LANGUAGE, NATION AND CONGREGATION:

WORLD-SYSTEM AND WORLD-POLITY PERSPECTIVES

ON LANGUAGE INTEGRATION

IN SOUTH AFRICAN CHURCHES

DAWID VENTER

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Prof C J Groenewald and Dr A S Kritzinger

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DECLARATION

I, the undersigned, hereby declare that the work contained in this dissertation is my own original work and that I have not previously in its entirety or in part submitted it at any university for a degree.

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ABSTRACT

The study is a theoretical excursus in the political sociology of language which discusses how features of the world-polity and world-economy intersect in such a way within the current world system as to affect linguistic practices in the religious domain in South Africa. Language practice in congregations provide the empirical data for this discussion. Data was collected through a survey of 60 racially integrated and multilingual Christian congregations from nine denominations across South Africa. Levels of linguistic and racial integration were measured according to an integration index, which shows that racial integration of these congregations is far more advanced than linguistic integration.

The dominance of English over indigenous languages became evident in all cases. This pattern is interpreted in terms of global institutional factors which support the dominance of English. The theory of John Meyer, John Boli, and colleagues forms the central analytical framework, in which global norms are perceived to create isomorphism across nation-states. These insights are combined with others from world-economy and globalization theories. Accordingly, formal and popular, global and local ideologies are seen to articulate with one other, so contributing to cultural and structural isomorphism across state and civil institutions. In particular I suggest that a language ideology which favours English operates among elites as well as among the general populace. Consequently English is regarded, globally as locally, as a language of access to employment, commerce and status. For this reason isomorphism between linguistic practices which devalues indigenous languages is visible between South Africa and other African nation-states. A similar isomorphism between linguistic ideology and practices also occurs between institutions within South Africa.

The emerging hegemony of English in South Africa is connected to similar processes operating elsewhere, and so can be linked to features of the world system. The diffusion of core cultures, which accompanied the expansion of the world-economy, continues to occur through the adoption of global mass education and religious institutions by non-core states. Along with the dispersement of the Western model of the nation-state came the increasing importance of having a constitution as foundation stone. Language rights were instituted in constitutions as part of the globalization of human rights, as happened in South Africa. Compared to the previous constitution, the latter reflects the increasing integration of South Africa into the world polity and its global norms of equality.

As globalization produces heterogeneity and homogeneity, the dominant trend towards linguistic homogeneity (English) is countered by a weaker option for inclusion of multilingualism (e.g. through accommodation of indigenous languages). In Africa this produces African-Western individuals, lending some support to the notion that globalization produces hybridization.

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OPSOMMING

Die studie is 'n teoretiese verkenning, vanuit die vertrekpunt van die politieke sosiologie van taal, van hoe aspekte van die wêreld-politiese en wêreld-ekonomiese bestel mekaar ontmoet binne die huidige wêreldstelsel op so 'n wyse dat taalgebruik in die religieuse domein in Suid-Afrika indirek beinvloed word. Taalgebruik in gemeentes verskaf die empiriese data vir hierdie bespreking. Data is versamel deur 'n opname van 60 rasgemengde en veeltalige gemeentes van nege denominasies landswyd. Vlakke van taal- en ras-integrasie is gemeet aan 'n integrasie-skaal, wat aantoon dat ras-integrasie binne sulke gemeentes meer gevorderd is as taal-integrasie.

Die oorheersing deur Engels van inheemse tale is duidelik in al 60 gevalle. Hierdie patroon word vertolk na aanleiding van globale institusionele faktore wat die oorheersing van Engels ondersteun. Die teorie van John Meyer, John Boli en kollegas word in die studie gebruik as sentrale analitiese raamwerk wat daarop dui dat globale norme isomorfisme bewerkstellig tussen nasie-state. Hierdie insigte word by ander vanuit wêreld-ekonomiese en globalisasie teorieë gevoeg. Daarvolgens kombineer formele en populêre, globale en plaaslike ideologieë met mekaar om tot kulturele en strukturele isomorfisme tussen staats- en ander maatskaplike instellings by te dra. Meer spesifiek voer ek aan dat 'n taal-ideologie wat Engels bevoordeel onder lede van die elite asook onder die algemene bevolking ontstaan het. Gevolglik word Engels wêreldwyd en plaaslik gesien as 'n taal wat toegang verleen tot werk, handelsgeleenthede en status. Dit veroorsaak dat isomorfisme in taalpraktyk tussen Suid-Afrika en ander Afrika-lande voorkom wat inheemse tale verontreg. 'n Soortgelyke isomorfisme tussen taal-ideologië en -praktyke kom ook voor tussen staats- en ander maatskaplike instellings binne Suid-Afrika.

Die toenemende heerskappy van Engels in Suid-Afrika is gekoppel aan soortgelyke prosesse wat elders plaasvind, wat daarom beskou kan word as deel van sekere aspekte van die wêreldstelsel. Die globale verspreiding van die kulture van dominante lande, wat saamgeval het met die uitbreiding van die wêreld-ekonomie, word voortgesit deur die grootskaalse aanvaarding van globale massa-opvoeding en godsdienstige instellings deur nie-dominante lande. Soos die Westerse model van die nasie-staat versprei, neem die fundamentele belangrikheid van 'n grondwet ook toe. Taalregte word in grondwette institusionaliseer as deel van die globale uitbreiding van menseregte, soos die geval is in Suid-Afrika. In vergelyking met die vorige grondwet reflekteer die huidige een die toenemende integrasie van Suid-Afrika binne die wêreld-politiese bestel en tot die norme van gelykheid binne daardie bestel.

Omdat globalisasie beide verskeidenheid en eenvormigheid aanmoedig, word die heersende tendens na eentaligheid (Engels) teengewerk deur 'n swakker opsie vir veeltaligheid (bv. deur aanvaarding van inheemse tale). In Afrika is die gevolg individue wat beide Westers en Afrikane is, wat 'n mate van steun verleen aan die idee dat globalisasie 'n vermenging van plaaslike en globale eienskappe bewerkstellig.

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DEDICATION

I dedicate this work to my wife, Ansie,
and my children Cara and Simon,
whose unselfish sacrifices made it all possible.

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- CHAPTER ONE -
INTRODUCTION, METHODOLOGY AND TERMINOLOGY

1. LANGUAGE AND CONGREGATION IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN NATION

Language, like race and class, has always been near the heart of political developments in South Africa. As a state policy, apartheid segregated all major institutions legally, resulting in enforced residential and social segregation between 1948 and the mid-1980s. Contact between race groups was extremely limited, usually to formal work environments; while linguistic diversity was dampened under a bilingual language policy which favoured English and Afrikaans. During apartheid South African Christian churches became just as segregated as other social institutions, with few exceptions.

Under the apartheid government, choice of language became an enforced marker of ethnic and cultural identities, and so one of the mechanisms which regulated relations between groups created in this way (compare Benjamin 1994). Subsequently language preference was linked to political ideologies, so that language itself was perceived to be an instrument of oppression or liberation, as illustrated by the June 16, 1976 Soweto uprising against the compulsory use of Afrikaans (alongside English) for examinations in black schools. As ethno-political marker, choice of language could even have fatal consequences, as Zulu-speakers discovered during the Inkatha/ANC war on the Witwatersrand in the early 1990s[1].

Currently, the new post-1994 South African regime implicitly endorses non-racialism and multiculturalism as twin national ideologies which underpin frequent exhortations to nation-building. Non-racialism encourages racial integration within the same institution across all sectors of society, from education to economic institutions, most notably in the affirmative action quotas of the recent Labour Equity Bill. Non-racialism can be defined as an ideology which attempts to "eliminate overtly racist discourse", including "language uses which perpetuate the ideologies of racism and patriarchy" through "unnecessary references to such labels" (Benjamin 1994:100,106).

Multiculturalism emerges in the recognition of eleven official languages[2] in the new 1996 Constitution, in contrast to the two official European-derived languages of the past (English and Afrikaans). The preamble of the 1996 Constitution also implicitly recognizes the rights of all South Africans to practice

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[1].This is not to suggest that the conflict had to do with language itself, but to note that language is an easily identifiable badge of identity (cf. Bamgbose 1994:34). Conflict attributed to language diversity at base is usually about economic and political inequality (Tollefson 1991:205).

[2]. Afrikaans, English, Sepedi, SeSotho, SeTswana, Shangaan, XiTsonga, TshiVenda, Siswati, isiZulu, isiXhosa.

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multilingual and multicultural South African society through state policies. The ultimate goal is to integrate the nation through the creation of a national identity (identification with being a South African) which fosters loyalty to the state.

In this way space is created for renegotiating or discarding ascribed and enforced identities, such as race. Concretely, people are drawn together into settings and relations which previously were ideologically and geographically difficult to structure, where they can renegotiate or discard ascribed and enforced identities, such as race or language.

The question whether state ideologies will sanction or suppress cultural and linguistic diversity can be examined in public institutions such as parliament, state departments, the national broadcaster, and schools and universities. These have arguably been most directly affected, in accordance with the degree of control available to the state. Certainly, the policies of the Government of National Unity recognizes the rights of all South Africans to practice their respective languages and cultures. Eleven official languages are acknowledged in the new 1996 Constitution, in contrast to the two official European-derived languages of the past (English and Afrikaans). Other aspects of language policy have only recently been implemented, such as the establishment of the Pan-South African Language Board (PANSALB).

But how is diversity structured in voluntary non-governmental organisations which fall outside of the formal control of the state, and so provide an ideal setting in which to demonstrate informal, grass-roots ideologies and counter-ideologies? And how can such attempts at managing diversity be explained by reference to national and global trends? What choices are made about language in a voluntary organisation without a formal language policy? How are those formerly classified as belonging to different race groups incorporated in decision-making structures where there is no formal policy of affirmative action? And how is cultural diversity accommodated in social interaction where no guidelines exist for those responsible for leadership?

To answer the above questions I have chosen to focus on multicultural and multilingual Christian congregations, which, as religious institutions in a newly secular state, fall outside direct control of state policy as far as e.g. language usage is concerned[3]. While others have examined integrating congregations in South Africa (Massie 1993), or language and race at the denominational level (Kritzinger 1995, Zaaiman 1994), mine is the first attempt to examine language usage in South African congregations, as far as I am aware. Theoretically the languages used in church services (e.g. English,

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[3]. David Brown shares a similar interest in institutions that fall outside state control, by studying language usage in the mining industry. An important difference between mining and a focus on congregations is that the former has an explicit language policy, namely compulsory acquisition of the pidgin Fanagolo (Brown 1988, 1992; 1995; see Mesthrie 1992)

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Zulu) are much more open to negotiation than those used in public sector organizations. At the same time, churches are not unconnected to other dynamics and institutions, and their members do not leave either ideological persuasions or social identities at the door.

The central concerns of my study is with language usage in racially and linguistically diverse congregations; with what the choice of language/s reveals about the relations between language groups; and with how this configuration can be explained in terms of theories which describe the interconnectedness of the local and the global in terms of a single global system or field. I am interested in how religious institutions are affected by extra-institutional factors which function at national and global levels. For this reason I examine language choice in a voluntary organisation without a formal language policy, as providing an ideal setting which demonstrates the interaction of meso- and macro-factors.

There is some evidence that the state's formal multilingual policy conflicts with an existing informal monolingual language ideology, as I discuss in Chapter Five. This would explain why the evidence in the public sector is so ambivalent, a subject I referred to elsewhere (Venter 1996).

The apparent option for English - a former colonial language - in public domains, places language practice in South Africa within a pattern well established across Africa by elites, who tend to favour European languages above indigenous ones (Prah 1993). Most African states are exoglossic, dominated by European languages (English, French, Portuguese) as the national language; yet European languages are usually spoken by a small elite comprising "fewer than 20 per cent" (Kaschula and Anthonissen 1995:102,103). Endoglossic states include "Tanzania (Swahili), Somalia (Somali), Ethiopia (Amharic), Sudan (Arabic), and Guinea" (with eight languages, e.g. Fula; Manding) (Kaschula and Anthonissen 1995:102). Other states which have indigenous languages (but which do not actively promote their use) include "Botswana (Tswana), Burundi (Rundi), Lesotho (Sotho), Malawi (Chewa), Rwanda (Kinyarwanda), and Swaziland (siSwati)" (Kaschula and Anthonissen 1995:102).

Non-racialism and nation-building, as the basis for nonracial, multilingual and multicultural policies, represent local attempts to address two paradoxical global trends: (a) increasing pressure for equality of opportunity for all (i.e. social equity), and (b) insistence on recognition of cultural differences (see Rex 1986:120). This requires a delicate balancing act between the "politics of equal dignity" and the "politics of difference" (Charles Taylor 1994:37-44). The conundrum is that equality usually requires cultural assimilation, mediated by those institutions controlled by a dominant cultural group; yet this very process inevitably diminishes cultural diversity (Eriksen 1993:143; Rex 1986:120). In South Africa equality of opportunity translates into affirmative action, i.e. racial integration; while the accommodation of cultural differences takes the form of a muted multiculturalism.

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An episode on the issues-based television discussion programme "Future Imperfect" clearly demonstrated how language preference is affected by a conflict between the politics of equity and of difference, in the form of a contestation between mono- and multilingualism. About two years ago Ms Anna Boshoff, wife of rightwing leader Carel Boshoff, caused a furore on "Future Imperfect" for insisting on speaking in Afrikaans to other participants, on the basis that it was her constitutional right. She instantly became the focus of the programme, and was browbeaten until she finally yielded and spoke in English. No doubt the positions assumed by the participants on this issue were based on the supportive role of white Afrikaans-speakers in the past for apartheid, Ms Boshoff's own current Volkstaat persuasions, and the experiences of the other participants of apartheid informed their responses. Yet their attitudes flew in the face of resolutions which emphasize "the right of the individual to communicate in the language of her/his choice", such as was adopted at the 1992 ANC national conference (Benjamin 1994:108).

The above incident demonstrates several other issues that I would like to explore with reference to how language preference links to the perceptions and interrelations between groups of people. First, language preference (i.e. which language one chooses to speak) is not necessarily a neutral option, but often co-occurs with contestations of power. Second, language preference is a function of a language ideology, which determines the attitudes of different language groups towards one another, as well as structuring relations between groups in a status hierarchy. In turn, language status is linked to language organization and the resources available for its vitality (see Van Binsbergen 1994:167). Third, language usage as part of a social identity is largely dependent on the institutional setting within which it takes place. The type of setting, in conjunction with the ideology, determines specific types of representation, with certain linguistic identities deemed appropriate and others not. These notions are well-known to socio-linguists in one form or another.

In what follows I will in Chapter One introduce the research problem, clarify terms, and outline the methodology used. I worked inductively both in gathering the data and in formulating a theoretical framework with which to analyse the information. That is why I do not start by formulating hypotheses which not only inform the research question but are also, against the backdrop of a particular theory, tested against data. Instead, I end with hypotheses that require further operationalisation.

Chapter Two introduces the general orientating framework of political sociology of language, which includes issues relating to cultural hegemony in the context of nation-building. Chapter Three reviews different approaches used to analyse the world system, and advances reasons for the selection of world-economic and world-polity theories. In Chapter Four I supply a summary of the distribution of language and race groups within the denominations relevant to this study, and outline the levels of linguistic diversity and integration in 60 congregations. Chapter Five examines the extent to which the pattern in these congregations correspond to national patterns observed in other surveys, which in turn

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are compared to practices of other African states as part of their nation-building projects.

In Chapter Six I offer some analytical conclusions, arguing that language practice in South Africa converges in a way that suggests a developing hegemony of English, as evident from state and non-state domains. This seems to be the outcome of three factors:

- a language ideology, institutionalized during the colonial epoch by colonists, during the anti-apartheid era by the liberation movements, and in the current climate practised (but not officially espoused) by the elites and supported by the general populace. Beyond these agencies, the dominance of a non-indigenous language can be explained in terms of a cultural extension of the economic hegemonies of Britain and the USA in the world-economy;
- the global norms of the world-polity, as expressed in the globalized ideal of the nation-state, which favour the use of a single language in nation-building as demonstrated in the peripheral region of Africa. I emphasise that the world-polity promotes institutional isomorphism between different nation-states, as well as between institutions within the same society;
- interaction of macro- and meso-factors which differentially affects institutional change within a society.

My major argument throughout is that in South Africa informal understandings have emerged (and continue to do so) which - by and large - negate formal multilingual and multicultural policies, while supporting non-racialism in state as well as in civil society institutions. I anchor this argument primarily - but not exclusively - on the existence of a language ideology which runs counter to the spirit of multilingualism. This is what I believe the empirical data on congregations illustrates. The language ideology which establishes the dominance of English is linked to global processes and norms.

2. TERMINOLOGY AND RESEARCH QUESTION

In the first section below I spell out the central research question and briefly outline the terminology and theories that it implies, which are taken up in later sections. Then I discuss in more detail terminology used throughout the study.

2.1 Research question

The central research question driving this study is "how can a world system perspective help to explain the degree of linguistic integration in racially-diverse congregations?" Due to the inductive method that

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I followed the research question emerged only after the data was collected[4]. The question was prompted by my interest in understanding local phenomena from a world system perspective, and in turn prompted the construction of the two theoretical bases of the study. On the one hand I had to formulate what a world system approach was; and on the other I had to conceive a political theory of language. As I considerd the economic features of the world-system approach (with a hyphen) to be inadequate, due to its lack of explicit attention to religion and culture, an obvious theoretical task was to construct a more general world system perspective. A second theoretical project was to find a starting block for a discussion which would enable me to indicate the political aspects of language choice, and to set up potential linkages with the world system perspective.

At an explicit level I intend with the question to discern the macro-sociological trends and forces that impact on a meso-level unit of analysis (racially-diverse congregations) to produce a particular socio-cultural outcome (language practice). Language practice has elicited a plethora of studies on the micro-level. Of these I refer to David Laitin's rational choice theory in Chapter Two, and to similar South African research in Chapter Five. While these researchers do attend to wider societal forces, their analysis fails to connect conclusions to global processes and structures, so revealing only half the elephant. I will attempt to show how this weakness can be corrected through attention to global economic structures and global cultural (institutional) processes. The legitimacy of selecting macro-analytical above micro-level perspectives will be taken up in the section on validity, below, as well as in the discussion of what counts as legitimate analysis of an event or structure in global terms.

At an implicit level the research question indicates a primary theoretical intention to analyse the empirical data presented in terms of two further theoretical issues. Language practice in racially-diverse congregations serve to illustrate empirically what is essentially a theoretical discussion. The first theoretical issue is whether the central claim posed by all world system theories - that the global structures and organizes the local, in a dialectic and reflexive manner - can be sustained. The second issue concerns the question whether the particular theories that I chose can be used to analyse relatively arbitrarily selected local phenomena. The two issues are related: the assumption of the first (interconnectedness of most phenomena) begs the question in the second (whether any local phenomenon contains traces of the global, and vice versa). The latter problem concerns what can be excluded from a world system analysis, what does not count as legitimate analysis. If all phenomena are globally interrelated, then micro-sociology faces serious challenges.

While two world system theories guide my analysis, the data collection and description was informed by the theoretical orientation formed by the political sociology of language. That means, to borrow

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[4]. The data was collected with a particular question in mind, namely whether racially-diverse congregations could provide models on which others could build. The assumptions on which the question was based, that congregations were at different stages of a linear development process, proved unreliable.

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from Goke-Pariola[5], that I explore how language use in the religious domain can be interpreted in terms of the struggle for power and the legitimation of particular cultural ideologies in other domains, in the context of explicit and implicit language policies and group agenda, through the operation of non-explicit sanctions. This implies that my unit of analysis is congregations as social organizations.

As befits the political sociology of language, themes under consideration include (a) the complex pattern of factors through which congregants have been socialized into a language ideology, which (often implicitly) determines decisions about language practice in integrating congregations; (b) the extent to which language use converge with or diverge from government policy; (c) the implications for the power differentials between English and indigenous languages (see Goke-Pariola 1993:127); and (d) "the implications of language choice and the dominant ideology of the English language" for the definition of the relationship between South Africa and the outside world, both Africa and global. My assumption, like that of Goke-Pariola (1993:21), is that language use establishes and defines power differentials between different groups within congregations, and is related to similar interactions in South African society. Congregations not only exhibit the effects of linguistic socialization and informally support or oppose government policies in this regard, but also contribute to language socialization.

To summarise, the research question tries to unlock the puzzle of how to explain the dominance of English over indigenous languages in a particular domain, which may even be numerically dominated by African language speakers. Goke-Pariola outlines how this can be done in relation to setting and also hints at the wider forces at work. He notes that in the African context the use of European or indigenous languages is largely determined by context. While indigenous languages are usually preferred for intragroup situations, formal and informal "factors of setting" - such as work and role-relationship of equality or inferiority - determine the choices of participants (Goke-Pariola 1993:150).

In religious settings what is important "is not what language is used to worship in what religion ... but rather if there is choice, and what such choice may say about the individual, or class, in relation to power, or ideology" (Goke-Pariola 1993:138). The African middle class provides "the meeting ground and the major battleground for the power and ideological conflicts between European and African languages, between Western and African world views. Occupying a schizophrenic middle ground, the middle class is constructing its identity via a simultaneous rejection of the indigenous .. and the acceptance of the Western; a process which generates new cultural values in fashion, literature, religion, political consciousness, and a sharpening gendering contradiction" (Goke-Pariola 1993:20).

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[5]. Goke-Pariola's work answers his question in terms of "the struggle for power and the legitimation of particular cultural ideologies carried on outside the school system?" (Goke-Pariola 1993:127).

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Goke-Pariola's introduction of the notion of language ideology into the discussion prompted me to pay attention - in attempting to answer the research question - to the role of the state. This is because language ideologies, like the policies that follow from them, serve the "interests of the state and the groups that dominate it" - language "is embedded in the rise of the state" (Tollefson 1991:200,202).

That is why a global framework "which emphasizes power and competing interests" is necessary so that "the impact of language policy upon the organization and function of society" can be understood (Tollefson 1991:200). From this perspective, state language policy can either threaten non-dominant groups, who will try and organize against it; or benefit dominant group members (Tollefson 1991:200). As a result one should ask "What role does language policy play in the function of the state? What are the consequences of language policies in the lives of individuals? These should be the fundamental questions that guide the effort to understand the relationships between language policy, social organization, and political power" (Tollefson 1991:202.

Apart from state policies, language education is another mechanism through which relations of power function to restrict minority languages to specific domains. Economic inequality is created and sustained where the state constructs conditions "which make it virtually impossible for some citizens to acquire the language competence they need. This occurs when groups that hold power enjoy economic and political advantages based upon their exclusive language proficiency" (Tollefson 1991:200,202,203).

2.2 TERMINOLOGY

World system is a central organizing concept in this study, and refers to the outcome of global political, cultural, and economic processes and forces which increasingly draw the world into a single global society. These processes are collectively understood to drive globalization, simultaneously generating homogenising and differentiating (anti-systemic) movements. World system, as I use it, is similar to global formation and world-system, but distinct from both as it privileges insights from world-polity studies.

By world system I mean the global whole, produced by the interconnection and interdependence of economic, political, and cultural (institutional) values, exchanges, consumption, structures and organization. In this study I will rely primarily on John Meyer and John Boli's world-polity theory for analysis, and secondarily on Immanuel Wallerstein's world-economy theory. In addition I will include in an eclectic manner one or two of the central features of Roland Robertson's globalisation theory. My choice for world-economy (Wallerstein's world-system) and for world-polity is motivated by the centrality of these features in the world system. While my emphasis indicate their relevance to this study, I do not mean to reduce the world system to these two only. Nor is my selection meant to

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invalidate other world system theories.

I wholly agree with Holton that the world system should be described in terms of the intersection of economy and culture, thus ensuring multidimensionality. "Reductionist general theories that seek a political-economic or cultural explanation of any global phenomenon seem especially weak ... the culture of a particular epoch, group, or nation cannot necessarily be read off from a purely political-economic understanding any more than cultural analysis can explain all patterns of political-economic activity" (Holton 1998:195).

In general, a **world system perspective** refers to "the recognition of a collective reality at the world level that structures the long-term interaction of individual nation-states and national economies" (Boswell and Bergesen 1987:4). But that global reality is multidimensional, so that global formation - "the post-war global institutionalization of political-economic structures" (Holton 1998:194) - affects but does not control national economies, polities, and cultures. Similarly, while the world-economy dominates globalization and the world system, the independent functions of a world culture or a world-polity should not be neglected.

To avoid confusion, I will use **world-economy** to refer to the economic features of the world system as indicated by "world-system" theorists. I acknowledge the importance of structure in the global formation, and of the significance of the world-economy in producing that structure through increasingly dense financial and trade networks. I also recognize that to a large extent the world-economy as a totality encompasses most system-wide dynamics (Boswell and Bergesen 1987:4). I also accept that a threefold structure of the global division of labour exists in the form of a periphery, semi-periphery, and core. Yet I find the arguments for some independent functioning of cultural and political logics equally compelling, as I discuss in Chapter Three, and so reject the notion that the world system is structured by a single economic logic.

By **world-polity** I mean a system of nation states which operates in terms of global norms, a world (political) culture (Meyer 1980:109; compare Robertson 1994:105). The full scope of world-polity theory is more fully discussed in Chapter Three, as is the nature of **world culture**. "World culture" or "global culture" is still a matter of contention and confusion within most attempts to explain the world system, although Boli's suggestion of a distinction between core culture and global culture may provide a way forward. These arguments are also taken up in Chapter Three. Robertson's globalization theory concentrates on the construction of global meanings, and so implies a world culture. Yet Holton claims that globalization theories still offer unsatisfactory explanations of cultural dynamics due to their underdeveloped nature, entailing "general programmatic statements ..... little more than broad orientations to analysis" (Holton 1998:196). Apart from Meyer and Boli-Bennett's work, theories about culture in the world system are seldom applied and remain highly abstract. Consequently I fuse the

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concepts and theories of world-economy and world-polity in the backbone of my arguments, supplemented by insights from other scholars when necessary.

By **diverse** I refer in general terms to the presence within a congregation of an unspecified number of people of colour, and to the presence of more than one language group of indeterminate size. A crucial factor is that in either case diversity is conceived in terms of people who regularly attend services; i.e. who are members of the congregation. In other words, a congregation is racially diverse when a person who in the past had been categorised as black, "coloured", or from Indian or Asian descent, regularly attends the congregation in question. A congregation could be considered significantly diverse if such a group makes up 20% or more of a congregation which was previously constituted primarily by whites. This is not a wholly satisfactory conceptualization: for instance, it appears to be too sensitive to small numbers. For example, a congregation in which one person who speaks Zulu and the rest English would be considered linguistically diverse. I distinguish between being diverse and integrated, as I discuss more fully below. For purposes of argument throughout the study, integration is a more important concept than diversity.

In this study **integrating congregations** refer to congregations which display some (unspecified) level of linguistic and racial diversity. Congregation refers to the average number of those people (i.e. the "congregants"), no longer of school going age, who attended all services on all Sundays during March 1997 for the purpose of participating in Christian worship. By **linguistic integration** I have in mind the extent to which particular languages are selected and used in the congregational activities of racially-diverse congregations.

Integrating is used in this text in a general, broad sense to mean "racially and/or ethnically-mixed" and - by implication - linguistically and culturally diverse. More accurately: these forms of diversity show a proportional increase when measured over time; demonstrating an ongoing process of integration. Integrated is used in a second specific and limited sense to mean an ideal type of congregation with a (relatively) stable racial/ethnic mix, in which the diversity of members is represented at all levels of decision-making, and allowed to affect the content and structure of the service. Accordingly, both the general and specific meanings can be considered as stages in a process, with mixing as a first and integration as a later stage, as long as these are not seen as necessarily sequential in any particular direction. Congregations can be founded as relatively fully integrated institutions and remain so, or deteriorate to a relatively mixed but unintegrated configuration. But congregations which remain merely mixed, without attempting to integrate structures and processes, will function assimilatively, with a particular culture, class, race, or language group as the target.

The integrating and integrative distinctions can be used to indicate the direction in which integrating congregations can develop; i.e. in assimilative or integrative ways. The assertions of Kathleen Heugh

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about language usage at a national level can be applied to describe possible trajectories:
a) In *assimilative congregations* marginalised groups are subordinated "under a dominant group", despite appearing to draw together diverse groups into a whole. Assimilation results in a hierarchical configuration in which "marginalised groups are always at the disadvantage of the culture, language and value system of the dominant group" (Heugh 1995:330). Although such congregations contain e.g. first language speakers from different groups, English dominates. Such a diglossic situation (in which English retains a higher status than other languages) retains inequality, and promotes "a belief that language is a problem" (Heugh 1995:331). An overt or covert language policy of a laissez-faire nature (or a language-as-human-right policy) which does not contain an effective implementation strategy will have the same result, as in such situations language is often treated as a passive rather than a positive right (Heugh 1995:331). Even where congregations aim to integrate, the process can be subverted by assimilationist tendencies emanating from the dominant classes (compare Heugh 1995:340).

b) In *integrative congregations* integration proceeds from "a recognition of a racially and culturally pluralistic society ... in which cultures, languages, and races interrelate so as to bring strength, depth, and diversity to the whole. Integration should not mean, or require, the giving up of one's accent, songs, or life-style, but it can be the framework in which diversity is shared and appreciated by all" (Davis and White 1980:100). In short, integration is achieved through "the drawing together of disparate groups, their languages, cultures and value systems, and the establishing of a system in which all can coexist interdependently" (Heugh 1995:330).

In the South African context the question is whether English as language of choice in congregations (as in society at large) aids assimilation or not. I believe that the conclusion that in Africa only "a lingua franca is likely to act as an assimilating factor and attract speakers of other languages, even to the degree of language shift" is not nuanced enough. Cultural assimilation occurs at different levels and at an uneven rate. Brandel-Syrier has shown that education and religion play primary roles in promoting cultural - and political - assimilation. Language is only one dimension of culture, so that the presence or absence of language shift by itself cannot be the sole indicator of assimilation. By the same token language "'alone cannot be expected to bring about national unity or to ensure the loyalty of the citizens to the state'" (Kashoki 1982[6], quoted in Mansour 1993:127).

It is necessary to define what is meant by an **institution**, and to relate that to what is understood by an organization, as the discussion moves in the final chapter towards constructing a theory of institutional change. An institution can be defined as complex systems of social relationships and

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[6]. Kashoki, M E 1982. Achieving nationhood through language: the challenge of Namibia. Third World Quarterly 4, 2: 282-290. Also see Kashoki, M E 1982. Rural and Urban Multilingualism in Zambia: Some Trends. International Journal of the Sociology of Language 34: 137-166.

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norms (e.g. private property, marriage) which structure major forms of social relations such as systems of education, politics, economics, family and law. Institutional characteristics include stability, universality, crystallized human needs, variability, interrelation, and systematization of roles. Berger and Luckmann (1967) defined an institution as a social construction of reality - more specifically, as a set of socially sanctioned activities which develop slowly over time, until they are treated as objective and external, and affect social action (referred to in Granovetter and Swedberg 1992:17,19).

Language will refer to the vernacular of a particular (ethnic) speech-community, i.e. English, Afrikaans, Zulu, and so on. Categorizations like these inevitably involve some degree of objectification, which belies the complexities found in reality.

Language practice refers to the language/s in which the congregation has, by consent or default, chosen to conduct its activities. Strictly speaking, language use expresses the "preference" of the congregational leadership only; but I argue that by accepting the status quo the congregation is also indicating their preference. While it is possible that some congregants see themselves as lacking the power to challenge existing practices, or do not see the need to do so, the outcome still expresses the language preference of the leadership. For this reason I use language choice or language use interchangeably with language preference.

Language ideology is the set of ideas which supports and promotes the use of a particular language within a particular social setting in line with the economic and political interests of the members of a particular class (Tollefson 1991:132). Language ideology functions to rationalize or justify perceptions of language use, by making usage seem natural and universal, and neglecting the historical context (Woolard and Schieffelin 1994:57-58). To suggest that the majority of South Africans prefer English as a consequence of the operation of a language ideology raises the question whether any contradictions should be ascribed to internal inconsistencies within the same ideology, or whether in fact two separate ideologies operate side by side. On the other hand, on what grounds can this preference be described as an ideology, rather than an expression of social values?

Ideology means a general consensus of ideas which affects social behaviour. While a dominant ideology usually serves to promote the interests of the ruling class, dominance does not exclude contending ideologies, which remain possible - if often ineffective. On the other hand dominant ideologies are Janus-faced, in that they can be turned against the interests of those that promote them[7]. I agree with Eagleton's (1991) assertions in this regard: ideology functions at different levels, is internally not completely consistent. I argue that the integrative, action-oriented, and universalizing functions of ideology are most clearly operative in language preference.

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[7]. I am grateful to John Boli for pointing this out in a review of this study.

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Eagleton defines ideology in six sequential ways:

a. "the general material process of production of ideas, beliefs and values in social life", a politically and epistemologically neutral term which is narrower than the definition of culture as "all of the practices and institutions of a form of life"; it refers to the way people engage in social practices rather than the institutions in which such practices are located (Eagleton 1991:28);

b. "ideas and beliefs which symbolize the conditions and life-experiences of a specific, socially significant group or class" (Eagleton 1991:29);

c. "the promotion and legitimation of the interests of such social groups in the face of opposing interests" - i.e. which is action-oriented (vs. reflective), suasive (vs. veridical), with an emphasises on relational or conflictive dimensions with regards to "the reproduction of social power as a whole" (Eagleton 1991:29);

d. "the promotion and legitimation of sectoral interests ... of a dominant social power" in such a way that it unites social formations while "securing the complicity of subordinated classes" without the latter losing their ability to function as rational actors (Eagleton 1991:30);

e. "ideas and beliefs which help to legitimate the interests of a ruling group or class specifically by distortion and dissimulation[8]" (Eagleton 1991:30);

f. "false or deceptive beliefs" arising "from the material structure of society as a whole"(Eagleton 1991:30).

Nation-building is generally used as a synonym for state-building and for national integration, and involves a struggle "for the institutionalized domination over society by a ruling cadre" (Laitin 1992:9). Strictly speaking, state and nation-building can be distinguished: Laitin (1992) argues that (a) *nation-building* is "the project of cultural homogenization of the tribes who live within the boundaries of the internationally accepted state boundaries" (Laitin 1992:8). Within this paradigm the nation is identified "in foreign terms", with the former colonial language as the preferred lingua franca for "most newly independent states" (Laitin 1992:9). On the other hand (b) *state-building* is the establishment of organizations to maintain order and extract resources. Laitin argues that rulers are more interested in state-building than nation-building, although they "use the symbols of a nation" (Laitin 1992:9).

The nation/state-building distinction allows language conflict to be viewed as concerned "with the terms of the state's domination over society" - not in terms of modernising elites opposing traditionalist societal groups. Language, as one aspect of "the nation ... gets pulled into the battle for the institutionalized domination over society by a ruling cadre"; i.e. state-building (Laitin 1992:9). The struggle between elite groups at best takes the form of a symbolic struggle across various socio-political domains to obtain power, revealed by e.g the use of particular languages or varieties

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[8]. Eagleton notes that this definition does not imply that some political ideas are not ideological, and does not help to define the activities of opposition groups (Eagleton 1991:30).

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(Goke-Pariola 1993:65). Language policies are the outcome of such symbolic conflicts, between e.g. a Westernised elite class "who have mastered English .. and whose interests largely coincide with those of Western political powers", and various ethnic elites (Goke-Pariola 1993:65).

A ruling elite is not monolithic in composition, and comprises only one of several competing groups, along with other individuals, ethnies, and ideologies (Goke-Pariola 1993:59). The elite "at times speak as champions of their own mother tongue" (i.e. for cultural integrity), and at other times "passionately advocate ... a single, indigenous language as official language" (Laitin 1992:4). Obviously the political agenda behind elite discourse is often to promote the interests of their own ethnic group (Goke-Pariola 1993:60,64).

The nation/state-building distinction has some utility in the South African context, as the state's nation-building policies cannot be said to promote cultural homogenization. Yet Laitin's distinction seems to exclude nation-building as an attempt to manage the diversity of post-colonial African states while creating a single overarching national identity. Institution-building (Laitin's state-building) should be seen as a subset of this process (Goke-Pariola 1993, Bamgbose 1991:10).

Multiculturalism refers to an ideology which promotes the acceptance of cultural variety within the same unit, such as a pluralistic society, while acknowledging that unequal relationships exist between dominant and subordinate cultures. I use "multiculturalism" to indicate "a radical social transformative perspective", which addresses the functional and status aspects of languages (Heugh 1995:330).

Race was retained because it remains an operational social construct in the South African context, despite ideological and technical problems involved. Racial composition adds a different dynamic to the functioning of a congregation or denomination, and so is worthy of isolation (see De Gruchy 1986:246). Although some would no doubt prefer non-racial terms, I am convinced that a focus on race is essential to expose overt and covert racist patterns of behaviour. While racism is not implictly in focus throughout the study, another related form of discrimination is, where language forms the operational construct.

3. METHODOLOGY AND SAMPLING PROCEDURE

As noted above, I conducted the study by means of inductive methods that operated at two levels. First in the collection of data, then in the construction of a theoretical framework to interpret the data. The reasons for this way of working are that not only does no political sociology of language as such exist, but neither is there an existing world system window from which questions about language and religion can be viewed. As a result the structure of this study may appear somewhat unorthodox.

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While I could have written the study as though it was a deducive work, this would not only have been dishonest but would also not have done justice to the data.

3.1 Methodological strategies

The empirical data for this study was collected as part of research conducted between 1995 and 1997. I was particularly interested in finding congregations with high levels of racial and high levels of linguistic diversity. The **unit of analysis** was congregations, a meso-level phenomenon, but various aspects of demography and diversity that affect congregations at the macro- and micro-levels were included. Although the research approach was qualitative, I attempted to gather a representative sample across the three denominations selected.

I lean towards a nomothetic perspective, wanting to explain similarities within different congregations by reference to the global structure. Yet this does not mean that idiographic elements are not present; particularly as I consider the 60 cases as a single case study in order to place them within a world system perspective.

My investigation proceeded from an implicit action and advocacy research, in which the researcher identifies with and promotes the cause of the research subjects. One of my personal goals is to empower culturally mixed congregations to deal with their diversity through exposure to information about other congregations which face comparable issues. Broadly speaking, participatory researchers believe that the researcher must use his/her information to empower those who are being researched. This clearly places participatory research on the opposite side of the spectrum from those who argue that researchers should play a "neutral" role, attempting to not directly affect what is being researched. This does not mean that participatory research is non-reflexive: it includes the position that unless researchers deliberately counteract the inequalities of class, race and gender, their research can reproduce these.

3.1.1 Sampling procedure

The rationale for the inclusion of three of the four major denominations turned on size of affiliation and non-segregationist ideology. Individual congregations were selected primarily for being racially diverse. The three major "English-speaking" Christian denominations include the Anglicans (Church of the Province of South Africa), Methodists (Methodist Church of South Africa), and Roman Catholics (see Table 1). In addition a major Pentecostal-Charismatic grouping was also included as representing different theological and structural traditions, namely the International Federation (formerly "Fellowship") of Christian Churches.

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Table 1: Size of largest denominations represented in study, 1992 estimates

Denomination	*Affiliation*	*Number of churches*	*Number of clergy*
Anglican	2 000 000	1 200	12 bishops 1 300 priests
Catholic	2 750 000	875 parishes	32 bishops 1280 priests
Methodist	2 500 000	6 450	941 ministers
IFCC#	400 000	600	900 ministers

Source: Froise 1992.

Note: # IFCC = International Federation of Christian Churches.

As Table 2 shows, the three major denominations represented in the sample have a combined affiliation of 7,25 million people - about 26% of the total SA population, and 28% of all South African Christians (unless otherwise indicated, figures reflect the Human Science Research Council's 1993 Omnibus Survey).

Table 2: Affiliation as percentage of the total South African population, 1960-1993

	1960	*1970*	*1980*	1993
# Anglican	8.78%	7.87%	6.48%	5.98%
Methodist	10.68%	10.58%	8.49%	9.52%
Catholic	6.73%	8.71%	9.47%	10.18%

Source: HSRC Omnibus Survey 1993. Used by permission of the Sociology Departments of Huguenot College and the University of Pretoria.

Note: # Includes the Church of the Province of South Africa as well as the Church of England.

In order to elicit names of integrating congregations, telephone interviews were first conducted with denominational church officials to compile a list of regional church officials (e.g. bishops or administrative secretaries). This produced a list of 56 denominational officials to which faxes requesting information on racially and culturally integrating churches were sent: 15 Anglican diocesan administrators; 11 Methodist bishops (excluding the presiding bishop); 30 Catholic bishops (including 5 archbishops and one auxiliary bishop).

Regional church officials were requested by fax to forward the addresses of congregations in their

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areas which they believed contained "significant mixes of people from different race or language groups". Where no responses were forthcoming a second fax was sent, and as far as funds would allow this was followed up by a telephone reminder. Yet some church officials did not respond at all, most notably the Catholic Bishop of Johannesburg (Bishop R J Orsmond), while his counterpart the former Methodist Bishop of South Western Transvaal (Bishop Peter Storey) sent the official list of bishops' names, not congregations - despite two attempts to get him to do so. A subsequent informal conversation with the present presiding MCSA bishop, Rev H Mvume Dandala, ascertained that few congregations in the Johannesburg area were attempting this transition.

The names of 222 congregations were forwarded, and considered to constitute the sampling universe. They represented the total number of denominational sub-regions fairly well:
a. Catholics: 12 out of 27 diocese and archdiocese (Oudtshoorn, Eshowe, Kroonstad, Bethlehem, Port Elizabeth, Keetmanshoop, Rustenburg, Kimberley, Pietermaritzburg, Queenstown, Aliwal North, Keimoes, Marianhill, Kokstad, Klerksdorp, Witbank, Ingwavuma, De Aar, Dundee, Tzaneen; as well as the Archdiocese of Bloemfontein, of Cape Town, of Durban, of Johannesburg, of Pretoria - excluding Windhoek, Manzini, Gaborone, Rundu);
b. Anglicans: 11 out of 12 diocese (Kimberley-Kuruman, George, Natal, Pretoria, St Mark, Christ the King, Grahamstown, Johannesburg, Klerksdorp, Zululand, Umzimvubu);
c. Methodist Districts: 6 out of 11 (Cape of Good Hope, Grahamstown, Queenstown, Kimberley and Bloemfontein, Northern Free State and Lesotho, Natal Coastal, Natal West, South Western Transvaal, South Eastern Transvaal and Swaziland, Limpopo, Clarkebury - excluding Mozambique and Namibia Districts).

The Catholic congregations were concentrated mainly in three diocese, namely the Diocese of Oudtshoorn (19 congregations), Diocese of Dundee (12), and the Archdiocese of Durban (18). The highest concentrations of Anglican congregations were from the Diocese of Johannesburg (10 congregations), and the Diocese of Natal (10). Methodist candidates were clustered in the District of the Cape of Good Hope (12 congregations), District of the Limpopo (12), and Natal West (12).

As Table 3 on the next page show, the final sample contained representation from the following church regions: 7 out of 27 Catholic diocese and archdiocese (Durban, Pretoria, Eshowe, Kimberley, Kokstad, Kroonstad, Dundee); 8 out of 12 Anglican diocese (Cape of Good Hope District, Kimberley-Kuruman, Natal, Pretoria, St Mark, Diocese of Christ the King, Johannesburg, Klerksdorp, Zululand, Grahamstown); and 3 out of 11 Methodist Districts (Cape of Good Hope, Natal West District, Limpopo).

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Table 3: Denominations by provinces, church regions and number of congregations (n=60) Source: Own Data, 1997.

Provinces	*CPSA* *Dioceses of:*		*RC* *Dioceses of:*		*MCSA* *District of:*		*IFCC*	*PCSA*	*IND*	*FreeMeth*	*Subtotal*
Western Cape		2	Cape Town	2	Good Hope	3	3		1		11
Eastern Cape	Grahamstown	1						1			2
Northern Cape	Kimberley-Kuruman	2									2
Free State			Kroonstad	3							3
Gauteng	Pretoria Christ the King	1 2	ArchDiocese of Pretoria	2			1				6
Kwazulu-Natal	Natal Zululand	5 2	Kokstad Eshowe Dundee ArchDiocese of Durban	1 1 3 6	Natal West	4	1			1	24
North West	Klerksdorp	1									1
Northern Province					Limpopo	1	1				2
Mapumalanga	St Mark	4									4
Unknown		2		2		1					5
Total:		**22**		**20**		**9**	**6**	**1**	**1**	**1**	**60**

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3.1.2 Construction of questionnaire

The initial questionnaire was based on the Handbook for Congregational Studies (Carroll e.a. 1986) and underwent three versions during the pilot study before being finalised. Because of the difference between questions in a pilot study regarding language and musical preferences and those of the final survey, little data can be compared across the two surveys.

As Appendix One shows, the final questionnaire divided into two major sections, of which the first probed current levels of diversity (Questions 1-10), and the second the demographic profile of congregations (Questions 11-22). As some of the questions are discussed in greater detail below under the rubric of operationalization, I will here just discuss general features of the questionnaire as a whole. In designing it I tried to take into account the limited time that congregational leaders have by keeping the questionnaire as short as possible. For this reason many responses were limited to marking one answer. At the same time I tried to include open-ended responses where these seemed most relevant.

In Section One, Question 1 - which probed most influential forms of diversity - combined multiple response options with the possibility of open-ended answers (see Appendix One). The options were included because in my experience some congregations resent the implication that a particular issue (e.g. racial integration) would be a problem for them, while they may want to focus on another (e.g. cultural incorporation). Other questions which left room for open-ended responses included Question 3 which delved into effects of cultural diversity, and Question 6 which related to general processes of cultural integration. Two sub-questions probed whether structures were developed by congregations in response to increased cultural diversity (Question 6.1); and asked respondents to indicate examples of such structures (Question 6.2). Additional sub-questions enquired about the date when this occurred (Question 6.3), and the consequences (Question 6.4). Cultural diversity was defined in the questionnaire as "styles of singing, praying, communion, decision-making".

Congregants' perceptions of diversity were probed by the question "Do people comment on diversity; if yes, negatively; or otherwise?" (Question 2). This query was analytically related to Questions 3, 6, 9 (interaction between diverse groups) and 10 (diversity of congregation). I assumed that congregants who felt that increased diversity should not change the way in which the congregation functions would not make any attempt to adopt new structures or processes.

The two questions which together form the spinal column of this study are Question 4, which queries the level of linguistic diversity in congregational services, and Question 10, which probed the level of racial diversity in congregational structures (e.g. leadership) and functioning (e.g. services). A number of related questions where intended to test whether contextual geographic (rather than external institutional) variables were linked to diversity and integration. These included Question 7, which

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attends to the levels of diversity in neighbourhoods around congregations, and Question 16 (Section Two), distance for congregants to the Sunday meeting place. Question 19 (Section Two) was linked to linguistic integration, as it probed the number of speakers of different first languages. Questions which related to racial integration included those on racial composition of the congregation (Question 21), and those which periodized racial integration (Question 22).

"Culture" was - somewhat problematically and clumsily - spelled out as including "language, music styles, and ways of understanding life". I formulated this assumption in the question: "Do people in your congregation think that **cultural diversity** (language, music styles, and ways of understanding life) should change the way that the congregation is run; yes or no?" (Question 3). Obviously I am not suggesting that these reified, static perceptions prevent people from constructing the contents of culture in an ongoing and fluid way, nor am I ignoring the difficulties involved in tying language to culture, as I discuss in Chapter Two.

But my perception, formed in workshops with churches, is that congregants do tend to perceive culture in this way, even where they are aware of its temporal fluidity. I checked my assumption by eliciting open examples to a later question "Have any **structures or processes** been developed **to deal with cultural diversity** in your congregation, yes or no?", with "structures or processes" defined as "styles of singing, praying, communion, decision-making" (Question 6). As expected, the examples supplied most often reflected language, associated with hymns, sermons, liturgy. This could be ascribed to the effect of the preceding questions. Nevertheless, due to the difficulties with these questions, I decided not to read too much into these answers, and they do not form a substantial part of my arguments.

Section Two consisted of questions relating to the general demographic profile of congregants (see Appendix One). Of these, questions relating to congregational size (Question 11.3), separate services (Question 11.5), distance for congregants to the Sunday meeting place (Question 16), number of first language speakers (Question 19), racial composition (Question 21), and periodization of racial integration (Question 22) seemed particular relevant, as discussed above. Congregational size has been indicated in some congregational studies literature as an independent variable that affects the dynamics of congregations. Whether separate services were held or not is related to the strategies of congregations to deal with increasing racial and cultural diversity, and so links up with Questions 1 to 3, as well as 6, 7 and 10.

As many responses depended on how well congregational leaders knew their congregations. As the accuracy of their answers could not be ascertained, answers were treated as general guidelines rather than as hard facts. I discuss this issue in more detail under Section 3.2.2, Validity and reliability of data, below.

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3.1.3 Data collection strategy

An initial small-scale **pilot study** was conducted between December 1995 and January 1996, involving 36 congregations. The aim of the pilot study was to test the questionnaire and to obtain information to guide further research. Addresses of suitable congregations were obtained by means of a snowball method. Table 4 represents a summary of the data collection strategy for both the pilot and final surveys.

Table 4: Summary of data collection strategy

	Pilot Study	Final Study	Total:
Number of denominational officials contacted for information	3	56	59
Number of congregations identified	36	222	230*
Number of questionnaires mailed out	24	222	246
Number of questionnaires received	24	75	91*
Interviews by telephone	24	12	36
Interviews by telephone and face-to-face (included in figure above)	7	-	7
Number of congregations involved in workshops	36	-	36

Notes: * Includes congregations from the pilot study who were also part of the final survey

Three data-gathering methods were used, comprising: a postal survey of 24 congregations; workshops initially involving 36 congregations were held in Pretoria (1996), Durban (1996), Cape Town (1995 and 1996). The purpose of the workshop was twofold: to share information from a 1994 study of mixed congregations (Venter 1994), and to gather information from congregations in a setting conducive to face-to-face questions. In addition three workshops were conducted in Cape Town (1996) on the historical process of racial incorporation in three Anglican congregations which claim to have been racially mixed since inception (St Paul's CPSA Rondebosch, Holy Trinity CPSA Kalk Bay, St Saviour's CPSA Claremont). Lastly I conducted telephone interviews with 23 clergy and a Methodist bishop. Not all congregations involved in the pilot study were included in the final phase on which this study rests.

Twenty-three of the 24 congregations involved in the survey participated in the four workshops. Eight of these were not included in the final survey, due to my perception that they would balk at being involved in a third research event.

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The **final survey** was initiated in March 1997, and comprised a postal survey of 222 congregations and 12 telephone interviews. In the survey clergy were asked to complete a questionnaire with the assistance of at least 5 lay leaders (see Appendix One: Questionnaire). Rough estimates were accepted. Congregations were reminded of the deadline by post card, mailed out three weeks (April 1997) after the initial questionnaire went out. This was followed up by telephone reminders starting about two weeks later, which were also used to conduct interviews. Twelve telephone interviews were conducted with clergy to provide greater clarity.

The final survey yielded 60 valid cases out of 75 received, resulting in a final response rate of 34% when measured against the universe of 222. Seven dominations were represented, i.e. the Church of the Province (CPSA), the Roman Catholic Church (RC), Methodist Church (MCSA), the (pentecostal-oriented) International Federation of Christian Churches (IFCC) and one Independent, one Presbyterian, one Free Methodist Church. Of the 60 cases, 35% (21) were congregations of the CPSA, 33% (20) of the RC, 15% (9) of the MCSA, while 10% (6) belonged to the IFCC. These 60 congregations represent an estimated total of 18 586 people, a substantial figure, of whom the Charismatic-Pentecostal IFCC and Catholics make up the two single largest groups at 50.16% and 30.35% respectively, as Table 5 demonstrates.

Table 5: Number of congregants as percentage of sample

Denomination	*Congregants*	*% of sample*
Anglican	2 193	11.8%
Catholic	5 640	30.35%
Methodist	1 195	6.43%
Subtotal:	*9 028*	*48.57%*
IFCC	9 322	50.16%
FreeMeth	56	.30%
IND	100	.54%
PCSA	80	.43%
Subtotal	*9 558*	*51.43%*
Total:	**18 586**	**100%**

Source: Own Data, 1997.

Seven dominations were represented in the 60 congregations. i.e. the Church of the Province (CPSA), the Roman Catholic Church (RC), Methodist Church (MCSA), the (pentecostal-oriented) International

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Fellowship of Christian Churches (IFCC) and one case each of Independent, Presbyterian, and Free Methodist Churches. Table 6 demonstrates that of the 60 cases, 35% (21) were congregations of the Church of the Province of South Africa (CPSA), 33% (20) of the Roman Catholic Church (RC), 15% (9) of the Methodist Church of Southern Africa, while 10% (6) belonged to the International Fellowship of Christian Churches (IFCC).

Table 6: Number of congregations by denomination (N = 60)

Denomination	*Number of cases*	*Percent*
Anglican	21	35%
Catholic	20	33.3%
Methodist	9	15%
IFCC	6	10%
PCSA	1	1.7%
Full Gospel	1	1.7%
Independent	1	1.7%
Free Methodist	1	1.7%

Source: Own Data, 1997.

3.2 Analytical strategy

Clearly my analysis centres on one particular social phenomenon (language practice) in a single unit of analysis (racially-mixed congregations). Yet the analysis itself moves between three different levels (national society, the African region, and the global system), regarded as necessary for a more complete perception of the processes which structure language practice. Obviously the methods used to analyse the three levels differ from those used to understand the unit of analysis.

At the congregational level of analysis first-hand empirical data was collected on this unit of analysis using the methods described above. The twin problems that all congregations in the sample have to deal with is that of race and of language. I choose to treat the first as the independent and the second as the dependent variable, so that my initial question was "what happens to language diversity in racially-diverse congregations?" The analysis of this data was placed within a national framework, and similarities between its configuration and other nation-states as sub-units of the Sub-Saharan Africa region considered.

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But when I shifted to the regional level of analysis, empirical data became tertiary, while at the global level I depended on theories on the world system, which did not always have an explicit empirical base. Race becomes less important than language at these levels, due to the scarcity of social science research on the effect of race and ethnicity on religious structures. While an equally small amount of work has been done on the reciprocity between language and religious structures, quite a corpus of work has evolved on language in relation to structures of state and of stratification.

Under these conditions my initial question became secondary, so that the new primary question became "can what happens to language diversity in racially-diverse congregations be explained in terms of the world system?" Again I was faced with the lack of literature on language and religion in the world-system; which forced me to look at other global perspectives which pay attention to the role of culture within the current world system (without the hyphen).

Equally important is the fact that while I want to say something theoretical about the interaction between the global and the local, my study focuses on a particular local phenomenon which I wish to relate to the global. In other words, mine is not a study of the world system as such, but of the possible effects of the world system on the local.

3.2.1 Operationalising congregational diversity and integration

In order to better represent the data on congregations, I distinguish between diversity and integration, and then use these to develop measures of the degree to which each is present. Questions were included in the survey which probed the extent of internal and external diversity (and possible interrelation between them), as well as the degree of integration (and possible effect on structures and interaction).

Diversity answers the question "Are any differences present?", while integration addresses the question "How are these differences included?" The difficulty is that once integration has happened, at whatever level and to whatever degree, it becomes part of the diversity in the congregation. By the same token, integration cannot happen before some form of diversity is present. As a result, the integration-diversity distinction cannot be maintained strictly, yet this does not undermine its usefulness completely. Conceptually integration refers to processes which incorporate differences in social structures, so that diversity is the outcome. From this perspective diversity is a more passive and integration a more active process.

Diversity within a congregation was operationalised by means of several questions relating to the type of diversity that influences the functioning of the congregation (Question 1 in the questionnaire - see

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Appendix A), members' valuations of diversity (Questions 2 and 3), home languages of congregants (Question 19), nationalities of congregants (Question 20), and racial composition of congregation (Question 21). Socio-economic status was determined with regards to gender, age, marital status, income, occupation, and education (Questions 12-18). In addition, level and type of external diversity were measured by the presence or otherwise of racial, linguistic, and cultural mix in the surrounding neighbourhood (Question 7). Of particular interest was whether the degree of internal diversity (composition of the congregation) related to levels of external diversity (composition of the neighbourhood), with distance that congregants lived from the congregation's meeting place as intervening variable (Question 16).

Integration was conceptualised along three axes: racial integration (Question 10); linguistic integration (Questions 1 and 4); and musical integration (Question 5). Respondents were asked to outline the processes that led to this threefold integration (Question 22 and 6) and to identify any changes that happened as a result (Question 6). The extent of linguistic integration in each congregation was determined as occurring in terms of a linguistic-diversity index comprising 5 categories, namely number of languages spoken in sermons, hymns, liturgy, praying, and readings (Question 4). Seven congregations reported a linguistic-integration index of 10 (out of a maximum of 15), and four (7,4%) indicated an index between 11 and 14. Level of racial integration was measured in terms of lay leadership, outreach programmes, and home groups (Question 10).

I assumed that the level of integration was interrelated to the level of diversity. So, in measuring racial integration of leadership, I had to take into account the extent of racial diversity present in the congregation, as lay leadership (in contrast to clergy) must be appointed from among the congregants. A congregation with only two race groups is unlikely to have three races represented on its leadership; it will be structurally integrated to the extend that both race groups are represented on the leadership. By the same token a congregation with a mixture of race groups in its membership, but lacking racial representation in leadership, cannot be considered to be integrated along that dimension. The interrelatedness of integration and diversity was tested in questions relating to linguistic and racial interactions in formal and informal contexts (Questions 8 and 9).

3.2.2 Validity and reliability of data

While the small scale of my final sample of 60 congregations precludes generalizations in the strict sense of the word, the cases do provide broad enough evidence to comment on general patterns. This is especially true where the data is supported by numerous already completed studies of related phenomena in society, such as language preference. Given the macro-level focus of this study, investigation at the micro-level was precluded.

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Beyond crude quantitative analysis more complex statistical operations were precluded due to two factors: data was drawn from a non-probability sample, that represented the impressions of leaders of congregations. The accuracy of the leaders' impressions could not be ascertained, nor whether they followed the recommended procedure of consulting with five others in answering questions. Reliability of some questions seemed highly problematic, and these were generally disregarded; for example, questions from Section Two in the questionnaire which asked respondents to estimate age groups, occupations, and education.

In defence of my data-gathering strategy I must indicate, however, that certain congregations, to my knowledge, do attempt to keep accurate records of such matters as Sunday attendance. Some research has also indicated that clergy's impressions of their congregations can be relatively accurate. This seems to be bourne out by the remarkable stability of data over the fourteen months that passed between the pilot and final surveys for congregations which had participated in both, like Fort Beaufort Presbyterian Church. On the other hand, in one instance where the clergy-person clearly did not follow the procedures for completing the questionnaire, and had instead asked individual leaders to complete questionnaires by themselves, responses were highly divergent.

I conclude with a brief comment on the reliability of the data on the crucial variable in the study, namely the number of languages used in services. Should this data not also be dismissed because it is based on clergy estimates? I would argue not. Clergy are usually directly involved in the planning of services, and themselves officiate during the services. And so the probability that clergy would inaccurately report the number of languages that they themselves would have to use is exceedingly small. Reliability is increased by the straightforward nature of Question 4 on language use (see Appendix A), which allows little room for inaccurate interpretation.

In the analysis of the data in Chapter Four the qualitative information from the interviews and workshops is combined with the general quantitative picture provided by the survey.

3.2.3 Legitimacy of analytical method

In this section I consider two central questions of relevance to this study: first, what are the correct ways of studying the world-system? and, second, when can a particular instance legitimately be analysed within the world-system paradigm? While the first question raises the issue of validity, the second relates to falsifiability. An important general question is whether the jump from local cases to global structures and back involves a legitimate use of methods. Specifically, is the movement from local practices, to global processes not an ecological error, in which two phenomena operating at different levels are incorrectly treated as if they belong to the same category?

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In what follows I will utilise Chase-Dunn (1989) to address first the issue of research methods, in order to locate my own approach in a wider debate, and to consider the validity of the methods that I employ. Next I consider issues relating to falsifiability. In this way I attempt to address both methodological questions along with their underlying issues.

My intention to analyse integrative processes against the widest possible scope raises questions regarding the validity of my interpretations. In short, how can I know that language practice in a local institution is affected by global structures, agencies, and norms? As outlined in the previous section, I intend to show "how social structure affects a group's language attitudes", for example by cumulatively affecting language choice in such a way that indigenous languages eventually are devalued (compare Kulick 1992:8).

Similar studies - with reference to language shift - have identified the relevance of macro-sociological forces such as "migration, industrialization, urbanization, proletarianization, and government policies". But theories which highlight macro-sociological causative factors have been criticized as "mechanical", and as possessing limited explanatory and predictive abilities (Kulick 1992:8). How can this be avoided?

Chase-Dunn (1989:310) maintains that studies of other units of analysis such as individuals, organizations, classes, states, zones, etc. are not "irrelevant for our understanding of the world-system. Indeed, our conception of the world-system as a holistic structure includes these levels." He continues that "some world-system processes must be studied by examining smaller units of analysis". This begs the question whether my study of congregations falls into the latter category; or could language practice have been equally well-explained by other means?

As a result of opting for a macro-meso approach, critics may argue that I neglect micro-level individual agency, particularly congregational language use as the outcome of cumulative choices exercised by lay members. While I do factor individual choice into the analytical theory that I develop, it is true that individual motivations behind language use in congregations remain empirically unsubstantiated, and were not methodologically catered for in my survey. My method of data gathering took the form of questionnaires completed by leadership groups, with some individual interviews for clarification. What my study lacks is attention to individual congregants and their attitude towards target language, interaction with language teachers, age, ability to learn a language, and level of education (see Tollefson 1991:27).

The assumptions behind the micro-approach is "that the key to understanding social systems is the individual ... that individual decisions are predictable but free; and that the proper focus of social research is the analysis of individual decisions" (Tollefson 1991:28). Analysis which favour

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micro-variables "located within the individual" as analytic tools to explain language behaviour, has been characterised as "neoclassic" (Tollefson 1991:26). Kulick argues that a micro-sociological study allows for a focus on "shifts in personal and group values and goals" in a community setting (Kulick 1992:19).

A key explanatory device in neoclassic micro-perspective is accommodation theory, often used to explain language behaviour between individuals from different ethnic groups. Accommodation theory combines key terms (convergence[9], divergence, speech maintenance, psychological convergence) with four social-psychological theories (Tollefson 1991:70-71). The latter include (a) similarity attraction theory, which states that "people are attracted to those whom they perceive as having similar beliefs, values and attitudes"; (b) social exchange theory, which argues that people make language decisions about convergence or divergence freely, based on their cost-benefits analysis; (c) causal attribution theory, which presumes that people have individual motives for language decisions; (d) ingroup distinctiveness theory, which explains linguistic and cultural differences as favourable to the group (Tollefson 1991:71-72). Using the above constructs, accommodation theory can predict e.g. language loss in terms of the perceived low levels of ethno-linguistic vitality of a group (Tollefson 1991:71). Ethno-linguistic vitality is understood to be determined by status variables (the economic resources, status, and prestige available to a group and its language); demographic variables (number of first-language speakers, relative distribution in relation to other speakers, population trends); and institutional support ("representation of speakers of a language in formal and informal institutions") (Tollefson 1991:71).

In the light of the above, I now list the reasons why I chose a macro-analysis which could include meso-level organizations, and discuss what remains unexplained as a result of this approach. The term meso-level is best understood in comparison to micro- or macro-level. Smelser (1997) maintains that the micro-level emphasises the individual in relation to the social, while macro-level analysis examines the state and society as a whole. By contrast, the meso-level refers to entities such as communities, voluntary associations, political parties, and trade unions. For Smelser there are actually four levels of sociological analyses, as he adds the global, which refers to suprastate aspects of the social system. Ferree and Hall (1994) discuss the three levels as part of stratification theory. Accordingly, gender is perceied as a micro-phenomenon which results from socialization, to race as a meso-factor which involves group interaction, and class as a macro-phenomenon which can be used for cross-national comparisons. Instead, Ferree and Hall propose that feminist theory incorporates an alternative model

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[9]. Convergence refers to the attempt by a speaker to make his speech more similar to that of another speaker; divergence is the opposite; maintenance indicates no change; and psychological convergence refers to the unintended outcome when a speaker intends to converge but achieves the opposite. Convergence or divergence can be upwards or downwards, depending on whether the adjustment is made by a speaker with higher or one with lower status (Tollefson 1991:70).

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which analyses these phenomena at all three levels as interactive processes.

First, my methodology focuses on how leadership - not members - perceive and structure diversity. This enables me at the theoretical level to compare diversity management strategies in state and church, which are effected by leadership. In the case of the state, diversity is managed through formal policy, which is supported by a covert or overt ideology. In the case of the congregations diversity is dealt with through decision-making processes, supported by the organizational culture of the congregation and its denomination.

Second, I doubt whether the inclusion of a survey of individual congregants' language preferences would provide any additional information to what has already been discovered in several studies, particularly with reference to black congregants. South African individuals have been polled in state-influenced organisations like schools and universities, e.g. De Klerk's study of Rhodes students; Prah's 1993 study of six Southern African universities, including the predominantly black Universities of the Transkei, and of the Western Cape. Studies of the general public have been conducted by the HSRC and the SABC, and more recently, Idasa. If those samples were representative, then given the lack of evidence to the contrary, it is neither theoretically unreasonable nor statistically irresponsible to assume that the same sentiments that motivate respondents in these studies are also present in the congregants. In addition, the ANC's Language Policy Considerations (1992) claimed that "large sections of black urban communities have already pressurised primary schools into beginning with English as the medium of instruction from day one" (Heugh 1995:341, Brown 1998).

Third, the neoclassic micro-variable approach has been critiqued as also containing inadequacies. Factors that are external to the individual (and by extension to language policies) are not considered, while appropriateness, equity or fairness are not addressed (Tollefson 1991:28). Historical and structural factors are underestimated, and "the political and economic interests that benefit" are not weighed (Tollefson 1991:28). For these reasons the neoclassical model cannot explain "formation and development of language communities"; nor variations in a group's ability to retain a first language or not. More importantly for my study, micro-variables cannot explain "how, and under what conditions, planning decisions bring about linguistic change", as it views most such changes as "natural" (Tollefson 1991:29).

Of course a synthesis is possible which traces how micro-processes intervene between macro-sociological factors and so affect congregants' use of language (cf. Kulick 1992:8). From this perspective what is crucial is how macro-sociological change "has come to be interpreted in a way that dramatically effects everyday language use in a community" (Kulick 1992:9,12). But such ethnographic attention to individual motivation, due to my choice of unit of analysis (congregations), lack of time and of finances, was ultimately beyond the scope of my study. Any comments I make

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which infer individual decisions about language use should be taken as remaining at the level of theoretical speculation based on existing studies, so that my arguments remain empirically informed - even if at second-hand.

But in the final analysis I preferred a world system perspective because it not only incorporates micro-macro-interactions, but world-polity theory in particular allows for attention to meso-level organizations. A world system perspective also offers a helpful synthesis of individual, national, and global levels of analysis which can be applied to my subject. Theorists like Peter Beyer have posited a global culture, a global polity, and a global economy which combine to form a single global society. Spybey has also used both individual and global levels of analysis in which individuals feature strongly as agents within global economic, nation-state, communications, and world order structures, which in turn affect them. Holton argues that Robertson's model of the interactions between individual selves, nation-states, the world system of societies, and humankind in the global field offers the most fruitful analytical avenue. These suggestions will be more fully described in the theoretical section below, and applied in the concluding chapter.

3.2.4 Contributions of this study

A last objection, which applies to the nature of this study as a doctoral dissertation, is whether I offer anything new to the extensive literature on language politics. This seems a particularly apt protest as my contention (that the status of English, bolstered by macro-factors, suppresses the use of indigenous languages) has been in circulation for some time.

The novelty and value of my contribution is rather in the way that I apply existing theories to South Africa, for instance in pulling together existing arguments in the concept of language ideology, and in interpreting data through a world systems perspective. This has not been considered in South Africa before, particularly not in a way that combines meso- and macro-level features (compare Reagan 1986, 1995 for application to the macro-level). My emphasis on non-state institutions is also unique, given the usual preference for domains under more or less direct state control.

But the real contribution lies in the data on integrating congregations in South Africa, which have rarely been considered (only three works exist, with another focusing on Zimbabwe), and certainly not on a national scale. The endeavour to combine empirical data on religion at the congregational level with theories on state-construction is also rare. Finally, the attempt to construct an ecological theory that explains levels of diversity in integrating congregations as a function of macro- and meso-factors, which differentially affect institutional change within a society, is also original in its application to South Africa.

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4. CONCLUDING REMARKS

This chapter introduced the motivations behind the study, defined the basic terminology, and spelled out the primary purpose: to identify macro-structural constraints on and enablers of linguistic integration in Christian congregations. In my focus on congregations I am especially interested in those groups who do not speak English as first languages, particularly black congregants. As my emphasis is on language integration, a distinction was drawn between diversity (plurality) and integration (incorporation of diversity) to aid data collection and analysis. Linguistic integration refers to the extent to which the plurality of languages present among the congregants are selected and used in congregational activities.

The overall goal of the study is to construct a macro-level theoretical framework - a world system perspective - which offers a coherent explanation of meso-level data, built on the question why non-English languages do not achieve greater prominence in racially-integrating congregations. An overview is provided of the survey methods used, which consisted of postal surveys conducted in two phases.

In the chapters that follow I move towards the goal by using political sociology of language as primary theoretical orientation, and by constructing a world system perspective, primarily from the central elements of world-polity theory, and secondarily from aspects of world-economy and world-economy theories.

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- CHAPTER TWO -
ORIENTATING FRAMEWORK:
THE POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY OF LANGUAGE

Chapter Outline

In addressing language and power as central issues, my study falls, broadly speaking, within the political sociology of language as orientating framework, which in turn leads to the selection of world system theories for analysis of my data. Chapter Two provides a broad overview of this orientation, including central features, specific emphases, and utility for analyses of nation-building in Africa. The discussion also serves to problematise the notion of language practice, and in this way guides discussion in other chapters.

This chapter charts new territory through synthesising the works of several authors into a political sociology of language, a subfield which combines aspects of political sociology with sociolinguistics. This includes sociolinguists such as Fishman (1977), sociologists like De Swaan (1989), anthropologists like Fardon & Furniss (1994), and political scientists like Laitin (1986). As far as I am aware a political sociology of language has not been treated in any systematic or full manner, although it was first suggested in 1975 in the title of Ali Mazrui's **The political sociology of the English language** - but not defined in any way. Such an enterprise is clearly beyond the scope of this study, so that I confine myself in what follows to outlining the central theoretical features of political sociology of language. I will limit myself to discussing such terms as are most relevant to this study.

In general terms a political sociology of language is concerned with how language reflects power differentials between groups of language speakers, such that within the same society some groups are rendered at a disadvantage compared to others.

As befits a study which attempts to place language practice in South Africa in a regional, African, and a global perspective, most of the theoretical texts that I use are by Africans, or by other scholars who focus on Africa. A primary example of the former is the work of Goke-Pariola (1993), who combines attention to language with a focus on power within states. An example of the latter is provided by the empirical work of David Laitin (1993), who produced an influential book on language repertoires and state construction in Africa (1992), as well as on hegemony and culture (1986). While I deliberately opt to base my synthesis on an Afro-centric and empirical focus, I also include other relevant theoretical contributions, such as the notion of linguicism, developed in separate and joint texts by Phillipson and Skutnabb-Kangas (1992, 1996).

The overal aim of the discussion in this chapter is to clarify the link between political sociology of

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In broad terms both world-economy and political sociology of language attend to the stratifying functions of power differentials. What is needed is a more explicit bridge between the world-economy as contributory source, and the dominance of English as a world language - a subject I explore in Chapter Six. By the same token a connection can be established between world-polity and political sociology of language by paying attention to the role ascribed in both to institutional rules. What is needed is for the narrower emphasis within political sociology of language on intra-national rule-making to be extended to the global level through world-polity theory. In short, establishing potential threeway linkages is not enough: the test for successful theoretical conjuncture such as this is that the sum of the parts must be greater than the whole.

Although not conceived or executed in terms of a specific theory, three particular theoretical perspectives were used with which to triangulate the parameters and direction of my study. Broadly speaking I was from the start interested in the political aspects of language usage; and found much in the political sociology of language to guide my thinking. As I point out in more detail in Chapter Three, I found that theories of the world system helped me to identify the norms which structure the global and local political significance of language practice and ideology, as well as the processes which influence both. In turn, neo-institutionalism supplied isomorphism as mechanism which enables global norms to be diffused across states and within each society. The emphasis on the impact of power on the organizational forms of society in both political sociology of language and in world system theories provides a way through which the two can be linked.

In the sections below I first address the *focus* of a political sociology of language, as expressed in terms such as language choice, language planning, language policy, and language use. Next I refer to the *forms* through which language and power are mediated and their outcomes. I conclude with a relatively full discussion of Laitin's theories of the articulation of notions of power and language in African state construction through a process of language rationalization. An evaluation of his work provides a bridge to the theoretical considerations of world system perspectives in Chapter Three, and to empirical discussions of African nation-building in Chapter Five.

The theories of authors like Goke-Pariola and Laitin sensitize us to the manner in which a state can structure patterns of organization so that similar configurations of language and power appear at different levels of society (here, churches as representative of civil society). This theme will be picked up again in a more empirical manner in Chapter Five, where I discuss how certain studies alert us to the role played by language in national state-building projects in Africa, particularly Southern Africa as South Africa's regional context. I recognize that "state apparatuses function at numerous levels (from the national to the local), and the political aspects of language and ethnicity are not necessarily consistent between these situations" (Fardon & Furniss 1994:19).

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1. CONCERNS OF A POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY OF LANGUAGE

The division of this section corresponds broadly to the two senses of "rule-making and rule enforcing activities" in political sociology, as spelled out by Goke-Pariola (1993:7).

In Section 1.1, a political sociology of language is shown to articulate with discourses on language choice, language planning, and language policy. All are concerned with rule-making and rule enforcing in the *broader sense*, that is, with "the patterned co-variation of political and social behavior on the one hand, and language behaviour and preference on the other". Such an emphasis can lead to a consideration of how, who, or what produces the conventions that determine the "expressive resources" available to particular groups or languages. As a social institution, language not only reflects social structures "but also structures social reality" (Goke-Pariola 1993:7).

In Section 1.2. I describe how in political sociology of language rule-making activities are seen to configure language practice (language use). The concern is with rule-making activities in a *narrower sense*, as they apply to sociolinguistic groups (e.g the speech community) or to their subunits (e.g. the work place). The emphasis can lead to a consideration of "who speaks what language/dialect to whom, and when, and what are the consequences of breaking the sociolinguistic rules" (Goke-Pariola 1993:7).

A consideration of sociolinguistic rules and their sources may lead to a discussion of a *language situation*, formed from "above" by the interaction of language choice, language planning, and language policy, or from "below" by language practice. Language situation refers to a "total configuration of language use", including "how many and what kinds of languages are currently spoken, by how many people, and under what circumstances, as well as the attitudes and beliefs about languages held by the population" (Goke-Pariola 1993:95).

1.1 Language choice, language planning, language policy

In terms of the above definition of the broader sense of rule-making and rule-enforcing, language choice, language planning, and language policy refer to three themes that a political sociology of language could pursue.

A discussion of *language choice* could emphasise linguistic diversity in a specific context; linkages between languages and development; and the intersection of language policy with language planning. The latter will be considered separately.

The *linguistic context* forms the focus of the first route, with regards to the prevalence and influence

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of other languages on language choice. So, for example, Fordham (1994:67) differentiates between possible linguistic contextual configurations relating to choice of language of instruction: (a) where there is no linguistic majority (e.g. Nigeria or Papua New Guinea); (b) where a locally developed lingua franca exists (e.g. Swahili); (c) where a predominant indigenous language occurs (e.g. Quechua in Peru, Ecuador, and Bolivia; or Somali); (d) where multiple languages with literary and religious traditions are used (e.g. India with "over 1000 languages using twelve or more scripts" and 14 official languages").

A second route could discuss language choice through attention to *development* and international linkages. Fordham (1994:68), for instance, points to debates on multilingualism in relation to economic development (compare Reagan 1995:320). In one debate some claim that multilingualism is a barrier to development, while in a second others argue that world languages are necessary to maintain international dialogue. As space prevents deeper exploration of these debates, suffice to outline Fordham's responses: i.e. that countries like Singapore with four official languages have shown that multilingualism does not present an inherent barrier. In addition, the multilingual nature of most nation-states, and the low GDP of some homogenous states, indicate that other factors are involved here (Bamgbose 1991:36-37). The integration of the European Union shows that it is not necessary for the whole of any particular population to know a world language for that country to maintain international dialogue.

While multilingualism bears no direct relationship to development, the same cannot be said about literacy. Bamgbose (1991:38-54) points out that literacy and communication link language with socio-economic development. Where literacy rates are higher, so are economic indicators. And when literacy and communication occur in indigenous languages, information is able to reach the masses more effectively than if portrayed in Languages of Wider Communication (LWCs)[1] - a language that is "widely known among speakers of other languages" (Bamgbose 1991:20). While LWCs are unavoidable evils for transporting "ideas, concepts, and technology", it is equally necessary that "such concepts must be transmitted to the masses in the language that they can understand", as the Japanese case shows (Bamgbose 1991:51).

Language planning is a political and ideological enterprise, pursued consciously in order to address language status or language development (corpus planning) in the future, and involves decision-making processes (Reagan 1992:320; 324; Bamgbose 1991:109-110). As a process language planning involves "(a) fact-finding, (b) establishment and articulation of goals and strategies; (c) implementation; (d) evaluation" (Reagan 1992:320). A good policy must be desirable, effective, just, and viable (Reagan 1992:320). In the South African context examples of language status issues relate to "the

[1]. The opposite concept is of a Language of Narrower Communication such as Dutch, Danish, Czech (Bamgbose 1991:20).

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role and place" of English, Afrikaans, and African languages (Reagan 1992:324).

For Tollefson (1991:16) [top-down] language-planning refers to "the institutionalization of language as a basis for distinctions among social groups (classes) ... one mechanism for locating language within social structure so that language determines who has access to political power and economic resources". From this perspective the interests of ruling classes are tied to economic structure, so that language planning in effect contribute to the division of labour. That is why "there is no evidence that ESL [English as Second Language] ... leads to upward mobility"; instead clues point in the opposite direction: at the integration of marginal groups into the peripheral economy (Tollefson 1991:132-3). By implication a "successfully empowering language policy would then be in conflict with economic interests" (Heugh 1992:332).

Language policy concerns language choice as a result of the state acting as decision-maker, while implementation is mostly left to linguistic experts such as linguists or teachers (Bamgbose 1991:110). In a political sociology of language discussions here could refer to types, influences, and outcomes of policy. For example, Bamgbose (1991:110-111) distinguishes between these types of language policy: official (concerning languages and their functions recognised by the state), educational (regarding languages used by education institutions as subjects or media), and general ("unofficial government recognition or tolerance of languages used in mass communication, business and contacts with foreigners"). Language status decisions are policy decisions (i.e. "a programme of action on the role or status of a language in a given community"), as they have economic and political effects, and so usually involve state decrees. He adds that language policy in Africa has been characterised by one or more of the following: "avoidance, vagueness, arbitrariness, fluctuation, and declaration without implementation" (Bamgbose 1991:111).

And Heugh (1992:332) presents an example of a discussion of the influences and outcomes of language policy. In relation to influences on the implementation of language policy, she argues that the politics of the economy, linguicism (see below for discussion), and perceptions of language will play a role as either problem or resource. These establish "a deep-level infrastructural hegemony of ruling classes". The potential outcomes of language policies depend on their inherent assumptions: "(a) if the language policy does not match up with the explicit goals of the state, the one is likely to undermine the other; (b) if effective language planning procedures are not put in place, the policy will not be implemented; (c) if the language policy is in conflict with the more hidden political and economic infrastructure, it will be undermined; and (d) if the articulation and implementation of language policy are entirely top-down rather than accommodating of bottom-up processes, then the needs of the people on the ground will not be met".

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1.2 Language practice, ethnic identity and setting

In this section we consider the narrower sense of rule-making activities which determine language practice (use) - that is, what language is spoken by which groups in what particular domains, as well as the consequences of breaking these. In such discussions, political sociology of language often emphasises social identity. Questions about the relationship between language and social identity (especially ethnic identity), and the ways in which both relate to setting then emerge.

In what follows I review four contesting viewpoints within political sociology of language regarding the relationship between language, ethnic identity, and setting. These range from imputing some secondary role to language in the construction of identity, to linking language directly to ethnic identity. I will use Bamgbose's (1991:11-12) summary of the debates along four dimensions, according to which language is regarded as most or least important; or as occupying one among many roles; or indeed a varying role.

In viewpoint one *language is seen as the most important feature* in the construction of difference and the maintenance of boundaries between groups. Here ethnic identity correlates directly with language. For example, Van Binsbergen (1994:168) claims that "among all possible culturally produced materials, it is primarily language on which ethnicity feeds and thrives". The advantage of linking ethnicity to language is that "it throws a conceptual bridge between macro-sociological factors seen to bring about social change and the ways in which those factors come to influence people's perceptions and strategies" (Kulick 1992:10). Language may be used to promote ethnicization, for instance in a "ideological and organizational response to incorporation in a national political space", in which social mechanisms for accommodation (e.g. intermarriage) are overwhelmed through the power or numbers of "the other". Driven by a sense of alienation, ethnicization also occurs in the context of material disempowerment at the hands of an alien political power (such as the colonial state) and a foreign economic mode (such as capitalism) (Van Binsbergen 1994:170).

In viewpoint two approach *language is seen as unimportant* in the construction of ethnic identity, as the latter rests on a priori sentiments of belonging which defines "we" over against "them". According to this perspective, language can be discarded along with other markers without the surrender of ethnic identity (Bamgbose 1991:12). This is essentially a counter-argument to viewpoint one, and implies that a direct relationship does not always occur. Different ethnic groups can share the same language, while a particular group can lose their vernacular and yet retain their ethnicity (e.g. the Irish or Scots) (Kulick 1992:10). But this position can also be countered, by pointing to the symbolic value of language which may continue to be evoked even (or particularly) in its absence in order to retain a sense of group identity. Such a strategy is still evoked by the Nigerian Fulani, even though they speak mostly Hausa instead of their native Fulfulde (Bamgbose 1991:11,12).

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In viewpoint three *language is seen as one among several other factors* which together function to produce ethnicity (Bamgbose 1991:12). Here language is central, but not directly or necessarily related to identity, which may, for instance, be largely determined by setting. Identity is seen as constituted by a cluster of elements which, taken together or separately, may also determine the strength and direction of identity. A religious setting may dampen political, linguistic, and racial aspects of identity, but raise racial consciousness as when a white person visits a black church. The relevance of this discussion is obvious: what does the use of a language in a congregation say about the cultural or ethnic identity of the members - if anything? Do congregations function to suppress linguistic identity, and if so, is this the function of a language ideology, or a religious ideology, or of the relations of power within the wider society, as reflected in the congregation? Or some combination of all?

In this study several settings are relevant, most obviously institutional (state, religion, language, and - more obliquely - education), physical (buildings), and geographical (neighbourhood, region, global) settings. My study links setting to the issue of what language use signifies in South Africa. Is a choice to use English in a congregation merely an expression of pragmatic concern? Or of symbolic contestation? I suggest that the two issues cannot easily be separated, as pragmatic concerns are dictated - to varying degrees - by the symbolic power of a particular language. Fardon & Furniss admit that language choice in multilingual settings invites misunderstandings: what is pragmatic "from one perspective might be interpreted ideologically from another" (1994:22).

In viewpoint four *language is accorded a variable role* at different stages (Bamgbose 1991:12). When communities bind themselves together by use of one language, minorities refer to larger or more powerful groups which determine the scope of their language use, while ethnic groups mobilize the symbolic value of language in nationalism (Bamgbose 1991:12). The assumption is that group identity progresses through various stages.

All four the above approaches focus on the function of language in *intergroup* relations. The analytic advantage is that status differences can then be identified as causative factors which lead to changes in language use (e.g. language shift), resulting in two outcomes, namely diglossia or assimilation. For example, Kulick (1992:11) maintains that speakers of a language with "stigmatized status" can switch between two languages depending on their desire to signal solidarity or prestige. Or, stigmatised speakers can shed their identity by rejecting their native language and by adopting another higher status language as their vernacular. In effect this means to assimilate an alternative ethnicity. Yet even such descriptions do not explain the "processes through which this desire [to alter ethnic identity] comes to transform their interactions with one another".

An alternative approach is to look at the function of language in *intragroup* language behaviour. In this perspective ethnicity is not always analytically relevant, and is actually a relatively weak heuristic device to explain language behaviour. Changes in language usage cannot always be explained by

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reference to the relative ranking of various ethnic groups on the basis of socio-economic difference (i.e. status). In Kulick's study of an isolated rural area, language usage still evoked hierarchical differences but *within* the same group. Gapun villagers distinguished between individuals stigmatized as unable to participate in "the modernization process", and those who demonstrate possession of the approved status (i.e. able to participate) (Kulick 1992:10). Instead of surrendering the vernacular, the strategy to deal with status differentiation is to add "another language to one's communicative repertoire" (Kulick 1992:11).

Kulick (1992) claims that the study of intragroup language behaviour requires attention be paid to e.g. language transmission from parents to children where intra-generational language shift is under way. Language shift is indicated where transmission is not completed, so that children no longer learn their former vernacular. Yet no work has been done on language socialization[2] "of the first generation of non-vernacular-speaking children" (Kulick 1992:12). Yet it is probable that children's language acquisition is influenced by a number of factors other than parental decisions and reactions, e.g. the role of siblings (Kulick 1992:13,14).

Researchers on intragroup language practice tend to emphasise the role of parents, who are portrayed as either (a) "consciously and explicitly" deciding "not to teach their children their own vernacular" or, (b) more passively, as deciding "not to encourage their children to learn the vernacular, even if they continue to use it among themselves" (Kulick 1992:12). Parental behaviour in both instances is explained as resulting from their evaluation of "the relative prestige of the vernacular in relation to a language of wider currency". Consequently parents decide that "their children 'do not need' to learn the vernacular to get by in society or they are concerned that the child's school language may suffer" (Kulick 1992:12).

The above discussion raises several questions in relation to my study. Should I refer to ethnicity or not to explain language usage in congregations? (After all, ethnicity has been among one of the most debated conceptualisations of social and political identity in the social sciences.) Is intergroup or intragroup distinctions more salient? Where non-English first-language speakers prefer to speak English rather than their vernacular, does this indicate language shift? In answering these, can I invoke ethnic differences as a causative factor? Or should my analysis describe the use of English as an attempt to change intragroup status through an add-on lingua franca?

As fuller discussion of these concerns will be reserved for the two last chapters of this study, I will here just indicate some of the themes that I spell out later. To analyse the use of English as an attempt

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[2]. Language socialization refers to "the use of language in socialization and socialization to use language" (Kulick 1992:13,14).

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to change intragroup status seems, at first blush, valid for black congregants who prefer to speak English. But the answer really hinges on whether the outcome is diglossic; i.e. whether or not two languages are restricted to separate domains (e.g. family and religion). In Kulick's description of the Gapun, the preferred language strategy could not be classified as diglossia, as both languages occurred across various domains. With regards to the question about language shift, at present the South African evidence does not appear to support the conclusion that a wholesale shift is under way in situations where English is preferred by non-English first-language speakers (see Section 2.1.2 in Chapter Five).

Finally, the geographical dimension of the socio-politics of language is often neglected as a setting in discussions of the macro-factors that affect language usage (compare Bamgbose 1991), although the centre of attention in geolinguistics (e.g. Williams 1991). In this section I will discuss some attempts to rectify this situation; apply their insights to the historical development of languages in South Africa; and finally move on to the implications for an analysis of integrating congregations.

Mansour (1993) uses West Africa to argue that language usage is affected by the geographic features of a region, especially when linked to trade organization[3]. She contends that a language which comes to dominate a trade route in a terrain relatively unmarked by geographic encumbrances (e.g. mountains, desert, water) will "naturally" lead to a centralised state formation, the emergence of a lingua franca, and linguistic assimilation of smaller languages. In the case of West Africa the intervention of colonists (particularly missionary linguists and others) arrested this development, and led to the fragmentation not only of lingua francas but other language groups as well. On the other hand broken terrain (by mountains, swamps, river deltas) favours the development of decentralised and egalitarian political organizations, characterised by marked linguistic differences. This situation will be worsened in a context of slave trade, when refugees fleeing to such areas add to the linguistic diversity already there. In certain parts of West Africa trade did not necessarily lead to the development of biculturalism, for instance where middle men engaged in silent trade. According to this method, commodities would be left in an open area by one group, and exchanged for other commodities by the middle men, without verbal contact. Mansour's work shows a curious lack of attention to power relations, leading her to claim that sociolinguists should remain unmoved by language shift

Cartwright (1991) offers further insight into how attention to territory can be used to explain language usage. He uses the centre-periphery distinction to demonstrate on the basis of empirical research in Canada the conditions which affect bicultural interaction between peripheral groups within a specific

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[3]. Hammond-Tooke (1993) also argued that historically specific political and spatial arrangements corresponded to features of terrain in South Africa, but the implications for language usage seems not to have received much attention from local scholars.

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region. Cartwright conceptualises a cultural transition zone, which can emerge on the territorial (and socio-cultural?) boundaries between two major ethnic groups, resulting in biculturalism and bilingualism. Cultural transition zones function to decrease social and cognitive distances between the major cultural groups. The transition zone is marked by the development of bicultural institutions, in which languages are either shared, or followed independently in the same building. For example, churches provide services "in both languages simultaneously", while institutions emerge "in which the two ethnic groups interact in each other's language" (Cartwright 1991:243).

Applied to my study, Cartwright's insights demands attention to where integrating congregations emerge, and what function they fulfil there. Integrating congregations that emerge in multilingual urban situations function as social-cultural transitional zones. The question is whether their emergence outside of metropolitan areas coincide with ethno-linguistic boundaries?

2. LANGUAGE & POWER CONTESTATIONS AS ORGANIZING THEMES OF A POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY OF LANGUAGE

This section concerns the forms through which language and power are mediated (e.g. political ideology, culture, language ideology) as well as the outcomes (e.g. hegemony). Sociology, language, and politics intersect in relation to "the utilization and development" of power, which pervades almost all social relations and interactions, including language preference (Goke-Pariola 1993:6). Politics "concerns the exercise of power in social situations, its structuring, as well as its legitimation within social groups" (Goke-Pariola 1993:7). The "politics of language necessarily involves relations between languages" (Fardon & Furniss 1994:6). Language, "more than any other part of institutionalized culture", has the "capability of encoding and displaying identity or alienness in social interaction" (Fardon & Furniss 1994:6).

Language and power (defined as the ability to influence someone, or to effect a particular outcome) are related in several ways (Goke-Pariola 1993:9-10):

a. access to language or to a particular variety "is often a prerequisite to power, with e.g. a standard dialect corresponding to social class and power";

b. language "serves as a marker or means of social power" through e.g. the particular status ascribed to it, which in turn is often "the result of uneven distribution of cultural capital";

c. the "relative power of varieties of a language" demonstrates social stratification, with particular languages (or varieties) accorded specialised functions and domains. For instance, in a diglossic situation a "high status" language is "used for religious activities, letters, political speeches, lectures, news broadcasts, and newspaper editorials" (i.e. realising social values of "power and formality"); while a "low status" language "is used to give instructions to servants, waiters, workmen, in family

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conversations, and with friends" (i.e. realising the values of "solidarity and spontaneity").

In order to ascertain the intersection of power and language, Goke-Pariola (1993) maintains, the researcher should pay attention to social and historical contexts, and note who influences whom. Language "may serve as a means of power in several ways", e.g. through persuasion; manipulation, or ideology (Goke-Pariola 1993:10). Power through language use may be exerted consciously or unintentionally, so that the user's social influence is determined by the effect s/he has (Goke-Pariola 1993:11).

2.1 Objectifying relations between strong and weak languages

Language debates, such as those that intersect within a political sociology of language, involve processes of analysis in which languages could become objectified; that is, viewed as relatively autonomous objects. As an object, language is ascribed properties such as "systematicity, distinctiveness, closure, and independence" (Fardon & Furniss 1994:10). Objectification becomes particularly apparent "when language is committed to writing for the first time" (Van Binsbergen 1994:169). The politics of language is sometimes objectified as "a hegemonic relation between strong and weak languages by virtue of the positions of their speakers" (Fardon & Furniss 1994:8). This form of objectification involves viewing features external to language (political or economic power) as intrinsic to it.

Different types of objectification occur according to whether languages are viewed spatially, functionally, as a commodity, or as discourse:

a. *Spatial objectification* of language can happen "in terms of genealogies or lists", as often happens in policy discourses (Fardon & Furniss 1994:13). In policy discourses languages are objectified spatially when they are ranked ordinally according to number of mother tongue speakers; or according to number of those competent in specific languages; or as genealogically linked language families (Fardon & Furniss 1994:12). The sense of objectivity in policies is achieved by participating in globally available "discourses of human rights, economic utility and governmental efficiency, as well as aesthetic expression and the authenticity of personal and collective identities" (Fardon & Furniss 1994:10).

b. *Functional objectification* takes the form of "allotting different languages [to] sectoral uses" for definite purposes (Fardon & Furniss 1994:13). Functional allocation is achieved either formally by the state, or informally through the "common recognition that particular language practices are required for ... the 'language of the hearth', or 'language of religion'". The function of language is linked to notions of appropriateness for particular levels, in terms of the social position occupied by speakers. This also involves "extra-linguistic questions" about the implications of speaking a particular language, "in practical and/or symbolic terms" (Fardon & Furniss 1994:14).

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c. From the perspective of *language as a commodity*, objectification enables language to be viewed as "potentially available to all who desire it", but "in practice accessible in different forms to separate and often specialized and privileged sectors of a community". The degree to which language is inaccessible depends on "unequal educational opportunities, regional remoteness from the source of diffusion, and differential access incurred through differences of status, gender, age, and ethnic origin" (Parkin 1994:228).

Language objectification usually occurs in portrayals which imply that certain languages are weaker than others. The weak-strong distinction can be problematised in several ways. It could be argued that relative strength between languages is determined by context, not by the characteristics of any particular language itself. Strength depends on who controls the discourse of others in a particular context (Fardon & Furniss 1994:9; cf. Kaschula & Anthonissen 1995:63). Also, in a multilingual context like Africa, a language can be both "strong *and* weak according to context" (Fardon & Furniss 1994:9). Spatial and functional objectification are both potentially "divisive", dividing people "along lines of educational background, rural/urban separation, class, religion and familial socialization, gender" (Fardon & Furniss 1994:14).

The danger of objectification for the social analyst is the mistake of viewing language as an independent variable in ethnicization, instead of one of the dynamic elements "of collective symbolic reproduction (e.g. "a cult, a vision of the past)" which is shaped by that process itself. During pre-colonial periods objectification was fluid, but "intensified in a context of political and economic incorporation - the very cradle also of ethnicity" (Van Binsbergen 1994:169).

d. *Discursive analysis* may better describe the "local level practices and the power relations they entail" than spatial or functional forms of objectification (Fardon & Furniss 1994:15). While discursive analysis does not eliminate the problem altogether, language is objectified in terms of focus on the linguistic interactions of individuals, on "discourse about discourse" (Fardon & Furniss 1994:15). Discursive analyses "may typically distinguish circumstance in which a mother tongue is used from situations in which varying types of multilingualism or polyglossia prevail. But extended situations conducted only in the mother tongue may be diminishing as a proportion of all language events .... close investigations of the linguistic parameters of socialization may readily dispel the notion of uncontaminated 'authenticity' ... may complicate accounts of sectoral usage" (Fardon & Furniss 1994:15). Debates about language are seldom really about language, but rather relate to discourses about language (Fardon & Furniss 1994:9). Discussion should instead centre on discourse, so that the debate can be pulled inside language. The debate then involves "discourses instantiated in language" which can be represented as discursive realities (Fardon & Furniss 1994:10,12).

Despite the above, Van Binsbergen argues that it "is difficult to see how any language could maintain

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a minimum stability and persistence over time ... if objectification did not already exist in some inchoate form" (1994:169). The process of objectification is conducted as much by native speakers as by outsiders or administrators and educationalists (Van Binsbergen 1994:168).

2.2 Language, ideology, and language ideology

In the discussion below the dialogical nature of links between language, culture, and ideology, contested features in a political sociology of language, are outlined and problematised, and the notion of language ideology conceptualised. I pay particular attention to language ideology, which forms a central part of one line of my argument about the dominance of English in South Africa's public institutions. An important question is whether language is merely a neutral vehicle, with the potential of acting as a ferry to an ideology, or whether it is intrinsically ideologically laden.

Language and culture are usually portrayed as intricately linked, as language is an indispensable agent in the transfer of culture between generations (Kaschula & Anthonissen 1995:21). The link between language and culture has two implications: "a person must know enough about the culture of another person in order to communicate effectively in multicultural contact"; and "culture, as a form of social behaviour which is explained in terms of societal values, cannot exist in a vacuum and has no life apart from culture [society?]" (Kaschula & Anthonissen 1995:21).

At face value this line of thought seems close to viewpoint one in Section 1.2, above, which links language to the establishment of especially ethnic identity, and so to ethnic culture. But the difference is that any culture needs to be transmitted in some form, and language does become involved at some point. The emphasis is on the general process of acculturation, rather than on a specific form of identity that is established as an outcome.

Yet, as we have discussed in Section 1.2, language boundaries do not necessarily coincide with cultural boundaries, as language need not "represent the boundary of a group" (Herbert 1992:4). "To postulate unified groups with their so-called 'standxard' languages which are meant to portray the identity of a so-called ethnic group is often a fallacy" (Kaschula & Anthonissen 1995:99). Those who ignore this warning run the same danger as those responsible for the creation of homelands, or as those who first portrayed North Sotho and Tswana, and Swati and (Kangwane) Zulu as different languages (Herbert 1992:3). These were political acts with little basis in linguistic reality (Kaschula & Anthonissen 1995:99).

The discussion so far requires that we reintroduce the notion of ideology; for how we conceptualize the relationship between language and culture will determine how we perceive the relationship between language and ideology. As I indicated in Chapter One, one of the perceptions of ideology is

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of "'a set of articulations that derive from a system of beliefs and symbols embedded in popular consciousness, reinforced by civil ritual, and codified in the social order" (Goke-Pariola 1993:10, quoting Paul Roberge 1990:134). In this sense ideology refers to "the entire broad spectrum of cultural behaviour" (Goke-Pariola 1993:10).

There are at least three contested conceptualisations of the relationship of language and ideology in a political sociology of language, which I review below. These range from the perception that language is ideologically neutral to a strong argument which states the opposite. The fact that these perspectives are often tied to a particular position regarding a specific language, demonstrates that here we are dealing with ideologies which intrude into a debate about ideologies. Or, to put the argument into concepts discussed more fully in the next chapter, dealing with the intrusion of global norms and values into theory.

According to the first position, *language is ideologically neutral*. This notion is usually put forward by those who maintain that English is neutral - a group which, according to Kamwangamalu & Chisanga (1996:286-7), includes Alexandre (1972[4]), Kachru (1976[5], 1982[6]), and Mazrui (1975). Bra Kachru is credited with doing the groundwork for the acceptance of non-native or "New Englishes". Kachru argues that in India an Indian English evolved, which is so enmeshed with Indian culture that it is used to maintain distinct Indian patterns of life (Kachru 1983:112,124,139-140[7], quoted in Kamwangamalu & Chisanga 1996:287). A similar argument is that language itself "'is not inherently oppressive; its role is defined by the people who wield it and the social forces which act upon it'" (Meintjies 1989:16[8], quoted in Benjamin 1994:100). Others argue that English is a practical and necessary vehicle for the transmission of modernization.

In the second conceptualisation *language transmits ideology*. Scholars argue here that language, "as an embodiment of culture, transmits the ideological beliefs of those who possess a language" (Goke-Pariola 1993:14; compare Kaschula & Anthonissen 1995:17-21 for discussion). The point is not that language structures reality, so that reality and language are aspects of the same entity (as the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis maintains); but that it structures experiences and perceptions of reality. Ideology is promoted through the way that (a) a speaker's language structures the hearer's experience

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[4]. Alexandre, P 1972. An introduction to languages and language in Africa. Translated by F A Leary. London: Heinemann.

[5]. Kachru, B B 1976. Models of English for the Third World: white man's linguistic burden or language pragmatics? TESOL Quarterly 10: 221-239.

[6]. Kachru, B B (ed) 1982. The other tongue: English across cultures. London: Pergamon Press.

[7]. Kachru, B B 1983. The Indianization of English: the English language in India. New York: Oxford University Press.

[8]. Meintjies, F 1989. Language and labour in South Africa. *Staffrider* 8, 3: 15-27.

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of the message; (b) a language conceptualizes reality, which affects all who acquire it; (c) the status accorded a language denotes the "relative status and power of a particular group" (Goke-Pariola 1993:11).

In the third argument *language itself is ideologically laden*. Scholars adhering to this position insist that the use of language *do* structure reality, as certain African commentators argue, for example Goke-Pariola (1993) and Bamgbose (1991:23). Goke-Pariola asserts that the very English textbooks through which the language is acquired reflect the structure of British/American and Western societies. He demonstrates his argument by examples from textbooks used in Nigeria, which contain, first, examples which make Europe or the US the ultimate reference point (cf. 108,112). In addition these textbooks promote Western-style institutions, such as marital relations (monogamy vs polygamy), religion (draw examples from Christianity or Islam rather than indigenous religion), and kinship concepts (e.g. someone called "father" in an African language now becomes merely an "uncle" (cf. 116,119). The result of such a devaluation of African institutions is that greater social distance is created between relatives through the English kinship notions, which "redefine interpersonal relationships" (Goke-Pariola 1993:119). In Goke-Pariola's opinion, Africans who imbibe these Western values embedded within the English language have ceased to be African.

Clearly Goke-Pariola is not speaking of a political ideology transmitted by language as a medium, as argued by Flaitz (1988), but he maintains, instead, that language itself is ideological in nature. Barton (1994:4) agrees with Goke-Pariola, saying "It is not just that English is spreading, but that ... English becomes an imported literacy bringing its own practices with it and consequently stifling indigenous or local literacies". "As English spreads throughout the world, British and American conceptions of literacy get exported in the same way as other goods and services are being exported, harmonised, standardised; and in particular it is western school practices which are becoming more dominant" (Barton 1994:6). The effect that English literacy programmes can have is considerable when placed in the context that "of the more than 4 000 spoken languages in the world, only 300 have a developed orthography ... and less than 100 have significant written literature" (Fordham 1994:65).

Goke-Pariola develops his argument further through Pierre Bourdieu's understanding of language "as a means of achieving symbolic power". Bourdieu's understanding is based on how habitus ("structured socially acquired sets of dispositions in any area of a person's life") interacts with *the market* ("the specific structured space [with concomitant sanctions] in which people interact" on the basis of various kinds of capital - economic, cultural, symbolic - that they have accumulated). In short, "linguistic choices are conditioned by the demands of the target social field/market (audience)", so that "every linguistic interaction displays 'the social structure that it both expresses and helps to create'"

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(Goke-Pariola 1993:17, referring to Bourdieu 1991[9]).

Goke-Pariola uses Bourdieu's theory to argue that to "acquire English as a Second Language" is to participate in "the transmission and regeneration of values" which ensures "the legitimacy of a given political order" (colonial, New World), while providing "a limited degree of solidarity" among the learners. "Language outcomes matter, because they are inherently matters of ideology and power" (Goke-Pariola 1993:18).

So far the discussion has emphasised the relationship between language and ideology as independent concepts, but now we turn to consider the two as merged into the single notion of language ideology. Having defined the matter in the first chapter, the stress here is on the features and outcomes of language ideology.

Language ideology contains several components, as demonstrated in the movements for and against English as sole official language in the USA. Underlying the English-only ideology are the assumptions that: (a) "language diversity is inherently disunifying"; (b) "English language competence is a measure of loyalty to the nation"; (c) anyone who wants to learn English can, given sufficient motivation; (d) "English language competence leads to upward mobility"; (e) "Language is rightfully excluded from protection under laws barring discrimination" (Tollefson 1991:132).

A language ideology which favours English serves those who speak English; those who support it claim "for themselves significant advantages in competition for education, employment, and political power". Although rhetoric varies, "the effort to sustain a privileged position for English has a similar motivation in the First and Third Worlds" (Tollefson 1991:152). As elsewhere, English is "a major criterion for employment, as well as for access to the key institutions dominating ... economic and political life" (Tollefson 1991:153). In such a setting English also dominates government, the media, education, business (Tollefson 1991:154).

One way out of the impasse between the opposing views about language and ideology is to accept Tollefson's assertion that while language itself is neutral, it always relates to strategies of power (1991:203). Although "language cannot be the source of equality or inequality", it functions as "a tool for them" (Tollefson 1991:183). This implies that learning a language is not an ideologically neutral act, but is caused by unequal relationships of power which cannot be resolved at the linguistic or educational levels only (Tollefson 1991:210).

Tollefson cites the intersection of language and education in the Philippines and in Australia to bolster

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[9]. Bourdieu, P 1991. *Language and symbolic power*. Translated by Gino Raymond and Matthew Adamson. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

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his argument. When "language is a gatekeeper for employment and higher education, it may become a powerful tool for sustaining inequality and hegemony", he states. In the Philippines "English is associated with a rigid class structure characterized by extremes of wealth and poverty" (Tollefson 1991:137). In such settings a dual level education system usually exists which prepares poorer school-leavers for low-wage jobs (Tollefson 1991:138). In Australia the economic system requires low-skilled workers, and an education system which fails to adequately transmit English ensures that a sufficient number are available (Tollefson 1991:185). "In this way, language is a form of covert state control of labour" (Tollefson 1991:184).

While the general trend of Tollefson's description of a dual level education system rings true for South Africa, his reasons do not. South Africa's location in the world-economy as a declining semi-periphery, as I argue in Chapter Five, means that there is little need for low-skilled labour here. Other causes have to be found, perhaps in the global arena outside the economy.

2.3 Linguicism

While the above discussion has identified language ideology as a set of ideas which supports the use of a particular language, the type of language ideology which informs relations between a dominant and subordinate languages has been characterised as linguicism.

Linguicism refers to "ideologies and structures which are used to legitimate, effectuate, and reproduce an unequal division of power and resources (both material and non-material) between groups which are defined on the basis of language (on the basis of their mother tongues)" (Skutnabb-Kangas & Cummins 1988:13). Within a political sociology of language linguicism is usually perceived to be attached to two viewpoints. Accordingly, multilingualism is seen as a problem, divisive, and as the cause of intellectual deficiency; or, monolingualism is seen as the norm (Heugh 1992:333).

Heugh perceives a link between linguicism and African education systems. Linguicism "operates covertly to ensure that the Third World educational systems, by following Western models, tend to advantage a small elite and disadvantage the majority". "Subtractive or transitional programmes and curricula make little provision for the transfer of knowledge and cognition from the first language to the second, and this is likely to impair cognitive development" (Heugh 1992:333). In subtractive bilingualism "the first language is removed from the educational environment of the student", and may imply that a language shift is underway towards a prestigious language, and that a first language has little educational value. Linguicism can be countered by an active programme of additive bilingualism, "in which a second and even third language is added to the students' repertoire" while "sustaining the first or primary language system throughout the schooling process" (Heugh 1992:334).

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2.4 Language and cultural hegemony

What remains to be outlined in our exploration of a political sociology of language is to indicate the mechanisms by which a particular language ideology achieves hegemony and to situate the topic of language preference within a wider discourse of nation-building.

One way of moving forward is provided by Laitin (1986), who introduces the notion of a language subsystem into the discussion, and establishes a linkage between culture and hegemony. Laitin (1986:13) defines a subsystem as "aspects of collective life which (a) are shared across classes; (b) differentiate a collectivity from other collectivities; (c) are not necessary for species survival; (d) have continuity amid economic change; (e) provide significance to events, and goals for collective action; (f) rely on the production and use of symbols; and (g) become institutionalized into 'systems' of patterned activity". The conception of a subsystem forms a central element in the neo-functionalist paradigm, in which religion, language, art, and kinship are all seen as cultural subsystems. This perspective has two advantages: it enables theorists to view culture in terms of social stability, and to argue that change in one subsystem affects all other subsystems - as Clifford Geertz proposed.

Next Laitin adapts and applies Antonio Gramsci's conceptualization of hegemony[10] to culture, in order to explain the conditions under which certain ideologies achieve salience in specific subsystems. First it is "necessary to determine the arenas of symbolic production that have the power to infuse other subsystems and to restrict the relevance of symbolic structures embedded in potentially competing subsystems" (Laitin 1986:177). Also important is to grasp that "elites in all subsystems attempt to direct the flows of symbols" (Laitin 1986:176). Subsystems "create their own commonsensical visions of political reality and suggest for their members what political problems are worth fighting about". In other words, subsystems have implicit preference functions (Laitin 1986:177). As symbols are inherently ambiguous, cultures cannot directly determine values, are fluid, and have restricted relevance (Laitin 1986:178).

For Laitin the utility of the hegemony-culture conceptualization is that it provides a way out of the impasse about the role of culture in ethnic group mobilization in primordialism-instrumentalism debates.

In the *primordialism* paradigm (or essentialism), identity is accepted as a given, and cultural functions are conceptualized in terms of a neo-functionalist systems perspective. Society is seen as a social system, consisting of a collection of subsystems which seek overall equilibrium by adjusting their

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[10]. Hegemony is "the political forging - whether through coercion or elite bargaining - and institutionalization of a pattern of group activity in a state and the concurrent idealization of that schema into a dominant symbolic framework that reigns as common sense" (Laitin 1986:183).

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values towards one another in a homeostatic manner. Culture is influential, deeply embedded, and, in the form of symbols, affects economic and political behaviour (Laitin 1986:11).

In the *instrumentalism* paradigm, identities are accepted as fluid, cultural symbols which are shared and exploited for specific purposes; namely to achieve wealth or power. Individuals are rational agents who calculate their choices according to elementary micro-economics of the potential losses and gains which could be incurred as a result - as argued by Abner Cohen and Jeremy Bentham (Laitin 1986:12). Cohen's theory is that culture provides a shared set of markers which can be exploited as an economic and political resource, e.g. in obtaining credit, or in mobilizing political groups (Laitin 1986:178). When political strategies are rationally pursued the result - at the macro-sociological level - is the formation of reified cultural groups (Laitin 1986:177).

For Laitin the instrumentalist application of rational choice theory fails to explain continuity as well as culturist explanations do. While rational choice defines identities as often fluid, it cannot explain why certain identities remain stable over time, nor why "the range of calculated choices is far more restricted than the range of possible choices" (Laitin 1986:179). But in later work Laitin himself appears to over-emphasize the micro-economic and rational aspects of individual decision-making to explain outcomes between groups (1992).

Laitin's solution starts with adding the notion of "points" to that of values, which he combines with the concepts subsystem and hegemony to construct a dynamic explanatory model to replace existing homeostatic models. He argues that each culture contains points of concern which are regarded as important, yet not necessarily resolved (Laitin 1986:180). Instead of always tending towards value congruence, cultural subsystems contain incongruent values to each other. When hegemony is established, a particular cultural subsystem (or one of its aspects) achieves privileged status over against others, which do not necessarily stop functioning but instead are seen as irrelevant in particular contexts. The privileged subsystem functions as the dominant locus of symbolic reproduction in society (Laitin 1986:181). Non-congruent and non-preferred subsystems are potential sources of counter hegemony. "Hegemony can create a dominant subsystem; it cannot create a congruent and harmonious social system" (Laitin 1986:183).

Laitin demonstrates his own approach by analysing the selections of particular identities in Nigeria. Specifically, he asks why religious identity did not become divisive in Yorubaland, as it did elsewhere in Nigeria. Using interaction between Muslim Yorubas and Christians and other groups in the legislative assembly as a case study, he argues that identification with ancestral cities (i.e. tribes) outweighs other claims of identity. The Yoruba could possibly have subordinated "tribal" identity (Yoruba) to "religious identity" (Muslim), but did not. As a result religious identities are not seen as relevant to political organization among the Yoruba. At first his argument appears to confirm the essentialist argument; yet Laitin shows how the importance of the ancestral cities were reified during the colonial

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period. Models of authority (gerontocracy) in the cultural subsystem of the ancestral city of the Yoruba differ from those in the religious subsystem (procedural or charismatic) (Laitin 1986:181).

Laitin then ties together the elements of subsystem and culture with the dynamics of the state. A state can use power "to create a cultural framework in a society", as the state functions independently to the other subsystems. So hegemony can also be established by the state, when it seeks to select and support "different strands of culture, and thereby ... to make those strands the privileged loci of symbolic production - a form of cultural hegemony" (Laitin 1986:174). People "will act collectively along the preferred framework if there are benefits to be accrued for so doing" (Laitin 1986:182). A subsystem can also gain privilege as a result of political foundings such as external hegemony (e.g. British indirect rule and English), in which cultural elites are co-opted, so reinforcing their cultural subsystem and extending their commonsensical notions of political relationships into the political arena (Laitin 1986:182).

Although Laitin does not consciously define strategies that could be assumed by elites seeking internal hegemony, the following seems to be a close facsimile: "The 'political culture' of a society can be thought of as a function of the 'points of concern' embedded in the dominant cultural subsystem. Political elites in any society will act strategically and ideologically in the hope of defining and delimiting which strands of their society's culture should become dominant. Those who are successful in establishing a dominant cultural framework form a 'hegemonic bloc' ... the new elites will themselves become (often unwilling) subjects of their own past cultural choices ... [which impact on] the subsequent choices of both elites and masses" (Laitin 1986:171). This illustrates the influence of culture on political subsystems.

Laitin concludes that the "first challenge to theorists of culture is to embed their analysis more fully into the surrounding social and political realities. The cultural independent variable must be defined in a manner in which it relates to other social subsystems. In the study of language as a cultural subsystem, for example, the semantics of a particular language may be less relevant for a theory of political outcomes than its 'pragmatics'"(Laitin 1986:173).

Applied to the South Africa context, Laitin's work suggests that black political elites in the ANC have managed to establish the hegemony of English (a strand from a previously dominant culture) in the language subsystem. The value of indigenous languages remain intact in the private sphere, and so provide the basis for potential counter hegemonies. Establishing or altering language preference in congregations are political strategies, i.e. it restricts the range of options available. At the same time, Laitin's theory helps explain why most black members usually appear not to be interested in establishing their own languages: linguistic identity is not a basis for political mobilisation.

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Fardon & Furniss have questioned whether Laitin's assumption, that legitimate state organs will implement language decisions in the process of state-building, holds true. They warn that "alternative scenarios of the disintegration of the state, control of its remaining powers by factional interests, and a general decline in statal ability to sponsor developments of national scope are all too readily to hand. The formulation of state policy on language may transpire to be a symbolic political contest with only tangential effects upon the development of discursive practices adopted by most people, most of the time" (Fardon & Furniss 1994:19).

They also consider Laitin's vision of the relations of hegemony as existing between *languages* problematic. Rather, the hegemonic relation exists "between social agents who are empowered or disempowered under specific conditions of language", through "the *imposition* on others of discourses and practises to do with language" (Fardon & Furniss 1994:16). For this reason they criticise the argument - promoted by Skutnabb-Kangas (1990:7-8) - that because languages should have equal rights, one should not dominate the other. They argue instead that rights attach to people (Fardon & Furniss 1994:17).

Fardon & Furniss (1994:17) also claim that a discussion of hegemony implies another problematic distinction, namely that between state and civil society. While the distinction enables one to examine the "shifting analytical status of the state", the difference between the two concepts "is highly contestable" and cannot be maintained "in the same form across contexts". The paradox that the state is both weak and strong can be highlighted in relation to language by noting that the state can sponsor (often conflicting) programmatic and pragmatic policies. Programmatic language sponsorship refers to "the official policy of the state expressed in its regulations about recruitment, education, the judicial process, the media". Pragmatic sponsorship refers to "those effects in and through language that the policy of the state brings about".

While the state can sponsor particular programmes, "it cannot legislate a desired situation into being nor can it determine how people will interpret the changes". Failure to understand this leads to the state "programmatically sponsoring one set of initiatives while pragmatically reinforcing another, whether by intention or not" (Fardon & Furniss 1994:18). Instead of ignoring the political interests attached to international, national, and regional languages, "policy makers would be well advised to offer each ... some endorsement in both policy and practice". An important issue is whether the state "can afford to implement its policy, or indeed have the political means or will to do so" (Fardon & Furniss 1994:19).

In short, the state "is severely constrained in its programmatic sponsorship of language change". Examples of these constraints include "the post-pluralist nature of the civil society to be changed, the degree to which civil society has captured the state, the linkages between national issues and a variety of regional and global projects over which slight influence can be exercised, and the degree that state

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policies pragmatically encourage outcomes contrary to their programmes" (Fardon & Furniss 1994:21).

In terms of my study, the above raises the question whether the language policies of the South African state are in opposition to, or in agreement with the sentiments of civil society. A related question is whether the chicken of elite discourse (expressed by the leadership of the exiled liberation movements) on English as language of preference preceded mass discontent, focused on the entrenchment of Afrikaans during apartheid. If the first, then the directional assumption of Fardon & Furniss implicit in the notion of pragmatic sponsorship (that state policies affect civil society) holds true; if the latter, then not.

I would argue that the state's praxis, which entrenches the status of English (as opposed to its policies), proceeds from sentiments expressed by the majority, and is supported by the organs of civil society. For instance, the consensus in research is that most (urban?) blacks prefer to use English as language of public discourse, as I outline in Chapter Five. Where discontent rears its head the issue is not about the status of English, but about the exclusion of minority languages from state policy - and the implications that this has for e.g. land claims with an ethnic base. This is not to imply that counter-tendencies are not afoot; the paradoxical simultaneous endorsement of multilingualism and the promotion of English as global language also emerge in local forms.

3. LANGUAGE AND NATION-BUILDING AS AN APPLICATION OF A POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY OF LANGUAGE

Laitin (1992) argues that a discussion of language usage should be situated within state-building efforts, as part of which the state will regulate language choice in public domains. This means a focus on the dialectic between state and individuals. While the state extends "administrative control over society", accompanied by specifications regarding language usage in official domains, individuals express their preference for certain languages (Laitin 1992:6).

Similarly, Goke-Pariola states how important it is to examine the "interplay between language and power in the national polity" via explicit government policies. These show "the intention of those in power", their use of language as political tool to advance the agenda of their group or the entire nation. The practice of the populace is "usually at variance with government's stated policy", because of "pragmatic educational considerations"; "psychological disposition of the colonized" as result of "the manner of colonization"; and "the dominant ideology of colonial capitalism" (Goke-Pariola 1993:95). The functional uses of language within certain domains are delimited by "government policy, setting, topic, and individual choice" - where the latter is "a function of individual needs as well as of the larger cultural issues of group or ethnic identity" (Goke-Pariola 1993:96).

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Economic development is usually part of any nation-building project. Strategies to aid national integration include "power-sharing through zoning of political and bureaucratic posts, a legal requirement for a multi-ethnic base for political parties, special programmes .... ideologies to raise national consciousness" and the use of various national symbols (Bamgbose 1991:10). In such a setting a plurality of languages and ethnicities are perceived as hindrances (Bamgbose 1991:14). Linguistic diversity is often dealt with through a state strategy of language standardisation or rationalisation to increase the sense of unity ((Bamgbose 1991:14).

The question of how language situations lead to specific language decisions in the context of state-building continues to receive attention from scholars. So, for example, Joshua Fishman (1971; referred to in Laitin 1992) attempted to classify three types of state-building in terms of the absence or presence of a Great Tradition in the existing cultural situation:

a. In a Type A nation there is consensus that a Great Tradition which can serve an integrative function is absent, leading to the accommodation of a foreign Language of Wider (and technical) Communication, e.g. in Cameroon, Ghana, Gambia, Tanzania.

b. In a Type B nation there is consensus that a single Great Tradition is at hand to provide the symbolic elements necessary for "nationwide identification", leading to "the replacement of a colonial language with a indigenous lingua franca", although a LWC may fulfil a transitional role, as in Ethiopia.

c. In a Type C nation numerous - often conflicting - Great Traditions exist, requiring strong central co-ordination of "regional pressures for the development of regional vernaculars", as happened in India and Malaysia (Laitin 1992:21; Bamgbose 1991:20-21).

Fishman's typology has been criticized for being static and apolitical (Laitin 1992:21), and for ignoring the strong role of nationalist languages - which overrides efficiency as primary concern (Bamgbose 1991:21).

Laitin's attempt to construct a dynamic model of the role of language in state-building, emphasising state action and its outcomes, are discussed in the two sections that follow. For Laitin the consolidation of a modern state often takes the form of language rationalization (section 3.1); which has various results but tend to favour a "3-plus-or-minus-1 language outcome" (section 3.2).

3.1 Language rationalization

According to Laitin (1992:9) language rationalization refers to "the territorial specification of a common language for purposes of efficient administration and rule". Where language rationalization occurs as part of the consolidation of a modern state, a single language will be enforced (Laitin 1992:9).

In other words, language rationalization refers to the use of state power, in the form of regulations and state education, to standardize language usage through policies which can transform multilingual

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societies into monolingual nation-states. Such language policies usually stipulate the domains and the language to be used within them, resulting in the prevalence of one particular language (Laitin 1992:10). Japan, France, and Spain are examples of countries where language rationalization was successfully implemented through political struggle (Laitin 1992:11).

For Bamgbose, language rationalization proceeds from two false assumptions: that multilingualism "always divides" and monolingualism "always unites"; so that "national integration is believed to be possible only through one national or official language". Espousal of a common language is regarded as necessary for "socio-cultural cohesion and political unity". Yet Bamgbose has argued that other factors have to be present first before language can fulfil such a function; "political, economic, educational and social arrangements must be such that the different groups in the polity feel a sense of belonging and a conviction that their needs and aspirations are being met" (1994:33).

Because of the prevalence of multilingualism in Africa, language rationalization affects the language repertoire of individuals (Laitin 1992:19). A language repertoire refers to "the set of languages that a citizen must know in order to take advantage of a wide range of mobility opportunities in his or her own country. The language repertoire of an entire citizenry consists in the set of languages that the model citizen must know in order to play an active role in family, society, economy, and polity", and which impact on status in a local community, job mobility in wider society, and functional communication between a political administration and the individual (Laitin 1992:4,8). As a result of language rationalization the following is likely to happen: *situational code switching* - where persons will, in particular social domains, switch between their mother tongue and a dominant language; and *symbolic (metaphorical) code switching* - where individuals use the dominant language among themselves or in non-official domains. The latter signals "a possible change in socio-cultural identity" (Laitin 1992:11).

Multilingualism is not eliminated at the sub-state level as a result of language rationalization. Nor does the existence of a single speech community imply monolingualism, as dialects can diverge quite extensively within the same language (Laitin 1992:11). Usually one of these come to be considered as the standard form; in the case of Xhosa, for instance, dialects such as Hlubi or Baca are disadvantaged over against the preferred dialect of Thembu, as spoken by the Gcaleka (Kaschula & Anthonissen 1995:58,100). Where language rationalization has occurred, language revitalization can still happen, particularly where economic advancement develops to a greater extent in a peripheral than in a central (dominant) region (the case with e.g. Catalan and Flemish; Laitin 1992:17). Strong within-region rationalization will then emerge in inverse proportion to the weakening of statewide rationalization. Language revitalization can also happen in former colonial countries, e.g. Finnish in Finland. Not all revival movements achieve success, as the case of the Celtic languages in the United Kingdom shows (Laitin 1992:17).

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But language rationalization does lead to language domination, in the form of either diglossia or hegemony. In a diglossic society, citizens view the use of the language promoted by the state as "natural and proper" in official domains, while viewing their regional languages as backward and applicable to low-status or unofficial domains only (Laitin 1992:16; see discussion above on Kulick 1992 for an alternative view). By contrast language hegemony occurs when all normal interchange occurs in the dominant language, with "vestiges of the regional language used only occasionally to establish local solidarity". This leads to language death, which, when generalized, results in 'language hegemony'. According to Laitin the latter was achieved in France, China, and Great Britain (Laitin 1992:16).

Not all modern states are "rationalized as one-country, one-language states". For example, in Switzerland rationalization happened at the sub-state (regional) level without a single national state language; yet a common national identity was still achieved (Laitin 1992:12,14-15).

3.2 Conditions under which the state affects cultural change

State rationalization "implies cultural change .... [because of] state-building processes, people may alter their sense of national identity, their religion, and their language" (Laitin 1992:24). Language rationalization is part of state rationalization, the process by which the state establishes "efficient and orderly rule" through the establishment of e.g. borders, a calendar, weights, unit of measure, and currency.

Several arguments have been advanced to specify the conditions under which cultural change occurs under state guidance, and we consider those of Geertz and Deutsch before reviewing Laitin's attempt.

Clifford Geertz (1973) suggested that in new states an integrative revolution occurred which changed primordial (blood) to civil ties. Integration is supported by state force and ideology, so that various distinct primordial communities can be contained "'under a single sovereignty'" (Geertz 1973:277[11], quoted in Laitin 1992:25). Geertz does not specify the conditions and mechanisms involved in such a change; which means his work cannot help answer the question "under what conditions did change in language repertoire lead to a new social or political identity?" (Laitin 1992:26);

Karl Deutsch (1953) conceived of nation-building in terms of a cybernetic theory of communication, which has either social mobility or assimilation as consequences. Social mobility is a process through which people are brought into wider circles of communication, so creating society; that is, a group

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[11]. Geertz, C 1973. The interpretation of cultures: selected essays. New York: Basic Books.

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"made economically interdependent by the division of labour". The primary thrust of social mobility is differentiation. Assimilation is a process in which people receive quantitatively more information relevant to the whole of society than to their particular group. Community is created by shared values ("a common filtering of information") which arise in response to internal and external stimuli (Laitin 1992:28). The primary thrust of assimilation is unification, and so is associated with cultural homogenization.

According to Deutsch's theory, states are successful to the extent that they process and transmit information, while adjusting their behaviour accordingly (Laitin 1992:27). Deutsch's ideas are similar to Luhmann's on communication. In terms of theoretical adequacy, Laitin concludes, cybernetic interpretations can account for both primordiality and instrumentalism: "cultural communities are primordially linked because they have for longer periods shared a common communications filter"; but they can change as a result of exposure to new filters and communications networks.

In contrast to Deutsch and Geertz, Laitin adapts game theory to "strategic theory" to explain the conditions under which the state affects cultural change. He notes the strategic choices made by state and regional actors in a dialectic relationship with various language groups. Each set of actors act in accordance with their own interests, while taking the possible choices others may make into consideration. The first step for the analyst is to note the possible choices and the "payoffs" of state language policies in relation to the aggregate of individual choices made by the general populace. His method allows him to pay attention to agency and structure, as well as to accommodate Geertz' and Deutsch's insights.

Laitin combines strategic theory with what he terms "3-plus-or-minus-1 language outcomes" to explain similarities and differences in certain states, e.g. India. For Laitin India presents an example of a non-rational strategic choice, as federal state politicians wanted to administer government in Hindi, but were countered by a bureaucracy, institutionalized in the colonial period, which preferred English. At the same time regional politicians prefer local vernaculars to Hindi. The outcome is that language is neither rationalized nor indigenised, as the state functions in English and Hindi, and the populace in local vernaculars. Laitin maintains that the rational choice for the state would have been English, which would have been accepted by the bureaucrats, and would have allowed regional politicians the option of a non-Hindi language of wider communication, while acknowledging local vernaculars in symbolic (cultural, kinship) domains (Laitin 1992:39-45).

From a theoretical perspective, the study of language choice relates to the debate about the impact of modernisation on Africa; whether here, as elsewhere, the end result will be a reduction in the number of indigenous languages (Laitin 1992:4). The choice of a former colonial language as LWC rests on its function in advancing modernization. Like Laitin, Bamgbose suggests that the choice of

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a national language rests on its acceptability to the majority, number of speakers, ability to promote vertical integration, function in relation to nationalism or nationism, and language development status (Bamgbose 1991:19,27). I need to unpack some of these terms in order to proceed with the discussion. *Vertical integration* refers to a process which aims to create solidarity between different language or ethnic groups in a praticular society. By contrast horizontal integration creates solidarity between various strata of the same group. *Nationism* refers to "constructing, consolidating, and governing what is a geo-political, but not necessarily a sociocultural, entity"; while *nationalism* is "the feeling of members of a sociocultural unit ... that they are united and identified with others who share a common history, culture, religion, and language" (Goke-Pariola 1993:57). The implications of these terms are picked up again in Chapter Five, particularly in Sections 1.1 and 1.2.

Based on these factors, in Nigeria Arabic would receive a higher score than a LWC, while majority indigenous languages would rate lower, but higher than minority languages, an artificial language, or a pidgin (Bamgbose 1991:26-29). On the other hand, language usage relates to issues such as democracy, equality, economic growth, and cultural autonomy (Laitin 1992:4).

Judging by the number of books on the subject, "the problematic relation of the state and language remains a major focus of current discussion" in Africa, "canalized around the ideal of a single national language" (Fardon & Furniss 1994:5). By contrast, in Europe and America, "recent writers have emphasized the diminishing pertinence of the national state", shifting instead to "the emergence of regional and global frameworks for analysis" (Fardon & Furniss 1994:5). Europeans, through their insistence on the coincidence of ethnicity and state boundaries, managed to avoid issues of multilingualism while globalizing the "terms language and political identity" (Fardon & Furniss 1994:5-6)

Chapter Five will return to issues of state language policies in relation to nation-building in sub-Saharan Africa, illustrated by reference to empirical cases.

4. CONCLUDING REMARKS

A political sociology of language was constructed within four intersecting dimensions, formed by *social identity* (linguistic, ethnic), *ideology* (nationism, language ideology), *power* (relative status of language groups, relative positions of nation-states in the world-economy), and *setting* (church, state, region, globe). These dimensions serve as forms through which language and power are mediated. How they converge or diverge to affect integration in congregations is the hidden theme of this study, but emerges most consciously in the final chapter.

The intertwined concept of a language ideology and the centrality of the state in supporting it is a

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central, explicit theme that was introduced here and which flows through the study. The analytical framework constructed in Chapter Three enables us to view this theme in a global framework. While a globalized language may be ideologically neutral, learning it is always an ideologically laden act, which always relates to strategies of power. Linguicism was identified as a type of language ideology which informs relations between a dominant and subordinate languages.

A particular language ideology achieves hegemony within nation-building, as Laitin's work illustrates. While not unproblematic, his work shows how important analysis of the role of the state is, while it also hints at the need to go beyond the nation-state as level of analysis. On the one hand he does show that linguistic dominance can be traced to state activities under certain conditions. Yet his discussion of subsystems also provides a way of linking the dominance of English in the language subsytem to external hegemony of English-speaking core states in the global system, as I argue more fully in Chapter Six. Hence the need in Chapter Three to reflect on those global theories which best suit the analysis of language practice across and within nation-states.

Laitin's suggestion that cultural subsystems do not necessarily move towards value congruence but contain incongruent values to each other is important. As I indicate in Chapter Three, the functionalist paradigm that underpins the neo-Marxist facade of world-system scholars causes difficulties precisely because they insist that culture should play an integrative role. Because they assign a primary integrative role to the world-economy, they conclude that no unified world culture exists. As a result, world-system theorists have to define the nature and role of a world culture or a dominant core culture away.

The state is both weak and strong in relation to language, as revealed by differences between state sponsored programmatic (policy) and pragmatic policies, as Fardon & Furniss argued. The question of where this weakness and strength derives from can only be answered in world-polity and world-economy terms. As I will show in Chapters Three and Six, the notion of loose coupling from neo-institutionalism also helps to explain the disparity between policy and practice. Laitin outlined how language rationalization is part of state rationalization, and that the rational choice for the state often is to choose English at the national level, and to acknowledge local vernaculars in symbolic (cultural, kinship) domains.

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- CHAPTER THREE -
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK: WORLD-ECONOMY, GLOBALIZATION, AND WORLD-POLITY

Chapter Outline

In Chapter Three I evaluate and select from three major perspectives on the world system, namely that of Wallerstein, Robertson, and Meyer e.a., and refer to two minor approaches in passing (i.e. Frank, Luhmann)[1]. As the subheadings indicate, these three include globalization, world-system (as distinct from world system), and world-polity orientations. Each subsection reprises salient aspects of a particular theory, especially as it relates to culture and the nation-state, as well as major critiques. In the final subsection I evaluate the relevance of these theories for this study, and argue that the world-polity approach represents the general analytical framework which best fits in with the political sociology of language. The world-polity approach promises most help in tying language usage to nation-building; and in relating both institutions to the features and dynamics of the world system.

Yet I incorporate some of the concepts from the other approaches in eclectic fashion as necessary. I subscribe to the view that the world system is primarily integrated economically, but also underwrite the notion that the world system as a whole consists of a world-polity and a world-economy. These function dialectically and relatively independently alongside the world-economy, as discussed by John Meyer and his colleagues. My eclecticism stems from what Robert Holton describes as analytical "scepticism towards the claims of any general theory to explain the observable historical, economic, political, and cultural features of globalization".

Space and relevance preclude a full overview of the burgeoning literature on globalization, world-system/s, global order, and world society below. I also do not attempt to discuss the full complexities of the various theoretical viewpoints, but extract only those which together describe the basic features and dynamics of the present world system. In general my purpose is to isolate aspects which can be used to demonstrate possible linkages between global tendencies and local societal institutions.

A peculiar problem with most world system theories is their lack of attention to religion, a result of a general undervaluing of culture in favour of over-stressing global economy or polity. By contrast, globalization theories tend to stress cultural dimensions, and so appear to hold out most relevance for this study. Yet global and local cultures cannot be understood in isolation from the fundamental structural dimensions of the world-economy or the world-polity.

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[1]. These are not the only possible approaches; for instance Thompson (1983) also lists Modelski's long cycles of world leadership.

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At first (and second!) glance there appears to be as many globalization and world-system theories as there are theorists. This seems partly due to the variety of academic disciplines (Frank (1993) lists more than twelve) in which similar ideas have been percolating more or less simultaneously, and partly due to the difficulty involved in describing the complexity of global reality. As a result, "globalization", like "world-system", not only means different things to different people - but divergent terms are also used to describe similar processes or features.

Within sociology Wallerstein's views dominate world-system approaches, alongside the - as yet - minority world system position of Frank and others; while Robertson's work dominates globalization perspectives. World-system perspectives have been well-critiqued by Chase-Dunn (1989), albeit sympathetically, and placed in religious perspective by Beyer (1994). Wallerstein is perceived to stress the economic dimension of the present capitalist *world-system* to the exclusion of the cultural, Robertson the *cultural* dimensions of processes of globalization. Frank avers (with Gills) that there is and has always been only *one single world system*. The major difference between the Wallersteinian and Frankian positions are their respective stresses on disjuncture and continuity between the present and earlier world systems.

A central question which surfaces often in critiques of both world-economy and globalization is whether the world system exists outside the control of its own units or not. Wallerstein and Friedman[2] argue respectively that neither the world-economy nor the global system is controlled by any global actor; whether a nation-state or global institutions like the World Bank or United Nations. While the world-economy may have been aggressively promoted by the European region, it is no longer controlled by any core state or group of states. A similar argument holds true for any of the non-economic dimensions of the world system. While initially British and later USA cultures achieved successive hegemony in the world system, globalized American culture is no longer controlled by the USA. This does not mean that actors play no part: Spybey insists that a world society is created through the institutionalization and reproduction of globalization by individuals. People who buy from McDonalds contribute to the McDonaldization of the globe. While McMichael (1996) accepts the significance of actors, he contends that globalization is a historical-political project driven by the state managers of the core in conjunction with their counterparts in the periphery. The relation of the world-economy to globalization is a comparative question which indicates the contestation between the two perspectives. Robertson maintains that the world-economy is merely an aspect of globalization, while Friedman asserts to the contrary that globalization is produced by the global system.

Yet there does seem to be some mutual theoretical interplay. Spybey (1996:156) indicates that

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[2]. Friedman (1995:80) says that local structures articulate with global processes to form the world system. Global cultural-institutional forms like states, markets, and movements "are produced and reproduced by the global local articulations of the world system".

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Robertson's central concept of universalisation-particularisation was developed from Wallerstein's idea of "universalism through particularism, and particularism through universalism" (Wallerstein 1984:167). According to Friedman there is some agreement between Wallerstein and Robertson regarding the globalization of nationalism. Yet such agreements should not paper over differences which exist.

Because Robertson always includes references to the religious domain, his views seem most compatible with a study involving religious phenomena. But my approach is more eclectic, as I prefer to use the insights from a variety of authors.

1. WORLD-SYSTEM THEORY: ECONOMIC STRUCTURE IN THE WORLD SYSTEM

1.1 Development of world-system theory

Hopkins (1979) traces the development of world-system theories to the earlier modernization approaches of the 1940s and 1950s, which emphasised long-run, large scale, comparative social change. The view that modernization scholars held of social change (all nation-states passed through the same development path) came under attack from two directions. First, dependence theorists argued that "the well-being of advanced states" depended on "the advantageous relations they have had with less-developed states", which would have to negotiate a different path to development. Second, imperialism theorists maintained that the development of "advanced" states are structurally dependent upon the underdevelopment of other states. They "implied that a single basic set of general economic processes underlies the world's uneven development", acting hand-in-hand with national and transnational political and economic processes. The economic process which drove "modern social change" was later explicitly identified as a single capitalist world-economy which originated in sixteenth century Europe. Although several authors proposed the idea, it was "propounded most fully and most forcefully by Wallerstein" (Hopkins 1979:22-23).

The participation of various scholars under the "world-system" rubric should not disguise the differences that exist between what has been described as contending approaches (Thompson 1983). Winckler (1979) shows that at least three alternative conceptions exist of where states are to be located within the world-system, which differ markedly in some respects from one another. For instance, in one portrayal seven states form part of the core (USA, Western Europe, Japan, Canada, Australia, USSR, China, and Eastern Europe), the others respectively include four (USA, the European Community, Japan, USSR) and two (USA, USSR) (Winckler 1979:57). Nederveen Pieterse (1995:47) demonstrates how five "perspectives relevant to globalization" differ according to the timeframe they suggest for its inception; varying from the 1500s to 1960.

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1.2 Economic structure of the world-system

Hopkins (1979:23-24) outlines an early perspective on the structure of the world-system (synonymous with world-economy) as comprising a single expanding economy (discernible through international trade, organised in terms of accumulation by core zones from the peripheries), a growing system of nation-states (which attempt to expand their influence over one another and other areas through an interstate system), and a single division of labour. A central contradiction marks the system: the development of a single economy over against the formation of separate states.

The world-system develops out of the articulation between the processes of (a) the axial division and integration of labour on a global scale, and of (b) the formation "and deformation" of nation states. The articulation of these processes encourages "the network of relations among political formations (states, colonies, etc.)" to be "patterned like the network of relation among production-accumulation zones (core-periphery), and vice versa" (Hopkins 1979:24). As a result, economic and political location usually coincide: strong states emerge in the core, weak ones in the periphery (Hopkins 1979:25). Hopkins' ideas will be picked up again under the rubric "institutional isomorphism" in the last section of this chapter, and his ideas are implicitly critiqued in the review of Meyer's ideas, below.

More recently Wallerstein used a threefold summation of the structure of the world-system, sometimes expanded to twelve criteria, but in all cases comprising "an axial division of labour involving integrated labor processes" geared to the "*ceaseless* accumulation of capital" (Wallerstein 1993:293). Wallerstein's "descriptive trinity" consists of core-periphery relations, A & B cycles of expansion and stagnation or contraction, and rivalry between core states for hegemony. Apart from the preceding three, the other nine characteristics of the capitalist world-economy include: a semi-peripheral zone; continued existence of non-wage labour; a co-inherence of the boundaries of the world-system and an interstate system; an origin in the 1500s; an expansion from Europe to the globe; non-primordiality of states, ethnic groups, and households; racism and sexism as organizing principles; anti-systemic movements that "simultaneously undermine and reinforce this system"; cycles prompted by the contradictions of the system (quoted in Frank 1993:203).

For Wallerstein, then, the world system is a **world-economy** with a single division of labour but multiple polities and cultures, which emerged in Western Europe in the 15th century[3]. He views capitalism as based on the integration of relations of production through the exchange of commodities into a world division of labour, geared towards the ceaseless accumulation of capital. This allows him to view unfree labour relations - instead of the free wage-labour posited by Marx - as compatible with the

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[3]. See Friedman (1994) and Frank & Gills (1993) for alternative argument: that the world became a global system through trade and conquest long before the middle 1500s - Wallerstein's point of departure.

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world-economy (Holton 1998:24). Subsequently, Wallerstein can conceive of 400 hundred years of economic history as based on the increasing dominance of a single mode of production, instead of the plethora of modes advanced by Marxists.

Wallerstein distinguishes between three spatial structures (zones) in the world-economy (compare Nederveen Pieterse 1988:251). Core states are complex, exhibiting mixed economies and combining high technologies with high wages. Periphery nation-states supply the core with staples and raw materials, and are characterised by low wage labour and low technology. Semi-periphery states (e.g. Brazil) form a permeable barrier between the core and periphery, exploiting the periphery and being exploited by the core. The semi-periphery prevents wholesale revolt thus stabilising the system, demonstrating that in essence Wallerstein conceives of the nation-states within the world-system as classes (Beyer 1994:17). Core states redistribute wealth internally in order to protect the vested interests of the ruling class. Periphery states are generally-speaking weak, as their ruling classes are often complicitous with the ruling class of core states, who also subvert the peripheries through various measures (Beyer 1994:18).

For Wallerstein nation-states are a "dependent function" of "a single logic of the world-economy" (Beyer 1994:18). The world-economy led to the rise of the modern nation-state, and created three geographical divisions: the periphery, the semi-periphery, and the core. States do not control the world-economy but are themselves controlled by it (Beyer 1994:17). The position of a nation-state in the global division of labour determines its place (in the core, periphery, semi-periphery), strength, and its position in the class structure of the world-economy. So, for example, semi-peripheral areas function as a middle class. The world-economy is driven by class conflict, disguised as racial or ethnic conflict by a global "ideas-system".

The world-economy is characterised by certain temporal dynamics, namely cycles, trends, emergence and collapse (Nederveen Pieterse 1988:251). Cyclical trends occur through class conflict between those who benefit from it, and those who do not (Beyer 1994:18). But cycles also result from the contradictions within the capitalist mode of production. Capitalism needs "constant expansion to maintain profit margins", and new economic opportunities have to be found continually - "often in different areas" (Beyer 1994:19). This process causes economic upturns and downswings (Beyer 1994:19). Linear trends also occur from one type of social system to another, which will in the future lead to a new type of system, mediated by anti-systemic agents (e.g. socialist movements; Beyer 1994:20).

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1.3 Critique of world-system theory

1.3.1 Substantive criticisms: a systems-theory without a system

Wallerstein's conceptualization of the world-economy has been critiqued extensively, as befits a dominant paradigm (compare Bergesen, Beyer, Boyne, Chase-Dunn, Holton, Graaff, Lechner, Nederveen Pieterse, Winckler). These criticisms centre on metatheory, economic reductionism, notions of system, mode of production, and relations to globalization.

Bergesen (1980, 1990; also Lechner 1989) has argued against the utilitarian metatheoretical perspective inherent in world-system theory. Accordingly, world-economy theorists derive the features of the whole system from the interaction between its units. For Bergesen this is simply historically inaccurate, as features of colonial states after independence were patently based on an already existing inter-state system. In other words, units of the world-system derive their aspects from the system itself. Bergesen also criticises the over-economistic emphasis, which leads to inaccurate representations in which forceful domination over peripheral peoples (e.g. the Aztecs) inadvertently becomes disguised as "unequal exchange".

Frequent criticisms centre on Wallerstein's supposed neglect of non-economic dimensions of the world-system (compare Lechner 1989, Boyne 1990, Robertson 1992). Wallerstein's counter-argument is to deny the ontological autonomy of the political, economic, and cultural spheres (Wallerstein 1990:63). And Friedman (1995:69) writes that while world system theorists emphasise economic structures, this does not necessarily prevent them from dealing adequately with culture. He argues that the time-space compression involved in globalization is driven by capital accumulation. Friedman, like Holton, believes that Robertson is equally guilty of sidelining economic, political, and structural features of the world system (Friedman 1995:70).

Various commentators (e.g. Winckler 1979; Zolberg 1983; Graaff 1990) have questioned the lack of specificity accorded to "system". Nederveen Pieterse (1988:251) calls Wallerstein's approach "a theory of the world system without a system theory".

Chirot[4] (1977:48-54) claims that Wallerstein's conceptualization is not systemic "because it does not identify rational interests sufficient to account for the behavior of individual actors and the dynamics of the system as a whole". Graaff (1990 claims that Wallerstein's world system appears closed (as does Nederveen Pieterse, 1988:251), uni-dimensional (global) and mononodal, as subsystems are conceived as having discrete boundaries within a single system. In addition the system derives from

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[4]. Chirot, D. 1977. *Social change in the twentieth century*. New York: Harcourt, Brace Jovanivich, quoted in Winckler 1979:56.

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historical conjuncture, which implies a relatively strong degree of determinism. Instead, "a system is better seen as a node with a surrounding (fairly ragged) field of influence". Graaff draws on Giddens[5] (1984:164-5, quoted in Graaff 1990:5) to argue that systems are "'constituted by the intersection of multiple social systems'" which operate simultaneously. The core-periphery system then contains dynamics operating "at different levels superimposed 'on top of' each other", as well as "a number of nodes existing 'next to' one another" (Graaff 1990:5).

Particularly problematic is Wallerstein's insistence that a single mode of production characterises the world-economy, which envelops pre-capitalist modes so that both core and periphery are linked by a single system. Critics claim that Wallerstein here obscures the stages and processes of integration by which other economic systems were integrated into the dominant capitalist system, thus collapsing them into one. By contrast, modes of production theory posed the persistence of pre-capitalist modes within the systemic domination of the capitalist mode (Graaff 1990:11.12). The degree to which these modes co-vary explains how peripheries differ from one another. Graaff (1990:14) argues for a synthesis in which persisting older forms of modes of production combine pre-capitalist and capitalist features in a distinct peripheral mode of production. As a result persisting pre-capitalist modes have been "structured and recast by insertion into a capitalist context" (Graaff 1990:15).

Zolberg (1983) questions when and whether world systems theory is appropriate to use. He asks what theoretical contributions a comparison of relations of production in 1479 to those in 1979 can make. For him the timespan includes too many variables to make propositions specific enough to achieve theoretical significance. To seek to explain some phenomena through "the arduous formalization of a world-system" is sometimes simply a question of overkill and thus an inefficient research strategy. In such instances "the world-system conceptualization may in fact obfuscate rather than clarify" (Zolberg 1983:275).

Boli-Bennett (1980) rejects the class analysis inherent in world-system theory. He finds little support for the role of traditionally conceived classes, as new technocratic classes ("state bureaucrats, *techniciens*, corporate executives, experts") have arisen in both the core and periphery which do not own the means of production, but do control it. The means of production now have been expanded to include "production of knowledge, information processing methods, organizational management techniques, propaganda". He concludes that "the historically important classes .... are now of secondary importance only" (Boli-Bennett 1980:80). Boli-Bennett also does not accept that state dominance depends only on locality in the world-system, which in turn affects the level of internal development. Here he is in agreement with Thomas & Meyer (1980), who believe that the state system itself has become hegemonic. "It is external to particular local interest patterns and organizations in independent societies, and it is authoritative apart from particular economic or social

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[5]. Giddens, A 1984. *The constitution of society: outline of the theory of structuration.* Berkeley: UCLA Press.

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interests", such as specific elites (Thomas & Meyer 1980:142).

For Robertson (1991) globalization theory not only preceded world-system theories, but represents an alternative which "have very little to do" with the latter. He sketches the distinctions between globalization and world-systems theories in a summary of the relevance of religion to globalization theory. For Robertson the economic base of world-systems theory is "but one aspect of one dimension of the overall process of globalization", namely global internationalization ("the expansion and consolidation of the international system"). Zolberg (1983:274) similarly claims that the world-system is "a component of some larger global entity". The other three processes, which together make up globalization, include "global societalization (the global generalization of a particular conception of the modern form of society); global individualization (the global generalization of a conception of the modern person); and global humanization (the global diffusion of a conception of a homogenous, but gender-distinguished, humankind)" (Robertson, 1991:282, italics in original text).

By contrast to Robertson, Friedman believes that a global system incorporates globalization, thus differentiating between these terms. Globalization refers to a duality of objective and subjective processes, which promote an increasing interdependence and an intensifying awareness of that interconnectedness (Robertson 1992:8; Friedman 1995:70). By global system Friedman (1995:73-4) means "a definite set of dynamic properties, including the formation of centre/periphery structures, their expansion, contraction, fragmentation and re-establishment throughout cycles of shifting hegemony". This system produces a global arena, the precondition for globalization - and so for the formation of globally generated local identities, such as ethnicities and nation-states.

Holton (1998:196) concludes that while "theories of capitalist global dominance have much explanatory power" they are "unable to explain the limits to multinational power set by the robustness of the nation-state and by political and cultural resistance to corporate power".

1.3.2 Alternative conceptualization: a world system "without the hyphen"

A more temporal-spatial critique argues for continuity of the present world-economy with older and Oriental world systems, instead of Wallerstein's notion of a decisive 16th century European disjuncture. This argument is exemplified most vociferously by Andre Gunder Frank and colleagues, with more tempered contributions by Jonathan Friedman (1994), Janet Abu-Lughod (1989, 1993), and Chris Chase-Dunn & Tom Hall (1994). A similar line of thought is sustained in (largely anthropological) treatises of world civilizations, such as Wilkinson (1993)'s claim that a central global civilization exists, which originated in the Middle East around 1500 BC. Holton (1998:25-33) contains a brief review of most of these major texts.

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Frank and Gills (1993) argue, with Ekholm and Friedman, that measured in terms of capital accumulation through an extensive trade network only a single world system has existed for more than five thousand years. For Frank and Gills a major problem with world-system analysis is that the mode of production (capitalist mode, or core-periphery modes) is taken as the fundamental feature of the whole system (compare Graaff 1990 and Nederveen Pieterse 1988 for similar arguments). In their analysis, accumulation rather than production is central, and so there has been no decisive 16th century break as argued by world-system theorists. Instead, a world system has existed for over 5 000 years.

The notion that the origins of the world system lies in the East rather than Europe, has most recently been taken up by Frank in *Re-Orient: global economy in the asian age* (1998). According to reviewers, Frank argues that Europe is a latecomer, and only managed to buy its way into the Eastern world system at a later stage. In this Frank supports but goes beyond Abu-Lughod (1993)'s argument that a world system existed, based in the East, which bound together the East and Europe. The rise of the West, both these authors argue, followed on the demise of the East. A similar argument was made by William McNeill (1963)[6], who suggested the existence of a Eurasian ecumene in which European and Asian regions interacted in a multidirectional manner. But Holton rejects this argument, "There is no evolutionary necessity for a fully fledged global economy to emerge directly from earlier historical episodes of global economic interconnection" (Holton 1998:26). He stresses discontinuity (expansion, crisis, contraction, collapse) alongside continuity as mechanisms of change.

The above evidence points to the arbitrariness of choosing to focus on one world system, historical period, or geographic region rather than on others. At the same time arguments about which system was first is to engage in infinite, and ultimately pointless, regression (Zolberg 1983:275). The evidence also draws attention to what critics perceive as Eurocentrism in world-economic analyses, and instead advances "the centrality of non-Western sources of dynamism in areas such as trade, technology, and science" (Holton 1998:31).

2. GLOBALIZATION THEORIES: CULTURAL PROCESSES IN THE WORLD SYSTEM

Roland Robertson describes globalization as a process which results in a **global culture** operating within a global field. According to Beyer (1994:27) Robertson defines globalization as "'the overall process by which the entire world becomes increasingly interdependent, so as to yield a 'single place' ... a world society'". Consequently "subunits of the global system can constitute themselves only with reference to this encompassing whole. This is what Robertson means by relativization". So for

[6]. McNeill, W 1963. *The rise of the West: a history of the human community.* New York: New American Library; referred to by Zolberg (1983:274).

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Robertson globalization is a process concerned with globally understood forms of meaning, i.e. the awareness of globality. That is, by global culture is understood consciousness of interpenetrating global system, and the consequences of this awareness, not the extension and hegemony of a particular local culture.

For Roland Robertson globalization has a strong cultural effect, in that all forms of identity is affected. Globalization relativizes identities: national identities can now be constructed only by reference to "the global system of societies", while individual identities have to refer to "humankind". In other words, globalization universalizes the particular (distinct national/individual identities) and particularises the universal (global order/humankind) (Beyer 1994:27,28).

The globalization process involves a paradox: (a) the world becomes a single place, in which (b) the expectation exists that societies "'should have distinct identities'" (Beyer 1994:28). The process is not supported by a single dominant image of global order, supplied by a world culture. Instead, societies construct their own images (national identities), which not only reflect what the world should be like, but conflict with those of others (Beyer 1994:27). In their attempts to deal with these conflicting images, a global culture is produced around the idea that the world is a global whole (Beyer 1994:27).

Globalization for Robertson constitutes a global field, not a system, in which paradoxical and cognitive interactions take place in terms of selves, humankind, national societies, and the world system of societies as reference points. The interactions point simultaneously at "tensions between conflicting principles" and opportunities to resolve them.

Robertson's global field retains agency while bridging "the micro-macro divide in understandings of globalization" (Holton 1998:188-89). At the same time Robertson allows for the paradoxical interaction of the "universalization of particularism" and the "particularization of universalism" (1992:100). By "universalization of particularism", Holton (1998:192) explains, Robertson refers to two features of the global field. First, to the universal acceptance of the legitimacy of assertions of difference - whether on the basis of communal or individual claims. The latter is revealed in, for example, the proliferation of ethnies or alternative lifestyles. Second, to "the diffusion of particularistic practices on an increasingly global scale", such as revealed by the almost universal acceptance of the nation-state which at the same time encompasses particular interests. By the "particularization of universalism" Holton understands Robertson to refer to how universal notions are given concrete form in, for instance, "conceptions of rights or forms of political mobilization". Robertson's mutually interacting processes distinguishes his work from modernisation theory, "which assumed that universalism would triumph", and world-system theory, which reduces "the problem to one of capitalism and its discontents" (Holton 1998:193).

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Robertson's work readily lends itself to an emphasis on agency because in essence he operates with an implicit symbolic interaction perspective (Simpson 1991:16; Garrett 1992:299; Robertson 1992:320). Structuration bridges the agency-structure opposition by indicating that agents create structures which constrain and enable actors in a ongoing dialectic and reflexive manner, thus affecting their continuous construction. Spybey argues that global institutions can only be reproduced by individual agents, without whom they would cease to exist. For example, individual consumers have to make and buy globalized products, so contributing both to the globality of such items but also constituting themselves as global actors. Similarly individuals accept the nation-state as a global organizing principle, so constituting themselves as global citizens and perpetuating its diffusion. Spybey perhaps overstates individual agency to the detriment of collective agency, in which individuals together make decisions on behalf of groups or organizations. The dialectic between global agents and structures is an important aspect to consider when evaluating the local effects of the global.

The primary feature of globalization theory is that its unit of analysis is the entire globe, perceived as a single social system with distinct properties which constrains and enables all other social forms such as polities and cultures. What happens in any one society "occurs only in interrelationship with what happens in other societies with which it is closely associated". Yet "similar forces of change will have different effects on different societies" - hence structural differentiation emerges between states in the world-system (Beyer 1994: 14,16).

2.1 Globalization: homogenization, heterogenization, or hybridization?

For Robertson (1991:283) globalization does not presume a harmoniously integrated whole, neither a progression towards a better world, nor a homogenizing process. With reference to the latter, Robertson precludes recovery of mechanical solidarity through globalization as he believes that "any sociocultural entity must manifest variety in order to perpetuate itself". Globalization encourages diversity and similarity, in the form of "heterogeneity-within-homogeneity, or difference-within-identity", so that localism-universalism have become globalized modes of thinking - even when they occur in opposition to one another (Robertson 1991:283-84).

Robertson disagrees that global*ization* is a consequence of modernity[7] as Giddens have proposed; instead, he links global*ity* to modernity. The linkage of modernity and globalization suggests that the former leads through a series of historical processes to the latter, and inherently causes homogenisation. Both assumptions are incorrect, according to Robertson. Modernity is generally associated with successive temporal processes, which ignores the fact that at least three types of modernity developed relatively autonomously in non-Western contexts, through: annihilation of

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[7]. Friedman (1995:69) agrees that modernity is "a product of the modern world system".

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indigenous peoples (New World); reaction to external challenge (Asia); and colonial imposition (Africa). In fact, Robertson refers to globality as a spatial condition, in which geographically distinct 'civilisations' interpenetrate. He views globality as necessary for the diffusion of modernization (Robertson 1995:26-27). Spybey (1996:155) finds Robertson's insistence that modernization and globalization be kept separate inconsequential.

Globalization forces religious organizations to respond to the subsequent condition of globality (Robertson 1991:284). As a result "the whole world is a constraining as well as an enabling setting for ... intrasocietal or intracivilizational affairs". Instead of opposing homogenization and heterogenization to one another researchers should attend to empirical examples which indicate a combination of the interpenetration of the universal and the particular (Robertson 1995:27).

Nederveen Pieterse (1995) indicates that globalization can have two cultural outcomes: globalization-as-homogenization or globalization-as-hybridization. Instead, Friedman (1995:78) distinguishes between stronger and weaker types of globalization. Stronger globalization leads to the homogenization of local contexts into universal meanings, so that the same meaning is ascribed to global objects regardless of the location within the system of those who so attribute meaning. Weaker globalization occurs where the universal is assimilated into local meanings.

Friedman (1994) suggests a third, structural possibility, namely globalization-as-fragmention at the political and economic level; similar to Samir Amin's notions of multipolarity within the world-system. In Friedman's opinion globalization can act as centrifugal process which decentralizes power and capital, resulting not in the disintegration of the world system but in its radical realignment. Fundamental changes are brought about by a decentralisation of capital, which weakens the centre while strengthening the periphery (Friedman 1994). The decline of hegemony leads to the fragmentation of homogeny, and so to an increase in expressions of different cultural and social identities. Whether viewed in terms of centrifugal or centripetal conceptualizations of the world system, the notion that a shift in the world system is underway since the 1970s seems widely supported (compare Featherstone 1990).

By contrast Clark (1997) suggests that globalization and fragmention (e.g. regionalism) are opposing tendencies. Nederveen Pieterse would deny this, as he conceives heterogenization and homogenization as opposite poles which occur along a continuum (Nederveen Pieterse 1995:62). Friedman (1995) explains the operations of homogenizing tendencies in global systemic terms which suggest conjuncture where Appadurai would posit disjuncture. Homogenization co-occurs as part of the centralization and heterogenization of the decentralisation of accumulation. "The globalization of fundamentalisms and of powerful nationalisms is part of the same process, the violent eruption of cultural identities in the wake of declining modernist identity" (Friedman (1995:84).

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The discussion of homogeneity-heterogeneity and the universal-local in the context of globalization poses analytical issues which need to be resolved in my study. Is the dominance of the English language in South African institutions an example of the homogenizing effect of globalization, with the retention of indigenous languages in the private sphere as a weak form of heterogenization? Or would it be better to consider racially-integrating congregations as demonstrating a universalizing tendency as opposed to the localizing strategies employed in indigenous-language congregations? And is the discrepancy in the public sphere between multilingual ideologies and monolingual practices an example of localized adaptations of universal norms?

For Spybey (1996) globalization was initially instituted through the implantation of modern Western institutions throughout the world - an early form of modernity. In addition modern forms of communication, economy, polity, and tourism substantially increased the diffusion and density of global awareness. Like Spybey, Niklas Luhmann emphasises the role of communication in establishing a global society. For Luhmann a the world system is *global* because communication "extends continuously around the globe", while it is a *society* (or social system), in which actions occur, based on meaningful communication (Beyer 1994:30,33). And, "increasingly, meaningful communication can and often does take place between any two points" (Beyer 1994:30). Communication, in turn, depends on relatively stable social structures, based on expectations (Beyer 1994:36). The kind of communication that has become globalized is cognitive or adaptive; e.g. scientific, technical, news, travel (Beyer 1994:36). Modernisation leads to globalization, and so to a world society (Beyer 1994:38).

For Luhmann one of the most important shifts between pre-modern to modern societies is from a normative to a cognitive (learning) way of responding to disappointed expectations (Beyer 1994:37). Learning is increasingly important in modern social structures (Beyer 1994:36). Another shift is from the dominance of stratified differentiation to that of functional differentiation (Beyer 1994:34):

i. In stratified differentiation people are ranked on the basis of status, so that their actions are interpreted according to strata membership. Stratified societies are characterised by the dominance of a ruling stratum, who control most of the power. The boundaries of society are determined by "the reach of their communication" (Beyer 1994:35);

ii. In functional differentiation people and their actions are categorised on the basis of the function that they fulfil in specific (political, economic, educational, religious) systems (Beyer 1994:35). Such systems "specialise in specific modes of communication" (Beyer 1994:37). By implication this sets boundaries which are relatively independent from one another, so that one system cannot control others (Beyer 1994:38). The "only boundary that remains possible for the encompassing societal system is then the globe itself" (Beyer 1994:38). World society is characterised by "the dominance of functionally differentiated subsystems" (Beyer 1994:40).

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2.2 Glocalization

In globalization terms Christian congregations as well as language practice represent globalized institutions which are affected by the dual dynamic inherent in glocalization (Robertson 1995). This term refers to the simultaneous drive towards global cultural homogeneity and adaptation to local heterogeneity. Linguistic integration of congregations can serve as a test-case for the latter two processes: my impression is that they illustrate the first (movement towards global identity, active reproduction of a global institution) better than the second. This argument will have to be weighed up against glocalization, and the related notion of hybridization.

Hybridization, unlike glocalization, allows for attention to the operation of power relations, without precluding a more neutral evaluation of the eventual outcome (Nederveen Pieterse 1995). In addition hybridization allows for a non-Eurocentric perspective in which the dominated do exercise some power, so permitting for a view in which peripheral Asian, Latin American, and African cultures can influence Western forms as well as one other. Such an outcome can be described as interculturality, in which e.g. African cultural forms contribute to Western forms and vice versa.

2.3 Critique of Robertson's globalization theory

Holton (1998:187-192) finds much to commend in Robertson's theory, particularly its multidimensionality and multidirectional interactionism. By multidimensionality Holton refers to Robertson's rejection of a single logic in favour of a inclusion of economic, political, and cultural dimensions, "together with multiple centres of action and multiple players" (individuals, nation-states). Multidirectional interactionism refers to globalization's intensification of the local-universal dialectic, which forces all actors to be cognisant of "transnational processes and institutions". But local actors can affect global processes; for instance, global consumer capitalism is forced to adjust to local particularistic demand (Holton 1998:194). This perspective is what Spybey draws on in his conceptualization of world society.

Yet Robertson fails to draw explicit attention to inequalities of power, resources, and information between actors in the global field - though he is aware of this problem. This devaluation results partly from his exclusive concern "with cognitive issues to do with how the globe is understood and how that understanding reflects and embodies the connected issues of universalization and particularization" (Holton 1998:194). Consequentially Robertson "neglects the post-war global institutionalization of political-economic structures .... including the way in which the 'global', 'national', and 'local' are both organized and understood". In this way, Horton concludes, global awareness is not connected to global political economy. So Wallerstein's weakness is Robertson's strength, and vice versa.

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3. WORLD-POLITY THEORY: INSTITUTIONS AS CULTURAL FRAMEWORKS OF THE WORLD SYSTEM

Boli, Meyer, and others argue that world-polity and world-economy function independently to a degree, and that world-polity is governed by global norms, a global culture. Their insistence on the constitutive effect of norms is drawn from new institutional theory, and so I first review the development and contents of this approach, which I take to be an underlying metatheory of the world-polity perspective. Next I outline the basic arguments which are used by world-polity analysts to indicate the political-institutional structure of the world-system. This section ends with a brief critique of world-polity theory.

3.1 New institutionalism as metatheory of world-polity theory

World-polity theory is embedded within a wider theoretical framework, namely new institutionalism, and utilises institutional isomorphism as a central concept. According to Hall & Taylor (1996:939) institutionalism explains how institutions affect individual behaviour, so answering the questions "how do actors behave, what do institutions do, and why do institutions persist over time". Applied to the world system, institutionalists maintain that international, state and substate organizations are structured and behave in convergent ways due to the operation of global institutional (or, cultural) factors (compare Finnemore 1996:337).

Institutional analysis have in the past diverged, depending on whether they regarded institutions to have been created to meet specific tasks, or to satisfy particular norms. New institutionalists came to emphasise the second approach, arguing that institutions are valued because they contain symbolic elements which legitimate their incorporation in organizations (cf. Granovetter & Swedberg 1992:15). By contrast, economists often favoured the first approach which indicated that social and other institutions are generated to solve particular problems efficiently and rationally. This perspective tends to neglect the role of powerful role players and prevailing norms (Granovetter & Swedberg 1992:16). Research on so-called path-dependent development shows that it is not the most efficient solutions that are adopted by organizations (e.g. the organization of keys on a computer's keyboard). Instead, the process can be the outcome of chance elements which interfere at an early stage, often influenced as much by social as the historical development of market forces, technology, politics, and society (Granovetter & Swedberg 1992:17,18).

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New institutionalists[8] argue that the institutional environment exercises an isomorphic effect on organizations. The environment includes "norms, standards, and expectations held by relevant stakeholders and common to all inhabitants of the organizational field" (Kraatz & Zajac 1996:812). Due to the constraining effects of institutional environments, organizations tend towards homogeneity through a process of institutional isomorphism. As organizational fields - the complex formed by interactive patterns between an organization and other organizations to which it relates - become more defined (structurated), they exert a strong homogenizing influence on organizations. Consequently, organizations tend "to adopt uniform, institutionalized structures and practices that conform to the mandate of the institutional environment" (Kraatz & Zajac 1996:813). Change is inhibited through the inertia generated by organizations' need to be legitimized by the institutional environment, which precludes "certain choices of action". This is known as the legitimacy imperative (Kraatz & Zajac 1996:813).

In other words, institutionalism examines the ways in which the institutional context affects individuals and groups in the formation of their strategies to obtain particular goals (Koelble 1995:236). In terms of the environment-organization interaction, neo-institutionalism rejects both "technical" and functional theoretical explanations associated with the adaptation of organizations to their environments (Kraatz & Zajac 1996:813). Adaptive theories stress the importance of general and local technical environments ("customers, suppliers, competitors, regulatory groups") in affecting change in the practices and structures of organizations (Kraatz & Zajac 1996:812,15). By contrast neo-institutionalism emphasises "'organizational conformity with social rules and rituals'" (Kraatz & Zajac 1996:813, quoting Orru, Biggart, & Hamilton 1991:361).

New institutionalism is not a unified approach, but takes rational choice, historical, and sociological forms, which are employed somewhat differently by economists, political scientists, and sociologists (Cook & Levi 1990; Koelble 1995; Hall & Taylor 1996; Lowndes 1996; Hirsch 1997; cf. Sjostrand 1993:6; Granovetter & Swedberg 1992). I will briefly summarise the major components of each form of institutionalism, noting particularly the interrelationship between institutions and behaviour, and outline their views on how institutions emerge and change.

Rational choice institutionalism borrows the idea of exchange from economics to emphasise that individual preference and action result from actors who strategically calculate the costs and benefits of outcomes in terms of what serves their best interests (Koelble 1995:232). The repeated interactions of utility-maximising social actors create institutions to ensure stability, contain transaction costs, and encourage co-operative behaviour (Koelble 1995:239). So co-operative behaviour leads to the

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[8]. New institutionalism differs from "old" institutionalism in two ways: the newer form downplays actors' rationality (Powell & DiMaggio) and emphasises (cross-country) comparative systemic analysis through the isolation of intermediate institutions (Steinmo, Thelen, & Longstreth) (Koelble 1995:237).

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emergence of institutions (Koelble 1995:240), partly as a result of the "power of decision makers to provide benefits, sanctions, and incentives for others" and to monitor "possible noncompliants" (Koelble 1995:241). Institutions further the interests of actors who at the same time are constrained by them; that is, institutions are intervening variables which affect but do not determine individual choices and actions (Koelble 1995:232,237). Institutional change comes about when individuals seeking change become more effective than those who oppose change (Koelble 1995:241). Rational choice institutionalism often underpins the work of economists (e.g. Douglass North) and political scientists (e.g. Cook & Levi 1990; Laitin 1993).

Historical institutionalism maintains that institutions emerge to legitimate "certain rules of conduct and behavior which concern power relations and the establishment of social and cultural norms". Institutions are formal or informal routines, norms, conventions, "sets of rules and procedures which define the appropriateness" of choices or actions (Koelble 1995:233). They are associated with organizations, and embedded in organizational structures (particularly of the polity) (Hall & Taylor 1996:938). Although affected by "collective and individual choices", institutions are independent variables which determine individual actions (Koelble 1995:232,237). Individuals make decisions based on preferences influenced by the institutional context, the outcome of "the interaction among various groups, interests, ideas, and institutional structures" (Koelble 1995:232). Decisions emerge from bounded rationality - that is, people do not have full information and cannot totally anticipate the consequences of their decisions (Koelble 1995:234). Actors "may make wrong choices and frequently do not see their interest clearly" (Koelble 1995:238).

Historical institutionalism within political science goes beyond group theory, which states that politics is about conflict between groups for scarce resources, and structural functionalism with its emphasis on "polity as an overall system of interacting parts" (Hall & Taylor 1996:937). Instead historical institutionalists argue for the primacy of "the institutional organization of the polity" in "structuring collective behavior"; i.e. emphasise structural aspects (Hall & Taylor 1996:937). For some the state is not a neutral agent intervening between competing interests, but a complex of institutions which structure relations and outcomes among various organized interests through e.g. public policy (Hall & Taylor 1996:938).

For historical institutionalist like Peter Hall the structural and institutional context which influenced economic institutions in France and Britain includes "the organization of labor, the state, capital, the political system, and the position of the country in the international economy" (Koelble 1995:236). The notion of bounded innovation seems particularly relevant to my study, suggesting that "a novel idea will succeed only as far as it is compatible with the institutional context" (Koelble 1995:238). According to Thelen and Steinmo there are at least four stimuli for institutional change: (a) change in the socio-political context, e.g. with different institutions becoming more important than before; (b) new actors which use existing institutions to their advantage; (c) established actors who create new

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goals for existing institutions; and (d) "actors within the institutions adapt to institutional changes" (referred to in Koelble 1995:238). In short, institutional change results from "conflicts over interests, ideas, and power" (Koelble 1995:238).

Sociological institutionalism views institutions - which include "conventions and customs" - as dependent on macro-factors such as culture and society; i.e. institutions are dependent variables which determine individual actions (Koelble 1995:232,234). Actors choose actions based on their institutionally-guided perceptions of their appropriateness to particular contexts (Koelble 1995:234). Individuals are embedded in so many relationships that utility-maximising and rational explanations become almost impossible (Koelble 1995:235). Organizations choose particular cultural or symbolic systems "which are then reflected in the structures, functions, and goals of the organization as well as the rationality of individuals within the organization and institution" (Koelble 1995:235).

In this view the mechanisms of change are either extra-institutional or intra-institutional - e.g. through antagonistic actors who oppose one another in the same institution (Koelble 1995:235). Isomorphism is an important extra-institutional mechanism for change, in the form either of (a) competition between organizations for resources, customers, niches (competitive isomorphism); or (b) of responses to other organizations for "political power and institutional legitimacy" (institutional isomorphism) (DiMaggio & Powell 1991:66). Institutional isomorphism is driven by coercive, mimetic, or normative mechanisms: (a) *coercive isomorphism* is characterised by relations of force, persuasion, or collusion which are exercised formally or informally both by organizations on dependent organizations as well as by cultural expectations; (b) *mimetic isomorphism* results from uncertainty generated within or outside the organization; (c) *normative isomorphism* "stems primarily from professionalization" (DiMaggio & Powell 1991:70). In short, isomorphism explains the "diffusion of certain departments and operating procedures to interorganizational influences, conformity and the persuasiveness of cultural accounts" (DiMaggio & Powell 1991:13).

How do notions of institutions and institutional isomorphism relate to globalization? Spybey (1996) offers several insights into how this can be done. His central thesis is that simultaneous reproduction and reflexivity exists between the global and the local; a clear adaptation of Robertson's idea of the particularization of the universal and the universalization of the particular. Institutions are globalized and accepted by humans, but altered in line with local needs.

3.2 Political-institutional structure of the world-polity

The world-polity approach by Meyer, Boli, and associates contrast with Wallerstein's insistence that a single economic logic drives the world-system, from which all other features such as the nation-state derive.

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For John Meyer the global order consists of a system of nation states which operates in terms of a world political culture (Meyer 1980:109; compare Robertson 1994:105). A nation-state's internal strength is not determined by its position in the division of labour of the world-economy. Instead, the degree to which it conforms to world norms determines whether its legitimacy is accepted by other states (Beyer 1994:23). Legitimacy is a reward for conforming to two particular world cultural norms: equality and progress, and allows states to expand their control over more and more aspects of their citizen's lives. States that profess conformity to these norms are allowed enormous internal powers, and also monopolies of legitimated violence. Obviously affirmations of conformity as such are neither wholly sufficient nor the sole contributing factor to legitimacy. Nevertheless, such claims enable strong, centralized states to develop in the periphery as much as in the core (Beyer 1994:23). At the same time state control is increasingly exercised over civil society. And, "states continually take on new tasks they never thought to consider before" (Boli 1999, personal communication). Boli (1980) supports Meyer's ideas by showing that across the world system, state domination is increasing, regardless of a state's position in the core-periphery hierarchy.

In other words, a world-polity functions independently of the world-economic system, as illustrated by the internal dynamics of states. That is, it contains two logics: polity and economics. The world-polity is decentralised, and held together by a world culture (Beyer 1994:25). Meyer's arguments are made possible by his theoretical distinction between polity and economy, based on different systems of value creation (Beyer 1994:22). The economy creates value through commodification, while polity creates value through collective authority, by constructing and bestowing value on selected activities. These values are not determined by market forces, but by the authority of the polity. For example, the state as a dominant agent of collective authority can place a high value on social services. Polities include religious and cultural organisations (Beyer 1994:22).

In similar vein to Meyer and colleagues, Lechner defines global order as regular (i.e. structured) interaction between a number of significant actors or institutions "across the globe" whose actions are governed by a minimally shared cultural conception of globality (Lechner 1991:263). Globality refers to a sense of belonging to and participating in a single global cultural arena. Once this construct of a global order becomes accepted as real, it has real consequences. In brief, "globalization is the process by which a new social order comes about on a global scale", through "the institutionalization of a global (social and cultural) order". Lechner argues that a central emphasis in world system analysis should be on how global order is achieved through the institutionalization of global forms of thought and action. This requires specification as to what is institutionalized (Lechner 1991:269). A second emphasis should be on the possible alternative global orders, and the historical processes that lead to the emergence of this particular world system (Lechner 1991:264).

Meyer argues that the "notion of a powerful world-polity enables us to explain a number of features of the world system that are highly problematic for theories depicting the world simply as an economic

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exchange system". These include: political stability of the interstate system; continued modernization of peripheries; the global shift to tertiary (service) sectors;

Due to normative rules which control the world-polity, isomorphism occurs between societies (Meyer 1980:110). Nation-states conform to one another and to the global norms: "surprisingly similar institutions of modernity (e.g. state services, educational systems) appear in all sorts of societies" - all involving "rapid state growth". An argument made by Thomas & Meyer (1980) in the context of expanded strong states is worth considering here. They imply that many ideas and structures which exist in most nation-states (e.g. what defines strong states) arise from - and are sustained by - forces external to their particular societies. Internal groups which support these "derive their coherence less from the natural play of forces within society than from the operation and legitimating rules of the system as a whole"; i.e. by world culture (Thomas & Meyer 1980:142). According to Thomas & Meyer (1980:145-6), nation-building in newer states is a different proposition to that which took place in Europe and the USA. They thematize the former processes as being imposed in the form of national interests and identities by the state from the top downwards, and leading to increasingly stronger state organizations.

Boli (1987:78-80) explains isomorphism by indicating how the expansion of the authority (legitimacy) of a nation state occurs via processes of integration in the world system. Three related processes takes place, namely systemic integration, national integration, and pluralization of the power of nation-states at the centre of the system. Systemic integration is the continuous integration of the world system through increasing trade linkages and "flows of value" between states. National integration is the continuous integration of more nation-states into the world system by the same processes. Integration contributes to a pluralization of the power of core states, a decrease in hegemony measured as percentage of world trade. Both integration and pluralization "aids the expansion of the state in peripheral countries" (Boli 1987:80). Because no country can achieve hegemony, core control of the periphery is weakened, competition among core states increases, and peripheral states increasingly "take their cues from the more implicit but ever-present directives contained in the overarching world polity" (Boli 1987:80). As a result Boli's cross-national research demonstrated that state authority, as defined in constitutions, "is most expanded in the semiperipheral states and least expanded in the central states" (Boli 1987:83,90).

Boli (1980:87) defines integration into the world system as the extent to which: (a) "the local economy is oriented to the world economy ... (b) local politics reflect developments in world politics", and (c) world culture is present. Location of a particular nation-state in the world system thus depends on the degree of systemic integration as well as the level of its own integration into that structure. The more integrated into the world system a state is, the likelier it is to exhibit the ideologies, organizational forms (e.g. dominant states) and institutions of the world-polity - and so of its core states. As a result, some countries can be peripheral in the world-economy yet be highly integrated into world ideology,

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as revealed by state dominance. On the other hand some core countries (e.g. the USA, Canada) may be loosely integrated into the system and so have less dominant states. That is, "two peripheral countries with roughly the same level of economic/technical development might have states with quite different levels of authority and organization if one country is highly integrated into the world structure while the other is largely isolated from it. In this comparison, the former should have the more expanded state" (Boli-Bennett 1987:79).

Boli (1980:88,87) argues that a "corpus of world ideology" exists within the world system, consisting of "a fairly coherent set of ideological and organizational standards for national behaviour[9]. These include standards that define external and internal success in the system, as well as those which define the mechanisms by which success is to be achieved. External standards consist of "economic predominance, geopolitical influence, national autonomy". Internal standards are "highly institutionalized" but differ in the extent to which they have been adopted by elites and incorporated into local ideologies. Accordingly internal success is determined by increases in Gross National Product and personal income, high levels of literacy and schooling, extensive political participation, adherence to human rights, "restrained use of official violence .... some degree of advanced technological development", and forms of cultural expression that enhances national prestige in the world system. Mechanisms for achieving these standards comprise mass education, "mobilized citizenry, considerable investment in research and development, strong identification with national goals and priorities on the part of citizens". But "the chief underlying mechanism ... must be an increasingly dominant state that organizes society around projects that will satisfy world standards (Boli-Bennett 1980:88).

A raft of ideologies can become dominant within the world system, and is then differentially distributed - via political and economic elites - over the subunits of the system, thus integrating different states to varying degrees. World ideology is also diffused via economic organizations, mass media, global intellectual movements (including tertiary education). Training leads to a transfer of "specific organizational forms and techniques for implementing these ideologies. Similarly, multinational corporations impose organizational forms and techniques in the economic sector that can be transferred to the political realm and employed by the state" (Boli 1980:89). The presence of ideologies and organizational forms do not necessarily translate into actual implementation, but require certain political conditions (e.g. little civil society resistance, elites willing to extend state powers) (Boli 1980:90). World religions also represent transnational organizational forms and ideologies, which probably affect the general populace more than they do elites.

To summarise, Boli (1980:91-92) maintains that the world system has become increasingly integrated

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[9]. Boli's arguments need to be adjusted to political developments since 1980, as statism (state socialism) was a predominant ideology in the world system at that time (e.g. Boli 1980:88). The rollback of the welfare state under Reaganism and Thatcherism - which continues in a different guise in Europe and the USA, cast doubts on parts of his argument. Some argue that neo-liberalism has achieved near-hegemony in the world system.

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since 1900, with accompanying effects. Increasing integration is demonstrable through stronger linkages via e.g. international treaties; rising economic interdependence; multiplying exchanges (of commodities, students, tourists, films, scientific and technological information). The first effect is that the overall system develops economically and technologically. While peripheries remain relatively worse off, they are not stagnant either; this explains the involvement of some peripheries in the development of high technology commodities (e.g. software development in India). Second, all nation states become more integrated into the system. Third, the integration of the system is reciprocally linked to the pluralization of power in the centre. The more pluralization occurs, the more competition exists between core countries; the more integration occurs, the more pluralization takes place. The better integrated the system becomes, the more power is evenly distributed throughout core countries, so that monopoly is no longer as possible as it was in the colonial period. Centre pluralization "operates to the advantage of the periphery rather than the central countries".

3.3 Critique of world-polity theory

No sustained criticism of world-polity theory has emerged, in contrast to the world-economy perspective. Meyer himself (1999b) explains that scholars whose point of departure consists of "very strong pictures of actorhood" tend to criticize world-polity theory "on two basic fronts. First, we are thought to greatly understate the roles of power and interest in the formation of collective institutions. Second, we are thought to understate the roles of power and interest in producing subunit conformity". The latter criticism takes two forms: too little attention to coercion; and lack of specificity accorded mechanisms which involve a "fairly rational and purposive actor".

Finnemore (1996) spells out some of the above critique in greater detail from a political science and international relations perspective. For her the first difficulty lies in the lack of attention by Meyer, Boli and associates to the causal or change mechanisms of world culture. Instead they emphasise correlation between units of the system, or between units and system-wide phenomena, from which they assume world cultural causes. Case studies which trace the origins, processes, and mechanisms of diffusion are missing. This skews their work towards an overemphasis on structure and a neglect of a more dialectic relationship with agency (Finnemore 1996:339).

The lack of attention to historical case studies leads world-polity perspective to overstate the extent to which isomorphism is caused by the cognitive element of institutions, Finnemore suggests. An account of the spread of Western culture, the modern state, human rights, or market economies must instead pay careful attention to the role played by coercion, contestation, violence, and leadership in this process (Finnemore 1996:339). While cognitive processes are undeniably important, "they are by no means the only forces at work". "Cultural rules are often established not by persuasion or cognitive processes of institutionalization but by force and fiat". The examples she cites include the three

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centuries of Protestant wars in Europe that preceded the dominance of Western Christianity and ethnic cleansing in Bosnia and Rwanda (Finnemore 1996:340).

A second difficulty for Finnemore (1996:340) is that institutionalists tend to overstate the mutually reinforcing nature of the major elements specified as constituting world culture. As a result the tensions and contradictions between these Western cultural rules (Western rationality, progress, equality, bureaucracy, markets) that constrain their isomorphic effects are submerged. For example, economic progress and equity are "two pillars of the normative structure" which "often pull in opposite directions .... Contradictions among dominant cultural norms mean that social institutions are continually being contested, albeit to varying degrees at different times" (Finnemore 1996:341). Such tensions may lead to mobilization on the basis of normative claims that were compromised as a result of contestation. Finnemore implies that glocalization should be in focus, as tensions between competing world norms may be resolved so as to reflect an admixture of local and international norms, "contingent on local circumstances and personalities". In turn, as the case of Japanese management principles illustrate, such glocal institutional compromises are fed back from the periphery to the core.

In conclusion, while Finnemore acknowledges the central insight of isomorphism, she argues that global institutionalists need to specify "sources of instability, conflict, or opposition". While "global norms may create similar structures and push both people and states towards similar behavior at given times", contestation among central global norms causes instability in the outcomes, and raises questions regarding why certain norms are adapted instead of others.

These arguments will be taken into consideration in the selection of features from the three world system theories in the next two sections.

4. RELEVANT FEATURES OF A WORLD SYSTEM FRAMEWORK FOR UNDERSTANDING LANGUAGE AND RELIGION IN THE NATION-STATE

An eclectic theory for the analysis of language configurations in congregations is best constructed by synthesizing those elements from the various theories which overlap, or by selecting those most relevant to this study. The theme of this study dictates that particular attention be given to how culture and religion as well as the nature and role of the state is conceptualized. Instead of forming a blueprint this section explores relevant concepts with which the analysis of Chapter Six will be triangulated. While I retain central notions from both world-polity and world-economy theories, I accentuate the former.

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4.1 The dialectic interaction of world-polity and world-economy in the world system

I am particularly interested in isolating features of the world system which condition social change, social stratification, and the formation of nation-states. My focus should be self-explanatory. First, the analysis of racial and linguistic integration of congregations presupposes institutional change, embedded within larger, global scale social changes. Second, the outcome of linguistic interaction can be explained in terms of social stratification, propelled by processes which divide and integrate labour in the world-economy. For instance, the dominance of English is at once a global symptom and contributing factor to a class-based division of labour. Acceptance of this dominance signals an attempt to move up in the local division of labour, as defined by the world-economy. Third, the formation of post-colonial nation-states, and the accompanying ideologies of nation-building (like non-racialism and multiculturalism), relate to the expansion and structures of nation-states as globalized units in the world-economy.

The above analytical focus justifies my retention of both world-polity and world-economy theories, a move also suggested by their connectedness to dependency theory as early source; although both ultimately go beyond it. World-polity's emphasis on the constitutive aspects of global institutions enables theorists to posit a link between the economic and political aspects of the world system. In this institutionalists draw not merely upon an earlier Weberian tradition, but also on dependency theory, which originated in the 1950s from within the UN Economic Commission for Latin America (Boli-Bennett 1980).

The similarities between dependency and world-economy perspectives should be clear from a comparison of the basic tenets of the former. According to dependency theorists the world division of labour is based on three principles: exchange of periphery raw materials for manufactured goods from the core; economic dominance of the periphery by the core; continued economic advantage for the core, translated into more efficient production and military-technical superiority (Boli-Bennett 1980:82). Here level of internal development depends on a nation-state's location in the world-system, and on whether the necessary resources for state dominance are available. In this perspective internal dominance enables external domination (Boli-Bennett 1980:83). In class terms an alliance of commercial, industrial, and financial elites controls core states either directly or indirectly; with a view to promoting a strong state which can look after their interests in the world-economy. In peripheries export-oriented elites, usually in control of primary production, emerge and form alliances with elites of core states. They prefer weaker states which cannot interfere with their interests; Chile has historically served as an example (Boli-Bennett 1980:84).

Among the central notions that I accentuate are Thomas & Meyer (1980)'s ideas about state expansion - which Boli-Bennett (1993) links to integration into the world system - and those of Chase-Dunn (1989) (reviewed in section 4.2, below). These notions are particularly relevant to the arguments about

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nation-building in Africa that I make in Chapters Five and Six. As Boli's arguments were already covered in detail, I merely note their implications below.

Thomas & Meyer observed that state expansion, increased state dominance, or deliberate changes in regime are all part of nation-building, which has as a prime goal stability. As nation-states receive their legitimacy primarily from external sanctions, "the lack of integrating national symbols and loyalties [are] a bigger problem than in an earlier world .... and have much more to legitimate" (Thomas & Meyer 1980:143-144). A feature of the world system is that peripheral states have "the same world-culturally-defined obligations as an advanced one, but with fewer social and organizational sources", so that peripheries make national plans "that cannot be implemented, and defines forms of national and international justice that cannot be sustained". This often causes turbulence in peripheral regimes, which tends to create stronger states. In short, such regimes appear to have failure built-in (Thomas & Meyer 1980:145,147).

The importance of external legitimation becomes visible when even internal groups which oppose particular regimes seek external support for their struggles. In South African history the ANC's struggle was at times based on foreign soil and the movement also received support from various external transnational and national entities. Even in the post-1994 period some groups have also sought greater rights by appealing to external sources, such as attempts to establish linkages between Griqua/Nama and First Nation groups in Canada, as observed at a Institute for Democratic Alternatives for South Africa (Idasa) conference in 1995. The latter event was obviously also highly significant in terms of the international platform that it presented, which linked the local to the global.

Boli's arguments about state expansion and integration have at least two effects. First, his work prompts a focus on the extent that the state dominates civil society institutions. My case study of language practice in a non-state institution shows that state domination needs not be achieved by direct coercion if it resonates with existing popular ideologies. The actions of the South African state - as opposed to its policies - demonstrate two diverging ideologies regarding language/culture. Individuals in non-state institutions are presented with two options between which they can legitimately choose. However, the state's option for participation in the global economy and the functioning of the word-economy itself bias choice towards non-indigenous languages. Second, Boli's delineation of institutional isomorphism implies that this process is likelier to occur if South Africa is reasonably well-integrated into the world system - despite its semi-peripheral position in the world-economy. As Chapter Five shows, the extent to which South Africa's political and economic elites are embracing economic globalization reveals that this class has already adopted global ideologies and are moving the state in that direction. While still economically a semi-periphery, South Africa's elites are closely integrated into the world system, including the global polity.

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4.2 Global culture, global society and globalization in the world system

Attention to global culture as a central feature of the world system is prompted by its role in driving isomorphism, but also by the difficulty of separating world culture from the world-economy or from the world polity.

But what is meant by global culture is contested. While Meyer and colleagues link global culture to global polity, others consider the possibility of global culture/s as an autonomous entity. Such discussions tend to be couched in terms of the homogenizing effect of global culture; often viewed negatively in terms of Westernization or Americanization. Some deny the very possibility of a global culture, on the basis that such a notion depends on a unitary world society or global political structure. World-system theorists have been taken to task for inattention to the place of culture in the world system (Holton 1998, Boyne 1990, see Lechner 1989:15 for discussion).

World-system theorists frequently disregard the structure and function of culture in the world system, as noted in section 1 of this chapter. Their inattention is prompted by various interpretations of "culture" and of "world culture"; and by their perceptions about the extent to which global culture links to other features of the world system. In the discussion above, disagreements emerged whether global culture links to subsystemic formations such as the nation-state or to system-wide structures like the world-economy. Meyer and colleagues like Boli argue strongly that global norms operate independently of the world-economy, and determine the legitimacy and structures of nation-states within a global polity. By contrast, Wallerstein considers a global ideas system to legitimate the world division of labour.

For example Chase-Dunn (1989:88) concludes that "world culture and normative integration play secondary rather than primary roles in the reproduction of contemporary world order because of the nature of the capitalist mode of production". The primary integrative role is fulfilled "by political-military power and market interdependence". While the economic base does not mechanically produce the superstructure, the "nature and structure of world culture depend on more potent economic and political institutions" (Chase-Dunn 1989:105).

The integrative role of markets is supported by the interstate system ("a military-political balance of coercive power"), while world culture "operates to legitimate commodity production and the interstate system" (Chase-Dunn 1989:104). The function of world culture here seems similar to Wallerstein's notion of a global "ideas-system", which disguises class conflict in the world-economy as racial or ethnic conflict. Wallerstein regards the emergence of an ideas-system as a dependent function of the world-economy, with the purpose of overcoming contradictions in the system. The world-economy requires both the removal of all social barriers which hinder the operation of the market, and the unequal distribution of wealth necessary for the accumulation of capital. The universalistic-egalitarian

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ideas promoted by the first requirement is countered by particularistic-inegalitarian notions generated by the ideas-system, such as race, ethnicity, and nationalism (Beyer 1994:18). These cultural notions are so pervasive that antisystemic movements which oppose the world-economy cannot but take them into account (Beyer 1994:18).

Although Chase-Dunn accepts that world culture may not play a secondary role in all systems, or at all times, he maintains that in the modern world-system normative mechanisms do not play a central role. Yet, consciousness may play a role in transforming it through "the normative assertion of these collective [human] values" and the construction of a socialist world polity (Chase-Dunn 1989:105).

The importance of cultural institutions within large scale socio-economic systems varies according to type of integration which distinguishes them, argues Chase-Dunn. He identifies three types, which can be combined in different ways in a world-system, with varying emphasis as follows (Chase-Dunn 1989:90-92): *Normative social systems*[10] contain modes of production and exchange "based on consensually held norms of reciprocal obligation". Such societies tend to be classless (unranked) and stateless, and to have "belief systems which define roles and regulate interaction". Examples include families, a "kin-based mode of production", and Wallerstein's mini-systems. *Politically coercive social systems* are "integrated by political institutions (e.g. states) which gather goods by means of taxation or tribute payments", through the use of "threats and coercion". Such societies tend to have both classes and states, and combine political-military rule with institutional authority. Religion legitimates "the rule of the temple and the palace". Wallerstein's world empire is one example of this type. *Market-based social systems* are integrated by competitive "buying and selling of commodities in price-setting markets". Integration is driven by the specialization and subsequent interdependence of producers. Wallerstein's world-economy comprises an example.

Within the present world-system, normative solidarity - the integration of families, communities, and nations - do play some role. Through the medium of e.g. families, normative integration reproduces the labour force, and helps to create and sustain individual and group identities (local communities, ethnicities, national identities). Yet as a whole the world-system "is not held together by consensual understanding" nor by "reciprocal obligations". Instead, "exchange is organized as market trade of commodities and as interorganizational and interstate political bargaining" (Chase-Dunn 1989:93).

Nationalism is a prime example of normative integration (through an institutionalised ideology) which still plays a fundamental role in the functioning of the world-economy. It legitimates competitive

[10]. Parsons is among those who advocated that a global system exists which is normatively integrated around "international law, shared assumptions about the desirability of economic development, rational bureaucratic organization, and political democracy". For Parsons "all social systems are, by definition, normatively based"; i.e. contain "shared assumptions about proper rules of behavior" (Chase-Dunn, 1989:90,referring to Parson's 1961 article "Order and community in the international system").

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production, the use of force by the state to protect "market share interests". At the same time nationalism undercuts internal class conflicts; within the core and periphery it binds workers to the national interests of the ruling classes and so prevents transnational class solidarity (Chase-Dunn 1989:94). Nation-building, "the formation of national solidarities out of formerly separate collective identities, is itself a product of the long-run operation of the interstate system and the commodity economy". In "terms of collective identity" core nation states are better integrated, due to the colonial policy of pitting peripheral ethnicities against one another which simultaneously facilitated development of core identities (Chase-Dunn 1989:98).

But even markets presuppose minimal normative relations of "expectations about fair trade and the protocols of diplomatic interaction". In these ways a world culture "facilitates the linkage of different cultural regions by market interdependence". Other important ways in which ideology accompanies political and economic institutions include legitimation of wage inequalities (Chase-Dunn 1989:95,96).

Chase-Dunn (1989:97,98,99) argues that world culture is "fragmented into national cultures", weakly institutionalised, and has no functions across the whole system. Instead, culture serves merely to integrate individual nation-states - its primarily role. While nation states are normatively integrated, the world-system itself is multicultural, multinational, and primarily economically integrated. No single language or culture straddles the globe, and non-Western traditional belief or cultural systems are invoked to counter the influence of western cultures (Chase-Dunn 1989:98,102).

Chase-Dunn (1989:97,98,99) rejects claims that international law institutionalises global norms, as he believes that legal structures enforce global normative regulations, such as the World Court, are often ignored with impunity (Chase-Dunn 1989:99,100,104). While the interstate regime does exhibit some consensus, deviance does not invite shame or punishment to the extent that one would expect if global norms had become institutionalized (Chase-Dunn 1989:98,104). Chase-Dunn (1989:100) concludes that "while normative regulation may have increased", no single culture exists across the world-system. If a world culture does exist, it should be thought of as complex and heterogenous, with national cultures operating as subcultures.

Lechner (1991:265) points to international law as a prime instance of "the quintessential institutionalized normative order", and so a globalized feature of the modern world system. International law not only determines who qualifies as actors in the world system (as pointed out by Meyer 1980), but also helps determine the relative strength of state-actors through enabling the extension of internal control, thus leading to strong states which form part of the core (as argued by Wallerstein, who neglects international law) (Lechner 1991:266).

That Lechner's ideas should not be dismissed summarily is clear from the way they support other views on the world system, not only those of Meyer and Boli, but also that of Robertson. Lechner

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moves Robertson's ideas regarding relativization from "cultural developments among elites", to how this is expressed in "the rules governing global interaction and in global institutions". This would include the relationship between states, the rights of individuals in relation to the state, or the rights of individuals as human beings. In short, the "notion of humankind is increasingly treated in natural law-like fashion as a fundamental principle from which rights and duties can be derived". Here Lechner refers to the formulation of new global categories and how "their relationships are institutionally specified, at the very least in the form of norms governing the use of the category of humanity in concrete contexts" - although also including "global mediation structures, such as international organizations". Global order "is made possible by the normative regulation of the main components of the global situation in relation to each other", backed up by global institutions. One such "a global normative model for social integration" is 'society' (Lechner 1991:269-70).

The position that a global culture does not exist, or at best functions very weakly, incorrectly extrapolates from the notion of cultures-as-local-community-based-practices-and-resources, and overemphasises continuity. Chase-Dunn, for example, assumes that culture serves to integrate society around a consensus based on norms, and so by extension global culture should provide a global consensus within the world-economy. By culture Chase-Dunn refers to consciousness and symbolic systems (i.e. to ideology) in the sense of belief systems; this is the narrower denotation of the term which, broadly speaking, refers to "a constellation of socially constructed practices" (Chase-Dunn 1989:89).

By contrast Meyer advocates a strong world culture, which he links directly to the world polity. "Meyer claims that certain values, primarily those of economic progress and rationality, are institutionalized as normative rules in the world polity" (Chase-Dunn 1989:103). Meyer's concept of world culture refers to "'a shared and binding set of rules endogenous to any given society'", located in individuals, elites, and world institutions such as "interstate relations, lending agencies, world cultural elite definitions and organization, transnational bodies" (Meyer 1987:50). Thomas & Meyer (1980:142) assert that "an expanded world culture defines progress and equality as goals", and legitimates states as the mechanisms by which these should be achieved.

Yet world-economy theorists do acknowledge that obvious isomorphisms have been produced within the world-system. For Chase-Dunn the mechanisms are "cultural imperialism and the ideological hegemony of European religion, politics, economics, and science" (Chase-Dunn 1989:98). Consensual symbolic systems are emerging globally in the form of "certain underlying cultural themes", which are "at the least shared by national elites everywhere" (Chase-Dunn 1989:98,100). Most notable among these are the notions of a world system, of political equality, of development (including education), of rational bureaucracy, and of the nation state. Certain structures and institutions have become accepted at the state level worldwide. For example, John Meyer has shown how nation states have expanded their education systems between 1950 and 1970, without comparable economic

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development (Chase-Dunn 1989:102).

English have achieved some dominance due to the successive hegemony of Britain and the USA within the world-system, accompanied by aggressive support for this language (Chase-Dunn 1989:100). Core culture "has been promoted in an effort to legitimate core-periphery exploitation" (Chase-Dunn 1989:102). As a result the number of spoken natural languages across the earth have declined, while synthetic languages like mathematics and science have expanded transnationally. But Chase-Dunn (1989:101-102) denies that cultural imperialism plays a central role in the world-system, as cultural resistance remains far more viable than changing "the position of a nation in the economic and political-military hierarchy". "Participation in the world market ... does not demand much in the way of cultural uniformity" (Chase-Dunn 1989:103). In the above senses, some norms and aspects of western culture have become globalized and institutionalized.

There is, then, some accord between world-polity and world-economy theorist on some features of the world-system, and these will be pursued in the analysis persented in the last chapters. Regardless of differences about the nature of global culture, there seems to be a measure of agreement that global culture exists translocally. Nation-building is perceived by both camps to result from an institutionalised ideology which legitimates the functioning of the world-economy. And finally, few seem to doubt that obvious isomorphisms have been produced within the world-system.

4.3 Locating religion in the world system

As this study concerns the intersection of global and local institutions in a subunit of a *religious* institution, it is important to address the question of how religion is seen to interact with the world system. The nature of the interaction can be viewed in three ways. The first considers the possible contribution that religious institutions make to globalization processes. The second concerns the reverse, the effects of the global system on religious institutions. A third approach discerns the dialectic dynamics of these two processes. The focus in this study on congregations in their interaction with national and global forces presupposes the importance of all three, but runs counter to the usual centrality accorded to secularization in the second approach, which views it as a consequence of globalization. I review some of the major arguments here because I will return to them later, to argue that religion not only contributed to the globalization of Western cultural norms, and so to hegemony, but that, paradoxically, the institutionalization of such norms fed into anti-systemic attitudes and so contributed to heterogeneity.

Garrett & Robertson (1991:xii-xiii) propose that any approach will depend on how one views the interrelatedness of religion with other aspects of the world system - such as social order, economic, cultural identity, and socialising agents. For these scholars the global social order is constituted by

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states, political parties, ideologies, cultural symbols, society, and "patterns of political legitimation". Economic institutions are formed by businesses, unions, organizations, welfare systems, and "attitudes to work". Cultural identity includes national bodies, ethnies, classes, associations, interest groups, and the media; while socialising agents comprise "the family, neighborhood, reference groups, peer groups". While the articulation of religious elements with these components are historically demonstrable, in an increasingly differentiated and pluralizing post-modern world the relationships are admittedly complex (Garrett & Robertson 1991:xiii).

For example, secularization can be viewed as related to global processes in different ways (Garrett & Robertson 1991:xii-xiv). Some would argue that globalization results in "deep structural secularization", which will mean the "inevitable eclipse of religious hegemony". Others view religion as having been exorcised from the macro-structural to the micro-structural realm where it provides symbolic sustenance to individuals. Or, European secularization can be seen as a special case, premised on a particular alliance of religious and class elites in a specific political context. Then it follows that outside of Northern Europe "modernity and religious decline have not been coterminous" (Garrett & Robertson 1991:xiv). This sentiment is echoed in Jules-Rosette's (1989:156-7) evaluation of new African religious movements as cultural responses to modernising and secularising influences.

Lechner accepts that the current world system is essentially secular, despite recognizing that counter-evidence exists in the form of religious revivals, high levels of belief, or continued salience of religious institutions. Unfortunately he fails to support his argument in any way. He does point out that in the past certain religions not only functioned "as global institutions", nor merely existed as limited world systems (e.g. the Holy Roman Empire), but also played causal roles in establishing the world system. Lechner warns against the danger of idealist perceptions of the world system which highlights values to the exclusion of other categories, which may emerge when religion is considered in global terms (Lechner 1991:265).

In short, Lechner (1991:272) argues that religion plays an important role in processes of institutionalization as "an obvious source of values". Then the question is what the role of religion/s are in the institutionalization of global values. Where differences of values occur, this may hinder such institutionalization[11].

Simpson believes that Robertson's perspective on the role of religion in the world system contains great flexibility and has the advantage of explicitly thematizing religion. For example, Robertson departs from the received notion of modernization as he proposes the possibility of a "new typological social

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[11]. Lechner (1991:273-76) summarizes competing arguments in this regard, and provides counter-examples. Some claim that diverse cultural value systems exist which hinder universal understanding. Moreover, these differences support a range of political structures which "prevent the institutionalization of a legally grounded global order" - and, by implication, of global order (Lechner 1991:274).

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complex"; which combines "symbols, structures, and cultural elements of Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft". This allows Robertson not only to include institutional differentiation but also to imagine "the 'recombination' of autonomous institutions", so that in globalization processes religion can be viewed as "seeking institutional 'partnerships'" (Simpson 1991:13).

Yet, like Robertson, Simpson argues that no single thematization is adequate. All the major theories are defensible, including those which emphasise "exchange processes" (Wallerstein), "myths of progress" (Meyer), "logic of interaction and perception operating within an admixture of traditional and modern institutions that perforce lead to the direction of co-operative systems or systems governed by the tempered conflict of pluralism" (Robertson) (Simpson 1991:14; compare Beyer 1994:28).

For Simpson (1991:15), Wallerstein's theory "raises the question of the structure of the relationship between religion and other institutions at the global level". Wallerstein seems to regard religion, like culture, as "structurally dependent on processes of exchange". Questions which is left unanswered here include whether the envisaged relationship between economic and religious institutions is necessary, and the extend to which that relationship varies across time and space.

Meyer's contribution brings to the fore the conditions under which certain ideas ('myths', according to Simpson) come to "organize a context of action". This follows from Meyer's conclusion that, in the contemporary world system, "the myths of progress and science" possess "the greatest organizing capacity". Simpson maintains that Robertson's perspective does not exclusively concern the role of religion in globalization, but the construction and perception of identities at different levels "in the field of global interaction". Religion is important because of its function as one of several major generators of frames of reference in identity formation (Simpson 1991:15).

Simpson concludes that a theory which combines aspects of Wallerstein, Meyer, and Robertson's analyses should be attempted, which outlines "the structure of institutions and their relationship to exchange processes, the varying capacities of different types of myth to organize action, and the dynamics of symbolic interaction between selves, societies, and the system of nation-states at the global level" (Simpson 1991:16).

What would such a combined examination of global processes involve from a methodological perspective?

For Lechner (1991:264) "the problem of institutionalization of global forms of thought and action needs to be at the heart of world system analysis. Two other issues to address is (a) the historical process which produced (b) this particular world system". Research requires a focus on how the cultural construct (globality) achieves social form (Lechner 1991:263). That is, a study of "globally institutionalized modes of communication and association ... which involve interaction on an

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unprecedented scale .. guided by normative principles of unprecedented scope". Lechner argues that to explain global order as "natural" in either utilitarian notions (i.e. of outcomes of interactions), or of idealist notions (i.e. as outcomes of sacred principles) is unacceptable.

Garrett & Robertson (1991:xiv) maintain that theories of globalization "must define the role of cultural factors in establishing the parameters of that order by which the world is apprehended as 'one place'". This implies that the role of religious elements must be explained, a task which again provides a variety of responses. First, theorists who argue that cultural factors have a limited role in globalization tend to side with radical secularists, while those who acknowledge the function of culture tend - at the least - to be more ambivalent (Garrett & Robertson 1991:xiv). Second, theorists who accept that globality comprises norms, but not those directly linked to religious sources, (e.g. international law). Third, those who accept the basic secularity of globalization, but admit that religions can occupy certain niches in the world order. Fourth, those who believe that religions contribute "significantly to the development of patterns of universal order", though in forms not directly associated with denominational organizations (Garrett & Robertson 1991:xv).

The consequences of globalization can be viewed as including unavoidable participation in global projects (such as "democracy") and events; and also as the generation of specific "nation-states, ethnic groups, language communities, religious enclaves" and so on as a means of preserving identities. Insistence on national sovereignty can be read as a manifestation of global involvement (Garrett & Robertson 1991:xix).

5. CONCLUDING REMARKS

Chapter Three served to provide the base for later analyses, and so links backwards to the introduction and theoretical discussion as well as forwards to the concluding chapter. Any consideration of local social change should be considered against the global system to see whether it was prompted by developments at that level. World system theories form the widest possible macro-framework against which to measure changes in local phenomena. The relevance of world system and globalization approaches is that they enable me to construct a macro-sociological lens through which to view my conclusions in the final chapter.

My retention and synthesis of world-economy and world-polity into an analytical framework are prompted by the agreement on various issues between the three perceptions of the world system that were discussed in this chapter. These include the importance of an ideas system (Wallerstein) similar to the conceptualization of global norms (Meyer, Boli). World-economy and world-polity theorists also seem to agree on the relevance of location in overall system, while they differ on how this is to be defined. Both perspectives accord some significance to cultural hegemony, the role of the nation-state

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in nation-building, and the absence of a central actor in the world system. The structural similarities between world-polity and world-economy theories should not disguise the differences between them (compare (Finnemore 1996:328).

World system theories provide a tool kit of concepts suitable to this study. From globalization comes the notions of glocalization and the inherent dialectical tension of heterogeneity and homogeneity; and from world-economy, the centrality of geographic stratification (i.e. core-periphery relations). World-polity provides the central analytical concepts in this study, namely institutionalism, particularly the concepts of institutional ecology and isomorphism. In Chapter Six this tool kit will be applied to show how the macro-institutional environment (an idea derived from institutional ecology) and isomorphism affect linguistic diversity.

Isomorphic change is central to what I intend to argue: that congregations as social organizations tend to respond to conditions in a particular socio-political environment by usually becoming more alike (DiMaggio & Powell 1991:66). My focus on the state also makes coercive mechanisms relevant, that is, laws or ideologies set by the state which lead to the institutionalization of similar rules in organizational structures (compare DiMaggio & Powell 1991:68). Yet the influence of the other mechanisms cannot be dismissed: mimetic isomorphism is partly caused by the presence of individuals in churches who are also political beings. And normative isomorphism emerges in the apparent lack of attention in seminaries to preparing clergy to manage racial and linguistic integration. Institutionalism and its focus on isomorphism are relevant as I wish to include analysis of the nation-state and world system. A focus on institutions can increase our understanding of how patterns of language usage occur as a result of un/conscious decisions, shaped by external factors, which establish in/formal rules within congregations. According to Koelble (1995:236) institutions "shape the preferences and goals" of decision-makers, distribute power among the actors, and so affect outcomes. This recalls the discussion of rule-making in Chapter Two.

My emphasis on structure brings my work more in line with "new" historical institutionalists (who focus on structure) than with rational choice theorists (who emphasise individual action), just as my accentuation of the world system and the nation-state aligns me with sociological institutionalists who stress larger frames of reference. Within Scott's typology of institutional approaches, my study can be said to fit into the examination of variance at the meso-level and macro-level, although under the latter I include the global. Variance theories attempt to describe causal relationship between variables to determine why a particular outcome occurred. Generally the efficiency of independent variables - considered sufficient and necessary to particular outcomes - is isolated[12]; although the object of

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[12]. By contrast process theories deal with sequences of events which are considered necessary but not sufficient contributors to outcomes. The emphasis is on time sequences, and the question is how did this outcome come about (83).

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inquiry could focus on whether institutional factors are independent (why do institutions develop?) or dependent (what are the effects of institutions on organizations).

The world system is generally conceived as emerging out of increased density of interactions, usually of either an economic or political nature. What is often missed is that all forms of interaction has to be transacted through the medium of language, frequently the supracentral language of the hegemonic core state. This is often the case with economic or academic interactions. In this sense a global system evolves from increasing linguistic interaction and interdependence. The world-economy and the world-polity is thus tied together by a global language system, as De Swaan (1989) has noted.

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- CHAPTER FOUR -
LANGUAGE PRACTICE IN RACIALLY INTEGRATING CONGREGATIONS

Chapter Outline

The primary function of this chapter is to highlight linguistic integration, yet I include an emphasis on racial diversity due to its guiding role as independent variable in the selection of congregations for this study. More specifically, levels of linguistic integration are analysed in order to establish linkages between findings here, with discussions of nation-building (Chapter Five) and of the global forces which affect it (Chapters Three and Six). Chapter Four, then, is pivotal in providing the central empirical threads which are to be woven into the theoretical discussion. Another function of retaining a dual emphasis on race and language is to examine the existence and significance of any links between levels of integration.

In order to present a more coherent picture of the atomised quantitative data from the survey, two strategies will be followed, involving case studies. Reference will be made to relevant aspects of the same congregations in each of the sections, in order to supply illustrative strands which can be traced throughout the chapter and so tie the whole together. At the end of the chapter more elaborate mini-case studies of these six congregations will be presented. These strategies are also prompted by the nature of the data: impressions of leadership about the congregations render higher level quantitative analysis inadvisable.

A feature of the chapter is that generalisations are substantiated by reference to specific congregations, and filled out by detailed mini-case studies. Without exception, the 60 congregations included in this study are all examples of congregations which have either (a) always been diverse, or (b) are formerly white congregations which have recently become diverse. What the state is in black multilingual congregations still remains to be investigated. What little I know about them suggest that due to the multilingual facility of black South Africans, black congregations in multilingual settings will have thoroughly bilingual services. The exceptions would be those in highly homogenous contexts.

In Chapter Four I will outline the current levels of racial, musical, and language integration in the congregations surveyed. The first section profiles the racial and linguistic composition of the three major denominations emphasised in this study, and includes a brief history of the development of racial diversity in South African churches over the last hundred and eighty years. No direct connection exists between the racial composition of denominations and their congregations, due to the geographic segregation of ascribed race groups under apartheid.

Next I describe the current levels of racial, musical, and linguistic integration, concluding that relatively low levels of diversity exist. When the analysis moves up to the question of integration, the picture

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of integration among congregations, nine years after the abandonment of the Group Areas Act, needs explanation. The continuous effect of external structural constraints, and the institutionalised reproduction of the previous status quo, appear likely. While the racial and linguistic distribution of the South African population (described in Table 20, Chapter Five) is unequally distributed over the denominations, the picture is even more skewed in the congregations. Section 2.1 discusses how congregants evaluate diversity, and indicates their responses to diversity.

I now turn to a discussion of how race and language functioned in the history of the three major denominations in this study.

1. LANGUAGE AND RACE IN DENOMINATIONAL PERSPECTIVE

First I describe the current levels of linguistic and racial diversity in Anglican, Methodist, and Catholic Churches in South Africa, followed by the distribution of languages across the denominations.

1.1 A general history of the development of racial diversity

In this brief general history of how South African churches became racially and culturally diverse my primary focus is on the three major English-speaking Christian denominations who claim never to have followed segregationist policies. These include the Anglicans (Church of the Province of South Africa), Methodists (Methodist Church of South Africa), and Catholics. Despite the linguistic label, in these denominations blacks and black languages proportionally outweigh other language and racial categories. What follows is based on work I published elsewhere (Venter 1994b, 1995, 1998).

Racially-integrated congregations are rare in South Africa today, due mostly to the political policy of residential and social segregation enforced by the apartheid regime between 1948 and 1990. Only 3%[1] of all Anglican, Methodist, and Catholic churches in the whole of South Africa was identified by regional church officials as "significantly racially integrated and culturally diverse" in the 1997 survey on which this study is based. This translates into a projected 255 churches out of a possible 7 650 churches in the Anglican and Methodist churches alone (figures for the Catholic church could not be obtained).

I argued previously that "the formation of racially-mixed congregations can be described in terms of pre-apartheid, mid-apartheid, and post-apartheid periods. Congregations which emerge during the first and last periods de-emphasise race, in contrast to congregations formed in the second period, which exhibit a more explicit focus on race as basis for integration".

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[1]. This is an estimate based on returns of a postal survey, and people may simply not have responded.

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"In the pre-apartheid era the class distinctions exercised by colonists in the 19th century resulted in ethnically segregated institutions such as schools, churches, and eventually suburbs. A small number of congregations were integrated at the membership level, while leadership was the exclusive preserve of white male landowners. Ironically, the master-servant relationship not only functioned to integrate these congregations but also resulted in segregated seating for different race and class groups. Class coincided largely with race, and was reinforced by the experience of slavery" (Venter 1998:67).

Yet between the 17th to 19th centuries most denominations in the first colonised region of South Africa, the Cape of Good Hope (today the Western Cape), expressed the ideal of racially-mixed services (Venter 1994b). Some congregations put the ideal into practice until about 1872.

For example, in the Anglican church (then still part of the Church of England) in Cape Town, mixed services were implied in the hope expressed by a newly-arrived Anglican clergyman in ca. 1848 "that masters and mistresses and others having influence over the coloured population will use their exertions' to induce them to attend" (Langham-Carter 1977:56). Before the building of the Anglican mission chapels in Cape Town, people of colour (e.g. Malay converts) attended communion at St George's Cathedral in 1854, as they still did by 1877, according to a report by Archdeacon Lightfoot (Barnett-Clarke 1908:183). This general attitude still prevailed by 1879, as evident from the actions of Henry Bousfield, the Anglican Bishop of Pretoria, who "dealt sharply with one congregation which attempted to exclude Africans from its services" (Hinchliff 1968:155).

Similarly the Catholic parishes of the Cape of the 1880s "included both European and coloured" (Brown 1960:204). The Catholic Church "recognized no colour bar from the earliest times, all Catholics sharing the same building and joining in the same worship". Where separation occurred (e.g. of black miners in the Transvaal of the 1890s) it was because of "difficulties of language and distance" (Brain 1991:71). This inclusiveness has been attributed to the Catholic assimilationist thinking, exhibited in the Spanish and Portuguese colonies of the South and Central Americas, where mission was "an extension of Christian civilisation" (Brown 1960:204).

But the ideal was not always translated into reality, even for the extremely small number of English-speaking congregations who were racially-diverse from their inception due to the incorporation of servants/slaves. Racial incorporation was often skewed by separated seating arrangements for different races, the occasional turning away of people of colour, and by the overriding equation of white civilisation and culture with Christianity (compare Villa-Vicencio 1988:43,47,54; Maimela 1988:323; Goedhals 1989:108). By 1951 a Catholic priest justified segregated seating ("special places") "for Europeans, Coloureds and Bantu", provided "they are all admitted to the same communion rail" (Schimlek 1951:159). Segregated seating became unofficial Catholic practice until the 1970s.

The Anglican pew-rent system resulted not only in a class division, and fewer free seats for poor white and black people, but also caused church officials to be prejudiced against those unable to support the

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maintenance of the building in this way. Anglican Archdeacon Merriman witnessed the turning away of three Malays from a 1848 service at St George's (Anglican) Cathedral in Cape Town (Goedhals 1989:108). The completion of St Paul's mission in 1880, was applauded for potentially draining away some coloured people. Nicholas Merriman, first Anglican Archdeacon of the Eastern Cape, noted with disapproval that only whites attended Trinity Church, Cape Town in 1848, which "looked just like a smart London congregation" (Goedhals 1989:108).

Escalating pressure on the denominations' ideal came through increasing institutional segregation and the extension of class differentiation to the lower classes during the 19th century. *De facto* segregation in schools had existed "from the first half of the 19th century". The Anglicans had schools for the offspring of coloureds at Bishopscourt, and for those of African chiefs at Zonnebloem (Hinchliff 1968:36). By the mid-1880s this practice had extended to hospitals, prisons, and asylums. The effect was to separate poor whites from other groups (Bickford-Smith 1989:48; compare Brown 1960: 224)).

At base of this developing ideology of racial discrimination in the guise of liberalism was increasing industrialisation (e.g. of mining) and the "mineral revolution" since the 1870s (discovery of copper, diamonds, gold, coal). The liberal sentiments[2] which influenced the English-speaking churches from the 1880s emphasised the worth of individuals regardless of race; but paradoxically also maintained white power and social control (Goedhals 1989:111). Like the Dutch Reformed Church, the English-speaking churches mirrored the ideals of the dominant society (Villa-Vicencio 1988:22; Saayman 1990:28; compare Cochrane 1990:95). From the end of the 19th century onwards, segregation had developed into a fully-fledged racist ideology as "the dominant political emphasis in colonial policy", combined with a labour-repressive economic system of capitalism (Cochrane 1987:48,62).

This evolving political economy affected mission policy that in effect played an important role in the supply of labour, for which segregation was deemed necessary. Labour needs dictated by political interests determined mission policy at the turn of the century, and would again in the 1920s (Villa-Vicencio 1988:72). Missions' emphasis on "economic individualism" and tithes on the one hand functioned to co-opt black peasants into a labour market controlled by whites. On the other hand government taxes introduced a monetary economy and subsequently drove black farmers into industries and mining (compare Goedhals 1989:106; compare Kiernan 1990:15,16; Cochrane 1987:24). The emphasis on Western technologies and methods of production implicit in mission policy also created a a market for items manufactured by the British (Villa-Vicencio 1988:44, quoting John Philip of the LMS).

Mission policy divided mission work along racial lines almost from the start, so reflecting the influence

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[2]. "Liberal convictions include a belief in the importance and dignity of the individual without regard to colour, culture, creed and sex; emphasis on equality of opportunity, freedom of thought, conscience, speech, movement and association, and the rule of law; and the conviction that society can achieve political stability, economic prosperity and social justice by human effort and evolutionary pace" (Goedhals 1989:112).

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of "racial structuring of society" on theological reasoning (compare Saayman 1990:29). While clergy looked after settler parishes, from the mid-1880s missionaries were appointed with the sole purpose of preaching to the (black) heathen (Cawood 1964:20; Kritzinger 1994:180). The results were segregated services and later on segregated buildings for settler parishes and 'native missions'; as in the Dutch Reformed Church, so too in the Anglican, Methodist, and Catholic traditions (Goedhals 1989:109; Hinchliff 1963:194; Brain 1991:133-136). And once the "tribes" across the Orange River were thought of in 1840, the inclusive pattern of Catholic mission changed to segregated missions, as European civilisation was considered unlikely to dominate there (Brown 1960:204; see Oosthuizen 1968:15).

When the white National Party assumed power in 1948, four racial identities were legally recognised, namely "whites", "coloureds", "Asians", and "blacks"; each including several ethnic groups. Each South African was assigned to one of these four categories. The distinction made enforced discrimination possible between the whites and other groups. Residential segregation was enforced and racial intermarriage forbidden, so that interpersonal contact was severely curtailed and individual prejudice strengthened. Thus culminated a process initiated by colonial rulers in cities like Cape Town, Kimberley, Port Elizabeth, and Durban[3] during the previous century (Venter 1998:67).

Despite their vocal opposition to legislated discrimination, the English-speaking churches generally exhibited a pragmatic compliance to racial segregation. By 1964, Anglicans, Methodists, Catholics, and Presbyterians admitted that "people of different races do not normally worship together in the same church" (Cawood 1964:58,61,52,76,92). Segregated congregations became the rule well into the 1980s. Churches like St Mary's Anglican Cathedral in central Johannesburg which became integrated in 1957, were among the few exceptions. When colonial segregation hardened into apartheid policies, the churches were already compromised by more than 70 years of segregated practice (Cawood 1964). In a supremely ironic twist of history, the initial ideal of mixed services was now inverted.

In the mid-apartheid period of the 1960s a new form of deliberately racially-diverse congregations emerged, providing a pattern that was repeated in the 1970s and again in the 1980s.

Local congregations that were deliberately racially-mixed first emerged in the 1960s, in explicit defiance of the apartheid system. The idea seems to have been first formulated by Rev Rob J D Robertson in 1958, who formally proposed it in 1961 to the Assembly of the Presbyterian Church of South Africa. But not until 1962 was the prototype - in the form of North End Presbyterian Church, East London - founded (Robertson 1962:9, 1994:2; Regehr 1979:162). In a separate development at almost the same time, St Peter's-by-the-Lake Lutheran Church in Johannesburg was deliberately constituted in 1961 by whites, a black couple, and an Asian couple as founding members (Identity 1977bb:455,457-8). In 1968 Methodist clergyman Rev (now emeritus Bishop) Peter Storey launched

[3]. Segregation in Durban had been implemented by the Durban city council since 1871 (Maharaj 1992:74).

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a programme which eventually incorporated some whites into a coloured congregation, the Buitenkant St Methodist Church in Cape Town. Storey and Robertson had corresponded about the idea of deliberate integration. When Storey became superintendent minister at the Central Methodist Church in Johannesburg, from 1976 onwards he deliberately opened the congregation to all races.

Congregations which managed to remain integrated from their inception were usually located in racially-mixed neighbourhoods. Although some of these mixed neighbourhoods survived until the mid-1970s, many had been obliterated by the mid-1960s and would not reappear until the 1980s. An example of the former was St Antony's Congregational Church in Pageview, founded in 1975 in Johannesburg. St Mary's Catholic Cathedral in Cape Town reportedly remained racially-mixed (white, coloured) until the late 1940s, due mainly to the mixed nature of the surrounding neighbourhood; but seating was racially patterned. Generally-speaking, the Catholic Cathedrals remained racially-mixed islands in a sea of apartheid segregation in Cape Town, Johannesburg, Pretoria, and Kimberley. Segregated seating occurred in many, such as in the Kimberley cathedral from its opening in 1951 to the 1970s (Cawood 1964:10; Brain 1991:157).

An unexpected turn of events was the emergence of racially-diverse congregations in the mid-1980s at the height of state repression, due to two causes.

First, people of colour increasingly moved into white areas in defiance of the Group Areas Act. Such "grey" neighbourhoods had emerged by 1988 in Johannesburg suburbs such as the Central Business District, Mayfair, Hillbrow, Joubert Park, and Berea (De Coning e.a. 1987:121; Fick e.a. 1988). So Christ Church (Anglican) in Mayfair became integrated when a coloured family moved to Mayfair from Natal and started attending in about 1986. A church whose integration similarly depended largely on the changing rhythms of racial demographics was St Francis Xavier Catholic Church in Johannesburg. Initially founded in 1929 for blacks, the neighbourhood eventually became the racially-mixed "freehold" area of Martindale, in which blacks could own land. In addition, nearby a black township had been proclaimed after World War One. Black participation was effectively brought to an end in 1955 under the Group Areas Act, through forced removals. Few of these parishioners continued to attend. The area around the parish building became a white neighbourhood, and by the 1960s the church was predominantly white. Later the black township was declared a coloured area, and during the 1980s a smattering of people of colour started attending again. During the 1990s the neighbourhood steadily became mixed again (Venter 1998:72).

The second cause was the re-emergence of deliberately mixed congregations in the 1980s, echoing the mid-1960s pattern. In 1985 an independent charismatic church called Johweto was founded in Soweto[4]. In 1987 a small group of whites and Indians broke away with one of their (white) ministers from the Indian (Dutch) Reformed Church in Africa in Laudium to form the Reformed Confessing

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[4]. The name embodied the vision of crossing racial and economic lines drawn by apartheid between the predominantly white city of Johannesburg and Soweto.

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Community. In 1992 it amalgamated with Melodi Ya Tshwane[5] (black) Dutch Reformed Church in Africa congregation in Pretoria. The Central Methodist Mission in Cape Town started integrating in 1988, through amalgamation with Buitenkant St, on the insistence of the latter.

"Congregants who chose to join racially-mixed congregations during this period often espoused and were bound together by a political ideology which ran counter to that of the apartheid regime. Certain integrated congregations provided a site for political meetings and so entered into a prolonged confrontation with government forces, e.g. Central Methodist Church (Johannesburg). Compared to the racial segregation prevalent in the wider society and in most churches, these congregations" had a strong anti-systemic political identity, "and saw themselves as representative of what non-segregated society should be" (Venter 1998:67).

"Such mixed congregations worked against assimilation into the dominant political ideology of the wider apartheid culture. Religious identities were brought into line with political identities, and church membership became a political statement. Legitimation of anti-apartheid political ideologies could be obtained through the social interaction within racially-diverse congregations, which sustained the plausibility structure of the ideology. The persistence of the ideal of integrated congregations show that religious ideology accompanied and contributed to the reproduction of non-racialism as political ideology" (Venter 1998:67).

"In the post-apartheid era since 1990, integrating congregations have begun to emerge at a faster rate than in the previous two periods. Under the new regime previously homogeneous urban Christian congregations now have to manage an increasingly diverse racial, linguistic, and cultural membership. The year 1990 saw the release of Nelson Mandela and the unbanning of the liberation movements, which gave concrete impetus to those aspects of apartheid legislation which had been repealed just prior to this date (e.g. removal of restrictions on geographic mobility). Most of the congregations that are now integrating are located in neighbourhoods that became increasingly diverse; particularly inner city areas" (Venter 1998:67).

As a result people are increasingly drawn into multilingual settings alongside others previously classified as "other" in terms of race, language, and culture. These congregations also offer the possibility to be Western and African, although in practice most assimilate the latter into the former. South Africa's present non-racial ideology encourages cultural diversity within the same institution, across all sectors of society - from educational to economic institutions. The present post-apartheid era opens up new possibilities of renegotiating ascribed and enforced identities. Yet the old identities and linguistic preferences prove hard to do way with.

"More-recently formed racially-diverse congregations feed into and is supported by the dominant

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[5]. Melodi Ya Tshwane (the song of Tshwane) was the name given to Pretoria before the whites came, by men listening to the birds as they brought their cattle to drink at the Fountains. Evangelist Piet Mabuza had suggested the name for the congregation.

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political ideology of non-racialism, as exemplified by emeritus Archbishop Desmond Tutu's espousal of the "rainbow-nation" slogan. Non-racialism pressures religious people to form or join integrating congregations, and links up with historical attempts by church leaders to promote such expressions of pluralism. In addition many denominations have started exerting an increasing pressure on segregated congregations to integrate, such as Methodist and Anglican churches" (Venter 1998:67).

Attempts to unite various racial groups in churches do not always meet with success. The Methodist Church of SA (MCSA) has attempted to unite previously racially segregated regional structures[6] since 1976, without complete success - despite the initial target date of January 1996. Both the Anglicans and Methodists are trying to integrate white congregations with black ones, which up to now have met at different times in the same building. These euphemistically-termed "afternoon services" are held primarily for domestic workers in vernacular languages under the authority of a black clergy-person based in a nearby black "township" congregation. The majority of English-speaking congregations continue to exhibit little or no integration due to the lasting effects of geographic separation. In some cases in Cape Town such racially segregated congregations are separated from one another by less than a kilometre. Lack of integration is of course not limited to the English-speaking churches: Afrikaans-speaking churches like the DRC remain hesitant to unite with the black and coloured Uniting Reformed Church.

In the light of the above, the most remarkable aspect about racially-mixed local congregations in South Africa is not that they do not exist, but that some exist at all.

1.2 Distribution of race by denominational affiliation

While the English-speaking denominations were technically racially-mixed since their inception, the rate of integration of black clergy into national church structures was very slow. Compare for instance church founding dates with the appointment of e.g. blacks to denominational positions. The Catholic church was founded in 1834, and the Anglican church in 1848. In the Anglican church only white bishops were appointed until 1953, and all had been born in England. The first black bishop (Alpheus Zulu) was appointed in 1960, and the first black archbishop (Desmond Tutu) in 1986 (Goedhals 1989:120,124; Cawood 1964:16,56; Hinchliff 1968:240). By 1980 only one diocesan and four suffragan (assistant) bishops were black. By 1988 nine out of 18 diocesan bishops and five suffragan bishops were black (Goedhals 1989:121; Pato 1989:172).

The Methodist church was established in South Africa in 1814, but the first black Methodist president (Seth Mokitimi) was only elected in 1963 (Gish 1985:74). In the whole history of the Methodist church only seven black presidents had been appointed by 1988 (Gish 1985:4,69). The current Presiding

[6]. The areas under discussion are called "circuits" - a number of congregations grouped together in a specific geographic area.

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Bishop (Mvume Dandala) is also black. Apart from most congregations, regional (circuit) structures were also segregated until 1976.

Table 7: Race as percentage of denominational affiliation, 1993

	Black	*Coloured*	*Asian*	*White*
Anglican	46.62%	26.32%	1.5%	25.56%
Catholic	69.27%	15.63%	5.73%	9.38%
Methodist	69.54%	14.37%	0.57%	15.52%

Source: HSRC Omnibus Survey 1993. Used by permission of the Sociology Departments of Huguenot College and the University of Pretoria.

As a percentage of denominational affiliation (Table 7), blacks form clear majorities in the Catholic, Anglican, and Methodist Churches. Blacks make up almost 70% in both Catholic and Methodist Churches, but less than half of the Anglican church. White Anglicans have decreased from 12.49% in 1960 to 7.72% in 1993 according to HSRC data. Coloureds form a significant minority in the Anglican church, a factor which reportedly affects church politics in regions such as the Northern and Western Cape, where they form a majority.

As a percentage of the total population, 12% of all black South Africans are Catholics, and 11% are Methodists (Zaaiman 1994; Human Science Research Council's 1993 Omnibus survey). Eleven percent of all people formerly classified as "coloureds" claim affiliation to the Anglican denomination.

1.3 Distribution of languages by denominational affiliation

No single language group has been captured by a particular Christian brand but, as Table 8 shows, various languages are distributed across the three major Christian denominations involved in the study. A similar distribution occurs across other denominations. The exception is Afrikaans-speakers, who tend to belong to either the Uniting or Dutch Reformed Churches.

Ten or more languages occur across most major Christian denominations, namely the African Independent, Reformed, Catholic, Methodist, Anglican, and Lutheran Churches (Kritzinger 1995:360). Zulu-speakers are spread out across the Catholic Church (32,7% in 1980; 37% in 1993), the Methodist churches (21% and 27.6%), the Lutheran Church (32.9% in 1980) and the African Independent Churches (42% in 1980; Kritzinger 1995:360). Northern Sotho- (24.9% in 1980) and Zulu-speakers (35% in 1980) form the largest blocks among those practising African Traditional Religion (Kritzinger 1995:364).

Historically missionaries had a strong influence on language development, as they learnt - and

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standardised - indigenous languages. Yet from early on a division of labour emerged among missionaries who could speak indigenous languages, and other clergy who could not. For example, in the 1800s few Catholic priests could speak indigenous languages, and so most served the white urban areas, where Mass was conducted in Latin and the sermon or instruction in English (Brain 1991:71). In this way language and race became interrelated, so that language differences corresponded to racial segregation.

Table 8: Language as percentage of denominational affiliation, 1993

	Eng	*Afr*	*Xhosa*	*Zulu*	*Sotho*	*Sha/ Tso*	*Swa/ Nde*	*O/E*
Anglican	39.1%	13.5%	15%	14.3%	0.8%	1.5%	0%	**.8%**
Catholic	19.3%	10.9%	6.8%	37%	22.9%	1%	1%	**0.5%**
Methodist	16.1%	14.9%	14.9%	27.6%	21.8%	1.7%	2.9%	**0%**

Source: HSRC Omnibus Survey 1993. Used by permission of the Sociology Departments of Hugenote Kollege and the University of Pretoria.

Note: Eng = English, Afr = Afrikaans, Sha/Tso = Shangaan/Tsonga; Swa/Nde = Swati/Ndebele; O/E = Other European; O = Other

As social institutions, denominations are carriers of the social, cultural, economic, and political forces in society (see Villa-Vicencio 1988:42). And so congregations also have the values of European culture imprinted on the language, structures and processes of their denominations (Ramphele 1989:179; see Cochrane 1987:26; Saayman 1994:12; Bill 1994:168). In South African pentecostal and independent charismatic churches the cultural overlay is usually that of the USA, due to historical links. Many South African Pentecostal churches were founded by US citizens. The pattern started in 1908, when US citizen John G Lake and others held the first pentecostal services in this country in Doornfontein, Johannesburg (Cawood 1964:102). In 1866 the black African Methodist Episcopalian (AME) Bishop William Taylor visited and subsequently the AME was founded here. A variation is presented by the Rhema Bible Church, founded after Ray McCauley visited the US.

2 LANGUAGE AND RACE IN CONGREGATIONAL PERSPECTIVE

2.1 Development and extent of racial diversity in congregations surveyed

While Section 1.1 outlined the general history of racial integration in South African churches, here I focus specifically on the common features in the histories of the 60 responding congregations. This theme will be fleshed out by more detailed case studies in Section 3, below.

Whites were obviously over-represented, and blacks underrepresented in the survey, as most of the

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congregations were previously exclusively white (except those who were always mixed), so that they contained less than a quarter of blacks, coloureds, or people from Indian descent. Twenty congregations contained no-one from Indian descent; seven had no black congregants; six no coloureds; and only one church had no whites. In 17 cases whites formed a majority greater than 75%, and in 10 formed a majority between 51% and 75% of the congregation. In five congregations coloureds formed a majority greater than 75%, and in six cases made up between 50% and 75% of the congregation. Blacks were in two cases a majority greater than 75%, and in three made up between 50% and 74% of the congregation.

Fifty-five congregations indicated that they had became increasingly racially diverse over a period spanning 166 years. Of all churches in the sample, St John's Church in Wynberg has been racially-diverse the longest, since its founding in 1830. Three congregations (St Mary's, St Stephen's, and Shophar) represent the most recently-mixed, dating their racially-diversity to 1996. An arbitrary breakdown shows clearly that the rate at which congregations are integrating is speeding up. Thirteen racially-integrated congregations emerged during 1974-1989, compared to the 24 that did between 1989-1997. In the 63 years from 1830 to 1899, seven congregations were racially integrated, compared to the seven that became mixed over the next 48 years (1900-1948). During the next 24 years (1949-73) the integration-rate slowed down, with only four achieving this status. But the inverse happened over the subsequent 23-year period (1974-97), with 37 congregations becoming integrated[7].

In constructing Table 9, 17 (32%) of the 54 valid cases were excluded, as these respondents indicated that their congregations had always been racially-mixed. For this reason they were deemed irrelevant to the discussion of factors which had contributed to increasing racial diversity. By themselves these congregations would have represented the highest single percentage of valid responses - far greater than I expected. Continuous racial diversity was a factor almost completely neglected in my previous research (Venter 1994, 1995). Several examples occur in the Cape Town area, notably the Anglican Churches of St Paul's (Rondebosch, founded in 1834), St Saviour's (Claremont, 1850), and Holy Trinity (Kalk Bay, 1855). Central Methodist Mission, represents a trajectory which moved from initial racial heterogeneity to homogeneity and then completed the cycle to its present integrated format. A particular sub-species here is the deliberately integrated congregations, which emerged in conscious defiance of the political system during the dark years of apartheid.

A factor which Table 9 identifies quite clearly is the significance of external causes, reported by 70% (26 out of 37 valid cases) as affecting integration. Substantially fewer congregations became

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[7]. A more historically sensitive division could be arrived at, by noting the number that became racially-mixed under petty apartheid from 1948to 1966(4 congregations), compared to those which initiated mixing under grand apartheid from 1967to 1986(10congregations). Special attention should be paid to the period marking the height of repression, arguably stretching from 1984 (the year before the first state of emergency) to 1989 (the year before the unbanning of the liberation movements) (8 congregations). But such alternative schemas do not alter my basic conclusion that the rate of integration is increasing.

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Table 9: Factors cited for change towards increased racial diversity (N=37) Source: Own data, 1997.

Source of change	***Frequency***	***Valid Percent***
External		
Legislation	*5*	*13.5%]*
Creation of homelands	3	8.1%
Group Areas scrapped	2	5.4%
[Demographics	*17*	*6.3%]*
People moved through company policy	1	2.7%
Demographics of area changed	13	35.1%
Some demographic mix always present	2	5.4%
Only church in town	1	1.9%
[Denomination]	*5*	*13.5%*
Black priest appointed	1	2.7%
Denominational programme	1	2.7%
Changed parish boundaries	2	5.4%
Subtotal:	*26*	*70.3%*
Internal		
Leaders' efforts	3	8.1%
Special programme implemented	1	1.9%
Subtotal:	*4*	*10.8%*
Unknown		
'A miracle'	1	2.7%
'Natural togetherness'	3	8.1%
'Gradual process'	1	2.7%
'Just opened our door'	1	2.7%
'Don't know'	1	2.7%
Subtotal:	*7*	*18.9%*
Totals:	**37**	**100%**
No response	3	8.1%
Invalid responses	3	8.1%

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integrated as result of internal dynamics (11%). (i.e. pro-active processes initiated by congregational leadership). So although leadership do play a crucial role, their integrative function in most churches seems limited to a small percentage of cases, or at best is an intervening factor subsequent to ecological changes. A periodisation of the process indicates that the integrative function of clergy was greater under apartheid than in the post-apartheid era, when demographics played a more significant role.

In all, almost three-quarter of respondents became integrated due to factors beyond the control of the congregation itself. The implication is that the greater majority of unintegrated congregations will not be able to induce integration deliberately, and that denominations were doing extremely little to proactively enhance the process. But such a conclusion is premature, as closer scrutiny of the dates of integration will show. Those who exercised some choice became integrated in recent years; while those who did not, changed some time ago. Only 11% (4 cases) reported self-initiated integration, while an additional 11% (4 cases) pointed to denominational actions as causes, such as clergy appointments (one case), or changes to parish boundaries (two cases). Some 19% of respondents (7 cases) ascribed integration to other causes than the above, such as "a miracle" (one case), "natural togetherness" (three cases), or "a gradual process" (one case).

The link between neighbourhood racial diversity and congregational racial diversity seems to be clearly demonstrated in Table 9. Almost half of the 37 responding congregations (48.7%, or 18 cases) indicated that demographic factors were primarily responsible for integration, This occurred through an increasing movement of people of colour into formerly white neighbourhoods, especially after the Group Areas Act was repealed. Obviously state legislation closely affected the internal organization of religious institutions in the apartheid and post-apartheid era. Yet apartheid legislation also unwittingly aided integration in instances where the composition of congregations were changed through the incorporation of their communities into the former homelands. Many congregations reported that three or more race groups are present in the neighbourhood surrounding the church buildings, and many also reported the presence of two race groups.

Yet I would argue that no direct relationship exists between racial diversity in the neighbourhood and in the congregation, a point also argued by Massie (1993). In many cases congregants commute long distances to the church meetings, so that only where congregations draw most of their members from the immediate neighbourhood would there be any direct effect. The eight out of the 60 congregations who stated that no-one lived within walking distance to their church buildings are unlikely to be affected by the demographics of neighbourhood. The same is true for a further 29, who had less than 10% of congregants resident in their neighbourhoods. My argument is substantiated by the three racially well-integrated congregations found in neighbourhoods with only one race group, and the three somewhat integrated congregations in similar areas. A further argument could be made on the basis of the two poorly integrated congregations located in areas with residents from three or more races.

2.1.1 Racial integration index

Table 10 reviews the extent to which racial integration has occurred in responding congregations, measured by three categories in Question 10 - leadership, outreach programmes, and home groups.

The index represents a ranking according to a composite score that was obtained by supplying a score

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for every congregation in each category, and then adding up all the category scores. Table 10 reflects the overall ranking, and the scores for each category. For each category, a church was scored as follows: the response "not mixed" obtained a score of 1; "some mix" a score of 2; and "representative" (of the racial diversity of congregants) a score of 3. The subtotals from each of the three categories were then added up to give an overall score out of a possible 9. Churches with an overall score of between 1 to 3 were classified as poorly integrated; between 4 to 6 were regarded as somewhat integrated; and those with an overall score of between 7 to 9 as well-integrated. For example, St Peter's Anglican Church, Tzaneen, scored 2 for leadership; 3 for outreach programmes; and 2 for home groups. St Peter's overall score of 7 out of a possible 9 meant that it was regarded as well-integrated.

One of the drawbacks of this index is that congregations whose leadership was unintegrated could still appear well-integrated, if it scored highly on the other two categories. However, Boli (personal communication, 1999) indicates that "such mismatches are inherent in any index that combines several variables". In any case, this can be corrected by also considering overall integration along with leadership integration, as in Table 17, below. For example, while Rhema seems "somewhat" integrated, its leadership is only partly integrated. The same is true of St Peter's Church, whose "well-integrated" ranking disguises a "somewhat" integrated leadership - a category for congregations which exhibit neither fully representative nor completely homogeneous leadership. Examples of the latter include 10 congregations which have no other races in their leadership, and 8 cases which have none in outreach programmes and home groups.

Table 10: Racial integration index (N=51)[a]

Level	*Overall*	*Leadership*	*Programmes*	*Home groups*
Poorly	5.9%	17.6%	15.7%	15.7%
integrated	*3*[b]	*9*	*8*	*8*
Somewhat	39.2%	37.3%	43.1%	43.1%
integrated	*20*	*19*	*22*	*22*
Well integrated	54.9%	45.1%	41.2%	41.2%
	28	*23*	*21*	*21*
	100%	100%	100%	100%

Source: Own data, 1997.
Note:
[a] Nine cases were discarded for including invalid or no response to the three categories
[b] Refers to the number of cases.

Through use of this multidimensional method, 54.9% (28 of 52 cases) could be said to be substantially integrated, with 39.2% (20 cases) somewhat integrated, and 5.9% (or 3 cases) poorly integrated. Table 10 shows that slightly more well-integrated congregations have racially-representative leadership (45.1%) than those with well-integrated home groups (41.2%). Yet the reverse is true for somewhat integrated congregations. Here home groups tend to be more racially-representative (43.1%) than leadership (39.2%) - and a similar pattern emerges among poorly integrated congregations. No hint emerged from the data to explain this. There may possibly be more resistance in somewhat integrated congregations to integrate leadership than there is in well-integrated congregations, but this remains

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speculation.

When the 21 cases of Anglican, Methodist, and Catholic churches that are racially well-integrated are compared, more Anglican (61.9% or 13 cases) than Catholic churches (33.3% or 7 cases) can be placed in this category. One Methodist congregation was well-integrated. Again, no data emerged to explain this. Perhaps the ongoing difficulties of Methodists to integrate have to do with the relative importance of smaller scale supra-congregational structures (circuits and their quarterly meetings) which were segregated in the past. These appear to set up racialised tensions regarding power and control of resources whenever circuit or congregational mergers are mooted. Not a single Anglican church indicated that they were poorly racially integrated, compared to one Methodist and three Catholic churches.

Of the eight racially well-integrated congregations which claim always to have been integrated, three were already diverse in the 19th century (Christ Anglican Church, St John's Wynberg, St Saviour's Anglican Church Claremont), two in the early 20th century before apartheid (Vryheid Catholic Church; Our Lady Help of Christians Catholic Church), and three during apartheid (St Catherine Catholic Church; Ubunye Free Methodist Church; Sacred Heart Catholic Church).

The average integration rates (time elapsed between founding and integration of congregants; see p.99) for the remainder are far longer for the Anglican (79-130 years) than for the Catholic (3-23 years) - with one exception (Christ the Redeemer Catholic Church in Klerksdorp, 1896-1994). As can be expected, the integration rates for racially well-integrated IFCC congregations are shorter again than for any other denomination (1-4 years) of this type. This is due to their nature as churches which suffer neither the drag from long church traditions nor from de-centralised authority structures.

2.2 Extent of language diversity in congregations surveyed

2.2.1 Extent of language diversity

Responding congregations were asked to indicate the approximate percentage of first language speakers in their respective congregations. Ten of South Africa's eleven official languages were distributed over the 59 valid responses, while the number of first languages of congregants in a particular congregation ranged from two to 11 languages, excluding foreign languages.

The presence of up to four first languages in a congregation was fairly common, as Table 11 illustrates. Forty-five congregations (76.3%) contained 1-4 first languages; 12 (20.3%) between 5 to 8; and two (3.4%) had 9 to 12 first languages. A similar number of congregations had five (5 or 8.5%) languages than had six first language-speakers (4 or 6.8%).

Despite the English-speaking label of the denominations to which these churches belong, in a quarter (16 cases) English first-language speakers made up 30% or less of the total membership, as Table 12 illustrates. Three churches (5.4%) reported that no English was spoken by members of their congregations. In 11 congregations (19.7% of 59) surveyed, the number of people who spoke English as first language made up less than 20% of the total. English first-language speakers formed a majority (50% or more of all members) in 40 out of 59 congregations, which includes a two-thirds majority

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(more than 65%) in 29 cases (or 49.6%). In all, English first-language speakers were found across 55 congregations.

Table 11: Number of first languages present in congregations (N=59)

Number of languages	*Number of cases*	*% of responses*
2	14	23.7%
3	18	30.5%
4	13	22%
5	5	8.5%
6	4	6.8%
7	1	1.7%
8	2	3.4%
10	1	1.7%
11	1	1.7%

Source: Own data, 1997.

Afrikaans was spoken by more than 50% of the congregation in 8 out of 59 churches (i.e. 14.8%). Altogether 18 (35.9%) reported that 25% and more of their congregation was Afrikaans-speaking. In 12 (20%) no Afrikaans-speakers were reportedly present. In 54% of all churches surveyed Afrikaans formed the first language of 8% or less of the total membership. Afrikaans first-language speakers were spread over 46 congregations. European first-language speakers (other than English) were distributed over 19 cases, and Asian first-language speakers over eight.

Table 12: Distribution of English first language speakers by congregations (N=59)

% of English first language speakers	*No. of Cases*	*Percentage*
None	3	3.6%
1-33%	13	22%
34-66%	17	28.8%
67-100%	28	47.5%

Source: Own data, 1997.

In terms of African languages, Zulu were spread over 23 congregations, Xhosa over 18, Sotho over 15, Tsonga over 6, Swazi over 5, Venda over 2, Shangaan over 4, Pedi over 4, Tswana over 3. Other African first-language speakers were distributed over 17 congregations (29%).

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2.2.2 Linguistic integration index

In order to assess the extent of linguistic diversity in each congregation, I constructed a linguistic-diversity index as shown in Table 13. A different procedure was employed to devise this index than was used for the racial integration index. The level of linguistic integration was represented in terms of whether or not churches' services reflect the number of languages in the congregation.

Overall ranking in the linguistic-integration index was determined in terms of three dimensions: monolingual, bilingual, or multilingual. These were used to describe (a) the number of languages in services, as well as (b) the number of language groups present in each congregation.

The number of languages in *services* was determined by responses to Question 4, where respondents indicated whether "one", "two", or "three or more" languages were used in sermons, hymns, liturgy, praying, and readings. In order to be classified as bilingual, two languages had to be used in at least three out of the five categories. To qualify as a multilingual service, three or more languages had to be used in at least three out of the five categories. So St Peter's, for example, could be classified as "somewhat" linguistically integrated, as two languages were used in four of the five categories; with monolingual sermons as the exception.

Table 13: Language integration index: number of languages in congregation and number used in services (N=51)[a]

Level of integration (index)	*N*	*Number of languages in congregation [b]*	*Number of languages used in service*	*Total as % of responses*
Poorly integrated	23	Three or more (multilingual)	One (monolingual)	45.1%
Somewhat integrated	9	Two (bilingual)	One (monolingual)	17.6%
	13	Three or more (multilingual)	Two (bilingual)	25.5%
Well integrated	4	Two (bilingual)	Two (bilingual)	7.8%
	2	Three or more (multilingual)	Three or more (multilingual)	3.9%

Source: Own Data, 1997.

Note: [a] Nine cases were discarded for including invalid or no response to the three categories.
[b] Number of first languages spoken by congregants.

The number of *language groups* present in each congregation was decided by responses to Question 19. Here, respondents had to indicate in percentages the number of congregants who spoke any of thirteen first languages. While the given percentages could be dismissed as "guesstimates", the number of language groups identified is likelier to be underestimated. This is because respondents were conceivably only aware of the languages of members with whom they had had contact; additional languages may have been present.

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Three rankings were devised from the data, based on how the three dimensions affected the configuration of languages in services and languages present in the congregation. These included (a) a multilingual-monolingual configuration, which I classified as "poorly" integrated; (b) bilingual-monolingual or multilingual-bilingual arrangements, regarded as "somewhat" integrated; (c) multilingual-multilingual or bilingual-bilingual groupings, categorised as "well-integrated". In other words, churches were regarded as linguistically "well-integrated" when the number of languages in services corresponded directly to the number of language groups present. In linguistically "poorly" integrated churches the disparity between the languages used in services and languages present in the congregations were greater than those which were placed in the "somewhat" integrated ranking.

The linguistic integration index (Table 13) shows that six congregations could be ranked as "well-integrated", compared to 22 that were "somewhat" and 23 that were "poorly" integrated. What Table 13 disguises to a certain extent is that monolingual services are the norm in multilingual congregations. One language is used in the services of 62.7% of congregations (32 of 51 cases), which is remarkable as in 38 congregations (74.5% of 60 cases) three or more first language groups are present. In 33% of responding congregations two languages are used (17), and in only 3.9% (2) is three or more used. Given the presence of more than one first-language group in all congregations polled, bilingual services would have been the expected option, at the least.

Table 14 shows a more detailed picture which emerges when the number of languages used in services (column three in Table 13) is broken down into its five constituent parts. Of the 51 valid responses in answer to the question of how many languages was used in the sermon, 72.5% (37 cases) had monolingual preaching only; compared to the 27.5% who did not - including 13 which had bilingual (25.5%) and 1 (2%) multilingual sermons. The language of preference was usually English.

Table 14: Number of languages used in services by number of congregations (N=51)[a]

	Sermons	*Liturgy*	*Prayers*	*Hymns*	*Readings*
One language used	**37** *72.5%*	**32** *62.7%*	**31** *60.8%*	**30** *58.8%*	**29** *56.9%*
Two languages used	**13** *25.5%*	**16** *31.4%*	**17** *33.3%*	**17** *33.3%*	**19** *37.3%*
Three or more languages used	**1** *2%*	**3** *5.9%*	**3** *5.9%*	**4** *7.8%*	**3** *7.8%*

Source: Own Data, 1997.
Notes:
[a] Nine cases were discarded for including invalid or no response to the three categories

Other than may be expected, there seems to be a correlation between a relatively low number of first languages present in a congregation, and whether language is perceived as a problem or not. While three out of the sample of 61 congregations reported 7 to 10 first languages present, all 28 other valid responses reported between 2 and 6 first language groups. Of the 28, seven had 2 first languages; seven had 3; eight had 4; three had 5; and three 6. In other words, 14 congregations with a maximum

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of three language groups reported that language was a problem; and so did eight who had four.

Generally-speaking, the more languages were used in the services, the more likely the congregation was to indicate that language would be a problem. Nine linguistically well-integrated congregations indicated that language was a problem; most were Catholic (Matatiele, Sacred Heart, St Patrick's Cathedral, St Augustine's, Immaculate Conception); some Anglican churches (St Barnabas Anglican Church Church, St Catherine's Catholic Church Church, St Michael & St George's Anglican Church) and Lighthouse Christian Centre. On the other hand, two congregations which ranked high on the language index indicated that language was not a problem: Sacred Heart and St Francis Catholic churches.

There seems to be a fairly strong inverse correlation between first languages spoken and level of linguistic integration. Where a high number of first languages are present (ten or more), churches tend to fall into the somewhat integrated category. Conversely, where relatively fewer languages are present (2 to 6), higher rates of language integration are reported. This was true for all 11 most linguistically integrated congregations, including eight Catholic churches (Matatiele, Sacred Heart, St Patrick's Cathedral, St Augustine's, Immaculate Conception; St Catherine's Church; Sacred Heart; Vryheid), two Anglican churches (St Michael & St George's; St Barnabas'), and the Lighthouse Christian Centre.

More congregations with higher levels of language integration (11 cases) reported language as a form of diversity which affects the congregation than those with high ratings which reported no such influence (3 cases: Sacred Heart Tongaat; Vryheid; Ubunye FMC). There were no substantial differences in level of language integration between congregations which did or did not report language as a influence at medium and lower ratings.

In several cases congregations dealt with language differences by structuring separate services for the different language groups (St Dominic Catholic Church, Welkom - an example of a church with diversity but nil integration).

2.2.3 Level and contribution of external linguistic diversity

Most respondents perceived their congregations to be in neighbourhoods that were substantially linguistically diverse. In general, 75.9% of respondents (44 of 60 cases) reported that two or more language groups occurred in the neighbourhoods around their congregation's buildings - including 27 (46.6%) which were in neighbourhoods where three or more languages are spoken. In other words, only 24.1% (14) described their neighbourhoods as linguistically homogenous (see Table 15).

One could reasonably expect that higher levels of linguistic diversity in neighbourhoods would support higher levels of linguistic diversity in congregations, but this does not seem to be the case. A crude cross-tabulation (Table 16) shows that neighbourhoods with high linguistic diversity is associated with congregations with medium levels of diversity. The number of cases for high levels of diversity is too low (3 cases) for any meaningful interpretation. Low levels of neighbourhood linguistic diversity is not strongly associated with any of the three levels for congregational diversity, as a fairly even number were distributed through all three categories.

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Table 15: Number of languages in neighbourhoods (N = 58)

	Cases	*Percentage of valid cases*
One language	14	24.1%
Two languages	17	29.3%
Three or more languages	27	46.6%

Source: Own Data, 1997.
Note: 1 Invalid response; 1 No response.

There seems to be a weak link between the languages and their associated regions (see Section 1.3) and the language distribution among the congregations. For instance, congregations with relatively significant percentages of Zulu, Swati and Pedi-speakers are found in provinces in which these languages feature prominently. But this does not appear to be the case for the other eight languages.

Table 16: Language diversity in congregations by Language diversity in neighbourhood (N = 54)

Congregation	Neighbourhood		
Levels of diversity:	*Low*	*Medium*	*High*
Low	7	9	8
Medium	5	7	15
High	0	1	2

Source: Own Data, 1997.
Note: Six invalid and no responses.

3. CASES STUDIES OF LANGUAGE INTEGRATION IN RACIALLY-DIVERSE CONGREGATIONS

3.1 General features of case studies

Six case studies are presented below to flesh out the quantitative descriptions of racially diverse congregations supplied in Section Two, above. The cases were not selected randomly but rather for displaying certain features relevant to the discussion of linguistic integration in particular, and racial integration in general. Yet they do differ from one another in terms of features which also occur across the rest of the sample, namely manner of integration and the period during which this occurred, location, size, faith tradition, and levels of racial and linguistic integration. Table 17 on the next page represent three dimensions of linguistic integration and two of racial integration. The discussion will highlight the diversity and similarities in the sample that is submerged in the unavoidable but necessary reductionism inherent in tables such as these.

I will now briefly highlight some of the more interesting features of each case, before turning to a more detailed discussion in the following subsections.

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Sacred Heart Catholic Church represents the only case in the sample where black parishioners insisted on the inclusion in the service of their first languages. Their insistence was no doubt aided by their numerical superiority; yet, significantly, no other congregation with a majority of black congregants demonstrated this linguistic initiative. Yet in a few cases, non-whites did contribute significantly to racial integration. Perhaps Sacred Heart's sympathetic priest who could speak the majority black language of his parishioners helped to make the difference.

St Joseph's Catholic Church is unusual for the way in which it integrates the linguistic diversity of its parishioners into its services. Fort Beaufort Presbyterian Church is also unique for a number of reasons, not least because racial integration involved in part the initiative of parishioners, most of whom were non-South African Africans. But Fort Beaufort is also rare because of the sensitizing role that the cultural background of the minister played in his approach to the congregation.

Table 17: General features of six case studies

Congregation	*Language integration index* [a]	*Number of languages used in sermons*	*Racial integration index*	*Level of racial integration of leaders*
Fort Beaufort Presbyterian	**Poorly integrated**	**One**	**Well-integrated**	**Somewhat integrated**
St Peter's Anglican Church, Pietersburg	**Somewhat integrated**	**One**	**Well-integrated**	**Somewhat integrated**
Sacred Heart Catholic Church, Tongaat	**Somewhat integrated**	**Two**	**Well-integrated**	**Well-integrated**
Holy Trinity Catholic Church, Midrand	**Somewhat integrated**	**?**	**Somewhat integrated**	**Somewhat integrated**
Rhema Bible Church, Randburg	**Somewhat integrated**	**Two**	**Well-integrated**	**Somewhat integrated**
St Joseph's Catholic Church, Howick	**Well-integrated**	**Two**	**Somewhat integrated**	**Well-integrated**

Source: Own Data, 1997.
Notes: [a] Number of first languages of congregants compared to number of languages used in services; i.e. if there are two languages spoken in the congregation and these two are used in the services, the congregation ranks as well-integrated linguistically. Compare Table 13.

Like St Joseph's, Sacred Heart represents cases which were racially integrated from the start. By contrast Fort Beaufort, Holy Trinity, and St Peter's were all integrated after 1990. While St Peter's and Holy Trinity provide examples of the role played by demographic factors in racial integration, this was clearly not the case for Rhema, which represents congregations which became racially diverse during the latter period of the apartheid era. Rhema is located in a predominantly white suburb and yet

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became racially-diverse a year after its founding. While a single race neighbourhood also exists around St Peter's Church, two other factors make this an interesting case. First, the pro-active environment created by the regional (diocesan) structures, and second, the use of an external consultant - the only such instance I know of. While the leadership of Holy Trinity and St Peter's were quite deliberate in creating more racially diverse congregations, Rhema's initial integration came almost by default.

3.1 Congregations that rate as linguistically poorly integrated

As indicated in Table 13, 47.2% of congregations (25 out of 53) can be placed in this category, because they conduct primarily monolingual services for congregants who speak three or more different first languages. This includes 47.4% of Anglican, 42.1% of Catholic, 62.5% of Methodist, and 66.7% of IFCC congregations.

3.1.1 Fort Beaufort Presbyterian Church

Fort Beaufort Presbyterian Church was founded in 1847 in the Eastern Cape rural town of Fort Beaufort, which, according to the church's minister, presently has a population of about 2 500 families (Germiquet interview).

When Rev Eddie Germiquet began his ministry at Fort Beaufort Presbyterian in 1985, the congregation comprised 35 white members, which met two to three times each month. Most were farming in the area surrounding Fort Beaufort. About 70% of the population is Afrikaans-speaking. Recently the ranks of residents were swelled by academics from Fort Hare University, in nearby Alice, who prefer to live in Fort Beaufort. Some of these university personnel were from African countries, which explains the presence of e.g. Nigerians, Ghanains, and Zairians in Fort Beaufort Presbyterian Church.

In 1997 between 70 to 80 adults on average attended Fort Beaufort Presbyterian on Sundays, with 45 to 50 people going to six Bible studies during the week. In racial terms the Sunday meeting consists of 60% white, 35% black, 2% Indian, and 6% coloured people. Of these, 62 people were, according to the church's records, officially members, while 17 were considered "constituents" (non-members who regularly attend). In ethnic terms the congregation's diversity embodied about 53 white English-first language speakers, five white Afrikaners, a Polish couple, a Zambian couple, a Xhosa couple, a (Le)sotho couple, a Zairian couple, four Nigerians, four Ghanains, a Dutch couple, and a Ugandan. About fifteen of the English-speaking whites were from the farming community. Two of the six congregants who work at Fort Hare University were black. About 65% of the congregation was between 40-55 years old, with a few in the 30 and 60 year old categories.

While the congregation is thus clearly multilingual, only English is used in the sermons, readings, and liturgy, with Xhosa and Afrikaans surfacing in the hymns or prayers. Some 53% of the congregation is English first-language speakers, with 10% Afrikaans and 6% Xhosa first-language speakers. Although 35% of the congregation is black, 18% come from other African countries.

Under Germiquet's leadership Fort Beaufort Presbyterian started holding combined alternating services three times a year with their black counterparts in Alice, a congregation which Germiquet also looked after. He recalls that he deliberately tried to make these combined services "top class" - his words.

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Germiquet reasoned that this would help lower resistance to interracial contact. The services included a play and choir-singing, with tea afterwards. As a next step Germiquet suggested holding combined Sunday School picnics twice a year, which was billed as "a family thing so parents would come", he says. In about 1988 Germiquet invited Rev Luther Matheza of the Umtata Presbyterian Church to preach at one of the combined services. Matheza in turn invited Germiquet across, and later the process was repeated with the elders accompanying their respective ministers. This resulted in the white English-speaking farmers being exposed to "well-educated blacks [from the University of the Transkei in Umtata] who could express themselves". Meanwhile Fort Beaufort remained a white congregation.

In 1991 a black woman (Zambian Mrs Janet Chisaka, whose husband worked at Fort Hare University), started attending the white congregation after the abolition of the Group Areas Act. Then a coloured woman, Mrs Marie Adonis, turned up in the service. Both were telephoned and visited by a member of the congregation. Chisaka spoke to and drew in her friends, and later became the first black Sunday School teacher. Today the Sunday School is staffed by four whites, two blacks (Chisaka and Sarah Arko-Cobba, a Nigerian) and one coloured teacher. In 1993 the Young People's group became integrated when boarders from the nearby Winterberg Agricultural School joined the all-white youth group. Among them where black pupils. The boarders brought the racial tensions which existed among them at school along, sitting separately, with white boys playing vindictive jokes upon their black counterparts. Germiquet attempted to deal with these tensions by "trying to make people sensitive". He "did not scold the congregation about apartheid or their fears of integration". Instead, he wanted to make them feel positive about the future, about integration.

Germiquet acknowledges pursuing several conscious strategies in integrating the congregation:
a. to arrange special occasions to which congregants come dressed up in "traditional" dress and hats, which allow especially the West Africans to show off their colourful garb. So, in 1994, Christmas was celebrated with a candlelit bring-and-share dinner. People had to bring along a dish and the national flag of their country of origin. During the meal people had to explain the name of the dish, where it was from, and what the ingredients were. At another candlelit dinner, each family was asked to present a song in a different language. One unexpected result, according to Germiquet, was that people realised the linguistic differences that exist in the white community. For instance, the Germiquets brought a French song, to honour their French-speaking Swiss missionary ancestors. Such occasions are also promoted as outreach events, to which people were invited to bring their friends. Through such events Germiquet hopes to bring about a positive appraisal of difference. And the evidence suggests that he has;
b. to have a service conceived and conducted by Sunday School children between the ages of ten and twelve;
c. to make congregants who do not respond favourably, and who do not attend the special occasions, "feel that they were the one who have lost out in some ways";
d. to ask families to introduce a song, using language and music peculiar to their cultural group. Another aspect is to emphasise that "it is not only English that we can sing", says Germiquet.

So far the racial mix is reflected only to some extent in the elected leadership of the congregation. Germiquet explains that any member "first has to show that s/he is accepted as a leader before being elected". Professor Lukangaka Lusambe, initially from Zaire, and Trevor Rooy (coloured) already serve on the fifteen-member informal board of management which looks after the finances and the building. Lusambe is expected to be elected an elder by the congregation's members when next this is possible.

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The mix at Fort Beaufort Presbyterian Church is obviously the result of both external and internal factors. The movement of African academics into the town meant that an educated black elite became potential members of the congregation. By itself this demographic shift need not have changed anything. By 1997 the neighbourhood around the church buildings were well-integrated; but only 10% of the congregants lived within walking distance. Some 40% of parishioners lived between one and two kilometres away, and a further 40% further than 6 kilometres. Integration was brought about by the initiative of two hesitant visitors and the reciprocal interest of the congregants and the minister. These two non-white members also played a key role in persuading friends that they would be welcomed as well.

3.2 Congregations that rate as somewhat linguistically integrated

As indicated in Table 13, 41.5% of congregations (22 out of 53) can be placed in this category. This includes 17% (9 cases) that has monolingual and 24.5% (13 cases) that has bilingual services. Of the 22 cases, 36.8% is Anglican, 36.8% Catholic, 37.5% Methodist, and 33.3% IFCC congregations.

3.2.1 Sacred Heart Catholic Church, Tongaat

Sacred Heart Catholic Church was founded in 1950, in Tongaat, KwaZulu-Natal, a small, predominantly Indian town, with the black township of Hamalati nearby. As a result, Sacred Heart was racially diverse from its inception - attended by both Indian and white parishioners. In 1997 the largest of Sacred Heart's services was attended by 500 parishioners on average, of whom 70% was black. The parish programmes and leadership were reportedly well-integrated, due largely to the initiative of the white priest, Father Julian Davey. The church was attended primarily by people with low incomes. An estimated 40% had less than a Standard 10 (Grade 12) education, while another 40% had only Standard 10.

Sacred Heart's low linguistic integration ranking is based on the fact that while all five aspects of the services referred to in Table 14 are consistently bilingual. Zulu, English, Xhosa (2%) and Sotho (1%) are spoken as first languages by parishioners. The use of the integration index clearly presents a difficulty here, as Zulu and English represents 97% of the parishioners. Some 67% of the parishioners was Zulu-speakers and 30% English-speakers, of whom only 1% was white. English is also spoken as first language by about a quarter (25%) of the parishioners who are of Indian descent. Despite the numerical superiority of Zulu-speakers, the dominant language is English, the language in which the services are conducted. The evidence suggests that the index could be adjusted so that the size of the language groups come into play, while a qualitative distinction between poorly-integrated congregations with monolingual and those with bilingual services could also be drawn. Yet it then becomes difficult to decide at which point a particular group should be recognized; any number seems arbitrary.

Fr Davey, who can speak Zulu, has been at Sacred Heart since 1994. When he arrived, there were separate masses - one for the Zulu- and one for English-speakers (predominantly of Indian descent). The previous priest did not live in the area, and, at first, neither did Davey. He united the services, as well as the parish council. According to Davey, Zulu parishioners argued that "we live in the same town, why have separate services". Indian parishioners initially resisted the changes, and "a few hived

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off to [the parish of] Verulam".

Zulu is now incorporated in the services partly because some of the older generation Zulu-speakers on the parish council suggested this. Davey says he felt that the present setup is "the way God wanted it to be", that each parishioner should be able to "hear the word of God in their own tongue". He could not point to a specific origin for this belief, except that he had experienced culturally-mixed services at both St Peter's and St John Vianni Seminaries during his training for the priesthood. Although novices were taught about inculturation, this did not include specifics for implementation, nor any particular directives. Newly ordained English-speaking priests were sent to a black mission area to learn a black language; in the case of Davey this period lasted for six years.

Mass at Sacred Heart has been Africanised in several ways: parishioners (a) form a procession before the first reading, (b) bring gifts [financial contributions] to the front of the church, (c) voluntary contribute their own prayers; and (d) sing in a "loud and joyful" way while clapping their hands.

Davey suggests that the reason why black congregants elsewhere do not speak out in favour of Africanising their services is that "they [Zulus?] are usually polite, and not outspoken [in church contexts]". In contrast the youth like to show that they can use English. Davey recalled a youth service in which he asked questions of young people in English and in Zulu. Some of the Zulu youth preferred to answer in English. Many black youths in the area attend schools formerly reserved for Indians. His impression is that the Zulu-speaking youth "do not want a 'pure' Zulu service".

Bishops leave the implementation of inculturation to each priest. The parish council usually follow the lead of the priest. Davey thinks that the reluctance of some black parishioners to Africanise their services were due to the fact that they wanted to identify themselves as Catholics over against (say) Zionists. When blacks join the Catholic church they may in fact be more conservative than their priests, many who know African culture only in theory [while black parishioners have experienced the negative aspects of their own culture]. Black parishioners may recognize that a song introduced by a zealous priest may in fact have its origin in a war song, and so resist it. Davey believes that some white clergy are waiting for African priests and parishioners "to come forward" and take the lead in Africanizing the church.

3.2.2 Holy Trinity Catholic Church, Midrand

Holy Trinity Catholic Church was founded in Midrand, north of Johannesburg in Gauteng Province, in 1987 at the instigation of Fr Richard O' Rourke. Initially the church building for the an all-white Catholic parish was located in Olifantsfontein. Then Rabie Ridge township was developed in Midrand to house coloureds who were moved from Alexandra Township. In response, and because he did not want to serve an all-white parish, O' Rourke decided to establish a church in Midrand. At first the facilities of the Anglican church were used. When the present building was completed, the Olifantsfontein church was closed, and the newly mixed congregation of coloureds and whites met at Midrand. Later black professionals bought properties in the area, and by 1990 some had started attending Holy Trinity.

By 1997 the parishioners numbered an estimated 300 strong, of whom 20% could be classified as coloured, 70% as white, and 10% as black. The parishioners fall primarily into the mid-income (75%)

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and high income brackets (15%), and 90% live between 3 and 6 kilometres from the church buildings.

Ten first languages were represented, of which the three largest groupings included English (70%), Afrikaans, (10%), and Zulu (5%). Several black and European minority languages occur, including Tsonga (2%), Shangaan (1%); while 3% comprise Italian and German. Coloured parishioners speak Afrikaans, Sotho, and Zulu, while the whites are English-speaking. Black parishioners are mostly Zulu- and Sotho-speakers, with some Tswana- and English-speakers. Sermons are delivered in English, and hymns are sung in Sotho and Zulu. The liturgy is in English, but accommodates liturgical practices of black parishioners, such as styles of music, singing and dancing. Respondents indicate that "the Pastoral Council, Choir, and Liturgy Committee all actively promote diversity".

Today the leadership and programmes are fully representative, although this was not the case from the start. In 1991 coloureds were nominated and elected on to the Parish Council. In 1993 a black was elected on to the six-person council. By 1996 the Council numbered thirteen, of whom six were female. The Liturgy Committee comprised two blacks (Sotho/Zulu) and three whites. Of the lay Ministers of the Eucharist six were black, one coloured, and one white.

3.2.3 Rhema Bible Church, Randburg

Rhema Bible Church was founded as an independent pentecostal-type congregation in Johannesburg by Ray McAuley in 1979. Rhema was a founder member of the International Federation of Christian Churches (IFCC), which with some 400 000 members forms one of the larger independent pentecostal church groupings in South Africa - not counting the African Indigenous Churches. By 1980 blacks had already started attending Rhema.

By 1997 the largest service numbered 3 500 congregants, and three other Sunday services were also held. The two predominant languages were listed as Afrikaans (30%) and English (70%), presumably spoken by the 50% white, 10% coloured, and 5% Indian congregants. An estimated 65% of congregants had achieved Std 10 education or less. About 2% of the congregants are from Zaire and Nigeria.

The predominant language in all services but one is English, including the Bible readings. The choice to conduct services in particular language is indirectly determined by the predominant role of Ray McAuley in conducting the services. According to his spokesperson, McAuley "cannot conduct a service in Afrikaans, and so from the start services were conducted in English" (Steele interview).

The languages of the 35% black members are not listed in the returned survey, although a separate 2 pm vernacular service is held to meet the needs of domestic servants in area. The language spoken is usually Sotho, with translation into Zulu; although this depends on the language of the preacher. This service is now maintained by demand, with its own forms of music.

According to Rhema spokesperson Reverend Ron Steele, the leadership was nervous about starting the service, as it seemed to perpetuate "an apartheid style thing, a step back into the past". Yet "it came as a demand from the black people in the congregation and the white congregation. The white congregation said 'we have domestics servants, who knock off work on Sunday afternoons, they want to come, but we want them to work'. First we said 'then you have to give them off work'. Then the

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request from the black people came through the black pastor, they said that they were finding it difficult to follow the services, can we have an afternoon service, because we have to work on Sunday morning. Now we have 50 to 60 people in one of the halls, and get up to 700 people in one afternoon" (Steele interview).

The integration of leadership structures happened "four to five years ago". Steele said that "we felt that we must identify black leadership, because of the changing nature of the congregation. We have always been racially mixed, but felt that with the whole change in South Africa there would be a move from traditionally black areas of people who want to escape and to lift themselves up, and that we have to be geared towards them in leadership. But in the church you cannot apply affirmative action as in business, you cannot hire and fire and manipulate. But we do have a definite policy now that the next pastor we will appoint is going to be black. Our black pastors are from [traditionally segregated] areas such as Alexandra, where we built a community centre, as well as Soweto and Eldorado Park" (Steele interview).

Rhema's leadership structures consist of an advisory board, appointed by Pastor Ray McAuley. Of twelve people on the Board, two are black, ten white. The Board meet on a weekly basis with fifteen department heads. In addition the congregation is served by a pastoral staff of twenty-three pastors, of whom three are black, three coloured, and three women. Three pastors also serve on the Board.

3.3 Congregations that rate as linguistically well-integrated

As indicated in Table 13, 11.3% of congregations (6 out of 53) can be placed in this category, including 5.3% Anglican, 21.1% Catholic, and none of the Methodist or IFCC congregations.

3.3.1 St Peter's Anglican Church, Tzaneen

St Peter's Anglican Church in Tzaneen in the northeastern province of Mapumalanga is located in the Letaba parish, one of the poorer Anglican parishes in the Diocese of St Mark. St Peter's is considered Mother church to the 12 congregations in the Letaba Parish, which encompass an area of some 1 900 km around Tzaneen as centre point. Twelve people served on the general parish council, with each congregation electing its representative. Seven of the twelve are black, excluding the two black clergy, with the three white clergy completing the total.

The greater Letaba area has been "multiplied" (divided) into two parishes, one with four congregations, the other with 8, and a third section is being established. Most of the outlying congregations are considered chapelries, who do not have their own clergy. The two town congregations are more multiracial than the outlying ones. Three of the congregations in the parish include relatively large Indian and Sri Lankan components. Black professionals have started moving into Tzaneen to the extent that housing is now hard to come by. Many black Anglicans now live in town, although few have become members at St Peter's, according to the main priest, Rev Lionel Whatley.

In 1993 a diocesan planning conference was held which tried to anticipate future trends. Participants concluded that in 10 years time 70% of those living in the area would be under the age of 35 and black. At the time the diocese was not representative of the black population, "and was still

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functioning along apartheid lines". So in order to have credibility, "we had to mix" (Whatley interview). A strategic plan was worked out in line with what the diocese would look like in 5 and 10 years' time, and staff appointments made accordingly. The first goal was to appoint a Sepedi-speaking priest. The next was to appoint a counsellor to help with the large amount of trauma which people experienced during the transition from apartheid. A woman was found to fulfil this position. A third goal was to integrate people into cell groups and bible studies. A fourth goal was to employ a person to work with youth - preferably a black woman.

When Whatley arrived in 1993, the hymns were taken from the traditional Anglican hymnal, "Hymns ancient and modern". He has since brought in drums and guitars and flutes. "In the family service we try all kinds of things - using indigenous symbols, marimbas and shakers" (Whatley interview). These changes are confined to that service. Normal services at St Peter's are conducted according to the prayer book liturgy, with the hymns a mix of old and new, including Sepedi.

In 1993 St Peter's was attended by well-educated and relatively prosperous whites. The decision to change in order to reflect society led to the loss of about half the leaders at St Peter's. During 1994 blacks started moving into Tzaneen, and were encouraged to attend. A priest with experience in the multicultural parishes of St John's and St Margaret's in Singapore was invited to spend two years at St Peter's. He helped with mission outreach (to e.g. refugee camps), home groups, and specifically with integration strategies. The Singapore diocese helped financially in this scheme. The integration process still relies on various activities - including prayer - to draw people in. Two black Sepedi priests were appointed in 1994. Due to their own educational backgrounds, they tended to attract well-educated blacks in turn. As a result there is some struggle to attract lesser-educated blacks, such as the labourers from nearby farms.

The largest average service in St Peter's congregation in 1997 attracted some 126 people, including coloureds (3%), blacks (23%), Asians (2%), and whites (72%). Some 180-190 families were on the membership rolls of the congregation. The survey estimated that 70% of parishioners were professionals who belong to the middle income group, with a further 20% placing in the upper income bracket. Of these 45% was believed to have university degrees, and a further 20% another form of tertiary education.

Parishioners included English-, Sepedi-, Setswana-, Shangaan-, and Tsonga-speakers, as well as 2% from Zaire, Kenya, and Uganda. Many of those from other African states were professionals, such as doctors. At St Peter's about 8% of the congregation was Afrikaans-speaking, 60% English-, 20% Sepedi-speaking, while 6% spoke other African and 2% Asian languages. The diversity has no relation to the neighbourhood around the church buildings, which remained predominantly white. While about a third of parishioners lived within walking distance from the church buildings, 40% came from further than 7 kilometres away.

By 1996 there were two Sepedi-speaking priests in the parish - a younger man who has been there for two years, and one who had been a priest for 12 years. Until two years ago the norm in the parish was for Sepedi clergy to look after Sepedi parishioners, while whites looked after whites. Whatley was trying to attract more Sepedi-speakers and other blacks into the Tzaneen congregation. He insisted that blacks be involved up front, in manning a welcoming desk, in teaching in the Sunday school, and in taking part in plays. Whatley spoke of consciously "trying to put blacks in, to try and create a visual [black] presence in church" (Whatley interview). In 1997 there were two white English- and two black

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Sepedi-speaking clergy at St Peter's, alongside a woman deacon. When Whatley was away on leave in England for six months, black Sepedi priest Lazaruz Mokobake was in charge. This caused "a few hiccups, but by and large things went well" (Whatley interview). About 2% of the congregation left, but a number have since come back. Three of the four lay ministers are white, and one black (Sepedi).

Regular parish get-togethers are held once every quarter "to see whether we are still on track". Whatley worries that "there is not enough lay leadership - the Sepedis [parishioners] expect their minister to do everything" (Whatley interview). During the service at these get-togethers three languages are used from Anglican prayer book, including English, Sepedi, and Afrikaans. These occasions are divided into the different languages, yet is conducted mostly in English.

3.3.2 St Joseph's Catholic Church, Howick

Howick is a small, middle-class town, populated mostly by white, retired English-speakers, which is situated in South Africa's eastern province of KwaZulu-Natal. Although a small black township exists nearby, and Howick has Indian and working-class coloured areas, there were always a small number of blacks and whites living in the town.

St Joseph's Catholic Church was founded in 1914, "mainly as a mission to coloured and black people with only very few whites - as the town grew, more whites [attended] so the membership changed" (comment from survey). St Joseph's has been integrated "since the beginning", but more so since about 1986. The church buildings are on land previously occupied by coloureds, who were forceably moved out. By 1997 the neighbourhood around the church buildings was not racially mixed, and about 70% of the congregants lived between 1 and 2 kilometres away. Presently the church is part of the Archdiocese of Durban.

In 1997 St Joseph's largest service was attended by 200 parishioners, made up of 40% black, 25% white, 25% coloured, and 10% Indian parishioners. An estimated 50% of the congregation worked in low status occupations, and 10% in high status positions. In terms of employment about 20% was retired people. The income of 65% of the congregation fell in the low income, as did 5% in the high income brackets. While 60% of the congregation was English-speaking, only 25% was white parishioners. Some 10% of the congregation was former Zimbabweans, and 10% British. Coloureds (25%) and Indians (10%) made up the rest of the English-speakers. Zulu-speakers made up 40% of the congregation.

Integrated services had been held since 1986. A typical service would include an Old Testament reading in English, one Gospel reading in English and one in Zulu. The sermon was delivered in English, but interpreted in Zulu. Half of the eucharistic prayers were conducted in English, half in Zulu. The choir was integrated, and sang English-language hymns accompanied by the organ, and Zulu songs without accompaniment. Originally a segregated service was held once a month for Zulu-speakers, but this was no longer the case. But Zulu services were held on Good Friday. The daily liturgy was said in English, "but open to and attended by all groups", according to a respondent.

Seating remains segregated involuntarily, with whites sitting mostly on one side, and blacks on the other. In opposition to the integration process a few whites left for another parish, "where they can have only English liturgy". Small faith groups were not integrated, but separated into language and

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neighbourhood groups. There were both blacks and whites on the parish council. "We have to make sure of wide representation on parish council and we try to make sure that all sections are involved - but it goes more by feel than by structure", a respondent commented.

4. CONCLUDING REMARKS: THE DOMINANCE OF ENGLISH IN RACIALLY-DIVERSE CONGREGATIONS

The data presented so far shows that while most congregations were fairly linguistically diverse (in terms of number of first language spoken by congregants), few reflected this diversity in their services. In terms of the services themselves, the lack of linguistic incorporation is visible in two ways: (a) the number of languages included in the specific parts of the service (e.g. sermons, readings) as measured by a linguistic integration index which is used to characterise the services as (b) either monolingual, bilingual, or multilingual. When compared, the racial and language indices developed show that far more congregations are racially well-integrated (54.9%) than are linguistically so (11.3%).

Some of the major trends noted include:

a. most congregations exhibit some form of linguistic diversity, but with low levels of multilingualism;
b. most congregations prefer monolingual sermons;
c. linguistic diversity tends to be expressed in the form of bilingualism;
d. English predominates as language of choice in multilingual settings;
e. integrating congregations are associated with neighbourhoods with high levels of diversity

The extent to which external factors (linguistic diversity in the neighbourhood) or internal elements (proportion of English-speakers, race) are most likely to contribute to this condition varies. There does not seem to be any direct relationship between any of these factors and the levels of linguistic or racial diversity or integration. Most congregations do occur in racially diverse neighbourhoods, and many were affected by post-apartheid demographic shifts. Yet in several instances there appears to be no direct relationship between levels of diversity within the congregations and levels of linguistic or racial integration. A high number of Zulu-speakers in a congregation may correspond to a racially diverse neighbourhood but not necessarily so. Nor do their presence necessarily translate into the inclusion of Zulu in the service. The limited utility of such "narrowband" explanations again points at factors that operate beyond the local.

The dominance of English can be explained with reference to majoritarian, racial, and pragmatic strategies employed by congregations, which overlap with language ideology to render congregations monolingual. While theorizing in terms of such strategies allows agency to be stressed, the point remains that they are exercised within broader global structures, norms and values. I return to a fuller exposition of this argument in the final chapter.

A majoritarian outcome occurs where there is a linguistic majority which also comprises a racial majority, in a relatively linguistically homogenous neighbourhood. Like location, size of the congregation is also important; where language and race overlap, the size of the congregation would determine at what point the minority groups become visible and heard. A group of 10% in a congregation of 100 is less likely to make an impact than in one of 1 000, due to factors such as the enhanced symbolic effect of larger numbers. A few examples of majoritarian outcomes which occur

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in the overall sample include English-, Zulu-, and Afrikaans-congregations (but exclude the seven congregations mentioned above). Damesfontein Catholic church is a Zulu-speaking congregation, with a separate English-language Mass. Most of the 90 congregants are black (94%); and the church is located in a rural Zulu-speaking area in northern KwaZulu-Natal. At Carrington St Methodist church, English dominates despite its 27% black congregants, due to the 63% white and 70% English-speaking component among its 60-strong members.

A racial strategy is in some senses the reverse of the majoritarian result; the outcome is determined by the language spoken by a minority group, which also happens to be a smaller racial group (usually white congregants) - regardless of the proportions of other race groups or number of other languages. Size and location (rural) also play a role. The most striking example is St Mark's Chapelry, a small rural congregation (average attendance 20) with a 70% black component, although a puzzling 75% was reported as speaking African languages: 60% Venda and 15% "Other African". English-speaking whites number only 20%. A similar situation existed at Sacred Heart Catholic Church, where an English-speaking Indian minority (25%) still manages to determine language usage in the services to the extent that English and Zulu have equal status - despite the 70% Zulu-speaking majority in a congregation that averages 500 parishioners per service. To the extent that those of Indian descent could also exhibit higher education levels than their fellow parishioners, Sacred Heart can serve as another example of the impact of the global value of English on local language options. In this case, the mechanism could be the status conferred by formal education[8].

Pragmatic strategies occur where the number of first language speakers and racial proportions are relatively evenly divided. At Sacred Heart Cathedral in Pretoria four services were held predominantly in English, except for the 4 pm Mass for black workers in both Tswana and English. The priest explained that the two morning services "have many minorities", including 35% European languages (e.g. Portuguese and Italian) as well as blacks from different languages (Pedi 15%, Sotho 10%, Tswana 10%). Subsequently English was regarded as "the common denominator" - yet only 20% of the congregation spoke English as first language. The English Masses did include some aspects of African worship, namely an offertory procession, dancing and swaying to African music, and clapping hands during the hymns. The decision to have the services in English may have come from the Parish Council. Pragmatic considerations were also undoubtedly influenced by language ideologies, as evident by the reference to English as common denominator.

In conclusion, Chapter Four indicated that in most congregations English is the language of preference, apparently of all race groups, in almost two-thirds of the cases surveyed. The question whether this language dominance is domain-specific or unique to South Africa will be examined in Chapter Five by reference to other local domains (education, state departments) and to official language practice in other African states. The point of this chapter is to ask, in Sherlock Holmes' famous words, why the dog did not bark. The silence by non-English language speakers about the dominance of English can partly be explained by the presence of high percentages of white English-speakers, yet also points to a collusion by non-English speakers in a form of linguistic self-subjugation. The reasons for their collaboration is found at the state level in the agenda of nation-building which I trace in Chapter Five, which is related in the structures of the world system, as I argue in Chapter Six.

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[8]. I am grateful to John Boli for pointing this out.

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- CHAPTER FIVE -
LANGUAGE DIVERSITY, IDEOLOGY AND NATION-BUILDING IN PERIPHERAL AFRICA

Chapter Outline

As indicated in Chapter One, Chapter Five will show how language usage in Africa can be understood in terms of state attitudes towards nation-building on the continent, influenced by trends favouring the usage of English in the global arena. The ultimate point I want to make, with reference to my unit of analysis, is that language usage in congregations reflects the interplay between state and popular ideologies in establishing relations between different groups in the society at large, through the development of formal language policies and formal/informal ideologies. I also argue that the dominance of the English language in most of Africa (increasingly so even in non-English countries) should be explained by reference to the regional effects of pressures at work in the global arena.

The discussion in this chapter is situated within the three geo-political contexts which affect South Africa more or less directly: the local (South Africa), regional (Southern and Sub-Saharan Africa), and the global contexts. Although I emphasise language in relation to the nation state, I do so with reference to "regional or global considerations that are steadily growing in significance" (Fardon & Furniss 1994:16). By drawing attention to all three contexts, I wish to demonstrate how the local language situation is not only similar to what obtains in the rest of Africa, but also how the global system (see Wallerstein, Robertson), affects both the regional and local patterns of linguistic behaviour. While I am more interested in outlining similarities with the South African case, I will indicate where differences do occur.

The sections of this chapter deal with language diversity in relation to state policies and ideologies in sub-Saharan Africa, Southern Africa and South Africa. I introduce cases studies of former British colonies, representing West Africa (Nigeria), East Africa (Kenya), and Southern Africa (Zambia, Zimbabwe, Malawi, Botswana, Swaziland). Nigeria and Kenya were selected as the largest states in their regions which, like the selected Southern African countries, opted for English as language of wider communication. Where relevant, I refer to examples from non-English African countries (e.g. Mozambique, Benin), and non-African countries (e.g. India). References to the latter will be limited, because "particular care has to be exercised when choosing examples from elsewhere (e.g. India or Melanesia)" as the combination of circumstances affecting language use in Africa "has been particularly closeknit and visible" (Fardon & Furniss 1994:4).

In such a discussion, attention to the education domain is essential as the primary system through which languages are acquired, because "what happens to languages in the domain of education is

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directly related to their fate in all other domains" (Goke-Pariola 1993:96; cf. Tollefson 1991). Education is central to debates about language due to its close relation to "assessments of the balance between the number of speakers using a language as mother tongue [i.e. within homogenous groups] and those using it as a lingua franca [i.e. between different ethnic groups]" (Fardon & Furniss 1994:21). Yet from a bottom-up discursive perspective neither mother tongue nor lingua franca is "the objectively bounded entities these usages suggest" (Fardon & Furniss 1994:21).

In relation to the preceding and successive chapter, this chapter has two overarching goals. First, to provide empirical support from case studies in the African region for the argument that the dominance of European languages (and in particular English) in Sub-saharan Africa results from institutional isomorphism between core and peripheral states. Second, to present empirical evidence for the argument that English dominance in religious institutions converge with similar practices and policies in state-controlled and semi-controlled institutions; for instance, state departments and schools. In other words, institutional isomorphism is visible not only within states, but across the various institutions within a particular society.

Chapter Five also serves to link forwards to Chapter Six and backwards to Chapters Two and Four. Several themes from preceding chapters are returned to, and consequently there is some overlap with other chapters. For example, I re-introduce nation-building, which was first discussed in Chapter Two, at the same time extending the conclusions reached in Chapter Four to the regional level. Arguments presented here are in turn brought to a head in Chapter Six. The similarity in outline between Chapters Four and Five is deliberate, suggesting that diversity and integration are as much features of states as of congregations. In nation-building integration is achieved through ideologies which operate as much within policies as outside policies; or in the absence of policies. Similarly, the structuring of language practice in congregations is the outcome of submerged language ideologies.

1. LANGUAGE DIVERSITY & NATION-BUILDING IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

1.1 Language diversity in Africa

At the state level most of Africa's 54 countries can be defined as multilingual due to the cornucopia of languages which exists in the continent. So, for instance, over 400 indigenous languages occur in Nigeria, about 100 in Tanzania, and less than 100 in South Africa (Goke-Pariola 1993:19). At the individual level multilingualism is also the African norm to a large degree. For example, in Benin 50% of the population speak 4 languages; 30% five; 30% six; and 10% seven or eight (Igue & N'oueni 1994:58). One of Africa's most linguistically complex regions stretches from Senegal to Ethiopia - an area which includes Nigeria (Elugbe 1994:62). In the whole of Sub-Saharan Africa only ten states are

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almost entirely monolingual (Bamgbose 1991). With reference to the rest of Africa, South Africa has a medium level of language and ethnic diversity.

The multilingualism inherent in Africa implies that the multilingual citizen is "better integrated" than the monolingual one - contrary to current myths (Bamgbose 1994:34 quoting Kashoki[1] 1982:24; compare Kaschula & Anthonissen 1995:72). In a multilingual context "an attitude which values the identity of the monolingual person higher than that of the bilingual or multilingual members of a community, is out of touch with the linguistic reality of the majority of the population of the world" (Kaschula & Anthonissen 1995:72). "In multilingual countries integration into the national system cannot be measured by the ability to speak the official language of the state, but rather by the ability to communicate in several of its local languages" (Mansour 1993:127).

Africa's multilingualism at the state and individual levels leads Laitin to the overstatement that Africa differs from other nation-states in that multilingualism is the norm (Laitin 1992:3; compare Fardon & Furniss 1994:4). Laitin misses an opportunity to point out that heterogeneity is the norm for most nation states outside Africa as well. Connor estimates that if homogeneity refers to nation-states in which one ethnic group makes up 90% of the population, then only 28% of 132 states are homogenous, while in 40% the population can be divided into at least five groups (Connor 1972[2]:320, referred to in Bamgbose 1994:38). Similarly De Swaan (1989) points out that "there may not be a single, entirely monolingual country in the world", as apart from Europe and the USA, "societal multilingualism is the rule rather than the exception". And "since interaction between speakers of different languages is inevitable in these countries also, many citizens are necessarily multilingual".

Several schemas have been developed to describe the empirical language situation in Africa from above or below, focusing either on state policies or on existing language configurations. A "top-down" approach examines "from the perspective of the state" "the extremely large number of African languages, the enormous range in the numbers of their speakers (from a mere handful to many millions), the poor correlation between the frontiers of speech communities and the boundaries of African nation states, and the important role of European languages, pidgins and of Arabic in particular functional or sectoral usages". The bottom-up view emphasises "the very high degree of multilingualism common in most of sub-Saharan Africa ... multilingualism is the African lingua franca" (Fardon & Furniss 1994:4).

In what follows below I review three schemas before returning in the next section to Laitin's general

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[1] Kashoki, M 1982. Language policies and practices in independent black Africa: trends and prospects, in A Olabimtan (ed) *African universities and the development and wider use of African languages.* Lagos: UNESCO.

[2]. Connor, W 1972. Nation building or nation destroying? *World Politics* 24:320.

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suggestions as outlined in Chapter Two. Kaschula & Anthonissen's schema combines endoglossic and exoglossic distinctions with attention to whether the state actively or inactively pursues language policies. Bamgbose opts for two simpler schemas which evaluate, on the one hand, whether languages are dominant or non-dominant; and on the other, whether one or more languages are accorded official status.

Following Kaschula & Anthonissen (1995), the African continent can be divided into either endoglossic states which actively encourage indigenous languages as national languages; or, exoglossic states, which inactively promote European languages. Most states are *exoglossic*, e.g. Uganda, where English is the national language, although 25 minority languages exist. In these, the European languages are usually spoken by a small elite, "fewer than 20 per cent" (Kaschula & Anthonissen 1995:102,103).

Endoglossic states include "Tanzania (Swahili), Somalia (Somali), Ethiopia (Amharic), Sudan (Arabic), and Guinea" (with eight languages, e.g. Fula, Manding). Other states which have indigenous languages but which do not actively promote their use include "Botswana (Tswana), Burundi (Rundi), Lesotho (Sotho), Malawi (Chewa), Rwanda (Kinyarwanda), and Swaziland (siSwati)". As eight of South Africa's 11 national languages are indigenous, she can be said to officially pursue "a largely endoglossic approach" (Kaschula & Anthonissen 1995:102). I would add two qualifications to this characterisation: (a) an inactive policy does not necessarily mean that no sanctions are applied to non-speakers, as several examples below demonstrate (e.g. Van Binsbergen 1994); (b) whether active or not, in the end often a European language is also promoted (e.g. in Malawi).

Bamgbose shuns endo/exoglossic distinctions in favour of a division of sub-Saharan African states based on a dominant/non-dominant distinction (all states not included):

1. *States with a predominant language spoken by 90% of the population:* Burundi, Lesotho, Somalia, Madagascar, Botswana, Seychelles, Rwanda, Mauritius, Swaziland;
2. *States with a predominant language spoken by* less than *90% of the population:* Tanzania, Mali, Senegal, Ghana, Central African Republic, Niger, Togo, Zimbabwe, Malawi, Gambia, Equatorial Guinea, Mauritania, Burkina Faso;
3. *States with more than one dominant language:* Nigeria (Hausa, Yoruba, Igbo), Zaire (Lingala, Kikongo), Zambia (Bemba, Nyanya, Tonga), Sudan (Arabic, Dinka), Kenya (Swahili, Kikuyu, Luo), Ethiopia (Amharic, Oromo, Tigrinya), Angola (Umbumbu, Kimbundu, Kikongo), Guinea (Fulfulde, Malinke, Susu), Guinea-Bissau (Balanta, Fulfulde);
3. *States with several non-dominant languages:* Cameroon, Cote d'Ivoire, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Benin.

Bamgbose's second schema is based on state recognition of official languages as criterium, which results in two types of states:

1. those with a *sole official language*, which can be (a) a language of wider communication (LWC), such as English, Portuguese, French, Spanish); (b) Arabic; or (c) a major African language;

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2. those with *joint official languages*, which can be (a) a LWC and another language (French & Arabic; English & major African language; French & major African language), or (b) a LWC and a LNC[3] (Bamgbose 1991:30).

When these two situations are combined, the distribution of official languages can be represented as in Table 18:

Table 18: Distribution of official languages across African states, 1991 (N=54)

Language:	*No. of states*
African	8
Arabic	4
European:	
French	19
English	17
Portuguese	5
Spanish	1

Source: Bamgbose 1991:31.

Notes: Total no of Countries = 45 Total no. of countries x no. of official languages = 54

Bamgbose does not apply either of his constructs to South Africa, and apparently has a synchronic analysis in mind. In terms of his first schema South Africa would fit into the third division, as it has Zulu, Xhosa, and Ndebele as major non-dominant languages, followed closely by Afrikaans (Kaschula & Anthonissen 1995). If his second schema is followed, different outcomes will result depending on the period to which it is applied. Under apartheid South Africa would have resorted under 2 (b), but the current eleven-official-languages policy would not fit in at all, requiring instead the creation of an additional third major category.

There is some confusion between Bamgbose's concepts of "national" and "official" languages and those of other scholars. Bamgbose argues that "national language" refers to the status of an indigenous language (e.g. Swahili in Kenya); while an "official" language (e.g. English in Kenya) is used in state-influenced educational and administrative domains (Bamgbose 1991:29; see Schmied 1996,

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[3]. Bamgbose included Cameroon, with French and English, under 2 (b) - I am uncertain why, as both are surely LWCs?

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Van Binsbergen 1994 for similar usage). Because "a Language of Wider Communication is never called a national language" only official languages can be compared to one another (Bamgbose 1991:30). On the other hand, Kaschula & Anthonissen speak of indigenous languages as national languages (see Alexander 1989, Maake 1994 for similar usage).

As an object of debate in Africa, language "finds itself subjected to, usually incompatible, desires for purity, authenticity, modernity, Africanness, national usage, equality and statal identity. Meanwhile, language as practice develops as if it had a life of its own under the influences of the pursuit of wealth or political influence, or more neutrally communication and sociality" (Fardon & Furniss 1994:5-6: compare Parkin 1994:229).

And the question concerning the role of English in Africa continues to elicit manifold debates, often focusing on either the elite or the general populace, sometimes using similar concepts to convey divergent meanings. Two such confusing concepts arise in the discussion on whether English fulfils vertical or horizontal functions.

For David Gough, English in Africa fulfils a vertical function of "social access and mobility", by contrast to vernaculars which provide a horizontal function of "social solidarity" (Gough 1996:57). By contrast Jean Benjamin concludes that English "makes possible only horizontal integration" (Benjamin 1994:102). By this she means that the 10-15% of educated elites from various language groups are incorporated into a single social structure, which excludes the majority (Benjamin 1994:102; compare Bamgbose 1991:18).

Benjamin maintains that vertical integration is "only possible through an African language", which would link "elites with the masses" and allow "the vast majority" access to "the social, economic, and political system" (Benjamin 1994:102). In support Bamgbose (1991) argues that African states with an indigenous national language has higher rates of grassroots political participation (e.g. Tanzania) than those using English (e.g. Uganda) (compare Mansour 1993:126). But, contra Benjamin, Bamgbose contends that vertical integration is possible by two routes through which education can either (a) take the LWC of the elites to the masses, or (b) to "build on a base" of "one or more indigenous languages" (Bamgbose 1991:22). Bamgbose questions whether a LWC really unites the elites, "for, having used the language to unite to fight and win independence, they continue to use it for their ethnic and political rivalries and divisions" (Bamgbose 1991:23).

Katupha (1994) employs horizontal to refer to the use of related languages (i.e. within the same language family), and vertical to the use of unrelated languages. The confusion comes from the contrast between horizontal and vertical *communication* (apparently Gough's intention) as opposed to

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integration (seemingly Benjamin's). Horizontal communication was described by Heine (1979)[4] as being "essentially oral" indigenous languages, which are acquired voluntarily and spontaneously by the masses (Bamgbose 1991:53). In vertical communication LWCs are typically used, acquired formally "as a result of prescription or incentives", and associated with the elites - and therefore with status"[5] (Bamgbose 1991:54).

1.2 Language and nation-building in Africa

In Africa nation-building is an attempt to manage the diversity of post-colonial states while creating a single overarching national identity. Institution-building is a subset of this process (Goke-Pariola 1993, Bamgbose 1991:10). For Goke-Pariola nation-building is driven by an ideology of nationism and/or nationalism.

African states have in common an origin largely defined by the colonial experience, during which time bureaucratization was institutionalised (Goke-Pariola 1993:19; Mansour 1993:120; Bamgbose 1991:69). The colonial educational system aided colonial administrations by preparing a small number of Africans to carry out public service (Goke-Pariola 1993:99; compare Mamdani 1996, Laitin 1992). The language situation in each country also "reflects largely the colonial history", so that former colonial languages remain sole or joint official languages. For instance, Cameroon's twin official languages reflect a history in which the French administered the eastern part of the country, and the British the west (Bamgbose 1991:31).

In the pre-independence liberation movements language was largely a neglected issue. The claims that language played "a central role ... in the struggle for power and legitimacy between colonized Africans and the colonial powers" and that language played a significant role in the process of constructing African identities in response to historical pressures (Goke-Pariola 1993:18,19) seem unsubstantiated.

The attitudes of post-independence leaders - like Uganda's Milton Obote, or Senegal's Leopold Senghor - mostly confirmed the choice for colonial languages (Mansour 1993:121). European languages were seen as the most neutral and so the most likely to contribute to national integration. This demonstrates how post-colonial African states had to wrestle with the contradiction of "nominal political

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[4]. Heine, B 1979. Vertical and horizontal communication, *Journal of the Language Assocation of Eastern Nigeria*, 4 (1), pp. 106-119.

[5]. For Bamgbose, Heine's distinctions are generally valid with the following exceptions: (a) "the elites and masses often share the same indigenous language"; (b) an indigenous major regional language may function to communicate vertically (instead of an LWC) where other minority languages are present; (c) two vertical languages can co-occur (Bamgbose 1991:54).

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independence alongside economic, cultural, and psychological dependency on the foreign cultures and powers" (Goke-Pariola 1993:98).

In the post-colonial period "the inheritors of political power have used language not only as an instrument of state construction, but also to assert legitimacy". Language emerges "as an instrument in the negotiation of power between different groups of the elite class and ethnicities as well as by individuals in interpersonal relationships" (Goke-Pariola 1993:19). The goal of integration through European language cannot be said to have been reached, as statistics "suggest that education in the official language is more of a barrier to integration than an aid, and thus becomes a useful tool of social control in the hands of the elite" (Mansour 1993:124). In fact, in post-independence states the education system has changed little in terms of curriculum, or language of instruction.

As noted in the discussion of nation-building in South Africa, alternative visions of state formation or central roles for indigenous languages did exist, but were ignored or overruled. For instance, the All-African People's Conference[6] called in 1958 for post-independent nations to be shaped in terms of linguistic affiliation instead of arbitrary colonial boundaries (Mansour 1993:119,133). The Pan-African Union of Writers' suggested in the same year that a single African language be adopted across Sub-Saharan Africa, but failed to reach consensus to specify which one (Mansour 1993:119). Attempts at regional co-operation, such as the East African Community (EAC), formed between 1967-77 by Tanzania, Kenya, and Uganda, held out the hope of smaller-scale alternate language policies. But despite the ability of 90% of the Tanzanian population, 65% of the Kenyan and 35% of the Ugandan populations to speak Swahili, the EAC failed to establish this language as a regional lingua franca (Mansour 1993:123). Subsequently the task of promoting African languages in e.g. education passed to UNESCO and its African branch BREDA (Mansour 1993:122).

Discourse among elites often reveals an ambivalent attitude towards African languages. On the one hand there is a sense of pride in the number of African languages, which is in policy documents "countermanded by dictates of national integration and efficiency" due to the ongoing hegemonic influence of European 19th century "notions of the nation state as the embodiment of a unitary people, culture, and language" (Fardon & Furniss 1994:5; Bamgbose 1991:16; Mansour 1993:123). The nation-state model "is alien to most pre-colonial African contexts", which were multilingual and multiethnic, so that political power "was not ethnically marked" and "language boundaries were more fluid" (Van Binsbergen 1994:169).

Where national language debates continue, they tend to be either status quo, radical, or gradualist in approach (Bamgbose 1991:31-3). *Status quo* approaches tend to favour nationism, and to promote

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[6]. The AAPC comprised Ghana, Egypt, Sudan, Libya, Tunisia, Morocco, Ethiopia, and Liberia (Mansour 1993:133).

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LWCs as an *official* language - although no African state has proclaimed an LWC as *national* language (Bamgbose 1991:32). The *radical approach* mobilizes for the recognition of an African language as national language and so favours nationalism. "The radical approach is not feasible in most African countries. For it to succeed, the language chosen must be ... already widely spoken ...there must be the political will and mobilization of the people to support the policy; and there must be a strong or revolutionary government to give the necessary impetus and backing to the formulation and implementation" (Bamgbose 1991:33). The radical approach worked only in the cases of Tanzania (1961) and Somali (1972). The *gradualist approach* - which attempts to compromise by adopting a LWC for official and nationist functions, and an indigenous national language for authenticity under guise of seeking an indigenous national language - has been adopted by most African states.

The founding of the Organisation for African Unity (OAU) in 1963 seemed finally to close the door on alternatives to colonial forms of state and language. This follows on the OAU's acceptance of "non-interference in the integral affairs of states" (Mansour 1993:122). The OAU's adoption of French and English as working languages also sent a signal about member states' stance towards indigenous languages. Similar support for former colonial languages was conveyed within regional organisations such as OCAM, or within the OMVG and OMVS organizations for "countries which share the Gambia and Senegal rivers" (Mansour 1993:130,123).

Not until 1987 did the OAU promote an alternate position supporting indigenous languages. The OAU Council of Ministers which met during that year in Addis Ababa brought out **A Language Plan of Action for Africa**, an overall language policy for African states (Kaschula & Anthonissen 1995:101). In Part 1 of the Plan the use of African languages to replace European languages in official communication, and in the education systems of each state, is encouraged - as is the recognition of all indigenous languages in each state (Kaschula & Anthonissen 1995:101).

Although individuals have rallied to the cause, implementation of "the plan seems generally to lack political will", and "itself has not even been translated into any African language" (Kaschula & Anthonissen 1995:99). Bamgbose's threefold distinction between radical, status quo, and gradualist language approaches helps to explain why such radical approaches are always suggested, but never implemented. European languages have in fact become so institutionalised that when Anglophone and Francophone African countries meet they use translators, even where participants share a common African language (Mansour 1993:130).

To return to the issue of languages of instruction raised in the OAU's **Language Plan**, why do African states follow colonial practices in education? Bamgbose (1991) notes the existence of several constraints which make changes to the status quo unlikely. Yet what exactly the status quo is depends on who the former colonial power was. Former French and Portuguese colonies do not implement indigenous languages, while former British colonies do (Bamgbose 1991:70). Changing the status quo

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has been attempted in Somalia and Tanzania, but generally are constrained by historical, sociolinguistic, sociocultural, economic, pedagogical and political factors (Bamgbose 1991:71-80):
a. the *historical* constraint consists of the embeddedness of colonial practices, which undermined the function of African languages to convey science and technology;
b. the *sociolinguistic* constraint entails language status, number of speakers, "and state of language development" - all of which determine whether a language is used in education (Bamgbose 1991:71);
c. the *sociocultural* constraint involves the desire to preserve cultures (whether in the form of teaching language as a subject or as medium of instruction), which is often outweighed by the need to learn a LWC (Bamgbose 1991:73);
d. the *economic* constraint refers to the cost of implementing education in several languages - an argument which ignores the economic benefits of such a move (Bamgbose 1991:74);
e. the *pedagogical* constraint refers to "the conditions and facilities for teaching languages", which affect the effectiveness and availability of teachers in particularly minority languages (Bamgbose 1991:79);
f. the *political* constraint is manifested on the one hand in a reluctance by the state to change existing policies and to pay lip-service to the implementation of indigenous languages; and on the other hand in the tendency of state leaders to promote their own languages (Bamgbose 1991:79; Mansour 1993:122).

Laitin (1992:18) elaborates on the political constraint when he argues that where nation-building in Africa is accompanied by state rationalization of language ("territorial specification of a common language for purposes of efficient administration and rule") one of three language outcomes is possible: mono-lingualism, bi-lingualism, or a combination of bi-/multi-lingualism:
a. the *mono-lingualism* of language rationalization is under way in Somalia, Tanzania, Botswana, Swaziland, Lesotho, Rwanda, Burundi, and Malagasy (Laitin 1992:18);
b. the *bi-lingualism* of the two-language outcome seems to be developing in South Africa, Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, Togo, Morocco, Tunisia, and Zimbabwe (Laitin 1992:19). Here, "citizens maintain their own vernaculars but communicate with citizens who speak other vernaculars through a common international language [often in the form of a local variant or dialect]. No indigenous language is promoted by this state to serve as a lingua franca" (Laitin 1992:19);
c. the *bi-or-multi-lingualism* of the "three-plus-or-minus-one" outcome is likely in Nigeria[7], Zaire, Kenya, and Ethiopia, with a similar process operating in Ghana, Senegal, Congo, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Mali, Malawi, Gabon, Chad, Benin, Niger, Burkina Faso, and Zambia (Laitin 1992:18-19). In this outcome, citizens will typically need a repertoire comprising: "their vernacular (their primary language) ... the language in which they receive their elementary education"; "an African lingua franca, usually

[7]. While appreciative of Laitin, Goke-Pariola does not agree with the former's suggestion that Nigeria is heading for a three-plus-one language outcome. Instead, based on his observations of the education system, Goke-Pariola suggests that a diglossic situation has developed (Goke-Pariola 1993:105).

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promoted by a class of nationalist politicians ... for extralocal communication ... often taught as a compulsory subject in public school"; "the language of colonial contact ... as a means of international communication" and "as a key to business and technical communication" (Laitin 1992:18).

For citizens whose vernacular is the same as the former colonial lingua franca, the "three-plus-or-minus-one" repertoire requires only two languages (3-1); while those speaking a vernacular different from the regional language will have to learn four languages (3+1). Laitin argues that the "three-plus/minus-one" outcome will be the African norm, where "citizens seeking occupational mobility and middle-class urban opportunities" will use the language of colonial contact. Yet he does not believe that this outcome has been institutionalized in Africa (Laitin 1992:18).

Table 19: Effects of state rationalisation in nation-building on different language situations

Language situation:	**Direction of state policy/practice:**		
	Mono-lingualism	*Bi-lingualism*	*Bi-or-multi-lingualism*
One predominant language, native to more than 90%	**Botswana, Swaziland, Lesotho**, Burundi, Rwanda, Madagascar, Somalia		
One predominant language, native to less than 90%	Tanzania	Togo, Zimbabwe	**Malawi** Mali, Senegal, Ghana, Burkina Faso, Niger
More than one dominant language	**Namibia**	**South Africa** Angola	**Zambia, Kenya, Nigeria** Zaire, Ethiopia
More than one non-dominant language			Sierra Leone, Benin, Liberia

Source: Bamgbose (1991), Laitin (1992).

Laitin and Bamgbose's suggestions are combined in Table 19 above, which sets the eight countries selected as case studies in regional context. Gaps occur as Laitin did not include all African states in his schema. Table 19 raises several questions, relating in particular to Laitin's work: regarding the

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divergent trajectories indicated for states in Southern Africa, the weakness of his last category, and lastly whether any relationships between national and organizational configurations of language. I will address the first two issues here, and reserve discussion of the latter for the final chapter.

If the Southern African region is regarded as a periphery to South Africa's semi-periphery, and if it is relatively integrated economically, then one would expect similar language outcomes to develop, not least because of their shared British past - excluding the Lusophone states. The onus is on Laitin to provide grounds for placing, say, Lesotho and South Africa in different categories. I reverse Laitin's classification of Southern African countries and provide justification for it in the next section.

2. LANGUAGE IDEOLOGY AND PRACTICE IN SOUTH AFRICA

Section 1 delineates the language situation within which the congregations described in Chapter Four are embedded and by which congregants are directly influenced. Section 2 provides insight into how the language ideology which supports English at the elite and popular level was historically created and reproduced. I also use empirical data from recent studies of state and education institutions to indicate the present language situation, and to provide cross-domain support for the legitimacy of the conclusions of Chapter Four.

2.1 The current language configuration in South Africa

2.1.1 Spatial distribution of languages in South Africa

A great deal of work has been done on language distribution in South Africa as well as on attitudes towards language which indicate language status (compare respectively Du Preez 1987; Desai 1994; see Popenoe e.a. 1997:29 as well as Webb 1992; De Klerk 1996a; De Klerk & Bosch 1993, 1995; Gough 1996). Others have examined language policy (Alexander 1989; Brown 1992; Wright 1993; Reagan 1986, 1995; Benjamin 1994; Maake 1994; Heugh 1995; Hartshorne 1995) and language planning (Alexander 1992; McLean 1992; Makoni 1995; Webb 1995). Studies of individual language preferences have often focused on universities, e.g. De Klerk's 1996 study of Rhodes students and Prah's 1993 study of six Southern African universities (including the predominantly black Universities of the Transkei and of the Western Cape). Studies of the general public have been conducted by the Human Sciences Research Council (e.g. Schuring 1979), the South African Broadcasting Corporation (see Gough 1996:55), and the Institute for a Democratic South Africa (unpublished 1997). Language policy and practice in schools have also come under scrutiny, most recently in David Brown's study of choice of languages of learning in Natal (Brown 1998).

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More than 23 languages are spoken in South Africa, which can be subdivided into seven groupings (percentage of the total distribution of the eleven official languages in brackets) (Desai 1994:26; Popenoe e.a. 1997:29):

a. Nguni languages: Zulu (22%), Xhosa (17%), Ndebele (16%), Swati (2.6%) ;

b. Sotho languages: North Sotho (9.7%), South Sotho (6.7%), Tswana (8.6%);

c. Tsonga (4.4%);

d. Venda (2.2%);

e. European languages and derivatives: Afrikaans (15%), English (9%), and small percentages of Dutch, German, Greek, Italian, Portuguese, French;

f. Asian languages: Tamil, Hindi, Telegu, Gujerati, Urdu, Chinese;

g. Other (e.g. Hebrew).

Table 20: Spatial coverage of dominant languages, 1991

Dominant language	*Percentage area per province*								
	NP	**NW**	**GT**	**MP**	**NC**	**OFS**	**K/N**	**EC**	**WC**
isiZulu	-	-	21.2	40.2	-	9.4	91.1	-	-
Afrikaans	10.6	-	29.4	13.5	95.9	14.2	-	25.9	99.4
Sesotho sa Leboa	53.4	-	22.3	22.3	-	-	-	-	-
English	-	-	2.8	-	-	-	4.5	-	0.3
isiXhosa	-	-	6.3	-	1.5	2.1	4.4	74.1	0.3
Sesotho	-	-	5.4	-	-	65.0	-	-	-
Xitsonga	5.4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Setswana	8.9	100	12.7	0.9	2.6	9.3	-	-	-
siSwati	-	-	-	22.2	-	-	-	-	-
isiNdebele	-	-	-	1.8	-	-	-	-	-
Tshivenda	21.5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
TOTAL	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Source: 1995. Language in South Africa. Bellville: IMSA.

Legend:

NP:	Northern Province	NW:	North West	GT:	Gauteng
MP:	Mpumalanga	NC:	Northern Cape	OFS:	Orange Free State
K/N:	KwaZulu/Natal	EC:	Eastern Cape	WC:	Western Cape

South Africa exhibits "a high level of bilingualism and even multilingualism", reflecting "educational levels" as well as "extensive intergroup contact" (Reagan 1995:321). Yet in 1990 an Human Sciences

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Research Council survey found that 43% of all South Africans cannot speak English or Afrikaans, while only 7.5% of non-blacks can speak an African language (Desai 1994:21).

The 1991 dominant home language distribution pattern "reveals very little change over the intervening eleven years since the 1980 census. It is clear that each individual language dominates a separate and clearly identifiable area in South Africa" (*Language in South Africa* 1995). Zulu dominate in KwaZulu-Natal, and Afrikaans in the Northern Cape, and Xhosa in the former Ciskei and Transkei regions (compare Desai 1994:21). Three African languages (Zulu, Xhosa, Swazi) "constitute 68% of the population" (Maake 1994:112). And three languages are used specifically for religious purposes, namely Arabic, Sanskrit, and Hebrew (Reagan 1995:321).

Table 20 above demonstrates the spatial coverage of each language across the nine provinces. The data should be treated as general indications due to difficulties with censuses, as well as with questions regarding language.

2.1.2 Relative status of different languages in South Africa

During the colonial period "colonial bilingualism" prevailed in South Africa, in which "vernaculars are undervalued in relation to the colonial language" (Gough 1996:57; Brown 1992:86 prefers trilingualism). During apartheid language was also used "to maintain relations of dominance" of Whites over those classified as not White (Benjamin 1994:97). Studies demonstrate that both teachers and students favour "British English Standard", although some urban blacks emulate American English (De Klerk & Bosch 1993, Gough 1996:58 - referring to De Kadt 1993[8]). Localized new Englishes developed, which were "very often stigmatized in relation to more traditional standard varieties", signalling "different acquisitional contexts and different identities" (Gough 1996:58).

In the post-apartheid era a four-tiered language system appears to be developing, with English occupying first status. The second level consists of languages whose speakers wield considerable economic power (Afrikaans) or numeric superiority (Nguni languages). Maake (1994:118) argues that Xhosa and Zulu "are becoming more widespread and generally acceptable as the main vehicles of communication among Africans, without any implication of political domination". The third tier is made up of officially recognized minority African languages. A fourth tier includes all the "invisible" non-official languages. The continued unofficial status of English as language of wider communication "undoubtedly work principally to the benefit of the native speakers of English" most of whom are white - just as it would if this was official policy (Reagan 1995:320).

The four-tiered language status system makes Benjamin's conclusion (1994:102) that the interim

[8]. De Kadt, E 1993. Language, Power, and Emancipation in South Africa. *World Englishes* 12, 2: 157-168.

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Constitution guarantees "the right of **all** [my emphasis] South African languages to enjoy equal status" inaccurate (compare Maake 1994:120). While this may apply to 11 fortunate languages, at least 12 others are left out in the cold - which does not include the fast disappearing languages of the Khoi and the San, nor the sign languages of deaf communities (compare Reagan 1995:321).

The pre-eminence of English had not yet translated into increasing numbers of black English first-language speakers by the 1980s. About 1% of all English speakers - about 50 000 individuals (1983 figures) - are black; a figure that "emerged largely since 1970" (Gough 1996:53). Native English speakers make up about 9% of the population as a whole - the largest proportion on the continent. While there is considerable disparity between figures given for those who "know" English, there is consensus "that knowledge of English is highest in urban areas and reveals a positive correlation with degree of education" (Gough 1996:54). This is because black South Africans switch from mother tongue education after the fourth year of schooling "to all English-medium instruction" (Gough 1996:54). In this respect South African students are in line with the rest of Africa, which in 1977 contained 30% of all primary school students in the world which studied through English as medium of instruction. By contrast 70% of primary school students in the rest of the world study English as a subject. Only 15,8% of all secondary students study through English-medium instruction (Conrad & Fishman 1977:17).

The small percentage of black first language English speakers suggests that language shift from indigenous languages is limited in scale, and probably would remain so. Such a conclusion would converge with experiences elsewhere in Africa, where black first-language speakers of European languages are about 0.3% in Guinea Bissau and 0.22% in Senegal - albeit according to outdated statistics (Mansour 1993:125). Yet in the South African case unavailability of post-apartheid data makes a conclusion difficult. Some evidence suggests that the present generation of black urban children in private schools will likely add to the above percentage.

In line with debates elsewhere on language and ideology, some South African scholars reject English as a supposedly neutral language. They argue that English "effectively prevents the meaningful participation of the majority in the democratic process while concentrating power in the hands of those who have the necessarily privileged access to English" (Gough 1996:58). "Native forms of deference towards superordinates may be carried over to English interaction", resulting in e.g. lack of participation on the part of younger or female persons in certain contexts (Gough 1996:65). For Benjamin, English contains "a liberal ideology", although she does not elaborate on what this means (Benjamin 1994:105). Instead, she quotes Willemse (1991) to the effect that English proficiency holds the danger of "a concomitant internationalization of thought control". English has been criticized for its "potential for entrenching unequal class relations" between the urban African middle class and the rural African working class. Acquisition of English is determined by access to formal education, so that the distribution of English is increasingly "less a feature of race than of class" (Benjamin 1994:105).

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2.1.3 Functional allocation of languages in South Africa

As many of the congregants in the survey are black, and as I am interested in understanding how macrostructural constraints bring about the dominance of English, it is appropriate to look at the domains in which English is used by blacks.

Blacks use English most often in education and workplace settings, and usage "is typically restricted to formal communicative situations (such as political meetings)" (Gough 1996:1996:54). For most everyday interactions a vernacular language, or a mixture of English and vernacular, is used. Although English can function as a lingua franca among blacks speaking different first languages, an African urban lingua franca also can be used (Gough 1996:54). In the post-apartheid era blacks can now learn English in formerly white schools, and experience "parental pressure to speak English even at home. In some instances this appears to have led to at least partial language shift with a perceived decrease in competence in the mother tongue" (Gough 1996:55). Youths educated in private schools "perceived themselves as an elite group whose public use of English in particular marks them as a high-status group and signals their social distance from their peers in township schools" (Gough 1996:55).

Most black publications are in English, although an South African Broadcasting Corporation survey found that urban blacks prefer television "broadcasts to be in a mixture of English and the vernacular rather than exclusively in either" (reported in Gough 1996:55). But black radio listeners prefer vernacular to English, despite the high black listenership of a black-oriented station like Radio Metro (Gough 1996:56).

2.2 Language and nation-building in South Africa

As language occurs in conjunction with power and with the ideologies which structure power, it is important to examine how the high status of English developed historically within the framework of state-building. Remember that my focus is on how language and state power intersect, rather than just on state-building as such.

2.2.1 A brief history of attitudes towards language in political discourse

Language has always been a central theme in state-building projects in South Africa, from the colonial period to the present. This well-known history will only be covered broadly here in terms of two central themes: colonial and state policies as exhibited in schools; and the attitudes within liberation movements towards English and indigenous languages. Both themes intertwine, as the establishment

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of a language ideology favouring English was institutionalised during the colonial period, and encouraged later by general opposition to the apartheid state. The latter eventually assumed the form of rejection of Afrikaans as the central cultural symbol of a hated regime. The dynamics throughout form a helix of action and reaction, as anglicization evoked nationalist mobilization around Afrikaans, in turn eliciting resistance and a bias towards English. While earlier schooling institutionalised English among the black elite, reaction to apartheid education entrenched the ideology at a popular level.

During the colonial period Anglicization policies were implemented by the British, unexpectedly leading to nationalists yoking the recently coined patois of Afrikaans to their cause after the turn of the century. The Act of Union attempted to resolve the conflict between Afrikaners and English by declaring both official languages, so neglecting black languages (see Hartshorne 1992:307). From the 1930s onwards Afrikaans was developed as "a symbol of exclusiveness and separateness" by D F Malan's Nationalists in conjunction with the secretive Broederbond (Hartshorne 1992:309). By 1938 "Afrikaans and English had become compulsory subjects". At the same time Afrikaner Nationalist doctrine started to emphasise the extension of indigenous languages (Hartshorne 1992:309).

In the liberation movements an endorsement of English emerged early and was increasingly favoured, eventually displacing prior language options which upheld indigenous languages. As early as 1912 the idea of English as the language of liberation had begun circulating, when "Abdhurahman, leader of the African People's Organisation, advocated English as the national language" (Heugh 1992:341). This perception would continually re-emerge from the mid-1950s to the early 1990s (Heugh 1992:342). "With a few early exceptions, like the ANC newspaper *Abantu-Batho*, African languages have always been perceived as a tool of division .. the liberation movements were concerned with making themselves understood to Whites". This neglect contributed to the lack of development of African languages in occupational and technical domains (Maake 1994:119).

The roots of a pro-English bias in the black resistance movement originated in the vector formed by state, education, and religious institutions in the pre-apartheid era. Before 1948 English mission schools produced English-speaking black intellectuals, including the founders of the ANC (in its early guise as the African Native National Congress). Examples include Sol T Plaatje, Walter Rubusana, Pixley ka Isaka Seme, John L Dube, Sam Makgothi, and Saul Msane (Maake 1994:114). The founders of the PAC were also schooled by the missions, "such as Robert Mangaliso Sobukwe, Anton Mziwakhe Lembede, Zaphania Mothopeng". These men were described by H F Verwoerd as "'Black Englishmen'" (Maake 1994:114).

Yet older notions favouring indigenous languages did not disappear overnight, receiving a telling blow

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only when Bantu Education was rejected. From the 1930s[9] onwards some argued that Nguni and Sotho languages should be standardised as unifying lingua francas onwards, while the SA Communist Party wanted to develop all African languages (Benjamin 1994:102, 104; Kaschula & Anthonissen 1995:98; Heugh 1992:341; Alexander 1989:31). The 1955 Freedom Charter noted that "'all people shall have equal rights to use their own language'" (Hartshorne 1992:315). Even by the 1960s the ANC "had not entirely dismissed the notion of the development of African languages" through Africans, rather than through the white controlled Language Boards.

The pro-English ideology was supported by the practice in pre-apartheid government-aided schools of introducing English at an early stage and then using it as sole medium afterwards. British colonial policy stipulated "that English was a prerequisite for state aid in education" (Hartshorne 1992:308). By contrast the continental European missions (Swiss, German Lutheran, Catholic) supported indigenous languages as media for instruction (Hartshorne 1992:308). Some tension existed, then, between certain religious institutions and state policy from the start. Elsewhere language policies of missions have been attributed to a second tension between different missions for control over "their" affiliates.

Little attention was given to vernaculars, with the exception of the present Kwazulu/Natal which prescribed Zulu from 1855 onwards (Hartshorne 1992:307-8, quoting from the Welsh Committee of 1938). Yet by 1935 "a vernacular language was a compulsory subject" in black education "throughout the primary school and at teacher training colleges. At the secondary level almost all pupils took a vernacular language, but it was not a compulsory subject" (Hartshorne 1992:308).

The apartheid government from 1948 onwards instituted various acts to consolidate the position of Afrikaans in relation to English. Afrikaans was developed to compete with English at all levels (Benjamin 1994:97). The advancement of black intellectuals was contained by transferring school education from churches to the government with the Bantu Education Act of 1953. Protests were lodged by various organisations, and there were attempts to set up alternative community schools (Hartshorne 1992:311). The state's overt intention was to limit the education of Africans so that "their intellectual advancement" would "not be a threat to the state" (Maake 1994:114).

During the apartheid era vernaculars were promoted by the state as "the basic feature of state nationalism" (Benjamin 1994:99; see Brown 1992:82). At first education was conducted in mother tongues, which, given the denial of official status to Black languages, ensured White participation but Black exclusion at the national level (Benjamin 1994:97). At an institutional level black intellectuals

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[9]. In other parts of the world opposition to English was central to liberation movements. For instance, in the Philippines since the 1930s through to the 1980s the left (with some exceptions) favoured Tagalog (Pilipino), an indigenous Philippine language , while other vernaculars also enjoyed some "tactical value" (Tollefson 1991:147-8).

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were excluded even from English-speaking universities, which "excluded native speakers of African languages, except in some cases where the most highly qualified were employed in the lowest positions ... African academics were denied positions". Until 1975 Africans were also not appointed in white schools which introduced African languages (Maake 1994:116).

Control over African languages was enforced through the establishment of Language Boards and through control of media like the SA Broadcasting Corporation - both "subject to the control of Afrikaners" (Benjamin 1994:97; Maake 1994:116,117). The Central Bantu Language Board existed until 1977, when "autonomous" Language Boards were established "for each of the languages and handed over to native speakers" - although still under control of the state via the Publications Control Board (Maake 1994:116). The "development of African languages was limited to the promotion of traditional ethnic identities", which in turn became the basis of segregation (Benjamin 1994:97). Languages formed the basis of racial and tribal groupings, and of the forceful removal of Blacks to Bantustans (Herbert 1992:2; Benjamin 1994:99; Kaschula & Anthonissen 1995:98). From the 1950s onwards the ANC advanced English as a unifying language in response to state attempts to promote tribalism (Benjamin 1994:101).

In black townships segregated sections were created for different ethnic groups and blacks were not supposed to advance beyond a functional multilingualism (Maake 1994:114). Other measures included creating segregated rural homelands, and in urban areas "the destruction of mixed areas like Sophiatown, Lady Selborne, Marabastad, Eastwood, District Six". The apartheid government's attempts to separate language groups did not succeed completely, although it increased the distance between racial groups.

Where languages were concentrated in industrialized areas, this led to "the mixing of people who spoke different Bantu languages in churches, work places, social gatherings and other situations", so promoting multilingualism. Urban dialects like *Flytaal* evolved since the 1940s in the townships, composed of elements from different South African languages (Maake 1994:117; Calteaux 1996). Intermarriage between different groups produced a generation which could identify with more than one language group, especially in the Southern Transvaal (Maake 1994:113,118). Many of the African Independent Churches "provide examples of multilingualism without friction", e.g. the Zion Christian Church, which has branches in Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland (Maake 1994:118,119). The St John's Apostolic Church "with headquarters in Katlehong in the East Rand (Bishop Masango) and Evaton (Bishopress Manku), uses both Southern Sotho and Zulu" (Maake 1994:119).

Until 1955 state policy in schools was for vernacular languages to be the medium of instruction for between six (Natal) and two years of schooling (Transvaal), followed by "in practice almost always English" (Hartshorne 1992:308). By 1959 Std 6 examinations were for the first time conducted "in one or the other vernacular languages instead of English". 'Independent' homelands' education policies

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from 1963 onwards limited use of vernacular to the first four years of schooling, followed by English as sole medium of instruction - the outcome in all homelands by 1974 (Hartshorne 1992:311). "Both English and Afrikaans were made compulsory in all African teacher-training colleges and schools" (Hartshorne 1992:310). But "African opinion never became reconciled to the extension of mother-tongue medium beyond std 2, nor to the dual medium policy" (Hartshorne 1992:311). Unhappiness with this arrangement was ameliorated to some extent by the provision of exceptions to the rule (Hartshorne 1992:311).

In the 1970s Afrikaans was introduced as compulsory medium of instruction [alongside English] for "at least half the subjects taught in African schools", sparking widespread resistance in black schools against oppression in general (Maake 1994:118; (Kaschula & Anthonissen 1995:99). Eventually English medium instruction was introduced to Black schools, but because of a systemic underfunding of black education this did not lead to a high standard of proficiency in English (Benjamin 1994:97).

By 1975 a new policy reduced mother-tongue media to Std 4, with the result that the Std 5 examination had to be written in Afrikaans and English. But this time no exemptions were allowed, which broadened "the base of dissatisfaction". Protests spread from primary schools to secondary schools, reaching the well-known tragic events of 16 June 1976 (Hartshorne 1992:312).

The perception grew that mother tongue teaching structured the racial division of the labour market, and that the introduction of both official languages in black schools ensured its effective functioning. As a result of mounting opposition, a single medium of education became the norm by 1978, with "over 96 per cent of African pupils in Std 5 and above" taught in English (Hartshorne 1992:312). The next phase in the language struggle was the demand from parents and teachers to limit mother-tongue education to the first four years of schooling, a goal achieved by 1979 (Hartshorne 1992:313). This brought educational practice in line with that in most homelands. By 1989 "language policy was very much what it had been pre-1953" (Hartshorne 1992:312).

For blacks the "rejection of Bantu Education *ipso facto* meant disowning or neglecting their own languages", a strategy causing painful consequences to this day (Maake 1994:115). Paradoxically the "rejection of Afrikaans as a medium of instruction in the mid-1970s, spearheaded by students from the Black Consciousness tradition, had the uncalculated effect of advancing the position of English, not only over Afrikaans, but also over African languages" (Heugh 1992:342). Only with the re-emergence of black trade unions in the 1970s and 1980s were African languages brought "to the forefront of the struggle" (Maake 1994:119).

The ANC's earlier pro-English stance was affirmed at the organization's 1990 Language Workshop in Harare. The need for a linking language for "'a unified South Africa'" was interpreted as disqualifying "'any particular African language'" which "'carries a high source of potential conflict, since it will

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elevate one cultural group above others'" (Hartshorne 1992:315). Pressure for the development of black languages came from the internal wing of the ANC and organizations such as the National Language Project (Hartshorne 1992:315). In 1992 the National Education Policy Investigation (NEPI) outlined the various options regarding media of instruction (Hartshorne 1992:315).

The widespread acceptance of a English language education policy today has not changed the situation greatly; like elsewhere in the Third World this helps "to ensure that a great number of students fail" while producing "the necessary number of graduates" (Tollefson 1991:151, referring to the Philippines). In the absence of racial divisions the effect of English language education is to structure society along class lines - not a view often raised in South Africa. The continued unequal distribution of resources and teacher skills across the rural-urban or the private-government school spectrum, coupled with university admission policies, doubtless have stratifying effects. The question should be asked: "who benefits from the continued dominance by English?" (Tollefson 1991:152).

Nation-building is one of the publicly-stated goals of the previous Government of National Unity (1994-1999), specifically of the ANC. That the ANC's version of nation-building corresponds to nationism is clear from several sources. Former ANC President Oliver Tambo is quoted as speaking of the nation as all people "'and not a collection of Bantustans and racial and tribal groupings organized to perpetuate minority power'" (Jordan 1988:117). In this conceptualisation the nation is defined "by individual acts of voluntary adherence, which require submergence of other loyalties in favour of this larger unit" (Jordan 1988:118).

The 1996 Constitution attempts to affirm cultural and linguistic diversity without rewarding ethnic and cultural identity at the communal level (Venter 1996). The intention to de-politicize ethnicity has a relatively lengthy history in ANC policy, having been mooted in the 1989 *ANC-Soviet Social Scientists Seminar Report* (referred to in Degenaar 1991:13) and also in the ANC's 1993 Regional Policy document (ANC 1993). In addition, cultural diversity has to be affirmed without invoking apartheid's divisive racial or ethnic notions, long regarded by the ANC as creating artificial social barriers (see Jordan, 1988:116). In practice government policies lead to the affirmation of cultural diversity at personal and national levels, but not at a communal level (Venter 1996).

The exclusion in the present Constitution of several languages from official status means that:

a. "knowledge of the official language becomes a prerequisite for appointment and promotion in state institutions";

b. a "powerful official language, such as English ... can become irresistible even in non-state institutions such as the church";

c. "psychological pressure leads to parents preferring the official language as sole medium of education, sometimes leading to it becoming the home language of non-speakers", thus rendering demands for the use of non-official languages "meaningless or even counter-productive";

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d. negative attitudes towards non-official languages are developed (Benjamin 1994:98; summarising Webb 1990:2).

Various proponents, most notably Neville Alexander (1989), have suggested alternative language policies to the prevailing one, the most notable being accommodation of regional languages under a single national language (Maake 1994:120). Anthropologist Wim Van Binsbergen refers to this as the graded model, which allows for the "generous provision for the use, preservation and propagation of such plurality of languages as actually exists within the national boundaries. In this way basic human rights are safeguarded" and "the intellectual and technological potential" of members of minority languages are not wasted (Van Binsbergen 1994:173). At the same time effective communication can happen and "language-centred ethnic frustration is far less likely to threaten the stability and integrity of the state" (Van Binsbergen 1994:173). Language learning and multilingualism would be encouraged (Benjamin 1994:107). During the late 1980s several organizations supported this view, including the National Party, the Democratic Party, the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), the ANC, and the Azanian People's Organization (Heugh 1992:335). Despite receiving a wide range of support, Alexander's suggestions were not translated into policy or legislation.

Past objections by blacks to the use of African languages in schools, and the relatively low status of black languages at present, should be understood against the above background. At the same time the reluctance of whites to learn African languages should be addressed. "Whites of all political and ideological persuasions have been so comfortable with the privileges which Apartheid offered them in the form of cheap black labour that they found no need to learn African languages - they were in a situation which never demanded that they associate with the African working class as equals at any time" (Maake 1994:117).

2.2.2 Language practice under direct and indirect control by the state: state departments and schools

The evidence in the state sector is extremely ambivalent, as I reported elsewhere (Venter 1996, 1998). On the positive side, as Brown (1998) points out, "the founding provisions of the Constitution (Section 6(2)) commit the state to 'elevate the status and advance the use of the indigenous languages' ". The Pan-South African Language Board (PANSALB) was finally established in 1998, with this purpose in mind.

On the debit side, documents of state departments reveal a distance between an implicit formal policy of multilingualism, and a general option for monolingualism, which favours English as lingua franca. An audit by the Language Plan Task Group (Langtag), of annual reports published by government departments, found in 1996 that only two departments had been multilingual (Communication Services, Justice); seven bilingual (i.e. English and Afrikaans); while twelve used English only. In

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addition many other Government publications are published in English only, namely general notices (e.g. relating to the restitution of Land Rights Act in 1995), White papers (e.g. the Reconstruction and Development Programme of 1994) (Langtag 1996:159-161).

In short, official encouragement of multilingual diversity is often denied in practice in the public sector, with English achieving hegemony in Parliament and Senate by 1996, in provincial-national government communication, as well as in many local government meetings (Langtag 1996:47). A siSwati-speaking Constitutional Assembly official reportedly said that "we in the ANC do not believe in ethnic languages" *(Leadership* 14, 2:13).

In the second domain, that of education, I want to focus on the language of instruction, which the governing body of each school has to decide on, with approval by the provincial authority and the national Minister of Education (Brown 1998). According to Brown, these decisions have to conform to the Constitution, the South African Schools Act (1996), nine provincial Schools' Acts and regulations, and the policy document *Norms and standards regarding language policy in education* (1997). Governing bodies also have to decide about the languages their schools will offer as subjects.

Indigenous languages are used as languages of instruction in the first few years of education, then taught as subjects (Brown 1998). Policy requires two official languages to be taught during the last three years of school. Parents of learners can insist that a particular official language be taught if between 35 to 40 pupils in the same grade can be found who express a similar desire.

In a 1997 qualitative study of the opinions of teachers and pupils on language policy, David Brown found that in most cases the language of choice would be English as language of learning. "All other language choices usually coexist with English as the language of learning", he states; the obvious exception would be Afrikaans language schools. Brown limited his study to twelve primary and secondary schools in three extremely linguistically heterogeneous areas in KwaZulu-Natal, namely Umzimkhulu (Kokstad, Matatiele, Port Shepstone), Durban, and Newcastle. The languages in these regions included isiXhosa, isiZulu, Sesotho, English and Afrikaans, as well as siBaca dialect, Chinese, and Hindi.

A high school in Newcastle represents an exceptional case, where an attempt to introduce isiZulu in 1994 failed, reportedly due to resistance from African parents. Some African parents allegedly did not only want their children to speak English, but "wanted no other language to be spoken during school hours - something explicitly disallowed both in *Norms and Standards* and in the Constitution. The acquisition of English in a fee-paying state school was seen by African parents to be an important consideration in choosing the school" - a sentiment expressed several times elsewhere.

This is not to say that the option for English was necessarily encouraged by either the teachers or

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always supported by the learners. In some cases staff members felt that "many parents were doing their children a disservice by insisting they be educated in English", and some "believed in the full elevation of 'indigenous' (African) languages to languages of learning." Some of Brown's informants indicated that "the educational system was stratifying on the basis of class, and that English language assimilation and education was the key cultural manifestation of this phenomenon". This was particularly evident in a discernible movement from township schools to schools where English is a language of learning. Even in an informal settlement school north-west of Inanda, with mainly isiZulu-speaking learners, English is the language of learning (although here Zulu was taught as a subject).

3. FEATURES OF NATION-BUILDING AND LANGUAGE OUTCOMES IN SELECTED SUB-SAHARAN AND SOUTHERN AFRICA STATES

In Section 3 Botswana, Zambia, Kenya and Nigeria are selected as mini-case studies which display certain features - formed by the intersection of nation-building with education, language, and religion - which generally also occur in other African states. With reference to Table 19, Botswana illustrates language rationalization in a country which has one predominant language, yet which opts for English. Zambia, Kenya and Nigeria exemplify countries like South Africa which has more than one dominant language and which appear to follow multilingual policies. Namibia represents a country located in Table 19 within the same category as South Africa; yet ultimately adopted monolingual policies - just as Botswana did. Unlike the general summaries supplied for other states, the discussion on Botswana and Zambia is grounded in Van Binsbergen's more detailed ethnographic examination of the fortunes of the Nkoya and Kalanga minority languages. The section closes with an overview of the prospects for English in Southern Africa.

3.1 Language diversity and nation-building in Southern Africa

Southern African states provide insight on South Africa in relation to her most adjacent region, and a broader understanding of the status and function of English in Southern Africa (Schmied 1996:304). At the same time the Southern African language situation can be compared to that of Africa's other regions, namely East, West, and Central Africa. Zimbabwe, Zambia, and Malawi were previously collectively known as Central Africa; but their present interrelatedness with South Africa, Botswana, Namibia, Lesotho, Swaziland, and Mozambique is better captured in the name Southern Africa (Schmied 1996:301,317). Recent work on various aspects relating to the topic include that of Schmied (1991, 1996) and Van Binsbergen (1994).

A comparative approach demonstrates that important differences and similarities occur between

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Southern African states. State language policies in the colonial and post-colonial periods formalised the language statuses already achieved in the pre-colonial era. The "dynamics of state formation and hegemony, and the introduction of Christianity as a literate world religion, then engender an ethnic consciousness largely focussing on language" (Van Binsbergen 1994:161). The "recent political and economic history of the people who carry the minority language casts light on the extent, direction, degrees of organization, cultural and ethnico-historical elaboration, and success, of the language-centred ethnic strategies of each group" (Van Binsbergen 1994:160). While the history of languages in South Africa generally aligns with Van Binsbergen's conclusions, the major differences are the lack of evidence of "language-centred ethnic strategies" - apart from the early stages of Afrikaner nationalism, and the more recent Inkatha-ANC wars on the Rand in the 1980s.

Zimbabwe, Zambia, and Malawi are usually viewed as exoglossic Anglophone countries (Schmied 1996:304). Schmied suggests that English was brought into Zimbabwe, Zambia, and Malawi successively by missionaries ("especially in Malawi"), miners ("especially in Zambia"), and settlers ("especially in Zimbabwe") (Schmied 1996:1996:302).

Missionaries in Malawi provided support for regional and local lingua francas (Tumbuka and Nyanja respectively), through favouring Bible translation into indigenous languages. This dual language approach lead to the eventual recognition in 1945 of Yao and Tumbuka as national languages in addition to English (Schmied 1996:302). Mining companies extended British administration over these areas, followed by small-scale colonial administration, e.g. when Britain "took over Rhodesia from Rhodes' British South Africa company" in 1822 (Schmied 1996:303). Education remained in the hands of missionaries, while mines "generated migration". Generally-speaking English was "favoured in colonial education", although lingua francas received some support in the Annual Report on Native Education for 1927 (Schmied 1996:303).

An active language policy was absent in Zambia, Zimbabwe, and Malawi. No "coherent overall language policy was propagated (paying lipservice to African languages often went parallel with maintaining old requirements concerning English)" (Schmied 1996:305). Functional efficiency ("modernity, mobility, access to international knowledge, modern methods of instruction") was favoured "above cultural authenticity". Both are "only possible through a multilingual policy" (Schmied 1996:305).

The kind of differences and similarities that occur between states can be demonstrated by the fortunes of the Botswana Kalanga and Zambian Nkoya languages. In Zambia Nkoya first waned then gained in importance, while in Botswana Kalanga remain suppressed. Yet the ratio of Nkoya speakers to the Zambian population is smaller than the ratio between Kalanga and the Botswana population. State organization in Zambia allowed for local, regional, and national rule, whereas the Kalanga faced a two-tiered structure. In both cases the respective languages had "unofficial" representatives in

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government, usually in the form of people who could pass for another group. In Zambia language revitalisation was effective, unlike Botswana. In the post-colonial period the national political space was restructured so that an intermediate language level was created for six languages plus English in the case of Zambia, while no intermediate level was structured in Botswana (Van Binsbergen 1994:162).

In **Zambia** during pre-independence a multilingual policy recognized English as official language, alongside support for Bemba, Nyanja, Lozi, Tonga, Kaonde, Lunda, and Luvale, (Schmied 1996:304; Van Binsbergen 1994:145,150; Bamgbose 1991:107). The Lozi, itself a combination of Luyana and the southern Sotho-related Kololo, was favoured by the colonial state and exploited eastern Barotseland - including the Nkoya (Van Binsbergen 1994:144). The Nkoya was formed during their political incorporation into the Lozi state in the 19th century.

After independence "for fear of 'tribalism' and in the service of 'nation-building' no language other than English was used in state-citizen communication" (Van Binsbergen 1994:145; Heugh 1992:337). This practice became so entrenched that state officials would not use their own vernacular even if their audience consisted of people whose first language was the same as theirs (Van Binsbergen 1994:145). As a result, ethnic associations were discouraged, and about sixty other non-official languages or dialects were ignored, if not suppressed - like Nkoya, in central western Zambia (Van Binsbergen 1994). As late as 1973 a district governor told a political meeting that the language used could not be the locally spoken vernacular Nkoya, because "Nkoya does not exist" (Van Binsbergen 1994:149). Nkoya-speakers today number about 30 000 - or less than 1% of the Zambian population (Van Binsbergen 1994:114).

The English-only practice was reversed later, when "the impoverished and disintegrating Zambian state proved unable to mobilize popular support on the basis of services and benefits", and began to "appeal to a composite cultural heritage to which each ethnic and language group was now seen to contribute" (Van Binsbergen 1994:150). After 1980 ethnic associations "became viable again", such as the Kazanga cultural society of the Nkoya, named after an ancient first-fruits festival for the king, first held again in 1988. Yet Nkoya remains excluded from the media and schools, although at the second Kazanga festival in 1989 the deputy Minister of Culture addressed the crowds in Nkoya (Van Binsbergen 1994:150-1). After October 1991, Nkoya politicians - or those identifying with them - were taken up at the national level in President Frederick Chiluba's new MMD coalition administration, although half of the Nkoya remained loyal to ousted President Kenneth Kaunda's UNIP (Van Binsbergen 1994:151).

The cause of the Nkoya (from the 1920s onwards) had already been helped by their alliance with evangelical missions (especially the South African General Mission) rather than with the local Lozi-orientated Catholic Mission (Van Binsbergen 1994:147). "The mission pioneered literacy in Nkoya,

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published school primers, had hymns and part of the Bible translated into Nkoya" (Van Binsbergen 1994:147). As a result a "remarkable form of ethnico-religious discourse emerged, in which local Christian leaders would also be the articulators of the budding Nkoya ethnicity" (Van Binsbergen 1994:147).

Yet Nkoya labour migrants were as peripheral as they had been at home, since "mission education in Nkoya hardly compared with the ... empowering languages of Lozi and English, which the Lozi aristocracy had managed to attract". As a result, Lozi and other ethnic groups dominated the labour markets (Van Binsbergen 1994:147). By the 1970s the Nkoya "still felt the lack of recognition of their language to be the major sign of their powerlessness at the national and regional level, which they interpreted exclusively in terms of Lozi oppression" (Van Binsbergen 1994:148).

When the government took over primary school education the medium of instruction became Lozi, and communication with all levels of government had to be in either English or Lozi (Van Binsbergen 1994:148). At that stage "only about half the men and very few women had more than a smattering" of Lozi (Van Binsbergen 1994:148).

Nkoya chiefs were initially incorporated into the political system as senior members of the Lozi; and later of the post-colonial rural administration - which provided a sense of continuity of traditional leadership. They did not lose any of the associated apparatus of chieftainship (e.g. enclosures, regalia, dwellings), and so "as political power brokers" could bring together the Nkoya and the state (Van Binsbergen 1994:164). In the post-independence era, Nkoya ethnic claims "were met to a considerable extent", as a result of Nkoya support for the eventually victorious United National Independence Party, in contrast with Lozi support for a losing opposition party (Van Binsbergen 1994:149). As a result of increased development projects, economic opportunities expanded in the region, so that many Nkoya migrants returned home (Van Binsbergen 1994:149).

The Nkoya case demonstrates that "one cannot blindly generalize that all sub-national identity is divisive and leads to centrifugal tendencies away from the state" (Van Binsbergen 1994:164). Primordial and civic loyalties "are not necessarily mutually contradictory", as "a bifocal process of identification" can be promoted (Mansour 1993:132).

In more general terms the English-only policy can be regarded as a failure, for the limits of the Zambian economy meant that the majority could not achieve the competence required for participation in the political and economic domains (Heugh 1992:337). The goal of achieving national integration can also be said to have failed, for the rural communities remain marginalised. The language policy did not match the goal of integration, but rather that of neo-colonial assimilation, which could not be successful due to the small numbers of the elite (Heugh 1992:337). Education policies add to this, as teachers are usually appointed "in regions other than their own" (Bamgbose 1991:79).

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In **Botswana** today English and Tswana are the only official languages, while eight Tswana groupings are the only constitutionally recognized ethnicities. Yet several smaller language groups exist which constitute about 30% of the total population (Van Binsbergen 1994:165). Non-Tswana groups include the Kalanga, Mbukushu, Yei, Koba, Ndebele, Subiya, Herero, and Sarwa (Khoi-San) (Van Binsbergen 1994:153). The Kgalagadi, although speaking a language similar to Tswana, "share with the Sarwa a history of serfdom and humiliation at Tswana hands" (Van Binsbergen 1994:153).

After independence in 1966 Botswana, "for fear of appearing disunited, emphatically proclaimed itself a monolithic Tswana state", and minority languages became "politically and socially suspect" (Van Binsbergen 1994:153). According to popular Batswana perception, it is illegal to publish in any other language (Van Binsbergen 1994:157).

Just how state policies impact on non-official languages is illustrated by Van Binsbergen's discussion of the Botswana minority language Kalanga. Kalanga is a dialect of western Shona, and occurs from "north-western Zimbabwe all the way into the North Central and North East districts of Botswana", as it has done since the late 17th century (Van Binsbergen 1994:152). Kalanga-speakers, who number about 120 000, are at 13% of the total population "the largest non-Tswana speaking group in the country" (Van Binsbergen 1994:153). As language Kalanga is excluded from the media and in schools.

The Kalanga were placed under administration of the Ngwato Tswana group, whose chief became a member of the House of Chiefs in terms of the 1983 Botswana Constitution. Kalanga activists felt that the Constitution entails "a denial of the existence ... of languages other than Tswana, and of ethnic groups other than the eight Tswana-speaking ones". From the 1970s the Kalanga were represented (along with other ethnic groups of the area) by the non-Ngwato but Tswana-speaking Khurutshe, so that as a group they have no representation in the "far from nominal traditional political structures" (Van Binsbergen 1994:154).

By contrast with the Zambian Nkoya, the Botswana Kalanga were deprived of an integrated role for their traditional leaders, who could have functioned "as foci of cultural, ethnic, linguistic, and historical identity" (Van Binsbergen 1994:164). Under such conditions the heightened status of Kalanga could have engendered both ethnic loyalty from its own elite, and incorporation as an ethnic group could have functioned as the basis for a respectable and qualified integration. Under the present Constitution "refusing to speaking Tswana [apart from the domestic domain] can very well be interpreted as a subversive act" (Van Binsbergen 1994:165).

The control of the Ngwato over the Kalanga extended to religious ideology, as the Ngwato "did not permit any Christian diversification and upheld the monopoly of ... the London Missionary Society". For this reason the development of indigenous churches in the area from the 1920s onwards,

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prompted by the experience of migrant labourers during their sojourn in South Africa, "inevitably acquired overtones of ethnic and tribal defiance of Ngwato dominance" (Van Binsbergen 1994:154). As people and ideas frequently moved across the borders during the pre-independence period, the Botswana Kalanga benefitted from the translation of the Bible into Kalanga by Christian Missions in what was then Rhodesia. Missions in that country "offered a great many Kalanga both the formal education and the ideological outlook that provided the basis on which to advance in colonial society, while increasingly challenging the premises of inequality on which that society was based" (Van Binsbergen 1994:155).

Some immigrants into the area adopted Kalanga identities, while certain Kalanga adopted other identities - demonstrating the fluidity of ethnic identities which exist in such a context, and across the borders of territories. In Zimbabwe Joshua Nkomo chose to identify with Ndebele rather than with his Kalanga roots; while Kalanga activist K Maripe was a prominent trade unionist in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, and so could have represented himself as a citizen of Botswana, Zimbabwe, or Zambia. This implies that "appeal to an ethnic idiom in the context of formal, national level politics is not the expression of primordial attachments ingrained through socialization in early childhood ... but often the deliberate and strategic choice of a particular political instrument, identity and career from among alternatives" (Van Binsbergen 1994:155).

Due to their "relative educational and entrepreneurial success" Kalanga individuals were not completely excluded from the political process, as long as they downplayed their Kalanga identity and did not challenge Tswana ethnic and linguistic hegemony. In this way the Kalanga were implicitly accommodated, and themselves only occasionally resorted to "overt ethnic confrontation". As a result "the very people who ... might have been involved in the production and consumption of Kalanga symbolic culture .... tended to have vested interests in not doing so" (Van Binsbergen 1994:157). During the atrocities that followed the war of liberation in Zimbabwe, Botswana Kalanga in border communities stressed ("not always spontaneously") that "their first allegiance was to the Botswana state and not to an international Kalanga ethnic identity" - although help was offered through kinship networks to Kalanga victims (Van Binsbergen 1994:158). The Kalanga also tend to reproduce "the erroneous Tswana view" that in Botswana "they are merely recent immigrants enjoying, but dishonouring, Ngwato hospitality" (Van Binsbergen 1994:157).

Secular domains in urban settings such as Francistown are characterised by "petty confrontations on language and ethnic issues, in relationships between neighbours and friends, on the work floor, in access to the informal sector of the economy, in amorous matters, in drinking and nightlife, and in the conceptualization of social relationships in terms of sorcery" . Urban society is marked by White/Black, Tswana/Kalanga conflicts, fuelled by "ethnic stereotypes and the failure or refusal to learn and understand each other's language" (Van Binsbergen 1994:160).

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By contrast, in churches and non-Christian cults in the area there is little evidence of the more-or-less covert ethnic and linguistic antagonisms. Instead, "the accommodation of potential ethnic opposition within an encompassing idiom of religious transcendence of disunity are the catchwords to describe the local religious situation" in northeastern Botswana. Any religious event includes the use of "multiple and situational ethnic and linguistic identity, code switching, the mixture of songs and texts from Kalanga, Ndebele, Tswana (and even Shona and English)" (Van Binsbergen 1994:159). Ethnic and linguistic diversity in rural areas appear to have "no negative impact on social relations" as evidenced by e.g. Khurutshe/Kalanga "bilingualism, intermarriage, patterns of residence, and the frequent passing of Khurutshe .. as Kalanga" (Van Binsbergen 1994:160).

The inconsistencies in ethnic antagonism can be explained by reference to the distinction between "Tswana as a national state-backed language" and as "just another regional language at the sub-national level". Daily interaction at the local level is tempered by a reference to Tswana as just one other regional language, as well as a shared history of more than a century. This shows that "ethnic phenomena in the national political domain and those in the local domain" do not necessarily converge "on the same categories of ethnicity" (Van Binsbergen 1994:163). When Kalanga is viewed as a commodity, the submission to Tswana and lack of success in mobilisation against it can be explained by the relative market values that obtain in both languages (Van Binsbergen 1994:170).

Literature on the language situation in the other Southern African states follows the same pattern. As space does not permit a full discussion, I will here only outline the most salient features. In post-independence **Malawi**, English and Chewa were included in a bilingual policy until 1968, when Chewa was declared sole national language. This move evoked strong protests, as "language policy is always part of the general political development ... best interpreted in the context of the wider new national culture", and Chewa's prominence was "attributable to the fact that is based on the variety spoken in [former President] Banda's home area" of Central Province (Schmied 1996:305). Banda "used to address the public in English with a simultaneous translation into Chewa". In 1966 about 50% of Malawians spoke Nyanja/Chewa as first language, and 26% as a second language (Schmied 1996:304). The language situation was reversed in 1994, with English accorded official status (Schmied 1996:305).

English was introduced to **Swaziland** in 1903, and after independence in 1968 retained its status as official language alongside siSwati. No active language policy exists to date (Kamwangamalu & Chisanga 1996:285-286). English is used mainly within the educational system through which it is propagated, and "there is no need for English usage outside the classroom and in other formal situations. Consequently, English tends to be elitist in nature" and "restricted to a few domains" (Kamwangamalu & Chisanga 1996:286). Yet there is some evidence that a "Swazi Colloquial English" has become blended with Swazi culture (Kamwangamalu & Chisanga 1996:288,291). In the absence of a formal policy, "English will continue to have the edge over siSwati", as - despite some dissent -

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ordinary Swazis grant a higher status to English (Kamwangamalu & Chisanga 1996:291). Schmied notes that here (as in Zambia) students who desire university education must first pass the Cambridge Overseas School Certificate in English (Schmied 1991:23). In **Namibia**, which became independent in 1990, 18 indigenous languages are spoken (Kaschula & Anthonissen 1995:102; for fuller discussion see P"utz 1995).

In conclusion, the political, economic, and linguistic interconnectedness of Southern Africa demonstrate some of the mechanisms through which isomorphism occurred throughout the region. This overview of language usage in the Southern Africa region reveals that (a) to balance the needs "of efficient communication with the rights of minority or indigenous languages requires enormous skill", and that (b) the language policies pursued by the apartheid government had a "backwash effect" on neighbouring states (Schmied 1996:315-316). It also highlights how the region is interconnected not only economically, but also through the sharing of languages across borders: Tonga in South Africa and Mozambique; Ndebele in South Africa and Zimbabwe; Kalanga in Botswana and Zimbabwe; Tswana in South Africa and Botswana (ditto Sotho and Swazi), to name just a few linkages. Apartheid language policies lead to an emphasis on English not only in Namibia, Zambia and Zimbabwe, but also in South Africa (Schmied 1996:315-316). In Zimbabwe fluency in English is required for entrance into state agencies like the police and army (Schmied 1991:23).

That the role of English across Southern Africa will be strengthened in the future seems incontestable. This will be ensured through (among others) "the traditional ANC commitment to English" coupled to "the importance of English as an international language" in Lusophone Mozambique and Angola (Schmied 1996:316; Katupha 1994:94). Language dynamics in the region will be affected by the economic dependency of many Southern African countries on South Africa, and the lack of a clear alternative (like Swahili in East Africa) (Schmied 1996:316).

3.2 Language diversity and nation-building in Nigeria

Nigeria's 30 states contain 20% "of Africa's 2 000 odd languages". Of these, Bendel and Rivers States are among "the two most linguistically complex". While Hausa, Yoruba, and Igbo are recognised as national languages, "English remains the official language" (Elugbe 1994:62).

Nigeria demonstrates how nation-building in Africa has to accommodate both nationism and nationalism, the political objectives behind the language provisions in the 1979 and 1989 Nigerian Constitutions (Goke-Pariola 1993:72). The compelling need to create unity (nationism) is fulfilled by promoting both English and "national" languages through a trilingual policy (Goke-Pariola 1993:72; Kaschula & Anthonissen 1995:102; Mansour 1993:127). Nationalism is addressed in "the preservation of local cultures by preserving languages, and the development and projection of local languages" in

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what boils down to a triglossic policy which recognises mother tongue, other community language, and English (Goke-Pariola 1993:69-70,72-73). This is balanced by attention to individual language rights (Goke-Pariola 1993:72).

Nigerian education policies "are propelled by hidden group agenda", according to Goke-Pariola (1993:69-70). The agenda, he argues, surfaces in Nigeria's 1981 National Policy on Education (NPE). Significantly, here the aim of education is "to develop and project" Nigerian and world culture (note the singular) (Goke-Pariola 1993:70), which is repeated in the 1988 Cultural Policy for Nigeria, alongside a desire to "'cultivate a common language for the nation'", a reference probably to Hausa (Goke-Pariola 1993:75). The spread of Hausa in the northern states, far from being a "natural" process, was engineered as part of a "northernization" policy by the Northern Nigerian Government between 1960 and 1967. This suggests that the acceptability of languages as LWCs can be successful be promoted when it is supported by political motives and regional resources.

The emphasis in Nigeria on balancing power between Yoruba, Hausa, and Igbo ethnic groupings led to a strategy of the "deliberate underdevelopment" of certain languages (Fardon & Furniss 1994:22). Mother tongue and one of the three major languages (Hausa, Ibo, Yoruba) are to be inculcated at pre-primary, primary and junior secondary levels (Goke-Pariola 1993:71). English is introduced in high schools, and senior secondary students have to do English and one Nigerian language (Goke-Pariola 1993:72). The overall effect is "to encourage language versatility and to reduce the links between language, ethnicity and political affiliation" (Fardon & Furniss 1994:24).

The outcome of Nigerian language policies is that English "is the primary language of legislation and governance at all levels" (i.e. national, state, local), with little recognition of the official status of Hausa, Igbo, and Yoruba (Goke-Pariola 1993:68). In practice not all Nigerian states provide for minority languages (Goke-Pariola 1993:73). Ironically, the political elite in Nigeria who occupies government positions is also among those who deviate from official policy through their patronage of English educational institutions for their children (Goke-Pariola 1993:102).

Yet few instances exist where "extended language situations in Nigeria involve only groups of homogenous language groups". Hausa-speaking communities may switch to English, Yoruba, Igbo, Tuareg or Kanuri; while "in Taraba, Adamawa, or Borno states ... people sometimes use Kanuri or Fulfulde, sometimes Hausa or English, and on other occasions one or more of the less widely spoken languages of the region". In one Nigerian state the choice of a particular language could signal commitment to a particular culture and nationalism, in another state it may be a mere pragmatic desire to communicate between different language groups (Fardon & Furniss 1994:22).

Heugh (1992:338-339) concludes that in linguistic terms Nigeria has provided a greater number of additional points of access to significant numbers of people who are competent in regional or national

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languages than would have been the case if an English-only policy had been implemented. Yet the hierarchical arrangement of languages continue to present problems and to favour assimilation into English.

Language and religion in Nigeria

Goke-Pariola (1993:139-40) notes that in Nigerian religious institutions, language signals class and rural urban divisions. In southern Nigeria most urban Christian congregations reveal "a linguistic dichotomy which roughly parallels class lines". The middle class prefers English above the vernacular, in contrast to the lower classes. For instance, in Anglican congregations an early morning hour-long service is conducted in English, followed later by a far longer vernacular service, which incorporates aspects of traditional culture and indigenous languages, with African-rhythm music. The earlier service is attended mostly by the middle class, because it is shorter, they prefer English, and are no longer fluent in their original mother tongue. "Therefore the medium of the service one attends says something about one's class, or one's aspirations ... language is closely related to individual ideology and group power. It is difficult to imagine anything more intimate than religious practice ... yet, for many, English dominates even in these innermost recesses of the soul". A similar divide can be observed between rural and urban religion, as in the former areas English is still little known.

Denominations have also used language as tool to recruit or maintain followers; a denomination that promotes English would be more attractive in a context where vernaculars have been devalued. Certainly in Nigeria, "most parents see English as the key to the future" (Goke-Pariola 1993:100). School pupils no longer need official sanctions against speaking vernaculars; instead, a "self-imposed and self-monitored" process favours English as "students struggle to climb up both economically and socially" (Goke-Pariola 1993:105). The same could be said of South Africans.

3.3 Language diversity and nation-building in Kenya

In Kenya Swahili as national language and English as official language dominate completely, although both are primarily acquired languages. English is used in parliament, state bureaucracy, and in schools as medium of instruction. Swahili is a compulsory subject in schools. Vernaculars are not taught or used for official purposes, yet remain strongly linked to "expressions of regional and local identity". Consequently, competence in English is higher than (in rank order) in neighbouring Uganda, Tanzania, and Ethiopia. People prefer Swahili radio to English ones but reverse this preference for newspapers, while television is mainly in English (Parkin 1994:229). Arabic also occurs particularly along the coast.

While Swahili and English obtain at the state level, the general populace prefers English as language of status and mobility, and Swahili as the language of neighbourhood and market (Laitin 1992:110). In fact, people prefer English and the vernaculars, but the government maintains Swahili as language

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of education - a nonrational choice, in terms of Laitin's game theory. Laitin concludes that "languages which symbolize national unity but have no strong local support nor strong bureaucratic support will be marginalized in Africa's educational systems of the future" (Laitin 1992:112).

4. CONCLUDING REMARKS

Chapter Five extended the conclusions of Chapter Four - that English is dominant in congregations regardless of extent of internal linguistic diversity - to the societal and state levels. Similar linguistic configurations occur across the African region, where almost all states claim to support indigenous languages but in practice opt for a European language associated with former colonists. Such contradictory policies/practices by states and populations are related to the dynamics of the world economy, as I demonstrate in Chapter Six. In other words, English dominance viewed against larger settings (nation-states, regions) in which the language is not dominant - in terms of number of speakers - summon explanations which go beyond micro-theories. Rational action theories at best serve to describe rather than to explain language choice in a satisfactory manner. This is not to deny that individuals choose to speak English, but to insist that their choices are not based on individual preferences alone, but on the role and status of English within society. That is, individual agency is influenced by norms operating at the national level, which in turn articulates with global structures and global norms.

Chapter Five returns to a theme mentioned in earlier chapters, namely language practice as opposed to language policies. The evidence shows that the present South African state has in practice - as opposed to its policies - supported a global rather than indigenous language, and so (unintentionally?) established a form of cultural hegemony. This may be an example of the lingering effect of external (colonial) hegemony on cultural and political elites, as well as on the cultural subsystem (e.g. language), following Laitin. The discrepancy between language policy and practice introduced by Fardon & Furniss and by Goke-Pariola in this Chapter Two is a recurrent theme in this study. A central attempt to explain why this is so tends to be framed in economic terms, such as the suggestion that states do not have the financial resources to carry out their policies. Such a conclusion is only partly accurate, thus demonstrating the shortcomings of analysis which remains at the national level. The advantage of analysis at a global level in terms of world-polity, as advanced in Chapter Three, offers additional insight into why states find it necessary in the first instance to construct policies which they cannot carry out.

In other words, Chapter Five empirically grounds the dimensions of a political sociology of language, as explored in Chapter One, in the language configurations of certain former British colonies in Africa - most notably in Southern Africa. The functional allocation of languages in these states is seen as a consequence not only of various forms of language rationalisation by African state elites, but as

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following on the predominance of English within the world-system - a position reinforced through language-linked development programmes. That only a small percentage of Africa's general population can express themselves functionally in English does not contradict my argument. The majority of non-English speakers remain poorly incorporated into the dominant political and cultural systems, due to the position of the state within the world-economy, the development of internal core-periphery relations within each state, and the function of globalized education systems which institutionalise a single global (and intrastate) division of labour. As a result, the majority of the population is rendered not only dysfunctional in English but often also in their indigenous first languages.

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- CHAPTER SIX -

LANGUAGE INTEGRATION IN WORLD SYSTEM PERSPECTIVE

Chapter Outline

Chapter Six reiterates and ties together the major conclusions of the preceding chapters into broader theoretical constructs. Language practice in congregations - as in society - is shown to be affected by a world system comprising an economic structure, various globalization processes, and a political-cultural institution.

The "world system perspective" of the Chapter's title indicates that I chose to combine both world-economy and world-polity concepts in my analysis. While I do not intend to pedantically point out which theory is in play in particular sections, I will occasionally acknowledge where specific features of world-polity or world-economy are used. I deem the spatial and structural stratification of the global system by the operation of the world-economy into the core, semiperiphery and periphery as relevant. Just as important is the notion of isomorphism within world-polity, that best explains how global norms are established and diffused - particularly when a distinction is drawn between structural and cultural forms of isomorphism. In general I tend to favour world-polity theory, which allows me to include aspects of neo-institutional theory as applied to organizations.

In the sections that follow I distinguish between global, societal (national), and congregational levels of the environment (context), as well as between macro- and meso-levels of analysis. As a world system approach ultimately attempts to envelop all analytical levels in a hermeneutic dialectic, such distinctions are blurred and overlapping. I retain them for heuristic purposes, mainly to illustrate the point that congregations are immersed in and influenced by their societal environment, which is similarly affected by the global environment. At the same time it allows me to outline at the meso-level some of the local dynamics which I believe to be unique to these South African churches. By macro-level constraints I refer to several factors: attempts by state managers to construct a state through the development of national ideologies which resonate with global norms; popular support or opposition to these ideologies; and the effects of global capitalism on cultural diversity, e.g. through the establishment of a monolingual hegemony. By meso-level constraints I mean how perceptions of diversity within a congregation structure social interaction between groups within it.

In effect I present an ecological (or environmental) argument in which global factors which support and hinder diversity and integration are highlighted. Such an ecology of integration also denotes an ecology of language, which relates to the surrounding state formation, which in turn operates within cultural values set by the global political-economic environment. For, as Williams (1991) observed, the ecology of language has much to do with how some cultures are legitimized while others are alienated in the

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people and land, and of the granting or abrogating of social rights" (Williams 1991:4). Some may object to the introduction of an ecological argument, as such explanatory frameworks are usually regarded as more relevant to micro-level and rational-actor concerns[1]. Yet I use "ecology" and "environment" here to highlight how isomorphic effects occur across macro- and meso-level units of the world system.

The concept of "environment" refers to the "political context of organizations", that is, to the effects of interactions between organizations and the state. More specifically, environment refers to "those external events, actions and constraints occurring as a direct or indirect result of the organization of persons seeking to rule a particular domain, usually geographic in nature. The theoretical lens thus focuses on the polity, an organization designed to obtain compliance, even in the face of resistance ... An ecological view of this environment pays attention to those phenomena that affect populations of organizations rather than individual organizations" (Carroll, Delacroix & Goodstein 1988:361).

The political environment consists, on the one hand, of global and local institutions which indirectly affect organizations by promoting cultural and structural models which claim their allegiance. On the other hand the state clearly increasingly and directly affects the types and structures of organizations through a progressive embodiment of central ideologies in legislation. For instance, the requirement in the Labour Equity Bill that all organizations in South Africa above a certain size must reflect the racial composition of the population will radically alter the structures of organizations. Depending on how this law is policed, the number of organizations in a given organizational population may also be limited. My approach goes beyond that of Carroll, Delacroix & Goodstein (1988:361), who concentrate on "structural relationships between polities and populations of organizations". Unlike them, I include "the ideological content of specific regimes".

My argument in this chapter is in fact very straightforward. I maintain that the world system functions as an institutional environment which affects language status at the global level, thus establishing English, the language of former and current hegemonic core states, as high language across the world system. Through global norms which affect the rational organization of nation-states the global status of English is institutionalized (sometimes unofficially) in the nation-building projects of many countries, core states as well as peripheries and semiperipheries, thus affecting language configurations in societies and in their subnational institutions and organizations. A global language system operates as part of a transnational system, another way in which culture contributes to the stratification and integration of world society.

On the one hand the world-economy stratifies world society in such a way that the commodities of

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[1]. I am grateful to John Boli for pointing this out.

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former world system hegemons (the UK, then the USA[2]) have become dominant across the semiperiphery and periphery. This is not to deny that reciprocal influences from the periphery also do affect the core, nor that the periphery does not also contribute to world culture. I merely highlight cultural hegemony as most relevant to analysis of my data. The world-capitalist system often requires trade to be conducted in the supracentral language of the core, and aid agreements to be concluded in favour of the same language, namely English. On the other hand the norms circulating within the world-polity require that nation-states acknowledge and protect constitutionally the diversity of its peoples. Thus two ideologies have been established within the world system which in linguistic terms simultaneously promote monolingualism and multilingualism, homogeneity and heterogeneity, as well as hybridity.

The global status of world languages is institutionalized at the societal level through several processes, primarily nation-building, and through several systems, primarily education - and, in this instance, religion. To be more precise, societal processes and systems reflect an attempt by state managers, elites, organizations (local and transnational), to institutionalize both diversity and unity in the form of, say, multilingualism and monolingualism. In organizational terms this paradoxical process has two effects: (a) loose coupling occurs between state policies and state conduct; and (b) (indirect) coercive isomorphism happens; that is, the norms circulating within the world system are institutionalized by state policies, which form a normative environment to which intrasocietal organizations must adjust.

Institutional isomorphism thus explains the transnational diffusion of norms from the global to the societal levels as well as intranational diffusion of norms between institutions within societies. Subsequently language policies and practices of various states will be similar, just as within a particular society those of a state may converge with those of schools and churches. The state plays a central role in this diffusion process, as it adjusts to external rules and in turn institutionalizes them in constitutions and policies which affect societal organizations internally. With regards to the latter dynamic, Meyer (1983) argues "that organizations display structural features isomorphic with those of the state under which they exist" (Carroll, Delacroix & Goodstein 1988:369).

What general constraints occur in the political environment which can affect organizations? Meyer treats rationalization as central construct, which occurs "in organizational form or in the general culture". Rationalization "institutionalizes in society structures that both make organizing possible and constrain it". A pattern of organizing within a particular society "is a product of the structural elements that are institutionalized in society. Organizations are built up of these elements, but also constrained to employ them or take them for granted, which limits the possibilities for organizational structure and action" (Meyer 1983:272).

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[2]. There is some debate about whether the US is still a hegemon, or is a hegmon in decline.

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The argument so far allows me to return to the issue of glocalization. I argue not that the global (norms, structures supporting language status) affects the local (language practice in congregations) directly, but instead emphasise that the state - the very organization accorded legitimacy and authority by the world system to act on behalf of societies - mediates global institutions. Evidence from other former African colonies, particularly those previously under British rule, suggests that official acknowledgement of multilingualism is required by global norms, as instituted in transnational organizations like the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity. Yet at the same time communication with the core is required to be conducted in the global language of trade and commerce, namely English. At a secondary level it is important to recognize that the religious institutions (e.g. churches) also function as transnational organizations, and so should be expected to relay norms operating at the global level but which also affect their societies of origin, e.g. the UK and the USA.

1. THE WORLD SYSTEM AS MACRO-ENVIRONMENT WHICH CONSTRAINS AND ENABLES LANGUAGE INTEGRATION

The world system is taken as comprising at least the outcome of the globalizations of capitalism and of those institutions which regulate the interstate system. I also argue that these forces established the status of world languages, but particularly of English. As a result the world-economy is relevant in a discussion of language usage in South Africa, as it articulates with the dominance of English. The various subsections here take their cues from some of the structural features of the global formation, including the global division of labour, state development (nation-building), economic activities, and cultural hegemony.

Subsection 1.1 is not a reprise of the structures of the world system, by itself the most global of all macro-constraints on linguistic integration, but places South Africa in focus. The global division of labour is effected through the nation-state as distributive unit.

As a result the location of South Africa in the semiperiphery is crucial to an understanding of how the world system effects this society. Milkman (1979:264) argued that South Africa is "least satisfactorily dealt with" in world-economic literature, a point still generally true in terms of volume, if not substance. Very few local or international academics apply a world-systems perspective to this country. William Martin claimed in 1990 that not a single book was "written in the last two decades ... that seriously treats the country from a dependency, dependent-development, or world-systems perspective" (Martin 1990c:204). Martin's assertion is only diluted a little by the appearance of Vieira, Martin, and Wallerstein's *How fast the wind?* (1992), which included several substantive chapters on South Africa but as part of a broader, sub-regional analysis. With the exception of Martin's sustained output (1984, 1986, 1987, 1990a, 1990b, 1990c, Wallerstein & Martin 1979, Thomas & Martin

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1992), other examples remain few and far between, such as Arrighi (1979)'s thoughts on South Africa's peripheralization, or Ehrensaft (1976)'s comments on South Africa's dependent development in the world-economy. As a result I am forced to rely heavily on Milkman (1979), Martin (1990, 1992), and Wallerstein & Vieira (1992).

The number of local social science scholars who apply world-system analysis to South Africa are as few and far between as their international counterparts. Among the handful that I could locate is Johan Graaff (1990)'s critique of Wallerstein's notion of system, which uses South African examples. Jonathan Jansen (1991) reflected on knowledge production in the centre and periphery, using world-system concepts. Both Graaff and Jansen, like myself, refer to the intra-national replication of the world system within South Africa. Few dissertations address the topic; I could locate only one, a Master's thesis on democratization in peripheral states (Keulder 1995). From within government quarters the Department of Foreign Affairs, for example, issued a parliamentary media briefing on South Africa's new place in the world (Foreign Affairs 1997). A number of anthologies have appeared which focus on South Africa's economic position in the world system, most recently from an international relations viewpoint (Handley & Mills 1996).

A list of academic texts on South Africa in which globalization features as central construct is only slightly more extensive. These include my work on globalization and world-system influences on the formation of African Indigenous Churches (Venter 1998), Russon (1995)'s discussion of intrastate boundary disputes, Van de Walle (1997)'s reflection on globalization and democracy in Africa, and Coetzee and Wood (1993)'s comparative work on group identity formation in South Africa and Yugoslavia. The sparseness of sociological reflection on globalization contrasts sharply with the volume of articles on the subject in the popular press.

But location should not only be read off from economic integration, but also from cultural integration into globalized norms. The latter requires state self-development (nation-building) as the legitimated process of achieving progress and justice. States are authorised to integrate diverse groups as the nation, defined as "constituent citizens of the modern state system" (Williams 1991:4). World political culture requires states to devise and implement policies, usually reflected in constitutions, which deal with cultural and linguistic diversity.

The world-polity arguments of Meyer, Boli and colleagues utilize institutional theory by extending concepts usually applied to organizations to the global realm. Boli suggests that the world-polity approach represents a type of neo-institutionalism, in which social action is regarded as the "enactment of broad cultural models - of individuals, organizations, states, and goals" with little "genuine departures from social prescriptions". The basis of the world-polity is a world culture, "fundamental assumptions about social reality". While global structures have an economic dimension, they are actually undergirded by institutional (cultural) structures, "which are universalistic in the sense

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that they proclaim their applicability to all human experience and societies" (Boli 1999).

Subsection 1.2 outlines the economic activities and institutional norms within the world system which support the rise and ultimate status of English as *the* global language. The extension of economic dominance by former English-speaking core powers such as Britain and the United States of America was accompanied by cultural hegemony, including the religions and languages of the core.

Subsection 1.3. considers how the global status of English and its supportive ideologies affect the socio-linguistic configuration of contemporary semiperipheral and peripheral states - such as African societies (Goke-Pariola 1993:18). Despite the waning of former core states and the ongoing attempts at restructuring the world system into a multipolar and multicultural entity, these effects continue.

1.1 The structure of the world system with reference to South Africa's location

South Africa is clearly well-integrated into the global economy as a semiperiphery and into the world-polity as a modern state, as befits a country with a long history of global and regional interaction.

I describe the factors that indicate South Africa's location in the world-economy in detail, compared to a more general reprise of its integration into the world-polity, dealt with extensively and specifically in the section on nation-building in South Africa in Chapter Five. Next I briefly outline the relevance of structure and location in the world system, as a macro-environment, for language ideology and practice, a theme taken up again in subsection 1.2.

As indicated above, I treat world-polity and world-economy as making up a single environment, and so make explicit my assumption that culture and economics are related in the world system. In De Swaan (1994)'s words: in "the transnational context, cultural practices are embedded in networks of economic exchange and political interdependence, all the while being contested and contentious, accommodating and subversive, emanating from core areas to peripheries".

1.1.1 South Africa's incorporation of world-polity norms

The construction of a nation on the basis of non-racialism is central to this discussion. Nation-building through development was especially encouraged in the now dispersed Reconstruction and Development Programme. Equally, nation-building was served by the final Constitution - as in the Interim one - at the political level, and by the Bill of Rights at the judicial level. From its inception the ANC has promoted a national instead of "tribal" consciousness in a unified state as a sign of "liberation and social advance" (Slovo, 1988:145). An emphasis on regional or cultural "exceptionalism" is

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denounced as "an instrument of colonial, neo-colonial, or minority domination" (Slovo, 1988:145).

Global awareness, transnational economic exchange, and the constraints and benefits of global norms have been part of South Africa's collective consciousness for over three hundred years. No doubt this has engendered a deep openness to global influences, as demonstrated by the country's early involvement in transnational organizations, such as the League of Nations.

Among black South Africans the awareness of global interconnectedness emerged from the encounter with other Africans, Arabs, and Europeans as slavers, traders, colonists, administrators, and missionaries. During the colonial period the desire for foreign intervention into an oppressive situation was stimulated by events like the Crimean War. Russians, Americans, and the British were regarded at various historical points as potential military saviours. Black South Africans also participated in conflicts that involved global powers, throwing in their lot on both sides of two Anglo-Boer Wars, and on the Allied side during the two World Wars.

Global consciousness among whites is no doubt related to their European origin, and the extensive ties that some still maintain with particularly Great Britain. South Africa was - and now is again - a prominent member of the Commonwealth (of former British colonies). At various points linkages were sought and established with e.g. nazi-Germany before the second world war, while South African volunteers participated in many theatres of world and proxy wars of the hegemonic states, for example in Korea. Sporting contests between South Africa and other countries also doubtless contributed, and date back to the 19th century.

Apart from various colonial administrative structures, religious institutions constitute some of the earliest globalized organizations which linked South Africans to the rest of the world transnationally. On the one hand a strong European and missionary presence led to the establishment of education institutions which promoted "civilized" Western notions and economic practices. On the other hand indigenous appropriations of Christianity in the form of African Zionist churches were exported to other Southern African states.

Historically South African liberation movements have long drawn upon pan-African and universal human rights notions, as revealed in the African National Congress' Freedom Charter (1955). This demonstrates a linkage to the then emergent human rights regime centred on the UN Charter of 1945.

Global and regional interconnectedness increased rapidly along the liberative axis after these movements were banned in 1960. The role of the international connections of political parties like the

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SA Communist Party (SACP) should not be forgotten. The origin of non-racialism[3] lies within "the internationalist SACP tradition" of the 1920s, the SACP's 1924 decision to recruit blacks, and is based on a inclusive universalism (see Slovo, 1990; Adam, 1994:45; Filatova, 1994:55; O'Malley, 1994:78; Ellis & Sechaba, 1992:15, 42). The training of guerillas in all parts of the world, particularly the former USSR was a contributive factor. In addition many who went into exile were educated in diverse places like the United Kingdom, the USA, Cuba, and Eastern Europe. Some of the resulting influences can be traced in the policy and language debates outside South Africa prior to "the great shift" between the unbanning of liberation movements in 1990 and first general elections in 1994, as indicated in Chapter Five. Support for the liberation movements was obtained from other states, international organizations, subnational states, and individual cities.

Along another axis global and regional interconnectedness decreased rapidly subsequent to the events which lead to the 1976 uprisings. While South Africa continued to be the object of negative global attention from both the nation-state system and from global institutions (for example the United Nations, the World Court, and the World Council of Churches) the country was gradually excised from participation in many of these forums. This doubtless reinforced awareness of global norms and the cost of ignoring them.

Given the above dynamics, it is not difficult to conclude that South Africa is quite closely intertwined with the global norms that structure the world-polity. Meyer has suggested that "precisely because so many of its older institutions were delegitimated, the high forms of modernity may have great relative standing". Closeness to world society should be qualified as relative to local capacity to resist the power and legitimacy of world models. South Africa, like Namibia, lacks the proximity to world centres of states such as Sweden, and so has even less capacity to resist (Meyer 1999).

How does South Africa's incorporation of global norms affect the language configuration? Meyer suggests that more support for local languages would have been available if these had not been "so delegitimated by very recent history". He argues that two forces in particular move towards establishing a strong consensus favouring English. The first is "the very problematic status of Afrikaans as an alternative"; the second "the use of the local languages by South Africa as a now-highly-delegitimated strategy of subordination". Meyer points out that "in Namibia these two forces produced a strong consensus for English despite the very low level of utilization of English in the actual population. I visited many classrooms (in the north) where teacher and students were trying

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[3]. Introduced by SACP members into the ANC lexicon by the early 1950s, non-racialism was used as an ideological tool by the SACP to silence opposition to its plans for advancing non-African members into ANC leadership from within ethnically-based segments within the ANC. This was the case at the ANC's 1962 consultative conference at Morogoro in Tanzania, where non-racialism was used to prize open the ANC's membership to all races, as at Kabwe (O'Malley, 1994:78; Ellis & Sechaba, 1992:54-56). Far from being a neutral concept, non-racialism was used by the SACP to overcome the ANC's previously Africanist policies, and to obtain more control within the ANC (O'Malley, 1994:78; Ellis & Sechaba, 1992:150).

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without competence to function in English, and who clearly ... saw this as not only legally required but ideologically correct too" (Meyer 1999).

While South Africa's multilingual language policies reflect global idealised norms of human rights, monolingual language practice[4] illustrate the local effects of global language ideologies. In addition nation-building in the African context provides a regional habit of orientation towards European languages, and in particular towards English. Ramirez' (1987:326) suggestion, that the number of nation-states which adopt particular practices or structures predict the direction of isomorphism, appears to be borne out in Africa. Differences between state language policy and practice can also be viewed as loose coupling, a theme expanded in more detail in Section 4, below.

I do not argue that world ideology directly affects local congregations, but rather that global norms affect the state-building project in terms of the direction taken by language practice ideology, which are reflected in the dynamics of congregations, as in education.

1.1.2 South Africa's integration into the world-economy

In what follows I draw on a comparison with other countries which are presently considered part of the semiperiphery to help substantiate my argument. Attention to historical periods is as crucial in any discussion about how to locate South Africa, and to the region (Africa) and sub-region (Southern Africa) to which it belongs.

During its colonial history South Africa was incorporated into the world system as part of the periphery. According to Wallerstein, one of the primary indicators of periphery status is the overwhelming dependence of an economy on exports of raw material to the core. Milkman (1979) has drawn attention to colonial South Africa's exportation of raw materials (gold formed 60% of exports between 1909-1937) and importation of consumer goods. Different roles existed for non-mining settler capitalists and mining settler capitalists in the transition towards a semiperiphery (Milkman 1979:269)[5]. Mining capitalists were mainly British, and engaged in a struggle with non-mining capitalists (mainly Afrikaner) to control the economy. During the pre-Second World War period mining capitalists were ascendant, but their influence declined directly afterwards. The efforts of non-mining capitalists eventually led to economic diversification in the form of a secondary (industrial) sector. Foreign investment in mining before the pre-Second World War period amounted to 60% of all

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[4]. The irony of state practices is that during negotiations on the final constitution it was the previous regime, in the form of the National Party, who insisted on monolingual education clauses, while the ANC fought for multilingual clauses (Ebrahim 1998:206).

[5]. For contrary argument see Kruss (1985).

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investments between 1909-1937. By 1979, 40% of all foreign capital was in manufacturing (Milkman 1979:266-267,272).

South Africa moved into the semiperiphery around the time of the Second World War[6], aided by several factors. These include a global depression (or Kondratieff B-phase) which lasted from 1913/20-1945 in the world-economy; "rivalry in the interstate system"; South Africa's role in the global division of labour (as main producer of gold); and the coming to power of a white minority (Martin 1990c:219; Wallerstein & Vieira 1992:5; Milkman 1979:262). After 1948 a manufacturing industry developed, supported by direct foreign investment, restrictions on consumer imports alongside an import substitution industry, and importation of capital goods (Milkman 1979:261,266-7). Yet, by 1972, 60% of all exports continued to be of raw materials, of which 37% was gold (Milkman 1979:272). Milkman concludes that South Africa is a semiperiphery because it manifests continued technological dependence on advanced capitalist countries (Milkman 1979:262).

South Africa's stature as semiperiphery is confirmed by both Milkman and Martin, even though they used different methodologies more than a decade apart. Milkman deduces the country's location from the extent of core states' investment in that country, from imports by the late 1970s, and from South Africa's exports to Africa (about 15% of total exports). South Africa supplied "about 80% of the trade in the southern Africa region". Up to 1976 Britain was the single largest importer to South Africa, but was overtaken by the U.S. (Milkman 1979:274). Martin (1990c) uses a global and regional comparative perspective, which tracks South Africa's trajectory against core states and against other semi-peripheries, as reported below. In the debate about whether the apartheid regime was upheld by foreign investment, Milkman and Martin offer two slightly different answers. While Martin (1990c), like Milkman, accepts that a link exists between the apartheid regime and South Africa's improvement in the world-economy (compare Wallerstein & Vieira 1992), he argues that apartheid increasingly disadvantaged the country's potential during the 1970s.

From the mid-1960s to mid-1970s the hegemony of the USA "significantly constrained any further movement towards core status in the world-economy". Agreements with the International Monetary Fund and the Global Agreement on Trade & Tariffs prevented further protectionist policies and development of an export trade (Martin 1990c:216). The inflow of direct foreign investment stifled technological innovation while multinationals blocked exports. As a result, domination of the surrounding peripheries increased, with exports of "industrial goods for regional primary goods" - so that apartheid became a regional construct, through which a hierarchy of labour and production was established, "linked by flows of labor, capital, and commodities". "To a degree rare among members

[6]. According to Milkman, South Africa's movement happened during *and* after the Second World War, but Martin comments that South Africa was restructured during the interwar period, with the Southern African sub-region restructured after the War.

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of the semiperipheral zone, South Africa's position in core-peripheral networks was founded upon the emergence of a distinctive region of the world-economy" (Martin 1990c:217).

The general consensus that South Africa is part of the semiperiphery in the world-economy is not unproblematic. After all, this perception was coined in the 1970s and accepted until the late 1980s, so is it still valid at the end of the millennium? Has the change in political regime - manifested in 1990 and effected in the 1994 election - affected South Africa's location in the world system? If so, positively or negatively? In short, is South Africa an ascendent or a declining semiperiphery? Wallerstein (1979b) stated that nation-states which are semi-peripheries because they are ascending in the world system will look different from declining semi-peripheries. Presumably, because they assume more characteristics of core states while descending semiperipheries exhibit increasingly more characteristics of peripheries.

As part of problematizing the notion of South Africa's status, one should note its regional location, and the strategies used to move into the semiperiphery. Semiperipheries may differ qualitatively from one another, depending on the location of their region in the world-economy. South Africa is a semiperiphery in Africa, a region which is part of the periphery. Secondly, the strategies utilised by peripheral countries to move to the semiperiphery may result in qualitatively different types of semiperipheries, manifested in social or political structure (Milkman 1979:264). At least three strategies exist by which peripheral countries can move to the semiperiphery, namely import-substitution during world-economic contraction, as happened in South Africa; invitation during periods of world-economic expansion, for example the Ivory Coast; and self-reliance, e.g. China (Wallerstein 1974:9-16, according to Milkman 1979:282 footnote 2). The differences can be illustrated by reference to the polarized nature of Brazilian society, or the state socialism of China (Milkman 1979:264).

At the end of the millennium, indicators of South Africa's status are ambiguous, with internal self-perception differing from external interpretations. The current image projected by the South African state, business, and media is of a semiperiphery. State policies map out a high-wage, high-technology route, supported by a discourse of global competitiveness (compare Nattrass 1994). Greater integration into the world-economy is firmly supported by the business sector. An argument for semiperiphery status is supported by renewed South African exploitation of other Sub-Saharan nation-states, while it continues to be exploited by the core. Some South African textile industries are exploiting lower minimum wages in neighbouring countries such as Malawi, and chain stores are expanding into Africa, opening branches in Uganda (Shoprite) and Ghana (Pep Stores). During the 1970s South Africa behaved towards other nation-states in southern Africa as though it was part of the core, and treated these states as though it was the centre and they its hinterland (Wallerstein & Vieira 1992:12: Martin 1992:35).

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Some core agencies create perceptions which appear to ascribe peripheral status to South Africa. Investment analysts like Standard and Poore grade South Africa in the same risk category as Russia, and rates the country's economy as on par with other crises-stricken emerging markets. A Purchasing Power Parity index was published recently by *The Economist* on 29 countries, which measures whether currencies are under- or overvalued against the dollar (Sunday Times, Business Times section, 20 December 1998:1). South Africa was rated in the bottom third of the table, below Thailand and Poland; above Hong Kong, Hungary, Philippines, Russia, China, and Malaysia (in that order). The South African currency, which continues to be devalued, is considered to be 45% undervalued against the dollar.

I argue that the ambiguity and historical trajectory of indicators suggest that South Africa is a semiperiphery in decline. A downward slide can be explained in terms of Milkman's hypothesis that more progressive regimes lose favour with global capital. Milkman notes that South Africa in the 1970s was a dependent industrializing country, aided by a racial division of labour, with an internal dualism between highly developed urban areas and underdeveloped rural peripheries. She argues that this situation was in/directly supported by foreign capital[7], as evident from an increase in U.S direct investment in the six years following the Sharpeville massacre of 1960 (Milkman 1979:281). International capital desires "stable" economies in the semiperiphery, and so encourages strong suppressive regimes there (a la Meyer) to provide class-based alliances between core and semiperiphery elites. Milkman (1979:281) concluded in 1979 that "South Africa's apartheid system is bolstered by its location within the world-economy".

Others confirm a characterisation of South Africa as a semiperiphery in decline (Martin 1992, 1990c; Thomas & Martin 1992; McGowan 1993). Overall, the southern African region retained its position relative to the core in the world-economy during the post-1945 upturn (which lasted from 1945-1967/73) but declined since the 1970s, coinciding with the next B-phase in the world-economy (compare Wallerstein & Vieira 1992:5). Yet measured against other semiperipheries, South Africa shows a slide which started about 1973, coinciding with the current B-phase in the world-economy. While all semi-peripheries were affected, some moved ahead of South Africa during this period; e.g. South Korea. In part this is due to the political turmoil across the southern Africa region, but also to shifts in the global division of labour. During the downturn, core states shed manufacturing to the semiperiphery, so that some who were well-positioned did in fact benefit during this period. In terms of growth rate per capita semi-peripheries like Taiwan and South Korea moved beyond South Africa. South Africa's manufacturing (measured as employment across all economic sectors) declined over the same period.

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[7]. For a contrasting argument, i.e. that globalization supports democracy, see Van de Walle (1997).

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1.2 The status of English in the global language system of the world system: core cultural hegemony and glocal language statuses

Having established that South Africa is firmly embedded in the world system[8], I will now indicate the implications for language usage. I argue that the status of a language depends on its status in the world system, which is partly linked to the position that its speakers occupied - or occupy - within the world-economy.

1.2.1 English as supercentral language in the world language system

De Swaan (1989, 1994) intimated that a major aspect of transnational society is an emergent world language system, which consists of twelve central languages dominated by English. Chinese, Arabic, Russian, Hindi, Indonesian (Malaysian), Spanish, French, English each has "well over hundred million speakers and each connect a series of languages that are central at the national level. Portuguese, German and Japanese have a comparable number of speakers but perform less of an interlinguistic connecting function. Swahili, while less numerous, fulfils important functions of transnational communication. Together, these twelve languages allow direct access to some 60% of the world's citizens." They act as "central codes for dozens of other, national languages, and many of these are in turn in a central position with respect to several regional languages or dialects". One can speak of a world language *system* "because interdependences exist between languages of the world. The mechanisms driving interdependence consists of bilingualism and translation through which speakers interact" (De Swaan 1994).

Most of the central languages owe their status to imperialism, trade, or warfare, which are also responsible for the exponential growth of language interactions. In non-English countries the dominance of English is associated with colonial dominance and the concomitant used of English by subsequent governments (cf. Conrad & Fishman 1977). The four features associated with the spread of imperial languages (military conquest and subsequent enduring occupation, accompanied by the imposition of imperial administration over a multilingual context, and the opportunity of gaining material advantages through the imperial language) are not necessarily all relevant in explaining the global dominance of English. To these could be added urbanization, economic development (especially exports to English-speaking countries), educational attainment, religious composition, and political affiliation, among others (Fishman, Cooper & Rosenbaum 1977).

When the dominance of English is superimposed onto the hierarchical geographical ordering of the

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[8]. Other data could have been used to establish South Africa's incorporation into the world system, such as trade data or membership in international nongovernmental organizations.

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world-economy as De Swaan implies, it becomes clear that it is the language of two former core states - the former hegemon, Britain, and the more recently dominant USA - which is the "supercentral" language. The pre-eminent status of English as global language (Crystal 1997) is confirmed by its global reach as official language in 36 countries out of 152 listed in 1975: as sole official language in 21 countries, and co-official language in another 15 (Conrad & Fishman 1977:7). In addition, "in all supranational languages bilingual speakers exist who are competent in English" (De Swaan 1989).

In De Swaan's hierarchical global model, speakers of peripheral languages will generally "choose to learn the central language rather than any peripheral language, since that is the language from which translation to every other peripheral and the next higher central language is available". However, "speakers of only the central language do not gain much by learning a second language themselves, but do profit when others, peripheral language speakers, learn their language and in so doing also increase the formers' opportunities for direct communication and passive translation". As Mazrui (1990) has argued, global stratification is at least in part linked to language and culture.

The explanation of the dominance of English is incomplete without attention to two related issues, namely the expansion of cultural hegemony through economic means, and of Western education systems as part of development. English is often promoted through education itself, as a subject or teaching medium. Most textbooks used in universities are also only available in English.

Culture and development cannot easily be separated. Fardon & Furniss insist that "all development" is embedded in language. For example, all economic activity takes place "under particular conditions of language", whether "the language of farm or factory or financial institution" (Fardon & Furniss 1994:19). Thus the global status of English hinges both on the world-economy and world-polity. From this perspective language status in South Africa is a direct reflection of the language situation in the world system, and in the global hierarchy of languages, so that language ideology locally is tied to the global language ideology.

As the world-economy is dialectically linked to cultural change, cultural hegemony accompanies the expansion of the world capitalist system. Commercial exchange (e.g. the production and consumption of Western mass culture) often requires the use of English, which is also often tied to aid packages (Mazrui 1997). The initial expansion of the world-economy and its need for cheap migratory labour was sustained by "development" and a concomitant drive towards modernization. The world-economy with the nation-state as primary unit in the division of labour divides the world into "developed" and "underdeveloped" countries, dominated by a USA-European Communities-Japan triad (cf. Jessop e.a. 1993:228).

Development in turn was accompanied by the globalization of education, intended as a system of

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social control[9], by which cultural hegemony is established by the state over its subjects. De Swaan (1989) has shown with reference to Europe that mass education served to cement and expand central languages into universal languages in a particular society. Similarly, in former colonies, the central language happens to be the former colonial language, "taught to students and officials from all regions under the colonial administration". The colonial language helped "to unite persons from very different ethnic and linguistic background" and was used "as the language of the anti-colonial opposition which in many cases took over state power after liberation". But although the supercentral language is also "the medium for intellectuals and scientists in the territory", it usually far from universally distributed throughout the country.

Within each nation-state, education serves to structure the division of labour between the bureaucrats and technocrats essential for the functioning of the state within the world-system, and the rest, who are marginalised. This is particularly true when education is presented through a non-indigenous medium of instruction such as English (Tollefson 1991). The role of education in promoting English in the colonial period up to the mid-twentieth century, and the use of the apartheid state to promote Afrikaans as national language, was noted in the section on nation-building in South Africa (2.2.4, above).

Another way in which English, education, and development coincides is through aid packages which ties development to educational language programmes. English Second Language or English as Foreign Language programmes mostly devalue local languages by promoting subtractive bilingualism (Heugh 1995:330). Literacy programmes aimed at the socio-economic development of e.g. the agricultural sector are among the major socio-historical forces affecting language attitudes in sub-Saharan Africa (Goke-Pariola 1993:32,39,41). An analysis of the activities of the Ford Foundations and USAID has shown that "'education plays a crucial role in the organization of the market as colony .... Without mass education the market system of the corporations cannot function effectively either in terms of the jobs it creates or the consumption patterns it establishes'", e.g. a market for schoolchildren's uniforms (Goke-Pariola 107, quoting Chinweizu 1975:335,338[10]).

Tollefson contends that a world system "that is more just and equitable depends upon an understanding of how people can gain control of their own institutions. A key issue is the role of language in organizing and reproducing those institutions" (Tollefson 1991:201). When English "becomes the lingua franca of a community, an English mother tongue-speaker is seldom under any

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[9]. While some may object to this perspective, the intended purpose of education under the British colonial regime, as under Afrikaner apartheid ideologues, was to turn the population into co-operative subjects who embraced the core cultural and political values of the state. By this I do not deny that education also had the largely unintended side effect of proving useful in liberative struggles.

[10]. Chinweizu 1975. The West and the rest of us: white predators, Black slavers, and the African elite. New York : Random House.

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form of pressure to become proficient in any of the other local or national languages. Such a person will most probably expect people with any other mother tongue to switch to English when the company is bi- or multilingual. It may even be that the monolingual person wonders at the inability of bilingual people to use the lingua franca appropriately" (Kaschula & Anthonissen 1995:72).

1.2.2 Language, cultural hegemony and religion

Like language, religion is an institution closely linked to socio-political structures, which in turn are sensitive to ideas generated and accepted globally (e.g. "development"). Understanding the importance of English in South African religious systems requires a perception of how historical changes in e.g. African cultural and religious identities relates to the world system. In contrast to the communal orientation of African world views, the world-political culture promotes and encourages the institutionalisation of individualism through state structures and through the activities of non-governmental organisations - such as development organisations (Robertson 1992:105). Proliferation of aid and literacy programmes also indicate multiplication of international non-governmental agencies (INGOs), one of the criteria of integration into world-polity.

Not only do social, political, and economic factors play a role in promoting a particular language and in affecting types of religious organization, but these factors are underpinned by global forces. I have tried to show elsewhere (Venter 1998) that mainstream Christianity contributed to the establishment of a global European cultural hegemony, opposed symbolically by the emergence of local religious identities (like Zionism). But even local developments were constrained by the global system, so that even Zionism have to refer to the global; i.e.incorporate aspects of global Christianity.

Of particular relevance to my study is the findings of Fishman, Cooper & Rosenbaum (1977) which concern the role of religion in advancing or delaying the advancement of English. Fishman e.a. (1977:105) concluded that religious composition was among the two most important categories in predicting the status of English in former English colonies. These scholars found that the occurrence of traditional belief systems were substantially correlated to the presence of English as medium of instruction in primary and secondary schools - even when former Anglophone colonies were excluded; probably as result of low rates of economic development (Fishman, Cooper & Rosenbaum 1977:95-6).

Peter Smith (1986) has theorized that religion is strengthened inside a core state as that state achieves hegemony within the world system. Subsequently the core state extends its religious system to the

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periphery[11]. The dominance of religion within the world system is tied to the fortunes of its core state of origin. The dominance of Christianity in sub-saharan Africa is thus the residue of the core states that dominated this region.

Economic forces are primarily responsible for the achievement or loss of hegemony. A state that seeks hegemony has to gain a competitive advantage in agricultural and industrial production on the world market, followed by commercial and financial advantage. Historically, these advantages coincide with such a state achieving military superiority. Once a state dominates the world market, it seeks to keep barriers to world trade to a minimum so that it can freely sell its goods. At the same time it tries to force its competitors to give up their control of trade with their former colonies. A hegemonic state loses its productive advantage through a combination of factors, such as heavy military spending to ensure the international order; high domestic wages to placate its own labour force; "under-investment in new technology and in the educational and research facilities. During periods of struggle, competitors try to extend their power over the periphery to "secure their own economic zones". This usually results in war. A state rival could also gain the upper hand through innovation (inventing new forms of technology) (Smith 1986:90).

Hegemonic states need to generate such ideologies and institutions as they think is necessary in order to get and maintain hegemony. Smith argues that religion is a significant part (although not the only part) of an "ideological expression of well-being" which is shared among the upper and middle classes which benefit from their state's dominance. Churches which cater for these classes flourish in periods of dominance, and subside in periods of decline. Establishment religiosity is part of the dominant class ideology, which maintains the position of one class over others, ensures its internal unity, defines the differences between classes, and controls how property is owned and passed on. 'Early' capitalism "was supported by an ideology stressing individual moral responsibility, self-regulation and ... conscience". The religious element of this ideology supported the need for middle and upper classes to participate in religion "as an expression of 'respectability' and propriety". But "'late' or monopoly capitalism appears to require little ideological legitimation or coherence", content to rely on a mixture of elements and an "ethic of consumerism", and so "would be expected to be associated with the decline or privatization of religion" (Smith 1986:91).

The dominance of religion within the world system waxes and wanes with the fortunes of its core state, as it does within that state. For example, Britain's global political and economic decline was matched by a decrease in the public religiosity of its dominant classes. Upper and middle class

[11]. Smith's ideas have been evaluated and criticized in Burdick & Hammond (1991). They provide a long-term analysis of the number of mission workers sent out by British and American mainline churches, and conclude that Smith thesis needs to be revised, as mainline mission workers have decreased since 1960, but contrary to the implications of Smith's interpretations, the number of evangelical non-mainline missionaries have actually increased since then.

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membership in major Protestant churches steadily increased between 1830 and 1870 from 16.6% to 20.1% of the adult population, which started declining sometime "after the onset of the Boer War (1899-1902). People started turning to new religious movements, while in Ireland, Wales and Scotland religious involvement increased and reinforced the separatist nationalism there (Smith 1986:93).

During British religious decline, religious participation among the populations of Britain's rival states (Germany and the USA) were expanding. In Germany, participation in basic Christian rituals (baptism, marriage, confirmation and burial) increased in the period before the First World War, and political leaders proclaimed themselves Christian. Many Christians were in favour of German expansionism, and "most of the leading theologians enthusiastically endorsed the German war effort" in 1914. Meanwhile, in the USA church membership almost doubled between 1865 (25%) and 1915 (45%) (Smith 1986:94). With the dominance of the three Protestant nations came increased opportunity for missionary activity (Smith 1986:95). By contrast, the decline of the USA after 1945 is paralleled by a similar decrease in establishment religiosity (Smith 1986:88).

With the decline of British hegemony in the world system from 1870 onwards, a global conflict ensued to establish a new dominant state in the core[12]. The result was the First World War, which led to the defeat of Germany and the weakening of Britain. Although "no new stable international order was established to replace the old", the USA emerged stronger and wealthier. During the transition in the world system between the First (1914-1918) and Second World War (1939-1945), the three states tried to protect their economies against one another and to extend their political power across the globe (Smith 1986:96). Religious involvement declined further in Germany and Britain; and eventually also in the USA due to the isolationist policies of its leaders and the Great Depression of the 1929. People who felt marginalised began to identify more with the pentecostal subculture. When the USA re-entered world affairs and stabilised its economy in the 1930s, religious affiliation increased from 45% (1935) to over 50% (1945) (Smith 1986:97).

After World War Two the global order consisted of the communist East and the capitalist West, with the USA dominant in the world system from about 1946 to 1963. Many countries formed military alliances with the USA, and many had American military bases established in them (Smith 1986:98). In the USA civil religion developed to cement "commitment to the American nation both as a successful hegemonic power and as a godly bastion against communism" (Smith 1986:100). This period peaked in the period 1950-1954 (Smith 1986:99). Religious affiliation increased from 49% in 1940 to almost 65% in 1970, but the elite Protestant denominations started declining after the mid-1960s. Church attendance also decreased between 1963 (47%) and 1971 (40%), and stopped growing at all from 1971 onwards (Smith 1986:99). Yet more conservative Christian denominations

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[12]. The role of dominant state in the world system was eventually assumed by the United States after the First World War - a position challenged since the late 1960s.

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(e.g. Southern Baptists) started growing rapidly, and new religious movements (e.g. Unification Church) also benefitted (Smith 1986:100).

Between 1968-1973 the USA's hegemony started to decline in military terms as evident in losses in South-east Asia; and in economic terms through the emergence of independent oil producers and economically strong states in Europe and the East (Smith 1986:98). Internal dissension emerged, visibly in the Civil Rights movement, opposition to the Vietnam war, and a loss of faith in the establishment and its associated institutions, including religion - civil or otherwise. Three major responses followed: decline in mainline church affiliation; support for privatized eastern and new age religious movements; growth of the conservative pentecostal and evangelical churches (Smith 1986:101).

In South Africa the global struggle assumed economic, linguistic, and racial forms, evident in e.g. the elevation of English and Afrikaans to official languages during Union in 1910, and the subsequent devaluation of indigenous cultural forms - including belief systems. Mother tongue teaching during the initial years of education in black schools followed by the introduction of both official languages structured the racial division of the labour market, while ensuring the effective functioning of the economic market. A small educated black elite class was created, capable of co-operating in the divide and rule strategies over distant rural areas and of participating in the extension of Western institutions. Linguistically, as De Swaan (1989) has noted, "indigenous elites occupied the peripheral role of bilingual mediators between the colonial language and the language of their region".

Today the continuing spread of English as language of choice in state and civil society (despite official policies of multilingualism) entrenches class divisions of labour, and the core-periphery continuum between metropolitan and rural areas. Differential access to English, dependent on level of state funding of education, structures and integrates marginal groups into the peripheral economy (compare Tollefson 1991:132-3).

South Africa's peripheral incorporation in the world-economy also caused an internal replication of the core-periphery dualism, with the homelands constituting the periphery. Because this was accompanied by the hegemony of European culture and language, labour migrants who opted to remain outside the education system became peripherally integrated into the economy (as Van Binsbergen demonstrated for the Nkoya of Zambia; Van Binsbergen 1994:147). African Indigenous Churches (AICs) emerged during the late colonial period (1880-1925) as an African initiative to span the rural/urban, African/Western, local (African) and global (Western) continuums generated by the process of globalization. Shifts from traditional African religious identity to AICs are linked to attempts to overcome the peripheral position assigned to Africans in the world system. Christianity (and Islam) offered Africans entry into a global identity through conversion to a world religion. Like other newer forms of African religion, and unlike mainstream religion at that point in time, AICs provided

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possibilities of "inter-ethnic and transcultural associative networks" through "overarching symbols and doctrine" (Jules-Rosette 1989:157).

One effect of globalization on African cultural identities was to promote assimilation into the hegemonic culture, seen as inevitable and even desirable. Brandel-Syrier (1978) in her study of the emergence of an African elite in a South African townships in the 1960s outlines the mechanisms of assimilation which accompanied the acceptance of Christianity. These include enrolment in Western education systems, which produce an elite eager to assimilate Western society.

From a Marxist perspective changes in religious institutions can also be linked (although not in a crude causal manner) to changes in the relations of production which established the dominance of capitalist production in South Africa. For example, Kruss (1985) has argued that three major phases of transition occurred, each generating a particular class. During the colonial period a trade-based (mercantile) relation of exchange was established in competition with a pre-capitalist African social formations.

The *first transition* occurred during the period 1870 to late 1930s, which established an industrial capitalist system (Kruss 1985:73-4). During this period a black middle-class emerged, who accepted that political equality was possible if they assimilated European values through the education system, culture, and religion of the Western colonists. Disappointment with the outcome led them to link up with an existing pan-Africanist movement. Black aspirations concentrated on generating parallel systems of politics, education, and commerce to those of the colonists (Kruss 1985:97,108). During the earlier part of this century capitalist production over the country was extended, resulting in the loss of land on which the African middle-class had depended, and the increasing destruction of agrarian systems of production (Kruss 1985:113). A black, semi-educated peasant class emerged, who emphasised the establishment of self-supporting religious communities on their own land (Kruss 1985:125,137).

The *second transition* occurred from the 1940s to the present, resulting in the establishment of dominance of the capitalist mode of production along with the impoverished black working class (Kruss 1985:73,152). Before the Second World War the absence of a large proportion of the white working class led to a rapid increase of the black industrial labour force, while the black labour force on the mines, comprised essentially of landless people from "Reserves", also grew steadily (Kruss 1985:154). Along with industrialisation came urbanisation and proletarianisation, creating a sizeable but impoverished urban black working class between 1939 and 1952 (Kruss 1985:155).

From Kruss's perspective, the incorporation of blacks into formerly white congregations is made possible through the presence of a black urbanized working class, but increasingly so through the recent expansion of the black middle class and the development of the formerly minute black upper class. Congregational leadership is far likelier to be racially integrated on the basis of class affinities

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rather than disparities.

1.3 Nation-building and language usage in global perspective

Below I return to the effects of interactions between organizations and the state, and how this relates to isomorphism, as part of establishing an ecological theory of linguistic integration. As an introduction I start with a brief review of the notion of isomorphism, and also of the theories of state-organization interaction as advanced by Meyer (1983) and utilised by Carroll, Delacroix & Goodstein (1988). Then I move to a discussion of nation-building and language practice in South Africa as institutionally congruent with other nation-states.

Institutional isomorphism can be defined as a homogenizing effect demonstrated by organizations which conform to social rules, rituals, "norms, standards, and expectations held by relevant stakeholders and common to all" (Kraatz & Zajac 1996:812,813). Isomorphic organizations tend "to adopt uniform, institutionalized structures and practices that conform to the mandate of the institutional environment" (Kraatz & Zajac 1996:813). As noted in Chapter Two, institutional isomorphism is driven by coercive, mimetic, or normative mechanisms (DiMaggio & Powell 1991:70).

Carroll, Delacroix & Goodstein distinguish between structural and cultural isomorphism in explaining state effects on organizations. They argue that states constrain organizations through five general processes which: determine the types of organizations through regulations (e.g. non-profit), describe required forms of interaction (e.g. taxation), induce or create types of organizations, establish and maintain training institutions, and cultivate professional organizers (Carroll, Delacroix & Goodstein 1988:370-71). These state constraints limit the variety of organizational forms, and promote "a cultural blueprint on how to organize". The blueprint is "diffusely present throughout the national society" and affects, for example, the founding of organizations. Organizational decision makers do not rationally weigh up all possible alternative structures or elements, but select between those marked as viable. So organizational outcomes are not directly determined by the environment, but through the cultural blueprint which limits and orders "concepts and potentialities".

Structural isomorphism between organizations and states can take three forms, according to Carroll, Delacroix & Goodstein (1988:371), who lean strongly on Meyer. Meyer (1983:272-280), in his theory of the effects of varying political and cultural forms on organizations, combines vertical-horizontal distinctions with a focus on where patterns of institutionalization locate collective commitment and competence. These distinctions enable Meyer to differentiate between three types of "more developed societies" (fragmented centralized states, centralized states, corporatist states) which exhibit greater institutionalization of collective rationalization *outside* organizational forms. By comparison, in peripheral societies such institutionalization occurs primarily *within* organizational forms.

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Fragmented centralized states like the USA "promote the establishment of highly differentiated and complex organization with permeable and flexible boundaries" (Carroll, Delacroix & Goodstein 1988:371). According to Meyer (1983:273-76), such states locate competence and commitment in the individual. Weak vertical and horizontal organizational networks exist in which the state has limited functions. The result is a proliferation of organizations which tend to be highly structured (e.g. job titles, sections, roles, linkages and recordkeeping), complex, but less formally rational. Isomorphism occurs as structures interpenetrate weak organizational boundaries, and as organizations copy newly rationalized functions. Subsequently each one has similar functionaries with regards to safety, affirmative action, accounting and so on.

Centralized states such as France "promote the establishment of specialized organizations with highly formalized structures and sharply defined boundaries" (Carroll, Delacroix & Goodstein 1988:371). Meyer (1983:276-78) argues that such states locate competence and commitment in the state. Organizations occur in strongly structured state-centred vertical networks, with a clearly defined lateral organizational division of labour. Consequently organizations tend to be limited, highly specialized, differentiated, and rationalized; with fewer formal organizational structures. Organizational structures are few and hierarchical, and clearly laterally differentiated, as organizations are highly isomorphic in relation to the prescriptive state.

Corporatist states like Germany "promote the establishment of organizations with low levels of differentiation and complexity but with elaborate informal structures based on occupational status" (Carroll, Delacroix & Goodstein 1988:371). For Meyer (1983:278-80) these states locate competence and commitment in the groups that make up society. Vertical authority is determined by education and lateral differentiation occurs through clearly demarcated professions as corporate groups with social responsibility. Organizational networks are highly structured vertically and laterally, but determined by diffuse status relationships. Organizations exhibit low levels of structural rationality and complexity which are highly defined, and low levels of interpenetration, due to being highly bounded laterally. Although Meyer does not specify how isomorphism occurs, intra-occupational channels seem likely.

By **cultural isomorphism** Carroll, Delacroix & Goodstein (1988:373) mean the reproduction of state rhetoric and ideology "in the cultural fabric of organizations", particularly in centralized socialist states. Such isomorphism is not necessarily revealed in the behaviour of individuals, who may subvert it routinely and covertly. Subversive behaviour in this instance is causally but inversely related to the state-imposed culture, which generates a negative form of cultural isomorphism. Thus "a systematic decoupling between the formal and behavioral behavior systems of an organization" may occur, in which the "formal system may be culturally isomorphic with values embodied by the polity". In sum, "cultural systems in organizations formally reflect the ideology legitimizing the polity", but where such systems are politically imposed "they often generate behavior contradictory to that intended".

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I will apply both structural and cultural isomorphism to explain congruence between nation-states, and within nation-states. Carroll, Delacroix & Goodstein's cultural distinction seems to be a subtype of structural isomorphism, which to a significant extent is subsumed by Meyer's and Boli's insistence that structures are culturally determined by global institutions. Nevertheless, as long as the distinctions are not pushed too far, structural and cultural notions provide some help in defining isomorphic processes. For example, in world-polity theory all nation-states undergo degrees of cultural isomorphism, which involves limited types of legitimated polity structures. Intranational isomorphism in South Africa seems to involve cultural congruence between the state and organizations, rather than structural convergence.

1.3.1 Nation-building as global isomorphism

Nation-building is isomorphic between nation-states in the world-polity, and influences institutions to be isomorphic with one another within the same society. Norms are institutionalised in the global political system which limits the available options about how nation-states can be structured. Yet, nation-state isomorphism does not imply exact resemblance. What Meyer and Boli are saying is that both the norms structuring the world-polity and the nation-states that result form part of an institutional environment which affects organizations (like congregations).

One way in which institutionalization of global norms become visible is in a constitution and in human rights discourse. Boli draws attention to how constitutions show similar tendencies over time, particularly by extending individual rights which are counterbalanced by the expansion of state jurisdiction. Constitutions form part of the institutionalization of a human rights regime. He concludes that citizen rights (civil, political, social) function to extend political control over citizens, that is, they are incorporative. As nation-states are part of the institutional environment of congregations, the norms that they institutionalize in turn limit the options available for how congregations deal with diversity.

This section provides additional insight into South Africa's embeddedness in the world polity by illustrating isomorphism between it and other states at two levels. At the international level isomorphism becomes visible in similarities between constitutions and bills of rights. Similarly, at the regional level similarities appear between language policies of African states. As the latter has been dealt with extensively in Chapter Five, I restrict myself below to a reflection on constitutions and bills of rights.

International isomorphism can be demonstrated through highlighting linkages between the South African and other constitutions, and preceding conceptualizations which anticipate the human rights clauses of the final Constitution. South Africa's constitution is both home grown but also dependent upon other constitutions. The historical precedent was set by the first constitution of the Union of

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South Africa (1910), drafted by a convention in South Africa in 1908, but passed by the British House of Commons in 1909. Linkages to constitutional arrangements elsewhere were symbolized by Mandela's attempt during the period preceding constitutional negotiations to assuage white fears by referring to Zimbabwe's Lancaster House constitutional negotiations, which included short-term arrangements to accommodate whites (Ebrahim 1998:101).

The 1996 Constitution reflects the unique ways in which it arose, such as the first and second Conventions for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA I & II; 1991-1992) which paved the way for a Constitutional Assembly, solicited input from the public, and borrowings from the Namibian, Canadian, and especially the German constitutions. The use of 34 constitutional principles to guide the drafting of the 1993 Constitution was based on the Namibian precedent, which had in 1989 adopted as guidelines the constitutional principles contained in United Nations Resolution 435, laid down by the Western Contact Group in 1982 (Ebrahim 1998:178).

From Germany the principle of co-operative governance was borrowed, which, "based on a strong provincial dispensation, ensures that all levels of government co-operate with each other for the greater good of the country as a whole." Not only were models for the Constitution sought internationally, but so were its formulations regarding the role and status of civil services (Ebrahim 1998:258,84). Some human rights clauses in the interim Constitution were borrowed "virtually verbatim" from the Bill of Rights in the Basic Law of Germany (De Waal 1995:3).

Among the actors which facilitated isomorphism in this instance were legal experts, government officials, political elites, and state-created organizations. For example, a six-person Independent Panel of Constitutional Experts was constituted by the Constitutional Assembly to help the process of drafting the 1996 constitution through providing advise and resolving conflicts. The panel attended workshops in Germany and the United Kingdom. During the latter visit they were hosted by the Commonwealth Secretariat, and the workshop included participants from Botswana, India, the USA, Germany, Hong Kong, Australia, Canada, and Zimbabwe (Ebrahim 1998:186,343). In addition senior negotiators "from all parties visited a number of different countries in a bid to study different models. Similarly, leading international experts in a number of fields were incited to make presentations. This experience ensured that the Constitution was not only comparable with the best in the world, but could become a point of reference in constitutional debates internationally" (Ebrahim 1998:258).

The 1993 Constitution was perceived locally and internationally as of great value, symbolized by the support voiced by US President Bill Clinton in his 1994 State of the Union address (Ebrahim 1998:171). The "significant international influence evident in the Constitution" derived from the "attempt to ensure that Constitution was comparable with the most advanced constitutions in the world" (Ebrahim 1998:258).

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Documents which preceded the interim (1993) and final (1996) South African constitutions in spelling out human rights as central concern include those developed by non-South African agencies, and those developed by South Africans themselves. Du Plessis & Corder (1994) produced a classification system for such documents, based on liberal and liberationist, external and internal categories[13]. Prominent external examples in the external, liberal tradition includes the Human Rights Charter of the United Nations (1945); as well as the earlier Atlantic Charter (1941) concluded between the USA and Britain, who did not conceive of applying it to her colonies. Internal, liberal examples include the Molteno Report, the KwaZulu/Natal Indaba bill of rights, and the Business Charter of Social, Economic, and Political Rights (Du Plessis, 1994:96). External, liberationist instances include a Resolution on 'the South African question' adopted by the Executive Committee of the Communist International (1928)[14], and Sections 15 and 16 of the Harare Declaration of the OAU (1989). The Harare Declaration also envisioned a constitution "based on universally agreed constitutional principles" in order to arrive at what Section 17 described as " 'an internationally acceptable solution which shall enable South Africa to take its rightful place as an equal partner among the African and world community of nations' " (Ebrahim 1998:35,452).

In keeping with the notions of globalization and of isomorphism, South African discourse on human rights shows the interpenetration of global and local concerns, as exemplified by the effect of the Atlantic Charter of 1941 on the ANC's 1943 conceptualization of a Bill of Rights. The correspondence in titles is probably not incidental. Some argue that the universalism inherent in socialist thinking provides an early example of the globalization of human rights. The late SACP leader Joe Slovo remarked on the "crucial connection between socialism and internationalism and the importance of world working-class solidarity ... Working class internationalism remains one of the most liberating concepts in Marxism and needs to find effective expression in the new world conditions" (Slovo, 1990; Chapter 3, Marxist Theory under Fire).

An awareness of global norms surfaces in Schedule 4 of the Interim Constitution, which states that "all universally accepted fundamental rights" shall prevail. Similarly the Schedule contains a commitment to equality "between men and women and people of all races" in keeping with the world polity notions of equality (compare Ebrahim 1998:619). The link between the 1996 Constitution and human rights was also symbolised when President Nelson Mandela signed the Constitution into law in Sharpeville on Human Rights Day, 10 December 1996 (Ebrahim 1998:670).

Certain provisions in the Bill of Rights in earlier and final Constitutions draw strongly on international human rights documents. Section 31 in the final Constitution, on Cultural, Religious and Linguistic

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[13]. Clearly these categories are not mutually exclusive; from a world system perspective one would expect some dialectic interaction to have occurred between individuals and documents involved.

[14]. The Resolution called for " 'full equal rights for all races, black, coloured and white' " (Ebrahim 1998:376).

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Communities, "more or less follows the wording of article 27 of the [UN] International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966)", to which South Africa is a signatory (Strydom 1998:374). Similarly the anti-hate speech clause of Section 16 (2) corresponds considerably with Article 20 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Johannessen 1997:142, see footnote 30). Clearly, "in drafting the social and economic provisions of the Bill of Rights, the Constitutional Assembly, (with the assistance of the technical committee and panel of [constitutional] experts) closely followed the formulations adopted in international human rights instruments, especially the [UN] Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights" (De Vos 1997:76, and see footnote 32). Section 39 (1)(b) of the final Constitution (Section 35 in the interim version) states that courts "must consider international law" when interpreting the Bill of Rights (compare Ebrahim 1998:651). Thirteen sections[15] of the interim Constitution were "directly or indirectly related to the rights protected in the [UN] Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights" (Liebenberg 1995:375). The Human Rights Commission is required by Section 116 (2) of the interim Constitution to report "any proposed legislation ... contrary to international human rights law" (Liebenberg 1995:374, compare footnote 60). The overall effect is to enforce "consistency between domestic law and South Africa's international obligations" (Liebenberg 1995:375; De Vos 1997:76).

The discussion above demonstrate that constitutions and language policies are linked through human rights clauses. Choice of language is considered to be among those human rights which guarantee cultural freedoms in a bill of rights. For instance, the Bill of Rights in the 1996 South African Constitution recognizes language rights as part of clauses on Education (section 29), Language and culture (30), and Cultural, religious and linguistic communities (31) (compare Ebrahim 1998:641-642).

1.3.2 Language usage as intranational isomorphism

Language ideology is driven by the same logic of functional efficiency which operates in the work domain, creating a similar sense of alienation while disguising relations of power and domination (Tollefson 1991:206). As a result language practices are viewed as following natural trends in domains perceived to be outside the political domain, and so also as "outside politics and policy making" (Tollefson 1991:208). For these reasons, where the evidence in Chapter Four points to the unquestioned use of a second language like English in the religious domain, the functioning of a language ideology can be assumed.

The end-result of language ideology is that state policies surface in non-state institutions as common-sense notions about "'natural' language practices" (Tollefson 1991:208). Consequently the demand that one dominant language be used comes to be seen as unrelated to the state. Dominant linguistic

[15]. Sections 8, 10, 11, 12, 17, 22, 23, 24, 27, 29, 30, 31, 32.

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groups can "exercise an unquestioned, 'natural' (i.e. ideological) monopoly" over the language used in a congregation, and so over the congregation itself (compare Tollefson 1991:208). Just as language practice in e.g. the workplace is regarded as determined by "the market", so language usage in congregations is accepted and not debated because "dominance and inequality are not perceived to exist". Non-English first language speakers "cannot legitimize the use of their languages" (Tollefson 1991:208), except in township churches which cater exclusively for them.

By accepting that the religious domain "is outside the realm of politics or of citizenship rights, including language rights", non-English first language speakers participate in their own disempowerment (Tollefson 1991:208). This is often due to their exclusion from decision-making bodies, in the context of "hostility from speakers of the dominant language" (Tollefson 1991:209). The fact that some people must use English to participate in a congregation, is (as Tollefson 1991:210 noted in a different context) "a result of unequal relationships of power - not a solution to them". One effect of not being allowed to use one's own language in a particular domain is that individual becomes alienated from his/her activities. Language policies "that deny individuals the use of their own languages", whether at work or in the congregation, "are unnatural, antihuman, and anticultural" (Tollefson 1991:207).

If the aim was to merely obtain a common language, then "dominant groups would acquire minority languages and change their linguistic repertoire to accommodate other groups" while "accents and other variable features would not be stigmatized" (Tollefson 1991:210). Second language learning as an option for one group while others need not do so "is not a solution to exclusivity, privilege, and domination, but rather a mechanism for them" (Tollefson 1991:210). "Every time a society requires some people to learn another language in order to carry out human activities necessary for survival, an act of injustice has occurred that places those people at a disadvantage" and has "nothing to do with the 'common sense' or 'practical' value of having a common language to communicate" (Tollefson 1991:210).

As I argued above, language usage in non-state institutions are strongly affected by "a broader set of beliefs about language and citizenship that provide the basis for the exercise of state disciplinary power" (Tollefson 1991:207). State disciplinary power refers to the capacity of the state to control wage labour through covertly limiting the very rights which the state promotes. In the case of language, this is done by requiring facility in the dominant language, but providing differential means of achieving the goal (Tollefson 1991:207). The state structures "into the institutions of society the differentiation of individuals into 'insiders' and 'outsiders'" by tying language to nationalism (Tollefson 1991:207-8). Language policies not only create these two groups, but provide a system of managing both through language requirements which control access "to education, employment, and political participation" (Tollefson 1991:208). This view counters the belief that the role of the state is to gradually extent resources (education, employment, power) to larger percentages of its citizens.

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In the South African case the state explicitly promotes the equal value of 11 languages, a policy which surfaces in most integrating congregations in an awareness of the need for inclusion of samples of linguistic diversity in hymns and readings. Yet, while these acknowledgements of diversity are symbolically necessary, their limited scale of usage means regrettably that they will have little effect on existing class or status relations between congregants. Should such practices continue, the national policy of multilingualism will not be advanced, but instead the marginal status of black languages will be confirmed and confined to "minority" rankings.

Yet paradoxically the explicit multilingualism implicitly enhances the status of English, stigmatizes other languages, and leads to a form of linguicism - a form of discrimination against minority groups based on language preference. The attitudes of congregational leaders in regard to indigenous languages can be compared to those of policy makers and educationists, who maintain one of three attitudes towards languages (adapted from Tollefson 1991:47): (a) languages are important in themselves, is a right of individual speakers, and should be promoted as resources within congregations and explicitly protected by the state along with bilingualism; (b) indigenous languages are important until vernacular speakers can express themselves in English, and so are important as transitional; (c) indigenous languages are important in society, and can be used in private, but are divisive when given official recognition and so should not be accorded any rights; (d) indigenous languages should not be used in congregations or in public as they are inherently divisive. While South African state policies explicitly opt for (a), state practices seem to cluster around (c) or (d). While none of the congregational leaders expressed a preference for (b), and a few preferred (a), I would argue that congregations in which expressions of linguistic diversity is absent are influenced by the institutions of state.

While there is evidence in South African society of counter-hegemonic language movements (e.g. around Afrikaans, Venda[16]), the effect of religious identities and the promotion of a unified national identity can be said to undercut competing loyalties to language and ethnic groups. While elsewhere language and religion have contributed powerfully to ethnic identity formation, this has not happened in South Africa, as more missionaries were at work here during the colonial era than elsewhere on the continent. Ethnic groups were broken up among the denominations, so that religion and ethnicity were different sources of identity with little overlap between them. Membership in mainstream and pentecostal Christianity tends to neutralize the attraction of local ethnic identities by offering global alternative identities, of being Catholic, etc. Anecdotal and personal experience suggest that believers tend to place loyalty to the Christian identities above other identities.

Institutional isomorphism has a dampening effect on perceptions of racial identity, as can be seen in

[16]. For instance, in 1996 Afrikaners launched a language lobby which seemed not to have survived (The Cape Times, p. 7; 2 Dec 1996). More recently a political party for Vendas were mooted as a result of perceptions that the Venda language is being sidelined.

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the way that denominations and congregations deal with this issue. In accordance with the dominant non-racial ideology, racial identities are downplayed by denominational and congregational leaders (incidentally also in line with similar sentiments in the social sciences here and abroad). Just as the state claims to be the only legitimate instrument of violence, so it seems to claim to be the only legitimate institution which is allowed to acknowledge race (in the form of quotas in the latest labour equity bill) while paradoxically adhering to the denial of race as group marker.

Some congregations have little racial integration of leadership structures, but generally speaking racial integration is more noticeably present than is cultural or linguistic integration. In line with their formal anti-apartheid position, many of the churches actively espouse non-racialism in the sense of playing down the salience of race as category. In some denominations (CPSA) clergy are no longer required to report membership in terms of race. However this does not mean that awareness of race has diminished, or that racial integration has taken place. In some cases relations between black and white, or black and coloured are still strained. In the opinion of a clergy respondent the Black Consultative Forum in the CPSA was unhappy with the disproportionately large number of white bishops. Another clergy respondent stated that the (black) bishop in his diocese reportedly wanted to be "the first one who had no white clergy".

Yet race demonstrably continues to affect the structures of religious organisations and the interactions within them. This is illustrated by the existence of a separate black caucus in some denominations (Anglicans, Methodists); the apparent need by church officials to (re-)claim a history of racial integration (e.g. Catholics); the election of denominational church leaders from certain racial backgrounds (Methodists); the exclusion of white clergy from certain regions (e.g. United Reforming Church, Anglicans); and a general reluctance from those formerly designated as blacks and whites, as well as blacks and coloureds, to unite in regional or local congregational structures.

Language and religion, in an integrative setting favours middle class aspirations and formation. A lot of ink has been spilled recently about the emergence of a black middle class, for whom English fits better with their class aspirations. Most mixed congregations seem to follow the ideal set by the black political elite, namely assimilation into the English-language, and so offer a natural home to this group who are easily integrated into existing leadership structures without affecting the internal functioning of congregations. Black languages and customs are seldom allowed any space to function, with the exception of hymns translated into Bantu languages. In this way current integration in practice reinforces class divisions, structures of exclusion, and internal colonisation with respect to indigenous languages and cultures..Lower income blacks are assimilated in terms of their existing class position.

As can be seen from the preceding, these practices stretch back to colonial times, and apparently have been systemically reproduced to the present day. Under the impact of the Christian missions indigenous societies divided between those who used tradition to oppose domination, those who

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accepted the cultural dominance of settlers, and those who opposed political exclusion and economic exploitation in Christian terms. The so-called English-speaking churches incorporated indigenous peoples into a European-derived belief system, in which the economic and political structures of the settlers were replicated.

In these integrating congregations blacks, now as in the colonial period, are allowed into leadership if they show evidence of being fully acculturated and occupy the same class positions as their white peers. On the other hand blacks are utilising religious institutions to gain access to economic resources through assimilating themselves and their offspring. Meanwhile the marginalised segments of the population, in trying to emulate the status language of the elite, may be losing their ability to express themselves in indigenous languages, without developing adequate standards of English.

But the increasing domination of class values in congregations (as in society) does not move churches away from race as an issue, for it is European upper and middle class interests which now dominate local congregational structures. These configurations of power enforce white standards of living (e.g. dress codes, even within black congregations), and deny other races access to leadership (see Ramphele 1989:187). Class structures in South Africa coincide with race in an 'internal hegemony', a tempered domination of power and privilege in which race no longer appears as the primary criterion. This structure is revealed in attempts to de-racialise (church) systems without loss of [white] power, an exercise based on the recognition that dismantling privilege based on race must result in the collapse of (most ?) social infrastructures (Villa-Vicencio 1988:83,84).

2. RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS AS MESO-LEVEL ENVIRONMENT WHICH CONSTRAINS AND ENABLES LANGUAGE INTEGRATION

Congregations are meso-level phenomena sensitive to the mutually interactive structures and agencies which form their meso-environment. These include the institutional environment, language ideology, class formation, and denominational membership. Other factors discussed in the preceding chapters but which could have been included here include the size of the congregation, the ratio of language groups to one another, the congregation's neighbourhood, its geographic location (rural-urban), and the policies of the denomination.

2.1 The effects of congregational culture on language use

The congregation as setting constrains the ability of some linguistic or ethnic identities to advance their own interests, while advantaging other groups. While the congregations as organizations are

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multilingual, their white and Indian members (and to a lesser extend coloured members) are most often monolingual (in the case of English first-language South Africans), or at best bilingual (in the case of Afrikaans first-language speakers). In such a setting, even where they present a majority, indigenous languages have to take a back seat. In effect, regardless of the number of people present in the congregation or society at large, indigenous languages become minority languages in two senses: (a) they are afforded little or marginal space in the processes of the congregation; (b) they are considered to have lower status than English, which symbolises the most desired religious and class identities.

Monolingual English-speakers have the biggest impact on language preference in multilingual settings. In the case of integrating congregations, this means white congregants. Foreign congregants, who may technically be multilingual but not in any South African language, have the same effect. This is only overcome where a critical mass of mother-tongue congregants is so large that another language cannot be avoided. I would suggest that the favouring of English by non-English speakers is explained in terms of the higher status of English, as numerous studies have pointed out.

In other words, while the purpose of the setting is to reinforce a particular social identity, that of Christian believer, church members also bring multiple identities into that setting, some which are repressed and others which are selected. Language symbolises which identity is deemed more relevant to that setting, and demonstrates status differentials perceived to exist between different language groups. As rational agents, congregants, denominational leaders, clergy, lay leadership all consciously or subconsciously bring the contestations between groups into congregations with them, while choosing to represent themselves in a particular way. Yet such micro-level actions are also constrained by other actors in the meso-level setting, such as the cultural ideology at work in society at the macro-level and in the organization at meso-level.

Apparently institutional culture continues to favour the unofficial national language English, and in a few cases the old official language, Afrikaans, in the setting of "English-speaking" Christian denominations. The same ambiguity which marks official policies (good intentions contradicted in practice) occurs here. Linguistic diversity is now reflected in most liturgical publications (Prayer Book of the CPSA) and hymnals, but evidence shows that this is not necessarily translated into congregational life. It is hard not to conclude that South African mainline congregations are "still dominated by European Christian forms" (Ramphele 1989:179).

2.2 The effects of popular language ideology on linguistic integration

Evidence on the predominance of English in government publications and communications (Langtag 1996), and from research on language attitudes of university students (Prah 1993, De Klerk 1996) and the general populace (Schuring 1979, De Klerk & Bosch 1993) confirms that a language ideology

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(attitudes towards languages) is operating in the wider South African society, and has been doing so for a very long time. It structures languages (and so intergroup relations) in a status hierarchy in relation to one another, and deems that English is the only language fit for interstate, sub-state, and intergroup communication.

The origin of the ideology lies in the Anglicization policies of the colonial and Union periods, but can also be located in global politico-economic factors which favour the domination of particularly English and North American cultural forms. The increasing dominance of English in South Africa can also be explained by the indebtedness of major institutions here to the UK - and the USA, as is the case with other Commonwealth nations. As a result, structures and organisational cultures discriminate against other language and cultural groups, ensuring that European-derived languages dominate (cf. Castles 1992). Other critical elements include the enforced use of Afrikaans under Afrikaner nationalism and the negative reaction to that by the majority of South Africans, the educational backgrounds of liberation movement leaders (earlier leaders were educated in English-language mission schools, as were a significant number of the present elite in the UK). The language ideology can clearly be traced in studies which examine the language attitudes of South Africans.

In the politics of difference, a pertinent question is which language/s will dominate public and private institutions. Across many institutions languages are in competition, and perhaps only the economically powerful will survive in the public domain. English has achieved a renewed status as the unofficial official language, despite all the good policy intentions. English is increasingly advanced by some politicians as the dominant language for use in most major institutions (e.g. education, business, government).

Critics of my position may argue that the role of English in congregations as linking language is purely an instrumental issue, rather than one concerned with "sociolinguistic identity or the cultural values and resources of a language", as Mansour (1993:129) argues for state policies. If so, the only concern would be whether everyone in the congregation understands English or not. But Mansour's argument elsewhere, although aimed at the level of state organization, is relevant here: does an indigenous lingua franca exist which can fulfil the same role? The problem is that alternative lingua francas do exist (Xhosa, Zulu, Sotho), but whites mostly cannot use them. So Mansour's suggestion does not move us away from the power differential between English speakers and others. To use Mansour's terms, the problem does not lie in the socio-cultural (identity) dimension of language but in the realm of linguistic power relations. And in turn, I argue, these relations are linked to the global value of English in the world system.

The status and role of languages in meso-level interactions in South Africa are now affected by the same language ideology that operates at the societal and global levels. Informal language policies set in the organizational culture of religious institutions supports language statuses, as evidenced by the

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"English-speaking" label of some mainline denominations. Such a language ideology functions to dictate where and when a particular language is appropriate, and to enforce monolingualism. Congregations where the majority of members are not English-speaking, yet this is the language preferred, illustrate the point. There seems to be some popular consensus that the public realm is unsuitable for any language other than English, while the room for indigenous languages seems to be contracting. Afrikaans is an obvious example, as indicated by Minister of Education Sibusiso Bengu's pressure on the University of Stellenbosch to adopt English as an additional medium of instruction. Obviously none of the above examples are purely about language, nor as straightforward as I represent them.

2.3 The effects of denominational membership

So far the analysis has proceeded as though the congregations were equal units in similar settings, yet the variation between them shows that other factors could also be taken into account, for instance, denominational membership, polity, spatial organization, and worldview. Moberg (1962) maintains that theological differences affect structure and ritual; for instance, how authority is reproduced (apostolic succession versus priesthood of all believers) affects a central ritual like communion/mass. Such elements are difficult to factor in as the small sample and the scale of heterogeneity limits the universality of generalisations, and so I offer the following as theoretical hypotheses.

With regards to polity, there are more structural similarities among Catholics, Anglicans, and Methodists, than between these three churches and other denominations such as pentecostals. Anglicans and Catholics have similar episcopal polity systems; and the recent introduction of bishops in the Methodist church brings these three closer. According to Moberg church polities mirror the political institutions favoured at the time of their founding, so that the episcopal polity is similar to a monarchy, the presbyterian polity to an aristocracy, and the congregational polity to a democracy. Under the influence of the state institutions, and between institutions within a particular organizational field, these polities may become isomorphic - as has been the case in the USA (Moberg 1962:94-5,372). In South Africa a similar isomorphic process has affected church polities, with e.g. Catholic parishes become more democratic, with elected lay Parish Councils assisting priests in governing parishes; as a result of the twin influence of increasing democracy in South African political institutions and Vatican II. The democratization of Catholic lay leaders has also emerged in the USA since 1954 (Moberg 1962:417

But there are also important differences: Methodist bishops do not have the power and economic infrastructure to appoint clergy as do their Anglican and Catholic counterparts; this power rests with the congregation. Pentecostal churches like the IFCC combine elements from all three polity types: sharing independence of the local church with congregational polity, a modified system of elders with

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the presbyterian polity (albeit sans deacons and elections), with the supreme authority vested in the pastor as in catholic polity. As a result episcopal and pentecostal hierarchies have a greater chance of forcing or delaying the pace of integration, regardless of the reaction from congregants/parishioners, than do presbyterian and congregational polities. The Catholic or Anglican priest is more independent from his (or her, in the latter instance) congregations, as is the pentecostal pastor (depending on the church), than is the presbyterian or congregational clergy.

In terms of spatial organization Catholics regard the parish as the most basic unit, which may contain more than one local church. Given this structure, Catholics may chose to integrate the local churches within the parish through constituting a combined Parish Council, while retaining segregated local churches. This stems in part from the strong universal emphasis of Catholics, who route the activities of the parish through national or global Catholic organizations. So the St Francis Xavier Society undertakes welfare work within each parish, just as do the Knights of Da Gama. By contrast non-Catholic congregations tend to emphasise the local congregation, and it is at this level which integration must work or fail.

But regardless of polity and spatial organization, congregational leadership (clergy, lay leaders) plays a vital role in constraining or enabling integration. Reluctance on the part of leadership can effectively inhibit the operation of multilingual or multicultural identities. The congregational leadership arbitrates between the different levels of the congregation and the multiple identities which congregants bring with them, much in the same way as someone directing (ideological) traffic. On the other hand multilingual interaction is often associated with sympathetic leadership, such as a sympathetic clergy person. The constraints of institutional culture are only overcome where the critical mass of mother-tongue congregants is so large that another language cannot be avoided. But cases were black congregants insist on cultural or linguistic inclusion seem very rare.

3. TOWARDS A THEORY OF THE EFFECT OF MESO AND MACRO LEVEL INTERACTION ON INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE

In this section I present a theoretical discussion of cultural and structural isomorphism, through which I explore the dialectic effect of meso- and macro-level interactions on linguistic diversity in congregations. The discussion centres on two age-old sociological problems, that of systemic stability, which I address in subsection 3.1, below; and that of variance, which I tackle in subsection 3.2. Given that isomorphism operates within the world system, how does one explain the cultural and structural variety across the same units of analysis (e.g. nation states)? On the other hand, why does isomorphism not lead to a decreasing number of variants? In my theoretical answer I take seriously the idea that globalization institutionalises both homogeneity and heterogeneity within the world

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system, and that nation-states are not free to ignore the global[17]. Isomorphism leads to both similarity and variety between and within units of the world system.

In the discussion so far I have attempted to fuse two central elements of the world system (world-polity, world-economy) in order to explain linguistic integration in congregations in terms of their societal and global political environments - an ecology of integration. This allows endogenous change in congregations to be viewed as the result of a dialectic operating in various forms and at different levels of change in the institutions (language, race, leadership) which intersect them. Two assumptions underlie this: that (a) linguistic and racial integration of churches exemplifies institutional change, and (b) that the sources of change are primarily extra-institutional. Yet some intra-institutional sources of change also operate, as I indicate below.

At a metatheoretical level an ecological perspective brings together institutional and ecological theories from the sociology of organizations with the sociology of the world system (especially world-polity theory). Institutional and ecological approaches have been in some tension as they are sometimes perceived to be analytically separate. Ecological theories tend to focus on changes in populations of organizations, such as "founding and death rates of different organizational forms" (Singh, Tucker & Meinhard 1991:390). Institutional theories emphasise how organizations are affected by the institutional environment - "socially created beliefs and cognitions, widely held in society and reinforced by corporate actors" (Singh, Tucker & Meinhard 1991:390). This theoretical opposition has been resolved by world-polity theorists like Meyer and Boli who implicitly synthesised both, and who also involved organizational sociologists like Scott in combined research projects (compare Meyer & Scott 1983; Scott & Meyer 1994).

As integrating congregations can be viewed as a population of religious organizations, as well as embodiments of institutions in a organizational form, a combined institutional and ecological approach seems justified. The congregation-environment approach has a long history in the sociology of religion in the USA, from 1926 onwards (Metz 1967:25). To consider congregations as both organizations and social institutions have an equally venerable history (see Moberg 1962), as has the application of organizational theory to congregational analysis (see Carroll e.a. 1986).

An individual congregation can be seen as a relatively open social system which - like other organizations - is also defined by formal boundaries, formal purpose, formal membership, and formal patterns of authority (Metz 1967:26). Yet unlike many other organizations, congregational goals are often wide and unspecified, while membership is open and voluntary (Metz 1967:29-33). I regard congregations (and denominations) as different structural expressions of the same religious institution; while proposing that various other institutions (language, gender, leadership) simultaneously intersect

[17]. I am thankful to John Boli for drawing this to my attention.

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congregation (and denomination).

3.1 Institutional change as a consequence of cultural isomorphism across global, national and meso-level organizations

Where cultural isomorphism occurs between global norms and national policies, structural isomorphism will probably emerge across different sectors of a particular society. Yet, isomorphism does not produce uniform results between units of the world system, which is why structural dissimilarity appears between South African congregations. Homogenous congregations continue to be in the majority; and heterogenous congregations do not exhibit greater similarities. Cultural and structural convergence between social units in the same society may vary because of the extent to which state ideologies have or have not been institutionalised. That is, the structures of types of integrating congregations are the result of different levels of the institutionalisation of non-racialism and multiculturalism[18].

Global, local, and meso-level norms operate dialectically with one another in the institutional environment, and so contribute to institutional change. Language integration in congregations is a form of institutional change which can be brought about in several ways. For example, institutional change can be brought about through extra-institutional mechanisms such as values and norms in the institutional environment, e.g. nonracialism, nation-building. Or, change can result from intra-institutional mechanisms, such as antagonistic actors who oppose one another in the same institution (compare Koelble 1995:235). A congregation and the denomination to which it belongs represent different aspects of the same religious institution.

In the societal environment notions of nonracialism and multiculturalism are being institutionalised by the South African state as part of nation-building, through policy and supportive structures (e.g. through Constitution, policies, laws, the envisaged Commission for the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Communities; and the Pan-South African Language Board). Within such an environment other organizations and their supportive institutions conform to these notions, but to varying degrees. That is, organizations become isomorphic in an uneven manner, ranging from those who fully exhibit the ideals, to those who merely appear to do so, to those who totally reject them. Rhetorically, all will want to be seen to accept the newer state-sponsored ideals, while those who explicitly do not will attempt to phrase resistance in terms of other globalized norms. Resistance and acceptance can both be viewed as indicating the extent to which successful institutionalization has occurred (compare Carroll, Delacroix & Goodstein 1988).

[18]. . This is a paraphrase of an argument that I applied to the institutionalization of gender equity (Swemmer, Kritzinger & Venter 1998).

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In congregations that resist full linguistic and cultural integration, organizational inertia takes the form of loose coupling. That is, racial integration of leadership structures is the price paid in order not to deal with language. Conformity to notions of multiculturalism is apparently not regarded as essential to organizational survival. Hypothetically, conformity to external policies depends on the extent to which intra-institutional support exists for the values which they represent. Congregations which initiated integration before the formation of the post-apartheid state were arguably more influenced at an extra-institutional level by the relations of its leaders to global organizations like the World Council of Churches. Yet, given the policies of the present state, it would become increasingly difficult for institutions dependent on state recognition to resist some measure of implicit conformity to these norms of behaviour. Hence institutional isomorphism is likely to develop more rapidly in South Africa under the present post-apartheid state. Cultural isomorphism suggests the following sequence: norms are institutionalized in world culture, which in turn are incorporated by the nation-state, which has a knock-on effect on organizations.

Language usage in a congregation represents an institutionalized behaviour pattern, effected by an encompassing institutional environment. The denomination, the state, and other congregations form the institutional environment of the congregation. A congregation is a unit of a state-recognized denomination, and forms an institutionalized, voluntary and associational organization (compare Moberg 1962:19-20). Associations refer to a regulated form of relationship between individuals, while institutions refer to patterns of social behaviour (Moberg 1962:21). A congregation can be understood at different intersecting levels: as a central aspect of Christian institutions; as an institution by itself; or as an organization or an association. Some prefer to draw distinctions between these parallel conceptualizations. While a denomination is a diffused institution, congregations are institutionalized groups, nucleated institutions located in a specific place.

Integration in congregations can be viewed in terms of a dialectic cycle through which institutional change occurs in a local organization. Only if values are institutionalised will they be successful; they will only be institutionalised if they are broadly accepted. Institutionalisation implies acceptance of ideas (values and norms), and their implementation in roles and behaviour. On this basis I would argue that congregations which are racially integrated only (and those that are not integrated at all in contexts which would allow this) present instances of the partial institutionalisation of multiculturalism. By contrast nonracialism (racial equality) has been more fully institutionalised, to the extent that it has penetrated the consciousness of individual congregants (visibly expressed in the equal inclusion of all races) and has been accommodated in the creation of formal roles (black lay leaders). Yet the norms that determine the status and roles that languages may play (English should dominate) remain unaffected. As a result indigenous languages are not included, and those congregants or clergy who would support their incorporation are rendered ineffective by the attitudes of both English-speakers as well as other language groups, which also accept English dominance.

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Extra-institutional values (in the sense that they are apparently not shared by most congregants) such as multiculturalism are incorporated and unevenly distributed across the structures of the denomination. Among denominational representatives positive racial values are most clearly institutionalised as evidenced by church polity decisions, but without affecting the language norms governing congregations. At the congregational level there is an obvious acknowledgement of the different value-set contained in denominational and state policy, but this has not as yet ousted the dominant language ideology. While there is little disagreement about the usefulness of allowing other races to be integrated, the roles and status associated with language and culture remain unaffected.

The difficulties that congregations have in integrating linguistic diversity demonstrate how problematic the replacement of one set of values and associated norms and roles with another is, in a context of coercive isomorphism formed by state and denominational policies - however admirable.

3.2 Institutional change as a consequence of structural isomorphism across global, national and meso-level organizations

Where structural isomorphism exists between congregations and states, similarities occur because both have to organize the same type of diversity in terms of the same globalized norms. This implies, first, that congregations and states within the *same society* will evolve similar structures because they institutionalize similar norms; second, that these norms include representations of more or less legitimated models of appropriate structures; and third, that congregations and states in *different* societies will evolve similar structures as they attempt to resolve similar problems in terms of similar globalized models.

The concept of structural isomorphism suggests that similarities will emerge between congregational and state structures because they deal with the same problem: a growing awareness of and rising levels of ethnic and linguistic diversity[19]. Core, semiperipheries and peripheral states all experience increasing ethnic diversity: First World countries experience this as a consequence of immigration from Africa, Asia, the Caribbean, and Latin America. In the Third World internal migration through the ongoing urbanisation of ethnically diverse rural populations feeds the complexity of the urban areas. In both cases the forced movement of refugees also has an impact, in the case of Africa often affecting the rural areas near national boundaries as much as they do the urban areas. Mozambican refugees near South Africa's Eastern borders present a case in point.

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[19]. This raises several questions, most of which is beyond the scope of this section. For instance, can conclusions about the structure of large scale institutions (nation-states) be transferred to those of smaller scale (congregations) if the problematic and basic organization of both share enough similarities, allowing for differences of scale? Under which conditions is this possible; can such a transfer happen only within the same societal parameters? Or can guidelines about certain state policies and structure be transferred to congregations within another state?

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In order to deal with diversity, state and non-state organizations develop and institutionalize various policies and structures. This may take the form of constitutions, legislation, statements by politicians, and official policies. Implementation happens through state structures such as departments of immigration, home affairs, culture, and education. Specialised organisations can also be created at the local level (e.g. Britain's Race Relations Units, Vertovec 1996:63) or national level (e.g. Singapore's Presidential Council for Minority Rights, Brown 1989:59). The state's intentions can be contradicted by the actions of its officials, or disregarded by the public, so that an unofficial "policy" often overrides the ideals promoted by the state. By the same token benign policies can have unforeseen negative consequences.

Policies imply assimilative, culturally plural, or multicultural modes of incorporation, all of which often produce segregated and segmented institutions. In the post-World War II period multiculturalism gained ascendancy inside and outside the British Commonwealth of Nations. The dual pressure of nationalism and the economic untenability of maintaining colonialism led to independence for the colonies, and arguably also forced a global shift towards the acknowledgement of ethnic and cultural diversity. Implemented as official policies in Canada and Australia in the 1970s, multiculturalist policies now also occur in Britain, Singapore, and in other forms elsewhere, such as in South Africa.

Religious institutions in multi-ethnic societies, like other social institutions, face the same challenges and have to produce their own structural responses. My research in South Africa and the USA shows that two major modes of dealing with diversity in integrating congregations emerged: (a) internally united types, with unified leadership structures and cultural integration at all levels; and (b) internally differentiated types, with unified leadership structures but with segregated structures at other levels (Venter 1994b, 1998). As represented in Figure 1 on the next page, these arrangements seem similar to the cultural pluralist and multiculturalist modes employed by states. The discussion so far implies that some correlation exists between the origin of structures of incorporation that emerge at national, macro-level, and those at the local, meso-level.

Two self-contradictory gobal norms are generated within the world system that pushes towards heterogeneity while pulling towards homogeneity. Organizational responses lead to a limited number of structural forms, depending on the extend to which each norm is incorporated. Various modes of incorporation evolve, which appear to be based on state rationality but in effect are but local attempts to resolve global paradoxes. The difference between modes depend on the extent to which homogeneity is more or less valued than heterogeneity is within a particular unit of analysis. From this perspective, the dominance of English in South African institutions exemplifies the homogenizing effect of globalization, with the retention of indigenous languages in the private sphere as a weak form of heterogenization. Within the same unit of analysis homogeneity can be constructed at some and heterogeneity at other levels.

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So theoretically a limited number of forms emerge based on how the accommodation of diversity is institutionalized. The rationalized environment of the world-economy, which values functional efficiency highly, operates restrictively. Consequently structural similarities appear between states who deal with ethno-cultural pluralism, and congregations who deal with the linguistic dimension of the same issue, as Figure 1 on the next page shows. While states cannot ignore globalized norms of equality and human rights, they can attempt to avoid the consequences of violating these. They can for instance suppress ethnic and language diversity, while claiming that this leads to greater progress. States which embrace global norms more fully can recognize ethnic and linguistic diversity through include representatives of different groupings at all levels of government, and in all institutions. In short, policies, ideologies, and structures emerge which are strikingly similar to those of particular types of congregation. The similarity seems to be produced by the modes through which conflicting global norms are incorporated by states and congregations.

Within the world-polity three modes of incorporation of ethnic pluralism can be distinguished (Vertovec 1996, following M G Smith). *Structural pluralism* incorporates ethnies differentially, and is marked by exclusionary practices. South Africa during the late colonial period and under apartheid provides an example of a pluralist post-colonial state formation, with the institutionalisation of segregated forms of social, religious and political organisation. This process was also duplicated in other colonial states. *Social pluralism* involves institutional differences and "virtually closed social sections" for various groups, as exemplified by Switzerland. *Cultural pluralism* lacks corporate divisions but retains "distinct institutional practices", so that individuals are incorporated in a uniform mode which plays down the relevance of group membership (Vertovec 1996:58-9). The latter mode, according to Vertovec, institutionalises multiculturalism in societal form, and characterises societies such as Britain and Burma (Brown 1989).

Various state forms develop through interaction with these distinct modes of incorporating citizens. Within the same society different state forms can emerge over time which result in policies that evolve or regress. Successive governments in South Africa illustrate the point, as do regime changes in Australia under the Australian Labour Party (1972-75) and the Liberal-Country Party Coalition (1975-1982) (Castles 1992:554-59).

In the rather crude formulation of Figure 1, a **social pluralist** mode of incorporation is associated with a Type A state structure, where unified leadership structures occur alongside segregated institutions at other levels. Each large ethnic group may be assigned some autonomy in a particular region. This

Figure 1: Structural isomorphism between congregations and states, according to internal organisation

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	Type A: Internally differentiated structures	**Type B: Internally integrated structures**		
Congregations	**Class I:**	**Class II:**	**Class III:**	**Class IV:**
Examples	Woodlands-Montclair	Central	Johweto	St Joseph Flushing NY
Language usage	monolingual	monolingual	bilingual	multilingual
Structures	joint leadership, segregated peoples, segregated programmes	joint leadership, monolingual, some combined programmes	joint leadership, mostly combined programmes	joint leadership, combined programmes
States	**Social pluralism**	**Cultural pluralism**		
Examples	Switzerland	Britain, Australia, Brazil	Canada	Yugoslavia, USSR
Language policies	multilingual	monolingual	bilingual	
Structures	joint central leadership, other institutions segregated	some institutions segregated, others integrated		minorities acknowledged, regions dominated by ethnic majorities

state form is similar to a Class I congregation which has joint leadership but separate meeting places for segregated services. **Culturally pluralist** modes of incorporation exemplifies Type B state structures, with some institutions segregated and others integrated (e.g. the marketplace). A similar form of organization exists among congregations of Class II-III. A variant of Type B state structures exists which has unified leadership structures and integrated institutions at other levels. For example, minorities may be acknowledged within regions dominated by other ethnic groups, as was the case in Yugoslavia, or the old Union of Soviet Socialist Republics before their collapse. These arrangements are similar to those in Class IV congregations.

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The discussion so far logically implies that because globalized norms constrain structural possibilities, congregations and states will evolve similar structures of dealing with diversity even when these organizations do not occur in the same society. The concept of isomorphism has to be seen to produce both variety and similarity, so that differences between organizations within the same society can be explained, as well as similarities between organizations across different societies. Different state forms can be constructed from the same global cultural building blocks; and different congregational forms can arise within the same society. Yet enough similarity exist among nation-states to identify ideal types, just as similar types of congregations occur across different societies.

My argument in 3.1 and 3.2 runs the risk of reductionism and of determinism. Reductionism is implied in the act of selecting certain features of states and congregations and disregarding others. The rationale for doing so needs to be clearly developed. Second, my argument seems to imply that the institutional environment is the only causative factor of similarity or variety in organizational structures. This is certainly not my intention; as the meso-level section of this chapter indicates, I recognize that other factors which operate at different levels also play a role, such as the constraints posed by denominational tradition and the linguistic abilities of white congregants. My arguments can also be read as implying that the institutional environment operates so as to directly determine specific outcomes. This is certainly not my intention, nor that of Meyer, Boli or Scott who all leave room for organizational actors to select between available models rather than to slavishly copy them.

3.3 The dialectic effects of meso- and macro-level interactions on linguistic diversity

Next I want to offer a dynamic system-wide explanation of the observed inverse relationships between racial integration in congregations and state ideologies of the apartheid regime. Remarkably, the data suggests that as apartheid intensified, the number of racially integrated congregations increased. Paradoxically, racial discrimination was diminishing as legitimate strategy within the world system, having been displaced as norm by equality.

In the South African context language and race are sometimes perceived to indicate (but also to submerge) ethnic and so language differences. For this reason racial integration can be used as an approximate indicator of linguistic diversity. In this way I will tie together some of the observations in this chapter, as well as elements from the two subsections above, into a more coherent structural theory of language integration in South African congregations. Chase-Dunn has pointed out that structural approaches have lost some currency in the social sciences. This is due to a renewed emphasis on the individual, who is seen as more concrete than the alleged abstractness of system-wide forms of analyses. Yet, as he maintains, it is possible, by viewing nomothetic and idiographic (historicist) analyses as two points on a continuum, to employ a structural approach which does allow for agency.

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The first inverse relationship appears when the racial ideologies which came to dominance in South Africa during the apartheid period are compared to the dominant ideologies in the world system during the same periods. Of particular interest is the slow rate of ideological change within the South African regime compared to the rate at which the norms of equality and progress achieved dominance in the world-polity.

The second inverse relationship becomes visible when rates of racial integration in congregations are compared to the relative strength of state policies of segregation. When the population of integrating congregations as a whole are considered, the rate at which racially integrating congregations emerged under apartheid seems to increase in direct proportion to state efforts at enforcing segregation. This suggests that these congregations tapped into a resistance ideology, while the majority succumbed to racial segregation. In addition, a very small number of congregations became increasingly integrated as the state intensified its efforts. In the post-apartheid environment the rate of increase is exponential, suggesting the institutionalization of a different ideology.

The conundrum of these inverse relationships is best solved by a dynamic explanation which accommodates spatial and temporal dialectics operating simultaneously, but at varying rates and at different levels, within the total world system. The spatial notion that I use is Graaff's "Giddensian" conceptualization of the world system as constituted by overlapping systems - similar to the notion of institutional embeddedness. The temporal notion that I use derives from Thomas Hall, that of "feedback loops" of various lengths which are built into the interaction of different systems as well as within a particular system[20]. Where short loops exist, feedback is obtained relatively quickly, as opposed to long loops where the effects take a long time to be noticed. One could also speculate that compared to the world-economy, world-polity norms are tied into longer feedback loops between the core and the periphery, so that changes in one will generally take some time to affect the other. Hall suggests that "economic feedbacks are faster, and under capitalism take precedence".

The combination of spatial and temporal notions helps to explain how changes in one part of the world system (e.g. in ideology) may take various lengths of time to become visible in different parts of the system (e.g. states). In this way the distribution and sequencing of political, cultural and economic trends in the world system can be mapped. For example, apartheid emerged as 19th century racist notions became widespread and dominant throughout the world system, diffused through colonial political, economic, and cultural systems, but taking effect at different times. The negative reactions

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[20]. Thomas Hall in a discussion on the World Systems Network recently referred to feedback loops in discussing the relationships between humans across time with their natural environment. He argued: "When the material adaptation is precarious, in a volatile environment, with rapid [one, 2, 3 years or less] feedbacks, groups and their attending cultures will be closely attuned to 'nature,' or the environment--those which are not, do not survive long. The more robust the adaptation and the longer the feedback times, the less attentive they can be and continue to survive. One reading of our contemporary green crisis is that the loops are so long, the adaptations have been so robust that we [industrial states] have gotten away with devastating actions."

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from the periphery to enforced inequality, in the form of universal human and political rights, would arguably take about five decades to affect attitudes towards oppression at the core. Once institutionalized in human rights treaties, the return effects would take less time - about two decades - to reach the periphery in the form of decolonization, spurred by the economic crisis in the world system just after World War Two.

The dynamic becomes clearer when more detail is added. Apartheid after 1948 (as opposed to earlier colonial instances of urban and social segregation) linked into dominant but declining system-wide ideologies, which came to the fore during South Africa's post-war transition into the semiperiphery. Paradoxically, like sediment deposited by a withdrawing tide, the racist ideology continued to strengthen nationally just as the rising wave of universal human and political rights diffused across the system. Once institutionalised in constitutions and in the UN Declaration of Universal Human Rights, global norms legitimated the roles of nation-states in world-polity, along with their relationships to their citizens.

By the 1960s the emergence of post-colonial nation-states confirmed the institutionalisation of notions of the equality of societies. Probably it is no coincidence that universal notions of equality arose in the world-polity during a time of military crisis for the hegemon in the world-economy. Wallerstein has argued that egalitarianism enlarges the global market, thus increasing capitalist accumulation. The ideology of apartheid was particularly odious in this context and the apartheid state rightly became a pariah in the world system.

During the post-1960s period, anti-apartheid organisations in South Africa emerged as anti-systemic movements that opposed the dominant Southern African political regional system, but that were linked to increasingly dominant global ideologies of equal political and civil rights. The success of anti-apartheid movements depended on aligning their cause with the emergent global norms, while the divergence of state policies from these norms increasingly delegitimated the apartheid regime and eventually proscribed it as anti-systemic with reference to the world-polity. These changes in the world system may correspond to both economic, political and cultural changes, which caused similar progressive events across the globe at more or less the same time: the collapse of the USSR; reunification of East and West Germany; and US decline in hegemony. All these happened immediately before or after the lifting of the ban on the anti-apartheid political movements in 1990.

In the light of the above, system-wide diffusion of institutional norms at varying rates can be understood by analogy to ripples in a pond as phenomena which exhibit temporal and spatial qualities. First, feedback effects may either decrease or increase over time. Second, the length of the delay is affected by the degree to which states are integrated into the system. Third, attention to historical periods demonstrates that feedback happens faster during certain periods compared to others. Fourth, during different periods feedback could alternately take paths that are predominantly unilinear, bilinear,

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or multilinear. Fifth, the direction of diffusion would at various periods reflect the struggle for dominance in the world system. For example, during the colonial period technological changes in the core diffused towards the periphery, but little of what happened in the periphery affected the core. As the world system became more integrated, response time shortened. Arguably after the Second World War the feedback loops became increasingly multidirectional, coinciding with the founding of the United Nations. The ripple analogy is best understood when viewed as occurring in a narrow channel. The first ripple (economic forces?) sets in motion a second one (cultural change?), which causes a ripple to return from the borders of the channel (the world system?) and to interfere with the first wave.

Given the above, how can my argument that the predominant language ideology in the world system favours English, countered by a weaker bias towards multilingualism, be applied to language integration in South African congregations? The evidence seems to indicate that integrating congregations demonstrate the acceptance of the global and the devaluation of the local, rather than a rejection of global identities and statuses. For this reason denominations, congregations, and individual agents who attempt to promote multilingualism and multiculturalism are at an disadvantage. Those that are successful will be marginalized, or already exist at the periphery.

4. CONCLUDING REMARKS

Chapter Six identified the macro-influences which affect language usage in South Africa, and so in congregations which exhibit little linguistic integration. The world system serves as a macro-environment which constrains levels of linguistic diversity and integration in state as in civil society organizations. A secondary meso-influence was revealed in the extent to which congregations are integrated into the dominant societal language norms, as revealed at the micro-level by the attitudes of monolingual members and leaders towards language integration. Denominations seemed to be particularly weak and irrelevant meso-influence, due to the lack of guidelines that they provide for integrating congregations, despite the apparent support by denominational officials for multiculturalism and nonracialism.

Institutional isomorphism explains the tendency in integrating congregations to use English by referring to the embeddedness of religious organization in ever widening concentric contexts of national and global institutions, particularly polity and economy. The preference for English in congregations is thus linked to forces operating at the national level within a nation-building paradigm. In the previous chapter nation-building and the dominance of English were shown to exhibit similar patterns across the African region, demonstrating that systemic forces were producing isomorphic effects at the societal level. In this way the local context was connected via the region to political, economic, and cultural features of the world system. The expansion of the world system in polity and economic terms

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contributed to the spread of colonialism, and to the diffusion of state forms. Instruments of state control - education - and state legitimation - ambivalently, Christianity as a world religion - had a coercive[21] function in the world-system of the colonial period. Both mission education and imperialism aided the cultural hegemony in British colonies, which ascribed to English a higher status than to indigenous languages. Local elites were drawn into these institutions and in this way a language ideology was institutionalized and reproduced. Isomorphism also explains the structural similarities between African states noted in Chapter Five in terms of global norms that operate in the world system of nation states. Through isomorphism global and local norms are distributed between institutions within the same society by the state, and by civil society as agencies.

The features outlined in this chapter explain why multilingual language outcomes in Chapter Four were less likely to occur than monolingual ones. The cultural norms of the world system, namely equality and progress, aid the continuous need in the capitalist system for economic expansion. Equality, in the form of liberal democracy, enabled the removal of ethnic and racial barriers which could hinder the creation of new markets, a process undergirded by the diffusion of English as a global language through tertiary education and financial aids programmes. The globalization of liberal values supported the establishment of various charters of human rights, including the Freedom Charter, the present South African constitution[22], and the ideologies of nonracialism and multiculturalism. These values are expressed in state policies and legislation.

Even meso-factors which contribute to racial[23] and particularly linguistic integration in congregations could be explained in global terms. The preference for English is supported through the example of the state and various elites, but also through the common understanding that English is the language of status and commerce. Anecdotal evidence points to an understanding in certain black circles that the state's multilingual policy is merely an ideological mechanism for the devaluation of Afrikaans and other minority languages (like Venda). This view, for instance, was aired by black clergy at a recent workshop for a denomination not included in this study. This explains why, generally speaking, both white and black in integrating congregations dominated by English accept the status quo. For speakers of minority African languages, English represents a neutral alternative to the linguicism expressed by major language speakers such as Zulu or Xhosa. For whites the use of English maintains the

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[21]. Coercive isomorphism between state and religious institutions is clearly visible throughout South African history, for example in the consequences of segregative state legislation on institutional racial integration. Other examples to hand include the prohibition of Mennonites by the apartheid state, as well as the difficulty that independent churches experienced with the state in registering as churches. The latter is a particularly interesting example of coercive isomorphism, as state requirements imposed structure and function on the African Indigenous Churches (AICs), which was necessary in order to obtain the necessary official sanction for the acquisition of land (compare Claassen 1995).

[22]. Constitutional guarantees of religious rights is an example of an USA invention which has become globalized in part through its adoption by the United Nations - as is the separation of religion and state (compare Moberg 1962:369).

[23]. For example, the presence of non-South Africans as a result of in/voluntary migration; or white flight from inner cities to the suburbs in response to the relocation of, at first, industries, then trade, and later service organizations.

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dominance of European cultural values while appearing to conform to nonracialism; while for blacks it confers entry into a higher status and symbolizes the upward aspirations modelled by the new elite.

At the same time the fact that some congregations include other languages do point to the conflicting and contesting ideologies of multiculturalism versus monoculturalism. For this reason the contribution that churchgoers make to the language situation in their congregations and in their country should not be neglected. Any argument which correctly points to power differentials involved in the choice for a global language over against a local language should also address the co-operation of the dominated in their own subjugation. Ideological explanations and the national and global factors which support them were introduced in the first and second chapters, and were more broadly discussed in this chapter.

In answer to the base question set out in Chapter One, whether a world system perspective was useful in helping to explain the lack of linguistic integration in racially-diverse congregations, I would argue in the affirmative. In what follows I expand on this by noting first population ecology as an additional avenue that may have been pursued. Next I evaluate two alternative arguments, one based at the micro-level in terms of rational choice theory, the other following a "majoritarian" argument.

My argument may have been enhanced by a population ecology approach which focuses on all organizations at once, noticing such aspects as founding and death rates as well as organizational interactions. Considering integrating congregations as a population of organizations which are affected by social institutions would open up interesting analytical avenues and help to isolate contextual affects. For instance, founding rates can be described in terms of geographic location and denominational membership, as well as larger economic, political and historical forces. The knock-on effect of institutional isomorphism could then be seen to be reflected in the choices exercised by leadership with regards to language usage. While little is known about the death of integrating congregations, those which were deliberately formed in townships during the height of apartheid (e.g. Johweto, Soweto) required high levels of commitment. Their ability to attract members seems to have been weakened considerably in the post-apartheid era by a changing political regime and by the distances individuals have to travel. By contrast, those which diminished physical distance by relocating to racially integrating inner-cities (e.g. Melodi ya Tswane, Pretoria), or which were founded there (e.g. Central Methodist Mission, Johannesburg) survived and grew.

Logically the most likely alternative to a macro-explanation could be posed at the micro-level, for example in terms of rational choice theory, as Laitin did. Accordingly, individuals seek to maximise individual advantage by rationally weighing up the cost of different choices. English is the rational choice, because of its greater value and enhanced status. I argue that even such an micro-argument only makes sense once the issue of why this language - English - and not others are deemed of more value is addressed. As I demonstrate for the rest of Africa, this requires a global approach, for the

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value and status of English is fixed in the global market.

My arguments also have the advantage of including attention to the dynamic interaction between agents and structures, at macro-, meso-, and also micro-levels - although the latter is clearly not primary in my analysis. The choice for English in most integrating congregations is not merely a matter of communicative necessity, but rather is informed by settings (present and past state formations, denominational and congregational culture, global norms) and dominant popular and state ideologies (nationism, language ideology, modernisation) which, along with the dampening effect of religious identity, actively discourage the use of indigenous languages and suppress their associated ethnic identities. State elites and the popular masses; ministers, lay leaders and congregants; educationists and denominational leaders; all contribute to structures which simultaneously constrain them dialectically. As a result, ideas and people circulate in a dynamic way between civil and state institutions, with contestations for power producing a hegemonic linguistic ideology in favour of English and its associated British and USA cultures. Other ethno-cultural groups are incorporated tangentially into the norms and values of the dominant culture, so that relations of class inequality are reproduced between groups. Subordinate non-English groups remain mostly excluded from political power in the broad sense, and partly in conflict with the dominant language ideology.

Another argument contrary to mine could be based on the idea that the majority language should "naturally" dominate. After all, 67% of congregations (40 out of 59 cases) reported a majority of English-speakers. Yet such a contention distracts from the fact that the 10 languages distributed among these congregations to varying degrees were most often not reflected in congregational processes or programmes. As noted earlier in Table 13, 62.7% of congregations (32 of 51 cases) had monolingual services - compared to the 37.3% which did not. And Table 14 showed that 72.5% (37 cases) used only one language - usually English - for preaching sermons. The majoritarian argument also does not explain why English dominates in the few congregations where black-language speakers formed more than a two-thirds majority or a sizeable presence, for instance where Sotho and Xhosa-speakers constituted between 30-40% of the congregation; or even where Zulu-, Siswati-, and Venda-speakers make up between 60-90% of the congregation. In seven congregations blacks represent between 25% and 70% of the congregants, yet English is used for most of the services[24].

Lastly, some may criticize my implicit endorsement of multilingualism, and argue that in state building indigenous languages should "'for the sake of larger unity ... give way to others for official functions'". They could also conclude that "'individuals who demand scarce resources to publish, teach, and revive all languages in the name of human rights threaten the cohesion of the national community'"

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24. This is true for St Mark's Anglican (70% black), Carrington St Methodist (27% black), Christian Community (38% black), Our Lady of the Assumption Catholic (25% black), Rhema Bible Church (35% black), Sacred Heart Catholic Church (30% black), and St John's Anglican (45% black).

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(Bamgbose 1991:82, quoting Weinstein 1983:138[25]). Similarly, they could say, if cultures are about adjusting to an environment, then cultures not only should change, but those which no longer function in a modernised context should be discarded. Such instrumentalist arguments often falsely assumes that monolingualism or monoculturalism is the answer.

In response I would point out that the value of multilingualism can be demonstrated by reference to education. Should indigenous language be used in a way that supports additive bilingualism, a bridge would be built between social and educational worlds, and the dysfunction could be avoided that arise from having to learn written and conceptual skills through an unfamiliar language (Bamgbose 1994:82). Bilingual language strategies, which recognize both indigenous languages and Languages of Wider Communication, are more relevant in a multiethnic world than monolingualism.

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APPENDIX ONE: QUESTIONNAIRE

INTEGRATING

CONGREGATIONS

SURVEY

March-April 1997

Instructions

a. To ensure greater accuracy, please ask at least **5 lay leaders to check your answers.**
b. **Congregation** refers to the average number of those people, no longer of schoolgoing age, who attended all services on all Sundays during **March 1997**; i.e. the "congregants".
c. **Categories exclude one another,** e.g. people who have degrees should not be counted with those who have Std 10 in Question 17.
d. **Please answer all questions,** even if you have to give rough estimates.
e. **Use the back cover** if you need more space for answers.

Contact person: Dr Dawid Venter Tel: (021) 808-2100 Fax: 808-2143.

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INTEGRATING CONGREGATIONS SURVEY

Official **name** and denomination of congregation: ______________________

Physical **address** of congregation's meeting place: ______________________

Founding date of congregation: __________

SECTION ONE: CURRENT DIVERSITY

1. Which forms of diversity at present **most influence** your congregation's structures (e.g. leadership) and functioning (e.g. services), whether positively or negatively?:

   Language [ ] Culture [ ] Race [ ] Class [ ]
   Other (PLEASE ELABORATE): ______________________

2.1. Do people in your congregation **comment** on the diversity in their midst ? [TICK ONE BOX]:
   Yes [ ] No [ ]

2.2. If yes, is diversity seen as positive [ ] or as causing difficulties [ ] ?

3. Do people in your congregation think that **cultural diversity** (language, music styles, and ways of understanding life) should change the way that the congregation is run ? [TICK ONE BOX]:
   Yes [ ] No [ ] Why?
   ____

4. How diverse is your congregation's services in terms of **languages** used in:

Hymns	one [ ]	two [ ]	three or more [ ]
Readings	one [ ]	two [ ]	three or more [ ]
Prayers	one [ ]	two [ ]	three or more [ ]
Sermons	one [ ]	two [ ]	three or more [ ]
Liturgy	one [ ]	two [ ]	three or more [ ]

5. Would you describe the **musical styles** used in your congregation's **services** as:

Western	Western + African	Western + other	Western + African + other
[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

6.1. Have any **structures or processes** been developed **to deal with cultural diversity** in your congregation (e.g. in styles of singing, praying, communion, decision-making) ? [TICK ONE BOX]: Yes [ ] No [ ]

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6.2. PLEASE GIVE EXAMPLES TO ILLUSTRATE YOUR ANSWER IN 6.1.

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____

____

ONLY COMPLETE QUESTIONS 6.3 AND 6.4 IF YOUR ANSWER TO 6.1 WAS YES.

6.3. **In which year** were these structures or processes adopted? ____________

6.4. **What has happened as a result** of such structures or processes, if anything?

____

____

____

____

7. How diverse is the **neighbourhood** around your congregation's buildings in terms of:

Language	mostly one	[ ]	two	[ ]	three or more	[ ]
Culture	mostly one	[ ]	two	[ ]	three or more	[ ]
Race	not mixed	[ ]	some	[ ]	very mixed	[ ]

8.1. How many "official" **church activities** does your congregation have - i.e. how many Sunday schools, youth groups, fellowship groups, soup kitchens, etc. are there ? ______

8.2. In how many of these do people from all the different **language** groups in your congregation take part? ______

9. Do **more than half** of congregants from different language groups meet with one another:

9.1. in **informal church activities** (i.e. not mentioned in 8.1) - braais, camps, volleyball games:

Never [ ] Once or twice a year [ ] Once or twice a month [ ]

9.2. in one another's **homes** for informal visits:

Never [ ] Once or twice a year [ ] Once or twice a month [ ]

10. How diverse is your congregation in terms of **racial mix** in:

Top lay leadership	not mixed	[ ]	some	[ ]	representative	[ ]
Outreach programmes	not mixed	[ ]	some	[ ]	representative	[ ]
Home groups	not mixed	[ ]	some	[ ]	representative	[ ]

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SECTION TWO: DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE

11.1. How many **services** are held for your congregation on a Sunday ? [CIRCLE ONE]

1 2 3 4 More

11.2. What was the **average number** who attended each Sunday service during **March 1996**?

First service:____ Second:_____ Third:_____ Fourth:_____

11.3. Does the **same group** of people (e.g. young whites) **go to all the services**, or is each service attended by a different group of people ? [TICK ONE]: Same [ ] Different [ ]

11.4. Is the **total number** who attended all March 1997 services [TICK ONE BOX]:

More [ ] or Less [ ] compared to those for March 1996 ?

11.5. Are any **separate services** held for a particular **language group** at present ?

Yes [ ] No [ ]. If yes, for which group ? (GIVE DETAILS): ____________________

12. In terms of **gender**, approximately what percentage of those in the congregation who are no longer of schoolgoing age would you say is: Male _____% Female ____%

13.1. What is the average **age** of males and females who are no longer of schoolgoing age in your congregation: Male _____ Female ____

13.2. What percentage of your congregation falls into the following **age-groups**:

Pre-schoolers ___%
Primary and high schoolers ___%
Young adults (19-34 yrs) ___%
Adults (35-49 years) ___%
Middle-aged (50-64 yrs) ___%
Seniors (65 and over) ___%

14. What is the **marital status** of congregants who are no longer of schoolgoing age:

Single (never married) ___%
Married ___%
Separated, divorced ___%
Living together ___%
Widower, widow ___%

15. What do congregants **each earn per month** ? (as indicated by e.g. lifestyle)

Low income (less than R 2 000) ___%
Mid-income (up to R 6 000) ___%
High-income (above R 6 000) __%

16. **How far do congregants live** from your congregation's Sunday meeting place:

Walking distance (less than 1 km) ___%
Some way (1 to 2 km) ___%
Quite far (3 to 6 km) ___%
A great distance (7 to 10km) ___%

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17. What percentage of your congregation who work fall into the following **occupations**:

Those which others may see as of low status, e.g. labourers etc ____%

Those which others may see as of middle status, e.g. plumbers etc ____%

Those which others may see as of high status, e.g. professionals etc ____%

18. In terms of **education** levels, about how many members of your congregation have:

Less than Std 10	___%	College/technikon diploma	___%
Only std 10	___%	Degrees	___%
Apprenticeship	___%		

19. Which percentage of your congregation speaks as a **first language**:

SiZulu	___%	SiTsonga	___%	TsiVenda	___%
SiSwati	___%	SiXhosa	___%	Afrikaans	___%
English	___%	SeSotho	___%	Shangaan	___%
Sepedi	___%				
* Other African	___%	* GIVE DETAILS:	____________________		
* Other European	___%	* GIVE DETAILS:	____________________		
* Other Asian	___%	* GIVE DETAILS:	____________________		

20. What **nationalities** are represented in your congregation ?

South African	___%	GIVE DETAILS:	____________________
Other African	___%	GIVE DETAILS:	____________________
Other	___%	GIVE DETAILS:	____________________

21. Which percentage of your present congregation could in the past have been considered:

White ___% Coloured ___% Indian ___% Black ___%

22.1. **When** did your congregation come to have a more racially diverse membership? **19**____

22.2. **How** did this happen?

____

____

____

____

____

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THANK YOU FOR YOUR CO-OPERATION !

Which of the following would be of use to your congregation as it deals with cultural and other forms of diversity [tick appropriate box]:

a. workshops focusing on solutions [ ]
b. analysis with consultants of internal and external dynamics [ ]
c. news of what other "mixed" congregations are doing [ ]
d. Other (specify):

IF YOU HAVE ANY FURTHER COMMENTS, PLEASE ADD THEM HERE:

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APPENDIX TWO: SAMPLE CONGREGATIONS

All Saints CPSA, Melmoth
All Saints CPSA, Robertsham
All Saints CPSA, Barberton
All Saints CPSA, Stanger
Brooklyn MCSA, Pretoria
Carrington St MCSA, Mafikeng
Christ Church CPSA, Addington
Christ Church CPSA, Pietersburg
Christ the Redeemer RC, Klerksdorp
Christian Centre IFCC, East London
Christian Community Church IFCC, Pietersburg
Claremont Methodist Church MCSA, Claremont
Damesfontein RC, Damesfontein
Fort Beaufort PCSA, Fort Beaufort
Holy Trinity RC, Halfway House
Holy Trinity CPSA, Kalk Bay
Immaculate Conception RC, Pinetown
Kokstad MCSA, Kokstad
Kriel RC, Kriel
Ladysmith MCSA, Ladysmith
Lighthouse Christian Centre, Goodwood
Maranatha Community Church IFCC, Kempton Park
Matatiele RC, Matatiele
Mossel Bay Community Church IFCC, Mossel Bay
Our Lady Help of Christians RC, Lansdowne
Our Lady of Lourdes RC, Westville
Our Lady of the Assumption RC, Sasolburg
Plumstead MCSA, Plumstead
Port Shepstone MCSA, Port Shepstone
Prestbury Methodist Church MCSA, Pietermaritzburg
Rhema Bible Church IFCC, Randburg
Sacred Heart RC, Pretoria
Sacred Heart RC, Tongaat
Sea Point MCSA, Sea Point
Shophar Fellowship Ministries IFCC, Stellenbosch
St Augustine's RC, Upington
St Barnabas Church CPSA, Lichtenburg
St Catherine's Church RC, Kleinvlei
St Cyprian's CPSA, Kimberley
St Dominic RC, Welkom
St Francis of Assisi RC, Standerton
St John's RC, Estcourt
St John the Baptist CPSA, Mtubatuba
St John's CPSA, Mafikeng
St John's, Wynberg
St John's RC, Maitland
St Joseph's RC, Howick
St Katherine's CPSA, Port Shepstone
St Mark's CPSA, Louis Trichardt
St Mary's CPSA, Rosettenville
St Michael & St George's CPSA, Grahamstown
St Patrick's Cathedral RC, Kroonstad
St Paul's CPSA, Durban
St Peter's CPSA, Tzaneen
St Saviour's CPSA, Claremont
St Stephen's CPSA, Vryburg
Ubunye Free Methodist Church, Pietermaritzburg
Vryheid RC, Vryheid
Warmbaths CPSA, Warmbaths
Woodlands-Montclair CPSA, Woodlands