PEACEKEEPING OR PEACE ENFORCEMENT?
A PROPOSED MODEL FOR INTERVENTION
IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

by

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DECLARATION

I, the undersigned, hereby declare that the work contained in this assignment is my own original work and that I have not previously in its entirety or in part submitted it at any university for a degree.

SIGNATURE

DATE
SUMMARY

The principles and characteristics of peacekeeping, as the United Nations (UN) in its search towards global peace and stability originally intended, are not adhered to in Sub-Saharan African countries. In this context, peacekeeping operations are perceived to be synonymous with biased armed intervention and the enforcement of peace through the application of force, often without the consent of the parties involved in conflict.

As the political situation in many Sub-Saharan African states deteriorates, a greater need for peacekeeping and even peace enforcement operations has arisen. Mounting pressure on South Africa from regional forces, as well South Africa’s own national interest to become involved in peacekeeping, calls for an evaluation of ‘Sub-Saharan African peacekeeping’ per se. This situation creates a dilemma as regards both the responses by regional organs and the reaction of states to the endemic and escalating conflicts in collapsing states. Can what is currently happening in Sub-Saharan African still be referred to as peacekeeping? Do we need a fresh approach to conflict resolution in Sub-Saharan Africa? Are the UN principles, set in a post-World War II global context, still applicable in a deteriorating intra-state context?

In an attempt to find answers to these questions, this research focuses on the nature of peacekeeping operations from an analytical, comparative perspective with the aim of identifying commonalities and differences in the approaches and practices of countries that have participated in peacekeeping operations. Could it be that ‘classical’ UN peacekeeping has simply become historically outdated and that modern peacekeeping operations are dictated by the socio-political environment and thus requires a new approach? It would appear that the concept of peacekeeping needs to be re-defined from an African perspective in order to equip regional organs with a firm theoretical foundation for possible future involvement in Sub-Saharan African peacekeeping and peace enforcement endeavours.
The UN's peacekeeping performance on the African continent over the past decade has raised serious doubts as to whether the UN has the capacity or will to deal effectively with inter-state and more specifically, intra-state conflict. Consequently, Sub-Saharan African peacekeeping is currently standing at a crossroad. It is also evident that a transition needs to be made from 'classical' UN peacekeeping principles to a 'modern' African approach in touch with Africa's prevailing circumstances and demands.

From the research findings and case studies, a conclusion is drawn concerning how 'modern' peacekeeping practices compare to 'classical' peacekeeping, as envisaged in Chapter VI of the UN Charter. In addition, a model is proposed for dealing with the unique challenges of Sub-Saharan African intra-state conflict.
Die beginsels en kenmerke van vredebewaring, soos die Verenigde Nasies (VN) in sy soeke na wêreldvrede en stabiliteit oorspronklik beoog het, word nie in Afrika suid van die Sahara eerbiedig nie. In die konteks, word vredebewaringsoperasies geag as sinoniem te wees met partydige gewapende inmenging en die afdwing van vrede deur die aanwending van mag, dikwels sonder die toestemming van diegene wat in die konflik betrokke is.

Die verslegtende politieke situasie in vele lande in Afrika suid van die Sahara bring mee dat 'n groter behoefte bestaan vir vredebewarring en selfs operasies om vrede af te dwing. Toenemende druk op Suid-Afrika deur streeksmagte sowel as Suid-Afrika se eie nasionale belang om by vredebewaring in Afrika betrokke te raak, noodsaak juis 'n evaluasie van vredebewaring in Afrika suid van die Sahara. Hierdie situasie veroorsaak 'n dilemma in sover dit die reaksie betref van streeksorganisasies sowel as dié van mislukkende state wat toenemend by inheemse konflik betrokke raak. Kan dit wat tans in Afrika suid van die Sahara aan die gebeur is steeds beskou word as vredebewaring? Word 'n nuwe benadering tot die beslegting van inheemse konflik in Afrika suid van die Sahara vereis? Is die VN beginsels soos gestel binne 'n globale na-tweede-wêreld-oorlogse konteks steeds van toepassing op 'n verslegtende intra-staat konflik konteks?

In 'n poging om antwoorde te vind op dié vrae, fokus die navorsing op die aard van vredebewaringsoperasies vanuit 'n analitiese, vergelykende perspektief. Hierdie fokus het ten doel om ooreenkomste en verskille in die benaderings tot en toepassings van vrede in lande wat aan vredebewaringsoperasies deelgeneem het, te identifiseer. Is dit dalk moontlik dat 'klassieke' vredebewaring histories verouderd is en dat 'moderne' vredebewaringsoperasies deur die sosio-politiese omgewing dikteer word en as sulks, 'n nuwe benadering vereis? Dit wil voorkom asof die konsep van vredebewaring vanuit 'n Afrika perspektief her-definieer behoort te word sodat streeksorganisasies toegerus kan word met stewige teoretiese grondbeginsels.
waarop toekomstige vredebewaringsoperasies in Afrika suid van die Sahara gebaseer kan word.

Die VN se vertoning in die bewaring van vrede en meer spesifiek, dié se vertoning die afgelope dekade, laat ernstige twyfel ontstaan oor dié organisasie se vermoë of wil om effektief met konflik binne en tussen state te handel. As gevolg hiervan, bevind Afrika suid van die Sahara haar by 'n kruispad wat die bewaring van vrede aanbetref. Dit is ook duidelik dat daar 'n verskuiwing behoort plaas te vind vanaf 'klassieke' vredebewaringsbeginsels na 'n meer 'moderne' Afrika benadering wat in pas is met Afrika se eiesoortige omstandighede en eise.

Vanuit die navorsingsbevindinge en gevallestudies word daar in die gevolgtrekkings gekyk in hoe 'n mate 'moderne' vredebewaring in die praktyk met 'klassieke' vredebewaring, soos beoog in Hoofstuk VI van die VN Handves, vergelyk. Aansluitend hierby, word 'n model voorgestel vir die hantering van die intra-staat vraagstukke wat voortspruit uit konflik binne state in Afrika suid van die Sahara.
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Our Heavenly Father, who watched over me and on whose strength I could rely in the face of all adversity.
If war is the failure of diplomacy, then … diplomacy, both bilateral and multilateral, is our first line of defence. The world today spends billions preparing for war; shouldn’t we spend a billion or two preparing for peace?

UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan

The stark and inescapable fact is that today we cannot defend our society by war, since total war is total destruction, and if war is used as an instrument of policy, eventually we will have total war. Therefore, the best defence of peace is not power, but the removal of the causes of war, and international agreements which will put peace on a stronger foundation than the terror of destruction…. The grim fact, however, is that we prepare for war like precocious giants and for peace like retarded pygmies….

Lester B. Pearson (On accepting the Nobel Peace Prize, 1957)
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CHAPTER 1

CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATION

1.1 Introduction

Peacekeeping is a global occurrence, which has increasingly become prevalent on the African continent, as well as in Europe, the Middle East and the Americas. Since the demise of the Cold War, a steady increase in peacekeeping operations has been observed. Evident, however, is the inconsistent manner in which peacekeeping operations are being conducted in the Nineties in relation to the manner in which they were conducted before. The controversial nature of this global phenomenon calls for a re-examination of peacekeeping practices, principles, its operational nature and character.

In the Sub-Saharan African context, the concept and conduct of peacekeeping operations are often confused with concepts, such as ‘peace enforcement’, ‘peacemaking’, ‘peacebuilding’, ‘conflict intervention’ and ‘conflict resolution’. Peacekeeping operations are perceived to be synonymous with armed intervention and the enforcement of peace through the application of force, often without the consent of the parties involved in the conflict. Furthermore, it would appear that peacekeepers often allow their impartiality to take a backseat.

The first United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations endeavoured to monitor and supervise peace agreements, cease-fires and truces. These operations were known as Chapter VI operations as contained in Article 33 of the UN Charter. In essence, Article 33 mandates operations that aim to settle disputes in a peaceful manner. Such UN operations are based on three principles: The consent of the parties involved, the impartiality of the peacekeepers and the absence of force. However, the ‘classical’ UN intention and aim of peacekeeping are being misinterpreted in their application to modern inter-state, and intra-state conflict situations, especially as regards operations conducted in Sub-Saharan Africa. In this regard, Malan notes that
contemporary multinational interventions have borne little or no resemblance to traditional blue helmet operations, which are conducted with "...consent, impartiality and without resort to force" (1998a:1).

The reality of modern peacekeeping operations is characterised by a number of activities, suggesting that the concept of peacekeeping is a misnomer in need of clarification and even re-definition. A disregard of peace agreements and a lack of commitment to treaties by warring parties, often result in unsuccessful peace initiatives and a threat to the safety of peacekeepers. On a number of occasions peacekeeping endeavours have resulted in casualties among the participants of the peacekeeping operation, which suggests that the principles of UN peacekeeping are not being upheld. It is also evident that an increased tendency to apply force and threats to use force are part and parcel of these so-called 'modern' peacekeeping operations. More often than none, this inability to adhere to peacekeeping principles results in escalating violence, human casualties, the displacement of citizens and a deteriorating conflict situation.

As a causal factor for outside intervention, conflict needs to be evaluated in terms of its fundamental nature, the reasons for its presence and the devastating effect it has on the populace of a particular country. Owing to a lack of understanding and training, peacekeepers often fail to control conflict of ethnic origin. In this regard, the genocide in Rwanda and Somalia, during which the shortcomings of UN peacekeepers in dealing with ethnic intra-state violence were exposed, comes to mind. Africa is particularly prone to instances of intra-state conflict, where ethnic factions and the disregard for cease-fires and peace treaties constantly threaten the lives of locals and even peacekeepers.

This research project was prompted by the characteristic inconsistency of Sub-Saharan Africa peacekeeping operations and the unnecessary loss of life, which has become a trademark of recent peacekeeping operations. The experiences of two African countries in their dealings with intra-state conflict situations and the subsequent deployment of troops from Southern African
Development Community (SADC) member countries under the banner of 'peacekeeping' form the focal point of this study. In order to explore and ultimately suggest a remedy for this problematical phenomenon, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Republic of Lesotho have been selected as case studies. The reason for selecting these two countries is the fact that these are the most recent examples of operations conducted in Sub-Saharan Africa.

1.2 Motivation for Research Project

The practice of peacekeeping, in terms of its 'classical' meaning and what is actually taking place at an increasingly alarming rate in Sub-Saharan Africa, are worlds apart. What used to be noble acts of goodwill, seem to be 'war' disguised and executed under the pretence of peacekeeping and sinister so-called 'national interests'. The impression is also being created that countries participating in peacekeeping operations are reluctant to become involved or to render greater material and/or logistical support when the success rate of an operation is perceived to be low or doubtful.

As the political situation in many Sub-Saharan African states deteriorates, a greater need for such operations may arise. Mounting pressure on South Africa by regional forces, as well South Africa's own national interest to become involved in peacekeeping, calls for an evaluation of Sub-Saharan African peacekeeping per se. This evaluation, together with an investigation into the different disguises of peacekeeping, shortcomings in addressing ethnic inter-state and intra-state conflict and the factors giving rise to its necessity, are the driving forces motivating this research project.

The researcher aims to evaluate the intervention under the banner of peacekeeping in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Republic of Lesotho, by comparing it to 'classical' peacekeeping as epitomised by the United Nations. Can what is currently happening in Sub-Saharan Africa still be called peacekeeping? Do we need a fresh approach to conflict resolution in Sub-Saharan Africa? Should African states solve their own internal
problems and should outsiders be permitted to intervene? If intervention is selected as an option, how should it be conducted? In search of answers to these pressing questions, this research project sets out to find solutions to an increasingly prevalent and destructive phenomenon.

1.3 Objectives of Research Project

This research project has a number of objectives. One of these is to determine the most viable theoretical approach whereby the Sub-Saharan African peacekeeping phenomenon can be analysed. To accomplish this objective, a policy content analysis approach, with a comparative analysis as analytical focus will be pursued. This will be done in Chapter 2.

A second objective is to examine the nature of conflict and the management thereof. This examination will enable this researcher to examine 'classical' peacekeeping policy in terms of its theory and practice with the aim of comparing it to the 'modern' peacekeeping theory and practice. The analytical focus will therefore be on the United Nations Charter (specifically Chapters VI and VII), in terms of which comparisons will be drawn to Sub-Saharan African peacekeeping implementation practices and theories. To achieve this goal, two Sub-Saharan African examples (The Democratic Republic of the Congo [DRC] and the Republic of Lesotho) will be used as case studies. The second objective will be dealt with in Chapters 3 and 4.

A third objective is to propose a conflict-intervention and conflict-resolution model in view of the increased reliance on peace enforcement and armed conflict intervention as an evidently Sub-Saharan African option to resolving volatile conflict situations. The proposed model, which aims to fill the hiatus in an emerging peace enforcement paradigm, is described in Chapter 5.

A fourth objective is to ensure a coherent product. This objective will be achieved by ensuring that linkages are established between the various chapters in order to provide for a systematic progression from one theme to the other. In the chapters of this research project the aim is to build on the
central theme by exploring the African experience of peacekeeping. The central theme will culminate in Chapter 6, in which a number of recommendations shall be made on the way forward for African conflict and the resolution thereof.

1.4 Problem Statement and Research Hypothesis

The principles and characteristics of peacekeeping as the United Nations, in its pursuit of global peace and stability, originally intended are not being adhered to in Sub-Saharan African countries. The reasons for this inconsistency are numerous and range from the evident inexperience of participants in peacekeeping operations to a lack of consent, breaches of impartiality and the utilisation of force when dealing with such situations. The apparent misconception is that peace will be attained through violent means. Other reasons include the unique nature and history of ethnic violence; the remnants of a historical (colonial) era in especially border demarcation and the escalation of inter-state and intra-state conflict.

When dealing with conflict, peacekeeping is usually employed to prevent the escalation of the conflict and to limit casualties. However, peacekeeping has proved to be a fatal misconception, since if peacekeeping is not practised in accordance with its guiding principles (consent, impartiality and without force), it can never be the ultimate tool for resolving conflict situations. In fact, it often contributes to the deterioration of situations, since parties to the conflict forfeit the principles of consent and impartiality and ultimately resort to the use of force in order to save face and to maintain the status quo. It seems, however, that enforcement action aimed at stabilising an already volatile situation is, in some instances, a more viable option, but is inconsistent in terms of its mandate and modus operandi. Possible reasons for these enforcement operations are the reluctance of the UN to become involved and the notion that African conflict needs an African solution.

Owing to the constraints of this research paper, the intention of this researcher is to review present peacekeeping implementation practices as
they pertain to Sub-Saharan Africa only. For this purpose, two Sub-Saharan African case studies will be presented. Given the nature of the research problem, the following hypothesis was formulated with the aim of establishing why peacekeeping operations are being conducted in their current manner.

**Research Hypothesis**

The research hypothesis maintained in this research paper is the following:

*The current Sub-Saharan African practice of resolving conflict is inconsistent with the UN peacekeeping principles of consent, impartiality and the absence of force.*

1.5 **Research Methodology**

This research will focus on the nature of peacekeeping operations from an analytical and comparative perspective with the aim of identifying commonalities and differences in the conduct of countries participating in peacekeeping operations. In support of this methodology, a section on policy theory (Chapter 2) will be included to cover the theoretical premise of this research project. The practices of African peacekeepers will be examined to determine why peacekeeping operations have evolved to the extent currently evident. Could it be that 'classical' UN peacekeeping has simply become historically outdated and that modern peacekeeping operations are dictated by the socio-political environment and thus require a new approach?

It is evident, therefore, that the current nature of peacekeeping will be the main focus and evidence in support of this focus will be obtained through a quantitative review of literature pertaining to the identified countries. In turn, these literature will be evaluated against the blueprint of what is commonly referred to as, 'classical' peacekeeping. The unstable and volatile political environment of the countries falling within the scope of this research will provide the context for it. This context will also be analysed to establish causal linkages in terms of the reasons for and failure of Sub-Saharan African peacekeeping operations. From the research findings a conclusion will be
drawn concerning how ‘modern’ peacekeeping compares to ‘classical’ peacekeeping, as envisaged in Chapter VI of the UN Charter.

A variety of techniques will be explored during the research process to ensure that valid arguments form the basis of sound conclusions. A thorough search will be conducted concerning literature on the concepts and related terminology of peacekeeping in order to acquaint the reader with the different concepts prevailing in peacekeeping jargon. A quantitative and qualitative literature collection process will be followed concerning the case studies of both the DRC and the Lesotho Republic to establish the causes of conflict, the nature of the peacekeeping operations and the need for intervention. In both case studies, the research will be supplemented by thorough media searches.

The research will be both deductive and inductive, as it will be based on both primary and secondary data sources that suggest a fresh look at the nature of peacekeeping. The focus will therefore specifically fall on peacekeeping practices in the Sub-Saharan African context. The main focus of this research document will be a comparative analysis of ‘classical’ peacekeeping and ‘modern’ (African) peacekeeping principles and practices. The ultimate aim of the researcher is to propose a conflict-intervention and conflict-resolution model that could perhaps aid attempts to resolve intra-state and inter-state conflict in a ‘modern’ and evolving continental peacekeeping paradigm.

1.6 Clarification of Concepts

In order to understand and contextualise peacekeeping and related concepts referred to in the research, clarification of certain key concepts is deemed necessary. The following concepts are therefore clarified:

1.6.1 Peacekeeping: Peacekeeping involves the use of armed forces to maintain a negotiated truce and to facilitate a diplomatic/political solution for a specific conflict situation. According to Mboma (1995:115) peacekeeping can be defined as, “[T]he prevention, containment, moderation and termination of hostilities between or within states, through the medium of a peaceful third
party intervention organised and directed internationally, using multinational forces of soldiers, police and civilians to restore and maintain peace.” Chipman, in citing Marrack Goulding’s\(^1\) textbook definition of peacekeeping, defines it as:

“Field Operations, established by the United Nations, with consent of the parties concerned, to help control and resolve conflicts between them, under United Nations Command and Control, at the expense collectively of the member states, and with military and other personnel and equipment provided voluntarily by them acting impartially between the parties and using force to the minimum extent necessary” (1995:11).

The UN Secretary-General defines peacekeeping in its ‘Agenda for Peace’, as “[T]he deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all parties concerned, normally involving United Nations military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well. Peacekeeping is a technique that expands the possibilities for both the prevention of conflict and the making of peace” (Gumbi, 1995:28). The United States Defence Force distinguishes between traditional and aggravated peacekeeping. ‘Traditional’ peacekeeping refers to, “the deployment of a UN, regional organisation, or a coalition presence in the field with the consent of all parties concerned, normally involving UN regional organisations, or coalition military forces, and/or police and civilians”. ‘Aggravated’ peacekeeping is undertaken with “…minimal consent of all belligerents parties, but which are complicated by intransigence of one or more of the belligerents, …peacekeeping forces are authorised to use force in self-defense, and in defense of the mission they are assigned, which may include monitoring and facilitating implementation of an existing truce agreement in support of diplomatic efforts … or supporting or safeguarding humanitarian relief efforts” (Gumbi, 1995:29). It is evident from these definitions that the principles of peacekeeping are to be upheld as far as possible with only slight deviation permitted in certain instances. Also important, is that peacekeeping is dependent on a commitment by the willing and able.

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\(^1\) A former UN Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs
1.6.2 Peace Enforcement: Peace-enforcement refers to peace operations conducted without the consent of one or more parties concerning one or more aspects of, or concerning the entire UN mandate. Peace-enforcement action takes place under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and involves the use of military means to restore peace in an area of conflict. Such means may include dealing with an inter-state or internal conflict situation to meet a humanitarian need or when state institutions have largely collapsed (Gumbi, 1995:29; Cilliers, 1995:58). Shelton (1997:13) refers to it as, "[T]he threat or use of force to restore or maintain peace", whilst it is defined by Williams as, "[T]he purposeful use of military force as sanctioned by the UN Security Council to either deter or counter unlawful aggression by one country against another" (Williams, 1996:27-29). Peace enforcement operations often fall outside the scope of UN command and control capabilities. Such operations often bear the label of unilateral action, since they are conducted in coalition or with the endorsement of organisations, such as the UN, the Organisation for African Unity (OAU) and even the SADC. The operation of (SADC) forces in Lesotho is a classical example of a peace enforcement operation.

1.6.3 Peacebuilding: Cilliers defines peacebuilding as, "post conflict action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify a political settlement in order to avoid a return to conflict" (1995:58). Peacebuilding mechanisms include the identification and support of structures that will consolidate peace, advance a sense of confidence and well-being and support economic reconstruction, which may involve the military and civilians. According to Kofi Annan, the current Secretary-General of the UN, "...peacebuilding involves integrated and coordinated actions aimed at addressing the root causes of violence—whether political, legal, institutional, military, humanitarian, human-right related, environmental economic and social, cultural or demographic." (1998:21). This activity normally takes place after peace has been restored and is thus regarded as a long-term conflict-prevention strategy.

1.6.4 Peacemaking: According to the UN, peacemaking is, "... actions to bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially through such means as
foreseen in Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations” (Gumbi, 1995:28). Peacemaking involves the deployment of diplomats and politicians to achieve a negotiated settlement in a conflict situation prior to or even after the commitment of a peacekeeping force. Other skills employed include persuasion, mediation, non-military coercion (which may consist of diplomatic isolation and sanctions), multi-lateral discussions and conciliation. Peacemaking usually takes place after conflict has erupted and aims at establishing a peaceful settlement. The Lusaka Agreement (signed in July 1999 between the conflicting parties in the DRC) is an example of a peacemaking initiative brokered by politicians and diplomats.

1.6.5 Conflict Intervention: Conflict intervention refers to the actions of a third party intervening in a situation where at least two warring factions are engaged in hostile acts against each other. The ultimate objective is to establish peace by forceful or peaceful means. The concept of conflict intervention is closely linked to conflict prevention, which includes activities ranging from diplomatic initiatives to the deployment of troops in order to prevent further hostilities. According to Dobbie (1994:124), conflict intervention includes early warning, surveillance, stabilising measures and preventative deployment. It may also include fact-finding missions, consultation, warnings, inspections and monitoring.

1.6.6 Armed Intervention: Armed intervention refers to conflict intervention, which involves the threat to use and the actual use of force in order to stabilise an already volatile situation. In most conflict stricken regions in Africa, armed intervention often takes place unilaterally and under the guise of peacekeeping – often without UN sanction.

The following three concepts constitute the foundation upon which ‘classical’ peacekeeping is founded. At this juncture it is only briefly conceptualised to provide a general orientation, since a more comprehensive discussion follows in Chapter 3.
1.6.7 Consent: Consent is viewed as one of the cornerstones of peacekeeping, together with impartiality and the absence of force. It is defined by Malan (1997:18) as, “[T]he reaching of agreement, the granting of permission or approval by parties to the conflict … it is given and may also be withdrawn”.

1.6.8 Impartiality: The impartiality of a military force intervening in a conflict situation is of cardinal importance to ensure that the trust and confidence of the disputing parties is maintained. In order to ensure impartiality, any force established to intervene in a conflict situation must be a multi-national one and must be represented as broadly as possible. Malan (1997:25) simply defines impartiality as, “…[the] absence of bias”.

1.6.9 Absence of Force: Peacekeeping is based on the premise that all peaceful methods shall at all times be explored to establish lasting peace. However, this is not always possible, even though it may be desirable. The absence of force therefore implies the pacific resolution of conflict. The pacific resolution of conflict may include negotiation, mediation, arbitration and other peaceful means. Williams (1996:28) refer to the absence of force as “restraint”.

1.7 Conclusion

Western powers are seemingly disengaging from peacekeeping in Africa as a result of a number of factors that will become evident in this research paper. This western approach results in a situation whereby Sub-Saharan African countries involved in intra-state and inter-state conflict appear to have been left to their own perilous devices, which suggests that they themselves need to sort out their own internal problems. The Western powers are keen to support training initiatives that may contribute to strengthening Africa’s own capabilities to deal with conflict situations. However, they are reluctant to engage in peacekeeping operations themselves when the lives of outsiders are perceived to be placed at risk. Should this be the case in future, then every effort must be made to ensure that Sub-Saharan African states will be
able to intervene with multi-national forces committed by the region for the region.

Lasting peace, (something that has evaded the region for decades) is a continental requirement for political stability and economic development and peacekeeping or even peace enforcement is a vehicle for achieving this. Consequently, the concept of peacekeeping needs to be re-defined from an African perspective in order to equip regional organs such as the SADC and OAU with a firm theoretical foundation for possible future involvement in Sub-Saharan African peacekeeping endeavours. Within this melting pot of approaches to and practices of peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations, a solution that will suit Africa’s needs must be found.
CHAPTER 2

GENERAL THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 Introduction

Since the objectives outlined in Chapter 1 require a general orientation in terms of the theory of policy analysis, the focus of this chapter will be on discussing the methodological approaches to analysis and on selecting and discussing an appropriate analytical focus and approach. The selected approach will be used to contextualise and guide the thought-processes and research required for this paper.

2.2 Methodological Approaches to Policy Analysis

Policy analysis is a contentious issue. The main reason for this seems to be disagreement on what exactly constitutes this discipline. In this chapter the intention is not to become involved in an academic debate concerning the merits and demerits of policy studies, but rather to provide a brief overview of the different approaches that various scholars have adopted in their quest to address the issue of policy analysis. This chapter will therefore focus on the theoretical approaches to policy analysis and on selecting an appropriate theoretical application. The selected theoretical approach will provide the fundamental theoretical linkage to the research in support of the methodology. The aim of this chapter is thus:

- to construct a broad framework by describing what policy, public policy, policy analysis and comparative policy constitute;
- to describe the analytical approach, focus and instruments of comparative policy analysis; and
- to select an appropriate policy application that can be employed as a structural component and theoretical point of departure for the research.
2.2.1 Policy

The concept “policy” has various denotations. These range from the broadest everyday denotations, such as its reference to “a government’s economic policy” to its reference to policy as a “programme, output, outcome, theory or model” (Hagwood and Gunn, 1984:13-24). In an attempt to define the concept of policy, Fox and Meyer (1995:96) state that policy is “a guide of action or statement of goals that should be followed in an institution to deal with a particular problem or phenomenon”. Furthermore, they propose that policy should be regarded as, “a guide to action ... to provide consistency of decisions” and as, “goals and objectives within a given situation and the methods to realise them”. Koenig (1986:2) supports this view when he states that policy is, “...incremental...” and “...a long-term rather than a short-term guide of action”. Dunn (1994:33) relates the term “policy” to the Middle English word “policie”, which refers to, “the conduct of public affairs or the administration of government”. What is evident from the cited definitions is that policy entails a proposed action by an institution such as a government and such action is aimed at achieving a desired outcome.

2.2.2 Public Policy

Two key concepts are related to policy. One is the environment in which we live and the other is the problems generated by it. The problems stemming from environmental factors result in a need for policy. Policies thus originate in response to societal phenomena. Such responses may be focused on any level of society. For example, in the case of a national crime prevention strategy, the policy to effect such a strategy will have a national focus, whereas a policy to address the theft of bicycles will have a local focus confined to specific areas where the incidence of theft is high. The aim of such a policy will thus be to achieve a decrease in the theft of bicycles. In this regard, Hecla, as cited by Koenig (1986:2), defines public policy as, “a course of action intended to accomplish some end”.
Public policies should be viewed as formal expressions (legislation, executive orders, rules and regulations) of decisions, choices made and actions taken in response to societal phenomena. Dunn's definition of public policy as a, "...long series of more or less related choices (including decisions not to act) made by government bodies and officials" support this particular view (1994:70). Fox and Meyer (1995:107) define public policy as, "authoritative statements made by legitimate public institutions about the way in which they propose to deal with policy problems". Dye (1976:1) simply defines public policy as, "...whatever government choose to do or not to do". The significance of public policies lies in its reference to action by some institution to effect an intended change of the status quo. One important aspect to realise is that policies require adaptation, because no two environments or sets of circumstances are identical.

2.2.3 Policy Analysis

No single definition of policy analysis exists. This is evident if one considers the vast number of definitions contained in literature. One well-known definition of policy analysis is offered by Dye when he defines it as, "finding out what governments do, why they do it, and what difference it makes" (1976:1). In his view, essentially all definitions of policy analysis are the description and explanation of the causes and consequences of government action. Ham and Hill (1984:13) put forward a seemingly narrower view of policy analysis when they write that, "[a]ctions as well as decisions may therefore be said to be the proper focus of policy analysis". In defining policy analysis, Dunn (1994:84) offers a more comprehensive definition. He defines it as "[a]n applied social science discipline that uses multiple methods of inquiry in contexts of argumentation and public debate, to create, critically assess, and communicate policy-relevant knowledge". This definition accentuates the practical nature of policy analysis as, "...a response to recurrent problems and crisis facing governments" (Dunn 1994:62). The lack of a single definition should be regarded as a positive rather than a negative consequence, as one single definition would not have done justice to the diverse nature and scope of policy analysis.
2.2.4 Comparative Policy Analysis

The objective of this research project is to draw a comparison between traditional UN peacekeeping principles and African peacekeeping practices. In order to provide insight into the art of comparative policy analyses, it is necessary to clarify what this concept constitutes. Before attempting to define this concept, the objectives of comparative analyses need to be considered. According to Hitchner and Levine (1981:5) three objectives can be distinguished, namely

- to develop a verifiable body of knowledge on government and politics in general;
- to evaluate political experience, institutions, behaviour and processes in terms of cause and effect and desirability and undesirability; and to
- ultimately be able to predict events, tendencies and consequences.

The value of comparison is emphasised by Hague and Harrop (1987:15) in their view of comparison as, "... the foundation of any systematic branch of knowledge". They assert that, "...causal relationships should always be analysed by comparing situations where given factors are present with those where they are absent". In reference to the preceding postulations of what comparative policy analysis is and should be, comparative policy analysis may be viewed as the study of how, why and to what effect various governments pursue particular courses of action or inaction.

2.2.5 Approaches to Policy Analysis

In an attempt to contextualise this research project, it is necessary to review the different approaches to policy analysis in a broad context. For this purpose, the approaches to policy analysis will be explained by means of a model. Figure 1 represents a summary by Wissink (1988:75) of the different approaches, analytical foci and analytical instruments that may be employed as points of departure in the study of policy analysis. As mentioned in the preceding section, the objective with the inclusion of this model is firstly to
contextualise the various approaches to policy analysis, secondly to describe and select an appropriate approach, focus and instrument as analytical basis. The selected approach, focus and instruments will provide the framework within which peacekeeping and its related concepts will be analysed.

**FIGURE 1: APPROACHES TO POLICY ANALYSIS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ANALYTICAL APPROACH</th>
<th>ANALYTICAL FOCUS</th>
<th>ANALYTICAL INSTRUMENTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Policy Content Analysis</strong></td>
<td>Policy Interpretation Studies</td>
<td>Judicial practice Administrative law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Comparative Policy Analysis</td>
<td>Correlation of policy content</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Policy Dynamics</td>
<td>Indicators of policy change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Policy Pathology</td>
<td>Problems and ailments of the policy process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Policy System Analysis</strong></td>
<td>Policy Behavioural Studies</td>
<td>Influence, decisions of shareholders and actors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Policy Institutional Studies</td>
<td>Role of institutions and organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Policy Process Studies</td>
<td>Agenda-setting procedures of policy-making bodies and committees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Policy Issue Analysis</strong></td>
<td>Policy Problem Structuring</td>
<td>The objective nature of public problems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Policy Advocacy</td>
<td>Recommended policy alternatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Policy Outcome Analysis</strong></td>
<td>Policy Monitoring</td>
<td>The outcome of policy actions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Policy Impact Evaluation</td>
<td>The value of policy actions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


When examining the highlighted sections (see Figure 1), it is evident that the analytical approach to this research project constitutes a policy content analysis. The analytical focus has a dual purpose, as firstly it seeks to analyse the content of peacekeeping policy and secondly it provides the
framework within which historic peacekeeping policies can be compared with current practices. In terms of the scope of this research project, the policies and practices of traditional UN peacekeeping will be compared to the practices of African peacekeeping. The instrument of analysis will be a correlational study of the policy content of UN peacekeeping principles and African peacekeeping practices. The aim is to empirically verify the deductions and conclusions of the research findings by correlating these to currently prevalent manifestations.

The comparative approach in this research project attempts to gain a deeper understanding of peacekeeping policies by explaining why a need exists for this global practice and to propose a procedure for dealing with the causes and consequences of conflict.

Closely linked to policy analysis, is the policy-formulation process. From as early as 1956 (Laswell) through to 1970 and 1980 (Brewer, Jones and Anderson), scholars have developed various models in an attempt to explain the policy-formulation process (Howlett and Ramesh, 1995:10-11). A particularly useful model in support of the objective of this research project and one that may have value in dealing with intra-state conflict is the one put forward by these authors. The model they propose (Figure 2), contain the various policy stages and reflect its relationship to applied problem-solving.

**FIGURE 2: FIVE STAGES OF THE POLICY CYCLE AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO APPLIED PROBLEM-SOLVING**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PHASES OF APPLIED PROBLEM-SOLVING</th>
<th>STAGES IN THE POLICY CYCLE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Problem Recognition</td>
<td>1. Agenda Setting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Proposal of Solution</td>
<td>2. Policy Formulation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Putting Solution into Effect</td>
<td>4. Policy Implementation</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Monitoring Results</td>
<td>5. Policy Evaluation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Howlett and Ramesh (1995:11)
2.3 Conclusion

In this chapter a theoretical framework is outlined which aims at setting the tone for a discussion (in the forthcoming chapters) of the issues relating to the nature of peacekeeping. Policy issues differ widely, and each one requires a unique approach. The approach, focus and instruments selected in this chapter will provide the structural components for a comparative analysis of the context of Sub-Saharan African peacekeeping and the 'classical' UN context of peacekeeping in terms of their historical-political setting, causal factors and outcomes. In Chapter 5 a conflict-intervention and conflict-resolution model is proposed, which is founded on a problem-solving approach to conflict.
CHAPTER 3

THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON PEACEKEEPING

3.1 Introduction

In Chapter 2, the methodological approaches to policy are discussed in order to contextualise the comparative policy approach adopted for this research project. The aim of this chapter is not to define the various peacekeeping concepts used by so many scholars in modern peacekeeping literature (this is done in Chapter 1), but to contextualise peacekeeping per se. In this chapter peacekeeping is viewed in its wider context and encompasses all the related concepts already explained.

The contextualisation of peacekeeping is necessary because, as Cilliers (1999:20) observes, "[t]he concept of peacekeeping was designed to deal with conflict between states and not with internal conflict in countries". What we increasingly observe in Africa, however, is that the peacekeeping playing fields are not level and the rules of the peacekeeping 'game' have undergone major changes over the last decade of this century. These changes are evident if one considers the global difference in the various practices and approaches to peacekeeping. The nature of inter-state and intra-state conflict on especially the African continent requires a different approach to what is commonly known as 'classical' or 'blue helmet' peacekeeping operations. The preferred option is that UN peacekeeping operations be based on the principles of consent, impartiality and the absence of force.

One could argue that African circumstances dictate an approach, where the emphasis on keeping the peace needs to be shifted from mere passive engagement (based on the said criteria) to actual enforcement. Such an approach would ultimately suggest greater emphasis on the use of force to restore or maintain order and limited or partial regard for consent. In Chapter 5, a model is proposed that is intended to serve as a framework, should such
a shift take place. Whether this is indeed the way forward, seems to be a source of fierce debate in both the region and the UN.

This chapter aim is to argue whether such a shift is a viable option by reviewing:

- the origin of peacekeeping and the UN organs responsible for peacekeeping by way of a historical overview;
- the UN Charter mandating the maintenance of peace and security;
- the characteristics of 'classical' peacekeeping and its principles;
- how peacekeeping operations are financed;
- the nature of African conflict;
- the United Nations' disengagement as a consequence of the nature of African conflict;
- the emergence of a 'modern' peacekeeping approach;
- the impact of 'modern' peacekeeping approaches on 'classical' principles;
- regional responses to inter-state conflict; and by reviewing
- the future challenges of peacekeeping.

### 3.2 Historical Overview

In 1941, during the Second World War (1939 – 1945), Franklin D. Roosevelt, President of the United States and Winston Churchill, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, met aboard a battleship in the Atlantic Ocean to plan for the establishment of an international organisation (United Nations, 1998a:4). The aim of that historic meeting was to ensure that global peace and security would prevail and that an occurrence like World War II would not be repeated. The initial meeting was followed by a meeting with the then leader of the Soviet Union (USSR), Joseph Stalin, in 1945 in Yalta and by a subsequent conference in San Francisco in June 1945 during which the UN Charter was adopted. All of these events initiated the birth of what was to become the largest international body for the maintenance of peace and security. The UN was officially constituted on 24 October 1945, during which the majority of the
founding members of the organisation adopted the UN Charter (United Nations, 1998a:5).

Within the global context of a world population still stunned by the devastating effects of World War II, a genuine need for peace and security prevailed. One primary purpose for the establishment of the UN and a central part of its mandate was, and still is, the maintenance of international peace and security. There is no doubt that over many decades the UN has fulfilled its mandate by preventing conflict from escalating into war; by persuading opposing parties to use the conference table rather than force and by assisting in restoring peace where conflict has erupted. Even though this has been the case, the recurrent eruption of global intra-state conflict, hostilities between ethnic groups and recent genocidal practices have left deep scars on the image of the UN as a messiah duty-bound to save humanity. On the African continent the vivid images of Somalia, Rwanda, Liberia and Angola come to mind as examples of UN ‘failures’. In the final analysis, the UN ‘scorecard’ in the last decade of this century, in terms of Africa and even Europe, does not look impressive at all. During this period it became increasingly evident that the UN is reluctant to become involved in African peacekeeping, while yet maintaining that the Security Council must sanction any operation aimed at establishing peace. This situation creates somewhat of a controversy as it implies that the UN wishes to be both conductor and musician at the same time.

The Secretary-General, together with two principal organs, namely the Security Council and the General Assembly, constitute the main role-players concerned with peace and security. In terms of the UN Charter, which can be considered an international treaty, member states are obliged, “...to settle their disputes by peaceful means, and in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered” (United Nations, 1998c:68). It goes further by stating that member states are to refrain from the actual use of or threatening to use force against any state. Any dispute may be brought before the Security Council who will determine the appropriate action to be taken.
Since its inception in 1945, the UN has grown from 51 to 185 members. This growth can be attributed to the global realisation that peace and stability can only be achieved through a collective effort. The table below (Figure 3) depicts the growth of the UN since its inception in 1945 to 1998. Most evident are two significant growth spurts in UN membership. The first one (1955 to 1960) may be attributed to the advent of the Cold War between the East and the West and the realisation by small-powered to medium-powered states that the superpowers will no longer be able to provide security guarantees. In this temporary void, the UN was viewed as a viable alternative and a symbol of multilateralism for providing a form of security (Nöffke, 1995:17). The second spurt, which started shortly after 1990, is possibly attributable to the global response to intra-state conflict and the subsequent search for a collective approach to peace and security.

**FIGURE 3: GROWTH OF UNITED NATIONS MEMBERSHIP (1945-1998)**

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Growth</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from United Nations Department of Public Information (1998c:6)

3.2.1 The Security Council

Under the UN Charter, the Security Council is primarily responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security. It has fifteen members, of which five are permanent (China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States of America) and ten members elected by the General Assembly for a two-year term. The powers and functions of the Security Council are:

- to maintain international peace and security in accordance with the principles and purposes of the UN;
- to investigate any dispute or situation that may result in international friction;
• to recommend methods of settling such disputes or to recommend the terms of settlement;
• to formulate plans for establishing a system to regulate armaments;
• to determine the existence of a threat to peace or an act of aggression and to recommend what action should be taken;
• to call on members to apply economic sanctions and other measures that do not involve the use of force to prevent or stop aggression;
• to take military action against aggressors;
• to perform the trusteeship functions of the United Nations in ‘strategic’ areas; and to
• recommend to the General Assembly the appointment of the Secretary-General and, together with the Assembly, to elect the judges of the International Court of Justice (United Nations, 1998c:9-10).

In terms of the Security Council’s mandate to maintain international peace and security, members are obliged to accept and carry out the Council’s decisions. Should a dispute be brought to the attention of the Security Council, the Council’s first reaction is usually to recommend to the parties to reach agreement by peaceful means. In some cases the Council may undertake to investigate and mediate a dispute and propose guidelines for a peaceful settlement. Should a dispute result in fighting, the Council’s first concern is to terminate such hostilities as soon as possible. In order to effect this, the Council may issue cease-fire directives to prevent further acts of hostility and protect the lives of innocent civilians often caught in the crossfire. The Council may, in support of the peace process, deploy military observers or a peacekeeping force to an area of conflict.

3.2.2 The General Assembly

The General Assembly consists of all the members of the United Nations, and each member is limited to five representatives. The UN Charter (Article 11) empowers the General Assembly to, “consider the general principles of cooperation in the maintenance of international peace and security” and “make recommendations ... to the Members or to the Security Council or both”. In
The General Assembly may, under the 'uniting for peace' resolution adopted in November 1950, take action if the Security Council fails to act as a result of a lack of unanimity among its five permanent members. "The Assembly is empowered to consider the matter immediately with a view to making recommendations to Members for collective measures, including, in the case of a breach of the peace or act of aggression, the use of armed force" (United Nations, 1998c:7).

Other functions of the General Assembly include the:

- consideration and recommendation of the principles of co-operation for maintaining international peace and security, including the principles governing disarmament and arms regulations;
- initiation of studies and making recommendations to promote international political co-operation;
- acceptance and consideration of reports from the Security Council and other UN organs;
- consideration and approval of the UN budget and apportioning contributions to member states; and
- the election of non-permanent members to the Security Council and other organs.

Various committees of the General Assembly deal with a variety of issues. However, issues pertaining to peace and security are dealt with in its First (Disarmament and International Security) and Fourth (Special Political and Decolonisation) Committees.
3.3 ‘Classical’ UN Peacekeeping and its Principles

Peacekeeping is a technique, pioneered and developed by the UN, which defies simple definition (United Nations, 1998b:2). Peacekeeping is by its very nature interventionist, and the interpretation and application thereof differs from operation to operation. The term ‘peacekeeping’ is, however, absent from the UN Charter and nowhere is ‘peacekeeping’ explicitly stated. In this regard, Dag Hammerskjold (a former Secretary-General of the UN) referred to it as belonging to ‘chapter six and a half’. ‘Classical’ peacekeeping is also referred to as ‘blue helmet’ peacekeeping (in reference to the blue headgear worn by UN peacekeeping forces). At most, peacekeeping is a complementary measure to resolve tension existing between states. (Also see Gumbi, 1995:45; Urquhart, 1983:163; Wiseman, 1983:343). This implies that peacekeeping can neither be regarded as a pacific method of conflict resolution nor can it be the ultimate solution for the restoration of peace and security. The term “peacekeeping” was formalised in 1965 with the establishment of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (Monnakgotla, 1996:54).

In terms of conflict resolution, the UN Charter classifies the pacific settlement of disputes as Chapter VI operations, whilst more forceful action is classified as Chapter VII operations. The advent of peacekeeping as a pacific means of conflict resolution must be regarded as a technique and concept developed by the UN in response to a global need for peace and security. It is evident that the absence of the term ‘peacekeeping’ in the UN Charter is not owing to an omission, but is, in fact, a product of the political milieu, which influenced and guided the thought processes of those who drafted the Charter. The logic and principles of peacekeeping, although not specifically mentioned in the UN Charter, thus developed and matured over fifty-years to its current posture in response to a need for a pacific and lately, active settlement of disputes.

The UN distinguishes two broad categories of peacekeeping operations (United Nations: 1998b:2). These are
• military observer missions with small numbers of unarmed officers charged with such tasks as monitoring cease-fires, verifying troop withdrawals or patrolling borders or demilitarised zones; and
• peacekeeping forces composed of national contingents of troops deployed to perform tasks similar to those of military observers, who often act as a buffer between hostile parties.

A number of UN peacekeeping operations have been conducted since the UN’s inception. In its first five years, only two peacekeeping operations were undertaken in comparison with the seventeen in the past five years. The first UN peacekeeping operation in Africa was deployed in the Congo (UNOC2) in 1960. In the fifty years of its existence (from 1948 – 1998) the UN has committed 750 000 individuals in 49 UN peacekeeping operations worldwide. Since its inception the UN has lost more than 1 580 military and civilian peacekeepers deployed in operations (United Nations, 1998b:1). Figure 4 provides a global breakdown of the 49 peacekeeping missions undertaken by the UN between 1948 and 1998. It is not surprising that over this period, a total of 16 peacekeeping missions was established on the African continent, which represents one third of all missions conducted to date.

FIGURE 4: BREAKDOWN OF GLOBAL UN PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Continent</th>
<th>Completed</th>
<th>Ongoing</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Americas</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from the UN Department of Public Information (UN, 1998b:16-17)

According to Steyn (1998:30) sub-Saharan Africa had “...[T]wo interstate wars and fourteen serious intrastate conflicts...between 1946 and 1988...”

2 United Nations Operation in the Congo.
During this period, only one UN peacekeeping intervention (in the Congo in 1960-62) took place. This number is a matter of concern for two reasons. Firstly, one could argue that this inaction by the UN suggests a reluctance to become involved. It may also serve as a possible deliberate signal to African security organs, such as the OAU and SADC, to resolve their own internal problems. Secondly, the UN’s inaction could be interpreted as an admission that it lacks the capacity and political will to solve intra-state conflicts. This view is supported by Malan (1998b:11) when he remarks that, “...[T]he UN has not been able to react effectively to the imperative to intervene in failed states in the throes of civil war”.

According to Berman and Sams (1998:4) the UN Security Council has become reluctant, “... to commit UN Blue Helmets in sizable numbers – if at all-”. In this regard, the lack of commitment displayed by the UN Security Council can be attributed to the absence of a clear mandate when it comes to interference in intra-state affairs. The main driving force for committing a peacekeeping force has, in most cases, been the moral obligation to intervene when humanitarian considerations prompt action by an outside force. Malan (1998a:1) maintains that peacekeeping has remained the preferred term to describe a diverse range of latter-day multinational interventions, many of which have borne little or no resemblance to traditional blue helmet operations, “conducted with consent, impartiality and without resort to force”. ‘Classical’ UN peacekeeping should thus be regarded as being founded on three universal principles, namely:

- the consent of the parties;
- the impartiality of the peacekeepers; and
- a prohibition on the use of force.

The aforementioned principles will now be discussed in detail in order to validate the hypothesis formulated in Chapter 1 of this study.
3.3.1 The Principle of Consent

The consent of the parties involved in a conflict or dispute is one of three principal requirements for planning, establishing and conducting a peacekeeping operation. A distinction must be made between consent for an operation (consent acquired prior to an operation) and consent within an operation (during the conducting of an operation). Consent for an operation refers to the consent that a peacekeeper may expect to have obtained proportionately, from certain people, for certain activities, for certain periods of time (Dobbie, 1994:122-123). Consent should not be regarded as political permission for an operation, since it incorporates a wide range of techniques, which may include negotiation, mediation, community liaison, public information and civil affairs.

For peacekeepers deployed in a conflict area, a requirement is the consent of the parties to the conflict. The consent acquired through the various techniques may be partial or comprehensive. If consent is absent, the operation becomes peace-enforcement. The SADC intervention in Lesotho (discussed in detail in Chapter 4) is an example of a peacekeeping operation that may be coined ‘a peace-enforcement operation’ due to the absence of consent from all parties to the conflict.

Consent within an operation pertains to the permission given by conflicting parties during the execution phase of a peacekeeping operation. Consent obtained in this manner is the product of ongoing negotiations, mediation, bargaining and lobbying between a party of negotiators or a peacekeeping force and conflicting parties. The consent mustered within an operation is necessary if the initial terms of engagement are later redefined as a result of changing circumstances.

The scenario explained here works perfectly in theory, but seldom in practice. The nature of African conflict holds serious consequences for consent as a principle of classical peacekeeping. According to Malan (1997c:2) it has become increasingly difficult to depend on consent as a prerequisite for
intervention in contemporary humanitarian crises. In many cases, it is impossible to obtain consent because of the collapse of authority or the proliferation of groups claiming authority. Under such circumstances, agreements are worthless and non-existent, because international law and conventions are openly disregarded. Consent is, however, still considered by the UN as a prerequisite for intervention and is viewed as a positive contributor to the success of a planned operation. In this regard, Nhlapo (1999:3) remarks that, “… peacekeeping operations without consent by the belligerent parties hold little prospect for success in the long term...”. In a peacekeeping operation, consent for and within an operation is closely linked to impartiality since, without consent, breaches of trust and potential conflict of interest is possible and likely to occur.

3.3.2 The Principle of Impartiality

As a principle of UN peacekeeping, impartiality needs to be adhered by interventionist forces in order to ensure the absence of bias. According to Dobbie (1994:133) it requires the widest and most significant application as a fundamental determinant of a peacekeeper’s role. In the first decades of UN peacekeeping the need for impartiality and disinterestedness partially contributed to the general practice of not using troops from certain countries (Adams, 1994:94). In order to effect this, peacekeeping forces from the five permanent members of the Security Council and neighboring states were not employed. According to Clapham (1995:145) all peacekeeping forces claim to act neutrally between the contending parties in the conflict in which they have intervened. However, in the process “they favour some parties more than others”. The impartiality imperative can only be adhered to if a multinational force is deployed under the banner of ‘classical’ peacekeeping, while having a clear and unambiguous mandate and broad representation (see also Cilliers, 1995:59).

In recent UN operations it became clear that the principle of impartiality was sorely neglected in the wake of violent inter-state conflict intervention. Examples thereof can be cited from operations conducted in Africa. In this
regard, the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) operation in Liberia (West Africa) and the intervention in the DRC and Lesotho (sub-Saharan Africa) can be cited as more recent examples. The difficulty of remaining impartial is demonstrated when operations are mounted under the banner of peacekeeping and turn out to be nothing other than interventions to serve the national interests of a state or states. In this regard, Adams (1994:139) is of the opinion that peacekeepers who value their impartiality are not at liberty to take sides. In terms of peacekeeping versus peace enforcement, an analogy may be drawn between a peacekeeping operation and a football game. In such a scenario, the referee (peacekeeper) is supposed to remain impartial in order to ensure fair play. The players force their will to win over the referee on the one hand by transgressing the rules of the game, and on the other hand they attempt to win the game by forcing their opponent to succumb to their might. If the referee is not impartial, one side will be favoured over the other.

Given this illustration and the arguments postulated elsewhere in this document, it would be fair to assume that the ‘modern’ approaches to conflict situations have neglected this very important cornerstone of ‘classical’ peacekeeping. In addition, it should thus be regarded as one of the main reasons for the failure of peacekeeping attempts to resolve conflict effectively.

3.3.3 The Principle of Absence of Force

Peacekeeping forces are not supposed to use force. In instances where force needs to be applied, it should be in self-defence and as a last resort. Urquhart (1983:165-166) is of the opinion that the absence of force is indeed one of the main strengths of peacekeeping and that a peacekeeping force should never be expected to rely only on force to achieve its ends. Should such a situation arise, it would lose its status of peacekeeper and it would cease to be above the conflict. According to Cilliers (1995:59), peace support operations are based on the premise that peaceful methods will generally be used to achieve a mission’s goal. Another premise he adds is that, “any use of force must be justified and carefully controlled”. It is evident that, as in the
case of impartiality, peacekeepers should uphold the principle of the absence of force as a critical mission success factor. The issue of force will henceforth be discussed in terms of the provisions of Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

3.4 The UN Charter

The UN Charter provides the foundation for any action or inaction on the part of its principal organs, as well as its regional organs. According to Chapter VI, Article 33 of the UN Charter, "[t]he parties to any dispute,...shall, first of all seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements or other peaceful means of their own choice". The UN Charter goes further by stating in Article 34 that, "[t]he Security Council may investigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security" (United Nations, 1997:24). These two articles emphasise the importance of a pacific (peaceful) settlement of disputes as a priority.

Chapter VII of the UN Charter relates to, "[a]ction with respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression" (United Nations, 1997:24). The mandate to enforce decisions taken by the Security Council is derived from Article 39 which stipulates that the “Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken...” (United Nations, 1997:27). To put this mandate into effect, the Security Council may take a 'soft' or 'mild' approach, which may constitute actions, such as embargoes and economic sanctions. It may also, in accordance with Article 42, authorise a 'hard' or 'harsh' approach, which would ultimately include the use of force to ensure that mandates are fulfilled. When a decision to act is made, the UN may request member states to contribute by way of armed forces assistance, equipment and facilities, including rights of passage necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security. The authorisation of force is a measure that
is taken as a last resort when all peaceful means of settling a dispute have proved to be fruitless, a breach of the peace has occurred or when acts of aggression have been committed.

In any conflict situation, even when a ‘peace mission’ has been deployed, fatalities cannot be excluded. Article 51 of the UN Charter grants members the right to defend themselves against any armed attack. This right could be interpreted as a mandate (for a peacekeeping force in an operational situation) to act in response to an armed attack on one or more of its members or facilities. The operational history of UN peacekeeping contains ample examples of incidents where UN peacekeepers have had to resort to force as a measure of defending themselves against armed attackers. In the process, a number of fatalities among UN peacekeeping forces has been recorded. The table below (Figure 5) provides a summary of UN fatalities over a fifty-year period since its inception.

**FIGURE 5: UN FATALITIES – 1948 to 1998**

![UN Fatalities Chart]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fatalities caused by:</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Accidents</td>
<td>657</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hostile Acts</td>
<td>573</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illness</td>
<td>271</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Adapted from statistics of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations Situation Centre (1998)

From the statistics contained in Figure 5, it is evident that more than three-quarters of UN fatalities resulted from accidents (42%) and hostile acts (36%). These figures clearly indicate that peacekeeping forces are either not properly trained in preparation for their tasks or they are not readily welcomed by disputants. According to the Lessons Learned Unit of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, an essential element of successful peacekeeping operations is, “the relationship with the local population and the parties to the
conflict” (United Nations, http://www.un.org). If it is considered that these fatalities occurred over a fifty-year period, it amounts to less than 3 fatalities per month, which is a relatively small price to pay for global peace and security.

3.5 How Peacekeeping Operations are Financed

Peacekeeping, as Javier Pérez de Cuéllar remarked is, “an expensive activity” (United Nations, 1990:xvi). According to him, the UN peacekeeping budget for 1989 was almost as great as the UN’s regular budget, but by comparison, it is still relatively small. “The [cost of the] observer group [UNI/MOG]^3 monitoring the cease-fire between Iran and Iraq is less than the value of the crude oil carried in only two supertankers” (United Nations, 1990:xvii). Durch (1993:6) states in this regard that the hotter the conflict and the sooner the UN intervenes, the higher those costs are likely to be. A steady increase in the peacekeeping budget can be observed in the past decade in comparison with the previous 40 years of UN peacekeeping. The notion that peacekeeping is an extremely expensive exercise is demonstrated by the 1990 (US $379 million), 1994 (US $3,5 billion) and 1996 (US $3,2 billion) amounts expended by peacekeeping forces. The United Nations’ estimated peacekeeping budget for July 1997 – June 1998 was approximately US $1 billion. This budget has been reduced from the US $2.8 billion (which contains an enormous amount expended in the former Yugoslavia) in 1995 (United Nations, 1998c:20). According to Mills (1999:1) this reduction in the peacekeeping budget is not due to a diminution of worldwide or African conflict or the successes of earlier peace missions. The main reason for this reduction is the reluctance of the UN to commit peacekeeping forces and resources as it did prior to 1995.

In terms of the financing of peacekeeping operations, the usual practice is for member states to share the cost proportionately. The General Assembly apportions expenses according to a special scale of assessment (payment) applicable to peacekeeping. The assessment scale takes into account the relative economic strength of member states. The permanent members of the Security Council are required to pay a greater share because of their special
responsibility for maintaining international peace and security.

Countries may also volunteer to provide personnel, supplies or other support for a peace mission for which they are reimbursed in accordance with agreed upon rates (United Nations, 1998b:6). A participating country’s own government pays peacekeeping soldiers according to their own national rank and salary scale. Countries volunteering personnel to participate in peacekeeping operations are reimbursed by the UN at a flat rate of about US $1,000 per soldier per month. This situation may lead to corruption on a massive scale, as some countries, which experience huge value differences in their exchange rates to the US dollar, pay their soldiers far below the proposed flat rate. It could therefore be argued that even though countries participating in peacekeeping cannot afford to send a peacekeeping contingent (especially in Sub-Saharan Africa), they do so in the hope of making a lucrative profit from the reimbursements by the UN. In this regard, Corum (1995:122) states that “…many developing nations have turned to peacekeeping as a source of revenue”.

Since the 1960’s the UN has been plagued by financial difficulties mainly because member states pay their assessments late or only partially. This situation worsened during the 1990’s, even as the UN was launching the largest and most complex UN operations to date in Bosnia-Herzegovina (1992 to 1995). The estimated cost for this operation amounted to almost US $4.8 billion, with more than 80 000 military and civilian peacekeepers being deployed. (United Nations, 1998b:63).

According to statistics provided by the UN, its member states owe more than US $1.5 billion, of which the arrears of the United States of America account for approximately half this amount (United Nations, 1998b:7). The non-payment of assessments by member states impacts negatively on the UN’s ability to fund peacekeeping operations. One ever-present consideration is: Who is footing the bill? In conflict areas where negotiated settlements are not evident, peacekeeping operations may take far longer than initially
anticipated. This delay inevitably causes the peacekeeping budget to increase. In terms of financing an operation, Berman and Sams (1998:12) draw a significant distinction between multinational forces and peacekeeping forces. According to them, UN peacekeeping operations are financed from the assessment budget whilst UN multinational forces are financed through voluntary contributions, "...with participants expected to cover their own costs". Consequently the UN favours the deployment of multinational forces owing to the actual and potential financial relief it brings to the peacekeeping budget.

Apart from financing an operation, the UN also reimburses countries for equipment and personnel contributions. Reimbursements to these countries are often deferred owing to cash shortages caused by member states' failure to pay their dues. From a financial point of view, this could be a contributing factor to the UN's evident reluctance to become involved in peacekeeping on especially the African continent, where the prolonged nature of conflict tends to increase peacekeeping operational costs. It can therefore be concluded that even though the UN may wish to become involved, the extent of its involvement is often determined by financial constraints beyond its control – adding another 'justification' to their growing inventory of 'justifications'.

3.6 The Changing Nature of African Conflict

Civil wars or regional conflicts have, since the end of World War II, plagued all the major regions of the developing world. According to Ayoob (1995:47) two major sources of inter-state conflict can be observed. One source is the intermeshing of domestic insecurities with inter-state antagonisms and the second source relates to the autonomous dynamics of regional conflict, which is often centered on the aspirations of preeminent regional powers. In many instances the latter is a legacy of the colonial era. In this regard, Hough holds the view that contemporary African conflicts have a unique character and do not fit into the former conceptual framework of bipolar confrontation between East and West (1998:47). In most cases 'poor' countries (of which numerous
constitute the African continent) have been particularly affected by protracted internal struggles that sporadically erupt into violence.

According to Steyn (1998:26) African states are caught up in both domestic and cross-border conflict. Such conflicts originate from age-old feuds, foreign interest, arms smuggling and mercenary soldiering. In addition to these, Annan (1998:21) cites political, legal, institutional, military, humanitarian, human rights, environmental, economic, social, cultural and demographic reasons as the root causes of violence. Malan (1998a:4) is of the opinion that African conflict is caused by a combination of internal and international conflict with the local civilian populations suffering serious human rights violations on a large scale. These conflict situations result in a large number of refugees and displaced persons, which can be attributed to the following factors:

- a lack of coincidence between nations and states, ethnic tension and the suppression of minorities;
- corrupt and dictatorial regimes;
- support for such regimes by international arms traders;
- chronic poverty and underdevelopment; and
- a grinding debt burden. (Republic of South Africa, 1998:19.)

In addition to these causes, one could also add the involvement of neighbouring states that form alliances with conflicting parties. An example of such an alliance is found in the conflict-ridden Democratic Republic of the Congo, where Zimbabwe, Angola, Namibia and Chad support the ‘legitimate’ government of President Laurent Kabila and Zambia, Uganda and Rwanda support the opposition (UN Secretary General, 1999:SC/6654).

What is increasingly being observed on the African continent, is the intractability of conflict. Friedman (1999:13) attributes African conflict to political patterns that have developed and have become reinforced over years and to failed states with leaders that have shallow roots and a low capacity to settle conflicts politically. No foolproof blueprint exists to deal with African conflict situations since each one is different from the other (Urquhart,
1983:167). The UN’s peacekeeping capabilities were devised to deal with inter-state violence (hostile acts between states) and not intra-state (within states) violence and conflicts. Annan, in his report to the UN Security Council notes that, “…14 of the 33 wars on the African continent were afflicted by armed conflict in 1996 alone and over 30 have occurred in Africa since 1970, mostly within states”. These wars, “…accounted for more than half of all war-related deaths worldwide and caused more than 8 million people to become refugees, returnees and displaced persons” (United Nations, 1998, SG/2045). In this regard, the reluctance of the UN to become involved can be interpreted as indicative of either a lack of ability or a lack of political will or both. By own admission, the UN’s Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, echoes this sentiment, when he states that, “African leaders have failed the people of Africa; the international community has failed them; the United Nations has failed them” (United Nations, 1998: SG/2045).

3.7 The United Nations’ Response to African Conflict

The UN’s peacekeeping performance on the African continent over the past decade has raised serious doubts as to whether the UN has the capacity or will to deal effectively with intra-state and inter-state conflict. The UN regards mediation, conciliation and arbitration as primary instruments of conflict management (Steyn, 1998:29). The UN’s will to intervene in African conflicts is determined by a number of factors, and constructive UN involvement is hampered by, among others, the

- view that intra-state conflict (as opposed to inter-state conflict) requires a domestic solution with minimum outside interference;
- belief that little can be done about violence of an ethnic origin;
- assumption that the UN’s primary instruments must be used to solve conflict;
- fear that peacekeepers may become targets of belligerent parties;
- notion that a cease-fire agreement needs to have been concluded before the UN will consider deploying a peacekeeping force; and the
- view that regional-organ involvement should precede UN action.
What is evident, though, is that the UN is actively seeking co-operation with regional organisations. In this regard, the co-operation with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in Liberia and the OAU in Somalia and Western Sahara can be cited as examples. The UN is constantly monitoring African conflict and support efforts by parties to find a negotiated solution.

The evident increase in global crises requires a comprehensive response aimed at resolving conflict, assisting in humanitarian crises and establishing a lasting peace agreement between warring factions. In this regard, Malan (1997b:1) argues that, “the traditional concept of peacekeeping has become an irrelevant means of addressing African conflict in the crisis stage” and consequently the “present conceptions of peace-enforcement are doomed to failure”. Adams, who contends that, “UN peacekeeping in recent years have proved unpromising and onerous”, supports this view (1994:107).

3.8 The Emergence of the ‘Modern’ Peacekeeping Approach

From the provisions of the Articles of the UN Charter, it is apparent that the Security Council’s main concern is to maintain international peace and security. When international peace is threatened, the UN has a moral obligation to act in accordance with the provisions and stipulations of the Articles contained in the UN Charter. Since the establishment of the UN fifty years ago, significant changes in the peacekeeping environment have taken place. However, no such changes are reflected in the UN Charter. What we do see is an ‘outdated’ document that does not reflect current realities. Traditional tasks of UN peacekeeping operations from 1950 to 1970 included monitoring and enforcing cease-fires, observing frontier lines and positioning forces between belligerents (Adams, 1994:94).

In stark contrast to these tasks, peacekeeping forces consisting of military and civilian contingents have had to face ‘modern’ challenges not previously encountered during deployment. Adams (1994:95) refers to these as the
‘new’ tasks of UN peacekeeping forces. These tasks include activities, such as:

- monitoring (and even running) elections, such as those in Namibia, El Salvador, Angola and Mozambique;
- protecting the inhabitants of a region such as the United Nations Protection Area in Croatia;
- ensuring the partial demilitarisation of particular areas, such as around Sarajevo and Gorazde in Bosnia;
- guarding the weapons surrendered by or taken from parties to a conflict;
- assuring the delivery of humanitarian relief supplies and performing a wide range of other humanitarian tasks during conflicts;
- assisting in the reconstruction of governmental or policing functions after a civil war; and
- reporting on violations of the laws of armed conflict by belligerents.

These additional or ‘new’ tasks fulfilled by peacekeeping forces prove that UN peacekeeping, as it was envisaged, is vastly different from the realities of ‘modern’ peacekeeping, and that the ‘classical’ concept of peacekeeping needs to be revisited and reviewed. These adaptations made by the UN in response to peacekeeping realities illustrate that the UN is committed to change. If one, however, considers the challenges to peacekeeping as they have manifested themselves globally over the last decade of this century (compared to the tepid response by the UN) serious doubts are raised regarding this ‘commitment’.

3.9 The Impact of ‘Modern’ Peacekeeping Approaches on ‘Classical’ Principles

The challenge to Sub-Saharan African peacekeeping has created a dilemma for both the UN and for regional organs. Peacekeeping as it was conceived and practised prior to the last decade of this century, has undergone major changes in its methods, composition and mandate. These changes can be attributed mainly to the nature of current Sub-Saharan African inter-state
conflict and the inability and apparent unwillingness of the UN to deal with it effectively. The UN’s ‘classical’ peacekeeping dispensary has, to a large extent, run out of remedies and cures as regards ‘modern’ threats to security and peace. What is evidently required, is a comprehensive approach to resolve yet another dimension of instability and threats to regional peace and security. Such an approach would include:

- a proper appreciation of the causal factors contributing to conflict;
- an evaluation of the intentions and objectives of the parties to conflict;
- taking cognisance of the lessons learnt from completed missions; and
- a plan of action to address conflict situations, thereby ensuring that mission objectives are satisfied.

In view of the reluctance of member states to provide forces and support for peacekeeping initiatives, the onus is placed firmly on the regional organs to serve this need. Upon examining the abundant literature on conflict and peacekeeping in Africa, it becomes evident that ‘peacekeeping’ has been highjacked to describe and justify new approaches, such as peace enforcement, peace-making, peace restoration, peace-building, preventative diplomacy and a host of other ‘modern’ approaches not envisaged in the UN Charter. According to Malan (1998a:2) these multinational approaches have borne little or no resemblance to traditional blue helmet operations. Also evident is that these approaches have been inadequate in terms of the ‘classical’ principles of consent, impartiality and absence of force. The inconsistencies arising from these mutations of peacekeeping have a negative impact on the ‘classical’ principles of peacekeeping as a means of resolving conflict mainly because a comprehensive framework is lacking within which each approach can be clearly defined.

Africa and the Balkans have emerged as the most dangerous and challenging environments for conducting peacekeeping operations (Malan, 1999b:4). In an African context, the emergence of peace enforcement as an alternative to peacekeeping warrants a deeper investigation than mere mention. The reason for this assertion is twofold. Firstly, peace enforcement is increasingly
used as an alternative and even substitute for peacekeeping. Secondly, the nature of this concept has resulted in what Williams (1996:28) refers to as, “a grey area ... between peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations” which still is a cause of controversy among analysts today.

In addressing the latter controversy, Malan (1998b:11) refers to ‘peace enforcement’ as an “oxymoron” because of the absence of peace during such operations. The term ‘peace enforcement’ has existed in the realm of theory since 1992, when it was viewed as consisting of units intervening impartially in a civil war in order to compel the warring parties to conduct peace talks as a prelude to the establishment of a cease-fire and the eventual deployment of a peace force. In 1993, Boutros-Ghali (a former UN Secretary-General) in ‘An Agenda for Peace’, proposed that, “…the [UN] Council consider the utilisation of peace-enforcement units in clearly defined circumstances and with their terms of reference specified in advance” (cited in Malan, 1997b:2). Time and again, one or even all three ‘classical’ principles are not upheld and peace operations cross the magical ‘classical’ peacekeeping divide in a quest to address conflict situations.

It is also evident that ‘classical’ peacekeeping cannot be done ‘by the book’ in an African conflict situation. A ‘classical’ approach is also not the solution, and a balance will therefore have to be struck between an increased need for a ‘modern’ approach and the moral and humanitarian imperatives of traditional peacekeeping practices. What is evident though, is that the term ‘peacekeeping’ is a misnomer on the African continent, because interventions are still largely based on traditional peacekeeping practices even though they fail to adhere to traditional principles. In the final analysis, the time has come for Africa and the UN to face reality.

3.10 Regional Responses to Intra-State and Inter-State Conflict

In this section, a distinction will be drawn between institutional and societal responses to intra-state and inter-state conflict. The aim of this discussion is
to provide a framework and point of departure for the cases discussed in Chapter 4.

3.10.1 Institutional Responses

'Institutional responses' refers to the abundance of regional institutions, agencies and organs responsible for the maintenance of peace and security. These institutions consist mainly of military, inter-governmental and non-governmental institutions that are involved in some way or another with the issues of peace and security.

Article 52 of the UN Charter makes provision for the establishment of, "regional arrangements or agencies" under the authority of the Security Council (UN, 1997:34). In terms of Article 53, the UN may utilise these regional organs for enforcement action, with the proviso that no such action shall take place without the authorisation of the Security Council. The UN Charter also explicitly states in Article 33 that disputants should exhaust regional possibilities before invoking UN measures (Pelcovits, 1983:258). The establishment of treaties between states has been and still is a practice that ensures co-operation and collective action. Numerous examples of such organs are found world-wide. The most commonly known ones include the United Nations (UN) established in 1945, and The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) established in 1949.

The principal regional bodies responsible for peace and security in Africa are the Organisation for African Unity (OAU); the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The importance of these organisations as regional security organs, as well as their current and future involvement in conflict resolution, cannot be underestimated. This is a view supported by Malan when he remarks that, "[t]he nature and scope of contemporary humanitarian emergencies generated by conflict in Africa continue to exceed the international community's will and capacity to respond" (1997a:1). This
statement by Malan, effectively signifies that the capacity of regional organs for dealing with African conflict will have to be enhanced and expanded. In order to contextualise the importance of regional organisations in Africa, the origin, mandate and functional roles of three such organisations will briefly be discussed and compared with the UN.

3.10.1.1 The OAU

The OAU was founded in 1963 on the vision of pan-Africanism to foster political and economic co-operation. Its operational philosophy is based on the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of member states (Wiseman, 1983:359). In a regional capacity, the OAU depends largely on the techniques of negotiation, mediation and arbitration as conflict-resolution measures. This is also explicitly confirmed in Article 3 of the OAU Charter, where it is stated that the OAU will not interfere in the internal affairs of states. This clause may prove to be a serious drawback, should the OAU be forced to intervene in humanitarian crises, because it will not have the mandate in terms of its own charter.

In order to strengthen its capacity to deal with intra-state conflict and to manage conflict more effectively, the OAU adopted the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution in 1993. This OAU Mechanism provides for:

- a central decision-making body, the Central Organ, consisting of about 16 members states and selected states representing the sub-regions of Africa which meet at head of state-, ministerial- and ambassadorial level; and
- the establishment of a Conflict Management Division within the OAU Secretariat (Vogt, 1998:6).

In terms of its mandate this mechanism is to provide the Secretary-General with the initiative to manage conflict within the region and to mobilise resources from within and outside the continent. Vogt (1998:4) is of the
opinion that the establishment of this mechanism has resulted in the development of the capacity of the OAU to:

- anticipate and prevent conflict through a wide range of early warning systems;
- deploy special envoys to mediate and shepherd conflict resolution processes; and to
- deploy peacekeeping forces, civilian police, military observers and political officers in conflict areas.

It is evident that the Security Council members (United States of America and Germany in particular) are reluctant to commit their troops to UN interventions in Africa, especially in light of their experiences and the eventual loss of life in Rwanda and Somalia. The UN's financial and institutional support for the OAU should therefore be interpreted as a deliberate attempt to invest in the development of a regional capability in Africa to deal with African conflict. However, it is believed that the OAU lacks the institutional capacity to intervene with a peace force in a conflict situation because, as Malan (1997b:3) observes, "sub-regional organisations in Africa were established for co-ordination of economic development, and their political and security frameworks are very immature". The assumption that the OAU lacks the institutional capacity is thus justified, since the OAU displayed its inability to deploy a peace force during the failed Nigerian-led intervention in Chad (Vogt 1998:7). This evidently exposed the organisation's weaknesses in terms of its ineffective mission policy framework, its technical incapacity and its lack of financial resources. Another conclusion that can be drawn from this is that the UN should not abdicate its mandated responsibility to seek global peace and security by relegating this responsibility to regional organs. The question that remains unanswered is: How can the UN expect from a regional organisation like the OAU to set matters right when it (the UN) has been struggling for fifty years to do so?
3.10.1.2 The SADC

In 1980 the SADC was established as the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC). According to the Institute for Security Studies (ISS, 1998:1), the SADCC operated without a legal framework, treaty or protocol for the first twelve years of its existence. The SADC was formally constituted with the signing of 'The Declaration and Treaty of the SADC' in Windhoek (Namibia) in 1992 (Malan and Cilliers, 1997:1). Under the auspices of the SADC, a specific organ deals with matters of peace and security. This body, which was established in January 1996 at a meeting with SADC ministers in Gaborone, is known as the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security. Its objectives are, among others, to:

- protect the people and safeguard the development of the region against instability arising from the breakdown of law and order, inter-state conflict and external aggression;
- promote political co-operation among member states and to develop a common political value system and institutions;
- develop a common foreign policy as regards matters of mutual concern and interest and to lobby, as a region, on issues of common interest at international forums;
- co-operate fully as regards regional security and defence through conflict-prevention management and resolution;
- mediate in inter-state and intra-state disputes and conflicts;
- use preventative diplomacy to pre-empt conflict in the region – both within and between states – through an early warning system;
- seek an end to conflict through diplomatic means and, when such means fail, to take ‘punitive’ measures;
- promote and enhance the development of democratic institutions and practices within member states by encouraging the observance of universal human rights;
- promote peace-making and peacekeeping in order to achieve sustainable peace and security;
• develop a collective security capacity and to conclude a mutual defence pact for responding to external threats, and a regional peacekeeping capacity within national armies that could be called upon within the region, or elsewhere on the continent; and to
• deal with extra-regional conflicts that impact on peace and security in Southern Africa (Hough, 1998:29-30).

At present this organ essentially exists only at head of state and the Inter-state Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) levels (Malan and Cilliers, 1997:2). Compared with the OAU, the SADC still has to go some way to reach the same functional levels of interaction and interoperability. This could prove to be a serious hindrance to its effectiveness as a regional organ to act pro-actively in the spheres of both the peace and security.

It is evident that the mandate of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security provides a framework of good intentions and is described by the ISS as, “lofty goals with very little ... substantial guidelines” (ISS, 1998:1). This description emphasises the need for sufficient mechanisms to put its mandate into effect. Unfortunately, even with the best intentions, policies are doomed to failure if the pre-implementation and post-implementation infrastructure is lacking. A review of the SADC track record as a regional organ for peace and security thusfar, reveals that its performance as a peace enforcer surpasses that of peacekeeper. The Lesotho invasion under the pretext of peacekeeping, as well as the intervention in the DRC (both of which will be discussed in Chapter 4), conjures up vivid images in support of this notion.

3.10.1.3 ECOWAS

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was founded in May 1975. The treaty establishing ECOWAS included the maintenance of regional peace, stability and security through promoting and strengthening good neighbourliness. Provision was also made for the establishment of a regional peace and security observation system and peacekeeping forces where appropriate. Two organs are responsible for issues on defence,
namely the Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance on Defence (*Defence Protocol*) and the *Protocol on Non-Aggression*.

The *Protocol on Non-Aggression* was adopted in 1978 with a view to creating, "an atmosphere, free of any fear of attack or aggression of one state by another" (Aning, 1999:3). It furthermore makes provision for member states to:

- refrain from threatening to use or using force or aggression in their relations with one another;
- refrain from committing, encouraging or condoning acts of subversion, hostility or aggression against the territorial integrity or political independence of other members; and to
- respond to all peaceful means in the settlement of disputes that arise among member states (Hough, 1998:32-33).

The *Defence Protocol* took effect only in 1986 and, among others, makes provision for:

- collective regional security, since a threat or act of aggression against any member is regarded as being directed at the entire community of states;
- mutual aid and assistance in respect of any armed threat or aggression;
- the mediation of conflict between two member states of the Community; and for,
- if need be, the interposition of the Allied Army Forces of the Community between the troops engaged in conflict (Hough, 1998:30-32).

As a regional security framework, these two treaties, together with the revised 'Treaty of 1993', provided specific blueprints and limitations for state action, as well as a collective defence system (Aning, 1999:3).

In terms of peacekeeping, ECOWAS deployed the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in Liberia in August 1990. This group initially consisted of 4 000 and eventually of 12 000 troops. The
ECOMOG operation illustrated the incapacity of regional organs acting as peacekeepers because, as Malan (1999:49) remarks, “Units initially landed without intelligence or military maps ... some without personal weapons ...boots and uniforms ... and adequate logistics”. The worst aspect of this operation is that the same problems existed eight years later. Another problem was the alleged partiality, brutality and corruption of ECOMOG troops.

ECOMOG was hailed as a regional initiative which saved many lives albeit at considerable cost to the member states, especially Nigeria who sacrificed 500 lives and footed a bill of more than US $1 billion (Malan, 1999a:50). As a peacekeeping operation in both Liberia and Sierra Leone, ECOMOG has been legitimised by means of, “ex post facto Security Council resolutions, the co-deployment of UN observer missions, and the overt support of major donor countries” (Malan, 1999a:51). Malan’s observation once again supports the notion that the UN is slowly shifting its mandated responsibility to regional organisations.

A review of the three regional organisations discussed above reveals that their success rates are equally low in terms of conflict resolution in a regional context. Despite ongoing capacity-building initiatives by the UN to strengthen African peacekeeping capabilities, it is evident that to abdicate its responsibility towards these organs would be an irresponsible course of action. Too many restraining forces impact negatively on these organs (at least in the short-term to medium-term) for such organs to take complete ownership for African peace and security.

3.10.2 Societal Responses

The societal responses referred to in this document relate to the impact of internal and external violence, war and conflict on the inhabitants of a conflict-ridden state or society.
Conflict within a state arguably has a greater impact on the populace of a particular region or state than any other natural occurrence. The collapse of state structures and subsequent take-over by (usually) a military regime causes a definite shift in the balance of power. History has proved that the local civilian population suffers most when gross abuses of human rights occur. In violent conflict situations, millions of people are displaced or killed, communities disintegrate, corruption is at the order of the day, basic services deteriorate beyond redemption, aid intended for the needy fall into the hands of the perpetrators, and warlords run amok in a lawless society. A typology of African armed conflicts is given by Lodge (1998:1-5), who categorises regional conflict into seven major categories, namely:

- ethnic competition for control of the state;
- regional or secessionist rebellions;
- continued liberation conflict;
- fundamentalist religious opposition to secular authority;
- warfare arising from state degeneration or state collapse;
- protracted conflict within politicised militaries; and
- border disputes.

Lodge (1988:1-5) also makes the comment that such conflicts are common in countries where the state has been weak; that several of these hostilities occur as a consequence of national rivalries within regions and that they are a consequence of militarised religious opposition to secular states.

In the wake of all these factors, regional responses have still a long way to go in their quest for a universal plan of action and a workable solution to a seemingly insurmountable problem.

3.11 Future Challenges for African Peacekeeping

Much has been said about what the UN needs to do in order to promote peacekeeping as a means of intervention as opposed to other inappropriate interventionist measures. African peacekeeping is at a crossroads, and a
transition needs to be made from ‘classical’ UN peacekeeping principles to a ‘modern’ approach that satisfies current demands. One school of thought argues in favour of regional responses to conflict resolution, while another argues in favour of sustained UN intervention. Both these arguments are fundamentally flawed: where one is evidently reluctant and lacks the political will, the other lacks the institutional capacity required to meet the challenge. This view is supported by Landsberg (1999:47) who writes: “Too often those states with the resources lack the will and those with the will lack the resources; the able are unwilling and the willing are unable”. Accordingly, this situation creates a “paralysing paradox”.

In short, the following may be regarded as the challenges for African peacekeeping:
- maintaining the division between peacekeeping and peace enforcement, with clear mandates for operational deployments;
- enhancing the political, institutional, financial and operational capacity of regional organs;
- political commitment, unity of purpose and trend establishment by the willing and able;
- the provision of adequate equipment and matériel by regional and international organisations;
- networking to revitalise the continental debate on peace and security;
- strengthening the capacity of existing initiatives, i.e. The African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI), to deal with conflict in the region; and
- revitalising the early warning system as a method of intervening to avoid the implementation of comprehensive intervention measures.

3.12 Conclusion

The renewed conflict on the African continent, especially in the Great Lakes region, has placed the issue of peacekeeping and similar conflict-resolution mechanisms on the global agenda. The preceding discussion reveals that peacekeeping as a means of resolving conflict has had it successes and failures. It also reveals that the time has come to re-evaluate the manner in
which peacekeeping is being conducted in intra-state conflict situations. The question may indeed be posed as to whether peacekeeping in its current 'classical' guise still has a place in Sub-Saharan Africa.

The UN's apparent reluctance to become involved has left Africa to find solutions to its own problems. One may add that, in many instances, these solutions have contributed insignificantly to improving the situation. African organs responsible for peace and security have strongly come to the fore as an inadequate but willing response to regional peacekeeping needs. In a UN press release, the UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, warns that African efforts to resolve conflict should be complemented and not supplemented by the UN efforts (UN Secretary General, 1998:SG/2045). An obstacle that unfortunately detracts from African peace initiatives is that conflict is not resolved in accordance with 'classical' peacekeeping principles.

Despite the increased intensity and frequency of global conflict and a strong signal to the UN to strengthen its future peacekeeping capacity in especially Africa, the UN remains firm in its belief that conditions must be right before intervention will be considered. An earnest need for intervention has become evident in the midst of serious reconsideration of Super Power involvement. On the negative side, this reluctance to act may still prove to be a serious threat to the future of 'classical' UN peace initiatives in Sub-Saharan Africa; on the positive side it may well serve as a much-needed impetus for enhancing the capacity of regional organs.
CHAPTER 4

CASE STUDIES

4.1 Introduction

In Chapter 1 it is hypothesised that the current Sub-Saharan African practice of resolving conflict is inconsistent with the UN peacekeeping principles of consent, impartiality and the absence of force.

The aim of this chapter is to evaluate both the SADC’s intervention in the Republic of Lesotho and the current security situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The evaluation will be done in terms of the ‘classical’ UN principles of peacekeeping with the aim of establishing the level of compliance and also to illustrate the misinterpretation of peacekeeping principles in a Sub-Saharan African context. Although these interventions can by no means be classified as ‘peacekeeping’ operations, they will be evaluated as such in view of the model proposed in Chapter 5. The intervention in Lesotho (1998) and the current intervention in the DRC (1999-2000) will thus be analysed in terms of the principles of consent, impartiality and the use of force in order to determine whether these interventions substantiate or refute the hypothesis.

A significant difference that must be pointed out is that the DRC conflict is current (2000), whilst the Lesotho invasion (1998) by SADC forces has already taken place. This difference implies that different analytical approaches are required. In the case of Lesotho, the analysis is based on a past experience, and in the case of the DRC, the analysis is based partly on past experience in terms of the events that have already taken place and partly on forecasting as to what may still happen.

The analysis will be done within the parameters of the following framework:

- an overview of events preceding the operations;
- an overview of the operational mandates and objectives;
a comparison of UN principles to the practices of the SADC force(s); and
a conclusion based on these assessments.

4.2 The SADC Intervention in the Republic of Lesotho (Operation BOLEAS)

4.2.1 General Overview

The Republic of Lesotho, a mountain Kingdom surrounded by South Africa, is not new to, "...violent power struggles, politically motivated assassinations and coups" (Makoa 1996:13). Lesotho is also not new to political instability because, even as far back as 1965/66, the Basotho Congress Party (BCP) refused to recognise the Basotho National Party (BNP) and, "the ensuing political instability claimed scores of lives" (Makoa 1996:16). Numerous struggles for political power characterise the political history of this nation-state, and it seems as if these power struggles recurrently erupted into violent takeovers. Examples of such takeovers are the one in 1970 by Jonathan's BNP and military coups in both 1986 and 1991 by Lekhanya and Ramaema respectively (Van Nieuwkerk, 1999:4).

In contrast to a 1994 call for intervention, the South African government this time heeded a request by the Prime Minister of Lesotho, Mr. Pakalitha Mosisili, (on behalf of the Lesotho government) to restore law and order by means of an intervention. During the early hours of 22 September 1998, a 600-strong South African military task force entered Lesotho (Neethling, 1999:1). The request came about as a result of an attempted coup d'état by rebellious Lesotho soldiers. The intervention was to be conducted under the SADC banner, with armed forces deployed from the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) and a 200-strong force from the Botswana Defence Force (BDF). However, the BDF arrived only at nightfall on 22 September 1998, and the initial intervention was a solo act by a SANDF contingent. In reference to the BDF's involvement, Tapfumanyei (1999:23) observes that, "South Africa enlisted Botswana's token support to invade Lesotho, with hardly any SADC sanction".
After the election in Lesotho, large-scale unrest broke out and a state of lawlessness prevailed. Van Nieuwkerk (1999:1) describes the intervention as, "an orgy of destruction, looting, and violence which resulted in 39 casualties". The main reasons for the unrest were the rejection of the election results by the Lesotho opposition parties and the subsequent rejection of the findings of the Langa Report (Van Nieuwkerk, 1999:1). The events following the election resulted in the Lesotho government summoning the support of its South African counterpart.

4.2.2 Overview of the Operational Mandate and Objectives

In terms of the hypothesis formulated in this document, the Lesotho invasion cannot be classified as a 'true' peacekeeping operation, even though it will be analysed as such. The reason for this course of action is the assumption that any deployment of troops in a sovereign state must be conducted in accordance with a UN Chapter VI or VII mandates. In the case of Lesotho, Operation BOLEAS would have required a Chapter VII UN mandate. Despite the absence of a UN mandate, the operation went ahead with a SADC mandate based on the perceived critical humanitarian need for an intervention. The reason for the intervention was (according to the SANDF), "...to intervene militarily ... to prevent any further anarchy and to create a stable environment for the restoration of law and order" (SANDF, http://www.mil.za). The SADC mandate, although obtained before the intervention, was from the onset, clouded in suspicion regarding the manner in which it was obtained. This situation resulted in strong media reaction which targeted particularly the South African government's for "poor planning" and "flawed execution" (Van Nieuwkerk, 1999:1).

4.2.3 Comparison of the UN Principles with the Practices of the SADC Forces

The assumption is made that African peace organs lack the coherence, ability and capacity to perform operations under the banner of peacekeeping. In view of this assumption, the operation in Lesotho will be analysed from a policy content perspective in order to establish a framework for comparing the
operation to both the ‘classical’ UN principles of peacekeeping (consent, impartiality and the absence of force) and the practices of the forces involved in the current events in the DRC.

4.2.3.1 Consent

In view of the abovementioned criterion for intervention, it can be argued that the SADC force had partial consent. The request by the ‘legitimate’ government of Lesotho, which followed elections clouded by allegations of dishonesty, provided the partial consent required for intervention. However, no consent was obtained from or granted by the Lesotho opposition or any other party to the dispute. According to Hansen (1999:3), consent is akin to legitimacy, in which the latter relates to, “the acceptance of the peace force [intervention force], as well as its mandate ... by the international community and by the parties to the conflict”. In Lesotho’s case this is evidently not true, because the armed Lesotho opposition countered the SADC intervention. Another factor to consider regarding the issue of legitimacy is the call for assistance by what opposition parties perceived to be an ‘illegitimate’ government following a disputed election result.

Consent and legitimacy should also be viewed from a SADC perspective. In this regard, consent was obtained by means of, “... a series of phone calls between the relevant heads of state” (Neethling, 1999:12). This state of affairs places a big question mark over the institutional capabilities and transparency of the SADC as a regional organ entrusted with decisions to sanction military intervention. The intervention in Lesotho was never authorised by the UN Security Council (Malan, 1999c:94). Another consideration, although beyond the scope of this paper, is whether this intervention operation was legitimate in terms of international law. A proper analysis of these factors may hold serious implications for future operations of this nature. It can thus be concluded that the ‘classical’ principle of consent in the Lesotho intervention was only partially satisfied.
4.2.3.2 Impartiality

As has been stated previously, the concept of impartiality is a prerequisite for successful intervention. The mere fact that South Africa geographically surrounds Lesotho confirms that the South Africa government cannot be regarded to be impartial. South Africa's national interests in terms of its capital investment in Lesotho (specifically the Lesotho Highlands project, its fuel depots and key buildings), as well as the devastating effect that displaced citizens may have on the South African economy, support this notion. By own admission, one of the stated reasons for South Africa's intervention was, "...to protect South African assets..." (Neethling, 1999:3). If viewed in terms of the 'classical' UN principles, the SADC intervention in Lesotho did not meet the requirements of impartiality and, as such, the legitimacy of the intervention is questionable.

4.2.3.3 The Use of Force

In an assessment of the use of force in the Lesotho intervention, one significant feature was the level of force employed by the SADC force. The authorisation of force in Lesotho came about as a measure to curb the acts of aggression by the Lesotho opposition. In a SANDF Info Bulletin (No. 57/98) the force levels used in the intervention operation are described in vivid detail. A summarised version of the various forces includes:

- the South African Army, which deployed a mechanised battalion (inclusive of armoured personnel carriers, infantry contingents and military police), with an airborne company in reserve;
- the South African Air Force, which deployed six Oryx transport helicopters, two Alouette III gunships, two Alouette helicopters and a Cessna Caravan (aircraft);
- a medical task group; and
- the BDF, which deployed only a mechanised infantry company.
The entire SADC force constituted a manpower component of 800 soldiers. From the beginning, the SADC force (in fact it was initially only the SANDF contingent) met with strong, armed resistance from the Royal Lesotho Defence Force (RLDF), which resulted in eight casualties and numerous injuries among SANDF ranks. The total number of casualties was thirty-nine (Van Nieuwkerk, 1999:1). It can therefore be concluded that, in terms of ‘classical’ UN peacekeeping principles, the SADC intervention in Lesotho cannot be classified as a peacekeeping operation. The force levels that were engaged in the operation constitute a force large enough to make war not peace. The SADC’s invasion of Lesotho should much rather be viewed as a peace enforcement operation, falling within the ambit of a Chapter VII mandate.

4.2.4 Conclusion

Any justification for military intervention, including the use of force or a threat to use force (Chapter VII of the UN Charter) on the grounds that it is in the interest of peace, must proceed from the assumption that such action is an absolute last resort. If a decision is made to act on humanitarian grounds, then a peace enforcement or intervention operation should be mounted in order to have a justified legal mandate that allows for deviation from the ‘classical’ UN principles of peacekeeping.

The intervention in Lesotho is indicative of the deterioration of regional initiatives in the absence of a proper operational mandate. What happened in Lesotho is unjustifiable and falls within the realm of the powerful policing of South Africa’s backyard, although it may be argued that the intentions were noble and based upon humanitarian considerations. This evident unilateral action as a means to contain intra-state conflict, should be condemned in the strongest possible terms and should not be allowed to supersede the political resolution of conflict and multinational involvement. Moreover, Operation BOLEAS was in contravention of South Africa’s own stance on preventative diplomacy, as contained in the White Paper on Participation in International Peace Missions (Republic of South Africa, 1998:12). In this regard, the official
view is, “persuasion or show of force, rather than … the use of force”. The intervention was also undertaken without a UN sanctioning resolution or mandate. One positive outcome of the Lesotho intervention was the resumption of talks that paved the way for another round of elections.

4.3 The SADC Intervention in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)

4.3.1 General Overview

Conflict in the DRC can be traced back to the systematic collapse of state institutions weakened by, “predatory corrupt government and elite factionalism” (Lodge, 1998:3). According to Breytenbach et al. (1999:33), present-day problems may be traced back to the history of boundary demarcation by colonial powers.

A contributing factor to the current state of affairs is what Lodge (1998:3) refers to as mainly the result of the state being administered by, “...a series of regional fiefdoms largely built around the control of smuggling routes by military chiefs”. One such historical example is Mobutu Sese Seko, who was a colonel in the Congolese army that staged a successful coup in 1965. He changed the name to Zaïre, created a one-party state and lead the country autocratically through decades of misrule and plunder (Mail and Guardian, 1999:10). Today (2000), with Kabila at the helm since 1997, the situation is to a large extent still the same.

A host of parties are involved in the conflict in the DRC. This situation is not only confusing, but it is also difficult to determine exactly who fights with and against whom. On one side is President Laurent Kabila and his Congolese Armed Forces supported by Zimbabwe, Angola, Namibia, Chad and Sudan and on the other side are the three main rebel groups and their sympathetic supporters (Rwanda and Uganda). Two of the three rebel groups constitute two separate wings of the Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD), which are backed by Uganda and are lead respectively by Ernest Wamba dia Wamba
and Emile Ilunga. The third rebel group is the Movements for the Liberation of the Congo (MLC) lead by Jean-Pierre Bemba. In the midst of all these conflicting parties are the UN, the OAU and the SADC – all attempting to deploy a UN peace mission. For the sake of clarity, this confusing concept is represented graphically in Figure 6.

**FIGURE 6: PARTIES INVOLVED IN THE DRC CONFLICT**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DRC GOVERNMENT</th>
<th>Opposition</th>
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<tr>
<td>Pres. Laurent Kabila and the Congolese Armed Forces</td>
<td>- The Congolese Rally for Democracy wing backed by Rwanda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- The Congolese Rally for Democracy wing backed by Uganda</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- The Congo Liberation Movement</td>
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<td>Sympathisers</td>
<td>Sympathisers</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>Namibia</td>
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<td>Uganda</td>
<td>Rwanda</td>
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</tbody>
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Source: Compiled from media reports

On 10 July 1999 six regional countries and the Kabila regime signed the Lusaka Peace Accord, which was mediated by Zambian President Frederick Chiluba (SAPA-DPA-Reuters, 1999:8; De Coning, 1999:8). The rebel groups, after much negotiation and mediation, signed only in August 1999.

The aim of this accord was to call a cease-fire after 13 months of civil war in the DRC. The agreement allowed for, "...a cessation of hostilities within 24 hours of the signing of the agreement, a troop standstill, followed by a withdrawal of all foreign forces" (De Coning, 1999:8). A cease-fire (as a prerequisite) would have paved the way for a UN peacekeeping force to be deployed. However, this never took place, because in early November 1999 renewed fighting between rebel forces and Kabila's troops broke out. Although the cease-fire is still in force, the recent outbreak may derail the fragile cease-fire and peace process pursued by the UN, OAU and SADC.
Another threat (if media reports prove to be accurate) is that Kabila has ordered the UN monitoring group, MONUC, out of the country (SAPA-AFP-Reuters, 1999:1-2; Reuters, 1999:9). This irresponsible act will inevitably impede an already drawn-out process.

4.3.2 Overview of the Operational Mandate and Objectives

On 18 August 1998 the SADC mandated the intervention during a meeting of SADC defence ministers in Harare (Malan, 1999c:92). Two different mandates are evident: One is the SADC mandate to participating countries to assist Kabila in restoring order; the second pertains to the UN and OAU to monitor the situation and to confirm that a cease-fire has been established so that a multinational peacekeeping force can be deployed.

Malan (1999c:92) points out that the SADC mandate was controversial because of claims by President Robert Mugabe that all fourteen SADC members 'unanimously' agreed to assist Kabila. President Mandela subsequently reprimanded Mugabe for his "inflammatory talk" but later, to the surprise of observers, Mandela announced that all SADC members support the military intervention in the DRC. The reason for this turnabout is not apparent. What is apparent is that Mugabe would have deployed his troops even without South Africa's endorsement because, as Breytenbach et al. puts it, "Zimbabwe has managed to wrangle important mineral extracting concessions from the Kabila government ... Zimbabwe is seeing dollar signs. Zimbabwean troops are merely the price" (1999:40). It can be assumed that Kabila would have made similar deals with the other countries to secure their support.

Another mandate that warrants mention is the formation of a Joint Military Commission, which is tasked with the responsibility of overseeing the implementation of the Lusaka cease-fire agreement. In addition, an OAU observer mission was also deployed in the DRC, and the UN has also dispatched military liaison officers to the capitals of countries surrounding the DRC (Wakabi et al., 1999:12).
4.3.3 Comparison of the UN Principles with the Practices of the SADC Forces

Although a UN peacekeeping force has not been deployed in the DRC, the ongoing involvement of outsiders and the actions of the government army and rebel forces warrants an analysed in terms of the UN principles.

4.3.3.1 Consent

Consent for the SADC’s intervention, as has already been explained, is a point of controversy. By virtue of Kabila’s acceptance of the assistance offered by Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia, it could be argued that consent was obtained. Consent is, however, a much broader concept. For consent to be in accordance with UN principles, it must be obtained from all parties to a conflict. It is evident that the rebel forces never consented to the intervention, apart from the signing of the Lusaka Peace Accord. The signing of the peace accord can be regarded as consent within an operation, as discussed in Chapter 3. As such, it can be assumed that only partial consent was obtained for the SADC’s intervention in the DRC.

4.3.3.2 Impartiality

The involvement by SADC member states in the DRC should be viewed from two angles mainly because the impartiality of the SADC force has been a bone of contention. One angle is the stance taken by the then South African president, Nelson Mandela, and the other is the stance taken by the Zimbabwean president, Robert Mugabe. Mandela espoused the need for dialogue and a negotiated settlement, which would have supported the notion of impartiality; the other is the option taken by Mugabe to intervene militarily in support of Kabila. Soon afterwards, Angola and Namibia joined in to support Zimbabwe. Since then, the civil war has been continuing for more than thirteen months. Angola’s involvement is based on the belief that Unita guerillas operate against the government from bases in south-western Congo.
and on the fear of a pro-Unita regime in Kinshasa (Mail and Guardian, 1999:11).

Currently, a clear distinction can be made between forces in support of Kabila’s ‘legitimate’ regime and the forces that support the rebel groups (see Figure 6). The mere fact that so many forces are involved in the DRC conflict proves that none of the forces can claim entire impartiality.

4.3.3.3 The Use of Force

There can be no doubt regarding the use of force by forces deployed in the DRC. This can be proved mainly by the huge amounts spent on defence in the Congolese war. Zimbabwe and the other supporters assisting Kabila employed forceful measures right from the onset of this intervention. Media reports have it that Zimbabwe, with a contingent of an estimated 11 000 troops, has incurred losses of R1, 7-billion worth of military equipment either destroyed or captured by rebels. To date a total of 434 Zimbabwean soldiers have died in the Congolese war (Mandizvidza, 1999:4). The Mail & Guardian (12-18 November 1999) reports that, according to the International Institute for Strategic Studies based in London, Kabila has spent $250 million on defence. Kabila also has an estimated 56 000 troops compared with Uganda’s 30 000 and Rwanda’s 40 000.

4.3.4 Conclusion

For some time the area known as the Great Lakes region has been viewed as a ‘hot spot’ on the African continent. The last decade of this century has seen civil wars erupt in Burundi, Rwanda, the Central African Republic and Angola. Some of these civil wars have a long-standing history that started long before the dawn of the Nineties and are still continuing today. The DRC is no exception, and the UN, OAU and the SADC are closely monitoring the current situation.
The DRC conflict can be resolved only through dialogue with and the commitment of all parties. In order for this to happen, a condition of peace and trust must be created by preferably a neutral third party. The evident mistrust among the signatories to the agreement, together with the need for dialogue, makes the deployment of a UN peacekeeping mission an urgent priority. For the foreseeable future, at least, this seems to be an uncertain possibility.
CHAPTER 5

TOWARDS A SUB-SAHARAN AFRICAN CONFLICT-INTERVENTION AND CONFLICT-RESOLUTION MODEL

5.1 Introduction

In Chapter 4, two cases were discussed where peacekeeping (measured in terms of its 'classical' principles) proved to be irrelevant, undesirable and unsuitable because of its limited application in intra-state conflict situations. If it is thus argued that peacekeeping has limited applicability, what is the correct approach? In answering this question, the aim of this chapter is to put forward a dual-purpose model that can be used both as a framework for conflict intervention (as an alternative to the 'classical' peacekeeping paradigm) and as a critical measurement tool for the intervention phases of an enforcement operation.

5.2 Conceptualising the Proposed Model

The proposed model (Figure 7) is described as the 'Cyclic Conflict-Intervention and Conflict-Resolution Model' in view of the nature of African conflict, viz. the recurrent eruption into violence, which often results in the horrors of gross human rights violations - even after peace agreements have been signed. Moreover, the model proposes that the notion that the signing of a peace agreement constitutes a resolution of conflict should be treated as a misconception because, contrary to popular belief, conflict intervention can be set into motion only after the paperwork has been completed. This has been proved in the Great Lakes region in the case of Angola and the DRC, where peace agreements have served as "a breathing gap" for conflicting parties to plan yet another offensive (Powell, 1999:32). The proposed model also suggests that all conflict situations are unique, and that mission success will depend on the mandate and the objectives of an operation. The proposed model was developed from a Sub-Saharan African perspective with a view to applying it within a wider African, and even international, context. The
intervention model proposed by this researcher by no means belies the notion that all peaceful means must be resorted to in order to resolve conflict. It also does not mean that the hypothesis put forward in Chapter 1 is negated in favour of the forceful settlement of disputes. In this regard even Sir Brian Urquhart, who contributed significantly to ‘classical’ peacekeeping; conceded that the deployment of, “credible and effective peace enforcement units...could make a decisive difference in the early stages of a crisis” (1998b:13).

The proposed model ultimately attempts to illustrate that if all else fails, this may be one approach, based on humanitarian considerations, to resolving recurrent and seemingly unresolved conflict situations. In this regard, and with specific reference to the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention versus state sovereignty, Seymour (1996:2) is of the opinion that the plight of the people caught in conflict situations should be of paramount concern. He puts forward three critical factors that favour legitimised intervention above state sovereignty, namely the:

- right of individuals to receive humanitarian assistance;
- right of international organisations (in certain instances) to gain access to conflict-ridden areas in order to provide such assistance; and
- right and obligation of the international community to intervene in widespread gross human rights violations.

Should the forceful (military) resolution of a conflict situation serve as the ultimate solution, as recent incidents in Bosnia, Rwanda and Somalia have proved, then it should at least be applied in accordance with some or other set of guidelines and principles that will elicit what Seymour (1996:2) terms “[c]oherent and consistent responses”. In this regard, the proposed model accommodates the emerging regional security paradigm of, ‘coalitions of the willing and able’ and is intended to fill a specific hiatus in the realm of conflict resolution. It is also contended that Africans will have to take responsibility for conflict prevention and resolution on their continent. The proposed model is schematically represented in Figure 7.
FIGURE 7: CYCLIC CONFLICT-INTERVENTION AND CONFLICT-RESOLUTION MODEL

Phase 1: Early Warning System
- Set entry criteria; mission objectives; mission success factors; exit criteria
- Mandate military intervention to enforce peace

Phase 2: Intervention Process
- Deploy intervention force in strategic areas; secure strategic areas; negotiate and sign cessation of hostilities; broker peace agreement; disarm and demobilise disputants; assist in the restoration of state authority

Phase 3: Conflicts
- Signed peace agreement
  - Introduce post-conflict peacebuilding initiatives and monitoring mechanism
  - Reach political end-state
- Failed peace agreement
  - Evaluate strategy and process
  - Re-negotiate peace agreement

Types of Interactors:
- NGOs
- Disputants
- Sympathizers
- Military observers
- Civilian observers
- Diplomats
- Politicians
- Special envoys
- Sanctioning authority
- Permanent peace secretariat

Roles and Authorities:
- Sanctioned intervention by regional/multi-national force
- Intervention planning and strategy
- Permanent peace secretariat
- Sanctioning authority
- Early warning system
5.3 Model Phases

As can be concluded from Figure 7, the proposed model consists of three distinct phases. The three phases constitute a pre-intervention phase, the intervention per se and a post-intervention phase. Apart from these phases, a number of actors, a process and a strategy are also distinguished. The proper course of action is determined by the factors considered during the pre-intervention phase of an operation. These factors include:

- the nature of the conflict;
- the requirements for successful engagement and exit;
- a decision on which actors are required for successfully resolving the conflict;
- agreement on the mission objectives and mission success factors; and
- a decision on what processes and strategies to utilise;

The consideration of all these elements will make it possible to draw up an intervention plan that is based on sound principles and objectives. This consideration furthermore implies that the proposed model can be adapted to the needs of the intervention force and to the mission objectives set by the sanctioning authority. It is also assumed that the sanctioning authority will meet all legal requirements in terms of intervention (Chapter VII UN mandate) prior to deployment.

5.3.1 Considerations Pertaining to Phase 1

5.3.1.1 The Nature of the Conflict

African conflict situations are protracted, violent and costly and according to De Coning (1999:3) “highly volatile” and in the foreseeable future will need a “Chapter VII type peace enforcement mandate”. The main causes of African conflict can be attributed to intra-state tension and disputes between warring factions which, in most instances, stem from age-old feuds, foreign interests, ethnic divisions, arms smuggling, mercenary soldiering and from domestic
and cross-border insurgencies. Clapham (1999:32) supports this view when he writes that peacekeepers in Africa have been called upon to re-create collapsing states; to intervene in vicious civil wars; and to negotiate and enforce peace settlements among conflicting parties. Another cause is the non-acceptance of borders set along geographical instead of ethnic lines by colonial imperialists.

5.3.1.2 The Sanctioning Authority

Authorisation for an operation is a critical aspect of the legitimacy of such operations (Hansen, 1999:5). The UN remains the principal sanctioning authority for peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations. From a regional perspective, the Sanctioning Authority may call upon the OAU as regards a wider African context and upon the SADC as regards a regional Southern African context. Both these organs may mandate regional missions in order to resolve conflict situations and may ultimately establish peace through achieving a political end-state. However, the UN should still sanction all missions (see also Hansen, 1999:5 and Vogt, 1998:8). In this regard the UN Charter (Chapter VIII, Article 53:1) specifically expresses the need for regional arrangements and states that, “...no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorisation of the Security Council...”. By its very nature, this is a disputable clause as, firstly, it pertains to what Cilliers (1999:21) refers to as “consensual peacekeeping”. This type of peacekeeping applies to inter-state conflict situations in which two opposing sides have agreed to a cease-fire and have called upon the international community to intervene. Secondly, it is a totally inadequate approach for dealing with current intra-state conflicts - especially in the light of the evident reluctance of the UN to act. Finally, this clause creates a dilemma, because the 'willing and able' participants in a regional conflict situation may have to act swiftly and decisively (from a humanitarian point of view), yet valuable time is initially lost while waiting for a UN resolution to be passed and for a peacekeeping force to be deployed. All these inadequacies result in a ‘post facto authority syndrome’ in which authorisation is often granted only after a force has been deployed.
Consequently, such authorisation amounts to nothing more than the legitimisation of a peace mission, with an added flavour of enforcement. Of late, this dilemma has evidently also been experienced at a micro-level: countries act unilaterally and fail to obtain prior authorisation for deploying a peace mission. The SADC intervention in Lesotho and the DRC are cases in point.

What is evident, though, is that the Sanctioning Authority and the discretionary powers bestowed upon it will remain a point of dispute if the current manifestations of apparently underlying issues are not addressed urgently. The UN needs to empower regional organs, such as the OAU and SADC, to decide on deployment and engagement in crises-ridden volatile environments, where humanitarian considerations are paramount. At the same time the legality of such empowerment needs to be thrashed out. A grave concern for the UN is the maintenance of its Chapter VIII mandate in order to prevent the dilution of its constituted powers contained in the UN Charter.

A proposed solution to this dilemma is to establish a Permanent Peace Secretariat within each regional security organ that will enhance the capacity of such organs to deal with volatile situations (see Figure 7). Such a peace secretariat will ultimately have to establish networks with other regional organs and should be the co-ordinating centre for an early warning system. The secretariat may be developed further as a regional-level mechanism that has direct links with the UN Security Council. The advantages of a permanent peace secretariat are that it will have a secretary-general and multi-national staff. Continuity in its operations will be maintained and, at the same time, it will provide regional organs with a mechanism for effective planning and decision implementation. This mechanism will prevent individual countries from acting unilaterally. The latter view is supported by Malan (1999c:92), who warns that, "SADC leaders have proved willing to abuse the Development Community to justify ad hoc military intervention in the affairs of others". The establishment of a permanent peace secretariat may, however, prove to be a pipe dream (at least in the short term), as the UN is not only reluctant but also unwilling to relinquish any power that may jeopardise its
'sole mandate' for international peace and security. In the view held by this researcher, regional organs would consequently have to demonstrate their commitment and take the initiative and responsibility for establishing such an organ.

5.3.1.3 The Parties Involved

In a conflict situation, two distinct parties can be distinguished. One is the disputing parties who are responsible for any given conflict situation, and the other includes those endeavouring to bring an end to hostilities and to establish peace. In an intra-state conflict situation, the disputants usually include warring parties, belligerents, rebellious factions, dissidents, sympathisers and ethnic groups. Intra-state disputes may result from either legitimate or illegitimate claims to territory, power and other perceived entitlements. Such disputes may result in the taking up of arms and engaging in war.

In the Great Lakes region, for example, sympathisers, such as Namibia, Zimbabwe and Angola are taking sides with factions under the guise of 'peacekeeping forces', and their involvement serves only to complicate matters. The effect of this 'outside' involvement in conflict situations is that more parties have to be convinced to engage in peace talks, which tends to drag out the peace-making process and reduces the chances of successfully settling disputes. It may also be difficult to reach a cease-fire agreement in situations where outsiders are involved, because the initial scope of the problem is greatly increased.

The parties aiming to resolve such conflict include actors, such as:

- military and civilian observers;
- non-governmental organisation (NGOs);
- peacekeeping and/or peace enforcement contingents;
- politicians and diplomats; and
- special envoys representing regional and international organisations.
5.3.1.4 The Early Warning System

An early warning system includes any mechanism, action or process designed and established to share intelligence capabilities between regional and international organisations. The definition offered by Anderlini and Nyheim (1999:20) is, "the systematic collection and analysis of information coming from areas of crises for the purposes of: (a) anticipating the escalation of violent conflict; (b) development of strategic responses to these crises; and (c) the presentation of options to critical actors for the purposes of decision-making". In the conflict arena, an early warning system has the potential of preventing the loss of life and the destruction of property by virtue of the fact that decisions to act can be made timeously. Shelton (1997:4) defines "early warning" as, "information that can provide a timely alert to potential conflicts". According to him, an early warning system should involve the synthesis of a range of information inputs from various sources, including governments, non-governmental organisations, and academic and research institutions.

However, the UN has not been able to establish an integrated intelligence system. At present such a system (in the African context) exists only 'in name' and resides under the Centre for Conflict Management of the OAU (Cilliers, 1999:24). Anderlini and Nyheim (1999:21) hold the view that early warning is about forecasting a potential crisis and set four criteria for its success:

- Conflict early warning requires information concerning a wide range of social, economic and political factors.
- It should be subjected to thorough and objective analysis as there is always the danger that information may be interpreted biasedly to favour the agenda and interests of certain groups.
- An appropriate response strategy needs to be established.
- Local and international players must be committed.

An early warning system may be perceived to be infringing on the sovereignty of states and could be rejected as an interference in the domestic domain of
states. In this regard, the current non-operability and effective 'absence' of an early warning system may be viewed as a serious drawback for regional security because of its potential to enhance the planning and execution of interventionist operations or non-consensual peacekeeping.

5.3.1.5 Intervention Planning and Strategy

If a decision to intervene is made by the sanctioning authority, it signifies a commitment to engagement in Phase 2. In order to provide a firm legal foundation for intervention, a resolution will have to be passed by the sanctioning authority to provide a proper mandate for the planned intervention operation. Such a mandate can be regarded as the watershed between a passive and an active operational mode. Forces with a predetermined mandate will now be committed for inter-positioning in strategic areas. Several steps precede intervention, and various actors and a strategy form part of this phase. A most important consideration is the funding for the operation. Peace enforcement operations have proved to be an extremely costly and lengthy exercise. A recent example is the Lesotho intervention (Operation BOLEAS), which amounted to R36-million over a one-year period. Phase 2 will subsequently be discussed in greater detail.

Intervention planning is a task that requires, "a high degree of co-ordination between various contributing nations and bodies" (Neethling 1999:2). It is thus clear that such planning must be undertaken jointly, timeously and meticulously by the organisation authorising the intervention. The planning should be based on sound and verifiable information gathered through the early warning system and other intelligence sources. Pre-intervention planning tasks will have to be supported by techniques, such as geopolitical scenario analysis, strategic and operational planning, logistical planning, force level and force composition planning and command and control planning.

Another task before an intervention operation takes effect is the appreciation of an intervention strategy. Owing to the unpredictability of peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations, any intervention must be accompanied by
clear entry and exit criteria, and mission success guidelines and objectives. A sound intervention strategy and proper intervention planning will reduce risk-taking and casualties, and will ensure a higher degree of success. The success of a mission will be determined by, among others, the

- ability of deployed forces to persevere under difficult and unfamiliar circumstances;
- ability of the deployed forces to restrain themselves in the wake of an armed onslaught; and
- ability of the deployed forces to unite in an effort to attain the mission objective within the framework of the mandate.

5.3.2 Considerations Pertaining to Phase 2

5.3.2.1 The Intervention Process

The intervention process consists of elements that are more appropriate for 'classical' peace enforcement operations. One such element is the deployment of an intervention force in strategic areas. Such a force will have to be of a multinational nature preferably committed by regional states situated in close proximity to the conflict area to ensure rapid deployment and unity of effort. A vital task of an intervention force will be to secure strategic areas or 'hot spots' by forceful intervention in order to ensure that warring parties are coerced to the negotiation table. Once this is achieved, negotiations can begin, and all factions can form part of the signing of a cessation of hostilities. Once a peace agreement has been brokered, warring disputants can be disarmed and demobilised as a first step to restoring civil authority and to achieving a political end-state.

5.3.2.2 The Intervention Force

In order to ensure legitimacy, the main requirement for an intervention force is that it should be multinational. As already pointed out, no unilateral action by individual states should be permitted. A pre-determined mandate must be adhered to and should be strictly enforced. A requirement would be an
accurate estimate of adequate force levels for deployment in order to prevent
a recurrence of a 'Lesotho'-type intervention in which an inadequate number
of troops was met with fierce resistance. Other considerations include joint
exercises to ensure interoperability of systems and procedures, a common
command and control plan and the use of an operational language
understood by all forces. Another important consideration is the conformity to
the principles guiding the conduct of parties entering into armed conflict. In
this regard, the international law concerning the conduct of hostilities (The
Hague and Geneva conventions) must be adhered to.

5.3.3 Considerations Pertaining to Phase 3

Phase 3 depends entirely on the outcome of the strategy and processes of
Phase 2. This implies that two distinct courses of action may be forthcoming.
One course of action depends on the successful resolution of the conflict, and
the second takes effect if the outcome is unsuccessful. Both phases may
prove to require a long process, depending upon the success or failure of the
intervention operation and the willingness of the disputants to cease
hostilities.

If it is assumed that the conflict situation has been satisfactorily resolved, an
environment conducive to post-conflict peacebuilding initiatives and the
implementation of an effective monitoring system is established. The
opportunity for a lasting peace agreement to be implemented would then have
been created. The establishment of lasting peace will inevitably create an
environment for a political end-state within which civil society may return to
'normal', and the intervention force can be withdrawn in accordance with a
pre-determined exit strategy.

Should this aforementioned scenario not be realised and depending on the
nature of the unresolved matters, the process may have to be referred back to
the sanctioning authority for a post mortem of the strategy and processes
employed in Phase 2. One course of action will be to call all the actors
together in order to re-negotiate a 'new' peace-agreement, to employ a 'new'

strategy and process and to obtain and a 'new' intervention mandate based on the outcome and findings of the post mortem. An analytical problem-solving approach will be required for such an exercise.

For the purposes of clarity, elements of Phase 3 will be now be elaborated upon.

5.3.3.1 Post-Conflict Peacebuilding Initiatives and Monitoring

According to Williams (1999:163) post-conflict peacebuilding is subject to constant debate in the international academic community. The White Paper on South African Participation in International Peace Mission (Republic of South Africa, 1998:8) defines peacebuilding as, “activities such as the identification and support of measures and structures which will promote peace and build trust, and the facilitation of interaction of former enemies in order to prevent a relapse into conflict”. It furthermore regards peacebuilding as critical in the aftermath of a conflict. In this regard Monnakgotla (1996:59) writes that, “post-conflict peacebuilding ... will lay the foundation for longer term stability and eradicate the conditions that originally caused the conflict”.

A distinct characteristic of peacebuilding is the strong emphasis placed on civil-military co-operation. In this respect, peacebuilding is used collectively to define those activities aimed at restoring state structures in order for a state to return to civilian rule after a period of conflict and war. The activities referred to will include addressing issues, such as:

- fostering respect for human rights and political tolerance;
- building a state capacity and mechanisms for good governance;
- building and restoring a civil society capacity; and
- ensuring meaningful economic growth and development.

Linked to these activities are a long-term monitoring process and function that needs to be performed by the sanctioning authority or a group designated for this purpose.
Haugerudbraaten (1998:24) distinguishes between two concepts of peacebuilding, each with its own characteristic tendencies. The first concept is the short-term involvement of the international community, whilst the second concept relates to the long-term efforts by indigenous actors and entails broad comprehensive efforts in the political, economic, humanitarian and social spheres. In an African context, the latter tendency seems to be the preferred course of action. The concepts and tendencies are reflected in Figure 8 below.

**FIGURE 8: PEACEBUILDING CONCEPTS AND TENDENCIES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension</th>
<th>Tendency 1</th>
<th>Tendency 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aim of peacekeeping</td>
<td>Promotes good governance and dispute settlement mechanisms</td>
<td>Addresses root causes of conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Means of peacebuilding</td>
<td>Primarily political intervention</td>
<td>Broad intervention in political, economic, security and humanitarian spheres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temporal aspects of peacebuilding</td>
<td>Short-term</td>
<td>Long-term</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main actors of peacebuilding</td>
<td>International community</td>
<td>Indigenous actors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Process/action dimension</td>
<td>Peacebuilding equated to the actions undertaken</td>
<td>Peacebuilding seen as the result, as the aggregate process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organisation of peacebuilding</td>
<td>Peacebuilding is centralised under the auspices of the UN, greater emphasis on co-ordination than on diversity</td>
<td>Peacebuilding is facilitated by a multitude of actors, greater emphasis on diversity than on co-ordination</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from Haugerudbraaten (1998:24)

5.3.3.2 Failed Peace Agreements

Peace agreements - especially in African conflict situations - are not worth the paper they are written on. For this reason, no guarantee exists that a peace agreement will be permanent. Proof is to be found in countries, such as Angola, Mozambique and, more recently, in the DRC, where initial peace agreements have been violated by outbreaks of renewed war. It is therefore contended that the planning and strategy for an intervention operation should
take cognisance of this probability. A host of factors may contribute to a failed peace agreement. Among others, these include:

- a lack of commitment from disputants;
- a lack of understanding of the historic origin and the root causes of the conflict;
- the unpredictability of the actions of conflicting parties;
- the lack of clarity of purpose, mandates and principles;
- the (often underestimated) influence exercised by disputants and sympathisers;
- the lack of support from the local population;
- the difficulty in obtaining consent; and
- the perceived lack of legitimacy versus the sovereignty of the state.

5.3.3.3 Evaluation of the Strategy and Processes

A failure of Phase 2 (the during-intervention stage) calls for an evaluation of the strategy and the processes and a ‘lessons learnt approach’. The sanctioning authority, in close collaboration with the force commanders and planning staff, should do such an evaluation. A step-by-step scenario analysis may reveal the weak links in the strategy and process, and corrective measures should be instituted to eliminate the factors that gave rise to a failed peace agreement. The strategy should also involve measures to prevent a repetition of similar occurrences.

5.3.3.4 Re-negotiation of the Peace Agreement

To re-negotiate a failed peace agreement is easier said than done. Firstly, all disputants must be summoned to a neutral venue to resume peace talks. Secondly, neutral parties acceptable to all disputants must be found. A third concern is the time factor, which may prove to be instrumental in maintaining the momentum generated by initial peace agreements.
5.4 Summary

The development of the model proposed in Figure 7 is rooted in the assumption that the UN peacekeeping approach is not suited to the realities of Sub-Saharan African conflict situations. It is these realities and the 'gray area' experienced by peacekeepers involved in operations that force them to cross the fine moral line between keeping peace and enforcing peace. In the wake of escalating violence, recurrent regional civil wars and the unacceptable levels of cruelty against humanity, a comprehensive response by regional organs is needed to deal with the appropriately dubbed 'paralysing paradox' of countries willing, but unable, and those able, but unwilling. In the absence of such a response, the proposed model attempts to fill this hiatus by suggesting a remedy to current unacceptable practices.

Figure 9 contains a summary of the distinguishing characteristics of the proposed model compared with current realities.

FIGURE 9: DISTINGUISHING CHARACTERISTICS OF PROPOSED MODEL COMPARED WITH CURRENT REALITIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROPOSED MODEL</th>
<th>CURRENT REALITIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Peace enforcement</td>
<td>Disguised peacekeeping</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holistic approach</td>
<td>Uncoordinated approach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanctioned and mutually funded operations</td>
<td>Unsanctioned and self-funded operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clear strategy, mandates and procedures</td>
<td>Ambiguous strategy, non-existent mandates and unclear procedures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multinational approach</td>
<td>Unilateral approach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational permanent peace secretariat and early warning systems</td>
<td>Non-operational peace and security structures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legitimate regional imperatives</td>
<td>National interests</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled from research results

In view of the comparative distinguishing characteristics mentioned above, the proposed model aims to serve as a framework for the following:
• a holistic approach to intra-state conflict situations that employs a variety of role-players including among others, the military, civilian organisations, external and internal observers, politicians and diplomats;
• the establishment of a permanent peace secretariat and a comprehensive and operational early warning mechanism with all its potential benefits for the successful resolution of conflict;
• proper authorisation and funding of an intervention operation. For this purpose, strong emphasis is placed on the role of the Sanctioning Authority and its mandating responsibility. The case studies (Chapter 4) have exposed the disregard for the sanctioning authority and in this context, the model aims to prevent the unilateral deployment of forces without a sanctioned mandate under the pretext of peacekeeping;
• a clear intervention strategy, comprising sound operational objectives that are free from bias and national interests, pre-determined mission success factors and mutually agreed upon entry and exit criteria; and
• genuine efforts to establish a lasting peace agreement. Such efforts should be linked to the introduction of post-conflict peacebuilding initiatives, coupled with an effective monitoring mechanism.

The proposed model should not be regarded as a quick fix for conflict resolution and is by no means the ultimate approach to an intricate and problematic phenomenon. The value of the proposed model lies in its potential to provide policy guidelines for future interventionist operations that will prevent unacceptable practices from being performed under the pretext of peacekeeping. It is hoped that the proposed model will initiate not only a doctrinal debate on regional conflict resolution, but that it will actually contribute to the search for a policy solution to a serious and destructive regional security dilemma.

5.5 Conclusion

The model proposed in Figure 7 was developed as a result of an absence of a suitable alternative to resolving the current situation. In this regard, the proposed model serves to provide a remedy for intractable regional conflict.
As can be observed from the preceding chapters, peacekeeping has admittedly undergone major changes regarding its interpretation and implementation in especially Sub-Saharan African conflict situations. On the one hand, the UN Charter serves as the guiding policy document; on the other hand, there are the realities of ‘modern’ African intra-state and inter-state conflict. The assumption is thus made that the policies intended for implementation and those that are ultimately implemented differ widely. It has become a serious imperative to remedy this state of affairs in the Sub-Saharan African region.
CHAPTER 6

SYNTHESIS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

6.1 Introduction

In this chapter, the research paper will be concluded with closing remarks on all the issues addressed in the preceding chapters. To accomplish this, the aim of this chapter is to:

• revisit the problem statement and the research hypothesis formulated in Chapter 1;
• achieve a synthesis of the main themes;
• make recommendations based on the research findings;
• put forward proposals for future research; and to
• draw final conclusions regarding the research.

6.2 Problem Statement and Research Hypothesis

It is the view of the researcher that the research conducted in this paper conclusively validates the research hypothesis formulated in Chapter 1. It is therefore contended that:

• the current Sub-Saharan African practice as regards the resolution of conflict is inconsistent with the UN peacekeeping principles of consent, impartiality, and the absence of force; and that
• the practices of Sub-Saharan African countries in conflict situations often contribute to a deterioration of conflict situations.

In both case studies (Republic of Lesotho and the DRC), the non-compliance or partial compliance with the UN peacekeeping principles of consent, impartiality and the absence of force to deal with intra-state and inter-state conflict have done serious damage to the capacity of regional organs to address and resolve conflict issues. Where enforcement action was used, it lacked a mandate and a consistent approach.
6.3 Synthesis

The researcher set out to study the phenomenon of peacekeeping from a Sub-Saharan African perspective. Chapter 1 provided a general overview of concepts and explains the research methodology used in the research. The selection of an appropriate approach to the study is the objective of Chapter 2. A comparative policy content analysis was found to be the best approach to deal with the concept of peacekeeping. Chapter 3 is the most comprehensive chapter, since the concept of peacekeeping is explained, reviewed and compared in terms of its 'classical' meaning and the 'modern' approaches evident in current practices. The comparative policy content approach proved to be a useful tool in this regard, as some interesting conclusions regarding peacekeeping can be drawn from the findings in this particular chapter. Two case studies (Lesotho and the DRC) are provided in Chapter 4 in order to comparatively measure peacekeeping practice with the theoretical foundation espoused in Chapter 3.

The research project has three overall objectives to satisfy. One of these is an evaluation of the evolution, principles and characteristics of peacekeeping and the conditions resulting in the need for peacekeeping. The second objective is to compare the various concepts, contentions and views of numerous writers on the subject of peacekeeping. A third objective is to propose a model for intervention in conflict situations together with a broad description of the elements, actors, conditions and requirements for conflict intervention and the resolution thereof.

It is the contention of this researcher that all the abovementioned objectives have been achieved satisfactorily, and based on these, the ensuing recommendations are put forward.

6.4 Recommendations based on the research findings

The view held by this researcher is that all research should contribute to an existing body of knowledge, by either supporting the findings of previous
research or by producing new thought-provoking data that challenges existing paradigms. The proposed model expounded in Chapter 5 asserts the latter.

In this regard, the following recommendations are made:

- **Peacekeeping should be regarded as the ultimate approach to resolving conflict and, as such, it should be applied only when conditions are favourable enough for it to be firmly embedded in the ‘classical’ UN principles of consent, impartiality and the absence of force.**

- **Security organs, such as the UN, the OAU and the SADC should not view peace enforcement as a threat to peacekeeping. It should preferably be viewed as an alternative approach to situations where it is evident that peacekeeping will not succeed.**

- **International organisations dealing with peace and security should renew their commitment towards the resolution of conflict on the African continent.**

- **The UN Security Council needs to shift its peacekeeping paradigm by reviewing its commitment to global peace and security.**

- **Peace initiatives should address the root causes and not the symptoms of conflict.**

- **The financing of peacekeeping operations should remain the responsibility of the UN Security Council to ensure compliance by regional organs.**

- **Sub-Saharan Africa should rely on its own strengths to deal with conflict prevention and resolution through enhancing the capacity of regional organs and by obtaining the assistance of international bodies.**

- **The conduct of conflict management operations should be sanctioned (in all instances) by a regional body in accordance with the UN Security...**
Council and should be approached from a holistic perspective with the aid of a comprehensive early warning system and policy framework in order to prevent inconsistent conduct.

- Sub-Saharan African countries should foster a greater respect for human rights, the rule of law, democratic governance and political tolerance.

- Peace and stability should be regarded as a regional imperative that require commitment from all regional role-players.

6.5 Recommendations for future research

Owing to the limited scope of this research project, certain issues could not be addressed. In this regard, the following recommendations are made that aim to augment the content of this text.

- With the development of peacekeeping to beyond the mere monitoring of cease-fires, a need exists for a comprehensive approach that addresses the entire 'modern' peacekeeping dimension. It is thus recommended that research be conducted to establish what the constituents should be for such a multidimensional peacekeeping approach.

- The research revealed that tension exists in the SADC between especially South Africa and Zimbabwe. It was also observed that the SADC was established on the concept of regional economic co-operation. If it is conceded that the SADC will play a leading role in the resolution of regional conflict, it stands to reason that better political co-operation will be a prerequisite for a co-ordinated effort to resolve regional security matters and for ensuring continued support from the UN. In this regard, studies need to be conducted to establish:

  - What factors are responsible for the tension among members of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security and how it can be resolved.
- What measures need to be taken to enhance regional political cooperation.
- Whether a 'new' SADC organisation (similar to the UN Security Council), to deal specifically with regional security, needs to be established under UN guidance.

6.6 Conclusions

The greatest challenge for Africa in general, but more specifically Sub-Saharan Africa, is to find lasting solutions to the intractable conflict that has prevented this continent from developing to its full potential. Decades of efforts to resolve Africa's problems through peaceful means have resulted in little progress towards a sustainable solution. This can be ascribed partially to the historical origin and imperialistic influences and partially to age-old feuds and ethnic intolerances that still dictate relations between Africa's nations.

The research has demonstrated that conflict originating from within states cannot be dealt with with mechanisms designed for conflict between states. In recent times, Africa, as arguably the greatest proponent of intra-state conflict and tension, has put a number of 'home-made' mechanisms to the test in an attempt to solve its own problems. These mechanisms have resulted in not only tension and disagreement with the UN, but have also proved to be inadequate and to lack a holistic approach.

The research has indicated that the UN's reluctance to become involved in Africa has left regional organs to grapple with security matters themselves, while lacking clear guidelines, receiving limited support and being subject to rife criticism from the UN.

The research has also found that, apart from the political dimension, conflict also profoundly influences the economic, social, institutional and humanitarian dimensions of states and nations. The fact that peacekeeping principles are not being adhered to, is a clear signal that they need to be re-evaluated from an African perspective. Peacekeeping, as it is envisaged by the UN and as it
is stated in the hypothesis, does not work in Africa and the research has endeavored to validate this notion through a comparative study of 'classical' UN principles and the 'modern' manifestation of peace initiatives. Also evident, is that no substitute exists - beyond the western peacekeeping paradigm - that meets all the 'classical' peacekeeping criteria.

The research has also shown that the disengagement of the Western Powers is another problem in need of a solution. For Sub-Saharan Africa to deal effectively with intra-state conflict, a balance will have to be struck between the ability of the willing and the capacity of the able. The lack of financial resources experienced by regional organs is yet another drawback as Sub-Saharan Africa searches for answers to address conflict beyond the year 2000. Mere capacity building, the latest trend in Western involvement, fall short of providing a sustainable solution.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


