DESTIGMATISATION WITHIN THE HIV/AIDS PANDEMIC:

TOWARDS A PASTORAL ANTHROPOLOGY OF EMBODIMENT.

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DECLARATION

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**ABSTRACT**

The focus of the thesis is on the HIV and AIDS-related stigma and stigmatisation of people who try to live positively with HIV/AIDS within the pandemic. The basic assumption is that there is interplay between the HIV/AIDS-related stigma as a cultural phenomenon and the negative perception of the human body. Since a human being is created corporeal and re-created due to the fact that human embodiment is a fundamental ingredient for the understanding of soul, it is argued that in a pastoral approach, a person should be understood holistically. Anthropology within the traditional kerygmatic approach focused mainly on the notion of sin (*corruption totalis*) within the theological understanding of God’s judgement (*judgemental attitude*). I have proposed that pastoral anthropology should adopt constructive paradigms and point towards the integration of embodiment (*wholeness*) in a realistic approach rather than emphasising the notion of sin and forms of dualism. The thesis departs from an eschatological and pneumatological view of the human being, in which the concepts of resurrection and hope are equally crucial. I further argue that a Christian spiritual perspective on embodiment is potentially destigmatising itself. In terms of a pastoral hermeneutic I have shown that in destigmatisation the transformation of the HIV and AIDS-related stigma corresponds to the transformation of the mindset and paradigm of a person (*habitus*). Through the process of destigmatisation people discover meaning and are enabled to live fully embodied and responsible lives.

The thesis is designed as a literature study based on text analysis and hermeneutical reflection. Moreover, in order to develop a pastoral anthropological view, the Scripture is used as a reference point.

**Keywords**

Destigmatisation, HIV/AIDS pandemic, pastoral care, pastoral hermeneutics, corporeality, embodiment, pneumatology, eschatology
OPSOMMING

Die navorsing fokus op die fenomeen van stigmatisering binne die HIV/AIDS pandemie. Die kernargument is dat stigmatisering as ’n sosiaal-kulturele konstrukt binne die netwerk van verhoudinge direk in verband staan met ’n bepaalde destruktiewe persepsie wat die vraagstuk van liggaamlikheid onmiddellik raak. Vandaar die verdere fokus op die verband tussen liggaamlikheid en die verstaan van die menslike siel binne die raamwerk van ’n pastorale antropologie. Die teologiese invalshoek is die eskatologiese paradigm, die mens as ’n pneumatiese wese en nuwe skepping. Liggaamlikheid deel gelykoorspronklik aan hierdie nuwe wees-funksie van die mens sodat ’n verstaan van die mens as ’n „beliggaamde siel“ en ’n „besielde liggaam“ alle vorme van dualisme in ’n teologiese antropologie teëwerk. Die totale mens is as ’n beliggaamde mens geskep sodat in ’n pastorale antropologie die menslike persoon holisties verstaan moet word. Om menswees bloot vanuit die perspektief van sonde te benader hou nie rekening met die realisme van die Bybel wat die mens binne die raamwerk van die wysheidsliteratuur sien vanuit die perspektief van genade en vernuwing. ’n Eensydige fokus op die paradigma van sonde dra by tot ’n destruktiewe veroordelende houding (judgemental attitude). Volgens die aard van ’n kruisteologie is die „smeet“ en „stigma“ van sonde daar oorwin. In die lig van die opstandingsperspektief is die „dood van stigma“ totaal uitgewis. Hierdie opstandingperspektief moet verreken word in ’n teologiese model wat gerig is op prosesse van destigmatisering binne ’n pastorale hermeneutiek. Die implikasie hiervan is die transformasie van stigmatiserende paradigmas en die skep van ’n pastorale houding (habitus) van begrip en medelye.

Deur ’n dergelike proses van destigmatisasie word mense in die kern van hul wees-funksie kwalitatief bemagtig ten einde vervulde lewens te kan ly. Die tesis volg ’n kwalitatiewe benadering. Dit is voorts ’n literêre studie gebaseer op teks-analises, kritiese refleksierig en ’n hermeneutiese metodologie.

Sleutelwoorde
Destigmatiesasie, HIV/AIDS pandemie, pastorale bediening, pastorale hermeneutiek, liggaamlikheid, lyflikheid, pneumatologie, eskatologie
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INTRODUCTION

- Background and description

To introduce the alarming proportions of stigmatised persons trying to live positively with HIV and AIDS, I borrow Eunice Kamaara’s words:

“Due to the culture of stigmatisation, persons living with HIV and AIDS [...] are discriminated against or they isolate themselves socially. They may choose to avoid public occasions and social interactions that are important for human life, or may feel unloved, useless and uncared for. They may hate themselves and suffer from feelings of self-blame, guilt and denial. These feelings translate into stress and suffering not just for the individual person living with HIV [and AIDS] but also for the entire society around the person” (Kamaara 2004:42).

The HIV and AIDS pandemic leads human beings into borderline situations. There continues to be no medical cure as an option. Likewise, the HIV and AIDS-related stigma seems to stand in where words are no longer able to transfer meaning. Still, attached to the HIV and AIDS-related stigma is great suffering and behind it lurks meaningless. What would be a constructive and meaningful way to deal with the pandemic and the realities it includes in order to speak of “AIDS competence” in a pastoral response (Louw 2006:1)? In this study the hermeneutical process of interpretation is an important theological tool in the pandemic, based on the presupposed assumption that there exists a correlative interplay between the eventual notion of stigma and the perception of human embodiment.

In the case of the HIV and AIDS pandemic, I assume that HIV and AIDS-related stigmatisation is connected to negative and destructive perceptions regarding the value and status of the human body. More specifically, in pastoral theology, a one-sided perception regarding the place of the human body in human identity, can add to the complexity of HIV and AIDS-related stigmatisation within Christian circles and communities. Because of the HIV and AIDS-related stigmatisation, the life quality of people trying to live positively with HIV and AIDS is dramatically at stake.
Simultaneously, as a consequence of stigmatisation, the occurrence of HIV is more likely due to denial, repression, and ignorance of the issue. Silence about HIV and AIDS makes fighting it more difficult. Hence, HIV and AIDS-related stigmatisation is one factor which makes HIV and AIDS an individual as well as a societal threat. If pastoral care, *cura animarum*, the healing of the soul, is actually *cura vitae*, the healing of life (Louw 2007), then an approach to pastoral anthropology has to take into account the need for structural healing regarding the notion of HIV/AIDS and its related stigma and stigmatisation. Structural healing pastorally implies that all members of the community, the body of Christ, are afflicted. Thus, the research topic: *Destigmatisation in the HIV and AIDS pandemic: towards a pastoral anthropology of embodiment*.

Although stigmatisation is a phenomenon that happens in certain contexts, among certain people, in a certain time, the task in a pastoral theological reflection is to question the anthropological paradigm behind the cultural and relational phenomenon.

First, in the centre of the pastoral theological reflection is the mistaken human being, the sinning human being and the suffering human being. The focus on the body arises from the assumption above and the fact that it is only through the body that human beings do relate with one another. In theological and philosophical history the view of the body as subordinated to the human mind, and the body understood as “flesh” associated with “being sinful” has dominated. In the theological context one can even speak of the stigmatisation of the human body “in a hierarchy of values by relegating it into an inferior position to the mind and the spirit” (Ackermann 2006:12). The human being at sin may not be narrowly understood in the sense of moral transgression. Rather, the notion marks a relational status in being distanced from God’s everlasting faithfulness.

Second, the theological argument for the reassessment of the human body and the *wholesomeness* of the human being stands in line with the notion of creation and re-creation through the inhabitation of the Spirit in the human being; being human can become a means “to glorify God”, a means through which life attains new meaning despite the contextual reality of suffering.
● Problematic field of research

It is of highest importance to reflect in pastoral theology whether, and to what extent, the traditional association between our human sinfulness (see my Chapter Two) and human embodiment is contributing to negative perceptions within the debate on HIV and AIDS-related stigmatisation. The theological paradigm of sin in itself is problematic, if it remains unreflected, because it invites for a one sided judgment of what is right or wrong. Hence, the paradigm of sin opens up a tension between dogmatical and ethical reflection, which especially challenges practical theological questions like how to understand HIV/AIDS-related stigmatisation of people who are trying to live positively with HIV and AIDS.

The assumption of the thesis is that the problem lies in the perception of the human body and embodiment. This negative perception is expressed in the notion of stigma and stigmatization. In the background of a pastoral approach towards destigmatization stands the question of images of God and the human being. The challenge in the thesis is to identify the paradigm behind those images which add fuel to HIV/AIDS-related stigma and stigmatization. In asking, what is the attitude behind HIV/AIDS-related stigma, the difficulty is to interpret the finding appropriately in a relational instead of an ontological approach.

● Research problems

In the HIV and AIDS pandemic stigma and stigmatisation are problematically connected to the negative perception of the human body. Stigmatisation of people who are trying to live positively with HIV and AIDS often happens in Christian circles under the label of “Christian norms and values” focussed on the notion of the sinning human being. The difficulty is to clear out the actual connection between sin and stigmatisation. The challenge of research is then to describe the shift from stigmatisation to destigmatisation in terms of a Christological approach.

For this understanding the notion of eschatology, the human being in the light of God’s grace, is determining. How can destigmatisation within the HIV and AIDS pandemic take place despite the experiences of indifference, rejection and
discrimination in life situations of human beings? How in terms of destigmatisation


can human beings experience trust and gratefulness, and develop an affirmative


attitude towards human corporeality and life itself?


● **Hypothesis and research assumptions**

It is hypothesised that HIV and AIDS-related stigmatisation is closely related to


skewed perceptions. A judgemental attitude directly impacts human identity. At stake


is the notion of human dignity and its relatedness to human embodiment. In order to


change perceptions, paradigms should be changed. In this regard a pastoral


approach to the problem of stigmatisation implies a total re-evaluation of the human


body, thus the importance of the research topic: towards a pastoral anthropology of


embodiment. In the thesis I state that HIV and AIDS-related stigmatisation is


essentially a problem of perception due to presupposed judgements about worth and


value of the human being.


In Chapter One the main assumption is that the phenomenon of stigmatisation is


related to negative paradigms and schemata of interpretation of the human being,


which leads to the degradation of human embodiment. In Chapter Two the thesis


considers the assumption that stigmatisation goes along with the degradation of


human embodiment within the context of the HIV and AIDS pandemic. The aim of


the chapter is to show the complexity of HIV and AIDS-related stigma and to unmask


its connection to the notion of sin (hamartiology), as well as to look at this


connection’s impact on theological anthropology. In Chapter Three the concepts of


corporeality and embodiment in theology and philosophy will be investigated. The


chapter begins with an inspection into the theological and philosophical discussion of


body concepts. It will then consider those paradigms that have contributed to the


degradation of the human body in the history of philosophy and theology, and finally


proposes a pastoral anthropological reflection of embodiment based on a biblical


understanding of the human being. In Chapter Four the aim is to interpret previous


scholarly discussions on the notion of stigma and embodiment in the light of


Scripture. In terms of pastoral hermeneutics, the pneumatic notion of
destigmatisation means a new stance and attitude in life determined by the eschatological perspective.

- Methods
The approach of this topic in pastoral theology is based on the hermeneutical connection between situational context, theological reflection and Scripture. The research is designed as a literature study based on critical analysis of existing data from the perspective of pastoral anthropology. In analysing and assessing the meaning of concepts and rational constructs and their impact on human behaviour, the study also implies a qualitative approach. Throughout, the thesis follows a hermeneutical approach in the interpretation of the phenomenon of stigmatisation within a pastoral anthropology. In theological thinking, the term “hermeneutic,” on the one hand, refers to the necessity of interpreting texts (including rites and arts) of the Christian tradition, and on the other hand, the term points to both human understanding and self-understanding in contexts in which theological thinking participates, and towards which it contributes (Jeanrond 1994:1654f.).

- Research objectives
The way in which Christian churches (the body of Christ) responded to the HIV and AIDS-related stigma, should be assessed against the background of specific cultural contexts. I unmask stigma as a social construction and as an ethical and theological dilemma. In so doing, the meaning and importance of reintegration of the body in pastoral theology, in context of the notion of stigmatisation, will become clear. The theological argument is an eschatological perspective on human embodiment. This Christian spiritual perspective turns out to be potentially destigmatising itself.

The research’s key objective is to probe into the realm of schemata of interpretation and evaluate its impact on human embodiment. This will be achieved through the following:
- Identifying stigmatisation as an offence far more serious than so-called “moral misdeeds”;
- developing, in theory formation, a constructive understanding of the human body and its relatedness to human identity; and
- Pointing out in what way and to what extent a Christological approach can help us to destigmatise human embodiment.

● Research contributions to future developments in this field

The approach taken herein towards a pastoral anthropology chooses to build on a normative anthropology, in the sense that how we deal with HIV/AIDS and the related stigma is indeed a moral issue. Unmasking stigma as a social construction and an ethical and theological dilemma can open up the way in pastoral theology to become sensitive to the re-integration of the human body in the theological discourse about HIV and AIDS and their related stigmas. Hence, pastoral theology also needs to reflect about societal and structural conditions of human beings as texts in their contexts. Pointing out the vulnerability of being human, this study also opens up the way for further research concerning the opportunities of being embodied.

● An extant presupposition

The centrality of the body in theology is a basic feature that should not be underestimated. Many misunderstandings, such as the notion of stigmatisation, arise from the neglect and indifference towards a holistic perspective of human beings. At the same time, the Gospel and its destigmatising power offer a remedy in the sense of cura vitae.
CHAPTER ONE
THE PHENOMENON OF STIGMA AND STIGMATISATION:
DEGRADATION OF HUMAN EMBODIMENT

In the first chapter I shall begin by considering the concept of stigma and stigmatisation in order to offer a working definition. Likewise, I refer to human embodiment in describing how stigma and stigmatisation affect the human being in his or her total existence. This will be done from a pastoral theological perspective while taking into consideration studies outside the field of theology.

1. PRELIMINARY DEFINITION OF STIGMA

In ancient Greek, the term *stigma* (στίγμα) means sign, brand or engraving. It served as a mark of decoration, belonging or property (Mödl 1994:1736). Other meanings included a wound or a tattoo. On the one hand, for the ancient Greeks, stigma referred to bodily signs or branded marks, while on the other hand, these marks were meant to express something “unusual” or “bad” about the “moral status of the signifier”. Signs were cut or burnt into the skin of the bearer, who often was a criminal, a slave or an otherwise blemished person, said to be out of the moral framework of society. The purpose was to recognise somehow the other in order to be able to differentiate, and to exclude the individual or the group from normal society (Goffman 1990:11).

Today in anthropological sciences, as in sociology and psychology, *stigma* defines a mark or a sign that attracts attention and usually expresses *otherness* in terms of devaluation of an individual or a group. Here the emphasis on the mark and sign does not lie consciously on the physical appearance of a stigma anymore. According to Goffman (1990:11), the term *stigma* “is widely used in something like the original literal sense, but it is applied more to the disgrace itself than to the bodily evidence of
it”. Nevertheless, the reference to bodily expression of a stigma may be prevalent in social status (e.g. material wealth) or sexual orientation. In addition, sharing certain characteristics with other people such as being physically disabled, being from a specific ethnic background, or being infected with a specific virus, is enough to be a sign or a mark referring to bodily expression.

In what follows, I shall refer to the term *stigmatisation* as the phenomenon in which an individual or a group of individuals consciously or unconsciously define another individual or a group as “different”. The definition serves as a preliminary working definition for the study.

### 2. RELIGIOUS CONNOTATION OF STIGMA

In Scripture\(^1\), the word stigma is scarcely mentioned. Rather, the word θημείον (sign),\(^2\) which is theologically closely connected to stigma, is common in passages of Scripture.\(^3\) Talking about stigma in the broader sense of Scripture also entails an eschatological sign.\(^4\) Paul uses the expression τὰ στῖγματα in a literal sense in Galatians 6:17: “From now on let no one cause me trouble, for I bear on my body the marks of Jesus.” Interpretations suggest that he refers to the visible signs of his apostolic service and to the wounds Jesus had to suffer (Mödl 1994:1737; Heiligenthal 2000:1116). In later Christian eras, metaphorical layers were added. In mysticism, stigma refers to “bodily signs of holy grace;” whereas the medical allusion to the religious connotation refers to “bodily signs of physical disorder” (Goffman

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\(^2\) Examples of passages, that deal with the term θημείον, are Luke 2:35 and Genesis 4:15.

\(^3\) Hebrew terms for “sign” in the Old Testament have two equivalent terms in the New Testament, στίγμα and θημείον.

\(^4\) The doctrine of eschatology refers to assertions concerning “the already, but not yet” of God’s kingdom in the world. Examples using a term for “sign” found in Scripture: Isaiah 44:5, Ezekiel 9:4 and Revelation 13:16ff. Different terms for “sign” are used, which also refer to an eschatological dimension (Mödl 1994:1737). I will focus on the eschatological dimension of stigma in Chapter Four.
In the history of theology, appearances of stigma have been understood according to the context of biography and the intention of the bearer. The question is whether a natural or supra-natural cause (e.g. charisma) lies behind a particular stigma (Mödl 1994:1737).

In the thesis I go a step further and hermeneutically inquire into the meaning of (the HIV/AIDS-related) stigma. What is the paradigm of stigma in the context of the HIV/AIDS pandemic, theologically, and what are the meaning dimensions that can be added?

3. CONCEPTUALISATION AND DESCRIPTION

This section discusses stigmatisation based primarily on the work of Erving Goffman (1963. Stigma. Notes on the management of the spoiled identity), who was one of the pioneers in the research on stigma and whose work has been built upon by many sociologists. This section is also indebted to Jürgen Hohmeier’s sociological work on stigma (1975). For an investigation of HIV and AIDS-related stigma, I will refer to Gregory M. Herek (1999), who is known for his research on HIV and AIDS-related stigma.

3.1 Stigma: deviance and “spoiled identity”

In Goffman's view, society has the potential and “means of categorising persons”. Society lays down “the complement of attributes felt to be ordinary and natural for members of each of these categories” (Goffman 1990:11). The encounter between a “stranger” and “us” is constituted in a way that, with first appearances, one is able to anticipate categories and attributes of the other. Both attributes and categories

5 The term stigmatisation, in reference to processes of exclusion and separation in sociological sciences, has only emerged at the beginning of the 1970s. Goffman describes the social process, in which stigmatisation is likely to happen as one, in which one does not meet the expectations of another category.

6 Stigmatisierung als sozialer Definitionsprozess builds on Goffman’s research and complements it in certain aspects.

7 “Category” here refers to various sectors of a society.
define a “social identity.” Goffman’s observation that “anticipations” are soon to be transformed into “normative expectations” and from there to “righteously presented demands” is outstanding. Goffman suggests that the “demands we make might better be called demands made ‘in effect’, and the character we impute to the individual might better be seen as an imputation made in potential retrospect – a characterisation ‘in effect’, a virtual social identity. This virtual social identity stands beside the actual social identity, which eventually could be proved to be factual (Goffman 1990:12).

Goffman points out that a special discrepancy between virtual and social identity constitutes stigma. Stigma therefore refers to a deeply discrediting attribute, “which is incongruous with our stereotype of what a given type of individual should be” (Goffman 1990:13). Hence, for Goffman, stigma is a relational term, a term that describes social relations. In fact, “stigmatizing labels” or attributes have a discrediting and exposing effect, often with heavy consequences on the life situation and identity of the people affected.

Theologian Gillian Paterson considers Goffman’s approach to stigmatisation more closely, and identifies three insights. The first is that Goffman shows that there is nothing ontological about stigma and stigmatisation. Rather, it is connected to one’s context and perception; it emphasises norms and values and it is rooted in human attitude. Sociologists agree that the phenomenon itself (stigma) and prejudices “do not necessarily inhere [sic!] in behaviours or types of persons” (Ainlay, Becker & Coleman 1986:91). Another almost self-explicating point that Paterson draws on, is that norms have the function to give orientation and to demarcate from phenomena differing from the norm. Consequently, where one speaks of norms, which have a special meaning and function in society, there is also deviance bound to exist. She

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8 Goffman uses the term “social identity” instead of the term “social status” because personal attributes (e.g. honesty), as well as structural ones (e.g. occupation) are involved (Goffman 1990:12).
9 Here, the thesis needs to question further the ‘demanded’ norms behind such expectations. Nonetheless, we are neither aware of making demands, nor of their contents “until an active question arises as to whether or not they will be fulfilled” (Goffman 1990:12).
10 Goffman’s italics.
11 In organized societies there do exist values, which can become norms, which can become rules, and which can finally become laws.
also stresses that persons characterised as the normal and the stigmatised are not to be regarded as persons. With Goffman we can speak of virtual social identities, to which Paterson refers to as perspectives (Goffman 1963:12; Paterson 2005:34).\textsuperscript{12}

The sociologist Hohmeier also builds on Goffman’s concept of stigma. Instead of emphasizing the discrediting attributes as Goffman does, Hohmeier points out to the negative definition, which is ascribed to the notion of stigma (Hohmeier 1975:7). He argues from a sociological perspective by describing deviance as the result of a social process of compromising. In this process of compromising, ways of behaviour or attributes are characterised as “deviant” (Hohmeier 1975:6). Hence, Hohmeier like Paterson recognises that deviance is not a quality of acting and being itself (ontological), but the result of a societal definition. Like all social phenomena, which are contextual, deviance, as a social definition, also underlies historical changes.\textsuperscript{13}

Both Hohmeier and Goffman focus on the phenomenon of stigma. Goffman points to a stigmatising label; so to speak, the stigma is attached to a discrediting attribute of the bearer, through which the latter is recognised as deviant and even spoiled. Differently, Hohmeier stresses the process of a negative social definition. With Hohmeier it is the perspective, the attitude of an individual or a group, who defines another individual or a group downwards as deviance. In so doing, Hohmeier affirms that deviant attributes (which are worth stigmatizing) are not rooted in the state of being different of persons or certain groups. It is the process of definition itself, in which the fact of being different is pinned down in a judgemental way.

According to Hohmeier, stigma is the special case of a social prejudice towards a person or a group to whom a negative attribute is ascribed. Therefore, stigma is based on generalisations, typification and stereotyping; on the one hand, it is grounded on own experiences, and on the other hand, it is based on unproven and adapted experiences (Hohmeier 1975:7). Furthermore, a characteristic of stigma is

\textsuperscript{12} The latter outcome calls for a systemic approach, which analogically deals with the notion of position.

\textsuperscript{13} Note that “history” is always written from a specific perspective.
that a certain attribute at hand is defined in an explicit negative way, so that other negative attributes are added easily.

Stigmatisation, therefore, is a verbal or non-verbal *behaviour*, based on an ascribed stigma (e.g. social prejudice) which is brought upon the individual or a group (Hohmeier 1975:7). One of the fatal effects of stigmatisation is that generalisations about the person lead to a definition of the person in terms of the stigma in all social relations. Stigma then becomes a “master status”, that like no other feature of the person determines the place in society, and the social intercourse with other human beings (1975:8).

From the above-mentioned understanding of deviance, a deviant person can be described as someone to whom certain “etiquette” has been ascribed successfully (Hohmeier 1975:6). Here, the link with creating paradigms and the need to shift destructive paradigms arise. As institutions caring for traditions and values, theological schools and churches have a great responsibility to create and keep alive paradigms, and each generation of theology and church practitioners is challenged to reflect (self-) critically on the appropriate understanding of the Christian message.

### 3.2 General conditions and functions of stigmatisation

From a sociological point of view, Hohmeier asserts that investigating the conditions for the occurrence of stigmatisation in societies is one of the most important aspects of research on stigma and simultaneously, the least regarded aspect of those researches. Preconditions of stigmatisation lie in generalisations, clichés and in common and committing norms. In addition, power relations between the person who stigmatises another and the person to whom stigma is ascribed play an important role. Another condition is that stigmatisation is likely to occur in societies which function according to principles of individual achievement and competition. In the same way, tensions between different groups within society provide the soil for

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14 “Das Stigma wird zu einem, master status’, der wie keine andere Tatsache die Stellung einer Person in der Gesellschaft sowie den Umgang mit anderen Menschen bestimmt” (Hohmeier 1975:8).

15 I will pay attention to the notion of power relations later.
stigma (Hohmeier 1975:9). Here I question the conditions of stigmatisation on an individual level as well as on a societal level. Facing individual stigma in social interaction may serve as a means of categorising a person. It functions as a relief for one’s attitude, in this sense it reduces insecurity by being a decision aid (i.e. concerning the stance or attitude one should adopt).

Another possible function of stigmatisation is grounded in theories which deal with “identity strategies”. People may make use of identity strategies such as rejection, avoidance of social intercourse with stigmatised persons or through isolating them, in order to keep or restore their own psychic balance and to protect oneself. The encounter with a stigmatised person is seen as a threat to one’s own identity because, for example, it may remind one of one’s own tendencies of deviance. Since a person may lack the ability to deal with the differences in another person, that is cognitively, emotionally and practically, one may conclude that the threat of the stigmatised person lies in the disability of the stigmatising person (Hohmeier 1975:11).

On a societal level Hohmeier identifies four functions of stigmatisation. Stigmatisation may regulate the social intercourse between different groups, for example, between majorities and minorities. Stigmatisation may also stabilise the system in that it channels frustration and aggression towards weaker members, the powerless and the less-equipped, who can be regarded as the scapegoats of society. Simultaneously, one can say that stigmatisation enhances and strengthens the norm conformity of the person who stigmatises; since if there were no stigma, 

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16 The description can be regarded as an analogue to what we call an industrialised nation (Hohmeier 1975:9).
17 An interpretation according to depth psychology is the understanding of stigma as a projection. It serves as a release of aggressions. However, aggressions may be rooted in justified frustration or may be connected to social prejudice. Another interpretation of stigma as projection is based on the suppression of natural drives. A person may not allow him or herself to express personal wishes and drives, because he or she assumes they are forbidden or not acceptable. Hence, forbidden wishes become projected and rejected in the stigmatised individual (Hohmeier 1975:10).
18 In societies, which undergo a rapid change or underlie a high frequency of territorial mobility, the need for orientation is especially high (Hohmeier 1975:10).
19 “Identitätsstrategien sind Verhaltensweisen, die der Bewahrung eines gefährdeten bzw. der Herstellung eines gestörten psychischen Gleichgewichts dienen” (Hohmeier 1975:11).
20 Social intercourse includes the access to rare resources such as status or professional possibilities (Hohmeier 1975:12).
there would be no advantage of being “normal” or non-deviant. Finally, stigma may also serve as a tool of suppression. A typical instance is the affiliation of catastrophes or disasters with a stigmatised group (Hohmeier 1975:12).

3.3 Possible origins of stigmatisation

Hohmeier admits that causal relations are hard to grasp and are rather vague. He provides general hypotheses that trace back the origin of stigmatisation in societies (Hohmeier 1975:20). The first hypothesis is that interests of global societal institutions, such as politics, economy or religion, are crucial to the complex subject of stigmatisation and its origin. In this understanding stigmatisation objectively serves the interest of global institutions.

According to Hohmeier, a second hypothesis on the cause of stigmatisation in societies can be traced back to the dynamic interconnection between norms and stigmatisation. A set norm is the precondition for being stigmatised. For the realisation of stigmatisation due to existing norms, power relations or the influence of an institution play a decisive role. The incapability to match up with common principles of achievement can also lead to stigmatisation, which is sustained through conventional norms, values and ideologies of a society.

The third hypothesis refers to the anthropological constitution of human beings, which is grounded in either a natural or a learned need of differentiation towards the other. At the same time, one can also suspect anxiety towards the perceived difference of the other. Additionally, the need for orientation, release of aggressions and projections of stressing desires, offer a clue to clarifying the openness of a stigmatizing attitude (Hohmeier 1975:22).

21 For example, the institution of “private property” does bring about “theft”, just as churches produce the “sexual deviant” (Hohmeier 1975:21).

22 See the notes in Chapter Two from a discussion during the seminar on “HIV and AIDS: Biopolitik in South Africa”, held at the Humboldt University of Berlin in the 2007/08 winter semester.
3.4 Consequences of stigmatisation

On three levels, Hohmeier describes the consequences of stigmatisation from the perspective of the stigmatised individual, who naturally seeks approval as a person and as a partner in interaction within the society. These are a) participation within the society, b) interaction with non-stigmatised persons, and c) identity change of a stigmatised person (Hohmeier 1975:13).

a) Participation within the society happens through formal and informal roles that one assumes. Stigmatisation can lead to the loss of these roles or hinder the fulfilment of a role. The loss of one’s roles in society also reduces the possibility of one’s societal participation.

b) Participation within the society is further questioned, in that social interaction with non-stigmatised persons is continuously threatened by disruption. The stigmatised person does not know if (and under which conditions) the interaction partner accepts him or her. The stigmatised individual is under stress to keep up a permanent “stigma management” (Goffman 1990). Hence, tensions, insecurity, embarrassment, and anxiety are characteristic of the social interaction between stigmatised and non-stigmatised persons.

c) Participation and interaction within the society is a precondition for social and personal development of human beings. In worst cases, participation and interaction within society can also become a source of social and personal regression, for example, in a culture of stigmatisation and discrimination. Thus, it is a challenge for a stigmatised person to keep-up his or her identity authentically, or even to make further attempts towards growth (Hohmeier 1975:14; Louw 2004:95).

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23 One of the possible consequences of the “attitude” of stigmatised persons is that society offers certain roles to the stigmatised. Further, Hohmeier asserts that in the process of stigmatisation people are urged to take on such roles (i.e. immediate socialization). There is the urge for self-identification with the role of being stigmatised (i.e. internalized stigma). Hohmeier calls this a happenstance and “self-fulfilling prophecy” (Hohmeier 1975:15). Another aspect he mentions is the “secondary deviance” in which people adapt their self-image towards the stigma which has been ascribed to them.

The stigmatised carry within themselves in an inner certainty that the others like themselves are aware of their supposedly tainted identity. Likewise, their experience of being treated according to the stigma reminds them of being different (Hohmeier 1975:16).
4. THE MANIFESTATION OF STIGMA: HABITUS

From the discussion of stigma above, the notion of attitudes of people can be derived and is manifested in judgement towards so-called “deviant attributes.” Goffman identifies “attitudes normals have towards a person with a stigma” (Goffman 1990:15). Likewise, Hohmeier has focussed on the dynamic process of stigmatisation, which is equivalent to a negative definition (judgement/ judgemental attitude). He emphasises the “dynamic relational aspect” inherent in stigma as an ascribed prejudice, and stigmatisation as a “verbal or non-verbal behaviour”. Hence, one can speak of stigmatizing attitudes people hold.²⁴

Paterson also points to the notion of “perspectives” instead of demarcating “persons” in order to define “the deeply held attitudes and beliefs of […] groups that lead to labelling, stereotyping, setting apart, devaluing and discriminating”. The notion of “perspectives” refers to both, the process of judging and stigmatizing, as well as stigma itself. Here, Paterson sees a main danger in the internalisation of stigmatisation that people receive, so that they feel like “having a stigma” or “being stigmatised”. According to Paterson, an approach focussing on the avoidance of stigmatizing attitudes and behaviour should be rooted in two principles. Firstly, the mechanisms that lead to disadvantage and issues of individual and structural discrimination should be named. Secondly, the approach must address the fundamental cause of stigma and stigmatisation, and help “chang[ing] the deeply held attitudes and beliefs of powerful groups that lead to labelling, stereotyping, setting apart, devaluing and discriminating” (Paterson 2005:40). In general, three positions exist with regard to attitude. To begin with, attitude always refers to an object either on a concrete level (e.g. attitude towards the human body or corporeality) or on an abstract level (e.g. attitude towards life). Next, in social

²⁴ Note the connection between the Latin words habitus (English, attitude) and habere (English, to behave).
sciences, it has been established that attitudes are acquired through learning. Finally, attitudes can be described as relatively long lasting, and operational. This means that continuously the same clusters of behaviour are produced towards the object of attitude. According to Abele and Nowack (1975:146), attitude is the “affective-judgemental expression” towards the object of attitude. Moreover, Abele and Nowack explain the sociological use of the term “attitude” (Einstellung, Haltung) in connection with behaviour, for example, in connection with stigmatisation.

Sociological theories about stigma have provided insight into conceptualisation, conditions, functions, possible causes, and consequences of stigmatisation. The focus has also been on the conditions and functions of HIV and AIDS-related stigma, which may be of symbolic or instrumental nature. Consequently, one can differentiate between stigmatising attitudes based on fear and the urge for protection, and the attitudes of negligence, ignorance and social meanings connected to norms and values of society. Stigma can be described as the result of the social process of the definition of deviance. As mentioned above, stigma is the special case of social prejudice towards a person or group to whom a negative attribute is ascribed (Hohmeier 1975:7).

5. STIGMA AS RATIONAL CONSTRUCTION: SCHEMATA OF INTERPRETATION

Goffman has introduced the notion of a “virtual social identity”, which is actually ascribed to a person who is judged as somehow deviant. The person then is regarded through a special “frame”. In the same way, a person who identifies him or herself with a certain deviant attribute, called a stigma, likewise understands him or herself through a specific “frame”. With this, another relevant dimension of stigma is opened up by understanding stigma rationally as schemata of interpretation. According to Daniël Louw, stigmatisation and discrimination are often linked to perceptions created by “schemata of interpretations”. Louw also refers to Goffman who uses the term “frame” to describe the schemata of interpretation, which determines how events or circumstances are perceived. He notes that, “Frames are
the ways we perceive events or circumstances. They are the guidelines that shape reality for each of us. Frames may be seen as patterns through which we put together and interpret information and experiences” (Stone 1994:233, cited in Louw 2003:210).25 26

Frames or schemata of interpretation are largely determined by culture, which refers to human structures within concrete context as shaped by needs, values, norms, rituals, symbols, and language. Up to modern times in Western culture, the term “culture” was identical with religion. Today, both are distinct, though still influencing one another.27 Culture is no uniform term since it includes co-existence in terms of difference, for example, regarding ethnicity, gender and class (Louw 2004:124). Louw suggests that perceptual schemata of interpretation help to understand everyday life encounters and co-existent (human) beings. Due to conflicting interests, competing ideologies or the anthropological constitution of the human being, co-existence and encounter can be interpreted negatively within cultures.28 This interpretation of encounter and co-existence is a totally negative one.

On an individual level, Louw probes deeper and identifies that due to “partiality and narrow perspectives, negative associations of experiences are stored in the mind as suspicion. Through labelling, suspicion is linked to all phenomena associated with [a certain]... experience” (Louw 2004:123). Finally, suspicion manifests itself in prejudice and prejudice becomes a biased schemata of interpretation, which leads to the “-isms” of prejudice (Louw 2004:123).29

26 Patterns of thought develop due to perceptions and experiences. People may generate schemata of interpretation that are disconnected from reality, if their perception is one-sided and if it had earlier gone through a process of “dissection” (Louw 2003:210).
27 Culture can also be understood as a shared “living space” in which people transform their immediate environment (Louw 2003:210).
28 See my Chapter One, section 3.3.
29 Though South Africa is a secular state, religious orientation has played an enormous role in enacting state power. For example, the ideology of ‘a nation created by God’ during the Apartheid regime (which legitimised its power as “God given”), the vision of the “Rainbow Nation” designed by Archbishop Desmond Tutu, the ideals of forgiving and forgiveness as the basis for the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, and finally, the new “ubuntu” – culture nationalism, all have a religious
Louw traces stigmatisation and stigma (as the outcome of prejudices) back to an accumulation of suspicion in human beings created by perception and learned patterns of thought (Louw 2004:124). Noteworthy is the combination of emotions, perception and thought in the construction of a “frame” through a person’s encounters with the world. The human being in its total ratio-emotional-perceiving being in the world is carrier of a certain attitude, moreover carrying a certain quality of attitude (e.g. suspicion).

Consequently, the notion of “frame”, how events or circumstances are perceived, always refers to the whole human being in its totality. When it comes to the “isms” of prejudice, we can speak of rational schemata of interpretation, because the carrier of a prejudice is rarely able to clearly trace back where the feeling of suspicion is rooted.

6. THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN STIGMA AND POWER

The phenomenon of stigma is not grasped if the dynamic and relational connection between stigma and power is missing. It is prejudice combined with hierarchy and misused power that leads to stigmatisation.

Gillian Paterson argues that stigma and power belong inseparably together. She further states that human nature inherently creates hierarchies with the tendency “for moving someone downwards” (Paterson 2005:39). The occasion of stigma then offers a basis for devaluing, rejecting and excluding other individuals. In this way


30 Louw describes ideology “as the violence of the mind when an idea is absolutised in order to maintain power… when it is isolated from existential and moral issues which shape the quality of human dignity when it violates the ethics of unconditional love”. He further comments that “rational patterns of thought, detached from values and a realistic approach, easily degenerate into ideology” (Louw 2004:123).
Paterson sees the correlation between stigma and social, economic and political power. She notes that, “If you have no power, you may stereotype but you cannot stigmatise” (Paterson 2005:39). Here, she agrees with the observation of Bruce Link and Jo Phelan\textsuperscript{31} who state that relatively powerless groups may create labels and stereotypes about more powerful groups. Although they treat the more powerful group in accordance with these stereotypes, the latter would never end up being a stigmatised group. “This clarifies why the definition of stigma must involve reference to power differences. Without such a reference, stigma becomes a very different and much broader concept” (Link & Phelan 2001, cited in Patterson 2005:39).\textsuperscript{32} A decisive aspect of stigma and stigmatisation is the relational component, which is characterised by a specific use of power. Individuals or groups regarded as more powerful are likely to stigmatise people who have less power, whereas people in “weaker” positions are not able to stigmatise “more powerful” individuals or groups.

For example, in the South African context, power is a delicate topic. The public consciousness judges power mainly as negative; this is mirrored in the people’s historical experience with political, economic and social powers. The negative historical experience of corrupt power leads to the reaction of critique and resistance. In this way, it is not power in itself that is subject to rejection, but rather the misuse of it. This calls for sensitivity to a reflected understanding of power in the South African context. The renouncement of power would entail relinquishing any social conduct. Since this is neither possible nor preferable, only two means of keeping the danger of power in check remain, namely institutional control and personal responsibility (cf. Gerhardt 1999:343).


\textsuperscript{32} Patterson speaks of the misuse of power in connection with stigma while Volker Gerhardt approaches power more neutrally. He asserts that many negative judgements about power are based on the assumption of violence or force, supremacy, reign, and sovereignty. Possibly, power may find expression in violence or force (Gewalt), which takes on amorphous or often physically destructive forms. Power may also be expressed in supremacy or sovereignty (Herrschaft), which is structured according to hierarchies affected (Gerhardt 1999:342).
Another concrete example is provided by Denise Ackermann. She emphasises the influence of institutional power put forward by global injustice, which causes poverty in parts of the developing world. Additionally, she critically points to the situation of disordered gender relations in the South African context, and the question of having power over one’s own body in a patriarchal society (Ackermann 2005:47). The remarkable role that power relations play prompts Ackermann to speak up for the legitimate questions about God’s justice, power and presence in a suffering world (Ackermann 2005:49).

33 The question of power in a theological context inevitably leads to the question of the power of God. I shall refer to God’s power in dealing with the notion of destigmatisation in Chapter Four.

34 Ackermann describes a connection between a distanced (i.e. unembodied) self-understanding and the low threshold of hurting others (Ackermann 2003:72). She supports Hannah Arendt and thus: If… a torturer allows ‘the reality of the other’s suffering to enter his own consciousness, [it] would immediately compel him to stop the torture’. The victim’s pain becomes the torturer’s self-blinding power. ‘It is not merely that his power makes him blind, nor that his power is accompanied by blindness, nor even that his power requires blindness; it is, instead, quite simply that his blindness, his willed amorality, is his power, or a large part of it.’ Ackermann (2003:72) concludes that the torturer’s ability to distance him or herself from the bodies of those being tortured leads to the destruction of the same.

35 Likewise, Gerhardt points out the danger of power. A characteristic of power is its dangerous tendency to become independent, a purpose in itself. With power, temptation proceeds carelessly to get itself through all hindrances (“In der Macht selbst steckt allerdings eine Gefahr, als sie zur Verselbstständigung tendiert und die Menschen mit einer gewissen Zwangsläufigkeit verführt, sich über alle Widerstände hinwegzusetzen.”) (Gerhardt 1999:342).

36 According to Gerhardt, the metaphysical power concept is determined by the “model of human action”. Even Friedrich Nietzsche, who had tried to overcome the “model of human action” in his work, Der Wille zur Macht, did not overcome the inherent anthropomorphism. Gerhardt (1999:341) quotes Nietzsche, who concedes that the only acknowledgeable access to the understanding of power in his time is ‘to make use of the analogy “human being” in a consequent way’ (“sich der Analogie des Menschen zu Ende bedienen”) (ibid.).

37 Gerhardt regards both institutional control and personal responsibility as imperfect; both are always subject to improvement (Gerhardt 1999:343).

38 In German, the term “power” is translated with Macht (Indogerm.: magh= mögen, vermögen; Engl.: to be able). Max Weber has defined power as being “amorphous”, meaning it is before all concrete reality (Gerhardt 1999:340).
In the philosophical context Plato understood power (*dynamis*) as pure *being* itself and the notion of *virtue* to be an expression of power. Aristotle, who built on Plato, differentiated power as the potential for movement and change. He explicitly distinguishes virtue as *habitus* (*hexis*) from indeterminate potential (*dynameis*).

Stigma and stigmatisation arise in a cultural context in which norms and values exist. Regimented norms and values are rules and laws, and to live accordingly is a virtue. Stigma and stigmatisation have been identified as perspective, frame or schemata of interpretation. A stigma is then rather a social construction, a relational process in which stigmatisation is the (pretending of) sticking to certain norms, in order to live a life of virtue and justice. According to Plato and Aristotle *virtue* and *habitus* (as the more distinguished expression of power) qualify a human being in his or her status of power. Moreover, *virtue* (Plato) and *habitus* (Aristotle) are embedded in a certain ethos, which defines norms and values. If one lays open norms and values in a Christian ethos, for example, and compares these with unmasked norms and values (consciously or unconsciously) applied in the process of stigmatisation, then a gap between the Christian ethos and the paradigm behind stigma and stigmatisation becomes obvious.

If the notion of power is defined by human virtuousness and behaviour in the holistic sense of habitus, then one needs to question whose norms and values one is talking about. Who establishes those norms and values? Is it society who dictates what is “good” or “bad”, or is there a “law” pre-existent to all human society, which gives orientation, like that revealed in the Christian belief?

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39 According to Volker Gerhardt (1999:340), *virtue* is the connection between power and a body-soul constitution (*leibseelische Verfasstheit*).
40 Antique ethics requires the adjustment of the individual who is striving towards possibilities of individual behaviour. Simultaneously, it is connected to effect and the notion of freedom. In the Old and New Testaments, omnipotence becomes the character of a personal, living God. With his understanding of divine power, Augustine bridges the notion of will, freedom and reason as the measure for human power. In modernity, Leibniz sets the foundation for the conception of power. Power is characterised as human power, namely what is possible through human action and metaphysical power becomes the transcendent pendant for human power (Gerhardt 1999:340).
There is interplay between stigma and power if we trace back the norms and values behind stigma and if the definition of power remains vague for the moment. The question in a pastoral context grounded in the Christian ethos is whether truly Christian norms and values, the will of God (Christian ethos), offer the base for human relation or if suspicion and prejudice based on fear, ignorance or negligence offer a base for stigmatisation and discrimination.

7. CONCLUSION: STIGMA, A CHALLENGE TO PASTORAL ANTHROPOLOGY

When pastoral theology is concerned with the healing and salvation dimension of the Gospel, then it becomes relevant in clarifying the notion of stigmatisation. To begin, a working definition of the concepts of stigma and stigmatisation have been provided; subsequently, a deeper understanding of the phenomena will be probed.

Chapter One has dealt with the conceptualisation of stigma and stigmatisation. The finding is that there is nothing ontological about stigma. Either stigma is attached to a discrediting attribute of the bearer, through which the latter is recognised as deviant and even spoiled. The process of stigmatisation has been identified as the process of a negative social definition. A glimpse into the preconditions of stigmatisation has shown that prejudices or the actual evaluation of certain deviant attributes (from which stigmatisation derives) are dependent on power relations.

The preliminary definition departed from the literal meaning of stigma, in being a sign or a mark, which refers either to a bodily condition or one of moral blemish of the human being. It is interesting how both the bodily, as well as the moral aspect, come together in HIV and AIDS-related stigma and stigmatisation. This will be further discussed in the next chapter. I will sustain the argument that within the context of the HIV and AIDS pandemic, stigmatisation goes along with the degradation of human embodiment. Human embodiment always includes the human being in its totality. In Chapter Two I focus on the human body as an aspect of human
embodiment because of the assumption that the object of HIV and AIDS-related stigmatisation is human corporeality.

The aspect of stigma as a social definition of deviance and stigma as schemata of interpretation connected to prejudices are important for pastoral theology because religion also offers a schema for “framing interpretation,” in terms of paradigms. The notion of the quality of attitude behind the HIV and AIDS-related stigma and the potential of the Christian belief will be relevant to further discussion. The paradigm behind stigma so far has been circumscribed by the quality of the attitude of the human being. Stigma is either ascribed or internalised by human beings. Stigmatisation is a process, behaviour or habitus of human beings.

Ackermann also sees the connection between stigmatisation and the human body. In support of Ackermann, a most urgent and central issue is the stigmatisation of the human body as a way of alienation from being. As a theologian, she is (self-) critical of how Christian theology (enacted in a Christian ethos) has contributed to the stigmatisation of the human body (Ackermann 2006:12). She sees a dark part in Christian history in that the body has been regarded as secondary to the human soul for too long, so that Christian thinking must become “embodied theological thinking” (Ackermann 2005:49).

From a Christian pastoral viewpoint, the consequences of stigmatisation point to the aspects of community and acceptance versus exclusion and suffering. The Christian potential deserves more attention and will be discussed later in the thesis. At the same time, the consequences of stigmatisation in general are analogous to those of the HIV and AIDS-related stigma.
CHAPTER TWO
HIV/AIDS-RELATED STIGMA: A CHAOTIC DILEMMA

In Chapter Two I outline specific features of HIV and AIDS-related stigma and stigmatisation. The chapter shows that the general perception of HIV and AIDS is intertwined with a negative perception of the human body, which leads to the degradation of human embodiment. In pastoral theology the human body then is associated with being sinful. Subsequently, in naming the ethical, theological and ecclesiological dilemma, I probe into the notion of sin (hamartiology), and its impact on the discussion of HIV and AIDS-related stigmatisation and pastoral anthropology.

1. HIV/AIDS AND LANGUAGE: NAMING THE PANDEMIC

Language and thinking are inevitably linked. Because language structures the world in which we live, an approach to life reality via the hermeneutic of language should be chosen consciously and carefully. In the 1980s, when the virus HIV was first identified, it was called an epidemic (i.e. it could go away with time). Next, it was identified as endemic (such a disease remains). Today, HIV and AIDS are generally referred to as pandemics (global diseases). This change in naming mirrors the perception of HIV and AIDS as things that are no longer external, rather they concern all human beings. For an assessment and approach to deal with HIV and AIDS, Louw stresses that in the HIV and AIDS pandemic it is necessary to have a realistic view of the situation, which is neither pessimistic nor over-optimistic. Since thinking and language go together it is important how information about HIV and AIDS become communicated.
The acronym HIV names the virus, as well as the condition, of the person who has been tested HIV positive. In later stages, HIV causes AIDS, the acronym for Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome. This is the condition of the body when it has lost its ability to defend itself against infections and various types of cancer. Since the 1980s, the interaction between the nervous system, the immune system, the neuro-endocrine system, and the psychosocial components that influence immunity and their effects on health and disease, has been discovered. Though the effect of emotions and stress is ancient knowledge, “the suggested relationship between mental state and disease has not gone unchallenged” (Karren et al. 2006:6).

The philosopher and scientist, René Descartes, “had a dramatic impact on the ‘holistic’ attitude and philosophy of medicine”, which came to dominate not only medical philosophy but also religious philosophy (Karren, Hafen, Smith & Frandsen 2006:6). Descartes hypothesized that there were two separate substances in the world: matter, which behaved according to physical laws, and spirit, which was dimensionless and immaterial. The body was material, and the mind spiritual. Thus, Descartes’ notion was of “a fundamental, unbridgeable chasm between the body and the spirit – between the brain and the mind” (Karren et al. 2006:6). The impact of the physical state of the body on mental health and vice versa is common knowledge today. Unfortunately, this decisive information is still neither central in medical nor religious philosophy. Rather, in cases of illness, people tend to regard the body negatively as an opponent that is just not working. The distanced attitude to ones factual bodily nature becomes supported by language and metaphors, which stress internal and external perspectives.

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41 The infection can finally lead to death. Medication in the form of anti-retroviral drugs can slow down the multiplication of the virus, but the virus itself cannot be eliminated. For transmission, the virus needs access to the bloodstream of a person. Since the virus is present in semen, vaginal fluid, breast milk, and blood, the main ways of transmission are intimate sexual contact, blood transfusion, sharing needles of intravenous drug users, mother-to-child transmission, or health care work via accidental pricks by contaminated needles (Van Dyke 2005:3; UNAIDS, in Louw 2007:397).

42 Chinese physicians (4000 years ago), Egyptian physicians and Greek physicians, (Hippocrates and Galen) noticed the strong relationship between mental state and disease. Ancient Indian scriptures warn that emotions such as violence, hatred, grief, and ingratitude are stronger than the body’s capability for healthy balance, so that a poor prognosis is given to patients afflicted by intensely negative emotions (Karren et al. 2006:6).
A rather more dramatic description of HIV and AIDS might refer to it in terms of a "war metaphor," such as the body under invasion or a subversive act in the inner part of the body. In contrast, the enemy HIV is the infectious external cause. However, if the emphasis is on transmission, HIV and AIDS are perceived as infiltrating society, and "contamination" is one of the key terms. Susan Sontag refers to the kind of language associated with the political paranoia, with its typical suspicion against a plural world (Sontag 1989:21). Sontag speaks of the labels and attributes connected with HIV and AIDS in terms of metaphors. For example, she mentions the strong association of HIV and AIDS with death. In her essay, "AIDS and its Metaphors", Sontag critically argues against common interpretations of HIV. She does not solely comment on certain metaphors of HIV, rather she points out the human mechanism of thinking in metaphors (i.e. as the transfer of a word, and the expression of its meaning in terms of an image, which is not identical to the word). At this point, we can recall the above understanding of stigma as schemata of interpretation.

In my own view, however, the stigma following HIV and AIDS goes beyond the meaning of a metaphor. Stigma itself means "being a sign", transferring its very special meaning. There are metaphors attached to HIV and AIDS that help to produce the HIV and AIDS-related stigma; and even though there are no visible scars or wounds, "stigma" remains a sign or even a "symbol". An important step is to become aware of the use of language in the HIV/AIDS context. Dube (2005:60) claims that, "Language is central in communicating the message of breaking the stigma"; hence, the necessity of appropriate communication of a theological framework for breaking HIV and AIDS-related stigma and discrimination.

The recent discourse on HIV and AIDS takes place amidst different discourses that influence the HIV and AIDS debate. The discourse is about the populace and

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43 Symbol (Grk. “thrown together”). A symbol is meant to bring back the lost unity that gives sense and meaning. In this regard, the symbolic function of stigma can be understood in restoring a lost unity. "Ursprünglich Wiedererkennungszeichen für Getrenntes; fortentwickelt zum Inbegriff jeder Zeichensprache, durch die sich der in Zufälle, Irrtümer, Widersinne des Lebens geworfene Mensch der Ganzheit und Einheit des Weltgrundes versichert hält" (Pongs 1954:1301); (Grk./Lat. sign; germ Kennzeichen, Zeichen) (Duden Fremdwörterbuch 9th ed).
individual members within the populace who are either the "normal" woman, the "normal" man, or the "normal" child, or in contrast, the woman, the man or the child infected with HIV, or the one who is ill because of AIDS.

A closer look at the different discourses that surround the HIV and AIDS issue shows that operators of these discourses are predominantly institutions. Among these institutions, we can name the state or the government, which provides a judicial system, a public health system and regulates access to treatment and medication. Simultaneously, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and activists take part in the discourse on education and information and are interested in the production of laws and prohibitions. The international pharmacy industry and Western medicine are of interest and may have their own interests as well. Another aspect in the discourse is offered by the so-called "AIDS dissidents" (who may deny the existence of HIV and AIDS), or alternative medicine or healers. Religious authorities, represented by churches and their leaders, participate in education and information campaigns. The notion of sex and sexuality, which is closely linked with HIV, gives rise to the regulation of sex and sexuality and the construction of normal or deviant sexuality. Various institutions participate in the debate about HIV and AIDS. Different discourses are prevalent and represent different interests (one has to note that the discourses and the interests are mainly directed to talk about the population and its individuals instead of talking with them). Institutions discuss definitions of HIV and diagnostic criteria of AIDS. Likewise, the access to condoms is controversial in some churches, and the question of birth control extends beyond a medical discourse into one on political strategies.

In the South African context, in particular, the discourses concerning HIV and AIDS are diverse. They range from the assertion of Western medicine as a hegemonic system of knowledge to the argument on a colonial and postcolonial construction of
“Africa”. The claim of racism, especially rooted in the context of Apartheid, becomes repeatedly louder.\textsuperscript{44}

2. HIV/AIDS AND PREJUDICE: JUDGING THE PANDEMIC

Originally, the main feature of the popular and media-based conception of HIV was the supposed connection to and representation with male homosexuality (Louw 2006:398).\textsuperscript{45} Particularly in the beginning, homosexuals were blamed as responsible for the “epidemic” (Weinreich & Benn 2004:46).\textsuperscript{46} Today, one can still speak of a reciprocal stigma, which seemingly creates an indissoluble connection between male homosexuality and HIV.\textsuperscript{47} In a stigmatizing view, both living with HIV/AIDS and being homosexual are associated as including one another and therefore as being reciprocal.

Weinreich and Benn remark that, in certain contexts, prejudices against people trying to live positively with HIV/AIDS may, for example, derive from already existing fears of women, sexuality and poverty. AIDS is often seen as an illness men get from prostitutes or as the consequence of promiscuity. Among women, the thinking is that it is caused by prostitution or by sex outside marriage, or with multiple partners. It is

\textsuperscript{44} This information was obtained from a discussion during the seminar on “HIV and AIDS: Biopolitik in South Africa”, held at the Humboldt University of Berlin in the winter 2007/08 semester.

\textsuperscript{45} Existing social metaphors of HIV and AIDS invite people to associate “plague, punishment, contamination, bodies out of control, fear, and death with the virus” (Chapman 2002:396).

\textsuperscript{46} Statistics reveal a great difference between HIV transmission in Africa and industrialised countries. In Africa, statistics shows that 87% of HIV transmissions happen through heterosexual activities, 10% is based on mother-to-child transmissions, 2% on blood transfusions, 1% on drug-use, and nearly 0% on homosexual activities. In industrialized countries, statistics show that 39% of HIV transmissions happen through homosexual activities, 37% through drug-use, 24% through heterosexual activities, 1% through mother-to-child transmissions, and nearly 0% through blood transfusions (Weinreich & Benn 2004:4).

\textsuperscript{47} The virus itself does not discriminate (see also Louw 2006:398). The discriminations made against people living with HIV and AIDS are unjustified, but hostility has no rational basis and is able to resist correction (Weinreich & Benn 2004:104). Smithurst (1990:107) remarks that, “intolerance needs no reasons, [it needs] only excuses”. Smithurst argues that the dread of HIV and AIDS is largely a reflection of a culture’s dread of homosexuality, which is based on restricted statistics and media reporting. In this sense, certain groups (mis)use HIV and AIDS as a “God-given propaganda vehicle” (Smithurst 1990:104). Concerning the “realities of sex” Smithurst asserts that nature rarely deals with categories; “only the human mind invents categories and tries to force facts into separate pigeon-holes” (Smithurst 1990:107).
further stated that sometimes HIV and AIDS are even understood as a woman’s disease, like other sexually transmitted illnesses. Women are likely to be accused of transmitting HIV and of being responsible for its spread (Weinreich & Benn 2004:46).

Likewise, the “incurability” of HIV and AIDS has structured the public perception. There is the widespread notion of HIV and AIDS as a “contagion”, and as being “highly infectious” (Smithurst 1990:100). People who are trying to live positively with HIV and AIDS are judged infectious or contaminated, and therefore are to be avoided (Ackermann 2006:1). Often people experience rejection and exclusion from families and communities; for example, they lose their job, or experience refusal of care, the loss of living space, neglect, physical violence, and/or the collapse of partnerships and marriage (Weinreich & Benn 2004:46). One has to be aware that descriptions of HIV and AIDS often unintentionally present the condition as a “death sentence” (Weinreich & Benn 2004:47).

Living with HIV and AIDS then likely bears the risk of being judged and stereotyped without evidence. Due to common assumptions, one is assumed either to have behaved shamefully or to be morally at fault and therefore deserves to be punished.

The judgements going along with HIV and AIDS are fuelled by the paradox of the fundamental connection between life-creating sexuality and death, which causes a strong effect in people (Louw 2007:334).

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48 On a rational level, these considerations, which are connected to fear and anxiety, should be overcome by now. Furthermore, such ideas should be eradicated because there is no justifiable proportion that can be seen between the risk (of transmission in social intercourse) and discrimination. This supports the idea that further education and information concerning HIV/AIDS is needed. Smithurst (1990:100) wonders how one can attempt to correct misinformation from the reporting media, “but what is to be done when the public refuses to learn?” Likewise, his remark shows the need for further education concerning the notion of what it means to be human.

49 The International Labour Organization has stated in its Code of Practice that HIV is to be treated like any other illness, and that working people may not be discriminated against or stigmatised based on their HIV status. HIV tests cannot be made a requirement for employment (Weinreich & Benn 2004:46).

50 The other extreme is to underestimate HIV for what it actually means. HIV has already been referred to as a “manageable, chronic illness, much like hypertension or diabetes” (UNAIDS, cited in Louw 2007:397).
a) The realm of sexuality

Since one way of transmitting the HIV virus is through sex, the assumption here is that HIV and AIDS-related stigmatisation is strongly connected to human sexuality. From the beginning, sexuality in the Christian tradition has been determined by purity laws. Paterson sees Mary Douglas’ work as an important critique, in that she identifies the subconscious role of religion in supporting purity rules. Paterson and Douglas consider religion a key factor that underpins social order. According to Douglas, order is society’s highest value, and it is the purpose of religion to safeguard this order associated with purity. It can be stated that because religion articulates a belief system and culture, it consciously or subconsciously plays a key role in the process of stigmatisation by the way it underpins social order.

An underlying factor also may be the biblical perception of sin as impurity, pollution or defilement. In the Old as well as the New Testament, the negative definition of *holiness* means the avoidance of impurity. Paterson argues with Douglas that when society stigmatises and excludes, it is trying to protect itself from danger, namely contagion. The reasoning is that one is polluted by breaking a taboo, and the stigmatised individual is a polluting influence which has to be avoided. Consequently, individuals who have broken a taboo must be cast out and punished (Paterson 2005:38).

Furthermore, Stephen Barton notes that in history rules of purity served the purpose of maintaining segregation. Israel’s purity rules and holy wars were meant to maintain separation from the Gentiles, while Christian purity rules and holy wars were meant to keep up the separation between believers and unbelievers (Barton

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52 Particularly in the Old Testament, the Levitical Law provides dietary rules and rules for women (cf. Lev 11; Deut 14). In the New Testament, cultic purity rules are set aside. Holiness is primarily defined by the avoidance of spiritual impurity but the notion of sin as a contagious defilement remains (cf. Mk 7:1-23; Rom 1:24-32; see also Barton 1997:761).
53 The motivation behind this may be identified in society’s will for survival (Paterson 2005:38).
Barton states that, “the violence directed at ‘sinners’ whether in biblical times or since, is a violence directed at those whom a society or group regards as anomalous and therefore threatening to the group’s purity” (Barton 1997:761). From this point of departure one can argue that, historically speaking, the notion of purity and impurity had a deleterious effect. In general, pollution laws have affected women more than they have affected men, especially in the area of sexuality (Paterson 2005:38). The power of images regarding pollution can create neuroses of guilt and obsessional concerns about cleanliness (Paterson 2005:38). By crossing internal and external boundaries, one theoretically does not only risk polluting oneself but also the whole system.

The Judaeo-Christian tradition of the notion of wholeness and completion, especially physical wholeness, is regarded as a sign of freedom from pollution. Douglas observes that the messianic counterpart of the Mosaic Law is the Sermon on the Mount. Paterson cites Douglas below:

“From this time on, the physiological condition of a person, whether leprous, bleeding or crippled, should have become irrelevant to their capacity to approach the altar. The foods they ate, the things they touched, the days on which they did things … should have no effects on their spiritual status…” (Douglas, in Paterson 2005:38).

Paterson comments that despite the spiritual intentions of the early church, a spontaneous resistance to the idea that bodily conditions were irrelevant to ritual (and the relationship with God) has continued (Paterson 2005:38). She sees the necessity for understanding and challenging pollution laws; meaning, it is important to understand the subconscious role of religion in supporting purity rules and the potential of Christian tradition to challenge those rules (Paterson 2005:38).

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54 In some cultures, taboos about menstruation and childbirth still contribute to the subordination of women. One also needs to mention the attempts to take control of women’s bodies and to exclude women from public domain (Barton 1997:761; see also Schäfer 2005).
55 Lev 21.
56 Mat 5-8.
57 Here, Paterson builds on R. Gill’s argument that historical facts show that the Christian tradition has resisted the purity laws of particular cultures (Gill, cited in Paterson 2005:38).
Douglas identifies sex and sexuality as a particular trigger for polluted thinking (Paterson 2005:38). She claims that there are no other social pressures potentially as explosive as those which constrain sexual relations (Douglas, in Paterson 2005:38). There is also the tendency to regard sexual sin as the gravest sin of all. In the same way, one may say that HIV and AIDS is the result of sinful sexual relations. The consequence is that people living with HIV and AIDS are subjected to greater stigmatisation that sets them apart from the so-called “lesser sinners” (UNAIDS report 2005:14). On the one hand, Barton suggests that taboos about sex and the resulting stigmatisation lead to the denial of the human body. On the other hand, it is due to this denial that the notion of sex and sexuality becomes associated with promiscuous behaviour (Barton 1997:761). This gives rise to the understanding of the powerful interplay between HIV and AIDS-related stigma and the taboo of sexuality.

Anthony Coxon points out that, historically, Christian thinking on sexuality has been largely negative. The notion of sexuality in the Christian tradition has been restricted to marriage and to marriage for the purpose of procreation (Coxon 1997:759). Up to this day, more conservative Christian traditions, such as Catholicism, point to sexuality’s exclusive procreational purpose and forbid the use

58 Another perspective of sexuality and truth is opened up by Michel Foucault. The postmodernist critically asks whether the point is to say ‘yes’ to sex for whatever reason or to say ‘no’. Foucault opts to open up the “polymorph techniques” and mechanisms of power, in order to show the “will for knowledge”, which functions as both basis and instrument at the same time (Foucault 1992a:22). Foucault shifts the focus from the hypothesis of repression of sexuality. Although he does not deny the repression of sex as a historical fact, he argues that particularly in Western societies discourses serve as power strategies for various institutions. For Foucault, repression of sex and sexuality is not the first aim, instead, it is the accomplishment of power. Thus, “life” itself becomes the political theme. Here, the meaning of sex and sexuality becomes obvious (in political conflicts as well as under the notion of embodiment): sex is the hinge between the two axes of development of a political technology of life. The one axis belongs to the disciplines of the body. The other axis, due to its global effect, is attached to the regulation of population. Sex opens up the access to the life of the individual body as well as to the life of a whole population. Hence, discourses about sexuality and sex are principles of regulation of power. The mechanisms point towards the body, towards life itself and its expansion, its upkeep, its fitness, its authorization, and its exploitation. In this understanding, sexuality stands not as a symbol or a sign but, rather, as the object and the target (Foucault 1992b:176).

59 The two creation reports in Genesis diverge in accounting for sexuality. The Priestly account (1:1-2:4) stresses the reproductive role of both male and female while the second, Yahwistic (2:4ff.) account, reflects aspects of companionship and/or pleasure (Coxon 1997:754).
of contraceptives. Furthermore, the puritan ideal is celibacy, through which one should liberate oneself from the bondage of the world (Louw 2007:334).

In the Christian tradition the *locus classicus* for the strong association of sin with sexuality is the story of the Fall in Genesis 3. The UNAIDS report states that the story of the Garden of Eden is partly the story of human beings’ alienation from their sexuality (2005:12). In the creation story, one can perceive God’s gift to human beings - enjoying each other as sexual beings. Although in Eden humankind squandered this gift, there is fundamentally a positive scriptural perspective of humankind (Louw 2005:157). In particular, interpretations of the book of Genesis have led to the stigmatisation of women’s sexuality (UNAIDS Report 2005:12). Blaming women for their sexuality has had the tendency to portray women as the scapegoat of the society. In this regard, feminist and sociological re-interpretations of biblical texts are important because they strip the associations and ideas from conceptions of sin that are damaging and have a long-lasting history. Additionally, they help to foster new directions in understanding sin (Barton 1997:760).

In the last century, contributions to the disciplines of psychology, biomedical science and social science, such as anthropology and sociology, have had a wide impact on the thinking of sexuality. In addition, developments in biblical as well as historical criticism have led to a change in sexual attitudes in theology (Coxon 1997:758). From a psychological angle, which introduces the notion of the subconscious, one can argue that concerning the notion of sin, defence mechanisms are also at work. We want to push sin, or what we associate with it, far away from us, as if it was not related to us. In other words, although we do not want to become impure, we do not notice that in denying human sexual nature one already acts in an impure way by denying God’s creation in human beings.

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60 Perhaps Tertullian’s statement concerning women as Eve has had a lasting effect on Western civilisation under the Christian tradition: “You are the Devil’s gateway. You are the unsealer of that forbidden tree. You are the first deserter of the divine law. You are she who persuaded him whom the Devil was not valiant enough to attack. You destroyed so easily God’s image of man. On account of your dessert, that is death, even the Son of God had to die” (*de Cultu Feminarum* 1:1).
When HIV and AIDS are associated with stigma and discrimination, it leads to individual suffering and makes it more difficult to have open discussions concerning HIV and AIDS. The latter has a negative impact on fighting against the HIV and AIDS pandemic, since keeping silent about HIV and AIDS also promotes stigmatisation and discrimination (Weinreich & Benn 2004:47). In one way it becomes understandable that negative messages on sexuality as a means of prevention have a rather harmful effect. All the same, in order to avoid one-sidedness, the problem should not be reduced to the notion of sex and sexuality alone. On a communal and national level, “denial of HIV and AIDS means that important and controversial themes in the fight against HIV and AIDS – such as cultural standards of sexuality and inequalities in gender relations and social life – are evaded” (Weinreich & Benn 2004:47).

From here arises the “need to denounce the identification of sin with sex, as well as the stigmatisation and debased theology of sin that results from it” (UNAIDS 2005:14). Nevertheless, sexuality has its place in intimate human relationships so that it is not justified to judge people because of their sexuality. Since sexual expression takes place in different ways, sexuality challenges us to face differences. A pastoral approach to sexuality should not aim to condemn others, nor should HIV be misused for establishing a new sexual moral.

Departing from an incarnational approach, one can argue that because human beings are created by God, sexuality should be regarded as a gift from God. This simultaneously challenges us to acknowledge the centrality of the human body in theological thinking. Ackermann wonders that Christians, whose faith is grounded on Incarnate Love, “are so reluctant to grapple with what it means to have bodies” because “[a]ll reality and all knowledge are mediated through our bodies. We do not

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61 One critically needs to question what should be promoted - the prevention of HIV/AIDS or of sex. In this way the bare association between sex, sexuality and HIV/AIDS becomes obvious.
62 This implies that the distribution of condoms cannot be the final word in responding to HIV/AIDS.
live disembodied lives. Our bodies are more than skin, bones, and flesh. The fact that we can see, hear, touch, smell and feel is the source of what we know” (Ackermann 2005:48). This statement explains why the place and meaning of sexuality should be integrated in theological teaching. Ackermann, like James B. Nelson (1978), raises the question of what it means to be a sexual human being living in a community of sexual human beings. If we can assume a spiritual meaning of sexuality, one may ask how spirituality, the notion of embodiment and expression of sexuality fit into a design for pastoral theology (Louw 2002:157). Focusing on embodied living, John A.T. Robinson comments: “For the body is not simply evil: it is made by and for God. Solidarity is the divinely ordained structure in which personal life is to be lived” (Robinson, cited in Janssen 2005:37).

b) The fear factor

The notion of sexuality underlies all debates about HIV. It is the most striking trigger of stigmatizing attitudes concerning HIV and AIDS, as it appears that the paradoxical combination of procreative sexuality and the bodily restriction of death scares people (Weinreich & Benn 2004). The fear of HIV/AIDS increases considerably by the fear of loss and death (Van Dyke 2006). Dealing with fears should be taken seriously but “death is not the ultimate tragedy in life. The ultimate tragedy is to die without discovering the possibilities of full growth” (Norman Cousins, cited in Karen et al. 2006:667).

In modern times, in philosophy and theology, Sören Kierkegaard has been occupied with the phenomenon of anxiety. Kierkegaard differentiates between fear and Angst. In Kierkegaard’s paradigm, the term Angst lies beyond the notion of “good and bad”, and should be located before the biblical Fall (from innocence). While Angst corresponds with innocence due to ignorance and a psychic state of sleep, fear is rather connected to guilt, because of the knowledge and consciousness that

something has gone wrong against or through oneself (Winkler 2000:301). For Kierkegaard, Angst also has an important function after the Fall. It continuously points to the fact that “nothing” is steadily present. Angst, for Kierkegaard, turns out to be an *Urphenomenon* of human existence. Angst lays open the illusion of security. The human being continuously has to make choices and does not know the outcome. In deciding (even though it is out of Angst), the human being is confronted by his or her freedom. According to Kierkegaard, Angst leads the human being to freedom, and produces the “dizziness of freedom”. Finally, Angst becomes the attribute of a free and differentiated human being (Winkler 2000:302).

Klaus Winkler also refers to Heidegger in dealing with the notion of Angst. For Heidegger, the basis of the state of Angst is an outstanding reconstruction (*Erschlossenheit*) of being (*Dasein*). He describes Angst as an outstanding state of being (Heidegger 1984:184), and phenomenologically differentiates between fear and Angst. Whereas the origin of fear is found in something specific in the world

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65 Winkler (also Kierkegaard) characterises Angst and sets the notion of nothing (nichts) as the object of Angst. Angst then delves into the actual “humanum” of human freedom. Without Angst, the world would seem to be a totally secure space. If there was no Angst, there was no possibility of choice because then the human being would solely have to choose by knowledge (“mit zuordnendem Geist”) between good and bad, which would correspond to right and wrong as existence fostering or existence impeding. Human beings would be in the position to preserve their existence on their own, and would be in the forced position to do always the right thing. We can argue against that view by showing that to regard one’s existence in this world as secure is an illusion (Winkler 2000:302).


67 Winkler (also Kierkegaard) sees in Angst a “*Konstitutivum des Humanum*”. Without Angst, human beings would understand neither themselves nor the world. Without Angst, human beings become distorted images of themselves. Angst creates sense, and it is indispensable for a sound world view (Winkler 2000:304).

68 Heidegger would rather gain ontological insight into being itself (*Seiendes*) through the possibilities of being, and this is only possible through the reconstruction of the state of being (*Befindlichkeit*) and its understanding (*Verstehen*). “*Die Grundbefindlichkeit der Angst als eine ausgezeichnete Erschlossenheit des Daseins*” (Heidegger 1984:184).
Angst hits one in one’s being thrown into the world; it destroys the everyday familiarity with the world. Being becomes isolated as ‘being in the world,’ and the latter reaches an existential mode (modus) of being not-at-home (Unzuhause; cf. Heidegger 1984:189). Nevertheless, Heidegger also sees the outstanding potential of Angst in the way it operates. Angst alone has the potential to reconstruct ‘being’ (erschließen) because it can isolate. This isolation points towards essentiality and inessentiality.

From a pastoral perspective, it is difficult to differentiate between the essential and inessential aspects of life, because what is important is what “the heart” latches onto. If stigmatisation is rooted in Angst or fear, then in terms of a new orientation, it can also become a chance for growth in overcoming Angst. Facing the threat of the

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69 On the other hand, the origin of Angst, being in the world itself, is quite undetermined. The world itself, and what is in it, is not relevant in terms of Angst: “[D]as Wovor der Furcht ist je ein innerweltliches, aus bestimmter Gegend, in der Nähe sich näherndes, abträgliches Seiendes, das ausbleiben kann” (Heidegger 1984:185).
70 For Heidegger, the familiar mode of being in the world is a mode of the eeriness (Unheimlichkeit) of being, and not the other way round. Angst is a characteristic state of being in the world. Only because in being-in-the-world, Angst is always latently present, fear is possible. The form of fear concerns the “world” and is in itself hidden Angst. “Furcht ist an die “Welt” verfallene, uneigentliche und ihr selbst als solche verborgene Angst” (Heidegger 1984:189).
71 According to Heidegger, one experiences an eerie feeling in Angst. In German, the attribute/noun “unheimlich/Unheimlichkeit” linguistically resembles the notion of being “not-at-home”: “Das In-Sein kommt in den existenzialen, Modus des Un-zuhause. Nichts anderes meint die Rede von der ‘Unheimlichkeit’” (Heidegger 1984:189).
72 “Existenziell ist zwar im Verfallen die Eigentlichkeit des Selbstseins verschlossen und abgedrängt, aber diese Verschlossenheit ist nur die Privation einer Erschlossenheit, die sich phenomenal darin offenbart, daß die Flucht des Daseins Flucht vor ihm selbst ist… Allein in der Angst liegt die Möglichkeit eines ausgezeichneten Erschließens, weil sie vereinzelte. Diese Vereinzelung holt das Dasein aus seinem Verfallen zurück und macht ihm Eigentlichkeit und Uneigentlichkeit als Möglichkeit seines Seins offenbar” (Heidegger 1984:191).
73 The following four definitions are Louw’s explanations for the implications of life’s existential issues. Anxiety hinders one from anticipating the future meaningfully: “Existential anxiety describes the human predicament related to the fear of rejection, isolation and loss… Anxiety invades one’s schemata of interpretation. Dread becomes the only paradigm to interpret and understand suffering” (Louw 2004:99).
Guilt is connected to conscience and “implies ethics and moral awareness. [i.e. the insight that a norm or value has been transgressed]. Guilt can [also] play a constructive role in crisis management, because it designates responsibility, sensitivity and consciousness […] and [can] contribute to the process of growth and healing” (Louw 2004:99). Louw regards shame and regret as corollaries of guilt. Later, I shall differentiate more clearly between guilt and shame.
Despair “derives from doubt: the cul de sac of a human soul” (Louw 2004:99).
Helplessness indicates dysfunctionality, and can become anger turned inwards.
Louw further describes these existential issues as “the darkness of the soul or the shadow of soulfulness. An alternative to these shadows […] can be called the brightness of soulfulness.
pandemic, being exposed in the process of being embodied in the world should also have a predominant place in the theological discussion of ethical and existential core issues. The medical historian, Sander Gilman, adopts a psychoanalytical approach and shows that positive and negative stereotypes are the historical product of a social group. The use of stereotypes is the externalisation of fear. Externalisation of fear states that what we fear lies outside of ourselves. Gilman concludes that human beings cannot live without stereotyping (Orell 2005:13). Responding to Gilman’s suggestion, Esther Orell emphasises the purpose of unmasking stereotypes in the necessity to acknowledge and understand why we need stereotypes; the occupation with stereotypes opens up the opportunity to deal with our fears (Orell 2005:14).

Prejudices against people trying to live positively with HIV and AIDS or denial of HIV and AIDS and the related stigma, all serve the same function, which is the avoidance of the time consuming and often-unpleasant preoccupation with an aspect of truth. One aspect of truth is that we are thrown into the world and seemingly lack of all meaning. Exposed to meaningless human beings are scared (Grundbefindlichkeit) and hold skewed perceptions about the world and life issues. Consequently, existential life issues, like being embodied in the world (which includes, for instance, being both sexual and mortal) offer the opportunity to judge according to ones perception shaped by suspicion.

Brightness represents a horizon of meaning and a different perspective on anxiety, guilt, dread, and helplessness” (Louw 2004:99).

The function of externalization, according to Gilman, is to make sure that what we fear lies outside ourselves (“sicher zu stellen, dass “das was wir fürchten, nicht in uns selbst liegt”) (Gilman 1992:308).


We should also realise how ideologies (including those self-made) structure our world (Orell 2005:14).

Denial may take place due to the association of HIV and AIDS with taboo themes such as sexuality and death, or with the attached stigma itself; because in many societies, due to existing norms and perceptions, these sensitive topics cannot be named easily, especially in public (Weinreich & Benn 2004:47).
3. SCOPE OF THE HIV/AIDS-RELATED STIGMA

Gregory M. Herek, who is specialised in studies in the area of HIV and AIDS-related stigma, offers insights into the social psychology of the HIV and AIDS stigma. In following Goffman’s arguments, he points out that HIV and AIDS manifest at least four characteristics that are likely to evoke stigma.

- The first characteristic suggests that stigma is more likely to be attached to diseases whose bearer seems accountable and, therefore, responsible for the cause. “To the extent that an illness is perceived as having been contracted through voluntary and avoidable behaviours – especially if such behaviours evoke social disapproval – it is likely to be stigmatised and to evoke anger and moralism rather than pity and empathy” (Herek 1999:1109). Herek concludes that, since ways of HIV transmission are “widely considered voluntary and immoral”, the public often regards people living with HIV and AIDS as responsible for their condition and consequently stigmatises them (Herek 1999:1109).

- Herek stresses a second factor that favours stigma associated with conditions that are unalterable and degenerative (Herek 1999:1109). From the beginning, HIV and AIDS were known to be fatal conditions. Being diagnosed with HIV and AIDS has been closely related to a death sentence. For others, the person infected with HIV may be a reminder or even the personification of death and mortality.78

- A third factor that makes stigma more likely is the possibility of harm and danger to others, since the common tendency is to overestimate the contagiousness of HIV.79

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78 Even though there are effective therapies and there is the hope of transforming being HIV-positive from a fatal condition into a chronic illness, HIV will probably continue to be perceived as a fatal disease for a long time to come (Herek 1999:1109).
79 It is a fact that being infected through social intercourse is actually impossible. HIV infection is transmitted primarily through sexual intercourse, by HIV-infected blood passing directly into the body of another person, or by breastfeeding from mother to child (van Dyk 2005:23).
The fourth condition that tends to make stigmatisation more likely is when the condition is obvious to and perceivable by others. In an illustrative way, the condition of deviance is said to disrupt the social interaction and is even “perceived by others as repellent, ugly or upsetting” (Herek 1999:1110). In particular, the last stages of HIV infection can have a dramatic effect on the physical appearance and vitality of individuals, which may result in distress and in stigma from others (Herek 1999:1110).

Theories of HIV and AIDS-related stigma developed by social psychologists often describe two sources for individual attitudes concerning the HIV and AIDS-related stigma. Herek describes possible sources and functions of an HIV and AIDS-related stigmatizing attitude.

The first source of attitude results in an “instrumental HIV/AIDS-stigma”. The attitude of the instrumental stigma is grounded in the fear of HIV and AIDS as a disease, and an accompanying desire to protect oneself from it due to its infectiousness and lethality. Stigma based on fear functions as a means of protection against the disease. The second source of stigmatizing attitude is the symbolic association between HIV and AIDS and groups identified with the virus.

A “symbolic HIV/AIDS stigma” exists due to social meanings attached to HIV and AIDS. The latter “represents the use of the disease as a vehicle for expressing a variety of attitudes like negligence or ignorance”. Basic to the symbolic stigma are social meanings connected to norms and values of a society (Herek 1999:1112).

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80 Interestingly, from these characteristics, Herek shows that from its epidemiology and social history, HIV and AIDS would have evoked stigma independently. However, the special character of stigma in the United States predominantly derives from the association between HIV and AIDS and particular sectors of the population, especially gay and bisexual men, and injecting drug users.
The above data has indicated that beyond the fact that HIV is a virus and AIDS is the medical consequence of the HIV infection, HIV and AIDS-related issues have to do with more than the medical context. Today, it is obvious that HIV affects and is affected by cultural (religious) norms and practices, socio-economic conditions, development, gender issues, and sexuality – to name a few aspects (WCC 1997:4).

Ackermann defines stigma theologically as, “broadly speaking, a term that marks and then excludes a person as being tainted or alien, of less value, blameworthy or to be feared as undesirably different” (Ackermann 2006:4). The nature of stigma is multi-faceted. In being a sign and symbol for something, its nature is ambivalent. In its essence, stigma refers to another level of meaning. Although the understanding of stigma may vary in historical and cultural contexts, regarding the HIV and AIDS pandemic, the perception of people who try to live positively with HIV and AIDS through the lenses of stigma is clearly a negative one.

In approaching the HIV and AIDS stigma, Ackermann identifies two appearances of stigmatisation. One is “brutal” and “violent”, while in the other stigma manifests with “great subtlety”. Both brutal violence and scheming subtlety may have a devastating effect on the human being (as already discussed above; cf. Ackermann 2006:4). Ackermann further states that the starting point in dealing with stigma and its effects is to become aware of its complexity; understanding stigma becomes the “first line of defence” (Ackermann 2006:4).

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81 According to Louw (2007:401), “[S]tigmatization and labelling are synonymous with immediate isolation. HIV therefore becomes the leprosy of the twenty-first century”. On an existential and social level, rejection means exclusion from community, in life and closeness to death, “which is the ultimate state of loneliness” (Louw 1998:3). If HIV/AIDS is the leprosy of the 21st century (Louw 2007), then stigma can be understood as the stone people throw at one another – “He who is without sin may throw the first stone”.

82 The aspect of attitude is intrinsic to human beings, whereas the quality of attitude is varying. Attitude finds orientation in norms and values. The pastoral challenge would be to establish the norm of the will of God. Destigmatisation would presume an overhaul of a person’s normative system.

83 HIV and AIDS-related stigma points out to “pre-existing stigmata” like race, poverty, sexuality, and gender. Their reality needs to be acknowledged in the discussion.
Due to its complexity, one approach may not be to ask what HIV and AIDS-related stigma is (explanatory and causal approach), but rather to enquire how it affects human beings in their context (its quality in the HIV and AIDS pandemic in terms of hermeneutics (Louw 2007)). In their approaches, both Ackermann and Louw touch the very essence of what stigmatisation beyond theories actually means: it is hard to name the unnameable.

4. THE ETHICAL DILEMMA: REJECTION OR ACCEPTANCE?

One can approach the ethical dilemma of stigmatisation from two sides, namely, from the stigmatizing perspective, and from the perspective of the person who receives the stigma (i.e. the question of motivation and intention [stigmatiser], or guilt and shame [stigmatised]). From another perspective, the ethical dilemma of stigmatisation takes place on two levels - on a personal level, in which individuals personally evoke stigma or are affected by stigma, as well as on a societal level, in which people have an effect on or are delivered to certain structures. Here, the assumption is that on both levels stigmatisation not only leads to isolation and disconnectedness but stigmatisation is also consequently the manifestation of isolation and disconnectedness.

Ethic, as the “theory about the human way of life” (Eschmann 2000:171), deals with the notion of guilt in order to articulate human transgressions according to whether human action and behaviour can be called good or bad. Christian ethics have their orientation in systematic theology. According to G. Sauter, sin and guilt are to be differentiated, because sin is less accompanied with the understanding of ethical transgression than guilt. For this reason, sin is not central to understanding norms and violating them; rather, sin is solely understood through the grace of God, who confronts us with our sin (Sauter, in Eschmann 2000:167). Sauter does not explicitly regard sin in terms of human relation towards God, or guilt solely as human beings’ social relations, because these areas are too closely intertwined. Rather, for the purpose of this discussion, the differentiation between sin as a transgression in
terms of the God-human relationship and guilt as a primary ethical transgression is useful. The differentiation refers to the understanding of human beings as both coram deo as well as coram mundo (Eschmann 2000:167).

The conceptualisation of stigma and the outline of prejudices in HIV and AIDS-related stigmatisation have shown that stigma affects and is affected by cultural (e.g. religious) norms and practices, socio-economic conditions, development, gender issues, and sexuality (WCC 1997:4). One may ask, therefore, for the measures, principles, criteria, conditions, and commitment of moral norms and values that are effective in stigmatisation (Prechtl 1999:159). In the Christian tradition (ethos), norms and values are basic to ethics. Next, I shall indicate that there is an ethical dilemma for practical theology rooted in the doctrine of sin and theological anthropological premises. This ethical dilemma is considered to be, from an anthropological perspective, connected to the HIV and AIDS-related stigma.

Systematic theological reflection functions as the critical means to connect to the source and message of the Gospel. At the same time, in practical theology, systematic reflection helps to connect the reflected tradition to the present context of time. In addition, a pastoral perspective entails constantly mediating between Christian doctrines and ethical reflections of the same. Practical theology mediates between dogmatic references in theological reflection and a reflected stance in a responsible theological practice of the Christian church. Thus, a pastoral hermeneutic is decisive for putting the commitment to Christian norms and values into practice. Otherwise, even Christian theology runs into the danger of becoming a tool in the process of stigmatisation. Hence, the questions what are Christian norms, and what does it mean to violate them?

84 The term “church” here is used to refer to the ecclesiological aspect.
4.1 Stigmatisation and the biblical notion of sin

The biblical view of sin is a central category in the theologies of the Old Testament. Sin refers to a universal aspect of the human condition. The ways sin manifests is as varied as the human life itself. Sin is both individual and corporate and it fundamentally disorganises relationships with other human beings and with God (Härle 2000:480). Wilfried Härle approaches sin from the point of view of the calling of human beings before God. Human calling, according to the Christian understanding of creation, is the calling for love. Sin, therefore, means to fail in this calling. Different interpretations of why human beings happen to fail in their calling are possible (Härle 2000:461). In this regard, the UNAIDS theological report states that sin in the Bible is understood relationally. Sin means “the breaking of our essential relatedness to God, one another and the rest of creation. Sin, therefore, is alienation… estrangement, and infects us all” (UNAIDS 2005:13). Stigmatisation of the individual is a sin against the Creator God, since all human beings are made in God’s image. Stigmatisation of the individual means “to reject the image of God in the other and to deny him or her life in its fullness” (UNAIDS 2005:13).

Hence, the theological argument here is that the act of stigmatizing the other is sin and a denial of the Creator and creation. Underlying this argument is the basic biblical assumption that we all are sinners, whether we are HIV-infected or not. It is the individual and the community that have fallen short of the glory of God (i.e. have become guilty). However, we deny this truth by being self-righteous in stigmatizing others for what they are or are not. To deny that we are all “sinners” and instead stigmatise the other, is to deny this truth (UNAIDS 2005:13).

Nevertheless, in theological history the common over-emphasis on “sin” rather than on, for example, the notion of human dignity, in a cultural climate determined by

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85 The doctrine of original sin stands close to the doctrine of human freedom and responsibility (Barton 1997:760).
86 Härle points out the task of interpretation in using the term “sin”, which requires a responsible theological reflection. The sole substitution of the term sin with transgression, estrangement or alienation, or the substitution of the term guilt with responsibility is not complete. Much more, it is about the distinct illustration of the problem area (Härle 2000:465).
metaphysical and dualistic thinking, had a major impact on Christian anthropology (Huber 1992:579).

### 4.2 Sinfulness and stigma

The ethical dilemma for practical theology concerning HIV and AIDS-related stigma is rooted in the seemingly paradoxical tendency to either overemphasise the doctrine of sin or to neglect it.\(^ {87} \) If the notion of sin is neglected and misunderstood, a central aspect of Christian anthropology falls short, because with the notion of sin, the human being is portrayed in a realistic way in order to overcome sin. Human sin and human dignity do not exclude each other. Rather, the notion of human dignity becomes concrete where it is threatened and negated by sin (Huber 1992:578). Wolfgang Huber claims that three factors have delayed the Christian conception of human dignity. One important aspect has been the conception of original sin and the understanding of the sinfulness of all human beings. Since human beings have forfeited their right before God with the Fall, consequently, they have forfeited their right concerning dignity beyond secular and ecclesial power (ibid).\(^ {88} \)

A second critical aspect, which has delayed the Christian conception of human dignity, is the notion of differentiation. Up to modern times, Christians often have understood human dignity as a Christian privilege. Finally, Christian anthropology had the tendency to understand society in classes as well as having a hierarchical understanding of churches. On this basis, the differentiating function of the notion of dignity was legalised (Huber 1992:579). The basis for human dignity in the Christian tradition is the connection to the biblical creation report and human as being created in the *imago dei* (Gen 1:26; Huber 1992:579).

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\(^{87}\) In everyday life experience, as well as in the theological context, the attitude to sin is likely to be that of suspicion and indifference (Härle 2000:457).

\(^{88}\) Barton (1997:761) notes that “conceptions of sin have served sinful ends”.
The ethical dilemma of stigma is reflected in the neglect of discussions of sin, because stigma is also about keeping silent and denial. The inherent nature of sin is that it withdraws from human understanding and rationalising (Eschmann 2000:160). Holger Eschmann summarises different understandings of why theological discussions of sin today are to be regarded as ‘keeping-silent’. Eschmann also comments that this assertion implies, on the one hand, that presently theology is unable to talk appropriately about sin and, on the other hand, it speaks for the centrality of the doctrine of sin in theology.

One argument is that the proclamation and action of the churches have failed to give witness to the biblical message and to face the specific contextual question. At present, theology does not address the sin. Another argument lies in the historical changes human sciences have gone through since the Enlightenment and post-modernity. The loss of open discussion of sin and forgiveness go hand-in-hand with the “loss of meaning” in talking about God in the modern era. Yet another interpretation refers to the mechanism of denial and the suppression of everything that is negative due to a certain lifestyle, for example, the tendency to moralise sin rubs off its deeper dimension (Eschmann 2000:160).

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89 Silence and hindrance to the spread of information create barriers to an open discussion or they even reinforce stigmatizing attitudes by neglecting the issue of HIV and AIDS, for example, by seeing it as the problem of the other ethnic group (WCC 1997:5).

90 Similarly, Gestrich asserts that if we were able to talk clearly and with commitment about sin, theology would win back all other contents of Christian doctrine for our time. “Könnten wir wieder verständlich und verbindlich von der Sünde sprechen, hätte unsere Theologie auch alle übrigen Inhalte der christlichen Glaubenslehre für unsere Zeit zurück gewonnen” (Gestrich, in Eschmann 2000:159).

91 Louw asserts that, currently, the trend in pastoral care in a post-modern context is to re-interpret sin in terms of our normal limitations and from a psychological viewpoint. Sin is understood as an inner alienation or obstruction of inner potential rather than as estrangement from God.
5. THE THEOLOGICAL DILEMMA: SCAPEGOATING OR GRACE (COMPASSION)?

The UNAIDS report of a theological workshop focusing on HIV and AIDS-related stigma deals with the notion of Christian responsibility and identifies stigmatisation as the main hindrance to effective prevention and treatment of HIV and AIDS. Simultaneously, the report exposes those aspects of Christian theology that promote stigmatizing attitudes (UNAIDS 2005:11). In order to clarify the understanding of HIV and AIDS as the “sinner’s disease”, the UNAIDS theological report identifies four main strands of sin related to stigmatisation. In Christian theology, the following aspects interrelate with the notion of sin and the phenomenon of stigmatisation.

- Associated connection between sexuality and sin
- Understanding of HIV and AIDS as a punishment for sin
- Sin as a failure to take responsibility
- Stigmatisation as sin in itself

The religious connotation of the term “scapegoat” occurs mainly in the name of religious denunciation. I shall consider whether the anthropological assertion of the “sinful human being” (sinful due to the notions discussed above) correlates to a certain understanding of God. A prevailing argument in justifying stigmatisation is

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92 It also emphasises the potential and the resources of Christian theology, which provide the framework for a deepened Christian reflection (UNAIDS 2005:11).
93 While the first three notions often serve as justification for stigma, the latter aspect, “stigmatisation as sin itself,” argues against stigma (UNAIDS 2005:13).
94 As mentioned above, stigma can function as a means of regulating the social intercourse (which includes the access to rare resources, such as status or professional possibilities) between different groups or, for example, between majorities and minorities. As a function, stigma may also channel frustration and aggression towards weaker and powerless people, who can then be called the “scapegoats” of society (Hohmeier 1975).
95 In a pastoral context, one may question the existence of stigmatisation, if people are truly committed to the “paradigm of sin” (indifference and disconnectedness). Likewise, Louw approaches the theological dilemma rooted in stigmatisation expressed in three aspects namely the notion of contamination, ’scapegoating’, labelling, stereotyping, and the cause-question concerning HIV infection (Louw 2007:401).
that HIV and AIDS is a punishment of God for those who are promiscuous or in some other ways “sinful” (Vitillo 2005:21). Robert Vitillo unfolds an important discussion, which leads to the question of our God-image as the final argument and point of departure for the question of HIV and AIDS as punishment for sin. His argument is that misreading Scripture has hampered the church’s task of engaging with people who try to live positively with HIV and AIDS but who might be affected by stigmatisation. This suggests that the capacity to help affected people in their structures and prevention of further transmission has been diminished. A theological argument against the linking of HIV and AIDS with punishment can be based on the book of Job (Gutiérrez 1988:15) and the healing narratives of the Gospel.

When the pandemic was first identified, some theologians responded in terms of a moralistic approach and interpreted HIV and AIDS as a punishment by God.

96 First, Vitillo argues that “while sexual transmission was the most frequent means of contracting the virus, it certainly was not the only one. [Secondly,] that even among those who had been infected by sexual means, many (especially women) had been faithful to one partner – namely, their husbands – for life. [Thirdly,] that many of history’s greatest saints – including Saint Augustine – had admitted to being ‘promiscuous’ at one or other time in their lives and yet none was reputed to have been punished with a virus sent by God; and finally, that I [Vitillo] could not place my faith and hope in a capricious, vindictive and punitive God” (Vitillo 2005:21).

Vitillo suggests that discriminatory behaviour is based on a reaction of ignorance and fear of infection or negative reactions by others (reputation) than on punitive attitudes. In contrast to this, Louw argues that the understanding of HIV and AIDS as a punishment for sin is based on a judgmental attitude (people who have contracted HIV and AIDS are reaping the fruits of their immoral actions). One may conclude that ignorance and fear go hand-in-hand with a judgmental and punitive attitude (Vitillo 2005:21).

98 Louw cites D. Chilton as an example of one who relates HIV/AIDS to disobedience, expressed in cases of homosexuals who were infected: “The homosexual is at war with God, and, in his very practice, is denying God’s natural order and law” (Chilton, cited in Louw 2007:402).

99 Although Chilton represents a general “anti-position” towards homosexuality, there are usually two theological options. One option is a rejecting-but-non-punitive position; it corresponds to a qualified acceptance position, which holds that “homosexual orientation falls short of God’s intent while one should recognise its irreversibility. If celibacy is not possible, same-sex monogamy is acceptable” (Louw 2007:355). An example of the rejecting-but-non-punitive position offers Rotter in his book “Sexualität und Christliche Moral” (1991). He argues in a completely ambivalent way that, “for more understanding and tolerance towards homosexual people, simultaneously, a socially preferential treatment of heterosexuals is fundamentally legitimate and necessary in order to counteract the danger of temptation and unnecessary reinforcement of any homosexual disposition” (Sicher bedeutet die oft sehr ablehnende Einstellung der Gesellschaft gegenüber Homosexuellen für diese eine zusätzliche Beeinträchtigung. Etwas mehr Verständnis und Toleranz wären hier wünschenswert. Anderseits ist aber die soziale Bevorzugung der Heterosexualität grundsätzlich doch legitim und notwendig, um den Gefahren der Verführung und unnötiger Verstärkung homosexueller Veranlagungen entgegenzuwirken” (Rotter, Hans (1991). Sexualität und Christliche Moral. Wien: Tyrolia – Verlag, 114.).

More general positions in the gay debate include a pro-position: “due to human rights, gay people have the right of choice”;

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However, Louw strongly suggests that HIV and AIDS should not be misused to establish a new sexual morality. HIV and AIDS challenge our theological paradigm in that they question, “a theology based on imperialism and affluence” (Louw 2007:1). Louw adds that HIV and AIDS challenge our understanding of human progress and achievement ethics in that they show us how fragile and fallible humans are despite all technological progress. He claims that, “HIV forces medical science back to the confines of life: death. It radicalizes human’s fallibility, fragility, weakness, mortality and fear of death” (Louw 2007:399).

In order to understand stigma in pastoral theology, the notion of the God-Image would play an important role, in that one needs to question how people perceive, experience and understand God (Louw 2006:1). The challenge to interpret and understand the Christian truth in terms of human understanding and experience is the critical point for the pastoral approach. The understanding of HIV and AIDS as a punishment for sin is based on a judgmental attitude, in that people who have contracted HIV and AIDS are reaping the fruits of their immoral actions (Louw 2006:2). Due to this assumption the God-image is fundamental in any pastoral diagnosis. Among the various God-images, one can make out two common understandings of God in the HIV and AIDS pandemic.

- At the heart of stigmatizing attitudes to HIV and AIDS within a theological or ecclesial context, there are widely different understandings of God such as the image of a vindictive God.

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an emphatic position: “due to unconditional love one should try to understand the predicament of being gay in a heterosexual world”;

a love-but-position: “one should tolerate gays”;

an emphatic, but-position: “don’t practice being gay”;

an neutral dialogue-position: “due to uncertainty one should accommodate gays (even in the church)”;

Finally a trans-pro-responsibility position: “at stake is the question whether sexuality and different sexual expressions are the core issues in a Christian spiritual assessment of being gay” (Louw 2007:357).
The feeling of being rejected by the community can finally lead to a feeling of being rejected by God (i.e. the image of a transcendent God in terms of causal interpretation and the internalized stigma).

The image of a vindictive God against a God of compassion stands in contrast to the other; hence, the urgent need to reclaim biblical images of God that are “trinitarian, non-patriarchal and grounded in divine love” (UNAIDS 2005:12). From the perspective of the person who receives the stigma, the feeling of being rejected by the parish can lead to the feeling of being rejected by God. From those perspectives, the question and theological problem arises: what God-image is upheld?

Louw (2005:2) says that in the Gospel, “God’s identification with human existence […] is explained in anthropomorphic terms”. Furthermore, he stresses the need to introduce God into the pandemic, since stigmatizing attitudes within a theological and ecclesial context can be traced back often to widely different understandings of God. The central theological question, according to Louw, is how to link God to the pandemic? Is suffering the will of God? At the same time, the human quest for meaning, human dignity and questions concerning theodicy and the power of God are important. It is to be noted that the understanding of theodicy in practical theology needs a hermeneutical approach, in which suffering is not philosophically abstract, but rather is an honest existential struggle (Louw 2004:44).

From a religious point of view, one could argue in terms of providence, that God is involved somehow in the origin, sending or management of the virus, in that God, in suffering, “illuminates” meaning metaphors regarding His faithfulness within the context of human misery (Louw 2004:44; 2007:402). Nevertheless, understanding an omnipotent and loving God, and the contradiction between God’s power freely

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100 Louw mentions that in the ethical debate, the following God images can be traced: God as “A vindictive judge – due to mankind’s misunderstandings of divine justice”; God as “A rigid bookkeeper of our mistakes”; God as “A sadistic brute who takes pleasure in our sufferings; A fateful force who has determined the destinies of all”; an indifferent God who does not care about humanity’s suffering”. Alternatively, Louw argues for positive images of God proclaimed by the church “in its struggle against stigma, discrimination and the subsequent feelings of guilt and shame” (Louw 2007:402).
disposed to the world (destiny), and human calling (ethos) are hard to grasp and pose questions to human beings.

In this context, Link discusses the crisis of belief in providence (2005). He opens up the framework for the theological enterprise to interpret human experience in and with the world, in which the belief in providence cannot serve a cause and effect model anymore. In order to free the understanding of providence from the principle of causality, God’s will (providence) should be interpreted in terms of an accompanying and empowering principle (Link 2005:428; Louw 2004:169). Both Link and Louw see providence as being theologically rooted in pneumatology, which is theory formation the sphere of the Holy Spirit.

In terms of a biblical argument, one can say that the “isolation model stands in sharp contrast to the compassionate model of Christ” (Louw 2007:402).\textsuperscript{101} Louw sees two possible points of departure: a causal explanatory model or a hermeneutical, interpretative model. While the explanatory model interprets God in terms of metaphysical ontology,\textsuperscript{102} a hermeneutical model applies a metaphorical concept of God.\textsuperscript{103} In a hermeneutical approach, the question is “about the essence and quality of the encounter with God in terms of the human quest for meaning in suffering” (Louw 2007:403). Louw stresses the point that the primary problem is not the question of sin but one should rather question the concepts of life and meaning (Louw 2007:403).

\textsuperscript{101} See the story of Christ and the leper in Mk 1:40-41.
\textsuperscript{102} An explanatory model operates within the relation of cause and effect. In this approach, one tries to describe God ontologically in terms of being. In doing so, anthropomorphic elements are used, which can lead to the misuse of specific descriptions of God's essence or being (Louw 1998:82). This understanding is characterised by God as the ‘callous despot’; “everything is programmed according to the law of providence and prediction” (Louw 2007:403).
\textsuperscript{103} A metaphorical concept of God implies “that all reference to God is indirect ... That does not imply that God is not ‘real’. Rather, the reality of God can only be phrased in finite human terminology. But, in terms of faith, the reality of God is a meaningful and substantial issue” (Louw 1998:83; see the next chapter on the notion of embodiment).
Thus, the choice of a hermeneutical approach to the pandemic and stigmatisation has a direct effect on a theology of pastoral care. It is no longer possible to interpret God in terms of metaphysical ontology and its anthropomorphic elements (Louw 1998:82). Instead, the choice of a dialogical and metaphoric model of God is linked to a personal concept of the God-human relationship. Following Louw, theology is therefore interested in the understanding and interpretation of the God-human encounter and the way God is involved with humanity (Louw 1998:83).

Regarding the pandemic, the question is about God’s relatedness and engagement with human suffering (Louw 2007:403). For Louw, the notion of HIV and AIDS as a punishment from God appears inappropriate, irresponsible and irrelevant in theologising. Louw also remarks that only suffering people who are guilt-loaded and want to accept responsibility for something in their life by turning to God can bring the punishment element to the fore, which should lead to a constructive confession of sin (Louw 2007:403; 1998:416).

Moreover, Louw (2005:120) claims that the analysis of a person’s God-image helps a pastor to make a diagnosis of the person’s faith. In the pastoral encounter, which can be viewed “as an embodiment of God’s salvific intervention” (Louw 1998:82), the pastor as an “interpreter of meanings” (Louw 2007:84) should first also be aware of her or his own concept of God (Louw 1998:85) in order to be able to identify the God image of the person to be counselled. Louw offers further alternatives for a re-interpretation of the concept, “God as Father”, because at present “patriarchal and national cultural associations which are based on status, hierarchy and distance between subject and God” may create an abstract or even repelling understanding of God (Louw 1998:82).

In terms of the theological dilemma one may conclude that any approach to HIV and AIDS and the related stigmatisation strongly depends on the God-image, first behind

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104 From the point of view of pastoral care, theology is a hermeneutical science and undertaking (Louw 1998:83).
a person, and then collective behind a group of people. Louw stresses the point that the primary problem is not the question of sin but one should really question the concepts of life and meaning. Hence, metaphors of God should be applicable to various contexts of meaning, in order to open up people’s attitude to experience God’s presence. In the context of faith care, Louw particularly recommends metaphors such as God as the shepherd, the servant, the wisdom, and the Paraclete. In particular, the concept of God as a Soul Friend should play an important role in the communication of care and comfort (Louw 1998:85). The hermeneutical key is a God who is concerned about human beings, a God of love and compassion. The actual question at stake is now, how unconditional is Christian love (Louw 2007:399)?

6. THE ECCLESIOLOGICAL DILEMMA: INDIFFERENCE (APATHY) OR IDENTIFICATION (AGAPÉ)?

A radicalising effect of the HIV and AIDS pandemic is the question of identity, integrity and dignity of the Christian church (Louw 2007:399). Through churches, narrow morally enacted understanding of sin can contribute to processes of stigmatisation. The challenge to face difference (e.g. in the case of an HIV positive status or homosexual expression of sexuality) becomes the stone of proof, if the Christian model of compassionate identification is applied (Louw 2007:402). HIV/AIDS and its related stigma and stigmatisation challenge “fixed ecclesial doctrines and rigid clerical convictions” behind which a neutral attitude of apathy or the attitude of hypocrisy and prejudice may lurk (Louw 2007:400).

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105 According to Louw (1998:85), “An effective metaphor for God should express dimensions of sensitivity and compassion (pathos), identification (woundedness), insight and understanding in terms of paradoxes (wise-fool); as well as consolation, encouragement (paraclesis) and empowerment. The concept of ‘God as Soul Friend’ (God’s friendship in terms of his covenantal and compassionate faithfulness) should play an important role in pastoral communication of care and comfort. Therefore, a theology of pastoral care is about the faithfulness of God, whose caring presence is expressed in the pastoral encounter as a metaphor of covenantal presence and mutual partnership/companionship/friendship”.

Unfortunately, the response of churches has been inadequate, and has even worsened the problem in many cases (WCC 1997:5). The relevance of a pastoral response becomes obvious in the way Christian churches have supported the stigmatisation of people who try to live positively with HIV and AIDS, for example, in accusing people with HIV and AIDS of having sinned morally, and in excluding them from community. This failure of Christian churches is a practical argument against linking HIV and AIDS with punishment for sin (and the image of a vindictive God), because of its damaging effect from a practical theological perspective. Likewise, resulting judgmental attitudes highly undermine the churches’ tasks and efforts in care and prevention. Stigmatisation hampers any approach that diminishes new HIV infections, since people rather repress the subject of HIV and AIDS and, in this way, they avoid dealing with it (Weinreich & Benn 2004:47).

In addition, the World Council of Churches’ (WCC 1997) document argues that the relevance and credibility of churches will be determined by their response. The church bears a special responsibility in the fight against HIV and AIDS because action can be derived from their mission of salvation entrusted by Jesus Christ (Weinreich & Benn 2004:100). It is their members’ task to become in their very nature the body of Christ’s healing communities (Weinreich & Benn 2004:103). Hence, the task of theology is to reflect on the human conditions in the HIV and AIDS pandemic and sharpen the awareness of people’s inhumanity to one another (WCC 1997:2). From a pastoral point of view, therefore, it can be stated that the ethical dilemma of stigma is rooted in the doctrine of sin and the failure of churches to respond in a Christian way.

106 The effect of the missed vocation of the church is that people, who directly or indirectly suffer from HIV and AIDS, experience discriminatory behaviour due to their serum positive status, or the status of a friend or relative. The effects of HIV and AIDS itself and its related stigma go hand-in-hand: HIV and AIDS cause stigmatisation, and stigmatisation causes HIV and AIDS. Both together constitute a vicious circle. Simultaneously, stigmatisation impoverishes the life quality of people living with HIV and AIDS (Weinreich & Benn 2004:47).
Louw (1998:162) notes that, “[…] sin is about irresponsible choices, hypocrisy, false motives and distorted needs of self-interest. Essentially, sin is a problem of distorted relationships”. He remarks that:

The theme of sin in Scripture does not appear in order to design a negative anthropology. Rather, the notion that the human person is a sinful being, creates a realistic view of our human being, and has the primary intention of setting human beings free from sin. Sin, therefore, should be assessed within the perspective of salvation and grace (Louw 1998:161).

The basis of a theological anthropology is essentially positive: people are evaluated not in terms of their sin, but in terms of God’s grace. Sin should thus be interpreted within a broader framework as freedom from guilt, reconciliation and forgiveness (Louw 1998:162).

In this chapter I have demonstrated the perception of HIV and AIDS, and how it is expressed in language. I have questioned the paradigm behind the stigma, which goes along with specific assumptions and expectations about the other person. The scope of the HIV and AIDS-related stigma actually points to the person or group who hold certain expectations. HIV and AIDS-related stigma and stigmatisation in the Christian context open up an ethical, theological and ecclesiological dilemma. The underlying question is if anthropology should be approached from the perspective of sin or rather if not God’s grace and faithfulness is the determining reality concerning the human being. HIV/AIDS and its related stigma challenge practical theology in that we do not solely have to learn about a virus in a medical sense, but we should understand our own human nature, behaviour and perception.

In the framework of this study, I suggest a spiritual perspective and orientation for addressing the problem of destigmatisation within the HIV and AIDS pandemic. The notion of stigmatisation reveals that sin is a problem of distorted relationships, and should not be understood in terms of a negative anthropology (e.g. the degradation and denial of the human body).
CHAPTER THREE
CORPOREALITY AND EMBODIMENT IN THEOLOGY - TOWARDS A
RE-ASSESSMENT OF THE BODY IN A PASTORAL
ANTHROPOLOGY

The history of theology and philosophy, even history of human kind, is mediated
history about and from human bodies in their specific contexts. Instead of
gratefulness for this precondition of existence, corporeality and human embodiment
have from the start been regarded rather suspiciously in theology. So far, the
degradation of the human body in pastoral anthropology has been exposed through
the process of stigmatisation. I have pointed out the connection of stigmatisation
exemplified in the HIV and AIDS-related stigma to the perception of the human being
in relation to the doctrine of sin. I indicate here understanding of corporeality and
embodiment from a philosophical and theological perspective. Finally, I argue for a
re-assessment of the body in pastoral theology.

1. CORPOREALITY AND EMBODIMENT: A PHILOSOPHICAL AND
THEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE

1.1 Platonic dualism: the degradation and denial of the body

Originally, philosophy was determined by existential questions; and the question for
wisdom was raised from everyday life experiences. In order to support philosophical
assertions and concepts, philosophy was determined mainly by reason and logic.
Moreover, when theology became conceptual, engaging with philosophy was
inevitable. Over centuries, philosophy and theology as “the arts”, beside power-
political influences, have shaped the societal ethos as well as the image of the
human being. In the following text, I describe formative influences pertaining to the
view of corporeality and embodiment beginning with the Hebrew tradition and
extending up to modernity.
Nelson notes that in pre-Christian Hebrew tradition, the human being was often associated with the “flesh” rather than with the “spirit”. The prevalent syncretism and antagonism of Jewish Old Testament tradition held a holistic conception of a person that can be broken down to the phrase, “I am an animated body” (Feichtinger 2004:12).\textsuperscript{107} Although the idea of a spiritualistic dualism was minimized and sexuality was regarded as a gift of God, a form of sexist dualism was present throughout because the culture was male-dominated (Nelson 1978:47).\textsuperscript{108}

First, one can make out body-denying impulses that are probably connected to Persian influences, such as the fact that the notion of salvation was intertwined with sexual restriction. Sexual repression among the Jews occurred often under specific historical circumstances, for example, during the return from exile. Nelson agrees with Vern that:

> The most logical explanation for the changes in attitude seems to lie with the Jewish attitude toward themselves; when Judaism seemed threatened, when the Jews, both as a group and as individuals, were insecure, and their sexual attitude was the most repressive; when there was a greater feeling of security, attitudes were more tolerant (Vern, cited in Nelson 1978:47).

Consequently, Vern links bodily repression to repression in social order.\textsuperscript{109} One can tentatively add the observation that the Jewish repression can be linked to the experience of stigmatisation. This observation would also give rise to the idea of the internalization of stigma, which was expressed in the own restrictions in social life.\textsuperscript{110} In addition, Nelson sees sexual repression and sexist dualism in reaction to certain historical circumstances as being connected to the freedom of the individual and the social body (Nelson 1978:47).\textsuperscript{111 112}

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\textsuperscript{107} My translation.
\textsuperscript{108} There are exceptions to patriarchy in the Old Testament, e.g. Gen 2 and 3, the Song of Songs, Ruth, Jeremiah 31:15-22, Hosea 4:14 (Nelson 1978:47).
\textsuperscript{111} Nelson refers to Herbert Marcuse, who states that, “alienation from society and alienation from one’s own sexuality go hand-in-hand” (cited in Nelson 1978:42).
\end{flushright}
The Hellenistic culture had a major influence on Christian tradition and the perception of the body. Although the attitude of Greeks towards sexuality and sensuality was quite affirmative until the late Classical Age, a spiritualistic dualism arose especially in the period after the death of Alexander the Great (Nelson 1978:48). With Hellenistic and (neo-) platonic heritage, a rather dualistic understanding of a separation of soul and body developed. The phrase “I am a soul, who does temporarily have a body” can be associated with that time (Feichtinger 2004:12). Moreover, Roman influences brought up changes in the Christian era, when Stoicism became the reigning ethical philosophy and passionlessness was one of the highest values.

The Church father, Augustine of Hippo (354-430 AD), had a lasting influence on the Christian tradition. Therese Fuhrer shows that Augustine did not have a clearly negative attitude towards the body, for example, concerning illness and pain. Augustine ascribed a positive function to illness and pain in terms of an expression of God’s grace, because illness and pain were signs of the deficient state of being human (Fuhrer 2004:176). Moreover, Augustine’s assessment of sexuality needs to

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112 Nelson (1978:34) draws a distinction between polarity and dichotomy. While polarity derives from a creative tension and differentiates between elements, dichotomy designates a fundamental difference that cannot be resolved and even hinders communion (Nelson 1978:34).

113 Recently, Plato researchers have argued against the claim that the ontological body-soul dualism can be traced back to Plato because Plato intended the integration of dualistic elements of the soul, striving towards divine unity. Consequently, the deprivation of the bodily value would be based on Pythagoras’ (580-470 BC) idea of the transmigration of souls. Despite this disagreement, Naurath follows Hermann Schmitz and others, who see in Plato’s philosophy the crucial turning point in the conception, which had determining consequences for a dualistic understanding of the human being (Naurath 2006:25).

114 The identification of the soul with being human, and a part of the soul (the sensible and controlling one) with the actual humanum, promoted the psychosomatic dualism and the devaluation of corporeality (Schmitz, Hermann (1978). Leib und Seele in der abendländischen Philosophie. In PhJ, 85. 221-241. Psychosomatic dualism in modern Western philosophy is based on the physiology concerning perception and objectivisation of the external world, which gave rise to rationalism (Naurath 2006:25).

115 “Seneca, the Stoic philosopher and a contemporary of Jesus, taught that the sign of true greatness was the achievement of the state in which nothing could possibly disturb or excite one. To the Stoic, sex was not bad in itself, but passion was greatly suspect, and the only justification for marriage was procreation” (Nelson 1978:49).

be differentiated. The ‘desires of the flesh’ (concupiscentia carnis, cupiditas, libido, voluptas) as hindrances are present throughout in his description of striving for a fulfilled life, beata vita. In his Confessiones, Augustine provides insight into his own attitude to the body’s connection to the sexual drive and erotic experiences which clearly characterises his moral theological point of view. A critical evaluation shows that Augustine struggled with his own sexuality and tried to fix the problem through a rigid and body denying ethic that declares this practice as valid for everyone (Fuhrer 2004:179).

Nevertheless, Fuhrer notes that, in later years, Augustine’s stance towards sexuality and the body became more liberal, since without the help of God, nobody could restrain from sexual drive (Fuhrer 2004:182). Fuhrer, likewise, points out the efforts Augustine made in trying to combine antique conceptions of the soul and body with a revolutionary idea of a bodily and fleshly eternal existence. In this respect, Augustine’s body conception remains pessimistic. He uses the platonic image of the body as a ‘chain’ or ‘cage’ for the bodiless and immortal soul. In this metaphor and perception, the body receives a negative connotation. Augustine maintained his view of combining the platonic body conception with the doctrine of the bodily resurrection (Fuhrer 2004:83).

Centuries later in the Middle Ages, Thomas Aquinas’ formula of anima forma corporis also emphasised the body-soul-unity of the human being in historicity and in eternity, yet, Greek dualism was not overcome. Rather, the dualism of a transitory body and an everlasting soul remained (Naurath 2006:27). On the part of Luther, it was evident that there was a rejection of scholastic substance ontology in favour of the ontology of relation. In contrast to the scholastic view in which metaphysical explanations were given, Luther interpreted the immortality of the human soul as the expression of the relation of the human being (who is in need for justification)

117 Augustine “was almost exclusively concerned about the genital aspect of human sexuality... and fatefully, [saw] no power in love to transform the sex act in any significant way” (Nelson 1978:53).
118 Regrettably, the corpus containing more liberal assertions of Augustine remains missing throughout the Middle Ages up to modern times (Fuhrer 2004:182).
119 Thomas Aquinas favours a biblical monism (Naurath 2006:27).
towards God. The anthropological assertion of the immortality of the human soul, which in terms of creational theology does not think without the body, is based solely on the theological promise of the faithfulness and grace of God towards creation.

Hence, the eschatological anticipation (sola gratia), based on Christology and sceptis towards philosophical proofs for immortality, can be traced back to Luther and his theology. The motif “anima medium inter corpus et spiritum” is, for Luther, the expression of a dual locus in life: the bodily constitution of human beings whose existence is restricted by death, and human beings’ calling for community with God. For Luther, the soul inevitably belongs to the body; it is the principle of life.¹²⁰ Like Paul, Luther does not divide the human being into flesh and spirit but sees totos homo confronted with both, either the power of sin or God’s grace (Naurath 2006:28).¹²¹

The synthesis of body and soul, for which high scholastic and reformation have strived, began to crumble with the beginning of the modern era. Mathematics and natural sciences revolutionised the worldview, and with the rational deconstruction of metaphysics the body-soul-problem (Leib-Seele-Problem) became the body-mind-problem (Körper-Geist-Problem) (Naurath 2006:28).¹²²¹²³

In sum, one can historically identify two forms of dualism that can be circumscribed as spiritualistic and sexist dualism. Spiritualistic dualism arose in the Greek Classical


¹²² See Luther, WA 2, 585, 31-33.

¹²³ The terminology concerning the body-mind-problem varies and differentiation is difficult. Under the notion of the body, there is a development of the terms for soul and mind (Naurath 2006:28).

¹²⁴ In English, one speaks of the mind-body problem which does not show the reference to the older word, Seele (Grk.: Psyche; Lat.: Anima; Engl.: soul).
Age (i.e. Hellenistic dualism). Perhaps the fear of transience and the longing for immortality has been the deepest driving force in this form of dualism (Geest, cited in Naurath 2006:34). Moreover, Hellenistic dualism influenced the Christian interpretation of the human being (Nelson 1978:46). The second form of dualism, sexist dualism, was prevalent in the Israel of the Old Testament and continued in the Christian tradition. Both forms of dualism can be interpreted and traced back to the alienation of the body.

1.2 The quest for ontology

Through practical aspects of the reality of HIV and AIDS and their related stigmatisation, the paradigmatic appearance of stigmatisation of human corporeality becomes obvious as a way of alienation from embodiment rooted in theological and philosophical history. In 13th century universities, the tendency was to regard academic theology as a science, that is, next to philosophy. In order to be a part of the academic enterprise, “theology ran into the danger of becoming a purely rationalistic enterprise which tried to capture the mystery of God in terms of rationalistic categories: the thread of dogmatism” (Louw 1998:103). In fact, “theology

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125 “It was the subordination of women – systematically present in the institutions, the interpersonal relations, the thought forms, and the religious life of patriarchal culture” (Nelson 1978:46).
126 Nelson gives several theories which account for sexual dualism, and its possible origin (Nelson 1978:60-62). One theory is the fear of men over the biological powers of women, especially the capacity for pregnancy and giving birth. Further, when women in history have been regarded as creatures with supernatural gifts, men responded in two ways: they either adored women as divine or treated them as demonic. Both expressions have occurred in Christian tradition (Nelson 1978:60). A second hypothesis is connected to male fear concerning women’s sexual power in so far that men are separated from their own instinctive sexuality. Nelson mentions the transition of tribal to urban societies, away from biological processes and consciousness. The latter then became associated with women whereas a new definition of [man] himself towards a more-than-sexual identity shall be achieved: “as one created not in the image of any biological thing, but as a being sharing in the covenanting-legal power that rules the universe” (Richardson, H. W. (1971). *Nun, Witch, Playmate: The Americanization of Sex*. New York: Harper & Row, in Nelson 1978:61). A third theory highlights not only man’s direct fears of the woman (i.e. in relation to sexual intercourse); but a related “castration anxiety”, and the ever present fear of impotence (Nelson 1978:61). These theories can be linked to sexist dualism and located in man’s anxieties in the face of woman’s sexuality.
became, next to physics and mathematics, metaphysics: a science regarding the
being of God” (Pannenberg 1973:15-17, in Louw 1998:103).\textsuperscript{127}

Naurath refers to Godehard Brüntrup,\textsuperscript{128} who claims that the history of philosophy has been written from the perspective of the mind. In modern times, besides the principle of causality in ontological questions concerning universal elements, critical positions were set to form the philosophy of the mind.\textsuperscript{129}

However, recent anthropological discussions tend towards interdisciplinarity with a growing criticism of fundamental dualism. Regarding the everyday life relevance of the topic, Büntrup addresses the dialogue with notions from empirical modern sciences on the relation between the body (\textit{Leib}) and the soul, the body (\textit{Körper}) and the mind, as well as between physical and mental aspects (Naurath 2006:38). Büntrup emphasises the experience of dualism in everyday life, in which the physical and psychical are dependent on and simultaneously influence each other.

In respect to the history of Christian doctrine from a church historical perspective, it may be assumed that in today’s postmodern era, the emphasis has shifted from metaphysics to ethical questions. By reflecting on its (Christian tradition) origin, conditions and principle (through estrangement in order to get back to itself), theologians should also be reminded that talking about God is not superior to talking to God. Ethical reflection and argumentation begin with both the experience of suffering and the recognition that there is evil in the world. At the same time, there is

\textsuperscript{127} The importance of a philosophical perspective to theology is that, with the help of philosophical methods, theological doctrines are to reflect critically for a new understanding in the light of context and human environment.


\textsuperscript{129} Naurath (2006:39) describes them as: first, a genuine dualistic position that declares mental and physical entities as independent from each other; the body-mind-dualism and the problem of a psychophysical interdependency; second, monistic approaches, which consider mental entities dependent on physical ones: non-reductive physicalism (mental characteristics are dependent on the physical base but are not identical with it), and reductive physicalism (drawing back of all mental characteristics to the physical); and third, a radical monistic concept, which denies the existence of mental entities; abstractionism and eliminative physicalism doubt the reality of any mental aspects.
no surety when it comes to living a fulfilled life (Prechtl 1999:159). From a Christian perspective, the existential dimension is opened up between the ‘ought’ and the ‘may’ of human beings coram Deo, that is, before God (Louw 1998).  

Likewise, philosophical anthropology has contributed to theological anthropological reflections on ontology and human embodiment. Since the 19th century, the body phenomenon was already being addressed by Hegel, Marx, Kierkegaard, and Nietzsche, each of whom “employed concepts of the body to subvert Cartesian dualism” (Welton 1999:3). In the last century, within the debate of existential philosophy, the issue of embodiment shifted again to the centre of recent philosophical and theological reflection.

In existential phenomenology, Martin Heidegger is concerned about ontology from the angle of the notion of being (Dasein). Overgaard argues that Heidegger’s concept of Dasein crucially involves the notion of embodiment and he explains further the reason that Heidegger avoids dealing with the topic explicitly in his magnus opum, Being and Time. Since for Heidegger the dualistic approach is unacceptable, he tries to avoid the terms “body” and “embodiment”. Overgaard notes Heidegger’s concern with articulating the mode of being-in-the-world by stressing the idea of the ‘whole’ human being, which shows that corporeality is essential to Heidegger’s concept of Dasein (Overgaard 2004:118). Heidegger’s

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130 Stigmatisation may enable one to observe the tension between a practical ‘ought to’ and ‘commitment’ (Prechtl 1999:159). For Huber, the sense of tradition lies in taking up the old and overcoming worldviews in order to transform or process them creatively. If rightly understood, tradition points to the future of human beings and mirrors the sense of the humanum, which is a normative idea. In its content, this idea emanates from human beings’ ideals of themselves. Therefore, tradition can be understood as the stimulus of education. Education should be understood as a process, rather than a result (Huber 1992:577ff.).


134 In his speech, “Der Satz der Identität” (1957), Heidegger considered the history of metaphysics under the subject of how “thinking and being” and “being human and being” can be brought together. Heidegger focusses on overcoming metaphysical thinking in order to provide the lost unity of being human and his concept of being (Lübbe, H. (1959). Art. Identitätsphilosophie. Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart. Bd. 4. 3rd ed. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 564-566).
hesitance on the conceptualisation of “the body” and “embodiment”\textsuperscript{135} may provide a hint about the delicate nature of the subject matter and the methodological consequences of its use. However, in the 21\textsuperscript{st} century and in context of the HIV and AIDS pandemic, we are in dire need of categories for approaching the problem.

Furthermore, in philosophical anthropology of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century, M. Buber is also critical of the attempt to determine and define the essence of the human being in general.\textsuperscript{136} According to him, the entity of the human being needs to be traced back in an act of self-reflection, or in the act of life itself. In this relational approach, Buber is comparable to Husserl, Heidegger and French existential philosophy. In the same way, the ‘symbolic interactionism’ is against a substantial determination.\textsuperscript{137}

Influenced by existential philosophy, Max Scheler draws on Husserl’s methodology of phenomenology and develops it further. Scheler sets a new emphasis in philosophical anthropology by regarding the human being as a pneumatic being, who is ‘open towards the world’.\textsuperscript{138} However, instead of the pneumatic conceptualisation, Plessner accentuates the human position out of the self-consciousness, which sets the human being in an ‘eccentric position’.\textsuperscript{139} Gehlen, on the other hand, builds on Scheler’s thoughts; his conceptions have been developed further in the classic form of modern philosophical anthropology.\textsuperscript{140}

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\textsuperscript{135} Heidegger’s teacher, Edmund Husserl, first developed the notion of the lived body (Leib), and set it in opposition to the body (Körper) under a physicalistic description. A contrastive concept of the lived body is brought up by Max Scheler at the same time (cf. Walton 1999:4). \\
\textsuperscript{137} In his book, “Embodiment” (1978), Nelson follows symbolic interactionism in his interpretation of human sexuality. Mead asserts that the exchange of signs is a characteristic of human beings. This line can be traced back to Dewey’s pragmatism. \\
\end{flushleft}
Ontology of essence according to Scheler (1962)

Bernhard Lorscheid identifies the different terms used for the body in philosophical anthropology. Based on Max Scheler’s *Wesensontologie des Leiblichen*, Lorscheid identifies the nuances between the physical, the psychological and the somatological. Although Christian theology does not uniquely own a ‘being-analysis’ (*Wesensanalyse*), a pastoral anthropology should consider a ‘philosophical analysis of being’ (*philosophische Wesenseidologie*) in order to throw light on the theological problems of becoming truly human. In the same way, a theological anthropology is needed for such an understanding in order to reflect on the notion of death and resurrection in human beings. Therefore, a philosophical reflection of the *being* structure of embodiment seems reasonable for a modern anthropology in which “being embodied” and “embodied processes” are confronted with existential philosophical and ethical questions.

At this point, it seems useful to shed more light on Lorscheid’s investigation of Scheler’s work. Scheler considers the difference between “Körper” und “Leib”, but further identifies the ‘Leibphenomenon’ (*Leibphänomen*). Since he distinguishes between “Leibbody” (*Leibkörper*), “Leibsoul” (*Leibseele*), and “Leib” itself; the latter is a “mental-physical non-deviant phenomenon”. He defines “Leiblichkeit” in a phenomenological sense as a category, which is, apriori, consciously externally and internally perceivable for the *Leib* consciousness. An external view describes the “Leibbody”, while an internal point of view regards the “Leibsoul”. It is important to

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142 Scheler’s *Wesensscha(on) des Leiblichen* identifies with the existential philosophy of Sartre, Merleau-Ponty and Plessner on the objectifying assessment of the body and the emphasis on the subjective “Leib experience” (Lorscheid1962:17).
144 In his phenomenological method, Scheler distinguishes between *eidetical reduction* and *phenomenological reduction*. Of these two approaches, it is the first one, a phenomenology of the object (*Gegenstandsphänomenologie*), which explores the existence of being, and which can be called the actual method.
145 The original is, “*ein psychophysisch indifferentes Phänomen*” (Lorscheid 1962:29).
146 See also Louw’s distinction between the “external and internal person” (1998:163).
147 One can differentiate between an orientation towards the body that is culturally suggested and one that is independent of culture, since the body can be regarded as the expression (*Ausdruck*) of the inner being. Ringleben mentions the idea of the inside being recognisable on the outside (e.g. smile, flush of anger); “*das Innere am Äußeren*” (Ringleben 1998:218).
note that the Leib is much more fundamental for both; that is what Scheler calls the “Urphenomenon” (1962:29).

For Scheler, the qualitative structure of embodiment (des Leiblichen) is crucial. He prefers to uncover the constituents of the embodied being and he develops a concept via the specific way of looking at reality.\textsuperscript{148} Scheler’s differentiation of the ontic structure of embodiment goes further than the existentialists’ by differentiating between lived Leib conditions (Leibzuständen)\textsuperscript{149} and an element which underlies those conditions as a fundamental fact: the actual Leib.

Lorscheid further describes the function of the Leib. In a detailed reflection, he points out that the expression of Leib (leiblicher Ausdruck) works as a symbol for “something”. An almost ‘immediate’ perception\textsuperscript{150} of a “soulful substance” becomes possible “in” and “through” the expression of the Leib. Therefore, the Leib attains symbolic function in the recognition of the individual “I” of a person (Lorscheid 1962:46). For Lorscheid, this concept is truly fertile in the discussion of body-ontological questions in recent theology. Although in Scheler’s time, the full meaning of his work and method, Wesensschau des Leiblichen, was not recognised, Lorscheid’s interesting systematic exposition and terminology serve as a point of departure for regarding the phenomenon of embodiment in terms of a holistic theological anthropological reflection.\textsuperscript{151, 152}

\textsuperscript{148} Lorscheid’s “eidetisch-reduzierende Erkenntniseinstellung”, from here Scheler obtains his “Wesenseidologie des Leiblichen” (Lorscheid 1962:10).
\textsuperscript{149} Note here the similarity and relatedness to the concept of attitude.
\textsuperscript{150} One has to distinguish between the internal and external sense of perception (Lorscheid 1962:46).
\textsuperscript{151} The differentiation between Leib und Körper should not be confused with dualism as promoted by Descartes’ philosophy, which is incompatible with the understanding of the Leib as a ‘mental-physical non-deviant Urphenomenon’ (Lorscheid 1962:29).
\textsuperscript{152} The Cartesian School regarded the mind (res cogitans) and the body (res extensa) as two different substances. The question of the unity of the two was answered by a causal relationship between mind and body that finally resulted in the dualistic mind-body-problem. Hermas sees the development and spread of the dualistic anthropological concept not only in Descartes’ distinction between res cogitans and res extensa, but as having originated in the scholastic theology since Thomas Aquinas, including the protestant orthodoxy of the 16\textsuperscript{th} and 17\textsuperscript{th} centuries (1991:30).
1.3 “Defining the body”: corporeality and embodiment

According to Louw, following the philosophical anthropological debate on ontology and ethics of the human body, one cannot completely ignore a substantial approach to anthropology. In pastoral hermeneutics, “substantial then refers to ‘authenticity’ and the stance of the individual before God” (Louw 2004:17). In Louw’s conception, substantiality refers to the state of being and a qualitative condition determined by grace. Rather than focussing only on substantia from the angle of inclusive anthropology, Louw sees the importance of dealing with both, that is, the mutuality of relationships (relatio) as well as the identity of being qualities (substantia).

From this point, the need for a holistic and relational approach to the human being arises. Louw (2004:13) argues for a holistic biblical perspective in emphasizing the connection between “each part of the body, whether it is soul, spirit, mind or kidney”. He stresses a fundamental affirmation of both physicality and embodiment in a Christian anthropology which follows a biblical understanding. The body is perceived as a “psycho-physical unity” representing the vegetative and physiological aspects, which is simultaneously “determined by the ego, consciousness and a moral awareness (ethics)”. 

In the same way, one can understand the body as “the medium through which human beings exist and express themselves” (Louw 1998:162). The emphasis is on being wholly physical, and not merely having a body but more accurately the “I and the ‘soul’ are ‘enfleshed’ in a bodily existence” (Louw 2004:162). Through the body one is in contact with the world so that the body is always a part of its surrounding. This also shows that the undertaking of investigating embodiment can never be done apart from the “system” in which human beings exist.153 Through embodiment, Louw (1998:162) refers to the quality of existence of human beings; it indicates “the way in which human beings, in their daily living, express their motives and goals through their bodily existence, and thereby reveal themselves within relationships”. Louw

153 “System” here is understood as the social network in which one lives (Louw 2005:25).
(1998:162) further stresses that embodiment “should thus not be perceived as an external human element, but rather as indicative of the person him-/herself from the perspective of a certain mode of existence: a bodily awareness (embodiment).”

Even though the quest for meaning arises in borderline situations such as suffering and death, existential philosophy can solely describe a situation, but it cannot enlighten the ultimate. Louw (1998:145) argues that, “Existential analysis and phenomenological research cannot determine the meaning of our existence: still in need is a transcendental factor which reaches beyond phenomenological events.” For Karl Barth, the “knowledge” of the ultimate meaning of the human person is revelational; human existence should therefore be approached from a theonomous perspective (cf. Louw 1998:144). From the viewpoint of pastoral theology, it can be concluded that the body itself is not the object; more exactly, the human being in relation to another with a body is the object. The focus of interpretation has also been the attitude in place and time.

Eberhard Jüngel attempts to define what makes a human being a whole human being. He differentiates between wholeness regarding quantity (totalitas quantitas), essence (totalitas essentiae) and potential (totalitas virtutis or potentiae). These three are assimilated by the understanding of integral wholeness. For integral wholeness, irrelevant parts may be missing, but not essential parts. Jüngel argues with Luther that a theological definition of the human being is superior to a philosophical one, because theology does characterise the human

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154 Barth does not deny the value of phenomenological insights. In fact, if phenomenological observations and hypotheses become absolutes, they only appear foreign in a Christian perspective (Barth KD III/2 1948:26, in Louw 1998:145).
155 In German, the meaning of the reflexive verb, “sich verhalten zu” (to behave), follows “Haltung” (attitude).
156 Jüngel hereby quotes the example by Thomas Aquinas of a bald-headed person, Calvi non dicuntur colobi. Bald-headed persons do not deserve to be called disabled because hair is not an integral part of being wholly human (Jüngel 2003:40).
157 Closely connected to the triples totalitas is the differentiation between totum universale, totum integrale and totum potentiale (Jüngel 2003:41).
158 See Luther’s thesis in Disputatio de homine.
being as *homos totus et perfectus* (Jüngel 2003:43). Although philosophical anthropology, especially in the West, had a vast influence on the understanding of the human being compared to theology, philosophy does bring up only segments and knows very little about the human being. In addition, Luther does not discuss human wholeness in terms of the ambivalent body-soul unity; rather, it is God’s creative and justifying Word that makes the human being humane; *homos totus et perfectus*.

Caroline Bynum inquires, “*Why all this play-acting about the body... In a certain sense, it is naturally wrong to make ‘the body’ the subject. Either ‘the body’ is not a topic itself, or it includes as good as all topics*” (Bynum, cited in Janssen 2005:18). Bynum argues that one cannot reduce the interdisciplinary discussion about the body to a common denominator. In order to make assertions about understanding the body in history, a nuanced understanding of history is necessary (ibid.) This is because body history lays open past and present “embraced” certainties. Besides historical conditions and cultural implications and specifications, political dimensions may also play a role.

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159 Philosophical definitions of the human being, which describe *animal rationale*, *sensitivum*, *corporeum* or the *aritotelic causae*-scheme cannot designate the whole and perfect human being (Jüngel 2003:43).

160 Philosophy, in its true sense, should be more concerned about norms and values of the human being; by so doing, philosophy asks for “wisdom”.

161 *Homo totus et perfectus* is “*creatura Dei et anima spirante constans, ab initio ad imaginem Dei facta sine peccato, ut generaret et rebus dominaretur nec unquam moreretur... Post lapsum vero Adae subiecta potestati diaboli, peccato et morti, utroque malo suis viribus insuperabili et aeterno... Nec nisi per filium Dei Christum Iesum liberanda (si credat in eum) et vitae aeternitate donanda: [er ist] Gottes Geschöpf aus Fleisch und lebendiger Seele bestehend, von Anbeginn zum Bilde Gottes gemacht ohne Sünde, mit der Bestimmung, Nachkommenschaft zu erzeugen, über die Dinge zu herrschen und niemals zu sterben... das aber nach Adam’s Fall der Macht des Teufels unterworfen ist, nämlich der Sünde und dem Tode – beides Übel, die durch den Sohn Gottes Christus Jesus zu befreien ist (sofern es an ihn glaubt) und mit der Ewigkeit des Lebens zu beschenken*” (M. Luther, *Die Disputation de Homine*, These 21-23 (WA 39/I, 176,7-13; quote and trans. after G. Ebeling; Lutherstudien, Vol. II/1, 19, in Jüngel 2003:44).


163 Philipp Sarasin makes an important statement that, “if the human body is not anymore the unquestioned point of departure of political and cultural discourses and practices, instead, if the human body itself has become the place and object of these actions, then body history becomes political history” (Sarasin (1999). Mapping the body. *Körpergeschichte zwischen Konstruktivismus, Politik und “Erfahrung”, in Historische Anthropologie, 7, 437-451, in Janssen 2005:19).
The body, in history, has served as a fine demarcation between pagans and Christians, between orthodoxy and heresy, between norm and deviance, and as a constituent of individual and collective identity. Barbara Feichtinger cites several examples in which the body has been regarded as a central venue. One example is, the destruction of the body produces the martyr and the body is placed within the tension between Christian identity and pagan state power. The question of the social availability of the (female) body for reproduction separates ascetics from worldly Christians while the metaphor of the Corpus Christi is a symbol of unity as well as a symbol for the hierarchical structure of the institution of the church, which represents theological as well as social conflicts. Again, the question concerning the place of the body in a universal ontological value system divides orthodoxy and heresy as well as Christian and pagan philosophy. Besides, the doctrine of the resurrection of the flesh focuses on central questions of Christian identity (Feichtinger 2004:13).

The point that shall become clear is that religious, political and social fields of conflict have found expression in antagonistic perspectives of the interpretation of the body (Feichtinger 2004:13).  

Feichtinger contrasts the biological body with the reflected, discursive represented body. The first is the indispensable precondition of human existence while the latter, so to speak, is defining and reading the body as a “text”. So she can claim that the “body” represents an element of human culture (Feichtinger 2004:11).

Lorenz understands body history as the “historisation of the body” (which includes a plural of bodies). She points out that the body is not an anthropologically constant factor, to be viewed only through the lenses of biosciences. The “body” can only be


164 In his study, the historian Ernst Kantorowicz draws from the concept of the King’s Two Bodies, one of which is a natural and mortal body, while the other can be described as a supernatural, political immortal body. “The King’s Two Bodies” is the central theme and serves the purpose of clarifying the idealistic preconditions of kingship in order to trace the myth of state, its development and its shaping (Fleckenstein, J. (1992). Geleitwort, in Kantorowicz, Ernst H. (1992). Die zwei Körper des Königs. Eine Studie zur politischen Theologie des Mittelalters. Stuttgart: J.G. Cotta’sche Buchhandlung Nachfolger GmbH, 9-24).
understood if regarded through differing and changing definitions. Central aspects of body history are, for example, “bodies in plural”, “body and language”, the relation of “sex and gender”, and the question of varying “definitions of the body”, which are mirrored back in a chosen term.

Often, modern thinkers associate “Körper” with the external body, which is the object of the senses, whereas “Leib” designates an internal experienced body, to which ensoulment is ascribed. Bernhard Lorscheid acknowledges that philosophical anthropology differentiated the two terms for the body. Lorscheid also refers to Joseph Ratzinger, who stresses the importance of the difference between “Körper” und “Leib” for theology. According to Ratzinger, a decisive point is that Körperlichkeit is characterised by “ceasing”, while the character of Leiblichkeit is “becoming” (Ratzinger 1957, in Lorscheid 1962:2).

A further dimension of the human body can be observed in Härle who cautions that Körperlichkeit should also not be ignored in theological reflections. The meaning of “soul” does not exist independently of the corporeality of living beings. Instead, corporeality is determined by the soul. In this understanding, the corporeality of living

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166 In philosophical dictionaries, one can find differences in the reception of the definition of the body. In English especially, the word “body” describes two different expressions for the “body” in German. In German, one differentiates between “Körperlichkeit” (der Körper) and “Leiblichkeit” (der Leib). These terms correspond to the Afrikaans terms “Liggaamlikheid” and “Lyflikheid”, respectively. Etymologically, the term “Leib” is connected to “Leben” (life). Both have the same Germanic root ‘leib.’ The term “Körper” is taken from Latin corpus. (cf. Alexander Kluge (1999). Etymologisches Wörterbuch der deutschen Sprache. 23. erweiterte Aufl., bearbeitet v. Elmar Seebold, Berlin/ New York. 478, 511).


168 Ratzinger agrees with Origenes who opened up the differentiation of the human body between materiality “εἶδος τὸ σωματικόν” in a state of flux, and the remaining form “εἶδος τὸ χαρακτηριῖν”. Ratzinger refers to H.E. Hengstenberg who notes that M. Scheler was the first to recognise the difference between Körper and Leib (Lorscheid 1962:2).
beings has the special character of Leiblichkeit (Härle 2000:431). Therefore, the term embodiment mirrors a rather holistic understanding of Leiblichkeit.

Having differentiated and identified the terms, corporeality and embodiment, at this point it seems appropriate for one to question whether both corporeality and embodiment are valued on different levels and how a specific stance towards both aspects has developed. A closer inspection leads to the argument of a holistic understanding of embodiment, which subsumes both aspects, and which does not deny the other one. Having touched different perspectives and concepts in the definitions of “the body” and “embodiment”, in what follows, I point out aspects of the body in history that promoted a dualistic understanding of being human. Through this, aspects which have added to the degradation of the human body become clearer.

1.4 Embodiment and the ethical discourse

Despite the trend towards a fundamental critic on dualism and the shift towards ethical questions, Anne Reichhold sees an argumentative deficit in the lack of explicit analysis in the face of corporeality and embodiment of the human being in recent philosophy.\textsuperscript{169} Reichhold argues that based on the fact that humans are vulnerable and mortal, discussions of human rights, justice and the protection of life become meaningful.\textsuperscript{170} Embodiment of a person and the fact of being exposed to the world, finally, constitute finite subjectivity. This notion appears as \textit{conditio sine qua non}, on which the discussion of the ethical term of personhood is built (Reichhold 2004:227).

\textsuperscript{169} \textit{Die Ausgrenzung der körperlichen Verfasstheit der Person aus den ethischen Bestimmungen der Person in der gegenwärtigen Philosophie birgt die Gefahr in sich, die Grundbegriffe ethischer Argumentation insgesamt zu negieren} (Reichhold 2004:227).

\textsuperscript{170} \textit{Durch die Betonung des in der ethischen Personendiskussion vernachlässigten Aspekts der Leiblichkeit von Personen wird eine entscheidende Begründung für den ethischen Charakter der Person genannt, die implizit in allen ethischen Normen enthalten ist: die Verletzbarkeit und Sterblichkeit der Person, die Ethik überhaupt erst erforderlich und möglich macht} (Reichhold 2004:229).
The point of departure for Reichhold is the tension between ethical and ontological theories of “persons” and their corporeality. She shows that ethical reflections do not pay attention to aspects of corporeality regarding the term “person”. On the contrary, one can argue that theories on ontology should be reflected if they adequately correspond with ethical concepts that are integrated in a time context.

In analytic philosophy, the ontological metaphysical discussion of the person regards corporeality in the form of an individual person in space and time and mental characteristics as constitutive. Besides the bodily-material aspect in the use of the term “person” a counter term in the Cartesian tradition is the subject, purely defined by reason (Reichhold 2004:13). Talking about person in an ethical context, embodiment (in the sense of corporeality) completely slips the mind, because it is implicitly assumed (Reichhold 2004:227). Likewise, in ethics the emphasis is mostly on autonomy and reason as determining aspects of a person, so that the mind takes a dominant position.

Reichhold observes that in regarding the understanding of the person, the bodily constitution is not the subject in ethical discussions. Rather, due to methodological reasons, ethical theories of the person avoid the bodily aspect, and tend to stress the nature of reason in a person. However, there is a close interconnection between the aspect of corporeality and the understanding of a person as the reflection so far has shown, especially in ethics (Reichhold 2004:13).

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171 Similarly, from a pastoral perspective, I have indicated the tension arising in the ethical dilemma of Christian ethics and the doctrine of sin. The term “person” is central in the context of the body-mind-problem. Since the term also designates a moral unity of an acting subject as an ontological unity of a subject equipped with mental and bodily attributes, the term takes in a mediating function between the fields of theoretical and practical philosophy. Its major function is to synthesise the two in a modern determination of the subject (Reichhold 2004:12).

172 For Reichhold (2004:228), only the connection between ethical and ontological theories on the human being may bring about the moral potentiality of the term, person. Simultaneously, the term “person” takes up a central role in the body-mind problem, because it often brings together dualistically determined mind definitions (Reichhold 2004:12).

173 Today, in the philosophical anthropological discussion of the ‘Leib-Seele-problem’, the term “person” is dominant. It points to a subject which is both physically and psychically determined (Schütt 1994:1122).
2. POWER AND EMBODIMENT: THE GENDER DEBATE

This section discusses the notions of power and embodiment from the perspective of the debate on gender. I begin by considering the alienation from the body in terms of the suppression of embodiment in the refusal of bodily expression.

Nelson points out that the problem of rejecting bodily expression (e.g. in sexual expression) is not unique to Christian history. Nevertheless, it can still be acknowledged that the story of a tradition had and still has a formative influence in cultures and places all over the world (Nelson 1978:45). According to Nelson (1978:42), human alienation of the body may express itself as the “fear of the body”. He shows that the “fear of the body [even] finds expression in our daily patterns of human interaction”.

Nelson claims that human beings may be distanced from emotions and relationships by withdrawing from society possibly because they want to avoid stigmatisation. The other extreme is that if we are only acceptable because of our trans-worldly divinity and not because of our concreteness, then the other can also only be of transcendent value. The other becomes “the occasion to experience God” (Nelson 1978:43). This view implies the loss of particularity and the value of the individual. Nelson concludes that body alienation is alienation from God and vice versa, and human beings are alienated from wholeness through this separation (Nelson 1978:44).

Theories become “enhanced when one reflects on the psychic strata of our sexual history” (Nelson 1978:62). Rosemary Redfort Ruether further identifies three psychic layers in sexual history that have been present - though not explicitly - in any historical period. Roughly sketched, one can identify the perception of women as dependent on men and their property. Secondly, the identification of the woman with the body is prevalent but the latter represents carnality and evil. Thirdly, the perspective of women as the spiritualized ideal also plays a role. (Redfort Ruether, R. (1975). New Woman, New Earth: Sexist Ideologies and Human Liberation, New York: Seabury, and in Bianchi, E. C. and Redfort Ruether, R. (1976). From Machismo to Mutuality: Essays on Sexism and Woman-Man Liberation. New York: Paulist, in Nelson 1978:62).

Nelson's assertion of twenty years ago is still of current interest: “At this point it is important that we face honestly those elements of our common tradition which have contributed to the sexual alienation we presently experience” (Nelson 1978:57).
The struggle of human beings and the strive for understanding, belief, dogma, right, power, justice, or even God have been fought out more or less in the body; it has literally and metaphorically become a “battlefield”, distinct from the soul and mind. Social anomalies and injustices are mirrored on the level of gender and intimate relationship in the form of prevalent conflicts. Likewise, the HIV and AIDS pandemic can be regarded as an expression of disordered gender relation in which the human body has become the battlefield.

2.1 Patriarchalism: background schema of interpretation

Suppression of embodiment also takes place wherever any form of power is prevalent. In order to understand what is meant by the heritage of patriarchy, Culbertson mentions the main interlocking premises in different sectors of life, which have served as justification for biological, cultural, economic, and religious dominance by males. He draws on the assertion that physical strength is part of the intended natural law. Secondly, the notion of family and society is naturally based on aggression, domination, procreation, and protection. Another aspect is that property, production and distribution of the latter belong naturally to the male domain. Lastly, male superiority, dominance and privilege are part of the received religious revelation (Culbertson 1994, in Louw 2007:365).

These aspects all form the cornerstone of patriarchalism and they should be acknowledged in the gender debate, because they directly point to the tension in the notions of power (Louw 2007:368). Patriarchalism finds expression in “male power and control in intimate relationships as well as discrete acts of behaviour” (Louw 2007:366). It can easily turn into the misuse of power, in physical, visual, verbal, or sexual acts, called “male violence”. According to Louw (2007:366), “[m]ale violence feeds on gender inequality and is socially constructed as a hierarchy, that most men base their personal identities on being member of the dominant class”.

Women may experience male power or even violence as threatening and assaulting. The consequence of being hurt or degraded becomes concrete when women are
robbed of their ability to take control in any (intimate or otherwise) encounter. Louw also offers an interpretation about what fuels male violence in the patriarchal paradigm. He sees interplay between patriarchalism, fear and resistance. For example, men’s fear may be bound to men’s cultural role in society. Men do not want to lose face in falling out of their ascribed role, and encounter shame – even stigma. Hence, the fear which stands in line with the patriarchal paradigm is the fear of powerlessness. In many cases, the only way of gaining power and shifting from being a victim is to become violent and to respond with aggressive behaviour (male violence).

2.2 The power game: masculinities – femininities (social constructs)

When we assume that the gender debate is, to a certain extent, socially constructed, one can concede that males as well as females are victims of their culture and the connected stereotypes (Louw 2007:375). Male stereotypes are connected to the notion of power; whereas femininity is associated with vulnerability. While the danger that lurks in male gender symbols is violence, the danger in female gender symbols arises from the restricted perception of female sexual identity ascribed to them.

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177 The attempt to sum up male fears does not imply a generalisation of all men’s fears; the insight on one’s fears has to be accomplished by oneself, either male or female. In an attempt to summarise male fears, one can mention the fear of showing emotions or being exposed to affectiveness. Males tend to associate emotions with weakness or associate occupancy with processes of inner experience with triviality. Here, I would rather argue from a pastoral hermeneutics that intrinsically deep-seated cultural prejudices and fixed gender roles are connected to our being human, i.e. on fears.

178 Louw (2007:367) mentions here that “[t]he fear of being weak or called a woman, can quickly spill over into misogyny, the hatred of things associated with women”.

179 See Louw (2007:368). Louw also refers to violent crime in the South African context. He points to the lack of social security and the high rate of poverty, unemployment and experienced powerlessness among the people in the Cape Flats area. Being the victim of an unjust society especially affects the male population (Louw 2007:368).

180 Louw differentiates between threat power and integrative power. The latter is “the ability to bring about desirable results through affection, giving loyalty, care and other forms of bonding... Threat power includes manipulation, intimidation, even expressions of disapproval” (Louw 2007:372).

181 Louw designates to masculinity the p-factors and to femininity the s-factors. The p-factors are penis, power, phallus, performance. The s-factors are subtle, submission, seduction, sensual (Louw 2007:370ff.).

182 “The strangeness between men and women brings out the point where the power lies, that is, where the stigmatisation works” (MacDonald 2005:42).
Louw explains that every culture has a gender system which lays down expectations of what female and male behaviour entails as well as what social norms or roles are implied. He also agrees with Mowrey, who presupposes that a dualism that runs all the way exists under the mentioned stereotypes and creates the problem of identity (Louw 2007:366). Gender images are constructed and identities are put into shape or ‘frames’. From there, also arises the danger of fixed gender roles and social prejudices, which fuel stereotyping and feed the gender discourse in terms of a gender war.

Louw sees through the gender debate the necessity to question culturally critical points. The notion of HIV and AIDS related stigmatisation necessarily raises questions in the field of disordered gender relation. Is the philosophical paradigm of patriarchy, which is related to a hierarchical understanding of human value and identity, culturally appearing to decline? Have the idea and debate of gender equality become stuck in the universal fact of women’s oppression (Louw 2007:360)? The quest for transformation in a society that is characterised by change arises. Concerning gender relations, one may conclude that to find new appropriate roles that no longer contribute to women’s oppression is a societal challenge for men. At

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183 Women's assertiveness lies in ‘femininity’ as softness and defencelessness. In contrast to men, women experience themselves as vulnerable and are likely to be exposed to exploitation (Louw 2007:370).
184 Predominantly, the societal structure in Africa (and particularly in South Africa) is patriarchally constituted. In the same context, men are traditionally polygamous, and often have more than one sexual partner. Since polygamy and concubinage are silently accepted as normal among Africans, there is no public disapproval; therefore, processes of stigmatisation are not directed against male sexual activity (Louw 2007:394). In a different way, in some African communities there is a stigma attached to the use of contraception, since these restrict men's view of sexual performance and fecundity (Louw 2007:399).
185 A dualism regarding the following aspects can be traced back: masculine/feminine, active/passive, mind/body, rational/emotional, independent/dependent, dominate/subordinate, objective/subjective… culture/nature (Louw 2007:376).
186 Louw (2007:359) asserts that the difference between gender and sex lies in the fact that, “A person’s sex is indeed determined by biology, genetics and neurology and role functions are embedded in engendered constructions as social and cultural created systems of meaning”.
187 In Sub-Saharan Africa, the structures and context have to be taken into account in order to get a realistic picture of the HIV/AIDS threat and stigmatisation. Statistics mirror a high infection rate among key populations connected to poverty. Undeniably, HIV/AIDS and poverty are linked; poverty provides the social context in which the pandemic flourishes in Africa and in South Africa, in particular. Louw describes the pandemic as a “vicious circle”; since “poverty causes HIV and in turn, HIV causes poverty” (Louw 2007:393).
the same time, the dignity and contributions of women in society should be acknowledged.188

For Louw, the decisive question concerning the gender reality in the recent process of democratisation is whether the heritage of patriarchy, which is located in deep-seated cultural prejudice and fixed gender roles, will undergo a constructive transformation (Louw 2007:360).189 Louw points in the direction of an “intrinsic spiritual change as a devotion to norms and values geared to foster human dignity and human rights” (Louw 2007:368). From there follows the fundamental need for an approach to heal alienated gender relations whose battles have been fought out on human bodies.

3. TOWARDS AN ANTHROPOLOGY OF HUMAN EMBODIMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY

3.1 Shame

Helen Lynd asks whether the feeling of shame implies an acceptance of the validity of the values or standards of the society in relation to which one feels ashamed, or if shame points towards trans-cultural values in terms of which one judges oneself as well as society. Concerning the origin of shame, Lynd tentatively states that shame can be understood only with reference to trans-cultural values. This awareness of values beyond one’s own society is one of the distinctions between shame and guilt (Lynd, in Morris 1971:167). Interestingly, it is the act of feeling ashamed and the wish to cover oneself that is described in Scripture as the first consequence of the Fall

188 “There is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither slave nor free, there is neither male nor female, for you are all one in Christ Jesus” (Gal 3:28). The dimension for pastoral care is derived from this statement.
189 Compare Moltmann’s understanding of “democratisation” concerning the understanding of any human being as image, representative, servant, and reflection of God (Moltmann 1985:225).
(and not guilt).\textsuperscript{190} Shame, in contrast to guilt, can refer to the damage to life that occurred to people without their responsibility, e.g. without having “behaved wrongly”.

The HIV and AIDS related stigma may communicate the association of shame in being wrong and having behaved wrongly, and consequently being guilty. Guilt in a religious sense means, on the one hand, falling short of expectations, and on the other hand, it concerns the notion of responsibility in terms of accountability (Härle 2000:463).\textsuperscript{191} Regarding shame, the HIV and AIDS related stigma also seems to point towards an aspect of the identity that one would rather keep secret because of shame. Stigma stands for the “spoiled identity” (Goffman 1963); while one feels shame for what one has done (or neglected to do), or even shame for whom one is (Ackermann 2006:1). The experience of shame seems to embody the root meaning of the words to uncover, to expose and to wound (Lynd, in Morris 1971:159).\textsuperscript{192}

According to Louw, the notions of guilt and shame are important in order to understand sin meaningfully (2005:158). The concepts of shame, guilt and anxiety play an important role in human psyche (Augsburger 1986:126; Louw 2005:159). Louw refers to guilt and shame in line with existential life issues, while Slenczka (2007) adds guilt and shame to the category of negative relations toward oneself (negative Selbstverhältnisse).\textsuperscript{193}

Sartre sees the roots of shame in the structures of human beings. According to Sartre, the human ‘I’ needs other beings to recognise itself and its structures of

\textsuperscript{190} Genesis 3:7ff.
\textsuperscript{191} The spiritual dynamics of responsibility and respondability are an indication and expression of human beings’ ontic status before God (Louw 1998:156).
\textsuperscript{192} The German expression “Scham” refers to genitals, but the meaning of shame goes beyond the feeling of being ashamed due to the urge to cover one’s sexual organs. One can also act in a shameful or bashful way, which then may refer to the covering of intimate body parts or behaviour (Baudy 1994:862).
\textsuperscript{193} Slenczka, N. (2007). Notes from a discussion during the seminar on “Schuld, Scham und Angst als negative Selbstverhältnisse”, held at the Humboldt University of Berlin in the 2007/08 winter semester.
being, fully. He describes shame in the sense that one is ashamed because one is seen (doing something that is unacceptable or one is somehow unacceptable) by others. The primary structure of shame entails one being ashamed of oneself before another person. The other is the indispensable mediator between me and myself: “I am ashamed of myself, of how I appear to others.”

The dilemma, according to Sartre, is that the human ‘I’, in being ashamed, acknowledges being the way he or she is perceived in the eye of the other; this has fatal consequences in the case of stigmatisation. His pessimistic view of the human being being in relationship is crucial for Sartre; he refers to being in relationship as being potentially dangerous (Sartre 2004:406).

For Scheler, being embodied is the precondition for the experience of shame. Similar to Sartre’s, Scheler’s view is that shame is constituted in the relational context of human beings. At the same time, shame is expressed in three aspects of being human: reflection, protection and tension. Scheler sees in reflection a human being turning towards his or her own embodiment (Leib) with own limitations in space and time (Scheler 1957:69). The tension expresses the contrary relation between the ideal, ‘ought to be’ (das Seinsollende), and the factual, ‘being’ (das Faktische). In shame, the personal worth of the individual, who experiences shame, is present, which clarifies the inherent moment of protection in the shame reaction.


195 For Scheler (1957:87), shame is “the natural clothing of the soul” (Seelenkleid) regarding one’s gender: “[S]o müssen wir die Scham geradezu einer feinen Aura von als objektive Schranke empfundener Verletzlichkeit und Unberührbarkeit vergleichen, die den Menschenleib sphärenhaft umfleißt”.

Further, Scheler (1957:87) explicated that it is not the ‘ensoulment’ (Beseelung) of body and flesh from the viewer’s perspective that to this aura (this sphere of incorruption and purity), but actually is a less or more guilty ‘un-soulment’ (Entseelung) of the original phenomenon that leads to the perception of flesh and corporeality. (“Nicht eine “Beseelung” des Körpers und Fleisches seitens des Betrachters führt zu jener Aura, zu jener Sphäre von Unberührbarkeit und Reinheit – sondern eine mehr oder weniger schuldhafte Entseelung des ursprünglichen Gesamtphänomens führt zur Perzeption des Fleisches und der Körperlichkeit”).

196 Scheler claims that just because human beings are equipped with a body, they have to feel ashamed, and just because human beings in their spiritual way of being can reflect, they are able to feel ashamed (Scheler 1957:69).

197 Concluding, Scheler remarks that the human being primarily is ashamed because of oneself and “before” the God in oneself. “Er [der Mensch] schämt sich in erster Linie seiner selbst und ‘vor’ dem Gott in ihm” (Scheler 1957:69).
For Scheler, shame is the moment in which, in a strange way, “spirit” and “flesh”, eternity and time, essence and existence come together.\(^{198}\)

Moreover, Härle describes shame as an involuntary psychosomatic reaction of human beings who cannot accept a particular thing in their lives, because it does not belong to them. Stated differently, Härle (2000:486) regards shame as the outcome of an “inner split”. He also stresses that the feeling of shame has even deeper roots than the feeling of guilt. Shame seems to be even more closely attached to one’s identity; like guilt, shame contains the hope of overcoming sin. He, likewise, identifies the latter with an inner split or division (Härle 2000:486).

Sartre and Scheler’s dimension of relation, which is fundamental for shame, is interesting. Similarly, the contrast between Scheler’s and Härle’s view is worth noting. While Scheler sees in shame a uniting factor, “in which in a strange way ‘spirit’ and ‘flesh’, eternity and time, essence and existence come together” (Scheler 1957:69), Härle points to an “inner split” connected to shame.

In a further sense, one may conclude that the notion of shame regarding the HIV and AIDS related stigma is directed towards a spiritual dimension of wholeness. Similarly, in processes of stigmatisation both guilt and shame could play a therapeutic role in the counter process of healing: “the positive power of shame is ‘discretion motivating choices, energizing “honour”, a disposition to virtue, while guilt is direction demanding the better, pointing to values, [and] an urge for integrity’” (Augsburger 1986, cited in Louw 1998:407).\(^{199}\)

\(^{198}\) “Darum berühren sich in der Scham auf merkwürdige und dunkle Weise “Geist” und “Fleisch”, Ewigkeit und Zeitlichkeit, Wesen und Existenz” (Scheler 1957:69).

\(^{199}\) A further difference may be made in line with Augsburger, who differentiates between Western cultures as more guilt-oriented than Eastern cultures, which are more shame-oriented (Augsburger 1986, cited in Louw 1998:407). Likewise, Baudy (1994:862) speaks of the differentiation between shame cultures (\textit{Schamkultur}) and guilt cultures (\textit{Schuldkultur}).
3.2 Embodiment

The argument that HIV and AIDS related stigma and stigmatisation are directed towards a *spiritual dimension of wholeness* radicalises the question of personal as well as structural responsibility. One could question whether HIV and AIDS, in a certain sense, is a “behavioural disease” (Louw 2007:398). In that case, the question becomes the “cause-question” for HIV and AIDS individually and structurally. Another focus is on the understanding of sin as a failure to take responsibility in processes of stigmatisation. Louw emphasises the principle that people should be educated to take responsible choices (asking people to take up responsibility is not comparable to the cause-question regarding HIV infection). HIV and AIDS “radicalizes human behaviour to the point that choices and responsibility obtain a new dynamic meaning” (Louw 2007:399). Like a “torch”, HIV and AIDS expose silence, unjust conditions and indifference on personal as well as on societal levels. The WCC document explains that “HIV/AIDS is a sign of the times, calling us to see and understand” (WCC 1997:2). How to deal with HIV and AIDS should not undermine the debate on HIV and AIDS related stigmatisation.

At the same time, one has to face the fact that HIV and AIDS thrive on a picture of reality, where people in weaker *positions* are not free to respond, since their bodies are under the control of others with more power. HIV transmission too often “is the result of certain types of behaviour in often complex situations” (Ackermann 2006:2). The complexity of structures in which power relations play a decisive role (and the question of having power over one’s own body) interfere with a straightforward argument that HIV and AIDS (and therefore the HIV and AIDS-related stigma) are attracted by sin as a failure to take responsibility. Hence, a direct counter

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200 Here it remains necessary to make people aware that in relation to HIV and AIDS, what they do is more important than who they are (Louw 2007:398).
201 HIV and AIDS have evoked responses from various national governments, United Nations’ bodies and Non-Governmental Organisations (WCC 1997:1).
202 Italics are mine.
203 An interesting metaphor regarding the “cause question” is the statement that the virus that causes AIDS is accompanied by two other “viruses”. Denise Ackermann affirms Teresa Okure’s recognition of the existence of a “virus” that causes men to abuse women, and “that is responsible for the shocking fact that in many countries in Africa the condition that carries the highest risk of HIV infection is that of being a married woman” (Ackermann 2005). With this example, Ackermann points
argument is the incompatible connection between sin and HIV transmission. Firstly, sexuality must not be associated with sin. Secondly, there are other ways of transmission, and it also affects people who cannot bear responsibility for infection, for example, babies born with the virus, abused women and children, faithful partners of unfaithful spouses (UNAIDS 2005:14).  

Eilert Herms qualifies human action as the centre of ethics. The specific theological character of action is set within a Christian understanding of reality. As a precondition for an action, one can define the characteristic of being embodied in the world. Being embodied demands choices in any situation of which only one can be realised at a time. Decisions are also a kind of choice actions. Herms regards choice decisions as self-consciously free because of reason and the individual as an example of one who is obliged to and capable of making a choice out of given possibilities.
possibilities. Choices become enacted not only about, rather also through the individual. Any choice draws consequences and therefore works effectually through social, physical or psychical rules.209

Finally, any choice aims at something, which does not imply that each choice attains its aim.210 Herms (1991:xii) stresses that actions a person takes are not only physical, but also underlie psychic and social rules; that simultaneously qualifies the world in which we live as an embodied as well as a social and spiritual world.211 In this understanding, to reflect consciously on processes of stigmatisation (how the individual or society is involved) is a social and spiritual task for which human beings are called to answer (responsibility).

3.3 Responsibility

From the foregoing, the meaning of sin is bypassed if we reduce it to the notion of moral transgression. Louw articulates the importance of the meaning dimension. He remarks that, underlying the quest for meaning, the basic philosophical principle of responsibility and accountability needs to be stressed (respondeo ergo sum) (Louw 2005:155). While Descartes' principle of cogito ergo sum places the emphasis on the human mind, and its rational capacities, respondeo ergo sum emphasises our responsibility and ability to make decisions. Ethics and the moral implications of human behaviour (menschliches Handeln) are taken into account. Louw (2004:123) confirms that, “Accountability is an important ingredient of our being-functions and reflects our sensitivity in dealing with our quest for meaning in a responsible

209 Enacted choices therefore underlie the criteria of technical and ethical priority or preference based on a certain knowledge or certainty. The first (technical criteria) refers to how to reach the aims of the choice inherent in the action. The latter criteria refer to the preferred ability of the aim in itself. They are based on an inner certainty (Überzeugung) about the “highest good” or one can say one's calling, which is grounded in the constitution of life itself (Herms 1991:xii).

210 Thus, actions are geared according to orderly rules of interaction (Regelmäßigkeiten) and the knowledge of the arising consequences and effects of certain actions. Actions are therefore transparent and contribute to the world we all have in common (Herms 1991:x).

211 Herms further names three conditions for his definition of personal action, which are based on insight. First, for him, being capable of action is grounded in certainty, which is both technically and ethically oriented. The second insight refers to the content of certainty, which is qualified in being the “highest good” for oneself. Finally, the third gained insight is that this certainty is grounded in the indispossession self-experience (unverfügbare Selbsterfahrung) of each individual (Herms 1991:xxvi).
manner”. Being created in the image of God implies responsibility and ‘respondability’. Nevertheless, this concept presupposes that the addressee can answer and is able to give account (Louw 1998:156).

Further, the concept allows the association between ‘must’ (obligation) and ‘can’ (potential) though it does not provide a detailed understanding of what the obligation or the potential implies. Hence, human beings are owed freedom, “within which reason and volition play an important role” (Louw 1998:156). Louw concludes that people are moral beings because of accountability and the concept of responsibility (ibid.). For him, the basic notion underlying theological anthropology is the meaning of responsibility: respondeo ergo sum. I respond (and I am responsible), and therefore I am (ibid.).

In a pastoral context, the spiritual dynamics of responsibility and respondability indicate and express human beings’ ontic status coram Deo (Louw 1998:157). The threat posed by the HIV and AIDS pandemic requires that human beings should act responsibly in any area of life, whether as workers in health care departments and laboratories or as people in public, private and intimate relationships. Willful lack of responsibility in any area may be destructive to other people, and is therefore sinful (UNAIDS 2005:14). The understanding of sin as a failure to take responsibility leads to the division between guilt and sin (UNAIDS 2005:14). Finally, the task of pastoral care remains that of creating the space to confess and alleviate guilt in terms of forgiveness. In this regard, understanding of sin as a failure to take responsibility in processes of stigmatisation subsequently is a topic for pastoral theology.

212 Louw (1998:156) states that, “Responsibility and respondability are components of our spiritual dimension”. In the pastoral context, the etymological origin of the concept of responsibility is of interest. Derived from Latin and Greek terms, it seems that the notion of ‘response’ is connected to commitments within relationships and to the restoration of bad relationships. “People are responsible ‘to’ and ‘for’, so that to be human means to be committed to someone and to live with a vocation to do something for someone” (Louw 1998:156).

213 “Responsibility presupposes the covenantal context of human existence, within which people are addressed by God’s Word and are thus responsible to God” (Louw 1998:156).
In conclusion, in this chapter I have dealt with corporeality and embodiment in the theological and philosophical perspective. I have shown that forms of dualism and the quest for ontology have been determining in theological and philosophical anthropology. This understanding has run the danger of neglecting or even degrading human embodiment in terms of corporeality. Addressing the human body has been reduced to the purpose of being a battlefield as in the gender debate. In the gender debate the notion of power and its misuse is prevalent. I have stressed that the paradigm of patriarchalism is the leading background schemata of interpretation, which fuels conflicts and that dualistic tendencies are based on social constructs.

My argument has been for an anthropology of human embodiment and responsibility. The anthropology of human embodiment and responsibility takes into account the human being, which is not perfect and yet is able to be ashamed. The aspect of shame points towards the direction of worth and value of the human being in its full existence and embodiment. Human beings live in the tension between the indicative of being and the imperative of becoming truly humane.
CHAPTER FOUR
DESTIGMATISATION WITHIN THE HIV/AIDS PANDEMIC: TOWARDS A PASTORAL ANTHROPOLOGY OF WHOLENESS

Departing from different pastoral models, the main perspectives in pastoral anthropology are introduced here. Alternatively, I argue for a hermeneutical approach to pastoral anthropology. I also refer to biblical conceptions of the human being with emphasis on Pauline texts. Finally, I deal with the notion of destigmatisation from a pneumatical and eschatological perspective. Hence, this section focusses on the human being, characterised by wholeness, from a pastoral anthropological perspective.

1. ANTHROPOLOGICAL APPROACHES IN PASTORAL CARE

In the following I refer to the main pastoral models within pastoral theology focussing on the anthropological premises. In pastoral theology, pastoral models are based mainly on different perceptions and definitions of the essential characteristics of humans. Both the motivation for pastoral ministry and the therapeutic outcome are determined by anthropology, which functions as a presupposed framework (Louw 1998:129). Louw (1998:129) traces two main streams of pastoral models that can be ascribed to “whether a model encompasses the incarnation motif (Christ’s becoming human) or the soteriological motif (Christ’s redeeming work as mediator)”. From the viewpoint of anthropology, it can be stated that the focus in these models is either on the humanity of people and their inner potentials, or the guilt of people and their sin.

There is no static doctrine of pastoral care in the form of poimenics. Rather, interpretations of the character of pastoral care are connected with different conceptualisations and interpretations of pastoral models which are valid for all times. Outlining a preliminary definition of pastoral care, Winkler asserts that pastoral care can be understood as the exemption of a Christian habit or behaviour of coping
with life. In particular, pastoral care can be understood as the processing of conflicts under specific conditions (Winkler 2000:3).  

The two most important theoretical models in pastoral care are the kerygmatic model (homiletic approach) and the client-centred model (empirical approach). In the last thirty years, both approaches have moved closer to each other making it possible to discuss the approaches in a more integrated way (Louw 2005:7).

a) Kerygmatic model

In the reformed tradition, the kerygmatic model has been influential. Through proclamation of Scripture, admonishment, confrontation, and directive advising, kerygmatic components (proclamation and conversion) had a central function in pastoral care (with the effect of remorse, confession, and conversion). According to Louw (1998:25; 1998:138), “Pastoral care was then mainly viewed as the offer of redemption to sinners through the therapeutic process involved in forgiveness and the care of the soul.”

Under the kerygmatik model, pastoral care is understood as proclamation, which is only through the communication of the Word of God directed at the individual. The accomplishment of the Word of God is the aim of proclamation, which is

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214 In the context of pastoral care, Winkler speaks of the exemption of a Christian habit in order to cope with life demands and to undergo conflict management under specific conditions. “Allgemein ist Seelsorge zu verstehen als Freisetzung eines christlichen Verhaltens zur Lebensbewältigung. Im besonderen ist Seelsorge zu verstehen als die Bearbeitung von Konflikten unter einer spezifischen Voraussetzung” (Winkler 2000:3).

215 In the period after Worldwar I, dialectical theology after Karl Barth, Friedrich Gogarten, Rudolf Bultmann, and Eduard Thurneysen, have been influential in poimenics in terms of the kerygmatic claim of absoluteness. More empirical approaches such as those of Otto Baumgarten, Friedrich Niebergall, and Oskar Pfister operated on the basis of interdisciplinary dialogue to reform pastoral care theory and praxis (Naurath 2000:46).

characteristically expressed through a break in the dialogue from the anthropological level to a theocentric level. The understanding of the soul departs from the understanding of humans as being fundamentally sinners (Naurath 2000:47).

Under the kerygmatic model, the understanding of the pastoral encounter and the faith relationship between the individual and God is accompanied by a specific Christian understanding of nature and the character of the human being (Louw 1998:121).217 Thurneysen departs from the idea of human beings completely distant from God. There is no potential for humans to start a relationship with God; instead, only the recognition of one’s own sinfulness and the gracefulness of God are possible.218 Although dialectical theology criticises Platonism, Thurneysen is ambivalent concerning monistic and dualistic assertions. On the one hand, he emphasises the wholeness of human beings, while on the other hand, he differentiates dualistically between soul and body in terms of a hierarchical model.219

Elisabeth Naurath (2000:49) questions the view that a dualistic image of human beings goes with a moralistic God-image, as suggested by Thurneysen. Naurath describes Thurneysen’s view as a decidedly dualistic approach that devalues embodiment.220 Simultaneously, the subordination of the body when compared to the soul has a theological base. The focus on the qualitative difference between God and humans in dialectical theology finds continuance in anthropology because the anthropological differentiation between body and soul is, in fact, the differentiation...
between flesh and spirit. The notion of differentiation becomes the actual criteria in Thurneysen’s anthropology (Naurath 2000:51).

Finally, within the kerygmatic model, meaning from the view of anthropology, the bipolarity between sin and grace is opened up. Christology is determined by the doctrine of God (Naurath 2000:53), and it is easily reduced to soteriology, whereas anthropology is reduced to harmartiology (Louw 1998:139). In fact, one can say that human beings in the kerygmatic model remain mere sinners (Louw 1998:169).

b) Phenomenological model

The focal point in the client-centred model is the concrete life situation of persons. The conception is based on theological as well as on psychological premises (Naurath 2000:71). It has less to do with the what of the proclamation than with the how, that is, how to reach the modern human (Naurath 2000:79). Rather than the effectiveness of the divine word (healing through forgiveness, reconciliation, transformation, and conversion), methodological questions shift into the foreground.

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221 According to Barth, a theological anthropology is only possible based on an analogia relationis or analogia fidei, which depicts the human analogy of election by faith. Barth’s use of the term analogy is the pendant of Paul Tillich’s catholic doctrine of the analogia entis, which means the human possibility of an ontological analogy with God - “Die wirkungsgeschichtliche Kehrseite der diallektischen Kritik an der Anthropologisierung der Theologie ist die differenzlose Theologisierung der Anthropologie” (Naurath 2000:53).

222 The works of Anton T. Boisen, Russel L. Dicks, and Richard C. Cabot are considered important to the development of the phenomenological (client-centred) model. Boisen’s student, Seward Hiltner, developed the “Clinical pastoral training” under the reception of Carl Roger’s client-centred therapy (Gesprächstherapie) (Naurath 2000:71).

223 The phenomenological (client-centred) model brought a change in the paradigm of poimenics. Departing from the American context at the end of the 1960s, an ‘empirical change’ took place which influenced the German context in particular. Teamwork among medical and theological professionals in hospitals opened up the development of clinical pastoral care programs (Naurath 2000:70). Sociological as well as natural scientific perspectives were set aside and openness towards interdisciplinarity has made a way for a fundamental theological discourse (Naurath 2000:79; 2000:82).

224 From this approach, Naurath speaks of a convergence model, in which psychology is established on an equal level with theology and not just as a mere assistant science. She sees the common point of departure in an incarnational theological base of God and human, transcendence and immanency, and sacral and profane (Naurath 2000:81).
(process of communication and counselling) (Louw 1998:27).\textsuperscript{225} The individual’s inner frame of reference such as self-insight, self-help, self-confidence, self-integration, congruency, and the revelation of the inner potentials of a person, becomes the focal point (Louw 1998:139). The phenomenological model claims that, “People are their own therapists and have the inherent potential to arrive at transformation and constructive self-realization” (Louw 1998:27).\textsuperscript{226}

Departing from Thurneysen’s theo-logical anthropology, Stollberg claims that pastoral care is, first of all, about the human being and the empirical reference (Stollberg, in Naurath 2000:73).\textsuperscript{227} The human being in a specific situation (embodied, psychic, social, political, and cultural) becomes the subject of interest in the care that is based on a Christian perspective of life (Naurath 2000:82). Stollberg’s value for theology lies in the fact that he proves the necessity and legitimation of an approach to pastoral care, which takes seriously the human being in context (Naurath 2000:74).\textsuperscript{228} His conception is based on an optimistic image of human beings, which positively regards the chances of personality development by acceptance and allowance of all emotions.\textsuperscript{229}

Winkler (2000:54) criticises Stollberg’s use of a variety of concepts of the human being, whereas Naurath sees Stollberg’s approach as being clearly under Luther’s theology of justification and, therefore, distinct from a purely humanistic-inspired approach towards the human being. Rather, Christology, with incarnational

\textsuperscript{225} Three components are considered as priority: Listening skills, empathy and communication; establishing of a relation of trust; and the phenomenological method of experience, observation and perception (Louw 1998:139).

\textsuperscript{226} Louw describes the “therapeutical functions” of the phenomenological model as healing, guiding, sustaining, reconciling, and nurturing (Louw 1998:139).

\textsuperscript{227} Dietrich Stollberg (1968). Was ist Pastoralpsychology? In Wege zum Menschen (WzM). 210-216.

\textsuperscript{228} “Der Mensch in seiner spezifischen Krisensituation wird zum Ausgangspunkt seelsorgerlichen Handeins, ‘die zwischenmenschliche Beziehung als das entscheidende Medium der Begegnung von Gott und Mensch (wird; E.N.) wieder zur Geltung’ gebracht” (Stollberg; Klessmann (1975). Fünfzig Jahre “etwas anderes”. Zum 50jährigen Jubiläum der Klinischen Seelsorgeausbildung, in LR, 355-361).

\textsuperscript{229} Naurath stresses that the concept’s origin goes back to the specific North American socio-cultural circumstance and it cannot be transferred to another context without reflection. In the German context, Dietrich Stollberg is one of the first scholars to absorb critically pastoral counselling and pastoral care training, providing the impulse for a change from the proclamation model to a counselling, client-centred model (Naurath 2000:71f.).
theological implications, forms the basis of his model (Naurath 2000:74). Through God’s becoming man, humanity increases in worth, and human relationships become the theological point of departure. Departing from Stollberg, Naurath argues for an approach of human being’s corporeality (*Leiblichkeit*) in pastoral care (Naurath 2000:72; see also Louw 1998).

c) The qualitative, systemic model

Louw sees the value of a phenomenological approach in its ability to help theological anthropology to understand the human being as a person within relationships, to concretise human knowledge and to concentrate on human needs (Louw 1998:142). Simultaneously, the consequence for theology is that if the emphasis is on human potential, then Christology may be narrowed down to incarnation in terms of a functional Christology and anthropology may be restricted to ethics. Ethics in this understanding, thus, runs the danger of being concerned with the perfection of the human being through his or her own actions, and of humanity solely on improving the quality of human life (Louw 1998:139). Hence, in a phenomenological model, one has to question the weight of human abilities and self-actualisation in pastoral care (Louw 1998:169).

Likewise, if one considers the kerygmatic approach critically, it would be observed that the kerygmatic model holds the understanding of the human being as *simul_
justus et peccator. Due to guilt before God and the reality of sin, a person is a sinner and has to expect God’s wrath and punishment. Only through Christ’s expiatory sacrifice and God’s sovereign mercy can humans be freed.\textsuperscript{234} The notion of being a sinner dominates to the extent that being created in the image of God becomes secondary. Here, the danger of an overemphasis of the Fall arises, and one can speak of a ‘hamartiocentric theology’ (Louw 1998:130). Louw points out that there is the danger of diminishing human creatureliness in using the paradigm of sin (the Fall) as the hermeneutical key for a theological anthropology. Rather, “[s]in is secondary and not the final word about man... Nature is not identical to sin. Sin is not situated \textit{per se} in matter or in the body. One can question if such a view would bring theology back to Greek philosophy with its dualism between spirit and matter” (Louw 1998:130).\textsuperscript{235}

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textit{Towards a practical theological design}
\end{itemize}

According to Louw, the challenge in pastoral care is to address the existential life issues from the perspective of Christian faith and hope. God’s comfort should be conveyed and meaning instilled; that is the reason the existential perspective should be implemented in terms of a pastoral hermeneutics (Louw 2005:3). Practical theological concepts of pastoral care express the specific implicit understandings of the soul because each conception in pastoral care is based on a characteristic theological historical understanding of the “soul” (Naurath 2000:42). Naurath identifies the following consequences for the understanding of pastoral care.

\textsuperscript{234} Louw (1998:130) shows that, “The kerygmatic approach to the human being is determined by the scriptural declaration: ‘… for all have sinned and fall short of the glory of God, and are justified freely by his grace through the redemption that came by Christ Jesus’ (Rm 3:23-24).”

\textsuperscript{235} Similarly, Eschmann (2000:169) states that a Christian theological meaning of sin, guilt and forgiveness cannot be understood outside the Christian horizon, since it becomes only understandable in the context of God’s revealing history with human beings.
Firstly, pastoral care has to focus on the whole human being as a unity of the body and the soul. Pastoral care draws on a biblical understanding of the soul, which implies the embodiment of human beings.\textsuperscript{236}

Secondly, based on intellectual history and popular belief, the term “soul” has been used ambiguously, being attached to the belief in the immortality of the soul which draws on the devaluation of embodiment. For this reason, pastoral care has to point towards the integrative unambiguousness of the biblical understanding of the soul and help to clarify differing understandings of the soul. No other term than the soul is suitable for expressing the religious dimension of the human existence based on a biblical and anti-dualistic understanding. The insecurity of theologians regarding the concept of “soul” lies in the intellectual historical alienation and transfiguration of the term.\textsuperscript{237} The term “soul” affords the theological chance of bringing the modern feeling of being pulled apart (\textit{Zerissenheit}) in empiric graspable segments into a holistic human image.

Thirdly, in so far as pastoral care offers help for the integration of embodiment and the soul in the own understanding of identity, clinical pastoral care, in particular, has to face eschatological questions concerning illness, dying and death. In those experiences (the crisis of one’s embodiment), the theme of a body-soul unity becomes of present interest. Facing the absoluteness of death, the radical fear of death has to be taken serious and should not be suppressed in terms of reducing death to the area of the body. This can be regarded rather as a way of strengthening identity crisis.

In summary, pastoral care with its biblical foundation entails the care for the body and soul. Pastoral care only becomes relevant when not only the spiritual dimension

\textsuperscript{236} Due to that unity, one can neglect the understanding of an “\textit{anima seperata}”, which would lurk behind the term “\textit{Seel-Sorge}”, that is, the care for a separated soul (Naurath 2000:42).

\textsuperscript{237} Likewise, modern sciences today assume that the body and the soul are an inseparable unity; therefore, theology and pastoral theology also have to work it out.
in human beings is addressed but the fact of human beings as a body-soul unity is also addressed (Naurath 2000:42-43). If one could add, the spiritual dimension in human beings in terms of their corporeality also needs to be acknowledged.\footnote{According to Louw (1998:158), biblical realism describes and incorporates the ambivalence between our misery (sinful nature) and our new being (redeemed nature). See also Louw (2004:123) on the concept of a “realistic stance”.

I agree with Louw that when people “understand” the mechanics of the soul, they are more unlikely to experience a breakdown in internalizing stigma or less prone to stigmatizing others. How they orient themselves in situations reveals a specific stance, aptitude and attitude towards crises. Louw concretely identifies it thus: “One cannot change what befalls one, but one can indeed change one’s approach to the different happenstances of life. One’s approach reveals the quality of one’s soul” (Louw 2004:10).}

- \textit{Pastoral care as cura animarum}

The classical understanding of pastoral care as \textit{cura animarum} describes care for the whole person from a spiritual perspective. For Louw, a more specific, non-ambiguous understanding of pastoral care offers the phrase \textit{cura vitae}. It directly refers to the healing of life without the reference to a possible exclusive substantial understanding of the soul (Louw 2007). \textit{Soul care} refers to the healing of life and addresses humans in the centre of their existence, which is the faith relationship, or the dependence on God.\footnote{I agree with Louw that when people “understand” the mechanics of the soul, they are more unlikely to experience a breakdown in internalizing stigma or less prone to stigmatizing others. How they orient themselves in situations reveals a specific stance, aptitude and attitude towards crises. Louw concretely identifies it thus: “One cannot change what befalls one, but one can indeed change one’s approach to the different happenstances of life. One’s approach reveals the quality of one’s soul” (Louw 2004:10).} From a pastoral perspective on embodiment and corporeality, the human soul is an integral part. In terms of a pastoral hermeneutic based on a biblical understanding, the human soul is not solely part of the transient world, it is also concrete.

Naurath examines the philosophical and theological history concerning the term “soul” and shows the actual inherence of the bodily dimension in the Protestant theological context. Even though Naurath (2006:23) attempts to differentiate between philosophy and the theological processes of thought in history, the portrayed interconnection between the history of theology and philosophy indicates that both have influenced and presupposed each other. The history of Christian
doctrine shows that reflections on the soul had been greatly influenced by philosophy (Louw 2004:13).\textsuperscript{240}

The discussion of the conceptualisation of pastoral care is intrinsically linked to the biblical understanding of the soul.\textsuperscript{241} In order to understand the meaning of the term “soul”, the Hebrew Bible and New Testament’s perspectives are useful (Naurath 2000:20). The Hebrew term \textit{vp,n} (nèphèsh) has a broad meaning and shows the following characteristics.

The human being is portrayed as an indivisible psychosomatic whole, which through God’s creation has become a human soul. Becoming a human soul (instead of receiving a soul) then means being vivid and becoming a person.\textsuperscript{242} To be a soul is first defined by the God-relationship. The term \textit{vp,n} designates life energy and life affirmation, which essentially accompany the human being, even through pain and despair. It describes the wholeness of the human being. The human being in the Old Testament does not define himself or herself by a subject-object split; the term \textit{vp,n} is not restricted to mind and thinking, but is an anthropological characteristic. The human being realises himself or herself in his/her own vividness and individuation from life. This life energy includes intellect, emotions, reason, and instinctual life. It points towards the whole human being in any situation; it may be in illness, lament, or praise in the experience of God’s blessing. The understanding of the soul also includes the bodily dimension;\textsuperscript{243} it does not presume the idea of an indestructible core that could exist separate from the body. Only later, under the influence of

\textsuperscript{240} In particular, the aspect of subjectivity, individuality and self-awareness gradually surfaced in the discussions of the soul in the 19\textsuperscript{th} and 20\textsuperscript{th} centuries (Louw 2004:13).

\textsuperscript{241} This is highly regarded under the high relevancy of Scripture within the Protestant tradition.

\textsuperscript{242} The second creation report in Genesis (2:4b-25; cf. Gen 2:7) reads: “[T]hen the LORD God formed the man of dust from the ground and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life, and the man became a living creature”.

\textsuperscript{243} The bodily dimension of the \textit{vp,n} has the basic meaning of “throat” as the organ for breathing and repleteness. It therefore points to the existential functions of vividness and personality. One can speak of a synthetic thinking, since the physical function and the organ are one. Hence, the bodily aspect of the biblical understanding of soul is not only obvious but also fundamental (Naurath 2000:21).
Hellenistic-dualistic thinking, did some accents of a bodily division of the soul from the body after death appear (Naurath 2000:20).

In the New Testament, the term ψυχή (psuché) has a broad meaning. In line with the Hebrew term, the Greek term for living soul ψυχή ζύω designates the vividness in the human being.\(^244\) It expresses the vitality closely linked with affects of the human being. Here, the soul is also connected with the bodily dimension and stands against a dualistic anthropology. Louw notes that in the New Testament, the soul is linked to the spirit πνεῦμα (pneuma).\(^245\) Paul specifically draws this interconnectedness and refers to the “very unique relationship between God and human beings” when he discusses the spirit (Louw 2004:13). Both Louw and Naurath warn against regarding the New Testament in terms of a dualistic paradigm; likewise, one should not misinterpret Paul’s differentiation of life according to the spirit or the flesh.\(^246\) In 1 Corinthians 15:35-49, Paul speaks of the resurrection in terms of the recreation of the σώμα fully belonging to the πνεῦμα. Louw also interprets 1 Thessalonians 5:23 in terms of a trichotomy of spirit, soul and body; that is, instead of a threefold division, “different perspectives within a unity” are meant (Louw 2004:13).\(^247\)

According to Paul, the human being is a body-soul unity, but there is no way of separating these perspectives of a human being. From this ambivalence in Scripture (described in terms of soul, spirit, body), Louw wonders how these three different perspectives help to understand and interpret the human being’s coram Deo position

\(^{244}\) Additionally, Louw emphasises that both nèphèsh and psyché “refer to life and its quality” (see Mt 16:25; John 15:13; Louw 2004:12). Especially note 1 Cor 15:45 “Thus it is written, ‘The first man Adam became a living being’; the last Adam became a life-giving spirit.”

\(^{245}\) The New Testament also sees the soul, post-mortem bodily. The platonic idea of freeing the immortal soul out of the bodily prison is foreign to the New Testament’s belief in the resurrection (Naurath 2000:22).


\(^{247}\) Different anthropological categories are not meant; rather, an “eschatological understanding of the Kingdom of God and its implication for the new life in Christ” is implied (Louw 2004:13).
(Louw 1998:157). He notes that other sources claim that the “[s]oul therefore does not refer in the first place to a different anthropological category, but to a different mode of being” (Louw 2004:11). Louw departs from the basic assumption that the art of coping with life demands interlocks with the quality of the soul (soulfulness). The soul thus “designates a specific stance in life” and the “soul refers to a complexity of networking and systemic relationships” (Louw 2004:10).

In systemic theories, the concept of soul is explained in terms of position and corporative structure. The healing of space is then related to “interconnectedness and relatedness, [to] presence, value, norms, meaning, perception and attitude” (Louw 2003:212). Louw further states that, “the space of the living God in this world is the space of Christ in our place (substitution)”. In a systemic approach, “to be healed” means to shift one’s position and attitude. Hence, it is about the “quality of being” that is also indicated in Louw’s understanding of “soulfulness” (Louw 2004:16). Consequently, “if one can understand the complexity of soulfulness within the happenstances of life, one should be better equipped to cope” (Louw 2004:10).

Further deriving from what has been said, the term “soul” never describes an immaterial substance and the Scripture’s view of the soul does not depart from a purely spiritualistic and immortal part of the human being. Naurath differs with Heino Sonnemans and remarks that the absence of a body-soul dualism leads neither to monism nor to an undifferentiated understanding of the human being. Rather, the influence of Hellenism on the Hebrew way of thinking since the 5th century BC had a sustaining influence on the Christian theological paradigm of the human being. With Naurath, an anti-dualistic critique of the theological use of the term, soul, implies that pastoral care has to integrate consciously the dimension of embodiment, without diminishing body-soul (Leib-Seele) or body-mind (Körper-Geist) differences (Naurath 2000:42). From here, it becomes clear that the paradigm of the soul is of importance to any paradigm of pastoral care.
Related to the concept of the soul in a pastoral approach is the concept of attitude. For Louw, “attitude” (aptitude, habitus, position) indicates a mode of being, and is a qualitative concept related to meaning and the reality of the soul. The hermeneutics of soul and soulfulness is essential for the understanding of attitude. Louw (2004:11) notes that in this understanding and in working with the notion of position within a relational systems model, it is possible to approach a shift in the pathological state of affairs such as stigmatisation.

This section has clarified the need to re-assess the human body from a theological and philosophical perspective. The embodiment addressed in pastoral care is a biblical category referring to a different mode of being. It incorporates different perspectives of the human being (i.e. spirit, soul and body) and even more, since it goes beyond the meaning of relation (systemic theories). Hence, in talking about soul and embodiment, we can speak of the embodiment of the human soul and the ensoulment of the human body. Likewise, related to the concept of soul in a pastoral approach is the concept of attitude (Louw 2004:111), which indicates a mode of being and is a qualitative concept. In what follows, I consider the approach of destigmatisation based on embodiment and inhabitation.

2. TOWARDS A THEOLOGY OF EMBODIMENT

2.1 Human embodiment in Pauline theology

The theological understanding of Paul points the way for a Christian interpretation of human embodiment. Crucial for a pastoral hermeneutic of embodiment is the new perspective in the interpretation of Pauline theology.

- *The body in Pauline theology as a theme in New Testament theology*

Claudia Janssen provides an overview of the research on the body in Pauline theology and in the last century, Rudolf Bultmann’s work on the topic has had a
particularly lasting influence. Janssen criticizes the individualistic interpretation of σῶμα in Rudolf Bultmann’s work, claiming that it is limited (Janssen 2005:30). Broader dimensions than the individual have to be understood concerning the term σῶμα. The reference to history and the social field is important and is stressed by the new perspective in the interpretation of Pauline theology. In particular, S. Heine points out the necessity of taking society and ways of action into consideration in interpreting σῶμα. Janssen also refers to the seeming meaninglessness of the physical body in Bultmann’s concept, which claims that humans have a body, but does not pay attention to the theological meaning of that physical body (Janssen 2005:43) as done by Albert Schweitzer and John A.T. Robinson.²⁴⁸

Janssen comments on the lack of clear assertions concerning the body, which is also prevalent in the discussion of the resurrection. Although it is stressed that the resurrection concerns the present life reality, understanding it and the consequences that the resurrection has for the present body and life praxis are, however, not clear (Janssen 2005:43).²⁴⁹

Paul talks about the body in different layers of meaning. His body-talk is concrete, metaphorical and ultimately, theological (Janssen 2005:13). It is important to consider that people in the ancient world had a different view of being human and of individuality from today’s view. Moreover, in Hebrew, there is no word for either a

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²⁴⁸ Robinson (quoted in Nelson 1978:50) observes that the concept of the body (soma) forms the cornerstone of Paul’s theology. According to him, “It is from the body of sin and death that we are delivered; it is through the body of Christ on the Cross that we are saved; it is into His body the Church that we are incorporated; it is by His body in the Eucharist that this community is sustained; it is in our body that its new life has to be manifested; it is to the resurrection of this body to the likeness of His glorious body that we are destined.” Robinson, J. A.T. (1952). The Body: A Study in Pauline Theology. London: SCM, 9.

²⁴⁹ In arguing for a new perspective, for example, regarding Jewish theology and eschatology, Janssen considers Albert Schweitzer’s view, and claims that the point of departure for Schweitzer is not anthropology but historical sciences. The emphasis is on the interpretation of Paul not being individualistic, but focussed on the question of how the promise to Israel shows them as a people who are included in the history of salvation (Janssen 2005:46). Other important researches include Sanders, P. (1977). Paul and Palestinian Judaism. A Comparison of Patterns of Religion. The new perspective in Pauline research is further clarified in the works of James G. Dunn; Heikki Räisänen; Nicolas T. Wright and Lloyd Gaston. Using different concepts, they deal with Paul’s view of Judaism, the inclusion of other peoples and the role of the Torah (Janssen 2005:46).
person or a body (Janssen 2005:20). In the New Testament, the word \( \text{σωμα} \) stands not explicitly for the individual body, but also for the collective. In the centre of the theological exposition of Paul is the necessity to survive as well as experiences of joy and happiness. The biblical tradition, in which Paul stands, therefore, is especially interested in describing the eating, working, dying and anxious body (Janssen 2005:25).

From the background of a Hebrew tradition, Paul refers to the body and single body parts for the purpose of theological coherence. Having faith, recognizing and fulfilling the commandments of the Torah, being in relation with God and other human beings, loving and caring – all these aspects are made distinct through the body. In that sense, the body becomes the place of God-relation. Janssen explains that the power of the Spirit flows into the hearts of human beings and makes their limbs work for justice (Janssen 2005:63). Hence, Paul’s use of body language makes the relational aspect of human beings towards each other and towards God visible, and gives rise to the possibility of transferring own experiences into what is said. One can argue that the heart of Paul’s theology in the New Testament, that is, God’s revelation and grace, is not understandable unless we first understand his presuppositions on anthropology. Important key terms which Paul uses are the Greek words \( \text{σωμα} \) and \( \text{σαρξ} \).

The flesh \( \text{σαρξ} \)

In the Septuagint (LXX), the term, \( \text{σαρξ} \) is the translation of the Hebrew word \( \text{רֶפֶס} \). This means “flesh” in its concrete physical sense and is used in reference to humans and animals. Simultaneously, it can refer to the whole human being, the body or a corpse. All human beings and everything alive are circumscribed with \( \text{רֶפֶס} \). Further, the origin of illness and suffering lies in the “flesh”; relatives who have the same blood and sexual organs are regarded as the same. A man and a woman in one living community are also regarded as “one flesh”. In \( \text{רֶפֶס} \), human beings are appointed as creatures (in spite of their limitations and mortal dimension) as well as in being an expression of life (Janssen 2005:64). Paul uses the term in the contexts
of bodily need and misery\textsuperscript{250} and in the context of work and fight for survival in the face of experiences of violence and the threat of death (Janssen 2005:65).\textsuperscript{251}

Regarding \textit{σαρξ} also James D.G. Dunn identifies a whole spectrum of meaning with varying interpretations for the term. The spectrum of the meaning of flesh ranges from denoting the physical body to the sphere of being opposite to God. One can distinguish between the expressions, “to live in the flesh” \textit{ἐν σαρκί}, and “according to the flesh” \textit{κατὰ σαρκα}. The latter can then be understood as the antithesis to Christian living. It can also characterise human weakness and the assertion that no \textit{σαρξ} is justified before God (Dunn, in Janssen 2005:64).\textsuperscript{252} The variety of the spectrum becomes clearer when we consider Paul’s context of being a Hebrew in a Hellenistic world. In this sense, the idea of \textit{σαρξ} as a material body reflects rather the Hebrew sense of \textit{ phiên פהא}. In a different way, the idea of flesh as antagonistic to God is rather Hellenistic in character (Dunn, in Janssen 2005:62). There are conflicting views on the term, “flesh,” in scholarship. For R. Bultmann and E. Käsemann, “flesh and sin” are regarded as an entity.\textsuperscript{253} Janssen follows an interpretation of \textit{σαρξ} which originates from the social history.\textsuperscript{254} She sees in Paul’s use the characteristic of \textit{σαρξ} in

\textsuperscript{250} In the same way, Paul uses the term, \textit{σαρξ}, created and corporative human being (2 Cor 12:7), to refer possibly to his own illness (Gal 4:13). He describes the \textit{Gestalt} of a living creature parallel to \textit{σώμα} (1 Cor 15:39), “Flesh and blood” refers to groups of human beings (Gal 1:16; Mt 16:17; 1 Cor 15:50); while descent or origin may be expressed in the phrase \textit{κατὰ σαρκα} (Rom 1:3; 4:1; 9:3.5.8; Rom 11:14; Phlm 16). The phrase also stands for natural procreation because in sexual intercourse two human beings become one flesh (1 Cor 6:16; cf. Janssen 2005:65).

\textsuperscript{251} Compare also 2 Cor 10:3; Phill 1:22.24; 1 Cor 7:28; Gal 2:20. The experience of exhaustion and hopelessness is perceivable in 2 Corinthians 4:7-18. In verse 7, Paul describes his persecution and the despair he experiences. The experiences go beyond his individual (he uses the first person in plural). Paul sets his own and the suffering of others in the communities in relation to the suffering and death of Jesus. What serves as encouragement for them is the resurrection (2 Cor 4:14; cf. also Janssen 2005:65).

\textsuperscript{252} Dunn, J. D. G. (1998) \textit{The Theology of Paul the Apostle}. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans.


\textsuperscript{254} This refers to life under the \textit{Pax Romana} at that time.
connection with the vulnerability of human beings. The consequence is that the power of harmatia (e.g. the influence of the politics of that time) manifests itself in their bodies, their flesh, their action and even their thinking (Janssen 2005:69). Σάρξ, in this meaning, is the place of the social experience of violence.

Paul encourages people not to give up on themselves in spite of their feelings of helplessness and the power of sin manifested in the structures around them. Rather, they should orientate their lives according to love ἀγάπη and the power of the spirit πνεῦμα (Janssen 2005:69; cf. also Gal 5:13). Paul expresses both aspects with the word ὁμοίωσις. On the one hand, all creation is related to God, and on the other hand, is distant from God, with the societal and social consequences. In this way, he shows the intertwinedness of the individual human being and his or her action with the structures of society (Janssen 2005:69).

Subsequently, ὁμοίωσις does not stand solely for a sphere of distance from God, but simultaneously, ὁμοίωσις is the concrete place, where the consequences of society which is distanced from God and its power structures become perceptible. Σάρξ describes the vulnerability of human beings, as well as the ongoing circle of violence and death, experienced bodily. Janssen (2005:70) formulates it clearly thus: “The injuries and hurts, which are the traces of violence, and and unjust supremacy, are written in the ‘flesh’” (cf. 2 Cor 4:7-18; 1 Cor 15:31). It is interesting that in Galatians 6:17, Paul uses instead the word σώμα to end his letter. This brings us right into the heart of his theology: “From now on let no one cause me trouble, for I bear on my body the marks τὰ στίγματα of Jesus.”

Inevitably, we are involved with ὁμοίωσις due to our human constitution, being vulnerable to discrimination, violence and death; yet being gifted with a new bodily-self, marks remain.
Paul’s spectrum concerning σῶμα refers to the human body, to the “body of Christ”, and once to the celestial body (1 Cor 15:40). Paul describes the concrete human body as σῶμα, when he writes about his own body and about punishing himself (1 Cor 9:27); the same body he wants to hand over to the fire to be burnt at the stake (1 Cor 13:3). It is also with that body he stands in the congregation (1 Cor 5:3), and the same body, he refers to as “weak” (2 Cor 10:10; cf. Janssen 2005:71). His mention of, τὰ στίγματα, the marks of Jesus on his body, can be associated with the scars on his body due to his persecution (cf. Gal 6:12-14; 2 Cor 4:10). At the same time, they might be understood, metaphorically, because he compares them as “stigmata” or “signs” of Jesus with the circumcision of the “flesh” (cf. Gal 6:13). Σῶμα therefore designates the degraded and humiliated body in its total existence (cf. Phil 3:21), as well as the transformed body, for which the suffering, men and women, are yearning (cf. Rom 8:23; Janssen 2005:72). Recreation is inseparably connected with the hope dimension.

In another use of the term, σῶμα, Paul describes those bodies that are determined by the power of God’s Spirit, that is, σῶμα πνευματικόν (Janssen 2005:71ff.; cf. 1 Cor 15:44). The individual bodily being is not to be separated from the participation in the σῶμα Χριστοῦ (1 Cor 12:13). The human bodies shall glorify God through their bodily existence (1 Cor 6:20; Phil 1:20). In this case, the close relation between human bodies and the presence of God is stressed. By the gift of the Spirit, human bodies are sanctified and do already participate in the reality of the new creation, that is, embodiment (2 Cor 5:17; Gal 6:15; cf. Janssen 2005:73).
Hence, for Paul, the “body of Christ” (as a spiritual and ecclesial concept) is at least as much in the foreground as the concrete body. The σῶμα Χριστοῦ is central because in it the “resurrected body” finds expression in the world. In Christ, human beings become participants of the “new creation” (2 Cor 5:17; Gal 6:15; cf. Rom 6:4). The consequence of being in Christ is that people participate in the sanctity of life, which includes their bodies and what they do with their bodies. At the same time, being in Christ is the foundation for responsibility and integrity of “the body” (1 Cor 6:12-20).257 The close and existential relation of human beings with the life, dying and resurrection of Jesus Christ, which they experience within their own bodies,258 allows them to live from the power of resurrection, now; and they hope for the total transformation of their degraded bodies, then (Phil 3:20ff; Rom 8:29). Here lies the reason why the behaviour of the single members of the body towards other members and towards their own bodies is of so much importance. In them the new life “in Christ” is taking place (Rom 6:13.15; 11:27.29), which is the realization of the change of regiments, that empowers the individual human being to act in solidarity and live in mutually giving relation (Gal 3:28; cf. Janssen 2005:75).

For Dunn, Paul’s use of σῶμα includes the physical body, and more, hence, the use of the alternative term embodiment. The body, σῶμασ ἀσ, as the personal embodiment of the person denotes a relational concept, since Paul uses it extensively as a model of human co-operation and interrelationship. Dunn asserts that Paul’s distinction “made possible a positive affirmation of human creatureness and of the interdependence of humanity within its created environment” (Dunn, in Janssen 2005:73). His use enforces the concept of embodiment in its importance. With Dunn, one can say that the “body” or “embodiment” denotes a being in the world, whereas the “flesh” denotes belonging to the world, but importantly, the flesh should not be misinterpreted as being devalued.

σῶμα, which points to a trichthonomological anthropology that stands in contrast to Paul’s understanding of the body as examined in other verses (Janssen 2005:73).

257 Through baptism, people become a part of the body of Christ (1 Cor 12:12, 27). In the Eucharist, participation in the body and blood is represented (Janssen 2006:74).

258 Here I refer to both σῶμα and σῶµασ (cf. 2 Cor 4:10; Rom 6:10.)
Aspects of dualism

As mentioned above, the main problem with the translation of σώμα into German is that the term can refer to two clearly different concepts, Leib and Körper. Janssen refers to R. Ammicht-Quinn\textsuperscript{259}, who closes her examination of the recent theological Leib-Körper discussion with the remark that the material aspect of the body which is represented in Körper carries basically a moral blemish (Janssen 2005:26). The theological use of the body in Körper stresses the concrete material dimension of human life, while in the use of Leib the same aspect is missing. Even in terms of a biblical argumentation, in which Leib and soul are seen as analogous, Leib is mentioned with great respect and it is far from sin. Janssen points out that there is a little crack of a door left open for dualism, since Leib is not to be mixed up with Körper (Janssen 2005:26).\textsuperscript{260}

Despite the warning against reading Paul and the New Testament dualistically (Naurath 2006:21; Nelson 1978:50), dualistic tendencies in our interpretations are there, where there is differentiation between the body as Leib and the material conditions of the physical life; namely the split of the flesh σάρξ from the bodily existence (leiblich) (Janssen 2005:44).

One also has to recognise the narrowness of the term Leib. The theme of Leiblichkeit has to take into account the concrete and ambivalent experiences of human beings within their bodies as well, in order to offer a holistic description of being human. This problem is avoided in the English word, body, which includes both Leib and Körper. One the other hand, both terms in their variety and richness


\textsuperscript{260} In the same way, the result of Christl Maier’s work, which shows in her exemplary exegesis of Psalm 139 how the function of the body is constituted in relationships, is remarkable. This function is expressed by the human as well as the divine body. Maier discusses capability and need for the relations which lie in concepts of the body “Leiblichkeit”. (Christl Maier (2003). Beziehungsweisen. Körperkonzept und Gottesbild in Ps 139, in Körperkonzepte im Ersten Testament. Aspekte einer Feministischen Anthropologie, Hedwig-Jahnow-Forschungsprojekt, Stuttgart u.a., 174, in Janssen 2005:26).
have to be explicit in the explanation of body and embodiment as they are used here.\textsuperscript{261}

On Janssen’s part, one can conclude that, for Paul, bodily existence is never isolated, but is always in relation to God, other human beings and creation. It is important to note that, for Paul, the life of human beings happens in a fleshly body. The measure for life is given by the Torah (Rom 3:31; 7:12; 8:4). Paul is not interested in separate parts of the body; instead, his focus is on the function and the specific aspects they embody (Janssen 2005:82).\textsuperscript{262}

Further, Pauline theology may not be separated from its social and political context. This explains why Paul’s language, on the one hand, is characterised by the experience of violence and death, and on the other hand, the experience of life and solidarity. His own experiences and those of the people around him serve as the point of departure for his comments on the body. The bodies he knows (and to which he counts himself) are abused, tortured, whipped, raped, enslaved, freezing, hungry, and anxious bodies (2 Cor 4:7-18; 11:20-33; cf. Janssen 2005:82).

With the help of the term \textit{sώμα}, Paul shows the close relation of human bodies to Jesus Christ, who as a human being went through the same experiences of suffering as they do, and who now, as the resurrected, constitutes the congregation of believers, the \textit{sώμα Χριστοῦ}. This body (the church of Christ) is more than a metaphor for Paul, because it describes the presence of the resurrected, which

\textsuperscript{261} With the consideration that the theological tradition in using the term \textit{Leib} has pushed a form of dualism between spiritual existence (\textit{leiblich}) and material (\textit{körperlich}) existence, C. Janssen prefers to deal with \textit{Körper} as the translation of \textit{sώμα} in order to ask if both aspects have been considered. At the centre of her reflection is the relation between body, death and survival/life (Janssen 2005:28).

\textsuperscript{262} From the writings of Paul, one can relate to the social, historical, religious and cultural background of the people of his time. Again, the content of 1 Cor 15 stands in the context of a dialogue with people about their conflicts and anxieties concerning their bodies, life, dying and resurrection (Janssen 2005:29). Paul’s answers based on contemporary anthropological premises, culturally characterise understandings of embodiment, biblical views of embodiment and his own experiences and those of the people around him. Paul’s theology is highly relational (he sees humans as social beings), and rather practical than speculative (Dunn, in Janssen 2005:53).
becomes a new identity for the believer, and is therefore concrete (Janssen 2005:82).

For a further perspective of Pauls’ body theology I shall here refer to Lorscheid’s investigation of Scheler’s work, in which the dualistic aspect shifts to the background (Wesenseidologie, a phenomenological method) as already mentioned above. In his philosophical reflection of the being structure of embodiment, Scheler considers the difference between “Körper” und “Leib”, but further identifies the ‘Leibphenomenon’ (Leibphänomen). Since he distinguishes between “Leibbody” (Leibkörper), “Leibsoul” (Leibseele), and “Leib” itself (the latter is a “mental-physical non-deviant phenomenon),” he defines “Leiblichkeit” in a phenomenological sense as a category, which is, apriori, consciously externally and internally perceivable for the Leibconsciousness. An external view describes the “Leibbody”, while an internal point of view regards the “Leibsoul”. It is important to note that the Leib is much more fundamental for both; that is what Scheler calls the “Urphenomenon” (Lorscheid 1962:29).

Hence, for Scheler, the qualitative structure of embodiment (des Leiblichen) is crucial. He prefers to uncover the constituents of the embodied being and he develops a concept via the specific way of looking at reality and identifying the actual Leib.

2.2 Embodiment within an eschatological approach

Does an understanding of the human person in terms of personality [stigma] and physicality [embodiment] suffice for a pastoral anthropology, or is the human person a spiritual being with a transcendental destiny? (Louw 1998:157)

So far, the discussion has touched aspects of personality (stigma), physicality and embodiment of the human being in the context of pastoral anthropology. Next, I shall

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263 The original is, “ein psychophysisch indifferentes Phänomen” (Lorscheid 1962:29).
264 See also Louw's distinction between the “external and internal person”(Louw 1998:163).
refert to the phenomenon of stigmatisation from the perspective of eschatology. The quest for the wholeness of the human being is oriented in pneumatology. The Spirit of God is, both, the gift to human beings now in the context of their time, and the eschatological new creating power, through which God allows creation to participate in eternal life in the thereafter (Härle 1999:636).

Being human means being embodied in the world. Therefore, the question of embodiment (which implies human corporeality) is interlinked with the human being’s calling in the world; **coram Deo**.

- **Created in the image of God**

In the Christian understanding, the world has been created by God. It is the work and result of God’s creative involvement. Theologically, therefore, it is appropriate to ask what the expression of creation reveals about the relationship between God and human beings, and how the relationship is qualified (Härle 2000:410). In that understanding, the term “creation” can refer to the act of creating as well as the result of creating, namely all that was created. The Christian worldview is primarily interested in the element of the relationship that is connected to the “created world” (Härle 2000:411). Theological anthropology refers to philosophical anthropology and the results of biological, sociological, psychological and pedagogical anthropologies. The specific contribution of theology is that it reflects on the human being and his or her calling through God taking into account the philosophical and human sciences. At the centre of theological anthropology is therefore the question of the divine calling of the human being (Härle 2000:430).

The creation and calling of the human being is the most decisive theological assertion about the human being. The human being, through creation and calling, 

\[267\] The world as creation is **creatio ex nihilio**. The world is unique and created out of nothingness (Härle 2000:409).
is in a certain outstanding relation to God.⁶⁶ It is important to note that there is nothing in or about the human being, which makes him or her to be the image of God (not the bodily shape, the upright walk, the spirit nature, responsiveness, two sexes, or the order for dominion).⁶⁷ Rather, altogether, human beings’ existence in the face of God and in relation to God is what determines being created in the image of God. This calling is given in the being in the world of human beings and in meeting up with this calling by living a life of justice (Härle 2000:435).⁶⁸

Being created in the image of God, therefore, entails the relation of God to humanity and, on the other hand, the relation of human beings to God (Moltmann 1985:226). From the point of view of God’s relation to the human being, being the creature does not solely lie in specific characteristics but in the whole being of humans (in seinem ganzen Dasein).⁶⁹ It should be clear that the human being does not have the image of God as a characteristic or a part of his or her being. Rather, the image of God is the promised, intended, and expected calling of God for love (Härle 2000:437).

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²⁶⁷ Important biblical assertions concerning the human being as the image of God are found in Ps 8 and Gen 1:26. (Other references to the image of God include Gen 5:1; 9:6; 1 Cor 11:7; Col 3:10 and Jam 3:9; cf. also Härle 2000:434).

²⁶⁸ This relation is expressed through the Hebrew terms zelem and d’mut” (Grk. ικω and ομοιωμα; Lat. imago and similitude). According to Irenäus of Lyon, two separate human conditions can be understood. On the one hand, there is the remaining creative equipment of the human being in terms of reason and will, and on the other hand, there is the analogy of human beings within the will of God, which was the original status of perfection (“status integritatis”) that was lost because of the Fall. Nowadays, one commonly agrees that both terms, zelem and d’mut, do not describe two separate entities; rather they describe two mutual rapprochements (Härle 2000:435).

Moreover, Moltmann sees the heavy influence of substance ontology in the theological tradition, which has shaped the understanding of human beings as being created in the image of God. In terms of the soul, the human nature is characterised by reason and will because the soul was said to be immortal and of divine nature. A second argument lies in the Gestalt analogy which is based on the human beings’ upright walk and fixing their gaze above. A third perspective is opened up according to the analogy of proportionality in that human dominion over the earth is proportional to God’s reign on the earth. Finally, in line with Moltmann (1985:226), in the analogy of relation, the human being is created in the image of God as male and female (which relates to the inner Trinitarian community of God).

²⁶⁹ Louw notes that being created in the image of God implies respondability and responsibility (Louw 1998:151; 155ff.).

²⁷⁰ Human beings can deny and contradict their calling due to their freedom, but they have not lost their calling even after the Fall (Härle 2000:435).

²⁷¹ “Der ganze Mensch, nicht nur seine Seele; die wirkliche menschliche Gemeinschaft, nicht nur die einzelne Person; die mit der Natur verbundene Menschheit, nicht nur die der Natur gegenüberstehenden Menschen sind Bild und Ehre Gottes”. Moltmann also argues against the physiognomy of human beings concerning the image of God. The eschatological providence of human beings being created in the image of God can be recognised in the “face-to-face” notion. Physically, the face becomes the mirror of God (Moltmann 1985:227).
God’s image and the HIV and AIDS pandemic

Stigma has been associated with being wounded, and being vulnerable as part of the human constitution. There can be wounds or stigmata on the body and in the body. Another conception is that in stigma the characteristic “vulnerability of God” finds expression. The meaningful symbolic “different nature” (of God’s being-with) in which God acts, finds manifestation and reaches its climax in the stigma of Jesus’ death on the cross. The resultant paradox stands in contrast to human expectations. Instead of transcendence, this event reveals God’s condescendence. In a unique and actually unmistakable way, God expresses his innermost quality in being with the humble and wounded (Louw 2004). The experience of being different as a point of departure is at the heart of Christian theology. Being different is now defined from the perspective of God’s work in Christ (eschatological perspective).

Hence, the deviant person is not defined by his status (social, health status) but by his relationship within God. God’s condescendence finally reaches those who defy all expectations - the humble, and those who experience their weaknesses. In the case of HIV and AIDS pandemic, not only is the “human body” afflicted physically, but the HIV/AIDS-related stigma also afflicts “human embodiment,” individually and socially, in a mistakeable moral sense, which is actually immoral. In the same way, healing in the form of destigmatisation is only possible through human embodiment (reconciliation and sanctification) which is qualified by the God relationship and inhabitation of the Spirit.

According to John, the evangelist, the incarnation of Jesus is not the only fulfilment of God’s faithfulness and his death on the cross is not the end. Jesus’ death stands for a new beginning, through which the resurrection of all human beings,

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272 Ackerman also mentions stories “about the body” and “stories in the body”. The latter can be understood as stories internalized in one’s body and, therefore, in one’s embodied being. In the present context, a story may refer to our being wounded (Ackermann 2003:69), for example, stories referring to the stigmatised body or the internalized stigma in a Narrative approach in Pastoral Therapy.

273 See also Jhn 16:7; 17:4.
which are followers of Christ, becomes a possibility. In terms of the Gospel, suffering and stigma are closely connected to the gift of the Holy Spirit. Nevertheless, the question for the meaning in suffering needs to be raised.

- **Eschatological dimension**

Moltmann explains that the restitution or recreation of human beings being created in the image of God happens in the faith relationship of the believer with Christ. Since Christ Jesus is the messianic *imago Dei*, believers become the *imago Christ* and through Him, they are on the way to becoming the *Gloria Dei* on the earth (cf. Rom 8:29). It is God who creates the believer according to the image of the Son, as Paul states in Romans 8:30: “And those whom he predestined he also called, and those whom he called he also justified, and those whom he justified he also glorified.”

Through grace and God’s justification, the sinner again becomes the image of God on the earth. Nevertheless, glorification is futuristic, because it lies in “the redemption of our bodies” (Rom 8:23), which is the “[transformation of] our lowly body to be like his glorious body” (Phil 3:21). Hence, justification is the present beginning of a futuristic perfection of justification. Both happened due to God’s choice by grace, due to the creator’s faithfulness.

Between justification and glorification of the justified human being in the future, stands the way of sanctification, which happens by putting on the *new human being* as written in Ephesians 4:24: “[a]nd to put on the new self, created after the likeness of God in true righteousness and holiness.” Similarly, Colossians 3:10 states: “And have put on the new self, which is being renewed in knowledge after the image of its creator”.

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274 “Der Zusammenhang von Liebe und Leiden, der sich vom Kreuz Christi her auftut, könnte das Tragfähigste sein, was vom Christlichen Glauben her zur Realität des (physischen) Übels in der Schöpfung zu sagen ist” (Härle 2000:450). Herein lies the basis of the Christian hope concerning suffering in this world and time, and the emphasised notion of God’s co-suffering and presence (Härle 2000:450).
Being created in the image of God, according to the Scripture, is charisma, task, and hope - indicative and imperative at the same time (Moltmann 1985:232). To be human means becoming human in the historical process. The image of God is here the whole, embodied human being - the human being in community, not excluded or excluding. This is because human beings in the messianic community with Christ become whole, embodied and societal human beings, whom death cannot split (body and soul) anymore or tear apart from God. To be human in this way means to live in the process of resurrection. In the resurrection process, one can experience oneself wholly, embodied and socially accepted/accepting and at the same time demanded and relieved (Moltmann 1985:233).

The messianic calling leads human beings into eschatological history of recreation: from calling to justification, from justification to sanctification, and from sanctification to glorification (Moltmann 1985:234). Eschatology becomes then the schemata of interpretation and the frame of reference for being a Christian. The understanding of human embodiment in an eschatological perspective is pointed out by Paul.

3. TOWARDS A THEOLOGICAL PROCESS OF DESTIGMATISATION

From Paul’s body theology, it can be inferred that the whole human being is affected by the reality of the cross and the resurrection. How are being and becoming whole possible, and what is the place of stigma in these?

“When the perishable puts on the imperishable, and the mortal puts on immortality, then shall come to pass the saying that is written: ‘Death is swallowed up in victory’” (1 Cor 15:54).

275 The eschatological notion of becoming like God (Gott-gleich-werden) in human beings is rooted in the term, “looking”. Because looking at the face of God, that is, how God is, makes the viewer to be looked at, and allows him to participate in the life and aesthetics of God (Moltmann 1985:234). See 1 Cor 13:12: For now we see in a mirror dimly, but then face to face. Now I know in part; then I shall know fully, even as I have been fully known. See also 1 John 3:2: Beloved, we are God's children now, and what we will be has not yet appeared; but we know that when he appears we shall be like him, because we shall see him as he is.
Being and becoming whole in terms of recreation through the Spirit of God enables stigma to become charisma.

3.1 The Christological perspective

According to Louw (2000:99), essentially, a theology of the cross is pastorally structured since in the cross, God deals with human guilt, conquers death and enables a new relationship with God and oneself. In what follows, the Christological aspects relating to the cross, the theology of the cross and the paradox of the cross will be examined amongst other issues.

The New Testament entails as much as the reign of God, healing, the justice of God, or reconciliation (Härle 2000:304). To express the notion τὸ εὐαγγέλιον in the Old Testament Hebrew and the profane Hellenistic Greek was meant to be a “message of victory”, or “the wage for a good news” (Strecker 1992:177). The meaning of τὸ εὐαγγέλιον in the New Testament is more specific. It designates the news of God and by God. Although it is understood as the “good news”, it contains both grace and judgment (Rom 2:16; Rev 14:6; cf. Strecker 1992:177).

There is a gap opened up by the paradox that τὸ εὐαγγέλιον in the New Testament is also connected to poverty, lowliness, and even to the shame of dying the death of a criminal (Härle 2000:304). The εὐαγγέλιον of Jesus Christ is a possible σκάνδαλον of which one may be ashamed of (Rom 1:16; 1 Cor 1:18-2:5); the same is valid for its content and the addressee of τὸ εὐαγγέλιον. It is the promise of healing for those who are lost and the election of those who count least in the world (Lk 15; 1 Cor 1:26-29; cf. Härle 2000:304).

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276 Earlier, it was connected to the cult of the Emperor Caesar, being associated with the power of the Emperor and his lordship (Strecker 1992:177).
What we know about the person and the work of Jesus Christ is taken from the synoptic tradition of the Gospel and the letters of Paul. As a person on the earth, he was a preacher and a healer at the same time. For Paul, Jesus is the crucified, who died and was buried. Additonally, Jesus is the person whom God has raised. According to Paul, the assertions about Jesus stand in relation to the human being; hence, the understanding that Jesus died “for us”.

Likewise, his resurrection is to be understood as a process, which includes those who believe in Christ (Janssen 2005:76). It is also valid that in the Christian belief God has revealed himself as love in the person of Jesus Christ (Härle 2000:305). Further, the cross becomes the expression and tool for connecting the loving God and the sinful human being without being identified with both (Slenczka 1994:1752).

Theologically, one can differentiate between the meaning of healing in the work and fate of Christ, on the one hand (de opere/munere Christi), and the person, on the other hand (de persona Christi). Protestant Christology also makes a distinction between different states of the Christ (de statibus Christi), that is, between humiliation (exinanitio) and raising “exaltation” (Härle 2000:306). Even though a distinction exists, it is important to keep an eye on the unity between the work and the person of Christ (Härle 2000:306).

- Estrangement and alienation - paradox of the cross

“For the word of the cross is folly to those who are perishing, but to us who are being saved it is the power of God” (1 Cor 1:18).

277 Cf. 1 Cor2:2; 2 Cor 13:4; Gal 3:1; Phill 2:8.
278 Cf. Rom 6:4; 8:34; 14:9; 1 Cor 8:11; 15:3.
279 Cf. Rom 6:9; 7:4; 8:34; 10:9; 1 Cor 15:5;12.21; 2 Cor 4:14.
280 Cf. 2 Cor 5:15 and Phil 3:9-11.
281 The differentiation of the “states” is not on the same level as the differentiation between the person and the work of Christ; rather, they refer primarily to the doctrine of the person and, secondarily, to the doctrine of His work (Härle 2000:306).
282 Christology deals with Jesus as the Christ (Messias, the Anointed One) in its salvific meaning. The title has the important function of keeping alive the continuity with the Jewish context, which was Jesus’ origin, and wherein he was active. In this title, the special meaning is expressed in the form of a confession that Jesus is “the Christ” (Mt 16:16; cf. Härle 2000:305).
This verse of Paul’s is characterised by an inherent opposition; because the world does not recognise the word of the cross as God’s power and wisdom, God and the world have to be constructed as being in opposition here. Paul does not talk of human wisdom because the word of the cross, according to human measures, remains folly even for the believer. In this sense, it is God’s wisdom which remains secret (cf. 1 Cor 2:7). Paul’s statement on “God’s power” is based on the connection to “being saved”. Since faith springs from the saving power of God, its perfection cannot be human wisdom or realization. The word of the cross sets humans in the position of choice whether one accepts the foolishness of this word as the power of God or not (Merklein 1992:178). In the HIV and AIDS context of suffering and the dilemma of stigma, the why-question belongs in the sphere of the paradox. Likewise, the possibility that stigma becomes charisma is the paradox per se.

- Theology of the cross - a systematic theological sketch

According to Michael Korthaus, the terminus technicus, theologia crucis, unites diverse concepts. Thus, one cannot speak of ‘the’ theologia crucis. Korthaus examined several designs of a theologia crucis. Commonly, they are determined by their reference to the loci classicus of theologia crucis, which are the first and second chapters of Paul’s letter to the Corinthians, and Martin Luther’s Thesis 19 and 20 of the Heidelberger Disputation (Korthaus 2005:363). Hence, the concept itself is rooted in the theology of Paul, and later in Luther’s theology. Luther’s qualification of the formula sets the foundation for dealing with a theologia crucis in the 20th century.

In this sense, working with the idea of a theologia crucis is in itself a hermeneutical undertaking (that is, in reference to the theologies of Paul and Luther). A characteristic of any theologia crucis is that in its attempt to explain the reality of the cross either in a systematic abstract design or in a specific context, it simultaneously fulfills the word of the cross, because the reflection process wants to undergo the

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283 An in-depth study of the history and content of the terminus technicus theologia crucis is offered by Michael Korthaus in his work, Kreuzestheologie (2005), Mohr Siebeck: Tübingen.
The paradox is constituted in that a *theologia crucis* has to claim to be an appropriate way of talking about salvation as constituted by God. If *theologia crucis* would resist being broken, then it would become a *theologia gloriae*. This refers to a human undertaking under the sign of the cross which does not want to become affected by God who gives and takes life (Korthaus 2005:364f). The paradox of the cross resists any approach; therefore, it remains a hermeneutical undertaking to explicate the life reality concerning (HIV and AIDS) stigma and embodiment.

**Theologia crucis as a critique of a theologia gloriae**

The current tragedy in the HIV and AIDS context challenges (pastoral) theology to offer clear answers regarding the meaning and significance of human life. Nonetheless, theology has to resist the optimism and the danger of a *theologia gloriae* (Louw 2006:1). For the latter, it is constitutive that God is the “embodiment” of positive predicates and stands for omnipresence, omnipotence and omniscience. In contrast, a *theologia crucis* sees in the cross of Christ the place of God’s self-definition in expressing himself as the one who makes human suffering and the human condition his own. A *theologia crucis* identifies human suffering and being distant from God as the place where God’s being with the human being is only accessible by trusting in the faithfulness of God (Slenczka 1994:1752). The WCC Report states “that we do not ‘posses’ the truth but are constantly to search for God’s will in a changing world” (WCC 1997:4).

*Theologia crucis*, from this point of view, opposes *theologia gloriae*. (Korthaus 2005:366). On the one hand, the argument against any power turns human life in the
direction of untruthfulness, bondage and hopelessness and, therefore, destroys human life. A theology of the cross instead does always articulate anew the radical argument and the question of power and talk about God (Korthaus 2005:367). On the other hand, a theology of the cross articulates God's argument, which happened in the death of Jesus on the cross against the sin of human beings. The latter is the actual theological layer, from which a *theologia crucis* can then be unfolded (Korthaus 2005:367). Sin then represents the general condition of human beings; sin rules their thinking, their volition, and their actions. Since human life is an embodied life, besides discussing sin in an abstract manner, it is necessary to articulate the symptoms of sin in their ever-changing relations of existence. Consequently, the connection to theological anthropology is made.

Furthermore, Korthaus argues for the interpretation of a soteriological understanding of a theology of the cross in concrete situations. Connected to such an interpretation is therefore the pneumatic visualization of the word of the cross (Korthaus 2005:367).

Louw opts for a Christology from below, in which God's condescendence and the unity between Christ's divinity and humanity are stressed, rather than God's transcendence and the differentiation between divinity and humanity. For Louw (2000:108), “[t]he contribution of a theology of the cross is that it enables what could be called a ‘hermeneutics of the cross’ from below”. The cross, therefore, is about God's identification with human misery and that identification discloses the being of God. Louw explains that, “a theology of below thinks in terms of relationality and is interested primarily in God's passibility and identification” (Louw 2000:109).

- **Cross and the HIV and AIDS-related stigma**

A realistic view of the HIV/AIDS pandemic does not ignore the reality of suffering and evil. Louw asserts that theology cannot ignore judgment and sin. Nonetheless, concerning the pandemic, we have to get rid of the stigma that ‘HIV is the sinner’s disease’ because such an understanding falls short of evidence and deeper meaning, and theology should advocate for the final word of God’s grace and
salvation (Louw 2006:4). Obviously, the notion of death is inherent since in the context of the HIV/AIDS pandemic, people are exposed to devastating suffering due to HIV and HIV and AIDS-related stigmatisation, which is a form of death manifested in rejection.\textsuperscript{284} Death does not only imply the physical extinction of life; it entails much more, especially in the context of the HIV pandemic, “death refers to the destruction of relationships, i.e. human beings’ exposure to loneliness, isolation, rejection and loss” (Louw 2004:2).\textsuperscript{285} Further, Louw agrees with Kierkegaard that when death is the greatest danger, then one hopes simultaneously for life (Louw 2004:2).\textsuperscript{286}

**The paradigm of sin and death**

The death of Jesus on the cross was meant to be a cursed death (Gal 3:13). The object of a *theologia crucis* makes this objectionable death and distance from God, part of the news from Christ’s rising from death (Slenczka 1994:1753). In order to get near the cross as it were (namely the central symbol of soteriology, first, one has to get rid of fixed and mellow associations. “The cross is dumb, and makes dumb. God was silent. Jesus died. The disciples ran away.” Korthaus sees the cross in itself as soteriologically silent (cf. Dalferth 1997:62).\textsuperscript{287} The relation between the cross and the resurrection has to be clarified in order to recognise the soteriological quality of the cross.

Korthaus provides an explication of the connection between sin and death. The cross of Christ shows that human sin brings the one without sin to death. On the one

\textsuperscript{284} Again, stigmatisation adds to already existing social problems, i.e. the aforementioned gender debate and the power question. In the South African context, Louw describes the dilemma of a vicious circle opened up by poverty and social problems which fuel the spread of HIV/AIDS. The people are thus caught up in the circle (Louw 2007:335).

\textsuperscript{285} Sin understood as the separation of human beings from God corresponds to the transgression and destruction in the relation with oneself and other human beings. “Therefore, the consequence of sin as a destructive urge into disconnectedness is death”: “Die Folge der Sünde als zerstörerischer Drang in die Verhältnislosigkeit ist deshalb der Tod” (Rom 6:23; Krölke 1994:1868).


hand, God's judgment on sin is symbolized in the death on the cross. On the other hand, through the turning away of human beings from God and the urge to destroy real life, life is covered by the reality of death. In this sense, life is inseparably bound to death (not only to physical and natural death), which is qualified by ‘God’s no’ to the work of sin. Consequently, in the cross of Christ, both death as the “wage” of sin, and God’s judgment on sin, come together. Only in the cross does sin reveal its deadly quality (which is the God-imposed consequence of death). Therefore, only in the cross of Christ can the human being truly recognise him or herself. At the same time, with the recognition of oneself in the cross of Christ, humans may recognise God’s will for our salvation (Korthaus 2000:381).

Here again it is important to note that sin should not be viewed as something substantial. Louw defines sin in the context of “irresponsible choices, hypocrisy, false motives and distorted needs of self-interest. Essentially, as discussed above, sin is a problem of distorted relationships” (Louw 1998:162). Sin denotes separation from God and the falling away from a faithful relationship to God expressed in concrete acts of disobedience to the divine will and the breaking of the covenant established with creation (Barton 1997:759). One can state that the link between sin and stigmatisation is disconnectedness which consequence is, theologically speaking, death (Krötke 1994:1867).

In concluding this section, the reflection on the interconnectedness of sin, death and stigmatisation has shown that stigmatisation of others is a “sin” far greater than most of the so-called “misdeeds” on which the HIV infection is often blamed. In terms of hermeneutics, the notion of sin can be regarded as analogous with a stigmatizing attitude (which is characterised by making human expectation the yardstick), that is, putting oneself in the place of God (self-righteousness). Moreover, the acceptance and internalization of the negative stigma as the final word is ambivalent individually and socially, because of the dangerous effect that stigma becomes the master status.

Substantial refers to the origin of sin in an ‘inner component’ or ‘material principle’ (Louw 1998:162).
(see chapter one) of a person or group of people. In the sphere of death, stigma (being stigmatised and being wounded) produces more stigmas (stigmatizing and wounding others). The task is to move beyond stigma in terms of healing.

- **Essence of a theology of the cross as the core of the doctrine of reconciliation**

Salvation in all its facets includes the character of overcoming harm.\(^{289}\) From the Christian perspective, the character of contrast and overcoming are essential, since salvation can only be experienced in contrast to harm and the overcoming of it (Härle 1999:500). Thus, salvation should not be regarded as an “intact world”; rather, salvation means a “healed”, “freed” and “reconciled” world; that is, a world which has gone through the experience of harm in the encounter with the power of sin (Härle 1999:500). Härle points out that the words “healed”, “freed” or “saved” may “say too much”, since harm, sin and evil are still prevalent. In the Christian understanding, it is “just” that the power has been broken (Härle 1999:500).\(^{290}\)

There would remain a misunderstanding, if one concludes that the power of sin would have to be broken only once. Surely, experiences may occur occasionally, which could be circumscribed with what the New Testament calls “salvation”, but it becomes dangerous, if such an experience is evaluated as an end. Rather, it is the beginning; one can speak of a breaking through experience, of a setting off point of a hard, difficult and painful way, on which one encounters sin repeatedly (Härle 1999:501).\(^{291}\) Nevertheless, an important aspect would be missing if one would ignore the principle of hope embedded in the cross, which can be characterised as the resurrection hope (Moltmann, in Louw 2006:6).


\(^{290}\) Luther has expressed this difference with the formula “peccatum regnans” (ruling sin, herrschende Sünde) and “peccatum regnatum” (ruled sin, beherrschte Sünde). (Luther, M. (1521). *Wider den Löwener Theologen Latomus*. WA 8, 94,9f.In: Härle 1999:500).

\(^{291}\) Härle adds that it would be another misunderstanding, if one assumed that the power of sin would become weaker in that way; rather, the opposite is the case. The more deeply a human being is touched by the love of God, the more it hurts him to experience his incapability and unwillingness to love, which is the manifestation of the power of sin. By contrast, the experience of overcoming the power of sin also becomes more intensified (Härle 1999:501).
3.2 Resurrection: the reframing of power

The resurrection of the dead is the central image of hope in the Christian faith. It states in a metaphorical way that the triune God does not hand over the dead to death; instead, God’s creative power overcomes the power of death and makes the dead participate in life and in his glory (Louw 2006; Schwöbel 1994:919). The idea of the resurrection of the dead according to the Christian understanding cannot be separated from the quest for the realization of the salvation of God, which brings justice and life (Schwöbel 1994:919).

The distance of human beings to salvation and their being bounded in sin are expressed in the powerlessness of humans to live life when faced with death. Finally, because of God’s creative power, justice breaks through. This is revealed in God’s love, which even overcomes death, for the one who is lost in alienation. In this sense, the Christian faith can confess truly that, “The righteous shall live by his faith” (Habakkuk 2:4b; cf. Schwöbel 1994:919).

Korthaus asserts that the reflection on the relationship between the cross and resurrection formally belongs at the forefront of a theological interpretation of the death of Jesus on the cross, because the message of the resurrection is initially the precondition for understanding the cross conveying the healing message (Korthaus 2005:373). Korthaus agrees with Dalferth that God’s work in the resurrection constitutively refers to the history of the crucified Jesus of Nazareth, which compels one to refer to the complete assertions of Christology.292

Simultaneously, Korthaus distances himself from the theology of the cross as proposed by Moltmann. He criticizes Moltmann’s understanding of eschatology, because he sees in Moltmann’s interpretation of the resurrection message, the proof of God’s being God in the future, which is characterised by the assistance of human beings. “Wird mit der Auferstehungsbotschaft eine Eschatologie im Moltmannschen Sinne verbunden, in der der Erweis des Gottseins Gottes im Grunde erst in einer Zukunft erwartet wird, an deren Heraufführung der Mensch durch sein Handeln antizipatorisch bereits
The message of resurrection constitutes the word of the cross in such a way that it is understood as the implication of the message of the cross under the presumption that the resurrection is about God’s action in and at the person of the crucified Christ (Korthaus 2005:373). In this understanding, the message of the resurrection does not add something material to the word of the cross; rather, it recovers its actual meaning (Korthaus 2005:373). Consequently, Korthaus sees the locus of the resurrection message as a “preamble” to a *theologia crucis*. The resurrection message neither substitutes a theology of the cross, nor wants to go over it (Korthaus 2005:373).

Hence, in defining the relation between the cross and resurrection, Korthaus regards the resurrection as the act in which God identifies himself with the crucified Jesus. The event on the cross becomes the decisive and unparalleled event of salvation. Through the resurrection, the crucified participates in God’s Kingdom, and the soteriological sufficiency of the event stands in the perspective of the eschatological completion of God's reconciling work in the whole of creation (Korthaus 2005:375).

Therefore, the resurrection can be named the “yes of God towards the crucified one” (G. Ebeling, in Korthaus 2005:375). For Dalferth, the message of the resurrection is “the word of the cross which articulates the same as a reconciling event” (Dalferth, in Korthaus 2005:375).

The question of whether the event is a subjective inner or rather an objective external event is not appropriate because it divides what can only be grasped as an
entity. The resurrection of Jesus did not happen solely as a historical factum to be believed. Rather, Jesus’ resurrection happened in that way so that people’s faith can be evoked (Härle 2000:314). This faith-evoking event happened as the work of God in certain people at a certain time and through the image of the crucified Jesus of Nazareth (Härle 2000:314). Consequently, the belief in resurrection is based on the assurance that God has not left the crucified to the power of death. God has not “forsaken” him; rather, he has recognised his person and work, which means that God has “exalted” him (Phil 2:9).

- **God and humans reconciled**

The God-image portrayed through a theology of the cross transfers clearly the aspect of vulnerability. In terms of a theology of the resurrection, power and victory can be ascribed to God, who raises and exalts the crucified. Louw explains that the cross and the resurrection, connected through pneumatology, reveal even more than God’s power. Simultaneously, “[p]eople who are in a crisis and are exposed to despair, anxiety and guilt, need more than ‘vulnerability’ and a ‘vision about victory’” (Louw 2000:101).

Louw also notes that the actual need of people is the need for continuity and security. With this, Louw refers to what is offered in the Gospel and is expressed in terms of the paradox and mystery of faith, what he calls a “strange

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293 The Gospel tells of the disciples who lacked understanding about the death of Jesus. They were frightened, disappointed and anxious (Mk 8:31; 9:32). For them, it seemed that God had “forsaken” Jesus (Mk 15:29-37; Lk 24:19-21). Shortly after that, the same people related their experience of the resurrected Christ. Their confession is articulated in the formula: “he appeared to” (1 Cor 15:5-8; Mk 16:9-11; Lk 24:34; Act 9:17).

294 From the beginning, determining the time that was associated with the resurrection has proved significant; it was always “the third day” (1 Cor 15:4; Lk 24:21; Mt 16:21, 17, 23; 20:19; Lk 9:22; 18:33; 24:7, 46; cf. Härle 2000:314).

295 “Rising from the dead” (Auferweckung) and “exaltation” (Erhöhung) describe two distinguishable aspects which formally belong together in one event:

- Jesus Christ participates in the life of God, which overcomes the power of death. He is the “firstfruits of those who have fallen asleep” (1 Cor 15:20).
- Jesus Christ has been legitimized and confirmed by God, and so participates in the dignity and glory of God (Rom 1:4; Phil. 2:9; cf. Härle 2000:314).

296 To stress the existential component of pastoral care, Louw remarks that, “The full impact of reformation moves beyond sola fide: the indwelling Spirit expresses Himself in us in hope (spes) and care (caritas) as well” (Louw 2000:99).
ontology” and the work of the Holy Spirit (Louw 2000:101). In the centre of a theology of the cross, and hence, valuable for pastoral theology, is the faithfulness of God. Louw’s view is that, “The how of God in suffering is vulnerability because of his faithfulness: ‘I shall be your God.’ Behind God’s pathos is his faithfulness. His pathos gives rise to a vivid, everlasting hope” (Louw 2000:100).

The core of the proclamation and the work of Jesus is the Kingdom of God as the salvation breakthrough in the world (Härle 2000:602). Nevertheless, that work through which the fallen world shall be saved attains its goal in world history only in a fragmental way (Härle 2000:602). Salvation becomes visible only in parts, and remains threatened by its opposite; hence, “the end” under earthly historical conditions always seems to be open as well as the question of how to end the battle between God and the power of sin (Härle 2000:602). The strangeness of this openendedness is evoked by the fact that God’s Kingdom and the all-determining reality is at stake in this battle. At the same time, God’s will for salvation is expressed in Christian hope. A characteristic of Christian hope is that it is aware that the restrictions (resulting from the finite nature of the world, human freedom and the reality of suffering) will be overcome by God, and that hope remains in the state of being a fragment (Härle 2000:603).

The point is that the realization of something being a fragment already keeps alive the yearning for completion. In this way, in the reception of the temporary, the final is present in the present experience (Härle 2000:603). In this view, according to

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297 Here, Louw refers to the verses in Romans 8:24-25: “For in this hope we were saved. Now hope that is seen is not hope. For who hopes for what he sees? But if we hope for what we do not see, we wait for it with patience.”

298 It is important to keep in mind that eschatology is connected to soteriology (Härle 2000:601); and that eschatological assertions represent the core of all systematic theological reflections (Härle 2000:602).

299 Härle claims that the effect of Jesus’ work in history is restricted in that it reaches only a restricted number of people of whom only few follow the way which is opened up by Jesus. Therefore, it should be noted that Jesus’ work breaks through the power of sin, but does not remove it. Finally, Jesus’ work meets and challenges the resistance of the power of sin (Härle 2000:602).

300 Louw (2000:148) introduces the aspect of time regarding the question of when one would overcome suffering in the form of anxiety, rejection and stigma. He reasons that in terms of eschatology, the concept of “when” is the status of our new being in Christ; it refers to the realm of life
Härle, the need for eschatological assertions becomes obvious. They are necessary because they bring to light the final message of salvation as proclaimed by the Gospel, and at the same time, they identify the present experience of healing as a fragment (Härle 2000:603).

A pastoral context in eschatology deals with the final expectations of human beings; similarly, the HIV and AIDS pandemic offers the stage in which people struggle with hope or anxiety concerning death and dying (Härle 1999:601). At this point, one can connect with Louw’s understanding of eschatology as a basic principle for a pastoral care design. In his view, eschatology links the twin concepts of death and life, and fear and hope with the cross and the resurrection (Rom 6:4; cf. Louw 1998:59). The relation between the cross and resurrection is only then complete, if the resurrection message points to the eschatology of the cross. Resurrection eliminates the sting of death (1 Cor 15:55).

Finally, this polarity opens up two concepts, which are fundamental to a pastoral approach to suffering and the reality of evil, namely God’s identification with suffering and the transformation of suffering by God (Louw 1998:147). Here, one arrives at the most fundamental notion of theology, that is, trust in God (Louw 2000:147). In as much as tragedy and drama are part of human life, the question of theodicy compels human beings to search for meaning. In the words of Louw (2005:155):

> Eschatology makes it impossible to regard sin and human guilt as the primary point of departure for a pastoral anthropology. The point of departure is salvation. This means that in pastoral care human beings should not be addressed in terms of their negative and destructive components (guilt and death), but in terms of grace: the positive and transforming power of eschatology.

The above statement has implications regarding the concept of embodiment (Körper and Leib) in care. Moreover, the (more or less dormant) concept of embodiment as defined by the resurrection of Christ.” The answer and proof of God’s power is the resurrection of Jesus Christ (Louw 2000:149). Louw refers here to Romans 6:4: “We were buried therefore with him by baptism into death, in order that, just as Christ was raised from the dead by the glory of the Father, we too might walk in newness of life.” In this reference, “when” should not be considered as a temporal category but as an existential and ontological category of status and quality (Louw 2000:148).
shifts to the foreground. The (stigmatised or stigmatizing) human being in his or her embodiment attains the status of a means, that is, as far as salvation is concerned; human beings have a calling and do not have a purpose in themselves. The new being in Christ is this calling and the status in which one is aware of this fragmental participation (in one’s embodiment) in the process of salvation because of finiteness in time. Simultaneously, through anticipation of one’s embodiment (the spiritual being; one’s embodiment is the recreation of God in terms of an inhabitational approach), one already participates in the eternity of the Kingdom of God.

- Resurrection and embodiment

In the Reformed concept of sanctification, the process “through which the Holy Spirit applies the implications of the new reality of salvation” (Louw 1998:179) is inherent and points to the everyday life behaviour of human beings. Louw explicates that because the person is sanctified in Christ and in God Himself, who is holy, he or she should become holy in all conduct as well (1 Pet 1:15-16). The sanctification process of the individual as well as of the congregation is the orientation in a moral life (Eph 5:26-27; Col 1:22). Morality should not be understood in terms of moralism. Rather, I would support living an ethical life, and keeping an eye on the spiritual dimension of life by reflecting on true biblical values, norms and virtues. In the opinion of Louw (1998:180), sanctification labels a person as a moral being, who is thus called to respond to salvation (vocation in life).

Louw also refers to the fact that, in a special sense, the human body becomes part of this process of pointing to eschatology. In line with the argument of the thesis, the role of the body is such that, as the temple of the Holy Spirit, it is the locus through and in which God should be inseperably glorified (1 Cor 6:20). Here the argument does not point towards natural theology; instead, a person is viewed from the perspective of the resurrection and eschatology.
Resurrection as a pastoral category

Louw describes stigmatisation as a form of death (rejection), which becomes nullified by the resurrection as a divine act; in so doing, the implementation of a theologia resurrectionis “can act as a theological critique on all forms of human suffering, including the spiritual suffering of punishment, guilt, rejection and stigmatisation” (Louw 2006:1). The resurrection in relation to the cross is a multidimensional concept, which opens up the hermeneutical horizon for a dynamic understanding of God and the discovery of meaning in suffering.

According to Louw, the resurrection is an indication of God’s trustworthiness and the conclusiveness of the Gospel: “And if Christ has not been raised, then our preaching is in vain and your faith is in vain (1 Cor 15:14; cf. Louw 2000:161).” Louw describes resurrection as a pastoral category pointing to growth in faith, to admonition, and to comfort and hope. In order to help understand and interpret suffering from the perspective of the resurrection, he identifies theological indicators which function as important paradigms in a hermeneutics of pastoral care. These are the following notions:

1. **Transformation** - the new reality within the reality of pain and destruction;
2. **Freedom and liberation** - the experience of forgivingness and reconciliation;
3. **Vision, imagination and future** - the motivating and driving force behind anticipation and expectation;
4. **Witness** - the intention to reach out to others in their suffering and pain;
5. **Faithfulness** - the guarantee for trust despite disorientation and disintegration;
6. **Support** - edification within the fellowship (koinonia) of believers;
7. **Comfort** - the courage to be, to endure and to accept; and

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301 Louw (2000:161) further notes that, “The resurrection hope has served as a paranetic principle for those in the Corinthian community who wanted, firstly, to deny the resurrection from the dead; secondly, to spiritualize existence and thus also the body, and thirdly, ultimately degrade creation.”
These indicators are explicated in a biographic example below in which embodiment, from the perspective of eschatology, means becoming whole by going through the paradox of the cross.

In his writing, Ernesto Barros Cardoso describes “[t]he experience of faith in the face of suffering despair, the search for healing and salvation, the expectation of death, [and] the hope of resurrection.” Being affected himself, he describes how he experiences mystery, grace, hope and resurrection which are proclaimed in the Gospel. Cardoso’s reflection expresses comfort in understanding hope, first, as having the courage “to throw oneself into Mystery”, or deliver oneself up to the Mystery. For Louw, it is the courage to be (affirmation), to endure and to accept, which characterises comfort. It is the resurrection hope which enables patience and endurance “without which suffering becomes unbearable” (Louw 2000:165). Comfort, therefore, means not only a word of consolation, but “a new state and condition of being: to suffer in close communion with Christ” (Louw 2000:165)

Further, Cardoso illustrates his identification through his body with the bodies of other people in anonymity and solidarity. He departs from his individual experience “in one body” and “feel[s] one with all bodies that suffer”. Here, Cardoso expresses his identification and being witness with others in their suffering and pain (Louw 2000:161). Cardoso describes his perception of the Kingdom as it is presented in the Gospel, and in signs, gestures, indications and insights, which point

302 Ernesto Barros Cardoso was a member of the WCC’s AIDS consultative group. He died from HIV and AIDS in 1995 (WCC 1997:43).
303 The headline of one of his paragraphs is “Theology from the perspective of the body that suffers and dreams and delivers itself up to the Mystery” (Cardoso 1997:37).
304 “In one body, all bodies. The tired, suffering body of the world, the oppressed and downtrodden body of the poor, the repressed and violated body of so many women, the bodies, without energy and resistance, of boy and girls ... It is impossible not to have the feeling, in spite of the particularity of my experience, of identifying with millions. Yes, we are millions who are infected and affected” (Cardoso 1997:38).
to the “quality of life, the defence of the dignity of life and of people [and] their integrity. [This] can be experienced not as struggle, which must lead to the naming of winners, of new holders of power…” (1997:40). Instead, he describes the challenge of God’s kingdom as one, which is to be faced in “anti-power”, “anti-institution”, the “madness of faith”, and in “hope against all hope”. The people’s challenge is developing sharpened senses to discover revelation, and doing theology as pure sensibility, as an expression of dependence and surrender, and as a response of faithfulness (Cardoso 1997:40). Louw also stresses the notion of faithfulness as the guarantee of trust despite disorientation and disintegration (Louw 2000:161). The hermeneutical process of interpretation orientated at the work of God in Christ conveys a theology of resurrection.

Cardoso further asserts that, “the most profound experience for the sufferer who does not find a reason for suffering… is precisely living a totally new experience based on a change in approach and perspectives, on openness to the newness of the revelation of God. This is something like being born again, being born in the Spirit” (Cardoso 1997:42). In describing the pneumatological event, Cardoso opens up “the new reality within the reality of pain and destruction” in which transformation is taking place (Louw 2000:161).

In other words, from a pastoral perspective, Cardoso asks for embodied actions, a liturgy of symbols, gestures, and silence in order to perceive contact with the Mystery. He uses the words of Job 42:5: “I had heard of you by the hearing of the ear, but now my eye sees you”. Cardoso speaks up for a radical change of perception, of view and of projection. The change should also reach the leadership of the churches, theologians and ministers. Their attitude should help people who are existentially affected such as the HIV and AIDS-traumatized and -stigmatised person “to recover and to re-encounter, from within their pain and their suffering body, the responses and arguments, the inexhaustible spring that helps to make radical changes” (Cardoso 1997:41). Consequently, theology, as well as the pastoral

[305] Italics by Cardoso.
ministry of the church, becomes a direct protest against all forms of human discrimination.

3.3 Wholeness and destigmatisation: the pneumatological perspective

- Presence of the Holy Spirit

Louw (1998:167) points out Paul's modified understanding of the Old Testament נפֶשׁ (nèphèsh) to πνεῦμα (pneuma). By talking of the "spiritual body" - geistlicher Leib - (1 Cor 15:44 σώμα πνευματικόν), Paul refers to the mystic insight on the resurrection. The key to understanding the doctrine of resurrection lies in the formula of Romans 8:11:

*If the Spirit of him who raised Jesus from the dead dwells in you, he who raised Christ Jesus from the dead will also give life to your mortal bodies through his Spirit who dwells in you.*

Romans 8:11 literally clarifies that God gives the Spirit to dwell in human beings and to make them alive. From the verse, Härle claims that to assume, that a substantial essence within the human being would constitute the relation with God, with other human beings and with oneself, is not appropriate. Rather, a relational ontology and anthropology is able to transfer and articulate assertions of Paul’s theology. Härle pleads that the essence of human beings in terms of a structure of relation (Beziehungsführung) or a relational happening (Beziehungsgeschehen) should be taken serious. This structure of relation is constituted by the (creative) relation of God towards the human being (human beings refer to it in their belief or unbelief) and their external relation to the world and other human beings, as well as their internal relation to own identity (Härle 1999:635).

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306 John refers to the Holy Spirit as Paraklet, in Greek ‘counsellor or one who gives comfort’, who would be sent after Jesus’ death (John 16:7).
307 According to Härle, Paul refers to the metaphor of the seed, which provokes the question of how the dissolving and changing mortal body could remain alive and be full of life energy (Härle 1999:635).
The relational ontological approach allows the thinking that although the relations, in which human beings exist, become passive in death, God's constitutive creative relation to the human being remains even beyond death (Härle 1999:635). The Spirit of God as the saving spirit is constitutional for the perfection of the human being in God’s Kingdom (Härle 1999:636). Further, one may question the understanding of God’s Kingdom as the eschatological hope for resurrection and new life, and the present effect of the resurrection on human bodies. Here, it can be suggested that, “If God is the in-betweenness of self and self [relational encounter], the occasion itself is the communion with God” (Nelson 1978:35). In addition, bodily issues become concrete spiritual issues. The Christological understanding of a person’s new being and the pneumatological interaction between God and the human spirit play an important role in a theological anthropology (Louw 1998:167).

● Role of pneumatology in the design of a pastoral anthropology towards destigmatisation

Louw makes the important point that a theological hermeneutics of the cross is linked to the resurrection through pneumatology (Louw 2000:99). Therefore, the cross should be interpreted pneumatologically. He claims that, “The divine dimension of the cross has been disclosed and declared by the Spirit in terms of the resurrection, which is the pneumatological exegesis of the cross: it reveals God’s weakness as power” (Louw 2000:99). Louw recognises that the mystery of the...

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308 The relational understanding of the human being in the theology of Luther requires explanation. In Luther’s understanding, basically, the human being relates to the world (coram mundo) and to God (coram Deo). These relations are constituted by the creative relation of God towards the human being, and towards which the human being (in the world and God-relationship) may correspond to in faith or reject in sin (Schwöbel 1994:920). Schwöbel, in reference to Jüngel and Härle, interprets death as the end of active possibilities of relations, which include the absolute dependence that God maintains in the creative relation with the human being which is beyond death because of the new everlasting life (Schwöbel 1994:920).

309 Naurath also stresses an important point that spirituality should not be abstract but concrete and should have consequences for our earthly life here and now. Hence, she pleads for a departure from solely spiritualistic to body friendly pastoral care. When the human being is approached “only spiritually”, belief remains one dimensional and inconcrete: “Wo der Mensch nur spirituell angesprochen wird, bleibt der Glaube eindimensional und unkonkret. Da die Bibel jedoch von Gotteserfahrungen erzählt, die den ganzen Menschen berühren, hat die Theologie die Pflicht, reduktionistische Tendenzen ihres Menschenbildes aufzudecken und zu verabschieden” (Naurath 2006:236).

310 Louw refers to Romans 8:16, where the link between the human pneumata and the work of the godly pneumata is described (Louw 1998:166).
suffering God and the divine presence in and with death points to a pneumatological event, so that comfort to human beings is also pneumatologically manifested.

Louw further explains that, “God enters into suffering through the Spirit and is in suffering because of the Spirit. The notion of the suffering God is a pneumatological act and reality” (Louw 2000:99). A theology of the cross “becomes a theology of comfort and liberation on the grounds of the reality of the Spirit. In the midst of suffering, the Holy Spirit enables one’s human spirit to appropriate the offer of salvation and to express it in faith, hope and love” (Louw 2000:99). With a theology of the cross, pastoral care can reach out to people who are suffering. At the same time, it is the work of the Holy Spirit to concretize the presence of God and to actualize salvation (Louw 2005:120).

Referring to destigmatisation within the HIV and AIDS pandemic from a pastoral and faith perspective, the transformation of prejudices in terms of stigma goes with the transformation of the person. Volition and thoughts are transformed and the person can experience new life every day.311 In 1 Corinthians 2:11-12, Paul asserts that people realise what God has given them through grace in pneuma. From the viewpoint of pneumatology, the new person’s potential is called charisma, that is, the received potential (Louw 1998:173). The new person then can approach life from a spiritual perspective as represented in Christ’s person and Spirit. In a new focus on God, this transformation imparts new meaning to the human spirit and makes humans dependent on (or empowers them in terms of) the transcendental dimension of their Christian life (Louw 1998:167). In this process the HIV and AIDS-related stigma looses its power and painful “sting”.

In 1 Cor 6:19-20, Paul clarifies the meaning of the human body in the metaphor of the temple:

311 Hereby I refer to both, the person who formerly stigmatised another and the person who was the former recipient of the “stigma”.
Or do you not know that your body is a temple of the Holy Spirit within you, whom you have from God? You are not your own, for you were bought with a price. So glorify God in your body.

Subsequently, one can agree with Louw (1998:172) thus:

Christ lives in a person through the Holy Spirit (inhabitatio Spiritus). So radical is this in-dwelling presence of Christ that [likewise] human sexuality and physicality have a special place in God’s revelation: the body becomes a temple of the Holy Spirit (1 Cor 6:19), and the new person is commanded to honour God in his/her body (1 Cor 6:20).

Louw also asserts that the function of pneumatology is “to concretize this new life in and through daily behaviour and conduct” (Louw 1998:169). In this understanding, being human is the most concrete bodily expression and possibility for glorifying and honouring God. Nevertheless, in a theological anthropology, the abilities of a person should be viewed with regard to the work of the Holy Spirit and human potential viewed from the perspective of faith (Louw 1998:169).

However, in terms of Christology, resurrection transforms life into the new mode of the fruit (charisma) of the Spirit (pneumatology). In this way, God’s recreation promotes human dignity, justice and the reconciliation in the Kingdom of God. Thus, the body becomes the means “to glorify God”. Paul explains in the same context that it is about the right use or the appropriate being with and in the body.

To sum up, it can be assumed that in terms of pneumatology, the purpose is to develop our being qualities in the presence of God; humanity is interpreted as charisma, which is followed by a positive confirmation of our being functions (Louw 1998:173). Louw explains that the Holy Spirit addresses people in their inner being - the soul. In this sense, the human pneuma can be described as “a point of connectedness or point of mediation for continual spiritual growth and the

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312 Cf. the concept of attitude (habitus) in Chapter One.
313 That Jesus was much concerned for the temple shows in the narrative of Jesus and the money changers (Jesus und die Tempelreinigung) in the Synoptic Gospels and in John (Mk 11:15-19; 11:27-33; Mt 21:12-17; 21:23-27; Lk 19:45-48; 20:1-8; Jhn 2:12-25). His actions are remarkable - he was angry and aggressive and quoted from the book of Isaiah (56:7): “For my house shall be called a house of prayer for all peoples”; and from Jeremiah 7:11: “Has this house, which is called by my name, become a den of robbers in your eyes?”
development of Christian faith” (Louw 1998:167). This pneumatological point of contact is important, according to Louw, since it indicates that the continuity between the earthly and the eschatological life is not situated in inner psychic abilities, but only in the faithfulness of God and in his transforming actions through the renewing power of the Holy Spirit. The Spirit in our hearts acts as the security deposit and guarantee (cf. 2 Cor 1:22).

Louw (1998:167) disagrees with K. Barth and concludes that pneuma is the centre of a Christian understanding of personality. According to Barth, the human pneuma is the impact of God upon creation or God’s movement to human beings (Barth, in Louw 1998:167). However, for Louw (1998:168), “[t]he pneuma of the new person endowes the psuché/ sarx/ soma with an eschatological identity: one now lives from God’s grace and promises”.

One can state that the cross (and therefore Christology) is an ontic principle, which indicates our new status as new beings in Christ and creates fellowship between God and human beings. In this concern, Louw adds, that this solidarity (between God and human beings) in both the Christological-soteriological as well as the theological-pneumatological dimension should be acknowledged. The divine presence in terms of God’s being with us, which finds expression in the suffering God in a theology of the cross, needs to be acknowledged first (Louw 2003). The “resurrection paradigm” as a consequence and precondition of the cross at the same time, therefore, opens up a new category in life.\textsuperscript{314} Life attains sacramental and symbolic meaning. Just as the pastoral encounter should be interpreted metaphorically, the totality of real existence becomes an embodiment of God’s grace, in which we are gifted and challenged to overcome stigma and stigmatisation in a constructive way (Louw 1999:119).

\textsuperscript{314} The Gospel proclaims that through the Holy Spirit life becomes a transformative category (Louw 1999:119).
Louw concludes that only in the concept of pneumatology do human beings attain their healed and transformed *humanum*, which is the gift of the Spirit (Louw 1998:171). Whereas in Christology, salvation is the object of faith, in pneumatology, human embodiment (the totality of a person; body, soul and spirit) is the object of salvation (Louw 1998:171). In Christology, Christ becomes human (*incarnation verbi*), and in pneumatology, Christ becomes a person’s Saviour, as Paul explains: ‘But by the grace of God I am what I am’ (1 Cor 15:10). Thus, the Spirit of God as the reconciling spirit is constitutional for the recreation of human beings as children and heirs of God (Gal 4:17; Rom 8:12-17).

- **Structural healing as becoming whole - the resurrecting body**

According to Louw, another helpful aspect of the notion of healing offers systemic theory and a *Gestalt* approach to *healing of space and relationships*. Since “HIV has become a structural and systemic pandemic” (Louw 2006:334) the issue should be addressed as such in a consequent way, rather than being mistaken for a problem “in terms of personal morality and behavioural changes”. In this way, Louw (2006:334) concludes that when confronting the HIV and AIDS pandemic, the emphasis should be on the change of community structures.

Louw uses the term *Gestalt* for the notion of space and position taken from systemic thinking. In terms of a systemic approach, “[l]ife is viewed as an event of ongoing *Gestalts* [*Gestaltung*] which continually form, reach completion and recede for the next emerging Gestalt” (Louw 2005:26). Regarding space, Louw refers to it as “the quality of atmosphere within an encounter due to attitude, aptitude and reciprocal influence” (Louw 2004:26). Space implies the dynamic occurrences in life

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315 Louw remarks that where two or more people encounter one another within a spirit of availability, acceptance (unconditional love) and appreciative awareness, a space of intimacy occurs... Within the space of intimacy (belonging), meaning is discovered. The bipolarities and positions within this space designate the mechanics of the human soul” (Louw 2005:27).


317 For Louw (2005:26), “Attitude and aptitude create an atmosphere which can either separate (push away, detachment, [rejection, death]) or draw nearer (attract, attachment, [acceptance, love])”.

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(happenstances of life) through which life becomes a dynamic organism of encounter. Furthermore, the characteristics of a Gestalt perspective are the transpersonal area, the processes of networking, the place of space and the dynamics of positioning (Louw 2004:26). Here, one can regard the notion of soul as an emergent property of the whole system (Watts 2002, in Louw 2005:22).

The outlined structures reflect the extent to which the character of society is a subject of ethics, which is based on the social interaction of each individual according to specific principles. In order to apply Gestalt in the society, actions cannot avoid interaction rules. In Herms’ view, interaction rules are the only moment in the process of Gestaltung in which each member of the society has an influence according to his choice action. Interaction rules (i.e. in terms of norms and values) are the only point where the process of Gestaltung can be influenced (Herms 1991: xviii). The meaning of social structures becomes clearer when we recognise the place of any encounter, more specifically, the social setting. In terms of a pastoral hermeneutic, any encounter is directly or indirectly an embodied encounter.

Likewise, an understanding of African spirituality points to the understanding of life, in which the dynamics are more communal than individualised. The human body in African thinking is seen as a living organism that serves relationships. Understanding of the body refers to “the instrument by which human beings relate to others” (Byamungu 2002, in Louw 2005:23). In an African context of spirituality, one may add the idea of the principle of ubuntu, which states that a human being is only a person through others (Louw 2005:23). The space created by soulfulness represents the warmth of God. Within the Christian church and congregation, this space is called koinonia or the σῶμα Χριστοῦ. Louw (2005:22) asserts that a theological understanding of space refers to the intimacy of covenantal and sacrificial love and

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solitary relations. He therefore denotes the quality of Gestalt and space as the opposite of discrimination and stigmatisation.

The point here concerns the resurrection as a life category in the here and now. Resurrection as recreation is a process that finds expression in the relations of life (space and position/Gestalt). This process is characterised by trust in God’s faithfulness despite the happenstances of life. It shows that life should be lived in terms of the hope of resurrection hope as a totally new and sanctified recreation through God’s Spirit:

And he died for all, that those who live might no longer live for themselves but for him who for their sake died and was raised. From now on, therefore, we regard no one according to the flesh. Even though we once regarded Christ according to the flesh, we regard him thus no longer. Therefore, if anyone is in Christ, he is a new creation. The old has passed away; behold, the new has come (2 Cor 5:15-17).

In inhabitation, the process of destigmatisation of the human being takes place, that means becomes embodied. Becoming whole from a pastoral and a faith perspective of the HIV and AIDS pandemic implies that the transformation of prejudices in terms of stigma is consistent with the transformation of the person. Embodiment becomes the means and occasion “to glorify God”. Paul explains in the same context that, it is about the right use, the appropriate being with and in the body.

In conclusion, one can say that the meaning dimension points to the purpose of developing our being qualities in the presence of God; humanity is interpreted as charisma, which is followed by a positive confirmation of our being functions. The reality of the HIV and AIDS related stigma and stigmatisation is inherent in “the cross”. The pneumatic event determines the new relation of recreation in terms of embodiment/attitude. The Holy Spirit addresses people in their inner being, which is otherwise called the “soul.” Therefore, God’s recreation promotes human dignity, justice and the reconciliation in the Kingdom of God and destigmatisation in terms of “the resurrection” takes place.
HIV and AIDS related stigma and stigmatisation in the HIV and AIDS pandemic becomes the motivation for developing our being qualities, to live the gift of embodiment (charisma). In this sense, the whole human – including the body in the sense of corporeality - as the temple of the Holy Spirit, can be found as the locus of connectedness and mediation of continual spiritual growth and development of the Christian faith.

A pastoral understanding of wholeness can contribute to destigmatisation within the HIV and AIDS pandemic because the whole human being is perceived as a spiritual being. Spirituality is then immanent in everyday life; everyday life conduct becomes a matter of spirituality. The beauty and aesthetics of life is the actual focal point in such an approach towards life. It is in this understanding of life that “God enters into suffering through the Spirit and is in suffering because of the Spirit. The notion of the suffering God is a pneumatological act and reality” (Louw 2000:99). “The divine dimension of the cross has been disclosed and declared by the Spirit in terms of the resurrection, which is the pneumatological exegesis of the cross: it reveals God’s weakness as power” (Louw 2000:99). The resurrection power in terms of the Spirit is the category of life for Christians, in which destigmatisation takes place. In terms of Christology, resurrection transforms life into the new mode of the fruit (charisma) of the Spirit (pneumatology). Referring to destigmatisation within the HIV and AIDS pandemic from a pastoral and faith perspective, the transformation of prejudices in terms of stigma goes with the transformation of the person. Volition and thoughts are transformed and the person can experience new life every day.\textsuperscript{320} Like Paul states in 1 Cor 2:11-12, people realise what God has given them through grace in pneuma.

Louw also asserts that the function of pneumatology is “to concretize this new life in and through daily behaviour and conduct” (Louw 1998:169).\textsuperscript{321} In this understanding, being human is the most concrete bodily expression and possibility for glorifying and honouring God. Nevertheless, in a theological anthropology, the abilities of a person

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\item\textsuperscript{320} Hereby, I refer to both the person who formerly stigmatised another and the person who was the former recipient of the “stigma”.
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should be viewed with regard to the work of the Holy Spirit and human potential viewed from the perspective of faith (Louw 1998:169).
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

Regarding pastoral anthropology, Chapter One has investigated a working definition of stigma and what constitutes stigma in the HIV and AIDS pandemic. In this study, stigmatisation is understood as the phenomenon in which an individual or a group of individuals consciously or unconsciously define another individual or a group as different and consequently exclude and reject the other.

It has been shown that stigma may be attached to social status (material wealth), sexual orientation, sharing certain characteristics with other people such as being physically disabled, being of a specific ethnic background, or being infected with a specific virus, which is enough to be a sign or a mark referring to bodily expression. The understanding of a stigma as schemata of interpretation and the connection between stigma and power has been identified as main features of stigma; likewise, a definition of stigma involves reference to societal power differences. One of the fatal effects of stigmatisation is that generalisations about the person lead to a definition of the person in terms of the stigma in all social relations. The threat is that stigma then becomes a "master status", which, like no other feature of the person, determines the place in society and the social intercourse with other human beings (Hohmeier 1975:8).

I have further argued that processes of stigmatisation are verbal or non-verbal behaviour, based on an ascribed stigma (social prejudice) that is brought upon an individual or a group (Hohmeier 1975:7). The paradigm of stigma has been identified as a way of behaviour that judges people downwards, who are perceived as deviant. In the form of a judgemental attitude, a stigmatizing addressee departs from his or her own body-soul constitution, which is qualitatively determined by stigmatisation and discrimination. Stigmatisation is a more or less subtle violence and aims at the body-soul constitution of the stigmatised recipient.
Moreover, I have given an interpretation in relation to the concept of “attitudes normals have towards a person with a stigma” (Goffman 1990:15). One can speak of expectations or a stigmatizing attitude that people hold towards the stigmatised. From a sociological perspective, attitude is the “affective-judgemental expression” towards the object of attitude (Abele & Nowack 1975:146), while in a pastoral context, “attitude” (aptitude, *habitus*, position) indicates a mode of being, and is a qualitative concept related to meaning and the reality of soul and its networking (Louw 2004:11).

Attitude finds orientation in norms and values. The pastoral challenge that could ensue is in establishing the norm of the will of God. Thus, *destigmatisation* would presume an overhaul of our normative systems. (In this understanding, any expectation would be geared towards God’s recreating power as expressed in Chapter Four by the indicators of: (1) Transformation - the new reality within the reality of pain and destruction; (2) freedom and liberation - the experience of forgivingness and reconciliation; (3) vision, imagination and future - the motivating and driving force behind anticipation and expectation; (4) witness - the intention to reach out to others in their suffering and pain; (5) faithfulness - the guarantee for trust despite disorientation and disintegration; (6) support - edification within the fellowship (koinonia) of believers; (7) comfort - the courage to be, to endure and to accept; and (8) Truth (Louw 2000:161-167).

Chapter Two of this study has examined stigma and stigmatisation within the context of the HIV and AIDS pandemic. In discussing HIV and AIDS-related stigma and its association with the degradation of the human body in pastoral theology, I have probed the notion of sin (hamartiology) and its impact on theological anthropology. The discussion focussed on the question of how sin is interpreted by pastoral anthropology in the context of the HIV and AIDS pandemic. Here, I have outlined the complexity of HIV and AIDS-related stigma and stigmatisation, the use of HIV and AIDS-related language and metaphors and especially that the paradoxical
connection between “life creating sexuality” and the “threat of death” provides a strong base for stigma and stigmatisation.\textsuperscript{322}

My argument has been that it is necessary to refer appropriately to the notion of sin, which means neither to deny it nor to overemphasise it. The pastoral ethical dimension has been discussed in terms of sexual ethical aspects, God-image, responsibility and the aspect of shame. From an ethical perspective, stigmatisation is a relational process, in which judgment and prejudice are the determining factors. In theological language and in connection with the notion of sin, the connotation in the case of HIV and AIDS related stigma is one of moral blemish. Destruction of human relationships is a sin far greater than the so-called misdeeds for which persons, who are trying to live positively with HIV and AIDS, are blamed.

In Chapter Three, the focus has been on corporeality and embodiment in theology and philosophy. I have given a historical introspection of the theological and philosophical discussion of body concepts considering those paradigms which may have contributed to the degradation of the human body in philosophical and theological history. Further, I have referred to the current gender debate in order to clarify that the human body, in history and at present, is the “battlefield” in which discursively and practically a fight expressed in an ongoing tendency to dualism takes place. I would argue that dualism is essentially a quality in itself, which can be regarded as an anthropological constant, since it has been prevalent throughout history.

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\textsuperscript{322} Here, I refer to already mentioned sources and functions of an HIV and AIDS related, stigmatizing attitude. The first source of attitude results in an “instrumental HIV and AIDS-related stigma”, which can be interpreted as grounded in fear. The second source of attitude results in the “symbolic HIV and AIDS-related stigma”, which can be associated as based on certain norms and values.
\end{footnotesize}
Even in the theology of Paul, it cannot be denied totally. Expressions such as “degradation”, “discrimination” and “stigmatisation” represent what we can call the “alienation of human embodiment”. Subsequently, I have proposed a pastoral anthropological reflection of embodiment based on a biblical but holistic understanding of the human being. In this regard, I have referred to a practical theological design (Louw 2005; 2007) that argues for the re-assessment of the human body in pastoral theology and care.

I have dealt with the main challenge of a theological reflection in terms of a pastoral hermeneutics in Chapter Four. The aim was to interpret previous scholarly discussions on the notion of stigma and embodiment in the light of Scripture. In terms of a pastoral hermeneutics, the pneumatic notion of destigmatisation describes a new stance and life attitude (human embodiment) that are marked and gifted by the eschatological dimension of the cross and resurrection.

Stigmatisation itself has been identified as sin against the Creator God, creation and the human self. One argument is that because being human means being corporeal, its denial would be a denial of creation, which is a gift of God. Thus, the theological argument for the re-assessment of the human body and the wholesomeness of the human being stands against the notion of stigmatisation. The identification of the human body as the object of stigmatisation in the pandemic, which is an expression of woundedness and alienation, requires healing and reconciliation. It is only through God’s gift, one’s incarnated embodiment in inhabitation of the Spirit in the human being, that being human can become a means “to glorify God”, a means through which life attains new meaning despite the contextual reality of suffering.

323 Despite the warning against reading Paul and the New Testament dualistically (Naurath 2006:21; Nelson 1978:50), dualistic tendencies in our interpretations are there, where there is differentiation between the body as Leib ωσμα, the bodily existence (leiblich), and the material conditions of the physical life, the flesh ωμξ (Janssen 2005:44).
Just as human embodiment is about the right use, and the appropriate being with and in the body, it is also simultaneously about the aesthetics of life (on which the thesis has fallen short to describe). Reconciliation with ourselves, with others and with God and our God images is necessary. In other words, the first step is to recognise ourselves as integral persons living integral lives, which includes sexuality and vulnerability etc.. This acceptance reveals the beauty or aesthetics of life. The passion of the cross entails both love and suffering, at the same time, and while this world is characterised by finitude, resurrection may mean being raised from death (or from sin as estrangement in the form of isolation and rejection). Therefore, this understanding characterises an eschatological approach. An eschatological approach for dealing with the pandemic in a constructive and meaningful way is what Louw refers to as “AIDS competence” (Louw 2006:1). The hermeneutical process of interpretation becomes an important tool in the pandemic.

Becoming whole (in terms of the resurrection and pneumatology) in the HIV and AIDS pandemic means that the transformation of prejudices concerning stigma goes hand-in-hand with the transformation of the person, the mind-set and paradigms. People must become whole within themselves and acknowledge their own bodies and the bodies of the other with dignity. They need to grasp the meaning, task, challenge, and opportunity of being equipped with a body and living an embodied life. In being a “tool”, one finds meaning, and may discover the beauty in life despite suffering.

If pastoral care, cura animarum, is perceived as cura vitae (Louw 2007), then an approach to pastoral anthropology (being-in-relation) has to take into account the need for structural healing regarding the notion of HIV and AIDS and its related stigma and stigmatisation. In terms of a pastoral anthropology, then, being embodied becomes the occasion for the pneumatological event. In the change of attitude arises the change and the realistic hope of the transformation of the stigma to charisma; that which formerly has been characterised by the language of violence then

Here it can refer to the human body and the Body of Christ (koinonia).
becomes an embodied word of love in a changed response. The main challenge in a pastoral context is the radical aspect of healing and salvation that is revealed by the Gospel, as well as to understand and interpret human existence within real life contexts and relationships.\textsuperscript{325} After all, the paradigm for a pastoral approach in the HIV and AIDS context should emphasise the resurrection category as the central life-giving message of the Gospel, which is about faithfulness, its promise and hope.

This study in the field of pastoral anthropology has primarily introduced the problematic questions of HIV and AIDS-related stigmatisation and destigmatisation. It has, on the one hand, shown the need to reflect critically on pastoral responses and the theological paradigm behind. In terms of a pastoral hermeneutic, the paradigm behind processes of HIV and AIDS related stigmatisation has been identified by norms and values that miss the biblical understanding of the human being in relation to God, embodying grace and faithfulness. On the other hand, destigmatisation can be identified as process and event, action and hope, the potential of the Christian message, which is about acceptance and being with the other, in the one body of Christ, now and then.

Further, the research has opened up new questions for me that go beyond the framework of the thesis, such as to have a closer look at body concepts, as well as concepts that shed light on the meaning of (embodied) awareness. The issue, therefore, would be whether such approaches could have a sustaining effect on the development of being qualities (Louw 2000). An underlying factor here is the assumption that a truly conscious perception of the human body on an experiential level is necessary for the development of being qualities which contribute to the process (of destigmatisation) of human beings becoming embodied words of love.

\textsuperscript{325} Louw notes that the challenge is essentially a hermeneutical one (2005:1).
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