South Africa's Bid for the 2004 Olympic Games as Means for International Unity and International Awareness

Philele Masuku

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Supervisor: Dr. J. van der Westhuizen

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DECLARATION

I, Philile Masuku hereby declare that this assignment is my own original work and that all sources have been accurately reported and acknowledged, and that this document has not previously, in its entirety or in part, been submitted at any university in order to obtain an academic qualification.

P Masuku   October 2004

ABSTRACT

Mega-events such as the Olympic Games have emerged as one of the most significant features of the global era. Not only has the number of participants increased, but also the hosting of these events has been seen as an opportunity for countries to externally market themselves, in an attempt to raise their international profile, and to develop national identity. As such, many nations continue to enthusiastically compete to host these events. Despite the prestige of hosting events, South Africa has in the past been excluded from participating, let alone being considered to bid to host events of such magnitude. This was as a result of the Apartheid policy that extended into sport. After being admitted into the world of sport, it has joined the list of nations that regularly compete to bid.

There are two questions that this study sets out to explore. Firstly, how did hosting of the Games market South Africa internationally? Secondly, did hosting the Games help celebrate South Africa's national identity? In trying to answer these questions, the marketing power concept has been used. Part of the proposition is that marketing power is more sought after by state elites who lack national identity. In light of this, South Africa has been used as a case study. Bidding to host the Olympic Games was no easy road for South Africa, and in the aftermath of the Bid, this study identifies the reasons why the Bid was unsuccessful.

The findings suggest that South Africa's attempt to host the Games did indeed market the country internationally. However, the findings indicate that bidding to host the Games did not bolster national identity, instead it revealed that there was lack of unity. In addition there are some important lessons that can be drawn from this study.

ABSTRAK

Hoe-profiel gebeure soos die Olimpiese Spele is een van die mees opmerklike gevolge van die globale era. Buiten dat die aantal deelnemers aan sulke gebeurtenisse dramaties togeneem het, het die eise en die kompetisie om sodanige gebeurtenisse aan te bied, toegeneem omdat state hierdeur hulself ekstern kan bemark en intern skep sulke gebeurtenisse 'n geleentheid om nasionale identiteit te bevorder. Ten spyte van die prestige wat die gasheer-staat in sulke gevalle te beurt val, is apartheid Suid-Afrika histories uitgesluit van deelname aan veral hoe profiel sport, en was die aanbieding van sulke gebeurtenisse in Suid-Afrika buite die kwessie. Namate Suid-Afrika weer 'n aanvaarde lid van die gemeenskap van nasies geword het, het Pretoria ook toenemend begin bie om hoe-profiel sportgebeurtenisse aan te bied.

Hierdie studie verken twee sentrale vraagstukke. Eerstens, hoe bemark die aanbied van die Olimpiese Spele Suid-Afrika op 'n internasionale grondslag? Tweedens, help die aanbieding van sulke sportgebeure werklik om 'n gevoel van 'n nasionale identiteit onder Suid-Afrikaners aan te wakker? Ten einde die vrae te beantwoord, word in 'n hoe mate van die konsep, 'bemarkingsmag' ('marketing power') gebruik gemaak. Daar word deel geargumenteer dat bemarkingmag juis deur staatselites nagejaag word in samelewings waar nasionale identiteit gebrekkig ontwikkel is. Die Suid-Afrikaanse geval is dus by uitstek 'n toonaangewende voorbeeld van die tendens. In die studie word daar aangedui hoekom die bie proses ten einde die Olimpiese Spele aan te bied so 'n besondere komplekse uitdaging is, hoe dit deurgevoer is en waarom Suid-Afrika misluk het.

Die bevindings suggereer dat motivering om die Spele aan te bied inderdaad gedryf is deur die behoefte om Suid-Afrika se bemarkingsmag uit te brei. Ten spyte hiervan, het die bie-proses ook 'n baie brose sin van nasionale identiteit ontbloot het en 'n duidelike rasse-skeidslyn in terme van populere steun vir die bie-proses. Die studie onttrek ook 'n aantal gevolgtrekkings wat vir ander bod-prosesse van waarde kan wees.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

LIST OF SELECTED ACRONYMS

SASF	South African Soccer Federation
FASA	Football Association of South Africa
FIFA	International Football Association
SANROC	South African Non-Racial Olympic Committee
IOC	International Olympic Committee
IAAF	International Amateur Athletic Federation
IABA	International Amateur Boxing Association
IACF	International Amateur Cycling Federation
IASF	International Amateur Swimming Federation
IAWF	International Amateur Wrestling Federation
IBA	International Basketball Association
ITTF	International Table Tennis Federation
IVF	International Volleyball Federation
SATTB	South African Table Tennis Board
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
ANC	African National Congress
NP	National Party
IDC	Industrial Development Corporation
DBSA	Development Bank of South Africa
MCC	Marylebone Cricket Club

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CHAPTER 1

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SPORT MEGA-EVENTS IN THE CONTEMPORARY ERA

Sport mega-events are large-scale events that have an international significance by virtue of their size, scale, the substantial mobilisation of resources required and the involvement of different nations worldwide (Hiller, 2001:1). These events are increasingly becoming popular in the contemporary era and this is indicative in the increased number of sport mega-events being staged worldwide. For instance the Soccer World Cup events held in France in 1998 and jointly in Japan and Korea in 2002, (Roche, 2003:102), the Rugby World Cup held in Wales in 1999 and in South Africa in 2003, to name but a few. This further illustrates how important sport has become globally.

Accordingly, Lincoln Alison (1993:112) notes sport 'is one of the most potent of human activities in its capacity to give meaning to life, to create and interconnect senses of achievement and identity. Above all, and increasingly, sport has a complex and important interaction with nationality and the phenomenon of nationalism'. In addition, this interaction occurs in at least three ways. Firstly, sport provides 'a form of symbolic action which states the case for the nation itself (Jarvie, 1993:74). Secondly, hosts of international sporting pageants, such as the Olympic Games, display national wealth, technical expertise and organisational competence. Thirdly, sporting events provide 'shared memories'. It is said that occasionally these may act as 'turning points for national history' and help forge ideas about 'common destiny' (Jarvie, 1993:76).

Since the foundation of the Olympic Games in 1896, the idea that sport should bring nations together has always been emphasized. Yet international sport has been widely used as a means through which nations gain international recognition and display their power and resources. History has shown that most nations have used international sport events,

especially the Olympics, to pursue their own interests rather than the collective goals of international communication, unity and peace. This is illustrated by the massive gatherings in the 1930s, where the Italians and Germans would proudly parade their young muscular athletes and sportsmen and women relaying the message of not just physical supremacy but also political supremacy. The Italians gained world-wide acclaim for their achievement in winning the Soccer World Cups of 1934 and 1938 (Keys, 2002:1).

Sport and INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS have intersected at many levels. For instance, in 1971 a US table-tennis team consisting of fifteen American players and three journalists paid a visit to China after nearly two decades of estrangement and antagonism between the two countries. This gesture surprised the world and also opened the door for China-US people-to-people contacts. Even though China's invitation to America came as a complete surprise, it gave the communist nation a good opportunity to take a positive major step towards opening relations with the US under the disguise of a sporting event. This later became known as the 'Ping-Pong Diplomacy' (Ramsey, 1971:1).

For new nations seeking legitimacy, entry into the International Olympic Committee and other international sport federations was a stepping-stone toward international recognition. In 1969 only thirteen countries had actually recognized East Germany as an independent country. Accordingly, the German Democratic Republic, for example, successfully used achievements in international sport as a vehicle for achieving recognition as an independent country (Goldberg, 2000:1).

With the advent of television and the incredible advertising revenues from broadcasting high profile international events, hosting these events has become a sought after goal in its own right. Cities and nations compete vigorously to host the Games and show off their tourism potential and culture to billions of television viewers. It has also been widely seen to contribute to significant business opportunities (Andrews, 2000; Black, van der Westhuizen 2003; Short, 2001; Marketing Matters, 2001).

In light of the various vital roles sport plays in the global world, sport has become an international phenomenon, which many nations focus on.

1.2 BACKGROUND/PROBLEM STATEMENT

This study sets out to investigate why countries fiercely battle to host major events such as sport. More specifically, this study will be investigating South Africa's bid to host the 2004 Olympic Games. Studies by Bale and Maguire (1994); Bale and Sang (1996), show that there is a global sports market and economy that is dominated by major events such as the Olympic Games, Soccer World Cups and the like. In addition, sporting events have been seen as providing local actors with a high-profile mechanism to increase economic activity and to also succeed visibly within an environment of increasing intercity competition (Andranovich, Burbank, & Heying, 2001:114). As such, a growing number of high-profile sport events have seen many nations going to great lengths in an attempt to host such events. Nations have ventured into the dimension of marketing themselves through international sport as one of the main tools of being 'visible'.

South Africa is unavoidably linked to the global network of sport and has sought to become a major player in the hosting of large-scale events. Black & van der Westhuizen (2003:3) note that governments are developing institutional mechanisms and campaigns to expand their marketing repertoire. The South African government for example established the International Marketing Council delegating top advertising executives to help market South Africa abroad. Buthelezi (2000:6) further argues that attracting and hosting mega international events in South Africa has become a 'means' and 'end' and therefore major South African city governments are increasingly becoming entrepreneurs who treat their cities as products to be marketed locally and internationally for fixed development investment. Moreover, the success in attracting high-profile events is seen as a way to measure the marketability and ability of South Africa to compete internationally.

The concept of 'marketing power' will be used in the analysis of this study to try and answer the questions to be explored. Marketing power denotes a variety of strategies state elites employ in order to enhance 'name recognition'. Marketing power has a dual purpose; it fulfils both an external and an internal purpose. States use marketing power externally as

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a means to attract capital, tourism, investment and a range of subsequent 'spin-offs' (Van der Westhuizen 2001:70). Internally, marketing power serves to shore up political legitimacy and reinforce national identity.

To find an answer to these issues, the following proposition guides the study. South Africa's decision to bid for the 2004 Olympic Games was driven by the belief that hosting such a high-profile international event would forge national identity and in addition, it would 'sell' and raise international awareness of South Africa thereby generating greater investment, tourism and trading opportunities. It will be argued that whilst political differences severely hurt the South African Bid process, South Africa generated some international awareness.

The selection of South Africa as a case study is based on the fact that South Africa represents a fragmented society that attempted to use the 2004 Olympic Games amongst other things, as a vehicle to forge national identity. Based on this proposition, it would be useful to explore the marketing power concept as a means to achieve the said objectives of raising international awareness and forging national identity. This will be explored by firstly looking at a general definition of power.

1.3 CONCEPTUALISATION

Many major theories of international relations have tended to view power as emanating from tangible resources, yet power can also emanate from visibility or attraction. In order to establish a useful concept for this study, a general definition of power will be discussed within INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. According to Michael Byers, (1999:5) power is understood in a general sense as 'the ability, either directly or indirectly, to control or significantly influence how actors - in this case states – behave'.

Rosen & Jones (1980) broadly define power as "the ability of an actor on the international stage to use tangible and intangible resources and assets in such a way as to influence the outcomes of international events to its own satisfaction" (1980:203). In addition, they contend that power is not a natural political attribute, but a product of material (tangible)

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and behavourial (intangible) resources, each of which has its unique place in the totality of the actor's power. Secondly, power is said to be a means for achieving influence over other actors who are competing for outcomes favourable to their own objectives. Thirdly, the rational use of power is an attempt to shape the outcomes of international events in a way which will maintain or improve the actor's satisfaction with the international political environment. Power is also seen as a means to an end, an instrument for achieving objectives (Rosen & Jones, 1980:204).

In an attempt to focus on power as emanating from visibility and attraction, the conceptual definition of 'marketing power' will provide a useful framework through which to understand this study. Marketing power denotes a variety of strategies state elites employ in order to enhance 'name recognition'. Marketing power has a dual purpose; it fulfils both an external and an internal purpose. States use marketing power externally as a means to attract capital, tourism, investment and a range of subsequent 'spin-offs'.

Van der Westhuizen (2001:70) points out that states have justified hosting an event on the basis of its potential to 'export' the country and 'put it on the world map'. A good example cited is Burkina Faso which hosted the 21st African Cup of Nations in February 1998. Hosting the African Cup of Nations was an ideal way to market a relatively unknown country such as Burkina Faso internationally and also provide valuable publicity in the run-up to, amongst others, the OAU summit in June 1998.

Furthermore, internally, marketing power serves to shore up political legitimacy and reinforce national identity. Ironically, the allure of marketing power is that it is more often than not sought after by state elites in societies marked by quite a profound *lack* of national identity. The ironic political twist results in a catch-22 situation: as state elites seek to enhance their legitimacy by prevailing upon the state's sources of marketing power, it can very often exacerbate or expose their lack of legitimacy (Van der Westhuizen, 2001: 70).

The marketing power concept may appear similar to the concept of propaganda. Propaganda is defined as the control of information, ideas, facts, or allegations spread deliberately to further one's cause or to damage an opposing cause (Boll, 2003:1). However the use of such a concept to make a state visible is not very attractive since it is biased and has negative connotations; hence the use of marketing power appears to be more attractive and legitimate.

Guided by the analytical utility of the marketing power concept, two questions are pivotal to this study: How does hosting of the Olympic Games market South Africa in the international arena? Secondly, does hosting an Olympic Games help forge South Africa's national identity? After an extensive study of various literature written on sporting events, it is evident that not much attention has been given to the use of the Olympic Games to market South Africa internationally and also forge national identity.

1.4 LITERATURE REVIEW

A plethora of literature has been written about high-profile sporting events and South African sport. For the purposes of this study, various publications and articles have been explored and gleaned. Amongst other significant issues explored in this paper, the general importance of sport in the international arena and the significance of sport in the South African context have been discussed. Allison and Monnington (2002) shed light in this regard by mentioning that sport has been used by states to sell themselves and to also discipline international behaviour of which they don't approve.

The expulsion of South Africa from participating in international sport in 1964 illustrates this point. On the other hand the authors add that many states have depended on sport as a way of acceptance in the international community. Again in this case South Africa is a good example and this will be helpful later in the discussion on how South Africa has used sport to be accepted internationally, more specifically its' bid for the 2004 Olympic Games.

As this study seeks to explore amongst other issues, the construction of national identity of South Africa through the use of sport, Douglas Booth (1998) sheds light by looking at the role of sport in fostering a new national identity in South Africa. He points out that sport remains an important element of post-Apartheid politics, especially with the various sport events that have been staged in South Africa which have been used to foster this new identity.

However, he argues that although former president Mandela and his government believed that sport could unite black and white South Africans, after careful analysis, he draws the conclusion that sport will never unite South Africans except on a superficial level. His work is also quite significant in this study because it provides an explanation and an evaluation of why South Africa attempted to use sport to unite its people, which is helpful in trying to answer some of the key questions being sought by the study such as whether or not the Bid helped unite South Africans.

John Nauright, (1997) echoes the words of Booth by also concluding that South African sport has not been able to overcome the legacies of Apartheid and the social divisions it created. In addition, Nauright's examination of the inter-relationship between identity formation and sport in an ethnically fragmented South Africa is useful in this study, as we will be briefly discussing South Africa as a fragmented society. Both Booth and Nauright's study give some insight in examining some of the issues to be discussed in this study, such as the general use of sport to forge national identity, they do not however address the questions that this study sets out to explore such as the significance of hosting the Olympic Games in South Africa.

Also, Lapchick's (1975) analysis of the racial discrimination in South African sport and South African participation in international games contributes substantially to this study, as it highlights some important aspects which give insight on the historical study of how the policy of Apartheid was extended into national and international sporting relations from 1959 to 1970 when South Africa was finally expelled from the Olympic Movement. In addition, Lapchick focuses in detail on the specific issue of Apartheid sport which is also

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fundamental in understanding why it was important for South Africa to return to international sport. Lapchick's study is instrumental in establishing the significance of sport in a racially divided society such as South Africa. The challenges of bidding for an Olympic Games in a divided society bring with it many issues, which will later be discussed in the study. Lapchick's work will also be very useful in this study's examination of South Africa's sport history in chapter two.

This study also attempts to understand why the 2004 Olympic Bid failed and Pieter De Lange's (1998) work is quite useful in that it attempts to address the challenges in hosting the Olympic Games, especially in the South African context. He looks at the role sport plays in modern society (which is beneficial in this study's exploration on why it was important for South Africa to use sport events in the post-Apartheid era). He also examines the power struggles that are evident in the Games. The power struggle is significant in trying to understand one of the key themes of this study, which is the internal selling of the Bid to South African (nation building).

On the other hand, Edward Griffiths (2000) discusses why South Africa lost the Olympic and World Cup Bids and continues to narrate the story of the Bids, giving recommendations on how to win next time. These authors come short of discussing the question whether the Olympic Bid bolstered national unity on the whole.

Despite these various observations, there is a dearth of literature written on the underlying issues of how such sporting events have been used to market a country and also how they help a country forge its national identity. South Africa has joined the list of states by either hosting some of these international sport events or bidding to host them. The Olympic Games in particular is the biggest sporting event and many cities have joined the list of bidders to stage this big event. Accordingly, this study will attempt to fill some of the related gaps that remain in this field by examining the politics of South Africa's Bid to host the Games and the reasons why Pretoria decided to bid for the Games.

1.5 AIM OF STUDY

The hosting of high-profile events has become more significant for both political and economic reasons. Politically, sport events provide an opportunity to celebrate the nation, especially in divided societies and South Africa's apartheid history is indicative of a fragmented society and as such, Maguire (1994):, Nauright and White, (1996) argue that international sport is the most significant cultural activity in the construction and reconstruction of national identities in the global age. Economically, it is believed to 'sell' the country to gain international recognition, which in turn is said to attract foreign direct investment and many other financial spin-offs.

This study seeks to examine how South Africa has sought to 'sell' itself in the aftermath of both the Cold War and Apartheid eras. With globalisation becoming the dominant feature of the post-Cold War world, generating global attraction has become all the more important. Accordingly, this study focuses on South Africa's attempt to sell itself by bidding to host the 2004 Olympic Games. South Africa has been selected as an appropriate case study because the opportunity to host the Games came at a time when South Africa was going through transformation and policy makers believed that the Games could be used to enhance the national identity of the new, so-called 'Rainbow Nation'.

In addition, the Olympic Games are the biggest event in the world and the opportunity to host an event of this nature is alluring. Baines (1998:1) points out that South Africa's transition to democracy and acceptance as a member of the community of nations has been accompanied by a quest for a new national identity. Notably, the African National Congress government and the then President Mandela personally encouraged the ritual celebration of the 'rainbow nation' at international sports events such as the 1995 Rugby World Cup (Nauright 1998; Steenveld & Strelitz 1998).

1.6 SIGNIFICANCE OF STUDY

This study is significant in two ways. Firstly, South Africa has emerged from a controversial Apartheid past in the international sport arena. Prior and during its transformation, it used various tools to place itself on the world map through events such as film, theatre and music (van der Westhuizen 2001:74). Hosting the world's most universal sporting event would also be seen as a powerful signal of South Africa's emergence as one prominent state amongst other states, after decades of isolation. The Games would also showcase South Africa's new status and its acceptance by the international community.

Secondly, nations and even cities have always competed for prestige and glory, and sporting events have become a major priority not only to South Africa but also to many other nations as a marketing strategy. It has become important for countries to be internationally recognised for various reasons. Key policy makers and politicians believe that being internationally recognised draws scores of tourists to the country and substantially improves the tourism industry. Moreover, the development and improvement of sport facilities, investment by local and international companies, are just some of the benefits that come with hosting mega-events. International sporting success is one of the key ways that countries continue to use to promote themselves to the rest of the world.

1.7 METHODOLOGY

As we set out to find answers to the key questions in this study, the nature of this study warrants a qualitative method because it is a case study and involves historical context. The method of data collection will include documented interviews of key people in the Bid, surveys and newspaper articles from the period of 1993 when the idea of bidding to host the Games commenced, until after the outcome of the Bid in 1997. This period will be relevant in the study because it is at this time that significant activities were unfolding. For instance, 1994 saw South Africa engage in the first democratic elections and at the same

time, the Bid was being sold. It is during this period that the concept of national identity was being promoted using the Bid.

As stated before, a limited amount of research has been conducted on the 2004 Cape Town Olympic Bid. Exceptions are De Lange (1998) and Griffiths (2000), other consulted literature also includes academic journals and electronic reports which have been retrieved from archives on the internet. In an attempt to further test and validate the proposition, the author has also consulted extensive research reports presented in the Candidature file which cover various aspects of the Bid including one of the main themes this study sets out to explore which is nation building. Other sources to be used are speeches made by relevant people in the Bid and also business journals and periodicals.

Much has been written on the relationship between sport and politics, the role of sport in society and the like. Such literature will be useful in our discussion of the relevance of sport not only internationally but also in the context of South Africa. The main focus of this analysis will be 1993-1997, which was the period during which the Bid was made. Since the mediating effect of apartheid is fundamental to understanding the context within which the Bid process took place, we also examine the apartheid state's use of sport to attain certain objectives.

In order to address these issues, a case study will be pursued. The selection of South Africa as a case study is useful because in trying to answer the questions, South Africa emerges as a classic frame of reference and a useful illustration of what the study sets out to explore. For instance, it stands out as a typical example of a deeply divided society that has attempted to use hosting the Olympics to forge national identity. In addition, the use of a case study will assist in making the study more focused and also more detailed.

1.8 OUTLINE

This chapter has introduced the questions that are to be explored in this study. It has provided a background on the nature of international sport and how different nations have used sport for various reasons. In addition, it has discussed the importance of hosting mega events such as the Olympic Games. A problem statement has guided the study to give direction on what is to be addressed. In trying to put the argument into perspective, a conceptual definition of 'marketing power' has been introduced. The literature review identified the missing gaps that this study sets out to fill.

We have also discussed the aims of the study and the motivation why it is a significant study. Given the fact that this is a South African case study, Chapter two will briefly examine the history of South African sport and politics. Particular reference to South Africa's participation in international sporting events will be discussed since this will give insight on why South Africa was isolated and excluded from such significant worldwide sporting events. The Olympic Games is an integral part of the study, hence the focus on South Africa and its relation to the Games will also be discussed in this chapter.

Chapter three examines the run up to the Bid to host the Olympic Games and also looks at how the Bid was sold to South Africans. In addition, the outcome of the Bid will be discussed. In order to understand why South Africa failed to host the Games, chapter four will be a post-mortem of the Bid. The last section of chapter four will be the conclusion and will bring together the argument that was set out in chapter 1. It will further determine if the 'marketing power' concept was a useful tool in this study and in addition, possible lessons will be drawn from this study for other cases.

CHAPTER 2

2 INTRODUCTION

2.1 SOUTH AFRICAN SPORT

This chapter will examine two significant aspects. The first part will briefly discuss the nature of South African sport and politics in the Apartheid era. It will ascertain the extent to which Apartheid was enforced in sport. Thereafter, it will examine the consequences of the move to separate sport according to race. This will include the various sport boycotts implemented against South Africa by numerous international sport bodies and the Olympic Movement.

It will also discuss the efforts made by the Apartheid government to change Apartheid sport as a result of pressure from these key sport bodies. This chapter will be helpful in trying to understand why South Africa was excluded from the international sporting arena, and conversely why its return to the international sporting world has been so significant. In addition, this chapter will cover the period of the Apartheid era, up until South Africa's re-admittance to the Olympic Movement in 1991.

2.2 SOUTH AFRICAN SPORT AND POLITICS

According to Lapchick (1975:5), South African sport is of significance internationally because it is through international sport competition that South Africa is able to measure itself against the rest of the world. Sport is the national religion and in the post-Apartheid era, is widely believed to transcend race and unite the country. Yet, during the Apartheid era the sport policy of South Africa was linked to the political system, which had institutionalized racism as part of the sport structure. The system of white supremacy in South Africa was applied in the field of sport as much as in all other walks of life.

The Apartheid system segregated sport and games. They were played separately according to race and it was taboo for white and black sportsmen or women to compete against each other let alone play in the same venue. Each was to play sport in designated areas, i.e. whites playing in their own venues and blacks likewise. However, the social value of the games was measured disproportionately. "White sport" (rugby, cricket) was given the limelight and held in higher prestige and enjoyed more funding than "black" sport (soccer, boxing) (Nauright, 1997:21).

Since there was no integration amongst races during international sport events, South Africa would only send out its white team to compete internationally. White sporting bodies enjoyed international recognition in the field of athletics, boxing, wrestling, weightlifting, tennis, table tennis, soccer, rugby and cricket. In addition, the all-white South African Olympic Games Association (SAOGA) was a member of the International Olympic Committee until 1970 (Nauright, 1997:127).

The stark difference that prevailed during the Apartheid era between white and black sport is evident in the way sport was seen across colour lines. Indeed, sport aggravated some racial tension. Nauright (1997:47) highlights the fact that even though black sporting clubs and associations had been there for decades, the white South African attitude about black sport was centred on the belief that blacks had a different sporting culture. This they claimed, was far from 'western' and also that black sport was more soccer and boxing oriented.

Although sport has been seen as a unifying exercise among nations, during the Apartheid years, this did not hold true in South Africa. South Africans across racial lines had the love of sport but race determined which group would support which sport. Rugby became identified as the white South African sport, played by white males. Soccer on the other hand was seen as a black sport. South Africa became one of the most successful rugby-playing countries. This further 'endorsed' the 'white sport superiority' and it became a significant part of white South African identity. Yet soccer, like rugby, played a significant role for black South Africans (Nauright, 1997:41).

Notwithstanding, the first soccer club was a white club founded by English settlers in 1879. It was only in the latter part of the twentieth century that black soccer associations were formed. In 1898 the Orange Free State Bantu soccer club was formed. Soccer became overwhelmingly popular and particularly successful amongst blacks. Whites had associated soccer with blacks because they claimed it was a sport that didn't need much skill, and also that since blacks were "closer to nature", it was only natural that they played soccer. On the other hand, rugby was seen to be a sport that was sophisticated and needed skill which only the white man had. Accordingly, white South African teams graced the front pages of newspapers as the true heroes to be glorified (Nauright, 1997:103-104).

There was no official Apartheid policy that banned inter-racial or non-racial sport. Rather, it was the effect of several policies that prevented the mixing of races in sport. The first government interference in South African sport after the Nationalists came to power in 1948 was in 1951. This was provoked by Jake Ntuli's victory over the British Empire flyweight boxing title while he was visiting England in 1951. The South African minister for Interior, Dr. Donges announced that South Africa would not allow black boxers to enter South Africa to compete against South Africa's black boxers. This was one of the efforts made to discourage black participation in the international arena.

Needless to say this move stifled Jake Ntuli's career (Lapchick, 1975:21). The Nationalist government in conjunction with the South African press, declared all attempts by black sports people to gain recognition and international acceptance as "attacks" on white people and therefore major steps would be taken to make sure that it did not happen.

The extension of Apartheid in sport was further emphasised when the South African Soccer Federation (SASF), which was the black body in South Africa, attempted to negotiate a merger with the Football Association of South Africa (FASA) between 1952 and 1954. The acceptance of the black body was conditional. They were to be accepted on the basis that they had no voting rights on the national Committee. SASF did not agree to this and they formally applied to the Federation of International Football Association (FIFA) for international recognition. FIFA asked the body to renegotiate with FASA and it was clear

that it would be unworkable and in 1954, the first governmental ban on organised sport between whites and blacks was announced (Lapchick, 1975:21-22).

In 1955 black spectators were banned from sport events in South Africa. A new stadium had been built and the Bloemfontein City Council ruled that blacks were not allowed in the new stadium. They could not witness an international rugby match between Britain and South Africa because it was feared it would cause friction. Blacks were said to have been strong supporters of the opposing British team, which was probably in protest to the sport policy implemented in the country (Lapchick, 1975:23).

2.3 SOUTH AFRICAN SPORT BOYCOTT

Such conduct by the government was a violation of the IOC Charter. In 1955 the first internationally publicized charges of South Africa's violation of the IOC charter were made, and in July of the same year, the Reverend Trevor Huddleston was quoted as saying,

> The Olympic Games are open to competitors from the whole world over.... with the exception of the black peoples of South Africa. South African teams to these Games have so far been selected only from the white population of the country although the other sections have produced men of Olympic status (Lapchick, 1975:22).

Despite these charges, South Africa continued to exclude the black population from the South African teams to the Games.

It was not until 1956 that the South African sport policy was effectively challenged. This happened when the all-white South African sport body of International Table Tennis was excluded from the Table Tennis Union. The non-racial South African Table Tennis Board was recognised as the sole controlling body in South Africa. Government could no longer bear this and was prepared to intervene. Their intervention however, did not involve any alterations to Apartheid sport:

- Whites and nonwhites had to organise their sport separately;

- No mixed sport would be allowed within the borders of South Africa;

- No mixed teams would compete abroad;

- International teams competing in South Africa against white teams had to be all white, according to South African custom. When South African teams travelled overseas, they would respect the customs of the country where they were playing (meaning they would play against multiracial teams abroad);

- Black sportsmen from overseas could compete against South African blacks in South Africa;

- Black organizations who wanted international recognition had to do this through the already recognized white organizations in their code of sport

- Lastly, the government would not issue passports for non-white activities designed to change South Africa's racial divisions by any process of eliminating white South Africans from international competition (Lapchick, 1975:25).

These principles were in clear violation of international norms that held that 'sport is an area where there is equal opportunity for all based purely on the ability of the athlete, with no reference to the athlete's personal background and/or beliefs: and, on the level of international competition' (Lapchick, 1975:xvi). Sport, it was further stated, transcended politics. South Africa's adamant refusal to heed these principles led to boycotts and tremendous pressures from the outside world. However, it was clearly evident that South Africa had its intent on extending Apartheid into sport. Booth (1998:5) quotes Heribert Adam (1973) "South African whites preferred to suffer the humiliation of seclusion from world sport rather than accommodate an even symbolic abandonment of their colour role and master role".

Although the South African government dismissed all demands to integrate or even extend political rights to blacks, the National Party was concerned about its international isolation. The prime minister, B J Vorster finally made some sort of 'compromise'. South African sport officials attempted to find means of dealing with the tightening of the sport boycott. (Booth, 1998:135). Firstly, they established propaganda campaigns to convince the world

that they had 'normalized' sport. They alleged that blacks were to be blamed for their own plight. This was in regard to their poor education, ill health, crime, unemployment and the like that emanated from political and environmental factors. This, they claimed, was inherent in the lifestyle of blacks. They also claimed that the absence of blacks from national teams was a result of their lack of interest in sport (Booth, 1998:6).

Secondly, white sport administrators recruited sport mercenaries who were prepared to rebel against national and international sport authorities in return for attractive payments (Booth, 1998:7). Against this backdrop, the international sport decision-making bodies continued to allow South Africa to participate in international competition.

Nauright (1997:129) adds that international sport was developed at a time when white-dominated countries of Western Europe and the USA created empires throughout the world with native people being accorded unequal status. (White dominated countries were those countries that had predominately white people who controlled the resources of the country, and ruled over the non-whites). It was the white-male world order that dominated modern sport for most of the past century. This could perhaps explain why it took so long for these international organizations to realise that these sport practices by white South Africans were offensive to blacks.

In 1964 the International Olympic Committee (IOC) prohibited South Africa from sending a team to the Rome Games because the South African Olympic team was segregated into whites and blacks. Although the IOC prohibited South Africa from the Rome Games, it was not until 1970 that South Africa was officially expelled from the Olympic movement. In 1966, the Supreme Council for Sport in South Africa and the pan-African Organization made its first recommendation. Unless South Africa made major changes, they recommended that the country be expelled from the IOC:

> It is the firm decision of the Supreme Council to use every means to obtain expulsion of South Africa sport organizations from the Olympic Movement and from International Federations should South Africa fail to comply fully with the IOC rules (Lapchick, 1975:80).

This resolution signalled the seriousness of the Supreme Council in trying to eradicate Apartheid in sport and also persuaded the IOC to be accountable to their own Charter.

When South Africa was allowed to participate in the Mexican Games in 1968, the Supreme Council for Sport in South Africa threatened to boycott the Games, supported by numerous African states. Algeria and Ethiopia were the first African countries to commit to this boycott. In 1968, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) Ministerial Council passed a resolution stating that unless the IOC excluded South Africa from the Games, all OAU member states would be strongly encouraged to boycott. After giving it much thought, in April 1968, Brundage, the President of the IOC, called a meeting to rescind their decision to allow South Africa to participate in the Mexican Games (Berns, 2000:20).

The sport ban was just one aspect of the many ways used to eradicate Apartheid. From this point onwards, the IOC demonstrated intolerance with regard to Apartheid and South Africa. South Africa's obsession with sport was frustrated by such a move as South Africans had to watch the Olympic events from a distance.

The supporters of an Olympic ban on South Africa also raised Article 6 of the *Fundamental Principles* of the Olympic Charter to draw attention to the IOC value of non-discrimination that was inconsistent with the Apartheid sport system:

> The goal of the Olympic Movement is to contribute to building a peaceful
> and better world by educating youth through sport practiced without
> discrimination of any kind and in the Olympic spirit, which requires
> mutual understanding with a spirit of friendship, solidarity and fair play.

Under the Olympic Charter, one of the objectives of the IOC is to oppose any political abuse of sport and athletes and one of the principles of Olympism holds that not only do all individuals have the right to compete based on their athletic ability but also the fact that they are all equal regardless of skin colour. Apartheid clearly refuted such a principle and denied black athletes the opportunity to compete against other contestants who were not of their race (Berns, 2000:21).

Richard Pound, Executive Vice President of the IOC stated, "The ban forced every South African to face the fact - the world rejected Apartheid" (Berns 2000:22). The banning of South Africa by the Olympic Movement was also an indication that the internal issues of a country had the potential to influence the country's right to participate in the Olympic Games. Ultimately South Africa could not afford to leave its future in the hands of fate. It had to make decisions that would change its status in the world of sport if its growing passion for sport was to be recognized.

Similarly in 1968, controversy erupted over the England cricket tour to Apartheid South Africa. It had been cancelled because of South Africa's refusal to accept the presence of Basil D'Oliviera as part of the team. D'Oliviera was a South African citizen, but his race prevented him from pursuing his sporting career in his home country. In order to realise his dream, he moved to England where he gained his residence qualification. The British had tried to deal with this problem by selecting another player in D'Oliviera's place, Tom Cartwright.

Unfortunately this didn't materialise as Cartwright was injured and could not participate. That meant they were left with no choice but to keep D'Oliviera in the team. Soon after hearing of the selection, John Vorster made a speech in Bloemfontein on September 17, 1968, saying: "The team as constituted now is not the team of the MCC (Marylebone Cricket Club) but the team of the Anti-Apartheid Movement, the team of Sanroc and the team of Bishop Reeves" and was not welcome in South Africa (Dispatch, 1999:1).

Three years later, in 1971 the Springbok's rugby tour to Britain caused some of the most violent demonstrations witnessed in Britain and Ireland for a long time. They were protesting against the continuation of Apartheid in South Africa. Since then, the Springboks never set foot in Britain until 1995. Yet it was not until 1977 (six years later) that the Commonwealth countries finally took a stand against the South African government. After a meeting of sport ministers held at Gleneagles, Scotland, the *Commonwealth Statement on Apartheid in Sport* was produced. This was later known as the *Gleneagles Statement.* In this statement, the Commonwealth members undertook to

take 'every practical step to discourage contact or competition by their nationals with sporting organisations, teams, or sportsmen from South Africa' (*Commonwealth Agreement on Apartheid in Sport*, 1977).

Prior to this agreement, there had been an unfruitful meeting held in Singapore in 1971. It was unfruitful because the sport ministers had failed to come up with an effective policy against Apartheid. It had taken six years to get representatives around the table again. The agreement did prove effective in excluding South Africa from competitions such as the Commonwealth Games (British Council, 1999). After the *Gleneagles Statement,* all Commonwealth sporting links with South Africa were suspended and South Africa was now being excluded from many international sport organizations (Geldenhuys, 1989:634).

Despite the fact that South Africa was banned from the Olympic Movement and other international sporting organizations, it remained firmly rooted in the International Rugby Board along with other countries such as New Zealand, Australia, Scotland, Ireland and England. Many white South Africans felt that international sporting isolation could be tolerated as long as they could still play rugby. Rugby to white South Africans symbolized an important element of male culture throughout the Apartheid era. There was a strong sense of white national identity in rugby, especially with the Springboks gaining continual international success in their matches (Nauright, 1998:83).

Accordingly, the national rugby team actually became synonymous with Apartheid. Although rugby was a British public school invention, played by the cream of colonial Anglo Saxon society, in South Africa, it was Afrikaners who dominated the sport, and for them it was more than a game – it was an expression of resurgent Afrikaner nationalism. To black South Africans, rugby had a different meaning: it was a white man's game, and a brutally hard one which symbolized white superiority (Nauright, 1997:77,80).

This continued expression of cultural identity through rugby ultimately led to the United Nations Secretary General, U Thant calling on all nations to break sport links with South Africa in 1969. This indicated that the United Nations was part of the anti-Apartheid sport

movement and they were well aware of its effects on those negatively affected by it. The General Assembly undertook four principal initiatives in trying to end Apartheid sport in South Africa. These initiatives were:

- *The International Declaration against Apartheid in Sport.* This declaration was adopted by the General Assembly in December 1977.

- *The International Convention against Apartheid in Sport.* This declaration condemned Apartheid in sport, forbade countries from competing with countries that practised Apartheid, and encouraged countries to expel Apartheid countries not only from international sport bodies but also regionally. Additionally, countries were urged not to allow into their country members of teams, individual athletes, coaches and administrators who had competed in South Africa.

- *The UN Special Committee on Apartheid.* This Committee was established by Article 11 of the *International Convention against Apartheid in Sport.* The aim of this Committee was to ensure the implementation of Article 10 of the *International Convention Against Apartheid in Sport* (the article states that parties should use their best endeavours to ensure universal compliance with the Olympic principles of non-discrimination and the provisions of the present Convention.

- *Blacklist.* In 1981, the UN established the Blacklist as a tool in its campaign against Apartheid sport. The Blacklist tracked players and coaches who had not heeded to the sport boycott by competing in South Africa or against South African teams outside of South Africa. Booth (1998:114) points out that the list was the UN's "most potent weapon against sport contacts" because many coaches and athletes feared their names appearing on the list (High Commissioner for Human Rights, 1985). Being blacklisted meant that the culprits were barred from participating in any international sporting events.

In March 1978, five Nordic foreign ministers called an end to all sporting ties with South Africa, and similarly, the Australian government banned the entry or transit of South African sport teams (Geldenhuys, 1989:635).

By 1979, sport underwent a restructuring. De Klerk, the Minister for Sport, allowed sport associations to manage their own affairs without the interference from government. The permit system was relaxed whereby people were allowed to play sport outside their own group areas. This was the beginning of 'multiracial sport' (Booth, 1998:131).

In 1981, however, a *Register of Sport Contacts with South Africa*, proposed by the Special Committee of the UN General Assembly was published whereby over 700 international sportsmen and women were 'blacklisted'. The UN Special Committee in conjunction with SANROC (South African Non-Racial Olympic Committee) further staged a large international conference on Apartheid in sport in London in 1983 and in 1984; New Zealand refused visas to South African sportsmen and women. States like Brazil (August, 1985), Canada (September 1985), Austria (September 1985), the five Nordic countries (October 1985) and Britain (August 1986) began to further tighten their ban on sporting contacts with South Africa (Geldenhuys, 1989:635).

In addition, various states continued to act against *third party states* that had contact with South Africa. For instance, an England cricket tour had to be cancelled in 1985 after Bangladesh and Zimbabwe refused to accept the team for including some players who had been to South Africa. The following year, of the 58 eligible states only 26 sent teams to the thirteenth Commonwealth Games held in Edinburgh. This was in protest against Britain's refusal to apply wholesale economic sanctions against South Africa. Pakistan refused to play against England in the cricket tournament staged in New Zealand because many of the English players had links with South Africa. In September 1985, the European Community (now European Union) decided to support the sport boycotts by 'freezing contacts' with South Africa in the sporting sphere (Geldenhuys, 1989:635).

Of the 29 international sport federations whose sport appear on the Olympic Games programme, South Africa had at some point, belonged to 25 of them. It was later permanently excluded from 8 federations: International Amateur Athletic Federation (IAAF), International Amateur Boxing Association (IABA), International Amateur Cycling Federation (IACF), International Amateur Swimming Federation (IASF), International Amateur Wrestling Federation (IAWF), International Basketball Federation (IBF) and was temporarily suspended from 8 federations. Its affiliation application to the International Volleyball Federation (IVF) was never accepted. Additionally, despite the fact that South Africa was affiliated with these federations, none of the 25 South African sport bodies actually enjoyed a completely 'normal' relationship with its international federation, being full membership benefits (Geldenhuys, 1989:636).

In 1985, De Klerk continued to find means of changing the situation. By then he was the minister for national education. He asked the Sport Federation to look into forming a non-political representative body which would put a formal distance between the government and sport. The steering Committee that was formed was adamant that sport must not involve itself in politics (Booth, 1998:131). Consequently, multiracial sport administrators and government officials propagated campaigns to convince the world that South African sport was 'normal' and that the country met the prerequisites for readmission to international competition.

By 1989, white administrators claimed that they had integrated their sport. They felt victimised by the 'anti-South African' world which continued to marginalise them and throughout the 1980s, consecutive presidents of national governing associations declared their opposition to any form of discrimination in the playing, administration and promotion of sport and claimed that their constitutions prohibited discrimination. However, Booth (1997) mentions that according to a survey major discrepancies and irregularities were found despite these claims. They discovered that clauses in constitutions dealing with membership were rather vague. This was to evade allegations of discrimination on any grounds including race, religion, class or gender (Booth, 1997:137).

From 1990, South Africa was ushered into a new world of democracy which brought with it great opportunities and high hopes for a bright future. Following the dismantling of some Apartheid legislation such as the unbanning of liberation organisations, the repeal of the Separate Amenities Act and the repeal of the last Apartheid legislation- Population Restriction Act, Group Areas Act and Land Acts in 1991 by President F.W. de Klerk, the nation saw its unbanning in international sport events and they were now free to participate with the rest of the world. However against this backdrop, not all international sport bodies felt South Africa was ready to enter the international sport arena. There were some unsatisfactory reports that made some of these international sport bodies a bit reluctant about this move.

The UN and SANROC wanted a continued ban and felt South Africa had not done enough to ensure equality in the sport system, thus justifying the country's exclusion from the 1992 Barcelona Olympiad. The *Montreal Gazette* reported the UN's position on South Africa's re-admittance to the Olympic Movement:

> The United Nations' major anti-Apartheid criticized the International
> Olympic Committee's decision to end its ban on South Africa's participation
> in Olympic sport as premature (Berns, 2000:25).

South Africa marked its return to the Olympic family at the Barcelona Games held in 1992. Since South Africa's readmission to the Olympic Games, South Africa has realised its unlimited opportunity in sport and has gone beyond just being a mere participant of international sport events. Not only did South Africa want to compete in the Games, it has actually gone as far as fervently bidding for the right to host international games such as the Soccer World Cup 2006 and also bidding to stage the biggest show on earth, the Olympic Games of 2004. South Africa has even hosted some of these mega-events such as Tri-nations, All Africa Games and many others. Evidently, South Africans are known for their zealous love and support for sport. South Africa has also won the 2010 World Cup Bid.

2.4 CONCLUSION

This chapter has discussed South African Sport and Politics, leading to the South African sport boycott. Furthermore, it has discussed specifically, South Africa's re-admittance to the Olympic Movement. As has been discussed, South Africa has indeed moved from one extreme to another. A move from being totally isolated and not featuring in the world of sport, to being admitted and actually hosting some of these mega-events. The next chapter will show the extent to which South Africa has participated in the world of sport by bidding to host the 2004 Olympic Bid.

CHAPTER 3

3 INTRODUCTION

3.1 SOUTH AFRICAN BID FOR 2004 OLYMPIC GAMES

This chapter will discuss South Africa's bid to host the 2004 Olympic Games. This was quite a significant move for South Africa, having been the pariah of world sport, to bidding to stage games of such magnitude. Firstly this chapter will discuss the internal use of the marketing power concept, which was to mobilize the nation to be united during the hosting of the Rugby World Cup and the African Cup of Nations, and also discuss how the Bid actually came about.

Secondly, it will discuss the selection of a South African bidding city, and also the tension that arose between the two key people leading the Bid, Sam Ramsamy and Raymond Ackerman. The tension that arose will be important in the study, as it will be instrumental in answering one of the pertinent questions that the study sets out to answer, did hosting an Olympic Games help celebrate South Africa's national identity?

Thirdly, this chapter will discuss the accrual of supposed or expected benefits of hosting the Games, such as tourism, job opportunities, games-related investments, development, and housing, to name but a few. In addition, this chapter will examine the various arguments that emerged amongst South Africans concerning the Bid. Fourthly, it will discuss the presentation and lastly, the outcome of the Bid.

3.2 UNIFYING A SPORTING NATION

As South Africa entered the world of sport, one of the crucial factors was to have a unified nation. The opportunity for South Africa to display and expand its marketing power as a 'unified nation' came in the staging of the world's fourth largest international sport event, the Rugby World Cup in 1995 (Nauright, 1997:177). Nauright highlights the fact that, because of the significance of international sport, particularly in a country like South Africa, which he says needs as much access to international audiences as possible to reinvigorate the economy, the government and former president Mandela placed tremendous value on a successful Rugby World Cup.

The marketing director of American Express in South Africa stated that the Rugby World Cup had placed South Africa 'on the map' (*Mail & Guardian, Open Africa Supplement, July 1995:3*). In order to have this much-needed access to international audiences it is imperative to unite the people of the country behind the bid.

Ironically, the sport that represented a specific racial group in the past, was now being promoted and marketed to unite the nation. Prior to the Rugby World Cup, Mandela had taken it upon himself to pledge full support for the Rugby national team, and continued to market the Rugby World Cup across all areas of South African society. Nauright further contends that the Springboks were transformed to be the 'One team, One country' slogan. At the Youth Day Rally on June 16, Mandela wore a Springbok cap while addressing the audience. As he concluded his speech, he held out the cap and stated, " You see this cap I am wearing? This cap does honour to our boys who are playing France tomorrow afternoon' (SAPA, 16 June 1995).

On hindsight, Griffiths (1996:62) argues that the representation of the 'Rainbow Nation' of South Africa in the Rugby World Cup ceremony did little to present South Africa in ways that did not resonate with white rugby supporters. While some were happy with the

ceremony itself, Griffiths (1996:68) contends that its success was largely accomplished through the elimination of history from the display.

Be that as it may, South Africa continued to expand its marketing power through hosting other international events such as the African Cup of Nations. As the football national team, Bafana Bafana led South Africa to victory, Nelson Mandela wore the national kit. Thabo Mbeki, then Deputy President was quoted as saying 'we are a winning nation, this is our nature' (Griffiths, 2000:18). Griffiths adds that by 1996 a historic, unique, maybe even miraculous transformation had taken place. This observation of a transforming South Africa led to amongst other opportunities, the prospects of hosting an Olympic Games.

3.3 EARLY DREAMS

In June 1990, Raymond Ackerman, owner of Pick n' Pay supermarkets and his wife were attending a banquet organised in Manchester, UK by the Manchester Business School. This was shortly after the release of Nelson Mandela. One of the men suggested that the time had never been more favourable for South Africa to bid to host the 2004 Olympic Games. South Africa was going through a positive transformation and at that point, the Olympic movement supposedly wanted Africa as a candidate for hosting the Games (Bell, 1995:28).

From the day the concept of bidding to host the 2004 Olympic Games was initiated, South Africa joined a number of other nations such as Italy, Greece, Argentina, Sweden, Brazil, and Russia who felt they had the capacity to host an Olympic Games. Raymond Ackerman read the political waters (peaceful transition to a new democratic South Africa) and initiated the dream of South Africa hosting the Games.

As soon as Ackerman returned from his trip, he contacted the Mayor of Cape Town, Gordon Oliver. Initially the mayor was sceptical as he felt it was rather far-fetched and had major financial implications. The President, F W de Klerk had the same attitude but eventually supported it. Ackerman knew that in order for his dream to be realised, he had to

have the support of those in key positions, such as the national government of the day, the private sector and the President of the National Olympic Committee of South Africa, Sam Ramsamy.

Coming from an Apartheid past, one of the main challenges Ackerman faced, was the fact that he was a white businessman bringing a Bid proposal to various people who were previously oppressed. This raised suspicions with black sport administrators and his proposal was understandably scrutinized. It was unthinkable that one man should be in charge of a national project of such magnitude, especially a white man (Griffiths, 2000:22).

Although Ackerman may have been the right man for the Bid, it appeared to be at the wrong time. He represented a private enterprise and may have been seen as having his own interests at heart. Sam Ramsamy, the President of NOCSA, felt this was a premature move by Raymond Ackerman, and suggested that he wait until after the Barcelona Games in 1992. Ackerman was eager to start work and wanted to develop the idea for Cape Town. Ramsamy gave him the go ahead but mentioned that he would not commit himself financially and that there would be no official Bid as yet. Ackerman continued to secure funding with various business contacts such as Shell, BP and Coca-Cola. Each responded positively and pledged R250 000 in return for the promise that if the Bid were successful, their contribution would be recorded on a plaque at the City Hall in Cape Town. Before long this initiative had raised R3m (Griffiths, 2000:24).

The private sector played a significant role in contributing towards the Bid since they contributed a sizeable amount. As time went by more and more businesses made contributions. Mercedes Benz, Caltex, Pick 'n Pay, Unifruco, Nedbank, South African Airways, Telkom and Sun International each paid between R7.5 million and R10 million and R95 million was raised by July 1994 (*Financial Mail*, 1994:67).

The next phase of the Bid was selecting a South African bidding city and the three cities that indicated a commitment to staging the Games were Durban, Cape Town and Johannesburg (*Mayibuye,* 2nd January, 1994).

3.4 TENSION IN THE BID

During meetings with the three candidate cities' committee, the differences between Sam Ramsamy and Raymond Ackerman were conspicuously emerging. Ramsamy felt that Ackerman was trying to be in control. Conversely, the Cape Town team suspected that Ramsamy secretly supported the Johannesburg bid, which was led by Danie Malan, a prominent administrator within athletics and NOCSA. Being one of the most successful businessmen in South Africa, Ackerman enjoyed a high profile and was known as "Mr. Olympics" (Griffiths, 2000:25).

This recognition worked against Ackerman because as mentioned earlier, Ramsamy felt he was pulling his weight unnecessarily and becoming too pushy. In January 30th 1994, Cape Town was chosen as the most suitable city in South Africa to host the Games (*Cape Times,* 31st January, 1994). Ramsamy stated, "we looked for the city which has the best potential for marketing overseas on behalf of South Africa" (*Sunday Nation,* 6th February, 1994). This was a clear indication that marketing South Africa internationally was vital, hence the strategic selection of Cape Town by the NOCSA executive to market South Africa. Ramsamy congratulated Ackerman, and there was hope that these two would put their differences behind and work together for the national good.

The ANC Government was rather sceptical at this stage in supporting the Bid. This was at a time when a new Cabinet had been sworn in, in June 1994 (Bell, 1995:29). One of the reasons was that Ackerman was a white, wealthy businessman and this made it difficult for him to be accepted as a leader of the Bid. As Ackerman states, politics worked against him because the ANC wanted black leadership of the Bid (Alfreds, 2001:3).

Moreover, Cape Town had won as the bidding city for the Games and this placed the ANC government in a predicament because the ANC was the government of the day yet the National Party ran the Western Cape provincial government where it was anticipated the Games would be hosted (De Lange, 1998:204). How could the ANC government support the Bid initiative that was to be hosted at the opposition party's territory and make sure that

it promoted the interests of government? Although all parties had announced their total support for the Bid, Bid officials were sometimes caught up in the political crossfire (Griffiths, 2000:35).

The conspicuous tension between the two prominent leaders of the Bid from different racial backgrounds began to challenge South Africa's use of the Bid to foster national identity. Nevertheless, there was hope that the Bid would still enhance national identity on a wider scope.

3.5 PREPARATIONS FOR THE BID

The tension between the two leaders saw Raymond Ackerman subsequently resigning as the CEO of the Bid. The new CEO of the Bid Committee who had replaced Raymond Ackerman, Chris Ball prepared comprehensive financial projections at the request of the Deputy Finance Minister, Alec Erwin. Erwin wanted a basic outline budget within two weeks, a detailed budget within three months and a full budget within six months. According to Griffiths (2000:39), the financial projections estimated that the cost of the bidding phase would be just under R100 million. Additionally, it had been projected that the Games would add 1% to the Gross Domestic Product for each of the next ten years. Despite these positive projections, Finance Minister, Trevor Manuel appeared to be cautious and wanted to see the bottom line for the government in terms of finances (Griffiths, 2000:40).

The Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) had recommended that government support Cape Town's Bid to secure the Olympic Games (*Business Day,* 15th September, 1995). The IDC's role was to assess the Cape Town Olympic Bid committee's plans to stage the Games. The Bid Company made a formal presentation to Cabinet in September 1995. F W de Klerk chaired the meeting and Nelson Mandela held authority as President. After this presentation, there was a two month thorough investigation by the Minister of Sport, Steve Tshwete, on all aspects of the Bid and what government's financial commitments would

have to be. This was later followed by a Special Cabinet Committee, which met to discuss the Bid at the highest level (*The Daily News,* 22nd September, 1995).

Trevor Manuel, together with government officials were finally persuaded and reaffirmed their total support for the Bid. They committed money to start improving the city's infrastructure. By the end of 1995, the Cape Town Olympic Bid Company appeared to have established a constructive relationship with NOCSA and the government (Griffiths, 2000:41-42).

Accordingly, Ackerman, jointly with other local businesses and the government, invested huge amounts into bidding for the Olympic Games to be hosted in Cape Town. Bidding for the Games is an expensive exercise and has many implications. Since the launch of the Olympic Games in 1896, no African nation has ever hosted the Games because of the political and economic implications, and South Africa would be the first African country to do so. Despite considerations about poverty, the high rate of unemployment, escalating crime rate, lack of housing, the political transformation and many other shortcomings South Africa was faced with, South Africa wanted to be on the list of bidders.

Bidding was not just about bringing the Games to Africa because it was Africa's turn. South Africa had to prove that it was ready, with the required infrastructure and facilities, and that it could organise the Games efficiently. Getting the Games for South Africa became an all-consuming passion for the Bid team. With great determination, the leaders were prepared to go to great lengths trying to secure South Africa a comfortable position in the list of bidders. South Africans were told of the benefits of hosting the Games: operating costs of R2826 million, revenues of R3762 million and an operating surplus of R936 million-which would generate a profit of R96 million (*The Sunday Star*, 23rd January, 1994).

Bidding to host the Games gave South Africa a marketing platform and the perfect occasion to showcase the country. International recognition was one of the most highly desired aspects for South Africa after being out of the international scene for decades. Hosting the world's most universal sporting event would be a powerful signal for South Africa's emergence as one of the world's most prominent after decades of isolation. Moreover, it would be seen as a celebration of South Africa's peaceful and miraculous transition to democracy as being one of the major achievements of the late 20th century.

Winning the Olympic Bid is an indicator of a nation's arrival and 'visibility' on the world stage. In addition, games are also seen amongst other things as "the reconciliation of warring nations" (Guttmann, 1994:1). With this concept being highlighted in a nation so divided by race, South Africa was about to engage in a new display of nation building. Whether or not this would materialise was a different story. Additionally, the Olympic Games represents a key opportunity for economic regeneration, infrastructure investment and environmental improvement, as well as a means of achieving international prominence and national prestige through 'place marketing'. As a result, the Olympics are perceived by many political leaders as a highly desirable event to host (Essex, & Chalkley, 1998). It is said that just bidding for major global events, never mind hosting them, can lead to improvements in sporting facilities, and the forging of new regional partnerships (Aldersdale, 2001:3).

The Olympic rationale is also founded on a dramatic growth in tourist numbers. A country or city hosting Games is put in the spotlight as it presents itself as an alluring destination, and a large audience is attracted to these events. The head of regional tourism in Cape Town, Gordon Oliver claimed that cities bidding for the Games record above average increases in the number of foreign visitors in the two years before the decision is made and remain popular destinations even if their bids are unsuccessful (*Financial Mail,* 1994:67).

Numerous reports projected that by 2004 tourism, without the Olympics would have more than doubled since 1993. With the Olympics it was expected that it would quadruple and would be almost sustained until 2008 (Bell, 1995:42). *Financial Mail* (1996:49) stated that

international magazines reported Cape Town as 1996's hottest tourist destination. It was further estimated that eight million foreign visitors were expected in Cape Town by 2000. Pierre Tredoux, a director of Greene Belfield-Smith, the tourist and leisure division of Deloitte & Touche Management Consultants, responsible for the tourism aspects of the Cape Town 2004 feasibility study, projected an annual increase of 15% in tourism revenue for the city if Cape Town were to win the Bid (*Business Day,* 27th January 1994).

The benefits of hosting the Games were listed in the Candidature File as:
A dynamic for human development; a boost to the GDP; the potential of sporting events to unify the nation; it would strengthen the Olympism Movement if it were seen to be committed to progress for all nations, not only the big economies and it would confirm Africa's place in the family of nations and boost confidence in this continent (represented by the 5th ring) (Candidature file, 1997).

An independent group of professional consultants, called the Olympics Assessment Team selected by a panel which included representatives from the Olympic Bid Company, local, regional and national government, a non-governmental and community based organisations conducted a Strategic Environmental Assessment study. Similarly, this team identified job opportunities as one of the many benefits that preparing for and hosting the Games in Cape Town would bring. They claimed that the jobs would likely be located mainly in the construction and tourism industry *(Strategic Environmental Assessment Report*, 1994:5).

According to Cliff Macmillan who was Cape Town's feasibility study team leader and chairman of consulting engineers Ove Arup, preliminary development work would generate 42 000 permanent new jobs for the next five years. He also claimed that an additional 120 000 permanent new jobs and 60 000 temporary jobs would be created between 1998 and 2004. Opportunities for skills development were also cited as beneficial to disadvantaged communities. Job-training programmes were to be introduced particularly in the tourism, construction and communications sectors (*Citizen, The* 22nd January, 1994).

Moreover, the Strategic Environmental Assessment team report pointed out that Games-related investment addresses basic needs by providing a large number of training venues and competition venues in disadvantaged areas. After the Games, these venues would be used as multi-purpose community facilities in an effort to gain better investment returns. The Strategic Environment Assessment team further reported that one-third of investment in Olympic sport facilities would be going to previously disadvantaged areas of the Cape Flats and Metro South East (*Strategic Environment Assessment Report,* 1994:7).

Similarly, *The Herald* (12th September, 1994) reported that sport facilities in Port Elizabeth townships and informal areas had received a big financial boost in expectation of the Bid. The Wolfson Sport Complex, the Chevrolet Stadium, the Zwide Stadium and the New Brighton Oval were each allocated R1million for improvements. A total of R8.2million had already been approved for these improvements. Substantial amounts of money were invested in various other sport areas. An investment of R1 558 million would be directed to public transport, which would improve the overall mobility of disadvantaged communities and also improve access to recreation facilities.

In addition, there was a general consensus that the Olympic Games could be a potential catalyst in development. The hosting of Olympic Games usually triggers major new developments and enables existing plans to be 'fast-tracked' through the planning and development stages much faster than would have otherwise been the case. The Good Hope Centre was renovated for R4million to be used for Olympic badminton (*Weekend Argus,* 27th November, 1994).

The Cape Times (1st February, 1994) reported on the upgrading of infrastructure such as the airport, adding short rail links and new roads as one of the ways the Games would enhance development. Not only would the Games improve infrastructure but also give impetus to economic development and urban construction and management. The opportunity of a metropolitan Reconstruction and Development Programme was cited as one of the benefits to be reaped from this exercise.

Despite these potential benefits, the idea of the Cape Town Olympic Bid still brought with it mixed feelings to many South Africans. Some South Africans were both startled and bewildered by the proposal while others warmly welcomed it. Public support of the Bid was reported to be inconclusive in the IOC commission report and this worked against Cape Town, given the fact that public support was one of the requirements for a successful Bid. The social divisions in the Western Cape could not go unnoticed. There was a division between the racial groups in terms of supporting the Bid. Blacks appeared to be the most supportive of the Bid because, being the most disadvantaged group, the thought of getting jobs and the reconstruction argument was appealing to them. Whites generally on the other hand were more cynical about the fiscal costs of the Bid as ratepayers and the financial interests that stood behind the Bid (Hiller, 2001:5). Instead of strengthening national identity, the bid for the Olympics seemed to create a rift amongst the races as has been established in the different opinions of various racial groups.

The Bid proposal provoked many arguments. For example, Rev Herbert Syre, wrote in *The Argus* (2nd April, 1996) that there was no indication from the sponsors and developers that they would foot the maintenance bills after the Olympics. He further stated that if the majority of Capetonians did not have any money to contribute now, how would they be able to share the financial burden of maintenance later? And as far as "badly needed sporting facilities" are concerned, there were clubs which could not maintain their grounds due to lack of money and shortage of water. He further contended that the "most aspirational buildings" this city needed were proper houses for shack dwellers. The Olympic Village, he asserted was not the most functional solution in this regard. Hosting the Games it would seem, would be a misdirected expenditure.

Ivan Williams, leader of a group called "Stop 2004 Olympic Bid" felt that sporting events were meaningless to South Africans who were struggling to survive. South Africans' real concern was how best to survive. "The sport of the community living in this area is getting up at four in the morning, going to the boiler rooms of the South African economy and returning at eight at night...that's the sport they enjoy," Williams said. The bottom line was

that housing and education were the people's greatest needs and that South Africa should delay its Bid for 20 years (Williams, 1997:1).

Garth Strachan, member of the Central Committee of the SACP argued that the Olympic Games would further enrich only the business sector and not result in a fundamental change as suggested by the Bid Committee. It would instead have limited 'trickle down' effects to the poor from direct employment in construction and commercial activities associated with the Olympics, neither of which would lead to sustainable development. He further added that there was a great danger that the construction of new facilities and infrastructure would in fact serve to entrench existing inequalities and divisions within the city, which wouldn't lead to reconstruction and redistribution of expenditure and resources (Umsebenzi, 1996:1).

For instance, Strachan cited that building more and wider freeways to venues and Olympic accommodation might provide better access for private motorists, but it would not be beneficial to the larger community for affordable and safe transport for the working people of the city. This would mean that public sector investment in infrastructure and resources would only encourage development in well-established centres, rather than disadvantaged areas and thus perpetuate the apartheid city. Some of those who opposed the Bid felt that the Bid for 2004 was premature and felt that there were other priorities that had to prevail (Umsebenzi, 1996:1).

Against this backdrop, the Bidding process continued. Cape Town had won three world championships, hosting cross-country, fencing and sailing which would boost hopes for the 2004 Olympics. This was just one way of trying to get the attention of the world to show that they were capable of hosting the Games. Ackerman commented that such events were vital in boosting the economy of the country, as they would bring with them 'tangible bottom-line benefits for the economy'. He further claimed that the cross-country event was to be televised to more than 80 countries (*Weekend Argus*, 6th August, 1994).

This was actually the very first time any of these events had been hosted in sub-Saharan Africa. The Rugby World Cup was one of the five international events to be held in Cape Town in the run-up to the city's final Bid in 1997 for the Olympics 2004. The spokesman for the Bid Committee said they wanted to send out a message that Cape Town could host any game no matter how complex and technical. He further asserted that although these games were not mainstream, they were influential for the Bid (*The Argus*, 25th August, 1994).

3.6 THE BID AS A MEANS FOR NATIONAL UNITY

Nation building is one of the key issues that are pertinent to this study and is one of the most important motivations that both the private and public sector drew attention to in bidding to host the Games in South Africa. Political leaders felt sport had the remarkable power to unite the new Rainbow Nation. It would bridge the gaps that had clearly kept South African people apart.

Clive Grinaker, Managing Director of Sandton-based Grinaker Sport Management, official marketers for the National Olympic Committee of South Africa, commented:

> And if as I believe, the Olympic spirit that is building now proves as the catalyst for national unity in this tortured country of ours, then South Africa will have one more reason to be grateful... (*Financial Mail*, 1994:70).

This statement was supported by the co-chairman of the Bid, Ngconde Balfour (he had been appointed co-chairman on the 4th of November 1994 by the Bid Committee) who called for all in South Africa to back Cape Town. "We now need support at all levels from every grouping in this country. We need all South Africans to come together and move forward". He said that progress had to come from two philosophies, which were development and unity (*The Star*, 1st February1994).

The Strategic Environment Assessment report also highlighted the importance of the Olympic Games in strengthening nation building. The report argued that hosting the Games was an exclusive opportunity for building a unified South African nation. While promoting national pride and a sense of unity, the Games would also help in unifying sport after years of segregation and sporting isolation (*Strategic Environment Assessment Report*, 1994:9*)*.

Bell (1995:49) saw the Bid as a window of opportunity and mentioned that "winning the Games offers singular political benefits: a focus of nation building and unity is offered on a plate". Support from all sectors of the community was a prerequisite for a successful Bid. The Bid had actually brought together an astonishing diversity of people. These were people who would likely disagree on almost everything else but had agreed on their support for the Bid.

The Olympic candidature file states that sport has played a singular role in the promotion of national unity.

> In 1995 the national rugby side, once an exclusive symbol of white pride, broke through its old barriers to embrace the (vindicated) hopes of the entire country in winning the Rugby World Cup. In 1996, the national soccer side broke through its own confines and captured the imagination of all South Africans in winning the Confederation of African Football competition (Candidature file, 1997: 38).

In a speech made by Nelson Mandela at the President's Sport Awards function in Pretoria, he emphasized the importance of national unity. "This spirit of partnership will stand us in good stead as we take on the challenge of persuading the International Olympic Committee that Africa is the right continent and Cape Town the right city to host the 2004 Olympic Games". He continued to say that success depended on the united support of government; business; sport administrators; athletes; and the public at large (Speech by Mandela, 'President's Sport Award Function', 1996).

In another address to the International Olympic Committee evaluation commission, Mandela appealed to them to give the Games to South Africa saying that they would be a source of confidence and unity for the people, further cementing the bonds of the new nation that was being built. He continued to say "the Games exemplify the power of sport to consolidate non-racial and international comradeship and it would be a jewel in the crown of the Rainbow Nation to host the 2004 Olympic Games" (Speech by Mandela, 'IOC Evaluation Commission', 1996).

3.7 PREPARING THE BID PRESENTATION FOR LAUSANNE

In July 1996, the Bidding team was preparing an official Bid document. A letter written by Nelson Mandela to the IOC launched volume one of the document. He stressed, "The legacy for South Africa and Africa would be real. I believe that the spirit of Olympism will have a meaningful contribution to the welfare of mankind" (Candidature file, 1997:8). This volume covered issues such as political stability, the weather conditions, environment, and gave an outline of how Cape Town was planning to address the escalating crime rate.

The second volume outlined plans for staging the world championships in 28 separate sport codes in one city. The third volume outlined infrastructure, both existing and planned, accommodation, transport, technology and the media. It also included more than 160 signed guarantees secured from national, provincial and local government, 28 international sport federations, hotel groups, transport companies and telecommunications organisations (Griffiths, 2000:47-48).

The Bid book was to be presented on the 15th of August 1996. Of the 11 Bid books, Cape Town's was unofficially rated as second to Stockholm's excellent submission. This was impressive for Cape Town, since this suggested that Cape Town had overcome the first obstacle of the technical challenge. In the second phase, each of the 11 candidate cities was inspected by a 12-man IOC group led by Dr. Thomas Bach. A short list of five candidate cities was drawn up. The announcement of Cape Town having been short-listed in April 1997, further enhanced its chances. Michael Fuller, the Bid's Director of Finance and

Administration, stated "We had been very hopeful, but it was a huge encouragement for us. It felt like affirmation that we were on the right track. We were competing in the global community and, as South Africans, we were achieving" (Griffiths, 2000:50).

Friday 5th of September 1997 was the day of the big decision. Scores of people gathered around the big screens at the Waterfront in Cape Town in anticipation of the final decision. Samaranch read: "The winner is Athens!" The IOC coverage included live coverage from crowds in each of the five cities. Griffiths (2000:70) asserts that while tens of thousands were shown to be gathered on the Grand Parade in Cape Town, in the Piazza Navona in Rome and the national stadium in Stockholm, barely 150 people had assembled in Athens. This announcement was followed by boos of disappointment from those in the defeated cities. The Bid Company CEO made a point of shaking each of his colleagues' hands, thanking them personally for their efforts during the campaign.

3.8 THE OUTCOME OF THE BID

Cape Town emerged third out of 11 candidate cities. In the first round, Athens had received 32 votes, Rome 23, Stockholm 20, Buenos Aires 16 and Cape Town 16. A vote-off was held between the latter two cities, which Cape Town won by 62 votes to 44. In the second round, Athens had 38 votes, Rome 28, Cape Town 22 and Stockholm had 19. Cape Town was eliminated in the third round, securing only 20 votes against 52 votes for Athens and 35 for Rome. In reflection, Chris Ball concluded that the Bid was a success. "By any decent standards, to finish third place at the first time of bidding for the Games was an outstanding achievement. We had persuaded the world that, as a country, we could organise a major event like the Olympic Games. We had established an important foundation for future bids", he claimed (Griffiths, 2000:72).

3.9 CONCLUSION

This chapter has discussed the dream of South Africa to stage the 2004 Olympic Games. Athens has emerged as the winning city to host the 2004 Games. Nevertheless, in the aftermath of the 5th of September, the search for explanations why Cape Town lost the Bid could not be avoided. No doubt there was disappointment amongst some South Africans. In addition, so much money and time had been invested in the Bid, and advocates of the Bid had gone to immeasurable lengths to try and win the votes of IOC officials. Yet South Africa didn't qualify. The following chapter reveals the reasons behind the failure.

CHAPTER 4

4   INTRODUCTION

4.1 WHY THE BID FAILED

An Olympic Bid is a difficult and uncertain undertaking. Accordingly, cities that contest to host the Games must meet certain standards. The political and technical weak points of Cape Town were instrumental in the decision that was made on the 5th of September 1997 in favour of Athens. Cape Town had been judged unready to host the Games. The failure of Cape Town to host the Games has been attributed to two main aspects, which this chapter will discuss.

Firstly, it will discuss the *logistical and technical reasons* which includes among other issues, the weak South African economy; underdeveloped infrastructure; Cape Town's geographic location; the capacity of South Africa's international airports; suburban railway facilities; insufficient accommodation; an inadequate transport system; lack of sporting facilities; the dispute surrounding Wingfield; the main venue identified for the Olympics and finally, the problem of crime.

Secondly, we will discuss the *political reasons* for the failure. Amongst other issues to be discussed, we will look at racial tension that emerged within the Bid Committee; the dissolving of the original Bid Committee; bad publicity generated by clashes between Ackerman and Ramsamy; and the fact that the Bid was politicised from the start. We will further look at the disagreements between government and the Bid Committee; the scandal of how South African officials offered to buy air tickets for the wives of some African IOC members; and finally South Africa's assumption that African IOC members would automatically vote for fellow Africans.

4.2 LOGISTICAL AND TECHNICAL REASONS

Pieter De Lange (1998) questioned the viability of hosting the Games. He highlighted that international research had shown that a one-off event such as the Olympic Games on its own could not permanently sustain a region's economy, and as a result, the Games could only be successfully hosted by developed, well managed, and economically vibrant regions of which Cape Town was not one. The South African economy was definitely weak. Cape Town specifically was too small in size, had an underdeveloped infrastructure, and its location was rather isolated, being situated at the bottom of the continent, far from the rest of the African continent and its people (*Finance Week*, 1997:32).

A comparative study of the cities that had actually hosted the Games confirmed the fact that Cape Town was far behind in these respects. For example, the population of the Western Cape which at that time (1994 elections) was estimated at 3,6 million and its proximity to the nearest next city was 700km away (Port Elizabeth). Comparing this to the population of Barcelona of more than six million and its proximity to the French border being less than 90 minutes drive and 50 minutes by air from Madrid, obviously showed that more people would have been able to travel to the Games compared to Cape Town. Cape Town was a clear indication of diseconomies of scale.

Additionally, since Cape Town was sparsely populated and quite isolated from other towns, one had to bear in mind that unlike developed countries where people can actually afford to fly out to the Games, Cape Town being located in a developing country, it was a given that not many people would be prepared or able to afford long distances to watch the Games (De Lange, 1998:172).

A third problem related to concerns about South Africans' ability to afford attending the Games. A comparison of the Gross Domestic Product of Developed Countries like Australia where the GDP was US$20 200 a head, and the Spanish figure being $14 400 and South Africa's a meagre $3 370, placed South Africa at the bottom of the list of the five Bid cities. De Lange (1998) further noted that Cape Town's location placed it at a disadvantage

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in terms of its' potential to sell tickets. More than three million tickets are said to have been sold in Barcelona, which contributed 8% to the revenue. Of these three million, 80% of them were sold in Spain.

Given the proximity of Cape Town to neighbouring countries of just under 10 000 km and average per capita income of less than $500 a year, the Games would not be able to successfully draw a significant number of would-be spectators from these countries. (Zimbabwe, Swaziland, Botswana, Mozambique, Lesotho and Namibia) (*Sunday Times*, 2nd June 1996). Even though these would-be spectators could afford the travel costs, the average projected price per ticket was R640. This was a phenomenal figure compared to Barcelona where 85 percent of the tickets were sold for less than R100 and the average price for the tickets in Atlanta was R280. Looking at these ticket figures, it seems unworkable that a developing country would have to sell tickets at a higher price where not many people can even afford to travel to the Games let alone purchase tickets.

Another issue of concern was the capacity of South Africa's international airports. Johannesburg international airport's capacity was reported to hold 11 million passengers a year. Cape Town airport could only handle four million passengers. Barcelona, Atlanta and Sydney's airport on the other hand could handle 12 million, over 51 million, and 17 million passengers respectively. How then was South Africa planning to sustain such a huge number of passengers heading for the Games?

Rollo Dickson (1994:96), a consulting editor to *South African Transport*, highlighted that providing excellent transport posed daunting challenges to Cape Town especially at an airport which was already struggling to cope with one international flight per hour. An estimate of between 200 000 to 400 000 visitors was envisaged for the Games and this meant that 800 250-seater, wide-bodied jets flying into and out of the city at an average rate of 57 every 24 hours or one in every 25 minutes was required. While the airport's runways are said to cope with that volume of traffic, the problem was that the international facilities could only handle one wide-bodied aircraft an hour (Dickson, 1994:96).

Unlike Barcelona and Atlanta, Cape Town lacked high-capacity suburban rail facilities to the city. The airport's access to town is limited to the N2. Not only was the concern about the airport capacity, there was also worry about the reliability and safety of local taxis amidst ongoing taxi wars. With the lack of high-capacity suburban rail facilities, there was no alternative transport that could be used besides the taxis. Moreover, in comparison to Barcelona, where the railway runs 500km from the airport, Cape Town's railway runs only 164km. Barcelona has 50km reserved bus lanes whereas Cape Town had fewer than 5km. Cape Town was the only city among the five finalists which didn't have a rail linkage to the international airport and no underground system (*Financial Mail*, 1994:96).

Editor of *South African Transport Magazine*, Proctor Sims, (1996) raised the concern that "the city's present transport capacity is no more than 40% of Atlanta's or 20% of Sydney's" and an unrealistic low budget had been presented in conjunction with the Cape Bid. He recommended that the budget had to be trebled for Cape Town to cope efficiently with the transport requirements of competitors, managers, media teams and spectators. Under these conditions, he continued to say that the best thing for South Africa would be for Rome or one of the other contenders to win the 2004 Olympic Bid (De Lange, 1998:215).

Accommodation was another cause for concern. With so many visitors coming into Cape Town, the city was definitely bound to run into accommodation shortages. De Lange claimed that Cape Town had about 13% of Atlanta's (1996 Games) hotel rooms. On hindsight, Rome is said to have sold 1,44 million tickets in 1960 and its 19 418 hotel rooms had been filled to capacity. Cape Town had 6 500 hotel rooms and yet hoped to sell 4,7 million tickets. It was mind boggling to imagine what would happen to those who couldn't find accommodation or how this shortage was going to be overcome. Compared to other host cities, it was clear that Cape Town fell short in its ability to provide accommodation. A survey concluded that Cape Town was still short of 71 500 rooms. The concern over the shortage of hotel accommodation was expected to get worse if Cape Town won the Bid (*Finance Week*, 1997:32).

Amongst the bidders, Cape Town required the most new sporting facilities to host the various sports. According to De Lange (1998:216) Cape Town needed 16 new sporting facilities which also included a 75 000 seat Olympic Stadium, costing $78 million. Each new competition site would cost on average $21,25 million. On the other hand, Rome needed only eight new sport sites to be constructed and they didn't require a new Olympic Stadium since they could use the Football Stadium which was used for the 1990 World Cup.

Athens had a stadium which would host the 1997 World Athletics Championships and also qualified to host an 80 000-seat Olympic Stadium. Athens would then only require ten new sporting facilities. Buenos Aires also didn't have to construct an Olympic Stadium since they had the 60 000-seat River Plate Stadium built for the 1978 Football World Cup which would only need modifications for the Olympic Games. Stockholm needed to construct only six new competition sites.

Andrew Jennings argued that Cape Town had huge financial tasks in the following years to overcome in trying to build or rebuild infrastructure for its people. He remarked that "the people of South Africa don't need elite swimming pools, specially designed for top international events...you simply don't need these elite facilities because they don't work for communities" (De Lange, 1998:204).

Wingfield, the main venue identified for the Olympics was also under dispute. This is a site that was used as an airfield in the Second World War and it belonged to the Graaff Family Trust who supposedly 'sold' the land to government provided government 'resold' it back to them once it was no longer needed for military purposes. There was a set interest rate of 3% a year which was included in the original deal and this meant that the trust would have to pay the government approximately R255 000 to buy back the land, but stand to resell it for 500 times that price. The commercial value attached to this land was R129 million (*Sunday Times*, 16th June, 1996).

The problem that the Bid Committee encountered was that in the preliminary operating and capital budget review, it was assumed that there would be no capital expenditure for the acquisition of land. In the Basic Information Package on Cape Town 2004 Bid, it actually stated that one of the most important features of Wingfield was that it was state owned and its management and control could be managed in the most appropriate way to suit the Olympics. People removed from the area in 1924 lodged Land claims and it was reported that up to 5000 families could seek reimbursement (*Business Day,* 16th June, 1996). This obviously had financial implications for the Bid Company and they had only made provision for R261 million in the capital budget (De Lange, 1998:189).

A study by the Strategic Assessment Team, *The Impact of the Olympics on the Construction Industry*, revealed the risks of enormous increases in building costs which were projected to be between 20 and 30% per year. The study revealed that the scale of Olympic construction would expose serious capacity constraints in the South African building industry (De Lange, 1998:188).

The issue of crime was a serious concern that constantly emerged throughout the evaluation process. The Bid had to come up with ways to convince the evaluation team that they had mechanisms in place to deal with these concerns. The high crime rate was the worst feature of the Olympic evaluation commission's report. Similarly, the shantytowns that can be seen next to the highway in the airport vicinity were a constant reminder of the socio-economic problems South Africa faced.

4.3 POLITICAL REASONS

Once successfully deployed, marketing power is said to often coincide with a well-consolidated sense of national identity. Yet South Africa's endeavour for national identity through the Bid was questionable. The very people who were trying to showcase the so-called 'new' South Africa were involved in racial squabbles, which inevitably exposed the thin veneer of unity. From the beginning when Raymond Ackerman proposed the Bid first to Sam Ramsamy, then to the government, the fact that he was a white wealthy man created

racial problems. Government couldn't look beyond the fact that the Bid Committee comprised of a majority of white people and wanted to see a racially balanced Bid Committee.

As was earlier mentioned, the concept of marketing power more often than not attracts state elites in societies that lack national identity. As an ethnically divided society, South Africa attempted to take advantage of the marketing power derived from hosting the Games to enjoy a high level of international attention. However, as Van der Westhuizen (2001:70) states, "as state elites seek to enhance their legitimacy by prevailing upon the state's sources of marketing power, it can very often exacerbate or expose their lack of legitimacy". South Africa on many occasions during and after the 2004 Bid, appeared to be battling to legitimise national unity.

Ackerman and Ramsamy were two strong individuals who came from opposite ends of the South African political spectrum. From the outset of the Bid, they seemed to be operating on different perspectives, which strained the relations between the two. Ramsamy confessed "there was no chemistry between us". Ackerman was a wealthy white man who led the Bid and Ramsamy was of Indian descent and a 'champion' of the anti-Apartheid sport movement. Ackerman had the experience and capability of being a leader and unfortunately, coming from a past of Apartheid, it was difficult for a white man to lead a national project such as the Olympic Bid.

Bell (1995:27) contends that the clash that led to the ousting of Ackerman has a place in South Africa's transitional politics. A wealthy Jewish businessman who started the Bid proposal in the 1990's would have to hand it over to the new transitional local authority to finish it off by 1995. Government was of the view that the Bid Committee was too white and therefore would affect African perceptions and insisted that it be mixed to give content to the theme of an "African Bid".

Tension between Ackerman and Ramsamy first emerged during a meeting to brief the Bidding teams from Durban, Cape Town and Johannesburg. To Ramsamy, Ackerman was unnecessarily intervening in issues that didn't really concern him and to Ackerman, Ramsamy was being aggressive. Each accused the other of racism and Bell (1995:28) states that this was a demonstration of the fragility of the spirit of reconciliation, which along with Nelson Mandela, was an asset in this contest for international sport marketing's biggest prize. This was the beginning of many disputes to come.

One cannot ignore the problems that were evident in the Bid Committee itself. The original Bid Committee was dissolved and this was detrimental because these were the people who had experience and the support of international and powerful sponsors. While Ackerman was away on an overseas trip, Ramsamy formed a new alternative Cape Town Bid team as he felt the City did not have all the necessary information it needed and that he would assist its officials in seeing IOC officials in Barcelona and Lausanne. When Ackerman heard of this move, he was livid and when the officials flew to Barcelona, phone calls were made ahead of them, informing the IOC that they were coming without the authority of the Bid Committee. The IOC then contacted Ramsamy who informed them that they were coming at his specific recommendation. At this point, the IOC was already aware of the on going clashes between NOCSA and the Bid Committee (Bell, 1995: 31).

When Ackerman returned from his trip he went to seek an audience with Nelson Mandela who tried to resolve the problem by bringing all parties concerned together. The underlying issues of the dispute included questions such as who owned the Bid, who was responsible for the day to day running of the Bid and who reported to whom. There was a public war of words that broke out, with accusations of bad faith on both sides. There were statements published in the press which further put South Africa in a bad light (Bell, 1995:31). After numerous meetings with Steve Tshwete, the sport minister who was a moderator, they reached a stalemate and early in 1995, Ackerman announced his resignation from the Cape Town Bid Committee (Griffiths, 2000:32).

According to Bell (1995), the clashes generated bad publicity, and in the maze of Olympic politics, threatened to destabilize Cape Town's favourable position among a dozen other potential candidate cities. Not only did it create bad publicity but it also brought technical planning to a standstill for several months. Similarly, Nationalist politicians such as the Cape premier, Hernus Kriel went to Lausanne under protest and complained about being sidelined by the ANC and felt that the Bid had actually been turned into an " ANC Bid" and not a national one. Kriel clearly embarrassed the ANC leadership as he continued to protest. Whether or not South Africa's image would be dented was not the issue, the Nationalists were prepared to fight this and risk losing votes for the Games (Bell, 1995:27).

The attempts to enhance post-Apartheid South Africa's marketing power were constantly challenged by the debate on whether or not bidding to host the Games was justified. As discussed earlier, the division of opinion based on the 'haves' and 'have nots was alarming and did not do much to encourage national unity. Only 47% of whites, 74% of Africans, 75% of Asians, and 63% of Coloureds felt that government should fund the Games. Also, one of the requirements to host the Games was that there should be public support. The IOC report however claimed, "the extent of public support for the candidature is difficult to assess". It was later revealed by Market Research Africa that support from the Western Cape had dropped dramatically during 1996 (De Lange, 1998:191).

The Bid was a highly politicised affair to the extent that the ANC actually threatened to withdraw its support if the Western Cape province supported the ruling National Party, which it eventually did. *The Weekend Argus* (9th April 1994) headlines read "No Olympics if Nats take Cape". The ANC had actually warned that Cape Town could lose the Olympics if the Western Cape voted for what they termed 'racist' Nats. Speaking at an ANC rally, the ANC provincial premiership candidate, Allan Boesak had clearly stated that racial stability and respect for human dignity could be forgotten if National Party 'racism' won.

Government's initial lack of commitment to such a great event did not do justice to the country and Chris Ball, leader of the Bid Committee, realising how vital support from government was, wrote to Steve Tshwete soon after the March 1996 meeting in Lausanne where Cape Town had been short-listed. Ball was adamant that the government show some serious support if Cape Town were to win. Government heeded Ball's words and appointed

a cabinet sub-committee. Mojanku Gumbi, an advocate who had been working with the Deputy President's office was appointed as the legal advisor and began to assume a role in every discussion and decision. However, there was conspicuous tension between the Bid Committee members and government. Bid members became apprehensive and concerned that government was beginning to use the worldwide platform of Cape Town's Olympic Bid to propagate their own politics (Griffiths, 2000:64-65).

Nevertheless, the Bid Committee continued to work on the content of the Bid. There were three themes on which the Bid Committee was going to centre the Bid. First, the Olympics were seen as a vehicle for development among emerging nations. Secondly, it was an economic opportunity for the IOC in Africa. Thirdly, that Cape Town had the physical and human capacity to host the event. However, government representatives didn't agree with these tactics and there was a stalemate. Despite numerous attempts by Chris Ball to try and convince government that the presentation's content was not a matter of personal opinion but had to be developed in order to win votes and IOC's advice was that it was a good approach, government disapproved because it had a different plan (Griffiths, 2000:65).

At the heart of the dispute were differences in approach. Government seemed to be focusing on what benefits the Games would bring to South Africa whilst the Bid's pitch was to stress what South Africa could do for the Games. The Bid members recall this as the lowest point of the campaign. They felt that government was interfering and turning the Bid into a party political broadcast. Ball pointed out that South Africans needed to realise that an Olympic Bid was not a political exercise, and that the IOC didn't particularly like politicians, and they are only required to provide guarantees and meet the demands of protocol, which the South African government was clearly not adhering to. Moreover, the right to host the Olympic Games should be an essentially sporting challenge between sport people, free from political interference (Griffiths, 2000:66).

While preparing for the presentation to be held in Lausanne, it is alleged that South African politicians wanted to take it upon themselves to arrange hotel bookings for South African officials who were to attend the presentation, which was unbecoming in the eyes of the IOC system. Each candidate city was allocated a fixed number of rooms at a designated IOC hotel. The list of people who were planning to attend the South African presentation,

was unreasonably long and there would be insufficient rooms to accommodate the various politicians and their entourages. This didn't deter South African politicians, and they went and asked for additional rooms and were declined. They continued to persuade the IOC to make more rooms available by sending the South African ambassador in Switzerland to the IOC offices, and again it was declined (Griffiths, 2000:67).

Moreover, when the South African delegation arrived at the airport in Switzerland, seven black Mercedes Benz cars met them and it was realised that each South African government minister had actually been allocated a car yet no other candidate city had made such an arrangement. Additionally, rumours had been going around that Cape Town had offered to buy air tickets for the wives of some African IOC members to Switzerland. Reuters reported this scandal on the Tuesday, three days before the selection took place. This was damaging to South Africa's image and during meetings with IOC members before the decision, the team started to realise that things were working against them and they had to do some damage control (Griffiths, 2000:67).

Nelson Mandela seemed to be the only trump card South Africa had at this stage. He arrived in Lausanne the day before the decision was made. As he made his speech on the day of the decision, it didn't seem to have the effect that South Africans thought it would have on the IOC members. It transpired that Ball had earlier prepared a great speech which he thought would strike the right cord among the IOC officials. However this speech had been set aside and Thabo Mbeki, who was the Deputy President prepared what the officials had described as a 'bland and intellectual' speech. Moreover, the presentation of a video it was said, revealed a lack of understanding of the values of Olympism (Griffiths, 2000:69).

Despite the unfavourable presentation in Lausanne, the blame for Cape Town's failure was placed on Africa for betrayal, since the IOC African officials had not voted for South Africa. The Bid Committee and the government had the misconception that Cape Town would be supported by the African IOC members in their quest to have the Games in Africa for the first time. Ball maintained that the African continent had never hosted the Games, and Cape Town presented a credible Bid and yet other Africans voted for someone else.

Bell (1997:18) however, argues that South Africa was misled into thinking that IOC African members represented Africa in the IOC. Yet the fact is they represented the IOC in Africa. He continues to say that they are not Africa's emissaries to the capital of sport and their loyalty actually lies with Samaranch. Therefore IOC members' first preference would be for the benefit of the IOC and not Africa. If the IOC African members felt Cape Town was not ready, it would have been detrimental to the IOC if it continued to support Cape Town on the basis of being 'fellow Africans'. Moreover, Griffiths (2000:73) points out that in theory, they are supposed to protect the true spirit of Olympic sport; in practice they are free to do what they like. As such, IOC decisions are difficult to predict.

Had South Africans been more rigorous in their appraisals and not allowed themselves to be misled by the nods and winks, Bell claims they might have critically altered the Bid's strategic thrust. Accordingly, if one of the main aims in the strategy was to win votes, then perhaps Cape Town was always targeting the wrong votes since it failed to realise that Cape Town would not appeal to its so called 'African brothers and sisters' in the IOC membership. This was seen as a failure of analysis.

Martin Gillingham concluded that Cape Town never had a chance of winning, and that its inclusion in the final five was more a gesture of encouragement by the IOC that the time may soon be right for an African Games (Sunday Independent, 7th September, 1997). Darryl Accone, (1997:3) commented, "Exactly when will we realise that we cannot emotionally blackmail the world on the basis of our transformation, no matter how laudable that will always be".

4.4 CONCLUSION

There are two main points that this chapter set out to discuss. These two main points are the *logistical and political reasons* behind Cape Town's failure to host the 2004 Olympic Bid. Despite how appealing the benefits of hosting the Games were to South Africa, the reasons that have been discussed give us an indication of how virtually impossible it would have been for South Africa to host the Games, and they also help us understand the adverse effects hosting the Games would have brought on the country. At the announcement of Athens being the winner, some South Africans heaved a sigh of relief. But we cannot deny the fact that despite the failure to host the Games, Cape Town has arguably been put on the map.

CONCLUSION

Having explored the various literature, we have ascertained that the literature did not deal with the pivotal questions of this research paper. However, using the various sources of information, and the outcome of various events, this paper has made some observations and conclusions which answer the questions set out in the first chapter and these are highlighted later in this section. In addition, chapter one also stated that this paper seeks to examine how South Africa has sought to 'sell' itself in the aftermath of the both the Cold War and Apartheid Eras. The subsequent chapters reveal that South Africa used amongst others the 2004 Olympic Bid to 'sell' itself.

At the beginning of this study we have witnessed sport initially dividing South Africans and giving nationals separate identities. For example, rugby represented 'white' South Africans and soccer represented 'black' South Africans. In the post-Apartheid era, we have witnessed sport being used by key policy makers as a means to forge national identity in an effort to change the past. Accordingly, after decades of being sidelined and isolated, the opportunity to expand South Africa's marketing power came through bidding to host the 2004 Olympic Games, which it was believed was one of the most effective ways to market South Africa. This opportunity came at a time when South Africa needed to bolster its national identity and wanted to signal its' return to the world because of the remnants of Apartheid which had resulted in a fragmented and divided society.

Moreover, Hiller (2001:5) highlights the fact that the Olympics were seen in the South African context, to play an important role in helping remove the nagging South African sense of inferiority and the remnants of shame from the Apartheid past that stalked the country's international image. In a globalised era, where countries are competing for a place in the global community and for 'name recognition', the opportunity to showcase a country through staging mega-events such as the Olympics has become very significant. This is evident in the increased number of nations joining the list of bidders to host the Games.

Conversely, as the world becomes more and more of a global community, the distinction between national identities of various cultures becomes blurred. Accordingly, the challenge has now become how best to market a country and at the same time strengthen national identity. This challenge is especially evident in societies deeply divided by ethnic groups, and more often than not, these societies are found in the Third World countries. This creates an even greater task for developing countries to be recognised internationally. In the case of South Africa, from the onset, we have seen how the opinions of the Bid initiative were spread across different racial lines, which was an indication of a divided society, and it would require a lot of convincing to get people together towards a common goal.

This is not to say that in societies where there is no ethnic division, all nationals will support the Bid to host mega-events. Stockholm is a typical example of an ethnically homogenous society where it was reported that public support for the 2004 Olympic Bid was dwindling. Perhaps the hurdles of trying to get people of diverse cultural and linguistic groups towards a common goal are much more visible in divided societies.

This study set out to prove whether or not bidding to host the 2004 Olympic Games actually marketed South Africa in the international arena and also to prove whether or not bidding to host the Olympic Games helped celebrate South Africa's national identity.

5.1 MARKETING SOUTH AFRICA THROUGH THE BID

Firstly, we have seen how South Africa has drawn attention in the international arena through hosting various international sport such as fencing, sailing and also bidding to host the 2004 Olympic Games. Secondly, like many other cities that failed to host the Games, Cape Town proved that bidding to stage the Olympic Games, is in its own right a vehicle to gain international publicity. This is evident in the increased number of tourists that came into the country and also the increased number of international sporting events that were hosted subsequent to the Bid such as the All Africa Games, 1999; World Cricket Cup, 2003 and others.

Thirdly, despite the failure, there was an incredible spill over, and the Games brought a substantial amount of credibility to South Africa. After the Bid, South Africa continued to host the All Africa Games in 1999 and also hosted other big events such as the World Cricket Cup held in 2003. Although Cape Town failed to host the 2004 Olympic Games the Bid process had impacted favourably on the Western Cape and saw scores of tourists flocking into the Cape.

Cape Town was promoted positively on an international platform, and has also been recognised as a prime tourist venue by tourist travel organisations. A survey conducted by Wesgro showed Cape Town as the most attractive location for foreign investment. Wesgro believed that Western Cape as a whole had the fastest growing economy in South Africa. They also observed that the tourism sector had been strengthened by the 2004 Cape Town Bid (Nelson, 1996:1).

The President of the National Olympic Committee commented that Cape Town was now one of the Fodor 100's best destinations and the city appears on CNN's temperature list. Moreover, the city would also benefit on the 'immense international awareness' created by the Bid for the next few years, as the Western Cape Minister for Tourism claimed (Van der Westhuizen, 2001: 78).

As other developing countries entertain the idea of hosting the Games, they could draw some lessons from the Cape Town Bid. Usually the hosting of mega-events is reserved for developed countries or cities, Cape Town has challenged that argument by going as far as being in the top five of bidding cities, beating some of the most developed cities such as Stockholm. South Africa has set the pace, opening more opportunities for other developing countries to bid and be 'known' worldwide. Van der Westhuizen (2001:78) points out that South Africa had successfully prevailed on its marketing power in order to retain a level of international prominence it would not have otherwise had.

On the other hand, we cannot deny that there were some unique features that further enhanced South Africa's marketing power. Nelson Mandela stood out as a trump card and the biggest asset for South Africa as he drew incredible attention from the world as one of the greatest men who tried to bring a divided nation together. Mandela was honoured internationally and emerged as a hero who possibly had the potential to transform South Africa. What better time to bid to stage the Games with so much attention already directed at South Africa?

In an interview with Bell, (1996:36) Chris Ball was asked if South Africa actually stood a chance for the 2004 Bid. He responded that there was no doubt about that, the mood was now for South Africa because of the presence of the State President, Mr. Mandela. "He will be in office in 1997; he won't be in office thereafter", he stated.

Although South Africa lost the bid, arguably a lot was learned from such an exercise. South Africa paved the way for hosting other significant and international events and also had some marketing benefits.

5.2 CELEBRATING SOUTH AFRICA'S NATIONAL IDENTITY

Needless to say hosting such events can also highlight divisions much easier. As articulated in the marketing power concept in the first chapter, state elites seek to enhance their legitimacy by prevailing upon the state's sources of marketing power. Yet, such attempts very often expose divisions or even a lack of legitimacy. In addressing the second question of whether or not bidding to host the Games helped celebrate South Africa's national identity, there are quite a number of issues that arose. Essentially however, the mistakes South Africa made was that the post-apartheid state was still too fragile to be able to endure the kind of tensions and pressures such as hosting an Olympic Games imposed. South Africa needed more time to develop a more coherent sense of national identity.

Firstly, the fact that Ackerman's Bid proposal was not easily embraced by government because of the fact that he was a wealthy white man and also represented the private sector, revealed how daunting it would be to celebrate South Africa's national identity through the Games. Moreover, the fact that government felt the Bid Committee was too 'white', and in trying to make the Bid an 'African Bid' it seemed the role which whites performed would have to be downplayed.

Secondly, the continuous racial tensions between the key leaders of the Bid team, Sam Ramsamy, of Indian descent, and Raymond Ackerman, a white, wealthy man continued to challenge this endeavour. The conspicuous racial tension between these two leaders got to the point where Ackerman resigned and a new Bid committee was formed.

Thirdly, despite the continued appeals and recommendations by various key people such as Ngconde Balfour, Nelson Mandela, the Strategic Assessment Team and many others for a united internal front in the Bid, it was apparent that it would not work as there were divided opinions on whether or not the Games were a good idea across racial lines, which further exacerbated the racial tension. As one commentator noted,

> We were not promised the Olympics but a better life for all. We need houses, jobs and good living conditions for all. Until these needs have been met the people's trust in our MPs will fade, perhaps as it has started to do already. People are starving - no food to eat, no clothes to wear, no place to stay. Stop the 2004 Olympic Bid or else we are just going to pay more and more tax (*UCT Cape Times*, 31st July, 1996).

Fourthly, politics in the Bid continued to create a gap within South Africans. The fact that the Western Cape Province and Cape Town, elected a National Party government exacerbated tensions between the two levels of government, (provincial and national government) because the ANC government had a more prominent and controlling role in the Bid process. The ANC then threatened to withdraw its support of the Bid in protest against National Party supporters in the Western Cape.

Lastly, the outcome of the Bid exposed the fragility of national identity amongst South Africans. It showed that national identity was too complex an issue and could not be solved by simply using a Bid. Perhaps the time had not come for South Africa to host the Games, seeing how big a role national identity plays in hosting the Games. Evidently, the Bid couldn't be used as a tool to foster national identity. It appeared that there was unity on a superficial level, which was for the sake of solidarity because as soon as Athens won the Bid, there was pointing of fingers and bitterness towards certain individuals who were blamed for letting South Africa down and accusations along racial lines. Accordingly, although the Bid didn't genuinely unite the nation, we cannot deny that it brought the historically divided society together for a common goal-at least for a while.

5.3 LESSONS TO BE DRAWN FROM THE STUDY

There are a number of lessons that we can draw from the study. Firstly, we have seen that the Bid cannot be owned by either the private sector or government and to that end, has to be politically neutral. Initially, the private sector had control of the Bid and arguably, the business community was looking to benefit enormously from it. This is clearly evident in the great amounts that were invested by the business community. The Bid was seen as 'good business' and no doubt the business sector would benefit. Construction companies, and many other companies were all going to enjoy 'good business' through various projects to be implemented.

Government ultimately saw its opportunity to use the Bid as an instrument for national policy on human development and took over the Bid. They realised that they needed to work hand in hand with the private sector, which would help fund the Bid. This did not mean that there would be harmony between the private sector and government, as evidenced during the deliberations on the content of the Bid. Government was accused of wanting to use the Bid for its own interest. Future bids have to be run by an independent team that has no interests in personal gains.

Secondly, taking into consideration the history of South Africa in terms of racial discrimination, the use of a 'white' bid team to pursue the Bid was contentious as it was often argued that they represented an elite group and in that sense, they would further enrich themselves and pursue interests of those they 'represent' such as sponsoring companies. The interesting twist however, was that opinion polls indicated that white people least supported the Bid. They argued that they would be the ones to bear the brunt of the costs. In contrast, black South Africans were more supportive of the Bid because the Olympic Bid was pegged on to human development and economic growth which the disadvantaged population desired.

Thirdly, according to Hiller (1997:1) South African nationals were not consulted on hosting the Games. Yet we have seen that events of such a competitive nature require support by the public, hence the importance of consulting the public. How can the Bid successfully mobilise support in the face of 'foreign' competition if the very people who are to play a significant role are not consulted?

Fourthly, The Olympic Games have the power to transform a town, city and country. However, certain social, political, economic and physical structures must pre-exist within a city and are contingent to a city being awarded the Olympic Games. The country's infrastructure is assessed and such issues as the airports, highways, railroads, public transportation, sports facilities, hotel accommodations, and security are all measured. In this regard, South Africa had to amongst other things, improve and develop these areas of concern in order to qualify.

In conclusion, the marketing power concept tool has been useful in this study. It has been a useful guide in demonstrating that South Africa's use of the Olympic Bid as a means to reinforce national identity has not been ideal. This is evident in the various differences of opinions, the tension that arose within the Bid team itself, the power struggles that arose between national and local government on who owns the bid and other related issues. On the other hand, the marketing power concept has illustrated how South Africa by using this concept has achieved a relatively high level of international awareness such as the staging

of various international sporting events, being recommended by tourist travel organisations as a preferred destination, being included in CNN's weather forecast, to name but a few.

South Africa has created quite a number of opportunities for the country in the global arena and has become a key player in the global economy. South Africa has also proved that marketing power can be used by any country to draw international attention. We have seen China following suit and actually winning the Bid to host the 2008 Games after being isolated for many years. Other countries can also take the challenge.

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