


**A CRITICAL DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS OF THE ROLE OF  
TRACK I AND TRACK II DIPLOMATIC INTERVENTIONS:  
THE CASE OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO  
(1998-2002)**

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**Thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of  
Master in International Studies at Stellenbosch University.**

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**March 2010**

## **DECLARATION**

By submitting this thesis electronically, I declare that the entirety of the work contained therein is my own, original work, that I am the owner of the copyright thereof (unless to the extent explicitly otherwise stated) and that I have not previously in its entirety or in part submitted it for obtaining any qualification.

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## **ABSTRACT**

The climate of the Great Lakes Region fostered desperate sources of insecurity which fed each other in a conflict-system which was also largely fuelled by the surrounding war economy. Consequently, the focus of this study was narrowed to providing only a descriptive analysis of the Democratic Republic of the Congo's peace processes of 1998-2002. Subsequently, the surrounding climate served to aggravate the DRC's ethnic cleavages and the conflict grew so complex that the issues could no longer be clearly divided. The motivation for conducting a study of this nature was that amidst the twenty-three failed attempts for peace, the conflict persisted with no signs of abating, which suggests that a historical and discourse analysis of the peace processes is justified.

This study found that during these peace processes, far greater prominence was given to Track I diplomacy than to the unofficial Track II diplomacy. This was due to various limitations that existed. This distinction is fundamental because even though unofficial diplomacy has a different function to official diplomacy, their values are equal and more effective in a peace process when there is a collaborative effort between the two. This is called a Multi-Track approach (Diamond and McDonald, 1996). Thus this study proposes that by giving Track II diplomacy a greater prominence in a peace process, the Multi-Track approach would be fully utilized. It suggests that governmental, informal, and unofficial contact in civil society is fundamental in trust-building between parties in negotiation.

Overall, there is value in providing a critical descriptive analysis of both Track I and Track II diplomatic initiatives that were undertaken during the 1998-2002 peace process, in order to expose the shortcomings. In doing so, this study presents the Multi-Track approach in order to emphasize its potential efficacy in addressing similar future cases of intractable conflict.

## **OPSOMMING**

Die omstandighede in die Groot Merestreek het onsekerheid gekweek, wat mekaar versterk het in die konteks van 'n konflik-sisteem wat ook deur die omliggende oorlog-ekonomie aangevuur was. Gevolglik is hierdie studie se fokus beperk tot 'n beskrywende analise van die vredesprosesse wat tydens 1998-2002 op die tweede rebellie in die Demokratiese Republiek van die Kongo gevolg het. Die omstandighede in die omliggende omgewing het die DRK se etniese splitsings vererger, en die konflik het so kompleks geword dat daar nie meer duidelik tussen die verskillende geskilpunte onderskei kon word nie. Die motivering vir hierdie studie is dat daar te midde van die drie-en-twintig mislukte vredes pogings geen teken was dat die konflik aan die afneem was nie, wat suggereer dat 'n historiese diskoers analise van die vredesproses geregverdig is.

Hierdie studie het gevind dat daar gedurende hierdie vredesprosesse 'n veel meer prominente rol aan die amptelike *Track I*-diplomatie as aan die nie-amptelike *Track II*-diplomatie toegeken was, as gevolg van verskeie beperkinge wat bestaan het. Hierdie onderskeid is van kardinale belang; ten spyte van die feit dat nie-amptelike diplomatie 'n ander funksie as amptelike diplomatie vervul, dra dit ewe veel waarde en behoort vredesprosesse waar daar samewerking tussen die twee inisiatiewe plaasvind dus meer effektief te wees. Hierdie redenasie word 'n *Multi-Track* benadering genoem. Hierdie studie stel voor dat die *Multi-Track* benadering meer effektief geïmplementeer kan word deurdat daar aan *Track II*-diplomatie 'n meer prominente rol in die vredesprosesse toegeken word; dit stel dus ook voor dat regeringskontak, informele en nie-amptelike kontak tussen gewone burgers van kardinale belang in die bou van vertroue tussen bemiddelingspartye is.

Daar lê dus waarde daarin om 'n krities-beskrywende analise van beide *Track I*- en *Track II* inisiatiewe wat tydens die 1998-2002 vredesprosesse onderneem is weer te gee, ten einde die tekortkominge daarvan uit te wys. Op hierdie manier hou hierdie studie die *Multi-Track* benadering voor om uiteindelik die potensiele bruikbaarheid van hierdie benadering in soortgelyke toekomstige gevalle van konflik te beklemtoon.

## **ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS**

I wish to extend my appreciation to the following people who in various ways assisted and supported me in the completion of this study:

- To The Lord for His undeniable grace, truth and provision.
- Mr. Gerrie Swart, my supervisor, for his professional guidance and continued encouragement and support.
- To my dear friend Marna Pretorius for her time in translating the abstract into Afrikaans and for her warm, loving support.
- To Miss Liezel Visser for the professional editing of this study.
- To my parents, Mario and Isabel de Carvalho, for their love, motivation and financial support.
- Lastly to Carl Reader, for his love, support and encouragement as he continued to stand by me through the highs and lows of this undertaking.

## **LIST OF ACRONYMS**

<b>ACCORD</b>	African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes
<b>ADF</b>	Allied Democratic Forces
<b>AFB</b>	Africa Research Bulletin
<b>AFDL</b>	Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo Zaire
<b>AGOA</b>	African Growth and Opportunities Act
<b>ALIR</b>	Army of Liberalization of Rwanda
<b>ASADHO</b>	African Association for Human Rights Organization
<b>AU</b>	African Union
<b>CMR</b>	National Crude Mortality Rate
<b>CNDP</b>	National Congress for the Defence of the People
<b>CNONGD</b>	National Council of Development NGOs in Congo
<b>CONADER</b>	National Demobilisation and Reinsertion Commission
<b>DDRRR</b>	Disarmament, Demobilisation, Repatriation, Reintegration & Resettlement
<b>DRC</b>	Democratic Republic of Congo
<b>FAFO</b>	English: Institute for Applied Social Science
<b>FAPC</b>	People's Armed Forces of Congo
<b>FARDC</b>	Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
<b>FDD</b>	Defence of Democracy Forces
<b>FDLR</b>	Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda
<b>FEWER</b>	Forum on Early Warning and Early Response
<b>FNI</b>	Front for National Integration, an Ituri armed group
<b>FPDC</b>	Popular Force for Democracy in Congo
<b>FRPI</b>	Patriotic Force of Resistance in Ituri
<b>ICC</b>	International Criminal Court
<b>ICD</b>	Inter-Congolese Dialogue
<b>ICG</b>	International Crisis Group
<b>IGO</b>	Inter-governmental organizations
<b>IPC</b>	Ituri Pacification Commission
<b>IPRA</b>	International Peace Research Association
<b>IRC</b>	International Rescue Committee
<b>IRIN</b>	Integrated Regional Information Network

<b>LRA</b>	Lord's Resistance Army
<b>MILOB</b>	Deployment of military observers
<b>MLC</b>	Movement for Liberation of the Congo
<b>MONUC</b>	United Nations Mission in the DRC
<b>NCPCR</b>	National Conference of Peace Making and Conflict Resolution
<b>OAU</b>	Organization for African Unity
<b>OCHA</b>	United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
<b>ONGDH</b>	Forum of Human Right Organizations
<b>PPRD</b>	People's Party for Reconstruction and Democracy
<b>RCD</b>	Rally for Congolese Democracy
<b>RCD-ML</b>	Congolese Rally for Democracy-Liberation Movement
<b>RCN</b>	Belgian NGO promoting the law and an independent justice system
<b>RPF</b>	Rwandan Patriotic Front
<b>SARIPS</b>	Southern African Regional Institute for Policy Studies
<b>SERACOB</b>	Service for the Reinforcement of Assistance to Grassroots Communities in Central Africa
<b>SPLA</b>	Sudan People's Liberation Army
<b>TAPRI</b>	Tampere Peace Research Institute
<b>UN</b>	United Nations
<b>UNDP</b>	United Nations Development Programme
<b>UNHCR</b>	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
<b>UNICEF</b>	United Nations Children's Fund
<b>UNITA</b>	National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
<b>UPC</b>	Union of Congolese Patriots
<b>UPC-RP</b>	Union of Congolese Patriots - Reconciliation of Peace.
<b>UPDF</b>	Uganda Peoples Defence Force

## **CHRONOLOGY OF KEY EVENTS: 1998-2002**

Solomon and Swart (2004)

### **1998:**

- The RCD rebels launch an armed rebellion against the DRC president Laurent – Desire Kabila. Also Uganda and Rwanda commit to backing the rebel groups.
- The first summit on the DRC conflict brings together seven heads of state from southern Africa and east Africa at the Victoria Falls, Zimbabwe.
- Ministers from eleven African countries meet in the Zambian capital Lusaka and adopt the framework for a ceasefire in the DRC, Zambia acts as regional mediator.
- Another rebel movement, the MLC, is formed in the Equateur Province under Jean-Pierre Bemba with Ugandan backing.

### **1999:**

- SADC reaffirms support for Kabila in Botswana, but is concerned over continued destabilization in the region.
- Ernest Wamba dia Wamba, the first president of the RCD moves to Kisangani as the movement initiates a series of splits.
- Kagame vows to keep his troops in the DRC as long as his national security is under threat.
- RCD moves its base from Goma to Kisangani, tension within the RCD increases. Disagreement between RCD and MLC in Kisangani also intensifies.
- Kabila dissolves the ADFL, which swept him in to power in 1997, accusing members of opportunism and self- enrichment.
- A new RCD(Goma) leader is named: Emile Ilunga. The Goma and Kisangani factions are associated with Rwanda and Uganda respectively.
- President Chiluba agrees to work with Colonel Muammar Gaddafi to implement a Libyan peace accord. Rwanda says it only recognises the Zambian initiative. Presidents of Uganda, Rwanda and Tanzania meet to discuss the growing rift between the Ugandan and Rwandan military campaigns.
- Lusaka ceasefire agreement signed in Zambia by the six states involved in the conflict. The rebel MLC signed on 1 August. RCD rebels sign later on 31 August.
- UN Security Council authorises deployment of UN liaison personnel, in support of the Lusaka agreement.



- The RCD-Kisangani faction is renamed the RCD-ML. Wamba dia Wamba is confirmed president, with Bunia as the capital.
- Secretary General issues a second report on the UN Preliminary Deployment in the DRC. Annan seeks approval for five hundred observers in the Congo and wants authorisation for the deployment of the Observer Mission (MONUC)
- UN Security Council Resolution 1279 establishes (MONUC).
- Former president of Botswana, Ketumile Masire, appointed to serve as facilitator of the Inter-Congolese Dialogues provided for in the Lusaka agreement.

## **2000**

- SADC gathers in Maputo to discuss peace implementation but Laurent Kabila is absent.
- Seven regional heads of state meet in New York with UN mediators.
- Security Council Meeting on Congolese Peace Process. UN Secretary General Kofi Annan states that the Lusaka peace accord remains the only solution.
- MONUC announces the first phase of deployment of liaison officers in Bunia
- Seven African heads of state meet in Lusaka and adopt a new timetable for applying the DRC ceasefire.
- UN Security Council expands MONUC in resolution 1291.
- Sir Ketumile Masire visits Kinshasa where he is prevented from travelling into the interior of the country.
- MONUC reinforcements arrive in Kisangani, from Kinshasa.
- Heavy fighting between Ugandan and Rwandan forces in Kisangani continues.
- UN Security Council passes Resolution 1304 condemning Rwanda and Uganda for their actions in Kisangani, it is also approved and Rwanda and Uganda are called upon to withdraw troops from the DRC.
- Kabila inaugurates the Transitional Parliament, the first legislative body since May 1997. A government-formed committee selects 240 deputies and Kabila himself appoints the other sixty members.

## **2001**

- DRC president Laurent-Desire Kabila is assassinated. Joseph Kabila, his son, assumes control of the presidency.

- Rebels accuse Joseph Kabila of instigating new acts of war and reject him as head of state. Fighting erupts in the Eastern Congo
- Joseph Kabila, in his capacity of president of the DRC meets with the US Secretary of State Colin Powell in Washington D.C. and meets with UN Secretary General Kofi Annan in New York to discuss the future of the DRC and prospects for peace.
- Joseph Kabila takes part in his first summit on the DRC in Lusaka, together with four other countries involved in the conflict and the rebel movements.
- The UPC formed with Thomas Lubanga as leader.
- Preparatory meeting for the ICD held in Botswana
- First meeting of the ICD in Addis Ababa. Meeting fails to yield any positive developments.

## **2002**

- ICD resumes, yet meeting is delayed for 10 days following the disagreements surrounding the composition of the unarmed political opposition.
- ICD Sun City peace meeting adjourned after reaching a wide agreement, but notably deferred key terms on power-sharing.
- Humanitarian agencies estimate five hundred-thousand people are displaced in Ituri region.
- Former prime minister of Senegal, Moustapha Niasse, is appointed to the UN Special Envoy to assist in driving the ICD process forward.
- Peace accord between Rwanda and DRC signed in Pretoria.
- Luanda accord signed between Uganda and DRC. A 100-day timetable is set for UPDF withdrawal after the establishment of an IPC.
- Comprehensive peace deal signed at ICD talks in Pretoria.
- Rwandan- backed RCD-Goma rebel movements form alliance with the Bunia-based UPC-RP of Thomas Lubanga in the Ituri District of the north eastern DRC. The agreement commits the two parties to co-operate and support one another mutually in the domains of politics, military, and economics.

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## **CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION**

### **1.1. Introduction**

The second conflict of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) officially ended in 2002. However, in the eastern region defiance of the various peace activities persists, and the conflict continues on another level. Since 1999, over five million people have been killed in this conflict, amounting to a higher death toll than that of the Iraqi, Afghanistani, and Darfur conflicts combined. It is thus not surprising that the conflict has been described as the deadliest the globe has seen since World War II. According to reports by the International Rescue Committee (IRC), these are the most recent statistics, which are based on surveys compiled between January 2006 and April 2007. Currently, the DRC's national crude mortality rate (CMR) is 57% higher than the average rate for Sub-Saharan Africa (Coghlan, Ngoy, et al. 2008: 2). The DRC still faces many major challenges, and cynics predict that immediate and absolute relief for the country is unrealistic.

Where desperate sources of insecurity feed each other in a conflict-system, it is impossible to separate the issues, as is the case in the Great Lakes Region. Thus, the altruistic motivation of intervention by foreign armies in such conflict is disputable. The fact that there were twenty-three failed attempts to establish peace further suggests that the foreign armies' attentions were focused elsewhere and therefore remained fruitless, despite their efforts. The aim of this study is to provide a descriptive analysis of the peace processes during the conflict-period between 1998 and 2002, in order to demonstrate that a Multi-Track approach (Diamond and McDonald's: 1996) was then not fully utilized. This chapter provides a general background to the study. The problem statement, objectives, research design, and methodology used are outlined. A brief literature review is included and conceptual definitions are provided.

### **1.2. Background and Rationale**

The conflict between 1998 and 2002, also known as the 'Second Rebellion', persisted largely in defiance of various peace processes that were initiated. It was characterized by mass displacement, a collapse of health systems, food shortages, and environmental degradation, all of which contributed to major elevations in the national mortality rate (IRC: 2009). The persistence of the conflict indicated that its origins were far more complex than they initially

appeared and were rooted in the region's history of insecurities and strife, which feed each other in a highly complex conflict-system. Historically, the country gained independence from Belgian rule in 1960, and the new State of Zaire began deteriorating progressively under the brutal dictatorship of Mobutu Sese Seko over the subsequent twenty five years.

The instability of neighbouring Rwanda began to affect Zaire significantly following the genocide of 1994, when 2 million Hutu refugees went into hiding with the Interahamwe militia in Zaire after the Tutsis invaded the capital of Rwanda, Kigali (Solomon, 1997: 1). The Interahamwe are a consolidated Hutu paramilitary organisation that carried out the genocide acts against ethnic Tutsi Rwandans. Apart from the strain on resources caused by the massive influx of Rwandans into the country, by this time, Mobutu and his followers had destroyed most of Kinshasa's infrastructure, necessitating international corporations to boycott their ventures for fear of potential big investment losses. As a result, the economy shrank by 7.4%, inflation grew to 23,700%, and the vital mining sector shrunk by 10%. The economy was disintegrating (Solomon & Swart, 2004: 4).

By the early 1990s, the countries of the Great Lakes Region were concerned that their stability was potentially threatened by the effects of the escalating conflict in Zaire. Mobutu was seen as the cause of the country's domestic difficulties, so they began searching for an alternative Zairian leader to replace him. During the 'First Rebellion', between 1993 and 1997, Laurent Kabila, head of a popular Zairian rebel group, The Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo Zaire (AFDL), was identified as an alternative leader by the concerned neighbouring countries, who then proceeded to aid him in toppling Mobutu's leadership in 1997 (Breytenbach *et al*, 1999: 1). Kabila's forces achieved 75% control of the country (Solomon & Swart, 2004: 5), and Zaire was renamed the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).

However, within a year of the AFDL's victory, Kabila became unpopular amongst his allies, Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi. He revoked mining contracts, expelled Rwandan advisors, and criticized Uganda, whilst also accusing these countries of belligerence and encouraging inter-ethnic conflicts and violence in order to promote their economic interests in foreign adventurism, either directly or through proxies (Katshung, 2003:119). However, the allies denied these allegations and grew apprehensive at these unexpected displays of disloyalty. Confidence in Kabila was lost, and Rwanda and Uganda attempted to attack the capital



Kinshasa, but drew little support. Neighbouring countries began intervening in the second rebellion, on Kabila's side (Van de Veen, 2000: 2). Kabila's unsatisfactory performance led the allies to expect him to turn his back on Rwanda and Uganda in order to consolidate his domestic base. In desperation, Kabila requested the intervention of other stake-holders, including Angola; Chad; Namibia, Sudan and Zimbabwe, to assist against his former allies.

It is essential that the rationale behind these countries' interventions be clarified. Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe, who are members of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), justified their intervention as arising from loyalty, which induced them to defend their fellow SADC member from the aggression of Rwanda and Uganda, who are not Member States (FAFP, 1998). Critics have since questioned this justification and accused them of having had ulterior motives. Angola's motivation was to prevent Jonas Savimbi, the main armed opposition to the Luanda regime at the time, from utilizing the DRC territory as a base for his National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) operations (Reuters, 1998: 2; ICG, 1998: 10-11). Namibia and Zimbabwe's ulterior motives are deemed to have been economic. Both parties hoped to defend, preserve and promote their already invested interests in the DRC (Casteran, 1998: 1-2; ICG, 1998:10-11; Reuters, 1998: 8-9). Chad's and Sudan's ulterior motives for joining the Kabila coalition are not apparent.

Kabila felt confident with this support and wished to consolidate his domestic base. Thus, he no longer wanted the alliance with either the Tutsi-led Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), who were ruling Rwanda at this point, or the Ugandan forces, who supported Tutsi refugees fleeing from ethnic purges before the Kigali take-over. Both parties were criticized for exploiting the DRC. Yet, neither had any intention of leaving, despite Kabila's order that they should withdraw from the DRC, in August 1998. Approximately fourteen months after the war ended, the emergence of a new armed movement announced the beginning of the anti-Kabila regime, leading the struggle for liberation into the 'Second Rebellion'. This arose from disputes between the founder members of Kabila's AFDL (ICG, 1998, No 2: 1-25). In order to counteract the rebels, Kabila supported the guerrilla groups in order to utilize them as infantry in his coalition force. The rebel movement grew to stretch across nearly half of the northern and eastern regions of the country. Occupation zones separated the region into territories with their own agendas (ICG, 1999, No 4: ii). In addition to this challenge to Kabila's leadership, there was a dispute between Rwanda and the ex-FAR and Interahamwe

groups that continued, and Uganda was battling both Sudan and its own rebels. Furthermore, the Angolan government was in a dispute with UNITA, the Burundian government clashed with the National Council for the Defence of Democracy-Forces (FDD) rebels, and Congo-Brazzaville was fighting the militias who were backing Lissouba, the deposed former president (ICG, 1999, No 4: ii).

Up to this point, twenty three recorded peace initiatives for the DRC had been attempted and failed. Conditions escalated to their worst, necessitating a SADC emergency summit, upon which a ceasefire was signed. In short, it was the peace agreement of 2002 in South Africa, known as the Sun City talks, which brought the second war to its end (ICG, 2000, No 26). In October 2003, a special panel, established by the UN Security Council to investigate the plunder of the DRC's natural resources, issued its final report. It concluded that illegal exploitation remained one of the main sources of funding for the rebel groups involved in the conflict and was inextricably linked with the perpetuation of the conflict on another level (UN 2001: 2). Finally, a comprehensive power-sharing agreement was reached in Pretoria, South Africa. "The Global and Inclusive Agreement on the Transition in the DRC," commonly referred to as the "Pretoria Agreement II," provided for a two-year transition period, for the establishment of the "Institutions of The Transition", as well as for an interim government which would rule for two years in the run-up to national elections (ISS, 2003).

The last attempt for peace was the 'The Final Act' agreement signed in April 2003 in Sun City, which still prevails today. Human rights and justice were addressed in this agreement, which later provided for the establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission and of a National Observatory on Human Rights. It specifically provided that there would be no amnesties for crimes against humanity, genocide and war crimes. In April of 2003, a new Constitution was promulgated and steps were taken in an effort to integrate belligerent forces into a new reformed national army (ISS, 2003). However, the attempt failed when the rebel leader General Nkundla continued to lead his men in opposition to the Kabila leadership.

The second war left in its wake disease and malnutrition that continue to take thousands of lives. Presently, the Congolese Government's Armed Forces (FARDC) are pursuing the remaining members of the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR). These rebels are trapped within the borders of the DRC, hiding from the genocide charges that they face in Rwanda. Perhaps as a result of this, the FDLR continues to undermine the sovereignty of the DRC, surviving through criminal acts on Congolese soil.

The Congolese Mai Mai rebel groups, who number over a dozen, have been driven into forests and are threatening the lives of innocent civilians in an effort to undermine Kabila's Republican guards. Although a large scale effort at disarming such militias with the aid of the UN troops succeeded in 2007, fierce confrontations between local tribes persist in the north-east regions of the DRC, extending down from the Ituri region into the North and South Kivu regions (ICG, 2007, No 133). These conditions, together with neighbouring states' attempt to maintain their influence through proxies, as well as the further decline of the DRC's political and socioeconomic spheres, cause the situation to remain relatively unstable. Additionally, they constitute a partial explanation for the persistence of the conflict in the face of the numerous peace initiatives that have been introduced. Further diplomatic interventions and initiatives were required to address this continuation of violence and instability. As a result of these obstacles, the achievement of sustainable peace remained out of reach.

This complicated, interconnected conflict is a part of a conflict-system in the Great Lakes Region and therefore cannot be understood to contain separate issues suitable for individual analysis. In this system, the different sources of insecurity feed one another, and thus the peaceful resolution of such a complex conflict situation was particularly difficult to achieve. This factor is crucial in the consideration of the humanitarian crisis in this region, which has been described as 'Africa's First World War'. At different stages, the role players changed their direction and shifted their support. Due to the complexity of the conflict, it is particularly difficult to propose a perfectly adequate solution, hence the failure of twenty three peace attempts. The aim and purpose of this study is to provide a descriptive account of the peace process and to highlight the minimal role of Track II diplomatic initiatives, and thus the absence of the utilization of a fully operational Multi-Track approach. This absence leads the current study to continue its analysis by describing the coordinated use of the Multi-Track approach in order to emphasize its potential utility in addressing similar cases of intractable conflict in future (Diamond and McDonald, 1996).

### **1.3. Significance of this Study**

It is the primary objective of this study to provide a descriptive analysis of the peace processes that were initiated in the DRC between 1998 and 2002. In doing so, it addresses the roles of the actors involved at both official and unofficial levels. The significance of this study lies in the fact that it provides a greater understanding of the reasons for the failure of

the overall peace process in the DRC. The study also posits that a Multi-Track approach (Diamond and McDonald, 1996) was not fully utilized or implemented in the peace processes that were initiated between 1998 and 2002. Amidst a conflict that is largely fuelled by the war economy, which subsequently serves to aggravate ethnic divisions, there is great value in offering a more collaborative effort between official and unofficial intervention. This study will go further and assist this, combining the value of all stake-holders, in the flowing system of Diamond and McDonald (1996). However, this study does not evaluate the effectiveness of the peace processes in the conflict or make claims of any nature about it. It will only present a critical descriptive analysis of various peace initiatives, notably Track I and Track II diplomatic endeavours, which were initiated between 1998 and 2002.

#### **1.4. Problem Statement**

Broader issues and agendas operate as a starting point in this type of research, but due to the complexity of the conflict the intention of this study has been narrowed. This can be attributed to the climate of the Great Lakes Region, where desperate sources of insecurity feed each other in a conflict-system, and it is thus impossible to efficiently separate issues. The DRC conflict of 1998-2002 was such a case, where it was largely fuelled by the surrounding war economy, which subsequently served to aggravate its own ethnic divisions, and which grew so complex that issues could no longer be clearly divided. Amidst the twenty-three failed attempts for peace the conflict persisted with no signs of abating, which suggests that an historical and discourse analysis of the peace processes would be useful.

The intention of this research is not to make an empirical inquiry or offer any solution to the conflict, but rather it primarily aims to achieve clarity on the peace processes through describing the incidences of each peace attempt that was launched during this turbulent period. In doing so, the study aims to posit that priority was accorded to Track I diplomatic initiatives to the relative greater exclusion and neglect of Track II diplomatic endeavours. However, this does not mean that the tracks were always implemented in isolation because there were cases where Track I did indeed involve Track II elements, such as in the Pretoria Agreement. Nevertheless, for the most part, this study argues that significantly less prominence was given to Track II diplomatic efforts. For this reason, as part of a critical analysis, support for a fully operating Multi-Track approach (Diamond and McDonald, 1996) is presented in the theoretical framework. The analysis herein is that because each track

brings to the table its own exclusively skilled value in a combined effort, as offered through the Multi-Track approach (Montville and Davidson, 1981: 155), it can in theory operate more effectively.

This study aims to examine the following questions: What was the role of Track I diplomacy and the role of track II diplomacy in the peace process of 1998-2002? Track II diplomatic efforts are mostly intangible and can be seen in changing political cultures on sides; making parties more open to negotiation, and building the capacity of parties to negotiate and implement resolutions when opportunities arise. Thus a subsidiary question is explored: In terms of Track II diplomacy, what role did civil society have in the peace processes in opening channels of communication for negotiation and playing a role in relationship-building and trust-building in growing the capacity of parties to negotiate as a part of its function?

These questions, once answered, critically evaluate the roles of Track I and Track II initiatives in the peace processes. The study attempts to reveal that the unofficial intermediaries frequently had to act independently and in isolation (and were to a great extent sidelined from crucial aspects of the peace talks) from the official efforts. This supports the critical analysis that a Multi-Track approach was not fully utilized. Additionally it attempts to prove that the weakness of civil society in the DRC during the period translated into weak track II initiatives and that consequently limited the role of unofficial diplomacy which subsequently restricted the Multi-Track approach to be implemented fully.

### **1.5. Demarcation of the Study**

According to Susan Nan (2003: 1) Track I diplomacy is that which,

Involves direct government-to-government interaction on the official level. Typical Track I activities include traditional diplomacy, official negotiations, and the use of international organizations. The participants stand as representatives of their respective states and reflect the official positions of their governments during discussions.

Additionally, the purpose of Track I diplomacy can involve sanctions; ultimatums and psychological intimidation directed at changing states' relationships or reaching mutual

agreements. Lastly, it can be used by a third-party state to help achieve the above between other states (Said, Lerche and Lerche III. 1995: pg 69). Track I diplomacy takes place either bilaterally, between two states, or multilaterally, when several states interact. Examples of multilateral Track I diplomacy can be seen in regional structures, such as in the case of the Great Lakes Region or as in the USA's intervention in the DRC conflict through inter-governmental organizations (IGO's).

Track II diplomacy, according to Nan (2003: 1), is explained as:

[that which] generally involves informal interaction with influential unofficial actors from civil society, business or religious communities, and local leaders and politicians who are considered to be experts in the area or issue being discussed. It generally seeks to supplement Track I diplomacy by working with middle and lower levels of society and often involves non-traditional methods, such as facilitating dialogue mechanisms and meetings that include participants from both government and non-government institutions.

Overall, this differentiation individually illustrates the values of each Track, and it is helpful in understanding why a combination of the roles in a Multi-Track approach would strengthen any peace process. However, the opposite is also true concerning the limitation of tracks having to work individually. Therefore this study will assess whether Track II diplomacy effectively provided complimentary support to Track I diplomatic efforts or not.

## **1.6. Literature Survey**

With the outbreak of the 1998 conflict in the DRC, it was generally agreed that a military outcome alone would not produce the lasting peace required for the reconstruction of the country. Only Track I efforts were pursued with the purpose of persuading the government, the rebel movements, and the regional states to negotiate and implement a cease-fire agreement. This is not to say that Track II efforts did not have any role. To a limited extent, Track II did facilitate the signing of the Pretoria Cease-Fire Agreement in 2002, and helped provide the unarmed actors with an opportunity to voice their position on the conflict throughout the peace processes (Naidoo, 2000). Consequently, this provided greater coordination of the unarmed forces' programmes and gave them an opportunity to organise themselves into a stronger voice to present their position in the conflict, which led to a

proliferation of information on the subject. Track II efforts included the organization of dialogues in which the social issues, such as inter-ethnic rivalry based on the access to Congolese land and resources, especially in the Kivu province, were discussed. This descriptive analysis reveals that the rest of the peace processes between 1998 and 2002 were dominated by Track I government-to-government diplomacy and involvement with the central aim of resolving the military dimension of the conflict only.

Authors such as Brittain (2001), Cauvin (2002), Chigas (2003), Cilliers and Malan (2001), Lanotte (2003), Montville and Davidson (1981), Malan and Boshoff (2002), Mpangala (2004), Naidoo (1997 and 2000), Nan (2003), Nzongola (2002), and Prunier (2009) explain the purpose of Track I and II and the roles they played in the peace processes between 1998 and 2002. The main sources consulted with regards to peace efforts made in the DRC include authors Solomon & Swart (2004), the Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN: 2001), the International Crisis Group (ICG, 1998-2008), the International Rescue Committee (IRC: 2009), and UN Reports (1999-2001). Authors such as Coghlan and Ngoy, et al (2008), Breytenbach (1999), Katshung (2003), N’Gbanda (2004), Olsson (2006), Reyntjens (1999), and Takeyh (2001) are consulted to provide the historical background needed for this descriptive analysis.

The theoretical framework in which this study is grounded maintains that Track II diplomacy, unofficial diplomacy mainly through that of civil society, is essential in any peace process. This is why a Multi-Track approach, which provides a consolidated effort on the part of all tracks, can offer a powerful outcome when utilized fully. Thus, the second chapter of this study is separated into two main parts. Part one concerns Civil Society, with focus mainly on the works of Bayart (1986) and Bratton (1989), as well as other authors such as Collins (1998), Cohen and Arato (1992), Harbeson (1994), MacGaffey (1987), Kasfir (1984), Putnam (1993), and Walzer (1991). Part two concerns Multi-Track diplomacy, focusing on the works of the originators of the systems approach, as developed by Diamond and McDonald (1996) and observes that the Israeli-Palestinian Oslo Accords of 1993 were a successful example of a Multi-Track approach in action when utilized fully.

### **1.7. Methodological Aspects**

This study provides an overview of scholarship in the discipline of Multi-Track diplomacy through a descriptive analysis of the peace processes in the DRC conflict of the period between 1998 and 2002, where Track II diplomacy was accorded less prominence than Track I diplomacy. This research is non-empirical since it is theory driven and utilizes secondary data such as books, journals, and internet articles in order to pose descriptive, theoretical and conceptual questions. The reasoning is inductive in nature because a ‘sample’ of texts has been read (Mouton, 2001: 179) in order to describe and critically analyze the role of official and unofficial tracks in the conflict of this period.

Although this study concludes that Multi-Track diplomacy was not fully utilized in the peace processes of the period between 1998 and 2002 because there was no proper coordination of tracks, its primary purpose is still descriptive by nature. In addition, this study is also descriptive in its historical account of the conflict and its effects on the DRC society and surrounding Great Lakes Region. Lastly, this study is exploratory in positing that no single intermediation process is adequate in dealing with conflict alone. Thus, a fully utilized Multi-Track approach is offered as a potential tool to address future conflicts of a similar nature to that of the conflict situation in the DRC.

### **1.8. Research Design**

This study has an historical element because the conflict in the DRC stretches from as far back as the 1960s, when its fight for independence commenced. Also, this study builds on the inductive approach utilised by authors such as Montville & Davidson (1981), Bayart (1986), Bratton (1994), Diamond and McDonald (1996), Nan (2003), and Chigas (2003). Consequently, the study is qualitative in nature, and, as Neuman (2003: 139) points out, such studies often rely on interpretive or critical social science. This is appropriate for a descriptive analytical study of the peace processes of the period between 1998 and 2002 and Multi-Track diplomacy, which can be seen as examples of critical social science.

Unlike experiments and surveys, design elements in qualitative research are usually established during the course of the study. A qualitative approach will serve to enhance an understanding of reasons for failure in the 1998-2002 peace processes in the DRC and will also provide a greater understanding of how a fully utilized Multi-Track approach to peace is



relevant. It is against this background that this study is presented. A literature study, involving a descriptive analysis of the peace processes without evaluating the effectiveness of the various peace initiatives, is presented. This demonstrates that a Multi-Track approach was not fully utilized in the process.

### **1.9. Outline of Remaining Chapters**

The rest of this study is divided into five chapters. Chapter two provides an overview of the applicable theoretical framework and explains the conceptual foundations of the analysis, including the role of civil society in understanding Track II's function in the peace processes of 1998-2002, as well as the Multi-Track approach, which was not fully utilized during the peace processes. Chapter three describes the role played by Track I diplomatic initiatives in the 1998-2002 peace processes. It then describes the motives for international Track I intervention. After this presentation of actors' roles, the chapter proceeds to describe the actual Inter-Congolese Dialogues in detail. Chapter four is devoted to the role of unofficial intervention, or Track II's role, in the peace processes of the 1998-2002 period. The chapter reveals the minimal role that Track II played in the processes. Additionally, it describes the development of social networks through civil society and also describes the infrastructure for peace that was present at that time. Chapter five describes why Track II efforts could not play a more prominent role in the peace processes initiated between 1998 and 2002, thus revealing that a Multi-Track approach was not fully utilized in the processes. The final chapter of this study provides the aim and a summary of the main findings of the preceding chapters and outlines the conclusions that were reached regarding the role of Track I and Track II diplomacy in the conflict. It also evaluates the success of the research methodology and the relevance of the theoretical concepts used. Lastly, it briefly discusses the lessons learnt during the course of this study.

### **1.10. Conclusion**

There are a multitude of factors that make it feasible for a state to descend into the level of conflict exhibited in the DRC, especially in the context of the conflict-system in the surrounding Great Lakes Region, where desperate sources of insecurity feed each other, and it is impossible to separate the issues. Therefore, all the factors that contributed to the twenty-three failed attempts at establishing peace in the DRC between 1998 and 2002 cannot be

focused upon in a short study of this nature. Thus, this study specifically presents a descriptive analysis of the roles of Track I and II diplomacy in the peace processes initiated to address the 1998-2002 conflict. This study further attempts to reveal that Track II initiatives were less effectively utilized, as opposed to Track I diplomatic initiatives. Based on this description and analysis, the study argues that greater prominence should have been accorded to Track II diplomacy, utilized in a combined approach with Track I diplomacy, in order for sustainable peace to have been secured during this critical period. The study thus argues that a Multi-Track approach (Diamond and McDonald: 1996) was not effectively utilized during this period. This study is qualitative in nature, which is appropriate for a descriptive analytical study of Track II and Multi-Track diplomacy, which are examples of critical social science. It is in this way that the study serves to enhance and reorient the understanding of the reasons for failure the failure of the peace processes in the DRC.

**CHAPTER TWO: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK:**  
**A SYSTEM'S APPROACH TO PEACE**

### **2.1. Introduction**

At the outbreak of the second rebellion in the DRC during 1998, it was generally agreed that a military outcome alone would not produce the lasting peace required for the reconstruction of the country. Only Track I diplomatic efforts were practised to persuade the government, rebel movements, and regional states to negotiate and implement a cease-fire agreement. However, this does not mean that Track II actors did not play any role. To a limited extent, Track II diplomacy facilitated the signing of the Pretoria Cease-Fire Agreement in 2002, and helped to provide the unarmed actors with opportunities to voice their positions on the conflict throughout the peace processes (Naidoo, 2000). Consequently, this provided greater co-ordination of the unarmed forces' programmes, as well as an opportunity for to organise themselves into a stronger voice to present their positions in the conflict, which led to a proliferation of information on the subject. Track II initiatives included the organization of dialogues, where the social issues, such as inter-ethnic rivalry based on the access to Congolese land and resources, especially in the Kivu province (Naidoo, 2000: 90), were discussed.

Thus, the primary aim of this study is to provide a descriptive account of the peace processes in order to highlight the minimal role of Track II diplomatic initiatives and thus the failure to utilize a balanced Multi-Track approach. This study includes a component in its framework which describes the coordinated use of the Multi-Track approach to emphasize its potential utility in addressing similar future cases of intractable conflict (Diamond and McDonald, 1996). Additionally, in support of this component, successful examples of Track I and II diplomacies in action are described after each term is defined and conceptualized. For the purpose of this component in the framework, it is necessary to differentiate between Track I and II diplomacies in order to establish an comprehensive descriptive analysis of the Multi-Track systems approach.

Civil society is commonly referred to as the 'third' or 'non-profit' sector because it contains all associations and networks between the family and the state in which membership and activity are voluntary. This structure is partly responsible for opening channels of

communication for negotiation and facilitating relationship-building and trust-building in one of its functions, which is to increase the capacity of parties to negotiate. This is a principal characteristic of Track II diplomacy, and it is therefore essential that civil society's role be described as a component of the theoretical framework in which this study, aimed at proving that Track II initiatives were less effectively utilized in the peace processes, is grounded. Hence, this chapter aims to illustrate that Track II diplomacy, through its incorporation of civil society's involvement, is essential in any peace process. Consequently, a Multi-Track approach, which consolidates all tracks, can offer a powerful outcome when utilized effectively. This chapter is presented in two parts. Part one concerns Multi-Track diplomacy; it focuses on the systems approach as developed by Diamond and McDonald (1996) and includes examples of successful Tracks I and II initiatives in action. The relevant sources consulted in this component include: Chigas (2003), Montville and Davidson (1981), and Nan (2003). The second part of the chapter concerns Civil Society and focuses mainly on the works of Bayart (1986) and Bratton (1989), as well as authors such as Collins (1998), Cohen and Arato (1992), Harbeson (1994), MacGaffey (1987), Kasfir (1984), Putnam (1993), and Walzer (1991).

## **2.2. Multi Track Diplomacy: The System**

In order to understand the system by which international peacemaking occurs the parable of the blind man and the elephant might be considered (Diamond and McDonald, 1996: 1):

Like the blind man, if we feel only the trunk or the tusk or the tail of the peace pachyderm, we will misperceive the true nature of this lively creature. Likewise, if we consider the animal as a whole but don't know the parts and how they each contribute, we lose the value of acquaintance with a richly complex being.

Multi-Track Diplomacy is a conceptual way to view the process of peacemaking as a complete elephant, a living system which needs the combination of all its body parts to function. Diamond and McDonald (1996), Chigas (2003), Montville and Davidson (1981), and Nan (2003) all support the theory that different levels of Track diplomacy exist as the 'body parts' which, when combined, can function most effectively as the complete elephant. So as to fully capture the complexity of Track II diplomacy, one must understand that it is comprised of separate sub-tracks. The Multi-Track theory reflects the values of the different Tracks, which, when combined, contribute most effectively to a peace process. Multi-Track

theory recognizes that in modern, complex society peacemaking cannot be left solely to either governmental interaction or the responsibility of the state. Out of this realization evolved the ‘burgeoning citizen diplomacy movement’ (Diamond and McDonald, 1996:2) or ‘civil society’, which this framework later expands upon, that contains all associations and networks between the family and the state as a newfound power to collectively make a difference. The nine sub-Tracks, or ‘body parts’, are separated for a practical and conceptual framework for operationalization in this descriptive study, which attempts to explain that the Multi-Track theory can be an useful approach to peace processes when utilized effectively. These nine sub-tracks are: Government or Peacemaking through Diplomacy, Nongovernmental / Professional or Peacemaking through Conflict Resolution, Business or Peacemaking through Commerce, Private Citizen or Peacemaking through Personal Involvement, Research/ Training and Education or Peacemaking through Learning, Activism or Peacemaking through Advocacy, Religion or Peacemaking through Faith in Action, Funding or Peacemaking through Providing Resources, and Communications and the Media, or Peacemaking through Information.

Each sub-track contains a system within itself with regards to membership, activities, philosophy, and purpose, which often overlap. They mostly complement each other’s values and activities when combined as the living system of modern peacemaking. Therefore, the Multi-Track approach is the interrelatedness and coordination of these nine sub-tracks. Theorists have attempted to construct models of representation for the approach, and, to date, the most adequate is the ‘Compass Interaction Model’. All the models will now be elaborated on to provide clarity.

### 2.2.1. Compass Interaction Model

In Figure 1, below, the Compass Interaction Model illustrates the Multi-Track approach in a circular or compass shape. This opposes the previous idea that Track I is seated at the top of the hierarchy, with all the "unofficial" tracks poised to change the direction of Track I. This model is the newly expanded version, which demonstrates that all the sub-tracks as have equal value but different functions. As a result, each Track is uniquely positioned on its own, but it is connected by the outer circle and at the centre, in other words the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. Track nine is the inner circle in the compass because it links the sub-tracks through its communication function. This model illustrates that a synergy of added-

value is produced when functioning together, and theoretically this is most effective for a peace process (Diamond and McDonald, 1996: 15).




Figure 1  
(Diamond and McDonald, 1996: 15)

### 2.2.2. Education, Research and Action Model

The 1990s Education, Research and Action Model, illustrated in Figure 2 below, (Diamond and McDonald, 1996: 16) demonstrates the reorganisation of the same sub-tracks but in a triangular shape, which makes three *type* classifications: research, action and education. The research type includes basic and applied research, the action type includes advocacy and direct peacemaking action, and the education type includes both knowledge in theory, as well as knowledge through practice. The centre of the triangle is the public and its leaders who make decisions which influence the three types and is also influenced by it. Despite this interrelatedness, the model still portrays the sub-tracks as separate, rather than combined. The obvious shortfall of such a model is that it suggests that there exists no direct link in meeting the needs of the people in conflict and the activities of the research, action, and education.

This model is therefore useless to this study, which attempts to prove that a coordinated use of the Multi-Track approach necessary, in order to demonstrate its potential utility in addressing similar future cases of intractable conflict.





Figure 2  
(Diamond and McDonald, 1996: 15)

### 2.2.3. Linear Interaction Model

The Linear Interaction Model (Diamond and McDonald, 1996: 16) has three components: advocacy, action, and education, which overlap as each extends into the separate peacemaking, peacebuilding and peacekeeping efforts. This model, although useful in explaining how the activities relate to one another, also has a major shortfall. Players in the field of conflict are often all involved in peacemaking, peacebuilding and peacekeeping; therefore, the separation of these three components is unhelpful in this study, which attempts to prove that a coordinated use of the Multi-Track approach is the more effective when utilized fully by means of descriptive analysis.



**Figure 3**  
(Diamond and McDonald, 1996: 16)

Therefore, this study supports Figure 1's Compass Interaction Model, which best describes the Multi-Track approach and in theory proves the most appropriate model because it demonstrates the correlation of all the sub-tracks as having equal value but different functions. The complexity of the 1998-2002 peace process necessitates that it be understood as a living system that functions with a combination of body parts (Diamond and McDonald, 1996: 1)

Systematic services to manage and serve the Multi-Track approach are scarce (Diamond and McDonald, 1996: 18), and there is yet to exist an institution that broadly includes all nine tracks perfectly equally. A good recent example of an organization that has members from many scopes of the system and provides a platform for the system to look at itself is the National Conference of Peace Making and Conflict Resolution (NCPCR)<sup>1</sup>. The problem however is that some scopes are more involved than others, thereby implying differing values. Then there are organizations such as the International Peace Research Association (IPRA)<sup>2</sup> which includes members from at least a broad range of the track-system but has a specific focus and therefore cannot be said to be a systemic organization with the task of serving the entire field. Therefore, an effort must be made to develop suitable institutions that carry out this Multi-Track theory.

In order to understand the Multi-Track systems approach to peace, the concepts of peace building and standard procedures need to be understood. Three main categories of activities

<sup>1</sup> The NCPCR provides a common forum for professionals and activists in mediation, conflict resolution, and peacemaking every second year.

<sup>2</sup> The IPRA is a network of peace-researching scholars, practitioners and decision-makers globally in pursuit of interdisciplinary study of issues related to sustainable peace around the globe.



exist within peace building. The first category is political peace building, which is accomplished through Track I diplomacy and consists of political rebuilding. Secondly, there is economic and institutional peace building, which also forms part of Track I diplomacy. Finally, there is social or society peace building, the impact of which is often underappreciated by traditional peace building actors, and which includes civil society (McDonald, 2003: 1).

The absence of the Multi-Track approach in the 1998-2002 DRC conflict has led part of the theoretical framework in this study. Despite critics of this framework, who argue the impossibility of coordinating all non-state actors, who may not even want the conflict to be resolved anyway, this study still argues that Track I diplomacy, mostly acting alone, was a major factor to consider in this descriptive critical analysis of the 1998-2002 peace processes. Below are listed the issues that the Multi-Track approach faces. It is crucial to this framework because this study does not wish to present the approach idealistically but instead attempts to prove to the reader that, despite these issues, the approach remains effective in a peace process when fully utilized.

### **2.3. Issues of the Multi-Track Diplomacy System (Diamond and McDonald, 1996)**

In recent history, attention has shifted from superpower proxy conflicts to identity-group conflicts, thus changing the way in which conflict is seen. Ideas that were formerly not considered are now conventional. This can be seen across a number of spheres. The business community sees potential in the peace building process. Education sees the study of global affairs and cultural awareness as pertinent. Religious and private groups are expanding their role behind the scenes. The activist community is exploring the causes of the less visible groups. The media has taken a greater active role in analyzing world affairs and, with new technology, is able to reach the entire world faster, which is crucial for bridge-building. Environmental awareness and the desire for worldwide peace have become a measure of integrity across the globe, and previously ignored issues no longer go on unnoticed because psychiatrists, psychologists and other health professionals are now included in the reconciliation process in conflict-ridden areas. Thus, it can be said that the Multi-Track approach is the basis for reaching peace in a modern way, through attention given to conflict at every level, including individual behaviour, family behaviour, neighbourhood behaviour,

community behaviour, and workplace behaviour. It is, however, the implementation of the system's approach that proves problematic (Diamond and McDonald, 1996).

For this reason, this following section is dedicated to the works of Diamond and McDonald, the originators of the Multi-Track diplomacy system, in an effort to present the shortfalls of the approach's implementation. Although it is not the aim of this study, it is relevant because it contributes understanding to the overall question of Track II's minimal role in the DRC conflict, as this study describes. Perhaps in a separate study the challenges of the system's theory itself could be investigated. Moreover, it is important to note that a worthy commentary or critique of the system is difficult to find. This could be attributed the authors' own extensive evaluation of the limitations and shortcomings of the system. Consequently, this section will be based only upon these authors' own commentary on their theory.

It is essential to consider the limitations of the Multi-Track approach so that it is clear that it is not an idealistic theory, one which, despite its shortcomings, remains effective in a peace process, if fully utilized. As the world's condition continues to change, the system needs to continue to change in terms of the nature and scope of the Multi-Track approach.

### 2.3.1. Legitimizing the Field

Diamond and McDonald (1996: 142) explain that unofficial diplomacy is not entirely recognized as a serious discipline in the eyes of official diplomacy. This is because the professional conflict community is seen as the culpable party in conflict, and thus carry little weight in the sphere of diplomacy. Consequently, this affects the field's perceived right of existence in the political process (Diamond and McDonald, 1996: 142). Moreover, the trend is that the public do not take seriously or legitimize the need to define their role in the peace process. Furthermore, the credibility of the role of the religious community as part of unofficial diplomacy is questioned. Religious convictions are considered of little importance in decision making, yet it has widespread networking at a grass-root level. It is important to note that the use of the religious community as a track has yielded considerable results in unofficial intervention (Diamond and McDonald, 1996: 142). The activist community track is also delegitimized by policy makers but has much to contribute in organizing at a grass-roots levels as well as representing the human elements needed in policy making. The citizen diplomacy track or civil society is also not taken seriously by official diplomacy. The business track is only just commencing its role in the process. The tracks of media and

funding are mostly regarded as irrelevant to the process. Considering the inferior status given to unofficial track diplomacy in general, the Multi-Track approach cannot function effectively.

### 2.3.2. Professional Development

Diamond and McDonald (1996: 144) state that there is an overall lack of communication and coordination between the tracks' elements of training; standards and ethical motives or approaches. More specifically, the training elements in each track differ in the funding, resources and scope available to advance it, and in some track-cases the training is almost non-existent. In the unofficial sphere, or Track II diplomacy, standards and accountability are difficult to uphold, and practically no guidelines are provided with regards to ethics. When taking all of the above into consideration, it becomes clear that the unofficial sphere can lead to counter productivity in the peace processes if professional training and development is not provided for the track players (Diamond and McDonald, 1996: 144).

### 2.3.3. Diversity

Diamond and McDonald (1996: 147) acknowledge that identity group issues are present in the Multi-Track system. This is problematic because most developing nations' conflicts involve cultural or ethnic strife at its root, and therefore the Eurocentric white male dominance that directs the system cannot adequately solve the non-European problems. Thus, another shortfall of the Multi-Track approach is that it is not truly universally applicable in its theory and practice. Furthermore, the lack of representatives from non-western backgrounds that have experience and knowledge to contribute but cannot hinder the full potential the system could have in peace processes. Diamond and McDonald (1996: 144) further explain that the aim should be:

...to name, confront, accept, and grow from our differences without having to convert, dis-empower, control, co-opt, or diminish those who are different from us, and to do so because we know that without all perspectives the circle is not complete, the whole is not fulfilled.

### 2.3.4. Resources

Diamond and McDonald (1996: 150) argue that financing is the major issue facing the system. Numerous projects; programs, and organizations are limited by insufficient funding.

In addition, a constantly fluctuating economy puts much pressure on those tracks which do not generate income but need it to sustain themselves. Furthermore, it is difficult for unofficial tracks to convince aid donors to offer financial assistance when most of their functions are intangible or arguably unimportant.

### 2.3.5. Evolving Political Systems

Diamond and McDonald (1996: 132) observe that:

With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the breakdown of superpower rivalry as a basis for world order, and the disintegration of communism as a major ideological structure for state power, political systems and relationships are in massive flux.

This change in favour of democracy has been difficult politically, rapidly presenting new conditions for which there are no ready-made solutions. In other words, in order for democratization to be completed; new political, economic and social structures need to be invented (Diamond and McDonald, 1996: 132). These structures will need to extend into conceptualizing the new world democratization process in general, while simultaneously supporting the individuality of each country's circumstances, such as in the case of the DRC and the phenomenon of warlordism. In addition to these new changes are the newly created citizen empowerment tools or methods, such as massive street demonstrations (Diamond and McDonald , 1996: 132), found in civil society which might or might not be used constructively as political state-craft.

### 2.3.6. Regional and Identity-Group Conflicts

In today's world more and more nations are fighting to be heard, to be recognized, and to be included in the international community. To facilitate this, they are presenting themselves in the context of ethnic rivalry for their rights to self-determination. The shift has changed from the battle once fought for ideology, to identity. Thus the battle has shifted from international to intrastate war, and formerly quiet, or hidden, ethnic groups are presenting themselves in a world that knows very little about them and therefore cannot make space in its current coping-systems fast enough (Diamond and McDonald 1996: 133). Terrorism, that has no boundaries and alerts the world to the inherent danger of sporadic and spontaneous attacks, is also on the rise. It has become a new form of expression for repressed groups who fear losing their identity. These new elements in conflict are creating a long-term, intangible effect

which emphasises the growing need for a new method of confrontation: a Multi-Track approach (Diamond and McDonald 1996: 133).

### 2.3.7. Changing Views of Power and Violence

The world no longer tolerates any individual or entity controlling another. Instead, the reality of partnership has opened the eyes of the world. In the words of Diamond and McDonald (1996: 134):

...power begins to look more like the ability to do something together rather than to wield control over another. This is a major transformation in human experience, and we are in the midst of it- one foot in the past and one in the future.

This new global family view makes it difficult to threaten one another with devastating weapons and reflects on the effects of past, slavery; imperialism and colonialism acts, which go against modern humanitarianism to motivate a global trend to seek non-violent resolutions to any disputes. In addition, the world is learning that structural violence in our societies, including economic and social injustices, cannot be addressed without justice. This is because, in theory, there is greater commitment to non-violence in finding solutions in conflict. The field of conflict resolution is expanding as the need for a new approach to finding peace is the priority. Moreover, modern civilization strives to eradicate war, replacing it with conflict resolution and peacemaking. However, the downfall of such aspirations is that an effective alternative to the international community's self-seeking, self-serving motivation for intervention in conflicts is yet to be found (Diamond and McDonald, 1996: 134). Additionally, the UN and NATO's credibility is fast deteriorating, which is evidenced by the lack of regard for their authority.

### 2.3.8. Environmental Sustainability

The world is increasingly aware that environmental damage is a disaster. Consequently, environmental awareness is finding greater prominence in the political arena, and, as a threat to global security, it can only be addressed through multilateral relations (Diamond and McDonald, 1996: 137). Ultimately, these internal and external issues that the Multi-Track approach faces do not detract significantly from the potential it has for maximum effectiveness if utilized fully after these issues are tackled.

## **2.4. Camp David and the Israeli-Egyptian peace accords - Successful Track I Diplomacy in Action**

Before any example can be presented, it is essential to make clear that Track I diplomacy is not a tangible, concrete thing. Rather, it is an abstract concept, that serves to describe the functioning of official role players in political decision-making by giving it a title. The concept can be understood as Susan Nan (2003: 1) explains it:

[Track I diplomacy] involves direct government-to-government interaction on the official level. Typical Track I activities include traditional diplomacy, official negotiations, and the use of international organizations. The participants stand as representatives of their respective states and reflect the official positions of their governments during discussions.

In addition, the theory as a title includes that official political actors utilize sanctions, ultimatums and psychological intimidation in changing states' relationships or for meeting mutual agreements at a diplomacy level. Lastly, Track I includes in its function the power given to official political role players to act as go-betweens in other states for mediation purposes (Said, Lerche and Lerche III. 1995: pg 69). Also, there is the power to make bilateral or multilaterally agreements, and an example of multilateral Track I diplomacy can be seen in the regional structures in the Great Lakes Region.

Author Joffe (2002: 171) explains that mediation in the Middle East has been successful only once, and it was, "during the 1978 Camp David conclave under the tenacious management of President Jimmy Carter". Joffe provides a concise summary of these Israeli-Egyptian peace accords and describes it as the first peace settlement of any kind between Israel and any of its Arab neighbours. The American President at that time, Jimmy Carter, mediated the talks between the then Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin and the then Egyptian President Anwar el-Sadat. America's Track I diplomatic role was clear when President Carter committed himself to working toward these comprehensive peace accords for the Middle East, which called for Israel's withdrawal from the occupied territories of the West Bank, the Golan Heights, and the Sinai Peninsula. It also called for Egypt to recognize Israel and agree on peace. Furthermore, the accords addressed the problem of Palestinian refugees who were displaced during the 1967 war that established Israel. The efforts succeeded for the most part

The role President Carter played was to mediate the settlement, and a breakthrough was made when the invitation to host the summit at Camp David in Maryland, USA was offered. The accords then became recognized as the Camp David Accords. The privacy and seclusion that the previous attempts for peace did not offer the parties in their respective countries was provided at Camp David. The personal and emotional elements were addressed in this non-threatening environment, which proved to offer the perfect condition for finding a way out of the stalemate (Laue, 1991: 11). Critics recognize that it was extremely unusual for these heads of state to engage in a summit meeting after decades of war and considering their respective complicated personalities, but, none the less, the official Track I actors met and negotiated (Laue, 1991: 12). In this instance, Track I diplomacy was successful in its direct government-to-government interaction on the official level. This serves to illustrate successful traditional Track I diplomacy in action.

## **2.5. The Israeli-Palestinian Oslo Accords – Successful Track II Diplomacy in Action**

Like Track I diplomacy, Track II diplomacy is also not a tangible, concrete thing but an abstract concept. Track II diplomacy serves to describe the functioning of unofficial role players by giving the informal interaction, a title. The concept, according to Nan (2003: 1), is [that which] generally involves informal interaction with influential unofficial actors from civil society, business or religious communities, and local leaders and politicians who are considered to be experts in the area or issue being discussed. It generally seeks to supplement track I diplomacy by working with middle and lower levels of society and often involves non-traditional methods, such as facilitating dialogue mechanisms and meetings that include participants from both government and non-government institutions.

For example, the Oslo Process of 1993 has been described by critics as a major success and a classic example of Track II diplomacy in action. Track II diplomacy was instrumental in trust-building between the parties, and Norway, having had no vested interest, offered this by presenting itself as the third party neutral mediator. The Norwegian interventions in the Israeli-Palestinian relations included assurance of absolute secrecy, the provision of facilities that encouraged intimacy between the delegates, and arranging for meetings over a long

enough period of time for components of optimism to emerge and a possible agreement to be developed. These accords were important in three ways:

...they produced mutual recognition between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO); they led to the establishment of the Palestinian Self Government Authority; and they embodied a commitment to and an agenda for future negotiations (Pruitt, 1997: 237).

Historically, Track II diplomacy attempted to aid peace making in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. One such example, through civil society, is the efforts of scholars from Harvard University who worked to organize and present problem-solving workshops in the 1970s in an attempt to bring about negotiations between the opposing parties (Mitchell, 1993: 12). This is important because it shows that Track II diplomacy failed to bring about sufficient change in the process when it acted alone. But the Oslo Process introduced Track II initiatives in Norway, while at the same time official Track I negotiations were started in Spain and then continued in the USA where the historic signing of the Israeli-Palestinian Oslo Accords took place (Mitchell, 1993: 9). Thus, the Oslo Process is crucial in supporting a Multi-Track approach to diplomacy. In this example, Track II diplomacy's value lay in the fact that it worked alongside Track I diplomacy in a fully utilized Multi-Track approach, and, as a result, the outcome of the peace process was successful.

## 2.6. Civil Society

The State is not merely "the Government" but a dualistic polity because it is comprised of the political society (i.e.: state institutions) and the civil society (i.e.: social institutions). The division between the two is *intellectual*, rather than *literal*, because both societies make up the State in their different ways (Bratton, 1989). Civil Societies have now been recognized as a legitimate area for external intervention (White, 1994: 376), but this is contested territory both in theory and reality. Therefore this theoretical framework wishes to draw attention to several schools of thought on this subject.

Shills (1992), a theorist on civil society, defines the concept as having three main components:

...civil society as a part of society comprising a complex of autonomous institutions-economic, religious, intellectual and political- distinguishable from the family, the



clan, the locality and the State. The second is a part of society possessing a particular complex of relationships between itself and the State and a distinctive set of institutions which safeguard the separation of State and civil society and maintain effective ties between them. The third is a widespread pattern of refined civil manners.

Bratton (1994: 2) explains it to be:

...a sphere of social interaction between the household and the state which is manifest in norms of community cooperation, structures of voluntary association, and networks of public communication.

Authors Cohen and Arato (1992: 17-18) offer a third perspective and explain as when people construct:

...a sphere other than and even opposed to the state...includ(ing), almost always unsystematically, some combination of networks of legal protection, voluntary association, and forms of independent expression.

All of these essentially recognize civil society as a theoretical concept rather than an empirical one because it means different things to different people, plays different roles at different times, and constitutes both problem and solution. Also, all three descriptions acknowledge that civil society is participatory because it is formed by self-constitution, self-mobilization, non-governmental-, and unofficial players. Bayart (1986: 112) explains that it is a synthetic conceptual construct, which is not necessarily embodied in a single and identifiable structure. In this study, it will not be simply utilized as a slogan because then the analytical rigour, conceptual clarity, empirical authenticity, policy relevance, and emancipatory potential are all threatened. Therefore the theoretical framework in this study includes civil society as a practical support to the theory of Track II- or unofficial diplomacy.

Three schools of thought, presented as analytical models, exist in the civil society theory. Edwards (2004: 1-112) concisely summarizes them as follows: the associational life model, the normative model, and the public sphere model. This study favours the public sphere model because it offers civil society as an arena for public deliberation, rational dialogue, and the exercise of active citizenship in pursuit of the common interest. In addition, this model suggests that, because civil society is often ignored in government policies and international

agencies' roles, it offers a role for civil society to play in democracy and development. Edwards (1992: 1-112) argues that, although this model has its strengths in terms of conceptualization, it too has its shortfalls, and there is no need to treat the conceptualization of civil society as belonging to one model at the exclusion of the others. Instead, he embraces a holistic approach that integrates elements from all three schools of thought for a mutually supportive framework, which strengthens the utility of civil society both as an idea and a framework for action.

Clearly little solid consensus is found about what civil society is, what it does, or even whether it exists in certain parts of the world. Therefore it would be foolish for this study to make too many claims too soon. Nevertheless, the concept of civil society is utilized in this study to provide an organizational framework for the description of Track II diplomacy's role in the peace processes of 1998-2002. To do so, it is important to understand that universal ideas require that the adaptation of the concept of civil society into different parts of the world must take into account the distinctiveness of those diverse regions, particularly at the level of socioeconomic development and in the cultural attributes of different nations and sub-nations (Bratton, 1994: 1). Therefore, civil society in developing nation states, which is largely a colonial creation upon which the market economy has only a fragile hold, differs from civil societies in the developed western world (Edwards, 2004:1-112). This is a crucial point to understand since a strong civil society is expected to be associated with a competitive market economy as well as with a capable state, both of which were limited in the context of the DRC conflict of 1998-2002. The conflict climate was not ideal for the proper functioning of civil society because social life became limited in the context of the political violence coupled with a break in essential services. In addition, networks of public communication (i.e.: civil society) cannot develop fully unless the state establishes and enforces guarantees of freedom of speech or if the state is collapsing or operating well below its capacity. There is "no possibility of choosing, like the old anarchists, civil society alone" (Walzer, 1991: 301). Instead, civil society is "institutionalized and generalized through laws (provided by the state), especially subjective rights" (Cohen and Arato, 1992: 9). This is of fundamental importance because under Kabila's totalitarian rule the liberal democratic society<sup>3</sup> was arguably absent, and, according to Shills' definition (1992: 2), this sets the ground for an antithesis of civil society because to totalitarian rule is contrary to liberal democracy in its

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<sup>3</sup> A liberal democratic society is a society of an inclusive collective self-consciousness whereby institutions of civil society play a significant role (Shills, 1992: 2).

political aspects. Furthermore, it is imperative to understand that civil society was not only limited in its functioning during the conflict. It was also deeply divided into distinct ethnic formations with affiliation to specific political parties. Collectively, these factors call into question civil society's ability "to play its role at every point in the development of conflict and its resolution: from surfacing situations of injustice to preventing violence, from creating conditions conducive to peace talks to mediating a settlement and then promoting it, from setting a policy agenda to healing war-scarred psyches" (Barnes, 2009: 131) in the DRC between 1998 and 2002.

This is significant since, as a result of these factors, African literature on the concept would question very differently how the civic players in the DRC and other Track II initiatives communicated towards achieving peace during the 1998-2002 peace processes. In the case of the DRC, this is exactly why understanding the concept of civil society is crucial in furthering the descriptive analysis of Track II diplomacy's minimal role in the 1998-2002 peace processes. In other words, the weakness of civil society in the DRC during the period translates into weak Track II initiatives, and that consequently limited the role of unofficial diplomacy in the peace processes, which prevented the Multi-Track approach from being implemented fully.

## **2.7. Conclusion**

This chapter serves to demonstrate that the Multi-Track approach is most effective when fully utilized. It explains that the Multi-Track approach is relevant to this study's descriptive analysis because it was largely absent during the 1998-2002 DRC peace processes. Due to the complexity of the climate of the Great Lakes Region during the period when desperate sources of insecurity fed each other in a conflict-system, it was impossible to efficiently separate the issues or make any claim of a causal nature about Track I diplomacy acting alone as having led directly to the failure of the twenty-three peace attempts. Therefore, despite critics of this framework who argue the impossibility of coordinating all non-state actors who may not even want the conflict to be resolved anyway, the framework still attempted to argue that Track I diplomacy, mostly acting alone, was a major factor to consider in this descriptive critical analysis. Issues facing the Multi-Track approach were also presented in this chapter, and, because this study attempts to prove to the reader that, despite these issues, the approach remains effective in a peace process when fully utilized, these issues form a crucial element

of the framework. The case of the Oslo Accords was provided to further illustrate the benefits of combining Track I and Track II initiatives for a successful peace process.

Furthermore, this chapter presented civil society as the other component of the theoretical framework because the concept forms a fundamental part of unofficial Track II diplomacy and is therefore crucial in describing the minimal role of Track II in the 1998-2002 peace processes. In other words, the framework attempts to prove that the weakness of civil society in the DRC during the period resulted in weak Track II initiatives, which consequently limited the role of unofficial diplomacy and thus prevented the Multi-Track approach from being implemented fully.

Both of these frameworks are relevant and necessary in the descriptive analysis of this study, which aims to prove that a Multi-Track approach was not fully utilized. This was largely due to the limited functionality of civil society, which inhibited effective Track II diplomacy, and in turn resulted in mostly Track I diplomacy being implemented.

**CHAPTER THREE: THE ROLE OF TRACK I DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVES TO  
RESOLVE THE CONFLICT IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO:  
1998-2002**

### **3.1. Introduction**

In August 1998, war erupted in the DRC. This second Congolese conflict, otherwise known as the ‘Second Rebellion’, took place in a conflict-system of the Great Lakes Region within which desperate sources of regional insecurity fed each other. Consequently, fuelled by the surrounding war economy, the DRC’s own ethnic cleavages were aggravated. The conflict soon grew so complex that issues could no longer be separated (ICG, No.4, 1999: 2).

More specifically, the second rebellion arose when it was claimed that a substantial part of the eastern Congo was historically Rwandan. Kabila was accused of organizing genocide against the Banyamulenge people<sup>4</sup> in the Kivu region after he chose to remove Rwandans from government that year. The degree to which Rwandan intervention was motivated by a desire to protect the Banyamulenge people, as opposed to using them as a smokescreen for its own regional aspirations, as mentioned above, remains questionable and will not be addressed herein. Later in August 1998, supported by Rwanda and Uganda, who were backing these Congolese Tutsi’s, a well-armed rebel group emerged: the Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD), composed primarily of Banyamulenge (Deibert, 2008: 65).

It was at this point that Kabila called upon the assistance of his SADC brethren: Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe. Approximately four million people died in the conflict of 1998-2002, mostly as a result of war-related diseases and starvation (ICG, No.4, 1999). The Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement was signed a year later in 1999, and the UN Security Council Peacekeeping Mission (MONUC) was authorised the year after that. In 2001 Laurent Kabila was assassinated and his son, Joseph Kabila, replaced him. In late 2002 Rwanda and Uganda withdrew their troops following peace negotiations. Noticeably, however, proxies did remain. By December 2002 the Congolese belligerents and political groups signed a peace deal in Sun City, South Africa (Mpangala, 2004:19). This deal introduced the transitional

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<sup>4</sup> This is a term historically describing the ethnic Tutsi Rwandans who live on the Itombwe Plateau of South Kivu, the eastern region of the DRC. The Hutu Rwandans, Interahamwe, "those who attack together," were a consolidated power who opposed the Banyamulenge. This led them in their key role in the 1998-2002 conflict.

government by June 2003, and documented Joseph Kabila's agreement to share power with four vice-presidents.

Despite this conflict in the Ituri region, the Northern and Southern parts of the Kivu and Katanga provinces were unrelenting. The war over land and resources kept the rebel groups fighting, the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) being the largest and most involved. In June 2002, Kabila issued a request to the International Criminal Court (ICC) to investigate the crimes, but the case was only opened in 2004. The UN described the Eastern Congo as the "world's worst humanitarian crisis" by March of 2005 (Ahoua *et al*, 2006: 195). Although the current study does not wish to make claims of a causal nature, extensive reading does reveal that the country continues to face considerable challenges. The national army (FARDC) remains unmanageable. The country continues to deteriorate as there is a desperate need for basic services and infrastructure, as well as an honest public administration. Moreover, the situation remains precarious due to a lack of militia disarmament and reintegration as well as a deficiency of transparent natural resource management (ICG, 2009). This study only describes the current atmosphere in an attempt to prove that the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement was more of a failure than a success, and posits that, for this reason, the descriptive nature of this study is relevant.

The study will show that the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement (July, 1999); Sun City Agreement (April 2002); Pretoria Accord (July 2002); Luanda Agreement (September 2002) and the Global All-Inclusive Agreement (December, 2002) have proved fundamentally central to the role of Track I diplomacy. The Inter-Congolese Dialogues pursued solutions for peace in the conflict, but none of these bore fruit that actually secured lasting and sustainable peace. An obvious weakness of these peace agreements was that, due to the complexity of the conflict, each failed to recognise and address the core issues regarding the regions of the Ituri, and Southern and Northern Kivu.. The security concerns of Rwanda, Burundi, and Uganda, the alliance between the Mai Mai and the Rwanda Liberation groups, the Interahamwe, and the Banyamulenge nationality issue constitute but a few of the factors that simultaneously contributed to the conflict. This was a limitation on the Track I official agreement initiatives (Mpangala 2004: 19). This chapter will take into account the latter limitation in its description of the Track I diplomatic initiatives and provide examples of fruitless Track I efforts. As such, this chapter will serve to highlight the dominant role that Track I played in the 1998-2002 peace processes.

### 3.2. Track I Diplomatic Initiatives in the DRC: 1998-2002

#### 3.2.1. 1998-1999: *The Spark of the Conflict and Intervention*

After Kabila's removal of his Rwandan chief of staff, James Kabarebe, in July 1998, to replace him with a native Congolese, Celestin Kifwa (Brittain, 2001: 164), his neighbors were even less willing to leave than they were before. Pressure built and strife accelerated because Kabila had, by this time, offended Rwanda and Uganda, who had helped him into power. Kabila attempted to ease the pressure by appointing the former chief of staff, Kabarebe, as the military advisor to the newly appointed Kifwa. This, however, did nothing to patch up the relationship and Kabila abandoned this diplomatic attempt and ordered both Rwandan and Ugandan military forces to leave the DRC. Rwanda then began to direct the spark for another disaster. Unlike Rwanda and Uganda, the role of Burundi in the conflict was remote, resulting more from tolerant involvement and less from a feeling of commitment. This tolerance implies that there was sympathy for Rwanda and a respect for the DRC's sovereignty (Lanotte, 2003: 173). Simply put, the Hutu's aimed at ousting the Tutsi establishment in the DRC (N'Gbanda, 2004: 263) and Burundi entered into the conflict as moral support for Rwanda. Rwandan and Burundian regimes could relate to one another because both were Tutsi and faced racist ideology from the Hutu's. Notably, in the regional conflict-system of the time, the surrounding war economy also fuelled the Burundian involvement. N'Gbanda (2004: 263) notes that Burundi has been enjoying the Bujumbura Free Trade Zone with the DRC ever since and has been accused of smuggling valuable resources from the country.

Almost immediately after the events described above, the SADC parties, Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe, as well as the African countries Chad, Libya, and Sudan swiftly intervened, coming to the rescue of the Congolese government. The conflict continued back and forth by irregular proxy forces and almost no new territory was gained by any single party. The Banyamulenge people of the east, who were once a part of the First Congo War or 'First Rebellion', now entered into what began the Second Congo War or 'Second Rebellion'. By means of the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD), composed primarily of these eastern Banyamulengean people and backed by Rwanda, the resource rich eastern region of the DRC was dominated and Uganda intervened to support in this opposition (Nelson, 2004: 62).

Growing desperate, Kabila took control of a large part of the Kivu region, the above mentioned offensive side which included the RCD, Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi. They counteracted Kabila and overtook the Inga hydroelectric station, the Matadi Port, as well as the diamond center of Kisangani (Reyntjens, 1999: 247), which collectively provided Kinshasa with power, food, and investment. At this stage Uganda created the Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC), whilst backing the RCD alongside Rwanda. The Victoria Falls Summit of 1998 was an attempt to hurry the conflict's decline by drawing the parties into peace talks; this, however, only resulted in a stalemate (Lanotte, 2003: 109). This was said to be due to Kabila's approach to the conflict as founded purely on aggression; thus he chose not to negotiate with the rebels, because that would imply, by default, that the conflict was an internal matter (Lanotte, 2003: 109). Consequently, the rebel groups refused to acknowledge an agreement that they had not signed, because they had not participated. The overall outcome, by 1999, was the DRC's division into three parts, namely the east (Rwandan and Ugandan), the south (a security zone for Angola and economically dominated by Zimbabwe), and the west (Kabila's government's domain) (Lanotte, 2003: 108).

Fortunately for Kabila, his diplomatic efforts with six supporting countries came to fruition. The efforts, however, were short-lived when the offensive side (including Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi) was pushed out of the capital city, which then escalated the conflict into a war. Now it involved the national Rwandan and Ugandan armies, and no longer merely the rebel movements. The rest of the world insisted on an end to the bloodshed and did not deploy any troops. However, for investment purposes, Australia, Canada, Japan, and the United States struck a deal with Kabila in the mining and diamond extracting industries. This deal, or official negotiation, sought the regions' resources in exchange for support for the government (Olsson, 2006: 1133). Within the space of one year, the second rebellion involved all of the above foreign countries, each with their own objective for intervention, each of which constituted, by definition, a Track I diplomatic initiative.

- 3.2.1.1. Zimbabwe's Role in the Conflict: Altruistic?

Having deployed the most troops to assist the FARDC in resisting Rwanda and Uganda's offensive aggression, Zimbabwe was the DRC's major ally in this conflict (Nzongola, 2002: 239). In an attempt to initiate negotiations, Mugabe had also arranged a summit meeting in Harare shortly after the conflict broke out. The ICG (No.2, 1998: 20) describes several reasons for Zimbabwe's interest in backing Kabila. The first was that SADC members are



linked by a defence agreement in the specific case of hostility. Officially, thus, Zimbabwe intervened at the DRC's request in the name of SADC responsibility. Notably, however, South Africa, Lesotho, Swaziland, Malawi, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, the Seychelles, and Mauritius, also SADC members, chose a neutral stance, illustrating that there was, in fact, an alternative option for members to take. A less obvious intention on Zimbabwe's part was the hegemonic conflict within the SADC that had resulted from Mugabe's "South African complex"<sup>5</sup>. In short, because of the world-wide extolling of the young democracy led by Mr. Nelson Mandela, the attention was no longer on Zimbabwe (Lanotte: 2003:180). Moreover, South Africa was in a leading role in the SADC, which further fuelled Mugabe's complex and led to a disagreement with Mandela about the deployment of troops into the DRC. Additionally, the rapidly diminishing favour and praise from major powers, that was essential to assuring Zimbabwe's business and other incentives, also fuelled its motive to counteract South African business interests in the DRC<sup>6</sup>.

Lanotte notes (2003: 180) that,

...the Zimbabwean interest in the Congo of Kabila results from the necessity for this enclosed state to maintain the Zimbabwe-DRC axis and its commercial corridors in order to pretend to compete somewhat with South Africa's economic leadership in the region.

The next motivation for Zimbabwe's choice was the decline of its economy; Mugabe hoped that the intervention, in backing Kabila, would produce business so that Zimbabwe's economy could bounce back and compete with South Africa. It is important to note that Mugabe and Kabila have links that date back to their Marxist past and that Zimbabwe helped the DRC during the first war of liberation (Lanotte, 2003:180). Thus deeply rooted in this history, Zimbabwe's move to increase and diversify its investments in the DRC is supported. Soon the Zimbabwean Defence Force and its Central Intelligence Organization were benefiting from the resource extraction in the DRC (Lanotte, 2003: 182), which included the extraction of copper and cobalt. Also, economically speaking, Zimbabwe used its position to

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<sup>5</sup> The term is borrowed from Lanotte, 2003: 180.

<sup>6</sup> Pretoria was interested in the mineral industry, thus giving incentive for Nelson Mandela to encourage a peaceful transition from Mobutu to Kabila. The tables turned however, when Kabila turned rebel and Pretoria then had reason to support the offensive side in this second conflict.

ensure that the main road to the DRC stayed open along with its commercial corridors so that it could, at least, compete with South African leadership in the region (ICG, No.2, 1998: 20).

However, Nest (2001: 469-490) disputes the claim that business interests advanced Zimbabwe's involvement in the conflict by suggesting, instead, that as a consequence of their involvement, the capitalists realized there was commercial value in following the military actors into the DRC once their networks were already in place. Contrary to this view, however, the current study supports Lanotte's explanation that Zimbabwe was motivated by economic dividends from its intervention in the first conflict, which consisted of large sectors of the Congolese mineral economy (Lanotte, 2003: 180). Not surprisingly, this directed Mugabe's choice for the second intervention. The profits yielded by the Mugabe-Kabila business alliance are considerable.

The last motivation, which is by no means the least important, is the uncertainty that would be brought on by the new land reform approach in Zimbabwe at the time. The struggle for the confiscation of white farms would result in the embargo against Zimbabwe because major outside powers supported the farmers. This fuelled Zimbabwe's choice to intervene in the DRC (ICG, No.2, 1998: 21) because as Lanotte (2003: 181) explains,

...in the framework of the land reform policy in Zimbabwe, which stripped away slews of lands from white farmers, the [Zimbabwean] government would have sought to indemnify the latter by allocating them large farm concessions in the DRC.

On the whole, Kabila needed Zimbabwe, and Mugabe used this role to benefit from the DRC's resources. Despite Zimbabwe's various motives, its intervention is described as ultimately becoming the main contributor to Kabila's rescue through fighting alongside the Angolans and defeating a Rwandan commando unit in Kinshasa, and by providing assistance to the FARDC and the Mai-Mai fighters in the East-Congo against the RCD (ICG, No 2, 1998: 21).

- 3.2.1.2 Angola's Intervention: Not a Profitable Motive

Fortunately for Kabila, experienced Angolan forces were, surprisingly, interested in providing their support. This is because, previously, Angola's intervention was on the

offensive side.<sup>7</sup> Now, however, in the second rebellion, Angola's confidence in Kabila is what directed the country's intervention in support of him. Angola's belief was that UNITA operations, which included the exchange of diamonds from the region for foreign weapons (Dietrich, 1999: 282) in the southern Congo, would end. Angola felt that by aiding the Congo in this way a power vacuum would be avoided. The troops began their attack advancement north and eastward from its borders into the DRC. This study disagrees with Lanotte's (2003: 177) claim that "like most of its neighbouring countries, natural resources constituted a heavy argument in Luanda's decision to intervene beside Kabila's forces". Instead, the study wishes to emphasize that Angola's intention for intervening was not profit-driven. Clearly, with its ample resources, Angola was in no need to covet the DRC's natural resources. Moreover, Angola's decision was to launch a limited intervention, particularly aimed at ending the bombardment in order to secure the Congolese regime, and to defend parts of the DRC that were controlled by a government.

In addition, although Angola's contingent was the most powerful of all in the war, it never counterattacked against offensive forces in the way Kabila had hoped for – overrunning Kigali. This was evident in that, once the Blitzkrieg were defeated, Angola contacted Rwanda and Uganda to explain to them that Angola's intervention was not intentionally directed at them (Lanotte, 2003: 177). Angola threatened Kigali and Kampala with a generalized conflict only when, in 2000, Angola learnt of the UNITA-MLC tie-up, based upon UNITA supplying troops to the MLC, whilst the MLC provided airports to UNITA for exporting diamonds and securing arms and ammunition. UNITA and MLC denied these allegations and thus the threat never played out (Lanotte, 2003: 178).

Furthermore, Angola's intervention, when compared to that of Zimbabwe, for example, was too small to plunder the DRC's oil while securing the Congolese government and Angolan-Congolese borders (Lanotte, 2003: 177). Thus, as previously mentioned, the suppression of UNITA's rear bases in the DRC was the priority in Angola's intervention because the UNITA-RCD-MLC tie was precarious for Luanda; it would secure the diamond-trafficking for UNITA in the southern DRC. This threat was the main reason for Angola's support of Kabila; even if Kabila's promise to eradicate UNITA was not being carried out in full, it was the option that opposed UNITA. This is a crucial determinant in grasping the nature of

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<sup>7</sup> This is because there was a long standing rivalry between Angola and the rebel group the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). Angola intervened in the First Conflict on the offensive side, towards Congolese Mobutu Sésé Seko.

Angola's intervention and in revealing the major impact Track I diplomacy had on the conflict.

- 3.2.1.3. Namibia Chose to Side with Angola and Zimbabwe

President Sam Nujoma claimed to have no national interest in his support-given-intervention that backed the Kabila government. One quarter of the Namibian army was deployed to the DRC, which included about two thousand troops in a devoted adherence to its SADC agreement (ICG, No.2, 1998: 21) (Lanotte, 2003: 184). The main determinant for Namibia's Congo policy stemmed from the Marxist-Leninist past history shared by Nujoma and Kabila in Tanzania<sup>8</sup>. Given this, Namibia now sought to back Kabila. Additionally, Namibia's intervention also sought access to the water of the Congo basin.

Lanotte (2003: 185) explains three ulterior motives for Namibia's aid in the conflict which, summarized, reveal the hegemony issue in the SADC region. One motive constitutes an attempt by Namibia to eradicate the lasting legacy of South African 'hegemony' over it by siding with Zimbabwe in the matter of intervention in the Congo, rather than supporting South Africa's choice not to intervene. Secondly, Namibia's loyalty to Angola for its support during Namibia's struggle against South Africa's guidance (Lanotte, 2003: 185) also led Namibia to intervene in the DRC, in a move to suppress UNITA. Lastly, business constituted a predictable incentive for Namibian intervention.

Notably, however, the international community has not slated the former over the plunder of Congolese resources, as was the case with Rwanda, Uganda, and Zimbabwe. In fact, "Namibia still defends herself from any claim whatsoever of participation in the exploitation of the CoNGOs mineral riches," (Lanotte, 2003: 184). The riches gained by Namibia from the DRC were granted by the DRC government in compensation for Namibian spending in the conflict (Namibian NGO National Society for Human Rights, cited by Lanotte 2003: 185). Therefore, with or without the business issue, Namibia was already inclined to support Kabila on the above mentioned grounds.

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<sup>8</sup> Both had been mentored, in a time they were struggling for power in their respective countries. This mentorship was under the then President Julius Nyerere.

- 3.2.1.4. Chad was committed to Halting the Advance of the MLC

In 1998, Chad intervened into the DRC and deployed a couple of thousand troops. Chad's commitment was to halting the advance of the Ugandan-sponsored rebel group, the Movement for the Liberation of the Congo (MLC), in the Equator province. It is essential to note that Chad's President, Mr. Idriss Deby, was reluctant to intervene because the Franco-Congolese relationship was more than shaky. Despite this, however, Nzongola (2002: 240) notes that

...there is no doubt that the geopolitical interests of France and its Central African allies were a factor, particularly through pressures exerted by President Omar Bongo of Gabon, the dean of heads of state in Central Africa. The countries of the sub-region would like to see the Congo remain engaged with them, rather than turn eastward and southward with English-speaking countries.

Chad's obvious lack of fervour in its commitment to the DRC is evident in a reference to the conflict as being "useless and extremely costly in human lives" (Lanotte, 2003: 190) as well as in the fact that Chad, at the time, had its focus on building a pipeline lining the Chadian oilfield to the Cameroonian port of Douala (Lanotte, 2003: 190). Nevertheless, sentiment inspired Chad to join the pro-Kabila coalition by sending soldiers into the DRC conflict (Casteran, 1998; Reuters, 1998). Chad's sentiment consisted of the old hatred of a common enemy, the USA. However, before long the troops were committing serious human rights violations against the very people they were supposed to protect, and looting also commenced. Chad was soon expelled from the conflict because of the scrutiny of, and pressure exercised by, the international community. Although brief, however, the Chadian intervention stopped the MLC advance, giving Kinshasa the time and opportunity for a counter attack. Thus Chad made a mentionable contribution.

- 3.2.1.5. Sudan's Motive for Intervention was the Fear of Displeasing the US

In June 1998, Kabila met clandestinely with el-Bashir in Sudan, requesting assistance in its preparation for an attack from Uganda and Rwanda (ICG, No.3, 1999: 22). The ICG (No.3, 1999: 2) expresses Sudan's motive for intervention as stemming from the attitude that "the enemy of my enemy, is my friend". Thus Sudan's rival, Uganda, was now also Kabila's enemy, and therefore Sudanese President el-Bashir's justified his intervention in the conflict

by framing Uganda as “a threat for the security of the region”. This constituted a declaration that its support of the Kabila regime was “purely political” (Lanotte: 2003: 187).

Also, it is said that another motive for Sudan’s intervention was the fear of displeasing the US, who, having investment interests in the DRC, could retaliate. This fear was previously based upon the US’ attack of Sudan’s pharmaceutical factory, which was a consequence of the terrorist attacks on American embassies in early August of 1998. As reported by Lanotte (2003: 1-87), Sudan thus constitutes one of the main obsessions of Washington, in respect of Africa, because it is suspected to be Africa’s chief supporter of Islamic terrorism against the West.

Furthermore, it is of note that Kabila was criticized during the conflict for being double-faced, because whilst he allowed Ugandan troops to enter the DRC, in order to pursue ADF rebels, he was also, on the other hand, bargaining a passageway in the northeast with Sudan, who was permitted to airdrop weapons (ICG, No.3, 1999: 22). This is relevant in that it represents the role Sudan played in the DRC; although its role was minimal, Sudan supplied the DRC with warplanes (Lanotte, 2003: 187).

- 3.2.1.6. Libya Intervention: Attempts to earn back respect and end its isolation  
History reveals that, in 1988, the United Nations (UN) was forced to call for the international isolation of Libya because of its bombing over Lockerbie, Scotland (Takeyh, 2001: 62). In an attempt to earn back its respect and end this isolation, Libya entered the DRC conflict in 1998, in support of the Kabila government. Its role, although minimal in terms of troops present in the DRC, cannot be overlooked. Libya provided airplanes to take Chadian troops into the DRC. President Muammar al-Gaddafi was willing to do so despite the relations between Chad and Libya being historically unstable.

- 3.2.1.7. MONUC and UNHCR Intervention: Fruitless

**MONUC:**

MONUC is a specific example of a Track I initiative that was hindered in its performance. This UN mission in the DRC was established in 1999, and commenced as a peace keeping mission through the deployment of its peace keeping forces into the DRC (Mpangala, 2004:

21-22). Essentially, the mission was observatory in nature and was not a peace enforcement mission (ISS,2002: 11).

MONUC carries out its work in the DRC in phases, namely the deployment of military observers (MILOB's) and liaison officers, the drawing and completion of new ceasefire lines, and the DDRRR<sup>9</sup> programme, the abbreviation of which stands for disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration (of the armed forces in the DRC). Ultimately, MONUC's mandate is to support the democratically elected government (FARDC) on top of the phases already mentioned. Notably, this support would not be at the expense of civilian protection, particularly where the FARDC is the cause of such strife (ICG, 2008b). This support for the FARDC is significant in that it illustrates that civil society, or Track II initiatives, are not always completely disconnected from, or in opposition to, the Kabila government. The complexity of the conflict, as previously explained, was a major limitation for the efforts of MONUC and also a reason that working alongside unofficial intervention in a Multi-Track approach would have aided its efforts overall.

Further hampering its efforts, MONUC has been experiencing poor logistical facilities, in particular the transport infrastructure. It is restricted for the simple reason that the DRC is one of the largest countries on the continent. Furthermore, in the previous Mobutu dictatorship, the development of all types of infrastructure suffered, including education, health, and water supply. Transport infrastructure was therefore not any different (Mpangala, 2004: 21-22). For this reason, MONUC, during the conflict, had to depend on expensive air transport.

Another limitation for MONUC was the principle of voluntarism in carrying out the DDRRR programme, as will be discussed in chapter 4, paragraph 4.2. Mpangala (2004: 21-22) explains that armed groups have to be disarmed on a voluntary basis, which was not the option the RCD rebels chose. They, as well as other parties, opted instead to continue fighting and not to attend the peace dialogues.

Thus limited in performing its function, MONUC also faced the constraint that, on top of the fact that the conflict included so many armed parties, the conflict was affected by the

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<sup>9</sup> It is noteworthy that the DDRRR functioned through MONUC, the coordination with various governments, and other NGOs (Mpangala, 2004: 21-22).

complexity characterising each party. For example, the Interahamwe forces' alone had a mandate that requires the identifying of the instigators and those of the lower ranks who were involved in the 1994 Rwandan genocide. Mpangala (2004: 21-22) explains this complexity by pointing out that there are also normal refugees who are not involved in the genocide to be considered, making the mandate arduous to carry out.

Thus, for MONUC, because of the unique complexity of each armed force, each requires a different mode of repatriation. Some need to be sent to the Arusha UN tribunal, whilst others must be repatriated to a third country (Mpangala, 2004: 21-22). This task alone proves very expensive and almost impossible to complete without the support of as many initiatives as possible working cooperatively.

### **UNHCR:**

The United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR) encamped 11 000 Rwandese Hutu refugees whilst also protecting and providing for them (Prunier, 2009: 201). This UN initiative had six functions which, when summarized, included the establishment of dialogue on protection with rebel forces, acting as a substitute for public services, protection, the inclusion of local and international NGOs in a joint effort, and the implementation of small economic/production projects (UNHCR, 1999).

Notably, a limitation for the effort was that it had to deal with both de facto and de jure authorities. The UNHCR was thus unable to prevent forced repatriations. Due to the lives that were being saved through the initiative, however, a controversial decision to continue the programme in spite of the evictions was made (UNHCR, 1999).

Thus, through the Essentials of the Humanitarian Practice (EHP) initiative, the UNHCR operated as a substitute for public services. This included rehabilitation activities and compensation projects (UNHCR, 1999). Limitations surfaced when the staff that was deployed were inexperienced and various important posts were left unfilled. In addition, project sites were often inaccessible, and the co-ordination and communication poor. The project was also often delayed by conditions which were beyond their control, such as the looting of their offices and the limitation of essential donated resources.



Additionally, the project's choice of, mostly, international rather than local NGOs as partners limited the local NGOs by not supporting space for them to work in and to expand their capacities. This is crucial, in that local NGOs would best represent the Congolese civil society. Overall, the UNHCR initiatives required greater Congolese community involvement and planned, longer term perspectives, thus they were limited due to the minimal role local Track II was given throughout the conflict. This stands as an example of the fact that, because of the many limitations and the absence of local Track II initiatives, the UNHCR's role proved almost pointless.

### *3.2.2. 1999-2000: Factions within the RCD Broke Away*

In July 1999 the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement was signed by the DRC, Angola, Namibia, Zimbabwe, Rwanda, and Uganda<sup>10</sup>. Notably, both the RCD and MLC refused to sign. The Agreement concurred that forces from all sides, under a Joint Military Commission, would assist in ending hostilities, withdrawing foreign forces, deploying the UN peacekeeping force (MONUC), disarming, cantoning, and documenting all armed groups in the DRC, and in measures to hand over mass killers and perpetrators of crimes against humanity to the ICTR and to the national courts (ISS, 1999: 12).

By this point, the aggressors were forced to end their advancement shortly after having conquered almost half of the DRC. Their hopes for more progression ended because of the numerous foreign interventions, as well as the Mai-Mai militia resistance in the conquered territories. Additionally, by August 1999, the violent inward collapse of the Rwandan RCD began; birthing a new faction, the Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie-Mouvement de liberation (RCD-ML), which was backed by Uganda and established by Ernest Wamba dia Wamba in Kisangani (Lanotte, 2003: 113).

At this juncture, the UN Security Council Resolution 1279 was passed and the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) was established. By May 2000, MONUC reinforcement arrived in Kisangani from Kinshasa to help (Solomon and Swart, 2004: 51). The aid was essential because the faction division in the RCD now turned its attention to the mineral-rich Kisangani territory. Thus the dispute over it culminated between Rwanda and Uganda by June 2000. Consequently, later in June, the UN

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<sup>10</sup> To address the security matter of the DRC and neighboring countries due to a concern that it might negatively impact the surrounding Great Lakes Region (Solomon and Swart, 2004).

Security Council passed the Resolution 1304, condemning Rwanda and Uganda for their actions in Kisangani. They were then called upon to withdraw from the DRC (Solomon and Swart, 2004: 51).

It was not long before all signed parties (to the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement) launched accusations at one another over breaking the accord when MONUC was deployed to monitor the ceasefire agreement. This did little to faze the rebel groups, who continued to fight the government forces heavily, and Rwanda, who continued to fight Ugandan forces. By August 2000 more conflict reigned in the Equateur Province, where a government offensive was stopped by the MLC forces. Up to this point every attempt had failed: military operations, bilateral diplomatic efforts made, the UN intervention, the AU intervention, and even the presence of the SADC community.

The ICG (26, 2000) reports that the overall failure of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement can be accredited to the absence of leadership. The agreement depended completely upon the cooperation of the signatory parties in order to succeed. However, none of the signatories fulfilled what they had pledged. Each party suspected the other of a double game and in this way justified its own duplicity (ICG, 26, 2000). Consequently, because policy making was handled by the belligerents themselves, there was no external agent to hold them accountable; the agreement quickly lost its function of producing peace.

### *3.2.3. 2001: War over Resources*

In January 2001 there was an attempt to assassinate President Laurent Kabila, and he died two days afterward from internal injuries (IRIN: 2001). Kabila's allies criticized his government for failure to execute a detailed timetable for the introduction of a new democratic constitution leading to free and fair elections. They described Kabila as the major impediment to a peaceful settlement of the war that was specifically launched, in August 1998, to unseat him.

His son, Joseph Kabila, Western educated and English speaking, who was sworn in as the new president, quickly got to work. In February, he met with Rwanda, Uganda, and the rebel group leaders in the US and agreed upon a UN pullout plan. Soon, Rwandan and Ugandan troops began pulling back from the front line (IRIN, 2001). Meanwhile, the 1999 Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement still remained unfulfilled. The accord called for democratic transition in

the DRC, but Joseph Kabila was stalling, which raises the possibility that he felt his power threatened.

On the side, by April 2001, the UN investigated the illegal exploitation of lucrative resources in the DRC such as diamonds, cobalt, coltan, and gold (UN, 2001), only to discover that Rwanda, Uganda, and Zimbabwe were guilty of systematically raiding the country. The Security Council was asked to impose sanctions (UN, 2001). The exploitation of resources in the DRC has contributed to prolonging the war to this day, because it affirms the motivation for the external military contingents to remain active to sustain their positions of power. This is essential to an understanding of the continuing consequences of conflict in the DRC, even though this study will not go into the details of the issue of exploitation.

Although most of the exploitation happened at gunpoint, the use of existing networks suggests that the withdrawal of forces will not automatically stop the huge resource diversion. This study proposes that, with collective Multi-Track diplomatic efforts, a lasting resolution to the conflict will surface when these resources are left for the benefit of the Congolese only and when the stakeholders decide that peace (for the Great Lakes region, not just the DRC) is the more alluring option, as opposed to the continuing war over resources.

#### *3.2.4. 2002: The Conflict Continues On Another Level Despite Peace Attempts*

Despite the various efforts previously made to end the conflict, the condition began to worsen. Violent clashes broke out between the Banyamulenge and the Rwandan forces whilst the western region was secured by Kabila. International aid was re-continued as inflation in the DRC came under control. In April 2002, the Sun City Agreement was formalized and became the new framework for the DRC to follow (Cauvin, 2002: 1-4). According to this framework, it was agreed that the DRC would have a unified, multiparty government with democratic elections. The unification of the army was not considered and this weakened the agreement, yet the conflict was reduced overall, however minimally.

Not long thereafter, breaches of the agreement occurred. In July 2002 it was necessary for yet another agreement to be signed: the Pretoria Accord (Malan and Boshoff, 2002). Rwanda and the DRC signed this after five days of peace talks in South Africa. Issues brought to the table included addressing the issues of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, particularly in terms of ensuring its implementation. It committed Rwanda to withdraw its 20 000 troops from the

DRC, as well as to round up the ex-Rwandan soldiers and break down the wanted Hutu militias, the Interahamwe<sup>11</sup> (Malan and Boshoff, 2002). It committed Rwanda and the Congolese government to supporting the disarmament, demobilization, and repatriation of The Army for the Liberalization of Rwanda (ALIR). Notably, the two groups were identified in the Lusaka Agreement as negative forces (ISS, 2002).

In September 2002, another agreement was required to formalize peace between the DRC and Uganda: the Luanda Agreement (Ulriksen *et al.*, 2004). It was very difficult to execute what was agreed upon, which was that Uganda would withdraw its troops from Bunia and would strive to build a good relationship with the DRC. October 2002 arrived and MONUC confirmed the departure of all 20 000 Rwandan troops (BBC News, 2002).

By December 2002, the Global and All-Inclusive Agreement was signed by the Congolese parties: the national government, the MLC, the RCD, the RCD-ML, the RCN, the domestic political opposition, representatives of civil society and the Mai Mai (Kibasomba, R. 2005: 1-24). This was the final hope for a formal end to the Second Congo War by providing a transitional government intended for 2004. But even at present, in 2009, it is evident that the conflict continues on another level.

### **3.3. The Inter-Congolese Dialogues**

#### **3.3.1. Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement (July 1999)**

The conception and signing of the ceasefire agreement in Lusaka, Zambia, in July 1999, was accomplished with much difficulty. The process was littered with obstacles and grievances that severely weakened it altogether. Laurent Kabila, who eventually signed this agreement, was coerced into doing so by the application of great military pressure (Cilliers and Malan, 2001: 20) that threatened to defeat him, as well as by the weakening support of his allies' commitment to his cause. According to Solomon and Swart, Kabila, “[d]espite his claims of victories, [...] had not recovered any of the territory taken by the rebels and their allies since the beginning of the war,” (2004: 11).

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<sup>11</sup> These were the ex-soldiers that took part in the Rwandan genocide in 1994, who had fled into the DRC to escape responsibility in their country.

Furthermore, Critics describe Kabila as having lost his control and influence over the country, and as presenting himself as not having the necessary power to develop a sustainable regime in Kinshasa (ICG, 2002: 78). Other hurdles surfaced when the talks commenced with the factions of the RCD; each claimed to have the authority, as the leader of the group, to sign (Solomon and Swart, 2004: 11). Another threat to the process was constituted by the demands from parties involved that changes be made to the agreement. The hope was to reach a solid agreement; intended to last 270 days, it has progressively extended into years (Solomon and Swart, 2004: 11).

The agreement provided for the initiation of an Inter-Congolese dialogue on the political future of the DRC. The main provisions of the agreement included the immediate cessation of hostilities, and the establishment of the JMC, comprising of the aggressive parties under a neutral chairman appointed by the Organization for African Unity (OAU). The OAU had previously held a Ministers' Meeting in Addis Ababa in September 1998 for the planning of the agreement (MacLean and Shaw, 2002: 16).

The JMC's appointed function was to investigate ceasefire violations, work out mechanisms to disarm identified militias, and monitor the withdrawal of foreign troops. This was to take place in accordance with an agreed schedule; the deployment of an "appropriate" UN mission (peacekeeping and peace-enforcement) tasked with disarming the armed groups, collecting weapons from civilians and providing humanitarian assistance and protection to vulnerable populations; and initiating an Inter-Congolese dialogue which was intended to lead to a new political dispensation in the DRC (Malan and Boshoff, 2002: 1).

Despite these good intentions, the agreement was ultimately reached in a manner that largely froze the armies in their positions, without actually ending the conflict. The agreement was soon used merely as a reference document, and this by groups with few other options, thereby calling into question whether the accord signified actual peace, or was a perfunctory agreement only. Not surprisingly, a stalemate resulted and lasted for eighteen months (Solomon and Swart, 2004: 13).

The agreement, although conceptualised with a view towards ending the conflict, was negotiated unrealistically (Solomon and Swart, 2004: 46). Its ruin was brought about by the fact that it was only implemented in part, and that none of the groups have been capable of

defending themselves without war and repression. It seems that power sharing is not an option and that the idea of a government of national unity is not appealing to the groups. This is not to say, however, that the agreement did not make a vital contribution towards peace, but rather that the agreement was greatly flawed. Solomon and Swart judge the agreement by the theory of conflict termination, settlement strategies, and the structure of negotiations, concluding that the agreement has been more of a failure than a success (Solomon and Swart, 2004: 47).

For the purposes of this study it is not necessary to go into detail concerning the roles of each Track I action in the agreement. This would be superfluous for an analysis with relevance to Multi-Track diplomacy theory. The framework of the theory consists of three interrelated aspects which, to be successful, must work as one. The three pillars of the framework are demobilization, reintegration, and repatriation, or the resettlement of armed groups (Solomon and Swart, 2004: 47). Clearly, the shortcoming of Track I, in the case of Rwanda, was the absence of *all three* pillars of the framework; the omission of one led to the ineffectiveness of the action as a whole. There was no demobilization and disarmament of the negative forces and therefore the withdrawal of foreign troops was not carried out in earnest.

This could possibly have been avoided if Track II efforts were given greater prominence. The chaotic setting affected the entire surrounding region and called for more Track II diplomacy, in an all-inclusive Multi-Track approach, to deal with the rooted social issues that were not being addressed in the peace process. This toning-down of the internal causes of the conflict was the true shortcoming of the agreement; these should not have been divorced from the military dimension that was Track I's only focal point. The internal causes were the breakdown of the state and the collapse of the political, economic, and social dimensions of the lives of the Congolese people (Solomon and Swart, 2004: 47).

Overall, only Track I efforts were pursued to the purpose of persuading the government, the rebel movements, and the regional states to negotiate and implement the Lusaka ceasefire agreement. However, this disregarded the pre-existing issues that Track II could have unravelled with its own added value and vision.

### 3.3.2. Sun City Agreement (April 2002)

The DRC's Kabila and the MLC's Bemba met in Pretoria, South Africa, to shake hands on the power-sharing accord drafted in Sun City. South Africa's president at the time, Thabo Mbeki, mediated the process and, with the newly established African Union (AU), he led the meeting in an effort to create political stability. Speaking on behalf of SADC he stated that, "[w]ithout peace in this region, we couldn't talk about peace on the continent generally...this matter is very crucial" (Cauvin, 2002: 1-4).

Subsequently, the agreement cited that all MLC soldiers would be withdrawn. In return, the DRC agreed to disarm Hutu militiamen from Rwanda who had escaped responsibility after the 1994 Rwandan genocide. Despite the goodwill demonstrated by the previous Lusaka agreement, the accord was never really adhered to; the Sun City agreement was the turning-point. Although the signing of this agreement did not cement a successful outcome, it did recognise the need for civic leaders to be a part of the drafting of the agreement this time.

Thus Track II initiatives helped to delegate the laying down of the groundwork for the post conflict condition (Cauvin, 2002: 1-4). Moreover this accord according to an ICG report (2002):

[it] transformed the discussions between the Lusaka signatories into a bilateral negotiation with a Kabila-Bemba axis backed by the international community on one side, and a politically weak RCD, backed by a militarily strong Rwanda on the other.

The Sun City agreement was described as the beginning of the political realignment in the DRC conflict, the end of the Kabila coalition, and the isolation of the RCD, who refused to sign the accord. It voided the Lusaka accord, and new enthusiasm went into progressing negotiations with the RCD and Rwanda (ICG, 2002). The Sun City talks were the first to introduce real regional discussion on the deep-rooted issues at the centre of the conflict, rather than just on the political element. For this purpose Track II diplomacy was introduced in a minimal role, unlike with the Lusaka agreement.

Herein, the agreement for political transition towards disarmament, demobilisation, repatriation, reintegration, and resettlement (i.e., the DDRRR programme) of armed groups could be better coordinated (ICG, 2002). This is because Track II, when expanded into several separate sub-Tracks, reflects the different roles that contribute to the peacemaking

process; from there the theory's relevance. It recognizes that, in such an agreement as this, the outcome could not be seated in governmental personnel and procedures only; hence the failure of the Lusaka agreement. It therefore posits that a new opportunity to make a difference lies in the introduction of Track II diplomacy, which offers contributions from citizens equipped with a variety of skills (Diamond and McDonald, 1996: 2).

### 3.3.3. The Pretoria Agreement (July 2002)

This Pretoria Agreement of July 2002 was brokered by Thabo Mbeki, as facilitator and Chair of the African Union, together with the UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan. Kabila and Kagame signed the agreement. Notably, the stakes involved in the execution of the agreement were high for Mbeki because this was the first peacemaking success for him since his appointment as Chair of the AU (Malan and Boshoff, 2002: 2). This is significant because it means that forces other than merely the UN were now included, namely the AU and/or South Africa.

However, even with the necessary signatures on the agreement, diplomatic activity should not be mistaken for actual achievement. This can be inferred from the fact that, when the Lusaka agreement was put into action, the unsolved details became operational problems. Therefore, there was a call to have advisor-observers at hand at the talks for the Pretoria agreement to make sure that the goals would be operationally viable (Malan and Boshoff, 2002: 6).

The biggest obstacle for this agreement was the lack of troop commitment by the parties. In the agreement, the DRC government acknowledged its support for the Interahamwe and ex-FAR in the conflicts, and committed to discontinue that support. Rwanda also again committed itself to the withdrawal of all its forces from the DRC (Malan and Boshoff, 2002: 8). Overall, this agreement's purpose was to pave the way for the re-establishment of the DRC's control over territories that were subjugated by the RPA and RCD. The responsibility for the implementation of the agreement lay largely on the shoulders of the monitoring third party, South Africa<sup>12</sup>.

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<sup>12</sup> In accordance with paragraph 8.6 of the Pretoria agreement, "*the third party will take responsibility for verification whatever information, through whatever measures they deem necessary*" (South African Office of the Presidency. 2002).



Now, the agreement highlights the fact that the input of the combination of major implementing actors during the negotiating phase would have improved the overall concept of operations, as well as the commitment to effective implementation of all those involved in the process. The reality, however, was that this combination did not include enough of the much-needed Track II diplomatic endeavours. Perhaps if Track II had been given a greater prominence, the breach in understanding between the soldiers and politicians, and also between those in charge of political affairs in a field mission and the brokers of new peace agreements, would not have occurred. Thus the problem of peacemaking that is conducted in isolation from peacekeeping persists, because Track I diplomatic efforts prove unsuccessful when attempted without due consideration of the resources available for implementation, which Track II provides.

#### 3.3.4. Luanda Agreement (September 2002)

In September 2002, the Luanda agreement also paved the way for the withdrawal of foreign forces from Congolese territory. It formalized peace between the DRC and Uganda, who this time agreed to pull out its forces from Bunia and hand over control back to the DRC government (Ulriksen *et al*, 2004: 508). By this point, it was official that all Rwandan soldiers had withdrawn.

Various reasons finally pushed Uganda to withdraw its troops. The first is that which Uganda claimed initially: the fear that rebel groups, who were a threat to it, were operating in the DRC. However, a report soon revealed that this was no longer the case (Rogier, 2004: 34). Secondly, for Kabila, the Pretoria agreement meant that the new security arrangement in Sun City was backed and the DRC was able to regain access to the north-Kivu region. As a consequence, the government could surround and conquer the Rwandan proxies in that area. This may have been a reason for Uganda to agree to withdraw its forces in Luanda.

Furthermore, a new body, the Ituri Pacification Commission (IPC), comprising of Congolese, Ugandans, and leaders on the ground, was born at this time to supervise and maintain law and order. This process was an incentive for Uganda to sign the agreement because it portrayed Uganda as a peacemaker whilst simultaneously retaining some of its political influence over the resource rich Ituri region (Rogier, 2004: 34). With Rwanda, Uganda, and the MLC having signed peace accords, the way was paved for the next step: the Global All-Inclusive Agreement that would include signatory groups.

### 3.3.5. Global All-Inclusive Agreement ('Pretoria II') (December 2002)

The signatories of this second Pretoria agreement included the FAC, the MLC, the RCDN, and the Mai Mai militia, who collectively agreed to be included into a *DRC defence integration process* whereby a new national and republican Congolese Army was formed. This FARDC does not include the national police force (Kibasomba, 2005: 11). Although development has been fairly successful, the table provided below illustrates the main challenges that are yet to be conquered.

Table 3.3.5. : *Summary of Achievements and Challenges to the DRC Defence Integration Process*

Steps	Source of problem	Level of achievement
1	Agreement on goals	All seem to agree on the need for reunification and the formation of one integrated, professional, modern army and police force for defending territorial integrity and maintaining law and order.
2	Detecting deviations from goals	The process is on Track thanks to the appointment of regional military commanders and external pressures and assistance; MONUC, CIAT, Belgium, France, UK, USA, South Africa and Angola play prominent roles.
3	Economic and ethical or political incentives for Commitment	Many former rebel leaders, officers and combatants feel worse off compared to when they rewarded themselves directly; compensation in terms of claims for higher ranks characterises the process; there is continued off-budget spending and money laundering.
4	Short-sightedness and lack of long-term planning/budgeting	Political behaviour and commitment is limited to the 2005 election outcome and the end of the transition; the risk of belligerence politics is high.
5	Prejudices	Opponents suspect each other and think of the post-election worst-case scenario; there is a tendency to sabotage or delay defence integration and DDR processes.
6	Lack of resources and Knowledge	Lack of access to donors' pledged funds for defence, DDR, DDDRR and reconstruction because of a legacy of governance malpractice and limited institutional capacity; inability to generate need-based budgets; an inability to mobilise domestic resources; World Bank and UNDP and European Union play a decisive role.

*Adapted from Brauer's model (2004: 138-139)*

Not only was the second Pretoria agreement settled outside the framework of the Inter-Congolese Dialogues, but the nature and weaknesses illustrate that the dialogues were now degraded and only used as a bargaining platform between warlords and greedy leaders over how they would share power at the government level during the transition period while the democratic elections were being held (Kibasomba, 2005: 11). Rojier (2004: 35) explains that the transitional government would include ministers and deputy ministers.

The structure and composition of the parliament would include a national assembly comprising 500 members, and a senate comprising 120 members. This fact is crucial to the realisation that civil society would only have five independent institutions, and then only so that it would appear democratic in the eyes of the international community because the Sun City agreement exacted it. Therefore, parties' signing of the agreement was motivated by both the fear of potential marginalization and the fear of not having their share of power preserved, confirmed, and recognised. This, in turn, denotes that the priority was not to help the DRC recuperate, in which case Track II initiatives would have had greater prominence in the negotiations.

### **3.4. Conclusion**

This chapter presents a description of Track I initiatives in the 1998-2002 DRC conflict and consequently reveals how Track I diplomacy mostly functioned alone. Fundamentally, the description highlights that the conflict was a voracious resource-related war. Several nations, namely Zimbabwe, Angola, Namibia, Sudan, Chad, and Libya were the Kabila government's allies on the defensive side. Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi constituted the offensive side. South Africa, as a neutral power, also had an influence on the conflict by brokering peace agreements. The last role was played by the United Nations initiatives MONUC and the UNHCR.

These initiatives were expounded upon within this chapter to illustrate that a major shortcoming of their intervention was that they worked separately from Track II local initiatives. Notably, this chapter does not imply that it was the only shortcoming and, therefore, does not assume this reason to have led directly to the failure of the attempt. In fact, in chapter two of this study, the example of the Israeli-Egyptian Peace Accords in Camp David is provided as a successful example of Track I initiatives acting alone.

This chapter furthermore emphasises the fact that so many Track I diplomatic efforts were involved on both sides that it complicated and deepened the conflict to a point where neither side had a decisive victory, resulting in a stalemate. After this, the conflict shifted its focus noticeably, from political goals to the plundering of resources. Then, in 2001, after the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement's attempt to find an attainable solution, came the death of Laurent Kabila as the result of a failed effort at a coup. The subsequent appointment of

Joseph Kabila gave rise to the reopening of the peace and democracy process in order to restore damaged relations between the DRC and the major powers. It was hoped that the process initiated in Sun City, South Africa, would re-liberalize the internal politics and economics of the country.

Although Track I intervention is largely the focus of this chapter, this should not be considered a dismissal of the role of those most directly liable – the DRC's own venal political class. Neither the DRC's position in the world economy at the time, nor any social pressure, forced politicians to choose the actions they opted for. Both the offensive and defensive sides chose to challenge power violently and to invite outside forces to aid them. The analyses, provided earlier in this study, of the Congolese government's actions, and of those of the different foreign powers, guided this chapter in clarifying the conflict's origins and describing the role of the external character of the conflict, by detailing the responsibility of each foreign actor on the offensive and defensive sides.

Overall, the aim of the Inter-Congolese Dialogues was to create a transitional administration in the DRC until the democratic elections. As stipulated in the Lusaka agreement, the intention with the dialogues was to reach consensus on four major issues concerning power-sharing in the DRC. These included the formation of the FARDC, the drawing up of the blueprint for a new institutional structure for the country, the organization of general elections, the creation of a temporary constitution, and, lastly, the founding of the institutions that would govern the country during the transition period. Most importantly, dialogues not only included Track I parties, but also the main rebel groups, the oppositional political parties, and civil society representatives, even if these were not effectively represented. All parties were supposed to participate with equal status, but the description of Track I's role in this chapter reveals that Track II diplomacy's role was minimal.

The minimal role of Track II diplomacy in managing conflict, as described in this study, does not devalue the respective agreements' contribution to the peace process; however, their failures outweigh their successes. Consequently, the reason for an emphasis on the potential utility of a coordinated Multi-Track approach to address similar cases of intractable conflict in future is clarified (Diamond and McDonald, 1996).

**CHAPTER FOUR: THE ROLE OF TRACK II DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVES TO  
RESOLVE THE CONFLICT IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO:  
1998-2002**

#### **4.1. Introduction**

Chapter three illustrates, even if only in summary, between the many summits, presidential meetings and special envoys, the undeniable, solitary prominence given to Track I diplomacy in finding a solution to the conflict in the DRC. In the negotiations, political solutions were the only priority. The single aim was to convince the DRC government, the rebel groups and foreign parties to employ a ceasefire agreement. These efforts did not produce the lasting peace required for the reconstruction of the country. This is not to say, however, that the efforts were in vain, because there was significant advancement in the peace process – but not to the extent that was potentially possible. This is because the role and influence of Track II diplomatic initiatives were minimal, which should not have been the case if one considers the intangible, non-political issues facing the DRC. These underlying social issues could not be addressed by official diplomacy alone, either through policies or by force. However, to address such intangible issues adequately, specific expertise are required. Unofficial diplomacy offers a wide range of the required, specialised labour<sup>13</sup>. A Multi-Track systems approach promotes the greater prominence of such specialised skills in the peacemaking process.

Consequently, this chapter will identify the role Track II diplomacy has played in the DRC in order to support the hypothesis that a Multi-Track approach is indispensable. It will explore how, through changing the attitudes about the "other", through opening up and improving the quality of the channels of communication, and through building trust and relationships in general, the pre-negotiation climate should, in theory, improve. In doing so, this chapter will highlight that in the case of the DRC, the minimal allowance given to Track II diplomacy limited the potential to influence the pre-negotiation climate and therefore proved unhelpful in the overall outcome. Additionally, it is significant that this chapter describes the development of social networks through civil society and questions whether there is an infrastructure in place for peace in the DRC. This is fundamental in observing which spheres

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<sup>13</sup> This includes specialised labour from the following sources and/or spheres: professional, business, private citizens, research/education, activism, religion, funding, and communication/media.

of civil society were relevant to the peacebuilding during the conflict, as part of the Track II role analysis. Notably, these observable parts include (Bratton, 1994: 2) the norms of civic community, the structures of associational life, and the networks of public communication in the DRC.

#### **4.2. Role of Track II Diplomacy**

The term ‘Track II diplomacy’ was coined by Joseph Montville in 1981 in an effort to label the unofficial efforts made outside governments which brought about a diplomatic resolution to conflicts. Montville felt a need to define the division between action which was government-to-government and action which was people-to-people. In its original conception, Track II diplomacy refers to private citizens discussing issues that are usually reserved for official negotiations. Nan (2003: 1) describes it clearly as that which

...generally involves informal interaction with influential unofficial actors from civil society, business or religious communities, and local leaders and politicians who are considered to be experts in the area or issue being discussed. It generally seeks to supplement Track I diplomacy by working with middle and lower levels of society and often involves non-traditional methods, such as facilitating dialogue mechanisms and meetings that include participants from both government and non-government institutions.

The concept is based upon the belief that Track II is channel along which conflict is to be evaded if the contacts between people are initiated to build friendship and tolerance. As such, II diplomacy can contribute to conflict transformation by encouraging the parties to employ fruitful dialogue. Notably, this would entail using bargaining and negotiation methods in the dialogues between citizens from all sides. These include problem-solving workshops, dialogues as well as cultural exchanges (Naidoo, 2000: 88), all of which Track II players do not necessarily have experience of, because usually Track I diplomatic initiatives are skilled to utilize these techniques. This is a limitation that will be discussed in chapter five. In the interim, this chapter wishes to explain that Track II efforts are managed between two or more parties to a conflict, and, occasionally, also is utilized in only one party towards creating awareness of that party’s view or position in the conflict. This is significant in it this can facilitate group cohesion and help individuals who have become marginalised by their own

ethnic group find resolutions which would meet their needs and bring peace<sup>14</sup>. Ideally, in today's modern democratic world, Track II diplomacy would have a prominent position in decision-making alongside Track I efforts in a Multi-Track approach. However, in the 1998-2002 DRC conflict, this was not the case and, therefore, possibly the shortfall of all the attempted peace accords.

Track II diplomacy should have had greater prominence; however, Naidoo (2000: 84) provides five reasons for the lesser role it played. Firstly, the *nature* of the conflict and the enormity of its crisis compelled Track I to take prominence, even if it failed. Secondly, the conflict was so complex and messy that, regardless of a Track I or Track II initiation, a lasting solution could not so easily be achieved. Thirdly, the crisis was amongst the most complex, deadly, and prolonged conflicts and had a very high rate of sexual crimes, mutilations, displaced populace and summary executions that were shocking in magnitude (Shekhawat, 2009: 5).

The enormity made it particularly intensive for Track I military efforts and, therefore, the focus was on these. This focal point meant that, amidst what was seen as "serious official business", Track II initiatives were taken seriously to an even lesser extent than what would be expected, directing all activity into Track I officials, leaving little to no space for Track II to contribute its unofficial skills.

Fourthly, poor coordination between Track II endeavours themselves consequently meant that NGOs focused their resources on the Track I process. Lastly, in a developing country such as the DRC, especially amidst the devastating conflict, the capacity of unofficial diplomacy was limited and therefore, predictably, underdeveloped. On the whole, Track II's actions are not completely clear and deemed almost impossible to record. The underdeveloped condition of the civil society as well as the people's uneducated understanding of the significance of Track II's role challenged the need for record-keeping of all the unofficial intervention.

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<sup>14</sup>The case with the RCD in April 1999, for example. It split into different factions when Ernest Wamba dia Wamba, the first president of the RCD, moved to Kisangani, and that move is what commenced the series of tensions.

Nonetheless, what is recorded is that Track II diplomacy provided the unarmed forces with “an opportunity to voice their position on the conflict” (Naidoo, 2000: 84), which in turn became their rightful contribution, even if small, to the official peace process. This happened in spite of Kabila’s attempt to silence the unarmed forces and civil society groups. In detail, this meant that during the conflict, foreign Track II activity provided the overlooked civil society groups in the DRC with ways to interact and connect, in the hopes of strengthening their voice towards ultimately making an impact. Track II served to harmonise relations amongst the civil society groups.

Additionally, the various Track II efforts are what publicized and expanded global knowledge of the crisis in the DRC, thus introducing global awareness of the atrocities and their severity through the distribution of information during external dialogues, conferences and meetings (Naidoo, 2000: 84). Moreover, academic papers were published and presented by respected community leaders, researchers, and academics alike, further educating the world about the true desperation of the DRC situation and encouraging the intervention needed in the conflict crisis<sup>15</sup>. These practices, through which Track II manifested, will subsequently be expanded upon.

In the DRC, when the state infrastructure collapsed during the previous Mobutu regime, the Roman Catholic Church, together with other churches, began providing services in order to facilitate civil society’s need to run itself (Havermans, 2000). The church as a whole provided, specifically, a radio service which aided communication with the international world as well as regionally. An example of an NGO through which religious leaders played a key role is the Groupe Jérémie, which made considerable efforts to promote basic human rights (IRRIa, 1999). These efforts were to encourage long term, structural prevention through building civil society, and touched less on diplomacy. Another such example in the DRC was the Commissions Justice et Paix (Havermans, 2000), who worked closely with the Roman Catholic Church to host a platform for the dialogue between local groups from nearly all the Congolese dioceses, including those in rebel held territory. These talks were directed in the hopes of clarifying the roles each had in the overall public peace process. Additionally, these meetings provided a channel along which to disseminate information on the justice

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<sup>15</sup>Only insufficient or incomplete information was provided by the normal daily news reports (Naidoo, 2000: 98).



system, instruction for conduct when facing the aggression of the military and directional approaches to non-violent strategic action (Havermans, 2000).

For Havermans (in Naidoo, 2000: 98) the activities of Track II diplomats,

...vary from organising problem-solving workshops, acting as go-betweens to help set up a dialogue between antagonistic communities, offering mediation courses, organising seminars and conferences and private one-on-one diplomacy behind the scenes.

With this in mind, Track II roles in the DRC, other than the two already mentioned above, were undertaken to contribute to a resolution. The Montreal Conference for Durable Peace and Democratic Development in the DRC<sup>16</sup> was embarked upon in an effort to develop the involvement of civil society groups and the non-violent democratic forces in the peace process (Naidoo, 2000: 99). These initiatives, although ideal on paper, were poorly attended, and, besides educating Canada about the crisis, failed.

Another attempt by Track II diplomacy to end the conflict was a meeting convened in Pretoria South Africa, in March 1999. The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) led it and attempted to bring together RCD rebels, unarmed groups, government, the Archbishop of Kisangani and several civil society groups once again (Naidoo, 2000: 99). This time, the outcome was successful in part, in that it “narrow[ed] the gap between the parties” (Laufer in Naidoo, 2000:99). Different sides of the conflict were clarified and made intelligible, yet the absence of the required Kabila government at the meeting meant the sharing was a waste of time as far as directing actual negotiations was concerned.

Additionally, the National Council of Development NGOs in Congo (CNONGD) launched a campaign for peace in the DRC in 1999 (Havermans, 2000). Its aim was to collect international support for a ceasefire agreement, a foreign intervening peacekeeping force, and the establishment of democracy in the country. For this effort, which was a Track IV action, found within the overall Track II approach, a tour was arranged for civil society leaders to

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<sup>16</sup> In Canada, January 1999, the conference organised by the International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development, provided a platform for a wide range of DRC civil society organisations to partake in constructive dialogue between themselves, the government and the armed opposition groups (ICHRDD, 1999).

visit the western world (Diamond and McDonald, 1996: 15). Although the dialogues had not commenced until mid-1999, Kabila's move signified that his position could be influenced by the interventions of civil society. Overall the initiative was successful and proved that Track II could have a worthwhile influence, in light of Kabila's move afterward, to organise talks in 1999 between his government, the internal opposition and the civil society.

Through criticism it became clear that Track II efforts, by this point, only included internal civil society groups and, with the conflict being on an international scale, interaction between all interest groups across the Great Lakes Region needed to be included (Naidoo, 2000: 101). The 2000 Service for the Reinforcement of Assistance to Grassroots Communities in Central Africa (SERACOB) organised a meeting in Nairobi, Kenya. Civil society groups that attended included only those from Burundi, the DRC, and Rwanda. This meeting provided, primarily, a platform for the various same-country, as well as for the different-country groups, to interact (MacLean and Shaw, 2002: 15). A similar meeting in October 1999, called the Seminar on Peace-Building in the Great Lakes Region, was held in Zanzibar, Tanzania (MacLean and Shaw, 2002: 15). This meeting was organised by Track II role players: the Austrian Study Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution, together with the Southern African Regional Institute for Policy Studies (SARIPS) and the Tampere Peace Research Institute (TAPRI). These were essentially Track IV initiatives within the overall Track II approach, which includes private citizens (Diamond and McDonald, 1996: 15), as mentioned in the previous chapter. Naidoo (2000: 101) explains the meeting to have been aimed at expanding the recommendations on peace-building in the Great Lakes Region.

The following year, in 2000, a discussion forum was convened by religious groups. This is essentially categorized as a Track V initiative within the overall Track II approach, which includes research, training, and education (Diamond and McDonald, 1996: 15), as referred to in the previous chapter. These discussions were held in the DRC in a desperate attempt to bring about much needed peace (Naidoo, 2000: 101). Very soon afterward, the National Consultation Talks were undertaken in the DRC in 2000, whereby Kabila, human rights activist groups, church leaders, civil society groups, and rebel groups came together. This was organised by religious groups (MacLean and Shaw, 2002: 15) and was key in reaching a consensus for the negotiations' issues in the preliminary talks to the Inter-Congolese dialogues, in the hopes that they would proceed without obstacles and be successful. Track II successfully performed its function when unofficial actors opposed the Kabila government's

attempt to control these talks, denoting that these talks illustrate the freedom inherent in civil rights.

Overall, Track II was considered to play its role at the two day conference, *Crisis in the Great Lakes: Peace Prospects and Regional Dimensions*, hosted by the Johannesburg-based Centre for Policy Studies, and at a two-day conference entitled *Whither Regional Peace and Security? The DRC after the War*, organised by the Africa Institute of South Africa in February 2000, in Pretoria (Kadima and Kabemba, 2000). These were pertinent in presenting information on the conflict and in generating awareness of the intricacy of the crisis, while simultaneously providing experts in the field of unofficial diplomacy, with lessons for future attempts.

Lastly, in accordance with Mitchell's (1981: 278) model for conflict management technique, reproduced below, the role of unofficial diplomacy is clearly warranted as indispensable. The complete range of management processes is outlined in table 4.2, but for the purposes of this study only the second stage, which is the development of unregulated conflict behaviour, is used to illustrate that Track II provides the route along which conflict may be evaded if the contacts between people are initiated to build friendship and tolerance. By encouraging the parties to employ fruitful dialogue, Track II diplomacy can contribute to conflict transformation.

Table 4.2. : *Stage Two – Unregulated Conflict Behaviour Development*

Strategy	Method	Tactics
Conflict Settlement	Third party aims at stopping conflict behaviour and at reaching some compromise settlement	Intervention Imposition Peacekeeping good offices and conciliation mediation
Conflict Resolution	Third party aims to modify all three aspects of conflict (attitudes behaviour and situation-goals and issues) to produce a self-supporting settlement	Non-directive techniques including: social case work, marriage guidance, t-group analysis and controlled communication

*Mitchell's Model (1981: 278)*

### 4.3. A Critical Assessment of the Role of Track II Diplomacy

An assessment of the contribution of Track II's intermediation in the DRC's intractable conflict reveals that its implementation is somewhat more challenging than it appears when outlining its basic theory. Differing in skill from Track I diplomacy, it seeks to change the intangible factors of the conflict's intractability. These include attitudes and relationships that underlie the deeply rooted social issues, of which the contribution to the broader conflict environment is problematic to assess. In the words of Chigas (2003: 1),

...even when the impact of the interventions on participants' attitudes and relationships can be measured, the significance of these "micro" level achievements for the larger conflict resolution process is often not clear.

The implications of Track II's achievements are frequently unclear for a number of reasons. Specifically in the case of the DRC, however, the records of such initiatives are meagre, and the general condition of the country does not allow for progressive civil society. Nonetheless, Track II diplomacy has demonstrated some success in changing attitudes and relationships among the parties of the second DRC conflict, in challenging them, as explained in paragraph 4.1, to develop their capacity to work cooperatively towards peaceful means for resolution.

Through meetings, campaigns, forums, seminars, discussions and the like<sup>17</sup>, Track II initiatives were instrumental in changing the attitudes about the "other" (Chigas, 2003: 1). This intermediation, therefore, addresses the psychological and social dimensions of the conflict (Slim and Saunders, 2001). With regards to the concept of the "other", Track II diplomacy aided the breakdown of negative stereotypes and generalizations of the opposition in the conflict that previously caused severe distrust, suspicion, and hatred. This is crucial, because perceptions of the "other" are used to rally resources and support for the leaders to justify their motives in violence against the opposition group. Now, through these tools, Track II participants have expanded their understanding of the "other's" intentions and used these to elucidate misinformation and to accept the misfortune the opposition has also had to suffer through. Empathy with regards to the awareness of viewpoints, experiences, and needs is vital in building trust between parties in order to reach a peaceful resolution (Chigas, 2003: 1).

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<sup>17</sup> See paragraph (4.1.) for an expansion of these.

However, the question of why these tools have not produced a positive difference must be addressed, because in theory, they should. The answer is simple. Track II's initiatives to open channels of communication in an attempt to build trust were worthless, because Track I did not cooperate by working in the same direction, towards improving the quality of communication. Trust-building is not achievable if the parties in the intractable conflict are not willing to take these initiatives seriously. Track I was not prepared, in the case of the DRC, to analyze the conflict in a structured way, which entailed exploring the intangible, underlying root issues that included interests, needs, fears, concerns, priorities, constraints, and values. Consequently, Track I lacked the foundation for the development of trust between all the parties, necessary for achieving cooperative problem-solving to overcome the obstacles which obstructed the path to successful settlements in the past.

The International Crisis Group (ICG, 2008) supports this view and asserts that, to ensure lasting stability in the DRC, Track II must, fundamentally, confront the conflict's deeply rooted underlying issues, including the perceptions of the "other" promoted by Chigas (2003). The ICG (2008) supports a Multi-Track approach in that, while Track II diplomacy facilitates such work, Track I must simultaneously abandon a purely reactive approach to peace, because until now it has only produced failure in the conflict prevention process. The ICG expresses concern for the complete absence of inter-community reconciliation, that which is fundamentally led by civil society, throughout the peace process. For this reason, the ICG suggests that Track II initiatives contribute by integrating themselves more prominently into the public peace process.

In theory, the public peace process is based upon the premise that there are things government can do that the public cannot, and vice versa. Track II has provided dialogue for relationship and trust-building to happen through civil societies, which have a different kind of freedom to innovate and deepen the relationships. While only Track I can officially make the peace agreements, Track II develops the new ideas and sustainable implementation through public consent and involvement. As a direct result of Track II's marginal status in the peace process, a Multi-Track approach (Diamond and McDonald, 1996) was jeopardized and, in line with this study's argument, this subsequently limited the pursuit of a fruitful solution. Such an example of Track II diplomacy's minimal status in the conflict is evident in the case of the 'Montreal Conference for Durable Peace and Democratic Development in the DRC'.

Presented in January 1999, the conference was convened by the International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development. The aim was to provide a platform for a wide range of DRC civil society organisations to partake in constructive dialogue between themselves, the government, and the armed opposition groups (ICHRDD, 1999). The initiative, although fully drafted on paper, was not taken seriously, and the participants regretted the absence of representatives of the key parties; to wit, the Kabila government and the RCD. This poorly attended effort was one amongst many that impeded productive dialogue.

Chigas (2003: 5) aptly describes that

...being with the ‘enemy’ at breakfast, in the meetings themselves, and at the bar at night re-humanizes the conflict and helps participants recognize that they share many fears, needs, and concerns. While this new found trust, and in some cases friendship, does not always extend beyond the boundaries of the workshop to the “other” as a whole, these personal relationships are critical to developing a process for coming to the table and dealing with the hurdles in negotiation.

In this way, as already expressed, Track II deepens the understanding of the “other’s” needs and develops willingness to abandon previously non-negotiable positions (Kaye, 2002: 50). Track II, by this virtue, aids the transformation of acuties in ways that open space for negotiable positions by facilitating mutual awareness and acceptance, thereby transforming people’s win-lose outlook (Rothman and Olson, 2001: 290, Pearson, 2001: 276). What is more, Slim and Saunders (2001) report that in cases where Track II initiatives have had greater prominence, partakers in such unofficial gatherings testified beforehand to having had an actual hope and confidence that a solution could be found. They also testified to having had a greater willingness to engage with the opposition<sup>18</sup>. Furthermore, in the cases where non-negotiable gaps remain, the empathy brought about by Track II processes makes it more accessible for parties to work together in negotiations (Deutsch, 2000).

This said, Track II initiatives go beyond simply providing understanding and dialogue. These endeavours are essential to facilitating change in the relationships between parties by bringing them together to act collectively. Saunders explains this “acting together” in his fifth

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<sup>18</sup> For example, participants in the Inter-Tajik Dialogue, facilitated by Hal Saunders, report that the dialogue helped them to expand their understanding of the sources of conflict in Tajikistan. The participants expressed that it helped them to moderate their own positions (Saunders and Slim, 2001).

stage of public dialogue (Chufrin and Saunders, 1993), expounding that the initiatives introduce fresh ideas<sup>19</sup> to the process in lieu of the de-escalation of conflict. This input would, otherwise, not be generated in official Track I negotiations, which, because of the different focus of its skills, consider mainly the topical issues. In addition to this strengthening influence on the process, Track II is also a vehicle for the silenced or the marginalized moderate perspective voices in the public dialogue (Chigas, 2003: 6).

Evidence of affects such as the bringing together of opposing parties, the breakdown of perceptions of the “other”, trust and relationship building, and the provision of a platform for voicing viewpoints on the conflict are all revealed through the specific works of certain unofficial actors (Chigas, 2003). While this study does not wish to discount any effort, its scope is limited, and thus only a few initiatives will be considered.

One such initiative is the African Association for Human Rights Organization (ASADHO), which is still based in Kinshasa and has become the voice for many other NGOs and for civil society in the DRC. ASADHO assumed its role in representing human rights in the second conflict by calling for negotiations towards establishing a democratic government (IRRIb, 1999). It held talks in Kinshasa in 2000, where another active NGO, the national Forum of Human Right Organizations (ONGDH), called upon the UN Security Council to coerce the Kabila government into engaging in national dialogue, ‘through the right to implement sanctions’, as stipulated in Chapter VII of the UN Charter (UN, 1945). This should be considered a success, even if merely for the fact that amidst the outbreak of the second conflict most initiatives of DRC NGOs were suspended, offices were looted, contact was lost with external funders and partners<sup>20</sup> and the overall working environment for these NGOs deteriorated (Havermans, 2000). In spite of these limitations, and many others that will be discussed in chapter 5 of this study, the DRC NGOs collectively rounded up a National Campaign for Lasting Peace in 2000 in an effort to speak out in promotion of peace, for the repatriation of foreign troops and for the establishment of an authentic democracy. Another such NGO, present in the DRC during the second conflict, is the Forum on Early Warning and Early Response (FEWER), which played a major role in organizing gatherings to access the conflict based on the situation analyses collected on a regular basis (Havermans, 2000). Synergies Africa and the International Human Rights Law Group is yet another NGO that

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<sup>19</sup> This includes those ideas that would be too sensitive to address in official negotiations, i.e. the underlying relational issues.

<sup>20</sup> These foreign-based funders and partners include Oxfam (UK), Novib (Netherlands), and NCOS (Belgium).

aided the CNONGD in coordinating a gathering of all leaders in civil society. The aim was to encourage productive dialogue between the civil society and the Kabila government (Relief Web, 1997.). Lastly, the ICG has, since the second conflict began, been advocating a regional crisis prevention plan for the Great Lakes Region.

Overall, this chapter illustrates that while the function of Track II is crucial in peace processes, as the above mentioned examples have illustrated, it has been largely ineffective in the case of the DRC, as previously expressed in paragraph 4.1. An assessment of its role reveals that it was limited under the Kabila government's chosen route of Track I dominance, regardless of its efforts and potential. The limitations of Track II and civil society will be discussed in further detail in Chapter 5. The articulation of Track II was silenced due to the polarization of the relationship between conflicting parties, which made it almost impossible, when voicing their opinions, to be heard and taken earnestly. They were silenced by political oppression and intimidated by the authorities (Chigas, 2003: 6).

#### **4.4. Social Networks for Civil Society and Infrastructure for Peace**

Civil society, as Bratton (1994: 2) defines it is:

...a sphere of social interaction between the household and the state which is manifest in norms of community cooperation, structures of voluntary association, and networks of public communication.

Bayart (1986: 112) explains civil society as a synthetic conceptual construct that is not necessarily embodied in a single, identifiable structure. Being intangible, this study observes that it is thus found within the structure of Track II, and therefore forms part of this chapter's focus.

Civil society, in Africa, should be expected to occur in different forms than in the western world (Bratton, 1994: 1). This is significant in that African literature on the concept questions very differently how the civic players in the DRC and other Track II initiatives are communicating towards building change for peace. In the 1990s climate of political liberalization, civil society in the DRC thrived under Laurent Kabila's rule. This was aided by the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of the Congo, together with foreign donors, who began pressurizing the political leaders to bring about change. A few notorious Mobutist political prisoners were released (Collins, 1998:12), for example, and one-party



constitutions were nullified in an attempt to improve the legal environment for free expression and association. In light of this, Bratton (1994: 6) cites extensive evidence to show that formerly closed political space in the DRC, was now occupied by genuine manifestations of civil society. These materialized through civic norms, structures of associational life, and networks of public communication.

However, before considering these elements, it is vital to recall that Track II diplomacy, in the specific case of the DRC's second conflict, made its major and critical contribution to the official peace process in the conflict by providing the unarmed actors with an opportunity to voice their position. This was desperately needed and essential because the de facto partitioning of the country made it unfeasible for communication between the occupied areas and the civil society to flow. Significantly, it was the Track II efforts, taking place outside the DRC, which served to provide civil society groups with a platform for interaction and engagement. Examples of such initiatives include ASADHO, ONGDH, FEWER, CNONGD, and the ICG, as explained in paragraph 4.2. These Track II initiatives were created for and geared towards supporting and providing civil society groups with a platform of interaction and engagement. Consequently, these Track II efforts provided greater coordination of the unarmed forces' programmes and also an opportunity for them to unite and create a stronger voice to present their position in the conflict, which led to a proliferation of information on the crisis. This, in turn, educated the world about the desperate circumstances in the DRC, which subsequently mobilized the likes of MONUC, for example, to form and intervene. As a part of a Multi-Track approach, the role of civil society within Track II unofficial diplomacy will be reflected through elucidating its manifestations in the DRC.

#### 4.4.1. Norms of Civic Community as a Manifestation of Civil Society

Robert Putnam (1993: 72-173) explains the norms of civic community as those whereby social actors learn to trust each other and unite for a common voice. Very little information exists on how Congolese citizens feel about democracy, which constitutes the norms of civic community. The citizens that do take part in politics and community affairs do so through voluntary associations, such as ASADHO, ONGDH, FEWER, CNONGD, and the ICG, which all have debatable strengths and weaknesses, in light of their contribution to the conflict. One such strength, as Bratton explains, is that, because the Congolese draw their identity from "collective social units like family, clan and ethnic group, there is a firm basis of group solidarity upon which to construct primary associations" (Ekeh, Agbaje and the

National Research Council, quoted in Bratton, 1994: 8). This is crucial in understanding that, consequently, the capacity of Congolese civilians to support united relations can be invested in collective action (Hyden and Landell-Mills quoted in Bratton, 1994: 8). The product of this is that voluntary associational groups have been formed as a united front to fight for their voice in policy making and conflict negotiations.

Bratton explains (1994: 3) that,

As citizens, people define community needs, assert claims of political rights, and accept political obligations. They do so primarily by clustering together in organized groups of like-minded individuals in order to obtain common objectives.

An obvious weakness, however, is that the Congolese economic climate during the conflict did not provide the essentials needed for the development of civil society. MacGaffey (1987: 2) and Kasfir (1984: 84) explain that in order to evade the costs and inefficiencies of the economic implemented regulations, “part of the economy variously referred to as the second, parallel, informal, underground, black or irregular economy” was, and still, is supported. These trading networks in the DRC ranged, for example, and continues do so, from unplanned village markets to organized international smuggling syndicates. These networks have grown rapidly in the DRC since the 1980s, and are said to exceed the size of the official gross domestic product (Bratton, 1994: 5). This has had profound political implications which in turn aggravated the economic crisis of the state because the shift towards informal networks made it difficult to collect taxes, which weaken public revenues, especially in foreign exchange. As a result, and out of desperation, permission was granted to these networks to perform some of the functions that were previously monopolized by the Mobutu government.

With these obvious setbacks, civic community affairs were not a high priority in the DRC under the circumstances, undoubtedly because the focus was on family needs and physical survival. Moreover, the Congolese government itself did not consider the education needed to develop well-informed civilians for civil society a high priority either. Such a climate was unfavourable for fostering the norms of reciprocity and participation which civil society is essentially based upon. Thus, in the face of economic strife, especially in the case of a developing country such as the DRC, civil society is, predictably, not important.

Bratton (1994: 8) affirms this, saying that

Indeed, the global association between stable democracy and advanced industrial economy suggests that democratic institutions (including civic institutions) are difficult to construct under conditions of mass economic privation and great social inequalities.

Moreover, in the case of the DRC, when the contributions of foreign donor aid have led to economic dependence, this has had direct negative consequences for civil society. The dependence on foreign funds implies that the loyalties of civil society is distracted or divided because it must be accountable elsewhere. This, in turn, enables the host government to write them off with the excuse that they are directed by foreign interests (Bratton, 1994: 8).

Another weakness pertaining to the norms of civic community in the DRC is the neo-patrimony that exists, which mostly reveals itself in corruption and, at mass level, in a vertical fear between the patron and subordinate. This implies that the patron often goes unchallenged. Both of these are unfavourable for the development of civil society (Putnam, 1993: 87).

#### 4.4.2. Structures of Associational Life as a Manifestation of Civil Society

In particular relevance to the DRC, a brief look at history tells us that after independence, African ruling elites emphasized state sovereignty and national security. Bratton (1994: 5) also expresses that the elites sought to bring about "de-participation". Despite the elites having poured all their energy into the one-party systems and military regimes, they were largely unsuccessful at discouraging the establishment of autonomous organizations in civil society. Out of desperation, leaders began integrating them under the wing of governing parties, while other leaders barred them completely. In spite of these attempts, however, voluntary associations demonstrated their strength when they survived as an alternative institutional framework to the bureaucracy.

Additionally, a strong civil society is expected to be associated with a competitive market economy as well as with a capable state. This is noteworthy because associational life was limited in the context of the conflict's political violence because of the absence of the rule of law and other such essential services that were discontinued. There is "no possibility of choosing, like the old anarchists, civil society alone" (Walzer, 1991, 301). Instead, civil

society is "institutionalized and generalized through laws (provided by the state), especially subjective rights" (Cohen and Arato, 1992: 9). As a result, the civil society in the DRC did not have the assisting environment of legal rights and infrastructure that was essential for it to play out its full potential. It could not operate in the DRC during the conflict, where public order had collapsed and was operating well below its capacity.

With regards to the structures necessary for civil society, Robert Putnam (1993: 72-173) explains the structures of associational life to be those constructs which are in place for civil activity to occur. This said, in order for civil society to produce a real effect, however limited, Track II initiatives in the DRC conflict<sup>21</sup> took on the form of organizations and national conferences, where people voluntarily united for a common cause. An example was the 'Montreal Conference for Durable Peace and Democratic Development in the DRC' which was presented in January 1999. This conference was organised by the International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development. Generally, these organizations and national conferences varied from localized organizations, informal organizations, apolitical organizations, to national policy advocacy organization (Bratton, 1994).

Notably, it is the policy advocacy organizations that had the most positive influence on Track I official politics (Bratton, 1994: 2) in general. Established in the DRC in the 1980s, civic organizations had the mandate for monitoring human rights performances and representing the unheard voices (Bratton, 1994: 6). In spite of various limitations, these efforts were still embarked upon. Policy advocacy organizations demanded sovereignty to perform public corruption charges in an effort to strip Kabila of his powers (Bratton, 1994: 6). This is a perfect example of civil society in the DRC playing its role to represent the unheard voices in the official jurisdiction. Despite having failed, the mere fact that civil society was active in criticism and attempted action illustrates that its role was very necessary, but, unfortunately, underestimated and perhaps even undermined.

#### 4.4.3. Networks of Public Communication as a Manifestation of Civil Society

The notion of going to war democratically is a subject on its own and will not be expanded upon here. However, considering the networks of communication in place during the second

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<sup>21</sup> A national conference, explained by Bratton (1994:2) "is an assembly of national elites, between several hundred and several thousand strong, which includes representatives of all major segments of society and is often chaired by a church leader".

conflict, the subject must be discussed briefly so that a clear understanding of the role of civil society within Track II, as unofficial diplomacy, is reached. Under the strains of the DRC conflict, the democratic values of the right to freedom of information were, not surprisingly, diluted, evaded, but mostly abandoned altogether. Baker (2000: 263) explains that the Kabila government saw Track II to have no value to add to military matters of which they had no experience in and that their contribution, through conferences and debates, were just talk and simply interrupted decision-making in negotiations. Track II was considered to undermine the Congolese national unity through the networks of public communication publishing their reports.

Lastly, with regards to public communication in today's globalized world, an array of new communication systems has promoted public political discourse through technology. Despite Joseph Kabila's authoritarian rule, he was unable to control the decentralized technologies that updated the Congolese people, as well as the international community, on the crisis, disseminating also those political viewpoints that were considered rebellious when provided with the devastating statistics. From fax messages to satellite television broadcasts, to newspapers, to the internet, the press was a force within the civil society. However, the absence of democracy meant that these networks were unable to develop fully and have maximum impact on the peace process, because the state would not establish and enforce the guarantee of freedom of speech.

#### **4.5. Conclusion:**

The ultimate aim of this chapter was to provide clarity on the role of Track II diplomacy in the DRC's second conflict of 1998-2002. Track II initiatives were limited and could not adequately influence the issues it had the potential to nurture. In this way, its role was made marginal in only facilitating the signing, and not the creation, of the peace agreements. Thus the function it did have, but was powerless to fulfil, resulted in the system's shortcoming under the Kabila government's chosen route of a diplomatic approach that was dominated by Track I initiatives. Differing in skill from Track I diplomacy, Track II diplomacy nonetheless sought to add its value to the peace processes.

Still, from the descriptive analysis provided, it is evident that Track II diplomacy had to resort to working separately from Track I initiatives because of limitations. Track II, in

summary, only provided the unarmed forces with opportunities to voice their positions, which, in turn, became their rightful contribution, albeit small, to the official peace processes of 1998-2002. This happened in spite of Kabila's attempt to silence civil society groups. During the conflict foreign Track II diplomacy's activity provided overlooked civil society groups with ways to interact and connect in the hopes of strengthening their voice towards ultimately making an impact. This served to harmonise relations amongst the civil society groups. According to Bratton (1994: 6), formerly closed political space was occupied by authentic signs of civil society in the DRC. This could be observed in the civic norms, the structures of associational life, and the networks of public communication.

Track II diplomatic initiatives were what publicized and expanded the global knowledge of 'the DRC story', thus introducing global awareness of the atrocities and their severity through the distribution of information during external dialogues, conferences, and meetings. Academic papers were also published and presented by respected community leaders, researchers, and academics, which further enlightened the world about the true situation of the DRC, subsequently encouraging the intervention required in the crisis. A combination of discussion forums hosted by religious groups, meetings, campaigns, forums, and seminars, constituted Track II initiatives that were instrumental in changing the attitudes about the "other" (Chigas, 2003: 1). These efforts therefore attempted to address the psychological and social dimensions of the conflict (Slim and Saunders, 2001). In this way, Track II assisted in the debunking of negative stereotypes and generalizations of the opposition in the conflict through dialogue. An example is the Commissions Justice et Paix (Havermans, 2000), which worked closely with the Roman Catholic Church to host such dialogue. This is essential, since perceptions of the "other" were used to muster resources and support for the leaders to rationalize their motives for violence against the opposition group.

Naidoo (2000: 84) provides five reasons for the lesser role that Track II diplomacy played. Firstly the *nature* of the conflict and the enormity of its crisis compelled Track I diplomacy to take prominence, regardless of the possibility of failure. Secondly, the conflict was so *complex and messy*, that a permanent solution could not be arranged so simply, whether initiated by Track I or Track II. Thirdly, the *magnitude* of the conflict made it particularly severe for Track I military efforts to achieve success, so that the focus and resources were concentrated on these. Thus there was no scope for the coordination of Track II into what necessarily became the Track I process. Fourthly, *poor coordination* between Track II

activities themselves consequently meant that NGOs focused their resources on the Track I diplomatic process to the detriment of Track II diplomacy. Lastly, in a developing country, such as the DRC, especially amidst the devastating conflict, the *capacity* of the Track II diplomacy was limited and consequently underdeveloped.

For the most part, Track II's initiatives to open channels of communication in an attempt to build trust were worthless, because Track I diplomacy did not cooperate in working towards improving the quality of communication. This does not mean that Track I initiatives did not incorporate Track II during the 1998-2002 peace processes at all. Instead, the surrounding region's insecurities and war economy limited Track II's potential to work more closely alongside Track I. Furthermore, as this chapter explains, Track I was not prepared, in the case of the DRC, to analyze the conflict in a structured way, and was consequently left without the foundation for the development of trust-building between all the parties. Trust-building could have facilitated cooperative problem-solving, thereby providing a means through which to overcome obstacles that hampered the many unsuccessful agreements in the past. In the contemporary democratic world, Track II diplomacy would ideally have a prominent position in decision-making alongside Track I diplomatic efforts in a Multi-Track approach. Yet in the 1998-2002 DRC conflict this was not the case.

## **CHAPTER FIVE: LIMITATIONS OF UNOFFICIAL INTERVENTION**

### **5.1. Introduction**

In the case of the DRC, where domestic conflict is at the centre of the conflict, implementing any peace accords proves complicated because of the underlying, deeply rooted relational issues that persist in the parties involved. These issues were directed by mistrust and miscommunication, which hindered the implementation of intervention. In the short term, at least, Track II initiatives were not designed to accomplish the goals of Track I diplomacy, such as policy changes. Instead, the intangible factors were affected, such as the immeasurable attitudes and the underlying issues of which the part in the bigger picture, while difficult to access, were fundamental. This is exactly why the factor of grass-roots participation must be delegated carefully and intensely, amalgamating the identity of the people herein, versus the instrumental nature of the negotiations that take part at a Track I. This is to say that the involvement of civic representatives is as crucial as the involvement of Track I officials, because Track II deals with factors such as fears and distrust that lead to the miscommunication, indirectly prolonging the conflict. Pearson (2001: 276) expresses how these factors need to be weighed against the prominent role of power balances, exhaustion, and stalemate in the implementation of peace accords. He thus stresses the importance of grass-roots participation in the negotiation process and therefore the key connection between the limitations of Track II initiatives and the ultimate outcome of peace implementation.

Although the changes contributed by Track II diplomacy are not as apparent as the Track I's political policy or leadership change, many of the contributions of Track II can be identified in the changing of attitudes and relationships among the parties. This, when limited, however, cannot fully produce success in building the capacity for the parties to actually work together towards developing securing a peaceful resolution of the conflict. This chapter, as an assessment of the limitations on unofficial intervention, will question why Track II efforts have not been able to have a greater positive impact on the conflict. Therefore, in support of this study's central hypothesis, the factors that contributed to the limitation of unofficial diplomacy will be briefly discussed, as well as the underlying motivations that led to its general exclusion from this critical period, during which the peace process required consultation and input from each and every segment of society in order to have been considered a success.



## 5.2. Limitations of Track II Diplomatic Intervention

After the Cold War era, greater attention was turned upon security and its effectiveness in conflict resolution. With this, the traditional Track I role players have been reviewed worldwide, allowing for attention to be turned, and rightfully so, to the potential value that unofficial role players have in presenting other capable resolutions. The major role of Track II has predominantly been in economic and humanitarian aid and relief through NGOs. However, McDonald (1991: 201) further scrutinizes this aid to have “done little to resolve the root causes of conflict” and faults it on the limited capacity of Track II players, who have greater potential if given more prominence in the arena alongside Track I initiatives.

Notably, amidst the outbreak of the second conflict, most initiatives of the DRC NGOs were suspended, which included the NGO offices which were looted by army soldiers or militias; they were also deprived of scarce resources such as necessary fax machines and computers. Also, contact was lost with the foreign funders and soon the overall working conditions for the NGOs deteriorated (Havermans, 2000), all of which were the more obvious limitations on Track II influence.

### 5.2.1. *Lack of Experience and Isolation*

In the case of the DRC’s second conflict, Track II diplomacy attempted to contribute towards its transformation by encouraging all the parties to employ fruitful dialogue. This entailed using bargaining and negotiation methods between citizens from all sides, including problem-solving workshops and cultural exchanges (Naidoo, 2000: 88), as explained in the previous chapter in section 4.1. The limitation, however, was that Track II players had no adequate experience in these. It is, in fact, Track I that usually possesses the needed skills to use these techniques. A Multi-Track approach, however, would have provided for Track II to work alongside Track I to complement these skills as a part of a living system. Diamond and McDonald (1996: 1) express this idea through the parable of the blind man and the elephant: “Likewise, if we consider the animal as a whole but don’t know the parts and how they each contribute, we lose the value of acquaintance with a richly complex being”.

Dalia Kaye (2001: 68) writes about the effectiveness of Track II diplomacy in the context of the Middle East Dialogues. Her argument can, similarly, be used to illustrate the limitations of Track II in general, as well as in the context of the DRC conflict. She posits that “it is an

ironic aspect of Track two that when such dialogue is most needed, it is often most difficult to bring about". It is difficult to bring about because Track II players have had to separate their work wholly from that of Track I's. Track II's work is considered immaterial if it does not alter Track I's position and therefore this complete separation directly limits the needed dialogue, making it difficult to produce resolution properly. Thus, unofficial processes cannot be entirely isolated from the official political environment in spite of Track II's expected low key and private contribution. In the context of official activity, media coverage, and public opinion, it is impossible for official and unofficial processes to be fully disconnected (Chigas, 2003: 10).

### *5.2.2. Lack of Participation*

While various Track II endeavours were perfect on paper, they were, in reality, poorly attended and resulted in failure. The Montreal Conference for Durable Peace and Democratic Development was such an endeavour, embarked upon in an effort to develop the involvement of civil society groups and the non-violent democratic forces in the peace process (Naidoo, 2000: 99). The limitation on this Track II initiative was the division of the unofficial process from Track I, because there was an obvious lack of participation by all the pertinent parties, to cooperate and take the dialogue seriously.

Another instance of this disconnectedness that ultimately limited Track II work, arose when a meeting was convened in Pretoria, South Africa, in March 1999. The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) led the meeting, which was unsuccessful in yielding more than a "narrowing [of] the gap between the parties" (Laufer in Naidoo, 2000: 99). The different viewpoints of all parties in the conflict were clarified and made intelligible, yet the limitation on such activity was the absence of a key actor, the Kabila government. This essentially curbed any progress and wasted time. The outcome produced no actual negotiation.

### *5.2.3. Lack of Cooperation*

Yet another setback for Track II concerned its efforts to open channels of communication towards building trust. These efforts proved worthless because Track I did not cooperate in working in the same direction towards improving the quality of communication. Trust-building is not achievable if the parties in the intractable conflict are not willing to take these

initiatives seriously. Track I was not willing, in the case of the DRC, to analyze the conflict in a structured way, and therefore not prepared to explore the intangible, underlying root issues that include interests, needs, fears, concerns, priorities, constraints, and values. As a result, no foundation was laid for building trust between all the parties towards cooperative problem-solving which would be able to scale the obstacles previously in the way of unsuccessful peace related settlements.

#### *5.2.4. Antagonism from Official Activity, Media Coverage and Public Opinion*

Moreover, in terms of a limitation, the openness of Track II initiatives exposes it as “vulnerable to negative media exposure caused by leaks or media commentary” (Chigas, 2003: 10). This is crucial in pointing fingers to the official activity, the media coverage, and the public opinion that were mostly antagonistic,<sup>22</sup> proving extremely critical of Track II initiatives. Naidoo (2000: 84) explains that poor coordination amongst Track II endeavours, coupled with this negative commentary, meant that the NGOs and other foreign aid in the conflict, focused their resources almost entirely on the Track I processes. This limitation eventually obstructed any possible progress in the direction of erecting required dialogue.

#### *5.2.5. Complicated Nature and Enormity of Crisis led to Track I Prominence*

Furthermore, it is Track I’s contribution that offers a “power-based, formal and often rigid form of official interaction between (the) instructed representatives of (the) sovereign nations” (McDonald 1991:201-202). This is often construed as interfering in the internal affairs of a sovereign state and the setback is the lack of a flexible, less formal and unofficial balance that only Track II can bring through dialogue and improved communication. Naidoo (2000: 89) explains that the merit of working alongside Track II in this way is that it de-escalates the conflict before official negotiations can continue, because the layman on either side has a greater capacity to influence their side, relationally and physiologically. Especially since the end of the Cold War, the world has experienced a different side of war, one that is more internally disputed, “in which governments are just one of the (many) actors involved” (Havermans, 1999: 223). This signifies that Track I diplomacy cannot, nowadays, be the solitary solution for conflict.

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<sup>22</sup> The antagonism included harassment, bullying, aggression, negative bureaucratic interference from the different parties’ sides, all of which make the needed dialogue difficult to produce, shaking up even the bravest of Track II actors (Chigas, 2003: 10).

The DRC was one such case that definitely required both internal and external mediating tools, but it did not utilize these sufficiently. The nature of the conflict and the enormity of its crisis alone compelled Track I to take prominence, which, in turn, became the limitation on Track II diplomacy work. The fusion of eight foreign regional states, various rebel groups, local leaders, and community-based organisations complicated the already chaotic, enormous conflict and was also a limitation because it led to the prominence of Track I diplomacy. Additionally, soon after the conflict commenced, a new rebel group, the MLC, arose whilst factions also broke out from other rebel groups enlarging the already extensive list of partakers in the conflict. This further complicated the task for the Track I initiatives, because they were then forced to stretch thinly and only focus on the main aggressors, pouring their resources into those. This in turn limited the opportunity for Track II to gather all the parties together to carry out, in its unofficial manner, fruitful dialogue. This illustrates that a lasting solution could not simply be arranged in brief. The magnitude of the conflict made it particularly intensive for Track I military efforts. Moreover, it is exactly the sizeable range of actors involved that makes the second conflict a perfect case for illustrating why and how a Multi-Track approach is vital. In a case such as this, Havermans (1999: 223) comments about Track II diplomacy that “most experts in the field believe that its potential has not been fully used”. Track II diplomacy would be perfectly suited, in this massive conflict, as a pre-negotiation means for a more effective way in working alongside the government.

#### *5.2.6. The Logistics of Networking*

Another limitation that Track II diplomacy had to face was the requirement that, for it to succeed, a wide network of contacts accumulated through gaining respect and trust in the intermediate processes must first be collected. This in itself requires much time to generate, and is crucial in facilitating the necessary atmosphere for dialogue to take place; one of neutrality and safety for all parties involved (Chigas, 2003: 10). Other than time, these networks also require finances in order to run the processes for dialogue towards developing strategies and ideas for implementing change in the wounded societies concerned. Combined, time and extensive resources become some of the basic requirements for successful intermediary processes, but in the conflict, these were challenging to acquire because foreign, governmental, and private donor aid was limited and directed to Track I diplomacy, as previously expressed.

### 5.2.7. *The Ulterior Motives of Foreign Intervention*

Chapter three of this study covers the role and motive of Track I diplomacies in the DRC and found that many of the foreign interventions were not, in fact, altruistic in nature. This influenced and further complicated Track II work in terms of facilitating dialogues between more actors. It also, consequently, limited the already minimal donated funds and human resources for Track II initiatives that were not on par with these exploiting actors. Therefore, the ulterior motives of foreign intervention that had contributed resources further pressurized the already unmanageable conflict (Chigas and Ganson, 2003). This subsequently made it difficult for Track II to maintain a balance between building coalitions across conflict lines and safeguarding their position, their social networks, and their efficiency within their own side or skill which, according to Chigas (2003) is a necessity. Overall, the networking largely limited Track II diplomacy.

### 5.2.8. *The Way in which Politics Undermines Track II Diplomacy's Role*

In addition, another limitation on Track II diplomacy is the way in which politics undermined its role. Wolpe and McDonald (2008: 140) explain that,

Democracy and peace are sustainable only when leaders of a divided society have come to recognize that, whatever their conflicting interests, they share more important commonalities. It is only when they come to see themselves as dependent upon one another, as fundamentally part of the same social and political universe, that they will have the will and the capacity to attack the underlying social and political inequalities that gave rise to their conflict in the first instance.

In other words, when leaders do not recognize these commonalities, Track II's role is undermined while it attempts to equalize this imbalance by providing the unarmed forces with "an opportunity to voice their position on the conflict" (Naidoo, 2000: 84). As previously mentioned, this, in turn, became Track II's contribution, albeit small, to the official DRC 1998-2002 peace process. It is important to note that this happened in spite of Laurent Kabila's attempt to silence these and civil society groups, which in itself was another limitation. Moreover, Track II's role is undermined at times when the inequality between the parties is exposed through the views of the parties concerned, and, more importantly, through the way in which they regard the Track II diplomacy initiatives (Mohammed in Chigas, 2003: 11). Kriesberg (in Chigas, 2003: 11) explains that, in most cases, parties either attempt to convince the opposition to change their political views, or they attempt to establish

relationships and build unity with the opposition. This is how the parties' regard for Track II's role might negatively affect its ability to equalize any disparity. In other words, all parties must allow space for effective solution finding, in order for Track II diplomacy efforts to change political cultures on both sides towards proceeding in constructive negotiation.

*5.2.9. Kabila's Totalitarian Rule left no Space for a Liberal Democratic Society*

According to the definition of civil society, the public peace process is based upon the premise that there are things government can do that the public cannot, and there are things the public can do that government cannot. Track II diplomacy has provided dialogue for relationship and trust-building to transpire through civil societies which have a different kind of freedom to innovate and deepen the relationships. While only Track I diplomacy can officially make the peace agreements, Track II diplomacy develops the new ideas and sustainable implementation through public consent and involvement. As a result, Track II diplomacy had a rather critical contribution to offer in the peacebuilding process, which was not taken seriously enough by the Track I officials and so only a minimal role was given to Track II diplomacy, therefore inhibiting the role of Multi-Track diplomacy to function (Diamond and McDonald, 1996).

Furthermore, after Kabila led the ADFL into seizing Kinshasa in May 1997, he began limiting political rights and banned political activity. This was coupled with his failure to put into effect a worthy transitional government (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2006: 132). The consequence brought the unarmed internal opposition to react by non-violently opposing Kabila's sudden position. Their efforts, however, were in vain, because Track I initiatives still did not include all the internal unofficial parties concerned, such as the Mai Mai movement, in the signing of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, in July 1999 (Solomon and Swart, 2004: 1-50). Track I initiatives were primarily centred on the Kabila government; the rebel groups and the foreign armed forces (Naidoo, 2000: 9). This left very little room for Track II efforts into the underlying relational issues, because the DRC became the "battleground for the internal disputes of six neighbouring countries" (Naidoo, 2000: 92). The desperate sources of insecurity fed each other within the conflict system that existed throughout the Great Lakes Region.

#### *5.2.10. Local NGOs paralyzed and Cornered into Supporting a Side*

Furthermore, crucial to understanding the limited role of civil society is the fact that it was victim to ethnic and regional animosities instilled by the political elites (Havermans, 2000: 4). When Badouin H. Kabarhuza, leader of the national umbrella organizations of all NGOs in the DRC (CNONGD), was arrested by the Kabila government for charges of collaborating with the rebel groups, and then when several other local civic representatives were also arrested, the pressure on unofficial activity was clamped down. This limitation subsequently brought local reconciliatory activities at a civil society level to a pause. Moreover, Havermans (2000: 4) explains that another limitation for the Track II activity was that many local NGOs were under great pressure to choose a side in the conflict and were thus limited in not taking a neutral stance which, not surprisingly, weakened the local NGO structures. As a result, this gave international NGOs more of a reason to channel their support into Track I efforts.

#### *5.2.11. Inadequacy of Record-Keeping*

The people's uneducated understanding of the importance of their contribution through participation at grass-roots level undermined the significance of Track II's role. This subsequently challenged the need for the record-keeping of all the unofficial intervention's work, which in itself was then also a limitation. On the whole, the lack of clarity results from a number of reasons, but especially in the case of the DRC, the records of unofficial interventions are meagre, a fact which is aggravated by the war-torn condition of the country, which does not allow for the progressiveness of civil society (Naidoo, 2000: 84).

#### *5.2.12. No Role in the Actual Creation of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement*

Overall, Mpangala (2004: 19) reports that the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement failed to pave the way to a lasting solution to the conflict because it was weak. He explains that its weakness lay in that it left implementation to the belligerents themselves, opening the possibility that the process would be sabotaged. Due to Track II having had no actual role to play in the creating of the agreement, nor in the implementation process, its unofficial, indispensably specialized contribution, was absent, as this study has attempted to illustrate. The absence of its contribution thus decreased the chances of success in accordance with the hypothesis of this study that recommends rather, a Multi-Track approach.

### 5.3. Conclusion

This chapter explores the limitations on Track II intervention, specifically in the case of the DRC's second conflict. These limitations are the basis for this study because, without identifying them in the hopes that progress could be built upon this clarity, this hypothesis would prove useless. A list of these limitations serves as an overview to conclude the chapter:

- Lack of experience and isolation.
- Lack of participation resulting from disconnectedness.
- Lack of cooperation.
- Antagonism from official activity.
- Media coverage and public opinion.
- Complicated nature and enormity of crisis leading to Track I prominence.
- The logistics of networking.
- The ulterior motives for foreign intervention.
- Politics' undermining of Track II's Role.
- Kabila's attempt to silence civil society, limit political rights, and ban political activity.
- The failure to put into effect a worthy transitional government.
- The DRC being used as a battleground for inter-state aggression.
- Local NGOs being paralyzed and coerced into supporting a side.
- Inadequacy of recordkeeping.
- Lack of involvement in the creation of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement (ISS, 1999).

Track II diplomacy, as explained in chapter 4 of this study, has the potential to influence the conflict greatly through its initiatives, yet when restricted by these limitations it could not produce success in building the capacity for the parties to work together towards developing peaceful resolution.

However, it is crucial to clarify that although Track II diplomacy's role in the DRC was limited; the mere fact of its presence was a positive start for a developing African country. Therefore, the blame cannot be placed solely upon the shoulders of the Kabila government for not allowing Track II greater prominence. The responsibility must, instead, be shared with the Multi-Track community who need to implement their system more effectively and comprehensively in Africa. For this reason, chapter two considered both the internal and



external issues of the system, notably in accordance with its creators, Diamond and McDonald (1996), highlighting reasons for its limited implementation. Therefore, in support of this study's hypothesis, the limitations that faced Track II diplomacy in the conflict has clarified how the peace process can be approached differently in future, when the Multi-Track approach is considered.

## **CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION**

### **6.1. Aim and Main Findings of the Study**

Broader issues and agendas operate as a starting point in this type of research, but due to the complexity of the conflict the intention of this study has been narrowed. This was due to the climate in the Great Lakes Region where desperate sources of insecurity have fed each other in a conflict-system, making it impossible to efficiently separate issues within a conflict. The DRC conflict of 1998-2002 was such a case because it was largely fuelled by the region's surrounding war economy, which subsequently served to aggravate pre-existing ethnic divisions. The conflict soon grew so complex that its issues could no longer be clearly divided. Despite the twenty-three failed attempts to establish peace, the conflict persisted with no signs of abating, which suggests that an historical and discourse analysis of the peace processes could be useful.

Thus, chapter one of this study presents the aim, which is not to make an empirical inquiry or offer any solution to the conflict, but rather to achieve clarity on the peace processes through describing the incidences of each peace attempt that was launched during the conflict period between 1998 and 2002. In doing so, the study aimed to describe the role of official and unofficial diplomacy in the processes. It revealed that priority was given to Track I diplomatic initiatives, to the relative greater exclusion and neglect of Track II diplomatic endeavours. However, this does not mean that the tracks were always implemented in isolation, as this descriptive analysis reveals that there were cases where Track I did indeed involve Track II elements, such as in the Pretoria Agreement. However, for the most part this study argued that substantially lesser prominence was given to Track II diplomatic efforts. For this reason, as part of a critical analysis, support for a fully operating Multi-Track approach (Diamond and McDonald, 1996) is presented in the theoretical framework.

Chapter two of this study served to present the specific context for the theoretical framework of Multi-Track diplomacy and civil society. It explained that the Compass Interaction Model offers the most efficient approach to peace making, as it opposes the previous idea that Track I is seated at the top of the hierarchy, with all the unofficial tracks poised to change the direction of Track I. It revealed that the proposed model is a new expanded version, which demonstrates that all the tracks in a peace process add equal value, while differing in

function. Furthermore, the chapter explained that one of the functions of civil society is to increase the capacity of conflicting parties to negotiate by opening channels of communication for negotiation and for facilitating relationship-building and trust-building. Thus, civil society constitutes a fundamental part of Track II as unofficial diplomacy. It therefore forms a pertinent part of this study's aim of describing the roles of diplomacy in the peace processes of 1998-2002 in the second DRC conflict.

For the purpose of achieving this aim, chapter three of the study questions Track I diplomacy's role in the conflict. The main findings of the chapter reveal that Track I intervention failed to work collaboratively alongside Track II in the unsuccessful attempt at a peace agreement processes. Fundamentally, the 'Second Rebellion', including the roles of the offensive sides; Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi, was a resource-related war. The less obvious role-players in this war were a coalition of major foreign powers, namely Australia, Canada, Japan, and the United States. Several other nations, Zimbabwe, Angola, Namibia, Sudan, Chad, and Libya, intervened as allies on the Kabila government's side. Lastly, South Africa was involved as a neutral power who brokered the peace agreements. The fact that so many actors were involved on either side complicated and deepened the conflict to a point where neither side had a decisive victory, which resulted in a stalemate. The chapter describes the shift in focus from political goals to the plundering of resources in the war economy of the surrounding region, which financially benefited several Track I intervening actors.

Another finding in chapter three revealed that the aim of the Inter-Congolese Dialogues to create a transitional administration in the DRC until the democratic elections, as was set in the Lusaka Agreement, was to reach consensus on four major issues concerning power-sharing. The finding was that the true shortcoming of the agreement was the toning-down of the internal causes of the conflict. These underlying internal problems should not have been divorced from Track I diplomacy's only focal point, which was the military dimension. However, this does not suggest that the agreement was futile in contributing towards peace; this descriptive study reveals that it was greatly flawed, though. Through the theories of conflict termination, settlement strategies and structure of negotiations, the agreements have been labelled by the conflict resolution community as more of a failure than a success. Chapter three ends by describing the coordinated use of the Multi-Track approach to emphasize its potential utility in addressing other similar future cases of intractable conflict.

Chapter four of this study clarified the role of Track II diplomacy in the conflict. The finding was that Track II was limited and could not therefore adequately influence the issues it was supposed to nurture. In this way, its role was made trivial with regards to only facilitating the signing and not the creation of the peace agreements. Thus the function it had, but was powerless to step into, was the systems' shortcoming under the Kabila government's chosen route of Track I dominance. Moreover, the findings concerning Track II's role included that, although differing in skill from Track I diplomacy, Track II nevertheless sought to change the intangible factors of the intractability. These included the attitudes and relationships which underpinned the deep rooted social issues, the contribution of which to the broader conflict environment was problematical to assess. For this reason, the finding revealed that Track II diplomacy had to resort to working separately from Track I. Track II diplomacy, in summary, provided the unarmed forces with opportunities to voice their positions, which in-turn became their rightful contribution, if small, to the official peace process. This happened in spite of Kabila's attempt to silence them and civil society groups. During the conflict, foreign Track II diplomatic activity provided the overlooked civil society groups with ways to interact and connect in the hopes of strengthening their voice towards ultimately making an impact. This served to harmonise relations amongst the civil society groups themselves. Bratton (1994: 6) demonstrates that there is extensive evidence to show that formerly closed political space was occupied by genuine manifestations of civil society in the DRC, which included the civic norms, structures of associational life and the networks of public communication.

Chapter four of this study found that Track II diplomatic efforts were what publicized and expanded a global knowledge of 'the DRC story', thus introducing global awareness of the atrocities and their severity through the distribution of information during external dialogues, conferences and meetings. Academic papers were also published and presented by respected community leaders, by researchers and by academics alike, further educating the world about the true desperation of the DRC situation and encouraging intervention that was greatly needed in the conflict crisis. Discussion forums were held by religious groups and meetings, campaigns, forums, seminars and discussions were, collectively, instrumental Track II initiatives in changing the attitudes about the "other" (Chigas, 2003: 1). Therefore it attempted to address the psychological and social dimensions of the conflict (Slim and Saunders, 2001). Additionally, Track II diplomacy aided the dismantling of negative stereotypes and generalizations of the opposition in the conflict in this way, through dialogue

and an example is the Commissions Justice et Paix (Havermans, 2000) whom worked closely with the Roman Catholic Church to host such dialogue. Chapter four found this finding to be crucial because perceptions of the “other” were used to rally resources and support for the leaders to justify their motives in violence against the opposition group.

Furthermore, chapter four found that there were five reasons for the lesser role Track II diplomacy played. Firstly the *nature* of the conflict and the enormity of its crisis, compelled Track I to take prominence, even if it failed. Secondly, the conflict was so *complex and messy*, that a lasting solution could not simply be arranged in brief, whether Track I or Track II initiated it. Thirdly, the *magnitude* of the conflict made it particularly intensive for Track I military efforts and therefore the focus was predictably there. Thus there was no space for the co-ordination of Track II diplomacy into what essentially became the Track I diplomatic process. Fourthly, *poor coordination* between Track II endeavours themselves consequently meant that NGO’s focused their resources on the Track I diplomatic process. Lastly, in a developing country, such as the DRC, especially amidst the devastating conflict, the *capacity* of unofficial diplomacy was limited and mostly underdeveloped.

Thus chapter four exposed the initiatives of Track II in opening channels of communication in an attempt to build trust which proved worthless because Track I did not cooperate in working in the same direction towards improving the quality of communication. Trust-building is not achievable if the parties in the intractable conflict themselves, are not willing to take these initiatives seriously. Track I was not prepared, in the case of the DRC, to analyze the conflict in a structured way thereby missing the foundation for the development of building trust between all the parties, towards cooperative problem-solving to prevail over the obstacles in the way of the many settlements that never produced fruit.

After having described the role of Track II diplomacy in chapter four, chapter five of this study explored the limitations of Track II’s intervention. The limitations were the basis for this study because without identifying them in the hopes that progress could be built upon its clarity, then the hypothesis would prove useless. In brief, the limitations found were: a Lack of Experience and Isolation; a Lack of Participation from Disconnectedness; a Lack of Cooperation; Antagonism from Official Activity, Media Coverage and Public Opinion; Complicated Nature and Enormity of the Crisis which led to Track I Prominence; The Logistics of Networking; The Ulterior Motives of Foreign Intervention; The Way in which

Politics Undermined Track II's Role; Kabila's Attempt to: silence civil society, limit political rights, ban political activity and his failure to put into effect a worthy transitional government; The DRC used as a Battleground for Inter-State Aggression; Local NGO's Paralyzed and Cornered into Supporting a Side; Inadequacy of Record-Keeping; No Role in the Actual Creation of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement.

These findings exemplified that the potential to influence the conflict properly, was restricted by these limitations. Track II diplomacy was unable to build the capacity for the parties to actually work together towards developing peaceful resolution. Additionally chapter five differentiated between these limitations and those of the Multi-Track system. This was crucial in making clear that although Track II's role in the DRC was limited; simply its presence was a positive start for an African developing country. Therefore the chapter found that the blame could not be placed completely upon the shoulders of the Kabila government for restricting track II diplomacy's role. The responsibility should be shared with the Multi-Track community who need to implement their system more affectively and wholly into Africa. For this reason the internal and external issues of the system were explored within the chapter in accordance with the creators of the system: Diamond and McDonald (1996), highlighting findings for its lack of implementation.

Therefore by describing the roles of Track I and II diplomacy in the 1998-2002 peace processes this study revealed the limitations that Track II diplomacy faced and that the initiatives were mostly separated. The study consequently describes that a coordinated use of the Multi-Track approach, in addressing other similar future cases of intractable conflict, is important when fully utilized in a peace process.

## **6.2. Success of the Research Methodology**

This study is qualitative in nature which is appropriate for a descriptive study of Multi-Track diplomacy and civil society which are good examples of critical social science. Moreover, this is how this descriptive study served to enhance and reorient the reader's understanding of the 1998-2002 peace processes in the DRC second conflict.

The limitations of the research methodology were inherent to the nature of this study. Due to this study being limited with regard to time and space, it was overall short. This in itself narrowed the study to only having a descriptive purpose. Additionally there was no

opportunity for a hands-on approach in data-collecting. This is due to the restriction that fieldwork could not be conducted, as it was neither possible nor feasible to travel the DRC for such purposes. Thus reliance was placed mostly upon secondary sources. It is notable however that fortunately many of the author's that this study utilized had themselves undertaken research trips to the DRC whereby they collected data and wrote up their primary sourced findings. Subsequently those findings have characteristically driven this literature-review study.

However, had this study been conducted under different conditions, i.e. a longer time span, with the possibility of travel and field research in the DRC, it is believed that a more extensive and comprehensive account might have been delivered on the conflict. In addition, there would have been opportunity to place Track II diplomacy into a more predominant role to see if whether in practice the Multi-Track approach would yield fruit as it did in the example of the successful Oslo Accords of 1993. In addition when considering the conflict in retrospect the role of unofficial intervention in the DRC conflict has not been well documented. The nature, complexity, magnitude, poor coordination, and capacity of the devastating conflict should warrant it worthy of greater, in-depth research and analysis. Although the lack hereof may prove to be a deterrent for future studies, it should also be noted rather that in this way it discloses the necessity of filling such a gap.

Overall success of the research methodology was in that it achieved its purpose of presenting a descriptive analysis of the 1998-2002 peace processes by explaining the roles of Track I and II diplomacy therein. It was also successful in bringing together the schools of traditional official and conventional unofficial diplomacy. It served to prove that the two schools of thought, although different in functioning, share equal value and a coordinated effort from the two in a Multi-Track approach to a peace process would be effective.

### **6.3. Relevance of the Theoretical Concepts**

Chapter two of this study provided a framework for a Multi-Track approach and civil society in the peace processes of 1998-2002. Multi-Track diplomacy is based upon the work of the authors Diamond and McDonald and is relevant to this study because the peace processes were mostly deficient of unofficial intervention. A greater prominence of non-governmental; informal; and unofficial contacts and activities between private citizens is explained as

necessary for improving communication; understanding and relationships by decreasing anger; fear and misunderstandings. After noting the significance of having a theoretical point of departure such as this one, the study was able to move towards a conceptualisation of civil society because it a part of Track II diplomacy. The applicability of civil society to this study was established through the discussions entered into in chapters four and five.

Bayart (1986) and Bratton (1989)'s explanation of civil society were relevant insofar as discussing that without a basis for civil society to grow upon, as was the case in the DRC, then unofficial initiatives cannot operate to its fullest potential. Moreover, these author's reference to Africa's need for an individual approach to civil society was also pertinent in understanding the limitation of its role in the case of the DRC.

Overall it was through the descriptive analysis of the 1998-2002 peace processes that Track II diplomacy's minimal role was revealed and the use of a Multi-Track approach questioned. Therefore the theoretical concepts of Multi-Track diplomacy and civil society were highly applicable to this study's purpose.

#### **6.4. Lessons Learnt**

In the initial stages of this study, it was believed that the Kabila government was solely to blame for the minimal role of Track II intervention in the conflict. However, upon closer investigation this study found that various other factors such as the regional insecurity of the Great Lakes Region, and the surrounding war economy served to fundamentally drive the conflict by aggravating the pre-existing ethnic divisions within the country. It was simply not enough to only find fault with the government for the lesser role of Track II diplomacy in the peace processes. Another lesson learnt was that Diamond and McDonald's Multi-Track approach system in itself has major flaws, and this provided perspective into the implementation of the approach in an African context.



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