Democratic consolidation: A comparative study of Botswana and South Africa

Which is the most consolidated and why?

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Assignment Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Philosophy in Political Management at the University of Stellenbosch

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December 2004
DECLARATION

I, the undersigned... here declare that the work contained in this assignment is my original work and I have not previously submitted it in its entirety or in part at any university for a degree

Signature

Date 09/11/2004
ABSTRACT

Before a country can have democracy a consolidated democracy, democracy is a prerequisite. The term democracy can be traced back to ancient Greece and the studies of the consolidation of democracy dates since the transition of the seventies. The notion of democratic consolidation has been defined by authors as a process of making new democracies secure, deepening institutions and liberties and making them immune against the threat of authoritarian regression. But authors have also found that there are socio-economic conditions favourable to consolidation such as sufficient affluence.

This study compares Botswana and South Africa’s democracy, the reason being to find out which is the most consolidated and why? To compare these two countries’ democracies, the study focuses on the following; affluence, institutions suitable for democracy, free and fair elections and electoral systems.

There are similarities and differences between these countries. They share British parliamentary traditions. Both practice multiparty elections but neither experienced turnovers, for example; Botswana started practicing from 1965 until now, while South Africa started in 1994. The major institutional difference is the electoral system. Their ratings in the human development indexes are declining, but South Africa scores better. The other major difference is in their Freedom House ratings, where South Africa’s rating is better than Botswana’s. The issue of HIV/AIDS infections remains a big problem for these countries. To what extent this would impact on democracy is uncertain as little research of this kind has been done.

In concluding this study, it is explicitly stated that these countries are free electoral democracies but not consolidated yet, because they have not passed Huntington’s “two turnover test”, and their socio-economic conditions are
also problematic. At this stage, however South Africa is slightly better off for the reasons cited above.
Demokrasie is `n voorvereiste vir `n gekonsolideerde demokrasie. Hoewel die term demokrasie sy oorsprong het by die antieke Grieke dateer studies oor die konsolidasie van demokrasieë slegs terug na die sewentigerjare van die 20ste eeu. Demokratiese konsolidasie verwys na die proses waarvolgens nuwe demokrasieë na hul aanvanklike vestiging teen die gevaar van outoritêre verval beveilig word deur die daarstelling van demokratiese instellings en vryhede. Navorsing het bevind dat sekere sosio-ekonomiese faktore of omstandighede soos byvoorbeeld voldoende ekonomiese voorspoed die konsolidasie van jong demokrasieë bevorder.

Die studie behels `n vergelyking van die demokrasieë van Suid-Afrika en Botswana ten opsigte van hulle graad van demokratiese konsolidasie en die redes daarvoor. Die studie fokus in die verband op aspekte soos: ekonomiese voorspoed, die demokratiese aard van hulle instellings, vrye en regverdige verkiesings en hulle kiesstelsels.

Daar is beide ooreenkomste en verskille tussen die twee state. Beide is gesetel in die Britse parlementêre stelsel. Beide gebruik sedert hulle vestiging as demokrasieë veelparty verkiesings – Botswana sedert 1965 en Suid-Afrika sedert 1994. Die belangrikste institusionele verskil is in hulle kiesstelsels geleë. Hoewel die lande se klassifikasies beide in die indekse sowel as die verslae oor menslike ontwikkeling daal, waar Suid-Afrika steeds beter as Botswana. Die duidelikste verskil is ten opsigte van hulle Freedom House klassifikasie. Die kwessie van MIV/VIGS-infeksies bly steeds `n belangrike probleem vir beide state. Vanweë die gebrek aan navorsing in die verband is dit onseker in watter mate die VIGS-kwessie demokrasie in die lande in die toekoms gaan beinvloed.
Die gevolgtrekking van die tesis is dat hoewel beide state vrye demokrasieë is hulle nog nie as gekonsolideerde demokrasieë geklassifiseer kan word nie. Die gevolgtrekking is hoofsaaklik gebaseer op hulle problematiese sosio-ekonomiese omstandighede en die feit dat hulle nog nie Huntington se "two turnover test" geslaag het nie. Suid-Afrika is egter op grond van die redes wat hierbo aangevoer is, tans beter as Botswana daaraan toe.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I hereby acknowledge the contribution of:

My promoter Professor, Willie Breytenbach for his supervision and constant encouragement and his effort to make sure that I complete my thesis.

My parents, sisters, my late brother, relatives and friends for their interest and tolerance of my “anti-social” behaviour during the course of my studies.

My fiancée, Lisa for her support throughout my studies.

Lastly, Almighty God for giving me strength to complete my thesis

Sello Clive Mukhara

Stellenbosch

December 2004
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

Declaration i  
Abstract ii  
Opsomming iv  
Acknowledgements vi  
Table of contents vii  
List of abbreviations x  
List of tables and figures xi  

## Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1 Introduction 1  
1.2 Problem statement 3  
1.3 Institutions 4  
1.4 Affluence 6  
1.5 Aims and purpose 8  
1.6 Methodology 8  
1.7 Delimitation 8  

## Chapter 2: Botswana
2.1 Historical background of Botswana 10  
2.2 The focus on the parliament and the electoral system 13  
2.2.1 The role of the parliament 13  
2.2.2 The electoral system 16  
2.3.3 Free and fair elections 17  
2.3.4 Election result: eight elections (1965-1999) 18  
2.5 Affluence 24  
2.5.1 Per Capita income and trends 24  
2.5.2 Human Development index and trends (1987-2003) 28  
2.6 Evaluations 29  

## Chapter 3: South Africa
3.1 Historical background 31  
3.2 The focus on the parliament and electoral system 37  
3.2.1 Parliament 37  
3.2.2 The functions of the parliament 38  
3.2.3 The electoral system 39  
3.3 Free and fair elections 40
Chapter 4: Conclusion

4.1 Similarities 56
4.2 Differences 58
4.3 Final assessments 60

Bibliography 63
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ACDP-African Christian Democratic Party
AEB-Afrikaner Eenheids Beweging
AIDS-Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
ANC-African National Congress
AU-African Union
AWB-Afrikaner Weerstands beweging
AZAPO-Azanian People’s Organisation
BC-Black Consciousness
BCP-Botswana Congress Party
BDP-Botswana Democratic Party
BNF-Botswana National Front
BFP-Botswana Freedom Party
BIP-Botswana Independence Party
BLP-Botswana Labour Party
BPP-Botswana Peoples Party
BPP-No.1 Botswana People’s Party No.1
BPU-Botswana Progressive Union
CODESA-Convention for a Democratic South Africa
DA-Democratic Alliance
DEIC-Dutch East Indian Company
DP-Democratic Party
FF-Freedom Front
FPTP-First Past The Post
GDP-Gross Domestic Product
GNI-Gross National Income
GNP-Gross National Product
GNU-Government of National Unity
GPGP-Government by the People Green Party
HDI-Human Development Index
HDR-Human Development Report
HIV-Human Immune Virus
IEC-Independent Electoral Commission
IFP-Inkatha Freedom Party
IMF-International Monetary Fund
LLB-Lesedi la Botswana
MF-Minority Front
MP's-Members of Parliament
NA-National Assembly
NCOP-National Council of Provinces
NNP-New National Party
NP-National Party
OAU-Organisation of African Unity
PAC-Pan-Africanist Congress
PR-Proportional Representation
SACP-South African Communist Party
SOPA-Socialist Party of Azania
UCDP-United Christian Democratic Party
UDF-United Democratic Front
UDM-United Democratic Movement
UN-United Nations
UNDP-United Nations Development Program
USP-United Socialist Party
WB-World Bank
LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES

Table 1: Number of people who registered and voted from 1965-1999 elections

Table 2: Botswana’s elections from 1965 till 1999

Table 3: Composition of the Parliament from 1965-1999

Table 4: Botswana’s Per Capita income trends (1960-2002)

Table 5: Botswana’s Human Development Index Rankings (1990-2001)

Table 6: 1994 Election results

Table 7: 1999 Election results

Table 8: 2004 Election results

Table 9: Annual Household income by Race, 2002

Table 10: Per Capita income trends (1990-1999)

Table 11: HDI Rankings (1990-2003)

Figure 1: Number of people registered and voted (1965-1999)
Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Introduction

Africa is a latecomer to democratisation. It has followed other countries rather than led other countries in giving birth to the reform movements that have installed elected governments, multiparty systems, and more open societies in the world (Bratton and Mattes, 2001:107). The global wave of democratisation of the 1990s, which followed the demise of the Cold War international systems, has also swept the African continent (Kafela, 2004:1).

As the result of the “third wave” of democratisation (Huntington, 1997), almost all African countries adopted some sort of political reform towards addressing questions of democracy. The hegemony of single parties and the practice of life presidency, which were some of the features of African politics, are no longer exercised. Thus, this process of democratisation has encouraged many African countries to hold regular multiparty elections. But elections alone, do not guarantee a consolidated democracy (Joseph, 2003). Institutional and social weakness could prevent consolidation.

The process of democratisation in this continent has been checkered because of number of interrelated factors, which have both domestic and external dimensions. From among the several factors that are hampering the consolidation of multiparty democracy is the tendency of incumbent regimes to hold onto political power, ethnic conflicts and negative intervention by external forces (Kafela, 2004).

This study will focus on Botswana and South Africa. These two countries made a transition to democracy through elections, and they both practice multiparty systems since their democratisation. Institutional weaknesses and social and economic conditions favourable for democracy will also be analysed in this study.
Botswana's democratisation began in the 1960s. Since independence in 1966, Botswana practiced a parliamentary democracy. In 2003, Botswana was rated 26th highest level of economic freedom, tied with eight other nations including Japan and Norway. Botswana's life expectancy stood at 39.

Botswana held eight multi-party democratic elections and the ninth in 2004. But, there were no turnovers; the BDP won all of them. Botswana would not just be an electoral democracy but at least a liberal democracy because of its good ratings on political rights and civil liberties, mainly being rated as free with an aggregate of 2. Its elections were regarded as free and fair. It uses a constituency-based electoral system also known as the first-past-the-post electoral system.

South Africa got its self-government from the British in 1910 (Du Toit, 1995). The governance was autocratic in nature because of white minority rule. Democratic rule came only in 1994 (Breytenbach quoted in Van der Nest [1999: 69]). The country has a heterogeneous population in which 75% are black, 14% white, 9% coloured, and 2% Indian (see World Value Survey, 1995 and Freedom House, 2003: 1). Currently there are about ± 43.6 million people residing in South Africa.

South Africa made the transition from a minority-ruled country to an inclusive democracy in 1994. Its transition to democracy culminated in two constitutions: an interim constitution in 1993 and the final constitution in 1996 (Act 108 of 1196), which took effect in the beginning of 1997 (Wessels, 2000). A special feature of this transition was a pact-driven i.e. negotiated constitution between and among the majority political stakeholders at the time, namely F.W de Klerk’s National Party (NP) and government, and Nelson Mandela’s African National Congress (ANC) (Breytenbach, 2002: 34).
South Africa held three general elections since democratisation. The first elections came in 1994 after the long struggle for liberation, while the second elections were held in 1999 and third in 2004. The elections were regarded as free and fair. This country practices a parliamentary system whereby the executive are members of the legislature and accountable to parliament. South Africa practices proportional representation in electing parliamentary members. As in Botswana, South Africa is rated highly by Freedom House.

1.2 Problem statement
Democracy did not emerge pristine and beautiful anywhere in the world; elections are a step in the process but not sufficient (Reynolds, 1999: 15). The main purpose of this study will be to compare Botswana and South African democracies, by asking which is the most consolidated and why? Attention is paid to mainstream institutional theories like Dahl (1971). Both South Africa and Botswana have parliamentary systems, but their electoral systems differ. Botswana has a first-past-the-post constituency system while South Africa has a proportional representation system. However, none had a turnover yet.

Schedler (1998: 91) states that the past quarter century, referring to the third wave of global democracy, has brought 60 countries around the world from authoritarian rule towards some kind of democratic regime. But, not all are equally consolidated: he classifies electoral, liberal, and advanced democracies. He therefore postulates degrees of democraticness. Carothers (2002: 5) agrees with Schedler. He says that the last quarter of the twentieth century only in 20 out of 100 worked.

Schedler (1998) points out that many regimes experience problems of strengthening and stabilising their regimes. He further states that democratic consolidation is a process to describe the challenge of making new democracies secure and of extending their life expectancy beyond the short
term, of making them immune against the threat of authoritarian regression by building dams against eventual reverse waves (Schedler, 1998).

1.3 Institutions
It is said that the revitalisation of institutions of political expression and representation constitutes one of the most serious challenges facing the contemporary world (Cardoso, 2001: 7). Dahl (1998: 87) places the emphasis on institutions, which lived in the older democracies, where the transition to democracy occurred some generations ago, even if they faced an equally different challenge (Cardoso, 2001: 99).

As indicated above, Schedler (1998: 2) classifies democracies into various types. We want to find out whether Botswana and South Africa are in the same classification, or not. He notes that other democracies fall between democracy and authoritarianism, and he termed them semi democratic or electoral democracies. Although they hold more or less inclusive, clean, and competitive elections they fail to uphold the political and civil freedoms essential for liberal democracy.

The consolidation of democracy is therefore a matter of the degree to which the basic principles are realised, and this is almost always an unfinished process (Beetham, 1994: 157). Key institutional ingredients in any democracy, is the choice between a presidential and parliamentary systems and the choice of electoral systems. It can be assumed that the qualities of elections are directly influenced by the quality of political rights and civil liberties in any country. Hence, the relevance of Freedom House rankings. Freedom of speech and the press allow citizens to provide feedback to government leaders about the effectiveness of policies and their impact on general welfare (Roll and Talbott, 2003: 79). Institutions are structures, and like many other structures constrain individuals (Pontusson quoted in Van der Nest [1999: 19]).
On multi-ethnic countries, Breytenbach (1997:23) notes that there is a possible link between ethnic homogeneity and stability on the one hand, and ethnic heterogeneity and instability on the other. Ethnic heterogeneity tends to reinforce ruling parties to be in power for a long time, as in Botswana, Zimbabwe and Namibia, and possibly South Africa.

The problem facing new regimes like South Africa and other developing countries, is the survival of democracy. Because some of these countries have heterogeneous populations, they face a huge problem in the allocation of resources (Hermat quoted in [Van der Nest, 1999: 67]). Southall (2001: 12), argues that this makes the process of democratic consolidation a little bit more complex.

Przeworski et al (1996: 45) supported the parliamentary system rather than the presidential system; because in the presidential system the president has more powers and can generate legislative paralysis, whilst the parliamentary systems are more durable, and its life expectancy is 71 years. In presidential systems, the winner takes everything, while the looser gets nothing, not even a position as the leader of the opposition. Linz (in Przeworski, 1996: 44) argues, under the presidential system the stakes are higher since the race for the presidency can have but one winner. In a parliamentary system, the looser becomes the leader of the opposition in parliament. Paralysis between the executive and legislature cannot arise, because they are of the same party.

Przeworski et al (1996: 39) argued that in order for a country to have a consolidated democracy there has to be a democracy as well as affluence, growth with moderate inflation and declining inequality.
1.4 Affluence

There is a school of thought that sees a strong link between democracy and favourable socio-economic conditions. Affluence is regarded being central to democratic consolidation (Przeworski et al, 1996: 41).

Therefore, the country’s level of economic development has a strong effect on the probability that democracy will survive. Przeworski et al (1996: 42) argue that rapid growth is not destabilising for democracies (or for dictatorships). Democracies are always more likely to survive when they grow faster. In order for a country to survive in such conditions, its per capita income should exceed $6000 in order to be impregnable. Under $1000 they are unsafe (Przeworski et al, 1996: 41).

Huntington and O'Donnell (in Przeworski et al [1996: 41]) argue that $6,000 is the level a country has to reach in order to survive. For example, two countries (South Korea and Taiwan), made an impressive development under the era of dictatorship with fast growth. These two countries reached a standard level of $1000 in the 1950, and increased their annual per capita income to $5000 in the 1990’s. Today these are democracies.

Feng (2001: 170) argues, “wealth does not particular lead to democracy, though it sustains democracy once it is achieved, and political regimes have no impacts on the growth of total income”. Democracy is therefore much more likely to survive in countries where income inequality is declining over time (Przeworski, 1996: 43).

Inflation is seen as another factor that threatens democratic stability, which means that a democratic regime has a chance of dying and an expected life of 44 years when its annual inflation is below six percent. Hence, Hirschman argues that only a moderate rate of inflation promotes democratic stability (Przeworski, 1996). Botswana meets these conditions (Van de Walle, 2002: 75).
Mattes and Thiel (1999: 103) state that South Africa is not a rich country. In 1993, annual per-capita income was just $3,127 but according to Przeworski’s calculations, was enough to give South African democracy a probable life expectancy of 33 years. Moreover, the country has one of the highest levels of inequality in the world, reflecting the reality of two South Africa’s; one has first world-style income levels and the living standards; the other and much larger, South Africa belongs to the third world.

Huntington (1997: 5) was of the opinion that democracy is incompatible with economic equality, which can be achieved only by a coercive dictatorship. But it is also incompatible with inequalities in wealth and income.

According to Mattes and Thiel (1998: 102), “the South African economy has actually shed 500,000 formal jobs since 1994 and deprived hundreds of thousands of households of the income needed to make ends meet. Recently, a new spectre has appeared on the economic horizon”. In its September 1999 decision to move forward with a R29.9 billion package of arms purchase, the government appears to have ignored internal feasibility studies warning that any depreciation of the currency could increase cost significantly. These happened, and the full cost of the deal is now estimated at R50 billion (Mattes, 2002: 24).

Economic growth eventually reduces these inequalities and hence facilitates the emergence of democracy. The other challenge of social transformation is economic transformation. The ANC-government has not been consistent in its policy on the role of the state in economic transformation.

In 1970, Botswana’s per capita GDP was US$590, less than the sub-Saharan average of US$609. After three decades of relatively high economic freedom, Botswana’s per capita GDP rose to US$3,950 while in the rest of Africa where
economic freedom levels were dismal, per capita GDP shrunk to US$564 (McMahon; 2003).

1.5 Aims and purpose
The aim of this study is to compare democratic consolidation in Botswana and South Africa. The most crucial aspects of this study, is to describe the salient features of Botswana and South Africa's institutions: the parliamentary institution and electoral systems, plus the quality of human rights in Botswana and South Africa respectively. It will also assess socio-economic conditions in Botswana and South Africa in terms of the Przeworski criteria on affluence (really, per capita income) as well as ethnic heterogeneity. In the end, this study will make an assessment on which of Botswana or South Africa have consolidated best in terms of the criteria mentioned above.

These two case studies have been chosen because all have made a transition from a non-democratic government to multiparty competition with varying degrees of success. The specific aims are:
To describe the democratisation process in these two countries
To compare which is the most consolidated democracy
To analyse the reasons why

1.6 Methodology
This study is comparative in nature. It will utilise books, newspapers, academic journals, the Internet, official and unofficial documents from both governments and Non-Governmental sectors (NGOs).

1.7 Delimitation
This study will compare Botswana’s democracy from 1965 up until 2004 and South Africa from 1910 till 2004. Due to logistic problems as well as matters of time constraints the study is compelled to use secondary sources.
the following; Human Development Reports, Development Reports, Freedom Ratings, etc.
Chapter 2: Botswana

2.1 Historical background of Botswana

Botswana was first inhabited by the San who are thus regarded as the original inhabitants of Botswana. They originally came from the North and gradually migrated southwards. Around 2,000 years ago, Khoi-Khoi followed the Bushmen who were then followed by Bantu speakers. The two groups except, coexisted amicably and there was a flourishing trade between them. The Shona speakers settled in the north east of Botswana in around the 10th century AD (AfricaNet, 2004:1).

Breytenbach (1976: 10) asserts that the first migration and the oldest tribal complex consisted of the Kgalagadi and the Ghoya. These groups probably entered the present Tswana territories during the 10th and the 11th Century. Soon afterwards, the Kgalagadi split into two groups, namely the Rolong and the Tlharo tribes who entered the Vryburg and Kuruman areas. Tlou and Campbell (1984: 57) said that these groups have Batswana and Bakgalagadi ancestorship, which can be dated 800 years ago. Subsequently they absorbed the offshoot known as the Kgwatleng. Whilst the Ghoya disintegrated completely, and the last of its remnants are today found among the Khubung, Phiring, and especially the Taung tribes in the Republic of South Africa.

The second migration was undertaken by the Barolong, which later fragmented into the Tlhaping, Ratlou, and Kaa. The majority of the Rolong mostly live in South Africa and the Kaa people reside among the Ngwato in the Eastern part of Botswana. The last migration took place under the Hurutshe-Kwena and Fokeng (known as the Bafokeng), who entered Botswana in the 1871 (Breytenbach, 1976: 10).

By the 18th century, the Tswana people were well established in the Kwebe hills (Du Toit, 1995:75). Following the Mfecane and Difacane battles, the
territories and boundaries of the Southern African region were altered. The results of the Mfecane and Difacane can be described as one of the greatest formative events of African history (Du Toit, 1995: 75). These struggles permanently modified the ethnic map of the Bantu African people and thereby played an important part in establishing the framework of political and cultural life in a number of modern Southern African states.

The social, political and military revolution in Zululand in the early 1800 has created the Zulu Kingdom under Shaka Zulu. Many small tribes, who feared the rule of Shaka, immigrated to the north of Southern Africa. When they were immigrating, they either formed strong tribes for the sake of protection. The wave of colonialism started from 1884 up until when the late Tshekedi Khama III of the Bamangwato sought protection from the British protectorate. British control lasted from 1885 to 1966, a period of 81 years. During the colonial rule, boundaries were demarcated differently as compared to the independent Botswana. Before independence, Mafikeng (in the province in Northwest, South Africa) was the capital city, but after independence, Gaborone was then chosen to be a capital city (Dale 1999: 129).

Questions have been asked about why the late Tshekedi Khama of the Bamangwato sought the protection of Britain. The answer is because he feared a hostile intervention in his domain by the Boer Republic of the Transvaal in the east, and from the German presence in the West (Du Toit, 1995: 79; Simkins and Gilomee, 1999: 195-196; Steadman; 1993: 14). The British colony encouraged the formation of a moderate, conservative and non-racial political party, which was the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP, founded in 1962) to govern the post-colonial state (Baumhögger, 1999: 103).

At independence, Botswana was rated the third poorest country in the world. One half of its government budget was financed by grants from Great Britain, and about two-thirds of its workers had jobs in South Africa. Drought had
killed about a third of its total cattle herd, which was then Botswana’s only significant asset (Steadman; 1993: 13). Baumhögger (1999: 103) also notes that the extreme drought hit many countries in the South of the Saharan region.

Botswana is the longest surviving democracy in Southern Africa, which others often seek to emulate. But there have been no election turnovers yet. It also stands out as one of the most liberal countries with the highest levels of support for democracy (80%) (Bratton and Mattes: 2003: 111).

Before independence, Botswana was poor (Simkins and Gilomee; 1999, and Du Toit, 1999: 87). The following indicators mentioned below define the situation in Botswana before independence.

i. At independence in 1966 there was only 25km tarred road.

ii. Only eight secondary schools (of which one was a government school opened a year before independence).


iv. Infant mortality was 122 per 1000 live births.

v. Life expectancy for men stood at 46 years, while for women it was 49 years.


Botswana has a heterogeneous population but with a compact Tswana majority. The Tswana language is dominant (Du Toit, 1995: 72) with about 82% being Tswana speaking. Botswana also has a small population (1,2 million in 1990 and 1,5 in 1998), and in 2001 this percentage was calculated taking into account the effects of excess mortality due to Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS), at an estimated infection rate of 40%, which lowers life expectancy.
Traditional leaders are represented in the House of Chiefs, keeping tribal identities alive. Various political parties also show signs of ethnic identities. One such party is the opposition Botswana National Front (BNF) who are strong among the Bangwaketse despite tying to secure a majority of the urban working class. Thus, the National Front has tried to establish electoral coalitions. Despite repeated attempts, the conflict between class and ethnicity has prevented realization of this goal.

Botswana demonstrates its satisfaction with democracy and the legitimacy of the state by claiming that the government exercises power within legal means and equally represents the interests of all citizens. This country does not tolerate corruption; there is a relatively uncorrupted bureaucracy accountable to the government (Parsons, 1999: 1). For example, as Gilomee and Simkins (1999:199) pointed out, that in 1992, the Botswana deputy President and the Minister of Agriculture were forced to resign after allegations of corruption. Likewise, Baumhögger (1999: 103) points out that, in 1992, a corruption scandal between the Vice-President and the Secretary-General of the BDP led them to relinquish their posts.

2.2 The focus on Parliament and the electoral system
This part will address the functioning of the parliament, and the electoral systems. These institutions are important for democratic consolidation. Parliament is seen as a central structure through which power is exercised and whereby policy is shaped. Elections take place through an electoral system based on geographic constituencies is also known as plurality or first-past-the-post systems.

2.2.1 The role of the Parliament
According to Du Toit (1995:93) and Parsons (2004: 106) the constitution of Botswana describes it as a unitary state and a parliamentary republic. Parliament is arguably the most visible and important institution in a
democratic regime (Kornberg and Clarke, 1992: 112). It forms part of the constitutional protected *trias politica* or separation of powers into legislative, executive and judiciary powers (Taljaard and Venter in [Van der Nest, 1999: 80]).

The most crucial function of a parliament is to transform government policies into laws. The three spheres of government (Executive, Legislative, and Judiciary) make sure that those functions are coherently put into place. Thus, the parliament is responsible for discussing, changing and passing bills from the ministers or from parliamentary members. Others functions of the parliament include considering petitions from the public, holding the executive accountable and fulfilling judicial functions concerning its own activities (Van der Nest, 1999).

The legislative authority is vested in Parliament, which consists of the National Assembly, the House of Chiefs, and the President. At independence, the legislative Assembly of Botswana consisted of a Speaker, thirty-two elected members and four specific elected members. The Attorney General and the financial secretary were also members; however, the Attorney General does not have any vote in the parliament. Furthermore, the special members are nominated by the president and chosen by the elected members of the Assembly, who may also nominate candidates for the special seats.

Today, the National Assembly has 47 members, 40 members elected for a five-year term in a single seat constituency, 4 members co-opted by the elected members and two ex officio members and the Speaker (if elected from outside Parliament). The conventions are similar to the British House of Commons (Dale, 1999: 128).
The House of Chiefs is a largely advisory 15-member body consisting of the chiefs of the eight principal tribes, four elected sub-chiefs, and three members selected by the other 12 members.

The executive authority is vested in the president, who heads a Cabinet appointed from the ruling party in the National Assembly. At the time of their nomination, National Assembly candidates declare their support for a presidential nominee (Parson in Delury [2004: 106]). The president of Botswana acts as a Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. The members of the Assembly directly select the president, and retain office until the Assembly is dissolved, or vote of no confidence is passed. The maximum term of office of the Assembly is five years (Du Toit, 1995; 94).

Lekorwe et al (2001: 2) notes, “the constitution of Botswana has created an executive presidency in which the President is both Head of State and Government”.

The Cabinet advises the President, who in turn is obliged to consult with this body, though it is required to take collective responsibility for his actions. The president also has powers to dissolve the National Assembly, and has extensive powers of appointment. The office of the president oversees foreign affairs, the security forces, and the various branches of administration, while the ministry of finance and development planning generally supervises other ministries (Parson, 1999: 2).

Regarding the judicial system in Botswana, it is composed of customary and statutory courts. Customary courts are presided over by chiefs and exercise minor powers, most significantly in cases of cattle theft and marriages laws. In addition, common law courts include Magistrate Courts, Circuit Courts of Appeal, and the High Court, which is located in Lobatse (Parson in Delury [2004: 106]). Dale (1999: 129) notes that the judicial system of Botswana
utilizes both traditional (African customary) and modern systems of law, with the latter drawing upon English law as well as the Roman-Dutch law that was prevalent in Cape Province in South Africa which was where the colonial authorities once were vested.

2.2.2 The electoral system
Botswana uses the system commonly known as “First-Past-The-Post,” taken over from the British. Who governs the country? The candidate with the plurality of votes (who is first to cross the finishing line) in a geographically demarcated constituency is declared the winner (Dale in Delury [1999: 129]).

It is the typical Westminster constituency-based system. Breytenbach (2003: 63) made two arguments about how this system operates. Firstly, the constituency system of Botswana, favours the sparsely populated rural areas that means that a drop in overall votes may not necessary mean a drop in the parliamentary seats. Secondly, this system is problematic to the opposition parties, who are stronger in the urban areas but where there are fewer seats allocated.

The actual voting is done by using counters (i.e. small discs) with different voting colours allotted to candidates of particular parties. In the polling booth, the counter is put into a ballot envelope, which is then sealed by the voter, while the unused counters are put into discarded boxes. The ballot envelope is then dropped into the ballot box placed in front of the presiding officer. The winner of the majority of votes in a constituency is declared to be elected; if there is only one candidate, no polling is conducted.

The Supervisor of Election is obliged by the constitution to submit a report on each election to the minister responsible for the elections. This is usually done within a relatively short time (a few months). Therefore, the minister in turn
has to table the report in parliament within seven days of the beginning of its new session (Baumhögger, 1999).

2.3 Free and fair elections

Botswana’s success story as a democratic system is anchored in the performance of its institutions, particularly holding regular, free and fair elections (Lekorwe et al, 2001: 4). The first democratic elections of Botswana were held in 1965. Sir Seretse Khama became the first president of Botswana. The country holds the free and competitive elections every five years, and earned a reputation of being a multi-party democracy with unparalleled political stability as well as economic success due to good governance and the discovery of vast diamond deposits.

In a measure to widen the frontiers of democracy, in 1997 Botswana instituted electoral reforms that created an IEC. In that year the voting age was reduced from 21 to 18 years, and created an absentee ballot. Currently, there is a raging debate on reforming the electoral system to make the composition of parliament more reflective of proportional representation (Lekorwe et al, 2001: 2). The electoral commission is independent, and bodes well for the integrity of the process and for public respect for the probity of the parliamentary system (Dale, 1999: 129).

The IEC was established by Section 65A of Constitution of Botswana in 1997 Constitution (Amendment) Act 1997), which also provides for the composition of the Commission. The Commission consists of a Chairman and a Deputy Chairman appointed directly by the Judicial Service Commission, and five other members appointed from a list of persons recommended by the All Party Conference. As stipulated in Section 65A, the Chairman of the Commission shall be a Judge of the High Court. The Deputy Chairman shall be a Legal Practitioner (IDEA, 2001: 3).
The 2004 general election will indicate that Botswana has held nine free and fair elections, though there has never been a turnover in party control of government. The FPTP system has produced a dominant party system in which the ruling BDP has won every election by a landslide victory (at least in terms of legislative seats). Only in 1994 did the opposition BNF project itself as a serious contender for political power by winning 13 out of 40 parliamentary seats (Lekorwe et al, 2001: 3).

2.4 Election Results: Eight Elections (1965-1999)
This section will analyse the election results held in Botswana since independence. There will be some figures illustrating percentages of the numbers of the people who took part in the all elections. This part will start by introducing figures of the people who registered for all general elections of Botswana.

Tables and figures

The figures represented hereunder indicate numbers of people who registered for the democratic elections in Botswana since 1965 up until 1999 and it further shows the percentages of the people who made it to the elections. Indeed, elections in Botswana were held every five consecutive years since 1965 up until 1999. For the first time, Botswana citizens residing outside the country were given the opportunity to exercise their constitutional right to vote. The external voting was held on 2nd October 1999, at a High Commission, a Botswana Embassy or designated polling stations within the following countries: Republic of South Africa, United Kingdom, United States of America, Namibia and Zimbabwe (IDEA, 2001)
Table 1: Number of People who registered, and voted from 1965-1999 elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>REGISTERED</th>
<th>VOTED</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>188950</td>
<td>140858</td>
<td>74.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>140428</td>
<td>76858</td>
<td>54.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>205050</td>
<td>64011</td>
<td>31.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>230231</td>
<td>134496</td>
<td>58.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>293571</td>
<td>227756</td>
<td>77.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>367069</td>
<td>250487</td>
<td>68.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>370173</td>
<td>283375</td>
<td>76.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>459662</td>
<td>354466</td>
<td>77.11</td>
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The first democratic elections held in Botswana in 1965 showed a relatively high percentage of voters 74.55% participated in the election. In the 1969, 1974 and 1979 elections the election turnout decreased dramatically from 74.55%, to 54.73%, 31.22% and 58.42% respectively. In 1984 it picked up again.

The drought that hit Botswana’s market in 1980 did not change the perceptions of the people about the elections. In 1984, the people went into the elections in masses. The election results increased from 58.42% to 77.58%, in 1984, which means that political participation remained high, perhaps because an increase in the population size coupled as well as the lowering of the voting age (Lekorwe et al, 2001: 2).
Figure 1: Number of people registered and voted (1965-1999)

Election results of Botswana from 1965 hitherto 1999
Elections in Botswana run every five years. It reveals that Botswana is essentially a two-party system: the BDP and the BNP.

Table 2: Botswana’s elections from 1965 until 1999

<table>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BDP</td>
<td>80.4</td>
<td>63.8</td>
<td>76.6</td>
<td>75.2</td>
<td>68.0</td>
<td>64.8</td>
<td>57.4</td>
<td>54.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIP</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BPP</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BPP NO.1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independents</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

According to Baumhögger (1999: 104), during the leadership of Sir Seretse Khama, the BDP overwhelmingly won the pre-independence elections of 1965 with 74.5% of the votes. Hence, Breytenbach (2003: 61) points out, at the time of independence, the Tswana-speaking political party BDP of the late Sir Seretse Khama won a landslide victory, namely 29 of 31 seats, while the opposition come from the Botswana Progressive Party of, later Botswana National Front of Dr Kenneth Koma. The new challenge to the dominant position of the BDP arose at the first post-independence election (1969), when the influential Batheon II, ex-Chief of the Bangwaketse, become the driving force of the BNF which was thus able to entrench itself in the Bangwaketse area in (Lobatse) the Southern part of the country. However, its original orientation had been more suitable for gaining support in the urban areas.

In 1989, six parties contested the elections. Those parties include BDP, BIP, BNF, BPU, and BLP. At that point in time, 34 seats were contested. Out of 34 seats, the BDP won 31 seats in the parliament leaving only three seats for the
remaining parties, which were won by the BNF. One can argue at this point that, out of six parties, only two succeeded to get an entrance in the parliament.

In the 1989 general elections, the BNF captured 27.7% of the total vote, which together with the ruling party represented 92.75% for all the Tswana-speaking regions, plus the working class of approximately one-third of the work force from non-Tswana workers (Ibid, 62). This figure was 91% in the 1994 general election (Dale, 1999: 130).

In the 1994 democratic elections, the BDP experienced a shock after the election results released. They won the election by 55%, the lowest percentage they have ever experience since independence (Baumhögger, 1999: 104). This led to the resignation of the former president Sir Ketumile Masire on the 30th March 1998. There were speculations about the low level of votes received by the BDP. One of those speculations was the corruption committed by Botswana top officials.

From 1984 to 1994, the BNF had recorded a steady growth in the popular vote, only to drop by 12 percent in the popular vote in 1999, with just six parliamentary seats due to a party spilt, and the formation of the new Botswana Congress Party (BCP). Were it not for that split, there was every indication that it would do well in the 1999 election. However, as it is, the opposition remains weak and ineffective. Baumhöger (1999: 104) states that the BNF was not able to make much impact until 1984, while the breakthrough came 10 years later when it polled 37% of the votes and managed to overcome the disadvantage of the majority system for the first time by gaining about one third of the elected votes but still fewer seats than under a proportional system.
Opposition parties have drawn their strength generally from urban areas. The Botswana People's Party (BPP) was the main but ineffective opposition in the 1960s when urban areas were small. Since then the BNF has grown in strength, largely among the working class and younger middle class in the rapidly expanding urban areas but also including some support among conservatives in certain rural areas. By 1989, the BNF held both parliamentary seats and the majority of the city council of Gaborone, and similar representation in other urban areas. Meanwhile the ruling BDP controlled the nine rural district councils, six of them almost totally. The 1994 elections, however, rolled back the BDP power base, with a number of seats won only by small margins (Parsons, 1999).

With regard to the qualification for elections as President, the candidates must have attained the age of 30 years, must be qualified to be elected as a member of the National Assembly, yet has to be a citizen by birth (those persons who became citizens prior to the amendment of the Citizenship Act in 1982) or by descent (person who register as a citizen because they were born outside Botswana, although the father was a Botswana citizen at that time (Baumhögger, 1999:107).

Table 3: Composition of the Parliament from 1965-1999

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BDP</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIP</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BPP</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
BNF | 3 | 2 | 2 | 5 | 3 | 13 | 6 |
--- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
BCP | - | - | - | - | - | - | 1 |


2.5 Affluence

2.5.1 Per Capita Income and Trends

Affluence refers to per capita income levels and the Human Development Index, where purchasing power parity (of per capita income), longevity and adult literacy are measured (Nelufule: 2000). Botswana has translated the benefits of growth into human development through well-structured policies. It started as a low-income country with low human development and uneven distribution of income. Furthermore, its human development (except for life expectancy) is among the best in Africa, particularly in the Sub-Saharan Africa (Human Development Report, 1990: 47).

What has been remarkable about Botswana is its dramatic rate of economic growth since independence. Since independence, Botswana has had the highest average economic growth rate in the world at about 9% per year from 1966 through 1999. At that time its highest average annual GDP growth rate in the world, at 6.1% pushed GDP per head up from US$600 in 1966 to over US$300 in 1991. The growth in formal sector employment has averaged about 10% per annum over Botswana’s first 30 years of independence, a period when most African countries suffered negative growth (Human Development Report, 1990: 49).
Table 4: Botswana’s Per Capita income Trends (1960-2002)

|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|-------------|


The government has consistently maintained budget surpluses and has substantial foreign exchange reserves totaling about US$6.2 billion in 1999 (Fact Index: 2004; Country Profile, 2003: 26; and Mhone, 1994: 198).

Economic growth and development are important ingredients for democracy. Botswana has been fortunate to be one of the leading recipients of both foreign financial assistance and private capital investment. Stedman (1999: 12) made a comparison of Botswana’s economic indicators with other countries. Those comparisons measured different indicators but, for the purpose of this chapter, only the growth rate and GNP per capita will be assessed: from 1965-1973 Botswana’s growth rate was 9.3%, from 1973-1980 was 7.3%, and from 1980-1987 was 8.0%. The aggregate for all these indicators was 8.2%. Indeed,
these percentages indicate a positive growth by Botswana, albeit those indicators fluctuates, GDP growth remain positive.

The economy of Botswana depends on the diamond mining, cattle farming, tourism, and subsistence farming. The agricultural sector still provides a livelihood for more than 80% of the population but supplies only about 50% of food needs and accounts for only 3% of GDP. Subsistence farming and cattle rising predominate. This sector is plagued by erratic rainfall and poor soils. Diamond mining and tourism also are important to the economy. The substantial mineral deposits were found in the 1970s and the mining sector grew from 25% of GDP in 1980 to 38% in 1998. The unemployment rate is officially 21% but unofficial estimates place it closer to 40%. The Orapa 2000 project, which will double the capacity of the country's main diamond mine, will be finished in early 2000. This will be the main force behind continued economic expansion (Abacci Atlas: 1999).

With a per capita GNI of US$3,600, Botswana is one of only a few African states classified as a lower middle-income country. The government has managed the country's resources prudently and has kept its recurrent expenditure within its revenue, allowing for investment in human and physical capital. The government's revenue from diamonds, as well as profits from large foreign exchange reserves of the Bank of Botswana, has largely cushioned Botswana from the recessions that have buffeted most countries in the region (Country Brief, 2004).

Botswana has had the unusual problem of enormous foreign exchange reserves, a government budget surplus sometimes running into billions of dollars, and excess liquidity of capital lying unutilised in private banks. Partly thus was a matter of expediency: capital held back for the rainy days of world diamond price slump or deliberate destabilization by the apartheid regime in South Africa. Nevertheless, it also reflected an ideological bias against direct
state investment in productive enterprises, and state dependence on the initiative of private enterprise (Parsons, 1999).

The mining sector GDP grew by 11.9% in 1999/2000 compared to a decline of 2.8% in the previous year. This increased the share of mining in total GDP by 1.3 percentage points from 32.1% to 33.4% in 1999/2000. At the same time, growth in non-mining GDP declined from 7.8% in 1998/99 to 5.7% in 1999/2000. This was due mainly to the relatively sluggish performance of the manufacturing, construction and transport sectors because of problems confronting some textile companies, completion of major construction projects, including the Orapa expansion project, and problems affecting rail transport (The World Factbook, 2004:).

The real rate of growth of the gross national product has been more than 10% annually for the past twenty-five years. Botswana’s economic growth was the highest for any country in the world from 1966 to 1986. It got this highest economic growth through fiscal discipline and sound management. In 2002, its GDP purchasing power parity per capita was $9,500 (The World Factbook, 2004: 7). From 1968 to 1978, its GDP grew three times in real terms.

The Central Bank of Botswana and a strong ministry of finance and development planning manage the economy. There are four multinational commercial or street banks, with branch operations down to village level. The Foreign Merchant Banks have also opened branches in Gaborone. The windfall profits of diamond production, and sound national financial management since the later 1960s, have combined to make the Botswana Pula the hardest currency in Africa.

Political and economic stability led to high levels of foreign aid, particularly in the form of expatriate personnel, from Western countries in 1970s-1980s. However, nearly all foreign aid was withdrawn since Botswana achieved the
status of a (lower) middle-income country in the early 1990s. Indeed, the success of Botswana's good governance and long period of sustained economic growth has not translated itself into a significant degree of socio economic transformation as reflected both in the country's over-dependency on high unemployment/poverty levels. It has been reported that this country is ranking number one in the Southern Africa, in terms of HIV/AIDS percentages. Thus, these in the long run will have some negative impact in the running of the country (Gervase, 2003).

2.5.2 Human Development Index and Trends (1987-2003)
The Human Development Index is used to measures the following factors: life expectancy at birth, adult literacy, as well as Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita at purchasing power parity (Nelufule, 2002).

Table 5: Botswana’s Human Development Index Rankings (1990-2001)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1990</th>
<th>1996</th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>Trend</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>Deteriorating</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The following figures are indication of Botswana’s ranking in the Human Development Report in comparison with other countries. In 1990, Botswana was ranking 58 out of 130 countries, 97 in 1996, 122 in 1999 and 125 in 2001. These figures show a decline in terms of its Human Development Ranking.

For example, in 1994, the adult literacy rate was 68.7%, of persons of age of 15 and over, who could write and read. In terms of gender, male was 76.9%, and female made 82%. This indicates that more female in Botswana are literate than male.

2.6 Evaluations
What has been discussed in this chapter bring into context that Botswana’s democracy is better than merely an “electoral democracy”. According to Freedom House Botswana was rated “free”: in 2002 1 for political rights (the free category), and 2 for civil rights (still free). Then a slight decline for 2002 where both categories were rated as 2 (Freedom House, 2002 and 2003)

The way Botswana got its independence from the British government shows that traditional chiefs played an important role in decolonisation. The presence of the late President Sir Seretse Khama, being the first president of Botswana, had an impact on the stability and economy of Botswana. If one recalls that at independence, Botswana was amongst the poorest country in the world. Today it is a “middle income “country with per capita of over US$3000. Przeworski argued that a country with per capita income below US$1000 cannot sustain democracy and it is likely for authoritarian trends to emerge. But it is still far below $6000 which is regarded as impregnable.

As Du Toit (1995) notes, “Botswana’s economy since independence was dependent on the diamond mines, cattle farming and the tourism sector”. None are very labour intensive. The result is increasing unemployment, which is especially evident in the urban areas where the opposition (the BNF) is strongest.

Botswana uses the “First Past The Post” electoral system. This constituency system put the ruling party BDP in an advantageous position during election periods, as it favours the sparsely populated rural areas that mean that a drop
in overall votes may not necessarily mean a drop in the parliamentary seats. This is a disadvantage for the BNF and urban opposition because many of its supporters are concentrated in urban areas, for example: in the 1994 election, BNF secured 36.9% of the total votes but without attaining and equivalent number of seats where fewer seats. As such, there has been no turnover yet since independence.

Botswana is showing positive results in terms of the adult literacy. In 1994, adult literacy level was 76.9%, as opposed to only 18% at independence. However, its rankings on the HDI of the United Nations declined every year from 58 in 1965 to 125 in 2001. These declines have been caused by the high rates of HIV/AIDS, as 35, 80% of the adult population is contaminated with this disease. If high HIV/AIDS levels are detrimental to democracy, Botswana might be one of the first Africa countries to show this.
3.1 Historical background
The history of South Africa started long time ago. Its construction as a distinct political unit started in 1910 with the merging of the British owned possessions of the Cape of Good Hope, Natal, the Orange River Colony and the Transvaal into the Union of South Africa. This Union was a self-governing entity with the status of a dominion of the British Commonwealth (Du Toit, 1995: 293).

The Dutch East Indian Company (DEIC) arrived in the country in 1652, under the leadership of Jan Van Riebeeck. The DEIC was sent to create a refreshment station for their East-bound voyages, to erect a fort for seventy men, to build a wooden building for sick soldiers and sailors, and to establish a vegetable garden for passing ships (Davis in Nelufule, 2002: 34). Some setbacks were experienced by this company. For example, during the first winter of their arrival, at least 20 men who came with Jan Van Riebeeck died. The settlement did however started to flourish. The number of sailors who anchored at the Cape to stock up on milk, meat and vegetables grew steadily. The construction of a pier rendered the bay safer and even more attractive. Soon workshops to repair ships and a hospital for the ill were installed (Travel Net; 2004).

Due to the rapid development of the port, and other construction work, a need for labour increased dramatically. Firstly, slaves and politically banned people were imported from Indonesia (Java and Sumatra), but soon Dutch settlers arrived after 1652. In 1688, a large group of French Huguenots who were fleeing religious persecution at home, settled in the Cape. Because the demand for agricultural land, especially pastures, grew continuously, the
settlement steadily spread from Table Bay towards the north and north-east (Travel Net; 2003). The first “free burgles” farmed in the Stellenbosch area.

The relationship between the Khoi-Khoi and the DEIC deteriorated because, the Khoi-Khoi resisted working for the company. They were forced to concede land to the settlers, although they strongly resisted the expansion of the Cape settlers. Earlier in 1659, a Khoi-Khoi uprising resulted in complete defeat, and they had to retreat to the north. The DEIC consequently started to import slaves from all over the world, including countries such as the East Indies, West Africa, Madagascar and Mozambique to provide services for the company (Travel Net: 2004).

The British became more imperialistic. In 1806, the British government made the Cape its colony. The British also settled in the Eastern Cape in 1820. In 1836 Great Trek started which Afrikaner farmers moved north. This movement started from the Eastern Cape colony and move penetrated parts of South Africa. During their movement, the Voortrekkers (Great Trek) fought numerous wars with the Xhosa people over grazing land. Nelufule (2002: 35) claimed that the arrival of the Dutch-Afrikaners farmer methodically robbed the indigenous peoples of their land and destroyed their economic independence.

On 16 December 1838, about 464 Boers under the command of Andries Pretorius fought and defeated more than 10,000 Zulu warriors in the battle of Blood River. The war started after the Voortrekkers failed to negotiate a secession of land for settling and grazing with the Zulus, and had endured a number of catastrophic assaults. Those deeply religious Boers did not ascribe the military victory to their technically superior armaments, but interpreted it primarily as a sign for God because, before the battle, they prayed and made a vow that if God would grant them victory over the Zulus they would commemorate the event annually. With that battle behind them, they believed
even more strongly that white dominance over blacks is God's own will (Travel Net, 2004).

Another war erupted between the Zulus and the Voortrekkers in 1842 and the Voortrekkers eventually settled north and south of the Vaal River. Then the British also settled Natal. When the Boers arrived there, they firstly formed the independent Transvaal to the north, which would later become the South African Republic as well as the Free State to the south.

The Orange Free State (OFS) and Transvaal come under British rule after the Anglo-Boer war (1899-1902). During the war, the Afrikaner republics employed both conventional and guerrilla warfare against a British force of close on 450 000 troops. In response, the British used what was called the scorched earth policy, by burning farmstead and some twenty villages belonging to the Afrikaners (Du Toit, 1995). In 1910, the British government introduced political representation (Parliament) and self-government, and granted full independence to the Union of South Africa, which was made up of four provinces namely, Cape, Natal, Orange Free State and Transvaal, within the framework of the British Commonwealth (KMLA: 2001). The evolution of state and society after the first decades of union was strongly influenced by the guidelines for racial policy set by the South African Native Affairs Commission, (Lagden Commission) appointed by Lord Milner in 1903 (Du Toit, 1995).

At that time, Lord Milner made numerous recommendations. Firstly, he recommended that land ownership should be divided by race into exclusively white and black areas. Secondly, he recommended that dormitory towns, so-called locations, later townships, should be established for blacks adjacent, but still spatially distinct from towns in the white areas of land ownership. Thirdly, the commission advised that education for blacks in the Cape and Natal should focus on agricultural and industrial vocations. Fourthly, it was
suggested in 1936 that political separation, in the form of separate representative institutions for blacks should be elected by the voters from separate rolls, and with jurisdiction only over the land reserved for the specific race group, should be implemented (Du Toit, 1995: 296-297).

Most black communities in South Africa accused the National Party (NP), the former ruling party of the previous regime of the consequences of apartheid, but fail to understand that the apartheid system was not a spontaneous result of the NP to gain power in 1948. Its complex structure evolved over centuries, emerging as early as colonial settlement in 1652 (Venter, 1989: 32; Gilomee and Schlemmer 1991: 1).

There were also laws that were introduced during the apartheid era aiming at separating and differentiating the black people around the country. Du Toit (1995, 297-306) singles them out as follows: the Native Trust Land Act of 1913 (which set aside about 7% of the country for exclusive black ownership, effectively preventing them from owning property in the remaining 93% of the country); the Black Trust and Consolidation Act 18 of 1936; (which set further trust land aside); the Population Registration Act of 1950 (the most fundamental of apartheid laws, which defined two basic categories of people those of 'Whites' and 'Africans', the official criteria were based on descent; appearance and general acceptance); the Mixed Marriage Act of 1949 (which prohibited multi-racial marriages); the Immorality Act of 1950 (outlawing sex across racial barriers); the Group Areas Act of 1950 (which established the administrative infrastructure for separate urban residential areas and business premises on the basis of race); the Separate Representation of Voters Act of 1951 (removing the coloured voters from the parliamentary roll); the Reservation of Separate Amenities Act of 1953 (authorizing the state to establish separate public facilities for different races); the Bantu Education Act of 1953 (which intended to eliminate direct competition between Africans and White labour through differential curricula, thus effectively confining Africans to lower ranks of the
occupational pyramid); Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act of 1959; and the Bantu Homelands Act of 1971 (which expanded structures into full mini-states, with elected legislatures, executives and judicial branches and bureaucracies with police forces and miniature armies). In 1976, Transkei was considered a sovereign state followed by Bophuthatswana in 1977, Venda in 1979 and Ciskei in 1981.

After the South African Communist Party (SACP) was banned in 1950 in 1960, the ANC and PAC were banned in South Africa, because the then ruling government thought that these abovementioned organisations wanted to establish armed wings to pursue guerrilla warfare (City of Johannesburg, 2004).

Most black people resisted the system, especially the pass laws but other forms of oppression as well the 1976 Sharpeville Massacre, (which started in Soweto as a result of the imposition of Afrikaans as a first language of instruction in black schools has been widely documented) many political prisoners died in detention, for instance Black Consciousness (BC) leader, Steve Biko, in 1977 (Du Toit, 1995: 359). During that time, South Africa become ungovernable and international institutions increased their pressure on the South African government through sanctions.

The new South Africa came into existence after a speech by former President F.W de Klerk, which led to the un-banning of the ANC, Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), South African Communist Party (SACP) and 33 other organisations in the February 1990 and with the release of Nelson Mandela from prison (Du Toit, 1995: 378, Kotzé, 2000:79-81, and Reynolds, 1999: 182). Some authors state that South Africa’s transition to democracy come as the result of the fall of the Soviet Union (which could limit the ANC’s strength), the fall of the Berlin wall, the orderly assumption of power by Swapo in Namibia, and the many domestic crises as well and the transition wave,
which started in the 1970s in Portugal. Van der Nest (1999: 55) states that the negotiations for a democratic South Africa occurred within a transformed international climate, during the era of the collapse of political systems in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.

In 1992, former president F.W de Klerk won a firm mandate for change in a whites-only referendum. Mr Mandela who became (the first president of the new South Africa in 1994), however dominated the negotiations at the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA), a forum of nineteen delegations, which first met on 20 December 1991 and ended in November 1993. During the talks at CODESA, tensions arose between members of the ANC and IFP, which led to the death of thousands people to death, the Boipatong Massacre of June 1992, murders in trains and in townships, and the Bisho massacre (Financial Mail, 2004: 13).

When the negotiations reached a deadlock, the ANC responded to the stalemate with a promise to once again demonstrate its mass-based strength by orchestrating rolling mass action and to seek a fresh mandate from its constituency for any further negotiations (Zuern, 2001:9-10).

The other challenge to the transition process came from the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), the then ruling party in the KwaZulu Natal homeland, which has been engaged in an unofficial war with the ANC since the mid-1980s. The civil war spread out to the huge townships around Johannesburg and Pretoria, which were torn by violence during much of the early 1990s (Country Report, 2003: 10).

A resolution was reached at the end: power-sharing for a limited power, compromises on provinces, and consensus on the electoral system. All key players agreed to support the democratic elections and to use the proportional representation system for voting in the 1994 election. At that
time, the country was still using the interim constitution of 1993, which was replaced by the new constitution of South Africa Act, 108 of 1996 (Reynolds, 1999: 183).

The first democratic election, which was won by the ANC, calmed the tensions between IFP and ANC. The ANC won the national elections with 62.65% (Reynolds, 1999: 188; Financial Mail, 2004: 15). The Government of National Unity (GNU) brought the ANC and NP together as parties in cabinet were formed power-sharing until 1997. Thabo Mbeki and F. W de Klerk were made deputy presidents (Country Report, 2003).

South Africa adopted features of a unitary and a federal state, (a typical compromise at the negotiations) and became a liberal democracy. A permanent constitution was adopted in 1996, with an extensive bill of rights and provision for an independent judiciary. The 11-judge Constitutional Court is the highest court of appeal. This body has concurrent powers (with provinces) to make laws on issues set out in a Schedule of the Act 108 of the 1996 Constitution. Provinces are given exclusive powers in only a few areas, such as roads and recreation. It provides for a strong central government headed by a president, who is elected for a five-year term and serves as both the chief of state and head of government (Constitution Act, 108 of 1996).

3.2. The focus on parliament and electoral system

3.2.1 Parliament

South Africa has a bicameral parliament consisting of a 400-member National Assembly, elected by proportional representation, and 90-seat National Council of Provinces (NCOP), formerly the Senate, elected by the nine provincial legislatures. There are 27 ministers for different departments. Ministers must be members of parliament (Du Toit, 1995: 392), therefore South Africa has a parliamentary system but with a president as head of the state and government.
3.2.2 The functions of the parliament

Parliament in South Africa plays a direct and active role in national affairs and it exercises the following responsibilities:

- It transforms government policies into laws and discusses and debates government policies and political matters;
- It approves the budget presented by the different government departments and acts as watchdog of the government;
- The Public Protector, Auditor General and the South African Police check that public money is spent wisely; and
- It is responsible for discussing, changing and passing bills from ministers or from parliamentary members (Van der Nest, 1999: 80).

The National Assembly (parliament) has a portfolio committee on each department. For example, the portfolio committees on Social Development deal with all matters relating to this ministry. The portfolio committees do most of their work approving and disapproving bills tabled in the parliament. They discuss bills and make changes. For an important bill, a committee will hold public hearings or ask for submissions from the general public (Public Education, 2003).

There are also nine provincial parliaments in South Africa, namely Gauteng, Northwest, Free State, Mpumalanga, Northern Cape, Northern Province (now known as Limpopo), Eastern Cape, KwaZulu Natal and Western Cape. Their representatives are elected, based on proportional representation. In 1994, 1999 and 2004 each province was governed by the Provincial Executive Council, consisting of a premier and ten executive members, comprising all parties that gain at least 10% of the seat in the provincial legislature (Du Toit, 1995: 393).
3.2.3 The electoral system

The South African electoral system is not based on geographical constituencies as the basis for representation in parliament, but based on the typical European system of Proportional Representation (PR). This is based on party lists, which are more conducive to the representation of small parties (Breytenbach, 2003: 80), but lacks a system of accountability of elected representatives to the voters because these are not any constituencies anymore.

In South Africa, before the elections, each political party draws up a list of candidates in order of preference. For example if a political party wins half the votes, it will hold half the seats in the National Assembly. The voters use two ballot papers to elect their representatives. The first ballot paper is for the National Assembly, while the second ballot paper is for the province government. Only political parties registered for a particular election get an opportunity to contest the elections (Lodge, 1999).

The South African electoral process, like most other processes, consist of at least three electoral phases or stages: (1) the pre-election period, which include preparatory work on the registration list, the campaign, access to the media, and the use of state resources; (2) the election period, consisting of voting on election day and the subsequent vote count; and (3) the post-election period, comprising of ballot recounts and adjudication of complaints (Wessels, 2000).

The South African electoral system undertakes several tasks. It translates the votes cast in an election into seats won in a representative chamber. That system gives exact weight to proportionality (Reynolds, 1999: 89).

Lodge (1999:19) argues that on paper, the South African electoral system is one of the simplest in the world. According to Breytenbach (2003: 80) the
The electoral system used in South Africa is flawed in limiting the voters' control and accountability over their elected representatives, because it has contributed to the trend of dominant power systems and institutional centralism in South Africa, which goes with executive dominance.

The principles underlying the system of representation in the 1999 and 2004 elections were the same as those in 1994 and derived from the 1993 constitution (known as the interim system). The agreement to retain the 1994 system was taken by the ANC and the then National Party (now New National Party or NNP) held during the final months of the Constitutional Assembly in 1993.

3.3 Free and fair elections

The Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) has been responsible for all three general elections in South Africa and for ensuring that elections are free and fair. The first democratic election results of 1994 were accepted by all parties who contested the election as “substantially free and fair” (Alence, 2004: 83). It was reported by many sources that many people who lost their lives were mainly from two rival political parties (ANC and IFP) who were still at loggerheads over who will rule KwaZulu-Natal.

Despite threats to boycott the first general election, the IFP under Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi took part at the last minute, leaving his colleagues (the former President of Bophuthatswana) Lucas Mangope, and Eugene Terreblanche a leader of the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB) in the dark. The turnout in most areas was high, and the buoyant public mood carried the voting over a number of organisational hurdles (Country Report, 2003: 10; Financial Mail, 2004).

The 1994 general election was regarded as having the character of an “ethnic census”. With the exception of rural KwaZulu-Natal, almost all African voters
voted for the ANC, whilst large majorities of white, coloured and Indian voters supported the National Party (Seekings, 1997: 297).

Johnson and Schlemmer (in Seekings [1997: 299]) argue that the first democratic election was full of threats, as many African voters did not feel free to vote rationally, i.e. according to the merits of the parties’ policies. Their surveys provide evidence that many communities were under pressure of the violence and intimidation which took place and caused lots of spoilt ballot papers.

Five years after the first post-apartheid elections, on 2 June 1999, South Africans voted in the country’s second national democratic elections. The election was described as free and fair by most domestic and international observers. A group of observers sent by the Commonwealth, however, refrained from using the term “free” and “fair” to describe those elections, but elected to describe the elections as “sufficiently expressing the will of the South African people” (Wessels, 2000).

Giliomee, Myburgh and Schlemmer (1999: 162), state that the 1999 general election was more peacefully and professionally conducted than its predecessor and that the majority voters displayed greater tolerance. I share the same sentiments, especially if one considers that during the 1994 election campaign, there were many no-go areas created by political parties (i.e. ANC and IFP) in KwaZulu Natal and in other provinces within the country.

The 2004 general elections were free and fair. This view was shared by the Centre for Contemporary Conflict when they noted, “there was no large-scale political intimidation, the number of politically-related deaths was minimal, and there were very few ‘hotspots’ of conflict between rival parties. The list of potential trouble areas identified by the Independent Electoral Commission included, for the most part, informal settlements (i.e., shack areas) where fires
had destroyed people's identity documents, potentially preventing them from voting” (Piombo, 2004). The IEC was worried that these people would try to vote anyway and could get violent when denied. There were reports of intimidation in KZN and a few other areas, but the campaign and election day were overwhelmingly peaceful. The process was perceived to be on track to such an extent that the European Union, United Nations, Commonwealth and Carter Centre all declined to send observer and monitor delegations to observe the 2004 polls.

3.4 Three democratic elections (1994, 1999 and 2004)

3.4.1 Election results (1994)
The April 1994 general election in South Africa was regarded a turning-point in the country’s political history. It was the first inclusive multiracial election in South Africa (Seekings, 1997:287). According to party list, the ANC won the election with 62, 65% (Lodge, 1999: 167; Reynolds, 1999: 189; Giliomee and Simkins, 1999: 11; Nelufule, 2002; 50). Seekings points out that the following worked to the ANC’s advantage in winning a massive proportion of black votes in the 1994 election: ANC was considered a liberation movement by many black voters and campaign message was shrewd and straight-forward (Seekings, 1997: 29).

The National Party became an opposition party by securing 20. 39% of the total vote, while the IFP secured 10.54% of the total votes. Giliomee (quoted in Seekings 1997: 296) points out that NP did not win a larger margin of the votes because of the “irrationality of African voters” in the uhuru (liberation). The mainly white liberal Democratic Party (DP) and the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), one of the historical anti-apartheid movements, managed to win only 1.7% and 1.25% respectively.
Table 6: 1994 Election results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PARTY</th>
<th>VOTES</th>
<th>NATIONAL (%)</th>
<th>SEATS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>12,237,655</td>
<td>62.65</td>
<td>252 (63%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NP</td>
<td>3,983,690</td>
<td>20.39</td>
<td>82 (21%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFP</td>
<td>2,058,294</td>
<td>10.54</td>
<td>43 (11%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FF</td>
<td>424,555</td>
<td>2.17</td>
<td>9 (2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DP</td>
<td>338,426</td>
<td>1.73</td>
<td>7 (2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAC</td>
<td>243,478</td>
<td>1.25</td>
<td>5 (2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACDP</td>
<td>88,104</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>2 (1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>160,175</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>19,533,498</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Independent Electoral Commission, Republic of South Africa 1994 General Election

3.4.2 Election results (1999)

Table 7 below represents the election results of 1999. The election turnout in South Africa declined dramatically from 19,533,498 in 1994 to 15,892,367 in 1999 (Reynolds, 1999:37). The election was held on 2 June 1999. That election was considered better organised than the 1994 election; this was epitomized by the presence of a common voter’s roll, which ended up registering just
over 18 million eligible voters. This, according to Lodge (1995: 53), was a very important accomplishment as voters rolls were used for the first time. In comparison with 1994, a considerably calmer atmosphere prevailed.

Sixteen political parties contested the elections. The ANC won the election with 66.3% of the votes. The DP, which was the underdog in the 1994 election, managed to increase its support to almost 10% of the vote, replacing the renamed NNP as the opposition. What helped it to be the opposition was its campaign strategy to “fight crime, corruption, and unemployment”, which turned numbers of “swing voters” voting for it. However, the ANC argued that the campaign strategy was racist (Kotzé, 1999: 173).

The NNP was beaten in most white areas, maintaining its support only in Cape Town coloured areas, winning 7% of the total vote (Country Article; 2003: 13), losing 13% of the national support in parliament, especially comparing that 3, 900, 000 votes it polled in the 1994 elections (20, 39 percent or 82 seats in the National Assembly), with 1, 098, 000 votes (6.87 per cent or 28 seats) it received in 1999 (Kotzé, 1999: 173).
Table 7: 1999 Election results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PARTY</th>
<th>VOTES</th>
<th>NATIONAL%</th>
<th>SEATS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACDP</td>
<td>228 994</td>
<td>1,43</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AEB</td>
<td>46 403</td>
<td>0,29</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>10 608 021</td>
<td>66,36</td>
<td>266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AZAPO</td>
<td>27 263</td>
<td>0,17</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DP</td>
<td>1 526 315</td>
<td>9,55</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FA</td>
<td>86 707</td>
<td>0,54</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFP</td>
<td>1 373 180</td>
<td>8,59</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MF</td>
<td>48 285</td>
<td>0,3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NNP</td>
<td>1 098 125</td>
<td>6,87</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAC</td>
<td>113 150</td>
<td>0,71</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GPGP</td>
<td>9 188</td>
<td>0,06</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOPA</td>
<td>9 065</td>
<td>0,06</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCDP</td>
<td>125 408</td>
<td>0,78</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDM</td>
<td>547 188</td>
<td>3,42</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FF</td>
<td>127 233</td>
<td>0,08</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AITUP</td>
<td>10 6200</td>
<td>0,07</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>15 892 367</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The IFP won about 9% of the vote, followed by the United Democratic Movement (UDM), a new multiracial party with more than 3% of the vote, whilst the extremist (white and black) and Christian parties gained only minimal support. Looking at the regional results, ANC managed to win seven provinces out of nine. KwaZulu-Natal and the Western Cape were the two provinces that the ANC lost. It did not give up until it made coalition
governance with IFP in KwaZulu-Natal. However, Western Cape was under the control of NNP and the renamed Democratic Alliance (DA) (Country Report, 2003).

The coalition between the NNP and the DA in the Western Cape Province did not last for long. It came to an end when the DP criticised the NNP’s assertions that a vote for smaller parties was a ‘wasted vote’, and would increase the likelihood of the ANC achieving a two-thirds majority nationally as well as a majority in the Western Cape (Kotzé, 1999: 171).
3.4.3 Election results (2004)  

Table 8: 2004 Election results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PARTY</th>
<th>NATIONAL ASSEMBLY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>VOTES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACDP</td>
<td>250,272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>10,878,251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AZAPO</td>
<td>41,776</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DA</td>
<td>1,931,201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ID</td>
<td>69,765</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFP</td>
<td>1,088,664</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MF</td>
<td>55,267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NNP</td>
<td>257,824</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAC</td>
<td>113,512</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCDP</td>
<td>117,792</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDM</td>
<td>355,717</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VF Plus</td>
<td>139,465</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>15,612,667</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: http://electionresources.org/za/2004/

In the 2004 general election, the ANC increased its share of the votes to almost 70% and its seats to 279, compared to 266 in 1999 (Alence; 2004: 79). But fewer people voted. This percentage of seats in parliament gave it more than a two-third majority. Furthermore, it has at last won the two remaining provinces:
Western Cape Province that had been won in 1994 by the then National Party and in 1999 by a coalition of the DA and NNP) and KwaZulu-Natal province, which used to be IFP strong-hold. Schlemmer (2004: 5) argues that the victory of the ANC raises questions about the existence of opposition parties.

The DA made small inroads into the black electorate in the 2004 elections, but has to break through to significant support levels. The DA has yet to genuinely transform its leadership to include a majority of black, coloured and Indian leaders. At present, most of its leaders are white, and those who are not have histories from the struggle era that render them suspect amongst many South Africans. Until the party’s national leadership changes, the DA is bound to remain perceived by many South Africans as a representative of minority (interpreted as white), interests (Piombo, 2004). According to Myburgh (2004: 5), the fact that the DA is still an opposition party puts pressure on the ANC because they regard it as a threat to unity and transformation.

The IFP emerged from the 2004 elections as the third largest party in the NA, holding the same rank as in 1994 and 1999, but it was weakened. The IFP’s bid to increase its performance in the provinces in 1999 had failed, and after the 2004 elections its presence outside KZN declined even further when it won only 2 seats in Gauteng province, and no seats in all the remaining seven provinces (Election resources, 2004). The big changes for the IFP after this election were that the party lost control over the KZN provincial legislature and failed to secure ministerial positions in the new Cabinet.

The new emerging party the Independent Democrats (ID) led by Patricia DeLille, made history by winning 1.73 % of the total votes. This gave it seven seats in the National Assembly, more than UCDP, MF, PAC and the VF Plus. The UDM got only 9 seats in parliament, losing 5 seats; while the PAC and
UCDP got the same number of seats that they obtained in the 1999 elections (Election resources, 2004).

3.5 Affluence

3.5.1 Per capita income and trends

The distribution of income in South Africa is regarded as one of the most unequal in the world (see World Value Survey; 1995). Du Toit (1995: 310) states that the distribution of income by race was unequal, as white people received more income than any other racial group. He goes to say that whites received more than 70% of the total income (Du Toit, 1995).

These inequalities can be expressed in various ways. McGrath (quoted in Du Toit, 1995) calculates that in 1970 the richest 10% of income earners were receiving 57% of the total personal income, and that whites comprised 97% of that upper bracket of income earners. Society-wide inequality expressed in the single statistic of a Gini-coefficient for South Africa in 1975 stood as 0.68, which McGrath judges to be “...higher than the Gini coefficient estimated for any economy for which family or household income data is available” (Du Toit, 1995: 312).

The income gap in South Africa is closing very rapidly. The table below shows how annual income of South African’s households by race is distributed. The ratios are about 4:1 for white and Africans, 2.5:1 for white and coloured and 1.3:1 for white and Indian.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Race</th>
<th>Annual Household Income (2002)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>African</td>
<td>R45,134 00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coloured</td>
<td>R75,782 00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian</td>
<td>R146,412 00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>R192,786 00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Kane-Berman, South Africa Survey 2003/2004
Habib (2004: 3) singled out numerous achievements by the current government as follows: 1,985,545 houses built at a value of R24, 22 billion; new water connections benefit 9 million people; electricity connections extended to 70% of households by 2001, 1.8 million hectares of land have been redistributed; and 1,600,633 new jobs have been created. However, Mattes and Thiel (1998: 102) argue that the South African economy has actually shed 500,000 formal jobs since 1994 and deprived hundreds of thousands of households of the income needed to make ends meet.

The South African government has achieved their objectives, but there are many people trapped below poverty levels. As Focus (2004: 1) points out, from 20,2 million to 22 million South Africans are living below poverty levels. The new pattern is that urban blacks get richer while rural blacks remained poor.

Table 10: Per Capita Income trends (1990-1999)

|-------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|---------|


Affluence has a strong effect on the probability that democracies survive (Przeworski, 1996:40). The per capita income trends in South Africa have been and continue to be characterised by huge disparities along racial lines but also urban and rural lines. This dilemma can be traced back to the apartheid
regime when certain groups in the country were discriminated against. According to Przeworski et al (1996: 41), “if a county’s per capita income is less than $1000, are extremely fragile, the probability that one (i.e. a poor democracy) will die during the particular year is 0.12”. Democracies can survive if they manage to generate development, if they reduce inequality, if international climate is propitious and if they have parliamentary institutions”. Above $6000 is considered to be “safe”. However, South African per capita income is between $2,000 and $4,000. Thus, its rate falls to 0.03, which gives it a probability of 33 years to survive. That place South Africa somewhere in the middle between “fragile” and “safe”.

3.5.2 Human Development Index and trends
The Human Development Index refers to the composite of the variables measuring life expectancy, adult literacy and the GDP purchasing power parity per capita. Education is perhaps the most important factor determining the economic prospect of South Africa because it can raise the standard of living of many people. Under apartheid, racially biased education policies undermined the skilled resources of the country, with long-term implications for the labour market and South Africa’s competitiveness (Country Report, 2003).

In 1960, the comparative illiteracy rate for different races was as follows: for whites it was calculated at about 2%, for Indians at just less than 13%, for coloureds at 18%, and for Africans close on 30% (World Bank Atlas; 1986). In 1991, the matric pass rate increased, whereby 41% of the pass rate was recorded for black learners, 83% for coloured learners, 95% for Indians pupils and 96% for whites (Du Toit, 2003: 315). 

51
Table 11: HDI RANKINGS (1990-2003)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>Deteriorating</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


According to the Human Development Report 1990, South Africa belongs to the medium human development category where it occupied position 68 out of 130 countries in the overall HDI rankings. If democracy is a dependent variable, depending on sufficient levels of development, then HDI rankings are useful indicators for the indication of endurance. The breakdown of this HDI shows that in that period, South Africa’s life expectancy at birth rate was 63 years, the adult literacy rate at 81% whilst the, GDP PPP per capita measured about US$3799, using data for the year 1992 (Nelufule, 2002: 58).

The Human Development Report of 1994 ranked South Africa amongst the countries that still belonged to the medium human development category. But its position had gone down to 100 out of 174 countries in these rankings. By 2001, there was as improvement and sudden worsening since 2002. The biggest HDI weakness is longevity.

South Africa’s life expectancy at birth rate has declined from 58 in the 70s to 47 in 2003. These drastic decreases are probably best explained by the epidemic of HIV/AIDS. According to Mattes (2002: 28), “one problem of democratic government in South Africa has less to do with political institutions than with the personality of President Mbeki and his stance on HIV/AIDS”.

52
The impact of HIV/AIDS in the near future will hamper the work force in the country, by creating labour shortages. The Institute for Futures Research at Stellenbosch University, which conducted a study and made some forecast about the emergence of HIV/AIDS, “predicted that this disease will decrease the labour force to 3.9 million in 2015 than in any no-AIDS scenario, but still marginally larger than in 2000”. This epidemic has now increasingly targeted the skilled and highly skilled members of the workforce. In 2015, a quarter of the skilled workforce could be HIV positive, along with just over 18% of the highly skilled workforce (Kane-Berman, 2003: 211).

Chirambo (2003:17) states that the impact of HIV/AIDS might contribute to political instability, social tension, the weakening of states or even state failure. He went on to say that the epidemic’s impact on economic growth and development could reduce revenue and the shrinking of the tax base, depleting the level of funds available for government spending. The Institute for Global Dialogue (2001; 84) points out that 19, 94% of the adult population in South Africa (about 5,5 million people) is infected by the epidemic, which means that life expectancy cannot be expected to grow because of the epidemic.

3.6 Evaluations
The South African transition to democracy could serve as a good example to many countries under authoritarian regimes. Transitions are not easy, especially in multi-ethnic countries, with high levels of inequality. The 1990 speech made by former President de Klerk will always remain in many people’s minds, and in my view is one of the crucial factors in this transition.

In terms of South Africa’s electoral system, Alence (2004: 80) states that, “the South Africa’s electoral system, on both the national and provincial level, is based on proportional representation without minimum thresholds”. This system worked well for inclusivity and nation-building. But it also worked to
the ANC’s advantage who won all three democratic elections easily. One of the reasons being for this is that the proportional representation system is not complex like other electoral systems, because it can cater for the illiterate voters.

Freedom House is an institution that ranks country’s civil liberties and political rights. In terms of South Africa, the Freedom House ranked it as follows;

- From 1972 until 1973, South Africa was rated 5 (not free) in terms of civil liberties and 6 (not free) on political rights.
- From 1989 until 1990, before De Klerk’s speech South Africa’s ratings changed to 6 (least free) in terms of political rights and 5 (still not free) in terms of civil rights.
- From 1992 until 1993, during the negotiations Freedom House rated South Africa at 5 (not free) on political rights and 4 (partly free) on civil rights.
- From 1994 until 2004, this rating reflected the dismantling of apartheid legislation after the first election. South Africa according to the Freedom House was rated at 1 (free) in terms of its political rights and at 2 (still free) for civil liberties (Freedom House; 2004). This makes the new South Africa a “free” country since 1994. But as indicated above, problems of service delivery and especially health policy remain problematic.

The three elections (1994, 1999 and 2004) held in the country could be regarded as steps in consolidating democracy. Free democracies are usually consolidated democracies. Is South Africa consolidated? The ANC’s big victory margins cannot be good for a democracy. Myburgh (2004: 2-4) states that the ANC won the 2004 election with 69% of the vote implying that the party enjoys overwhelming support could thus be the beginning of a dominant party system which can undermine the rights of minorities and
may even create voter apathy. So far however, the country’s rates of participation are not unusually low when compared to other countries in similar situations. This dominance has also not yet increased political instability in post-apartheid South Africa (Piombo, 2004).

With a working judiciary and constitutional court, human rights are also not undermined. But inequality may be a threat. South Africa is not a rich country. As of 1993, annual per-capita income was $3,127. The per capita income levels have increased from US$760 in the 70s to US$2900 in 1999, and declined to US$2820 in 2003 (Human Development Reports: 1995 and 2001; Development Report, 2003: 184). The weak rand compared to the global market has caused this decline. This has affected the labour force, resulting in high unemployment rates which were reported to be 40. Another form of inequality is the outcome of the fast emergence of a new black bourgeoisie in urban areas, especially in Gauteng. The general criticism is that this is enrichment and empowerment.

The issue of HIV/AIDS is one of the obstacles South African government is facing because it is now home to more HIV-positive residents than any country in the world (Alence, 2004:90). Apart from declines in longevity, it may also be seen as a civil rights issue because government was slow in responding to this crisis.
Chapter 4: Conclusion

4.1 Similarities
Botswana and South Africa have similarities. Both Botswana and South Africa were former colonies of Britain. These two countries have parliamentary systems, which derived from the English style of parliament. Both have two houses in their parliaments. In Botswana it consists of the National Assembly and House of Chiefs, while in South Africa there is the National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces. Przeworski et al (1996: 45) supported the parliamentary system rather than the presidential system, because in the presidential system differences between the executive and the legislature can generate legislative paralysis, whilst the parliamentary systems in new democracies according to Przeworski are more durable.

South Africa and Botswana had a number of regular multiparty elections: South Africa three and seven in Botswana. Ruling parties are dominant. For example in Botswana, the BDP has won all the elections since the country’s independence in 1966 up until now, while in South Africa the ANC has won bigger majorities since 1994. There have been no turnovers yet in both countries.

Affluence is regarded as being central to democratic consolidation as it is also been regarded as one of the indicators used to test the endurance of a country’s democracy. Both countries per capita income have risen and declined over time but remain well above Przeworski’s “fragile” benchmark of $1000, but below the “safe” margin of $6000. Both falls somewhere in the middle between “fragile” and “safe”.

The GNP per capita of these countries differ. Botswana’s GNP per capita in 1984 was US$940; it rose incredibly to US$3600 in 1998, but declined to US$3100 in 2001. Cornish (2004) posit that, “Botswana has shown the highest
level of per-capita growth of any country in the world in the last 35 years”. In 2003 the South Africa’s GNP per capita rose dramatically to US$2820. These results indicate that South Africa’s GNP per capita income in 2003 was higher than of Botswana.

Their rankings in the human development indexes (both are in the “middle’ category), are deteriorating. Przeworski et al (1996: 42) argued that rapid growth is not destabilising for democracies (or for dictatorships), indeed, democracies are always more likely to survive when they grow. Botswana grew faster than South Africa, but its HDI dropped faster than South Africa’s. Cornish (2004) states that Botswana, “is the only country of 21 in the world that recorded a drop in the human development index during the period of 1990 to 2001 and simultaneously experienced rapid economic growth.

South Africa’s ranking in the human development report was better than Botswana. In 2003, out of 175 countries, South Africa was ranking position 111 in 2003, while Botswana was ranking 125. The life expectancy at birth rate in these two countries is not satisfactory. Both countries have high rates of HIV/AIDS in their populations. However, “South Africa is now home of more HIV-positive residents than any other country in the world, with about one in five adults infected” (Alence, 2004). The increase of HIV/AIDS in these countries threatens the survival of democracy, because of higher cost, people with scarce skills die, and the health budgets could grow at the expense of education and job creation.

The high levels of HIV/AIDS infections have an impact on the low rates in the life expectancy at birth rate. In Botswana 35, 80% of the adults are infected by this pandemic. According to Cornish (2004), one in three Batswana is infected. But the government is providing the anti-retroviral to the infected people. These high levels of HIV/AIDS caused some decline in the life expectancy by which in 1995, Botswana life expectancy was 68 and fell to 49.
While in South Africa, it was reported that almost 19.94% (The Institute for Global Dialogue, 2001; 84) of the adults have been infected by this epidemic, causing its life expectancy to decline from 58 in the 70's to 47 in 2003.

Democracy will only be consolidated if the rules become "the only game in town" (Linz and Stepan, 1996). Schedler (1996) notes that democratic consolidation is a process of making new democracies secure, of extending advances of the system or life expectancy beyond the short term, of making them immune against the threat of authoritarian regression of building dams against eventual reverse waves (Schedler, 1998).

4.2 Differences
South Africa has a large population of ±43 million, whilst Botswana has only 1.8 million. South Africa is a multi-racial country. There are eleven official languages recognised by the South African new Constitution Act 108, of 1996. However, Botswana is a relatively homogeneous country, as the majority (about 77%) of the people speak Setswana language.

The transition to democracy in both countries differs; for example, South Africa made the transition from a minority-ruled country to an inclusive democracy in the 1994 elections through pact formation and negotiations. South Africa's transition to democracy culminated in two constitutions: an interim constitution in 1993 and the final constitution in 1996 (Act 108 of 1996), which took effect at the beginning of 1997, whereas in Botswana, the traditional chiefs played a major role in their transition to democracy, during the fifties and sixties.

South Africa became self-governing in 1910 from the British government. Its democratic governance only came in 1994. The electoral system of these countries also differs, for example, Botswana uses the First-Past-The-Post system. The opposition parties criticised this electoral system. They state that,
the FPTP system gives the BDP a victory at the elections (Matlosa, 2004 and Baxter, 2004). This argument is based on the outcome of the 1999 elections, in which the ruling party got 1992,598 (54.3%) but that entitled it to 33 (82.5%) of the parliamentary seats, while other parties got a small proportion of the seats in parliament. South Africa is using the Proportional Representation system, which is exactly proportional, but then lacks accountability.

Affluence remained a major problem facing the South African democracy. According to Mattes and Thiel (1998:103), “South Africa has highest levels of inequality in the world, reflecting the reality of two South African’s; one has first-world style income levels and the living standards while the other and much larger belongs squarely to the third world. Despite the vast minerals wealth this county has, the majority of South Africa has not improved their livelihoods since the abolishment of the Apartheid regime”. Alenee (2004:85) notes that, “the government has failed to narrow overall income inequalities substantially. The distribution of income among races has become less unequal as many educated black South Africans have entered the middle and upper economic strata, aided by policies promoting economic empowerment and employment equity”. In order to bridge that gap of inequality, it would be necessary for a state to deliver goods and services equitably. According to the Public Citizen (2003:1) inequality in South Africa has risen dramatically which can be compared with that of Brazil, as the most unequal country in the world. Thus new inequality is also black (urban) versus black (rural).

In the case of Botswana, poverty is amongst the factors affecting the country. Cornish (2004) say that, other parts of the country have been struck by this endemic. He goes to say that, “livelihoods have suffered to the extent that some are supported only by state destitute payments”.
4.3 Final assessments

Botswana and South Africa are amongst countries in the sub-Saharan region of Africa, which have never experienced a coup. Their democracies are far better than any other country in Africa (with the exception of Mauritius). But are they consolidated? Their elections have run smoothly since their independences, but they have not passed what Huntington called a “two-turnover test”, which states that democracy will be regarded as consolidated only if governments can routinely be removed by electoral means. For example, the BDP has been in power since 1966, and the ANC in 1994. In the first five years of South Africa’s democracy, many people argued that its democracy was not yet consolidated. One of the reasons could be fact that was still new in the democratic dispensation.

Currently, South Africa has made significant strides towards consolidation of democracy, regardless of being a latecomer into democracy. It has achieved the following: a stable democracy and free and fair multi-party elections, a working judiciary and a free press. However, in terms of the human development index and trends, and the per capita income and trends, South Africa got worse, but better rates and ratings than Botswana. It is still early to say that these three successful democratic elections made South Africa’s democracy more consolidated, while there are still many challenges the government has to overcome: inequality, weak opposition enrichment of elites, etc.

The issue of crime in South Africa it remains one of the major problems threatening this democracy. One good example is the recent parliament travel scam involving many ruling party’s top officials. According to Alence (2004: 90), these alarming crime rates make South Africa per capita murder rate (murder being the most reliably measured violent crimes) about ten times higher than that of the United States. One can argue that these high levels of
crime could be the result of high rate of unemployment, which Graham (2004; 1) said is to be expected to be as high as 40% in 2004.

Another controversial issue about South Africa’s democracy is the way President Mbeki executes his powers, e.g. the issue of HIV/AIDS and the centralisation of his and the empowerment policy. As mentioned, this is a civil rights issue.

Botswana has been practicing democracy for a longer time since independence but not a turnover yet. Botswana’s government has strict measures on corruption; for example, the 1992 corruption case that involved the then Deputy President and the Minister of Agriculture who were forced to resign. Matlosa (2004) states that, Botswana has done so well to institutionalise its democracy, however, the way in which the ruling party is enjoying unlimited access to the state resource is unquestionable.

The internationally acclaimed scholars of democracy such as Linz and Stepan (1996) argued that regardless of the quality of political processes and institutions, a democracy is only consolidated once it is “legitimated,” or seen by all significant political actors and an overwhelming majority of citizens as the “only game in town”. For democracy to be meaningful, the “rules of the game” must have a meaning for political competitors. Those rules must be valued, and observed. Therefore, democratic practices become so internalised by political actors that acting outside the institutional “rules of the game” becomes unthinkable (Harris and Railly, 1998: 136-137).

According to Gouws (1996: 17) “democracies are systems in which groups compete for scare resources and they require institutions, which can deliver a particular kind of equitable outcome: public goods of equally distributed. Therefore, those public goods include (the right to vote in competitive elections as a means to enter the contest of power, as well as the goods and
services required for the survival and prosperity). Thus, creating a system of mutual security that allows peaceful competition among vastly different political interests should be of highest priority for the consolidation of democracy (Du Toit, 1995: 440; and Gibson, 1995:6). But all levels of the system must effectively deliver good policies.

In conclusion, both countries had multiparty elections since their independences. But, there have been no turnovers yet. There are small differences in their HDI’s with South Africa the higher placed. The other difference is in their Freedom House ratings, where South Africa rated at 1 (free) in terms of its political rights and at 2 (still free) for civil liberties, while Botswana rated at 2 (still free) in terms of the political rights and 2 (still free) in terms of the civil rights. All these characteristics mentioned above shows that both countries are good electoral, perhaps not consolidated yet.
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