THE HIPP'H IL VERBAL THEME
IN BIBLICAL HEBREW

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THESIS
presented for the Degree of
DOCTOR IN LITERATURE
(Semitic Languages)
at the University of Stellenbosch

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September 1971
P R E F A C E

It gives me great pleasure to express my thanks and appreciation towards all who have contributed towards the completion of this study.

First, I am especially grateful to Prof. Dr. F.C. Fensham, under whose supervision as promotor and under whose guidance this work was carried out. I am thankful for the way in which he introduced me into the field of Semitics, and for his direction of this study with patience, encouragement, interest and with valuable advice.

My thanks also to Dr. P.J. van Zijl, the internal examiner, for his interest in the progress of this study and for his helpful comments, especially with regard to Ugaritic.

I am equally indebted to Prof. Dr. James Barr who consented to act as external examiner. The results of his research proved valuable to me in connection with this examination of a verbal category in Hebrew.

There are many others who in some or other way made invaluable contributions: in making source materials available or in helping to mould this dissertation in the form in which it now appears. These also I thank sincerely.

Above all: SOLI DEO GLORIA.
## CONTENTS

1. **INTRODUCTION**
   1.1 General Remarks ................................................. 1
   1.2 The Object of this Monograph ................................. 4
   1.3 The Method and Organization of this Monograph ............. 5
   1.4 The Transliteration of Hebrew .................................. 9

2. **FUNDAMENTAL NOTIONS OF TRANSFORMATIONAL GENERATIVE GRAMMAR RELEVANT TO THE PRESENT DISCUSSION** .............................................. 11
   2.1 Introduction .................................................. 11
   2.2 The General Approach of Transformational Generative Grammars ................................. 11
   2.3 The Organization of the 1967 Model of Transformational Grammar .................................. 15
   2.4 Recent Developments in Transformational Grammar ........... 19
   2.5 The Treatment of Causatives in Transformational Generative Grammar ......................... 23
      2.5.1 The Semantic Lexicon .................................. 23
      2.5.2 The Selectional Lexicon ................................. 23
      2.5.3 The Transformational Lexicon .......................... 25
      2.5.4 The Translational Lexicon .............................. 26
   2.6 On the Lexical Representation of Hebrew Verbs .............. 32

3. **ETHNOLINGUISTIC AND "PHILOLOGICAL" CONSIDERATIONS RELEVANT TO THE PRESENT DISCUSSION** .............................................. 40
   3.1 Introduction .................................................. 40
   3.2 Language and Thought ......................................... 41
   3.3 The Value of Historical Arguments .......................... 57
   3.4 Comparative Philology - an Evaluation ...................... 70

4. **VARIOUS ASPECTS OF THE HİPḤ'İL VERBAL THEME** .................. 93
   4.1 Introduction .................................................. 93
   4.2 The Causative Function of the Hiph'īl ....................... 93
   4.3 The Factitive Function of the Hiph'īl ...................... 95
   4.4 The Declarative Function of the Hiph'īl .................... 95
   4.5 The Intransitive Hiph'īl ................................... 106
   4.6 Compound Causative Constructions ......................... 113
6. QAL AND HIPHER WITH SIMILAR MEANING 263
   6.1 Introduction 263
   6.2 Various Considerations 263
   6.3 Jenni's Views on Qal and Hipher with Similar Meaning 271
   6.4 Conclusion 276

7. SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS 278

APPENDIX I 286
APPENDIX II 291
APPENDIX III 299
APPENDIX IV 303

BIBLIOGRAPHY 313

INDEX 326
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 GENERAL REMARKS

The Semitic verbal system and especially that of Hebrew, has already been the subject of various discussions. During the first half of this century the so-called tenses (tempora) have probably received the most attention from scholars. This subject has been thoroughly investigated, and comparative Semitic material has been used for this purpose to a great extent, sometimes to the good and sometimes erroneously. 1) In the past few years attention has been drawn to a different aspect of the verbal system which had long been characterized by a somewhat uncritical acceptance, namely the aspect of the so-called stem-formations or verbal themes. 2) The shades of meaning which are connected with these verbal themes have been represented in traditional grammar as being relatively simple and even completely predictable: The basic idea expressed by the root is modified with regularity and in an unvarying way to provide new meanings, e.g. passive, reflexive, intensive and causative. However, the design was not quite so simple, and the function of verbal themes was defined in detail in the standard grammars. The various aspects of meaning were brought into relation within a well-defined scheme, by means of which meanings could be pre-

1. Cf. Garbini (1960, pp. 136-37) for a summary of research on this specific subject. The studies of Blake (1951) and Brockelmann (1951) still seem to be the most justified views on the "tenses", in spite of a recent study by Michel (1960). In chapter 5 mention will once more be made of the interpretation of the "tenses".

2. Various other terms are also used, viz. "verbal conjugations" and "patterns". I prefer to use the name "verbal themes" for explicit reasons connected with the findings of this study: it makes clear that themes or patterns are at stake which cannot be assessed as conjugations or variations within a paradigm.
dicted accurately. The case was presented more or less as follows: given the meaning of the basic theme, the Qal, and the derived theme (e.g. the Hiph'il) being specified, the meaning of the corresponding word in the Hiph'il could be predicted exactly, because the Hiph'il is the causative verbal theme. In other words, the meaning of a word in various verbal themes was represented in a schematic or logicistic way, as Barr has pointed out (1961, pp. 102, 183).

The traditional scheme was not to remain quite untouched. The first point to be criticized, was (as could probably be expected) the Pi'el verbal theme, which was usually regarded as being the intensive form of the Qal. Goetze dismissed the idea of the Pi'el (also called the D-stem) being an intensive verbal theme as a romantic notion (1942, p. 2). His opinion was that on closer observation, this idea would fall away. Goetze's research was made specifically in connection with Akkadian, but he contended that the differences suggested by him could quite successfully be applied to West-Semitic (and thus also Hebrew) (1942, p. 8). Although Goetze's ideas found immediate acceptance in the field of Akkadian grammar, they were not clearly and definitely accepted in the field of Hebrew grammatical description. In Brockelmann's important study (1956) on Hebrew syntax, Goetze's article (p. 36) was mentioned, but his conclusions were not applied in terms of Hebrew. However, Goetze's study was indirectly responsible for a new critical disposition towards the traditional conception of the verbal themes, which finally crystallized in Jenni's works (1967, 1968).

It was not until 1961 that important statements and viewpoints on the verbal themes were once more published, in James Barr's The Seman-
tics of Biblical Language. This work was not intended to provide a positive grammar of biblical Hebrew, but nevertheless it contained very important and far-reaching statements in connection with Hebrew grammar. Barr quite rightly criticized certain methods of theological explanation and certain interpretations which had long been customary. With regard to the verbal themes, this criticism was of the utmost consequence, for he took into account the power of word formation and maintained that the idea that the various verbal themes implied straightforward and predictable modification of the so-called basic meaning of the Qal, was an obvious fallacy. By contending that each word was semantically a new formation, Barr was in opposition to much of the traditional interpretation - with regard to grammatical descriptions and to the conclusions of exegetics and other scholars. Barr's view was moreover well-formed and developed and should definitely be regarded as a turning-point in the description of the functions of the verbal themes.

Certainly the most revolutionary and far-reaching attempt towards an explanation of the function of the verbal themes has recently been made by Ernst Jenni. His first publication of this kind was an article "Faktitiv und Kausativ von 'bd 'zugrunde gehen'" (1967), which was soon followed by a comprehensive work Das Hebräische Pi'el (1968). Jenni is mainly concerned with the functioning of the Pi'el and the Hiph'il, respectively Qal and Pi'el, in their relation towards one another. It may thus seem as if Jenni's study only touches on the perimeter of the subject of this study. This is, however, not so, because Jenni's interpretation of the Hiph'il (and the other verbal themes) is of such a revolutionary kind that it will have to be taken into account. His approach towards the verbal themes in general seems to be exactly the opposite as that of Barr. The verbal themes are treated in an even
more rigorous way than has been the case in traditional grammar. If it is further taken into consideration that Jenni's interpretation—in my opinion not always thoroughly tested—was very well received in the field of Semitic studies, it is quite clear that it should be thoroughly investigated. Indeed, in contrast with the view of Barr (amongst others) that each new word has its own intricate background, Jenni is of the opinion that Pi'el and Hiph'il (or Qal and Pi'el) can be separated in a uniform manner throughout the entire lexicon.

From this survey it is clear that there is no unanimity among scholars with regard to the functions of Hebrew verbal themes. On the one hand one finds the viewpoint of traditional grammar and of Jenni (in his own special way) that one has predictability with regard to the semantic value of a word in a particular verbal theme; on the other hand, there is the viewpoint of Barr (amongst others) according to which the meaning of a word in a particular verbal theme can hardly be described in general terms, because each word has a complex history and that, in any case, we have to deal with unpredictability on the semantic level.

1.2 THE OBJECT OF THIS MONOGRAPH

The main object of this study is the characterization of the Hiph'il verbal theme. The previous paragraph proved that there is no unanimity among scholars about the reason why a certain word appears in

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4. A few reviews are mentioned later on (5.4). To these may be added the appraisals of Otzen (1970, pp. 21-22) and Vetter and Walther (1971, pp. 83, 95 n. 49). Otzen regards Jenni's distinctions as really significant, but not entailing any theological importance in the case of 'bd; Vetter and Walther regard Jenni's study as a fine example of the study of semantic fields. In any case, Jenni's study has (apparently?) been taken up by scholars in an incomprehensibly uncritical way.
the Hiph'il, or, to put it differently, about the semantic value of a word in the Hiph'il, if a Qal form of which the meaning is known exists, is it possible to predict the corresponding Hiph'il correctly? Or, to take the other extreme, do we perhaps have to deal with a totally arbitrary use of the verbal themes? In this study it will be attempted to determine the specific value and implications of the Hiph'il. Special emphasis will of necessity have to be laid on the way in which verbal themes should be approached in general. One point should be clearly stated at this stage: this study does not aim at making an inventory of all Hiph'il forms - that would be the function of a dictionary. Moreover, such a procedure would meet with insuperable problems, namely that all the numerous text critical variants suggested in *Biblia Hebraica* and the many commentaries would also have to receive attention and consideration. Indeed, there are several Hiph'il forms which appear only once and in relation to which their very existence is a text critical problem. To avoid these problems, which would in their turn detract from the interpretation of the whole, not all Hiph'il forms will be accounted for. Rather it will be attempted to give an answer to the question how the Hiph'il verbal theme is to be assessed in general as a morphological phenomenon.

1.3 **THE METHOD AND ORGANIZATION OF THIS MONOGRAPH**

The field of general linguistics has experienced great developments in the past decades, with regard to content on the one hand, but also because of the fact that more and more languages have been thoroughly analyzed linguistically. It has become clear that the matter did not only concern new terms, but also fundamental aspects of language. It may now be positively stated that the time is past when linguistic description can be undertaken without consideration of language as a
whole and without bringing all findings in relation to a valid linguistic theory.

With regard to Semitic languages, also, the insight of modern linguistics has been employed, but adaptation has been slow and laborious, especially in the case of the old Semitic languages. The linguistic approach of researchers in this field was mainly a philological one. In connection with linguistic approaches, old and new, in the field of Semitic languages, James Barr (1968b) has drawn a very thorough characterization. As the title of his article indicates, we have to deal with a conflict between philology and linguistics. His definition of philology is highly successful, in so far as it is understood as "a predominantly historical and comparative approach, with the primary interest directed upon the historical derivation and the cognate affinities of linguistic items and sets of items" (1968b, p. 37). The field of linguistics is wider than that of philology, for example because the synchronic and diachronic levels are not confused. In the field of Semitic languages the idea did indeed exist that something might be gained from the insight of modern linguistics, but the idea was also frequently found that linguistics should be regarded as a discipline "in which a complicated, pretentious and impenetrable technical terminology is used in order to disguise a lamentable ignorance of the detailed facts" (Barr, 1968b, p. 39). This last proposition may appear to be an overstatement, but is the impression sometimes conveyed by purely philological studies. The cause of this conflict is difficult to determine, but it does appear that blame should not be laid on one side only. On the one hand the inability of linguists to convey their insights to researchers in other fields and to make these insights useful and accessible was often apparent. On the other hand, most researchers in the fields of theology and Semitics were interested in a
linguistic theory only as a means to an end, and were chiefly concerned with their own subject matter. In many respects there was distrust of the new, especially because there were so many theories each claiming to be the only correct one. In the meantime, there were at the same time so many problems in the field of Semitics, that it was hardly possible to give sufficient attention to linguists. In like manner, many reasons may be given for the conflict (cf. Barr, 1961, pp. 292-295; 1968b; Gleason, 1963; Birkeland, 1956, p. 49 for a further diagnosis of the conflict). In any case, in the past few years great changes have occurred in the field of Semitics, and many studies have made good use of modern linguistic theories. Thus we have Reiner's analysis of the Akkadian (1966) and, very recently, Andersen's thorough study of the verbless clause in biblical Hebrew, specifically in the Pentateuch (1970). In this last work the study was undertaken within the cadre of Pike's tagmemic theory. There are also quite a few other excellent studies not mentioned here.

Considering what has already been stated, it follows that this study of the Hiph'il should be made within the cadre or framework of a specific linguistic theory. The problem is, however, that so many general linguistic theories are in use at present that it would be difficult to make a justifiable choice without having to offer a comprehensive linguistic study - and, after all, general linguistics should provide a framework within which the present study can be carried out. It is difficult, also, to determine exactly which theory is most favoured at present. For various reasons and without giving all arguments against or in favour of it, the transformational generative theory has in this case been selected. Also note that Nida made use of it very effectively in his manual for Bible translators (1964), and that his presentation of the theory makes it accessible to students of the
The exposition of the general linguistic theory in chapter 2 will clearly show how this model can be used successfully.

The choice of a specific theory is, however, not so simple as it may appear: there is no agreement amongst scholars about the exact form of the transformational generative theory. The theory is constantly in a state of flux, and it is almost impossible to determine which specific form is in favour at a given moment. A realistic choice will therefore also have to be made with regard to this aspect, since the ultimate purpose is to obtain a framework within which the present study may be conducted. In chapter 2, this choice and its motivation within the wider range of transformational generative grammar will be dealt with.

Earlier in this paragraph, philology and linguistics were quite rightly placed antithetically towards each other. With regard to living languages, the differentiation may easily be maintained, but in the case of languages which are no longer spoken, the situation is rather more complex. In the study of a language such as Hebrew, a method which corresponds to traditional philology to a great extent will necessarily be used, that is, a method making use of philological procedures. In connection with a language such as Ugaritic, of which even less is known, this kind of method will be used to an even greater extent. However, it is essential that all these procedures be moderated and influenced by general linguistic theories as much as possible. Chapter 3 will deal with this aspect. At the end of chapter 3, a further statement will be formulated in connection with the findings of that chapter.

Since each chapter has a brief introduction, the contents of each chapter will not be given fully at this stage. In chapter 4, however, certain aspects of the Hiph'îl will be described. In chapter 5 verbs
having the same meaning in the Pi'el and the Hiph'il will be discussed, and due attention will be paid to Jenni's propositions in this connection. In chapter 6 Qal and Hiph'il forms having the same meaning will in turn be discussed. In chapter 7 conclusions will be drawn from the study as a whole.

Passages from the Old Testament are quoted in the following way: standard translations are used, except where they do not convey the sense of the passage and of the verb under discussion clearly. Use is made of the following standard translations:

- The New English Bible
- The Jerusalem Bible
- Revised Standard Version
- King James Version.

1.4 THE TRANSLITERATION OF HEBREW

Due to practical reasons the regular system of transliteration of vowels (as suggested e.g. by Segert (1960, p. 487) cannot be followed and adaptations have to be made. Vowels are transliterated in the following way:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Names of vowels</th>
<th>Transliteration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>hêreq (short)</td>
<td>i</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hêreq (long)</td>
<td>i</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>šêrê</td>
<td>ā</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>šêrê (with yôd)</td>
<td>è</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>segôl</td>
<td>e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>segôl (with yôd)</td>
<td>è</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pataḥ</td>
<td>a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>qâmeq</td>
<td>ā</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>qâmeq ḫatûf</td>
<td>o</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
According to this system the transliteration of different vowels correspond, but due to typographic factors this situation cannot be avoided.
2.1 INTRODUCTION

In the introductory chapter it has been seen that a subject such as the present one has to be discussed within the framework of a well-founded theory or model. Concepts such as "syntax", "style", "meaning" and "derivation" will be used repeatedly; these concepts of language must be adequately specified within the framework of a general theory of language - the transformational generative theory. The already mentioned uncertainty in linguistic circles on the exact shape of the theory at present, however, creates an obstacle to this aim. This necessitates an exposé of the more classical form of the theory, brought up to date by the most recent publications, either books or articles in journals on linguistic matter.

Examples given and details furnished will in the main be those that are relevant to the present subject of investigation. No claim to minuteness of detail of the theory presented in this chapter is made. The ultimate aim is to provide a framework within which causative verbs and constructions (and the like) in Hebrew may be treated satisfactorily.

2.2 THE GENERAL APPROACH OF TRANSFORMATIONAL GENERATIVE GRAMMARS

A fundamental distinction between linguistic competence and linguistic performance is basic to a proper understanding of transformational generative grammar. This amounts to a distinction between

1. This part of the study was completed in July 1970.
the speaker-hearer's knowledge of his language and his actual use of language in concrete situations (Chomsky, 1965, p. 4; Dinneen, 1967, p. 358) or, as Chomsky expounds this elsewhere, a distinction between what the speaker of a language knows implicitly, and what he does (Chomsky, 1966, p. 9-10). This primary distinction throws light on both the potencies and impotencies of transformational generative grammar.

A grammar has to be an account of linguistic competence, since it should account for the ability of the fluent speaker of a language to understand an arbitrary sentence of his language and to produce an appropriate sentence on a given occasion (Chomsky, 1966, p. 10; Botha, 1968, p. 19). This ability is present in the form of an internalized grammar (Botha, 1968, p. 22). Performance is a direct reflection of competence only in an idealized speech-community where the ideal speaker-hearer knows his language perfectly and is unaffected by various grammatically irrelevant factors, either physical, neural or temporal. However, these conditions are not met with in a natural speech-community. In the latter case a sentence, although perfectly grammatical, may be unacceptable "due to reasons having to do not with grammar, but rather with memory limitations, intonational and stylistic factors, 'iconic' elements of discourse" (Chomsky, 1965, p. 11). A description of actual behaviour in natural language must account for these factors of performance, but this is not derogatory to the assumption of competence or the underlying system of knowledge which has to be described by the grammar. The facts of performance should indeed be faced, but they can only be studied on the basis of a well-founded theory of the competence that underlies it (Chomsky, 1966, p. 10).

This crucial distinction between competence and performance may in
a certain sense be said to be corresponding to and to be an extension of De Saussure's distinction between la langue and la parole. These two sets of words should, however, not be equated with each other too hurriedly. It is worth recalling the meaning De Saussure attached to the terms la langue and la parole: la parole refers to the individual manifestations of language - it is not a social fact; la langue is "the set of passively acquired habits we have been taught by our speech community, in terms of which we understand other speakers and produce combinations other speakers of our community understand" (Dinneen, 1967, p. 197) - it is a social fact exercising constraint over individual speakers. The distinctions of Chomsky and De Saussure may thus be related to each other, but Chomsky explicitly states that the concept of a mere systematic inventory of items should be rejected (Chomsky, 1965, p. 4). The claims of transformational generative grammar are much more far-reaching, as will be seen further on in this paragraph.

In describing what he understands exactly in using the term competence, Chomsky expresses his indebtedness to Von Humboldt's view that a language "makes finite use of infinite means" and that its grammar must describe the process that makes this possible (Chomsky, 1965, p.4). This aspect of linguistic competence is also labelled "creativity of language" and is the speaker's ability to produce (and the hearer's ability to understand) an infinite number of sentences, the majority of which are as wholes completely novel. However, these novel sentences are composed of parts which are completely familiar (Jacobs and Rosenbaum, 1968, p. 268). At the same time this idea of an infinite set of elements forms no paradox with the recognition of the finite storage and learning capacities of human beings as finite physical
The finite system or set of rules produces or generates these infinite numbers of sentences. GRAMMAR, then, is the concept that refers to these finite systems, and a grammar is generative "insofar as it is perfectly explicit, leaving nothing to the reader's intuition, but providing symbols and rules for all the operations on the items described by the grammar" (Dinneen, 1967, p. 381-82). In addition to generating an infinite number of grammatical, and only grammatical, sentences, a grammar should assign to each a structural description, allowing them to be interpreted semantically and phonetically.

In order to account adequately for the competence of the native speaker (present in the form of an internalized grammar) on the basis of only primary linguistic data, the existence of an acquisition device has to be specified. This device makes it possible for any native speaker to acquire his internalized grammar - therefore it has to be language-independent. The many fundamental similarities manifested by all languages, the uniform process of first language-learning and other similar factors, lead us to the assumption of a universal, innate, linguistic structure (cf. Jacobs and Rosenbaum, 1968, p. 283). It is in particular the recognition of the Deep Structure - Surface Structure distinction that has disclosed the rich system of similarities underlying the superficial syntactic differences between different languages. We find, e.g., organizational universals, formal universals and substantive universals (Botha, 1968, p. 22-23). In this way it is seen that the claims of the transformational theory of linguistic structure are indeed mentalistic.3)

2. Various other terms are used by linguists to characterize this ability of the finite rules. For a discussion, cf. Botha (1968, pp. 60-61).

3. Cf. Botha (1968, pp. 84-110) for an evaluation of the different views on mentalism.
2.3 THE ORGANIZATION OF THE 1967 MODEL OF TRANSFORMATIONAL GRAMMAR

The system of rules, regarded in the foregoing part as the internalized grammar of a speaker, can be analyzed into the three major components of a generative grammar: the syntactic, semantic and phonological components.

A basic assumption of generative grammar is the centrality of syntax. Fillmore (1968a, p. 3) characterizes the difference between generative grammar and much of traditional grammar as follows: "There was a time when a typical linguistic grammar was a long and detailed account of the morphological structure of various classes of words, followed by a two- or three-page appendix called 'Syntax' which offered a handful of rules of thumb on how to 'use' the words described in the preceding sentences - how to combine them into sentences. In grammars where syntax is central, the forms of words are specified with respect to syntactic concepts, not the other way round." The syntax is a component without a real input: making infinite use of finite means, it generates or produces an infinite number of abstract, formal structures, or syntactic structures. In other words, the syntactic component embodies the creative power of the grammar. However, it says nothing about meaning, except for the meaning of the individual lexical items - the meaning of the whole string is still unknown. The output of the syntactic component forms in turn the input to both the semantic and phonological components. The semantic component operates on each of the syntactic structures and assigns a semantic interpretation to the sentence as a whole and to each of its consti-

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4. This exposition is a rendering of the 1967 model of the "classical theory". It is based mainly on Chomsky (1965, pp. 15-18), as repeated in Jacobs and Rosenbaum (1968, p. 280 ff.), and Botha (1968, p. 25 ff.).
tuents. Analogously the phonological component operates on each of the syntactic structures and determines their phonetic shape. Both the semantic and phonological components are therefore purely interpretive, operating only on information provided by the syntactic component which is fundamental and adequate. Dinnaen describes in one sentence the interaction of the three components in a most concise and successful way: "...the syntactic component specifies the deep structure of a sentence, for which the semantic interpretation is specified, and via transformations, the surface structure, for which a phonetic interpretation is determined by the phonetic component" (1967, p. 382).

Corresponding to the previous distinction, two new concepts have to be introduced: deep structure and surface structure. The syntactic component specifies for each sentence a deep structure and a surface structure; the former serves as input to the semantic component, the latter as input to the phonological component. "The central idea of transformational grammar is that they (= the two structures) are, in general, distinct" (Chomsky, 1965, p. 16). They are, however, related via a series of transformations mapping the underlying deep structures into surface structures. These transformations are formal grammatical operations on the deep structures associating them with surface structures. In this way the pairing of phonetic representations and semantic interpretations are mediated through the syntactic component. The syntactic component must now be thought of as having two parts or subcomponents: the BASE subcomponent generating deep structures, and the TRANSFORMATIONAL subcomponent associating surface structures with or deriving surface structures from deep structures.

The base system or subcomponent is further subdivided into two parts: the categorial system and the lexicon (Chomsky, 1967, p. 420),
each of which has a definite function to perform. Since a full account of the different opinions on lexical attachment within the sphere of transformational grammar is to be given in 2.5, a full exposition of the contents of the lexicon will not be given here. It may, incidentally, be mentioned here that each version of the transformational theory requires only slight modification of the conception of the lexicon.

The categorial system of the base subcomponent has the form of a simple or context-free phrase-structure grammar (Chomsky, 1967, p. 421). The information on any sentence is presented in a set of rewriting rules of the form $X \rightarrow Y$, to be read as "rewrite $X$ as $Y". A derivation from such a set of rules is formed when one symbol occurring to the left of the arrow is replaced at a time. In this way a pre-terminal string is formed, i.e. a string into which lexical formatives can be inserted, resulting in a terminal string (Chomsky, 1965, p. 84). The information presented in phrase structure rules can also be presented in a diagram called a tree-diagram.

The foregoing remarks on the set of base phrase-markers lead us to a deeper understanding of the transformational subcomponent of which it was said earlier that it relates surface structures to deep structures. The rules of the transformational component bring about modifications to the phrase-markers, i.e. the labelled bracketing generated by the rules of the base component (phrase structure rules of the categorial system and rules of lexical insertion) (Chomsky, 1967, p. 425).

In this way derived phrase-markers are formed, with a final derived phrase-marker as the last one.


The semantic component consists of two parts: a dictionary providing a meaning for the lexical items, and a finite set of projection rules. The projection rules "assign a semantic interpretation to each string of formatives generated by the syntactic component" (Katz and Postal, 1964, p. 12). The entries in the dictionary are to be in a normal form - a full analysis of the meaning of each lexical item into its most elementary components should be given, with a statement indicating the semantic relations among the items. To acquire this, use is being made of syntactic markers, semantic markers, (optional) distinguishers, and selectional restrictions.  

The area of phonology is interrelated with that of syntax and semantics and although it is not deemed necessary for the purpose of the present discussion to enter into a detailed exposition of the phonological component, some remarks on it will be made in 2.6.

The assertion has been made in 1.3 that the theory of transformational grammar is in a constant state of fluctuation, to the extent that continuous research is being done, modifying previous conceptions of language and introducing new problems. Thus we find that, although the basic insights remained unchanged, the appearance of the transformational approach to syntax presented by Chomsky in 1965 in Aspects of the Theory of Syntax seems quite different from that presented in 1957 in Syntactic Structures. The most important reason for this is the appearance of Katz and Fodor's article (Katz and Fodor, 1964) in which the domain, goals and mechanisms of a semantic theory were delineated. Several articles and books were to follow. This led to the explicit inclusion of a semantic theory that gives an interpretation of the sen-

7. For a full exposition, cf. Katz and Postal (1964, pp. 12 ff.).
tences generated by the syntactic component (Dinneen 1967, p. 379). It is this model of the transformational theory, with an included semantic component, that was expounded earlier in this paragraph.

2.4 RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN TRANSFORMATIONAL GRAMMAR

It has been noted that at different stages of the development of the transformational grammatical theory, linguists have developed a feeling of discontent with some or other principle of the theory. One of these modifications was the explicit inclusion of a semantic theory in grammatical description since the early sixties. Within the field of power of the transformational theory different views on aspects of the theory were always maintained. In this paragraph arguments will be advanced to support the hypothesis that a modification of the interrelation of the three main components of a transformational theory is necessary. These arguments centre on the idea that syntax and semantics should be interrelated much more closely and that the theory should provide "for the sequential interdigitation of some semantic and syntactic rules and, in particular, for the appearance of semantic symbols in a derivation before the last syntactic rule has been applied" (Weinreich, 1966, p. 468). In other words, these linguists plead that a more basic function be allocated to the semantic component.

The above-mentioned quotation captures to a large extent the semantic theory of Weinreich that was advanced in 1966. He rightly criticizes the assumption of Katz and Fodor (1963) that semantics begins where syntax ends. In this way generative grammar has claimed too much for syntax (Weinreich, 1966, p. 469), and he now suggests the name "no syntax without semantics" for his theory.

Roughly the same idea has been heavily stressed by three participants in the symposium on the topic "Universals in Linguistic Theory"
held at the University of Texas in April 1967.\textsuperscript{9}) I refer to the articles by Fillmore (1968a), Bach (1968) and McCawley (1968a) in the recently mentioned volume. Summarily their respective suggestions amount to the following: Fillmore's analysis of the grammatical concept of case leads him to question the validity of syntactic analyses based on syntactic data alone. He suggests that, if his proposals on "semantic deep structures" can be developed by rules, "it is likely that the syntactic deep structure of the type that has been made familiar through the work of Chomsky and his students is going to go the way of the phoneme" (1968a, p. 88). In his search for a universal base component, Bach (1968, p. 117) finds it necessary to exclude the lexical component from the base. He regards a new conception of the lexicon and its operation in a grammar a necessity and expresses the idea that many of the relationships between different syntactic structures, for some linguists expressed by transformations, have their counterparts in the relations between lexical items. Our conception of the lexicon should allow us to state some generalizations even if there is no regular formation for, say, desiderative verbs (Bach, 1968, p. 120). In the "Postscript" of his article (McCawley, 1968a) McCawley (after earlier in the article having accepted the general outlines of the model of Chomsky) comes to the conclusion that the syntactic and semantic components of the earlier theory will have to be replaced by a single system of rules. These rules, then, convert semantic interpretation through various intermediate stages into surface syntactic representation.

In a somewhat more recent article Fillmore once more stressed the desirability of a conception of syntax-semantics (1968b, p. 393). The same may be said of an article by McCawley (1968b, p. 266).

\textsuperscript{9} Cf. Bach and Harms (1966).
These linguists have developed their proposals mainly since 1967, but no one of them has put his ideas extensively into practice or has indicated the implications. Gruber, however, has maintained the position outlined above since 1965 (Gruber, 1965). In 1967 he developed his point of view further (Gruber, 1967). In the main his thesis is that "we must regard the base as generating the very semantic language by which meaning is formalized in language, so that semantics and syntax are merged at this level" (Gruber, 1967, p. 19). This implies that semantics is not merely interpretive. The base component itself should be regarded as generating not purely syntactic, but the syntactic-semantic elements that characterize meaning in language. Evidence for this Gruber adduces from the fact that selectional restrictions - previously regarded as belonging to the lexicon in the base component, i.e. a syntactic subcomponent - may quite as easily be considered semantic as syntactic. In any case, no clear distinction can be made between syntactic and semantic selectional restrictions. Furthermore, co-occurrence relationships such as illustrated by the English pair buy and sell, can only be handled on semantic grounds. Another example Gruber adduces from a pair of words of which one is the causative of the other (1967, p. 18) - incidentally, note that this is highly relevant for the present discussion of the Hebrew Hiphil. To him it seems best to isolate the element of meaning common to both words. When these two words are then used in actual sentences, these underlying categories formally characterizing the common element of meaning should only be differently related to the subject in each case. The language in which meaning is formalized, he suggests, must itself

have a syntactic structure. This approach assumes only the levels of Semantic-syntactic Representation and Surface Structure, the two being related via transformations (Postal, 1970, p. 110).

The foregoing outlines seem to support the statement at the beginning of this paragraph that the dissatisfaction with the classical theory seems widespread. Yet the list of linguists bearing these questions in mind, is by no means exhausted. This is proven by one glance at the reference-list of Postal in a more recent article in which he takes up this whole question as a side-issue (Postal, 1970, pp. 118-120). He makes the following statement: "Almost everyone working within the overall generative-transformational framework now seems convinced in one way or another that Classical Theory is incorrect ... there is roughly equal conviction that at least some of the assumptions of the Classical Theory are wrong" (1970, p. 98). Following this, he admits that there is a great division of opinion as to what is wrong and how the theory can be remedied. He himself argues for the new approach by Bach (1968), Gruber (1967), McCawley (1968a; 1968b; and other articles) and others, which has come to be called "Generative Semantics", and against the classical view (Postal, 1970, pp. 110, 112).


13. It is very difficult for an outsider to determine exactly which theory or variant thereof is currently preferred. The "Generative Semantics" approach, however, has not been accepted as a remedy by all linguists. Thus e.g. Tullai warns the prospective reader of a book on English syntax by Langendoen (a somewhat kindred soul of Fillmore) that "the syntactic theory favoured therein is not current gospel" (E. Tullai, Language Sciences (February 1970), p. 15.)
Nevertheless, despite the current uncertainty, a justified and realistic choice has to be made as to a framework within which the present discussion may be conducted. Preference is here given to Gruber's approach (1967), because his treatment seems to convey the most important nuances of "Generative Semantics" and also because his is the only treatment that has been elaborated to such a wide extent that it can be readily used as framework for a discussion such as the present one.

2.5 THE TREATMENT OF CAUSATIVES IN TRANSFORMATIONAL GENERATIVE GRAMMAR

2.5.1 The Semantic Lexicon

The early version of transformational grammar, e.g. that presented by Chomsky in Syntactic Structures, was not primarily interested in the lexicon, but in generative syntax. This grammar involved a phrase-structure component, a transformational component, and a morphophonemic component (Dinneen, 1967, p. 378). The syntactic component generates terminal strings by means of phrase-structure rules in the base component. The lexicon is conceived of as a list of terminal elements with associated definitions, containing no syntactic information and having no syntactic significance (Gruber, 1967, p. 8). Its significance was in the interpretive semantic component, which matched a lexical entry with and assigned its definition to each element (and only one at a time) in the generated terminal string (Gruber, 1967, p. 8). Each element of the lexicon was attached to, and thus dominated by, not more than one syntactic category.

2.5.2 The Selectional Lexicon

With the advent of Katz and Fodor's sketch of a semantic theory

14. The designations of the different types of lexicon are essentially that of Gruber (1967).
(1964), words became cross-classified with respect to various selectional features, whereas the phrase-structure rules could only handle hierarchically classifying word classes. A representation of this approach is found in Chomsky's model of 1965. The lexicon is in this case conceived of as a set of lexical entries, each of which can be regarded as a set of features of various sorts (Chomsky, 1967, p. 420). The lexicon will also contain redundancy rules specifying the redundant, i.e. predictable, properties of lexical items (Chomsky, 1967, p. 420; Botha, 1968, p. 30). In short, "it contains information that is required by the phonological and semantic components of the grammar and by the transformational part of the syntactic component of the grammar, as well as information that determines the proper placement of lexical entries in sentences ..." (Chomsky, 1965, p. 88). All the "properties of a formative that are essentially idiosyncratic will be specified in the lexicon". 15) Each lexical entry now contains information on the syntactic environment in which the lexical item may be attached to the derived tree. We find features such as ANIMATE, HUMAN, COUNT in the case of nouns, each preceded by "·" or "·" indicating that the lexical item has or does not have the feature so marked.

Chomsky also takes up the problem of derivational processes and regards it as creating much more of a problem for any sort of generative grammar than do inflectional systems (1965, p. 184). He finds it an unfortunate circumstance that derived items in the case of quasi-productive processes must be entered in the lexicon directly, since it is clear from the point of view of both the semantic and the phonological interpretation that it is important to have internal structure represented in these words, to permit some "internal computation" (pp. 186-

187). He has, however, no wish of following such a course, since it would affect the structure of the lexicon while "there is apparently no empirical motivation for allowing complex symbols to appear above the level of lexical categories" (p. 188).\textsuperscript{16} Causative verbs, he suggests, may be handled by a general "causative" transformation, requiring nevertheless that items must be specified lexically in terms of the operations that apply to them (p. 189). Chomsky's model, then, provides no possibility of capturing any of these generalizations.

In a somewhat later paper Chomsky admits the possibility of a compromise solution that adopts the "lexicalist position"\textsuperscript{17} for certain items (such as the gerundive nominals) and the "transformationalist position" for others (such as the derived nominals) (Chomsky, Preprint, pp. 8, 21, 56).

2.5.3 The Transformational Lexicon

Lakoff (1965) focuses his attention more on co-occurrence relationships than on simple selectional restrictions. He finds e.g. a co-occurrence relationship between the verbs \textit{die} and \textit{kill}. This relationship motivates the attempt to establish a common underlying form between the two verbs, but one construction is regarded as basic to the other. This, in turn, implies that there is a transformational relationship between the two. In the case of causative sentences, Lakoff proposes the same deep structure for both the causative and the non-causative sentence, except that the former has a causative pro-verb (1965, p. IV - 16). Once again there seems to be no regular way of deriving such forms from each other, and the only relation seems to be

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{16} Note that in the classical theory no lexical item could be attached to a complex symbol.
\item \textsuperscript{17} For this, see 2.5.4.
\end{itemize}
26.

a lexical one (Bach, 1968, p. 120). The items concerned have to be entered in the lexicon as containing an ad hoc-feature allowing the occurrence of what is to be regarded as irregularly occurring transformations. In the main Lakoff’s approach gives expression to the classical theory, and does not allow any generalizations.

2.5.4 The Translational Lexicon

Gruber proceeds on the assumption, stated earlier in 2.4, that the underlying syntactic and semantic representations of an expression are the same linguistic entity: a base tree prior to lexical attachment (1967, pp. 1, 5). Sentences involved in a co-occurrence relationship can now be regarded as participating in the semantic language. The base, without lexical items, generates the elements of linguistic meaning - it constitutes an underlying semantic system.

Lexical items are inserted in the proper places by the lexical attachment component. However, they are not inserted before the deep structure has been handled by the transformational component as Chomsky insists. We recall that Chomsky (and also Lakoff on the model of Chomsky) maintains that the substitutions and structural changes as to lexical items occur by way of transformations AFTER they have been inserted in the (unsemantic) deep structure (Botha, 1968, pp. 30-33).

Gruber (1967, p. 117) insists that these substitutions and changes occur IN THE COURSE OF the ordinary process of lexical attachment itself. This constitutes the essential difference between a treatment in the transformational component and a treatment in the lexical component.

If the base itself is semantic, Gruber continues, we should have

18. This assumption Gruber (1967) motivates and works out in detail in paragraph 1.2.
"many-one translations" (pp. 1, 19) or mapping (p. 63) by the lexical attachment component from the underlying syntactic-semantic categories into morphemes. In other words, the lexical attachment captures the syntactic and semantic elements of the generated base tree and maps, translates or lexicalizes (p. 5) it into morphemes, i.e. into a language in terms of the traditional elements of syntax (p. 19). From this it follows that we must have polycategorial lexical attachment and not monocategorial lexical attachment as in the system of Chomsky where no lexical item may be dominated by more than one category (Chomsky, 1965, p. 188). The lexicon in this proposed system Gruber prefers to call the TRANSLATIONAL LEXICON.

In the study of the lexical component three aspects have to be taken into consideration: (1) principles determining when it is possible to attach a specific lexical entry to a specific portion of an underlying tree; (2) principles predicting the extent of tendencies (as to derivation) within the content of the lexicon itself; (3) conventions operating during the lexical attachment process and determining the form of the tree manifested after lexical attachment. In the present study the attention will, in the main, be focused on the second aspect. We are particularly interested in the formation of causative verbs in Hebrew, or, as seen from the point of view of the title of this investigation, the various shades of meaning conveyed by the Hiph'il verbal theme.

Gruber conceives of a lexicon as providing "a storage of phonolo-

19. According to his own arrangement, Gruber elaborates this aspect in 2.2. Various comments on the content of the lexicon are also to be found in 2.3 where the third aspect is treated. These further comments are made in 2.3 only because Gruber wishes to play off there a lexical treatment of word extension against a transformational one.
gical entities associated with underlying categorial trees, which they can be used to translate" (1967, p. 104). These associated pairs are called lexical entries. The content of the lexicon is influenced by external requirements covering all the alternative ways in which categorial trees may be manifested in terms of morphemes, and internal tendencies or preferences pertaining to the ease by which a total lexical content (i.e. each of the just-mentioned manifestations) can be stored. In this way a simplicity criterion for lexical structure is invoked.20)

As far as the second is concerned, Gruber argues that a lexicon is the more highly valued if it uses derivational means for getting new words than to produce entirely new ones (p. 113). For convenience we may call any two lexical items partially synonymous if certain parts of the underlying tree of categories which they represent are identical. A verb may e.g. be "extended" to mean the causative of that verb: die, kill (cause to die); grow in The boy grows and The farmer grows corn. The same is true of nouns and adjectives with different "extended" meaning. Even if there is no productive way in these derivational processes, a means of saving or simplicity is invoked when previously-used morphemes are used. A lexicon reveals the tendency to extend its content on the basis of definitions already established (p. 112). This is the case even if the lexical items covering the same field are not related morphologically, e.g. die and kill: the semantic and syntactic characteristics for the former are included in those of the latter. If there is no connection in meaning between two words displaying the same phonological form, an entirely new phono-

20. This simplicity criterion is explicitly formulated by Gruber (1967, pp. 109-114). It comes to this that a lexicon is more highly valued the lower the count of distinct types of subtrees found therein, regardless of the number of tokens or repetitive uses of that type.
string is to be entered into the lexicon (p. 114).21)

It has to be stressed that, as against a transformational treatment where one word (e.g. the noncausative verb) is basic to the other (the causative verb), Gruber considers both forms alternative manifestations of a third form (1967, p. 13), an element of meaning common to both sentences (p. 18). The underlying categories formally characterizing this element of meaning should in both cases be assigned to the verb, although differently related to the subject in each case (p. 18), e.g. the underlying categories characterizing went up in John rose and John raised his hat. An example of these contrasting treatments follows, pertaining specifically to causative verbs:

Transformational treatment: encage

\[
\begin{align*}
(S_1) & \rightarrow \text{VP} \\
V & \rightarrow \text{CAUSE} \\
N_1 & \rightarrow \text{go} \\
\text{PP} & \rightarrow \text{IN} \\
N_2 & \rightarrow \text{cage} \\
\end{align*}
\]

\[\text{en} \rightarrow \text{cage (with deletion of other elements).}\]

21. Cf. 3.4 in this study for cases where this principle is of importance, e.g. Hebrew \( ^c \text{nh} \) I and \( ^c \text{nh} \) II.

22. Indicating a transformation. \( N_1 \) e.g. the bird; \( N_2 \) the cage.
Gruber wishes to separate the so-called affixation "transformations" from other transformations (e.g. the question- or passive-transformation) in order to capture the generalizations, and exactly this amounts to giving affixation a lexical treatment. We should, however, note that lexical entries themselves are really transformation-like rules anyway, indicating how an underlying base tree becomes restructured by the inclusion of another category - hence the similarity between the two diagrams. Incidentally, note that CAUSE (although having syntactic implications) is a SEMANTIC and not a syntactic category (Gruber, 1967, p. 120). This, too, necessitates a treatment in the lexical component.

Two further concepts have to be introduced towards an understanding of Gruber's ideas on the content of the lexicon. However, first note

23. Above the thick line we have all the underlying categories. Structural changes do not occur before lexical insertion any more, but the categories (themselves transformational in character) are lexicalized into morphemes.

24. Denoting word boundaries.
that those types of word extension which can be formulated by extensions, should be treated separately. In this case only some very formal properties of the base tree are necessary to state the generality. There are, however, certain types of word-extension which cannot be handled "by convention", even though they are regular, because they are not quite regular enough and because substantive characteristics of the word-extension must also be specified (Gruber, 1967, p. 108).

Earlier in this paragraph it has been noted that Gruber attaches great value to the recognition of the "principles predicting the range of and tendencies within the content of the lexicon itself" (p. 63). These tendencies are an outcome of the simplicity criterion for lexical structure. According to Gruber the extension of a word (e.g. by affixation) to be used for a more inclusive set of base categories, may be PRODUCTIVE or NONPRODUCTIVE. An affix is fully productive when it is usable with all stems definable by some semantic, syntactic or phonological properties. It is necessary that every word included in the definition be subject to this process (pp. 105, 107). In the case of productive word extension the identity of the stem need not be specified in order to indicate whether the extension may occur or not. If it is necessary to specify the identity of the lexical item that may take the affix, i.e. if it is not definable in the above-mentioned way, the affixal formation is nonproductive.

In the treatment of nonproductive word-extension we can recognise a kind of rule-governed behaviour, but no rule may be postulated without appending to this rule the set of verbs to which it applies (p. 108). It remains a nonproductive process, to the extent that the word which undergoes this pro-

26. No distinction is made between nonproductive and semiproductive word-extensions.
cess be specified.

Building on the simplicity criterion (pp. 112-114), Gruber asserts (p. 120) that a large saving is imposed on the lexicon if it specifies a large number of word-extensions, even nonproductive ones: the higher the type-to-token ratio, the higher the lexicon should be valued. The purpose of the simplicity criterion is to indicate what sorts of tendencies exist in a lexicon, even though it be only some sort of "potential rule". We are only stating tendencies, not necessities or hard and fast rules. Yet we can say that a language uses these word-extension possibilities once they have been established. There will generally be some lexical items that do not fit into this pattern (Gruber, 1967, pp. 112, 120-121).

2.6 ON THE LEXICAL REPRESENTATION OF HEBREW VERBS

The question may arise as to how justice is to be done to the peculiar structure of Hebrew. After all, the verb stem in the Semitic languages is not monomorphemic as in many other languages, but always an intercalation of two discontinuous elements (or morphemes) - a consonantal root and a vowel pattern (Gleason, 1961, p. 73; Erickson, 1965, p. 29). This is not only the case with verbs, but also with other "open system" lexical categories, specifically nouns and adjectives (Aronson, 1969, pp. 138-139). The traditional notation that the sequence of (three) consonants carry the basic lexical meaning while the vowel changes merely signify grammatical modifications of the basic meaning, will not be discussed here, but in the next chapter (3.4) where the semantic aspect comes under discussion.

The problem of the lexical representation of verbs in transformational generative grammar has been treated in a masterly way by Ruth Aronson (1969). She makes the proposal "that any lexical formative
that is marked (+ VERB) be represented in the lexicon, and inserted into the surface-structure output of the syntax, in the form CCC; each C represents an underlying consonantal ... and the combination represents a given root" (1969, p. 130). Associated with each such formative is a set of "root-markers". Therefore we have the following situation if we use "rewrite" rules:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{VERB} & \rightarrow \text{Root} + \text{Root-Markers} \\
\text{Root-Markers} & \rightarrow \text{Pattern} + \text{Tense} + \text{Pron. Ref.} + (\text{Pron. Obj.}) \\
\text{Pattern} & \rightarrow \begin{cases} 
\text{Q} & \text{Qal} \\
\text{N} & \text{Pi'el} \\
\text{P} & \text{Hiph'el} \\
\text{H} & \text{Hitpa'el} \\
\text{HT} & \text{PASSIVE} \\
\end{cases} + \text{PASSIVE}\text{27)
\text{PASSIVE} & \rightarrow \begin{cases} 
\text{Niph'al} & \text{Qal} \\
\text{Pu'al} & \text{Pi'el} \\
\text{Hoph'al} & \text{Hiph'el} \\
\end{cases}
\end{align*}
\]

Because we are at present only concerned with the verbal themes or patterns, it is not necessary to discuss the other root-markers further.\text{28)}

If it is now kept in mind that each lexical formative that is marked (+ VERB) is represented as CCC + a set of root-markers, it can be claimed that the phonetic shape of any given verb-form can be derived entirely by two kinds of rules: (i) Morpheme-structure (or word-structure) rules by which prefixes and suffixes or the form \text{C ((V) C)} are added (i.e. consisting of vowels and consonants) and infixes of the

\text{27. Aronson admits that because the semantic and syntactic relations between Passive and Non-Passive in the Hebrew verb are by no means straightforward, it may be necessary to represent "Passive" as a separate category (root-marker) in the syntax, instead of subsuming it under the heading "pattern" (1969, p. 131). After all, the Niph'al does not always signify the Passive of the Qal or the Pu'al that of the Pi'el. Very often the passive of the Qal is rendered by the Hitpa'el or the Pu'al.}

\text{28. For a similar kind of generative statement of the inflected verb in Akkadian, see also Reiner (1966, p. 135). The verbal themes are indicated in her rule 9.}
form V are inserted; (ii) Phonological rules translating the abstract underlying (syntactic and semantic cf. 2.5.4) forms provided by (i) into pronounceable phonetic sequences. There are two kinds of phonological rules: (a) verb-specific rules, e.g. redundancy rules determining the phonetic shape of the various affixes described in (i) and the phonetic processes attending verbs with one (or more) so-called "weak" or "defective" consonants; (b) rules pointing to general phonetic processes which apply throughout the language, e.g. the reduction of vowels to a šēwā, assimilation (Aronson, 1969, pp. 132-133).

Admitting that her proposals may be open to several objections, Aronson sets forth to consider these counter-arguments relating to both general phonological theory and the structure of Hebrew. None of the counter-arguments should be taken lightly, since they touch on the heart of the matter. We may safely put it more strongly: the way in which Aronson refutes them, may lead to a better understanding between the linguist and the "philologically-minded" Hebraist or Semitist. 29

The first counter-argument concerns recent research in generative phonology, especially the nature of underlying representations. It has been suggested that these underlying representations be subject to a "naturalness condition" (Postal, 1968). This condition should apply to all levels of phonological representation, including the abstract base forms30 of dictionary entries, and implies that all underlying

29. It seems as if the peculiar structure of the Semitic languages is (in any case, at the outset) grasped only with difficulty in the general linguistic terminology, and especially in that of transformational generative grammar.

30. Note that according to Aronson the base forms have both semantic and syntactic features associated with them, e.g. causativeness, reflexiveness (1969, p. 138) - thus substantiating the theory of "Generative Semantics" described in 2.4 and 2.5.2.
representations must be pronounceable (Aronson, 1969, p. 135). A representation of the underlying forms of verbs by CCC, i.e. without vowels, would seem to be a violation of this condition, because these lexical entries would be unpronounceable. Moreover, the counter-argument runs further, they would give no indication of the phonological fact that all verb-forms in Hebrew must contain at least one vowel.

As against this counter-argument Aronson maintains that this seeming violation of the "naturalness condition" is necessary to describe a Semitic language such as Hebrew. In the first place such a treatment allows for a simpler or more economical formulation of the grammar in that it does not require one to represent in the lexicon elements that are fully predictable by general phonological process, i.e. "rule-bound" segments. In an earlier paragraph (2.5.4) it has become clear that a lexicon is more highly valued the more repeatedly it uses the same elements among its lexical entries (cf. Gruber, 1967, pp. 108-109). In the second place, Aronson argues, a representation CCC "provides a truer, more 'natural' way of capturing a salient feature of Semitic morphological and phonological structure" (1969, p. 135). The traditional analysis was and is the natural one for the Hebrew verbal system, because, given the consonantal root and the syntactic morphological information in terms of root-markers (e.g. pattern, tense, pronominal reference) the vowels "constitute fully predictable sets of infixes attached to the consonantal roots and affixes" (p. 139). Therefore it is not necessary to resort to the redundant procedure of indicating vowels in dictionary forms merely in order to ensure that the dictionary entries be pronounceable. Aronson adduces further evidence in favour of her proposal from the following: Hebrew orthography has typically treated vowels precisely as "predictable variants" so that the native speaker applies a set of internalized rules that insert vowels within
consonantal frameworks when he reads, and control other phonetic processes (pp. 140-41); traditional Hebrew lexicography bases dictionary entries, even in the case of the so-called defective or weak roots, on the consonantal roots of verbs (p. 141); native Hebrew speakers themselves view their language as in some very basic sense constructed out of consonantal roots on which vowels are then superimposed (p. 141); other pieces of empirical evidence such as new coinages (pp. 142-43).

The second counter-argument against a CCC representation of verb-forms is that it would be inconsistent and result in an undesirable "asymmetry" in the lexicon (Aronson, 1969, p. 138; Reiner, 1969, p. 4). After all, a consonantal representation is not so obviously suited to lexical categories apart from the verb, since "closed system" items such as pronouns, prepositions and conjunctions are no less idiosyncratic than in non-Semitic languages. With regard to nouns and adjectives the situation is apparently far less rule-bound than in the case of verbs. A proposal such as that of Aronson might therefore require a different type of dictionary representation for verbs on the one hand (CCC + Root-Markers) and other lexical formatives on the other (vowels indicated in the base) (Aronson, 1969, pp. 135-136).

Aronson refutes this counter-argument by maintaining that even if nouns and adjectives cannot be treated in the way that seems to be the natural one for verbs, the specific treatment of verbs is not thereby disqualified. It would rather mean that a certain legitimate, substantive claim were being made about the nature of the Hebrew verbal...

31. The procedure followed in the preparation of the Chicago Assyrian Dictionary is somewhat different in that all the so-called "derived verbal stems" are treated under the infinitive of the "base stem" if one exists. If the verb does not occur in the "base stem", it is listed in the attested infinitive, regardless of the verbal theme in which it stands (Reiner, 1969, p. 4).
system by which it is set apart from other lexical categories of Hebrew (1969, p. 136). An inherent feature of the Hebrew verbal system may not be sacrificed to a claim of symmetry in the lexicon, even if the verbal system is to be treated in a quite distinguishing way. However, Aronson suggests that nouns and adjectives can also be represented in the form of consonantal bases plus associated root-markers (1969, p. 136). The different kinds of lexical formatives should then be handled in the following way: "closed system" items (prepositions, pronouns, etc.) are to be listed in the dictionary with underlying vowel representations, as instances of the idiosyncratic patterning of consonant + vowel representations; all "open-system" lexical categories are to be represented as a combination of CCC roots and associated root-markers (noun-pattern e.g. /mišqāl/, gender, number). In other words, Aronson claims, the traditional categories of "binyan" for verbs and "mišqāl" for nouns "reflect similar processes of "root-modification", with similar phonological regularity and hence predicability but semantic and lexical anomaly characterizing both systems" (1969, p. 139). In this way a noun-pattern CACCAC is used to denote "occupations", e.g. gannāb ("thief") (1969, p. 140). We therefore have the following situation:

\[
\text{NOUN} \rightarrow \text{Root} + \text{Root-Markers} \\
\text{Root-Markers} \rightarrow \text{Pattern (}= \text{mišqāl}) + \text{Gender} + \text{Number}.
\]

In short, Aronson suggests that nouns and adjectives be represented in the lexicon in basically the same way as verbs. This proposal is of course widely divergent from the largest part of the traditional handling of the lexical categories, according to which verbs constitute the only "open-system" category. This is not to say that Aronson's proposal is incorrect; it rather seems that her proposal should receive the attention of lexicographers in the Hebrew (and Semitic) field.
of study.\textsuperscript{32} The only difficulty the present author foresees in connection with such a representation in the lexicon is that the number of possible noun-patterns is considerably higher than in the case of verb-patterns. In any case, this is only a practical consideration and detracts nothing from the value of a consonantal representation for nouns, as is suggested.

A third counter-argument is raised with respect to the Hebrew verbal system itself, but is even less convincing than the two previous arguments. In any case, the argument runs that a purely consonantal representation of the underlying forms of verbs "does not take account of the largely idiosyncratic relation between the lexical and semantic features associated with each "root" and the different "patterns" of the Hebrew verb-system" (Aronson, 1969, p. 137). Actually the problems concerning the semantic features associated with the verb-patterns or verbal themes come to discussion and more detailed examination in the next chapter (3.4). Suffice it to say in the present context that the argument concerning the idiosyncrasies of the so-called "derived stems" is substantially correct. The claim that this state of affairs be decisive to the present discussion on the lexical representation of verbs, is, however, not to be conceded to. True, the semantic and syntactic

\textsuperscript{32} It is interesting to note that Reiner treats the Akkadian language in much the same way as is suggested by Aronson, precisely for the same reason: that it may lead to simplified descriptions on the morphological level. A distinction is made between lexical items that can be regarded as consisting of two discontinuous morphemes, viz. "root" and "scheme" or "pattern" (e.g. verbs and noun forms, being a class comprising substantives, adjectives and participles) on the one hand, and items that cannot be broken down into roots and patterns (e.g. loanwords, some proper names, prepositions, conjunctions, interjections and some numerals) on the other (Reiner, 1966, pp. 54, 72). In the Chicago Assyrian Dictionary, however, each noun is listed in its proper place in the alphabet, e.g. a noun having /m/ as first consonant under m (Reiner, 1969, p. 4).
features associated with the root-markers have to be handled at some point in the grammar, but Aronson is concerned with regularity and hence predicability on the phonological level and not with semantic aspects. According to her own view of lexical representation, complete justice is done to the semantic and lexical anomalies and idiosyncrasies (cf. Aronson, 1969, pp. 136-39). Actually the counter-argument is pointless, or rather, spurious, because the position advocated in it (viz. indicating vowels in the dictionary representation of verb-morphemes) does not necessarily solve the problem (Aronson, 1969, p. 138).

Aronson successfully refutes the counter-arguments that argue against her proposal and succeeds in showing how these considerations might be incorporated in a generative phonology of Hebrew according to which vowels are omitted in the dictionary representation of verbs at least, but probably also other categories of lexical formatives. It has to be stressed that according to her proposal we have phonological regularity and hence predictability, but semantic and lexical anomaly characterizing the verbal (and nominal) system (1969, p. 139).

To summarize the conclusions at which Aronson has quite justly arrived: any lexical formative that is marked (+ VERB) should be represented in the lexicon in the form CCC, with which a specific set of root-markers is associated (indicating the patterns or verbal themes).
CHAPTER 3

ETHNOLINGUISTIC AND "PHILOLOGICAL" CONSIDERATIONS RELEVANT TO THE PRESENT DISCUSSION

3.1 INTRODUCTION

In this chapter two main issues will be involved, the second of which can be subdivided into two parts. All these issues are of exceptional importance to Old (and to a lesser extent New) Testament studies, and an investigation of a verbal category, such as is at stake in this study, necessitates a clear answer to these problems from the side of linguistics and its related fields of study.¹ All too frequently (as will be seen) presumptuous or pretentious claims have been made with only some sidelong reference to the utterances of some or other linguist or "quasi-linguist" whose system cannot be accepted uncritically.

The first issue concerns the historically old and since then constantly reformulated proposition that language and thought are interdependent. The second concerns firstly the necessity for regarding a language as a synchronic whole to which the history of a structural element makes no meaningful contribution and, secondly, a critical discussion of problems with which the student of biblical Hebrew (this being an extinct or "written" language²) has to cope. Since many formerly proposed discussions seem to run ashore on the fascination of historical explanation, a critical discussion of certain professed solutions will also be given here.

1. Cf. Barr (1961, p. 73) where he mentions the importance of the verbal system to Boman as the key to Israelite thought.
2. Preference is given to the term "written language" rather than "dead language". For this, cf. also Reiner (1966, p. 20).
3.2 LANGUAGE AND THOUGHT

This problem has remained a much-discussed issue in the study of the Old Testament and in modern theology it has come to have enormous importance. This history of this discussion has recently been illuminated in a detailed examination by Barr (1961; 1962a), in which he diagnoses the tendency to use linguistic arguments in order to draw a sharp contrast between Greek and Hebrew mentality. Barr's presentation and criticism of this issue is not the only one, but his is certainly the most comprehensive one. Therefore the present discussion will mainly follow Barr's treatment, with only reference to the works of other scholars (e.g. Siertsema (1968) and Gleason (1963)). The study of Siertsema is of immense importance to the discussion to follow, because she (from a general linguistic point of view) takes up position against a-linguistic views of language maintained within the field of theology and related disciplines and appraises Barr's study (1961) on important points.

Barr associates the lines of theological thought which he wishes to subject to survey, very roughly with the movement for so-called "biblical theology" (1961, p. 4 ss.). This movement he characterizes as being very strongly conscious of the contrast between Greek and Hebrew thought, and appreciating the Israelite mind as essential to the understanding of the New Testament. The same movement also places great emphasis on the Bible "as a unity". By this is meant "that there is some general underlying point of view which ... is usually connected with the

3. Of course, the lines of thought under discussion are also found with scholars who have no connection whatsoever with this movement. Fact is that in recent years this subject has very often been raised in connection with studies in the field of biblical theology. Cf. Sode (1964), Jumpyel (1957), Landsberger (1926) to mention but a few. In the course of this chapter various scholars with opinions of the same kind will be mentioned.
given and essential Hebraic background" (p, 5). It should be noted here that Barr is not primarily concerned with the validity of the contrast to be outlined below. He is, to be more precise, interested in surveying and criticizing the way in which the thought contrast has affected the examination of linguistic evidence and the way in which the linguistic evidence has been assessed and used to support or illustrate the contrast (pp. 4, 13, 14).

Barr regards Boman (1960) and Pedersen (1926) as two typical exponents of the approach for biblical theology. The following contrasts are of major importance to this approach, as far as the "differences" between Hebrew and Greek thinking are concerned: that between static and dynamic, between abstract and concrete and between the different conceptions of man. These contrasts came to be supported by evidence from linguistic phenomena and a correlation of the thought contrast with linguistic phenomena received much attention. As to the relation between mental pattern and linguistic structure, we find the following

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4. Barr stresses this point time and again when he examines the linguistic "evidence" for what otherwise may be a good theological case. Cf. Barr (1961), pp. 117, 127, 135, 146, 147, 157, 164, 180, 185, 190, 194, 270, 280; (1962a), p. 18. There is therefore no reason why Ridderbos (1964, p. 219) should question Barr's integrity in this respect. Thus Barr declares that it is quite possible to maintain the contrast of ways of thought without basing the case on differences between the Greek and Hebrew languages themselves (1961, p. 14). In this respect we have the excellent example of the work of Albright who succeeded in giving a thorough characterization of Semitic and especially North-West Semitic culture. His typification, however, was done from the sources and not from philosophical presuppositions or by way of linguistic speculation (Cf. Fenaham, 1971, p. 2). For a typical example of Albright's work in this connection, cf. Albright (1964, pp. 103-129; 1966) where various typifications are made.

5. Pedersen may hardly be said to have been a theologian, but his sociological work has had a significant influence on theology and theologians, especially on Boman. In the latest edition of his book (1968, p. 199) Boman himself admits the influence of Pedersen.
statement by Pedersen: "Hebrew, like other Semitic languages, has preserved its primitive character and gives an immediate expression of the processes of thought" (1926, p. 112). On this Barr comments as follows: "He appears to mean that the Semitic languages are so perfect a reflection of Semitic thought that from their grammatical structure one can read off the contours of Semitic thought" (1961, p. 41) - a statement in which the essentials of the whole movement are captured. Boman proceeds on the same lines of thought. He seems to favour a one to one correspondence between both lexical items and grammatical structures on the one hand, and thought structures on the other hand. This idea permeates the whole study of Boman. In his introduction he mentions a number of linguists who favour this point of view and he states that "modern linguistic philosophy, the founder of which is taken to be W. Humboldt ... is perfectly clear about the fact that languages are the expressions of thinking peculiar to peoples, even of the most primitive peoples ..." (Boman, 1960, p. 24). Thus he attempts to describe the Israelites' conception of time by an examination of their tense system (pp. 141, ff.). In like manner it is maintained that the idea of the "corporate personality" has as grammatical consequence the repeated transitions from singular to plural and vice versa (Robinson, 1936, p. 58; Boman, 1960, p. 148; Ridderbos, 1964, pp. 216-217).

Extreme positions in relating language to thought are also to be found, e.g. in an article by McAllaster (1960) in which he argues that

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6. For an example of Pedersen's argumentation: (1926, pp. 167-68).

7. Cf. also the following statement by Zimmerli: "... deutlich, dass das Weltbild der hebräischen Verbe den Menschen nicht als den König seiner Gegenwart gleichermassen von seiner Vergangenheit wie seiner Zukunft absetzt" (1959, p. 10).
the tendency in the Hebrew language to preserve a vowel which once existed (in this case the "vocal shewa") is "parallel to" the shadowy state of the soul after death or to the maintenance of a dead man's name through the levirate marriage.\(^8\)

Barr, in the whole of his book, protests vehemently against this correlation of linguistic structure and thought structure.\(^9\) His arguments are strong and linguistically well-founded. A large part of Barr's book is devoted to a criticism of the faulty etymological method; as for the rest, he diagnoses the causes of the attempts towards correlation as the following: the failure to examine the languages as wholes and the failure to relate what is said to a general theory of linguistics (1961, p. 21). The former reason concerns the question of the general evaluation of the validity of the attempts; the latter concerns the general framework or background of the relevant linguistic theory. Boman's approach (and also that of his kindred spirit) may be evaluated by discussing firstly the principles underlying his efforts - i.e. the second reason will be treated first.

Although he quotes other philosophers of language as well, it seems that Boman wishes to accept some ideas of Von Humboldt as basic for his own method - especially the idea propounded by Von Humboldt that "languages are the expressions of thinking peculiar to peoples" (Boman, 1960, p. 24). When Barr comments on Boman's rather uncritical acceptance of Von Humboldt's view, Boman, in the latest edition of his work (1968, pp. 200-203), tries to justify his acceptance by indicating the extent to which this idea has been adapted and developed by various lin-

\(^8\) This formulation is that of Barr (1962, p. 20). Cf. Barr (1961, p. 45; 1962, p. 20) for inferences of the same kind.

guists. Nowhere does he mention a single piece of criticism that has been levelled against von Humboldt's conception of language, and he goes to the extreme of asserting that Barr's mistake is that he maintains "Privatmeinungen über die Linguistik ... die verantwortliche Linguisten nicht teilen" (1968, p. 201). The latter category seems to include only linguists who have built on the foundation propounded by W. von Humboldt, e.g. Weisgerber and Cassirer (in his later writings), or who maintain the same ideas, e.g. Benjamin Lee Whorf.

Since the influence of Whorf in linguistics, and especially ethnolinguistics, is not to be underrated, a somewhat more lengthy discussion of Whorf's ideas, influence and of the criticism brought in against him, seems justified.

The relations between language, race and culture have been the concern of many scholars, and also of Franz Boas, Edward Sapir and his pupil B.L. Whorf. The ideas of the former two scholars have been developed most fully and persuasively by Whorf. In the so-called Sapir-Whorf hypothesis it is suggested that languages, being unique structures, either help or hinder their speakers in making certain observations or in perceiving certain relations (Dinneen, 1967, p. 218). According to this principle of linguistic relativity the thought aspects of different cultures are conditioned by their particular languages.

10. Exactly how far the principles of Barr differ from those of Boman, becomes clear from a statement of Boman in a review of Barr (1961): "Es ist schwer, ein Buch gerecht zu würdigen, wenn man die Prinzipien, worauf es aufgebaut ist, nicht anerkennen kann" (Boman, 1962, p. 262).

11. Dieboldt (1965, p. 260) succeeds in showing that Weisgerber's method is in complete accordance with the movement termed "Neo-Humboldtian ethnolinguistics". Cf. Basilius (1952, pp. 89-99) for a discussion of the views of Cassirer and Weisgerber.

language and thought are interdependent, and the structural particulars of one are necessarily replicated in the other. Whorf comments as follows on his own position and this seems to convey the essence of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis: "... the study of language ... shows that the forms of a person's thoughts are controlled by inexorable laws of pattern of which he is unconscious. These patterns are the unperceived intricate systematizations of his own language - shown readily enough by a candid comparison and contrast with other languages, especially those of a different linguistic family. His thinking itself is in a language - in English, in Sanskrit, in Chinese. And every language is a vast pattern-system, different from others, in which are culturally ordained the forms and categories by which the personality not only communicates, but also analyzes nature, notices or neglects types of relationships and phenomena, channels his reasoning, and builds the house of his consciousness" (Carroll, 1956, p. 252).

Merely to accept the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis without more ado would imply a neglect of various studies undertaken since the time of the formulation of this hypothesis. The validity of the hypothesis has been questioned by various scholars. To quote a few: in 1961 Wallace expressed the idea that hypotheses asserting a radical dependence of the very form of rationality upon the local structure of language would be incapable of proof and incapable of being described. A survey of linguistic relativity conducted in 1962 illustrates the vast amount of research work done in this respect (Dieboldt, 1965, pp. 258-67). Although the majority of writings manifest the idea that the mental functions of a group are in some way dependent upon the structure and content of their language, Dieboldt stresses that this relationship between language and thought "has never been conclusively demonstrated to exist"
The Whorfian theory can be approached from two angles: from the field of ethnolinguistics and from that of psycholinguistics. The former approach seems to be more interested in the structural differences between languages and here we sense a tendency to place all accent on the differences (Dieboldt, 1965, p. 260). In the meantime, however, the striking universals in language structure would seem to reverse the directionality of linguistic relativity. Of course, this system of similarities pertains in the first place to the "deep structure" of languages. This relationship between language and mental processes is implied by the assumption of a genetically determined linguistic organization - as was seen to be fully justified in 2.2.

Two levels of correlation are assumed by Whorf and his adherents in order to support their claims: that of lexical items and that of structural-typological differences in grammar (Dieboldt, 1965, p. 262). Arguments will now be raised to show that, in addition to the implications of the already mentioned language universals, no attempt towards correlation on either level is successful. In the course of this, the other main cause according to Barr's diagnosis - and also of the diagnosis by Gleason (1963) - will be introduced and expounded.

Dieboldt mentions in his survey that the results of experiments as to the validity of the Whorfian hypothesis on lexical level are widely divergent (1965, p. 263). In these experiments the question of linguistic codifiability is at issue and the question is, then, to what extent these differences in the linguistic categorization of experience between different languages may be related to or are responsible for corresponding differences in thought. Some light is thrown on this problem by the recognition that language is arbitrary, i.e. there is no
direct or necessary connection (except for comparatively few words formed by way of onomatopoeia) between the nature of things or ideas and the linguistic units by which these things or ideas are expressed. 13) There is little doubt that lexical differences have some effect on thought. It is, after all, easier to operate with concepts coded by single words than to speak by way of circumscription, e.g. "brownish black" (Langacker, 1968, p. 40). However, such circumscripive phrases can be formed easily. Our thinking is thus conditioned by the linguistic categorization of experience only in that it is easier to operate with concepts coded by single, already existing words - lexical items have only a minimal effect on thought, but "there is absolutely no evidence to suggest that this influence is in any significant way a tyrannical or even a powerful one" (Langacker, 1968, p. 40). In a review article by Longacre, he equally protests against this professed obtaining of different world pictures as a result of divergence in the analysis of the world (Longacre, 1956, p. 302). He maintains that, ultimately, the divergencies in the 'vocabulary grids' are irrelevant and that we err in abstracting words from their contexts and hypostatizing these 'vocabulary grids'. 14) Of course, if the term 'relativity' is only used to give expression to the view that particular languages reflect in their vocabulary the culturally-important distinctions of the societies in which they operate, then there is no objection. But when the relation is represented as a kind of linguistic determinism - from

13. For further motivation, cf. Dinneen (1967, pp. 8, 106), Nida (1964, p. 31), Barr (1961, p. 204). This idea has also been stressed by De Saussure - cf. Dinneen (1967), pp. 203, 209. The study of etymology has its beginning in the Stoic position that there is, in the remote history of the language, a natural or necessary connection between the linguistic sign and the things for which the sign stands (Dinneen, 1967, pp. 93-94).

14. This "hypostatization of linguistic phenomena" is treated in an illuminating way by Barr (1962b).
either side - then we are up against an untenable hypothesis (Lyons, 1968, p. 433).15

Various attempts have been made to correlate the grammatical structures of a language with thought processes and Barr (1961) mentions a number of scholars who attempted this correlation between Hebrew language and thought. The validity of these attempts is to be seriously doubted. What has been said on the arbitrary nature of the linguistic sign on lexical level, may be repeated and stressed on the structural level - there is no externally imposed system that controls the combinations of forms and meanings (Dinneen, 1967, p. 209).16) In this connection Langacker maintains that no evidence has ever been presented in support of the claim that differences in grammatical structure entail significant differences in the thought processes of the speakers: "If, in your native language, you were brought up to say the equivalent of The flower reds, The tree talls, and The river deeps, it would not follow that you lived in an especially exciting mental world where colors were actions on the part of objects, where trees continually participated in the activity of tallness, where rivers stretched themselves vertically while flowing horizontally ... You would live in the same world you live in now" (Langacker, 1968, p. 42; cf. also Barr, 1961, pp. 54-56). Langacker quotes nobody for making such an inference, but it is interesting to compare with this a statement by Boman: "... the stative

15. It is worth noting the way in which Lyons puts this matter: "It is generally agreed that linguistic determinism, interpreted in this strong sense (= the sense of Von Humboldt and Sapir and Whorf), is an untenable hypothesis"(Lyons, 1968, p. 433). In the same sense also Soggin (1962, p. 211).

16. When speaking of arbitrariness in this connection, it is not excluded that there is a relative motivation, e.g. when inflected forms are constructed similarly in order to signal the same meaning relations. This relative motivation also holds good on the lexical level, i.e. in the processes of derivation (cf. 2.5.4.).
verbs are not static; they are called stative because they designate a condition (status) which is not fixed and dead but is in flux - it is as much a becoming as a being ... the Hebrews have a great many of them. We have to presuppose, therefore, that the verbal idea in Hebrew static verbs is always living and palpable even when we are not able because of poverty of expression either to repeat it or to feel it with them. It seems particularly difficult to us to express verbally the spatial quantity; in certain connections, however, we too can do it ... In place of 'The peak of the mountain is vertiginously high', we can say, 'The mountain raises its peak to a vertiginous height' ... The exceedingly great number of stative verbs in Hebrew (as well as in other Semitic languages) constitutes fresh evidence for the fact that the Hebrew (and Semitic) mind is directed to the dynamic and the active" (Boman, 1960, pp. 33-34. My emphasizing).

The question may be put as to whether more evidence on methodological grounds can be advanced against a correlation of linguistic structure and thought pattern, i.e.: how can the correlation hypothesis be tested? A very significant argument in this connection is introduced by Barr, and on this argument, too, the attempts of, for instance, Pedersen and Boman run ashore: we have to ask not only "Are there linguistic phenomena which can be correlated with such patterns?" but also "Are there phenomena which cannot at all be so correlated?" (Barr, 1961, p. 23). If, in principle, it is possible to correlate one structural feature with a certain thought pattern, it should also be possible to correlate all the structural features of a language with thought patterns; otherwise a valid reason should be advanced as to why only certain phenomena are correlated. It should furthermore be possible to implicate all languages in such a process. Boman's purpose is primarily to present the peculiarity of Hebrew thinking in comparison with the
Greek, 17) but if there is the possibility of such a comparison - on good linguistic grounds, that is - between these two languages, it should also exist for any two other languages. Conversely, if it can be shown that a correlation in several languages is impossible and far-fetched, it seems very likely that in the case of Hebrew vs. Greek such a correlation is equally far-fetched. These remarks on the testability of correlation-hypotheses are elaborated in an examplary way by Barr (1961, pp. 24-25, 39, 87-88). Although the example seems somewhat extreme, Barr remarks (p. 39) that no one would suppose that the Turks, because they do not distinguish gender in their language, are deficient in the concept of sexual difference. Numerous similar arguments are advanced by Barr (pp. 39-42) in order to show the difficulties with which a consistent way of argumentation in favour of a language-thought correlation is likely to meet.

In this connection we should beware of misunderstanding Barr. He is quite conscious of the fact that the relations between language and thought (or culture) are too intricate to be settled by advancing a few random examples by which the correlation-hypothesis is represented in a ridiculous way. His position is rather that, even if there is a direct relation between language and thought - which, as seen in the foregoing discussion, still has to be proved - this relation is "logically haphazard, so that detailed word-meanings cannot be plotted from a knowledge of thoughts entertained ..., nor can a system of ideas or concepts

17. Boman (1960, p. 25). In the latest edition (1968, p. 197) Boman takes exception to Barr's widening of the scope of comparison from Hebrew and Greek to other languages. Siertsema uses exactly the same criterium as the one suggested by Barr in her discussion of the views of Ridderbos: before the hypothesis can be regarded as valid, there should be correlation in all languages and on all points (Siertsema, 1968, p. 280).
be read off from a structure of lexical elements" (Barr, 1969, p. 205; cf. also Barr, 1961, p. 295; 1968c, p. 382). Exactly this point, viz. that the material cannot be treated in a consistent way, illustrates that any attempt toward a correlation of language and thought cannot be successful on methodological grounds. After all, if not all structures can be implicated in the process, then no single claim as to the existence of a particular mental (or cultural) structure as correlate of a certain linguistic structure can carry any cogency.

In this respect Barr has been misunderstood by many of his critics. Because the position advocated by some of these critics implies a return to some of the viewpoints discussed earlier in this paragraph, it would seem to be necessary to give attention to some of these opinions, especially as far as theoretical presuppositions are concerned. According to Ridderbos (1964) Barr's book (1961) does not succeed in giving a satisfactory answer to the far-reaching and topical questions which have been raised by it (1964, p. 24). Ridderbos's criticism is unfounded in some respects, but here we shall pay special attention to his criticism of Barr's reaction to the correlation of language and thought. Firstly, Ridderbos criticizes the impression created by Barr, viz. that the authors against whom he (Barr) brings in his arguments, base their ideas on a completely outdated view of language which has long since been rejected by experts (Ridderbos, 1964, p. 212, cf. also p. 214). However, this does not seem to be Barr's purpose and the very paragraph to which Ridderbos refers, should be interpreted slightly differently. What Barr is actually maintaining is that the way in which Hebrew linguistic phenomena are correlated with patterns of the Hebrew mind, is equivalent to the idea that the linguistic structure reflects the thought-structure, or is in accordance with it. Barr further states:

"In this view, however, there are very great difficulties, and though
it may be possible to maintain it in some greatly modified sense, the way in which it is at present used in theology may well be regarded as wholly outmoded and a survival from the time before the scientific study of language began" (1961, p. 33, my emphasis). It therefore rather seems as if Barr leaves room for other opinions, but that he criticizes the fact that they are incorrectly used, namely - as has been said before - that they cannot be applied consistently.

In order to demonstrate that one need not be an adherent of an outdated view of language to accept the idea that a correlation exists between linguistic structures, Ridderbos quotes a number of Ullmann's (1962) ideas. He selects Ullmann because, according to him, Ullmann is an acknowledged expert, does not hold extremist views, and can hardly be grouped with one or other specific school (Ridderbos, 1964, p. 214-215). In the introduction of this study it has already been made clear that it is essential that all linguistic pronouncements be made within the framework of a well-founded theory. Moreover, quoting Ullmann does not prove anything. Ridderbos then goes on to assert that the fact that the correlation does exist can only be shown by giving actual examples (1964, pp. 215-216). Then the "example", which has been mentioned before, is presented; according to this example, the repeated transitions from singular to plural and vice versa in Hebrew sentences are seen to be a reflection of the idea of the "corporate personality" (cf. also Robinson, 1936, p. 58). Ridderbos then attempts to present the relation between language structure and thought structure in a quite ingenious way, but in the end it nevertheless amounts to the impermissible leaps which are criticized by Barr. Ridderbos thinks that it would be incorrect to deduce the realization of the unity between individual and community on the grounds of the transitions from plural to singular. He is of the opinion that, in con-
nection with his example, there is no question of an automatic conclu-
sion: there was a strong realization of the unity of individual and
community among Israel, and there are transitions from plural to singu-
lar in the language. For this reason a connection may be made between
these two, and the sudden transitions may be regarded as signs of the
realizations of the close connection between individual and community
(1964, p. 217). Ridderbos’s phraseology is significant: he speaks of
the grammatical consequences of the corporate personality (1964, p. 216).
In spite of the fine shades of difference in the argument, we neverthe-
less deal with the typical correlation argument. Siertsema’s purely
linguistic criticism is exceptionally helpful in clarifying this argu-
ment: it would only have value and serve as proof if these transitions
occurred solely in language communities where the mentality of the "cor-
porate personality" is found (and in Dutch these transitions also occur,
although she claims that there are no greater individuals than the
Dutch) (Siertsema, 1968, p. 280). In this case we have to deal at
most, with an accidental parallel, but not with a reflection.

Ridderbos attempts to support his argument with "examples", and he
concludes that there certainly is a correlation between the structure
of the Hebrew language (1964, p. 228). The features of Hebrew in
which Israel’s mentality is expressed, from an organic whole, in his
opinion (1964, p. 224), in contrast with the features of Israel’s reli-
gion. Ridderbos brings no proof of all his theories and it seems as
if he totally misses the basic point of Barr’s argument, viz. that, if
there is no correlation in but a single structure – which is clearly
the case – there can be no justification for or value in arguments of
this kind.18)

18. Incidentally, note that Ridderbos refers to Albright in support
of the term "protological" (Ridderbos, 1964, p. 218 n. 12). The
Hill (1967) accuses Barr of not dealing adequately with the Humboldtian theory, and of never actually coming down to a discussion of the validity of the theory itself (p. 9). Even if there are difficulties in connection with this view, Hill thinks that it should be kept in view, since Humboldt's view is the basis of the studies of "such distinguished linguists" as J. Trier and L. Weisgerber, while in America the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis is based on these ideas. Further, Hill proceeds from a statement by Ullmann in which he makes much of the hypothesis that language gives expression to our thoughts and that it even qualifies and defines thought (Hill, 1967, pp. 9-10). Even though emphasis is sometimes biased and the relations concerned are too inflexibly formulated, Hill is of the opinion that the framework of the approach is correct in so far as it concerns the lexicon, but that linguists do not agree to the same extent where grammar and syntax are concerned (1967, p. 10).

Hill's criticism is that Barr takes no account of the psychological and sociological aspects of language (1967, p. 10), but, as Barr quite rightly maintains in a review (1968c, p. 378), it is precisely to these aspects that he pays attention (cf. Barr, 1961, pp. 113, 159). What Barr objects to is the incorrect use of sociological material,
which is used by Pedersen, for instance (cf. Fensham, 1971). A second point on which Hill criticizes Barr, is that he is in favour of a mechanistic linguistic approach and against idealism (1967, p. 11). However, Hill does not thereby prove that Humboldt's theory is necessarily right - rather, it appears that the linguist should not be too hasty in identifying himself with similar philosophical views (Lyons, 1968, p. 408; Barr, 1969, p. 202). Thus, Hill does not come to the important point in connection with the testing of any correlation hypothesis, namely that it only becomes a valid hypothesis when it can be consistently applied (Barr, 1961, p. 23; Siertsema, 1968, p. 280). For this reason, Hill's references to Ullmann (1962) are of no consequence.

One important point in linguistic research of the type conducted in this study, is illustrated by the foregoing remarks: the language should be investigated as a whole, and what is said, should be related to a general linguistic theory. Boman wishes to see the elements of Hebrew in their relation to one another (as is necessary), but he lacks a cosmopolitan linguistic outlook and wide language experience - according to the diagnosis of Gleason (1963, p. 52). He fails to appraise language structures and their differences within an adequate conceptual framework, with linguistics as a whole (Gleason, 1963, p. 52; Barr, 1961, pp. 21, 25). It is also worth noting that in studies which are led by the hermeneutic principle of the advocates of the correlation-hypothesis, due justice is not done to literary and historical considerations (Van Vreumingen and Van der Woude, 1969, p. 264).

When we now learn from Boman that we can understand the fact that the Niph'al appears as the passive of the Pi'el or of the Hiph'il, both of which have causative meaning, only from the viewpoint of the dynamic and active character of the Hebrew verb (1960, p. 34), we keep in mind the rather ill-founded and far-fetched bases of the argument. In the
course of this investigation as to the nature of the Hiph'īl, considerations such as Boman's, whereby a professed "psychological aspect" or "religious factor" is seen as corresponding to a linguistic structure, will not be taken into consideration.

3.3 THE VALUE OF HISTORICAL ARGUMENTS

In various studies of the past, particular attention has been devoted to the origin of the Hebrew Hiph'īl verbal theme. On the one hand, an attempt is made to determine the original form of the discerning linguistic elements of a verbal theme - either within Hebrew, or in a cognate language, or in "Proto-Semitic" - as though this provides the infallible key to the sense of this verbal theme in the Biblical period; on the other hand, the "close relationship" of the Semitic languages is emphasized, as though the function of a grammatical construction in one language necessarily find its correlative or near-correlative in a cognate language (by which a transfer of identity is accomplished very easily). Examples of such treatments will not be presented and critically examined as to their testability and their contribution to our understanding of the Hiph'īl.

In the grammar of Gesenius and Kautzsch, which represents an important mainstream in the history of the study of Hebrew, the characteristic /h/ element of the preformative of the Hiph'īl is explained as perhaps having its origin in the šaph'ēl formation or verbal theme which is found in other Semitic languages (Gesenius and Kautzsch, 1966, pp. 144, 153). The presence of /h/ is then attributed to phonetic change.

19. In the different Semitic languages causatives are formed by /a/, /#/ or /h/. Cf. Garbini (1962, p. 172) and Speiser (1936, pp. 22-33) for lists showing the causative preformatives in the different languages. Cf. also Garbini (1960), pp. 129-135.
In another important grammar, that of Bauer and Leander, the element /h/ (as well as the causative elements of the other languages) is described as being the remainder of an original verb with the meaning "machen" (Bauer and Leander, 1918, p. 283). This historical connection is, in accordance with the set-up of the whole grammar, basic to an understanding of the Hiph'il.

Thierry questions the validity of Bauer and Leander's argument with the assertion that a verb such as they suggest, does not exist (1950, p. 143). He himself prefers to regard the element /h/ as originally an independent interjection which gradually acquired a demonstrative sense. It is this same demonstrative or "deictic" particle that later served as the definite article in Hebrew (ha). On the basis of this element there at first developed imperative forms and thence the prefix- and suffix-conjugations of the Hiph'il.

Even though the history of the characteristic element of the Hiph'il is not always explicitly mentioned as the key to the understanding of the function of this verbal theme, it nevertheless always seems as if the original meaning of the element concerned is of exceptional importance.

Somewhat different from the foregoing approaches, is that of Speiser (1936). In the first place he takes up the argument according to which it is attempted to lead the different causative preformatives

20. Bauer and Leander do not explicitly maintain that the causative prefixes go back to a verb "machen", but this seems to be their general idea. Their German equivalent for this supposed original form is actually a verb. This is also the interpretation of Thierry (1950, p. 143). Daube (1961, p. 264) gives Bauer and Leander the benefit of the doubt and interprets them as though they do not actually want us to suppose a verb, but rather a prefix with causative force. That they actually had in mind a verb, seems to me however perfectly in line with their general historical attitude.
in the Semitic languages back to one original prefix (pp. 24-26). A
development of /h/ to /'/ he quite correctly finds fully justified, but for a development of /h/ from an original sibilant (/ð/ or /s/)
there is no grounds, despite many ingenious efforts. This makes him
resort to a particular syntactic phenomenon in the Semitic languages:
that the initial consonant of the personal pronouns for the third per-
son in a specific language is almost constantly the same as the conso-
nant of the causative preformatives of that language. This corre-
lation is found over so wide a field that to Speiser every possibility
of mere coincidence seems to be excluded, and he then looks for a deeper
connection - on the semantic rather than the syntactic level. This
connection, Speiser suggests (p. 28), has been brought about in that
the pronouns of the third person entered into the make-up of the causa-
tive formations. To illustrate this, Speiser describes the meaning
of a causative word as follows: A caused B to do something; the lat-
ter is the secondary agent - it stands for "someone, anyone else" -
and this agent is expressed by the prefix of the stem (p. 29). If the
consonant of the personal pronoun is /ð/, then that of the causative is
/ð/; if it is /h/ in the personal pronoun, then it is /h/ in the causa-
tive. The only notable exception to this rule would seem to be Ugari-
tic: here the šaphṭel is the usual causative formation, whereas the
pronoun has /h/ (Harris, 1938, pp. 103-111; Speiser, 1952, p. 81 n. 4).

It should be noted that when Speiser expounds this argument, he is
actually concerned with semantic aspects, i.e. with the functions of
causative verbal themes. He makes it his object to determine the ori-

21. For this development, see Garbini (1960, pp. 127-128; 1959;

22. For this, see also Garbini (1962), p. 171. On p. 172 a
table is provided in which these correspondences are indicated.
Cf. also Speiser (1954, p. 112).
ginal values and functions of the verbal themes (1936, pp. 22, 29), and regards this as of importance for determining the functions in any stage of any Semitic language.

In two different writings Garbini also concerns himself with the causative verbal theme (1960, 1962). However, he does not aim at determining the sense and function, i.e. at a descriptive, synchronic exposition, but merely at a historical survey. In this way he finds a change from /s/ to /h/ certainly justified and actually prefers a phonetic development of */s/ into /h'/y/ to a development from two original elements (1962, p. 177). In both of these two important historical surveys, however, no attempt is made to lead the function of the causative verbal theme in any language back to the original meaning of its constituting parts.

Next to the historical tendency sensed in the above-mentioned approaches, there is also a tendency to place exceptional emphasis on a comparison of the Semitic (and even the Hamitic) languages, as to the functions of the verbal themes. Basically the idea is that the Semitic languages are so closely related that a random transition from one language to another is quite justified - either as to linguistic structures or as to lexical items - and that it is in fact part of the scientific practice of comparative Semitic philology (e.g. Castellino, 1962). 23)

It seems necessary to examine these approaches in the light of a general linguistic theory, in order to test their validity.

In the previous paragraph mention has been made of the arbitrari-

23. Cf. Barr (1968a) for an excellent and detailed diagnosis of this "comparative tendency" in Semitic scholarship. On p. 36 he presents two quotations conveying this idea.
ness of the linguistic sign (Dinneen, 1967, p. 209, in connection with De Saussure). In this connection, too, we have to stress this arbitrariness. Here, too, we find relative motivation for certain linguistic phenomena, and it is only to be expected that linguistic phenomena will show larger correspondence within one particular group of languages as is the case with languages outside this group. It is, however, of the utmost importance to keep in mind that each language is a synchronic whole or synchronic system - an idea that has been stressed heavily by De Saussure, and with which he has acquainted the linguistic world. Of course we have to grant that certain insights in the structure of a language can only be had when we follow the history of the language (Dinneen, 1967, p. 200). In this respect historical surveys are indeed of importance. Nevertheless, it is an undeniable fact that there is not the slightest evidence that all these different associations - either historical, or as is found in other Semitic languages - were in the mind of the speaker or writer of e.g. biblical Hebrew. On the contrary, our common sense tells us that some of them were unknown or even unknowable to him (Barr, 1961, p. 116). For this very reason we may not seek the aid of other languages in any study where the determining of a function is at stake. Of the etymological associations of the grammatical structures the writer could have been completely unknowing. In this respect the above-mentioned approaches of Gesenius and Kautzsch, Bauer and Leander, and Thierry - not to mention the far-fetchedness of the latter two - have no synchronic value or significance. In no way at all do they illuminate the meaning and use of the verbal theme. The argument of Speiser seems to be much more realistic, especially since each language is here treated as a separate whole, but the etymological associations suggested by him could
have been long forgotten. Furthermore, even should his etymology be correct as far as the origin of the Hiph'îl is concerned, no light is shed on other causative constructions, e.g. the Pi'el which also expresses a causative notion. We therefore see that even the approach of Speiser contributes nothing to our understanding of the function of the Hiph'îl. It rather accentuates the problem of other causatives.

Further objections to these historical approaches may be raised on methodological grounds. When it is said that a form "originally" had a certain sense or that a Hebrew meaning has developed from some other pre-Hebrew or extra-Hebrew meaning, then this is a statement on a sometimes scientifically inaccessible process - the argument is a reconstruction and is not in itself directly or empirically verifiable (cf. Barr, 1968a, p. 79). The excessive confidence in comparative philology has positively contributed to the strong accent that has come to rest on historical explanation. In addition to this case of the causative verbal theme, we find that in much of traditional Hebrew grammar the forms are only carefully classified and their histories traced. Closely bound up with this is the excessive etymological treatment that will be more closely treated in the next paragraph of this chapter.

The notion that a language is a synchronic system leaves us with very important viewpoints on the method to be followed later on in this study. These ideas have been summarized and elaborated in a masterly way by Barr (1961, 1968b), who insists that a synchronic study be made of each language separately as it functions as the means of communication of a certain community. He has no wish of doing

24. In like manner the "intensive" meaning of the Pi'el is seen as the natural result of the doubling of the second (or middle) consonant, e.g.: "L'intensité du sens est très naturellement exprimée par l'allongement de la consonne" (Joüon, 1923, p. 116).
away with all interest in the diachronic study of language - at most he wants scholars to apply the pattern of argumentation actually founded within general linguistics, with due allowance for the particular problems with which the Semitist is apt to meet.

Barr's heavy emphasis on the fact that each language functions as the means of communication of a certain community, forms the basis for his often repeated remark that meaning may strictly be determined only in one language at a time. A grammatical structure of Hebrew has its particular, distinguishing meaning only in Hebrew, and an Arabic one only in Arabic. The meaning in Hebrew may be quite independent of that in Arabic, and even of that in any other language, however close cognates the two languages may be. Of course, we may find correspondence in meaning, but this correspondence is by no means necessary. If we stand on this important principle, then we can make an honest attempt to determine the exact shades of meaning of each word or construction. Words or grammatical structures operate in relation to one another within the whole of the language. Our concern is with the balance of functions and the import of separate elements within a structural and structured whole.

The following table seems to illustrate this point. In each case we have the "same root" in Akkadian and Hebrew, but the verbal themes differ largely. The Akkadian words and meanings are taken from the word-list of the grammar of Ungnad and Matouš (1949).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Akkadian</th>
<th>Hebrew</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>kalālu</td>
<td>kll Qal &quot;complete&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>labāšu</td>
<td>lbš Hiph'il &quot;clothe&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>našāru</td>
<td>ngr only Qal &quot;watch, guard&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>paqādu</td>
<td>pqd Qal and Hiph'il &quot;appoint&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>šarāhu</td>
<td>șrh Hiph'il &quot;utter the war-cry&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G and š &quot;guard&quot;</td>
<td>G and D &quot;appoint&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gt &quot;laut aufschreien&quot;</td>
<td>Qal &quot;complete&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>š &quot;ertonen lassen&quot;</td>
<td>Qal and Hiph'il &quot;appoint&quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
There are indeed cases where the verbal themes correspond exactly, e.g.

- *malu* D "fill"
- *šakánu* š "anlegen lassen"
- *tebáhu* G "slaughter"
- *harābū* š "lay waste"

but the fact that there are cases where no such correspondence is to be found, makes it necessary to treat one language at a time as a separate whole - also as regards the verbal themes. 25)

The function of the Hiph'il verbal theme may then be determined neither by way of reference to the causative formations in other languages, nor by way of a historical survey of its constituent parts, but only by determining its function in each case and checking how it is connected with cognate forms within Hebrew. In this case attention will be paid to the functions of the compound causative construction and all the other verbal themes.

Much has up to now been made of the fact that a language is a synchronic system. In the case of biblical Hebrew, however, this principle leaves us with some embarrassment, because much of the Old Testament cannot be dated exactly. One glance at a competent introduction to the books and literary types of the Old Testament 26) confirms this. This leaves us with two possibilities for grammatical treatments. The first is to make a cutting and to consider only material which can be

25. Barr examined these differences between Hebrew and Syriac verbs and finds that, in the case of verbs with /b/ as first consonant, words in Syriac have a sense close to Hebrew in 26 cases, a sense remote from Hebrew in 13 cases, have a corresponding root, but not as a verb, in 9 cases, and are not found in Hebrew in 30 cases (Barr, 1969a, pp. 162-164, 305-307).

dated exactly. This was done, for instance, by Harris, who set as his aim to give a description of the Hebrew spoken in Jerusalem in official circles at about 600 B.C. (1941, p. 143). Harris’s method has however evoked strong criticism from other scholars in the field who maintain that Harris is working with a reconstructed language, that his whole analysis is speculative, and that there is no evidence for many of the "linguistic phenomena" he describes. Harris indeed maintains that certain forms "must have existed" (1941, p. 147). Furthermore, in following this method, the data for our present investigation becomes too sparse. The only alternative - and the one followed in this discussion - is to regard the language of the Old Testament as one synchronic whole, and this covers the period from the thirteenth to the third century B.C. Occasionally, when the material is dateable and when there is a long period of time between two passages, a comparison may be made. Only to a certain extent, then, the principle of synchrony is not followed in this study (cf. Classen, 1969, p. 55).

Another kind of diachronic perspective has gradually been introduced in the description and explanation of the Hiph'il verbal theme, namely that of the distinction between denominal and deverbal roots. The terms "denominal" and "deverbal" have a long history in Semitic scholarship. In the classical grammar of Gesenius the idea is expressed that "there are in Hiph'il a considerable number of denominatives which express the bringing out, the producing of a thing, and so are properly regarded as causatives" (Gesenius et al., 1966, p. 145). In this quotation two general ideas of Gesenius's grammar are captured. The first and most important is that of "denomination". A historical

process is being implied according to which the noun is historically the first existing element of the language (in certain cases) and the corresponding verb is then derived from it. Thus, for instance, the following roots in the Hiph'il verbal theme are said to be derived from nouns having the same root:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Root of verb (in Hiph'il)</th>
<th>Noun</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>prs &quot;having divided hoofs&quot;</td>
<td>parsâ &quot;(divided) hoof&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ymn &quot;go to the right&quot;</td>
<td>vāmin &quot;right side&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lăn &quot;slander&quot;</td>
<td>lāšôn &quot;tongue&quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This process of denomination is also assumed for the Pi'el verbal theme, as expressing "a being occupied with the object expressed by the noun, either to form or to make use of it" (Gesenius et al., 1966, p. 141).

Examples are then

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ver</th>
<th>nominative</th>
<th>nominative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>cpr</td>
<td>&quot;throw (earth) at&quot;</td>
<td>cāpar &quot;dry earth&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gnn</td>
<td>&quot;make a nest&quot;</td>
<td>gēn &quot;nest&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>šl̄̂</td>
<td>&quot;divide into three parts&quot;</td>
<td>šālōs &quot;three&quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For the Qal, too, a few examples of denominatives are given:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ver</th>
<th>nominative</th>
<th>nominative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>mhr I</td>
<td>&quot;cover (with pitch)&quot;</td>
<td>ḫēmār &quot;pitch, bitumen&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mlh II</td>
<td>&quot;to salt&quot; (also other themes)</td>
<td>melāh &quot;salt&quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Gesenius also mentions that there are a considerable number of denominatives in the Hiph'il and Pi'el, but apart from asserting that these verbs "are properly regarded as causatives" (p. 145), he draws no far-reaching conclusions from these observations. The same is to be said of the treatment of several other grammars or syntactic outlines of biblical Hebrew. 28)

Much more far-reaching conclusions are made from similar observations by Sperber (1966). He explicitly rejects the idea that the so-called derived stems are "verbal stems" and prefers the name "verbal conjugations" (p. 14) because "they shed light on the important problem of the interrelation between verb and noun of the identical root, namely: which one is genuine and which is only a derivation" (p. 46). In other words, the derived stems from the logical and historical connection between nouns and verbs. Sperber is of opinion that the verb in the Qal led to the formation of derived nominal forms, while the Pi'el and Hiph'il are "in the main denominative verbs" (p. 46, my emphasis). As examples of the Qal we have špt - mišpāt and zkr - zāker. Actually no evidence is presented in support of the assertion that Pi'el and Hiph'il are in the main denominative, but the reader is referred to a few passages where a verb in one of these themes and a noun with the same root occur in close connection, e.g.:

2 Kings 17:15 "they rejected ... the solemn warnings (כֹּדְתָּו) which he had given to them (הָכְדִית בָּם)" (NEB): root כֹּדַד.

2 Kings 23:26 "because of all the provocation (כֹּכֶסֶת) which Manasseh had given him (הָכְסֶסּו)" (NEB): root כֹּס.

Now these passages are indeed of great importance and we have to account for them. It seems as if we have in this phenomenon an important stylistic device which is also known from Ugaritic literature.29) However, it is not at all justified to base the whole issue of denomination on such uncertain grounds. There are 25 occurrences of כֹּדַד in the

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29. Ullendorff (1963, p. 240) mentions the alternation of Hiph'il and Qal in Lamentations 5:21 "O Lord, turn us back to thyself (הָשִׁיטֶנְךָ) and we will come back (וָנֵשַׁעְבָּךָ)"; root שְׁוָב. This construction seems however to be analogous to one where a noun and a verb "of the same root" occurs.
Hiph'il - with the meaning "admonish assure" (Lisowsky, 1958, p. 1030) - and only twice do we encounter this construction where the verb is followed by a noun having the same root; in the case of the Hiph'il of כנ (there are only three occurrences of this phenomenon in a total of 46 passages (Lisowsky, 1958, p. 693; Mandelkern, 1969, p. 594). In all the other cases the verb occurs in the Hiph'il without a "corresponding" noun and it is difficult to see how any light is then shed on "the interrelation between verb and noun of the identical root" (Sperber, 1966, p. 46). Furthermore, if we argue according to the traditional pattern in our search for denominatives, it is hard to see how Sperber can maintain that verbs in the Qal are not denominatives, as indeed he implies (1966, p. 46). Two "denominatives" in the Qal, according to Gesenius, have already been mentioned: ירב and מלח II. If 갤 (from 갖 or 갖), א (from א), and מ (from מ) are denominatives according to Sperber, then there is no reason why the following verbs, occurring only in the Qal, are not denominatives too:

- מ from מ "feast"
- מ from מ "treacherous act"
- מ from מ "vow"
- מ from מ "flow, stream"
- מ from מ "neck"
- מ from מ "divination".

We therefore see that the entire elaborate scheme of Sperber according

30. 2 Kings 17:15, Neh. 9:34.
31. 2 Kings 23:26, 1 Kings 15:30, 1 Kings 21:22 - all these passages in the books of the Kings!
32. If the Pi'el and Hiph'il are in the main denominative verbs and these verbs occur in a list of his on the Hiph'il (1966, p. 14), then we may safely assume that he regards them as denominatives.
to which he tried to explain the use of the verbal themes, is unprovable and without basis on several points.

Returning to the concept of denomination, as outlined by Gesenius, for example - i.e. when only mention is made of the fact that certain verbs are denominals - we encounter another problem: we know nothing about the process of the formation of "denominal verbs" or "deverbal nouns". It could have happened some time in the past of the language, but we do not know exactly how, and the process is entirely inaccessible to us. By accepting such a process we are left in utter uncertainty and relativity (cf. Claassen, 1969, p. 57). A high measure of arbitrariness is always involved. Thus we find that Gerber, in a detailed study on this subject (1896), extended the sphere of the principle for the recognition of the denominative character of verbs considerably. In defence of this, Gerber maintains that he wished to consider each verb not by itself, but "in Zusammenhalt und unter Berücksichtigung der ganzen dazu gehörigen Familie der Denominativa" (1896, p. iii). Many more verbs should be treated as original nouns than has been done by any previous grammar - including that of Gesenius (p. 1). As a result of this we find that Gerber lists ad denominatives - occurring only in one conjugation - 39 verbs in the Qal, 34 in the Pi'el and 29 in the Hiph'il, and if we accept denomination in principle, no valid reason can be advanced why certain of these verbs should rather be left out of the lists. This shows quite clearly that denominatives can be dealt with in such a way that even the argument that Hiph'il and Pi'el are used in particular for this purpose, does not stand firm any more. It is also clear that it is absolutely impossible for us to follow the historical process exactly - it remains inaccessible to us and therefore also unprovable. True, certain verbs are apparently denominatives and we clearly recognize the nouns from which they are
formed, e.g. 'hl in Qal and Pi'el (from 'ōhel) and 'pd (from 'epōd) - Gerber, 1896, p. 4), but the same cannot be said quite as easily of kth, even though Gerber regards this as a denominated form (1896, p. 2). In the face of this uncertainty it seems best to make no judgment on possible denominatives.

The other important aspect captured in the quotation from Gesenius and Kautzsch is that of the transition from one shade of meaning to another. At this stage we have only to keep in mind that these transitions are equally unprovable.

3.4 COMPARATIVE PHILOLOGY - AN EVALUATION

Hebrew and general Semitic scholarship of the past is to a certain extent characterized by a predominantly historical and comparative approach (Barr, 1968b, p. 37). Interest was centred chiefly in the historical background of a word, and in the relationship of a word from one language to that from another. In many respects, researchers went their own way, and little attention was paid to the underlying principles of their often ingenious but sometimes extravagant and far-fetched methods. In historical perspective, it is quite clear and understandable why this was so, as will be shown later. It was James Barr who investigated these principles thoroughly (Barr, 1961; 1968a; 1968b).33) Until his most important and most comprehensive work (1968a) was published, no book had been devoted entirely to this subject. A review

33. The contributions of other scholars are not denied, but it is only maintained that Barr's examination is the most comprehensive one, so that it can be readily discussed in this chapter. Long before the appearance of Barr's first book (1961) Palache declared that, as seen from the point of view of the actual use of words at present, etymology has little value, or even no value at all, because the word is a conventional sign (Palache, 1939, p. 3; cf. also Hospers, 1964-5, p. 21).
of the most significant ideas expressed by Barr and which are relevant to this study, follows. While the preceding paragraph dealt mainly with grammatical structures and their relationship, the study of words and their meanings will not be discussed.

Barr gives numerous examples of a philological method which is untenable according to the most elementary principles of general linguistics. Thus he refers to an argument built up around the words with the meaning "man" in the Old Testament (1961, p. 144). One of these words is geber. The consonants of this word's root are also found in verbs meaning "be powerful". Immediately, a logical link is forged between these two words, and it is asserted that this word contributes to the Old Testament idea of man in such a way that it indicates power. Arguing against this etymological connection between the two words on the grounds of agreement of consonants, Barr rightly asserts that there are many cases where geber indicates man where the idea of the power of a man is quite out of the question. Exactly here, in the usage of the word, lies the final test.

Both of Barr's works had already been published when the following examples of untenable etymology appeared (Labuscagne, to appear). In the entire article the author tries to explain that the roots of certain words in biblical Hebrew originally consisted of one or two consonants. The more extensive forms were thought to have originated from a causative element or preformative, either /š/ or /h/, added to an original form, with attendant processes such as, for example, metathesis. These attempts are of considerable importance here, because causative elements are used in the argument. Thus we find that (in emulation of Gordon) the root 34 šr, in the Pi'el, meaning "serve" (personal service or

34. The word "root" is used in a very unsystematic way in this paper, e.g. "the verb šabbat" (p. 7), "the root šabar" (p. 6), "the root šhr" (p. 6), "the verb qbb" (p. 7).
service at the sanctuary) is considered to be a š-form of yrd "to go down" (Labuscagne, to appear, pp. 11, 12). The Hebrew root then points to the action of someone who serves at the sanctuary as "causing the god to go down (from heaven) in order to serve him" (p. 12). Labuscagne even tries to relate certain roots to what he regards as "monoradical roots" (pp. 9, 10). The phoneme /b/ is regarded as conveying the idea of "movement into, coming in", which survived in Hebrew as the preposition šš "in, into, at, among" (p. 12). In the historical process the causative element /š/ supposedly came to be added to the "root b", with the resulting meaning "to cause to come, let come, i.e. to bring, to give" - in order to account for the Aramaic ššabb "to give". The Hebrew root ššb "to take captive" is explained as a šš causative of "the root š", with the original meaning of "causing (the enemy) to come (to the land of the conquerer)" (Labuscagne, p. 12). The Hebrew root ššb "to draw water" is also accounted for as šš causative of /b/, with the original meaning "causing (water) to enter (the container)" (p. 13).

One more example seems to be sufficient to indicate the essence of this etymological game. The root qbb (in Qal and Hiph'il: "to give attention") is said to have come about by way of metathesis after a šš causative had been added to an original root qbb, a denominative of gab, which denoted a measure with a capacity of approximately one litre. According to Labuscagne (p. 7) one litre is a double hand-full, i.e. the capacity of a man's vaulted hands. In Arabic we have a denominative gbb (Arabic gabba "be vaulted"). For the rest the argument runs as follows: "Now, if gab is 'vaulted hands', gbb originally applied to

35. Ullendorff (1958, p. 72) uses this striking term to denote the unacceptable linguistic methods at present under discussion.
the hands, meaning 'be vaulted', and so the ša-causative šqī means 'to cause the hands to be vaulted'. Considering that we use our vaulted hands for two purposes, first, as a container, and second, to put them behind our ears in order to hear better, it is clear that the verb šqī originally meant 'to make (the hands) vaulted', and specifically "to make (the hands) vaulted (behind the ears)"; which is exactly what is meant by 'giving attention'" (p. 7).

This type of study has been done by many scholars, and to raise objections against it, is not very difficult. In the first case there is no reason why the supposed "original meaning" could not have been "to cause yourself to go down in front of the god in order to serve him", with the derived meaning "kneel down, serve". For the second example - that with /b/ - there are absolutely no grounds. The supposed semantic connections are so vague and far-fetched that no scientific value can be attached to this effort - there is no reason why the supposed entity at the base of the preposition "in" should imply movement, and a causative of this could just as easily have yielded "to throw". As to the best example: the idea that one litre is a double hand-full, has its origin as a linguistic argument only in the mind of the expounder of this idea. 37)

At present, it is clear that the time has passed when a lexical item in one language can be explained through a different language without more ado. Barr's analysis of practices which had long been held valid, shows clearly that the underlying principles of many of these practices are not in accordance with any justifiable general linguistic theory. To follow up what has been said in the preceding para-

37. Cf. also the criticism of Van Zijl (1963, p. 60).
graph: each linguistic item possesses its particular meaning only in one specific language. Words may not be compared atomistically to related words in different languages without more ado. It is much more important to see each word as a simple item in a series or group of items to which it is related by means of a system of opposites. If, for instance, three words occur in Hebrew with different modifications of the meaning "walk", but only two of these are found in Ugaritic, then the load of these words in Hebrew can not be in the same as in Ugaritic. Therefore the words should always be considered in their relation towards one another within a single language. The total lexical stock should at all times be kept in mind, as in this case the matter revolves round one word which is closely interwoven with all the words of the particular language (Barr, 1968a, pp. 170-171, Siertsema, 1968, pp. 265-66), language being considered here as a means of communication, which was certainly the case with biblical Hebrew. (For an excellent example of this, cf. Stamm, 1945).

As illustrated by the above examples, the reconstruction of linguistic stadia preceding those for which evidence exists, is a risky undertaking (Barr, 1968a, p. 80). This does not detract from its value - this aspect will be discussed later. Any new discoveries however, could change such a reconstruction and the reconstruction will therefore always remain hypothetical. Such is the case of Proto-Semitic.

38. The tendency to look to the meaningful Arabic dictionaries for explanation of an unknown word, has recently been investigated by several scholars. Blau warns against the practice of regarding "secondary meanings" as being of primary importance: "wir dürfen nicht in den Wörtersammlungen der diversen Dialekte blättern und wurzeln "finden", die biblischen "entsprechen", ohne zu untersuchen ob nicht diese "parallele" Bedeutung eine sekundäre Entwicklung ... ist" (1955, p. 338). To the same effect also Kopf (1956, pp. 286-288, 301; 1956, pp. 161-162). Kopf's references to Arabic seems to be very appropriate and realistic.
which has been very thoroughly described by Moscati as "the ensemble of elements which an examination of the historically documented Semitic languages leads us to regard as common property of the Semitic group in its most ancient phase ... 'Proto-Semitic' is merely a linguistic convention or postulate" (Moscati, 1964, p. 15). While Moscati regards this convention as indispensable to the understanding of linguistic history (1964, p. 15), it should be admitted that in the case of a synchronic study such as this, where the meaning of a verbal category is at stake, such historical references make no contribution whatever (cf. Barr, 1968a, p. 78). As with grammatical structures, there is no evidence in the case of single words of all the historical connections existing in the mind of the author. On the contrary, the opposite is more valid. Moreover, it is impossible to trace the development of the meanings of a word in different stages and in different languages accurately. There is no basic pattern according to which meanings should necessarily develop, and any generalization runs the risk of leaving an erroneous impression. One meaning of a word could for instance derive from a fairly unimportant subordinate meaning (Barr, 1968a, p. 11).\(^{39}\) Various geographical, social and other conditions in different languages may help to invest a word with its own unique meaning. In short, every development in meaning within a language can be quite unique as well as completely unmotivated.

Many reasons can be advanced to explain the working method within the field of Semitic languages. One reason is the discovery of much new material during the past century, chief among which are the Akkadian texts, the South Arabian inscriptions and the Ugaritic cuneiform texts. These materials had to be deciphered while absolutely nothing was known

about any of these languages. It is therefore small wonder that scholars took refuge in comparative philology, which in fact made a great contribution towards the understanding of unknown languages. Thus, words were explained one by one by comparison with related words in other languages. Ugaritic is certainly the best example of this - today, several decades after the decipherment of Ugaritic, realistic and illuminating propositions are still being put forward. In this way, more attention has been paid to the interpretation of more and more new materials than to the systematizations of known material. Barr should therefore not be accused of neglecting the real value of comparative philology and even of etymology (cf. Boman, 1962, p. 262). On the contrary, he acknowledges their value, but insists that the correct method should be followed, that scholars should proceed cautiously and that comparison should not degenerate into a supposed mutual elucidation where the structural differences between languages are discarded. Barr also admits that the meanings of a great number of very difficult and obscure words in Hebrew, for instance, could be ascertained successfully by referring to related words (Barr, 1961, pp. 158-159; 1968a, pp. 92, 293). But even these analogies do not imply that phonologically related words from two languages have the same meaning - very often this is not the case. It is more probable that the related word will indicate the general field of meaning within which the Hebrew word will fit (Barr, 1961, p. 158; 1968a, p. 293). The exact meanings and more delicate nuances, however strongly suggested by the related words, will generally be determined by the Hebrew context.40) This remark is in accordance with what has previously (2.3) been stated in connection with the centrality of syntax. The meaning of words cannot be ascert-
The following proposition formulated by Barr, serves well as a general evaluation of etymology: "Etymology ... is a historical study. It studies the past of a word, but understands that the past of a word is no infallible guide to its present meaning. Etymology is not, and does not profess to be, a guide to the semantic value of words in their current usage, and such value has to be determined from the current usage and not from the derivation" (1961, p. 107). Apart from its value in deciphering unknown words, it must be admitted that the prehistory of a word does not necessarily contribute anything whatsoever to its meaning.

Admissible and well-motivated etymologies may in one respect be significant in connection with this study, viz. the identification of homonyms (cf. Barr, 1968a, pp. 125-55). Indeed, problems with homonyms are especially striking and topical in the case of verbs. This discussion of homonyms is significant, in accordance with Gruber's statement (1967, p. 114) that where there is no relation in meaning between two words with the same phonetic shape, an entirely new phonogram should be added to the lexicon (cf. 2.5.4). There are two kinds of homonyms. Firstly, there are those having one phoneme in Hebrew for two phonemes in another language, e.g. Arabic (and also hypothetically in Proto-Semitic). In other words, the merging of two phonemes within the historical process is involved. For example, it is ascertained that the two verbs כהנ I "answer" and כהנ IV "sing" correspond to two different verbs in Arabic, viz., one which has /c/ as

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42. Labuscagne (to appear, p. 1) quotes the last two sentences, but his study does not fully display the ideas of Barr on the limited value of the etymological game, because the history of a word has a say in its meaning in biblical Hebrew.
first consonant, and the other /ɡ/. This instance of homonyms is therefore rooted in the historical process of merging, and is easily recognizable. It is quite clear that we are dealing with actual homonymy and that the meaning of one verb need not be connected with that of the other by way of derivation.

Secondly, there are homonyms which cannot be connected with phonetic merging. Here, distinction should be made between complete and partial homonymy. In the case of complete homonymy, all the items of the paradigm of one word correspond with those of the other word. Barr is justly sceptical about this kind of homonymy (1968a, p. 134), considering that it would greatly depreciate the effectiveness of communication of any language. He therefore warns against the inclination of researchers to discover more and more similar homonyms, for which there is no real need (1968a, pp. 134-42). A few do indeed occur, but only a very small number (p. 147). An investigation of the nature of partial homonymy also indicates that the number of homonyms should be kept very small. It would appear that many supposed cases of homonymy are of this kind, and that such conclusions are actually based on an error. Thus, for instance, we find br' I "create" and br' III "cut down (trees)"; these could readily be regarded as homonyms, but in reality the homonymy is based solely on the sequence of three of the consonants, the so-called root. br' I occurs only in the Qal and Niphal; br' III occurs only in the Piel. This brings us to an important conclusion: Hebrew functioned as means of communication by means of "the whole sound of the root concerned and not upon the abstraction we call the 'root'" (Barr, 1968a, p. 131). Where only the roots are identical, it cannot be implied that we are dealing with a case of homonymy - it could rather be regarded as partial homonymy. Complete homonymy deals with the overlapping of forms and not only of
The search for related roots which occur so frequently in Semitic philology, instead of giving attention to the complete word forms, is therefore completely erroneous. Nouns have special form patterns which distinguish them from verbs - just so, verbs occurring in different verbal themes have different form patterns. When a certain language has a root occurring only in the nominal form, it is not implied that the language also has that root in verbal forms. The meaning of a noun and that of a verb may differ widely, apart from their grammatical function in sentences. It is, for instance, impossible to predict whether the idea of the verb will be active or passive in the noun at stake. With regard to roots only, overlapping may occur fairly frequently, but what is completely unpredictable is the relationship between the form-sense relationship in one language and the form-sense relationship in another (Barr, 1968a, p. 164).

The discussion of homonyms presents numerous difficulties. Much uncertainty exists about one of these and a subjective decision will have to be taken, to decide when we are dealing with homonymy and when with polysemy. This problem should be approached from the point of view of the communicative function of the language and taking into account the fact that the speaker did not necessarily have knowledge of the prehistory of words. Barr offers a criterium which is valid for the determination of the relationship or otherwise between phonologically related words and assumes that the meanings of words are related to each other when the meaning of one can be correctly predicted from the related word, as is being done in ordinary philological studies (1968a, p. 163). While taking into account the inadequacy of any cri-

43. Later on considerable use will be made of this.
44. Cf. Barr (1968a, p. 305) for a sample of research of this kind.
terium in this connection, the above criterium will be applied (where necessary) in this study to distinguish between homonymy and polysemy.45)

It has been mentioned earlier that the word as a whole should be taken into account, and that the appearance of the root cannot in itself be a decisive criterium for ascertaining the meaning. In this proposition we find one of the fundamental problems with which Barr was confronted (1961 and 1968a). His solution will therefore bring about a major modification of our traditional conception of Hebrew.

According to traditional Hebrew grammar, the root consonants46) are the real conveyors of meaning and the vocalization merely modifies the main idea. The root meaning, which is normally the meaning of the verb, is thought to remain operative through all the variations given to the verbs by affixes and other formative elements. This view has been challenged from various sides, and can no longer be maintained.47) It appears rather that root and vocalization are closely interwoven and together express the meaning, which was previously attributed solely to the consonants (Ullendorff, 1958, p. 70).

Barr characterizes this excessive reliance on the "original" meaning of the root - viz. the meaning of the root before it formed part of a complete word - very clearly when he calls it "the root fallacy" (1961, pp. 100-102). He finds a telling example of this in David-

45. This problem is treated extensively by Barr (1968a, p. 142 ff.). In imitation of Reichling (1969, pp. 40-47), Siertsma suggests the same criterium: "Wanneer er tussen twee woorden met dezelfde vorm en verschillende betekenis bij enig nadenken 'n betekenisverband voor ons is spreken we van polysemie; wanneer dat verband er voor ons niet is spreken we van homonimie" (Siertsma, 1968, p. 264 n. 19; cf. also pp. 265-266).

46. The name "discontinuous morphemes" has been suggested and accepted by various linguists and seems most apt. Cf. Gleason (1961, p. 73), Bach (1964, p. 114), Erickson (1965, p. 29), Barr (1966a, p. 199).

47. For a discussion and literature, cf. Claassen (1969, p. 18-21). This point has been stressed by Ullendorff (1958, pp. 69-70).
son: "Stems in Hebrew are considered to contain three consonantal letters. The noun may be regarded as expressing the stem idea in repose, and the verb the idea in motion" (Davidson, 1960, p. 54). This kind of fluid viewpoint has already been mentioned above in connection with the appearance of a root in nominal and verbal forms. When such exaggerated importance is attached to the root, which is actually an abstraction, all the power of word formation and syntax— the importance of which has often been noted—is completely neglected. A schematic, or better still, logicistic method is used, and each word is not consistently considered as a new word in its own right. Furthermore, it is clear that it is this very over-emphasis of the so-called root idea which is the underlying principle of the confidence in etymological arguments. Quite recently the following opinion on roots appeared: "The true nature of the Semitic root had already been seen by Arab and (after them) by Jewish grammarians. For them the "root" was indeed "something more than a mere abstraction and had a psychic reality", living in the linguistic consciousness of the people even nowadays, who can develop new words from a given root" (Castellino, 1962, pp. 41-42). In contradiction to this, we shall have to put forth our view clearly, in support of Barr, that the root is, in reality, entirely theoretical (1961, p. 290). What is called the "basic" or "original" meaning, is only historically related to the meaning of still existing forms. It is, however, an error to use this "root meaning" as an infallible guiding principle for the meaning of words in a synchronic, descriptive study.

In a certain sense it is quite understandable why in the course of time more and more meaning became attached to the root. In the first place, one should mention the particular style of writing of

Hebrew (and certain other Semitic languages), which was originally unvocalized. As a result the consonants, especially those of the root, appeared very prominently in contrast with the vowels. In this regard the root was pre-eminent and eye-catching. Another reason is the high didactic or mnemonic value connected with the sequence of three (or two) consonants. The root has a practical purpose here, but it should never be raised to a semantic principle on a descriptive level. This distinction between root and affirmative was established at a late stage of the history of grammatical description of Hebrew - in the period of Ben Asher (Barr, 1968a, p. 61; cf. also Barr, 1964, p. 242).

This reliance on the root meaning led to an unfortunate schematism, especially with regard to one sphere of the verb - the verbal themes. The Qal is regarded as being the actual or original theme ("verbal stems proper", "pure stem" - Gesenius, Kautzsch and Cowley, 1966, p. 114) from which the derived themes are formed. According to Gesenius: "From the pure stem, or Qal, the derivative stems are formed according to an unvarying analogy, in which the idea of the stem assumes the most varied shades of meaning, according to the changes in its form (intensive, frequentative, privative, causative, reflexive ...) ... In other languages such formations are regarded as new or derivative verbs ... In Hebrew, however, these formations are incomparably more regular and systematic than (e.g.) in Greek, Latin, or English" (Gesenius et al., 1966, p. 115). My emphasis). In other words, a word in one of the derivative themes is rather regarded as a kind of variation within a paradigm - which can be set down schematically and which is hardly flexible - than as a new formation semantically. It is actually not a new verb, but can be approached etymologically by simply tracing the original meaning and the various modifications which it has undergond. Such is also the opinion of Bauer and
Leander: "Aus dem Grundstamm haben sich ferner Intensivstämmme herausgebildet ..." (Bauer and Leander, 1918, p. 281). It is difficult to perceive clearly how Gesenius and Kautzsch can account for a case like *ngd*, which occurs only in the Hiph'il (and the passive Hoph'al), with the very obvious non-causative meaning "make known, report, tell". The same can be advanced against Bauer and Leander in the case of words in the Pi'el which express no intensive meaning whatever. In its most profound sense this kind of schematism or logicism amounts to intra-Hebraic etymology, since too much value is attached to the origin and development of a word in contrast with its actual semantic value. It is to be noted that not all grammarians represent the matter in this way. Bergsträsser (1928), for example, maintains that the means of derivation of new words (prefixes /š/, /ḥ/, /n/ etc.) "wurde von Haus aus mit grosser Beweglichkeit verwendet und frei miteinander kombiniert" (p. 12). He also makes mention of the extraordinary number of modifications of the root meaning that can be expressed in this way and gives a warning that categories such as "reflexive" etc. are really inadequate to express the various modifications (1928, p. 13). Sperber - although his own special schematism proved unacceptable - raises equally strong objections against these schematizing efforts which attempt to see all verbs as derived from the Qal (1966, p. 6).

It appears that more emphasis should be laid on the power with which word formation is attended (Barr, 1961, p. 165; 1968a, p. 133). As opposed to the unfortunate schematism which has become so prevalent, the meaning of a word in each formation pattern will be ascertained by considering what is special about the word in that context. Whenever a new word is formed, separate and new spheres of meaning can be composed. However much one inclines towards the opposite direction, new
formations should be regarded as independent forms. Each form has a complex history which should be thoroughly investigated and since the historical process is inaccessible, the form should be studied in its actual use. Thus, several grammers and syntactic outlines indicate that, although the causative is one of the best known and most characteristic functions of the Hiph'il, there are still many words in connection with which no causative meaning can be observed and other functional indications should rather be used to describe the tendencies within the lexicon. 49) This is in accordance with what has earlier (2.5.4) been described as the proper way to follow in a study of the contents of the lexicon.

The question might be put as to exactly how this untenable kind of schematism can be avoided when a system of lexical representation as presented in 2.6 is followed, i.e. when only the root and its associated root markers are represented in the lexicon. Would this not be derogatory to the obvious idiosyncrasies in meaning which we encounter in new formations? Certainly not, but then we should be careful not to confuse phonological and semantic aspects.

In the system of lexical representation advocated by Aronson (1969) - and found to be fully justified in 2.6 - a fine distinction is made between lexical and phonological aspects. To be more precise, a counter-argument according to which semantic (and syntactic) features plead against the representation that seems to be the natural one as far as the phonological aspects are concerned, is successfully refuted by Aronson (1969, pp. 136, 138). In other words, she succeeds in doing justice to both of these linguistic levels. The contents of the

third counter-argument (the one concerning semantic features) she regards as substantially correct, but she opposes the supposed implications of the semantic considerations. We may now give attention first-ly to the contents of the counter-argument that could argue against Aronson's proposal and secondly to the way in which she (quite justly) incorporates the counter-argument in her own proposal.

Firstly: the traditional proposition that the meaning of a verb is inherent in its root (consisting of consonants), and that the various modifications (i.e. verbal themes or root-markers) supply straightforward "variations on the theme" is incorrect, or, rather, a fallacy (Aronson, 1969, p. 136). Actually not only the verbal themes or patterns, but all the root-markers have to come under discussion in the present context. With regard to the root-markers Tense and Pronominal Reference\(^{50}\) the situation is relatively straightforward because they can be associated with a roughly uniform set of syntactic and semantic features that apply throughout the lexicon. However, this is not the situation with regard to the verbal themes where the meaning of the Qal (taken as the "base meaning") is modified in a variety of seemingly unpredictable ways, both syntactically and semantically. The patterns are intercalated or associated with roots in a wide variety of ways. Moreover, the patterns are interrelated with each other in an equally wide variety of unpredictable ways, i.e. it is not possible to regard any of the verbal themes as reflecting (even approximating) clear-cut semantic or even syntactic categories. In other words, "it is not possible to interpret the meaning of a pattern, or assign its correct syntactic features, simply in terms of a paradigmatic 'pattern-meaning root-meaning' system of markers" (Aronson, 1969, p. 137). As proof of

\(^{50}\) Cf. the previous chapter (2.6) and Aronson (1969, p. 130) for a discussion of these root-markers.
this statement, reference may be made to the fact that not a single root in Hebrew actually occurs in all five patterns and that there are many obvious cases where the traditional scheme simply does not fit. (Attention will be given below to obvious cases that do not fit into the traditional scheme.) In short: the system of formation of modification by way of the verbal themes or patterns is characterized by semantic and lexical anomaly and hence unpredictability.

However, the recognition of this semantic anomaly does not necessarily imply that we should give preference to a dictionary representation in which the vowels are indicated. After all, it cannot be denied that, given the root and the syntactic-morphological information formalized in terms of root-markers, the vowels of all lexical formatives marked (+ VERB), at least, constitute "fully predictable sets of infixes attached to the consonantal roots and affixes" (Aronson, 1969, p. 139; cf. also p. 138). The semantic aspects have to be handled somewhere in the grammar, but this need not argue against a lexical representation in the form CCC, as is strongly suggested by phonological aspects.

We therefore see that Aronson protests as vehemently as Barr, and clearly quite justly, against the schematic efforts of grammarians in their description of the verbal themes. There are cases such as the following that make an explanation on traditional lines untenable for the whole corpus of biblical Hebrew. The English translations of Koehler and Baumgartner (1958) are followed, although they are not always above criticism and sometimes seem to be strongly influenced by the schematism at present under discussion.

51. It is not clear whether Aronson has been influenced by Barr in her analysis. In any case, in her references (1969, pp. 144-45) no mention is made of Barr's important remarks in this connection.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Root</th>
<th>Qal &quot;simple&quot;</th>
<th>Niph'al &quot;passive or reflexive of Qal&quot;</th>
<th>Pi'el &quot;intensive&quot;</th>
<th>Pu'al &quot;passive of Pi'el&quot;</th>
<th>Hitpa'el &quot;reflexive of Pi'el&quot;</th>
<th>Hiph'el &quot;causative&quot;</th>
<th>Hoph'el &quot;passive of causative&quot;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>'al</td>
<td>observe mourning rites</td>
<td>observe mourning rites</td>
<td>give cause for mourning rites</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'dm</td>
<td>be red</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>be red</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'hl</td>
<td>pitch a tent</td>
<td>pitch a tent</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>be red</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'wq</td>
<td>urge, be in haste</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>be red</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'nh</td>
<td>sigh</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>urge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'np</td>
<td>be angry</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>urge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hws</td>
<td>tread down</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>urge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hō'</td>
<td>hide oneself</td>
<td>hide oneself</td>
<td>keep oneself hidden</td>
<td>keep oneself hidden</td>
<td>hide</td>
<td></td>
<td>be trodden down</td>
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<tr>
<td>huš</td>
<td>make haste</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>be kept hidden</td>
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<tr>
<td>ṣt</td>
<td>wrong, offend</td>
<td>purify from sin</td>
<td>purify oneself</td>
<td>cause to sin</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hil</td>
<td>be profaned</td>
<td>profane</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>hmm</td>
<td>be warm</td>
<td>inflamed</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>ṣmm</td>
<td>be leavened</td>
<td>strangle oneself</td>
<td>strangle oneself</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>ṣpp</td>
<td>be ashamed</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>ṣqq</td>
<td>inscribe</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ṣrr</td>
<td>be aglow</td>
<td>be made aglow</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ṣrh</td>
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<tr>
<td>Root</td>
<td>Qal &quot;simple&quot;</td>
<td>Niph'al &quot;passive or reflexive of Qal&quot;</td>
<td>Pi'el &quot;intensive&quot;</td>
<td>Pu'el &quot;passive of Pi'el&quot;</td>
<td>Hitpa'el &quot;reflexive of Pi'el&quot;</td>
<td>Hiph'1l &quot;causative&quot;</td>
<td>Hoph'al &quot;passive of causative&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>knC</td>
<td>put on, be clothed with</td>
<td>be humbled</td>
<td>clothed with</td>
<td>clothe oneself</td>
<td>clothe</td>
<td>humble a person</td>
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<tr>
<td>lbš</td>
<td>mock, deride</td>
<td>murmer against</td>
<td>speak as foreigner</td>
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<td>lwn</td>
<td>totter</td>
<td>be caused to totter</td>
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<tr>
<td>îg</td>
<td>blot out</td>
<td>be blotted out</td>
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<td>get blotted out</td>
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<tr>
<td>ml‡</td>
<td>save oneself, escape</td>
<td>save</td>
<td>leap forth</td>
<td>deliver</td>
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<tr>
<td>mqq</td>
<td>rot away</td>
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<td></td>
<td>cause to rot</td>
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<tr>
<td>mšš</td>
<td>grope</td>
<td>grope</td>
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<td>let feel; grope</td>
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<tr>
<td>nbl</td>
<td>wither</td>
<td>treat with contumely</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>touch</td>
<td>be struck deadly</td>
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<tr>
<td>ngC</td>
<td>touch</td>
<td>flow be poured</td>
<td>strike</td>
<td>be stricken</td>
<td>pour down</td>
<td>be poured down</td>
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<tr>
<td>ngr</td>
<td>wield (an ax)</td>
<td>be scattered</td>
<td></td>
<td>scatter</td>
<td>be chased away</td>
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<tr>
<td>ndš</td>
<td>anoint oneself</td>
<td>act foolishly</td>
<td>turn into foolishness</td>
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<td></td>
<td>do foolishly</td>
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<tr>
<td>skl</td>
<td>faint away</td>
<td>faint</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>show feebleness</td>
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<td>çpš</td>
<td>make, do</td>
<td>be done</td>
<td>squeeze, press</td>
<td>be made</td>
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<tr>
<td>pth I</td>
<td>be apt to be deceived</td>
<td>be deceived</td>
<td>deceive</td>
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<tr>
<td>str</td>
<td>be concealed</td>
<td>conceal oneself</td>
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<tr>
<td>rgz</td>
<td>be excited</td>
<td>conceal</td>
<td></td>
<td>keep oneself hidden</td>
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<tr>
<td>ršn II</td>
<td>have dealings with</td>
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<tr>
<td>rsg</td>
<td>crush</td>
<td>be crushed</td>
<td>crush (in pieces)</td>
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<tr>
<td>bšq</td>
<td>play, laugh</td>
<td>play, jest</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>utter mockery</td>
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<tr>
<td>ņpq I</td>
<td>clap one's hands</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>shake hands with</td>
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The examples advanced above constitute only a small portion (namely the most obvious ones) of the numerous verbs that cannot be accounted for in terms of the traditional analysis. An implication of Gesenius’s statement that the verbal themes are formed from the “pure stem” according to an unvarying analogy, regular and systematic (1966, p. 115) is that an overlap in meaning between two or more verbal themes is hardly possible. However, in the examples advanced above there are many cases where we have the same meaning in one or more verbal themes (’dm, hrn II, str, etc.), where the Péhél serves as passive of the Hiph’él (e.g. tbC), where the Niph’al occurs as passive of the Hiph’él (e.g. str), where the Hiph’él serves as causative of the Niph’al (e.g. y’s, mgg), where the Hitpa’el appears as reflexive of a verbal theme other than the Pi’el, apart from cases where the Pi’el is not attested (e.g. rgz), where the verb has a sense so divergent from the meanings in the other verbal themes that it can hardly be thought of as derived from the latter (e.g. ht’ Htp., nbl Pi., Cšh Pi.), where the Niph’al even expresses the causative of the Qal (e.g. hrr I),\(^\text{52}\) etc. In other words—clearly substantiating the views of Barr and Aronson (and Sperber)—the verbal themes are interrelated with each other and associated with roots in a wide variety of ways, and in such a way that the meaning is quite unpredictable. The situation is, however, even more complicated than this: within one and the same theme two divergent or even opposite meanings may be expressed, e.g.

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{nu} & \text{s Hiph. : “put to flight, save by flight”} \\
\text{sp} & \text{l Pi. : “pelt with stones, cleanse from stones”} \\
\text{sr} & \text{Hiph. : “give a tenth of, receive a tenth of”}.
\end{align*}
\]

\(^\text{52}\) Cf. Schoneveld (1969, p. 201 n. 3).
Whereas the Hitpa'el regularly has the meaning "prove to be" or only "be", it can also have a different meaning, e.g. כtır Hitp. "pretend to be rich", כח Hitp. not reflexive, but "gaze about (anxiously)". In the case of the Niph'al a passive or a reflexive sense may be present, according to traditional Hebrew grammar, as is clear from e.g. הנה Niph. "comfort oneself, be comforted", התי "conceal oneself, be concealed". The exact shade of meaning is, however, unpredictable. In the case of the Hiph'il a causative and a non-causative shade appear next to each other, e.g. הָסְר Hiph. "lack, cause to lack", הָסָר Hiph. "be ashamed, put to shame". Again the exact shade of meaning is unpredictable.

Of course we have to be careful not to draw a wrong picture of the so-called traditional interpretation of the verbal themes. The point of view of Gesenius and Kautzsch is a logicistic one and the various shades of meaning of each verbal theme is clearly brought down to a fundamental idea (cf. Gesenius et al., 1966, pp. 137-50). However, even they make mention of, for example, the fact that the Niph'al occurs as passive of the Pi'el and Hiph'il in some instances (cf. also Jouon, 1923, p. 115). In this way provision is made for many shades of meaning that exist next to the basic or fundamental one. The only point of criticism is that an attempt is made to connect all the "secondary" shades of meaning with the "fundamental" one. The treatment still remains logicistic and cannot therefore account for all verbal forms.

In the next chapter the possibility of distinguishing various tendencies in the lexicon of Hebrew will be examined. These tendencies in lexical formation are of the kind suggested by Gruber (2.5.4).

With the discussion of this chapter, in which the unpredictability
of the semantic values of verbs with any specific verbal theme or pattern seems to be an established fact, the subject is still not closed. Ernst Jenni's interpretation of the verbal themes - very important, but to the present writer's opinion equally untenable - seems to exhibit the same kind of schematism that has been discussed in this paragraph. We may even claim that it is a much more far-reaching interpretation of the verbal themes than has ever been presented. In the world of theology and Hebrew studies, Jenni's interpretation has received wide acclamation and acceptance (some of these instances will be mentioned where necessary) and it seems as if the influence of his views is still increasing. In any case, his views on the verbal themes amount to exactly the opposite of what is claimed by Barr and Aronson. Therefore it is necessary to give a thorough examination of Jenni's proposals towards a solution of the tangly problem of the use of the verbal themes. Examination of every detail of Jenni's proposals would amount to presenting a work of the same extent as Das hebräische Pi'el. Moreover, it would fall partly outside of the scope of this study, viz. the Hiph'il verbal theme in biblical Hebrew. Therefore I propose to examine Jenni's interpretation on the basis of two groups of verbs that are of direct relevance to this study, viz. those with similar meaning in Pi'el and Hiph'il and those with similar meaning in Qal and Hiph'il. In this way Jenni's elaborate system may be tested on crucial points and yet another goal may be attained: I am of opinion that an examination of the two groups as proposed may furnish additional proof in favour of a conception of semantic unpredictability with regard to the verbal themes as suggested by, for example, Barr. After all, if it can be proved that Pi'el and Hiph'il (and similarly Qal and Hiph'il) forms exist next to each other with similar meaning, then much of the traditional scheme becomes invalid. This does not imply that all other
relations between the Hiph'il and another verbal theme are of minor importance. There are indeed many other intrinsic relations, e.g. where the Niph'al occurs as passive of the Hiph'il or where the Hiph'il occurs as causative of the Niph'al or even the Pi'el (cf. Nyberg, 1952, p. 229). These relations equally point to the unpredictability of semantic values. The two relations that will be discussed in detail, are rather those where we have the largest degree of lexical overlap and which have therefore evoked most criticism from scholars. Moreover, both of these groups are discussed in detail by Jenni and a criticism of his interpretation is of the utmost importance in connection with the Hiph'il. In Chapters 5 and 6 the explanations of various scholars (mostly views expressed in grammars) will be discussed, followed by a lengthy and detailed examination of Jenni's views.
CHAPTER 4

VARIOUS ASPECTS OF THE HIPHERIL VERBAL THEME

4.1 INTRODUCTION

In this chapter, several aspects of the Hipheril will be discussed in so far as they follow from the two previous chapters. If it has become apparent that there is no question of semantic predictability, it should be possible to present the Hipheril in a more systematic way. Indeed, in chapter 2 it was established that it was valuable to ascertain tendencies within the lexicon, even if they were non-productive. The causative, factitive and declarative-estimative functions of the Hipheril will now be discussed. Since the term "denominative" has already (3.3) for various reasons been rejected as a criterium on the descriptive level, it will not be considered here. The general term "internal transitive Hipheril" will however also be discussed. Since compound causative constructions will be mentioned again further on, they will also receive attention in this chapter. The so-called "elative Hipheril" will not be discussed, since any study on this aspect will have to make much use of comparative material, because the allegedly attested cases in Hebrew are so few. Speiser's examination of the "elative" in Akkadian (1952) is interesting, but the alleged cases of such a Hipheril in Hebrew still needs examination. Gen. 35:16-17 can be explained merely as due to stylistic variation in the use of the verbal themes (cf. Speiser, 1964, p. 273). In any case, it constitutes no proof for the widespread use of an "elative Hipheril" in biblical Hebrew (cf. also Jenni, 1968; p. 91 for another kind of explanation).

4.2 THE CAUSATIVE FUNCTION OF THE HIPHERIL

All grammars clearly register the fact that the Hipheril is used
for the formation of causative words, but they do not all agree on the nature and extent of this causative function. Various grammarians\(^1\) regard the causative as the basic or original function of the Hiph'il and consequently have in some way or another to bring the other aspects of the Hiph'il in relation to this basic meaning. Others\(^2\) seem to regard the causative as one of the senses of the Hiph'il and leave room for other shades of meaning such as the declarative and intransitive, without making an attempt to derive the latter from the former.

Before the validity of each of these two positions, it seems necessary to give attention to the nature of the causative relation expressed by the Hiph'il. It is widely recognized that the "bringing about" ("Veranlassung") of the causative can have the character of compulsion or of consent or permission.\(^3\) These different shades of meaning can be recognized in the case of the so-called compound causative constructions - there too we have compulsion as well as permission as aspects of the compound causative construction. In the case of the Hiph'il the causative idea takes on various nuances according to the meaning of the word (Jenni, 1968, p. 34) and according to the circumstances. In the case of נָלַע we even have the meaning "let one ask, give, lend on request" (Koehler and Baumgartner, 1958, p. 937; cf. al-

1. Ewald (1863, p. 321), JoDann (1923, pp. 120-21), Brockelmann (1956, p. 36) (although he leaves room for complete overlap in meaning between Hiph'il and Qal), Gesenius and Kautzsch (1966, p. 144).


3. Brockelmann (1908 I, p. 526; 1956, p. 36), Jenni (1968, p. 34). Carmignac (1965) rejects the idea of a "permissive" Hiph'il and is of opinion that the meaning "allow to" can be fully explained by separating the cause and the effect in the Hiph'il, and adding a negative to the effect (1965, p. 224). He equally rejects the idea that the causative can take on various shades of meaning. It seems, however, safest to keep to the various shades of meaning.
so Yriezen, 1963 on §'l and 'mr).

The causative Hiph'il should be regarded as a non-productive word-extension, in the sense given to this term by Gruber (cf. 2.5.4). After all, if the causative is regarded as the basic or original function of the Hiph'il, the range of meanings is represented as completely predictable. In the previous chapter, however, it has been seen that there are many verbs without a Hiph'il, or where another theme expresses the causative. Therefore the "causative" may not be regarded as the basic function of the Hiph'il. It is rather one of the few functions in which the Hiph'il could be used. Then we should, however, add that the causative is the most frequent function in which the Hiph'il is used.

4.3 THE FACTITIVE FUNCTION OF THE HIPH'IL

The term "factitive" is used to indicate the causative in connection with a condition. It appears that in the Hiph'il, also, there is a tendency towards the formation of factitive verbs. Actually this aspect will only come up for discussion in the following chapter, where it forms an integral part of a larger whole. From the discussion in chapter 5, however, it will emerge clearly that it may be rightly maintained that the Hiph'il, like the Pi'el, has a factitive function.

4.4 THE DECLARATIVE FUNCTION OF THE HIPH'IL

All competent grammars (and related works) on Biblical Hebrew agree on the point that one of the functions of the Hiph'il verbal theme is to express a declarative shade of meaning. Although the fact of a declarative shade of meaning is acknowledged in all grammars, the relation of the declarative sense to the causative sense is not always represented in the same way. The attitude of scholars to the causative
as the basic sense of the Hiph'il or not, is decisive in each case. In this way Brockelmann (1908 I, p. 527), 4) Jouon (1923, p. 123), Goetze (1942, p. 3), Moscati (1964, p. 125) and Gesenius and Kautzsch (1966, p. 144) include the declarative sense under the causative or regard it as a subvariety of the causative. 5) Bauer and Leander (1918, p. 292), Nyberg (1952, p. 227) and Williams (1967, p. 36) record the declarative sense next to the causative without trying to connect the two historically or logically. Baer and Meyer (1969 II, p. 108) seem to regard the declarative sense as a variant of the denominative, as also does Hillers in a recent study (1967, p. 322). Other similar, terms are also used, viz. "estimative", 6) "putative" 7) and "delocutive". 8) It seems best to bring all of these "delocutive" senses to discussion at the same time. Without one deriving from the other, they may be regarded as belonging to the same group or rather as exhibiting the same tendency in lexical formation; sometimes it even becomes difficult to decide whether the sense is declarative or estimative. Before considering the merits of the views mentioned above, it is necessary to give attention to Jenni's contentions on the non-existence of a declarative Hiph'il.

In Jenni's discussion of the declarative or estimative function of

4. In his later work (1956) Brockelmann merely lists the declarative sense next to the causative, with the following comment: "Das Kausativ hat ausser seiner eigentlichen Bedeutung, der Veranlassung ... oft deklarativen Sinn" (p. 36).

5. The same scholars regard the declarative sense of the Pi'el as a subvariety of the factitive or causative meaning of the Pi'el. Cf. Brockelmann (1908 I, p. 509; 1956, p. 36), Jouon (1923, p. 118) and Gesenius and Kautzsch (1966, p. 141).


the verbal themes, the supposed contrast between a verbally expressed (analytic) statement in a verbal sentence and an adjectivally expressed (synthetic) statement in a nominal sentence plays an important, not to say dominant, role (cf. discussion in 5.4.2.2). Jenni's main thesis as to the declarative sense is that a declarative Hiph'il in the same sense as a declarative Pi'el cannot exist in Hebrew (Jenni, 1968, p. 43). Of course, Jenni has to maintain that a real declarative Hiph'il cannot exist, because this is the only situation that will be consistent with his theory, as expounded later (5.4.3.1). After all, a declarative statement is necessarily a synthetic one (as described in 5.4.2.2) because something new is said about a subject and the Pi'el - in contrast with the Hiph'il - is the verbal theme that stands in direct relation to a synthetic statement. Seeing that the contrast synthetic statement vs. analytic statement and in many respects Pi'el vs. Hiph'il has been found to be an untenable or false contrast, 9 it is to be expected that the conclusion from the contrast will in this case, too, be susceptible to criticism.

Discussing the nature of the declarative Pi'el, Jenni maintains that the declarative sense only occurs in cases where there is a subjective judgment with regard to "eine abstrakte, nicht allgemein einsichtige Qualität vorliegt" (1968, pp. 41-42). These qualities or attributes are e.g. ṭāmē' ("ceremonially unclean"), qādōš ("holy"), ḡaddīq ("guiltless, just"). They are not thought of as "an den betreffenden Grössen ohne weiteres ablesbare Qualitäten ..., sondern als vom Beurteiler imputierte Urteile" (Jenni, 1968, p. 42). Turning to the Hiph'il, Jenni maintains that the examples of a so-called declarative Hiph'il that are usually advanced in the grammars are to be ex-

9. Cf. the theoretical arguments in 5.4.2.2 and the demonstrations of the untenability in practice in 5.4.3.
explained in quite a different way. Next to the sense "zur Rechts-
schaffenheit vor Gott verhelfen" in the case of ṣdq Hiph. there are
ten passages that are regularly translated "pronounce, declare a person
guiltless or just", to take only the most important senses.¹⁰) To
Jenni, however, the latter group of passages are not really "declarative" (1968, p. 44). In all these passages, he maintains, the object
of the declaring-just or (in the case of ṭrā'ā) the declaring-guilty is
a person who has already in so many words or by the circumstances been
characterized as "guilty" (rāṣā'ā) or "just" (ṣaddīq). The object is
not merely any person of whom it is in the mind of the speaker still
unclear whether he belongs to one of the two categories, because the
action in the Hiph'il does not allow for a synthetic judgment, but only
an analytic one (Jenni, 1968, p. 44)! This difference is supposed to
be clearly indicated in Dt. 25:1 where both ṭrā'ā and ṣdq Hiph. occur:

Dt. 25:1 "When two men go to law and present themselves for judgment,
the judges shall try the case; they shall acquit (ṣdq Hiph.)
the innocent (ṣaddīq) and condemn (ṭrā'ā Hiph.) the guilty (rāṣā'ā).

(2) If the guilty man is sentenced to be flogged ..." (NEB).

Jenni's comment is that the just or guilty person is not classified
declaratively, i.e. by way of a subjective, synthetic judgment, in a
certain category, but "er erfährt nur die Auswirkung seiner als objek-
tiv vorhanden vorgestellten Gerechtigkeit oder Schuldigkeit" (1968,
p. 44). Therefore, Jenni further maintains, the estimative aspect
that is always clearly visible in the case of the Pi'el, is lacking
and the judgment may be followed directly by "ein Zum-Recht-Verhelfen
... das Schuldigssprechen in ein Verurteilen ..." (ibid.). For the

¹⁰. It is not always possible to determine with accuracy the
exact sense or the verb in the text. Therefore the transla-
tions suggested by Jenni (1968, p. 44) are not the same as
those suggested by Koehler and Baumgartner (1958, p. 794).
last statement reference is made to a few passages where the suggested following-up of the judgment is clear, e.g.

1 Kings 8:32  "When a man wrongs his neighbour and he is adjured to take an oath, and the adjuration is made before thy altar in this house, then do thou hear in heaven and act: be thou thy servant's judge, condemning (רֵא כ Hiph.) the guilty (רָשָׁא כ) and bringing his deeds upon his own head, acquitting (שָׁדַי כ Hiph.) the innocent (שָׂדִי כ) and awarding him as his innocence may deserve" (NEB).

The declarative aspect is not the fundamental nuance of the meaning, but rather "jemand gerecht (schuldig) sein lassen, als gerecht (schuldig) behandeln" (Jenni, 1968, p. 45).

Of course, there are marked exceptions to Jenni's views, and no doubt he finds himself in a difficult position with passages such as Prov. 17:15:

Prov. 17:15  "He who justifies (שָׁדַי כ Hiph.) the wicked (רֵא כ) and he who condemns (רֵא כ Hiph.) the righteous (שָׂדִי כ) are both alike an abomination to the Lord" (RSV).

The action is not any more in accordance with the object - it is indeed so that the object is classified subjectively into a new category. This kind of action is however supposed to be expressed by the Pi'el (Jenni, 1968, p. 44). Jenni admits that there are passages such as these, and comments that "das Gerechtsprechen oder Schuldigsprechen des Falschen ergibt, der Negation eines analytischen Urteils entsprechend, ein Paradox, das durch erneute Negation abgedwendet werden kann" (1968, p. 45) and then - typical of Jenni's way of explanation - reference is made to another passage where this phenomenon of the diversion of a paradox really occurs, viz. Ex. 23:7.
Ex. 23:7 "Avoid all lies, and do not cause the death of the innocent and the guiltless; for \(^{11}\) the Lord will never acquit (gdq Hiph.) the guilty (rāṣā-c)" (NEB).

In Ex. 23:7 a negation is used, but not in Prov. 17:15. The view that we have a paradox in Prov. 17:15 and Ex. 23:7 is only tenable on acceptance of Jenni's scheme of the verbal themes (cf. 5.4.3.7.2). In Prov. 17:15 there is no negation "to avert the paradox" and the declarative sense of the Hiph'il is above dispute. A wicked person is justified and a righteous person is condemned. Jenni's thesis that the object in the Hiph'il is always a person who has been characterized by the circumstances or in so many words as righteous (in the case of gdq Hiph.) or wicked (in the case of rāṣū Hiph.), cannot stand up to the test in a case such as Prov. 17:15. In other passages the untenability of his claims becomes equally clear, e.g. in Ex. 22:8 where the adjectives are lacking:

Ex. 22:8 (NEB 22:9) "In every case of law-breaking involving an ox, an ass, or a sheep, a cloak, or any lost property which may be claimed, each party shall bring his case before God; \(^{12}\) he whom God declares to be in the wrong (rāṣū Hiph.) shall restore twofold to his neighbour" (NEB).

This passage should now be compared with Dt. 25:1 (vide supra) where the adjective "guilty" (rāṣū-c) occurs with the verb. If it could have been said in connection with Dt. 23:1 that the object of the condemnation has already been characterized as guilty, then we have an exactly

\(^{11}\) Jenni accepts the emendation of first to second person in the verb. This emendation has no bearing on the present argument, but there is no necessity for it, as far as the evidence of both the versions and the content is concerned (Fensham, 1970, pp. 175-76).

opposite situation in Ex. 22:8. The parties are brought before God (without mention of who the guilty one is) in order that God should decide and declare who is guilty. The verb cannot be interpreted as having any other meaning. True, there is reference to the effect of the object's being found guilty ("he shall restore twofold . . .") but this only follows after he has been declared guilty. Jenni simply adds up the effects or contributions of various contexts on the verb under examination and seems to regard the contextual details as the particular semantic content of the verb.¹³

Even more evidence against Jenni's claims can be gained from an examination of the Pi'el passages where the declarative Pi'el is supposed always to imply a subjective judgment; the object is not supposed to be characterized by the quality expressed in the declarative verb. This is however not the situation in a passage such as Lev. 13:44:

Lev. 13:44 "(43) Then the priest shall examine him, and if the diseased swelling is reddish-white . . . (44) he is a leprous man, he is unclean (šāmā'); the priest must pronounce him unclean (šm' Pi.); his disease is in his head" (RSV).

In so many words, the object of the Pi'el verb is characterized as unclean beforehand. This is however the position expected if a Hiph'il had been used.

It may further be remarked that when we learn in Dt. 25:1 that the innocent (sadīq) is acquitted (sad Hiph.), the adjective may, without forcing an argument, indicate that the judges will acquit the person whom they regard and declare as innocent. In any case, it would be

¹³ The same situation as in Ex. 22:8 occurs in other passages with ḫāq Hiph.: Dt. 25:1; Ps. 94:21; Job 9:20, 10:2, 32:3, 34:17, 34:29, 40:8.
pointless to maintain that the person of whom it is already clear that he is innocent, is declared innocent.

From this discussion it has become clear that Jenni's claims cannot at all be substantiated. This was to be expected, because they rest on false contrast. Jenni's claim that the examination of the declarative estimative character of the Pi'el (and the lack thereof in the Hiph'il) amounts to a yet stronger affirmation of the view that the Pi'el as factitive stands in relation to an adjectivally expressed condition (Jenni, 1968, pp. 42-43) - in contrast with the Hiph'il as causative of a verbally expressed event - should be reversed. The fact that a real declarative Hiph'il undoubted exists, provides yet more evidence AGAINST the contrast verbally expressed event vs. adjectivally expressed condition! The general position of standard grammars, viz. that the Hiph'il verbal theme could express a real declarative of estimative sense, is still correct.

As far as the explanation of the declarative sense of the Hiph'il is concerned, there is still difference of opinion among scholars. It has been mentioned that various scholars regard the declarative sense of the Hiph'il as merely a subvariety of the causative, while others regard it as a subvariety of the denominative. Recently a discussion has arisen as to the validity of each of these views. Hillers (1967) and Jenni (1968) both stated their views on the two possible ideas as to the origin of the declarative sense.

According to Jenni only the Pi'el has a real declarative or estimative sense. Although the declarative Pi'el occurs mostly with verbs that can be related to an intransitive Qal, it can also occur with denominative verbs, e.g. בָּרֵי ("call blessed") from בָּרֵי ("blessed, happy") and שָׁטִּים ("detest as unclean") from שָׁטִּים ("detested idol or..."
Because of these few cases, however, we do not have to regard all declarative Pi'el forms as denominated from adjectives, because the factitive stands in the closest connection with adjectives. The particularity of the declaritive-estimative sense as against the factitive should not be explained by way of a kind of free relationship between the denominated verb and its corresponding noun in the opinion that the ordinary Pi'el can express only the bringing about of a condition and the denominated Pi'el in addition also "ein blosses Reden und Denken" (Jenni, 1968, p. 41). Jenni furthermore regards it as unnecessary to bring the notations "make" and "declare (authoritatively)" in an ingenious way on the same level, by thinking of the Ancient Near Eastern idea of the "innnewohnende Mächtigkeit" of the word. The idea could then be that to declare a thing in words amounts to bringing it about in fact. Jenni quite correctly maintains that an explanation along these lines would not account for the estimative sense of the Pi'el (1968, p. 41).

According to his conception of the factitive, Jenni brings the declarative Pi'el in relation to adjectives, e.g. Saddiq ("righteous, just"). He maintains that in the factitive only the condition, as it can be expressed by an adjective, is of importance, and not the action that has led to the condition. Whether the "adjektivische Stellungnahme" becomes possible through an action as "Seinsveränderung" or by way of a declarative formula or by way of a mental act, is for the factitive irrelevant because it is only interested in the result (Jenni, 1968, p. 42). We therefore see that Jenni finds the connecting link between declarative and factitive in the fact that the factitive expresses the bringing about of a condition.

Hillers (1967) expresses himself against the term "declarative pi'el/hiph'îl" for the category of verbs concerned. A category "de-
clarative Pi'el" could not account for a case like 'šr Pi', Hillers argues, because "declarative Pi'el implies a Qal or an adjective which
denotes the quality and in this case there is no corresponding Qal or
adjective. This points to a flaw in the traditional explanation and
classification (1967, pp. 321-22). Furthermore, a category "declarative
Pi'el/Hiph'il" is misleading: the declarative function is regular­ly sought in the conjugation at grammatical level, rather than in the
particular words, at the lexical level. According to Hillers, the
idea that a verb becomes declarative by putting it in the Hiph'il theme
(as for example transitives of intransitive verbs are formed) is incor­rect. The idea that the declarative sense is in some or other way
logically connected with the causative of factitive, Hillers rejects as
without any grounds (1967, p. 322). His reason for this is quite
interesting and can be explained through an example:

Prov. 17:15 "He who justifies (sqd Hiph.) the wicked and he who con­demns (ršc Hiph.) the righteous

are both alike an abomination to the Lord" (RSV).

Hillers comments that to improve the character of the wicked man or to
make him righteous (causative) would be an admirable thing and no abo­minatio to the Lord; to declare him righteous however, would be an
abomination. Therefore the declarative Hiph'il can have no relation
with the causative (1967, p. 322). Hillers himself thinks it possible
to account for the fact that the verbs dealt with are Pi'el's and
Hiph'il's, by regarding them as a subclass of denominative verbs (1967,
p. 322). Their peculiar sense, viz. "to say, declare, think that some­one is such and such" - in contrast with the meaning of other denomena­tives - is due to the fact that these are not ordinary denominatives,
but "a subclass based on certain fixed locutions" (ibid.). These locu­tions are of the following kind: When the priest went through the
rites of purification in the case of someone who had leprosy and found him ritually pure or unclean, he (probably) used a fixed formula - if the person was found unclean, it is likely that the formula תָּהוֹר הָעָם would have been used, (cf. Lev. 13:44) or if he was found pure תָּהוֹר הָעָם (cf. Lev. 13:44). To the Pi'el and Hiph'el in the sphere of ritual law אַדְנָק and יְרֵכֶא Hiph. in the sphere of civil law would correspond. The Pi'el and Hiph'el verbs have been derived from these fixed formulas by way of denomination (Hillers, 1967, pp. 322-23).

It has to be acknowledged that both Jenni and Hillers are correct in denying the existence of a logical or "Ancient Near Eastern" connection between the declarative and the causative or factitive senses. There is no evidence in favour of the suggestions of various grammarians in this connection (mentioned earlier in this paragraph). As far as the rest of their arguments are concerned, both Jenni and Hillers encounter unsolvable problems. Jenni regards אַדְנָק Pi. and יְרֵכֶא Pi. as denominative verbs (1968, p. 41), but an argument can easily be constructed according to which they are not denominative. Seeing that "denominative" implies a diachronic perspective, reference can be made to the Akkadian G-formation ṣaqišu with the meaning "be unclean" and the Hebrew Niph'al of יְרֵכֶא "be abhorred" with the statement that corresponding Qal intransitives could have occurred in a larger corpus of Hebrew. To employ the designation "denominative" in synchronic description is to introduce a diachronic perspective that makes the description speculative. Furthermore, Jenni accepts only a declarative Pi'el and he connects the declarative sense closely with the factitive character of the Pi'el where only the result is of importance. If we, however, accept that there is a declarative Hiph'el - as has been demonstrated to be necessary earlier in this paragraph - Jenni's explanation of the Pi'el becomes untenable. After all, in the Hiph'el not only the result or
condition is of importance. Jenni’s interpretation of Pi’el and Hiph’il does not leave room for a declarative Hiph’il and therefore does not explain the declarative sense of the Hiph’il adequately.

Hillers, too, makes much use of the designation “denominative”, which makes his analysis also speculative in certain aspects. In this connection we repeatedly find him using words such as “probably”, “likely” (1967, pp. 322). In the case of כְּּֽהִּי Hiph. Hillers has to admit that a formula such as he suggests, does not really exist in the preserved corpus of ancient Hebrew and that it is unlikely that such a phrase existed as a fixed formula in the language (1967, p. 323) seemingly because it does not as formula fit either the cultic or the civil sphere suitably. This declarative Hiph’il verb remains unexplained in terms of Hillers’s discussion.

There is still one important question that is left unanswered by Hillers’s treatment of the declarative - or as he suggests “delocutive” - verbs. According to Hillers the fact that the verbs dealt with occur in the Pi’el or Hiph’il theme, can be accounted for by regarding them as denominatives, or rather a subclass of denominatives (1967, p. 322). In other words, because they are denominatives, they appear in the Pi’el or Hiph’il. However, if the designation “denominative” is employed in linguistic explanation, it has to be kept in mind that various grammars list denominatives for Pi’el and Hiph’il as well as for the Qal theme (Bauer and Leander, 1918, p. 289; Gesenius et al., 1966, p. 114). Gerber (1896) even finds 39 examples of denominatives in words occurring only in the Qal (pp. 4-21). If it is now maintained that the Pi’el and Hiph’il are used because the verbs dealt with are denominatives, the question may rightly be put as to why no declarative-estimative verbs appear in the Qal theme. Earlier in this study it has been
maintained that the alleged denominative character of Pi'el and Hiph'il is no characteristic of these verbal themes (3.3). We therefore see that Hiller's account of the delocutive verbs is not completely above criticism.

At this point it seems necessary to raise the question: Why is it necessary to give a diachronic or historical explanation of the declarative-estimative (Pi'el and) Hiph'il? Are all the various efforts to connect the declarative sense logically or historically with the causative/factitive or supposed denominative sense not merely symptoms of the excessive (and sometimes harmful) tendency to explain the past of the word rather than giving attention to its actual use (cf. 3.3)? In this connection some of the remarks of Hiller's are of the utmost importance: the declarative or delocutive words were used in connection with certain fixed formulas, e.g. when someone was declared innocent or guilty in civil law (Hiller, 1967, p. 322). (Incidentally, note that a derivation of these words from fixed locutions or formulas cannot account for the estimative sense which is clearly very closely connected with it; vide infra.) The general sphere of the use of the words has to be studied, and it should receive mention that they were used in connection with formulas such as "he is innocent". Whether the declarative verb has been derived from these formulas is uncertain, and for descriptive study irrelevant. Jenni's insistence on the fact that the declarative Pi'el is related to certain qualities (1968, p. 42), is quite correct, but in exactly what way, we do not know. In our linguistic description it should suffice to say that next to ordinary factitive or causative function, the Hiph'il also served the function of expressing a declarative or estimative function.

Hiller's criticism is particularly directed against the term "de-
clarative" because it is "not a useful or apt term as it has been applied to biblical Hebrew" (1967, p. 323). Following Benveniste's explanation of verbs of this kind, Hillers suggests the designation "de
delocutive". It is to be doubted whether this designation is any better than the traditional terms declarative-estimative (or -putative), because Benveniste coined it to express the idea "say something of (to) someone" and even "declare ..." (Hillers, 1967, p. 320). The estimative sense is, however, closely connected to the declarative and a term "delocutive" would not account for a verb such as Hệqal (gll Hiph.) "regard as light, belittle" (Williams, 1967, p. 30). It therefore seems best to retain the traditional term "declarative-estimative".

If we use the terms suggested by Gruber (cf. 2.5.4), we have to regard the declarative-estimative sense of the (Pi'el and) Hiph'il as a non-productive word extension, i.e. in Hebrew the declarative or estimative sense of a word can be expressed by putting it in the (Pi'el or) Hiph'il theme. Note however that the declarative sense occurs next to the ordinary causative or factitive sense, so that sdq Hiph. can also have the meaning "do justice towards, treat as guiltless, help one to his right" (Koehler and Baumgartner, 1958, p. 794). In each case the exact sense of the word will have to be decided by taking the context into account.

4.5 THE INTRANSITIVE HIPHERL

The occurrence of intransitive verbs in the Hiph'il is certainly one of the most problematic issues if we take into account the way in which traditional grammars have handled them. Especially if the basic or fundamental meaning of the Hiph'il is regarded as the causative - a designation which implies transitivity - many ingenious efforts are made in order to account for intransitive forms. Gesenius and Kautzsch
provide us with the widest variety of explanations (Gesenius et al., 1966, p. 145). A certain number of verbs are explained as denominatives "which express the bringing out, the producing of a thing, and so are properly regarded as causatives", e.g. (to take intransitives) šmʾl Hiph. ("to go to the left"), qrn Hiph. ("to have horns"), šmn Hiph. ("to grow fat"), šlg Hiph. ("to become snow-white"). The remainder of the intransitive Hiphʾil verbs are explained by Gesenius and Kautzsch under a general heading "inwardly transitive" or "internal transitive". The designation "intensive Hiphʾil" is also used - quite puzzling and of course not at all justified. Unfortunately the latter term has not been more closely defined: one would like to see in exactly which way the "intensity" becomes realized!

In order to grasp exactly what Gesenius and Kautzsch understand under "inwardly transitive", we have to quote them at some length. Firstly, we notice that they connect this term with the causative and transitive ideas expressed by the Hiphʾil. Among these two ideas "are included ... according to the Hebrew point of view (and that of the Semitic languages in general ...), a series of actions and ideas, which we have to express by periphrasis, in order to understand their being represented by the Hiphʾil-form" (Gesenius et al., 1966, p. 145). Three groups of verbs fall under this general definition: (a) "Hiphʾil stems which express the obtaining or receiving of a concrete or abstract quality", e.g. (with Hiphʾil meanings given) hzq "to be strong", ṭrkh "to be long (to acquire length)" (ibid.), ṭtq "to cry out", ṭrm "to become red", ṭrš "to be silent"; (b) "Stems which express in Hiphʾil the entering into a certain condition and, further, the being in the same", e.g. ybd ṭ颖 "to become dry", ṭqṭ "to become quiet", ṭrb "to come near"; (c) "Stems which express action in some particular direction", e.g. ṭēt "to err", ṭbt "to act well, to do good", ṭkl "to act wisely",...
"to act godlessly", ṣḥt "to act corruptly". Before critically discussing this representation of the matter, we may look at the way other grammarians deal with the same intransitive verbs.

Brockelmann sets up two main classes for intransitive Hiph'il verbs: (a) "Das Kausativ ist ... intransitiv, wenn das zu bewirkende Objekt nicht die Handlung eines andern, sondern ein am Subjekt selbst in die Erscheinung tretender Zustand ist" (1908 I, p. 527) or elsewhere "dass ein Zustand am Subj. in Erscheinung tritt" (1956, p. 36), e.g. (in the Hiph'il) ḫrs "to be silent", ṣqt "Ruhe halten", ṣmn "become (grow) fat"; (b) the object of the causative (sic.) can further be "eine bestimmte Art, zu handeln" (1908 I, p. 527) or expressed in another way "dass das Subj. eine bestimmte Art zu handeln in Aktion setzt" (1956, p. 36), e.g. ḥt ’ "sin, err", yṭb “act well, do good”, ṣkl "to act wisely".

Juon explains an intransitive meaning mainly by saying that the action rests with the subject (i.e. (a) of Brockelmann) or that it introduces a specific way of acting, e.g. (in the Hiph'il) ṣmn "become fat", ḫrs "to be silent", ṣqt "to become quiet", yṭb "to act well, do good". A few other intransitives are explained by way of the so-called "ellipse of the object", e.g. ṣḥt Hiph. "fait mauvaise (l'action) = agir mal" (1923, p. 123). According to Williams, the intransitive action can be explained sufficiently as follows: It is "a use which indicates the entry into a state of condition and the remaining in the same", e.g. (in the Hiph'il) yḥb ”become dry" or "the exhibiting of a state or quality", e.g. ṣkl "act wisely", ṭṣc "act wickedly" (1967, pp. 30-31).

In the first group (as explained by Brockelmann and Gesenius) we notice that Brockelmann states more explicitly the causative character
of verbs under discussion as does Gesenius and Kautzsch. The various
opinions with regard to the same verbs may now be compared: "”mn Hiph.
("become, grow fat") is regarded by Gesenius and Kautzsch as a denomina-
tive (1966, p. 145), by Brockelmann as an action which is effected to
the subject himself (1908 II, p. 527; 1956, p. 36), and by Joüon also
as of the latter kind (1923, p. 123); Hiph. "to err, sin" is re-
garded by Gesenius and Kautzsch as "action in some particular direction
(1966, p. 145) (!) but by Brockelmann as indicating a specific way of
acting (1908 I, p. 527; 1956, p. 36); Hiph. "be, become sweet"
is explained by Gesenius and Kautzsch as expressing "the obtaining or
receiving" of a concrete or abstract quality (1966, p. 145), but by
Williams as "the entry into a state or condition and the remaining in
the same" (1967, pp. 30-31).

In addition to this diversity of opinion, it may be mentioned that
Bauer and Leander do not make much of the so-called "internal transi-
tive" meaning and regard nearly all the verbs discussed above as deno-
minatives, even though they may be denominatives formed by way of ana-
logy to other forms. Thus, e.g. ytb Hiph. ("to do good, act well") is
a denotiveative from tob ("good") and Hiph. ("become strong") as a
denotiveative from hasaq ("strong") (1918, p. 294). However, next to
the denotiveative verbs often stands "ein deverbales", e.g. Hiph.
"make strong, strengthen" (ibid.).

The examples indicate quite clearly the perils to which a treat-
ment of the verbal themes in terms of "denominatives" and "internal
transitives" (as in reality a kind of causative) gives rise. In these
terms no certain proof can ever be given, because the process of the
formation of these words is unknowable to us. An analysis along
these lines will always be speculative and - it has to be admitted -
we learn nothing more about the meanings of the words concerned. But
even more substantial criticism can be levelled against the methods outlined above - when we inquire into the exact contents of the meanings. Thus we may compare the use of Qal and Hiph'îl of a few verbs:

Jer. 48:11 "All his life long, Moab has lain undisturbed (šqî Qal) like wine settled on its lees" (NEB);

Jer. 49:23 "Hamath and Arpad are confounded, ...

they melt in fear, they are troubled like the sea which cannot keep quiet (šqît Hiph.) (RSV).

Ex. 16:20 "Some, however, did not listen to Moses; they kept part of it till morning, and it became full of maggots and stank b'yî Qal (NEB);

Ex. 16:24 "So they put it aside till morning, as Moses had commanded, and it did not stink (b'yî Hiph.)," nor did maggots appear in it" (NEB).

Gen. 26:8 "When he had been there a long time (ʾrk Qal + yāmîm = when his days were long), Abimelech ... looked out of a window ...

Ex. 20:12 "Honour your father and your mother, that your days may be long (ʾrk Hiph. + yāmîm) in the land which the Lord your God gives you" (RSV).

It is not clear how the designation "inwardly transitive" can be maintained for the Hiph'îl in cases such as these where the Hiph'îl verb - exactly like the Qal - expresses a simple and straightforward in-

14. Koehler and Baumgartner's suggestion (1958, p. 106) that the Hiph'îl be translated as "grow stinking" as against the Qal "stink" only points to the tendency of distinguishing in some other way between the Qal and the Hiph'îl. It is clear that there is no grammatical difference in meaning between the two passages where the verb is used - both can be translated as "stink" or "grow stinking".
transitive idea. In the Hiph'il the sense connected with a designation such as "inwardly transitive", namely "to acquire length" (Gesenius et al., 1966, p. 145), is by no means clear from the context, in any case not in distinction from verbs in the Qal theme. Likewise Koehler and Baumgartner's proposed translation "sich als lang erweisen ... prove long" (1958, p. 87) seems to be a concession to the traditional view of the verbal themes, viz. that the intransitive sense in the Hiph'il has to be logically connected with the causative sense. There are no grounds for a translation "prove long".

It would, however, also be wrong to abandon the term "internal transitive Hiph'il" completely as if it were applicable to no word at all. There are cases where it serves quite satisfactorily, e.g. Ps. 56:7 "they conceal themselves" (gpn Hiph. (cf. Dahood, 1970 III, p. 389; Kraus, 1966 I, p. 408). What is actually asserted here, is that the words which have traditionally (in some grammars) been included in this class, do not all fall under this group. As has been shown above, it would be best rather to consider the other words to be examples of unpredictability with regard to the verbal themes. In other words, these words occur in the Hiph'il because of some or other, at present inaccessible, process.

4.6 **COMPOUND CAUSATIVE CONSTRUCTIONS**

Earlier on (2.5.4) the traditional lexicon was presented as follows: the lexical attachment component captures the syntactic and semantic elements of the generated base tree and maps or lexicalizes it into morphemes, i.e. into a language in terms of the traditional elements of syntax (Gruber, 1967, pp. 5, 19). In this way we may regard "to show" as a "lexicalized" causative of "to see". By using the expression "make ... see", one would have had a "non-lexicalized" causa-
tive construction (Lyons, 1968, pp. 368-69), but the meaning would have been exactly the same. One could also have spoken of "compound causative constructions". Of course, compound constructions occur over a much wider field than merely in the causative, e.g.

Hos. 9:9 "They have deeply corrupted (Hiph. + Pi. Perf.) as in the days of Gibeah" (ASV).

In this example the first verb serves to intensify the actual verb. Similarly, ~wb is often used as auxiliary verb bearing the meaning "again" (cf. Holladay, 1958, pp. 66-72):

Judges 19:7 "When he rose to go, his father-in-law urged him to stay, and again he stayed for the night (~wb Qal + lyn Qal)" (NEB).

Several other verbs are used in more or less the same way together with other verbs.

For the purpose of the present study it is important to note that there is no difference in meaning between compound causative constructions and lexicalized causatives. The underlying semantic and syntactical associations are identical. In Hebrew ġsh and ntn are used to form the causative of other verbs, e.g.:

Ezek. 36:27 "I will put my spirit into you and make you conform ġsh (1 sing. + hlk 2 pl.) to my statutes, keep my laws and live by them" (NEB).

The verb ġsh very clearly serves the purpose of forming a causative, although a Hiph'il of hlk (of which many examples exist) would have expressed exactly the same meaning.

Similarly, ntn is used to express the causative of a verb, usual-
ly in conjunction with the infinitive of the verb, e.g.

2 Chron. 32:11 "Is not Hezekiah misleading you, that he may give you over to die (ntn + mut Qal) by famine and by thirst . . . " (RSV).

At the same time, a Hiph'il of mut was available, with exactly the same meaning, viz. "cause to die" (cf. Prov. 21:25). The same goes for Hos. 5:4 (sw), where the Hiph'il expresses the same meaning.

However, in most cases the construction with ntn expresses the idea of "allow that, allow to". This is an idea that is also expressed by the Hiph'il.

Judges 3:28 "they ... allowed (ntn + cbr Qal) no man to cross" (NEB) (cf. cbr Hiph. with exactly the same meaning in Neh. 2:7).

2 Sam.21:10 "She allowed no bird to set upon them (ntn + nwh Qal) by day nor any wild beast by night" (NEB) (Cf. nwh Hiph. with the sense "allow" in Prov. 5:11, Ps. 105:14 and 1 Chron. 16:21).

In like way other verbs are constructed, e.g.

dw': Ex. 12:23, Joshua 10:19, Judges 15:1, 1 Kings 15:17, 2 Chron. 20:10
hlk: Ex. 3:19, Numbers 22:13
ys': 1 Kings 15:17
ngC: Gen. 20:6
qwm: 1 Sam. 24:6
cc Hiph.: Gen. 31:7
sw: 1 Sam. 18:2

It would therefore be completely justifiable to conclude that two different linguistic constructions, which actually express identical meanings, are dealt with in this case.
5.1 INTRODUCTION

In this chapter verbs will be discussed that bear one main characteristic, namely that of identical or near-identical meaning in both of the formations Pi'el and Hiph'il. Judging from the treatments of various other scholars, verbs belonging to quite different groups will be treated here. This is not to say that a classification of verbs into different groups according to the meaning of the corresponding Qal - with all the difficulties involved in determining whether a Qal is transitive or intransitive 1) - is of no value at all. On the contrary, good use can be made of this kind of classification in determining the tendencies in word-formation within the lexicon. The proposals and solutions of scholars will also be discussed within their general framework of classification. Later, however, it will be seen that a clear "systematisation" of the Hiph'il - as well as the other verbal themes - does not merely rest on a new classification of verbs, but on a totally new attitude to the Hebrew (and Semitic) verbal system.

5.2 THE POSSIBILITY OF A CAUSATIVE PI'EL

Although the Hiph'il is regarded as the causative verbal theme par excellence, it is also recognised by grammarians that there are cases where the Pi'el, too, shows a causative meaning in relation to the Qal. Some grammarians only employ the term "causative" as a designation of the idea of causality expressed by the Pi'el (e.g. Beer 1).

1. These problems are treated in an extensive way by Blake in a lengthy article (1903). The whole issue becomes problematic when verbs that are regularly intransitive, sometimes do show an object.
Gesenius and Kautzsch also use this term and they seem to regard this "causative" of the same kind as that expressed by the Hiph'il (Gesenius et al., 1966, p. 141). Williams (1967, p. 30), Bauer and Leander (1918, p. 293), Jouon (1923, p. 117) and Nyberg (1952, p. 221) recognise both a causative and a factitive meaning with verbs in the Pi'el. The term "factitive" is employed by them in order to indicate the function of the Pi'el in forming causatives in relation to a state or condition expressed by the Qal. Of the two terms under discussion, Moscati uses only "factitive" in his definition of the stem with doubled middle radical (1964, p. 124), but later on in this chapter it will become clear that his characterization is not exhaustive for Hebrew. In any case, most of the grammarians mentioned above still allow for a causative function of the Pi'el next to a primarily factitive one.

Quite recently this point of view has been challenged by Ernst Jenni (1968, p. 22). Jenni vehemently rejects the idea that the Pi'el has any causative meaning at all. According to him it is a wrong understanding of especially lmd that has led to the completely erroneous idea that the Pi'el can always have causative meaning with transitive "Grundstämmen" and that the Pi'el does not distinguish itself in meaning from the causative Hiph'il. He admits that lmd (Qal: "learn") is at present (i.e. in biblical Hebrew) only constructed with an accusative. For us this has the implication that, according to definition, lmd is most certainly transitive. Nevertheless, according to Jenni, the history of lmd is of more importance than its actual use: it is of "intransitiven Herkunft", "von Hause aus intransitiv" (p. 22). But this is an argument from the word's history and contributes nothing to our knowledge of the use of this verb in biblical Hebrew. It is
quite true that the cognate languages suggest the meaning "be accustomed, get accustomed to", from which Jenni wants us to follow the development into "learn", but this is decidedly not the meaning in Hebrew. Here we have the situation that the verb is transitive. It is interesting to note that Aro (1964, p. 116) suggests a like development, but only in the reverse, for בָּשָׁס (Qal: "be strong") on the ground of meanings in cognate languages. His suggestion is that בָּשָׁס is "vielleicht ursprünglich transitiv" (p. 116). It is thus clear that by thinking along the lines suggested by Jenni, we are left in complete uncertainty.

The root לֶמֶד need not concern us very much, because there is no Hiph'îl form containing it. The same can be said of יָלָד, which is most certainly transitive in its actual use in the Qal. There are, however, three other roots that are of considerable import to any systematisation of the Hebrew verbal themes, viz. יָלָד, שָׁמֵר and נָה. All of these are transitive in the Qal (according to most grammarians, e.g. Bauer and Leander (1918, p. 292)) and occur in the Pi'él as well as the Hiph'îl with a causative meaning in both of these verbal themes. In accordance with the whole purpose of his book, namely to illustrate that the Pi'él is a theme that stands in distinctive opposition to the other themes (1968, p. 275), Jenni tries to prove that in reality these cases do not point to a causative Pi'él.

The root יָלָד (Qal: "bear, bring forth") occurs only once as finite verb in the Pi'él formation, viz. Ex. 1:16: "When you are attending the Hebrew women in childbirth ..." In this translation the particle 'et is regarded as nota accusativi. To the mind of Jenni, however, this is wrong. There is already a Hiph'îl with the unmistakably causative meaning "beget, cause to bring forth", and therefore the Pi'él
has to be interpreted otherwise. 2) Jenni now suggests that the particle 'et should be understood as the preposition with the meaning "with", resulting in "wenn ihr bei den Hebräerinnen Geburtshilfe leistet, so achte auf das Kind ..." (p. 211). The verb in the Pi'el is then a "Resultativ" with the following development of meaning: "(ein Kind) geboren machen = Geburtshilfe leisten" (ibid.).

This proposal is to be doubted seriously. Although the following case is not completely analogous and the verb "help" in Koehler and Baumgartner’s translation "help to bring forth" (1958, p. 381) is most likely a weakening of the two basic ideas of the causative formation, viz. "cause" and "allow", we may compare the use of the verb בָּרֵךְ (Qal: "help, succour, support"). This verb is constructed mostly with a direct accusative, expressed by the pronominal suffix added to the verb. The nota accusativi is employed three times: Jos. 1:14, Joshua 10:33 and Is. 41:6. In Is. 41:6 we read: "Each workman helps the others." בָּרֵךְ is also used quite a few times with the preposition לְ, e.g. 2 Sam. 21:17 "but Abishai ••• came to David's help", and even with בֵּין ("with") in 1 Chr. 12:22 "from day to day men came in to help David". Through the use of the last preposition we have come very near to Jenni's proposal, but nevertheless 'et ("with") is nowhere used in connection with "help". It is thus clear that Jenni's proposal is improbable. Pi'el יְלַד is indeed used with an accusative and may safely be said to be a causative of the same kind as the Hiph'ıl.

There are two more verbs in the Pi'el formation that may be regarded as causatives. Thus we have בָּרֵךְ, occurring twice in the Pi'el with

2. Later on in this chapter (5.4.2.1.2) mention will again be made of this - in the present writer's opinion incorrect - idea that there cannot be two linguistic entities expressing the same meaning in one language.
the meaning "(cause to hear), assemble" (Koehler and Baumgartner, 1958, p. 991), e.g. in 1 Sam. 15:4 "Thereupon Saul called the levy..."

In the Hiph'il there are three passages out of a total of 63 with the same meaning which we have in the Pi'el. Next to a possibility of denomination - only mentioned but not worked out in detail - Jenni wants us to keep in mind "den intransitiven Hintergrund des Verbs ṣămîn" (1968, p. 220). We should (according to Jenni) perhaps start with the secondary meaning "obey, be obedient" and from that conclude to an adjective "obedient" (which in biblical Hebrew does not exist). Jenni admits that a definite explanation is not possible, but to posit a causative function for the Pi'el "widerspricht aller Erfahrung und ergäbe mit hören lassen = verkünden auch keine präzise Bedeutung" (1968, p. 220). The latter part of the quotation, incidentally, furnishes no proof at all: the causative function posited for the Pi'el (or the Hiph'il) need not be logically causative. As to a development of meaning from the Qal "hear", it is clear that the Pi'el may rightly be characterized as causative, resulting in a meaning exactly the same as in the mentioned cases of the Hiph'il.

Jenni's argument in the case of năš (Qal: "forget"; Pi: "make forget") is just as unconvincing (1968, p. 228). It may be quite true that the vocalization of the Pi'el in Gen. 41:51 (naššâni) is due to the name Manasseh (mĕnaššē), but then we should remember that any new verb will fit into the general pattern of the language. This fact is acknowledged elsewhere by Jenni, viz. in his treatment of the so-called denominative verbs, and he is quite explicit about this: "Ist namentlich das Verbum einmal gebildet, so darf man annehmen, dass es sich auch analog zu den andern Verben verhält und den gleichen

3. 1 Kings 15:22; Jer. 50:29, 51:27.
Regeln der kategorialen Semasiologie (z.B. in der Frage der Funktion des Pi'el) unterworfen ist wie jene" (1968, p. 264). Were a causative Pi'el impossible according to the speaker's knowledge of Hebrew, even such a play on words would have been unbearable.

To adduce the last example as crown witness for a causative function of the Pi'el would indeed be going too far (cf. Jenni, 1968, p. 228), but the joint findings in five cases (ımd, ıp, yld, šm and nędh) cannot but point to a definite causative function of the Pi'el. The term "causative" is then used to designate Pi'el verbs that are transitive in their corresponding (i.e. "with the same root") Qal forms.

There is still another verb that has a definite causative function in the Pi'el, viz. ydC. Jenni tries to argue this case away by saying that the meaning is not "jemand etwas wissen lassen" but "sachkundig machen" (1968, p. 235). The Pi'el is ostensibly not a causative of ydC Qal. On the contrary, it has to be totally separated from the Qal and should be regarded as a denominative totally independent of the Qal.4) It is quite true that the same meaning we find in Job 38:12 does not occur in the Hiph'ɨl verbal theme, and the same applies to the conjectured form in Ps. 104:19, which is accepted by the NEB, but is, however, not accredited strongly on textual grounds (Kraus, 1966, p. 701). Nevertheless, some criticism can be levelled against Jenni's argument: the explanation "make known" ("sachkundig machen") as against "make someone know something" ("jem. etw. wissen lassen") does not only pertain to the Pi'el cases. This idea of factiticity pertains

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4. In some cases Jenni seems to accept two different processes of denomination with one and the same formation or verbal theme, e.g. "die beiden deutlich denominierten Bedeutungen ..." (1968, p. 276).
equally to the Hiph'il, e.g. Ex. 18:20 "... and teach them how they must behave ..." Should we paraphrase, we may safely do it as follows: "... and make known to them (i.e. make something yādūa) the way in which they should behave (walk) ..." This, however, is the kind of argumentation which Jenni presents in favour of a clear factitive meaning of the Pi'el (1968, p. 235). Therefore the Hiph'il in Ex. 18:20 can equally be regarded as factitive of yādūa, especially if we take into account the use of the preposition lā. It thus seems best to regard the one certain and one conjectured Pi'el as causatives as much as are the Hiph'il forms. Otherwise the term factitive should be used for both, but unfortunately this term has come to have a restricted meaning, namely in relation to Qal verbs expressing a state or condition. Therefore we keep to the term "causative" for the Pi'el theme of yādūa. The meaning, then, is not as clearly causative as it is in the Hiph'il, but it might quite as well have come to be used as a "technical term" used specially for heavenly bodies.

By way of conclusion for this paragraph, then, it may be said that a causative Pi'el existed in biblical Hebrew.

5.3 PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEM, UNTIL 1967

Various solutions to the problem of apparently similar meanings in the Pi'el and the Hiph'il have been proposed in the course of time. Even to try to mention all the explanations given by scholars would be quite impossible, because this problem has turned up in nearly every commentary on a book of the Old Testament. In these cases the commentator had time and again to account for the appearance of a consonantal root in two different verbal themes with no clear difference in meaning, since the critical apparatus of Kittel's Biblia Hebraica abounds in suggestions towards textual emendation of Pi'el in Hiph'il or vice ver-
sa. It is clear that not all of these proposals towards a solution can be discussed. Only the most important and far-reaching proposals will receive our attention in order to draw a picture representative of the different solutions.

Much more attention can be given to the proposals of grammars in this connection. It seems best to classify the different attitudes of grammarians in so far as they express themselves on this issue. There are three main lines along which the problem has been approached.

5.3.1 Differentiation in Meaning

Bauer and Leander assert that only rarely does there exist a Pi'el and a Hiph'il form of the same root, with the same meaning, next to each other (1918, p. 293). As an example of this they present 'bd (Pi'el and Hiph'il: "vernichten"). Nevertheless, they declare that usually only the one or the other is in use "oder sie weichen in der Bedeutung voneinander ab". For the last statement we are referred to the following case: kbd Qal "be heavy", Pi'el "honour", Hiph'il "make heavy, cause to be honoured". As explanation of this whole matter, according to the principles of linguistic theory, is also given, viz. "Die Bedeutung der beiden Stammformen ist hier also differenziert worden, wie das zu geschehen pflegt, wenn eine Sprache für denselben Begriff zwei Ausdrucksweisen besitzt: zum Zwecke schärferer Nuanzierung verteilen die beiden Ausdrucksweisen das Gebiet des Begriffs unter sich" (Bauer and Leander, 1918, p. 293). In other words, a differentiation in meaning is posited where we have seemingly identical meanings. There are according to Bauer and Leander only a few cases where the meanings in the Pi'el and the Hiph'il are the same. The question why these few cases showing identical meaning are still allowed in the language is left unanswered - if we consider the explana-
tion quoted above. But Bauer and Leander's explanation cannot even account fully for the case they advance as illustration. They actually mention both of the meanings "schwer machen" and "zu Ehren bringen" for kbd Hiph'īl. This is also the testimony of Köehler and Baumgartner (1958, p. 419). In this respect we may completely agree with Jenni that the often assumed lexical differentiation of Pi'ēl and Hiph'īl in the meanings "honour" and "make heavy" is not valid (1968, p. 105). It is clear that both of the meanings "honour" and "make insensible, dull" occur in both Pi'ēl and Hiph'īl.5) Later on in this chapter it will be seen that there are many cases where such a differentiation is completely impossible and where Bauer and Leander's suggestions are therefore quite unrealistic.

Another scholar who mentions these differences in meaning, is Nyberg (1952, p. 222). His claims are, however, not as far-reaching as those of Bauer and Leander.

5.3.2 Differentiation in Meaning: Intensive vs. Ordinary

Various scholars try to solve the problem of apparently similar meaning in Pi'ēl and Hiph'īl by maintaining that the Pi'ēl here, too, expresses the intensive of the activity expressed by the Hiph'īl. In the words of Ewald this is "ein merklicher untersach: denn Pi.

5. With the meaning "make dull" we have the Pi'ēl in 1 Sam. 6:6 and the Hiph'īl in Ex. 8:11, 26; 9:34, 10:1; Is. 6:10, Zech. 7:11. With the meaning "honour" - to mention only a few examples - we have the following correlations: Pi'ēl in Is.60:13 "to honour the place", Pr. 4:8 "she will bring you to honour" = Hiph'īl in Is. 8:23 "confer glory on the Way of the Sea" (JB); Pi'ēl in Ps. 91:15 "I will .. bring him to honour", 1 Sam. 2:30 "I will honour those who honour me" = Hiph'īl in Jer. 30:19 "I will raise them to honour". Some of these translations differ slightly from the others, but this is only due to the context. The meaning "honour" is basic in the latter group of forms.
drückt zunächst den Begriff des causativen mit dem Nebenbegriffe der besonderen sorge und thätigkeit aus womit man etwas bewirkt, während ihn Hif-il gang einfach oder sinnlich bezeichnet ..." (Ewald, 1863, p. 315). Again, this distinction pertains only to certain verbs, since there are others where Pi'el and Hiph'il are used next to each other without great difference in meaning (ibid.). Quite a few other scholars share this opinion. Brockelmann mentions the "Nebensinn der Sorge und des Eifers" (1908 I, p. 509; so also 1956, p. 36). In his earlier work it is maintained that this additional meaning is "meist noch" (1908 I, p. 509) attached to the causative - a category including for Brockelmann both factitive and causative as described in 5.2 - but in the later work we learn that this intensive meaning is to be found "immer noch" with the causative (1956, p. 36).

Next to verbs that display a real difference in meaning between Pi'el and Hiph'il (5.3.1), Nyberg maintains that in the case of verbs with both Pi'el and Hiph'il, the Pi'el should be regarded as the intensive of the Hiph'il (1952, p. 225). No real instance of such a difference in meaning is given by Nyberg. It is in fact difficult to see why Nyberg wishes to hang on to the idea of a continuous intensive meaning of the Pi'el in cases such as these under discussion here. The apparently identical meanings in Qal and Hiph'il he indeed regards as identical in most cases (1952, p. 226), and when he deals with the difference between Qal and Pi'el - where the opposition ordinary vs. intensive is most commonly sought - we find the following statement: "The difference between kal and pi is often negligible and the use of the one or the other root - form more a question of style" (1952, p. 220). The fact, therefore, that we have in Nyberg's grammar only a single unmotivated statement as to the distinction between Pi'el and Hiph'il, can only make us realise that this aspect of the verbal system
It is quite interesting to learn why the Pi'el is regarded as the intensive of the Hiph'il by these scholars. This idea clearly stems from the so long uncritically accepted notion that the Pi'el is first and foremost the intensive formation of the corresponding Qal. The phonological phenomenon of the doubling of the middle consonant is supposed to have as semantic counterpart an intensification of the meaning. As Joöon expresses this idea: "L'intensité du sens est très naturellement exprimée par l'allongement de la consonne" (1923, p. 116). Joöon seems to be the only scholar who makes much of this natural correspondence - a hypothesis the untenability of which has been demonstrated in a previous chapter (3.2). Other scholars agree that the Pi'el is primarily an intensive formation, e.g. "The fundamental idea of the Pi'el, to which all the various shades of meaning in this conjugation may be referred, is to busy oneself eagerly with the action indicated by the stem" (Gesenius et al., 1965, p. 141) and "Dieser äußerst häufige stamm drückt ... die gewalt, den eifer, die fertigkeit oder schnelle wiederholung von handlungen aus" (Ewald, 1863, p. 314). It is not deemed necessary here to test the validity of the claim that the Pi'el is intensive in relation to the Qal. Suffice it to say that many of the Pi'el verbs normally

6. Joöon does not go into detail on this subject, but the quotation from his grammar can be approached from two angles, viz. that of linguistic relativity where the phonological phenomenon of the lengthening of the middle radical is supposed to have a necessary counterpart in the system of meaning (cf. 3.2), or that discussed in 3.3 where the value of historical arguments have been assessed (i.e. if the first hypothesis is of some value).

7. Not all scholars share the same opinion in this matter. Christian chooses as point of departure the iterative and denominative function of the Pi'el (1935, pp. 41-45). Most scholars, however, choose the intensive function as point of departure in a description of the Pi'el.
cited as intensive do not in the least appear to be intensive if we approach them from their contexts without traditional biases. Quite recently Jenni (1968) has thoroughly examined this matter and, although his proposals seem equally unacceptable, he has shown clearly that this "romantic notion" is without any foundation. In this Jenni is not at all alone. As early as 1939 Poebel queried the professed intensive character of the Pi'el (1939, p. 65 ff.) and soon after him also Goetze (1942, p. 3). From these studies it is clear that we have to exercise great caution not to let a few cases - conditioned as they may be by context or stylistic use - serve as model for a whole category such as the Pi'el.

The reason why we have to give attention to the function of the Pi'el - here not as in opposition to the Hiph'il, but in its relation to the Qal - is that the distinction discussed in this paragraph stems from the assumed general function of the Pi'el. Where both Pi'el and Hiph'il have a causative (including factitive) function, the opposition Pi'el vs. Hiph'il = intensive causative vs. ordinary causative is connected with the supposed intensive function of the Pi'el. In fact, the causative is derived from the intensive. In the words of Brockelmann: "Diese Bemühung um das Zustandekommen einer Handlung führt ... oft zur kausativen Bedeutung, der aber meist noch der Nebensinn der Sorge und des Eifers anhaftet ..." (1908 I, p. 509) or "Die Bemühung um das Zustandekommen der Handlung führt zur Bedeutung des Kausativen" (1956, p. 36). Roughly the same idea is propounded by Ewald (1863, p. 315) and Gesenius and Kautzsch "The eager pursuit of an action may also consist in urging and causing others to do the same" (1966, p. 141). This proposed development in meaning is however not at all demonstrable, as Bauer and Leander declare (1918, p. 293). It is equally possible
that the meanings of verbal themes and the different meanings within one and the same verbal theme could have come about quite independently.

Subsequently we may test the validity of the theory that the Pi'el differs from the Hiph'il in expressing the causative idea in an intensive way. Seeing that the supporters of this theory - except Brockelmann (1956) - admit that there are verbs where such a distinction is not perceptible, we confine ourselves to verbs for which a distinction is indeed posited, e.g. נַעַל. According to Brockelmann the meaning in 2 Kings 10:6 is "mit Sorge grossziehen" (Pi'el) and in Gen. 19:19 merely "gross machen" (Hiph'il) (1956, p. 36). Ewald, too, advocates this idea (1863, p. 315). The two cases cited by Brockelmann fail to provide ample proof for a distinction as crucial as is propounded here, for in 2 Kings 10:6 we only read that "the royal princes ... were with the nobles of the city who were bringing them up". In Gen. 19:19, rather, we may detect an intensive meaning where Lot is talking to the angels: "You have shown your servant favour and you have added to your unfailing care (= increased your loving kindness) for me by saving my life". In the Pi'el there are many cases where we sense no idea of intensity, e.g. Is. 23:4 where we only have a summary of certain events that have not taken place:

"I have not laboured nor given birth,

nor reared young men

nor brought up young girls" (JB)

In this passage an idea of intensity is quite out of the question, as it is in 1 Chr. 29:12: "thine it is to give power ... to all",

8. The translation of the Jerusalem Bible is preferred, since the NEB deviates markedly from the Hebrew text with "I have no young sons to rear".
Ez. 31:4 "Springs nourished it" (where mayim cannot be said to reveal any particular zeal or concern), Is. 44:14, 51:18, etc.

In Is. 1:2 we may recognize some special concern of Yahweh for his people: "I have sons whom I reared (gdl Pi.) and brought up", but then we must admit that in Is. 9:2 (NEB 9:3) we have a concern of the same kind: "Thou hast ... given them great gladness (= make joy great)" (gdl Hiph.). In Eccl. 1:16 somebody is speaking who shows both zeal and concern in his search for wisdom, but the verb is in the Hiph'il theme: "I have acquired a greater stock of wisdom than any of my predecessors in Jerusalem" (JB). In Eccl. 2:4 we have "I undertook great works" (Hiph.).

From the foregoing examples it is clear that in the case of gdl the Pi'el does not express any idea of intensity, any special zeal or concern, in any case not more than does the Hiph'il. It is possible that Brockelmann's impression of an intensive Pi'el with gdl has been created through the fact that in the Pi'el almost exclusively persons appear as object, whereas in the Hiph'il there is no personal object. In this way an idea of special concern, e.g. of Yahweh for his people, is created easily. In this respect we would be wise to give attention to Barr's analysis of some practices in theological explanation from which it is clear that the relation of a word to its context is not always understood clearly (cf. 3.4). Too often the semantic effects of various contexts on a (Hebrew) word are added up, rather than that an attempt is made to get a clear picture of the specific contributions which a word makes to its context (Barr, 1967, p. 71). It seems very fruitful to apply this distinction to gdl. Yahweh's special concern for his people in Is. 1:2 is not clear merely from the use of the word gdl Pi., but only from the data presented in the next
two verses. In Is. 23:4 (already quoted) no more details are furnished and therefore we sense no special concern or zeal. It is wrong to regard the idea of intensity in Is. 1:2 as the contribution of the word to its context, since in Is. 23:4 no contribution of the kind is made. From this it is clear that the Pi'el cannot in the case of qdl be regarded as a category expressing intensity in relation to the Hiph'il.

Jenni mentions another case where this distinction (intensive causative vs. ordinary causative) does not hold good: "Dass Athalja die Vernichtung der jüdischen Dynastie mit mehr "Sorge und Eifer" betrieben hätte als Jehu diejenige der Baalsverehrer, wird man aus dem unterschiedlichen Gebrauch der Stammformen nicht herauszuhören haben" (1967, p. 145). With this we may well agree.9)

By way of conclusion to this paragraph it appears that the distinction intensive causative (Pi'el) versus ordinary causative (Hiph'il) does not bear examination.

5.3.3 No Difference in Meaning

Certain scholars admit that there is no difference in the meanings of Pi'el and Hiph'il in cases such as are under discussion here.10) As has been mentioned in the previous paragraph, Ewald, in addition to his distinction of intensity, admits that there are verbs where there is no difference between Pi'el and Hiph'il (1863, p. 315). According to him this group consists of verbs with the following roots: kṣ, ṣdq,

9. Jenni cites no source for having made such a statement, but none of the grammars actually makes this distinction with ḫbd. Ewald, for example, discusses ḫbd in connection with the verbs that show no great difference in meaning between Pi'el and Hiph'il (1863, p. 315).
10. An interesting observation is that these viewpoints are found mainly in commentaries, where scholars do not speculate theoretically, but are confronted with facts.
Sperber (1966) opposes the schematising efforts of scholars who want to bring all verbs in relation to the Qal (p. 14). According to him the verbal themes were used interchangeably in order to indicate one and the same meaning without implying the slightest differentiation (1966, pp. 6, 14). In this way he compares passages where the Pi'el or Hiph'IL is used - 12 verbs (as well as one in the passive) are implicated in the discussion. Sperber finds no difference in meaning between Pi'el and Hiph'IL and regards them as being used interchangeably (1966, p. 14). Sperber treats other pairs of verbal themes in the same way.

Dhorme, in his commentary on the book of Job, mentions that the Pi'el and Hiph'IL of כוֹחַ has "similar meaning", viz. "make deviate" (Dhorme, 1967, p. 113).

Zimmerli, in another commentary, is confronted with Ezek. 30:24-25 where הָזְקֵה Pi. is used in verse 24 and הָזְקֵה Hiph. in verse 25:

"Then I will strengthen (הָזְקַה Pi.) the arms of the king of Babylon and put my sword in his hand; but I will break Pharaoh's arms, and he shall lie wounded and groaning before him. I will give strength (הָזְקֵה Hiph.) to the arms of the king of Babylon, but the arms of Pharaoh will fall."

Zimmerli notices this use of the verbal themes and remarks by way of question that it is to be explained as variation in a living language: "Ist es Verschreibung oder Variation, wie die lebendige Sprache sie auch immer wieder zeigt?" (1969, p. 742).

According to these scholars, then, the meaning of Pi'el and Hiph'IL of one and the same root is a matter of free variation. It is a difference not to be studied on grammatical, but on stylistic level.
5.4 ERNST JENNI'S PROPOSED SOLUTION

5.4.1 Introduction

The most interesting, comprehensive and far-reaching, but at the same time also the most revolutionary attempt towards an explanation of the function of the Pi'el verbal theme - which is touched on in this chapter - has been made by Ernst Jenni. His proposals will be treated separately here.

Jenni's first publication on the verbal themes was an article with the title "Faktitiv und Kausativ von 'bd 'zugrunde gehen'" (1967). In this article Jenni makes revolutionary statements with which every scholar dealing with biblical Hebrew should acquaint himself.11) Certainly the most important reason why heed should be given to this article, is that it served as motivation for a still more important study from the pen of Jenni, viz. Das hebräische Pi'el (1968), as he himself admits (1968, p. 15). This study has in turn, been acclaimed by one of its reviewers as "one of the best treatments of a single problem in the Hebrew (and Semitic) verbal system of which the reviewer is aware."12) The important point to note here in the introduction, is that Jenni seems to have based many of his viewpoints in the larger work on his findings in the article. It is therefore of the utmost importance to present in this chapter a summary and critical discussion of the findings and statements of Jenni both in his article and

11. In one of the more recent grammars of Biblical Hebrew this article indeed receives recognition (Beer and Meyer, 1969 II, p. 108). It does not seem, however, that the general content of Jenni's article is reflected in Meyer's general explanation of the verbal themes.

in his much more detailed book.)

To begin with, the general framework and assumptions of Jenni's study will be discussed, since these aspects seem to exercise great influence throughout the study. Then the real distinctions proposed by Jenni will be discussed.

5.4.2 General Framework and Assumptions of Jenni's Study

5.4.2.1 General Considerations

5.4.2.1.1 The Pi'el and the Verbal Theories in General

Jenni starts his book by mentioning the different meanings ascribed to the Pi'el (e.g. factitive, privative, denominative), and he rejects the different common denominators ("Oberbegriffen") earlier assigned to the Pi'el as being too vague. The attempts to derive the different meanings secondarily from a primary function, he equally - and quite correctly (cf. 3.3 and 5.3) - rejects (1968, p. 9). The so long un-critically accepted "romantic notion" that the Pi'el is mostly intensive, he equally rejects.

The two main problems Jenni meets in his study of the Pi'el in wider context are (i) the mutual relation between the different possibilities in the meaning of the Pi'el and (ii) the delimitation of the Pi'el from the Qal and Hiph'il. From this it is clear that Jenni himself aims at formulating a (or more than one) comprehensive term (terms) to describe and define the Hebrew Pi'el. This aim of Jen-
ni is clear throughout the whole of his study. Jenni regards the other verbal themes (e.g. Qal, Niphal, Hiph'il) as receptive of unified definition and exactly because of this, he thinks that we may not omit a living grammatical category such as the Pi'el from this system of opposites: We should on no account abstain from treating the meaning of the Pi'el as a matter of the syntactic semasiology and surrender it to separate researches on lexical level (1968, p. 12; 1967, p. 143). In short, Jenni maintains by way of question that we should assign to the Pi'el a linguistically more unified syntactic-semasiological function that delimits it from both Qal and Hiph'il (1968, p. 12). Elsewhere Jenni declares in advance that the problem cannot be solved by a comparison of the lexica, because in that way we are handicapped by the reproductive possibilities of our own (European) languages. Rather we should compare passages with seemingly identical meaning and try to find a unified explanation for the differences then notices (1968, p. 16).

In the present writer's opinion, some of Jenni's statements are susceptible to criticism. In the first place, the other verbal themes are by no means receptive of unified definition of the kind Jenni proposes for the Pi'el. If it were the case, how is ngd (Hiph'il: "make known") accounted for when the Hiph'il is merely regarded as causative? It is also known that sometimes the Niphal appears as passive of the Pi'el or Hiph'il, whereas it is mostly regarded as the reflexive or passive of the Qal. The general appellation "causative" for the Hiph'il exactly stresses the point that the Hiph'il has not been sufficiently examined.

In the second place, Jenni proceeds from the preconception that the problem of the meaning of the Pi'el can be solved not by studies on
the lexical level, but only by a syntactic study. It is not clear how, according to this point of view, the meanings of the other verbal themes can be determined. In chapter 2.5.4 of this study, attention has been given to word-formation, and especially the tendencies that exist within a lexicon. From the discussions in 2.5.3 and 2.5.4 it is clear that the lexicon will be at stake in this problem too. This is not to deny that syntax plays a role; on the contrary, syntax has a central place in linguistic analysis. The lexical items have syntactic implications, but it is of the utmost importance that we capture the tendencies existing within the lexicon. When Jenni claims that we are up against a syntactic-semasiological problem, it is implied that rules can be set up that hold good for all verbs in the Pi'el formation - the definition has to bear a unified character. On the other hand, when we regard the problem as a lexical one from the beginning, rules can be set up that are valid for only a few cases, to be specified in the definition time and again (cf. 2.5.4). This allows us to say that, for example, verb A bears certain characteristics that need not necessarily be the same for verb B.

5.4.2.1.2 Synonymy in Relation to Jenni's Proposals

In determining his method, Jenni proceeds by asking the question whether it is possible according to linguistic theory that a language uses "zwei voll ausgebildete grammatische Kategorien, wie Qal und Pi'el bzw. Pi'el und Hiph'il, in soundso vielen Fällen nebeneinander ..., ohne dass eine primäre oder doch sekundäre Bedeutungsdifferenzierung erkennbar wäre" (1968, p. 15; cf. 1967, p. 143). This statement (by way of question) is to be appreciated as a point of departure in linguistic examination of this kind - certain differences in meaning, imperceptible at the first glance, may exist in another language. Jenni seems, however, to answer his question in the negative and to leave
it at that (1968, p. 16). With this answer the problem is not solved: our experience tells us that a language can possess two or more words or grammatical categories for the expression of one and the same meaning. Synonymy in the case of single words is well-known. Only in an "ideal" language each form would have only one meaning, but this "ideal" is probably not realised by any natural language (Lyons, 1968, p. 405). True, it is widely held that there are few, if any, real synonyms in natural languages. Ullmann, for example, says about synonymy that "it is almost a truism that total synonymy is an extremely rare occurrence, a luxury that language can ill afford" (Ullmann, 1957, p. 108). In the strict sense only words "which can replace each other in any given context without the slightest change either in cognitive or emotive import" (ibid., pp. 108-109) are synonymous. However, here we are interested in context-dependent synonymy. It is clear that this kind of synonymy offers large opportunities for stylistic variety (Lyons, 1968, p. 452). Especially in the study of Hebrew this kind of synonymy should receive adequate attention, namely where we have in poetry the phenomenon of parallelismus membrorum. Wide use is made of this stylistic feature in general, but in this connection the synonymous parallelismus membrorum is important: in the second line of poetry the same idea (sometimes exactly the same) is expressed as in the first line, but different words and expressions are used (cf. Fensham, 1966, p. 8).

To move from single words to grammatical structures: in chapter 4 it has been seen that a verb in the Hiph'il can express the same causative idea as for example ntn + the corresponding Qal verb. There is also another well-known example: the direct object in Hebrew is expressed either by adding personal suffixes directly to the verb, or by adding these suffixes to 'et, and yet these two structures have the
same meaning. This is perfectly clear from examples quoted below. Incidentally, note that these two passages occur in the same prophecy as one of Jenni's examples in favour of a distinction between Pi'el and Hiph'il (Jenni, 1968, p. 89):

Ezek. 30:23 "I will scatter the Egyptians among the nations and disperse them (wēzerītīm) over many lands."

Ezek. 30:26 "I will scatter the Egyptians among the nations and disperse them (wēzerīti 'ātām) over many lands."

Jenni's wishes to show that throughout the whole of the Hebrew verbal system Qal and Pi'el or Pi'el and Hiph'il stand in distinct opposition to each other, and this he motivates on linguistic grounds. We should however note that, as outlined above, two grammatical categories need not stand in opposition to each other. The merit of each individual case will have to be ascertained time and again.

5.4.2.1.3 Statistical Considerations

In his explanation of the deductive method which he wishes to follow in his study, Jenni makes the claim that a hypothesis may be regarded as proven when it holds good for only ninety per cent of the cases. For the remaining ten per cent of the cases not conforming to the hypothesis we have to think of "gelegentlichen Abweichungen von der Regel, Sonderentwicklungen und da und dort ... eine gewissen Willkür in der Anwendung der Formen" (1968, p. 17).

It should be stressed that this is a very difficult matter. Jenni is quite correct in maintaining that a certain measure of non-conforming cases can occur. It is, however, difficult and somewhat uncertain to fix this percentage on, for example, ten. If this is done, then the examination will have to be carried out in strict adherence to this theory. Jenni's examination does not always show this character
as will be seen later. At the same time we have to be very attentive, should the deviation reveal that the hypothesis is really not proved.

5.4.2.2 State and Event

In his attempt to demonstrate that throughout the whole of the Hebrew verbal system Pi'el and Hiph'el stand in distinct opposition to each other, the terms "state" or "condition" ("Zustand") and "event" ("Vorgang") are of the utmost importance to Jenni. As will be seen in the next paragraph, Jenni proceeds from the findings of grammatical research in Akkadian, and here these two terms are of considerable importance, viz. in the definition of the categories factitive and causative. Before applying these two categories to biblical Hebrew, Jenni now sets forth to analyse the terms "state" and "event" (1968, pp. 25 ff.).

Jenni maintains that, even though in the European languages there is no difference in meaning between "er ist lebendig" and "er lebt" or "er ist ansässig" and "er wohnt", this is not the case with the Semitic languages (1968, p. 26). In Hebrew and the Semitic languages in general, adjectival condition or state and verbal event are not subordinate or accidental distinctions, but they form an opposition of fundamental importance. This distinction between a statement of condition and one of event or action is according to Jenni closely connected with the fundamental syntactic distinction between the nominal (or verbless) sentence and the verbal sentence. Jenni also mentions that this syntactic phenomenon is so widely acknowledged that a discussion of it is not necessary. All that concerns him, is to confirm that in Hebrew there is a difference between nominal sentences with adjectival predicate and verbal sentences with a finite verb (and in this connec-
tion especially the so-called "Zustandsverb"). As example of the first possibility we have \( \text{gādōlîm mā'ase} \) yhwh "great are the doings of the Lord" (Ps. 111:2) and of the second mā-gādōlū mā'asekā yhwh "How great are thy deeds, O Lord!" (Ps. 92:6 NEB 92:5). We represent both cases in German (and English, etc.) by an adjective and an auxiliary verb, but this is merely because our own languages lack further possibilities of distinction (p. 26). Nevertheless, this state of affairs detracts nothing from the event-character of these verbs in Hebrew (p. 25).

Concerning Jenni's treatment up to this point, it is important to note that he postulates a difference in meaning in the case of the nominal sentence and the verbal sentence. Subsequently he tries to demonstrate on the basis of a few examples the real difference between these two types of sentences. He chooses the verb ḫkm (Qal: "be wise") occurring 19 times, next to which we find the adjective ḥākām "skilful, wise", occurring 15 times with predicative sense.

To a certain degree, Jenni thinks, we can manage with the "eineleuchtenden Unterscheidung" according to which the nominal sentence postulates "etwas Starres, Zuständliches, ein 'weise sein'" whereas the verbal sentence postulates "ein Bewegliches und Fliessendes, ein Geschehen und Handeln ... 'weise werden'" (1968, p. 27). In this Jenni shares the opinion of Gesenius and Kautzsch (par. 140e) - in fact, part of the quotation above is quoted from Gesenius and Kautzsch.

15. Actually Jenni is not very pleased with the term "Zustandsverb", because the distinction between adjectival state and verbal event is such an important matter. Whatever the history of these verbs, fact is that in Hebrew they do not express conditions, but events, "nicht mehr Zustände, sondern Vorgänge" (1968, p. 25).

16. In the English translation of the grammar of Gesenius and Kautzsch these parts read as follows: "Noun-clauses with a substantive as predicate, represent something fixed, a state or in short, a being so and so; verbal-clauses on the other hand, something moveable and in progress, and event or action (Gesenius et al.,1966,p.450).
140.

by Jenni - and Boman (1960, pp. 31-35). In the case of ḫm Jenni finds it quite easy to apply this distinction: there are many passages with the verb that can be translated "become wise" or "act wisely".17) A problem is however met with in the five passages where the only possibility is to translate as "be wise" (Dt. 32:29; 1 Kings 5:11; Job 32:9; Eccl. 2:15; Zech. 9:2). In other words, the distinction (static) condition vs. (active) event does not hold good for all the cases (Jenni, 1968, pp. 27, 33). Another possibility, namely the distinction between forms used comparatively or not, is still less successful.

This makes Jenni look for another distinction which holds good for all the cases of occurrence. He finds a more efficient distinction in the relationship between subject and predicate, a relationship that can be represented differently by the speaker according to whether he uses a nominal sentence or a verbal sentence. In the nominal sentence the predicate - except in special circumstances when the intention is to use certain figures of speech, e.g. tautology - is to be regarded as a new attribute or characteristic, being something additional with regard to the subject, a "neu zum Subjekt hinzutretendes Merkmal" (p. 27). The predication of the subject by an adjective represents a synthetic judgment by the speaker. In the verbal sentence, on the other hand, subject and predicate are in the finite verb closely connected from the beginning, "von Anfang an aufs engste verbunden" (p. 27). In this case the speaker gives expression to the fact that the predicate belongs to the subject, that it is "für diesen Moment als im Wesen oder der Situation des Subjekts begründet" (p. 28). The utterance is in this case an analytic judgment.

Now it is to be noted that by his introduction of this new dis-

17. Later on it will be seen that many passages translated by Jenni as "become wise", can just as well be translated "be wise".
tinction, Jenni by no means discards the opposition state vs. event. On the contrary, he introduces the new criterium in order to understand the border-line cases for which the earlier criteria could not account. By making a distinction between the synthetic judgment with the adjective and the analytic depiction of an event by a finite verb, the earlier used opposition is deepened - in Jenni's words: "Das Gegensatzpaar ... muss ... noch vertieft werden" (1968, p. 33).

Jenni presents the following passages as examples of the distinction he proposes (English translations cited):

1. Ezek. 28:3 "You are wiser (adj.) now than Danel" (JB).
   1 Kings 5:11 (NEB 4:31) "For he (Solomon) was wiser (verb) than any man";

2. Is. 31:2 "Yet he too is skilled (adj.) in working disaster" (JB).
   Zech. 9:2 "for she (Sidon) is very wary (verb)".

According to Jenni these examples show quite clearly how the difference is brought about (1968, p. 28). To take the first example: Ezek. 28:3 is the synthetic judgment of another on the wisdom of the ruler of Tyre. This is clear from the interjection hinne that marks the sentence as "Neueinsatz". 1 Kings 5:11, on the other hand, is merely the continuation of the nearly identical announcement in vs. 10 (NEB 4:30): "... so that Solomon's wisdom surpassed that of all the men of the east and of all Egypt". In the second example Is. 31:2 enters into the apparent wisdom of those who favour an alliance with Egypt and postulates (as a synthetic judgment) that Yahweh too is wise, but in the special way that He works disaster. Were the verb used - as expression of the characteristic wisdom of Yahweh - the words "he too" would have implied a concession to the wisdom of the politicians. In Zech. 9:2, Jenni maintains, an ironical reference is made to the
"allgemein verbreitete Auffassung von der Sidon inhärenten besonderen Weisheit" and therefore the verb is used (1968, p. 28).

Jenni claims that all the remaining passages may be differentiated along these lines (1968, p. 28) - a claim that will be examined more closely later on in this paragraph. However, Jenni considers it unnecessary to demonstrate this distinction with all the passages. We only have to reflect upon the basic function of the adjective and the verb (1968, p. 28)! The predicative adjective informs us about the way the speaker takes up position towards the matter or phenomenon according to the way he values it subjectively; the verb depicts the general event as it is seen by the speaker, but as objective modality. "Stellungnahmen und Beurteilungen durch Adjektive enthalten normalerweise synthetische Urteile; Schilderungen von Vorgängen in allen ihren Modalitäten, auch wenn einfach konstatiert wird, sind nicht Synthesen von Subjekt und Prädikat, sondern Analysen eines Gesamteindrucks mit den beiden Polen Vorgang und Träger des Vorgangs" (p. 29).

We thus see that Jenni attaches more value to the motivation of this matter on the grounds of a linguistic theory than to the results of an examination of the actual data! With this we cannot agree. Before examining the actual data, however, it seems necessary at this stage to examine and discuss the language theoretical principles underlying Jenni's study.

Although Jenni is sceptical about the idea that any direct inferences can be drawn from his distinctions in favour of the "linguistic relativity" hypothesis (1968, p. 277), his whole approach inclines very much to this hypothesis. In his exposition of the two basic types of sentences, viz. the nominal and the verbal sentence, Jenni follows the typification of Nyberg (1952, pp. 256-63) and Michel (1960, pp. 177-82)
as stated by himself (1968, p. 26 n. 44; 1967, p. 156 n. 1). Michel, in turn, proceeds from the assumptions of Boman (1960, pp. 31-35) and Ratschow. Michel maintains that the verbal sentence records "den Volzug einer Handlung oder das Wirken einer Eigenschaft" and further "Die sogenannten Eigenschaftsverben bezeichnen nicht das Vorhandensein, sondern das Wirken einer Eigenschaft" (1960, p. 177). For the last statement Michel refers us to Boman (Boman, 1960, pp. 31-35), where, amongst others, we find the following statements (quoted and discussed earlier in 3.2, but repeated here for the sake of completeness): "the stative verbs ... designate a condition (status) which is not fixed and dead but is in flux - it is as much a becoming as a being ... the stative verb expresses neither being nor becoming but asserts an action of the subject proceeding from within" (Boman, 1960, pp. 33-34).

Apart from this indirect reference to the views of Boman, we find that Jenni leans directly on Gesenius and Kautzsch (Gesenius et al., 1966, p. 450) and mentions that Boman also followed Gesenius and Kautzsch in this respect (Jenni, 1968, p. 27 n. 47). It is quite so that Boman fully agrees with the statements of Gesenius (cf. Boman, 1960, p. 35).

It is very important to take notice of one of the scholars who became mentioned in the Barr vs. Boman debate, viz. Leo Weisgerber. Although Boman does not refer to the works of this scholar in the earlier editions of his work, he does so in the addendum "Sprache und Denken" in the latest edition of the work in which he characterises Hebrew thought as differing largely from Greek thought (Boman, 1968, p. 197). Boman mentions Weisgerber's name in reaction towards Barr's statement that Weisgerber's approach to language in general has some-

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18. Michel used the first edition of Boman's work in German (1952). References are here, however, converted into the page numbers of the English translation (1960).
thing in common with Boman's (Barr, 1961, pp. 87-88) - Weisgerber maintains the same for German as Boman does for Hebrew. It is not necessary to go into this matter further at this stage, but it is of importance to note that Boman concedes that Weisgerber's analysis of German is just: "Ich glaube Übrigens, dass Weisgerber recht hat" (Boman, 1968, p. 197). Later on more will be said about Weisgerber's approach to language.

When Jenni claims that we do not have to test our theses as to the difference between synthetic and analytic statements on all the passages, but that we only have to come to clarity as to the basic function of the adjective and the verb, he refers to the Duden Grammar of the German language for these theoretical aspects (Grebe, 1959, pp. 203 f.). For Jenni's claim that the predicative adjective implies "eine beurteilende Stellungnahme des Sprechers an das betreffende Phänomen" (1968, p. 28), there is adequate motivation in the Duden grammar, viz. "... das Adjektiv ... seine Grundleistung besteht darin, die Stellungnahme des Sprechers zu den Wesen oder Dingen ... auszudrücken, den Eindruck zu bezeichnen, den Wesen, Dinge, ... auf ihn ausüben" (Grebe, 1959, p. 203). For Jenni's claim that with the verb we have an analytic statement and that here subject and predicate are closely connected, there is apparently no motivation in the Duden grammar.19) Grebe, however, refers to the works of Weisgerber in his discussion of the adjective (1959, p. 203 n. 1), and Weisgerber has something more to say in his attempt to describe the contribution of the different parts of speech to the "Wortung der Welt". In connection with the world of colours Weisgerber maintains that we never bring our perception of colour in an active connection with the coloured object, since the ob-

19. Cf. Grebe (1959, p. 81) where the "Grundleistung" of the verb is discussed.
ject is for us certainly "Farbträger und nicht Farbsender" (Weisgerber, 1954 II, p. 130). The existence of the three "Zustandsverben blauen, grünen, grauen" is only due to the fact that the blue and green belongs to the innermost nature of heaven and plants. The verbs characterise "den Dauerzustand als Lebensregung, als wesensgemässes Ausdrucksform" (Weisgerber, 1954 II, p. 131), "es liegt also in diesem blauen und grünen der Niederschlag einer bestimmten Auflassung und Beurteilung des Kerngehaltes wesentlicher Vorgänge, also etwas völlig anderes als ein bloss feststellendes blau, grün sein" (1954 II, p. 180).

This is Weisgerber's view with regard to the "Zustandsverben". Grebe, cited by Jenni, has been influenced strongly by Weisgerber, among others (Grebe, 1959, pp. 6, 7, 203). In his utilisation of Duden's view, Jenni thus indirectly leans on the views of Weisgerber. It is however clear that Weisgerber's approach to language is in complete accordance with the movement termed "Neo-Humboldtian ethnolinguistics" (Dieboldt, 1965, p. 260; Basilius, 1952, pp. 89-99) - a movement characterized by the language - thought correlation already discussed in an earlier chapter (3.2). The affinity between the distinctions propounded by Jenni and the views of the advocates of the linguistic relativity approach, is thus clear.

We recall that Jenni regards his introduction of the distinction synthetic vs. analytic as a deepening of the proposed distinction between static and dynamic predication (1968, p. 33). To say that a predication is analytic, follows from the idea that the state is an activi-

20. We should note that on this point the views of Boman and Weisgerber do not exactly correspond. Weisgerber do not regard colours as actions on the part of objects (1954 II, p. 130). According to Boman, however, the verbal idea in Hebrew is always living and palpable (1960, p. 34). Accordingly we have to regard the coloured object as something dynamic and active.
ty of the subject, emerging from within. The next step in this logical reconstruction is apparently that, since the state (condition) is an activity, an event, it has to be in accordance with the subject, in close connection with, or inherent in the subject, and thus analytic. The affinities of the idea of dynamic predication has been shown above, and the untenability of the linguistic theory from which it springs, has been clearly illustrated - in the Semitic field of studies especially thanks to the detailed criticism of Barr (discussed in 3.2). No unquestionable evidence has ever been produced in support of the theory of linguistic relativity. Likewise, there is no evidence that if one says the equivalent of the flower reds, one experiences the relation between subject and predicate differently (Langacker, 1968, p. 42). Jenni values the verdicts of the linguistic theory on which he leans higher than an examination of the actual data (1968, p. 28)(!) and provides no further proof for his suggestions, not even a thorough examination of the relevant Hebrew passages. Therefore we are quite justified in regarding his proposals towards a distinction as unrealistic and untenable from the theoretical side. Seeing that evidence from the context is so important for whatever point of view, this will be discussed in the rest of the paragraph.

As Jenni starts with hkm, this "root" will be discussed first. We keep in mind that the adjective signals a synthetic judgment, the verb an analytic one. It should now be possible to characterize every sentence in which hkm occurs as either synthetic or analytic. Jenni's careful statement that our concern is not whether the speaker's choice (of verb or adjective) is the only possible or justified one, but that we can only see which meaning the speaker (author) has given to his utterance, is really puzzling. To quote Jenni: "... dass es nur darum gehen kann, zu erkennen, welchen Sinn der Verfasser seiner
Aussage gegeben hat, nicht darum, ob diese so gewählte Aussage die einzig mögliche oder berechtigte war. In gewissen Fällen ist eine echte Wahl des Redenden zwischen den beiden Sprachmöglichkeiten (Be-tonung des Objektiven oder des Subjektiven) denkbar, aber wir haben nicht hinter die getroffene Wahl zurückzugehen" (1968, p. 33 n. 56).

If the distinction really has any value, according to the principles outlined above, then it should hold good for all the cases, otherwise an exact definition of non-conforming cases should be possible. If the use of the adjective signals a synthetic judgment, then we should be able to expect an adjective wherever a synthetic judgment is made, and the same with the so-called verbally expressed analytic statement. Otherwise no control is possible. To say "wir haben nicht hinter die getroffene Wahl zurückzugehen", only provides an escape for preconceived ideas. If the whole issue is clearly uncertain, as is implied by the above quotation, then our verdict should rather be a non liget and then we should not base further theories on it.

Four passages have already been quoted and Jenni's views on them have been mentioned. Even these passages, advanced as examples, are not without problems. It is, for example, not at all clear why Zech. 9:2 ("for she (Sidon) is very wary (verb)") is in a lesser way a synthetic judgment than Ezek. 28:3 ("You are wiser (adj.) now than Danel" JB) - said to the prince of Tyre in a whole series of prophecies against Tyre, but nevertheless in the first prophecy directed against the ruler himself. Jenni regards the presence of the verb in Zech. 9:2 as due to an ironic concession to "die allgemein verbreitete Auffassung von der Sidon inhärenten besonderen Weisheit" (1968, p. 28). From the context these (military) excellences of Sidon are all but prominent. The information about Tyre in vs. 3 still says nothing about
Sidon.21) It is difficult to see how Jenni can maintain the presence of an analytic judgment in Zech. 9:2. If we look at Ezek. 28:2, it is much easier to think of an analytic judgment: from the beginning of chapter 26 there are prophecies against Tyre from which we learn about the excellences of this city and, as is expected, of the fine properties of its ruler (28:2)! But here, according to Jenni, we have a synthetic judgment.

In connection with Ezek. 28:3 there is another interesting point that throws doubt on Jenni's claims. It is clear that the proposed distinction should be valid with all "roots" if it is to meet the demands of a linguistic rule. In Ezek. 28:2 we have another predication, namely with ghb (Qal: "be high, haughty"): yaC an gābah lībbēkā = "because your heart was haughty" and somewhat more freely translated: "Being swollen with pride" (JSB), "In your arrogance ..." (NEB). In verse 5 we have nearly the same expression, viz. wayyigbah lēbābekā bēhēlekā = "and ... your heart was (has become) haughty". In both these passages the verb does the predicating and between them there is the adjective hākām in verse 3! The first part of chapter 28 (up to verse 19), however forms a close unity - it is a prophecy directed against the prince of Tyre. If the statement about the prince's wisdom (adj.) is synthetic, then the statements about his haughtiness (verbs) are equally synthetic, especially the first one. In the meantime the adjective "haughty" was available to the author (Koehler and Baumgartner, 1958, p. 164). True, the "Neueinsatz" in verse 3 has been marked for Jenni by hinā (Jenni, 1968, p. 28); therefore the causal clause in verse 2 should not carry too much weight with us. But

21. Incidentally note that it is better to regard the second part of Zech. 9:2 as a clause of causality rather than one of concession. Cf. Laetsch (1956, p. 449) as against Jenni (1968, p. 28).
the straightforward expression in verse 5, still following the inter­
jectie, cannot but weaken the claims of Jenni.

Nearly the same difficulties are encountered in connection with
Jenni's explanation of Is. 31:2. The statement in verse 2, that Yahweh
is wise, may indeed be regarded as a synthetic one according to Jenni's
explanation and definition, especially in the light of "he too" (Jen­
ni, 1968, p. 28). Again the claims of Jenni are weakened by a nearby
verse, in this case verse 1. Here the magnitude of the Egyptian cha­
riotry and the number of the horsemen is at stake. With rekeb we have
the description kî râb (adj.), and with pârâsim we have kî - Cănâsû mê'ôd
(verb), i.e. for one part of the Egyptian army an adjective is used and
for another an intransitive verb. Nevertheless, the meaning of these
two descriptive expressions are the same - both are judgments of the
same kind.

ALL the passages in which hkm occurs, will now be discussed.
Only the passages where we can translate "be wise" should be implica­
ted - "die eindeutig nichtzuständlichen Aussagen, bei denen der Ge­
brauch des Verbalsatzes selbstverständlich ist" are to be eliminated
(Jenni, 1968, p. 30; cf. p. 27). It has been shown that this infe­
rence, namely that a condition is an action on the part of a subject,
is untenable, but it will in all fairness be respected here where Jen­
ni's further proposals are at stake. There are many passages where
the translation "be" or "become" is equally possible. Cases where
"become" is clear, are marked with an asterisk. In any case, the verb
is supposed to signal an analytic judgment. In some cases it remains
a question whether the terms "synthetic" and "analytic" can be used suc­
cessfully, but they will be used here according to Jenni's definition.
Jenni suggests that we add certain "Test - Wendungen" in order to de­
termine whether we have understood a sentence correctly. According to
this we should be able to add "objectively" to a passage containing a verb and "can be regarded as" or "as it seems" to the sentence with an adjective (Jenni, 1968, p. 29):

Dt. 32:29 "Were they wise, they would understand this" (literal translation, partly JB) - **analytic** if we use the test-word "objectively" (Jenni, 1968, p. 29). In verse 28, however, it is stated that they are not wise ("devoid of understanding"). Seen in this way, then, we have a **synthetic** judgment if a situation is described in which they are wise.

1 Kings 5:11 (NEB 4:31) "For he (Solomon) was wiser than any man" - analytic if we take into account what has already been said. Nevertheless, here we find a fine example of how the author judges the wisdom of Solomon: he was wiser than all the others. And this subjective judgment is exactly what Jenni postulates for the expression with an adjective.

Zech. 9:2 "for she (Sidon) is very wary" - synthetic: as has been said earlier in this paragraph, there is no reason why this should be an analytic judgment. Jenni makes an appeal to a supposed general conception of special wisdom inherent in Sidon (1968, p. 28), but in other cases (e.g. 1 Kings 5:11) the argument is based on what has been mentioned earlier.

Job 32:9 "it is not ... the old who are wise" - analytic: verses 5 and 9 already contain references to the wisdom of the aged.

*Proverbs 6:6* "Go to the ant, you sluggard, watch her ways and get wisdom".

* -- 8:33 "listen to instruction and grow wise ..."

* -- 9:9 "Lecture a wise man and he will grow wiser"
Proverbs 9:12 (2x) "If you are wise, it will be to your own advantage" ('im ḥakamā ḥakamā lāk). Translated in this way, this is a synthetic judgment, in any case with regard to the first verb. As a kind of conclusion from the first, the second part may then be regarded as analytic.  

-- 13:20 "He who accompanies wise men becomes wise".  

-- 19:20 "... accept correction, to be the wiser in the time to come" (JB) - synthetic. There is no need to translate "become wise" as suggested by Jenni (1968, p. 27), although this is also possible.  

-- 20:1 "Wine is reckless ... unwise is he whom it seduces" (JB) - synthetic (?) It is not clear why this negation is to be regarded as a paradox, keeping in mind Jenni's suggestion that the negation of an analytic judgment yields a paradox, but not that of a synthetic one (1968, p. 29). This passage is translated by Jenni as "weise werden" (p. 27).  

-- 21:11 "When a mocker is punished, the ignorant man grows wiser".  

-- 28:15 "My son, if your heart is wise, ...." (JB) - synthetic. Here too, Jenni translates "weise werden" (1968, p. 27).  

-- 29:19 "Listen, my son, listen, and become wise." To translate "be wise" is also possible.  

-- 27:11 "Be wise, my son, then you will bring joy to my heart" - synthetic.  

Eccl. 2:15 "To what purpose have I been wise?" - analytic: cf. vs. 9ff.  

22. McKane (1970, p. 224) and Gispen (1952, p. 152) both translate "be wise", but Scott translates as "become wise" (1965, p. 74). McKane's explanation - the future will be in accordance with what the person is - lends support to a translation "If you are wise".  

23. Jenni himself wishes to translate "weise sein" (1968, p. 27), but later on he translates "wozu bin ich dann ... so viel weiser geworden?" and still regards it as an analytic judgment (1968, p. 29).
Eccl. 2:19 "Who knows whether he will be a wise man or a fool?"
- synthetic: a new person, Qohelet's successor, is introduced.
Incidentally, note that with "who knows" the author expresses his subjective judgment, and this would require an adjective.

7:23 "I said, 'I am resolved to be wise'" (RSV: "I will be wise")
- analytic.

Subsequently, passages with an adjective will be examined. According to Jenni's proposals, we should expect a synthetic judgment in these cases.

2 Sam. 14:20 "Your majesty is as wise as the angel of God ..."
- synthetic: the subjective view expressed by the woman. If this verse is compared with 1 Kings 5:11 (NEB 4:31) where we have the verb, do not both verses contain the same kind of subjective judgment with regard to the wisdom of the person concerned?

Is. 31:2 "Yet he too is skilled in working disaster" (JB) - synthetic if we keep in mind that a new aspect of Yahweh's wisdom is introduced, viz. that of working disaster.

Jer. 4:22 "they are clever only in wrongdoing" - synthetic if we take into account that in the first part of the verse it is said that the people are "fools ... with no understanding". It is quite interesting to compare this judgment by Yahweh of his people with Dt. 32:29 where Moses reflects in his song the judgment of Yahweh over his people. Verse 28 reads as follows: "They are a nation that lacks good counsel, devoid of understanding". In other words, it is explicitly stated here that they are not wise. Then in verse 29 a situation is visualized in which the people are wise and give attention to their destiny. This is clearly a synthetic judgment since the subject and predicate cannot in any way
be "von Anfang an aufs engste verbunden" (Jenni, 1968, p. 27).
The construction and even the details are as nearly identical as can be in Jer. 4:22 and Dt. 32:29, but in the former case we have an adjective and in the latter a verb!

Jer. 8:8 "How can you say, 'We are wise, ...'" - synthetic: the previous verses (e.g. verse 6) inform us that the people who are speaking, are not wise.

Ezek. 28:3 "You are wiser now than Danel" (JB) - synthetic, perhaps analytic, as has been said earlier. Attention has already been given to the interesting fact that a verb is used to express the haughtiness of the ruler of Tyre addressed in this prophecy.

Hosea 14:10 (NEB 14:9) "Let the wise consider these things" (mi ḥākām wē'yābēn 'ēlā) - it is difficult to make a choice, but this is most probably a synthetic judgment. However, the test-phrase suggested by Jenni for synthetic judgment (with adjectives) does not at all fit here: the prophet certainly has an eye on the person who is "objectively" wise, rather than on someone who is wise in his own eyes or in the eyes of the prophet himself.

Psalm 107:43 "Let the wise man lay these things to heart" (mi ḥākām wēyišmor - 'ēlā) - as in the former case, probably synthetic.

Proverbs 3:7 "Do not think of yourself as wise" (JB) or more literally "Do not be wise in your own eyes" - synthetic.

-- 12:15 "wise is the man who listens to advice" - synthetic, but when we apply the test-phrases, we get exactly the opposite result: "wise (as it seems to him or me objectively) is the man who listens to advice". If it is "objectively", as is strongly sug-
gested by the first part of the verse where we learn that the way a fool goes, is right in his own eyes (with the consequence that in the second part we have an objective judgment: the person who listens to advice, is truly wise) then, taking into account Jenni's proposals, it remains a question why the corresponding Qal verb ḫ̄km has not been used.

17:28 "Even a fool, if he holds his peace, is thought wise" - synthetic if we keep in mind that a fool is being pronounced a wise man.

26:5 "Answer a stupid man as his folly deserves, or he will think himself a wise man" - from ḫ̄km bb'ēnāw it is clear that "as it seems to him" fits quite well. This is a synthetic judgment.

26:16 "A sluggard is wiser in his own eyes than seven men who answer sensibly" - again we have "in his own eyes" with a synthetic judgment: wisdom is posited for a sluggard.

28:11 "The rich man may think himself wise, but ... " synthetic.

30:24 "Four things there are which are smallest on earth yet wise beyond the wisest" - synthetic, but the test-phrase for synthetic judgments ("as it seems to me") does not fit.

Eccl. 12:9 "And besides the fact that Qohelet was wise" (literal translation) - analytic: this might be a subjective judgment of the editor towards the author (Jenni, 1968, p. 29), but is not the wisdom of Qohelet essential or substantial to him? The editor, furthermore, wishes to say that Qohelet was objectively wise. ḫākām in this verse need not be an adjective used predicatively. It could just as well have been an adjective used as substantive, as is seen in the JB translation: "Besides being a sage, Qohelet also taught ..."
From the foregoing discussions it is evident that with ḫkm the distinction analytic vs. synthetic corresponding to verb vs. adjective does not hold water. This is in contradiction to Jenni: "Wo nun das Adjektiv ḫāḵām verwendet wird, handelt es sich immer um subjektive Stellungnahmen des Sprechenden zu einer anderen Person" and "Beim Verbum dagegen liegt nirgends eine subjektive Stellungnahme, sondern immer eine als objektiv ausgegebene Wirklichkeitsanalyse vor" (1968, p. 29). Statistically we have the following results: in the case of the verb there are 13 passages to be translated "be wise". Although we expect an analytic judgment, only 5 (= 38.5%) are analytic, and 8 (= 61.5%) are synthetic. Out of 15 passages, 14 (= 93.3%) are synthetic and one (= 6.7%) is analytic.

It is further evident that the two terms involved can be defined in at least two ways: (a) in the case of 1 Kings 5:11 it is said that we have an analytic judgment on the grounds of details furnished in the previous verses (Jenni, 1968, p. 28); (b) in the case of Zech. 9:2 the judgment is analytic on the grounds not of what has been mentioned already, but of what is supposed to be the general conception of the wisdom of Tyre (Jenni, 1968, p. 28). If the latter kind of argument is maintained consistently, then we should expect an analytic judgment in the last passage discussed above (Ecol. 12:9), because it was certainly widely known that Qohelet was a wise man. This discord is already evident on the theoretical level when Jenni regards an analytical judgment as essential or substantial, but then also allows space for contextual definition, "... für diesen Moment als im Wesen oder der Situation des Subjekts begründet ..." (Jenni, 1968, p. 28).

It is a wise idea to add certain "Test-Wendungen" in order to control whether the sense of the passage has been grasped (Jenni, 1968, pp. 29-31). The few cases where Jenni adds these test-phrases are
indeed fine illustrations (1968, p. 29), but it is equally clear that these phrases cannot be applied throughout, in any case not in support of Jenni's proposals. If the test-phrases are of any importance as a linguistic argument, one would expect that they could be applied consistently. Jenni maintains that with the verb we can always add "objektiv" and with the adjective "jeweils ... 'kann betrachtet werden als' oder 'wie mir (dir, ihm usw.) scheint'" (1968, p. 29; my emphasis). Our findings in the cases discussed above seem to contradict these statements. It is further clear that by adding the test-phrases we obtain other results than when operating without them. To repeat what has already been said in the discussion of the different passages: In Dt. 32:29 a situation is visualized in which people who in reality are not wise (vs. 28) are wise. In other words, when it is now said in verse 29 that they are wise, it is not meant that the people act corresponding to their nature - subject and predicate are not "von Anfang an aufs engste verbunden" (cf. Jenni, 1968, p. 27). According to Jenni's initial explanation of the two terms (1968, pp. 27-28), Dt. 32:29 is an example of a synthetic judgment. However, later on Jenni suggests "objectively" as test-word for the analytical judgment expressed by the verb. He himself is of opinion that we should prefer "objectively" : "wären sie (objektiv/wie mir scheint) weise (Perf.), so würden sie dies verstehen" (1968, p. 29). This is to say, we have an analytic judgment!

From the foregoing example it is clear that the suggested test-phrases confuse rather than clear up the matter. By using them we obtain different results. Two further cases provide sufficient proof of this. In Hosea 14:10 (NEB 14:9) we read "Let the wise (= mī ḥākām ...) consider these things". An adjective is used and we have a synthetic judgment according to the first explanation. The person at
stake, however, is not one who is wise in his own eyes - "wie ihm scheint" (cf. Jenni, 1968, p. 29 for this phrase) - but one who is truly wise, wise "objectively". This last word is, however, the test-word for verbs. According to this argumentation we have an analytic judgment. In Proverbs 12:15 we have a synthetic judgment, but the test-word "objectively" is the only one that fits. According to this, then, the judgment is analytic! From this it is quite clear that the proposed test-phrases do not at all conform to the earlier definition of the terms; rather they introduce a new range of ideas.

It is certainly necessary to test the findings with ḫkm on another pair of words as Jenni does. Jenni takes qdl as second example. Here ḫbd will be discussed as second example, in both of the meanings "(be) heavy" and "(be) insensible, dull". ḫbd is one of the comparatively rare cases where a Qal verb and an adjective containing the same root, viz. kāḇēd, each occur in enough passages to allow a comparison of this kind. A detailed examination of all passages is presented in Appendix I.

In the case of ḫbd there are 23 passages containing a verb. Of these 15 contain a synthetic judgment and 8 an analytic one. With the adjective there are 14 passages: 10 synthetic and 4 analytic. Expressed in terms of percentage: in the case of the verb (where we expect an analytic judgment) 65.2% is synthetic and only 34.8% is analytic. Where the adjective is used, 71.4% is synthetic and 28.6% is analytic. On the 34.8% analytic judgments in the case of the verb, no theory can be built according to which the verb gives expression to an analytic judgment. On the other hand, the 28.6% clearly analytic judgments with the adjective may not be conveniently left unexplained. In the discussion of certain passages the overlap in the use
of verb or adjective also become inevitably clear.

The results of an examination of הָזֵק (Qal: "be strong, grow strong"; adj.: "firm, hard, strong") equally do not seem to support Jenni's proposition. These results are presented in an appendix, Appendix II. The 28 cases (marked with two asterisks) where we have "be strong, be resolute!" should in all fairness be left out of consideration: with an imperative we normally have a synthetic judgment.

True, there are cases where a command follows analytically from the situation, but where we have הָזֵק this is not the case in the majority of passages: somebody is encouraged exactly because he is discouraged. Moreover, הָזֵק is very often used in connection with 'מֶג and this combination might easily be a rigid exhortatory formula. Ezek. 30:21 should be left out of this discussion of הָזֵק, because there we clearly have "become strong". Leaving these passages, then, we have out of a total of 79, 50 passages to consider:

Verb in Qal: 40 synthetic judgments, 10 analytic ones.

Adjective: 13 synthetic judgments, 5 analytic ones.

Expressed in terms of percentage, we find that in the case of the Qal verb (where an analytic judgment is expected) 80% of the judgments are synthetic, and only 20% analytic. With the adjective 72.2% of the judgments are synthetic, but the 27.8% analytic judgments remain unexplained.

As next example we may regard the "root" יָבַשׁ - the details are presented in Appendix III. The passages marked with an asterisk are those where we have to translate "become dry" (cf. Jenni, 1968, p. 30).

Verb in Qal: 14 synthetic judgments, 1 analytic.

Adjective: 2 synthetic judgments.

Expressed as percentages, we find that 93.3% of the judgments are syn-
thetic, and only 6.7% analytic. In the case of the adjective "dry" 100% of the judgments are synthetic.

Some problems connected with another verb will now be discussed. This is the verb הָלַח (Qal: "be ill, weak, become ill"). In Gen. 48:1 we find the verb הָלַח as well as the interjection הָלִינוּ. The latter introduces a new, unexpected synthetic judgment, according to Jenni (1968, p. 28). But with an unexpected judgment we would expect an adjective. There is, however, no adjective containing the consonants הָלַח. If the scheme of Jenni is really applicable to biblical Hebrew, then an adjective "sick, ill" would have existed and would have been used in a passage such as Gen. 48:1. Otherwise it would have been created in conformity with the general pattern of other verbs and adjectives. There are in addition to Gen. 48:1 many passages where we have to translate "be ill" (not "become ill") and where we have to admit that the judgment is synthetic.²⁴) הָלַח illustrates another very important point in connection with the use of verb or adjective: a participle of the verb is used in places where, as with other verbs, we would expect an adjective, e.g. Neh. 2:2 "Why do you look so unhappy? You are not ill" and 2 Kings 8:7 "Elisha came to Damascus, at a time when Ben-hadad king of Aram was ill". From this we may conclude that, when there is no adjective "ill" available, the speaker resorts to the verb, whatever the sense of what he wishes to express (e.g. analytic or synthetic).

From the foregoing considerations it is clear that the distinction analytic vs. synthetic corresponding to verbal sentence vs. nominal sentence, as proposed by Jenni, does not hold water. In the first

²⁴. 1 Sam. 19:14, 31:3; 2 Kings 8:7; 1 Chr. 10:3; Neh. 2:2; Ps. 35:13; Is. 33:24.
place, objections on theoretical grounds have been raised in this paragraph (5.4.2.2) against the hypothesis that the stative verbs ("Zustandsverben") express actions on the part of subjects, a condition which is not fixed but in flux. This view is quite untenable. In the second place, Jenni's further definition or extension of the first distinctions by the introduction of the terms "analytic" and "synthetic" have been examined. While ħkm conforms fairly well to these distinctions, it is equally clear that other verbs and adjectives do not fit into the scheme at all. A rather weak point in Jenni's exposition is that the verdicts of the linguistic theory from which he proceeds, are of more importance than an examination of the actual cases. It has been found that neither the linguistic or rather philosophical theory, nor the Hebrew passages support Jenni's theory. For a distinction as crucial as this is supposed to be for Jenni, we would expect a full agreement and not even a deviation of 10 per cent (cf. 5.4.2.1.3).

Now we should take notice of the fact that this distinction is of fundamental importance to Jenni's distinction between Pī'el and Hiph'il: "Aus diesen grundlegenden Bestimmungen folgt alles Weitere" (Jenni, 1967, p. 156, also p. 149; so too 1968, pp. 25, 26). When these distinctions are introduced later on (5.4.3) we should keep in mind that they rest on an unacceptable basis, viz. the distinction between condition and event as outlined above.

5.4.2.3 The Results of Grammatical Research in Akkadian

Jenni sets as his aim a synchronic study of the concatenation of

25. One of the reviewers of Jenni's book also declares that "the distinction between synthetic and analytic statements may be philosophically unsound since there are no objective criteria for determining which is which" (Sawyer, 1969, p. 261; cf. Lyons, 1968, p. 445). To say that it is a practical distinction (Lyons, 1968, p. 445) detracts nothing from the fact that by using it we are left in utter uncertainty.
verbs according to their meaning and use (Jenni, 1968, p. 25). In his attempts to do this, he regards the results of grammatical research in Akkadian as of the utmost importance: while the Arabic and Hebrew grammar can look back on an age-old tradition since the Middle Ages, the relatively young Akkadian grammar has developed into what can linguistically be regarded as the most modernly developed branch of Semitics. Therefore it is possible and most desirable to try to apply the results of the Akkadian grammar to Hebrew grammar (Jenni, 1968, p. 12; 1967, p. 148).

The results and understandings of the Akkadian grammar to which Jenni wishes to subscribe, are those related to the verbal themes in Akkadian. In the Akkadian grammar, too, it has for a long time been a commonplace that the D-stem (= "Dopplungsstamm", corresponding to the Hebrew Pi'el) is primarily an intensive formation. This "romantic notion" - as it has been named by Goetze - has been challenged most severely by Goetze (1942). Goetze's view will now be discussed in short.

Goetze lays down a connection between the stative (or "Permansiv" or "Verbaladjektiv") of the ground stem (= the Hebrew Qal) and the D-stem (= Hebrew Pi'el) in Akkadian. The D-stem is not like the Š- and N-stem (corresponding to the Hebrew Hiph'īl and Niph'al respectively) a modification of the verbal ground-stem, but a derivation from the...

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26. Already in 1939 Poebel questioned the idea that the Pi'el expresses intensity. He is of opinion that the Pi'el of transitive verbs expresses plurality, while that of intransitive verbs has a causative meaning (1939, pp. 5 n. 1, 69). This causative he regards as the same as that formed by the Šaph'ēl theme - with intransitive verbs, these two formations then express "similar or even identical meanings" (Poebel, 1939, p. 69).

27. These summarizing details are also found in Jenni's book (1968, pp. 12-13).
stative which is basically a nominal form. This derivation is in complete accordance with the general denominative character of the D-form, the primary force of the form (Goetze, 1942, p. 6). The meaning is then in general: "make a person or a thing what the adjective indicates, i.e. it is a factitive" (ibid.). There are three sub-groups of Akkadian statives: the durative stative denoting an inherent quality of a person or a thing (e.g. arišk "is long"), the perfect stative denoting a condition which results from the subject's own action (e.g. šağišt "possesses") and the passive stative denoting a state of affairs resulting from another person's action (e.g. šağiššit "(is) seized"). The last group is related to transitive verbs, e.g. iššat "he has seized". In the first group the D-stem has factitive force, e.g. urrukum "make long". In the third group the difference between the D-stem and the ground-stem is fairly small ("seize" and "make seized"): with the G-stem šağištum the emphasis is laid on the action performed, with the D-stem šağištum on the effect of the action.

We thus see that Goetze is interested primarily in the relation between the G- and D-stems. Only once has he something to say on the š-stem (corresponding to the Hebrew Hiph'il): it belongs to the action-type verb and denotes "cause someone to act in the way which the basic verb indicates" (1942, p. 4). The whole complicated problem of the relation between D- and š-stems is not entered into. It is equally clear that Goetze is in the first place interested in Akkadian. He starts his study with Hebrew and Arabic references only in order to show that the history of a term such as "intensive" can be traced back to Arabic grammatical research via Hebrew. The verbal system of Akkadian provides Goetze with the key to an understanding of the stem or theme with doubled second radical in all the Semitic languages. In any case, at the end of his study he declares that the conclusions at
which he has arrived, are founded upon an investigation of Akkadian forms and are in the first place valid only for that language (Goetze, 1942, p. 8). At the same time, however, it is evident to Goetze that the application of his results to West Semitic leads to an adequate and uniform explanation of all the varieties of the D-stem occurring there. The idea is then that the West Semitic loss of the stative, resulting in amongst others a category of basic neuter verbs like kabida (1942, p. 4), has cut the D-form loose from the ground on which it has grown. Through this the original function of the form has been obscured (1942, p. 8).

In Von Soden's standard grammar of Akkadian (1952) the results and proposals of Goetze's study have been taken up and extended considerably. The views of Von Soden are of importance in that the relations between all of the verbal themes are being brought up, also those between the D- and Š-stems. Of the D-stem Von Soden, in imitation of Goetze, declares that its main function is the factitive, i.e. it expresses "vor allem die Herbeiführung des Zustandes ..., der durch den Stativ des G-Stamms bezeichnet wird" (1952, p. 115). This is clearest in the case of the verbs of condition, e.g. damig "is good", dummuğum "make good". Von Soden declares, however, that as factitive of these verbs we do not always find the D-stem, but sometimes also the Š-stem next to it. The reasons for this usage, Von Soden declares, still have to be examined (ibid.).

In the case of intransitive verbs that do not express a condition but an action, the D-stem also has a factitive meaning, e.g. gadağum "prostrate oneself", guddudum "bend". With transitive verbs expressing an action the D-stems have partly "eine Art resultativer Bedeutung (z. B. šabāțum "packen": šubbutum "gepackt halten" ....), in anderen
Fällen bezeichnen sie die Durchführung einer Tätigkeit an mehreren Objekten (z. B. *nakašum* "abschneiden" : *nukkušum* "viel abschneiden, verstümmeln" ...) wobei der Bedeutungsunterschied zwischen G- und D-Stamm bisweilen kaum merkbar ist" (1952, p. 116). By way of comment it is said that with this kind of verbs the function of the D-stem can only be ascertained by way of penetrating "lexikalische Einzeluntersuchungen" (!), while stylistical variations may also be at stake (1952, p. 116). Von Soden also makes much of the denominative character of the Pi'el.

The š-stem is explained by Von Soden as a causative. In contrast with the factitive, the causative describes "das Veranlassen von Handlungen und Vorgängen, die durch den G-Stamm ausgedrückt werden" (1952, p. 117). With certain transitive verbs it is used as factitive in relation to the passive stative of the ground-stem, e.g. *šakin* "ist gelegen", *šukunum* "ausgestreckt sein lassen, wohnen lassen" (p. 117). It is, however, explicitly declared by Von Soden that the division between factitive and causative is not always quite clear: "Bei den Zustandsverben gibt es in der Bedeutung manche Überschneidungen mit dem faktitiven D-Stamm ... indem š und D bei einigen Verben ohne erkennbaren Bedeutungsunterschied nebeneinanderstehen (z. B. *šurukum* neben *urrukum* "verlängern" zu *arkum* "lang"; *šuknušum* neben *kunnušum* "unterwerfen" ...)" (ibid.). While some cases can be explained, the use of the stems or verbal themes in many cases still require an explanation. Von Soden also mentions that with some verbs the D- and š-stem each express different nuances or shades of the factitive meaning, e.g. "*rabûm* "gross": *šurbûm* "gross machen"; *rubûm* "(Kind) aufziehen" " (1952, p. 117). In the case of other verbs of condition, the š-stem

28. We recall that Poebel greatly stressed this way of expressing plurality (Poebel, 1939, pp. 5 n. 1, 69).
is used instead of the expected D-stem, e.g. marṣum "ill", ūmrusum "make ill" (ibid.). In other words: these words cannot be expressed in general terms, but individual lexical differences have to be taken into account.29)

Before applying the categories factitive and causative to biblical Hebrew, Jenni enters into the problem of the overlapping in meaning ("Bedeutungsüberschneidungen") between the D- and š-stems in Akkadian. Von Soden, we recall, regards the overlapping as still unexplained (1952, p. 117). Jenni's conclusion as to this problem is that the apparent exceptions do not alter anything of the fundamental difference in function between the D-stem and the š-stem (Jenni, 1968, p. 38).

In the case of arākūm - advanced by both Von Soden (1952, p. 117) and Ungnad and Matouš (1969, p. 76) as a verb of which both the D- and š-stems show a factitive meaning ("lengthen") - Jenni declares that the overlap in meaning is due to the special meaning of the word. The same is the case with kanāšum. According to Jenni the ground-stem kanāšum means "sich (mehr oder weniger freiwillig) in den passiven Zustand der Unterwerfung versetzen" (1968, p. 40). If this activity is brought about in the š-stem, the activity of its own on the part of the object is neutralized by the bringing about ("das Veranlassen (Zwingen)"). What now remains, is "in den passiven Zustand (der Unterwerfung) versetzen" - and this is precisely what is generally expressed by the D-stem. Therefore the š-stem can also be used, but this is only because of the specific lexical meaning of this verb - a rare exception. Jenni's conclusion as to the D- and š-stems of arākūm and kanāšum is therefore that the cases showing an overlap in

meaning, are only exceptions due to the lexical meaning of the words.

The merit of Jenni's views on the Akkadian verbal system will not be exhaustively discussed here. Suffice it to say that it is clear that Jenni proceeds from a logical treatment of the verbal system - a kind of "logicism" as this process is labelled by Barr (1961, p. 102). In other words (as discussed in 3.4), any verbal theme except the Qal is seen as a variation within a paradigm rather than as a new formation semantically. Of course, this is also the case with some of the Akkadian grammarians quoted earlier in this paragraph. Von Soden, however, states quite clearly that there is an overlap in meaning, that certain verbs have a history of their own not to be brought under in a strict scheme, but to be examined by individual lexical examinations (1952, pp. 116-117). Jenni, on the other hand, approaches the cases where Von Soden and Ungnad and Matouš see an overlap in meaning from a theoretical conception of what factitive and causative should be in terms of these two words. For him this theoretical presupposition lies on the same level as the terms "state" (adjective) and "event" (verb of condition) - a contrast which has been demonstrated as untenable in 5.4.2.2. Certain verbs provide clear evidence of a factitive meaning in the D-stem, but this is no proof for a factitive meaning in all verbs in the D-stem. On the contrary, "factitive" may be formulated as an inclusive term only if all the verbs show the same pattern. According to Jenni the š-stem is causative in relation to an event. Applied to kanāšum, this yields "machen, dass jem. sich unterwirft = zur Unterwerfung zwingen" (1968, p. 40). According to Jenni's views the causative signals a certain activity

30. Cf. also Sperber's objections against these schematising efforts (1966, p. 6).
on the part of the object: an event is brought about. This defini-
tion, however, fits with difficulty in the example advanced by Jenni:
"[šiddē] meš ṛu. qa. tu tu-šak-na-ši qī-bīt \([ki]\) ferne \([Gegenden]\)
unterwirfst du \([deinem]\) Wort" (Jenni, 1968, p. 39). Indeed, any ac-
tivity on the part of the object is out of the question.

When Jenni sets about showing that there is no overlap in meaning
between D- and š-stems, the question is still left unanswered why the
š-stem is used to express the factitive of e.g. šubûm "be great":
šurbûm "make great" (cf. Von Soden, 1952, p. 117). If the factitive
is always formed from the stative of the ground-stem, why then is a
š-stem used here? It seems that we would do better not to treat the
matter in a strict logicistic way, but to leave room for differences
between lexical items. Instead of formulating all-inclusive rules,
ad hoc rules should be set up. The cases not conforming to these
rules are to be treated on the individual lexical level.

In any case, in this paragraph a much more important piece of
criticism can be levelled against Jenni. Whatever the situation in
Akkadian, Jenni makes untenable inferences from Akkadian for his analy-
sis of the verbal themes in biblical Hebrew. He tries to describe
the verbal themes by means of distinctions holding good for Akkadian.
Having given an explanation of the terms "factitive" and "causative"
as they function in the Akkadian grammar, Jenni declares the following
in his article: "... (wir versuchen) einmal, die eben umschriebenen
Kategorien Faktitiv und Kausativ auf das Verbum \('bd\) anzuwenden" (1967,
p. 148) and in the book we learn of the "als Ausgangspunkt dienenden
Beschreibung des Faktitivs und des Kausatives in der akkadischen Gram-
matik" (1968, p. 33; cf. also p. 15). In so many words, then, Jen-
ni sets forth from a distinction of Akkadian grammar.
It is quite true that Hebrew and Akkadian are languages belonging to the same linguistic family and that a certain - and sometimes perhaps very high - degree of overlap is to be expected. At the same time, however, it should be maintained that a word or linguistic category such as is at stake in the present discussion, has its unique and discerning meaning only in one language - a Hebrew category only in Hebrew, and an Akkadian one only in Akkadian (Barr, 1968a, pp. 292-93). There are always some points of agreement between these two languages, but these points are not inevitable and therefore this way of argumentation carries no cogency. If two languages show but one difference in their verbal systems, then the semantic load of any verbal category need not be the same as that in the other language. The "total balance of the available series of choices" is always at stake (Barr, 1968a, p. 293). Of course, it is mainly theoretical to say that one difference entails a whole series of other differences, but what is of importance is that when there is one difference we may expect other differences as well. To take an example: whereas conditions are expressed in Akkadian by a stative of the ground-stem, there is no stative in Hebrew. In Hebrew the condition can, however, be expressed by the Qal (= "ground-stem" G). The loss of the stative in West Semitic not only obscured its original function in relation to e.g. the Pi'el (D-stem) (Goetze, 1942, p. 8), but certainly altered the total balance of the available series of choices. Whatever the situation in Akkadian - i.e. whether the distinctions proposed there hold good or not - these distinctions may not be directly applied to Hebrew. Instead of forcing the details of Hebrew into a straightjacket provided by Akkadian research, an examination should have been started by an analysis of Hebrew forms. The details of Akkadian grammar may lead us in some respects to a better understanding of the history of Hebrew,
169.

but for the speaker of Hebrew these historical connections need, or even could, not have been known. This aspect of Jenni's study leads him to claim that, because the Hiph'il is regarded as the causative of an event, it presupposes a certain own activity on the part of the object, with the consequence that the object of the Hiph'il can only be "Grössen ... die als selbständige Träger des Geschehens gedacht werden können" (Jenni, 1967, p. 149). Earlier in this paragraph it has been shown that even in Akkadian this cannot be said of the passage "ferne Gegenden unterwirfst du deinem Wort" (Jenni, 1968, p. 39). Later on (in 5.4.3.1) it will be shown that in Hebrew we meet unsolvable problems by subscribing to Jenni's claims.

5.4.3 Distinctions Proposed by Jenni

5.4.3.1 Introduction

Jenni suggests at least four possible distinctions between Pi'el and Hiph'il verbs with apparently identical meaning. All of these distinctions - as will be seen - proceed logically from the previously expounded distinction between the supposed two kinds of predication: verbally expressed event and adjectivally expressed condition (cf. Jenni, 1967, pp. 149, 156; 1968, pp. 25-26). In 5.4.2.2 it has been shown that this distinction is quite untenable. We therefore keep in mind that the basis of the following distinctions is not justified.

Proceeding from the findings of the grammatical research in Akkadian, and especially from the terms "factive" and "causative" (cf. 5.4.2.3), Jenni declares that in Hebrew the transitive function of verbs that are intransitive in the ground stem, have to be regarded in one case as a "Bewirken" and in the other as a "Veranlassen" - according to whether a condition or an event is the aim of the action (1968, p. 33). Only on the face of it the relation between subject and ob-
ject in both of the verbal themes is that of a transitive "bringing about" that originates with the subject and is suffered by the object. From the side of the object there is a clear difference in the way the action comes about: in the factitive "er macht: er ist lebendig" becomes "er macht ihn lebendig", whereas in the causative "er macht: er lebt" becomes "er macht ihn leben" (Jenni, 1968, p. 34). To take another example: from the root 'bd we have a verbal adjective ("Verbaladjektiv") in the substantivised feminine form 'abēdā with the meaning "a thing which has been lost" (cf. Jenni, 1967, p. 149); Jenni now maintains that the Pi'el as factitive of the verbal adjective means "verloren machen, zugrunde richten, in den Zustand der Vernichtung versetzen", whereas the Hiph'īl as causative of the event means "machen, dass etwas verloren oder zugrunde geht" (1967, p. 149). The Hiph'īl presupposes a certain own activity on the part of the object, which is not the case with the Pi'el. The causative brings about that the event originates from a new centre. In one case (the Pi'el) the object is transferred without contribution of its own and completely passively into a new state; in the other (the Hiph'īl) the object at the same time remains logical subject of the event (cf. 5.4.2.2) expressed by the ground stem. "Das Machen ist im Faktitiv ein direktes Bewirken, im Kausative dagegen ein das Objekt mitaktivierendes und daher indirektes Veranlassen" (Jenni, 1968, p. 34). This "lassen" (as auxiliary verb to be used in a German rendering of the exact meaning) can take on different nuances or shades of meaning, according to the meaning of the verb in its ground stem, but these shades of meaning are always such that they involve "das eigene Verhalten des Objekts als Untersuchsubjekt" (ibid.). Shades of meaning such as the following are possible: compel to, see to it that, allow that, treat as, grant that

31. On this nuance of the causative meaning, see also Gesenius and Kautzsch (1966, p. 141).
This last remark of Jenni is of much importance. It illustrates that we should not delimit our conception of "causative" to a scheme where only a strict idea of causality is at stake. The idea of causality can take on various shades of meaning. Earlier attention has been given to this aspect.

This distinction between "make" ("machen") in connection with an adjective and "cause" ("lassen") in connection with a verb is supposed to lead to a tentative lexical separation of Pi'el and Hiph'il (Jenni, 1968, p. 35). Thus the meaning of בָּרָה is suggested as follows: "pi. brennend machen = anzünden, das hi. brennen lassen = etwas verbrennen" (ibid.). But does this interesting and far-reaching analysis accord with the facts? Apparently yes, if we regard the following passages:

Is. 50:11 "Go, walk ... among the fire-brands you have set ablaze (Pi'el)"

Nahum 2:14 (NEB, RSV 2:13) "I will burn (Hiph'il) your chariots in smoke" (RSV).

In one case the attention is focussed on the kindling of the fire, in the other on the action of the burning. But this distinction is decidedly not a completely distinguishing one. In the Pi'el theme there is one passage where the attention is not focussed on the kindling:

Is. 40:16 "All Lebanon does not yield wood enough for fuel ('ên de bâcer)". It would have been pointless to say that the Lebanon does not yield wood enough to be kindled ("brennend machen = anzünden"). On the contrary, is it not meant that all the wood of the Lebanon will be burnt up and still it will be insufficient? There are also two passages (out of six) in the Hiph'il where we clearly meet with the meaning "kindle":

Ex. 22:5 (NEB 22:6) "... he who started the fire shall make full-
restituation".

Judges 15:5 "He then set the torches alight (wayyaböör ‘eék ballappidim)".

In these passages it would have been incorrect to paraphrase "brennen lassen = etwas verbrennen" as we expect with a Hiph'il.

In the case of qör, too, a lexical separation is suggested, with the Pi'el meaning "kurz machen = verkürzen" and the Hiph'il "kurz sein lassen = kurz dauern lassen" (Jenni, 1968, p. 35). In the Pi'el and Hiph'il respectively, only one form of this verb occurs. Jenni presents an argument according to which a factitive is only possible where we have a continuing period as in Ps. 102:24 "he has shortened (Pi'el) my days". On the other hand, a closed period (as we find in Ps. 89:46 where the downfall of the Davidic dynasty is described), cannot afterwards still be shortened, but can only be described as having been of longer or shorter duration. For this the causative "kurz sein lassen" has to be used (1968, pp. 35-36). In the present writer's view, however, exactly the opposite of Jenni's explanatory remarks would have been more in keeping with the status quo in the Hebrew passages. That is, according to the pattern of Jenni's whole argumentation, we would expect a Pi'el where we have a Hiph'il, and vice versa. After all, we learn time and again that in the factitive it is only a matter of the "erreichten Zustand" (Jenni, 1967, p. 149). In Ps. 89:26 the days (= life) of the person under discussion are described as of short duration - it is not possible to shorten these days any more (Jenni, 1968, pp. 35-36) - but here a Hiph'il form of the verb is used. On the other hand, the secondary subject (my days = life) is supposed to be always active - "... selbständige Träger des Geschehens ..." (Jenni, 1967, p. 149; 1968, p. 34) - and in Ps. 102:24 we have a situation where
such a subject is at stake (of course, in terms of Jenni's argumentation). The days "can still be active", because a continuing period is described, but here we are confronted with a Pi'el. It is thus clear that Jenni's argument in connection with qr is quite out of line with the whole of his views on the verbal themes.

Jenni's attempt to present early in his book a tentative lexical separation of verbs in Pi'el and Hiph'il, is therefore not successful. Jenni acknowledges that in certain cases this separation is not immediately clear, e.g. "make discontent, grieve" (1968, p. 35). This is quite true, but even the cases where he perceives such a difference cannot stand up to the test, as has been shown above.

We thus see that Jenni proceeds from a logical analysis of the terms factitive and causative. As logical deductions from these two terms the above-mentioned remarks are quite correct, but some examination has shown that it is not a settled matter to say that Hebrew conforms to this logical pattern.

Earlier (5.2) we have come across one case where the Hiph'il is definitely not causative (in the terms discussed above), but functions exactly as we expect with a Pi'el: "... and make known to them (lāhem) the way in which they should behave (walk) ..." (Ex. 18:20). When we paraphrase (as has been shown in 5.2), we may safely do it as follows: "... make something yādūa lahem" - but this is the shade of meaning we would expect in the Hiph'il. This one case, as well as those discussed earlier in this paragraph, amply illustrates the fact that an examination of the Hebrew passages is necessary - an examination not influenced by the logical exposition given above, but one in which these remarks are critically judged. After the basis of Jenni's distinctions has now been examined, we turn to the distinctions proposed by
him. In the first one the relation between subject and object is at stake.

5.4.3.2 The Object

Proceeding from the terms "factive" and "causative", Jenni makes far-reaching claims concerning the object of constructions of the kind under discussion. To repeat what has been said in the previous paragraph on this distinction: The Pi'el is factitive in relation to an adjectively expressed condition, whereas the Hiph'il is causative in relation to a verbally expressed event. There is a clear difference in the way the action comes about. In the factitive Pi'el "er macht: er ist lebendig" becomes "er macht ihn lebendig"; in the causative Hiph'il "er macht: er lebt" becomes "er macht ihn leben" (Jenni, 1968, p. 34). Another example is presented by Jenni, in this case with the consonants 'bd: the Pi'el yields the meaning "vernichtet machen", the Hiph'il "umkommen lassen" (1967, p. 149). Consequently - and this is the most important aspect in this chapter where the object of causative constructions is at stake - the Hiph'il presupposes a certain activity of its own on the part of the object, which is not the case with the Pi'el (1967, p. 149). The causative brings about that the event (i.e. the verbally expressed "event" described in 5.4.2.2) originates from a new centre. Exactly therefore, however, only entities that can be thought of as "selbständige Träger des Geschehens" qualify as objects of the Hiph'il (1967, p. 149). Whatever be the exact shade of meaning of the idea of causativity at stake, it is always such that the "eigene Verhalten des Objekts als Untersuchsubjekt" is involved (1968, p. 34). The object at the same time remains logical subject of the "event" (cf. 5.4.2) expressed by the so-called ground-stem (1968, p. 34). Therefore we expect as object of the Hiph'il in the first place per-
sons\textsuperscript{32}) or living beings.

In the Pi'el, on the other hand - where only the condition achieved is concerned and the result is the same in the case of persons and things - personal as well as non-personal objects are possible (1967, p. 149). In this verbal theme the object is transferred completely passively, without any contribution of its own, into a new state.

When Jenni first set forth this distinction in his article, 'bd (Qal: "perish"; Pi'el and Hiph'il: "destroy, exterminate") served as example. With the Pi'el he found personal (including all kinds of living beings) as well as non-personal objects. Where the verb is in the Hiph'il theme, Jenni ventures the statement that the object is always personal (1967, pp. 145-49). A few passages, however, render some difficulty to Jenni's opinions, but according to him these difficulties can be reasoned away successfully. Thus the objects "their name" (Dt. 7:24) "sounds of joy" (Jer. 25:10) and "hope" (Job 14:19) are regarded by Jenni not as things, but as the expressions of living people (1967, p. 146). With this we may well agree. Jer. 46:8 is somewhat more problematic. Here the object is the city (cities) and its (their) inhabitants. According to Jenni, we have in any case to think of the inhabitants when we read כיר (1967, p. 146, n. 2). But is this the case? The passage reads as follows:

"He said, I will rise, I will cover the earth,
I will destroy cities and their inhabitants" (RSV).\textsuperscript{33}

\textsuperscript{32} The terms "person" and "personal" are used by Jenni in this connection with a somewhat wider range of meaning than is usual. People as well as other living beings are understood under the term "persönlich" (cf. Jenni, 1967, p. 149).

\textsuperscript{33} Jenni considers the possibility of textual corruption (1967, p. 146 n. 2), but Bright in his commentary retains "and their inhabitants" (Bright, 1965, p. 302).
The mention of "city" would have been superfluous if it only means to designate the inhabitants. In the previous line the earth, or rather country, is mentioned as object of the destruction of the enemy. Moving from the more general to the particular, the cities are stated next, and lastly the inhabitants of the cities. The copula (wə) is used explicitly in order to indicate that two kinds of entities come into discussion. In any case, since non-personal as well as personal objects are used in this passage, it should not be advanced against Jenni's theory as a most important point of criticism.

The most important exception to Jenni's theory we find in Micha 5:9 (NEB, RSV 5:10):

"And in that day, says the Lord,
I will cut off your horses from among you -
and will destroy your chariots" (RSV).

Having first acknowledged this passage as an exception (1967, p. 146), Jenni later on gives an explanation of this usage: the chariots are not conceived of as magazine material, but as mobile entities (1967, p. 149-50; 1968, p. 37). In support of this, a passage in Exodus is mentioned, Ex. 14:25 where we read the following: "He clogged their chariot wheels and made them lumber along heavily" (NEB). In this passage activity on the part of the chariots is out of the question, since the Hebrew verb nhg (Pi. : "lead") is used, i.e. "He ... led the wheel(s) of his chariots in difficulty". In any case, in the context of Micha 5:9 the chariots are indeed conceived of as magazine material. This is quite clear if we consider the objects in adjacent passages: (according to the NEB) 5:11 "cities ... fortresses", 5:13 "images ... sacred pillars ... things your own hands made", 5:14 "sacred poles ... altars". People are also mentioned as objects, but then in addition
to the inanimate things made by men.

From a discussion of these two passages - especially Micha 5:9 - it is clear that Jenni's argumentation on the object of the Hiph'il 'bd is not at all successful.

It would have been of little value to merely tabulate and try to refute all the arguments adduced by Jenni in order to support his (logical) theory. It is certainly of much more value to recognize the way in which Jenni deals with the evidence. Micha 5:9 provides a very good example of this (as has been seen above). The context should be decisive in all instances. Furthermore, any argumentation in this connection should be consistent. Jenni's argumentation is not always consistent. At first he maintains that with the abstract notions ("Abstraktbegriffen") such as "their names" (Dt. 7:24) we do not have to think of objects conceived of as things, but rather of the "Lebensäußerungen der dahinter stehenden Menschen" (1967, p. 146). In a footnote we are referred to Dt. 12:3 where "their name" is used as object of 'bd (Pi.): "you must tear down their altars, smash their pillars, cut down their sacred poles, set fire to the carved images of their gods and wipe out their name from that place" (JB). It is said that "their name" in this passage does not refer to persons, but to the cultic objects that are to be destroyed (Jenni, 1967, p. 146 n. 1). True, "their name" has to be wiped out, but this expression cannot refer to the name of the cultic objects or the images of gods. It rather refers to the name of the gods or the name of the enemies.\(^ {34} \) Therefore "their name" in Dt. 12:3 is to be regarded as an expression of the same kind as that in Dt. 7:24.

\(^ {34} \) Cf. vs. 2 "... where the nations ... have served their gods ..." Cf. also König (1917, p. 115).
There is still another inconsistent argument concerning the word "name". When Jenni tries to get support for his own claims by an examination of Aramaic, he states that, according to his theory the "name" in Sefire-inscription II 8 7 is to be taken as a thing-object (1967, p. 151)! But let us compare this passage from the inscription - where a Pa’iel is used (the Aramaic equivalent of the Hebrew Pi’el - with the Hebrew passage from Deuteronomy - where a Hiph’il is used:

"... dann werde ich die Hand nicht gegen dich erheben können ... weder sie zu schlagen noch ihren Namen zu vernichten" (Sefire II 8 7) (Donner and Röllig, 1964 II, p. 259):

"He will put their kings into your hands, and you shall wipe out their name from under heaven" (Dt. 7:24) (NEB).

The details concerning the destruction of the name are as nearly the same as can be! But when Jenni examines the Sefire passage, he explains the meaning of the name by way of reference to another passage rather than taking into account the context of the passage itself. In this other passage it is much easier to think of the name as a thing, although in any case this kind of argument remains too precarious, according to the present author: "Und seine Nachkommenschaft soll keinen Namen besitzen" (Sefire II 8 7) (Donner and Röllig, 1964 II, p. 242). It is therefore clear that this kind of argumentation leads to complete arbitrariness.

Still in this connection it is of interest to note that Jenni quotes (1967, p. 151) Donner in support of this interpretation of the verbal themes, namely the following: "Hinter dem Gebrauch des Verbums 'bd Haf. steht die Vorstellung von der Lebendigkeit und der Rede-fähigkeit der Inschrift" (Donner and Röllig, 1964 II, p. 263). This is said in connection with the following passage (especially the second
part): "Ich werde die Inschriften auslöschen ... Ich werde 'KTH!' auslöschen und 'seinen König'!" (Sefire II C 4-5) (Donner and Rollig, 1964, p. 259). This statement of Donner is supposed to give support to the differentiation between factitive and causative (Jenni, 1967, p. 151). If I understand Donner correctly, he wishes to stress that behind the use of the word with the meaning "exterminate" stands the idea of the "Lebendigkeit und Redefähigkeit der Inschrift!" Reference is certainly not made to the fact that the verb occurs in the Haph'el theme, as Jenni interprets Donner. This is clear from the fact that Donner refers explicitly to the Ancient Near Eastern idea of the close connection or rather the identity of name (word) and matter (cf. Noth, 1967, p. 24). What Donner means, is that the destruction of the inscription will amount to the extermination of the king himself - in the sense of sorcery by way of analogy (Donner and Rollig, 1964 II, pp. 254, 263). Therefore we may safely say that Jenni quite unjustly makes an appeal to Donner for support of his theory. Incidentally, note that the incorporation of the idea of the identity of the name (word) and the matter would have left Jenni with innumerable problems. It would then have been necessary to regard all the objects as personal where "the name of ..." refers to living beings (cf. Donner and Rollig, 1964 II, p. 263).

Still considering the way in which Jenni deals with the evidence, we notice that he has some difficulty with Pi'el-forms 35) where a Hiph'il would have suited his theory better. As reason for these non-conforming forms in Esther he mentions that the personal object is in all probability not presented as autonomous bearer of the events, "sondern nur als rein passives, gewissermassen dingliches Objekt, das

in den Zustand der Vernichtung versetzt wird" (1967, p. 150). But this is by no means a distinguishing mark of the Pi’el - it can be said of nearly every object of both the Pi’el and the Hiph'il of 'bd. Even less convincing is the statement that 'bd (Pi.) occurs in a series of other verbs of devastation and killing and that 'bd has adjusted itself in meaning to these verbs (1967, p. 150). It is not exactly clear what Jenni has in mind, but it seems as if his remark has no real bearing at all on the issue at stake. In any case, passages with 'bd Hiph'il can also be advanced where we have such a series of verbs of the same kind. By way of preliminary summary it may then be said that Jenni's argumentation in separating Pi'el from Hiph'il throughout, is not consistent.

At the end of his article Jenni declares that the differences between Pi'el and Hiph'il (as found to be with 'bd) hold good for this verb, and are to be found only to a certain degree with other verbs (1967, p. 157). When other verbs are involved too in his more comprehensive work, he seems to have found more support for his findings in the study of 'bd. Where the verb is in the Pi'el, living beings as well as things can appear as objects (1968, p. 37). Persons and living beings with own activity can be thought of as passive; inanimate things can only be thought of as active in the case of events ("Vorgänge") that contain in their meaning no specific activity of living beings (1968, p. 37). In the case of verbs with a ground meaning characteristic of living beings, there is the restriction that "nur

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36. See e.g. Dt. 9:3; Jer. 18:7, 3:28.
38. Here it is to be noted that the way in which a word is presented, is to be ascertained by regarding it in its context - not by adducing other passages, as Jenni does with "name" and "chariot" (cf. earlier in this paragraph).
zu solcher Tätigkeit aktivierbare oder aktiviert vorstellbare Größen
Objekt des Veranlassens sein können" (1968, p. 37). This state of af-
fairs is held up as valid for Hebrew, but we nevertheless find the
statement that no pretence is made of being exhaustive (ibid.). Exact-
ly on this point we have to differ from Jenni. ALL the verbs defined
by some or other syntactic property - as described in 2.5.4 in connec-
tion with the translational lexicon - should be implicated in our exa-
mination. To put it more concretely, we have to look at all the verbs
presented by Jenni as related to intransitive verbs (1969, pp. 20-21).
Jenni's statement that no pretence is made of being exhaustive, is quite
out of line with his earlier - and one might add : merely theoretical -
remarks that the Pi'el should be treated as a matter of the syntactic
semasiology and should not be surrendered to separate researches on
lexical level (1968, p. 12; 1967, p. 143). In 5.4.2.1.1 we have seen
how strongly Jenni insists on this kind of treatment. But does his
neglect of making a comprehensive examination not amount exactly to
treating the Hiph'il on a lexical level? If this differentiation on
the part of the object really corresponds to a state of affairs through-
out the whole corpus of Hebrew, then it should be clear in every single
instance. Conversely, if a differentiation on the part of the object
is not possible throughout, the logical basis - which certainly is very
important to Jenni (cf. 5.4.3.1) - of his theory collapses. It is
therefore necessary to test the (rather doubtful) results of 'bd on
other sets of words, in order to establish whether these findings are
connected with the particular meaning of 'bd, or fit into a general
syntactic pattern (in the sense in which Jenni uses this word).

Firstly we give attention to the nature of the object. The first
words that are to be examined, as to the object, stand in relation to
an intransitive Qal (as presented by Jenni, 1968, pp. 20-21).
When the Pi'el of ḫkn (Qal: "live in, dwell") is used, we have the following objects: the Lord's name (8 x), the Israelites, the Judeans (2 x), the tent (tabernacle).39) Objects of Pi'el ḫkn are: the cherubim, the tent (tabernacle), wickedness, honour, tribes, birds of the air. If we take "name" as "personal", then we have in the Pi'el and Hiph'īl respectively, one inanimate object: "tent". It is quite clear that in Joshua 18:1 the tent is not conceived of as an active object, whatever be the evidence of other passages. Here, then, we have a percentage of 16.7 for non-conforming cases. Where the Pi'el is used, this percentage is 8.3.40)

With ḫkr (Qal: "be drunk") there are four occurrences in each of the Pi'el and Hiph'īl. In all of these passages the object is either personal or represented as personal. In Dt. 32:42 ("I will make my arrows drunk with blood") the arrows are clearly personified, especially if we take into account the next part where we read: "my sword shall devour flesh". In the case of ḫkr, then, the verb takes similar objects in Pi'el and Hiph'īl.

With ḥyh (Qal: "be alive") we have the following position: in the Pi'el there are 50 personal or living objects, 4 inanimate objects and 2 passages where the verb has no object. In the Hiph'īl we have 20 living objects, no inanimate objects and 2 passages without object. This verb then seems to support Jenni's claims as to the object.

39. NEB, RSV and JB reads the verb as ḫākān, i.e. "the tent where he dwelt". This is the evidence of many early versions as well, and is accepted by Koehler and Baumgartner (1958, p. 971) and Kraus (1966, I, pp. 538-9), but Böhl and Gomser (1968 II, p. 53) stand by ḫīkān. The deviation from the Masoretic pointing cannot account for the absence of the expected preposition bē.

40. These figures differ somewhat from those presented in the author's earlier article (Claassen, 1971) where the term "personal" has been taken only in its strict sense as referring to persons.
In the case of hlp I (Qal: "come by turns, sweep on") there are only two passages in the Pi'el with the object "clothes". The Hiph'il provides us with a variety of meanings, but we have the following objects: wages (2 x), clothes, part of an offering, strength (Job 29:20; Is. 40:31, 41:1) - to be taken as personal - the foundation of the earth and the heavens, cedars, as well as one passage where an object is not mentioned (Job 14:7). Out of 10 passages, 6 contain inanimate objects that are also not represented as personal or animate.

If we consider ybš (Qal: "be, become dry, be dried up"), we notice that the following objects occur with the Hiph'il theme, whilst none are specifically represented as active: water (3 x), streams (or rivers) (2 x), sea, green herbs, pools, fountain, green tree, fruit. As objects of the Pi'el we have: sea, shoots and bones. This verb clearly testifies against Jenni's convictions - nowhere is the activity of the object at stake or is the object represented as active. ybš and the previous verb hlp I lend no support to Jenni's theory.

mrr (Qal: "be bitter") occurs only three times in the Pi'el and four times in the Hiph'il. In the Pi'el the objects are to be regarded as personal according to Jenni's definition: him (Joseph), their lives, weeping. When the Hiph'il theme is used, one passage has no object; otherwise the objects are still personal: an angel, the soul, Naomi. In this case we see that the objects are of the same kind.

With k's (Qal:"be discontent"), there are two verbs in the Pi'el theme and 46 in the Hiph'il. In all the cases the object is represented as personal. It strikes immediately that in nearly all the Hiph'il passages Yahweh is the object. However, in the Pi'el Yahweh appears as object when He speaks of Himself.
In addition to all these verbs that show an intransitive Qal, another very important verb has to be discussed in connection with the object of the Pi'el and Hiph'il, viz. šḥṭ (Pi. and Hiph.: "spoil, ruin, destroy"). This verb is not discussed by Jenni in connection with the above-mentioned verbs because it does not stand in relation to an intransitive Qal. Jenni wishes rather to deal with šḥṭ Hiph. as a verb showing an internal causative Hiph'il in relation to a transitive Qal (1968, p. 251 ss.). In order to grasp completely what Jenni understands under these terms, we have to turn back to where he describes a causative of the same kind in relation to an intransitive Qal (1968, pp. 46-50). Here we have two kinds of verbs in the Hiph'il: those where the subject is identical with the object (e.g. cause oneself to be great = do great things), and those with which there is a regular ellipse of the object that is "obvious" (e.g. ḥzq Hiph. "seize, grasp" = cause (the hand) to be firm on). 41)

When the Hiph'il stands in relation to a transitive Qal verb, there are also two kinds of verbs. In the first group, called by Jenni the normal-causative group, the verb may take two accusatives. Then we have an inducing subject ("Subjekt des Veranlassens"), a first object ("das veranlasste Objekt") and an object of the transitive action, e.g. ḥd̄g "make one know a thing" (1968, p. 251). The object of the transitive action may even sometimes be lacking. But - and here we come to the essence of the argumentation - even more frequent than the first group is the second, where the first object ("veranlasste Objekt") lacks regularly and only the object of the transitive action appears! Šḥṭ is to Jenni a highly illustrative example of verbs of

41. Later on (in 5.4.3.6) this kind of verbs will be discussed in detail.
this kind. Jenni now suspects that this Hiph'il-meaning - which is roughly the same as that of an ordinary transitive Qal - is, in any case partly, to be understood as analogous to internal transitive Hiph'il verbs with intransitive ground stems. To put it more concretely; the inducing subject might ("dürfte") be identical with the first object ("das veranlasste Objekt"), e.g. "to allow oneself to ruin someone or something" in the case of šḥt.

We immediately notice that Jenni himself expresses the hypothetic character of his proposal. He extends the usual conception of the internal transitive character of the Hiph'il (as found e.g. with Gesenius et al. 1966, p. 145) considerably. Gesenius and Kautzsch classify šḥt under a sub-group of the internal-causative group of words with the heading "Stems which express action in some particular direction" (1966, p. 145). We therefore see that Jenni stands quite on his own in maintaining that we have a regular elliptical first object with verbs such as šlḥ and šḥt.

Before examining the actual usage of šḥt, it is necessary to give attention to the way in which Jenni brings this verb in relation to the other verbal themes. For a construction such as is outlined above, a basic (Qal) meaning is necessary. Because šḥt does not occur in the

43. Cf. 1968, p. 252: "Die Vermutung", "dürfte", "zu erwarten dass sich der Unterschied ... bemerkbar macht".
44. Although Gesenius and Kautzsch wish to form a logical link between the causative idea and all of the internal-transitive Hiph'il verbs (1966, p. 145, par. (d)), it is nowhere maintained that šḥt is to be understood in the way suggested by Jenni. Barr justly criticises this attempt of Gesenius and Kautzsch to suggest an ultimate causative notion for verbs having a clear non-causative meaning, especially when Gesenius makes an appeal to "the Hebrew point of view" (Barr, 1961, p. 183).
Qal, Jenni finds it necessary to reconstruct a corresponding Qal. In order to do this, he takes recourse to the meaning of a verb containing the corresponding root in Arabic, viz. sahata "extirpate" (Jenni, 1968, p. 242) - a procedure which has earlier been shown to be precarious (3.4). The reference to the Arabic word is supposed to fix the hypothetical Hebrew ground stem as a transitive. Jenni admits that this is a somewhat problematic case, because Koehler and Baumgartner refer to another correlate, viz. the Akkadian ētu "escape" - an intransitive verb - and mention that we may in this case accept a development of meaning similar to that of 'bd (Qal: "perish"; Pi. and Hiph.: "destroy, exterminate") (Koehler and Baumgartner, 1958, p. 962). This complicates the matter considerably, but Jenni maintains that we can solve it successfully by determining whether there is an accidental/substantial relation between the action and the object. This relation will later be discussed in detail (5.4.3.5) and then it will become clear that it is untenable as a distinction between Pi'el and Hiph'il. Jenni now tries to use this distinction of his to decide whether the hypothetical Qal has a transitive or an intransitive meaning. Four passages are advanced where a substantial Hiph'il cannot be discerned, and then it is stated that the acceptance of a transitive ground meaning solves the problem, because the "aktuell/resultativ" distinction plays a role (1968, p. 243). But Jenni does not do justice to šht Hiph.: four cases have been advanced where a substantial Hiph'il cannot be discerned, but MANY passages can be advanced where the action really

45. According to this distinction, as set out by Jenni, the use of the Pi'el signifies an accidental action, while the action is substantial in relation to the object where a Hiph'il is used (cf. 5.4.3.5).

is substantial towards the object, in the sense given to this word by Jenni, e.g.:

2 Kings 13:23 "But the Lord was gracious and took pity on them; because of his covenant with Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, he looked on them with favour and was unwilling to destroy (םֵיהֶת Hiph.) them" (NEB);

1 Chron. 21:15 "And God sent an angel to Jerusalem to destroy (םֵיהֶת Hiph.) it" (NEB).

In the first part of vs. 23 it is said that Yahweh was gracious and took pity on Israel, that he looked on them with favour and acted according to his covenant and consequently did not destroy them. To take the second example: David chose to fall into the hands of Yahweh and then the pestilence came. God sent an angel to Jerusalem in order to destroy it in accordance with his plan. Is it justified to choose only a few cases and then state that the accidental/substantial distinction does not apply? And even if the distinction did not apply toםֵיהֶת, we keep in mind that this proposed distinction does not hold water (as will be seen later).

Jenni, by taking refuge in a hypothetical Qal, makes his further analysis ofםֵיהֶת speculative. His argument towards demonstrating the transitive character of the Qal, carries no cogency. An argument might just as well have been advanced in support of the intransitive character of the reconstructed Qal. Thus it could have been maintained that מִשָּׁהְת ("destroyed things") is the verbal adjective, as 'אָבְדָה is that of 'בָד (Jenni, 1967, p. 149).

To return to Jenni's conclusions from the "fact" of the transitive character of the Qal: the question is whether this Hiph'il distinguish-
es itself throughout from the corresponding Qal (as in šlh) or Pi'el (as in šht). In conformity with the whole of his study, Jenni expects from the theoretical exposition that there is a differentiation in the use of the forms within their context (1968, p. 252). In the case of šht this distinction is supposed to become clear as follows: the Hiph'il stresses the non-resultative character of the action and can be translated "absichtlich verderben, verderben wollen, verderben können"; the Pi'el which is in the case of transitive verbs resultative in contrast with the Qal, can be translated "tatsächlich verderben", while the modal colouring is also lacking (Jenni, 1968, p. 260). Several pairs of passages are presented to illustrate the distinction between Pi'el and Hiph'il, but according to the present writer none of these really illustrates a distinctive use of either Pi'el or Hiph'il successfully, e.g.

Gen. 6:12-13 "And God saw the earth, and behold, it was corrupt; for all flesh had corrupted (Hiph.) their way upon the earth. (13) And God said to Noah, "I have determined to make an end of all flesh; for the earth is filled with violence through them; behold, I will destroy (Hiph.) them with 47) the earth" (RSV).

Gen. 6:17 "For behold, I will bring a flood of waters upon the earth, to destroy (Pi.) all flesh in which is the breath of life from under heaven" (RSV).

The discussion runs as follows: "all flesh had corrupted their way" is to be regarded as durative ("auf dem ganzen Weg freveln") and "setzt Absicht voraus" exactly as does God's decree (vs. 13). The flood in vs. 17 is only an instrument without any intention of its own

and destined to bring about in facts the will of God (Jenni, 1968, p. 260). This argument may be criticized as follows: There is no evidence at all that the corruption in vs. 12 is represented as durative, as Jenni maintains. True, the action of corruption must have stretched over a long period of time, but in vs. 12 this period is not described, but only the fact of the corruption, as is clear from the first part of vs. 12 and also vs. 11 where we learn that the earth was corrupt and filled with violence. The phrase "all flesh had corrupted their way" does not presuppose any kind of intention. For Jenni's argument concerning the third verb šḥt, we may compare his remark on other pairs of passages: in the case of Gen. 6:17 and Gen. 19:13 it is said that the Pi'el is used because the flood and the two men (in the destruction of Sodom) do not act with intention of their own, but according to their commission; in the case of Judges 6:5 (Pi.) (where the Midianites came into the land in order to destroy it) nothing is said about intention of their own or about a commission, but another kind of argument is introduced, viz. that attention is focused on the devastated condition of the land (Jenni, 1968, p. 261). In all three cases a Pi'el is used, but only in one of these "attention of their own" is at stake! True, in Judges 6:5 (with a Pi'el) "um es verheeren zu wollen" would be ridiculous, but quite so in Gen. 6:17 and 19:13 (both Hiph'il)! In 1 Sam. 26:15 (discussed on p. 261, Jenni, 1968) a Hiph'il is used to describe "intention of his (their) own" of exactly the same kind as in Judges 6:5.

It is clear that Jenni's argumentation towards laying down a distinction between Pi'el and Hiph'il of šḥt is not convincing and successful. Furthermore, there is absolutely no evidence for an interpretation of šḥt Hiph. as "sich veranlassen, jemand zu verderben". 
hiṣḥit did never mean "to cause oneself to destroy someone or something" in any stage of biblical Hebrew; it only meant "spoil, ruin, destroy", and that is as far as we can go in our linguistic description. 48) There is no passage where this additional suggested meaning is evident. On the contrary, good reasons can be advanced in support of maintaining that the fluent speaker was not conscious of these extra meanings: the contexts of šḥt Hiph. suggest that the connotations advanced by Jenni were not actually alive in the minds of the speakers, e.g.

Jer. 51:11 "... for the Lord's purpose against Babylon is to destroy (šḥt Hiph.) it" (NEB). Would it be better to translate "... the Lord's purpose against Babylon is to cause himself to destroy it" in a passage where Yahweh's judgment and his severe action against Babylon are described? The use of mēzimmātō makes the proposed paraphrase somewhat out of the question, as also in the next example:

2 Chron. 25:16 "I know that God has determined to destroy you because you have done this ..." (NEB). God's decision to destroy Amaziah is because of their worship of idols. Will God then decide to cause himself to destroy the king? His action would rather be immediate and obvious.

Passages with ’ābâ "want to" preceding šḥt also present difficulties. 49) It might be possible to interpret this internal causative as "getting oneself to destroy someone", perhaps with addition of "with difficulty" or "despite everything that pleads for the opposite". In this way it

48. Barr (1961, p. 175) maintains in the same way that he’ēmīn never meant anything but "trust, believe". The suggestion "show faithfulness" is merely a reconstruction of certain scholars.

is quite understandable to get passages such as the following:

Gen. 6:12. "And God saw the earth, and behold, it was corrupt; for all flesh had corrupted (šḥt Hiph.) their way upon the earth" (RSV). To state it somewhat differently: "all flesh got so far as to corrupt their way ... (although there was no reason for such)."

Judges 2:19. "But as soon as the judge was dead, they would relapse into deeper corruption (šḥt Hiph.) than their forefathers" (NEB).

However, if this interpretation of the "sich veranlassen" is what is meant, it is not a completely distinguishing one. There are many passages where such an interpretation would just not fit, e.g.:

Judges 6:4. "Then they pitched their camps in the country and destroyed (šḥt Hiph.) the crops as far as the outskirts of Gaza, leaving nothing to support life in Israel" (NEB). The Midianites are on the war-path and certainly do not have to get themselves to the point of destroying the land.

All the other passages where we have non-personal objects, also do not lend support to such an interpretation. On the contrary, the occurrence of objects of this kind makes the explanation "sich veranlassen" - in whatever way it be understood - clearly far-fetched.

1 Sam. 6:5. "Make models of your tumours and of the rats which are ravaging the land ..." (NEB).

There are furthermore passages with šḥt Pl., too, where such an interpretation is impossible:

50. These passages are: 1 Sam. 6:5 (rats); Jer. 2:30 (lion), 15:3 (birds and beasts), 51:25 (mountain?), Mal. 3:11 (locust or pests).

51. We nevertheless see that Jenni builds an argument in this connection: "... ein durch das Wesen des Subjekts bedingtes Können (das Gefäss veranlast sich, etwas zu fassen = es vermaga wesensgemäß, etwas zu fassen)" (Jenni, 1968, p. 254).
pretation and paraphrase could fit quite well, e.g.:

Joshua 22:33 "The Israelites were satisfied, and they blessed God and thought no more of attacking Reuben and God and ravaging (šht Pi. Inf. Co.) their land" (NEB). Beforehand the Israelites thought of bringing themselves to the point of ravaging the land of Reuben (cf. vs. 12).

It is clear that Jenni wishes to give more attention to the effects of the adding of "sich verlassen ..." than to any meaning directly resulting from it (as has been described above). We learn that, rather than trying to express the internal causative idea directly, we have to look for effects. Unfortunately some of these effects remain rather loosely connected with the internal causative in its basic meaning. To the present author the "original meaning" of the internal causative, viz. "to cause oneself to ..." remains very closely connected with the effects. In other words, if it is not possible to add to the meaning of šht Hiph. time and again "to cause oneself to destroy", then this phrase is no more part of the linguistic knowledge of the speaker and then the effects, also, are unknown to him. It may or may not be possible that a Hiph'īl has been formed in that way, but the historical associations are no longer present and therefore the (logically expected) effects of the historical events of the language are irrelevant.

As the above criticism of Jenni's discussion of šht Hiph. in distinction from šht Pi. has shown, there is no difference in meaning between the two verbal themes. No distinction can successfully be carried through from start to finish.

The necessity of this lengthy discussion of šht becomes clear if we keep in mind that there are many verbs without a corresponding Qal where it is not possible to make a distinction between the meaning of
the Pi'el and Hiph'il. Of course, small differences or near-identical meanings are not excluded in this rather vague definition. Some differences we do not deny, e.g. that in one verbal theme the word has a more concrete meaning than in the other. Fact is that in these cases the verbal themes generally have the same meaning. Therefore - and this is the reason for the lengthy excursion above - these verbs without a corresponding Qal or with corresponding transitive Qal are also to be implicated in a critical evaluation of Jenni's proposed distinctions between Pi'el and Hiph'il. Therefore we now return to the examination of the object of the verb in the themes Pi'el and Hiph'il.

When the verb stands in the Pi'el the object is personal in 12 passages out of a total of 39, while 22 passages have a non-personal object. Five passages have no object. When the Hiph'il verbal theme is used, we have a total of 41 passages. In 3h the object is personal, in 3 non-personal, while 3 passages show no object. Stated in terms of percentage, we have the following position with 5ht:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Personal object</th>
<th>Non-personal object</th>
<th>No object</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pi'el</td>
<td>30.8</td>
<td>56.4</td>
<td>12.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hiph'il</td>
<td>37.4</td>
<td>36.3</td>
<td>26.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is now necessary to bring our findings of 5ht in connection with the other verbs that have been examined. Statistically we have the following position:

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52. Elliptical objects are not taken into consideration in the statistical observations.

53. The 19 cases where the participle appears as substantive, are not taken into consideration, neither the 4 passages where we have in the Psalms "Tune: 'Do not destroy'" (Jerusalem Bible).
If we add to these clear data the many obvious queries that can be advanced against Jenni's treatment of 'bd - as presented earlier in this paragraph - there can be no doubt as to the total untenability of his claims with regard to the object of the Pi'el and Hiph'il. In the case of some of the verbs discussed above, there are only, or nearly exclusively, personal objects (e.g. hyh, kñ, mrr, škr), with two only, or nearly exclusively, non-personal objects (ybs, hlpl), with one we have percentages roughly the same in the two verbal themes (škn), with one roughly equally distributed kinds of objects (šlt) and with another one a result quite the opposite of Jenni's claims (hlpl I Hiph.). Jenni's claims cannot be conceded to. Strictly speaking the negative results of the examination of the object cancel Jenni's whole theory on logical grounds, but the other proposed distinctions are still to be examined.
The suggestion that the object in the Pi'el is represented as passive, does not hold water when we look at a verb like הָנָה (Pi. and Hiph.: "cause to rejoice"). In the one Hiph'il passage (Ps. 89:43) the object is no more actively represented as in any of the Pi'el ones. On the contrary, a few Pi'el passages can be regarded as having such an object (e.g. Neh. 12:43; Ps. 86:4; Jer. 31:13).

When we have to account for the use of the object - in so far as only certain objects are used with certain verbs - we may safely say that in each case the object stands in connection with the particular semantic value of the word as lexical item, rather than with any syntactic-semantic distinction valid for all verbs (as suggested by Jenni). With הָנָה, מַרְלָה and שְׁקָר there is a preponderance (or even exclusive use) of the personal or living class of objects, because it is normally people and living beings that are being made alive (when dead) or preserved alive, are being embittered or made drunk. On the other hand, normally non-personal things are being made dry or withered.

An examination of the use of the verbal themes should thoroughly take cognisance of the similarities with regard to the objects, rather than merely focusing attention on the differences. Then we find that with בְּדָד there are at least eight groups of objects of nearly the same kind appearing both in the Pi'el and in the Hiph'il:

(i) Dt. 12:3 "the name of them"; Dt. 7:24 "their name".
(ii) Dt. 11:4 "them" (= Egyptians); Dt. 9:3 "them" (= Anakim); Ezek. 25:7 "you" (= Ammonites).
(iii) Ps. 9:6 (NEB 9:5) "the ungodly"; Dt. 7:10 "Those who ... show their hatred".
(iv) Is. 26:14 "All memory of them"; Job 14:19 "the hope of frail man".
(v) nephēš Ezek. 22:27 "man's lives"; Lev. 23:30 "any person".

(vi) Job 12:23 "peoples"; Dt. 8:20 "nations".

(vii) 2 Kings 19:18 "their gods"; Ezek. 30:13 "lordlings".

(viii) 2 Kings 11:1 "the royal line"; Jer. 49:38 "the king and his officers".

In the case of hīp I (Pi. and Hiph. "change") we find the object "clothes" in both of the verbal themes. With ybš the object "sea" occurs in both, and with k̄s "Yahweh".

The last verb brings us to some of the inferences Jenni makes from the object-situation as he believes it to be. We learn that it could be of theological interest that the user of biblical Hebrew in certain cases shrank from regarding Yahweh as a purely passive object and therefore with certain verbs with unpleasant meaning gave preference to the causative Hiph'il instead of the Pi'el (Jenni, 1968, p. 37). Thus, for example, preference was given to k̄s Hiph. "cause to be discontented" rather than Pi'el "make discontented". In the causative Hiph'il activity on the side of Yahweh is supposed to be involved, "weil man sich Jahweh nicht als total affiziertes in einen negativen Endzustand versetztes Objekt vorstellen möchte" (Jenni, 1968, p. 38). Roughly the same is claimed for yq̄ (Pi. and Hiph.: "make weary"). This argument can be criticized as follows: Firstly, the Hiph'il is not used exclusively with Yahweh as object as is claimed, but also - and then in a degrading sense and certainly mockingly - with people as objects, e.g. in the last part of

Dt. 32:21 "They roused my jealousy with a god of no account, with their false gods they provoked me (k̄s Pi.); so I will rouse their jealousy with a people of no account, with a brutish nation I will provoke them (k̄s Hiph.)" (NEB).
Objects of this kind we also find in 1 Sam. 1:7 (Peninnah grieving Hannah) and Ezek. 32:9 (Yahweh troubling the heart of the peoples). Can it be maintained that in all these passages there is a special concern for not representing the object as passive? Certainly not. Secondly we note that in the first part of Dt. 32:21 (above) Yahweh himself is speaking and a Pi'el is used for the grieving of Yahweh! Jenni, too, notices this apparent anomaly, but "explains" it by saying that in this passage "Jahwe selber redet und sich anklagend als durch und durch Erzürnten hinstellt" (1968, p. 38). But cannot this also be said of many passages with a Hiph'il too? There are 19 passages where Yahweh speaks of himself as being offended by his people, and in most of these passages He is thoroughly irate. Jenni's explanation is certainly not successful. Yahweh speaks of himself in both Pi'el and Hiph'il of k'as and we may expect that this indicates that the verbal themes are used merely for the sake of variation. This view is supported by the fact that the Pi'el is used in the first part of Dt. 32:21 and the Hiph'il in the second part, exactly in the same way as the Pi'el of gn' is used in the first part of the same passage and the Hiph'il in the second! For the same kind of free variation - as the present author prefers to call this problematic use of the verbal themes - we may look at 1 Sam. 1:6 and 7:

54. The emendation suggested by the Targum-reading is not necessary (cf. Zimmerli, 1969 II, p. 764; also id. 1969 I, p. 195). The phrase wayyasubu lēhak'isent is not to be left out merely on the ground of other versions and because of the verdicts of the "Deuteronomistic work of history" - that it is a word frequently used in connection with the offending of Yahweh in this work of history and does not fit in Ezekiel - as is done by Zimmerli (1969 I, p. 195).

55. 1 Kings 14:9, 16:2; 2 Kings 21:15, 22:17; Is. 65:3; Jer. 7:18, 19, 8:19, 11:17, 25:6, 7, 32:29, 30, 32, 44:3, 8; Ezek. 8:17 (see previous foot-note), 16:26; 2 Chron. 34:25.
198.

1 Sam. 1:6-7 "Further, Hannah's rival used to torment her (k^c^6 Pi.) and humiliate her because she had no children. (7) Year after year this happened when they went up to the house of the Lord; her rival used to torment her (k^c^6 Hiph.)" (NEB).

Jenni has another explanation for passages such as these - the so-called accidental/substantial distinction to be discussed later - but at this stage we only keep in mind the nature of the object. In 1 Sam. 1:6-7 we find exactly the same object (Hannah) and she is not represented as active in the second instance. 56 To advance further arguments against inferences of this kind is not very difficult. One wonders, for example, what Jenni would say to disprove an argument that the author of Deuteronomy did not believe in the living presence of Yahweh at the sanctuary because škn is used in the Pi'el verbal theme in the recurrent phrase "the place which the Lord your God will choose, to make his name dwell there" (RSV Dt. 12:11 etc.). In this connection mention may also be made of two passages where šmm Pi. ("to cause to rejoice") is used with Yahweh as object (Judges 9:13; Ps. 45:9). In the meantime the Hiph'il of šmm was available to the speaker.

Jenni's "theologically interesting" inferences from the nature of the object have been proved to be quite unjustified. Although Jenni's approach is not the same as that of Boman (cf. 3.2), some of his inferences resemble those of Boman, e.g. the one which has been disproved above. As regards the object we may diagnose Jenni's mistake as a

56. Jenni regards Hannah in vs. 6 as passive object because of the phrase "because the Lord had closed her womb" (Jenni, 1968, p. 70). This phrase does however not alter anything to the conception of the object. In vs. 7 Hannah is not represented any more passive as in vs. 6. One could just as well maintain that the phrase "therefore Hannah wept and would not eat" (vs. 7 the last part) points to the intensity of her affection and serves to represent her as passive object in the case of the Hiph'il verb.
neglect of taking into consideration the language under discussion as a whole. Rather than making inferences from words, we have to keep in mind that the characteristic linguistic expression is not the individual word, but the word-combination or sentence (cf. Barr, 1961, p. 233).

5.4.3.3 The Aspect of Time

The aspect of time, according to Jenni, is very closely connected with the so-called distinguishing use of the object.

Again the concepts "adjectival condition" and "verbal event" seem to play a dominant role. Where the verb expresses the factitive of an adjectively expressed condition, only the achieved result, or rather condition, is of importance, without regard for the duration of time necessary for the achievement of the condition (Jenni, 1967, p. 150; 1968, p. 53). Where the verb in the Hiph'il expresses a causative idea, attention is focused on the verbally expressed event and regard is paid to the duration of time necessary for the event to occur (ibid.). Jenni stresses that this explanation only pertains to the "zeitlichen Aktionsarten" and not to the so-called tempora Perfect and Imperfect that have no influence on lexical meaning of the verb - the polarity of the so-called tempora is not based on an objective distinction of Aktionsarten (e.g. complete/incomplete or punctual/lasting) (Jenni, 1968, pp. 53-54).

There are nine verbs of which only an Imperfect is in use, but only indirectly, in Jenni's opinion, can this

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57. The use of the so-called tempora has been the subject of many discussions, but Michel's conception of the tempora cannot be sanctioned. Jenni makes much use of Michel's interpretation of the tempora and regards it as perfectly reconcilable with the findings of his own examination (Jenni, 1968, pp. 53, 55). According to Michel the speaker states in the Perfectum an action that is accidental in respect of the subject (i.e. the subject could have neglected doing it or he could have done
fact contributes to the function of the Hiph'il (1968, p. 54). 58)

The tempora with their varying uses we therefore leave out of discussion, but not the "zeitlichen Aktionsarten". The first conclusion Jenni draws from the fact that in the Hiph'il a certain duration of time is required, while the change of condition in the Pi'el is momentary - the Hiph'il is of durative, the Pi'el of punctual Aktionsart. He regards this distinction as a real and living one, but not always applicable, nor the fundamental one in connection with the verbal themes. 59) Hebrew reveals the differentiation between the Aktionsarten lexical-semasiologically rather than syntactical-semasiologically (1968, p. 56). We should however note that even for the cases where the Pi'el is to be regarded as of punctual Aktionsart, this punctuality is not of a strict kind in distinction to a momental one, but the two verbal aspects find in Hebrew a unity which it does not otherwise), and in the Imperfectum an action which is substantial with regard to the subject (i.e. the subject did not act according to his free will, but in conformity with his being and the situation) (Michel, 1960, p. 110). Brockelmann, too, regards the tempora as expressing subjective aspects, but his explanation is totally different from that of Michel and is much more acceptable (Brockelmann, 1951, pp. 146-50; 1956, pp. 39-45). Michel's approach is permeated with the untenable distinction between adjectivally expressed condition and verbally expressed event (cf. 5.4.2.2).

58. Jenni's claim that the action or event is always substantial ("substantiell ... wesenhaft") in these passages (1968, pp. 54-55) is certainly not proven. Cf. the Hiph'il of hll 1 (in Is. 13:10; Job 41:10), zhr (in Daniel 12:3), zgn (in Hiob 14:8) and 'm§ . This substantiality can (according to his definition on pp. 87-88) only be ascertained from the context and not from the meaning of the word itself (as he maintains on p. 54).

59. Although quoting Joüon for discussing this problem at the hand of the examples biggeš ("seek to find" = durative) and maš ("find" = punctual) (Joüon, 1923, p. 291), Jenni prefers to take darás ("seek") as example (1968, p. 56). biggeš is of course one of the most obvious examples of a durative Pi'el! It is clear that if bogiš has a durative meaning when it occurs in the Pi'el while theoretically a punctual meaning was expected, the whole of thelogical construction (cf. 5.4.3.1) becomes invalid (although this "distinction" is only advanced for certain passages by Jenni).
have for us (1968, pp. 56-58). Thus, for example, we can have a passage such as 2 Chron. 29:17 ("then for eight days they consecrated the house of the Lord" (NEB)) where the Pi'el - theoretically expected to be of momental Aktionsart - is used to describe an action that spans over eight days. The action is according to Jenni (1968, p. 57) not punctual, but rather "iterativ-punktuell" (1968, p. 57). To me this seems to be a fruitless argument. If a piece of detail such as "for eight days" can be used together with a Pi'el quite freely, then the obvious explanation is that the Pi'el is not a verbal theme of momentary kind, or rather that terms such as "momentary/durative" cannot successfully be applied to the Pi'el and Hiph'il.

The second conclusion drawn by Jenni, concerns the Hiph'il: the Hiph'il comprises from the outset a verbally expressed event and can therefore be grasped in terms of the Aktionsarten. When the intransitive ground stem expresses a durative being or becoming, the Hiph'il is "ebenso von durativer Aktion" (1968, p. 59). This view leads Jenni to point out a fundamental distinction between causative and factitive of many verbs that are usually entered into dictionaries and grammars as having the same meaning. Again, this distinction has to be integrated with others, e.g. the important substantial/accidental distinction. In these passages our distinguishing point is: non-durative passages in the Pi'el vs. durative passages in the Hiph'il.

60. By consenting to these statements, we are back in the same position as Boman. We learn that the two meanings "brennend machen, in Flammen setzen" and "feuern, Feuer unterhalten" are for us "lexikalisch auseinanderstrebenden Bedeutungen" while he Hebrew they are "nicht so weit auseinander" (Jenni, 1968, p. 57). This may or may not be true for German, but in Afrikaans it is definitely not the case. Here "vuurmask" is generally used for both actions under discussion, although other words and phrases are available, e.g. "vuur aanstek, brand stig, vuur aan die gang hou, vuur stook". Therefore no claims as to the peculiarities of the Hebrew language may be made from linguistic phenomena like these.
"heilig machen" = factitive "Heiligkeit übertragen, heiligen, weihen" vs. "heilig sein lassen" = causative "heiligen, weihen ... als heilig behandeln" (ibid.).

Apparently this distinction works perfectly and we may feel tempted to regard it as a revolutionary approach, e.g. (a pair advanced by Jenni):

Dt. 32:51 "This is because both of you were unfaithful to me at the waters of ... when you did not uphold my holiness (Pi.) among the Israelites" (NEB);

Numbers 20:12 "But the Lord said ... 'you did not trust me so far as to uphold my holiness in the sight of the Israelites" (NEB);

"Because you did not believe in me, to sanctify me in the eyes of the people of Israel" (RSV).

In conformance to his being, Yahweh is to be sanctified; therefore a Hiph'il is used in the second passage. However, when the same idea is put in the negative, then every kind of duration is out of the question and a Pi'el is used (Jenni, 1968, p. 60). To this argument we may add that other particulars in Dt. 32:51, viz. the mention of the place where they were unfaithful etc., stress the punctual or momentary character of the Pi'el verb even more than the deduction from "the negative of a durative action". In this pair of passages, then, we find support for Jenni's claims. However, a warning seems necessary, lest we confuse theological issues (such as the necessity of a continuous sanctification of Yahweh) with linguistic ones. Jenni too readily crosses from linguistic "facts" (Hiph'il expresses duration) to theological ones, and we should beware of the obvious fallacies of Boman's approach (cf. 3.2).
When we implicate other pairs of passages in our discussion, it does however become clear that the difference between the use of either Pi'el or Hiph'il is not so obvious any more. In 1 Kings 9:3 (= 2 Chr. 7:16) a Hiph'il is used:

1 Kings 9:3 "I have heard the prayer and supplication which you have offered me; I have consecrated (Hiph.) this house which you have built, to receive my Name for all time" (NEB).

Jenni explains the use of the Hiph'il by saying "die dauernde Heiligung des Tempels durch Jahwe dagegen blickt mit "dass ich meinen Namen darin wohnen lasse immerdar auf die Folgezeit" (1968, p. 60). But is this representation of the matter true? Certainly not. Jenni confuses the contribution of two verbs to the general idea that the author wishes to express. The action of the consecration is presented by god Hiph. as a completed one. The prospect of the future is presented in the next part of the sentence ("to receive my Name for all time"). When we study the meaning of a word, we have to look for the contribution of a word to the context, and not simply add up the semantic effects of various contexts on a word (cf. Barr, 1961, p. 71).

Jenni treats another passage in the same way, and here the fallacy of his approach is even more clear (Jenni, 1968, p. 60):

1 Kings 9:7 "I will renounce this house which I have consecrated (Hiph.) in honour of my name, and Israel shall become a byword and an object lesson among all peoples" (NEB).

It is very clear that the action of consecration is represented as completed and that the promise of destruction to Israel has linguistically no effect whatsoever on the word "consecrate".

Two other passages illustrate clearly what kind of argumentation Jenni uses in order to force the evidence into the straitjacket of his
preconceived ideas. We give special attention to the way Jenni discusses these passages - it is exactly the same as we have met earlier:

1 Kings 8:64 (= 2 Chr. 7:7) "On that day also the kind consecrated (Pi.) the centre of the court which lay in front of the house of the Lord; there he offered the whole-offering ..." (NEB).

Numbers 3:13 (= 8:17) "For every first-born belongs to me. On the day when I struck all the first-born in the land of Egypt, I consecrated (Hiph.) for my own all the first-born of Israel, of both man and beast. They are mine; I am Yahweh" (JB).

These passages are not directly compared with each other by Jenni, but his argument runs as follows: In the first passage we have a unique event, viz. the consecration of part of the temple-court "on that day"; the Pi'el is used for this momental event. The second passage, on the contrary "blickt auf diese erstmalige Weihung zurück: seither ist alle Erstgeburt andauernd für Jahwe heilig und darf nun entsprechend nicht mehr zur Arbeit verwendet werden (Dt. 15, 19, hi.)" (1968, p. 61).

In other words, because every first-born belongs to Yahweh for all time, the verb appears in the Hiph'il theme. We may criticize this argument as follows: in the second passage Jenni confuses linguistic use with theological ideas. The phrase "On the day when I struck all the first-born in the land of Egypt" contains reference to a specific day in the past, as well as to a specific place, and the verb under discussion refers to an action by Yahweh on that specific day. The circumstances are therefore the same as in 1 Kings 8:64 (a passage with a Pi'el verb) where "On that day" refers to a specific day during the unique event of the consecration of the temple. Jenni seems to imply that the following is meant: since that day I have consecrated every first-born for my own. But this is not what we have in the pas-
sage. Rather, it is meant that the unique event of the consecration of the first-born has as theological implication that for all time to come the first-born belongs to Yahweh. The repeatedly mentioned fact that the first-borns belong to Yahweh changes nothing of the statement that Yahweh once consecrated the first-born. We conclude, therefore, that in Numbers 3:13 (Hiph.) we have a one-time or momental event. Furthermore, by arguing along Jenni's lines, it may just as easily be maintained that in 1 Kings 8:64 (Pi.) we also have a durative event, because after the consecration it is holy or consecrated to Yahweh, so that we learn in 1 Kings 9:3 that Yahweh places his name there for ever.

Two further passages illustrate the way in which Jenni deals with the evidence:

2 Chron. 29:5, 17 "Now sanctify yourselves, and sanctify (dqš Pi.) the house of the Lord, the God of your fathers ...(17). They began to sanctify (Pi. Inf.) on the first day of the first month, and on the eighth day of the month they came to the vestibule of the Lord; then for eight days they sanctified (Pi.) the house of the Lord, and on the sixteenth day of the first month they finished" (RSV).

2 Chron. 29:19 "(We have purified the whole of the house of the Lord ...) and we have put in order and consecrated (Hiph.) all the vessels which King Ahaz cast aside during his reign, when he was unfaithful. They are now in place before the altar of the Lord." (NEB).

Jenni argues that the vessels have been newly consecrated for the future - the vessels "stehen nun (dauernd) vor dem Altar Jahwes" and therefore the action of consecration is expressed by a Hiph'il. (1968,
p. 60). There is however no evidence for adding "dauernd"; in Hebrew we simply have hinnām i.e. "there they are". That the vessels are in front of the altar, is a simple statement about their location and there is no hint at their function in the future. The statement in vs. 19 is clearly one about a completed action, as is also indicated by the phrase "we have purified" in vs. 18. In two of the forms the action is not momentary as Jenni maintains: the order directed at the Levites in vs. 5 is one that would stretch over a period of time, as is indeed really made clear later on in vs. 17. The phrase "for eight days" disqualifies the Pi'el as a theme indicating punctuality or momentary action, as has been suggested earlier in this paragraph. Jenni's explanation of this passage, also, does not stand up to the test.

In Jer. 1:5 Jenni's claims as to the use of gadā find the best counter-argument:

Jer. 1:5 "Before I formed you in the womb I knew you for my own; before you were born I consecrated you" (NEB).

With bēterem ("before") an action before a fixed point in time is indicated. Of course, it can be argued that Jeremiah was destined to be a prophet, but this kind of argument may just as well be advanced with Pi'el passages, e.g. (and we compare Jenni's argument in connection with the vessels in 2 Chron. 29:19 above):

Numbers 7:1 "On the day that Moses completed the setting up of the Tabernacle, he anointed and consecrated it (gadā Pi.); he also anointed and consecrated (Pi.) its equipment, and the altar and its vessels" (NEB).

By advancing an argument such as "the vessels were destined for use for all time" we get nowhere and our treatment of the evidence becomes ri-
Would Jenni for example maintain that the command to keep the sabbath day holy (where a Pi'el is used) is not valid for all time?

Having shown that Jenni's discussion of qdš Pi. and Hiph. is quite unacceptable, we proceed to his treatment of ḫy(h). Again a syntactical (in Jenni's use of the term) differentiation is pursued where we have a similar lexical use of Pi'el and Hiph'il. It is suggested that where the Pi'el is used, the interest is only in the achievement condition of being alive (as distinct from being dead), whereas the Hiph'il expresses the lasting event of being alive, motivated in some other way. In the following case this suggestion looks attractive:

Jos. 9:15 "And Joshua made peace with them, and made a covenant with them, to let them live (ḥy(h) Pi.) (RSV);

Jos. 9:20, 21 "This we will do to them, and let them live (Hiph.) lest wrath be upon us, because of the oath which we swore to them" (21). And the leaders said to them, "Let them live.

So they became hewers of wood ..." (RSV).

Jenni comments as follows: vs. 15 concerns their exemption from being killed according to the stipulations of the ban, vs. 20 their staying alive further on as servants of the Israelites (1968, p. 63). But are these two situations so divergent as regards content that two verbal themes would have been used to express them? In vs. 15 there certainly is a decision between life and death, but the same is found in vs. 20: the people came together exactly because they had been misled and wanted to slay the Gibeonites. In this respect the circumstances are the same. Furthermore, Joshua granted them a treaty in vs. 15, a treaty which they made by an oath sworn to Yahweh (vs. 18). Would this treaty not have implied their living for all time, as Jenni implies? According to both the treaty and the final decision
the lives of the Gibeonites would be spared, without any reserve in the first instance.

Judges 21:14 "At this the Benjamites came back, and were given those of the women of Jabesh-gilead who had been spared (hyh Pi.) (NEB);

Judges 8:19 "I swear by the Lord, if you had let them live (Hiph.) I would not have killed you" (NEB).

In these two passages the position suggested by Jenni is exactly reversed. In the first one (Pi'el) no momentary decision between life and death was at stake: the women were not killed, in conformity with the commission of the assembly of Israel (vs. 11) - for them there was no possibility of being killed; in the second there must have been such a decision, because Gideon implies that the two men could have let his brothers live - because they chose to kill them, they themselves were killed.

Again we may take two other passages in the same book, this time testing the suggestion that the Hiph'il gives expression to the lasting event of being alive, specially motivated as to not focusing attention on the state of merely being alive:

2 Sam. 12:361) "And he (the poor man) brought it (the lamb) up (hyh Pi.) and it grew up with him and with his children; it used to eat of his morsel, and drink from his cup, and lie in his bosom, and it was like a daughter to him" (RSV);

2 Sam. 8:2 "And he defeated Moab, and measured them with a line, making them lie on the ground; two line he measured to be put to death, and one full line to be spared (Hiph.). And the Moa-

61. Jenni makes interesting remarks, but nevertheless remarks without impact on nearly all the Pi'el passages (of hyh), but not on 2 Sam. 12:3 (cf. Jenni, 1968, p. 64).
bites became servants to David and brought tribute" (RSV).

Exactly according to Jenni's comment on Jos. 9:20 (1968, p. 63) - where we have an analogous situation - we may draw attention to the detail according to which the "irgendwie motivierten weiterdauernden Vorgang des irgendwie qualifizierten Leben" (Jenni, 1968, p. 62) is expressed. In the first passage it is not only stated that the poor man made the lamb live; emphasis is rather laid on the affection of the household towards the lamb. In the second passage we learn explicitly what became of the men whose lives were spared. Both of these passages qualify for a Hiph'il, according to Jenni's suggestions, but in one a Pi'el is used. Here, too Jenni's proposed solution does not fit well enough to qualify it as a syntactic rule.

With regard to Jenni's second inference from the factitive/causative opposition with regard to the aspect of time, viz. that between momentary and durative Aktionsart, we may therefore conclude by saying that it is not justified. To single out a few passages where the distinctions really become clear and to say one or two words about the other passages, interesting remarks that do not really touch the point, however, (e.g. Jenni, 1968, p. 64) cannot be justified.

The third inference that Jenni makes from the terms factitive and causative towards a distinction between Pi'el and Hiph'il, applies to verbs that stand in relation to a ground stem in which "ein Vorgang und ein Endzustand zeitlich unterschieden werden können" (1968, p. 65). These are verbs which do not express a uniform event (such as qdš "be holy"), but an irreversible progress of the event. The adjective with corresponding root then expresses the final condition. The meaning of these verbs are called "perfektiv" by Jenni, e.g. šlm ("be completed, finished") and šdš ("perish"). "Der Vorgang des Fertig-
When these intransitive meanings in the Qal are now made transitive in the Piel, Jenni maintains, these verbal themes do not behave exactly the same with regard to the spheres of time: when only the achieved result is important (as it is in the factitive), then a statement in the past as well as the future is meaningful and possible, e.g. "er hat fertig gemacht ... er wird fertig machen ..." (1968, p. 66).

When the event comes into prominence (as it does in the causative), statements in the past or the future are theoretically possible, e.g. "er wird fertig werden lassen" (ibid.). In practice, however, preference is given to the final condition which is nearer to the speaker rather than to the event which is further from the speaker. This is to say that "(es) bei diesen Verben ... weniger interessiert, ob in der Vergangenheit einmal ein Vorgang veranlasst worden ist ... weil hier das Endresultat zeitlich näher liegt" (1968, p. 66). On the contrary, it is possible without more ado to state the bringing about of an event in the future, because the event is, to the speaker, nearer than the statement about the advent of a condition.(ibid.). From this exposition, which is rather theoretical, Jenni expects that in the case of verbs with a perfective meaning in the Hiph'il, there is a restriction with regard to the past, although theoretically a statement in the past is not excluded.

62. The same can of course be said of many verbs which according to Jenni do not fall into this class, e.g. ṣḏq ("be in the right") and qḏ ("be holy") - two examples which Jenni explicitly excludes from this group (1968, p. 65). A full definition of what he understands under the terms "perfektive Bedeutung" and "resultative Aktionsart" is given in a foot-note (ibid. n. 96). To posit any difference between qḏ and šlm in this respect, is risky.
Jenni admits that the position with $\text{šlm}$ is not very conclusive because the material at our disposal is too sparse. In any case, with $\text{šlm}$ in the meaning "be completed" there is only one factitive Pi'el, referring to the past. Where the verb occurs in the Hiph'il, there are three passages - all of them referring to the future.

According to Jenni more importance can be attached to the observations: in the case of $\text{'bd}$ "perish".\textsuperscript{63} The 41 passages with a Pi'el refer to both the past and the future, the 26 passages with a Hiph'il only to the future - formally in full harmony with what Jenni has maintained in the above explanation. In this way we find passages such as the following side by side:

2 Kings 11:1 "As soon as Athaliah mother of Ahaziah saw that her son was dead, she set out to destroy (Pi. Impf. waw cons.) all the royal line" (NEB);

2 Kings 10:19 "But Jehu did it with cunning in order to destroy (Hiph. Inf.) the worshippers of Baal" (RSV).

Jenni's comment on this pair of passages clearly reveals his adherence to the condition vs. event opposition: the statement is made that a Pi'el is used because a Hiph'il would only have pictured the bringing about of the event of perishing ("nur die Veranlassung des Vorganges, der zum Untergang führte") without establishing the desired result or

\textsuperscript{63} In his earlier essay on the subject Jenni regarded the situation with $\text{'bd}$ as much more uniform. He found only Jer. 12:17 and the passages in Esther (containing a Pi'el) exceptions by occurring in futuristic context. (1967, pp. 146-147). There are however some more passages referring to the future: Dt. 12:3 (not mentioned by Jenni as an exception, but certainly one), Ps. 21:11 (not mentioned as an exception, but certainly one if we notice the transition from present to future in verses 8 and 9, NEB verses 7 and 8), Ps. 119:95 (decisively not "durch den Kontext auf die Vergangenheit festgelegt" as Jenni maintains (1967, p. 146)). On this cf. also Classen (1971).
condition (1968, p. 67). This statement is without ground, because in a passage such as Dt. 7:23 'bd Hiph. is used to indicate the result, namely complete destruction: 64)

Dt. 7:24, 25 "He will put their kings into your hands, and you shall wipe out ('bd Hiph.) their name from under heaven. When you destroy them, no man will be able to withstand you. (25). Their idols you shall destroy by fire ..." (NEB).

The fact that 'bd Hiph. can be used so easily in a context where complete destruction is the point at issue, indicates that it could just as well have been used in 2 Kings 11:1. Jenni's comment on 2 Kings 10:19 is that a Hiph'il is used in order to fix attention on the sly behaviour of Jehu: he plans to destroy the worshippers of Baal with the help of their own contribution to their own destruction; a Pi'el would not have done justice to the sly manoeuvre of Jehu. (1968, p. 67)! There is no need for much argument to illustrate the untenability of this statement by Jenni. Suffice it to refer to the last passage quoted above where a Hiph'il is used: the kings will be wiped out without any contribution of their own, if the passage conveys any sense. Yahweh and the Israelites are the only actively presented parties. In 2 Kings the sly conduct of Jehu cannot be derived from the verbal theme used, but it is clearly stated in the phrase "Jehu did it with cunning". Furthermore, in both passages the result is visualized, otherwise the attempt at destruction would be pointless.

The following two passages are very near to each other and it is not possible to make a distinction of the kind suggested by Jenni:

Jer. 51:55 "For the Lord is laying Babylon waste,

64. For passages of the same kind cf. Dt. 28:63, Ezek. 32:13.
and stilling ('bd Pi. Perf. waw. cons.) her mighty voice
(qôl gâdôl)" (RSV);

Jer. 25:10 "... I will banish from them (Hiph. Perf. waw cons.)
the voice of mirth and the voice of gladness, the voice of the
bridegroom ... (qôl) (RSV).

Only formally do we have the position suggested by Jenni, i.e. with re-
gard to the fact that with 'bd all the Hiph'il passages refer to the
future. As far as the contents of these verses are concerned, it is
clear that his suggestions do not stand up to the test.

No far-reaching conclusions may be made from the situation with
regard to nht and htt 65) because the evidence at our disposal is too
sparse. In any case, these two verbs lend support to Jenni’s theory
to a certain extent. 66)

The next two verbs that require discussion, are the Pi’el and
Hiph'il of hlp I (Pi. and Hiph. "change") and kÇa (Pi. and Hiph.
"cause to be, make discontent"). A pair where a distinction is dif-
cult, is:

Gen. 41:14 "Pharaoh thereupon sent for Joseph, and they hurriedly
brought him out of the dungeon. He shaved and changed (hlp Pi.)
his clothes, and came in to Pharaoh" (NEB);

Gen. 31:7 "You know how I have served your father to the best of my
power, but he has cheated me and changed (hlp Hiph.) my wages ten
times over" (NEB).

65. Cf. the remark of Dhorme (1967, p. 468) on this verse: in Job
31:34 the Hiph'il of htt in vs. 34 has the same meaning as that
of the Pi’el in Job 7:14.

66. The perfectum propheticum in Is. 9:3 does not fit in very well,
100).
Jenni's explanation of the completed action in the second passage is that the Hiph'il may be used with reference to the past, but then only with special motivation. This motivation is supposed to be given by qualifying "ten times" (1968, p. 68). It may now be asked whether the changing of Joseph's clothes in Gen. 41:14 is not equally strongly motivated: it is no ordinary thing for a prisoner to change his clothes in order to appear before the Pharaoh.

In the case of ֔ם's, we have already taken cognisance of the suggestion that the Hiph'il is in many instances used with reference to the past because Yahweh is the object (cf. 5.4.3.2). The idea is that the user of the language shrank from regarding Yahweh as purely passive object - as is supposed to be the case where a Pi'el is used - and therefore gave preference to the Hiph'il where the activity of Yahweh is involved. This possibility has been shown to be untenable because Yahweh speaks of himself as object of a verb in both Pi'el and Hiph'il (cf. 5.4.3.2). Jenni now encounters a problem where the Imperfectum refers to the past in 1 Sam. 1:6-7 - it serves to describe a continuous action in the past. The action is continuous, but nevertheless refers to the past, as is possible in the light of the last part of the passage.

1 Sam. 1:7 "So it went on year by year; as often as she went up to the house of the Lord, she used to provoke her (ס Hiph.). Therefore Hannah wept and would not eat" (RSV).

Furthermore, the last part of vs. 7 refers to the achieved condition of discontent in which she wept and did not eat.

According to Jenni the two passages 1 Sam. 1:6-7 and Dt. 32:1 illustrate the different use of Pi'el and Hiph'il most clearly. In the previous paragraph this distinction has already been shown as un-
tenable. We may therefore readily subscribe to Steuernagel's comment on the use of Pi'el and Hiph'il in Dt. 32:21 "Das dem Pi'el in v a das Hiph. in v b entspricht, ist inhaltlich bedeutungslos und dient nur der Belebung der Form" (1923, p. 168).

Jenni discusses still another group of verbs - the opposite of verbs with a perfective meaning in the ground stem. These verbs do not express a uniform progress of the event, but unlike the group discussed earlier where the corresponding adjective expresses the final result, they appear in this case as a condition or state at the start. "Wenn dieser Zustand eingetreten ist, ergibt sich daraus eine l"angere Zeit anhaltender Vorgang des Habens oder Versehen-Seins" (1968, p. 70). In the case of these verbs, Jenni contends, we may expect that the position as to the Aktionsarten is exactly the opposite as with the verbs just discussed. Only three verbs fall in this group: rw hé "saturate", ygC "make weary" and perhaps (without a corresponding Qal) bhl "terrify". It remains quite incomprehensible why the first two verbs fall in this group and not in the same one as kC's. After all, the adjectives corresponding to these verbs are rwéhé "saturated" and végééC "weary, wearisome" and they certainly do not refer to the condition at the beginning ("Anfangszustand") - they rather refer to the end-result. Had Jenni incorporated these two verbs in his examination of verbs with perfective meaning in their Qal theme, the position would have been quite different, because rw hé ygC are in the Hiph'il only used with reference to the past. As far as the meaning is concerned, there is no reason for making a difference of the kind suggested between ygC "be weary" and kC's "be discontented" (cf. also Jenni, 1968, p. 37).

At the end of his chapter on the aspect of time or rather Aktionsarten Jenni stresses the fact that the observations on a distinction
of Pi'el and Hiph'il cannot be constitutive because they only concern secondary effects of the distinction condition vs. event (1968, p. 72). All these proposed distinctions follow from an earlier distinction which has been illustrated to be untenable - according to both the insights of linguistic theory and the actual contents of the relevant passages (cf. 5.4.2.2). All three inferences from the state vs. event contrast have been proved untenable, quite apart from the unsatisfactory way in which Jenni treats the evidence.

5.4.3.4 The Relation between Subject and Action

Having treated the position as to object and aspect of time, Jenni proceeds to an examination of the relation between the subject and the action as it is expressed by Pi'el and Hiph'il. Again Jenni proceeds from his earlier distinction between factitive and causative which in turn rests on the false contrast state vs. event.

The fundamental question with which to commence, is how far the subject is independent or dependent of given factors in its action. When a condition is brought about in the factitive, then the result is immediately and directly achieved with regard to the passive object without reference to any circumstances outside itself. In the causative an action in respect of the object is brought about more indirectly, in which case the object itself is considered as participating in the action as secondary subject. In this case the subject does not act independently, but is from the outset committed to a second entity, the secondary subject ("Untersubjekt") (Jenni, 1968, p. 78). Two factors are to be kept in mind: the direct or independent and the indirect or dependent execution of the action and the circumstances of the action in terms of time - "Das erreichte Resultat ist unabhängig von den Zeitumständen, der veranlasste Vorgang dagegen verläuft innerhalb
seiner Zeit und steht in Beziehung zu anderen Ereignissen" (1968, p. 78). These two factors go hand in hand in the theoretical exposition.

From these theoretical grounds Jenni concludes that in the causative where there is a subject, secondary subject and action, a "verhältnismässig merkmalreiche und damit individuell bestimmte Situation" is pictured. The one who brings about the situation, is qualified by it "als individuell, okkasionell, je und dann, fallweise Handelnder" (1968, pp. 78-9). Even when - and this important aspect will again receive attention later on - the situation with all its components is repeated several times or even with some degree of regularity, the action still remains occasional. E.g. when the Israelites offend Yahweh time and again:

Is. 65:3 "(I spread out my hands all day appealing to ...) a people who provoked me (k° Hiph.) continually to my face, offering sacrifices in gardens ..." (NEB).

Even in a passage such as Jer. 32:30 where the offending of Yahweh since the earliest days of Israel is pictured, the action is still to be regarded as occasional: the offenders are not presented to us as people acting in a normal way, habitually; they are pictured as paradoxically always acting anew on the slightest provocation (Jenni, 1968, p. 79).

In the factitive the object is thought of as passive and the transitive action only states the attaining of a condition. The direct relation between subject and object pictures "eine verhältnismässig einfache, merkmalarme und daher leichter zu generalisierende Situation". The one who brings about this situation can be typified as "generell, habituell, regelmässig, gewohnheitsmässig oder gar professionell Handelnder" (1968, p. 79). His acts are without any motivation as well
as habitually corresponding to his being. When he acts without motivation occasionally, then the action is very close to the occasional action of the Hiph'il, but is not exactly the same "da er aus irgendwelchen Gründen einmalig Handelnde eben dadurch ein Stück seiner Wesensart. Er ... wird so ein mindestens potentiell-habituell Handelnder, nicht aber ein durch die Umstände getrieben fallweise Handelnder" (ibid.).

These distinctions are not only valid for the participles, but equally for all forms of the verb (Jenni, 1968, p. 77), but because the use in the Pi'el shows no unity and the character of the relation will also come out in the discussion of the next distinction (5.4.3.5), Jenni regards a full discussion unnecessary. Only a discussion of participles is given.

Before considering a few passages, we may mention that Jenni's argument is not very clear and convincing. There is not enough reason for maintaining that an action in the Hiph'il has to be occasional. Too much is made of semantic connections and connotations that must have been unknown to the speaker. Furthermore, the definition given by Jenni is such that it leaves room for any interpretation of the material. The fact that Israel is presented as offending Yahweh from its youth, time and again - expressed by a Hiph'il - can only point to the fact that the distinction is no valid one. To coin a term such as "potentiell-habituell Handelnder" for the use of the Pi'el where the action comes near to that expected with a Hiph'il, seems to be creating an escape from difficult passages.67)

67. In Ezek. 21:4 (NEB 20:48) - (I will set fire to you, and the fire will consume all the wood ...) (4) All men will see that it is I, the Lord, who have set it ablaze (b'Cf Pi.)" (NEB) - it is pointless to say that Yahweh is "potentiell-habituell Handelnder" rather than "okkasionell Handelnder". Is Yahweh perhaps anywhere pictured as one who sets fires ablaze?
But is the proposed distinction in accordance with the facts? The Hiph'īl is supposed not to be habitual, but it is in the following passage:

2 Kings 10:19 "But Jehu did it with cunning in order to destroy ('bd Hiph.) the worshippers of Baal" (RSV).

Jehu is pictured in 2 Kings 10 as a "Baal-destroyer" (cf. vs. 11, 14, 17, 25, 27, 28). Or would Jenni maintain that Jehu is not one who acts habitually, but rather potential-habitually? In order further to test the validity of Jenni's claims as to this point we may compare two passages with nearly similar object:

Ps. 5:7 (RSV 5:6) "Thou destroyest ('bd Pi.) those who speak lies; the Lord abhors bloodthirsty and deceitful men" (RSV);

Dt. 7:10 "Know therefore that the Lord your God is God, the faithful God who ...) (10) requites to their face those who hate him, by destroying them ('bd Hiph. Inf.)" (RSV).

Would it be possible to maintain that Yahweh destroys those who speak lies habitually while he only occasionally destroys those who hate him? We especially notice that in the case of the second passage the statement is made after we have heard in vs. 9 that Yahweh is the faithful God who keeps his covenant with those who love him. In both these passages Yahweh is pictured as the God who destroys certain kinds of people when such people make their appearance. Time and again Yahweh destroys them. There is no difference as far as the relation between subject and action is concerned. So too in

Ezek. 6:3 "Mountains of Israel, hear the word of the Lord God ... I am bringing a sword against you, and I will destroy ('bd Pi. Perf. waw cons.) your hill-shrines" (NEB);
Ezek. 30:13 "Thus says the Lord God: I will destroy (‘bd Hiph. Perf. waw cons.) the idols, and put an end to the images, in Memphis" (RSV).

Again different verbal themes are used to express ideas of the same kind. Therefore we cannot agree with Jenni in his claim that all forms of the verb show the proposed distribution of habitual and occasional actions.

Jenni's claims have been worked out in more detail with regard to the participles. He is of opinion that the aspects "habitual" and "occasional" will be most clearly discernable in the case of the participle as nomen agentis (Jenni, 1967, p. 153). This difference can be expressed in German by "ein Schreibender" as against "ein Schreiber". The action can be characterized by the adding of adverbs such as "stets, erachtungsgemäss, wie gewohnt, berufsmässig" in the case of a habitual action and "je und dann, jeweils, in dem betreffenden Fall, fallweise, umständehalber" in the case of an occasional one (1968, p. 80). As Jenni admits, we have to be careful not to interpret an action as habitual merely because the durative participle is used.

Jenni's argument on the first pair of passages advanced by him, is open to the strongest criticism:

Jer. 23:1 "Woe to the shepherds who destroy ('bd Pi. Part.) and scatter the sheep of my pasture! says the Lord" (RSV);

Dt. 8:20 "You will be destroyed because of your disobedience to the Lord your God, as surely as were the nations whom the Lord destroyed ('bd Hiph. Part.) at your coming" (NEB).

Jenni's comment is that the shepherds "lassen die Schafe ständig, geradezu professionell zugrunde gehen; Jahwe richtet die Völker vor euch,
d.h. bei Gelegenheit der Landnahme, zugrunde" (1968, p. 80; cf. also 1967, p. 153). Nothing can be further from the truth than his comment on the first passage: it is true that the shepherds cause the sheep to be lost in their profession, but they certainly do not do this professionally, "generell, habituell, regelmässig" (cf. Jenni, 1968, p. 79).

At first Jenni stresses that even when e.g. the Israelites offend Yahweh time and again (Is. 65:3, Jer. 32:20, vide supra) the action may still be occasionally, because they act in the specific way time and again, by occasion. And this is exactly the situation in Jer. 23:1. By the shepherds reference is made to Judah's rulers (the king and the nobles) (Bright, 1965, p. 143) and how can they be said to cause the sheep (the people of Israel) to be lost habitually? Although they did it many times (time and again) it is still not pictured as their normal and expected way of action - but this is part of Jenni's definition of occasional action in the Hiph'il (1968, p. 79). We therefore see that the one Pi'el participle does not lend support to Jenni's claims. It is rather of exactly the same kind as the Hiph'il participle in Dt. 8:20: Yahweh time and again destroys the nations, occasionally and not habitually.

In two passages with participles of bcr we equally have an untenable argument by Jenni:

Jer. 7:18 "(17) (Do you not see what is going on in the cities of Jerusalem?) (18) Children are gathering wood, fathers lighting (bcr Pi. Part.) fires, women kneading dough to make crescent-cakes in honour of the queen of heaven; and drink-offerings are poured out to other gods than me - all to provoke and hurt me (k's Hiph.)"

NEB;

Ex. 22:5 (NEB 22:6) "When a fire starts and spreads to a heap of brush-
wood ... he who started the fire (bCr Hiph. Part.) shall make full restitution" (NEB).

The whole of the first passage has purposely been quoted, because the part of it that Jenni quotes, gives a wrong impression. In his comment Jenni quite correctly starts by saying that in vs. 17 the activities in the streets of Jerusalem are described. He concludes: "Die Arbeits­teilung beim Backen der Kuchen für die Himmelskönigin ist also deutlich habituell" (1968, p. 81) - seemingly a very convincing argument. But we still have to consider: do the fathers in their lighting of the fires (as also the women and children in their different activities) really act habitually, or is this impression only created by the particle expressing a continuous or durative action? The latter is most certainly the case. After all, it is not the occupation of fathers to light fires and of children to gather wood, although the statement about the women is to a larger degree correct, because they are normally busy with baking cakes. But even in this case they do not act habitually when they bake cakes! There is still another strong argument against Jenni's interpretation of the evidence in the case of bCr: in vs. 17 the prophet calls our attention to what is going on in the streets of Jerusalem, in vs. 18(a) the activity in the streets is pictured in detail and in vs. 18(b) the aim of all these actions is mentioned: they do it in order to make sacrifices to the "queen of Heaven" but ultimately "to provoke (k's Hiph.) and hurt me (= Yahweh)". But this "provoke" is regarded by Jenni as not a habitual action. In this connection he says of the Israelites who provoke Yahweh: "so sind sie dennoch nicht als normale gewohnheitsmässig handelnde Subjekte dargestellt, sondern als paradoxerweise immer wieder bei jedem Anlass

okkasjoner Handelnder" (1968, p. 79). When we now hear of preparations in order to offend Yahweh, how can the action be regarded as "habitual"? In Ex. 22:5 the action is occasional, as Jenni maintains. We thus conclude this part by saying that the Pi'el and Hiph'il participles of bкр, too, do not substantiate Jenni's claims.

In the case of гдт the one Pi'el participle quite correctly indicates a habitual action: the great men of the city bringing up the king's sons (2 Kings 10:6). The Hiph'il is nowhere used with "children" as object in the sense of "bringing up". The three Hiph'il participles indicate occasional action, although reference is made to a repeated action of Yahweh and the enemies of the psalmist. If we extend our examination to other forms of the Pi'el except participles, it is however difficult to see how we can get past the fact that with гдт in the Pi'el (with reference to the rearing of children) the relation between subject and object is not always habitual, e.g. Sidon (Is. 23:4).

Jenni's argumentation on Љск is equally untenable. We have the following two passages played off against each other:

2 Kings 12:6 (translations 12:7) "Therefore King Jehoash summoned Jehoiada the priest and the other priests and said to them, "Why are you not repairing the house? Now therefore take no more money from your acquaintances, but hand it over for the repair of the house. (8) So the priests agreed that they ... should not repair the house " (RSV);

Ezek. 27:9 "The elders of Gebal and her skilled veterans were in you, caulking (Љск Hiph. Part.) your sea; all the ships of the sea with their mariners were in you, to barter for your wares" (RSV).

Before actually discussing these passages, we note the fact that in his
comment on these passages Jenni - as he does repeatedly later on - changes the content of his earlier definition of occasional and habitual actions considerably in order to make them applicable to the situation pictured (1968, pp. 81-82). The accent, and with that the point of differentiation, is shifted from the person who acts to the situation in which he acts. In this way we learn that there is a difference between normal recurrent reparations and unusual reparations undertaken under special circumstances. In 2 Kings 12:8 (the temple) we are supposed to have work of the first kind and in Ezek. 27 (the ships) work of the second kind. This shift of accent has no satisfactory grounds - how would the difference between the habitual or professional worker and the occasional one otherwise have been indicated? We therefore hold by the earlier definition concerning the person who acts. Jenni comments that in 2 Kings 12:8 "nicht die während der Jahrhunderte immer wieder eintretende fallweise Notwendigkeit der Ausbesserung, sondern die Kompetenz oder Pflicht dazu" stands in the foreground; the participle with the negative marks the "Unterbruch der habituellen Tätigkeit" (1968, p. 82). I have to differ from this interpretation of 2 Kings 12:8: the priests are not pictured as habitual or professional workers in the reparation of the temple; in vs. 6 (translations vs. 5) we read "he ordered the priests ... to repair the house wherever it was found necessary". If the term had been "whenever", one would have been apt to regard the priests as the persons who regularly had to do this work. The action is clearly OCCASIONAL. The other passage with a Pi'el participle is Ex. 14:17 where Yahweh says that he will make the Egyptians obstinate (ḥzq Pi. Part.) - an action which can in no way be regarded as habitual.

69. Note that no participle occurs in Neh. 3. Jenni refers to this work in connection with his discussion of Ezek. 27 (1968, p. 81) and the impression might be created that these two parts are to be brought in relation to each other.
because an unexpected statement is made about Yahweh in his action towards the Egyptians. 70)

Jenni's explanatory remarks on the Hiph'il in Ezek. 27:9 and 27 are unsuccessful as well. He comes out against the suggestions of commentaries towards textual emendation of the Hiph'il into Pi'el 71) in both these passages because "dies würde ... professionelle "Leckausbesserer" ergeben ... und ein normales Leckwerden der Schiffe voraussetzen"; we rather have to think of "ein gelegentliches Instandstellen unerwartet auftretender Schäden" for which skilled veterans of Gebal are used (1968, p. 82). It is not necessary to emend the Hiph'il into a Pi'el, but Jenni certainly confuses two aspects of the action in vs. 9 and 27. By shifting the accent from the persons doing the work, he only focuses attention on the nature of the work to be done. It may or may not have been regular reparation on the ships - we have no more information and can only speculate on this aspect. But what is emphasized in these passages and what is quite clear, is that craftsmen and their activities are pictured. In vs. 7 we have oarsmen and helmsmen, in 9 sailors, in 10 warriors, in vs. 26 again oarsmen, in vs. 27 sailors, helmsmen, caulkers (!), merchants, warriors, ship's company (according to the NEB translation). And if the participle refers to craftsmen, they certainly act HABITUALLY. Jenni's treatment of hzq is unsatisfactory; the situation is in reality exactly the opposite of Jenni's  

70. Jenni's attempt to explain the action in Ex. 14:17 is unsuccessful. He admits that it is not habitual, but does not regard it as occasional either (1968, p. 82). Jenni makes handy use of his earlier statement that the action in the Pi'el is either habitual or "potentiell-habituell". His reason for maintaining that it is not occasional ("die Aktion folgt nicht aus V. 16") is meaningless and empty. Nobody maintains that an occasional action follows from a previous verse. To the unprejudiced observer the action in Ex. 14:17 is occasional.

71. Zimmerli favours this emendation (1969 II, p. 629) without, however, advancing convincing reasons.
In the case of "skl counter-arguments can equally be advanced against Jenni's treatment of some of the passages. In Ezek. 36:13 "Menschenfresserin" is a little too free a translation - "a land that devours men" (NEB) would have been better and in that case the action would not be habitual. The other three Pi'el participles may be regarded as Habitual. One Hiph'il participle is occasional, but the other (Hos. 9:14 rehem maskil = "a womb that miscarries") is certainly habitual - it is of the same kind as Ex. 23:26 (with Pi'el), regarded by Jenni as habitual.

If we take a look at grb, we gain more evidence against Jenni's claims. The agent in the factitive is defined as "habituell, regelmässig, gewohnheitsmassig oder gar professionell Handelnder" and the same in the causative as "individuell, okkasionell, je und dann, fallweise Handelnder" (Jenni, 1968, p. 79). If we apply this distinction to "the bringing of an offering", the priests are to be regarded as those who present the offering professionally, as a part of their profession; the laity will then be regarded as those who make a sacrifice or present an offering under special circumstances, every now and then, when the situation necessitates it. Applied to grb (Hiph.: "bring near, offer") this would mean that the priests are subject of verbs in the Pi'el and the laity of verbs in the Hiph'il. But what is the factual situation with grb? Thirteen passages contain a participle of the Hiph'il verbal theme, while there are no Pi'el participles. The Hiph'il participle is used for both

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72. The meaning "womb that miscarries" is necessarily habitual, but not "rob (someone) of children". The participle expresses the durative idea - time and again the land robbed her tribes of children" (cf. Jenni's definition: 1968, p. 79).

73. Ex. 23:26; 2 Kings 2:19, 21.
priests and laity, even in passages in the same chapter. 74) If the speaker had known such a distinction as Jenni proposes, he certainly would have used it in order to indicate the difference between the action of the priests and the laity. He would have coined a Pi'el participle for that purpose. Since a distinction such as Jenni suggests should apply to all verbs definable by some criterion (e.g. intransitive in Qal), we cannot accept Jenni's distinction as one valid for a group of verbs.

At this point we should note some remarks of Jenni where he treats ḥzq Hiph. (1968, p. 85). Jenni accepts an elliptical "hand" (yad) for all cases where ḥzq Hiph. means "seize, grasp". The following development of meaning is suggested: cause the hand to be strong on something = seize, grasp. When he finds that in the Hiph'il the action is not always occasional, the following explanation is given: "Durch den Wegfall des Objekts bzw. Untersubjekts vereinfacht sich die Situation; die Handlung lässt sich leichter generalisieren" (1968, p. 85). Therefore we do not have to expect that the Hiph'il will always be used with an occasional meaning. For us it is important to note that in this one case Jenni admits that the historical connections of ḥzq Hiph. is so vague to the user that it does not exert any compelling force on his language use.

From our discussion it has become clear that Jenni's suggestions towards a distinction are really not proven, neither in the "ordinary" verbal forms, nor in the use of the participles. There are many passages contradicting these suggestions that cannot successfully be reasoned away.

74. Priests as subject in 5 passages: Lev. 7:8, 9, 33; 21:6, 8. Laity as subject in 7 passages: Lev. 3:1, 7; 7:12 (chief), 18, 29; Numb. 15:4, 16:35.
Having found Jenni's claims as to the relation between subject and action untenable, we may proceed to the next distinction which he suggests.

5.4.3.5 The Relation between Action and Object

The distinctions discussed up to this point are regarded by Jenni - even though he tried earlier to make every passage fit his suggestions - as only secondary effects or manifestations of the supposed primary distinction (1968, p. 87). Having examined the relation between subject and object, the action itself and the relation between subject and object, Jenni wants us to examine the relation between action and object - according to him "eine grundlegende Unterscheidung, die in allen Fällen wirksam ist und die es erlaubt, Differenzierungsprobleme zu lösen, die allen andern Betrachtungsweisen trotzen" (1968, p. 87). We have, however, to be very careful in the case of this distinction, Jenni maintains, because our own languages do not always have the means to translate the delicate nuances of Hebrew. 75)

First, we note the theoretical explanation by Jenni: This distinction proceeds directly from the supposed difference between the semantic values of nominal sentences and verbal sentences (Jenni, 1968, p. 87) as discussed earlier (5.4.2.2). This supposed difference has earlier been found quite untenable, but we may repeat what Jenni understands by it: the adjectively expressed statement in the nominal sentence is a synthetic judgment, the verbally expressed statement in the verbal sen-

75. On hearing a statement such as this, we immediately feel ourselves very near to Boman's extensive system of supposed nuances in Hebrew which is lacking in our own languages. One of the reviewers of Jenni's book (1968) regards Jenni's findings as providing fresh evidence in favour of "some long-unnoticed linguistic distinctions between Hebrew and several Indo-European languages" (Sawyer, 1968, p. 262).
sentence is an analytic judgment. When the factitive now brings about an adjectivally expressed condition (i.e. a synthetic judgment), and when the causative brings about a verbally expressed event (i.e. an analytic judgment), then the relationship existing between subject and predicate in the verbal sentence or nominal sentence are to be found back as relationship between action and object, because the earlier subject now appears as object (1968, p. 87). However, the terms "synthetic" and "analytic" cannot now be used any more, because they have a bearing on the relation between subject and predicate and cannot be used for the combination of subject and predicate as seen from the point of view of a new subject. Therefore Jenni introduces the terms "accidental" ("akzidentiell") and "substantial" ("substantiell"). Because the predicate in the adjectival statement (in a nominal sentence) is something extra or some new data not already belonging to the subject, the action in the factitive must be something accidental towards the new object. The action does not necessarily follow from the nature or situation of the object and is therefore "austauschbar oder auch in der Negation mindestens denkbar" (Jenni, 1968, p. 88). In the case of the causative the situation is quite different: the causative stands in relation to a verbal statement; the subject is already included in the verb and is closely connected with it. When the "event" is now brought about in the causative, it follows that the event cannot include or contain anything foreign to the now new object ("Untersubjekt"). Therefore there must be a non-accidental, i.e. a substantial action, appropriate to the nature of the new object and corresponding to, or rather necessarily arising from the situation. Without a certain degree of contradiction, the action cannot be put in the negative (ibid.)

With this explanation Jenni thinks to have found two mutually exclusive characteristics of the action in its relation to the object,
which he now sets about to find back in the material at his disposal
("die es nun im einzelnen nachzuweisen gilt: das Pi'el ist akzidentiell
in Bezug auf sein Objekt, das Hif'il ist substantiell in bezug auf sein
Object") (Jenni, 1968, p. 88). In other words, Jenni proceeds from the
theoretical exposition as given above to the actual material in order to
find the relation as he expounds it. Jenni makes it clear that his
use of the two terms accidental and substantial differs widely from
Michel's use of the same. The use of these terms with Michel concerns
the relation between subject and action as subjective aspects as it ma-
ifests itself in the so-called tempora Perfectum and Imperfectum: the
action in the Perfectum is accidental with regard to the acting person,
while that in the Imperfectum is substantial with regard to the acting
person (Michel, 1960, p. 110). 76)

In order to make clear the difference between accidental and sub-
stanial action, Jenni presents the following example: 77)

Ezek. 30:23-26 "(23) I will scatter (puw Hiph. Perf. waw cons.) the
Egyptians among the nations and disperse them over many lands.
(24) Then I will strengthen (hzq Pi. Perf. waw cons.) the arms
of the king of Babylon and put my sword in his hand; but I will
break Pharaoh's arms, and he shall lie wounded and groaning before
him. (2) I will give strength (hzq Hiph. Perf. waw cons.) to
the arms of the king of Babylon, but the arms of Pharaoh will fall.
Men will know that I am the Lord, when I put my sword in the hand
of the king of Babylon, and he stretches it out over the land of

76. Jenni does not wish to treat the problems of the so-called tem-
pora further, but is of opinion that Michel's representation of
the matter can be fully integrated with his own views on the use
of the verbal themes (1968, p. 89). Though not explicitly, Jen-
ni thus falls in with the interpretation of the tempora by Michel.
77. Jenni quotes only vs. 24-25, but for a thorough discussion vs. 23
is also necessary.
231.

Egypt. (26) I will scatter (pws Hiph. Perf. waw cons.) the Egyptians among the nations and disperse them over many lands, and they shall know that I am the Lord" (NEB).

In his comment Jenni rejects the suggestion of Zimmerli (1969 II, p. 742) that the use of the different verbal themes is only a matter of variation, and maintains that the riddle can be solved by taking the context into consideration (Jenni, 1968, p. 89). The king of Babylon has not yet been mentioned in the prophecy against Egypt starting at verse 20. The fact that Yahweh will strengthen his arms against the Pharaoh of Egypt is therefore something new - in relation to the object, the arms of the king of Babylon, the action is accidental. In the parallel structured statement in vs. 24(b) the arms of the Pharaoh are equally treated as passive object: Yahweh will break them. In vs. 25 the statement of vs. 24 is again taken up after some decorative details, but now the arms of both of the kings are not simply object, but in the case of ḫṣq Hiph. "Untersubjekt" ("stark sein lassen") and in the case of the parallel npl (Qal: "fall down") the subject. Whereas Yahweh is in vs. 24(a) the only subject (ḥṣq Pi. and ḫbr Qal), the effect on the arms come to the fore. "Diese Wirkung ist aber nach dem vorher ausge- sagtten Handeln Jahwes nur noch die entsprechende Folge und daher bereits substantiell in bezug auf das Objekt" (1968, p. 89). So far Jenni's comment on the use of the verbal themes within their context (or rather narrow context). But let us take a look at the wider context of this context. In vs. 22 it is said that Yahweh will break the arms of the Pharaoh. In vs. 23 as well as vs. 26 it is said that Yahweh will scatter the Egyptians among the nations, and the same is said in vs. 26. If we try to apply the terms "accidental" and "substantial" to these two verses, we have to regard the statement in vs. 23 as accidental (and expect a Pi'el) - this is the first statement about the fate of the
Egyptian people apart from their Pharaoh - and that in vs. 26 as substantial (and expect a Hiph'il). In both passages, however, the Hiph'il theme of pws is used. It can be argued that no Pi'el of pws exists. That is quite true, and therefore this verb is not listed by Jenni with others having an intransitive Qal and both a Pi'el and Hiph'il theme (Jenni, 1968, pp. 20-21). But pws has (next to a transitive meaning) an intransitive meaning in the Qal, and if we accept the principle of the productivity of a language, (cf. 2.2), it follows that the user of the language could have developed such a form to meet the situation of an accidental statement such as we have in vs. 23. The fact that pws does not show the same pattern as hzq in this passage seem to distract from the validity of Jenni's suggested distinction. There is still another phenomenon that needs attention:78) in vs. 23(b) Yahweh states that He will disperse them (= the Egyptians) over many lands. The suffix indicating the object has been added directly to the verb and we have wēzerītim. When the same statement is repeated in vs. 26 - it is now supposed to be substantial - the suffix indicating the object is added to the nota accusativi 'et and we have wēzerīti 'ōtām, but the meaning of these two passages is exactly the same.

Are not these two phenomena to be brought in relation to the behaviour of hzq? The last one (concerning the accusative) cannot be explained in any other way than as an example of free variation. Zimmerli regards the use of the verbal themes likewise as a matter of free variation (1969 II, p. 742), and Steuernagel in quite another connection as serving only "der Belebung der Form" (1923, p. 168). An explanation of this kind suits the whole of Ezek. 30:23-26 much better.79)

78. This phenomenon has already been treated in 5.4.2.1.2 where Jenni's "views" on synonymy have been discussed.
79. In this respect the NEB renders this stylistic device - as the author wishes to call it - excellently.
There is still one matter that endangers Jenni's explanation of vs. 24: It is not at all clear to what extent the action in vs. 24, viz. the strengthening of the arms of the king of Babylon, is accidental, because as recently as vs. 10 we learn that Yahweh will make an end to the hordes of Egypt by the hands of Nebuchadrezzar, king of Babylon. In vs. 18 and 19 of the previous chapter (29) we also learn that Yahweh is giving the land of Egypt to Nebuchadrezzar in order to plunder; it is stressed that it is Yahweh who is behind the king of Babylon and who sends him to plunder Egypt (vs. 18-20). Is the action of the strengthening of the arms of the king of Babylon then not to a certain extent an expected one? But we give Jenni the benefit of the doubt in this instance and by conceding that these important passages (even 30:10) are too far remoted from vs. 24 and that the direct prophecy against Egypt caused an interruption of the line of thought.

Because the difference between Pi'el and Hiph'il cannot be rendered by verbs only in German, Jenni proposes that we add the following adverbial phrases and words in each case in the case of an accidental action "trotz allem, sogar auch, zufällig, unerwartet, leider, nach freiem Entschluss, aus freien Stücken" and in the case of a substantial action "entsprechend, konsequenterweise, notwendig, ohne weiteres, sachgemäss, umstän dehalber" (Jenni, 1968, p. 90). Jenni's paraphrase of Ezek. 30:24-25 illustrates quite clearly how he proposes to add these phrases: "Ich werde (dazu noch) dem König von Babel (aus freien Stücken, unversehens) die Arme stärken ... Ja, die (bereits erwähnten) Arme des Königs von Babel werde ich (dann dementsprechend) stark sein lassen ... (1968, p. 90). One thing is very clear: the suggested adverbial phrases make a wide variety of interpretations possible. We should

therefore beware of only applying these phrases and neglecting the origi-
nal definition.

Before examining more passages, Jenni - no doubt somewhat apologeti-
cally - once more sets about to define the nature of this accidental or
substantial relationship. He warns us against expecting a very clear
differentiation: "Es handelt sich bei dieser Unterscheidung ... 
selbstverständlich nicht um eine objektiv ein für allemal feststehende
logische oder gar ontologische Beziehung zwischen Handlung und Objekt,
sondern um eine subjektive Darstellungsweise des Sprechenden, die je nach
der Situation und dem, was in der Rede vorangegangen ist, wechseln kann.
Dieselbe Handlung kann je nach der Stellung im Zusammenhang der linear
ablaufende Rede akzidentiell oder substantiell sein" (1968, p. 90). His
formulation elsewhere is even more astonishing: "Selbstverständlich geht
es nicht darum, ob die Handlung von uns her gesehen objektiv als sub-
stantiell oder akzidentiell zu gelten habe, sodass entsprechend nur hi.
oder nur po. möglich wäre, sondern darum, welche Ausdrucksweise der Spre-
chende gewählt hat" (1967, p. 154, my emphasis)! This is to say that
the whole matter is withdrawn from our control and examination: we only
have to accept it as such, we cannot ask why it is only true of some ca-
es and not valid for others. Still more: it is implied that we can-
not even test Jenni's claims as to their validity. Earlier in his book
Jenni had already made a statement of the same kind - in connection with
the supposed difference between a statement in a nominal sentence and one
in a verbal sentence (cf. 5.4.2.2). For the sake of completeness and
comparison with the statements above, it will be repeated: "... sei be-
tont, dass es nur darum gehen kann, zu erkennen, welchen Sinn der Verfas-
sser seiner Aussage gegeben hat, nicht darum, ob diese so gewählte Aussa-
ge die einzig mögliche oder berechtigte war. ... wir haben nicht hinter
die getroffene Wahl zurückzugehen" (Jenni, 1968, p. 33 no. 56). There,
too, the matter has been withdrawn from thorough investigation, but it has also been found that this supposed distinction is quite untenable and unacceptable (5.4.2.2). Seeing that the accidental vs. substantial distinction rests directly on the condition vs. event contrast (Jenni, 1968, p. 87), we may safely regard as untenable the claim that we may not question the subjective choice of the speaker. To consent to Jenni's claims, is to plead that a door be left open for the explanation of passages that do not accord with the theory. On the contrary, if there are cases where we have an accidental or a substantial action without the corresponding use of either Piel or Hiph'il as expected (in the terms of Jenni), we have to doubt seriously the validity of the distinction or definition or both. Furthermore, the distinction will again have to be perceptible and valid in all passages; otherwise it does not qualify as a distinction of the kind Jenni suggests, viz. a distinction on syntactical rather than lexical level.

According to Jenni's exposition of the relation between action and object, at least two widely different interpretations of the substantiability are possible. In one case - and this is the one that is most closely connected with the original definition (1968, p. 88) - an action is substantial when it follows logically from the circumstances and the situation, when it is "durch die gegebenen Umstände motivierte und notwendig erscheinende" (1968, p. 91; cf. also 1967, p. 154). In this case the whole context of a passage is taken into account as well as the general conception regarding the object under discussion. A fine example of this kind of substantiability is found in 2 Kings 10:19 where it is said that Jehu acted in such a way as to destroy (Hiph.) the worshippers of Baal - Jehu planned an action that would be in full agreement with his general policy towards the worshippers of Baal, therefore the action
is substantial in relation to the object (Jenni, 1967, p. 155).

The second kind of substantiality is based on what has earlier been said and not on the general circumstances from which an action necessarily follows. The already discussed position in Ezek. 30:24-25 (discussed above) is a fine example of this kind of substantiality. The Hiph'il in vs. 25 is only due to the repetition of the verb, about the same as the parallelismus membrorum: the first verb stands in the Pi'el theme and the second in the Hiph'il "als substantielle Folge" (1968, p. 90). The differentiation is now between "akkidentiellen Neueinsatz im Pi'el und substantielles Hiph'il in Zweitstellung oder Folgestellung" (ibid.). But - and at this point we again have to differ from Jenni - "der Satz ist natürlich nicht umkehrbar, dass jedes Verbum an zweiter Stelle (z.B. im synonymen zweiten Versglied) automatisch substantiell sein müsse; vielmehr gibt es auch Aufzählungen von unabhängigen, gleichzeitigen oder konkurrierenden akkidentiellen Handlungen bei denen die späteren Verben nicht eine notwendige Folge der früheren Handlunge angeben" (1968, p. 90). Contradicting Jenni we have to maintain that all passages should reveal this proposed distinction. After all, on what grounds will it otherwise be decided whether we have "Folgestellung" or an enumeration of independent, simultaneous, accidental actions? It will later become clear that the passages for which this exception is introduced, are those where a Pi'el is used in the second position. The second definition of substantiality is even less satisfactory than the first. It seems necessary to add a third definition for accidental or substantial action - one where the first mention ("Neueinsatz") is not made directly before the verse containing the verb that stands in "Folgestellung". In the passage in Ezek. 30 we have come about this situation. The problem is: how many passages may intervene between an earlier and a following statement in order still to make the
latter a substantial one? This problem may give rise to a high degree of arbitrariness in our examination. If a distance of 15 verses still qualifies a second statement as "Folgestellung", then Jenni's argument on the accidentality of Ezek. 30:24 collapses.

In order to indicate the arbitrary nature of a treatment along the lines suggested, we may look at Jenni's interpretation of the previously twice discussed Dt. 32:21:

Dt. 32:21 "They roused my jealousy (qn' Pi.) with a god of no account, with their false gods they provoked me (kכ's Pi.); so I will rouse their jealousy (qn' Hiph.) with a people of no account, with a brutish nation I will provoke them (kכ's Hiph.)(NEB).

Jenni suggests that we read the first two lines "Sie haben mich (unnötigerweise) eifersüchtig gemacht/gereizt (akz.)" and the last two as "ich werde sie (dementsprechend auch) eifersüchtig machen/reizen (subst.)" (Jenni, 1968, p. 91). But this is certainly not the only way in which test-phrases could be applied. The first part of Dt. 32:21 should rather be paraphrased as follows: "(as I have just shown, accordingly) they roused my jealousy with a god of no account ..." After all, in the previous verses we learn all about the idolatry and sin of Israel: vs. 5, 15 (forsook God), 16 (They roused his jealousy with foreign gods and provoked him with abominable practices), 17, 18, 19, 21. It would have suited perfectly to begin vs. 21 with the adverb "accordingly" ("dementsprechend"). But then we would have expected a Hiph'il. Still more evidence against Jenni's interpretation we gain from vs. 16 where we read "They roused his jealousy (qn' Hiph.) with foreign gods and provoked him (kכ's Hiph.) with abominable practices" (NEB). According to Jenni's definition the action in this verse is substantial (cf. vs. 5,
15) and a Hiph'il is to be expected - as we actually have it. In vs. 21 the action of the Israelites towards their God is described - equally substantial (cf. vs. 17-20). And what can we learn from this use? Certainly that the use of Pi'el and Hiph'il has another function than indicating accidentality or substantiality. Therefore Steuernagel sees the matter in fine perspective when he maintains that the use of the verbal themes in Dt. 32:21 "dient nur der Belebung der Form" (1923, p. 168).

In order not to content ourselves with a discussion of individual passages without relation to each other, an examination of all the passages with škn Pi. and Hiph. will now be made. Jenni himself discusses two passages very shortly, and we may start with an examination of his criticism:

Ps. 78:60 "He forsook his dwelling at Shiloh, the tent which he placed (made dwell) (škn Pi.) among men" (partly RSV); 81)

Ps. 78:55 "He drove out nations before them, he allotted their lands to Israel as a possession and settled (škn Hiph.) his tribes in their dwellings" (NEB).

Jenni's comment on the first passage is that it accentuates the free and accidental grace of Yahweh towards his people when he settles Israel or when he makes his tent dwell in Israel (1968, pp. 92-93). As a general truth about the revelation this statement is quite correct, but it gives no clear answer on all the passages. In the case of Ps. 78:60 it is

81. Kraus (1966 I, p. 539) prefers to read šakan, i.e. a Qal, as is also the testimony of various early translations. The NEB, JB and RSV, too, follow this reading. Gemsar and Böhl (1968 II, p. 53) retain the reading šikkən. This reading is followed here because it makes good sense, as Jenni quite correctly contends (Jenni 1968, p. 92 n. 119).
certainly true that Yahweh makes his tent dwell among men in his free grace. But then we are looking at the relation between subject and object. And in this paragraph we are supposed to deal with the relation between action and object! Therefore we have to ask the question: was it necessary or accidental for the tent of Yahweh to be placed among men? (In order to show that this kind of argumentation is not mere quibbling, we may refer to Jenni's comment on yšô Pi. in Ezek. 25:4 where we read that the people of the East will set their encampments among the Ammonites: "das Aufstellen der Zelte ist eine für die Zelte akzidentielle Handlung" (Jenni, 1968, p. 94). In other words, where it suits his theory, Jenni himself argues to the letter instead of taking the wider context into consideration. It is after all clear that if the second part of Ezek. 25:4 is seen in the context of the whole verse, it follows nearly substantially from the fact that Yahweh hands the Ammonites over to the people of the East.)

Now in Ps. 78:60 it is accidental to the tent that it is placed somewhere. But if we take the context of the whole verse into consideration, we have a substantial relation. After all, in the first part of the verse we are informed that Yahweh forsook his dwelling at Shiloh, and it has been a fact for the Israelites that Yahweh was the One who placed this tent among men. Therefore we see that the same passage can be interpreted as either revealing an accidental relation or a substantial one, according to the way one looks at it.

The second passage quoted above (Ps. 78:55) is less problematic. In the previous verses the fact is stressed that Yahweh guided his people and brought them to his Holy Land. In the light of this and by

the knowledge of the details of settling in the land, the action may be regarded as substantial. But still, taking only strictly the immediate relations in the sentence, it is not substantial for the tribes to dwell in tents.

As Jenni admits, two of the Pi'el passages in Jeremiah (7:3, 7:7) as we have them in the Masoretic Text, fall outside of the suggested pattern for Pi'el verbs. According to the Masoretic pointing we have wa’āšakkēna ‘attēkem "that I may let you live" - ūkn therefore in the Pi'el theme. The verses read:

Jer. 7:3, 7: "These are the words of the Lord ... Mend your ways and your doings, that I may let you live (ūkn Pi.) in this place" ... (Mend your ways ...) (7) Then I will let you live (ūkn Hiph.) in this place, in the land which I gave long ago to your forefathers for all time" (NEB).

As has been said, Jenni admits that the MT suggests a substantial action on the part of Yahweh: Mend your ways that I may (accordingly, "dem-entsprechend") let you live .. (Jenni, 1968, p. 93). But then Jenni takes refuge in the suggestion of various commentaries that the words be re-painted to a Qal + a preposition (wē’ēškēnā ‘ittēkem). This is an obvious emendation, but it has no good grounds, 83 and both of these

83. Bright, too, contends that in the "temple sermon" the temple is the centre of interest and that MT wrongly understands "this place" as referring to the land (1965, p. 55). The matter is not, however, settled as easily as this. There is no single text in the OT where the preposition ʿēt is used in the expression "Yahweh dwells with his people"; when he dwells with his people bētōk, or bēgereb is always used, the more "sublime" expressions. On the contrary, even in the dwelling of people with each other - usually expressed by Cim - use is made only once of the preposition ʿēt. Bright refers to 1 Kings 6:13 where Yahweh's presence in the temple is described, but here bētōk is used with ūkn (Bright, 1965, p. 55). Fohrer, too, favours this untenable emendation (1949, p. 402). We have to see the verb as referring to the land, as is undeniably clear from vs. 7(b).
verses should still be regarded as having an accidental action and thus being exceptions to Jenni's theory.

The case against Jenni's claims will however not be made on textual critical grounds only. All the Pi'el passages where we learn that Yahweh will choose a place to make his name dwell there, may be regarded (with Jenni) as signalling an accidental action.

The Hiph'il passages bring us to some interesting questions, not always substantiating Jenni's claims.

Ezek. 32:4 "I will fling you on land, dashing you down on the bare ground. I will let all the birds of the air settle (škm Hiph.) on you and all the wild beasts gorge themselves on your flesh" (NEB).

According to the whole of the context, it follows that with the destruction of the Egyptians the birds and wild beasts will be involved, in order to devour the flesh of Yahweh's enemies, but we may ask - strictly according to Jenni's own argumentation (1968, p. 94) - whether it is necessary for the birds to be made to settle on the Egyptians. Certainly not. In Jos. 18:1 we have exactly the opposite:

Jos. 18:1 "The whole community of the Israelites met together at Shiloh and established (škm Hiph.) the Tent of Presence there" (NEB).

According to earlier instructions by Yahweh it was substantial for the tent to be established somewhere, but in the context of Joshua 18:1 the establishing of the Tent is unexpected and accidental. Jenni's treatment of Gen. 3:24 makes the untenability of his approach very clear:

Gen. 3:24 "He cast him out, and to the east of the garden of Eden he stationed (Hiph.) the cherubim and a sword whirling and flashing
to guard the way to the tree of life" (NEB).

Jenni's paraphrase is as follows: "nachdem er den Menschen vertrieben hatte (okk.), liess er (konsequenterweise) die Cherube östlich vom Garten Eden (dauernd) wohnen, den Weg zum Baum des Lebens zu bewachen" (1968, p. 93). This interpretation may be criticized as follows: in the first place the designation "(okk.)" for the first part of vs. 24 is simply not correct. In the previous verse it has already been said that Yahweh drove them out of the garden of Eden to till the ground! When it is now again said that He cast the man out, the adverb "accordingly" ("dementsprechend") certainly fits. Secondly, the placing of the cherubim is an accidental action, unexpected and Jenni's addition of "dauernd" misses the point completely and is simply pointless.

In the same way in Ps. 7:6 (NEB 7:7) where the psalmist says "may my adversary ... lay (škn Hiph.) my honour in the dust" it is not a necessary part of the action of the psalmist's adversary that he should lay someone's honour in the dust! Even Job 11:14 is not undeniably substantial.

In the case of וָב there is only one Pi'el form and at least 31 Hiph'ill forms and, exactly as can be expected, we have here about an equal distribution of accidental and substantial actions. In fact, it seems as if only five passages are really substantial. Let us, for example, try to add "accordingly, subsequently" to the following passage:

2 Chron. 8:2 "... and he rebuilt the cities which Huram had given him and settled (וָב Hiph.) Israelites in them" (NEB).

This is clearly an accidental action, i.e. we expect a Pi'el. In the two following verses we have exactly the same situation as in Ezek. 30:24-35, but in both verses a Hiph'ill is used - we may paraphrase as Jenni does:
2 Kings 17:24, 26 "Then the king of Assyria brought people from Babylon ... and settled them (yēḇ Hiph.) in the cities of Samaria in place of the Israelites; so they occupied Samaria and lived in its cities ... (26) The king was told that the deported peoples whom he had settled (yēḇ Hiph.) in the cities of Samaria did not know the established usage of the god of the country" (NEB).

In the case of the first Hiph'il form we may add "unexpectedly", "nach freiem Entschluss" and we would have expected a Pi'el verb. The second Hiph'il is substantial, because we can safely add "as has been said", "entsprechend", "bereits erwähnt". In other words, the accidental vs. substantial distinction is not valid in this case. The same situation we have in, for example, Ezek. 21:3, 4:

Ezek. 21:3, 4 (NEB 20:47, 48): "These are the words of the Lord God: I will set fire to you (yēṯ Hiph.), and the fire will consume all the wood ... (4) All men will see that it is I, the Lord, who have set it ablaze (būr Pi.); it shall not be put out" (NEB).

The last part my be paraphrased as follows: "... it is I, the Lord, who have set it (= the above-mentioned fire) ablaze". The relation is substantial, but a Pi'el is used. Again, Jenni's claims are not substantiated. To refer to a case where the Pi'el indicates a substantial action:

Joshua 11:20 "It was the Lord's purpose that they should offer an obstinate resistance (ḥqv Pi. + lēḇ)" (NEB).

If it is stated in so many words that they acted according to the Lord's plan, how can we add the adverbial phrases for the Pi'el: "unerwartet, zufällig, nach freiem Entschluss, aus freien Stücken"? To this we may add one of the most certain proofs against Jenni's claims:
Dan. 11:21 · "In his place shall arise a contemptible person to whom royal majesty has not been given; he shall come in without warning (בְּמַלְוָ) and obtain (נָמָה הַמַּלְוָ) the kingdom by flatteries" (RSV).

The test-words for the Pi'el are among others "zufällig, unerwartet, aus freien Stücken" (Jenni, 1968, p. 90). The important point to notice in the two previous examples, is that the fluent speaker apparently had no difficulty at all in using "it was the Lord's purpose" in connection with a Pi'el (expected to indicate an unexpected action) and - even more clear - "without warning" in connection with a Hiph'il (expected to indicate an inevitable action or one that took place expectedly, according to circumstances). This is the clearest proof that Jenni's claims are quite untenable.

In Appendix IV all passages in which a certain root occur, will be discussed in detail in order to indicate the absolute untenability of Jenni's claims.

As one last point mention may be made of a phenomenon concerning the use of the verbal themes in Neh. 9:19:

Neh. 3:18-20 "After him their kinsman did their repairs (נָמָה הַמַּלְוָ): Binnui son of Henadad, ruler of half the district of Keilah; (19) next to him Ezer son of Jeshua, ruler of Mizpah, repaired (נָמָה הַמַּלְוָ) a second section opposite the point at which the ascent meets the escarpment; (20) after him Baruch son of Zabbai repaired (נָמָה הַמַּלְוָ) a second section, from the escarpment to the door of Eliashib the high priest" (NEB).

84. Perhaps the translation of the NEB is even better: "yet he will seize the kingdom by dissimulation and intrigue in time of peace". Cf. Koehler and Baumgartner's translation of ṣālāwā (1959, p. 973): "while they are at ease".
The circumstances in the three verses are the same, and in verses 19 and 20 exactly the same, as far as object, aspect of time, etc. are concerned. In the whole of chapter 3 of Nehemia ḫṣq in the sense of "repair" occurs 34 times in the Hiph'il theme, but only in this one case is the Pi'el used. This cannot but point to a free variation in the use of the two verbal themes where the meaning is the same.

Jenni's claims as to the relation between action and object do not at all stand up to the test. This is to be expected, because they rest on and proceed logically from a false contrast, viz. that between condition and event with regard to predication in a sentence. Apart from Jenni's point of departure we have also noticed the following weak points in his argument: the relation between the suggested test-phrases and the original definition (in logical terms) is not clear. Closely connected with this point is the fact that accidentality and substantiality can be interpreted in nearly every way: Jenni himself leaves us with two possibilities, but a third has to be added, namely when substantiality rests on a general conception of something or on something which has been said much earlier. Let it be quite clear: Jenni's own presentation of the matter illustrates that on the basis of his distinctions a passage can be interpreted in exactly the way the interpreter wants it. His treatment of for example Ezek. 25:4 and Gen. 3:24 leaves no doubt on this point. (In order to convince himself, the reader is referred to the detailed Appendix IV.) In connection with the relation between action and object this arbitrary treatment is the clearest of all.

This paragraph can be concluded by claiming that an accidental or...

85. The verb in vs. 19 is a waw cons. Pi'el Imperfectum form, while in the case of all the other ḫṣq verbs in the chapter, the ordinary Perfectum is used. Seemingly there is no reason for this change. In any case, the meanings are the same.
substantial relation between action and object, brought into near connection with Pi'el or Hiph'il, is out of the question.

5.4.3.6 Hiph'il with Intransitive Meaning and Hitpa'el

Because the Hitpa'el is the reflexive of the Pi'el - as it is normally regarded - it also has to come under discussion here. The interesting point and the reason why the Hitpa'el theme has to be discussed, is that there are many verbs in the Hitpa'el theme that show a similar meaning to verbs containing the same root in the Hiph'il theme. Because Jenni is concerned with apparently identical meaning in different verbal themes and contends that such verbs are in reality not synonyms (cf. 5.4.2.1.2), he also takes up the relation between Hiph'il with intransitive meaning and Hitpa'el.

The Hiph'il is normally a transitive verbal theme. There are, however, also instances where the Hiph'il occurs in an intransitive or - to use the term which has come to be used for this phenomenon - inwardly transitive meaning. In many cases such an intransitive meaning occurs next to the ordinary transitive (causative) meaning. Thus, for example (to quote the same example given by Jenni) gdl Hiph. has the meaning "make great a thing" ("etwas gross sein lassen") as well as "assume great airs" ("sich gross machen, gross tun"). In the Hitpa'el, however, gdl shows nearly the same meaning as the latter one, viz. "boast" ("sich gross machen") (Koehler and Baumgartner, 1958, p. 171). The inwardly transitive (or internal-transitive) meaning is not to be confused with the real transitive meaning with the true transitive Hiph'il with elliptical object, Jenni maintains (1968, p. 46). With the Hiph'il meaning "seize, grasp" yad is the elliptical object that is obvious and is therefore left unmentioned. The development in meaning is

86. Cf. Gesenius et al. (1966, p. 145) for an exposition.
"to cause (the hand) to be strong on = to grasp". Consider, as a typical example, the meaning "to do great things" in 1 Sam. 12:24. The development in meaning is the following: "(die Taten) gross sein lassen =Grosses tun (im Unterschied zu innerlich-transitivem grosstun)" (Jenni, 1968, p. 46).

In order to illustrate the difference between the Hitpa'el and the Hiph'il forms concerned, Jenni again starts his explanation on the theoretical level, once more incorporating the supposed difference between condition and event. The factitive transposes "das Gegenüber von Prädikat und Subjekt des Nominalsatzes in ein Gegenüber von Handlung und Objekt (er macht:er ist lebendig ≠ er macht ihn lebendig) (Jenni, 1968, p. 47). The object is the indispensable element, both in the nominal sentence and as in the factitive. In the nominal sentence, Jenni maintains, the predicate always implies a judgment of the object by someone else. Even when the person who makes a judgment judges himself ("I am great") he sets himself against himself as an object ("I regard myself as great"). When the synthetic relation is now brought about in the factitive, a diversity of subject and object is always to be taken into account. When the subject turns towards himself, then a kind of circumscription is to be used, e.g. by using nepheš ("self") or the verbal theme used for this specific "Sich-Selber-GegenÜbertreten des Subjekts, the Hitpa'el ("I make: I am great = I make myself great) (Jenni, 1968, p. 47).

In the causative the object corresponds to the subject of a verbal sentence where it is closely connected with the intransitive verb - the

87. In 1 Sam. 12:24 we only have רְפִּיּוֹ הָעֹֽשֶׁר - הִגִּידֵל גִּמְמָקֵנִים, translated by the NEB as "Consider what great things he has done for you".
88. Cf. the detailed discussion of this in 5.4.2.2.
judgment is an analytic one. In the action of the causative the earlier subject is still actively contributing to the action. The inducing subject can however easily be identified with the "Untersubjekt", e.g. "ich veranlasse : ich lebe = ich lasse mich leben, ich erweise mich lebend" (Jenni, 1968, p. 48). Because a relation such as this is possible, the Hiph'il is used as the reflexive theme.

Having explained the internal transitive Hiph'il in this way, Jenni claims that there must be a difference between it and the Hitp'el where they exist next to each other: "Die beide Stammformen sind nicht auswechselbar. In einen Fall besteht Identität zwischen Veranlasser und Veranlassten, im anderen steht der Bewirkende sich selber als Bewirktem gegenüber" (1968, p. 48). Concretely this difference becomes perceptible by the fact that in the internal causative Hiph'il the occasioned event is in accordance with the nature of the object and is regarded as necessarily originating from it. In the reflexive-transitive Hitp'el the action of the inducing agent towards itself is understood as "nicht notwendiges, freiwilliges oder zufälliges Bewirken" (1968, p. 48).

The theory is quite credible if we accept the contrast of condition and event with regard to predication in a sentence. Again the actual passages will be examined. The following two passages are played off against each other:

2 Chron. 26:8 "The Ammonites brought gifts to Uzziah and his fame spread to the borders of Egypt, for he had become very powerful (hzq Hiph.) (NEB);

2 Chron. 27:6 "Jotham became very powerful (hzq Hitp.) because he

89. Although not exactly the same, this distinction does not differ much from the accidental:substantial distinction between Pi'el and Hiph'il discussed in 5.4.3.5.
maintained a steady course of obedience to the Lord his God" (NEB). 

Jenni's comment is that, although in both cases mention has been made of the paying of tribute in the earlier verses, the statement on the power of the king has in the first case - as against the second - been anticipated by a phrase with the same content of meaning, viz. "his fame spread to the borders of Egypt" (Jenni, 1968, p. 49). To say that Uzziah's fame had spread far is however not exactly the same as to say that he had become very powerful. This phrase is not enough reason for maintaining that the statement about Uzziah's power has been anticipated. There is equal reason to maintain that the statement about Jotham's power has been anticipated: his power is regarded by the writer as being due to his obedience to the Lord and in 27:2 it has already been said that he did what was right in the eyes of the Lord. 

Next to this similarity in the motivation of the statement concerning each king's power, there are also other similarities: mention about building operations and the erection of fortifications (26:2, 6; 27:3, 4), about wars against the enemies of Israel (26:7; 27:5), and about the tribute of the Ammonites (26:8; 27:6). Even the explicit statement that God caused Uzziah to prosper (26:5) is not enough reason for maintaining that only the statement about Uzziah's power has been anticipated. Both passages should rather be regarded as making a "necessary" statement about the king's power, seen in the whole context.

In 2 Chronicles there is still another passage with a Hitpa'el that shows a "necessary" statement according to Jenni's use of the term, viz. 13:21 where it is said that Abijah grew mighty: in vs. 17, 19, 20 statements are made about his military successes.

It seems as if Jenni's claims are really substantiated if we keep in mind that only two verses out of the 27 with a Hitpa'el in the mean-
ing "to strengthen oneself, to show oneself strong" (Lisowsky, 1958, p. 475) make statements which follow necessarily from the foregoing data. Two of the three passages with an internal transitive Hiph'il⁹⁰ are however not in agreement with Jenni's claims. In Dan. 11:7 we learn that "a branch" will enter the fortress of the king of the north and will (unexpectedly) prevail. In Dan. 11:32 we learn that the people who know their God will (miraculously, in spite of everything) stand firm - in the previous verses the action of "the king of the north" against the people of the covenant is described in detail and the reader expects that they will yield to the afflictions. These two verses, then, describe an accidental action, something "nicht notwendiges" - exactly what we would have expected if a Hitpa'el had been used.

Subsequently the position of the use of Hiph'il and Hitpa'el in the case of gdl will be examined. The Hitpa'el ("boast", "sich gross machen") occurs 4 times and according to Jenni "die vom Subjekt entwickelte Grösse ist nicht als wesensnotwendig vorgestellt" (Jenni, 1968, p. 49). In Is. 10:15 this is exactly the shade of meaning of the verb, but then only in the one passage. The other three passages reveal a different pattern:

Dan. 11:36-37 "The king will do what he chooses; he will exalt and magnify himself (gdl Htp.) above every god and against the God of gods he will utter monstrous blasphemies. All will go well for him until the time of wrath ends, for what is determined must be done. (37) He will ignore his ancestral gods, and the god be-

⁹⁰ Koehler and Baumgartner (1958, p. 287) and Lisowsky (1958, p. 475) make mention only of 2 Chr. 11:7, 11:32 and 2 Chron. 26:8 as passages where hzq Hiph. has an internal transitive meaning.
loved of women; to no god will he pay heed but will exalt himself (gdl Hitp.) above them all" (NEB).

The first Hitpa'el verb stands for an action that follows obviously from what has been said in the previous verses. Actually it is only a summary of his blasphemous deeds (cf. the detail in verses 28, 30, 31-33). Seen from another point of view, vs. 36 interprets the king's deeds as corresponding to a plan: "what is determined must be done". If it is now said that the king will magnify himself above every god, it follows merely as conclusion or necessary consequence. And even if the verb in vs. 36 does not very clearly signal a substantial action, there certainly can be no doubt as to the substantiality of the statement at the end of vs. 37. When it is said there that the king will exalt himself above every god, it is a statement that has in so many words already been made in vs. 36; it is only repeated and therefore a "necessary" statement.91) If we accept Jenni's scheme, we would expect a Hiph'il in vs. 37.

The Hitpa'el in Ezek. 38:23 is somewhat more problematic. Jenni is quite correct in maintaining that the action rests in Yahweh's revelation of himself and cannot be concluded to by taking into account the Being of God or the circumstances (1968, p. 49). However, when we take the context into account, it becomes clear that vs. 23 is only a summary or a summarizing piece of information of the previous verses. The NEB translates quite correctly "Thus I will prove myself great and holy ..." Seen in this way, the action is substantial.

The Hiph'il passages Jenni settles by saying that in all cases (except 1 Chr. 22:5) the subject is an enemy "zu dessen Wesen es von

vornherein gehört, dass er in der betreffenden Weise seinen Character zeigt" (1968, p. 49). But can this principle be applied throughout as a characteristic of Hiph‘il passages in contrast with Hitpa‘el passages? Certainly not! The king of Dan. 11:36 and 37 is equally an enemy. Furthermore, I can see no reason why the enemy would necessarily reveal his inner being if a Hiph‘il were used! We shall have to keep to the definition given earlier (Jenni, 1968, p. 48).

At least two passages form exceptions to Jenni’s theory, i.e. the Hiph‘il indicates an accidental or voluntarily action, e.g. Ps. 55:13:

Ps. 55:13 (RSV 55:12) "It is not an enemy who taunts me -
then I could bear it;
it is not an adversary who deals insolently with
me (qdl Hiph.) -
then I could hide from him.
(14) But it is you, my equal,
my companion, my familiar friend (RSV).

It is puzzling how Jenni can still maintain that we have the hostile conduct of an enemy in vs. 13. It is explicitly stated that the person who deals insolently with the psalmist, is his familiar friend. If one should deny this, he misses the meaning of the passage. Because it is the friend of the psalmist who deals insolently with him, it has to be maintained that the action is accidental - "nicht notwendiges, frei-williges oder zufälliges Bewirken" (Jenni, 1968, p. 48). 1 Chr. 22:5 forms another exception to Jenni’s suggestions ("... the house that is to be built to the Lord must be exceedingly magnificent" qdl Hiph.).

An explanation according to which the Hiph‘il expresses "die Wesensnot-

wendigkeit der Grösse des Tempels" (Jenni, 1968, p. 49) is irrelevant and out of the question.

The important exceptions discussed above indicate that Jenni's claims as to a differentiation between Hitpa'el and internal transitive (or inwardly transitive) Hiph'il are untenable. There are cases where the terms "accidental" and "substantial" can successfully be applied, but the exceptions again indicate that the suggested distinction does not hold good on syntactical level, and not even on the individual lexical level. The reason for this seems clear: the suggested distinction was the logical outcome of a false contrast (cf. 5.4.2.2). It has also been made clear that the suggested values of Hitpa'el and Hiph'il of this kind can be interpreted in many different ways and we have seen that Jenni has treated the material in an unsatisfactory way. As the previous four suggested distinctions have been proved untenable, this one is also untenable and the different use of Hiph'il with intransitive meaning and Hitpa'el has to be cleared up in another way. To maintain that the speaker of Hebrew could use either Hitpa'el or Hiph'il, i.e. that it was to him a matter of free variation, seems to be the most obvious and realistic conclusion.

5.4.3.7 Absolute and Relative Meaning with regard to Spatial Indications

According to Jenni, the distinction between Pi'el and Hiph'il also becomes apparent in the case of verbs which indicate spatial distance. The two verbs which are to be considered here, are qrb (Qal: "come near, be near") and rḥq: "be, become far"). The difference between condition and event would become apparent here in that only the attainment of an absolutely near or a far distance are expressible in the Pi'el, whereas in the Hiph'il, on the other hand, approach or moving away may be expressed relatively (1968, p. 74). Further, it appears that this proposed
distinction depends on the untenable distinction between the semantic value of adjectival and verbal predication: the adjectival predicate defines its subject without observance of the time factor; in the case of a verb which illustrates an occurrence, the "Relationsfähigkeit" is much greater, with the result that modal nuances as well as the passage of time are expressible (Jenni, 1968, p. 76). (This distinction should actually rather fall within the scope of the paragraph on the "Aktionsarten").

Since this distinction rests on an earlier distinction which is untenable (5.4.2.2), it is to be expected that all cases will perfectly fit into the scheme as has been intimated. This indeed proves to be the case. All passages in which the words concerned occur will not be discussed here; only certain exceptions to Jenni's scheme and examples which he is unable to explain satisfactorily. The Pi'el is supposed to express "ein Entfernen im absoluten Sinn ... indem er den Zustand der weitesten denkbaren Entfernung bis zur Nichtexistenz oder einen absoluten Gegensatz zwischen Nähe und Ferne, Gottesgegenwart und Gottesferne ausdrückt (Jenni, 1968, p. 74). In Is. 26:15 however, it does not appear absolutely undisputable:

Is. 26:15 "Thou hast enlarged the nation, O Lord,
enlarged it and won thyself honour,
thou hast extended (rHQ Pi.) all the frontiers of the land" (NEB).

Here there is definitely no question of an absolute distance, having no boundaries whatever - not "relationslos". With regard to rHQ Hiph., there are many cases in which absolute distance also occurs. Jenni admits that the Hiph'il is also able to express this absolute meaning (1968, p. 74), but in the present writer's opinion there is no
sense in still attempting to adhere to such a distinction. Thus Jenni sees a problem in the ten cases in which indications of difference are not given, e.g.:

Ps. 88:9 (NEB 88:8) "Thou hast taken all my friends far from me (rhq Hiph.) and made me loathsome to them" (NEB).

Although Jenni admits that absolute distance can be expressed in the Hiph'il, he nevertheless wants to explain this text; he contends that the action itself receives all the accentuation (1968, p. 75). The fact is that Pi'el and Hiph'il are used in exactly the same way in the case of rhq.

A similar distinction is proposed for grb. The Pi'el is said to indicate a state of close vicinity, whereas the Hiph'il deals with a process of relative approach (1968, p. 75). The following example is given:

Is. 41:21 "'Produce your defence (grb Pi.)', says Yahweh 'present your case' says Jacob's king" (JB);

Dt. 1:17 "If any case is too difficult for you, bring (grb Hiph.) it before me and I will hear it" (NEB).

Jenni's comment is that in the first example there is no preposition indicating approach and therefore only the result of the action is important. In the second example a preposition is found which indicates the process of bringing nearer (1968, p. 76). I cannot agree with this view; Is. 42:21 is not exclusively concerned with the result, viz. that the case should be brought forward and nothing more. Is. 41:21-29 rather deals with a lawsuit, the course of which is described (cf. Fohrer, 1964, pp. 45-7). The assertion that only the result matters,
fits in better with Dt. 1:17 where vs. 18 mentions an entirely different matter. But then Jenni's views on the verbal themes are reversed.

Here too, it appears, that the meaning of Pi'el and Hiph'il cannot generally be separated. Rather, two different verbal themes express similar meaning.
5.4.4 Conclusions as to Jenni’s Study

The purpose which Jenni initially sets himself is commendable, namely to show that words which have apparently the same meaning, may in reality be used divergently, and that these divergencies may occur over a wide field. This possibility will definitely have to be taken into account, but it need not be inevitable. There should also be scope for words with the same meaning and use, which may offer great opportunities for stilistic variety. This idea, namely that there should of necessity be a definite difference, plays a role throughout Jenni’s study, and influences it with regard to fundamental points. This results in the data having to be forced in a certain direction.

The premise which definitely has the greatest influence on Jenni’s study is the alleged difference between predication in case of a nominal sentence and a verbal sentence, namely, that in one case we have an adjectively expressed condition and a verbally expressed event in the other. The difference between synthetic and analytic judgments is supposedly dependent on this. This idea occurs widely in the literature of this field, but it is unfounded and untenable. This is shown by the explicit findings of recent research and by an actual survey of the relevant passages. In so far as Jenni bases all the suggested distinctions between Pi’el and Hiph’il on this untenable premise, they cannot be true distinctions. The fact that Jenni starts out with findings of Akkadian research - findings which are not even accepted without reservations for Akkadian - hangs together very closely with this premise. Still it is clear that jumping from a situation in a certain language to that in another is not allowable. It is manifest that these two points of view together form the basis of Jenni’s proposed distinctions, and that all further arguments rest on this, namely on the difference between “factivite” and “causative”.
All the distinctions between Pi'el and Hiph'il suggested by Jenni follow logically from the terms "factive" and "causative". The most important of these distinctions have been thoroughly examined according to examples used by Jenni himself, as well as other examples which have been brought forward with a view to testing the data presented by Jenni. His assertion that one should not invariably expect to find the suggested distinctions in every case where the situations seems favourable, but that one should only recognize the fact that the author had had a purpose in using them, should of course be ruled out of order without more ado. It is inconceivable that such an important distinction as that which was suggested, should be considered as not subject to comparison and investigation, and be left entirely to the discretion of the interpretation of researchers (cf. 5.4.3.5).

In conclusion, the following general remarks may be made on the way in which Jenni analyses the material on all basic points, and motivates his viewpoint: Jenni's viewpoints are based on observations of only a few cases and cannot be applied in all the instances where the relevant word occurs. There are certainly cases where, for example, the terms "substantial" and "accidental" can be used in a stimulating manner in the interpretation, but the fact remains that this is not applicable in all cases, and that a great number of obvious cases all plead against it, which indicates unambiguously that this is not a case of syntactical distinction,93) as interpreted by Jenni. It is not even possible to state that one has here a "lexical" situation with regard to one verb (or even a few verbs), since there is no single

93. "Syntactical" (as against "lexical") taken here in the way Jenni uses the term, viz. as a distinction that holds good for all verbs of the group under discussion. The context of the verb determines in each case whether a Pi'el or a Hiph'il has to be used.
verb which fits in with the proposed scheme in all the passages in which it occurs. With regard to the distinction between Pi'el and Hiph'il, Jenni's survey does not offer a solution.

There is, however, another serious objection to the way in which Jenni deals with the material in his study. It has been noted that, proceeding from an untenable distinction and from the situations in the Akkadian, he first decides on what the difference between Pi'el and Hiph'il should be. This idea, that certain distinctions ought to become clear, is often stated explicitly. (Jenni, 1969, pp. 34, 36, 48, 87). Only afterwards does Jenni approach the text in order to analyze actual examples. One now finds that he cannot explain all the relevant passages, and that definite shifts are made. In the discussion many cases have been cited where Jenni interprets the text in such a way that it complies with his own conclusions decided on beforehand. So-called text-phrases to aid the reader in interpreting the text correctly are suggested time and again, but our discussion has made clear that the text-phrases are sometimes far removed from the original definition (e.g. the habitual vs. occasional distinction). In addition, Jenni does not apply these text phrases consistently. One of the most curious aspects of Jenni's study is the fact that he often makes an interesting and quite true observation in connection with a certain text, but that this observation is totally irrelevant to the matter under discussion, and has nothing to do with the question of whether, for example, an action is substantial or accidental (e.g. Jenni, 1968, p. 94). In any case, it is obvious that only one interpretation out of a few possible ones, is preferred. From what has just been said, it follows that the study of Jenni here referred to cannot be accepted and does not give a successful account of the use of
the Hebrew themes.

In chapter 3 schematic or logicistic attempts to connect the verbal themes have been considered Jenni's proposed solution to the problem is also schematic or logicistic, but of a character unrivalled by any of its predecessors. The details of this scheme have been more carefully worked out than those of any previous schematic approach. Little or nothing of "semantic anomaly" or "semantic unpredictability", as these terms have been defined by Barr and Aronson (cf. 3.4), is apparent in Jenni's scheme.

Jenni's attempt to solve the problem of similar meanings in Pi'el and Hiph'il, does not succeed. These two verbal themes cannot be distinguished in the way he proposes. On this point, also, it will have to be maintained that Pi'el and Hiph'il forms with the same meaning occur in Hebrew.

Further conclusions may be drawn from the discussion of this chapter: None of the above distinctions, which arise quite logically from a distinction factitive vs. causative, has proved to be valid, after examination of the subject matter, therefore the distinction condition vs. event (with regard to predication) which has previously been rejected on theoretical grounds, is also proved untenable. In this way new empirical evidence may be brought to bear against the supposed distinction. From this, even more far-reaching conclusions may be drawn: the supposed distinction condition vs. event is an aspect of the linguistic relativity hypothesis, and if the distinction has now been found untenable on reliable grounds, new empirical evidence is also submitted against this linguistic relativity hypothesis.
5.5 SUMMARY

The first question to be considered was whether a causative Pi'el existed. The majority of scholars replied in the affirmative and Jenni's arguments against it do not seem to be successful. It may rightly be maintained that the Pi'el has also been used to express a causative idea. (From his later arguments it appears that Jenni cannot accept a causative Pi'el, because in his opinion the Pi'el has to be factitive in contrast with the Hiph'il, which is causative.)

None of the many attempts to distinguish between Pi'el and Hiph'il with similar meaning, appears to be really successful. The idea that the Pi'el is the intensive of the Hiph'il, which has been suggested by various scholars, is not proven - it would appear as if it may have been an incorrect view of the relation between word and context which caused this "romantic notion" (Goetze, 1943, p. 2).

Jenni's views on the verbal themes have been thoroughly considered, as his study is the most comprehensive that has as yet appeared on this subject. Since this study deals specifically with the Hiph'il, only Jenni's ideas about the distinction between Pi'el and Hiph'il in connection with corresponding intransitive Qal verbs have been examined. As has been shown in the conclusions about this study (5.4.4), Jenni's ideas cannot be accepted as the solution to the problem.

From the examination of this chapter it thus appears that in the case of an entire series of words Pi'el and Hiph'il verbal themes are used side by side without any difference in meaning. The view of the scholars mentioned in 5.3.3 viz. that the alternative use of the verbal themes is a matter of free variation or serves a stylistic purpose, seems to be the obvious solution. A series of forms having the same meaning in two verbal themes has far-reaching implications with regard
to the general interpretation of the verbal themes, as has been shown at the conclusion of chapter 3. In chapter 7 the findings of this chapter will be considered once more.
CHAPTER 6

QAL AND HIPHER WITH SIMILAR MEANING

6.1 INTRODUCTION

In chapter 6 verbs that show similar or even identical meaning in the verbal themes Qal and Hipher will come under discussion. Unlike the subject of the previous chapter, viz. Pi'el and HIPHER with similar or identical meaning, this relation between verbal themes has not received as much attention - and in some cases even mention - from scholars. Nevertheless, the various attitudes towards a relation such as this one will now be critically discussed. Since Jenni's study on the Pi'el also contains some passing (but still very important) considerations on this subject, a broad discussion of his views will be given.

6.2 VARIOUS CONSIDERATIONS

Gesenius and Kautzsch (1966, pp. 144-45) as well as Bauer and Landem (1918, p. 293) make mention of Pi'el and HIPHER verbs that occur next to each other with similar meaning, and even try to explain them - it may be added - in a rather theoretical way, without touching the root of the problem (cf. discussion in 5.3). Neither of these, however, make much of Qal and HIPHER verbs with similar meaning. Of course, this does not include the verbs explained by these authors as "internal transitive" HIPHERs (cf. 4.5). Likewise Bergsträsser discusses only the "internal transitive" group in connection with verbs with similar meaning in Qal and HIPHER (1929, pp. 102-103). Beer and Meyer (1969 II, p. 108) come nearer to the problem when they mention cases where the HIPHER serves a function quite independently of the Qal, e.g. intransitively in 'rk HIPHER. "be long". This point is not fully developed, in so far as it is not mentioned that 'rk Qal has the same meaning.
Joüon (1923) proceeds in his explanation of the Hiph'il from the fundamental causative meaning, as he regards it (p. 122). According to him the causative meaning is active throughout all the shades of meaning of the Hiph'il (e.g. the declarative meaning). However, Joüon comes across a problem when there are Hiph'il verbs with a meaning expected for a Qal. In these cases he thinks that we have a secondary Hiph'il or, as he calls it, a "pseudo-hifil". Without actually incorporating these Hiph'il verbs in a justified way into his general definition of the Hiph'il - this is clear from his use of the term "pseudo-hifil" rather than "pseudo-causative" - Joüon suggests that these forms could easily have developed from the Qal Imperfectum (with i) because the Qal forms resemble a Hiph'il (1923, pp. 123-4)! The verbs with "pseudo-hifil" include verbs where there is a Qal with similar meaning (e.g. nnn, rnr) as well as verbs with no corresponding Qal in any meaning whatsoever (e.g. ysc, str). Joüon's suggestion that the Hiph'il developed phonologically from a Qal, is unproved and therefore untenable.¹ As a result of his emphasis on the causative as the main and original function of the Hiph'il, Joüon does not succeed in explaining this group of verbs successfully.

Ewald (1863) gave a lengthy typification of the verbal themes and also implicated the Hiph'il in his discussion (pp. 320-25). Having

¹ Wildberger (1967) develops Joüon's conception of the so-called "pseudo-hifil" further by taking the views of other scholars on the matter into consideration (pp. 384-85, n. 2). Wildberger suspects that the verbs with a Perfectum in the Qal theme and Imperfectum in the Hiph'il (sometimes only in the Hiph'il, as in mtg) might be explained in the following way: the Imperfectum forms with i-vowel came to be interpreted as Imperfecta of the Hiph'il with its characteristic i-vowel, and the Hiph'il Perfectum forms developed secondarily from the Imperfectum forms (1967, p. 384, n. 2). Even if these suspicions can be proved - which is doubtful if we take into account the importance and reliability of the vocalization (Barr, 1968a, pp. 194-207) - it is to be doubted whether it will entail any significant change in the meanings of the verbs concerned.
discussed the causative function of the Hiph'il as the primary function of the verbal theme, Ewald explicitly states that with a mere active meaning Qal and Hiph'il of the same root occur simultaneously "wie die geschichte jeder besondern wurzel lehren muss", e.g. zōrēa Qal and mazrīa Hiph. ("bearing seed") (Ewald, 1863, p. 322. My emphasis).

Ewald does not content himself with merely stating this phenomenon as a whole, but is interested in the detail and sets about to put into practice the principle quoted above that every root be taken on its own. In this way we learn that the most frequent way in which a Hiph'il arises next to a Qal, is when the Qal is used more and more intransitively; then a Hiph'il is formed, with transitive use. Ewald advances the following example: nth Qal "stretch out, extend" also develops the intransitive meaning "bend down, stretch towards, turn aside". Then the Hiph'il theme is applied to take up the transitive meaning "stretch out". Ewald has however to admit that this newly formed Hiph'il can subsequently secondarily also develop an intransitive meaning "turn away, turn aside" (as in, for example, Is. 30:11) (Ewald, 1863, p. 322). The somewhat hesitant way in which Ewald presents the matter immediately makes it clear that the historical process he suggests is extremely uncertain.

There is no evidence at all that the Hiph'il has been formed to establish the active transitive force of nth once again after it has become weakened. We have no knowledge of exactly how it came to be that the Qal and Hiph'il have both a transitive and intransitive use.

The history of other verbs are explained by Ewald in the same way: in the case of yld "beget", zēg "utter a plaintive cry", ʻnh "answer", qnh "acquire", cızr "help" it is suggested that the Hiph'il developed gradually next to the Qal (Ewald, 1863, p. 322). Again we have to comment that there is no evidence that the Hiph'il forms developed along these lines. With the verbs mentioned above we only have the situation
that the Qal occurs roughly ten times more often than the Hiph'il. The reason for Ewald's strong insistence on the fact that the Hiph'il forms are secondary developments, is clear. In his own words: "es wäre dem begriffe dieses stammes gänzlich entgegen wenn er jemals ursprünglichen intransitive bedeutung hätte; und alle beispiele dafür sind nur scheinbar" (ibid.). Ewald accepts the causative function as the most original and most typical function of the Hiph'il and therefore regards it as necessary to implicate this causative value in every occurrence of the Hiph'il (cf. Ewald, 1862, pp. 321, 322, 323). The problem with and explanation of this kind is that this supposed original causative function is no longer known and exactly because of this any synchronic analysis along these lines becomes speculative.

Still in the same connection Ewald maintains that whereas many verbs in the Qal express "ganz einfach beschaffenheit oder zustand, in Hif-il ein Handeln, thätiges Leben dieser sache aus" (1863, p. 322). In this way ṣqṭ is supposed not to express "ruhig seyn ... sondern ruhe halten"; in the same way developments in meaning are constructed for ṣkl, ṣg, ṣh and ṣḥ (1863, pp. 222-23). This may or may not have been so, but even when an explanation along these lines is given, the fact that this Hiph'il again "secondarily" developed an intransitive meaning, remains unexplained. Next to the Qal "be undisturbed, be quiet" we have the Hiph'il with the meaning "cause quietness", but also "show quietness, be quiet" (Koehler and Baumgartner, 1958, pp. 1007-8). As historical explanation Ewald's argument may be correct or incorrect, but as synchronic description and evaluation of the semantic function of the ṣḥ Hiph.

Ewald suggests a development of the same kind from ṣḥ Qal "verderbt seyn". Such a Qal does not exist, but according to Ewald's contention it must have existed. In this connection note also Sperber's argument against the schematizing efforts of scholars who wish to bring all verbal forms back to a Qal which existed or must have existed (Sperber, 1966, pp. 6, 14).
Hiph'ïl it is certainly not successful. In the following two passages there is no difference in meaning, although in one case a Qal and in the other case a Hiph'ïl is used:

Jer. 46:27 "and Jacob shall be at rest (Šqt Qal) once more, prosperous and unafraid" (NEB);

Jer. 49:23 "Hamath and Arpad are confounded, for they heard evil tidings; they melt in fear, they are troubled like the sea which cannot keep quiet (Šqt Hiph.)" (RSV).

In the one case of another verb (ngî) the statement is made that the Qal is used in the case of things and the Hiph'ïl in the case of persons, but as any competent dictionary shows, things as well as persons occur as objects as well as subjects in both Qal and Hiph'ïl (cf. Koehler and Baumgartner, 1958, p. 593). The reference to an inchoative meaning is equally not a characteristic of all the Hiph'ïl passages or even of all the occurrences of a single verb. In other words, we may regard Ewald's account of the Hiph'ïl as containing too vague historical connections or explaining only single lexical items. As a result of his emphasis on the causative function as the original function of the Hiph'ïl, the influence of which can be traced in all the extant shades of meaning, Ewald does not succeed in giving a successful account of the wide variety of meanings expressed by the Hiph'ïl. 3)

Nyberg, in his Hebrew Grammar (1952), leaves ample room for the recognition of various shades of meaning in the Hiph'ïl verbal theme.

3. In certain cases Ewald suggests a development according to which a transitive Hiph'ïl is the first to be formed, and from that an intransitive one, e.g. nîth (1863, p. 322). In other cases we first have an intransitive meaning, while the transitive meaning develops secondarily from the Qal (1863, p. 324). It is clear that by arguing in this way one can become totally entangled in historical reconstructions without taking the semantic values into account.
Nyberg acknowledges that there are various cases where the Hiph'il has no causative meaning in relation to the Qal. The only difference, according to him, is that in the Hiph'il a shift in the point of view with regard to the action takes place. Nyberg lays down the following tendencies and gives examples of each: (i) when the Qal expresses an action that sets in or one that comes to a certain conclusion, the Hiph'il expresses the action in its durative aspect, e.g. לְעַר (Qal: "become light"; Hiph.: "shine, give light"); (ii) when the Qal expresses an action in its durative aspect or one that has not yet come to conclusion, the Hiph'il expresses the action that sets in or comes to a certain conclusion, e.g. בִּשָּׁמֶשׁ (Qal: "be ashamed"; Hiph.: "(be) put to shame"); (iii) when the Qal expresses an action in general, the Hiph'il delimits it to a specific object, a specific subject or a specific situation, e.g. רָנַכְנָא (Qal: "jubilate"; Hiph.: "burst out in jubilation"). However, to all these tendencies Nyberg has to add that in all the cases mentioned the Hiph'il may also possibly have a causative meaning (Nyberg, 1952, p. 225). Nyberg's attempt to systematise the shifts in meaning brought about by the Hiph'il verbal theme is interesting, but at the same time it has to be maintained that these remarks only hold good on lexical level. In other words no exhaustive definition of the function of the Hiph'il can be given along these lines. Thus, for example, רָנַכְנָא Hiph. has the meaning "ring out a cry of joy" but also "cause to cry for joy", and בִּשָּׁמֶשׁ "put to shame" as well as "be ashamed".

Having set up these tentative tendencies towards a distinction between Qal and Hiph'il, Nyberg readily admits that there are cases where the differences between Qal and Hiph'il are unnoticeable (1952, p. 226). This is not to say that there is complete agreement in all the passages where such verbs occur, because sometimes a Hiph'il has a causative meaning next to regular non-causative meaning, e.g. דָּקַר (Qal and Hiph. "tread
(on)\), nth (Qal and Hiph. "stretch out, extend") and ng\(c\) (Qal and Hiph. "touch"). In the last case, however, Nyberg mentions that the Hiph'il can also express the causative idea "cause (a thing) to touch a thing".

Nyberg is very cautious not to let a supposed original or basic causative meaning influence his views on all the manifold aspects that can be expressed by the Hiph'il. His treatment of the Hiph'il illustrates that there are many individual differences that can be ascertained only on the lexical level - hence his statement that the differences between Qal and Hiph'il are not always noticeable. The three tendencies towards a distinction between Qal and Hiph'il are only very broad statements that cannot lay claim to any exhaustiveness. Only on the individual lexical level will it be possible to handle such distinctions, i.e. it will not be possible even to apply them to all verbs of a certain class. In general it may be stated that Nyberg leaves ample room for an overlap between Qal and Hiph'il.

The approach of Brockelmann (1956) is very much like that of Nyberg. Having given attention to the basic or proper meaning of the Hiph'il, viz. the causative - as he regards it - Brockelmann states that the Hiph'il can also express "dass ein Zustand am Subjekt in Erscheinung tritt" (1956, p. 36). The verbs which fall under this class are verbs such as dm Hiph. and qt Hiph., and incidentally these verbs also have a corresponding Qal with similar meaning. Whereas in all these cases he does not refer explicitly to a corresponding Qal, he does so clearly in maintaining that there are verbs where no difference in meaning between Qal and Hiph'il, e.g. drk "tread (on)", ctr "pray", nth "stretch" (1956, p. 36). We thus see that Brockelmann leaves room for overlapping between Qal and Hiph'il.

Sperber (1966) raised very strong objections against the schemati-
sing efforts of grammarians who want to bring all verbs down to the common denominator of a triliteral root and to regard all these conjugations as derived from the Qal (1966, p. 14). Sperber opposes the idea of Bauer and Leander (1918, p. 283) that the causative has been formed from the ground stem (Sperber, 1966, p. 6). Sperber himself contends that the so-called derived stems are not verbal stems, but verbal conjugations and that they were used interchangeably in order to indicate one and the same meaning without implying the slightest differentiation (1966, pp. 6, 14). In other words, Sperber deals with verbs as individual lexical items without trying to schematise them. He simply compares the meanings of the Pi'el and Hiph'il themes of 52 verbs - in one of these a Niph'al and Hoph'al are compared - in order to show that these two themes were used interchangeably (1966, pp. 7-10), e.g.:

Ps. 80:7 (NEB 80:6) "Thou hast humbled us before our neighbours, and our enemies mock (\text{Qal}) us to their hearts' content" (NEB);

Ps. 22:8 (NEB, RSV 22:7) "All who see me mock at me (\text{Hiph.}), they make mouths at me, they wag their heads" (RSV).

Joel 4:18 (NEB 3:18) "When that day comes, the mountains shall run with fresh wine and the hills flow with milk" (NEB);

Amos 9:13 "A time is coming, says the Lord, when ... The mountains shall run with fresh wine (\text{Hiph.}), and every hill shall wave with corn" (NEB).

4. Another contention of Sperber, viz. that the verb in the Qal led to the formation of derived nominals while the Pi'el and Hiph'il are in the main denominative verbs (1966, p. 46), has earlier been shown to be untenable because it is not provable (cf. 3.3).
In the case of passages such as these, Sperber wishes us to leave room for interpretations according to which the speaker had a choice between two verbal themes with the same meaning.

6.3 JENNI'S VIEWS ON QAL AND HIPH'IL WITH SIMILAR MEANING

Gesenius and Kautzsch (1966, p. 145) make much of the so-called intransitive character of the Hiph'il, but Jenni extends the usual conception of the internal-transitive character considerably (1968, pp. 250-52) (cf. also the discussion in 5.4.2.2). To repeat in short the exposition given earlier: When the Hiph'il stands in relation to a transitive Qal, there are two kinds of verbs. In the first group the verb may take two causatives. In the second group, Jenni maintains, the "veranlasste Objekt" might lack regularity and only the subject of the transitive action appears. The inducing subject ("veranlassende Objekt") might be identical with the first object ("veranlasste Objekt"), e.g., in the case of שִׁית, "to allow oneself to ruin someone (or something)" (Jenni, 1968, pp. 251-52). Jenni makes this suggestion in a quite hypothetical way, but he thinks that the difference between Qal and Hiph'il can be demonstrated along the lines suggested. Seemingly a distinction of this kind is suggested for many Hiph'il verbs, but since Jenni does not wish to make a thorough examination of the Hiph'il he contents himself with an examination of a few examples.

In the case of של (Qal: "send") the Qal occurs 564 times and the Hiph'il only 5 times - the latter in the meaning "let loose upon". Having earlier (1968, pp. 193-98) differentiated the Qal from the Pi'el passages, Jenni now sets about to examine which factors are common to the five Hiph'il passages and which are lacking in the corresponding Qal passages. Taking the context into account in each case, Jenni maintains that in each of the five passages the point of time at which the subject
starts the action, is "betont hervorgehoben". "Die Handlung geschieht als Folge auf die Erfüllung einer Bedingung, die von Jahwe selber gesetzt worden ist ... oder zu einem Zeitpunkt, den Jahwe selber bestimmt hat" (1968, p. 253). These findings Jenni now brings in connection with the structure of the internal-causative - as he prefers to call a Hiph'il of this kind - as it has been expounded theoretically. "Das veranlasste Agens ... handelt nicht aus freien Stücken, sondern in Abhängigkeit und Übereinstimmung mit dem veranlassenden Subjekt ..., das gewisse Bedingungen oder Termine aufgestellt hat. Gegenüber dem Qal kann also das innerlich-kausative Hiph'il zusätzlich eine gewisse modales Färbung der Handlung von seiten des Subjekts her ausdrücken ..." (1968, p. 253). Exactly how Jenni makes the crossing from the detail on the circumstances of the action to the "fact" that the "veranlasste Agens" does not act on its own, is not very clear. Even less clear is the reason for the statement that the internal-causative Hiph'il can express a modal colouring of the action which cannot be expressed by the Qal.

Still more important criticism can be levelled against Jenni's treatment of the Hiph'il of ūlh - a treatment on which his theoretical premises on the distinctions between Qal and Hiph'il rest (Jenni, 1968, p. 253). Jenni sets as his aim to determine which factors are common to the Hiph'il passages but are lacking in the Qal passages. In other words, Jenni seems to be on the lookout for really characteristic or discerning elements that occur only in the Hiph'il and not in the Qal. Such a discerning element is supposed to have been found in the detail of the circumstances in which the action took place, but let us compare Ex. 8:17 and Ez. 14:13 with other passages containing a Qal:

Ex. 8:17 (NEB 8:21) "If you do not let my people go (ūlh Pi.), I will send (ūlh Hiph.) swarms of flies upon you, your courtiers, your
people ... (18) on that day I will make an exception to Goshen ... (19) **tomorrow** this sign shall appear" (NEB);

Ex. 9:14 "(13) The Lord then told Moses to rise early in the morning ... (14) This time I will strike home (šîh Qal) with all my plagues against you, your courtiers, and your people ... (15) By now I could have stretched out my hand, and struck you and your people with pestilence ... (16) I have let you live only to show you my power ... (18) **tomorrow** at this time I will send a violent hailstorm" (NEB);

Ezek. 14:13 "Man, when a country sins by breaking faith with me, I will stretch out my hand and cut short its daily bread. I will send (šîh Hiph.) famine upon it ..." (NEB);

Ex. 23:28 "(23) When my angel goes before you, and brings you in to the Amorites ... and I blot them out, (24) you shall not bow down to their gods ... (27) I will send (šîh Pi.) my terror before you, and will throw into confusion all the people against whom you shall come ... (28) And I will send (šîh Qal) hornets before you, which shall drive out Hivite ... from before you" (RSV).

If the situation in Ex. 23:28 is said to be not of exactly the same kind as that in Ezek. 14:13, we may compare a Pi'el passage:

Ezek. 5:17 "(7) Because you are more turbulent than the nations that are round about you ... but have acted according to the ordinances of the nations that are round about you ... (8) therefore thus says the Lord God : Behold, I, even I, am against you; and I will execute judgment in the midst of you in the sight of the nations ... (17) I will send (šîh Pi.) famine and wild beasts against you, and they will rob you of your children ..." (RSV).
No two passages can be nearer to each other in detail than Ex. 8:17 and 9:14. Jenni contends that in 8:17 the point of time at which the subject will make the action set in, is emphasized (1968, p. 253). This is quite true but in 9:14 even more; reference is made to the past, to Yahweh's plan and to the future ("tomorrow"). The point of time in the future is even more clearly emphasized by the addition of "at this time". In Ex. 23:28 and Ezek. 5:17 the description of the situation is equally detailed. In the case of šîh then, there is no fundamental difference between the use of Qal or Hiph'îl. Since Jenni's definition of the difference between Qal and Hiph'îl rests to a large extent on supposed differences in the case of šîh, we may justly doubt its validity.

On the same lines as described above, Jenni thinks it possible to distinguish between the Qal and Hiph'îl of kwâl ("contain, hold in (a quantity), comprehend") (Jenni, 1968, p. 254). According to the definition to which the (faulty) examination of šîh has led him, the Qal should express "die einfache, faktische Tat des Schöpfers" whereas the Hiph'îl time and again expresses a modal colouring, or to quote Jenni, "ein durch das Wesen des Subjekts bedingtes Können (das Gefäß veranlasst sich, etwas zu fassen = es vermag wesensgemäss, etwas zu erfassen)" (1968, p. 254). The Qal passage, Is. 40:12 is translated by the NEB as follows:

Is. 40:12 "Who has gauged the waters in the palm of his hand, or with its span set limits to the heavens? Who has held (kwâl Qal) all the soil of the earth in a bushel ..." (NEB).

Although the Qal is supposed to express the simple fact of enclosing the dust (soul) of the earth in a measure, it seems rather as if we have here a deed that expresses something "wesensgemäss". After all, Yahweh's
eminence above the nations is described by way of a series of questions, and the question now is: Who is it that could ("wesengemäss") enclose or comprehend all the soil of the earth in a measure? (Cf. Duhm, 1914, p. 266). In the passages with a Hiph'il, rather, a simple statement is made without implying anything of the kind Jenni suggests, e.g.:

1 Kings 7:26, 38 "the Sea rested on top of them. (26) Its thickness was a handbreath ... it held (kwl Hiph.) two thousand bath of water ... (38) He then made ten bronze basins, each holding (kwl Hiph.) forty bath and measuring four cubits" (NEB);

Jer. 2:13 "... they have hewn out for themselves cisterns, cracked cisterns that can hold (kwl Hiph.) no water" (NEB);

Ezek. 23:32 "You shall drink your sister's cup which is deep and large; you shall be laughed at and held in derision, for it contains (kwl Hiph.) much" (RSV).

In all these passages only facts are stated, and of the Qal passage it may rather be maintained that the circumscription "wesensgemäss" is necessary. Where the Hiph'il is used, the modal colouring is only added in order to make the translation read better.

A distinction on the same lines is further suggested for byn (Qal: "understand"; Hiph. : "be able to discern, make understand"). For the Qal forms that are certain, the translation "auf etw. achtgeben, merken" is suggested, and for the so-called internal-causative passages "unterscheiden können, Einsicht haben, verstehen, sich verstehen auf, achten auf" (Jenni, 1968, p. 254). The modal colouring ("können") is no longer suggested for all the Hiph'il passages - there is no difference in meaning between many verbs in the Qal and corresponding verbs in the Hiph'il theme. Whereas in the case of šlh the difference was based on the modal colouring, it is now only maintained that there is a difference
although the modal colouring is lacking most of the time. It seems as if Jenni's attempt towards a distinction between Qal and Hiph'il is unsuccessful. In the case of šlh, kul and byn, in any case, there is no great difference of the kind suggested by Jenni. Such has also been the findings in the case of šht (and other "roots" not showing a Qal) (cf. discussion in 5.4.3.2). Earlier it has also been maintained that there is absolutely no evidence for an interpretation of, to take an example, šht Hiph. as "sich veranlassen, jemand verderben". šht Hiph. meant in Hebrew "spoil, ruin, destroy" and we may go no further in our linguistic explanation.

6.4 CONCLUSION

It seems as if much room should be left for verbs having similar or even identical meaning in Qal and Hiph'il. Various scholars have occupied themselves with this phenomenon, but some could not rid themselves of the conception that the causative is the main function of the Hiph'il. In this way Ewald (1863) and Joüon (1923) could not arrive at a successful explanation of verbs that show no trace of a causative meaning although they appear in the Hiph'il theme. Joüon had to regard verbs with a meaning of the kind found in the Qal theme, as examples of "pseudo-hif'il" - a term which is quite incomprehensible: "pseudo-causative" would have been more clear, although not justified. Ewald had to take refuge in individual historical sketches in order to account for a few verbs as showing secondary developments in the Hiph'il resulting in similar meanings in Qal and Hiph'il. In other respects, however, Ewald's approach is significant: rather than setting up a few general rules, the history of each "root" should be taken on its own.

In the approaches of Nyberg (1952) and Brockelmann (1956) ample room is left for overlap in meaning. Nyberg states some smaller differences
between Qal and Hiph'il forms with similar meaning, but no generalizations are made. In similar vein Brockelmann mentions a few cases of overlap in meaning and seems to regard this as completely understandable and reconcilable with the character of the Hiph'il verbal theme.

Sperber's contentions are far-reaching, but his claims as to similar meanings cannot be refuted. Of course, Sperber does not maintain that all the passages in which e.g. ́iq ("laugh, mock") occurs in the Qal have exactly the same meaning as those where a Hiph'il is used. Fact is that in certain passages the speaker had a free choice between two (or even more) themes.

Jenni's suggestions towards a distinction between Qal and Hiph'il of e.g. ́sh are completely speculative and in certain respects merely an extension of his views on the relation between Pi'el and Hiph'il verbs with similar meaning (cf. 5.4). There is no evidence for the nuances of meaning he suggests and even less evidence that these shades of meaning have been known or even knowable to the speakers.

The discussion of proposed solutions towards a differentiation of Qal and Hiph'il has shown that recognition has been given by many scholars to these overlaps in meaning. It is in no way possible to predict from the meaning of the word or from its phonological form whether it will have a similar meaning in the Hiph'il as in the Qal. The meaning seems to be totally unpredictable.
CHAPTER 7

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

1. To state the problem, the present situation was outlined, namely that there is no agreement with regard to verbal themes, and that divergent opinions on this linguistic aspect appeared in publications of the past decade. The set purpose was to characterize the Hiph'il as verbal theme rather than to provide an inventory of all Hiph'il forms.

2. From the introductory remarks it appeared that it was absolutely necessary to undertake and conduct this study within the framework of a well-founded general linguistic theory. In this respect, however, the problem was on the one hand the large number of general linguistic theories which were available to the researcher in connection with a specific language, and the validity of which would in itself have demanded extensive study; and on the other hand the state of fluidity which exists within each linguistic theory. For various reasons the transformational generative theory was selected as the cadre for this study. Within the confines of this theory, preference was given to the ideas of Gruber (1967), mainly because his conclusions on the form of the lexicon had been set out in such detail that this study could conveniently make use of it. Gruber's general viewpoint is motivated within transformational generative grammar as a whole and it appeared that his viewpoint was favourably received by scholars. From the general survey it became clear that the contents of the lexicon would have to be examined for the purpose of this study. An important aspect of this is that principles should as far as possible be established according to which the scope of the tendencies (with regard to derivation) could be defined within the lexicon. A lexicon is rated higher in so far as it
uses derivational means for the formation of new words. An affix is fully productive when it can be used with all words that can be defined in terms of semantic, syntactic or phonological characteristics. In all other cases we have to deal with non-productive word-extension and when a rule is formulated, all the words subject to it will have to be specified. In the present study, this principle offered great possibilities for linguistic description.

3. In chapter 3 various aspects were discussed to which solutions had to be found, since they were relevant to pre-suppositions which might substantially influence a study such as the present one. The proposed correlation between language and thought was summarily dismissed, since it is unproved as well as unproveable. Sharp reaction came from Barr (1961) especially against Boman's (1960) observations in this connection. Boman's study, however, does not stand independently; he is actually only one of the representatives of a complete attitude in linguistics. On the other hand, Barr, also, is not alone in his criticism of the language-thought correlation. On the contrary, research during the past few years has shown unambiguously that no real proof exists in favour of the hypothesis under discussion (Dieboldt, 1965, pp. 259-260). On methodological grounds strong evidence can be brought forward against the proposed correlation, for instance the fact that it cannot be carried through consistently. Characteristic of the attempts at correlation is that a language is not examined as a whole, and that all assertions are not brought in line with a general linguistic theory. The same principle to which is referred in this criticism, viz. that there is no indispensable connection between the nature of things or ideas and the linguistic units by which these things or ideas are expressed, implies that the history of a word or structural element need
not necessarily contribute anything towards the meaning of a word in a synchronic context (3.3). Any attempt to determine the meaning and function of the verbal themes by studying their history or that of their structural elements - in which context several researchers have sought the solution - is therefore unsuccessful. The only justifiable method is to attempt to define the function of the Hiph'il verbal theme in the actual use thereof within a synchronic whole. Reference to other languages will therefore offer no solution either.

4. In chapter 3 attention was paid to the mainly historical and comparative approach which for a long time characterized Semitic scholarship - and which to a great extent persists to the present time, in spite of pleas in favour of a different method. James Barr's examination of the underlying principles of many of the studies was of great value in this connection. By the use of several examples, it was shown exactly how far-fetched and speculative many etymological studies actually were. Since comparative philology and even etymology may well be of great value when correctly applied, these disciplines should not be set aside as being useless. Most important, however, is the fact that these traditional working methods should be influenced by and defined according to the principles of a general linguistic theory. Thus it was shown in 3.4 how such a profitable effect might occur. Very closely related to traditional grammar is the idea that the consonants are actually the bearers of meaning, and that the vowels merely express modifications of this fundamental and continuous thought. This idea will certainly have to be rejected, especially because it does not take into account the power of word formation. Each word will again and again be regarded as a new formation semantically.

Especially in connection with the verb - and the verbal themes in
particular - this reliance on the "root meaning" led to an unfortunate schematism, since all the verbal themes were regarded as straightforward variations on the Qal. As regards meaning, a word within a definite verbal theme is seen as a variation in a paradigm. To put it differently, given the meaning of a word in the basic theme and given the "basic" or "fundamental" meaning of one of the other verbal themes the ultimate meaning in the last-named theme can be predicted correctly. Barr (1961) broke with this idea completely, by emphasizing the fact that the meaning could not be predicted with such precision as was claimed: each word, no matter in which theme it occurred, should be regarded as a new formation semantically. Barr was supported in his viewpoint by Sperber and Aronson, among others. The latter declared explicitly that in the verbal system of Hebrew one has to deal with phonological regularity and hence predictability but semantic and lexical anomaly and hence unpredictability (1969, p. 139). All these scholars strongly rejected the idea that one simply has to deal with "variations on a theme" - the shades of meaning which are expressed by the verbal themes are too rich and varied for this idea to be acceptable. In support of this point of view - which has been thoroughly motivated and well thought out - a number of forms have been presented regarding to which the situation is not all straightforward, semantically speaking. Before taking into account Jenni's ideas, the above view appears to be the best motivated and the most thoroughly investigated view.

5. The question is: How should the Hiph'il verbal theme be appraised in the light of the above examination, which does after all appear to be thoroughly motivated? To be able to reply to this, it is necessary to refer back to the conclusions in connection with chapter 2, viz. that it is useful to establish as many tendencies as possible within
the lexicon. However, it is important to remember that if a certain word-extension cannot be applied to all words which are definable according to a specific criterium, it would be a non-productive word-extension, so that all the words to which it is applicable would have to be enumerated. In chapter 1 it was pointed out that it would be impracticable to mention all these cases. As has been shown in chapters 5 and 6, the following assertion may now be made in connection with tendencies which occur with the Hiph'îl verbal theme: in a large percentage of cases the Hiph'îl is used to form causative verbs, in which the meaning need not always be directly causative, but may also be permissive. In a great number of cases, the Hiph'îl is used to form factitive verbs. In a limited number of cases, the Hiph'îl is used to form words with a "declarative-estimative" meaning. The appellation "internal-transitive" which has become traditional usage for intransitive verbs in the Hiph'îl verbal themes, is not sufficiently descriptive of this group. It would be better to consider the words which were often classified in this group to be examples of unpredictable modifications of meaning. With regard to the above-mentioned three tendencies, occurring over a wide range, it should be kept in mind that they are non-productive word-extensions, and that, in any study which included all verbs, all the related verbs would have to be enumerated along with the rule. It would also be possible to point out still more tendencies within the lexicon. Indeed, the lexicon is rated higher for this very reason, as has been explained before. Even if each rule should only be valid for a few words, a study in connection with the structure of the lexicon would be of great value.

The following remarks in connection with tendencies within the lexicon are not entirely in the scope of the present investigation, but are,
However, related to it: the same tendencies mentioned above as being applicable in case of the Hiph'il, are also valid to a greater or smaller degree in connection with the Pi'el, viz. the forming of causative, factitive and declarative-estimative verbs. As has been mentioned in 3.4, even the Niph'al has been used to form causative verbs.

6. In chapters 5 and 6 two groups of verbs of direct consequence to this study were discussed. A dual purpose was served by this discussion: it was found that Pi'el and Hiph'il (as well as Qal and Hiph'il) verbs occurred bearing the same meaning, which would create a problem regarding the traditional interpretation of semantic predictability - these forms having the same meaning were apparently used arbitrarily and according to a principle of free variation, furthermore, it provided the opportunity of thoroughly testing Jenni's ideas about the verbal themes which are of importance in this connection, because the Hiph'il, also, was involved. In the field of study concerned, Jenni's ideas had elicited positive and favourable comment, but still it became apparent that the distinctions between verbal themes suggested by him were quite untenable. Actually his idea of predictability on the level of the verbal themes is in direct opposition to that of the unpredictability thereof as explained and motivated by, for example, Barr and Aronson. Whereas there have been several publications in which positive attention has been given to, and even good use made of, Jenni's theories, Jenni's untenable presuppositions should once more be thoroughly reconsidered, as well as the way in which he treats his material. His views have been examined only in so far as it affects the Hiph'il, but a detailed study of his ideas on the relation between Qal and Pi'el would seem to be necessary.

7. After, for example, having ascertained that Pi'el and Hiph'il have
the same meaning in the case of a large group of verbs, it would be possible further to examine the specific use of the verbal themes on a stylistic level. An examination of this kind would, however, have to be limited to the sphere of style, since the verbal themes are apparently equal on a purely grammatical level.

In the Hiph'il there will always remain a considerable number of forms which are in no wise comprehensible by means of rules. The reason for this is clear: the history of these forms is unknown to us. As many researchers have stated, one may in this instance have to deal with analogy or other influences (Bauer and Leander 1918, p. 294; Barr, 1961, p. 183). It is also possible that many of the forms were originally occasional forms, e.g. for the sake of paronomasia (Nyberg, 1952, p. 228; Reckendorf, 1909, pp. 59-72). Barr gives a good example of what is meant by this, in a totally different context:

Is. 7:9 “If you will not believe (‘mn Hiph.), surely you shall not be established (‘mn Niph.)” (RSV).

In this case we do not have a play on the "root meaning" (Porteous, 1963, p. 71), but we have indeed a stylistic device in which two verbs from the same root are used with striking effect (Barr, 1964, p. 242). Words could possibly have originated in a similar manner. The exact process by which Hiph'il words came into being will in any case remain uncertain, and stylistic examination would probably not make the processes any clearer.

8. Contrary to Jenni's view that the system of the verbal themes only started to disintegrate in post-biblical Hebrew from the logically connected whole which they had formed in biblical Hebrew (1968, p. 278), we must agree with Barr (1961, p. 102-103) and Aronson (1969, p. 136) that
even in biblical Hebrew it is impossible to establish the verbal themes in a fixed scheme. Even in biblical Hebrew one could not speak of direct modifications in meaning which were expressed by the verbal themes.
APPENDIX I

The following passages contain a Qal verb with the root kbd:

Gen. 18:20 "There is a great outcry over Sodom and Gomorrah; their sin is very great" - synthetic: in 18:20 we have the first statement in a few chapters on the sin of Sodom and Gomorrah. An appeal may of course be made to a general conception of the sin of these two cities, or, more deserving, to Gen. 13:13 ("Now the men of Sodom were wicked, great sinners against the Lord") as an earlier mention of this sin. It can then be said that Gen. 18:20 is analytic, but five chapters separate these two utterances. Unless an appeal is made to a general conception of the sin of the city - a very precarious kind of argument - this passage contains a synthetic judgment.

48:10 "Now Israel's eyes were dim with age, and he could not see" ( ... kāḇēḏō mizzōgen) - synthetic: neither does this heaviness belong inherently to Israel's (= Jacob's) eyes, nor is anything said in the previous verses on Israel's eyesight or health.

Ex. 5:9 "Let the work be heavy on the men" (literal translation)¹) - analytic: in the two previous verses details of this heavier work are furnished and the command follows from these details to a certain degree.

9:7 "and yet he remained obdurate ..." (or to bring out clearly the verb: "and the heart of Pharaoh was obdurate") - synthetic: the many earlier statements about the obduracy of Pharaoh (Ex. 7:13, 14; 8:15, 28) might create the impression that the statement in 9:7 is an analytic one. It is, however, synthetic since it follows an

1. The NEB has "Keep the men hard at work" - a better translation, but obscuring the verb under discussion.
episode in which the heart of the king was expected to be softened. This statement is a new and unexpected one.

Judges 1:35 "but the hand of the House of Joseph was heavy (on them)"
(composite literal translation) - synthetic: verse 28 ("But when the Israelites became stronger, they subjected the Canaanites to forced labour"
(JB) concerns the whole of Israel, whereas in verse 35 the Amorites specifically are at stake.

- 20:34 "Then ten thousand picked men ... appeared before Gibeah. The battle was fierce (kāḇādā)" (JB) - synthetic: this is the first time we have this fact mentioned and a battle need not necessarily be fierce.

1 Sam. 5:6 "The hand of Yahweh weighed on the people of Ashdod and struck terror into them" (JB) - synthetic: what is hinted at, is not the fall of Dagon in verses 3 and 4, but what follows. Why was an adjective not used for this clearly synthetic statement? It is very important to compare this verse with 1 Sam. 5:11.

1 Sam. 5:11 "the hand of God was very heavy there" (JB) - analytic: this is a conclusion from what is said in the previous verses. In 1 Sam. 5:6 (above) the same verb is used, but there the judgment is clearly synthetic.

- 31:3 "The fighting was heavy about Saul" (partly JB) - analytic: only to a certain extent is this an analytic judgment, since it does not necessarily follow from the fact that the Philistines hotly pursued Saul and his sons.

2 Sam. 13:25 "The king answered 'No, my son, we must not all come and be a burden (= be troublesome) to you'" (welō, nikbad Cālēkā) - synthetic.
2 Sam. 14:26 "When he cut the hair of his head - and he would cut it every year; he would cut it then because it grew too heavy for him - he would weigh the hair" (JB) - synthetic: the mention of the weight of the hair is ironic just because it is so unexpected.

Is. 24:20 "The earth reels to and fro like a drunken man ...; its sin is heavy on it, and it falls never to rise again"

(NEB, JB, and somewhat more literal) - partly analytic: cf. 24:5. Nevertheless, here we learn for the first time the magnitude of the sin.

59:1 "(hên) No, the hand of Yahweh is not too short to save, nor his ear too dull (kāḇēḏā) to hear" (JB) - clearly a synthetic judgment after the interjection hên. In Ezek. 28:3 (where we have an adjective) an interjection cognate to hên (viz. hinā) signals to Jenni that the judgment following is "ein ... als Neueinsatz markiertes, unvorbereitetes synthetisches Urteil" (1968, p. 28).

66:5 "Your brothers say ...

'Let Yahweh show his glory, 2)

let us witness your joy!" (JB) - synthetic.

Ezek. 27:25 "Then you were rich and glorious

surrounded by the seas" (JB) - analytic (partly).

Psalm 32:4 "For day and night thy hand was heavy upon me" - synthetic.

38:5 "Denn meine Vergehen wachsen mir über den Kopf, ..." (JB, and不低于in 10)

2. Westermann prefers the Niph' āl form above the Qal yikbad and translates "Let Yahweh be glorified" (1969, p. 415). However, the Qal form makes good sense, as Ridderbos translates: "... dat de Heere heerlijk worde" (1934, p. 231, 234).
wie eine schwere Last sind sie mir zu schwer"
(Kraus, 1966 I, p. 293) - analytic: details are furnished in the previous verses.

Job. 6:3 "Nun ist das (= my grief) schwerer als der Meere Sand"
(Horst, 1968, p. 92) - synthetic.

-- 14:21 "His sons are honoured (yikhăḏū), but he knows nothing of it"
(the writer) - synthetic: much is said earlier on the brevity and incomprehensibility of life, but this is an unexpected statement.

-- 23:2 "For God's hand (yāde) is heavy on me in my trouble" (NEB)
- synthetic.

-- 33:7 "Behold, no fear of me need terrify you;
my pressure will not be heavy upon you" (RSV) - synthetic:

cf. the discussion of Is. 59:1 (above) where it is mentioned that in Ezek. 28:3 hinneh signals a synthetic judgment to Jenni.

Neh. 5:18 "Yet with all this I did not demand the food allowance of the governor, because the servitude was heavy upon this people"
(RSV) - analytic.

3. The suggestion in Biblia Hebraica towards deletion of kāḇēḏ as attributively used adjective has been taken up by both JB and NEB. The excellent translation by Kraus, however, shows that this deletion is not necessary.

4. Dhorme insists on translating yādī as it stands in the Hebrew text: "my hand lies heavy on my groaning" (1967, p. 343). The change from yādī to yādō (as is the testimony of the LXX and Syriac translation) he regards as improbable, because the hand of God is heavy on a person, but not on an experience of suffering (1967, pp. 343-44). This is quite true (Fohrer, 1963, p. 362) but Dhorme's translation does not make as much sense.

5. 'akpī is retained by the NEB, RSV and also by Fohrer in his commentary (1963, p. 452). JB and others want to change it into wē kappi "and my hand will not lie heavy over you". This is also the testimony of the LXX. Fohrer quite correctly advances as argument that such a change as is advocated would call for a feminine form instead of yikbd (1963, p. 454).
1 Chron. 10:3 (= 1 Sam. 31:3 discussed above) "The fighting was heavy about Saul" (partly JB) - analytic (partly).

The following passages contain an adjective with the consonants kbd and are supposed to imply synthetic judgments:

Gen. 12:10 "Now there was a famine in the land. So Abram went down to Egypt ... for the famine was severe in the land" (RSV) - synthetic : the first mention of the extent of the famine.

-- 13:2 "Abraham was now very rich (kābēd) in cattle and in silver and gold" - synthetic.

-- 41:31 "The good years will not be remembered in the land because of the famine that follows; for it will be very severe" - analytic: in verse 30 and the first part of verse 31 the severity of the coming famine is described and the last part of verse 31 merely follows as conclusion and repetition!

-- 43:1 "Now the famine was severe in the land" (RSV) - this is a recapitulation of what has already been said in 41:56 and 57 where it is twice mentioned that the famine was severe. In 43:1 we have an analytic judgment - what is said, is by no means unexpected.

-- 47:4 "We have come to sojourn in the land; for there is no pasture for your servants' flocks, for the famine is severe in the land of Canaan" (RSV) - synthetic. There is also an analytic aspect : it is said earlier in the verse that there is no pasture in the land.

-- 47:13 "Now there was no food in all the land; for the famine was very severe ..." (RSV) - synthetic : said of Egypt, too, and not only of Canaan as in verse 4.
Gen. 50:9  "He took with him chariots and horsemen; the company was very great" (partly NEB) - partly analytic as a conclusion from the foregoing verses.

Ex. 4:10  "I am not eloquent ... but I am slow of speech (kēbad - pê) and slow of tongue (kēbad - lāsôn)" (Partly RSV) - synthetic.

-- 7:14  "Pharaoh's heart is hardened, he refuses to let the people go" (RSV) - analytic : in vs. 13 it is already said that Pharaoh's heart was hardened; even though Yahweh is speaking and says something to Moses about the king, the judgment is by no means unexpected.

-- 17:12  "But Moses' hands grew weary (= were heavy kēbēdîm)" (RSV) - synthetic.

-- 18:18  "The task is too heavy for you" - synthetic.

Numbers 11:14  "I am not able to bear all this people alone, because (it is) too heavy for me" (KJV) - synthetic.

1 Sam. 4:18  "... Eli fell backwards from his seat and broke his neck, for he was old and heavy" - synthetic.

Proverbs 27:3  "A stone is heavy, and sand is weighty, but a fool's provocation is heavier than both" (RSV) - synthetic.

**APPENDIX II**

Verbs and adjectives containing the "root" ḥzq. Firstly the verb:

Gen. 41:56  "... and Joseph opened all the granaries and sold corn to the Egyptians, for the famine was severe (wayyeḥēzaq)" - analytic.
Gen. 41:57 "all the earth came to Egypt ... because the famine was severe over all the earth" (RSV) - analytic.

- 47:20 "... all the Egyptians sold their fields, because the famine was severe upon them" (RSV) - analytic.

Ex. 7:13 "Still Pharaoh's heart was hardened, and he would not listen to them" (RSV) - synthetic: in vs. 3 Yahweh promises Moses that He will harden Pharaoh's heart, but the statement in vs. 13 is unexpected and follows on one of the signs done by Yahweh.

- 7:22 "But the magicians of Egypt did the same by their secret arts; so Pharaoh's heart remained hardened" (RSV) - synthetic: unexpected after the second sign done before Pharaoh.

- 8:15 (translations 8:19) "And the magicians said to Pharaoh, 'This is the finger of God'. But Pharaoh's heart was hardened" (RSV) - synthetic: unexpected, especially when even the magicians have come to other insights.

- 9:35 "So the heart of Pharaoh was hardened" (RSV) - analytic: in vs. 34 it is said that he hardened his heart. What follows in vs. 35 is only a conclusion.

- 12:33 "And the Egyptians were urgent (ḥzq Qal) with the people, to send them out ..." (RSV) - synthetic: in vs. 31 Pharaoh urges the people to leave, but here the subject is "the Egyptians".

Dt. 11:8 "You shall therefore keep all the commandments which I command you this day, that you may be strong ... " (RSV) - synthetic.

- 12:23 "Only take care (raq ḥāzaq) not to consume the blood" (JB) - synthetic.

**- 31:6 "Be strong, be resolute; ..."
**Dt. 31:7  "Be strong, be resolute; ..."**

** -- 31:23  "He gave Joshua son of Nun this order: 'Be strong, and stand firm'" (JB).

** Jos. 1:6  "Be strong, be resolute ..."

** -- 1:7  "Only be strong and resolute ..."

** -- 1:9  "Have I not commanded you? Be strong and of good courage" (RSV).

** -- 1:18  "Only be strong and resolute".

** -- 10:25  "Do not be fearful or dismayed; be strong and resolute".

-- 17:13  "But when the people of Israel grew (= were) strong, they put the Canaanites to forced labour" (RSV) - synthetic.

-- 23:6  "Therefore be very steadfast to keep and do all that is written" (RSV) - synthetic.

Judges 1:28  "Later, when Israel became (= were) strong, they put them to forced labour" - synthetic.

-- 7:11  "and you shall hear what they say, and afterward your hands shall be strengthened (hzq Qal)" (RSV) - synthetic.

1 Sam. 17:50  "So David prevailed over (hzq + min) the Philistine with a sling and with a stone" (RSV) - analytic.

2 Sam. 2:7  "Now therefore let your hands be strong, and be valiant" (RSV) - synthetic.

-- 10:11  "And he said, 'If the Syrians (Aramaeans) are too strong for me (hzq + min) then you shall help me'" (RSV) - synthetic!

-- 10:11  "but if the Ammonites are too strong for you, then I will come and help you" (RSV) - synthetic.
2 Sam. 10:12 "Take courage (חֶזָּאָק) and stand firm for the sake of our people" (JB) - synthetic.

-- 13:14 "But he would not listen to her, and being stronger than she, he forced her, and lay with her" (RSV). NEB has "overpowered her" (חֶזָּאָק + מִנָּה) - synthetic: the latter translation renders the sense best (cf. Koehler & Baumgartner, 1958, p. 286).

** -- 13:28 "Be courageous and be valiant" (RSV).

-- 16:21 "... the hands of all who are with you will be strengthened" (RSV) - synthetic!

-- 24:4 "But the king's word prevailed (חֶזָּאָק + מִנָּה) against Joab ..." (RSV) - synthetic.

** 1 Kings 2:2 "Be strong and show yourself a man".

-- 16:22 "But the people who followed Omri overcame the people who followed Tibni ..." (RSV) - synthetic!

-- 20:23 "Their gods are gods of the hills, and so they were stronger than we" (RSV) - synthetic!

-- 20:23 "but let us fight against them in the plain, and surely we shall be stronger than they" (RSV) - analytic: it follows to a certain extent from what is said in the first part of the verse.

-- 20:25 "then we will fight against them in the plain, and surely we shall be stronger than they" (RSV) - analytic (cf. vs. 23).

2 Kings 3:26 "When the king of Moab saw that the war had gone against him (כִּי חֶזָאָק מִמְמַנְנוּ הָמַיִלְהָמָא)" - analytic.

-- 14:5 "When the royal power was firmly (חָזֶּקָה) in his grasp, ..." synthetic.
2 Kings 25:3 "On the ninth day of the fourth month the famine was so severe in the city ..." (RSV) - synthetic!

Is. 28:22 "Now therefore do not scoff, lest your bonds be made strong (yehzEQû)" (RSV) - synthetic.

** -- 35:4 "say to the anxious, Be strong and fear not" - synthetic.

-- 39:1 "Merodach-baladan ... sent envoys with a gift to Hezekiah; for he had heard that he had been ill and was well again (wayyehZÄQ)" - analytic (cf. 38:1-10).

** -- 41:6 "Every one helps his neighbour, and says to his brother, 'Take courage!'" (RSV) - synthetic: it cannot be said that this is analytic only on the grounds of the first part of the verse.

Jer. 20:7 "thou art stronger than I, and thou hast prevailed" (RSV) - synthetic.

-- 52:6 "In the fourth month of that year ... when famine was severe in the city ..." - synthetic!

Ezek. 3:14 "... I went full of exaltation, the hand of the Lord strong upon me" - synthetic.

-- 22:14 "Will your heart be able to resist, will your hands be strong ...?" (JB) - synthetic (?)

* -- 30:21 "it has not been bound up ... so that it may become strong ..." (RSV) - to be left out in the discussion (cf. Jenni, 1968, pp. 27, 30).

** Haggai 2:4 "But now, Zerubbabel, take heart ..."

** -- 2:4 "Take heart, Joshua son of Jehozadak ..."

** -- 2:4 "Take heart, all you people, says the Lord."
** Zech. 8:9 "Let your hands be strong ..." (RSV).

** -- 8:13 "and I will save you ... Fear not, but let your hands be strong" (RSV).

Malachi 3:13 "Your words have been stout (hāzāqū) against me, saith the Lord" (KJV) - synthetic!

** Ps. 27:14 "be strong, take courage".

** Ps. 31:25 (NEB, JB, KJV 31:24) "Be strong, and let your heart take courage" (RSV).

** Daniel 10:19 "Be strong, be strong."

-- 11:5 "Then the king of the south shall be strong" (RSV) - synthetic!

-- 11:5 "but one of his princes shall be stronger than he" (RSV) - synthetic!

Ezra 9:12 "... never seek their welfare or prosperity. Thus you will be strong ..." - synthetic.

** -- 10:4 "Take courage and act."

1 Chron. 19:12 "If the Syrians (= Arameans) are too strong for me ..." (RSV) - synthetic!

-- 19:12 "but if the Ammonites are too strong for you ..." (RSV) - synthetic.

** -- 19:13 "Take courage and stand firm" (JB).

-- 21:4 "But the king's word prevailed against Joab" (RSV) - synthetic.

** -- 22:13 "be strong and resolute."

-- 28:7 "I will establish his sovereignty ... if only he steadfastly obeys my commandments ('im yehēzaq la'asōt)" - synthetic : open
posibility in the future.

** -- 28:10 "Be strong and set to work" (JB).

** -- 28:20 "Be strong, stand firm" (JB).

2 Chron. 8:3 "And Solomon went to Hamath - zobah and took it (wayyehōzaq ālākā)" (RSV) - synthetic.

** -- 15:7 "But you, take courage! Do not let your hands be weak" (RSV) - synthetic.

** -- 19:11 "Be strong and resolute."

-- 25:3 "When the royal power was firmly in his grasp ..." - synthetic.

** -- 25:8 "But if thou wilt go, do (it), be strong for the battle" (KJV).6)

-- 26:15 "he was marvellously helped, till he was strong" (RSV) - analytic: cf. details in the previous verses.

-- 27:5 "He fought with the king of the Ammonites and prevailed against them" (RSV) - synthetic.

-- 28:20 "Tiglath-pileser ... attacked and besieged him but could not overcome him (welō ū̂hzāgō)" (JB) - synthetic.

-- 31:4 "He ordered the people ... to provide ... so that they might devote themselves entirely to (lemān yehēẓāqû bĕ) the law of the Lord" - synthetic (?)

6. RSV translates "if you suppose that in this way you will be strong for war", in accordance with the LXX, Vetus Latina and Vulgate.

7. In accordance with the reading hizzāqû (according to one LXX manuscript), NEB translates "pressed him hard" and RSV "afflicted him". The evidence is, however, too small for such a change. The meaning "prevail over" is furthermore well attested (cf. Koehler & Baumgartner, 1958, p. 286.)
298

"2 Chron. 32:7 "Be strong, be brave."

The following passages contain an adjective הָזָּגוּ:

Numbers 13:18 "See ... whether the people who live there are strong or weak ..." - synthetic.

Joshua 4:24 "so that all the peoples of the earth may know that the hand of the Lord is mighty" (RSV) - synthetic.

Joshua 14:11 "I am still as strong as I was on the day when Moses sent me out" - synthetic.

Joshua 17:18 "you shall drive out the Canaanites, though they have chariots of iron, and though they are strong" (RSV) - partly analytic: cf. verses 12 and 13. The expression "as has been said" can be inserted without detracting anything from the meaning of the sentence.

Judges 18:26 "and Micah, seeing that they were too strong for him, turned and went home" - analytic: the violent conduct of these men, not allowing any resistance, is clear from the previous verses.

1 Sam. 14:52 "There was bitter warfare with the Philistines throughout Saul's lifetime (wayēḥi hammilḥāmā הָזָּגוּ)" - analytic: except for the genealogical table in 14:47-51, the whole of 1 Sam. 13 and 14 describe the warfare against the Philistines - the warfare referred to in vs. 52.

1 Kings 17:17 "... the son ... became ill ... and his illness was so severe (wayēḥi ḥolyō הָזָּגוּ) that there was no breath left in him"
1 Kings 18:2  "Now the famine was severe in Samaria" (RSV) - synthetic.

Jer. 50:34  "Their Redeemer is strong" (RSV, JB) - synthetic.

Ezek. 2:4  "The people also are impudent and stubborn (weḥizzê - lêb)" (RSV) - synthetic.

-- 3:7  "The whole House of Israel is stubborn (ḥizzê - màṣāḥ) and obstinate" (JB) - analytic in the light of Ezek. 2:3 and 4.

-- 3:8  "Behold, I have made your face hard against their faces" (RSV) - synthetic.

-- 3:8  "and your forehead hard against their foreheads" (RSV) - synthetic.

-- 3:9  "Like adamant harder than flint have I made your foreheads" (RSV) - synthetic.

-- 26:17  "you who were mighty on the sea" (JB) - synthetic.

Ps. 35:10  "thou who deliverest the weak from him who is too strong for him (mēḥażaq mimmennû)" (RSV) - synthetic.

Proverbs 23:11  "for their Redeemer is strong" (RSV) - synthetic.

**APPENDIX III**

yḇš : the verb. Passages marked with an asterisk are not implicated in the calculations:

Gen. 8:14  "By the twenty-seventh day of the second month the whole earth was dry" - synthetic : in the previous verse we learn that the earth was beginning to dry. Speiser (1964, p. 53) mentions
that ḥrb denotes "to be or to become free of moisture". ybš signifies complete dryness (Speiser, ibid.) and therefore the statement in vs. 14 does not refer to that in vs. 13.

Joshua 9:5 "The bread they took with them to eat was all dry and crumbling" (JB) - synthetic.

-- 9:12 "it was warm ... and now you see it is dry and crumbling" (JB) - synthetic: even if we leave out of consideration Jenni's argument that hinnê introduces an unexpected or synthetic judgment (1968, p. 26), it is clear that this statement is meant to express the opposite of what is said about the bread in the beginning of the verse.

* 1 Kings 13:4 "And his hand, which he stretched out against him, dried up ..." (RSV) - synthetic.

* -- 17:7 "After a while the stream dried up ..." - synthetic.

Is. 15:6 "the grass is withered" (RSV) ("has become dry" is also possible) - synthetic.

-- 19:5 "the river will be parched and dry" (RSV) - synthetic.

*-- 19:7 "there will be bare places by the Nile ... and all that is sown by the Nile will dry up" (RSV). Cf. niddaph ("be blown away").

-- 27:11 "When its boughs are dry, they are broken" (RSV) - synthetic: the first mention of boughs drying.

* -- 40:7 "The grass withers, the flower fades" - synthetic: this symbol has impact just because of this unexpected statement.

* -- 40:8 "The grass withers, the flowers fade" - analytic.
301.

* 40:24 "scarcely have they taken root in the earth, before he blows upon them and they wither away" - synthetic.

Jer. 12:4 "How long will the land be in mourning, and the grass wither (= be dry) all over the countryside?" (JB) - synthetic.

-- 28:10 "the pastures of the wilderness are dried up" (RSV) - synthetic.

*-- 50:38 "A sword over her waters and they shall dry up" - synthetic.

*Ezek. 17:9 "shall he not pull up the roots thereof ... that it wither? it shall wither in all the leaves of her spring" (KJV).

*-- 17:10 "Will it not utterly wither when the east wind strikes it - wither away on the bed where it grew?" (RSV).

-- 19:12 "its strong stem was withered; the fire consumed it" (RSV) - analytic: cf. "the east wind dried it up" (19:12).


Hosea 9:16 "Ephraim is struck down: their root is withered, and they yield no fruit" - synthetic (?)

Joel 1:12 "The wine withers, ...
Pomegranate, palm and apple, all the trees of the field are withered" (RSV) - synthetic(?)

-- 1:20 "the water-channels are dried up" - synthetic.

*Amos 1:2 "the top of Carmel withers" (RSV).

8. MT reads "a drought" (hōreb), but if we take into account verses 35-37, it is preferable to read here too "a sword" (cf. Bright, 1965, p. 355).
*Amos 4:7 "the field on which it did not rain withered" (RSV).
*Jonah 4:7 "God appointed a worm which attacked the plant, so that it withered" (RSV).
*Zech. 11:17 "May his arm wither entirely" (JB).

Ps. 22:16 (JB, NEB, RSV 22:15) "My mouth is dry as a potsherd" - synthetic.

-- 90:6 "in the evening it fades and withers" (RSV).
-- 102:5 (NEB, RSV, JB 102:4) "My heart is smitten like grass, and withered" (RSV) - synthetic.
-- 102:12 (NEB, RSV; JB 102:11) "like grass I wither away".
-- 129:6 "let them be like grass ... which withers before it can shoot".

*Job.8:12 "they wither earlier than any plant."
-- 12:15 "if he withholds the waters, they dry up" (RSV).
-- 14:11 "a river wastes away and dries up" (RSV).
-- 18:16 "His roots beneath dry up."

*Lament. 4:8 "their skin ... has become as dry as wood" (RSV).

There are two passages containing adjectives, predicatively used:
Numbers 11:6 "but now our strength is dried up" (RSV) - synthetic.

Ezek. 37:2 "and they were very dry" - synthetic.

APPENDIX IV

In this appendix all verbs containing the root ūḇ will be discussed. It is necessary to keep in mind that various criteria can be used to determine whether the statement is accidental or substantial. In order to avoid tediousness, the following symbols may be used to designate the different criteria: A: when the action follows necessarily "aus dem Wesen oder der Situation des Objekts" (Jenni, 1968, p. 88); B: when the substantiality rests only on the repetition of the verb (Jenni, 1968, p. 90); C: when substantiality rests on a general conception of something or on something which has been said much earlier (cf. my discussion of this point in 5.4.3.5); D: when the argument is made according to the letter without regard to the context (Jenni, 1968, pp. 93-4 for an example of this).

The one passage with a Pî'el has already been discussed (5.4.3.5). The Pî'el is supposed to signal an accidental action:

Ezek. 25:4 "I will hand you over as a possession to the tribes of the east. They shall pitch (Pî.) their camps ... among you" (NEB) - according to Jenni "das Aufstellen der Zelte ist eine für die Zelte akzidentielle Handlung" (1968, p. 94), i.e. he uses criterion D, but according to A the pitching of the camps follows nearly substantially from the fact that they receive the land as possession.

The Hiph'îl is supposed to signal a substantial action and according to Jenni ūḇ Hiph. always stands "in einem Entsprechungsverhältnis zum Vorhergehenden (Handlung, bestehender Plan, zu explizierende Größe)" (1968, p. 94):

Gen. 47:6 "The country of Egypt is open to you: settle (ūḇ) your father and brothers in the best region" (JB) - substantial accord-
ing to B (vs. 6a), but accidental according to A, in that it was not necessary for Pharaoh to allow them to settle them there (cf. vs. 4 "Now give your servants leave...").

Gen. 47:11 "Joseph settled his father and brothers, giving them a holding in the land of Egypt ..." (JB) - substantial according to A and 

Lev. 23:43 "you shall live in arbours ... so that your descendants may be reminded how I made the Israelites live (Hiph.) in arbours when I brought them out of Egypt" (NEB) - substantial according to B, but not A: it was not necessary for Yahweh to make them live in arbours; also not substantial to D.

1 Sam. 2:8 "He lifts the weak out of the dust ... to give them a place (Hiph.) among the great, to set them in seats of honour" (NEB) - accidental according to A and D: the impact of the statement lies exactly in the fact that Yahweh does the unexpected to these persons; only according to B it is "substantial" (viz. that it follows from the previous statements to a certain extent).

-- 12:8 "... he sent Moses and Aaron, who brought them out of Egypt and settled (Hiph.) them in this place" (NEB) - substantial, but not according to A and D: it was not necessary that Israel should have been brought out of Egypt and settled in Canaan, and Jenni's paraphrase "in der Konsequenz dieses Handelns" (1968, p. 94) is certainly not the only one.

10. If verses 5 and 6 or part of them are re-arranged (JB and Speiser, 1964, pp. 348, 350-351), the relation between action and object is even more substantial according to B (vs. 6a "They may stay ..." comes before "settle them"), but still not A. In any case, Jenni takes the passage as it stands (1968, p. 94).
1 Sam. 30:21 "When David returned to the two hundred men ... whom he had left behind (Hiph.) at the ravine of Besor ..." (NEB) - the words "gezwungenermassen, umständehalber" (Jenni, 1968, p. 94) may be added, and according to criterium B (the repetition of the verb, cf. vs.9), too, it is substantial, but was it really necessary for the men to be left there (criterium D)?

1 Kings 2:24 "As the Lord lives, who has established me and set me (Hiph.) on the throne of David my father" (NEB) - Jenni paraphrases: "der mich eingesetzt und (entsprechend) auf den Thron ... erhoben hat" (1968, p. 94), i.e. criterium B, but it was certainly by the favour of Yahweh and not "necessary" that Solomon should have been set on the throne (criteria A and D).

21:9 "Proclaim a fast and give Naboth the seat of honour (Hiph.) among the people" (NEB) - there are other explanations than "entsprechend dem gefassten Plan" (Jenni, 1968, p. 94), viz. that the action is not substantial towards the object (Naboth) because Jezebel clearly takes extraordinary measures towards Naboth. The explanation that an action takes place "according to plan" is actually far removed from the original definition of accidentality and substantiality.

21:10 "and set (Hiph.) two base fellows opposite him" (RSV) - as clearly accidental a relation as in vs. 9.

21:12 "they proclaimed a fast and gave Naboth the seat of honour" (NEB) - according to B it is substantial (cf. vs. 9, 10), but taken quite generally, it is still extraordinary for Naboth to have been given a seat of honour (criteria A and D).

2 Kings 17:6 "... he captured Samaria and deported its people to
Assyria and settled (Hiph.) them in Halah and on the Habor ..." (NEB) - Jenni's paraphrase "he deported its people and (accordingly) settled them in Halah" (1968, p. 94) is out of the question; it is quite a new and unexpected statement: the people had not necessarily to be settled somewhere (D) and according to the historian the fate of the people was at first unknown (A). None of the criteria illustrates a substantial judgment.

2 Kings 17:24 "Then the king of Assyria brought people from Babylon ... and settled them in the cities of Samaria in place of the Israelites" (NEB) - unexpected, accidental according to all criteria.

2 Kings 17:26 "The king was told that the deported peoples whom he had settled (Hiph.) in the cities of Samaria did not know the established usage" (NEB) - accidental to all criteria except B (referring to the already mentioned fact in vs. 24). Note that in verses 24 and 26 we find the nearest possible parallel to Jenni's primary example, viz. the one in Ezek. 30:24-25 (cf. Jenni, 1968, pp. 89-90). After all, in vs. 26 the action of settling is an accidental one, in vs. 26 substantial because it stands in "Folgestellung". However, we would then expect that the Pi'el theme is used in vs. 24. A Pi'el of yāḥ was available, after all. This illustrates that Jenni's proposals do not always apply when the situation favours or necessitates it, or rather, that Ezek. 30:24-25 can be explained in a quite different way without any possibility of testing the validity of the explanation!

Is. 54:3 "for you will burst out to right and to left. Your race will take possession of the nations, and people (Hiph.) the abandoned cities" (JB) - partly substantial (A and B), in that an expanding people will usually (or
probably) settle in abandoned cities, but it is still not necessary that the desolate cities be populated again (D).

Jer. 32:37 "(these are the words of the Lord ... to this city ...) I will gather them from all the lands to which I banished them in my anger, rage and fury, and I will bring them back to this place and let them dwell (Hiph.) there undisturbed" (NEB) - clearly accidental according to criteria A, B and D (but not C, cf. vs. 15); after all, in vs. 36 it is stated that according to everyone's opinion "it is being given over to the king of Babylon" - then, in vs. 37 we have the surprising announcement that Yahweh will once more settle people in the cities of Israel.

Ezek. 26:20 "I will thrust you down with those that descend to the abyss, to the dead of all the ages. I will make you dwell (Hiph.) in the underworld as in places long desolate ..." (NEB) - partly substantial in the light of the predictions of the previous verses, but still not quite substantial in the light of the predictions of the previous verses, in that it was necessary for Tyre to be made to dwell in the underworld.

-- 36:11 "I shall multiply the men and animals that live on you; there will be many of them and they will be fertile. I shall re-populate (Hiph.) you as you were before" (JB) - substantial according to B, but not fully substantial according to A, and least of all D (not necessary for the mountains to be repopulated).

-- 36:33 "On the day I cleanse you from all your sins, I will repopulate (Hiph.) the cities and cause the ruins to be rebuilt" (JB) - substantial according to A, B and C, but not D (not necessary for the cities to be repopulated).
Hosea 11:11 "They will come speedily, flying like birds out of Egypt, like pigeons from Assyria, and I will settle (Hiph.) them in their own homes" (NEB) - in a sense this action of Yahweh follows from the statement that He will not let loose his fury (Wolff, 1965, p. 263), but it is still not necessary or substantial that He will settle them in their own homes; it remains an unexpected act of free grace.

-- 12:10 (NEB 12:9) "Yet I have been the Lord your God since your days in Egypt; I will make you live (Hiph.) in tents again, as in the old days" (NEB) - certainly not substantial (except for C, cf. 11:11). According to Jenni the substantiability follows from the "Entsprechungsverhältnis" ("noch einmal ... wie") (1968, p. 94), but this explanation has nothing to do with the original definition of substantiability.

Zech. 10:6 "I will strengthen the house of Judah, and I will save the house of Joseph. I will give them dwellings because I have compassion on them" (WTC) - substantial according to A and B, but not C. Furthermore, it was not necessary that they should receive dwellings!

11. Wolff emends the verb under discussion into a Hiph'il of šwb and translates "heimkehren lassen" (1965, pp. 247, 249). This emendation, however, only rests on the use of the preposition, and even then it is not a settled matter, as he himself acknowledges (1965, p. 249).

12. NEB, JB and RSV change to Hiph. šwb ("restore"), but Elliger retains šwb and translates "Ich führe sie heim" (1967, p. 155).
Ps. 4:9 (NEB 4:8) "Now I will lie down in peace, and sleep; for thou alone, O Lord, makest me live (Hiph.) unafraid"

(NEB) - not accidental (cf. vs. 5), but not substantial either.

-- 68:7 "God gives the friendless a home (Hiph.)

and brings out the prisoner safe and sound;

but rebels must live in the scorching desert" (NEB) - in the previous verses mention is made of various kinds of persons, but not of "friendless" or "lonely" ones; therefore the action is accidental in relation to the object.

-- 107:36 "There he gives the hungry a home (Hiph.),

and they build themselves a city to live in"

(NEB) - accidental!

-- 113:8 "giving them a place (Hiph.) among princes,

among the princes of his people"

(NEB) - accidental: Yahweh does the unexpected when He gives them a place of honour.

-- 113:9 "He gives the barren woman a home (Hiph.),

making her the joyous mother of children"

(RSV) - it does not follow from the earlier mentioned acts of Yahweh that the barren woman should receive a name.

-- 143:3 "For the enemy has pursued me;

he has crushed my life to the ground;

he has made me sit (Hiph.) in darkness like those long dead"

(RSV; Dahood, 1970 III, p. 321 "He made me dwell") - only partly substantial according to B; in other respects accidental.

Job 36:7 "Look at kings on their thrones:
when God gives them sovereign power (yēḇ Hiph. + lāneṣah), they grow arrogant" (NEB) - accidental according to all criteria. It would be pointless to add "consequently, accordingly" to this passage (as well as to any of the following three passages).

Lament. 3:16 "He has forced me to dwell (Hiph.) in darkness with the dead of long ago" (JB) - accidental: nothing necessarily follow from the previous details.

2 Chron. 8:12 "and he (Solomon) rebuilt the cities which Huram had given him and settled (Hiph.) Israelites in them" (NEB) - certainly accidental according to all criteria.

23:20 "Then ... they escorted the king from the house of the Lord through the Upper Gate to the royal palace, and seated (Hiph.) him on the royal throne" (NEB) - accidental: until we learn that they seated Joash on the throne, it is still uncertain exactly what they planned to do with him.

The seven passages with the meaning "give a dwelling to a foreign woman, marry" (Koehler and Baumgartner, 1958, p. 140) are also implicated by Jenni in his discussion. His explanation is that the words with the meaning "marry" stand in "Zweistellung" after "sin, commit an offence" and "im Relativsatz zur Kennzeichnung der betreffenden Schuldigen"; therefore the condemned action is substantial with regard to the object (1968, pp. 94-5). The descriptive remarks are all quite true, but the writer cannot agree with the conclusions drawn from them by Jenni. The remarks are far removed from the original definition. Jenni applies criterium 8, i.e. that their marrying foreign women follows necessarily from their having committed an offence against God, or, put in another way, that the latter action is anticipated in the former. But this is

13. Nearly all translations and commentaries differ as far as the interpretation of this passage is concerned, but this does not alter the fact that the relation between action and object remains accidental.
evidently not the case. Even though the offence of the people is described in the previous chapter as their marrying foreign wives, the terms "offend" and "marry a foreign wife" are still not synonymous. Furthermore, it was not necessary for the people to take foreign women - rather, it was expected behaviour from their side (A, D). The passages concerned, are:

Ezra 10:2  "We have committed an offence against our God in marrying foreign wives (Hiph.)" (NEB) - accidental (vide supra): their conduct was unexpected.

10:10  "You have committed an offence in marrying foreign wives (Hiph.)" (NEB) - the same, accidental.

10:14  "let all in our cities who have married foreign women (Hiph.) present themselves at appointed times" (NEB) - accidental: in addition to the comment made above, note that the conduct concerned does not in this passage stand in "Zweitstellung" after a verb "sin, offend", thus weakening Jenni's claims.

10:17  "by the first day of the month they had finished their inquiry into all the marriages with foreign women (Hiph.)" (NEB) - the same as the previous passage: a verb "sin" is lacking.

10:18  "Among the members of priestly families who had married foreign women (Hiph.) were found ..." (NEB) - as above.

Neh. 13:23  "In those days also I saw that some Jews had married women (Hiph.) from Ashdod ..." (NEB) - accidental: a completely unexpected statement, and not in "Zweitstellung".

13:27  "Are we then to follow your example and commit this grave offence, breaking faith with our God by marrying foreign women (Hiph.)? " (NEB) - there is a verb "commit offence", but the action
remains accidental with regard to the women (D).

From this discussion of Pi'el and Hiph'il verbs with the root y š b it becomes clear that Jenni's claims are not substantiated. We rather see that the four (widely divergent) criteria allow for any interpretation of the data. Jenni selects at a given time only one or two that lend support to his interpretation, but there is no single passage where all the criteria (especially A, B and D) point to a substantial relation between action and object.
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<table>
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OTS Oudtestamentische Studien. Leiden.
VT Vetus Testamentum.
INDEX OF AUTHORS

Albright, W.F., 42 n. 4, 54, 55 n. 18

Andersen, F.I., 7

Aro, J., 118

Aronson, R., 32-39, 84-86, 89, 91, 281-284

Bach, E., 17 n. 6, 20, 22, 26, 80 n. 46

Barr, J., 2-4, 6, 7, 40-45, 47-53, 55, 56, 60-64, 70-83, 86, 89, 91, 129, 143, 144, 146, 166, 168, 185 n. 44, 190 n. 48, 199, 203, 264 n. 1, 279-284

Basilius, H., 45 n. 11, 145

Bauer, H. and Leander, P., 58, 61, 66 n. 28, 82-84, 94 n. 2, 96, 106, 111, 117, 118, 123, 124, 127, 263, 270, 284

Baumgartner, W., vide Koehler, L.

Beer, G. and Meyer, R., 94 n. 2, 96, 116, 132 n. 11, 263

Bergströsser, G., 83, 263

Birkeland, H., 7

Black, M., 45 n. 12

Blake, F.R., 1 n. 1, 55 n. 18, 116 n. 1

Blau, J., 74 n. 38, 75 n. 39

Boas, F., 45

Böhl, F.M. Th. de Liagre and Gemser, 8., 182 n. 39, 238 n. 81

Boman, T., 42-45, 50, 51, 55-57, 76, 140, 143-145, 198, 201 n. 60, 202, 228 n. 75, 279

Botha, R.P., 12, 14, 15, 17, 18 n. 8, 24 n. 15, 26

Bright, J., 221, 240 n. 83, 301 n. 8

Brockelmann, C., 1 n. 1, 2, 66 n. 28, 84 n. 49, 94 n. 3, 96, 110, 111, 125, 127-129, 200 n. 57, 269, 276, 277

Brockington, L.H., 132 n. 12

Cantineau, J., 65 n. 27
Carmignac, J., 94 n. 3
Carroll, J.B., 46
Cassirer, E., 45
Castellino, G.R., 60, 81
Cazelles, H., 65 n. 27
Chomsky, N., 12, 13, 15-19, 20, 23-27
Chomsky, W., 73 n. 36
Claassen, W.T., 65, 69, 80 n. 47, 133 n. 13, 182 n. 40, 211 n. 63
Cowley, A.E., vide Gesenius
Dahood, M., 113
Daube, D., 58 n. 20
Davidson, A.B., 81
De Saussure, F., 13, 48, 61
Dhorme, E., 121, 213 n. 65, 289 n. 4
Dieboldt, A.R., 45 n. 11, 46, 47, 145, 279
Dinneen, F.P., 12-16, 19, 23, 45, 48 n. 13, 49, 61
Donner, H. and Rüllig, W., 178-179
Duhm, B., 275
Eissfeldt, O., 64 n. 26
Elliger, K., 308 n. 12
Erickson, J.L., 32, 80 n. 46
Ewald, H., 94 n. 1, 125-130, 264-267, 276
Fensham, F.C., 42 n. 4, 56, 100 n. 136
Fillmore, C.J., 15, 20
Fodor, J.A., vide Katz, J.J.
Fohrer, G., 240 n. 83, 225, 289
Garbini, G., 1 n. 1, 57 n. 19, 59 n., 60
Gemser, B., vide Böhl
Gerber, W.J., 67, 70, 106

Gispen, W.H., 151

Gleason, H.A., 7, 32, 41, 47, 56, 80 n. 46

Gode, A., 41 n. 3

Goetze, A., 2, 96, 127, 161-163, 168, 261

Gordon, C.H., 71

Grebe, P., 144, 145

Gruber, J.S., 21-23, 26-32, 35, 77, 90, 95, 108, 113, 278

Harris, Z.S., 59

Hill, D., 55-56

Hillers, D.R., 96, 102-108

Holladay, W.L., 114

Horst, F., 289

Hospers, J.H., 70 n. 33

Jacobs, R.A. and Rosenbaum, P.S., 13-15


John, P., 62 n. 24, 84 n. 49, 90, 94 n. 1, 96, 110, 111, 117, 126, 200 n. 59, 264, 276

Jumpelt, R.W., 41 n. 3

Katz, J.J. and Fodor, J.A., 18, 19, 23

Katz, J.J. and Postal, P.M., 18

Kautzsch, E., vide Gesenius

Koehler, L. and Baumgartner, W., 86, 94, 98 n. 10, 108, 112 n. 14, 113, 119, 120, 124, 148, 182 n. 39, 186, 244 n. 84, 267, 294, 297 n. 7, 310

König, E., 177 n. 34

Kopf, L., 74 n. 38, 75 n. 39

Krauss, H.J., 113, 121, 182 n. 39, 238 n. 81, 252 n. 92, 289, 302 n. 9
Labuscagne, C.J., 71, 72, 77 n. 42
Laetsch, T., 148
Lakoff, G., 25, 26, vide Ross and Lakoff
Lambdin, T.O., 132 n. 12
Landsberger, B., 41 n. 3
Langacker, R., 48, 49
Leander, P., vide Bauer, H.
Lisowsky, G., 68, 250
Longacre, R.E., 48, 76 n. 40
Lyons, J., 49, 56, 76 n. 40, 114, 136, 160 n. 25
McAllaster, A.R., 43
McCawley, J.D., 20-22
Mckane, W., 19
Mandelkern, S., 68
Matouš, L., vide Ungnad, A.
Meyer, R., vide Beer, G.
Michel, D., 1 n. 1, 142, 143, 199 n. 57, 200 n. 57, 230
Morag, S., 65 n. 27
Moscati, S., 65 n. 27, 66 n. 28, 75, 96, 117
Nida, E., 7, 48, 76 n. 40
Nyberg, H.S., 66 n. 28, 92, 94 n. 2, 96, 117, 124, 125, 142, 267-269, 276, 284
Otzen, 4 n. 4
Palache, J.L., 70 n. 33
Pedersen, J., 42, 43, 50, 56
Pike, K., 7
Poebel, A., 127, 161 n. 26, 164 n. 28
Porteous, N., 284
Postal, P., 22, 34
Ratschow, 143
Reckendorf, H., 284
Reichling, A., 80 n. 45
Reiner, E., 7, 33, 36, 38 n. 32, 40 n. 2
Ridderbos, J., 288 n. 2
Ridderbos, N., 42 n. 4, 43, 51-55
Robinson, H.W., 43, 53
Röllig, W., vide Donner, H.
Rosén, H.B., 65 n. 27
Rosenbaum, P.S., vide Jacobs, R.A.
Ross and Lakoff, 21 n. 10
Sapir, E., 45, 46, 49
Sawyer, J.F.A., 132 n. 12, 133 n. 14, 160 n. 25, 228 n. 75
Schoneveld, J., 89 n. 52
Scott, R.B.Y., 151
Segert, S., 9
Siertsema, B., 41, 51, 54, 56, 74, 80 n. 45
Soggin, J.A., 49
Speiser, E.A., 57-59, 61, 93, 188 n. 47, 299, 300, 304 n. 10
Sperber, A., 67, 68, 83, 89, 131, 166 n. 30, 266 n. 2, 269-271,
277, 281
Stamm, J.J., 74
Steuernagel, C., 232, 238
Thierry, G.J., 58, 61, 73 n. 36
Trier, J., 55
Tullai, E., 22 n. 13
Ullendorff, E., 67 n. 29, 72 n. 35, 80
Ullmann, S., 53, 55, 56, 136
Ungnad, A. and Matouš, L., 2 n. 3, 165 n. 29, 166
Van Vreumingen, D.G. and Van der Woude, A.S., 56
Van Zijl, P.J., 73 n. 37
Vetter, D. and Walther, J., 4 n. 4
Von Humboldt, W., 13, 43, 45, 49, 55, 56
Von Soden, W., 2 n. 2, 163-167
Vriezen, Th. C., 95
Wallace, 46
Walther, J., vide Vetter, D.
Weinreich, U., 19
Weisgerber, L., 45, 55, 143-145
Wernberg-Müller, P., 222 n. 68
Westermann, C., 288 n. 2
Whorf, B.L., 45-47
Wildberger, H., 264 n. 1
Williams, R.J., 66 n. 28, 84 n. 49, 94 n. 2, 96, 108, 110, 111, 117, 222 n. 68
Wolff, H.W., 308
Zimmerli, W., 43 n. 7, 131, 197 n. 54, 225 n. 71, 231, 232, 239 n. 82
## INDEX OF HEBREW VERBS DISCUSSED

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Verb</th>
<th>References</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ḍr</td>
<td>4 n. 4, 123, 130 n. 9, 131, 170, 174, 175, 177, 178, 180, 186, 187, 194, 195, 209-13, 219, 220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ḍh</td>
<td>170, 174, 175, 177, 178, 180, 186, 187, 194, 195, 209-13, 219, 220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ḍh</td>
<td>n. 9, 131, 114, 115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ḍh</td>
<td>109, 265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ḍh</td>
<td>182, 194, 195, 207, 208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ḍh</td>
<td>109, 111, 118, 131, 158, 184, 223-227, 230-232, 243-245, 248, 250 n. 90, 291-299</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ḍh</td>
<td>n. 58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ḍh</td>
<td>114, 115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ḍh</td>
<td>112, 109-111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ḍh</td>
<td>128-130, 157, 223, 246, 250-252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ḍh</td>
<td>139, 140, 146, 149, 154, 155, 157, 160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ḍh</td>
<td>115, 109, 110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ḍh</td>
<td>275-276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ḍh</td>
<td>183, 194, 196, 213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ḍh</td>
<td>68, 64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ḍh</td>
<td>90, 268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ḍh</td>
<td>159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ḍh</td>
<td>200 n. 59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ḍh</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ḍh</td>
<td>78</td>
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<td>64</td>
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<td>148</td>
</tr>
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<td>213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ḍh</td>
<td>109, 268, 269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ḍh</td>
<td>158, 200 n. 58</td>
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<td>ḍh</td>
<td>109, 259</td>
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<td>268</td>
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<td>284</td>
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<td>90, 268</td>
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<td>200 n. 59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ḍh</td>
<td>275-276</td>
</tr>
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<td>ḍh</td>
<td>171, 218 n. 67, 221-223, 243</td>
</tr>
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<td>ḍh</td>
<td>170, 174, 175, 177, 178, 180, 186, 187, 194, 195, 209-13, 219, 220</td>
</tr>
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<td>114, 115</td>
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<td>182, 194, 195, 207, 208</td>
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<tr>
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<td>109, 111, 118, 131, 158, 184, 223-227, 230-232, 243-245, 248, 250 n. 90, 291-299</td>
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<td>ḍh</td>
<td>102, 104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ḍh</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ḍh</td>
<td>70</td>
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<tr>
<td>ḍh</td>
<td>109, 112, 263</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ḍh</td>
<td>118, 121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ḍh</td>
<td>268</td>
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<td>284</td>
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<td>ḍh</td>
<td>158, 200 n. 58</td>
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<tr>
<td>ḍh</td>
<td>89, 109-111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ḍh</td>
<td>218 n. 67, 221-223, 243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ḍh</td>
<td>139, 140, 146, 149, 154, 155, 157, 160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ḍh</td>
<td>200 n. 59</td>
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<td>ḍh</td>
<td>215, 218 n. 67, 221-223, 243</td>
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<td>90</td>
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<td>148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ḍh</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ḍh</td>
<td>128-130, 157, 223, 246, 250-252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>thr</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tm'</td>
<td>101, 105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>y's</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ybd</td>
<td>109, 110, 150, 183, 194, 196, 299-302</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>yg^c</td>
<td>196, 215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>yd^c</td>
<td>121, 184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ytb</td>
<td>109-111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>yld</td>
<td>118, 119, 121, 165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ymn</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>y's'</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>y's'</td>
<td>243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>yrd</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>yšb</td>
<td>239, 242, 243, 303-312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>yč</td>
<td>264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kbd</td>
<td>123, 124, 157, 286-291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kw1</td>
<td>274, 275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>k11</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>k^c</td>
<td>67, 68, 130, 173, 183, 194, 196-198, 213-217, 221, 237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ktb</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lbš</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lyn</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lmd</td>
<td>117, 118, 121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c^g</td>
<td>270, 277</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lšn</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>m'l</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mut</td>
<td>115, 131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ml'</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<p>| mlh  | 66, 68 |
| mqa  | 89 |
| mrr  | 183, 194, 195 |
| mtq  | 111 |
| nbl  | 89 |
| ngd  | 83, 134 |
| ng^c | 115, 267, 269 |
| ndr  | 68 |
| nhg  | 176 |
| nhr  | 68 |
| nwh  | 115 |
| nws  | 89 |
| nhh  | 264 |
| nhm  | 90 |
| nht  | 213 |
| nth  | 265, 267 n. 3, 269 |
| ntp  | 270 |
| npl  | 231 |
| nšr  | 63 |
| ntn  | 114, 115, 136 |
| nšh  | 118, 120, 121 |
| shr  | 71 n. 34 |
| sql  | 89 |
| srš  | 63 |
| str  | 89, 90, 264 |
| c_br | 115 |
| c_wd | 67 |
| c_wh | 131 |
| c_zr | 119, 265 |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Symbol</th>
<th>Page References</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C_{mq}</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C_{nh} I</td>
<td>77, 265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C_{nh} IV</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C_{pr}</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C_{rp}</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C_{šh}</td>
<td>89, 114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C_{šr}</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C_{šq}</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C_{šr}</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C_{tr}</td>
<td>269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pws</td>
<td>230-232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pqd</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>prs</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>qšd</td>
<td>98-108, 130, 210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>špn</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>qbb</td>
<td>71 n. 34, 72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>qsdš</td>
<td>68, 202-210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>qwm</td>
<td>115, 131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>qtr</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>qll</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>qn</td>
<td>68, 197, 237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>qnh</td>
<td>265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>qnn</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>qss</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>qšr</td>
<td>172, 173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>qrb</td>
<td>109, 131, 226, 253-255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>qrn</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>qšb</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
335.

\[ \mathfrak{S}_h \quad 90 \]
\[ \mathfrak{S}_{pt} \quad 67 \]
\[ \mathfrak{S}_{qb} \quad 73 \]
\[ \mathfrak{S}_{qt} \quad 109-112, \ 267-269 \]
\[ \mathfrak{S}_{qs} \quad 102, \ 105 \]
\[ \mathfrak{S}_{rt} \quad 71 \]
\[ \mathfrak{t}^c_b \quad 105 \]
\[ \mathfrak{t}^c_h \quad 266 \]
## INDEX OF BIBLICAL PASSAGES DISCUSSED

**Genesis**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Verse(s)</th>
<th>Pages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3:24</td>
<td>241, 242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6:12</td>
<td>186, 191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6:13</td>
<td>188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6:17</td>
<td>188, 189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8:14</td>
<td>299</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12:10</td>
<td>290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13:2</td>
<td>290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13:13</td>
<td>286</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18:20</td>
<td>286</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19:13</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19:19</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20:6</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26:8</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31:7</td>
<td>115, 213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41:14</td>
<td>213, 214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41:31</td>
<td>290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41:51</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41:56-57</td>
<td>291-292</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43:1</td>
<td>290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47:4</td>
<td>290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47:6</td>
<td>303</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47:11</td>
<td>304</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Leviticus**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Verse(s)</th>
<th>Pages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3:1,7</td>
<td>227 n. 74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7:8,9,12</td>
<td>227 n. 74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7:18,29</td>
<td>227 n. 74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13:44</td>
<td>101, 105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21:6,8</td>
<td>227 n. 74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23:30</td>
<td>196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23:43</td>
<td>304</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Exodus**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Verse(s)</th>
<th>Pages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1:16</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3:19</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4:10</td>
<td>291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5:9</td>
<td>286</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7:13</td>
<td>292</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7:14</td>
<td>291</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Numbers**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Verse(s)</th>
<th>Pages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3:13</td>
<td>204, 205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7:1</td>
<td>266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8:17</td>
<td>204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11:6</td>
<td>302</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reference</td>
<td>Page</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>11:14</td>
<td>291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13:31</td>
<td>290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15:4</td>
<td>227 n. 74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16:35</td>
<td>227 n. 74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20:12</td>
<td>202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22:13</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Deuteronomy**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reference</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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**Judges**

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**Joshua**

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**1 Samuel**

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**II Samuel**

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**I Kings**

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<td>251, 252</td>
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**Esther**

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**Job**

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**Psalms**

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<td>299</td>
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<tr>
<td>26:5,16</td>
<td>154</td>
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</table>

Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
341.

50:11 171 5:21 67 n. 29
51:18 129
54:3 306 Ezekiel
59:1 288 2:4 299
65:3 217,221 3:7-9 299
66:5 298 3:14 295
   5:17 273, 274
   6:3 219
Jeremiah
   1:5 206 14:13 273
   2:13 275 17:9-10 301
   3:28 180 19:12 301
   4:22 152 21:3-4 218 n. 67, 243
   7:3,7 240 22:14 295
   7:18 221 23:32 275
   8:8 153 25:4 239, 303
   12:4 301 25:7 195
   12:17 211 n. 63 26:17 299
   18:7 180 26:20 307
   20:7 295 27:9 223-225
   23:1 220-221 27:25 288
   25:10 213 28:3 141, 147-148, 153
   28:10 301 30:13 196, 220
   32:20 221 30:21 158, 295
   32:37 307 30:23-26 131, 137, 230, 233, 236
   46:8 175 31:4 129
   46:27 267 32:4 241
   48:11 112 32:9 197
   49:23 112, 267 36:11 307
   49:38 212-213 36:13 226
   50:34 299 36:27 114
   50:38 301 36:33 307
   51:11 190 37:2 302
   51:55 212-213 37:11 301
   52:6 295 38:23 251
Lamentations
   3:16 310 Daniel
   4:8 302
   10:19 296
   11:5 296
11:7  250  10:6  308
11:21  244  11:17  302
11:32  250
11:36-37  250-252  Malachi
12:3  200 n. 58  3:13  296

Hosea
9:9  114
9:14  226
9:16  301
12:10  300
14:10  153, 156

Joel
1:12  301
1:20  307
4:18  270

Amos
1:2  301
4:7  302
9:13  270

Jonah
4:7  302

Micah
5:9  176-177

Nahum
2:14  171

Haggai
2:4  295

Zechariah
8:9,13  296
9:2  140-141, 147-150