Attitudes towards Gender Equality and the Representation of Women in Parliament: A Comparative Study of South Africa, Uganda and Zimbabwe

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DECLARATION

By submitting this thesis electronically, I declare that the entirety of the work contained therein is my own, original work, that I am the owner of the copyright thereof (unless to the extent explicitly otherwise stated) and that I have not previously in its entirety or in part submitted it for obtaining any qualification.

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ABSTRACT

Although gender equality is evident in many spheres in African countries, the entry of women into political institutions has often been described as slow and unequal. In sub-Saharan African countries this trend is particularly associated with social, cultural and historical barriers within political spheres that hinder gender equality in political leadership and an equal representation of women in parliament. The issues of gender equality and the representation of women in parliament have long been hotly contested debates on the continent and in sub-Saharan African countries more specifically, largely as a result of different cultural heritages and countries’ being poised at varying phases within the democratic consolidation process.

It is necessary to evaluate attitudes towards gender equality in order to determine whether a populace embraces the principles of gender equality. Of equal significance is the evaluation of the percentage of women represented in parliament as an important indicator of whether gender equality is perceived by the populace to be an important principle in practice.

In order to gauge the levels of gender equality and the representation of women in parliament in sub-Saharan Africa, this study evaluates attitudes towards gender equality and a number of its dimensions, namely women in leadership positions, equal education and the economic independence of women; it also investigates the representation of women in parliament by examining the actual numbers of women representatives in parliament in South Africa, Uganda and Zimbabwe. This in an attempt to determine whether there is a link – either directly or indirectly – between attitudes towards gender equality and the number of women represented in parliament.

For comparative purposes the attitudinal patterns and trends towards gender equality, as measured in the World Values Survey 2001, are evaluated amongst respondents in South Africa, Uganda and Zimbabwe. This study also identifies four independent variables, namely gender, level of education, residential status (urban vs. rural) and age in an attempt to explain some of the differences in attitudes towards gender equality between the three samples.
The main findings include, amongst others, that: the South African sample has by and large the most positive attitudes towards gender equality in comparison to its Ugandan and Zimbabwean counterparts; and that a higher percentage of women are represented in the South African parliament in contrast to Uganda and Zimbabwe. The independent variables prove to be fairly good predictors of the varying attitudes towards gender equality across the three samples. This study concludes that in sub-Saharan Africa positive attitudes towards gender equality can indeed be linked to a higher percentage of women represented in parliament; however, the inverse – that negative attitudes towards gender equality can be linked to low percentages of women represented in parliament – is not substantiated.
**OPSOMMING**

Alhoewel geslagsgelykheid sigbaar is in baie sfere in Afrika lande word die toegang van vroue tot politieke instellings dikwels beskryf as stadig en ongelyk. In sub–Sahara Afrika-lande word hierdie neiging in besonder geassosieer met sosiale, kulturele en historiese hindernisse binne politieke instellings wat geslagsgelykheid in politieke leierskap en gelyke verteenwoordiging van vroue in die parlement belemmer. Die kwessie rondom geslagsgelykheid en die verteenwoordiging van vroue in die parlement is ’n sterk debat op die Afrika kontinent en meer spesifiek in sub-Sahara Afrika-lande, hoofsaaklik as gevolg van verskillende kulturele tradisies en verskille in die fases van demokratisering.

Dit is nodig om die houdings ten opsigte van geslagsgelykheid te evalueer om te bepaal of ’n bevolking die beginsels van geslagsgelykheid aanvaar. Hiermee saam is die evaluering van die persentasie van vroue verteenwoordiging in die parlement ’n belangrik aanwyser van die feit dat geslagsgelykheid deur die bevolking as ’n belangrike beginsel beskou word.

Ten einde die vlakke van geslagsgelykheid en die verteenwoordiging van vroue in die parlemente in sub-Sahara Afrika te meet, bespreek hierdie studie die houdings teenoor geslagsgelykheid en ’n aantal van sy dimensies, naamlik vroue in leierskap posisies, gelyke opvoeding en die ekonomiese onafhanklikheid van vroue. Dit bestudeer ook die vroue verteenwoordiging in die parlemente in Suid-Afrika, Uganda en Zimbabwe. Hierdie studie poog verder om te bepaal of daar ’n verbintenis - direk of indirek - bestaan tussen die houdings teenoor geslagsgelykheid en die aantal vroue verteenwoordigers in die parlemente van die lande onder bespreking.

Die studie se doel is om vas te stel of positiewe houdings teenoor geslagsgelykheid verbind kan word met ’n hoër persentasie van vroulike verteenwoordigers in die parlement. Vir vergelykende doeleindes, is die houdingspatrone en neigings teenoor geslagsgelykheid, soos gemeet in die die Wêreld Waardes Opname, ondersoek tussen die respondente in Suid-Afrika, Uganda en Zimbabwe. Die studie identificeer ook vier onafhanklike veranderlikes, naamlik geslag, opvoedingvlak, woongebied (stedelik vs platteland) asook ouderdom, in ’n poging om sommige van die verskille in houdings teenoor geslagsgelykheid tussen die drie lande te verduidelik.
Die vermaamste bevindings sluit onder meer in dat: Suid-Afrika by verre die sterkste positiewe houdings teenoor geslagsgelykheid het in vergelyking met Uganda en Zimbabwe; en, dat daar ’n hoër persentasie van vroue verteenwoordiging in die Suid-Afrikaanse parlement is, in vergelyking met Uganda en Zimbabwe. Die onafhanlike veranderlikes blyk redelike goeie voorspellers te wees van die verskille in houdings teenoor geslagsykheid regoor die drie lande. Die studie kom tot gevolgtrekking dat binne hierdie drie lande, positiewe houdings teenoor geslagsgelykheid verbind kan word met ’n hoër persentasie van verteenwoordiging van vroue in die parlement, maar dat die teenoorgestelde - dat negatiewe houdings teenoor geslagsgelykheid verbind kan word met ’n laer persentasie van verteenwoordiging van vroue in parlement – nie ondersteuning in die data kry nie.
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Chapter One: Introduction and Outline of the Study

“...equality of access to positions of power and decision-making is a matter of fundamental human rights, and a pre-requisite to democracy.”


1.1 Introduction

Many factors have contributed to the lack of gender equality in political leadership and representation in politics; these include, amongst others, the institutional context of electoral systems and structural barriers (Inglehart, Norris and Welzel, 2004:2). Although gender equality is evident in many spheres, the barriers to the entry of women in political institutions persist. Norris and Inglehart (2001:126) note that women’s active participation at all levels in politics has been discernible over the past decades, especially at grassroots, national and international levels for entering and competing for government agencies and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Participation at this level has been facilitated in an effort to enable the integration of agendas such as those for equality, development and peace into national programmes of action (Norris and Inglehart, 2001:126-127).

Apart from the general attitude that people have towards gender equality, another possible reason for women and men’s failed efforts at fostering gender equality can be linked to the attitudes and perceptions that African people have with regards to the role of women in politics. Inglehart and Norris (2003:135) are of the opinion that the attitudes towards women as political leaders are a key component that limits women’s empowerment. The World Values Survey1 measures the degree of gender equality in political leadership by asking respondents whether they agreed or disagreed (on a 4-point scale) with the statement: “On the whole, men make better political leaders than women do”. A comparative study using WVS data by Inglehart, Norris and Welzel (2004:4) concluded that some countries have positive responses toward the political leadership of women, whilst others were fairly or very negative. This study aims to determine whether there is a link between the attitudes towards gender equality in South Africa, Uganda and Zimbabwe and the representation of women in these respective parliaments. By extension, this study will also explore possible factors that

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1 The World Values Survey is conducted in over 50 countries, and is invaluable for research in the field of mass public attitudes and values (Lombard, 2003:1).
might limit gender equality in parliament. To this extent, institutional aspects such as electoral systems will be used as explanatory variables.

A comparative study between South Africa, Uganda and Zimbabwe, all of which are at different stages of their democratisation process and likely to have varying attitudes towards gender equality, will allow us to make inferences about the progress of gender equality and the representation of women in parliament in sub-Saharan Africa. The primary reason that these countries were chosen for comparison is because the WVS was conducted in each of the countries in 2001 by Markinor, which meant that I had access to these datasets which are available to the Centre for International and Comparative Politics (CICP), Stellenbosch University. I will use the model of descriptive representation as a means to determine whether a country that has a great deal of support for gender equality also has a proportionate percentage of women represented in parliament. The model of descriptive representation prescribes that groups who constitute the majority of a society, such as women, must be represented in the same proportional number to men in democratic practices (Rosenthal, 1995:601; Hassim, 2003:84).

In order to determine whether there is a link between the attitudes towards gender equality and the representation of women in parliament, data from the 2001 wave of the World Values Survey in the three respective countries are utilised for comparison. Although a longitudinal analysis to establish whether growth in positive attitudes toward gender equality also leads to growth in the representation of women in parliament would be beneficial, no longitudinal data are available in the case of Uganda and Zimbabwe; therefore, the study undertakes a cross-sectional analysis between the three countries in 2001.

This chapter introduces the argument for gender equality and democracy, and provides an overview of gender equality and the representation of women in an

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2 The WVS is conducted in South Africa by the CICP in partnership with Markinor. This will be discussed in Chapter Three.

3 This question differs from another body of research that offers a direction of causality which assumes that higher representation of women in parliament leads to positive attitudes in gender equality (See Norris and Inglehart, 2001:1; Kenworthy and Malami, 1999:235; Kunovich and Paxton, 2005:87, Gouws, 2006:4).
international and African context, before taking a closer look at the situation in South Africa, Uganda and Zimbabwe.

1.2 Literature Review

1.2.1 Gender Equality and Democracy

Before the 19th century women did not even have the basic right to vote in elections as a result of the socialisation of societies in previous centuries which regarded men as superior to women. The 20th century, however, has seen gender equality being placed as an important issue on the global agenda (Carli and Eagly, 2001:629).

In late the 20th century the United Nation’s Decade for Women focused on women’s development through the formation of thousands of women’s organisations and networking worldwide (Inglehart and Norris, 2003:3). Although the 20th century was the starting point for women’s integration into decision-making structures, it seems that representation of women in politics in particular remains limited (Carli and Eagly, 2001:629).

It is important to examine attitudes towards gender equality and democracy in order to understand the level of gender equality in a given country. According to Norris and Inglehart (2001:1), a fundamental problem in the worldwide failure of democracy is the lack of gender equality in political leadership. The widespread belief that “men make better political leaders than women,” as noted earlier in this chapter, is a key stumbling block to achieving gender equality in the political sphere, despite a slight reprieve in advanced industrial societies. The World Values Surveys illustrate that in developing countries the majority of the population still supports the idea that “men make better political leaders than women”, whereas industrialised countries are more likely to reject this notion (Inglehart, Norris and Welzel, 2004:6).

Does the belief that men make better political leaders than women have political consequences? Studies have shown that in countries where the majority of the population rejects the belief mentioned above, there are a higher percentage of women represented in parliament (Inglehart, Norris and Welzel, 2004:6). This means that cultural norms such as patriarchy and customary laws, including the attitudes and
beliefs of people, have a greater impact on the percentage of women in parliament than democratic institutions do (Inglehart, Norris and Welzel, 2004:6).

Although the representation of women in parliament is an integral part of this study, there are other reasons – apart from the argument that the composition of parliament should reflect that of the populace – why women are needed in parliament. Lovenduski and Karam (2000:152) argue that women representatives make a difference in parliament because they act in women’s interests. These authors also argue that there is some evidence that the “presence of female decision-makers greatly influences the outcome of issues debated” (Lovenduski and Karam 2000:152). However, all women are not alike and whether women’s interests are universally the same is questionable. In African countries women MPs have not been vigorous in their efforts to formulate a range of women’s issues as priorities for the national agenda (Hassim, 1999:13). Karam (1998:21) is of the opinion that women in parliament can definitely influence political agendas and policies. Govender (1997), as quoted by Karam (1998:44), notes that “with more women in politics, the gun culture will be eliminated from the political agendas and certain ideals such as politics as a service to humanity and creating a qualitative difference will be reinstated”.

According to Siemienski (2004:437), attitudes toward gender equality may vary widely amongst different groups within countries. She argues that inequality and social and cultural barriers are more evidently problems confronting women than men. This may be a reflection of men and women’s different interpretations of gender differences. Siemienski (2004:437) observes that men perceive women as lacking the necessary skills and preparation for leadership positions, whereas women argue they are not being integrated into leadership structures but rather professionally isolated.

A society’s culture is arguably one of the key determinants of the level of representation, or at least the likelihood of this, of women in parliament. Reynolds (1999:549) argues that religion is the most important element to predict levels of female representation. This argument is supported by a study that found gender equality to be highly influenced by a society’s cultural heritage (Siemienski, 2004:429). In most African societies, the social system of patriarchy, along with religion, can play an important role in the levels of female representation, as women
have to fight harder to combat men’s superior rule over women. Another study, by Inglehart, Norris and Welzel (2004:8), shows that when the public belief that “men make better political leaders than women” is tested against religious traditions, the “public endorse the norms of gender equality, both in the society’s religious tradition and public attitudes and beliefs toward gender equality”. This may have a powerful effect on the percentage of women in parliament.

Some studied have also found that the more democratic national institutions are, the higher the percentage of women in parliament (Lowe Morna, 2004:15). The Freedom House (2008) ratings of political rights and civil liberties seem to differ and the conclusion is that a society’s level of democracy does not have statistical significance for the percentage of women in parliament. In the end cultural changes seem to play a greater role in the rising trends of female representation in parliament regardless of democratisation (Inglehart, Norris and Welzel 2004:9). Therefore, this study focuses on cultural changes which include the attitudes and beliefs of citizens in South Africa, Uganda and Zimbabwe towards gender equality; instead of just examining their democratic systems of governance.

For the purpose of this study, linking attitudes towards gender equality to the representation of women is a crucial element of the descriptive representation of women. According to Rosenthal (1995:601), women constitute the greater part of most societies; therefore, “if half of the majority does not have full political rights, the society is not democratic” (Inglehart, Norris and Welzel, 2004:2). Inglehart and Norris (2004:3) are of the opinion that equal representation in decision-making is an important necessity in democracy. The representation of women is viewed as a fundamental human right by national, regional and global instruments (Inglehart and Norris, 2004:3). Thus, one could argue that the representation of women is an issue of fundamental human rights and justice (Norris and Inglehart, 2001:1).

1.2.2 A Global Perspective on Gender Equality and the Representation of Women in Politics

Incorporating women into politics and government has proved to be challenging. When exploring macro level trends, studies have found that only 39 states worldwide have ever elected a woman as head of government (Norris and Inglehart, 2001:127).
The United Nations (UN) points out that in 2001 women represented less than one tenth of the world’s cabinet ministers and one fifth of all sub-ministerial positions (Norris and Inglehart, 2001:127). Furthermore, the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) spring report for 2001 notes that the number of women in parliament worldwide can be estimated at about 5,400, which is 13.8% of the total number of parliamentarians worldwide. This figure is highly disproportionate, despite an increase from 9% in the 1980s (Norris and Inglehart, 2001:127).

It is evident that the percentages of women in parliament have increased worldwide; however, how likely is it that equality in parliament will be achieved? In other words, how likely is it that 50% of parliamentarians in a given country would be women? Studies have shown that the worldwide progress of women in parliament has been slow, but that some regions do show greater proportions of women being elected to legislative branches (Lowe Morna, 2004:19). Equal representation in parliament has not, however, been achieved in any country. Countries with the most gender-balanced parliaments include the Nordic nations, Sweden and remarkably an African country, Rwanda, in which almost half the ministers are women (Norris and Inglehart, 2001:127; Powley, 2005:154). Other regions show a much lower percentage of women representatives in parliament; these regions include sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, the United States and the Pacific countries. Although declarations of intent by most countries claim to maintain conditions of gender equality, the overall results show that major barriers are limiting women’s progress in public life (Norris and Inglehart, 2001:127).

Kenworthy and Malami (1999:236) write that political factors, such as the type of electoral system practised in a given country, are a major barrier to equal representation of women in parliament. It is expected that nations which encourage voters to choose candidates from party lists in multimember districts would have a greater representation of women in politics. But Norris (1987:129) states that “rather than selecting individual representatives, the voter is choosing a party, with a certain group of candidates, some of which happen to be women”. Women are more likely to be elected by parties and voters, if women represent half of the candidates. However, electoral systems are not the focus of this study, but they will be used as an explanatory variable. This study aims to investigate the possible link between
attitudes towards gender equality and the representation of women in parliament; in addition, it argues that the type of electoral system of a given country could influence the outcome in this respect.

For example, the Scandinavian countries have a greater representation of women in parliament as a result of their formal quota systems implemented by political parties. In some African countries, the type of electoral system adopted seems less favourable to women as they may encourage votes cast for individual candidates in winner-takes-all contests (Kenworthy and Malami, 1999:237). These contests are used in electoral systems such as the single-member district, which awards seats on the basis of the highest number of votes attained without ensuring fair representation for minority groups (Program for Representative Government (Fair Vote), 2008:1).

1.2.3 An African Perspective on Gender Equality and Women in Parliament

Women in Africa have positive attitudes toward their entry into politics after being excluded from the political sphere before the 1980s, when patriarchal power structures were dominant (Geisler, 2004:9). These positive attitudes are a result of the United Nation’s Decade for Women, which ended in 1985, which initiated the establishment of thousands of women’s organisations and networking throughout the world for women, and motivated them to force their way into male-dominated structures (Geisler, 2004:9).

According to the United Nations (2000:39-40), the percentage of women in parliament in sub-Saharan Africa in 1987 was 7.1%. However, the number of women in parliament has slowly increased ever since (Geisler, 2004:9). The Inter-Parliamentary Union (1999) reports that only 4 out of 23 African countries have more than 20% of women represented in parliament (Geisler, 2004:9). This shows that the growth of equal representation of women in parliament in African countries is slow but progressing.

Karam (1998:22) argues that the obstacles to equal representation of women in parliament can be categorised into four basic areas: political, socio-economic, ideological and psychological. The author also states that when looking at the political area, the first obstacle that women face is the prevalence of a “masculine model” of
political life and elected governmental bodies (Karam, 1998:23). The reason for this is that the political arena is dominated by men and that political life in most societies is organised according to male norms and values (Shvedova, 2003:35). The existence of a male-dominated model of politics results in women either rejecting politics or rejecting male-style politics (Shvedova, 2003:35). Thus, the women who do participate in politics tend to do so in smaller numbers (Karam, 1998:23).

Geisler (2004:13) notes that African women’s involvement in nationalist movements and liberation struggles has not improved women’s rights not their ability to exert an influence in the newly independent states. Instead, the campaign for women’s rights was interpreted by African leaders as a way of diverting the struggle for economic emancipation and was pulling away attention from the leaders’ “defeat of capitalism” (Roberts, 1984:183). It is a highly contested debate in literature whether African women did not object to the African gender equity goals as interpreted by their African male leaders and adopted an African view of being family oriented (Geisler, 2004:13; Kolawole Modupe, 1997:11). Western feminism questions the notion of a collective African identity and raises the issue of why African women avoid gender equity goals within cultural discourse (Geisler 2004:13; Thiam, 1989:13).

At the same time, on a global level, the 1995 Beijing Platform for Action played an important part in promoting the increased participation of women in decision-making and women’s access to political power (United Nations, 1996:8). This Platform for Action “set targets and implemented measures to substantially increase the number of women in decision-making with a view to achieve equal representation of women and men through positive action in all governmental and public administration positions” and “to take positive action to build a critical mass of women leaders, executives and managers in strategic decision-making positions” with the purpose of eliminating barriers to women participation in decision-making (Geisler,2004:12-13). The Platform called upon political parties to “consider taking measures to ensure that women can participate in leadership of political parties on an equal basis with men” (United Nations, 1996:109-119).

It was only in 1997 that Africa reached a turning point as the Southern African Development Community (SADC Parliamentary Forum, 2003: 22) raised the issue of
a Gender and Development Declaration at their summit after decades of organising and lobbying by gender equality non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in the region (Geisler, 2004:9). The aim was to achieve a 30% quota of women in political decision-making by 2005 (Geisler, 2004:9). This 30% would aid in the promotion of women’s full access to and control of resources, the elimination of social structures that discriminate against women, amend constitutions and reform laws, and prevent rising levels of violence against women and children (Kethusegile and Molokomme, 1999: 3-13).

It is also important to look at the gender equality strategies which led to women’s empowerment and increased representation of women in parliament. Here three main elements have an influence on the number of women in parliament in African countries: electoral systems, gender quotas and political parties.

1.2.3.1 Electoral Systems

Electoral systems determine how votes cast in elections are translated into seats won by parties and candidates (Paxton, Kunovich and Hughes, 2007:269). For the purpose of this study, two electoral systems will be discussed, the plurality-majority electoral systems and the proportional representation (PR) systems. South Africa uses the proportional representation system, whereas both Uganda and Zimbabwe use the plurality-majoritarian system. The plurality-majority system entails that voters in an electoral district vote for only one person to represent them, and the candidate with the most votes wins the election (Paxton, Kunovich and Hughes, 2007:269). The proportional representation system, on the other hand, means that voters vote for a party, which has a list of candidates, and the party that wins get legislative seats in proportion to the number of votes they receive (Paxton, Kunovich and Hughes, 2007:269).

Studies have found that women have a better chance of holding political office through the proportional representation (PR) system than in a plurality-majority electoral system (Reynolds, 1999:537). Matland and Montgomery (2003:22) explain that “PR systems have higher district magnitudes which typically produce higher party magnitudes and that when district magnitudes increase, the chances that a party will win several seats increases and party leaders may be more conscious of balancing
the ticket between men and women”. This means that a larger number of women representatives can be elected to the national legislatures. Multi-member districts use PR systems, in which party gatekeepers feel more pressure and are obligated to ensure some degree of equality in their party lists of candidates which are represented across different interest groups in society or in the party itself (Matland, 2002:2).

1.2.3.2 Gender Quotas
Gender quotas are very important for women’s political representation. To date more than 60 countries worldwide have adopted gender quotas, which are defined as “legislation or party rules that require a certain percentage of candidates or legislation to be women” (Paxton, Kunovich and Hughes, 2007:269). According to Dahlerup (2003:12), “the introduction of quotas is increasingly influenced by recommendations from international organisations and by cross-country inspiration”. Electoral quotas are implemented in those countries where women have been almost entirely excluded from politics, as well as in countries with a long history of mobilisation of women into labour markets and political life. However, gender quotas do not always lead to increases in women’s representation. Instead, studies on gender quotas in the past have found that some quotas may be more effective than others at increasing the representation of women in parliament (Dahlerup, 2006:5).

These barriers to gender quota effectiveness are problematic as placement mandates of women on party lists may result in women being buried at the bottom of such a list (Paxton, Kunovich and Hughes, 2007:269). Although party leaders face consequences such as sanctions for non-compliance if they do not uphold gender quotas, this is rarely the case (Jones, 2004:1215; Dahlerup, 2006:50).

1.2.3.3 Political Parties
In political parties women are in high demand as officers and, to a lesser extent, as candidates and legislators. Thus, political parties function as gatekeepers in the gender equality process (Matland, 1993:16).

Political parties are also important because they have the potential to promote women to political leadership positions (Caul, 2001:1225). This means that if a larger number of women are included in party structures, they have a better chance of advocating for
a greater number of female candidates, because female party elites are more likely to support female candidates in party elections by influencing list placement (Carli and Eagly, 2001:629). Consequently, the greater the number of women on the party list, the more likely the increase in the percentage of women represented in parliament (Caul, 2001: 1225).

Matland and Studlar (1996:712) are of the opinion that parties which deal innovatively with women’s rights have a better chance of gaining electoral advantages. These innovations may lead to fielding more female candidates and may spread to other parties (Ishiyama, 2003:267). It is likely that when parties are resistant to change, women may form their own parties. These types of parties – women’s parties – have been established in a number of countries, but do not necessarily result in long-term benefits in terms of political power (Moser, 2003:160; Ishiyama, 2003:267).

The lack of party support is an obstacle for equal representation of women, as it can limit financial support for women candidates, limit access to political networks and the perpetuate the prevalence of double standards (Karam, 1998:24). Women often play important roles in campaigning and mobilising support for their parties; however, they are rarely in a position to make decisions within these structures (Karam, 1998:24). Women simply do not benefit from resources that political parties possess for conducting election campaigns and Karam (1998:24) notes that in a number of cases over the past years, parties simply did not provide enough financial support for women candidates. In addition, the selection and nomination processes of parties are often biased against women which results in the under-representation of women as politicians (Karam, 1998:24).

Karam (1998:26) argues that another political obstacle to women’s representation in parliament is the lack of contact and co-operation with other public organisations such as women’s interest groups. Karam (1998:26) also notes that women’s movements, especially in developing countries, do not find it necessary or do not have the means to invest in channels of communication and lobbying on issues related to the promotion of women in decision-making. In order to achieve a gender balance in political life, it is necessary to ensure commitment to equality and it is here that
women’s groups and greater participation of women’s groups could play an important role in advancing women’s representation (Karam, 1998:27).

In summary, Karam (1998:27) concludes that “affirmative action is indeed a necessary tool to maintain a benchmark of at least 30% of women in all decision-making levels”.

It is quite clear from the discussion above that gender equality has been a contestable subject in politics worldwide, and even more so on the African continent. Barriers to equal representation in male-dominated structures have been a tremendous challenge for women and their entry into democratic institutions. To date, women’s integration into politics has been slow but progressing nonetheless and at different levels for each country. Therefore, for the purpose of this study it would be important to look at the three sub-Saharan countries under investigation in greater depth to evaluate their patterns of representation of women in parliament and levels of gender equality.

1.3 South Africa, Uganda and Zimbabwe: Drawing Comparisons

In this section I will provide a comparative overview of South Africa, Uganda, and Zimbabwe in order to familiarise the reader with the political landscape of each country in 2001, discuss the prioritisation (if any) of gender equality as well as determine past trends in the representation of women in parliament.

1.3.1 South Africa

There was a high demand for gender equality in the political sphere during the negotiations for democracy in South Africa (Britton, 2005:2). The 1990s saw numerous developments towards a non-racist and non-sexist democracy in South Africa (Kgasi, 2004:6). For example, the Women’s National Coalition and its Women’s Charter Campaign played a crucial role in placing women issues and policies on the political agenda (Gouws and Kotze, 2007:168). Therefore, the first democratic government after the 1994 national elections laid the groundwork for mainstreaming gender, which included the development of gender equality policies and programmes, a commitment made by government and new legislation, the supervision of legislation, and the allocation of resources for gender mainstreaming (SADC, 1997; Kgasi, 2004:6; Britton, 2005:128).
Since 1994 development in South Africa has been aimed at improving both the status of women and their quality of life (Kgasi, 2004:7). The most meaningful development occurred in the form of the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) in 1995 (Kgasi, 2004:7). South Africa also implemented the national gender machinery and new legislation was proposed to address social, economic and political inequalities between men and women (Britton, 2005:128). Government policies ensured that women obtained more opportunities “to demonstrate their abilities and to participate in issues that may be advantageous to society” (Kgasi, 2004:7). Subsequently, the participation of women in the political arena, in terms of numbers and portfolio committees, was noteworthy.

Another significant development was the participation in the Beijing Platform for Action of 1995, which recommended a national gender machinery which would address issues relating to the “implementation, monitoring, evaluation, mobilization and the support of policies that would promote women’s progress” (Kgasi, 2004:8).

In addition, the national gender machinery was established in 1997 to solidify South Africa’s commitment to gender equality from a constitutional mandate to a social reality (Britton, 2005:128). A significant step in achieving the goal of institutionalising women’s issues within the new democracy was to secure long-term advancement for women. It was under these circumstances that the national gender machinery was established. The national gender machinery in South Africa includes components such as: structures for the government, the legislature, parliament and statutory bodies such as the Commission on Gender Equality (Britton, 2005:129).

In South Africa 33% of all members of parliament are women (Garson, 2008:1). This percentage placed South Africa at 8th position on the world list in terms of gender equality in 2007 (Garson, 2008:1). This is a stark contrast to the pre-1994 ranking of 141st; thus, it was only after South Africa’s transition to democratic rule that the ruling party (ANC) as well as other parties, like the New National Party (NNP) and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), implemented a 30% quota to its party list that the representation of women in parliament increased visibly (Garson, 2008:1, Goetz and Hassim, 2003:86). In 2001, 9 of the 27 members of Cabinet were women, whilst 8 of the 14 deputy ministers were women (Kgasi, 2004:6).
Table 1 illustrates the national representation of women in parliament in South Africa since democratic rule commenced in 1994. It is positive to note that although the representation of women in parliament has been slow it has also been progressive, with 41% of cabinet seats reserved for women since the last elections (IPU, 2008).

According to Goetz and Hassim (2003:6), two key factors are responsible for the representation of women in parliament in South Africa, namely the proportional representative electoral system and the quota system.

In PR systems the candidates focus on the party and its policies rather than the individual (Goetz and Hassim, 2003:6). This process may be beneficial for women if they are placed proportionally on their party’s party list. The advantage of this type of electoral system for women is best illustrated by contrasting the representation of women on the three tiers of government following national, provincial, and local government elections (Goetz and Hassim, 2003:6).

Thus, the increased representation of women in parliament in South Africa was kick-started by the democratic national elections in 1994, the establishment of a national gender machinery, the type of electoral system utilised in South Africa, as well as the implementation of gender quotas. One can also argue that all the activities propagated by the gender machinery sensitised a significant number of political leaders as well as the general population to the need for gender equality in South Africa.

### Table 1: Women in Parliament in South Africa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>% SEATS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1995/97</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997/99</td>
<td>29.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999/01</td>
<td>29.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001/03</td>
<td>29.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003/05</td>
<td>32.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005/07</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: IPU, 2008
1.3.2 Uganda

Uganda gained independence from the British in 1962, after which the Ugandan constitution was changed (in 1963) to accommodate the alliance between the Uganda People’s Congress (UPC) and the Kabakka Yekka Party (Country Studies, 1992:1). In 1966 the UPC dominated Parliament and changed the constitution once again (Country Studies, 1992:1; Goetz, 2003:110). Elections were suspended, which ushered in an era of coups and counter-coups which lasted until the mid-1980s, when the National Resistance Movement came into power after the Ugandan “bush war” (guerrilla war between 1981 and 1986) led by the National Resistance Army with the aim of ousting then-President Obote (Country Studies, 1992:1; Goetz, 2003:110).

The National Resistance Movement (NRM) came into power in 1986 and proposed a political system that would ban all activities of political parties and candidates would be elected on individual merit (Ssenkumba, 1998:179). The Movement’s system and the abolition of political parties were justified by the country’s brutal history after independence. Leaders of the NRM motivated their decision on the fact that previous political parties had based their ideologies on religion and ethnicity, which caused divisions in society (Ssenkumba, 1998:179).

In the 1990s the NRM government under president Museveni introduced policies of affirmative action in order to facilitate the election of women to local government (Hanssen, 2005:6). The constitution of the Republic of Uganda declared that one third of all positions on all levels of local councils should be reserved for women (Goetz, 2003:118). This resulted in an increased number of women in local government by means of the decentralisation and transfer of administrative, fiscal and financial powers from the central government to locally elected district and lower councils (Ahikire, 2003:213).

According to Hanssen, (2005:1), statistics of the inter-parliamentary union show that the representation of women in sub-Saharan Africa’s legislatures suggests that only a small group of states have higher rates of female representation. Uganda had 24% of women in parliament in 2001, ranking it among the top countries in Africa in terms of gender equality (Hanssen, 2005:1). Uganda’s high levels of representation of women are partially the result of the separate elections held for women whereby each of the
56 districts in Uganda elects one female district representative to parliament (Hanssen, 2005:1).

Uganda’s separate elections can be traced back to the establishment of the National Resistance Council in 1989, when “affirmative action measures for women were introduced and, 34 women were elected to so-called “women’s seats” in parliament (Hanssen, 2005:2). During the country’s sixth parliamentary session held between 1996-2001, there were 39 districts in Uganda and so 39 women were elected as female district MPs. With the 7th Parliament between 2001-2006, Uganda introduced 17 new districts, securing 56 seats for women in parliament (Hanssen, 2005:2).

These separate elections for women are held with the aim of increasing women’s representation in parliament and for sustaining the gender equality debate, and the effect has been to include articles relating directly to gender equality in the constitution (Hanssen, 2005:1). Therefore, women’s representation in the Ugandan parliament is to a large extent determined by the separate elections for women (Ahikire, 2003:213). The Ugandan method of electing women to parliament is based on the reservation of seats as an “add-on” process to elect women as part of the 214 MPs on the basis of the plurality/majoritarian system of first-past-the-post winners (Hanssen, 2005:6).

Since 1986, women’s organisations increased dramatically in Uganda and numerous Acts, focussing on women’s rights and equality, have been successfully adopted. One of the most important is the Land Act which was passed in 1998 and ensures that women have the right to inherit and co-own land and has significant implications for the financial independence of Ugandan women (Hanssen, 2005:4). Another important piece of legislation adopted by the Ugandan government was the Domestic Relation Bill (DRB) which aims to protect the rights of women regarding polygamy, child custody, and property ownership.

Table 2 illustrates the number of women in parliament in Uganda since 1996. Similar to the South African case, the representation of women in Uganda has been slow but

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4 Uganda’s electoral system changed to a multi-party system in 2006.
progressive. More importantly, less than a quarter of seats in parliament were reserved for women in 2001, but the achievement of the 30% gender quota has thus far proved elusive.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>% SEATS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1996-98</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999-01</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002-04</td>
<td>23,9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005-07</td>
<td>29,8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Hanssen, 2005:3-6

Women’s effectiveness in parliament is largely influenced by a strong connection with the NRM (Ahikire, 2003:214). The NRM ideology, initiated under President Museveni, considers all segments of society, taking into account the needs of different groups, as an increased opportunity for women to enter the political arena. It can be said that the NRM no-party system has created a political system in which women and their contribution to the Ugandan society are not only recognised but also guaranteed (Goetz, 2003:111).

Like South Africa, Uganda has a national gender policy for women that coordinate the participation of women from grassroots to national level (Goetz and Hassim, 2003:214). Uganda’s national gender policy was established in 1997 and its objectives are to mainstream gender concerns in national development processes (Womenwatch, 2008:1). The motivation was to address gender equality in all sectors and, as a result, it has influenced the adoption of gender mainstreaming in Uganda as a principle in district development programmes (Womenwatch, 2008:1).

1.3.3 Zimbabwe

In Zimbabwe’s first and second parliamentary elections since independence in 1980, the percentage of women in parliament increased to 10% (WIPSU, 2008:1). Although women constitute half of the population in Zimbabwe, they are still underrepresented in decision-making processes in Zimbabwe. The barriers to women’s equal representation lie in the elements of poverty, cultural values and political cultures which exclude women (Machipisa, 2008:1).
It was not until the early 1990s that a real increase in the percentage of women in parliament became evident, rising to around 15% between 1990 and 2000 (Machipisa, 2008:1). However, this increase has since been followed by a decrease in female representatives to less than 10% of parliamentary seats after 2000 (Kwidini, 2008:2). Table 3 illustrates this trend in the number of women in parliament in Zimbabwe since 1980.

### Table 3 Women in Parliament in Zimbabwe

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>% SEATS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1980-84</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985-90</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990-95</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995-00</td>
<td>14.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000-05</td>
<td>9.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In Zimbabwe more than half (52%) the population is female (EISA, 2002). However, according to the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU), in the post-1995 parliamentary elections only 22 female MPs were elected to the single-chamber Assembly (EISA, 2002). In the period between 1996 and 1999, there were 20 women in the 150-member Zimbabwean parliament, of which 3 cabinet ministers with portfolios, 3 ministers of state, and 3 deputy ministers were women (EISA, 2002).

Both the electoral laws and the constitution of Zimbabwe make no provision for the special representation of women in publicly elected bodies. Nor do they make any provision for quotas but instead permit the implementation of affirmative action programmes (EISA, 2008). These affirmative action programmes ensure that women are placed in certain positions within institutions based on that fact that these positions have in the past been dominated solely by men.

The ruling party in Zimbabwe, the Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), adopted a 25% quota for female candidates for the National Assembly in 2005, despite the fact that only 18% of ZANU-PF positions are held by women (Chiroro, 2005:12). These quotas are said to be a result of intense lobbying by women’s movements and the implementation of the quota is a direct reflection of the
marginalisation of women and also the belief that men are more powerful within the party (Chiroro, 2005:102). The Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), the main opposition of the ZANU-PF, provides that one third of its National Council be women (Sachikonye, 2005:36).

According to the Human Rights Forum (2008), Zimbabwe has ratified CEDAW and the Convention on the Political Rights of Women. Zimbabwe has also signed the Treaty of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the SADC Declaration on Gender and Development and its addendum on the Prevention of Violence Against Women and Children, which all acknowledge gendered rights as fundamental human rights. Zimbabwe also adopted the Dakar Platform for Action and Beijing Declaration in 1995 thereby acknowledging and committing to take strategic action to promote the human rights of women and eliminate all forms of discrimination. However, these international agreements cannot protect Zimbabwean women in the manner that they are meant to as under Section 111B of the Constitution of Zimbabwe they “shall not form part of the law of Zimbabwe unless incorporated into the law” as Acts of Parliament. After the most recent and highly publicised elections held in 2008, only 28 women were elected to the House of Assembly (Valy, 2008:1).

Thus, it is quite clear from the data in sub-Saharan Africa as a whole – and South Africa, Uganda and Zimbabwe more specifically – that there are different patterns of representation of women in parliament. The aim of this study is to establish whether there is a link between attitudes towards gender equality and the representation of women in parliament.

1.4 Research Question and Main Proposition
The central focus of this study is a descriptive analytical discussion of gender equality in South Africa, Uganda and Zimbabwe, and the representation of women in their respective parliaments. The aim of the study is to determine whether a link exists – directly or indirectly – between attitudes towards gender equality and the representation of women in parliament by using South Africa, Uganda and Zimbabwe in a comparative context. This study proposes that: the more positive the attitudes
towards gender equality in a given country, the higher the likelihood of more female representatives in the national parliament.

Even though the link may be indirect, such as the introduction of gender quotas for parliamentary lists, this would still be an indication of a positive attitude towards gender equality.

1.5 Research Methodology
This study is a descriptive quantitative study in which an overview of attitudes towards gender equality and the representation of women in parliament is analysed in order to reveal patterns and connections that might otherwise go unnoticed (Neuman, 1994:30). The study consists of a brief literature review of theories of gender equality and the representation of women in parliament as well as secondary data analysis of relevant items in the World Values Survey.

The Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSS) will be used for the statistical analysis. When undertaking secondary data analysis, such as the case with the WVS data, the researcher uses previously collected information (Neuman, 1994:29). In this study the data from the 2001 wave of the WVS conducted in South Africa, Uganda and Zimbabwe were used. This type of analysis proves problematic in that one has no control over the operationalisation of key concepts within the survey. Therefore the quality of the data is highly dependent on whether the survey followed stringent data-collection methods. In the cases of all 3 countries in the comparative study, data were collected by the market research company, Markinor, and subjected to the highest degree of quality management.5

Using secondary data analysis has both advantages and disadvantages. The advantages of secondary data analysis can be listed as follows: it is unobtrusive, which means that it does not require the researcher to intrude into the research context; it is fast to get access to data and incurs little cost; the researcher does not have to deal with data-collection problems; and secondary data analysis provides the

5 Comprehensive field reports can be found within the WVS data archive in Madrid. http://www.jdsurvey.net/wvs2005/home.jsp
basis for comparison between data (Neuman, 1994:322; Orlando State University, 2008).

The disadvantages of secondary analysis can be listed as follows: data availability may be problematic; the level of observation may be problematic; quality of documentation; data quality control; and outdated data (Neuman, 1994:322).

Although individual opinions and attitudes are the basis of the survey, the aggregated quantitative data will be utilised to make inferences regarding the broader society. During data analysis various statistical procedures will be used to analyse the nature of gender equality and the gender priorities of the national samples in South Africa, Uganda and Zimbabwe in 2001. Thus, a speculative-empirical analysis will be employed to determine the causes of representation of women and changes in the three countries.

1.6 Chapter Outline

This study can be outlined as follows:

Chapter Two will present a brief theoretical overview of gender attitudes and values, gender equality and the representation of women in parliament. Furthermore, the chapter will conceptualise and operationalise attitudes towards gender equality and the representation of women in parliament.

Chapter Three will include the data presentation and the procedures used during the data analysis process. It will also include the description of data, statistical analysis and testing of hypotheses. It will also provide an interpretation of the data and attempt to infer implications with regard to the differences in attitudes towards gender equality and the representation of women in parliament in the three sub-Saharan countries under investigation.

Chapter Four will present a discussion of the possible consequences for the representation/under-representation of women in parliament, and what this means for gender equality in the three sub-Saharan countries; it will also summarise the main findings and make recommendations for future research.
Chapter Two: Theory, Conceptualisation and Operationalisation of Gender Equality and the Representation of Women in Parliament

The doctrine of equality of opportunity is the product of a competitive and fragmented society, a divided society, a society in which individualism in Tocqueville’s sense of world, is the reigning ethical principle... In other words, much of the demand for equality, and virtually all of the demand for the kind of equality expressed in the equality – opportunity principle, is really a demand for an equal right and opportunity to become unequal.

Schaar, 1971:142-3

2.1 Introduction

The principle of equality arguably refers to the most powerful political concept and practice. The term equality has a wide range of meanings including “a moral belief, a rationalist precept, an a priori principle, a right, a means to an end, or an end in itself” (Forbes, 1991:17). These divergent meanings indicate that the joining of interests and commitment around the concept of equality can be maximised in spite of analytical differences between protagonists for equality of a particular kind. Equality principles are an identifiable category in thought and a basis for political action. Therefore, they are an essential element in continuing attempts to organise, institute and achieve change in society (Forbes, 1991:17).

Equality is also one of the most problematic concepts of political theory. Although it has great liberating and emancipating force, it is at the same time limited and restrictive (Bussemaker, 1991:52). The universal claims of equal rights and the assumption of classical liberation found in social contract theories do not seem to fit very well with the existing social differences that exist between men and women (Bussemaker, 1991:52). Therefore, in order to understand the concept of gender equality, one needs to understand how gender equality manifests itself at both societal and parliamentary levels, as well as understand the relationship between gender equality and representation.

This chapter will provide a brief theoretical overview of gender equality and representation, after which the conceptualisation and operationalisation of these two concepts will follow.
2.2 Theoretical Overview
This section will examine the theoretical discourse around gender attitudes and values, gender equality and the representation of women, which were briefly mentioned in Chapter One. The theoretical insights into these concepts will then determine the conceptualisation and operationalisation of gender equality and representation of women in parliament for this study.

2.2.1 Gender Attitudes and Values
It is important to analyse the theories of gender attitudes and values in order to establish why attitudes towards gender equality vary between individuals and countries. According to Berg (2006:5), there are two general theories that explain the variation of gender attitudes. These two theories are based on a structural and value explanation. However, before we can unpack these theories, we need to define what is meant by “attitudes” and “values”.

Berg (2006:5) postulates that gender attitudes normally refer to “attitudes that concern gender relations in society” – in other words, the “extent to which a person supports the norm of gender equality” (Berg, 2006:6). Allport (1961:347) argues that “an attitude always has an object of reference”, something specific towards which one’s mental position is directed. Furthermore, “attitudes are usually pro or con, favourable or unfavourable toward that object (Allport, 1961:347).

Rokeach (1973:5) postulates that values, on the other hand, are “enduring beliefs that a specific mode of control or end-state of existence is personally or socially preferable to an opposite or converse mode of conduct or end-state of existence”. He goes on to say that an attitude differs from a value as an attitude indicates a set of ideas around a specific situation, whilst values “guide actions, attitudes, judgements and comparison across objects and situations and beyond immediate goals to more ultimate goals” (Rokeach, 1973:18). Thus, values are of a more general nature than attitudes are, and these general values can serve as explanations of more specific attitudes (Berg, 2006:6).
2.2.1.1 The Structural Explanation
As mentioned in 2.2.1, there are basically two broad theories that explain the variation of gender attitudes. With regards, to structural theories, Wilensky (2002) argues that advanced industrial societies over the years have become more similar as a result of industrialisation. The process of industrialisation can lead to changes in the occupational structure of a society, where a shift is often seen in the type of workers in the occupational sectors. A few decades ago the dominant occupational group would have consisted of unskilled manual workers; however, the processes of industrialisation changed this norm to skilled workers, professionals and managers as the dominant occupational group (Berg, 2006:7).

Furthermore, the industrialisation process provided increases in the economic costs associated with child rearing as well as decreases in the benefits provided by the economy. This gave women more reason to enter the labour market as opposed to confining themselves to motherhood roles and raising children. Simultaneously, the change in the modern types of jobs required higher education for both sexes. Berg (2006:7) states that “developments, in terms of gender relations, are a growth in the education level of women (and that of men) and increased labour force participation by women. He further argues that the increased presence of women in the labour force is likely to result in a more accepting attitude towards gender equality amongst men (Wilensky, 2002:7).

2.2.1.2 Values Explanation
Following a value approach to the variation of gender attitudes is Inglehart (1997:80) who argues in terms of two important value changes that influence populations of advanced industrial societies, namely: materialist and post-materialist values. Materialist values are seen as being more dominant in traditional industrial societies, where people’s everyday life is focused on providing for their basic needs, such as food and shelter. The materialist value concept is “concerned with the distribution of material goods in society” (Berg, 2006:8).

The process of generational replacement has, however, resulted in the continuation of post-material values becoming more widely distributed in especially post-industrial societies. Post-materialist values “are the result of material well-being in people’s
formative years” (Berg, 2006:8). People encouraging post-materialist values are normally those who place an emphasis on issues that have to do with the quality of life, such as political participation, etc. Inglehart (1997:80-86) argues that a “religious-secular” dimension can also change the values of people over time. Values can change from being religious to being secular, and these secular values are seen as a significant part of the “values” held by people in the world today.

Berg (2006:8) critiques Inglehart’s theory (1997) of post-material values, adding that other value perspectives also play a major role in people’s values. The author argues that “left-right materialism also adds to value sets of modern societies as it originates from traditional industrial societies” (Berg, 2006:8). Berg (2006:8) defines left materialism as “beliefs in and support for equality, an active government, and harmony between classes”, whilst right materialism refers to the “support of personal freedoms, a relatively weak government, and economic liberalism”.

Inglehart’s theory (1997) emphasises that the values of advanced industrial societies assist the acceptance of women’s equality (Norris and Inglehart, 2004: 63-69; Berg, 2006:9; Inglehart, 1997:88) and reiterates that values are “the principal causal factor that lead to more liberal gender attitudes in advanced industrial societies” (Berg, 2006:9).

### 2.2.2 Gender Equality

Agassi (1989:160) postulates that some of the simplest approaches to the study of gender equality can be classified under psychological, sociological or economic theories. This is cumbersome as hardly any theory falls within one discipline. Another possible method of analysing gender equality would be to classify the concept according to socialist, liberal or radical feminist theories (Agassi, 1989:161).

While there are many theories and approaches to the study of gender equality, this study will only focus on discussing a selection of theories and approaches most relevant to the study. I will group theories by way of the dominant themes in the literature, namely: economic independence, education and leadership.

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6 See also van Deth (1995:5-10).
2.2.2.1 Economic Independence

According to Lipset (1959:70), when focusing on economic independence, the classical modernisation perspective argues that increases seen in democracy and human choice are often a direct result of economic development\(^7\). When linking this approach to gender equality, one can argue that economic development is indeed a starting point for increasing the pool of women appropriate for positions of social power (Alexander and Welzel, 2007:1).

Many scholars, such as Rostow (1960) and Inkles and Smith (1974), are of the opinion that increased economic development can be linked to the distribution of educational and occupational resources. In conventional women’s work roles, the major responsibility for unpaid domestic and in particular, child-care work restricts women in occupational roles (Alexander and Welzel, 2007:4). Therefore, the greater the access to educational and occupational resources, the greater the change in women’s professional development, “creating a greater pool of women eligible for power positions such as political leaders” (Alexander and Welzel, 2007:5).

Furthermore, Alexander and Welzel (2007:5) state that higher levels of economic development can generate more social services for societies. For the most part, economic development alleviates the cost of labour and the time associated with care giving (Alexander and Welzel, 2007:5). According to scholars like Reynolds (1999:549) and Kenworthy and Malami (1999:235), developmental measures such as a country’s level of “non-agricultural development, women in the workforce and women college graduates” can influence the number of women in parliament.

Furthermore, development theory makes the assumption that traditional societies are to blame for the inequality between men and women, because of their characterisation of sharply differentiated gender roles that discourages women from seeking for jobs outside their homes (Inglehart and Norris, 2000:446). Virtually all pre-industrial societies emphasised child-bearing and child-rearing as the central goal for women, and their most important function in life; careers in the paid workforce were predominately male. In post-industrial societies gender roles have increasingly

\(^7\) See also Bell (1999:122).
converged because of a structural revolution in the paid labour force, in educational opportunities for women, and in the characteristics of modern families (Inglehart and Norris, 2000:446).

According to Inglehart and Welzel (2005:35), it is the process of human development which can gave rise to an “emancipative worldview in which self-expression values are reflected, and human choice and autonomy are emphasised”. Human development perspectives link social modernisation to emancipative values through changes in existential constraints (Alexander and Welzel, 2007:6). The theory highlights the changes in modern societies particularly conducive to women’s empowerment and establishes an indirect link between cultural modernity and populations that value greater equality between genders (Alexander and Welzel, 2007:6). Welzel (2003) links the modern human resources crucial to the human development sequence to economic development.

Inglehart and Norris (2003:49) postulate that cultural modernity, as mentioned above, holds real positive consequences for women. The authors’ measures of attitudes towards gender equality are a sole predictor of proportion of women in parliament (Inglehart and Norris, 2003:49). According to Alexander and Welzel (2007:7), “it is not so much gender equalitarian attitudes in particular but broad emancipative implications of self-expression in general that positively predict gender empowerment”.

Therefore, the human development perspective and the classical modernisation perspective offer theories to explain why modern societies are more conducive to gains in gender equality (Alexander and Welzel, 2007:7). According to Norris and Inglehart (2003:10), it is modernisation theory that is important in understanding cultural change, for it suggests that “human development can be linked to changed cultural attitudes toward gender equality” (2003:10).

Inglehart and Norris (2003:10) also postulate that the impact of modernisation has two key important phases for gender equality in societies. The first phase implies that “industrialisation brings women into the paid workforce and reduces fertility rates; women attain literacy and greater educational opportunities; and women begin to
participate in representative government, but with far less power than men do” (Inglehart and Norris, 2003:10). The second phase implies that post-industrialisation brings a “shift toward greater gender equality as women rise in the political sphere and influence political bodies” (Inglehart and Norris, 2003:10).

These two phases can be linked to certain developmental trends in social modernisation which may lead to legacies of path-dependent cultural and institutional organisation that affect societies’ abilities to improve women’s lives (Krasner, 1984:225). The emergence of such institutions depends on the types of social organisations that have a continuing and somewhat determinant influence on phenomena relevant to those institutions far into the future (Peters, 1999:80).

There are four measures of path-dependent processes which are highlighted in the literature as capable of affecting gender equality (Alexander and Welzel, 2007:8). The four measures are: Protestant religious traditions, a long tradition of female suffrage, a state tradition of investing in welfarism rather than coercive forces, and a tradition of leftist dominance in government formation (Alexander and Welzel, 2007:9).

Reynolds (1999:550) states that religion may vary in providing opportunities for women’s emancipation, depending on the nature of women’s traditions. For instance, relative to other religious heritages, the literature shows that a Protestant religious heritage improves the status of women in a country (Inglehart and Norris, 2003). The Protestant religion holds a tradition particularly hospitable to democratic values, such as individualism, reciprocity and popular sovereignty because of its traditions of sectarianism and volunteerism (Alexander and Welzel, 2007:8).

According to Inglehart and Norris (2003:50), the impact of religious legacy on women’s empowerment through the population’s levels of secularisation is the most important measure for gender equality. As societies secularise, there is a “greater deference to rationality and expertise”, and this in particular can give rise to a modern state and widespread services (Inglehart and Norris, 2003:52). The secularising trend typically can be seen from the pre-industrial through the industrialising phase of modernisation. During this transition to secularisation, traditional institutions restrictive of women’s development, such as family and the church, lose authority as
individuals place more emphasis on rationality and individualism (Norris and Inglehart, 2003:63).

Moreover, Berdahl (1996:31) suggests that religious differences can lead to changes in the status and role of men and women in a society and can translate to differences in personality. This can also determine differences in women and men’s cultures, which can influence the roles and positions of sexes. Norris and Inglehart (2004:9) therefore argue that it is not only different changes in societies that contribute to the unequal status between women and men, but that “cultural change is a necessary condition for gender equality”. Women need to change themselves first and then try to change society. In return, cultural change accelerates the process of gender equality (Norris and Ingelhart, 2004:50).

Alexander and Welzel (2007:10), on the other hand, are of the opinion that “a state-financed welfare policy is another tradition that research on gender equality highlights as central to societies’ progress in gender equality”. The literature highlights that a key barrier to women’s full social inclusion and autonomy has been and continues to be institutional arrangements that restrict the state’s role in care-taking and domestic responsibility (Hirschman, 2001:23; Tronto 2002:44).

The theory of economic independence by Bussemaker (1991:54) states that equality between men and women is based on social security, wage-related social benefits as well as welfare benefits for women. This notion of the theory of economic independence is mainly based on the promotion of the idea that women should have an income that is sufficient to be able them to live a normal live. This theory also suggests that everyone should have the opportunity to “provide for his or her own subsistence and take care of him-/herself” (Bussemaker, 1991:54). According to Bussemaker (1991:54), economic independence happens where the objective is ‘to reach a situation in which every adult can build an independent livelihood, regardless of gender, marital status, or living-arrangement.”

According to the Marxist theory advocated by Engels in the 1880s, the cause of women’s inferior status in terms of economic independence rather “lies within the class society and forms of patriarchal family organisation” (Engels, 1884:50). Engels
Engels (1884:34) argues that not only does the status of women play an important role in gender equality and economic independence as the socialist theory suggests, but also that the private family structure and household condemns women to inequality and promotes the development of male domination (Engels, 1884:34). He further postulates that in order for women to be able to become equal to men, the “dissolution of the private family and household must take place through socialisation”. Engels (1884:34) states that “within the family [the husband] is the bourgeois, and the wife represents the proletariat”.

Therefore, the status of women can also be linked to capitalism as it can also be “blamed for the separation of the place of reproductive work (the family) from productive work (factory), which has restricted the participation of women in social production” (Engels, 1884:45; Agassi, 1989:162). Materialist theorists emphasise that the introduction of women into labour force is important as it can lead to a progress in women’s economic independence. Brown (1975:251) postulates that the extent of the contribution by women in societies cannot be attributed to the status of women; rather women can only gain powerful positions if they gain control over the economic organisation of their societies.

Brown (1975:251) also notes that “there is a varying degree of women’s contribution to subsistence production as depending on the degree of compatibility of child minding with the kind and conditions of subsistence production in each society”. However, Sanday (1973:1690) refutes this argument by stating that “the existence of societies whose women, though they contribute over half of their subsistence, the less have extremely low status”. She further argues that “participation in subsistence production is necessary but not sufficient for women’s high status”. Instead, a sociological theory suggests that it “is only the production of surplus resources, and access to and control over these resources that translate into power and valued status for women and men alike” (Blumberg, 1984:95).

An argument by Blumberg (1989:102) indicates that the economic independence of women may be sufficient for the “acquisition of equal power such as equal status in marriage and in the household without being sufficient for attaining equal status for women in the community or larger society”.
From the theories above, it can be stated that the economic development of women can be linked to a greater access to educational and occupational resources, and alleviation of the time consumption associated with care-giving at home. It is traditional societies rather than modern societies that should be blamed for inequality between men and women, as traditional societies sharply differentiate gender roles and discourage women from taking up job opportunities, whilst modern societies are more conducive to promoting women’s empowerment and economic independence. Human development can play a major role in changing people’s attitudes towards gender equality, but it is in fact the more traditional and conservative cultural attitudes toward the role of women that are responsible for maintaining the inequality between men and women. Therefore, the theories mentioned above suggest that a change in culture, religion and human development may lead to changes in the status and the role of women in societies.

2.2.2.2 Education

When looking at education and the promotion of gender equality, the liberal feminist approach often suggests that “equal means the same.” Byrne (1979:19) refutes this argument by stating that the “same treatment for girls and boys in education provision may produce unequal outcomes, as prior socialisation may ensure that different sexes have interests in labour market practices, where equally qualified boys and girls are welcomed with differential enthusiasm”.

According to Acker (1989a: 423), liberal feminism in education also focuses only on socialisation, sex roles and sex stereotyping. Acker (1989a:423) postulates that often girls and boys are socialised by schools into “traditional attitudes and orientations that may lead to limiting their future roles unnecessarily to sex stereotyped occupational and family roles”. Socialisation often also encourages patterns of interpersonal relationships between males and females that can certainly place females in disadvantaged positions.

Socialist feminist theory further suggests that socialisation is often associated with what is called “reproduction”, which implies a variety of mechanisms that often reproduce class and gender divisions within the workforce (Acker, 1989b:426). This theory can be seen as a “starting point for political economy perspectives in the
reproduction of gender roles in schools, and the social division of labour in the family and the workplace” (Acker, 1989b:426).

Therefore, in this instance socialisation in education can be classified as a “critical mechanism” (Jacobs, 1996:157). The critical perspective suggests that the “educational system reproduces gender inequality in society, despite also provoking resistance to inequality on the part of women” (Jacobs, 1996:156). The most critical theoretical problem in addressing gender inequality arises when applying a reproductionist model to the education system; the consequence of this is that schools may not satisfy the demands of the economy (Jacobs, 1996:157).

There are often numerous fundamental problems with the logic of class reproduction. The analogy between class and gender often fails because these forms of inequality bear a fundamentally different relationship to educational systems (Jacobs, 1996:160). Differential access to higher education is a principal support for racial and social class inequality. The disadvantaged social position of those holding less prestigious positions in society, namely racial and ethnic minorities and the unemployed, stems in large part from the fact that they do not have the educational credentials, especially university degrees, of more socio-economically successful people (Jacobs, 1996:160). Gender inequality in earning persists despite broad equality in access to education, whereas class inequality is based on sharp differences in access to education (Jacobs, 1996:160).

One can also detect a link between education and power, as Blumberg (1984:86) states that “hierarchy in societies’ political power is at the top and other types of power such as economic power, below. “Achievement of power in lower domains than those of political power, such as in education and occupation, is necessary to getting power at the highest level” (See also Paxton, 1997:443). However, there is a challenge, according to Paxton (1997:444), who argues that the educational theory of gender equality suggests that gender equality often fails in political institutions because women have less access to education and professional opportunity. Therefore, if women are found disproportionately in disadvantaged positions in the social structure, the implication is that they will not have the necessary resources to gain political power.
O’Brien (1983: 13) refutes the argument that education is merely a mechanism to gain equality of political power and suggests that the goal of education in the process of gender equality “is not equal knowledge, power and wealth, but the abolishment of gender as an oppressive cultural reality”. The radical feminist theory of education also uses the concept of reproduction, but refers to “eliminating the domination of men over women, denying girls and women full access to knowledge, resources and self-esteem, and to the need for freedom from fear and harassment” (Acker, 1989:429).

According to Arnot (1991:450), the educational theories of socialists suggest that education can be limited by equality of opportunity. The core meaning of equal opportunity for education can be found in the desire to ensure “equal access for all social classes to education, so as to equalise the occupational chances of individuals who compromise those classes” (Arnot, 1991:450). Equal opportunities also prevail in the conceptual foundation of liberal-feminist education theory, where the intention is to remove barriers which prevent girls from reaching their full potential in school, individual psyches or discriminatory labour forces.

From the theories above, it is clear that socialisation may play a major role in the differences between men and women’s interests, especially in schools and workplaces, where stereotyped school subjects and occupational and family roles are forced upon women. The lack of education can lead to class and gender divisions in the workplace and disadvantages in social positions in society. Therefore, in order to gain any political power or a position in political institutions, a higher level of education is required.

2.2.2.3 Leadership

Hegel (1821:167) notes that Western political theorists such as Aristotle, Rousseau, Hobbes and Locke always excluded women from politics on the basis of their non-rational nature. The argument made by Hegel (1821:167) is that “if women were to control the government, the state would be in danger, for they do not act according to the dictates of universality, but are influenced by accidental inclinations and opinions”.
In addition to Hegel’s (1821:167) argument, Richter (1991:524) suggests that “leadership in politics is one of the least tractable topics that political scientists deal with”. She argues that leadership is often shaped by the social system of patriarchy, which has a decisive impact on women in most cultures and has reinforced authoritarian values over democratic norms (Richter, 1991:526).

Authoritarian values have often been seen as being legitimated in the laws and customs of most African societies (Richter, 1991:526). The notion of different cultures and religions might be based on the division of roles as well as the way in which politics are perceived in the public life. Therefore, it is often the private life of the family that is forced on most women as part of the justification for making them ineligible for political roles (Richter, 1991:526).

Often barriers limiting women to political leadership roles can also be associated with “unequal opportunities” (Meehan and Sevenhuisjen, 1991:24). Neo-liberal theory has two dimensions in addressing equal opportunity. The one dimension entails a critique of egalitarianism. This dimension sees equal opportunity ready to “disgorge the evils of affirmative action, positive discrimination, and equality of outcome” (Meehan and Sevenhuisjen, 1991:24). The second dimension is less antagonistic about equal opportunity. The difference is evident in positive claims concerning inequality in society. According to Meehan and Sevenhuisjen (1991:25), “unequal outcomes between unequals in society are approved, as are equal outcomes between equals; unequal outcomes between equal individuals are not, nor are equal outcomes between unequals, if some restriction of the freedom of individual is entailed”.

In addition, Cavarero (1988, as quoted in Meehan and Sevenhuisjen, 1991:70) writes that in Western political thought, the privileged parameter is the male sphere of action and the sexual differences of men and women are insignificant. Therefore, if a woman wants to become a political leader, she is “obliged to compare herself with a man, and the parameters of her political action also have to be male”. Cavarero (1988, as quoted in Meehan and Sevenhuisjen, 1991:7) further argues that to attain the ideal of gender equality, in the sense of women being political leaders, it would be necessary to gain the same political rights equal to those of men and that “equity legislation would prevent the arbitrary treatment of women”. Parvikko (1991:37) argues that
gender equality from a women’s point of view is “the notion of gender equality as a double-edged sword because the ideal of gender equality require that women must have the same political rights as men”.

Eagly and Karau (2002:575) state that gender equality in leadership is only possible once the prejudice against women as leaders is eliminated. Throughout the past decades leadership has been seen as a “male prerogative” across all sectors of society (Eagly and Karau, 2002:575). Women as elite leaders still remain limited in number. The representation of women in leadership roles has traditionally focused on the idea that women lack the necessary qualifications (Eagly and Karau, 2002:1). Therefore, it is more difficult for women to become leaders and to succeed in leadership positions.

In most of the cases the increases in female leadership have been accompanied by changes in theories and practices of leadership. According to Eagly and Carli (2003:809), in the past, leaders based their authority mainly on their access to political, economic or military power, in post-industrial societies leaders share far more and establish many collaborative relationships”.

In addition to female leadership, Caul (1997:82) and Kunovich and Paxton (2005:26) evaluate the characteristics of parties that have an impact on the recruitment, selection and support of women political elites. The authors also highlight the importance of party ideology and women’s involvement in party leadership. Scholars generally emphasise that “leftist parties are more likely to recruit women and to adopt strategies to ensure more women candidates”, which can lead to increases in the number of women in the party leadership.

Alexander and Welzel (2007:20) are of the opinion that institutional characteristics mediate mass support for women’s empowerment in ways that either enable or constraint women’s attainment of political leadership. The three aspects of a political system include: the strength of democracy, the electoral system and the gender electoral quota system (Alexander and Welzel, 2007:20).

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8 See also Goleman, Boyatzis and Mckee (2002:221).
Explanations of women’s social and political empowerment often also highlight the role of democratic institutions. According to McDonagh (2002:552), “the oppressive, unequal treatment of women clashes with the democratic idea of human equality. As societal foundations that preserve and socialise free and equal citizenship, democratic institutions supply women with more rights and more channels for making their voices heard” (2002:552).

In summary, it can be argued that leadership is shaped by the social system of patriarchy, which impacts on women in most cultures. Authoritarian values are often forced upon women in African societies as different cultures may divide the role of men and women in politics and public life. Women are obliged to restrict themselves to the private life of family, which makes them ineligible for political leadership. Also prejudices against women as leaders are one of the barriers to that limit elite female leaders. The strength of democracy, electoral systems and gender quotas may enable the attainment of leadership positions for women. Furthermore, citizens’ attitudes towards gender equality may be linked to the varying degree of female leaders in African countries, especially with regards to the systems of patriarchy and customary laws practiced in African societies.

2.2.3 Representation of Women
To get to the second dimension of the theoretical overview, the theories of representation are important for this study, as they highlight the role of women, especially in the political arena.

In 1950, Friedrich (1950:286) argued that the most fundamental principal of representation lies within the notion of “proportional representation” and explained it as the attempt “to secure a representative assembly reflecting with more or less mathematical exactness the various divisions in the electorate”. Dexter (1955:5), on the other hand, suggested that this concept of representation was rather “acting with the consent of someone else”. This idea has two meanings: firstly, to “act in a certain way is conditional upon another man having expressed the wish that he should act that way”; and secondly, the “represented must share in the responsibility for the action taken in his name by the representative” (Dexter, 1955:5 cited in Pitkin, 1967:44).
Pitkin (1967:314) builds on the argument of proportional representation, as earlier discussed by Friedrich, by further stating that for proportionalists, a country’s national assembly should represent “the most exact possible image of the country”. He further postulates that not only is the identity of a group important, but the essence of representation should lie in the “delegation and granting of authority”. To give a representative authorisation, is to “grant another the right to act on behalf of oneself” (Pitkin, 1967:314).

Pitkin (1967:5) identifies four views of representation: formalistic representation, descriptive representation, symbolic representation and substantive representation. Each of these views provides an alternative approach for addressing representation of women within democratic states. Pitkin (1967, as cited in Dovi, 2006:6) surmises that formalist representation “focuses on the processes of authorisation and accountability”; descriptive representation focuses on the “extent to which representatives resemble or look like the represented”; symbolic representation “examines the emotional responses of the represented to the representatives”; and substantive representation focuses on the “activity of advancing the represented interests”.

However, Pitkin’s (1969:42) understanding of “political representation dictates the need for objective criteria for identifying who counts as constituents as well as the objective criteria for identifying the objective interests of constituents”. It can be argued that whilst Pitkin’s analysis of political representation is certainly helpful in identifying different approaches to representing women; the extent that women are a heterogeneous group and the extent to which the concept of gender can expand or constrict, Pitkin’s concept of representation is less helpful for determining whether women are being properly represented in democracies (Dovi, 2006:7).

Young (1994:20) argues that the issue of representation is a rather contested debate as women often faces numerous problems regarding representation. Firstly, deliberation is often biased against women’s ways of expressing their opinions and undermines their ability to be heard. Secondly, the standards of full citizenship as well as autonomy can be biased against the work performed by women. Thirdly, democratic participation is only available to those people who have the time and the necessary
resources to get involved. Therefore, representative institutions are often biased against those who provide care and those who depend on others (Dovi, 1994:20).

Gouws (1996:65) also suggests that the issue of representation is a contested terrain as it involves epistemological issues and that the issue of representation is not often addressed on this epistemological level. The feminism schools of thought concerned with gender inequalities have led to numerous obstacles on the epistemological level of foundationalist metatheories. They have illustrated how historically situated knowledge has been passed as “ahistorical and universal truths” (Fraser and Nicholson, 1990:26, Gouws, 1996:65) and feminists have created their own universal truths in order to correct these metatheoretical inadequacies.

Gouws (1996:65) identifies three epistemological traditions of representation that have importance for feminism: the feminist standpoint, post-modernism, and post-colonialism. The feminist standpoint makes the assumption that knowledge is socially put together in a careful manner and that a positivist notion of objectivity should be rejected (Gouws, 1996:65). Post-modernism, on the other hand, marks the argument that truths outside of the social location of a researcher cannot exist and views all knowledge to be filled with some form of power relation (Gouws, 1996:65). Whilst, the post-colonialism feminism provides critique to western scholarship which contradicts the notion of cross-cultural differences (Gouws, 1996:66).

Authors such as Jagger (1983:385) and Gouws (1996:67) are of opinion that feminist epistemology explains why predominant representation of reality and conditions of theoretical sufficiency are viewed as being male-biased. The most important starting point for the feminist standpoint lies within the notion that knowledge is socially situated. Conventional research is often portrayed as biased and only illustrating what is seen from a male point of view. Therefore a standpoint concern with the lives of women are seen as less bias and misrepresented as it gives the view of the oppressed.

The feminist epistemology attempts to address women’s experiences through intersubjectivity which are based on the assumption that despite the existence of differences between women they do indeed share same experiences. According to Harding (1991:138, see also Gouws, 1996:68), the feminist standpoint epistemology
needs strong objectivity that requires that “powerful background beliefs be interrogated (i.e. the cultural agendas that shape people’s attitudes and beliefs”.

Post-modernism, on the other hand, suggest that “knowledge is socially constituted and the self is an embodied self” (Gouws, 1996:70). The establishment of universal categories which entails women, have been revealed as ethnocentric and their very abstract claims mirror the experiences of a minority of people (Gouws, 1996:71, Flax, 1990:430). According to Butler (1992:3, cited by Gouws, 1996:71), the constitution of the “universal subject of women takes place through exclusion” and that “any effort to give universal or specific content to the category of women, presuming that the guarantee of solidarity is required in advance will necessary produce functionalisation”. Gouws (1996:71) concludes that “rejecting the totalising concept of women opens up the category for women through contestation, through which agency becomes possible”.

The feminist theorists of the post-colonial school of thought extend the critique of post-modernists to the power relations experienced by “Third World women”, which in theory can be seen as the mental image of communities of women with different sets of histories and social locations (Gouws, 1996:71). Third World women are handled as a homogeneous group due to the ahistorical idea that these women share the same experiences (Gouws, 1996:71, Mohanty, 1991:56). Mohanty (1991:5) states that feminist theorists often view these “third world women” as “victims of underdevelopment, illiteracy, poverty and religious fanaticism”. Using women in a category for critical examination often treats women as an already formed group. Yeatman (1995:194) argues that the post-colonial epistemology challenges foundationalist science and suggests representation be based on the questions: “who has the authority to present reality?” or “who must be silenced in order that representation prevail?” (Gouws, 1997:65, Yeatman, 1995:191).

Therefore, Mansbridge (2003:516) highlights that “in practice, disadvantaged groups often need the full representation that proportionality allows in order to achieve several goals: deliberative synergy, critical mass, dispersion of influence and a range of views within the group”
For Williams (1998:23), descriptive representation is crucial for the representation of women because “political representation of women shapes the political identities of women” and in order to be autonomous, members of a group must “participate in the formation of the identity of that group”. In terms of democracy, within the general framework it is likely that proportional descriptive representation will work best (Mansbridge, 1999:647). Mansbridge (1999:647) also states that this view of descriptive representation can reduce distrust and increase democratic legitimacy. This view accepts that elected politicians should be typical of the larger class of persons whom they represent, for example, that women represent women. It also advocates the notion of “substantive representation for the promotion of interests by improving deliberation” (Mansbridge, 1999:654).

For theorists of descriptive representation, like Mansbridge (2003:234), the function of a representative assembly is the action of “talking on behalf of the represented”. Mansbridge (2003:5) identifies four forms of democratic representation: promissory, anticipatory, gyroscopic and surrogacy. Promissory representation can be understood as the process through which representatives are “evaluated by the promises they make to constituents during campaigns” (Dovi, 2006:8) and resembles Pitkin’s formalistic representation. Anticipatory representation occurs when “representatives behave in ways informed by what they think their constituents will reward in the next election and not on what they promised during the campaign of the previous election” (Dovi, 2006:8). Gyroscopic representation, on the other hand, occurs when the “representatives ‘look within’ to derive from their own experience conceptions of interests and principles to serve as basis for their action” (Dovi, 2006:8). Whilst, surrogate representation occurs when the “legislator represents constituents outside of their districts” (Dovi, 2006:8). All four forms of representation can be implemented by “democratic citizens” who can be “legitimately represented within a democratic regime” (Dovi, 2006:9, see also Chaney and Fevre, 2002:898).

For theorists like Rehfeld (2006:20), political representation is not always and not necessarily democratic. He further argues that people who evaluate the representation of women cannot make the assumption that the increasing number of women in public office is evidence of democratisation (Dovi, 2006:10). In new democracies, scholars in favour of quotas state that more support for women in political institutions do not
have an impact on women’s roles when elected to office (Hassim, 2006:5). However, there is a bigger concern with regards to the inclusion of new actors and perspectives to break the link between maleness and political office. Hassim (2006: 5) argues that feminists concerned with the representation of women’s interests, can progress by “using the access created by quotas to build on other form of political action”.

Moreover, in new democracies, the reality of women as democratic citizens is progressing as a result of the adoption of quotas which have led to a “quota fever” (Dahlerup, 2004 cited by Hassim, 2006:3). The requirement created for quotas are based on the assumption that an increase in representation of women is a democratic good in itself. Incontestably, women’s under-representation in political institutions constitutes a democratic insufficiency and the rapid inclusion of a considerable number of women, albeit through quotas, can change people’s perceptions of women’s role in politics and may even shift gendered modes of deliberation in parliament (Hassim, 2006:3).

In western democracies, the idea of quotas raises normative objections in that they promote “essentialist and homogenised views of social groups, reinforces stereotypes and rigidly identities” (Hassim, 2006:5). A second such objection is that quotas are based on the problematic assumption that descriptive representation is in some sense better than other forms of representation; that is, that women are better represented by women (Hassim, 2006:5).

According to Hassim, (2006:4), quotas address the very essence of the claim to inclusion and descriptive representation. Moreover, quotas establish a considerable number of new actors into institutions, break up male monopolies, and may have downstream effects on how the gender of political elites is divided (Hassim, 2006:5). Evidence shows that legitimacy and institutional trust are made more attractive by descriptive representation and that those in favour of quotas suggest that the presence of women in political institutions, such as parliament, can move the “patriarchal demeanour of political institutions and force institutions to recognise women” (Hassim, 2006:4).
In both old and new democracies, similar arguments are made for the democratic importance of increasing women’s representation. Women’s claims to representation entail the “claim to equal inclusion in the nation-state” (Hassim, 2006:4). This claim draws attention to the denial of suffrage to women as well as to the gender gap between women’s votes and their presence as elected members of legislatures. Women’s under-representation is undoubtedly a function of systematic historical discrimination against and marginalization of women as a group. According to Hassim (2006:4), demands for inclusion can signal different understandings of the body politic: for some feminists, equality means women taking their place in the “modernist, liberal democratic state as it is currently constituted”; for others, inclusion is a “platform from which to question the extent to which suffrage on its own would reduce deeply embedded social and economic inequalities of gender”.

Dovi (2006:10) argues that we need to realise that being able to “act as a representative on behalf of someone else depends on the person’s background”. Therefore, women’s backgrounds prohibit them from political participation and inclusion due to historical disadvantages. Some theories of representation note that representation depends on the representative’s characteristics and that the representative does not act for, but rather stand for others by virtue of the connection between them, a resemblance, or reflection (Dovi, 2006:10, Chaney and Fevre, 2002:899). This view is mainly held by advocates of proportional representation.

Another way of looking at representation is by emphasising the critical mass theory. The critical mass theory can be debated in two ways (Childs and Krook, 2006:6). Firstly, it focuses on the opportunity for women to form supportive alliances when there are an increased number of women. Secondly, it refers to the proportion of women that range between 15 and 40 percent in parliament (Childs and Krook, 2006:6). This means that the spaces in different parliaments will be occupied by skewed and sometimes balanced groups (Childs and Krook, 2006:6).

Childs and Krook (2006:6) goes on to argue that mechanisms for the real representation of women lie within the “critical acts that can lead to changes and change the position of minorities in society”. These critical acts include the “introduction of quotas for women, recruitment of women, equality legislation and
institutions, and most importantly the willingness and ability of the minority to mobilise the resources of the organisation or institution” (Dahlerup, 1988:296).

Hassim (2006:5) suggests that the notion of “critical mass” is appropriate when talking about women’s interests and shows that policy concerns relating to care-work and women’s rights are more likely to be introduced when women attain a significant proportion among decision-makers. Hassim (2006:5) argues that historical discrimination creates a “minimal set of group interests among women that transcend race, class, ethnic and other differences”.

Hassim (2006: 14) points to a bottom-up politics in which different constituencies of women identify and define policy demands which can be advanced as part of a horizontal coalition of interests (for example, poor urban women linking up with housing movements) as well as through policy-focused alliances with (or where necessary pressure on) women parliamentarians. The emphasis on building a constituency-based politics recognizes that not all women have the same interests, that women’s organizations might conceive of their interests differently from women politicians, and that strong organizations of women at the local level enhance the virtuous circle of representation.

In Uganda, women’s organizations have been somewhat successful in pursuing such strategies although their effectiveness is highly constrained by the authoritarian political culture in which they are operating, where building alliances outside of Museveni’s approved network can be impact negatively on parliamentary politics (Hassim, 2006: 14). Similarly, it can be argued that in South Africa women who are elected into parliament are increasingly distant from movements of poor people (Hassim, 2006:14-15). For example, witness the political (and constitutional) contestation between the Treatment Action Campaign and Health Minister (and ANC Women’s League leader) Manto Tshabalala Msimang.

Thus, the theories discussed in this section under the main themes of gender equality and representation are important for the conceptualisation and operationalisation of gender equality and the representation of women in parliament in this study as they identify the key elements of gender equality and representation of women.
2.3 Conceptualisation of Gender Equality and Representation of Women in Parliament

In this section, attitudes towards gender equality and representation of women in parliament – the central focus of this study – will be conceptualised.

2.3.1 Gender Equality

For the purpose of this study gender equality will be conceptualised by way of three main themes applicable to this study: leadership, education and economic independence. The study will emphasise Bussemaker’s (1991:53) argument regarding gender equality, which identifies two interrelated conceptions. The first concept is “equal formal rights between men and women”; this denotes a liberal notion of equality and conception of formal and legal aspects, and also includes formal education and political leadership based on the democratic values of a country (Bussemaker, 1991:53). The second conception is that “gender equality has been related to equal access to welfare and equal opportunities”; this denotes the conception of material and social aspects, and economic independence (Bussemaker, 1991:53).

The study will also emphasise a further conceptualising of gender equality based on the Group of Specialists on Mainstreaming commissioned by the Council of Europe (1998:4), which states that gender equality refers to “equal visibility, empowerment, and participation of both sexes in all spheres of public and private life.”

Therefore, the study’s own conceptualisation of gender equality entails the notion of formal equality and substantive equality and indicates that: women should have equal opportunity in leadership positions in parliament, equal opportunity in education and equal economic independence compared to men.

2.3.2 Representation of Women in Parliament

For the purpose of the study the representation of women in parliament will be conceptualised in terms of descriptive representation. According to Pitkin (1967:11), as previously mentioned, descriptive representation focuses on the extent to which representatives resemble or look like the represented. Descriptive representation helps “compensate for past and present injustices, provides a voice for overlooked interests,
and contributes to the overall legitimacy of democratic institutions” (Wolbrecht and Campbell, 2002:921).

Mansbridge (1999:648) argues that proportional descriptive representation, as discussed in 2.1.2 of this chapter, can reduce distrust and increase democratic legitimacy. This view states that elected politicians should be typical of a larger class of persons which they represent, for example, that women represent women. If women account for half of the population in a society, then women should represent the same proportion in parliament and other democratic institutions. This also furthers substantive representation views on the “promotion of interests by improving deliberation” (Mansbridge, 1999:654).

Mansbridge (1999:627) offers important qualifications for the functions of descriptive representation. The four contexts in which descriptive representation performs certain functions the best can be found when female citizens prefer female representatives: “to foster adequate communication in context of mistrust; to promote innovative thinking in the context of uncrystalised, not fully articulated interests; to create a social meaning of ability to rule for members of a group in historical contexts where that ability has been seriously questioned; and to increase the polity’s de facto legitimacy in the context of past discrimination” (Mansbridge, 1999:628).

2.4 Operationalisation of Gender Equality and Representation of Women in Parliament

The operationalisation of gender equality in the study will divide gender equality into three dimensions. These dimensions will include: leadership, education and economic independence.

2.4.1 Gender Equality

2.4.1.1 Leadership Dimension of Gender Equality

Women in positions of power have produced new opportunities to observe female leaders along with male leaders in the process of gender equality in politics (Eagly and Carli, 2001:629). Although new opportunities for female leaders are evident, women have always adopted leadership positions in social structures such as families and throughout communities. However, women are seldom found in major positions
of public leadership, especially in the political sphere (Eagly and Carli, 2001:629). Female political leaders may function as role models, inspiring other women and girls to be politically active themselves (Wolbrecht and Campbell, 2007:922).

The study will use the following item from the World Values Survey questionnaire of 2001:

For each of the following statements I read out, can you tell me how much you agree with each? Do you agree strongly, agree, disagree, or disagree strongly?

On the whole, men make better political leaders than women do.

Responses were coded on a five-point (Likert) scale, where 1 was strongly agree and 5 was strongly disagree.

2.4.1.2 Educational Dimension of Gender Equality
The relation between education and gender equality is not simple. As with social class relations, schools both reinforce subordination and create new possibilities for liberation. These contradictions can occur at every level of education. Education sites are responsible for gender socialisation, but they also offer girls a chance to develop their skills and knowledge (Wrigley, 1995: viii). Wrigley (1995: vii) suggests that education can be linked to both public and private worlds which help to form consciousness and to structure inequalities. The theories of gender equality reach their greatest intensity in the educational sphere (Wrigley, 1995: viii). Education has many outcomes in favour of gender equality. These include: progress to economic development for women; progress in attaining powerful positions for women; and the achievement of higher levels of knowledge and intelligence for women (Wrigley, 1995: viii).

Education will be operationalised as follows:

For each of the following statement I read out, can you tell me how much you agree with each? Do you agree strongly, agree, disagree, or disagree strongly?

A university education is more important for a boy than a girl.

Responses were coded on a five-point (Likert) scale, where 1 was strongly agree and 5 was strongly disagree.
2.4.1.3 The Economic Independence Dimensions of Gender Equality

The notion of economic independence has been related to the labour market, the system of social security, wage-related social insurance benefits, as well as welfare benefits (Bussemaker, 1991:54). Gender equality in terms of economic independence is formulated as being the “equal treatment of women and men in the access, payment and treatment in the sphere of paid labour as eliminating inequality in rights between men and women in the system of social security” (Bussemaker, 1991:54). Bussemaker (1991:54) also states that unequal opportunities in the access to the labour market and the elimination of indirect discrimination, including breadwinner labels, usually mean that women are less able to qualify as such than men (Bussemaker, 1991:54).

For the purpose of this study, economic independence is measured by way of two WVS items:

1. For each of the following statement I read out, can you tell me how much you agree with each? Do you agree strongly, agree, disagree, or disagree strongly?

   Both husband and wife should contribute to household income.

   Responses were coded on a five-point (Likert) scale, where 1 was strongly agree and 5 was strongly disagree.

2. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement?

   When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women.

   Responses were coded on a three-point scale, where 1 was agree and 3 was disagree.

3. For each of the following statements I read out, can you tell me how much you agree with each? Do you agree strongly, agree, disagree, or disagree strongly?

   Being a housewife is just as fulfilling as working for pay.

   Responses were coded on a five-point (Likert) scale, where 1 was strongly agree and 5 was strongly disagree.

2.4.2 Representation of Women in Parliament

The representation of women in parliament will be measured according to the actual count or percentage of women in parliament in the three sub-Saharan countries, South
Africa, Uganda and Zimbabwe. These percentages or numbers will include all women elected to parliament.

The study will use sources from government websites to gain the relevant information regarding the actual number of women in parliament. These sources will include publications and journals from these websites as well as secondary sources as a means to obtain information on the percentages of women in parliament.

2.5 Conclusion
This chapter provides a theoretical overview of gender equality and representation in order to provide the study with a theoretical context. The conceptualisation of gender equality and the representation of women in parliament is the central focus of this chapter. The operationalisation of these two concepts focuses on how they will be measured by means of a comparative cross-national analysis of items taken from the World Values Survey questionnaire conducted in the three sub-Saharan countries, South Africa, Uganda and Zimbabwe.

Chapter Three will present the data and the procedures used during the data analysis process. It will also include a description of data, statistical analysis and testing of propositions.
Chapter Three: Data, Measurement and Findings

“It is difficult to conceive of a human problem that would not be better illuminated if reliable value data concerning it were available”
Rokeach, 1979:26

3.1 Introduction
In scientific inquiry the researcher is provided with numerous tools with which to facilitate the process of moving from abstract concepts towards more concrete observations (King, Keohane and Verba, 1994; see also Steyn, 2002:73). If casual inquiry were to be undertaken by the human observer in observations, the results would be catastrophic as knowledge would be spoiled by false and inaccurate observations, which would in turn lead to reasoning that is based on illogical and gross over-generalisations, ego involvement and mystification (Babbie, 1989:7). Babbie and Mouton (2001:34) are of the opinion that the duty of the scientific researcher is to employ the rules of scientific observation when observing reality.

Babbie (1989:17) suggests that “Scientific theory deals with the logical aspect of science; research deals with the observational aspect; and statistics offer a device for comparing what is logically expected with what is actually observed.”

The aim of this study is to determine whether there is a link between attitudes towards gender equality and the representation of women in parliament. Therefore this chapter will provide the data representation of items in the World Values Survey questionnaire 2001; it will also give a description of the data, undertake a data analysis, and test the proposition. The study will also attempt to draw out the implications with regard to gender equality in parliament by comparing the three sub-Saharan countries, South Africa, Uganda and Zimbabwe.

3.2 The Strategy of Inquiry
This section will provide background information on the World Values Survey (WVS); it will also present an overview of the methodology used for this study, as well as a description of some of the demographic attributes of each sample.
3.2.1 The World Values Survey
The World Values Survey was originally planned by the Roman Catholic Church in some European countries and other groups in 1980. The aims of the World Values Survey are to attain a broad understanding of socio-political trends, which includes perceptions, behaviour and expectations among adults across the world. The World Values Survey (WVS) has subsequently (from 1990 onwards) become a worldwide investigation of socio-cultural and political changes, and explores values relating to family, gender, work, politics, economics, religion and leisure time (www.worldvaluessurvey.org).

In all three countries selected, i.e. South Africa, Uganda and Zimbabwe, interviews were conducted on a face-to-face basis with questionnaires available in a number of different languages to ensure comprehension. The interviews were accordingly conducted in the respondent’s language of choice to ensure more reliable and high-quality data. The World Values Survey questionnaire is standardised and the same questionnaire was used in all three countries to ensure consistency and comparability. For the purpose of this study, results from the WVS conducted in South Africa, Uganda and Zimbabwe in 2001 will be utilised (www.worldvaluessurvey.org).

3.2.2 Composition of the Sample
3.2.2.1 Sample size for each country
The World Values Survey was conducted in the three sub-Saharan countries: South Africa, Uganda and Zimbabwe in 2001 (Technical Report for WVS, 2001).

The sample size (N) for each country was as follows:

- South Africa = 3000 respondents;
- Uganda = 1002 respondents;
- Zimbabwe 1002 respondents.

The sample for South Africa included more respondents compared to that of Uganda and Zimbabwe based on the size of the population, the number of provinces, the number of official languages, and the racial groupings within the country. In order for the sample to be representative of the country, in the South Africa case more
inhabitants were therefore interviewed across different racial groups, different provinces and language specifications compared to Uganda and Zimbabwe.

### 3.2.2.2 Sampling method

The WVS uses a probability sampling technique, making it theoretically possible to select anyone from the respective population who is 16 years of age and older in the South African case, and 18 years of age or older in Uganda and Zimbabwe. The surveys also use stratified samples, drawn from homogenously constructed sub-groups of the total population (Technical Report for WVS by Markinor, 2001).

A standard form of sampling instructions was used by the World Values Survey agencies to ensure uniformity in the sampling procedure. Agencies supplied street names for urban starting points and in cases where neither maps nor street names were available for rural areas, suggestions were made for sampling procedures (Technical Report for WVS by Markinor, 2001).

The sample-point level represents the respondent selection which is done randomly according to a selection grid (the first two pages of the master questionnaire) by Markinor. In the Zimbabwean case the traditional Kish grid method was used. The sampling instructions include six interviews conducted at sample point, and a male/female split of 50/50 (Technical Report for WVS by Markinor, 2001).

The samples were stratified into sub-groups defined by province, gender, population group and community size, making it representative of the total adult population. The representativeness of the samples is within a statistical margin of error of less than 2% at 95% confidence level and weighted to the full population. Thus, all the samples are

---

9 A probability sample is one that is selected in such a way that sets of elements from a population accurately correlate with the total population from which the sample was selected. This involves random selection, giving each element an equal opportunity of participate in the study (Babbie and Mouton, 2001: 175; see also Neuman, 1994).

10 A stratified sample involves the process of stratification, i.e. grouping units composing a population into identical groups or strata so that the sample can be representative of the total population and decrease the probability of sample error. For instance, Female/Male is 50/50 (Babbie and Mouton, 2001: 191; see also Neuman, 1994).

11 A method used when evaluating data similar in content by exposing such data to different sampling techniques and measurements (Informe Design, 2008:1 [www.informedesign.umn.edu/glossary](http://www.informedesign.umn.edu/glossary)).

3.2.2.3 Rural/urban sampling

All the samples have to be representative of urban as well as rural populations in all the countries. In the case of the World Values Survey 2001, the sampling of the three sub-Saharan countries shows the distribution for rural/urban status as follows: in South Africa, 60% of the sample consisted of metropolitan areas (large cities with populations of 250 000+) and 40% of non-metropolitan areas (cities, large towns, small towns, villages and rural areas). The allocation to urban areas in Uganda was 30% and 70% to rural areas. Lastly, in Zimbabwe 37% of the sample consisted of urban areas and 63% of rural areas (Technical Report for WVS by Markinor, 2001).

3.2.2.3.1 Urban sampling

Urban sampling included all community sizes greater than 500, whereas the rural sample will include all community sizes less than 500. This sampling is a definition of rural and urban in South Africa.

The sample structure for Uganda indicates the number of interviews allocated to both the rural and urban sample. The Ugandan sample is divided between the actual number of interviews and the number of sampling points per province. For example, the Lira province included 36 conducted interviews in the rural areas in total, which means that six sample points needed to be drawn for rural Lira.

The sample structure for Zimbabwe also indicates the number of interviews allocated to the rural and urban sample. The male and female split and a total sample also apply here. The total sample is split up between the actual number of interviews and the sampling points per province. For example the Bulawayo province included 84 interviews in urban areas, which means that 14 sample points needed to be drawn from the urban areas.

3.2.2.3.2 Rural sampling

The rural points are selected using a method that included small towns and then conducting the interviews within a 20-kilometre radius of the boundaries of the
selected town. This method involves randomly selecting a sample in which small towns are selected in each province.

3.2.3 Some Demographic Attributes of the Samples

3.2.3.1 Gender

The distribution of the samples in all three countries by gender centre on a near 50-50 split (see Table 4). In the cases of Uganda and Zimbabwe, slightly more than half of the samples (52% and 54% respectively) are women, whilst the opposite is true for the South African sample, where 52% are male.

Table 4: Distribution of the sample by gender

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>South Africa</th>
<th>Uganda</th>
<th>Zimbabwe</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>52.0</td>
<td>47.6</td>
<td>46.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>48.0</td>
<td>52.4</td>
<td>53.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.2.3.2 Level of Education

When analysing the levels of education (Table 5), the findings show that more than half of the samples in each of three countries under investigation have either some or completed high school education. In fact, 63% of South Africans have some/completed high school education, in comparison to 54% of Ugandans and 51% of Zimbabweans. Interestingly, a larger percentage (30%) of the Ugandan sample has some post-Matric qualification, compared to 17% of South Africans and only 7% of Zimbabweans.

Table 5: Distribution of the sample by education

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>South Africa</th>
<th>Uganda</th>
<th>Zimbabwe</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None(^{12})</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary school(^{13})</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>36.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High school(^{14})</td>
<td>63.1</td>
<td>53.8</td>
<td>51.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-Matric(^{15})</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{12}\) This represents those respondents with no formal schooling at all.

\(^{13}\) This represents those respondents with either some primary schooling or those who have completed primary school.

\(^{14}\) This represents those respondents with either some high school or those who have completed high school.

\(^{15}\) This represents all those respondents who have some post-Matric qualification, including: completion of artisan’s certificate, technikon diploma/degree, professional, technical, secretarial, some university or completed university degree, and postgraduate degree.
For the purpose of this study, there were two expectations based on the theory discussed with regards to the level of education in each country: first, that Ugandans and South Africans would have more positive attitudes towards gender equality; and second, that these two countries could have more women representatives in parliament.

3.2.3.3 Residential Area

Table 6 reveals some interesting features about the size of the town/community in which the majority of respondents in all three samples live. The majority of Zimbabweans and Ugandans surveyed in 2001 (59% and 56% respectively) live in rural areas, in contrast to only 16% of the South African respondents. A total of three-quarters (76%) of the South African sample indicated that they are urban dwellers, in comparison to 33% of Zimbabweans and only 13% of Ugandans.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>South Africa</th>
<th>Uganda</th>
<th>Zimbabwe</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rural&lt;sup&gt;16&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>55.6</td>
<td>59.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Town&lt;sup&gt;17&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>31.7</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban&lt;sup&gt;18&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>75.6</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>32.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Therefore, the expectation here, again based on the theoretical discussion, is that those countries with a higher percentage of people living in rural areas, such as Uganda and Zimbabwe, are less likely to have positive attitudes towards gender equality and could, as a result, have fewer women in parliament.

3.2.3.4 Religious Affiliation

The distribution of the samples by religious affiliation (Table 7) indicates that the vast majority of the samples within each country subscribe to some form of religious practice. In all three countries Protestantism is the most widely practised religion, followed by Roman Catholicism in Uganda, the Independent African Church in Zimbabwe and Evangelical/Apostolic in South Africa. Only 1% of Ugandans indicated that they do not belong to a religious denomination, in contrast to 16% of

<sup>16</sup> Size of town/community = 0 – 499 inhabitants  
<sup>17</sup> Size of town/community = 500 – 39 999 inhabitants  
<sup>18</sup> Size of town/community = 40 000+ inhabitants
South Africans and 15% of Zimbabweans who indicated they either do not belong to a religious denomination or refused to answer.

Table 7: Distribution of the sample by religious affiliation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>South Africa</th>
<th>Uganda</th>
<th>Zimbabwe</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Do not belong</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>14.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roman Catholic</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td>17.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td>33.7</td>
<td>44.3</td>
<td>27.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orthodox (Russian/Greek)</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hindu</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evangelic/Apostolic Faith Mission</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buddhist</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent African Church (e.g. ZCC, Shembe, etc.)</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>21.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In a country where people are more religious than others, as is Uganda in this case, the study would expect that those people would follow more conservative and traditional norms. Therefore, based upon the theoretical insights, the more religious that people in a given country are the greater the likelihood that they would have negative attitudes towards gender equality, whereas those countries with a higher percentage of secular inhabitants would be more open to gender equality.

3.3 Findings

In this section the study will be discussing the following: the construction of a gender equality index, the analysis of frequencies, analysing gender equality by a few independent variables as a means to explain the differences found between the three sub-Saharan countries, South Africa, Uganda and Zimbabwe.

3.3.1 Constructing a Gender Equality Index

The three levels of gender equality in this study, namely leadership, education and economic independence, underpinned the construction of four indices, one for each level and then a combined Gender Equality Index. The exact items used in the World Values Survey were discussed in Chapter Two. These indices were constructed as follows:
(1) **Attitudes towards Women’s Leadership**: The variable ‘men make better leaders than women’ (1-4) was recoded to form a scale of negative (1/2) to positive (3/4).
(2) **Attitudes towards Women’s Education**: The variable ‘university education is more important for a boy’ (1-4) was recoded to form a scale of negative (1/2) to positive (3/4).
(3) **Attitudes towards Women’s Economic Independence**: The variables ‘being a housewife is as fulfilling as working for pay’ (1-4, which was recoded to form a scale of negative (1/2) to positive (3/4)), ‘both husband and wife should contribute to household income’ (1-4, which was recoded to form a scale of negative (1/2) to positive (3/4)) and ‘men have more right to jobs when jobs are scarce’ (1-3, was recoded to form a scale a two-point scale: 1 = negative and 4 = positive) were added to form a ten-point scale: 3-5 = very negative; 6-7 = negative; 8-9 = positive; and 10-12 = very positive.
(4) **Gender Equality Index**: The variables ‘attitudes towards women’s leadership’ (1-4), ‘attitudes towards women’s education’ (1-4), and ‘attitudes towards women’s economic independence’ (1-4) were added together to form a ten-point scale, ranging from 1 = negative to 10 = positive. The scale was recoded to form a three-point scale: 3-5 = negative; 6-8 = neutral; and 9-12 = positive).

### 3.3.2 Gender Equality and its Dimensions

In this section of the study the discussion will be based on the following: the analysis of gender equality and its dimensions, which include leadership, education and economic independence. This section will also examine the relationship between attitudes towards gender equality and a number of independent variables such as gender, education, rural/urban status and age in order to determine the possible reasons for differences in attitudes towards gender equality across the three sub-Saharan countries, South Africa, Uganda and Zimbabwe.

#### 3.3.2.1 Attitudes towards Women in Leadership Positions

According to Carli and Eagly (2001:629) as mentioned in Chapter Two, gender equality has produced new opportunities for male and female leaders, especially in the political sphere. Although new opportunities in politics have become available for
women, their leadership positions have in general been restricted to predominantly social structures such as the family and within communities.

*Figure 1* illustrates the percentage of the respective samples that have positive attitudes towards women in leadership positions. More than half of the South African sample (58%) indicated they had positive attitudes towards women in leadership positions. South Africa is the only country of the three under investigation where the majority of the sample indicated a positive attitude. Close to half the Zimbabwean sample (48%) indicated they had positive attitudes towards women in leadership positions, whilst only 32% of the Ugandan sample agreed.

A possible explanation for the lower percentages of positive attitudes towards women in leadership was suggested in Chapter Two, where Richter, (1991:526) argues that leadership is often shaped by the ideologies of patriarchy, which reinforces authoritarian values over democratic norms. It is possible in the cases of Uganda and Zimbabwe that authoritarian values have been legitimated as the norm by the laws and customs of the society’s culture, forcing women into private family life and in the process limiting their access to political leadership.

*Figure 1: Positive attitudes towards women in leadership positions*
The findings from Figure 1 allows one to infer that if a population has a positive attitude towards women in leadership positions, then women would be well represented in leadership structures throughout societal spheres, including parliament.

The data presented in Figure 2 allow us to examine the attitudes towards women in leadership positions more closely. In the case of South Africa\(^{19}\) it becomes evident that not only do more than half of the sample have a positive attitude towards women in leadership positions, but close to a quarter (24.6%) have “very positive” attitudes towards women in leadership positions. This figure is more than double that of their Ugandan (10.3%) and Zimbabwean (10.4%) counterparts.

There are a number of possible explanations for the positive attitudes towards women in leadership positions in South Africa. South Africa has a proportional representative electoral system (as previously discussed), which means that a larger percentage of representatives is elected to national legislatures because of the proportional representation system’s higher district and party magnitudes, placing more pressure upon party gatekeepers to ensure equality in their party lists of candidates, which are represented across different interests groups across South Africa (Matland and Montgomery, 2003:22). Kunovich and Paxton (2005:26) note that when parties adopt a more leftist approach, they are more likely to recruit women and to adopt strategies to ensure more women candidates; this may in turn possibly lead to increases in party leadership by women.

One can also argue that the demand for gender equality in South Africa is higher than in the other two countries as a result of developmental bodies such as the National Gender Machinery, which addresses a broad spectrum of gender issues (Kgasi, 2004:8). However, it is also important to emphasise that within the African National Congress (ANC) quotas have been a highly contested subject, especially within the ANC Women’s League. Erlank (2005:195) argues there have been tensions within the ruling party based on two main issues: firstly, the broad commitments to women’s liberation rooted in the ANC’s history as a national liberation movement; and

\(^{19}\)The standard deviation in the South African case is 1.025 with a mean estimated at 2.653. The standard deviation is the dispersion of a set of data from its mean; the more spread apart the data, the higher the deviation (Babbie and Mouton, 2004:425; see also [www.investopedia.com](http://www.investopedia.com)).
secondly, the specific policy directions that the party adopts as a contender in government. Gender activists and feminists also claim that the prioritisation of gender polices should be implemented strategically by the ruling party (Erlank, 2005:207).

Less than half of the Zimbabwean sample indicated positive attitudes towards women in leadership positions (Figure 1), of which 37% have a “positive” attitude and 10% have a “very positive” attitude (Figure 2). It is interesting to note that the Zimbabwean sample is split between those that have a “negative” attitude (36%) and those that have a “positive” attitude (37%) towards women in leadership positions. Thus, there is some degree of incongruence amongst the Zimbabwean sample with regards to women in leadership positions. A possible explanation could be that Zimbabwe’s plurality-majority electoral system. Although, majoritarian/plurality systems aims to create a “manufactured majority” that represent the share of seats of a party beyond its true size, it at the same time also penalises minority groups (Norris, 1997:3). In Zimbabwe, the “winner takes all” electoral system used by parties focuses on effective governance and not so much on the representation of all minority views and groups (Norris, 1997:3).

Another possible explanation for the Zimbabwean case could be the result of patriarchal practices within the country. Siemienski (2004:436) postulates that “attitudes related to gender roles are connected in some way with more general value orientations consisting of sets of interrelated attitudes and values within the culture of the different societies”. In Zimbabwe, the Shona culture highlights “patriarchy practices that shape and perpetuate gender inequalities” (Kambarami, 2006:1). Some of these patriarchal practices can be seen in the family, education, religion, marriage, politics and the economy of Zimbabwe. The Shona culture importantly makes the distinction that females are the subordinates of their male counterparts; men control women’s actions in marriage and communities, and women are seen as weak because of their sexuality. Therefore, politics in Zimbabwe can be seen as a “dirty game” which requires “tough qualities and very few women are attracted by it” (Kambarami, 2006:7). Furthermore, due to the patriarchal nature of the social system in Zimbabwe,

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20 The standard deviation for Zimbabwe is 0.878. The mean for this country is estimated at 2.420.
21 As earlier discussed in Chapter 1 in section 1.2.3.1, p. 9.
women often constitute the largest demographic in rural communities and are completely dependent upon the men within their communities, especially economically, rather than being independent leaders in public life (Kambarami, 2006:7).

More than two thirds (68%) of Ugandans, on the other hand, have negative attitudes towards women in leadership positions, of which 45% are “negative” and 23% are “very negative” (see Figure 2). This finding is surprising because, although Uganda has a plurality-majority electoral system, they also have what is known as a “separate election”, as discussed in Chapter One, where women participate as candidates in all 56 districts and one winner from each district is elected to parliament. The 56 women from the respective districts have special reserved seats in parliament which serve as an add-on to the 214 MPs in the Ugandan parliament (Electionguide, 2008).

A possible explanation for higher percentages in negative attitudes towards gender equality could be that affirmative action in Uganda is initiated through a top-down approach, which results in women’s inability to set their own agendas (Hanssen, 2005:10). Also, because the separate elections have been implemented by the ruling

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22 The standard deviation for Uganda is 0.908 .The mean is 2.188.
party and the president, female candidates elected as district representatives find it hard to make political decisions as they are expected to obey the customary laws and patriarchal system of the society. Perhaps Ugandans’ negative attitudes towards women in leadership positions can also be explained by the country’s party system. Caul (2001:1225) postulates that political parties are important mechanisms in the promotion of women to leadership roles and in effect influence the number of women in parliament. In Uganda the political party system is classified as a no-party system, which consists of one dominant party, the National Resistance Movement (NRM), which is for the most part a male-dominated institution (Hanssen, 2005:6). The demography of Uganda’s political parties and their lack of women’s issues on their party agendas may point towards a social structure that is patriarchal in nature (Hanssen, 2005:12). This “prejudice” is not only visible in numerous political institutions in Uganda but are also favoured and supported by the Protestant and Roman Catholic churches (Hanssen, 2005:13). Therefore, the negative attitudes towards women in leadership in Uganda may indicate that either women see their achievement as candidates for parties as privileges handed by the NRM and feel uncertain to join other political parties or “women might feel insecure and afraid to express the political conscience” because of government intimidation(Hanssen, 2005:13). Furthermore, opposition parties to the NRM have “lacked stability within their own political set-ups and often find themselves in disputes over whom to front for candidates” (Hanssen, 2005:13).

Thus, South Africans have a more positive attitude towards women in leadership positions than Ugandans and Zimbabweans. Chapter One presented three tables which indicated the percentage of women in parliament for the three countries under investigation, and it should come as no surprise then that in 2001 the South African parliament had a higher percentage of women than Uganda and Zimbabwe. What is surprising is that, although 24% of seats in Ugandan parliament in 1999/01 were held by women, more than two thirds of the sample had negative attitudes towards women in leadership positions. However, it should be mentioned that in Uganda, the manipulated “separate election” system has the effect that more women are elected to parliament. In contrast, almost half the Zimbabwean sample had a positive attitude

23 Discussed in Chapter 1 in section 1.3.2, p. 15.
towards women in leadership positions, whilst only 9% of the seats in Zimbabwean parliament were held by women. Again, this is in a system where women compete directly against men.

3.3.2.2 Attitudes towards Gender Equality in Education

According to Wrigley (1995: vii), also mentioned in Chapter Two, ideologies have always reached their greatest intensity in the educational sphere. Education is argued to be an important variable for gender equality, as education has outcomes related to higher achievement on levels of knowledge and intelligence, which helps with the progress of economic development and the attainment of leadership.

Figure 3: Positive attitudes towards gender equality in education

The findings in Figure 3 indicate that all three of the respective countries expressed positive attitudes towards equal education for men and women. A majority of 82% of the Zimbabwean sample and 81% of South African sample have positive attitudes towards equality in education; whilst the Ugandan sample follows suit with 77%. Therefore, it is possible to infer that the education of women in the three sub-Saharan countries meets with little resistance, which is imperative should women want to attain leadership positions and economic independence. Recalling the argument of Blumberg (1984:84), education is necessary if power at the highest level is to be achieved.
Although *Figure 3* illustrates fairly positive attitudes towards equality in education across all three samples, a few interesting patterns are revealed upon closer examination of the data (see *Figure 4* below). Although the Zimbabwean sample has the highest percentage of respondents with positive attitudes towards the education of women, less than half (40%) are “very positive”, compared to 45% of Ugandans and 52% of South Africans.

One possible explanation for the findings that the majority of South Africans\(^{24}\) have a “very positive” attitude towards equality in education could be the intense networking of women on governmental, national and grassroots levels to address women’s issues in the country, which has led to the promotion of, for example, gender equality in both schools and higher education (Kgasi, 2004:7).

**Figure 4: Attitudes towards gender equality in education**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Very Negative</th>
<th>Negative</th>
<th>Positive</th>
<th>Very Positive</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>51.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>31.9</td>
<td>44.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>41.7</td>
<td>40.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the case of Zimbabwe, it is interesting to note that, although the sample has the highest percentage of positive (“positive” + “very positive”) attitudes towards the education of women, it also has the lowest percentage of respondents that are “very positive” and the highest percentage of respondents that are “very negative” (6%). This may be attributable to the problems associated with social and cultural barriers, which are believed to have resulted in gender inequalities within the country.

\(^{24}\) The standard deviation is 0.877, with the mean estimated at 3.283.
Siemenski (2004:437) argues that these negative attitudes, linked to social and cultural barriers, will result in major complications in the country’s education policies and the implementation of gender equality in schools in the long term.

Although slightly more than two thirds of the Ugandan sample\(^{25}\) (Figure 4) has a positive attitude towards equality in education, of which 45% are “very positive”, little less than a quarter (23%) of the sample have a negative attitude, the highest amongst the three countries under investigation. One possible explanation for the findings may lie within the notion of religiosity. When looking at the distribution of religious affiliation, as discussed in section 3.3.3.4 of this chapter, one could argue that the inhabitants in Uganda are perceived to be more religious than their South African and Zimbabwean counterparts and, therefore, it can be suggested that the Ugandan respondents are more conservative and bound to the ideal that women should maintain a lifestyle that is based on the perception of strict boundaries about the role of women under patriarchy rule. Religion and churches, in particular, play an important role in political socialisation (Kotzé, 2001:22). According to Van Deth and Scarborough (1995:11), “the rise in secular value orientations can be conceptualised as a process – originating in occidental rationality – of detachment from the beliefs, values and practices of traditional churches” (quoted in Kotzé, 2001:22).

In other words, the social norm in Uganda would dictate the primary role of women as the caretakers of the household and children, whilst men are educated and labelled as the *breadwinners* of the household (Norris and Inglehart, 2003:2).

However, despite social and cultural barriers, and similar to the case of Zimbabwe, the Ugandan sample also reveals a pattern which indicates that the distribution of attitudes towards equal education is fairly positive. This is a trend that one can only hope will gain in strength over time.

### 3.3.2.3 Attitudes towards Women’s Economic Independence

Bussemaker (1991:54) postulates that gender equality in terms of economic independence can be described as equal opportunities for women and men in access,

\(^{25}\) The standard deviation is 0.855 and the mean 3.161.
payment and treatment in the sphere of paid labour. Therefore, economic independence can eliminate inequalities in the rights between the sexes in social security (Bussemaker, 1991:54).

**Figure 5: Positive attitudes towards women’s economic independence**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>54.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>54.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>60.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

More than half of the respondents in all three countries expressed positive attitudes towards the economic independence of women (see *Figure 5*). The Zimbabwean\(^{26}\) sample indicated a slightly higher percentage (60%) than that of their South African and Ugandan counterparts, both with 55%. A possible explanation for the higher percentage in Zimbabwe could be women’s contribution in the agricultural sector in rural areas. Classical modernisation theory, as discussed earlier in Chapter Two, postulates that increases in democracy and human choice often result in economic development, and it is economic development that is the starting point for increases in women’s eligibility for social power.

According to the Technical Centre for Agricultural and Rural Cooperation (CTA, 2000:1), in most sub-Saharan countries, such as Zimbabwe, women make a significant contribution to food production, especially in the processing and marketing of food products. Therefore, one can assume that the findings in *Figure 5* are a direct

\(^{26}\)The standard deviation is 0.868 and the mean 2.867.
result of women’s economic development in the agricultural sector, which provides financial and social benefits for women and a subsequent fostering of the idea of women’s economic independence. According to Machipisa (2008:1), the more women experience a difference in their living standards and gain some power in attaining economic independence, the more they will be receptive to equality between women and men. Another possible reason for a higher positive percentage of attitudes towards economic independence can found in the country’s exceptionally higher percentage of women in the labour force. According to the World Bank (2001:267), 45% of the Zimbabwean labour force is women.

The South African sample and Ugandan sample have fairly similar distributions of attitudes towards women’s economic independence (see Figure 6). An in-depth analysis of the distribution of attitudes presented in Figure 6 presents some remarkable findings, especially with regards to the centralisation of “negative” attitudes amongst all the samples studied. In all three countries the “negative” response category has the highest percentage of support with regard to women’s independence than any other response category: 37% in Zimbabwe; and 36% in both South Africa and Uganda. If one adds the “negative” and “very negative” response categories, 45% of the South African and Ugandan samples have negative attitudes towards women’s economic independence, in comparison to 40% of the Zimbabwean sample.

Uganda’s higher percentage of negative attitudes towards economic independence is surprising, as the country’s labour force consists of 48% females (World Bank, 2001:267). Perhaps the country’s higher negative attitudes can be linked to the Marxist theory, as discussed in Chapter Two, which implies that women’s inferior status with respect to economic independence is rooted within the society’s culture and forms of patriarchal family organisation than in any other structure (Engels, 1884:50).

27 The World Bank measures the labour force as those persons who are economically active, including armed forces and the unemployed, but excludes housewives and students (World Bank, 2001:278).
28 The standard deviation is 0.935 and the mean is 2.69.
29 The standard deviation is 0.951; mean is 2.715.
A further possible explanation for the lack of support for women’s economic independence in many sub-Saharan countries often lies in the fact that in many of these countries gender inequality becomes evident when trying to gain access to key elements such as land, credit, capital and appropriate technologies (CTA, 2000: iv). Furthermore, training opportunities, appropriate information, extension and advisory services available to women are lacking. These relate to, for example, functional literacy, accounting, bookkeeping, business management and agricultural technologies (CTA, 2000: iv).

3.3.2.4 Attitudes towards Gender Equality

According to Geisler (2004:9), women seem to have very positive attitudes towards their entry into politics in the process of advancing gender equality. In combining the three variables – attitudes towards women in leadership positions, equality in education, and women’s economic independence – a Gender Equality Index\(^{30}\) was constructed which provides an overall illustration of attitudes towards gender equality amongst respondents from the three countries under investigation.

\(^{30}\) For a detailed description of the construction of the Gender Equality index, please refer to section 3.3.1 on page 53.
A total of 60% of the South African\textsuperscript{31} respondents have a positive attitude towards gender equality. This is in contrast to their Zimbabwean\textsuperscript{32} and Ugandan\textsuperscript{33} counterparts, where only 48% and 39% respectively share the South Africans’ sentiments towards gender equality. Thus, of the three sub-Saharan countries studied, only one has a sample in which more than half of the respondents indicated positive attitudes towards gender equality.

\textbf{Figure 7: Positive attitudes towards gender equality}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure7.png}
\end{figure}

According to Hanssen (2005:1), Uganda is one of the highest ranked countries in sub-Saharan Africa in terms of implementing gender equality in public structures and, as such, it is worrying to observe that the findings show the country’s population to be less positive towards gender equality than those of South Africa and Zimbabwe. Furthermore, when looking at Zimbabwe’s low percentage of “positive” attitudes, one can infer that the country’s lack of provision for any representation of women in publicly elected bodies might be a possible explanation for the low percentage in attitudes towards gender equality as illustrated in Figure 7 (EISA, 2008).

\textsuperscript{31} The standard deviation is 0.664; mean is 2.497
\textsuperscript{32} The standard deviation is 0.650; mean is 2.388.
\textsuperscript{33} The standard deviation is 0.66; mean is 2.261.
Figure 8 presents fairly high percentages of neutral responses with regards to attitudes towards gender equality for Zimbabwe (43%) and particularly Uganda (49%). One possible explanation for this occurrence could lie in what Karam (1998:23) calls a “masculine model” of political life, which portrays patriarchal dominance in political structures. It can be argued that in all three sub-Saharan countries, men overwhelmingly dominate the political arena, and political life is often organised according to male norms and values (Shvedova, 2003:35). Therefore, male-dominated politics often result in women either rejecting politics or rejecting the male-style of politics in these countries. When women do participate in politics, they tend to do so in small numbers or have neutral, indecisive attitudes towards gender equality, as illustrated in Figure 8.

According to Siemienski (2004:437), the attitudes towards gender equality vary in intensity in different countries. In the three sub-Saharan countries under investigation one notes that in terms of positive attitudes towards gender equality, this observation is in fact true. A possible explanation for the findings would be that inequalities created by social and cultural barriers are more profound amongst women than men and, as such, the gender differences that do exist are interpreted very differently by the two sexes.

**Figure 8: Attitudes toward Gender Equality**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>South Africa</th>
<th>Uganda</th>
<th>Zimbabwe</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>31.2</td>
<td>49.2</td>
<td>42.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>59.3</td>
<td>38.5</td>
<td>48.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Another possible explanation for the significant differences in “positive” attitudes amongst the South African, Ugandan and Zimbabwean samples could lie in religion. Reynolds (1999:12) argues that religion is the most important element to predict levels of female representation. In the case of Uganda the argument by Reynolds might be correct, as the society’s cultural heritage and values may have possible implications for people’s attitudes towards gender equality, also discussed in Chapter Two. The Ugandan sample (Figure 8) had the lowest percentage of “positive” attitudes towards gender equality and had the highest in the “neutral” response category (49%) and “negative” category (12%) than the other two countries in terms of attitudes towards gender equality, which could be explained in terms of public endorsement of norms towards gender equality through their society’s respective religious traditions.

According to Norris and Inglehart (2001:131), the theories of socialization have long emphasised the importance of gender roles; especially the “predominance of either egalitarian or traditional attitudes towards women in the private and public spheres” as seen in Uganda and Zimbabwe. In cultures with traditional attitudes towards the role of women in the home and family, positive attitudes towards gender equality would not have a great deal of support, and as a result women may find it difficult – and often fail – to attract enough support to be elected to political institutions (Norris and Inglehart, 2001:131).

3.3.3 Differences in Gender Equality and some “Explanatory” Variables
In this section a number of “explaining” or “independent” variables are introduced in order to assist in explaining the possible differences in attitudes towards gender equality in the three sub-Saharan countries, South Africa, Uganda and Zimbabwe. The following four “explaining variables” are under discussion: gender, education, rural-urban dwelling and age.

3.3.3.1 Attitudes towards Gender Equality by Gender
When analysing the attitudes towards gender equality, it is important to examine the influence of gender itself and determine the differences in attitudes between men and women. Unsurprisingly, Figure 9 illustrates that a higher percentage of female
respondents in all three countries have more positive attitudes towards gender equality than their male counterparts.

What is surprising, however, is that only in South Africa do more than half of the male and more than two thirds of the female respondents have positive attitudes towards gender equality. Although a higher percentage of female respondents in Uganda and Zimbabwe have a more positive attitude towards gender equality than the male respondents, these percentages all lie below 50%. In general, Ugandan respondents, especially male respondents, appear to have the least positive attitudes towards gender equality when compared with South African and Zimbabwean respondents.

**Figure 9: Positive attitudes towards gender equality by gender**

One possible explanation for the findings in South Africa is that equal political leadership between women and men has always been a contested subject. Although meaningful developments have been made on the ground in eliminating these inequalities, women remain unequally represented in parliament. Therefore, one can possibly infer that the findings in Figure 10 are a probable indication of the mainstreaming of women into all spheres of political and social life, and also the result of gender equality policies in South Africa that have had a positive effect on attitudes towards gender equality for both women and men. Perhaps a further possible explanation for more positive attitudes towards gender equality can be linked to South
Africa’s fairly higher representation of women in parliament. Mansbridge (1999:647), as discussed in Chapter Two, suggests that when the representatives in parliament resemble the represented, also known as descriptive representation, it can reduce distrust and increase democratic legitimacy.

The findings for Zimbabwe in *Figure 10* indicate remarkably similar attitudes between male and female respondents in terms of gender equality. Thus, gender as an independent or explaining variable in the case of Zimbabwe renders it ineffective, as no significant statistical differences are accounted for between the two sexes with regards to attitudes towards gender equality.

*Figure 10: Attitudes towards gender equality by gender*

The percentages of male and female respondents in Uganda who have a positive attitude towards gender equality are very low. Both sets of respondents indicated that they were more “neutral” in their attitude towards gender equality. It can be argued that a higher percentage of “neutral” attitudes towards gender equality in Uganda, especially among men, can possibly be explained in terms of men’s and women’s perceptions about women lacking the necessary skills and preparation for leadership positions and, therefore, women are not integrated into leadership structures but rather professionally isolated (Siemienski, 2004:437). Moreover, women’s movements in
partially developed democracies often do not find it necessary to invest in channels of communication and lobbying on issues related to promoting women’s decision-making powers (Karam, 1998:26). Perhaps in the Ugandan case it can also be argued that political representation was not always democratic, as it cannot always be assumed that the increasing number of women in public office is evidence of democratisation (Dovi, 2006:10).

Thus, the use of gender as an explaining/independent variable as a means to explain the differences in attitudes towards gender equality is useful in the case of South Africa and Uganda, but is not statistically significant in Zimbabwe.

3.3.3.2 Attitudes towards Gender Equality by Level of Education

Levels of education are an important explaining variable for differences in attitudes towards gender equality in sub-Saharan African countries, because an individual’s level of formal education is a pivotal element in the attainment of leadership positions and economic independence. Jacobs (1996:153) notes that gender inequality is more accounted for in some areas in education than in others. However, education can also be a relatively advantaged sphere for women in their social life. In general, women progresses at a relatively good pace in areas of access, but less in terms of higher education; women are particularly disadvantaged in respect to the outcomes of schooling (Jacobs, 1996:154).

Figure 11 reveals some interesting findings with regards to attitudes towards gender equality by the attainment of various levels of formal education in each of the countries studied. In the case of South Africa the data reflect the expectation that the higher the level of formal education attained, the more “positive” the attitude towards gender equality would be. Thus, in South Africa respondents who have a post-matric qualification have a higher percentage of “positive” attitudes towards gender equality (70%) than those with some/completed high school education (59%), those with some/completed primary school education (50%) and those with no formal schooling (38%). A possible explanation for the South African findings may be found in a previous argument discussed in Chapter Two, where Blumberg (1984:86) states that education is indeed necessary to attain power of the highest level, as findings reveals
that more positive attitudes towards gender equality were expressed by those respondents who have a post-matric qualification.

The outlook for Uganda and Zimbabwe, on the other hand, is significantly different. In the case of Uganda the highest percentage of respondents with positive attitudes towards gender equality were those with no formal schooling (55%), in comparison to 34% of those with some/completed primary school education, 38% of those with some/completed high school education, and 40% of those with some post-Matric qualification (see Figure 11). This finding bucks the trend that the attainment of higher levels of education correlates with more positive attitudes towards gender equality; in fact, the Ugandan data present a direct contradiction to this expectation. A possible explanation for this trend might be found in the country’s illiteracy rates, as the World Bank (2001:320) reports that 46% of females compared to 24% of males in Uganda are illiterate.34

There seems to be a relatively equal distribution of positive attitudes towards gender equality amongst the various levels of education attained amongst Zimbabwean respondents. Those with some/completed high school education have the highest

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34 The World Bank measures illiteracy rates by the total population aged 15 years and over who do not have the ability to read or write (World Bank, 2001:339).
percentage of positive attitudes towards gender equality (52%), followed by those with no formal schooling (50%), those with a post-Matric qualification (44%) and those with some/completed primary school education (43%).

One could argue that, in the case of Uganda and Zimbabwe, highly educated women may still face the dilemma of having to choose between marriage and motherhood, on the one hand, and occupational success, on the other. In the traditional norms of sub-Saharan countries, if a woman wants to have both, she is criticised for stealing jobs from men and venturing beyond her ‘domestic’ sphere (Oppenheimer, 1970:1).

Another possible explanation for the Zimbabwean and Ugandan findings could be the argument made by Paxton (1997:444), as earlier discussed in Chapter Two, which argues that gender equality often fails because of women’s lack of access to education and professional opportunities, placing women in disadvantaged positions in social structures.

*Figure 12* illustrates the dispersion of responses amongst the various levels of educational attainment for South Africa, Uganda and Zimbabwe. The South African sample further establishes the notion that, whilst higher levels of education translate into positive attitudes towards gender equality, the converse is also true. In other words, negative attitudes towards gender equality are more than likely attributable to little or no formal schooling. This is especially true in the case of Uganda, where lower percentages in illiteracy rates among both men and women are evident. The World Bank (2001:326) estimated the secondary school gross enrolment\(^{35}\) ratio at only 9% of the female population in Uganda compared to 15% of the male counterparts.

In the case of Uganda 48% of those with some/completed primary school education, 49% with some/completed high school education, and 52% of those with a post-Matric qualification remained “neutral” in terms of their attitude towards gender equality. The outlook in Zimbabwe is far more erratic and the findings do not seem to

\(^{35}\) The secondary school gross enrolment ratio is measured by the total number of pupils enrolled at the secondary level of education, regardless of age, expressed as a percentage of the population corresponding to the school age of secondary level education (World Bank, 2001:339).
follow any predictable pattern. Almost a third (31%) of Zimbabwean respondents with no formal schooling has negative attitudes towards gender equality; however, close to half (49%) of those with no formal schooling have positive attitudes towards gender equality. More than half the respondents (53%) with post-Matric qualifications are neutral when it comes to gender equality, along with 46% of those with some/completed primary school education and 41% of those with some/completed high school education.

Figure 12: Attitudes towards gender equality by level of education

In recent decades women in many post-industrial societies have progressed in the private and public sectors and increased their enrolment in higher education. One notes that modernisation has created predictable changes in gender roles. In countries where modernisation has been evident, such as South Africa, women are paid for labour and fertility rates have reduced. In these instances women make substantial gains on the basis of educational opportunities and literacy.

3.3.3.3 Attitudes towards Gender Equality by Residential Area
The residential areas within which respondents reside – rural, town or cities (urban area)– are important in terms of the possible effect they may have on attitudes towards gender equality, because of the link that the residential area may provide to access to
areas of economic opportunity (which facilitates economic independence) and to formal education. These residential areas also account for class differences between different groups within a population of a country. The expectation is that people residing in more densely populated areas (urban areas/cities) would have more positive attitudes towards gender equality than people living in rural areas.

In all three countries under investigation more than half of those respondents living in urban areas have positive attitudes towards gender equality (see Figure 13). A total of 63% of South African urban dwellers have positive attitudes towards gender equality, followed by 49% of their rural and town counterparts. Just more than half (54%) of Zimbabwean urban dwellers have positive attitudes towards gender equality, compared to 46% of their rural and 42% of their town counterparts. Similarly, 53% of urban Ugandans have positive attitudes towards gender equality, in comparison to only 38% of their rural and 35% of their town counterparts.

**Figure 13: Positive attitudes towards gender equality by residential area**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Residential Area</th>
<th>South Africa</th>
<th>Uganda</th>
<th>Zimbabwe</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>49.4</td>
<td>37.9</td>
<td>45.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Town</td>
<td>49.1</td>
<td>34.5</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>62.5</td>
<td>51.7</td>
<td>54.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figure 14 illustrates the attitudes towards gender equality by the different areas in which respondents reside. Amongst the South African sample 17% of town dwellers have a negative attitude towards gender equality, compared to 11% of rural dwellers and 9% of urban dwellers. A possible explanation for the majority of South African respondents in all three living areas having positive attitudes towards gender equality*
may lie in the rapid pace at which people are migrating to urban areas and experiencing exposure to a more cosmopolitan lifestyle with far less differentiation between male/female roles.

The majority of Ugandans residing in towns (53%) express neutral attitudes towards gender equality, followed by half (50%) of those living in rural areas. Furthermore, 12% of town dwellers have negative attitudes towards gender equality, whilst 13% of rural dwellers share the same negative sentiment. The high percentage of “neutral” attitudes towards gender equality in Uganda could result from respondents’ insecurities over low literacy and poverty.

The percentage of Zimbabwean respondents who have a “negative” attitude towards gender equality is fairly small across the three dwelling areas: 11% amongst rural dwellers, 7% amongst town dwellers, and 8% amongst urban dwellers. The majority of town dwellers (52%) are “neutral” in their attitude towards gender equality in comparison to 44% of rural dwellers and 38% of urban dwellers.

Figure 14: Attitudes towards gender equality by residential area

The use of residential areas as an explaining or independent variable in my analysis of attitudes towards gender equality has been useful in determining some of the differences that occur amongst the three sets of respondents. Most importantly, the
use of this variable has confirmed my expectation that respondents throughout sub-Saharan Africa who live in urban areas have more positive attitudes towards gender equality than those residing in less populated areas, such as rural areas and/or towns.

### 3.3.3.4 Attitudes towards Gender Equality by Age

Age is considered to be an important factor in generational differences within societies and, as such, is bound to impact upon or have an influence on the attitudes towards gender equality amongst the younger and older generation.

The age variable amongst the three samples reveals some interesting findings with regards to attitudes towards gender equality (see Figure 15). Firstly, the younger generations (16-24 and 25-29) of the South African sample have the highest percentage of positive support for gender equality, at 65% and 66% respectively. Second, the distribution of positive attitudes towards gender equality in Uganda by age is fairly even with the youngest generation (18-24) showing the highest percentage of positive support at 41%. Third, there appears to be a fairly even distribution of positive attitudes to gender equality amongst the various age categories on the Zimbabwean sample as well; however, the middle-aged generation (30-49) have the highest percentage of positive support at 51%.

![Figure 15: Positive attitudes towards gender equality by age](image-url)
A closer look at the South African sample ([Figure 16](#)) reveals that more than half of the respondents within each of the age categories have positive attitudes towards gender equality. As mentioned above, this support is stronger amongst the younger (16-24 and 25-29) generations. There are a number of possible explanations: first, traditional norms and cultural beliefs may facilitate a more “neutral” or even “negative” position towards gender equality amongst the older generations. Second, rural dwellers are from an older generation, with lower levels of literacy and education and stronger adherence to traditional gender roles. At the same time the younger generation is migrating to urban areas, where these traditional gender roles are blurred and/or insignificant. Third, the younger generations now have equal access to a better education and are more exposed to the gender equality debate in schools, universities and the labour force. Fourth, as the younger generations enter the electorate and the older ones leave the demographic turnover, a gradual shift in the balance of a society’s values is expected. Page and Sapiro (1993:304) also argue that substantial generational differences are more likely to be found in traditional values, the workplace and family.

**Figure 16: Attitudes towards gender equality by age**

![Bar chart depicting attitudes towards gender equality by age for South Africa, Uganda, and Zimbabwe.](#)

In Uganda more than 10% of each age category indicated “negative” attitudes towards gender equality, whilst the youngest generation (18-24) revealed the highest
percentage of support for gender equality at only 41% (see Figure 16). Ugandan respondents can be said to have predominantly “neutral” views towards gender equality: 18–24 years = 47%; 25–29 years = 54%; 30–49 years = 50%; and 50 years or older = 49%. Individuals are often influenced by the life-cycle effects of a specific society as they get older and, according to Heath and Park (1997), people become progressively more conservative as they age. The pattern seen in the findings in the case of Uganda (Figure 16) can show possible effects of experiences in the workplace, family and community as individuals enter middle age, and take on more commitments such as mortgage and childcare.

The pattern amongst the Zimbabwean respondents appears to buck the trend. Figure 16 illustrates how the older generations (30–49 and 50+) have more positive attitudes towards gender equality (51% and 48% respectively) than the younger generations (18–24 and 25–29), both at 46%. In fact, very few Zimbabwean respondents, across all four age categories, have “negative” attitudes towards gender equality, with the exception of the oldest generation at 15%. Thus, the three youngest generations amongst the Zimbabwean respondents are either “positive” or “neutral” towards gender equality, whilst the oldest generation, despite being progressive in its stance towards gender equality, still embraces a fairly substantial “negative” sentiment.

Thus, the four explaining/independent variables of gender, education, residential status and age, have proved to be partially effective in explaining some of the differences between the samples with regard to attitudes towards gender equality. The effectiveness of these four variables has, however, proved to have differing explanatory strengths for each of the countries under investigation.

3.3.4 Gender Equality and the Representation of Women in Parliament
In this section I will evaluate the trends of the representation of women in parliament for the three sub-Saharan countries, South Africa, Uganda and Zimbabwe in 2001. This section will also attempt to link the number of women in parliament in 2001 to the attitudes towards gender equality (the findings which were discussed in the previous section).

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3.3.4.1 Trends in Representation of Women in Parliament

The national representation of women in parliament in 2001 for the three countries under investigation should sound some alarm bells.

*Figure 17* illustrates that less than a third (30%) of the members of parliament in South Africa were women in 2001; less than a quarter (24%) of the members of parliament in Uganda were women; and less than 10% of the members of parliament in Zimbabwe were women. These numbers are surprisingly low, considering that in each of these countries the gender split of the respective populations was roughly equal at the time the surveys were conducted and that parliament is supposed to be a reflection of the views of the populace, according to the descriptive representation, as discussed in Chapter Two.

*Figure 17: National representation of women in parliament in 2001*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>South Africa</th>
<th>Uganda</th>
<th>Zimbabwe</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>29.5</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: IPU, 2008; Eisa, 2002; Hanssen, 2005:3-6

Putnam (1976:32) maintains that statistically women are the most underrepresented group in political elites worldwide and that the number of highly educated males increases as the level of authority increases. Although the representation of women throughout the elite has improved since then, males still dominate elite positions. Similarly, the studies of elite recruitment in advanced capitalist democracies by Drew and Murtagh (2000:6) have found that economic and, to a lesser extent, political elites are recruited primarily from men with privileged social origins and higher education.
In spite of the fact that about half the respondents of the three samples under investigation are women, parliamentary positions remain, almost exclusively, the preserve of males.

The aim of this study was to investigate whether positive attitudes towards gender equality translated into a higher representation of women in parliament. Casting our minds back to Figure 7, we saw that 59% of the South African respondents, 48% of Zimbabweans respondents and 39% of Ugandan respondents had positive attitudes towards gender equality. When one compares these data to the national representation of women in parliament in 2001 (Figure 17), it becomes evident that in countries where there is a higher percentage of people who support gender equality (South Africa), there is also a larger proportion of women represented in the national parliament.

In the next section the study will explore whether the assumption mentioned in the above paragraph can be justified and whether a possible link can be found between the attitudes toward gender equality and the number of women as representatives in parliament.

3.3.4.2 Link between Trends in the Representation of Women in Parliament and Attitudes towards Gender Equality

As stated previously, the aim of the study is to determine whether a link can be found between attitudes towards gender equality and the representation of women in parliament in the three sub-Saharan countries, South Africa, Uganda and Zimbabwe. In order to do so, a Gender Equality Index was constructed based on a number of items from the WVS and the findings compared to the percentage of women who hold parliamentary positions in their respective countries.

The study’s main proposition and secondary propositions developed in the discussion here are set out as follows:

- The attitudes towards gender equality play a major role in the likelihood of stronger representation of women in parliament in each country, especially in the case of South Africa;
The attitudes towards gender equality in each of the three sub-Saharan countries under investigation will differ; The independent variables, namely gender, level of education, residential status and age, could possibly contribute to the explanation for the differences in attitudes towards gender equality amongst the three countries.

The overall findings from the data show that in the case of South Africa the attitudes towards women’s leadership were more positive in comparison to Uganda and Zimbabwe. More respondents in South Africa believe that political leadership is a task that can be fulfilled without gender bias. It should come as no surprise, then, that more women are represented in parliament in South Africa than in Uganda or Zimbabwe. Thus, positive attitudes towards women in leadership positions translate into a higher proportion of women in parliament.

All three samples share a relatively high percentage of respondents who believe that education is equally as important for a woman as it is for a man. What is striking, however, is the fact that although there does not appear to be a gender bias in the three samples attitudes towards equality in education, fewer respondents view the economic independence of women with the same vigour.

Gender, as an explanatory variable for differences in attitudes towards gender equality, has a greater explanatory effect in South Africa and Uganda than it does in Zimbabwe, where male and female respondents share almost identical views. In all three countries, however, female respondents had a higher percentage of positive attitudes towards gender equality than their male counterparts.

The correlation between high levels of education and more positive attitudes towards gender equality is best illustrated by the South African sample. In South Africa women have begun to attain higher social status and more significant economic roles, which have resulted in greater political influence within elected and appointed bodies. According to Inglehart and Norris (2001:129), a country’s level of socio-economic developments is significantly related to its proportion of women in parliament. The same cannot be said for Uganda, where 30% of the sample have some form of post-
Matric qualification (the highest for all three samples), yet only 40% of those (the lowest of all three samples) have a positive attitude towards gender equality.

The residential status (rural, town, urban) and education variables share similar strengths in determining attitudes towards gender equality. One notes that in post-industrialised countries, where education is more advanced and easily accessible, more people live in urban areas and as such have more positive attitudes towards gender equality. In all three samples those respondents living in urban areas had a more positive attitude towards gender equality than those living in rural areas or towns. In the case of South Africa, which has a higher percentage of women in the national parliament than Uganda and Zimbabwe, the percentage of rural and town dwellers who have positive attitudes towards gender equality is also higher than their Ugandan and Zimbabwean counterparts.

The age variable showed that younger generations have more positive attitudes towards gender equality in South Africa and Uganda, whilst respondents from older age groupings showed remarkably positive attitudes towards gender equality in Zimbabwe. Therefore, one can infer that the younger age cohorts play an important role in the promotion of gender equality and the transformation of parliament to be more representative of the populace. In a country such as Zimbabwe, where the older generations have more support for gender equality than the younger generations, female representation in national parliament is low.

Despite many transformations in the lifestyles of men and women, electoral success has continued to elude women, especially in the cases of Uganda and Zimbabwe. While improvements in women’s educational and professional status serve as facilitating conditions for women’s empowerment, structural changes may be insufficient for women to achieve greater success in winning elected office. Therefore, the type of political system, especially the proportional representation and gender quotas, such as those in place in South Africa, suggests that political rules of the game are also some of the primary explanations for systematic differences in women’s representation among relatively similar societies such as the three countries under investigation. One can argue that if those rules are changed, it would be
possible to promote women’s representation in the parliaments of Uganda and Zimbabwe.

3.4 Conclusion

This chapter provided a detailed presentation of WVS data relating to the attitudes towards gender equality in three dimensions: leadership, education and economic independence. This chapter also explored attitudes toward gender equality in terms of four explaining variables: gender, education, and residential status and age.

The main findings of this chapter are that variables such as gender, education, age and economic independence do play a role in explaining the promotion of gender equality and the representation of women in parliament. The findings show that the attitudes toward gender equality can be linked to the percentage of women in parliament. The findings also show South Africa to have more “positive” attitudes towards gender equality in comparison to Uganda and Zimbabwe, as well as a higher percentage of female representatives in parliament.

The concluding chapter, Chapter Four, will present a discussion on the possible implications for the representation of women in parliament and attitudes towards gender equality in the three sub-Saharan countries, South Africa, Uganda and Zimbabwe, and will also make recommendations for future research.
Chapter Four: Summary, Implications, Recommendations and Conclusion

“Only when all passive toil at machines has been successfully done away with, will human creativity be free to answer in detail all the questions of the second modernity”.
Beck, 2000:179

4.1 Introduction

This study’s primary focus is an attempt to link the attitudes towards gender equality and the number of women represented in the national parliaments in three sub-Saharan countries, South Africa, Uganda and Zimbabwe. The point of departure was evaluating gender equality in terms of democracy, where, according to Inglehart and Norris (2001: 624), a fundamental problem in the failure of democracy worldwide can be linked to the lack of gender equality in political leadership.

Linking gender equality to democracy in three sub-Saharan countries allows us to explore the different types of political and democratic systems practised by each in order to determine its role in fostering positive attitudes towards gender equality amongst its citizens. I adopted the notion of descriptive representation to argue that, in democratic practice, groups in a society, such as women, who constitute half of the population, must be represented in the same proportional number to that of men. Therefore, if half of the population is not fully represented, the society is not to be regarded as fully democratic (Inglehart, Norris, and Welzel, 2004:2; Rosenthal, 1995:601; Hassim, 2003:84).

Advanced industrial societies have often seen a change in their citizens’ gender attitudes; especially relating to the instances where citizens have become receptive to gender relations and even more accepting of gender equality. Therefore, the belief that “men make better political leaders than women” is fast becoming outdated in advanced industrial countries in comparison to less developed countries, where the idea of gender equality is not so much of a reality (Inglehart, Norris, and Wetzel, 2004:6).

Lowe Morna (2004:15) argues that the percentage of women in parliament does have an impact upon democratic institutions; however, it is the cultural changes such as the attitudes and values of citizens that seem to play a greater role in the rising trend of
female representation in parliament, regardless of democratisation (Inglehart and Norris, 2001).

From a theoretical point of view, a number of obstacles to equal representation of women in parliament were identified in this study, namely political, socio-economic, ideological and psychological barriers. It was also determined that electoral systems, gender quotas and political parties had a role to play in possibly restricting the number of women represented on a national level. Thus, it was expected that the percentage of women represented in the national parliaments in South Africa, Uganda and Zimbabwe would not only differ as a result of different value patterns with regards to gender equality, but also as a direct result of the different electoral systems implemented in these countries.

Using data from the 2001 wave of the World Values Survey, this study set out to examine whether a connection could be found between the attitudes towards gender equality and the representation of women in parliament. Gender equality was measured in terms of three dimensions:

- Leadership
- Education
- Economic independence.

Furthermore, the representation of women was measured by tracking the actual number of women in parliament and calculating the number of seats they held as a proportional percentage to that of men in the three respective countries in 2001.

4.2 Summary of Results
The following provides a summary of the most significant findings of the study:

1. Attitudes towards women in leadership positions
The South African sample was the only sample of the three countries studied in which more than half of the respondents (58%) had a positive attitude towards women in leadership positions. Close to half (48%) of Zimbabweans followed suit; whilst only 32% of the Ugandan sample agreed.
2. Attitudes towards equality in education

Equality in education and the belief that women have as much right to an education as men do was very positively supported by all three samples. In fact, 82% of the Zimbabwean sample; 81% of the South African sample; and 77% of the Ugandan sample positively support the notion of equality in education.

3. Attitudes towards women’s economic independence

The respondents from all three samples had positive attitudes towards the economic independence of women, albeit not to the same extent as equality in education. The Zimbabwean sample was most supportive of women having economic independence (60%), whilst 55% of both the South African and Ugandan respondents shared this positive sentiment.

4. Attitudes towards gender equality and the “explaining variables”

   - “Gender” variable

The overall findings for the three sub-Saharan countries, as measured on the Gender Equality index discussed in Chapter Three, indicated that more female respondents had positive attitudes towards gender equality than their male counterparts. However, the difference between the three countries should be mentioned. In South Africa, although more women had a higher percentage of positive attitudes towards gender equality, more than half the male respondents agreed. This is interesting as neither half the male (47%) nor female (48%) Zimbabwean respondent attitudes indicated positive attitudes towards gender equality. Although the Ugandan data revealed that women have more positive attitudes towards gender equality than men, the percentage is very low: 42% for females and 34% for males.

   - “Level of education” variable

In South Africa the higher the level of education attained, the more positive the attitude towards gender equality. In Zimbabwe positive attitudes towards gender equality are fairly evenly split amongst the various levels of education, with those respondents that have some/completed high school education having the most positive attitudes towards gender equality (52%). In Uganda respondents with no formal
education have more positive attitudes towards gender equality than respondents with some schooling and/or tertiary education.

- **“Residential status” variable**
  The overall findings showed that in all three sub-Saharan countries respondents living in urban areas have more positive attitudes towards gender equality than those respondents living in rural areas or towns. One should point out that nearly half (49%) of both rural and town dwellers within the South African sample also had positive attitudes towards gender equality.

- **“Age” variable**
  The differences in the attitudes towards gender equality by the “age” variable showed different patterns across the three sub-Saharan countries. In South Africa respondents from the younger age cohorts expressed more positive attitudes towards gender equality than respondents from the older age cohorts. In Uganda there was a relatively even spread of positive attitudes towards gender equality amongst the age cohorts; however, the youngest cohort had the most positive attitudes. Zimbabwean respondents, on the other hand, indicated that those belonging to the older age cohorts were more “positive” towards gender equality than the younger age cohorts.

5. **The overall attitudes towards Gender Equality**
   Overall, 59% of South African respondents have a positive attitude towards gender equality, compared to 48% of the Zimbabwean respondents and only 39% of the Ugandan respondents. It is perhaps worrying that, of the three countries studied, only one had more than half its respondents positively geared towards gender equality.

6. **Trends in the representation of women in parliament for 2001**
   The trend in 2001 in terms of the number of women in parliament looked as follows: South Africa has the highest percentage of female representatives in parliament at 30%; followed by Uganda, with 24%; and Zimbabwe, where only 9% of parliamentary seats were reserved for women.
Thus, when linking these findings with regards to the attitudes towards gender equality in each of the three sub-Saharan countries to the number of women representatives in parliament, the outcomes are very significant. In the case of South Africa, I can conclude that the more positive the attitudes towards gender equality of a nation are, the more likely it is that there will be a higher percentage of women representatives in parliament. The inverse, however, that the more negative the attitudes towards gender equality, the less likely that a substantial percentage of women will hold seats in parliament, is not true. This is seen in the cases of Uganda and Zimbabwe. As mentioned before however, in the Ugandan case, the relatively high number of women is based on a “manipulated” system and not the result of direct competitive elections.

4.3 Implications of the Findings
The study highlights three main implications with regards to attitudes towards gender equality and the representation of women in parliament. These implications will be discussed in terms of the three dimensions of gender equality used in the study to measure gender equality: leadership, education and economic independence.

- The lack of equal political leadership can have numerous implications for a country. One major implication relates to the representation of women in parliament. As mentioned in Chapter One, the representation of women is a fundamental human right. Therefore, it is only good democratic practice if women are represented in the same proportional number to men. Unequal representation of gender in decision making, especially in parliament, can weaken democracy. The lack of representation could result in ignorance about gender equality issues and evasion of women’s interests, impacting upon confidence in the ability of women as political leaders.

- Lack of equal education has two implications for gender equality and the representation of women in parliament. Firstly, it can limit the progress of economic development for women. Secondly, women could be restricted in gaining powerful political positions, if they lack higher education.
The lack of economic independence can have the following implications for gender equality and the representation of women in parliament: a lack of social security, lack of wage-related social insurance benefits and welfare benefits for women. Therefore, women would have unequal opportunities and in some cases this can even limit women’s access to the labour market.

4.4 Suggestions for Future Research
The study took the form of a comparative descriptive and quantitative analysis, where the attitudes towards gender equality in South Africa, Uganda and Zimbabwe in 2001 were presented and analysed. It is known that a descriptive study does not provide the necessary capacity to give an explanatory framework for the findings revealed. In Chapter Three the discussion was based on the findings presented and provided tentative explanations for these findings, based on the operationalisation of items from the World Values Survey discussed in Chapter Two. However, these explanations are not to be seen as grounded in quantitative research, but should rather be seen as tentative explanations for the data described and observed in the study. Therefore, the suggestions for future research would be to validate the explanations provided in Chapter Three, based on empirical causal analysis of the factors provided.

Because the items from the World Values Survey were used, the analysis proves to be problematic in that one has no control over the operationalisation of key concepts within the survey. The task of future research would be to provide more appropriate key concepts, if any, to operationalise and to explain the phenomena of this study.

The study also examined the attitudes towards gender equality at a given point in time, namely 2001. Future research could focus on using a longitudinal analysis to establish whether growth in positive attitudes towards gender equality also leads to growth in the representation of women in parliament.

An analysis of the extent of gender equality between various sub-groupings of the three sub-Saharan countries defined by ethnic, racial and cultural groups would be possible through future research. The current study also fails to address household income as an explaining variable for gender equality because of the different currency
indictors for the three countries; therefore future research could take household income as an independent variable into consideration. Such analysis would involve categorical data being recoded in order to allow for comparison of the means.

4.5 Concluding Remarks
The current study hopes to provide the reader with an accurate description and analysis of the attitudes towards gender equality and the representation of women in parliament in the three sub-Saharan countries, South Africa, Uganda and Zimbabwe, in 2001. The South African population is indeed moving towards a greater number of women in parliament, as this country is shown to have more positive attitudes towards gender equality compared to the other two countries. South Africa also seems to have more gender policies in place in order to uphold gender equality in the country than Uganda and Zimbabwe do.

It seems that the slow progress in the percentage of women in parliament in Uganda and Zimbabwe can partially be attributed to gender attitudes and values. As mentioned earlier, the South African picture does look far brighter in terms of gender equality in parliament than its sub-Saharan counterparts. Uganda and Zimbabwe now faces the challenge of reframing gender equality in their societies and improving gender equality policies to create a level playing field for men and women to battle it out for prominent political positions.
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