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Declaration

I, the undersigned, hereby declare that the work contained in this thesis is my own original work and that I have not previously in its entirety or in part submitted it at any university for a degree.

Signature: 

Date: 6 February 2007
Abstract

This thesis applies the theory developed by Manuel Castells in his three-volume book, *The Information Age*, to the African National Congress' (ANC) policies for post-apartheid South Africa. An overview of major theories of nationalism provides the context for Castells' own views. There follows a brief summary of the ideas Castells proposes on the transition from industrial capitalism to informational capitalism, expressed in the emergence of the ideal type of the network society, and his theory on identity and nationalism. Turning to ANC policy, an analysis of ANC and government documents demonstrates that the ANC intends creating a new South African nation; an exposition of the characteristics of this new nation is given. This thesis also shows that the economic policy of the ANC-in-government, shifting from the 1994 Reconstruction and Development Programme to the 1996 Growth, Employment and Redistribution strategy, deliberately joined South Africa to the global economy. After examining the contemporary state of nationalist sentiment in South Africa, the significant extent to which South Africa tends towards the network society pattern is determined, following which Castells' conceptions of the network society and identity are applied to present-day South Africa in order to project the path of nationalism in the country.
Abstrak

Hierdie tesis pas die teorie wat Manuel Castells in sy drie-volume boek, The Information Age, ontwikkel het toe op ANC beleid vir Suid Afrika. ’n Oorsig van die belangrikste teorieë oor nasionalisme word ter agtergrond gegee. Daarna volg ’n kort opsomming van Castells se idee van die oorgang van industriële kapitalisme na informasie-gebaseerde kapitalisme. Dit word onder meer vervat in die konsep van die "network society" en sy teorie van identiteit en nasionalisme. ’n Analise van ANC en regerings dokumente toon dat die ANC dit ten doel het om ’n nuwe Suid Afrikaanse nasie te bou. Vervolgens word die kenmerke van die nuwe nasie uiteengesit. Die tesis wys ook hoe die ANC regering in 1996 doelbewus sy ekonomies beleid verander het om Suid-Afrika deel te maak van die wêreld-ekonomie. Na bestudering van hedendaagse sentiment jeens nasionalisme in Suid-Afrika, is dit moontlik om te bepaal watter mate die Suid-Afrikaanse samelewing ooreenstem met die "network society" model. Hierna word Castells se konsepte van "network society" en identiteit in hedendaags Suid-Afrika toegepas om projeksies oor die pad vorentoe vir nasionalisme in die land te maak.
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Chapter 1

Introduction

Outwardly we [South Africans] are a people of many colours, races, cultures, languages and ancient origins. Yet we are tied to one another by a million visible and invisible threads. (Mbeki, 2001b)

As South Africans prepared for the 1994 election, the first in which non-whites would be voting alongside whites, the country was tense, with an uncertain future - some predicted that South Africa would tear itself apart in civil war. Twelve years and three national election victories for the African National Congress (ANC) later, South Africa is lauded as the “miracle” nation and held up to the rest of the world as an example of a country that was able to transcend its history of centuries of racial division. Politicians hailed triumphant moments such as the country’s victory in the 1995 Rugby World Cup and the winning bid for hosting the 2010 FIFA World Cup as expressions of national unity. By the end of 2005, the South African economy had recorded the longest period of expansion in its history (Mboweni, 2005), and the black middle class was reported to be exhibiting "stunning growth"1 (Business Day, 19 July 2005).

Nonetheless, commentators from across the political spectrum agree with the ruling party’s assessment that South African society remains divided. This thesis sets out to examine the prospects for the ANC government’s stated ambitions of uniting South Africa into one nation, using the theory contained in Manuel Castells’ The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture, which is a three-volume analysis of the world situation at the end of the twentieth century. To put it differently, this thesis seeks to answer a question posed as follows: taking Castells’ theory as postulate, what are the anticipated results of the ANC’s nationalistic endeavours?

The country is divided, but so is the ruling party. Jacob Zuma’s attempt to succeed Thabo Mbeki as president of South Africa (a question unresolved at the time of writing) has exposed - to much comment in the media - the distance between factions in the ANC. Both of the ANC’s partners in the Tripartite Alliance, the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu) and the South African

1Lawrence Schlemmer (2005) took a more nuanced view, suggesting that the reality was “far more complex than the media hype allows for”; in particular, the rate of growth of the black middle class had dropped off since 2002 as “employment for Africans in the public service reached a point of saturation.”
Communist Party, publicly announced that they were considering quitting the Alliance in frustration at their inability to influence government policy. A significant cause of these tensions is the fact that, twelve years into democratic rule, despite the ANC’s slogan promising “a better life for all”, poverty and unemployment remain rife, especially amongst Africans, a verity that leads left-wing critics to charge that the government acts in the interests of the wealthy elite rather than the masses. Economic policy is at the heart of the struggle for the soul of the ANC, to paraphrase the title of a recent book chronicling the ascendancy of Thabo Mbeki to the presidency of both the ANC and the country.

Why Castells?

“Castells might be right.” (Soludo, 2001:53)

The scope of Manuel Castells’ *The Information Age*, dealing at length with the world-wide economic, political and cultural consequences of what he identifies as the shift from industrial capitalism to informational capitalism and the associated emergence of a new kind of society, the network society, is surely relevant to post-apartheid South Africa. The three volumes of his book emerged in the few years after South Africa’s first democratic election, and can be considered to provide one view of the ‘international political and economic order that the new ANC government had to negotiate in its attempts to improve the material circumstance of the black African majority of South African citizens, on behalf of whom the ANC now ruled the country. The constraints imposed by the ANC’s accommodation with this international order - an order in which finance capital is perceived as dominant - can be taken as explaining the ANC’s abandonment of its policy of nationalisation and its adoption of the free-market policies contained in the 1996 Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) economic blueprint (see Section 5.1). The pertinence of Castells’ theory to South Africa has been recognised by President Mbeki (2001b), who appointed him as a member of the Presidential International Advisory Council on Information Society and Development in 2001.

Organisation of this thesis

This thesis pursues the conjectural implications of the theory proposed by Manuel Castells in *The Information Age* for state-sponsored nationalism in South Africa. The schema followed is outlined below.

Chapter 2, the literature survey, discusses theories of nationalism. Since the literature on nationalism is overwhelmingly large, this chapter is necessarily extremely focused. First, a typology of the major theories of nationalism is presented. Second, the answers to two key questions are sought by turning to several of the theories falling in the modernisation school of thought; this school is the orthodox view in the field, although it is by no means universally supported. This section examines whether nations are foremost political or cultural entities and the relationship between the nation and the state, looking at causality in particular. Third, the concept, proposed by Mahmood Mamdani, of the
bifurcated state as the mechanism by which imperial powers administered their colonies in Africa is presented. Fourth, the notion of South African exceptionalism - to what extent South African society differs from other post-colonial African societies - is briefly considered. And fifth, the waning mystique of nationalism since the fading of the Cold War is reviewed.

Chapter 3 is a summary of the relevant arguments from the core theoretical text of this thesis, The Information Age by Manuel Castells\(^2\), focusing on the economic and cultural links engendered by the ascendancy of the network society as a pattern according to which whole societies are formed and the related developments in the significance of collective identity. In turn, the chapter describes: the genesis and character of the network society pattern; the importance of collective identity in a world of network societies; Castells’ conception of nations and nationalism; the decline of state power; and Castells’ commentary on post-colonial Africa and South Africa at the end of the twentieth century. This chapter provides the theoretical frameworks according to which the policies of the ANC government will be analysed.

Chapter 4 investigates the ANC’s policies in regard to nationalism and nation-building in South Africa by consolidating the policy statements made in publicly available ANC and government documents. The chapter proposes that the ANC has indeed embarked on an attempt to foster a South African national identity. The chapter demonstrates that the ANC views South Africa as currently being, in effect, two nations. The characteristics of the new and united nation that the ANC desires are presented. Finally, the chapter shows that the ANC intends for itself and the government it controls to be the leading force in creating the new South African nation, as the ANC shifts towards developmental state-type policies, pushes for black economic empowerment and “transformation” of the civil service, attempts to set the national “vision” and endeavours to inculcate patriotism through state pageantry, the education system and media (especially the national broadcaster). The chapter concludes by analysing the syncretistic nature of ANC policy on nationalism.

Chapter 5 scans, in broad sweep, the economic policies implemented by the ANC government since assuming power in 1994. The chapter shows that the overall intention and effect, subsequent to the 1996 introduction of the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) policy, has been the integration of South Africa into the world economic system, with South Africa’s apartheid-era isolation giving way to openness to trade and capital flows. The ANC’s recent embrace of policies emulating the Asian developmental states is seen as acknowledging the disappointing results of this policy in reducing poverty. The chapter investigates the actual effects of ANC economic policy on South Africa’s economic links with the rest of the world by examining the trends in trade and capital movements since 1994. Further, the government’s efforts at reforming the multilateral institutions of global governance and the attempts to secure Africa’s economic and political development through the New Economic Partnership for Africa’s Development are studied - both initiatives can be taken as responses to the global situation.

The analysis in Chapter 6 brings the elements of the three previous chapters together to construct the main arguments of this thesis, which revolve around the interplay between the effects of economic

\(^2\)See Muller (2000:65) for an example of an application of Castells’ ideas to South Africa.
policy, in terms of Castells’ theory, and the government’s attempts to forge a united South African nation. The chapter begins by assessing the government’s progress, after twelve years in office, in creating a “broader South Africanism.” The chapter then investigates the degree to which the economic, social and political aspects of democratic South Africa resemble the archetype of the network society as defined by Castells; this section evaluates the integration of post-apartheid South Africa into the world economy and identity-based reactions to this integration. Finally, the chapter appraises the prospects for a South African nationalism in terms of the theoretical frameworks provided by Castells and condensed in Chapter 3.

The overall plan of this thesis, then, is to describe Castells’ theory of the network society, shared identity and nationalism; to distill the elements of the ANC’s programme for South African nationalism; to demonstrate that the new ANC government has deliberately integrated South Africa into the world economy; to show that this policy of economic integration set the country on the course to becoming a network society, a process which was well under way by the mid-2000s; and to draw out the consequences for South African nationalism of becoming a network society.
Chapter 2

Theories of Nationalism

2.1 Theories of nationalism

The literature on nationalism is both vast and contentious - the "study of nations and nationalisms is rent by deep schisms" (Smith, 1998:225). Even attempting to provide a summary of each of the major theories on the subject would exceed the ambit of this thesis. This chapter therefore approaches the topic by turning to some of the major recent works on nationalism in search of answers to two questions of paramount significance for state-sponsored nationalism in South Africa. First, is a nation essentially a political or a cultural entity? Second, what is the relationship between the nation and the state; specifically, do nations precede states, and can states create nations?

The chapter begins with a short account of the typology of theories of nationalism provided by Llobera (1999) in Recent Theories of Nationalism, which serves as a brief overview of academic thinking on the topic.

2.1.1 An overview of recent theories of nationalism

Josep Llobera (1999), in his overview of theories of nationalism, divides writings on the subject into three broad categories according to the central assumption made about nations and nationalism: Essentialist views, of which primordialist and sociobiological theories form the two camps, hold that nationality is ultimately a birthright; instrumentalist views suppose that people assume nationality as a calculated strategy; and modernisation views propose that nations arise as a consequence of some combination of the social, economic and political changes wrought by the transition from traditional social order to modernity, the emphasised factor varying according to the author.

2.1.1.1 Essentialist theories

Primordialist theories Primordialist theories of nationalism are premised on group identity being formed around some essential characteristic that an individual possesses by virtue of being born into a
particular society at a particular time (Isaacs, 1975); in Geertz’s (1973, cited in Llobera, 1999) phrase, these are “ineffable yet coercive ties”, such as blood, language, race, religion, or region. Ethnic groupings express and are bound by these ties - an ethnic group or nation is seen as an extension of the family, and the bonds that hold the group together are analogous with the natural, primordial bonds within a family1, as proposed by Shils (1957, cited in Llobera, 1999). Geertz (1973) suggests that primordial identities, in addition to being natural and ineffable, are primarily based on sentiment or affection.

A nation is formed because of the affective ties between a particular group of people who share common descent and culture. The inability to provide an account of the origin of nations is one of the key criticisms of primordialist theories (Llobera, 1999). Primordial identities are rigid and the boundaries demarcated by them inflexible - another major criticism of primordialist theories is that they cannot explain changes in or the dissolution of ethnic groups (Llobera, 1999).

Sociobiological theories Sociobiology attempts to explain human social behaviour with reference to evolutionary biology. Sociobiological theories of nationalism draw on the mechanisms of kin selection (i.e. nepotism), reciprocity and coercion (Llobera, 1999). At root, sociobiological theories are premised on the significance of biological relatedness for human behaviour, as expressed in the concept of inclusive fitness2. Van den Berghe (1981) contends that, other factors being equal, people will tend to cooperate or fight depending on how closely related they are. This is echoed in The Sociobiology of Ethnocentrism (Reynolds, 1983), in which “Genetic distance was put forward as the key factor accounting for amity and enmity. Linguistic and cultural markers make sure that people are easily classified either as insiders (potential collaborators) or outsiders (potential foes)” (Llobera, 1999). Shaw and Wong (1989:109-110) provide a comprehensive model, centred on a psychological mechanism for group identification:

“individuals have identified with groups larger than their nucleus ethnic group due to balance-of-power considerations. They have done so voluntarily or through coercion (that is, defeat and forced amalgamation with conqueror)… To belong to and fight for a larger group, priorities of inclusive fitness maximisation and related biases in mental development must be linked with priorities and choices in the cultural environment… Cognition and emotion work simultaneously to produce powerful group alliances… The identification mechanism operates best to identify preferred-group membership when groups are naturally cohesive. Natural cohesion arises when five recognition markers are in congruence and intensity of emotion concerning these recognition markers is strong. The recognition markers are common phenotypes, descent, language, homeland and religion.”

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1The practice of likening the nation to a family is widespread in nationalist rhetoric. The ANC - which characterised itself as a revolutionary national organisation - had a struggle-era slogan exclaiming the “ANC is your mother and your father” (Suttner, 2005).

2Inclusive fitness is an evolutionary concept which holds that the behaviour of individual organisms tends to maximise the overall reproductive success of the species; the idea is used to provide a genetic explanation for seemingly self-defeating behaviour such as altruism. Inclusive fitness is most famously explained by Richard Dawkins (1989).
It is important to note that most sociobiologists do not claim that nationalism can be purely explained by genetic causes without regard for culture and history, but that nationalism rests on innate human tendencies to treat people differently according to the how closely related they are (Llobera, 1999).

For sociobiologists, nations are associations of people who share a larger proportion of genes than average, in other words who have common descent - nations that do not satisfy this condition will be fragile and easily fissured (Shaw and Wong, 1989:110). Nations are bound together by a common identity, people having an innate mechanism for producing identification with a group. This identity will be strongest when Shaw and Wong’s (1989:109-110) five markers are in agreement - i.e. the group shares physical features, language, descent, homeland and religion.

As with primordialist explanations for nationalism, sociobiological theories typically fail to explain the formation of nations (Llobera, 1999). Drawing on Shaw and Wong (1989), however, we can allow for political and cultural processes forming nations, the durability of which are then determined by the strength of the identification of the individual members with the group.

2.1.1.2 Instrumentalist theories of nationalism

Instrumentalist theories generally refer to ethnic groups but are often generalised to account for nations too (Llobera, 1999). The basic claim of instrumentalist theories is that ethnic identity is “flexible and variable... both the content and boundaries of an ethnic group change according to circumstance” (Llobera, 1999). Ethnic identification is caused by economic, political and social processes and is not permanent - individuals can potentially move from one group to another.

Bärt (1969) defined ethnicity as a form of social organisation, that is as a cultural artefact. Maintaining the boundary between groups (distinguishable by cultural differences) is then an essential task. For Barth, ethnic collectives are formed and mobilised largely by ethnic entrepreneurs or leaders (Llobera, 1999).

Competition theories (see, for example, Nagel and Olzak (1986)) assume that competition between distinct groups for scarce resources provides the conditions for the emergence of ethnic identity as a basis for collective action (Llobera, 1999).

Rational choice theory - expounded by, among others, Banton (1983) and Hechter (1988) - emphasises the role that individual preferences play in ethnic affiliations (Llobera, 1999). Rational choice theory assumes that individuals select their ethnic affiliation, to the extent that circumstances permit, in order to gain the most benefit (calculated as wealth, security or prestige).

Instrumentalist theories of ethnicity and nationalism emphasise the role of individual agency in forming nations and these theories are thus criticised for ignoring the role of the state (Llobera, 1999).

2.1.1.3 Modernisation theories of nationalism

Many theories of nationalism assert that nationalism is a phenomenon associated with modernity and turn to elements of modernity to explain the emergence of nationalism (Llobera, 1999) - this
viewpoint can be taken as orthodox. Some authors propose that nations are an ancient phenomenon but that nationalism is peculiar to modern societies (Llobera, 1999).

In general, "modernization theories maintain that nationalism emerges as a result of the process of transition from traditional to modern society; some of these theories focus more specifically on the spread of industrialization\(^3\), and on the socio-economic, political and cultural conditions functionally associated with it, as the main cause of nationalism" (Llobera, 1999).

**Social communication theories** Social communication theories emphasise the importance of communication in the formation of national groups (Llobera, 1999).

Deutsch (1953), specifically addressing the advent of nationalism in the transition from traditional to modern societies, defines a nation as a collective who communicate more effectively and intensely with one another than with people outside the group (Llobera, 1999). Deutsch pointed to large-scale social organisation as increasing the importance of language and culture and hence of nationalism, with the implication that modern nation-states are likely to absorb any ethnic minorities they might incorporate. In fact, the reverse has proved true - minority cultures continue to assert their distinctiveness and demand more autonomy (Llobera, 1999).

Rustow (1969:30, quoted in Llobera, 1999) asserts that "the essential link between modernization and nationhood consists of course in the need for an intensive division of labour." Equality is an important feature of nations. While allowing the possibility that some traditional societies were nations, Rustow argues that modernisation and nationhood are closely related, with the nation-state being the most appropriate political structure for achieving advanced modernisation and with modernisation providing the most suitable social conditions for the fostering and maintenance of national identity (Llobera, 1999).

Rokkan (1983), analysing Western European nation-states, proposes a model in which some important elements of their emergence occur in medieval and early-modern periods (Llobera, 1999). He explains the proliferation of nation-states in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries through the interaction of economic, territorial and cultural factors.

Benedict Anderson’s influential *Imagined Communities* (1983) highlights the role of social communication in nation-building. He (1983:15) defines a nation as “an imagined political community... imagined as both limited and sovereign.” He argues for the crucial role of print capitalism in the early-modern period in the genesis of nations: widespread printing in vernacular languages created in each case a standardised language\(^4\) which in turn fostered communication within a population. Anderson explains the emergence of nationalism as an anti-colonial force by suggesting that the colonised groups were politically and culturally excluded and were able to imagine their own communities which allowed them to overthrow their colonial rulers.

\(^3\) Application of modernisation theories to Third World countries should take into account that industrialisation is often absent in these countries (Llobera, 1999).

\(^4\) Alexander (2002:93-94), drawing on Anderson, argues that the standardisation of the written forms of the indigenous South African languages is essential for their preservation.
Economistic theories Economistic theories of nationalism assume that nations are created to serve a particular group's economic interests and that nationalist discourse obscures these economic interests - i.e. it “can be used to justify or hide economic exploitation” (Llobera, 1999).

For Llobera (1999), Marxist theories “posit a more or less explicit causal connection between the development of capitalism and the appearance of nationalism.” The 1970s saw several modifications of Marxist theories arise. First, the theory of internal colonialism (see Hechter, 1975) noted that states tended to show internal inequalities on the basis of ethnicity (in the USA, for example) or region (in Europe), and that these inequalities gave rise to ethnic movements within states; the idea of a national culture was deprecated in favour of a conceptualisation suggesting a dominant national culture that subordinates other cultures within the state by monopolising prestigious social positions. Second, Nairn (1977) attributed nationalism to the negative effects of uneven development; states in the periphery could defend themselves by fostering nationalism, an inter-class alliance that asserted its independence of the dominant, alien state by expressing its cultural uniqueness. Third, Wallerstein (1987:381) suggests that nations derive from the political system of the modern world economy, that is from states; for Wallerstein, nations are equivalent to states (Llobera, 1999).

Ernest Gellner insists that nationalism, while it is itself a cultural phenomenon, is “the unavoidable outcome of an industrial society which requires a spatially ductile workforce” (Llobera, 1999) - “the specific roots of nationalism are found in the distinctive structural requirements of industrial society” (Gellner, 1983:31). Gellner (1964) maintains that nationalism can only be explained through the effects of industrialisation, competition between classes and the integrating effects of language and education. Industrialisation, in undermining traditional social order, made culture extremely significant in that it became the source of identity. The state was important because it provided a standardised education system and official language. For Gellner, nations are invented units.

Anthony D. Smith (1986), who clearly asserts the link between modernity and nationalism, also recognises that “we find in pre-modern eras, even in the ancient world, striking parallels to the 'modern' idea of national identity... and we find movements that appear to resemble modern nationalism” (Smith, 1986:11).

Politico-ideological theories Theories that account for nationalism by recourse to politics and ideology insist on modern nationalism as being primarily political in nature.

While Breuilly (1985) allows that nations existed in medieval Europe, he delimits nationalism to the modern era; nationalism results from the development of the modern state and the international state system - nationalism is a political phenomenon and the state is central in fostering nationalism.

Giddens (1981:190-191) defines nationalism as “the existence of symbols and beliefs which are either propagated by elite groups, or held by many of the members of regional, ethnic, or linguistic categories of a population and which imply a community between them.” Although Giddens considers nationalism as a modern phenomenon, it is not a deterministic product of nation-states which are themselves not simply products of capitalism, but which developed in tandem (Llobera, 1999). Giddens insists that European nationalism cannot be generalised to other regions. Giddens (1985:220)
makes provision for the "origins of oppositional nationalism" being strongly influenced by uneven capitalist development.

Brass (1991) maintains that ethnicity and nationalism are modern phenomena. Further, they are constructed by elites aiming to use culture to entrench their own political or economic advantage.

The following two sections consider only theories that fall under the modernisation school of thought.

2.1.2 Are nations primarily political or cultural units?

This section focuses on conceptions of the nation; is this social unit, which has assumed such meaning in the last two centuries - as Benedict Anderson (1983:132) puts it "Dying for one's country... assumes a moral grandeur which dying for the Labour Party, the American Medical Association, or perhaps even Amnesty International can not rival" - essentially political or cultural?

All the authors surveyed - and they can be classed in the modernisation category of Llobera's schema - agree that nations and nationalism are both political and cultural phenomena, although there are certainly disagreements in other respects. Deutsch (1953:61,70,75,78) defines a "nationality" as "a people striving to equip itself with power", where a people is a group of people linked by economic intercourse and the ability to communicate effectively with each other. A nationality becomes a nation when it achieves the ability to compel allegiance, and a nation becomes a nation-state when it captures or forms a state and attains sovereignty (Deutsch, 1953:78-79).

The cultural and political aspects of nationhood are explicit in Benedict Anderson's (1983:15) definition of a nation as "an imagined political community - and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign." Anderson (1983:14) points directly to the paradox that nationalist ideologies can assert potent political force despite their philosophical "poverty and even incoherence."

Ernest Gellner emphasises the cultural aspects of nationality and ethnicity; for Gellner (1964:168), nationalism is a political movement that seeks power - "Nationalism is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness; it invents nations where they do not exist - but it does need some pre-existing differentiating marks to work on" - it is a political principle that asserts "the conviction that the ethnic [national] boundary ought also to be a political one" (Gellner, 1994:35). Gellner (1983), in *Nations and Nationalism*, stresses the "role of mass public education systems in sustaining 'high' cultures in modern, industrial societies" (Smith, 1998:29).

Anthony D. Smith (1991:15) holds that "National identity and the nation are complex constructs composed of a number of interrelated components - ethnic, cultural, territorial, economic and legal-political." In his definition, a nation shares, amongst other attributes, "a mass public culture" and "common legal rights and duties for all members" (Smith, 1991:14). Smith (1991:91) gives more weight to cultural aspects: "More than a style and doctrine of politics, nationalism is a form of culture - an ideology, a language, mythology, symbolism and consciousness" (emphasis in original) - it is this cultural aspect that provides the "deep historical grounds for the sense of immemoriality and continuity which underpins the profound attachments of so many people to their ethnies and nations" (Smith, 1998:226).
Breuilly (1985:36) takes a view with the opposite emphasis to Smith - "Nationalism is a form of politics." Yet, nationalism "clearly builds upon some sense of cultural identity, even if it is the major creator of that sense" (Breuilly, 1985:35); national identity is constructed somewhat arbitrarily, drawing on culture and history with an "emphasis on cultural distinctiveness" (Breuilly, 1985:349).

Giddens views the nation-state as a "conceptual community" founded on common language and common symbolic history" (Smith, 1998:73). The institution of the state is paramount - "Giddens insists... that nationalism, and the nation, are really only significant insofar as they are linked to the state, that is, to attaining and maintaining state power, and further that the nation has no independent conceptual status outside of its link with the state" (Smith, 1998:74-75). The nation is inherently political and cultural in this view.

2.1.3 The relationship between nation and state

This section presents a survey of the selected scholars' views on the relationship between nation and state, paying attention to the question of causality - do nations precede states or vice versa?

Deutsch (1953:78-79) presents a model where nationalities that achieve a kind of coercive power over their members become nations and nations become nation-states when and if they achieve sovereignty, i.e. they capture or create a state. Nations, then, come before states, and statehood is the ultimate objective of nationalism (Deutsch, 1953:78).

Anderson (1983:55) devotes considerable attention to the "ways in which administrative units create meaning" (see Anderson, 1983:54-61); it is clear that he considers it possible for states to create nations, a trajectory that he (1983:80-103) identifies in the cases of what Seton-Watson (1977) called “official nationalisms”, conscious attempts by the European dynastic empires of the late nineteenth century to embrace nationalism (in imitation of the recently emerged popular "linguistic-nationalisms") as a legitimating principle. Anderson also discusses the largely state-led nationalism (Anderson's (1983:104) "Last Wave") of post-colonial countries, in which administrative units inherited from the former colonialists attempted to forge new nations:

"so often in the 'nation-building' policies of the new states one sees both a genuine, popular nationalist enthusiasm and a systemic, even Machiavellian, instilling of nationalist ideology through the mass media, the educational system, administrative regulations, and so forth... One can thus think of many of these nations as projects the achievement of which is still in progress" (Anderson, 1983:104-105).

Gellner (1964:168) considers nations to be the creations of nationalism. He points to the importance of mass, public education systems in inculcating a common culture, created by elites, and it is this function of education that provides the opportunity for states to create nations - the "public, mass education system binds state and culture together" (Smith, 1998:32). Gellner, however, emphasises the role of ethnicity - the essence of nationalism is that it seeks the congruence of ethnic and political
boundaries (Gellner, 1994:35) - which would suggest that a degree of ethnic homogeneity is necessary for the nation to be plausible.

For Anthony D. Smith (1991:15,39,175; 1998:45) too, ethnicity as a differentiating marker is a major ingredient of nationalism, which again suggests that nations cannot be created from arbitrary cultural materials. While Smith (1991:39) suggests that “a state’s ethnic core often shapes the character and boundaries of the nation” because “it is very often on the basis of such a core that states coalesce to form nations”, he (1991:40) does “note the possibility of forming nations without immediate and antecedent ethnie.” Nation-building in post-colonial states tends to be an elite, rather than popular, project - it is intellectuals who propose and elaborate nationalistic cultures (Smith 1991:41,93; 1998:56). The state, then, can direct its resources to nation-building through cultural means.

Breuilly (1985:374) denies the existence of nations as anything other than political concepts - nationalisms are not “true”. For Breuilly (1985:365), the goal of nationalism is the achievement of political sovereignty - i.e. each nationalism pursues its own state. Nationalism is only possible in a world of states; the “development of the political concept of the nation was related to the ways in which the absolutist or would-be absolutist state in early modern Europe shaped political thought and action” (Breuilly, 1985:353) - the “process which created the modern idea of the state in its earliest form also gave rise to the political concept of the nation” (Breuilly, 1985:353). Indeed, in Breuilly’s view, a nationalism ceases to exist as such when its proponents have attained their own state - “In so far as nationalism is successful it appears to be true” (Breuilly, 1985:343), although states may attempt to harness nationalistic ideology in order to “determine the features of the cultural group [i.e. the nation]” from which the state claims legitimacy, in which case the nationalism in question becomes “arbitrary” (Breuilly, 1985:380). In fact, for Breuilly (1985:380), modern nationalism has been reduced to “an arbitrary combination of emotion and pragmatism”; it is a tool that can be wielded by the state.

Giddens takes the opposite view to Deutsch - nations arise out of the “processes of state centralisation and administrative expansion which, through the reflexive ordering of the state system, fixed the borders of a plurality of nations” (Smith, 1998:72). For Giddens, the nation is the state, or at least its citizens. Giddens considers nationalism, when espoused by the state, as a means of maintaining state power (Smith, 1998:74-75).

2.2 The bifurcated African colonial state

It is commonplace to note that the borders of colonial states in Africa were arbitrary, drawn up at the convenience of imperial powers without regard for the ethnic constitution of the countries thus enclosed (Alexander, 2002:89; Slovo, 1988; Comaroff and Comaroff, 2003:454; Nolutshungu, 1993:616) (in terms of Anthony D. Smith’s ideas referred to above, this meant that such states frequently did not contain a core ethnic group). Mamdani makes the crucial point that the governments put in place by the colonialists commonly ruled the indigenous population through the mediation of the institutions of traditional leadership.
2.2.1 Mamdani and the bifurcated colonial state in Africa

Mahmood Mamdani (1996:16-23) identifies a particular form of rule adopted by imperial powers in Africa as an "inexpensive but efficient mode of control over natives" (Mamdani, 1996:63), namely "indirect rule". Indirect rule basically meant that the colonialist state exerted administrative control over the rural indigenous population through traditional authorities rather than directly.

"indirect rule came to be the mode of domination over a 'free' peasantry. Here, land remained a communal - 'customary' - possession. The market was restricted to the products of labor, only marginally incorporating labor or land itself. Peasant communities were reproduced within the context of a spatial and institutional autonomy. The tribal leadership was either selectively reconstituted as the hierarchy of the local state or freshly imposed where none had existed, as in 'stateless societies.' Here political inequality went alongside civil inequality. Both were grounded in a legal dualism. Alongside received law was implemented a customary law that regulated nonmarket relations, in land, in personal (family), and in community affairs. For the subject population of natives, indirect rule signified a mediated - decentralized - despotism." (Mamdani, 1996:17)

"the colonial state was a double-sided affair. Its one side, the state that governed a racially defined citizenry, was bounded by the rule of law and an associated regime of rights. Its other side, the state that ruled over subjects, was a regime of extra-economic coercion and administratively-driven justice." (Mamdani, 1996:19)

Thus, the colonial state never fully dismantled the traditional authorities, preferring to use them to administer the rural areas of their colonial territories without committing large amounts of settler manpower. This "bifurcated" form of government was the legacy of colonialism bequeathed to the newly-independent African states, and the inability of the new governments to overcome this legacy explains the weakness of national governments and the continued significance of ethnicity in post-colonial Africa. As Jean and John Comaroff (2003:454) put it,

"Born of long histories of colonisation, these [post-colonial] polities typically entered the new world order with legacies of ethnic diversity invented or exacerbated in the cause of imperial governance. Colonial regimes, intent on the management of racial capitalism, never constituted nations in the Euromodernist sense of the term, even where they gave their 'possessions' many of the ceremonial trappings of nationhood."

2.2.2 Is South Africa exceptional?

Mamdani (1998) describes South African exceptionalism thus: "At its core, South African exceptionalism is the contention that the South African experience is so totally and irrevocably shaped by the initiative of the settler, that South Africa is no longer, in any meaningful sense, part of Africa, native
Africa.” Mamdani (1996:27) opposes this view, suggesting instead that “South Africa has been an African country with specific differences... It is only from an economistic perspective - one that highlights levels of industrialization and proletarianization one-sidedly - that South African materialism makes sense.” The commonality “lies not in the political economy but in the form of the state: the bifurcated state” (1996:28). Mamdani (1996:28) concedes that the “sheer numerical weight of white settler presence in South Africa sets it apart from settler minorities elsewhere in colonial Africa.”

Butler (2004:140) disagrees, claiming that South African politics is not “a typical product of colonial rule”:

“Nineteenth-century wars of dispossession, mass population displacement, and enforced changes in social organization undermined the communal land control Mamdani identifies as crucial to indirect rule... South Africa’s rebellion against apartheid was not in any way confined to a war against institutions equivalent to ‘direct rule’, even if these institutions did indeed bear the brunt of direct protest. Opposition to apartheid was also often self-consciously anti-ethnic, political, urban, unionized, and ideological.”

For Alexander (2002:2),

“there is no difference between what happened in other settler-colonial countries of the ‘Old Colonial Empire’, such as Canada, the United States of America, Australia and New Zealand, and South Africa [except that] in South Africa, with the exception of most of the Khoisan-speaking communities, the colonists failed to exterminate the indigenous African peoples.”

South Africa has inherited a “unique combination” of “a modern industrial state characterised by a first-class infrastructure in specific economic and social sectors and inhabited, as it were, for the most part by people of European descent” coexisting with “a set of Third World and eventually Fourth World conditions” (Alexander, 2002:138). These elements are joined by “the system of internally maintained migrant labour” into “complementary, interdependent parts of a larger social system” (Alexander, 2002:139). For Alexander (2002:140), while Mamdani might be correct in asserting that “South African society” is not “totally different from the rest of Africa”, South Africa does have a “peculiar social formation.” In particular, “the fact of a large population of European descent, most of whom had come to identify themselves, objectively if not consciously, with the African continent, does make all the difference [for] what happens in South Africa” (emphasis in original).

### 2.3 Developments in the late twentieth century

Following a similar line of reasoning to Castells (see Section 3.3), Zygmunt Bauman (2001:97-98) contends that the “uneven development of economy, politics and culture (once coordinated in the framework of the nation-state)” characteristic of the contemporary phenomenon of “globalization”
leads to the “separation of power from politics: power, as embodied in the worldwide circulation of capital and information, becomes extraterritorial, while the extant political institutions stay, as before, local. This leads inevitably to the progressive disempowerment of the nation-state.” The state is forced to abandon “normative regulation” of “economic and cultural processes”, which in turn “renders the cultural/ideological mobilization of the subject population, once the modern state’s principal strategy, and the evocation of nationhood and patriotic duty, once its main legitimation, redundant” (Bauman, 2001:98).

The consequence of this is a loss of “natural belonging” as citizens come to identify less and less with the nation-state and begin individual journeys to defining their own identities; in this situation, collective identities promise security and belonging (Bauman, 2001:98-100); Bauman (2001:100-101) refers to the “potency of community” to explain the pull of collective identity on “the overwhelming majority of the population orphaned by the nation-state.”

Vinen (2002:611) concurs, pointing to the decreasing relevance of the state as a meaningful institution able to inspire its citizens, for Europeans at least, in the decade following the fall of the Berlin Wall:

“States had always justified their existence in terms that went beyond the purely utilitarian. The state was a focus for patriotic loyalty and, in extreme cases, it had the right to ask its citizens to die for it. In the 1990s, its mystique was challenged. Europeans transferred their loyalties to other entities, including nations that did not correspond to the frontiers of any existing state. The key mystical power of the state - its ability to shed the blood of its citizens - seemed irrelevant to most Europeans, or at least to most western Europeans, at a time when a major war seemed unimaginable.”

2.4 Summary

Academic studies of nationalism have produced a variety of theories, with little agreement over even fundamental points such as the definition of a nation. Essentialist theories of nationalism suppose members of a nation to be bound by some intrinsic characteristic. For primordialists, such as Geertz, nations are bound by birth or blood ties - ethnic groups and nations are extensions of the family or clan. Sociobiologists draw on evolutionary biology, especially kin selection, to explain nationalism. Van den Bergh argues that the degree of relatedness between groups tends to determine whether they cooperate or fight. Shaw and Wong propose a genetically-determined psychological mechanism for group identification, which naturally tends to form bonds based on shared phenotypes, descent, language, homeland and religion.

Instrumentalist theories of nationalism emphasise individual agency in selecting national affiliation. Competition theorists suggest that ethnic identity is amenable to serving as a tool in contests over scarce resources, while rational choice theorists such as Barton and Hechter claim that individuals choose their ethnic identity, as far as possible, out of calculated self-interest.
Overwhelmingly, however, scholars of nationalism hold that it is a phenomenon unique to the modern period. Social communication theorists, like Deutsch, Rustow and Anderson, emphasise the importance of communication within a group for the emergence of collective identity. Anderson highlights the importance of early print capitalism in standardising vernacular languages, thereby fostering communication and a feeling of national unity. Economistic theories of nationalism hold the economic order of modern industrial society to be the cause of nationalism. Marxists saw nationalism as a consequence of capitalism, and Gellner insists that nationalism is the “unavoidable outcome” of industrial society. Smith, however, also stresses the importance of ethnicity in nation-formation. Theorists like Giddens, Breuilly and Brass maintain that nationalism, while a modern phenomenon, is principally political or ideological in nature. These scholars emphasise the role of elites (in the case of Giddens and Brass) and the state (in the case of Breuilly) in fostering national identity.

Within the modernisation camp, the scholars surveyed allowed that nations were both political and cultural units, although Deutsch, Breuilly and Giddens emphasised the political dimension, whereas Smith emphasised the cultural dimension and Anderson and Gellner emphasised both.

Turning to the question of whether nations created states or states created nations, the views of the scholars surveyed disagreed. Deutsch proposed that nationhood led to statehood, whereas Anderson, Gellner and Giddens claimed that the state produced the nation, although Gellner emphasised the importance of ethnicity. Smith (again emphasising the significance of ethnicity) and Breuilly allowed for either trajectory.

Mamdani contends that colonial powers in Africa were able to rule cheaply by co-opting the institutions of traditional leadership to rule the indigenous populations. This indirect rule produced a “bifurcated” state, where the indigenous populations were legally and politically distinct from the colonial citizens. The traditional authorities thus remained largely in place, especially in rural areas, leaving a fragmented polity as the inheritance of newly independent African states.

Mamdani regards South African exceptionalism - the view that South African society is sufficiently different from other African societies as to warrant entirely separate consideration - as mistaken; Butler and Neville Alexander, however, consider Mamdani to have ignored the factors in South Africa’s peculiar history, in particular the level of industrial development and the large number of white citizens, which set South Africa apart from the other societies on the continent.

In an historical irony, Bauman notes the declining significance of national identity in the developed world at the end of the twentieth century. He suggests that economic globalisation separates power from politics, as power - in the form of a “worldwide circulation of capital and information” - escapes the local, territorial domain of political authority. The consequent loss of capacity of the nation-state makes its usual role of inculcating national identity redundant, as ordinary people tend to identify less with nations and more with other communal identities.
Chapter 3

Castells' The Information Age

Manuel Castells (1997; 2000a; 2000b), in his three-volume book The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture, attempts to describe the global social situation at the end of the twentieth century and presents theoretical frameworks for making sense of the state of the world. Castells himself discerns two primary themes, highlighted by the titles of his first two volumes: increasing international linkages within what he calls the "network society" and the related intensification of the significance of "identity." Broadly speaking, the first theme describes processes of global (although not uniformly distributed) economic and cultural integration and the second theme describes defensive and creative reactions against the threats to economic or cultural autonomy perceived as consequent of this worldwide integration.

This chapter summarises Castells' positions on three key topics: first, the genesis and characteristics of the network society; second, collective identity and the nature and origins of nations and nationalism; third, the declining ability of nominally sovereign states to control their own economic and political destinies. This selection is made on the basis of our interest in using the theoretical frames provided by Castells to analyse the attempted fostering of nationalism in South Africa by the African National Congress (ANC)\footnote{The three volumes of The Information Age have also received attention from the ANC and the South African Communist Party (SACP): the SACP programme adopted at its 2002 Congress acknowledges Castells as influencing the party's conceptualisation of globalisation (SACP, 2002). Castells serves on the South African government's Presidential International Advisory Council on Information Society and Development, announced by President Mbeki (2001b) in his State of the Nation address in 2001. See Kraak (2000) for an account of a seminar featuring Castells and Martin Carnoy of Stanford held in Gauteng in June 2000 in which a number of prominent ANC members participated.}. Castells' comments on post-colonial Africa, and South Africa specifically, are also summarised.

3.1 The network society

3.1.1 The shift to the network society

The primary role of economic rearrangements in inducing the network society can be gauged by the space Castells devotes to consideration of these changes: in The Rise of the Network Society, fully
four out of seven chapters (over 300 pages out of 500) are devoted to economic matters, analysing in turn the prominence of information processing and communication technology as a source of productivity and competitiveness, the emergence of an interdependent global economy, the organisation of businesses into network forms and a marked shift towards flexible employment practices. Changes in economic institutions, practices and technologies can be regarded as generating the shift to the network society.

Castells (2000b:77,165) locates the beginnings of the shift in the early to mid 1970s - a useful marker might be the collapse of the 'Woods fixed exchange rate mechanism in 1973 (Hill, 2001:307). By this time, trade barriers had declined substantially since the establishment of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) in 1947, while world trade had grown steadily since the early 1950s (Hill, 2001:9).

Castells traces the origins of the network society to the interactions between several mutually interacting processes. Starting in the mid-1970s, businesses adopted new, more flexible, organisational forms and practices to cope with rising levels of uncertainty as individual firms faced more rapidly changing environments (Castells, 2000b:165). Businesses in developed countries, beginning in the United States in the mid-1970s but subsequently in Europe and Asia also, sought competitiveness and profitability by exporting to new markets and moving production to cheaper locations overseas; the resulting intensification of competition forced other firms to follow suit (Castells, 2000b:135,165). These strategies were made possible by improvements in information and communication technologies and management practices (Castells, 2000b:90,94-97,164). This accelerating international expansion of firms and movement of capital was made possible by governments removing regulatory restrictions on trade and financial flows (Castells, 2000b:135). Government policies favouring deregulation, trade liberalisation and privatisation were promoted by international institutions such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the World Trade Organisation - by the 1990s, these policies were dominant throughout the world, circumscribing the policy options available to individual governments (Castells, 2000b:137,142).

3.1.2 Characteristics of the network society

The Rise of the Network Society describes the principal characteristics of the network society as each conforming to a networking logic. These characteristics manifest in the various cultures throughout the world, but are most clearly discernible in the developed economies - "major societies" (Castells, 2000b:20) - of North America, Europe and Asia. The Rise of the Network Society is thus the story of "the emergence of a new social structure" (Castells, 2000b:14).

While pointing to the network society as an underlying pattern - the "common fundamental features" of "socio-technical systems" - visible in various societies, Castells (2000b:20,188-189) makes it clear that individual societies structure their institutions according to their own values - institutions reflect the societies they inhabit. "Each society tends to generate its own organizational arrangements" (Castells, 2000b:188). Looking specifically at commerce in East Asia, "patterns of business organization... are produced by the interplay of culture, history, and institutions" (Castells, 2000b:189),
while looking at employment, there is “historical variation in employment patterns according to specific institutions, culture, and political environments” (Castells, 2000b:217). So “the new society emerging from this process of [technological] change is both capitalist and informational, while presenting considerable historical variations in different countries, according to their history, culture, institutions” (Castells, 2000b:13). The “new social structure” of the network society is “manifested in various forms, depending on the diversity of cultures and institutions throughout the planet” (Castells, 2000b:14).

### 3.1.2.1 Informational capitalism

Castells (2000b:13,15) argues that, after the collapse of Soviet statism, the global economy is now capitalist - that is, the social distribution of economic consumption and surplus happens according to the rules of the capitalist mode of production. Further, Castells (2000b:17,99) argues that the economic “mode of development” has altered from industrialism to informationalism - technologies for processing and communicating information and creating knowledge are now the principal sources of productivity. He labels the “new techno-economic system” as “informational capitalism” (Castells, 2000b:18). Information and communication technologies have become pervasive.

### 3.1.2.2 Global economy

In addition to its informational character, Castells (2000b:77,132) maintains that the contemporary world economy is global and networked - by which he means that the world economy as a unit spans the entire globe and business networks are significant elements determining productivity and competitiveness - and operates in real-time. The major industries are massively globalised, linking local economies together - while the bulk of production and employment is still local and regional, “the core activities of production [and] consumption ... are organised on a global scale” and it is these core activities which determine the success or otherwise of local and regional firms and economies (Castells, 2000b:77,97,101).

While the global economy is linked together by markets for capital, goods and services, the global movement of labour is severely constrained (Castells, 2000b:102,106,131,250).

The global economy has a networked spatial form that does not cover the earth uniformly, as it connects to useful locations and regions and does not connect to “everything, and everyone, which does not have value, according to what is valued in the networks” (Castells, 2000b:134).

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2Castells (2000b:14-17) makes the distinction between “modes of development” and “modes of production.” This analysis is based on the “socially complex” production process, examining the ways in which the “product of the production process is socially used” in the forms of “consumption and surplus” (Castells, 2000b:15). Modes of development are “the technological arrangements through which labour works on matter to generate the product, ultimately determining the level and quality of surplus” (Castells, 2000b:16). Modes of production are the “rules” which determine “the appropriation, distribution, and uses of the surplus”; modes of production “define social relationships of production, determining the existence of social classes that become constituted as such classes through their historical practice” (Castells, 2000b:16).

Characterising modes of production by the “structural principle under which surplus is appropriated and controlled”, Castells (2000b:16) suggests that two major modes of production existed during the twentieth century, namely capitalism and statism.
3.1.2.3 Flexible enterprises

Businesses, in pursuit of the flexibility to adapt to continually changing environments, adopted network-like organisational forms, largely in the shape of transnational production networks linking up collections of firms, with coordination enabled by advanced information and communication technology (Castells, 2000b:177,180). Importantly, companies also adjusted their labour practices away from salaried, long-term employment in favour of short-term contract employment, again in pursuit of flexibility (Castells, 2000b:282). The “prevailing model for labor in the new, information-based economy is that of a core labor force... and a disposable labor force”, with firms obtaining flexibility in their treatment of the latter (Castells, 2000b:295, emphasis in original). Castells (2000b:216,251) claims that these new labour practices are “the main lever by which the informational paradigm and the process of globalization affect society at large” as state-bound workers increasingly feel the effects of global competition and economic conditions.

3.1.2.4 Increasing polarisation of labour

The intertwined processes through which firms adjust to the global economy of informational capitalism by pursuing adaptability through flexible labour practices and outsourcing and upgrading the technology of their production systems have consequences for the organisation of work, and “therefore employment and occupational structure” are being redefined (Castells, 2000b:255-267). Castells (2000b:266-267) observes that the effects of these changes are that while “a substantial number of jobs are being upgraded in skills”, “a large number of [low-skilled, repetitive] jobs are being phased out by automation in both manufacturing and services”, the net result of which is a “bifurcation of work patterns and polarization of labour”, with the workforce segregated by level of education into professional and multi-skilled clerical workers in one category and “low-skill, low-paid” labourers in the other. While informational capitalism does restructure the workforce, Castells (2000b:280) adds that “there is no systematic structural relationship between the diffusion of information technologies and the evolution of employment levels in the economy as a whole” (emphasis in original).

Castells (2000b:299), in identifying the consequences of the labour force adjustments, points to the American example of “income inequality and declining real wages” as especially significant since America represents the “flexible labor market model at which most European nations, and certainly European firms, are aiming.” However, the “new vulnerability of labor under conditions of unrestrained flexibility does not concern only the unskilled labor force” - professionals find that permanent employment is available for shorter periods than previously the case (Castells, 2000b:299).

3.1.2.5 The space of flows

Castells (2000b:442) introduces the concept of the “space of flows” as existing separately from ordinary, physical space, removing the necessity of physical contiguity for simultaneous social practices. The space of flows is the “material support” for the flows of capital, information, images, sounds, symbols and goods which are the “expression of processes dominating our economic, political, and
symbolic life” (Castells, 2000b:442). This space comprises three layers: the circuits of electronic exchanges and high-speed transportation through which goods and information move; the physical places (“nodes and hubs”) these circuits attach to; and the spatial organisation of the “dominant, managerial elites”³ (Castells, 2000b:442-445). A map of airline routes is an apt visual representation of one of the components of the first layer, with dense connections in the countries of North America, Europe and parts of Asia, and sparse connections in the rest of the world.

Castells (2000b:411) notes that while urban centers joined by the physical and conceptual links of the space of flows become increasingly interdependent, they become at the same time decoupled from their surrounding territories. Castells (2000b:446-448) identifies a “cosmopolitan” culture shared by the elites connected through the space of flows, with the “major trend of cultural distinctiveness of the elites” being the “unifying” of “the symbolic environment of the elite around the world”⁴ - the elite culture is increasingly separate from local cultures. There exists “an international culture whose identity is not linked to any specific society but to membership of the managerial circles of the informational economy across a global cultural spectrum”⁵ (Castells, 2000b:447).

3.2 Identity, nations and nationalism

The second volume of The Information Age (Castells, 1997) is dedicated to discussion of (group) identity and its various interactions with the pressures of an increasingly interlinked world described in the first volume.

3.2.1 The construction of identity

Identity, in Castells’ formulation (1997:6), is what people use to ascribe meaning - symbolic significance - to their actions and experiences; more specifically, shared or group identity is the “process of construction of meaning” using cultural materials and this identity becomes important when it is “given priority over other sources of meaning”⁶. A particular individual may well have several identities, with one being primary (Castells, 1997:6). Identity is then, in this formulation, a constructed phenomenon, built with cultural artefacts from history, geography, biology, religion, etc. Further, a constructed identity implies a constructor, a social agent, which selects and arranges the content of the identity to suit its own purposes (Castells, 1997:7).

³Stalder (1998) formulates the three layers as technology, places, people.
⁴The cosmopolitan elites communicate easily with each other, a situation strongly reminiscent of Deutsch’s (1953:60-79) idea of “social communication”, which he applied to nationalism - nationalities consist of groups of people who communicate easily and effectively with one another and far less easily with other groups and who are joined together by strong economic links.
⁵Micklethwait and Wooldridge (2000) coined the term “cosmocrats” to describe this international elite.
⁶Tomlinson (2003:271) points out that anthropologists and media and cultural critics have recently suggested that the conception of identity-formation as “a universal feature of human experience” is in fact an ethnocentric assumption; rather, the adoption of specific, individual and collective identities is only necessary for those operating in societies structured by modern institutions - identity is “a specifically modern cultural imagination.”
Castells (1997:8-10) distinguishes three categories of collective identity according to their relationship to dominant social relations and institutions. First, “legitimising identity” is propagated by dominant social institutions and justifies their domination; legitimising identity “generates a civil society”\(^7\). Second, “resistance identity” is propagated by groups that are excluded by the dominant groups in a society; resistance identity forms “communities”\(^8\). Third, “project identity” is formed when social actors attempt the transformation of their society; project identity forms “subjects”, collective social actors\(^9\).

Castells does not make the point himself, but implicit in his argument about the waning relevance of legitimising identity - identity that supports the legitimacy of the state - is that the mystique the nation-state assumed as a result of widely-held legitimising identities has vanished. The state is left as a provider of services and transfer payments - Castells (1997:252-254) alludes to this trend in his claim that transfer payments (i.e. the welfare state) are now the main source of state legitimacy in modern (major) countries. Starkly put, the state has little symbolic importance for its citizens, who draw their meaning from other identities (see Section 2.3).

Castells (1997:11) holds that the network society makes it difficult for most individuals and groups (excluding the dominant elites) to build coherent identities because of the “systemic disjunction between the local and global.” This separation between power - which increasingly lies in global networks - and local association and representation causes civil societies to contract, thereby encouraging people to form defensive communities around resistance identities\(^10\) - resistance identities are thus the dialectic consequence of integrated global flows\(^11\) (Castells, 1997:11).

### 3.2.2 The making of nations

Nations are “cultural communes constructed in people’s minds and collective memory by the sharing of history and political projects” (Castells, 1997:51). They exist independently of statehood - nationality is distinct from citizenship (Castells, 1997:51).

Granted that nations are constructed, the important questions are who makes them and from what materials? Castells (1997:31-32) cites De Ventos’ theory which explains the production of national

\(^7\)Castells (1997:8-9), following Gramsci, proposes that civil society consists of “‘apparatuses,’ such as the Church(es), unions, parties, cooperatives, civic associations and so on, which, on the one hand, prolong the dynamics of the state, but, on the other hand, are deeply rooted among people.” This conception of civil society is by no means canonical - Habib (2003:228), writing about civil society in South Africa, defines civil society as “the organised expression of various interests and values operating in the triangular space between the family, state, and the market”, a definition which allows for collaborative and antagonistic relations between civil society and the state.

\(^8\)For Castells (1997:9), these communities are “forms of collective resistance against otherwise unbearable oppression”, usually formed “on the basis of identities that were, apparently, clearly defined by history, geography, or biology, making it easier to essentialize the boundaries of resistance.”

\(^9\)Castells (1997:10) suggests that movements such as those attempting to remove patriarchal domination or the religious conversion of entire societies are examples of project identities; Stalter (1998) suggests feminism and environmentalism.

\(^10\)Peter Alexander (2006:63) argues in this regard that Castells “surely overstates his case... There is a real sense in which a global recognition of place is emerging, and that sense is at least as strong in South Africa as South Carolina.”

\(^11\)Tomlinson (2003:271) specifically takes issue with Castells’ characterisation of globalisation and identity as opposing forces, suggesting that Castells has missed the link between “globalization and the institutionalized construction of identities”: “globalization is really the globalization of modernity, and modernity is the harbinger of identity.”
identity through the interaction between four sets of factors: primary factors, including ethnicity, territory, language and religion; generative factors, including communications and technology, cities, armies and monarchies; induced factors, such as the codification of languages, the emergence of bureaucracies and standardised national education; and reactive factors, in particular, the defence of oppressed identities. In Castells' view (1997:29,52), common ethnicity, religion or language alone are not sufficient raw materials from which to build a nation. The crucial, binding, elements, both of which are necessary, are shared experience and language12 (Castells, 1997:29,52). A common language is especially important for nations without states - Castells (1997:52) hypothesises that language provides the means for people to recognise each other as belonging to the same nation and, through its function as the medium of cultural expression, demarcates resistance against the threat of cultural homogenisation.

Of particular interest to the South African situation is Castells' (1997:53-59) assertion that race is now not viable as a primary cultural building block for shared identity; his claim is based on the splitting up of African-Americans into differing social classes, as evident in the last three decades. Castells argues that “Race matters, but it hardly constructs meaning any longer" - racial identity in the network society is subsumed “under broader principles of cultural self-definition, such as religion, nation or gender.”

Castells (1997:29) suggests that nations are given life through “cultural constructs and political projects.” Yet, governments alone cannot create a nation13 - Castells (1997:39) gives the example of the USSR14, where “one of the most powerful states in the history of humankind was not able, after 74 years, to create a new national identity15.” The state, however, can play an important role in creating and reinforcing national identity, in particular by funding cultural activities that promote the nation - Castells (1997:48) cites the example of the Catalan state government paying for language tuition to integrate non-Catalans culturally. Castells (1997:30-31) allows that both cultural elites and the masses participate in constructing nations, rather than the creation of a nation being solely a project of self-serving elites16 - “in fact, nationalism nowadays is more often than not a reaction against the global elites.” As for the nation-state itself, Castells (1997:270) argues that this was, in the “Modern Age”, a creation

12 Pointing to Benedict Anderson’s (1983:123-126) arguments - specifically his suggestion of Switzerland of an instance of a nation without “linguistic uniformity” - Alexander (2002:86-88) specifically rejects this assertion by Castells, because, “in the post-colonial African context, the state, generally speaking, creates the conditions in which meaning (identity, and also identities) is created ... the crucial issue is the capacity of the citizens to communicate with one another effortlessly, regardless of the language in which they do so.”

In simple terms, Castells argues for a common language as a means of recognition, while Alexander claims that communication is enough.

13 Alexander (2002:88) again differs from Castells here: “in the post-war African context, the word ‘nation’ is, and should continue to be, used in order to denote the population that resides within a given independent state... in the post-colonial African context, the state, generally speaking, creates the conditions in which meaning (identity, and also identities) is created.”

14 Anthony D. Smith (1991:148-149) makes the same point, “ethnic ties and nationalist aspirations have proved more durable than Marxist ideologies and parties.”

15 Alexander (2000:21) considers use of the instance of the USSR as an over-generalisation.

16 This stands in contrast with the position of other theorists of nationalism, like Anthony D. Smith, Ernest Gellner, Nairn and Breuilly who emphasise the role of intellectual elites in fomenting national feeling.
of the state and not the nation.

3.2.3 Nations and nationalism in the network society

Paradoxically, the increased economic and cultural integration of the late twentieth century has resulted in rising, rather than falling, national sentiment throughout the world (Castells, 1997:27). Castells (1997:31) argues that contemporary nationalism is usually a form of collective resistance mobilised by the fear of cultural or economic subjugation, this resistance tending to take cultural rather than political forms. Indeed, Castells (1997:30,51) notes the development of nations that do not necessarily pursue full-blown statehood but which extract some measure of sovereignty from their parent state instead. Consequently, pluri-national states that attempt to maintain full sovereignty or to deny their several national components face disintegration (Castells, 1997:51).

3.2.4 Territorial identities

Castells (1997:60) proposes that “urban movements” pursue three kinds of goals, combined in particular movements to varying degrees: “urban demands on living conditions and collective consumption”, “the affirmation of local cultural identity”, and “the conquest of local political autonomy and citizen participation.” Castells (1997:61) argues that, despite the “usually brief” lifespan of these movements, they become significant - they create meaning - “not only for the movement’s participants, but for the community at large”, as the movement becomes embedded in the “collective memory of the locality.” But the identities formed by such collective action are “in most cases... defensive reactions against the impositions of global disorder and uncontrollable, fast-paced change” (Castells, 1997:64). These identities are, in other words, resistance identities (Castells, 1997:66).

3.2.5 Social movements

Observing that “people all over the world resent loss of control over their lives, over their environment, over their jobs, over their economies, over their governments, over their countries, and, ultimately, over the fate of the Earth”, Castells (1997:68-69) places the primary locus of reaction against “domination” as residing in “social movements”, “defensive movements built around the trenches of specific identities.” For Castells (1997:72,105), these social movements, each crystallised around “a specific principle of identity”, are the way in which “historically specific societies take their revenge against their domination by global flows.” As such, they are “primarily identity-based mobilizations in reaction to a clearly identified adversary. They are reactive, and defensive, rather than purveyors of a societal project” (Castells, 1997:106). Social movements achieve much of their impact by exploiting the media and “their effective use of information technology” (Castells, 1997:106-107).
3.3 Declining state power in the network society

Castells (1997:305) observes that, despite the differences between the institutional, pluralist and instrumentalist theories of the state, these theories all agree that the state is “the expression of social actors pursuing their interests and achieving domination.” States frequently maintain legitimacy by “the territorial differentiation of state institutions”; the associated articulation of power structures into various levels which are able to represent the interests of subordinate “social groups” produces a “complex geometry... in the relationship between the state, social classes, social groups, and identities present in civil society” (Castells, 1997:270-271). In this way the state is able to bear the burden of representing competing interests while retaining legitimacy.

The general pattern emerging from Castells’ analysis is that individual states are losing their capacity to make decisions and implement them. Power, formerly vested in nation-states, now diffuses to global networks of capital, production, crime, supra-national institutions, non-governmental organisations, religions and public opinion movements and, within states, to communities, tribes and gangs organised around common identities.

Growing globalisation of criminal activity subverts state authority and reduces governments’ capacity to maintain law and order within their territories, and, in extreme cases, penetrates government itself, compromising the functioning of the state (Castells, 1997:259).

National governments also find their monopoly on policy-making contracting under pressure from international and local social forces. Expanding global linkages, particularly economic, mean that individual states find themselves increasingly interdependent, with the scope for setting policy limited accordingly (Castells, 1997:262). In this context, the supra-national institutions of “global governance” become forums for negotiating economic, security, development and environmental decisions - nation-states trade sovereignty in exchange for continued existence (Castells, 1997:267-268). Further, public opinion, expressed and mobilised through international single-issue movements, confronts the global problems that states are ineffective in resolving (Castells, 1997:268).

The loss of government influence over national economic policy is particularly acute. First, the mechanism of floating exchange rates forces states to coordinate their monetary policy to maintain exchange rate stability, removing control of a fundamental element of economic policy from state hands (Castells, 1997:245). Second, the increasingly transnational character of production means that governments are less able to keep productive, revenue-generating activity within their own territories, leading to a fiscal crisis for individual states. This results from the “increasing contradiction between the internationalization of investment, production, and consumption, on the one hand, and the national basis of taxation systems, on the other” (Castells, 1997:246). In particular, the fiscal crisis of

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17Stephen Gelb contest Castells on this point, maintaining that states still have “infrastructural power” and retain the ability to lead the “productive classes” (Kraak, 2000). However, Joel Netshitenzhe has suggested that “South Africa’s re-entry into the global economy has also weakened the new state primarily because of the power of financial markets” (Kraak, 2000). Castells himself admits that the state still has important functions, such as providing education (Kraak, 2000).

18Bauman (1998:57-58) trenchantly describes the “withering away” of state authority: “no one seems now to be in control” (emphasis in original).
the advanced economies and the associated increase in government debt leaves these governments increasingly reliant on global capital markets (Castells, 1997:247).

The ability of governments of the industrialised countries to provide the benefits of a welfare state to their citizens, in Castells’ (1997:252-253) estimation “probably the main building block” of state legitimacy in these countries, is undermined by the same tendency to international migration of capital and production. Again, firms experience large differences in costs associated with social benefits and small differences in labour productivity and production quality as contradictory, producing a “downward spiral of social costs competition” (Castells, 1997:253).

State power is also squeezed from within. The modern nation-states comprising the set of developed countries are founded on a traditional identity, constructed to suit the interests of the dominant groups at the origin of the state and established over time as shared history induced social and cultural bonds within a particular nation (Castells, 1997:270). Yet, states contain multiple territories and identities and these are unevenly represented in governing institutions and so these marginalised, “territorially differentiated”, identities are increasingly claiming power from their respective national governments (1997:270). The network society sees an “increasing diversification” and “plurality of identities” making demands on nation-states, potentially leading to national governments losing legitimacy in the eyes of some of their citizens (Castells, 1997:271). States respond to these demands by devolving power to local and regional political structures, thus witnessing an erosion of their sovereignty from below. But ceding power downwards may not be enough; since only selected identities can be institutionalised in a given state, not all the identities contained within a particular national territory can necessarily be accommodated in government structures (Castells, 1997:270-276).

The simultaneous wearing away of state sovereignty is best summarised by Castells (1997:308) himself:

‘Thus, the more states emphasize communalism, the less effective they become as co-agents of a global system of shared power. The more they triumph on the planetary scene, the less they represent their national constituencies. End of millenium politics, almost everywhere in the world, is dominated by this fundamental contradiction.’

3.4 Post-colonial Africa

3.4.1 Selective integration in the global economy

Castells (2000a:90-91) points out that, while most of Africa is marginalised and ignored by the world economy\textsuperscript{19}, minerals and oil are still extracted and exported, with local elites consuming expensive imported goods - Africa's inclusion in the world economy is "fragmented" (Castells, 2000a:91).

### 3.4.2 Predatory states

Castells (2000a:95-105) points to the destructive influence of "predatory" states "on their economies and societies", attributed to the abuse of power for personal benefit by elites and the "individualization of ruling classes", whereby dictatorial leaders captured state power. In these situations, "access to state power is equivalent to accessing wealth" (Castells, 2000a:98).

### 3.4.3 Ethnic identity and nationalism

Turning to ethnicity, Castells (2000a:105-110) observes that "the ethnic differences that are at the forefront of Africa's political scene today are politically constructed, rather than culturally rooted" - ethnic groups were classified by European colonialists according to their view of African tribal society and to make the administration of their territories more amenable\textsuperscript{20}. Castells (2000a:106) cites Mamdani's concept of the "bifurcated state" in which Europeans controlled the state as a legal entity, while co-opting traditional leaders for administrative purposes, thus dividing the indigenous population into formal ethnic groups.

On attaining independence, "Africa's nationalist elites simply occupied the same structures of the legal/modern state which, therefore, were de-racialized. Yet, they kept in place the fragmented, ethnicized customary state" (Castells, 2000a:107). When competition arose for scarce resources, ethnicity determined access to resources controlled by the state - "it was the state, and its elites, that shaped and reshaped ethnic identity and allegiance, not the other way around" (Castells, 2000a:110).

In contrast to the success of the Asian developmental states, and despite the crucial role of nationalist movements in achieving independence, newly sovereign African states failed to transcend ethnic divisions to create actual nations, due to "the weakness of the nation in the African nation-state" (Castells, 2000a:110). This weakness was in several ways inherited from colonialism: nationalist sentiment was largely confined to the "educated elite" and the "small urban business class", and the various ethnic groups within arbitrarily-drawn state borders fought with each other (Castells, 2000a:111). The new African nation-states had shallow social foundations:

"The lack of a national basis for these new African nation-states, a basis that in other latitudes was usually made up of shared geography, history and culture... is a fundamental

\textsuperscript{19} Soludo (2001:55-58) takes exception to Castells' pessimistic outlook for Africa's future, noting that Castells assumes matters will remain the same, "Castells ignores the current momentum for reforms - political and economic - taking place in the region"; further, "while the phenomenon of globalisation is inevitable, perhaps unstoppable, its form and character are subject to change... the form can be tamed by 'purposive human action'."

\textsuperscript{20} Castells (2000a:107-109) gives the case of Rwanda, in which first the German and then Belgian colonial administrations formalised the previously vague distinction between Hutas and Tsutsis and institutionalised political "cleavages", with tragic consequences at the end of the twentieth century.
difference between Africa and the Asian Pacific, with the exception of Indonesia, in the
differential fate of their developmental processes... The crucial difference was the ability
of Asian Pacific countries to mobilize their nations, under authoritarian rule, around a de­
velopmental goal, on the basis of strong national/cultural identity” (Castells, 2000a:111).

Castells (2000a:112-114) also ascribes Africa’s present state to the interplay between economic fail­
ure and ethnic political rivalries. The cohort of states granted independence in the 1960s found them­selves already in poor economic shape as a result of their economic development being retarded under colonial rule, and the policies of preference for agricultural exports and industrial autarchy only man­aged to achieve the destruction of the livelihoods of local peasants. The 1970s, marked by “world capitalism’s crisis and restructuring” saw little progress in Africa, where economies were hampered by “technological backwardness”, inefficiency and worsening terms of trade, so that African states had to turn to foreign lenders for survival by the end of the decade (Castells, 2000a:112-113). The debt thus incurred, and structural adjustment programs undertaken in order to obtain new loans, led to widespread political and economic collapse during the 1980s. By the 1990s, most of Africa was, economically speaking, irrelevant to the rest of the world, with the exception of the natural resources sector. The major consequences of this economic disaster were: the adjustment of states to “the political economy of begging”, the flourishing of “large-scale illicit trade”, and the entrenchment of ethnicity as the factor determining access to state resources, in turn triggering inter-ethnic strug­gles (Castells, 2000a:113-114). “In the end, by the mid-1990s, not only was Africa increasingly marginalized from the global/informational economy, but in much of the continent nation-states were disintegrating” (Castells, 2000a:114).

3.5 South Africa

Importantly, South Africa is a “state without a nation” - as distinct from a state containing many nations - in Castells’ schema (1997:51).

For Castells (2000a:121), “South Africa is clearly different from the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa.” The country is more industrialised, its economy is more diverse, and its economy - while neither a “low­wage dependent” nor a “high-skilled, competitive emerging” one - is more tightly, and increasingly, linked into the world economy.

South Africa has high unemployment, “extremely unequal income distribution” - divided largely along racial lines - and poverty is correspondingly prevalent, with poverty especially concentrated in the African and coloured population(Castells, 2000a:123-124).

South Africa serves in the world economy as a nodal point for the “entire Southern Africa region”, and most of the region’s states are economically dependent on South Africa (Castells, 2000a:125).

Castells’ (2000a:126) outlook for South Africa takes notice of the obvious challenges: its social and economic problems compel it to focus on the needs of its own population, thereby possibly reducing employment opportunities for economic migrants from neighbouring countries; while opening its
economy to the world, South Africa faces "harsh competition" which threatens to destroy much of the country's industry. Castells' suggests that it is "utterly unrealistic" to expect South Africa, through its integration with the world economy, to fertilise development in the rest of the region.

"If the political fate of South Africa is indeed linked to its African identity, its developmental path continues to diverge from its ravaged neighbours - unless the end of the gold rush, a lagging technological capability, and increasing social and ethnic tensions push South Africa toward the abyss of social exclusion from which the African National Congress fought so bravely to escape" (Castells, 2000a:126).

3.6 Summary

The first volume of Castells' *The Information Age* describes the manifestation of a social pattern that he calls the network society, a process beginning in the mid-1970s and most evident in the developed societies. The emergence of this pattern was facilitated by the interaction between advances in information processing and communication technologies and the pursuit by businesses of competitiveness through flexibility, growth through expansion into international markets and profitability through the siting of production in cheaper locales. The concomitant legislative changes promoted deregulation, trade liberalisation and privatisation. The network society pattern applies to countries across the planet.

The key features of the network society are: informational, as opposed to industrial, capitalism; an integrated global economy; flexible enterprises, especially in the form of transnational production networks; an increasing polarisation of the workforce between the highly-skilled and the less-skilled; and what Castells terms the "space of flows", the technology, places and people constituting the global circuits through which goods, capital and information move - the elites in each country, joined through the space of flows, form a unified world-wide culture.

Identity is the source of symbolic significance for social action. Collective identities are social constructs, built from cultural artefacts. Castells names three categories of identity: legitimising identity, which generates civil societies; resistance identity, which generates communities of solidarity; and project identity, which generates "subjects" aiming to fundamentally transform society. The network society leads to the increasing separation between territorially-bound political representation and the global networks of capital and production, such that the latter's power expands at the expense of the former. This development reduces the importance of legitimising identity, causing the decline of civil societies.

Nations are "cultural communes constructed in people's minds", bound together primarily by shared experience and a common language. Nationality and citizenship are distinct concepts - the nation is not the state. Race alone is not a viable element for forming a nation. While governments cannot create nations by edict, the state can play a significant role in creating and reinforcing national identity.
The paradoxical resurgence of nationalism in the late twentieth century is explained by these instances of nationalism being expressions of cultural and economic defensiveness in the face of global integration - they are dialectical reactions against the globalisation advocated by elites.

Territorial identities are defensive urban movements, that usually have short lifespans but remain significant through preservation in the "collective memory of the locality." On a larger scale, social movements are, in each case, reactions against the loss of localised power; these movements are organised around specific identities.

State power is in decline, as governments cede some authority to supra-national governance mechanisms, find their scope for policy-making limited by economic interdependence, have increasingly weak positions in relation to transnational production networks, are less able to afford comprehensive welfare states (for Castells, the primary component of political legitimacy) and are forced to yield increasing autonomy to local government levels in the face of demands from regional identities.

Turning to Africa, Castells notes the selective integration of the continent into the world economy, with vast areas being disconnected. While ethnic groupings were politically constructed during the colonial era, ethnicity has come to determine access to state resources following decolonisation. The new, post-colonial states had no national basis, containing as they did multiple ethnic groups, a situation that allowed the easy exploitation of ethnic rivalries.

With regards to South Africa, Castells claims that the country is not a nation. It is, however, different from the rest of Africa, being more industrialised and more tightly linked into the world economy - South Africa is the nodal point for the rest of Africa in the schema of the space of flows. The primary danger facing the country is the potential for the political exploitation of ethnic divisions, an occurrence which would see it emulate much of the rest of the continent.
Chapter 4

"The national question": ANC policy on fostering nationalism in South Africa

This chapter presents a synopsis of African National Congress policy on promoting nationalism in post-apartheid South Africa. The chapter aims to identify the various elements of the ANC programme for creating a united nation in South Africa by distilling documentation published by the ANC and the ANC-controlled post-apartheid government1, many of the elements occurring repeatedly in documents spanning more than a decade.

Sources

The policies summarised below were extracted from ANC documents published since 1990 and from post-apartheid South African government policy documents. The ANC's policies on nation-building have remained remarkably consistent in this period, although this may also be a result of the policies themselves being expressed only vaguely - the ANC's recipe for South African nationalism is rather bland and occasionally contradictory (see Section 4.4). However, the rhetorical tone has shifted between the Mandela and Mbeki presidencies, with the former (1996; 1997; 1998; 1999) emphasising reconciliation and a "New Patriotism" and the latter asserting Africanism (Alexander, 2002:41,141; Butler, 2004:32; Habib et al., 2003:3-5), although Mbeki's flavour of Africanism tends to be inclusive rather than racially defined (Ryklief, 2002:114), as epitomised in his (1996) famous "I am an African" speech2.

1This chapter involves analysing documents from both the ANC and the ANC-led government of the Republic of South Africa, which raises the question, particularly in regard to legislation regulating immigration, of whether government policies may be attributed to the ANC. The ANC itself declares that it is necessary for "the ANC to provide political direction to the institutions of governance... there is only one ANC irrespective of areas of operation" (ANC, 1997c). However, the ANC also noted in 1997 that the "point of gravity as regards policy development appears to have shifted to government and away from ANC constitutional structures" (ANC, 1997c), an assertion reinforced by the extraordinary accusations by Cosatu that the Mbeki presidency was becoming dictatorial (See Appendix A).

2The annual Nelson Mandela Memorial Lecture that President Mbeki (2006a) delivered in July 2006 might be a telling indicator of Mbeki's intellectual reference points: while he starts off by mentioning "ubuntu", he then quotes from or mentions the Bible (he quotes from the Book of Proverbs several times), Shakespeare, Goethe, Adam Smith, R.H. Tawney, Karl Polanyi, Joseph Stiglitz, George Soros, Friederich Engels, Karl Marx, Charles Darwin, Vladimir Lenin,
Constraints on ANC policy since assuming power

ANC policy is constrained by its membership of the Tripartite Alliance with the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu) and the South African Communist Party (SACP) - although the latter two complain of lack of influence - and by its largely African\(^3\) and poor electoral base, bearing in mind that several commentators have pointed out that the ANC appears to act in the interests of the new African capitalists.

ANC policy is also dictated by the particular South African political-economic situation in which most of the land, skills and wealth are owned by white citizens, by the history of South African economic development in which minerals extraction was long dominant, by commitments made during the negotiations of the early 1990s leading up to the 1994 elections and, the next chapter will argue, by international forces (Gelb, 2005:368; Koelble, 2003:152; Southall, 2003:55).

The ANC also has a notable legacy of support for the principle of non-racialism, as set out in the 1955 Freedom Charter,\(^4\) which is still a touchstone\(^5\) for the ANC. In government, the ANC is also bound by the 1996 Constitution which emphasises human rights.

The “national question” within the ANC

The ANC discusses the topic of nationhood and national identity in South Africa under the rubric of “the national question.” One measure of the importance that the ANC itself places on the national question is that the matter was chosen as one of the four themes for the ANC’s National General Council in 2005 - the associated discussion document (ANC, 2005d) highlights the national question as something less than “the central political question of our time” - it is a question that dare not be ignored. Indeed, the national question as a theme - “an area of intense debate within the ranks of the ANC” (ANC, 1997b) - runs consistently through many of the ANC documents published since 1990\(^6\) (nation-building was one of the six “basic principles” of the Reconstruction and Development

Rene Descartes (in Latin and French) and William Butler Yeats, all in support of his prayer that “the new South Africa that is being born will be a good, a moral, a humane and a caring South Africa which as it matures will progressively guarantee the happiness of all its citizens.”

\(^3\)Despite the abolition of apartheid, the topic of race is unavoidable in discussing South African society. The ANC recognises the racial categories of whites and blacks, with the blacks comprising Africans, coloureds and Indians (see Section 4.2.1). The aggregation of the latter three races as black is an historical residue of the theory of “Colonialism of a Special Type” (see Appendix A), which divided South Africa into the white oppressors and the black oppressed. The terms favoured by the ANC will be used in this thesis, with “black” referring to African, Indian and coloured people.

“...The Freedom Charter was drawn up in 1955 by the Congress of the People and adopted by the ANC the following year (Suttner, 2005). The Freedom Charter’s guarantee of equal status for all racial groups led the Africanist wing of the ANC to split off in 1959, forming the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), claiming “white communists had manipulated the Congress of the People behind the scenes” (Sparks, 2003:353; Butler, 2004:108); “Africanists forces” claimed that the Charter “ignored the superior claim of indigenous Africans to the country” (Burnham, 2005:13).

\(^5\)Nelson Mandela, just before release from imprisonment, insisted that the Freedom Charter demands for nationalisation were “the policy of the ANC”, although this policy was soon reversed (Bond, 2005:15). In 2001, the ANC’s (2001a) online journal ANC Today noted that the Freedom Charter “remains the basic guiding document of the liberation movement in South Africa.” The ANC (2005e, cited in Hemson and O’Donovan, 2006:11) was still affirming the Freedom Charter in 2005: “We must base our vision, programmes and actions on that historic manifesto of the people of South Africa, the Freedom Charter.”

\(^6\)For Filatova, (1997:47) the ANC’s nation-building doctrine, as set out in Nation-Formation and Nation Building, “lays an ideological foundation for the policy of the party in every possible sphere from economy to education and defines
Programme (RDP) (ANC, 1994)), as well as featuring prominently and regularly in speeches by senior ANC politicians. The Policy Co-ordination and Advisory Services organ of the Presidency released a major analysis of progress towards a South African nation, entitled *A Nation in the Making* in mid-2006.

4.1 The ANC on the origin and nature of nations

4.1.1 What constitutes a nation?

The ANC does not clearly articulate a detailed theory of nationhood. This naturally has some advantages - leaving the term slightly fuzzy avoids contention over precise definitions while allowing agreement between parties who would find themselves disagreeing if they discussed the topic in detail. This proteanism also allows flexibility in rhetorical use of the term “nation” - nationhood can be conferred on one group or denied to another as deemed politically expedient, even if such usage is theoretically incoherent. In other words, an exact definition of nationhood would limit ANC policy and rhetoric while increasing the possibility of dissent among its constituent elements. Despite the lack of such clarity, this section teases out from ANC documents the characteristics the organisation attributes to nations.

4.1.1.1 A nation is a political entity

As Bornman (2006:388) puts it, “it is not clear what the new South African government understands under the concept ‘nation’ in its emphasis on nation-building”; the “concept of ‘nation’ and its derivatives have never had a straightforward use by the opponents of apartheid” (Nolutshungu, 1993:608). The clearest definition of what nationalism means to the ANC is that the “national question” is essentially a “continuous search for equality by various communities which have historically merged into a single nation-state” (ANC, 1997b). The term “communities” is not defined. Taken to its extreme, the national question becomes the “struggle for self-determination and even secession by communities within such states” (ANC, 1997b). The ANC does not provide a coherent explanation of the difference between “community” and “nation”; the reader is left to presume that “nation” simply corresponds to the state - the difference being one of political status. This implies that a community can become a nation simply by attaining statehood, i.e. by a political change. For the ANC, then, nations seem to be primarily political rather than cultural entities.

In contrast with the divide-and-rule tactics of the apartheid government, African unity has been the policy of the ANC since inception in 1912 (see Appendix A), so the movement consistently rejects the possibility that the tribal groups of South Africa are nations and also rejects the possibility of Afrikaner secession into a *volksstaat* (1997b; 2005d). No explanation of why these groups are denied its attitude towards the role and place of individuals and groups (both cultural and social) in the present and future South Africa.” For Vale (2003:33), the “course of national re/discovery - including the search for a ‘national interest’ to support the trope of a ‘rainbow nation’ - has been pivotal in determining policy (and its outcomes) in post-apartheid South Africa.”
the potential for nationhood is given, although defining them as not being national groups has obvious political advantages.

4.1.1.2 Unity and equality

The ANC maintains that nations need certain shared elements to exist. A nation must have citizens with equal rights, a common territory, a common economy, a “sense of community”, patriotic feeling, “loyalty to the constitution and the democratic state” and a common culture (ANC, 2005d).

Despite having many common elements, nations are not classless societies - the ANC (1997b) explicitly states that nations contain several classes.

4.1.1.3 Shared identity

The ANC (1997b; 1997c; 1997d) places special emphasis on the significance of group identity in nation building - while allowing for multiple identities, a national identity should be nothing less than the primary identity for citizens.

The importance of identity leads the ANC (2005d) to stress again that “tribalism, racialism or any other form of ethnic chauvinism” is contrary to the national interest. The ANC (1997b; 2005d) consistently calls for a common South African identity, going so far as to describe the popular image of the “rainbow nation” as “nebulous” because it implies division.

The stress on identity also leads to the importance assigned to national feeling as a “social psychological”, “superstructural” matter, finding expression through language, culture and religion. The ANC (1997b) suggests that these factors can be used as tools to promote nation formation.

4.1.2 Nations are socially constructed

The ANC (1997b; 2005d) holds that nations, rather than being natural phenomena, are socially constructed entities, being contingent on “politics, history, and social and economic processes”, with the “process of nation formation” being an “historical evolution”, and, as such, nations are continually in flux, as opposed to being “static and unchanging.” The ANC’s position, in its emphasis on the leading role of the state in fostering nationalism, makes it clear that the social construction the ANC has in mind is an active construction, pursued by social agents, rather than merely being the result of social structures and abstract forces, although the latter are also involved in the sense that they limit the possible avenues for intentional action.

7 Section 4.2.1 briefly recounts historical theories of nationhood within the ANC, noting the influence of the theory of “Colonialism of a Special Type” (see Appendix A) which held that the black people constitute one nation. Afrikaner nationalism had collapsed even before the end of apartheid (O’Meara, 1997).
4.2 The new South African "nation in the making"

The previous section presented a distillation of the ANC's conception of what constitutes a nation and how nations come into being. This section puts forward the notion that the ANC intends the creation of a South African nation and presents the characteristics of this "nation in the making."

4.2.1 South Africa: a country divided into "two nations"

The liberation movement has long debated the national question in South Africa (Nolutshungu, 1993:607) (the apartheid government's stand was that the country contained about ten nations or quasi-nations, a view which was used to justify the Bantustan policy (Alexander, 2002:35)). The ANC Youth League, in its 1948 manifesto, proposed that "South Africa is a country of four chief nationalities, three of which (the European, Indian and Coloureds) are minorities, and three of which (the Africans, Coloureds and Indians) suffer national oppression" (quoted in Alexander, 2002:36). The Freedom Charter, adopted as ANC policy in 1956, also distinguished between the various national groups in South Africa. Proponents of the thesis of "Colonialism of a Special Type" (see Appendix A) divided South Africa into two nations, the (colonised) black nation comprising the Africans, coloureds and Indians, and the (colonialist) white nation (Alexander, 2002:37). "For most of the 40 years from 1960 to 2000, what we call 'African nationalism' in South Africa - including the short period at the beginning of the 1980s when the black nationalism of the BCM [black consciousness movement] became dominant - was projected as being in conflict with racist Afrikaner nationalism" (Alexander, 2002:41). The stated policy of the ANC, however, is non-racialism.

The ANC does not consider contemporary South African society as constituting a single nation - rather, the divisions of the apartheid era, an era defined as Colonialism of a Special Type, are readily discernible. Then deputy-president, Thabo Mbeki, (1998) described South Africa in 1998 as a "country of two nations", one "white, relatively prosperous" with "ready access to a developed economic, physical, educational, communication and other infrastructure" and the other, "second and larger" nation being "black and poor, with the worst affected being women in the rural areas [and] the black rural population in general" and having a "grossly underdeveloped" infrastructure and having little ability to "exercise what in reality amounts to a theoretical right to equal opportunity"; he claimed that these nations were failing to become one nation. The ANC's National General Council observed the "current reality of 'Two Nations' in one country" in 2000 (ANC, 2000). In November 2003, President Mbeki (2003a) proposed that South Africa had, in effect, a "first economy" and a "second economy" existing in parallel, a theme repeated in subsequent 'State of the Nation' speeches (Mbeki, 2003).

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8 Adam (1995:460) notes that "compared with the global renaissance of ethnicity and nationalism, the new official emphasis on inclusiveness, reconciliation and even colour-blindness contradicts trends elsewhere."

9 Black South Africans were "the last colonized people on the African continent" (ANC, 2002c).

10 The idea of "two nations" in one country is not new: Disraeli used the phrase "two nations" to describe England in the nineteenth century and the 1968 Kerner Report on race riots in the USA described the United States as becoming "two societies, one black, one white, separate and unequal" (Watson, 2001:386,525); the American academic Andrew Hacker took the phrase as the title of his 1992 book about race relations in the USA, Two Nations: Black and White, Separate, Hostile, Unequal.
2004a,b, 2005a, 2006b) and taken up in a 2005 ANC (2005d) discussion document on the national question which described South Africa as “a country characterised by two economies” and which reiterated the motif of division by claiming that the “majority of whites and the majority of blacks live in two different worlds” and which bemoaned the absence of a “sense of common patriotism.” To put it simply, ANC rhetoric emphasises the divisions in South African society, which is construed as consisting of a collection of cultures or communities (Alexander, 2002:81-82).

4.2.2 The National Democratic Revolution addresses the national question

The ANC (1997d) regularly proclaims the necessity of creating a new and united nation in South Africa. The primary aim of the ANC’s (1997b; 2005d) nation-building project is amelioration of the material conditions of the black citizens who suffered “national oppression” under apartheid. The ANC (1997c) considers the national question in South Africa as being a “complex of socio-economic and political power relations” related to “material inequalities” in South African society. ANC (1997b) policy in this regard is founded on the theory of the “National Democratic Revolution” (see Appendix A), a “revolution” which is in itself “an act of addressing the national question.” The ANC’s (2002e) 2002 National Conference in Stellenbosch noted that the “challenge of nation building remains the primary task of the ANC for the full realisation of the NDR.”

4.2.3 ANC objectives for the South African nation

The ANC (1997b; 1997d; 2000; 2002d; 2005d) consistently asserts that its objectives are the creation of a South African society that is “united, non-racial, non-sexist and democratic” - the special attention paid to improving the economic situation of black citizens is an attempt to redress inequalities imposed by apartheid.

11 This claim was made in a discussion document for the ANC’s 2005 National General Council. The Council resolved that there was in fact only one economy, although it could be viewed as consisting of two economies, and that interventions should address the economy “as a whole” (ANC, 2005a).

Devey et al. (2006:224) observe that “Arguments about dualism and the relationship between the mainstream of the economy and the periphery have characterised much of South African historiography.” They (2006:226) argue that “contrary to the views of the President and the ANC, there are in fact fairly close linkages between the formal economy and the informal economy.” Similarly, Webster (2005:66) notes that “the informal economy is largely dependent on the formal economy.”

12 This emphasis on improving the material lot of the poor is resonant of the findings in Afrobarometer surveys that “for Africans democracy is intrinsically linked to delivery... Africans are predisposed to judge the performance of democracy primarily in terms of its record in delivering improvements in the socioeconomic sphere” (February, 2005:56).

13 It should be noted that the ANC (1997b) proclaims that the National Democratic Revolution - despite being dubbed a “Revolution” - does not aim towards the “creation of a socialist or communist society.” In fact, as Alexander (2002:46) puts it, “the ANC has never been a revolutionary organisation.” The NDR is the basis for cooperation between the ANC and its partners in the tripartite alliance, although the eventual goals of the alliance members diverge, with the ANC satisfied with democratic rule and the SACP pursuing a socialist South Africa (see Appendix A). The ANC clearly favours revolutionary rhetoric, however - the 2005 National General Council recommended that the organisation “reaffirm the ideological orientation of the ANC as that of ‘revolutionary African nationalism’” (ANC, 2005a).

14 These qualities can be traced back at least as far as the Freedom Charter (Suttner, 2005).
4.2.3.1 The removal of racial divisions in South African society

The ANC (1997d) insists that the "de-racialisation of South African society" is "critical to nation-building." Addressing the national question concerns "the attainment of fundamental human rights", "justice", "human dignity" and "freedom" (ANC, 1997d, 2005d). But it mainly means economic change: "improving the quality of life of the poor, the overwhelming majority of whom are defined by South African capitalism as blacks in general, and Africans in particular" - the "liberation" from economic as well as political subjugation of these groups, who form the bulk of the poor, is the principal goal of the National Democratic Revolution and the primary component of the national question (ANC, 1997b, 2005d). The effectiveness of the new government's progress in creating a new South African nation will be judged by "the extent and depth of the liberation of african [sic] people in particular - and blacks in general" - liberation being from economic deprivation (ANC, 1997d, 2005d). Economic integration - bringing the poor, black people of South Africa into the economy - is thus central to the formation of the new nation (ANC, 2005d). Runney (2005:405) traces the conceptual genesis of black economic empowerment (BEE) to the RDP.

The ANC (1997b) recognises that the socio-economic changes envisaged by the National Democratic Révolution imply the development of a "black bourgeoisie" and takes cognisance that the "race-consciousness" of this class will diminish with its increasing economic success. Despite disavowing the objective of creating a socialist state, the ANC (1997b; 1997c) describes the achievement of working class unity across racial lines as "key to creating the South African nation."

4.2.3.2 Equal rights for all

The ANC (2005d) declares that all South African citizens should enjoy equal rights "political and otherwise" in practice as well as principle, an objective that can be traced back at least as far as the 1955 Freedom Charter (Congress of the People, 1958). The new Constitution, introduced in

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15 Roberts (2005:486-496) notes

"Living standards have been shown to be closely associated with race, with poor Africans accounting for the overwhelming majority of the poor... the incidence of poverty in rural localities [is] significantly higher than for residents of secondary cities and the metropoles... Substantial provincial disparities also exist, with those containing the former homelands bearing a disproportionately larger share of the poverty burden... the disjuncture between increases in employment and the economically active population is especially pronounced for Africans as well as for women... the historical racial divide is being supplanted by a class divide, since democratisation and the subsequent neo-liberal embrace has effectively only deracialised the apex of the class structure."

Moleke (2006:204-205) asserts that the

"inequalities and racial divisions of South African society are nowhere as evident as in the labour market": the labour force "continues to be racially divided between skilled white workers and unskilled and/or semi-skilled African workers... whites are concentrated in high-level positions, top management and senior management, while Africans are concentrated in unskilled and semi-skilled occupations."

16 Burnham (2005:28) suggests that "the progressive bill of rights in the 1996 Constitution, with its injunction to government to act aggressively to redress inequalities, derives from the Freedom Charter."
1996, included “the achievement of equality” as one of the primary values outlined in the Founding Provisions, equality was enshrined as non-derogable in the Bill of Rights and unfair discrimination on “one or more grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth” was prohibited (RSA, 1996).

Despite the stated ambition of equal rights for all, the ANC government passed the Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act in 2003 and the Communal Land Rights Bill in 2004, legislation which had the effect of granting “separate and different rights to rural and urban South Africans” as a consequence of the “denial of the right to elect one’s leaders” for rural citizens (Ntsebeza, 2005:59).

In this regard, Ntsebeza (2005:68-69) postulates that the government “seems to have succumbed to the pressure exerted by traditional authorities” who opposed “the notion of introducing new democratic structures”, a policy shift that abandoned the RDP principle promising “Democratisation of South Africa” (ANC, 1994). Dladla (2000, cited in Ntsebeza, 2005:76) quotes Lodge as suggesting that the ANC’s accommodation of traditional leaders was a political compromise, in favour of the Inkatha Freedom Party, to avoid potential conflict in KwaZulu-Natal.

Yet Mamdani (1998) contends that citizenship is neither “common or equal” - “the 1994 compromise has brought South Africa in line with other equatorial African countries: while civic citizenship is deracialised, ethnic citizenship remains unreformed”, with ethnic citizenship the “exclusive right” of the “‘indigenous’ citizens” and unavailable to “settlers defined as ‘non-indigenous.’” This formulation exactly matches the ANC position - hardly surprising given the idea of “Colonialism of a Special Type” and its corollary the National Democratic Revolution.

The ANC: distinguishes between the “settler colonial community” and the “indigenous Africans”

17 As Govender (2006:103) puts it, “As much as apartheid was about inequality, the Final Constitution is about the attainment of substantive equality. ... running through the fabric of the Bill of Rights is a commitment to an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom.”

18 The “affirmation of gender equality” is critical to the NDR (ANC, 1997d).

19 The role of traditional leaders in post-colonial African states is a controversial question. Buur (2005:253) notes the “uneasy accommodation of cultural diversity and custom”; Cherry (1994:627) suggests that the concession to the Zulu king is one of the “interesting contradictions in the new constitutional dispensation which could provide a basis for increased ethnic conflict”; Jean and John Comaroff (2003:445) positi a “confrontation between the Constitution of South Africa and the Kingdom of Custom.”

According to Ntsebeza (2005:60-65), there are two principal schools of thought. Firstly, those who, following Mamdani’s (1996:22-24) analysis, argue that the continued delegation of authority to traditional leaders by the state echoes “bifurcated” colonial and apartheid governance structures of “indirect rule”, at least as far as local government is concerned; accordingly, the active participation of traditional authorities in politics compromises democratic rule (Bank and Southall, 1996), cited in Ntsebeza, 2005:61). Secondly, others argue against the “dramatic marginalisation” of traditional leaders, suggesting that there are aspects of governance where they can be useful; further, such schemes can lead to increasing democratisation of traditional leadership institutions (Ismail (1999), cited in Ntsebeza, 2005:61). The ANC itself is “also not unanimous on the issue of the role of traditional authorities in a democracy. Historically, the ANC has been divided on this question between pro- and anti-chief factions” (Ntsebeza, 2005:77).

20 It should be noted, however, that the 1997 ANC National Conference in Mafikeng resolved that the “institution of traditional leaders... has an important and integral role to play in the building of our new constitutional order... Local government in rural areas will be restructured in order to achieve a clear definition of roles between elected councils and legitimate traditional leaders” (ANC, 1997c). By 2000, the National General Council observed the need to “reconcile the system of traditional leadership with democratic local government” (ANC, 2000, emphasis added).

21 Mamdani (1996:289) notes that, in the case of the “mainstream nationalists”, the “new state power sought to indigenize civil society institutions and to restructure relations between the independent state and the international economy and polity. In the absence of the detribalization of rural power, however, deracialization could not be joined to democracy.”
(ANC, 1997b,d) for whom South Africa is the “motherland” and the “ancestral lands” (Mbeki, 2003b); reserves rightful ownership of the land to “the indigenous people” (ANC, 1992), land that the “Dutch and British colonialists” sought to “usurp” (ANC, 1997d); distinguishes between the “indigenous” African languages and the foreign languages of English and Afrikaans (ANC, 1994, 2002e, 2005d); desires the promotion of “indigenous African cultures” (ANC, 2002e); and differentiates between “European high art” and “indigenous art” (ANC, 1992). The “‘Coloured’ community” is granted “indigenous” status (ANC, 1997b).

4.2.3 A shared identity

The ANC perceives the significance of identity for their nation-building project - ANC documents (1997b; 1997c; 1997d; 2005d) consistently call for the development of a “common South African identity.” At the same time, however, the ANC recognises that South African citizens will hold multiple identities, based, for example, on ethnicity or religion; the ANC (1997b; 1997c; 1997d; 2005d) allows for these multiple identities but maintains that the South African identity should be dominant. This shared identity should be expressed in South African cultural activity, cuisine, media, education, and ordinary social life (ANC, 1997b, 2005d). Nevertheless, the specific content of this South African identity is left undefined except in the vaguest terms.

4.2.3.4 Unity

Alert to the apartheid government’s exploitation of tribal differences22, the ANC (2000; 2005d; 2005b) appeals for solidarity, rather than a society fractured along the ethnic lines of “tribalism” - the 2003 South African Social Attitudes Survey showed the ANC’s success in this regard, as over ninety percent of non-Zulu Africans and sixty percent of Zulu Africans expressed their support of the ANC, while only thirty-four percent of Zulu Africans supported the IFP23 (Naidu, 2006:44). However, the passage of the Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act and the Communal Land Rights Bill entrench tribalism since “tribalism is inherent in the recognition of separate chieftancies” (Ntsebeza, 2005:78).

A nation should live in a common territory (ANC, 2005d). To this end, the ANC government has integrated the notionally independent Bantustans into South Africa - “democratization... unified and strengthened the new polity” and “White and black secessionist forces were marginalized” (Adam, 1995:458). This principle guides the rejection by the ANC (2005d) of the concept of a separate Volksstaat for Afrikaners.

Historically, the ANC has considered the territorial bounds of the South African nation as restricted to the borders established with the Union of 1910 - indeed, the ANC was founded as the South African

22 According to Gouws (2003:53), the “norms of the [apartheid] regime, however, strengthened group identities.” See also Grossberg et al., 2006:54.

23 Gavin Davis (2004:297), however, notes that “those parties that invoke an exclusive ‘us and them’ message fare better than those that attempt an inclusive ‘catch-all’ strategy... It is quite possible that, over time, South African political parties will ‘learn’ that the most successful means of mobilizing voters is to play on the fears and aspirations associated with their race, thus exacerbating racial tensions.”
National Native Congress, the Freedom Charter was drawn up in the name of “the People of South Africa” (Congress of the People, 1958), and the ANC (1992) has never called the political boundaries of South Africa into question\(^24\) (Congress of the People, 1958; Gumede, 2005; Alexander, 2002:32; Maré, 2003:39). The political boundary of the South African state remains as it was in 1910 - having prevailed in the struggle to capture the state (Maré, 2003:25), the ANC’s task is the creation of a nation within the existing borders of the country.

The ANC government has successfully removed the legal foundation for separate schooling for different races\(^25\) - “If race separation was the defining feature of schools in the apartheid era, race integration became a defining feature in the post-apartheid era” (Chisholm, 2005:215).

4.2.3.5 The flowering of Africanness

South Africa is “an African nation”, so the new South African identity - “our shared African nationhood” (ANC, 2005b) - should be distinctively African\(^26\) (ANC, 1997b,c,d, 2005d), although the actual constituent elements of this African identity are not specified at all (the ANC (2005d) does call for its cadres to “spare no effort to reject those of our traditional practices which are backward”, again

\(^{24}\)In Vale’s (2003:24-25) argument, the firmness of state boundaries - a notion that “seems to have a long and honourable lineage, which is legitimised through time and sanctioned through tradition” - has produced “deadly outcomes” for the region’s inhabitants. He notes that

“All efforts to both understand and engineer social relations in southern Africa turn on the notion that borders are fixed - permanent entities that both demarcate and determine the points of entry to, and exit from, what Larry Bowman first called the ‘southern African state system’... the permanence and continuity of the national - as opposed to the regional - are invariably below the surface of policy rhetoric” (Vale, 2003:25,33).

It is also remarkable that the ANC simply assumed power after the 1994 elections in what Adam (1995:457) called a “negotiated revolution” and Emery (2005) called a “revolution without the revolution” - in other words, it took occupation of governmental structures, rather than abolishing them and instituting new ones; there was legal and administrative continuity between apartheid and post-apartheid South Africa, which are in fact the same entity under different political masters (Maré, 2003:25), a condition which Vale (2003:31,37) calls “sovereign continuity” and which Alexander (2002:64) attributes to the “anti-revolutionary British jurisprudential tradition of continuity of sovereignty” (emphasis in original).

\(^{25}\)While schools may have been desegregated in law, in practice “the large majority of schools in South Africa remain uni- or mono-racial”; schools effectively form a “two-tier system in which social class is a major factor in determining who is included and who is excluded” (Chisholm, 2005:216-217).

\(^{26}\)The ANC’s penchant for vigorous Africanist oratory, together with the presence in South Africa of around 5 million people of European - i.e. non-African - descent, leads to some occasionally confusing rhetoric: the 50th National Conference resolved that South Africa should “appropriate its African identity” while at the same time propagating “an inclusive meaning to the term ‘African’ that embraces all those who have made this continent their home”, proposing that “African” could have two meanings:

“In the broad sense, ‘African’ applies to all those who have a sense of identity with this country and the African continent and are committed to the upliftment of the people of this country, especially the poor. However, the term ‘African’ as historically used in our movement to refer to the most oppressed under apartheid is also endorsed” (ANC, 1997c).

Thabo Mbeki (1996), as deputy President, stated of the 1996 South African constitution that it “constitutes an unequivocal statement that we refuse to accept that our Africanness shall be defined by our race, colour, gender or historical origins”, while not clarifying what “our Africanness” actually was defined by. A 2005 discussion document muses (without answer): “Afrikaners ask the valid question: how many hundreds of years more do they need to live here before they can be called Africans?” (ANC, 2005d). In the words of Frederik van Zyl Slabbert (“In Need of a Road Map”, Financial Mail, 14 June 2006), “It is all as clear as mud.” (See Section 4.4.)
without identifying which traditional practices are backward and which are to be retained). The ANC (1997b; 1997d) therefore calls for “a continuing battle to assert African hegemony" in the context of a multi-cultural and non-racial society while making the contradictory claim that “the affirmation of our Africanness as a nation has nothing to do with the domination of one culture or language by another.” (What it means to be “African” is of course contested in a debate that “flares up periodically and ever more passionately” (Alexander, 2002:82).

Despite suggesting that the rainbow nation metaphor is potentially misleading or harmful, because it implies continued separation (1997b; 2005d), the ANC’s (1997c; 2002e) and its leaders (Mbeki, 2006b) own statements promoting “unity in our diversity” (Mandela, 1996) suggest an ideal that is very similar to the rainbow metaphor - the various “cultures” or “communities” are to exist side-by-side, “united in their diversity” (Mbeki, 2005a), although there should be a “healthy osmosis” between the “various cultures” (ANC, 1997b). In President Mbeki’s (1999) flowery prose, “all our cultures and languages occupy their rightful place within the rich tapestry that constitutes our diverse being as a people.”

4.2.4 Immigration policy: who is and who isn’t South African

4.2.4.1 Africanist rhetoric, hostile policy, xenophobic citizenry

Post-apartheid South Africa is awash with Pan-Africanist rhetoric - the preamble to contemporary South Africa’s constitution (1996) declares that South Africa “belongs to all who live in it, united in our diversity”, Thabo Mbeki (1996) famously declared that “I am an African”, the “idea of an African Renaissance - and the vision outlined in the founding document of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (Nepad) - has been the defining concept of Mbeki’s government” (Sachikonye, 2005:570) and the 2005 National General Council referred to “our shared African nationhood and Pan-African solidarity” (ANC, 2005b). Nonetheless, immigration legislation remains harsh28, perhaps reflecting the widespread xenophobia among ordinary South Africans29.

Immigration has not been encouraged by the post-apartheid government30. The Immigration Act of 2002 calls for the strengthening of border monitoring “to ensure that the borders of the Republic do..."
not remain porous and illegal immigration through them may be effectively detected, reduced and deterred” and aims to ensure that “the contribution of foreigners in the South African labour market does not adversely impact on existing labour standards and the rights and expectations of South African workers” (RSA, 2002). Indeed, post-apartheid South Africa is a positively unwelcoming place to illegal immigrants: deportations of undocumented migrants increased by seventy-five percent in the first year that the ANC was in power (Crush and McDonald, 2001); 167,000 non-citizens, mostly Mozambicans and Zimbabweans, were deported in 2004 (Landau, 2005). Writing in 2001, Crush and McDonald (2001) described immigration policy as reflecting apartheid policy; the 1995 Aliens Control Amendment Act and the 1995 South African Citizenship Act strengthened state powers in dealing with illegal immigrants, while the apartheid-era contract system of migrant labour remained in place (Klotz, 1997). The South African government demonstrated its hostility to immigration on two occasions when it “killed” proposed SADC protocols on freer movement of people within the region (Crush and McDonald, 2001).

Several analysts explicitly tie lukewarm support for immigration to South African nationalism: Smith (2003) writes that “There was a whole new project of ‘nation-building’ and immigrants from the North did not fit in well with this project”; Crush and McDonald (2001) suggest that

“...The declared task of the state was to redistribute the cake to newly enfranchised citizens, not allow others in to take an undeserved slice. Decision makers showed minimal support for immigration, a view widely endorsed at the grassroots... There is little evidence that the ruling African National Congress (ANC) saw any role for immigration in its social and economic transformation plans... By and large, immigration and migration have been viewed to date as antithetical (or at best irrelevant) to the post-apartheid project of nation-building and social transformation.”

Erasmus (2005:18) notes that

“...like all processes of nation-building, post-apartheid South Africa’s nation-building project is by definition exclusionary. In light of its history of divisions, post-apartheid South African nationalism focuses particularly on building a united South African national identity.”

4.2.4.2 Amnesties

While the post-apartheid state has, in general, treated illegal immigrants harshly, and was slow to implement South Africa’s responsibilities as a signatory to UN and OAU conventions on refugees - the Refugee Act was only passed in 1998 - there have been three amnesties granted to specific groups of refugees: contract miners who’d worked in South Africa for more than ten years were offered result of a political deal between the ANC and the IFP; or the ANC and the IFP share similar views on immigration and both parties emphasized nation-building.
permanent residence in 1995; SADC citizens who could prove (legal or illegal) residence in South Africa for at least five years were offered citizenship in 1996, as a result of which over 124,000 people were naturalized as South Africans; and the government announced in 1997, but only implemented in 2000, an amnesty in which Mozambican refugees who had fled to South Africa before 1992 and remained in the country were offered permanent residence (Crush and McDonald, 2001).

4.3 The ANC and government role in shaping the new South African nation

ANC documentation (1997b; 2005d) makes it clear that the organisation does not intend to merely articulate the kind of nation the new South Africa should become, but that the ANC and the ANC-led government should be the primary agents in the making of this nation - the ANC and its government “have a critical role to play in facilitating the emergence of a new nation” as their “duty to South Africa and its future generations.” This intention is in keeping with the ANC’s (2005d) portrayal of itself as being the authentic voice of the South African people and the “motive force” of their destiny.

4.3.1 The ANC as prime mover

The ANC portrays itself as the leading agent in removing black South Africans from political and economic oppression - it is the “leading force for social transformation” (ANC, 2002e). In the organisation’s own words,

“History has bequeathed on it [the ANC] the mission to lead South African society as a whole in the quest for a truly non-racial, non-sexist and democratic nation”31 (ANC, 1997d).

The ANC (1997d) is thus “the vanguard32 of all these motive forces of the NDR, the leader33 of the broad movement for transformation.” The ANC (2002a) is “a ruling party, a mass-based movement, the leading formation in a dynamic Alliance and at the head of all progressive forces for change, for transformation and for nation-building.”

4.3.2 Government’s forceful role in creating the new South African nation

The ANC’s National General Council in 2000 resolved that laws passed by the government should “contribute to nation building and the forging of a common national consciousness” (ANC, 2000).

31 Struggle-era slogans included the “ANC is the nation” and the “ANC is your mother and your father” (Suttner, 2005).
32 “Mbeki and his followers in the ANC leadership, most of whom are former exiles... were trained in the radical Leninist school of thought that gives primacy to the role of the vanguard party and revolutionary intellectuals” (Johnson, 2002:222).
33 The General Secretary of the South African Communist Party, Joe Slovo (1988), acknowledged that the “main core of the whole democratic struggle illegal and legal is the ANC which stands at the head of the liberation alliance.”
This section outlines the ways in which the government is actively attempting to nurture South African nationalism.

4.3.2.1 Towards a developmental state

ANC policy on government involvement in the economic transformation of South African society has shifted somewhat. Immediately after assuming power in 1994, the ANC (1994) adopted the Cosatu-inspired34 Reconstruction and Development Programme, which called for a strong role for the state and demanded significant government spending on poverty alleviation. Several ANC documents (1997b; 1997c) explicitly link the eradication of material inequalities by implementation of the RDP with the national question.

In 1996, however, a coterie35 in the ANC, led by then deputy-president Thabo Mbeki, forced the adoption36 of the “neo-liberal” (Alexander, 2002:49) Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) programme, which served up fiscal austerity instead of government largesse to the poor and dropped the emphasis on redistribution in favour of policies intended to stimulate economic growth and inspire financial market confidence in the new government (Gumede, 2005).

ANC rhetoric remained full of references to strong state with a “developmental role” (ANC, 1997c) - and indeed to the RDP as well - during the GEAR period, a situation which Patrick Bond (2004) neatly captured in the title of his book Talk Left, Walk Right.

Most recently, ANC policies (see Section 5.1) rather than merely rhetoric show evidence of a turn towards the concept of a developmental state, modelled on Asian countries. The kind of state envisaged would be capable of effecting “fundamental transformation” and would, by virtue of being a developmental state, naturally need to be responsible for nation-building - such a state “Acts as the key force for social integration and nation-building” (ANC, 2004).

4.3.2.2 Forcing economic transformation

The “mission of the ANC” is nothing less than the “fundamental transformation of the South African economy in order to empower black people, especially Africans” (ANC, 1997c). So while the replacement of the RDP with GEAR signaled the ANC leadership’s acceptance of market-based economic policies, the ANC still introduced legislation intended to hasten the transfer of wealth to black South Africans, a process known as “black economic empowerment” (BEE), a term first used in the early

34 The first draft was drawn up by Jay Naidoo, the General Secretary of Cosatu (Sparks, 2003:191).
35 For Alexander (2002:49), the present ANC leadership is “moderate”; for Bond (2004:21-22), “Mbeki and his top political aides” have implemented “neoliberal” policies in South Africa while attempting to reform multilateral institutions along “Post-Washington Consensus” lines, these reforms yielding no signs of “obvious progress”; GEAR is “neoliberal orthodoxy” (Bond, 2005:17) foisted on South Africa by “ANC elites” (Bond, 2005:52) who were co-opted by South African business (Bond, 2005:53-85).
36 GEAR was drawn up in secret, and promulgated by the ANC government without “due consultation with its allies or even with the rank and file membership of the ANC” (Alexander, 2002:148). As Gelb (2005:372) puts it, ANC leaders ignored Cosatu “when formulating the GEAR policy.” Sparks (2003:194-195) maintains that the ANC adopted GEAR “without even a debate in its National Executive Committee.”
1990s (Gumede, 2005). The Black Economic Empowerment Commission, appointed in 1997 under chairmanship of Cyril Ramaphosa, presented its report to President Mbeki in April 2001, recommending “the adoption of a wide-ranging, state-driven programme” (Southall, 2005:464). The ANC’s National General Council in 2000 called for “greater emphasis” on “black economic empowerment” (ANC, 2000), while the 51st National Conference in 2002 resolved that “Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) is a moral, political, social and economic requirement of this country’s collective future”, to use “government’s instruments such as licensing, procurement, state asset restructuring and provision of finance, to target BEE” and to “ensure government designs an enabling regulatory framework including operational guidelines to promote certainty in the implementation and regulation of BEE” (ANC, 2002e). The Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act (RSA, 2003) was passed in 2003, and the Department of Trade and Industry published a draft code of good practice for broad-based black economic empowerment in December 2004 (Southall, 2006a:186) and South Africa’s Economic Transformation: A Strategy for Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment (DTI, 2005) in 2005.

Key aspects of the ANC’s approach to black economic empowerment include the transfer of financial capital in the form of shares in companies37, the preferential employment and advancement of blacks (affirmative action), and the preferential procurement by businesses and the state of goods and services from black-owned businesses (Southall, 2005:463); these policies aimed at increasing “black ownership and control”38 of the economy (Southall, 2006a:185). The government intended that privatisation would contribute towards black economic empowerment (Gumede, 2005; Rumney, 2005). The ANC-in-government’s interventions in support of BEE “have moved from being largely persuasive to becoming more assertive and regulatory” (Southall, 2005:458, italics in original).

The black economic empowerment phase of the National Democratic Revolution would create a black bourgeoisie (ANC, 1997b; Southall, 2004). This class was not to be left to its own devices, however, but should be guided by the ANC (1997b; 1997c) to contribute to nation-building in “South Africa’s true interests.” In fact, the entire capitalist class, regardless of race, should be influenced by the ANC (1997b; 1997d) in this regard.

4.3.2.3 Changing the civil service

The civil service, too, is being changed in line with ANC policy. The ANC (1997b) considered the apartheid government as “colonial in character”, with the establishment of the Republic in 1960 simply marking the transfer of power from the “British conquerors” to the “settler colonial community” who continued exploiting the “indigenous Africans.” The necessity of the change is clearly spelled

37 Southall (2006a:178) cites figures suggesting direct black control of the JSE was no more than four percent at the end of 2004.
38 Southall (2006a:191) argues that black businessmen are becoming more and more influential in the South African economy, for example, he points to a 2003 survey by the Financial Mail which listed nine black men among the twenty most influential business people in South Africa. Yet, despite talk of the growth of the black middle class, the “mass of the black population” seems to have derived “little benefit” from BEE (Southall, 2006a:196).
out 39: “It is a dictum of all revolutions that, having laid its hands on the state machinery - at local, provincial and national levels - the democratic movement cannot wish this machinery to serve the purpose of social transformation” - the state machinery must be changed to perform its new tasks (ANC, 2004). The government and civil service 40 would naturally be increasingly staffed with ANC members, who were expected to “fulfil the mandate of the organisation” (ANC, 1997d). One of the major changes was the breaking down of the “administrative framework of separate development” and the assembly of a “single public service” (Naidoo, 2005:117). The “fundamental transformation” of the state was to be considered a “priority objective of the NDR” (ANC, 1997c). “Transformation of the state is paramount if we are to address the needs and aspirations of all our people” (ANC, 2000).

Cloete (1995:115, cited in Naidoo, 2005:115) shows that, around the time the ANC assumed power, blacks comprised almost eighty percent of the population but not even forty percent of the public service as a whole, and were negligibly represented in management positions, which were almost exclusively filled by whites. By 2000, at least fifty percent of senior management posts were held by blacks, who comprised seventy-three percent of the civil service by 2003 41 (DPSA (2000); PSC (2004), cited in Naidoo, 2005:118-119) so that by 2005 the ANC (2005d) could declare that “the public service and the organs of the state are becoming more and more representative of the population.”

4.3.2.4 Setting the national “vision”

The ANC (2002c) positions itself as “the main communicators of the South African vision”, influencing the “attitudes and values of the broader society.” The mass media should be changed to use all the official languages (ANC, 1997c). The means of the state were also to be used to promote the indigenous African languages; a 2005 discussion document complained that these “African languages still receive insufficient state resources” (ANC, 2005d), echoing the lamentations at the 2002 National Conference that “Indigenous languages... are poorly catered for” (ANC, 2002e).

4.3.2.5 Inculcating patriotism

While removing the racial skew in the South African economy is the main component of the ANC’s nation-building project, the party has stated that it should use its control of government to initiate cultural and educational programmes in support of its efforts to mould a new South African society.

The ANC (1997b) has proposed a campaign encouraging a “New Patriotism” to “capture the national imagination.” A programme encouraging national pride in school-children and intended to create

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39 ANC policy on transforming the civil service echoes the pre-liberation National Party government: “the ANC was also committed to utilising the public sector as an instrument of black empowerment, just as its predecessor NP government had turned to the parastatals to promote Afrikaner empowerment during the 1950s and 1960s” (Southall, 2005:462; Butler, 2004:39); “After a decade of NP rule, just as in the public service, the middle and upper echelons of the wide network of parastatal organizations were virtually monopolized by Afrikaners” (O’Meara, 1996:79, quoted in Southall, 2005:462).

40 The civil service is a significant employer in South Africa: in 2004, the public service had slightly more than a million employees (PSC (2004), cited in Naidoo, 2005:118). In addition, some 336 parastatal entities employ around 250,000 people (Southall, 2005:462).

41 Moleke (2006:211) attributes most of the “progress with regard to racial representation and advancement of Africans” in the entire labour market to changes in government employment patterns.
"greater awareness of our unity in diversity and the need for common South African patriotism" based on the new South African flag and the Constitution was resolved upon at the 1997 National Conference (ANC, 1997c) and launched in 2005 to some discussion in the media ("All in a flap", Mail & Guardian, September 30 to October 6 2005). The government was supposed to "develop a programme around Heritage Day which celebrates diversity and unity, and promotes respect for cultural identities in a manner that contributes to welding a sense of nationhood among our people" (ANC, 1997c).

The resolutions adopted at the 51st National Conference in 2002 expanded on the function of the state-owned broadcaster, the SABC, giving it the heavy burden of playing "a critical role in shaping opinions and building societal values, including the moral fibre of our society, socio-economic transformation and the building of a united, patriotic nation" while at the same time reflecting "the unity and diversity of our people and the needs of the democratic society" (ANC, 2002e). The 2005 National General Council called for more to be done "including implementation of programmes to better the lives of all, popularisation of national symbols, arts and culture, sporting and other activities that help to build a sense of shared South Africanness", suggesting that values should somehow "be used to promote social cohesion and nation building" (ANC, 2005a).

Also, "educational and cultural institutions including public owned media must be actively encouraged the affirmation [sic] of an African reality. Conscious teaching of African history as part of the school curriculum should be introduced to instil a sense of patriotism and promote the ideals of non-racialism" (ANC, 2000). The White Paper on Education and Training (DoE (1995), cited in Gouws, 2003:60) mentions civic education as being subsumed under the separate subject areas rather than being taught as a subject in its own right. The effectiveness of civic education is to be measured by specific and critical outcomes. Citing the Revised National Curriculum Statement Grades R-9

42Barnett (2000:63) notes that "In a situation in which processes of economic integration are increasingly taking place at a trans-national scale, the state's ability to use communications and media as instruments of domestic political and cultural integration are significantly constrained."

43The use of a national education system to instil feelings of nationalism stretches back to at least before the First World War - "The French governments of the Third Republic consciously used schools to propagate national culture and the national language" (Vinen, 2002:28, emphasis added). In a telling observation, Vinen (2002:54) says that the western powers involved in the Great War "could rely on the discipline instilled in their populations by education and compulsory military service. It was the bourgeoisie of western Europe that behaved in the most irrational way during the First World War, continuing to obey orders even when such obedience was certain to bring their death. It was the 'primitive' peasant populations of eastern Europe who behaved most rationally - they deserted, allowed themselves to be taken prisoner or mutinied."

44The specific content that should be taught as part of civic education is contentious: see Gouws (2003) pp 53-57 for a discussion. In agreement with Castells' formulation of legitimising identity, Brighouse (1998, cited in Gouws, 2003:56) points out that civic education involves the state teaching beliefs supporting its own legitimacy.

45Civic education is especially important in South Africa, since the previous regime's authoritarian character stunted the development of a democratic culture (Gouws, 2003:53). Yet, a study by Bratton et al. (1999, cited in Gouws, 2003:57) in Zambian in 1993 and 1996, which showed that individuals who had undergone civic education had higher levels of civic knowledge and values and were more likely to be active in civil society, qualified this observation by noting that the effects of civic education are "marginal rather than radical", civic education can have "unintended consequences that may not fit in with planned outcomes" and seemingly "higher levels of education were needed to understand the messages of civic education" (Gouws, 2003:57). Citing a 1994-1997 study by Finkel et al. (2000:1853) in the Dominican Republic, Gouws (2003:58) states that "Those who were exposed to civic education had trust in fewer institutions than those in the control group", a reversal of the intended result of civic education which is assumed to lead to "greater institutional trust." This suggests that civic education might in fact teach citizens critical thinking skills which potentially undermine the state's attempt to bring about its own legitimacy (Gouws, 2003:59).
Schools) (DoE, 2002:5), Gouws (2003:61) asserts that the curriculum's aims include healing "the divisions of the past", establishing "a society based on democratic values, social justice and fundamental human rights" and building "a united and democratic South Africa able to take its rightful place as a sovereign state in the family of nations."

4.4 The syncretism of the ANC's South African nationalism

Taken as a whole, the ANC's conception of nationalism, and South African nationalism in particular, appears syncretistic - that is to say, it seems to be the result of an inconsistent and contradictory merging of various theories of nationalism. Documents and speeches are in places redolent of Benedict Anderson's "imagined communities", are in places influenced by the old SACP ideas of Colonialism of a Special Type and National Democratic Revolution, are in places a reaction to the apartheid government's divide-and-rule stoking of ethnic rivalries, acknowledge in places the non-racialist tradition within the ANC (Adam (1995:473) proposes that "Non-racialism is the antithesis of... nationalism"), affirm in places the exclusive position of Africans as the indigenous people of South Africa, and proclaims in still other places the need for African hegemony.

The definition of and commitment to the principle of non-racialism within the ANC has a contested history:

"non-racial politics of the ANC today are the product of a long debate and struggle..."

the ANC did not arrive at a full blown non-racial position with respect to the question of membership of its own organisation until it had been in existence for some seventy years. The reservation of the three most senior positions in the organisation - president, the chairman and the treasurer - for Africans left the ANC short of the ideal, even if the adoption of full membership for non-Africans helped the ANC to claim maximal non-racial practices" (Ndebele, 2002:144).

"Even those who defined themselves as African nationalists treated well-disposed non-Africans as future beneficiaries of the nationalist struggle if not an integral part of it. The Pan African Congress, though less concerned to cultivate an image of universal inclusiveness from a racial point of view, was, in reality, not all that different from the ANC, the Unity Movement, and the Black Consciousness Movement in this regard. It is true

46 For example, Filatova (1997:55) noted the contradictions between the African nationalist stance of Nation-Formation and Nation Building and the "melting pot of broad South Africanism" expressed by Building the Foundation for a Better Life, both documents released simultaneously by the ANC.

47 The ANC's understanding of nationalism clearly echoes Joe Slovo's (1988) assertions that nations are the "consolidation or fragmentation of disparate ethnic groups" into "sovereign entities" and that "The struggle for national cohesion in multi-ethnic communities does not imply the imposition of cultural uniformity. Cultural diversity does not stand in contradiction to a national unity" and "one united nation, embracing all our ethnic communities, remains the virtually undisputed liberation objective" (Filatova, 1997:51).

48 The "ANC's conceptualisation of non-racialism has been hard to pin down" (Ndebele, 2002:144).

49 Mangcu (2003:110) contends that the ANC is currently engaged in a "race debate"; "by 2000, the old battles between black nationalists and white liberals had resurfaced within the ANC, and in society more broadly" (Mangcu, 2003:110).
that in defining Africans (for purposes of future South African citizenship) as not only the indigenous inhabitants of the continent but also all those who ‘owed allegiance to Africa’, it implied that some categories of people would have to pass a test of allegiance before they could be considered citizens or part of the nation. However, the criterion of ‘owing allegiance’ to Africa was so vague that it could barely be regarded as a decisive one.” (Nolutshungu, 1993:608)

Burnham (2005:13) observes that the Freedom Charter, with its emphasis on racial accommodation, “proved to be a source of a bitter division within the liberation movement of the 1950s”, as Africanist elements, especially in the ANC Youth League, called for “Africa for the Africans.” Because of the continuing affective appeal of traditional customs among the ANC’s mass support base, “the ANC has had to revise the ‘post-ethnic’ universalism to which most of its leadership was once fervently committed” (Comaroff and Comaroff, 2003:449). Halisi (1998) argues that the tension between African nationalism and non-racialism exists within the ANC. There “are those within the African National Congress who, impatient with the slow progress in the country’s social and political transformation, are pressing for a more robust Africanist approach to the ‘national question’” (Pieterse, 2002:1-2). Sahra Ryklief (2002:114) opines that “the Africanness he [Mbeki] refers to is regional rather than racial in character.”

One explanation for the self-contradictions of the ANC’s outlook in this regard begins by noting that the ANC is a “broad church”, originally uniting a disparity of groups - Africanists, non-racialists, communists, religious groups - with the common goal of ending apartheid; in other words, the ANC didn’t begin with a consistent theory of the South African nation, and the development of such a theory would necessarily have alienated one or more of its constituent groupings given the internal disagreements on points other than the necessity of ending apartheid. So the espousal of a bland, vague South African nationalism was probably the only course possible, since it allowed the unity of the movement to be preserved - this proved to be a “very successful tactic” (Filatova, 1997:55). The discourse of nationalism within the ANC slowly accumulated a variety of (contradictory) influences as various groups gained sway temporarily.

Since taking office in 1994, the ANC has failed to make good on its promise to South Africans to “define for ourselves what we want to make of our shared destiny” (Mandela, 1994) - the organisation has still not clearly articulated a detailed and consistent concept of South Africa as a nation (Filatova, 1997:55; Chidester et al., 2003b:296), a contention tacitly acknowledged by President Mbeki (2006b) in his 2006 State of the Nation speech, which reiterated Mandela’s “call.” Rhetoric and policy have remained vague and contradictory. This tendency can again be explained by invoking the variety of

50Neville Alexander (2002:37,40) suggests that the position of the Freedom Charter is actually multiracialist rather than non-racialist; see also (Pieterse, 2002:3-4).
51Indeed, Comaroff and Comaroff (2003:450) comment on the ANC’s recent, politically-motivated support for traditional authority by suggesting that “the ANC has conjured up a force that it is unable fully to control, a force that vitiates the very conception of nationhood on which the authority of the state rests.”
52The term “non-racialism” itself means different things to different groups (Adam, 1995:457).
53As Vale and Maseko (2002:124-125) put it in their discussion of the concept of the African Renaissance, “while analysts and commentators have trawled the idea of the African Renaissance for policy content,
groups within the movement and the country, each group having different concerns and interests.

In a sense, the ANC's scope for outlining a South African nationalism is even more limited now that the "movement" is running the country - the ANC's task is no longer just maintaining internal unity, difficult enough as that alone may be, but unifying the entire country - hence soothing statements like "Our neighbours, whether black or white, are as human as we all are and as South African as we all are" (Mbeki, 2001a). Of course, the divisions within the ANC hinder the party in its aim of national unity. The ANC cannot abandon its rhetorical commitment to Africanism without losing much support (Africanism is the centrepiece of the Mbeki administration so such an abandonment seems hardly likely), yet too strident an Africanism distances those within the ANC who seek a non-racialist future for the country.

The language of Africanism, despite occasional reassurances that Africanism has nothing to do with race or history, obviously estranges those citizens who are denied the possibility of being African by virtue of being descended from the "erstwhile oppressors" of "colonial domination" (ANC, 1997d). The ANC dare not tilt too far towards Africanism - although white South Africans provide negligible electoral support for the ANC (only two percent of whites support the ANC, constituting less than one percent of ANC supporters, ninety-four percent of whom are African and five percent of who are coloured (Naidu, 2006:43-44)), whites still hold most of the wealth and largely run the economy - the ANC (2005d) described the situation as "Economic apartheid is well and alive" - and can have a strong negative influence on potential foreign investors. In other words, the ANC cannot risk severely upsetting white South Africans by entirely abandoning the language of reconciliation.

In short, in the words of Filatova (1997:54), the "new definition of nationhood is a wonderful political there seems to be very little of substance to anchor an obviously fine idea... South Africa's idea of an African Renaissance is abstruse, puzzling, even perhaps mysterious; more promise than policy... its essential features remain deliberately vague; it is high on sentiment, low on substance:"

Adam (1995:472) noted that the "temptation simmers to use populist racial rhetoric" to assuage the population in the face of disappointed expectations - "Exhorting racial redistribution and racial vigilance serves to cover the privileges and mistakes of the new elite."

Peter Alexander (2006:39) makes an observation that is particularly germane given the historical use of the term "black" to include coloureds: "black Africans often describe themselves as 'black', but it is rare indeed to hear coloureds and Indians define themselves in this way."

There is a mild irony in the view of commentators like Ryklief (2002:114-116), for whom the discourse of the African Renaissance and NEPAD legitimises the expansion of (largely white-owned) South African capital into Africa - "it is resoundingly clear that Mbeki's African Renaissance is the best thing that has ever happened to South Africa's (still overwhelmingly white) capital in a long time." But see Vale and Maseko (2002:128-130) for an alternative "Africanist interpretation" of the African Renaissance idea to Ryklief's economicist or utilitarian view; seen from this Africanist perspective, the African Renaissance is primarily an initiative expressing the fundamental social and cultural ambitions of "Africanists [who] eschew the modernising tendency represented by Africa's encounter with Europe" who wish to construct a uniquely African identity - in this light, the African Renaissance is an instance of Castells' project identity. Peter Alexander (2006:42) notes of this latter interpretation, "African Renaissance is linked with a move to define national identity as something associated with black Africanness, which... might be less of inclusive of whites, Indians and possibly coloureds."

Presidents Mandela and Mbeki (2002) both regularly complained about pessimistic comments by white South Africans - the "prophets of doom" (Mandela, 1998), the "merchants of cynicism and despair" who engage in the "pessimism of arm-chair whining" (Mbeki, 1999), the "traditional doomsayers" (Mbeki, 2003c).

Steven Friedman (2005:759) states the challenge for the government as "retaining enough white confidence to prevent severe economic disruption."
tool for consolidating the support [sic] and mobilising the electorate behind the ANC leadership.”

4.5 Conclusion

While the Mandela and Mbeki presidencies have seen a shift in rhetorical temperature, with the warm, reconciliatory tone of Mandela being supplanted by the cold, occasionally antagonistic mood of Mbeki and his Two Nations, it is clear that the ANC has embarked on a project to develop a shared national identity in South Africa. The “national question”, long a preoccupation of the liberation movement, is still a matter of priority for the ANC-in-government, and the need for nation-building is frequently invoked to justify government policies.

ANC discourse on the national question is seemingly not hampered by the lack of a clear definition of nationhood - the protean character of this concept is possibly an advantage, given the disparate nature of the ANC’s constituent elements, who can be pulled together in the name of abstract but desirable-sounding notions like nation-building. Nonetheless, some conclusions can be made about the ANC’s implicit theory of the nation. First, in the case of South Africa anyway, the nation corresponds to the state - citizenship equates to nationality. The ANC seems to perceive nations to be primarily political entities, rather than having their foundation in easily-essentialised cultural attributes like language or common descent - the latter view would of course generate a pessimistic view for nation-building in a country like South Africa with its array of language and ethnic groups (one of the side-effects of apartheid was the strengthening of ethnic identities). An important corollary of this is that the ANC has never questioned the borders of South Africa despite their historically arbitrary nature. Another consequence of this view is that tribal groups are not nations in their own right (the ANC’s tradition of appealing to African unity dates from its inception). Second, a nation has several common elements: citizenship, economy, culture, territory, patriotism. Third, identity is crucial; in particular, the members of a nation should share a superordinate national identity. And fourth, nations are seen as social constructions.

With regard to contemporary South Africa, ANC rhetoric and policy emphasises the division of the country into two nations and two economies, segregated between poor blacks and wealthy whites. The National Democratic Revolution demands the creation of a united nation, implying the material upliftment of the black majority so that they may enjoy participation as full citizens.

The ANC holds out an ideal of the South African nation which has remained consistent since the party assumed power in 1994 - this ideal draws inspiration from the Freedom Charter. The major characteristics of the desired new South Africa are easily discerned. The nation should be non-racial, in that race should not determine opportunity (although the ANC-in-government’s persistent obsession with racial categorisation tends to belie the non-racialist oratory). Citizens should enjoy equal rights (although the ANC proved willing to compromise the rights of some rural citizens in the face of demands from traditional leaders). The members of the nation should be bound together by a shared culture and identity. Furthermore, this identity and culture should be African, although the features of this African identity and culture are left vague. The nation should be united; in particular, tribal
identities should not be used to divide South Africans between various ethnic groups. The boundaries of the nation are set at the current borders of the South African state.

Despite a profusion of pan-Africanist rhetoric, immigration policy remains unwelcoming, and ordinary citizens are remarkably xenophobic, reserving especial hostility for African immigrants, a situation usually attributed to worries over economic competition.

The ANC perceives itself as fulfilling an historic mission on behalf of the people of South Africa. The party - or movement as it styles itself - thus, unsurprisingly, advocates the state assuming the leading role in building the new South African nation. The ANC therefore has a natural affinity with the model of the developmental state, an affinity which is increasingly reflected in government policy and discourse. The firm hand of the state is also applied in changing the racial composition of the economy, through policies of black economic empowerment and the civil service. The ANC intends that government should influence South African cultural life and media, in particular through the state broadcaster. The government also assumes the task of instilling patriotism amongst the population, through cultural events, media and the education system.
Chapter 5

ANC economic policy: Opening South Africa up to the world

As noted earlier, Manuel Castells emphasises the role of economic factors in inducing the network society. According to Castells' theoretical framework, countries that are fully connected to the global economy can be expected to tend towards the ideal type of the network society, whereas those countries that are largely isolated from the world economy should not display this tendency. Thus, whether or not South Africa joined the global economy following the dismantling of apartheid would be decisive in economic and social developments in the country. This chapter therefore examines ANC policy on South Africa's relationship to the global economy, specifically the extent to which the ANC government has opened South Africa up to economic contact with the rest of the world.

5.1 Post-apartheid economic policy

5.1.1 Overview: from poverty-alleviation to export-led growth and back

5.1.1.1 1994 to 1996: the RDP emphasises poverty-alleviation

In 1990, when the ANC was unbanned, the Freedom Charter was the only economic policy the organisation had (Sparks, 2003:176). Gelb (2005:369) describes the subsequent overarching accommodation or "implicit bargain ... between white big business and the ANC" whereby the ANC, during the negotiations preceding the 1994 elections, committed itself to macroeconomic stability and openness to the international economy while business agreed to "capital reform", that is to modifying the racial composition of asset ownership through what would become known as "black economic empowerment." According to Gelb (2005:368-370), the basic accord was in place by the end of 1990, and the subsequent debates about economic policy, namely whether policy would be oriented towards meeting basic needs or towards export-led growth, took place "within the framework of this
accommodation.”¹ This “bargain” between the economic and political elites set the parameters for post-apartheid South Africa’s economic policy. One telling instance of the ANC upholding its end of this bargain is the process whereby the Reconstruction and Development Programme was drafted: the original RDP was drawn up by Cosatu², but the ANC adopted a version that contained elements of the Cosatu document but which was revised to be more acceptable to business interests, the final version of the RDP being approved by the so-called Brenthurst Group of businessmen (Gumede, 2005:76-79; Sparks, 2003:174). Thus, “Aspects of the visionary declarations of the Freedom Charter were, with significant modifications, carried over into the celebrated RDP” (Hemson and O’Donovan, 2006:12, emphasis added).

5.1.1.2 1996 to 2001: GEAR replaces the RDP with a focus on growth through exports

Bond (2005:1) devoted an entire book, Elite Transition, to describing “the transition [of the ANC] from a popular-nationalist anti-apartheid project to official neoliberalism”, an ideological shift which Gelb (2005:368-370) interprets as a consequence of the bargain between the business elite and the ANC³ and which reflects what Alexander (2002:48) calls “the complete pragmatism of the ANC leaders in matters economic.” This shift to economic neo-liberalism was sufficiently comprehensive, at least among those who influenced policy, that it was noted that “the ANC government, first and foremost, serves the interest of the capitalist class” (Alexander, 2002:49). The SACP found its sway on policy to be negligible (Alexander, 2002:48).

Government economic policy shifted from the populist RDP of 1994 to a “fairly orthodox neo-liberal⁴ macroeconomic policy package” (Roberts, 2005:481), the Growth, Employment And Redistribution (GEAR) strategy of 1996, which made financial stability the priority⁵ (Hemson and O’Donovan, 2006:12; Blumenfeld, 2006:428). In the case of nationalization, the change was nothing short of a “somersault” (Alexander, 2002:48) or an “astonishing about-turn” (Sparks, 2003:170). Nelson Mandela’s first speech on release from imprisonment had affirmed that “nationalization of the mines, banks, and monopoly industry is the policy of the ANC, and a change or modification of our views in this regard is inconceivable” (quoted in Gumede, 2005:68). Yet, by late 1992, Mandela proposed

¹ Writing in 1993, Adam and Moodley (1993:346) noted that the “most rational and also the most likely scenario for South Africa is a social-democratic pact between business, labour, and key state bureaucracies” and predicted that “many a Utopian dream will be disappointed, particularly on the Left” as the free-market economic system prevailed - the “socialists will have to sacrifice most of their dream because they have the least real power, despite the mass sympathy for radical restructuring” (Adam and Moodley, 1993:348).

² The first draft was drawn up by Jay Naidoo, the General Secretary of Cosatu (Sparks, 2003:191).

³ This view is supported by Vale (2005:96).

⁴ The South African government was not alone in reaching an economic policy accommodation with “neo-liberalism” - Brazil (under the “radical ex-socialist” Lula da Silva (Taylor, 2005:3)) and India have followed similar trajectories (Taylor, 2005) by seeking to “derive optimum benefits from the globalisation process” (IBSA, 2003). Alden and Vieira (2005:1091), discussing trilateral diplomatic relations between India, Brazil and South Africa, note that “the notion of autonomous development has been replaced by market-orientation” among the leading countries of the South (emphasis added). Referring to the New Economic Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), Soederberg (2005:357) suggests that “One only has to look at Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil, and even Mexico to learn where Africa is headed, should it embrace this blueprint for economic renewal.”

⁵ As Sparks (2003:193) puts it, the “government has insisted ever since that GEAR did not replace the RDP, that, in Erwin’s words, ‘the RDP is embedded in GEAR’ ... But in fact the RDP disappeared as a political slogan which had acquired talismanic importance to the alliance partners.”
that the ANC should abandon nationalisation, and the version of nationalisation adopted in the 1992 policy document, *Ready To Govern*, and endorsed in the RDP was substantially vitiated\(^6\) (Gumede, 2005:71; ANC, 1992, 1994). Far from implementing nationalisation, the release of GEAR in 1996 saw official government economic policy support the privatisation\(^7\) of "non-strategic [state] assets" under the euphemism\(^8\) of "the public sector asset restructuring programme" (DoF, 1996:5; Alexander, 2002:65). The about-turn was pronounced enough that the resolutions adopted at the ANC’s 51st National Conference observed of the “restructuring of state-owned assets and enterprises” that “the transfer of assets to the private sector strengthens our developmental agenda” (ANC, 2002e). As Runney (2005:404) puts it, “the South African government has shown no great taste for nationalisation.”

The adoption of GEAR and the depreciation of the RDP signified the acceptance, by those wielding power within the ANC, of orthodox neo-liberal economic policies favouring a market economy. The SACP’s Jeremy Cronin described the early 1990s as a time when “the triumph of neo-liberalism was at its zenith” (quoted in Gumede, 2005:76). Bond (2005:156) notes that the World Bank and the IMF were hugely influential in setting economic policy in South Africa - indeed, two World Bank economists were part of the technical team contributing to GEAR\(^9\) (DoF, 1996); the World Bank and IMF were influential in determining policy on welfare, housing, infrastructure, water, land reform and health care as well (Bond, 2005:183; Gumede, 2005:77-78).

5.1.1.3 2001 onwards: Government moves towards the developmental state model to assist the poor

From around 2001, the ANC government began to examine the failures of its economic policy, particularly the lack of progress in eradicating poverty and creating jobs, and slowly expanded state involvement in the economy; by 2004, the government budget included a “large-scale” public works programme and a significant increase in social and welfare spending(Daniel et al., 2005:xxiii). However, the government did not raise taxation levels, preferring to fund the increased spending by letting the budget deficit grow\(^10\), an indication that the government’s policy hasn’t swung sharply towards social democracy, which would imply high taxation to fund large, equalising transfer payments (Daniel et al., 2005:xxvii).
et al., 2005:xxvii). All the same, the emphasis of government policy has switched back to poverty alleviation (Devey et al., 2006:225).

Daniel et al. (2005:xxviii) propose, cautiously, that the ANC government under Mbeki draws inspiration

“far less from socialism than from the idea of an Asian-style (capitalist) 'developmental state'". Most particularly, it would appear to borrow from the experience of Malaysia, which has been particularly influential in shaping the ANC's ideas about how to combine growth with racial redistribution.”

Southall (2006b:xviii-xxi) notes the “growing boldness with which the government and the ANC have latterly come to openly espouse the 'developmental state.'” In support, he cites President Mbeki’s (2005a) 'State of the Nation' speech for 2005, the governments “major investment and efficiency programme” for the state-owned enterprises (Erwin, 2005); President Mbeki’s (2005b) assertion that development “requires an effective state, one that plays a catalytic, facilitating role”; President Mbeki’s (2005b) description of the government as a “developmental state”; and the ANC (2005c) discussion document, Development and underdevelopment, which, in Southall’s terms, “leaves little doubt that its principal inspiration is that of the east Asian developmental model.” Southall (2006b:xxi) concludes that “the ANC and the government’s latest thinking asserts the necessity of a developmental state that is 'strong' in the sense of having the intellectual resources to plan, monitor and stimulate high growth (notably through revitalised SOEs), 'strong' in the sense of having legislative and administrative capacity to share [sic] and direct policy, and 'strong' in the sense of being able to mobilise and deploy capital into sectors where private industry will not venture.”

This view is reinforced, for example, by the the call, in the 2005 ANC National General Council's Consolidated Report on the Strategic Context of the National Democratic Revolution and the State of the Organisation, for a “more confident assertion of the role and character of the developmental state” (ANC, 2005b) and the statement in the ANC’s (2006) online journal, ANC Today, that the movement was working to “ensure that government is properly equipped to fulfil the requirements of a developmental state, capable of playing a leading and active role in the reconstruction and development of South Africa.”

5.1.2 Economic policy aimed at integrating South Africa into the global economy

5.1.2.1 Export-biased trade and investment policy

Whereas the RDP made “attacking poverty and deprivation” its “first priority”, to be achieved by recasting the economy to meet the “basic needs” of South Africa’s citizens (ANC, 1994), GEAR 11Castells (2000a:212-337) devotes 125 pages to analysing the developmental states of the Asian Pacific, in particular Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan. Crucially, he observes that the success of these developmental projects was contingent on the geo-political situation during their early stages, i.e. the Cold War; specifically, they benefited significantly from economic support from America and Great Britain (Castells, 2000a:280).
changed the emphasis to growth, necessitating "a transformation towards a competitive outward-oriented economy" (DoF, 1996:1, emphasis added).

This meant "deep-rooted reforms": among other elements, the abandonment of high levels of social spending in favour of fiscal discipline; monetary policy aimed at reducing inflation; the gradual liberalization of foreign exchange; the continued reduction of import tariffs (the tariff regime had already been lowered as part of South Africa's GATT obligations); tax reforms; and trade and industrial policies that "aim to promote an outward-oriented industrial economy, integrated into the regional and global environment, and fully responsive to market trends and opportunities" (DoF, 1996:3-7). GEAR specifically included measures to make it easier for foreign investors to borrow money in South Africa (DoF, 1996:12).

GEAR noted that "Increased openness to international trade and capital flows is one of the hallmarks of the more rapidly growing developing economies world-wide. Foreign direct investment plays an important role in encouraging growth" and accordingly suggested that foreign direct investment, especially in "export-oriented manufacturing" was necessary for faster growth and consequently that the South African economy should be made more attractive to foreign investors (DoF, 1996:Appendix 12).

As part of the government's commitment to attracting foreign investment, President Mbeki established an International Investment Council in 2000 (originally announced in 1999 (Mbeki, 1999)) and an International Marketing Council in August 2000 to promote "brand South Africa" abroad and "Encourage patriotism and national pride" (see webpage at http://www.imc.org.za/content/view/1/3/) - the government's embrace of the language of corporate branding extended to appointing a well-known Bollywood actor as "global brand ambassador" for South Africa (Mbeki, 2006b).

5.1.2.2 Tariff reduction

In an offer to GATT, effective from January 1995, South Africa replaced "all quantitative import tariffs on agricultural and industrial products with ad valorem tariffs" and proposed "a phased reduction of tariffs over periods varying between 5 and 8 years" (DoF, 1996:Appendix 10; Blumenfeld, 2006:435-437).

Tariff reduction has, in accordance with an emphasis on trade, been substantial - in addition to the removal of non-tariff barriers, the average (unweighted) tariff rate fell from 22% in 1988 to 11% in 2003 (IMF, 2003b:27) - although Blumenfeld (2006:437) questions the actual extent of the reforms, suggesting that the "tariff regime has remained relatively complex and cumbersome."

The IMF awarded South Africa a rating of 5 in the Fund's trade restrictiveness index in 2003, a rating which compares "reasonably well" with other emerging market economies; by 2003, non-tariff barriers were primarily related to textile imports (IMF, 2003b:27).

Bond (2005:199) attributes hundreds of thousands of job losses to tariff reduction as cheaper imports squeezed local producers out.
5.1.2.3 Debt repayment

The ANC government agreed to repay the foreign debt incurred by the apartheid government, which exceeded $20 billion (Bond, 2005:200), as a “market confidence-boosting measure” (Gumede, 2005:78).

5.1.2.4 Participation in multilateral and bilateral agreements

In the 1990s, the South African government also began to participate in international economic institutions such as the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs and its successor, the World Trade Organisation. The ANC signed an $850 million loan from the IMF12 in 1993, a condition of which was that South Africa would sign the GATT, which duly occurred in December 1993 (Bond, 2005:199; Gumede, 2005:77). South Africa’s commitments on trade liberalization were agreed during 1994 (Gelb, 2005:369). South Africa also entered into several bilateral free trade agreements: amongst others, the Interim Co-operation Agreement with the EU was in place shortly after the 1994 elections, with the final EU-South Africa Trade, Development and Co-operation Agreement being signed in 2000 (Blumenfeld, 2006:443-444).

5.1.2.5 Capital controls

South Africa has gradually relaxed constraints on capital flows since 1994 but restrictions remain for citizens and South African companies - the restrictions are mainly on capital outflows (IMF, 2004b:42). Citizens’ ability to invest abroad or borrow foreign currency is still strictly limited, and corporate and institutional investors are permitted to make foreign portfolio or fixed investments only within prescribed limits (IMF, 2003b:19). Firms must repatriate funds involved in foreign exchange transactions within a specified time.

5.2 The effect of post-apartheid economic policy on trade and capital flows

The previous section shows that the ANC government shifted the focus of economic policy from poverty-alleviation to export-led growth with the adoption of GEAR in 1996, an outcome Gelb (2005:397) suggests was determined by “powerful political and economic imperatives.” The overall effect of the conservative - “prudent and frugal” as the IMF puts it - macroeconomic policies has been to shape a more robust economy, as reflected in steadily rising sovereign credit ratings13 and the

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12 The letter of intent was drafted by none other than Alec Erwin and Trevor Manuel, “the ANC’s two key economic specialists” (Sparks, 2003:184).

13 Standard & Poor’s rating of South Africa’s foreign currency debt is shown in the table below (IMF, IMF, 2003b:38, IMF, 2004b:38); these ratings equate South Africa with countries like Egypt, Mexico and Thailand, which also had foreign debt ratings of BBB- in mid-2002 (IMF, 2004a:48):

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<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Rating</th>
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<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>BB+</td>
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<td>1999</td>
<td>BB+</td>
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<tr>
<td>2000</td>
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<td>2002</td>
<td>BBB</td>
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<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>BBB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>BBB</td>
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longest period of economic growth on record (Burgess and Harjes, 2005:360). This section aims to illustrate the effect of this policy adjustment on the flows of goods and capital into and out of South Africa - in other words, to assess the change in South Africa's economic connectivity to the rest of the world under ANC rule, a change summarised by the IMF as "After years of isolation, [South Africa's] economy has become much more open and increasingly well integrated with overseas markets" (Burgess and Harjes, 2005:360).

5.2.1 Imports

After trade liberalisation, imports grew rapidly until 1997, after which year the growth slowed substantially, picking up again in 2003 (Gelb, 2005:390).

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<th>2004</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Imports of goods and services</td>
<td>32.8</td>
<td>30.2</td>
<td>33.1</td>
<td>30.9</td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>57.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imports of goods</td>
<td>27.2</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>27.4</td>
<td>25.7</td>
<td>26.9</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>48.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imports of services</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>9.3</td>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Imports</td>
<td>1.63</td>
<td>2.56</td>
<td>3.84</td>
<td>8.29</td>
<td>19.60</td>
<td>11.32</td>
<td>18.40</td>
<td>30.55</td>
<td>29.70</td>
<td>55.20</td>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Imports</td>
<td>18.40</td>
<td>19.74</td>
<td>23.36</td>
<td>30.18</td>
<td>33.00</td>
<td>29.24</td>
<td>26.70</td>
<td>29.70</td>
<td>28.25</td>
<td>29.27</td>
<td>41.08</td>
<td>55.20</td>
</tr>
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5.2.2 Exports

Exports have increased substantially since 1994, and the composition of exports has become increasingly diversified in the same period (see Tables 5.4 and 5.5) (Butler, 2004:53; Gelb, 2005:390,396; Blumenfeld, 2006:429). The decline in the importance of mineral (primarily gold) exports and the rise in the importance of machinery and equipment is worth noting, although the growth rate of non-gold exports fell off after peaking in the mid-1990s, with 2002 and 2003 recording shrinking non-gold export volumes - the average annual growth rate from 1994 to 2003 was just over 6 percent, an "unspectacular" performance that was in fact lower than the growth of overall world trade in the

14 Gold sales formed 15% of South Africa's GDP in 1980 but had dropped to less than 3% in 2000; the contribution of all minerals to GDP fell from 22% in 1980 to 6% in 2000 (Sparks, 2003:19,26).
same period (Blumenfeld, 2006:429). South Africa’s share of world trade actually declined, “falling to 0.53 per cent between 1995 and 1999 and 0.44 per cent between 2000 and 2003” (Blumenfeld, 2006:429).

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<th>1998</th>
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<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Exports of goods and services</td>
<td>34.3</td>
<td>33.7</td>
<td>36.6</td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td>36.3</td>
<td>45.9</td>
<td>56.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exports of goods</td>
<td>29.1</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>31.7</td>
<td>30.9</td>
<td>31.7</td>
<td>38.4</td>
<td>48.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nongold</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>27.9</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>33.9</td>
<td>43.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gold</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exports of services</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>8.3</td>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minerals</td>
<td>61.3</td>
<td>50.7</td>
<td>45.6</td>
<td>36.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food, beverages</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Textiles and clothing</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic processed goods</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>28.1</td>
<td>27.4</td>
<td>29.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machinery &amp; equipment</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>19.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other manufactured goods</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Table 5.5: Percentage shares of merchandise exports, by sector, 1990 to 2002 (Source: TIPS, 2003; cited in Gelb, 2005:396)

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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Exports</strong></td>
<td>1.98</td>
<td>2.55</td>
<td>3.34</td>
<td>8.79</td>
<td>25.53</td>
<td>16.29</td>
<td>23.55</td>
<td>27.85</td>
<td>29.98</td>
<td>45.93</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


One example of South Africa’s less-than-spectacular export performance since the demise of apartheid is the fruit sector, which has faced increased competition from Southern Hemisphere agricultural producers like New Zealand and Chile, with China an emerging competitor - for example, South Africa and Chile both exported 178,000 metric tons of apples in 1980, but by 2000 Chile, with exports of 415,000 metric tons, had pulled far ahead of South Africa, with a total of only 255,000 metric tons (Barrientos and Kritzinger, 2003:96).

The export performance of the automotive industry, however, was remarkable. The government introduced the motor industry development plan (MIDP) in 1995 - “Vehicle exports, almost measured in handfuls before the MIDP, were around 140 000 in 2005 and are set to reach 250 000 next year... To differing degrees, all local vehicle manufacturers have been absorbed into their foreign parents’ supply networks” (“Painful lessons in meeting demand”, Financial Mail, 14 April 2006). (South Africa also imported nearly 209 000 cars in 2005, which accounted for half of all new-vehicle sales, resulting in a R28 billion trade deficit for the South African motor industry (“Import braking point”, Financial Mail, 7 July 2006).)
### Table 5.7: Exports from South Africa, 1990 to 2004, in US$ billions

(Source: WTO via http://www.dti.gov.za/)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Exports</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>23.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>23.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>25.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>29.22</td>
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<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>31.01</td>
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<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>26.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>26.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>29.98</td>
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<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>29.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>29.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>36.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>45.93</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 5.2.3 Foreign investment in South Africa

Foreign direct investment increased markedly after 1993, peaking at 2.5% of GDP in 1997, largely due to the partial privatisation of Telkom (IMF, 2003a:76).

While total foreign investment into post-apartheid South Africa is similar to comparable emerging market countries, the split between fixed investment and portfolio investment has been unusually skewed in favour of portfolio investment - combined fixed and portfolio investment averaged 5% of GDP annually between 1994 and 2002, but the proportion of fixed investment was much smaller than that for comparable countries (Ahmed et al., 2005:3); the share of FDI in total capital inflows was only 30% for South Africa but 88% for the comparison countries between 1994 and 2002 (IMF, 2004a:49).

Foreign direct investment in South Africa has remained low when compared to other emerging market countries, net inflows averaging 1.5% of GDP during 1994 to 2002, a period in which a group of comparison countries averaged 3%; the average value falls to 0.7% if two large transactions are excluded, namely the partial privatisation of Telkom in 1997 and the purchase of De Beers by (London-listed) Anglo American in 2001 (IMF, 2004a:48). It is significant that the majority of the direct investment that did arrive has been used for mergers and acquisitions rather than new factories (Gelb, 2005:387; Butler, 2004:54; IMF, 2003a:78).

The low value of foreign direct investment mirrors, however, the low level of investment by domestic business - private investment averaged just over 12% of GDP between 1994 and 2003 in comparison with over 13% in 1982 and 14% in 1988 (Gelb, 2005:385-387). Tony Erhenreich (2003:90) of Cosatu bemoaned the “unpatriotic capitalists” for causing “some of the problems in our economy”, asking plainly, “if South African business people are not demonstrating confidence in the economy, how are South Africans going to get somebody else to think that theirs is an economy worth investing in?”

The European Union has provided about 90% of the FDI between 1994 and 2002, with the UK alone accounting for 74% of the total; the rest was provided by the USA (6%) and Asian (3%) (IMF, 2003a:77).

Alexander (2002:165) claims that “more capital has fled from South Africa since 1994 than has come into it.” As Bond (2005:193) notes, South African foreign direct investment abroad exceeded incoming FDI in 1997.

15The set of 59 comparison countries included Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Botswana, Kenya, China, India, Thailand, Vietnam, Egypt, Israel, Turkey, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru.
5.2.4 South African companies listing on foreign stock exchanges

A noteworthy development has been the granting of permission for a small number of major South African corporations to move their primary listings offshore, allowing them to access foreign capital in overseas financial markets. Between 1997 and 2005, five large firms\(^{16}\) moved their primary listings from the JSE to the London Stock Exchange (Southall, 2005:460-461).

5.2.5 Loans from Bretton Woods institutions

The World Bank offered policy advice and training to South Africa in the transitional period of 1990 to 1994, and has continued to offer policy advice to the ANC government - this influence is discernible in the GEAR strategy. The World Bank Group has also offered financial and technical support, including a small number of loans (US$61 million of loans have been approved but not much more than US$26 million had actually been disbursed by 2004) and grants (US$37.7 million by 2004) (IMF, 2004b:43).

5.3 Attempts at reforming multilateral institutions

The ANC's 2002 National Conference at Stellenbosch adopted a preface to the Strategy and Tactics accepted at the previous conference in 1997; the updated document stated that “the standing of South Africa has been enhanced, at the core of the efforts of developing countries and Africa in particular to reverse the unequal power relations that define global politics and economics today” (ANC, 2002d). Patrick Bond (2004:4-10) suggests that the ANC government, through its involvement in the multilateral institutions of global governance - the UN, WTO, World Bank and IMF - as well as various high-profile conferences and summits, has made some attempts at reforming the system of “global apartheid”, although these reforms were “systematically frustrated” so that the net effect was that Mbeki helped to “preserve the overall premises of capitalist globalisation.” Despite “Pretoria's increasingly active globe-trotting reformism” - and Mbeki “has emerged as an African statesman determined to reshape the architecture of global political and economic governance in order to cater for the needs of Africa, the South and the global poor” (Daniel et al., 2005:xxvii) - the South African government was able to achieve little (Bond, 2004:17).

Alden and Vieira (2005) note that the “activism on the part of three middle-income developing countries in particular - South Africa, Brazil and India - has resulted in the creation of a 'trilateralist' diplomatic partnership, itself a reflection of broader transformations across the developing world in the wake of globalisation”, with this partnership “actively challenging the position and assumptions of the leading states of the North.” This partnership is expressed in the Brasilia Declaration (IBSA, 2003), of which Ian Taylor (2005:19) notes, “Making neo-liberalism work for all is [the] central message.”

\(^{16}\)The firms were Billiton, South African Breweries, Anglo American, Old Mutual and Dimension Data (Southall, 2005:460).
5.4 The New Economic Partnership for Africa’s Development

The New Economic Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), the “economic blueprint”\textsuperscript{17} for the African Union (Butler, 2004:159), launched in 2002, is the embodiment in policy of the “idea of an African Renaissance” - in which South African leadership is implied (Schoeman, 2003:359) - and an expression of the “defining concept of Mbeki’s government” (Sachikonye, 2005:570). For Bond (2004:21), NEPAD is nothing less than an attempt to “relegitimise” the Washington Consensus of neo-liberal economics “across the [African] continent” that quickly degenerated into “farce” (Bond, 2004:103). Bond (2004:104-105) highlights the extent to which the World Bank, IMF, “Northern” politicians and “major transnational corporate executives” were involved in drawing up and supporting NEPAD, while NEPAD was criticised by “virtually every major African civil society organisation, network and progressive personality.”

NEPAD’s critics suggest that it is “merely GEAR writ large for the continent” (Daniel et al., 2005:xxxvii) (on the question of legitimacy, Kanbur (2003) notes that most of the heads of state who were involved in NEPAD’s formation were democratically elected). The central premises of NEPAD are that “deeper integration into the world economy will benefit the continent” and that the “enlightened proponents of NEPAD will discipline Africa’s ubiquitous dictators” (Bond, 2004:106-107). Alexander (2002:152) claims that this means the South African government is making the mistake of “placing its faith in the international capitalist class rather than in the social movements of the common people.” In short,

“the fact that the ANC leadership, together with their allies in Algeria, Nigeria, Senegal and elsewhere have adopted the neoliberal economic orthodoxy of the Washington consensus as the frame of reference for the promotion and implementation of NEPAD means nothing less than that it will benefit only the elites if it works at all. The vast majority of the urban and the rural poor will remain on the margins, desperately trying to eke out an existence in an alien and hostile world” (Alexander, 2003:17)

For Lesufi (2004:810), “at the heart of NEPAD is the continuation of the programme of the global and South African multinational corporations’ expansive tendencies in an attempt to find solutions to the crisis of world capitalism... the South African state serves to facilitate this penetration of African economies and markets by global and local multinational corporations.” Neville Alexander (2003:14) holds that “the economic basis for President Mbeki’s attempt to spearhead the revival of Africa exists in South Africa itself. The interests of the South African state and capital converge and coincide on this domain.” The “emphasis that NEPAD places on promoting the private sector simply echoes the current dominance of the neo-liberal economic paradigm, as promoted by the IMF and the World Bank” (Loxley, 2003:122).

\textsuperscript{17}Kanbur (2003) suggests that NEPAD’s scope is continually widening - its proponents have become too ambitious; he argues for “a toning down of expectations and rhetoric.”
5.5 Conclusion

The ANC inherited in 1994 an economy that was largely isolated from global economic activity as a result of sanctions imposed on the apartheid government. In his first State of the Nation address to Parliament as President, Nelson Mandela (1994) announced that South Africa faced the “major challenge” of “re-entering the global economy”, a process which the new government addressed comprehensively. This integration - which Sparks (2003:18) describes as the transformation of South Africa “from an isolationist siege economy into a player in the new global marketplace”18 - resulted from the ideological triumph within the ANC of neo-liberal economic prescriptions and the consequent emphasis on export-led growth. Until the early 1990s, what little economic policy the ANC had was based on the nationalisation clauses of the Freedom Charter, a position quickly abandoned in favour of an embrace of what is usually described as “orthodox neo-liberal” or “Washington consensus” economic policy, a shift manifest in the change from the RDP to GEAR. Latterly, the state has, in tacit acknowledgement of the failure of GEAR to deliver benefits to the poor, expounded the virtues of the developmental state, rhetoric which has been accompanied by a large state investment programme, emphasis on the state-owned enterprises, public works and attempts by the state to direct industrial policy.

GEAR specifically pursued “openness to international trade and capital flows” as the means to stimulate economic growth in South Africa. In particular, the government looked to foreign direct investment as an economic panacea; the ANC government’s willingness to repay debt incurred by the apartheid regime was ascribed to the necessity of not upsetting international financiers. South Africa joined GATT (subsequently the WTO) and signed several bilateral trade deals. Import tariffs were substantially reduced. The overall effect was that South Africa’s previously isolated economy rapidly became integrated with the global economy. By 2004, imports stood at triple their 1990 levels while exports had approximately doubled from their 1990 value - post-apartheid South Africa’s export performance was not entirely disastrous but certainly far from spectacular. Foreign direct investment, however, was disappointingly scarce, both in absolute levels and in comparison with other developing countries. Most of the investment that did arrive was portfolio investment, and the small amounts of FDI went mainly into mergers and acquisitions of existing businesses rather than new ventures. The reticence of foreign investors is understandable given the low investment by South Africans themselves, with some analysts suggesting that the post-apartheid period saw a net capital outflow.

The ANC government, in keeping with its populist oratory, did attempt to reform the multilateral institutions that govern, to some extent, the world economy. These efforts bore little fruit, and the ANC was roundly criticised at home for pandering to international capitalists. Similarly, the flighty rhetoric of the African Renaissance and the ambitious New Economic Partnership for Africa’s Development had little by way of concrete achievement to show for themselves.

18“Since 1990 the country has moved from an inward-looking import substitution model toward an outward-looking export-led growth model” (Kahn and Blankley, 2006:275).
Chapter 6

Analysing the ANC’s policies on nationalism in South Africa

This chapter integrates the previous three chapters, which covered respectively the theory on the network society, identity and nationalism proposed by Manuel Castells in *The Information Age*, the African National Congress’ policies on fostering South African nationalism and the manner in which ANC-in-government economic policy has integrated South Africa into the world economy. The chapter aims to illuminate the prospects for the ANC’s putative South African nationalism using Castells’ theory. The exposition is laid out in two broad sections. Firstly, the consequences of the reversal of South Africa’s economic isolation are considered. Secondly, Castells’ interpretations of identity and nationalism are applied to the context of democratic South Africa and the implications for nation-building elucidated. In principle, then, the chapter aims to form a prognosis for the ANC’s intended South African nation using Castells’ theoretical configurations (obviously there are other theories that could be used for such an analysis).

Two topics are tackled in order to prepare the ground for the theoretical discussion described above. First, the current state of South African national feeling is briefly examined. Second, the degree to which contemporary South Africa resembles Castells’ network society pattern is investigated. The following section deals with the first of these topics.

6.1 Assessing the ANC government’s success in fostering a “broader South Africanism”

This section evaluates the success of the ANC government’s policies in instilling a “broader sense of South Africanness” amongst South Africa’s 44-odd million\(^1\) citizens.

\(^1\)This estimate of South Africa’s population is quoted in Butler, 2004:30.
6.1.1 An increasing sense of being South African

Post-apartheid South Africa has been presented with a number of narratives supporting the idea of a new nation: Desmond Tutu’s “Rainbow Nation”, Nelson Mandela’s “miracle” (1999) and “New Patriotism” (Chidester et al., 2003b:308) and Thabo Mbeki’s “African Renaissance”. The country has also seen several much-commented on symbolic attempts at creating “a new sense of unity”, including the acclaimed Constitution, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, then-President Nelson Mandela’s donning of the Springbok rugby jersey in 1995, and the successful bid to host the 2010 World Cup (Koelble, 2003:162). As outlined in Chapter 4, ANC government policy has promoted the ideal of a united South African nation.

The ANC (2005d) has itself stated that, while it would be a “wild claim” to “proclaim that the new, and long sought after, South African nation has emerged”, “progress has been made towards non-racialism, non-sexism and a common patriotism and nationhood”; the A Nation in the Making discussion document observed that “there is an improving sense of an overarching identity” (PCAS, 2006:94); and President Mbeki (2003c) has noted that “our people are developing a strong sense of a common patriotism.” Chidester et al. (2003b:295) conclude that “government policy has largely succeeded in fostering a sense of being ‘proudly South African’” – “South Africans are increasingly identifying with a broader South African identity”; the authors point to research by the Human Sciences Research Council (Roefs, 2002) which shows that, between 1998 and 2000, “a substantial, and growing, proportion of people ‘strongly identified themselves’ as South Africans.” Roefs (2006:93) found that a “strong national identity is prevalent in South Africa.” Alexander (2002:41) suggests a more nuanced view, with the “socio-economic integration of the black and white middle-class elites” producing a “superficially united, non-racial political class”, an outcome he attributes to “economic necessity” and “massive propaganda.”

6.1.2 Yet the South African identity remains “thin”

Despite the rise in the number of people identifying themselves as South African, the prevailing sense is that South Africanism lacks substance – the actual content of this identity is “superficial, perhaps even meaningless” (Chidester et al., 2003b:316), “very thin” (Chidester et al., 2003a:17), and “no more than ornamental” (Alexander, 2002:82). The new, non-ethnic national identity, more a “matter of hope rather than accomplished fact” (O’Meara, 1997), has yet to “incorporate the cultural, linguistic, religious and other human resources of South African people” (Chidester et al., 2003a:17). The “notion of a South African nation is tenuous at best” (Maré, 2005:502).

As Alexander (2002:81) points out, “the people of South Africa do not constitute or participate in ‘one culture’, however defined.” The “illusion of coherence and unity... dissipates at the first touch

2 Chidester et al. (2003b:307) strike a more cautious note: “However, as South African history has demonstrated, such symbols of nationalism [as national flags, anthems and sports teams] do not actually make a nation” while Maré (2003:36) describes such efforts as “shallow and symbolic.”

3 Klandermans et al. (2001a:108) suggest that the ANC’s attempt to forge a common identity has not been very successful – “In the first years of democratic government in South Africa social identity seems to have diversified” (emphasis added).
of the bitter reality of racial, class and caste divisions” (Alexander, 2002:107). “South Africans are not at the point where they can say with any degree of confidence that the there [sic] is substantive agreement amongst themselves about questions of language, culture and race” (Soudien, 2000:42).

The strength of national identity amongst South Africans varies by race, with Africans displaying the strongest national identity and whites the weakest (Roefs, 2006:81). National identity is also “somewhat stronger amongst poorer Africans and coloured people than amongst the other class groups” (Roefs, 2006:82). The strength of identification with South Africa also varies by province, with Western Cape residents most likely to display “sub-group affiliation, as opposed to national identity” and least likely to be “enthusiastic about being citizens of South Africa” (Grossberg et al., 2006:64).

Grossberg et al. (2006:61), in analysing data from the 2003 South African Social Attitudes Survey, discern the fragmented nature of “what truly constitutes being a South African”, with citizens holding views that “varied in relation to place of birth, citizenship, country of residence, language, religion, respect for the law, feelings of belonging and ancestry.” In other words, “being South African” has no consistent meaning for South Africans. Notably, while being born in South Africa was regarded as essential to being South African by 92 percent of respondents, only 79 percent of respondents felt respect for the country’s institutions and laws was an important element of being South African. Preferences for cultural distinctiveness also varied strongly by province, with only 28 percent of Western Cape respondents agreeing that it would be better if “race/ethnic groups maintain distinct customs”, in comparison to 71 percent of Free State and 65 percent of KwaZulu-Natal respondents (Grossberg et al., 2006:65).

6.1.3 Citizens have multiple layers of identity

The ANC (1997b; 1997c; 1997d; 2005d) is unequivocal in its assertion that the supposed South African national identity should be the dominant one for citizens. The 2003 South African Social Attitudes Survey results reveal that whereas 64 percent of respondents were strongly attached to their city/town of birth, 62 percent were strongly attached to South Africa (Grossberg et al., 2006:62-63).

In their analysis of identity in South Africa, Chidester et al. identify two important factors opposed to the ANC’s programme⁴, both of which suggest that national identity, while a convenient political instrument for the ANC, might not be particularly important to the ordinary population. First, the increasing significance since 1989 of “new forms of ‘post-national citizenship’” has “dissolved any necessary link between the rights of citizenship and loyalty to the nation-state” (Chidester et al., 2003b:298), an idea captured by Nira Yuval-Davis in the phrase “multi-layered citizen” (Yuval-Davis (1999), cited in Chidester et al., 2003b:299-300). Second, in a conception echoing Castells’ (1997:6) formulation of identity as a “process of construction of meaning”, Chidester et al. (2003b:310) propose that

⁴O’Meara notes dryly that “the history of the last two hundred years, even in South Africa, is littered with the failure of such [nationalist] projects to ignite any mass enthusiasm. The mere appearance of nationalist interpreters and their nationalist discourse does not nationalism make. Simply preaching at people is a notoriously inefficient way of getting them to change their behaviour, let alone their identity” (O’Meara, 1997).
"Identity, in other words, may be based on what matters most to people, founded on the matrix of cultural and creative occasions and performances that give meaning to individuals' lives. Political, ethnic, or national identities may not carry the same weight for many as their religious, sporting, cultural or even historical lives" (emphasis added).

This point is borne out by data from the 2003 South African Social Attitudes Survey - when asked for the most important factor in their self-identification, nationality was the fifth-most popular choice for respondents of all races, ranking behind family or marital status, race or ethnic background, occupation and gender; nationality was the prime determinant of identity for only eight percent of those surveyed (Grossberg et al., 2006:66). The choice of primary factor of self-identification varies by racial group, with race being the most common selection for Africans and family being most common for whites and coloured people, while Indians and Asians identified most strongly with their occupation; a large percentage of coloured people identified themselves most strongly by their race/ethnicity and a large percentage of Africans identified themselves most strongly with their family (Grossberg et al., 2006:68). Roefs' (2006:83) analysis of the South African Social Attitudes Survey confirms this - "Race group identity was strongest amongst black Africans." Roefs (2006:85-87) further analysed the survey data to show that strong racial identities were correlated with strong national identities for coloured and African respondents but not for white and Indian/Asian respondents; over two-thirds of South Africans combined a strong language identity with a strong national identity, with isiXhosa speakers being most likely and English speakers being least likely to have strong language and national identities (English speakers tend by far to be least likely to have a strong South African identity).

Bornman (2006:398) observes that "certain groups in South Africa - and Afrikaans-speaking Whites, Indians and Shangaan/Tsonga-speaking African Blacks in particular - have a strong sense of their uniqueness and distinctiveness as a group."

The subtleties inherent in the concept of identity are brought out in several discussions of the manifold strands of identity in South Africa. Polzer (2004) shows how Shangaan-speaking refugees from Mozambique, who arrived in what was then the homeland of Gazankulu and is now the Bushbuckridge area of South Africa in the mid-1980s, were able to assimilate themselves into the local Shangaan-speaking population but were denied permission to settle by the Sotho homeland of Lebowa on account of their being Shangaan. The refugee's ability to assimilate into the local population was precisely because of their shared Shangaan language and culture, despite their different citizenship, i.e. not being South African (Polzer, 2004:5).

Wilhelm (2006) describes how the Chinese "communities" in South Africa have different relationships to the country depending on when they emigrated. The original wave of Chinese emigrants to South Africa arrived in the late nineteenth century, followed by Taiwanese in the late 1970s and 1980s (many of the Taiwanese have subsequently left South Africa - Wilhelm (2006:365) suggests that "their South African citizenship was more about expediency than commitment"). Substantial numbers of their second- and third-generation descendants have themselves emigrated, so that "there are now Chinese South African communities in the US, Canada, Australia and, more recently, New
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Race (self-attribution)</th>
<th>% of population</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>African</td>
<td>76.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>10.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coloured</td>
<td>8.9</td>
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<td>Indian/Asian</td>
<td>2.6</td>
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Table 6.1: South Africa’s population by race, 1996
(Source: Butler, 2004:29)

Zealand” (Wilhelm, 2006:351). When these Chinese South Africans “encounter other Chinese they feel less Chinese and more South African” (Wilhelm, 2006:354). Post-apartheid immigration from mainland China has led to tensions between the older Chinese communities in South Africa and the newcomers - the “new immigrants from the People’s Republic of China have brought these issues of identity to the fore, with a marked schism between the two groups” (Wilhelm, 2006:354-355).

6.1.4 Division tending towards class lines, although racial divisions persist

As Anthony Butler (2004:30) points out, the Rainbow Nation metaphor “inadvertently highlights the degree to which the constituent colours of South Africa’s rainbow have retained much of the ‘apart­ness’ they acquired during the segregationist and apartheid eras.” For Koelble (2003:163), the “gulf between ‘black’ and ‘white’ in South Africa still appears to be cataclysmic.” For example, Gauteng province still largely displays the residential segregation by race that characterised apartheid (Butler, 2004:39). The ANC’s (2005d) own assessment is that “Economic apartheid is well and alive.” Moleke (2006:220) concludes that “the labour market is far from being deracialised.” Roberts (2005:486-496) remarks that “Living standards have been shown to be closely associated with race, with poor Africans accounting for the overwhelming majority of the poor.” Altman (2005:426) presents figures demonstrating that unemployment is concentrated among African workers.

While race remains highly correlated with socio-economic variables, the growing number of African citizens attaining middle-class status has seen democratic South Africa riven more and more by class rather than by racial divisions (Roberts, 2005:494-495; Erasmus, 2005:11; Runney, 2005:403; Grossberg et al., 2006:72; Alexander, 2002:67-72). As Habib et al. (2003:20) put it, the “apex of the class structure” has been deracialised.

6.1.5 English becoming the national language

South Africa has eleven official languages, with the most widely-spoken, isiZulu, serving as primary language for slightly more than twenty percent of the population (see Table 6.2). Despite being only the fifth-most widely-spoken primary language, English is assuming the role of the “de facto national language for South Africa’s middle classes” thanks to “its status as a ‘global language’” (Butler, 2005:426).

In her study of the (mainly young) clientele of an upscale shopping center in the Johannesburg suburb of Rosebank, Nkuna (2006:265-266) observes that English is “the main language” heard at the shopping center - nearly eighty percent of the people interviewed preferred English for conversing with friends, despite it being the home language of less than
I

Primary household language | % of population
--- | ---
IsiZulu | 22.9
IsiXhosa | 17.9
Afrikaans | 14.4
Sepedi | 9.2
English | 8.6
Setswana | 8.2
Sesotho | 7.7
Xitsonga | 4.4
SiSwati | 2.5
Tshivenda | 2.2
IsiNdebele | 1.5
Other | 0.6

Table 6.2: South Africa’s population by household language, 1996
(Source: Butler, 2004:29)

2004:35). There is “a trend towards English as the real and aspirational language of commercial and political discourse” (PCAS, 2006:97). Alexander (2002:92) warns, however, that a “policy of de facto unilingualism”, where English is used as the “only language of power” serves to sabotage democracy in South Africa.

6.1.6 Increasing bias towards Africanism and away from non-racialism

Despite the ANC’s long history of support for the principle of non-racialism, Filatova (1997) argues that “Africanism... has [by 1997] gained momentum more than ever before both inside and outside the ranks of the ANC and its allies.” Butler (2004:32-33) discerns that, since 1999, “a quasi-Africanist conception of history and of politics has become increasingly prevalent in the movement’s leadership, and the doctrine of non-racialism has been somewhat eroded.” Habib et al. (2003:3-5) discern a perception that Mbeki has abandoned Mandela’s emphasis on reconciliation in favour of “empowerment and narrow African nationalism”, although they moderate their assessment by grounding Mbeki’s rhetoric in the need to overcome the racial divisions established during apartheid, while Mangcu (2003:108) ascribes a “more radical Africanist approach to national politics” to Mbeki’s presidency. Erasmus (2005:25-27) highlights the ANC’s “appeals to race as a resource for political gain” and for deflecting criticism. Frederik van Zyl (“In Need of a Road Map”, Financial Mail, 14 July 2006) identifies the contradiction between the ANC’s rhetoric of non-racialism and the policy of black economic empowerment which makes Africans “blacks of a special kind”; Van Zyl Slab-
bert asks of the government, “do you want us to be a nonracial democracy or a racially classified democracy?”

If we accept Koelble’s (2003:162) contention that the “multi-racialism of the ANC - and its eclectic anti-apartheid coalition built around universal principles of non-racialism and opposition to discrimination of any kind - may provide the party with an opportunity to help build a new sense of trust, solidarity and identity if it is able to provide reasons for South Africa’s citizens to embrace their shared historical experience and provide a new shape that allows for transcendence” then the turn away from non-racialism towards Africanism has troubling undertones for the prospects of national unity in South Africa. (Notably, the 2003 South African Social Attitudes Survey indicated that slightly more than one-third of respondents felt a strong African identity (Grossberg et al., 2006:62-63).)

6.1.7 A brittle identity and the politics of difference

Despite acknowledgement of the existence of a vague “broader South Africanism”, commentary on collective South African identity emphasises that this identity is fragile: while it has the potential to become stronger, this tentative identification with the nation-state can easily be shattered if South African politics emphasises division instead of unity - as Koelble (2003:144) points out, “the persistence of huge inequities will continue the politics of acrimony based on race and difference.” Van Zyl Slabbert (1997, quoted in Chidester et al., 2003b:295-6) reinforces this contention, cautioning “Anybody who under-estimates the potential for racial and ethnic outbidding in South Africa, can budget generously for disillusionment in the nation-building industry.” Alexander (2002:88) warns that “the crucial task of the political leadership, and of other elements of the ruling elite, is to ensure by democratic means that no intersection of economic interests and ethnic consciousness takes place.”

Mamdani (1998), after remarking on the presence in post-apartheid South Africa of an “ethnic citizenship” which claims for itself the exclusive privileges according to the “indigenous” inhabitants of the land (ANC rhetoric and policy is replete with distinctions between the indigenous and the non-indigenous, between the oppressed and the colonialists, between the African and the European), presents the cautionary example of newly-decolonised Uganda, a country in which there “developed a clear breach between the language of rights and that of justice. In native ears, rights-talks [sic] increasingly sounded like a defence of settler privilege, and justice a language to articulate native grievance”, a situation which provided the political opportunity for the “demagogue” Idi Amin to exploit the “wave of popular discontent” to gain power.

Chidester et al. call attention to the finding that “Diversity, in and of itself, can create violent division more easily than it can enable mutual recognition, understanding and tolerance.” (Chidester et al., 2003b:314, citing Chrisman (1996)), an argument which Koelble (2003:147-148) makes less forcefully, noting that “there are several racial, cultural, religious, ethnic and organisational forms of solidarity at work in South African society. None of them, however, lend themselves to the nation-building project that is required to be able to transcend identity-based communities as they re-enforce the politics of difference.”
6.2 Democratic South Africa as a network society

The first two volumes of *The Information Age* present a comprehensive body of theory about economic and social aspects of the network society. *The Rise of the Network Society* and *The Power of Identity* were first published in 1996 and 1997 respectively, shortly after the ANC assumed political power in South Africa in 1994. This section examines the extent to which South Africa - 12 years into ANC rule - exhibits the characteristics of the "network society" archetype, bearing in mind Castells' point that each society expresses the pattern of the network society according to its own history and institutions and culture.

6.2.1 The rise of the network society within South Africa

6.2.1.1 Global economic links

Section 5.1 shows that the ANC-in-government has deliberately increased the degree to which South Africa's economy is linked to the world economy, an approach codified in the GEAR policy, a policy which Habib and Schultz-Herzenberg (2005:185) interpret as indicating that South Africa's "privileged strata" have "captured" the government. Section 5.2 demonstrates that the policy has indeed been effective - Southall (2006a:198) summarises the results as:

"no longer contained and protected by state-imposed barriers, domestic conglomerates have increasingly 'unbundled' and internationalised; international and domestic finance capital is increasingly dominant over manufacturing; shareholding is concentrated in the hands of institutional investors, whose fates are determined by managers who are less and less accountable to shareholders and even the law; employee share ownership participation schemes are presently fashionable, yet there seems little guarantee that workers' share ownership will prove sustainable; few women are smashing through the 'glass ceiling' and corporations remain overwhelmingly male territory; and the gap between the financial rewards to top management and their workforces is widening alarmingly in a country where the patterns of inequality are already deeply entrenched."

As Carmody (2002:266) puts it, "While South African companies pressed to be able to globalise their activities, they are now also being shaped by globalisation, through direct competition with other TNCs, and through competition for financial capital."

Amalgamation with the world economy has seriously affected industries that compete with imports. These - "particularly the ultra-labour intensive industries" - have been "hard-hit" (Nattrass, 2003:150).

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7 Peter Alexander (2006:38) argues that, for South Africa, "national dynamics were probably more significant than in most other countries in the recent past", specifically in regards to the "emergence of new identities", "there is evidence of strong local characteristics as well as powerful global influences."

8 Castells (2000a:122) himself observes that the South African economy is experiencing "rapid reincorporation into the global economy after several decades of relative isolation." Buhlungu and Webster (2006:252) point to the role of government policy: "The state has facilitated many of these processes of corporate and market restructuring through liberalising trade and capital markets, fiscal conservatism and restructuring state enterprises through privatisation."
One estimate attributed the loss of 65,000 jobs in the textile industry alone to competition with cheap Chinese imports ("New Pattern Wanted", Financial Mail, 30 June 2006); Bond (2005:199) suggests that hundreds of thousands of jobs have been lost due to cheap imports; Carmody (2002:256) cites figures showing that "since 1996 when neo-liberal economic reforms were introduced more than a half a million jobs have been lost, in contrast to the 600,000 that were meant to be created"; Makgetla (2004:264) notes that the official unemployment rate rose from 16% in 1995 to over 30% in 2002.

South African employers pursued competitiveness "in response to globalisation" by increasing the capital intensity of their operations, so manufacturing employment failed to rise in step with exports (Altman, 2003:174,175). Meanwhile, American and European protectionism halted the expansion of agricultural employment (Altman, 2003:174).

6.2.1.2 Flexible enterprises

Transnational production networks  Buhlungu and Webster (2006:249-251) note that South African economy has become incorporated into the transnational production networks Castells identities as characteristic of the network society:

- "the most significant challenge facing the workplace has been the transition from a domestically-oriented economy to a more globally integrated one. This has led to wide-ranging forms of corporate restructuring effectively integrating companies into more globalised corporate and production structures... Domestic corporate restructuring is also proceeding rapidly, often intertwined with processes of internationalisation or increased international pressure in the domestic market... Overall, these trends tend to reduce the autonomy of South African companies - and of the state - whether with respect to workplace strategies or to national developmental goals such as domestic capital accumulation, job creation or product innovation."

Flexible contracts replace permanent employment  Broadly, "the imperatives of an increasingly global system of accumulation are profoundly changing employment relations" (Webster, 2005:65).

"Meanwhile, the restructuring of work results in the emergence of three zones in the labour market [in South Africa]. Firstly, there is the core, which is occupied by skilled permanent workers who enjoy relatively high wages, benefits, good working conditions and job security. Secondly, there is the non-core zone occupied by semi-skilled and non-skilled workers in precarious jobs who earn low wages, enjoy no benefits, work under poor conditions and have little or no job security. Finally, there is the periphery, which is occupied by those in the informal sector and the unemployed" (Buhlungu and Webster, 2006:251).

Barrientos and Kritzinger (2003:92) examine the experience of the fruit industry in South Africa as "an important example of an export sector that has undergone rapid transformation as a result of
globalisation in the past decade.” They find “a changing pattern of employment in the sector and the increasing use of different forms of flexible labour” - the changing employment pattern refers to the replacement of permanent employment with contract labour. They suggest that integration into the global economy exposed the fruit industry to “two contradictory pressures”: first, increased risk and price competition, which forces employers to reduce labour costs by pursuing flexible work practices; second, the demand for quality and employment standards necessitates a “pool of relatively skilled and stable workers” (2003:92).

6.2.1.3 Increasing polarisation of the labour force

“Liberalization has polarized the labor market” (Webster, 2005:67). As Alexander (2002:96) puts it, “the imperatives of globalisation are driving the rulers of South Africa in all sectors of our society in a very specific direction, that is, towards becoming a deeply divided society in which, as in all countries today, the divisions are determined by class.” One consequence of this is the tendency toward polarisation of the workforce - manufacturing, in particular, became increasingly capital-intensive during the 1990s (Nattrass, 2003:146) - between the (skilled) employed and the (unskilled) unemployed (Nattrass, 2003:147,152; Altman, 2003:164; Buhlungu and Webster, 2006:251). “Real average remuneration rose as employment fell during the 1990s” (Nattrass, 2003:147). According to Ashwin Desai (2003:17), “Over the last decade, there has been an increase in 'nonstandard' (temporary, casual, contract, part-time) forms of employment that heralds the ubiquity of a relatively unstable and nonunionized workforce.”

6.2.1.4 The space of flows

Urban centres joined together through space of flows The importance of the major urban centres - the four metropolitan centres are Gauteng, Cape Town, Durban and Port Elizabeth-Uitenhague - in post-apartheid South Africa is evinced by their being the destination of some three-quarters of all internal migration, with Gauteng - receiving 42 percent of the total - the most popular destination for internal migrants (Kok et al., 2003:35-36). This pattern is consistent with Castells’ thesis of the space of flows: the metropolitan centres act as the local nodes of the space of flows and consequently are the hubs for economic activity, becoming magnets for migrants seeking work.

Johannesburg “stands out as Sub-Saharan Africa’s best candidate for a 'global city’”, whereas Cape Town shows signs of “secondary world city status” (van der Merwe, 2004:43). Both Cape Town and Johannesburg appear in the “world city network” identified by Taylor et al. (2002).

The homogenising effects of the world-wide elite culture are also apparent - the government discussion document A Nation in the Making (PCAS, 2006:45-46) expressed alarm that the “the black and particularly African middle strata [of youth] are being acculturated into Euro- or American-centric credos as the primary frames of reference” with respect to “education, language and accents as well as concepts of civilisation”, acknowledging that the “cosmopolitanism that is reflected in the adoption and adaptation of United States and European music, dress and lifestyles” by young South Africans.
"does pose a general question of the impact of cultural globalisation on national identity." Rosenberg (2002) documents the influences of American music and styles of dress on young black South Africans.

6.2.2 The consequences of being a network society

The previous section makes it clear that post-apartheid South Africa, no longer economically isolated from the rest of the world, progressively resembles the archetype of the network society as delineated by Castells. This section evaluates whether Castells' predictions of the social consequences of this shift towards the network society are borne out in contemporary South Africa.

6.2.2.1 Declining civil society

As noted in Section 3.2.1, Castells announces the contraction of civil societies as their power is absorbed into the space of flows. Here, his concept of civil society and legitimising identity rests on the existence of a unified nation-state, an entity which civil society serves to perpetuate (by lending legitimacy) as well as modify. This situation manifestly did not apply to apartheid-era South Africa - black South Africans were in effect denied citizenship and the National Party government was in return denied legitimacy - civil society, in the sense intended by Castells, did not really exist for much of the population, since many of the institutions which constitute Castells' definition of civil society were devoted to overthrowing the state rather than prolonging it9 - "Under apartheid, the adversarial-collaborative divide largely took a racial form with the bulk of white civil society establishing collegiate relations with the state, and the majority of black civil society adopting a conflictual mode of engagement" (Habib, 2003:228). So this peculiarity of South Africa's history means that civil society, as Castells uses the term, only come into existence since the establishment of a government representing the interests of all South Africans rather than the white minority, a change that Gumede (2005:274) refers to as the "normalisation of South African politics."

Nevertheless, the question of the vitality of civil society in the democratic South Africa remains. Despite the "prominent role of civil society organizations10 in the struggle for democracy" (Butler, 2004:111), the overall impression is one of weakness11 - civil society organisations are in a "dismal

9Emphasising the - frequently ignored - significance of external forces, Koelble (2003:151) writes

"Much of the debate about the 'new' South Africa, its political dispensation, Constitution and electoral system, has been founded on the [fallacious] assumption that the transformation was achieved internally. ... As a consequence of these arguments, there is a sense that South Africa represents an anomaly on the African continent, that this is actually a country with a vibrant and strong civil society."

10The United Democratic Front comprised "trade unions, community groups, churches and civics", a "broad alliance" arrayed against racial oppression (Gumede, 2005:273-274). The UDF was established in 1983, becoming the leading "resistance movement in the absence of the banned political organisations" (Nthambeleni, 2006:298), and was absorbed into the ANC in 1991 (Gumede, 2005:273-274).

11In the analysis of Klandermans et al. (2001b:133), however, "Civil society in the new South Africa is vibrant and viable." They (2001b:134) find that the churches remain the civil society organisations with the most popular participation, while political parties have experienced the largest decline.
state" (Buhlungu, 2003:200) - the result of a decline beginning when civil society was excluded from the negotiations establishing the transitional regime (Maré, 2003:27).

The interest of ordinary citizens in politics has declined since the 1994 elections, a development that is "not particularly surprising" since, for many people "the 'struggle' is over" (Daniel et al., 2006:25). As Khosa (2005:131) notes, "participation levels in political life and activities appear to be very low." The political party which stands as the official opposition party to the ANC is the Democratic Alliance (DA) which garnered twelve percent of votes in the 2004 national elections, far behind the ANC's sixty-nine percent (Naidu, 2006:52) - the DA is "ineffective" (Southall and Daniel, 2005:34). Southall and Daniel (2005:37-40) draw attention to the decline of voter participation in national elections - well under sixty percent of the estimated number of eligible voters cast ballots in the 2004 elections; the total number of votes cast fell from that of the 1999 election, itself a substantial drop from the 1994 count.

The South African National Civic12 Organisation (Sanco) is in a state of "weakness" (Freund, 2006:310), a "patient in intensive care" (Gumede, 2005:273) which has failed "in finding a meaningful position in post-apartheid South Africa"13 (Nthambeleni, 2006:306).

The National Economic Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC), a "quasi-corporatist bargaining forum", has been largely ignored by the major business and labour groups (Butler, 2004:111). Buhlungu (2003:200) concludes that the trade unions are "weakening politically and organisationally"; he attributes the difficulties the unions have faced in post-apartheid South Africa to "the changed political circumstances in the country as well as... the insertion of South Africa into the modern global economy." The SACP and Cosatu have also lamented their own inability, despite their status as partners of the ANC in the Tripartite Alliance, to influence government policy14.

"Non-sectional associations, proclaiming universal goals or declaring that they act on behalf of humanity as a whole, are weaker than their sectional cousins" as donors have been "less indulgent" in recent years (Butler, 2004:114). Gouws (2006:163-164) observes "diminishing gender activism in the democratic era." The independence of formal NGOs has been compromised by financial dependence on business and the state (Habib, 2003:234).

Political campaigning has recently been revitalised by the formation of "Networks of community-based mass movements" - which fall outside of Castells' definition of civil society -as explored in the next section (Butler, 2004:114). Examining trends in participation in civil society, Khosa (2005:131) finds that participation in political parties, civics, street committees, and youth and church organisa-

12 Civic associations (civics) are "autonomous voluntary organisations", each local to a specific community, that "address the local grievances that residents have with their conditions of daily living, and are located outside formal governmental, party-political or developmental agency institutions" (Nthambeleni, 2006:297). Civics emerged as a feature of (African) township life in South Africa in the 1970s, becoming closely involved in the "fight for national liberation" through participation in the UDF in the 1980s (Nthambeleni, 2006:297-298).

13 Nthambeleni (2006:306) specifically points out that the end of apartheid deprived the civics of a common "identity" uniting them, with the result that SANCO fragmented as civics began "actively embracing local identities."

14 Webster and Buhlungu (2004:243) comment that "it would be premature to announce the marginalisation of [organised] labour in post- apartheid South Africa." The introduction of South Africa into the global economy, together with the "pressure on unions to identify with the goals of national development, as defined by the new political elite" has forced the trade unions to launch a number of "revitalisation initiatives" (2004:230,243).
tions has declined since 1994, although trade unions and cultural associations remain robust.

The ANC dominates the political sphere in South Africa (Butler, 2004:107; Southall, 2003:75; Southall and Daniel, 2005:34). The ANC: is the ruling party in the national government; runs all nine provincial governments (Southall and Daniel, 2005:54); “controls all major15 and almost all minor municipalities” (Freund, 2006:310); and leads a Tripartite Alliance comprising the largest trade union grouping and the SACP.

The ANC’s conception of itself as fulfilling a historic “mission... demands conflation of the movement with the state” and “argues for the collapse of civil society into the state”16 (Maré, 2003:43); Buur (2005:253) comments on “how the state and the ANC have tried both to undo and capture those forms of organisation that played an important role in the struggle against apartheid.” In this context, the ineffectiveness of the organs of civil society can be attributed as much to the South African political situation, in which the ANC17, laying claim to the legitimacy deriving from its struggle heritage18 (Southall and Daniel, 2005:34; Alexander, 2002:163), dominates the political scene, as to the local playing-out of a world-wide pattern of the progressive atrophy of civil society as a result of their increasing powerlessness. Nonetheless, Habib and Schultz-Herzenberg (2005:169) note that the ANC’s “policy concessions in the past decade have been largely to foreign investors and domestic capital (both black and white)... This is because it has been able to take the citizenry’s vote for granted... This lack of substantive uncertainty has eroded the citizenry’s leverage vis-á-vis state elites.”19

6.2.2.2 Resistance formed around communal identities

The theoretical thrust of The Power of Identity is that resistance to the ravages of globalisation in each society becomes organised around communal identities, including “territorial identities” (see Section 3.2.4) and social movements (see Section 3.2.5). In South Africa, campaigning against apartheid created a highly politicised populace, as activists “created nationwide networks of cross-class and anti-ethnic political organization” (Butler, 2004:106). Social activism in the apartheid period centred on achieving political equality for all races, with other social causes - for example gender equality and environmentalism - being largely deprecated in favour of the struggle against apartheid (Kraak, 1998;

15The ANC lost control of Cape Town in 2006.
16Klandermans et al. (2001b:133) observe that

“After decades of mobilisation against the state, 'black civil society' became the state. Thousands of officials left black civil society organisations in order to move into government. The liberation movement literally took office” (emphasis in original).

17For Johnson (2002:221),

“The restructuring of state-society relations has emerged as a primary goal of the ANC government led by Thabo Mbeki... Indeed, during the transition the traditional boundaries between government and civil society became blurred as large cohorts of civil society activists moved into government, and powerful constituencies of civil society, such as the trade unions and civic associations forged formal alliances with the ANC ahead of the 1994 elections.”

18As Sipho Seepe (2006:2) puts it, “each year the ANC craftily invokes the memory of struggle.”
19Steven Friedman (2005:738) comments that “there seems little need for the governing African National Congress (ANC) to account to the electorate since it is in no danger of losing an election in the foreseeable future.”

77
Gouws, 2006:143). With the formal demise of apartheid in 1994, activists have vigorously pursued the previously subordinated objectives (Kraak, 1998; Robins, 2003:268).

Since assuming power in 1994, the ANC government’s policies on water supply, housing, land allocation, electrification and HIV/AIDS treatment have evoked protest, at times ferocious, from “community-based” and “issue-based” movements, usually characterised as “new social movements” and increasingly organised in network formations (Butler, 2004:114). Habib (2003:236-237) identifies a “proliferation of informal, survivalist community-based organisations, networks and associations” and “a category of organisations that have been described by some studies as social movements”, both of which have “emerged in response to globalisation’s neoliberal manifestation in South Africa.” Examples of these latter movements are the Coalition Against Water Privatisation, the Soweto Electricity Crisis Committee, the Anti-Privatisation Forum, community-based resistance in Alexandra, the (Western Cape) Anti-Eviction Campaign, the Concerned Citizens’ Forum (later the Durban Social Forum), the Landless People’s Movement, the National Land Committee, the Land Access Movement of South Africa, the Water Crisis Committee, the Social Movements Indaba, the National Rural Network and the Treatment Action Campaign (Butler, 2004:114; Freund, 2006:320-322; Bond, 2004; Gumede, 2005:273-289; Desai, 2003; Ballard et al., 2005).

Recent years have also seen spontaneous local revolts in, amongst other areas, Tembisa, Tsakane, Viljoenskroon, Vrede, Memel, Warden, Hennenman and Ventersburg (Freund, 2006:320-322). International conferences, in particular the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development, witnessed “spectacular” protests (Freund, 2006:322).

Social movements “are becoming increasingly important as an alternative to political parties in the process of mediation between citizens and the state” (Klandermans et al., 2001b:134).

6.2.2.3 Declining state power

For Alexander (2002:162), “Castells’ description of the situation in which the state finds itself at the beginning of the twenty-first century tallies with the reality of the new South Africa” with “hardly any exception.” This section examines the situation more closely.

Globalisation of criminal activity Wilhelm (2006:363-364) records the involvement of “Chinese triad societies” in prostitution, smuggling of abalone, rhino horn and other protected species, diamond smuggling, drug trafficking, human smuggling, illegal gambling, extortion, vehicle theft and illegal imports. The senior government official charged with policing crime, Charles Nqakula, has

20 As Robins (2003:252) notes,

“[Township] residents who cannot afford to pay for electricity and water services, and who embark upon rent boycotts, once the defining feature of the anti-apartheid struggle, are nowadays hounded and evicted from their homes. Anti-evictions movements are growing as increasing numbers of urban poor people find themselves targeted for evictions. These urban activists, as well as those belonging to the Landless People’s Movement, have been identified by the state as a threat to good governance”.

21 These protests were also partly against the dismal administration of these municipalities (Freund, 2006:322).
stated that “Crime has been globalised... South Africans go elsewhere to commit crime and foreigners come here” (“Violent Nation”, Financial Mail, 7 July 2006).

Expanding economic links reduce policy autonomy The socio-economic policies of the ANC government - most notably GEAR - have been strongly influenced by the so-called Washington consensus (Koelble, 2003:152).

“the mechanisms of the international financial regime make it increasingly difficult for a nation-state to direct, let alone control, its resources towards addressing the problems of domestic justice and redistribution that are key to democratic consolidation and success. The abstract violence heaped upon the people of South Africa ... is an endemic feature of the neo-liberal economic strategy loosely described as the Washington Consensus” (Koelble, 2003:143).

Supra-national institutions absorb some sovereignty Alexander (2002:162-163) views President Mbeki’s concept of the African Renaissance, given institutional form in NEPAD, as an attempt by the South African government “to gain a better place for itself in the global pecking order” by putting together “regional and sub-regional cartells” - the “Mbeki administration, because of the choices made at the beginning of the 1990s, is doing exactly as Castells’ theory predicts.”

Marginalised identities claim power from state government Descendants of the Khoisan, the indigenous population of the Western Cape, have been granted First Nation status by the UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations, and have been demanding “national recognition within South Africa, but not in a separate homeland”, a form of “cultural nationalism” (Chidester et al., 2003b:306).

The granting of certain powers to traditional leaders in rural areas through the 2003 Traditional Leaders and Governance Framework Act in 2003 and the 2004 Communal Land Rights Bill can be viewed as consonant with Castells’ description of the manner in which territorially-bound, regional identities - in this case the traditional leadership - carve for themselves a portion of autonomy from the central state’s sovereignty. In other words, it is an example of the state ceding decision-making power to local authorities in exchange for continued legitimacy.

6.3 Evaluating the prospects for a South African national identity: applying Castells’ theory

The ANC has clearly spelled out its intention to forge a united nation in South Africa and intends to use its position in government to realise this aim (although it remains vague as to the precise substance of South African nationhood). This section applies the theory derived from Castells’ The Information Age, as summarised in Chapter 3, to the ANC’s nationalism project. In simple terms, this section asks what Castells’ theory mean for the ANC’s ability to promote nationalist sentiment in South Africa.
6.3.1 Integration into the world economy

The adoption of Washington Consensus economic policies, with the consequent integration of South Africa into the world economy, is crucial in regard to the potential for state-sponsored nationalism in South Africa. The ANC could have, on assuming power, turned South Africa’s back to the world, economically speaking, but the government opted instead to welcome the world economy with open arms, going so far as to establish an International Investment Council in President Mbeki’s first term. That the pattern of Castells’ network society pattern is discernible in South Africa - as traced in Section 6.2 - is a ramification of this economic policy stance.

6.3.1.1 A capitalist world

For Castells, the global economy was, following the collapse of statism, solidly capitalist by the end of the twentieth century, with even China “shifting from statism to state-led capitalism and integration in global economic networks” (Castells, 2000b:13). The pervasiveness of capitalism means that governments wanting to obtain the economic benefits of participation in the global economy must do so by conforming to the prevailing norms, failing which their countries would simply be ignored as investment and trading destinations unless they had particularly sought-after commodities to offer.

The economic result of the ANC government’s decision to open South Africa to the global economy is neatly captured in Southall’s (2006a:198) assertion that “since 1994, South African capitalism has become more rather than less like the contemporary capitalism of the Western world.” The economic policy of the ANC - a marked reversal from its support for nationalisation in particular - itself suggests that Castells’ description of the limited scope for governments to set their own economic course is unerring. The support of the ANC for capitalist economics has been a major source of frustration for its partners in the Tripartite Alliance over the last decade, but Castells suggests that the ANC has no other option as long as it continues to pursue export-led growth.

6.3.1.2 Economic polarisation

Several features of the global economy affect the labour force in South Africa. First, the transition from industrialism to informationalism; second, the effect of the flexible employment practices increasingly adopted by firms; third, the impact of trade on employment. All of these factors engender rising polarisation in the local workforce.

The contemporary world economy is not only capitalist, it is also, in Castells’ view, informationalist - productivity and competitiveness of firms depend on their ability to work with information, and information technology is “the critical ingredient of the process of work” (Castells, 2000b:259). This shift away from industrialism, in the context of capitalist restructuring, demands mainly educated, skilled workers and drastically reduces the demand for low-skilled workers, leading to the “bifurcation of work patterns and polarization of labour” (Castells, 2000b:266).
The flexible employment practices increasingly embraced by companies, who retain a core labour force while expanding and reducing the size of their “disposable” labour force according to market conditions, further exaggerate polarisation in the labour force, since it is the low-skilled workers who are worst affected as permanent employment is least available in those kinds of jobs which are increasingly automated out of existence or subcontracted to cheaper locations. Castells (2000b:251-255) observes that workers feel the effects of international economic links chiefly through the effects of increased competition resulting from expanding trade and through the “interpenetration of networks of production and management”, including multi-national corporations, across borders. These trends, in general, suggest a poor prognosis for South Africa’s workforce. Unemployment is high, especially among Africans; the number of unemployed workers increased dramatically between 1990 and 2002 as the unemployment rate doubled (2006:251). The labour force has strong racial divisions between skilled workers and semi-skilled or unskilled workers (Moleke, 2006:204), and Castells’ analysis implies little hope of secure employment for those without skills22. Africans still receive lower-quality education than white citizens (Chisholm, 2005:217; Reddy, 2006:399; Moleke, 2006:216), with the majority of schools remaining exclusively African (Chisholm, 2005:217).

The significance of the continued high levels of unemployment and low levels of job security lies in the social effects: the restructuring of the workplace displaces “confrontation, antagonism and disorder into the family, the household and the community”, precipitating a “broader social crisis whose symptoms are the breakdown of social solidarity” (Buhlungu and Webster, 2006:265). Alexander (2002:88), Chidester et al. (2003b:295-6) and Koelble (2003:144) all warn of the potential for the politicians to exploit the racial dimensions of inequalities in wealth with extremely deleterious consequences for national unity, as does Castells (2000a:126) himself.

6.3.1.3 Circumscription of state power

That state control is increasingly “bypassed” is an important element of Castells’ (1997:243) thesis on the contemporary world (see Section 3.3). If we accept Castells’ view, this loss of sovereignty naturally reduces the South African government’s ability to achieve its policy goals23. In economic terms, the government’s priority is clearly removing racial inequality and eliminating poverty, an aim which stands in opposition to the economic restructuring occasioned by integration into the world economy (Ehrenreich, 2003:84; Koelble, 2003:144,148; Chidester et al., 2003b:297) - the demands of economic competitiveness and the narrow focus of potential investors on cost shrink government’s leeway to provide social welfare (hence Castells’ (1997:252-254) prediction of the demise of the European welfare state).

22 Buhlungu and Webster (2006:253-254), in their longitudinal analysis of the membership of Cosatu since 1994, highlight the “decline of the unskilled stratum and the growth of the semi-skilled and skilled strata” as companies retrenched unskilled workers, a trend which stands in agreement with Castells’ analysis.

23 Carmody (2002:261) argues that the ANC government’s attempt to forge a “compromise between globalisation and social democracy... is being undermined as the state is increasingly characterised by embedded or institutionalised dependence on global forces.”
The significance of the circumscription of state power is in its suggestion that government, if it holds with neo-liberal economic policies, will not be able to reduce rampant unemployment and poverty amongst South Africans, which means that the racial inequalities in wealth will persist, together with the opportunity for discord they offer.

Referring to Castells’ argument about the decline of state power, Zegeye (2004:868-869) suggests that "In any project aimed at building a new nation largely through changing the identity of its citizens, such as the one embarked upon in South Africa, such a loss of power can be potentially devastating as it impinges upon cultural and political institutions’ capacity to initiate and lead the changes needed."

6.3.1.4 Cultural effects of the space of flows

South African elites are not immune to the “cosmopolitan” culture shared by elites worldwide (see Section 3.1.2.5), as a visit to the expensive shopping malls of Cape Town, Durban or Johannesburg will attest. The implication of the international culture - a cosmopolitan identity un-rooted in a specific society - is that South African members of the elite will tend to conform to the globally uniform elite culture rather than to the South Africanism espoused by the ANC, membership of this elite meaning cultural disconnection from a supposed shared South African culture. This obviously reduces the prospects for a cohesive, meaningful, South African identity being adopted by the local constituents of the cosmopolitan elite. The conclusion of Grossberg et al. (2006:62-63) that South Africans with “higher income, higher education and higher employment status” tended to feel less national pride than other other South Africans does not seem surprising since these are precisely the people who constitute the elite.

24 Habib and Schultz-Herzenberg (2005:185) suggest that there is a “contradiction in [the South African government’s] policy ensemble... while South Africa’s trade, industrial, monetary and fiscal policy is what it is, it will work against the social expenditure side of the Budget... There is therefore a contradiction at the heart of South Africa’s policy programme.”

25 Chidester et al. (2003b:312-313), citing Baeker (2000), point to the South African government’s fear of South African cultural products being swamped by cultural imports, mainly from the USA and Europe - this fear is manifest in, for example, the Presidency’s report on A Nation in the Making (PCAS, 2006:45). Nkuna (2006:267-270), surveying the youthful shoppers at an expensive Rosebank mall, described their preference for international clothing brands and US music. Joel Netshitenzhe (2001:79) acknowledges that the “extra-national centripetal tendencies of globalisation” encourage South Africans to identify with a global culture.

While none of the authors in Senses of Culture: South African Culture Studies (Nuttall and Michael, 2000) are directly concerned with global influences on South African popular culture, several of the essays touch on the issue obliquely, illustrating some of the ways in which South Africans absorb and use international popular culture artefacts and concepts: writing on “hair politics”, Zimitri Erasmus (2000:391) observes that South Africans attitude to “African” hairstyles “can be understood as a process signifying a re-making and revalorization of Africanness through the borrowing and localization of Afrocentric black American images and ideas... These transnational cultural borrowings and recreations suggest local uses of and for the global”; the uniquely South African genre of “contemporary black dance-music”, kwaito, “is an evolution of... South African disco [music], with elements of American hip-hop, European house music, and other international sounds thrown in” (Stephens, 2000:256); Sandra Klopper (2000:180-181) notes that Western Cape graffiti artists drew inspiration from “American hip-hop culture” - noting that seeking to “express opposition to the apartheid government by turning to America for inspiration” is hardly a new development, she gives the example of “1950s Sophiatown, where ‘cosmopolitan’ aesthetic forms were used to focus and articulate local expressions of resistance.”
The effect of this tendency is made worse by the significant rural population of South Africa and the racial differences in proportion of urban population - in 1996, the proportion of the coloured population living in urban rather than rural areas was around eighty percent, with the proportion of whites and Indians/Asians significantly higher (almost all Indians and Asians lived in urban areas), while the proportion of Africans living in urban areas was approximately forty percent, itself less than the proportion for the population as a whole at around fifty percent (Kok et al., 2003:34) and a continuation of the situation under apartheid (Maré, 2003:30). In other words, the rural population is mainly African while the cities and towns have mixed populations, so an increasing cultural distance between urban areas and rural areas - bearing in mind also Castells concept of urban areas linked into the space of flows being disconnected from their surrounding regions - is liable to stoke rather than damp racial tensions, or at least be susceptible to exploitation for such political purposes.

6.3.2 Reaction against integration into the world economy

Castells claims that the common factor among the various forms of resistance against the effects of economic and cultural globalisation is that they are all formed around shared identity. Two forms of these resistance identities are especially worthy of comment in relation to contemporary South Africa.

6.3.2.1 Cultural nationalism

Cultural - rather than primarily political - assertions of national identity (see Section 3.2.3) seem, at first glance, to have no relevance in South Africa, a country which Castells considers to have no nations. However, the cultural material exists for potential attempts at the mobilisation of ethnic groups as nations. Some attempts have already been made, although the two strongest candidates, the Afrikaner nationalism of those seeking a Volksstaat and the Inkatha Freedom Party’s Zulu nationalism have failed to ignite mass support (Chidester et al., 2003b:296,305-306; Gouws, 2003:53; Southall and Daniel, 2005:51-54; Alexander, 2002:155,161; Butler, 2004:112; Naidu, 2006:50; Piper, 2002).

6.3.2.2 New social movements

The proliferation of new social movements in post-apartheid South Africa has been frequently remarked upon (see Section 6.2.2.2). In Castells’ view, these movements are each configured around a specific identity - Soweto resident, HIV/AIDS patient or landless South African for example. Yet, as Castells points out, these identity-based movements have sharply defined boundaries, their divisiveness implying that they are not suitable material for a South African national identity. Indeed, the more these identities become meaningful to South African citizens, the less adherents of these movements are likely to be susceptible to the ANC’s invocations of national unity27.

26Zegeye (2004:868-870) notes the “cultural deprivation” among the black youth of Mamelodi township, which he attributes to the apartheid government’s deliberate policy of providing poor education for Africans.

27Peter Alexander (2006:59) concludes that
6.3.3 Identity and nationalism

The previous section has considered the impact of South Africa’s entry into the world economy - as described by Castells - on the prospects for nation-building. This section contemplates the ANC’s nationalism project in the light of Castells’ schemas of identity and nationalism.

6.3.3.1 Identity: legitimising and resistance

Castells’ views on what identity is are similar to those of the ANC: identity is a socially constructed phenomenon, made from cultural artefacts, and Castells allows the possibility of persons having multiple identities, with one being primary. However, Castells’ distinction between categories of identity, specifically those of legitimising identity and resistance identity, bears a less-than-sunny forecast for South African nationalism. Legitimising identity, linked to the sovereignty of the nation-state within its territory, loses relevance as global networks usurp authority, with the dialectic consequence of a surge of localised resistance identities. The symbolic significance of the state is thus reduced.

6.3.3.2 Nationalism

Castells specifically disavows the necessity of any link between nationhood and citizenship (1997:51): states can exist that contain no nations or several nations, with South Africa being a state without a nation. The most important ingredients for bonding a nation-in-the-making together are a common language and shared experience, neither of which assertions bodes well for a South African nationalism. South Africa has eleven official languages, not one of which is the primary language for even a quarter of her citizens (see Table 6.2) and ANC policy, in the name of cultural diversity, maintains state support for all eleven languages. The various cleavages of South African society - between wealthy and poor, urban and rural, white and black, educated and uneducated, modernised and traditional - ensure that, at present, all South Africans cannot be said to share anything like the same experience. Castells (2000a:111) notes the “lack of a national basis for these new [post-colonial] African nation-states, a basis that in other latitudes was usually made up of shared geography, history and culture”, an observation surely applicable to South Africa.

Despite the growing clamour of Africanism within the ANC, Castells proposes that race - i.e. African-ness in the case of South Africa - is not a viable binding agent for fabricating a collective identity.

"The likely trend, however, is probably towards a weakening and fracturing of South African national identity. This is a consequence of both axes of globalisation: the vertical dimension increasing inequalities and reducing common experience, and the horizontal dimension expanding opportunities for shared understanding with people in other countries."

28Neville Alexander (Alexander, 2002:82) suggests that the future of the various languages of South Africa, in particular Afrikaans, is potentially seriously divisive, “the most explosive issue on the terrain of South African politics”, an opening for the creation of ethnic separation that could shatter the fragile country.

29Sparks (2003:45) quotes a Soweto resident as complaining that

“Our best and brightest [Africans] are all running away from Soweto. The very people who are leaving are the people with the money and the know-how that Soweto needs. They are cowards driving their BMWs..."
Castells writes that nations are given life through “cultural constructs and political projects”, which, on a superficial reading, is favourable towards the ANC’s state-driven nationalism project. Yet, nationalism is constructed with participation by both elites and masses - without the involvement of the latter, the identity will fail to take hold. A government cannot form a nation by proclamation, as Castells’ example of the USSR evinces. Castells’ argument that the state cannot “construct national identity by itself” has “the most portentous implications for the promotion of national unity in post-apartheid South Africa. If it is correct, it may well leave us stranded with a rainbow in our eyes but without the pot of gold in the form of the (non-racial) ’nation’” (Alexander, 2002:90-91).

6.4 Conclusion

While the emergence of a South African national identity is occasionally proclaimed, a more nuanced view takes several qualifications into account. First, social and economic integration between racial groups applies only to the wealthy and middle-classes and not to the poor. Second, this South African identity is incoherent and lacks substance - it is an “illusion” in Neville Alexander’s words. Third, the importance and meaning of South African national identity varies according to race. Fourth, citizens have a host of identities, with national identity being by no means the most important source of meaning. Fifth, as racial divisions become less firm, class divisions are becoming increasingly significant.

Other noteworthy aspects of contemporary South African society are the position of English as the de facto national language (the most widely-spoken primary language, isiZulu, is spoken as home language by less than twenty-five percent of South Africans), the rising volume of the rhetoric of Africanism and the according weakening of support for non-racialism, and the continued strong potential for the exploitation of racial and ethnic disparities for political ends.

Under the ANC government, South Africa has joined the global economy and, consequently, the characteristics of Castells’ network society archetype are now discernible in South Africa. Global economic links have affected many industries; local companies have adapted to intense foreign competition by adopting flexible employment practices, South African firms have become drawn into transnational production networks, and the labour force is becoming polarised by division between the skilled and the (increasingly unemployed) unskilled. Civil society has declined in importance, in accordance with Castells prognosis for legitimising identity. The post-apartheid years have seen the proliferation of resistance against the effects of integration into the world economic system by social movements, formed around specific identities. The ANC has found its autonomy in government to be somewhat limited by global forces, given that the policy aims are set by the local elite. In short, the experience of democratic South Africa since 1994 bears out Castells’ theory on the network society and identity.

Taken as a means of predicting the future, Castells’ theory make for, in general, pessimistic predic-
tions for the ANC's project of fashioning a South African nationalism (unclear as the contours of that nationalism may be). According to Castells' theoretical framework, South Africa's integration into the world economy has decisive implications. First, the country has no choice but to remain a capitalist country as long as it is linked into the global economy. Second, economic polarisation will tend to increase, suggesting that large-scale unemployment and associated poverty - both social maladies concentrated amongst Africans who lack skills as a consequence of apartheid-era education policies - will persist. Third, the government will have limited capacity to ameliorate these social ills. Fourth, the (multi-racial) elite will be absorbed into the unified, cosmopolitan culture of the space of flows; this elite will be mainly urban, culturally disconnected from the rural population. Fifth, identity-based social movements will be the principal form of resistance against the effects of integration with the global economy; these resistance identities tend to undermine the ANC's aim of making a South African identity the primary identity for South Africans.

Castells' theory on identity and nationalism hold little good news for the ANC's desire to shape a "broader South Africanism." The reduction in state authority means that the state is simply less relevant as a source of meaning - legitimising identity is on the wane, and resistance identities are the main precipitators of collective solidarity. Further, citizenship is not to be equated with nationality, which is precisely the equation the ANC is attempting. Castells specifically emphasises the necessity of a shared language for national cohesion, a condition which is not present in present-day South Africa, which has eleven official languages. Castells' second necessary binding ingredient, shared experience, is also not obtained in South Africa, a country in which a variety of social cleavages are discernible. Castells also undermines the Africanists' position - race is not a viable element for constructing national identity.

In sum, then, the implications of South Africa's incorporation into the world economy - namely, the imprint of the network society pattern on the country - tend to subvert the ANC government's stated aims of cultivating a strongly-felt South African national identity, and Castells' conceptualisations of identity and nationalism also suggest that, considered theoretically, attempts by the state to promote a united South African identity are unlikely to succeed under contemporary conditions.
Chapter 7

Conclusion

The intention of this thesis has been to use the theory of Manuel Castells’ *The Information Age* to examine the tensions between the ANC’s programme of promoting a South African nationalism and the social consequences of the ANC government’s policy of closely integrating South Africa into the global economy.

The main thrusts of the arguments presented in this thesis are fourfold. First, the ANC is rhetorically committed to building a “united, non-racial, non-sexist and democratic” South African nation, although the rhetoric is rather vague - beyond generalities, the rhetoric has not found sufficient application in policy for the precise intention of the ANC to be discerned. The ANC’s stance in regard to South African nationalism, which resembles more a syncretistic amalgam than a coherent conceptualisation, bears the imprints of the variety of ideas which have enjoyed influence in the ANC’s near-century-long history, in particular African nationalism (albeit an African nationalism that is generally not racially defined, although the elimination of race (i.e. indigeneity) as a criterion leaves the definition of “Africanness” itself unclear), non-racialism, and the notions of the National Democratic Revolution and Colonialism of a Special Type, imported from the South African Communist Party. The stated ambition of the ANC is for the South African population to embrace a shared, South African identity as a primary source of meaning. While there was evidence of a widespread feeling of South Africanness, this is superficial and not itself uniform, with South African society still evincing divisions along racial and (increasingly) class lines.

Second, the ANC’s economic policy since assuming office has unequivocally directed South Africa at reversing apartheid South Africa’s sanctions-imposed economic isolation from the rest of the world by pursuing full integration with the global economy, a policy most clearly expressed in GEAR, with its emphasis on growth through exports and concessions aimed at attracting foreign capital to finance employment-generating economic activity. This policy was shown to be highly effective - at least in terms of increasing international economic links if not growth or employment - as discerned in the rise in trade and (disappointingly, largely portfolio investment) capital flows since 1994.

Third, the effects of this coupling of South Africa to the world economy on South African society were to push South Africa towards exemplifying the pattern of the network society, as described by Castells. The trend towards South Africa assuming the form of the network society can be most
clearly discerned in developments in the economy and employment - especially in those industries facing foreign competition - and in the rise of social movements as a means of political mobilisation; the trajectory of civil society is less clear, with the decline of traditional civil society as predicted by Castells attributable also to particular South African factors, especially the social distortions imposed by apartheid and the dominance of the ANC as a political institution. The much-bewailed about-turn of the ANC with respect to economic policy, manifested by the supercession of the RDP by GEAR, can itself be taken as confirming Castells' claims of limited government autonomy.

Fourth and finally, the consequences of South Africa increasingly conforming to the archetype of the network society tend to undermine the ANC government’s nation-building programme, according to Castells' formulation at least. The exposure of South African firms to international competition polarises the labour force between the skilled and the unskilled, leading to rising under- and unemployment and thereby increasing poverty, especially amongst black Africans, who were deliberately denied the quality of education provided to white South Africans under apartheid; the state, acting more on behalf of capital than its own citizens, is unable to assist the impoverished and simultaneously satisfy the demands of capital for fiscal restraint. The better-off citizens have the opportunity to participate in the cosmopolitan, worldwide culture of Castells’ space of flows, which reduces the importance of being specifically South African for the “elite.” Those who are left behind by - disconnected from - the networks of money and culture fight back, but this resistance again reduces the importance of South Africanness in favour of other, more particular and more sharply defined identities. In general terms, Castells' conceptualisation of identity predicts the decline of symbolic significance of the state for its citizens, while his presentation of nationalism emphasises the necessity of a common language and shared experience for national unity, neither of which condition is manifest in present-day South Africa with its eleven official languages and stark divisions between race, class and urban/rural areas.

In sum, then, application of Castells’ ideas indicates that, provided the ANC government remains committed to maintaining South Africa's economic ties with the rest of the world, the government is unlikely to make much progress in establishing a meaningful and widely-held “broader South Africanism.” The importance of this putative inability, however, is itself unclear - a South African national identity may not be necessary, and the general trend across the developed world - as argued by Baudrillard and Vinen - is for the decline of state identity as significant. The crucial factor for South Africa’s political stability and cohesion, however, is whether ethnic identities will be exploited for political purposes - it is in this possibility, repeatedly played out in post-colonial Africa, that the danger of violent fragmentation lies.
Appendix A

The ANC, the tripartite alliance, the National Democratic Revolution and Colonialism of a Special Type

A.1 The African National Congress

A.1.1 South African Native National Congress established to end racial discrimination

The South African Native National Congress was founded at Bloemfontein in January of 1912, with the founding leaders being “more moderate and conservative” (Gumede, 2005:1-2). The Congress’ constitution mandated a “Pan African Association”1, with the organisation aiming to unite2 the various African tribal groups to form a single political front aimed at “the removal of racial discrimination” (Gumede, 2005:1-2).

A.1.2 Africanism slowly becomes non-racialism

The 1940 national conference of the ANC “marked an important ideological turning point”, as the organisation “resolved to formulate a comprehensive race relations policy”, eschewing racial discrimination and - taking the principle of equal opportunity to its logical conclusion - pursuing “African dominance in the political and economic life of South Africa”; the Congress also decided to extend its membership to the (black African) masses (Gumede, 2005:13).

Chief Albert Luthuli, elected as president of the ANC in 1952, led the ANC into “embracing a much broader non-racist approach” (Gumede, 2005:20). The ANC adopted the Freedom Charter in 1956

1“Beginning with the ANC in 1912, the creation of a national, rather than an ethnic or tribal consciousness, became a key rallying cry of virtually every liberation movement in Africa” (Slovo, 1988).

2“At its founding conference in 1912, the ANC issued a clarion call for African unity under the Slogan, We Are One People” (Slovo, 1988).
(Suttner, 2005), drawn up a year earlier by the Congress of the People at Kliptown. The Congress of the People included representatives from the ANC, South African Indian Congress, South African Congress of Trade Unions\(^3\), the South African Communist Party\(^4\), the Coloured People’s Organisation and the Congress of Democrats (Gumede, 2005:20; Sparks, 2003:171). The Freedom Charter advocated that the “rights of the people shall be the same, regardless of race\(^5\), colour or sex”, endorsing the termination of racial discrimination in South African society (Congress of the People, 1958).

ANC membership “was officially opened to all races” at the 1969 conference at Morogoro, Tanzania (Gumede, 2005:24) - “non-racialism was a relatively late development in the history of the ANC, and it only came into full bloom in the late 1970s and 1980s” (Mangcu, 2003:110).

### A.1.3 A history of ideological tensions

Ideological tension is exhibited throughout the ANC’s history, a consequence of the movement being, in its own words, a “broad church”, “home to a variety of progressive ideological currents nationalist [sic]. Africanist, socialist and of a variety of different classes and strata, all united behind a common commitment to national democratic transformation” (ANC, 1997a) - thus “the Congress has an extended history of internal factionalism, detachment from mass political organization, and political conservatism” (Butler, 2004:108). “The ANC had never been an ideologically homogeneous organisation. From its inception in 1912 ... it has been an alliance of disparate elements drawn together for the common purpose of fighting racial oppression” (Sparks, 2003:176). “Ideological diversity has also been marked, with many deeply religious activists co-operating with equally numerous communists and traditionalists” (Butler, 2004:109).

The left-leaning and the more conservative elements of the ANC have battled each other for control of the ANC since as early as the 1927 national conference, when the leftist wing won control, with Josiah T Gumede, a militant communist, elected as president general and Eddie J Khaile, a member of the Communist Party of South Africa’s\(^6\) Central Committee, elected as secretary general; the conservatives regained control in 1930 (Gumede, 2005:10).

The 1949 conference saw another significant shift, with the radical Youth League\(^7\) and the leftist wing successfully opposing the conservatives - Walter Sisulu was elected as secretary general and

\(^3\)The South African Congress of Trade Unions, the forerunner of Cosatu, was the first non-racial trade union in South Africa (Gumede, 2005:20).

\(^4\)The SACP had been banned in 1950 (Sparks, 2003:171).

\(^5\)The Freedom Charter’s guarantee of equal status for all racial groups led the Africanist wing of the ANC to split off in 1959, forming the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), after failing to wrest control of the ANC from the “leftist multiracial leadership” (Gumede, 2005:21-22; Sparks, 2003:353; Butler, 2004:108).

\(^6\)The then-banned Communist Party of South Africa “resuscitated itself” as the South African Communist Party in 1953, although it only publicly announced its “underground” existence in the early 1960s (the African Communist - a “Forum for Marxist-Leninist Thought in Africa”, first published in 1959 - did not initially declare itself as the SACP organ it was) (SACP, 2006:9-10).

\(^7\)Pan-Africanism, as developed in South Africa, was therefore closely allied to the new radicalism within Congress which was highlighted by the emergence of the CYL in 1943-4” (Walshe, 1970:332).
Nelson Mandela joined the National Executive Committee (Gumede, 2005:18). The ANC now sought majority rule in South Africa (Gumede, 2005:18).

During the years in which the ANC was in exile\(^8\), beginning in the early 1960s, the South African Communist Party exerted considerable influence within the ANC (Gumede, 2005:24). As Suttner (2005) puts it, “elements of ANC history, which are nowadays not spoken of in polite circles, indicate that during the period of exile, the 1950s, and inside the country in the 1980s, socialist doctrine enjoyed widespread support.” “Communism was especially influential in the development of the ANC” (Butler, 2004:109). Alexander (2002:48) demurs:

> “beyond rhetoric, it [the SACP] had very little real influence on the macro-economic conceptions and philosophical orientation of the popular leadership of the ANC... Although the ANC was, and is, a multi-class organisation, there is no doubt that for most of its existence as an organisation, its dominant, indeed hegemonic, ethos was represented by the interests of the upward-striving black middle class.”

### A.2 Colonialism of a Special Type

The theory of “Colonialism of a Special Type” is explained in the 1962 programme of the SACP, and was influenced by the “Native Republic” thesis of 1928 (Filatova, 1997:49; Alexander, 2002:37; SACP, 2006). The central claim of the theory of Colonialism of a Special Type, distinguishing it from ordinary colonialism, is that “both the colonisers and the colonised shared one country”\(^9\) (ANC, 1997b,d).

The theory of Colonialism of a Special Type originated within the South African Communist Party but was adopted by the ANC at the Morogoro conference in 1969 (Filatova, 1997:49).

While Alexander (2002:38) suggests that the theory has been consigned to the “dust heap of South African history”, the concept still surfaces in ANC policy documents, including the *Strategy and Tactics* adopted in 1997 and validated in 2002.

### A.3 The National Democratic Revolution

The concept of the “National Democratic Revolution” is predicated on the thesis of Colonialism of a Special Type (Filatova, 1997:49). The basic principle of the National Democratic Revolution is that a socialist society\(^10\) in South Africa can best be achieved through two stages of revolution\(^11\).

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\(^{8}\) The ANC was banned under the Unlawful Organisations Bill of April 1960 (Gumede, 2005:23).

\(^{9}\) “The CST [colonialism of a special type] thesis correctly describes the reality that, in the post-1910 period, the substance of the colonial status of the blacks has remained intact, even though its form may have altered” (Slovo, 1988).

\(^{10}\) According to Slovo (1988), the “South African Communist Party, in its 1984 constitution, declares that its aim is to lead the working class towards the strategic goal of establishing a socialist republic and the more immediate aim of winning the objectives of the national democratic revolution which is inseparably linked to it.”

\(^{11}\) “The shortest route to socialism in our country is via a democratic state” (Slovo, 1988).
“content of the first stage is ‘the national liberation’ of the African people” (Filatova, 1997:49), in other words the “creation of a national democratic society” (ANC, 2002b). The second stage of the NDR, supported only by the socialist elements in the tripartite alliance, is the transition to socialism (ANC, 2002b).

The NDR was also adopted by the ANC at the 1969 Morogoro conference (Filatova, 1997:49). “The concept of the national democratic revolution guided the ANC and its allies through the political negotiations of the early 1990s” (Macozoma, 2003). The NDR provides the shared theoretical understanding which underpins the Tripartite Alliance: the report of the 2002 Alliance Summit (ANC, 2002b) recorded that “All components of the Alliance agree that the primary task of the current period is the implementation of the NDR. This common objective is the strategic political and ideological foundation of the Alliance.” The “dreary phraseology” of the NDR has enjoyed - and still enjoys - ideological hegemony within the Alliance despite it being “a device which has lost all relevance in the post-Cold War era” (Southall, 2003:75).

However, the ANC has effectively halted the NDR at the first stage, abandoning the second stage of socialism in favour of transformation, i.e. in favour of promoting empowerment and employment equity (Maré, 2003:37). Thus, the 2005 National General Council of the ANC, taking note of the progress made in consolidating democracy and the continued electoral support for the ANC, insisted that the NDR was entering a “new phase, in which the opportunities for accelerated transformation are greatly improved” (ANC, 2005b). The NGC reaffirmed that the “black working class and the rural masses remain the primary motive forces of the NDR”, yet drew attention to the “significant black middle strata” (ANC, 2005b). For Southall (2003:56), this is “ANC-speak” that “attempts to justify the party’s embrace of capitalism.”

12 “national liberation is ... a short-term class imperative for the working people” (Slovo, 1988).
13 The ANC (1997b) proclaims that the National Democratic Revolution does not aim towards the "creation of a socialist or communist society.” For Alexander (2002:48), “the SACP’s theory of a ‘two-stage’ so-called socialist revolution in effect abdicated the leadership of the ‘first’ stage of ‘national democratic revolution’ to the nationalist, that is, pro-democracy and pro-capitalist, forces in the alliance.”
14 Southall (2005:459) suggests that 

"with the changed balance of global forces brought about by the implosion of state socialism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and the need for the ANC-in-government to adapt to the post-1990 neo-liberal environment internationally, the interpretation of the NDR has been shifted in a much more conservative direction. Hence, instead of tilting the economy towards socialism, the NDR is now seen as: (i) legitimating the ‘historic role’ of the party in leading South Africa; (ii) validating the need for an interventionist state within the context of a mixed economy (iii) encouraging the existence, expansion, wealth and function of a black bourgeoisie; (iv) endorsing the need for close co-operation with capitalists of the old order some (at least) of whose ‘objective’ interests (for instance, in political stability) coincide with those of the liberation movement; and (v) quietly emphasising the role in ‘transformation’ of party elements which control the state, alongside the ‘patriotic’ bourgeoisie, at the expense of the working class and its allies” (emphasis added).

15 In a prescient piece of commentary, Slovo (1988), turning to the struggle to set the direction of post-apartheid society, noted that “It is obvious that the black middle and upper classes who take part in a broad liberation alliance will jostle for hegemony and attempt to represent their interests as the interests of all Africans.”
A.4 The Tripartite Alliance

The ANC and the South African Communist Party (originally the Communist Party of South Africa) have a history of political cooperation stretching back as far as the 1930s (ANC, 2001b). Although leading elements in the ANC opposed cooperation with the CPSA during the 1940s, the “launch of the ANC’s 1952 Defiance Campaign marked a qualitative improvement in the relations between communist activists and the rest of the liberation movement” (SACP, 2006:9). During exile, the ANC, SACP and SACTU, Cosatu’s precursor, operated together16 as the National Democratic Alliance in pursuit of democratic rule in South Africa.

The Tripartite Alliance was officially formed in May 1990, at a joint meeting of the ANC, SACP and Cosatu (the ANC and SACP had been unbanned in February of that year) (ANC, 1995). The ANC is the dominant member of the Alliance17. Despite long-standing tensions18 between its partners, the Alliance has lasted till the time of writing in June 2006, by when the SACP and Cosatu were openly questioning the Alliance’s future - the SACP Central Committee released a discussion document proposing the SACP consider contesting elections on its own (SACP, 2006:31); Cosatu issued a document, Possibilities for Fundamental Social Change, that mooted leaving the Alliance (“The future of Cosatu”, Mail & Guardian, June 23 to 29 2006); and Cosatu accused President Mbeki’s presidency of tending towards a “dictatorship” (“Mbeki’s plan of action”, Mail & Guardian, June 2 to 8 2006).

16The closeness of the Alliance can be gauged by the adoption of the ANC of SACP theories such as Colonialism of a Special Type and the National Democratic Revolution (SACP, 2006:5-7).
17“The ANC is the unifying embodiment of the collective of organised forces that seek to resolve the national contradictions within South African society. It is, for this reason, the leader of the NDR, and leader of the Tripartite Alliance” (ANC, 2002b).
18The Central Committee of the SACP posits that the “leading cadre” of the movement had in fact experienced a “significant rupture” in “strategic and tactical perspectives” as early as 1990, when the Tripartite Alliance was constituted - this “rupture” ending the “former unity between the ANC and SACP” (SACP, 2006:7). Habib et al. (Habib et al., 2003:3-4) note that the tensions within the Alliance date from the Mandela presidency.
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