

**CLIMATE CHANGE NEGOTIATIONS AND THE NORTH-SOUTH RELATIONSHIP: AN
EXPLORATION OF CONTINUITY AND CHANGE**

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DECLARATION

By submitting this thesis electronically, I declare that the entirety of the work contained therein is my own, original work, that I am the owner of the copyright thereof (unless to the extent explicitly otherwise stated) and that I have not previously in its entirety or in part submitted it for obtaining any qualification.

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ABSTRACT

The politics of climate change has thus far been marked by controversy and a lack of consensus in regards to the best manner in which to comprehend and mitigate this problem. This is further aggravated by the characterisation of climate change as a global problem requiring a global solution which has served to only further complicate inter-state relations.

While a number of analysts have remarked that the North-South relationship is no longer a meaningful analytical tool in international relations, it will be the purpose of this study to explore this contention within the field of climate change negotiations and to identify both the transformation and continuity within the relationship between the North and South. The unsuccessful nature of climate negotiations are largely held to be the result of the rift between the North and South, where the issues relating to the global political economy are largely responsible for the lack of consensus being reached between developing and developed countries. All climate negotiations since the 1972 *UN Conference on the Environment and Development* have showcased the tension between the two regions in regards to climate change mitigation and their inability to overcome this fissure. More importantly, the ensuing Copenhagen Summit of 2009 further highlighted a rift amongst the developing countries of the South, and between the developed and developing countries. As a consequence, the main aim of the research will be to understand the character of the global interactions between the North and South in terms of the context of global environmental politics. It is also the purpose of this research to gain a more comprehensive account of the sequence of causation within this relationship which stalled the negotiating process and lastly, to understand the conceptual demarcations of the two terms in the post-Cold War era so as to better understand the nature of the relationship between the two regions.

What may be surmised by the study is that there is still a continuity to be found in the international arena pertaining to the North-South relationship. However, the Copenhagen Summit has been instrumental in showcasing the growing stratification that is found within the South and as a result has highlighted the cross-alliances that have formed between the North and South in order to maintain economic growth. Overall, while the North-South relationship does impact the nature of climate mitigation negotiations, the stratification of states based upon economic and developmental divergences will result in states forming alliances based upon economic self-interest.

OPSOMMING

Die politiek van klimaatsverandering is tot dusver gekenmerk aan kontroversie en 'n gebrek aan konsensus met betrekking tot die mees effektiewe wyse waarop hierdie probleem verstaan en gemitigeer kan word. Die probleem word verder vererger deur die kenmerk van klimaatsverandering as 'n globale probleem wat 'n globale oplossing verg, wat tot die verdere komplikasie van interstaat-verhoudings gelei het.

Verskeie analiste het opgemerk dat die verhouding tussen die Noorde en Suid nie meer dien as betekenisvolle analitiese gereedskap op die gebied van internasionale verhoudings nie. Die doel van hierdie ondersoek is gevolglik om hierdie aanname in oënskou te neem, en om beide transformasie en kontinuïteit binne die verhouding tussen die Noorde en Suid te identifiseer.

Die onsuksesvolle aard van klimaatsonderhandelinge word grootliks toegeskryf aan die onenigheid tussen die Noorde en Suid, met kwessies rondom die globale politieke ekonomie grootliks verantwoordelik vir die gebrek aan konsensus tussen die streke. Sedert die 1972 *VN Konferensie oor die Omgewing en Ontwikkeling* het alle klimaatsonderhandelinge die spanning tussen die twee streke met betrekking to klimaatveranderingsversagtings en hul onvermoë om hierdie skeur te oorbrug, ten toon gestel. Die 2009 *Kopenhagen-beraad* het 'n onenigheid ontbloot tussen die ontwikkelende lande in die Suid en tussen ontwikkelende en ontwikkelde lande. Gevolglik is die hoofdoelstelling van hierdie studie om die aard van globale interaksies tussen die Noorde en Suid te verstaan met betrekking tot die konteks van globale omgewingspolitiek. Die doel van die navorsing is ook om 'n meer omvattende verklaring te verkry oor die volgorde van oorsaaklike verbande binne hierdie verhouding wat die onderhandelingsproses tot stilstand gebring het en laastens, om die konseptuele afbakening van hierdie twee terme in die post-Koue Oorlog era en die aard van die verhouding tussen die twee streke beter te verstaan.

Hierdie studie wys dat daar steeds kontinuïteit in die internasionale arena is met betrekking tot die verhouding tussen die Noorde en Suid. Die 2009 *Kopenhagen-beraad* was egter instrumenteel om die groeiende stratifikasie wat binne die Suid gevind word uit te lig, en die kruisalliansies wat tussen die Noorde en Suid gevorm is om ekonomiese groei in stand te hou, te beklemtoon. Alhoewel die verhouding tussen die Noorde en Suid tog 'n impak op die aard van klimaatversagtingsonderhandelings uitoefen, sal die stratifikasie van state wat op ekonomiese- en ontwikkelingsafwykings gebaseer is tot gevolg hê dat state alliansies vorm op grond van ekonomiese selfbelange.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AU	African Union
BRIC's	Brazil, Russia, India and China
BASIC	Brazil, India, South Africa and China
CO ₂	Carbon Dioxide
COP	Conference of the Parties
EU	European Union
G - 20	Group of 20
G 77	Group of 77
GHGs	Green house gases
IBSA	India-Brazil-South Africa Dialogue Forum
IR	International Relations
KP	Kyoto Protocol
LCA	Long-Term Cooperative Action
NAM	Non-Aligned Movement
NIEO	New International Economic Order
OECD	Organisation for Economic Development and Cooperation
OPEC	Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries
UN	United Nations
UNCED	United Nations Conference on Environment and Development
UNCTD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
WSA	World-Systems Analysis

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCING THE STUDY

1.2 CONTEXTUALISING THE FOCUS OF THE STUDY

1.1.1 The politics of the environment

“Climate change is the hardest political problem the world has ever faced. It is a prisoner’s dilemma, a free-rider problem and the tragedy of the commons all rolled into one.” (Duncan, 2009: 4). This statement clearly captures the importance of climate change as an issue of political salience as well as the immense complexity that surrounds it. Climate change is one of the most pressing dilemmas facing policy-makers and leaders alike and has proven to be one of the most difficult problems for countries to come to a comprehensive agreement on. The first decade of the twenty-first century has been characterised by a wide variety of inter-connected problems that have become increasingly global in nature requiring that a multiple and varied number of actors need to be able to systematically work together if these problems are to be resolved. However, these problems do not carry the same consequences for all actors nor are they viewed through the same ideational, developmental and cultural lenses, which further places strain on any effort to resolve these. Climate change is a problematic issue in its own right as it does not only pertain to the elimination of the negative consequences of climate change around the globe but it also skims the arena of international trade and development as well as the issues surrounding economic growth and consumption which have served as arenas of the global political economy that have problematised inter-state relations. Moreover, the North-South relationship¹, which has been a significant straining force for international dialogue, only serves to further negatively impact the manner in which global negotiations for viable solutions to climate change are carried out. The reasons behind this are complex and involve a great number of historical and structural factors, but the consequences of the inability of the North and South to effectively cooperate on this issue has proven to be hazardous.

¹ When attempting to establish a conceptual coherence within the research paradigm it is essential to recall that the concept of the South is to a greater degree a political term and thus holds divergent meanings for scholars from the North and South as it is ultimately a reflection of power relations (Najam, 2005: 112). This is made more complex by the fact that the degree to which the South is an accurate term to be used in international politics is debatable which only serves to further complicate the study of international relations (Najam, 2005: 112). According to Adil Najam, the category North signifies the industrialised and developed economies of the global North while the term global South indicates the less developed and developing states whose membership is included in the G77 which is the conceptualisation that will be used as the preliminary context to begin our understanding of the issues that will be discussed (Najam, 2005: 111). The North-South relationship makes reference to not only the global negotiations that take place between these two divergent regions, but also to the nature of this relationship which is characterised by marginalisation and the dependence of the South within the international system (Najam, 2005: 112). It is important to note that all these terms will be expanded upon in Chapter Three of the study and that the above terms form the preliminary research concepts.

It is evident that the North-South relationship has a historical narrative offering a complex account that is embedded with irony and conflict. The conflict that has existed between these two regions has a number of dimensions but is mainly driven by the distribution of both power and affluence to different governments and regions within the international system (Murphy, 1984: 536). This is underpinned by the distributional effects thereof which further legitimise and reinforce the regimes and rules that underpin these structures, hence heavily limiting the ability to change these towards a more equitable order (Murphy, 1984: 536). Nonetheless, after the colonial era had ended, it was initially felt that there could be potential for a greater amount of equity in the relationship between the two regions as Northern industrial states realised that they are dependent on the raw, but what was to become the increasingly scarce, natural materials of the developing world (Hansen, 1975: 921). Hence, it initially appeared that this phenomenon was to secure the bargaining power of the South against the economically and politically dominant North. However, what was needed for the acquisition of tangible and beneficial adjustments in the process of negotiations between the two regions, required that the South display a certain amount of solidarity amongst its members, yet this proved to be a difficult compromise to achieve, with Roger Hansen having predicted in 1975 that this relationship would increasingly fragment in the decades to come and be characterised by bilateral relationships within the divergent regions in the South (1975: 924). As Hansen further explains, “While the group has little trouble avoiding potential threats to solidarity of a political or ideological nature, it has been much more threatened by frictions between more developed and less developed members; and between groups of countries which have particularly strong links to differing regions of the developed world...Exhibiting widely differing stages of development, national structures and degrees of internal integration, what is to hold developing countries together?” (1975: 931, 938). Already in the 1970s, it became increasingly apparent that there were certain processes that were dividing the South internally which served to significantly weaken it and whose effects would influence negotiations surrounding various issues (Hansen, 1975: 931).

A major contention in the international dialogue as of the 1970s has been the South’s reiteration that these negotiations are illegitimate due to the complex historical as well as structural inequality inherent within these negotiations that serve to tilt the outcomes to the benefit of the North (Murphy, 1984: 534). This serves to greatly problematise the ability of these two divergent regions to reach a valid consensus due to the fact that the North and South hold divergent views of what is just in international affairs (Murphy, 1984: 534). This is further exacerbated by the fact that one of the greatest stumbling blocks in these negotiations is the notion that the South lacks the expertise and resources that are necessary to change the structures and the regimes of the international political economy, hence, greatly undermining its ability to have any valid power in an international

system in which it is part of but largely marginalised which causes it to be unable to comply with the North on key issues (Murphy, 1984: 535). As Adil Najam points out, the South is essentially a political entity, hence while it is correct to view the South as vying for a more just economic order, it is far more concerned with the marginalisation that it experiences at the political level as a result of the inability to have its voice be effectively heard and taken into account above the rhetorical level (Najam, 2005: 113). This is further exacerbated by recent trends which undermine this effort at procuring greater political inclusion due to the internal restructuring that the South has experienced over the last few decades between its (relatively) developed and developing members. This has resulted in the reconfiguration over the last decade of the parameters of the North-South debate; where the categories of the North and South “are no longer an unambiguous and incoherent entity.” (Thérien, 1999: 724). Moreover, the current environmental negotiations have further strained the exceptionalism of the Southern region, helping to reduce its unique character and increase the challenges that these countries face (Thérien, 1999: 726).

Thus, in the overall trajectory of the North-South debate, environmental politics has played a significant role in further complicating the manner in which countries position themselves in relation to one another and the specific goals that they ultimately wish to attain. Whilst industrialised countries have thus far maintained a systematic use of Southern raw materials in order to maintain increasing levels of consumption and economic growth, the countries that are situated in the South have exacerbated the use of the environment in order to industrialise so as to reach a level that is on par with that of the West (Maathai, 2009: 254). This has resulted in there being two main cleavages in the negotiations that revolve around climate change between these regions: the relationship between industrialised and industrialising countries as a reflection of global inequality in terms of CO₂ emissions; and the cleavage between those countries that heavily rely on the utilisation of CO₂ and those that substantially lack fossil fuel resources, which are a more concentrated reflection of the global political economy (Nevell and Paterson, 1998: 681). Thus far, the increase of emissions in the North has been met by the rising, but still limited, release of emissions from the South indicating that there exists a global misbalance between the two regions (Nevell and Paterson, 1998: 688). This global misbalance parallels the inequality that exists within the international political economy leading Parks and Roberts to argue that inequality and the need for a more just international system have been the two greatest hampering factors preventing the North and South from discovering a viable solution to prevent climate change (2008: 622). Furthermore, transnational corporations exert an immense influence over international environmental negotiations, the extent of which cannot be underestimated in its ability to further

complicate the relationship between the North and the South through the financial and technological power that these wield (Neveell and Paterson, 1998: 685).

When environmental issues emerged as an arena of political necessity in the 1980s; many authors began to view it as a new arena for the confrontation between the North and South (Thérien, 1999: 726). This view can be expounded due to the contention that most Southern states, especially those that are found in Africa, are heavily dependent on the environment, especially in the area of agriculture, hence, it is no surprise that it is ultimately developing countries that are most deeply affected by the poverty that stems as a result of environmental degradation (Maathai, 2009: 241; Thérien, 1999: 727). Furthermore, due to the lack of resources and essential skills in many poverty-stricken developing countries, issues such as deforestation and ozone depletion which are central to the politics of the environment, have to a large extent been neglected; with the necessary investment that should be transferred towards a vast number of environmental issues been unfulfilled (Maathai, 2009: 248 – 250). This environmental inattention by a number of governments will eventually transpire into the erosion of general human welfare as environmental degradation will touch on various issues of human existence, both individual and societal (Maathai, 2009: 241 – 242). With these various factors in mind, if one focuses one's attention of these developments on the current state of environmental politics, it becomes increasingly apparent that it is far more of a complex task to explain the outcomes of environmental politics through the lens of International Relations as this current trend does not follow the same logic as inter-state security questions with which International Relations originally concerned itself (Neveell and Paterson, 1998: 680). If one turns one's attention to the most dominant theoretical framework that is used to explain international negotiations regarding environmental treaties; regime theory claims that in light of the primacy of the environment for human welfare and development, one would expect countries to incorporate effective negotiations in regards to the protection of the environment (Dauvergne, 2008: 9). Yet, this was not witnessed at the recent Copenhagen Summit. Instead, it appears as though environmental degradation serves to only further exacerbate intra-state and inter-state tensions, as the recent negotiations at the Copenhagen Summit have seemingly indicated (O'Brien and Williams, 2004: 290).

Since environmental issues emerged as major global concerns, one of the greatest issues that policy makers have had to face is the best manner in which to reconcile the contradiction between "economic development and environmental equality" that is inherent in the international requirements relating to the protection of the environment versus national interest relating to the protection of jobs and the maintenance of economic growth (Benton and Short, 1999: 88). As a result, the two most important points in regards to the urgency as well as the contention within the

international community have been over the protection of the environment versus trade and economic growth with the two often being at odds with one another (Benton and Short, 1999: 177). Moreover, the fact that there have existed extensive and opposing cultural and linguistic artefacts between the supporters of environmental protection and economic growth only serves to further complicate this sensitive issue (Benton and Short, 1999: 177). Robert Cox mentions that due to the increasing levels of economic growth and consumption levels in the West there has resulted the overwhelmingly high degree of ecological destruction (Cox, 1994: 105). He further argues that there exists a strong contradiction between the process of globalisation which is one of the outcomes of the global economic system of the past few decades and the protection of the environment leading to this cross-national tension (Cox, 1994: 108). Yet, while companies in the USA and other Western nations have begun initiatives to protect the environment there was the inverse situation in many poorer countries as the deterioration of the environment was relegated to poorer regions (Benton and Short, 1999: 127).

Since the UN conference on climate change in 1992, carbon emissions have risen by over 30% in spite of the common-sense view that these need to be curbed (The Economist, 2009: 11). The irony is that environmental degradation is relatively simple and inexpensive to fix, yet it has remained difficult for negotiators to come to a consensus on the best manner in which to spread the costs between and within states (The Economist, 2009: 11). While the negotiations at Copenhagen in December 2009 had attempted to address the manner in which to distribute the financial and emission costs to various regions, yet the main area of contention at this Summit was not centred on technological or economic lack of resources or expertise but rather on the lack of political ambition (Duncan, 2009: 4). At the end of the Summit, the negotiations witnessed developed and strong developing economies adopting a controversial resolution that vulnerable states may be adversely affected by in terms of economic growth and sustainable development. Furthermore, the developmental goals of a number of developing countries make the issue more intricate to handle due to the fact that it is seen as an “either-or” choice between protecting the environment and sustaining long-term economic growth. In light of the above, are we once again witnessing a renewed source of conflict and exploitation between the North and South as they relate to one another over the issue of environmental degradation and the best manner to solve this?

1.1.2 Problem Statement

In spite of the transformation that has occurred in the North-South relationship over the last few decades resulting in the contention that these two conceptual categories are no longer as homogenous and unambiguous as they once were, an abyss still exists between these two entities in

terms of their interaction with one another which leads one to question the degree of transformation. Yet, when observing the North-South interaction in terms of environmental regulation it is witnessed that new dimensions are added to this rather tenacious relationship. The issue with regards to the regulation of the environment is a problematic area to study in its own right, with its impact on the North-South relationship often being haphazard. Nevertheless it presents an area of research that requires illumination in terms of its ability to problematise international relations between developed and developing countries. The study indicates the important position that environmental regulation has achieved in international relations over the past few decades yet its overall impact on the North-South relationship is as yet debatable. The actors who attempt to achieve a solution in regards to this issue approach it with varying historical, ideational, societal and developmental frameworks which serve to introduce a great number of challenges to this issue. However, the achievement of a sustainable future is not only a necessary goal but it is an issue that requires an immediate solution without which the current situation will only degenerate; hence gaining a nuanced understanding of what may impede the negotiations is of the highest necessity.

1.1.3 Research Aim and Question

The overarching research aim will be to outline how the politics of environmental regulation reflects existing power relations between the North and South, but also to explore in what ways it is indicative of a changing relationship between and within the two regions.

Specifically, the Copenhagen Summit will be used as a case study. The thesis will investigate whether any new ground was covered at the Copenhagen Summit or whether it is a reflection of past trends visible not only with regard to environmental summits but also within the general trajectory of the North-South relationship.

The research will attempt to achieve this aim by:

- firstly, introducing and contrasting the main critical theories that explore the North-South relationship and which place specific emphasis on the marginalisation of the South within global interactions,
- secondly, highlighting the fundamental nature of the relationship between the North and South since the era of decolonisation and to introduce the main historical overtures of this relationship and to also understand the changing nature of the concepts “Third World” and “South” as a reflection of key historical periods and structural components as these instances indicate the nature of its relationship with the North;
- and finally, providing a historical overview of global environmental regulation and the key motivations and alliances underlying the Copenhagen Summit of 2009.

Some secondary research questions that will flow from these aims are:

- Are there new trends occurring which cannot be explained by the previous North-South interactions or are we witnessing a repetition of past relationships?
- Are we witnessing any important new North-South alliances forming and in what direction may these develop?
- Are there important divisions forming in the alliance found in the South and is there enough solidarity among Southern states to withstand this?
- What is the future of green politics in terms of the main impediments to the North and South coming to a viable agreement in regards to this?

1.2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

No theory can fully account for the great number of phenomena that are encountered by practitioners on a daily basis. However, if we are to provide relevant answers to the questions that stem from our daily existence, it will be necessary to employ a theory based on the particular merits of the specific situation which can then best explain the various nuances that will arise. In the particular context of the North-South relationship as it pertains to environmental regulation, as well as the overall nature of the interactions between the two regions, it will be argued that the World-Systems Analysis (WSA) will be able to best account.

World-Systems Analysis, as developed by Immanuel Wallerstein, posits a historically grounded analysis of the manner in which states relate to one another in the international arena as well as the particular structure into which these states develop (Skocpol, 1977: 1076). The theory will be further expounded upon in Chapter 2 of the thesis but a short overview will be provided at this point in order to highlight the interlinkages between the various components of this chapter. The outcome of the negotiations at Copenhagen illuminate not only the immense differences between developing and developed states but also indicates that the relationships that were established in the post-colonial era between these states may still be present in terms of the exploitation between various regions as well as the goals that they accrue. This forms a direct link with Immanuel Wallerstein's theory where all states are divided into three divergent regions that are depended upon one another resulting in the development of specific types of relationships amongst one another in terms of their position in the global economic system (Skocpol, 1977: 1076). Most importantly, these actor find themselves in one all encompassing entity called the world-system which provides the actors within it with their rationale and logic (Skocpol, 1977: 1080).

The world-system that began in Europe and spread in the sixteenth century to encompass the entire globe depended upon two main factors for its success: the demarcation of various territories into

sovereign nation-states and the continuous search for profit by its capitalist class (Skocpol, 1977: 1077). But, this system also developed the world into a technologically advanced and affluent core, and a technologically backward and impoverished periphery and a number of semi-peripheries that contain a mixture of core and peripheral activities (Wallerstein, 2000: 129; Skocpol, 1977: 1079 – 1080). However, another component of the spread of this system involved the exploitation and destruction of the environment; the effects of which would be increasingly experienced with the progression of the twentieth century. Thus, it is upon this basis that the research paradigm will begin its analysis of the relationship between the North and South in regards to environmental regulation.

1.3. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

Within the specific research objectives that the researcher wishes to address, the unit of analysis² that will be studied for the above-mentioned purposes will be the North-South relationship. In order to thoroughly investigate the mutually constitutive elements of this relationship, the research design will be empirical and qualitative in its overall scope. The research will also focus on an examination of the definition of the North and South in order to better understand the manner in which these definitions develop and thus discover any changes that may manifest themselves which may lead us to reconsider the characterisation of these in their relationship to the process of environmental negotiations.

The main research methodology to be employed due to the specific focus of what is to be examined will be that of a literature review or scholarship review³. The focus will primarily be on secondary sources as the main research components that are undertaken by this specific study. The data collection process will be carried out as an extensive collection and examination of written material, specifically books, journal articles, as well as relevant newspaper and magazine articles and various official reports. The case study⁴ that will form the pinnacle of the study will be the Copenhagen Summit of the seventh to the eighteenth of December 2009. The timeframe of the study will be

² Mouton explains that “the unit of analysis refers to the *what* of the study: What “object”, “phenomenon”, “entity” “process” or “event” I am interested in investigating (2005:51). As the study essentially examines the content and nature of the interactions between the North and South, the unit of analysis for the specific study will be the relationship between the two regions.

³ A literature review is utilised to provide an overview of the main debates and trends within the sphere of a certain field of scholarship (Mouton, 2005: 179).

⁴ The case study is best conceptualised as “an intensive examination of a single unit” (Babbie and Mouton, 2008: 281). Nevertheless, this type of study still utilises the examination of multiple variables related to the phenomenon under investigation (Babbie and Mouton, 2008: 281). The case study is also typically inductive and does not posit a hypothesis (Mouton, 2005: 150).

cross-sectional and will observe the immediate time span of the Copenhagen Summit of 2009. The purpose of the research will be twofold, namely exploration⁵ and explanation.⁶

1.4 THE LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

The study has to delimit the material that will be covered throughout the research due to the constraints that are imposed both by time and space which do not permit a prolonged examination of the various factors that pertain to this issue. This means that only the main issues relating to the research question shall be investigated.

This study is also limited by the fact that the research paradigm investigates specifically the North-South relationship which results in the situation that it will not always be possible to treat country-specific cases and exceptions that may fall outside the parameters of the analysis. However, the researcher is aware of this and will attempt to be as fair and concrete as possible within the specific scope of the research aims. In spite of this limitation, it is hoped that this study will establish a sound foundation that other researchers may use to build upon for more country specific analysis.

The research methodology, even though it is the most appropriate for the specific focus of the study, invariably also contains weaknesses. Mouton explains that a research review can be blindsided by being biased when collecting sources as well as being unable to fully grasp the ultimate meaning of the author (Mouton, 2005: 180). Due to the fact that the author relies on second-hand sources the researcher is unable to conduct independent analysis as to the validity of such sources. Hence, a careful consideration of a wide range of sources will be necessary so as to draw on as many viewpoints as is possible within the specific limitations of the study. A case study also has certain limitations as the researcher may be blinded by personal bias, however this may be counter-set by the production of essential insight which may be of great assistance for future research (Babbie and Mouton, 2008: 150).

1.5 THE STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS

Chapter 2: THE DEVELOPMENT OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT

The main theoretical drive of the study will be examined in this chapter. While the North-South relationship has been observed from various perspectives the main theory that this research will

⁵ Exploratory studies provide a basic understanding of a subject matter and are frequently conducted when a field of research is relatively new (Babbie and Mouton, 2008: 79). As exploratory studies are aimed at providing understanding more than the accumulation of “detailed, accurate and replicable data” the majority of these studies utilise the examination of a case study and often rely upon a literature review as their main research method (Babbie and Mouton, 2008: 80).

⁶ Explanatory studies primarily attempt to provide causal explanation either between events or variables (Babbie and Mouton, 2008: 81).

build upon will be that of the World-Systems Analysis as developed by Immanuel Wallerstein. However, World-Systems Analysis falls within a critical paradigm that examines international relations; hence it will be useful to further contrast it to other critical theories that have been developed, specifically those developed by the Dependency School theorists, as well as environmental/green theory. By incorporating these theories in relation to the World-Systems Analysis, it will not only serve to illuminate important differences between these theories but will also highlight the main issues that these theories might be unable to incorporate and will as a result illuminate important factors that each retains in its examination of the North-South relationship which will help to increase our understanding of this subject matter.

Chapter 3: EAST OF EDEN

The focus of this chapter will be on the historical and contemporary relationship between the North and South as well as an exploration of their conceptual transformations. A historical exploration of the role of the South within the international system will serve to illuminate its specific structure and goals as well as its orientation vis-à-vis the North. The South has formed a number of multilateral bodies aimed at strengthening its position in order to benefit from the hierarchically structured international system; hence, a clarification of such groups as the G77, NAM, the BRICs, IBSA and the G20 will be expounded upon in order to provide a better understanding of the South's relationship with the North.

Chapter 4: THE STATE OF NATURE

The main focus of this chapter will be the specific study of the events that occurred at the Copenhagen Summit. In order to effectively evaluate this, it will be necessary to provide an overview of the politics of environmental regulation in order to effectively be able to understand the history behind and the impetus of these negotiations. The process of environmental regulation will thus be examined as it occurred over the past three decades and will serve to illuminate if any new ground was covered at the Copenhagen Summit or whether it is a reflection of past trends concurred not only at environmental summits but also within the general trajectory of the North-South relationship.

Chapter 5: THE TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONS

This final chapter will serve as the connection between the various aspects that have been observed throughout this study. The findings will be observed in unison, providing an overall conclusion as to the impact of the regulation of the environment upon the North-South relationship. A general discussion of the limitations that the study incurred will be discussed followed by recommendations for future research.

CHAPTER 2

THE DEVELOPMENT OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT⁷

2.1 INTRODUCTION

The contours of the global political economy have witnessed immense structural changes as of the 1970s that serve to both undermine previous knowledge structures while at the same time revealing new channels of insight and investigation. It is at precisely such a time that we can afford to take cognisance of a number of theoretical assumptions to contend whether these still serve as effective analytical tools within the present order. The world has not only become more complex, but the very foundation of knowledge in the twenty-first century faces both the challenges of previous epistemological debates and needs to be able to come to terms with recently emerged challenges.

The North-South relationship has been investigated from various theoretical perspectives with most analysts contending that the important structural changes which have occurred as a result of the end of the Cold War and the ensue of globalisation, significantly impact on the manner in which these concepts are to be investigated. While keeping such distinctions in mind, a strong theoretical foundation can provide one with illumination in regards to emerging anomalies whilst providing the theorist with the opportunity to refine the theory and help it to adapt to a new context. The perspective of more critical studies came to the fore to contend that the relationships that form as a result of the process of exchange in the global economy play a significant role in impacting the role that countries acquire in the hierarchy of the international system. Thus, while states contain a number of structural differences, their commonality is their participation in one all encompassing global economy. While these theories originally concentrated on the politico-economic factors that play a role in impacting the relationship between the North and South, it is currently necessary to evaluate the impact of environmental regulation as both a familiar dimension in the North-South relationship whilst at the same time provoking a new arena of exploitation in its own right. The South bears an important role in the process of environmental investigation due to the consequences that environmental politics has for the development of the South. Southern underdevelopment was originally understood in terms of its exploitative relationship with the North and the subsequent system of economic exchange that took place between the two. Yet, we witness that environmental regulation places a further strain on Southern development. Thus, the process of environmental regulation serves as a profound new arena for investigation in its own right whilst at the same time

⁷ This term was developed by Andre Gunder Frank to refer to the strategies that were created by the core states and businesses that create the underdevelopment found in peripheral states due to the working of the capitalist mode of production (Wallerstein, 2005: 12).

serving to make the study of International Relations (IR) a far more complex affair. Yet, it is this recent development in IR, which may serve to bolster key areas of investigation, which can lead to new breakthroughs both at an ontological and epistemological level. With this point in mind, this section will serve to point out important parallels between the various critical theories to be investigated whilst also allowing space to indicate where they may diverge so as to bolster our knowledge of the North-South relationship.

This chapter will be subdivided into the following key segments that are necessary for effective investigation: first, an examination of the key assumptions of critical theory; second will be an examination of the Dependency School theorists as exemplified by Andre Gunder Frank and Immanuel Wallerstein, followed by an analysis of Green Political Theory and finally a short critical overview of the theories under discussion.

2.2 THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS

Critical theory is a broad academic field that encompasses a number of theoretical viewpoints⁸. These have had an immense influence on the academic literature through the use of their anti-systemic position vis-à-vis the dominant theories of IR namely Realism and Liberalism (Nel, 2006: 35). While Realism and Idealism have been concerned with the evaluation of the status quo contours of IR, critical theorists argue that if we wish to understand the true essence of the outcomes of the international system than analysts should not limit themselves to a superficial reading of the relationships between states. Instead, one is required to not only provide a deeper analysis of the workings of this system but to also analyse factors that dominant theories of IR leave behind such as the inter-state class system and the voices of the marginalised both on a domestic and international level (Nel, 2006: 35). Whilst traditional theories view states as being rational actors who are lawfully equal, critical theorists have as their main theoretical concern the root of the structural inequalities which they claim is the result of the interactions between the powerful and the marginalised within the international system (Nel, 2006: 29; Griffiths, 1999: 107). This *motife* induces the radical nature of these theories with the commencement of two main assumptions with regards to the study of IR: firstly, they hold that one is not able to separate theory from praxis by which it is meant that one is not able to separate the subject and object under investigation (Griffiths, 1999: 107). Secondly, these theorists tend to incorporate a historical approach within their analysis. This enables critical theorists to reject an analysis that is orientated towards the improvement of the functioning of the hierarchically-charged system but rather, they argue for a

⁸ Some of the various theories that pertain to this critical school of thought are Constructivism, Feminism, Marxism, Critical Theory etc. While diverse in nature, they all implicitly reject the status quo of social relations and investigate the deeper causes of social interactions.

critical analysis of the roots of inequality and the forces that sustain both the material capabilities and ideology that perpetuate the functioning of this system (Griffiths, 1999: 107). Thus, they contend that we need to explore the relationship between the anarchical inter-state system which is upholding a hierarchically-structured global economic system (Griffiths, 1999:107).⁹

It is at this point that one needs to understand that the Gramscian-inspired theorist, Robert Cox, makes a clear distinction between two types of theoretical perspectives, these being critical theory and problem-solving theory. According to Robert Cox, problem-solving theory takes the known parameters of International Relations and uses that as its starting point which results in this theory being status-quo orientated (1990: 116 – 117). Thus, this theoretical perspective only observes the various problems that may arise within the power structures which are configured by the institutions and world order that is present. This form of theory is as a result necessary for system maintenance which Cox concedes can also be beneficial in terms of its necessity for utility (Cox, 1994: 117). Thus, the overall structure of such a theory is a-historical, making it a mirror image of the past and the future (Leysens, 2008: 41). This also allows problem-solving theory to have a certain theoretical eloquence and methodological strength due to the fact that it subdivides different areas of social reality which allows it to fully concentrate on that particular area (Cox, 1990: 117). Critical theory, in contrast to problem-solving theory, takes a holistic approach when analysing problems and observes them as being part of a certain historical context (Cox, 1990: 117). As a result, Cox views critical theory as a “...theory of history.” (Cox, 1990: 117). This means that it is necessary for the theorist to stand apart from the prevailing order in order to approach it holistically, thus allowing the theorist to take account of an alternative order. Critical theory does not attempt to create an artificial divide between society and politics but instead attempts to see the manner in which they mutually reinforce one another (Cox, 1990: 117).

If this is to be correlated to the manner of investigation pertaining to the relationship between the North and South, central to problem-solving theory’s investigation is the assumption that the manner in which underdevelopment in the South was studied revolved around a consensus that

⁹ The following study will focus upon an investigation of the Marxist-inspired critical theories as these have traditionally investigated the unequal relations between the North and South which are underpinned by an unequally structured global economic system. The purpose of this investigation is two-fold, namely: to understand the role of environmental regulation in the wider contours of the global political-economy and to understand the validity of such theoretical perspective within the overall North-South relationship in the era of globalisation. While other critical schools of thought, such as Constructivism focus upon the ideational and linguistic channels that this may incorporate, the study wishes to have as its basis the current structure of global economic interactions in order to better understand its impact upon diverse regions’ orientation towards environmental mitigation as the mitigation of the environment touches upon economic progress and well-being. The study will also construct a general synopsis of Green Theory as this is the first theoretical framework constructed with the view of the environment as its starting point.

underdevelopment was the result of cultural, religious and ethnographic factors that were specific to certain states (Friedmann and Wayne, 1977: 400). Inherent in this view was the belief that both development and underdevelopment were evolutionary stages that formed part of the sequence of the state-building progress (Friedmann and Wayne, 1977: 400). However, critical theories helped to illuminate that it was not these factors alone that impacted Southern underdevelopment but instead it was the position of the South within the global economic hierarchy and its relationship with the politically and economically dominant North.

2.3 THE DEVELOPMENTAL SCHOOL OF THOUGHT

Developmental theorists arose out of a certain key historical period and include writers such as Immanuel Wallerstein, Giovanni Arrighi and Andre Gunder Frank. Their main contention with both traditional and Marxist theories of underdevelopment is that the latter explain the underdevelopment of certain nations due to inherent cultural, social, institutional and psychological factors whilst leaving unexamined the bond that exists between the international political and economic constraints in establishing the nature and structures of these states both in terms of their political and economic structures as well as ensuing international relations (Ede, 1982: 28). It was the success of Keynesian-inspired principles that had been applied in European states in the aftermath of the Second World War that helped these states to achieve effective economic growth and recovery which created the impression that the same principles could be applied to “backward” countries in the South with similar results, yet it became apparent that the South was unable to achieve the same level of economic success that was initially hoped for (Dickenson, Gould, Clarke, Mather, Prothero, Siddle, Smith, Thomas-Hope, 1996: 22). It was this paradoxical situation which created the arena for more critical approaches to be created which could examine new nuances in the relationship between the North and South in terms of this apparent economic underdevelopment (Dickenson *et al*, 1996: 22).

It had being the Dependency School of Thought which had pointed out that the examination of the nature of a particular country in isolation from the global context would not yield an accurate image of the development of that particular nation. Rather, it was the particular position that states had assumed within the capitalist world economy that was responsible for the inequality that is found between states. As Andrew Linklater states, “The myth of the autonomous society invented by the modernisation theorists concealed the historical relationship between development in the core and underdevelopment in the periphery” (1990: 103). Hence, it was the survival of these historical ties from the colonial era which continued to obstruct peripheral industrialisation and political autonomy in the latter part of the twentieth century. It was thus not a solution for these states to

follow Western-based methods of modernisation because one was unable to fully comprehend the structures, both historical and contemporary, which prevented these states from advancing economically and politically. (Linklater, 1990: 102 - 103).

Traditional Marxist theories have contended that a state's internal class structure is integral to understanding the nature of its society and it is as a result of this stratification that conflict is generated which is necessary for historical development. However, it is this very conflict that is found within states which can transpire into the conflict that is present at the international level between states, and creates the development of historical analyses at the international level. However, whereas traditional Marxist analyses concentrated mainly on the process of production as an explanatory factor due to the dominant classes' use of this mode to control and exploit subordinate classes, they also articulated that the extension of capitalism would create the apparatus through which seemingly backward countries could develop. But, according to Neo-Marxist theories of International Relations it is the global network of exchange relationships which acts as the means thorough which the powerful nations of the world draw from the subordinate nations and limit their ability to develop. (Linklater, 1990: 102)

Having analysed the key assumptions that have been articulated by the Dependency Theory school, it is necessary to conduct a more funnelled analysis in order to gain a concrete understanding of this school of thought. André Gunder Frank and Immanuel Wallerstein are two important thinkers in their own right and it is necessary to compare their theories so as to gain insight into the scope of their utility for this study.

2.3.1 Southern exposure: the theory of Andre Gunder Frank

Andre Gunder Frank was a German-born intellectual who had escaped to America with his family in order to evade Hitler's Nazi policies (Griffiths, 1999: 126). It was while writing his doctoral dissertation at the University of Chicago that he contested his traditionally-inspired academic upbringing and created a fresh understanding of the North-South relationship (Griffiths, 1999: 126). Frank's Dependency Theory forms one of the two streams of Neo-Marxist analysis which emerged in the 1960s as an attempt to understand the deep causes of underdevelopment that occurred in the post-colonial regions of the world (Ede, 1982: 28). His theoretical perspective was created as a countervailing force to the liberal modernisation theory which viewed states as being autonomous structures that were equipped with similar societies that were developing though not at the same pace (Linklater, 1990: 102).

Frank's analysis relies upon the premise that if we are to fully account for the "development of underdevelopment" in the South then it is necessary that we analyse the inter-relationship between developed and underdeveloped states. This relationship not only exists at the international level between metropolises (developed states) and satellites (underdeveloped states) but also within satellite regions themselves as the cities within these satellites act as metropolises towards their peripheral regions. Hence, such states are unable to fully develop due to their satellite status within the hierarchy of the global economy. Frank's argument further rests on certain key assumptions that are necessary to take into account if one is to fully comprehend and assess these relations. According to Frank, satellite regions that have ceased their relationships with the metropolises are the ones that have experienced the most economic growth while the regions that are considered the most underdeveloped within the contemporary global context are the ones that have experienced the most contact with the metropolises. Within this system, during the period of capitalist expansion and consolidation, these satellite regions were simply the conveyors of net export to more developed regions which strengthened the metropolises while systematically weakening these regions, a situation which has also remained in the postcolonial era. (Griffiths, 1999:126).

Frank argues that as a result of the specific manner in which capitalism developed globally, it becomes inevitable that inequality between and within regions would develop from the unequal basis between political and economic associations at the inter-state level (Ede, 1982: 28). His main contention is that underdevelopment is one of the major characteristics of countries that are found in the South which occurs as a result of the impact of capitalism's global hierarchy in which developed and underdeveloped countries are constitutive entities of this system (Ede, 1982: 28). Within this system, development and underdevelopment are interrelated parts and are thus influenced by the appropriation and transfer of capital from one region to another which forms what Frank has termed the developed or metropole area and the satellite or underdeveloped areas (Ede, 1982: 28). Even though it was claimed that his theory proved to be too static in its analyses of the economic and political developments of states within the system, Frank explains that such criticisms did not take into account the new modes of political alliances in the periphery which transformed the material development of these states (Linklater, 1990: 106).

Furthermore, Frank's exposition is that peripheral countries did not contain what had appeared to analysts to be dual economies: that is on the one hand a feudal economy based on a pre-capitalist mode of production, and an economy run by a modern bourgeoisie that had links to foreign capital; but instead, this was the structure of the satellite, which was underdeveloped irrespective of the seemingly modern elements that it contained, which preserved the dependent character of these states. From the inception of these areas into the global capitalist economy and through to the

contemporary context, these peripheral areas continued with the export of primary commodities whilst importing luxury goods from the core, and thus maintained their dependent character. It was in this manner that the colonial relations and structures of the periphery in the international arena were maintained in the postcolonial era. Hence, there existed a chain of exchange, ranging from the most deprived satellite state to the most advanced metropole with every metropole (except for those at the top of the hierarchy) serving as satellite to another metropole. Frank further explains that although it is true that within this hierarchy, these metropolises did acquire a certain percentage of the surplus appropriated, its main function within the transmission belt was to advance this surplus to the core of the system. Through this system, peripheral areas became continuously poorer whilst core countries acquired ever greater wealth and power within this system. (Linklater, 1990: 103 - 104).

Society and the state are thus not to be analysed as self-contained units as was maintained by traditional theories of development in IR. Instead, if we are to comprehend the history of any state we have to view it within the history of the world-system that developed as a result of capitalism. Therefore, the unit of analysis which is under Frank's investigation is the relationship between states within which the entire spectrum of these relationships constitutes the world-system where inequality is born as a consequence of the relationship between two societies. (Friedmann and Wayne, 1977: 400 - 401)

To conclude, it was in the 1970s that Andre Gunder Frank further modified and accentuated his work by producing a more thorough analysis of the manner in which capitalism was able to reproduce underdevelopment in the South. Towards the end of this period he was able to publish two seminal works that were to fully expand on the trajectory of the three phases of capitalist accumulation. He expanded on his historical analysis during this period as he set down the theoretical parameters for the various positions that states came to assume by stating that it was the transatlantic triangular trade that would determine whether these states would become developed or underdeveloped states over the duration of the next two hundred years. Thus, it was his analysis of the historical period that witnessed the birth and growing interdependency of various states within the capitalist world economy that led Frank to argue that the term "development" could only be fully comprehended when placed within the structural parameters of the post-1945 world order. He further emphasises that the so-called division between modern and traditional societies is in fact mythological with the dualistic divide arising out of the contours of the political economy as it was present in the 1950s. (Griffiths, 1999: 126 – 127)

Frank's framework introduces an important contextualisation of the relationship between the metropole North and the satellite South. However, his two-tier classification of seemingly developed and underdeveloped states is too limited in terms of state interactions within the global system. It was Wallerstein's characterisation of states as being either core, peripheral, and very importantly, semi-peripheral, that would better account for the limitations in Frank's theoretical framework and provide for a more nuanced understanding of inter-state interactions.

2.3.2 The world according to Immanuel Wallerstein

World-System Analysis was created by US sociologist, Immanuel Wallerstein, in the 1970s as a means of accounting for the immense disparities between developed and developing countries. Wallerstein contends that in order to fully understand the manner in which countries develop and relate towards one another, it is necessary to be able to take into account not single countries as the unit of analysis but rather an entire global system of which individual countries are but units. This is the world-system that came to absorb all regions within its mode of production by the end of the twentieth century. Through the use of a historical overview one is able to fully analyse the manner in which this system developed and its overall impact on the internal structure of states and the manner in which these will relate to one another as a result thereof (Skocpol, 1977: 1076). Wallerstein's work was not simply conducted in order to gain an understanding of the sources of underdevelopment in the South, but it was also a means to react to the manner in which social scientific study was being instigated since the latter half of the nineteenth century with Wallerstein expounding on this view by stating that his work is less of a theoretical framework than a perspective with which to analyse social phenomena (Wallerstein, 2000: 129). Hence, his work was concerned with the incorporation of a holistic approach to the study of social phenomena instead of having subjective divisions between various modes of analysis. Immanuel Wallerstein explicates that one should be able to comprehend and view the world-system as a social system, which refers to a "largely self-contained entity that has its key developmental progress the result of largely internal dynamics" resulting that it is necessary to study this system in its totality in order to fully comprehend it (Wallerstein, 2000: 347; Skocpol, 1977: 1076 – 1077).

Wallerstein explains that there are two kinds of systems that have existed, the one being a world-economy and the other a world-system (Wallerstein, 1974: 390). The defining characteristic of social systems according to Wallerstein is that they are dependent upon a single division of labour with the result that the various areas that infiltrate the social system are dependent upon one another for their functioning (Wallerstein, 1974: 390). He uses this conceptualisation to explain there have existed three types of systems: minisystems, world-empires and world-economies (Wallerstein,

1974: 390). A world-empire contains a singular authority that presides over the vast territorial unit and presides over economic activity within it whilst a world-economy had a number of sovereign territorial units that were encompassed within one economic system but were unable to control this singular economic system (Wallerstein, 1974: 348). While the economic system that has spread across the world is that of capitalism, which contains within it its own assumptions and logic, its territorial basis has been divided into politically autonomous entities (Skocpol, 1977: 1077).

This world-system had its origin in Europe in the sixteenth century and would then spread to envelop the entire globe. In spite of its long duration, the underlying structures of this system have remained essentially the same (Shannon, 1996: 85). It is important to note that the term “structure” that Wallerstein refers to points to long-standing and stable human relationships which can refer to those that exist at the personal level such as the family unit while also referring to the inter-state system and the global system of capitalist production at the economic level (Wallerstein, 1974: 3). Capitalism, as an economic system, requires that there exist a global economy which is large enough for the appropriation of goods which can be exchanged on the market but that is simultaneously subdivided by the interstate system (Wallerstein, 2005: 24). Wallerstein explains that the defining characteristic of this economic system is not merely its insistence upon the accumulation of profit, but rather its insistence upon the endless accumulation of profit that makes it distinguishable (Wallerstein, 2005: 23 - 24). The survival of this system is guaranteed as no sovereign political power is able to harness complete control over this system through its subdivision into a number of territorial units (Wallerstein, 2005: 23). Hence, in order to fully understand why certain countries have embarked on the individual developmental path it is necessary to observe the relationships that exist between states and to view these relationships in their totality, instead of observing countries in isolation (Friedmann and Wayne, 1977: 401).

Wallerstein effectively encapsulates these important dimensions which will also be expanded upon in the study with the following paragraph:

“The division of a world-economy involves a hierarchy of occupational tasks, in which tasks requiring higher levels of skills and greater capitalization are reserved for higher-ranking areas. Since a capitalist world-economy essentially rewards accumulated capital, including human capital, at a higher rate than ‘raw’ labour power, the geographical misdistribution of these occupational skills involves a strong trend towards self-maintenance. The forces of the market pace reinforce them rather than undermine them. And the absence of a central political mechanism for the world-economy makes it very difficult to intrude counteracting forces to the misdistribution of rewards.” (Wallerstein 1974: 349).

In order to function effectively there has to exist “an extensive division of labor” while simultaneously there must exist a number of cultural entities (Wallerstein, 2000: 348). “Capitalism

and a world-economy (that is a single division of labor but multiple polities and cultures) are obverse sides of the same coin...One does not cause the other. We are merely defining the same indivisible phenomenon by different characteristics.” (Wallerstein, 1974: 391). According to Wallerstein the inter-state system is the political side of this system while the overarching division of labour is fitted into a global capitalist system which forms its economic dimension which results in the phenomenon that if we wish to fully theorise about the development of a certain country, then its political structures are indivisible from its economic structures (Wallerstein, 2000: 348).

This division of labour engenders that these states acquire a certain form and structure and relation to one another which produces the inherent dynamics that we observe in states. These states can be characterised into core, peripheral and semi-peripheral states. Core states are identified via those economic activities that generate high-profit, and utilise the acquisition of high-technology and contain a division of labour which is categorised as being stratified (Wallerstein, 2000: 129). The manner in which a core state is able to establish and maintain the exploitative relationship between itself and the periphery - which according to Immanuel Wallerstein is one of the inherent effects of the global capitalist system - is through the use of the unequal exchange mechanism (Skocpol, 1977: 1079). Through this mechanism, the core states are not only able to retain their dominance in the system but at the same time they are enabled to increase global inequalities (Skocpol, 1977: 1079).

The difference in state strength and their varying policies is the result of the difference of the surplus appropriation through the economic activities that states engage in, and the objectives of the dominant class within each political unit as a result of their orientation vis-à-vis the system (Skocpol, 1977: 1080). Therefore, the core is strong because it appropriates more tax and because its capitalist class exerts pressure on the state for more state protection which results in these states being able to control international trade while the periphery has weak or non-existent state structures as its dominant class that desires the benefits of direct relations with business factions in the core (Skocpol, 1977: 1080). It is important to note that Wallerstein refers to peripheral areas and not to peripheral states due to the fact that these “states” are either non-existent or are simply too weak (Wallerstein, 1974: 349). Peripheral areas are characterised by activities that tend to produce low-profit acquisition, require low technological input, and low wages and high exploitation of their workers and they have produce that is far less diversified than that which is found in the core (Shannon, 1996: 30, 33). The majority of these states are further characterised by having traditional rule which is the case in most African states (Wallerstein 1974: 355).

In juxtaposition to this, strong states are characterised by their ability to be strong not only against the other core states which constitute this system, but they are also strong against the political entities within their borders (Wallerstein, 1974: 355). Thus, strong states, while giving their support to the dominant classes within them, are also required to have a certain amount of strength vis-à-vis the social groups constituting them, allowing these states to have a higher level of autonomy (Wallerstein, 1974: 355). However, it should be noted at this point that although these factors play a significant role in generating strength, Wallerstein contends that this is not the only factor that impacts state strength but that other factors do come into play as well (Skocpol, 1977: 1080). Thus, a dialectically-charged relationship exists between core and peripheral states because as strong states grow stronger, weak states only grow weaker (Wallerstein, 1974: 3, 5). The role that semi-peripheries play in the world-system is a very specific role as a result of these states having to play an intermediary role in the world-economy. These countries have a division of labour that is far more evenly distributed amongst the various strata of its population in the sense that it has a mixture of both core and peripheral activities within them (Wallerstein, 1974: 3, 5). The interesting role that these assume is that these states are key to the stability and maintenance of this system (Wallerstein, 1974: 5). Moreover, their orientation vis-à-vis the core and periphery is characterised by the core states utilising these nations as peripheral areas within the production mode whilst these semi-peripheries act as core nations within their interactions with the peripheral areas (Wallerstein, 2005: 29). Thus, having analysed the structure of the capitalist economy and the structures of various forms of states, the main focus in this analysis that has been expounded upon is that the relations that exist amongst countries is one that is dominated by exploitation.

Thus, while the critical theories that have been explored have a strongly materialist basis, it may be worth-while to briefly explore a theoretical framework that takes the environment as its main *motif* in order to better understand the role of the environment in inter-state relations.

2.4 GREEN THOUGHT AND THE INTER-STATE SYTEM

Environmental theory, or what is loosely referred to as Green Politics, is one of the most recent theories to emerge in the field of IR. This form of theorising attempts to integrate various perspectives on the manner in which the global ecological crisis can potentially impact global politics and interactions. It was in the 1970s that green politics emerged as a response to the ecological degradation that many states were facing and which could negatively impact not only common human welfare but also inter-state relations. Paterson argues that there exist two main tenets to Green Politics, these being the creation of eco-centric ethics and the decentralisation of state power. (Paterson, 2001: 235)

Green Political Theory (GPT) is based on a number of key assumptions that clearly differentiate it from traditional theories within IR. The first of these being that of *ecocentrism* whereby it rejects the anthropocentric viewpoint of the dominant theories within IR and instead it espouses a moral value on all living things. The second assumption that this theory is concerned with is that economic growth needs to come to a limited scope or to halt altogether. This is based on the claim that the environmental crisis came about as a result of the economic growth and expansion of the last two hundred years and that it is this growth that needs to be reversed if we are to secure a future for the planet. The third key assumption that environmental politics rests upon is decentralisation of state power. Interestingly, Paterson argues that it is at this point that the implications for the subject of IR comes to a prominent point as this may entail an enormous impact for the ongoing trajectory of the inter-state system. (Paterson, 2001: 237)

The above-mentioned tenets of environmental theory can be traced back to the ultimate objective that this thought paradigm wishes to attain which is social as well as ecological sustainability and the promotion of the sustainable use of resources. Hence, their theorising of global environmental problems is resident upon the assumption that this phenomenon is inherently related both to social and biophysical factors. Hence, this theory is concerned with the creation of a strong normative basis and outcome that it hopes will change the structure of IR. (Princen, 2008: 2)

2.5 A CRITICAL REPRISÉ

It is at this point that it is necessary to briefly consider the limitations of the theories that have been under discussion, in particular as they relate to the subject of this study. No theory is able to fully account for all facets of reality, however this does not invalidate the theories under discussion but rather it serves to indicate that one must be guided by praxis within one's approach.

One of the key critiques that has been levelled against Dependency Theory, as well as World-Systems Analysis, is the manner in which it conceptualises the structure of the world-system, that is, the relationships that form between various states as a result thereof leave very little room for structural changes to occur in the position that states have attained within this structure (Friedmann and Wayne, 1977: 405). The fact that these theories also rest on a strong material basis, where economic relations are seen as key to explain various outcomes, may hinder these theories from incorporating different variables that may also play a decisive role in impacting the manner in which states act and interact with one another.

Green Theory also suffers from a number of short-comings that may play a strong role in impacting its evaluative and predictive ability. One of the key assumptions of this theory concerns its tenets of

eliminating the inter-state system, however, the key question relates to whether it is the inter-state system that creates a number of the environmental problems that the world is facing or whether one should be concerned with the question of political culture as a stronger component in the degradation of the environment (Paterson, 2001: 247). In terms of the key question that is investigated by the research paper, it is also questionable to what degree the normative account of Green Thought is able to account for the outcomes of environmental regulation within the North-South relationship as it is more of an approach than a theory and as such has stunted predictive ability.

2.6 CONCLUSION

This chapter has paid considerable attention to some of the theoretical perspectives that constitute the critical approach within IR as these pay thought to the marginalisation that has occurred between disparate regions of the globe, potentially undermining inter-state relations, and the marginalisation that the environment has experienced by mankind which threatens the very existence of communities and even nations. The importance of these theories lies in their ability to remind us to not accept the status-quo as a given but to question those factors that are often taken for granted. The theories that have formed the material under discussion are united by their emphasis on the exploitative relationship that is inherent on a number of levels, whether this is inter-state exploitation, inter-class exploitation, or the exploitation of nature by mankind. These theoretical approaches are also united by the belief that capitalism has been a driving force of underdevelopment within Southern states and the degradation of nature that was necessary for capital accumulation. Hence, we witness a strong parallel between the South and the environment on a number of key points.

After having investigated a number of these theories, as well as their limitations, the writer argues that Immanuel Wallerstein's World-Systems Analysis forms an important explanatory role in terms of the relationship between the North and South in regards to the process of environmental regulation. His theoretical approach is more nuanced than the one that has been posited by Andre Gunder Frank by recasting the South in both peripheral and semi-peripheral distinctions; thus, opening not only important elements in the North-South relationship, but also in terms of the South-South relationship. His theory does contain a strong normative basis, but it also contains a more pronounced and extensive analysis and predictive capacity than does Green Political Theory. Moreover, his theoretical framework contains a detailed analysis that explains global interactions based upon the characterisation of states as either a core or peripheral or semi-peripheral that will account for the manner in which these states will approach the mitigation of climate change.

While it is beyond the scope of this study to explore the limitations of World-Systems Analysis in detail¹⁰, in terms of the question under investigation, this theoretical framework does form a more practical alternative. There is no doubt that environmental degradation forms a key phenomenon which impacts international relations whilst incorporating a number of contradictions in terms of its impact upon various actors, yet it is closely linked to the ability of states to either maintain their overall level of economic achievement – as in the core – or to be able to successfully develop which has been a key goal of many Southern states, which serves to divide nations based upon economic and developmental criteria.

¹⁰ For further detail see: Shannon (1996) on new directions in World Systems Analyses, Garst (1985) *Wallerstein and his Critics* Skocpol (1977) *Review: Wallerstein's world capitalist system: a theoretical and historical critique* as well as Friedmann and Wayne (1977) *Dependency Theory: A Critique*.

CHAPTER 3

EAST OF EDEN

3.1 INTRODUCTION

The end of the colonial era created an arena that highlighted fundamental shifts and transformations in regards to both state and regional relationships by giving prominence to issues of global justice and human well-being. This is mainly driven by the illustration that while one part of the world has enjoyed economic development and political transformation, another has sunk deeper into poverty and conflict. This is offset by the inequality that has become more deeply entrenched in its various dimensions across state lines, and appears to have deteriorated in the current political-economic arena with developing states appearing to bear the brunt thereof. It thus appears that there exists a gulf between the world's developed or Northern states and their politically and economically diverse Southern associates¹¹.

What can be surmised is that the controversial and ambiguous relationship between Northern and Southern states has undergone immense transformation which is a reflection of the changing nature of the global political economy in the post-Cold War era. This has created new analytical demarcations which are necessary to consider if one is to confront the current dynamics of this relationship. The purpose of this chapter is to create a historical overview of the development of the South in order to observe not only the changing parameters of the relationship between the Northern and Southern regions but to also critically evaluate the meaning of the term across various historical periods, as it will provide the study with invaluable insight as to the South's relationship with the North. However, there is no easy way to approach a concept that encapsulates various cultural, historical and state structures without incurring a certain amount of generalization within one's study. Nonetheless, the marginalisation that the South experiences within the international system, as well as its emphasis upon presenting a united front in order to curb Northern dominance and to attain key goals, are important points to consider when analysing the North-South relationship within the historical overture. Even though various theorists note that such a term no longer holds

¹¹ The common thread running between the South and the Third World occurred in the 1950s when the nations of the Third World challenged the East-West conflict to the more poignant North-South conflict which they claimed was of greater importance, wherein they would coalesce around the cause of the South to transform the nature of the international political economy (Isbister, 2003: 201; Berger, 2004: 10). The terms Third World and South will be used within this chapter based upon the historical era being discussed as well as the nature of structural relations being discussed. However, the terms Third world and South have a historical significance with the term Third World being used during the bipolar politics of the Cold War. However, it is the purpose of the study to utilise the term "South" as it captures both the change but also the continuity of this entity in the post-Cold War era.

analytical weight, the chapter will attempt to assess the manner in which important historical periods, these being the post-colonial era, the OPEC era and the post-Cold War era, have impacted the relationship between the North and South as well as our understanding of what the South pertains to.

Hence, this chapter will be demarcated into the following sections which will concentrate on the metamorphosis of the relationship between the North and South: the South and the Third World as terms of conceptualisation, the politics of the Cold War, a reflection upon the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and the Group of 77 as institutions formed to contain the autonomy of the South in its relationship with the North, the influence of OPEC on the North-South relationship; and the post-Cold War era and the age of globalisation.

3.2 THE SOUTH AND THIRD WORLD AS TERMS OF CONCEPTUALISATION

It had been pointed out that while many theorists disregard the terms ‘South’ and Third World as obsolete, the current debate can be construed as revolving around whether these terms still conceptually reflect the current structures of states within the boundaries of the contemporary political economy and whether it is analytically feasible to refer to these countries collectively as the “South” or the “Third World”. There is no doubt that the countries which initially formed the regions of the Third World or the South have in a certain sense fundamentally changed yet it will be necessary to conduct a brief introduction to the main similarities and differences between these two terms in order to understand these as reflections of the North-South relationship¹².

An important point to commence with is that even though the terms “Third World” and the “South” share a number of important characteristics, and are often used interchangeably, they are not synonyms (Braveboy-Wagner, 2009: 2). Rather, these terms reflect the empirical reality that they constitute which has undergone immense transformations over the past five decades. Since these terms first gained currency in the 1950s and 1960s, these states have undergone immense structural changes; however, a number of the issues that dominated the agenda of these states still remains. As Isbister so carefully contemplates the matter, “The plight of the Third World is not only economic; it is social and political as well.” (2003: 3).

¹² The study conceptualises the term North as pertaining to the rich and industrialised states who are found as members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) while the term South refers to those nations that are ‘developing’ or ‘less developed’ and who are members of the Group of 77 (G77) (Hansen, 1975: 922; Najam, 2005: 111). While the South may appear to be an incoherent grouping, the study uses Hansen’s contention that the multilateral bargaining between the industrialising and the industrialised countries as of the 1950s pertains to the significance of the North-South relationship (Hansen, 1975: 922).

To commence with, Braveboy-Wagner identifies the Third World and South as sharing a number of overlapping characteristics; these being: their geographic location in the three continents of Asia, Latin America and Africa who shared a history of colonial domination, exploitation, and underdevelopment as well as containing multi-cultural and multi-ethnic societies (Braveboy-Wagner, 2009: 2). Crucially, these states attempted to collectively transform the borders of the international political economy in order to create a more equitable world order between the 1960s and 1980s as a result of their shared history of colonialism and underdevelopment which had being responsible for their shared sense of injustice at the hands of the international system (Braveboy-Wagner, 2009: 2). The common thread running between the South and the Third World occurred in the 1950s when the nations of the Third World challenged the East-West conflict to the more poignant North-South conflict which they claimed was of greater importance, wherein they would coalesce around the cause of the South to transform the nature of the international political economy (Isbitsier, 2001: 201; Berger, 2004: 10). While the global South is currently comprised of both underdeveloped states and major growing economies, such as India and Brazil, it is still beset by a number of internal problems which serve to limit its power (Morphet, 2004: 517). Thus, while a number of states have been able to achieve impressive economic growth, the majority are still characterised as being “low to middle income countries that are engaged in an open-ended political and economic development process.” (Morphet, 2004: 521).

Over the past few decades, the term the ‘South’ has been the preferred concept to be used when discussing global politics which is the position that the author will adopt (Braveboy-Wagner, 2009: 1). The South was originally used to mark the geographical location of states in the Southern hemisphere that had been poor and underdeveloped in contrast to their rich and developed Northern neighbours (Dickenson *et al.*, 1996: 6). However, as Rothstein points out, one manner in which to also conceptualise the South in order to gain a more comprehensive and analytical definition thereof is to view it as “an international social protest movement that seeks to respond to change and redirect it in presumably beneficial ways.” (Rothstein, 1990: 170). This is an important point to consider as the countries of the South are not only grouped together as a result of the earlier characteristics that had been mentioned, but more importantly, because of their shared identity and the goals which they wish to attain which would have an important impact upon its association with the North.

Thus, while the concepts of the “Third World” and the “South”¹³ have undergone important transformations as a result of the historical trajectory which impinges upon their analytical

¹³ The terms First and Third World have their roots in the emergence of the East-West conflict of the Cold War whereby the First World signifies the developed, capitalist nations of the North and the Third World refers to the

associations, the author argues that the concept of the South is the preferred analytical overture to be adopted. This rationale is based upon the normative and analytical fusion between the Third World and its place in the East-West conflict which does create an outmoded concept in the face of the era of globalisation. The South, on the other hand, is a more broad concept, fusing both the historical Third and Fourth World, while also paying tribute to the shared identity and history that these nations evoke which enables them to absorb both traditional semi-peripheries and peripheries as well as new peripheral regions that have been created by the process of globalisation.

3.3 THE NORTH-SOUTH CREVICE

There are a number of contentious issues which surround the relationship between the North and South creating a strong theoretical debate in regards to the nature of this relationship. The debate is augmented by two main issues that make the study of the North-South relationship problematic, these being whether or not the relationship between the North and South is characterised by continuity or transformation, with neo-realism emphasising the continuous nature of the relationship whilst its critics stress the amount of transformation that has become embedded within their analyses of the interactions between the two regions (Rothstein, 1990: 163 – 164). The second aspect of the debate highlights the nature of the relationship between the domestic and international arenas of political association where often the international arena seems to create a number of the structural inequalities that dominate the relationship; however while there is no doubt that the internal politics of many Southern states also contribute to the poverty and instability endemic within a number of these countries, this is further complicated by the marginalised position that these states occupy in the international hierarchy of states (Rothstein, 1990: 163 – 164). Overall, the relationship between the North and South has been described as one that is characterised by “inequality, stratification and subordination” with the end of the Cold War not appearing to diminish this but rather transform it whilst allowing the basic tenets thereof to remain intact (Grugel and Hout, 1999: 7).

The initial relationship that had been created between the two regions began when Northern powers competed for Southern territory and resources which would create the preliminary colonist/colony relationship between them (Reuveny and Thompson, 2002: 485 – 486). It thus came to pass that Northern production and consumption patterns would depend upon its access to low-cost manpower

underdeveloped nations who were colonies of the West (Isbister, 2003: 15; Braveboy-Wagner, 2009: 2). In spite of the inherent divergences that these Southern states are characterised by, their commonalities lie in their shared sense of marginalisation and colonial history that these experienced (Isbister, 2003: 15). The terms Third World and South will be used within this chapter based upon the historical era as well as the nature of structural relations being discussed. However, the terms Third World and South have a historical significance with the term Third World being used during the bipolar politics of the Cold War. However, it is the purpose of the study to utilise the term “South” as it captures both the change but also the continuity of this entity in the post-Cold War era.

and resources from the South (Reuveny and Thompson, 2002: 485). As a result, Thérien argues that the North-South relationship had been the principle explanatory force behind global poverty and inequality for the first few decades after the colonial period had ended (1999: 723).

In the aftermath of the Second World War, it was the unequal partnership between the industrialised North and the primary commodity-exporting South which was seen as being the main impediment to sustained global economic growth and political stability (Amuzegar, 1975: 549). While this relationship had initially been overshadowed by the formidable East-West conflict which had also encouraged analysts and practitioners to theorise global relations and regions along the First or capitalist, Second or socialist and Third World tiers, friction in the relationship between the First and Third Worlds would soon make this an unavoidable landscape within academic and political parlance (Reuveny and Thompson, 2002: 484). It had been this stark realisation of the increasing economic and political divergence between the states of the Northern hemisphere and the states of the Southern hemisphere in the turbulent economic climate of the 1970s that led to the groundbreaking 1980 publication of the *North-South: A programme for Survival. Report of the Independent Commission on International Development Issues*, otherwise known as the Brandt Report, which was instrumental in pointing out the “backward” and dependent nature of the Southern countries upon their economically developed neighbours which had been used as the initial classification of the world into Northern and Southern political-economic regions (Dickenson *et al*, 1996: 6). However, the Brandt report did emphasise that variations within the North-South divide did exist, but their main commonality was characterised by their occupation of a singular global economy which would dominate their interactions as well as development (Brandt Report, 1980).

3.4 THE POLITICS OF THE COLD WAR

In order to understand the nature of the Third World as it is currently utilised, it will be necessary to engage with its initial conceptualisation which was evoked at the height of Cold War politics in the 1950s. Hence, becoming better acquainted with the prominent dimension of this era and what this meant for the North-South relationship is paramount. With the colonial period coming to an end, the newly-independent countries of this era challenged the horizontal axis of the East-West issues that dominated international relations in the 1950s and pressed elites to observe the more poignant vertical North-South issues which they claimed were of a more critical nature (Isbister, 2003: 201; Berger, 2004: 10). This historical context was also underpinned by the belief of many Western elites and academics that economic development would produce political development and that the inner-workings of the liberally-orientated Bretton Woods system would result in a trickle-down

effect which would positively impact underdeveloped countries (Rothstein, 1990: 170). This belief would have a strong impact upon the orientation between the economically powerful and developed North, and the marginalised South. As a result, from its very inception, one of the key questions that confronted theorists was the issue of Southern solidarity, that is whether there existed enough cohesion amongst these states in order to be able to coherently bargain for the emergence of a new world order vis-à-vis the North (Hansen, 1975: 924). The question of Southern identity was an important stimulus for South-South co-operation, as it is not only the shared history of marginalisation that binds these nations, but their shared belief that unity is their most poignant device to receive benefits from an international system that is skewed against them (Rothstein, 1980: 3, 12). Thus, one of the prominent developments that had emerged in terms of the Southern bargaining position was the creation of an institutional structure that would enable the collective forum for the South to bargain vis-à-vis the economically dominant North (Hansen, 1975: 929). These institutional structures would emerge between the Bandung Conference of 1955 and the UNCTAD meeting of 1964 in order to effectively deal with these Southern issues, thus forging a singular position regarding economic and political development which would be pertinent for the creation of a strong Southern bargaining position (Hansen, 1975: 929).

It is imperative to note that from the outset, one of the key characteristics that emerged in regards to Third World countries vis-à-vis the North is their higher propensity to be involved in multilateral organisations than their industrialised counterparts. Braveboy-Wagner argues that the motivation underlying their involvement in multilateral organisations can be understood to both parallel the motivations of their Northern counterparts while also being distinct in character. As the countries of the South lack the individual capacity to transform the systematic inequalities of the international system, collectively bargaining for their preferred position would be a source of power within the international system vis-à-vis the North. (Braveboy-Wagner, 2009: 1)

However, in spite of their efforts at consolidating a singular identity, the problems that had characterised the Third World would dissolve the collective bargaining position that was needed in order to attain their goals, especially as they were embedded within the Cold War politics of the time as both the East and West spearheaded their influence in the region (Braveboy-Wagner, 2009: 2). Nevertheless, within this ideological battleground, two organisations would emerge in order to expand the Southern position and identity in order to raise concern in regards to the marginalisation that Southern issues faced vis-à-vis the North; these organisations being the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and the Group of 77 (G77). It would be these two organisations who would form the main bodies that would attempt to provide a coherent Southern identity not only within South-South interactions but also within their interactions with the North. It was at the

UNCTAD meeting in 1964 that the G77 would emerge as a direct expression of the South's position as a coherent body that would vie for an alternative economic order (Hansen, 1975: 929). The Group of 77 was initially relatively strong in terms of the solidarity amongst its members in the 1970s but the threat of political disagreements, divergent intra-state requirements, as well as differing interests placed immense pressure upon the unity of the organisation (Rothstein, 1990: 173). Both the unity, as well as, divergences within the Southern position could better be illuminated when it is considered that advanced developing nations, or the semi-peripheries, seek to support many of the South's initiatives as a means of having access to these developing nation's markets which is also confounded by their concern of being unable to have entrance to the North's markets (Rothstein, 1980: 8). By belonging to the South, these advanced economies are able to procure preferential advantages from the North and access to other Southern markets, a position that is further advanced by their desire to become regional hegemony (Rothstein, 1980: 8 – 9). Nevertheless, upon either side of the spectrum the Non-Aligned Movement would form a strong multilateral body that would incorporate the various regions of the Third World in order to deal with the issues of political salience that these states faced. Together, these would constitute the diplomatic groupings that the South would present as an advancement of the particular issues that these states face which would allow them to collectively coalesce as a diplomatic unit in terms of their relationship with the politically and economically dominant North (Hansen, 1979: 7).

3.5 THE BANDUNG CONFERENCE AND THE CREATION OF THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT

Acquiring membership in international organisations has traditionally been seen as an important source of coalition building, as well as affirmation, by less powerful states against those that dominate the international arena (Braveboy-Wagner, 2009: 6). This enables these states to pursue what Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye refer to as linkage strategies which have been used to develop a common identity amongst states, enabling them to amass a similar set of characteristics and objectives (Braveboy-Wagner, 2009: 6). Third World states would consequently converge into multilateral organisations with the goal of creating a more equitable world order in a system dominated by hierarchy, using multilateralism as an important tool of counteracting negative, hierarchical effects (Braveboy-Wagner, 2009: 6). By engaging in multilateral organisations weaker states are able to harness their collective power to form a consensus surrounding their agenda on a global level and to facilitate an information and ideational channel amongst one another and to procure the reduction of any costs that may be incurred as a result of a backlash by the North for non-compliance which became an important dimension in the South's campaign to transform the international division of labour and terms of trade (Braveboy-Wagner, 2009: 7; Mortimer, 1984: 2).

Moreover, with the ideological race between the East and West intensifying during the 1960s and 1970s, the South was provided with an important incentive to transform the rules and regimes of the international global order as the superpowers competed to win the favour of the increasing number of decolonised states who had become members of the Non-Aligned Movement (Braveboy-Wagner, 2009: 7).

The creation of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) came about through the South's desire to promote a more equitable world order and to reduce the South's economic and political dependence on the North (Braveboy-Wagner, 2009: 13). The NAM had its roots in the liberation movements of the former colonies, which after decolonisation, had subsequently recreated their resistance to curb the West's desire to have these newly liberated states form "aggressive military blocs". Moreover, it was this convergence of the decolonised states' non-alignment vis-à-vis the East and West that helped these states to form a sense of shared identity and self-reliance. As Tassin eloquently explains this imperative, "Under the circumstances, developing countries had to devise foreign policy concepts that would, on the one hand, ensure their separation from the evolving super-power military-political alliance; and, on the other, help create the conditions most favourable for the defense of newly-gained sovereignty, the raising of living standards, and the promotion of general socio-economic progress." (2006: 147). Thus, non-alignment became an important foreign policy tool that would enable these states to garner a sense of autonomy both within the international as well as domestic setting and which would also help with their process of nation-building. (Tassin, 2006: 151, 147 – 148).

However, it was the Bandung Conference of 1955 which laid down the multilateral foundation for what would later become known as the NAM (Braveboy-Wagner, 2009: 13). The Bandung Conference, which hosted representatives from African as well as Asian and Arabic countries, was held in order to secure the cooperation needed by these countries towards ensuring the demise of racism as well as colonialism in the Third World (Braveboy-Wagner, 2009: 13; Morphet, 2004: 524). Moreover, the main motivation to convene at the conference was to voice these nations' collective dissent at the lack of representation of these states at the United Nations and the slow rate of decolonisation within the Third World (Geldart and Lyon, 1980: 82). The significance of this movement can be understood by observing that prior to the end of the Second World War; little contact had existed between the colonies and this was thus the first attempt by these states to form a common solidarity amongst themselves after decades of isolation between them (Braveboy-Wagner, 2009: 14). However, in spite of the initial enthusiasm, the Bandung Conference was not only marked by stark cultural and geographical differences between the diverse countries that attended but it would also be marked by strong controversy in regards to which member states could

be included in the conference and based upon which criteria, as well as their divergent alliances to the two dominant ideologies of the time (Braveboy-Wagner, 2009: 14; Mortimer, 1984: 7). Nevertheless, in spite of its professed non-alignment to either power, the NAM would come to be closely affiliated with the Soviet Union as a result of the latter's not having accumulated any colonies outside of Eastern Europe and its support for the economic and political aims of the Third World through the provision of political and economic resources which had also added to the Third World's revisionist approach to IR issues (Braveboy-Wagner, 2009: 17).

Furthermore, the West was preoccupied during this period with aiding Europe to reconstruct its battered, post-war economy whilst providing developing nations with economic and technological assistance to limit the power of the Communist East in the region; however, while this partnership would reach a successful plateau within the European arena, it would face limitations in the Third World (Amuzegar, 1976: 556 – 557). As a result, the relationship between the two regions would not only be dominated by economic issues but it would be rife with a political nature which would strongly characterise their interactions (Amuzegar, 1976: 557). Overall, while the conference created an atmosphere of exhilaration and prolonged rhetoric, the summit failed to create a common set of objectives that could be accomplished by these states, which would prove to be the most hampering factors in the drive towards South-South co-operation (Braveboy-Wagner, 2009: 14; Mortimer, 1984: 8).

Nonetheless, in spite of the internal divisions that the South faced, nonalignment became an impetus for an institutional organisation and the NAM came into being in Belgrade in 1961 at the premier conference of Heads of State or Government of non-aligned countries (Braveboy-Wagner, 2006: 7, Graham, 1980: 153; Strydom, 2007: 1). The major ideals that the NAM wished to attain were non-alignment, non-interference and neutralism as well as a greater drive towards anti-colonialism and a protection of political sovereignty (Hansen, 1979: 20; Strydom, 2007: 4). The NAM acknowledged that its members had diverse interests and that the alliance was essentially a loose organisation; however they stipulated that they had two main objectives that unified its members, the first being that these states would not be pressurised by the two superpowers which they accomplished through the formation of the “exterior” armour of non-alignment; and the second objective being the creation of political momentum to spread the process of decolonisation in the South (Graham, 1980: 153). It was initially believed that the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) would have considerable influence within the United Nations and hence the elites of these states did not overtly focus on

economic issues during this period; instead the G77¹⁴ would have the main impetus in this regard and would act as “the economic voice of the South” (Rothstein, 1990: 165; Hansen, 1979: 20).

The NAM would thus utilise its multilateral and collective-action initiatives to promote the ideals of the South which became the main driving force of the organisation after they had entrenched themselves in a neutral position vis-à-vis the super-powers (Isbister, 2003: 201). In order to achieve this, they would press for a transformation of global and economic interactions which they wished to accomplish by dominating the United Nations General Assembly wherein they formed the majority of nations present (Isbister, 2003: 201 – 202). The NAM had also utilised the phrase of “Southern self-reliance” as an important multilateral initiative that would involve collective action by the South to advance development within the region (Hansen, 1979: 53). This would involve greater multilateral inter-governmental efforts aimed to increase the scope of trade within the South and to initiate various government-sponsored projects aimed at fostering Southern businesses and research initiatives (Hansen, 1979: 53).

Thus, by the 1970s, the Group of 77 (G77) as well as the NAM were able to create an avenue of alternate diplomatic action to counteract the prevailing economic and political structures of the global arena. While traditionally, the states that were collectively summarised as the Third World occupied a somewhat transitory position in the academic and political circles, the growing collective power of these states as of the 1970s allowed them to gain a more established position in the academic vernacular. While it has been made mention that these countries occupy diverse positions in terms of racial, cultural, geographic and linguistic components, they also occupy a seminal position based upon a common factor that had united them. One of the distinguishing factors that these countries originally laid claim to was the unprecedented poverty that they endured which created gross inequality between themselves and the North and subsequent marginalisation. (Mortimer, 1984: 1 – 2)

However, the transformations that would occur in the global political economy would strain this unified position and would amplify the differences that existed between these states, especially in relation to their economic goals. With the 1980s debt crises, NAM turned its attention towards economic development and anti-imperialism which enabled it to avoid factions forming over ideological and military concerns that would have potentially undermined the solidarity of the organisation (Braveboy-Wagner, 2009: 17). However, towards the end of the Cold War the differences in the NAM between the semi-peripheries, such as Argentina and Chile, who were busy ascending the global economic hierarchy and the peripheries, began to starkly manifest themselves

¹⁴ To be discussed in the next section.

which resulted in the semi-peripheral states seeing NAM as a liability in their efforts to modernise and liberalise which had prompted them to distance themselves from the original position that the NAM had espoused (Braveboy-Wagner, 2009: 17 – 18). With the end of the Cold War, NAM's insistence on neo-colonialism became outdated in the new international order where liberal-interdependence and the USA's sole hegemony had become the dominant characteristic in the international order (Braveboy-Wagner, 2009: 18). Thus, these states' inherently diverse characteristics, and desire to attain even marginal advantages at the individual level in the international system, were two of the most hampering issues in the Third World coalition's attempt to transform the international political economy which would ultimately play a decisive factor in undermining the NAM (Mortimer, 1984: 2).

3.6 TERMS OF COOPERATION: THE GROUP OF 77

With the increased number of countries emerging to fill the ranks of the United Nations General Assembly, efforts were instigated to establish a global economic organisation that was specialised in development as well as trade conferences that would revolve around the issues surrounding Southern development (Mortimer, 1984: 15). With greater emphasis being placed upon the need for greater economic ascendancy, the countries of the Third World would establish an important camaraderie in order to have these objectives achieved. Thus, the drive towards creating a more united Southern front was not only aided with the inclusion of newly independent African states that added their voice for the creation of an equitable world order but concurrently, the drive towards a united front for economic development would be assisted via the emergence of Latin American countries joining this initiative in 1962 (Mortimer, 1984: 16).

A crucial turning point came when Argentinean Raul Prebisch became executive secretary of the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America which was an integral stepping stone in establishing the interest of the South American countries towards the establishment of the G77 alongside their Asian and African counterparts (an organisation whose membership had by 2010 included over one hundred and thirty members, the name being kept due to its historical significance) (Mortimer, 1984: 16; The Group of 77, 2010). Other important developments that would lead to the establishment of the G77 was the creation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) which was further reinforced when the OAU and the ECLA states united with their Asian subsidiaries at the Bandung Conference which laid their agenda for the upcoming Geneva Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD I); which coalesced in 75 nations ratifying this declaration thus laying the foundation for the G77 which would form the first official North-South dialogue in the post-colonial era (Mortimer, 1984: 16, Hansen, 1979: 20). While the conference was

held to initiate discussions in regards to a number of important economic and trade objectives, the main impetus for the discussions had been political in nature and related to the creation an organisation that would oversee the creation of economic development (Mortimer, 1984: 16 – 17). However, the conference would already hold the precedent for the ensuing nature of the relationship between the North and South which could be witnessed through the reluctance of the North to agree to Southern economic objectives (Mortimer, 1984: 17).

Regardless, the G77's role in international affairs was to be that of an organisational body within the UNCTAD conferences; and to be the embodiment of a unified position by the South to change the structures of the Northern dominated economic system which they claimed was biased against them (Mortimer, 1984: 24). To place this within a more concrete perspective, the G77 would focus its collective action at the United Nations with the hope of attaining a more fair division of labour based on altered forms of trade and production and to promote the independence of Third World economies (Geldart and Lyon, 1980: 80, 85). However, as they were unable to fully attain an identity as an autonomous Third World body in international affairs, their ability to achieve these aims would be significantly weak (Mortimer, 1984: 24). The G77 attempted to overcome the internal differences amongst its members by having the Asian, African and South American delegates consult first within their regional bodies before embarking upon an attempt to reach a consensus amongst one another (Mortimer, 1984: 25). While these attempts were configured to address the marginalisation that these states faced both economically and politically, their attempts remained informal in nature which resulted in these states struggling to create coherent strategies to deal with the agendas that they identified due to the diversity of the member countries present, which also prevented these countries from being able to construct a more nuanced framework to deal with the above-mentioned points (Mortimer, 1984: 25). While promoting the developmental agenda was an important goal for the G77, which also increased their need to create a coherent identity, their inability to achieve this would thus form a strong impingent at the next meeting relating to trade and development issues (Mortimer, 1984: 25).

Parallel to these developments, Northern states were unwilling to reorganise the “rules of the game” or to provide developing states with the financial assistance required to improve their developmental trajectory (Mortimer, 1984: 27). With the G77's inability to achieve significant changes in the politico-economic structures that governed North-South interactions, disillusionment amongst member states began to be instilled undermining the effectiveness of the organisation as well as the overall call for Southern solidarity (Mortimer, 1984: 29). While these countries could come to agreements over matters of a general nature, policy-specific issues would undermine initiatives at Southern solidarity whilst highlighting the strong differences that existed amongst

them (Mortimer, 1984: 29; Hansen, 1975: 931). While this would be understood to be an impediment to Third World development and would showcase the lack of effective power that the G77 contained, the group would continue over the next decade in their attempt to transform the nature and working of the global political economy (Mortimer, 1984: 29). However, it would be the success of the OPEC nations in the alteration of the power dimensions in the global political economy in the 1970s that would showcase the South's ability to transform global relations as a result of its control over essential resources.

3.7 BLACK GOLD: THE INFLUENCE OF OPEC ON THE NORTH-SOUTH RELATIONSHIP

In the 1970s the relationship between the North and South gained a new, more contentious character as a result of the growing interdependence of various states, the OPEC oil dilemma and the increasing resource scarcity which would become a major agenda for policy-makers in the following years (Rothstein, 1990: 165). The international political economy would also be characterised by immense structural transformations when US president, Richard Nixon, decoupled the dollar from the gold-standard (which was also underpinned by the inconvertibility of the US dollar) in 1971 thereby creating an economic system that would be based upon floating exchange rates, a phenomenon which would herald the formation of a new relationship between state and non-state actors (Geldart and Lyon, 1980: 91). This was further augmented by the inability of various economic policies to reduce Third World poverty and underdevelopment, as well as the growing realisation by many Third World elites of the increasingly dependent nature of their states on the North (Rothstein, 1990: 165). This created various difficulties in not only restructuring the global political economy to be more harmonious to the needs of Southern development but also in regards to the idea that there existed a harmony between the interests of the North and South (Rothstein, 1990: 165). As a result, these developments led to the South adopting a unified position in order to achieve certain objectives which they hoped would be facilitated by the South's control of a number of key resources, especially oil (Rothstein, 1990: 165). These events not only impacted the various theoretical positions in regards to their causation, but far more fundamentally these events had long-lasting policy implications for the South, not only because of the South's ability to withhold important natural resources from the North but also because the OPEC countries were able to distribute financial aid to other Southern countries, thus forming a new axis of power for Southern development vis-à-vis the North (Rothstein, 1990: 165, Hansen, 1975: 935). However, as Rothstein notes, the South lacked the ability to establish its interests in the international community due to the lack of a coherent set of interests amongst these states which resulted in the group being essentially unstable (1990: 166).

The oil crises which erupted would thus serve as an important litmus test in regards to the strength of the power configuration between the North and South (Mortimer, 1984: 3). The power that the South felt it had incurred vis-à-vis the North came to be dominated by its belief of employing “resource power”, and because of its self-perception as having power over economic and political procedures through the employment of Southern solidarity (Rothstein, 1990: 166). The Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) was created in 1960 and would be instrumental in showcasing its political and economic strength over the global political economy (Morphet, 2004: 525). As a result of US support towards Israel during the fourth Israeli-Arab War of 1973, OPEC’s Arab members would quadruple the price of oil in order to place pressure on the Western world with the overall impact of this embargo having far greater ramifications for the global political economy than just a traditional power play to influence the outcome of Middle Eastern politics (Mortimer, 1984: 3). This action would create the platform for the creation of the New International Economic Order which would form a substantive forum for the diffusion of a new economic agenda (Mortimer, 1984: 3). This would occur when the NAM and the G77 converged to promote the creation of international economic reforms that would create a new pinnacle of Southern unity (Hansen, 1979: 21). Initially, oil companies were the main instigators of the price of oil at the international level; however these events formed the first instance of a group of Third World countries significantly altering the course of the global politico-economic trajectory (Geldart and Lyon, 1980: 91; Mortimer, 1984: 3). However, this instance also came with the comprehension that oil constituted a special type of commodity that was of a high necessity for the global economy and that this would have been a special type of instance in the trajectory of the North-South relationship (Mortimer, 1984: 3).

Much of the developing world’s position on and source of power was derived from the political and economic strength that OPEC could wield during this period. The United Nations Special Session on Raw Materials and Development held in 1974 was an attempt to create a new partnership between the North and South which would be based upon “sovereignty over national resources, improved terms of trade for the raw-material’s producers, and increased transfer of real resources to the developing countries” (Amuzegar, 1976: 550). However, this initiative would be met with strong criticism from the North on the grounds that it was not thoroughly understood in regards to the actual intents and motivations from the South as well as the ideological climate of the era which promoted free trade (Amuzegar, 1976: 550).

What served to further complicate this instance is that the economic and political interests of the OPEC nations would significantly diverge from that of the rest of the Third World, greatly limiting its ability to have a transformative power for the South within the international order (Mortimer,

1984: 3). However, the representatives of OPEC would continuously press the idea of unity of purpose between themselves and that of other developing countries (Hallwood and Sinclair, 1982: 271). While initially a great deal of financial support was generated by OPEC towards other Third World countries, it soon became apparent that these early initiatives were limited in scope as a result of OPEC's refusal to sell oil at diminished prices to other Third World countries (Hallwood and Sinclair, 1982: 272). An increasing number of Third World countries would then begin to question the ambivalence of receiving financial aid at the expense of soaring fuel prices which had a negative impact upon their domestic economies (Hallwood and Sinclair, 1982: 274). Furthermore as the USA, Japan and Europe were eventually able to contain the shock of the oil crises which would reduce their overall reliance on the oil industry resulting in OPEC losing some momentum in its overall ability to impact the North-South relationship (Fromartz, 1989: 693). The initial strategy of limiting the supply of natural resources thus appeared to be an ineffective tool to significantly alter the overall trajectory of the North-South relationship (Mortimer, 1984: 3).

From this unique historical period it can be deduced that OPEC played a significant role during this era by highlighting that the diminishing nature of raw materials did not simply lead to physical limitations and outcomes in the North-South relationship but that it had a significant impact on both the political and financial dimension of this relationship (Amuzegar, 1976: 547). The 1970s also highlighted the unstable nature of the economic system that was adopted by Western nations leading to an increased call from the South to restructure the global system with the creation of a new economic order that would be both egalitarian and more stable (Amuzegar, 1976: 550). Furthermore, as it became apparent that Third World countries faced economic difficulties and underdevelopment, it became increasingly difficult to justify more conventional theories of economic development which had been centred on neo-liberal arguments, while the USA's decoupling of the dollar from the gold-standard created an economic order which facilitated new modes of behaviour from both state and non-state actors, greatly restricting the North-South relationship and alliances (Rothstein, 1990: 171). This crisis was further exacerbated by the divergent viewpoints that were held between the North and South in regards to the structure of the international political economy and the challenges that this posed to states and as a result the varying initiatives that should be carried out in order to effectively deal therewith (Rothstein, 1990: 171). Amuzegar painted the dilemma that is still being heralded by stating that:

“There is, however, also significant internal diversity of interest within each group. The have-not nations are held together by a set of common grievances against the rich and by a common desire for economic independence and political self-assertion. But they are also beset by national differences in resource endowment, population pressure, income level, technological progress, foreign aid receipts, access to world

capital markets, and attractiveness for foreign investments, tourism, etc. These intra-group disparities are bound to make the maintenance of common positions by them on all issues somewhat difficult. The rich countries, in turn, display intense differences in philosophical outlook, national economic objectives, and global political ambitions. They find a unified stand on all agenda items an almost impossible task. There are also significant philosophical and practical policy differences on many agenda items among the various national agencies of some Western countries; that is, the positions favoured by the foreign ministry, the treasury, and the central bank of a single country do not always coincide. As a result, the possibilities of different bargaining coalitions on different issues are greater than ever.” (Amuzegar, 1976: 554 – 555).

3.8 THE POST-COLD WAR ERA AND THE AGE OF GLOBALISATION

The post-Cold War era created a new dynamic in the North-South relationship with important new relationships and structures emerging in regards to their political and economic associations. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the triumph of Western capitalism being heralded in the ideological battleground, the economic process of globalisation could be unleashed which would congeal the political, economic and technological processes across the world. While the advent of a more ubiquitous and pervasive form of globalisation posed immense opportunities for the creation of wealth, as well as immense technological innovation and cross-border interactions that would recreate international relations, at the same time it threatened to stretch the poverty curtain across greater numbers of nations and peoples, especially in countries that already were underdeveloped. With the Soviet threat no longer a calculation in the power dynamic in the international arena and the so-called “end of history”¹⁵ being heralded, many Southern states were once again threatened to be relegated to the margins of the international arena as a result of the end of the East-West conflict.

While the Cold War era was dominated by the bipolar politics of the East-West discrepancy, the global order that would take its place would be more fragmented regionally and driven by multilateral diplomatic initiatives. Within this new world order, the South would come to face a number of inter-related problems that would be unleashed by the end of the Cold War and would also be more vulnerable than the North to the impact of contagion and other related economic practices. The hazards facing the South have moreover been expanded due to the weak nature of its borders and state structures which would be even more burdened as the end of the Cold War unleashed the forces that would undermine these structures such as ethnic conflict. These features would weaken the sovereignty of many nations in the South and increase the likelihood of intervention by the international community. However, the integration of divergent regions would also have a strong impact on the North as can be witnessed by the transformation of migration patterns across the world. Thus, conflicts would have spill-over effects into neighbouring states

¹⁵ Francis Fukuyama is credited as having first made mention of the concept in his 1989 article *The End of History?*

which would place the international community at risk of instability, and issues relating to the globalised economy would have a cross-regional impact, making the world more inter-connected than ever before and increasing the scope of volatility for all regions. Within this new world order, the impact of globalisation cannot be underestimated. (Chubin, 1993)

Globalisation is a concept which pertains to the cross-border actions that occurred in one country or region which had begun to impact and have wide-ranging consequences for states that have no involvement with the state of origin (Halabi, 2004: 23). Furthermore, the concept encompasses the unification of norms, values and objectives across the international system whilst also integrating different cultures across state-borders and has led to a transformation of the economic relations amongst states leading to a world where states and societies have become interconnected along these dimensions (Halabi, 2004: 23; Grugel and Hout, 1999: 4). As Grugel and Hout explain, globalisation entails that the "...cotemporary forms of economic inter-connectedness impinge on the relationship between the state and capital. The global patterns of trade, investment and production, and hence the choices state elites can make and the range of developmental options available are being reshaped by: the liberalization of financial markets; the spread of information services and the concomitant mobility of service industries; and the shift from a fordist to a post-fordist system of corporate and industrial organization, resulting in the desire of the producers to locate close to the suppliers and their customers." (1999: 4) In order to effectively deal with the challenges that globalisation poses states began to carry out their initiatives in concert with global governance structures in order to deal with the negative consequences of globalisation such as environmental degradation and the contagion effects of financial crises (Halabi, 2004: 23). Most importantly, it needs to be recalled that globalisation does not affect all peoples in the same manner and its effects are not extensive in all sectors but instead cross-variations do exist. In this regard, the creation of various global governance structures over the past two decades to deal with the consequences of globalisation was supposed to create a framework that would help to foster better understanding between the North and South (Halabi, 2004: 22).

Coincidentally, the drive towards regionalism across both the North and South would be a paramount approach adopted by states to meet the challenges of a changing world order and the weakening of state structures which led these states to adopt a position whereby regionalism was seen as a manner to achieve intended goals (Grugel and Hout, 1999: 3). Grugel and Hout argue that the initial attempts at regionalism in the South in the 1950s and 1960s depended on a political base, conversely, the regionalism that is found in the South as of the 1980s is primarily a "defensive response" to the ensuing economic marginalisation that these states experienced and the consequent political uncertainty (1999: 4). However, as Halabi argues, developed countries tend to encourage

Third World countries' participation in governance institutions in order to restrict their participation in creating high-value added products and to foster their competitive advantage in labour-intensive and primary-product goods (2004: 22). As a result of these global transformations, while the South has remained essentially a disparate group of nations, it can currently be subdivided into three major groupings (Halabi, 2004: 22). The first group consists of those nations that have received very little foreign direct investment and are generally unable to foster Western institutions that are conducive for capitalist economic growth (Halabi, 2004: 22). Then there are those nations that are crucial for the global economy either because of their strategic or economic importance, even though they produce labour-intensive goods, and face immense pressure from the IMF and the World Bank to adopt Western economic institutions whilst receiving very little foreign direct investment (Halabi, 2004: 22). Lastly are those nations which are newly industrialised and have become an important source of foreign direct investment over the last twenty years and have continuously been pressurised to adopt Western economic principles and institutions (Halabi, 2004: 22). As a result, these nations have been dispersed across the core, peripheral and semi-peripheral state dimensions, weakening the collective unity of the South.

Within this new global order, the transnationalisation of the process of production has led to a new hierarchy emerging amongst states, with borders becoming porous in relation to economic exchange, production and distribution. The importance of this phenomenon lies within its ability to create new core and peripheral areas as a result of the transformation of new production relations that retransform the international system. As a consequence of these trends, core and peripheries have become either regions that are embedded within states or regions that transcribe state boundaries. Moreover, the process of globalisation will lead to a much more acute dissection between those areas considered core and those areas considered peripheral increasing the inequality gap amongst and within nations. Overall, globalisation will have far more acute consequences for peripheral than core areas as a result of the marginalisation that peripheral areas experience both politically and economically. The effects that this process has on peripheral areas is to introduce a greater element of competition amongst peripheral areas in order to acquire much needed foreign direct investment and to incorporate a greater number of both state and non-state actors to the policy-making process especially in regards to those areas that are considered economic in scope. The semi-peripheral area has also grown in scope and can be characterised as being segmented along two dimensions, the first being semi-peripheral areas that are strong and those that are weak. (Grugel and Hout, 1999: 5 – 6)

On a conceptual level, the disintegration of the concept of the Second World, and the changes that had occurred over the last two decades that would transform the internal structures and relations of

many states, would place pressure on the analytical purity of the Third World as a relevant concept in the era of globalisation which led to the term Third World losing ground as an analytical concept as it was deemed to be archaic (Braveboy-Wagner, 2009: 3). Moreover, while these changes led to a number of nuances being created, these transformations can be summarised as pertaining to economic, political and regional configurations. Regionally, with the advent of the 1980s, the nations of East Asia began to procure a higher economic development through the invocation of the developmental state strategy leading to a strong differentiation amongst the nations of the South and placing pressure on the idea of the development of underdevelopment (Braveboy-Wagner, 2009: 3; Leftwich, 2000: 158 – 159). Furthermore, on an economic and political dimension, as the triumph of Western liberalism affirmed the Washington Consensus, the economic trajectories of Southern nations would be retransformed as they accepted the World Bank and IMF's structural readjustment programs, resulting in the unity and impetus required to create the new economic order that would level the playing field between the North and South suffering a great blow as the ideals of global capitalism became deeper entrenched against that of the Non-Aligned Movement of the 1960s and 1970s (Braveboy-Wagner, 2009: 3). To put this in perspective, writing shortly after the end of the Cold War, Buzan notes that as the Second World that was encapsulated by the ideologically-driven communist states was no longer in existence, it made no sense to discuss the Third World as a conceptual category (1991: 432). He went on to argue that there is no longer a unifying thread that would be able to hold such diverse states together in the post-Cold War era (Buzan, 1991: 432). However, this study holds the view that this is essentially a very limited view of the concept of the Third World and what it came to encompass. It needs to be recalled that the end of the Cold War did not come to dispel the essential objectives that these states attempted to achieve, nor did it vanquish a number of the structural inequalities that were evident in the Cold War period. If anything, these only came to be more deeply entrenched.

While the diverse nations of Asia, Africa and South America could relegate their differences in previous decades through the goals that they attempted to achieve, once the structural component of the East-West conflict was no longer in place, it became that much more difficult for these nations to remain united in the midst of their growing disparities (Braveboy-Wagner, 2009: 3). As a result, the use of the term "the global South" had become a more appropriate and neutral concept to be used for those nations that once were understood to be the Third World in international politics but the term also encapsulates those parts of the Northern countries that had become peripheralised as a result of globalisation whilst paying tribute to the familiarity of the problems that these states still experience (Braveboy-Wagner, 2009: 3). However, as Barveboy-Wagner explains, while a number of similar trends have remained much the same over the last four decades amongst those countries

that are commonly characterised as Southern, the differences that exist among them have begun to become much more acute, strongly differentiating these states as can be paid witnessed by the rise of different terms that have become used to describe the divergent needs of the various regions of the South (2009: 3). Yet, in spite of the immense changes that have occurred in the international arena, one should not discredit the term the South too easily. This can be better surmised when it is considered that these countries have continued to act in unison “under the collective banner of the ‘global’ South” in order to minimise their vulnerability and to accrue advantages from an international system wherein they still experience marginalisation which also accounts for the continuous existence of the NAM as well as the G77 in international politics as the “voices” of the global South (Najam, 2005: 112; Braveboy-Wagner, 2006; Kasa, Gullberg and Hegeglund, 2008: 115). Moreover, it will be necessary to consider that these nations view the challenges that they face differently and make use of a different kind of narrative to that of the nations of the North and it is this difference that forms the pinnacle of the cause for the South to be viewed as distinct category (Braveboy-Wagner, 2009: 3).

Nevertheless, over the last decade, a new dimension has emerged in the development of the South which pertains to two phenomena within this entity; the one being the increased nature of South-South co-operation, while the other relates to the growing stratification between the nations of the South. South-South cooperation experienced a resurgence in the past decade as a result of the increasing power stake in international affairs that have been gained by the BRIC countries¹⁶ (namely Brazil, Russia, India and China)¹⁷. These emerging economic powers have been able to have a strong impact on global governance and especially over the relationships between themselves and other developing states through their use of economic diplomacy which has important implications for the North-South relationship (Shaw, Cooper and Chin, 2009: 27). Through the initiatives that the BRICs promote, they have being able to espouse the notion that the global arena should incorporate a new set of norms that illustrate the global order of the new millennium, with multilateralism being an important component thereof, and that the terms of trade be restructured (Shaw, Cooper and Chin, 2009: 27 – 28). Moreover, the ascendancy of these countries is heralded to be the start of a new Second World which will affect global interactions and

¹⁶ It should also be taken note that South Africa is attempting to also be a part of this grouping.

¹⁷ The first mention of the BRIC countries had occurred in 2003 when Goldman Sachs had released a prominent article entitled, *Dreaming with BRIC's: The Path to 2050*, in which they claimed that the countries of Brazil, Russia, China and India will form the economic powerhouses of the future which will have a tremendous impact on global governance. The controversial article had claimed that trends indicated that global economic and political power was being reconfigured from the North and would be galvanised to the East over the course of the next fifty years. Thus, the article claimed that by 2050, the BRIC economies would be larger than that of any other countries in the world save that of the US and Japan which would have important implication for the South in terms of the South-South and South-East axis. (Bremmer and Keat, 2009: 67)

the place of marginalised states therein (Shaw, Cooper and Antkiewicz, 2007: 253). The BRIC countries will constitute the next axis of global economic power on the international stage and are heralded to be the largest economies in the world by 2050 – with the exception of the USA and Japan (Bremmer and Keat, 2009: 67). This phenomenon is further augmented as a result of the post-Cold War era, where far greater prominence is encapsulated by these states, providing more accord for multilateralism (Cooper, Antkiewicz and Shaw, 2009: 674). The BRIC countries are thus able to contrive a new form of regionalism enabling them to provide a novel set of alternatives to the countries of the South in opposition to US hegemony (Cooper, Antkiewicz and Shaw, 2007: 676). While these states are diverse in nature, their shared use of soft power and distribution of foreign aid is an important strategic consideration utilised in order to garner the support of Southern states, especially those that are found in Africa (Shaw, Cooper and Chin, 2009: 32). It is these interactions at the global level that have led to analysts to ponder that the tide may be turning from the North-South power differential to one that is characterised by increased East-South interactions (Shaw, Cooper and Chin, 2009:33). However, in terms of the power differentials of these emerging powers, it is questionable the degree to which these trends are beneficial to the South in the long-term, as a state such as China is seen to be an ambiguous entity in terms of its self-identity as being a Southern state, as the power that it wields at the international level places it within a conflicting and ambiguous position in the South (Eckl and Weber, 2007: 11). It has also being increasingly accused of carrying out a policy of neo-colonialism in Africa – an accusation that the other BRIC countries would fall prey to as well (Shaw, Cooper and Chin, 2009: 34). Further more, the inherent divergences between these states, as well as the serious internal problems that these countries face ranging from endemic corruption to a shortage of resources as well as the weak foundation of their economies, leads one to question their ability to be serious global contenders and economic bodies in the long-term (Cooper, Antkiewicz and Shaw, 2009: 674).

Another important dimension in regards to the transformation of the North-South relationship is the introduction of the Group of 20 (G20) as a global multilateral body. As the Group of 7 (G7)/Group of 8 (G8) proved to be too limited a forum to deal with the crises that the international community faced in the 1990s, it would soon emerge that powerful states would require the assistance of the emerging economies to effectively mitigate the new dilemmas that the world would face in the era of globalisation (Martin, 2005). Essentially, it was the global recession of 2008 – 09 that instigated the G20 as the main multilateral body that would oversee global interactions as opposed to the G8 as the nature of this economic crisis was too wide in magnitude to be presided over effectively by only a single body (Martin, 2010: 26; Cooper, 2010: 741). The G20, which was created in 1999, is a multilateral body which includes the G8, which is the collective body for the traditional developed

and strategic powers, as well as eleven “key emerging and regional centres of powers.” (Martin, 2005). The G20’s creation was paramount for the facilitation of global interests and for the mitigation of the impact of globalisation (Martin, 2010: 26). Apart from its ability to secure the essential resources that are necessary to maintain the stability of the global economy, it also plays a key role in retransforming the structures of global governance (Cooper, 2010: 741). Thus far, the scope of its activities on the global stage has been two-fold, namely, to provide stimulus packages for the recovery of the global economy, as well as to provide legitimacy to global governance regimes (Cooper, 2010: 741 – 742). This is an important point to take note of as the global governance regime has been accused of lacking credibility due to its invoked biased practices which limited the abilities of countries to systematically work out their differences (Cooper, 2010: 742). During the duration of its decade long trajectory, the G20 has been enabled to widen the scope of the Washington Consensus and to create policies to deal with issues that affect both regions such as terrorism and environmental degradation (Martin, 2005). The importance of this organisation is its reflection of the current scope of the North-South relations where the two regions have to interact along a number of broad-based dimensions, however this is still limited to the interactions between developed and strong emerging economies which may not be of benefit to those countries in the South which experience the most marginalisation. The G20 is still overtly criticised as being highly exclusive as its membership consists of key players at the expense of the weak (Cooper, 2010: 742). This point can be better illustrated when it is considered that the G20, in many its policy issues, has essentially overlooked Africa¹⁸, especially in relation to such strenuous issues as food security which plagues the continent (Martin, 2010: 26). Moreover, the G20 does not allow the UN (the key multilateral body) to have an important role at the negotiations but rather lays emphasis on providing the IFI’s with an important role to play at the negotiations. While the inclusion of China, Brazil and India, as well as other key players from the global South, was instrumental for pragmatic reasons as these were seen as key economic allies, the G20 is still beset by mounting tension between the USA, China, Brazil and India due to their conflicting notions in regards to the necessity of coherent democratic principles as well as the path to development, which serves to create fissures amongst the members (Cooper, 2010: 751).

The structure of global governance has also become further transformed as a result of the increased scope of formalised South-South alliance building which allows these states to re-orientate their economic and political spheres vis-à-vis the North (Taylor, 2009: 45). The creation of the India-Brazil-South Africa Dialogue Forum, otherwise known as IBSA in 2003, formed an important new alliance in the global South where three of the regions’ biggest economies came together in order to

¹⁸ South Africa being the only African member present (G - 20, s.a.).

enhance their position vis-à-vis global governance structures, especially in WTO negotiations, and to act as a unified position on behalf of the South to promote the G20 agenda (Taylor, 2009: 45, 47 – 48). However, one key transformation in the North-South relationship that IBSA pays witness to is that whilst in previous decades most leaders of the developing world heavily criticised the financial institutions of the North, these are now viewed as being central and legitimate institutions that promote rule-based activity and are as a result beneficial to the North-South relationship (Taylor, 2009: 49). Thus, while these new trends in the international arena pay witness to a new cross-alliance formation between the North and South and within the South itself, these factors also indicate that the South is no longer as homogenous a body as it once was and that important stratifications currently exist with it.

While it is not within the scope of the paper to be able to confidently state what the outcome of these new bodies will be for the development of the South, this is currently an important new development in international relations whose impact is beginning to coalesce into a strong presence within the South.

3.9 CONCLUSION

This chapter has examined the historical relationship between the North and the South since the process of decolonisation up to the present day. By examining this historical period important trends could be sifted which have come to dominate this relationship. Moreover, important developments have been highlighted within the South which have had a fundamental impact upon our understanding thereof and as a result its relationship with the North. By highlighting the impact, as well as the limitations, of the NAM, G77 and OPEC one is able to gain important insight into what had been the main driving motives for the creation of these organisations as well as the strong impediments that led to these organisations being unable to achieve their intended goals.

While Southern unity was a strong *motif* within the trajectory of these organisations, and a need to create a Southern identity was a rallying call based upon a shared history of colonialism, deprivation and economic underdevelopment, the strong differences that exist amongst these states have become more stark in the age of globalisation and would undermine the majority of initiatives that were needed to create the breakthroughs that would transform the relationship between the North and South into one that is based upon an egalitarian affiliation. Furthermore, the current transformation of global politics to include such bodies as the BRICs, IBSA and the G20 pays witness to the current state of North-South and South-South cross-alliances which are on the rise as a result of the increasing nature of the intra-related problems that the world is facing as well as the ascendancy of these middle-powers unto the world stage. Yet, in terms of their ability to transform

the marginalisation that is faced by poverty stricken areas remains to be seen. These trends lead one to question the overall justification for a shared Southern identity and if perhaps it does not make more structural cohesion to rather create regional, issue-based bodies that could coalesce to gain structural power within the international arena. However, then the question becomes whether such regional bodies would have the individual capacity to recreate the international arena that would alter the systemic marginalisation that is currently experienced by the South. While such pondering is not within the scope of the paper it does highlight that while a sense of Southern identity has been created based upon a shared history and characteristics this may also be the weak link within this structure. However, with the North also being unwilling to change the underlying structures of the global economic and political system, the bid for a more inclusive international order where the identity and impetus of the South is acknowledged is strongly undermined as a result.

CHAPTER 4

THE STATE OF NATURE

4.1 INTRODUCTION

The latter half of the twentieth century witnessed a greater scope being given to the mainstreaming of the environment in domestic politics. As science provided a clearer picture of the harmful effects of environmental degradation upon human development and ecological wellbeing, the environment began to be accommodated within the legislative and political systems of various nations. As green movements began to flourish in the West, and media attention began to turn towards the adverse effects of pollution and resource depletion, policy-makers could no longer ignore the significance of this new turn in public consciousness. However, the irony of this increased turn towards environmental protection has been the fact that within the scope of the same period, environmental degradation would reach unprecedented levels and has had severe implications for human welfare as is witnessed by the increased presence of severe weather conditions which are attributed to the phenomenon of global warming which has wrought havoc on certain parts of the globe. More importantly, what marks the significance of environmental degradation is the idea of its being a global problem, thus requiring a global solution. The last three decades have thus witnessed various international conferences being held to mark the global turn in finding an all-encompassing solution to the problem of environmental degradation. However, the process of environmental regulation has proven no easy feat to achieve. With developing and developed countries being unable to reach a consensus to mitigate the harmful effects of environmental degradation, tension between the two regions has only increased, diminishing the scope for a necessary solution to be procured. What lies at the heart of this inability to reach a viable solution to curb environmental degradation are the issues that lie at the heart of the global political economy; these being questions relating to consumption levels, trade, equity and justice. The Copenhagen Summit that was held in December 2009 served as a stark reminder that the issues relating to the inability of the North and South to come to terms relating to the working of the international system are still very much present.

In order to investigate these trends, the following chapter will be subdivided into the following sections: the main contours surrounding environmental degradation which lay an important foundation for comprehending the context for the imperative state and societal response to this phenomenon, the prominence of the environment in politics, ideology and legislation which creates

the preliminary context to understand global climate negotiations; a historical and theoretical overview of climate negotiations and a critical overview of the Copenhagen Summit.

4.2 GREEN THOUGHT

In order to fully amass the impact of environmental regulation and environmental movements upon the nature of international relations, it is necessary to pay brief attention to the major phenomena that led to the environment becoming a serious arena of international concern. Since the 1750s, the earth has experienced an increased level of heating as a result of the continuous release of greenhouse gases (GHGs) into the earth's atmosphere which have risen by approximately 70 % since the 1970s (Harris, 2008: 455). This phenomenon is commonly referred to as global warming which is induced by atmospheric changes that occur as a direct or indirect result of human actions (Harris, 2008: 456). Some of the adverse weather conditions that have been attributed to this phenomenon have been intense tropical cyclones, severe draught, heat waves and high sea levels that have become an attribute of greater parts of the world (Harris, 2008: 456). As the scientific community began to increase their epistemological base in regards to the implications of climate change, the impact thereof upon society began to appear more incremental. Thus far, the history of Western society has been characterised by its ability to nearly eliminate its dependence upon natural forces and to subordinate it (Yearly, 1992: 118). As Yearly explains this point of view, "In other words, people (or at least some people) have more or less overcome the environmental constraints presented by distances, the climate and even the limitations which stem from the nature of living organisms." (1992: 119). However, Yearly goes on to explain that vis-à-vis this progress that Western society had been enabled to achieve through science and technology was the marginalisation of nature by human forces (1992: 119). As a result, the changes that have occurred in the climatic sphere over the last few decades had initially being understood to be a future-orientated dilemma, however, this has become significantly ingrained in public consciousness due to the severity of recent climate induced changes which can no longer be ignored due to their impact upon human well-being (Harris, 2008: 456).

An important turning-point within this dimension had occurred by the 1990s when the impact of environmental degradation upon societies and ecosystems had become well-publicised raising this issue in the public consciousness (Yearly, 1992: 121). This stems from the contention that the main factors that had been present to assist the ecological crisis that modern society is facing had come from a number of inter-related factors. With the release of harmful gases into the atmosphere such as carbon-dioxide, as well as acidic gases, acid rain had been allowed to develop and fall in states that were not responsible for this gaseous release (Yearly, 1992: 121 - 122). More importantly,

these instances proved why environmental regulation proved to be of such a difficult nature to mitigate and develop. With the specific case of acid rain as an illustration, it had being difficult to prove which state was responsible for the creation of these hazards, as these gaseous effects could be found to be in places a vast distance away from the actual point of origin, hence it was difficult to hold any individual state or company accountable (Yearly, 1992: 122). Human waste also proved to be a significant area that would lead to the destruction of the environment and be of a difficult nature to manage (Yearly, 1992: 125). Under the correct circumstances, waste from humans and animals can be discharged into the environment and allowed to decompose at a beneficial rate; however, with such high levels of waste being released from dense urban areas, factories and farms the natural balance thereof has been disturbed, especially damaging seas and rivers which have often been seen as free areas for the disposal of waste (Yearly, 1992: 125-126). Furthermore, with consumption levels in the West increasing and the cost of the removal of this waste being significantly high, many companies began to use Third World countries, especially in West Africa, as destinations to rid themselves of this waste at cheap costs and with fewer restrictions (Yearly, 1992: 126 - 127). Thus, the ability to effectively control and eliminate waste has been a source of great difficulty, as the regulation and mitigation thereof between states has proven ineffective.

The depletion of resources has proven to be another important and highly controversial arena in regards to ecological deterioration. The depletion of the earth's resources has being an important source for the high levels of consumption and economic growth that has occurred in Western countries since World War Two. The major problem with this, besides the pollution that this creates, is that the majority of these resources are finite and the consumption thereof cannot be indefinitely prolonged. While the exact impact and effects of this are not wholly surmisable as scientists argue over the nature of resource depletion and the best manner to mitigate this, the impact of the acceleration of economic growth and consumption has been met by the ability to harness cheap resources from the Third World in the 1980s, thus increasing Third World debt and poverty. In terms of abolishing Third World poverty, Yearly explains that, "Even people who are optimistic about the potential for growth are unclear about where the energy resources would come from if we were to try to provide everybody with the same standard of living as is currently enjoyed by an average West European or North American citizen." (1992: 129). As a result, the effective control and elimination of a transnational problem amongst states became highly problematised as this issue touched upon the core structures of states and economic relations in the twentieth century. (Yearly, 1992: 128 - 129)

4.3 SOCIETAL RESPONSE TO THE ENVIRONMENTAL CHALLENGE

The environment has come to occupy a miscellaneous position within the public consciousness with its very presence on the political agenda been attributed to a number of important factors. While the impact of environmental degradation has been outlined in the earlier section, it is necessary to understand that this is a social problem with a social understanding which will impact the amount of prominence that this issue is able to achieve. This can better be illustrated if one observes that in the 1960s, as well as 1970s, environmental issues had found a very comfortable platform within the political and societal consciousness; however, the more stringent economic and political landscape of the last three decades would prove to be of a hostile nature to these issues; indicating that the prominence attributed to environmental factors depends upon a number of inter-related factors such as the strength of economic performance as well as regime type. However, this should not dispel the strength of the environmental movements and green parties that have grown in number and strength over the last few decades as they have helped to establish the environment as an issue of political salience. (Yearly, 1992: 131)

The politically-motivated groups that aspire to protect the environment, and often but not always win political power, are frequently guided by an ideology that attempts to transform the manner of living in the industrialized West which they claim has resulted in environmental degradation, with this ideology habitually being either reformist or radical in nature (Yearly, 1992: 136). What should come to the foreground is that these movements base their critiques upon the idea of reforming production and economic growth to be more sustainable, and to minimise the high consumption levels that are often found in Western societies whilst making the political system one that is decentralized (Yearly, 1992: 136). While a great deal of this thought stems from their critique of the Enlightenment¹⁹ which attempted to break down the forces of nature into their component parts and to see it as subordinate to human beings for utility purposes, the green movement attempted to adopt a more holistic approach in their understanding of nature and society (Yearly, 1992: 136; Held, 2004: 152 – 153).

One of the most fundamental ways in which these green movements have attempted to influence the space that is accorded to the environment in the agenda-setting process within the political system is to attempt to gain victory at the electoral polls. However, due to the ideological pillars that these green parties espouse, it has proven increasingly difficult for green parties to fully accommodate the

¹⁹ The scientific breakthroughs of the Enlightenment led thinkers to argue that there was a divide between Nature and human subjectivity (or thought process) whereby the mind could be used to understand the laws and structure of Nature. Moreover, these ideas placed human beings in the centre of their epistemological basis which had been seen as a justification for the exploitation of nature. (Held, 2004: 152)

political process within their campaign scheme as they frequently promote a direct form of democratic participation and do not support hierarchy but rather a scheme that is based upon a decentralized mode of party governance. Further more, their general mistrust of party politics, that is their fear of being co-opted by the power-seeking agenda of the political process which is perceived to have a corrupting influence, also limits their ability to become occupied in the political process or when they are involved, problematises it. Nevertheless, and in spite of the aforementioned limitations, green political parties have been able to successfully campaign within the electoral process. Many green parties that are found in Western Europe have run successful electoral campaigns and have found a great number of seats in the legislature or have been part of power-sharing governments. Yet, the success that green parties are able to achieve during election periods does depend upon the electoral system in place, with the bipartisan politics of the USA hindering green parties from attaining victory whilst the representative system found in countries such as Germany promoting it. What has been highlighted by observing this section, is that through the campaign efforts of green parties, and the power dividends that they were able to attain in legislatures, environmental issues have attained a central position in the public consciousness which has also led more mainstream parties to take ecological affairs and transform them into important electoral issues that the public espouses. (Yearly, 1992: 137 – 141)

This section has thus far outlined that in spite of the fluctuation of support that green movements have enjoyed within the public arena, it can be stated that the support from the public has generally grown, especially as more scientific knowledge has been accumulated in regards to the harmful effects of environmental destruction. However, one of the weaknesses of the green movement is that the support that they have amassed has generally been related to domestic issues such as the construction of nuclear plants within urban areas or the intended destruction of local natural reserves, but green parties have had more difficulty attaining support in regards to transnational environmental issues as states struggle to conjure up consensus in regards to the amelioration of certain problems such as the reduction of carbon dioxide as the necessary solution places strain upon economic development and the scientific proof that is presented thereon remains controversial, resulting in states being hesitant in their approach to these issues (Yearly, 1992: 142 – 143). Thus far, international negotiations aimed at regulating and providing adequate laws to protect the environment can be described as being weak and poorly regulated (Zanetti, 2009: 21). Initial laws aimed at protecting the environment were created in the USA in the 1960s as a result of local campaigners' efforts to prevent an energy company from constructing a reservoir in their area in New York state in order to preserve a local scenic site; the case being successful, was able to establish a precedent in the legislation regarding environmental affairs and conservation (Zanetti,

2009: 21). As the 1960s and 1970s progressed, increased efforts were procured to advance laws regarding the preservation of the environment, especially at an international scale as the dilemma was too complex and inter-related in scope for one state or region to effectively deal therewith (Zanetti, 2009: 22).

However, finding a consensus at the international level has been no easy feat to achieve due to the complex relations that exist both within and among states. This is further aggravated by the fact that the impact of climate change is viewed as being especially detrimental to those countries where extreme poverty and geographic limitations make them even more vulnerable (Harris, 2008: 456). This is especially stark when it is considered that development has been an issue of high salience for the developing world which has involved “using” the environment in order to fulfil these developmental needs (Yearly, 1992: 149). As Yearly points out, “Mining, mineral processing, logging and agribusiness will all add to the likely environmental burden of development. Yet, for the Third World, there is no choice but the need for development...” (1992: 149). In order for these states to reduce the absolute poverty that great numbers of their population live in it will be necessary to increase national income growth and to increase the size of their economies, yet it will come at the price of environmental destruction which may add to the severity of living conditions already experienced (Yearly, 1992: 149). While it is the North that has been responsible for the greatest amount of pollution and environmental destruction, it is unable to mitigate the negative effects thereof on its own and therefore requires the contribution of the South in order to have this achieved as a result of the interdependence of this phenomenal; however, its ability to accomplish this in light of the South’s developmental needs may be severely stunted (Yearly, 1992: 149).

4.4 THE INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS AIMED AT PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT

The last three decades have been marked by the increased presence of international negotiations aimed at preserving the environment and mitigating the negative effects of ozone depletion. Nevertheless, these efforts have been marked as being overtly unsuccessful in their attempts to harness the controls and responses that are necessary to curb the negative impact of climate change. In order to understand why the nature of these negotiations is so contentious, one needs to understand where the present responsibility lies for atmospheric damage as well as the state of international relations between the North and South. If one contrasts the position of the North and South on this issue, by 2008 estimates, the USA has produced 20% of the world’s global emissions even though its citizens only constitute 4% of the world’s population which is an especially stark comparison when one considers that this is the equivalent of 136 developing nations which all

together emit 24% of the world's emissions (Parks and Roberts, 2008: 623). It has to be considered that the richest 20% of the world's population emits more than 60% of global emissions into the atmosphere, with this amount increasing substantially when one uses a historical perspective to determine the amount that has been emitted by this population group (Parks and Roberts, 2008: 623 - 624). As a consequence of the vast divergences in emission levels between developing and developed nations, which are further complicated by the notion of justice in the international system, this inequality greatly undermines the total balance of emissions between developed and developing nations and as a result, the most effective manner mitigates this (Parks and Roberts, 2008: 624). This mitigation process is rendered further ineffective by the notion that limiting gas emissions implicitly suggests weakening a nation's industrial growth, which results in developing nations being remarkably resolute in creating a stunted negotiating process (Parks and Roberts, 2008: 621).

In terms of the explanatory analysis of this stalemate situation, divergent explanations have been produced as to the nature of these stunted negotiations revolving around climate change. Thus far, various analysts have theorized in respect to these negotiations' outcomes as being the result of a country's accumulation of bargaining power, their ability to employ coercive measures against other states; as well as the impact of exogenous shocks such as oil crises, or national self-interest, the influence of non-governmental environmental organisations (NGOs), the persuasion of political leaders, the business and intellectual community, as well as the values of a post-materialist society which they claim impacts the nature and outcomes of climate negotiations. Yet, Parks and Roberts claim that these views are limited in explanatory prowess; they instead argue that it is the impact of economic and political inequality within the hierarchic international system which is an impediment to the successful negotiating scheme between the North and South in regards to the issues relating to environmental degradation (Parks and Roberts, 2008: 622 - 623).

4.5 A HISTORICAL PREVIEW

The mitigation of the environmental dilemma by various states and regions does not only pertain to the cross-figuration of international relations in the prevention of climate change but also touches on key issues related to resource use, trade and economic development. When the subject of development in the Third World was initially analysed during the 1970s and 1980s, development was understood to strictly pertain to the variables of modernisation and economic growth in a strictly economic sense, with the environment largely being excluded from this analysis as a feature of development, a notion that was borne by the Dependency School which had dominated the theoretical perspective in regards to the development of the South. Nevertheless, the initial

connection between the environment and development was established at the first *UN Conference on the Environment and Development* which had taken place in Stockholm in 1972. During this period concern was raised in regards to the negative impact of overpopulation and depletion of essential resources such as oil leading to the Malthusian Trap which further expounded fears from the developed world of a future irrevocable crash of the world's economy if the matter was not dealt with effectively. However, this fear was soon relinquished once new reserves of oil had been discovered which could form a restraint against the oil embargoes that were formed by OPEC leading to a weakening of the organisation as a global player once developed nations recovered from the initial oil shocks. (Dickenson *et al*, 1996: 26)

However, the increased pressure from the scientific community as to the dire consequences of environmental damage soon re-sparked the need to recreate cross-border mitigation to stall the harm that was being done to the environment. It was during the 1980s that a host of scientific conferences were procured in regards to the impact of environmental damage thus establishing the environment as a preeminent issue that was of high salience for societal welfare (Paterson and Grubb, 1992: 293). Central in the efforts aimed at creating the platform that would constitute these negotiations had been the work generated by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) which had been established in 1988 and would hearken scientists to establish their collective efforts to deal with climate change and create the basis for the concern that has been shown by governments to deal with this dilemma (Harris, 2008: 459). As a result, the United Nations General Assembly went on to create the Negotiating Committee for a Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) which would be used as a precedent as well as organising body for any future negotiations regarding the mitigations surrounding climate change (Harris, 2008: 459). It had thus been these scientific discoveries which initially compelled countries to set up diplomatic conferences in order to deal with the effects of climate change, however while the basis for these discussions had initially being neutral, the nature thereof would soon become highly politicised (Harris, 2008: 459).

Before embarking upon a historical investigation of the international climate regime, it would be of benefit if one took stock of a few important trends. If one investigates the historical trajectory of climate negotiations that have occurred between developed and developing nations, two main issues arise which appear to constrain the negotiation process. The first issue relates to where the responsibility lies in terms of who will be required to "clean up" their emission levels (Parks and Roberts, 2008: 627). To make this point more precise, this relates to who will be required to limit their greenhouse gas emissions and who will have to carry the greatest load of this atmospheric clean up in the years to come (Parks and Roberts, 2008: 622). In order to industrialise and enhance

economic growth, Southern governments are faced with the need to increase the level of their emissions in order to have this achieved. Northern governments, on the other hand, attempt to convince Southern nations to limit their emission levels, however, the issue of contention for the South lies in the North's unwillingness to limit their own emission levels (Parks and Roberts, 2008: 627). With a few notable exceptions, emissions have increased significantly in the North over the last few decades only increasing the tension between the two regions (Parks and Roberts, 2008: 627 - 628). More importantly, in order to be able to meet their reduction costs domestically, but still maintain their level of industrialisation and economic growth, a number of industrialised nations have relocated their activities to Southern countries in order to restore their overall emission levels while attempting to promote change in the industrialisation process domestically (Parks and Roberts, 2008: 628). This is augmented by Southern leaders' belief that this is conducted in order to quell Northern distributional requirements, and more importantly that this is done in order to stall Southern development (Parks and Roberts, 2008: 628).

These Southern fears need to be understood as emanating from the wider inequalities that are to be found within the global economic system. As Southern states feel that their developmental efforts are being stunted by the bilateral and multilateral agreements that are developed by Northern states, one of the most precarious of these agreements being intellectual property agreements, otherwise known as the TRIP's, their efforts to comply with the North on the climate regime becomes significantly reduced. As Parks and Roberts go on to explain, "These inequalities of opportunity have had a significant impact on how developing countries approach global environmental negotiations... 'developing states' perceptions of the global economic structure as inequitable has long being a factor in their policy responses to global environmental issues... when powerful states disregard weaker states' position in the international division of labour in areas where they possess structural power (as in international economic regimes), they run a higher risk of weaker states 'reciprocating' in areas where they possess more bargaining leverage (as in international environmental regimes)." (2008: 632). (Parks and Roberts, 2008: 631 - 632)

Furthermore, these international negotiations have stalled due to the perceived hierarchic inequality which exists within the international environmental regime itself. When the first climate negotiations had been held in 1972 in Stockholm, the relationship between the North and South would become increasingly strained as a result of the South's fears that the limitations being placed would limit their growth especially as the North had continued its unabated use of the world's resources. Northern countries, on the other hand, wished the issues at the conference to revolve around the population growth in the South, whilst promoting avoidance of the consumption levels in the North and being unrestricted as to technological and financial transfers to the South. With the

advent of the New International Economic Order (NIEO) in 1974, Southern countries were in a better position to negotiate for the amelioration of their position within the international system, however, with the more stringent economic and political climate that ensued with the victory of the neoconservatives in Washington and Great Britain, the South's position became even more marginalised within the economic system and the ensuing climate mitigation conferences. (Parks and Roberts, 2008: 629 - 630).

In spite of this, in 1992 the UNFCCC was created in order to stabilise gas emissions in the atmosphere whilst providing a time-frame for when this is to be achieved with the organisation officially coming into effect in 1994 after it had been ratified by 150 states. The UNFCCC's purpose was to have developed countries' greenhouse emissions reduced to 1990 levels by the year 2000, with the organisation being especially concerned that developed countries would assist developing countries with technological and financial resources that had been necessary to have this achieved. By 1995, the Conference of the Parties (COP) had been established by the UNFCCC which served as the "overriding authority" for these climate negotiations. However, in spite of these efforts to create a more conducive environment for the negotiations between the regions, climate negotiations have thus far been unsuccessful and highly controversial with little progress actually having been achieved. (Harris, 2008: 459)

As Parks and Roberts further insist, the deliberations revolving around climate change shall not be adequately settled unless the questions surrounding the political and economic inequality will be thoroughly responded to (2008: 622). However, as the earlier chapter outlined, inequality is itself a contentious topic within the international field and creates a number of litigious issues. This point is better illustrated when it is considered that international negotiations between developed and developing nations aimed at finding a consensus to reverse environmental damage, starting with precedent-setting 1972 UN Conference, have been significantly stalled by perceptions of decision-making by powerful states that perpetuate global patterns of injustice and inequality. This is an important point to take into consideration as this reinforces "structural-worldviews" preventing countries from realising a consensus as earlier issues relating to the relationship between the North and South become reignited. (Parks and Roberts, 2008: 622 - 623).

It is thus the issues which had been present within Southern deliberations as illustrated by the NAM, G77, the OPEC era as well as other milestones within the historical trajectory of the North-South relationship, which come back starkly to the fore in climate negotiations, politicising these issues and limiting the ability of policy-makers to reach a thorough consensus thereon. Southern actors remained sceptical of these negotiations as they saw these as a brake upon their economic

and social development whilst Northern states, such as the United States, refused to be a part of any consensus to limit their emissions unless Southern states did the same. Thus, while Northern and Southern states eventually did ratify the UNFCCC, the treaty avoided the controversial issues that had been necessary to fully mitigate the climate change dilemma. Nevertheless, the main principle that the treaty wished to espouse had been that of “common but differentiated responsibilities” which promoted the notion that states limit their emissions, but, it had never been fully deliberated into a broad-based consensus surrounding actual obligations. More importantly, shortly after the consensus came into being, industrialised countries had begun to reverse their deliberations of assisting poorer nations with technological and financial support. Thus, the international conferences that had been held were groundbreaking in resetting the relationship between the North and South and also held key measures that would signify their inability to overcome the traditional impasses between the two regions. (Parks and Roberts, 2008: 622)

The premier 1992 *United Nations Conference on Environment and Development* (UNCED) had taken place in Rio de Janeiro and was seen as the collective action by states to act in concert to find solutions for the global environmental problems that the world was facing at the time (Paterson and Grubb, 1992: 293). The Rio Conference had been held to mark the twenty year passage of the Stockholm Conference that had been held in 1972, and had been able to build on the foundation created in Stockholm thus strengthening the analytical and empirical ties that exist between the environment and development and had played an important role in adopting the principle of sustainable development which had become the conference’s pinnacle policy output (Cleveland, Kubiszewski, Miller and Saundry, 2007). More importantly, it marked a significant turn in international politics as the beginning of the 1990s marked the end of the Cold War with its political impasse and where public consciousness regarding the seriousness of environmental degradation had significantly increased (Cleveland, Kubiszewski and Miller, 2007). The Rio de Janeiro conference was also important as it encoded the gulf that was forming between the North and South in the post-Cold War era in regards to climate change as well as other related issues (Paterson and Grubb, 1992: 294).

Even though it was seeped in controversy, the 1997 Kyoto Protocol was a significant treaty as it was the first international accord to provide a time table and emission target that developed countries had to follow through without anticipating a similar response from Southern countries (Harris, 2008: 460). The Protocol also established a means for developed countries to transact emission levels amongst one another thus allowing for some adaptability within this arrangement (Harris, 2008: 460). The breakthrough pinnacle of the Kyoto Protocol is that whilst previous conventions had “encouraged” nations to limit their overall emission levels, the Kyoto Protocol

committed them to do so (UNFCCC, s.a.). As the Kyoto Protocol lays the historical responsibility upon industrialised countries, it commits these nations to bear the brunt thereof based upon the “principle of common but differentiated responsibilities.” (UNFCCC, s.a.). Yet the protocol would experience a setback because even though US President Bill Clinton had originally agreed to the Kyoto Protocol, the US Senate unanimously agreed to put into effect the Byrd Hagel Resolution which prevented America from decreasing their emission levels unless developing nations agreed to do likewise, a decision that had been denounced by Southern leaders who claimed that the USA was responsible for a greater amount of emissions than the countries in the South (Parks and Roberts, 2008: 622). While further negotiations took place over the next few years that would centre around contentious issues within this protocol, these efforts would also be significantly rolled back with the advent of the Bush administration in Washington as these environmental negotiations were viewed as hampering US economic interests thus negating the earlier consensus that was established (Harris, 2008: 460; Monbiot, 2004). While an agreement was finally reached in 2002 between the United States and a number of developed nations, as well as certain developing countries such as India and China; a change would be incurred from earlier negotiations by refocusing the consensus from the limitation of emissions within the North, to developed countries helping developing countries to adapt to climate change (Harris, 2008: 461). Moreover, strong developing states would begin to procure bilateral agreements with developing nations as a result of their belief that they are powerful enough to be able to bargain for a position that they view as being beneficial to national self-interest (Kasa, Gullberg and Hegeglund, 2008: 114). Hence, one of the most poignant aspects of these negotiations thus far has being the contention forming between developing and developed countries, where Southern countries attempt to convince developed countries to restrict their emission levels and developing countries being reluctant to have this achieved (Harris, 2008: 461).

4.6 THE DELIBERATIONS AT COPENHAGEN

The Copenhagen Summit which ran for approximately two weeks beginning on the 7th of December 2009 and ending on the 18th, was host to the largest gathering of world leaders (190 in total) outside of the United Nations’ headquarters in New York that would attempt to find viable solutions to climate change (Bodansky, 2010: 230). Initially, a sense of enthusiasm permeated the discussions; however, with the advent of the Summit a sense of unease began to settle amongst representatives and delegates as the Summit appeared to evoke biased practices from the world’s powerful states, such as China and the USA, and was seen as being a significant setback in the climate negotiations between the North and South (Bodansky, 2010: 230). The rift that occurred should be understood within context as George Monbiot explains that the problem that nations are attempting to find a solution to has essentially reconfigured the political landscape which prompted him to write that,

“Humanity is no longer split between conservatives and liberals, reactionaries and progressives...Today the battle lines are drawn between expanders and restrainers, those that believe that there should be no impediments and those who believe that we must live within limits.” (2009: 18).

The main objective of the Copenhagen Summit had been to secure a legally binding agreement amongst states to reduce their overall emission levels and to create a binding decision in regards to the CFC pollutants in the earth’s atmosphere; however, it soon became apparent that the negotiation process was unduly slow and marred by inconsistencies relating to the manner in which the documents relating to the mitigation process between states had been formulated (Groenewald, 2009: 11; Monbiot, 2009: 18). At the end, the Summit was unable to produce a legally binding document that would be able to compel countries to limit their emission levels (Groenewald, 2009: 11). The main areas of contention at Copenhagen related to the impasse that had been created between the developed and developing nations; where the United States, which was supported by Canada and Australia, did not intend to limit its overall emission levels whilst blaming China for the ensuing deadlock and criticising it for its encroaching emission levels (Groenewald, 2009: 11). However, it was the island states – who are especially vulnerable to rising sea levels - and African nations that would have being affected most dangerously by climate change, and who had laid the greatest amount of criticism against the developed world for being unable to accept their historical responsibility for climate change (Groenewald, 2009: 11). The unity that was required from the developing world to reach a beneficial consensus soon disappeared as various developing nations, such as Ethiopia would make bilateral agreements with the developed world that weakened the South’s negotiating position vis-à-vis the North (Groenewald, 2009: 11).

4.6.1 The main issues stalling the summit

Climate change mitigation is a central issue within international relations and is a serious reflection of the level to which states are committed to overcoming this crisis as mitigating climate change will require that industrial and political structures be renegotiated and reconfigured (Paterson and Grubb, 1992: 293). It is thus necessary to comprehend that the vast complexities which hamper this discussion have parallel linkages to the complexities that have permeated the North-South relationship (Khor (a), 2009: 1). As these negotiations are not simply related to the limitation of CO₂ gas in the atmosphere but are also related to the economic issues that interlace the North and South and involve the distribution of economic and financial resources, there does not exist a simple manner to overcome these issues without proffering a vast array of political and economic sacrifices (Khor (a), 2009: 1). This can be illustrated by observing that in the follow-up to the Copenhagen

Summit, developed countries had exerted demands upon strong developing nations such as India and China to limit their overall emission levels which created tension between Northern and Southern regions (Khor (a), 2009: 2).

However, these efforts are complicated by the lack of consensus as to what exactly constitutes an advanced developing country or what constitutes a major emitter. Khor uses the example of India to explain that while India does possess a large population, that does not necessarily translate into India being a large emitter nor necessarily an advanced country. These negotiations have also been complicated in regards to the responsibilities of developed countries under these conventions. Developed countries, with the exception of the USA, will be required to limit their overall emission levels by 5.2% in comparison with their 1990 emission levels by 2012, with these emission levels being renegotiated for the post-2013 period. While the Kyoto Protocol is not made redundant after 2012, negotiating a number of crucial aspects of the treaty in terms of both individual and corporate duties is still necessary. It was thus at the Bali Conference of 2007 that those developed countries which had not agreed to the Kyoto Protocol, with the exception of the USA, were able to make similar commitments as those developed states that already were members of the Kyoto Protocol. While developing countries were not expected to make emission cuts under the Kyoto Protocol, the Bali Action Plan does require a nationally appropriate emission level cut to suit the needs of developing countries so long as these countries are assisted therewith by technological and financial transfers from the North. The Bali Action Plan thus reinforces the notion that there are certain parallel responsibilities between the North and South however, its importance still lies within its recognition of “the common but differentiated responsibilities” principle between these two regions. The Bali Action Plan would thus constitute a basis for the negotiations that would occur at the Copenhagen Conference and would form the foundation for a new agreement in the post-2010 period, whilst also providing the USA with new duties. (Khor (a), 2009: 2)

It is important to briefly take note of the events which had occurred at the Bali Summit of 2007 as it laid the foundation for the important agendas that would need to be resolved at Copenhagen. The delegates who had attended the Bali Summit had agreed that the initiatives aimed at reducing carbon emissions into the atmosphere have to be increased and that a unanimous agreement thereon would need to be reached at the Copenhagen Summit in 2009. As the Kyoto Protocol will be ineffective as of 2012, it will be necessary to come to an agreement in accordance with four main issues that are key to securing the first phase of the Kyoto Protocol, with the main agenda being finding the most appropriate manner in which to minimise greenhouse emissions as much as possible. The four main issues that were to be resolved at Copenhagen in order for the Kyoto Protocol to be effective had been the following: increasing the financial and technological resources

necessary to assist with mitigation and adaptation; promoting the suitable mitigation activities for particular national capacities; creating an appropriate governance body that would assist developing nations with climate mitigation; and creating ambitious emission reduction targets for developed nations. It was thus hoped that the Copenhagen Summit would lay down the foundation for the climate mitigations necessary after 2010 and to create the financial imperative to begin coalescing the climate change regime which was needed in 2010. (UNFCCC, 2009)

However, a major point of contention occurred in 2009 prior to the Copenhagen Conference when developed countries, although having differentiated goals as well as motives in mind, were no longer willing to ratify this accord but instead insisted on siding with the USA on climate mitigation actions. This will effectively negate the responsibilities that developed nations have accumulated under the Kyoto Protocol, with their climate mitigation rather being based upon nationally chosen emission cuts that are peer reviewed by Convention parties under the new action plan. This would form a major setback for developing nations especially as this new agreement is supported by the European Union (EU), limiting the ability of the South to counter this action, with the G77 and China strongly voicing their disapproval of such a regime mechanism. This is further compounded by the lack of commitment that has been shown by developed countries to substantially limit their overall levels of emissions. This is a major setback for climate mitigation efforts as a fair climate deal would incorporate the strong drive by developed nations to considerably limit their overall emission levels. It is essential to understand the importance of this point as the more developed countries are able to limit their own emission levels the more “atmospheric space” will remain for developing countries which will enable them to focus their attention upon economic growth and social development. At present developing countries, *sans* the USA, are only willing to limit their own emission levels by sixteen to twenty three percent which will decrease to eleven to eighteen percent if one includes the USA within one’s analysis. (Khor (a), 2009: 2 - 3).

The Copenhagen Accord that was reached on the eighteenth of December 2009 simply had the UNFCCC state that it took “note” of the Accord which places the COP in a neutral position in regards thereon. A key note of controversy in regards to the Accord has been the position of developing nations in regards to it whereby they claim that it is politically binding and will strongly impact the manner in which they mitigate climate change. Moreover its impact is further reinforced via its association with the COP 15 which creates a situation whereby the Accord may form the basis for international law. That is, any nation that chooses to associate themselves with the Copenhagen Accord essentially binds that nation both legalistically and politically to the Accord or otherwise will be at least understood to signify its political alliance to the Accord (South Centre,

2010: 1). Its importance is also incremental via its ability to create what is to be a roadmap that would replace the earlier UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol and create a new set of resolutions that developing and developed nations bind themselves to. (South Centre, 2010: 1 - 2).

Furthermore, the Accord was maimed by more controversy as the process by which the agreements at international climate negotiation conferences are reached must be based upon the principles of multilateralism and openness (Khor (b), 2009: 2). The Copenhagen Accord unfortunately did not live up to these ideals whereby the Danish Presidency had chosen to convene with only twenty six of the one hundred and ten leaders at the conference in order to minimise the varied number of states that would be present, thus making it easier to reach a consensus and to incur a time limit upon the other states so as to pressurise them to accept the Accord, which would mean that a great voice of discontent would be released by the majority of world leaders at the conference as this was viewed as a betrayal of the principles upon which these talks had been based as well as a betrayal of the ideals of the Kyoto Protocol which had sought to alleviate the plight of developing countries as a result of climate change (Khor (b), 2009: 1 - 2). One of the great impediments to reaching a viable solution at Copenhagen had been the short span of time which diminished the ability to reach a thorough accord on the various issues that had been related. Rather, Copenhagen was supposed to have been used as the initial phase to begin the process of reaching a viable solution for climate change (Khor (b), 2009: 1). While two main groups were responsible for the attempt to establish a working solution, these being the LCA (long-term, cooperative action) and the KP (Kyoto Protocol) under an inclusive manner with their main objective being the proliferation of the Bali Action Plan and the Kyoto Protocol (Khor (b), 2009: 2; Bodansky, 2010: 230). The Danish Presidency thus wished to use this opportunity to use a select group of leaders to create an agreement which would attempt to harness the discussions which would provoke nations to adopt it on account of the constrained time factor (Khor, 2009 (b): 1). Thus, the principle reasons behind the inability of the majority of nations present at the conference to accept the Accord had being based upon (i) the *content* of this accord and (ii) the manner in which it had been established (Khor (b), 2009: 1).

4.6.2 Implications of the Copenhagen Accord

It should be understood that the Copenhagen Accord will have an enduring and long-lasting impact upon the North-South relationship. To begin with, this will have an undermining impact on the Kyoto Protocol, thereby greatly diminishing what had been the Protocol's focus upon promoting the emission reductions of developed nations. Instead there was created by the Accord a "bottom-up" initiative on the part of developing nations, with a voluntary framework being used instead of the earlier legally binding agreement (South Centre, 2010: 2). In this manner the Copenhagen Accord

does not permit the developed and developing countries to fulfil their differentiated obligations under the UNFCCC whilst requiring a greater amount of CO₂ mitigation from developing countries which greatly limits their ability to develop (South Centre, 2010: 3). Furthermore, the Accord also limits the necessity for the developed world to provide the developing countries with the necessary financial and technological assistance (South Centre, 2010: 3; Khor, (a), 2009: 3). Thus, while it does recognise that global temperatures are to be reduced it provides no structural initiative on the manner in which this is to actually be achieved (South Centre, 2010: 3). It also does not set a date which acknowledges the deadline by which developed countries are to achieve these initiatives thus leaving this problem essentially unresolved (South Centre, 2010: 2). As a result, every state has the option of distinguishing their own emission targets without having to secure the approval of the UNFCCC (South Centre, 2010: 2). Overall, developed countries have pressurised developing countries to accrue a greater degree of the burden for climate mitigation which is not in accordance with the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities.” (Khor, (a), 2009: 3).

4.6.3 The nature of the structural alliances at Copenhagen

Perhaps, one of the principle impacts of the Copenhagen Summit has been its ability to reflect new trends that have permeated the scope of international relations. The Copenhagen Accord that was presented to world leaders on the 18th of December 2009 had been created as the result of the interactions between the world’s politically ascending and strongest developing countries namely, China, India, Brazil and South Africa (the BASIC grouping) as well as the world’s hegemonic power, the United States (Vidal and Watts, 2009). However, the Summit also revealed strong rifts forming amongst developing nations themselves. Whilst in previous summits, developing countries had presented a relatively strong and united front in terms of their responsibility towards climate change and its mitigation, the Copenhagen Summit revealed a rift forming between the economically weakest nations which are at the same time the most vulnerable to climate change who are pushing for a strong consensus on the need to drastically curb emissions as the very state of their survival depends thereon; with the opposite view being reiterated by advanced developing nations which view any such limitations as a curb on their economic development and strategic importance such as India and China (Walsh, 2009). China has been able to use its position quite strategically in order to amass a position that would be of benefit to itself by aligning itself with the G77 for specific purposes but in terms of the actual Accord that had been issued it found it to be of more benefit to align itself with the other BASIC countries namely Brazil, South Africa and India (Taylor, 2010). As China is currently the world’s largest emitter of greenhouse gases, the position that it has occupied is of strategic necessity if it is to achieve its longstanding developmental goals.

In order to improve one's understanding in regards to the contrasting positions both within the North and South in regards to this issue it may be of aid to understand the various groupings that formed within both regions in regards to this issue. Within the South one can distinguish groups that coalesce around three issues which will impact their overall relationship to this issue; these being those nations that are oil-producers and exporters, such as Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, who have repealed all pleas to reduce emissions levels (Paterson and Grubb, 1992: 299). These states are also joined by those which heavily rely on deforestation, such as Brazil, and thus view any form of climate negotiations as an infringement upon their sovereignty over their natural resources (Paterson and Grubb, 1992: 299). On the opposite side of the spectrum are the island states, such as Vanuatu in the Pacific Ocean, which are highly susceptible to climate change due to their low-lying position making them vulnerable to rising sea levels and as a result they require that strong curbs be placed on rising emission levels (Paterson and Grubb, 1992: 299; The Independent, 2006). Interspersed between these two opposing dimensions are those nations which believe that this is a Northern problem which should coalesce into a Northern solution but who nevertheless require financial and technological assistance to effectively deal with climate change especially when this is considered in terms of the developmental costs incurred by climate negotiations (Paterson and Grubb, 1992: 300).

The North, on the other hand, can also be subdivided into three groupings in order to better understand their relationship towards climate negotiations. First, are those states which attempt to coordinate a beneficial climate regime in order to decrease emission levels. This group is mainly comprised of the Scandinavian countries and the European Union; although it should be noted that this is not a homogenous group and thus their efforts are not always uniform. Nevertheless, these countries have demonstrated in the past that they wish for climate mitigations to be successful and are generally willing to assist the Southern countries in their precarious position and it is thus no surprise that these nations are at the same time energy importers. Nevertheless, it should also be understood that there is also a strong technological and economic rationale which supports these countries' desire to promote climate mitigation. The position that the USA has occupied in relation to the climate regime can thus far be characterised as being the direct opposite to the position that has been presented by the aforementioned states. The basis for this has strong historical and economic roots thereby complicating climate mitigations by enhancing America's position as being against all form of climate control. With the USA's strong position as both an oil exporter and importer, as well as the strong development of its economy through its ability to have cheap fuel prices as well as its high CO₂ emission status, the USA thus finds it of strategic importance to prevent any form of climate control. The position of Japan, Russia and the former Soviet Bloc tends

to be more ambiguous as these countries tend to act in a less uniform manner in regards to climate negotiations, and instead their position appears to be of a more mercurial disposition in regards to the decisions that they undertake. (Paterson and Grubb, 1992: 300 - 304)

The final Accord that had been instigated was done so at the political behest of President Barack Obama and China's premier Wen Jiabao, with South Africa, India and Brazil playing a strong role in the creation of the final Accord as well (Walsh, 2009). While the accord does make mention of the necessity to reduce global temperature levels by two degrees Celsius, there is no actual mention of the commitments that are necessary to instigate this measure (Walsh, 2009). The impetus behind this policy output should be considered within the economic configuration that these states are embedded in, for instance Brazil depends upon utilising bio-fuels and hydropower while the South African economy is founded upon coal requiring that both countries forge an agreement that will be of benefit in this dichotomous energy production context (The Economist, 2009: 26). These elements should be analysed within the current international power configuration as these countries currently form the economic power-houses of the South whose intentions will differ as a result from the rest of the developing world, as they are pre-occupied with securing their economic ascent into the core of the global economic system. Since environmental degradation is essential for economic growth for these major polluting middle powers, their negotiating position in Copenhagen can be considered to have cut off their identification with the G77 and the most marginalised nations that will suffer from climate change (Devraj, 2010; Goswami, 2010). The formation of the BASIC group thus pays witness to the new transformation in the North-South relationships as it is essentially a Southern negotiating bloc which had the power to procure an agreement with the USA that will affect the global response to climate change. As these countries are found in a conflicting position between the interests of the developed and developing world, their rise into the latter affects their global affairs which have essentially become aimed at procuring their ascent within the international order (Ist, 2009). Moreover, with China's strong position and crucial ties with the international community, it could utilise its ties to influence or coerce other countries to agree to the Accord (Murray, 2010). Given the above, it is discernable that there is a new power configuration at the helm of the global political system. This non-traditional alliance between the USA and BASIC points to intersecting alliance formation between the North and South and within the South itself. More importantly, the current shift that has been pointed out between the USA and China leads to a world that is increasingly influenced by the G2 (a strategic non-formal alliance between the USA and China) which has great potential to have strong ramifications for the North-South relationship.

Furthermore, what has become rather evident is the weak position of the European Union (EU) within the Accord, leading to a transplantation of its position within the Northern axis as a major

power in climate politics (Charlemagne, 2009). Instead, the EU appeared to have a far stronger relationship with Brazil at the Accord who was one of the principal countries that had been responsible for the creation of the agreement (Charlemagne, 2009). Nevertheless, within the EU it had been the more traditional powers of Britain, Germany and France who had spearheaded the negotiations aimed at reducing global emissions (Charlamgen, 2009). Their African counterparts, on the other hand, as represented by the African Union (AU) presented a rather weak position in relation to the issues at hand; and instead it has mainly focused its efforts upon maintaining its support towards the G77. However, the position displayed by such countries as Ethiopia may significantly prove to undermine the already weakened African position as Ethiopia forged an agreement with Britain and France which had not been the policy that the AU and G77 wished to achieve (Groenewald, 2009: 11). This weak position also allowed such nations as China to increase the scope of its influence over Africa's overall position on climate change. This could also clearly be seen with the position that South Africa chose to occupy at the negotiations. Originally, South Africa united itself with the position of the AU and the G77; but it would later on retract its position and align itself with the position that the USA and China would come to occupy; which is significant as this is a deal that would not aid those countries which are most vulnerable to climate change (The Sunday Independent, 2009). It is this development in the politics of environmental regulation that leads one to question the idea of Southern solidarity. While similar characteristics had been presented in the past, it has become clear that this has taken on a new dimension in these climate negotiations.

What had thus become increasingly apparent at the negotiations is the formidable position that was displayed by China and India at the discussions. The two countries, that are also strong emerging economies and are some of the world's biggest emitters of greenhouse gases, had only decided to sign their convention in March 2009 (Broder, 2010). Alongside, these states, the other countries that did ratify the convention were those comprising the EU, Japan, the Alliance of Small Island States (even though they called for far more stringent emission reductions that will be necessary to reduce global temperatures) and the African Union; however, not all states were willing that delegates adopt the position afforded by the Convention which became evident by the strong antipathy that it had received from the Latin American countries and Sudan (Vidal, 2009; Walsh, 2009). It needs to be understood that as a result of the complexity that environmental negotiations have accrued through the growing emission levels from the world's fastest developing economies, the Kyoto Protocol is to a degree rendered ineffective if these developing countries do not meaningfully participate in these negotiations and make serious emission cuts (Taylor, 2010). All in all, while the Accord did receive the support of certain countries, this was insufficient to harness the Accord into

a legally binding agreement that would have secured the full participation of all involved (Taylor, 2010).

4.6.4 A theoretical reprise of international climate negotiations

It is necessary at this point to present a brief theoretical reprise in order to make sense of these occurrences that have been investigated up to this point. Wallerstein explains that the unit of analysis that one must investigate must be the all-encompassing world-system within which various dialectically-charged social groups attempt to remodel the system to their benefit (Wallerstein, 1974: 347). Within this world-system there exists a number of territorial units comprising the state system which also contains a kaleidoscope of cultural groups within their jurisdiction (Wallerstein, 1974: 349). However, what does remain consistent within this world-system is that it contains a singular division of labour within which it unites these various territorial units (Wallerstein, 1974: 349). The division of labour also places a hierarchical structure upon those occupational skills that require more capital and greater skill which reserves them for the core states (Wallerstein, 1974: 350). It is this occupational structure which will form one of the central aspects of the analysis as it plays a decisive role within the economic structure of the world-system. Wallerstein explains further that the system remains intact, or “self-maintained” as a result of the strength of accumulated capital in juxtaposition to what he refers to as “‘raw’ labour power”, which reinforces the geographical hierarchical division of labour with the ongoing economic growth of this system which further increases inequality amongst these geographical locations (Wallerstein, 1974: 350). Wallerstein also contends that the technological progress that is achieved within this system tends to increase its geographical boundaries thus allowing states to transform their position within this hierarchy either positively or negatively (Wallerstein, 1974: 350). Another important attribute of this system is the central role that is played by classes. The geographical milieu of classes plays a pivotal role in the position that they will occupy both within the division of labour as well as the position that they would come to occupy within their influence over their domestic state as well as the states that compose the hierarchic scheme of the division of labour within the world-system (Wallerstein, 1974: 351 - 355).

The concept of sustainable development had been created in the 1980s as a means to form a resolution to the problem of the tension between economic progress and the preservation of the environment (Novek and Kampen, 1992: 250). It was also believed that a combination of market forces, appropriate state intervention as well as international negotiations would be sufficient to curb the threats posed by the problem of environmental degradation (Novek and Kampen, 1992: 250). It was thus believed that retransforming the economic structure from one that was heavily

energy reliant to one that is not as resource-intent would promote harmony between economic advances and the protection of the environment (Novek and Kampen, 1992: 250). Thus, by promoting information industries instead of manufacturing in the core would lead to the improvement of economic performance as well as sustainability (Novek and Kampen, 1992: 250). However, as Novek and Kampen explain, this shift in the structure of the global economy, that had been coupled with the advent of globalisation had not being able to be of a sustainable nature as, “...the relationship between economic expansion and environmental preservation remains fundamentally contradictory...the societal-environmental dialectic” in which economic expansion imposes on the natural and social environment which can ultimately threaten economic expansion itself” (1992: 250). What the procedures that are necessary to preserve the environment do illustrate is that states have acquired a contradictory role in the modern era as their commitments are tied between trying to enforce the expansion of the market while attempting to curb the environmental degradation thereof which does not always leave much room for them to manoeuvre (Novek and Kampen, 1992: 250). In order to better understand this it is necessary to make sense of a number of key trends that have permeated the last two decades of the global political economy.

The process of globalisation has retransformed the mitigation process of environmental degradation as it has essentially changed “the distributional conflicts over environmental externalities, such as pollution” (Novek and Kampen, 1992: 251). Furthermore, as a result of the distances incurred within the processes of production and consumption, the externalities that accrue which may be of harm to the environment take place at great distances from their point of origin, limiting the ability to thoroughly mitigate this (Novek and Kampen, 1992: 251). Furthermore, this is rendered more complex as the drift towards the information technology sector has only increased pollution, resource depletion and overall consumption levels, thus increasing the costs incurred to societies and the environment if this is to be dealt with effectively (Novek and Kampen, 1992: 251). As a result of the above-mentioned factors, the state occupies a dialectical position as it must promote both economic integration as well as limiting environmental damage (Novek and Kampen, 1992: 251). Thus, the increased presence of the information-based economy has simultaneously being met by the increased stake of the global economy within new and diverse regions as this was of necessity for the acquisition of scarce resources in order to propagate this system (Novek and Kampen, 1992: 256). This is responsible for the crevice formation between the geographical consumption of these resources from their physical acquisition through the working of the globalised economy (Novek and Kampen, 1992: 257). This further renders the international division of labour more precarious as Southern nations contend with manufacturing and securing the resources and goods that are necessary for Northern consumption and are similarly forced to accept

the externalities of this environmental degradation (Novek and Kampen, 1992: 258). However, the state has to be a promoter of environmental protection in order to build public legitimacy while its most important function is to create the conditions for economic growth with the mitigation of the environment posing as a constraint thereon (Novek and Kampen, 1992: 262 - 263). Yet, while all states feel the need to enhance their economic growth this is again constrained by a strong public outcry for the protection of the environment (Novek and Kampen, 1992: 263).

Hence, if these trends are placed in parallel to the theoretical foundation that was clarified at the beginning of this section, these trends may better be illuminated. Due to the structural hierarchy that the system creates with its unequal basis amongst states, a number of options need to be undertaken if states wish to overcome this structural inequality. As the global capitalist economy needs to find the necessary resources to secure its growth and expansion, it requires having this accommodated by the limits being placed upon it through the restriction of carbon emissions and resource use. Thus, a prominent core state, such as the USA, will find it beneficial to form a strategic alliance with semi-peripheral states which are resource-rich and regional hegemons such as India, China, Brazil and South Africa as this maintains the equilibrium of the system whilst encouraging economic growth and the depletion of resources from outlying peripheral areas that these semi-peripheries are able to access. It is thus to the benefit of these semi-peripheral states to maintain an economic relationship with the USA in spite of earlier cries for Southern solidarity as this enables them to ascend the global economic hierarchy.

4.7 CONCLUSION

Climate negotiations have proven that a co-variance of factors are involved in driving and complicating the multilateral impasse thereon. The structures of the global political economy that have permeated the North-South relationship over the last five decades have ingrained the structural issues that make these two regions unable to come to a beneficial solution in regards to these matters. Issues that relate to carbon emissions, trade, resources and technological as well as financial transfers are the main impediments that form which essentially clog the negotiating process. It is necessary to understand that it is the political-economic issues that have sustained the incongruent relationship between the two regions that have maintained both the global environmental problems as well as inhibiting the ability to reach a consensus to mitigate this. As the climate regime requires a restructuring of political-economic relations, the solutions required to mitigate this shall be essentially inefficient if these factors are not included. While the North holds economic and technological prowess, the South is able to form a counteraction to this by holding unto essential resources as well as diplomatic power that is able to stall the negotiations.

Furthermore, the growing interdependence and stratification between and within the North and South clearly places strain on previous alliances. It is evident that the ascendancy of the semi-peripheries in the global hierarchy has undermined the rallying call for Southern solidarity as these nations require strategic alliances with certain core states in order to increase the scope of the power in the international arena. Yet, it becomes evident by observing the alliance formation at Copenhagen that relationships between the North and South, and within the individual regions as well, are busy undergoing a metamorphosis as redirecting the negotiations will either secure the economic future of some countries or the very survival of others.

CHAPTER 5

THE TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONS:

SUMMARY, DELIMITATIONS AND PROPOSITIONS

5.1 INTRODUCTION

The study has investigated the multi-faceted impact of environmental regulation which appears to be both a reflection of the North-South relationship but which also seems to highlight important new global shifts and alliances. Thus, while the study has been able to procure that important new trends have been established, it has also emphasised that the long-lasting asymmetries between the two regions have remained. It has also established that environmental regulation, as a key that is endemic to both future economic growth but also to the very survival of nations, has resulted in it creating novel imperatives both within and between regions. As environmental regulation touches upon sensitive issues relating to trade, economic growth, and social development, as well as global justice, the Northern and Southern regions have been most at odds at establishing how this burden will be subdivided amongst them. While a number of theories have been presented which have attempted to explain the inability to commemorate a workable solution to resolve climate change, the main impetus that the study supports is that the inequality which permeates the heart of the global political economy has been the most critical issue preventing the North and South from accepting a workable solution to solve climate change. Without an effective forum being created to critically address the mitigation of climate change, this phenomenon will deteriorate the well-being of communities around the globe.

In order to fully surmise and reflect upon the findings, the following chapter will be subdivided into the following sections in order to reflect upon the findings incurred: an overview of the main findings that the study has established, the delimitations of the study and scholastic recommendations.

5.2 COPENHAGEN: THE NORTH/SOUTH IMPASSE

The study had established the historical narrative between the North and South as well as the main facets of their relationship based upon their political and economic interactions. It also critically pointed out that the South has undergone various conceptual ramifications which has led to scholars insisting that the term is no longer viable and as a result that global interactions between states can

no longer be viewed through the lens of the North-South impasse. However, the nature and roots of Southern identity, its main goals and achievements as well as its orientation vis-à-vis the North during three historical periods, as well as the nature of its interactions with the North essentially remain which is inscribed as a critical manifestation of current global interactions. However, the strong differences amongst these states based on their developmental needs and power differentials strongly impinges upon the earlier mentioned characteristics and has the potential to render them stunted as the South appears limited within its ability to provide a united front in order to change the global order. Thus, the ensuing stratification of the South has procured a region that is no longer a coherent and unified entity and as a result important differences remain within this region as a result of changing economic and developmental needs, especially between those states that are characterised as semi-peripheral and peripheral which have become increasingly pronounced as a result of the process of globalisation. Hence, while some states have been enabled to improve their position within the global order by partaking in such organisations as the G20, others still face stark political and economic marginalisation that does not appear to subside.

Thus, Copenhagen has been instrumental in stressing that while a certain amount of continuity has remained intact within global interactions, new trends have been procured that may pay witness to the formation of important new shifts in global dynamics. The creation of such multilateral bodies as the G20 is indicative of the cross-alliance formation between North and South, as Northern states came to the realisation that the magnitude of the problems that the world faced was too complex and cross-regional in nature and required the cooperation of certain regions in the South. Nevertheless, the incorporation of strong developing and developed states within this dynamic may still undermine the position of developing nations in the South that still experience marginalisation, leading one to question the degree of transformation for all but the strongest developing nations in the South. At the Copenhagen Summit, while core countries were instrumental in mitigating the power relations in previous global negotiations, new alliances in the South seem to form as is demonstrated by the Copenhagen Accord which was developed between the BASIC countries (namely Brazil, India, China and South Africa, a manifestation of the BRICSA countries heralded to be the world's politically ascending as well as strongest growing economies) and the USA, which is a key reflection of the North-South alliance. In addition, from this it may be inferred that the new alliance between the USA and China, or the G2, may form the new power dimension in the twenty-first century and fuel global politics and alliances which will revolve around these two key states.

What may be surmised is that the current negotiations pay witness to where the power centres within the international community currently lie. While technologically and financially backward nations have been spurned at the negotiations and may suffer the most acute challenges as a result

of climate change, those Southern nations which currently possess resource power and are on the economic ascent are in a more beneficent position to restructure the negotiations so as to meet their needs. As Hansen pointed out at the beginning of the study, the countries of the South have had little point of contention in regards to the ideological or political manifestations of the past; however it has been (and continues to be) far more internally weakened due to the pragmatic division between the more developed and less developed countries that form this group (Hansen, 1975: 924). Further more, due to the structural requirements of the global economy as well as their overall national needs; it is to the advantage of certain core states to maintain their level of consumption, industrialisation and CO2 emissions in order to preserve their economic growth and national well-being.

What the Copenhagen Summit has pointed to is the new alliance formation and stratification within the South in order to achieve advantages in the global economic order. An important facet that the global climate negotiations have indicated is the divergent interests and groupings that have formed both within the North and South as a result of opposing ideational, political and economic interests. While previous alliances within the South had been inherently unstable and achieved marginal gains due to the innately deviating needs of the South, the current alliances that had emerged are based strongly upon the need for increased growth in what are already strong emerging economies. However, due to their mutually aligned interests within the global climate regime, that is their need to increase and maintain economic growth, forming an alliance with core countries is an imperative in order to maintain this economic growth. However, while new alliances have been created within the South this may not necessarily be a lasting partnership in itself. The BASIC states contain a number of important internal weaknesses, such as limited economic growth, internal division and high levels of crime and pollution, that may undermine their overall economic growth and political stability which may eventually weaken this partnership. With the current stratification that is forming both within the North and South in regards to the most viable solution to mitigate climate change and maintain economic growth; there is currently reason to believe that these partnerships may be unstable in the long-term.

Having investigated the historical trajectory of climate negotiations which culminated in the Copenhagen Summit of 2009 as well as the historical overview of the North-South relationship as of the decolonisation era, it has come to the fore that this relationship has had a strong impact upon these negotiations. This largely pertains to the issues relating to justice, economic growth, consumption and trade within the global economy, with previous grievances having resurfaced at climate negotiations. However, as divergent economic and national needs do exist, states will make alliances and agreements based upon power differentials and their own self-interest regardless of

identity stakes and historical malpractices. Thus, states such as India, Brazil and South Africa would be more likely to make alliances with the United States and other core countries if this were to increase the likelihood of their economic growth whilst core countries such as England and France will make alliances that will provide them with the necessary resources to maintain their level of growth as well as consumption. It is evident that Immanuel Wallerstein's characterisation of states as either semi-peripheral or peripheral will impact the position of the South within the negotiations as strong semi-peripheral states will procure agreements that will help with their ascendancy into the core. In light of the trends, as well as theoretical framework investigated, it is ascertainable that there are strong divergences between the rising middle powers and the rest of the South, leading one to question whether these strong developing states should still be characterised as Southern except within a strict historical sense. This has important theoretical and conceptual ramifications for IR as it may be necessary to introduce a three, even a four-tier demarcation of states within the current global order. While the North-South relationship does shed light on global interactions to an extent, it may be necessary to create stronger demarcations within these groups based on developmental needs to increase predictive and explanatory capacity. To surmise, unless the issues that have permeated the North-South relationship over the last few decades in regards to global institutions and the hierarchic structure of the global political economy be effectively resolved, the politics of climate regulation will be stalled at future summits and negotiations.

5.3 LIMITATIONS AND AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

While the study has attempted to construct a coherent overview of the main impact and reflection of climate negotiations on the North-South relationship, this global overview has limited the study in certain respects. This short-coming arose due to the inability of the study to examine acute instances of climate negotiations between individual countries as well as regions but instead the focus had been relegated to the more conspicuous and form-altering events at the Summit which had led to the creation of the main multilateral agreement. Thus, future research should perhaps focus upon singular regions and even nations at these negotiations in order to examine more idiosyncratic instances.

In connection to this, while the study has investigated international climate negotiations along the contours of Immanuel Wallerstein's World-System Analysis, this has resulted in the study being unable to pertain to follow-through in regards to issues that are not within the parameters of this theoretical framework. While the observation of this theoretical framework has been an instrumental element in maintaining an overall level of coherence within the study, its strong economic basis may impede the study in certain important respects. Thus, future investigation

should focus upon ideational as well as cultural perspectives that may strongly illuminate other important facets at climate negotiations.

One important facet that the negotiations at Copenhagen illustrated is the divisions that are forming within the core itself. That is, can we speak of the North itself as a coherent entity? While the answer may at first appear obvious, it may be that a comprehensive account is required to understand the multi-layered facets thereof. Whilst previous studies stressed the lack of cohesion within the South as well as the internal processes dividing it, it may be necessary to form a similar account for the North as well, especially in light of the global financial crisis. This may have important theoretical implications as World-Systems Analysis traditionally subdivided the South into peripheral and semi-peripheral countries, however, it may not be stated so confidently that the core is still fully complacent with the functioning of the logic of the world-system.

The first aspect that may be built upon for scholastic review is the structural impact of the global political economy in creating divisions within the regions of both the North and South and its overall impact upon environmental degradation and mitigation as the study was too limited in its overall scope to explore this aspect in its fullest outcomes. The study would also encourage the overall investigation of the impact of structuralist viewpoints within the relationship between the North and South in regards to the climate regime, as Parks and Roberts argue, “by reinforcing ‘structuralist’ world-views and casual beliefs, polarising policy preferences and, making it difficult to coalesce around a socially shared understanding of what is ‘fair’...” (2008:623).

In line with the above-mentioned viewpoint, it may aid our understanding of the impact of climate politics by investigating various aspects of this issue upon an assortment of social arenas, as international climate change negotiations only represent one subset thereof. This is especially important as climate politics is still a rather novel subfield of political science and IR, one that requires greater investigation in its own right. One such important new area may be that of the securitization of climate change whereby the United Nations’ Security Council may increasingly legally bound states to act in compliance with climate change norms under Chapter VII (Scott, 2008: 606).

5.4 AFTERTHOUGHT

The crisis at Copenhagen confronts us with the basic dilemma, and perhaps irony, of our times. The explicit tension between economic growth and unprecedented consumption is abiding side-by side with intolerable poverty and the destruction of the very planet that is meant to belong to all and sustain all communities. The continuous exploitation of the environment is not only a matter that

has destructive consequences for those that are already burdened by poverty and marginalisation but its most devastating consequences will be borne by future generations. UN secretary-general Ban Ki-moon stated this simply when declaring that, “We are all complicit in the process of global warming. Unsustainable practices are deeply entrenched in our every day lives. But in the absence of decisive measures, the true cost of our actions will be borne by succeeding generations, starting with yours...” (UN News Service, 2007). It has come to the fore that the divisions between the “haves and have-nots” which perpetuate previous patterns of global injustice have a stark impact upon global climate negotiations. Thus, while climate change impacts all states, its overall impact is differentiated across different sectors of the globe with its most prolific impact being in those regions that are least able to cope with its effects.

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