinal patterns and it refers especially to wider or deeper levels of the overall process. It includes the inculcation of democratic values at mass level. Therefore, it includes some remaking of those aspects, related to democracy, of the political culture in a direction that is system-supportive for a new democracy – being removed, therefore, the last of the uncertainties “remaining” in the aftermath of the transition. Positive consolidation refers to longer-term change, while negative consolidation may be achieved in a shorter period. Positive consolidation places more

\(^{16}\) Other definitions of democratic consolidation, which are similar to these, are set forth by Mainwaring, O’Donnell and Valenzuela (Mainwaring et al., 1992: 3, 48-49, 58-72 respectively).
emphasis on the relationship between the new political system and the society (Pridham, 1995: 169; see also Pridham, 1990: 8-16).

Since this study is focused on the relation between consolidated democracy and middle class (a social strata and not a political institution), the finally-adopted concept of “consolidated democracy” will be based on the last conception above: The adherence to the social values and the political culture, concretely on Pridham’s theory of “positive consolidation” (engagement with political institutions, motivation for participation in political processes, acceptance of political results, confidence in the government, and, as stated by Lipset (1963: 1): “...the adherence by the “outs” to decisions made by the “ins”, [and] the recognition by the “ins” of the rights of the “outs”...”). This is so as to differentiate it from those “democratisation” – electoralisation would probably be a better term – processes that have occurred mainly in Latin America, which did not lead to stable and lasting democracies (consolidated democracies). In these countries, the political system has been characterised by continuous alternations in office between the army and democratically elected governments. The lack of economic development produced high rates of inflation, poverty, unemployment, political and social instability (and consequently no development of the middle classes), etc. In these circumstances, then, the army obtains control through a coup. Concrete examples are Honduras, Ecuador, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Argentina and Bolivia, to mention but a few (Lipset, 1993: 164; Huntington, 1993: 59-72, see also Muller, 1995a).

Those regimes could not “...remain stable in the face of such serious challenges as a major economic crisis...” (Gunther et al., 1995: 8). We could say, using Lipset’s previously cited words, that the “outs” did not adhere to the decisions made by the “ins”.

The above-mentioned (this Chapter, section 2.2.3.2) difference between normative and descriptive democracy holds broad consequences for the definition of democratic consolidation. It can be said that those who rest their definition of consolidated democracy on the attitudes of political parties towards democratic institutions, such as Gunther, Mainwaring, O’Donnell, Puhle, etc., are basing their definition of democracy on empiricism. If a regime is to be called democratic when it complies with some electoral requisites, it is to be understood that the more frequently
free and fair elections are held, the more consolidated a democracy would become. This leads the debate to the idea suggested by many scholars, that alternation in office after an election is an indicator of democratic consolidation. The best expression of this idea is Huntington’s “two-turnovers test” (Huntington, 1990: 42; 1993: 266-267; see also Dahrendorf, 1990: 74). In brief, this method proves that in the system there are, already, two major groups committed enough to the maintenance of the democratic regime as to abandon office when they lose the election. This means that, when something needs to be changed, the rulers are changed but not the ruling system.

An advantage of this method is that it is easy to test. However, Huntington himself recognises that there are problems with this method when measuring the consolidation of a democracy, as evidenced with the Peruvian case, for instance. Alan García won the first democratic elections in Peru after the military regime. He was succeeded by Alberto Fujimori who, shortly after winning presidential elections in 1992, carried out an executive coup (Palmer, 1992: 378).

On the other hand, countries such as Japan would still be consolidating democracy since the liberals have remained in office since World War II. In 1996 the Liberal party again won the elections. In the same way, in El Salvador, competitive elections were held at regular intervals during the 1960s and the 1970s, but there was no respect for democratic values or for the political aspirations of the Salvadoran people (Whitehead, 1989: 76-77).

This proves that alternation-in-office or election-counting systems do not prove properly the consolidation of democratic regimes.

On the other hand, those who base their definition of consolidated democracy on social values, like Pridham17, are basing it on rationalism. Latin America’s fragile democracies prove that elections and other related institutional procedures are not

17 What is more, we can find in Pridham’s work both an empirical and a rational conception of democracy. What he calls “negative consolidation” would be related to the empirical nature of democracy whereas his “positive consolidation” would be concerned with the rational essence of democracy.
enough to call a regime democratic – Mexico\textsuperscript{18} is a clear example (Diamond, 1996: 25; on Mexico’s politics see Lawson, 1997; Blum, 1997; Valenzuela, 1997). Democratic ideas and values need to be disseminated throughout the society to ensure that the regime will remain democratic even in the face of important challenges such as economic crises. It is the rational, ideal or substantive democracy that deals with this. It is not a matter of quantity but of quality. A democracy would be consolidated not according to the number of fair and free elections or alternations in office but according to the ideas, values, motivations and behaviour that motivate individuals in those processes.

Against this background, and as previously suggested, this study considers a democracy to be consolidated when most of its citizens believe that the current democratic institutions are the best for governance. This means that people consider the regime legitimate. As Mainwaring (1992: 306, italics added) states, legitimacy “...is every bit as much the root of democratic stability...”\textsuperscript{19} Diamond (1996: 33, italics added) also affirms that “in essence consolidation is the process of achieving broad and deep legitimisation, such as that all significant political actors, at both the elite and mass levels\textsuperscript{20}, believe that the democratic regime is better for their society than any other realistic alternative they can imagine”.

Consequently, this research will conceive democracy in South Africa to be consolidating if the social values and political ideas of the society are growing in the

\textsuperscript{18} Mexico was not considered to be a real democracy (until 1988) since its, then, “institutionalising ruling party [made] extensive use of coercion of patronage, media control, and other tools to reduce opposition parties to decidedly ‘second-class’ status” (Diamond, 1996: 25; see also Sartori, 1976 regarding the ‘second-class parties’).

\textsuperscript{19} On the discussion about democratic legitimacy and economic efficiency see Linz & Stepan, (1989); Mainwaring, (1992); Linz, (1978). Legitimacy is one of the basic aspects on which political systems depend. It involves the capacity of the system to engender and maintain the belief that the existing political institutions are the most appropriate ones for the society. The extent to which contemporary democratic political systems are legitimate depends in large measure upon the ways in which the key issues which have historically divided the society have been resolved. Accordingly, legitimacy is an evaluative concept (see Lipset, 1963: 22-27, 68-71). Weber distinguishes three historical forms of legitimacy: The traditional – exercised by the patriarch –, the charismatic – exercised by individual leadership according to heroism, revelation or any other quality of the leader –, and, finally, the legal (rational) – by virtue of the belief in the validity of legal statute and functional competence based on rationally created rules (Weber, 1968: 36-38; 212-245). For further and comprehensive studies on legitimacy see Connolly, (1984); Schar, (1981).

\textsuperscript{20} This differentiation between consolidation at “the elite and mass levels” is easily connected to Pridham’s, (1995: 169) Negative and Positive consolidation respectively.
Thus, the values, ideas, motivations and, in general, the political behaviour of the individuals, which make them adhere to and defend the democratic institutions even in the face of important challenges such as economic crises, need to be explored.

2.3 Democracy and Middle class: Following the link

The explanation and delimitation of both “middle class” and “consolidated democracy” was presented above. Now, the link between them is to be explained.

2.3.1 Theoretical background

It has been maintained that democracy is promoted by reducing inequalities in wealth, at least since Aristotle (1962: 173). On the other hand, it has also been suggested that democracy and inequality have no connection with each other (see Neubauer, 1967: 1008-1009).

Aristotle stated that “in Democracy the poor has more sovereign power than the men of property; for they are more numerous and the decisions of the majority prevail” (Aristotle, 1962: 237). Moreover, he says that “where one set of people possesses a great deal and the other nothing, the result is either extreme democracy or unmixed oligarchy or a tyranny due to the excesses of the other two” (Aristotle, 1962: 173).

The idea that political democracy and greater economic equality are linked is an old one and was held by both radicals and conservatives in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century. During the debate on the 1832 Reform Bill in England, John Stuart Mill foresaw the prospect of a revolution that would “exterminate every person in Great Britain and Ireland who has £500 a year”. John Wilson Croker, the leading Tory publicist of the day, expected the result would be “no King, no Lord, no inequalities in the social system; all will be levelled to the plane of the petty shopkeepers and small farmers” (Jaher, 1973: 206).

For longer than 150 years, researchers on democracy have assumed that social and economic equality naturally lead to political equality, that political democracy is
more likely to occur where societies are more egalitarian. This, as Turner and Carballo (1993: 270) wrote, is “historically and logically accurate: Before the French Revolution aristocrats in Europe and autocrats in other parts of the world monopolised political power, economic privilege and social distinction. Conversely, many social scientists and planning ministers have assumed, explicitly or implicitly, that the processes of development at the end of the twentieth century are working in some sense all together to create greater equality in the economic, political and social spheres”.

Predetermined characteristics of civil society are usually observed either as “important preconditions for the emergence of democracy or as persuasive elements for the bringing-up of a positive context for the consolidation of democracy” (Boschi, 1990: 214). It is possible to find support for this idea both in the empirical and the theoretical fields.

The analysis of conditions for the emergence and maintenance of democratic political systems is one of the central concerns of political science. As a well-known precursor stated, “the organisation and establishment of democracy ... is the greatest political problem of our time” (Tocqueville, 1969: 13). Since Tocqueville and his study, this statement has not lost any of its substance or more immediate repercussions. Today we witness processes of democratisation the world over, the most dramatic of these taking place in what used to be called the Second World. However, we are aware of the many problems and potential setbacks inherent in democratisation (see, for instance, Pennock, 1979; Powell, 1982; Lijphart, 1984; Diamond et al., 1988; Sartori, 1987).

For Key (1949), democratic institutions are important because they give rise to organised political competition. In light of his analysis of the one-party factionalism common in South America, he concluded that single-party politics precludes organised debate on issues, and leads instead to a politics of personality. The lack of sustained competition between two clearly defined political groups makes government more susceptible to individual pressures and favouritism. Single-party politics has a statu quo bias that benefits the “haves” at the expense of the “have-nots” (Key, 1949: 307). Anyway, Key recognises that political competition itself does not guarantee that the “have-nots” can be an effective political force, but he argues
that the absence of competition excludes any such outcomes.

Lenski (1966) bases a deductive argument on the redistributive significance of democracy on two assumptions, the first being that those who control the government are able to determine the rules governing the competition for rewards in society, and by virtue of this power, are able to influence profoundly the outcome of this competition. The second is that political democracy has significantly shifted the distribution of political power from the rich to the poor. He shows that “industrial” societies have a more equal distribution of income than do “agrarian” societies and also a much greater diffusion of political power. For Lenski (1966), the “new democratic ideology” is significant because it legitimates a major distribution of political power in favour of the majority – namely the disadvantaged element of the society. This increased political equality has led to greater social equality because the major electoral demand made on modern political elites has been for a more egalitarian redistribution of material goods (Lenski, 1966: 43-94, 297-434, 443-447).

Those who argue that political democracy has not resulted in a more equal stratification fall into two schools: The Functionalist and the Marxist.

The former argues that the form of government, irrespective of whether democratic or non-democratic, socialist or non-socialist, has no effect on the stratification system because the needs of modern industrial economies will require similar differences in earnings between occupational groups, similar mobility rates and similar government policies, etc. Any change in the distributive system is explained as a result of the “logic of industrialism”. Industrial and technological change lead to a convergent pattern of development in the stratification system of politics. The latter assumes that the capitalist class is able to dominate the state and use their power to maintain their economic and social privilege (see Hewitt, 1977; Miliband, 1969; Parkin, 1971).

One of the first (and very controversial) theories addressing this matter dates from the early sixties. The reference is to Lipset's Political Man (1963), in which he draws up the “social conditions of democracy”. Dahl's well-known Polyarchy (1971) also deals with this question. Analysis of political development and modernisation such as Huntington's (1968) or Cutright's (1963) are also important. No list could be
complete without at least mentioning O'Donnell and Schmitter's (1986, 1990), Rubinson and Quilan's (1977) and Muller's (1988; 1995a) work in the field.

More specifically, there has been increasing emphasis on the relation between social structure and democratisation. Against this background, there is ample research on the middle class-democracy linkage that has to be explained.

Lipset (1993: 166) states, for instance: “People with more income, in complex and widely interdependent work situations, with more education ... are more likely to ask for increased political freedom.” High levels of income, education and access to health and other services are characteristics of the middle class. These citizens' demands become more visible, as does a pattern of politics that can accommodate them (Lipset, 1993: 167). This pattern, then, naturally holds implications for democratising countries (see Lipset, 1959; 1963). Actually, in the early 1970s, Spain was the only one of 19 industrial market economies with a large middle class which did not operate as a democracy (Lipset, 1993: 158).

The most extensive process of democratisation occurred in the second half of this century, parallel to a significant enlargement of the middle classes (see Huntington, 1993: 3; Marshall, 1963: 148). Concretely, after the Second World War, there has been a narrowing of the inequality gap in the distribution of income that is clearly visible if the rise in the share of the lower ordinal groups is considered. In most countries, the share of the richest five per cent group (before taxes) was twenty percent or less in the post-Second World War years compared to well over fifty per cent in the 1920s, while that of the top twenty per cent group was between forty and forty five per cent in the 1920s. Information relating to the share of the lowest sixty per cent is scarce but there is some indication that this was below thirty percent in the 1920s and 1930s and rose to well above thirty per cent in the post-Second World War years (Paukert, 1973: 103).

This middle class was produced by the unprecedented global economic growth and industrial development of the 1960s, and is considered to be one of the main reasons for the rise of democratisation movements during the twentieth century (Huntington, 1993: 45). In fact, these democratic movements were mostly led by the urban middle class (Huntington, 1993: 67). Tezanos (1975: 87) also states that “... the
middle classes are the most favourable to democracy..."

At this point, it can be assumed (and will be shown later) that a large and well-developed middle class and stable democracy are parallel phenomena. A large middle class – as will be evidenced in this Chapter – is a characteristic of stable democracies. According to many scholars, the lack of a stable economic development in Latin America was the reason for its political instability (Lipset, 1993: 164) and, consequently, its lack of middle classes (Huntington, 1993: 59-72).

At this point it is also necessary to re-connect to the historical debate about the linkage between democracy and economic development. Many studies link democracy and economic development but the question is whether democracy produces economic development or vice versa. Huntington (1997: 5) states it directly: "... in short, if you want to get democracy promote economic development". There are several reasons to support this statement. Economic development implies a change in the occupational structure – produced by the increase in the urbanisation, and education –, which mainly consists of a decrease in the peasantry and increase in middle class and urban working class. These groups demand patterns of politics in which they can participate more directly (Lipset, 1993). These groups are in better condition to organise themselves – political parties, trade unions, etc. On the other hand, the bourgeoisie that controls the new independent centres of power based on technology, communication, etc. also demand patterns of politics in which they can exercise direct influence. Although generally – as previously said – the economic development comes before democracy (Western Europe, for instance), there, obviously, are exceptions such as Central and Eastern Europe where the collapse of the communist economic system produced political defeat (Cotarelo, 1996) or South Africa where the democracy was forced upon it (Thompson, 1995).

When we talk about a large middle class, we not only talk about social structure itself but also about the existing inequality level in a certain society. An extensive middle class implies low income-inequality. Rubinson and Quinlan (1977) reasoned that a very egalitarian income distribution reflects the rise of a strong and autonomous bourgeoisie, which strives to establish parliamentary democracies in order to convert its economic power into correspondent political power (see also Moore, 1966). Therefore, they estimate that a country's level of democracy "will vary as an inverse
monotonic function of income inequality, since countries with low income inequality, indicative of a strong middle class, will be more likely to establish democracy than those with high income inequality, where the middle class is weak”. In other words, they stir the issue of the relationship between class structure, political competition (and interaction with the state) and the formation of political regimes (Rubinson & Quinlan, 1977: 622). Muller also asserts (1988: 61) that “income inequality has a negative impact on level of democracy because it reduces the likelihood of inauguration of democracy”.

In this regard, Dahl (1971: 103) gives the following proposition: “In a society that already has a regime with public contestation, extreme inequalities increase the chances that competitive politics will be displaced by a hegemony. Polyarchies are particularly vulnerable to the effects of extreme inequalities. Extreme inequalities in the distribution of key values are unfavourable to competitive politics and to polyarchy because this state of affairs is equivalent to extreme inequality in the distribution of key political resources and is likely to generate resentments and frustrations, which weaken allegiance to the regime” (Dahl, 1971: 105).

All this gives rise to the question of allegiance, again. Nordlinger (1977: 93) defines the term “legitimacy deflation” as a “weakening of support for democratic regime due to the presence of high levels of economic inequality”. Scholars such as Finer (1962b), Nordlinger (1977) or Welch and Smith (1974), to mention but a few, attach great importance to the legitimacy variable. For them, a high level of legitimacy is supposed to act as psychological barrier that inhibits the military or the executive from usurping power. A coup against a legitimate regime is likely to generate opposition even within the officer corps. If we assume that the legitimacy of democratic government is eroded by a high level of income inequality, it can also be assumed that a democratic regime in a very non-egalitarian society is strongly susceptible to overthrow by a coup d'etat. This was the case of Brazil in 1964, Panama and Peru in 1968, Chile and Uruguay in 1973, Turkey in 1980, Gambia, Nigeria – even before its inauguration – and Niger in the 90s, where the army came to be in charge through a coup (Diamond, 1996: 31). In addition, an executive coup (where the chief executive decides to retain power indefinitely) took place in Philippines in 1969, carried out by the President Ferdinand Marcos; and in Peru in
1992 by Alberto Fujimori. We also saw significant restrictions on political liberty in Malaysia in 1969 when the parliament was suspended (Diamond, 1996: 28-31).

2.3.2 Empirical studies

At this point it is possible to make the following assertion: The higher the income inequality in a certain society, the less stable democracy becomes in that society. A country with a high income inequality is a country with a narrow and non-powerful middle class. This can be shown in two ways: Either by looking at the income share of the richest five per cent of the population or by dividing the income into quintiles and looking at the size of the middle quintiles. If the income-share of the quintiles in the middle (middle class) is high it means that the economic inequality is low (large middle class). If, on the contrary, it is low (narrow middle class), the inequality is high. On the other hand, if share of income of the upper five percent is high, the inequality is high (medium strata are small).

With this, the old debate about the democracy-socioeconomic development link is brought back. Originally developed by Lipset (1959; 1963) the discussion is still alive.

There are many empirical studies linking socioeconomic inequality and democracy. What follows is an exposition of the main findings in the area. Frequently, the studies refer to other studies and this could confuse the reader. In order to avoid this, the studies are chronologically presented, presenting at the beginning of each, in bold, the author’s name.

Cutright (1963) posited a linear relationship between socioeconomic development and political development. This implies that, as countries become more advanced economically, they tend to become more politically advanced. Cutright sought to “polish” Lipset’s methodology and, at the time, to broaden the theoretical scope of his conclusions. Four years later, Cutright (1967) identified an obvious negative effect of democracy on inequality, even controlling for the economic development.

Neubauer (1967) attempts to demonstrate that there is no relation between social equality and political democracy or between social equity and political democracy.
For him, any sort of combination of these variables is spurious. He criticises the methodology used by Cutright (1963) in probing his hypothesis. He argues that the method used to measure what Cutright defines as political development does not measure that, but democratic political development. On the other hand he also criticises Lipset (1959) because his study, according to him, suffers from methodological shortcomings. Using a different method he reaches different conclusions. He does not find any relation between level of performance in democratic countries and socio-economic development. However, Neubauer (1967: 1007) admits that “certain levels of 'basic' socio-economic development appear to be necessary to elevate countries to a level at which they can begin to support complex, nation-wide patterns of political interaction, one of which may be democracy ... [but] once above this threshold, the degree of to which a country will 'maximise' certain forms of democratic practise is no longer a function of continued socio-economic development” (he talks about level, not stability of democracy).

Jackman (1974) reviews the subject, doing an analysis of a cross section of sixty developed and non-developed countries (data from the 1960s) and his results indicate that the effect of the level of economic development on social equality (measured in terms of experience with social insurance programmes; income inequality and a social welfare index) and political democracy is positive and curvilinear. This implies that, while industrialisation results in greater social equality in the earlier phases of economic development, a threshold is reached in later phases of this process when the effects of industrialisation on social equality become progressively weaker. However, the political effect of political democracy on social equality is spurious once the economic development is controlled for. Although he accepts the hypothesis drawn up by Cutright (1965), which suggests that both the economic development and political democracy exert a joint effect on social equality, he maintains that political democracy does not have any separate effect on social equality or vice versa. Finally, he admits, in his conclusions, that “while this analysis indicates that political democracy is not related in any important causal manner to social equality, the last consideration does point to the utility of specifying 'political' variables precisely. That is, the above results should not be taken to mean that politics has nothing to do with the distribution of material rewards. ... The present study suggests that the argument [democracy-social equality link] is incorrect, but further research is needed...”
Rubinson and Quilan (1977) find that inequality has a negative effect on democratisation but there is less empirical support for the hypothesis that democratisation negatively affects inequality.

They review Cutright's (1967) results (as clear example of positive relation between the social equality and democracy link) and Jackman's (1974) findings (as a good example of non-existent relation). Jackman (1974) compared the above-explained hypothesis of Lenski (1966) with an alternative suggesting that this relationship is spurious, once the economic development is controlled. These results contradict the findings of an earlier study carried out by Cutright in 1967. Cutright researched the same kind of relations and his results showed that there was a significant negative effect of democracy on inequality, even controlling for the economic development. Thus, we have two similar studies with opposite results.

The first point Rubinson and Quilan (1977) noticed is the different methodology used by Cutright and Jackman in their respective studies: Different indexes of democratisation; different samples of countries used; the relationship between democratisation and inequality and the important issue of the direction of the causal relationship between democratisation and inequality. They also criticise the fact that none of them has made the most of the rich and complex original and common starting point: That of Lenski (1966).

The first difference between them is the measure of democracy. Jackman (1974) argues that his index of democratic performance measures more precisely "what more theories mean by democracy". In this sense, he criticises Cutright's method because it measures stability instead of the level of the democratic system (Jackman, 1974: 43). They tried to find out whether this was the reason for different results. They inspected the correlation matrix and carried out a factor analysis of those two indexes and a third index of democratisation, Dahl's polyarchy measure (1971). They found that the correlations among them are relatively high (Jackman and Cutright: .8182. Both of these indexes have practically the same correlation with Dahl's index: .7201 for Jackman and .7330 for Cutright) (Rubinson & Quilan, 1977: 614). The relatively high magnitude of these correlations implies, to some extent, that it is not possible to
simply assert – as Jackman does – that the different results found by Jackman between him and Cutright are due to the different political dimensions. The results of their analysis indicate that Cutright's and Jackman's methodologies do not capture different political dimensions.

Another reason why they get different conclusions might be that they use different samples. They only used those countries for which there was complete data on their necessary indicators. Jackman used 60 countries and Cutright 54. However, the comparison between the samples shows that they had 44 cases in common. This evidences that the different results cannot be explained by the different sampling. When they correlated the 44 common cases, they found a correlation of only .645. They reasoned that "although we can not determine the source of this low correlation, we can conclude that the difference in findings between Cutright and Jackman may be due to the fact that the two measures of sectoral income inequality do not correlate highly" (Rubinson & Quilan, 1977: 616).

Apparently, the main reason could be the measures of sectoral income inequality as a measure of inequality. While they both used the same conceptualisation of sectoral income inequality, it is possible that errors resulting from coding or from using different sources for determining sector income and workers per sector could be responsible for the discrepant findings.

Both Jackman and Cutright assert that sectoral income inequality does not measure social inequality as actual personal income distribution does (Cutright, 1967: 563; Jackman, 1974: 19-21). They both were forced to use this measure because they did not have measures of personal income distribution. Sectoral income inequality is a measure originally developed by Kuznets (1963). Hewitt (1977: 53) also critiqued Cutright's and Jackman's "unsatisfactory measure of income inequality". The use of sectoral income inequality is viewed by both writers as a substitute measure for individual-income-distribution data that are unavailable for many of the low- and middle-income countries that they analysed. It has also been criticised by Taylor and Hudson (1972). Certainly, it is hard to see why sectoral would be chosen over individual, if it was not because of the lack of available data.

Another method is offered by Parkin (1971). He measures income inequality by
ratios of the average earnings of different occupations groups. The downside of this method is the different occupational classification among countries and that ignores the income differential within occupation categories.

In order to find out which of them was right, they re-analysed the data using personal income distribution. When they substituted personal income as the measure of social inequality, they found that Jackman’s indicator of democratic performance has an important effect on lowering income inequality, even controlling for the level of economic development.

Their analysis of Cutright's study showed a similarly strong negative relation between the variables. Moreover, they say that “other results not presented here, also show that Jackman [with this new operationalisation] has significant effects on increasing the income of the bottom 20 percent of the population” (Rubinson & Quilan, 1977: 615).

According to their re-analysis, they conclude that both Cutright's and Jackman's researches imply a strong negative relation between democracy and social inequality (Rubinson & Quilan, 1977: 615).

After ratifying Cutright and correcting Jackman, they went further and addressed a matter done by neither of them. Both Cutright and Jackman established the relation between democracy and social inequality as a one-way situation: Democracy affects social inequality. However, there is a large research body, which infers that inequality affects democracy negatively. The main argument for this is the following: Observation of income differences among countries, proves that most of the difference is located “in the middle of the income distribution” (Rubinson & Quilan, 1977: 615; italics added). The countries that exhibit the greatest income equality are those which have a greater share going to the third and fourth quintiles of the population and a smaller share of income going to the top twenty percent of the population. Countries with the most unequal income distributions are those in which the top twenty per cent of the population has a relatively large share of the income and the middle quintiles have a relatively small share (Pauker, 1973).

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21 Jackman himself claims it to be better that his own (Jackman, 1975).
This conjecture suggests that the inequality of income among countries depends largely on the relative strength of socio-economic groups. The lowest amount of inequality “is associated with a large and economically powerful middle class group. Thus, when we compare countries on the basis of inequality, we are basically comparing their class structures and, particularly, the degree to which they are dominated by a middle class. It is interpreting inequality as an indicator of class structure that leads to the hypothesis that social inequality [negatively] affects democracy” (Rubinson & Quilan, 1977: 615; italics added).

It is possible to find a broad scope of historical studies that point in this direction. As the reader can easily figure out, one of them is the Marxist school of thought. Marx's social analysis stated that the growth and institutionalisation of the bourgeoisie rests on parliamentary democracy. This relationship between bourgeoisie and democratisation arose because the rising capitalist classes used parliamentary methods to get the control of the state from the Crown and the traditional land elite (Marx, 1972).

In the same way, Moore (1966) supports the idea that the urban bourgeoisie has been the crucial socio-economic group in the major democratic revolution. He concludes by saying that the strength and organisation of the urban bourgeoisie has been the crucial condition for the institutionalisation of democratic forms of government.

Following this, Soboul (1975), in his analysis of the French Revolution, maintains that the establishment of legal equality (the classic conception of democracy) over other visions of equality was due to the fact that the urban bourgeoisie eventually got the control of the French state.

To summarise, Rubinson and Quilan (1977) think that all the above-exposed imply that the degree of inequality, as an indicator of class structure, affects democratisation. While it might not be true, in theory, that the larger the income share going to the third quintile, the less the inequality in the data, it is empirically true in the data on income distribution presented by Pauker (1973) and the analysis of Rubinson (1976).

Their new analysis (taking into account the income share for the third quintile)
showed that there is a strong positive effect of the third quintile on both Cutright's and Jackman's measures of democratisation (Rubinson & Quilan, 1977: 616).

They finally conclude with two statements: The first being that they found theoretical and empirical support both for the assertion that democracy affects inequality and for the statement that inequality (interpreted as class structure) affects democracy. In other words, they bring along the issue of the relationship between class structure and competition to the formation of political regimes. The second is that it is necessary to warn the reader of the operationalisation process (Rubinson & Quilan, 1977: 617).

Bollen and Jackman (1985), in the same way, reviewed previous research on the matter, accusing the researchers of lack of precision resulting from the shortcomings of their specification, measurement and sample composition. They attempted to overcome those limitations and in doing so, did not find any evidence of direct effects of political democracy on income inequality or vice versa. However, according to them, economic development influences both variables. The essay ends with a criticism of both on the flaws in prior studies linking democracy with equality and of the political process that undermines such linkage.

They state that if this relation exists, the direction in which it occurs has to be figured out, which means that it is not clear which is the independent variable and which is the dependent. Democracy can affect or can be affected by income inequality. The third possibility is that the relation might be non-existent. They bring in Aristotle, Mill (1862), Key (1949), Lipset (1959) and Lenski (1966) to present (more theoretically than empirically) the possible effect of democracy on social inequality. Afterwards, they allude to Tocqueville (1969), Marshall (1950), Dahl (1971) and Lindblom (1977) to explain the potential influence of social inequality on democracy. In sum, the effect of inequality on democracy is anticipated because concentrated economic rewards lead to similarly concentrated political resources, undermining political equality. In addition, economic inequality generates frustrations that threaten loyalty to democratic procedures.

They also review the theoretical arguments of the democracy-social inequality non-relationship, calling attention to Kerr (et al., 1964) and "its logic of
industrialism" by which the process of technological development shapes both the distribution of material goods and the structure of political institutions. Therefore, according to them, any observed association between the latter two is spurious. Political structures are subordinate to technological development. Indeed, most Marxists – they continue – would argue that the logic of industrialisation implies the opposite. Marxist perspectives also imply no meaningful relationship between liberal political democracy and income inequality. Democratic structure and ideology serve, instead, to legitimise the existing class relations, while economic inequality serves as a manifestation of those relations. On the other hand, they refer to Lijphart (1984) to evidence that only a few democracies adhere rigorously to majoritarianism (in which the argument that political democracy reduces inequality is embedded). It is also assumed, they say, that low-income voters (the majority of the electorate) demand redistribution by supporting programmatic parties of the left, but it is difficult to overstate the degree to which democratic parties are programmatic (Downs, 1957; Edelman, 1964; Lindblom, 1977). To prove that this is wrong, they use India as an example where lower-income voters appear to lack the requisite class consciousness and are not well organised by labour unions and political parties with redistributive goals (Kohli, 1980). In a similar way – they continue – the argument for a social inequality-democracy effect rests on the assumption that inequality undermines the legitimacy of democratic regimes. However, they argue, to have such an effect, inequality has to be perceived as unjust, and "there is no reason to believe that inequality automatically generates perceptions of inequity. It is evident that proponents of a democracy-inequality linkage have not explored all the possibilities" (Bollen & Jackman, 1985: 441).

In their research, they found no empirical evidence of any linkage between political democracy and socio-economic inequality. According to them, with economic development controlled for, no statistically significant effect was found. However, they admit that it is possible that "future studies with better measures, a larger sample, an alternative specification or some combination of the above, might provide evidence of this linkage" (Bollen & Jackman, 1985: 450; italics added). The reason for this lack of linkage appears to be the common dependence of both, democracy and social inequality, on economic development. They point again to Kerr's logic of industrialisation (Kerr et al., 1964), which itself changes the
occupational structure in a more egalitarian direction and helps to produce pluralistic political institutions.

They also add to this the political factors, which also undermine any possible link between democracy and social inequality. They argue that, although, in democracies, the electorate can convert its preferences into actions, it is possible that the dominant preferences of the voting population are not for redistributive policies (Parkin, 1971; Jackman & Jackman; 1983; McDonough et al., 1985). Such preferences – they maintain – may have more to do with equality of opportunity than with equality of results. Alternatively, many people in capitalist countries may not allow the government intervention in the economy that would be necessary to institute the policies required to redistribute income, – they state. Their reason for this is that organised competition along clear left-right political lines is unlikely to occur (with one party adopting a redistributive program and another embracing a non-redistributive program). This undermines the responsible-party model implicit in Lipset argument (1960). When political discourse is ambiguous, voters are unlikely to adopt clear positions.

Finally, they invoke the legitimacy argument. According to them, Lipset (1960), Dahl (1971) and others have argued that high levels of inequality lowers the possibilities for democracy to survive, because inequality reduces legitimacy of regimes and democracy depends on legitimacy to survive. Nevertheless, all regimes need legitimacy to survive. Furthermore – they maintain –, even in the presence of high levels of inequality, regimes can maintain a degree of legitimacy by invoking other political symbols (nationalism, etc.). They end up suggesting that, as inequality is a vague term, it can be used in a highly ambiguous manner, those regimes that do declare that they pursue egalitarian principles have considerable room to scheme.

Muller (1988), from the same point of view, analyses forty countries that were under democratic rule in 1961. The relation between the upper-quintile-income share and democratic stability is shown in his study. All democracies with high income inequality (an upper-quintile share of more that 55 percent) were highly susceptible to military coups. On the other hand, more than two thirds of the democracies with an intermediate level of inequality (an upper-quintile share between forty-five and fifty-five percent) remained stable and all of those with relatively low inequality (an upper-
quintile share of less than forty five percent) were stable.

**Turner and Carballo de Cilley** (1993) delved in the same area and, after a short though serious review of the concerned literature, found a strong negative relation between democracy and inequality, contradicting Bollen and Jackman (1985) and supporting Cutright (1967), Muller (1988) and others. According to their results, those countries with low levels of per capita income, are more likely to maintain authoritarian regimes (Turner & Carballo de Cilley, 1993: 273). Concretely, they state that “analysis of late twentieth century data confirms that international inequalities in living standards that prevailed before the twentieth century, hindered or prevented the spread of democratic government around the world. In the 1990s, the wealthiest group of nations is the most consistently democratic, and the poorest are those where democracies endure the least. At the same time, as significant advances in per capita income have spread to most nations over decades, opportunities for polyarchy are significantly enhanced, and in fact the number of polyarchies increased dramatically by the early 1990s” (Turner & Carballo de Cilley, 1993: 281).

Finally, **Muller** (1995a) tried to determine why in the sixties and seventies, economic development did not converge to democracy. Actually economic development was associated with declines in democracy, especially in Latin American countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, El Salvador, Mexico, Panama, Peru, and Uruguay). Important declines of democracy also occurred in Europe (Greece), the Middle East (Turkey, Lebanon, Tunisia) and Asia (Malaysia and the Philippines). He finds income inequality to be the answer for that question. Income inequality is an economic determinant of democratisation. Furthermore, its negative effect on democratisation can counteract the positive effect of economic development (Muller, 1995a: 967).

The process of capitalist economic development is expected to have a positive impact on democratisation because it produces a shift in the labour force from agriculture to industry and services. This shift increases the size of the urban middle class (see Lipset, 1959; Huntington, 1991) and the urban working class (see Rueschemeyer et al., 1992) “which fosters the inauguration of democracy. However, capitalist economic development also initially heightens income inequality in a country, and this is expected to have a negative impact on democratisation because a
high level of income inequality radicalises the working class, enhances class polarisation and reduces the tolerance of the bourgeoisie for political participation by the lower classes. Therefore, income inequality is incompatible with the stability of democracy over time” (Muller, 1995a: 967-969).

Two important conclusions can be drawn from Muller's research: The first is that income inequality weakens democratisation and this negative effect explains the trend among countries at intermediate levels of economic development for democracy to decrease instead of increase. These countries are more likely to experience substantial declines in democracy than are countries at low or high levels of development because their high levels of income inequality make it difficult to sustain a relatively high level of democracy over time. Second, when the impact of income inequality is controlled for, the economic development has the expected positive effect on democracy. Consequently, a pattern of relationship between capitalist economic development and democratisation requires that income inequality be investigated (Muller, 1995a: 983).

Thus, Muller finds out why, during the 1960s and 1970s, middle-income and upper-middle-income countries that fit the prediction of the economic development-democracy hypothesis, such as Portugal, Spain or Thailand, were greatly outnumbered by middle-income and upper-middle-income countries that did not, like Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, El Salvador, Uruguay, Turkey, Peru, Mexico, South Korea, Nicaragua or Panama. The reason is that income inequality is not reduced as a country develops economically, as the proponents of the economic development explanation used to assume. Income inequality is an inverted-U function of level of economic development. Countries at intermediate levels of economic development thus tend to have the highest levels of income inequality. Countries with high levels of income inequality in the 1970s were much more likely to suffer a substantial decline in level of democracy than those countries with relatively low levels of income inequality. Muller’s findings show that income inequality has “a robust negative impact on democratisation that can counteract the positive effect of economic development. Income inequality appears to be important in explaining why economic development has often failed to promote stable democracy.... In sum, evidence from this study and others indicate that high levels of income inequality are
incompatible with the development of a stable democratic political system” (Muller, 1995a: 982-983).

2.4 Summary

At this point, the major aspects discussed until now should be briefly summarised in order to enable the reader to understand the main ideas on which this Chapter relies. It has been offered a clarification of concepts used – middle class and consolidated democracy – to avoid misunderstandings. Consequently, middle class and consolidated democracy already are delimited terms.

The link between democracy and middle class has also been presented, as were the different approaches to it. It has been shown that there is theoretical and empirical support for the idea that certain socio-economic prerequisites are indispensable for the stabilisation of democracy. One of them is social equality: The greater the social equality, the more stable the democracy in a particular society. This statement leads to the following: The larger the middle class, the greater the social equality. Consequently, it is possible to affirm: The larger the middle class, the more stable the democracy.

Some studies refute this idea, saying that the stability of democracies is due to the economic development. Further studies confirm our hypothesis while even controlling for economic development. Actually, economic development itself can not guarantee stability of democracy as it is evidenced, for instance, in Latin America in the 1960s and 1970s.

It is also very important to properly operationalise the concept of democracy and social structure. Some studies do not find any link between democracy and social structure but they do when the operationalisation is done correctly. In this regard, for instance, Robinson and Quilan (1977) showed that Jackman’s (1974) results were completely different once the operationalisation shortcomings (recognised by Jackman himself) had been corrected.

The direction of the middle class-democracy linkage is also to be taken into account. Some authors maintain that it is social structure which affects democracy and others that democracy affects social structure. It has been encountered, and
empirically proved, that it is social equality which positively affects democracy. Accordingly, a large middle class in South Africa is to be considered a sign of the consolidation of its democracy, and as a sign of the reduction of its inequality. This should be noted in (some indicators of\textsuperscript{22}) the political culture of the citizens. In other words, if the middle class develops extensively, this should be reflected in a higher commitment to democracy.

\textsuperscript{22} As said in Chapter 1, only those indicators more strongly related to democratic consolidation are analysed. This is amply explained in Chapter 4.
Chapter 3. Middle class operationalised

3.1 Introduction

In the previous two Chapters the reader has been introduced to the background of this research. The way political regimes democratise and consolidate has been explained, the contexts that help these processes and those which affect democracy negatively were also explained. It has also been stated that democracies stabilise better under certain social conditions, namely with an extensive and well-developed middle class. This invites one to monitor the evolution of the middle class in South Africa. The operationalisation of the middle class is, then, the next step to be taken. However, the concept middle class is part of a wider one, class (see Chapter 2). Hence, it is better to explain the different approaches to operationalise such a concept.

First of all, it has been noted in the previous Chapter that the term 'class' is vague and ambiguous and used in several ways. No definition is the definition. In actual fact, the definition adopted will be based on the needs of the researcher.

From a purely terminological point of view the student of class and stratification can allow her/himself considerable – although not unlimited – freedom in the way s/he defines her/his area of investigation. However, there are other reasons why one way rather than another should be chosen and these reasons are connected with the predictive or analytic properties of the class concept. Much of the current theoretical discussion and many of its controversies can be subsumed under a limited number of choices or orientation problems. Should stratification theories be "uni-" or "multi-dimensional"? Is stratification something inherently "continuous" or "discontinuous"? Should we concentrate on the so-called "objective" factors or on "subjective" factors? Should class phenomena be studied on the "community" or on the "mass society" level?

These orientation problems will be the subject of a critical discussion. It will be shown that these decisions are not independent but interconnected in several ways. Besides, the main aspect to take into account when operationalising in social science is to ensure that the method is doing what it was committed to do. This takes us to the next point in this research: The idea of analytic validity.
3.2 Analytic validity

In the present section the emphasis will be on research strategy in the field of class and stratification. Before the collection of data and their analysis begins, there are some decisions to be made. That is to say, these decisions do not follow from, but precede, and to some extent condition, the empirical findings of the study. In this sense they are a priori. Some of these decisions may be influenced by the results of earlier studies or by the investigator's general knowledge of the society s/he is investigating.

If a certain definition of "class" is said to be very narrow or to emphasise the wrong dimensions or variables, it can be interpreted as a problem of neglecting some research problems – whereas the compatibility of the criticised definition with current usage may not be the point at all. If this is the case, the argument against the definition is an argument based on "analytic validity".

Empirical results are, by definition, a posteriori, but the rules for their interpretation have to be "furnished" beforehand, a priori. Not until the data has been collected and processed can the researcher tell whether or not he has obtained a certain set of findings. But following the canons for empirical research in general, s/he ought to be able to say in advance, how he would interpret those findings.

Consequently, analytic validity of a certain conception or definition of class seems to imply that such an interpretation is possible. As Evans (1996: 210) put it, the analytic validity of one social schema means that "the schema operationalises the ... principles of the conceptualisation of the class structure [adopted]". In other words, analytic validity indicates that the researcher is measuring what s/he was supposed to measure.

Some class or stratification theories or definitions have been criticised precisely on this aspect of analytic validity. For instance, the contemporary Marxist approaches (i.e. Wright, 1985; 1989c; Andersen & Hoff, 1989) have been criticised because they do not get to measure the real essence of Marxism, being it the class consciousness and class antagonism. Actually, they have been defined as Weberian and as functionalist as those so-called functionalist theories (i.e. Goldthorpe & Erikson, 1993) they are suppose to

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1 For more details on analytic validity see, besides Evans (1992, 1996); the classic Cronbach & Meehl, (1955); Bohrnstedt, (1983) or Prandy & Blackburn, (1997).
oppose (Gubbay, 1997: 73-77; Goldthorpe & Marshall, 1992: 393, see also Crompton, 1993). In this regard, those who follow Weber (i.e. Evans, 1992; 1996; Goldthorpe & Erikson, 1993) have not escaped from analytic criticism either (see for instance Prandy & Blackburn, 1997: 150).

For a social research method of class operationalisation not to fall within these flaws and shortcomings, the researcher has to take several decisions. The first of them is to side with one conceptualisation of class, in general, and middle class, in particular.

In the previous Chapter the main modus operandi in the field of social stratification was explained to the reader. The selection of a Weberian – functionalist – approach was made and argued, the main alternative being discarded, namely the Marxist approach. However, a brief summing up to reintroduce the reader to the agenda may be necessary.

The history of sociology is imbued with a continuous debate over the importance of social class for understanding dynamics of social structure and social processes (Spector, 1995: 329). The two main approaches to address any issue in the field of social stratification are the Marxist – psychologist – and Weberian – functionalist. Both of them highlight the importance of the idea of class (Evans & Mills, 1999: 22).

For Marxists, class structure is determined by a social division based on class interest. The class structure is characterised by class antagonism (Baker, 1992: 489). For Marxism, class structure refers to the differential distribution of three productive assets: property, skills and organisational resources. Owning or controlling each kind of resource makes it possible to exercise rights of appropriation and disposal over the surplus products (Western, 1994: 102; see also Wright, 1985). This theory implies conflict and antagonism between the different social classes. Individuals sharing the same class position feel themselves as part of a class (So, 1991: 39; Gubbay, 1997: 73). As a consequence the different classes are strongly related to each other as groups that are not individually decomposable (Crompton, 1993: 49-52).

On the other hand, Weberian theory of class understands social structure as harmonic. Weberian class analysis begins by identifying inequalities in economic status

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2 A strongly relational class schema is one deriving from a theory about society as a totality which identifies relations between 'classes' as crucial to its dynamic (Crompton, 1993: 37; Gubbay, 1997: 76).
and the occupational structure and then exploring their consequences for their chances in life and action (Gubbay, 1997: 84). The awareness of class location subsequently is not relevant for class existence (Simpson, 1934: 829; Goldthorpe & Marshall, 1992: 381). Weberian social theory is neither politically nor sociologically ambitious (Goldthorpe & Marshall, 1992: 385). Weber was a methodological individualist, which means, "...that all social collectivities and human phenomena have to be reducible to their individual constituents, and explained in these terms..." (Crompton, 1993: 29).

In principle there are no grounds for naming one of these two main theoretical backgrounds as more valid or fundamental than other. The first one – Marxist – seems to be based on subjective and psychological attitudes, whereas the second – Weberian – seems based on objective factors, usually in terms of certain variable/s established down by the researcher.

In such a situation there is much in the argument that the specific manner in which classes are delimited by the researcher will have to depend entirely on which of the two main approaches is chosen, particularly, in the way the whole background of stratification is contemplated and in the intention or motive of her/his research.

Against this background and as argued in Chapter 2, this study conceives the social structure in the Weberian way, leaving aside any psychological influence. The reason is that there is no intention to monitor any social struggle or awareness in South African society. The middle class is considered as a reflection of inequality (see Chapter 2) and not as a political actor. Accordingly, the Weberian approach, as it is nominal (classes weakly related or not related to each other – see Crompton, 1993: 49-52; Gubbay, 1997: 75), allows the researcher to focus exclusively on one class, if necessary – as it is the case. This study exclusively operationalises the middle class. Consequently, social class is understood as an individually decomposable group of people sharing the same (objective) characteristics within society.

### 3.3 Operationalisation: Different approaches

Having had the background of social stratification explained, the reader is now perfectly capable of understanding the different approaches of operationalisation of social class. These are now presented.
As indicated above, this study adheres to Weber's conception of class and, consequently, understands a social class as an individually decomposable group of people. But the fact that this study adheres to Weber's class theory does not imply that there are not other methods. Actually, some of them compete with each other.

In attempts to understand the stratification of modern societies in terms of class, the primary concern is not with the subject evaluation that individuals and groups may make of each other. It is, rather, with certain social relationships in which individuals and groups are involved daily and which are believed to exert pervasive influence in their lives. One could say, using Goldthorpe's (1983) words, that class analysis begins with a structure of positions associated with a specific historical form of the social division of labour, which is usually seen as being constituted in two main ways:

1. "By basic employment relationships which differentiate employers, self-employed workers and employees;

2. By varying employment function and conditions of employment which differentiate categories of employee – those in subordinate positions and those whose employment conditions imply some exercise of authority, expertise or skill" (Goldthorpe, 1983: 467).

It can be deduced that these are the two main modus operandi in the field. For Edgell and Duke (1991) the main difference between them resides in whether the term class refers "exclusively to the social relations of production" or "technical relations of production" (Edgell and Duke, 1991: 22; see also Wright, 1980).

To show the difference between these two main competing operational methods of class, Edgell and Duke refer to an engineer as an example. If this engineer "sells her/his labour power to a capitalist" s/he would be classified as a worker; if s/he is in charge of workers as a "controller of labour"; if s/he is self-employed, as "petty bourgeois"; if s/he employs other people, as a capitalist. On the other hand, if we were based on an occupational scheme, this engineer would be classified as a "higher managerial or professional 'middle class'"


Here, it is observed that the main difference relies on what is considered to be the main cleavage in the society. In the first example, the main cleavage is meant to be the
division between the owner and non-owner of the means of production. In the second
one, it is supposed to be the skilled/non-skilled cleavage. Consequently, the decisive
factor of this debate is to be found in the theoretical background of each approach.

For Edgell & Duke (1991: 23) "the first scheme (called by them "social scheme") is
essentially a relational one which emphasises conflict, whereas the second -
occupational scheme – is a hierarchical one, which emphasises shared values and,
therefore, harmony" (see also So, 1991). Besides this, there are "occupational schemes"
that contain both social and occupational categories such as Hall and Johns’ (1950),
Goldthorpe's work in 1969 (Goldthorpe et al., 1969) and in 1987 (Goldthorpe, 1987);
Goldthorpe and Hope’s (1974) one in mid-1970’s. In all these studies, for instance,
large proprietors and higher-grade professional and managerial workers are placed in
the same top-ranking position.

Most studies tend to define class in occupational terms, as well as assuming that the
family is the basic unit in class analysis and that the class location of the family is
determined by the occupation of the male "head" of household. Furthermore, these
studies typically concentrate on people who are economically active on a full-time
basis.3

At the beginning of this Chapter the Marxist method was rejected. It is of
importance to note and present some of the shortcomings and flaws found within
several attempts to operationalise the social structure in a Marxist way. The most
important is that Marxist methods of operationalisation the social structure have not
been able to capture the basic elements of the Marxist school of thought (led by Wright,

The first criticism is that the method has been carrying too much "speculative
baggage ab initio" (Simpson, 1934: 835). Its "psychological background" has also been
object of criticism (Simpson, 1934: 829). In the same way, it has been said that Wright
and his followers have not been able to capture the real essence of Marxism, as it
concerns a class struggle, class consciousness and theory of exploitation (Goldthorpe &

3 For different approaches on this, see, for instance, Andersen & Hoff, (1989); Portocarero, (1989);
1985; 1989b), the operationalisation of social class in the Marxist tradition *assumes* that those who control or own the means of production are automatically aware of their class location and have an antagonistic disposition toward those, who also have a class awareness produced by not controlling/owning the means of production (Goldthorpe & Marshall, 1992: 385). Goldthorpe (1996: 483) strongly argued that Marxist force of explanation is spurious.

But the main criticism of Marxist operationalisation of social class (at least important in its relation to this study) is its treatment of the Middle Class. Marxists have not been able to accommodate the rise of the middle class (concretely the new middle class) into their operationalisation approaches. As Wright (1989c: 5) recognises "all Marxists share a basic commitment to a polarised abstract concept of class relations, and yet the concrete class structures of contemporary advanced capitalist societies look anything but polarised. The basic conceptual problem, then, is to figure out how to accommodate people such as professionals, managers, teachers and so on [middle class] within a Marxist class structural framework". The only solution found by him and followed by others is to "break up" the middle class and locate its components in several different classes *at the same time*. For instance, a manager would be a proletariat as s/he would be controlled by others and would not own means of production. However, at the same time, s/he would be a capitalist as s/he is controlling others (Wright, 1989c: 6; Kivinen, 1989: 55; So, 1991: 40). Besides, there is no explanation of the kind of class awareness those individuals would have. This embarrassing *trick* clearly indicates that Marxists have not accommodated the evolution of contemporary societies in which polarisation has decreased, precisely due to the emergence of middle classes. It also serves as an example of the difficulties with which Marxism has to deal nowadays in order to find accommodation in societies for which this theory was not created. Proof that this *movement* within Marxism is erroneous and that middle class should be accepted as a different social class is that, for instance, it is possible to find differences in vote intention between middle classes and working classes (Hoel & Knutsen, 1989: 182). Ehnrenreich and Ehnrenreich (1979) maintain that the middle class is an independent class from others. A proof of this is that they have an antagonistic relation to other classes and that different studies show that satisfaction with life is vastly different between working classes and middle classes. Their access to the social
resources is also different (Marshall & Firth, 1999: 28).

Once the non-selected method has been discarded the selected one will be presented: a Weberian approach. This has also been called occupational scheme (Edgell & Duke, 1991: 23; see Goldthorpe & Marshall, 1993) or occupational hierarchy (Hoel & Knutsen, 1989: 181). This clearly indicates that Weberian or functionalist approaches are also based on occupation, as are Marxist approaches. The next step then is to show that it is possible to construct an operationalisation method based on occupation.

### 3.4 Class and occupation

In what follows, the possibility of building a type of classificatory foundation based on occupation is considered.

It is not uncommon to speak of occupation as being one of the factors that determine class position or one of the variables in stratification. But when we look a little closer at the various factors or variables put side by side with occupation, they seem to be on a rather different level. By specifying a person's occupation, her/his income, educational level, status and so on are also specified, within fairly narrow bounds. A great number of occupations presuppose a prolonged formal education (doctors, lawyers, etc.). Thus, occupation will be inextricably connected with many other stratification variables (i.e. education or income) and cannot be divorced from them – or its separation is highly difficult (it is difficult to understand that a doctor does not have a degree in medicine). This all means that the index of class based on occupation will indirectly, but objectively, give ample information about many other characteristics related to social stratification.

There is hardly any doubt that people rely heavily on their knowledge about another person's occupation when they form a status judgement. Parsons (1954: 35), already noted it long ago when said that "the most prominent structure of modern society is that organised around the work that people do". Actually, those individuals who are permanently unemployed are defined as underclass (Buckingham, 1999: 49). All this may serve as a further argument in favour of the course adopted hereunder.

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4 For more critics on Marxist operationalisation see Clark & Lipset, (1991).
5 In the same line see Goldthorpe & Erikson, (1993: 1-28); Evans, (1996: 209).
The question we have to answer is whether occupation provides a suitable empirical basis for different class theories or conceptions. In the Marxist class theory, occupation helps to delimit groups with different relations to the means of production (see Wright, 1980; 1985; 1989a). Likewise, those who follow Weber will find in occupation a useful index of chances in life (see Goldthorpe, 1969; 1985; 1987; Evans, 1996; Evans & Mills, 1999). In other words both psychologists and functionalists have found in occupation a perfect analytic tool to analyse the social structure. Actually, several studies refer to social mobility or social status as occupational mobility or employment status (Ngo, 1992: 475; Portocarero, 1989: 359).

Many sociologists and other social scientists have used occupation as an indicator of stratification and have identified their social classes by separating occupations into categories (upper class, middle class, and lower/working class). At this point it is necessary to state that occupation is intrinsically connected to status/social prestige, which is intimately connected to social structure\(^6\).

The first complexity encountered by the social scientist who wishes to use this traditional method – occupational scheme – is that there are many occupational schemes to select from. In addition to the essential occupational schemes identified by Goldthorpe (see Goldthorpe et al., 1974), there are other occupational class schemes that are widely used, mainly in Britain. There is, for instance, the Registrar-General scheme (see Leete and Fox, 1977). This is an "official" (British) classification of occupations. A social grading of occupations was also developed by Kahan in a study of political attitudes (Kahan et al., 1966). This scale followed the definitions of occupational grades developed by market researches and has tended to dominate political science in the 1970s and market research in Britain ever since (Butler & Stokes, 1974; Monk, 1985)\(^7\).

Several critiques have been developed against the occupational scheme developed mainly by Goldthorpe, namely the Neo-Marxist criticism; the Feminist criticism and the Sectoral criticism. These are now presented.

\(^{6}\) For various approaches in this line see, for instance, Juárez & Reyes-Ayala, (1994: 253).

\(^{7}\) For a comparison among various points of view see Goldthorpe & Erikson, (1993: 28-64).
3.4.1 Neo-Marxist criticism

Neo-Marxist criticism of occupational schemes is mainly focused on the fact that these schemes fail to recognise the capitalist nature of modern societies in at least two related ways: (i) the capitalist class, the most economically powerful, disappears from the class structure; and (ii) theories about the relationship between capitalist and workers can not be adequately examined by class schemes that emphasise position in a class hierarchy, and fail anyway to identify the dominant class in the relationship (Wright, 1985: 1-17).

Another Neo-Marxist criticism concerns the vulnerability of occupationally based classifications to changes in the occupational structure. As a result of focusing on what a person does as work instead of on the relationships between classes, changes in the nature of work raise problems for occupationally based schemes. For Neo-Marxists, social processes such as enskilling and deskilling mean that it is imperative continuously to review and, if necessary, revise the relative position of occupations (Gubbay, 1997: 80-84, see also Wright, 1976).

Differences between the two approaches also concern the differences in the conceptualisation. "Social" scheme theorists would talk about "proletarian class occupations" (Stanworth, 1984: 164), while occupational scheme theorists would talk about "conditions of employment" (Goldthorpe, 1983: 479).

3.4.2 Feminist

Feminist criticism of the occupational scheme is focused on what Goldthorpe (1983; 1984) called the "conventional view", which maintains the following:

1. The family is the basic unit of social stratification and not the individuals.

2. The position in the social stratification is given upon the position of the male "head" of the family.

The feminist criticism is based upon the fact that the conventional view "effectively precludes examination of what should be recognised as one major feature of the stratification system as a whole: that is, sexual stratification, which, of course, cuts directly through the conjugal family. It follows then that not only are women rendered
largely invisible within the study of stratification, but furthermore that the existence of sexual inequalities becomes more or less disregarded" (Goldthorpe, 1983: 465).

Parkin (1971: 14-15) argued that, in modern societies, the family is "the major unit of reward" and hence that "for the great majority of women the allocation of social and economic rewards is determined primarily by the position of their families – and in particular, that of the male head".

In the same way, Wetergarrd and Resler (1975: 291) maintained that "it is men's occupation positions far more than women's ... that set the essential circumstances of life for most households, however much one may deplore this". For Goldthorpe (1983) a notable empirical illustration of this point would be the mortality rates among married women which vary far more sharply with their husband's occupational level than with their own (see Fox & Goldblatt; 1982: 31-33).

The conventional view mainly means that families should be allocated to classes on the basis of the occupation of the 'head' of the household, who is usually male. The position of the family as a whole within the system of stratification derives from that of the family head, in the sense of the participation of the labour market. Generally, married women are required, by conventional norms, to take major responsibility for the performance of the work that is involved in maintaining a household and rearing children. This requirement, then, restricts their opportunities in various ways and makes them fall into a situation of economic dependence on their husbands, so that the possibility of any effective challenge to the prevailing norms is greatly reduced, in turn. This comes out "from a premise which feminists would presumably not wish to deny ... women still have to await their liberation from the family" (Goldthorpe, 1983: 469).

From this standpoint, Goldthorpe (1983: 465; see also Goldthorpe & Erikson, 1993: 231-278) maintains that the family is the unit of stratification primarily because only certain members, predominantly males, have, as a result of their labour market participation, what might be termed a directly determined position within the class structure. Other family members, including wives, do not typically have an equal opportunity for such participation and their class position is, thus, indirectly determined, that is to say, it is derived from that of the family head.

Hence, the existence of marked sexual inequalities implies that women as a
collectivity have interests that stand opposed to those of men. However, the restricted and conditional nature of women's participation in the labour market means that they cannot be "usefully thought of" as themselves constituting a class. For, as well as their own chances in life being mediated via their husbands' class position to a large extent, they, for the most part, are also deprived of the most basic capacity for class action, namely, that of being able to "cause serious disruption of their productive process" (Parkin, 1979: 15; see also Goldthorpe, 1983). This means that "what is essential to class analysis is the argument that family members share in the same class position, and that this position is determined by that of the family 'head' in the sense of the family member who has the greatest commitment to, and continuity in, labour market participation. That this member is usually a male is then an independent fact, which is accounted for in terms of the dependence imposed on women by the conventional separation of sex roles within the family.... Thus, in the case where no male, or no economically active or employed male is present, or where the family 'head' in the above sense is female, no difficulty arises in principle for class analysis in recognising and accommodating these circumstances. A truly problematic situation would be created only if it could be shown that the extent and nature of female participation in the labour market is now such that in the more 'normal' conjugal family it is increasingly hard to say whether husband or wife could better be regarded as the family 'head' and that in many cases there are in effect two 'heads' with, quite often, different class positions" (Goldthorpe, 1983: 470; see also Zelditch, 1955; Erikson & Goldthorpe, 1992; Evans, 1996).

3.4.3 Sectoral criticism

Sectoral criticism of the occupational scheme concerns the argument that sectoral cleavage theory fits better with "class" (non-occupational) schemes than with occupational schemes (Duke & Edgell, 1984, see also Hoel & Knutsen, 1989 for a different approach). This is mainly because, in terms of the production sector, employers and the petty bourgeoisie are automatically classified as private sector. Therefore, the worker and the controller of labour classes can be divided neatly into public and private sectors. In view of the increased salience of sectoral cleavages during the 1980s (Dunleavy, 1989), the ability to accommodate both class and sectoral effects in the same model is a marked advantage (Duke & Edgell, 1984; 1983).
For Edgell and Duke (1991) the arguments in favour of a "class" scheme are strengthened by their political relevance in Britain since 1979 under the Thatcher era. During this period, the balance of class power between employers and workers altered in favour of employers. Over the same period, the patterning of public and private sector production and consumption altered in favour of the private sector. This obviously has implications for the class configuration (Hoel & Knutsen, 1989: 191).

3.5 Stratification operationalised: Different choices

For any system of stratification to overcome the limitations mentioned above and translate the abstract idea of class into a measurable term, accomplishing the "analytic validity" requirements, "social researchers need to make three interrelated choices" (Duke & Edgell, 1991: 32; Goldthorpe & Erikson, 1993: 28-65). Those are (i) the conceptual scheme (occupational, non-occupational or both combined); (ii) the unit of analysis (should it be the individual respondent of the family/household); (iii) the degree of coverage of population (economically active population or all adult respondent regardless of whether they are currently economically active).

3.5.1 The choice of a conceptual scheme

The choice of a conceptual scheme involves a fundamental theoretical choice between diametrically opposed views regarding the nature of class in advanced capitalist societies. Occupational class schemes generally give primacy to the manual/non-manual boundary and then further subdivide according to varying levels of skill within each category. By contrast, non-occupational schemes – the so-called 'class' schemes – emphasise the owner/non-owner division and then further subdivide on the basis of control over labour, attempting to study the class conflict. Such schemes have the advantage of being compatible with sectoral categories (Carlsson, 1958: 42-58; Edgell & Duke, 1991: 21-46).

Occupational schemes are weakened by the vulnerability to changes in the ranking of existing occupations and the inevitable introduction of new occupations. Comparisons across time are rendered highly problematic if the class scheme adopted is predicated on a changing occupational structure. Non-occupational schemes are less susceptible to this type of problem. Furthermore, occupational schemes are too
embedded in the occupational structure that may exclude large sections of the adult population, mainly the underemployed (the intermittently employed, who often also are women), the unemployed and the non-employed (i.e. students, housewives). However, the Marxist approach also suffers from these shortcomings (see So, 1991; 1995; Gubbey, 1997).

In the same way some argue that, in view of the extensive segregation that characterises the labour market in advanced capitalist societies, the occupational structure of women workers is different from that of men (Hoel & Knutsen, 1989: 184, see also Osborn & Morris, 1979; Evans, 1996; Gallie, 1988). More specifically, it has been argued that the manual/non-manual division has little relevance to women's work.

Marxist method (Wright, 1979b; 1985; Andersen & Hoff, 1989 to mention but a few) is based on owner/non-owner (they suppose that that cleavage automatically produces class awareness – see Chapter above) and Weberian method (Goldthorpe & Erikson, 1993; Evans & Mills, 1999 to mention but a couple) is based on manual/non-manual (skilled/non-skilled). As previously stated, this study sides with the Weberian approach and consequently follows the skilled/non-skilled approach. This allows making clear a differentiation between middle class and working class, not having to accommodate middle class in any other class as Marxists tend to do (Wright, 1989: 5; Gubbay, 1997: 80).

3.5.2 The choice of unit of analysis

The second fundamental choice involved in operationalising the concept of class concerns the unit of analysis. The unit of analysis refers to the person or institution on which the analysis is performed (see Carlsson, 1958: 25-37, Goldthorpe & Erikson, 1993: 28-64). Should the unit of analysis be the respondent/individual or the family/household?

First, it can be argued that the respondent's attitudes and behaviour should logically be analysed in terms of the direct experience of the respondent. Thus, in the context of the debate about women and class analysis, Stanworth (1984) suggested that the direct

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8 On this see Heath and Britten, (1984), Dex, (1983), and contradicting this idea, see Evans, (1992; 1996) and Evans and Mills, (1999).
employment experience of married women is relevant to an understanding of their class fate and class action. Therefore, wives' direct relationship to the class structure should not be denied on a priori grounds (see also Heath & Bitten, 1984). This is a matter not just of theoretical inconsistency, it is also of considerable empirical concern (see Delphy, 1981; Acker, 1973). This is in contrast to the conventional view advocated by Goldthorpe (1983: 465-67, see also 1984, Parkin, 1971; Giddens, 1973; Goldthorpe & Erikson, 1993: 1-65; 234-5; see also Erikson & Goldthorpe, 1992) who claimed that the family/household is the unit of class analysis. The main argument in favour of a group measure is that the family/household acts as the basic unit of economic strategy in terms of consumption (on this see also Edgell & Duke, 1991; Marshall et al., 1988).

This gives rise to another question to be addressed. If it is opted to use the family as a unit of analysis, how is class to be measured at the family/household level. Where there is only one adult in the household, the operational procedure is unproblematic and the same in fact as a respondent-based indicator. However, where there are two or more adults in the household, and if these adults are not in the same class, the problem is to select which should determine the household class measure. There are basically five possible solutions, namely (i) male head of household; (ii) joint classification; (iii) average method; (iv) the dominance principle and (v) multiple indicators.

3.5.2.1 Male-head approach

Acker (1973), Dex (1985), Stanworth (1984) and Wright (1989a), among others, reject the male-head indicator as it is sexist. Generally speaking, this alternative squares badly with an ideology of equality between the sexes but might still correspond well with the present situation (Erikson, 1984). This model was explained when the "conventional view" was criticised.

3.5.2.2 Joint classification

In relation to joint indicator, such as in Britten and Healths (1983, 1984), it has been suggested that the 'utility' of this solution is undermined by the high instability of the employment situations of married women (Goldthorpe, 1984) and that they are "inherently problematic because work positions differ in several dimensions" (Erikson, 1984: 503, see also Evans, 1996; Prandy & Blackburn, 1997).
3.5.2.3 Average method

The average method has also been criticised (Erikson, 1984). It is very difficult to find an average code as work position differs in several dimensions, making the method dubious. For an average to be an acceptable indicator of distribution, the distributed characteristic must be additive. Work situations clearly do not appear additive and an average accordingly should not be used to indicate the class position of a family. As a result this method is not considered any further.

3.5.2.4 Dominance principle

The dominance principle – allocating household class on the basis of the highest-class member – overcomes the male head of household problem (see Haug, 1973, Erikson, 1984). But this produces a secondary effect. As it is applied upwards rather than downwards, it produces a reduction in the working class. Also the dominance method requires a hierarchical class scheme with a clear order of dominance.

In those families where there is only one person in the primary generation the problem seems simple. The family position is just made identical with the position of this person. Neither does it seem problematic to classify households of which only one member of the primary generation is gainfully employed. It is when members of the primary generation have independently determined work positions and these positions are different that problems arise (i.e. Sweden (see Erikson, 1984)).

Trying to make a dominance-order index implies deciding upon a dominance relation for every pair of work positions. This means that we have to make an assumption about which of the two categories has the greater impact upon ideology, attitudes, behaviour and consumption patterns of the family members, provided that both are represented in the primary generation of a household. It is necessary also to consider which category has more importance for the opportunities of the children in the family.

We can base our assumption about relations of dominance on the various dimensions in which the work positions differ from each other. We assume that categories of higher qualifications dominate categories of lower. By this we actually assume that the hierarchies of the organisation of production spill over and have effects
also in the families. For the same reason we assume that when both spouses are at the same level of qualification, non-manual categories dominate manual categories. Being self-employed also has many consequences for personal life. Finally, categories of the gainfully employed are supposed to dominate categories of persons out of the labour force, and among the latter, students are supposed to dominate others.

In constructing dominance, we have only the characteristics of various occupations, not how firmly related the different family members are to the labour market. Our basic assumption, however, is that the market situation of families follows from the work situations of family members. It, then, seems reasonable to assume that the work situations of the family members that are most tightly knit to their work have the strongest influence on the situation of the family. We may, therefore, assume that the occupations of those who work full-time always dominate the occupations of those that work part-time. Within each category we use the same ranking order of occupational categories used for Dominance. This method implies the multiplication of the final categories and the results worsen rather than facilitate the social analysis. Hence, it is not considered any further.

### 3.5.2.5 Multiple indicator

Where the technique of analysis allows it, it is possible to include the class location of both the respondent and others in the household in the form of *multiple indicators*. This solution allows the influence of either or both to be displayed in the analysis.

In this regard, Erikson (1984) thinks that, depending on whether we concentrate on the market situation or work situation, we should thus either classify households or individuals, respectively. But the two situations are not clearly independent from each other. In reverse, the market situation depends heavily on the individuals' work situation. Different families face similar market situations because their members have similar work situations and accordingly they should get class assignments on the basis of the work situations of the family members.

As long as it is assumed that not only one member of each family is gainfully employed, no problem occurs (all families were assigned to the position of the gainfully employed member). But if two members of the family are gainfully employed and their work situations relate them to different classes, we clearly have a problem. To what
class should we assign the members of this family? Let’s imagine that a woman is married to a man in an executive or higher managerial position, but is herself working as a clerk. If we investigate working conditions, authority relations at work, etc. we clearly must place her with other clerks. But if we study housing conditions, consumption patterns or child-rearing ideologies, such a classification would probably be rather misleading. In this case we ought to somehow consider her husband’s occupation in assigning a class position to her and her family. It seems, therefore, as if two class concepts are needed, one work-related, with individuals as the unit of classification, and one market-related, with families as the unit of classification. From Erikson’s perspective, the nuclear family is the basic element of the class structure of modern industrial societies, because of the dependence of family members upon each other and largely-shared conditions within the family. He suggests the use of work position for the work-related concept and the term class position for the market-related concept. Thus, work position is uniquely related to the individual. As occupations are the positions within the system of production, the different work positions identified should be formed by grouping together occupations with similar work situations (Erikson, 1984).

The division into social classes basically results from the organisation of production in societies. A class assignment to a family should, then, be based as directly as possible on the positions of the family members in the system of production (i.e. on their occupations). This precludes the use of other bases for classification, especially the use of income and education. These latter variables are certainly important in the study of the stratification of societies, but they are so in their own right, not as direct indicators of class positions. By keeping them out of the index construction, we also make it possible to study the intercorrelations between class, income and education (Erikson, 1984). It would allow, through a longitudinal survey, monitoring of the income evolution of a certain class, for instance. Clearly, Erikson adheres to the idea that the class position of a family should not be based on an independent coding, but rather be made a function of the individual members’ occupations or, preferably, work positions.

3.5.3 The choice of the degree

The third choice in the operationalisation of class relates to the degree of coverage. In actual fact it pretends to sort out whether those who are “economically inactive” should be included or not. This involves the complicated question of the various
sociological meanings that can be attached to the notion of economic activity/inactivity. Typically, economic activity is divided into full- and part-time work, with variable boundary lines depending on the purpose of the research. Similarly, economic inactivity can range from the permanently inactive (i.e. retired, disabled) to the temporarily inactivity (i.e. students, housewives, unemployed). Interestingly, the practise of excluding unpaid housework dates from the 1881 Census in Britain (Hakim, 1980).

A practical justification for opting for the economically active only rests on convenience and comparability: It obviates the necessity to decide what to do with the various inactive categories and there is a preponderance of previous research based on this option. A general criticism of all studies that exclude the economically inactive, irrespective of whether they use an occupational (Marshall et al., 1988) or non-occupational scheme (Wright, 1985), is that this option invariably produces a restricted and therefore distorted view of the class structure.

Erikson (1984) and Edgell and Duke (1991) are of the idea that all the active/inactive should be taken into account. Furthermore, they think that the potential political significance of such economically inactive groups should not be ruled a priori. They could be introduced into the analysis by their previous class location or they can be located using the same classification as the closest member of the household/family. However, for those who have never worked, it could be argued that "locations in class structure is entirely constituted by mediated relations" (Wright, 1989a: 41).

3.5.4 Interrelations between the three choices

Once the three choices are known, it is necessary to say that all of them are closely related to each other.

It is important to recognise the interrelations and implications of the operational choices reviewed. The various procedures have different consequences for the shape and, hence, character of the class structure. For instance, economically-active respondent procedures provide a much narrower picture of what constitutes the class structure than do measurements of households as it leaves many people out of the social structure (housewives, etc.). In sum, different ways of operationalising class produce different pictures of the class structure and much depends upon the sociological questions that are being addressed. Thus, if the focus is on the production, the
economically-active respondent might be the more adequate unit of classification, whereas household appears to be a more appropriate unit of measurement when consumption is the research object.

Sectoral theory, as previously said, refers to social divisions between those who are dependent on the public sector for their employment and/or for certain services and those who produce and/or consume in the private sector. Changes in the structure of production and consumption, especially since 1945, were considered to be of political significance (see Dunleavy, 1979; 1980a; Saunders, 1981; O'Connor, 1973 and Castell, 1977). For instance, the conservative policy in Britain has favoured the private sector at the expense of the public one since 1979. This is thought to have heightened the political importance of political cleavage (see Edgell and Duke, 1983; 1991; Duke and Edgell, 1984; Dunleavy, 1989; Hamnett, 1989).

There are two aspects of sectoral location. First, production sectoral location refers to whether the respondent works in the public sector or the private sector. Second, consumption sectoral location refers to whether the household consumption of services is totally/mostly private or totally/mostly public.

On the relationship between class and consumption sector, this study sides with Dunleavy and Husbands' (1985) idea rather than Cawson and Saunders' (1983), in arguing that consumption sectoral locations are partially determined by household class position.

In this regard, Dunleavy argued that "state intervention to provide collectively consumed services ... radically changes the level of politicisation and the nature of consumption cleavages" (Dunleavy, 1979: 419). The consequent polarisation between the two models of consumption arguably constitutes an important basis for the growth of social and political cleavages, for instance between the users of public and private transport. Different consumption locations lead to conflicting interests with regard to government spending. In other words, the cuts in state spending on public provision represent an attack on those individuals/households who are dependent on collective consumption. In this sense the public spending cuts contribute to a potential for social and political polarisation (on this see Edgell & Duke, 1982; 1991).
3.6 Middle class

The main aim of this study, as explained in the first two Chapters, is to monitor the consolidation of democracy in South Africa through an approach to the existing inequality in South Africa from a different angle: The size and the composition of the middle class. As previously shown, the size of the middle class is a reflection of the existing inequality, which affects democracy negatively. In other words, inequality decrease (increase of middle class) leads to the increase of the stability of democracy. Due to this, this study will not operationalise the whole social structure, but only the middle class.

3.6.1 Middle class and occupation

There is no major dispute on what occupations should compose the middle class. There is a basic line of division between so-called "White collar worker" and self-employed (petit bourgeoisie). The former increased largely during the sixties. The second is a remnant ("relic") of the bourgeoisie that led the liberal revolutions of the 19th century (see on this Marshall et al., 1988; Marshall, 1963; Glassman et al., 1993).

There are numerous studies on its compositions although all of them are more or less similar.

Cole (1955: 94-95), for instance, puts forward a very tentative, although ambiguous, classification of groups: "[T]he main body of heads of private business ... except the greatest concerned with manufacture or other commercial or financial occupations. The main body of salaried administrators, managers, technicians, and accountants including business publicity or co-operatively owned; and the higher salaried officers.... The members of the principal recognised professions whether salaried or working as consultants and remunerated by professional fees; including medical men, lawyers, ministers of religion, officers of the armed services, the upper range of the teaching profession, and the upper and the middle ranges of the industrial professions. The higher and middle grades of the Civil Service, the Local Government service, and of other public or semi-public administrative services; and the corresponding grades of "voluntary" social service employees. The big and middle shopkeepers; and the analogous groups of employed managers, accountants, and other officers employed by joint stock companies operating in these fields. The large and middle farmers and with
them the relatively small numbers of managerial salaried workers employed on big farms. The main body of clerks, typists, persons belonging to the lower supervisory grades in industry, transport, and other types of business, but falling below the managerial grades".

Raynor (1969: 27-30, italics added), after analysing the middle class all over the world, establishes the composition of the middle class as follows: *"The professional group* (architects, lawyers, engineers, clergy, scientists, draughtsmen, librarians, teachers, nurses, musicians, doctors, accountants); *the business group* (restaurant owners, retail traders — as employers and proprietors —, and managers and administrators in manufacture, trade, transport, finance, etc., bankers, civil service administration grade) and the 'white collar group' (clerks, insurance agents, typists)".

Tezanos (1975), to give another example, does not deviate from this line. Actually, there is general acceptance on what occupations should be integrated in the middle class, namely professional, managers and clerks (new middle class) plus those self-employed with similar income (old middle class).

Wright (1989: 5; see also 1979b) includes the professionals, managers, teachers and clerks into the middle class, although this category is dissected into its components and relocated in other classes (see this Chapter, above)⁹.

More recently, Glassman and his colleagues (Glassman et al., 1993) included the owners of small businesses (self-employed) and managers, professionals and White-collar workers in the middle class.

Goldthorpe referred to them as the non-manual workers including the petty bourgeoisie and White-collar workers (Goldthorpe & Erikson, 1993: 38-39). Recently, Evans and Millans (1999) operationalised the social structure in Eastern Europe following the same functionalist approach as Goldthorpe and Erikson (1993). They referred to the middle class as service class (Evans & Mills, 1999: 32).

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⁹ For more Marxist operationalisations of middle class see Kivinen, (1989: 53-55).
In South Africa there have been some attempts to measure the social structure in general, and the middle class (mainly Black middle class), in particular. Both approaches, Marxist and Weberian, have been used. All of them use occupation as the indicator of class. However, in the end these studies come to be an analysis of the work force in South Africa. They are based mainly on analysis of the Manpower surveys conducted by the Ministry of Labour. Thus, the independent homelands were not included. The occupational composition also included professionals, managers and clerks (see Wolpe, 1977; Davies, 1979; Nolutshungu, 1983; Crakshaw, 1986; 1996). No study has been conducted more recently, to the author's knowledge.

Since there is not any major dispute on this, and the occupations are clearly identifiable in most surveys (included those used in this study), this point is developed no further. Those managers, professionals, clerks and self-employed-propertied with the same income are computed into the middle class, as such following the functionalist approach (Goldthorpe & Erikson, 1993; Evans & Mills, 1999).

3.7 Data on occupation in South Africa

South Africa, at the stage of writing this dissertation, somehow suffers from poverty of quantitative data with regard to both availability and comparability. When data is available, its comparability through the years is highly problematic. For instance, the population census conducted in 1991 did not include the so-called Independent Homelands, which makes it difficult to compare with the following census conducted in 1996, which represented the whole country. This limitation is being reduced with the years, especially since 1994. The number of conducted surveys covering the whole country has increased since the first democratic elections. Another important factor is the establishment of data banks, like the South African Data Archive (SADA hereafter), established in 1993. Surveys are deposited here to allow other researchers to perform secondary analyses.

After an extended search the following surveys were found to accomplish the necessary requirements of this study:

- **Population Census 1970.** This census provided no income information for the Black population. In attempting to prove the same information for all
population groups, no information for old middle class is provided\textsuperscript{10}.

- **Project on Social Movements in South Africa 1994, 1995, 1997, 1999\textsuperscript{11}**
  These are part of more comprehensive surveys conducted annually by the HSRC, the *Omnibus survey* 1994, 1995, 1997, and 1999. The Social Movements section, used in this study, aims to monitor, as the name indicates, the evolution of the social movements; the relationship of the different population groups; its expectations with regard to the future, etc. It was provided by the University of Stellenbosch\textsuperscript{12}. Respondents were drawn from qualifying household members by means of multistage stratified cluster sample design. The data were collected in February of each year by means of structured interview schedule/questionnaire from MarkData.

All these surveys are representative of the whole of South Africa, before and after the *changing* year of 1994. This research performs a secondary analysis on these primary data. This means that the data were not primarily created by the author. This could generate several problems of comparability as the questionnaires are not necessarily the same, or might not be representative of the whole country (in South Africa before 1994, most surveys did not include the so-called Independent Homelands). The questions utilised to operationalise the concepts used in this study, although not identical, are similar. All of them are representative of the whole country before and after 1994. This implies that neither the wording of the questions nor the representativity create any of the problems generally created in secondary analysis\textsuperscript{13}. As a result the data used in this study allow controlling of any necessary aspect for the correct operationalisation of the involved variables (middle class and consolidated democracy).

\textsuperscript{10} The old middle class is filtered economically to select only the middle incomers. As there is no income information this is not possible. This does not affect this study because the main focus of analysis will be done on the new middle class. This is amply explained in Chapter 5.

\textsuperscript{11} As explained before 1996 and 1998 surveys are excluded due to problems with the biographical data (see Chapter 1, fn. 14).

\textsuperscript{12} Prof. Hennie Kotze, Political Science Department, University of Stellenbosch.

\textsuperscript{13} On problems and virtues of secondary analysis see Hyman, (1972); Bulmer, (1982) or Kiecolt & Nathan, (1985).
3.8 Middle class operationalised: Methodology

The reader may have been overwhelmed by a collection of different approaches, the bewildering list of available choices, different perspectives, etc. In this section all of them will be summarised for the reader and the model adopted in this research will be presented and motivated.

In previous sections the reader was introduced to the main issues of social class operationalisation, the first being analytic validity. This means that the model used can do what it proposes to do, in order to overcome any limitations or shortcomings in this field. The researcher has to take, a priori, several decisions that will lead and delimit her/his research. The decisions taken in this study are now summarised.

3.8.1 Selection of conceptual scheme

This implies selecting a theoretical background for approaching the study of social science. The two main approaches are the psychologist or Marxist and the functionalist or Weberian, both of them mainly developed by Wright (1979b) and Goldthorpe (1987)\(^\text{14}\) respectively.

The Marxist approach was imbued with psychological aspects, such as class consciousness and antagonism between strongly-related-to-each-other classes. This implies that, in following this approach, any attempt to operationalise the middle class will be embedded in political propaganda, and will have to operationalise all the existing social classes (Crompton, 1993: 49-52; Gubbay, 1997: 75).

On the other hand, Weberian approaches are free of psychological influence and ideological infection and classes are not, or only weakly related, to each other (see also Crompton, 1993: 50). This allows operationalising only one class: The middle class. To this, it is necessary to add that contemporary Marxists are still struggling with the notion of middle class (Wright, 1989: 5; So, 1991: 40, see also Kivinin, 1989).

\(^{14}\) Although there are more and more recent references to both Wright and Goldthorpe, those quoted here are the benchmarks of their respective approaches.
3.8.2 Unidimensional or multidimensional operationalisation

Another important concerned issue in researching stratification is the number of variables to take into account. Should middle class be operationalised uni- or multidimensionally? This gives rise to the following question: Is occupation comprehensive enough to properly delimit "middle class" or should other characteristics such as income or education be taken into consideration? According to previous analysis, the answer is yes. The validity of this method based on employment has been amply analysed and confirmed by both Marxists and Weberians (see Carlsson, 1958; Foessa, 1994; Goldthorpe, 1987; Wright, 1980; Edgell & Duke, 1991; Goldthorpe & Erikson, 1993; Evans & Millan, 1999, among others).

Generally speaking, the fact that it is possible to affirm that middle classes are generally characterised by certain occupations, income and education does not imply that the income and education has be taken into account at operationalisation stage. Those features are empirical observations produced, secondarily, by the occupation issue. The income is derived from the occupation and the level of education is also a consequence — not to say a requirement — of the occupation\textsuperscript{15}. Furthermore, a careful observation of middle class individuals will also provide more information about them, such as dwelling, or even — going to an extreme — the fact that they have a microwave oven, and nobody would operationalise the middle class anywhere according to the existence or not of a microwave, type of dwelling, or possession of a certain kind or vehicle, although all these issues characterise the middle class. Actually, this will allow the research to test the evolution in time of those other characteristics. For example, it will allow examining the evolution of the income or level of education of the middle class through the years.

Besides rarely used and strange operationalisations such as Germani's (1961) which was based on occupation and dwelling, there is no important method, to the author's knowledge, of operationalisation that is not based on occupation only.

Subsequently, middle class, in this investigation, will be operationalised in terms of occupation, as successfully done in several studies (for comparison, see Juárez & Reyes-Ayala, 1994: 254-257, Goldthorpe & Erikson, 1993: 45). Besides, and to

\textsuperscript{15} No person without a post-graduate degree can become a professor, for instance.
strengthen this theoretical observation, the important correlation existing between these variables (Income and Occupation and between Education and Occupation) is now shown.

The following is an empirical explanation of the relationship between Occupation and Income/Education, using the data from 1983 and 1999. The figures are chronologically presented - 1983 and 1999. The 1983 survey is composed of four files - one per population group - which makes the exposition of four figures necessary - one per population group. In order to present the same information for each year, 1999 data is also presented in the same way (one figure per population group). Each scatter-diagram represents the relationship between Education & Occupation and Income & Education. The line that crosses each diagram is a graphic representation of a linear regression. The density of each point (number of "petals") represents the number of cases represented by each point (the more dense, the more cases represented by that point).

Occupation has been indexed progressively according to the skilled/non-skilled cleavage on which this study is based. Zero represents the less skilled professions (unskilled) and the highest value (it varies from survey to survey) represents those occupations that are highly skilled (doctors, engineers, etc.). It is important to note, that to show the correlation between employment and education and income, those considered not economically active, such as housewives, students or the unemployed obviously do not appear, as those are not occupations.

The income has also been indexed progressively from zero to the maximum (which also varies from survey to survey).

Education has also been presented progressively. Zero once again indicates no institutional education, and the maximum represents the highest grades of education possibly obtained (doctors, masters, etc.).

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16 See Chapter 4, section 4.3, for description of 1983 data set.
17 This statistical procedure draws a line that best represent the relation between the variables. It shows how one variable evolves as the other does. For more details on this procedure see Norüsis (1994: 223-278; 1997: 391-397).
The relationship is plotted by means of a scatter-diagram, which shows the dispersion and tendency of the relationship. The line that crosses each diagram represents a linear regression\(^\text{18}\). Alongside each two graphics is a table that shows the correlation between the variables. Zero is the minimum and one, the maximum.

\[^{18}\text{Ibid.}\]

117
1983 Data

Figure 3.1 & 3.2 Black population, 1983

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Correlation</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Occupation / Education</td>
<td>0.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation / Income</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

![Graph showing correlation between Occupation, Education, and Income for black population in 1983.](image-url)
Figures 3.3 & 3.4 White population, 1983

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Correlation</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Occupation/Education</td>
<td>0.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation/Income</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

![Graphs showing correlation between occupation, education, and income for the white population in 1983.](image-url)
Figure 3.5 & 3.6 Coloured people, 1983

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Correlation</th>
<th>Occupation / Education</th>
<th>0.62</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Occupation / Income</td>
<td>0.41</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Top Diagram:**

- X-axis: Occupation
- Y-axis: Education

**Bottom Diagram:**

- X-axis: Occupation
- Y-axis: Income
Figure 3.7 & 3.8 Indian population, 1983

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Correlation</th>
<th>Occupation / Education</th>
<th>0.47</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Occupation / Income</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

![Graph showing correlation between occupation, education, and income for the Indian population in 1983.](http://scholar.sun.ac.za)
1999 Data

Figure 3.9 & 3.10 Total population, 1999

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Correlation</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Occupation / Education</td>
<td>0.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation /Income</td>
<td>0.58</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

![Occupation vs Education](image1)

![Occupation vs Income](image2)
Figure 3.11 & 3.12 Black population, 1999

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Correlation</th>
<th>Occupation / Education</th>
<th>0.51</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Occupation / Income</td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[Graphs showing correlation between occupation, education, and income]
Figure 3.13 & 3.14 White population, 1999

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Correlation</th>
<th>Occupation / Education</th>
<th>0.31</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Occupation / Income</td>
<td>0.19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

![Occupation vs. Education](image1)

![Occupation vs. Income](image2)
Figure 3.15 & 3.16 Coloured population, 1999

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Correlation</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Occupation / Education</td>
<td>0.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation / Income</td>
<td>0.52</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The diagrams show the correlation between Occupation and Education, and Occupation and Income for the Coloured population in 1999. The correlation coefficients are 0.46 and 0.52 respectively.
Figure 3.17 & 3.18 Indian population, 1999

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Correlation</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Occupation / Education</td>
<td>-0.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation / Income</td>
<td>-0.21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
These diagrams, in brief, imply that if you want to get a "good" job, you must be educated. It can also be said that a high skilled job implies high remuneration. The 1999 figure for the Indian population seems to be erroneous. It is difficult to explain the negative correlation. This will be confirmed in the analysis of the middle class (there also are inexplicable figures for the Indian middle class — there quite obviously was a mistake when the 1999 data was coded by the HSRC).

The data presented also give information about the effects of the exclusion of the different population groups — from the citizenry during the former regime — with regard to income and occupation. For instance, in 1983 the correlation between income and occupation was only 0.10 for the Black population, and the income remained very low regardless of the occupation (Figure 3.2). However, the correlation between occupation and income for the White population was 0.10, but the income remained high for any occupation (Figure 3.4). Of the four population groups, Blacks and Whites have the lowest correlation between income and occupation. This reflects the protection of the White population. Their income was high, regardless of the position they held. On the other hand, Blacks received a very low income regardless of their job. In this regard, the correlation between income and occupation for Coloureds and Indians were similar to the figures of the democratic period.

In 1999 these figures changed drastically and the correlation between income and occupation now is 0.58 and between occupation and education it is 0.57 (total population). This implies that whoever wants to get a highly skilled job needs to obtain high levels of education and that highly skilled jobs imply higher incomes under democracy. However, the figures per population group indicate that the White population still remains somehow protected and that income remains high at all levels of education or occupation. Actually, both correlations retain the same value (occupation-income correlation was 0.10 in 1983 — high income at all levels — and 0.19 in 1999 — high income at all levels —; occupation-education correlation was 0.35 in 1983 and 0.31 in 1999). This may indicate that the economic sector is still controlled by the White population. Still, White correlations are the lowest of all population groups. In this regard, the Black population correlations change significantly. The correlation for 1999 is 0.51 for education-occupation and 0.50 for income-occupation, coming close to the mean, which is 0.57 for education-occupation.
and 0.58 for income-occupation. This confirms what was said above, that in the former regime, those politically excluded had difficulty in improving their standard of living, regardless of their education or skills.

As these figures confirm, operationalising the middle class exclusively in terms of occupation allows later crosstabulations with different variables (such as income or education) to monitor the evolution of the middle class in these sectors. Consequently, the above explanation strengthens the argument that the middle class should be operationalised in terms of occupation.

### 3.8.3 The degree of coverage

The degree of coverage is based on the difference between the whole population and those who are "economically active". There is no single reason why those not economically active (the unemployed, housewives, students) should be removed from the statistics. Hence, this study includes all the whole population in its analysis.

### 3.8.4 The unit of analysis

The unit of analysis refers to the person or institution (individual or family) on which the analysis is performed (see this Chapter, above). The selection of the unit of analysis offers the social scientist the possibility of basing her/his research on the respondent or the household. The approach followed here is based on occupation, which means it is focused on the work location. This implies that the point of view of this study is the "production" and not the "consumption". Consequently, the unit of analysis in this study is the respondent (individual) and not the household. The household is the unit of consumption, whereas the individual is the unit of production (Marshall et al., 1988: 85). This also facilitates the operationalisation, as the index does not have to be combined, which would result in a very large and complex model that would be difficult – not to say impossible – to analyse.


With all the necessary explanations given, the following step is the location and

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19 1996 and 1998 data are not analysed, as previously said (see Chapter 1, fn.14).
measurement of the middle class in South Africa.

In this section, the middle class in South Africa is finally operationalised and its evolution through the years is surveyed. As there are two different middle classes (new and old middle class), there are two operationalisation processes, one for the new middle class and one for the old middle class.

As previously said, new middle class refers to professionals, managers and clerks. Thus, the occupation variable is examined through the surveys and re-coded as follows: Those whose occupations fall into "professional", "manager" or "clerks" are automatically re-coded into "new middle class" - White collar workers.

On the other hand, those whose occupations fall into "self-employed-propertied" are re-coded into "old middle class". But this later category - old middle class - is filtered by an economic filter (income) to avoid a bias in the results. This is so to include only those who have a similar standard of living, leaving apart those who fall within the same category of self-employed but into a different - higher or lower - social class. Before proceeding with the operationalisation, the economic filter will be explained.

### 3.9.1 The economic filter

It has already been made clear that it is necessary to reduce the "contribution" from the "self-employed" category to the middle class to those with a certain income - similar to the income of the "new middle class". But, what filter would be appropriate?

There are several ways to express the degree of income inequality in a society. The simplest way is to arrange whatever units are chosen (persons, families, or households) in order of rank, from poorest to richest, divide the hierarchy into fifths (quintiles) and compute the average income quintile. Then the shares or averages of rich and poor can be compared.

Economists have devised several ways of making such comparisons with the use of a single index number. The most popular of these is the Gini index (or coefficient or ratio or number). While it simplifies comparisons, however, the Gini is not easy to
explain. Here's an attempt to do so with an example:

**Figure 3.19 Representation of Gini index, Lorenz curve and perfect egalitarian society (USA 1968-1992) (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1993)**

The graph plots the distribution of income in the United States in 1968 (a very egalitarian year) and 1992 (very un-egalitarian). The 45-degree line shows the income distribution in a perfect egalitarian society, where each 20 percent has 20 percent of income. The Gini index measures the gap between the actual line and the 45° line (called Lorenz curve). In the egalitarian society, the Gini would be 0.0, since both lines would match each other perfectly. Then, the higher the Gini, the greater the distance, and the more unequal the distribution of income. In a perfectly unequal society, in which one person (or household or family) had all the income, the Lorenz curve would look like a backward "L," and its value would be 1.0. In practice, the Gini usually falls between 0.20 and 0.45. For instance, in the annual report of the World Bank (1999: 72), South Africa had a Gini index of 0.59, behind only Brazil (0.61) and at the same level as Guatemala (0.59). In Europe, for instance, Denmark scored 0.24, Sweden, 0.25, and in North America the United States had a 0.41 Gini index.

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20 Data from 1993-1994.
As the graph shows and as many scholars pointed out, most of the difference is located "in the middle of the income distribution" (Rubinson & Quilan, 1977: 615), between the second and fourth quintiles – middle classes income. According to Rubinson & Quilan (1977: 615, italics added), the lowest amount of inequality "is associated with large and economically powerful middle class groups. Thus, when we compare countries with regard to inequality, we are basically comparing their class structures and, particularly, the degree to which they are dominated by a middle class. It is interpreting inequality as an indicator of class structure that leads to the hypothesis that social inequality affects democracy [negatively]" (see also Paukert, 1973 or Muller, 1995a). As a result, the economic filter will be applied as follows:

The income is divided into five quintiles and both the highest and lowest quintiles, are removed. Hence, the economic filter will have its limits in the second and fourth quintile – representative of middle class income. However, this is not as easy as it seems to be. South Africa’s previous regime, with its policy of apartheid, favoured the White population economically, politically and socially at the expense of the others, namely Black, Coloured and Indian (see, for instance DBSA, 1998: 8 and the discussion in Chapter 5). This is clearly evidenced in their different means of income:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population Group</th>
<th>Mean of income 1983 (R/year)</th>
<th>Mean of income 1994 (R/year)</th>
<th>Mean of income 1995 (R/year)</th>
<th>Mean of income 1997 (R/year)</th>
<th>Mean of income 1999 (R/year)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>7200-9588</td>
<td>5040-6730</td>
<td>5040-6948</td>
<td>9960-14988</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>10000-15000</td>
<td>42000-47988</td>
<td>49920-69948</td>
<td>49920-69948</td>
<td>69960-99948</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coloured</td>
<td>4000-7000</td>
<td>12000-13188</td>
<td>9960-14988</td>
<td>9960-14988</td>
<td>15000-19908</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian</td>
<td>1000-4000</td>
<td>21600-23988</td>
<td>13920-14988</td>
<td>19920-29988</td>
<td>30000-49908</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The large differences between White income and the others substantiate this argument. The White population, in terms of income, was and still is far ahead of the other population groups. The middle class is a social strata that, consequently, crosses the whole social spectrum and is composed (or at least it should be composed) of individuals from every population group. With these differences, however, it is expected to be composed mainly of the White population.
For those who formerly were excluded from the political system to accept and support the new democratic regime, these differences should be progressively reduced. Consequently the "income-mark" to "beat" is the "White mark". Hence, the economic filter will be limited by the second and fourth quintiles of the White population. This will be helpful to the pursuit of the main aim of this research: to measure the decrease/increase of the inequality within the South African society. In other words, to measure whether those formerly excluded are reaching the levels of the formerly favoured. The income quintiles of the White population is represented in Table 3.2.

Table 3.2 Economic filter to delimit the old middle class from the self-employed category (HSRC '94, '95, '97, '99)  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>42000-59988</td>
<td>30000-149988</td>
<td>49920-149988</td>
<td>69960-199908</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

At this point it is finally possible to select those individuals that compose the old middle class. Those who fall into the self-employed category and have an income within the above limits are considered to be part of the so-called "old middle class" (petit bourgeoisie). That group will be added to the "new middle class" group, to finally configure the South African middle class in 1970, 1994, 1995, 1997 and 1999.

3.9.2 Middle Class in South Africa: Its configuration

The different population groups are not equally represented within the country. Due to this, the percentage of the middle class which corresponds to each population group, will yield little information. Actually, it may provide the reader with a confusing perception of the South African reality. Consequently, the percentage shown refers to the percentage of each population group falling within the corresponding category (old, new and total middle class, respectively) in South Africa in the respective year. As a result, the configuration of the South African society is as follows:

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21 Only "new" middle class.
Table 3.3 South African population (%) (Census 1970 & HSRC '94, '95, '97, '99)

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<thead>
<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>70.2</td>
<td>71.6</td>
<td>70.0</td>
<td>70.6</td>
<td>70.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>17.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coloured</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Once the economic filter has been selected the next step is the operationalisation of the middle class in South Africa. The structure of the occupation variable in each survey is exactly as follows:

In 1970 the government conducted a population census. Regarding occupation, the question was:

"Present personal occupation (kind of work done)" (1970: Question H.)

The response categories were as follows:

(i) Professionals and related workers
(ii) Administrative and managerial workers
(iii) Clerical and related workers
(iv) Sales workers
(v) Service workers (catering, accommodations)
(vi) Farm, forestry, fishing, hunting and related worker
(vii) Production and transport worker, labourer (including mining, quarrying)
(viii) Unemployed
(ix) Workers employed but not previously classified
(x) a) Housewife
    b) Students
    c) Others not economically active and not classified

The categories selected as "new middle class" are (i), (ii) and (iii). The 1970 census did not provide any income-related question for the Black population. Thus, it is not possible to know the magnitude of the "old middle class".

In 1994, 1995, 1997 and 1999 the HSRC conducted its February Omnibus survey and prompted the respondent to give information about their employment situation. Concretely, the question was (the same for everyone):

The possible responses were:

(i) Professional, semi-professional and technical occupations
(ii) Executive and administrative occupations
(iii) a) Clerical occupations
     b) Sales occupations
(iv) Transport, delivery and communication occupations
(v) Service occupation (protection, catering, etc.)
(vi) Farmer, fishing, hunter and farm workers
(vii) Artisans and apprentices
(viii) Miners, quarrymen, production foremen and supervisors, operators, production workers and related occupations (also includes any unskilled worker not elsewhere classified)
(ix) a) Housewives
     b) Unemployed – Fit for work
     c) Unemployed – Not fit for work
     d) Retired
     e) Students

The categories selected for the NEW middle class are (i) Professional, semi-professional and technical occupations (ii) Executive and administrative occupations (iii) a) Clerical occupations.

The category selected for the OLD middle class is (iii) b) Sales occupations (filtered economically and work status (self-employed)). In this way, only the self-employed and propertied (generally an owner of a small shop) with middle income are selected. The percentages are calculated and presented in the following tables. In order to gain clarity in the presentation, the three tables are presented in the same page.
### Table 3.4 Old middle class (%)

<table>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>Not av.</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>Not av.</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coloured</td>
<td>Not av.</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian</td>
<td>Not av.</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Not av.</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Entries represent the percentage of each population group – and of the whole (total) population – falling within the OLD middle class in each year. The 1970 Census did not provide income information of certain population groups. *Ns* are offered below.

| Ns    | 12747280 | 2250  | 2226  | 2220  | 2210 |

### Table 3.5 New middle class (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>27.1</td>
<td>25.9</td>
<td>33.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coloured</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>11.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>19.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>10.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Entries represent the percentage of each population group – and of the whole (total) population – falling within the NEW middle class in each year. *Ns* are offered below. 1Updated from OHS 1994, 1995.

| Ns    | 12747280 | 2250  | 2226  | 2220  | 2210 |

### Table 3.6 Total Middle class (%)

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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>29.9</td>
<td>28.3</td>
<td>34.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coloured</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>11.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>19.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>10.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Entries represent the percentage of each population group – and of the whole (total) population – falling within the TOTAL middle class in each year. For 1970 only information about new middle class is provided as no income information was available for certain population groups. *Ns* are offered below. 1Updated from OHS 1994, 1995.

| Ns    | 12747280 | 2250  | 2226  | 2220  | 2210 |

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22 The October Household Surveys (OHS hereafter) are conducted by Statistics SA annually. Its reliability is very high due to the large sample. When possible, the data presented here has been verified on these surveys to increase the reliability of the results. For details on OHS see Orkin, (1998).
Although these results will be amply analysed in the following Chapter, it is important to make some comments. The main one is obviously that the middle class has increased since 1970 (at least the new middle class), but after 1994 the level stays at approximately 8%. From 1997 to 1999 it seems to have grown. Further research will confirm or refute this tendency of the last two years.

In general, the old middle class decreases. This is a normal process of the old middle class in advanced societies (see Glassman, 1997). The new middle class experiences an increase in the democratic period. However, as will be shown later, this is mainly due to the arrival of the Black population to the public sector and the protection that the White population still enjoys (low correlation between occupation and income and high income average).

3.10 Summary

In this Chapter the middle class in South Africa was operationalised according to the definition given in the previous Chapter. Different approaches were offered, mainly ranking from those who follow a psychological approach (Marxist, and Neo-Marxist, mainly led by Wright) and those who follow a functionalist approach, derived from Weber, mainly led by Goldthorpe. Three main reasons are presented to discard the psychological approach: The first is that psychological factors are difficult to measure and recheck; the second is that this theory emphasises the conflict in the society (on which this study is not focused) and class awareness (this study considers the middle class as a reflection of the income inequality and does not focus on the political role the middle class may play); and the third – derived from the former – is that neither Marxist nor Neo-Marxist can prove that they measure what they intend to measure, namely class awareness and social conflict. They are based on occupation (as functionalist), highlighting the division owner-control vs. non owner-no control. But that division does not itself imply or explain any kind of conflict or class awareness. This leaves no room for any other alternative but functionalism, which is easy to measure and recheck and measures what it intends to measure.

In the latter part of the Chapter, the data sets used were explained and the exact questions were given in detail as the method of operationalisation. Especial emphasis was placed on the "self-employed" category in order to include only those who are
regarded as members of the middle class.

Finally, the results were calculated and plotted. These were difficult to interpret. In other words, the middle class seems to retain the same level, although it has started to increase in the last two year-period. However, the new middle class seems to have grown in the democratic period. This could be promising for the future stabilisation of South African democracy. Later analysis (Chapter 5) will reveal that this increase is mainly produced by the arrival of the Black population to the public sector, "affirmative action" and the "protection" of Whites within the economic sector.

The next step to be taken is to operationalise and monitor the evolution of the consolidation of the democracy.
Chapter 4. Democratic consolidation operationalised

4.1 Introduction

In previous Chapters, the process of democratisation and the dangers that can lead to its breakdown were explained. The definition of the main concepts used in this study and the clarification of all aspects which may lead to misunderstanding were the main topics of Chapter 2. In Chapter 3, the operationalisation and measurement of the middle class in South Africa were presented. The current Chapter focused on the analysis of the consolidation of democracy.

The student of democracy, when testing or monitoring its consolidation, has to face the same unpleasant problems as when studying the social structure and, particularly, the concept of class. Ambiguity, different meanings – none of which are universally accepted –, and unclear definitions will be the starting point for the operationalisation of the concept of "consolidated democracy". If the definition is not clear, its operationalisation will be more difficult.

A wide scope of approaches to select from is always available, from those that focus on structural factors, such as economic development, to those that focus on cultural/values issues – the commitment to democracy at both/either elites and/or mass level –, passing through those that are based on institutional features, such as the party system, electoral law, the relation of the legislature to the executive or, going to an extreme, those that, ingenuously, attach the label of consolidated democracy to any system where at least two parties alternate in office.

Most of these approaches have already been criticised. A certain party system, or a particular electoral system may help democracy to consolidate by, for instance, excluding – through the establishment of a minimum percentage of votes required, etc. – those parties, generally small, opposed to democracy from the political realm. But that does not imply that the consolidation of the democracy relies on any type of electoral law, or on any form of legislature. These political factors may accelerate or slow down the process, may create a favourable context for democracy to consolidate, but nothing else.
Consolidation itself rests on the belief that the democratic rule is the best – or the worst with the exception of any other form of government (Churchill's hypothesis (1947) tried before. Concretely, it relies on their attitudinal commitment to the democratic rule – for "better or worse" (Bratton and Mattes, 1999: 3). It could be argued that the commitment at the elite level is also of extreme importance. This is partially true. It is obviously true that any democracy needs committed-to-democracy elites, who, in the end and day-by-day, rule the country, but those elites might be tempted to revert the system into any authoritarian form if it does not accommodate them. This reversion of the system would have little chance of success if most of the citizens accept and vigorously defend democracy even in the face of critical situations such as serious economic setbacks. In this regard, Venezuela may well serve as a perfect example. General Hugo Vázquez tried to gain office by force, twice in the early 1990s, but he only received the strong opposition of the Venezuelan people who went to the streets to oppose the coup attempts. However, in 1999, the same person competed in general elections and won overwhelmingly over all the historical and conventional political parties, with his Polo Democrático (El País, 07-7-99; Mccoy, 1999: 64-65). This example proved well enough that, when citizens show strong support for democracy and consider it "the only game in town", even when situations are most critical, with high rates on unemployment and corruption, economic recession, etc., elites will not have any chance to gain office other than by winning contested elections.

As a result it is possible to conclude that democracy can only be considered as consolidated when it is regarded as the best and only one form of rule – at the level of the masses. This converts the democratic regime to a legitimate regime. Mainwaring (1992: 306) stated it clearly when said that legitimacy "... is every bit as much the root of democratic stability...." This line of thought is widely shared and supported (see Diamond, 1994a; 1996; 1999; Linz & Stepan, 1996a; 1996b).

In this regard and reconnecting with the so-called structural and institutional issues and their role in consolidation, it is possible to state that they can favour the process of legitimisation of a democracy. They can promote certain values in certain ways. For instance, regarding those structural factors, economic development may promote urbanisation and a better and more equal distribution of income, which may
produce an increase in education. This may also produce a better-educated population with higher levels of understanding and tolerance. In this way, the social structure is shaped in a pro-democratic form.

This gives rise to the following proposition: If the commitment to democracy of a certain regime, at the level of the masses, is deviating from the pro-support trend, it is possible to conclude that democracy may be endangered, and provide a fertile soil for authoritarian ideas. This could be used speedily by antidemocratic leaders to put an end to the democratic form of government.

Consequently, it is of great importance to monitor the commitment to democracy at mass level in South Africa. Testing whether the indicators of political culture - most indicative of democratic consolidation - of South African citizens are developing in the direction given above will furnish the social scientist with a predictive analytical tool when surveying the South African democracy, in particular, or any democratic regime, in general. But, how?

One of the best and most frequently used ways to follow the evolution of those indicators of democratic consolidation from political culture in South Africa is through the observation of its public opinion.

The following surveys the evolution of some indicators of democratic consolidation in South Africa through the years – from 1983 to 1999. This is done through the examination of public opinion among the South African citizenry, especially during the last decade, during which the demise of apartheid gave rise to democracy. Although the final consolidation of democracy in South Africa, according to its political culture, may take a generation, there is no doubt that these years are decisive for the future stability and consolidation of the new political regime (Whitehead, 1989: 79).

Due to obvious reasons of strategy and space, only those movements of opinion related to the main aspects concerned with democratic legitimacy are analysed. There would be little sense in having to monitor the evolution of public opinion regarding areas not related to democracy, for instance. This aspect will be explained later in the Chapter.
4.2 Public opinion: Its nature

It is convenient to commence this section with an interpretative reference to the nature of public opinion. Before anything, it is necessary to take into account that public opinion is a collective phenomenon and not the sum of individual opinions. The citizen is perceived to be a political man according to Aristotle's meaning. Public opinion is a social and political phenomenon that lies somewhere between the social needs of people, political attitudes and their more visible public conduct – especially in voting – but not being any of these (see Foessa, 1994).

Public opinion is the opinion of many on controversial questions that claim action from the political authority. In this sense, public opinion is synonymous to political opinion. Public opinion refers to those polemic matters for which, earlier or later, a solution will be demanded.

Public opinion, though a political institution, is equivalent to neither the media messages nor the results of the value surveys. However, both of them – media messages and value surveys – are of public use and may reflect, help to know and conform to the public opinion. Thus, although public opinion is, in principle, something volatile and diverse, it is, in the end, susceptible to definition, measurement and control (Henessy, 1965: 19-80). That is the reason why, in this study, public opinion surveys are used to measure the citizens' support of the democratic institutions, – namely the political legitimacy of the democratic regime. Consequently, a quantitative longitudinal survey was used. It controlled the engagement with democratic institutions of the South African citizenship over the last 16 years.

Public opinion is not a collective phenomenon among many others only. It also "constitutes a basic institution within the democratic form of rule. It is of such importance than it can be argued that democracy is a regime of opinion.... When decisions are taken by force, the public opinion disappears" (López-Pintor, 1994: 578; see also Henessy, 1975: 21).

Public opinion is particularly heterogeneous, ephemeral and elusive; it is "our social epidermis" (López-Pintor, 1994: 579; see also Albig, 1956: 151-174; Henessy,
Due to this, it is necessary to refer to numbers and statistics as a quantitative representation of the phenomena on which this section is based. Nowadays, the evolution of social science research provides the social scientist with a bewildering and endless list of statistical procedures that, when used, may easily overwhelm the reader. In this regard, every possible effort has been made to reduce these to a minimum. However, every datum, graphic or statistical procedure used here is, in the author's opinion, unavoidable and strictly necessary.

4.3 Public opinion in South Africa: The data

This section uses the same surveys as for the operationalisation of the middle class, in Chapter 3, namely, HSRC '94 until '99. (See Chapter 3 for description.) However, as the operationalisation of a concept such as "consolidated democracy" deserves to have the attention focused on many characteristics, some other surveys have been added:

- **Inter-group Relations, Political Opinions and Recreational Activities Survey.**
  This was conducted by the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC, hereafter) in August, 1983. This study was part of a comprehensive research project regarding inter-group relations in South Africa, attempting to assess the importance of aspects influencing inter-group relations among the four population groups. It provides information about the socio-political situation during the former non-democratic regime. It is composed of four different files, one per population group. It was obtained through SADA. The fieldwork was carried out in August, 1983, on a random sampling representing all of the country. The method of data-collection was through face to face interviews with a structured questionnaire.

- **Idasa Election Survey, 1994.** This survey was conducted by the Institute for a Democratic Alternative in South Africa (Idasa, hereafter) in the aftermath of the first democratic elections in South Africa in 1994. It was on social, economical and political issues of South African citizenship. It has been provided, directly, by Idasa. The fieldwork was carried out by Markinor between 26 August and 16

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2 Dr R. Mattes, Public Opinion Service, Idasa, Cape Town.
September 1994. Respondents in households were randomly selected. It was based on a semi-structured personal interview-questionnaire.

- **Idasa Election '99 Survey.** This survey was conducted in September, 1998 by Idasa. It was also based on socio-political issues. Major interest was focused on the following (second) democratic election to be held the following year, 1999. It was supplied for this research, as the previous one, by Idasa. The fieldwork was carried out by Markinor in September, 1998. Respondents in households were randomly selected. It was based on questionnaires and interviews. The sample was drawn using a multi-stage, area-stratified probability sampling methodology. The sample was stratified by province, population group and community size.

### 4.4 Political culture: Genealogy of a concept

The peoples of different societies are characterised by enduring differences in basic attitudes, values and skills: In other words, they have different cultures. Through the years, economic, technological and socio-political changes have transformed the cultures in many ways, through issues that give rise to political conflict, people's religious beliefs, etc. Why do cultures change? Each culture represents a people's strategy for adaptation. Its changes respond, in the long run, to economic, technological and political changes; those that fail to do so are unlikely to flourish. In this sense, a culture is a set of beliefs and assumptions developed by a given group in its efforts to cope with the problems of external adaptation and internal integration (see Barnes, 1986, Schein, 1985; Inglehart, 1990).

Consequently, culture entails a system of attitudes, values and knowledge that is widely shared within a society and transmitted from generation to generation. While human nature is biologically innate and universal, culture is learned and may vary from one society to another. The more central and earlier acquired aspects of culture are resistant to change, both because it requires a massive effort to change central elements of an adult's cognitive organisation and because one's most central values become ends in themselves, the abandonment of which would produce deep

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4 Name borrowed from Gendzel, (1997).
uncertainty and anxiety (on the idea of culture in political culture theory, see, for instance, Eckstein, 1988: 801-803; see also Almond & Verba, 1963).

If culture refers to certain attitudes, values and knowledge, then it is to be understood that political culture will obviously refer to those attitudes, values and knowledge that are related to the political system. In this regard there is no doubt that "political culture is one of the popular and seductive concepts in political science; it is also one of the most controversial and confused" (Elkins & Simeon, 1979: 127).

This section, which borrows its name from Gendzel (1997: 225), pretends to present the meaning of a concept which, due to its uncontrolled use and development seems, nowadays, to mean everything. As Welch put it (1993: 1) "due the overwhelming and vague use by journalists and the general public, it has ramified and expanded so much that, like the early anthropological idea of culture itself, it threatens to absorb everything in its vicinity". It has become such an elastic idea that everything, currently, may find a place within it (Gendzel, 1997: 226). Another important problem that has arisen and is probably derived from the above, is that "the categorisation of different types of political culture ... turns to be quite possible" (Welch, 1993: 1; see also Gibbins, 1989; Kavanagh, 1983; Patrick, 1984). To all of these it has to be added that "the lack of a clear definition of political culture threatens to obscure the idea to which it refers, rather than reveals it" (Baker, 1987: 59-65).

Nowadays, there is a tendency within political science to "treat political culture like a familiar piece of furniture. Everybody is vaguely aware of its existence, but only rarely do they comment upon it. Generally, political culture appears as secondary, something which, while enriching our understanding of political life, is not deemed essential to our comprehension of it" (Street, 1994: 95; see also Barry, 1978).

Besides these difficulties that are encountered, the idea of political culture is of great analytical utility, although it may need more discipline in using it.

The concept of political culture evolved from centuries of generalising about the different faces of power in different places. Montesquieu's (1949) *Spirit of laws, and

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5 For comparative and different approaches see Welch, (1993) or Gendzel, (1997) to quote simply a couple.
Rousseau's (1982) *The social contract* are all ancestors to the concept. For instance, Tocqueville (1969, Vol. II: 1) made political culture a core idea when he wrote that "in order that society should exist and, *a fortiori*, that society should prosper, it is necessary that the mind of all the citizens should be rallied and held together by certain predominant ideas; and this can not be the case unless each of them sometimes draws his opinions from the common source and consents to accept certain matters of belief already formed".

In this regard, American social scientists speculated about how this "psychological coherence" or a certain culture might affect politics earlier in this century. That was how the modern concept of political culture was born during the Cold War (Gendzel, 1997: 226-227). Likewise, Almond (1956), for instance, attempted to address the cultural differences between Britain and the United States and the totalitarian states. However, he went further and found that every political system was embedded in a particular pattern of orientations to political action. He referred to this as the political culture. Gendzel (1997: 227) is of the opinion that, with that, "Almond offered a convenient catchphrase for such loosely conceptualised terms in comparative politics as attitudes, values, ideology and socialisation." He sided with Weber's theory of Protestantism as the culture engine of modernisation (see Weber, 1961; 1964; 1968). This all suggests that political culture has explanatory usefulness for political science. If this is the case, it would be useful to know what the term means.

In the most influential study on the topic, political culture is defined by Almond and Verba (1963: 13) as the "attitudes towards the political system and its various parts, and attitudes towards the role of the self in the system". These attitudes "yield three orientations: i) cognitive, ii) affective and iii) evaluative. These attitudes refer, respectively, to individuals' knowledge of the system, their feelings towards it and their judgement of it" (Almond & Verba, 1963: 15). For Almond and Verba, political culture is to be regarded as a set of individual psychological states, which can be revealed through survey questionnaires. Political culture is seen as "a cross between a catalyst and a fertiliser, providing the conditions for change and sustaining the product of that change" (Street, 1994: 98). Consequently, "political culture may or may not be congruent with the structure of the political system" (Almond & Verba,
1963: 21). This gives rise to the idea that only a certain type of political culture – the civic culture – is appropriate to democracy. In other words, different cultures fit different regimes (Barry, 1978: 49-50). The civic culture "is a participant political culture in which the political culture and political structure are congruent" (Almond & Verba, 1963: 31). But how does the civic culture achieve its functional or dysfunctional effect? The answer resides in the way the political culture links "micropolitics" and "macropolitics", and forges a bridge "between the behaviour of individuals and the behaviour of the system" (Almond & Verba, 1963: 32). These attitudes may not be purely political (and they are not as will be shown). In general, this pioneering research, studying the concepts of political culture, aimed to reveal "the relation between the attitudes and motivations of the discrete individuals who make up political systems and the character and performance of political systems" (Almond & Verba, 1963: 33). This civic culture – political culture committed to democracy – has been also labelled "civic republicanism" (Rice & Feldmann, 1997: 1144; see also Oldfield, 1990).

In this regard the studies of political culture have been developed along two "different" branches: Behaviouralism vs interpretivism. The former has to do with the "development of a science of the political process" (Dahl, 1961: 767), "... a major step forward in the nature of political science as science ... toward a probabilistic theory of politics" (Almond, 1960: 4). A basis for distinguishing behaviouralism is perhaps that it combined the aspiration to make the study of politics scientific with a methodology that appeared to make the aspiration fulfillable: Quantitative and more precise survey methodology. The development of survey techniques facilitated what had previously been seen as a distant goal only, because it enabled truly comparable and cumulative research (Giddens, 1984: 333). Behaviouralism is to be seen "as a stage in the territorial expansion of political science as a discipline; that is the enlargement of its subject matter from constitutions to informal elite political behaviour, hence to voters' behaviour and, finally, to mass attitudes and behaviour beyond the realm of electoral participation" (Welch, 1993: 3). The concept of political culture was in the vanguard of the behavioural revolution. Although the term had been used previously (see Banard, 1969: 392; Brown, 1984: 1), Almond's characterisation of political culture as "the particular pattern of orientations to political action, in which every political system is embedded" (1956: 396) is generally regarded as "an
act of coinage" (Welch, 1993: 4). Actually, it played a key role in several subsequent studies which have assumed the status of classics of the behavioural tradition, such as Almond and Verba's classical study (1963; 1980) and Pye and Verba's (1965). Political culture offers itself as an ideal token or catalyst for behaviouralism since it fulfils the two central aims to the approach: It can be defined so as to be measured quantitatively and it marks the ultimate expansion of the territory of political science into Anthropology. With this, the concept of political culture is "released" from the general concept of culture (Almond, 1956: 396).

On the other hand, interpretivism is a reaction to behaviouralism itself. The intellectual sources of this approach are diverse but the main difference with behaviouralism resides in its methodological principles. The most significant influence on political cultural interpretivism is anthropologist Geertz (1975) and in particular his notion of "thick description", according to which behaviour is not usefully described "objectively" (see Clifford, 1975). In the end, the most important difference is the methodology to be used: Can the political culture be measured and analysed quantitatively or not? (Welch, 1993: 30-39; 64-74). Giddens (1984: 333) stated that, in the end, the difference is non-existent, as both methods will focus on the same thing and will get to the same conclusions.

One of the first questions to which Almond and Verba's concept of political culture (1963; revised in 1980) was applied, was that of the relationship between political culture and democracy, and this has indeed continued to be a major area of political culture research. Their study was the original entry and has remained a benchmark for much subsequent research. Two different projects are identified in that study, the first being a comparative explanation consisting of an attempt to explain the presence of stable democracy in some countries and its absence in others in terms of pre-existing political cultural conditions. It comprises comparative explanation with political culture as independent variable. The second is a sociological investigation of the social conditions under which democracy works. The motivation behind the study was the anxiety provoked by events in Europe in the first half of the twentieth century, concerning the future of democracy. The comparative study argues that civic culture is the type of political culture most conducive to stable democracy, and takes this argument to be verified by the fact which much of the study is intended to
demonstrate, that in the stable democracies of Britain and the United States political structures most closely approximate to this ideal, while they fall somewhat short of it in countries where there had been recent instability or a deficit of democracy.

This pioneering research was widely criticised (see for instance, Welch, 1993: 30-44), but, it has provided the model followed by subsequent research in the field (see Inglehart, 1990; Lagos, 1997 to mention but a couple).

The last paragraphs serve as preface to the new section of the study, the relation between political culture and democracy.

4.5 Political culture and democracy

A defining characteristic of democratic regimes is that they depend on the existence of widespread public support for survival (see Rose, 1996; Easton, 1965). The survival and effective functioning of democratising regimes depends on more than simply the aggregate level of public support. The trajectory of support over time; the distribution of support across significant societal subgroups; the rules and institutional mechanisms by which support is aggregated; and the number, nature and severity of the problems or stresses facing the regime are among numerous other important considerations (on this see, for instance, Przeworski, 1991; Rogowski, 1974)

The relationship of political culture to political regime is not new. It was used already by classic thinkers. For instance, Montesquieu (1969), Rousseau (1982) and Tocqueville (1969), share the idea that the diffusion of certain cultural standards throughout society is the basis for developing attitudes and behaviours that sustain political regimes. In this sense, the stability of any political regime would be highly conditioned by the presence of a political culture consistent with its own institutions.

Montesquieu (1949: 298-299) emphasised this link between political institutions and cultural norms through his tendency to subordinate the former to dominant cultural practices. Rousseau (1982: 49-50) also postulated a close relationship between the institutional regime and prevalent social norms when he said that "just as an architect observes and examines the ground before putting up a large building, to see if it will withstand the weight, a wise legislator does not begin by writing laws
that are inherently good but rather tries to judge whether the populace, at which these laws are aimed, will be able to tolerate them". He states that, once customs are established and prejudices rooted, "it is a dangerous and vain endeavour to try to reform them; the populace can not even tolerate its evils being touched in order to get rid of them, just like those stupid and cowardly sick people who tremble at the mere sight of a doctor".

Tocqueville (1969: 304), agreeing with Mostesquieu (1949) and Rousseau (1982), noted with reference to the relationship between institutions and political culture, that "the most fortunate situation combined with the best laws can not maintain a constitution notwithstanding customs, in that sense customs continue to back the most unfavourable positions and the worst laws". He also accentuates political culture's role in the stability of democratic order when stating that "it is precisely their custom that make Americans able to tolerate democratic rule".

These classical authors have exercised a great influence on subsequent studies of empirical political theory, especially over the last thirty years.

Besides the obvious importance of cultural approaches, rational choice models, based on economic variables have become the dominant mode of analysis, while cultural factors have been de-emphasised to an unrealistic degree. This approach has made major contributions to our understanding of how politics works, but it underestimates the significance of cultural factors, if only because, while economic indicators are readily available for these models, cultural data generally are not. Rational choice models have fruitfully analysed the relationships between economics and politics, but left unexplored the linkages that culture has with both politics and economics. Goodhart and Bhansali (1970), Kramer (1971) or Cameron (1978) are clear examples.

The "threat" to political theory came from Marxism (until its demise as a political alternative) (Brown, 1979: 3-7) and from rational choice theories (Elster, 1989: 248-249). In the 1980s, with the disenchantment of these approaches, political science witnessed a re-emergence of cultural theories, assisted by the development of the concept in other disciplines. This rediscovery, as Street noted (1994: 102), "was much more comprehensive than his predecessor, taking in a wider range of human
responses and a broader portrait of the political" (see also Robertson, 1985: 285; Rose, 1980: 116-117; Kavanagh, 1985: 46; Topf, 1989: 53-67; Girvins, 1989: 31-51)\(^6\).

This line of thought unavoidably connects with the theory of nationalism. Nationalism implies the sharing of a particular political identity, which is represented and expressed culturally. This cultural identity then forms the basis of decisions to protest, fight, secede, or whatever (Beetham, 1991: 106 and Smith, 1991: 91-92; see also Malcolm, 1976; Anderson, 1983; Boyle, 1991).

Nationalism is not the only aspect where the effect of political culture on politics is reflected. Religion, for instance, has "overweighed class as an influence on electoral behaviour" (Inglehart, 1990: 147\(^7\)). There is no question that economic factors are politically important but they are only part of the story. Inglehart (1988: 1204) argues that different "societies are characterised to very different degrees by specific syndromes of political cultural attitudes; that these cultural differences are relatively enduring, but not immutable, and can have major political consequences, one being that they are closely linked to the viability of democratic institutions. The examination of political culture is an essential supplement to the rational choice approach, and that the two sometimes focus on different aspects of the same phenomenon".

Stable democracy is not a necessary consequence of economic development: It may encourage but does not guarantee the emergence of democratic institutions. If relationships between politics and economics are analysed in the long term, political culture is a crucial intervening variable. In large measure, cultural changes reflect the socialisation of enduring habits and attitudes. Once established, certain attitudes and customs may act as independent influences on politics and economics long after the events that gave rise to them. Thus, the long-term relation between economics and politics is complex. Rational choice and political culture explanations are not incompatible but complementary modes of explanation.

In brief, the political culture literature argues that the evolution and persistence of

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\(^6\) Differing visions of political culture based, for instance in symbols, are offered by Thompson, (1990) and Merelman, (1991).

\(^7\) On the effect of religion on vote, see Lijphart, (1979); on concrete religions such as Confucianism in East Asia or Catholicism in Latin America see Huntington, (1997) and Karl, (1991).
mass-based democracy requires the emergence of certain supportive habits and attitudes among the general public.

In 1963, Almond and Verba's (1963) political culture research, *The Civic Culture*, represented a major step forward. Previous works that attempted to address the role of culture in politics relied on impressionistic evidence. Almond and Verba based their research on cross-national empirical data. As Street (1994: 96) stated it, "its focus on culture meshed with challenges to Marxist materialism and mechanical structural-functionalism, while its empirical methodology clashed with an emerging doubt about positivism and individualism. Thirty years later, there are signs that culture is again becoming an important concern of political scientists. The collapse of Marxist regimes and the rise of nationalism have drawn attention to the way regimes legitimate themselves and the way citizens identify themselves, both processes which suggest an important mediating role for culture. Political culture is also implicated in the debate over the effect of mass communications on political behaviour" (see also Miller, 1991).

However, the *Civic Culture* has not been free from critiques. It has been accused of not concentrating enough on how democracy should be properly defined, and how the values people share affect their political system. The definition of political culture which was used has also been criticised for being too wide (Lijphart, 1980: 37-56; 41; Pateman, 1980: 64-68; see also Welch, 1993 for different suggestions). Other critics focused on the direction of the relationship. Concretely, some researchers argue that political culture is the result and not the cause of political regime (Pateman, 1980: 84; Wiatr, 1980: 114; on this see also Barry, 1978; Muller & Seligson, 1994). Lijphart (1980: 49) contested this idea, stating that political culture is both cause and effect. This is supported by the idea that particular culture is not automatically embraced by those who encounter it. Much depends on the mediating institutions and their effectiveness in modelling a culture for which there were willing consumers (Thompson, 1990: 3-4; 216-219; 238; 265).

Street, siding with Welch (1993) and others (see Almond and Verba, 1980), states Almond and Verba's (1963) view of political culture as inadequate. Other writers have, therefore, developed a fuller notion of political culture, which encompasses a wider range of spheres of social life and of states of mind, and which sees culture as a
discourse that people have to interpret and use. Culture refers to more than the attitudes that people hold towards politicians and political institutions. Rather, it is made up of a complex of feelings and images deriving from the home and work, from manifestos and popular culture. Linked to this version of culture and people's engagement with it, is the idea that it is constitutive of political activity.

Against this background, political culture theory is considered to be one of the viable approaches to replace the long-dominant leaders of the field: formal-legalism and rational choice (Marxism model automatically discarded since the events following 1989) (Eckstein, 1988: 789; see also Eckstein, 1979). It is understood, then, that political culture shapes, and even determines the character and intention of the political action. Consequently, in this study the political culture in South Africa will be surveyed as it is essential for its democratic consolidation to know whether it is growing in the correct direction – in proper support of the new democratic institutions.

4.6 Political culture: Measurement methodology

This section is grounded in the previous one: The assumption that processes of change are dependent upon the political culture of the polity. The beliefs, values and attitudes of ordinary citizens structure both the pace and possibilities for change. Though cultural theory does not provide a complete explanation of political change, culture undoubtedly influences the process mightily.

Concretely, the main purpose of this section is to determine to which extent democratic values are present in the South African political culture today. The purpose is not to describe the contemporary South African political culture\(^8\) but to determine whether the various attitudes pertaining to democratic values are organised within a democratic belief system and to present them over time to see what the tendencies were through the years.

This analysis begins with a consideration of some of the key cultural requisites of

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\(^8\) As said before, this study is not a study of the political culture but of the consolidation of South African democracy. Otherwise a very wide range of indicators should be taken into account, some of which are not even related to democratic consolidation.
democracies. Then, it examines the values of the samples and their evolution through the years, in an attempt to identify the relatively more or less democratic attributes of the South African citizenry. Finally, the distribution of these values throughout important segments of the South African society is analysed in an effort to assess the implications of these values for the future of this democracy.

Political theorists have long attempted to identify the particular cultural values that are conducive to the development of democratic polities (Dahl, 1971; 1989) and most would agree with the simple proposition that "the development of a stable and effective democracy depends upon the orientations that people have to the political process" (Almond & Verba, 1963: 498).

Virtually every scholar who has researched processes of democratisation has ascribed an important role to political culture (Di Palma, 1990a; Huntington, 1984 to mention two not previously quoted). However, there is little agreement with regard to specific cultural attributes that are conducive to democratic development. While nearly everyone recognises that interpersonal trust is important (it facilitates coalition formation) and that healthy doses of political tolerance are essential, not everyone agrees that personal satisfaction with life, for instance, is crucial to political development. Thus, at the general level, there is a broad consensus that democratisation is affected by culture, but there is much less agreement on the specifics (Gibson et al., 1992).

One of the most classical and influential thinkers in the field is Dahl. His list of cultural values conducive to democratic development is of particular interest to this study (Dahl, 1971: 127; see also 1989 and Gibson & Duch, 1991). Dahl identified (i) belief in the legitimacy of the institutions of democracy (public contestation and participation), (ii) beliefs about relationships of authority between government and governed, (iii) confidence in the capacity of the government to deal effectively with the country's problems, (iv) political and interpersonal trust and (v) belief in the possibility and desirability of political co-operation mixed with a belief in the legitimacy of conflict (see Dahl, 1989). In more simple words, a democratic citizen is one "who believes in individual liberty, and who is politically tolerant, who holds a certain amount of distrust of political of political authority but at the same time is trustful of fellow citizens, who is obedient but nonetheless willing to assert rights
against the state, who views the state as constrained by legality, and who supports basic democratic institutions and processes. Though there are undoubtedly those who would quibble with this list, it would be largely on the need to supplement the roster rather than delete items from it. Consequently, a democratic political culture is a "set of norms that (i) encourage the formation of individual and collective preferences; (ii) and the submission of those preferences to the political arena for satisfaction; (iii) within the context of support for a set of institutional arrangements for political decision making that is responsive to these preferences (Gibson et al., 1992: 332).

This research focuses on support for basic democratic rights, liberties and institutions under the assumption that, in the absence of such beliefs, processes of democratisation may slow down or even break down. For instance, competitive elections are difficult to implement in the context of widespread beliefs that diverse political parties exacerbate and create conflicts in society. Similarly, to the extent that ordinary citizens are intolerant of political diversity, democratic openness and competition are impeded. Certainly culture does not completely determine structure and practice, but it is difficult to understand the possibilities for reform without consideration of the beliefs, values and attitudes of ordinary citizens.

4.7 Earlier research on political culture

Putnam (et al., 1983) reached the same conclusions as Almond and Verba (1963) in a case study of Italy. Exploring the causal link between civic attitudes in the various regions in Italy and the efficiency and responsiveness of the newly formed regional governments, he found that the cultural legacy of the regions had a direct and powerful bearing on the quality of the fledging governments. The democratic future of nations with imperfect democracies and nations struggling to become democratic may hinge on the degree to which their citizens can be influenced to embrace civic principles. Likewise, the future viability of strong democracies may rest on whether or not they can continue to socialise their citizens to civic ideals.

Inglehart (1975; 1988; 1990), following Almond and Verba (1963), delved into the topic. One of his main contributions is the analysis of the effect of "satisfaction with one's life" as an indicator of political culture and commitment to democracy (see Inglehart, 1988: 1205-1210). He also takes interpersonal trust into consideration as an
important factor.

Gibson and his colleagues (Gibson et al., 1992) also researched the political culture in the Soviet Union to test the possibilities for democracy to stabilise and focused on political tolerance, valuation of liberty, support for the norms of democracy, rights consciousness, support for dissent, support for independent media, support for competitive elections.

Finifter and Mickiewicz (1992) tried to address the question of mass support for political change in Russia. This study is not only based on the political culture of Russia with regard to undergoing political reform but also on the economic reforms. The researchers tried to assess Russian opinion toward freedom of speech, competitive elections, individual liberties, methods of protest and put forward a battery of economic questions to address the economic "feelings". The questions on economic issues are not presented here, as they are not part of our concern. In Eastern and Central Europe, this was of extreme importance as the economy was state-controlled under the former regime. This was not the case during apartheid – albeit political exclusion had economic implications.

Seligson and Booth (1993), also following Dahl (1971), tried to detect and delimit political culture that supports liberal and representative institutions: Support for a system of widespread political participation and support for the right of minority dissent. For them, "a democratic political culture is one both extensive and inclusive. Extensive cultures support democratic participation, while inclusive cultures support civil liberties for unpopular groups" (Seligson & Booth, 1993: 780). They monitored the "right to dissent" (meaning approval of civil disobedience, participation in forceful action) and "opposition to the suppression of democratic values" (meaning to prohibit demonstration, or/and meeting of groups that criticise the government). The study makes a comparison between Nicaragua and Costa Rica, countries with a similar political and social past but with different regimes.

Putnam (1993) has perhaps made one of the best attempts at sorting through and organising the attitudes and behaviours commonly assigned to civic citizens. He grouped the attributes into four general categories: Civic engagement, political equality, solidarity, trust and tolerance and social structures of co-operation. His
findings were as follows (Putman: 1993: 87-89):

Civic engagement. Citizens in a civic culture are interested in public affairs and participate in politics. They feel the obligation to actively promote the public good, which they define as more than the aggregate of individual interests.

Political equality. Citizens "treat each other as equals in a civic culture. They are bound together by horizontal relations of reciprocity and co-operation, not by vertical relations of authority and dependency" (Putnam, 1993: 88).

Solidarity, trust and tolerance. A civic culture is marked by citizens who respect and trust one another. Diversity of ideas and lifestyle is usually tolerated, even encouraged.

Social structures of co-operation. Organisations abound in a civic culture, from labour unions to sport clubs and from political parties to neighbourhood organisations. Citizens are active members of many groups, exposing them to a variety of ideas and teaching them the rewards of co-operation and interpersonal trust.

Obviously very few people in any society, if any, embody all of the components of a civic citizen completely. But some individuals embody more than others. The same is true of societies: Some resemble an ideal civic culture more closely than others.

Rose and Mishler (1996) attempted the same research in post-communist Russia, and solicited citizens to assess the regime as a whole, as experienced it in its entirety, including its various institutions, leaders and policies as at the time. They simply asked respondents to compare the present regime to the former one and to say what they expected of the situation in five years on.

Rose (1996; see also 1997) based his research on Eastern and Central Europe's political culture. He tried to approach it by letting people compare the new and the former regime (focusing on freedom at present and before; the economic situation and the regime in general). He also noted the necessity of an absence of important antidemocratic parties in the political realm (Rose, 1997: 96).

Rice and Feldman (1997: 1143) referred to democratic culture as "civic
republicanism". Civic republicanism "understands virtue as involvement in self-rule guided by devotion to the common good" (Galston, 1991: 1). By many contemporary scholars this virtue is seen to be a vital prerequisite for effective democracy (see Kramnick, 1982; Lipset, 1963; Pocock, 1975; Sandel, 1982; Walzer, 1980; Wilson, 1991). Armed with extensive public opinion data, these scholars have been investigating the relationship between civic attitudes and support for democracy. Essentially, Rice and Feldman (1997) tried to measure the support for democracy by focusing on involvement with politics (reading newspapers, talking about politics, etc.), and membership of independent organisations.

In South Africa there have also been attempts to measure the evolution of political culture. For instance, Mattes and Thiel (1998) first focused on the "national legitimacy" (1998: 97), meaning "a near-consensual agreement on the identity of the state or 'people' that is to govern itself democratically" (they quoted this from Linz & Stepan, 1996a: 16). They believe that for them in order for the South African democracy to consolidate, people should be proud of being South Africans. This, however, is open for argument. For instance, Italians show a very low level of pride in being Italians – Germans are not particularly proud of being German either – and nobody is expecting Italian democracy to collapse (Orizo, 1991: 173-174; see also Rose, 1984). Subsequently, they asked people to compare their lives under democracy and apartheid, to assess democracy "when it does not work" and to assess their "satisfaction with personal life". As it will be shown later, this methodology of asking people to say whether they would 'support democracy when democracy does not work' is not operative in South Africa due to South African peculiarities of understanding democracy (this is explained below). 'Satisfaction with one's life' as an indicator also suffers several shortcomings (also explained below) which discard it as an indicator of democratic consolidation.

More recently, Bratton and Mattes (1999) tried to address the question whether commitment toward democracy was intrinsic or instrumental in Africa. Intrinsic commitment is based on "appreciation of the political rights and freedoms that democracy embodies when valued as an end in itself" and instrumental commitment

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9 On "civic republicanism" see also Bellah, et al., (1986); Green, (1985); Oldfield, (1990); Pangle, (1988) and Sandel, (1982).
is focused on the fact that the change of regime may be a means to other ends, "most commonly the alleviation of poverty and the improvement of living standards. Intrinsic support is a commitment to democracy for 'better or worse; as such it has the potential to sustain a fragile political regime even in the face of economic downturn or social upheaval. By contrast, instrumental support is conditional. It is granted, and may easily be withdrawn, according to the temper of the times. If citizens evaluate regimes mainly in terms of their capacity to deliver consumable benefits or to rectify material inequalities, they may also succumb to the siren song of populist leaders who argue that economic development requires the sacrifice of political leaders" (Bratton & Mattes, 1999: 1). They distinguish regime performance at delivering two distinct baskets of goods: An economic basket (jobs,...) and a political basket (civil liberties, political rights,...). In this sense, they side with Linz and Stepan (1996a: 42) when distinguishing between support and satisfaction (legitimacy and efficacy).

They also side with Rose and colleagues, (Rose et al., 1998) to operationalise the commitment to democracy by using "concrete terms and in the form of comparisons with plausible alternatives" (Bratton & Mattes, 1999: 9). They ask respondents to express their ideas toward democracy as a form of rule (compared to others) and their satisfaction with democracy. Afterwards, they try to explain those results.

The South African people characteristically misunderstand what democracy is. As a proof it is possible to show that "in 1995, South Africans were asked to choose from list of diverse meanings (both political and economical) that are sometimes attached to democracy. Topping the popular ranking, 91.3 percent of respondents [related] democracy to 'equal access to houses, jobs and a decent income' (with 48.3 percent seeing these goods as essential to democracy). This earthy image of democracy far outstripped all other representations: for example, regular elections (67.7 percent), at least two strong parties (59.4 percent) and minority rights (54.5 percent)" (Bratton & Mattes, 1999: 8). This leads to the following conclusions:

1. South Africans still have to undergo the bitter experience of realising that democracy is not the solution for their economic problems.

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8 For more studies see Lagos, (1997); Rose, (1994) or Shin & Shyu, (1997).
2. Any research undertaken in South Africa which aims to assess the commitment of the people to democracy must avoid the word "democracy" as the respondent would not automatically associate it with a form of rule; it would rather, and principally, be seen as a method to deal with economic deprivation. As a result, any further analysis of any result obtained in such a way will be biased.

At this point, it is worth presenting the main propositions from the existing literature regarding the measurement of the stability of democracy according to political values and ideas.

The existing literature indicates that there are two main methods for measuring the commitment toward democracy, the first being by asking people whether they prefer one regime - undemocratic - or another - democratic - and to voice expectations concerning the general future and personal life (for instance Bratton & Mattes, 1999; Mattes & Thiel, 1998; Rose, 1997; Rose et al., 1998 to mention but a few). The second is to operationalise the indicators of political culture related to the consolidation of democracy and to test whether they are pro- or anti-democratic (Almond & Verba, 1963, see also 1980; Inglehart, 1975; 1988; 1990; Gibson, Duch & Tedin, 1992; Seligson & Booth; 1993 to quote just a couple).

As the concept of democracy is highly ethereal and difficult to discern - especially in South Africa -, this study will avoid using the term "democracy" in this matter as much as possible. Rather, it will detect the indicators of a pro-democratic political culture and test to which extent they are present in the political culture in South Africa in the period covered by the study, 1983-1999.

Notwithstanding the large scope of possibilities offered to the researcher there is no doubt, according to the concerned literature, that the main indicator for the measuring of the political culture and its commitment to democracy is composed of (i) trust, and (ii) tolerance. Actually, "nearly everyone recognises that interpersonal trust is important ... and political tolerance is essential ...[although] not everyone agrees that [for instance] satisfaction with one's life is crucial to democratic development". Moreover, no other indicator has received as much attention as these
two and there is no agreement on the importance of the others\textsuperscript{11} (Gibson \textit{et al.}, 1992: 332).

These two concepts are now debated and the final selection of issues with regard to measuring the political culture in South Africa is presented thereafter.

\section*{4.7.1 Trust}

Trust is considered to be a necessary condition, both for civil society and democracy. In contemporary democracies the people do not rule directly but by depositing their trust with delegates and institutions that bear responsibility for aggregating the interests and preferences of the citizenry. These are officials such as members of Parliament or organisations such as trade unions, business associations, churches, and universities. The latter are part of the civil society and enjoy relative independence from the state. In this regard, political parties are especially important for the proper functioning of democratic government, creating two-way channels of communication between both the mass and elite/institutional levels (Rose, 1994: 18).

Democracy requires regular competition between organised groups, each of which seeks to convince individuals that it represents and deserves their trust. In this regard, individuals may represent the starting line for building a civil society, but they are not the only component. The family, for instance, is the simplest, most basic and most trusted form of association. Beyond the family, friendship extends the network of trusted organisations. Even when citizens are dissatisfied with the government or the economy, most remain satisfied with their family and friends. After this, work or leisure somewhat extend the individual's trust network on the basis of both extensive and intensive observation.

\textsuperscript{11} The extensive literature on political culture proves this. Tolerance and trust are the most investigated aspects when monitoring pro-democratic political culture. Actually many studies are exclusively based on Tolerance or Trust (Gouws, 1993; Rose, 1994 to quote a couple). Other indicators are also incorporated but these two are mostly present and regarded as the main ones (Gibson \textit{et al.}, 1992: 332-337). On tolerance see Stouffer, (1955); Prothro & Grigg, (1960); McClosky, (1964); Sniderman, (1974); Nunn, \textit{et al.}, (1978); Sullivan, \textit{et al.}, (1982); Mueller, (1988); McClosky & Brill, (1989); Gibson, (1989; 1996); Duch & Gibson, (1992); Sniderman, \textit{et al.}, (1991); Gouws, (1991; 1996); Gibson & Gouws, (1999). On trust see Rose, (1994); Gibson, \textit{et al.}, (1992); Thomas, (1998); Humphrey & Schmitz, (1998); Scholz & Lubell, (1998); Zussman, (1997) to cite simply a few.
The institutions of civil society may be privately controlled, state-licensed or certified, partially or wholly state-funded or even state owned (i.e. many universities). The organisations of civil society do furnish and complete democracy, creating what Dahl (1956: 83) called the "separation of powers". They act as checks upon the emergence of too strong a state.

Without trust, and without genuine representation, the bargaining process of any democracy will collapse (Rose, 1994: 20). During the Communist era in Central and Eastern Europe, there was "no social organisation outside the state". One of the main and urgent aims of the Soviet troops and communist parties after the World War II was to eliminate any organisation that might compete for authority and/or "trust" with the communist apparatus. Press, publishing houses, became "mouthpieces of the party line" (Rose, 1994: 21).

Communism converted public opinion to private opinion. Individuals held different views about government, politics, and Moscow's domination but there were no institutional means to collect or express such ideas. Official opinion was the only opinion that could circulate through the media. The party-state did not ask people what they wanted, but rather claimed to know what they were supposed to want. Individuals prudently confined their thoughts to their own private circles of relatives and close friends. In this way, face-to-face primary groups became a alternative for civil society rather than an integral part of it.

Interpersonal trust is viewed as "part of an enduring cultural syndrome that is conducive to the viability of democracy.... The evidence indicates that given societies are indeed characterised by distinctive levels of interpersonal trust. This even seems to be true of specific regions within given countries" (Inglehart, 1988: 1211).

Trust is not fixed, but shaped by the historical experiences of given peoples, and consequently subject to change. Almond and Verba (1963) found that the public of Britain and the United States – two long-established democracies English speaking – was ranked higher than others (West Germany, or Mexico, for instance) on the level of interpersonal trust.

It is maintained that low levels of trust make people "more likely to reject the
existing political system and support parties of the extreme Right or Left" (Inglehart, 1988: 1214; Lagos, 1997: 127-128). Trust can be measured with regard to institutions, but also at the interpersonal level. Perceived low levels of honesty and law-abidingness are tokens of low interpersonal trust. As Lagos (1997: 129) puts it, "these attitudes permeate society and affect human behaviour in numerous areas, breeding everything from aggressive driving to tax evasion".


Clear examples of the results of the distrust in the traditional parties are, for instance, the rise of fascist parties such as Le Penn's National Front in France, or ex-Communists in Russia or Central and Eastern Europe, or the neo-fascist Italian Social Movement (Inglehart, 1988: 1213-1214). Accordingly, this study will try to survey the South Africans' feelings of trust in the new democratic political institutions. To trust a democratic government requires the existence of a democratic government. Consequently, trust in the government will only be measured for the democratic period.

4.7.2 Tolerance

If trust is important, tolerance is not of less importance when monitoring the commitment toward democracy. Actually, "no single democratic value has received as much attention from empirical theorists as has political tolerance" (Gibson et al., 1992: 337). Scholarly interest has been focused mainly on the question of whether citizens will tolerate the political activity of their most hated opponents. Tolerance is typically thought to be "an essential ingredient of democratic politics. Without tolerance, widespread contestation is impossible, regime legitimacy is imperilled and numbing conformity prevails" (Gibson et al., 1992: 337; see also Gibson, 1996: 3). This is especially important in a country like South Africa, due to the deep divisions of the society. Democracies like South Africa – being incisively divided – may risk becoming majority tyrannies. That is, of course, if they are to escape civil war"
It has also been argued (Sullivan et al., 1979: 781) that, although "a democratic regime may be divided by fierce conflicts, it can remain stable if citizens remain attached to democratic or constitutional procedures – the right to speak, to publish, to run for office – on an equal basis to all, even to those who challenge its way of life".

Tolerance is, at least in a very instrumentalist way, an important value as it helps to maintain a stable democratic regime. But, what is tolerance? As Gouws (1996: 23) states, tolerance is "directly related to how willing people are to put up with their opponents. It entails the willingness to extend civil liberties to adversaries. It implies procedural fairness – a commitment to the rules of the game and willingness to apply them equally. Tolerance is the willingness to extend freedoms to those who are different" (see also Gibson, 1996: 5). Tolerance is consistently related to perceptions of threat. In other words, "the greater the perceived threat from a group, the more likely a person is to be intolerant of the group" (Sullivan et al., 1982: 251; see also Mueller & Seligson, 1988: 17).

The first study on tolerance, to the author's knowledge, was performed in the United States in the 1950s by Stouffer (1955) and encountered high levels of intolerance to objectionable groups. This study has been used as a guide for subsequent research (i.e. McClosky, 1964; Nunn et al., 1978).

Stouffer (1955) surveyed public attitudes toward communism and the extent to which Americans were prepared to extend political rights in the United States to communists and suspected communists – among other groups from the left (these groups were supposed to be relatively unpopular). Then, he analysed the effect of education, occupation, and gender on tolerance.

This method was in use during the late 1970s and early 1980s when Sullivan and 12 This is not to say that a democracy works only under no intolerance level. Actually, mature democracies also show a level of political intolerance. For instance, the United States shows a high level of intolerance. However, this level is constant. It does not increase over time. Add the fact the American society is intolerant of peripheral or extremist groups such as Ku Klux Klan or Black Panthers (Sullivan et al., 1984). This indicates, firstly, that there is no universal or exportable minimum or maximum level of political tolerance (each democracy may have its own acceptable level of political (in)tolerance to run properly) and secondly, that the only positive indicator of political (in)tolerance when measuring democratic consolidation, is the evolution over the years of political (in)tolerance.
his collaborators (Sullivan et al., 1979; see also Barnum & Sullivan, 1989) tried to analyse whether the suspected decrease in intolerance in the United States was real or not, and for that they applied a different method. Instead of giving the 'target group' (communists in Stouffer's work) to the respondent, they offered a variety of possibilities, ranging from the extreme political right to the extreme political left and other social groups, such as homosexuals, etc. In their findings they discovered that the presumed decline in the level of intolerance was fictitious and the explanation was that Americans had found different target groups for their intolerance, – which ranked at the same level. They also analysed the effect of education, gender, rural/urban dwelling, etc.

This method has substituted Stouffer's (1955) as it offers the respondent the possibility of choosing the "target group" (see for instance World Value Survey, 1995 or Idasa Survey '94 or '98). Consequently, the intolerance towards the actual 'least-liked' group can really be analysed.

These two approaches have been adequately analysed and contrasted (see Mueller & Seligson, 1988; Sullivan & Marcus, 1988; Gibson, 1992)\textsuperscript{13}.

As tolerance seems to be the most important issue when monitoring the consolidation of democracy (no tolerance, no democracy) this research will monitor the evolution of political tolerance in the South African society as an indicator of the existing commitment toward democracy. Reference will be made to the pre-democratic period (there is no need for undemocratic government to tolerate people with different opinions) to show its evolution. The "least-liked" group as explained above is selected as it allows the respondents to select their own "target group".

These two indicators, tolerance and trust, therefore are the reference to democratic consolidation used in this study. Besides these main indicators, other references are to (iii) political and societal participation, (iv) satisfaction with one's life, (v) influence in governmental decisions. Thus, although the main indicators on which this study relies are political tolerance and trust, (as they are the most important

for the stability of democracy and there is no general agreement on the importance of
any other — as shown above), some other indicators are also presented, but merely to
expand the view of the political culture of South African society\textsuperscript{14}. These\textsuperscript{15} indicators
added to tolerance and trust are presented exclusively on informative basis and they
will not be developed in later analyses. This is so because, firstly, there is no general
agreement on indicators to be analysed when monitoring consolidation of democracy
from a political culture perspective, with the exception for tolerance and trust.
Similarly, none of them would be as informative as tolerance and trust and the lack of
them in a society would not be as negative as the lack of tolerance or trust in the
South African democracy. These added indicators are now presented\textsuperscript{16}:

\textbf{4.7.3 General perception of personal life, general situation (past, present, future)}

Another indicator generally used when monitoring political culture and its pro-
democratic aspect is the general perception of one's life. This issue has been
significantly developed by Inglehart (1988; 1990) and it has influenced subsequent
research (i.e. HSRC surveys since 1994; Finifter & Mickiewicz, 1992\textsuperscript{17}). However,
the basis on which it has been built up is not as solid as it seems to be.

This indicator (general perception of personal life or general situation) is based on
the differences of 'levels of satisfaction' encountered in cross-national research. In
principle these differences are not a reflection of objective economic conditions.
However, Inglehart found that these differences hinge on economic motives. Actually,
there is a "tendency for life satisfaction levels to rise or decline gradually in response
to short-term economic fluctuations". To really probe this empirically, "we would
need survey data covering that past century or two in order to test this hypothesis

\textsuperscript{14} As previously said this is not a study on the political culture of South Africa, but on the consolidation
of its democracy. Thus, added indicators, after being presented, will not be analysed any further. They
may relate to democracy, but not as tolerance and trust. Actually, nobody, to the author's knowledge,
has ever argued that a democracy can break down due to a lack of political participation, for instance.
However, it is common to find research alerting to the risk of democratic breakdown due to the lack of
trust (Rose, 1994) or tolerance (Gibson, 1998).

\textsuperscript{15} Those selected here have been chosen attending to availability and comparability basis.

\textsuperscript{16} Actually, membership of independent organisations, as part of civil society, is of extreme importance
for democracy (Kotzé, 1996: 1) and it is presented now. However, civil society can not develop
properly in the absence of important doses of tolerance (Gouws, 1993: 15) and trust (Rose, 1994: 18).

\textsuperscript{17} This study, as many others, was carried out in Russia. Taken into account that the former regime
implied a state-controlled economy. Consequently, the introduction of questions regarding general
satisfaction does not engender any problem.
directly" (Inglehart, 1988: 1207-1208). As he recognises, there, as yet, is no "data base that would enable us" to empirically probe that relation "conclusively" (Inglehart, 1988: 1218).

Consequently, although there may be some correlation between life satisfaction and stable democracy, there also is such a correlation between stable democracy and gross national product per capita. As a result, the efficiency of this index becomes doubtful. Hence, it will not be considered further, or used in this study.

4.7.4 Participation in politics (vote, influence in government)

Another important indicator for measuring the commitment toward a democratic form of government is the direct participation of the citizen in politics. A democratic citizen is a politically active citizen. This participation is not simply reduced to vote, rather, a committed-to-democracy citizen is aware of political issues. S/He reads, listens and watches news about politics. In his/her conversations with others, politics have a relevant (or at least not a non-existent) place. As a result, s/he is politically influenced and tries to influence politically, aware or/and unaware and directly or indirectly aware of or unaware of other citizens.

The level and kind of participation is directly reflected in the political system. The presence of undemocratic parties in the Parliament, for instance, reflects the existence of an undemocratic sub-culture in the society (Rose, 1997: 96).

Accordingly this study will monitor participation in politics – concretely, the vote, sympathy to parties and belief in the capacity of having influence in governmental decisions. The vote can only be fully exercised in a democratic period. Due to this, this index will only be analysed with reference to the democratic period18.

4.7.5 Civil society

Political participation is not as simple as it seems to be according to the previous

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18 About the importance of political participation see Almond & Verba, (1963: 101-160); Rice & Feldman, (1997: 1147-1148); Gibson, (et al., 1992: 332) to quote simply a few. However, no scholar has ever said that a democracy has broken down due to the lack of participation. This shows that this issue is not as important as political tolerance or trust.
section. A democrat also participates in politics indirectly, that is, through different independent-from-the-state organisations (NGOs, Trade Unions, church, media, etc.). This implies that, besides political parties, a democratically elected government, democratic institutions, etc., a consolidated democracy also has to have a well-developed network of organisations which participate in politics and control the actions of (and pressurise the) government, through which citizens exercise their rights of petition, pressure, etc. This automatically leads to the concept of civil society.

An active and well-developed civil society is generally \(^{19}\) considered to be an "essential characteristic of consolidated democracies" (Kotzé, 1996: 1). In other words: No civil society, no democracy.

In Africa, the liberation movements secured independence in the 1950s and 1960s. However, stable democratic institutions were not always the result of these pro-independence struggles. Rather, internal disputes drove many countries into cruel civil wars (Angola and Mozambique are clear examples), ethnic unrest, military insurgency, long dictatorships (i.e. former Zaire), etc. In other words, multiparty elections were not enough to maintain democratic institutions, as they did not ipso facto institutionalise broad participation in political life. As Harbeson (1994: 1-2) put it, "civil society is a hitherto missing key to sustained political reform, legitimate states and governments, improved governance, viable state-society and state-economy relationships, and prevention of the kind of political decay that undermined new African governments a generation ago".

Actually, the concept of "civil society" has "entered core terminology in the analysis of African politics essentially in the past decade" (Young, 1994: 33). In brief, civil society refers to "the realm of organised social life that is voluntary, self-generating, [largely] self-supporting, autonomous from the state, and bound by a legal order or set of shared rules" (Diamond, 1994b: 5). It includes a wide web of organisations, such as economic, cultural, informational, interest-based, developmental, issue-oriented, and civic. They provide what Diamond (1994b: 6) called an "ideological market" (flow of information and ideas). Its primary aims are to

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\(^{19}\) For a contrasting view see Friedman, (1996).
survey and control the exercise of power by democratic states and to democratise authoritarian states. It is needless to show how important, for instance, the religious organisations in Kenya, Mali or Niger; or the organisation of teachers, civil servants and traders in the Republic of Benin; the trade union Solidarity in Poland; the student organisations in Mali; etc., have been in the struggle for democratisation (Gyimah-Boadi, 1996: 119; see also Almond & Verba, 1963: 300-323)\(^{20}\).

This study will monitor the evolution of organisations in South Africa as an indicator of democratic consolidation. Although civil society is characteristic of strong democracies, it can also exist in non-democratic regimes. Consequently, this study will examine the situation both before and during the democratic period\(^{21}\).

4.8 Apartheid and public opinion

The period before 1994 was not democratic for most South Africans, who were long deprived of their political rights. Consequently, it is not possible to measure the commitment toward democracy in the country before 1994. Hence, this study will emphasise the evolution of the political culture in the country during the democratic period, that is 1994-1999. However, although it is not possible to assess democratic consolidation before 1994, as there was no democracy, every possible effort will be made to introduce every available indicator, such as tolerance or membership of independent organisations, for comparison.

4.9 Political culture: Its measurement

In this section the indicators explained and selected above are measured. The main indicators on which this study relies, namely, Political tolerance and Trust and the added secondary indicators, Use of violence [to pursue goals]; Influence [in government]; Vote [participation in politics]; and Partisanship [membership in organisation of civil society].


\(^{21}\) This issue opens another door to strengthen the idea that political tolerance and trust are the most important indicators as the development of civil society has been found to depend to political tolerance (Gouws, 1993) and trust (Rose, 1994). Hence, if political tolerance and trust increases in democracy, the possibilities for development of civil society and democratic stabilisation increases.
4.9.1 Tolerance

It seems important to clarify to the reader that these surveys were not created specifically for the measurement of tolerance and were conducted by different institutions, as explained before. Thus, the accuracy of the final figures may not be of the highest order. However, this survey aims to show the general trend (increase/decrease) of political tolerance over time and this is perfectly possible with this data. Actually, surveys designed specifically for this purpose, conducted before and after 1994, show similar trends (see Gouws, 1991; Gibson & Gouws, 1998; 1999).

Tolerance, as explained above, is an important ingredient for the democratic "cake". Actually, if opposition groups are not tolerated, political violence is likely to increase. The highest expression of this context is the civil war. In other words, without fairly high levels of political tolerance, chances of democratic survival decrease. In this regard support for violent methods is also of great importance. Consequently, this section presents the evolution of the level of tolerance since 1983 until 1998 and the level of support for political violence during the same period.

Tolerance is measured through the "least-liked" method as it allows the respondent to select the group liked the least. In order to provide a wider picture of the level of tolerance in the country, two indicators have been selected: One for social tolerance and one for political tolerance.

The surveys used for this purpose are HSRC'83, Idasa'94 and Idasa'98. All of them have already been introduced in this Chapter.

In 1983, the HSRC presented a battery of questions to people to measure their tolerance of those least-liked groups. This study has selected the following for comparative reasons:

"I would accept them [least-liked population group] as neighbours" (Q.25d).

The supposed-to-be least-liked groups are (i) Afrikaans speaking White (ii) English speaking White (iii) Coloured; (iv) Indian (v) Black (order presented here as in the questionnaire).
Respondent had to indicate whether they would accept Afrikaans speaking Whites, English speaking Whites, Coloured and Indians as neighbours. The possible answers were 'Yes', 'No', 'Don't know' (D'k hereafter).

For this study, the group accepted the least was selected. For instance 16.8 % of Whites would accept a Black person as neighbour whereas 99.7 % of Whites would accept an Afrikaans speaking White as neighbour. Consequently, to measure tolerance the acceptance of the Black population was selected as it was the least-liked group (the White answer was selected as an example as it displayed the highest differences of acceptance from one population group to another) 22.

In 1994, Idasa asked people to select a most opposed political party and then asked a battery of questions about that "least-liked political group". For reasons of comparability, this study selected the following:

"Party member of this party [least-liked group] should have been allowed or not allowed to live in your neighbourhood" (Q.14c4).

The possible answers were: (i) 'Definitely allowed'; (ii) 'Allowed'; (iii) 'Uncertain'; (iv) 'Not allowed'; (v) 'Definitely not allowed'; (vi) 'Refuse to answer'. In order to make it comparable with other surveys, those answers have been re-coded as follows: Answer (i) and (ii) into 'allowed'; Answers (iii) into 'D'k'; Answers (iv) and (v) into 'not allowed'; Answer (vi) has been excluded (missing value).

In 1998, Idasa asked the respondents to identify the party/ies disliked the most and to say whether they would participate in action to avoid them to do certain things, such as living in their neighbourhood. Concretely:

"How likely or unlikely is it that you would take part in action with other people to prevent a member of those parties [the least-liked] from living in your neighbourhood" (Q.14.1).

The possible answers were (i) 'very likely'; (ii) 'likely'; (iii) 'unlikely'; (iv) 'very unlikely' and (v) 'D'k'. Again, the responses have been re-coded for comparability, as

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22 It should be noted that, at the time of conducting this survey (HSRC '83), mixed residential areas were prohibited by law. This could have affected the final response of the interviewee.
follows: Answers (iii) and (iv) into 'allowed'; (i) and (ii) into 'not allowed'; Answer (v) remains 'D'k'. The results are chronologically presented in Table 4.1. The data has also been bar-plotted and presented in Figure 4.1.

Table 4.1 Allow least-liked to live in your neighbourhood (%) (1983-1998)

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>48.4</td>
<td>43.1</td>
<td>68.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>51.04</td>
<td>42.4</td>
<td>22.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The entries represent the percentage (all the population groups) of the population allowing or not someone from their respective "least-liked" group to live in their neighbourhood. The 'uncertain' answer accounts for the difference to 100%.

Ns 3392 2517 2200

Figure 4.1 Allow least-liked group to live in your neighbourhood (1983-1998)

The previous indicator measures social tolerance and not political tolerance (Sullivan et al., 1982: 237-240). Thus, another indicator of political tolerance is introduced.

Another possibility allowed by the available data is the monitoring of the
recognition of the right to freedom of for the political opponents in democracy. The strength of this indicator for measuring democratic consolidation has been demonstrated by Gibson and Gouws (1998).

The 1983 data did not include this question. However, it is possible to follow the evolution within the democratic period, which is the most important for this study.

In 1994 Idasa introduced in its series of questions to measure tolerance the following:

"Party member of this party [least-liked group] should have been allowed or not allowed to make a speech in your area that criticise the party you support" (Q14c2).

The possible answers were: (i) 'Definitely allowed'; (ii) 'Allowed'; (iii) 'Uncertain'; (iv) 'Not allowed'; (v) 'Definitely not allowed'; (vi) 'Refuse to answer'. Answers have been re-coded as follows: Answers (i) and (ii) into 'allowed'; Answers (iv) and (v) into 'not allowed'; Answer (iii) into 'D'k'; Answer (vi) is excluded (missing value).

In 1998 Idasa asked the respondents to identify the party/ parties disliked the most and say whether they would participate in action to avoid them to do certain things, such as making a campaign speech in your neighbourhood. Concretely:

"How likely or unlikely is it that you would take part in action with other people to prevent a member of those parties [the least-liked] from making a campaign speech in your neighbourhood" (Q.14.2).

The possible answers were (i) 'very likely'; (ii) 'likely'; (iii) 'unlikely'; (iv) 'very unlikely' and (v) 'D'k'. Again the responses have been re-coded for comparability reasons as follows: Answer (iii) and (iv) into 'allowed'; Answers (i) and (ii) into 'not allowed'; Answer (v) remains as 'D'k'.

The results are chronologically presented in Table 4.2. They have also been bar-plotted and presented below in Figure 4.2.
Table 4.2 Allow least-liked to give political speech in your neighbourhood (%) (1994-1998)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1994</th>
<th>1998</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td>69.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>60.8</td>
<td>21.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Entries represent the percentage (all the population groups) of the population allowing or not someone from their respective "least-liked" group to live in their neighbourhood. The 'uncertain' answer accounts for the difference to 100%.

Ns

2517 2200

Figure 4.2 Allow least-liked group to make political speech in your neighbourhood (1994-1998)

As was expected, political tolerance is also increasing. As said above, tolerance runs parallel (or should run) to the refusal for allowing violent actions to obtain political goals. The highest expression of this violence and intolerance is civil war. Subsequently, it is necessary to monitor the evolution of the acceptance of violent methods within the South African society. As tolerance increases, it is expected that approval for this violent method decreases.
In 1983, a high level of acceptance of political violence was expected. The African National Congress (ANC) was banned, the tricameral parliament (excluding Blacks) was established and several states of emergency were declared due to social, political and labour unrest. Thus, a high level of acceptance of political violence was expected and a decrease, as democratisation progressed.

In 1983, the HSRC asked people to give their opinion on the usage of violent methods to pursue their goals. They asked:

"What is your opinion on the use of violence in order to achieve political objectives in South Africa?" (Q. 27)

The possible answers were, (i), 'Yes, in all instances', (ii), 'Yes, under certain circumstances', (iii) 'No' and (iv) 'Not sure'. For comparative reasons it was re-coded as follows: (i) and (ii) into 'Yes'; (iii) into 'No'; and (iv) into 'Not sure'.

In 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998 and 1999, South Africans were asked by the HSRC to give their opinion about different kinds of actions, namely peaceful, more forceful and violent actions, meaning by violent actions those against people and property. A citizen committed to democracy would reject the violent actions. They were asked:


The question is the same in all the surveys. The possible answers, being the same in all of them, are: (i) 'Extremely negative', (ii) 'Very negative', (iii) 'Negative', (iv) 'Neither negative nor positive', (v) 'Positive', (vi) 'Very positive' (vii) 'Extremely positive'. Again for comparative reasons they have been re-coded as follows: Answers (i), (ii), (iii) and (iv) are re-coded 'No'; Answer (v), (vi) and (vii) into "Yes". Answer (iv) is re-coded into 'Not sure'.

The results are presented in Table 4.3. Figure 4.3 below presents the results in a bar-plot.
Table 4.3 Support for violent actions to pursue political goals (%) (1983-1999)

<table>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>39.9</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>59.7</td>
<td>71.7</td>
<td>87.9</td>
<td>82.9</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>92.2</td>
<td>91.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Entries represent the percentage for the whole population in South Africa, which supports one or the other alternative. The 'uncertain' answer accounts for the difference to 100%.

As expected, the support for violent action as a method to obtain political ends grows smaller parallel to the increase of tolerance.

4.9.2 Trust

The next item surveyed is trust in the political institutions. Concretely, this refers to trust in the democratically elected government. Trust is not a necessary requirement for a democracy to function, but it is a very important aspect to bear in mind. If Tolerance is a *sine qua non* condition, a 'nut' of the democratic engine, trust is the 'oil'
that lubricates the system\textsuperscript{23}.

In the surveys conducted in 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998 and 1999 by the HSRC, people were asked about their trust in the government. The question was:


The question is the same in all the surveys. The possible answers, being the same in all of them, are: (i) 'Not applicable'; (ii) 'Never'; (iii) 'Seldom'; (iv) 'Sometimes'; (v) 'Mostly'; (vi) 'Always'. The importance of this issue is attached to the fact of whether people trust or not, leaving aside the intensity. Consequently, it was re-coded as follows: Answer (i) has been excluded (missing value). Answers (ii) and (iii) have been re-coded into 'No'. Answers (v) and (vi) have been re-coded into 'Yes'. Answer 'Sometimes' remains unrecoded.

The results are presented in Table 4.4. Figure 4.4 presents the results bar-plotted.

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
\hline
No & 48.2 & 30.8 & 34.7 & 38.2 & 45.4 & 37.5 \\
Yes & 20.5 & 35.8 & 29.2 & 22 & 21.7 & 32.5 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Trust in government (%) (1994-1999)}
\end{table}

Entries represent the percentage of the whole population in South Africa, which supports one or the other alternative. The 'Sometimes' answer accounts for the difference to 100%. Ns are presented below.

\textit{Ns} \textsuperscript{2250} \textsuperscript{2226} \textsuperscript{2228} \textsuperscript{2220} \textsuperscript{2227} \textsuperscript{2210}

Trust in government is the first pessimistic indicator for South African democracy. Trust increased from 1994 to 1995 (government democratically elected) and went down until 1998. In 1999 it went up again and probably for the election effect\textsuperscript{25}. The present government was elected recently and enjoys higher doses of

\textsuperscript{23} Trust in the new democratic government is measured here during the democratic period, as there was no democratic government to trust before. Besides, one study on the level of confidence in the political institutions reveals that the confidence in government of those politically excluded during the apartheid has increased whereas the confidence of those not excluded has decreased (see Van der Nest, 1999: 181-182).

\textsuperscript{24} Trust is not operationalised as it is directly stated as such in the question.

\textsuperscript{25} The government was to be elected soon (survey conducted in February, 1999). Many promises were made. Consequently, it is normal that, at that time, trust, in general, was higher.
support. However, the 1999 level of trust is still below that of 1995. Future analysis will reveal whether this tendency remains or whether the election effect will disappear, as after 1995.

**Figure 4.4 Trust in government (1994-1999)**

4.9.3 Capacity of Influence

Similarly, another important indicator that develops in the same realm as trust is the citizen's belief in their capacity to influence the government. In this regard this issue is also monitored to survey its tendency since the first democratic year, 1994. This indicator is not controlled before 1994, as there was no democratically elected government to influence.

In surveys conducted in 1994, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99 the HSRC, asked South Africans whether they thought that they could influence the government. The question was:

The question is the same in all the surveys. The possible answers, being the same in all of them, are (i) 'Disagree very strongly'; (ii) 'Disagree strongly'; (iii) 'Disagree'; (iv) 'Neither disagree not agree'; (v) 'Agree'; (vi) 'Agree strongly', (vii) 'Agree very strongly'. Consequently, it has been re-coded as follows: Answers (i), (ii) and (iii) into 'Yes'; Answers (v) and (vi) into 'No'; Answer 'Neither disagree nor agree', remains the same.

The results are presented in Table 4.5. Figure 4.5 presents the same results in a bar-plot.

Table 4.5 People like you can influence the government (%) (1994-1999)

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>34.2</td>
<td>47.3</td>
<td>39.4</td>
<td>36.3</td>
<td>33.8</td>
<td>45.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>42.4</td>
<td>35.3</td>
<td>40.7</td>
<td>50.2</td>
<td>54.3</td>
<td>43.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Entries represent the percentage of the whole population in South Africa, which supports one or the other alternative. The 'Neither disagree nor agree' answer accounts for the difference to 100%.

The level of "belief in the capacity to influence" does not bode well for South Africa's democracy either. The level of 1998 is slightly lower than in 1994 but remains constant in general terms. However, from 1994 to 1998, the percentage of people that thought that they could influence the government remained, more or less, at the same level, but the percentage of people that thought they could not influence the government was increasing (at the expense of those who did not have a clear answer). Again, data for 1999 breaks the tendency, and once again the election effect may discredit the predictive value of this datum.

4.9.4 Participation in politics. Vote for and proximity to parties

Participation in politics is, as explained before, a key issue in democracy. A committed-to-democracy citizen participates actively in politics, votes, supports parties and feels close to one or several of them.

What follows is an attempt to approach to the difference between a vote for a

\[^{26}\text{Ibid.}\]
party and proximity to a party. Citizens may decide to vote for a particular party even when they do not support that party. The reasons may vary. For instance, the performance of the supported party has not been as expected, and consequently the vote in the election may have a different direction, namely a different party or abstention. Consequently, it is important to distinguish between proximity, closeness to or sympathy for a certain political party and a vote for a particular party.

Figure 4.5 People like you can influence in governmental decisions (1994-1999)

The latter may be seen by the individual as an obligation or a necessity to avoid something to happening. A clear example of this was encased in the political propaganda of National Party in the Western Cape during the general elections of 1999. The message was: "Vote NP, stop the ANC" or "Vote NP, save the Cape". Clearly, this message does not attempt to gain votes to improve the lives of the voters but to stop their possible "deterioration" if they should vote for it. In this regard, a voter could be persuaded to vote for a party for which he or she does not have any sympathy. Another possibility is that the individual does not vote because he or she thinks that his or her vote does not have any chance of producing any effect. This can
be interpreted as "passive" support.

On the other hand, the former (sympathy, closeness to a party) implies that the voter trusts the party he or she is voting for, is close to it and professes sympathy toward it. He or she is not voting against something but for something. This can be interpreted as "active" support.

Against this background, this study will examine whether South Africans feel close to the parties they vote for or not. This is obviously only measured in times of election.

In 1994 and in 1998 Idasa conducted the annual surveys in which respondents were prompted to indicate whether they felt specially close to any party and the party for which they would vote. The questions were:

"Regardless of how you actually voted on election day (in April), was there one particular political party which you felt especially close to? Which party? (1994: Q. 13.a)

Respondents were offered a list of parties, plus "No party" and "Confidential". Later in the survey, the respondent was asked to give details of his/her intention. The question was:

"Thinking back to the actual Election Day, for which party did you vote" (1994: Q. 24.a)

As previously, a list of parties was offered, plus "Did not vote" and "Confidential".

In 1998 the question to measure the closeness to parties was:

"Do you usually think of yourself as close to any particular political party? (1998:Q. 6). Which party is that? (Q. 7). Which party do you feel closest to? (Q. 8)" (this study is focused on the last question (Q. 8) as, in 1994, it was asked for a single party).

As in 1994, a list of parties was offered, plus "No party". Later in the interview
the interviewed was asked to indicate their intention. The question was:

"If there were elections tomorrow, which political party or organisation would you vote for?" (1998: Q. 58)

As above, a list of parties was offered, also with the "D'k" possibility.

Tables 4.6 and 4.7 below show the results of the existing closeness-to-party feelings in 1994 and 1998. It would have been of great interest to survey the closeness to the parties every year and not only in the election years, to discover whether people identify political parties with elections (closeness would increase in election period) or with political organisations permanently active. However, the data available for this research does not allow such an observation. Besides that, the results presented clearly indicate a decrease, both in voting intention (or the expressed intention) and sympathy for the parties from 1994 to 1998. It is also important to note that the percentage of people close to parties in 1994 – the first democratic elections – doubles the percentage in 1998. This means that many people had illusions in 1994 which might have been frustrated.

The important difference between closeness and voting also indicates very strong feelings of "instrumentalism" accompanying the vote.

Table 4.6 Do you usually think of yourself as close of any political party? (%)(1994)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No (D' k incl.)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Entries represent the percentage of people supporting each option.

Ns = 2517

Table 4.7 Do you usually think of yourself as close to any political party? (%) (1998)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No (D' k incl.)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Entries represent the percentage of people supporting each option.

Ns = 2200

Tables 4.8 and 4.9 detail the same result but also indicates the party to which people feel closest.
Table 4.8 Party felt especially close to (1994)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>African National Congress</td>
<td>57.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Party</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inkatha Freedom Party</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom Front</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Party</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pan Africanist Congress</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African Christian Democratic Party</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confidential</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No closeness</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Entries represent the percentage of people feeling close to each party.

Ns = 2517

Table 4.9 Party felt especially close to (1998)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>African Muslim Party</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African Christian Democratic Party</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African National Congress</td>
<td>34.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative Party</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Party</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom Front</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inkatha Freedom Party</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Party</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pan Africanist Congress</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Christian Democratic Party</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Democratic Movement</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refused</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Entries represent the percentage of people feeling close to each party.

Ns = 2200

4.9.5 Vote for party

Tables 4.10 and 4.11 show the intentions of voters in 1994 and 1998, respectively.
Table 4.10 National level vote (1994)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>African National Congress</td>
<td>60.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Party</td>
<td>16.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inkatha Freedom Party</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom Front</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Party</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pan Africanist Congress</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African Christian Democratic Party</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No vote</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confidential</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Entries represent the percentage of people who voted for each party.

Ns = 2517

Table 4.11 National level vote (1998)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>African Muslim Party</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African Christian Democratic Party</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African National Congress</td>
<td>51.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azanian People's Organisation</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative Party</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Party</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom Front</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inkatha Freedom Party</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minority Front</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Party</td>
<td>10.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pan Africanist Congress</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Christian Democratic Party</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Democratic Movement</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Party</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do not know</td>
<td>12.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Will not vote</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refused</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None of these</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Entries represent the percentage of people who intended to vote for each party.

Ns = 2200
Finally, Table 4.12 presents the combination of both the results of feeling sympathy for and voting for a party in 1994 and 1998. Figure 4.6 presents the same results in a bar-plot.

Table 4.12 Closeness and vote for party (1994-1998)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1994</th>
<th>1998</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Closeness</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>44.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vote</td>
<td>87.9</td>
<td>79.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Entries represent the percentage of people in South Africa who felt close or intended to vote/voted for a party.

Ns
2517 2200

Figure 4.6 Parties in South Africa: Closeness and vote (1994-1998)

Although the manifested participation in elections remains high, the closeness to or sympathy for parties has dropped by a half. In 1994 those who voted for a party, according to these results, felt close to the party they voted for; in 1998 more or less half of those who intended to vote in the coming elections, felt close to a party. Many
people's hopes were probably frustrated. This is evidenced in the evaluation of
government by the citizens. This evaluation was only positive during election time
(see Mattes et al., 1999).

This indicator does not bode well for South Africa either. People are participating
in politics "instrumentally", as something they may have to do, but not actively and
positively.

4.9.6 Interest in politics

The previous results indicate that closeness to parties has decreased. As closeness
to party decreases, it seems necessary to observe whether people have interest in
politics in general. This will allow testing whether people are becoming disenchanted
just with the political parties or by the political system in general.

It is obvious that the interest in politics increases in the electoral year as the most
important political decision is made: the election of the government. Besides, it is
important to know whether apathy to politics (re) emerges after that. As a result, this
study will test whether people are interested in political issues in the country
periodically, only during election years or not even then, the last one being the worst
for democratic consolidation.

The HSRC asks people annually whether they read, watch, listen and talk about
politics and how often. In essence, respondents are prompted to say:

"How often do you read newspaper reports.../ watch television programmes.../
listen to radio programmes.../ discuss with other people... on politics?"

The possible answers (for all the questions and for all the years) are: (i) 'Hardly
ever'; (ii) 'two or three times a month'; (iii) 'Once a month'; (iv) 'two or three times a
week'; (v) 'One or more times a day'. If a committed-to-democracy citizen is involved
with politics, the more, the better. Consequently, this study is focused on the last
option (once or more times a day). In other words, this study surveys how many
people get information and discuss politics once or more times a day. Furthermore, as
not everybody in the country have access to TV, radio or newspapers, the research
will only focus on the possibility available to everybody, namely:

Table 4.13, below, shows the results. Figure 4.7 presents the same results but bar-plotted. They imply that people in South Africa, during the first years of the democracy were more interested in politics during (or when close to) elections.

Table 4.13 Talk about politics with other people once or more times a day (%) (1994-1999)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Entries represent the percentage of people who talk once or more times a day about politics with other people.

| No     | 2250 | 2226 | 2228 | 2220 | 2227 | 2210 |

Figure 4.7 Talk about politics with other people once or more times a day (1994-1999)
4.9.7 Membership of independent organisations

Independent-from-the-state organisations are essential for the survival of the civil society. Committed-to-democracy citizens are to join these organisations, which control and challenge the state when necessary and are an essential part of civil society. Consequently, the evolution of the membership of these organisations is also of great importance for the consolidation of the South African democracy.

The evolution of membership can be surveyed both before and after the first democratic elections, that is, both during and before democracy. As said above, the existence of civil society under democracy is a condition for its endurance, but this does not imply that there can not be civil society under non-democratic forms of government. Consequently, this issue will also be examined in 1983, as far as the availability and comparability of the existing data allows it. Hence, partisanship is surveyed in 1983, 1994 and 1998.

In 1983, the HSRC asked South Africans whether they belonged to any of these organisations. The question was:

"Please indicate your membership of or association with any of the following types of organisations" (1983: Q. 10)

The interviewed was offered four different types of organisations, namely, sport club, social club, welfare organisation and trade union. The alternatives were, in all of them, either 'Yes' or 'No'.

For comparative reasons only Sport Clubs, Social Organisations and Trade Unions are taking into account. Table 4.14 presents the results.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4.14 Membership of organisations (%) (1983)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Entries represent the percentage of people of each population group holding membership of each organisation in 1983. For the total percentages the data have been weighted according to data from SARR's annual survey so as to include people from the so-called independent Homelands.

Ns = 3392

In 1994, and 1998, the HSRC presented, within its annual survey, a list of
organisations to test the membership of the respondent. It ranked from political parties to hostel committees. 'Social club' is not included in the surveys after 1994 as such. Cultural organisations and political parties are added. The respondent was asked:

"Are you a sympathiser or a member who regularly goes to meetings, or are you an office bearer of ..." (1994: Q. 61; 1999: Q. 39).

The difference between simple membership and office bearer has not been taken into account for comparative reasons. Sympathisers are not considered to be members.

Table 4.15 below shows the results for 1994 and Table 4.16 those for 1998. After 1994 the HSRC eliminated the 'Sport Club' question, and added others. In substitution 'Cultural organisation' and 'political party' were included for comparative reasons to the 1994 questionnaire. Others such as youth or women's organisations would leave out people on account of sex or age. This could bias the comparability through the years.

**Table 4.15 Membership of organisations (%) (1994)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Sport Org.</th>
<th>Social (Civic) Org.</th>
<th>Cultural Org.</th>
<th>Trade Union</th>
<th>Political party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>11.13</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>19.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Entries represent the percentage of people of each population group holding membership of each organisation in 1994.

Ns = 2517

**Table 4.16 Membership of organisations (%) (1999)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Not available</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>14.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Entries represent the percentage of people of each population group holding membership of each organisation in 1998.

Ns = 2200
All the results are summarised and presented in Table 4.17.

Table 4.17 Membership of organisations (1983-1999)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>Not available</td>
<td>Not available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>11.13</td>
<td>19.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>Not available</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>14.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Entries represent the percentage of people of each population group holding membership of each organisation in each year.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ns 1983</th>
<th>Ns 1994</th>
<th>Ns 1999</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3392</td>
<td>2517</td>
<td>2200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The results leave no room for doubt. There is no important increase in any of the organisations. Actually, the only important movement is seen in the sport and social category and this simply shows a decrease. Trade Union membership is the only category showing growth.

In this regard it is important to note that, in general, civil society in South Africa is not evolving properly.

Non-governmental organisations, community-based organisations, churches, trade unions and voluntary organisations in general compose the civil society. As shown in the tables, membership of organisations remains low. Only Trade Union membership grows. The reason for this may be that Trade Unions have played a predominant role in the democratisation of the country. Much of the pressure for democracy was applied, historically, from the Trade Unions (see Chapter 5 for their role in democratisation).

The other organisations not only do not gain members, but are also losing leaders. With the coming of democracy many members of these organisations immigrated into high position in the administration, leaving many non-governmental organisations without qualified members to lead them. Many of the non-governmental organisations "have closed or drastically curtailed their operations. This has given rise to a general perception that the sector is shrinking" (James & Caliguire, 1996: 61).

27 Obviously, civil society includes a wider and more complex net of organisations. This simply is a mere indication of the membership evolution – increase/decrease – of some of them.
To this has to be added that all organisations that were struggling against apartheid, "now do not have any focus". Once apartheid disappeared, those organisations struggling for the abolishment of apartheid have no reason of existence. This has affected consequently their funding. Many NGOs relied on foreign funding, which with the arrival of democracy has been cut down (James & Caliguire, 1996: 63).

Finally, it is necessary to state that the new government's policy toward NGOs did not help to solve this problem. It rather finally strangled the sector. If any NGO wants to obtain foreign funds, it must obtain a permit from the government-appointed director of fundraising. However, there are no general guidelines or criteria for the permit to be granted. Thus, organisations depend on the personal criteria of the person in charge. This automatically opens the door for abuse. If an organisation is declared to be involved in politics, it is automatically prohibited from receiving funds (James & Caliguire, 1996: 64; see also Gyimah-Boadi, 1996; Breytenbach, 1998b).

This simply indicates lack of autonomy in South Africa's civil society. The members of civil society organisations are decreasing and those that remain are chained by having to depend on arbitrary government decisions regarding funding and, hence, existence.

In the end, this simply is another indicator that does not bode well for democracy in South Africa either. No civil society, no democracy.

4.10 Summary

In this Chapter the operationalisation of the consolidation of democracy in South Africa, based on some indicators of its political culture, was performed.

Different approaches to political culture were offered and a final selection of attributes characterising political culture took place according to propositions from earlier studies, the peculiar South African characteristics and the availability and comparability of data. The attributes arrived at, were political tolerance and trust. Besides these, and on informative basis, some other indicators were offered. They,

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28 Social tolerance was also offered to strengthen the argument.
however, are less significant and there is no general agreement on their importance. Thus, these added indicators were presented according to availability and comparability but will not be analysed any further.

The final picture obtained from these findings has a dual orientation. On one side, political tolerance, refusal of political violence and voting favour democratic stability. This indicates that the "democratic mechanism" functions. Elections are held peacefully and governments are elected democratically. However, on the other hand, trust is decreasing, and so are the other indicators presented, namely closeness to parties, belief in the capacity of personal influence, membership of independent organisations (with the exception of trade unions - which is understandable due to the important political role they have played historically).

Against this background, (social and political) tolerance and trust will be thoroughly analysed in the following Chapter to attempt to arrive at some conclusions on democratic consolidation in South Africa. The distribution of these values in subgroups (race, urban/rural, age, education, etc.) will be a point of major importance. Pertinent reference will be made to the other indicators to strengthen the argument, when necessary.

At this point the only comment to be made is that two doors are open to South African democracy (one indicator points to positive and the other to negative progress). Then, further analysis is required.
Chapter 5. The South African middle class and democratic consolidation: Results analysed

5.1 Introduction

In the previous four Chapters the background to democratisation, democratic consolidation, social structure, social class analysis, middle class and important aspects for the consolidation of democracy were presented to the reader.

Both the third and the fourth Chapters concluded with findings that are difficult to interpret. The middle class has grown between 1970 and 1999, but since 1994, the year of the founding elections, to 1999, growth has been nearly non-existent (it only grew by two percent since 1997).

On the other hand, the main indicators of democratic consolidation, political tolerance and trust, follow diverse trends. Political tolerance, an important ingredient for the existence of any democracy, is increasing. This is supported by the fact that the rejection of political violence is also increasing. This is understandable and reasonable. In 1994, the year of founding elections, there were more than 2000 deaths due to political violence. With those figures, if the political intolerance (understood as the acceptance of the disliked groups – see Chapter 4) had increased, there would probably not be any democracy to consolidate in South Africa. Tolerance is an important condition for the democratisation of the country. No tolerance, no democracy (especially taking into account the levels of political violence prior to 1994). However, there is no acknowledged minimum of political tolerance for democracy to exist. Hence, the only possibility is to show the trend over time. An increase in political tolerance will obviously favour democratic consolidation, whereas a decrease in political tolerance will impede it political competition becoming intractable and democratic institutions unstable.

On the other hand, trust, a more substantive part of democracy, is decreasing. Trust is not essential for the democratisation of the country, but it is for the proper consolidation of the democracy. If tolerance is a nut of the democratic machine, trust and the other indicators lubricate the system for a proper functioning ensuring enduring performance.
In this Chapter, the results presented in the two preceding Chapters (dealing with the middle class and the indicators of democratic consolidation) are presented for further analysis. Their distribution among the different population groups, age groups and other important cleavages is analysed. For instance, it will be important to know whether intolerance is more common in older people, more embedded in the past, or whether age does not seem to produce any effect. Of importance will also be the composition of the middle class. Is it equally composed of the different population groups or, is the White population leading ahead as is expected? If this is the case, how is it evolving over time?

Firstly, the middle class results are presented again and analysed. The factors that shaped the middle class into its current form are also presented to explain its size and composition. In other words, the evolution of the labour and education policies in South Africa are explained. After this, the middle class is analysed according to its occupational components.

Secondly, the results drawn from the analysis of the selected indicators of democratic consolidation are re-introduced. Their distribution through the different population groups, age groups, etc. is also analysed.

At this point, it is important to focus on the considerations: In Chapter 1 and Chapter 4 it was explained that this is not a study of the political culture of South African democracy. The study uses two indicators of political culture relevant to democratic consolidation (tolerance and trust) to show the trends of democratic commitment over time, whether pro-democracy or not. As said in Chapter 1 and 4, this study regards a democracy as consolidated when its people consider it to be the best regime. This, as was explained, should be reflected in their political culture. Thus, the indicators of political culture related to democratic consolidation were surveyed and its evolution over time presented. Not all the indicators of political culture were examined, as this enterprise would demand analysis of too large a range of indicators that have nothing to do with the consolidation of democracy. The selected indicators were tolerance and trust drawn from previous research and propositions from the relevant literature (see Chapter 4). Besides these, more indicators of political culture related to democratic consolidation were presented in order to provide the reader with a wider picture of existing political culture in South Africa. This, however, does not imply that those
indicators are to be analysed in this Chapter, as there is no general agreement on their importance. Consequently, tolerance and trust, the two main indicators of consolidation of democracy, will now be analysed in detail, focusing on distribution by race, age, income, occupation and education.

Initially, the analysis of the middle class is undertaken.

5.2 Middle class results: A reminder

The results from Chapter 2 are presented again. Table 5.1 presents the results for the old middle class. Table 5.2 presents the results for the new middle class and Table 5.3 presents the results for the total middle class. The distribution through the different population groups is also presented in each table. In order to gain clarity in the presentation, the tables are presented on the same page. The surveys used were 1970 Census, HSRC '94, '95, '97 and '99.
Table 5.1 Old Middle Class

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>Not Available</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>Not Available</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coloured</td>
<td>Not Available</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>3.0</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>Not Available</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Entries represent the percentage of each population group – and of the whole (total) population – falling within the OLD middle class in each year. As explained in Chapter 3, there is no data available for old middle class before 1994 as there either is no income question for certain population groups (census 1970) or the data is simply not comparable (does not include the former independent homelands). Ns are offered below.

Ns

12747280

Table 5.2 New Middle Class

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>27.1</td>
<td>25.9</td>
<td>33.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coloured</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>11.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>19.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>10.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Entries represent the percentage of each population group – and of the whole (total) population – falling within the NEW middle class in each year. Ns are offered below.

1 Updated from OHS 1995

Ns

12747280

Table 5.3 Total Middle Class

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total (only new)</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>29.9</td>
<td>28.3</td>
<td>34.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>11.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coloured</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>19.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>10.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Entries represent the percentage of each population group – and of the whole (total) population – falling within the TOTAL middle class in each year. For 1970, the total is composed only by new middle class. For 1970 only new middle class data is offered. Ns are offered below.

1 Updated from OHS 1994, 1995

Ns

12747280

195
Tables 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3 indicate that there has been an enlargement of the middle class over a period of nearly 30 years. However, the total is still only 10.4%\(^1\) of the population. In the democratic period it has grown by less than 2%, although the main progress is located in the last two years, from 8.7% in 1997 to 10.6% in 1999. Further research will reveal whether the last datum (10.6%) is accidental, derived, maybe, from the margin of error in the survey, or if it is really growing.

It is important to note the progress of the Black population in this regard, which registers at from 3.3% to 5.8%. This important advance of the Black population (proportionally the largest) seems, then, to be the main responsible factor for the enlargement of the middle class. This increase will be analysed later in the Chapter.

The Coloured population seems to remain stable when comparing 1994 to 1999 and so does the Indian population. The White population also progressed from 1994 (28.6%) to 1999 (34.5%). Although progress is non-existent\(^2\) between 1994 and 1997.

The middle class has been presented by race. In the following section, the middle class is dissected into its occupational components. As the old\(^3\) middle class in South Africa is following the same tendency as in many other countries (progressive shrinking) and the main pieces of labour legislation that have been passed affected the occupations that form part of the “new” middle class (professionals, managers, clerical workers) the main focus of this section is on the “new” middle class\(^4\).

### 5.3 Middle class analysed by occupation

In this section the attention shifts to the occupation-based composition of the middle class. The race-based composition was presented both in Chapter 3 and in the

---

1. There is no known pro-democracy growth of the middle class, or normal pro-democratic size information of the middle class. However, when, for instance, it is maintained (see Lipset, 1963) that stable democracies show a diamond-shaped social structure with a large middle class, it implies that most of the population falls in within middle class. The indicated 10% (South African middle class size) does not represent most of the population. Further research will reveal whether it keeps growing or not.
2. As previously said, data up until 1997 can be compared to the October Household Surveys. Thus, up until 1997, the figures can be checked against the OHSs, increasing, therefore, the reliability of the analysis.
3. Those self-employed, propertied with middle income.
introduction to this Chapter. Besides, further analysis is required to see where the advance (if any) is located, whether at the top (professionals) or at lower levels of the middle class (clerks). What follows is a dissection of the middle class according to occupation and race. The surveys used, as said above, were Census 1970 and HSRC '94, '95, '97 and '99. These were discussed in Chapter 3.

**Table 5.4 Middle Class 1970 (Occupational composition)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Population Group</th>
<th>Black</th>
<th>Coloured</th>
<th>Indian</th>
<th>White</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>New Middle Class</td>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Manager</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Clerk</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>11.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Old Middle Class</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Middle Class (only new)</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>18.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Entries represent the percentage of people of each population group falling within each occupation category. Information available for new middle class only. *Ns* = 12747280

**Table 5.5 Middle Class 1994 (Occupational composition)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Population Group</th>
<th>Black</th>
<th>Coloured</th>
<th>Indian</th>
<th>White</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>New Middle Class</td>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>5.2(^1)</td>
<td>10.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Manager</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Clerk</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>2.2(^1)</td>
<td>9.9(^1)</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Old Middle Class</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Middle Class</td>
<td></td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>7.9(^1)</td>
<td>21.5(^1)</td>
<td>28.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Entries represent the percentage of people of each population group falling within each occupation category. *Ns* = 2226

\(^1\) Upgraded from the OHS '94

**Table 5.6 Middle Class 1995 (Occupational composition)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Population Group</th>
<th>Black</th>
<th>Coloured</th>
<th>Indian</th>
<th>White</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>New Middle Class</td>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>6.5(^1)</td>
<td>11.1(^1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Manager</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.6(^1)</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Clerk</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>7.3(^1)</td>
<td>10.0(^1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Old Middle Class</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Middle Class</td>
<td></td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>7.0(^1)</td>
<td>18.3(^1)</td>
<td>29.8(^1)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Entries represent the percentage of people of each population group falling within each occupation category. *Ns* = = 2226

\(^1\) Upgraded from the OHS '95
Tables 5.4 to 5.8 indicate an important advance of the Black population from 1970 to 1999 in the “professional” and “clerk” categories. However, if the comparison is only made between 1994 and 1999, the democratic period, the advance is at the highest level only: “Professional”. The figure is doubled from 1.7% in 1994 to 3.3% in 1999, whereas the advance in “managers” and “clerks” categories is much lower (0.7% advance for clerks since 1994 and 0.5% for managers in the same period). Thus, the main progress of the Black middle class is at the highest level, whereas the advance is much slower in middle sectors, especially if taking into account the fact that, after 1994, the Black population arrived at the public institutions and the Black sector was pushed up with affirmative action. Thus, the real enlargement of the Black middle class has only occurred at the top level.

The White population has tripled their participation at the “professional” level (from 5.4% in 1970, to 10.1% in 1994 and to 15.8% in 1999). At the “manager” level, the increase has also been considerable: From 1.9 % in 1970 to 4.0 % in 1994 and to 6.6% in 1999. For clerical workers, the movement is not spectacular. In 1970, 11.2% of
Whites were working as clerical workers. This percentage went down to 8.8 in 1994 and it went up again to 10.9 in 1999\(^5\). This change from 1970 to 1994 may be due to the margin of error of the survey. In this regard, it is necessary to say that, at this level of analysis (small subgroups selected) the reliability of the data decreases. Besides, the main aim of the study is to show the trend and this indicates that the White middle class has grown at all levels (more than two percent in 5 years).

For the Coloured population the growth is as follows. They advance at the "professional" level (from 1.2% in 1970 to 4.6% in 1999). In the "managerial" level, the progress is from none to 0.7 in 1999. At the clerical level the increase goes from 1.8% for 1970 to 2.2% in 1994 and to 5.7% in 1999. Thus, the Coloured middle class is growing both at the high and the lower levels.

Indians start, at the professional level, at 1.6% in 1970, increasing to 5.2% in 1994 and to 7.3% in 1997\(^6\). Their progress in this sector is the most impressive. At the managerial level, the growth is from 0.3% in 1970 to 1.1% in 1994 and to 1.5% in 1999. At the clerical level, the progress goes from 4.2% in 1970 to 6.5% in 1997\(^7\). Thus, Indian middle class also grows both at the higher and lower levels – although the growth at the managerial level is nearly non-existent.

Against this background, it is possible to affirm that the White middle class progresses the most. The Black population's advance is also important, although only at the top level.

This enlargement of the middle class has obviously been produced by political, social and economical changes, both at the South African and at the international level. Both South African economic and political forces and international economy influenced the configuration of the social structure in general and the middle class in particular. These forces that shaped the middle class in South Africa to its current configuration are now presented to the reader.

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\(^5\) The figure for 1997 is 12.3%. Further research will reveal whether the figure for 1999 is "softer" and whether the share keeps growing, or whether the figure is correct. However, it is still larger than in 1994.

\(^6\) The figure for 1999 might be wrong. Such a sharp decrease in such a short period of time is not really explainable. In the following years, this figure may be revised as new data is added and longitudinal surveys become available.

\(^7\) The same goes for this figure but in the reverse way. It is difficult to understand such an important increase in such a short period of time.
The middle class was operationalised in terms of occupation. Occupation is a main ingredient of the labour market. Hence, the past and present situation of the labour market in South Africa will now be explained. It is also important to explain the enskilling process, which largely depends on the education system. It is then important to understand the functioning of the education system and its implications for the social structure configuration properly. These issues will be discussed next.

5.4 South Africa's middle class: Evolution analysed

In this section the reader is introduced to the labour market and the education system in South Africa. The different legislation policies, applied through the years and shaping the labour force – and consequently the middle class – are examined.

The different labour and education policies have influenced the size and composition of the South African middle class, producing its current configuration. Legislation has favoured the White population groups at the expense of the others (more strongly at the expense of the Black population).

Industrialisation in South Africa began with the discovery of diamonds in 1870 and of gold in 1872. Before that time, South Africa was a mainly agrarian society. Any existing employment relations were regulated by the Master and Servants Act of 1841 (Grossett & Venter, 1998: 30-32).

Traditionally, because South Africa did not have a large enough skilled work force, European migrants were employed to do the work in this category (Marais, 1998: 8). As these workers were in high demand, they occupied a privileged position in the labour market (the rest was made up by Blacks and those Whites who were obliged to leave the land after the Anglo-Boer war). These workers' unions formed the first trade unions in South Africa, which were therefore skilled unions. The first regulation instituting an industrial colour bar, even if indirectly, was introduced in 1897. This regulation already prevented Blacks from becoming skilled as they could not become mine-engine drivers (Finnemore & Van der Merwe, 1992: 17-20).

After this, the Anglo-Boer war came to an end in 1902. Many Afrikaans families were obliged to seek work in the industrial areas. This comprised a threat to skilled workers and in 1907, White mineworkers went on strike, because of the utilisation of
unskilled White persons (the so-called “poor White”)\(^8\). To this, was to be added the danger of losing jobs in favour of cheaper Black labour. Realising that they could gain power by other means, many White workers joined the newly formed South African Labour Party and, later, the Afrikaner Nationalist Party (Hunter, 1965: 115-117; Nel & Van Rooyen, 1989: 50-60; on this see also Fine & Davis, 1990).

This was followed by the 1911 Mines and Works Act, which, in essence, reserved thirty-two job categories for White mineworkers. These jobs were skilled jobs; thus Black, Coloured and Indian workers saw their chances becoming skilled decrease (Terreblanche & Nattrass, 1990: 8; Lipton, 1989: 19-20).

From 1910 to 1920, Black wages declined. Income of most population groups decreased, except for White English speaking and wealthier farmers (also White). This obviously shaped the social structure (and consequently the middle class) in a pro-White way. Those whose incomes did not decrease, retained higher positions in the social structure (Terreblanche & Nattras, 1989: 8; see also Van der Berg, 1989).

Afrikaners had for long resented the dominance of the English-speaking section, and especially the immigrant workers in industry (Hunter, 1965: 105-108). This led to the creation, in 1918, of the Afrikanerbond (also known as Broederbond\(^9\)). One of the specific aims of this body was to capture a share of the wealth of the country for the Afrikaner group (O’Meara, 1983: 3; Marais, 1998: 17).

The first comprehensive labour law was passed in 1924 in the form of the Industrial Conciliation Act. It concretised racial divisions through the exclusion of Blacks. With this, Blacks, who had no recognition in the political sphere, were now denied the right of legally exercising power in labour relations. In this way, racial segregation was already embedded in the industrial relations system long before the National Party legally entrenched the apartheid policy (Nel & Van Rooyen, 1989: 55-60; Marais, 1998: 11). As Blacks were, in this manner, excluded from industrial bargaining and access to certain skilled jobs, their potential progress in the social structure, in general, and middle class, in particular, suffered an important blow.

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\(^8\) In 1929, the “Poor Whites” were estimated to number some 220 000 (more than one-tenth of the White population) (Hunter, 1965: 116).

\(^9\) On Broederbond see, for instance, Serfontein, (1979).
In 1933, the National Party and the South African Party joined to establish a new party, the South African National Party. Parallel to this, was created the Purified National Party (Bendix, 1989: 291).

The 1930s brought important changes in the political and economical arena. The economic growth of the late 1930s boosted the industrialisation process, which accelerated urbanisation. However, most Blacks still remained living in rural areas (Marais, 1998: 12\(^{10}\)).

The National Party came to power in 1948. This was a period of general dissatisfaction amongst people of all races (because of economic hardship, job scarcity, etc.). Actually, the 1946 strike (70 000 miners and 6000 iron workers), for instance, is “commonly portrayed as a landmark event announcing a crisis in South African capitalism” (Marais, 1998: 12; Fines & Davis, 1990: 11-18, Saul & Gelb, 1985: 12-16). Employment was scarce and the influx of Blacks to the urban areas led to unrest in the townships. This produced a demand for stricter influx control. Increased polarisation between the different population groups – also between Afrikaans and English speaking – characterised this period, which set the scene for the policies that were to follow (Marais, 1998: 10; Finnemore & Van der Merwe, 1992: 22-23; Adam, 1971: 37-52). The subsequent regulations caused further polarisation. It also included a system of job reservation whereby a particular occupation could be legally reserved for a certain race group. This Job Reservation clause became one of the most notorious provisions in South African labour legislation. The passage of these Acts entrenched racial division by separatist legislation more effectively than ever before (Nel & Van Rooyen, 1989: 65; O’Meara, 1996: 19-38). This signified another important blow at expectations of growth for the Black middle class, as many skilled occupations were reserved for Whites\(^{11}\).

These job reservation clauses were not the only limitation to Black, Coloured and Indian people becoming skilled. The whole education system was configured to entrench such a limitation.

\(^{10}\) On Black urbanisation at that time, see also Smit (1985).

\(^{11}\) On this can be consulted Wolpe, (1988); Cranksham, (1996a; 1996b). The second also offers an interesting review of studies in the field.
The apartheid policies of education began to be applied in an important manner in 1953 with the passing of the *Bantu Education Act*. This Act removed education for Africans from provincial and rather haphazard control and handed it to the Ministry of Bantu Affairs. The Ministry of Education spoke of the "wrong type of education" for "Natives", which created a frustrated people with "expectations in life which circumstances in South Africa [did] not allow to be fulfilled". He continued: "I just want to remind ... that if the Native in South Africa today in any kind of school in existence is being taught to expect that he will live his adult life under a policy of equal rights, he is making a big mistake" (quoted in Bernstein, 1971: 43).

Education, at that time\(^{12}\), was compulsory for Whites, Coloureds and Indians, but not for Blacks. The total allocation to Black (Bantu) education was less that 0.4 % of South Africa’s gross national product, whereas 4.5 % of GNP was destined for total education at all levels. Concretely, R 74 was allocated for each White child, R 17 for each Coloured child, R 26 for each Asian child and R 2, 39 for each African child (Bernstein, 1971: 50). These initial figures facilitate understanding of the subsequent evolution and different trends of different population groups in the social structure. If the investment in education and training was different for the different population groups, the opportunities of social and economic progress were also different.

Stricter pass laws\(^{13}\) were imposed by the National government. This worsened the situation, as Blacks became more aware of their lack of rights. Furthermore, with the economy still growing, the position of the Black employee in industrial society became more firmly entrenched. As Whites moved up in the occupational hierarchy, Blacks replaced them. This obviously permanently located the White population over the rest of the population groups in the social structure (Marais, 1998: 20; Davies *et al.*, 1984: 170-172; Bernstein, 1985: 85-103; Schlemmer, 1985: 104-113; Finnermore & Van der Merwe, 1992: 24).

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\(^{12}\) Figures refer to 1965.
\(^{13}\) This "pass law" was already set down in 1922 by the Stallard Commission. As a result any Black man over sixteen years old had to carry a "pass" (reference book), which recorded permission to work and live in a particular White area. These pass laws (or influx controls) regulated the flow of African labour into the White areas and allocated labour to sectors and regions (Lipton, 1989: 18; see also Bekker & Humphrie, 1985).
In the sixties, one of the major problems of South Africa surfaced: The shortage of skilled workers. Actually, major interpretations of the crisis faced by the South African State and capital have also placed this problem of skill at the core of their arguments (see Saul & Gelb, 1981; Davies, 1979 or Sharp & Hatwig, 1983).

Skills shortages surfaced in South Africa in the 1960s, largely as result of "the trend towards a rising organic composition of capital through mechanisation, reorganisation and rationalisation of the labour process to thereby enhance capital's national and international competitiveness" (Sharp & Hawing, 1983: 9). These shortages were aggravated by the shortage of Whites and a racist education system, which prohibited the production of adequately skilled Blacks (Chisholm, 1984: 7).

During the 1960s, shortages of technicians, supervisors and artisans were met by floating the colour bar; shortages of clerical, administrative and sales personnel in circulation were overcome because of the availability of large amounts of foreign investment capital (Davis, 1979: 185). At the same time, to reproduce skilled labour power, the state began to place a major stress on vocational and technical education for Whites as well as on immigration (Sharp & Hatwing, 1983: 191)\(^\text{14}\).

In the 1970s, apartheid reached its peak and arrived at a critical\(^\text{15}\) situation (Marais, 1998: 37; Saul & Gelb, 1981: 3; Lipton, 1989: 281-306). The South African economy began to slide into recession (mounting balance of payment difficulties, growing inflation, etc.) The real growth rate, which averaged 5-7 annually during the 1960s, was zero in 1977. Increasing inflation, rising job losses and the removal of state subsidies on basic consumer items shaped the economical landscape (Morris & Padayache, 1989: 76).

The Bantu Labour Amendment Act, to keep Blacks out of skilled jobs, was another blow at Black middle class growth (Lipton, 1989: 35). It also was time of increasing mobilisation, strikes and general unrest that threatened the government, then presided over by P. W. Botha. The government reacted extremely rapidly to the 1973 wave of strikes. In the same year, it passed the Black Labour Regulation Act. This gave Black

\(^{14}\) For a detailed description of the South African apartheid education system during 1950s and 1960s, see Unesco, 1972: 33-118.

\(^{15}\) Crisis here denotes not a "terminal breakdown" but a "turning point" (see Gibson, 1991: 2).
workers a limited right to strike. However, few unions representative of Blacks utilised those procedures. This in the end signified nothing "but suppression of the Black middle class [that] was unchanged, with continuing restrictions on entry to skilled jobs and on business and property rights" (Lipton, 1989: 37; see also Wolpe, 1977; Hindson & Crankshaw, 1990; 1996a).

Those years, characterised by intensifying worker struggles and declining profitability, made by using earlier means of solving skill shortage problems impossible. The crisis of profitability forced capital to constantly introduce new technology to raise productivity. Thus, skill shortages were produced repeatedly. The political and ideological dimensions of the crisis necessitated reforming at least some aspects of the reproduction of labour power (Davis, 1979: 191). In this context, the only solution to the problems of skill shortages was to upgrade "the qualifications of significant sections of the Black population". This implied 'building up' a Black middle class committed to 'free enterprise' (Chisholm, 1984: 9).

By the 1970s, Whites were concentrated in the secondary and tertiary sectors (commerce and services) and the more skilled and White-collar sectors. Blacks dominated the primary sectors (agriculture, mining) and the low-wage and unskilled jobs: Coloured and Indians occupied middle position. This was created mainly by the job reservation policy (Lipton, 1989: 37).

Also in the 1970s, Schools and Universities, "after a decade of near-silence, became key sites of resistance with the emergence of the South Africa Students' Organisation (SASO) and the Black Consciousness movement. Actually, Black students mounted a sustained attack on Bantu Education, on apartheid and, more explicitly, in 1980 at least, on capitalism between 1976 and 1981. On each occasion, albeit in different ways, they forged or attempted to forge links with workers" (Chisholm, 1984: 13).

In 1973 it was announced that Blacks would be allowed to do skilled work. The "sacred rule that the hierarchical structure must be kept intact, with Blacks always working under Whites" was also abandoned (Lipton, 1989: 59). The possibilities of Black middle class growth were unleashed. However, this created a situation in which,

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16 On this see also Johnstone (1970) and Legassick, (1975).
at least under the law, all South Africans had an equal say in the industrial relations but within the political system, Blacks still remained outside the citizenry. This resulted in the politicisation of the trade unions, in particular, and the industrial relations, in general (Finnemore & Van der Merwe, 1992: 25; Nel & Van Royen, 1989: 67-71).

These internal pressures were accompanied by international pressures. The threat of sanctions and disinvestment increased (on this see ILO, 1993). The result was the appointment of the Wiehahn Commission and the approval of the Industrial Conciliation Amendment Act of 1979. It recommended the abolition of "job reservation" and the legalisation of a non-racial trade union movement. This made union membership rise\(^\text{17}\) (Marais, 1998: 51). The major impact of this act was Black South Africans were no longer excluded from the definition of employees. The restrictions on Coloured and Indian businessmen were eased (Terreblanche & Nattrass, 1990: 15).

Educational reform was crucial to the strategy of limited incorporation of small numbers of Blacks into middle class social strata. Education was a particularly sensitive and fertile area for state intervention since the desire for education and the frustration at the denial of both an adequate education and the fruits thereof had been a long-standing cause of bitterness. Reforms, which appeared to be real concessions, could defuse significant areas of opposition, at least in the short term. However, although the reforms were not merely cosmetic, they were implemented in a manner that left the roots of inequality in South Africa untouched. Actually, in education, these years of struggle were "most vividly demonstrated in the 1976 uprising and the school boycotts of 1980, which spread to every major and even some smaller towns in South Africa" (Chisholm, 1984: 2)

During the mid-1980s, the state started systematic repression of the unions. The Minister of Law and Order was given extensive powers such as the restriction of persons or organisations and the prohibition of attendance at gatherings and the publication of periodicals (De Villiers, 1987: 222-223; Marx, 1992: 149-169). In this regard, an estimated 33,000 people were detained during the several states of emergency that were declared during the late 1980s (Webster & Friedman, 1989: 22-25; 33-39;

\(^{17}\) Since its formation in 1985, COSATU, for instance, has more than doubled its membership from 45,000 to 921,497 paid-up members by 1990 (Alexander, 1990: 45).
Decker, 1990: 47). In 1986, the influx control measures were scrapped and the Black population was allowed to enter and work in urban areas without official state permission (Marais, 1998: 47, see also Morris & Padayachee, 1989 and Morris, 1991).

The Department of Education and Training assigned high priority to the provision of technical education for Blacks within urban areas in the 1980s. Previously the majority of these training courses were offered in the Bantustans (Chisholm, 1984: 13). In the 1980s these technical schools proliferated. In 1979 the Wiehahn Commission of Inquiry into Labour recommended that restrictions on apprenticeship training for Blacks be lifted. Actually, a survey undertaken in 1982 by the University of Witwatersrand Centre for Continuing Adult Education revealed that the mining industry, the chemical, clothing, furniture, timber, paper, iron and steel industries and the Chamber of commerce were engaged in training Blacks at all levels.

The strategic necessity for a class of Black middle-men in industrial relations was now emphasised constantly (Proctor-Sims, 1981: 196). By doing this, not only skill shortages were diminished, but the introduction of Blacks into management and supervisory positions, monitoring other Blacks, would also produce a class differentiation amongst Blacks. In other words, "skill[s] training [was] thus doing little more than socialising Blacks into values which schools are patently [able] to instil.... No wider education [was] provided ... the skills that [were] taught [t]here [were] narrow and limited to enabling the worker to relearn skills or competencies associated with maintaining machines" (Chisholm, 1984: 22-23).

The Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) Commission of Inquiry, chaired by De Lange, was appointed in 1980 and reported a year later. It articulated a new meritocratic, non-racial, technicist educational ideology. This was to provide South Africa with an education system able to meet the necessary manpower needs in the country, being opposed to the racially divided departments of the present system. It proposed to allow academic schooling to Blacks, as long as they could afford it. This was not only an attempt of raising the enskilling level of the country, but also an attempt to "reform racial capitalism through co-option of the small Black middle class and increase control over the working class" (Chisholm, 1984: 6).

When the Commission reported, the extent of the skills shortages was claimed to be
so great, that it could not be met by the White population which was already fully absorbed in employment, nor by White immigration which was not able to keep pace with the demand. For economic growth to be maintained, it was intoned, education would have to be revamped to enable the necessary education and training of some categories of Blacks.

This whole process of increasing education and training produced another important effect in the South African economical landscape: The narrowing in the income gap\textsuperscript{18}. Historically, there has been a serious income gap, mainly between Blacks and Whites. The slow increase of the White wage also helped to reduce this gap (Fallon, 1992)\textsuperscript{19}.

New urbanisation policies toward the Black population were also drafted. They aimed at creating class differences within the Black population through urbanisation policies (to create social differences between rural and urban Blacks) (Davies \textit{et al.}, 1984: 122, see also Smit, 1985). Parallel to this, there was a reactivation of union organisation at a level not previously seen (Nel & Van Rooyen, 1989: 67-71; Finnemore & Van der Merwe, 1992: 25). Non-racial unions were allowed. This gave way to the emergence of the trade union federation COSATU (Congress of South African Trade Unions) in 1985\textsuperscript{20}. The tricameral parliament was also established in the eighties (one legislature per population group, but Blacks being excluded). As the “Black” chamber was not created, protest and social unrest were re-boosted. Thus, the main intention of the reforms (to neutralise the opposition) was not reached. Rather, the openings “were used to revive old popular organisations, build new ones and strike fresh alliances around an increasingly unequivocal opposition against the apartheid system” (Marais, 1998: 49, see also Swilling & Phillips, 1989). As a result of the rising unrest, the

\textsuperscript{18} Between 1978 and 1988 the average Black monthly household income increased from R112 to R567 – an increase of 406 per cent. The comparable increase for Whites was 264 per cent (Schlemmer, 1991: 5). The 1996 Population Census survey revealed that Whites were still far ahead of the other population groups and especially the Black population.


\textsuperscript{20} Although there are many unions (i.e. FOSATU – formed by twelve unions in 1979 – which was reluctant to get involved in political struggle (Lodge & Nason, 1991: 28), SACTU – an ANC sympathiser union that was willing to consider labour struggle as part of the liberation movement (Baskin, 1991: 28; Lodge & Nason, 1991: 28; Alexander (1990: 44)), this federation (of which FOSATU was a member) had a very important role to play. Mainly because unions were the only way Blacks had to participate politically. On unions in South Africa, see Habib (1997) or Wood (1998), on COSATU, in particular, see SPA (1996) or Alexander, (1990).
reforms were stopped and several repressive measures were approved to restore stability (Webster & Friedman, 1989: 22-25; 33-39; Dekker, 1990: 47; see also Saul, 1993; Bethlehem & et al., 1989). This was accompanied by economic recession, job losses, an "emergence of a formidable array of popular organisations", the effect of international sanctions, the "absurdity of duplication state institutions (i.e. three chambers of parliament)", the recognition that "economic recovery was impossible without social and political stability" and the recognition of "the ANC as a force [with which] to negotiate a political transition" (Lipton, 1989: 328-338; Marais, 1998: 51-67).

On 2 February 1990, President FW de Klerk announced the un-banning of and the lifting of the restrictions on several organisations (i.e. the ANC) and formal negotiations were launched (Gargill, 1990: 11; see also de Klerk, 1990). The final structure of these relations were still being negotiated and the final picture would depend on the outcome of the constitutional negotiations and the general elections to be held on 27 April 1994. In 1993, the main organisations opposing the regime (ANC, etc.) stated that "affirmative action" would have to be implemented to address socioeconomic inequalities. This implied the appointment of Blacks, Coloureds and Indians (mainly Blacks) in positions historically reserved for the White population. With this, positive expectations of the Black middle class flourished (Human, 1993: 10-12).

In October 1994, the new Government of National Unity launched a strategic five-year plan: \textit{Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP)}\textsuperscript{22}. This plan aimed at converting South Africa into a more just and equal society by creating 2.5 million jobs, build one million low-cost homes by the year 2000; provide electricity to 2.5 million homes, provide running water, provide the society with compulsory education, extend infrastructure through public works programmes and restructure the state institutions to reflect the racial, class and gender composition of society" (Marais, 1998: 177-198; see also Freund, 1994; Bond et al., 1996)\textsuperscript{23}.

\footnotesize


\textsuperscript{22} The plan was pacted by ANC leaders and COSATU in the early nineties. Several drafts preceded the final version. This plan was a condition from COSATU for their support to the ANC in the polls (Lodge, 1999: 3-4).

\textsuperscript{23} On the labour law changes that accompanied the RDP, see, for instance, Rudd & Van Zyl (1997: esp. 4-5) or Kalula & Woolfrey (1995: esp. 29-70).
The RDP programme was followed by the *Growth, Employment and Redistribution* (GEAR) plan presented in June 1996. The aims of this programme were "a faster fiscal deficit reduction programme; a renewed focus on budget reform; a reduction on tariffs; a commitment to moderate wage demands; an exchange rate policy aimed at keeping the real exchange rate stable; a consistent monetary policy aimed at preventing a resurgence of inflation; the gradual relaxing of exchange controls; the speeding up of the restructuring of state controls; tax incentives to stimulate investment; an expansionary fiscal programme to address services deficiencies and backlogs and a strengthened levy system to fund training" (Biggs, 1997: 48; see also Marais, 1998: 160-172).

Affirmative action continued to be applied in the public sector, where it focused mainly on the Black population. In this regard, the *Public Service Laws Amendment Act* was passed in 1997. It aimed at ensuring that affirmative action positions or promotions in the public service could not be challenged in court. The beneficiaries of this affirmative action would be Black, women and the disabled (Office of Deputy President, 1997).

In brief, these events reveal the situation in which labour relations and education policy have evolved historically in the country. These events have shaped the social structure, in general, and, in particular, the middle class.

Obviously, the social structure (and consequently, the middle class) was shaped during the period covered from the *Industrial Conciliation Act* of 1924 until "Affirmative Action" of the post 1994 elections days. It developed from exclusion of Blacks, Coloureds and Indians from the socio-economic and political realm, to priority (mainly Blacks). It explains the low percentage of Blacks in the middle class in the 1970s and its increase up until the late 1990s. It also explains the high percentage of Whites within the middle class at any time in the South African history.

The explanation of the evolution of South African politics, in general, and the South
African labour market and education system, in particular, facilitates understanding the extreme distance between the White middle class and the rest, especially the Black middle class.

In the first and second Chapters, inequality was linked to middle class. Thus, at this stage, it is worth presenting some data regarding inequality in South Africa. According to the results presented for the middle class, inequality is expected to decrease in general terms. If the middle class has shown an increase from the undemocratic period to the democratic one, inequality, then, is expected to decrease.

5.5 Measures of income inequality

Figure 5.5.1 below shows the distribution of income in South Africa in 1990 (external line) and 1995 (internal line). The horizontal axis represents the percentage of people in the country (households in the 12 main urban areas) and the vertical axis represents the percentage of income shared.

In brief the figure shows that, in the 12 main urban areas, incomes have become less unequal in 1995, compared to 1990. The poorest continued to earn extremely little of all household income in the 12 main urban areas, both in 1990 and in 1995. For example, the poorest 20% of households earned 2% of all income in 1990 and the same 20% earned 2% in 1995. (This excludes small urban and non-urban households – Stats SA, 1995: 48-50.) The external curve represents the distribution of the income for 1995, in deciles and the internal one the distribution of income in deciles, also for 1999. The straight diagonal line represents an ideal society with a perfectly egalitarian income distribution. If South Africa were a perfect egalitarian society in, for instance, 1995, that line (internal curve representing 1995) should match the diagonal line.
Among those in the middle range, however, an improvement in income distribution is becoming apparent: 50% of households were earning 13% of income in 1995, while the same proportion of 50% were earning only 10% of income in 1990 (Stats SA: 1995).

It, therefore, seems as if the income, and hence life circumstances, of those households in the middle income range is improving. In other words, the middle class seems to be enlarging. This finding reinforces the results presented in the previous tables, when the middle class was analysed.

Table 5.9 compares the South African Gini coefficients in 1990 and 1995 (total and by race). It indicates that overall Gini coefficient has decreased from 0.63 to 0.55. Among African, Coloured and Indian households, however, the gap between the poor and the wealthier people is growing. On the other hand, within the White population,

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26 The Gini index is an inequality indicator that measures the difference between people's income (divided into quintiles). The higher the Gini index (1 is the maximum) the higher the inequality in a society. See Chapter 3 for further details on this index.
the gap between the poor and the richer is narrowing.

Table 5.5 Gini index in the 12 main urban areas in 1990 and in 1995 (Stats SA: 1995: 50)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1990</th>
<th>1995</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>0.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coloured</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The average Gini index for South Africa has decreased from 1990 to 1995 (expansion in middle classes)\(^{27}\), but in 1995 the differences within the different population groups have increased. The loss of jobs, generally semi-skilled and unskilled jobs, had an important effect, as will be explained in the next section. The only group that is cutting down its internal differences is the White population.

The last paragraphs connected the study, in general, and inequality in particular, to unemployment. Hence, the next step is to analyse the evolution of unemployment in South Africa.

5.6 Unemployment in South Africa

Together with the analysis of the middle class and its evolution, it is of great importance to monitor the evolution of the unemployed in the country. If the middle class is operationalised in terms of occupation, the evolution of the creation and destruction of employment is also of importance. The focus of this study now turns to that matter.

Once again the main problem to be faced is the several and different definitions of the concept of unemployment.

Statistics South Africa (Stats SA hereafter), previously known as the Central Statistical Service (CSS hereafter), recently revised its definition of the official unemployment rate in line with the main International Labour Organisation (ILO) definition, which is widely used.

\(^{27}\) This datum confirms the hypothesis that middle class size reflects inequality.
According to this new definition, the unemployed are those people within the economically active population who (a) do not work; (b) want to work, are available and fit for work and (c) have taken active steps to look for work or to start some form of self-employment. The definition used will affect the final unemployment figure. The question is whether those unemployed and willing to work are taking action to do so. The inclusion of this actively-seeking issue in the definition of unemployment gives different final figures. If the unemployed person is the person without a job, willing to work and actively seeking a job, the final figure will be smaller than if this condition is not taken into account. The size, therefore, varies according to the definition of unemployment used. If this condition (active job-seeking) is taken into account, the definition is considered a strict definition, if not is considered as an expanded definition (see Orkin, 1998: 1). The economically active population consists both of those who are employed and those who are unemployed and willing to work (Barker, 1999: 27).

Among South Africa's grave socio-economic problems, unemployment is one of the most serious and intractable. It is the most important cause of poverty, it has replaced race as the major factor in inequality\(^{28}\) and it underlies or contributes to a wider range of other socio-economic problems (Schlemmer & Levitz, 1998: 1; Schlemmer & Worthington, 1996: 1; Lyster & Swiss, 1990: 383-392).

The percentage of the working age population which was employed fell from around 38% in 1994 and 1995 to 34% in 1997. In 1994 and 1995, approximately 8 million people were employed, while in 1996 and 1997 the number was nearer 7,5 million (Orkin, 1998: 21)\(^{29}\).

The following two tables show the unemployment figures for South Africa. Table 5.6.1 presents the data for unemployment, comparing data from public sector to private sector, from 1990 until 1996, according to the South African Reserve Bank (1997)\(^{30}\). Table 5.6.2 presents data for unemployment in South Africa according to the October

\(^{28}\) As said before, the income gap between Black and White, for instance, is decreasing whereas the gap within the Black population is increasing. To this is to be added that a (small) Black middle class who will soon be differentiated from the Black lower class is being created. In other words, being Black does not automatically mean being poor, nowadays.

\(^{29}\) The October Household Surveys have been re-weighted after the 1996 Population Census revealed that the Population was smaller that what, in principle, was believed according to the previous census in 1991. Thus, the accuracy of these figures is reliable (Orkin, 1998: 11).

\(^{30}\) The data from the SARB comes from Statistics SA surveys.
Household Surveys (OHS hereafter) 94-97. The data have been gathered from Statistics SA.

Table 5.10 Non-agricultural private and public sector employment 1990-96

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Public Sector</th>
<th>(Increase/Decrease)</th>
<th>Private Sector</th>
<th>(Increase/Decrease)</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Increase/Decrease</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>1724591</td>
<td></td>
<td>3908714</td>
<td></td>
<td>5633304</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>1766131</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>3770630</td>
<td>-3.5</td>
<td>5536760</td>
<td>-1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>1786913</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>3640010</td>
<td>-3.5</td>
<td>5426923</td>
<td>-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>1764710</td>
<td>-1.2</td>
<td>3550004</td>
<td>-2.5</td>
<td>5314714</td>
<td>-2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>1773889</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>3506844</td>
<td>-1.2</td>
<td>5280733</td>
<td>-0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>1783164</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>3532268</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>5315433</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>1817962</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3438050</td>
<td>-2.7</td>
<td>5256012</td>
<td>-1.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.11 Unemployment in South Africa 94-97 (October Household Survey 94-97)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Population Group (%)</th>
<th>OHS 94-97 strict</th>
<th>Ns</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Black (41.1)</td>
<td>(6.4)</td>
<td>(17.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>(31.5)</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>30000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>(36.9)</td>
<td>25.3 (23.3)</td>
<td>18.1 (29.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>(5.5)</td>
<td>15.7 (22.3)</td>
<td>10.3 (13.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>(22.3)</td>
<td>11.8 (18.2)</td>
<td>10.9 (19.4)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Entries represent the percentage of each population group and of the total population being unemployed. Stats SA operates with two definitions. The official one (strict), officially used by the government and by ILO, and the expanded one (presented in brackets). Both results are offered. Ns are offered alongside the totals.

31 Once again the availability of data becomes problematic. Besides, the October Household Surveys, conducted periodically since 1994 (on comparability basis), the Survey of Total Employment and Earnings (STEE) and the Survey of Average Monthly Earnings (AME) it has been impossible to find other sources of information related to unemployment for this study, as the surveys either are not periodically conducted or not comparable (mainly with pre-94 period) or it is not possible to obtain information on unemployment from them. This, for instance, is the case with the HSRC surveys, which, as they are focused on over 18-year-old people exclude people economically active (people between 16-18 are also economically active but they are not included in the surveys) and give, therefore, mutilated information on unemployment. Besides, these surveys consider unemployed people as not economically active. There is no doubt that those unemployed, fit for work and willing to work, are part of the economically active population (Barker, 1999: 37). This leaves the OHS and the STEE and AME as the best sources of information on unemployment level available in South Africa. Many institutions such as the SARB use these surveys as source for unemployment analysis (see for instance, SARB, 1995, 1996). Others sources of information on unemployment, for instance, are the job advertisements in the media, but this only gives general impressions, not a detailed estimation of unemployment.

32 Agricultural employment has also decreased. According to the CSS, it dropped a 7% (former homelands excluded) between 1988 and 1993 (SARB, 1997).
Figure 5.6.1 plots the tendency of job creation/loss (Statistics SA, 1998; 1999).  

**Figure 5.6.1 Employment in SA (1994-1999)**

The tendency of losing jobs in all sectors is evident. Actually, the only sectors where employment has increased is the finance and public sectors (see Table 5.10). This may help to understand why the Black population is more affected by unemployment, as they form the least skilled sector. Another important fact to point out is that there has been an important increase in the wages. The attention of the study now turns to that.

**5.7 Wages**

In the previous section the decrease in general employment was explained. In this one the evolution of wages is described.

Figure 5.7.1 illustrates the tendencies of wage growth. The data have been gathered from SARB (1996, 1997; 1998; 1999). According to the figure, the year-to-year rate of

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33 This information is based on AME and STEE surveys conducted by Stats SA. They were launched in 1998 on monthly and quarterly basis. Prior to them, Statistics SA conducted 17 discrete monthly or quarterly business/organisation surveys. These were substituted by these two. The surveys collect information on current indicators of employment and the contribution of salaries and wages to the Gross Domestic Product.
increase in remuneration per worker in the total non-agricultural sectors of the economy decelerated, on balance, from 18,2 % in 1989 to 11,9 % in 1994 and 9,4 % in 1995, before accelerating to 10,2 % in 1996 (South African Reserve Bank, 1999: 11).

Figure 5.7.1 Evolution of wages SA (1994-1999)

The rise in the remuneration per worker in the private sector went from 10,0 % in 1994 to 11,2 % in 1995 and then slowed down to 10,7 % in 1996. The rate of increase in remuneration per worker in the public sector slowed down from a rate of 14,9 % in 1994 to 6,5 % in 1995 – the lowest rate of increase since 1972 – but accelerated again to 8,9 % in 1996. The average compound rates of increase over the period 1989 to 1996 for each sector amounted to approximately 12 % per year (South African Reserve Bank, 1996: 9; 1997: 11). These figures can be summarised as follows:

There has been (and current data indicates that there still is) an important decrease\(^{34}\) in employment (see Table 5.10) in all sectors with the exception of finance and public

\(^{34}\) For instance in 1995 there were about 8 069 000 people employed and in 1997, the figure drops to 7 548 000 (Orkin, 1998: 32 – figures refer to formal sector).
authorities in the period 1994-1999. The decrease in those less skilled sectors (mining, electricity, trade, etc.) especially affects those less skilled workers, generally Blacks. On the other hand, the fact that there has been an increase in job-creation in the public and finance sectors, implies that those qualified Blacks are enjoying a highly remunerated position, whereas their counterparts who are less skilled are becoming unemployed. At the same time, a high wage increase can do nothing but worsen the situation, as it enlarges the distance in terms of wealth between employed and unemployed. This could lead to the frustration of many people, mainly Blacks and a change in their attitudes toward the government and the democracy in general.

If those unemployed Blacks become aware of that situation, they may start wondering whether the situation is fair or not. The years of struggle for democracy may have produced only benefits for a qualified minority. This is especially important if it is taken into account that for most South Africans democracy is related to jobs and houses (Bratton & Mattes, 1999: 11). However, several surveys reveal that Black people do not blame the government for this situation. Idasa surveys reveal that "the government received extremely negative public ratings in the area of job creation, with favourable ratings ranging between 36% and 26% from mid-1995 to 1997. That decreased even further by the third quarter of 1998, with an abysmally low 12% approving of government performance, [w]hile it recovered to 24% by April 1999..." (Mattes et al., 1999: 41). However, "[a]cross all dimensions, there is a fairly clear pattern: Evaluations of government performance tended to improve sharply in late 1998 and early 1999. Of the 19 performance dimensions [that were] measured, ratings of the government were at their zenith in 12 of these areas by April 1999. This suggests a clear success in the ANC's efforts to advance its cause in a convincing manner, run a broadly positive re-election campaign, and ultimately create a broad 'feel good' effect among the electorate" (Mattes et al., 1999: 44). In general, it can be said that the government, at least at the end of the legislature, was not blamed by most South Africans.

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35 This is based on OHS, AME and STEE surveys from Statistic SA and several estimations from the South African Reserve Bank (SARB, 1998: 14; SARB, 1999: 12-13)
36 In the public sector there are also other job-categories such as labourers, but the fact that in those low-skilled sectors there has been job loss implies that the creation of jobs in the public sector has occurred at the high-skilled level
37 The Gini index for Black population increased from 0.35 in 1990 to 0.55 in 1995. Thus, before the first democratic elections the inequality within the Black population was already enlarging. There is no information available for later periods yet.
However, a further analysis of the "consolidation of democracy" variable is necessary to state conclusions properly. At present, the only clear argument that can be maintained is that the middle class has experienced a small increase during the democratic period, with the White population benefiting the most, together with the Black population – at the top level of the middle class and helped by 'affirmative action'.

5.8 Consolidated democracy: Trust and Political tolerance analysed

In the previous section the middle class was identified and analysed. It was found that the middle class is growing. Once it was dissected by its occupational composition the growth was found to be mainly due to the Black entrance into the public institutions and forced by "affirmative action".

In this section, the "consolidation of democracy" – in terms of political tolerance and trust – will undergo the same process. The results presented in Chapter 4 are now analysed in detail. In this section, the reader will be shown the distribution of those values throughout the population according to differences of race, age, income, education and occupation. These cleavages have been proposed by the relevant literature and selected for the following reasons:

• Race: In a society like the South African society, with a past based on racial divisions, the monitoring of the differences at this level becomes crucial. South Africa's history has been marked a permanent struggle among different population groups for social, political and economical inclusion/exclusion (see section 5.3 above). Thus, it seems to be important to view the distribution of tolerance among the different population groups (Finifter & Mickiewicz, 1992: 982-864; Gibson & Gouws, 1999: 513).

• Age: Age is an important cleavage to analyse. Attitudes toward democracy are expected to be influenced by age. Actually, most studies assessing political culture in changing regimes encounter younger cohorts more tolerant than older ones, who generally are more embedded in the past. This has implications for democratic

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38 This selection does not imply that there are not other cleavages of importance. It simply means that these are the most important according to the literature. For others, such as male/female see, for instance Gouws (1999).
consolidation as, if it is so that younger people are more tolerant, tolerance could be expected to decrease with the passing of time (White, 1979: 182; Bahyr, 1987: 94; Gibson et al. 1992: 356-357).

- **Income:** Those who benefit the most from a system are least likely to want to change it (Gibson et al., 1992: 355). Thus, if income increases among those least favoured sectors, tolerance, an essential part of democracy, is supposed to grow. This is especially important in South Africa, where democracy is understood as a system to facilitate “access to jobs and houses”, in other words, to increase the standard of living (Bratton & Mattes, 1999: 9). Thus, it is expected that those with lower levels of incomes show lower commitment to democracy and, hence, display a lower level of tolerance.

- **Education:** Education is also expected to have an important effect on political culture. More highly educated people are expected to show higher levels of commitment to democracy (Pye, 1990: 9; Breytenbach, 1998: 3; on this see also Gibson & Duch, 1992).

- **Occupation:** Occupation is an important cleavage to take into account when “breaking down” the political culture into its components. Those with high-skilled jobs are found to be more committed to democracy and, hence, more tolerant (Finieter & Mickiewicz, 1992: 865) and because, as stated in Chapter 3, occupation serves as a primary indicator of class in general, and middle class in particular.

As said in Chapter 4, this study relies on political tolerance and trust as the main indicators of democratic consolidation. In Chapter 3 it was explained that the idea of consolidation of democracy is a complex one and that it may involve many issues. It was finally determined and motivated that democracy can only be consolidated when it is regarded as the only system fit to rule the society. This had to be reflected in the political culture of the citizenry. Political culture refers to a very wide spectrum of issues, some of which did not even have any relation to democratic consolidation. Thus, only those indicators that best indicate the commitment toward democratic institutions were analysed. These were political tolerance and trust. The justification was done in Chapter 4. For instance, nobody is regarded as undemocratic because of
his/her lack of interest in politics – they may be called idiots but not undemocratic – but those who are politically intolerant are seen as undemocratic (see for instance, McClosky, 1964). On the other hand, the lack of trust in the democratic institutions has been one of the main reasons for the break-down of democracy as occurred in Peru, through its own President in 1992, or, more recently, the coup staged by the army in Ecuador (El Pais, 22-01-00), or the lack of democratic consolidation in Russia (Rose, 1994). Actually, there is no agreement on the importance of any other indicator of political culture when studying democratic consolidation (Gibson et al., 1992).

In other words, analysing the evolution of trust and political tolerance through the years and its distribution through the different social cleavages or rifts (race, age, education, income and occupation) will allow us to address the important question with which this section deals: The commitment to democracy in South Africa. The other indicators will be referred to when necessary, to strengthen the conclusions at which this study may arrive.

Against this background, although aware of the complexities of political culture, this section is focused on the main aspects of democratic consolidation, namely political tolerance and trust.

### 5.8.1 Political tolerance in South Africa: An analysis

In Chapter 4 the main procedures for measuring political tolerance were explained. The 'least-liked method' was finally selected because it allows the respondent to select his/her own least-liked group. Two indicators of tolerance were used to present the analysis. One measured whether people would allow those least-liked to live in their neighbourhood and another tested whether they would allow the least-liked to make a political speech in their neighbourhood. The first one measures political tolerance and

---

39 In ancient Greece, those not interested in politics were called idiots.
40 This is evidenced in the extensive literature pertaining to the field. Most studies investigating pro-democracy political culture have tolerance and trust in common. Other indexes are also incorporated but these two are present and regarded as the main ones (Gibson et al., 1992: 332-337). On tolerance, see Stouffer, 1955; Prothro & Grigg, 1960; McClosky, 1964; Sniderman, 1974; Num et al., 1978; Sullivan et al., 1982; Muller, 1988; McClosky and Brill, 1989; Gibson, 1989; 1996; 1998; Duch & Gibson, 1992; Sniderman et al., 1991; Gouws, 1991; 1996; Gibson & Gouws, 1998; 1999. On trust see Rose, 1994; Gibson et al., 1992; Thomas, 1998; Humphrey & Schnitz, 1998; Scholz, & Lubell, 1998; Zussman, 1997 to cite a few.
the second social tolerance (Sullivan et al., 1982: 84-109). Longitudinal data on political tolerance are only available after 1994. This does not affect the intention of the study, as democracy was launched in 1994. The results are again presented in the following table.

**Table 5.12 Allow least-liked to live in your neighbourhood**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>48.4</td>
<td>43.1</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>51.04</td>
<td>42.4</td>
<td>22.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Entries represent the percentage of people willing to allow a member of a least-like group in their neighbourhood. 

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ns</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3392</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.13 Allow least-liked to give political speech in your neighbourhood

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1994</th>
<th>1998</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td>69.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>60.8</td>
<td>21.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Entries represent the percentage (all the population groups) of the population allowing someone from their respective least-liked groups to give a political speech in their neighbourhood. The difference between them represents the 'D'K or uncertain'.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ns</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2517</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As the tables show and as explained in Chapter 4, tolerance has increased since 1983. In 1983, only 48.4% of people, according to the survey, were ready to allow least-liked people to live as their neighbours. In 1998 this percentage increased to 68% (22.9% for refusal). In the critical year of 1994, both acceptance and refusal dropped to 43.1% and 42.4%, respectively. This might be interpreted against the political developments of that time. Before adopting a clear stand, be it of acceptance or refusal, people probably prefer to see the evolution of the political situation. South Africa in 1994 had already been involved in negotiations on political transition, for four years, and the future was uncertain in that sense. Regarding the second table, the increase in tolerance is also important.

The results will now be analysed further. The effect of the *race, age, income, education* and *occupation* is explained. The results are presented chronologically, 1983,

---

41 In 1983, mixed residential areas were prohibited by law.
1994 and 1999. For 1983, the data set is composed of four different surveys, one per population group. Thus, all the results will be presented according to race. All the following tables for tolerance present the results obtained.

The social and political tolerance values will be analysed for 1983, 1994 and 1998. For each year the results will be dissected according to race, age, education, income and education. For 1983, each cleavage is sub-analysed by race. The analysis starts with 1983. There are no data available on political tolerance for 1983. As said before, this does not affect the main intention of the study as democracy was launched in 1994. Thus, for 1983, only data on social tolerance is offered.

5.8.1.1 (Social) Tolerance in South Africa 1983

The general results from 1983 are presented again in the table below.

Before analysing these low levels of tolerance it may be necessary to remember that mixed residential areas were forbidden by law at this point in time. This could have influenced the respondent when answering. Although, on the other hand, it is also important to note that this low level of tolerance might be the reason for that law to exist.

5.8.1.1.a Race

Any later analysis (age, education, income and occupation) will also present the results according to race. However, a brief exposition of the general results according to the different population groups seems important. The following table shows the levels of tolerance toward the least-liked group by race.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Race</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Yes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>47.5</td>
<td>52.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>82.5</td>
<td>16.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coloured</td>
<td>32.7</td>
<td>66.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian</td>
<td>34.4</td>
<td>53.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Entries represent the percentage of every population group supporting each option (Yes or No)

| Ns = 3378 |

---

42 HSRC '83 survey. For description see Chapter 4.
According to the figure the highest level of intolerance in 1983 was encountered in the White population, followed by Blacks, Indians and Coloured.

What is important, is that all White, Coloured and Indian like Blacks the least, although intolerance is not highly concentrated in Black population. The following table shows those results:

Table 5.15 Target group (1983)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Race of respondent</th>
<th>Black</th>
<th>White</th>
<th>Coloured</th>
<th>Indian</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td></td>
<td>47.5</td>
<td>34.6</td>
<td>40.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>82.6</td>
<td></td>
<td>76.3</td>
<td>77.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coloured</td>
<td>32.7</td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td></td>
<td>20.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian</td>
<td>34.4</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>30.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Entries represent the percentage of intolerance of each population group (left) toward each population group (right top). I.e. (in bold) 82.6% of Whites would refuse to accept a Black person living in their neighbourhood. Ns = 3378

White intolerance of Indians reaches 77.2%, Coloureds, 76.3% and Blacks, 82.6%. Indian intolerance of Whites is at 28.9%, of Coloureds, 30.2%, and of Blacks, 34.4%. Coloured intolerance shows the following figures: 32.2% to Whites, 20.8% to Coloureds and 32.7% to Blacks. Black intolerance ranks as follows: 47.5 to Whites, 34.6% to Coloureds and 40.5% to Indians.

In general terms, the intolerance is not concentrated in a single target, although it is concentrated more on Blacks and mainly from Whites. There is not any one intolerant group (all groups show intolerance to all the others). The absence of a clear target group is called 'pluralistic' intolerance and it means that repression of the target group is difficult (Sullivan et al., 1982: 82-109).

5.8.1.1.b Age

The second cleavage analysed is age. The tolerance values are analysed along the different age groups. The population groups are presented in order, according to the size of the population group, namely Blacks, Whites, Coloured and Indians.
### Table 5.16 Tolerance by age (Black, 1983)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>D’k</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18-25</td>
<td>49.7</td>
<td>50.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26-35</td>
<td>45.4</td>
<td>54.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36-45</td>
<td>45.0</td>
<td>55.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46-55</td>
<td>42.5</td>
<td>57.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56-65</td>
<td>48.6</td>
<td>51.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt;65</td>
<td>59.6</td>
<td>40.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Black</td>
<td>47.4</td>
<td>52.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Entries represent the percentage of tolerance (acceptance – Yes/ refusal – No) of each age group for Black population. Ns = 3378

### Table 5.17 Tolerance by age (White, 1983)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>D’k</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18-25</td>
<td>76.1</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26-35</td>
<td>80.6</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36-45</td>
<td>86.0</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46-55</td>
<td>83.3</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56-65</td>
<td>90.2</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt;65</td>
<td>78.4</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total White</td>
<td>82.7</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Entries represent the percentage of the tolerance (acceptance – Yes/ refusal – No) of each age group for White population. Ns = 3378

### Table 5.18 Tolerance by age (Coloured, 1983)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>D’k</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18-25</td>
<td>31.4</td>
<td>67.4</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26-35</td>
<td>33.9</td>
<td>66.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36-45</td>
<td>32.7</td>
<td>66.1</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46-55</td>
<td>32.4</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56-65</td>
<td>30.3</td>
<td>65.8</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt;65</td>
<td>38.7</td>
<td>61.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Coloured</td>
<td>32.7</td>
<td>66.2</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Entries represent the percentage of the tolerance (acceptance – Yes/ refusal – No) of each age group for White population. Ns = 3378
Table 5.19 Tolerance by age (Indian, 1983)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>D'k</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18-25</td>
<td>37.2</td>
<td>56.0</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26-35</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>56.1</td>
<td>15.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36-45</td>
<td>30.7</td>
<td>58.4</td>
<td>10.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46-55</td>
<td>40.8</td>
<td>45.4</td>
<td>13.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56-65</td>
<td>48.3</td>
<td>37.9</td>
<td>13.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt;65</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Indian</td>
<td>34.5</td>
<td>53.9</td>
<td>11.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Entries represent the percentage of the tolerance (acceptance – Yes/ refusal – No) of each age cohort for Indian population. Ns = 3378

The tables reveal that for Blacks, intolerance decreases from youngest (50.3% acceptance) to middle-aged people (57.5% of acceptance for 46-55 years old) and increases again as the age increases (40.4% acceptance for people over 65).

For Whites, the figure indicates that the intolerance is high at all ages, although the level of intolerance of youngest group is 76.1% which increases up to 90.2% for older people (56-65 years old). This level decreases again to 74.8%. This population group shows the highest level of intolerance. Before anything, it is important to remember that, when this survey was conducted, mixed residences were forbidden by law, although, it is also possible that these high levels of intolerance provide an explanation for the existence of that law.

For the Coloured population, the figure shows that the tolerance of this group remains high at all levels of age, although the acceptance decreases slightly for the group over 65 (from 65.8% for people 56-65 years old to 61.3% for people over 65 years old).

The Indian population’s figure reveals that the acceptance of the least-liked groups is higher among the younger age groups (58.4% for 26-35) than in the older sectors (50.0 %). Older people are more intolerant.

In general, it can be said that young sectors of all groups are more tolerant than middle age groups. Intolerance increases in all groups (with the exception of Indians, with whom it decreases) when age is over 65. Intolerance levels of all groups remain
high, although the White population is the least tolerant.

5.8.1.1.c Income

Now the same process will be undertaken with the focus on income. Again, each population group is presented separately. Again, one figure per population group is presented. The income refers to Rands per year.

Table 5.20 Tolerance by income (Black, 1983)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Yes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&lt;3999</td>
<td>46.3</td>
<td>53.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4000-9999</td>
<td>54.3</td>
<td>45.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10000-20000</td>
<td>29.4</td>
<td>70.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt;20000</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>47.0</td>
<td>53.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Entries represent the percentage of tolerance (acceptance – Yes/ refusal – No) at each income level for Black population (income =R/year). Ns = 3378

Table 5.21 Tolerance by income (White, 1983)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>D'k</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&lt;3999</td>
<td>84.1</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4000-9999</td>
<td>85.0</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10000-20000</td>
<td>83.0</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt;20000</td>
<td>73.0</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>82.6</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Entries represent the percentage of the tolerance (acceptance – Yes/ refusal – No) at each income level for White population (income =R/year). Ns = 3378

Table 5.22 Tolerance by income (Coloured, 1983)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>D'k</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&lt;3999</td>
<td>36.2</td>
<td>63.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4000-9999</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>77.6</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10000-20000</td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td>69.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt;20000</td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td>66.8</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td>66.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Entries represent the percentage of tolerance (acceptance – Yes/ refusal – No) at each income level for Coloured population (income=R/year). Ns = 3378

227
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tolerance by income (Indian, 1983)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&lt;3999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4000-9999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10000-20000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt;20000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Entries represent the percentage of tolerance (acceptance – Yes/ refusal – No) at each income level for Indian population (income=R/year). Ns = 3378

The Black population shows a high level of intolerance in both low and middle-income groups. The acceptance seems to increase at high levels of income, although the low Ns (3 and 2 for the two highest incomes respectively), somehow discredit the information provided. Up to R10 000 of income the intolerance decreases as the income increases (over R10 000, the low Ns discredit the reliability of the data, and, hence, the information provided).

As shown, the White population has the highest level of intolerance. The White population has higher levels of tolerance at higher levels of income. The lowest income, however present the highest mark of acceptance, but, again, the Ns for this group is too small (i.e. 3 for no-income) to be significant. Thus, the reliability of the information for low-income Whites becomes dubious as for the high-income Black population.

The Coloured population also tends to show the highest tolerance toward the highest income. At the mid-high level there is a decrease in tolerance, which increases at the high level. However, the low Ns (4 and 2 for the two highest respectively) again question the reliability of the information provided by the data at the high level of income.

The Indian population follows the same trend. Tolerance decreases from no income to mid-low and increases as income increases. In general, it can be said that intolerance in South Africa in 1983 is higher at low-income levels, irrespective of the population group.

5.8.1.1.d Education

The following is the explanation of the same results according to the level of
education of the respondent. It is expected that those with higher levels of education show lower levels of intolerance. Following the same line, one table per population group is presented. The tables, as before, are analysed at the end.

**Table 5.24 Tolerance by education (Black, 1983)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education Level</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Yes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>59.6</td>
<td>40.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stand. 5 (primary school)</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>55.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stand. 6 or 7 (or equivalent)</td>
<td>40.8</td>
<td>59.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stand. 8 or 9</td>
<td>49.5</td>
<td>50.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stand. 10 (Matric)</td>
<td>59.3</td>
<td>40.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matric plus 1 or 2 years of further training</td>
<td>40.7</td>
<td>59.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More</td>
<td>55.6</td>
<td>44.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>47.5</td>
<td>52.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Entries represent the percentage of tolerance (acceptance – Yes/ refusal – No) at each education level for the Black population. Ns = 3378

**Table 5.25 Tolerance by education (White, 1983)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education Level</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>D'k</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stand. 5 (primary school)</td>
<td>86.2</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stand. 6 or 7 (or equivalent)</td>
<td>89.6</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stand. 8 or 9</td>
<td>93.3</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stand. 10 (Matric)</td>
<td>81.5</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matric plus 1 or 2 years of further training</td>
<td>69.8</td>
<td>30.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More</td>
<td>67.5</td>
<td>30.8</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>82.6</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Entries represent the percentage of tolerance (acceptance – Yes/ refusal – No) at each education level for the White population. Ns = 3378
Table 5.26 Tolerance by education (Coloured, 1983)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>D'k</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>57.1</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary school</td>
<td>35.2</td>
<td>64.2</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stand. 6 or 7 (or equivalent)</td>
<td>29.4</td>
<td>70.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stand. 8 or 9</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>65.5</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stand. 10 (Matric)</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>66.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matric plus 1 or 2 years of further training</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>80.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More</td>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>32.8</td>
<td>64.5</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Entries represent the percentage of tolerance (acceptance – Yes/ refusal – No) at each education level for the Coloured population. \( N_s = 3378 \)

Table 5.27 Tolerance by education (Indian, 1983)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>D'k</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>47.8</td>
<td>37.0</td>
<td>15.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary school</td>
<td>38.0</td>
<td>48.5</td>
<td>13.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stand. 6 or 7 (or equivalent)</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>69.9</td>
<td>9.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stand. 8 or 9</td>
<td>25.6</td>
<td>66.1</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stand. 10 (Matric)</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>77.1</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matric plus 1 or 2 years of further training</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>86.4</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>90.5</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td>63.5</td>
<td>9.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Entries represent the percentage of tolerance (acceptance – Yes/ refusal – No) at each education level for the Indian population. \( N_s = 3378 \)

Whites, Indians and Coloureds increase their levels of tolerance as their levels of education increases. However, there does not seem to be any relation between education and tolerance for Blacks. Once again, however, the low \( N_s \) for high education levels (9 for “More”) for the Black population discredits the reliability of the analysis. Most of the Black population has low levels of education. At that level (from “none” to “Stand. 6, 7 or equivalent”) the intolerance decreases as the education increases. Consequently, and as expected, it can be stated that the higher the education, the higher the tolerance.

5.8.1.1.e Occupation

The last cleavage to be analysed regarding tolerance in 1983 is occupation. It is also expected that those occupations that imply higher levels of skill and education show
higher levels of tolerance.

Table 5.28 Tolerance by occupation (Black, 1983)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Yes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>41.0</td>
<td>59.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manager and clerk</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>50.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled worker</td>
<td>40.4</td>
<td>59.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-skilled</td>
<td>52.6</td>
<td>47.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unskilled</td>
<td>38.7</td>
<td>61.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>42.5</td>
<td>57.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Entries represent the percentage the tolerance (acceptance - Yes/ refusals - No) at each occupation category for the Black population. Ns = 3378

Table 5.29 Tolerance by Occupation (White, 1983)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>D'k</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>72.7</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manager and clerk</td>
<td>85.8</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled worker</td>
<td>84.8</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-skilled</td>
<td>82.6</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unskilled</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>82.5</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Entries represent the percentage of tolerance (acceptance - Yes/ refusals - No) at each occupation category for the White population. Ns = 3378

Table 5.30 Tolerance by occupation (Coloured, 1983)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Yes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>75.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manager and clerk</td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td>69.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled worker</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>71.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-skilled</td>
<td>25.3</td>
<td>74.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unskilled</td>
<td>40.5</td>
<td>59.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>30.1</td>
<td>69.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Entries represent the percentage of tolerance (acceptance - Yes/ refusals - No) at each occupation category for Coloured population. Ns = 3378
Table 5.31 Tolerance by Occupation (Indian, 1983)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>D'k</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>77.3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manager and clerk</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>69.4</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled worker</td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td>52.7</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-skilled</td>
<td>43.2</td>
<td>44.3</td>
<td>15.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unskilled</td>
<td>58.6</td>
<td>41.4</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>30.7</td>
<td>58.7</td>
<td>10.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Entries represent the percentage of tolerance (acceptance – Yes/ refusal – No) at each occupation category for Coloured population. \( Ns = 3378 \)

An important aspect to take into account is the \( Ns \) again. The wide distribution along the different occupations prevents high levels of accuracy (i.e. White unskilled 7). This consequently reduces the accuracy of the analysis. Besides, it is possible to deduce from the tables that, for instance, both Indians and Coloureds in highly qualified occupations, generally, are more tolerant than those less qualified. For Whites, however, the intolerance remains high at all levels of occupation, although, for instance, professionals rank at the highest level of tolerance. For Blacks, again, the relation between occupation and intolerance again is the minimum. Professionals show the same levels of intolerance as “semi-skilled workers” or “unskilled workers”.

5.8.1.1.1 Tolerance in South Africa in 1983: Summary

After surveying the existing (social) tolerance in South Africa and its distribution along the main cleavages — race, age, employment, income and education —, it can be stated that South Africa in 1983 was an intolerant society irrespective of race, although this was more concentrated in the White group. All population groups, however, show intolerance toward all others (although more to the Black population).

Consequently, this pluralistic\(^{43}\) intolerance (social)\(^{44}\) prevents serious repression on the target group. Actually, there is neither concentration of intolerance \textit{from} any group

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\(^{43}\) Although intolerance (social) is spread all over the society, it is more concentrated in Blacks.

\(^{44}\) For 1983, the results focus on social tolerance and not on political tolerance. However, other studies conducted in the early 1990s show that political tolerance was also high (see Gouws, 1991) and, as this study will show, political tolerance decreases from the pre-democratic period to the democratic one (Gibson & Gouws, 1998; 1999).
(no clear intolerant group, although Whites shows the highest level of intolerance) nor concentration of intolerance in any clear target (least-liked group). This makes intolerance in 1983 in South Africa "to 'be 'pluralistic', that is, there seems to be little consensus that a single group represents any overwhelming threat to the system" (Gibson et al., 1992: 339). This, in contrast to countries where there is a wide-spread agreement about what constitutes a major threat to society (i.e. Israel – see Shamir & Sullivan, 1983: 927-928 – or the United States in 1950 when communists were perceived to pose a serious threat\(^4\)). This means that intolerance seems to be distributed so broadly that the threat "it poses to liberty is neutralised" (Gibson et al., 1992: 339; Gibson, 1988: 511-512). This type of intolerance "bespeaks a type of intolerance in [South Africa] that is unlikely to be mobilised for the purposes of repression" (Gibson et al., 1992: 339; on this see Sullivan et al., 1982: esp. 84-109).

At first sight, those levels of intolerance suggest that democracy could not work in South African society in 1983. However, previous explanations might be a key to understanding the transition to the democracy that came to pass since De Klerk abolished apartheid in the early 1990s. With this consideration regarding the existing level of intolerance in South Africa in 1983, the analysis goes on to 1994, the year of the first democratic elections.

**5.8.1.2 (Social and political) tolerance in South Africa, 1994**

Before analysing the situation that existed in 1994, it is important to stress that 1994 was the year of the first democratic elections in South Africa. The country had been in transition for four years. More than 2000 people died due to political violence and the uncertainty about the future was a very important political factor.

The data for 1994\(^4\) will be analysed in the same way as that of 1983. After that, its distribution along the same cleavages (*race, age, income, employment* and *education*) is analysed. The reason was previously explained at the beginning of this Chapter. Data on political tolerance are available for this period. Thus, data for both social and political tolerance are offered. As with 1983 results, the cleavages will be those of race, age,

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\(^4\) Idasa 1994 elections survey. See Chapter 4 for description.
income, education and occupation. Race is the first one.

5.8.1.2.a Race

Before getting into a detailed analysis as with 1983, a general view of the situation relating to race is important. The following table explains the differences between races in 1983 and 1994.

Table 5.32 Would you allow “a least liked group” to live in your neighbourhood? (1983-94)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>White</th>
<th>Black</th>
<th>Coloured</th>
<th>Indian</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>82.5</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>47.5</td>
<td>52.5</td>
<td>32.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>44.2</td>
<td>41.6</td>
<td>44.3</td>
<td>34.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.33 Would you allow “a least liked group” to give a political speech in your area? (1994)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>D'k</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>66.1</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>39.6</td>
<td>50.6</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coloured</td>
<td>27.9</td>
<td>60.5</td>
<td>11.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian</td>
<td>57.1</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>27.6</td>
<td>62.5</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Regarding social tolerance (first table), both the acceptance and refusal figures decrease (with the exception of the Coloured population), which might be explained by the uncertainty about the future. As said above, the tricameral parliament was approved in 1983 with the exclusion of Blacks, and the social and political unrest increased. Several repressive measures were applied to calm down the situation. In the liberation of Nelson Mandela and the un-banning of the ANC 1990 were announced and the country had been involved in political negotiations for four years. In essence, the future was uncertain. This context of uncertainty may have influenced the decrease of both acceptance and refusal. People might have been waiting to see what the future was going to hold.

Social tolerance data show that the White population has came to greater acceptance of the mixed composition of South Africa in these 11 years, although the intolerance level still remains high. The Indian population, together with Whites, reveals the largest increase in tolerance (43.7% decrease of intolerance for Whites and 26.2% for Indians).
Coloured intolerance does not decrease and many of those who were ready to accept least-liked individuals as neighbours came to be uncertain about it (17.4%). The Black population has decreased its level of acceptance (12.1%). At the same time, the rejection of the least-liked individual has decreased but in small measure only (4.6%). The Black population has taken over as the most intolerant group. Still, the White population’s intolerance level remains high. The Indian population is the most tolerant.

Against this background, it can be stated that the effects of the transition and the uncertainty about the future made South African society, in general, reluctant to tolerate those least-liked individuals. It is important to note the important decrease in White intolerance. With the high level of intolerance shown in 1983, the transition would probably have not have been achieved through a political pact, following the model of Brazil in the late 1960s, Spain in the mid-1970s or Poland in the late 1980s.

Table 5.34 Distribution of (in) tolerance (1994)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Least-liked group (political party)</th>
<th>ANC</th>
<th>NP</th>
<th>IFP</th>
<th>FF</th>
<th>DP</th>
<th>PAC</th>
<th>ACDP</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>More than one</th>
<th>Confidential</th>
<th>None</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>22.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>41.8</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>27.4</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coloured</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>30.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>78.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Entries represent the percentage of people in each population group targeting supporters of each party as least-liked in 1994.

The distribution of the target group is shown in the table above. Whites concentrated their intolerance on the ANC and the PAC. Blacks concentrated it on the IFP more than on the NP. This can be interpreted as a shift in target group. There is no concentration on "White" as in 1983 (or on a White party). Above all, Indians seem to have learnt "to put up with their political enemies" best, as their response shows a very high level of tolerance. However, the strongest concentration is also on the ANC. Thus, White, Coloured and Indian people are concentrating their intolerance on a Black party (in 1983 it was in Black people).
5.8.1.2.b Age

The next cleavage to be analysed is that of age. Its effect on the existing levels of social and political tolerance is presented in the tables below.

Table 5.35 Would you allow “a least-liked group” to live in your neighbourhood? (1994)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Group</th>
<th>Yes (%)</th>
<th>No (%)</th>
<th>DK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18-25</td>
<td>40.3</td>
<td>44.7</td>
<td>15.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26-35</td>
<td>43.4</td>
<td>42.4</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36-45</td>
<td>46.4</td>
<td>38.4</td>
<td>15.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46-55</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>41.9</td>
<td>15.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56-65</td>
<td>50.5</td>
<td>38.5</td>
<td>11.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt;65</td>
<td>35.6</td>
<td>53.4</td>
<td>11.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>43.1</td>
<td>42.4</td>
<td>14.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Entries represent the percentage of people in each income category willing to allow a member of the “least-liked” group to live in their neighbourhood. Ns = 2517

Table 5.36 Would you allow “a least-liked group” to give a political speech in your area (1994)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Group</th>
<th>Yes (%)</th>
<th>No (%)</th>
<th>DK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18-25</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>62.1</td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26-35</td>
<td>28.4</td>
<td>63.4</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36-45</td>
<td>25.6</td>
<td>63.5</td>
<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46-55</td>
<td>28.1</td>
<td>60.7</td>
<td>11.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56-65</td>
<td>28.4</td>
<td>63.8</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt;65</td>
<td>27.4</td>
<td>58.9</td>
<td>13.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>27.6</td>
<td>62.6</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Entries represent the percentage of people in each income category willing to allow a member of the “least-liked” group to give a political speech in their neighbourhood. Ns = 2517

Both tables can be summarised as follows: Social and political tolerance seems to decrease with age until 56-65 years of age, but older people still are more intolerant (people’s memories are more closely connected to apartheid experiences). Maturity seems to make people more tolerant, although, at over 65, people, who probably are more embedded in the past, become more intolerant.
5.8.1.2.c Income

The explained cleavage to be explained now is income. The distribution of social and political tolerance values through the different income levels will be analysed. The figures are based on Rands per month.

Table 5.37 Would you allow “a least-liked group” to live in your neighbourhood? (1994)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income Level</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>D'k</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&lt;3499</td>
<td>40.5</td>
<td>44.9</td>
<td>14.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3500-9999</td>
<td>46.4</td>
<td>36.9</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10000-19999</td>
<td>49.3</td>
<td>35.8</td>
<td>14.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20000 or more</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>43.1</td>
<td>42.4</td>
<td>14.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Entries represent the percentage of people in each income category willing to allow a member of the “least-liked” group to live in their neighbourhood. Ns = 2517

Table 5.38 Would you allow “a least-liked group” to give a political speech in your area (1994)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income Level</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>D'k</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&lt;3499</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>65.2</td>
<td>10.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3500-9999</td>
<td>37.6</td>
<td>56.7</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10000-19999</td>
<td>43.9</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20000 or more</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>62.9</td>
<td>9.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Entries represent the percentage of people in each income category willing to allow a member of the “least-liked” group to give a political speech in their neighbourhood. Ns = 2517

Both tables show that income seems to influence the level of tolerance. The higher the income in South Africa in 1994, the higher the tolerance. Probably, those who earn higher incomes have higher levels of education and, therefore, higher levels of understanding and tolerance. They also may feel less threatened.

5.8.1.2.d Education

Now results are presented according to the level of education. The results are presented in Tables 5.39 and 5.40.
Table 5.39 Would you allow “a least-liked group” to live in your neighbourhood? (1994)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>D'k</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>none</td>
<td>34.5</td>
<td>41.4</td>
<td>24.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>primary</td>
<td>40.4</td>
<td>41.6</td>
<td>18.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>std6</td>
<td>42.0</td>
<td>42.0</td>
<td>16.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>std8</td>
<td>39.0</td>
<td>45.4</td>
<td>15.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>std9</td>
<td>40.5</td>
<td>48.3</td>
<td>11.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>std10</td>
<td>43.0</td>
<td>44.6</td>
<td>12.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt;std9 + dipl</td>
<td>48.4</td>
<td>38.2</td>
<td>13.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>degree</td>
<td>62.9</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>15.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>43.1</td>
<td>42.4</td>
<td>14.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Entries represent the percentage of people in each education level willing to allow a member of the “least-liked” group to live in their neighbourhood. Ns = 2517

Table 5.40 Would you allow “a least-liked group” to give a political speech in your area? (1994)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>D'k</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>none</td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td>58.6</td>
<td>20.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>primary</td>
<td>29.3</td>
<td>55.3</td>
<td>15.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>std6</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>71.7</td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>std8</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>67.3</td>
<td>11.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>std9</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>71.8</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>std10</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>61.9</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt;std9 + dipl</td>
<td>35.2</td>
<td>58.7</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>degree</td>
<td>54.6</td>
<td>40.2</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>27.6</td>
<td>62.5</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Entries represent the percentage of people in each income category willing to allow a member of the “least-liked” group to give a political speech in their neighbourhood. Ns = 2517

Once again, there is an important tendency to the increase of tolerance as the level of education increases. More educated people have higher levels of understanding and, hence, show higher levels of tolerance.

5.8.1.2.e Occupation

As with 1983 data, the following cleavage to be analysed is occupation. The following table offers the results:
Table 5.41 Would you allow “a least-liked group” to live in your neighbourhood? (1994)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>D'k</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>51.5</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>15.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manager</td>
<td>64.3</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>11.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerk</td>
<td>44.5</td>
<td>40.9</td>
<td>14.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled worker</td>
<td>41.3</td>
<td>43.7</td>
<td>15.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-skilled worker</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>75.0</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unskilled worker</td>
<td>41.3</td>
<td>42.3</td>
<td>16.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>44.8</td>
<td>40.7</td>
<td>14.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Entries represent the percentage of people in each occupation category willing to allow a member of the “least-liked” group to live in their neighbourhood. \( N_s = 2517 \)

Table 5.42 Would you allow “a least-liked group” to give a political speech in your area? (1994)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>D'k</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>47.1</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manager</td>
<td>47.2</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerk</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>63.0</td>
<td>13.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled worker</td>
<td>27.1</td>
<td>62.1</td>
<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-skilled worker</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unskilled worker</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>65.7</td>
<td>12.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>29.4</td>
<td>60.9</td>
<td>9.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Entries represent the percentage of people in each income category willing to allow a member of the “least-liked” group to give a political speech in their neighbourhood. \( N_s = 2517 \)

The tables presented above clearly show that professionals and managers have higher levels of tolerance than those in less skilled occupations. Higher levels of education in high skilled occupations probably have an important effect. Thus, the more skilled, the more tolerant (both socially and politically).

5.8.1.2.1 Social and Political tolerance in South Africa in 1994: Summary

After analysing in detail the intolerance level in 1994, it can be said that the transition period has had an important influence on the tolerance levels, as evidenced by the tables. The uncertainty about the future makes people wait to see what the future in the new political and social context brings. Thus, levels both of acceptance and of refusal decrease. Important to note is the progress in tolerance of the White and Indian populations.
The pluralistic (social) intolerance of 1983 is turning into more concentrated intolerance (both social and political intolerance). In 1983, the Black population was the main target group, although it was not the only one and the difference was not large. In 1994, generally, White, Coloured and Indian populations were intolerant of Black organisations (ANC) and the Black population of the IFP (also Black). Thus, the Black population is becoming the target group.

Again, the more noticeable influence on tolerance seems to come from education. The more educated, the more tolerant. Once the main doubts about the future disappear, tolerance is expected to increase. This will be tested in the following section of the study: The analysis of tolerance in 1998.

The political tolerance indicator follows the same trend and its analysis by race, education, occupation and income show the same results as those for social tolerance.

5.8.1.3 Tolerance in South Africa, 1998

The latest data available on tolerance for this study is from 1998, four years after the first democratic elections. Politics in South Africa had been developing peacefully. The Government of National Unity gave way to a government entirely composed of the ANC and the second democratic elections were close. The presentation follows the procedure as used for 1983 and for 1994. The general results are presented in a table, below, with comparable data from 1983 and from 1994. After that, as previously done, the same cleavages are analysed, being race, age, income, education and occupation.

The tables below show the evolution of both social (Table 5.43) and political (Table 5.44) tolerance. Both follow similar trends: Increase. After four years of democracy 68% of respondents would allow a least-liked people to live in their neighbourhood and 69.3% would allow the least-liked to make political speech. The data sets do not reveal who is the least-liked group. However, other studies specifically conducted for measuring tolerance in South Africa show that the least-liked group remains the same as in 1994. The Coloured, Indian and White populations like the ANC the least and the

47 The field work was conducted in September, 1998 and the elections were held in June, 1999.
Black population, the IFP (Gibson & Gouws, 1998).  

Table 5.43 Would you allow “a least-liked group” to live in your neighbourhood? (1998)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>48.4</td>
<td>41.7</td>
<td>68.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>51.0</td>
<td>41.0</td>
<td>22.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.44 Would you allow “a least-liked group” to give a political speech in your area? (1998)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1994</th>
<th>1998</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td>69.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>60.8</td>
<td>21.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8.1.3.a Race

Before getting into a detailed analysis like for 1983 and 1994, a general view of the situation according to race is important. Thus, race will be the first cleavage analysed. The following table presents the results of intolerance by race.

Table 5.45 Would you allow “a least-liked group” to live in your neighbourhood? (1998)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>D’k</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>83.9</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>61.8</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td>11.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coloured</td>
<td>86.5</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian</td>
<td>89.4</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>68.1</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Entries represent the percentage of each population group willing to tolerate (Yes) or not (No) a member of the least-liked group living in their neighbourhood. Ns = 2200

48 As was said in Chapter 4, these surveys were not created specifically for the measurement of tolerance. Besides, the main intention of the study – presenting the evolution over time – is possible and those other studies made specifically on tolerance in South Africa confirm this tendency (Gibson & Gouws, 1998; 1999). The increase in tolerance may not be as clear as the tables indicate. However, other surveys conducted specifically for this reveal that tolerance has increased from the pre-democratic period to the democratic period (see Gouws, 1991 and 1998). Thus, the intention of the study is to show the trend over time and compare the pre-democratic period with the democratic one. In this sense and regardless of the exact level, there is a trend of increase in social and political tolerance. This trend, although, less marked, has been confirmed by studies specifically created for testing tolerance.

49 Idasa election’99 survey. See Chapter 4 for description.
Table 5.46 Would you allow "a least-liked group" to give a political speech in your area? (1998)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>D' k</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>84.5</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>63.3</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>11.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coloured</td>
<td>86.5</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian</td>
<td>89.7</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>69.3</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Entries represent the percentage of people in each income category willing to allow a member of the "least-liked" group to give a political speech in their neighbourhood. \( N_s = 2200 \)

A quick look at the tables immediately reveals that tolerance has increased significantly in all population groups (most notably among Whites, especially compared to 1983). However, Blacks still remain the most intolerant group. It is probable that, the high level of unemployment in the country, mainly affecting the Black population may led to frustration and increase in intolerance. The political disputes between the ANC and the IFP may also lie behind this low level of tolerance within the Black population.

5.8.1.3.b Age

The first dissection, as above, will be made along age categories. Tables 5.47 and 5.48 present the results.

Table 5.47 Would you allow "a least-liked group" to live in your neighbourhood? (1998)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>D' k</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18-24</td>
<td>65.0</td>
<td>27.2</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-34</td>
<td>65.0</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-45</td>
<td>70.3</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-55</td>
<td>70.5</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>11.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55-64</td>
<td>68.3</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td>10.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt;65</td>
<td>75.6</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>10.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>68.1</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Entries represent the percentage of people of each age group willing to tolerate (Yes) or not (No) a member of the least-liked group living in their neighbourhood. \( N_s = 2200 \)
The tables reveal that the acceptance of least-liked individuals grows larger as the age increases. Besides, tolerance is higher at all ages than, compared with previous years. The following cleavage to be analysed is income.

### 5.8.1.3.d Income

The Tables 5.49 and 5.50 present the results for the total population and its distribution according to the level of income:

#### Table 5.49 Would you allow “a least-liked group” to live in your neighbourhood? (1998)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>D'k</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&lt;3999</td>
<td>64.9</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>10.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4000-9999</td>
<td>77.4</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10000-19999</td>
<td>87.0</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20000 or more</td>
<td>83.2</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>67.8</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>9.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Entries represent the percentage of people at each income level willing to tolerate (Yes) or not (No) a member of the “least-liked” group living in their neighbourhood. Ns = 2200

#### Table 5.50 Would you allow “a least-liked group” to give a political speech in your area? (1998)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>D'k</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&lt;3999</td>
<td>66.2</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4000-9999</td>
<td>77.6</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10000-19999</td>
<td>87.2</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20000 or more</td>
<td>87.0</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>69.0</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>9.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Entries represent the percentage of people at each income level willing to allow a member of the “least-liked” group to give a political speech in their neighbourhood. Ns = 2200
The tables clearly show a tendency of growth. The richer, the more tolerant. This probably is the result of a higher education. Those with high levels of education may have better-paid jobs. Education, as suggested before, promotes understanding of the differences and, hence, tolerance.

5.8.1.3.d Education

The next cleavage to be analysed is education: Tables 5.51 and 5.52 present the result for both social and political tolerance in 1998.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 5.51 Would you allow “a least-liked group” to live in your neighbourhood? (1998)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Education Level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No schooling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some primary school</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary school completed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some high school</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matric</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Further education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Entries represent the percentage of people at each education level willing to tolerate (Yes) or not (No) a member of the least-liked group living in their neighbourhood. Ns = 2200

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 5.52 Would you allow “a least-liked group” to give a political speech in your area? (1998)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Education Level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No schooling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some primary school</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary school completed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some high school</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matric</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Further education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Entries represent the percentage of people at each income level willing to allow a member of the “least-liked” group to give a political speech in their neighbourhood. Ns = 2200

The tendency is clear again and for both social and political tolerance. The more educated, the more tolerant. This has been explained previously.
5.8.1.3.e Occupation

The last cleavage to be analysed is that of occupation. The table below presents the tolerance results for the whole population distributed along the different occupations. As with previous analysis, it is expected that more skilled professions (professionals, managers, etc.) will show higher levels of tolerance.

Table 5.53 Would you allow “a least-liked group” to live in your neighbourhood? (1998)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>D'k</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>78.9</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manager</td>
<td>81.2</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>13.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerk</td>
<td>77.0</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled worker</td>
<td>75.8</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-skilled worker</td>
<td>80.1</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unskilled worker</td>
<td>69.1</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>14.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>74.8</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Entries represent the percentage of people in each occupation category willing to tolerate (Yes or not (No) a member of the least-liked group living in their neighbourhood. \( N_s = 2200 \)

Table 5.54 Would you allow “a least-liked group” to give a political speech in your area? (1998)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>D'k</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>85.6</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manager</td>
<td>85.2</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerk</td>
<td>74.8</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled worker</td>
<td>71.9</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>9.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-skilled worker</td>
<td>80.0</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unskilled worker</td>
<td>68.4</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>74.1</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Entries represent the percentage of people in each income category willing to allow a member of the “least-liked” group to give a political speech in their neighbourhood. \( N_s = 2200 \)

The tables reveals that highly qualified or skilled occupations tend to be more tolerant than those less skilled occupations (semi-skilled occupations somehow break that tendency. This might be due to margin of error of the survey). Again a higher level of education of those high skilled jobs may be the responsible.
5.8.1.3.1 Tolerance in South Africa in 1998: Summary

After analysing the existing tolerance in 1998, the first thing to point out is the remarkable decrease in the general level of intolerance in South African society, especially among the White population. This important decrease in intolerance explains the peacefulness of the first years of democracy.

The largest decrease has occurred among the White and Indian population groups. Black society stands out as the most intolerant in spite of the fact that apartheid has made place for a multiparty and non-racial democracy and the fact that the ANC won the first democratic elections overwhelmingly and was sure to win the second one. This might be explained by the fact that their target group has changed (from White Afrikaans speaking to IFP).

Concretely, intolerance has passed from being a "normal" phenomenon widely spread out through the whole society, along all population groups, to be a characteristic of the Black, young, low-skilled and low-educated population. Unfortunately, 1998 data do not provide information about the distribution of intolerance. However, as said before, different studies on tolerance in South Africa confirm that the least-liked groups remain the same (the ANC for the White, Coloured and Indian populations and IFP for the Black population) (Gibson & Gouws, 199851).

All population groups have a level of acceptance of the least-liked group of over 80%, whereas the Black population has an average of 61% (the value for the total population is 68%, obviously pushed down by the Black value).

Thus, in summarising, it is possible to state that the first requisite for democratic consolidation in South Africa, namely the acceptance of the diversity and plurality within society, has been reached, although it is necessary to alert that sector in which intolerance is becoming concentrated (intolerant group easily recognisable).

Once the levels of tolerance have been explained in detail, the next section to which this research shift the attention to is the other indicator of political culture, namely trust.

50 The second survey used (Idasa Election '99 survey) was conducted (September '98) before the second democratic elections also overwhelmingly won by the ANC.
51 This study offers more accurate figures.
5.8.2 Trust in South Africa 1994-1999

As said in the introduction to this Chapter the second index selected for analysing the consolidation of the South African democracy is trust. If tolerance refers to the procedural part of democracy, trust refers it to the substantive one. With tolerance, fair and periodic elections can be held and democratic governments can be appointed, but it will be very difficult to sustain democratic institutions if citizens do not trust them. Without trust, free participation becomes non-existence, the free expression of minorities is dubious. If those minorities fear repression, their involvement in the political system is not probable. This may produce aggressive forms of nationalism (Rose, 1994: 18-19; see also Schmitter, 1994).52

In other words, a distrusted democratic system has few chances of survival. Hence, the monitoring of the evolution of trust over time in the democratic government seems to be essential.

The general results of the analysis performed in Chapter 4 is presented again. Afterwards, the distribution of these values along race, age, income, education and occupation will be observed. As said in Chapter 4, to trust a democratic government implies the existence of a government democratically elected. Thus, trust is only surveyed for the period after 199553.

The surveys used for detailed analysis are HSRC '95 to HSRC '99. These surveys have been described in Chapter 3.

52 On the importance of trust for democratic consolidation, see also Diamond (1994a); Harik, (1994). Moreover, Inglehart (1990: 32) has empirically demonstrated a correlation between trust and democracy. Actually one of the reasons given to justify the lack of legitimacy of democratic institutions and, therefore, the breakdowns of Latin American democracies, is the high level of distrust (Lagos, 1997: 128; see also Karl, 1991). Eastern and Central Europe and Russia seem to suffer from the same problem (see the already quoted Rose, 1994: 28-29; see also 1997 and Fish, 1994). For Southern Europe see, in this regard, for instance, Pridhman, (1996) for a concrete case in that area (Spanish case) see Montero et al., (1997).

53 HSRC '94 survey was conducted before the elections. Thus, the government was not democratic yet.
Table 5.55 Trust in government

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>48.2</td>
<td>30.8</td>
<td>34.7</td>
<td>38.2</td>
<td>45.4</td>
<td>37.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>35.8</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td>32.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Entries represent the percentage of people in South Africa showing trust in the government in each year.

Table 5.55 indicates that 1994 shows the lowest trust in government. After that the first democratic elections were held and the trust in government increased. Since then, trust in government has done nothing but decrease. In 1999 it increased again, obviously helped by the election effect, but trust in government still remains lower than in 1995. Consequently, the analysis of the evolution of trust will be focused on the period 1995 – a democratically elected government already – to 1999, the last point with available data.

5.8.2.1 Trust in government in South Africa: 1995

As said before, 1994 data were collected before the elections. Thus the analysis begins from 1995, to ensure that people were giving their opinion on a democratically elected government. The values are now analysed by race, age, income, education and occupation. The first cleavage studied is, as with tolerance, race.

5.8.2.1.a Race

As with tolerance, the first close look at the indicator (trust, in this case) is by race. The results are presented in Table 5.56.

---

54 The survey, HSRC '94, was conducted before the first democratic elections, and thus was still a no legitimate government.
55 Actually the level of trust in 1998 is closer to the 1994's figure, when the government was not democratic.
Table 5.56 Trust in the government by race (1995)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>D'k</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>45.6</td>
<td>31.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coloured</td>
<td>43.9</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>40.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>46.9</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>39.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>54.0</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>36.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>30.7</td>
<td>35.8</td>
<td>33.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Entries represent the percentage of each population group showing trust in the government. Ns = 2157

Expectedly and according to the table, the population group that shows the least trust in the government is the White and the Black population group trusts it the most. After one year of democracy, the exact figures are: 45.6% of Blacks trusting the government; 9.9% of Whites show trust in the government, 14.1% of Indians and 16.0% of Coloureds. Now the same results will be offered by age:

5.8.2.1.b Age

The following table presents the results of the investigation into trust in government by age for the whole country.

Table 5.57 Trust in the government by age (1995)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Yes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18-25</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td>39.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26-35</td>
<td>30.5</td>
<td>34.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36-45</td>
<td>29.7</td>
<td>35.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46-55</td>
<td>32.5</td>
<td>34.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56-65</td>
<td>36.7</td>
<td>33.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt;65</td>
<td>42.1</td>
<td>33.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>30.8</td>
<td>35.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Entries represent the percentage of people at each age cohort showing trust in the government. Ns = 2157

The table does not leave any room for doubt. Young groups trust the government more than older ones do. In general, it can be stated that young people of all races (exception for the “18-25 year group”) tend to trust the government more than older groups. Consequently, general trust is to be expected to increase with the passing of time. The next analysis is concerned with income.
5.8.2.1.c Income

First a general view of how income influences trust in government is offered in the table below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income Level</th>
<th>No (%)</th>
<th>Yes (%)</th>
<th>DK (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&lt;2499</td>
<td>25.7</td>
<td>42.3</td>
<td>32.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2500-12499</td>
<td>41.5</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>38.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12500-24999</td>
<td>68.8</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>21.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt;25000</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>30.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>29.3</td>
<td>37.8</td>
<td>32.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Entries represent the percentage of people at each income level trusting the government. Ns = 2157.

The table indicates that, at low-income levels, the trust is higher than at high-income levels. This, as said before, may be the effect of the level of education lying behind the occupation, which will be analysed now.

After analysing the effect of income on trust in detail, it is possible to state that the general trend is to increase the confidence as the income grows. The next issue to investigate is the possible effect of education on trust.

5.8.2.1.d Education

The following table shows the results for the whole population:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education Level</th>
<th>No (%)</th>
<th>Yes (%)</th>
<th>DK (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>27.2</td>
<td>43.3</td>
<td>29.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Std.1 - Std. 4</td>
<td>25.1</td>
<td>40.6</td>
<td>34.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Std. 5 - Std. 9</td>
<td>29.4</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>33.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Std. 10</td>
<td>42.5</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>35.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Further</td>
<td>42.7</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>39.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>30.8</td>
<td>35.9</td>
<td>33.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Entries represent the percentage of people at each education level trusting the government. Ns = 2157.

The table indicates that trust decreases when education does. In other words, those educated do not seem to trust the government. This is somehow normal in mature
democracies (Zussman, 1997).

5.8.2.1. Occupation

Table 5.60 presents the results for occupation.

Table 5.60 Trust in the government by occupation (1995)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>D'k</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professionals</td>
<td>37.3</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>41.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managers</td>
<td>46.4</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>35.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerks</td>
<td>41.2</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>47.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled workers</td>
<td>39.2</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td>30.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-skilled workers</td>
<td>33.6</td>
<td>32.8</td>
<td>33.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unskilled workers</td>
<td>27.6</td>
<td>36.9</td>
<td>35.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>34.1</td>
<td>30.7</td>
<td>35.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Entries represent the percentage of people at each education level trusting the government. Ns = 2157

The figure shows that those in less skilled occupations tend to indicate more trust in government. Again, the level of education associated with each occupation level may be the responsible.

5.8.2.1.1 Trust in South Africa in 1995: Summary

After analysing the level of trust in the democratic South African government it is possible to state that the level of trust in this year (the first measurement with a democratic government) is the highest of all the measurements56 (1995-1999). The highest concentration of trust in encountered in the Black population, with low, or mid-low income, and low levels of skill.

The next step to be taken is the exposition of the same results, in the same way, but for 1999.

56 Refers to total measurement.
5.8.2.2 Trust in government in South Africa, 1999

The table below presents, again, the trust values in South Africa in 1999 and its evolution since 1995 – the previous year analysed.

Table 5.61 Trust the government (1999)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>30.8</td>
<td>34.7</td>
<td>38.2</td>
<td>45.4</td>
<td>37.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>35.8</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td>32.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Entries represent the percentage of people in South Africa showing trust in the government in each year. *Ns* are offered below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>2157</td>
<td>2228</td>
<td>2220</td>
<td>2227</td>
<td>2210</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In these four years the trust in the government has experienced a decrease of 3.2%. If the result is observed by year, trust did not stop shrinking until 1998. In this year it went down to 21.7% (nearly 14%). The fact that, the second elections were held in 1999 and the government was subsequently elected, may have served as a legitimisation for it and produced an increase in the general level of trust. These values are now analysed by race, age, income, education and occupation.

5.8.2.2.a Race

The results are presented in the following table. Below it, can be found the same result from 1995 for easier comparison.

Table 5.62 Trust in government by race (1999)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population groups</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>D'k</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>38.7</td>
<td>31.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coloured</td>
<td>48.4</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>29.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian</td>
<td>69.6</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>23.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>69.1</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>22.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>32.5</td>
<td>30.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Entries represent the percentage of people of each population group who trust (Yes) or distrust (No) the government. *Ns* = 2210

---

57 As said before, the 1994 survey was conducted when the government was still undemocratically elected.
Table 5.63 Trust in government by race (1995)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population group</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>D’K</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>45.6</td>
<td>31.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coloured</td>
<td>43.9</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>40.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian</td>
<td>46.9</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>39.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>54.0</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>36.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>30.7</td>
<td>35.8</td>
<td>33.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Entries represent the percentage of people of each population group who trust (Yes) or distrust (No) the government. \(N_s = 2210\)

Tables 5.62 and 5.63 show the decrease in trust suffered by the government. Most notable is the decrease of Black trust (from 45.6% to 38.7%) On the other hand, small advances have been produced from the other population groups. This indicates that for Whites, Indians and Coloureds the Black government was not as bad as expected and for the Black population it was not as good as thought.

The trust values are now observed according to age, income, education and occupation. Responses related to age will be looked at first.

5.8.2.2.b Age

The distribution through age is offered now.

Table 5.64 Trust in government by age (1999)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>D’K</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18-25</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>34.0</td>
<td>34.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26-35</td>
<td>39.1</td>
<td>33.2</td>
<td>27.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36-45</td>
<td>40.6</td>
<td>30.8</td>
<td>28.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46-55</td>
<td>35.8</td>
<td>29.7</td>
<td>34.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56-65</td>
<td>39.0</td>
<td>37.0</td>
<td>24.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt;65</td>
<td>39.0</td>
<td>31.3</td>
<td>29.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>32.5</td>
<td>30.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Entries represent the percentage of people of each age group who trust (Yes) or distrust (No) the government. \(N_s = 2210\)

Table 5.64 indicates in contrast to findings from 1995, that the age does not seem to have any influence on the trust of citizens in their government. Trust increases and decreases at all ages. Trust seems to decrease from younger groups to middle-aged ones, when it increases again and decreases after 65 years old. Distrust is, therefore, more
spread out along all ages. At this point it can be said that there is no continuity with 1995, when age was influencing trust more.

5.8.2.2.c Income

The following issue to investigate is income. Table 5.56 presents the results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income Range</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>D'k</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&lt;2499</td>
<td>32.5</td>
<td>37.3</td>
<td>30.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2500-12499</td>
<td>42.5</td>
<td>30.5</td>
<td>27.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12500-24999</td>
<td>52.1</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>32.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt;25000</td>
<td>72.2</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>29.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Entries represent the percentage of people at each income level who trust (Yes) or distrust (No) the government. Ns = 2210

The table reveals a decrease in trust as income increases. Those who are richer, show lower levels of trust. Again, better-paid jobs may imply higher levels of education. This might be the reason.

The following issue to be studied is education:

5.8.2.2.d Education

The table represents the results for the whole population.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education Level</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>D'k</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>41.0</td>
<td>35.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Std 4 or less</td>
<td>36.9</td>
<td>31.4</td>
<td>31.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Std. 5 - Std. 9</td>
<td>35.1</td>
<td>36.9</td>
<td>28.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matric</td>
<td>42.8</td>
<td>25.9</td>
<td>31.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Further</td>
<td>53.1</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>28.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>32.5</td>
<td>30.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Entries represent the percentage of people at each education level who trust (Yes) or distrust (No) the government. Ns = 2210

Once again, as in 1995, the tendency in Table 5.66 is clear. The highest educated show the lowest level of trust.
5.8.2.2. Occupation

The last cleavage to be studied is occupation. Table 5.67 presents the results.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>D'K</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>48.5</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>31.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manager</td>
<td>64.8</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>26.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerk</td>
<td>58.4</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>28.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled worker</td>
<td>42.8</td>
<td>31.2</td>
<td>26.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-skilled worker</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>47.4</td>
<td>29.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unskilled worker</td>
<td>38.8</td>
<td>33.6</td>
<td>27.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>42.3</td>
<td>29.9</td>
<td>27.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Entries represent the percentage of people of each education level who trust (Yes) or distrust (No) the government. \( N_s = 2210 \)

The table indicates, as in 1995, that people in low-skilled occupations show higher levels of trust in the government than those in high-skilled occupations.

5.8.2.2.1.1 Trust in South Africa in 1999: Summary

After analysing the evolution of trust in 1999, the first thing that calls for attention is its decrease compared to 1995 (although there is an increase from 1998, probably produced by the election effect\(^{58}\) – the 1999 survey was conducted before the election). The figure in 1998 is closer to the 1994 figure when there was no democratic government – the 1994 survey was conducted before the elections).

In 1999 it is more difficult to “locate” those who trust than in 1995. Distrust is spreading throughout society. Although still, education and occupation are still seen as important areas of cleavage.

It is important to note that those young Black individuals with low incomes who were trusting the government in 1995, now show a lower level of trust than those with higher levels of income. In other words and in brief, in 1995 trust was a characteristic of poor and low-skilled Black people. After 4 years, even those are losing their confidence in the government.

\(^{58}\) On this see Mattes (et al., 1999).
5.9 Middle class and democratic consolidation analysed: A summary

Before providing some concluding remarks for this Chapter, it seems to have worth to provide the reader with the most important results developed in this section.

The Chapter commenced with an introduction that explained the work to be done. The middle class results presented in Chapter 3 were repeated for further analysis, as were the results of the investigation into political culture presented in Chapter 4. Out of all the indicators analysed in Chapter 4 with regard to political culture, only two were selected for further analysis: Tolerance and trust, as they are the most important. This was motivated according to the existing literature in the field. Other indicators were added to these in Chapter 4 to provide the reader with a wider picture of the political culture of South Africa. There is no general agreement on their ability in measuring democratic consolidation.

The middle class was analysed in terms of occupation and population group. As explained in Chapter 3, no data is available for “old” middle class in the pre-94 period (either the data is not comparable – independent homelands are not included) or there is no income information for certain population groups (for Blacks in Census 1970, the last before the homelands became independent). Thus only new middle class was analysed for that period. This did not affect the aim of this research as all the labour legislation developed, historically, in South Africa was focused mainly on skilled occupations (since Industrial Conciliation Act in 1924 to affirmative action, 70 years later).

The analysis of the middle class revealed that the new middle class had grown since 1970. Since 1994, in the democratic period, this, as it was shown, was due to the entry of the Black population into government, and to affirmative action. This occurred mainly in the public and finance sectors. This (affirmative action and Blacks entering politics) seems to be responsible for the important advance (doubled since 1994) of the Black middle class (mainly located at the top – professionals). Besides, the White middle class showed the most progress, especially since 199759.

59 The data from 1994 to 1997 were checked against the October Household Surveys to increase reliability. After this period there were no data available to check against. Further analysis will reveal whether this tendency is correct or due to small error in 1999 survey.
Once the middle class had been analysed in detail, the evolution of the historical conditions that affected the social structure in general and the middle class in particular was explained. Even before the first comprehensive labour legislation was passed (*Industrial Conciliation Act* of 1924), the Black, Coloured and Indian populations were excluded politically and economically, until democracy was installed in South Africa in 1994. After this, the so-called “affirmative action” intended to introduce the previously excluded people (Blacks, Coloureds and Indians, although mostly Blacks) into those positions historically reserved for Whites (skilled occupations).

After this, it was shown that unemployment was increasing in the country at a 2% average rate since 1994\(^\text{60}\), affecting mainly low-skilled occupations and Blacks. Only public and finance sectors were creating jobs. At the same time, wages were increasing at 10% on average. Further analysis of inequality revealed that, as a result of this increase in salaries and unemployment, the “gap” between the richer and the poorer was growing bigger within all population groups (except Whites), although the general inequality level seemed to decrease\(^{61}\), confirming, hereby, the figures for the middle class (increase in middle class – although very small and due to Black entrance into politics – increase in equality).

With this picture of a small increase in the middle class, the Chapter turned to the explanation of the evolution of the "consolidation of democracy" in the country.

As was said before, only *tolerance* and *trust* were analysed. For tolerance, two indicators were offered in Chapter 4: “*Allow disliked person to live in your neighbourhood*” (social tolerance) and “*Allow least-liked group to give political speech in your neighbourhood*” (political tolerance). The results gathered in Chapter 4 were analysed by race, age, income, education and occupation. These cleavages were selected according to the propositions from earlier studies in the field and aspects peculiar to South Africa\(^\text{62}\). The first analysed was tolerance and then trust. The results were chronologically presented. It was explained that mature democracies (i.e. USA) also operate with high levels of political intolerance. Thus, zero-intolerance level was not a 

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\(^{60}\) This tendency of job loss has existed, at least, since 1990, according to the SARB (1997).

\(^{61}\) Data available up until 1995 only.

\(^{62}\) Not all studies on political culture emphasise race. This, according to the literature on South African political history, is a very important cleavage to take into account.
must. Consequently, the main aspect to monitor is the evolution of trust over time.

The main findings were that in 1983 tolerance ranked very low in the South African society. South Africa was, according to the survey, a very intolerant society at all levels and toward all levels (all population groups were intolerant and there was no clear target group). However, educated people seemed to show higher levels of tolerance. The fact that intolerance was spread throughout the society (no target group could be detected easily) makes it "pluralistic" (Sullivan et al., 1982: 83-109). This, according to previous studies is a "good" sign as it makes repression difficult. This probably might be a key aspect to understand the – in the end, peaceful – transition to democracy that occurred in the country.

In 1994, the first democratic elections were held and the country had been involved in political negotiations for democracy for four years. The future was uncertain. The main findings were that the White population had increased their level of tolerance considerably. Education, again, seemed to have made people more tolerant. The main target groups at which intolerance was directed, were the ANC, for the Coloured, Indian and White populations, and the IFP, for the Black population.

The data for 1998 showed that tolerance had increased significantly. In 1998 however, older groups seemed to show higher levels of tolerance – probably more embedded in the past – than levels of tolerance encountered in the youth. Again, as in 1983 and 1994, those who were educated, richer and had more highly-skilled occupations were more tolerant. The rich were also more tolerant. Besides, it was noted that intolerance in 1998 was being concentrated from Black, young, unskilled and lowly educated people. The target group remained the same as in other studies specifically conducted for this purpose. In general, the first objective for the consolidation of democracy, namely increased tolerance, seems to have been attained.

After tolerance, trust was analysed following the same methods and dissecting it according to the same cleavages. Only 1995 data (for a period with a democratic government) and 1999 data were analysed for reasons of space.

From 1994 to 1995, the main findings were that trust in the government had increased in general terms. In 1995, as expected, levels of trust were higher in Black population. Concretely, trust was concentrated in Blacks, who were young, with low
levels of education and skill.

In 1999, the second measurement of trust took place and a general and significant decrease in the level of trust in all population groups was encountered, but this was most noticeable in the Black population, although they still stood out as the group that trusted the government the most. Now it is more difficult to locate the group that has trust in the government, although young, low-skilled and low-educated Black people still have more trust. However, even for this sector, the level of trust has dropped.

5.10 Concluding remarks

Against this background, the following conclusions can be reached.

In general terms, the middle class has experienced a small growth in size in the democratic period and the indicators of democratic consolidation follow two different trends: Tolerance increases and trust decreases.

Middle class enlargement is small and mainly due to the entrance of the Black population into the political scene and to being pushed up by affirmative action. It still comprises only a 10%, though. However, there is no acknowledged minimum or "pro-democratic" growth pattern for the middle class. Thus, it can be stated that, in principle, middle class is growing in the correct direction, although its growth should be monitored further to ensure that it keeps growing and incorporates groups from all population groups.

As stated, tolerance and trust, the indicators of democratic consolidation, follow different trajectories. Both political and social tolerance are increasing among all population groups, although Black, young and low-skilled people are rated the least tolerant, probably because the high level of unemployment affects them particularly. Besides this and in general terms, tolerance levels seem to bode well for the future stability of the South African democracy. This has been confirmed by other findings from research performed specifically on tolerance in South Africa (see Gouws, 1991, Gibson & Gouws, 1998; 1999).

Trust, on the other hand, has done nothing but decrease since 1995. It only increased in 1999 but the level was still lower than in 1995. This increase (in 1999) is
probably due to the election effect. The government was to be elected soon and many promises were made. Besides, even the sector that used to trust the government the most was decreasing its trust (Black, low-skilled people). Thus, this indicator does not bode well for the stability of South African democracy.

All this should lead to a reconsideration of the hypothesis of this study, which was the larger the middle class, the greater the chance for consolidating democracy. The two indicators of consolidation of democracy follow different trajectories. Thus, it can not simply be stated that democracy is consolidating or not consolidating (tolerance increases but trust decreases). Hence, this point needs further explanation.

Tolerance seems to refer to the procedural dimension of democracy (see Chapter two). Without political tolerance (or acceptable levels of political tolerance), elections are difficult to run and the democratic election of government is impeded. In the absence of reasonable levels of political tolerance political violence may flourish. Hence, political tolerance is supposed to lubricate the democratic process. According to the findings of this study, democracy might be consolidating procedurally. People vote\textsuperscript{63}, reject political violence and more and more, tolerate their political opponents and, hence, government is democratically elected.

Trust seems to refer to a more substantive part of democracy. Without trust in the institutions, minorities will not see their rights protected, their participation in politics is hampered and, civil society will not develop properly (Rose, 1994). In South Africa, trust in the institutions is decreasing even from the Black population. Even those Blacks who have low levels of skill and young people who trusted the government the most are now decreasing their levels of trust (although the Black population still trusts the government the most). As there is no known level of trust for democracy to run or break down, we can only show the trend over time and this indicates that it is decreasing. Further research will reveal whether the increase experienced in 1999 is due to elections or a real turning point and whether trust will again turn upward. In the mean time it is

\textsuperscript{63} In 1994 elections, 87% of the voting age population cast their ballots, whereas in 1999, 80% of the voting age population did it, according to the IEC (Reynolds, 1999: 177). However, the 1996 Census revealed that the country was not as populated in 1994 as the projections from 1991 Census indicated. Thus, in this sense, this comparison is not very reliable. Besides this, there is a high level of participation.
only possible to state that, since 1995 (first data with democratic government) trust has 
decreased (the 1999 figure still is smaller than the 1995 one). Besides and up until now, 
it can only be said that South African democracy is not consolidating substantially. 
Trust is decreasing and the other indicators related to the substantive part of democracy, 
such as belief in the capacity to influence the government, closeness to parties or 
membership of organisation presented in Chapter 4 are also decreasing.

Against this background, this study’s hypothesis can be reformulated as follows: A small increase in the middle class in the first years of democracy may indicate that democracy is consolidating "procedurally".

As said in Chapter 3, democratic consolidation is a lengthy process that may take up to a generation. Thus, interpersonal relations may lead to interpersonal trust and this may lead, in turn, to higher levels of trust in the institutions. Then, democracy might be considered as consolidated substantively. On the other hand, if trust keeps decreasing, especially in the population sector that is supposed to trust the government the most, the poorest sector of the society (most of the South African society) might become fertile soil for populist and extremist leaders, which might pressurise daily political life (more radical reforms might be requested, etc). In this sense South African democracy may follow the same trend that Latin American or Russian democracies followed where the lack of trust was considered to be one of the most important obstacles to consolidation. In this context, the ANC may lose the control of the “collective memory” and its integrity as a single party might also be affected64, opening, in this way, a new uncertainty on the political horizon. This may be helped by the new class cleavage that is dissecting the Black population.

64 This was one of the main reasons why Solidarity in Poland broke up into so many parties (Smolar, 1994: 73-74)
Chapter 6. Concluding remarks

6.1 Introduction

This Chapter, the last one, will attempt to synthesise the complete study. A brief recapitulation of every Chapter will be offered to the reader, including the most important findings of every Chapter. Special emphasis will be focused on Chapter 3, Chapter 4 and Chapter 5. This is because the major results and findings are drawn from them. The Chapter will conclude with some prospects for the future consolidation of the South African democracy.

6.2 The study: A recapitulation

The intention of this study was to monitor the possibilities of survival of the new South African democracy. Chapter 1 offered a general description of the aim of this research and the methodology to undertake in such an enterprise. A general overview to the scope of the study was offered. The process of democratisation or "waves" of democratisation were presented. The factors (economic development, political institutions, political attitudes, elites, social structures and external influences) that help democracy to be established and consolidated were also presented. According to that, the hypothesis was introduced to the reader, namely: The larger the middle class, the greater the chance for consolidating democracy.

The second Chapter attempted to explain the different approaches to the concept of democracy, consolidated democracy, class and middle class. Final definitions were adopted and motivated. After that, and in the same Chapter, it was explained that a link existed between the middle class and democracy. The relevant literature suggested that it was an important factor to take into account when studying democratisation. The different theoretical and empirical studies on this link were presented and explained. A final justification supporting the theoretical background was found, backing up, the theoretical foundation on which this study is based.

The third Chapter was concerned with the operationalisation of the concept middle class. The previously given definition of middle class (a social group mainly comprised of professionals, businessmen and clerks, white collar workers - both in
the public and private sectors, and civil service plus those individuals running their own business, with similar incomes) was operationalised. Different approaches were offered and the final approach was selected and justified according to the theoretical description of the middle class presented in the previous Chapter. Two main models were offered. The first one was the Psychologist – Marxist – and the second one was the Functionalist – Weberian model. The former is based on the awareness of class and the class conflict in a society as a whole. It is embedded in ideological aspects and political propaganda. Different social classes are to be understood in their relations to the others. The latter conceives a society as a decomposable group of people, without any ideological contamination. This model allows the operationalisation of a single social class, as classes are not necessarily related (i.e. in conflict) to one another. These two models have been developed significantly by many scholars. Wright’s and Goldthorpe’s work were presented as the main contributions in the field in each methodology – psychologist and functionalist respectively.

The Marxist method was discarded due to the flaws and shortcomings from which it suffered. Marxism is based on a psychological background – class awareness and class conflict. Contemporary Marxists assume that, awareness is automatically produced by the work location, but they have not yet been able to demonstrate such a relation. Another important flaw encountered in Marxism is the treatment of the middle class. Marxist treatment of the middle classes (members of the middle class simultaneously are located in two different classes) only reveals the incapacity of this school of thought to find a firm foothold in contemporary societies for which that theory was not created. In other words, Marxists were not ready for the contemporary evolution of the middle classes, although it was foreseen by Marx, but not to such an extent. On the other hand, functionalism is not politically embedded and permits the operationalisation of only one class (the middle class). Accordingly, it was finally decided to operationalise the middle class in terms of occupation, thereby, following the Weberian approach, mainly developed by Goldthorpe.

The data used for this was explained. A final picture of the middle class in South Africa was offered to the reader. The Chapter concluded with an explanation of those results. The middle class had increased from 1970 to 1994. After 1994, the middle
class remained stable until 1997. Since then, up until 1999, it seemed to start growing. Further research will reveal whether that increase is fictitious and, therefore, due to statistical error of the survey or is a real growth. The data from 1994 to 1997 were double-checked with the OHS to increase its reliability.

In Chapter 4, the same process was applied to the consolidation of democracy in South Africa. The idea of democratic consolidation rested on the belief of the citizens that democracy was the best and only form of rule. This discarded all other definitions of democracy based on election-counting systems, or any other institutional features. Ecuador, Mexico and Japan were clear examples for the rejection these definitions. These citizens' support for democracy had to be found in their political culture. Thus, the operationalisation of the "consolidation of democracy" was performed according to those indicators of political culture most related to democratic consolidation.

The main indicators of democratic consolidation, according to the propositions from the relevant literature were *Political tolerance* and *Trust*. Consequently, these were selected as the main indicators. In order to provide a wider picture of the political culture of the South African society, other indicators were added to these two, namely *Acceptance of political violence; Interest in politics* (measured in terms of talking about politics to people); *Membership of independent organisations; Belief in one's personal capacity to influence government decisions; Political participation* (vote) and *Closeness to political parties*.

The data used for this aspect were presented and explained. The analysis of these indicators was presented chronologically from 1983, the first year for which data on political culture were available for this research, until 1999. The results gathered were presented. Both social and political tolerance had increased since 1983, although, in 1994, probably due to the uncertainty of the future, the "uncertain" rating was higher. Refusal of political violence also increased. At the same time, trust in the government had decreased since 1995. In 1999 it increased, compared to 1998, probably because of the election effect. The belief in the capacity of influence on the government and closeness to parties was also decreasing. As expected, interest in politics increased in election time.

In other words, the main indicators of the consolidation of democracy, political
tolerance and trust, were double-oriented. A proper analysis of this was to be made in Chapter 5.

Chapter 5 commenced with an explanation of the work to be done. The concepts of middle class and political culture were reintroduced for further analysis. Out of all the political culture indicators analysed in Chapter 4 only two were selected for further analysis: tolerance and trust, because they are the most important. This was motivated according to the existing literature in the field. Other indicators were added to these two in Chapter 4, in order to provide the reader with a wider picture of the political culture of South Africa. There is no general agreement on the strength of these arguments when measuring democratic consolidation.

In Chapter 3 it was explained that there is no data available for "old" middle class in the pre-94 period (either the data is not comparable -"independent homelands" not included) or there is no income information for certain population groups (for Blacks in Census 1970, the last before the homelands became independent). Thus only new middle class was analysed for that period. This did not generate any limitation in the study as most South African labour legislation affected the enskilling process, on which the "new" middle class relies (from Industrial Conciliation Act in 1924 to affirmative action, 70 years later).

The analysis of the middle class revealed that the new middle class had grown since 1970. Since 1994, in the democratic period, this enlargement was mainly due to the effect of having the ANC in government and being pushed up by "affirmative action". This occurred mainly in the public and finance sectors. This (affirmative action and Blacks into politics) seems to be the responsible for the important advance (doubled since 1994) of the Black middle class (mainly located at the top (professionals)). Besides, the White middle class was still progressing the most, especially since 1997.

After the analysis of the middle class, the evolution of the labour and education policies that configured the social structure, in general, and the middle class, in particular, was presented. These revealed that, even before the first comprehensive labour legislation was passed (Industrial Conciliation Act of 1924), Black, Coloured and Indian population were excluded politically and economically, and this was so
until democracy was installed in South Africa in 1994. After this, the so-called “affirmative action” intended to introduce the previously excluded people (mainly Black people) into those positions historically reserved for Whites (skilled occupations).

Parallel to this there was an increase in unemployment of 2% on average in the country since 1994 - although this tendency began much earlier - affecting mainly low-skilled occupations and Blacks. Only public and finance sectors were creating jobs. At the same time, wages were increasing at 10% per year on average.

Inequality analysis showed that, as a result of this increase in salaries and unemployment, the “gap” between the richer and the poorer is growing within all population groups (except for White population), although the general inequality level seemed to decrease (measured by the Gini index). This confirmed that the increase in the middle class - although very small - implied an increase in equality. After that the study turned to analyse the "consolidation of democracy".

As said before, only tolerance and trust were analysed. For testing tolerance two indicators were offered in Chapter 4: “Allow disliked person to live in your neighbourhood” (indicative of social tolerance) and “Allow least-liked group to give political speech in your neighbourhood” (indicative of political tolerance). The results were analysed by race, age, income, education and occupation. These cleavages were selected according to propositions from earlier studies in the field and aspects peculiar to South Africa. The results were chronologically presented. It was explained that mature democracies (i.e. USA) also operate with high levels of intolerance. Thus, a zero-intolerance level was not a must. Consequently, the main aspect to monitor is the evolution over time.

The main findings were that, in 1983, tolerance in the South African society ranked very low. South Africa was, according to the survey, a very intolerant society. All population groups were intolerant and there was no clear target group. The fact that there was no clear target group is called “pluralistic” (Sullivan et al. 1982: 83-109). This, according to previous studies, makes repression difficult.

In 1994, the first democratic elections were held and the country had been involved in political negotiations for democracy for four years. The main findings
were that the White population had increased their level of tolerance. Education, again, was seen as making people more tolerant. The target group for intolerance was the ANC, for the non-Black population, and, the IFP for the Black population.

The data for 1998 showed that tolerance had increased significantly. In 1998 however, older sectors seemed to show lower levels of tolerance – probably because they are more embedded in the past – than those encountered in younger sectors. Again, those who were educated, richer and more high-skilled occupations were more tolerant. Besides, it was noted that the most intolerant group in 1998 was Black, young, unskilled and lowly educated people. The target group remained the same, according to other studies specifically conducted for this.

In general, the first condition for the consolidation of democracy, namely political tolerance, seemed to be attained.

After tolerance, trust was analysed according to the same cleavages. Only 1995 (data for a period with a democratic government) and 1999 data were used to show the evolution through the years.

In 1995, the main findings were that trust in the government had decreased in general terms. As expected, trust levels were higher in the Black population. Concretely, trust was concentrated in Black, young, lowly educated and lowly skilled people.

In 1999, a general and important decrease in the level of trust in all population groups was encountered, but this was most notable in Blacks – although they still stand out as the group showing the highest level of trust. Besides, it is more difficult to locate the trustful group, although still young, Black people with low levels of skill and low levels of education still trust the most. However, for this sector the level of trust has also dropped.

Against this background, the following conclusions could be drawn:

6.3 Final remarks

If democracy, as shown in Chapter 2, can function in two different dimensions, namely procedural and substantive, it might be possible that democracy can also
consolidate procedurally and substantively.

Procedural democracy seems to refer to those mechanisms that permit democracy to function, namely elections, political campaigns, configuration of democratic institutions such as government, parliament, etc. Tolerance is a very important component for that. If opposition is not allowed, political disputes are not sorted out peacefully and democratic institutions do not work properly.

Substantive democracy refers to minority rights, active participation in politics, rule of law and the like. It does not seem possible that this dimension of democracy can develop with lack of trust, or in a context of decreasing trust. If minorities do not trust the institutions their participation in politics will be minimal or non-existent. This implies that the development of civil society is handicapped.

All this should lead to a reconsideration of the hypothesis of this study, which was the larger the middle class, the greater the chance for consolidating democracy. It should have to be reformulated, according to the findings encountered as: A small increase in the middle class in the first years of democracy may indicate that democracy is consolidating "procedurally".

As already stated, democratic consolidation is a lengthy process that may take up to a generation. Higher levels of trust in the institutions may lead to substantive democratic consolidation. On the other hand, if trust does not increase, the society might provide a fertile soil for extremist leaders that might bring tension into daily political life with the excuse of "cleaning" the polity of corruption, inefficacy, unemployment and the like. Latin American democracies, in general, and Ecuador and Venezuela recently, in particular, have shown that this is certainly possible. In this sense South African democracy may follow the same trend as Latin American or Russian democracies where the lack of trust is considered to be one of the most important obstacles to consolidation. In this context, the ANC may lose the control of the "collective memory" and its integrity as a single party might also be affected, opening, like this, fresh uncertainty on the political horizon. This may be helped on by

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1 For details on the difference between procedural and substantive democracy see, Chapter 2.
2 This was one of the main reasons why Solidarity in Poland broke up into so many parties (Smolar, 1994: 73-74).
the new class cleavage that is dissecting the Black population.

6.4 Future research

The above discussion opens the door to further research in the following areas:

1. Future analysis will reveal whether the enlargement of the middle class will continue or not. As said in Chapter 1, five years is a short period of time for the South African middle class to mature and reach the dimensions of other mature middle classes.

2. Further research will provide information about whether the incipient and new class cleavage – affecting mainly the Black population – may be able to substitute race as the main cleavage in South Africa, even to split up the ANC or, on the other hand, whether race will be strong enough to bind together what class is separating and to keep more than 70% of the total population and more than 60% of the total vote loyal to the same party (ANC), regardless of their social and economical situations. The ability of the ANC in the latter period of the legislature and its success in the polls indicate that this is fairly possible.

3. In the same way, future research will reveal whether it is possible for democracies, in general, and for South African democracy, in particular, to consolidate only procedurally or if the substantial dimension of democracy is an indispensable ingredient in the consolidation of democracy.

Along the same line, some recommendations seem to be important:

1. As many researchers from Lipset (1959) to Przeworski (Przeworski et al. 1996) have pointed out, economic development promotes democracy, especially in a country where democracy is “related to jobs and houses” for most of the population. The economic crisis is affecting the democratic values in an important way. South Africans understand democracy as an instrument (procedural – see Chapter 4) to obtain improvements related to material wealth. In this regard neither the GEAR programme nor its predecessor (RDP) attained the desired goals. Unemployment is increasing at an alarming rate,
irrespective of the definition adopted, and is hitting the Black, lowly skilled population\(^3\) with greater force (at the same time a Black middle-upper class is appearing and benefiting from the system). Thus, economic development and job creation (especially for the low skilled) seem to be necessary for the future stabilisation of democracy in South Africa.

2. The cleavage that seemed to most positively affect tolerance was education. Thus, education should be promoted as an instrument of democratic consolidation. In this regard, it is important to make South Africans realise that democracy is not a solution for their economic problems but a form of government, regardless of whether the decisions adopted by that government lead to economic progress or not. As soon as South African citizens become attached to democracy, even in the face of economic reversals, the expectations for democratic survival will increase.

\[^3\text{This sector, as said above, is becoming the intolerant group. Moreover, their trust in government is also beginning to fade.}\]
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